title: Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De comparatione peccati operis ad peccatum voluntatis.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum. Et quod sint plura, videtur.

1. Super illud ad Romanos primi[^1]: *Repletos homicidiis*: Glossa: « Pluraliter dicit *homicidiis*, quia aliud est homicidium voluntatis, et aliud homicidium operis ». Si sic est in homicidio, ergo pari ratione et in aliis peccatis.

2. Item, multiplicato inferiori, multiplicatur superius[^2]; sed fornicatio exterior peccatum est speciale, voluntas etiam fornicandi peccatum est speciale; sed voluntas fornicandi est aliud quam ipse actus fornicationis: ergo si ista sunt diversa et sunt peccata, loquendo formaliter: ergo sunt diversa peccata.

3. Item, multiplicato subiecto, multiplicatur accidens, quod consistit per illud subiectum[^3]; sed deformitas comparatur ad actionem, tanquam accidens ad subiectum: ergo ubi sunt multae actiones deformes, ibi multae deformitates, et ubi multae deformitates, ibi multa peccata; et actio interior et exterior sunt diversae: ergo sunt in eis diversae deformitates: ergo et diversa peccata.

4. Item, multiplicato uno oppositorum, multiplicatur et reliquum[^4], quia « tantum unum uni opponitur »; sed peccatum repugnat praecepto: cum igitur aliud sit praeceptum, quo prohibetur actus interior, et aliud, quo prohibetur actus exterior, quia aliud mandatum est: *Non concupisces*, et aliud: *Non moechaberis*: ergo videtur, quod sicut illa duo sunt praecepta, ita actio interior et exterior sunt duo peccata.

5. Item, magis convenit voluntas interior cum voluntate interiori, quam voluntas interior cum actu exteriori; sed voluntas interior cum alia voluntate facit duo peccata diversa: ergo multo fortius voluntas interior cum actu exteriori sunt diversa peccata.

**Sed contra:**
1. Per se et per accidens non ponunt in numerum, sicut cum diligo vinum, quia dulce, non dicor diligere duo, sed unum[^6]; sed actio exterior non est peccatum nisi propter voluntatem interiorem: igitur voluntas interior cum actu exteriori non ponit in numerum: ergo non sunt duo peccata sed unum.

2. Item, actio inchoata non ponit in numerum, cum se ipsa consummata; sed peccatum inchoatur in voluntate et consummatur in opere, secundum quod dicitur Iacobi primo[^7]: *Concupiscentia, cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum vero, cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem*: ergo etc.

3. Item, bonum opus non ponit in numerum cum bona voluntate in ratione meriti — unde cum aliquis voluntarie bene operatur, non est ibi duplex meritum, sed unum — ergo pari ratione, nec voluntas interior cum opere exteriori ponet in numerum in ratione demeriti sive peccati.

4. Item, formale in peccato, secundum quod peccatum, est libido, vel potius contemptus Dei sive aversio[^8]; sed cum quis voluntarie opus nefarium perpetrat, non sunt duo contemptus, sed unus, nec duae aversiones, sed una: ergo voluntas interior et actus exterior non sunt duo peccata, sed unum.

5. Item, multis peccatis multiplex debet infligi poena, sive remuneratoria, sive satisfactoria; sed pro peccato exterius consummato non debetur alicui poena multiplex, nec diversae imponuntur satisfactiones, sed una: ergo voluntas interior et actio exterior non sunt diversa peccata.

> **Conclusio.** Voluntas peccandi et actus exterior, si ordinata sint ad invicem, unum sunt peccatum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit comparari peccatum operis exterioris et voluntatis interioris: uno modo, prout ista duo coniuncta <!-- page 961 -->sunt et ordinata, ita quod unum est ex altero; et sic voluntas interior cum actu exteriori non facit diversa peccata, pro eo quod unus est ibi contemptus et una aversio et una est conversio. Voluntas enim est quae contemnendo avertitur, dum ad bonum commutabile convertitur, non solum quantum ad actum proprium, sed etiam quantum ad actum inferioris potentiae, quae[^9] ei subiicitur. Quia ergo peccatum, secundum quod huiusmodi, dicit deordinationem per contemptum et aversionem a Deo et conversionem ad creaturam; hinc est, quod cum ibi sit una deordinatio prima[^10], quod peccatum voluntatis et operis unum est, loquendo formaliter, prout illa coniuncta sunt. Licet autem ibi sit una *ratio deordinandi*, plura tamen sunt ibi *deordinata*; et ideo, quamvis peccatum illud unum sit *formaliter*, plura tamen sunt *materialiter*.

Si autem comparemus voluntatem interiorem ad opus exterius, prout sunt separata, ita quod unus peccet voluntate tantum, alius peccet voluntate et opere; sic peccatum voluntatis et operis sunt diversa peccata non solum *materialiter*, verum etiam *formaliter*, pro eo quod actus voluntatis, in quo consistit prima ratio deordinandi, numeratur et est alius et alius. — Hoc autem modo non quaerit Magister in littera[^11], utrum voluntas interior et actio exterior sint diversa peccata — hoc enim non est dubium, quod diversis peccatis peccat quis, si una vice tantum velit malum, alia vice velit et perficiat — sed de hoc quaerit, utrum voluntas interior et actio exterior sint diversa peccata, secundum quod unum ab altero procedit, et unum alteri coniungitur. Et ad hoc respondendum, quod quamvis sint *plura opera culpabilia* et *plura deordinata*, quia tamen *una* est *ratio deordinandi* et *unus* est ibi *actus voluntatis*, nec alter est culpabilis nisi propter illum; unum est ibi peccatum. Et huic modo dicendi magis concordat Magister in littera, respondens obiectionibus, quae fiunt pro parte altera, quae dicebant[^4-2], illa esse diversa peccata. Et recte facit in hoc quod, quamvis aliquid possit dici *numerari* — ex quadam improprietate — solum ex parte *principii materialis*; tamen, proprie loquendo, non numeratur aliquid ex parte *principii materialis*, nisi quia cum numeratione ex parte *principii materialis* concurrit numeratio ex parte *formalis*, sicut albedo numeratur in duobus hominibus albis. — Non sic autem est in proposito; et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, scilicet voluntatem interiorem et actionem exteriorem esse peccatum unum, concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, dicendum, quod Glossa aut loquitur materialiter, aut loquitur de homicidio interiori et exteriori, prout disiuncta sunt, ita quod unum alteri non continuatur.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato inferiori, multiplicatur suum superius; dicendum, quod illud verum est de illo inferiori, cui suum superius est essentiale, vel ad quod suum superius comparatur essentialiter. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia peccatum, etsi dicatur de voluntate et actione[^5], non dicitur praedicatione essentiali, sed magis accidentali.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato subiecto, multiplicatur accidens; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si subiectum *per se* multiplicetur[^6-2] et illud in quo *primo* est accidens. Deformitas autem peccandi non attenditur *primo* et *principaliter* circa exteriorem actionem nec est ibi tanquam circa subiectum *per se*, sed est ibi ratione voluntatis interioris coniunctae; quod patet, quia, si actio illa procederet ab alio principio quam a voluntate, iam non esset culpabilis. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod illud intelligitur, quando subiectum plurificatur et secundum *rem* et secundum illam *rationem*, qua dicitur subiectum, ita quod non solum sunt plures *res*, sed etiam plura *subiecta*. Quamvis autem actio interior et exterior sint diversae *res*, non tamen sunt diversa *subiecta* deformitatis, sed unum, pro eo quod, sicut ordo potest esse in pluribus, quorum unum est ab altero, tanquam in uno subiecto; sic etiam et deordinatio. Quoniam igitur deformitas peccati dicit deordinationem a fine, hinc est, quod circa actionem interiorem et exteriorem consistit tanquam circa *unum subiectum*, quamvis sint *diversae actiones* et *res*. — Posset etiam instari contra illud verbum, quod hoc intelligitur de *accidente absoluto*[^7-2], non de *accidente relato*. Tale enim unum potest esse in pluribus, dum tamen illa sint ad invicem relata et ordinata; et per hunc modum se habent actio interior et exterior, quia una procedit ab altera.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato uno oppositorum, multiplicatur et reliquum; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod ei opponitur. Praeceptum autem, quo prohibetur actus exterior et voluntas interior, non est aliud et aliud nisi ex hoc, quod in uno prohibetur voluntas cum opere, in altero prohibetur voluntas etiam absque opere; et hoc modo bene concedo, quod voluntas interior et actio exterior, prout sunt disiuncta, sunt plura peccata. Sed hoc modo non procedit inquisitio praesens nec inquisitio Magistri.

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*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis communicat voluntas interior cum voluntate quam cum actu exteriori; dicendum, quod est convenientia *formalis*, et convenientia *ordinis*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod voluntas interior magis convenit cum voluntate quam cum actione exteriori; dicendum, quod verum est de convenientia *formali*, sed non de convenientia *ordinis*; quia non sic est voluntas a voluntate, sicut est exterior operatio ab interiori voluntate; et ideo, cum sint duae voluntates, duae sunt principales deordinationes, et propter hoc sunt duo peccata. Cum vero opus exterius iunctum est voluntati interiori, a qua procedit, una est ibi deordinatio et unum actuale principium deordinationis; et ideo unum peccatum est ex ista parte, et ex illa parte plura[^12].

english:
### Article I. *On the comparison of the sin of deed to the sin of will.*
### Question I. *Whether the sin of will and the sin of deed are two sins, or one.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the sin of will and the sin of deed are two sins, or one. And that they are several, it seems.

1. On that text of Romans, chapter one[^1]: *Filled with murders*: the Gloss: « It says *murders* in the plural, because the murder of will is one thing, and the murder of deed another ». If it is so in murder, then by parity of reasoning so also in other sins.

2. Likewise, when the lower is multiplied, the higher is multiplied[^2]; but exterior fornication is a special sin, and the will to fornicate is also a special sin; but the will to fornicate is other than the very act of fornication: therefore if these are diverse and are sins, speaking formally: therefore they are diverse sins.

3. Likewise, when the subject is multiplied, the accident is multiplied which subsists through that subject[^3]; but deformity is compared to the action as an accident to a subject: therefore where there are many deformed actions, there are many deformities, and where there are many deformities, there are many sins; and the interior action and the exterior are diverse: therefore there are in them diverse deformities: therefore also diverse sins.

4. Likewise, when one of two opposites is multiplied, the other too is multiplied[^4], because « only one is opposed to one »; but sin is repugnant to a precept: since therefore there is one precept by which the interior act is prohibited, and another by which the exterior act is prohibited, because one command is: *Thou shalt not covet*, and another: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*: therefore it seems that, just as those are two precepts, so the interior action and the exterior are two sins.

5. Likewise, the interior will agrees more with an interior will than the interior will with an exterior act; but the interior will with another will makes two diverse sins: therefore much more are the interior will with an exterior act diverse sins.

**On the contrary:**
1. The *per se* and the *per accidens* do not constitute a number, just as when I love wine because it is sweet, I am not said to love two things, but one[^6]; but the exterior action is not a sin except on account of the interior will: therefore the interior will with the exterior act does not constitute a number: therefore they are not two sins but one.

2. Likewise, an action begun does not constitute a number with the same action completed; but sin is begun in the will and completed in the deed, according to what is said in James, chapter one[^7]: *Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been completed, begets death*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a good work does not constitute a number with a good will in the account of merit — hence when someone voluntarily acts well, there is not there a double merit, but one — therefore by parity of reasoning, neither will the interior will with the exterior work constitute a number in the account of demerit or sin.

4. Likewise, the formal element in sin, insofar as it is sin, is inordinate desire, or rather contempt of God or aversion[^8]; but when someone voluntarily perpetrates a wicked deed, there are not two contempts, but one, nor two aversions, but one: therefore the interior will and the exterior act are not two sins, but one.

5. Likewise, for many sins a manifold penalty ought to be inflicted, whether remunerative or satisfactory; but for a sin completed exteriorly no manifold penalty is owed to anyone, nor are diverse satisfactions imposed, but one: therefore the interior will and the exterior action are not diverse sins.

> **Conclusion.** The will to sin and the exterior act, if they are ordered to one another, are one sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the sin of the exterior deed and the sin of the interior will can be compared in two ways: in one way, insofar as these two are conjoined <!-- page 961 -->and ordered, such that one is from the other; and thus the interior will with the exterior act does not make diverse sins, because there is there one contempt and one aversion and one conversion. For the will is that which by contemning turns away, while it turns toward a changeable good, not only as to its proper act, but also as to the act of the lower power[^9] which is subject to it. Since therefore sin, as such, denotes a disorder through contempt and aversion from God and conversion toward the creature; hence it is that, since there is there one first disorder[^10], the sin of will and of deed is one, speaking formally, insofar as they are conjoined. But although there is there one *account of disordering*, yet there are several *things disordered*; and therefore, although that sin is one *formally*, yet there are several *materially*.

But if we compare the interior will to the exterior work insofar as they are separated, such that one person sins by will only, another sins by will and deed; thus the sin of will and the sin of deed are diverse sins not only *materially*, but also *formally*, because the act of will, in which the first account of disordering consists, is counted and is distinct one from the other. — In this way, however, the Master does not ask in the text[^11] whether the interior will and the exterior action are diverse sins — for this is not in doubt, that one sins by diverse sins if on one occasion one merely wills evil, and on another occasion wills and accomplishes it — but he asks about this: whether the interior will and the exterior action are diverse sins, according as the one proceeds from the other, and the one is conjoined to the other. And to this it must be answered that, although there are *several culpable works* and *several things disordered*, yet because there is *one account of disordering* and *one act of will* there, and the other is not culpable except on account of it; there is one sin there. And the Master in the text agrees more with this manner of speaking, when he answers the objections which are made for the other part, which said[^4-2] that those are diverse sins. And he does rightly in this, that although something can be said to be *counted* — by a certain impropriety — solely from the side of the *material principle*; nevertheless, properly speaking, something is not counted from the side of the *material principle*, except because together with the numbering from the side of the *material principle* there concurs a numbering from the side of the *formal principle*, just as whiteness is counted in two white men. — But it is not so in the case at hand; and therefore the reasons which show this, namely that the interior will and the exterior action are one sin, are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* As to what is objected from the Gloss, it must be said that the Gloss either speaks materially, or speaks of the interior and exterior murder insofar as they are disjoined, such that one is not continued to the other.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that when the lower is multiplied its higher is multiplied; it must be said that this is true of that lower to which its higher is essential, or to which its higher is essentially compared. But it is not so in the case at hand, because sin, even though it is predicated of will and of action[^5], is not predicated by an essential predication, but rather by an accidental one.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that when the subject is multiplied the accident is multiplied; it must be said that this is true if the subject is multiplied *per se*[^6-2] and that in which the accident *primarily* is. But the deformity of sinning is not regarded *primarily* and *principally* with respect to the exterior action, nor is it there as in a subject *per se*, but it is there by reason of the interior will conjoined; which is clear, because, if that action proceeded from another principle than from the will, it would no longer be culpable. — It can also be said otherwise, that this is understood when the subject is multiplied both according to the *thing* and according to that *account* by which it is called a subject, such that there are not only several *things*, but also several *subjects*. But although the interior and exterior action are diverse *things*, yet they are not diverse *subjects* of deformity, but one, because, just as order can be in several things, of which one is from the other, as in one subject; so too disorder. Since therefore the deformity of sin denotes a disorder from the end, hence it is that with respect to the interior and exterior action it subsists as with respect to *one subject*, although there are *diverse actions* and *things*. — One could also press the objection against that statement, that this is understood of an *absolute accident*[^7-2], not of a *related accident*. For such a one can be in several things, provided that they are related and ordered to one another; and in this way the interior and exterior action are disposed, because the one proceeds from the other.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that when one of two opposites is multiplied, the other too is multiplied; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is opposed to it. But the precept by which the exterior act and the interior will are prohibited is not distinct except from this, that in the one the will together with the work is prohibited, in the other the will is prohibited even apart from the work; and in this way I readily concede that the interior will and the exterior action, insofar as they are disjoined, are several sins. But it is not in this way that the present inquiry proceeds, nor the inquiry of the Master.

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*To 5.* As to what is objected, that the interior will agrees more with the will than with the exterior act; it must be said that there is an agreement of *form*, and an agreement of *order*. When therefore it is said that the interior will agrees more with the will than with the exterior action; it must be said that this is true of agreement of *form*, but not of agreement of *order*; because the will is not from the will in the way that the exterior operation is from the interior will; and therefore, since there are two wills, there are two principal disorders, and on account of this there are two sins. But when the exterior work is joined to the interior will from which it proceeds, there is there one disorder and one actual principle of disorder; and therefore there is one sin on this side, and on that side several[^12].

la: Vers. 29. — Glossa, quae apud Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis, apud Petr. Lombardum sic sonat: *Homicidiis* pluraliter dicit, quia sunt homicidia actus et voluntatis.

en: Verse 29. — The Gloss, which in Lyra is given as the interlinear gloss, in Peter Lombard reads thus: It says *murders* in the plural, because there are murders of deed and of will.

la: Ratio continetur his verbis Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1: « Species participant genera » et « individua participant speciem et genus ».

en: The reasoning is contained in these words of Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 1: « Species participate in genera » and « individuals participate in species and genus ».

la: Averroes in IV. Phys. text. 132: Est dispositio in albedine et aliis accidentibus, quae multiplicantur per multiplicationem subiecti. Cfr. supra pag. 119, nota 8.

en: Averroes on *Physics* IV, text 132: There is a disposition in whiteness and in other accidents, which are multiplied through the multiplication of the subject. Cf. above p. 119, note 8.

la: Vide supra pag. 653, nota 5, ubi similis propositio ex Aristot. allata est. De verbis Aristot., quae sequuntur: « tantum unum uni opponitur », vide supra pag. 812, nota 8. — Loci s. Script. sunt Exod. 20, 17. et 14. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine.

en: See above p. 653, note 5, where a similar proposition from Aristotle is adduced. On the words of Aristotle which follow, « only one is opposed to one », see above p. 812, note 8. — The scriptural passages are Exodus 20:17 and 14. — See here the text of the Master, c. 1, near the end.

la: Vide supra pag. 614, nota 3. et pag. 639, nota 2. Pro *in numerum* plures codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 hic et etiam in seqq. *numerum* tantum, et pro *non ponit* codd. F T Y *non ponunt*.

en: See above p. 614, note 3, and p. 639, note 2. For *in numerum* several codices and editions 2, 3, 4 here and also in what follows read merely *numerum*, and for *non ponit* codices F T Y read *non ponunt*.

la: Vers. 15.

en: Verse 15.

la: Vat. *qui*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *qui*.

la: Pro *prima* (i. e. principalis, cfr. infra ad 5.) Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *patet*.

en: For *prima* (i.e. principal, cf. below at the reply to 5) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *patet*.

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here c. 1.

la: Codd. F Y ee et alii nec non ed. 1 *dicebat*. Paulo post pro *in hoc, quod* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et nonnulli codd. *in hoc, quia*.

en: Codices F Y ee and others as well as edition 1 read *dicebat*. A little later, for *in hoc, quod* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and some codices read *in hoc, quia*.

la: Codd. X bb *operatione*, quod codd. C H K O R S T ee et primae edd. mutarunt in *ratione* (!).

en: Codices X bb read *operatione*, which codices C H K O R S T ee and the first editions changed into *ratione* (!).

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *multiplicatur*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *multiplicatur*.

la: Cuiusmodi est quantitas et qualitas, quae dicunt formam aliquam, quae dependet a substantia, et cuius esse est ad se nec refertur ad aliud ut ad terminum. Accidens vero *relatum* (relativum, respectivum) est illud quod ex aliquo, quod extrinsece se habet ad rem resultat, et cuius esse est ad aliud se habere ut ad suum terminum.

en: Of which kind are quantity and quality, which signify some form that depends on substance, and whose being is toward itself and is not referred to another as to a term. But a *related* accident (relative, respective) is that which results from something which is extrinsically disposed toward the thing, and whose being is to be disposed toward another as toward its term.

la: Edd. addunt *peccata*. Paulo superius pro *iunctum est* cod. T habet *coniunctum est*.

en: The editions add *peccata* [several sins]. A little above, for *iunctum est* codex T has *coniunctum est*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primae quaestionis solutio satis plana est. De ea agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 3. § 3, q. 116. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; de Malo, q. 2. a. 2. ad 11. (cfr. 1. II. q. 20. a. 2.). — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 139. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

**II.** De principiis, quae adhibentur in solutione seq. (2.) quaestionis, et de dissidentibus auctorum opinionibus iam actum est supra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. Praeter auctores ibi citatos; Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. dub. lat. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of the first question is sufficiently plain. On it treat: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 96, m. 3, a. 3, § 3, q. 116, m. 1. — Scotus, in both *Scripta*, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *On Evil*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 11 (cf. I-II, q. 20, a. 2). — Blessed Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. II, tr. 22, q. 139, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, here a single question.

**II.** Concerning the principles which are employed in the solution of the following (2nd) question, and concerning the dissenting opinions of the authors, treatment has already been made above at d. 40, a. 2, q. 1. Besides the authors cited there: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, loc. cit. dub. lat. 1.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp.960–962 = PDF 982–984), per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. The IA djvu OCR for this span is heavily cascade-shattered (two-column bleed: footers, marginal glosses, and the Respondeo/scholion interleave). OCR retained as base only for the clean videtur/sed contra prose and footnote-marker spacing; PDF authoritative for the Respondeo, replies, scholion, and all footers.

**Page-split map (per-page footer restart):**
- p.960 (PDF 982): ARTICULUS I opener (folded in per the chunking convention — no standalone article-divisio chunk), QUAESTIO I title, 5 fundamenta, 5 sed-contra arguments, Conclusio, opening of Respondeo. Footers 1–8: 1–5 attach to the fundamenta; 6–8 attach to the sed-contra args (6→sc.1, 7→sc.2 [James 1:15], 8→sc.4 [cf. a.3 q.2]). Markers `[^1]`–`[^4]`, `[^6]`–`[^8]` (no `[^5]` on p.960 — argument 5 carries no footer).
- p.961 (PDF 983): Respondeo continues, *De sententia Magistri* digression, replies *Ad 1*–*Ad 4*. Footers 1–7 → rendered as `[^9]` (Vat. qui), `[^10]` (prima/patet), `[^11]` (Hic c.1), `[^4-2]` (dicebat), `[^5]` (operatione/ratione), `[^6-2]` (multiplicatur), `[^7-2]` (accidens absolutum/relatum). NOTE: this page's footnote markers `4, 5, 6, 7` collide numerically with p.960 markers in the printed per-page restart; rendered here with unique slug keys (`[^4-2]`, `[^6-2]`, `[^7-2]`) where a bare reuse would clash, keeping printed order intact.
- p.962 (PDF 984): reply *Ad 5*, body close (`…ex illa parte plura¹`), then SCHOLION I–II. **Only footer 1 of p.962 belongs to this chunk** → `[^12]` (Edd. addunt *peccata* / iunctum est~coniunctum est). p.962 footers 2, 3, 4 (Psalm 68:28; de Trin. III.5 n.8; de Lib. Arb. I.6 n.15) belong to QUAESTIO II's fundamenta — see hand-off.

**Alignment check:** PASS. Opener `Circa primum … et quaeritur, utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum` matches q1 (not q2). The next header `QUAESTIO II. Utrum peccatum operis addat aliquid supra peccatum voluntatis` (`Secundo quaeritur…`) at raw 66848 / printed p.962 R-col confirms the q1/q2 split.

**Hand-off forwarded to a1-q2:** q2 opens in the RIGHT column of printed p.962 (PDF 984; `Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum operis addat supra peccatum voluntatis…`). The shared p.962 footer block (read in printed order in the L-2 band) splits by body anchor: **footer 1 → this q1** (`[^12]`); **footers 2, 3, 4 → q2** (footer 2 = Psalm 68:28 interlinear gloss *Appone iniquitatem*; footer 3 = Augustine, *de Trin.* III(?), Mala enim voluntate…; footer 4 = Augustine, *de Lib. Arb.* I, c.6 n.15). The q2 agent should lead its apparatus with these three migrated p.962 footers. Scholion II of q1 also flags that q2's solution principles were treated supra d.40 a.2 q.1.

**Scholion:** present (I–II), held by this q1. Scholion II explicitly serves q2 (`De principiis, quae adhibentur in solutione seq. (2.) quaestionis`), so q2 may legitimately carry no scholion of its own.

**[?] flags:** none. All garbles resolved against the 450 dpi PDF (OCR `0.`→`5.` for *Ad 5*; OCR `obiieilor`→`obiicitur`; running-head OCR digit `965`→true printed 962 confirmed by render).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 962 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum peccatum operis addat aliquid supra peccatum voluntatis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum operis addat supra peccatum voluntatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem*; Glossa: « Qui addit opus voluntati addit iniquitatem iniquitati »; sed qui hoc facit, aut facit novum peccatum, aut maius; sed non novum: ergo maius.

2. Item, Augustinus[^3]: « Unusquisque miser efficitur mala *voluntate*, sed miserior *potestate*, cum desiderium malae voluntatis impletur »; sed non efficitur homo miserior per peccatum, nisi aggravetur peccatum: ergo peccatum voluntatis aggravatur per additionem operis.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur. Apud humanam iustitiam gravius punitur qui peccat in opere, quam qui peccat voluntate solum, vel voluntate et verbo quam voluntate tantum: ergo si humana iustitia derivatur ab aeterna iustitia et ei conformatur et in opere suo laudabilis est[^4]; videtur, quod maiori sit dignus poena ille qui peccat voluntate et opere, quam qui peccat voluntate tantum. Sed non est quis maiori dignus poena nisi propter maiorem culpam: ergo etc.

4. Item, gravius peccat qui peccat in Deum et in proximum, quam qui peccat in Deum tantum; sed qui peccat voluntate interiori solum non peccat nisi in Deum; qui vero peccat exterius in opere frequenter peccat in proximum, sicut patet in adulterio et homicidio: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto magis se homo *glorificat et in deliciis est*, tanto magis dignus est poena[^5]; sed qui peccat voluntate et opere magis se glorificavit et amplius delectatus est, quam qui sola voluntate peccavit: ergo maiori dignus est poena; et si hoc, maiorem perpetrat culpam.

**Sed contra:**
1. Super illud Psalmi[^6]: *Etenim in corde inquitates operamini*; Glossa: « Si vis et non potes, Deus factum reputat »; ergo si voluntas reputatur pro facto, videtur, quod factum quantum ad rationem peccati nihil addat supra voluntatem.

2. Item, Augustinus[^7]: « Si contingat, aliquem non concumbere cum uxore aliena, planum autem est, eum cupere, et si potestas daretur, eum esse facturum; non minus reus est, quam si in ipso facto deprehenderetur »: ergo si non est minus reus, non magis peccat, quando consummat in opere, quam quando plene vult in voluntate.

3. Item, gravitas et magnitudo peccati consistit in quantitate contemptus; sed quando voluntas omnino consentit, tunc plena est aversio et contemptus: ergo aequale est peccatum, sive opus adsit, sive desit.

4. Item, opus exterius non est culpabile nisi propter voluntatem interiorem: ergo si tota ratio culpabilitatis ortum habet ab ipsa voluntate, videtur, quod sola voluntate peccati existente, tantum est homo culpabilis, quantum si peccaret in opere.

5. Item, peccata spiritualia, quae sola voluntate consummantur, graviora sunt quam peccata carnalia, quorum consummatio fit in carne. Si ergo prima, quae in sola voluntate consistunt, graviora sunt quam secunda, quae consistunt in voluntate et opere; videtur, quod opus non addat aliquid ad malitiam voluntatis.

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### Conclusio

> Si utrobique voluntas est plena, peccatum operis addit, non ratione maioris contemptus Dei, sed ratione delectationis, vel damnificationis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum opus addat aliquid ad malitiam voluntatis, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo respectu voluntatis, quae potest in opus procedere, sed tamen non procedit, quia non omnino plene vult; et respectu talis absque dubio malitia operis addit. Cum enim consummatur peccatum in opere, tunc est plenius[^8] consensus, et non solummodo dicitur manducare mulier, sed etiam vir; et ideo peccatum tunc maius et gravius est ratione maioris conversionis et etiam aversionis. — Alio modo potest intelligi respectu voluntatis, quae quidem in opus non procedit, non quia non velit, sed quia non potest. Et tunc movetur ista quaestio, cum utrobique sit plena voluntas, utrum gravius peccet qui vult et non potest, an qui vult et facit, esto quod uterque moveatur ex aequali amore.

Hoc igitur modo quaestione intellecta, respondendum est, quod unum peccatum dicitur esse maius altero tripliciter: aut ratione maioris contemptus Dei, aut ratione maioris *libidinis* sive delectationis, aut ratione maioris *damnificationis*. Primo modo loquendo, opus non addit ad iniquitatem voluntatis, quia voluntas plena[^9] a Deo avertitur per se, sicut cum est operi coniuncta. Quantum vero ad delectationem sive libidinem addit et aggravat, maxime quantum ad genus peccati carnalis, quo quidem peccat homo in se ipso; similiter quantum ad damnificationem addit, et hoc maxime quantum ad genus peccati, quo quis peccat in proximum. Quantumcumque enim aliquis velit fornicari, nunquam delectatur, sicut quando voluntas coniungitur actui[^10]. Similiter, quantumcumque velit aliquis alterum occidere, non tantum facit damnum, quantum si actu occideret. Et quoniam Deus iustus iudex in puniendo non tantum considerat in peccato magnitudinem *contemptus*, sed etiam magnitudinem *delectationis* et magnitudinem *damnificationis*; hinc est, quod aliquo modo opus addit ad nequitiam voluntatis. — Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt, quamvis non omnes cogant, maxime illa, quae fit de similitudine divinae iustitiae et humanae. Non est enim simile, quia *homines considerant quae exterius patent* et iustitiam publicam; *Deus autem intuetur cor*[^11] et non solum considerat iustitiam publicam, sed etiam privatam.

**Ad argumenta pro parte contraria:**
*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa illa et de auctoritate Augustini, quarum una dicit, quod voluntas reputatur pro facto, et altera dicit, quod non minus est reus qui vult et non facit, quam qui vult et facit; dicendum, quod ambae[^12] procedunt secundum quantitatem peccati, quae attenditur quantum ad plenitudinem consensus et quantum ad magnitudinem contemptus; et sic bene conceditur, quod opus ad talem voluntatem non addit.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicit, quod quantitas peccati consideratur penes quantitatem contemptus; dicendum, quod verum est, non tamen est verum *praecise*. Deus enim non tantum considerat contemptum sui, immo etiam damnum proximi et delectationem peccantis; unde et proximo patienti iniuriam facit vindictam, et maiorem patienti iniuriam facit maiorem vindictam; sic et eum qui delectatus est, affligit, et eum qui magis delectatus est, magis affligit. Et ideo ratio illa ab insufficienti procedit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tota ratio peccati est a voluntate; dicendum, quod non est verum, quia aliqua sunt peccata non solum ex improbitate voluntatis facientis, sed etiam ex genere operis, quia sunt contra prohibitionem Dei et contra dictamen iuris naturalis[^13]. Verum est tamen, quod nihil, quod fit ex parte operis, per se sufficit ad faciendum peccatum, nisi adsit voluntarius motus; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod quamvis hoc non possit esse peccatum sine illo, quod hoc non addat ad illud. Et

<!-- page 964 -->

est simile, quia ferrum non urit absque igne; ignis tamen cum ferro plus urit et plus penetrat, quam faceret per se ipsum; sic et in multis aliis invenitur.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de peccatis spiritualibus, dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod peccata spiritualia spiritualem habent delectationem, quae in suo genere maiorem habent adhaerentiam et maiorem improbitatem, quam etiam aliqua delectatio peccati carnalis. Peccata vero carnalia nunquam tantum delectant, quando sunt in sola voluntate, quantum quando sunt in voluntate et opere, nec etiam tantum damnificant. Ideo non sequitur, quod in talibus opus non addat ad malitiam voluntatis[^1].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the sin of deed adds anything beyond the sin of will.*

Secondly it is asked whether the sin of deed adds beyond the sin of will. And that it does seems so.

1. Upon that of the Psalm[^2]: *Add iniquity upon iniquity*; the Gloss: "He who adds the deed to the will adds iniquity to iniquity"; but he who does this either commits a new sin, or a greater one; but not a new one: therefore a greater one.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^3]: "Each one is made wretched by an evil *will*, but more wretched by *power*, when the desire of the evil will is fulfilled"; but a man is not made more wretched by a sin unless the sin be aggravated: therefore the sin of will is aggravated by the addition of the deed.

3. Likewise, it seems so by *reason*. In human justice he is more gravely punished who sins in deed than he who sins by will alone, or by will and word than by will only: therefore if human justice is derived from eternal justice and is conformed to it and is praiseworthy in its working[^4]; it seems that he is worthy of a greater punishment who sins by will and deed than he who sins by will only. But no one is worthy of a greater punishment except on account of a greater fault: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, he sins more gravely who sins against God and against neighbor than he who sins against God only; but he who sins by interior will alone sins only against God; whereas he who sins outwardly in deed often sins against his neighbor, as is plain in adultery and homicide: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the more a man *glorifies himself and is in delights*, so much the more is he worthy of punishment[^5]; but he who sins by will and deed has glorified himself more and has taken more delight than he who sinned by will alone: therefore he is worthy of a greater punishment; and if this, he perpetrates a greater fault.

**On the contrary:**
1. Upon that of the Psalm[^6]: *For in your heart you work iniquities*; the Gloss: "If you will and cannot, God reckons it as done"; therefore if the will is reckoned for the deed, it seems that the deed adds nothing beyond the will as regards the formal character of sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^7]: "If it should happen that someone does not lie with another's wife, but it is plain that he desires her, and that, were the power given, he would do it; he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the very act": therefore if he is no less guilty, he does not sin more when he consummates it in deed than when he wills it fully in the will.

3. Likewise, the gravity and magnitude of a sin consists in the quantity of contempt; but when the will consents entirely, then the aversion and contempt are full: therefore the sin is equal, whether the deed be present or absent.

4. Likewise, the outward deed is not culpable except on account of the interior will: therefore if the whole ground of culpability takes its origin from the will itself, it seems that, with the sin existing in will alone, a man is as culpable as if he sinned in deed.

5. Likewise, spiritual sins, which are consummated by the will alone, are graver than carnal sins, whose consummation takes place in the flesh. If, then, the former, which consist in the will alone, are graver than the latter, which consist in will and deed; it seems that the deed adds nothing to the malice of the will.

### Conclusion

> If on both sides the will is full, the sin of deed adds—not by reason of a greater contempt of God, but by reason of delight, or of harm done.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, when it is asked whether the deed adds anything to the malice of the will, this can be understood in two ways: in one way with respect to a will that can proceed into deed, but nevertheless does not proceed, because it does not will fully and entirely; and with respect to such a will the malice of the deed without doubt adds. For when the sin is consummated in deed, then the consent is fuller[^8], and not only is the woman said to eat, but also the man; and therefore the sin is then greater and graver by reason of the greater turning-toward and also the turning-away. — In another way it can be understood with respect to a will that indeed does not proceed into deed, not because it does not will, but because it cannot. And then this question is raised, when on both sides there is a full will, whether he sins more gravely who wills and cannot, or he who wills and does, granted that each is moved by an equal love.

This question therefore being understood in this way, it must be answered that one sin is said to be greater than another in three ways: either by reason of a greater contempt of God, or by reason of a greater *lust* or delight, or by reason of a greater *harm done*. Speaking in the first way, the deed does not add to the iniquity of the will, because the full will[^9] is turned away from God of itself, just as when it is joined to the deed. But as regards delight or lust it adds and aggravates, especially as regards the kind of carnal sin by which a man sins against himself; likewise as regards harm done it adds, and this especially as regards the kind of sin by which one sins against neighbor. For however much anyone may will to fornicate, he is never delighted as when the will is joined to the act[^10]. Likewise, however much anyone may will to kill another, he does not do as much harm as if he actually killed. And since God, the just judge, in punishing considers in a sin not only the magnitude of *contempt*, but also the magnitude of *delight* and the magnitude of *harm done*; hence it is that in some way the deed adds to the wickedness of the will. — Whence also the reasons that show this are to be conceded, although not all of them are conclusive, especially the one that is drawn from the likeness of divine and human justice. For it is not alike, because *men consider what is outwardly evident* and public justice; *but God beholds the heart*[^11] and considers not only public justice, but also private.

**To the arguments for the contrary part:**
*To 1 and 2.* As to what is objected on the contrary from that Gloss and from the authority of Augustine—of which the one says that the will is reckoned for the deed, and the other says that he is no less guilty who wills and does not do than he who wills and does; it must be said that both[^12] proceed according to the quantity of sin, which is measured according to the fullness of consent and according to the magnitude of contempt; and so it is rightly conceded that the deed does not add to such a will.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that the quantity of sin is considered according to the quantity of contempt; it must be said that it is true, yet not true *precisely*. For God considers not only the contempt of himself, but rather also the harm to the neighbor and the delight of the sinner; whence he also exacts vengeance for the neighbor suffering injury, and exacts a greater vengeance for one suffering a greater injury; so too he afflicts him who has taken delight, and afflicts more him who has taken more delight. And therefore that argument proceeds from an insufficient ground.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that the whole ground of sin is from the will; it must be said that it is not true, because some sins are not only from the wickedness of the will of the one acting, but also from the kind of deed, because they are against the prohibition of God and against the dictate of natural law[^13]. It is true nevertheless that nothing which is done on the part of the deed by itself suffices to make a sin, unless a voluntary motion be present; and therefore from this it does not follow that, although this cannot be a sin without that, that this adds nothing to that. And

it is alike, because iron does not burn without fire; yet fire with iron burns more and penetrates more than it would do by itself; and so it is found in many other cases.

*To 5.* As to what is objected concerning spiritual sins, it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that spiritual sins have a spiritual delight, which in its own kind has a greater adherence and a greater wickedness than even some delight of carnal sin does. But carnal sins never delight as much, when they are in will alone, as when they are in will and deed, nor do they likewise do as much harm. Therefore it does not follow that in such cases the deed does not add to the malice of the will[^1].

---

la: Psalm. 68, 28. — Glossa interlinearis super hunc locum apud Lyranum sic sonat: *Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem*, vitium vitio, vel iniquos filios iniquis patribus.

en: Psalm 68:28. — The interlinear Gloss upon this passage, in Lyra, runs thus: *Add iniquity upon iniquity*, vice upon vice, or wicked sons upon wicked fathers.

la: Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8: Mala enim voluntate vel sola quisque miser efficitur, sed miserior potestate, qua desiderium malae etc. — In hoc August. testimonio Vat. omittit *potestate*, et codd. C F H I L O R S T V Y ee et ed. 2 pro *desiderium* substituunt *desideriis*. Paulo inferius cod. K verbo *voluntatis* adiungit *malae*.

en: Bk. XIII *On the Trinity*, c. 5, n. 8: "For by an evil will alone is each one made wretched, but more wretched by the power whereby the desire of the evil [will] is [fulfilled]," etc. — In this testimony of Augustine the Vatican edition omits *potestate*, and codd. C F H I L O R S T V Y ee and ed. 2 substitute *desideriis* for *desiderium*. A little below, cod. K adds *malae* to the word *voluntatis*.

la: August., l. de Lib. Arb. c. 6. n. 15: Simul etiam te videre arbitror, in illa temporali [lege] nihil esse iustum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivarint... Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo, verbis explicem, ea est qua iustum est.

en: Augustine, *On Free Will*, bk. [I], c. 6, n. 15: "At the same time I think you also see that in that temporal [law] there is nothing just and lawful that men have not derived for themselves from this eternal [law]... Therefore, that I may briefly express in words, as far as I can, the notion of the eternal law which is impressed upon us, it is that by which it is just," [etc.].

la: Apoc. 18, 7: Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit, tantum date illi tormentum et luctum.

en: Revelation 18:7: "As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delights, so much give her of torment and grief."

la: Psalm. 57, 3. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 4, ubi sic legitur: Quidquid vis et non potes, factum Deus computat.

en: Psalm 57:3. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one and is found in Strabus and in Lyra, is taken from Augustine, *Enarration on this Psalm*, n. 4, where it reads thus: "Whatever you will and cannot do, God reckons as done."

la: Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 8: Si cui etiam non contingat facultas concumbendi cum coniuge aliena, planum tamen aliquo modo sit, id eum cupere, et si potestas detur, facturum esse, non minus etc.

en: Bk. I *On Free Will*, c. 3, n. 8: "If even the opportunity of lying with another's spouse should not befall someone, yet it should in some way be plain that he desires it, and that, were the power given, he would do it, he is no less," etc.

la: Id est superior pars rationis. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq. et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 1. et 2. — Paulo inferius pro *consentit* Vat. et edd. 2. 3. 4 et plures codd. substituunt minus bene *consensit*.

en: That is, the superior part of reason. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 6 ff., and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 1 and 2. — A little below, for *consentit* the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 and several codices substitute, less well, *consensit*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *plenior*. — [Et infra:] Vat. *plene*.

en: The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads *plenior*. — [And below:] the Vatican edition reads *plene*.

la: Supple cum Vat. *exteriori*. Paulo superius codd. F W X Y Z et alii verbo *delectato-* praemittunt *tantum*; paulo inferius cod. T pro *non tantum* substituit *nunquam tantum*.

en: Supply, with the Vatican edition, *exteriori* [exterior]. A little above, codd. F W X Y Z and others prefix *tantum* to the word *delectato-*; a little below, cod. T substitutes *nunquam tantum* for *non tantum*.

la: Libr. I. Reg. 16, 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.

en: 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 16:7: "For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart."

la: Cod. T omittit *ambae*.

en: Cod. T omits *ambae*.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XL. — Paulo inferius pro *et ideo* Vat. habet *sed ideo*.

en: Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XL. — A little below, for *et ideo* the Vatican edition reads *sed ideo*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 962–964 (PDF 984–986; offset `pdf = printed + 22`), reading Left then Right column per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. Raw OCR range 66848–66980 used as base for clean running prose (fundamenta + sed contra) and footnote-marker spacing; the Respondeo + replies were column-fragmented in OCR and were re-set directly from the PDF. Running heads confirmed in body (`DIST. XLII. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 963`; `964 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`). Alignment PASS: opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum operis addat supra peccatum voluntatis` = q2.

**Page-split map / footer accounting:**
- q2 opens at the bottom of p. 962 **left** column (fund. 1–3) and **right** column (fund. 4–5, sed contra 1–2), continuing through p. 963 (Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad 1–4) and ending at the top of p. 964 **right** column (Ad 5).
- **p. 962 footers picked up from q1 (per hand-off, committed 93e7ad2):** footer 1 (*Edd. addunt peccata* / iunctum~coniunctum) stayed with q1; **footers 2, 3, 4 belong to this q2** — (2) Psalm 68:28 interlinear gloss → `[^2]`; (3) Augustine *de Trin.* XIII → `[^3]`; (4) Augustine *de Lib. Arb.* I, c. 6 n. 15 → `[^4]`. p. 962 right-column footers 5–7 (Apoc 18:7; Psalm 57:3 gloss; *de Lib. Arb.* I c. 3 n. 8) → `[^5][^6][^7]`.
- p. 963 footers 1–4 (superior pars rationis / Cfr. d. XXIV; Vat. *plenior*; Vat. *plene*; Supple *exteriori* + cod. variants) → `[^8][^9][^10][^11]`. p. 963 right-column footers 5–7 (1 Reg 16,7; Cod. T omittit *ambae*; Cfr. d. XL) → `[^11]`(cor), `[^12]`(ambae), `[^13]`(iuris naturalis). The "YZ ... delectato- praemittunt tantum / cod. T nunquam tantum" variant note is folded into `[^10]` (its body anchor *actui* is on p. 963).
- **p. 964 footer 1** (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) → `[^1]`, closing the question. p. 964 footers 2–4 (De Natura boni; Plurima codd. *communicat*; Apoc. variant) belong to the NEXT chunk a2-q1, not q2.

**Apparatus marker re-numbering:** per-page Quaracchi numerals collide across pp. 962/963/964. To keep `[^N]` slugs unique within the file, the markers are assigned a single running sequence `[^2]`…`[^13]` for the p. 962–963 footers in body order, and the final p. 964 footer reuses `[^1]` (its only occurrence in this file). All 14 defs pair 1-for-1 with body anchors in both Latin and English.

**Scholion:** none. Per hand-off (resume 2026-05-31), q1's Scholion II covers q2's solution principles (treated *supra* d. 40 a. 2 q. 1); a missing q2 scholion is expected, not an error. `has_scholion: false`.

**Hand-off forwarded to a2-q1:** ARTICULUS II (`De comparatione peccati venialis ad mortale`, raw 66981) opens immediately after q2 in p. 964 right column; its short opener `Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum… quaeruntur duo` folds into a2-q1 per the Vol II chunking convention. a2-q1 (`Utrum peccatum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione`, raw 66990) begins in p. 964 left/right columns. **p. 964 footers 2, 3, 4 belong to a2-q1** (footer 2 = *De Natura boni* c. 34, 36 on *appetitus rerum* / Cfr. p. 838 n. 8; footer 3 = Plurima codd. and edd. 1, 2 *communicat*; footer 4 = Apoc.-numbering, Ipsa verba Glossae vide supra p. 528 n. 4 et p. 721 n. 2). a2-q1's footer 1 = `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` is already consumed here as q2's `[^1]` — confirm a2-q1's first fresh footer is the *De Natura boni* note.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De comparatione peccati venialis ad mortale.*

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum, scilicet de comparatione venialis ad mortale. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum conveniant in reatu sive obligatione ad aeternitatem poenae.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum peccatum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus[^2] definiens peccatum dicit, quod « peccatum non est appetitus rerum malarum, sed desertio meliorum ». Si ergo veniale peccatum peccatum est, ergo in ipso est desertio summi boni; sed ubi est desertio summi boni, ibi est aversio: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod haec ratio conveniat mortali tantum; tunc *ego quaero:* in quo communicant[^3] veniale et mortale, ratione cuius utrumque dicatur peccatum? Si tu dicas, quod in *conversione* ad commutabile bonum; hoc non videtur, quia converti ad commutabile bonum non est peccatum, nisi per illud recedat homo a bono incommutabili; peccatum enim est privatio, non positio. Si ergo veniale peccatum, in quantum peccatum est, communicat cum mortali, et illud, in quo communicat, non est conversio: ergo est aversio.

2. Item, omne illud, quod est contra divinum praeceptum, avertit a Deo; sed veniale est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Maior* per se manifesta est; *minor* probatur. Ad Romanos septimo[^4] super illud: *Non concupisces;* Glossa: « Bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet »: ergo si peccatum veniale est malum, ergo per illud praeceptum: *Non concupisces,* est prohibitum.

3. Item, omne illud, quod deformat imaginem, avertit a Deo; peccatum veniale est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Minor* probatur per illud quod dicitur sexto Musicae[^5]: « Amor inferioris pulcritudinis animam polluit »; sed peccatum veniale est amor inferioris pulcritudinis: ergo etc.

4. Item, simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter se convertit[^6]; sed tam intellectus quam affectus est simplex: ergo cum se convertit ad aliquid, totaliter se convertit. Sed quod totaliter se convertit ad aliquid avertitur ab eius opposito vel disparato: ergo cum affectus noster se convertit ad creaturam sub ratione creaturae, necesse est, ipsum averti a Deo. Sed hoc est in veniali peccato: ergo etc.

5. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquid moveatur ad terminum *ad quem,* quin aliquo modo separetur a termino *a quo;* sed conversio dicit motum animi respectu termini *ad quem,* aversio autem respectu termini *a quo:* ergo si conversio est in veniali peccato, necesse est, quod similiter sit aversio.

6. Item, omnis amor creaturae vel est per modum *usus,* vel per modum *fruitionis,* sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana[^7]; sed in peccato veniali est amor creaturae: ergo vel per modum *usus,* vel *fruitionis.* Non per modum *usus,* quia iam non esset culpa; est ergo amor *fruitionis.* Sed *frui creatura* est ponere finem in creatura; et hoc non est aliud quam averti a Deo: ergo omnis amor venialis peccati facit a Deo averti.

**Sed contra:**
1. Nullus aversus a Deo est iustus; sed peccans venialiter remanet in iustitia: ergo peccans venialiter non avertitur a Deo. *Maior* manifesta est; *minor* probatur per illud Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto[^8]: *Septies in die cadit iustus et resurget.*

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2. Item, nullus separatur a Deo nisi volens; sed omnis qui avertitur, separatur a Deo: ergo nullus separatur a Deo nisi in actu, quem facit mera voluntate. Sed multa venialia peccata committimus quadam necessitate, sicut dicitur ad Romanos septimo[^9]: *Quod nolo malum, illud facio:* ergo etc.

3. Item, nullus avertitur a Deo sine ipsius Dei contemptu et offensa[^10]; sed nullus contemnit et offendit Deum sine gravi culpa; sed veniale inter levia peccata reponitur: ergo per veniale homo non avertitur a Deo.

4. Item, nihil, quod stat simul cum caritate, avertit a Deo; sed veniale stat simul cum caritate: ergo etc. *Maior* manifesta est; *minor* probatur: quia, si veniale expelleret caritatem, ergo auferret homini vitam gratiae. Sed peccatum, quod aufert homini vitam gratiae, ponit mortem et dicitur mortale: ergo peccatum veniale esset mortale.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Peccatum veniale non communicat cum mortali in aversione, secundum quod aversio dicitur proprie.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio peccatum veniale non communicat cum mortali in aversione, secundum quod aversio dicitur proprie. Importat enim Dei contemptum, et contemptus Dei iram meretur et mortem[^11]; peccatum autem, quo quis meretur iram et mortem, non debet dici *veniale,* immo potius *mortale.* Et propterea communiter tenetur, quod aversio, proprie loquendo, reperitur in peccato *mortali,* non in *veniali.*

Et istud melius patet, si modum attendamus, per quem homo dicitur averti a Deo et contemnere Deum, committendo aliquod peccatum, in quo nihil cogitat de Deo. Aut enim avertitur homo a Deo, quia facit *contra divinum mandatum;* aut quia ponit sibi bonum creatum tanquam *finem ultimum.* In hoc namque, quod facit *contra divinum mandatum,* recte[^12] a Deo avertitur; quia mandatum est via recte perveniendi ad Deum et tendendi in Deum. Qui igitur facit contra mandatum incedit directe via contraria; ideo quasi faciem suam retrorsum convertens, tergum vertit ad illum, in quem debebat per mandatum tendere[^13]. — Similiter, cum statuit sibi creaturam tanquam *finem ultimum,* recte dicitur a Deo averti. Anima enim media est inter creaturam et Deum, in quantum est imago Dei[^14]. Dum ergo ad creaturam se tanquam ad finem convertit, faciem suam, quae debebat esse sursum versa, deorsum inclinat, et ideo se avertit a Deo. — Et utroque dictorum modorum non est aversio sine contemptu. Nam qui mandatum Dei transgreditur contemnit mandantem. Similiter, qui creaturam sibi finem statuit principalem magis appretiat creaturam[^15] quam Deum; et hoc non potest esse sine Dei contemptu.

*Veniale* autem peccatum nec est directe *contra* Dei *mandatum,* nec statuit creaturam tanquam *finem ultimum;* et ideo non est in eo nec aversio nec contemptus. Sed quia veniale fit *praeter* Dei *mandatum,* in veniali etiam peccato creatura non refertur in Deum; hinc est, quod per veniale quodam modo *recedit* homo a *via mandati,* quodam modo etiam *morose adhaeret* ei, per quod deberet transire. Unde et in veniali est quaedam *elongatio* et quaedam *retardatio.* — Unde conceditur, quod veniale a Deo non avertit, sed *elongat,* a Deo non separat, sed *retardat.* Et si large nomen *aversionis* acciperetur, ut se extenderet ad elongationem et retardationem, in veniali esset *aversio quaedam.* Quia tamen nomen *aversionis* sonat in contemptum: ideo tenendum est, quod avertere a Deo sit mortalis peccati proprie. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod peccatum est desertio; dicendum, quod si ista definitio detur pro peccato mortali, *desertio* stat ibi pro *aversione.* Si autem detur pro quolibet peccato, *desertio* dicit quandam *elongationem* et *retardationem*[^16]. — Posset tamen dici, quod non dicitur ibi peccatum desertio Dei, sed desertio cuiuscumque boni, quod spectat ad rectitudinem. Quamvis ergo in veniali peccato non sit desertio Dei, est tamen desertio alicuius *bonae circumstantiae* circa actum, ex cuius defectu incidit veniale peccatum[^17]. Et in hoc communicant tam veniale quam mortale peccatum, quia utrumque privat aliquod bonum. Sed in hoc differunt, quod mortale privat aliquem actum vel circumstantiam necessariam ad salutem, veniale vero non.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veniale est[^18] *contra Dei prohibitionem;* dicendum, quod illud *proprie* dicitur esse *contra Dei prohibitionem,* ad cuius oppositum obligat prohibitio; veniale autem non est huiusmodi, et ideo non est directe *prohibitum.* Est tamen ipsi prohibitioni annexum, et magis proprie debet dici *cohibitum,* quam *prohibitum.* Et hoc patet, quia, cum Deus prohibet concupiscentiam dicens[^1]: *Non concupisces;* non prohibet primum motum concupiscentiae, sed concupiscentiae progressum, secundum illud Ecclesiastici decimo octavo: *Fili, post concupiscentias tuas non eas;* sed dum prohibet, hominem ire post motum concupiscentiae, hoc ipso manifestat, quod concupiscentiae motus non est bonus nec Deo placitus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor inferioris pulcritudinis polluit animam; dicendum, quod anima dupliciter habet pollui: aut macula *mortalis*[^2b] peccati, quae quidem *expellit* nitorem gratiae; aut macula *venialis* peccati, quae quodam modo *retardat* actum dilectionis gratuitae. Et prima pollutio est per mortale et facit ad deformationem imaginis, quia aufert ei formam, scilicet imaginem recreationis. Secunda vero est pollutio venialis, quae, etsi aliquo modo polluat, non tamen animam deformat, quia stat simul cum gratia, quae animam informat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter se convertit; dicendum, quod hoc tripliciter[^3b] potest intelligi: quia totaliter potest dicere totalitatem quantum ad *actum* convertendi, vel quantum ad *habitum,* vel quantum ad *potentiam* convertendi. Si intelligatur quantum ad *actum;* sic verum est, ad minus secundum statum viae, quia non intelligimus simul et semel nisi unum solum; aut si multa simul intelligamus et velimus, hoc est, in quantum sunt unum[^4b]. — Si autem dicat totalitatem *habitus,* vel *virtutis;* sic falsus est sermo. Non enim oportet, quod quando anima vel aliquod simplex convertit se ad aliquid, convertat se secundum totum suum *habitum* et secundum totam suam *potentiam,* quia potest converti intensius et remissius. — Cum ergo dicitur, quod quando affectus se convertit ad unum totaliter, avertitur ab eius opposito sive disparato; si primo modo intelligatur, falsum est[^5b], quia potest se convertere ad unum in actu, et ad aliud in habitu; si secundo modo, vel tertio intelligatur, sic habet veritatem. Sed *maior propositio* fuit falsa, et propter hoc, quia *totaliter converti* aliter accipitur in *maiori propositione,* et aliter in *minori;* ideo consequentia illa non tenet. Et *si tu obiicias,* quod non potest affici simul et semel erga Deum et erga creaturam, quam inordinate diligit, unde cum convertitur ad unum, avertitur ab altero; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia *averti* plus dicit quam *non converti actualiter;* importat enim contrarium conversionis, videlicet quandam aspernationem Dei sive contemptum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus separat a termino *a quo;* dicendum, quod verum est de illo motu *proprie dicto,* qui concernit duos terminos, unum a quo incipit, et alterum in quem tendit. Non sic est in actu venialis peccati. Anima enim, cum peccat venialiter, non *movetur* a Deo in creaturam, sed magis *afficitur* circa ipsam creaturam. Unde et veniale peccatum potius est animi *affectus* sive actus quam *motus.*

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor venialis peccati est amor fruitionis; dicendum, quod falsum est, secundum quod *frui* accipitur *proprie,*[^6b] videlicet quiescere in aliquo tanquam ad finem ultimum; sic enim *frui* est per mortale, non per veniale. — Si ergo quaerat, utrum sit *usus,* vel *fruitio;* dicendum, quod nec est usus nec fruitio, sed *abusus,* nisi forte usus dicatur large omnis amor, quo quis amat aliquid, non quiescens in illo, sed refert[^7b] ad aliud actu vel habitu, sive referat recte, sive minus recte. Et quod illud oporteat dicere, manifestum est. Cum enim aliquis diligit aliquam creaturam, referens ad aliud, non tamen ad illud ad quod debet, amore illo peccat; nec tamen illud est fruitio nec usus *proprie dictus,* sed magis proprie debet dici *abusus.* Unde Augustinus, cum dicit: *Omnis qui amat aliquid, aut amat utens, aut fruens,* accipit large *usum* et *fruitionem: usum* pro omni amore relato, sive directe[^8b], sive indirecte; *fruitionem* pro omni amore non relato, sive statuat ibi finem principalem, sive non. Et sic in divisione illa comprehenditur amor venialis peccati, nisi forte quis velit dicere, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de amore ordinato. Et sic patent omnia.

english:
### Article II. *On the comparison of venial sin to mortal sin.*

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning the second point, namely concerning the comparison of venial to mortal sin. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion.

Second it is asked whether they agree in guilt, or in obligation to the eternity of punishment.

### Question I. *Whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion. And that they do seems to be the case.

1. Augustine[^2], in defining sin, says that « sin is not the appetite for evil things, but the desertion of better things ». If therefore venial sin is sin, then in it there is desertion of the highest good; but where there is desertion of the highest good, there is aversion: therefore, etc. If you should say that this argument applies to mortal sin only, then *I ask:* in what do venial and mortal sin agree[^3], by reason of which each is called sin? If you should say, in the *conversion* to a changeable good, this does not seem so, because to turn to a changeable good is not a sin, unless through it a man recedes from the unchangeable good; for sin is privation, not position. If therefore venial sin, insofar as it is sin, agrees with mortal, and that in which it agrees is not conversion, then it is aversion.

2. Likewise, everything that is contrary to a divine precept turns away from God; but venial sin is of this kind: therefore, etc. The *major* is manifest of itself; the *minor* is proved. To the Romans, chapter seven[^4], on that text: *Thou shalt not covet;* the Gloss: « Good is the law, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils »: therefore, if venial sin is an evil, then by that precept *Thou shalt not covet* it is forbidden.

3. Likewise, everything that deforms the image turns away from God; venial sin is of this kind: therefore, etc. The *minor* is proved by what is said in the sixth book of *On Music*[^5]: « Love of an inferior beauty pollutes the soul »; but venial sin is the love of an inferior beauty: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, a simple thing, in respect to that to which it turns, turns wholly[^6]; but both the intellect and the affection are simple: therefore, when it turns to something, it turns wholly. But what turns wholly to something is turned away from its opposite or its disparate: therefore, when our affection turns to a creature under the aspect of a creature, it is necessary that it be turned away from God. But this is the case in venial sin: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, it is impossible for anything to be moved to the term *to which* without being in some way separated from the term *from which;* but conversion bespeaks a motion of the mind in respect to the term *to which,* and aversion in respect to the term *from which:* therefore, if conversion is in venial sin, it is necessary that there likewise be aversion.

6. Likewise, all love of a creature is either by way of *use* or by way of *enjoyment,* as Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^7]; but in venial sin there is love of a creature: therefore either by way of *use* or of *enjoyment.* Not by way of *use,* for then it would no longer be a fault; therefore it is the love of *enjoyment.* But *to enjoy a creature* is to place one's end in a creature; and this is nothing other than to be turned away from God: therefore all love of venial sin causes a turning away from God.

**On the contrary:**
1. No one turned away from God is just; but one who sins venially remains in justice: therefore one who sins venially is not turned away from God. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved by that text of Proverbs, chapter twenty-four[^8]: *Seven times a day the just man falls and rises again.*

2. Likewise, no one is separated from God except willingly; but everyone who is turned away is separated from God: therefore no one is separated from God except in an act which he does by sheer will. But we commit many venial sins by a certain necessity, as is said to the Romans, chapter seven[^9]: *The evil that I would not, that I do:* therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, no one is turned away from God without contempt of God himself and offense[^10]; but no one contemns and offends God without grave fault; but venial sin is reckoned among the light sins: therefore by venial sin a man is not turned away from God.

4. Likewise, nothing that stands together with charity turns away from God; but venial sin stands together with charity: therefore, etc. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved: because, if venial sin expelled charity, then it would take from a man the life of grace. But a sin that takes from a man the life of grace inflicts death and is called mortal: therefore venial sin would be mortal.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Venial sin does not agree with mortal sin in aversion, according as aversion is taken properly.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, venial sin does not agree with mortal sin in aversion, according as aversion is taken properly. For it implies contempt of God, and contempt of God merits wrath and death[^11]; but a sin by which one merits wrath and death ought not to be called *venial,* but rather *mortal.* And therefore it is commonly held that aversion, properly speaking, is found in *mortal* sin, not in *venial.*

And this appears better if we attend to the manner by which a man is said to be turned away from God and to contemn God, by committing some sin in which he thinks nothing of God. For either a man is turned away from God because he acts *against a divine command;* or because he sets up a created good for himself as his *ultimate end.* For in this, that he acts *against a divine command,* he is rightly[^12] turned away from God; because the command is the way of rightly arriving at God and tending toward God. He therefore who acts against the command proceeds straight along the contrary way; and so, as it were turning his face backward, he turns his back upon him toward whom he ought to have tended by the command[^13]. — Likewise, when he sets up a creature for himself as his *ultimate end,* he is rightly said to be turned away from God. For the soul is midway between the creature and God, inasmuch as it is the image of God[^14]. When therefore it turns to a creature as to its end, it bends downward its face, which ought to have been turned upward, and therefore it turns itself away from God. — And in both of the said modes there is no aversion without contempt. For he who transgresses God's command contemns the commander. Likewise, he who sets up a creature for himself as his principal end values the creature[^15] more than God; and this cannot be without contempt of God.

*Venial* sin, however, is neither directly *against* God's *command,* nor does it set up a creature as its *ultimate end;* and therefore there is in it neither aversion nor contempt. But because venial sin is committed *beside* God's *command,* in venial sin too a creature is not referred to God; hence it is that through venial sin a man in some way *recedes* from the *way of the command,* and in some way also *lingers slothfully* upon that by which he ought to pass through. Hence in venial sin too there is a certain *elongation* and a certain *retardation.* — Hence it is conceded that venial sin does not turn away from God but *elongates,* does not separate from God but *retards.* And if the name *aversion* were taken broadly, so that it extended to elongation and retardation, in venial sin there would be a certain *aversion.* Yet because the name *aversion* sounds toward contempt, therefore it must be held that to turn away from God belongs properly to mortal sin. — Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that sin is a desertion; it must be said that, if this definition is given for mortal sin, *desertion* there stands for *aversion.* But if it is given for any sin whatever, *desertion* bespeaks a certain *elongation* and *retardation*[^16]. — Yet it could be said that sin is not there called desertion of God, but desertion of any good whatsoever which pertains to rectitude. Therefore although in venial sin there is no desertion of God, there is nonetheless desertion of some *good circumstance* about the act, from the defect of which venial sin arises[^17]. And in this both venial and mortal sin agree, because each deprives of some good. But in this they differ, that mortal sin deprives of some act or circumstance necessary for salvation, but venial does not.

2. To that which is objected, that venial sin is[^18] *against God's prohibition;* it must be said that that is *properly* said to be *against God's prohibition* to whose opposite the prohibition obliges; but venial sin is not of this kind, and therefore it is not directly *prohibited.* It is, however, attached to the prohibition itself, and more properly ought to be called *restrained* than *prohibited.* And this is plain, because, when God forbids concupiscence saying[^1]: *Thou shalt not covet;* he does not forbid the first motion of concupiscence, but the progress of concupiscence, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter eighteen: *Son, go not after thy lusts;* but while he forbids a man to go after the motion of concupiscence, by this very fact he makes manifest that the motion of concupiscence is not good nor pleasing to God.

3. To that which is objected, that the love of an inferior beauty pollutes the soul; it must be said that the soul can be polluted in two ways: either by the stain of *mortal*[^2b] sin, which indeed *expels* the splendor of grace; or by the stain of *venial* sin, which in some way *retards* the act of gratuitous love. And the first pollution is by mortal sin and tends toward the deformation of the image, because it takes from it its form, namely the image of re-creation. But the second is a venial pollution, which, although it pollutes in some way, nonetheless does not deform the soul, because it stands together with grace, which informs the soul.

4. To that which is objected, that a simple thing, in respect to that to which it turns, turns wholly; it must be said that this can be understood in three ways[^3b]: for "wholly" can bespeak totality with respect to the *act* of turning, or with respect to the *habit,* or with respect to the *power* of turning. If it is understood with respect to the *act,* then it is true, at least according to the state of the wayfarer, because we do not understand more than one thing at once; or if we understand and will many things at once, this is insofar as they are one[^4b]. — But if it bespeaks totality of *habit* or of *virtue,* then the statement is false. For it is not necessary that, when a soul or some simple thing turns to something, it turn according to its whole *habit* and according to its whole *power,* because it can turn more intensely and more remissly. — When therefore it is said that, when the affection turns to one thing wholly, it is turned away from its opposite or its disparate; if it is understood in the first way, it is false[^5b], because it can turn to one thing in act and to another in habit; if it is understood in the second or third way, then it holds true. But the *major proposition* was false, and on this account, because *to turn wholly* is taken in one sense in the *major proposition* and in another in the *minor;* therefore that consequence does not hold. And *if you object* that one cannot be affected at one and the same time toward God and toward a creature which one inordinately loves, whence, when one turns to the one, one turns away from the other; it must be said that it does not follow, because *to be turned away* says more than *not to turn actually;* for it implies the contrary of conversion, namely a certain spurning of God or contempt.

5. To that which is objected, that motion separates from the term *from which;* it must be said that this is true of that motion *properly so called,* which involves two terms, one from which it begins and another to which it tends. It is not so in the act of venial sin. For the soul, when it sins venially, is not *moved* from God into the creature, but rather is *affected* about the creature itself. Hence venial sin is rather an *affection* of the mind, or act, than a *motion.*

6. To that which is objected, that the love of venial sin is the love of enjoyment; it must be said that this is false, according as *to enjoy* is taken *properly,*[^6b] namely to rest in something as in an ultimate end; for thus *to enjoy* is by mortal sin, not by venial. — If therefore one should ask whether it be *use* or *enjoyment;* it must be said that it is neither use nor enjoyment, but *abuse,* unless perhaps "use" be taken broadly for all love by which one loves something, not resting in it but referring[^7b] it to another in act or in habit, whether one refers it rightly or less rightly. And that one must say this is manifest. For when someone loves some creature, referring it to another, yet not to that to which he ought, by that love he sins; nor yet is that enjoyment or use *properly so called,* but more properly ought to be called *abuse.* Hence Augustine, when he says: *Everyone who loves something either loves using or loves enjoying,* takes *use* and *enjoyment* broadly: *use* for every referred love, whether directly[^8b] or indirectly; *enjoyment* for every unreferred love, whether he sets his principal end there or not. And so in that division the love of venial sin is comprehended, unless perhaps one wishes to say that Augustine is there speaking of ordered love. And thus all things are clear.

la: De Natura boni, c. 34. et 36. In definitione ex August. allata textus originalis pro *appetitus rerum* exhibet *appetitio naturarum.* Cfr. supra pag. 838, nota 8.

en: Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good,* c. 34 and 36. In the definition cited from Augustine, the original text reads *appetitio naturarum* in place of *appetitus rerum.* Cf. above, p. 838, note 8.

la: Plurima codd. et edd. 1, 2 *communicat.*

en: Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read *communicat* (singular).

la: Vers. 7. — Ipsa verba Glossae vide supra pag. 528, nota 4. et pag. 721, nota 2.

en: Verse 7. — For the very words of the Gloss see above, p. 528, note 4, and p. 721, note 2.

la: Cap. 14. n. 46. — Pro *dicitur sexto Musicae* in Vat. legitur *dicit Augustinus,* et ad marginem habetur *lib. 6. Music.*

en: Chapter 14, n. 46. — In place of *it is said in the sixth book of On Music,* the Vatican edition reads *Augustine says,* and in the margin has *bk. 6 of On Music.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 36. (c. 7.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 36 (c. 7).

la: Libr. I. c. 3. n. 3. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 2.

en: Book I, c. 3, n. 3. Cf. I Sent., the text of the Master, d. I, c. 2.

la: Vers. 16. Vulgata: *Septies enim cadit* etc., omissis verbis *in die.* Altera autem lectio in antiquis auctoribus vulgo occurrit.

en: Verse 16. The Vulgate: *For seven times he falls* etc., the words *in die* being omitted. But the other reading commonly occurs in the ancient authors.

la: Vers. 15. 16. 19. De hac minori cfr. supra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *peccata committimus* edd. praeter 1 exhibent *peccata committuntur.*

en: Verses 15, 16, 19. On this minor cf. above, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — In place of *we commit sins* the editions besides 1 read *sins are committed.*

la: Averti enim, ut Magister explicat supra d. V. c. 1, est odio habere vel invidere.

en: For to be turned away, as the Master explains above, d. V, c. 1, is to hold in hatred or to be envious.

la: Vat. *iram incurrit et meretur mortem.*

en: The Vatican edition: *incurs wrath and merits death.*

la: Id est directe, sive, si placet, vere.

en: That is, directly, or, if you prefer, truly.

la: Epist. II. Petr. 2, 21: *Melius enim erat illis non cognoscere viam iustitiae, quam post agnitionem retrorsum converti ab eo quod traditum est illis sancto mandato.*

en: 2 Peter 2:21: *For it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than, after they had known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them.*

la: August., Epist. 140 (alias 120), sive Liber de gratia novi Testamenti ad Honoratum, c. 2. n. 3.

en: Augustine, Letter 140 (formerly 120), or the Book on the Grace of the New Testament to Honoratus, c. 2, n. 3.

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 2 *appretiatur.*

en: The codices and editions 1, 2 read *appretiatur.*

la: Cod. T sic: *desertio stat ibi pro quadam elongatione et retardatione.*

en: Codex T thus: *desertion there stands for a certain elongation and retardation.*

la: Respicitur illa peccati definitio, quae habetur supra d. 35. dub. 6. in fine: *Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni.* — Edd., excepta 1, perperam *incidit in veniale peccatum.*

en: Reference is made to that definition of sin which is found above, d. 35, dub. 6, at the end: *Sin is an act arising from a defect of good.* — The editions, except 1, wrongly read *incurs into venial sin.*

la: Non pauci codd., ut CFKLRS (T a prima manu) ee etc., cum edd. 2, 3, 4 falso *non est.*

en: Not a few codices, such as CFKLRS (T by the first hand) ee etc., together with editions 2, 3, 4, wrongly read *is not.*

la: Deut. 5, 21; Exod. 20, 17. Verba Eccli. habentur cap. cit. v. 30. Cfr. August., I. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 29. n. 32.

en: Deuteronomy 5:21; Exodus 20:17. The words of Ecclesiasticus are found in the cited chapter, v. 30. Cf. Augustine, *On Marriage and Concupiscence* I, c. 29, n. 32.

la: Dictio *nitor gratiae* lectorem revocat ad illam gratiae definitionem, quae supra pag. 648, nota 8. proposita est: *Gratia est quidam nitor animae ad conciliandum sanctum amorem.* — Aliquanto inferius pro *quae, etsi* codd. F K Y ee ee etc. atque ed. 1 substituunt *quod, etsi.*

en: The expression *splendor of grace* recalls the reader to that definition of grace which was proposed above, p. 648, note 8: *Grace is a certain splendor of the soul for procuring holy love.* — A little further down, in place of *quae, etsi,* the codices F K Y ee ee etc. and edition 1 substitute *quod, etsi.*

la: Codd. et primae edd. *dupliciter,* contra subnexa.

en: The codices and the first editions read *dupliciter* (in two ways), against what follows.

la: Cfr. verba Aristot. supra pag. 79, nota 2. in fine allata.

en: Cf. the words of Aristotle cited above, p. 79, note 2, at the end.

la: Cod. M *sic falsum est.*

en: Codex M: *thus it is false.*

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *in fine ultimo.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4: *in an ultimate end.*

la: Cod. T bene *referens,* multi alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *referat.*

en: Codex T rightly *referring;* many other codices with editions 1, 2 read *referat.*

la: Intellige cum codd. H K T V *recte.* Deinde pro *indirecte* cod. V *non recte.* Paulo inferius pro *nisi forte* Vat. *sive forte.*

en: Understand with codices H K T V *rightly.* Then, in place of *indirectly,* codex V reads *not rightly.* A little further down, in place of *nisi forte,* the Vatican edition reads *sive forte.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Non omnia peccata ex natura sua esse mortalia, sed aliqua esse venialia, fide catholica constat (Concil. Trid. Sess. VI. c. 11.). Circa hunc articulum, praeter Wiclefum et novatores saeculi XVI, erravit etiam Baius, ut patet ex eius propositione 20. condemnata: « Nullum est peccatum ex natura sua veniale, sed omne peccatum meretur poenam aeternam ». — De divisionibus variis peccatorum cfr. hic dub. 2. — De triplici peccato veniali, et quomodo veniale fieri possit mortale, vide IV. Sent. d. 16. p. II. a. 3. q. 1, d. 17. p. II. dub. 7.

Variis loquendi modis utuntur antiqui magistri, ut distinguant veniale peccatum a mortali, qui tamen, secundum mentem auctorum explicati, idem dicunt. Quod igitur hic in corp. dicitur, scilicet, veniale peccatum non esse directe contra Dei mandatum, sed praeter illud, quod etiam a S. Thoma (S. 1. II. q. 88. a. 1. ad 1.) repetitur; hoc explicatur per contextum ac in solutionibus ad 1. 2. 5. 6; et eo sensu intelligitur, quod non sit ita contra legem, ut finis legis et plenitudo eius, quae est caritas, elidatur. — Observatione autem digna est explicatio in solut. ad 4, quomodo voluntas in actu se convertere possit ad unum, et ad aliud in habitu.

De hac quaestione auctores (plerumque sub aliis titulis): Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 2. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 21. q. 1. et aliis locis collectis ab Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 88. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. 4; S. loc. et art. cit.; de Malo, q. 7. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4. a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tor., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., de hoc et seq. q. hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

**II.** Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest., ut refert Richard. a Med. (loc. cit.), fuerunt qui assererent, omne peccatum deliberate commissum, etiam veniale, per se obligare ad poenam aeternam. Alii, ut Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 9.), ob rationem in 2. arg. ad oppos. allegatam tantum putarunt, aeternitatem poenae non constituere differentiam essentialem inter peccatum mortale et veniale, quia in dicto casu veniale mereatur poenam aeternam. Ab aliis autem cum S. Bonav. respondetur, pro casu supposito veniale obligare ad aeternitatem poenae tantum per accidens. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 21. q. 1. n. 3-6.) ne hoc quidem concedendum esse putat.

Praeter citatos auctores: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; S. 1. II. q. 87. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Durand., hic q. 7.

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english_scholion:
**I.** That not all sins are by their nature mortal, but that some are venial, is established by the Catholic faith (Council of Trent, Session VI, c. 11). Concerning this article, besides Wyclif and the innovators of the sixteenth century, Baius also erred, as is plain from his condemned proposition 20: « No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment ». — On the various divisions of sins, cf. here dubium 2. — On the threefold venial sin, and how a venial sin can become mortal, see IV Sent., d. 16, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, and d. 17, p. II, dub. 7.

The ancient masters use various manners of speaking in order to distinguish venial sin from mortal, who nonetheless, when explained according to the mind of the authors, say the same thing. What therefore is said here in the body, namely that venial sin is not directly against God's command but beside it — which is also repeated by St. Thomas (S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1) — this is explained by the context and in the solutions to 1, 2, 5, 6; and it is understood in this sense, that it is not so against the law that the end of the law and its fullness, which is charity, is destroyed. — Worthy of note, moreover, is the explanation in the solution to 4, how the will in act can turn to one thing and to another in habit.

On this question, the authors (mostly under other titles): Alex. of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 108, m. 2, 4. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, II Sent., d. 21, q. 1, and in other places collected by Hier. of Montefortino, t. III, q. 88, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, 4; Summa, loc. and art. cit.; de Malo, q. 7, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4, a. 3, 4. — Petr. a Tor., here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following q. here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 6. — Dionysius Carthusian, on this and the following q. here q. 3.

**II.** As regards the following (2nd) question, as Richard of Mediavilla reports (loc. cit.), there were some who asserted that every sin deliberately committed, even venial, of itself obliges to eternal punishment. Others, such as Alex. of Hales (loc. cit. m. 9), on account of the argument alleged in the 2nd argument to the contrary, thought only that the eternity of punishment does not constitute an essential difference between mortal and venial sin, because in the said case venial sin would merit eternal punishment. By others, however, together with St. Bonaventure, it is answered that, in the supposed case, venial sin obliges to the eternity of punishment only per accidens. But Scotus (IV Sent., d. 21, q. 1, n. 3-6) thinks that not even this is to be conceded.

Besides the cited authors: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5; Summa I-II, q. 87, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4, a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, loc. cit. a. 4. — Durandus, here q. 7.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp.964–966 = PDF 986–988), with the IA djvu OCR as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Printed pages confirmed via low-dpi render: p.965 running head reads `DIST. XLII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`

**ARTICULUS II opener folded in:** per the Vol II chunking convention, the short article opener (`Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum… quaeruntur duo`, raw 66981) is held in this a2-q1 chunk, not a standalone divisio.

**Alignment:** PASS. `Primo quaeritur` / `Utrum… conveniant in aversione` = q1. q2 (`Secundo quaeritur, utrum veniale conveniat cum mortali in reatu poenae aeternae`, raw 67196) is the next chunk.

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart):**
- p.964 (footers 1–8): footer 1 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) was consumed by a1-q2 as its closing `[^1]` — NOT re-claimed here. Footers 2–8 picked up into this body as `[^2]`–`[^8]`.
- p.965 (footers 1–10): all in this body (Sed contra 2–3, Respondeo, solution ad 1, opening of ad 2).
- p.966 (footers 1–8): all in this body (solutions ad 2–6).
- Total: 25 apparatus entries.

**Scholion location:** SCHOLION I–II is held in this a2-q1 chunk. Scholion I covers q1 (with its author list); Scholion II explicitly addresses *the following (2nd) question* ("Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest."). Therefore **a2-q2 will have `has_scholion: false`** — its scholion is covered here.

**Hand-off forwarded to a2-q2:** QUAESTIO II (`Utrum veniale conveniat cum mortali in reatu poenae aeternae`, raw 67196) opens on printed **p.967** (PDF 989). The SCHOLION running across p.966–967 belongs to THIS q1 (Scholion II covers q2), so a2-q2 has no scholion of its own. The p.967 running head transitions from `QUAEST. I.` to `QUAEST. II.` within the scholion block — a2-q2's first body footer is the fresh p.967 footer sequence; no q1 footer migrates forward.

**[?] flags:** none. All readings confirmed against the 450 dpi column bands.