title: Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur cognitio scientialis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur cognitio scientialis. Et quod sic, videtur tali ratione.

1. Philosophus aliquis sciens rationibus cogentibus, Deum esse unum, creatorem[^p521-7] omnium, potest venire ad fidem, ita quod non obliviscatur illarum rationum; sed sciens illas rationes habet scientiam: ergo videtur, quod possit de eodem simul habere fidem et scientiam.

2. Item, aliquis cognoscens aliquid per demonstrationem quia sive per effectum, si incipiat nosse per causam sive per demonstrationem propter quid, non propter hoc amittit priorem cognitionem, quamvis haec secunda sit nobilior illa[^p521-8]: ergo duae cognitiones possunt haberi de eodem, quarum una nobilior est quam alia, et una non expellit aliam nec evacuat. Et si hoc verum est, tunc videtur, quod simul possit aliquid cognosci ratiocinatione acquisita et illuminatione infusa: ergo de eodem simul potest haberi fides et scientia.

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3. Item, cognitio intellectiva superadveniens non tollit cognitionem sensitivam, licet una illarum sit dignior et perfectior et nobilior altera[^p522-1]: ergo pari ratione videtur de fide et scientia, quod simul possunt haberi de eodem et circa idem.

4. Item, «experientia est principium scientiae»; sed de uno et eodem potest haberi fides et experientia: ergo de uno et eodem potest haberi fides et scientia. Maior probatur per Philosophum[^p522-2]; minor probatur in beata Virgine Maria, quae fide et experientia cognovit, se concepisse de Spiritu sancto.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut caritas diligit Deum propter se et super omnia, sic fides assentit primae Veritati propter se et super omnia; sed quia caritas diligit Deum super omnia et propter se, impossibile est, quod ipsa compatiatur secum dilectionem, qua quis diligit Deum propter terrena principaliter: ergo pari ratione impossibile erit, quod fides secum compatiatur cognitionem, quae principaliter adhaeret ratiocinationi acquisitae. Sed talis est cognitio scientiae: ergo impossibile est, fidem circa idem esse cum scientia simul et semel[^p522-3].

2. Item, visio patriae tollit fidem propter certitudinem et evidentiam in cognoscendo: si igitur quod cognoscitur per scientiam est certum et apertum, videtur, quod impossibile sit, aliquid esse simul scitum et creditum.

3. Item, animus noster nullo modo potest dissentire ab eo quod novit habitu scientiae — non enim potest non credere, quod triangulus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, si scit illud demonstrare[^p522-4] — sed quae fide creduntur voluntarie creduntur, et sicut possunt credi, ita et possunt discredi: ergo videtur, quod notitia scientiae non possit simul stare circa idem cum ipsa fide.

4. Item, quae scientia cognoscuntur subiacent rationi; sed quae fide creduntur sunt supra rationem, quoniam fides est illuminatio rationem elevans supra se[^p522-5]: ergo si idem non potest esse infra rationem et supra rationem, non videtur, quod possit simul cognosci per scientiam et fidem.

### Conclusio.

> Scientia apertae comprehensionis non compatitur secum fidem; sed scientia, quae est a manuductione ratiocinationis, simul stat cum fide, ita ut fides sit principale et scientia subserviens.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod duplex est cognitio[^p522-6], scilicet apertae comprehensionis et manuductione ratiocinationis. — Si loquamur de scientia apertae comprehensionis, quo modo cognoscitur Deus in patria; sic non compatitur secum fidem, ut simul idem sit scitum et creditum, pro eo quod talis cognitio simpliciter excludit aenigma; et hoc melius apparebit infra[^p522-7], cum agetur de evacuatione virtutum, quare videlicet et qualiter fidei actus per visionem excludatur et evacuetur. Et de hac scientia Sanctorum auctoritates dicunt, et communis opinio magistrorum tenet, hoc esse verum, quod idem non potest esse simul scitum et creditum.

Si autem loquamur de scientia, quae est a manuductione[^p522-8] ratiocinationis, sic voluerunt quidam dicere, adhuc esse verum, quod non potest simul stare cum fide, quia per talem scientiam assentit intellectus ipsi rei cognitae propter ipsam rationem principaliter, assentit etiam necessario, assentit etiam sicut rei, quae est infra se; cuius contrarium reperitur in fide, quae assentit primae Veritati propter se et voluntarie, elevando rationem super se. Et ideo dixerunt, habitum fidei et scientiae mutuo sese excludere, secundum quod caritas illum amorem excludit, quo quis amat Deum propter temporalia principaliter.

Aliorum vero positio est, quod de uno et eodem simul potest haberi scientia manuductione ratiocinationis cum habitu fidei, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus decimo quarto[^p522-9] de Trinitate, exponens illud Apostoli: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae: «Huic scientiae tribuo illud quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur; qua scientia non pollent plurimi fideles, licet habeant fidem».

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Et Richardus de sancto Victore[^p523-1] dicit, quod «ad ea quae fidei sunt, non tantum possunt haberi rationes probabiles, sed etiam necessariae, licet eas interdum contingat nos latere». Unde aliquis credens, Deum esse unum, creatorem omnium, si ex rationibus necessariis incipiat ipsum idem nosse, non propter hoc desinit fidem habere; vel si etiam prius nosset, fides superveniens talem cognitionem non expelleret, sicut per experientiam patet.

Ratio autem, quare talis scientia simul potest esse de eodem cum ipsa fide, ita[^p523-2] quod una cognitio alteram non expellat, est, quia scientia manuductione ratiocinationis, licet aliquam certitudinem faciat et evidentiam circa divina, illa tamen certitudo et evidentia non est omnino clara, quamdiu sumus in via. Quamvis enim aliquis possit rationibus necessariis probare, Deum esse, et Deum esse unum; tamen cernere ipsum divinum esse et ipsam Dei unitatem, et qualiter illa unitas non excludat personarum pluralitatem, non potest, nisi «per iustitiam fidei emundetur[^p523-3]». Unde illuminatio et certitudo talis scientiae non est tanta, quod habita illa, superfluat illuminatio fidei, immo valde est cum illa pernecessaria. — Et huius signum est, quia, licet aliqui philosophi de Deo sciverint multa vera, tamen, quia fide caruerunt, in multis erraverunt, vel etiam defecerunt. — Unde sicut in praecedentibus[^p523-4] dictum est, quod fides potest stare cum visione exteriori, quia illa habet coniunctam latentiam circa personam Christi; sic intelligendum est circa habitum fidei et talem modum sciendi, quod possunt se simul in eodem et respectu eiusdem compati. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod caritas non compatitur secum dilectionem, quae principaliter adhaeret alii rei; responderi potest, quod non est simile: quoniam amare Deum propter creaturam finaliter pertinet ad amorem iniquum et libidinosum, qui habet repugnantiam ad amorem rectum; sed assentire alicui vero probato propter rationem probantem, dum illatio sit vera et necessaria, nec hoc[^p523-5] dicit peccatum nec dicit errorem, et ideo non sic habet repugnantiam ad fidem; propterea non est simile. — Sed adhuc illud non solvit plene, quia, quidquid sit de caritate, ista duo non videntur simul se posse compati, quod aliquis assentiat veritati creditae propter se, et quod assentiat ei propter aliud. — Propter quod notandum, quod haec praepositio propter dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo, prout notat causam finalem; alio modo, prout dicit rationem moventem[^p523-6]. Si prout dicit causam finalem, sic non potest unum et idem credi propter se et propter aliud, sicut amari non potest propter se et propter aliud. Si dicat rationem moventem, cum plures possint esse rationes moventes ad assentiendum uni et eidem, sicut potest una conclusio probari per causam et per effectum, potest etiam probari per aliquid extrinsecus et per aliquid intrinsecus; sic non est inconveniens, quod aliquis assentiat alicui veritati propter se et propter aliud, diversis tamen habitibus et considerationibus. — Sed nec adhuc illud plene solvit, quia dicitur Ioannis quarto[^p523-7]: Et locuti sunt Samaritani credentes: Iam non propter verbum tuum credimus; quod est verbum fidei, et ita videtur, quod assensus fidei non compatiatur secum assensum scientiae, qui principaliter innititur rationi. — Et propterea voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod etsi non tollatur cognitio quantum ad habitum, tollitur tamen quantum ad actum, quia non habet iam illius usum, nec motum. — Istud tamen non oportet dicere, nec videtur esse conveniens, quod aliquis habet habitum, et non possit habere usum, maxime cum non habeat potentiam ligatam per aliquod impedimentum.

Et propterea potest dici, quod quando aliquis simul est sciens et credens, habitus fidei tenet in eo principatum; et ideo talis[^p523-8] assensu fidei assentit ipsi Veritati propter se, ita quod propter dicit rationem principaliter moventem. Assensu etiam scientiae assentit eidem propter rationem, ita quod propter non dicit rationem principaliter ipsum moventem. Quamvis autem non possit unum et idem credere propter se et propter aliud, ita quod sic et sic credat principaliter; tamen propter se et propter aliud[^p523-9] bene possunt se compati ad invicem, ita quod unum sit principale, et aliud sit subserviens. Unde illud

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quod dixerunt fideles: Iam non propter loquelam tuam credimus; intelligendum est principaliter.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de visione patriae, quod tollit fidem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cum[^p524-1] omnem excludit latentiam, iam credulitas fidei non est necessaria: non sic autem est de scientia, quae habetur per rationem manuductivam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sciens non potest dissentire ab eo quod scit; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad id quod de eo cognoscit, quantum tamen ad id quod latet, ex illo dissentire potest; et ratione illius est necessaria sibi credulitas fidei, sicut aliquis philosophus sciens probare, Deum esse unum, ratione necessaria, ab hoc[^p524-2] non potest dissentire; dissentiret tamen ab hoc, si quis diceret, quod illa unitas potest compati secum pluralitatem; quod quidem eum latet et excedit vires cognitionis suae et scientiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est de his quae sunt supra rationem, et scientia de his quae sunt infra; dicendum, quod sicut nihil impedit, unum et idem esse latens et patens; sic nihil impedit, unum et idem secundum alium et alium cognoscendi modum esse infra et supra; et ita scitum et creditum. Licet enim sempiterna virtus et Divinitas nosci possit per scientiam acquisitam, vel etiam innatam, in se[^p524-3]; tamen prout comparatur ad pluralitatem personarum, vel ad humilitatem humanitatis nostrae, quam Deus assumsit, omnino supra rationem est et supra scientiam. Si quis enim iudicio rationis et scientiae innitatur, nequaquam crederet possibile, quod summa Unitas secum compatiatur pluralitatem personarum; nec quod summa Maiestas uniri possit cum nostra humilitate; nec quod summa Virtus de non operante fiat operans sine sui mutabilitate, et cetera consimilia, quae videntur repugnare communibus animi conceptionibus secundum philosophiam. Unde valde parum attingit scientia cognitionem divinorum, nisi fidei innitatur; quia in una et eadem re apertissimum est fidei quod occultissimum est scientiae; sicut patet de altissimis et nobilissimis quaestionibus, quarum veritas latuit philosophos, scilicet de creatione mundi, de potentia et sapientia Dei, quae latuerunt philosophos et nunc manifestae sunt Christianis simplicibus. Propter quod dicit Apostolus[^p524-4], stultam fecisse Deum sapientiam huius mundi; quia omnis sapientia de Deo in via absque fide magis est stultitia quam vera scientia. Deprimit enim perscrutantem in errorem, nisi dirigatur et iuvetur per fidei illuminationem; unde per ipsam non expellitur, sed magis perficitur.

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### Question III. *Whether faith is of those things of which there is scientific cognition.*

Third it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is scientific cognition. And that it is, seems [so] by this reasoning.

1. Some philosopher, knowing by compelling reasons that God is one, the creator[^p521-7] of all things, can come to faith, in such a way that he does not forget those reasons; but one who knows those reasons has science: therefore it seems that he can have at once concerning the same thing both faith and science.

2. Likewise, someone knowing something by a demonstration *quia* or through the effect, if he begins to know it through the cause or by a demonstration *propter quid*, does not on this account lose the prior cognition, although this second be nobler than that[^p521-8]: therefore two cognitions can be had concerning the same thing, of which one is nobler than the other, and the one does not expel the other nor empty it out. And if this is true, then it seems that something can at once be known by acquired ratiocination and by infused illumination: therefore concerning the same thing faith and science can at once be had.

3. Likewise, intellective cognition supervening does not take away sensitive cognition, although one of them be more worthy and more perfect and nobler than the other[^p522-1]: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [so] concerning faith and science, that they can at once be had concerning the same thing and about the same thing.

4. Likewise, «experience is the principle of science»; but concerning one and the same thing faith and experience can be had: therefore concerning one and the same thing faith and science can be had. The major is proved through the Philosopher[^p522-2]; the minor is proved in the Blessed Virgin Mary, who knew by faith and by experience that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:** 1. As charity loves God for his own sake and above all things, so faith assents to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things; but because charity loves God above all things and for his own sake, it is impossible that it be compatible with the love by which one loves God principally for the sake of earthly things: therefore by parity of reasoning it will be impossible that faith be compatible with a cognition which principally adheres to acquired ratiocination. But such is the cognition of science: therefore it is impossible that faith be concerning the same thing together with science at once and at the same time[^p522-3].

2. Likewise, the vision of the fatherland takes away faith on account of the certitude and evidence in knowing: if therefore what is known through science is certain and open, it seems that it is impossible for anything to be at once known and believed.

3. Likewise, our mind can in no way dissent from that which it knows by the habit of science — for it cannot not believe that a triangle has three angles equal to two right [angles], if it knows how to demonstrate this[^p522-4] — but the things that are believed by faith are believed voluntarily, and as they can be believed, so also they can be disbelieved: therefore it seems that the knowledge of science cannot stand together about the same thing with faith itself.

4. Likewise, the things that are known by science are subject to reason; but the things that are believed by faith are above reason, since faith is an illumination raising reason above itself[^p522-5]: therefore if the same thing cannot be below reason and above reason, it does not seem that it can be at once known through science and faith.

### Conclusion.

> The science of open comprehension is not compatible with faith; but the science which is from the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination stands together with faith, in such a way that faith is the principal and science the subservient.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that cognition is twofold[^p522-6], namely of open comprehension and by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination. — If we speak of the science of open comprehension, by which God is known in the fatherland; thus it is not compatible with faith, so that the same thing be at once known and believed, for the reason that such cognition simply excludes enigma; and this will better appear below[^p522-7], when treatment is made of the emptying-out of the virtues, namely why and how the act of faith is excluded and emptied out through vision. And concerning this science the authorities of the Saints speak, and the common opinion of the masters holds, that this is true, that the same thing cannot be at once known and believed.

But if we speak of the science which is from the leading-by-the-hand[^p522-8] of ratiocination, thus some have wished to say that it is still true that it cannot stand together with faith, because through such science the intellect assents to the known thing itself principally on account of the reason itself, assents also necessarily, assents also as to a thing which is below itself; the contrary of which is found in faith, which assents to the first Truth for its own sake and voluntarily, raising reason above itself. And therefore they said that the habit of faith and of science mutually exclude one another, just as charity excludes that love by which one loves God principally for the sake of temporal things.

But the position of others is that concerning one and the same thing there can at once be had science by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination together with the habit of faith, according to what Augustine says in the fourteenth [book][^p522-9] *On the Trinity*, expounding that [saying] of the Apostle: To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of science: «To this science I attribute that by which the most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; in which science very many of the faithful are not strong, although they have faith».

And Richard of St. Victor[^p523-1] says that «for the things which are of faith there can be had not only probable reasons, but also necessary ones, although it happen that they sometimes escape us». Hence someone believing that God is one, the creator of all things, if he begin from necessary reasons to know that same thing, does not on this account cease to have faith; or if he also knew it before, faith supervening would not expel such cognition, as is plain through experience.

But the reason why such science can at once be concerning the same thing together with faith itself, so[^p523-2] that the one cognition does not expel the other, is that science by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination, although it makes some certitude and evidence concerning divine things, yet that certitude and evidence is not entirely clear, so long as we are in the way. For although someone can by necessary reasons prove that God is, and that God is one; yet to discern the divine being itself and the unity of God itself, and how that unity does not exclude the plurality of persons, he cannot, unless he be «cleansed by the justice of faith[^p523-3]». Hence the illumination and certitude of such science is not so great that, when it is had, the illumination of faith would be superfluous, nay rather it is very necessary together with it. — And a sign of this is, that, although some philosophers knew many true things concerning God, yet, because they lacked faith, in many things they erred, or even failed. — Hence as in the preceding [questions][^p523-4] it was said that faith can stand together with exterior vision, because that has joined to it a hiddenness concerning the person of Christ; so it is to be understood concerning the habit of faith and such a mode of knowing, that they can be at once compatible in the same thing and in respect of the same thing. — Hence the reasons which are for this side are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that charity is not compatible with the love which principally adheres to another thing; it can be responded that it is not similar: since to love God for the sake of a creature finally pertains to the iniquitous and libidinous love, which has a repugnance to right love; but to assent to some truth proved on account of a proving reason, while the inference is true and necessary, neither does this[^p523-5] bespeak sin nor bespeak error, and therefore it does not thus have a repugnance to faith; therefore it is not similar. — But this still does not solve [it] fully, because, whatever be [the case] concerning charity, these two do not seem able to be at once compatible, that someone assent to the believed truth for its own sake, and that he assent to it for the sake of another. — On account of which it is to be noted that this preposition *propter* («for the sake of») can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it denotes the final cause; in another way, as it bespeaks the moving reason[^p523-6]. If as it bespeaks the final cause, thus one and the same cannot be believed for its own sake and for the sake of another, just as it cannot be loved for its own sake and for the sake of another. If it bespeaks the moving reason, since there can be several moving reasons for assenting to one and the same thing, just as one conclusion can be proved through the cause and through the effect, it can also be proved through something extrinsic and through something intrinsic; thus it is not unfitting that someone assent to some truth for its own sake and for the sake of another, yet by diverse habits and considerations. — But not even this still solves [it] fully, because it is said in John, chapter four[^p523-7]: And the Samaritans believing spoke: Now we believe not on account of thy word; which is the word of faith, and thus it seems that the assent of faith is not compatible with the assent of science, which principally relies upon reason. — And therefore some have wished to say that, even if cognition be not taken away as to the habit, it is taken away as to the act, because it no longer has the use of it, nor the motion. — Yet this need not be said, nor does it seem fitting, that someone should have the habit, and not be able to have the use, especially since he does not have the power bound by any impediment.

And therefore it can be said that when someone is at once knowing and believing, the habit of faith holds in him the primacy; and therefore by such[^p523-8] an assent of faith he assents to the Truth itself for its own sake, in such a way that *propter* bespeaks the principally moving reason. By the assent of science also he assents to the same thing on account of reason, in such a way that *propter* does not bespeak the reason principally moving it. But although one and the same cannot be believed for its own sake and for the sake of another, in such a way that he believe principally thus and thus; yet for its own sake and for the sake of another[^p523-9] they can well be compatible with one another, in such a way that the one be principal, and the other be subservient. Hence that

which the faithful said: Now we believe not on account of thy word; is to be understood principally.

2. To that which is objected concerning the vision of the fatherland, that it takes away faith; it must be said that it is not similar: because, when[^p524-1] it excludes all hiddenness, then the belief of faith is not necessary: but it is not so concerning the science which is had through leading-by-the-hand reason.

3. To that which is objected, that one who knows cannot dissent from that which he knows; it must be said that it is true as to that which he knows concerning it, yet as to that which lies hidden, he can dissent from it; and by reason of that the belief of faith is necessary to him, just as some philosopher who knows how to prove, by necessary reason, that God is one, cannot dissent from this[^p524-2]; yet he would dissent from this, if someone should say that that unity can be compatible with plurality; which indeed escapes him and exceeds the powers of his cognition and science.

4. To that which is objected, that faith is of those things which are above reason, and science of those which are below; it must be said that, just as nothing prevents one and the same from being hidden and open; so nothing prevents one and the same, according to one and another mode of knowing, from being below and above; and so known and believed. For although the everlasting power and Divinity can be known through acquired science, or even innate, in itself[^p524-3]; yet as it is compared to the plurality of persons, or to the humility of our humanity, which God assumed, it is entirely above reason and above science. For if someone relies on the judgment of reason and science, he would by no means believe it possible that the highest Unity be compatible with itself the plurality of persons; nor that the highest Majesty could be united with our lowliness; nor that the highest Power should from non-operating become operating without its own mutability, and other like things, which seem to be repugnant to the common conceptions of the mind according to philosophy. Hence very little does science attain the cognition of divine things, unless it rely on faith; because in one and the same thing that is most open to faith which is most hidden to science; as is plain concerning the highest and noblest questions, whose truth escaped the philosophers, namely concerning the creation of the world, concerning the power and wisdom of God, which escaped the philosophers and are now manifest to simple Christians. On account of which the Apostle says[^p524-4] that God has made foolish the wisdom of this world; because all wisdom concerning God in the way without faith is more folly than true science. For it casts down the one searching into error, unless he be directed and aided through the illumination of faith; whence through it [science] is not expelled, but rather perfected.

la: Cod. V hic inserit *esse*.

en: Codex V here inserts *esse*.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 10. (c. 13.) et II. c. 1. seqq. Demonstratio, quae hic distinguitur in demonstrationem *quia* et demonstrationem *propter quid*, si stricte accipitur, non est idem ac demonstratio *a priori* et *a posteriori*, siquidem omnis demonstratio *propter quid* est *a priori*, sed non vice versa, cum demonstratio *propter quid* sit illa tantum, in qua causa immediata affertur. — Pro *nobilior* edd. 1, 2 *notior*, Vat. *notior vel nobilior*.

en: See Aristotle, I. Posterior [Analytics] c. 10. (c. 13.) and II. c. 1. seqq. The demonstration, which is here distinguished into the demonstration *quia* and the demonstration *propter quid*, if strictly taken, is not the same as the demonstration *a priori* and *a posteriori*, since every demonstration *propter quid* is *a priori*, but not conversely, since the demonstration *propter quid* is only that in which the immediate cause is adduced. — For *nobilior* editions 1, 2 [read] *notior* ("more known"), the Vatican edition *notior vel nobilior*.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 30. (c. 7.): *Nunquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.* Et ibid. text. 39. (c. 8.): *Qui non sentit aliquid, nihil utique addiscet nec intelliget.* Et cum speculetur, necesse est, simul phantasma aliquod speculari etc.

en: Aristotle, III. *On the Soul*, text 30. (c. 7.): *The soul never understands without a phantasm.* And ibid. text 39. (c. 8.): *He who does not sense anything will surely learn nothing nor understand.* And when it speculates, it is necessary that it speculate at the same time some phantasm etc.

la: Vide supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 3. ad oppos.

en: See above, d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 3 to the contrary.

la: Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 3. c. 1. q. 4. hoc significatum esse vult illis verbis Samaritanorum, Ioan. 4, 42: *Et mulieri dicebant: quia iam non propter tuam loquelam credimus; ipsi enim audivimus et vidimus.* «Samaritana», inquit, «significat rationem naturalem, Samaritani [significant] venientes ad fidem noviter; quoniam venientes ad fidem noviter dicunt rationi naturali: iam non propter te credimus, sed quia ipsi vidimus per fidem». Iste locus Script. respicitur etiam infra in solut.

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. III. tr. 3. c. 1. q. 4. wishes this to be signified by those words of the Samaritans, John 4, 42: *And they said to the woman: now [we believe] not on account of thy word; for we ourselves have heard and seen.* «The Samaritan woman», he says, «signifies natural reason, the Samaritans [signify] those coming to faith newly; since those coming to faith newly say to natural reason: now we believe not on account of thee, but because we ourselves have seen through faith». This passage of Scripture is referred to also below in the solution.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro *notitia scientiae* edd. *scientia notitiae*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. Posterior [Analytics] c. 4. seqq. — A little below, for *notitia scientiae* the editions [read] *scientia notitiae*.

la: Vide supra pag. 501, nota 5.

en: See above, page 501, note 5.

la: Vat. addit *scientialis de Deo*, et deinde cum edd. 1, 2 bis substituit *a parte* pro *apertae*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *scientialis de Deo*, and then with editions 1, 2 twice substitutes *a parte* for *apertae*.

la: Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 1, ubi hoc ex auctoritate Augustini, Gregorii probatur.

en: D. 31. a. 2. q. 1, where this is proved from the authority of Augustine [and] Gregory.

la: Cod. bb (a secunda manu) *per manuductionem*; reliqui codd. *manuductione* tantum, omissis verbis praecedentibus *quae est a*.

en: Codex bb (by a second hand) [reads] *per manuductionem*; the rest of the codices *manuductione* only, the preceding words *quae est a* omitted.

la: Cap. 1. n. 3, ubi, secundum verbum allegatum Apostoli (1. Cor. 12, 8.) distinguens *sapientiam* (i. e. rerum divinarum scientiam) a *scientia* (scil. rerum humanarum), docet, sapientiae non esse tribuendum quidquid sciri ab homine possit in rebus humanis, «sed illud tantummodo, quo fides saluberrima... qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum». — Pro *quo fides* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam *quod fide*.

en: Chapter 1. n. 3, where, according to the cited word of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12, 8.), distinguishing *wisdom* (i.e. the science of divine things) from *science* (namely of human things), he teaches that to wisdom is not to be attributed whatever can be known by man in human things, «but only that by which the most salutary faith... in which science very many of the faithful are not strong, although they are very strong in faith itself». — For *quo fides* many codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] *quod fide*.

la: Libr. I. de Trin. c. 4, quod testimonium, hic abbreviatum, integrum habetur I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. fundam. 2.

en: Book I. *On the Trinity* c. 4, which testimony, here abbreviated, is had in full I Sent. prooem. q. 2. fundam. 2.

la: Pro *ita* edd. *et*.

en: For *ita* the editions [read] *et*.

la: Secundum August., I. de Trin. c. 2. n. 4, prout eius verba a Magistro referuntur I. Sent. d. 11. c. 1.; cfr. ibid. Comment. dub. 1. et 2. — Pro *emundetur* edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. *emendetur*. Paulo inferius codd. A K Z omittunt *cum* ante *illa pernecessaria*.

en: According to Augustine, I. *On the Trinity* c. 2. n. 4, as his words are reported by the Master, I Sent. d. 11. c. 1.; cf. ibid. the Commentary, dub. 1 and 2. — For *emundetur* the editions 1, 2 with several codices [read] *emendetur*. A little below, codices A K Z omit *cum* before *illa pernecessaria*.

la: Quaest. 1. — Circa finem corp. Vat. post *compati* adiungit *quamvis non secundum idem*.

en: Question 1. — Near the end of the body the Vatican edition after *compati* adds *quamvis non secundum idem* ("although not according to the same").

la: Pro *nec hoc* codd. A K *hoc non*. Paulo ante pro *dum* Vat. *quo modo*. Paulo inferius non pauci codd. omittunt *simul* ante *se posse compati*.

en: For *nec hoc* codices A K [read] *hoc non*. A little before, for *dum* the Vatican edition [reads] *quo modo*. A little below, not a few codices omit *simul* before *se posse compati*.

la: Vers. 42, ubi Vulgata pro *verbum tuum* exhibet *tuam loquelam*, quam lectionem et infra circa finem solut. S. Bonav. recepit. — Non ita multo post pro *aliqui dicere* cod. K *aliqui ostendere*. Subinde multi codd. omittunt *quod* ante *etsi* et mox pro *tollitur tamen* scriptum habent *tollitur autem*.

en: Verse 42, where the Vulgate for *verbum tuum* sets forth *tuam loquelam*, which reading St. Bonaventure also adopted below near the end of the solution. — Not much after, for *aliqui dicere* codex K [reads] *aliqui ostendere*. Then many codices omit *quod* before *etsi* and presently for *tollitur tamen* have written *tollitur autem*.

la: Ita codd. H I L T etc.; codd. A G K Z bb nec non edd. 1, 2 *talis assensus*. Vat. cum paucis codd. *tali assensu*.

en: So codices H I L T etc.; codices A G K Z bb as well as editions 1, 2 [read] *talis assensus*. The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] *tali assensu*.

la: Vat. *tamen propter se principaliter et propter aliud minus principaliter*. In fine solut. edd. addunt *Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum argumentum.* — Haec solutio in re non differt a 2. solutione, quae in hoc deficit, quod obiectum locum Scripturae (cfr. pag. 522, nota 3.) non solvat.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *tamen propter se principaliter et propter aliud minus principaliter*. At the end of the solution the editions add *Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum argumentum* ("And by this the response to the first argument is plain"). — This solution does not in substance differ from the 2nd solution, which is deficient in this, that it does not solve the objected passage of Scripture (cf. page 522, note 3.).

la: Cod. F supplet *visio ista*. Paulo inferius pro *manuductivam* edd. 1, 2 *manuductione*, Vat. *manuductione ratiocinationis*.

en: Codex F supplies *visio ista* ("that vision"). A little below, for *manuductivam* editions 1, 2 [read] *manuductione*, the Vatican edition *manuductione ratiocinationis*.

la: Codd. plurimi *ad hoc*, sed cod. A *hic*, et paulo post cum cod. A etiam codd. C O bb *ab hoc*, Vat. bis *ab hac*. Edd. 1, 2 in secundo loco pro *ad hoc* posuerunt *adhuc*.

en: Most codices [read] *ad hoc*, but codex A *hic*, and a little after, with codex A also codices C O bb [read] *ab hoc*, the Vatican edition twice *ab hac*. Editions 1, 2 in the second place for *ad hoc* have put *adhuc*.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 1, 19. 20: *Quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis, Deus enim illis manifestavit. Invisibilia enim ipsius... conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque eius virtus et Divinitas etc.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. seq. et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius post *et supra* Vat. supplet *rationem*.

en: Reference is made to that [text] Rom. 1, 19. 20: *Because that which is known of God is manifest in them, for God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen; his eternal power also and Divinity etc.* Cf. I Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. seq. and II Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — A little above, after *et supra* the Vatican edition supplies *rationem*.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 1, 20: *Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi?* — Paulo superius pro *latuerunt* edd. *latuit*, complures codd. *latuerit*.

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 1, 20: *Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?* — A little above, for *latuerunt* the editions [read] *latuit*, several codices *latuerit*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod nec actus transiens visionis beatificae cum actu fidei componi possit, nec habitus eiusdem cum actu et habitu fidei, manifestum est (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.). Utrum autem scitum «manuductione ratiocinationis» possit esse obiectum fidei, in utramque partem disputatur. S. Thom. constanter negativam sententiam tenet; unde etiam asserit, existentiam Dei ut auctoris naturae non esse obiectum fidei nisi per accidens, scilicet quoad eos, qui demonstrationem huius veritatis non capiunt. Consentiunt Scot. cum sua schola multique alii. Tamen etiam opposita sententia S. Bonaventurae, quod in statu viae scitum de divinis possit generatim esse creditum, sed secundum alium et alium modum, multis antiquis et recentioribus placet; quam profitentur Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Richard. a Med., Durand. et Petr. a Tar., qui breviter argumentum principale sic proponit: «Scientia viae de divinis propter admixtam obscuritatem ex improportione intellectus nostri ad obiectum et frequentem obnubilationem phantasmatum non excludit fidem; scientia vero patriae dupliciter potest haberi; vel habitualiter in perpetuum, sic excludit fidem; vel actualiter ad tempus, ut in raptu Pauli, sic non excludit fidem». Ceterum ex solutione argumentorum ad oppos., praesertim ad 3., apparet, dissensum inter Angelicum et Seraphicum non esse tam gravem, ut vulgo putatur. — Satis clare auctor noster cum Scoto aliisque plurimis docet, refragantibus nonnullis recentioribus, quod obscuritas obiecti materialis fidei non spectet ad rationem formalem fidei, sed sit tantum conditio concomitans actum eius (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4. 6.).

**II.** De hac quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 3. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 17. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 1. a. 5; de Verit. q. 14. a. 9. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That neither the transient act of the beatific vision can be composed with the act of faith, nor the habit of the same with the act and habit of faith, is manifest (cf. below, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.). But whether what is known «by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination» can be the object of faith, is disputed on both sides. St. Thomas constantly holds the negative opinion; whence he also asserts that the existence of God as author of nature is not the object of faith except per accidens, namely as to those who do not grasp the demonstration of this truth. Scotus with his school and many others agree. Yet also the opposite opinion of St. Bonaventure, that in the state of the way what is known concerning divine things can generally be believed, but according to one and another mode, pleases many of the ancients and of the more recent; which Alex. of Hales, B. Albert, Richard of Middleton, Durandus, and Petr. a Tar. profess, who briefly proposes the principal argument thus: «The science of the way concerning divine things, on account of the admixed obscurity from the disproportion of our intellect to the object and the frequent clouding-over of phantasms, does not exclude faith; but the science of the fatherland can be had in two ways: either habitually in perpetuity, thus it excludes faith; or actually for a time, as in the rapture of Paul, thus it does not exclude faith». For the rest, from the solution of the arguments to the contrary, especially to [argument] 3, it appears that the dissent between the Angelic and the Seraphic [Doctor] is not so grave as is commonly thought. — Sufficiently clearly our author teaches, with Scotus and very many others, some more recent [authors] dissenting, that the obscurity of the material object of faith does not pertain to the formal character of faith, but is only a condition concomitant with its act (cf. below, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4. 6.).

**II.** On this question: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 3. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 17. — St. Thomas, here a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; *Summa* II–II q. 1. a. 5; *de Verit.* q. 14. a. 9. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 15. a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 5. q. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
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**Scholion (own, two sections).** The printed SCHOLION (p.524) has two sections: **§I** glosses *this* question (the Thomas-vs-Bonaventure dispute on whether *scitum manuductione ratiocinationis* can be *creditum*, with Petr. a Tar.'s synthesis); **§II** is the bibliographic list "De hac quaestione…". `has_scholion: true`. The scholion uses inline cross-references only — no superscript footnote markers. Placed LAST in both language blocks (parser requirement).

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 524 -->

### Articulus III. *De obiecto fidei quoad nominis rationem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de obiecto fidei quantum ad nominis rationem; consuevit enim nomine *articuli* censeri[^p524b-1]. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur secundum duplicem rationem articuli[^p524b-2].

Primo quaeritur de ratione articuli, quae assignatur a Richardo[^p524b-3].

Secundo de illa, quae assignatur ab Isidoro[^p524b-4].

<!-- page 525 -->

### Quaestio I. *De definitione articuli, quam ponit Richardus.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de illa ratione Richardi[^p525-1], quam ponit de articulo, definiens sic articulum: «Articulus est indivisibilis veritas de Deo, arctans nos ad credendum». Contra istam rationem obiicitur primo ratione primae partis, videlicet ratione huius, quod dicitur *indivisibilis veritas de Deo*.

1. Nullum enim verum complexum est verum indivisibile; sed articulus est verum complexum, ut enuntiabile, sicut in praecedentibus[^p525-2] fuit ostensum: ergo non est veritas indivisibilis.

2. Item, una tantum est veritas indivisibilis circa Deum[^p525-3]: ergo si articulus est veritas indivisibilis de Deo, unus tantum est articulus; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur.

3. Item, nihil quod est ipse Deus, est veritas de Deo; sed obiectum fidei est ipse Deus: ergo obiectum fidei non est veritas de Deo. Sed articulus est obiectum fidei: ergo inconvenienter dicitur articulus[^p525-4] veritas de Deo.

4. Item, resurrectionem esse futuram, est articulus; et hoc non est verum de Deo, sed est verum de carne: ergo illud non convenit generaliter[^p525-5]: ergo non videtur, quod primum membrum praedictae definitionis conveniat ipsi articulo generaliter nec vere.

Contra secundam partem notificationis, qua dicitur *arctans*[^p525-6] *ad credendum*, opponitur sic.

5. Nihil quod est supra rationem et occultum rationi, arctat eam ad credendum; sed articulus latet rationem et est supra rationem: ergo non videtur, quod arctet eam.

6. Item, ad nihil, ad quod mera voluntate inclinamur[^p525-7], per aliquid arctamur; sed ad credendum mera voluntate inclinamur: ergo per nihil arctamur ad credendum: ergo articulus non arctat nos.

7. Item, sicut se habet obiectum fidei ad actum credendi, sic se habet obiectum caritatis ad actum amandi; sed obiectum caritatis non arctat nos ad amandum: ergo nec obiectum fidei ad credendum.

8. Item, sicut articuli ordinantur ad actum credendi, ita praecepta ordinantur ad effectum[^p525-8] obediendi: et sicut arctamur ad credendum credibilia, ita arctamur ad exsequendum mandata: ergo sicut credibile dicitur articulus, ita praeceptum debet dici articulus: si ergo praeceptum non sortitur nomen articuli, videtur similiter, quod nec ipsum obiectum fidei debeat dici articulus.

### Conclusio.

> Definitio articuli a Richardo assignata est conveniens.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod articulus, quantum est de se ratione sui nominis, dicitur ab *arctando*[^p525-9]; hoc autem dupliciter habet intelligi, active videlicet et passive. Dicitur enim articulus, quia est quid in se arctatum; et dicitur articulus, quia alios arctat. Prout passive dicitur articulus quid in se arctatum[^p525-10], est terminus resolutionis; prout autem active dicitur, est principium distinctionis et discretionis. — Et primo quidem modo accipitur in scientia naturali, in qua dicuntur articuli membra sive partes, quae non resolvuntur in alias, sed in eis stat resolutio, sicut dicuntur articuli digitorum[^p525-11]. In quantum vero articulus dicitur principium distinctionis, consuevit

<!-- page 526 -->

item in accipi in scientia sermocinali, ut in grammatica et rhetorica. *Articulus* enim in grammatica est aliquid distinctum, faciens discretionem quantum ad genera et quantum ad casus et quantum ad supposita[^p526-1]; et in rhetorica articulus appellatur distinctio, quae fit in sententia et in prolatione.

Quoniam igitur aliae scientiae deserviunt theologiae, sumit et ipsa proprietatem suorum vocabulorum iuxta illud, quod invenit in aliis scientiis recte dictum. Quoniam ergo fides nostra dicit plurium cognitionem, et illa quidem cognitio terminata est et distincta; necesse est[^p526-2], circa ipsum obiectum fidei, hoc est circa Deum, reperiri aliqua, ad quae reducantur omnia credenda tanquam ad illa, in quibus stet resolutio omnium credendorum, et tanquam ad illa quae sunt principia directiva in omnibus quae creduntur; et illa sunt, quae principaliter fides credit, et quae proprie sunt obiectum fidei. Et pro ista duplici ratione debent censeri nomine articuli, videlicet quia sunt terminus resolutionis, et quia principium distinctionis.

Et propterea Richardus ipsum articulum definiens vel describens notificat ab hac duplici proprietate. Nam in hoc quod dicit primo: «articulus est veritas indivisibilis[^p526-3] de Deo», insinuatur, quod articulus est terminus resolutionis; resolutio enim stat ad indivisibile. In hoc vero quod subiungitur: «arctans nos ad credendum», insinuatur, quod est principium discretionis et directionis; arctat enim sicut regula directiva respectu omnium eorum quae communiter[^p526-4] sunt credenda. — Et sic ista notificatio recte est assignata, quia non tantum est realis descriptio, sed etiam nominis interpretatio.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nulla veritas complexa est indivisibilis; dicendum, quod indivisibile dictum de articulo non privat omnem divisionem, sed privat eam divisionem, quae quidem consistit in credibilium distinctione, quia articulus non distinguitur in alios articulos, ibi enim status est. — Potest etiam aliter dici, quod ipsi complexioni subiacet veritas indivisibilis. Sicut enim dictum fuit prius[^p526-5], intellectus circa ea quae Dei sunt et in Deo, quae sunt omnino simplicia, negotiatur et intelligit sub complexione quadam; et quamvis totum, quod est Deus, sit ipse Deus, tamen intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid de Deo, intelligit illud in ratione subiecti et attribuit ei aliquid in ratione praedicati. Et quia diversas ei attributiones facit, hinc est, quod ipsam Veritatem primam, quae una est, multis modis intelligit et multis modis enuntiat.

2. 3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia: licet enim indivisibilis Veritas sit una, tamen articuli sunt plures, quia articulus non solum est ipsa Veritas in se, sed prout comparatur ad aliquam attributionem, respectu cuius Deus est in ratione subiecti, sicut Deum esse creatorem, Deum esse trinum, Deum esse unum. Et ratione huius dicitur esse veritas[^p526-6] de Deo et plures articuli, quia plura enuntiabilia sunt de Deo et circa Deum, quae necessarium est credere ipsi fidei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carnis resurrectio non est de Deo; dicendum, quod immo, in quantum tenet rationem articuli; sic enim comparatur resurrectio nostra et carnis resuscitatio ad virtutem divinam. Unde credere carnis resurrectionem non est aliud quam credere, quod Deus corpora nostra resuscitabit, exigente hoc sua iustitia, et faciente sua potentia.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra secundam partem, quod articulus non arctat rationem, cum sit supra eam; dicendum, quod articulus definitur hic in comparatione ad intellectum non quemcumque, sed intellectum informatum[^p526-7] fide; et hoc notatur, cum dicitur arctans nos, scilicet fideles. Quamvis autem articulus sit occultus intellectui, qui quidem non habet fidem, et etiam supra ipsum; non tamen est supra intellectum, in quantum fide illuminatur et elevatur.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credere est per meram voluntatem, et ita non per arctationem; dicendum, quod est arctatio, quae repugnat libertati, et est arctatio, quae repugnat ambiguitati; et cum dicitur articulus, quia arctat ad credendum, hoc non dicitur per coactionem voluntatis, sed hoc dicitur per remotionem ambiguitatis, quia in ipsa veritate articuli determinate figitur mens credentis, ut nullatenus ad partem aliam inclinetur. Unde sicut dicitur vox articulata, quae ad significandum aliquid est determinata, cum prius in se indifferens

<!-- page 527 -->

esset ad significandum diversa[^p527-1]; sic articulus dicitur, quia ipsum oportet determinate credere et ei assentire, omni remota ambiguitate et vacillatione.

7. 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obiecto aliarum virtutum, et etiam de praecepto, quod arctat ad obediendum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, sicut prius dictum est, articulus non tantum dicitur, quia arctat obligando, sed quia arctat distinguendo et discernendo, et quia ad ipsum stat resolutio; et quoniam hoc proprie convenit ipsi fidei, quae est virtus perficiens ipsum intellectum, ad quem spectat principium et regula discretionis[^p527-2]: hinc est, quod solum obiectum fidei vindicat sibi nomen articuli.

english:
### Article III. *On the object of faith as to the meaning of the name.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the object of faith as to the meaning of the name; for it is wont to be reckoned under the name of *article*[^p524b-1]. And concerning this two things are asked according to the twofold account of an article[^p524b-2].

First it is asked concerning the account of an article which is assigned by Richard[^p524b-3].

Second, concerning that which is assigned by Isidore[^p524b-4].

### Question I. *On the definition of an article which Richard sets down.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and there is inquiry concerning that account of Richard[^p525-1], which he sets down concerning an article, defining an article thus: «An article is an indivisible truth concerning God, constraining us to believe». Against this account there is objected first by reason of the first part, namely by reason of this, that it is called an *indivisible truth concerning God*.

1. For no complex true thing is an indivisible true thing; but an article is a complex true thing, as an enunciable, as was shown in the preceding[^p525-2]: therefore it is not an indivisible truth.

2. Likewise, there is only one indivisible truth concerning God[^p525-3]: therefore if an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, there is only one article; but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, nothing which is God himself is a truth concerning God; but the object of faith is God himself: therefore the object of faith is not a truth concerning God. But an article is the object of faith: therefore it is unfittingly called an article[^p525-4] a truth concerning God.

4. Likewise, that the resurrection is to come is an article; and this is not true of God, but is true of the flesh: therefore that does not belong [to an article] generally[^p525-5]: therefore it does not seem that the first member of the aforesaid definition belongs to an article generally nor truly.

Against the second part of the notification, by which it is said *constraining*[^p525-6] *to believe*, it is opposed thus.

5. Nothing which is above reason and hidden from reason constrains it to believe; but an article lies hidden from reason and is above reason: therefore it does not seem that it constrains it.

6. Likewise, to nothing toward which we are inclined by mere will[^p525-7] are we constrained by anything; but toward believing we are inclined by mere will: therefore by nothing are we constrained to believe: therefore an article does not constrain us.

7. Likewise, as the object of faith stands to the act of believing, so the object of charity stands to the act of loving; but the object of charity does not constrain us to love: therefore neither [does] the object of faith [constrain us] to believe.

8. Likewise, as articles are ordained to the act of believing, so precepts are ordained to the effect[^p525-8] of obeying: and as we are constrained to believe the things to be believed, so we are constrained to carry out the commandments: therefore as a thing-to-be-believed is called an article, so a precept ought to be called an article: if therefore a precept does not obtain the name of an article, it seems likewise that neither ought the object of faith itself to be called an article.

### Conclusion.

> The definition of an article assigned by Richard is fitting.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that an article, insofar as of itself by reason of its name, is so called from *constraining* [*arctando*][^p525-9]; but this can be understood in two ways, namely actively and passively. For it is called an article because it is something constrained in itself; and it is called an article because it constrains others. Insofar as it is said passively, an article is something constrained in itself[^p525-10], [and] is the terminus of resolution; but insofar as it is said actively, it is the principle of distinction and discretion. — And in the first way it is taken in natural science, in which are called articles the members or parts which are not resolved into others, but in them the resolution stands, as are called the articles [joints] of the fingers[^p525-11]. But insofar as an article is called the principle of distinction, it is wont

to be taken also in the discursive sciences, as in grammar and rhetoric. For an *article* in grammar is something distinct, making a discretion as to genders and as to cases and as to supposits[^p526-1]; and in rhetoric an article is called the distinction which is made in a sentence and in utterance.

Since therefore the other sciences serve theology, it too takes the property of its words according to that which it finds rightly said in the other sciences. Since therefore our faith bespeaks the cognition of many things, and that cognition is indeed terminated and distinct; it is necessary[^p526-2], concerning the object of faith itself, that is, concerning God, that there be found certain things to which all the things to be believed are reduced as to those in which the resolution of all the things to be believed stands, and as to those which are the directive principles in all things which are believed; and these are the things which faith principally believes, and which are properly the object of faith. And by reason of this twofold account they ought to be reckoned under the name of article, namely because they are the terminus of resolution, and because [they are] the principle of distinction.

And therefore Richard, defining or describing the article itself, makes it known from this twofold property. For in this that he says first: «an article is an indivisible truth[^p526-3] concerning God», it is insinuated that an article is the terminus of resolution; for resolution stops at the indivisible. But in this that is subjoined: «constraining us to believe», it is insinuated that it is the principle of discretion and direction; for it constrains as a directive rule in respect of all those things which are commonly[^p526-4] to be believed. — And thus this notification is rightly assigned, because it is not only a real description, but also an interpretation of the name.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that no complex truth is indivisible; it must be said that "indivisible" said of an article does not deny every division, but denies that division which consists in the distinction of the things to be believed, because an article is not distinguished into other articles, for there the stopping-point is. — It can also be said otherwise, that an indivisible truth underlies the very complexion. For as was said before[^p526-5], the intellect, concerning those things which are God's and in God, which are altogether simple, busies itself and understands [them] under a certain complexion; and although the whole, which is God, is God himself, yet the intellect, while it understands something concerning God, understands it in the account of a subject and attributes to it something in the account of a predicate. And because it makes diverse attributions to it, hence it is that it understands the First Truth itself, which is one, in many ways and enunciates [it] in many ways.

2. 3. And by this is clear the response to the two following [objections]: for although the indivisible Truth is one, yet the articles are many, because an article is not only the Truth itself in itself, but as it is compared to some attribution, in respect of which God is in the account of a subject, as God's being creator, God's being triune, God's being one. And by reason of this it is said to be a truth[^p526-6] concerning God and many articles, because there are many enunciables concerning God and about God, which it is necessary for faith itself to believe.

4. To that which is objected, that the resurrection of the flesh is not concerning God; it must be said that on the contrary [it is], insofar as it holds the account of an article; for thus our resurrection and the resuscitation of the flesh are compared to the divine power. Hence to believe the resurrection of the flesh is nothing other than to believe that God will resuscitate our bodies, his justice requiring this, and his power effecting it.

5. To that which is objected against the second part, that an article does not constrain reason, since it is above it; it must be said that an article is here defined in comparison to the intellect, not just any intellect, but the intellect informed[^p526-7] by faith; and this is noted when it is said constraining us, namely the faithful. But although an article is hidden to the intellect, which indeed does not have faith, and even above it; nevertheless it is not above the intellect insofar as it is illumined and elevated by faith.

6. To that which is objected, that to believe is by mere will, and thus not by constraint; it must be said that there is a constraint which is repugnant to liberty, and there is a constraint which is repugnant to ambiguity; and when it is said an article, because it constrains to believe, this is not said by a coercion of the will, but this is said by the removal of ambiguity, because in the very truth of the article the mind of the believer is determinately fixed, so that it in no way be inclined to the other side. Hence just as that voice is called articulate which is determined to signify something, when before it was indifferent in itself to signify

diverse things[^p527-1]; so an article is so called, because it behooves [one] to believe it determinately and to assent to it, with all ambiguity and wavering removed.

7. 8. To that which is objected concerning the object of the other virtues, and also concerning a precept, which constrains to obey; it must be said that it is not similar: because, as was said before, an article is so called not only because it constrains by obliging, but because it constrains by distinguishing and discerning, and because to it the resolution stops; and since this properly belongs to faith itself, which is the virtue perfecting the intellect itself, to which pertains the principle and rule of discretion[^p527-2]: hence it is that the object of faith alone vindicates to itself the name of article.

en: Codex F supplies *visio ista*. A little below, for *manuductivam* editions 1, 2 [read] *manuductione*, the Vatican edition *manuductione ratiocinationis*.

la: Codd. plurimi *ad hoc*, sed cod. A hic, et paulo post cum cod. A etiam codd. C O bb *ab hoc*, Vat. bis *ab hac*. Edd. 1, 2 in secundo loco pro *ad hoc* posuerunt *adhuc*.

en: Most codices [read] *ad hoc*, but codex A here, and a little after, with codex A also codices C O bb [read] *ab hoc*, the Vatican edition twice *ab hac*. Editions 1, 2 in the second place put *adhuc* for *ad hoc*.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 1, 19. 20: *Quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis, Deus enim illis manifestavit. Invisibilia enim ipsius… conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque eius virtus et Divinitas* etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. seq. et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius post *et supra* Vat. supplet *rationem*.

en: There is regarded that text of Rom. 1, 19. 20: *Because that which is known of God is manifest in them, for God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him… are clearly seen; his eternal power also and Divinity* etc. Cf. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1 and following, and II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — A little above, after *et supra*, the Vatican edition supplies *rationem*.

en: Epistle 1 Cor. 1, 20: *Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?* — A little above, for *latuerunt* the editions [read] *latuit*, several codices *latuerit*.

la: Definitio articuli hic proposita et (ut communiter a Scholasticis) Richardo tributa, in dicti magistri operibus non occurrit; quod observavit P. Nicolai in ed. Comment. S. Thomae, III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. S. Thom., II. II. q. 1. n. 6. arg. 3. ait: «Sicut a quibusdam dicitur, articulus est indivisibilis» etc. Doctoribus hoc docentibus annumerandus est Guliel. Antissiod., qui S. p. III. tr. 3. c. 2. q. 1. dicit: «Articulus dicitur ab arctando, quia arctat nos ad se credendum», et «tria exiguntur ad hoc quod aliquid sit articulus, scil. quod sit de Deo, quod in nobis secundum se et directe generet timorem, vel amorem Dei, quoniam per timorem Dei vitamus malum, per amorem facimus bonum, in quibus duobus consistit perfecta iustitia, quam facit in nobis fides» etc.

en: The definition of an article here proposed and (as commonly by the Scholastics) attributed to Richard does not occur in the works of the said master; which P. Nicolai observed in the edition of St. Thomas's Commentary, III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. St. Thomas, II–II q. 1. n. 6. arg. 3, says: «As it is said by certain ones, an article is indivisible» etc. Among the doctors teaching this is to be numbered William of Auxerre, who *Summa* p. III. tr. 3. c. 2. q. 1. says: «An article is so called from constraining, because it constrains us to believe it», and «three things are required for something to be an article, namely that it be concerning God, that it generate in us in itself and directly fear, or love of God, since through the fear of God we shun evil, through love we do good, in which two consists perfect justice, which faith makes in us» etc.

la: Art. 1. q. 3. — Superius pro *Contra istam rationem* edd. *Contra istam definitionem*; et deinde non ita multo post pro *verum complexum*, quam lectionem codd. A K P V et edd. 1, 2 tuentur, alii codd. *complexum tantum*, Vat. *mentis complexum*. In conclus. post *ergo* codd. A K supplent *articulus*.

en: Art. 1. q. 3. — Above, for *Contra istam rationem* the editions [read] *Contra istam definitionem*; and then not so much later, for *verum complexum*, which reading codices A K P V and editions 1, 2 maintain, other codices [read] *complexum tantum*, the Vatican edition *mentis complexum*. In the conclusion, after *ergo*, codices A K supply *articulus*.

la: Immo, ut Anselm., Dialog. de veritate, c. 13. vult, est una tantum veritas, i. e. rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis, in omnibus veris.

en: Nay, as Anselm, Dialogue on truth, c. 13, holds, there is only one truth, that is, a rectitude perceptible by the mind alone, in all true things.

la: Codd. A V supplent *est*.

en: Codices A V supply *est*.

la: Vel aliis verbis: illud, scil. articulum esse veritatem de Deo, non convenit omnibus articulis. — Pro *ergo illud non convenit generaliter*, quam conclusionem edd. 1, 2 omittunt, Vat. *ergo articulus non est generaliter indivisibilis veritas de Deo*.

en: Or in other words: that, namely an article's being a truth concerning God, does not belong to all articles. — For *ergo illud non convenit generaliter*, which conclusion editions 1, 2 omit, the Vatican edition [reads] *ergo articulus non est generaliter indivisibilis veritas de Deo* ("therefore an article is not generally an indivisible truth concerning God").

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. adiiciunt *nos*.

en: The editions, with some codices, add *nos*.

la: Vide supra pag. 475, nota 3.

en: See above, p. 475, note 3.

la: Pro *effectum* edd. *actum*.

en: For *effectum* the editions [read] *actum* ("act").

la: Isidor., XI. Etymolog. c. 1. n. 82: «*Artus*, quibus colligantur membra, ab *arctando* dicti»; et n. 84: *Artus* dicti, quod colligati invicem nervis arctentur i. e. stringantur, quorum diminutiva sunt *articuli*. Nam *artus* dicimus membra maiora, ut brachia; *articulos* minora membra, ut digitos. — Paulo ante pro *quantum est de se ratione* etc. edd. *quantum est de ratione* etc.

en: Isidore, XI. Etymologies c. 1. n. 82: «*Artus* [joints], by which the members are bound together, are so called from *arctando* [constraining]»; and n. 84: *Artus* are so called because, bound together by one another's sinews, they are constrained, that is, tightened, of which the diminutives are *articuli*. For we call *artus* the larger members, as the arms; *articuli* [we call] the smaller members, as the fingers. — A little before, for *quantum est de se ratione* etc. the editions [read] *quantum est de ratione* etc.

la: Edd. *articulus quod in se arctatum est*.

en: The editions [read] *articulus quod in se arctatum est*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Histor. animal. c. 15, et de Lineis insecab., ubi circa finem discrimen ostenditur, quod interest inter punctum et articulum. B. Albert. in VI. Phys., circa finem, laudatum opusc. de Lineis insecab. commentans, articulum (in ult. cap.) sic definit: *Articulus enim dicitur minimum in corpore composito, in quo diversa articulantur et quasi colliguntur*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. on the History of Animals c. 15, and on Indivisible Lines, where near the end is shown the difference which lies between a point and an article. B. Albert in VI. Physics, near the end, commenting on the praised little work on Indivisible Lines, defines an article (in the last chapter) thus: *For an article is called the least thing in a composite body, in which diverse things are articulated and as it were bound together*.

la: Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 4: *Articulus secundam notitiam suppositorum demonstrat*. Si enim dicam: ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν [homo venit], primam notitiam ostendo; sin ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν, secundam. — Cicero, IV. Rhetor. ad Herenn. c. 19. articulum in rhetorica sic definit: *Articulus dicitur, cum singula verba intervallis distinguuntur caesa oratione, hoc modo: acrimonia, voce, vultu adversarios perterruisti* etc. — Mox pro *in sententia* Vat. *in scientia*.

en: Priscian, XVII. Grammar c. 4: *An article demonstrates the second notice of supposits*. For if I say: ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν [a man came], I show the first notice; but if [I say] ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν [the man came], the second. — Cicero, IV. Rhetoric to Herennius c. 19, defines an article in rhetoric thus: *It is called an article, when single words are distinguished by intervals in a clipped discourse, in this manner: by sharpness, by voice, by countenance you terrified the adversaries* etc. — Soon, for *in sententia* the Vatican edition [reads] *in scientia*.

la: Multi codd. hic inepte inserunt *quod*, et subinde non pauci codd. nec non edd. omittunt *ipsum* ante *obiectum*. Aliquanto inferius pro *et illa sunt, quae* Vat. *et illa, quae sunt*, et post pauca cum edd. 1, 2 *dicuntur* pro *debent* ac *termini* pro *terminus*.

en: Many codices here ineptly insert *quod*, and thereupon not a few codices and also the editions omit *ipsum* before *obiectum*. Somewhat below, for *et illa sunt, quae* the Vatican edition [reads] *et illa, quae sunt*, and after a little, with editions 1, 2, *dicuntur* for *debent* and *termini* for *terminus*.

la: Vat. *veritas mentis indivisibilis*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *veritas mentis indivisibilis* ("indivisible truth of the mind").

la: Pro *communiter* in codd. T V et aliis etiam legi posset *consequenter*. Guliel. Paris., de Fide, c. 2. dicit, quod communiter credenda «usualiter articuli fidei vocantur».

en: For *communiter* in codices T V and others one could also read *consequenter*. William of Paris, on Faith, c. 2, says that the things commonly to be believed «are usually called articles of faith».

la: Art. 1. q. 3. ad 2. — Paulo superius pro *quia* cod. H *qua*, Vat. *quoniam*. Infra pro *intellectus circa ea* codd. Q U *intellectus est circa ea*, et subinde pro *et in Deo* codd. F U *et ideo*. Post pauca pro *in ratione subiecti* codd. A K U *sub ratione subiecti*.

en: Art. 1. q. 3. ad 2. — A little above, for *quia* codex H [reads] *qua*, the Vatican edition *quoniam*. Below, for *intellectus circa ea* codices Q U [read] *intellectus est circa ea*, and thereupon for *et in Deo* codices F U *et ideo*. After a little, for *in ratione subiecti* codices A K U [read] *sub ratione subiecti*.

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. subiungunt *indivisibilis*. Mox pro *enuntiabilia* cod. A et edd. 1, 2 *essentialia*.

en: The editions, with a few codices, subjoin *indivisibilis*. Soon, for *enuntiabilia* codex A and editions 1, 2 [read] *essentialia*.

la: Codd. A G K bb *formatum*.

en: Codices A G K bb [read] *formatum* ("formed").

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 509, nota 2. — Paulo superius post *cum prius* codd. B C inserunt *etiam*.

en: Cf. tom. II, p. 509, note 2. — A little above, after *cum prius* codices B C insert *etiam*.

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et q. 2.

en: See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and q. 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Alii antiqui commentatores Magistri una quaestione solent absolvere quae in hac et seq. quaest. de duabus articuli definitionibus disputantur; insuper, duce Alexandro Hal., ipsi duabus hic notatis definitionibus tertiam Hugonis a S. Vict. adiungunt: «Articulus est natura cum gratia»; quam Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 25. q. 1. a. 1.) sic interpretatur: «Duo in quolibet articulo simplici inveniuntur: unum quasi formale, scilicet Veritas primo; alterum quasi materiale, scilicet aliquod attributum temporale, quod Deo attribuitur vel per inhaerentiam, ut in articulis de humanitate, vel per causam, ut in articulis de Divinitate». De opinionibus circa ipsam rem cfr. supra pag. 515, nota 6. — Etymologiam nominis articuli, quam S. Bonav. sumsit ex Latino, S. Thomas derivat ex Graeco vocabulo ἄρθρον (S. II. II. q. 1. n. 6.), et in Comment. (III. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. n. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) dicit: *Articulus nomen Graecum est et importat indivisionem; unde membra, quae non dividuntur in alia, articuli dicuntur*. Sed in Summa dicit de eodem secundum Albertum: «significat quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum»; et ibid. vult, credibilia fidei distingui in articulos, «in quantum in quasdam partes dividuntur, habentes aliquam coaptationem ad invicem». Ibid. ad 3. de definitione Richardi dicit, quod «datur magis secundum quandam etymologiam nominis, prout habet derivationem latinam, quam secundum eius veram significationem, prout a Graeco derivatur». In Comment. idem docet: «Illud quod habet specialem difficultatem in fide, et cuius suppositio non dependet ab alio supposito, proprie dicitur articulus fidei». — Plura de articulis fidei vide infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** De hac et seq. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 69. m. 1; in Supplemento coll. 39. n. 1-4. (artt. 1-3. partim ex Alexandro, partim ex Bonav. transcripti sunt). — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 25. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 25. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Other ancient commentators of the Master are wont to settle in one question what in this and the following question is disputed concerning the two definitions of an article; moreover, with Alexander of Hales leading, they themselves add to the two definitions here noted a third of Hugh of St. Victor: «An article is a nature with grace»; which Peter of Tarentaise (III. Sent. d. 25. q. 1. a. 1.) interprets thus: «Two things are found in any simple article: one as it were formal, namely Truth first; the other as it were material, namely some temporal attribute which is attributed to God either by inherence, as in the articles concerning the humanity, or by cause, as in the articles concerning the Divinity». On the opinions concerning the matter itself, cf. above, p. 515, note 6. — The etymology of the name *article*, which St. Bonaventure took from the Latin, St. Thomas derives from the Greek word ἄρθρον (*Summa* II–II q. 1. n. 6.), and in his Commentary (III. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. n. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) says: *Article is a Greek name and imports indivision; whence members which are not divided into others are called articles*. But in the *Summa* he says of the same according to Albert: «it signifies a certain coaptation of certain distinct parts»; and ibid. he holds that the things-to-be-believed of faith are distinguished into articles «insofar as they are divided into certain parts, having some coaptation to one another». Ibid. ad 3, concerning Richard's definition, he says that «it is given rather according to a certain etymology of the name, as it has a Latin derivation, than according to its true signification, as it is derived from the Greek». In the Commentary he teaches the same: «That which has a special difficulty in faith, and whose supposition does not depend on another supposit, is properly called an article of faith». — More concerning the articles of faith see below, d. 25. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** On this and the following question, besides those praised: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 69. m. 1; in the Supplement, coll. 39. n. 1–4 (articles 1–3 have been transcribed partly from Alexander, partly from Bonaventure). — B. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 25. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 25. q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{524,525,526,527}-{L,R}-*.png`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 36440–36632). Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the cascade-fragmented Respondeo/Solutio bands (pp.525–526). The SCHOLION header prints clean as `SCHOLION.` in the PDF (p.527-L); OCR fragmented its body. PDF = printed + 22.

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**Scholion (shared with q2).** The printed SCHOLION (p.527, between q1's *ad 7/8* and the QUAESTIO II header) has two sections: **§I** discusses both definitions (the etymology of *articulus*, Hugh's third definition, Thomas vs. Albert on the Greek vs. Latin derivation); **§II** is the bibliographic note "De hac et seq. quaestione…" covering this and the following question. The scholion is carried here in full; q2 (d24-a3-q2) is `has_scholion: false` and should redirect to this scholion. The scholion uses inline cross-references only — no superscript footnote markers. Placed LAST in both language blocks (parser requirement).

**Page-split map (pp.524–527):**
- **p.524** = end of a2-q3's scholion §II (top), then ARTICULUS III header + rubric + opener (*Consequenter quaeritur… duplicem rationem articuli*) + the Primo/Secundo question list (lower p.524, after q3's scholion). Art. III opener footer band = the fresh `p524b` nn.1–4.
- **p.525** = QUAESTIO I header + title + body opener (the Richardian definition) + args 1–8 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (opens; runs through *…sicut dicuntur articuli digitorum. In quantum vero articulus dicitur principium distinctionis, consuevit* / foot p.525-R). p.525 footer band = nn.1–11.
- **p.526** = Respondeo completes (*item in accipi in scientia sermocinali…* the grammar/rhetoric application + the *terminus resolutionis*/*principium distinctionis* recapitulation + Richard's twofold-property reading) + Solutio ad 1 + ad 2.3 + ad 4 + ad 5 + ad 6 (ad 6 breaks at *…cum prius in se indifferens* / foot p.526-R). p.526 footer band = nn.1–7.
- **p.527** = ad 6 completes (*esset ad significandum diversa¹…*) + ad 7.8 (ends *…regula discretionis²: …vindicat sibi nomen articuli*) + SCHOLION I–II, then QUAESTIO II opens (lower p.527). p.527's footer band (nn.1–7) **SPLITS by body anchor:** nn.1–2 gloss q1's ad-6/ad-7.8 tail (*diversa¹* / *discretionis²*) and belong to q1; nn.3–7 gloss q2's Isidore args and migrate OUT to d24-a3-q2.

**Apparatus 24 entries**, NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart:
- **p.524 ×4** (`[^p524b-1..4]`, fresh Art. III opener sequence; ids disambiguated from a2-q3's `[^p524-1..4]`).
- **p.525 ×11** (`[^p525-1..11]`): n.1 the long Praepositinus/William-of-Auxerre note on Richard's definition (opener) / nn.2–5 args 1–4 (Art.1.q.3.² / Anselm³ / Codd. A V est⁴ / *generaliter*⁵ variants) / n.6 *arctans nos*⁶ in the *contra secundam partem* heading / n.7 *mera voluntate*⁷ (arg 6) / n.8 *effectum*⁸ (arg 8) / n.9 Isidore Etymolog. on *arctando*⁹ (Respondeo) / n.10 *in se arctatum*¹⁰ variant / n.11 Aristot./Albert *articuli digitorum*¹¹.
- **p.526 ×7** (`[^p526-1..7]`): n.1 Priscian/Cicero on the grammatical/rhetorical *articulus*¹ / n.2 the *necesse est*² codd. variants / n.3 Vat. *veritas mentis indivisibilis*³ / n.4 *communiter*⁴ William-of-Paris / n.5 *prius*⁵ (Art.1.q.3.ad 2) / n.6 *veritas*⁶ de Deo variants (ad 2.3) / n.7 *informatum*⁷ → *formatum* (ad 5).
- **p.527 ×2** (`[^p527-1..2]`): n.1 *diversa¹* (ad 6; Cfr. tom. II. pag. 509, nota 2) / n.2 *discretionis²* (ad 7.8; Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.). These two p.527 footers gloss q1's ad-argg tail; the rest of the p.527 band (nn.3–7) belongs to q2.

**Footer ownership / hand-offs.**
- IN: the fresh p.524 Art. III opener sequence (`p524b` nn.1–4); all p.525 + p.526 NOTAE; p.527 nn.1–2 (q1's ad-6/ad-7.8 tail).
- OUT: p.527 nn.3–7 → migrate to **d24-a3-q2** (they gloss q2's Isidore-definition args: the Hugo/Isidorus *Auctorem definitionis* note [n.3, on opener] / Cfr.supra a.1.q.1 [n.4] / Codd. AK *naturaliter* [n.5] / Vide supra lit.Magistri d.XXIII [n.6] / Edd. *ergo si* [n.7]). Also note a2-q3 retains its own `[^p524-1..4]` (different content, same printed page).

**Seam.** Opens raw 36440 (ARTICULUS III header `ARTICULUS 111.`, continuous after a2-q3's close at raw 36436 *…Biel, hic q. unica.*). Closes raw 36632 (scholion §II *…Durand., III. Sent. d. 25. q. 2.*) immediately before QUAESTIO II header raw 36633 (*De definitione articuli, quam ponit Isidorus* — *Secundo quaeritur de notificatione Isidori…*).

**[?] flag — RESOLVED 2026-06-10 (during d24-a3-q2 build).** The prior session parked a [?] on q1's *ad 7/8* superscript at *…regula discretionis:*, having read it as a "5" with no matching footer. The 450 dpi re-read of p.527-L/R during the q2 build shows the marker is **²**, not 5, and that q1's ad-6 also carries a **¹** on *significandum diversa*. Both are real p.527 footers belonging to q1 (the prior session wrongly assumed q1 owned no p.527 footers): n.1 = *Cfr. tom. II. pag. 509, nota 2* (on *diversa¹*); n.2 = *Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.* (on *discretionis²*). Anchors `[^p527-1]`/`[^p527-2]` and the two apparatus entries are now added; q2 correctly owns only p.527 nn.3–7. No remaining [?] flags. Legible throughout at 450 dpi; running heads OCR digit-mangled (*325*=525, *526*, *327*=527, *DIST. XXIV. ART. III. QUAEST. I/II.*) — trusted via the +22 offset and running-head text, not the OCR'd digits.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0