title: Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 471 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum immortalitas innocentiae eadem per essentiam fuisset cum immortalitate gloriae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum eadem esset immortalitas innocentiae per essentiam cum immortalitate gloriae, si homo stetisset. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*
1. Augustinus *de Vera Religione*[^1]: «Per Christum recuperamus, quod perdidimus in Adam»: ergo illam immortalitatem, quam in Adam perdidimus, per Christum recuperamus; sed illa immortalitas, quam recuperamus per Christum, est immortalitas gloriosa: ergo etc.

2. Item, potentia materiae disposita est eadem per essentiam cum se ipsa indisposita[^2]; sed immortalitas innocentiae et immortalitas gloriae sic se habent, sicut potentia indifferens et potentia disposita dispositione, quae est *necessitas*, cum in statu innocentiae poterat mori et non mori, in statu gloriae necesse habeat non mori, ergo etc.

3. Item, liberum arbitrium confirmatum et non confirmatum est idem per essentiam[^3], similiter et caritas: ergo pari ratione et immortalitas; sed sic se habent haec immortalitas et illa: ergo etc.

4. Item, mortalitas in statu innocentiae non est alia a mortalitate in statu miseriae, quia non est post peccatum data nova potentia nec ablata: ergo pari ratione in statu innocentiae et statu gloriae non est alia et alia immortalitas.

5. Item, si homo stetisset, transferretur ad immortalitatem, ita quod nullius proprietatis nobilis in eo fieret deperditio: ergo cum immortalitas in homine diceret conditionem nobilem, si transferretur[^4], illa immortalitas non amitteretur; sed non sunt in eodem homine duae immortalitates simul et semel: ergo immortalitas innocentiae et immortalitas gloriae non differunt.

**Sed Contra:**

<!-- page 472 -->

*Fundamenta.*
1. Quod habet aliud et aliud principium proximum, differens per essentiam, est differens per essentiam[^5]; sed immortalitas in statu innocentiae et in statu gloriae habent aliud et aliud *principium* differens per essentiam, quia illa est a gloria, ista est a gratia gratis data: ergo differunt per essentiam.

2. Item, non est transitus ab eodem in idem[^6]; sed transitus esset ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae: ergo illa immortalitas et ista non sunt eadem.

3. Item, quorum opposita sunt diversa, ipsa sunt diversa[^7]: sed immortalitas status innocentiae non opponitur mortalitati, cum simul inessent eidem — Adam enim et mortalis erat et immortalis — sed immortalitas gloriae opponitur illi: ergo non est eadem cum illa immortalitate.

4. Item, licet vita Adae esset una et continua, si stetisset in via et patria, status tamen vitae et conditio esset alia et alia, quia conditio animalitatis et spiritualitatis non habent identitatem, sed potius oppositionem et diversitatem: ergo cum immortalitas non dicat solum vitam, sed potius conditionem vitae secundum statum animalem et spiritualem[^8], videtur, quod immortalitas sit alia et alia.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per illud quod dicitur in littera[^9]: «Alia est immortalitas, quam amisimus, alia, quam in resurrectione speramus». Ex hac auctoritate expresse colligitur, quod alia sit immortalitas viae, et alia patriae.

> **Conclusio.** Immortalitas hominis in statu innocentiae et gloriae eadem est quoad potentiam, differens dispositione.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est *notandum*, quod cum idem sit significatum in principali et sumto[^10] sive in abstracto et concreto, idem est significatum huius quod est *immortale*, et eius quod est *immortalitas*. *Immortale* autem dicitur quod est aptum natum sive potens non mori; *immortalitas* igitur idem est quod potentia sive aptitudo ad non moriendum. Et haec potentia ad non moriendum non est aliud quam potentia animae in regendo et continuando corpus, ut numquam deficiat nec ab ea separetur. Haec autem potentia consequitur ipsum liberum arbitrium et ei conformatur. Unde sicut in statu *innocentiae* homo poterat peccare et non peccare, sic anima poterat corpus *continere* et non *continere*[^11], et homo poterat mori et non mori. Quia vero in statu *gloriae* impossibile est, liberum arbitrium peccare, impossibile est etiam, animam corpus deserere. Et quia in statu *miseriae* necesse habet peccare et aliquando in peccato esse, saltem in sua origine; ideo impossibile est, animam corpori vitam[^12] continuare. — Quemadmodum igitur ipsius liberi arbitrii potentia in statu *innocentiae* et *gloriae* est eadem per essentiam, differens solum secundum statum et dispositionem superadditam; sic illa potentia continuandi et regendi corpus, quae dicitur *immortalitas*, per essentiam est eadem, differens sola superaddita dispositione. — Et ideo, cum quaeritur, utrum immortalitas innocentiae et gloriae, sive viae et patriae, esset eadem, responderi potest, quod eadem est quantum ad *potentiam*[^13], sed alia quantum ad *dispositionem* superadditam; vel, ut proprius dicamus, una et eadem est, sed altera sive alterata, sicut Coriscus albus et niger idem est, sed alteratus[^14]. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod haec immortalitas et illa per essentiam essent una. Ad rationes ad oppositum facile est respondere.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. Nam ad illud quod primo obiicit, quod principium proximum huius immortalitatis et illius est aliud et aliud; plana est responsio, quia principium praecipuum, scilicet potentia contentiva est

<!-- page 473 -->

una et eadem, licet sit aliter et aliter disposita, hinc gratia, inde vero gloria.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est transitus ab eodem in idem; dicendum, quod transitus ab hac immortalitate ad illam est per diversificationem *statuum*, quia est transitus a statu in statum; et ideo, sicut quod movetur a statu imperfectionis ad statum perfectionis non dicitur aliud et aliud, sed *status* dicitur alius et alius; sic in proposito intelligendum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habent diversa opposita; dicendum, quod illa diversitas oppositionis venit ex ratione superadditae *dispositionis*, sicut intelligitur in libertate arbitrii, quae est libertas a *coactione* et a *culpa* et a *miseria*. Libertas enim a *culpa* superaddit aliquam dispositionem, scilicet gratiam; libertas autem a *miseria* superaddit aliam dispositionem, scilicet vel innocentiam, vel gloriam, ratione quarum dispositionum habet opponi diversis[^15]. Sic et immortalitas *gloriae* superaddit ultra immortalitatem *innocentiae*, sicut dispositio, quae est *necessitas*, supra dispositionem, quae est *congruitas*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immortalitas dicit conditionem vitae sive statum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non principaliter; immo principalius dicit potentiam corporis contentivam, sicut praedictum est; et ideo ratio illa non cogit.

5. Ad ultimum, scilicet ad auctoritatem Magistri, iam patet responsio. Quod enim dicitur, quod sit alia et alia, aut intelligitur hoc esse dictum, quia est altera et altera, aut intelligitur esse alia et alia, non quantum ad ipsam *potentiam*, quam principaliter importat ipsa immortalitas, sed quantum ad dispositionem superadditam. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita[^16].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the immortality of innocence would have been the same in essence as the immortality of glory.*

Secondly it is asked whether the immortality of innocence would be the same in essence as the immortality of glory, had man stood firm. And that it would be so, seems clear.

*To the opposite.*
1. Augustine, *On True Religion*[^1]: «Through Christ we recover what we lost in Adam»: therefore that immortality which we lost in Adam, we recover through Christ; but that immortality which we recover through Christ is the immortality of glory: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the potency of matter when disposed is the same in essence as itself when undisposed[^2]; but the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory are related as an undetermined potency and a potency disposed by the disposition which is *necessity*, since in the state of innocence one could die and not die, while in the state of glory one must necessarily not die; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, free choice confirmed and not confirmed is the same in essence[^3], and so likewise charity: therefore by parity of reason also immortality; but this immortality and that are so related: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, mortality in the state of innocence is no other than mortality in the state of misery, since after sin no new potency has been given or taken away: therefore by parity of reason, in the state of innocence and the state of glory there is not one and another immortality.

5. Likewise, had man stood firm, he would have been translated to immortality in such a way that no loss of any noble property would occur in him: therefore since immortality in man would express a noble condition, if he were translated[^4], that immortality would not be lost; but two immortalities are not in the same man together and at once: therefore the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory do not differ.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*
1. What has different proximate principles, differing in essence, is itself different in essence[^5]; but immortality in the state of innocence and in the state of glory have different *principles* differing in essence, since the one is from glory, the other is from grace freely given: therefore they differ in essence.

2. Likewise, there is no passage from the same to the same[^6]; but there would be a passage from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory: therefore that immortality and this are not the same.

3. Likewise, things whose opposites are diverse are themselves diverse[^7]: but the immortality of the state of innocence is not opposed to mortality, since they were both present in the same person — for Adam was both mortal and immortal — whereas the immortality of glory is opposed to it: therefore it is not the same as that immortality.

4. Likewise, although Adam's life would have been one and continuous had he stood firm both in the way and in the fatherland, yet the state of life and its condition would have been one and another, since the condition of animality and of spirituality do not have identity but rather opposition and diversity: therefore since immortality does not signify only life but rather the condition of life according to the animal and spiritual state[^8], it seems that immortality is one and another.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems to be shown by what is said in the letter[^9]: «One immortality is that which we lost, another that which we hope for in the resurrection». From this authority it is expressly gathered that the immortality of the way is one, and that of the fatherland another.

> **Conclusion.** The immortality of man in the state of innocence and in glory is the same with respect to *potency*, differing by *disposition*.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be *noted* that, since the same thing is signified in the principal and the assumed[^10], that is, in the abstract and the concrete, the same thing is signified by «*immortal*» and by «*immortality*». For «*immortal*» means that which is by nature apt or able not to die; therefore «*immortality*» is the same as the potency or aptitude of not dying. And this potency of not dying is nothing other than the potency of the soul in ruling and sustaining the body, so that it never fails nor is separated from it. Now this potency follows upon free choice itself and is conformed to it. Hence just as in the state of *innocence* man could sin and not sin, so the soul could *contain* the body and not *contain* it[^11], and man could die and not die. But since in the state of *glory* it is impossible for free choice to sin, it is also impossible for the soul to desert the body. And since in the state of *misery* it must of necessity sin and at some point be in sin, at least in its origin; therefore it is impossible for the soul to continue life[^12] to the body. — Therefore, just as the potency itself of free choice in the state of *innocence* and *glory* is the same in essence, differing only according to state and superadded disposition; so that potency of sustaining and ruling the body, which is called *immortality*, is the same in essence, differing only by a superadded disposition. — And therefore, when it is asked whether the immortality of innocence and of glory, or of the way and of the fatherland, would be the same, it can be answered that it is the same with respect to *potency*[^13], but other with respect to the superadded *disposition*; or, that we may speak more properly, it is one and the same, but altered or made altered, just as Coriscus white and Coriscus black are the same, but altered[^14]. — And therefore the arguments showing that this immortality and that would be one in essence are to be granted. To the arguments to the opposite it is easy to respond.

*Solution of the opposites.*
1. For to the first objection, that the proximate principle of this immortality and of that is one and another; the response is plain, because the chief principle, namely the containing potency, is one and the same, although disposed in different ways, here by grace, there by glory.

2. To the objection that there is no passage from the same to the same; it must be said that the passage from this immortality to that is by a diversification of *states*, since it is a passage from state to state; and therefore, just as what is moved from a state of imperfection to a state of perfection is not called one and another, but the *state* is called one and another; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To the objection that they have diverse opposites; it must be said that this diversity of opposition comes from the account of a superadded *disposition*, just as is understood in the freedom of choice, which is freedom from *coercion* and from *fault* and from *misery*. For freedom from *fault* adds some disposition, namely grace; while freedom from *misery* adds another disposition, namely either innocence or glory, by reason of which dispositions it is opposed to diverse things[^15]. So too the immortality of *glory* adds something beyond the immortality of *innocence*, as the disposition which is *necessity* over the disposition which is *congruity*.

4. To the objection that immortality signifies a condition of life or a state; it must be said that this is true, but not principally; rather, it more principally signifies the containing potency of the body, as has been said; and therefore that argument does not compel.

5. To the last, namely to the authority of the Master, the response is now plain. For what is said, that it is one and another, is either understood to be said because it is altered and altered, or understood to be one and another, not with respect to the *potency* itself, which immortality principally imports, but with respect to the superadded disposition. And so the response to the questions asked is plain[^16].

---

la: Cap. 7. n. 13; c. 12. n. 2-3; c. 16. n. 30 seqq; c. 23. n. 44; c. 46. n. 88, quibus locis s. auctor dicit, in dispensatione divinae providentiae per Christum omnia quae per peccatum amissa fuerant, esse reparata, praecipue immortalitatem.

en: Cap. 7, n. 13; c. 12, nn. 2–3; c. 16, n. 30 ff; c. 23, n. 44; c. 46, n. 88, in which places the holy author says that in the dispensation of divine providence all things which had been lost through sin have been repaired through Christ, and especially immortality.

la: Sive proxima materiae dispositio ad actum non differt essentialiter ab ipsa aptitudine et potentia ad actum, sed est eadem ac ista, differens tantum ab ea secundum statum perfectionis et imperfectionis; v. g. proxima dispositio ligni ad combustionem [in qua dispositione lignum *necessitatur* ad recipiendam formam ignis] est essentialiter eadem ac illa potentia ligni, quae per ignem ad talem dispositionem perducitur. Qualiter habeatur haec *necessitas* dispositionis, indicatur supra pag. 301, nota 3. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 4. — Paulo inferius post *cum* nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3 subiiciunt *igitur*, ed. 1 *ergo*.

en: That is, the proximate disposition of matter to act does not differ essentially from the aptitude and potency to act itself, but is the same as it, differing only according to a state of perfection and imperfection; for example, the proximate disposition of wood to combustion [in which disposition the wood *is necessitated* to receive the form of fire] is essentially the same as that potency of the wood which is led through fire to such a disposition. How this *necessity* of disposition is to be understood is indicated above on page 301, note 3. Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 88, m. 4. — A little below, after *cum* some codices with editions 2 and 3 add *igitur*; ed. 1 has *ergo*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Quoad caritatem cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, habitum caritatis in patria non evacuari, sed consummari per gloriam. — Paulo inferius pro *haec immortalitas* plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *haec mortalitas*.

en: Cf. above, d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — As to charity, cf. III *Sent.* d. 31, a. 3, q. 1, where it is shown that the habit of charity is not abolished in the fatherland but is consummated through glory. — A little below, for *haec immortalitas* several codices with editions 1, 2, 3 read *haec mortalitas*.

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 perperam *transformaretur*. In fine arg. plures codd. et omnes edd. perperam *differrent* [*different*?] pro *differunt*.

en: Not a few codices with ed. 1 wrongly read *transformaretur*. At the end of the argument, several codices and all editions wrongly read *differrent* [*different*?] for *differunt*.

la: Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: *Nam quaecumque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eaedem et effectiva et corruptiva*. Et II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 86. (c. 13.): *Easdem enim eorundem necessarium est esse causas eisdem*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 1: *For whatever things are simply the same, their generations and corruptions and their efficient and corruptive causes are also the same*. And *On the Heavens and the World* II, text 86 (c. 13): *For it is necessary that the same things have the same causes*.

la: Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.) ait: *Si Thebas quis it, impossibile est, simul ire Thebas et ivisse Thebas*. Et Averroes in II. de Anima, text. 67: *Omne recipiens aliquid non recipit ipsum nisi in modo, secundum quem caret illo*. — Minorem cod. B sic exhibet: *sed transitus esset ab eodem in idem, si fieret transitus ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae, si esset idem*.

en: Under which respect Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 7 (c. 1), says: *If someone is going to Thebes, it is impossible to be simultaneously going to Thebes and to have gone to Thebes*. And Averroes on *On the Soul* II, text 67: *Every recipient of anything receives it only in the mode according to which it lacks it*. — Codex B presents the minor thus: *but a passage would be from the same to the same, if there were a passage from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory, if it were the same*.

la: Colligitur ex Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13. et VII. c. 1.

en: Drawn from Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 13 and VII, c. 1.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5: *Quandoque autem peccant, et passionem [sive affectionem] in genere eius quod passum est ponentes, ut immortalitatem vitam sempiternam dicentes esse. Passio enim vitae et accidens immortalitas videtur esse. Quod autem verum sit quod dicitur, manifestum fit, si quis admittat, aliquem ex mortali fieri immortalem; nullus enim dicit, aliam vitam eum sumere, sed accidens aliquod vel passionem huic eidem advenire, quare vita non genus immortalitatis*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 5: *And sometimes they err in placing a passion [or affection] in the genus of that which has undergone it, as when they say immortality to be eternal life. For a passion of life and an accident immortality seems to be. That what is said is true is made manifest, if one admits that someone becomes immortal from a mortal; for no one says that he takes on another life, but that some accident or passion supervenes upon this same one, wherefore life is not a genus of immortality*.

la: Hic c. 6: *Alia est immortalitas carnis, quam in Adam accepimus, alia* etc. — Pro *amisimus* cod. aa *accipimus*.

en: Here, c. 6: *One is the immortality of the flesh, which we received in Adam, another* etc. — For *amisimus* codex aa reads *accipimus*.

la: Codd. IQ aa *assumto*, Vat. *derivativo*. Lectio nostra, quae est etiam plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, confirmatur et explicatur illis verbis, quibus B. Albertus, II. Topic. tr. 2. c. 5, utitur ad explanandum, quid sint *coniugata*. Dicit enim auctor cit.: *Sunt autem coniugata principale et sumtum a principali per concretivam denominationem, quamvis secundum grammaticum, qui modos in formatione vocum attendit, principale descendit a sumto, ut iustus sti [i. e. iusti] addita tia fit iustitia; considerando tamen ad rem et naturam, compositum descendit a simplici; principale simplex est abstractum, et sumtum ab ipso dicitur, et dicuntur coniugata quasi sub uno iugo principalis significationis coniuncta secundum modum significandi diversum*.

en: Codices IQ aa read *assumto*; Vat. *derivativo*. Our reading, which is also that of most codices and editions 1, 2, is confirmed and explained by those words which B. Albert, *Topics* II, tr. 2, c. 5, uses to explain what *conjugates* are. For the cited author says: *Conjugates are the principal and that which is taken (sumtum) from the principal through a concretive denomination, although according to the grammarian, who attends to the modes in the formation of words, the principal descends from the taken — as iustus sti [i.e. iusti], with «tia» added, becomes iustitia; yet considering the thing and its nature, the composite descends from the simple; the principal simple is the abstract, and from it the taken is named, and they are called conjugates as being joined under one yoke of the principal signification according to a diverse mode of signifying*.

la: Ed. 1: *corpus continuare et non continuare*.

en: Ed. 1 reads: *to continue the body and not to continue (it)*.

la: Edd. 3, 4 cum Vat. *unitam*. Paulo inferius pro *potentia continuandi* nonnulli codd. *potentia continendi*.

en: Editions 3 and 4 with Vat. read *unitam*. A little below, for *potentia continuandi* some codices read *potentia continendi*.

la: Sola Vat. *essentiam*, quae etiam paulo ante pro *esset eadem* exhibet *sit eadem*.

en: The Vat. alone reads *essentiam*, which also a little earlier exhibits *sit eadem* for *esset eadem*.

la: Ut ex Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.) et c. 13. (c. 14.); II. c. 2. (c. 17.), c. 1. (c. 24.) et c. 5. (c. 26.) apparet, Sophistae utebantur Corisco ad exponendas fallacias. De Corisco cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 3. (c. 1.) et supra pag. 100, nota 8. Quoad vocem *alter* sive *alteratus* cfr. supra pag. 184, nota 6.

en: As appears from Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5) and c. 13 (c. 14); II, c. 2 (c. 17), c. 1 (c. 24) and c. 5 (c. 26), the Sophists used Coriscus to expound fallacies. On Coriscus see also Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 3 (c. 1) and above, page 100, note 8. As to the word *alter* or *alteratus* see above, page 184, note 6.

la: De hac liberi arbitrii divisione, quae sumta est ex Bernardo, vide infra d. 25, p. II. dub. 2. De dispositione necessitatis et congruitatis cfr. supra d. 9. q. 3. in corp. — Mox pro *ultra* cod. T *supra*.

en: On this division of free choice, which is taken from Bernard, see below, d. 25, p. II, dub. 2. On the disposition of necessity and congruity, cf. above, d. 9, q. 3, in the body. — Shortly after, for *ultra* codex T reads *supra*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- Single quaestio spanning printed pp.471–473 (raw lines 33152–33282), opening on p.471 R-1 at `QUAESTIO II.` and closing on p.473 R-1 at *Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.* immediately before `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` at raw 33283.
- Standard Vol II procedure: 450 dpi column-band PDF reads authoritative per Vol II Override step 1. OCR cascade-fragmented through Respondeo (*Quemadmodum igitur ipsius liberi arbitrii potentia*) and the *Coriscus albus et niger* simile; the Coriscus footnote [^14] anchored from the column-band read.
- `has_scholion: false` — per d19-a3-q1 SCHOLION III ("Sequens quaestio facile ex praedictis solvitur, unde a multis Commentatoribus Lombardi explicite non tractatur"). This Q2 carries no native scholion; the sibling's SCHOLION III covers it. Standard Vol II Override step 5 — no-scholion is normal when the article's q1 scholion declares "pro quaest. seq."
- 16 apparatus entries across 3 pages: p.471 footer band [^1]–[^4]; p.472 footer band [^5]–[^14] (the densest, 10 entries including the long [^10] Albert-on-*coniugata* gloss); p.473 footer band [^15]–[^16].
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention (six labels): *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Conclusio.*, *Notandum.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, plus the in-running-head glosses *Quid immortalitas.* / *In statu innocentiae.* / *In statu gloriae.* which are absorbed silently as they don't carry semantic weight beyond signaling the Respondeo's tripartite *innocentia / gloria / miseria* sweep.
- Cross-chunk hand-off: received nothing from d19-a3-q1; forward hand-off to d19-dubia: **none** — p.473 L-2/R-2 footer banks ¹–⁷ all anchor in DUB. I/II body, not in Q2.
- No `[?]` flags — all 16 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.471–473.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 19, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XIX)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the letter of the Master (Dist. XIX)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 473 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale*. *Animale* enim denominatur ab anima, ergo omne corpus habens animam potest et debet dici *animale*; sed corpus gloriosum est huiusmodi: ergo *animale* dici potest. Qualiter ergo dividitur *animale* contra *spirituale*? Si tu dicas, quod *anima* nominat ibi vitam carnalem, sicut dicitur Ioannis duodecimo[^1]: *Qui amat animam suam perdet eam*; sed tali modo vivere est reprehensibile: ergo videtur, quod tale corpus non competeret statui innocentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomen generis aliquando appropriatur ei quod pro sui incompletione vel imperfectione non addit nomen speciale[^2]; unde, sicut *animal* appropriatur bestiis, et dicuntur bestiae esse *animalia*, sic *animale*, dictum ab anima, appropriatur quodam modo his quae habent animam cibativam. Et ideo voluit Augustinus appellare *corpus animale*, id est corpus alimoniis egens; et iste modus dicendi attenditur, secundum quod *animale* venit ab anima. Et patet responsio ad obiecta. — *Alia solutio.* Alio modo posset dici, licet minus proprie, quod *animale* veniret ab hoc, quod est *animal*; et cum *animal* approprietur bestiis, diceretur *corpus animale*[^3], id est bestiis simile. Erat autem Adam in sua conditione, quantum ad *corpus*, consimilis bestiis in hoc, quod indigebat refici cibis; quantum ad *mentem* vero *erat in honore* et bestiis dissimilis. Sed quia, *cum in honore esset, non intellexit*, immo peccavit; ideo *comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis*[^4], ut non solum ipse et eius posteri bestiis essent similes indigentia cibi, sed etiam in bestialitate et appetitu mentis. Et sic patet, pro quanto dicitur Adam habuisse corpus *animale*, et quomodo dividitur contra *spirituale*.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quod habebat corpus mortale et immortale*. Cum enim *mortale* et *immortale* sint opposita, videtur, quod duo opposita simul et semel inessent eidem[^5]. — Item, *animal* essentiali divisione dividitur per *mortale* et *immortale*, sicut per *rationale* et *irrationale*. Si ergo impossibile est, animal simul et semel esse *rationale* et *irrationale*, impossibile est, esse *mortale* et *immortale*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *immortale* dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, prout privat actum et aptitudinem moriendi; et sic dicitur *immortale*

<!-- page 474 -->

*Notandum*, quod non est potens mori; et hoc modo directe opponitur ei quod est *mortale*, et impossibile est esse circa idem. Alio modo, prout privat actum solum; et tunc dicitur *immortale*, id est potens non mori; et hoc modo *mortale* et *immortale* non habent oppositionem, quoniam « potentiae rationales et illae quae rationalibus subiiciuntur, sunt ad opposita[^6] »; et ideo, licet *actus* sint oppositi, *potentiae* tamen non sunt oppositae. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa obiecta; procedunt enim, secundum quod *immortale* privat potentiam. Et si tu obiicias, quod « potentiae distinguuntur per actus[^7] », et ita, si actus sunt oppositi, et potentiae similiter; dicendum, quod *Notandum.* illud habet locum in potentiis naturalibus puris; vel si in aliis potentiis locum habet, intelligitur de actu, qui circumplectitur totam potentiam. Cum autem potentia est ad opposita, unus illorum actuum potentiam totam non circumplectitur[^8].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *post peccatum corpus factum est mortuum*. *Mortuum* enim et *vivum* opponuntur privative: ergo si corpus Adae post peccatum vivebat, falsum est dicere, quod *mortuum* erat. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum, quia necessitati moriendi erat adstrictum; pari ratione, cum haberet necessitatem ad putrefactionem, deberet dici, corpus Adae esse *putrefactum*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in decimo tertio libro *de Civitate Dei*[^9], *mortuum* potest esse *nomen* vel *participium*. Secundum quod est *participium*, sic significat, mortem infuisse, quia est participium praeteriti temporis; et tunc dicitur esse aliquis *mortuus*, in quo mors prius fuit. Secundum autem quod est *nomen*, sic denominat aliquem non solum a morte, quae *infuit*, sed etiam a morte, quae *inest*, sicut dicitur aliquis *albus* ab albedine, quae inest. Et quoniam mors nihil aliud dicit quam tendentiam ad non-esse, et homo continue ad non-esse tendit post lapsum; hinc est, quod continue est in morte, et ideo continue potest dici *mortuus*. Et ideo dicit Apostolus[^10], quod *corpus mortuum est propter peccatum*.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod *mortuum* et *vivum* opponuntur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *mortuum* simpliciter privat *vivum*, hoc est, secundum quod dicit actualem separationem sive terminum corruptionis. Quando autem dicit ordinem ad illum terminum, non opponitur de se, sed ratione eius, ad quod ordinat, quia ordinat ad oppositum vitae; et sic simul possunt stare, immo necesse est, simul esse cum vita praesenti. Et ideo signanter participium huius verbi *morior* est anomalum[^11] nec tenet formationem aliorum participiorum praeteriti temporis, sicut dicit Augustinus.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sumeret de ligno vitae, quo perfecte immortalis factus, cibi alimenta ulterius non requireret*. Contra hoc est: quod est corruptibile non potest dare incorruptionem; sed fructus illius ligni vitae erat corruptibilis; aliter non posset manducari et digeri: ergo non poterat homini praebere perfectam immortalitatem. — Item, aut ille fructus convertebatur in corpus humanum, aut non. Si non: ergo non reficiebat nec sustentabat; si sic: ergo erat eiusdem naturae cum carne reliqua: ergo videtur, quod immortalitatem praestare non poterat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud lignum vitae dicitur ab Augustino[^12] potuisse praestare perfectam immortalitatem, non quia propria virtute posset *Notandum.* corpus hominis facere incorruptibile, cum hoc sit solius potentiae divinae; sed quia virtute sibi data habebat ad hoc *disponere*, et divina virtus illi ligno tanquam sacramento assisteret, quae immortalitatem *perficeret*. — Et quod lignum vitae hanc posset habere virtutem, ut ad immortalitatem disponeret, satis patet in multis similibus. Multa enim sunt aromata, ut myrrha et balsamus, quae corpus hominis diu a putrefactione conservant. Quod vero ratione divinae virtutis assistentis diceretur corporibus illis immortalitatem praebere, simile habetur in Sacramentis, quae dicuntur conferre gratiam, quamvis non ipsam gratiam creent, sed divina virtus ipsis assistens, sicut melius in quarto libro[^13] explicari habet. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, cum lignum vitae esset primis hominibus in Sacramentum, sicut dicit Augustinus[^14].

---

english:
<!-- page 473 -->

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first there is inquiry concerning what he says: *In the first state the body of man was animal*. For *animal* takes its name from soul (*anima*); therefore every body having a soul can and ought to be called *animal*; but the glorious body is of this kind: therefore it can be called *animal*. How then is *animal* divided against *spiritual*? If you say that *soul* there names carnal life, as it is said in John chapter twelve[^1]: *He who loves his soul will lose it*; but to live in such a manner is reprehensible: therefore it seems that such a body would not befit the state of innocence.

**I respond:** It must be said that a generic name is sometimes appropriated to that which, on account of its incompleteness or imperfection, does not add a special name[^2]; whence, just as *animal* is appropriated to beasts, and beasts are called *animals*, so *animale*, named from soul, is appropriated in a certain manner to those which have a nutritive soul. And therefore Augustine wished to call the body *animale*, that is, a body needing nourishment; and this mode of speaking is taken according as *animale* comes from soul. And the response to the objections is plain. — *Another solution.* In another way it could be said, though less properly, that *animale* would come from this, that it is an *animal*; and since *animal* is appropriated to beasts, the *body* would be called *animale*[^3], that is, like the beasts. Now Adam in his condition was, as to *body*, like the beasts in this, that he needed to be refreshed with foods; but as to *mind* he *was in honour* and unlike the beasts. But because, *being in honour, he did not understand*, but rather sinned; therefore *he is compared to the senseless beasts and is become like to them*[^4], so that not only he and his posterity should be like the beasts in their need of food, but also in bestiality and in the appetite of mind. And thus it is plain in what sense Adam is said to have had an *animal* body, and how it is divided against *spiritual*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says: *That he had a body mortal and immortal*. For since *mortal* and *immortal* are opposites, it seems that two opposites would be in the same thing simultaneously and at once[^5]. — Likewise, *animal* is divided by essential division into *mortal* and *immortal*, just as into *rational* and *irrational*. If therefore it is impossible that an animal be at one and the same time *rational* and *irrational*, it is impossible that it be *mortal* and *immortal*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *immortal* is said in two ways. In one way, as it deprives [a thing] of the act and aptitude of dying; and so it is called *immortal*

<!-- page 474 -->

*Note*, which is not capable of dying; and in this way it is directly opposed to that which is *mortal*, and it is impossible [for both] to be about the same thing. In another way, as it deprives [a thing] only of the act; and then it is called *immortal*, that is, capable of not dying; and in this way *mortal* and *immortal* do not have opposition, since "rational potencies, and those which are subjected to rational ones, are towards opposites[^6]"; and therefore, although the *acts* are opposed, the *potencies* nevertheless are not opposed. — And thus the response to those objections is plain; for they proceed according as *immortal* deprives of potency. And if you object that "potencies are distinguished through acts[^7]", and so, if the acts are opposed, the potencies likewise are; it must be said that *Note.* this holds in pure natural potencies; or if it holds in other potencies, it is understood of an act which encompasses the whole potency. But when a potency is towards opposites, one of those acts does not encompass the whole potency[^8].

### Doubt III.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says, that *after sin the body became dead*. For *dead* and *living* are opposed privatively: therefore if Adam's body was living after sin, it is false to say that it was *dead*. If you say this was said because it was bound by the necessity of dying; by parity of reason, since it had the necessity of putrefaction, it ought to be said that Adam's body was *putrefied*.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine says in the thirteenth book *On the City of God*[^9], *mortuum* (dead) can be either a *noun* or a *participle*. According as it is a *participle*, it signifies that death has been in [the subject], because it is the participle of past time; and then one is said to be *dead* in whom death previously was. But according as it is a *noun*, it so designates someone not only from death which *was in him*, but also from death which *is in him*, just as someone is said to be *white* from whiteness which is in him. And since death says nothing other than a tendency toward non-being, and man continually tends toward non-being after the lapse; hence it is that he is continually in death, and therefore can continually be called *dead*. And therefore the Apostle says[^10], that *the body is dead on account of sin*.

What is objected, then, that *dead* and *living* are opposed, must be answered: it is true according as *dead* simply deprives [a thing] of *living*, that is, according as it bespeaks an actual separation or the terminus of corruption. But when it speaks of an *order* to that terminus, it is not opposed of itself, but by reason of that to which it orders, since it orders to the opposite of life; and thus they can stand together, indeed it is necessary, that they be together with present life. And therefore the participle of this verb *morior* is significantly anomalous[^11] and does not keep the formation of the other participles of past time, as Augustine says.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says: *He would take of the tree of life, by which, made perfectly immortal, he would no longer require food for nourishment*. Against this is: that which is corruptible cannot give incorruption; but the fruit of that tree of life was corruptible; otherwise it could not be eaten and digested: therefore it could not afford perfect immortality to man. — Likewise, either that fruit was converted into the human body, or not. If not: therefore it did not refresh nor sustain; if so: therefore it was of the same nature with the rest of the flesh: therefore it seems that it could not bestow immortality.

**I respond:** It must be said that that tree of life is said by Augustine[^12] to have been able to bestow perfect immortality, not because by its own power it could *Note.* make the body of man incorruptible, since this belongs to divine power alone; but because by the power given to it, it had the capacity to *dispose* to this, and divine power would assist that tree as a sacrament, [a power] which would *perfect* immortality. — And that the tree of life could have this power, namely to dispose to immortality, is sufficiently plain in many similar cases. For there are many aromatic substances, like myrrh and balsam, which preserve the body of man long from putrefaction. But that they would be said to bestow immortality on those bodies by reason of the assisting divine power, the like is found in the Sacraments, which are said to confer grace, although they do not themselves create grace, but the divine power assisting them does, as is better explained in the fourth book[^13]. So too in the present matter it is to be understood, since the tree of life was for the first men a Sacrament, as Augustine says[^14].

---

la: Vers. 25.

en: Verse 25.

la: Sive cui propter sui incompletionem vel imperfectionem non datur nomen speciale. — Pro *incompletione vel imperfectione* cod. T a secunda manu *completione vel perfectione*; cod. aa *quod per sui completionem vel perfectionem*. Proxime post in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desiderantur verba: *appropriatur bestiis... dictum ab anima*.

en: Or [to that] to which, on account of its incompleteness or imperfection, no special name is given. — For *incompletione vel imperfectione* codex T by a second hand reads *completione vel perfectione*; codex aa *which through its completeness or perfection*. Immediately after in the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 the words are missing: *appropriatur bestiis... dictum ab anima*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *corpus eius animale*. Mox cod. O ante *conditione* adiicit *prima*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *corpus eius animale*. Shortly after, codex O before *conditione* adds *prima*.

la: Psalm. 48, 13. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 82. m. 2. seq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 78; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. 2. et 3. lit.

en: Psalm 48:13. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 82 m. 2 ff.; B. Albert, *Summa* p. II tr. 13 q. 78; S. Thomas, here on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here doubt 2 and 3 on the letter.

la: Quod est impossibile; de quo cfr. supra pag. 100, nota 1. — De ratione seq. cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 2, ubi haec: *Differentia est animalis immortale, eo quod animalium alia mortalia, alia immortalia*. Cfr. et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.

en: Which is impossible; on which cf. above p. 100, note 1. — On the following reasoning cf. Aristotle, *Topics* IV c. 2, where these words: *A differentia of animal is "immortal," because of animals some are mortal, others immortal*. Cf. also Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter on Differentia.

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX text 3 and 10 (VIII c. 2 and 5).

la: Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). — Cod. S. addit *et actus per obiecta*.

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* II text 33 (c. 4). — Codex S adds *and acts through their objects*.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 4; Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. 2. lit.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 88 m. 4; Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, here on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here doubt 2 on the letter.

en: Chapter 11 n. 2.

en: Romans 8:10.

la: Graece ἀνώμαλον i. e. inaequale sive irregulare. De anomalia grammatici agunt et quidem illa verba vocant anomala, quae inaequaliter sive irregulariter declinantur vel coniugantur, quorum contraria *analoga* nominantur. — Verba August., quae hic respiciuntur, exstant XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et sic sonant: *Ab eo quod est oritur, fit verbum praeteriti temporis: ortus est; et si qua similia sunt, per temporis praeteriti participia declinantur. Ab eo vero quod est moritur, si quaeramus praeteriti temporis verbum, responderi adsolet: mortuus est, U littera geminata. Sic enim dicitur mortuus, quomodo fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, et si qua similia, quae non sunt praeteriti temporis, sed quoniam nomina sunt, sine tempore declinantur. Illud autem quasi ut declinetur, quod declinari non potest, pro participio praeteriti temporis ponitur nomen.* — De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit., Aegid. R., hic dub. 1. et 6. lit.

en: In Greek ἀνώμαλον, i.e. unequal or irregular. Grammarians treat of anomaly, and they call those verbs anomalous which are declined or conjugated unequally or irregularly, whose contraries are named *analogous*. — The words of Augustine which are looked to here are found in XIII *de Civ. Dei*, c. 11 n. 2, and run thus: *From* est *(is) arises the past-tense verb:* ortus est; *and if there are any similar, they are declined through participles of past time. But from* moritur, *if we seek a past-tense verb, the customary answer is:* mortuus est, *with the letter U doubled. For* mortuus *is said in the way that* fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, *and such similar words are said, which are not of past time, but since they are nouns, are declined without time. But that, as it were, this be declined which cannot be declined, in place of the past-tense participle a noun is put.* — On this doubt cf. S. Thomas, Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, here on the letter, Aegidius Romanus, here doubts 1 and 6 on the letter.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. et 6.

en: See here the letter of the Master, c. 5 and 6.

la: Dist. I. p. I. a. 1. q. 4. — Pro *divina virtus ipsis assistens* cod. O *divina virtus existens in ipsis*.

en: Distinction I p. I a. 1 q. 4. — For *the divine power assisting them* codex O reads *the divine power existing in them*.

la: Libr. VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8: *Erat ei ergo in lignis ceteris alimentum, in illo autem Sacramentum.* — Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic dub. 7. lit.

en: Book VIII *de Genesi ad litteram* c. 4 n. 8: *In the other trees, therefore, there was for him food; but in that one, a Sacrament.* — Cf. above a. 2 q. 2 and a. 3 q. 1; Aegidius Romanus, here doubt 7 on the letter. ---

translators_notes:
- **Dub count: 4** (Dub. I — *animale* vs *spirituale*; Dub. II — *mortale et immortale* simultaneous opposition; Dub. III — *mortuum* as nomen vs participium; Dub. IV — tree of life conferring perfect immortality). The OCR raw scrambles the two-column flow so that DUB. IV at line 33348 precedes DUB. III at line 33356 in source order; the printed page reads Dub. III in p.474 L-1, Dub. IV in p.474 R-1 — restored to semantic I → II → III → IV order in this chunk.
- **Apparatus count: 16 entries** ([^1]–[^14] are independently footed by page: p.473 L-2 ¹–⁴ (here as [^1]–[^2] partly absorbed by d19-a3-q2's hand-off — corrected: see below), p.473 R-2 ⁵–⁷ = [^3]–[^5]; p.474 L-2 ¹–⁶ = [^6]–[^11]; p.474 R-2 ⁷–⁹ = [^12]–[^14]). **Re-numbered actually in chunk as [^1]–[^14] sequentially** by body order with [^1] = p.473 R-2 ³ *Vers. 25* (anchor on *Ioannis duodecimo*), [^2] = p.473 L-2 ⁴ (anchor on *non addit nomen speciale*), [^3] = p.473 L-2 ¹ *Cod. cc... corpus eius animale* (anchor on second-modus *corpus animale*), [^4] = p.473 L-2 ² *Psalm 48,13* (anchor on *similis factus est illis*), [^5] = p.473 R-2 ⁷ *Quod est impossibile* (anchor on *inessent eidem*), [^6] = p.474 L-2 ¹ Aristot. IX Metaph. (anchor on *ad opposita*), [^7] = p.474 L-2 ² Aristot II de Anima (anchor on *potentiae distinguuntur per actus*), [^8] = p.474 L-2 ³ Cfr Alex Hal (anchor on *circumplectitur*), [^9] = p.474 L-2 ⁴ Cap 11 n 2 (anchor on *de Civitate Dei*), [^10] = p.474 L-2 ⁵ Rom 8,10 (anchor on *Apostolus*), [^11] = p.474 L-2 ⁶ Graece ἀνώμαλον (anchor on *anomalum*), [^12] = p.474 R-2 ⁷ Vide hic lit Magistri (anchor on *ab Augustino*), [^13] = p.474 R-2 ⁸ Dist I p I a 1 q 4 (anchor on *in quarto libro*), [^14] = p.474 R-2 ⁹ Libr VIII de Gen ad lit (anchor on closing *sicut dicit Augustinus*). Actual chunk entry count: **14**.
- **No [?] flags** — all 14 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.473–474. OCR around raw 33283–33402 was two-column cascade-fragmented (DUB. IV physically printed in p.474 R-1 appears in raw before DUB. III which is in p.474 L-1); column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override step 1.
- **`has_scholion: false`** — dubia chunks carry no SCHOLION by design.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline (Vol II convention):** *Alia solutio.* (Dub. I body), *Notandum.* (×2, Dub. II body and Dub. IV body, the second *Notandum.* in Dub. II as well = three total).
- **Cross-chunk hand-off received** from d19-a3-q2: **none** — d19-a3-q2 closed on p.473 L-1 at *Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita*[^16] with all its 16 footers anchoring inside its body and inside p.471–473 L-2 banks; the p.473 L-2 ¹ "De hac liberi arbitrii divisione..." footer is d19-a3-q2's [^15] cross-reference to d.25 p.II dub.2, NOT a dubia footer. **Forward hand-off** to d20-littera: **none** — p.474 footer banks all anchor in DUB. III/IV body.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 20

title_alt:
Distinctio XX — Littera Magistri
Distinction XX — The Text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 475 -->

### DISTINCTIO XX.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De modo procreationis filiorum, si non peccassent primi homines.*

Post haec videndum est, qualiter primi parentes, si non peccassent, filios procreassent, et quales ipsi filii nascerentur. — *Opinio quorundam.* Quidam putant, ad gignendos filios primos homines in paradiso misceri non potuisse nisi post peccatum, dicentes, concubitum sine corruptione vel macula non posse fieri. Sed ante peccatum nec corruptio nec macula in homine esse poterat; quoniam ex peccato haec consecuta sunt. — *Improbatur.* Ad quod dicendum est, quod si non peccassent primi homines, sine omni peccato et macula in paradiso carnali copula convenissent, et esset ibi *thorus immaculatus*, et commixtio sine concupiscentia; atque genitalibus membris sicut ceteris imperarent, ut ibi nullum motum illicitum sentirent; et sicut alia membra corporis aliis admovemus, ut manum ori, sine ardore libidinis, ita genitalibus uterentur membris sine aliquo pruritu carnis. Haec enim lethalis aegritudo membris humanis ex peccato inhaesit. Genuissent itaque filios in paradiso per coitum immaculatum et sine corruptione.

*Augustinus.* Unde Augustinus *super Genesim*[^1]: « Cur non credamus, primos homines ante peccatum genitalibus membris ad procreationem imperare potuisse, sicut ceteris in quolibet opere sine voluptatis pruritu utimur? Incredibile enim non est, Deum talia fecisse illa corpora, ut, si non peccassent, illis membris sicut pedibus imperarent, nec cum ardore seminarent vel cum dolore parerent; sed post peccatum motum illum meruerunt, quem nuptiae ordinant, continentia cohibet ». « *Dubium 1.* Infirmitas enim prona in ruinam turpitudinis excipitur honestate nuptiali, et quod sanis esset officium aegrotis est in remedium ». « *Dubium 2.* Emissi quidem de paradiso convenerunt et genuerunt, sed potuerunt in paradiso eis esse *nuptiae honorabiles et thorus immaculatus* sine ardore libidinis, sine labore pariendi ».

#### Cap. II.

#### *Quare in paradiso non coierunt.*

Cur ergo non coierunt in paradiso? *Dubium 3.* Quia, creata muliere, mox transgressio facta est, et eiecti sunt de paradiso: vel quia nondum Deus iusserat, ut coirent, et poterat divina exspectari auctoritas, ubi concupiscentia non angebat. Deus vero non iusserat, quia casum eorum praesciebat, de quibus homo propagandus erat[^2]. — Ecce expresse habes de modo propagationis filiorum.

#### Cap. III.

#### *De modo translationis in melius, si non peccassent.*

De termino vero temporis, quo transferrentur ad spiritualem[^3] caelestemque vitam, certum aliquid Scriptura non tradit. Et ideo ambiguum est, utrum *Dupliciter solvitur.* parentes, genitis filiis perfectaque humani officii iustitia, ad meliorem statum transferrentur, non per mortem, sed per aliquam mutationem; an parentes in aliquo statu vitae remanerent, ligno vitae utentes, donec filii ad eundem statum pervenirent, et sic impleto numero, omnes simul ad meliora transferrentur, ut essent sicut sancti Angeli in caelis. De quo *Augustinus.* Augustinus ambigue disserit *super Genesim*[^4], ita inquiens: « Potuerunt primi homines in paradiso filios gignere, non ut morientibus parentibus succederent filii, sed in aliquo formae statu manentibus et de ligno vitae vigorem sumentibus, et filii ad eundem perducerentur statum, donec, impleto numero, sine morte animalia corpora *Dubium 4.* in aliam qualitatem transirent, in qua omnino regenti spiritui deservirent, et solo spiritu vivificante, sine corporeis alimentis viverent ». « Vel potuerunt parentes filiis cedere, ut per successiones numerus impleretur, qui, genitis filiis perfectaque humani officii iustitia, ad meliora transferrentur, non per mortem, sed per aliquam mutationem ». — Ecce hic habemus de transitu hominis ad meliora, sed incertum nobis relinquitur, utrum simul transferrentur, an per successiones.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Utrum in perfectione staturae et usu membrorum procrearentur filii.*

« Si vero quaeritur, quales, si non peccasset homo, filios genuisset, utrum videlicet, sicut ipse primus homo secundum staturam corporis et usum membrorum perfectus mox conditus exstitit, ita etiam eius filii in ipso nativitatis exordio perfecti exsisterent, quia ambulare et loqui et cuncta facere possent[^5] »; responderi potest, quod filios parvulos nasci oportebat propter materni uteri necessitatem. Sed utrum mox nati perfectionem staturae et membrorum usum haberent; an parvuli et in minore aetate constituti uti possent membrorum officiis; an per intervalla temporum eo modo, quo nunc fit, perfectionem staturae et usum membrorum recepturi essent; de auctoritatibus definitum non habemus.

Et super hoc *Augustinus.* Augustinus ambigue loquitur. « Movet nos, inquit, si primi homines non peccassent, utrum tales filios essent habituri, qui nec lingua nec
<!-- page 476 -->
manibus nec pedibus[^6] uterentur. Nam propter uteri necessitatem forte necesse erat, parvulos nasci; sed, quamvis exigua pars corporis sit costa, non tamen propter hoc parvulam viro coniugem fecit; unde et eius filios poterat omnipotentia Creatoris mox natos grandes facere ». « Sed ut hoc omittam, poterat certe eis praestare quod multis animalibus praestitit, quorum pulli, quamvis sint parvuli, tamen mox, ut nascuntur, currunt et matres sequuntur. Econtra homini nato nec ad incessum pedes idonei sunt nec manus, saltem ad scalpendum, habiles, et iuxta se mammis positis, nascentes magis possunt esurientes flere quam sugere, propriaeque infirmitati mentis congruit haec infirmitas carnis[^7] ». — His verbis videtur insinuari, quod filii, etiam parvuli, officiis membrorum valerent uti.

*Aliorum opinio.* « Sed cum Augustinus sub assertione de his nihil tradat, non irrationabiliter quibusdam placuit, primorum parentum filios nascituros parvos, ac deinde per intervalla temporum eadem lege, qua et nunc nativitatem humanam ordinatam cernimus, staturae incrementum et membrorum usum recepturos, ut in illis *Dubium 5.* exspectaretur aetas ad ambulandum et loquendum, sicut modo in nobis; quod utique non esset vitio deputandum, sed conditioni naturae, sicut a cibo non penitus abstinere valebant, nec tamen illud erat ex vitio, sed ex natura conditionis[^8] ».

« *Opponitur.* Ad hoc autem opponitur ita: si non peccarent, nec morerentur; sed non peccarent, si non comederent: poterant ergo sine alimonia vivere. — *Responsio.* Ceterum, sicut supra[^9] diximus, non solum peccarent, si de ligno vetito ederent, sed etiam, si concessis non uterentur, quia, sicut erat eis praeceptum, non illo ligno vesci, ita aliis vesci. Praeterea, contra naturalem rationem facerent, qua intelligebant, de illis esse edendum, quod et naturaliter appetebant. — *Alia obiectio.* Item opponitur: cum fames sit poena peccati, si non peccarent, famem non sentirent; sed sine fame superfluum videretur comedere ». « Unde putant quidam, eos cibis non indiguisse ante peccatum, quia non poterant esurire, si non peccassent. — *Responsio.* Ad quod dici potest, quod fames vere defectus est et poena peccati. Est enim immoderatus appetitus edendi, cui non subiacuisset homo, si non peccasset; sed procul dubio peccaret, nisi hunc defectum cibo praeveniret. Habebat enim naturalem appetitum et moderatum, cui ita satisfaciendum erat, ne defectum famis sentiret. Sicut igitur non ex vitio, sed ex naturae conditione erat, quod ante peccatum homo cibis indigebat, ita non ex vitio esset, sed de natura, si hominis conditio in principio suo, id est in primo parente, a perfecto inchoata, in subsequenti propagatione a modico ad maiora proficeret, ut scilicet per intervalla temporis staturae corporeae incrementa usumque membrorum susciperet ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *Utrum etiam in sensu parvuli nascerentur.*

« Et cum de corpore humano non sit absurdum vel inconveniens hoc existimare, quaeri solet, utrum de sensu animae et cognitione veritatis eodem modo sentiendum sit, ut scilicet hi qui sine peccato nascerentur, sensu et intelligentia mentis imperfecti exsisterent et per accessum temporis in his proficerent usque ad perfectionem; an mox conditi perfectionem sensus et cognitionis perciperent. — *Sententia quorundam.* Illi qui sentiunt, parvulos natos in statura corporis et usu membrorum per accessum temporis profecturos, non diffitentur, eosdem in exordio nativitatis sensu imperfectos exsistere et per *Dubium 6.* intervallum temporis in sensu et cognitione proficere usque ad perfectum[^11] ».

« *Opponitur.* Ad quod quidam opponunt dicentes: si mox nati non haberent perfectionem sensus et intelligentiae, ignorantia in eis esset; ignorantia autem peccati est poena. — *Replicatur.* Sed qui hoc dicunt, non satis diligenter considerant, quia non omnis, qui aliquid nescit vel minus perfecte aliquid scit, statim ignorantiam habere sive *in ignorantia*[^10] esse dicendus est, quia ignorantia non dicitur, nisi cum id quod sciri et non ignorari debet, nescitur. Talisque ignorantia poena peccati est, cum mens vitio obscuratur, ne cognoscere valeat ea quae scire deberet ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *De duobus bonis, altero hic dato, altero promisso.*

« Talis erat hominis institutio ante peccatum secundum corporis conditionem. De hoc autem statu transferendus erat cum universa posteritate sua ad meliorem digniorem que statum, ubi caelesti et aeterno bono in caelis sibi parato frueretur. Sicut enim ex duplici natura compactus est homo, ita illi duo bona Conditor a principio praeparavit: unum temporale, alterum aeternum; unum visibile, alterum invisibile; unum carni, alterum spiritui ». « Et quia primum est quod est *animale*, deinde quod est *spirituale*[^12], temporale ac visibile bonum prius dedit. Invisibile autem et aeternum promisit et meritis quaerendum proposuit. Ad illius autem custodiam, quod dederat, et ad aliud promerendum[^13], quod promiserat, naturali rationi in creatione animae hominis inditae, qua poterat inter bonum et malum discernere, praeceptum *Dubium 7.* addidit obedientiae, per cuius observantiam datum non perderet et promissum obtineret, ut[^14] per meritum veniret ad praemium ».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XX.

#### Cap. I.

#### *On the mode of procreating children, if the first parents had not sinned.*

After these things it must be seen how the first parents, if they had not sinned, would have procreated children, and what manner of children would have been born to them. — *Opinion of certain ones.* Some think that the first men could not have been joined together in paradise for the begetting of children except after sin, saying that intercourse cannot happen without corruption or stain. But before sin neither corruption nor stain could be in man, since these things followed from sin. — *It is refuted.* To which it must be said that, if the first parents had not sinned, they would have come together in carnal union in paradise without any sin or stain, and there would have been an *undefiled marriage-bed*, and intercourse without concupiscence; and they would have commanded their genital members as the others, so that they would feel no illicit motion there; and just as we move other members of the body to others — the hand to the mouth — without the burning of lust, so they would have used their genital members without any itching of the flesh. For this deadly sickness has clung to the members of man from sin. They would therefore have begotten children in paradise through immaculate intercourse and without corruption.

*Augustine.* Hence Augustine *on Genesis*[^1]: « Why should we not believe that the first men, before sin, were able to command their genital members for procreation, just as we use the others in any work whatever without the itching of pleasure? For it is not incredible that God made those bodies such that, if they had not sinned, they would command those members as their feet, neither would they sow with burning nor bear with sorrow; but after sin they earned that motion which marriage orders and continence restrains ». « *Doubt 1.* For weakness prone to a downfall of turpitude is taken up by the honor of marriage, and what would be a duty in the sound is a remedy in the sick ». « *Doubt 2.* Once dismissed from paradise they did indeed come together and beget, but in paradise they could have had *honorable nuptials and an undefiled bed* without the burning of lust, without the labor of bringing forth ».

#### Cap. II.

#### *Why they did not have intercourse in paradise.*

Why then did they not have intercourse in paradise? *Doubt 3.* Because, the woman having been created, transgression at once took place, and they were cast out of paradise: or because God had not yet commanded that they have intercourse, and the divine authority could be awaited where concupiscence did not press. But God had not commanded it, because he foreknew their fall, from whom man was to be propagated[^2]. — Here you have expressly concerning the mode of propagation of children.

#### Cap. III.

#### *On the mode of translation to a better state, if they had not sinned.*

But concerning the terminus of the time at which they were to be translated to the spiritual[^3] and heavenly life, Scripture does not hand on anything certain. And therefore it is ambiguous *It is resolved two ways.* whether the parents, with children begotten and the justice of the human office being made perfect, would be translated to a better state, not through death, but through some change; or whether the parents would remain in some state of life, using the tree of life, until the children should attain the same state, and thus, the number being filled, all together would be translated to better things, so that they might be like the holy Angels in heaven. Concerning which *Augustine.* Augustine discusses ambiguously *on Genesis*[^4], speaking thus: « The first men in paradise could have begotten children, not so that the parents dying the children might succeed them, but with the parents remaining in some state of form and drawing vigor from the tree of life, and the children would be led to the same state, until, the number being filled, animal bodies without death *Doubt 4.* would pass into another quality, in which they would serve entirely the ruling spirit, and, with the spirit alone vivifying, would live without bodily nourishments ». « Or the parents could yield to the children, so that through successions the number might be filled, who, with children begotten and the justice of the human office made perfect, would be translated to better things, not through death, but through some change ». — Behold, here we have something about the passage of man to better things, but it is left uncertain to us whether they were translated all at once or by successions.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Whether the children would be procreated in the perfection of stature and use of members.*

« But if it be asked what sort of children, if man had not sinned, he would have begotten — namely, whether, just as the first man himself stood forth as perfect at once when made according to the stature of body and use of members, so also his children would exist perfect in the very beginning of birth, since they could walk and speak and do all things[^5] »; it can be answered that it was fitting that the children be born small on account of the necessity of the maternal womb. But whether, once born, they would have the perfection of stature and the use of members; or whether as small ones and set in a lesser age they could use the offices of the members; or whether through intervals of time, in that manner in which it now happens, they would receive perfection of stature and use of members; we have nothing defined from authorities.

And concerning this *Augustine.* Augustine speaks ambiguously. « It moves us, he says, whether the first men, if they had not sinned, would have had such children as would use neither tongue nor
<!-- page 476 -->
nor hands nor feet[^6]. For perhaps on account of the necessity of the womb it was necessary that small ones be born; but, although the rib is a small part of the body, he did not on this account make a small wife for the man; whence also the omnipotence of the Creator could make his children great as soon as born ». « But to omit this, he could certainly have granted them what he granted to many animals, whose young, although small, nevertheless as soon as they are born run and follow their mothers. On the contrary, for a man newly born neither are his feet fit for walking nor are his hands at all dexterous, even for scratching, and with breasts placed beside them, those being born can rather, when hungry, cry than suck, and to the proper weakness of mind this weakness of flesh is congruent[^7] ». — By these words it seems to be hinted that the children, even though small, would be able to use the offices of the members.

*Opinion of others.* « But since Augustine hands on nothing as assertion concerning these things, it has pleased certain ones not unreasonably that the children of the first parents were to be born small, and then through intervals of time, by the same law by which we now see human birth ordered, would receive increase of stature and use of members, so that in them *Doubt 5.* the age for walking and speaking would be awaited, just as now in us; which certainly would not be imputed to fault, but to the condition of nature, just as they were not able to abstain altogether from food, yet that was not from fault, but from the nature of their condition[^8] ».

« *It is objected.* Against this however it is objected thus: if they had not sinned, they would not have died; but they would not have sinned, if they had not eaten: they could therefore live without nourishment. — *Response.* But, as we have said above[^9], they would not only have sinned if they had eaten of the forbidden tree, but also if they had not used the permitted ones, because, just as it had been commanded to them not to feed on that tree, so to feed on the others. Moreover, they would have acted against natural reason, by which they understood that they were to eat of those which they also naturally desired. — *Another objection.* Likewise it is objected: since hunger is the punishment of sin, if they had not sinned, they would not feel hunger; but without hunger it would seem superfluous to eat ». « Whence some think that they did not need foods before sin, because they could not be hungry, if they had not sinned. — *Response.* To which it can be said that hunger truly is a defect and the punishment of sin. For it is an immoderate appetite of eating, to which man would not have been subject, if he had not sinned; but without doubt he would sin, unless he forestalled this defect with food. For he had a natural and moderate appetite, which had to be so satisfied that he might not feel the defect of hunger. As therefore it was not from fault, but from the condition of nature, that before sin man needed foods, so neither would it be from fault, but from nature, if man's condition, begun from the perfect in its beginning, that is in the first parent, in subsequent propagation should advance from little to greater, namely that through intervals of time it should take on increments of bodily stature and use of members ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *Whether they would also be born as small ones in sense.*

« And since concerning the human body it is not absurd or unfitting to estimate this, it is wont to be asked whether concerning the sense of the soul and the cognition of truth it must be thought in the same way, namely whether those who would be born without sin would exist imperfect in the sense and understanding of mind and through the accession of time would progress in these things up to perfection; or whether, once made, they would at once perceive the perfection of sense and cognition. — *The opinion of certain ones.* Those who think that the small ones born were to advance in the stature of body and use of members through the accession of time do not deny that the same ones in the beginning of birth exist imperfect in sense and through *Doubt 6.* an interval of time advance in sense and cognition up to the perfect[^11] ».

« *It is objected.* Against which some object, saying: if those newly born did not have the perfection of sense and intelligence, ignorance would be in them; but ignorance is the punishment of sin. — *Reply.* But those who say this do not consider diligently enough, because not everyone who does not know something or knows something less perfectly is at once to be said to have ignorance or to be *in ignorance*[^10], because ignorance is not so called except when that which ought to be known and not ignored is not known. And such ignorance is the punishment of sin, when the mind is darkened by vice so that it cannot recognize the things it ought to know ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *On the two goods, the one given here, the other promised.*

« Such was the institution of man before sin according to the condition of body. From this state, however, he was to be translated with all his posterity to a better and worthier state, where he would enjoy the heavenly and eternal good prepared for him in heaven. For just as man is compacted from a twofold nature, so the Creator from the beginning prepared two goods for him: one temporal, the other eternal; one visible, the other invisible; one for the flesh, the other for the spirit ». « And because the first is that which is *animal*, then that which is *spiritual*[^12], he first gave the temporal and visible good. But the invisible and eternal he promised and proposed to be sought by merits. And for the custody of that which he had given, and for meriting the other[^13], which he had promised, to the natural reason placed in the creation of man's soul, by which he could discern between good and evil, he added a precept *Doubt 7.* of obedience, by whose observance he would not lose the given and would obtain the promised, that[^14] through merit he might come to the reward ».

---

la: Libr. IX. c. 10. n. 18. Sequens locus ibid. c. 7. n. 12, et tertius ibid. c. 3. n. 6. — In primo textu codd. cum edd. 4, 6, 8, 9 *utuntur* pro *utimur*. In originali habetur: *sicut ceteris, quae in quolibet opere anima sine ulla molestia et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet.* — Bis respicitur illud ad Hebr. 13, 4: *Honorabile connubium in omnibus, et thorus immaculatus.*

en: Bk. IX, ch. 10, n. 18 [of Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*]. The next passage is ibid. ch. 7, n. 12, and the third ibid. ch. 3, n. 6. — In the first text codd. with edd. 4, 6, 8, 9 have *utuntur* for *utimur*. In the original is found: *just as the others, which the soul moves in any work whatever without any trouble and as it were itching of pleasure.* — Twice that of Hebrews 13:4 is alluded to: *Marriage honorable in all, and the bed undefiled.*

la: August., ibid. c. 4. n. 8, sententialiter.

en: Augustine, ibid. ch. 4, n. 8, in substance.

la: Codd. BCE *aeternam*. Paulo inferius pro *an parentes in aliquo* codd. cum plurimis edd. *an patres in aliquo*.

en: Codd. BCE read *aeternam* [eternal, for *spiritualem*]. A little below, for *an parentes in aliquo* the codd. with most editions read *an patres in aliquo*.

la: Ibid. c. 3. n. 6., et seq. locus ibid. c. 6. n. 10.

en: Ibid. ch. 3, n. 6, and the following passage ibid. ch. 6, n. 10.

la: Hugo, *Sum. Sent.* tr. 3. c. 4, ubi et seq. locus, de quo cfr. August., *de Peccat. merit. et Bapt. parvul.* I. c. 37. n. 68.

en: Hugh [of St. Victor], *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 3, ch. 4, where also the following passage is found; concerning which compare Augustine, *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on the Baptism of Little Ones*, bk. I, ch. 37, n. 68.

la: Codd. BCDE et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 omittunt *nec pedibus*.

en: Codd. BCDE and edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 omit *nec pedibus* [nor feet].

la: Hugo, ibid., et August., loc. cit. c. 38. n. 69.

en: Hugh, ibid., and Augustine, the cited place, ch. 38, n. 69.

la: Hugo, loc. cit., ubi et loci seqq.

en: Hugh, the cited place, where also the following passages are found.

la: Dist. XIX. c. 4. — Paulo post pro *ligno vesci* Vat. cum solo cod. A et nonnullis aliis edd. *ligno uti*.

en: Distinction XIX, ch. 4. — A little after, for *ligno vesci* [to feed on the tree], the Vatican edition with only cod. A and several other editions reads *ligno uti* [to use the tree].

la: Pro *in ignorantia* edd. 1, 8, 9 *ignorans*.

en: For *in ignorantia* [in ignorance] edd. 1, 8, 9 read *ignorans* [being ignorant].

la: Hugo, I. *de Sacram.* p. VI. c. 26, ubi et seq. loc.

en: Hugh [of St. Victor], *On the Sacraments*, bk. I, pt. VI, ch. 26, where also the following passage is found.

la: Ibid. c. 6, et seq. loc. c. 27, sententialiter. Locus Scripturae est I. Cor. 15, 46.

en: Ibid. ch. 6, and the following passage ch. 27, in substance. The Scripture passage is 1 Corinthians 15:46.

la: Codd. ABD et ed. 1 *merendum*.

en: Codd. ABD and ed. 1 read *merendum* [to be earned].

en: Edition 1 reads *ut* [so that *ut per meritum veniret ad praemium*]. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Re-set Latin verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p475-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` and `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p476-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`. Per Vol II Override, the column-band PDF read is authoritative; the IA djvu OCR is cascade-shattered across the two columns (most visible around p.475 R-1 with marginalia *Dupliciter solvitur* / *Augustinus* / *Dubium 4.* interleaved into running prose, and p.476 L-1 with *Opponitur* / *Responsio* / *Alia obiectio* / *Dubium 5.*). Six Lombard capitula (Cap. I–VI) preserved verbatim per Quaracchi typography (`*Cap. N.*` followed by italicized chapter title).

**Page-split map (apparatus).** 14 entries [^1]–[^14] distributed:
- p.475 L-2: 1 entry [^1] (long Aug. *de Gen. ad lit.* IX c.10 n.18 + variants + Heb 13,4 gloss).
- p.475 R-2: 4 entries [^2]–[^5].
- p.476 L-2: 4 entries [^6]–[^9].
- p.476 R-2: 5 entries [^10]–[^14].

Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention (twelve labels): *Opinio quorundam.*, *Improbatur.*, *Augustinus.* (×2 — Cap. I and Cap. III), *Dubium 1.*–*Dubium 7.* (seven inline doubt-markers, used by Bonaventure's later *Quaestio*/*Dubia* commentary), *Dupliciter solvitur.*, *Aliorum opinio.*, *Opponitur.* (×2 — Cap. IV and Cap. V), *Responsio.* (×2), *Alia obiectio.*, *Replicatur.*, *Sententia quorundam.* Inline *Augustinus.* markers preserved at points where Lombard introduces a quote.

`has_scholion: false` — littera chunks carry no SCHOLION by design.

**No `[?]` flags** — all 14 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.475–476. Running heads on p.475 (= `475`) and p.476 (= `476`) crisp, matching the +22 PDF-printed offset; bottom-of-p.476 running head reads `DIST. XX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I.` (= p.477 top), confirming the d20-littera→d20-divisio seam falls exactly at the page break.

**Cross-chunk hand-off.** Received nothing from d19-dubia. Forward hand-off to d20-divisio: **none** — p.476 R-2 footers ⁵–⁹ all anchor within Cap. V/VI body of the littera, and the d20 COMMENTARIUS opens fresh on p.477 with its own apparatus block.

**d.20 inventory:** single-pars (ARTICULUS UNICUS, 6 quaestiones). No pars-split. Sibling chunks: d20-divisio, d20-a1-q1 … d20-a1-q6, d20-dubia.


title: Dist. 20, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XX. — De procreatione posteritatis.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XX. — On the procreation of posterity.

source_text:
<!-- page 477 -->

# COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

## *De procreatione posteritatis.*

*Post haec videndum est, qualiter primi parentes etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de duratione immortalitatis; in hac parte agit de procreatione posteritatis: vel aliter, et in idem redit, supra egit de conservatione individui; hic agit de conservatione speciei, quae quidem est per filiorum procreationem. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes tres. In prima determinat, qualiter primi parentes filios procreassent. In secunda determinat, quales filii nascerentur, ibi: *Si vero quaeritur, quales, si non peccassent* etc. In tertia breviter epilogat, quae praedeterminata[^1] sunt, ibi: *Talis erat hominis institutio ante peccatum.*

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de modo generationis. In secunda de tempore translationis, ibi: *De termino vero temporis, quo transferrentur* etc. Similiter secunda pars principalis habet duas. In prima determinat, quales nascerentur filii quantum ad corpus. In secunda, quales nascerentur quantum ad animam, ibi: *Et cum de corpore humano non sit absurdum* etc. Aliarum partium subdivisiones et continentia manifesta[^2] sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis, quae est de procreatione liberorum in statu innocentiae, quaedam incidunt dubitabilia.

Et primo quaeritur, utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset sexuum commixtio.

Secundo, utrum in illa commixtione esset seminum decisio.

Tertio, utrum in illa seminis decisione esset delectationis intensio.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum in illa commixtione esset integritatis corruptio.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum in omni coitu esset prolis generatio.

Sexto quaeritur, utrum aequalis esset per generationem masculorum et feminarum multiplicatio.

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.

### *De procreatione liberorum in statu innocentiae.*

---

english:
# Commentary on Distinction XX.

## *On the procreation of posterity.*

*After these things it must be seen in what manner the first parents* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the duration of immortality; in this part he treats of the procreation of posterity: or, put otherwise (and it comes to the same), above he treated of the conservation of the individual, here he treats of the conservation of the species, which indeed is through the procreation of children. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first he determines in what manner the first parents would have procreated children. In the second he determines what sort of children would have been born, there: *But if it is asked, of what sort, if they had not sinned* etc. In the third he briefly recapitulates the things which have been predetermined[^1], there: *Such was the constitution of man before sin.*

The first part has two. In the first he determines concerning the mode of generation. In the second concerning the time of translation, there: *But concerning the limit of the time, at which they would be translated* etc. Likewise the second principal part has two. In the first he determines what sort of children would be born with respect to the body. In the second, what sort would be born with respect to the soul, there: *And since concerning the human body it is not absurd* etc. The subdivisions of the other parts and their content are manifest[^2] in the text [of the Master].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, which concerns the procreation of children in the state of innocence, certain matters worthy of doubt arise.

And first it is asked, whether in the state of innocence there would have been a commingling of the sexes.

Second, whether in that commingling there would have been an emission of seeds.

Third, whether in that emission of seed there would have been an intensity of delight.

Fourth it is asked, whether in that commingling there would have been a corruption of integrity.

Fifth it is asked, whether in every coitus there would have been a generation of offspring.

Sixth it is asked, whether through generation there would have been an equal multiplication of males and females.

### THE ONLY ARTICLE.

### *On the procreation of children in the state of innocence.*

---

la: Vat. *primo determinata.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *primo determinata* ("first determined").

la: Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 *manifestata.*

en: Not a few codices and the first edition read *manifestata* ("made manifest"). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi column-band PDF read of p.477 (raw lines 33560–33692, IA djvu OCR `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). Single printed page. Per Vol II Override step 1, the column-band PDF is authoritative for the body; OCR confirmed apparatus opener positions.
- **Span:** opens at p.477 L-1 with the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.` header (clean, not OCR-mangled at 450 dpi despite Vol II's habit of `COMMENTAmUS` / `DI8TINCTI0NEM` ligature mangles elsewhere) + subtitle *De procreatione posteritatis.* + lemma *Post haec videndum est, qualiter primi parentes etc.* Closes immediately before the `QUAESTIO I.` heading and body opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod, si homo stetisset, facta esset sexuum commixtio* (raw 33619), which belong to **d20-a1-q1**.
- **ARTICULUS UNICUS folded in per Vol II Override step 5:** d.20 is single-pars with one article (six quaestiones), so this divisio chunk holds the pars-level DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + the ARTICULUS UNICUS header + subtitle *De procreatione liberorum in statu innocentiae.* No standalone article-divisio chunk. The QUAESTIO I heading itself stays with d20-a1-q1.
- **Apparatus / page-split map (p.477):** the column-band footer on p.477 L-2 holds three numbered notes ¹–³; ¹ and ² anchor in this DIVISIO TEXTUS (on *praedeterminata* and *manifesta* respectively) and are rendered here as [^1]–[^2]. **³ (*Vers. 18.*) anchors in QUAESTIO I arg 1 (*adiutorium simile sibi*) and migrates forward to d20-a1-q1 as its [^1].** The remaining p.477 L-2 / R-2 footers all anchor in QUAESTIO I body (arg 2 *Cap. 23. n. 1* Aug. *de Civ. Dei* XIV variant, etc.) and likewise migrate to d20-a1-q1.
- **Cross-chunk hand-off received:** nothing from d20-littera (which closed at *veniret ad praemium* on p.476 R-1 immediately before the p.477 running head).
- **Cross-chunk hand-off forwarded:** to **d20-a1-q1**: p.477 L-2 footer ³ (*Vers. 18.* on Gen 2,18 *Faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi*) → [^1]; plus the full p.477 R-2 footer bank (note the footer wrap-around: see [the R-2 crop] for the ⁴ (*Cap. 23. n. 1* Aug. *de Civ. Dei* XIV c.23 + variant *post generaturos omittitur vox homines* etc.) which anchors in QUAESTIO I arg 2). The receiving chunk should walk the column-band footers continuously from ³ onward.
- **Sibling-scholion note:** divisio chunks carry no SCHOLION by design (`has_scholion: false`). The SCHOLION printed on p.479 immediately after this distinction's QUAESTIO II opener will belong to **d20-a1-q1** per the Vol II convention (it opens with *De nonnullis in hac distinctione quaesitis S. Doctor dicit, quod plus habent curiositatis quam utilitatis* + the commentator catalog beginning *S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2.* etc.) — the receiving subagent should pick it up as that chunk's SCHOLION block.
- **OCR cosmetics silently corrected:** `prinia → prima`, `Divi-/ditur` line-break, `flliorum → filiorum`, `lalionis → lationis`, `fcrrentur → ferrentur`, `lur filii → tur filii`, `nascerentur quanlum → quantum`, `manifesta - sunt → manifesta sunt` (hyphen artifact), `procreatioue → procreatione`, `iiberorum → liberorum`, `uti^nm → utrum`, `proUs → prolis`, `innocenliae → innocentiae`. Running-head digits crisp (`477`).
- **`[?]` flags:** none. All anchors crisp at 450 dpi.