title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit omnia mandata implere.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum absque gratia gratum faciente liberum arbitrium possit omnia mandata implere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Deuteronomii trigesimo[^1]: *Mandatum, quod ego praecipio tibi hodie, non est supra te neque procul positum,* etc. Et post: *Sed iuxta te est sermo valde in ore tuo et in corde tuo, ut facias illud;* hoc autem non esset, si observantia mandatorum esset supra posse liberi arbitrii: ergo videtur, quod absque gratia gratum faciente, quae est supra liberi arbitrii posse, contingat mandata Dei servari et impleri.

2. Item, hoc videtur auctoritate novi Testamenti, Matthaei undecimo[^2]: *Iugum meum suave est, et onus meum leve;* hoc autem non esset, si mandata Dei essent supra posse liberi arbitrii: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Multo benignior est Deus servis suis, quam sit homo; sed homo potest mandata hominis servare absque gratia gratum faciente, quae sunt gravia et multa: ergo videtur, quod multo fortius servare possit mandata divina.

4. Item, in mandatis Dei aut praecipiuntur ipsa genera operum, aut praecipiuntur opera formata. Si praecipiuntur opera formata: ergo qui honorat patrem pietate naturali, non faciens illud ex caritate, videtur illud mandatum omittere, quo praecipitur: *Honora patrem et matrem*[^3], et peccare mortaliter; quod absurdum est dicere. Si ergo ipsa genera operum sunt in praecepto; et hoc constans est, quod possumus facere absque gratia gratum faciente: videtur, quod divina mandata absque dono gratiae gratum facientis contingat implere.

5. Item, nihil difficilius est quam animam suam ponere pro alio, *maiorem enim caritatem nemo habet* etc., sicut dicitur Ioannis decimo quinto[^4]; sed absque gratia gratum faciente potest quis mortem pro alio subire: ergo multo fortius omnia genera aliorum mandatorum.

**Ad oppositum arguitur sic.**
1. Ieremiae decimo[^5]: *Scio Domine, quia non est hominis via eius, neque viri, ut ambulet et dirigat gressus suos;* sed quicumque implet divina mandata dirigit gressus suos: ergo non est in potestate hominis divina mandata implere.

2. Item, Actuum decimo quinto[^6]: *Hoc est iugum, quod neque nos neque patres nostri portare potuerunt; sed per gratiam Domini nostri Iesu Christi credimus salvari;* et loquitur ibi de mandatis Legis: ergo divina mandata observare non contingit absque divina gratia.

3. Item, observatio mandatorum Dei facit hominem Dei amicum, unde Ioannis decimo quinto[^7]: *Vos amici mei estis* etc.; sed nullus potest effici Dei amicus absque dono caritatis et gratiae gratum facientis: ergo impossibile est, absque huiusmodi dono mandata Dei servari.

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4. Item, observatio mandatorum Dei facit hominem dignum vita aeterna, unde Matthaei decimo nono[^8]: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata;* sed nullus potest mereri vitam aeternam absque dono gratiae Dei, ut dicitur ad Romanos sexto: *Gratia Dei vita aeterna:* ergo absque illa nemo potest divina observare mandata.

5. Item, sicut fundamentum Legis veteris est timor, ita fundamentum Evangelii est amor, sicut insinuat Apostolus ad Romanos octavo[^9], et expresse dicit Augustinus: ergo sicut mandata Legis veteris observari non poterant absque Dei timore, sic mandata evangelica impleri non possunt absque caritatis amore. Sed donum amoris non est absque dono gratiae gratum facientis: ergo absque huiusmodi dono non contingit divina mandata impleri.

### Conclusio

> Homo per liberum arbitrium sine gratia gratum faciente, sed cum gratiis gratis datis, praecepta Dei potest implere quoad substantiam operis, non tamen quoad intentionem mandantis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mandata Dei dupliciter contingit impleri: uno modo quantum ad genus operis, alio modo quantum ad intentionem mandantis. Si loquamur de impletione mandatorum quantum ad genus operis, sic per gratias gratis datas contingit ea impleri, sicut per fidem mandatum de adoratione, et per quandam naturalem pietatem et devotionem mandatum de parentum honoratione, et sic de aliis. — Alio modo est loqui de impletione mandatorum quantum ad intentionem mandantis; et sic — quia Deus praecipit mandata ad hoc, quod voluntas nostra conformetur voluntati suae, et hoc non potest esse absque caritate, et caritas esse non potest absque dono gratiae gratum facientis — mandata Dei secundum intentionem mandantis absque huiusmodi dono non possunt observari. Et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos decimo tertio[^10]: *Qui diligit proximum legem implevit;* et iterum: *Plenitudo legis est dilectio;* et primae ad Timotheum primo: *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro* etc. Hoc ipsum etiam insinuatur Deuteronomii sexto, ubi post enumerationem mandatorum decalogi subditur mandatum caritatis, quo dicitur: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo* etc. — Patet igitur ex praedictis, quanta sit necessitas gratiae gratum facientis, quia non solum est necessaria ad remissionem peccatorum, verum etiam ad victoriam tentationum, et ad observantiam mandatorum divinorum. Multipliciter igitur erravit Pelagius, qui dixit, liberi arbitrii donum[^11] posse habere, ut non indigeret gratia gratum faciente. Hac igitur positione tanquam haeretica repudiata, imploranda est gratia Dei, per quam deleantur peccata et vincantur diabolica tentamenta et impleantur divina mandata non solum secundum *genus operis,* sed etiam secundum *intentionem mandantis,* non solum ad *vitationem poenae,* verum etiam ad *meritum gloriae.* Nam etsi primus modus observandi potest esse per gratiam gratis datam, secundus[^12] modus non potest esse absque gratia gratum faciente, sicut prius ostensum est. — Et secundum hanc viam procedunt rationes, quae ostendunt, absque gratia gratum faciente mandata divina impleri non posse; unde et concedendae sunt.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Deuteronomio, quod mandatum non est supra hominem, sed prope; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de observantia quantum ad genus operis. Si autem intelligatur de observantia quantum ad intentionem mandantis, tunc dicitur esse prope, non quia liberum arbitrium possit in illud per se sine dono gratiae, sed quia gratia Dei praesto est unicuique; nec aliquis caret gratia, quia gratia desit sibi, sed quia ipse deest gratiae[^13].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mandata Dei levia sunt et suavia; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur in[^14] respectu habentis caritatem; homini enim habenti caritatem est facile diligere inimicum, sed non habenti est valde difficile et quasi impossibile. Et est exemplum in avibus, quae leves sunt ad volandum, quando habent pennarum abundantiam; quando vero pennis privantur, graves sunt et volare non possunt. Ideo Dominus dicit, mandata sua esse levia, quoniam volentibus illa servare et converti ad se dat caritatem et pennas virtutum, per quas possunt volare et se super se ipsos faciliter elevare.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo potest implere mandata hominis etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia homo indiget obsequio hominis et plus considerat actum exteriorem quam intentionem interiorem. Deus autem, qui bonorum nostrorum non indiget[^15], et magis intuetur corda quam facies, opus hominis non acceptat, nisi prius acceptabilis sit ei hominis voluntas, per quam fiunt illa opera.

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*Ad 4, 5.* Ad quartum et ultimum argumentum satis plana est responsio ex praedictis. Probant enim, quod mandata Dei servari possunt absque gratia gratum faciente quantum ad genus operis. Et hoc quidem verum est; nam potest homo mandatum illud: *Honora patrem tuum* etc., absque gratia implere, ut sic vitet poenam. Posset etiam facere et alia mandata, adiutus[^16] aliqua gratia gratis data, et non solum facere aliqua, quae videntur ardua, sed etiam pati terribilia. In his tamen omnibus non implerentur mandata secundum intentionem et acceptationem divinam, secundum quod expresse dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^17], enumerans multiplex genus operis, post quod subiungit: *Si caritatem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest.* Et hoc fuit, quod Pelagius non consideravit, propter quod in errorem cecidit et credidit, aliquem ex simplici mandatorum observantia quantum ad exteriora opera dignum esse vita aeterna; quod est contra fidem piam et sanam, sicut Apostolus explicat in auctoritate praemissa[^18].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether free choice without grace that makes pleasing can fulfill all the commandments.*

Thirdly it is asked whether, without grace that makes pleasing, free choice can fulfill all the commandments. And that it can, it seems.

1. Deuteronomy chapter thirty[^1]: *The commandment that I command you this day is not above you nor far off,* etc. And afterward: *But the word is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may do it;* but this would not be so, if the observance of the commandments were above the power of free choice: therefore it seems that, without grace that makes pleasing — which is above the power of free choice — it happens that the commandments of God are kept and fulfilled.

2. Likewise, this is seen by the authority of the New Testament, Matthew chapter eleven[^2]: *My yoke is sweet, and my burden light;* but this would not be so, if the commandments of God were above the power of free choice: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. God is much more kindly toward his servants than a man is; but a man can keep the commandments of a man without grace that makes pleasing, which are grievous and many: therefore it seems that much more strongly can he keep the divine commandments.

4. Likewise, in the commandments of God either the very kinds of works are enjoined, or formed works are enjoined. If formed works are enjoined: then he who honors his father with natural devotion, not doing it out of charity, seems to omit that commandment by which it is enjoined: *Honor your father and mother*[^3], and to sin mortally; which is absurd to say. If therefore the very kinds of works are within the precept; and this is certain, that we can do them without grace that makes pleasing: it seems that the divine commandments may be fulfilled without the gift of grace that makes pleasing.

5. Likewise, nothing is more difficult than to lay down one's soul for another, *for greater charity no one has* etc., as is said in John chapter fifteen[^4]; but without grace that makes pleasing one can undergo death for another: therefore much more strongly all the kinds of the other commandments.

**On the contrary, it is argued thus.**
1. Jeremiah chapter ten[^5]: *I know, O Lord, that the way of a man is not his own, nor is it in a man to walk and direct his steps;* but whoever fulfills the divine commandments directs his steps: therefore it is not within the power of a man to fulfill the divine commandments.

2. Likewise, Acts chapter fifteen[^6]: *This is a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear; but by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ we believe we are saved;* and he speaks there of the commandments of the Law: therefore it does not happen that the divine commandments are observed without divine grace.

3. Likewise, the observance of the commandments of God makes a man a friend of God, whence John chapter fifteen[^7]: *You are my friends* etc.; but no one can be made a friend of God without the gift of charity and of grace that makes pleasing: therefore it is impossible that the commandments of God be kept without such a gift.

4. Likewise, the observance of the commandments of God makes a man worthy of eternal life, whence Matthew chapter nineteen[^8]: *If you will enter into life, keep the commandments;* but no one can merit eternal life without the gift of the grace of God, as is said in Romans chapter six: *The grace of God, life everlasting:* therefore without it no one can observe the divine commandments.

5. Likewise, just as the foundation of the Old Law is fear, so the foundation of the Gospel is love, as the Apostle intimates in Romans chapter eight[^9], and Augustine says expressly: therefore just as the commandments of the Old Law could not be observed without the fear of God, so the evangelical commandments cannot be fulfilled without the love of charity. But the gift of love is not without the gift of grace that makes pleasing: therefore without such a gift it does not happen that the divine commandments are fulfilled.

### Conclusion

> Man, through free choice without grace that makes pleasing, but with graces freely given, can fulfill the precepts of God as to the substance of the work, yet not as to the intention of the one commanding.

**I respond:** It must be said that the commandments of God happen to be fulfilled in two ways: in one way as to the kind of work, in another way as to the intention of the one commanding. If we speak of the fulfillment of the commandments as to the kind of work, in this way it happens that they are fulfilled through graces freely given — as the commandment concerning worship through faith, and the commandment concerning the honoring of parents through a certain natural devotion and piety, and so of the others. — In another way is to speak of the fulfillment of the commandments as to the intention of the one commanding; and in this way — because God commands the commandments to this end, that our will be conformed to his will, and this cannot be without charity, and charity cannot be without the gift of grace that makes pleasing — the commandments of God as to the intention of the one commanding cannot be observed without such a gift. And this is what the Apostle says in Romans chapter thirteen[^10]: *He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law;* and again: *The fullness of the law is love;* and in First Timothy chapter one: *The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart* etc. This very thing is also intimated in Deuteronomy chapter six, where, after the enumeration of the commandments of the decalogue, there is added the commandment of charity, by which it is said: *You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart* etc. — It is clear therefore from what has been said how great is the necessity of grace that makes pleasing, since it is necessary not only for the remission of sins, but also for the victory over temptations, and for the observance of the divine commandments. In many ways therefore did Pelagius err, who said that the gift of free choice[^11] could be had so that it would not need grace that makes pleasing. This position therefore having been repudiated as heretical, the grace of God is to be implored, through which sins are blotted out and diabolical temptations are conquered and the divine commandments are fulfilled — not only according to the *kind of work,* but also according to the *intention of the one commanding;* not only unto the *avoidance of punishment,* but also unto the *merit of glory.* For although the first mode of observing can be through grace freely given, the second[^12] mode cannot be without grace that makes pleasing, as was shown before. — And along this way proceed the reasons which show that without grace that makes pleasing the divine commandments cannot be fulfilled; whence they are also to be granted.

*To 1.* To that which is objected from Deuteronomy, that the commandment is not above man but near; it must be said that this is understood of observance as to the kind of work. But if it be understood of observance as to the intention of the one commanding, then it is said to be near, not because free choice can attain it by itself without the gift of grace, but because the grace of God is at hand to everyone; nor does anyone lack grace because grace is wanting to him, but because he himself is wanting to grace[^13].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the commandments of God are light and sweet; it must be said that this is understood in[^14] respect of one having charity; for to a man having charity it is easy to love an enemy, but to one not having it, it is very difficult and as it were impossible. And there is an example in birds, which are light for flying when they have an abundance of feathers; but when they are deprived of feathers, they are heavy and cannot fly. Therefore the Lord says that his commandments are light, because to those willing to keep them and to be converted to him he gives charity and the feathers of the virtues, by which they can fly and easily raise themselves above themselves.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that a man can fulfill the commandments of a man etc.; it must be said that it is not the same, because a man needs the service of a man and considers the outward act more than the inward intention. But God, who has no need of our goods[^15], and looks more upon hearts than upon faces, does not accept the work of a man unless first the will of the man, through which those works are done, is acceptable to him.

*To 4, 5.* To the fourth and last argument the reply is sufficiently plain from what has been said. For they prove that the commandments of God can be kept without grace that makes pleasing as to the kind of work. And this indeed is true; for a man can fulfill that commandment: *Honor your father* etc., without grace, so as thus to avoid punishment. He could also do other commandments, aided[^16] by some grace freely given, and not only do certain things which seem arduous, but even suffer terrible things. In all these, however, the commandments would not be fulfilled according to the divine intention and acceptance, as the Apostle expressly says in First Corinthians chapter thirteen[^17], enumerating the manifold kind of work, after which he adds: *If I have not charity, it profits me nothing.* And this was what Pelagius did not consider, on account of which he fell into error and believed that someone, from the mere observance of the commandments as to outward works, was worthy of eternal life; which is against pious and sound faith, as the Apostle explains in the authority cited above[^18].

---

la: Vers. 11: *Mandatum hoc, quod* etc. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 14, in quo textu non pauci codd. et edd. omittunt *te,* et Vulg. pro *illud* habet *illum.*

en: Verse 11: *This commandment, which* etc. — The following text is in the same place, v. 14, in which text not a few codices and editions omit *you,* and the Vulgate for *it* (*illud*) reads *him* (*illum*).

la: Vers. 30.

en: Verse 30.

en: Exodus 20:12; Deuteronomy 5:16; Matthew 15:4; Mark 7:10; Ephesians 6:2.

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13.

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Vers. 10. seq.

en: Verse 10 and following.

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Vers. 17. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 23.

en: Verse 17. — The following text is at the place cited, v. 23.

la: Vers. 13. — August., l. de Morib. eccles. c. 28. n. 56; II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 73. seq. et 166. n. 2; contra Adimant. Manichaei discip. c. 17. n. 2. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 40. q. I, ubi de hac differentia fusius agitur.

en: Verse 13. — Augustine, book *On the Morals of the Church* c. 28, n. 56; *Questions on the Pentateuch,* book II, q. 73 and following and 166, n. 2; *Against Adimantus, the disciple of Mani,* c. 17, n. 2. Cf. *III Sent.* d. 40, q. I, where this distinction is treated more fully.

la: Vers. 8. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 10; tertius loc. cit. v. 5; quartus loc. cit. v. 5.

en: Verse 8. — The following text is in the same place, v. 10; the third at the place cited, v. 5; the fourth at the place cited, v. 5.

la: Pro *liberi arbitrii donum,* quae lectio invenitur in multis codd., ut C K O P R S T W X cc, et in edd. 1, 2, 3, Vat. *liberum arbitrium tantum,* codd. bb ee *liberum arbitrium* simpliciter sine *tantum.* Paulo ante pro *Multipliciter igitur* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et pluribus codd. *Multipliciter enim.*

en: For *the gift of free choice* (*liberi arbitrii donum*), which reading is found in many codices, such as C K O P R S T W X cc, and in editions 1, 2, 3, the Vatican edition reads *free choice only* (*liberum arbitrium tantum*); codices bb ee read *free choice* simply, without *only.* A little before, for *In many ways therefore* (*Multipliciter igitur*) the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and several codices reads *For in many ways* (*Multipliciter enim*).

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt *tamen.*

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add *however* (*tamen*).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 123, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, page 123, note 6.

la: Particula *in* abest a codd. L aa. — De hac solutione vide August., Enarrat. in Ps. 67. n. 18.

en: The particle *in* is absent from codices L aa. — On this solution see Augustine, *Exposition on Psalm 67,* n. 18.

la: Psalm. 18, 2. — Seq. textus est I. Reg. 16, 7: *Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.*

en: Psalm 18:2. — The following text is at I Kings (1 Samuel) 16:7: *For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *adiuncta.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *added* (*adiuncta*).

la: Vers. 3. — Paulo inferius post *mandatorum* in cod. aa subiungitur *Dei.*

en: Verse 3. — A little below, after *of the commandments* (*mandatorum*) in codex aa there is added *of God* (*Dei*).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion) cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 47390–47507; fresh literal English. **has_scholion=FALSE** — q3 carries no scholion of its own; the joint commentator-roll for q1+q2+q3 was supplied as SCHOLION II of d28-a1-q2 (*pro quaest. seq.* per Override §5; verified at p.679 L-col where the q2 SCHOLION I/II sits immediately above the *QUAESTIO III* header, ending *…Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4.*).

**Page span / seam map.** QUAESTIO III opens p.679 L-col (mid-column, directly below the q2 SCHOLION) and runs through p.680 to the top of p.681, closing on p.681 R-col at *…in auctoritate praemissa* (raw 47507), immediately before **ARTICULUS II** (raw 47508). Three printed pages, two seams:
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**[?] flags:** none.

**ARTICULUS II TRACTATIO sub-question list (verbatim, p.681, for the next dispatches):**
*Consequenter quaeritur de potestate liberi arbitrii, quantum se extendat absque gratia gratis data. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.*
1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratis data possit se ad gratiam gratum facientem sufficienter disponere.* (= a2-q1)
2. *Secundo quaeritur, utrum omni gratia destitutum possit alicui tentationi resistere.* (= a2-q2 — MISSING, must be CREATED)
3. *Tertio quaeritur, utrum possit per se, absque omni gratia, in bonum in genere.* (= a2-q3)


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De potestate liberi arbitrii absque gratia gratis data.*

Consequenter quaeritur de potestate liberi arbitrii, quantum se extendat absque gratia gratis data. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratis data possit se ad gratiam gratum facientem sufficienter disponere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omni gratia destitutum possit alicui tentationi resistere.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum possit per se, absque omni gratia, in bonum[^1] in genere.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum liberum arbitrium, destitutum gratia gratis data, possit ad gratiam gratum facientem sufficienter se disponere.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, destitutum gratia gratis data, possit ad gratiam gratum facientem se sufficienter disponere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Zachariae primo[^2]: *Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos, dicit Dominus.* Si igitur Deum converti ad nos non est aliud quam gratiam impartiri; antequam aliqua gratia conferatur, liberum arbitrium potest ad eum converti; sed se convertendo ad Deum disponit se ad gratiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Boethius[^3]: « Naturaliter est inserta nobis veri boni cupiditas »: omni igitur gratia gratis data circumscripta, salva animae rationalis natura, potest liberum arbitrium verum bonum desiderare; sed desiderando verum bonum disponitur ad donum gratuitum: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis potentia naturalis naturaliter appetit suam perfectionem, eo ipso quo illa indiget et ab ea nata est compleri[^4]. Si igitur liberum arbitrium aptum natum est compleri per donum gratiae et gloriae; omni gratia privatum perfectionem gratiae desiderabit et quaeret. Si igitur hoc est ad gratiam gratum facientem se disponere, videtur etc.

4. Item, sufficienter se ad gratiam disponit qui facit quod in se est; facere autem quod in se est, dicitur homo, quando facit illud quod est in sua potestate. Sed liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, potest facere quod in se est — nullus enim dubitat, quin possit facere quod potest — ergo absque omni gratia potest se disponere ad gratiam gratum facientem.

5. Item, liberum arbitrium, destitutum gratia gratis data, aut potest aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil potest: ergo nemo[^5] esset inculpandus ex hoc, quod non se praeparat ad gratiam. Si *aliquid* potest, vocetur illud quod potest A, tunc verum est dicere, quod liberum arbitrium potest in A; sed faciendo A toto suo posse se praeparat ad gratiam; et quicumque sic se praeparat, sufficienter se disponit: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne peccatum non tantum est expulsivum gratiae, sed etiam nocivum naturae[^6]; sed omnis natura refugit sibi contrarium et nocivum: ergo liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum et sibi relictum, per naturam habet detestari peccatum et refugere; sed detestando et refugiendo culpam se disponit homo ad gratiam: ergo etc.

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**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus[^7]: « Manet ad quaerendam salutem libertas arbitrii, sed admonente prius Deo et invitante ad salutem, ut vel eligat aut sequatur aut agat occasione salutis, hoc est inspirationis Dei »: ergo videtur, quod nunquam liberum arbitrium nostrum potest se ad viam salutis praeparare, nisi adiuvetur per aliquam gratiam gratis datam.

2. Item, timor servilis est illud, quo mediante declinatur a malo, sicut dicitur Proverbiorum decimo quinto[^8]: *In timore declinat omnis a malo;* sed timere serviliter est donum Dei, et nullus potest se disponere ad gratiam, nisi declinet a malo: ergo nullus potest ad gratiam se disponere sine aliquo dono gratiae.

3. Item, dispositio est eiusdem generis cum eo ad quod disponit[^9]: ergo ad bonum gratuitum non potest quis se disponere nisi per aliquid gratis datum: ergo impossibile est, quod ad illud se disponat liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum.

4. Item, dispositio praevenit illud ad quod disponit: si ergo liberum arbitrium posset se ad gratiam gratum facientem per se ipsum disponere, ergo posset gratiam praevenire: si igitur hoc est contra naturam gratiae praevenientis, videtur igitur etc.

### Conclusio

> *Liberum arbitrium, omni dono gratiae gratis datae destitutum, non potest se ad gratiam gratum facientem de congruo disponere.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod vix aut nunquam liberum arbitrium destituitur omni gratia gratis data; quoniam nomine gratiae gratis datae non solummodo intelligimus illa quae enumerat Apostolus primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^10] *Alii datur per Spiritum* etc., sed etiam vocatur hic gratia gratis data, quidquid illud sit, quod superadditum est naturalibus, adiuvans aliquo modo et praeparans voluntatem ad habitum vel usum gratiae, sive illud gratis datum sit *habitus,* sicut timor servilis, vel pietas aliquorum visceribus inserta ab infantia, sive sit etiam aliquis *actus,* sicut aliqua vocatio vel locutio, qua Deus excitat animam hominis, ut se requirat[^11]. — Sine hac quidem gratia gratis data vix aut nunquam aliquis habens usum liberi arbitrii reperitur; et sine hac concedendum est, liberum arbitrium nunquam sufficienter disponi nec posse se disponere ad gratiam gratum facientem, sicut dicit Bernardus expresse in libro de Libero Arbitrio, capitulo decimo tertio[^12]: « Conatus liberi arbitrii ad bonum cassi sunt, si a gratia non adiuvantur, et nulli, si non excitantur ». Et post dicit, quod « gratia excitat liberum arbitrium, dum seminat cogitatum ». Si igitur prima dispositio, quae fit ad gratiam gratum facientem[^13], est cogitatio, et haec non est absque dono gratiae gratis datae; impossibile est, quod liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, ad gratiam gratum facientem disponat se ipsum.

Ratio autem huius est haec: non quia gratia gratum faciens necessario praeexigat dispositionem gratiae gratis datae, sed quia ipsa est quid divinum et res existens supra liberum arbitrium et etiam supra naturale iudicatorium[^14]. Ideo liberum arbitrium nunquam assurgit nec ad cognoscendam gratiam nec ad petendam, nisi aliquo modo a sursum excitetur et per aliquod donum gratiae gratis datae, quod tenet quasi medium inter donum gratiae gratum facientis et naturalem libertatem voluntatis. Tenendum est igitur, quod liberum arbitrium, si excitetur per aliquod donum gratiae gratis datae, potest ad gratiam gratum facientem se de congruo disponere; si autem omni tali munere contingat ipsum destitui, nunquam posset ad illam disponi. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod liberi arbitrii est converti ad Deum; dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium lapsum nunquam ad Deum converteretur, nisi aliquo munere gratiae excitaretur; quod quia praesto est, ideo dicit Dominus: *Convertimini ad me.* Hoc enim ipso, quod invitat et vocat, exhibet homini aliquod donum gratuitum, per quod excitetur, et excitatus aliqualiter ad ipsum convertatur, et conversus per gratiam gratum facientem a Deo acceptetur; et ex hoc dicitur Deus *converti ad ipsum.*

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— Unde si quis velit attendere ordinem liberi arbitrii et gratiae divinae, expresse insinuat Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus[^15], ponens quatuor gradus, inter quos gratia praevenit liberum arbitrium. Ait enim sic: « Initium salutis nostrae Deo miserante habemus; ut acquiescamus salutari inspirationi, nostrae potestatis est; ut adipiscamur quod acquirendum admonitione cognovimus, divini est muneris; ut non labamur, iam adepto salutis munere, sollicitudinis nostrae est et caelestis pariter adiutorii ». In hoc ergo verbo, si quis diligenter inspiciat, insinuatur valde clare, quantum possit liberum arbitrium respectu gratiae. Nam cum sint in salutis opere ista quatuor, videlicet invitare, acquiescere, adiuvare et permanere; primum est inspirationis Dei, secundum libertatis arbitrii, tertium muneris divini, quartum sollicitudinis nostrae[^16] et divini pariter adiutorii. Et per hoc satis aperitur via ad dissolvendum rationes sequentes.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod inserta est nobis veri boni cupiditas; dicendum, quod verum est *in generali;* ut autem cognoscatur *in speciali,* quid sit illud bonum, et desideretur et requiratur, hoc non est absque Dei dono. Illa autem generalis cupiditas non sufficit ad disponendum ad gratiam, sicut patet in philosophis, qui beatitudinem multum desideraverunt, nunquam tamen gratiam Dei adepti sunt[^17].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura appetit suam perfectionem etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de perfectione illa, quae est *infra*[^18] terminos naturae; non autem oportet de illa, quae *supra* naturam est; aut si de illa intelligatur, eo modo appetit, quo cognoscit. Per se autem non cognoscit *in speciali,* sed *in generali* tantum. Sic autem cognoscendo et appetendo non se disponit sufficienter ad donum gratiae, sicut prius ostensum est.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sufficienter se disponit qui facit quod in se est; dicendum, quod *facere quod in se est,* hoc potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo *positive,* quia facit aliquid ordinatum ad gratiam, et tantum facit, quantum potest; et hoc modo verum habet sermo praedictus. Alio modo potest intelligi *privative,* ut dicatur *facere quod in se est,* quia facit quod potest, quamvis illud non sit ordinatum ad gratiae susceptionem; et hoc modo liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, potest facere quod in se est; et sic praedictus sermo non habet veritatem.

*Ad 5.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens. Quod enim quaeritur: aut potest aliquid, aut nihil; dicendum, quod aliquid potest; sed illud aliquid nihil est respectu gratiae suscipiendae, sicut posse comedere aliquod posse est: nihil tamen facit ad hoc, quod aliquis suscipiat donum gratiae.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium potest detestari culpam virtute propriae naturae; dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit detestari culpam: aut quia est offensiva maiestatis et aequitatis divinae, aut quia est laesiva propriae naturae. Primus modus detestandi disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem, nec unquam est absque dono gratiae gratis datae in statu naturae lapsae. Cognoscere enim, quod per culpam offendatur Deus[^19], donum Dei est. Alio modo est detestari peccatum, in quantum est laesivum naturae, sicut aliquis detestatur fornicationem, quia per ipsam amisit visum, vel incurrit alium morbum; et talis detestatio potest esse a virtute naturae; sed haec non disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem.

Et sic patent quaesita. Patet etiam, qualiter erraverit Pelagius, qui liberum arbitrium non solum dixit habere potentiam disponendi se ad gratiam gratum facientem, sed etiam merendi eam propria virtute. Dupliciter enim mendax fuit: et in hoc quod dixit, primam gratiam sub merito cadere, et in hoc quod dixit etiam, liberum arbitrium propriis viribus ad gratiam posse se disponere.

english:
### Article II. *On the power of free choice apart from freely given grace.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the power of free choice, how far it extends apart from freely given grace. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked whether free choice, apart from freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.

Secondly it is asked whether, deprived of all grace, it can resist any temptation.

Thirdly it is asked whether it can, of itself, apart from all grace, [tend] toward a good[^1] in general.

### Question I. *Whether free choice, deprived of freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether free choice, deprived of freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing. And that it can, it seems.

1. Zechariah, chapter one[^2]: *Turn to me, and I will turn to you, says the Lord.* If, then, for God to turn to us is nothing other than to impart grace; before any grace is conferred, free choice can turn to Him; but by turning itself to God it disposes itself to grace: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius[^3]: "There is naturally implanted in us a desire for the true good": therefore, with all freely given grace set aside, the nature of the rational soul remaining intact, free choice can desire the true good; but by desiring the true good it is disposed to the gratuitous gift: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, every natural power naturally seeks its own perfection, by the very fact that it stands in need of it and is born to be completed by it[^4]. If, then, free choice is naturally apt to be completed by the gift of grace and of glory; deprived of all grace it will desire and seek the perfection of grace. If, then, this is to dispose oneself to the grace that makes pleasing, it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, he sufficiently disposes himself to grace who does what is in him; and a man is said to do what is in him when he does that which is in his own power. But free choice, deprived of all grace, can do what is in it — for no one doubts that it can do what it can — therefore apart from all grace it can dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.

5. Likewise, free choice, deprived of freely given grace, either can do something, or nothing. If it can do nothing: then no one[^5] would be blameworthy on this ground, that he does not prepare himself for grace. If it can do *something,* let that which it can do be called A; then it is true to say that free choice has power over A; but by doing A with its whole power it prepares itself for grace; and whoever thus prepares himself, sufficiently disposes himself: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, every sin is not only expulsive of grace, but also harmful to nature[^6]; but every nature flees what is contrary and harmful to it: therefore free choice, deprived of all grace and left to itself, has by nature to detest and flee sin; but by detesting and fleeing fault a man disposes himself to grace: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^7]: "Freedom of choice remains for seeking salvation, but with God first admonishing and inviting to salvation, so that one may either choose or follow or act on the occasion of salvation, that is, of the inspiration of God": therefore it seems that our free choice can never prepare itself for the way of salvation unless it is helped by some freely given grace.

2. Likewise, servile fear is that by means of which one turns aside from evil, as it is said in Proverbs, chapter fifteen[^8]: *In fear each one turns aside from evil;* but to fear in a servile way is a gift of God, and no one can dispose himself to grace unless he turns aside from evil: therefore no one can dispose himself to grace without some gift of grace.

3. Likewise, a disposition is of the same genus as that to which it disposes[^9]: therefore one cannot dispose himself to a gratuitous good except through something freely given: therefore it is impossible that free choice, deprived of all grace, should dispose itself to it.

4. Likewise, a disposition precedes that to which it disposes: if, then, free choice could dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing through itself, then it could anticipate grace: if, therefore, this is contrary to the nature of prevenient grace, it seems, therefore, etc.

### Conclusio

> *Free choice, deprived of every gift of freely given grace, cannot congruously dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that scarcely or never is free choice deprived of all freely given grace; for by the name of freely given grace we understand not only those things which the Apostle enumerates in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter twelve[^10], *To one is given through the Spirit* etc., but also there is here called freely given grace whatever it be that is superadded to the natural endowments, helping in some way and preparing the will for the habit or use of grace, whether that freely given thing be a *habit,* such as servile fear, or a piety implanted in the inmost parts of some from infancy, or whether it be also some *act,* such as some calling or speaking by which God arouses the soul of man to seek Him[^11]. — Scarcely or never indeed is anyone having the use of free choice found without this freely given grace; and without this it must be granted that free choice is never sufficiently disposed nor can dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing, as Bernard says expressly in the book *On Free Choice,* chapter thirteen[^12]: "The efforts of free choice toward the good are vain, if they are not helped by grace, and null, if they are not aroused." And afterward he says that "grace arouses free choice when it sows the thought." If, then, the first disposition, which is made toward the grace that makes pleasing[^13], is the thought, and this is not without the gift of freely given grace; it is impossible that free choice, deprived of all grace, should dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.

And the reason for this is the following: not because the grace that makes pleasing necessarily presupposes a disposition of freely given grace, but because it is itself something divine and a thing existing above free choice and even above the natural power of judgment[^14]. Therefore free choice never rises either to knowing grace or to seeking it, unless it is in some way aroused from above and through some gift of freely given grace, which holds as it were a middle between the gift of the grace that makes pleasing and the natural liberty of the will. It must therefore be held that free choice, if it is aroused by some gift of freely given grace, can congruously dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing; but if it should happen to be deprived of every such gift, it could never be disposed to it. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that it belongs to free choice to turn to God; it must be said that fallen free choice would never turn to God unless it were aroused by some gift of grace; and because this is at hand, therefore the Lord says: *Turn to me.* For by this very thing, that He invites and calls, He bestows on man some gratuitous gift, by which he is aroused, and being aroused turns in some way to Him, and being turned is accepted by God through the grace that makes pleasing; and from this God is said to *turn to him.*

— Hence, if anyone wishes to attend to the order of free choice and of divine grace, Augustine expressly intimates it in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^15], setting forth four steps, among which grace precedes free choice. For he says thus: "The beginning of our salvation we have by the mercy of God; that we acquiesce in the saving inspiration is of our power; that we attain what we have learned by admonition to be sought is of the divine gift; that we do not fall away, the gift of salvation having been received, is of our solicitude and equally of the heavenly help." In this saying, therefore, if anyone inspects it diligently, it is intimated very clearly how much free choice can do with respect to grace. For since in the work of salvation there are these four, namely to invite, to acquiesce, to help, and to persevere; the first is of the inspiration of God, the second of the liberty of choice, the third of the divine gift, the fourth of our solicitude[^16] and equally of the divine help. And by this the way is sufficiently opened for resolving the arguments that follow.

*To 2.* To that, however, which is objected, that a desire for the true good is implanted in us; it must be said that this is true *in general;* but that it should be known *in particular* what that good is, and be desired and sought, this is not without the gift of God. But that general desire does not suffice for disposing toward grace, as is evident in the philosophers, who greatly desired blessedness, yet never attained the grace of God[^17].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that nature seeks its own perfection, etc.; it must be said that this is true of that perfection which is *within*[^18] the bounds of nature; but it need not be so of that which is *above* nature; or if it be understood of that, it seeks it in the manner in which it knows it. But of itself it does not know *in particular,* but only *in general.* And thus knowing and desiring it does not sufficiently dispose itself to the gift of grace, as was shown before.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he sufficiently disposes himself who does what is in him; it must be said that *to do what is in him* can be understood in two ways: in one way *positively,* because he does something ordered to grace, and does as much as he can; and in this way the aforesaid saying holds true. In another way it can be understood *privatively,* so that one is said *to do what is in him* because he does what he can, although that is not ordered to the reception of grace; and in this way free choice, deprived of grace, can do what is in it; and thus the aforesaid saying does not hold true.

*To 5.* And by this the answer to what follows is evident. For as to what is asked, whether it can do something, or nothing; it must be said that it can do something; but that something is nothing with respect to the receiving of grace, just as to be able to eat is a certain ability: yet it contributes nothing to this, that anyone should receive the gift of grace.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that free choice can detest fault by the power of its own nature; it must be said that it happens in two ways to detest fault: either because it is offensive to the majesty and equity of God, or because it is harmful to one's own nature. The first manner of detesting disposes toward the grace that makes pleasing, nor is it ever without the gift of freely given grace in the state of fallen nature. For to know that by fault God is offended[^19] is a gift of God. In another way it is to detest sin inasmuch as it is harmful to nature, as someone detests fornication because through it he lost his sight, or incurred some other disease; and such detestation can be from the power of nature; but this does not dispose toward the grace that makes pleasing.

And thus the things asked are clear. It is also clear in what way Pelagius erred, who said that free choice not only has the power of disposing itself to the grace that makes pleasing, but also of meriting it by its own power. For he was twofold a liar: both in this that he said the first grace falls under merit, and in this that he said also that free choice can dispose itself to grace by its own strength.

la: Vat. et ed. 4 subiungunt *aliquod.*

en: The Vatican edition and edition 4 subjoin *aliquod* ("some").

la: Vers. 3. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum ed. 4, post *conferatur* omisso commate, pro *liberum arbitrium* substituit *libero arbitrio,* et dein *disposuit* pro *disponit.* (Zach. 1, 3.)

en: Verse 3. — A little below, the Vatican edition with edition 4, the comma after *conferatur* being omitted, substitutes *libero arbitrio* for *liberum arbitrium,* and then *disposuit* for *disponit.* (Zechariah 1:3.)

la: Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2: *Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas.* Vat. *veri bonique.*

en: Book III of *On the Consolation [of Philosophy],* prose 2: "For there is naturally implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true good." The Vatican edition: *veri bonique* ("of the true and good").

la: Sive, ut Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.) ait: *Finis vero actus et huius gratia potentia sumitur; non enim ut visum [potentiam videndi] habeant, animalia vident; sed ut videant, visum habent.*

en: Or, as Aristotle says, *Metaphysics* IX, text 13 (VIII, c. 8): "But the end is the act, and for the sake of this the power is assumed; for animals do not see in order to have sight [the power of seeing], but they have sight in order to see."

la: Codd. K T W aa bb cc et alii cum edd. 1, 2 nulla ratione substituunt *non.*

en: Codices K T W aa bb cc and others, with editions 1, 2, without any reason substitute *non.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 35. a. I. q. I. seqq. — De propos. seq. vide Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa II. — Circa finem arg. sola Vat. omittit *et refugere; sed detestando.*

en: Cf. below, d. 35, a. I, q. I and following. — On the following proposition see Boethius, *On the Consolation,* III, prose II. — Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition alone omits *et refugere; sed detestando* ("and to flee; but by detesting").

la: Cap. 21, ubi textus originalis post *arbitrii* adiungit *id est rationalis voluntas,* et, bis substituto *vel* pro *aut,* in fine legit, ut et Vat., *inspiratione Dei* pro *inspirationis Dei.*

en: Chapter 21, where the original text after *arbitrii* adds *id est rationalis voluntas* ("that is, the rational will"), and, *vel* being twice substituted for *aut,* reads at the end, as also the Vatican edition, *inspiratione Dei* for *inspirationis Dei.*

la: Vers. 27; *Per timorem autem Domini declinat omnis a malo.* — Quod timor servilis sit donum Dei, ostenditur III. Sent. d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. I. (Prov. 15, 27.)

en: Verse 27: "But by the fear of the Lord each one turns aside from evil." — That servile fear is a gift of God is shown in III Sent., d. 34, p. II, a. 1, q. I. (Proverbs 15:27.)

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione, in quo inter relativa recensetur dispositio, quae a Boethio, II. Comment. super hunc loc., sic definitur: *Dispositio est ad aliquam rem mobilis applicatio, ut si quisquam flammae propinquus caleat, ille dispositus dicitur ad calorem* i. e. *habens aliquam applicationem coniunctionemque ad calorem.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories,* the chapter on Relation, in which disposition is reckoned among relatives, and is thus defined by Boethius, II Commentary on this passage: "A disposition is a mobile application toward some thing, as if anyone near a flame grows warm, he is said to be disposed toward heat," that is, having some application and conjunction toward heat.

la: Vers. 8.

la: Scilicet, ut se, i. e. Deum, quaerat. Vat. cum edd. 1, 4 *ut se praeparet,* codd. C O R S et alii cum ed. 2 *ut se reptat,* cod. L *ut resipiscat;* nostra lectio nititur auctoritate codd. A F (T a secunda manu) Y aa bb ee etc.

en: That is, that it may seek itself, i. e. God. The Vatican edition with editions 1, 4 reads *ut se praeparet,* codices C O R S and others with edition 2 read *ut se reptat,* codex L *ut resipiscat;* our reading rests on the authority of codices A F (T by a second hand) Y aa bb ee etc.

la: Num. 42; *Cuius quippe conatus ad bonum et cassi sunt, si a gratia non adiuventur, et nulli, si non excitentur.* Codd. et edd. allegant c. 17. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 14. n. 47. — Paulo superius pro *sufficienter disponi* cod. O *se disponere,* alii codd., ut C R S T aa bb ee etc., cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *se* [i. e. *a se*] *disponi.*

en: Number 42; "Whose efforts toward the good are indeed both vain, if they are not helped by grace, and null, if they are not aroused." Codices and editions cite c. 17. — The following text is in the same place, c. 14, n. 47. — A little above, for *sufficienter disponi,* codex O reads *se disponere,* other codices, such as C R S T aa bb ee etc., with editions 1, 2, 3 read *se* [i. e. *a se*] *disponi.*

la: Codd. F H I T V Z aa bb ee et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 perperam *quae fit a gratia gratum faciente.*

en: Codices F H I T V Z aa bb ee and others, with editions 2, 3, 4, wrongly read *quae fit a gratia gratum faciente* ("which is made by the grace that makes pleasing").

la: Cfr. infra d. 39. a. I. q. 2. in fine, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 4. schol. II. — Edd., excepta I, *iudicium.* Paulo inferius pro *aliquod donum* Vat. *adiutorium,* edd. 2, 3, 4 *additionem.*

en: Cf. below, d. 39, a. I, q. 2 at the end, and I Sent., d. 17, p. 1, q. 4, schol. II. — The editions, except 1, read *iudicium.* A little below, for *aliquod donum* the Vatican edition reads *adiutorium,* editions 2, 3, 4 read *additionem.*

la: Cap. 21, ubi textus origin. exhibet: *salutiferae* pro *salutari,* deinde *quod acquiescendo admonitioni cupimus* pro *quod acquirendum admonitione cognovimus,* denique *ab indepto* pro *iam adepto.*

en: Chapter 21, where the original text presents *salutiferae* for *salutari,* then *quod acquiescendo admonitioni cupimus* for *quod acquirendum admonitione cognovimus,* and finally *ab indepto* for *iam adepto.*

la: Codd. K T Y et alii cum edd. 1, 2 *naturae,* cod. ee *nostrae naturae.*

en: Codices K T Y and others, with editions 1, 2, read *naturae,* codex ee reads *nostrae naturae.*

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. a. I. q. 2.

en: Cf. IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, a. I, q. 2.

la: Cod. aa melius *intra;* sed etiam alibi a nostro auctore ista locutio in eodem sensu sumitur.

en: Codex aa reads better *intra* ("within"); but elsewhere too this expression is taken by our author in the same sense.

la: Cod. aa *divina maiestas.* Paulo inferius pro *visum* Vat. *usum.*

en: Codex aa reads *divina maiestas* ("the divine majesty"). A little below, for *visum* the Vatican edition reads *usum.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In tribus huius articuli quaest. S. Doctor regia via veritatis incedit inter duo extrema, quorum alterum cum Pelagianis necessitati gratiae penitus derogat, alterum vero cum Luthero, Calvino, Baio et Iansenio humanae naturae lapsae denegat tum cooperationem liberi arbitrii in negotio salutis, tum vires naturales ad faciendum ipsum bonum honestum ordinis naturalis.

Haec prima quaestio intelligitur de praeparatione ad gratiam suscipiendam *sufficiente* (ut declaratur in corp.) sive de dispositione *positiva* (solut. ad 4.). — Quo sensu hoc loco accipienda sit locutio *gratia gratis data,* perspicue in corp. declaratur (vide etiam supra d. 26. a. I. schol.); et dignum est observatione, quod eadem dicitur tenere « quasi medium inter donum gratiae gratum facientis et naturalem libertatem voluntatis ». Cfr. etiam hic dub. 1. — Quo sensu haec dispositio vocetur *de congruo,* explicatur IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 5. et q. 2. (cfr. etiam supra d. 9. q. 3.). Plura de praeparatione ad gratiam vide IV. Sent. d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3, a. 2. q. 2. 3. Concordat autem respons. optime cum decretis Concilii Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 5. et can. 4.) et Arausicani II. (can. 6. 7.). — Notatu digna est etiam in solut. ad 4. duplex explicatio celebris axiomatis: *Facienti quod est in se* etc.

**II.** Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 4.) distinguit duplicem praeparationem; remotam « per quodlibet opus de genere bonorum; et tali dispositione potest se homo per se disponere »; et propinquam « per appetitum seu desiderium seu consensum gratiae; et tali non potest se homo per se disponere sine gratia gratis data ». Idem docent Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.) aliique antiqui magistri; quod secundum doctrinam nostri Doctoris in solut. ad 4. exponendum est. S. Thom. in Comment. (hic a. 4.) quaedam obscura profert, quae ipse alibi, et praesertim in S. I. II. q. 109. a. 6, declarat, « dicta sua in II. Sent. ad meliorem sensum reducens declarando et addendo » (ita Caietanus in locum cit.). Sed Durand. (hic q. 5.) omnino corrigendus est; qui dicit, quod speciale adiutorium et immediata motio a Deo non requiratur, et quod bonum morale iam habeat ad gratiam immediatum ordinem. Similiter iudicandum de pluribus Nominalibus. Etiam Scoti verba (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 2. n. 14.) explicatione egent et a multis carpuntur, ut videri potest ibid. in scholio ad defensionem eius scripto. In Summa Hier. a Montefortino (p. III. q. 109. a. 6.) afferuntur dicta Scoti, quae non discordant a doctrina communi.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In the three questions of this article the holy Doctor walks the royal way of truth between two extremes, of which the one, with the Pelagians, utterly detracts from the necessity of grace, while the other, with Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius, denies to fallen human nature both the cooperation of free choice in the business of salvation, and the natural powers for doing the very honorable good of the natural order.

This first question is understood concerning *sufficient* preparation for receiving grace (as is declared in the body) or concerning *positive* disposition (solution to 4). — In what sense the expression *freely given grace* is to be taken in this place is clearly declared in the body (see also above, d. 26, a. I, schol.); and it is worthy of note that the same is said to hold "as it were a middle between the gift of the grace that makes pleasing and the natural liberty of the will." Cf. also here, dubium 1. — In what sense this disposition is called *of congruity* is explained in IV Sent., d. 15, p. I, q. 5 and q. 2 (cf. also above, d. 9, q. 3). More concerning preparation for grace, see IV Sent., d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3; a. 2, q. 2, 3. And the response agrees very well with the decrees of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 5 and can. 4) and of the Second Council of Orange (can. 6, 7). — Worthy of note also in the solution to 4 is the twofold explanation of the celebrated axiom: *To one who does what is in him* etc.

**II.** Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 2, a. 4) distinguishes a twofold preparation: a remote one "through any work of the genus of good things; and by such a disposition a man can dispose himself by himself"; and a proximate one "through appetite or desire or consent of grace; and by such a one a man cannot dispose himself by himself without freely given grace." The same is taught by Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 1, q. 2) and other ancient masters; which is to be expounded according to the doctrine of our Doctor in the solution to 4. St. Thomas in his Commentary (here, a. 4) brings forward certain obscure things, which he himself elsewhere, and especially in S. I-II, q. 109, a. 6, declares, "reducing his statements in II Sent. to a better sense by declaring and adding" (so Cajetan on the passage cited). But Durandus (here, q. 5) must be entirely corrected; he says that a special help and an immediate motion from God is not required, and that moral good already has an immediate order toward grace. The like is to be judged of several Nominalists. The words of Scotus too (IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 14) need explanation and are censured by many, as can be seen there in the scholion written in defense of him. In the *Summa* of Hieronymus of Montefortino (p. III, q. 109, a. 6) are adduced sayings of Scotus which do not disagree with the common doctrine.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (Vol II PDF-priority inversion) for pp. 681–683, cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 47508–47712. ART II opener (raw 47508) folded into this q1 per Override §5 — no standalone article-opener chunk; the ART II 3-question TRACTATIO list (*Primo… / Secundo… / Tertio…*) is recorded verbatim here. **has_scholion=TRUE** — q1 carries SCHOLION I (on all three questions of the article) + SCHOLION II (commentator roll, ending *…non discordant a doctrina communi*, raw 47712, immediately before QUAESTIO II). SCHOLION III/IV belong to a2-q3 (per their *Quoad hanc (2.) quaest.* / *De hac (3.) quaest.* openers, raw 47760+).

**Page-split map.**
- p.681 (L-col bottom → R-col): ART II opener + QUAESTIO I args 1–6. Footers 4–9 on this page (footers 1–3 belong to a1-q3).
- p.682: Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo opener, *Ratio,* Ad 1 opener. Footers 1–8 on this page.
- p.683: Ad 1 continuation (Augustine four-steps), Ad 2–6, *contra Pelagium* epilogue, SCHOLION I–II. Footers 1–5 on this page.

**Apparatus 19 entries [^1]–[^19]** (re-mapped to a continuous 1-based sequence): [^1] = p.681 footer 4 (ART II opener *in bonum⁴*); [^2]–[^6] = p.681 footers 5–9 (args 1, 2, 3, 5, 6); [^7]–[^10] = p.682 footers 1, 2, 3, 4 (Sed contra 1, 2, 3; Respondeo *primae ad Corinthios*); [^11] = p.682 footer 5 (*Scilicet ut se… quaerat,* at Respondeo *ut se requirat*); [^12]–[^14] = p.682 footers 6, 7, 8 (Bernardus; *prima dispositio… gratum faciente* variant; *naturale iudicatorium*); [^15]–[^19] = p.683 footers 1–5 (Augustine ecclesiast. dogm. four-steps; *nostrae²*; *adepti sunt³*; *infra⁴*; *offendatur Deus⁵*). (Counted: 19 La defs = 19 En = 19 body anchors in each language.)

**Hand-offs.**
- RECEIVED from d28-a1-q3: the ART II opener + p.681 footers 4–9 (now [^1]–[^6]). a1-q3 owned p.681 footers 1–3.
- FORWARDED to d28-a2-q2 (MISSING — to be CREATED): nothing. q1 closes clean at end of SCHOLION II (*…non discordant a doctrina communi,* raw 47712); QUAESTIO II opens at raw 47714 on p.683 R-col bottom / p.684. a2-q2 owns its own p.683 R-col footer (*Vers. 13. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 678, nota 2.*) + p.684 footers.

**Seam checks (450 dpi).** 681→682 (*…et refugere; sed detestando et refugiendo cul-‖pam se disponit homo*) and 682→683 (*…dicitur Deus converti ad ipsum. — Unde si quis velit atten-‖dere ordinem*) both grammatically continuous. No mid-page splice detected.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0