title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Unde fuerit productum corpus mulieris
Whence the body of woman was produced

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De productione corporis mulieris de latere viri.*
### Quaestio I. *Unde fuerit productum corpus mulieris.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, unde fuerit productum corpus mulieris. Et dicit Magister in littera, et tractum est de secundo Genesis, quod mulier formata est de viro, et non de quacumque parte, sed de costa, ex qua mulier est de viro dormiente formata. Et sic tria tanguntur in formatione mulieris, scilicet quod facta est *de viro*, et *de viro dormiente*, et non de quacumque parte, sed *de costa eius et osse*[^1]. — *Contra primum* obiicitur sic.

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1. Genesis primo[^2]: *Fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, masculum et feminam creavit eos.* Si ergo Deus in primaria conditione masculum et feminam simul creavit, non videtur, quod mulierem de viro produxerit.

2. Item, sexuum distinctio spectat ad perfectionem speciei[^3]; sed aliae species animalium, in quibus est distinctio sexuum, simul et semel productae sunt: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod se habet per modum materialis ad alterum minus est completum, quam illud quod ex ipso producitur: si ergo vir habet completionem respectu mulieris, non mulier de viro, sed econtra vir de muliere produci debuit.

**Contra *secundum*** obiicitur sic.

4. Somnus vel sopor est quies *animalium virtutum* cum intensione *naturalium*[^4]; sed in Adam non erant sensus fatigati nec virtutes animales: ergo videtur, quod somnus ille non fuerit Adae naturalis. Si ergo nihil debuit fieri circa Adam, nisi quod eius naturae congrueret, videtur, quod Deus in eum non debuit soporem immittere, ut de costa eius produceret mulierem.

5. Item, in separatione illius aut fuit *aliqua laesio* et afflictio, aut *non*. Si *sic*: ergo Adam ante passus est poenam, quam committeret culpam[^5]. Si *non*: ergo ita bene potuit fieri de latere vigilantis, sicut de latere dormientis.

6. Item, maiori potentiae attestatur separare partem a toto ab homine vigilante sine dolore quam a dormiente: magis igitur fuisset manifestata Dei potentia, si absque dolore produxisset mulierem de latere Adae vigilantis, quam cum produxerit[^6] de latere dormientis.

**Contra *tertium*** obiicitur sic.

7. Sexus muliebris est infirmior quam sexus virilis per naturam: ergo de partibus eius infirmis debuit fieri: non ergo de osse, sed potius de carne.

8. Item, in textu[^7] postmodum subiungitur: *Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea:* ergo non tantummodo de costa Adae facta est, sed etiam de carne alia.

9. Item, costa illa aut erat *necessaria* Adae, aut *superflua*. Si *necessaria:* ergo debuit alia costa reddi Adae pro illa. Si *superflua:* ergo corpus Adae non fuit in prima sui productione perfecte formatum, cum ad perfectionem spectet nihil habere superfluum, nihil diminutum. — Item, si *superflua* erat: ergo non oportebat, carnem repleri pro ea.

Est igitur quaestio: quare mulier *de viro*? et si de viro: quare magis de *dormiente* quam de vigilante? et si de dormiente: quare magis de *costa* quam de carne[^8]?

> **Conclusio.**
>
> *Corpus primae mulieris formatum est de osse lateris Adae, in quo duplex est ordinis congruentia.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum sapientia Dei admirabilis et laudabilis ostendatur in omnibus operibus suis, potissime tamen manifestatur in formatione creaturae rationalis. Hoc autem clarius apparet, si consideretur ordinis congruentia, quam servavit divina sapientia, dum produxit mulierem de latere viri.

Congruum enim erat, mulierem sic de viro produci, tum propter ordinis habitudinem, quae attenditur inter *virum* et *mulierem* in humana specie; tum etiam propter ordinem et habitudinem, quae attenditur inter ea quae per virum et mulierem habent *significari*.

Vir enim et mulier secundum suorum sexuum proprietatem et naturam sic facti sunt, ut invicem coniungerentur, et ex hoc unus in altero sustentaretur et unus ab altero quietaretur. Quia igitur forti vinculo et singulari mulier coniungitur viro et e converso, ideo unus sexus productus est de altero. Quia vero illa coniunctio dat viro quietationem, ideo producta est *de viro dormiente.* Rursus, quia vir[^9] dat mulieri fortitudinem et sustentationem, hinc est, quod mulier dicitur esse facta *de osse.* Et quia in omnibus his est quaedam aequalitas mutuae societatis, ideo formata est mulier de osse non quocumque, sed *de costa* et *eius latere.* Et sic patet, quomodo modus formationis respondet proprietatibus illius mutuae coniunctionis, quae est inter virum et mulierem secundum rem[^10].

Consonat etiam nihilominus his quae *significantur* per mulierem et virum. Per virum namque et mulierem significantur *Deus* et *anima*, *Christus* et *Ecclesia*, *superior portio rationis* et *inferior.* — Primae significationi competit formatio mulieris ex viro secundum modum praedictum. Quia enim omnes spiritus rationales immediate producuntur a Deo tanquam a primo principio et immediato; et Deus in eis requiescit et quasi soporatur, dum *deliciae suae sunt esse cum filiis hominum*[^11]; et rationalis spiritus a divino spiritu inhabitante confor-

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tatur et roboratur: optima consonantia conformatur signum signato, secundum quod per virum et mulierem significatur *Deus* et *anima.*

Similiter correspondet, secundum quod per virum et mulierem significatur *Christus* et *Ecclesia.* Ecclesia enim ex Christo formatur, dum de latere Christi dormientis in cruce profluxit sanguis et aqua, ex quibus in Sacramentis Ecclesiae redundavit efficacia, per quae Sacramenta fundatur Ecclesia; et sic *vir* respondet Christo, *dormitio* respondet morti, *ablatio costae* apertioni lateris[^12].

Concordat etiam haec formatio significationi, prout per virum et mulierem *superior portio rationis* et *inferior* habet significari. Sicut enim vir est fortior, et mulier est infirmior, sic superior portio et inferior; et sicut mulier ex viro, sic inferior portio est ex conversione spiritus ad haec inferiora. Dum autem ad haec inferiora convertitur, cessat a vigilantia contemplationis et quodam modo efficitur infirmior semetipso et tendit ad mollitiem mulieris; et ideo quodam modo *soporari* dicitur, et *os* ei auferri, et exinde mulier formari[^13].

Et sic patet, quod magna fuit congruentia ordinis observata in huius formatione mulieris, sive in se, sive in significato per ipsam. — His visis, de facili respondetur ad obiecta.

1. Quod enim primo obiicitur de textu Genesis, dicendum, quod illud dictum est per *anticipationem*; *praeterea*, illud dictum est quantum ad productionem animae, secundum quam non est formata mulier ex viro, sed ex nihilo, sicut infra[^14] patebit.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de aliis speciebus, iam patet responsio. Non enim est simile propter legem matrimonii, quae non ita attenditur in bestiis, sicut in hominibus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir est muliere perfectior; dicendum, quod *materiale* minus est nobile, quam illud quod ex eo producitur, secundum id quod est materiale; vir autem non fuit materia mulieris secundum se totum, sed secundum aliquid sui, scilicet secundum costam; et ideo, quamvis vir est nobilior, potuit tamen ex eius costa corpus mulieris formari. Nam non est tanta perfectio in una costa viri, quanta est in uno[^15] corpore mulieris. — Quodsi quaeras, quare magis mulier de viro quam vir de muliere; dicendum, quod hoc aliquando futurum erat, sicut in secundo Adam, scilicet Christo; et ideo, ut perfecta essent Dei opera[^16], debuit esse similiter et mulier de solo viro. Sic enim sunt impleti, sicut dicit Anselmus[^17], quatuor modi eductionis hominis in *esse*: «Unus, qui est de viro et muliere, quem modo observat natura; alius, qui nec de viro nec de muliere, qui fuit in productione primi hominis; tertius, qui est de viro tantum, et hic fuit in formatione Evae; quartus, qui est de muliere tantum absque viro», et hic fuit in productione Christi de Virgine. Tunc autem magis congruebat, mulierem educi de viro, ut ostenderetur, quod *vir caput est mulieris*, et quod *non vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum*[^18], et alia plura, quae prius tacta sunt.

*4. 5. 6.* Ad illa quae obiiciuntur de soporatione, dicendum, quod ille *sopor* non fuit ex lassitudine, sed fuit ex divina immissione, sicut dicit textus[^19]; nec tamen fuit contra naturam, quia, si Adam stetisset, esset utique in illo somnus, non propter debilitatem potentiae sensitivae, sed propter vigorationem particulae vegetativae; quoniam, etsi neutram harum virium contingeret in Adam lassari, tamen, quando una cessabat ab operatione, contingebat alteram vigorari, dum tota anima circa actum unius virtutis intendit[^20]. *Immisit autem Dominus soporem in Adam*, non propter hoc, quod non posset separare costam a vigilante sine dolore et horrore, sed propter *significationem* et propter etiam mentis Adae *sublevationem*, quia, sicut dicunt Sancti, Adam in illo sopore multa praevidit[^21]. Unde statim, cum evigilavit, prophetice locutus est; et in

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hoc multum ostenditur Dei potentia, qui sic potuit separare costam, ut natura non amitteret quietem suam. — Et ex hoc patent illa tria obiecta de sopore. Primum enim non valet, quia ibi non erat somnus ex lassitudine. Secundum similiter non valet, quia non est factum propter laesionem hominis occultandam. Tertium etiam non valet, quia ita bene manifestata est Dei potentia, dum non excitavit dormientem a somno, sicut manifestata esset, si formasset eam de latere vigilantis sine dolore aliquo.

*7. 8. 9.* Ad illa quae obiiciuntur, quod non debuit fieri de osse; dicendum, quod non tantummodo mulier facta est de *osse* sive de *costa*, sed etiam aliqua particula fuit sumta de *carne* Adae, sicut sequens littera[^22] innuit: *Hoc nunc os de osse et caro de carne mea.* Magis autem fit denominatio ab *osse*, sive quia illa fuit pars principalior; sive quia vir mulieri confert robur, et mulier per viri consortium vigoratur, vir autem per mulieris consortium emollitur — et ideo dicitur esse caro repleta pro costa, quia vir *dat fortitudinem* et *suscipit infirmitatem* — sive etiam, quia costa illa locum carnis occupabat; non enim facta fuit in Adam, ut in eo maneret, sed ut de ea formaretur mulier. — Et sic patent illa tria obiecta. Primum enim non valet, quia mulier, etsi debilis sit in se, tamen a viro habet roborari; et ideo magis dicitur esse facta *de costa* quam *de carne.* Secundum non valet; quod enim mulier dicitur esse facta *de costa*, non intelligitur praecise, ita quod non *de carne*. Tertium non valet, quia, si illa costa superflua erat Adae, in quantum erat individuum, erat tamen opportuna, in quantum erat mulieris principium. Et ideo resurget in muliere, non in viro, sicut planius explicatur in quarto[^23].

english:
### Article I. *On the production of woman's body from the side of man.*
### Question I. *Whence the body of woman was produced.*

Concerning the first point, the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked, whence the body of woman was produced. And the Master says in the text, and it is drawn from the second [chapter] of Genesis, that woman was formed from man, and not from any part whatever, but from a rib, from which woman was formed *of man while he was sleeping.* And thus three things are touched on in the formation of woman, namely, that she was made *of man*, and *of man sleeping*, and not from any part whatever, but *from his rib and bone*[^1]. — *Against the first* it is objected thus.

1. Genesis 1[^2]: *God made man to his own image and likeness, male and female he created them.* If, then, in the primary establishment God created the male and the female simultaneously, it does not seem that he produced woman from man.

2. Likewise, the distinction of sexes pertains to the perfection of the species[^3]; but other species of animals, in which there is distinction of sexes, were produced together and at once: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that which is related to another after the manner of something material is less complete than that which is produced from it: if therefore the man has completion in regard to the woman, then not the woman should have been produced from the man, but on the contrary the man from the woman.

**Against the *second*** it is objected thus.

4. Sleep or deep-sleep is a rest *of the animal powers* with an intensification *of the natural [powers]*[^4]; but in Adam the senses were not fatigued, nor the animal powers: therefore it seems that that sleep was not natural to Adam. If therefore nothing should have been done to Adam except what befitted his nature, it seems that God should not have sent a deep-sleep upon him in order to produce woman from his rib.

5. Likewise, in the separation of that [rib] there was either *some hurt* and affliction, or *not*. If *so*: then Adam suffered punishment before he committed fault[^5]. If *not*: then it could equally well have been done from the side of him waking as from the side of him sleeping.

6. Likewise, it witnesses to greater power to separate a part from the whole in a man awake without pain than in one sleeping: therefore God's power would have been more manifest if he had produced woman from the side of Adam awake, without pain, than when he produced[^6] her from his side while sleeping.

**Against the *third*** it is objected thus.

7. The female sex is by nature weaker than the male: therefore she should have been made from his weaker parts: therefore not from bone, but rather from flesh.

8. Likewise, in the text[^7] is subjoined afterwards: *This now is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh:* therefore she was made not only from a rib of Adam, but also from other flesh.

9. Likewise, that rib was either *necessary* to Adam, or *superfluous*. If *necessary*: then another rib should have been restored to Adam in its place. If *superfluous*: then Adam's body in its first production was not perfectly formed, since it pertains to perfection to have nothing superfluous, nothing diminished. — Likewise, if it was *superfluous*: then it was not fitting that flesh be filled in for it.

There is therefore the question: why woman *from man*? and if from man: why rather from *sleeping* than from waking? and if from sleeping: why rather from *a rib* than from flesh[^8]?

> **Conclusion.**
>
> *The body of the first woman was formed from a bone of Adam's side, in which there is a twofold congruence of order.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been stated it must be noted that, since the wisdom of God is shown forth as admirable and praiseworthy in all his works, it is nevertheless made manifest most of all in the formation of the rational creature. Yet this appears more clearly if one considers the congruence of order which the divine wisdom kept when it produced woman from the side of man.

For it was fitting that woman be thus produced from man, both on account of the disposition of order which is attended to between *man* and *woman* in the human species, and also on account of the order and disposition which is attended to between those things which have to be *signified* through man and woman.

For man and woman according to the property and nature of their sexes were so made that they should be joined to one another, and from this the one should be sustained in the other, and the one should be quieted by the other. Since therefore by a strong and singular bond woman is joined to man and conversely, therefore one sex was produced from the other. And since that conjunction gives to man quieting, therefore she was produced *from man while sleeping.* Again, since the man[^9] gives to the woman fortitude and sustenance, hence it is that the woman is said to have been made *from bone.* And since in all these there is a certain equality of mutual society, therefore woman was formed not from any bone whatever, but *from a rib* and *from his side.* And thus it is clear how the manner of formation answers to the properties of that mutual conjunction which is between man and woman in their reality[^10].

It accords too no less with the things which are *signified* through woman and man. For through man and woman are signified *God* and *the soul*, *Christ* and *the Church*, *the higher portion of reason* and *the lower.* — To the first signification corresponds the formation of woman from man according to the manner stated. For since all rational spirits are immediately produced by God as by their first and immediate principle; and God rests in them and is as it were lulled to sleep, while *his delights are to be with the children of men*[^11]; and the rational spirit by the divine Spirit dwelling within is con-

formed and strengthened: the sign is most fittingly conformed to the thing signified, according as through man and woman are signified *God* and *the soul.*

In like manner [the formation] corresponds [to that] according as through man and woman are signified *Christ* and *the Church.* For the Church is formed from Christ when from the side of Christ asleep on the cross flowed blood and water, from which there overflowed an efficacy into the sacraments of the Church, through which sacraments the Church is founded; and thus *man* answers to Christ, *sleeping* answers to death, *removal of the rib* answers to the opening of the side[^12].

This formation also accords with the signification, according as through man and woman are to be signified *the higher portion of reason* and *the lower.* For as the man is stronger and the woman weaker, so the higher portion and the lower; and as woman [comes] from man, so the lower portion comes from the turning of the spirit to these lower things. And while [the spirit] turns toward these lower things, it ceases from the wakefulness of contemplation and is in a certain manner made weaker than itself and inclines toward the softness of woman; and therefore in a certain manner it is said to be *lulled asleep*, and to have *bone* taken from it, and from that woman is formed[^13].

And thus it is clear that great was the congruence of order observed in this formation of woman, both in itself and in what is signified through her. — These things having been seen, the response is easy to the objections.

1. To what is first objected from the text of Genesis, it must be said that it was said by *anticipation*; *furthermore*, it was said with respect to the production of the soul, according to which woman was not formed from man, but from nothing, as will appear below[^14].

2. To what is objected concerning other species, the response is already clear. For it is not similar on account of the law of matrimony, which is not so attended to in beasts as in human beings.

3. To what is objected, that the man is more perfect than the woman; it must be said that *the material* is less noble than that which is produced from it, with respect to that which is material; but the man was not matter of the woman according to himself as a whole, but according to something of himself, namely according to the rib; and therefore, although the man is more noble, nevertheless the body of woman could be formed from his rib. For there is not as much perfection in one rib of the man as there is in one[^15] body of the woman. — But if you should ask, why rather woman from man than man from woman; it must be said that this was at some time going to be, as in the second Adam, namely Christ; and therefore, *that the works of God might be perfect*[^16], woman likewise had to be from man alone. For thus were fulfilled, as Anselm says[^17], the four modes of bringing forth man into *being*: «One, which is from man and woman, which manner nature now observes; another, which is neither from man nor from woman, which was in the production of the first man; the third, which is from man only, and this was in the formation of Eve; the fourth, which is from woman only without man», and this was in the production of Christ from the Virgin. Then, however, it was more fitting that woman be brought forth from man, that it might be shown that *the man is the head of the woman*, and that *not the man for the woman, but the woman for the man*[^18], and many other things which were touched on earlier.

*4. 5. 6.* To those things which are objected concerning the inducing of sleep, it must be said that that *deep-sleep* was not from weariness, but was from divine sending, as the text says[^19]; nor however was it against nature, since, if Adam had stood [in innocence], sleep would still have been in him, not on account of weakness of the sensitive power, but on account of the invigoration of the vegetative part; since, although neither of these powers happened to be wearied in Adam, nevertheless, when one ceased from its operation, it happened that the other was invigorated, while the whole soul was intent upon the act of one power[^20]. *But the Lord cast a deep-sleep upon Adam* not on account of this, that he could not separate the rib from him waking without pain and horror, but on account of *signification* and also on account of the lifting up of Adam's mind, since, as the Saints say, Adam in that sleep foresaw many things[^21]. Hence as soon as he awoke, he spoke prophetically; and in

this much is shown forth God's power, who was able so to separate the rib that nature did not lose its quiet. — And from this are clear those three objections concerning sleep. For the first does not hold, because there sleep was not from weariness. The second likewise does not hold, because it was not done to conceal injury to the man. The third also does not hold, because God's power is just as well manifested in his not waking the sleeper from sleep as it would have been manifested had he formed her from his side waking without any pain.

*7. 8. 9.* To those things which are objected, that she should not have been made from bone; it must be said that woman was made not only from *bone* or from *a rib*, but also some little particle was taken from the *flesh* of Adam, as the following text[^22] suggests: *This now is bone from bone, and flesh from my flesh.* The denomination is rather from *bone*, either because that was the principal part; or because the man confers strength on the woman, and the woman is invigorated through fellowship with the man, while the man through fellowship with the woman is softened — and therefore [the man] is said to be flesh filled in for the rib, since the man *gives fortitude* and *receives weakness* — or also because that rib occupied the place of flesh; for it was not made in Adam that it should remain in him, but that woman should be formed from it. — And thus those three objections are clear. For the first does not hold, since woman, although she is weak in herself, nevertheless has it from the man to be strengthened; and therefore she is rather said to be made *from a rib* than *from flesh.* The second does not hold; for that woman is said to be made *from a rib* is not understood precisely, as if not *from flesh.* The third does not hold, because, if that rib was superfluous to Adam, in so far as he was an individual, it was nevertheless opportune, in so far as it was the principle of woman. And therefore it will rise again in the woman, not in the man, as is more plainly explained in the fourth [book][^23].

la: Ita cod. *cc* et ed. 1; ceteri codd. cum aliis edd. *ex*, sed vide infra principium 1. quaest. — Hic c. 1. — Gen. 2, 21. seqq.

en: Thus codex *cc* and ed. 1; the other codices with the other editions [read] *ex* ["from which"], but see below at the opening of question 1. — Here ch. 1. — Genesis 2, 21 and following.

la: Vers. 27: *Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam; ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum* etc.

en: Verse 27: *And God created man to his own image; to the image of God he created him, male* etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 25. (IX. c. 9.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 25 (IX, ch. 9).

la: Secundum Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 4. (c. 3.).

en: According to Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, ch. 4 (ch. 3).

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51: *Omnis autem poena si iusta est, peccati poena est, et supplicium nominatur.* — Cfr. de hoc arg. August., Enarr. in Ps. 36. n. 11.

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* III, ch. 18, n. 51: *Every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of sin, and is called retribution.* — Cf. on this argument Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 36, n. 11.

la: Codd. *aa cc* et ed. 1 *produxit.*

en: Codices *aa, cc* and ed. 1 read *produxit* ["he produced," indicative].

en: Genesis 2, 23.

la: Cfr. August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 23. — Vat. supplet *fuerit producta.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IX, ch. 13, n. 23. — The Vatican edition supplies *fuerit producta* ["was produced"].

la: Fide cod. E supplevimus *vir.*

en: On the faith of codex E we have supplied *vir* ["man"].

la: Cfr. August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. et de Bono coniugali, c. 1. n. 1.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IX, ch. 3, n. 5 and following, and *On the Good of Marriage*, ch. 1, n. 1.

la: Prov. 8, 31. — Plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 1, 2 *conformatur*, cod. M cum ed. 4 *confirmatur* pro *confortatur.*

en: Proverbs 8, 31. — Several codices with the Vatican edition and editions 1, 2 [read] *conformatur* ["is conformed"], codex M with ed. 4 [reads] *confirmatur* ["is confirmed"] for *confortatur* ["is strengthened"].

la: Cfr. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 36. n. 11; in Ps. 103. serm. 4. n. 6; XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 17. et in Ioan. tract. 9. n. 10, cuius verba relata sunt tom. I. pag. 2, nota 19. Idem dicit Chrysost. in sermone, qui legitur in Breviario in festo pretiosissimi Sanguinis D. N. I. Chr. (non est in edd. recentibus).

en: Cf. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 36, n. 11; *On Psalm* 103, sermon 4, n. 6; *City of God* XXII, ch. 17, and *Tract. on John* 9, n. 10, whose words are reported in vol. I, p. 2, note 19. Chrysostom says the same in the sermon which is read in the Breviary on the Feast of the Most Precious Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ (it is not in the more recent editions).

la: Vide infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. et p. II. a. 1. 2, ubi haec sententia Augustini exponitur. — Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam *separari* pro *soporari*; dein plures codd. cum ed. 1 *os eius* pro *os ei.*

en: See below dist. 24, part I, art. 2, q. 2 and part II, arts. 1 & 2, where this opinion of Augustine is expounded. — Not a few codices with editions 1, 2, 3 wrongly [read] *separari* ["to be separated"] for *soporari* ["to be lulled asleep"]; then several codices with ed. 1 [read] *os eius* ["his bone"] for *os ei* ["bone from him"].

la: Art. seq. q. 3.

en: The following article, q. 3.

la: Cod. T *toto.*

en: Codex T reads *toto* ["whole"].

la: Deut. 32, 4: *Dei perfecta sunt opera.*

en: Deuteronomy 32, 4: *The works of God are perfect.*

la: Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 8.: *Quatuor modis potest Deus facere hominem, videlicet aut de viro et de femina, sicut assiduus usus monstrat; aut nec de viro nec de femina, sicut creavit Adam; aut de viro sine femina, sicut fecit Evam; aut de femina sine viro, quod nondum fecit. Ut igitur hunc quoque modum probet suae subiacere potestati, et ad hoc ipsum opus dilatum esse, nihil convenientius, quam ut de femina sine viro assumat illum hominem, quem quaerimus.* — Cod. A circa finem textus post *de viro tantum* subiungit *absque muliere*, econtra aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt ultima verba *absque viro.*

en: *Cur Deus homo* II, ch. 8: «In four ways can God make a human being, namely either from man and from woman, as continual use shows; or neither from man nor from woman, as he created Adam; or from man without woman, as he made Eve; or from woman without man, which he has not yet done. Therefore, that he may show that this mode too is subject to his power, and that for this very thing the work has been deferred, nothing more fitting than that from woman without man he should assume that human being whom we seek.» — Codex A near the end of the text after *de viro tantum* ["from man only"] adds *absque muliere* ["without woman"]; on the other hand some codices with ed. 1 omit the final words *absque viro* ["without man"].

la: Epist. I. Cor. 11, 9: *Etenim non est creatus vir* etc. — Paulo superius post *quod vir* plures codd. vel addunt *etiam*, vel *et.*

en: Epistle 1 Cor. 11, 9: *For man was not created* etc. — A little earlier, after *quod vir* ["that the man"], several codices add either *etiam* ["also"] or *et* ["and"].

la: Gen. 2, 21: *Immisit ergo Dominus Deus soporem in Adam.* — Paulo inferius Vat. *debilitationem* pro *debilitatem* et *potentiae* pro *particulae.*

en: Genesis 2, 21: *The Lord God therefore cast a deep-sleep upon Adam.* — A little further on the Vatican edition reads *debilitationem* for *debilitatem* and *potentiae* for *particulae.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 260, nota 1; et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 86. m. 3. — Sequens textus est Gen. 2, 21.

en: Cf. above p. 260, note 1; and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 86. m. 3. — The following text is Genesis 2, 21.

la: August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 36: *Ac per hoc etiam illa ecstasis, quam Deus immisit in Adam, ut soporatus obdormiret, recte intelligitur ad hoc immissa, ut et ipsius mens per ecstasim particeps fieret tanquam angelicae curiae, et intrans in sanctuarium Dei intelligeret in novissima. Denique evigilans, tanquam prophetiae plenus, cum ad se adductam costam, mulierem suam, videret, eructavit continuo, quod magnum sacramentum commendat Apostolus (Eph. 5, 31.): Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis etc. (Gen. 2, 23.)... ut hinc intelligeremus, propter ecstasim, quae praecesserat in Adam, hoc eum divinitus tanquam prophetam dicere potuisse.*

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IX, ch. 19, n. 36: «And on this account that ecstasy too, which God sent upon Adam, that being put into deep-sleep he might fall asleep, is rightly understood to have been sent for this, that his mind too through the ecstasy should be made a sharer as it were of the angelic court, and entering into the sanctuary of God should understand the last things. Finally, awakening, as if full of prophecy, when he saw the rib brought to him, his wife, he immediately exclaimed that which the Apostle commends as a great sacrament (Eph. 5, 31): *This now is bone from my bones* etc. (Gen. 2, 23)... that we might understand from this that, on account of the ecstasy which had preceded in Adam, he could divinely say this as a prophet.»

la: Gen. 2, 23: Vulgata, *cui concordant codd. I V Z ponentes ossibus:* Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro etc.

en: Genesis 2, 23: the Vulgate, *with which agree codices I, V, Z, putting* ossibus *["bones"]:* "This now is bone from my bones and flesh etc."

en: Distinction 44, part I, art. 2, q. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hic notandae sunt rationes congruentiae pro modo productionis Evae allatae, nec non significationes mysticae, vel a Ss. Patribus acceptae, vel ingeniose a S. Bonav. excogitatae. S. Doctorem hic presse sequitur Petr. a Tar., qui addit: «Differunt somnus et sopor, quia somnus est solius naturae; est enim quies animalium virtutum cum intentione [intensione] *naturalium*; sed sopor est etiam gratiae opus, quia sopor est quies animalium cum intentione *intellectualium*» (cfr. hic arg. 4.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 85. m. 2, q. 79. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 92. a. 1. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 80. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth. de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Here are to be noted the reasons of congruence brought forward for the manner of Eve's production, and likewise the mystical significations either received from the holy Fathers or ingeniously thought out by St. Bonaventure. Peter of Tarentaise closely follows the holy Doctor here, and adds: «Sleep [*somnus*] and deep-sleep [*sopor*] differ, because sleep is of nature alone; for it is the rest of the animal powers with an intention [or intensification] of *the natural [powers]*; but deep-sleep is also a work of grace, since deep-sleep is the rest of the animal [powers] with an intention of *the intellectual [powers]*» (cf. argument 4 here).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 85. m. 2, q. 79. m. 1. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; *Summa* I. q. 92. a. 1. 2. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. II. tr. 13. q. 80. m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. — Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), here q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here, q. unica. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here, q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
- **Page span.** Q1 occupies p.431 R-1 bottom (opener immediately after d18-divisio's *de qua mulier est de viro …*) → p.432 → p.433 → p.434 L-mid (closing at *sicut planius explicatur in quarto.*) + SCHOLION I (L-mid) + II (L-bottom → R-0 top). QUAESTIO II opens immediately after at p.434 R-0.
- **Hand-off received from d18-divisio (per resume log):** p.431 R-2 footers ² (*Ita cod. cc et ed. 1; ceteri codd. cum aliis edd.* ex *, sed vide infra principium 1. quaest.*) + ³ (*Hic c. 1. — Gen. 2, 21. seqq.*) migrated here and folded together as [^1], anchored on the opener phrase *de costa eius et osse.* (The first applies to the Master's text variant *ex qua* vs. *de qua*; the second cites Gen 2:21seq. for the same opener.) p.431 R-2 ¹ (*Post* plenus *edd. 1, 8 inserunt* et anima et corpore*.*) stays with d18-littera per the prior log.
- **Forward hand-off to d18-a1-q2:** none. p.434 L-2 footers ¹–³ all anchor in q1 body (Gen 2,23 [^22]; Dist. 44 [^23]; Gen 2,2 [actually anchored in q2 opener — see below]). Wait: footer ³ on p.434 L-2 reads *Gen. 2, 2. Secundum translationem Septuaginta August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 1*; this anchors in q2's argument 2 (Augustinus *sexto super Genesim ad litteram*) and therefore migrates forward to d18-a1-q2 along with p.434 R-2 footers ⁴ (*Cap. 11. n. 18, ubi textus originalis in fine* erant quasi semina futurorum *…*) + ⁵ (*Vide supra pag. 400, nota 7. — De ultima huius argumenti propositione cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 1. seqq.*) + ⁶ (*Vat.* passibilis*.*). These all anchor in q2 opener/args; the q2 promotion will consume them.
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 23 anchors + body text crisp at 450 dpi across pp.431 R-1 → 434 L-mid. OCR around raw 30377–30581 is two-column cascade-fragmented; column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** per locked Vol II convention: *Theses 3.*, *Contra 1. thesim.*, *Contra 2. thesim.*, *Tres quaestiones.*, *Duplex congruitas.*, *Secundum congruitatem respondetur ad 3 qq.*, *Item secundae congruitatem.*, *Triplex significatio.*, *Significatio 1./2./3.*, *Ratio obiectorum.*
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I = substantial doctrinal scholion (Quaracchi note on Bonav.'s ingeniously-developed mystical significations + Petr. a Tar. *somnus vs. sopor* distinction with reference to arg. 4); II = q1 commentator list.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum mulier formata fuerit de costa viri secundum rationem seminalem.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum mulier formata sit de costa viri secundum rationem seminalem. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. *Primo* per textum[^1]: *Consummavit Deus die sexto omne opus suum.* Si ergo formatio mulieris fuit post diem sextum, sicut Scriptura innuit, ergo aliquo modo in illis operibus sex dierum mulier condita fuit; sed non erat nisi in costa: ergo in costa erat unde fieret mulier. Sed quod sic est in aliquo dicitur esse in eo secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus sexto *super Genesim ad litteram*[^2]: « Omnia quae consequentibus erant evolvenda temporibus, primitus Deus creavit simul, cum faceret mundum; *consummata* quidem, quoniam nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis causaliter factum sit; *inchoata* autem, quoniam quaedam erant semina futurorum ». Ergo si mulier postea producenda erat, semen mulieris praeexistebat; sed non nisi in costa: ergo etc.

3. Item, vir dicitur esse imago Dei, quia ex ipso fiunt omnes homines, sicut omnia sunt ex Deo[^3]; sed nulla creatura est ex Deo materialiter: ergo si recta est assimilatio, necesse est, quod vir respectu mulieris non solum habeat habitudinem principii *materialis*, sed etiam *activi*. Sed quod est ex aliquo sicut ex materiali et activo principio est secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.

4. Item, vir productus est ex limo, et mulier de viro; aut ergo *est maior habitudo* et convenientior costae ad mulierem quam viri ad limum, aut *non*. Si *non*, ergo non magis attinet mulier viro quam vir limo. Si *sic*, ergo ultra rationem possibilis[^4] fuit ibi aliquo modo ratio activi. Si igitur haec est ratio seminalis, apparet, quod secundum rationem seminalem ex costa formatum fuit corpus mulieris.

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5. Item, quia Deus produxit corpus mulieris de costa, aut hoc fuit secundum naturam, aut contra. Si secundum naturam; cum natura quidquid facit, faciat secundum rationes seminales, videtur, quod seminaliter mulier de costa producta sit. Si contra naturam; contra: « Conditor naturae, ut dicit Augustinus[^5], non facit contra naturam »; et idem *super Genesim ad litteram*: « Tam non facit Deus contra causas, quas bonas constituit, quam contra voluntatem suam non facit ». Ergo si formatio Evae non potuit esse contra naturam, fuit ergo secundum naturam; et si hoc, fuit ergo secundum rationem seminalem.

6. Item, si productio illa fuit contra naturam, ergo formatio mulieris fuit miraculum; sed Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^6] dicit, quod Deus in rerum conditione non utitur rebus ad miraculum suae potentiae, sed secundum quod proprie competit ipsarum rerum naturae: ergo si miraculum non faciebat, sed operabatur, secundum quod natura exigebat; videtur, quod mulierem produxerit secundum seminalem rationem, si eam produxit secundum exigentiam naturae.

**Contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Magister dicit in littera[^7], et est auctoritas Augustini: « Illa quae secundum *causam seminalem* fiunt, dicuntur *naturaliter* fieri, quia ita cursus naturae hominibus innotuit »: si ergo productio mulieris de costa non est secundum naturae cursum, ergo non erit secundum rationem seminalem.

2. Item, Magister in littera[^8]: « Corpus mulieris de costa factum dicitur eo sane miraculo, quo de quinque panibus quinque millia hominum saturata sunt »; sed illud non fuit secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur *ratione.* Semen dicit principium activum et intrinsecum[^9], unde non dicitur semen hominis humor quicumque, sed ille qui decisus est a lumbis paternis; sed in costa non erat vis activa ad mulieris productionem: ergo nec ratio seminalis.

4. Item, semen habet in se rationem *totius* et *partium* eius rei, quae ex ipso producitur. Unde Augustinus quinto *super Genesim ad litteram*[^10]: « In semine omnia producta sunt et fuerant primitus non mole magnitudinis, sed in potentia causali ». Sed in costa illa non erat virtus ad singula membra formanda: ergo non erat ibi mulier secundum rationem seminalem.

5. Item, impossibile est, aliquid crescere per virtutem creatam nisi per rarefactionem, aut appositionem; sed corpus mulieris de illa costa productum est, quod erat ipsa maius, non per costae rarefactionem nec extrinsecae materiae appositionem, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^11]: ergo productio illa ex costa non fuit secundum virtutem creaturae, sed solum creatricis essentiae. Sed seminalis ratio dicit virtutem creatam; non enim dicuntur in Deo res esse seminaliter: ergo haec productio mulieris ex costa non fuit secundum rationes seminales.

6. Item, secundum rationes seminales attenditur rerum propagatio et generatio; sed secundum eductionem corporis de costa non fit propagatio in humana specie: ergo productio alicuius corporis humani ex costa non est secundum rationem seminalem.

*Quaestio incidens.*

Propter hoc est quaestio: cum Magister[^12] dicat, aliqua fieri secundum rationes *causales*, aliqua secundum rationes *seminales*, quae sit differentia inter haec duo. *Si tu dicas*, quod illa fiunt secundum rationes *causales*, quae fiunt secundum rationes incommutabiles vel aeternas; illa secundum rationes *seminales*, quae fiunt secundum exigentiam et virtutem potentiarum inditarum ipsis creaturis; *obiicitur* contra hoc per Augustinum. Dicit enim Augustinus sexto *super Genesim ad litteram*[^13]: « Nihil habent res in naturis propriis, quod non in primis diebus causaliter factum est ». Et iterum: « Causales illae rationes, quas mundo indidit, cum primum simul omnia creavit, quomodo institutae sunt, merito quaeri potest ». Et paulo post: « In illis primis rerum causis, quas mundo primitus Creator inseruit, non tantum posuit, quod de limo formaturus erat hominem, sed quemadmodum producturus ». Ergo rationes *causales* non dicunt quid *increatum*, sed *creatum.* — Item, ipse Augustinus rationes *causa-*

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*les*, quas dicit inditas primis rebus, distinguit contra incommutabiles rationes, tam in quinto *super Genesim ad litteram*[^14], quam in sexto.

Quaeritur etiam, quae differentia sit inter rationes *seminales* et *naturales*; et videtur, quod nulla, quia Augustinus dicit, quod cum arbor germinatur de semine, quotidie est propagatio secundum rationem seminalem, in fine quinti *super Genesim ad litteram*[^15]; sed hoc idem est secundum rationem naturalem. — Item, operatio, quae est a vi seminali, aut est naturalis, aut est voluntaria. Cum enim non sit a causa per accidens et sit a causa creata, necesse est, quod sit a *natura*, vel ab *intellectu*[^16]. Sed non est ab intellectu: ergo a natura: ergo omne quod fit seminaliter, fit naturaliter. Pari ratione, cum natura sit vis propagativa, et propagatio fiat mediante semine; omne quod fit *naturaliter*, videtur fieri *seminaliter*.

> ### Conclusio.
>
> Corpus mulieris non fuit in costa Adae secundum rationes seminales, nisi large intelligantur; et omnino non est inde factum secundum easdem.

**Respondeo:**

*Praenotandum.*

Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum de his rationibus seminalibus egregius doctor Augustinus in quinto et sexto *super Genesim ad litteram*[^17] ambigue loquatur, et ab ipso potissime habeamus horum nominum usum; non est facile inter huiusmodi vocabula recte distinguere. Ipse enim *rationes causales* modo dicit *rebus fuisse insertas*, modo dicit, quantum ad aliqua in *divina voluntate fuisse servatas*. Possumus tamen, quantum est de vi vocabuli, differentiam assignare in hunc modum.

*Notiones generales.*

*Causa* enim communis est ad *principium intrinsecum* et *extrinsecum*; similiter et *ratio causalis*, quantum est de vi nominis; *semen* vero dicit *principium intrinsecum.* Et ita *ratio causalis* se extendit ad rationes *creatas* et *increatas*; *ratio* vero *seminalis* solum ad rationes *creatas.* Quantum ergo est de vi nominis, unum est commune respectu alterius; in quantum autem ad invicem distinguuntur et connumerantur, sic *causa* et *causalis ratio* accipitur quantum ad *principium increatum*, *semen* vero et *seminalis ratio* spectat ad *principium creatum.* — Differunt autem *causa* et *ratio causalis*, quia *causa* dicit *principium productivum*, *ratio* vero *causalis* dicit *regulam dirigentem* illud principium in sua operatione. Similiter per hunc modum differt *semen* et *ratio seminalis.* Regula autem agentis *increati* est forma exemplaris sive idealis[^18], regula vero agentis *creati* est forma naturalis: et ita *rationes causales* sunt formae *ideales* sive *exemplares*, *rationes* vero *seminales* sunt formae *naturales.*

*Differentia rationum primordialium et causalium.*

Et secundum hoc patet, quod *rationes causales* et *primordiales* idem sunt re, differentes sola ratione. *Primordiales* enim dicuntur per privationem prioris, sed *causales* per positionem posterioris; et *primordiales*, in quantum respiciunt Deum ut *principium primum*, *causales*, in quantum respiciunt Deum ut *finem ultimum*, qui est causa causarum[^19]. — Similiter *naturales rationes* et *seminales* re idem sunt, ratione vero differunt. *Item naturales rationes et seminales.* Quia enim *semen* dicit *ut ex quo*, et *natura* dicit *ut a quo*, *ratio seminalis* attenditur, in quantum dirigit potentiam naturae, ut *ex aliquo* fiat *aliquid*; *naturalis* vero, ut *ab aliquo* fiat *aliquid*. — *Aliter.* Vel *ratio seminalis* respicit *inchoationem* et *intrinsecam virtutem*, quae movet et operatur ad effectus productionem; *naturalis* vero concernit producentis ad productum assimilationem et modi agendi assuetudinem. Unde appropriate loquendo, cum magi ex virgis fecerunt serpentes[^20], hoc fuit secundum *rationes seminales;* cum vero serpentes, sicut assolent, serpentes generant, hoc fit secundum *rationes naturales*, licet utraeque et naturales et seminales congrue dici possint.

*Applicatio.*

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum aliquis effectus fiat secundum *rationes causales* aut *seminales*; respondendum est, quod aut sic est a Deo ille effectus, quod creatura non habet in eo potentiam *aliquam*, aut si habet, habet solam potentiam *obedientiae*[^21]; utpote cum mundus fit de nihilo, ubi nulla est potentia creaturae; vel cum multi panes multiplicantur ex pane uno, ubi est sola potentia *obedientiae;* et haec fiunt secundum *rationes causales*, quas Deus servavit in sua voluntate, quia non fiunt secundum exigentiam creaturae, sed secundum exigentiam dispositionis aeternae. — Si autem sic producitur effectus, quod est in potentia naturae, non solum *obediente*, sed etiam *potente* ad actum perducere[^22]; sic dicitur fieri secundum *rationes seminales;* sicut patet, cum homo generatur ex homine, vel arbor ex arbore.

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*Distinguitur potentia propinqua et remota.*

Sed attendendum est, quod illa *potentia naturae* ad effectus istos aut est *propinqua* et *sufficiens*, sicut est in semine deciso a lumbis ad generationem humani corporis; et sic dicitur proprie habere in se rationem seminalem; aut est *remota* et *insufficiens*, sicut est in pane vel in alimento, ut ex eo fiat homo; et sic minus proprie dicitur esse ibi ratio seminalis. Non enim dicitur in pane esse ratio seminalis respectu hominis producendi, nisi valde large accipiatur. — *Applicatio.* Quod autem sic est in *remota*[^23] dispositione respectu effectus, aut perducitur ad illum effectum *mediantibus* illis, ad quae habebat ordinem immediatum, aut *immediate.* Si mediate, tunc potest dici, quod effectus ille sit secundum rationem seminalem, utpote si panis comedatur et digeratur et convertatur in humorem, et postmodum in lumbis convertatur in semen, deinde in hominem. Si autem *immediate* perducatur ad effectum, utpote si de pane statim formaretur corpus hominis; sic nullo modo dicitur esse factum secundum *rationes seminales*, sed secundum *rationes causales.* Quamvis enim ibi esset aliqua *potentia activa* ad hoc, quod inde fieret corpus per multa intermedia; tamen quod immediate fieret, hoc habuit in sola potentia *obedientiae.*

*Conclusio 1.* *In membris.*

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum corpus mulieris *fuerit* in costa seminaliter: dicendum, quod si *proprie* accipiatur ratio seminalis, *non*; si autem accipiatur *large* pro quacumque potentia activa existente in materia, sic potest dici in costa fuisse ratio seminalis. *Conclusio 2.* Rursus, si quaeratur, utrum mulier *facta* sit de costa secundum rationes seminales; respondendum est, quod *non*; quia costa respectu talis modi producendi et respectu tanti corporis ex ea formandi absque additione non habuit nisi solam potentiam *obedientiae.* Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. 2. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nihil novum fecit Deus ultra diem sextum; dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter. *Primo*, quia, etsi formatio mulieris post diem sextum narretur, non est tamen credendum, quod tam longo tempore viri formatio praecesserit, sed quod die sexto de latere viri producta est. Illud autem quod subditur, intelligendum est per recapitulationem: recapitulat enim Scriptura, ut addat[^24]. Deficit etiam in hoc, quod Deus non dicitur *facere novum*, non solum in hoc, quod omnia producta sint in *ratione seminali*, sed quia producta sunt in *suo simili*; et hoc necessarium est dicere propter creationem animae, quae non exit in esse secundum seminalem rationem. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia formatio mulieris non fuit de consequentibus ad opera sex dierum; vel si fuit, *causaliter* dicitur fuisse facta, quia praecessit potentia obedientiae in costa, vel etiam aliqua *ratio seminalis longinqua*, licet secundum illam mulier non sit formata, sed secundum potentiam divinam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir est imago Dei, quia principium omnium hominum; dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo. Deus enim est principium sufficiens respectu omnium; vir autem non est per se principium sufficiens respectu hominum; aliquo tamen modo tenet rationem principii; et hoc facit ad maiorem expressionem imaginis, ad cuius expressionem aliquo modo amplificandam non solum facit assimilatio perfecta, sed etiam assimilatio modica[^25].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior erat convenientia costae ad mulierem, quam limi ad virum; dicendum, quod costa dupliciter potest considerari: aut *in se*, aut *in quantum fuit pars viri.* *In se* quidem ita bene distabat a formatione corporis mulieris, sicut limus a formatione corporis viri. Si autem consideretur, *in quantum* est *pars viri;* sic, quia vir et mulier sunt personae, in quibus potest esse affinitas et attinentia, talis formatio faciebat quoddam maius vinculum attinentiae esse inter virum et mulierem; quod quidem non poterat esse inter virum et elementum terrae[^26].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod productio mulieris de costa non fuit contra naturam; dicendum, *Natura accipitur dupliciter; item locutio contra naturam.* quod dupliciter dicitur natura. Uno modo dicitur natura omne illud quod competit rei a sua naturali origine; et sic competit creaturae, ut ex ea producatur omne quod Deus vult. Opus enim respectu sui artificis habet in se potentiam perfectae obedientiae, cum per omnia subiaceat eius voluntati; propter quod dicitur[^27], quod *spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas;* et *contra* hanc naturam Deus nunquam facit, immo quidquid facit de creatura, secundum hanc naturam facit. Et secundum hunc modum accipiendi *naturam*, mulier de costa non est formata *contra naturam.* — Alio modo dicitur natura proprie *vis insita rebus*, secundum quam res naturales peragunt cursus suos et motus solitos; et hoc modo accipiendo naturam, aliquando Deus facit *contra naturam*, aliquando *supra naturam.* — *Distinguitur contra naturam et supra naturam.* Tunc facit *contra naturam*, quando facit aliquid, cuius simile *in* natura et *a* natura produci habet, tamen alio modo omnino diverso; ut patet in hoc, quod na-

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tura dat alicui visum et successive in primaria generatione, similiter et dat vitam; nunquam tamen caecum reducit ad visum nec mortuum ad vitam. Si ergo Deus sua virtute hoc faciat, ut alicui caeco visum restituat et mortuo vitam, tunc dicitur facere *contra naturam*, id est *contra solitum cursum naturae*, et tunc dicitur miraculum. — Quando vero Deus facit aliquid, cuius simile natura facere non potest, et ad quod natura non habet ordinem secundum propriam virtutem, sicut quando Deus factus est homo, vel quando corpus mortale fit gloriosum; tunc facit *supra naturam*, et illud opus proprie dicitur *mirabile*, non *miraculum*[^28]. *Quid mirabile, quid miraculum.* Quoniam igitur in operibus sex dierum naturae rerum nondum erant conditae, nec cursus earum determinati; ideo tam in productione mulieris ex costa viri, quam in productione aliarum rerum operabatur *supra naturam*, non *contra;* et ideo opera illa *mirabilia*[^29], non *miracula* dici debebant.

6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum obiectum; quia non fuit proprie *contra naturam* nec est *miraculum* dicendum.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason.*

Secondly it is asked whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason. And that she was, it seems:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. *First* by the text[^1]: *God completed on the sixth day all his work.* If therefore the formation of the woman was after the sixth day, as Scripture suggests, then in some way she was constituted in those works of the six days; but she was not [present] except in the rib: therefore in the rib was that from which the woman would be made. But what is in something in this way is said to be in it according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the sixth book *On Genesis to the Letter*[^2]: « All those things which were to be unfolded in later times, God created together at first, when he made the world; *consummated*, indeed, because they have nothing in their proper natures, by which the courses of their times act, which was not causally made in those [first works]; *inchoate*, however, because certain things were seeds of future things. » Therefore if the woman was afterwards to be produced, the seed of the woman pre-existed; but only in the rib: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the man is said to be the image of God, because from him are all men, as all things are from God[^3]; but no creature is from God materially: therefore if the assimilation is correct, it is necessary that the man with respect to the woman should have not only the relation of a *material* principle, but also of an *active* one. But what is from something as from a material and active principle is according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the man was produced from the slime, and the woman from the man; either then *there is a greater relation* and more fitting one of the rib to the woman than of the man to the slime, or *not*. If *not*, then the woman does not pertain to the man more than the man to the slime. If *yes*, then beyond the account of the possible[^4] there was there in some way an account of the active. If therefore this is a seminal reason, it appears that according to a seminal reason from the rib was formed the body of the woman.

5. Likewise, since God produced the body of the woman from the rib, either this was according to nature, or against. If according to nature; since nature, whatever it does, does according to seminal reasons, it seems that seminally the woman was produced from the rib. If against nature; on the contrary: « The Founder of nature, as Augustine says[^5], does not act against nature »; and the same author *On Genesis to the Letter*: « So far does God not act against the causes which he established as good, as he does not act against his own will. » Therefore if the formation of Eve could not have been against nature, it was therefore according to nature; and if this, it was therefore according to a seminal reason.

6. Likewise, if that production was against nature, then the formation of the woman was a miracle; but Augustine *On Genesis to the Letter*[^6] says that God in the founding of things does not use things for a miracle of his power, but according to what properly befits the nature of those very things: therefore if he was not working a miracle, but operating according to what nature required; it seems that he produced the woman according to a seminal reason, if he produced her according to the requirement of nature.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. The Master says in the text[^7], and it is the authority of Augustine: « Those things which happen according to a *seminal cause* are said to happen *naturally*, because thus the course of nature has become known to men »: if therefore the production of the woman from the rib is not according to the course of nature, then it will not be according to a seminal reason.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text[^8]: « The body of the woman is said to have been made from the rib by that same miracle by which from five loaves five thousand men were satisfied »; but that was not according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems by *reason*. Seed denotes an active and intrinsic principle[^9], whence not just any humor of a man is called seed, but that which has been separated from the paternal loins; but in the rib there was no active force for the production of the woman: therefore neither a seminal reason.

4. Likewise, seed has in itself the account of the *whole* and of the *parts* of that thing which is produced from it. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On Genesis to the Letter*[^10]: « In the seed all things have been produced and were first not in the mass of magnitude, but in causal potency. » But in that rib there was no power for forming the individual members: therefore the woman was not there according to a seminal reason.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that anything should grow by a created power except by rarefaction, or by addition; but the body of the woman was produced from that rib, which body was greater than the rib itself, not by a rarefaction of the rib nor by the addition of extrinsic matter, as the Master says in the text[^11]: therefore that production from the rib was not according to the power of a creature, but only of the creative essence. But a seminal reason denotes a created power; for things are not said to be in God seminally: therefore this production of the woman from the rib was not according to seminal reasons.

6. Likewise, propagation and generation of things are reckoned according to seminal reasons; but according to the leading-out of a body from the rib there is no propagation in the human species: therefore the production of any human body from the rib is not according to a seminal reason.

*Incidental question.*

On account of this there is a question: since the Master[^12] says that some things happen according to *causal* reasons, others according to *seminal* reasons, what the difference is between these two. *If you say* that those things happen according to *causal* reasons which happen according to immutable or eternal reasons; those according to *seminal* reasons which happen according to the requirement and power of the potencies given to the creatures themselves; *it is objected* against this through Augustine. For Augustine says in the sixth book *On Genesis to the Letter*[^13]: « Things have nothing in their proper natures which was not causally made in the first days. » And again: « Those causal reasons which he put into the world, when he first created all things together, how they were instituted, can rightly be asked. » And a little later: « In those first causes of things which the Creator first inserted into the world, he placed not only that he was going to form man from the slime, but how he was going to produce him. » Therefore *causal* reasons do not denote something *uncreated*, but something *created.* — Likewise, Augustine himself distinguishes *causal* reasons, which he says were given to the first things, against immutable reasons, both in the fifth book *On Genesis to the Letter*[^14], and in the sixth.

It is also asked what the difference is between *seminal* and *natural* reasons; and it seems that there is none, because Augustine says that when a tree sprouts from a seed, daily there is propagation according to a seminal reason, at the end of the fifth book *On Genesis to the Letter*[^15]; but this same thing is according to a natural reason. — Likewise, an operation which is from a seminal power is either natural, or voluntary. For since it is not from a cause by accident and is from a created cause, it is necessary that it be from *nature*, or from *intellect*[^16]. But it is not from intellect: therefore from nature: therefore everything that happens seminally happens naturally. By like reasoning, since nature is a propagative force, and propagation happens by means of seed; everything that happens *naturally* seems to happen *seminally*.

> ### Conclusion.
>
> The body of the woman was not in Adam's rib according to seminal reasons, unless these be understood broadly; and absolutely it was not thence made according to the same.

**I respond:**

*Praenotandum.*

For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since concerning these seminal reasons the eminent doctor Augustine in the fifth and sixth books *On Genesis to the Letter*[^17] speaks ambiguously, and from him chiefly we have the usage of these names; it is not easy to distinguish rightly among such terms. For he himself sometimes says that *causal reasons* were *inserted into things*, and sometimes says that, as to some things, they were *kept in the divine will*. We can nevertheless, as far as the force of the term goes, assign a difference in this way.

*General notions.*

For *cause* is common to *intrinsic* and *extrinsic principle*; likewise also *causal reason*, as far as the force of the name goes; but *seed* denotes an *intrinsic principle.* And thus *causal reason* extends to reasons *created* and *uncreated*; *seminal reason* only to reasons *created.* As far therefore as the force of the name goes, the one is common with respect to the other; but insofar as they are distinguished and counted among each other, thus *cause* and *causal reason* are taken with respect to the *uncreated principle*, while *seed* and *seminal reason* refer to the *created principle.* — But *cause* and *causal reason* differ, because *cause* denotes a *productive principle*, while *causal reason* denotes the *rule directing* that principle in its operation. Similarly, in this way *seed* and *seminal reason* differ. But the rule of the *uncreated* agent is the exemplar or ideal form[^18], whereas the rule of the *created* agent is the natural form: and thus *causal reasons* are *ideal* or *exemplar* forms, while *seminal reasons* are *natural* forms.

*Difference of primordial and causal reasons.*

And according to this it is clear that *causal* and *primordial* reasons are the same in reality, differing only in account. For they are called *primordial* by privation of a prior, but *causal* by positing of a posterior; and *primordial* insofar as they regard God as *first principle*, *causal* insofar as they regard God as *ultimate end*, who is the cause of causes[^19]. — Similarly, *natural* and *seminal* reasons are the same in reality, but differ in account. *Likewise of natural and seminal reasons.* For since *seed* denotes the *as-from-which*, and *nature* denotes the *as-by-which*, a *seminal reason* is reckoned insofar as it directs the power of nature so that *from something* there comes to be *something*; whereas a *natural* [reason], so that *by something* there comes to be *something.* — *Otherwise.* Or a *seminal reason* regards the *inception* and the *intrinsic power* which moves and operates toward the production of the effect; whereas a *natural* [reason] concerns the assimilation of the producer to the produced and the customariness of the mode of acting. Whence speaking appropriately, when the magi made serpents from rods[^20], this was according to *seminal reasons;* but when serpents, as they are wont, generate serpents, this happens according to *natural reasons*, although both can fittingly be called both natural and seminal.

*Application.*

When therefore it is asked whether some effect happens according to *causal* or *seminal* reasons; the answer is that either that effect is so from God that the creature does not have in it *any* potency, or, if it has, it has only the potency of *obedience*[^21]; as when the world is made from nothing, where there is no potency of the creature; or when many loaves are multiplied from one loaf, where there is only the potency of *obedience;* and these things happen according to *causal reasons*, which God has kept in his will, because they do not happen according to the requirement of the creature, but according to the requirement of the eternal disposition. — But if an effect is so produced that it is in the potency of nature, not only *obedient*, but also *able* to lead it through to act[^22]; thus it is said to come about according to *seminal reasons;* as is clear when a man is generated from a man, or a tree from a tree.

*Proximate and remote potency are distinguished.*

But it must be observed that this *potency of nature* toward such effects is either *proximate* and *sufficient*, as it is in the seed separated from the loins for the generation of a human body; and thus it is properly said to have in itself a seminal reason; or it is *remote* and *insufficient*, as it is in bread or in food, that from it a man may be made; and thus less properly is a seminal reason said to be there. For a seminal reason is not said to be in bread with respect to a man to be produced, unless it be taken very broadly. — *Application.* But what is thus in a *remote*[^23] disposition with respect to the effect is either led to that effect *by means of* those things to which it had an immediate ordering, or *immediately.* If mediately, then it can be said that that effect is according to a seminal reason, as if bread is eaten and digested and turned into humor, and afterwards in the loins is turned into seed, then into man. But if *immediately* it is led to the effect, as if from bread a human body were straightway formed; so in no way is it said to be made according to *seminal reasons*, but according to *causal reasons.* For although there might be there some *active potency* toward this, that thence a body should come about through many intermediates; nevertheless, that it should come about immediately, this it had only in the potency of *obedience.*

*Conclusion 1.* *In the members.*

When therefore it is asked whether the body of the woman *was* in the rib seminally: it must be said that, if a seminal reason is taken *properly*, *no*; but if it is taken *broadly* for any active potency existing in matter, thus it can be said that a seminal reason was in the rib. *Conclusion 2.* Again, if it is asked whether the woman *was made* from the rib according to seminal reasons; the answer is that *no*; because the rib with respect to such a mode of producing and with respect to so great a body to be formed from it without addition had only the potency of *obedience.* Hence the arguments adduced for this must be granted.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. 2. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that God did nothing new beyond the sixth day; it must be said that that argument fails in two ways. *First*, because, even if the formation of the woman is narrated after the sixth day, it is not to be believed that the formation of the man preceded by so long a time, but that on the sixth day she was produced from the side of the man. But that which is added is to be understood by recapitulation: for Scripture recapitulates, so as to add[^24]. It also fails in this, that God is not said to *do something new*, not only because all things were produced in *a seminal reason*, but because they were produced in *their own likeness*; and this it is necessary to say on account of the creation of the soul, which does not come into being according to a seminal reason. — And through this is clear the response to what follows, because the formation of the woman was not among the things consequent upon the works of the six days; or if it was, it is said to have been made *causally*, because there preceded a potency of obedience in the rib, or even some *remote seminal reason*, although the woman was not formed according to it, but according to divine power.

3. To that which is objected, that the man is the image of God because he is the principle of all men; it must be said that the likeness is not in every way. For God is the sufficient principle with respect to all things; but the man is not of himself a sufficient principle with respect to men; in some way, however, he holds the account of a principle; and this contributes to a greater expression of the image, for the amplifying of whose expression in some way not only a perfect assimilation contributes, but even a slight assimilation[^25].

4. To that which is objected, that there was a greater fittingness of the rib to the woman than of the slime to the man; it must be said that the rib can be considered in two ways: either *in itself*, or *insofar as it was part of the man.* *In itself*, it was as far removed from the formation of the body of the woman as the slime from the formation of the body of the man. But if it is considered *insofar* as it is *part of the man*; thus, because the man and the woman are persons in whom affinity and connection can exist, such a formation made a certain greater bond of connection to be between the man and the woman; which indeed could not be between the man and the element of earth[^26].

5. To that which is objected, that the production of the woman from the rib was not against nature; it must be said, *Nature is taken in two ways; likewise the locution against nature.* that nature is said in two ways. In one way, that is called nature which befits a thing from its natural origin; and in this sense it befits the creature that from it should be produced whatever God wills. For a work, with respect to its artificer, has in itself the potency of perfect obedience, since in all things it lies subject to his will; on account of which it is said[^27] that *the spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters;* and *against* this nature God never acts, but rather whatever he does of a creature, he does according to this nature. And according to this mode of taking *nature*, the woman was not formed from the rib *against nature.* — In another way, nature is properly called the *force implanted in things*, according to which natural things carry out their accustomed courses and motions; and in this sense of nature, sometimes God acts *against nature*, sometimes *above nature.* — *Against nature and above nature are distinguished.* Then he acts *against nature* when he does something whose like is wont to be produced *in* nature and *by* nature, yet in an altogether different way; as is clear in this, that nature

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gives sight to someone, and successively in primary generation gives life as well; yet it never brings back a blind man to sight nor a dead man to life. If therefore God by his power does this, that he restore sight to a blind man and life to a dead man, then he is said to act *against nature*, that is, *against the accustomed course of nature*, and then it is called a miracle. — But when God does something whose like nature cannot do, and to which nature has no ordering according to its own power, as when God was made man, or when a mortal body becomes glorious; then he acts *above nature*, and that work is properly called *marvelous*, not *a miracle*[^28]. *What is marvelous, what is a miracle.* Since therefore in the works of the six days the natures of things were not yet founded, nor their courses determined; therefore both in the production of the woman from the rib of the man, and in the production of other things, he was operating *above nature*, not *against;* and therefore those works ought to have been called *marvels*[^29], not *miracles*.

6. And by this is clear the response to the last objection; because it was not properly *against nature*, nor is it to be called a *miracle*.

la: Gen. 2, 2. Secundum translationem Septuaginta et August., IV. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 1. n. 1; c. 2. n. 6; VI. c. 11. n. 18. Vulgata autem: *Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum.* — De formatione mulieris ibid. v. 21. seqq.

en: Gen. 2, 2, according to the Septuagint translation and Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* IV, c. 1, n. 1; c. 2, n. 6; VI, c. 11, n. 18. The Vulgate, however, reads: *And God completed on the seventh day his work.* — On the formation of the woman, see ibid. v. 21 ff.

la: Cap. 11. n. 18, ubi textus originalis in fine: *erant quasi semina futurorum.* — Dein non pauci codd. cum primis edd. *sed non nisi costa* pro *sed non nisi in costa.*

en: Chapter 11, n. 18, where the original text at the end reads: *they were as it were seeds of future things.* — Then not a few codices with the early editions read *sed non nisi costa* for *sed non nisi in costa.*

la: Vide supra pag. 400, nota 7. — De ultima huius argumenti propositione cfr. Aristot., II. *de Generat. animal.* c. 1. seqq.

en: See above page 400, note 7. — On the last proposition of this argument cf. Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 1 ff.

la: Vat. *passibilis.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *passibilis.*

la: Libr. XXVI. *contra Faustum*, c. 3: *Deus autem creator et conditor omnium naturarum nihil contra naturam facit.* Cfr. Prosper, liber Sent. ex August., sent. 283. — Seq. textus habetur VI. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 18. n. 29: *Tam enim non fecit Deus contra causam, quam sine dubio volens praestituit, quam contra voluntatem suam non facit.* — Vat. cum edd. aliis, omisso in principio huius textus *Tam*, substituit mox *quia* pro *quam.*

en: Book XXVI *Against Faustus*, c. 3: *But God, creator and founder of all natures, does nothing against nature.* Cf. Prosper, *Book of Sentences from Augustine*, sent. 283. — The following text is found in *On Genesis to the Letter* VI, c. 18, n. 29: *For God does not act against a cause which he undoubtedly willingly established, just as he does not act against his own will.* — The Vatican edition with the other editions, omitting *Tam* at the beginning of this text, substitutes immediately *quia* for *quam.*

la: Libr. II. c. 1. n. 2.

en: Book II, c. 1, n. 2.

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here at c. 6.

la: Hic c. 4. — Vat. cum aliis edd. *saturati sunt*, contra codd. et Magistrum.

en: Here at c. 4. — The Vatican edition with other editions reads *saturati sunt*, against the codices and the Master.

la: Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 31. (c. 3.), V. *Metaph.* text. 3. et VIII. text. 12. (IV. c. 2. et VII. c. 4.) connumerat semen inter causas agentes. Cfr. etiam II. *de Generat. animal.* c. 3. et August., III. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 13.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 31 (c. 3); *Metaphysics* V, text 3 and VIII, text 12 (IV, c. 2 and VII, c. 4) numbers seed among efficient causes. Cf. also *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 3, and Augustine, *On the Trinity* III, c. 8, n. 13.

la: Cap. 23. n. 44: *In semine ergo illa omnia fuerunt primitus, non mole corporeae magnitudinis, sed vi potentiaque causali.* — In hoc textu codd. H Q W cc ee et ed. 1 omittunt cum originali *producta sunt et*, insuper cod. H substituit *fuerunt* pro *fuerant;* codd. D P legunt: *In semine omnia, quae producta sunt, fuerant;* nonnulli substituunt *quae fuerant* pro *et fuerant.*

en: Chapter 23, n. 44: *In the seed therefore all those things were at first, not in the mass of bodily magnitude, but in causal force and potency.* — In this text codices H Q W cc ee and ed. 1 omit, with the original, *producta sunt et*; moreover cod. H substitutes *fuerunt* for *fuerant;* codices D P read: *In the seed all things which have been produced, were;* some substitute *quae fuerant* for *et fuerant.*

la: Hic c. 4. — De ultima parte arg. cfr. ibid. c. 5. seq.

en: Here at c. 4. — On the last part of the argument cf. ibid. c. 5 f.

la: Hic c. 4. seq.

en: Here at c. 4 f.

la: Cap. 11. n. 18, ubi textus originalis post *naturis propriis* subiungit: *quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt.* — Secundus textus est ibid. c. 14. n. 25. — Tertius est ibid. c. 15. n. 26, cuius finem originale sic exhibet *sed etiam quemadmodum formaturus*, et in quo non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *creando inseruit* pro *Creator inseruit.*

en: Chapter 11, n. 18, where the original text after *in their proper natures* adds: *by which the courses of their times act.* — The second text is ibid. c. 14, n. 25. — The third is ibid. c. 15, n. 26, whose end the original presents thus: *but also how he was about to form*, and in which not a few codices with ed. 1 read *creando inseruit* for *Creator inseruit.*

en: Chapter 20, n. 41, and c. 23, n. 44. Cf. ibid. Book IX, c. 17, n. 32.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 48. seqq. (c. 5.), ubi ad stabiliendam definitionem casus et fortunae sive causarum per accidens praemittit definitionem et divisionem causarum per se, quae scil. agunt propter finem, nempe eorum *quae ab intellectu aguntur, et a natura*. De communi definitione naturae, quod sit *« vis insita rebus similia ex similibus procreans »*, vide tom. 1. pag. 134, nota 10.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 48 ff. (c. 5), where, in order to establish the definition of chance and fortune, that is, of causes per accidens, he prefaces the definition and division of causes per se, namely those which act for an end, that is, those *which are acted by intellect, and by nature.* On the common definition of nature, that it is *« a force implanted in things, generating like things from like »*, see tom. 1, p. 134, note 10.

la: Locis citt. in argg. — Paulo superius post *seminalibus* codd. M Y aa adiungunt *et causalibus.*

en: Locations cited in the arguments. — A little above, after *seminalibus*, codices M Y aa add *et causalibus.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 1. seqq. et XII. text. 23. (IV. c. 1. seq. et XI. c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 1 ff., and XII, text 23 (IV, c. 1 f., and XI, c. 4).

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 35. — In cod. V additur *scilicet essentia divina.*

en: See I Sent. d. 35. — In codex V is added *namely the divine essence.*

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 3. (IV. c. 2.): *Ipsum enim, cuius causa* [i. e. causa finalis] *optimum, et finis aliorum vult esse.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 3 (IV, c. 2): *For that itself, for the sake of which* [i.e., the final cause] *is best, and wills to be the end of the rest.*

la: Exod. 7, 12. — Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Exodus 7, 12. — Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.

la: De qua vide tom. 1. pag. 755, nota 3. — Paulo inferius codd. aa cc et ed. 1 *et hoc fuit* pro *et haec fiunt.*

en: On which see tom. 1, p. 755, note 3. — A little below, codices aa cc and ed. 1 read *et hoc fuit* for *et haec fiunt.*

la: Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. non bene *producere.* Vat. *obedientiae, sed etiam potentiae ad actum perducere* pro *obediente, sed etiam potente ad actum perducere.*

en: Very many codices with the early editions wrongly read *producere.* The Vatican edition reads *obedientiae, sed etiam potentiae ad actum perducere* for *obediente, sed etiam potente ad actum perducere.*

la: Multi codd., verbis transpositis, *est in sic remota.*

en: Many codices, with words transposed, read *est in sic remota.*

la: Simile habetur supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. — De seq. ratione vide supra d. 13. a. 2. q. 3.

en: A similar discussion is found above at d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1. — On the following argument see above d. 13, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Cod. T *et limum terrae.*

en: Codex T reads *et limum terrae.*

la: Gen. 1, 2: *Spiritus Dei ferebatur etc.* — Eodem modo hic textus explicatur ab August., VI. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 13. n. 23. — De duplici acceptione naturae cfr. August., loc. cit. c. 13. n. 24. seqq.; IX. c. 17. n. 32; et XXVI. *contra Faustum*, c. 3. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 *perfecte obediendi* pro *perfectae obedientiae.*

en: Gen. 1, 2: *The spirit of God was borne over etc.* — In the same way this text is explained by Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* VI, c. 13, n. 23. — On the twofold acceptation of nature cf. Augustine, loc. cit. c. 13, n. 24 ff.; IX, c. 17, n. 32; and XXVI *Against Faustus*, c. 3. — A little above, codex cc and ed. 1 read *perfecte obediendi* for *perfectae obedientiae.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3. seq.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 42. m. 1-6; B. Albert., hic a. 3. seqq. et S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 42, q. 3 f.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 42, m. 1–6; B. Albert, here a. 3 ff., and S. p. II, tr. 8, q. 31, m. 2; S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 3; Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 4.

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *mirabilia*, sed contra praedicta ad 5.

en: Not a few codices with ed. 1 read *mirabilia*, but against what has been said at ad 5.

la: Cap. 14. n. 25. seqq. — Paulo superius Vat. et ed. 4 *dicit esse communes* pro *dicit esse rationes.*

en: Chapter 14, n. 25 ff. — A little above, the Vatican edition and ed. 4 read *dicit esse communes* for *dicit esse rationes.*

la: Commentator list closing SCHOLION IV.

en: Commentator list closing SCHOLION IV. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Doctor, doctrinam Alexandri Hal. secutus, hic utitur distinctione inter *esse in costa* et *produci de costa*, unde duas conclusiones ponit. Omnes auctores conveniunt in *secunda* conclusione, scil. quod Eva *de costa facta* sit non secundum *rationes seminales*, sed praeter ordinem naturae immediate a Deo, cum ex parte costae non fuerit ad productionem istam nisi *potentia obedientialis* (cfr. hic dub. I.). — *Prima* autem conclusio non ab omnibus conceditur, scil. quod *fuerit* in costa aliquo modo *ratio seminalis*, si ratio seminalis intelligitur in sensu *largo* pro *quacumque potentia activa existente in materia.* Ratio huius dissidii fundata est in eo, quod multi non concedunt, materiae concreatum esse aliquod seminarium ut principium *activum* et *substantiale*; de quo in seq. quaestione plura dicuntur.[^30]

S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 92. a. 3. ad 1.) reprobat opinionem Hugonis a S. Victore et Magistri (hic c. 4.), quod sine alicuius rei exterioris additione vel novae materiae creatione corpus mulieris formatum sit; quam positionem dicit esse impossibilem. Sed Aegid. R. (loc. infra cit.) sententiam Magistri nititur aliter explicare eamque defendere.

**II.** Cum August. saepe nominet rationes *primordiales*, *causales*, *seminales*, *naturales*, hic in corp. et ad 6. distinctio horum *nominum* accurate determinatur, in quo antiqui auctores satis conveniebant, non autem in determinatione, quid in se sit *ratio seminalis* secundum rem et sententiam S. Augustini, de quo miro modo dissentiebant. — Opinio S. Bonaventurae circa rationes seminales iam explicata est supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et in scholio, et magis declaratur in seq. quaestione.

Praenotanda autem est distinctio inter *semen* in sensu proprio et *rationem seminalem.* Semen, secundum Scot. (hic q. unica, n. 8.), « est corpus quoddam, cuius forma non est intenta propter se, sed propter aliud, ut scil. ex illo generetur aliquid simile generanti ». Ratio autem seminalis est quaedam *vis activa*, quae est vel in *semine* ut subiecto, connaturalis eidem, vel generatim in *elementis*, sive in materia sub aliqua forma existente. De hac autem *ratione seminali* disputatur, quid proprie sit, et in specie, utrum sit *qualitas* activa et passiva, an *forma substantialis*, sed incompleta. — Item, praenotanda est distinctio S. Bonaventurae inter rationes seminales *proprie* dictas et generationi viventium *propinquas*, quales sunt in semine, et easdem *minus proprie* dictas et a generatione *longinquas*, sicut « in materia unius elementi est ratio seminalis ad formam alterius elementi » (Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.).

**III.** Quoad distinctionem inter *mirabilia* et *miracula* etc., de qua hic ad 5. agitur, S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3.) paulo aliter loquitur. Applicat enim terminum *miraculi*, proprie sumtum, ad ea quae fiunt immediate a virtute divina et alio modo, quam se habeat ordo causarum naturalium; et terminum *mirabilium* (admirabilium) ad ea quae fiunt vel per *solam operationem divinam*, vel per agentium creaturarum operationem, sed occultam et insolitam. Deinde idem distinguit tres species miraculorum, scil. quae sunt vel *supra naturam* (a S. Bonav. nominata *mirabilia*), vel *praeter naturam*, vel *contra naturam* (quae duo ultima membra a S. Bonav. sub uno termino *contra naturam* intelliguntur). Hic modus loquendi S. Thomae nunc communiter tenetur; in ipsa autem doctrina non est dissidium. De distinctione miraculorum etc. cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 3-6; S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 2. a. 1-3, q. 32.[^31]

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 83. m. 3; (de rationibus seminalibus aliisque in genere) ibid. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1-4. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit.; S. I. q. 92. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 81. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth. de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.[^32]

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The holy Doctor, following the doctrine of Alexander of Hales, here uses the distinction between *being in the rib* and *being produced from the rib*, whence he posits two conclusions. All authors agree in the *second* conclusion, namely that Eve *was made from the rib* not according to *seminal reasons*, but beyond the order of nature, immediately by God, since on the part of the rib there was for that production nothing except *obediential potency* (cf. here dub. I). — The *first* conclusion, however, is not granted by all, namely that there *was* in the rib in some way a *seminal reason*, if a seminal reason is understood in the *broad* sense for *any active potency existing in matter.* The reason for this disagreement is grounded in this, that many do not grant that some seedplot has been concreated with matter as an *active* and *substantial* principle; about which more is said in the following question.[^30]

St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 92, a. 3, ad 1) rejects the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor and of the Master (here c. 4), that without the addition of any external thing or the creation of new matter the body of the woman was formed; which position he says is impossible. But Aegidius Romanus (loc. infra cit.) tries to explain the Master's sentence otherwise and to defend it.

**II.** Since Augustine often names reasons *primordial*, *causal*, *seminal*, *natural*, here in the *corpus* and at ad 6 the distinction of these *names* is accurately determined, in which the ancient authors agreed sufficiently, but not in determining what *seminal reason* is in itself according to the reality and the mind of St. Augustine, about which they disagreed in a remarkable way. — St. Bonaventure's opinion concerning seminal reasons has already been explained above at d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, and in the scholion there, and is more fully declared in the following question.

It must also be noted beforehand the distinction between *seed* in the proper sense and *seminal reason.* Seed, according to Scotus (here q. unica, n. 8), « is a certain body, whose form is not intended for its own sake, but for the sake of another, namely that from it may be generated something like the generator. » But a seminal reason is a certain *active power*, which is either in *seed* as in subject, connatural to it, or generally in the *elements*, or in matter existing under some form. About this *seminal reason* it is disputed what it properly is, and specifically whether it is an active and passive *quality*, or a *substantial form*, but incomplete. — Likewise, the distinction of St. Bonaventure between seminal reasons *properly* so called and *close* to the generation of living things, such as are in seed, and the same *less properly* so called and *far* from generation, as « in the matter of one element there is a seminal reason for the form of another element » (Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2), must be noted beforehand.

**III.** As regards the distinction between *marvels* and *miracles* etc., about which it is treated here at ad 5, St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 3) speaks a little differently. For he applies the term *miracle*, properly taken, to those things which happen immediately by divine power and in a way other than the order of natural causes has it; and the term *marvelous* (admirable) to those things which happen either by *divine operation alone*, or by the operation of created agents, but a hidden and unusual one. Then he distinguishes three species of miracles, namely those which are either *above nature* (named by St. Bonaventure *marvels*), or *beside nature*, or *against nature* (the last two members of which are understood by St. Bonaventure under the single term *against nature*). This manner of speaking of St. Thomas is now commonly held; but in the doctrine itself there is no disagreement. On the distinction of miracles etc. cf. B. Albert, here a. 3–6; S. p. II, tr. 8, q. 31, m. 2, a. 1–3, q. 32.[^31]

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 83, m. 3; (on seminal reasons and other matters in general) ibid. q. 42, m. 5, a. 1–4. — S. Thom., here loc. cit.; S. I, q. 92, a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 7; S. p. II, tr. 13, q. 81. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 3. — Aegid. R., here q. 2, a. 3. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth. on this and the following questions, here q. unica. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.[^32]

---

translators_notes:
- **Span:** raw 30582–30915 (just before the OCR running-head garble `DIST. XVIli. ART. I. QUAKST. Itl.` at 30916; QUAESTIO III opens at 30919). Printed pp. 434–438 (PDF pp. 456–460, Vol II offset `pdf = printed + 22`).
- **Cross-chunk hand-off received from d18-a1-q1:** p.434 L-2 footer ³ (Gen. 2, 2 LXX + August. IV *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 1 n. 1; c. 2 n. 6; VI c. 11 n. 18) + p.434 R-2 footers ⁴–⁶ (*Cap. 11. n. 18, ubi textus originalis in fine: erant quasi semina futurorum*; *Vide supra pag. 400, nota 7. — De ultima huius argumenti propositione cfr. Arist. II de Generat. animal. c. 1. seqq.*; *Vat. passibilis*) folded as [^1]–[^4]. All four anchor in the Q2 opener block (textum / inchoata-semina futurorum / ex Deo / ratio possibilis).
- **Apparatus page-split map:** [^1]–[^4] p.434 hand-off; [^5]–[^9] p.435 L-2 ¹–⁵; [^10]–[^13] p.435 R-2 ⁶–⁹; [^14]–[^17] p.436 L-2 ¹–⁴; [^18]–[^23] p.436 R-2 ⁵–¹⁰; [^24]–[^28] p.437 L-2 ¹–⁵; [^29] p.437 R-2 (single footer continuation `hic textus explicatur ab August. VI de Gen ad lit c.13 n.23` — folded into the contra naturam apparatus stream around the *mortuum ad vitam* reference, marker placed on p.438 *mirabile* clause for parallel pairing); [^30] p.438 L-2 ¹ (commentator cross-refs around SCHOLION I); [^31] p.438 R-2 ² (codd. *mirabilia* variant); [^32] p.438 R-2 ³ (SCHOLION III explication ref). SCHOLION IV commentator list closes the apparatus.
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 32 anchors + 16 marginal labels crisp at 450 dpi across pp.434–438. OCR around raw 30582–30915 is two-column cascade-fragmented (the `QUAESTIO 111.` boundary garble at 30916, multiple Roman-numeral digit-mangles, marginal-label bleed-through `(^iaeBtio iincidenter`, and diagonal token reorder around CONCLUSIO/Respondeo splice + the *causa et causalis* tabulation block); column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Quaestio incidens.*, *Praenotandum.*, *Notiones generales.*, *Differentia rationum primordialium et causalium.*, *Item naturales rationes et seminales.*, *Aliter.*, *Applicatio.*, *Distinguitur potentia propinqua et remota.*, *Conclusio 1./2.*, *In membris.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Natura accipitur dupliciter; item locutio contra naturam.*, *Distinguitur contra naturam et supra naturam.*, *Quid mirabile, quid miraculum.*
- **`has_scholion: true`** — substantial SCHOLION block I–IV: I = Alex. Hal. *esse-in-costa* vs *produci-de-costa* distinction + 2 conclusions + S. Thomas / Aegidius dispute over Magister's *no-external-addition* position; II = Augustine's quadruple terminology (primordiales / causales / seminales / naturales) + Scotus on *semen* + Richard a Mediavilla *materia unius elementi → forma alterius* gloss; III = S. Thomas's tripartite miracle taxonomy (*supra / praeter / contra naturam*) vs Bonav.'s binary; IV = q2 commentator list.
- **Forward hand-off to d18-a1-q3:** none. p.438 R-2 footers ²–³ all anchor in this chunk's SCHOLION I/III; QUAESTIO III opens p.439 with its own opener + fresh p.439 footer sequence.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0