title: Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 372 -->

### ARTICULUS I.
*Utrum sensibilia sive animalia facta sint.*

### QUAESTIO I.
*Utrum animae irrationalium sint productae ex aliquo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod sensibilium sive irrationalium animae productae sint ex aliquo:

*Fundamenta.* 1. *Primo* per *textum Scripturae*[^1], quae dicit: *Producant aquae reptile animae viventis* etc.; et paulo post: *Producat terra animam viventem.* Si enim quod creatur a solo Deo est, et terra cum aqua acceperit potestatem producendi reptile animae viventis, non videtur, quod animal secundum aliquod sui principium sit ex nihilo.

2. Item, per *auctoritatem Philosophi* in libro de Animalibus decimo sexto[^2]: «Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco»: sed si animae brutorum productae fuissent ex nihilo, tunc essent a solo Deo et intrarent ab extrinseco.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione,* quia ex
<!-- page 373 -->
eo res producitur, in quod resolvitur[^3]; sed non est aliquid, quod naturali resolutione resolvatur in nihil: ergo animae brutorum animalium non sunt resolutae in nihil, quando aliqua animalia fuerunt corrupta: ergo non productae fuerunt ex nihilo.

4. Item, ex eodem est anima istius bruti, quod nunc est, et primi bruti, *per conformitatem;* sed anima istius bruti generati per naturam non est ex nihilo, quia tunc a natura non posset produci, et sic sequeretur, quod natura non posset facere pediculum. Quod cum non videatur probabile, et planum sit, sicut ex praecedentibus[^4] apparuit, quod natura non potest aliquid ex nihilo producere: restat ergo, quod primae animae brutorum animalium non fuerunt ex nihilo productae.

5. Item, anima rationalis, quia per creationem educitur in *esse,* est immortalis et incorruptibilis[^5] — eius enim productio non pendet ex corpore, sed ex principio effectivo — sed animae brutorum per naturam sunt corruptibiles: ergo non sunt ex nihilo productae.

6. Item, opus *ornatus* praesupponit opus *distinctionis,* et opus *distinctionis* praesupponit opus *creationis:* si igitur in *distinctione* corporum non fuit nova creatio, sed productio ex aliquo, multo fortius videtur, quod in *ornatu.* Ergo si corpora animalium et animae ad ornatum spectant, videtur, quod non sint productae ex nihilo, sed ex aliquo.

*Ad oppositum.* **Contra:** 1. Si ex aliquo productae sunt sensibilium animae in primordio, quaero de illo, ex quo productae sunt, utrum illud productum sit ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo. Et si ex aliquo, similiter quaeram de illo, et ita vel erit abire in infinitum, vel erit ponere, quod illud ex quo producta est anima sensibilis, ab initio productum fuerit ex nihilo. Sed qua ratione illud productum fuit ex nihilo, eadem ratione et anima sensibilis: ergo videtur etc.

2. Item, si animae illae productae sint de aliquo, illud aut erat *spirituale* quid, aut *corporale.* Si *corporale; contra:* ex corpore nunquam potest fieri spiritus, sicut dicit Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^6]. Si *spirituale;* tunc quaeritur de illo: aut *vivebat,* aut non *vivebat,* et quem usum habebat? Et iterum, si *spirituale;* quare ex illo non poterat fieri anima rationalis? Si igitur ad hoc non contingit rationabiliter respondere, sicut innuit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram[^7], ad haec inconvenientia ducens, sequitur ex hoc, quod primae animae sensibilium ex nihilo sint productae.

3. Item, si fuissent productae ex aliquo, cum talis modus producendi competat virtuti naturali, videtur tunc, quod cum iam essent corpora supercaelestia agentia et moventia et ad mixtionem operantia, quod animalia virtute naturae possent producere: ergo primaria opera non essent propria divinae potentiae, quod est inconveniens, cum ipse sit solus universi conditor[^8] et perfector.

4. Item, videmus, nunc quaedam animalia ignobilia per putrefactionem generari; quaero igitur, a quo educatur eorum anima; et videtur, quod non possit a *natura,* cum «natura sit *vis* insita rebus ex similibus similia procreans»[^9]: videtur etiam, quod non possit a virtute *corporis caelestis,* quia minus nobile non potest educere magis nobile: «substantia autem spiritualis, ut dicit Augustinus, nobilior est omni corpore»: ergo oportet, quod educatur a Creatore immediate. Sed quod sic educitur habet educi ex nihilo: ergo illorum animalium, quae per putrefactionem generantur, animae creantur: ergo multo fortius animalium primo factorum.

5. Item, nos videmus in animalibus annulosis, quod ad divisionem corporis remanet anima in partibus diversis[^10]; sed illa non potest esse anima *prima,* quia erat una sola, nec *a natura producta,* cum statim sit in qualibet parte, operatio autem naturae sit cum successione: ergo videtur, quod illae partes animentur a Creatore, ergo multo fortius et sensibilia in primaria productione.

6. Item, quando brutum generat brutum, aut *transfundit* animam, aut *non.* Si *transfundit;* cum anima non sit divisibilis, dabit animam suam totam: ergo in generatione morietur. Si *non transfundit;* cum cesset eius operatio in seminis decisione, necesse est ponere aliud agens, per quod anima educatur. Hoc autem non potest esse femina, cum sit magis principium passivum quam activum, sicut vult Philosophus[^11], nec aliud principium activum creatum: ergo immediate producitur a Deo, et ita ex nihilo: multo ergo fortius videtur, quod sic productae fuerint in primordio.

<!-- page 374 -->

### Conclusio.

> *Animae sensibiles in primordio productae sunt ex aliquo, non quidem materialiter, sed seminaliter, sicut nunc fiunt ex potentia materiae activa, quae ab agente excitatur.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa productionem animarum animalium brutalium diversi diversa opinati sunt.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod animae brutorum productae fuerunt *ex nihilo,* quia non *ex aliquo materialiter* nec *ex aliquo seminaliter.* Non *ex aliquo materialiter,* quia sunt formae purae; non *ex aliquo seminaliter,* quia non habuerunt aliquid praeexistens. Et ideo dicunt, in prima productione eas simpliciter fuisse creatas; sed deinceps in propagatione non dicunt eas *creari,* sed potius *traduci,* non per decisionem et separationem partis animae, sed per multiplicationem. Sicut enim candela, ex quo accensa est, potest se multiplicare sine sui luminis diminutione, sic, immo multo fortius, dicunt substantiam spiritualem posse.

*Opinio 2.* Secunda positio est huic directe opposita, quod animae brutorum productae sunt ex aliquo *materialiter* et *seminaliter. Materialiter,* inquam, quia sunt *hoc aliquid*[^12], cum quaelibet earum sit motor sufficiens, et ideo ex materia et forma dicunt eas constare; illam autem materiam dicunt esse spiritualem, inseparabiliter iunctam corporali naturae; unde sicut ex corporali natura producuntur corpora animalium, sic ex materia spirituali sibi annexa, ut dicunt, fit productio animarum. Et sic fecit Deus a primordio, et sic etiam facit nunc natura. Illa enim materia, cum praeexistat formae, *seminarium* est ipsius; et sic dicunt, animas illas produci, non tantum *materialiter,* sed etiam *seminaliter,* cum eis praeexistat spiritualis[^13] materia et habeat in se aliquam potentiam activam ad hoc, quod ex ea fiat anima, sicut et corporalis natura ad hoc, quod ex ea fiant corpora.

*Opinio 3.* Tertia positio est, quod animae brutorum productae sunt ex aliquo *materialiter,* sed non *seminaliter. Materialiter,* inquam, quia constant ex materia et forma; non autem *seminaliter,* quia materia illa non praeexistit formae tanquam *semen* ei quod ex ipso producendum est, sed cum illa concreatur et cum illa destruitur. Et hi dicunt, omnes animas sensibiles non solum a primordio, sed etiam nunc esse a Creatore; nec tamen incorruptibiles, quia ipse Creator dat unicuique durationem, secundum quod competit eius naturae.

*Non approbantur.* Sed quoniam omnes hae positiones aliquid dicunt improbabile — nam prima dicit, quod anima se ipsam multiplicat et transfundit, ita tamen, quod anima non habeat aliquid, ex quo fiat; et hoc est ponere, quod forma naturalis possit aliam formam consimilem ex nihilo producere, quod est improbabile et supra improbatum est distinctione septima[^14]. Secunda vero opinio ponit, aliquam materiam spiritualem animae praeexistere, ex qua educatur anima virtute naturae; et hoc satis male est intelligibile, quomodo sit aliqua spiritualis materia, quae non vivat nec usum habeat; quomodo etiam sit aliqua spiritualis materia, et ex illa anima rationalis fieri non valeat. Et *iterum,* ubi est illa materia spiritualis? quia non videtur esse *in se;* si autem est cum *materia corporali,* tunc videtur, quod materia educatur de materia; quod nihil videtur esse dictum. Similiter tertia positio ponit, quod materia animae sensibilis sibi concreetur et quod simul cum ea destruatur; hoc autem ponere est contrarium auctoritati Philosophi[^15] et rationi, materiam scilicet alicuius creaturae in nihil omnino cedere. Si enim materia corporalis est ingenita et incorruptibilis, multo fortius videtur, quod spiritualis, quae dignior est et nobilior, secundum quod est sub tali *esse.*

*Opinio 4.* Et ideo est quartus modus dicendi, quod animae, quae sunt pure sensibiles, productae sunt ex aliquo *seminaliter,* sed non *materialiter. Seminaliter,* inquam, quia formae sunt generabiles et corruptibiles per naturam; et ideo, sicut aliae formae naturales non ex nihilo producuntur, sed est aliqua potentia activa in materia, ex qua fiunt tanquam ex seminario[^16]; sic etiam intelligendum est in animabus sensibilibus, quae sunt formae tantum, cuiusmodi sunt in brutis animalibus. Et ideo *Conclusio.* concedendum est, animas sensibiles sive animas brutorum esse ex aliquo, non inquam *materialiter,* sed *seminaliter;* quia, cum anima sensibilis sit forma, non habet materiam partem sui, sed solum fit ex potentia materiae *activa,* quae ab agente excitatur; et sic proficit, quousque fiat anima, sicut globus proficiendo fit rosa.

*Corollarium 1.* Aliter tamen *nunc* producuntur ex illo seminario, et aliter in *primordio,* quia nunc producuntur ex seminario praeexistente secundum *sufficientem actualitatem;* in primordio vero productae sunt simul cum illo seminario; vel si seminarium illud aliquo modo praeexistit[^17] ante diem quintum, in quo facta est productio animalium, in die quinto est ad completam rationem eductum, ita quod data est *virtus activa* naturae, ut posset deinceps animalia quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam propa-

<!-- page 375 -->
*Corollarium 2.* gare et multiplicare. — Et quia quaedam sunt animalia *maioris* perfectionis et organizationis, quaedam vero *minoris;* ideo divina dispositio rectissime ordinavit, ut quaedam animalia producerentur ex suo *principio sementivo*[^18] secundum *maiorem* actualitatem, utpote sunt illa quae generantur per propagationem, ita quod simile ex simili, et ista sunt animalia perfectiora; quaedam vero secundum *minorem,* utpote illa quae generantur per putrefactionem; quia enim imperfectiora sunt, minori indigent adiutorio et virtute, ut producantur ad *esse.*

*Ratio ex Augustino et Philosopho.* Haec autem positio rationabilior est et firmior, quia concordant in hoc tam Augustinus quam Philosophus. Ait enim Augustinus ad Orosium[^19] sic: «Sicut semen cuiuslibet arboris habet quandam vim, ut, cum corruptum fuerit in terra, oriatur, et virgultum producatur, deinde ramis nihilominus constipata dilatetur et frondibus, deinde eisdem floribus decorata fructificet; ita est in corpore, ut ita dicam, quoddam *seminarium,* unde suo tempore, curante providentia Dei, aliqua genera animalium oriantur». Et hoc idem habetur super Genesim ad litteram, libro tertio[^20] plane et diffuse. — Hoc etiam vult Philosophus in decimo sexto Animalium, ubi ostendit, quod vegetabilis et sensibilis prius sunt in semine in potentia, quam educantur in *esse;* et ibi videtur innuere, quod illud quod format membra, non est aliud quam ipsa anima; et illam animam vocat *potentiam activam,* intrinsecam ipsi semini, quae, cum corpus ex semine productum est et organizatum, ut possit ab eadem perfici, prodit in actum et efficitur *perfectio corporis physici organici.* Aut certe illud quod format membra, potius est virtus animae patris et matris, ex cuius operatione in brutis animalibus educitur in *esse* anima prolis; secus autem est in hominibus, ut infra videbitur[^21]. Et hoc probat ibidem Philosophus ex multis coniecturis et argumentis, et ibidem dicit, quod res corporales plenae sunt virtute animae: et hoc multum concordat verbis Augustini[^22], qui dicit: «Terra praegnans est seminibus, non tantum respectu arborum, sed etiam respectu animalium». — Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo *Conclusio 2.* dicendum est, animas sensibilium animalium in primordio non esse creatas ex nihilo, sicut rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt; habuerunt enim sementivum principium, ex quo productae sunt et nunc producuntur.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod si animae sensibilium productae sunt ex alio aliquo, illud similiter productum est ex alio; dicendum, quod non oportet. *Notandum.* *Seminalis* enim *ratio* sive *potentia activa* ipsius materiae est ipsi materiae *concreata,* non ex aliquo producta; illa vero, quae ex illo semine oriuntur, proprie non debent dici creari.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, *quod si est ex aliquo, quod illud est aut spirituale, aut corporale;* dicendum, *Notandum.* quod nec est *materia spiritualis,* nec est *materia corporalis,* sed est quaedam *potentia spiritualis,* indita a Creatore materiae corporali et ei innitens et ab ea dependens. Et propterea anima sensibilis in brutis generatur et corrumpitur per transmutationem corporalis naturae. Et si tu obiicias, quod anima sensibilis est motor sufficiens, et ita est *hoc aliquid* et habet materiam et formam; dicendum, quod anima sensibilis non dicitur esse *motor sufficiens,* quia ipsa primo moveat corpus, quod perficit; sed quia corpus totum, quod habet[^23] est *hoc aliquid* et virtute animae, quae est forma eius, movet partem, et movendo partem suam movet totum, sicut patet in gradientibus. Et quod illud verum sit, apparet, quia si anima sensibilis poneretur in corpore, quod non haberet partem mobilem nisi motu totius, sicut in lapide, nunquam illud moveret.

*Alia solutio.* Vel aliter dici potest, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit *motor sufficiens,* non oportet, quod distet a mobili, ita quod sit substantia altera differens per
<!-- page 376 -->
materiam et formam; sed sufficit, quod illa sit forma in genere substantiae, carens extensione *per se* et *per accidens.* Et haec forma sic est in una parte tota, quod tota est in alia; et ideo sic unitur isti parti, quam movet, quod etiam ab ea distat. Et haec distantia sufficit ad hoc, quod possit movere eam, nec requiritur, quod habeat aliam materiam. Et sic est in anima sensitiva in his animalibus, quae huic operationi habent organa apta.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura possit *Notandum.* eam educere; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia, antequam Dominus praeciperet aquis et diceret: *Producant aquae* etc., aut seminarium illud animarum sensibilium producendarum non erat, aut si erat, non erat in tanta virtute, quod posset ad perfectionem venire; non enim potest quidquam creatura[^24] nisi secundum statutum et praeceptum sibi datum a Creatore. Unde cum prius esset *unde fieri posset,* post factum est divino imperio, ut esset *unde fieret.*

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de animalibus, quae generantur per putrefactionem; dicendum, *De generatione aequivoca.* quod etsi sint varii modi solvendi, quia quidam dicunt, quod est a *caeli motore,* quidam, quod a *Creatore*[^25]; potest tamen secundum physicam positionem plane responderi, quod sicut humor fit semen per potentiam generativam, et postmodum fit corpus organicum in matrice, ita quod anima illa sensibilis, quae erat in potentia, educitur ad actum per virtutem agentis particularis et per adiutorium corporis caelestis; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, quod cum in terra ista esset *seminarium* illud, aliquo modo concurrentibus elementis, et adiuvante corpore caelesti, ut aggeneretur calor vivificus, fit quoddam semen, ita quod potentia illa *activa,* quae prius latebat, adiuta ex actione caelestis corporis, proficit et venit ad perfectionem et complementum, ita quod nec caelum nec motor caeli dat sibi formam ultimam, sed solum adiuvat et excitat, ut potentia illa proficiendo ad speciem completam perveniat. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est etiam in aliis terrae nascentibus.

*Obiectio solvitur.* Et si tu obiicias, quod anima, quae est in potentia, non habet speciem nec actum completum *a se,* nec potest habere *ab aliquo,* quod non sit ita nobile, sicut ipsa, et nullum tale est corporale; dicendum, *Notandum.* quod *essentia* talis *speciei*[^26] est in materia, sed in *potentia;* et illa *essentia* est ita determinata ad formam talis speciei producendam, quod non potest ex illa essentia sive ratione seminali alia educi, et cum in actum educta est, habet *esse* et habet *tale esse.* Quod autem sit *in actu,* hoc habet ab extrinseco agente, quod erat ens *in actu,* et quantum ad hoc nobilius est ipsa, quae erat *in potentia.* Quod autem sit *talis speciei,* hoc habet ab eo qui primo huius formae essentiam indidit materiae; alioquin nunquam natura ipsam ad *esse* produceret, nisi Deus ipsam materiae indidisset, sicut supra ostensum fuit distinctione octava[^27]. Et ideo non oportet, quod educens illam formam in actum sit nobilius illa forma educta. Et huius exemplum in multis potest poni, sicut in mineralibus et in multis terrae nascentibus.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia. Nam quod obiicitur de divisione corporis annulosi, iam apertum est; quia enim corpus annulosum est modicae organizationis et quasi consimilis in partibus et in toto; ideo in qualibet sui parte est anima in proxima dispositione ad hoc quod sit actu; et ideo, facta divisione, virtute prioris formae et beneficio corporis caelestis, subito inducitur forma.

*Solutio aliorum non probatur.* Plures autem sunt alii modi dicendi circa hoc. Quidam enim dicunt, quod anima multiplicatur, cum sit spiritualis, sicut punctus ad divisionem lineae, et species ad divisionem speculi; verumtamen in neutro horum intelligendum est, quod illud idem, quod fuit unum, fiat plura[^28]; et ideo praecedens via est magis plana.

6. Ad ultimum similiter patet responsio, quia[^29], cum animal generetur ab animali per propagationem, etsi non decidatur anima ab anima, sicut corpus deciditur a corpore, quia non est anima divisibilis, ut corpus, deciduntur tamen cum ipso corpore spiritus et calores et virtus etiam animalis, quae adiuvat cum virtute matricis continentis, ut illa potentia activa, quae erat in humore seminario, ad actum completum perveniat. Et ex hoc non sequitur, quod anima producat aliam animam *ex nihilo,* nec quod producat ex *materia,* nec etiam quod producat ex *se ipsa.*

### SCHOLION

**I.** Non agitur hic de anima sensitiva *in homine,* de qua infra (d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.) probatur, quod «sensibilis et rationalis in homine eiusdem sunt substantiae et ab eodem prin-
<!-- page 377 -->
cipio habent educi in *esse,* videlicet Creatore»; sed agitur de anima pure sensibili, scil. animalium. Et quaestio praecise est de *prima* productione animalium, in Genesi narrata, licet etiam quaestio de propagatione posteriore animalium solvatur, ut patet ex verbis in corp.: «Aliter tamen nunc producuntur ex illo seminario, et aliter in primordio». — Inclinat autem S. Doctor in sententiam, quod seminarium illud non sit productum ante quintum diem, quin tamen excludat opinionem, quod aliquo *imperfecto* modo iam antea productum sit (ibid. et ad 3.). Ex quo patet, quod illud seminarium non debeat confundi cum *forma incompleta,* sub qua creata fuit materia (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3.).

Fuerunt autem illa aetate qui putarent, nullam animam, nec in plantis, nec in animalibus, produci ex *traduce* (hoc negat etiam Scotus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica, n. 3.), sed semper *creari* ex *nihilo.* Hanc sententiam, saltem quoad primordium, probabiliter sustineri posse, docet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), sed simul asserit, sententiam S. Bonaventurae probabilem esse. Attamen communiter posteriores Scholastici negant, eas *proprie* tunc creatas esse et nunc creari; quibus consentit S. Bonav. et etiam S. Thom., qui in *Sum.* (I. q. 71. a. unic.) docet, Deum ut principium activum *de materia elementari* animalia produxisse (cfr. ibid. q. 113. a. 2.).

Quoad *modum* autem, quo animae sensibiles nunc per propagationem producantur, non consentiebant Scholastici. S. Bonav. docet, quod ab agente producantur ex «aliqua potentia activa in materia, ex qua fiunt tanquam ex seminario». Haec sententia tota fundata est in doctrina eiusdem de *rationibus seminalibus,* de quibus cfr. infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3; d. 30. a. 3. q. 1, et supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 118. a. 1; de Potent. q. 3. a. 11.) docet, quod «in actu generationis ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae» (Sum. loc. cit.). Scot. autem (II. Sent. d. 18. in utroque Scripto et de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 3.) tenet, animas vegetabiles et sensitivas nec proprie creari ex nihilo, nec traduci a generante, sed a solo Deo educi de potentia materiae, quae materia alia non sit quam corpus, naturae viribus perfecte organizatum (cfr. Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 118. a. 1.).

**II.** Explicite de hac quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. P. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, qui alias opiniones impugnat et singulari modo loquendi utitur. — De opere quinti diei in genere cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. 1. q. 71. a. unic. — Alii commentatores Lombardi rem tangunt infra d. 18, ubi disputant de rationibus seminalibus.

---

english:
### Article I.
*Whether sensible things, that is, animals, have been made.*

### Question I.
*Whether the souls of irrational animals were produced from something.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the souls of sensible, that is, of irrational [animals] were produced from something:

*Fundamenta.* 1. *First,* by the *text of Scripture*[^1], which says: *Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature of a living soul* etc.; and a little after: *Let the earth bring forth a living soul.* For if that which is created is from God alone, and the earth together with the water received the power of producing the creeping thing of a living soul, it does not seem that an animal, with respect to some principle of itself, is from nothing.

2. Likewise, by the *authority of the Philosopher* in the sixteenth book of the *Animals*[^2]: «The intellect alone enters from without»: but if the souls of brutes had been produced from nothing, then they would be from God alone and would enter from without.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems by *reason,* because a thing is produced from that into which it is resolved[^3]; but there is nothing which by natural resolution is resolved into nothing: therefore the souls of brute animals are not resolved into nothing when certain animals have been corrupted: therefore they were not produced from nothing.

4. Likewise, from the same source is the soul of this brute, which now is, and of the first brute, *by conformity;* but the soul of this brute generated by nature is not from nothing, since then it could not be produced by nature, and so it would follow that nature could not make a louse. Which, since it does not seem probable, and it is plain, as has appeared from what precedes[^4], that nature cannot produce anything from nothing: it remains therefore that the first souls of brute animals were not produced from nothing.

5. Likewise, the rational soul, because it is brought forth into *being* by creation, is immortal and incorruptible[^5] — for its production does not depend on the body, but on its effective principle — but the souls of brutes are by nature corruptible: therefore they were not produced from nothing.

6. Likewise, the work of *adornment* presupposes the work of *distinction,* and the work of *distinction* presupposes the work of *creation:* if therefore in the *distinction* of bodies there was no new creation but a production from something, much more does it seem [the same is true] in the *adornment.* Therefore if the bodies of animals and their souls pertain to the adornment, it seems that they were not produced from nothing, but from something.

*To the opposite.* **On the contrary:** 1. If from something the souls of the sensible [animals] were produced in the primordium, I ask concerning that from which they were produced, whether that [thing] was produced from something or from nothing. And if from something, I shall ask likewise concerning that, and thus either there will be a regress to infinity, or it will be necessary to posit that that from which the sensible soul was produced was from the beginning produced from nothing. But by the same reason by which that thing was produced from nothing, by the same reason also the sensible soul: therefore it seems etc.

2. Likewise, if those souls were produced from something, that [something] was either *spiritual* or *corporeal.* If *corporeal; on the contrary:* spirit can never be made from body, as Augustine says *on Genesis according to the letter*[^6]. If *spiritual;* then it is asked concerning it: did it *live,* or did it not *live,* and what use did it have? And again, if *spiritual;* why could the rational soul not have been made from it? If, therefore, it is not possible to answer reasonably on this point, as Augustine intimates on Genesis according to the letter[^7], reducing it to these absurdities, it follows from this that the first souls of sensible [animals] were produced from nothing.

3. Likewise, if they had been produced from something, since such a manner of producing belongs to natural power, it then seems, since there were already supercelestial bodies acting and moving and operating toward mixture, that animals could have been produced by the power of nature: therefore the primary works would not be proper to the divine power, which is unfitting, since He alone is the founder[^8] and perfector of the universe.

4. Likewise, we see now that certain ignoble animals are generated by putrefaction; I ask therefore by what their soul is brought forth; and it seems that it cannot be by *nature,* since «nature is a *power* implanted in things, procreating like from like»[^9]: it also seems that it cannot be by the power of a *heavenly body,* because the less noble cannot bring forth the more noble: «but spiritual substance, as Augustine says, is more noble than every body»: therefore it is necessary that it be brought forth immediately by the Creator. But what is so brought forth must be brought forth from nothing: therefore the souls of those animals which are generated by putrefaction are created: therefore much more so [the souls] of the animals first made.

5. Likewise, we see in segmented animals that upon the division of the body the soul remains in the diverse parts[^10]; but that [soul] cannot be the *first* soul, because there was one alone, nor was it *produced by nature,* since it is at once in every part, while the operation of nature is with succession: therefore it seems that those parts are animated by the Creator, therefore much more so the sensible things in the primary production.

6. Likewise, when a brute generates a brute, it either *pours over* the soul, or *not.* If it *pours over;* since the soul is not divisible, it will give over its whole soul: therefore in generation it will die. If it *does not pour over;* since its operation ceases at the deposit of the seed, it is necessary to posit another agent through which the soul is brought forth. But this cannot be the female, since she is more a passive than an active principle, as the Philosopher holds[^11], nor any other created active principle: therefore it is immediately produced by God, and so from nothing: therefore much more does it seem that they were produced in this way in the primordium.

### Conclusion.

> *The sensible souls were produced in the primordium from something, not indeed materially, but seminally, just as now they come to be from the active potency of matter, which is aroused by the agent.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, concerning the production of the souls of brute animals, different [thinkers] have held different opinions.

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that the souls of brutes were produced *from nothing,* because [they came] neither *from something materially* nor *from something seminally.* Not *from something materially,* because they are pure forms; not *from something seminally,* because they had nothing pre-existing. And therefore they say that in the first production they were simply created; but thereafter in propagation they say they are not *created,* but rather *transmitted,* not by a cutting off and separation of part of the soul, but by multiplication. For just as a candle, once it has been kindled, can multiply itself without diminution of its own light, so, indeed much more, they say spiritual substance can [multiply itself].

*Opinion 2.* The second position is directly opposed to this, that the souls of brutes were produced from something *materially* and *seminally. Materially,* I say, because they are *this something*[^12], since each of them is a sufficient mover, and therefore they say that they are constituted of matter and form; and that matter they say is spiritual, inseparably joined to corporeal nature; whence just as from corporeal nature the bodies of animals are produced, so from spiritual matter joined to it, as they say, the production of souls comes about. And so God made [them] from the primordium, and so nature also does now. For that matter, since it pre-exists the form, is its *seedbed;* and so they say that those souls are produced not only *materially,* but also *seminally,* since spiritual[^13] matter pre-exists for them and has in itself some active potency by which the soul comes to be from it, just as corporeal nature [has the potency] for bodies to come to be from it.

*Opinion 3.* The third position is that the souls of brutes were produced from something *materially,* but not *seminally. Materially,* I say, because they consist of matter and form; not however *seminally,* because that matter does not pre-exist the form as a *seed* of that which is to be produced from it, but is concreated with it and destroyed with it. And these say that all sensible souls, not only from the primordium but even now, are from the Creator; nevertheless not incorruptible, because the Creator Himself gives to each one a duration according to what befits its nature.

*Not approved.* But since all these positions assert something improbable — for the first says that the soul multiplies itself and pours itself over, yet so that the soul has nothing from which it comes to be; and this is to posit that a natural form can produce another similar form from nothing, which is improbable and was disproved above in the seventh distinction[^14]. The second opinion posits that some spiritual matter pre-exists the soul, from which the soul is brought forth by the power of nature; and this is hardly intelligible, how there could be some spiritual matter which neither lives nor has a use; how also there could be some spiritual matter, and yet the rational soul cannot be made from it. And *again,* where is that spiritual matter? for it does not seem to be *in itself;* if however it is with *corporeal matter,* then it seems that matter is brought forth from matter; which seems to be nothing said. Likewise the third position posits that the matter of the sensible soul is concreated with it and that it is destroyed together with it; but to posit this is contrary to the authority of the Philosopher[^15] and to reason, namely that the matter of any creature should pass altogether into nothing. For if corporeal matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, much more does it seem that spiritual [matter] is, since it is worthier and nobler, in accordance with its being under such *being.*

*Opinion 4.* And therefore there is a fourth way of speaking, namely that the souls which are purely sensible were produced from something *seminally,* but not *materially. Seminally,* I say, because forms are generable and corruptible by nature; and therefore, just as other natural forms are not produced from nothing, but there is some active potency in matter from which they come to be as from a seedbed[^16]; so also it must be understood in the case of sensible souls, which are forms only, of which kind are those in brute animals. And therefore *Conclusion.* it must be conceded that the sensible souls, that is, the souls of brutes, are from something, not, I say, *materially,* but *seminally;* because, since the sensible soul is a form, it does not have matter as a part of itself, but is made only from the *active* potency of matter which is aroused by the agent; and so it advances until it becomes the soul, just as the bud by advancing becomes the rose.

*Corollary 1.* Yet they are now produced from that seedbed *otherwise* than in the *primordium,* because now they are produced from a pre-existing seedbed according to *sufficient actuality;* in the primordium, however, they were produced together with that seedbed; or if that seedbed in some way pre-existed[^17] before the fifth day, on which the production of animals was made, on the fifth day it was brought to its complete formal character, so that there was given the *active power* of nature, that it might thereafter propagate and multiply animals as to body and as to soul.

*Corollary 2.* — And because some animals are of greater perfection and organization, and some of less; therefore the divine disposition most rightly arranged that some animals would be produced from their *seminal principle*[^18] according to a greater actuality, such as those which are generated by propagation, so that like is from like, and these are the more perfect animals; while others [are produced] according to a lesser [actuality], such as those which are generated by putrefaction; for because they are more imperfect, they need less help and power to be brought forth into *being.*

*Argument from Augustine and the Philosopher.* This position, moreover, is more reasonable and more firm, because both Augustine and the Philosopher agree in this. For Augustine to Orosius[^19] says thus: «Just as the seed of any tree has a certain power that, when it has been broken open in the earth, [the tree] rises up, and a shoot is produced, then is spread out, packed in with branches and leaves, then adorned with the same flowers bears fruit; so there is in the body, so to speak, a certain *seedbed,* whence in its time, by the providence of God taking care, certain kinds of animals arise». And the same is found in *Genesis according to the letter,* in the third book[^20] plainly and at length. — The Philosopher also wills this in the sixteenth [book] of the *Animals,* where he shows that the vegetative and the sensitive are first in the seed in potency before they are brought forth into *being;* and there he seems to intimate that that which forms the members is nothing other than the soul itself; and that soul he calls an *active potency,* intrinsic to the seed itself, which, when the body has been produced from the seed and organized so that it can be perfected by the same [soul], comes forth into act and is made the *perfection of an organic physical body.* Or certainly that which forms the members is rather the power of the soul of the father and the mother, by whose operation in brute animals the soul of the offspring is brought forth into *being;* but otherwise it is in human beings, as will be seen below[^21]. And the Philosopher proves this in the same place by many conjectures and arguments, and in the same place he says that corporeal things are full of the power of soul: and this much agrees with the words of Augustine[^22], who says: «The earth is pregnant with seeds, not only in respect of trees, but also in respect of animals». — Holding therefore this position, *Conclusion 2.* it must be said that the souls of sensible animals in the primordium were not created from nothing, as the arguments adduced for this show; for they had a seminal principle from which they were produced and now are produced.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected, that if the souls of sensible [animals] were produced from some other thing, that thing likewise was produced from yet another; it must be said that this is not necessary. *Note.* For the *seminal ratio* or *active potency* of matter itself is *concreated* with the matter, not produced from something; but those things which arise from that seed ought not properly to be said to be created.

2. To that which is asked, *if it is from something, that thing is either spiritual or corporeal;* it must be said *Note.* that it is neither *spiritual matter* nor *corporeal matter,* but is a certain *spiritual potency,* placed by the Creator into corporeal matter and resting on it and depending on it. And for this reason the sensible soul in brutes is generated and corrupted through the transmutation of corporeal nature. And if you object that the sensible soul is a sufficient mover, and thus is *this something* and has matter and form; it must be said that the sensible soul is not called a *sufficient mover* because it itself first moves the body which it perfects; but because the whole body, which it has[^23] is *this something* and, by virtue of the soul, which is its form, it moves a part, and by moving its part it moves the whole, as is plain in things that walk. And that this is true is apparent, because if a sensible soul were placed in a body which had no movable part except by the motion of the whole, as in a stone, it would never move it.

*Another solution.* Or it can be said otherwise that for something to be a *sufficient mover* it is not necessary that it be distinct from the movable, in such a way that it be another substance differing through matter and form; but it suffices that it be a form in the genus of substance, lacking extension *per se* and *per accidens.* And this form is in one part wholly in such a way that it is wholly in another; and therefore it is so united with this part which it moves, that it is also distant from it. And this distance suffices that it can move it, nor is it required that it have another matter. And so it is with the sensitive soul in those animals which have organs apt for this operation.

3. To that which is objected, that nature can bring it forth; *Note.* it must be said that this is false, because, before the Lord commanded the waters and said: *Let the waters bring forth* etc., either that seedbed of the sensible souls to be produced was not yet, or if it was, it was not in such power that it could come to perfection; for the creature[^24] can do nothing except according to the appointment and command given to it by the Creator. Whence, when there had previously been [only] *that whence it could come to be,* afterwards it was made by the divine decree that there should be *that whence it might come to be.*

4. To that which is objected concerning animals which are generated by putrefaction; it must be said, *On equivocal generation.* that although there are various ways of resolving [this], because some say that it is from the *mover of the heaven,* some that it is from the *Creator*[^25]; nevertheless according to the physical position it can be plainly answered that just as moisture becomes seed through the generative potency, and afterwards becomes an organic body in the womb, so that that sensible soul which was in potency is brought forth to act by the power of the particular agent and by the help of the heavenly body; so also in the present case it must be understood that when there was in that earth that *seedbed,* with the elements somehow concurring, and with the heavenly body helping, so that a vivifying heat is generated, a certain seed comes to be, so that that *active* potency, which previously lay hidden, aided by the action of the heavenly body, advances and comes to perfection and completion, so that neither the heaven nor the mover of the heaven gives it its ultimate form, but only helps and arouses it, so that that potency, advancing, may arrive at a complete species. And in this manner it must also be understood with regard to other things growing from the earth.

*The objection is solved.* And if you object that the soul, which is in potency, does not have species nor complete act *from itself,* nor can it have it *from something* which is not as noble as itself, and no such corporeal thing exists; it must be said *Note.* that the *essence* of such a *species*[^26] is in matter, but in *potency;* and that *essence* is so determined to producing the form of such a species that no other [form] can be brought forth from that essence or seminal *ratio,* and when it has been brought forth into act, it has *being* and has *such a being.* That it is *in act,* this it has from an extrinsic agent which was a being *in act,* and to this extent it is more noble than [the soul] itself, which was *in potency.* That it is *of such a species,* this it has from him who first placed the essence of this form into matter; otherwise nature would never bring it forth to *being,* unless God had placed it in matter, as was shown above in the eighth distinction[^27]. And therefore it is not necessary that the agent bringing forth that form into act be more noble than the form brought forth. And of this many examples can be set forth, as in minerals and in many things growing from the earth.

5. And by this is plain the answer to the two following [arguments]. For what is objected concerning the division of a segmented body is already apparent; because, since a segmented body is of modest organization and as it were of like character in the parts and in the whole, therefore in any part of it the soul is in proximate disposition to being in act; and therefore, when the division has been made, by the power of the prior form and the help of the heavenly body, the form is suddenly induced.

*The solution of others is not approved.* But there are several other ways of speaking about this. Some say that the soul is multiplied, since it is spiritual, just as a point at the division of a line, and a species at the division of a mirror; nevertheless in neither of these must it be understood that that same thing which was one becomes many[^28]; and therefore the preceding way is more plain.

6. To the last [argument] the answer is likewise plain, because[^29], when an animal is generated from an animal by propagation, although the soul is not cut off from the soul as the body is cut off from the body — since the soul is not divisible like the body — nevertheless together with the body itself there are cut off spirits and heats and even the animal power which aids together with the power of the containing womb, so that that active potency, which was in the seminal moisture, may come to complete act. And from this it does not follow that the soul produces another soul *from nothing,* nor that it produces from *matter,* nor even that it produces from *itself.*

la: Gen. 1, 20. — Seq. textus ibid. v. 24. — Paulo inferius ex nonnullis codd. cum ed. 1 verbis *cum aqua* praemissis *et terra;* pro quo aliqui falso *et anima.* Lectio nostra respondet duobus textibus s. Scripturae.

en: Gen. 1:20. — The following text is the same chapter v. 24. — A little below, from several codices with ed. 1, the words *cum aqua* are prefixed by *et terra;* for which some falsely read *et anima.* Our reading corresponds to the two scriptural texts.

la: Secundum antiquam divisionem librorum de Animalibus. Nunc est II. de Generat. animal. c. 3: *Restat igitur, ut mens sola extrinsecus accedat eaque sola divina sit.*

en: According to the ancient division of the books *On Animals.* It is now II. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 3: *It remains, therefore, that the mind alone enters from without and that it alone is divine.*

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 43. (c. 3.): *Omne namque ex quo est, etiam resolvitur in hoc.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III text 43 (c. 3): *For everything from which a thing is, into this also it is resolved.*

la: Dist. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: Distinction 7. Part II. Article 2. Question 1 [and] following.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 2.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II text 21 (c. 2).

en: Book VII c. 12 n. 19 and c. 20 n. 26. Cfr. ibid. c. 22 n. 33 ff.

la: Libr. VII. c. 7. n. 10. seqq.

en: Book VII c. 7 n. 10 ff.

la: In cod. cc et ed. 1 additur *et formator.*

en: In codex cc and ed. 1 there is added *et formator* (and fashioner).

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10. — Verba Augustini, XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 16. n. 32: *Spiritus omnis omni est corpore sine dubitatione praestantior.* — Cfr. de hoc arg. supra pag. 198, nota 3. in fine.

en: See vol. I p. 134, note 10. — The words of Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* XII c. 16 n. 32: *Every spirit is without doubt more excellent than every body.* — Cfr. on this argument above p. 198, note 3, at the end.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 93. (c. 3.) et II. text. 20. (c. 2.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *On the Soul* I text 93 (c. 3) and II text 20 (c. 2).

la: Libr. I. de Generat. animal. c. 20. et II. c. 1. — Vat. post *nec* addit *est,* et paulo superius substituit *genus* pro *agens.* Mox Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et ceteris edd. *producuntur* pro *producitur.*

en: *On the Generation of Animals* I c. 20 and II c. 1. — The Vatican edition after *nec* adds *est,* and a little above substitutes *genus* for *agens.* Soon the Vatican edition with several codices and the other editions reads *producuntur* for *producitur.*

la: Cfr. hic solutio ad 2. et supra pag. 109, nota 7. et pag. 197, nota 3. — In sequentibus Vat. utitur ter verbis *corporalis materiae* pro *corporalis naturae.*

en: Cfr. here the solution to [argument] 2, and above p. 109 note 7 and p. 197 note 3. — In what follows the Vatican edition thrice uses the words *corporeal matter* for *corporeal nature.*

la: Parte II. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. Cfr. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Lineola supra posita indicat, incongruam esse constructionem. Refertur antecedens *ad hoc consequens: Et ideo est quartus.*

en: Part II. Article 2. Question 2 in the body. Cfr. d. 8. Part I. Article 2. Question 1 in the body. — The line placed above indicates that the construction is incongruous. The antecedent is to be referred *to this consequent: And therefore there is a fourth [way].*

la: Libr. I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.), ubi dicit, materiam esse «incorruptibilem et ingenitam... et si corrumpitur aliquid, in hoc [scil. materiam] abibit ultimum».

en: *Physics* I text 82 (c. 9), where he says that matter is «incorruptible and unbegotten... and if anything is corrupted, into this [namely matter] it shall pass at last».

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Aliquanto inferius plures codd. *et proficit* pro *et sic proficit.*

en: Cfr. above d. 7. Part II. a. 2. q. 1 and below d. 18. a. 1. q. 2 [and] following. — A little below several codices [read] *et proficit* for *et sic proficit.*

la: Ed. 1 *praeexstitit.*

en: Ed. 1 reads *praeexstitit.*

la: Plures codd. cum primis edd. *seminario;* Vat. *primo seminario.*

en: Several codices with the first editions read *seminario;* the Vatican edition *primo seminario.*

la: Sive Quaest. 63. q. 37. (inter opera Augustini), ubi textus originalis substituit *obrutum* pro *corruptum,* subinde omittit *eisdem;* plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 substituunt *creante,* aliqui cum Vat. *concurrente* pro *curante.* Cfr. V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 44.

en: Or *Quaest.* 63 q. 37 (among the works of Augustine), where the original text substitutes *obrutum* for *corruptum,* and then omits *eisdem;* several codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 substitute *creante,* some with the Vatican edition *concurrente* for *curante.* Cfr. V. *On Genesis according to the letter* c. 23 n. 44.

la: Praesertim c. 14. n. 22. — Sententiam Philosophi vide loc. cit. sive, ut nunc dicitur, II. de Generat. animal. c. 3.

en: Especially c. 14 n. 22. — For the opinion of the Philosopher see the place cited, or, as it is now called, II. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 3.

la: Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3. — Aristot., loc. cit. c. 3. seqq. — Alius textus est ibid. libro III. c. 11: *Generantur autem in terra humoreque animalia et plantae, quoniam humor in terra, spiritus in humore, calor animalis in universo inest, ita ut quodam modo plena sint animae omnia.* — Paulo ante Vat. *dicitur inesse* pro *educitur in esse.*

en: Distinction 18. Article 2. Question 3. — Aristotle, loc. cit. c. 3. ff. — Another text is at the same place in book III c. 11: *But animals and plants are generated in earth and moisture, because moisture is in the earth, spirit in the moisture, animal heat in the universe, so that in some way all things are full of soul.* — A little before, the Vatican edition reads *dicitur inesse* for *educitur in esse.*

la: Libr. III. de Trin. c. 8. n. 13: et c. 9. n. 16, ubi hoc verbum quoad sensum clare exprimitur; sic ultimo cit. loc. ait: *Nam sicut matres gravidae sunt fetibus, sic ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium* etc.

en: Book III. *On the Trinity* c. 8 n. 13, and c. 9 n. 16, where this saying is clearly expressed as to sense; thus at the last cited place he says: *For just as mothers are pregnant with offspring, so the world itself is pregnant with the causes of things to be born* etc.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. omittunt *habet* et *omnes,* exceptis F et T (a secund. manu) *et* ante *virtute.* — Pro intelligentia solutionis notentur haec ex Gul. Mara, hic q. 1: *Dicendum, quod hoc aliquid dicitur multipliciter. Aliquando idem est quod singulare quodcumque sive substantiae sive accidentis; et sic accipit Philosophus, ubi solvit paralogismos figurae dictionis;* «*Homo et omne commune non hoc aliquid, sed quale quid significat*» (II. Elench. c. 3.). *Aliquando est idem quod habens esse distinctum. Ita enim glossat Commentator super XII. Metaph. text. 14, ubi recitat distinctionem de ipso* quid *secundum Alexandrum,* hoc aliquid *i. e. habens esse distinctum in materia corporali; unde Commentator super III. de Anima, text. 4. dicit, quod intellectus non est* hoc aliquid *i. e. neque virtus in corpore neque corpus. Primo modo sequitur, si est motor sufficiens, quod sit* hoc aliquid, *quia omnes actiones sunt singularium. Secundo modo et tertio non sequitur; unde Commentator super illud VIII. Phys. text. 30: Et etiam quomodo est possibile : Motor, inquit, debet esse distinctus a moto aut secundum definitionem et esse, sicut illa, quae moventur ab extrinseco, aut secundum definitionem tantum, sicut est dispositio in habentibus animas. Anima enim, quae est motor in eis, distinguitur* [a corpore, quod est motum] *secundum definitionem, licet non distinguatur secundum esse* etc.

en: Several codices with the Vatican edition omit *habet* and *omnes,* except F and T (by a second hand) [omit] *et* before *virtute.* — For the understanding of the solution these things from Gul. Mara, here q. 1, should be noted: *It must be said that* this something *is said in many ways. Sometimes it is the same as any singular whatever, whether of substance or of accident; and so the Philosopher takes it where he solves the paralogisms of the figure of speech;* «*Man and every common [term] does not signify* this something *but a what-sort-of-thing*» (II. *Elenchi* c. 3). *Sometimes it is the same as that-which-has-distinct-being. For thus the Commentator glosses on Metaphysics XII text 14, where he recites the distinction concerning the very* "what" *according to Alexander:* this something *i.e. that-which-has-distinct-being in corporeal matter; whence the Commentator on On the Soul III text 4 says that the intellect is not* this something, *i.e. neither a power in a body nor a body. In the first sense it follows, if it is a sufficient mover, that it is* this something, *because all actions are of singulars. In the second and third sense it does not follow; whence the Commentator on that passage Physics VIII text 30: 'And also how is it possible': The mover, he says, must be distinct from the moved, either according to definition and being, like those things that are moved from without, or according to definition only, as is the disposition in things having souls. For the soul, which is the mover in them, is distinguished* [from the body which is moved] *according to definition, although it is not distinguished according to being,* etc.

la: Cod. T *natura.* Dein Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *statum* pro *statutum.* — Cfr. August., VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 26. seqq., ex quo Magister, infra d. XVII. c. 3, plura allegat.

en: Codex T reads *natura.* Then the Vatican edition with some codices [reads] *statum* for *statutum.* — Cfr. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* VI c. 13 n. 26 ff., from which the Master, below d. XVII c. 3, alleges several things.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 198, nota 3. — Sententiam Aristotelis vide III. de Generat. animal. c. 11. — Paulo inferius plures codd. *organizatum* pro *organicum.*

en: Cfr. above p. 198 note 3. — For the opinion of Aristotle see *On the Generation of Animals* III c. 11. — A little below several codices [read] *organizatum* for *organicum.*

la: Nonnulli codd. hic addunt *non.* Subinde pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *et illa potentia* [ed. 1 addit *essentialiter*] pro *et illa essentia.*

en: Some codices here add *non.* Then a few codices with ed. 1 [read] *et illa potentia* [ed. 1 adds *essentialiter*] for *et illa essentia.*

la: Parte I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

la: Aristot., de Iuventute et senect., c. 1. ait: *Et multa quoque non insectorum divisa possunt vivere propter nutritivam. Talem autem particulam actu quidem habent unam, virtute autem plures* etc. Idem dicitur I. de Anima, text. 93. seqq. (c. 5.) et II. text. 20. (c. 2.). — Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 2, ubi diversae opiniones hac de re proponuntur, et August., de Quantit. animae, c. 31. n. 62. seqq.

en: Aristotle, *On Youth and Old Age* c. 1 says: *And many even of non-insects, when divided, can live on account of the nutritive [soul]. Such a part, however, in act they have as one, but in power as many,* etc. The same is said in *On the Soul* I text 93 ff. (c. 5) and II text 20 (c. 2). — Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II q. 87 m. 2 a. 1 § 2, where various opinions on this matter are set forth, and Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul* c. 31 n. 62 ff.

la: Vat. *quod,* refragantibus multis codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition reads *quod,* with many codices and ed. 1 disagreeing.

la: *Solutio ad ultimum;* per propagationem brutum generat brutum, ita quod aliqua decisio corporea, non animae, fit; et inde virtus activa in humore seminario perficitur in animam prolis.

en: *Solution to the last [argument];* by propagation a brute generates a brute, so that some corporeal cutting-off, not of the soul, takes place; and from this the active power in the seminal moisture is perfected into the soul of the offspring. ---

english_scholion:
**I.** It is not treated here of the sensitive soul *in man,* concerning which it is proved below (d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.) that «the sensible and the rational in man are of the same substance and must be brought forth into *being* by the same principle, namely the Creator»; but it is treated of the soul that is purely sensible, that is, of [non-rational] animals. And the question is precisely about the *first* production of animals narrated in Genesis, although the question concerning the later propagation of animals is also resolved, as is plain from the words *in the body* [of the article]: «Yet they are now produced from that seedbed otherwise than in the primordium». — The holy Doctor inclines, however, to the view that that seedbed was not produced before the fifth day, though he does not exclude the opinion that it was produced in some *imperfect* way before then (ibid. and ad 3.). From which it is plain that that seedbed ought not be confounded with the *incomplete form* under which matter was created (cfr. above d. 12. a. 1. q. 3.).

There were, moreover, in that age those who held that no soul, neither in plants nor in animals, was produced by *transmission* (this Scotus also denies, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica, n. 3.), but is always *created* from *nothing.* That this view, at least as regards the primordium, can be sustained probably, Petr. a Tarantasia teaches (here q. 1. a. 1.), but at the same time he asserts that the view of St. Bonaventure is probable. Yet the later Scholastics commonly deny that they were *properly* then created or are now created; with whom agree St. Bonav. and also St. Thom., who in the *Sum.* (I. q. 71. a. unic.) teaches that God as active principle produced the animals *from elemental matter* (cfr. ibid. q. 113. a. 2.).

As to the *manner,* however, in which the sensible souls are now produced by propagation, the Scholastics did not agree. St. Bonav. teaches that they are produced by the agent from «some active potency in the matter from which they come to be as from a seedbed». This whole opinion is founded in his doctrine of the *seminal reasons,* concerning which cfr. below d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3; d. 30. a. 3. q. 1, and above d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — St. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 118. a. 1; de Potent. q. 3. a. 11.) teaches that «in the act of generation from the soul of the begetter there is derived a certain active power into the seed itself of the animal or the plant» (Sum. loc. cit.). Scotus, however (II. Sent. d. 18. in both Scripta and de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 3.) holds that the vegetable and sensitive souls are neither properly created from nothing nor transmitted from the begetter, but are brought forth by God alone from the potency of matter, which matter is nothing other than the body perfectly organized by the powers of nature (cfr. Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 118. a. 1.).

**II.** Explicitly on this question treat: Alex. Hal., S. P. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 1, who attacks other opinions and uses a singular manner of speaking. — On the work of the fifth day in general cfr. S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 2; S. 1. q. 71. a. unic. — Other commentators on Lombard touch on the matter below d. 18, where they dispute concerning the seminal reasons.

---

translators_notes:
- **Page span:** p. 372 R column bottom (`ARTICULUS 1.` opens at L column foot, `QUAESTIO I.` opens R column band 2) → p. 373 entire → p. 374 (Conclusio + Respondeo opening 3 *opiniones* + *Non approbantur*) → p. 375 (Opinio 4 + Corollaria + *Ratio ex Augustino et Philosopho* + *Conclusio 2* + opening of *Solutio oppositorum* 1 + 2) → p. 376 (*Alia solutio,* Solutiones 3 + 4 + *Obiectio solvitur* + Solutio 5 + *Solutio aliorum non probatur* + Solutio 6) → p. 377 L column top (SCHOLION I body) + R column top (SCHOLION II commentator list). `QUAESTIO II.` opens L column bottom of p. 377 in the next chunk.
- **Cross-chunk hand-off (p. 372 commentary-side footer 3–4):** picked up per the d15-divisio hand-off. Footer ³ (= chunk `[^1]`, Gen. 1, 20 / Seq. textus / Paulo inferius variant note) anchors at *textum Scripturae³* in Fundamenta arg. 1; footer ⁴ (= chunk `[^2]`, "Secundum antiquam divisionem librorum de Animalibus…") anchors at *de Animalibus decimo sexto⁴* in Fundamenta arg. 2. Both anchor positions crisp at 450 dpi. The divisio carried footers ¹–² (anchored in DIVISIO TEXTUS); the chunk-boundary footer split inside p. 372 is now fully accounted for across the two chunks.
- **Footnote-numbering convention:** Quaracchi restarts per printed page; this chunk runs 29 anchors sequentially because the chunk spans six pages. Per-page Quaracchi raw footer counts (anchored in this chunk): p.372 commentary side notes 3–4 (= [^1]–[^2]); p.373 notes 1–9 (= [^3]–[^11]); p.374 notes 1–3 (= [^12]–[^15], with [^15] = p.374 footer note 3 on Philosopher / *Phys.* I text 82); p.375 notes 1–6 (= [^16]–[^22], renumbered seminario / Quaest. 63 / etc.); p.376 notes 1–3 (= [^23]–[^25]); p.376 footnote 4–6 + p.377 footer 1–3 fold into [^26]–[^29] for the SCHOLION-area and Solutio-5/6 cross-references. The d15-divisio chunk consumed p.372 commentary-side notes 1–2; the d15-littera chunk consumed p.372 littera-side (i.e. none — p.372's littera-side footer was empty per the d15-littera Notes).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All anchor positions crisp at 450 dpi; all marginal labels (*Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Conclusio.*, *Opinio 1./2./3./4.*, *Non approbantur.*, *Conclusio.* mid-Opinio-4, *Corollarium 1./2.*, *Ratio ex Augustino et Philosopho.*, *Conclusio 2.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Notandum.* (× 5), *Alia solutio.*, *De generatione aequivoca.*, *Obiectio solvitur.*, *Solutio aliorum non probatur.*) preserved inline per locked Vol II convention.
- **Marginal label *Conclusio.* appears twice** inside the Respondeo, both crisp at 450 dpi: first labelling the Opinio-4 conclusion clause (*concedendum est, animas sensibiles sive animas brutorum esse ex aliquo, non inquam materialiter, sed seminaliter*); second as *Conclusio 2.* labelling the matching conclusion in the *Ratio ex Augustino et Philosopho* paragraph (*dicendum est, animas sensibilium animalium in primordio non esse creatas ex nihilo*). Both preserved as printed.
- **SCHOLION II** is a pure commentator-list (Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., S. Thom., Alii commentatores) — no apparatus markers inside Scholion bodies per Vol II convention.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 377 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum corpora animalium sint composita ex quatuor elementis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum corpora animalium sint composita ex quatuor elementis, an ex uno. Et quod ex uno, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. *Primo* per Scripturam[^1], quae dicit: *Producant aquae reptile* etc.; et similiter: *Producat terra animam viventem.* Si ergo Scriptura sufficienter animalium exprimit materiam, cum non exprimat nisi simplicia elementa, patet etc.

2. Item, forma debet proportionari materiae[^2]; ergo et corpus animae; sed forma animalium est simplex: ergo et corpora debent esse simplicia: ergo non sunt ex quatuor elementis: ergo etc.

3. Item, quanto aliquid ad naturam compositionis magis accedit, tanto minus est perfectum; quod enim simplicius est, potentius est et perfectius[^3]. Si igitur anima sensibilis est forma valde potens et nobilis: ergo debet esse perfectio corporis simplicis, non mixti ex quatuor elementis.

4. Item, corpora ad ornatum caeli spectantia non sunt facta de alia natura quam caelum, quod ornant[^4]: ergo pari ratione, si quaedam animalia ornant terram, et quaedam aquas, quaedam sunt ex sola terra, et quaedam ex sola aqua.

5. Item, si corpora animalium constant ex quatuor elementis, tunc videtur, quod cum elementa habeant sphaeras distinctas, quod elementa constituentia corpus animalis sint in unum iuncta per violentiam: si ergo violentia est contra naturam, constitutio corporis cuiuslibet animalis est contra naturam; quod est inconveniens.

6. Item, ex eisdem animalia sunt producta tunc, ex quibus producuntur nunc; sed nunc non possunt elementa virtute naturae coadunari: ergo non possunt corpora animalium ex quatuor elementis produci. Maior propositio per se manifesta est; minor probatur, quia non est in potestate naturae ignem facere descendere; si enim descenderet, cum medium interstitium aëris sit frigidissimum, necessario haberet ibi exstingui, et alia plura sequerentur inconvenientia: ergo etc.

*Ad oppositum arguitur sic.*

*Fundamenta.*

1. Sensus est operatio animae in corpore secundum conformitatem organi ad obiectum[^5]; sed quodlibet animal habet tactum, qui est perceptibilis quatuor qualitatum, quae radicantur in quatuor elementis: ergo quodlibet animal constat ex quatuor elementis.

2. Item, omne animal aliquo motu est mobile, ut *progressionis*, vel *constrictionis*, vel *dilatationis*; sed nullum elementum de se est sic mobile: ergo necesse est, animal constare ex pluribus elementis.

3. Item, quanto forma est spiritualior, tanto est plurium operationum principium; sed anima sensibilis est forma valde spiritualis: ergo est principium multiplicis operationis. Sed corpus datum est

<!-- page 378 -->

ad subministrandum ei: ergo necesse est, quod corpus sit aptum et idoneum ad diversas operationes[^6]; sed non est aptum ad diversas *operationes* nisi per diversas *virtutes*, nec ad diversas *virtutes* nisi per diversas *naturas*, nec habet diversas *naturas*, nisi quia ex diversis compositum: ergo etc.

4. Item, quanto forma posterior et ulterior, tanto nobilior, pro eo quod anteriora sunt materialia respectu posteriorum[^7]: ergo nobilior est forma mixti quam forma elementi. Si ergo anima sensibilis, cum sit forma nobilis, debet habere corpus nobile, ergo corpus animalis non tantum non est corpus simplex, sed constans ex diversis elementis.

### Conclusio.

> Corpora animalium habent in se naturam quatuor elementorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio corpora animalium habent in se naturam quatuor elementorum, sicut ostensum est per quatuor rationes, *Conclusio.* tum propter hoc, ut sint idonea ad *sensum*; tum propter hoc, ut sint idonea ad *motum*; tum propter hoc, ut sint idonea ad *multiplicitatem operationis*; tum propter hoc, ut in se habeant *dignitatem completionis*[^8], quae omnia competunt illi corpori, quod perficitur anima sensibili. *Rationes 4.* — Et propter hoc *Corollarium.* debet habere aliquem *gradum perfectum mixtionis*, ubi non tantum fit *mixtio*, sed etiam *complexio*; perfecta autem mixtio non est, quousque concurrant quatuor elementa. *Aqua* enim, cum sit subtilior terra in decupla proportione, penetrat partes terrae; sed non perfecte, pro eo quod aliquam habeat grossitiem. *Aër* vero, qui est subtilior in centupla proportione, adhuc intimius se profundat[^9]. Sed *ignis*, qui est subtilior et rarior in millesima proportione, sua subtilitate penetrat usque ad intima, et sic fit alteratio plena usque ad minima et *mixtio perfecta*, quia miscibilia sunt perfecte alterata. — Et sic patet, quod taliter debent componi corpora perficienda ab anima sensibili.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Genesis, dicendum, quod illud dictum est per quandam praedominantiam sive appropriationem, sicut melius patebit infra[^10].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod forma debet proportionari materiae; dicendum, quod verum est in conditionibus, quae magis competunt ipsi formae. Anima autem, cum sit simplex in substantia, multiplex est in virtute; et ideo non competit, ut corpus ei assimiletur in simplicitate, pro eo quod simplicitas corporalis repugnat multiplicitati virtutis.

3. Et per hoc patet solutio ad illud quod tertio obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid compositius, tanto minus perfectum. *Notandum.* Hoc enim etsi habeat veritatem in *spiritibus*, quorum perfectio attenditur per accessum ad summe simplex; non tamen habet veritatem in *corporibus*, in quibus et *magnificatur* virtus ex partium magnitudine, sicut magis urit magnus ignis quam parvus; et *plurificatur* ex partium multiplicatione, sicut maioris virtutis est syrupus compositus quam liquor impermixtus. Et ideo homo, qui inter cetera animalia est perfectissimus, inter cetera est compositissimus, sicut planius videbitur inferius[^11].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de corporibus ornantibus caelum, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia illa nec propriis *motibus* moventur nec spiritualibus *formis*[^12] perficiuntur, quibus debeatur multiplicitas operationum, vel diversitas partium componentium et organorum, sicut ponitur in animalibus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fit elementorum violentatio; dicendum, quod non est intelligendum, quod Dominus in primordio, cum corpora animalium composuit, elementa ex diversis sphaeris concurrere fecerit; hoc enim non oportebat, tum quia tam aqua quam terra non sunt elementa pura, sed aliis permixta secundum eam partem[^13], ex qua facta sunt ex eis animalia; tum etiam, quia, si essent pura et simplicia, in uno elemento sunt cetera in potentia, et ex uno possunt fieri omnia, si adsit virtus alterans et activa, sine aliqua locali mutatione, ac per hoc sine aliqua violentatione.

6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quia similiter, quando fit commixtio elementorum, natura non facit ignem, qui sursum est, descendere, vel aërem; sed eum ignem, vel aërem, qui vel est in terra, vel generatur per actionem alicuius agentis, facit venire ad constitutionem animalis. Et hoc quidem fit per naturam, non per violentiam. « Quia enim natura, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[^14], semper desiderat quod melius est », materia, quae est sub forma elementari, appetit esse sub forma mixti, et quae est sub forma mixtionis appetit esse sub forma complexionis; ideo cum ex diversis elementis fit mixtio in unum, appetitus naturae completur, et violentia non infertur.

<!-- page 379 -->

### Scholion.

**I.** Alii auctores antiqui hanc et seq. (3.) quaestionem unica tractatione sub diversis titulis absolvunt, praeter Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med.; omnes autem quoad ipsas conclusiones conveniunt.

Si autem quaeritur de *modo*, quo elementa in corporibus animatis remanent, tunc incidit celebris controversia de *pluralitate* formarum in mixtionibus, de qua supra, d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, in scholio mentionem fecimus. Hanc controversiam explicite tractat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.), qui quaestionem inscribit: « Utrum corpora animalium ita sint composita ex quatuor elementis, quod vere ibi maneant essentiae formarum elementarium incomplete ». Similiter Scot. (in utroque Scripto hic q. unica) quaerit: « Utrum in corpore animalis, vel in quocumque mixto remaneant elementa secundum substantiam in actu ». Richardus affirmantem et negantem opinionem cum suis fundamentis et oppositorum solutionibus refert, quin aliquid determinet. Sed Scotus (ibid. n. 5.) negative sic respondet: « Elementa non manent in mixto secundum substantiam sive remissam, sicut dicit Commentator, sive non remissam, sicut ponit Avicenna ». Deinde (n. 6. 7.) addit: « Quatuor elementa manent in uno mixto *virtualiter*, habente formam substantialem continentem *in virtute* formas elementorum, non tamen secundum substantiam ut partes sui ». Quae verba satis conveniunt cum doctrina S. Thomae (S. 1. q. 76. a. 4. ad 4.), qui dicit: « Formae elementorum manent in mixto non *actu*, sed *virtute*; manent enim *qualitates propriae* elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est *virtus* formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria *dispositio* ad formam substantialem corporis mixti, puta formam lapidis vel animati cuiuscumque ». — Aliter autem loquitur B. Albert., I. de Generat. et corrupt. tr. 6. c. 3. 6.

S. Bonav., qui in his duabus quaest. presse sequitur Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. II. q. 77. et q. 81. m. 1.), de corpore humano disputantem, explicite non explanat modum, quo remanent elementa in mixtionibus. Sed supposita eiusdem doctrina de incompletis formis et rationibus seminalibus, plura eius verba in utraque quaest., praesertim in fundam. 3. quaestionis 2., favent affirmanti opinioni, ut supra in cit. scholio dictum est. De corporis autem *humani* compositione disputatur infra d. 17. a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3, ubi praecipue in q. 2. notanda est solut. ad 6. Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) explicite etiam de 2. quaest. tractat, sed nihil de hac controversia dicit.

**II.** Alii auctores praecipue de 3. quaestione agunt. — Praeter iam citatos: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; (quoad corpus humanum) S. 1. q. 91. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the bodies of animals are composed of the four elements.*

In the second place it is asked whether the bodies of animals are composed of the four elements, or of one only. And that they are of one only, it seems:

*To the opposite.*

1. *First* through Scripture[^1], which says: *Let the waters bring forth the creeping thing*, etc.; and likewise: *Let the earth bring forth the living soul.* If therefore Scripture sufficiently expresses the matter of animals, since it expresses nothing but the simple elements, the point is plain, etc.

2. Likewise, form ought to be proportioned to matter[^2]; therefore also the body to the soul; but the form of animals is simple: therefore their bodies also ought to be simple: therefore they are not of the four elements: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more anything approaches the nature of composition, the less perfect it is; for what is simpler is more potent and more perfect[^3]. If therefore the sensitive soul is a very potent and noble form: therefore it ought to be the perfection of a simple body, not one mixed of the four elements.

4. Likewise, the bodies pertaining to the adornment of the heavens are not made of a nature other than the heavens which they adorn[^4]: therefore by parallel reason, if certain animals adorn the earth, and others the waters, some are from earth alone, and some from water alone.

5. Likewise, if the bodies of animals consist of the four elements, then it seems, since the elements have distinct spheres, that the elements constituting the body of an animal are joined into one by violence: if therefore violence is against nature, the constitution of the body of every animal is against nature; which is unfitting.

6. Likewise, animals were then produced from the same things from which they are now produced; but now the elements cannot be brought together by the power of nature: therefore the bodies of animals cannot be produced from the four elements. The major proposition is manifest of itself; the minor is proved, because it is not in the power of nature to make fire descend; for if it should descend, since the intermediate interstice of air is the coldest, it would necessarily there be extinguished, and many other unfitting consequences would follow: therefore etc.

*To the opposite it is argued thus.*

*Fundamenta.*

1. Sense is the operation of the soul in the body according to the conformity of the organ to the object[^5]; but every animal has touch, which perceives the four qualities, which are rooted in the four elements: therefore every animal is constituted of the four elements.

2. Likewise, every animal is mobile with some motion, as of *progression*, or of *contraction*, or of *expansion*; but no element of itself is mobile in this way: therefore it is necessary that an animal consist of several elements.

3. Likewise, the more spiritual the form, the more it is a principle of multiple operations; but the sensitive soul is a very spiritual form: therefore it is the principle of multiple operation. But the body is given

to be its servant: therefore it is necessary that the body be apt and suitable for diverse operations[^6]; but it is not apt for diverse *operations* except through diverse *powers*, nor for diverse *powers* except through diverse *natures*, nor does it have diverse *natures* except because it is composed of diverse things: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the later and further the form, the more noble, because the earlier are material in respect of the later[^7]: therefore the form of a mixed body is nobler than the form of an element. If therefore the sensitive soul, since it is a noble form, ought to have a noble body, therefore the body of an animal is not only not a simple body, but consists of diverse elements.

### Conclusion.

> The bodies of animals have in themselves the nature of the four elements.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the bodies of animals have in themselves the nature of the four elements, as has been shown by four reasons, *Conclusio.* both because of this, that they should be suitable for *sense*; and because of this, that they should be suitable for *motion*; and because of this, that they should be suitable for *multiplicity of operation*; and because of this, that they may have in themselves *the dignity of completion*[^8], all of which befit that body which is perfected by the sensitive soul. *Four Reasons.* — And on account of this *Corollarium.* it ought to have some *perfect degree of mixture*, where there is not only *mixture* but also *complexion*; and there is no perfect mixture until the four elements concur. For *water*, since it is more subtle than earth in tenfold proportion, penetrates the parts of earth; but not perfectly, because it has a certain coarseness. *Air* indeed, which is more subtle in hundredfold proportion, sinks itself yet more intimately[^9]. But *fire*, which is more subtle and rarer in thousandfold proportion, by its subtlety penetrates to the innermost parts, and thus there is a full alteration down to the smallest parts and a *perfect mixture*, because the things to be mixed are perfectly altered. — And thus it is plain that the bodies to be perfected by the sensitive soul must be composed in this way.

*Solution of the opposites.*

1. To that which is objected from the authority of Genesis, it must be said that this was said by a certain predominance or appropriation, as will appear more clearly below[^10].

2. To that which is objected, that form ought to be proportioned to matter; it must be said that this is true in those conditions which befit the form itself more properly. But the soul, since it is simple in substance, is multiple in power; and therefore it does not befit that the body be assimilated to it in simplicity, because corporeal simplicity is repugnant to multiplicity of power.

3. And through this is plain the solution to that which is objected in the third place, that the more composite anything is, the less perfect. *Notandum.* For although this has truth in *spirits*, whose perfection is attended to by access to the highest simple; nevertheless it does not have truth in *bodies*, in which power is both *magnified* by the magnitude of parts, as a great fire burns more than a small one; and is *multiplied* by the multiplication of parts, as a compound syrup is of greater power than an unmixed liquor. And therefore man, who is the most perfect among the rest of the animals, is among the rest the most composite, as will be seen more plainly below[^11].

4. To that which is objected concerning the bodies adorning heaven, it must be said that it is not similar, because those are neither moved by their own *motions* nor perfected by spiritual *forms*[^12], to which would be owed a multiplicity of operations, or a diversity of component parts and organs, as is posited in animals.

5. To that which is objected, that there is a violence of the elements; it must be said that it is not to be understood that the Lord at the beginning, when he composed the bodies of animals, caused the elements to run together from diverse spheres; for this was not necessary, both because both water and earth are not pure elements, but mixed with others according to that part[^13] from which animals were made out of them; and also because, if they were pure and simple, in one element the rest are in potency, and from one all things can be made, if an altering and active power be present, without any local motion, and on this account without any violence.

6. And through this is plain the answer to the last point, because likewise, when the commixture of elements takes place, nature does not make the fire, which is above, descend, nor the air; but that fire or air which is either in earth, or is generated through the action of some agent, it brings to the constitution of the animal. And this indeed happens through nature, not through violence. « For since nature, according to what the Philosopher says[^14], always desires what is better », matter, which is under the elemental form, desires to be under the form of the mixed, and that which is under the form of mixture desires to be under the form of complexion; therefore when from diverse elements a mixture into one is made, the appetite of nature is completed, and no violence is inflicted.

### Scholion.

**I.** Other ancient authors treat this and the following (3rd) question in a single treatment under diverse titles, except Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla; but all agree as to the conclusions themselves.

But if it is asked concerning the *mode* in which the elements remain in animate bodies, then there arises the celebrated controversy concerning the *plurality* of forms in mixtures, of which above, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, in the scholion we made mention. This controversy is explicitly treated by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 1), who inscribes the question: « Whether the bodies of animals are so composed of the four elements that the essences of the elemental forms truly remain there incompletely ». Likewise Scotus (in both of his Writings, here q. unica) asks: « Whether in the body of an animal, or in any mixed body, the elements remain according to substance in act ». Richard reports the affirmative and negative opinions with their grounds and the solutions of opposing arguments, without determining anything. But Scotus (ibid. n. 5) responds negatively thus: « The elements do not remain in the mixed body according to substance whether remitted, as the Commentator says, or unremitted, as Avicenna holds ». Then (n. 6, 7) he adds: « The four elements remain in one mixed body *virtually*, since it has a substantial form containing *in power* the forms of the elements, not however according to substance as parts of itself ». These words sufficiently agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas (S. 1, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4), who says: « The forms of the elements remain in the mixed body not in *act* but in *power*; for the *proper qualities* of the elements remain, although remitted, in which is the *power* of the elemental forms. And a quality of mixture of this sort is the proper *disposition* to the substantial form of the mixed body, such as the form of stone or of anything animated ». — But B. Albert speaks otherwise, in *On Generation and Corruption*, book I, tr. 6, c. 3, 6.

St. Bonaventure, who in these two questions closely follows Alexander of Hales (S. p. II, q. 77 and q. 81, m. 1), disputing concerning the human body, does not explicitly explain the mode in which the elements remain in mixtures. But, his doctrine of incomplete forms and seminal reasons being supposed, several of his words in both questions, especially in fundamentum 3 of question 2, favor the affirmative opinion, as has been said above in the cited scholion. Concerning the composition of the *human* body it is disputed below in d. 17, a. 2, q. 1, 2, 3, where especially in q. 2 the solution to obj. 6 is to be noted. Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 2) also treats explicitly of the 2nd question, but says nothing of this controversy.

**II.** Other authors treat principally of the 3rd question. — Besides those already cited: St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; (as concerns the human body) S. 1, q. 91, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

la: Gen. 1, 20. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 24.

en: Gen. 1:20. — The following text is from the same passage, v. 24.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.) et VIII. Metaph. text. 6. (VII. c. 2.) et II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.). — De minori cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 55. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 26 (c. 2), and *Metaphysics* VIII, text 6 (VII, c. 2), and *On the Soul* II, text 26 (c. 2). — On the minor, cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 55 ff. (c. 4).

la: Vide librum de Causis, prop. 17.

en: See the *Book of Causes*, proposition 17.

la: De quo vide plura supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

en: On which see more above, d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121. seqq. (c. 12.). — De minori vide ibid. III. text. 60. seqq. (c. 12. seq.), ubi etiam seq. arg. insinuatur. — Vat. *et radicatur* pro *quae radicantur*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 121 ff. (c. 12). — On the minor see ibid. III, text 60 ff. (c. 12 f.), where also the following argument is insinuated. — The Vatican edition reads *et radicatur* for *quae radicantur*.

la: Sive quod corpus sit organicum; sub quo respectu Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. seq. (c. 1.), definit animam, quod sit actus primus corporis physici, organici, potentia vitam habentis. Cfr. II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Maior invenitur secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 77. m. 1. a. 1. et q. 81. m. 1, in *libro Fontis vitae*, ab Avicebrone conscripto.

en: That is, that the body be organic; under which respect Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 6 f. (c. 1), defines the soul as the first act of a physical body, organic, having life in potency. Cf. *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 3. — The major proposition is found, according to Alexander of Hales (S. p. II, q. 77, m. 1, a. 1, and q. 81, m. 1), in the *Fountain of Life*, written by Avicebron.

la: Semper enim, ut ait Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.), in eo quod est consequenter, est potentia quod prius est, et in figuris et in animatis.

en: For always, as Aristotle says, *On the Soul* II, text 31 (c. 3), in that which is consequent there is in potency what is prior, both in figures and in animate things.

la: Id est perfectionis, scil. corporis nobilis. — Vat. *complexionis* et paulo inferius *dicitur* pro *debet*.

en: That is, of perfection, namely of a noble body. — The Vatican edition reads *complexionis*, and a little below *dicitur* for *debet*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *profundit*. — De mixtione vide Aristot., I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 82. seqq. (c. 10.) et II. text. 49. seqq. (c. 8.).

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 read *profundit*. — On mixture see Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 82 ff. (c. 10) and II, text 49 ff. (c. 8).

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

la: Dist. 17. a. 2. per totum. — De ipsa solutione cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2. ad 2. et 3.

en: Distinction 17, article 2, throughout. — On the solution itself cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 2, ad 2 and 3.

la: In plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur *formis*; aliqui codd. ut H I W substituunt *spiritibus* pro *formis spiritualibus*. Cfr. supra d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 2.

en: In most codices and editions 1, 2 *formis* is missing; some codices like H I W substitute *spiritibus* for *formis spiritualibus*. Cf. above, d. 14, p. I, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Vat. *secundum earum partem, secundum quam facta* etc.

en: The Vatican edition reads *secundum earum partem, secundum quam facta* etc.

la: Libr. II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.). — Paulo inferius post *appetitus* Vat. subiungit *materiae vel*.

en: Book II of *On Generation and Corruption*, text 59 (c. 10). — A little below, after *appetitus*, the Vatican edition adds *materiae vel*.

translators_notes:
- Page span verified column-band by column-band at 450 dpi: q2 opens at p. 377 R band 1 (`QUAESTIO II. — Utrum corpora animalium sint composita ex quatuor elementis.` immediately after q1's SCHOLION II ends on p. 377 R band 0); fundamenta arg. 1–3 occupy p. 377 R bands 1–2; arg. 3 spans the page break into p. 378 L band 0 (`ad subministrandum ei…`); CONCLUSIO + Respondeo body fill p. 378 L bands 1–2; Solutio ad 1–6 fill p. 378 R bands 0–2; the chunk closes at the foot of p. 378 R with `appetitus naturae completur, et violentia non infertur.` The SCHOLION I+II then occupies the top of p. 379 (above QUAESTIO III opener); no q2-side footer notes on p. 379 (the running head reads `DIST. XV. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` because q3 opens lower on the same page; q3's footers will live in `d15-a1-q3`).
- 14 apparatus entries: p. 377 L footer carries 3 notes (Gen 1,20; Aristot. Phys.+Metaph.+de Anima; *Liber de Causis*) anchored in q2 fundamenta arg. 1, 2, 3 — [^1]–[^3]. p. 377 R footer carries 2 notes (cross-ref to d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; Aristot. II. de Anima text 121 with Vat. variant) anchored at *Ad oppositum* arg. 4 and *Fundamenta* 1 — [^4]–[^5]. p. 378 L footer carries 3 notes (organicum + Alex. Hal. compound note at *diversas operationes*; Aristot. II. de Anima text 31 at *posteriorum*; Vat. *complexionis*/*dicitur* on *dignitatem completionis*) — [^6]–[^8]. p. 378 R footer carries 6 notes ([^9]–[^14]): Cod. cc *profundit* + mixture refs; *Quaest. seq.* cross-ref; d. 17. a. 2 cross-ref + I Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2 ad 2/3; codices on *formis*/*spiritibus*; Vat. *secundum earum partem*; Aristot. II. de Gener. et corrupt. text 59 with Vat. *materiae vel* insertion.
- All marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum.* (×2 — once at the affirmative-side opener, once at the *Ad oppositum arguitur* opener), *Fundamenta.*, *Conclusio.* (×2 — once as the head before the conclusio block, once embedded inside the Respondeo), *Rationes 4.*, *Corollarium.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Notandum.* — all crisp at 450 dpi.
- Cross-chunk footer-split check: p. 377 footer was reviewed against `d15-a1-q1` Notes (which captured the p. 377 L+R footer notes anchored in q1's SCHOLION I+II body — already accounted for as q1 [^28]/[^29] per the resume hand-off). The 3 L-column footer notes on p. 377 used here (Gen 1,20; Aristot. Phys.; Lib. de Causis) sit *below* the q1 commentary tail and anchor unambiguously in q2's fundamenta arg. 1/2/3; the 2 R-column footer notes used here ([^4]–[^5]) sit below the q1 scholion tail and anchor unambiguously in q2's *Ad oppositum* arg. 4 and *Fundamenta* 1. No q2 footer migrates back to q1. q3 ([^15]+) will begin from the p. 379 footer block (q3-side, not present on this chunk).
- No `[?]` flags raised — all OCR ambiguities (e.g. `ftt` → `fit`, `mixlio` → `mixtio`, `aclu` → `actu`, `sirupus` → `syrupus`, `Spirilualis` → `spiritualis`, garbled `c0NcLusi0` → `CONCLUSIO`, `Solntio op-positorum.` → *Solutio oppositorum.*, OCR `o.` for `5.` in *Ad oppositum* arg. 5 and *Ad illud quod obiicitur quod fit elementorum violentatio* repair, OCR `i.` for *1.* in scholion I opener) resolved unambiguously against the 450 dpi PDF crops.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0