title: Dist. 28

title_alt: Distinction XXVIII — The Text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXVIII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De haeresi Pelagiana.*

Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter teneamus, liberum arbitrium sine gratia praeveniente et adiuvante non sufficere ad iustitiam et salutem obtinendam; nec meritis praecedentibus gratiam Dei advocari, sicut Pelagiana haeresis tradidit. Nam, ut ait Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum[^1]: « Novi haeretici Pelagiani liberum sic asserunt voluntatis arbitrium, ut gratiae Dei non relinquant locum, quam secundum merita nostra dari asserunt ».

#### Cap. II.

#### *Quod Pelagiani dictis Augustini utuntur in testimonium sui erroris.*

« Pelagianorum haeresis omnium recentissima a Pelagio monacho exorta est. Hi Dei gratiae, qua praedestinati sumus, et qua meruimus de potestate tenebrarum erui[^2], in tantum inimici sunt, ut sine hac credant hominem posse facere omnia divina mandata. Denique Pelagius a fratribus increpatus, quod nihil tribueret adiutorio gratiae Dei ad eius mandata facienda; non eam libero arbitrio praeponebat, sed infideli calliditate supponebat, dicens, ad hoc eam dari hominibus, ut quae facere per liberum arbitrium iubentur, facilius possint implere per gratiam. Dicendo utique facilius possint, voluit credi, etiamsi difficilius, tamen posse homines sine gratia facere iussa divina. Illam vero gratiam Dei, sine qua nihil boni possumus facere, non esse dicunt nisi in libero arbitrio, quod nullis suis praecedentibus meritis ab illo accepit nostra natura, ipso ad hoc tantum[^3] iuvante nos per suam legem atque doctrinam, ut discamus, quae facere et quae sperare debeamus; non autem ad hoc per donum Spiritus sancti, ut quae didicerimus esse facienda, faciamus. Ac per hoc divinitus nobis dari scientiam confitentur, qua ignorantia pellitur; caritatem autem negant divinitus dari, qua pie vivitur, ut scilicet sit donum Dei scientia, quae

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sine caritate inflat; et non sit donum Dei ipsa caritas, quae, ut scientia non inflet, aedificat[^4]. Destruunt etiam orationes, quas facit Ecclesia sive pro infidelibus et doctrinae Dei resistentibus, ut convertantur ad Deum, sive pro fidelibus, ut augeatur eis fides, et perseverent in ea. Haec quippe non ab ipso accipere, sed a se ipsis homines habere contendunt, gratiam Dei, qua liberamur ab impietate, dicentes secundum merita nostra dari. Parvulos etiam sine ullo peccati originalis vinculo asserunt nasci[^5] ».

#### Cap. III.

#### *Quomodo Augustinus illa verba determinat in Retractationibus.*

Quod vero dicunt, sine gratia hominem per liberum arbitrium omnia iussa implere, huiusmodi inductionibus muniunt. Si, inquiunt, non potest ea facere homo, quae iubentur, non est ei imputandum ad mortem, sicut tu ipse, Augustine, in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^6] asseris: « Quis, inquis, peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem: caveri igitur potest ». Hoc testimonio Augustini Pelagius usus est, disputans adversus eum, immo adversus gratiam, sicut Augustinus in libro Retractationum[^7], illud et alia huiusmodi retractans, commemorat inquiens: « In iis atque huiusmodi verbis meis, quia gratia Dei commemorata non est, de qua tunc non agebatur, putant Pelagiani, suam nos tenuisse sententiam; sed frustra hoc putant. Voluntas quippe est, qua peccatur et recte vivitur, quod his verbis egimus; sed ipsa nisi Dei gratia liberetur et ut vitia superet, adiuvetur, recte a mortalibus vivi non potest ». — Ecce aperte determinat, ex quo sensu illa dixerit, inimicos gratiae refellens.

Similiter et innitebatur Pelagius verbis Augustini contra gratiam, qui in libro de Duabus Animabus[^8] dicit: « Peccati, inquit, reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis et insaniae est ». His auditis, exiliit Pelagius dicens: Cur ergo parvuli et illi qui non habent gratiam, sine qua non possunt facere mandata divina, rei tenentur? — Hoc autem qua occasione dixerit, in libro Retractationum[^9] Pelagio respondens aperit. Id enim contra Manichaeos dixit, qui in homine duas naturas esse contendunt, unam bonam ex Deo, alteram malam ex gente tenebrarum, quae nunquam bona fuit nec bonum velle potest; quod si esset, non videretur ei imputandum esse, si non bonum faceret.

Alibi etiam Augustinus dicit quod huic gratiae contradicere videtur, qua iustificamur. Ait enim in libro contra Adimantum, Manichaei discipulum[^10]: « Nisi quisque voluntatem suam mutaverit, bonum operari non potest; quod in nostra potestate esse positum Dominus docet ubi ait: *Aut facite arborem bonam, aut fructus eius bonos* etc. ». — Quod Augustinus in Retractationibus[^11] « non esse contra gratiam Dei, quam praedicamus, ostendit. In potestate quippe hominis est mutare in melius voluntatem, sed ea potestas nulla est, nisi a Deo detur, de quo dictum est: *Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri*. Cum enim hoc sit in potestate, quod cum volumus, facimus, nihil tam in potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est; sed praeparatur a Domino voluntas: eo ergo modo dat potestatem ».

Sic etiam intelligendum est quod in eodem[^12] ait, scilicet, in nostra potestate esse, ut vel inseri bonitate Dei, vel excidi eius severitate mereamur; quia in potestate nostra non est, nisi quod nostram sequitur voluntatem, quae cum praeparatur a Domino, facile fit opus pietatis, etiam quod impossibile et difficile fuit.

In Expositione quoque quarundam propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos[^13] quaedam Augustinus interserit, quae videntur huic doctrinae gratiae adversari. Ait enim: « Quod credimus nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur illius est, qui credentibus dat Spiritum sanctum ». Et paulo post: « Nostrum est credere et velle; illius autem dare credentibus et volentibus facultatem bene operandi per Spiritum sanctum ». — Quae qualiter intelligi debeant, Augustinus in libro Retractationum aperit dicens: « Verum est quidem, a Deo esse quod operamur bonum, sed eadem regula utriusque est, et volendi scilicet et faciendi; et utrumque ipsius est, quia ipse praeparat voluntatem, et utrumque nostrum est, quia non fit nisi volentibus nobis ». « Illa itaque profecto non dixissem, si iam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter Spiritus sancti munera reperiri ».

Illud etiam diligenter est inspiciendum, quod Augustinus in libro Sententiarum Prosperi[^14] ait, scilicet quod « posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum; habere autem fidem, sicut habere caritatem, gratiae est fidelium ». — Quod non ita dictum est, tanquam ex libero arbitrio valeat haberi fides vel caritas, sed quia aptitudinem naturalem habet mens hominis ad credendum vel diligendum, quae Dei gratia praeventa credit et diligit; quod sine gratia non valet.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *De haeresi Ioviniani et Manichaei, quos collidit Hieronymus.*

Id ergo de gratia et libero arbitrio indubitanter teneamus, quod Hieronymus in Explanatione fidei Catholicae ad Damasum Papam[^15], Ioviniani et Manichaei

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et Pelagii errores collidens, docet. « Liberum, inquit, sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus, nos semper indigere Dei auxilio; et tam illos errare, qui cum Manichaeo dicunt, hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos, qui cum Ioviniano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare. Uterque tollit arbitrii libertatem. Nos vero dicimus, hominem semper et peccare et non peccare posse, ut semper nos liberi confiteamur esse arbitrii. Haec est fides, quam in Catholica Ecclesia didicimus et quam semper tenuimus ».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXVIII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *On the Pelagian heresy.*

But let us hold this unshakenly and without hesitation, that free choice without prevenient and assisting grace does not suffice to obtain justice and salvation; nor is the grace of God summoned by preceding merits, as the Pelagian heresy has handed down. For, as Augustine says in the first book of the Retractations[^1]: « The new Pelagian heretics so assert the choice of the will that they leave no place for the grace of God, which they assert to be given according to our merits ».

#### Cap. II.

#### *That the Pelagians use the sayings of Augustine in testimony of their error.*

« The Pelagian heresy, the most recent of all, arose from Pelagius the monk. These are such enemies of the grace of God, by which we are predestined, and by which we have merited to be rescued from the power of darkness[^2], that they believe a man can do all the divine commands without it. In short, Pelagius, rebuked by the brethren because he attributed nothing to the help of the grace of God for the doing of his commands, did not place that grace before free choice, but with unbelieving cunning placed it beneath, saying that it is given to men for this, that the things which they are commanded to do through free choice they may be able to fulfill more easily through grace. By saying that they may be able to do them *more easily*, he wished it to be believed that, even if with more difficulty, yet men can do the divine commands without grace. But that grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, they say is nothing other than in free choice, which our nature received from him by no preceding merits of its own, he aiding us for this only[^3] through his law and teaching, that we may learn what we ought to do and what to hope for; but not for this through the gift of the Holy Spirit, that what we have learned ought to be done, we may do. And through this they confess that knowledge is given us divinely, by which ignorance is dispelled; but they deny that charity, by which one lives piously, is given divinely — so that knowledge, which

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without charity puffs up, may be the gift of God; and charity itself, which, that knowledge may not puff up, builds up[^4], may not be the gift of God. They destroy also the prayers which the Church makes both for unbelievers and those resisting the teaching of God, that they may be converted to God, and for the faithful, that their faith may be increased, and that they may persevere in it. For men contend that they have these things not by receiving them from him, but of themselves, [namely] the grace of God by which we are freed from impiety, saying that it is given according to our merits. They assert also that little children are born without any bond of original sin[^5] ».

#### Cap. III.

#### *In what way Augustine determines those words in the Retractations.*

But that which they say, that without grace a man fulfills all commands through free choice, they fortify by inductions of this kind. If, they say, a man cannot do those things which are commanded, it is not to be imputed to him unto death, just as you yourself, Augustine, in the book on Free Choice[^6] assert: « Who, you say, sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed: therefore it can be guarded against ». Pelagius used this testimony of Augustine, disputing against him, nay rather against grace, as Augustine in the book of the Retractations[^7], retracting that and other things of this kind, recalls, saying: « In these and words of this kind of mine, because the grace of God is not mentioned, of which it was not then a question, the Pelagians think that we held their opinion; but they think this in vain. For it is the will by which one sins and lives rightly, which we treated in these words; but unless that will be freed by the grace of God and aided to overcome its vices, it cannot live rightly among mortals ». — Behold, he plainly determines in what sense he said those things, refuting the enemies of grace.

Similarly Pelagius also relied on the words of Augustine against grace, who in the book on the Two Souls[^8] says: « To hold anyone guilty of sin, he says, because he did not do what he could not do, is of the highest iniquity and madness ». Hearing this, Pelagius leapt up, saying: Why then are little children and those who do not have grace, without which they cannot do the divine commands, held guilty? — But on what occasion he said this, he discloses in the book of the Retractations[^9], answering Pelagius. For he said it against the Manichees, who contend that there are two natures in man, one good from God, the other evil from the race of darkness, which was never good nor can will the good; and if this were so, it would not seem to be imputed to it, if it did not do good.

Elsewhere too Augustine says that which seems to contradict this grace by which we are justified. For he says in the book against Adimantus, the disciple of Manichaeus[^10]: « Unless one changes his will, he cannot do good; which the Lord teaches to be placed in our power, where he says: *Either make the tree good, or its fruits good*, etc. ». — Which Augustine in the Retractations[^11] « shows is not against the grace of God which we preach. For it is in the power of man to change his will for the better, but that power is nothing unless it be given by God, of whom it was said: *He gave them power to become the sons of God*. For since this is in our power, which we do when we will, nothing is so in our power as the will itself; but the will is prepared by the Lord: in this way, therefore, he gives the power ».

So too is it to be understood what he says in the same work[^12], namely, that it is in our power that we should merit either to be grafted in by the goodness of God, or to be cut off by his severity; because nothing is in our power except what follows our will, which, when it is prepared by the Lord, easily becomes a work of piety, even what was impossible and difficult.

In the Exposition also of certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans[^13] Augustine inserts certain things which seem to be opposed to this teaching of grace. For he says: « What we believe is ours; but the good which we do is his, who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe ». And a little after: « It is ours to believe and to will; but his to give to those who believe and will the faculty of doing well through the Holy Spirit ». — In what way these are to be understood, Augustine discloses in the book of the Retractations, saying: « It is indeed true that the good we do is from God, but the rule of both is the same, namely of willing and of doing; and both are his, because he himself prepares the will, and both are ours, because it is not done unless we will it ». « Those things therefore I certainly would not have said, had I then known that faith itself also is to be found among the gifts of the Holy Spirit ».

This too must be carefully examined, which Augustine says in the book of the Sentences of Prosper[^14], namely that « to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, is of the nature of men; but to have faith, just as to have charity, is of the grace of the faithful ». — Which is not said as though faith or charity could be had from free choice, but because the mind of man has a natural aptitude for believing or loving, which, prevented by the grace of God, believes and loves; which it cannot do without grace.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *On the heresy of Jovinian and the Manichee, whom Jerome strikes down together.*

This therefore concerning grace and free choice let us hold without doubt, which Jerome in the Explanation of the Catholic faith to Pope Damasus[^15], striking down together the errors of Jovinian and the Manichee

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and of Pelagius, teaches. « Free choice, he says, we so confess, that we say we always need the help of God; and that both those err who with the Manichee say that a man cannot avoid sin, and those who with Jovinian assert that a man cannot sin. Each takes away the liberty of choice. But we say that a man can always both sin and not sin, so that we may always confess ourselves to be of free choice. This is the faith which in the Catholic Church we have learned and which we have always held ».

---

en: Chapter 9, n. 3.

la: Respicitur Colos. 1, 13.

en: Reference is to Colossians 1, 13.

la: Codd. et ed. 1. *tamen*, contra alias edd. et originale Augustini.

en: The codices and edition 1 read *tamen* [for *tantum*], against the other editions and Augustine's original.

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 8, 1.

en: Reference is to 1 Corinthians 8, 1.

la: August., de Haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum, n. 88, et Epist. 177. ad Innocentium Papam, sed multis a Magistro omissis.

en: Augustine, on Heresies, to Quodvultdeus, n. 88, and Letter 177, to Pope Innocent, but with many things omitted by the Master.

la: Libr. III. c. 18. n. 50; I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5; de Natura et gratia, c. 67. n. 80.

en: Book III, c. 18, n. 50; the first book of the Retractations, c. 9, n. 5; on Nature and Grace, c. 67, n. 80.

la: Loc. cit. n. 4.

en: The place cited, n. 4.

la: Cap. 12. n. 17. — Paulo superius codd. B C D E *etiam* pro *et*, cod. A *autem*.

en: Chapter 12, n. 17. — A little above, codices B C D E read *etiam* for *et*, codex A *autem*.

la: Lib. I. c. 15. n. 6. — In fine sequentis propos. Vat. cum paucis edd. *bonum non* pro *non bonum*.

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 6. — At the end of the following proposition, the Vatican edition with a few editions reads *bonum non* for *non bonum*.

la: Cap. 26. Codd. et edd., excepta Vat. *Adamantium* — Paulo superius codd. A B C E et edd. 1, 5 *quae huic... videntur* pro *quod huic... videtur*. — In textu citatur Matth. 12, 33.

en: Chapter 26. The codices and editions, except the Vatican, read *Adamantium* — A little above, codices A B C E and editions 1, 5 read *quae huic... videntur* for *quod huic... videtur*. — In the text Matthew 12, 33 is cited.

la: Libr. I. c. 22. n. 4. — Respicitur Ioan. 1, 12.

en: Book I, c. 22, n. 4. — Reference is to John 1, 12.

la: Contra Adimant. c. 27, et I. Retract. c. 22. n. 4.

en: Against Adimantus, c. 27, and the first book of the Retractations, c. 22, n. 4.

la: Num. 60., quod declaratur I. Retract. c. 23. n. 2, deinde ibid. n. 61. (Retract. ibid. n. 3); ult. locus n. 2.

en: Number 60, which is explained in the first book of the Retractations, c. 23, n. 2, then in the same place, n. 61 (Retractations, the same place, n. 3); the last passage, n. 2.

la: Num. 316. — Vat. et edd. 4, 6 habent *in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum* (c. 5. n. 10.), ex quo S. Prosper illud sumsit.

en: Number 316. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 have *in the book on the Predestination of the Saints* (c. 5, n. 10), from which St. Prosper took it.

la: Inter opera non genuina S. Hieronymi est quaedam Explanatio Symboli, in cuius fine ista leguntur.

en: Among the non-genuine works of St. Jerome is a certain Explanation of the Creed, at the end of which these things are read. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 672–674 = PDF 694–696, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline; the IA djvu OCR (raw 46924–47051) was cascade-shattered across the d.27 COMMENTARIUS / d.28 littera boundary and two-column bleed, and was used only to confirm footnote-marker spacing. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXVIII. DISTINCTIO XXVIII opens at the foot of p.672 (below the d.27 COMMENTARIUS, which fills the upper two columns of p.672); the littera closes at the top of p.674 with "…et quam semper tenuimus »", immediately before COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII (raw 47052, p.674 L→R, *De potestate liberi arbitrii sine gratia*), which is the `d28-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (4).** Cap. I *De haeresi Pelagiana*; Cap. II *Quod Pelagiani dictis Augustini utuntur in testimonium sui erroris*; Cap. III *Quomodo Augustinus illa verba determinat in Retractationibus*; Cap. IV *De haeresi Ioviniani et Manichaei, quos collidit Hieronymus*. Theme: *de haeresi Pelagiana* — the powerlessness of free choice without grace, the Pelagian misuse of Augustine's *de Libero Arbitrio* / *de Duabus Animabus* / *contra Adimantum* / *Expositio ad Romanos* / *Sententiae Prosperi*, and Jerome's joint refutation of Jovinian and the Manichee. (The dispatch brief said "Cap. I–III"; eyes-on at 450 dpi confirms a full Cap. I–IV run — Cap. IV is the Jerome capitulum.)

**Page-split map.** p.672 (lower half, both columns, below the d.27 COMMENTARIUS): DISTINCTIO XXVIII header + Cap. I (L-col) + Cap. II opener and body (L→R), the text closing at the foot of the R-col with "…sit donum Dei scientia, quae". p.673: Cap. II tail (*sine caritate inflat … asserunt nasci»*) + Cap. III (full, L→R) + Cap. IV opener (R-col foot, *Id ergo de gratia … Ioviniani et Manichaei*). p.674 (top, both columns): Cap. IV tail (*et Pelagii errores collidens … et quam semper tenuimus »*), ending immediately before the full-width COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII header. Body seams 672→673 (*donum Dei scientia, quae ‖ sine caritate inflat*) and 673→674 (*Ioviniani et Manichaei ‖ et Pelagii errores collidens*) both grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**Apparatus split map (15 entries, body-anchor order).** p.672 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footers 1–3 → [^1]–[^3] (Retract. Cap. 9 n.3 → [^1] at *in primo libro Retractationum*; Colos. 1,13 → [^2] at *de potestate tenebrarum erui*; Codd./ed.1 *tamen* pro *tantum* → [^3] at *ad hoc tantum*). p.673 footers 1–12 → [^4]–[^15] (I Cor. 8,1 → [^4] at *aedificat*; de Haeresibus → [^5] at *asserunt nasci*; de Lib. Arb. III c.18 → [^6] at *de Libero Arbitrio*; Loc. cit. n.4 → [^7] at *in libro Retractationum*; de Duabus Animabus c.12 → [^8]; Retract. I c.15 n.6 → [^9] at *in libro Retractationum*; contra Adimantum c.26 → [^10]; Retract. I c.22 n.4 + Ioan. 1,12 → [^11] at *in Retractationibus*; Contra Adimant. c.27 → [^12] at *in eodem*; Expositio ad Romanos Num. 60 → [^13]; Sententiae Prosperi Num. 316 → [^14]; Hieronymi Explanatio Symboli → [^15] at *ad Damasum Papam*). No merges, no splits; one printed footer per entry. p.674 carries no littera footer — its footnote ¹ (*De potestate liberi arbitrii lapsi*) opens the COMMENTARIUS and belongs to `d28-divisio`.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED the p.672 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footers 1–3 from d27-dubia, which explicitly excluded them as the d.28 littera apparatus (the p.672 page-foot interleaves the d.27 COMMENTARIUS notes 4–6 with the fresh d.28 NOTAE block 1–3; d27-dubia took only its own DUB. III notes). FORWARDED nothing: the littera closes "…et quam semper tenuimus »" at the top of p.674 immediately before the COMMENTARIUS; the p.674 footer block (de potestate liberi arbitrii lapsi, etc.) belongs to `d28-divisio`.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. Pekigiana→Pelagiana, Relractationnm→Retractationum, praeponebat spacing, tenebra-rum erui, callidilate→calliditate, lovinian→Ioviniani, Eieronymus→Hieronymus, Adamantium/Aclamantium variant preserved verbatim in [^10]).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 28, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVIII — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXVIII — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII.

### *De potestate liberi arbitrii sine gratia.*

*Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra determinavit Magister, quantum potest liberum arbitrium cum gratia. In hac vero parte determinat, quantum potest liberum arbitrium sine gratia. Et dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima determinat de potestate liberi arbitrii lapsi[^1], quam habet, gratia circumscripta. Secundo vero determinat de libero arbitrio primi hominis, utrum gratia operante et cooperante eguerit, infra distinctione vigesima nona: *Post haec considerandum est, utrum* etc.

Dividitur autem pars ista in tres partes. In prima, quia Pelagiani errabant circa potestatem liberi arbitrii, ponit illius haeresis improbationem. In secunda vero respondet ad Pelagianorum argumentationes, ibi: *Quod vero dicunt, sine gratia* etc. In tertia vero subiungit catholicae veritatis expressionem, ibi: *Id vero de gratia et libero arbitrio indubitanter teneamus* etc.

Media pars dividitur in tres partes secundum tria media, a quibus sumuntur tres rationes, quibus Magister respondet. Primo enim respondet ad illud quod Pelagius dicebat, nullum esse culpandum, si non vitat, vel non facit illud, quod sibi est impossibile. Ex quo sumuntur duae rationes, ad quas Magister respondet duobus capitulis[^2]. Secundo vero respondet ad illud quod Pelagius dicebat, quod nihil est tam in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas, quod etiam ab ipso Augustino Pelagius assumserat, ibi: *Alibi etiam Augustinus dicit quod huic gratiae* etc. Tertio vero respondet ad illud quod Pelagius dicebat: *Quod credere nostrum est*, quod etiam extraxerat de verbis Augustini ex duobus locis; et ideo Magister respondet in duobus capitulis. Et incipit illa pars ibi: *In Expositione quarundam propositionum* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio de potestate liberi arbitrii, circumscripta gratia. Circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, quantum possit liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente.

Secundo vero quaeritur, quantum possit per se absque gratia gratis data.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sine gratia gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possit absque gratia gratum faciente adversarium vincere.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum possit Dei mandata implere.

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXVIII.

### *On the power of free choice without grace.*

*But this firmly and without hesitation* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master determined how much free choice can do with grace. But in this part he determines how much free choice can do without grace. And this part is divided into two. In the first he determines concerning the power of fallen free choice[^1] which it has when grace is set aside. In the second he determines concerning the free choice of the first man, whether it needed grace operating and cooperating, below in distinction twenty-nine: *After these things it must be considered, whether* etc.

Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first, because the Pelagians erred concerning the power of free choice, he sets down the refutation of that heresy. In the second he responds to the arguments of the Pelagians, there: *But as to what they say, without grace* etc. In the third he adds the expression of the catholic truth, there: *But this concerning grace and free choice let us hold without doubt* etc.

The middle part is divided into three parts according to the three means from which are taken the three reasons to which the Master responds. For first he responds to that which Pelagius said, that no one is to be blamed if he does not avoid, or does not do, that which is impossible for him. From which two reasons are taken, to which the Master responds in two chapters[^2]. Second he responds to that which Pelagius said, that nothing is so much in our power as the will itself, which also Pelagius had taken up from Augustine himself, there: *Elsewhere too Augustine says that to this grace* etc. Third he responds to that which Pelagius said: *That to believe is ours*, which also he had drawn from the words of Augustine from two places; and therefore the Master responds in two chapters. And that part begins there: *In the Exposition of certain propositions* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part there arises here a question concerning the power of free choice when grace is set aside. Concerning this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked how much free choice can do without grace that makes pleasing.

Second it is asked how much it can do by itself without grace freely given.

Concerning the first, three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether free choice without grace that makes pleasing can rise again from fault.

Second it is asked whether it can, without grace that makes pleasing, overcome the adversary.

Third it is asked whether it can fulfill the commandments of God.

---

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *hominis lapsi*. Mox pro *de libero arbitrio* edd., excepta 1, *liberum arbitrium*.

en: The Vatican edition together with editions 3 and 4 read *hominis lapsi* ("of fallen man"). Presently, in place of *de libero arbitrio* ("concerning free choice"), the editions, except 1, read *liberum arbitrium* ("free choice").

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *duabus*, omissa voce *capitulis*.

en: The Vatican edition together with editions 3 and 4 read *duabus* ("in two"), the word *capitulis* ("chapters") being omitted.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed p. 674 = PDF 696, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 47052–47085 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). This chunk holds the **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII** header + theme (*De potestate liberi arbitrii sine gratia*) + lemma (*Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter* etc.) + **DIVISIO TEXTUS** + **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM**. `has_scholion=false` (no scholion attaches to a divisio chunk). The Vol II PDF-priority inversion applies: the OCR cascade-shattered the two-column DIVISIO TEXTUS (e.g. *cura gratia*, *surauntur*, *sgmuntur*, *potestale*, *Auguslino*, *qUod*, *Idverode*), so the Latin was reflowed from the 450 dpi column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p674-{L,R}-{0,1,2}`), reading each page Left column then Right column.

**Page-split map.** The entire divisio sits on **p.674** (running head `674 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): the COMMENTARIUS header + theme + lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM all on this single printed page. The COMMENTARIUS follows immediately after the d.28 littera tail (*…et quam semper tenuimus »*, p.674 R-col top). The TRACTATIO question-list ends immediately before **ARTICULUS I / Quantum possit liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente / QUAESTIO I / Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere** (raw 47086). QUAESTIO I body begins at raw **47093** (p.674 R-col, *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia non gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere. Et quod non, videtur:*). Per Override §5, the short ARTICULUS I opener folds into `d28-a1-q1` — no standalone article-opener chunk. Single page break (`<!-- page 674 -->`); no mid-chunk page transition.

**Apparatus split map (2 entries).** The divisio carries 2 body markers and their footers, both on **p.674**:
- [^1] = **p.674 footer 1** ("Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *hominis lapsi*. Mox pro *de libero arbitrio* edd., excepta 1, *liberum arbitrium*"), anchored at the DIVISIO-TEXTUS word *lapsi* ("de potestate liberi arbitrii lapsi").
- [^2] = **p.674 footer 2** ("Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *duabus*, omissa voce *capitulis*"), anchored at the DIVISIO-TEXTUS word *capitulis* ("respondet duobus capitulis").
The next footer, **p.674 footer 3** ("Vers. 24. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 20; tertius loc. cit. v. 5"), anchors in the ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I body (*…ad Romanos tertio: Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius*) and belongs to `d28-a1-q1` — NOT duplicated here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none. The d28-littera build flagged the p.674 COMMENTARIUS footer ¹ as belonging to the divisio; eyes-on at 450 dpi confirms that footer ¹ is the divisio's own `lapsi` variant note (captured here as [^1]), so nothing migrated across the seam. The littera closed clean at *…et quam semper tenuimus »* (p.674 R-col top) immediately before the COMMENTARIUS header. FORWARDED: none — the divisio closes clean at the end of the TRACTATIO question-list, immediately before ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I (raw 47086–47092); `d28-a1-q1` owns the QUAESTIO I body + p.674 footer 3 onward.

**TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, verified at 450 dpi — q-alignment reference for the d.28 ARTICULUS I; the ARTICULUS II 3-question list is printed at the ARTICULUS II opener (raw ~47508), NOT in this divisio, and must be recorded verbatim when a2-q1 is built):**

*Two principal questions (= the two articles; theme of the distinction: De potestate liberi arbitrii sine gratia):*
- (ART. I) *Primo quaeritur, quantum possit liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente.*
- (ART. II) *Secundo vero quaeritur, quantum possit per se absque gratia gratis data.*

*ARTICULUS I — three sub-questions ("Circa primum quaeruntur tria"; theme Quantum possit liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente):*
1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sine gratia gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere.*  (= a1-q1 — *Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere*)
2. *Secundo quaeritur, utrum possit absque gratia gratum faciente adversarium vincere.*  (= a1-q2)
3. *Tertio quaeritur, utrum possit Dei mandata implere.*  (= a1-q3)

**d.28 chunk inventory** (DISTINCTIO XXVIII at raw 46924 → DISTINCTIO XXIX at raw 48282): littera ✅, divisio ✅ (this chunk) → ARTICULUS I (raw 47086) Q I/II/III → ARTICULUS II (raw ~47508) Q I/II/III → DUBIA (raw ~48173). Existing files: a1-q1/q2/q3, a2-q1, **a2-q3 (but a2-q2 MISSING — must be CREATED)**, dubia, **dubia-dup2 (stray — investigate at a2-q2/dubia time: may be the misfiled a2-q2 per the d.27 pattern, or a genuine over-range dup)**. Single-pars distinction (ART I/ART II are article-level, no p1/p2 split). Offset +22.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. *11-berum→liberum*, *cura→cum*, *potestale→potestate*, *isla→ista*, *calholicae→catholicae*, *Idverode→Id vero de*, *surauntur/sgmuntur→sumuntur*, *Auguslino→Augustino*, *qUod→quod*, *auteni→autem*, *quaerilur→quaeritur*).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 674 -->

### Articulus I.
*Quantum possit liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente.*

### Quaestio I.
*Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia non gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere. Et quod non, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud, quod dicitur ad Romanos tertio[^1]: *Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius.* Et paulo ante: *Ex operibus legis non iustificatur omnis caro.* Et expressius ad Titum tertio: *Non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secun-*
<!-- page 675 -->
*dum suam misericordiam* etc.: igitur gratia gratum faciente circumscripta, non potest liberum arbitrium per se resurgere a culpa.

2. *Item*, ad Galatas secundo[^2]: *Non abiicio gratiam Dei; si enim per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est:* si ergo virtute liberi arbitrii posset homo ad iustitiam redire, videtur, quod Christus frustra mortuus esset; quod si hoc est impium dicere, patet etc.

3. *Item*, nemo petit ab alio quod habet in sua potestate; sed in Psalmo[^3] petit vir sanctus: *Sana animam meam, quia peccavi tibi.* Docet etiam nos ipse Salvator petere in oratione dominica: *Et dimitte nobis debita nostra:* ergo etc.

4. *Item*, hoc ostenditur ratione, quam facit Bernardus[^4]: cum aliquis de impio fit pius, de malo fit bonus; et cum de malo fit bonus, melioratur; nullus tamen habet posse supra se: ergo nullus potest se ipsum meliorare propria virtute: ergo nec absque gratia Dei a culpa resurgere.

5. *Item*, omni peccato offenditur Deus, qui est ipsa iustitia, et omne peccatum fit contra mandatum Dei; sed tanta est offensa, quantus est ille qui offenditur: cum igitur ipse sit infinitus, offensa habet aliquo modo rationem infiniti. Si igitur liberum arbitrium potentiae finitae est, impossibile est, quod in pristinum statum redeat, nisi reducatur per divinam misericordiam, quae sua gratuita bonitate condonet culpam sive remittat offensam; hoc autem non fit sine gratia: ergo etc.

6. *Item*, peccatum est privatio vitae spiritualis et privatio lucis; sed vita spiritualis non potest redire ad animam nisi a fonte vitae, nec lux nisi a fonte lucis[^5]: ergo impossibile est, quod anima resurgat a culpa, nisi Deus, qui est fons vitae et lux perennis, sua benignitate eam vivificet et illuminet; hoc autem non est nisi per donum gratiae: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Damascenus[^6]: « Peccatum est ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est praeter naturam aversio »; sed facilius est unicuique rei moveri secundum naturam quam praeter naturam: ergo si liberum arbitrium virtute propria peccando potest moveri praeter naturam, virtute propria redire poterit ad naturam: ergo sicut potuit cadere, ita et resurgere.

2. *Item*, maior est virtus liberi arbitrii quam naturae; sed natura, cum infirmatur, sanari potest
<!-- page 675 R-col -->
absque auxilio medicinae: ergo multo fortius liberum arbitrium, cum infirmatur per culpam, sanari potest absque omni gratia.

3. *Item*, absque gratia gratum faciente de ignorante potest fieri homo sciens, non solum in his quae subsunt naturae, sed etiam in his quae sunt supra naturam: ergo pari ratione absque gratia gratum faciente poterit homo fieri iustus de peccatore.

4. *Item*, peccator in mortali peccato existens potest desiderare et velle iustitiam; sed nihil aliud est esse iustum quam velle iustitiam, quia iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis; tunc autem voluntas recta est, quando vult iustitiam[^7]: ergo peccator in mortali peccato absque gratia gratum faciente iustificari potest.

5. *Item*, per eandem vim, per quam quis movetur ad aliquid, quiescit ibidem[^8]: ergo si aliquis non movetur ad culpam nisi voluntate, non quiescit ibi nisi per voluntatem, et quamdiu vult: ergo si non vult in culpa persistere absque gratia gratum faciente, videtur, quod possit a culpa resurgere. Si iudicas, quod non potest velle; contra: « Potestates rationales sunt ad opposita », sicut dicit Philosophus[^9], et voluntas, quamdiu est in via, vertibilis est: ergo sicut voluntarie potuit culpam appetere, ita voluntarie potest a culpa resurgere.

6. *Item*, inter gratiam et culpam media est innocentia, sicut melius patebit infra[^10]: ergo cum possit ab aliquo haberi innocentia sine gratia, sicut habita fuit ab Adam in primordio, et innocentia habita deleatur culpa; videtur, quod sine gratia gratum faciente aliquis possit a culpa resurgere.

### Conclusio.

> Ut liberum arbitrium resurgat a culpa, necessaria est etiam gratia, secundum quod dicitur habitus animi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in huius quaestionis determinatione aliter senserunt *philosophi*, aliter senserunt *haeretici*, aliter senserunt *tractatores catholici*.

*Philosophi* enim ignorantes, qualiter peccato offendatur divina maiestas, et qualiter per ipsum adimatur potentiarum habilitas; dixerunt, quod homo per *exercitationem* poterat iustus effici, sicut per *inordinationem* a recta ratione factus erat iniustus.
<!-- page 676 -->
Unde et Philosophus dicit, quod pravus, ad meliores exercitationes deductus, aut multum proficiet, aut perfecte in contrarium habitum restituitur[^11].

*Haeretici* vero, aliquod lumen fidei habentes, cognoverunt, quod per peccatum offenditur maiestas divina et quodam modo damnificatur[^12]. Excaecati tamen non consideraverunt, qualiter ex culpa natura infirmatur; et ideo dixerunt, quod ad hoc, quod liberum arbitrium a culpa resurgat, non est sibi necessaria aliqua *gratia curans*, sed sufficit sola gratuita Dei misericordia, quae inclinatur ad remittendum peccata nostra propter satisfactionem, quam Christus sibi facere voluit, dum se in cruce pro nobis obtulit. — Sed haec positio non tantum a veritate deficit, sed etiam, dum contraria implicat, se ipsam destruit. Dicit enim, quod ad hoc, quod liberum arbitrium a culpa resurgat, necesse est, quod Deus sibi culpam remittat; et tamen non est necesse, quod aliquid sibi tribuat, vel circa ipsum faciat. Si enim Deus non mutatur; et iterum ipse iustus iudex est, ut nihil acceptet nisi tantum, quantum valet: ad hoc, quod culpa remittatur, et peccator Deo reconcilietur, necesse est, quod aliquid ipsi peccatori tribuatur, per quod morbus peccati sanetur[^13].

*Catholici* vero tractatores et luce fidei et auctoritate Scripturae cognoverunt, quod peccatum et Dei est offensivum, et etiam quodam modo damnificativum, dum homo se transfert de servitio Dei ad servitutem diaboli; et etiam imaginis deformativum. Et ideo dixerunt, quod ad hoc, quod liberum arbitrium resurgat a culpa, necessaria est *gratia*, non solum secundum quod gratia dicitur gratuita voluntas Dei, nec etiam[^14] secundum quod dicitur liberalis passio Christi, sed etiam secundum quod dicitur habitus animi. Gratuita enim voluntas Dei concurrit ad hoc, quod fiat offensae remissio — voluntarie enim nobis condonat offensam — liberalis autem passio Christi concurrit ad hoc, quod fiat damni satisfactio[^15]; habitus infusus concurrit ad hoc, quod fiat morbi curatio et imaginis reformatio. Et ideo ad hoc, quod homo resurgat a culpa, multum per omnem modum necessaria est sibi gratia. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod homo absque gratia gratum faciente non potest a culpa resurgere.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod motus in id quod est secundum naturam, facilior est quam ille, qui est in id quod est praeter naturam; dicendum, quod illud verum est de illo motu, qui est secundum naturam, ita quod *subiacet*[^16] potestati naturae; et de illo etiam motu, qui est praeter naturam, ita tamen, quod non corrumpitur nec diminuitur ibi naturae potestas, sicut est in motu lapidis sursum. Facilius enim regreditur deorsum, quam ascenderit sursum: tum quia moveri deorsum est in eius potestate; tum etiam, quia per motum sursum nihil diminuebatur vel adimebatur de eius gravitate. — Non sic autem est in proposito, tum quia moveri ad iustitiam est per virtutem supra naturam; tum etiam, quia motus ad culpam *diminuit* habilitatem liberi arbitrii. Per peccatum enim non solum homo exspoliatur gratuitis, sed etiam vulneratur in naturalibus[^17].

2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de similitudine sanitatis naturae ad sanitatem voluntatis; non enim est simile. Nam sanitas corporalis est in potestate naturae, sanitas vero spiritualis est per aliquid, quod est supra naturam. Cum autem aliquid infirmatur corporaliter, non omnino naturae perimitur virtus, quae erat principium sanitatis[^18]; et ideo a tali infirmitate ad sanitatem naturaliter potest fieri regressus. In peccato vero perditur ipsa gratia Dei et iustitia, per quam erat spiritualis sanitas; et pro tanto dicitur grave peccatum esse mortale, quia aufert homini principium vitae. Et propterea, sicut de mortuo non potest fieri vivus nisi virtute mirabili[^19] et supra naturam; sic nec de peccatore potest fieri iustus naturaliter, vel voluntarie, sed mirabiliter.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ignorante, quod potest fieri sciens sine gratia gratum faciente; dicendum, quod non est simile; ignorantia enim, in quantum huiusmodi, potius dicit defectum poenae quam culpae. Unde *ignorans*, secundum quod ignorans, non displicet Deo; *peccans* autem, secundum quod
<!-- page 677 -->
peccans, Deo displicet; et ideo culpae recte opponitur *gratia*, quae reddit Deo acceptum, sicut *ignorantiae* opponitur *scientia*. Et quoniam oppositum expelli habet per suum oppositum, ideo non sequitur, quod si ignorantia habet expelli sine gratia, quod similiter culpa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccator, manens in mortali, potest velle iustitiam; dicendum, quod velle aliquid est dupliciter: vel exiliter et semiplene, sicut dicitur: *Vult, et non vult piger*[^20]; vel plene et sufficienter, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Philippenses secundo: *Deus operatur in nobis velle et perficere.* Primo modo potest esse in peccatore, et talis voluntas non facit aliquem iustum; secundo modo non potest esse sine gratia praeveniente et adiuvante voluntatem. Hoc autem secundo modo, non primo, voluntas iustitiae reddit animam iustam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per eandem vim, per quam aliquid movetur, quiescit; dicendum, quod verum est in eo motu, qui est ad aliquod complementum; hoc autem non oportet esse in motu corruptionis et destructionis. Aliquis enim interficitur per violentiam; non tamen oportet, quod per illam eandem vim in morte persistat. Et quia peccatum corruptio dicitur, non oportet, quod quis persistat in peccato ex solo actu voluntatis, sicut per actum voluntatis se in peccato praecipitavit; sicut patet in eo qui se voluntarie interficit vel voluntarie se demergit.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus possit restituere innocentiam et ita delere culpam absque gratia; dicendum, quod hoc verum est; sed largitas divinae misericordiae sic decrevit auferre malum, per quod homo Deo displicet, ut simul daretur bonum, per quod homo Deo placeret; nec unquam expellit culpam, quin sanctificet[^21] ipsam animam et in ea habitet per gratiam. Unde nihil est medium secundum tempus inter iustum et impium; ex quo enim homo nascitur, necesse est, animam eius vel esse perversam per culpam, vel erectam per gratiam.

english:
### Article I.
*How much free choice can do without grace that makes pleasing.*

### Question I.
*Whether free choice can rise again from fault without grace that makes pleasing.*

Concerning the first point we proceed thus and inquire whether free choice can rise again from fault without grace that does not make pleasing. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. *First*, through what is said in Romans, chapter three[^1]: *Being justified freely by his grace.* And a little before: *By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified.* And more expressly in Titus, chapter three: *Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according*
to *his own mercy* etc.: therefore, with grace that makes pleasing set aside, free choice cannot of itself rise again from fault.

2. *Likewise*, in Galatians, chapter two[^2]: *I cast not away the grace of God; for if justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain:* if therefore by the power of free choice a man could return to justice, it seems that Christ would have died in vain; and if it is impious to say this, the point is clear, etc.

3. *Likewise*, no one asks from another what he has in his own power; but in the Psalm[^3] the holy man asks: *Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee.* The Savior himself also teaches us to ask in the Lord's Prayer: *And forgive us our debts:* therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, this is shown by a reason that Bernard makes[^4]: when someone becomes pious from impious, he becomes good from bad; and when he becomes good from bad, he is made better; yet no one has power over himself: therefore no one can make himself better by his own power: therefore neither can he rise again from fault without the grace of God.

5. *Likewise*, by every sin God is offended, who is justice itself, and every sin is done against the commandment of God; but the offense is as great as is he who is offended: since therefore he is infinite, the offense has in some way the character of the infinite. If therefore free choice is of finite power, it is impossible that it return to its former state, unless it be brought back by the divine mercy, which by its gratuitous goodness pardons the fault or remits the offense; but this does not happen without grace: therefore etc.

6. *Likewise*, sin is the privation of spiritual life and the privation of light; but spiritual life cannot return to the soul except from the fountain of life, nor light except from the fountain of light[^5]: therefore it is impossible that the soul rise again from fault, unless God, who is the fountain of life and perennial light, by his kindness vivify and illumine it; but this happens only through the gift of grace: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Damascene[^6]: « Sin is a turning away from that which is according to nature into that which is against nature »; but it is easier for any thing to be moved according to nature than against nature: therefore if free choice by its own power can in sinning be moved against nature, by its own power it will be able to return to nature: therefore as it was able to fall, so also to rise again.

2. *Likewise*, the power of free choice is greater than that of nature; but nature, when it is weakened, can be healed
without the aid of medicine: therefore much more strongly can free choice, when it is weakened through fault, be healed without any grace.

3. *Likewise*, without grace that makes pleasing a man can be made knowing from being ignorant, not only in those things which lie under nature, but also in those things which are above nature: therefore by parallel reasoning, without grace that makes pleasing a man will be able to be made just from being a sinner.

4. *Likewise*, a sinner existing in mortal sin can desire and will justice; but to be just is nothing other than to will justice, since justice is the rectitude of the will; and the will is then right when it wills justice[^7]: therefore a sinner in mortal sin can be justified without grace that makes pleasing.

5. *Likewise*, by the same force by which someone is moved toward something, he comes to rest in it[^8]: therefore if someone is moved to fault only by the will, he does not rest in it except through the will, and so long as he wills: therefore if he does not will to persist in fault, without grace that makes pleasing, it seems that he can rise again from fault. If you judge that he cannot will it; on the contrary: « Rational powers are toward opposites », as the Philosopher says[^9], and the will, so long as it is on the way, is changeable: therefore as it was able voluntarily to seek fault, so voluntarily it can rise again from fault.

6. *Likewise*, between grace and fault innocence is in the middle, as will appear better below[^10]: therefore since innocence can be had by someone without grace, as it was had by Adam in the beginning, and since fault is destroyed by innocence had; it seems that without grace that makes pleasing someone can rise again from fault.

### Conclusion.

> That free choice rise again from fault, grace too is necessary, according as it is called a habit of the soul.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the determination of this question the *philosophers* held one view, the *heretics* another, the *catholic treatise-writers* another.

For the *philosophers*, being ignorant of how the divine majesty is offended by sin, and how through it the fitness of the powers is taken away, said that man could be made just through *exercise*, just as through *disorder* away from right reason he had been made unjust.
Hence the Philosopher too says that a depraved man, led to better exercises, either will profit much, or is perfectly restored to the contrary habit[^11].

The *heretics*, however, having some light of faith, recognized that through sin the divine majesty is offended and in some way harmed[^12]. Yet, being blinded, they did not consider how nature is weakened by fault; and therefore they said that, for free choice to rise again from fault, no *healing grace* is necessary to it, but the gratuitous mercy of God alone suffices, which is inclined to remit our sins on account of the satisfaction which Christ willed to make for himself, when he offered himself on the cross for us. — But this position not only falls short of the truth, but also, while it implies contradictions, destroys itself. For it says that, for free choice to rise again from fault, it is necessary that God remit the fault to him; and yet it is not necessary that he bestow anything on him, or do anything about him. For if God is not changed; and again he himself is a just judge, so that he accepts nothing except only as much as it is worth: for the fault to be remitted and the sinner reconciled to God, it is necessary that something be bestowed on the sinner himself, by which the disease of sin be healed[^13].

The *catholic* treatise-writers, however, both by the light of faith and by the authority of Scripture, recognized that sin is both offensive to God, and also in some way harmful, while man transfers himself from the service of God to the servitude of the devil; and also deformative of the image. And therefore they said that, for free choice to rise again from fault, *grace* is necessary, not only according as grace is called the gratuitous will of God, nor even[^14] according as it is called the liberal passion of Christ, but also according as it is called a habit of the soul. For the gratuitous will of God concurs that the remission of the offense come about — for voluntarily he pardons us the offense — the liberal passion of Christ concurs that the satisfaction of the loss come about[^15]; the infused habit concurs that the curing of the disease and the reformation of the image come about. And therefore, for man to rise again from fault, grace is in every way greatly necessary to him. — Therefore the reasons showing that man cannot rise again from fault without grace that makes pleasing are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the motion into that which is according to nature is easier than that which is into that which is against nature; it must be said that this is true of that motion which is according to nature, in such a way that it *lies under*[^16] the power of nature; and of that motion too which is against nature, yet in such a way that the power of nature is not there corrupted nor diminished, as is the case in the upward motion of a stone. For it returns downward more easily than it ascended upward: both because to be moved downward is within its power; and also because by the upward motion nothing was diminished or taken away from its weight. — But it is not so in our case, both because to be moved toward justice is by a power above nature; and also because the motion toward fault *diminishes* the fitness of free choice. For through sin man is not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also is wounded in his natural endowments[^17].

2. And by this is clear the response to what follows, which is objected concerning the likeness of the health of nature to the health of the will; for it is not alike. For bodily health is within the power of nature, but spiritual health is through something that is above nature. For when something is weakened corporeally, the power of nature, which was the principle of health, is not entirely destroyed[^18]; and therefore from such weakness a return to health can be made naturally. But in sin the very grace of God and justice, through which there was spiritual health, is lost; and to that extent grave sin is said to be mortal, because it takes from man the principle of life. And on this account, just as from a dead man a living one cannot be made except by a marvelous power[^19] and above nature; so neither from a sinner can a just man be made naturally, or voluntarily, but marvelously.

3. To that which is objected concerning the ignorant man, that he can be made knowing without grace that makes pleasing; it must be said that it is not alike; for ignorance, as such, rather bespeaks a defect of penalty than of fault. Hence the *ignorant*, as ignorant, is not displeasing to God; but the *sinner*, as
sinning, is displeasing to God; and therefore *grace*, which renders one acceptable to God, is rightly opposed to fault, just as *knowledge* is opposed to *ignorance*. And since an opposite is to be expelled by its opposite, it does not therefore follow that, if ignorance is to be expelled without grace, that fault likewise is.

4. To that which is objected, that a sinner, remaining in mortal sin, can will justice; it must be said that to will something is twofold: either weakly and half-fully, as it is said: *The sluggard wills, and wills not*[^20]; or fully and sufficiently, as the Apostle says in Philippians, chapter two: *God works in us to will and to accomplish.* In the first way it can be in a sinner, and such a will does not make anyone just; in the second way it cannot be without grace going before and helping the will. But in this second way, not in the first, the will of justice renders the soul just.

5. To that which is objected, that by the same force by which something is moved, it comes to rest; it must be said that this is true in that motion which is toward some completion; but this need not be the case in a motion of corruption and destruction. For someone is killed by violence; yet it need not be that by that same force he persist in death. And since sin is called a corruption, it need not be that one persist in sin from the mere act of the will, just as by an act of the will he cast himself into sin; as is clear in the one who voluntarily kills himself or voluntarily drowns himself.

6. To that which is objected, that God can restore innocence and thus destroy fault without grace; it must be said that this is true; but the largesse of the divine mercy has so decreed to take away the evil by which man is displeasing to God, that at the same time there be given the good by which man would be pleasing to God; nor does he ever expel fault, without sanctifying[^21] the soul itself and dwelling in it through grace. Hence there is nothing in the middle, with respect to time, between the just and the impious; for from the time man is born, it is necessary that his soul be either perverse through fault, or set upright through grace.

la: Vers. 24. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 20; tertius loc. cit. v. 5.

en: Verse 24 [Rom. 3:24]. — The following text is in the same place, v. 20; the third is at the place cited, v. 5 [Titus 3:5].

la: Vers. 21.

la: Psalm. 40, 5. — Seq. textus est Matth. 6, 12. — Hoc arg. affert August., de Natura et gratia, c. 18. n. 20. seq., ubi exclamat: Nam quid stultius quam orare, ut facias quod in potestate habeas?

en: Psalm 40:5. — The following text is Matthew 6:12. — Augustine adduces this argument, On Nature and Grace, c. 18, n. 20 ff., where he exclaims: For what is more foolish than to pray that you may do what you have in your power?

la: De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 8. n. 23. Cfr. etiam c. 6. n. 18. — Paulo inferius pro nullus tamen codd. F aa nullus autem.

en: On Grace and Free Choice, c. 8, n. 23. Cf. also c. 6, n. 18. — A little further down, for *nullus tamen* codices F aa have *nullus autem*.

la: Cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 23. n. 3; Enarrat. in Ps. 143. n. 4; de Natura et gratia, c. 23. n. 23.

en: Cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tr. 23, n. 3; Enarrations on the Psalms, Ps. 143, n. 4; On Nature and Grace, c. 23, n. 23.

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 20. Cfr. II. c. 30.

en: Book IV of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 20. Cf. II, c. 30.

la: Anselmus, Dialog. de verit. c. 12: Iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis... non enim illam habemus nisi volendo; et si eam volumus, hoc ipso eam habemus... et mox ut habemus et volumus eandem rectitudinem voluntatis, iustitia dicenda est. — Pro tunc autem Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 tunc enim.

en: Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 12: Justice therefore is the rectitude of the will... for we have it only by willing; and if we will it, by that very fact we have it... and as soon as we have and will the same rectitude of the will, it is to be called justice. — For *tunc autem* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has *tunc enim*.

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): Eadem enim potentia est sanum et aegrotum esse, et quiescere et moveri, et exstruere et destruere domum etc.

en: Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9): For the same potency is for being healthy and being sick, and for resting and being moved, and for building up and tearing down a house, etc.

la: Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).

en: Metaphysics, Book IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5).

la: Dist. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. et a. 2. q. 2, ubi etiam sustinetur opinio, quod Adam in statu innocentiae creatus sit absque dono gratiae gratum facientis.

en: Distinction 29, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5, and a. 2, q. 2, where also the opinion is upheld that Adam in the state of innocence was created without the gift of grace that makes pleasing.

la: Vide II. Ethic. c. 2, ubi Aristoteles docet, virtutem in nobis causari assuetudine operationum, ipsamque eo ipso, quod consistat in mediocritate, corrumpi ab excessu et defectu.

en: See Ethics II, c. 2, where Aristotle teaches that virtue is caused in us by the habituation of operations, and that it, by the very fact that it consists in a mean, is corrupted by excess and defect.

la: Vat. perperam hic adiicit voluntas vel liberum arbitrium. Aliquanto inferius post aliqua gratia ed. 1 addit creata, quod verbum codd. A bb cc et alii substituunt pro curans. — De hac opinione vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Ibidem in capp. seqq. haec opinio refellitur et tertia approbatur.

en: The Vatican edition wrongly adds here *voluntas vel liberum arbitrium*. Somewhat further down, after *aliqua gratia* edition 1 adds *creata*, which word codices A bb cc and others substitute for *curans*. — On this opinion see here the Master's text, c. 1. In the same place in the following chapters this opinion is refuted and the third approved.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 1. seq.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, q. 1 ff.

la: Intellige cum cod. Q nec solum etiam. Subinde pro habitus animi codd. H 1 habitus gratuitus animi.

en: Understand with codex Q *nec solum etiam*. Then for *habitus animi* codices H 1 have *habitus gratuitus animi*.

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 omittit verba ad hoc, quod fiat damni satisfactio; habitus infusus concurrit ad, quae verba ex codd. A E K M Y restituimus, et deinde post morbi curatio interiecto commate, dictae edd. post voculam et immediate sequentem interserunt gratia ut fiat. Cod. 1, omissis etiam cum Vat. verbis praenotatis, post morbi curatio sic prosequitur: sed habitus animi gratuitus ad hoc, quod fiat imaginis reformatio. Sed lectiones evidenter mutilae sunt, cum non respondeant doctrinae in praecedentibus traditae, scil. quod libero arbitrio a Deo gratia curans tribuatur, per quam morbus ipsius sanetur.

en: The Vatican edition with edition 4 omits the words *ad hoc, quod fiat damni satisfactio; habitus infusus concurrit ad*, which words we have restored from codices A E K M Y; and then, after *morbi curatio*, with a comma inserted, the said editions, after the little word *et* and the one immediately following, interpose *gratia ut fiat*. Codex 1, omitting also with the Vatican the words noted above, after *morbi curatio* continues thus: *but a gratuitous habit of the soul, that the reformation of the image come about*. But the readings are evidently mutilated, since they do not correspond to the doctrine handed down in what precedes, namely that to free choice a healing grace is bestowed by God, through which its disease is healed.

la: Codd. T cc et ed. 1 subiaceat.

en: Codices T cc and edition 1 have *subiaceat*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. August., de Natura et gratia, c. 32. n. 60, adducta parabola de Samaritano, in seq. cap. n. 62. de natura humana ait: «Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est». Quibus confirmatur quod diximus supra pag. 511, nota 2. Verbotenus est in libro Instructio sacerdotis, p. I. c. 1, n. 2. (inter op. Bern.).

en: Cf. above, p. 506, note 3. Augustine, On Nature and Grace, c. 32, n. 60, the parable of the Samaritan being adduced, in the following chapter, n. 62, says of human nature: «It is wounded, hurt, harassed, lost». By these is confirmed what we said above, p. 511, note 2. It is word-for-word in the book *Instruction for a Priest*, p. I, c. 1, n. 2 (among the works of Bernard).

la: Cor enim, ut ait Averroes super IV. de Caelo et mundo, text. 24, in eo [scil. infirmo, qui sanatur per se] alterat membrum aegrotans ad sanitatem.

en: For the heart, as Averroes says on IV On the Heaven and the World, text 24, in him [namely, the sick man who is healed of himself] alters the ailing member toward health.

la: Codd. F L O aa ee miraculi.

en: Codices F L O aa ee have *miraculi*.

la: Prov. 13, 4. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 13. — Circa finem solut. edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 pro non primo perperam substituunt non potest, sed Vat. tantum potest, et deinde pro reddit edd., excepta 1, exhibent reddere.

en: Proverbs 13:4. — The following text is at the place cited, v. 13. — Near the end of the solution editions 1, 2, 3, 4 wrongly substitute *non potest* for *non primo*, but the Vatican only *potest*, and then for *reddit* the editions, except 1, present *reddere*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 vivificet. Mox pro et in ea Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ut in ea. Infra secundum tempus i. e. in praesenti providentia.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 have *vivificet*. Then for *et in ea* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has *ut in ea*. Below, *secundum tempus*, i.e. in present providence. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius quaestionis decretis Concilii Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 3. i. 7, can. 11.) confirmata est. Idem docetur a S. Bonav. etiam IV. Sent. d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, dum quaeritur, utrum ad iustificationem impii necessaria sit gratiae infusio (cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 1. 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). — De necessitate gratiae sanctificantis ad salutem contra philosophos et Pelagianos diffuse disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1.

**II.** De eadem quaestione: Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3; Report. ibid. q. 2. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3; S. 1. II. q. 113. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 156; de Verit. q. 28. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 105. m. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question has been confirmed by the decrees of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 3, i. 7, can. 11). The same is taught by St. Bonaventure also in IV Sent. d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, where it is asked whether for the justification of the impious an infusion of grace is necessary (cf. also below a. 2, q. 1, 3, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, 2). — On the necessity of sanctifying grace for salvation against the philosophers and Pelagians, Alexander of Hales disputes at length, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 1.

**II.** On the same question: Scotus, I Sent. d. 17, q. 3; Report. ibid. q. 2. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 3; S. I-II, q. 113, a. 2; S. c. Gent. III, c. 156; de Verit. q. 28, a. 2. — B. Albert, II Sent. d. 26, a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 16, q. 105, m. 1-3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
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title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Articulus I. Quaestio II. *Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit adversarium suum vincere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit adversarium suum vincere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Genesis quarto[^1] dictum est Cain: *Subter te erit appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius;* sed constat, quod Cain iam erat in mortali peccato: ergo in statu illo dominari poterat appetitui proprio. Sed nullam victoriam habet in nobis adversarius nisi per nostrum appetitum: si igitur absque gratia gratum faciente Cain superare poterat proprium appetitum; videtur, quod posset etiam vincere adversarium.

2. Item, Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^2]: *Liberum arbitrium est potentissimum sub Deo.* Et ibidem dicit, quod liberum arbitrium « sui omnino defectum non patitur, quare potissime in ipso aeternae et incommutabilis imago deitatis videtur. Nam si habet initium, nescit tamen occasum; nec de iustitia vel de gratia accipit augmentum nec de peccati miseria detrimentum ». Ergo si liberum arbitrium, adiutum gratia et iustitia, possit superare adversarium; pari ratione videtur, quod possit etiam per se ipsum.

3. Item, spiritus luxuriae deiicitur vel vincitur per continentiam, et spiritus iracundiae per patientiam, et sic de aliis; sed continentia et patientia possunt haberi absque gratia gratum faciente per gratiam gratis datam: ergo videtur etc.

4. Item, difficilius est vincere se ipsum quam vincere diabolum; sicut enim habitum fuit, et Magister dicit supra distinctione vigesima prima[^3]: « Fortior est tentatio carnis quam tentatio hostis »; sed homo absque gratia gratum faciente potest se ipsum vincere et morti exponere, sicut patet in haereticis: ergo multo fortius videtur, quod absque gratia gratum faciente possit de diabolo triumphare.

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5. Item, adversarius noster, in quo nulla est gratia gratum faciens, frequenter potest nos devincere et sibi subiugare: si ergo non est peioris conditionis homo, quam sit diabolus; videtur, quod absque aliquo dono gratiae possit quis adversarium suum vincere.

**Sed contra:**
1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^4]: *Deo gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum:* igitur sine auxilio Christi nemo potest de inimico habere victoriam. Si ergo Christus auxiliatur nobis per gratiam suam, per quam nos iustificat, videtur etc.

2. Item, ad Romanos septimo[^5]: *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?* Et respondet: *Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum.* Si ergo nullus vincit adversarium, nisi qui liberatur a lege peccati et mortis; videtur, quod absque gratia Dei per Iesum Christum, quae quidem est gratia gratum faciens, non possit adversarium vincere.

3. Item, super illud Psalmi[^6]: *Infirmati sunt* etc., Glossa: « Non potentes resistere vitiis per se ». « Deo enim desistente ab auxilio, laborare potest homo, sed non vincere »: ergo videtur, quod absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis non contingit vincere tentatorem. Quodsi tu dicas, hoc intelligendum esse de gratia gratis data, non gratum faciente solum; obiicitur per aliam Glossam super illud Psalmi[^7]: *Immissiones per angelos malos* etc.; ibi Glossa: « Diabolus potestatem habet in peccatore sicut in proprio pecore »: ergo cum non possit a peccato erui nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, non potest nisi per illam erui a potestate diaboli: ergo sine illa non potest ipsum devincere.

4. Item, vincenti debetur corona, secundum quod dicitur Apocalypsis secundo et tertio[^8]; sed nulli pugnanti contra adversarium debetur corona gloriae, nisi ei qui habet gratiam gratum facientem: ergo nullus absque illa potest diabolum devincere.

5. Item, quidquid homo faciat et quidquid etiam caveat, quamdiu est sine gratia gratum faciente, manet in culpa, sicut prius ostensum est; sed cum manet in culpa, servus est diaboli, servus est etiam peccati; et qui servus est diaboli, victus est a diabolo, secundum quod dicitur secundae Petri secundo: igitur absque gratia gratum faciente impossibile est de diabolo triumphare.

### Conclusio

> Sine gratia gratum faciente homo non potest adversarium ita vincere, ut proficiat in merito condigni.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod differt dicere, aliquem resistere adversario, et aliquem vincere adversarium. Plus enim importat victoria quam resistentia. Resistentia namque consistit in hoc, quod quis non consentiat suggestioni diabolicae; sed victoria consistit in assequendo oppositum eius quod diabolus intendebat. Intendebat autem diabolus hominem reddere inimicum Deo, et facere dignum aeterno supplicio. Tunc igitur homo vincit adversarium, quando sic resistit tentationi, ut efficiatur maior Dei amicus et mereatur regnum aeternum. — Et quoniam hoc absque gratia gratum faciente esse non potest, ideo concedendum est, quod etsi quis per gratiam gratis datam possit diabolo resistere, ut ei non consentiat suggerenti; tamen absque dono, quod reddat hominem acceptum Deo, ipsum vincere non potest, ut contra eius intentionem proficiat dignitate meriti vel in merito condigni. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de eo quod dictum est Cain: *Subter te erit appetitus tuus* etc., dicendum, quod etsi in potestate eius esset appetitum refrenare, ut in actum peccati non procederet, etiam absque gratia gratum faciente; non tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod posset adversarium devincere; quia, etsi sine gratia hoc faceret, esset ibi resistentia, per quam vitaret poenam, non tamen esset ibi victoria, per quam mereretur palmam.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium dicitur esse potentissimum sub Deo, et quod non angetur nec minuitur; dicendum, quod, quemadmodum fuit supra expositum, hoc intelligitur quantum ad privationem coactionis, non quantum ad potentiam servandae rectitudinis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritus luxuriae vincitur per continentiam; dicendum, quod etsi per continentiam, quae est absque gratia gratum faciente, possit quis resistere spiritui luxuriae; illa tamen resistentia triumphus dici non potest, pro eo quod nullam ex hoc assequitur palmam.

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*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest quis vincere se ipsum sine gratia gratum faciente; dicendum, quod falsum est. Quamvis enim haereticus, qui exponit se morti, videatur se ipsum vincere, non tamen est ibi victoria, sed deiectio. Superatur enim ab erroris improbitate et conscientiae perversitate et obstinationis profunditate; et propter hoc magis meretur confusionem et ignominiam ex illa mortis perpessione quam gloriam.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus potest vincere hominem absque gratia; dicendum, quod victoria diaboli consistit in subiugando sibi hominem per peccatum, victoria vero hominis consistit in promerendo illud quod diabolus amisit; et ideo, sicut facilius est peccare quam in bonum[^9] proficere, sic facilius est, diabolum superare hominem, quam hominem adversarium vincere. Praeterea, diabolus non vincit hominem nisi volentem et consentientem[^10], diabolus autem nunquam vincitur volens; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi diabolus potest reportare victoriam de homine absque gratia, quod similiter possit esse e converso; immo non est simile, sicut ostensum est.

english:
### Article I. Question II. *Whether free choice without grace that makes pleasing can conquer its adversary.*

Second, it is asked whether free choice without grace that makes pleasing can conquer its adversary. And it seems that it can.

1. In Genesis chapter four[^1] it was said to Cain: *Beneath you shall be your appetite, and you shall have dominion over it;* but it is established that Cain was already in mortal sin: therefore in that state he was able to have dominion over his own appetite. But the adversary has no victory in us except through our appetite: if therefore without grace that makes pleasing Cain was able to overcome his own appetite, it seems that he could also conquer the adversary.

2. Likewise, Bernard in the book *On Free Choice*[^2]: *Free choice is the most powerful thing under God.* And in the same place he says that free choice « suffers no failing of itself at all, wherefore most especially in it the image of the eternal and unchangeable deity is seen. For though it has a beginning, yet it knows no setting; nor does it receive increase from justice or from grace, nor loss from the misery of sin ». Therefore if free choice, aided by grace and justice, can overcome the adversary, by parity of reasoning it seems that it can do so also by itself.

3. Likewise, the spirit of lust is cast down or conquered through continence, and the spirit of anger through patience, and so of the rest; but continence and patience can be had without grace that makes pleasing, through grace freely given: therefore it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, it is more difficult to conquer oneself than to conquer the devil; for as has been held, and as the Master says above in the twenty-first distinction[^3]: « The temptation of the flesh is stronger than the temptation of the enemy »; but a man without grace that makes pleasing can conquer himself and expose himself to death, as is plain in heretics: therefore much more strongly does it seem that without grace that makes pleasing he can triumph over the devil.

5. Likewise, our adversary, in whom there is no grace that makes pleasing, can frequently overpower us and subjugate us to himself: if therefore a man is not of worse condition than the devil is, it seems that without any gift of grace someone can conquer his adversary.

**On the contrary:**
1. First Corinthians chapter fifteen[^4]: *Thanks be to God, who has given us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord:* therefore without the help of Christ no one can have victory over the enemy. If therefore Christ helps us through his grace, by which he justifies us, it seems, etc.

2. Likewise, Romans chapter seven[^5]: *Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* And he answers: *The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.* If therefore no one conquers the adversary except one who is delivered from the law of sin and death, it seems that without the grace of God through Jesus Christ — which indeed is grace that makes pleasing — one cannot conquer the adversary.

3. Likewise, upon that text of the Psalm[^6]: *They were weakened* etc., the Gloss: « Not able to resist vices by themselves ». « For when God desists from his help, a man can labor, but not conquer »: therefore it seems that without the help of grace that makes pleasing it does not happen that one conquers the tempter. But if you say that this is to be understood of grace freely given, not of grace that makes pleasing alone, the objection is made through another Gloss upon that text of the Psalm[^7]: *Sendings in by evil angels* etc.; there the Gloss: « The devil has power over a sinner as over his own beast »: therefore since one cannot be rescued from sin except through grace that makes pleasing, one cannot be rescued from the power of the devil except through it: therefore without it one cannot conquer him.

4. Likewise, to the conqueror a crown is owed, according to what is said in Apocalypse chapters two and three[^8]; but to no one fighting against the adversary is the crown of glory owed, except to him who has grace that makes pleasing: therefore no one without it can conquer the devil.

5. Likewise, whatever a man may do and whatever also he may guard against, so long as he is without grace that makes pleasing, he remains in fault, as was shown before; but while he remains in fault, he is the servant of the devil, and a servant also of sin; and he who is the servant of the devil has been conquered by the devil, according to what is said in second Peter chapter two: therefore without grace that makes pleasing it is impossible to triumph over the devil.

### Conclusion

> Without grace that makes pleasing a man cannot so conquer the adversary as to make progress in the merit of condignity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that it is one thing to say that someone resists the adversary, and another that someone conquers the adversary. For victory implies more than resistance. For resistance consists in this, that one does not consent to the diabolical suggestion; but victory consists in attaining the opposite of that which the devil intended. Now the devil intended to render the man an enemy to God, and to make him deserving of eternal punishment. Then, therefore, does a man conquer the adversary, when he so resists temptation that he is made a greater friend of God and merits the eternal kingdom. — And since this cannot be without grace that makes pleasing, therefore it must be granted that, although someone through grace freely given can resist the devil, so as not to consent to him when he suggests, nevertheless without the gift that renders a man acceptable to God he cannot conquer him, so as to make progress against the devil's intention in the dignity of merit or in the merit of condignity. — And the reasons that show this are to be granted.

*To the 1st.* To that which is objected concerning what was said to Cain: *Beneath you shall be your appetite* etc., it must be said that although it was in his power to restrain his appetite, so that he did not proceed into the act of sin, even without grace that makes pleasing; nevertheless it does not follow from this that he could conquer the adversary; because, even if he did this without grace, there would be there resistance, by which he would avoid punishment, yet there would not be there victory, by which he would merit the palm.

*To the 2nd.* To that which is objected, that free choice is said to be the most powerful thing under God, and that it is neither increased nor diminished; it must be said that, just as was expounded above, this is understood as to the privation of compulsion, not as to the power of preserving rectitude.

*To the 3rd.* To that which is objected, that the spirit of lust is conquered through continence; it must be said that although through continence, which is without grace that makes pleasing, one can resist the spirit of lust, nevertheless that resistance cannot be called a triumph, for the reason that one attains no palm from it.

*To the 4th.* To that which is objected, that one can conquer oneself without grace that makes pleasing; it must be said that this is false. For although a heretic, who exposes himself to death, may seem to conquer himself, nevertheless there is not there victory, but a casting-down. For he is overcome by the wickedness of his error and the perversity of his conscience and the depth of his obstinacy; and on account of this he merits confusion and ignominy from that endurance of death rather than glory.

*To the 5th.* To that which is objected, that the devil can conquer a man without grace; it must be said that the devil's victory consists in subjugating the man to himself through sin, whereas the man's victory consists in earning that which the devil lost; and therefore, just as it is easier to sin than to make progress in good[^9], so it is easier for the devil to overcome the man than for the man to conquer the adversary. Moreover, the devil does not conquer a man except one who is willing and consenting[^10], whereas the devil is never conquered willingly; and therefore it does not follow that, if the devil can carry off victory over a man without grace, that likewise it can be the other way around; rather it is not alike, as has been shown.

la: Vers. 7. — Haec quaestio quoad primum hominem iam soluta est supra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Gen. 4, 7. — This question, as concerns the first man, was already resolved above in d. 24, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 115, nota 6. Eodem loco etiam invenies primam partem textus seq., sicut in originali habetur (loc. cit. c. 9. n. 28.); in secunda parte textus allati originale pro *vel de gratia* exhibet *vel gloria,* et pro *de peccati miseria* legit *de peccato sive miseria.*

en: See above p. 115, note 6. In the same place you will also find the first part of the following text, as it stands in the original (loc. cit. c. 9, n. 28); in the second part of the cited text the original gives, for *vel de gratia, vel gloria,* and for *de peccati miseria* reads *de peccato sive miseria.*

la: Cap. 6. Cfr. ibid. in Comment. a. 2. q. 3, ubi comparatio fit inter tentationes carnis et alias.

en: Ch. 6. Compare, in the same place, in the Commentary a. 2, q. 3, where a comparison is made between the temptations of the flesh and the others.

la: Vers. 57.

la: Vers. 24. seq.

en: v. 24 and following.

la: Psalm. 106, 12. — Prima Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum, apud quem nec non apud Strabum exhibetur secunda Glossa, quae ordinaria est et sumta ex Augustino in hunc loc. (n. 10.).

en: Ps. 106, 12. — The first Gloss is interlinear and is found in Lyra, in whom — as also in Strabo — the second Gloss is given, which is the Ordinary Gloss and is taken from Augustine on this passage (n. 10).

la: Psalm. 77, 49. — Glossam, quae est secundum Augustinum in hunc loc. n. 28, vide apud Strabum et Lyranum. Verba integra Augustini sunt: « In filiis vero diffidentiae tanquam in suis mancipiis operatur, quemadmodum homines in pecoribus suis ». Lyranus: In malos potest diabolus ut in suo pecore.

en: Ps. 77, 49. — For the Gloss, which is according to Augustine on this passage n. 28, see Strabo and Lyra. The full words of Augustine are: « But in the children of distrust he works as in his own chattels, just as men do in their cattle ». Lyra: Over the wicked the devil has power as over his own beast.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *bono.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *bono.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 170, nota 2.

en: Compare above, page 170, note 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem de necessitate gratiae habitualis ad vincendum adversarium ab aliis antiquis Petri Lombardi commentatoribus non vidimus specialiter tractatam nisi aliquatenus ab Aegidio R., hic q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. 1. Principia autem in solutione adhibita eadem sunt cum iis quae in seq. quaestione declarantur. De necessitate gratiae actualis ad vincendas tentationes agitur infra a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** Quoad sequentem (3.) quaest. notandum, quod eadem distinctio inter duos modos mandata Dei implendi etiam a S. Thoma (hic a. 3, et aliis verbis etiam in S. I. II. q. 109. a. 4.) in hac quaestione solvenda adhibetur. — De eadem quaest. tractant etiam: B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question, concerning the necessity of habitual grace for conquering the adversary, we have not found specially treated by the other ancient commentators on Peter Lombard, except to some extent by Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2, dub. lat. 1. But the principles employed in the solution are the same as those declared in the following question. On the necessity of actual grace for conquering temptations there is a discussion below, a. 2, q. 2.

**II.** As to the following (3rd) question, it must be noted that the same distinction between the two modes of fulfilling God's commandments is employed also by St. Thomas (here a. 3, and in other words also in *Summa* I-II, q. 109, a. 4) in solving this question. — On the same question there treat also: Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (crops `vol2-p{677,678,679}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 47273–47389). Vol II two-column cascade applies: the PDF column bands are authoritative for the reflow, the OCR for footnote-marker spacing and footer text.

**Page-split map.**
- **p. 677** (R-col): QUAESTIO II title + opener + args 1–4. Page break `<!-- page 678 -->` falls at the end of arg 4 (*…possit de diabolo triumphare.*), grammatically clean.
- **p. 678**: arg 5 + Sed contra args 1–5 (L-col) → Conclusio + Respondeo + solutions 1–3 (R-col). Seam 677→678 and 678→679 both grammatically continuous (verified at 450 dpi).
- **p. 679** (L-col top + R-col top): solutions 4–5 + SCHOLION I (L) / solution 5 tail + SCHOLION II (R). The *Ad 5* solution carries p. 679 footers 1–2 → [^9]–[^10]. QUAESTIO III begins immediately after (raw 47390), on the same p. 679.

**Apparatus (10 entries, [^1]–[^10]).**
- [^1]–[^3] = **RECEIVED from a1-q1** = p. 677 R-col footers 3, 4, 5 (Gen 4:7 / Bernard *Vide supra pag. 115* / Magister d.21 *Cap. 6*). Anchored at args 1, 2, 4 respectively.
- [^4]–[^5] = p. 678 L-col footers 1–2 (1 Cor 15:57 / Rom 7:24) at Sed contra 1–2.
- [^6]–[^7] = p. 678 L-col footers 3–4 (Ps 106:12 Glossa / Ps 77:49 Glossa) at Sed contra 3.
- [^8] = p. 678 R-col footer 5 (Apoc. 2,7.10; 3,12.21) at Sed contra 4.
- p. 678 R-col footers 6–10 (Quaest. praeced. cross-ref; *Cod. T infert* var; *Cfr. supra d. 26*; *Alluditur ad verba Magistri d. XXIV*; *Dist. 2-3. p. II. q. 1.*) anchor inside the Respondeo/solutions which carry **no body markers** in the printed text (editorial back-references on the *importat*, *prius*, *expositum* clauses) — they are NOT rendered as numbered apparatus here, consistent with the absence of body anchors; Bonaventure's text on pp. 678–679 carries footnote markers only in the args/Sed contra.
- [^9]–[^10] = **p. 679 R-col footers 1–2** (`Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bono.` / `Cfr. supra pag. 170, nota 2.`) — both anchor in q2's *Ad 5* on p. 679 (footer 1 after *…in **bonum**…*, footer 2 after *…volentem et **consentientem**…*). ADDED 2026-05-30 (decade polish-blocker): these two footers physically sit at the head of the p. 679 L-col footer band but precede footer 3 (Deut 30:11, q3's first marker), so they belong to q2 (confirmed at 450 dpi, `vol2-p679-{L-2,R-0}.png`). They were previously dropped by BOTH q2 (apparatus had stopped at [^8]=p.678) and q3 (no q3 body anchor); the a1-q3 BACK-REFERENCE FLAG correctly diagnosed this. Now rendered. The q2 SCHOLION on p. 679 carries no markers.

**Hand-offs.**
- RECEIVED (from a1-q1): p. 677 R-col footers 3–5 → rendered as [^1]–[^3].
- FORWARDED (to a1-q3): none. QUAESTIO II closes cleanly with SCHOLION II at the bottom of p. 679 (raw 47389); QUAESTIO III opens fresh at raw 47390 (p. 679, *Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit omnia mandata implere*) with its own p. 679 L-col footers 1–4.

**has_scholion = TRUE** (SCHOLION I+II; II is *pro quaest. seq.* — the commentator-roll for q3, per Override §5).

**No [?] flags.**

**2026-05-30 (decade polish-blocker, Pass 3 cross-chunk seam top-up):** added [^9]–[^10] for p. 679 R-col footers 1–2, which had been lost at the q2/q3 seam (neither sibling rendered them). Verified authoritatively against the 450 dpi PDF (`vol2-p679-L-2.png` footer band, `vol2-p679-R-0.png` body): footers 1–2 (*Vat…bono* / *Cfr. supra pag. 170*) precede footer 3 (Deut 30:11 = q3 [^1]) and anchor in q2's *Ad 5*. Apparatus now 10 entries.