title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 630 -->

### Articulus Unicus. *De gratiae quidditate.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum gratia ponat aliquid circa gratificatum.*[^1]

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod gratia Dei aliquid ponat circa gratificatum.

1. Dicitur enim Ioannis primo[^2]: *De plenitudine eius accepimus gratiam pro gratia.* Si igitur quod accepimus in nobis est, divina gratia in gratificatis sive acceptatis a Deo habet esse.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^3]: *Divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult;* hoc autem non esset, nisi donum gratiae in singulis aliquid poneret: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum de gratia gratis data; tunc arguitur *a minori*[^4], quod si gratia gratis data aliquid ponit in gratificato, multo magis gratia gratum faciens, quae maioris est efficaciae et magis reddit ipsum gratificatum Deo acceptabilem.

3. Item, gratia gratum faciente efficitur quis dignus superna beatitudine; sed omnis dignitas aliquid ponit in eo in quo est[^5]: ergo dignitas retributionis aeternae aliquid ponit in eo qui dignus est; hoc autem non est nisi gratia: ergo etc.

4. Item, culpa, ex qua Deus hominem odit et reprobat, ponit aliquam deformitatem in eo qui reprobatur: ergo pari ratione gratia, ob quam Deus aliquem diligit et approbat, aliquid ponit in eo qui acceptatur.

5. Item, contingit, aliquem, qui non est gratus Deo, fieri gratum; sed hoc non est propter mutationem aliquam factam ex parte Dei acceptantis: ergo hoc est propter mutationem aliquam factam ex parte hominis acceptati. Sed talis mutatio nihil ab homine tollit: ergo aliquid circa hominem acceptatum ponit.

6. Item, Deus est *aequus ponderator*[^6]: ergo non magis acceptat unum hominem quam alium, nisi aliquod donum et aliquod bonum sit in uno, quod non est in altero; hoc autem vocamus ipsam gratiam: ergo gratia Dei aliquid ponit circa ipsum gratificatum et acceptatum a Deo.

<!-- page 631 -->

**Sed contra:** 1. Danielis primo[^7]: *Dedit Dominus gratiam Danieli in conspectu principis eunuchorum* etc.; sed constat, quod tunc nihil novum collatum est Danieli ad hoc, quod acceptaretur ab illo eunuchorum principe: si ergo Deus est benignior et ad acceptandum promptior, videtur, quod nihil oporteat in homine poni ad hoc, quod acceptetur a Deo. Si igitur gratiam Dei habere non est aliud quam Deo esse acceptum, videtur etc.

2. Item, videmus experimento, quod homo homini efficitur gratus ex solo aspectu, nec aliquid dat homo homini, cum suscipit illum in gratiam suam: ergo pari ratione non oportet aliquid dari homini, ut suscipiatur in gratiam Dei.

3. Item, omnis ille est alii gratus, qui est ab eo dilectus; sed dilectio Dei non ponit circa dilectum aliquid novum, quoniam dilexit *nos ante mundi constitutionem,* sicut dicitur ad Ephesios primo[^8]: dilexit etiam nos, *cum adhuc peccatores essemus,* sicut dicitur ad Romanos quinto: ergo pari ratione nec illa acceptatio sive gratificatio aliquid ponet circa gratificatum.

4. Item, solis precibus alicuius absque aliquo munere interveniente potest quis amicus et gratus effici alicui, cuius prius erat inimicus et odiosus. Si igitur hoc est in homine; cum Deus multo pronior sit ad miserendum quam homo, videtur, quod multo fortius hoc possit reperiri circa gratiam Dei.

5. Item, sic se habet gratia ad gratificatum, et acceptatio ad acceptatum, sicut se habet laus ad laudatum; sed laus nihil ponit circa laudatum, sed circa laudantem[^9]: ergo nec gratia circa gratificatum, sed circa gratificantem.

6. Item, abundantioris caritatis est diligere et acceptare eum qui minus est dignus amore, sicut inimicum, quam amicum: ergo divina caritas et bonitas non solum acceptat bonos, sed etiam quantumcumque malos; non solum dignos, sed etiam quantumcumque indignos: ergo divina acceptatio sive gratificatio non videtur aliquid ponere circa ipsum acceptatum aut[^10] gratificatum.

### Conclusio.

> *Gratia divina in gratificato aliquid ponit.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod gratia divina aliquid ponit circa gratificatum sive acceptatum. — Et ratio huius est ista, quia divina *voluntas* in acceptando non afficitur, divina *veritas* in approbando non fallitur, et *neutra* earum in gratificando mutatur. — Quia divina *voluntas* in acceptando non afficitur nec acceptat aliquem propter novum *affectum*, necesse est, quod acceptet propter aliquem *effectum*, et ita aliquis effectus ponitur circa eum[^11] qui acceptatur. — Quia *veritas* divina in approbando non fallitur, ideo non praefert unum alteri nec approbat magis unum quam alterum, nisi quia habet in se aliquid, quod est magis dignum approbatione divina. Neminem autem acceptat, nisi quem approbat, et ita nemo est gratus vel Deo acceptus, nisi in se habeat aliquid, per quod sit approbatione dignus. — Quia vero *voluntas* non mutatur in acceptando, nec *veritas* in approbando; cum aliquis de novo incipit approbari vel acceptari, et nulla cadit mutatio ex parte Dei acceptantis vel approbantis: necesse est, quod aliqua cadat mutatio ex parte acceptati et approbati. Sed hoc non est, quia aliquid ei aufertur: est ergo mutatio, quia aliquod donum sibi a Deo confertur. — Et sic patet, quod gratia aliquod donum ponit circa ipsum gratificatum. Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de gratia humana, de qua dicitur, quod *Deus dedit gratiam Danieli* etc.; dicendum, quod illud simile deficit in tribus conditionibus praeassignatis: tum quia homo in acceptando *afficitur;* tum quia iudicium eius frequenter *decipitur;* tum etiam quia, cum de non acceptante fit acceptans, in se ipso *mutatur.* Hoc autem in Deo non ponitur; et ideo non est simile. Et per hoc patet primum et secundum obiectum.

<!-- page 632 -->

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilectione, quod non ponit aliquid in dilecto; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod *dilectio* se extendit non solummodo ad praesens, verum etiam ad futurum[^12] — unde non tantum diligit nos Deus dilectione temporali, sed etiam aeterna — *acceptatio* vero et gratificatio solum ad praesens se extendit; et ideo effectum non solum in habitu, sed etiam in actu ponit circa ipsum acceptatum et gratificatum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solae preces reconciliant; dicendum, quod illud locum habet, ubi reconciliatio fit per mutationem *affectionis,* ut cum aliquis, qui alicui prius erat iratus, per preces alicuius mitigatur. Hoc autem circa Deum non ponitur; et si aliquando in Scriptura[^13] dici videatur, figurative intelligendum est, videlicet *per anthropopathon.*

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de laude, dicendum, quod sicut laus creaturae non ponit aliquid circa laudatum, sed circa laudantem; sic etiam gratia, qua unus homo alterum acceptat. Deus autem, qui non verbo eum laudat, sed approbatione, laudando aliquid ponit circa laudatum. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod gratia divina nihil ponat. — Posset tamen dici, quod non est simile de *laude* et *gratia,* quia *laus* respicit personam extrinsecam, cui laudatus ipse manifestus efficitur: sed *acceptatio* respicit bona intrinseca, ex quibus una persona redditur alteri accepta.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris caritatis est acceptare eum qui minus dignus est; dicendum, quod *acceptatio* non tantum respicit *opus* vel effectum sive donum *largitatis,* sed etiam *iudicium veritatis.* Qui enim alterum acceptat ipsum etiam approbat. Et quoniam divina veritas et aequitas non potest approbare nisi bonum et aequum; nullus, quamdiu manet in sua iniquitate, potest esse Deo acceptus, etsi etiam multa sibi beneficia a Deo impendantur. Et sic patet, quod ratio sua non cogit, quia sic est divinae largitatis immensitas, ut non excludatur divinae veritatis infallibilis[^14] aequitas.

english:
### Article (Sole). *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question I. *Whether grace places something in the one made pleasing.*[^1]

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the grace of God places something in the one made pleasing.

1. For it is said in John, chapter one[^2]: *Of his fullness we have all received, and grace for grace.* If, therefore, what we have received is in us, the divine grace has being in those made pleasing or accepted by God.

2. Likewise, first to the Corinthians, chapter twelve[^3]: *There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit, dividing to each one as he wills;* but this would not be so, unless the gift of grace placed something in each one: therefore etc. If you say that this is said of gratuitously given grace (*gratia gratis data*); then it is argued *from the lesser*[^4], that if gratuitously given grace places something in the one made pleasing, much more does grace that makes pleasing (*gratia gratum faciens*), which is of greater efficacy and renders him more pleasing and acceptable to God.

3. Likewise, by grace that makes pleasing one is made worthy of supernal beatitude; but every worthiness places something in that in which it is[^5]: therefore the worthiness of eternal reward places something in him who is worthy; but this is nothing other than grace: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, fault, by reason of which God hates and reprobates a man, places some deformity in him who is reprobated: therefore by parity of reasoning grace, on account of which God loves and approves someone, places something in him who is accepted.

5. Likewise, it happens that someone who is not pleasing to God is made pleasing; but this is not on account of any change made on the part of God who accepts: therefore it is on account of some change made on the part of the man who is accepted. But such a change takes nothing away from the man: therefore it places something in the man who is accepted.

6. Likewise, God is *a just weigher*[^6]: therefore he does not accept one man more than another, unless some gift and some good is in the one which is not in the other; but this we call grace itself: therefore the grace of God places something in the very one made pleasing and accepted by God.

<!-- page 631 -->

**On the contrary:** 1. Daniel, chapter one[^7]: *The Lord gave Daniel grace in the sight of the prince of the eunuchs* etc.; but it is plain that at that time nothing new was conferred upon Daniel that he should be accepted by that prince of the eunuchs: if therefore God is more benign and more ready to accept, it seems that nothing need be placed in a man that he should be accepted by God. If, therefore, to have the grace of God is nothing other than to be acceptable to God, it seems etc.

2. Likewise, we see by experience that one man becomes pleasing to another from his mere appearance, nor does the one man give the other anything when he receives him into his favor: therefore by parity of reasoning it is not necessary that anything be given to a man that he be received into the favor of God.

3. Likewise, everyone is pleasing to another who is loved by him; but the love of God does not place anything new in the beloved, since he loved *us before the foundation of the world,* as is said to the Ephesians, chapter one[^8]: he loved us also *while we were yet sinners,* as is said to the Romans, chapter five: therefore by parity of reasoning neither does that acceptance or making-pleasing place anything in the one made pleasing.

4. Likewise, by someone's prayers alone, without any gift intervening, one can be made a friend and pleasing to someone whose enemy and hateful he formerly was. If, therefore, this is so in man, then, since God is far more prone to mercy than man, it seems that this can far more strongly be found in the case of God's grace.

5. Likewise, grace is related to the one made pleasing, and acceptance to the one accepted, just as praise is related to the one praised; but praise places nothing in the one praised, but in the one praising[^9]: therefore neither does grace place anything in the one made pleasing, but in the one making pleasing.

6. Likewise, it belongs to a more abundant charity to love and accept him who is less worthy of love, such as an enemy, than a friend: therefore divine charity and goodness accepts not only the good, but even the wicked, however wicked; not only the worthy, but even the unworthy, however unworthy: therefore divine acceptance or making-pleasing does not seem to place anything in the very one accepted or[^10] made pleasing.

### Conclusion.

> *Divine grace places something in the one made pleasing.*

**I respond:** It must be said that divine grace places something in the one made pleasing or accepted. — And the reason for this is this: that the divine *will* in accepting is not affected, the divine *truth* in approving is not deceived, and *neither* of them is changed in making pleasing. — Because the divine *will* in accepting is not affected, nor does it accept anyone on account of a new *affection*, it is necessary that it accept on account of some *effect*, and thus some effect is placed in him[^11] who is accepted. — Because the divine *truth* in approving is not deceived, therefore it does not prefer one to another, nor approve one more than another, except because he has in himself something which is more worthy of divine approval. But it accepts no one except whom it approves, and thus no one is pleasing or accepted by God unless he has in himself something by which he is worthy of approval. — But because the *will* is not changed in accepting, nor the *truth* in approving; when someone newly begins to be approved or accepted, and no change falls on the part of God who accepts or approves: it is necessary that some change fall on the part of the one accepted and approved. But this is not because something is taken away from him: the change is therefore because some gift is conferred upon him by God. — And thus it is plain that grace places some gift in the very one made pleasing. Hence the reasons that show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the opposing side:**

*To 1 and 2.* As for that which is objected to the contrary concerning human grace, of which it is said that *God gave grace to Daniel* etc.; it must be said that that comparison fails in the three conditions assigned beforehand: both because man in accepting is *affected;* and because his judgment is frequently *deceived;* and also because, when from a non-accepter he becomes an accepter, he is *changed* in himself. But this is not posited in God; and therefore it is not similar. And by this the first and second objections are answered.

<!-- page 632 -->

*To 3.* As for that which is objected concerning love, that it does not place anything in the beloved; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that *love* extends not only to the present, but also to the future[^12] — whence God loves us not only with a temporal love, but also with an eternal one — whereas *acceptance* and making-pleasing extends only to the present; and therefore it places an effect in the one accepted and made pleasing not only in habit, but even in act.

*To 4.* As for that which is objected, that prayers alone reconcile; it must be said that that holds where reconciliation is brought about through a change of *affection*, as when someone who was previously angry at another is mollified through someone's prayers. But this is not posited in the case of God; and if at times in Scripture[^13] it seems to be said, it must be understood figuratively, namely *by anthropopathy.*

*To 5.* As for that which is objected concerning praise, it must be said that just as the praise of a creature places nothing in the one praised, but in the one praising; so too the grace by which one man accepts another. But God, who praises him not by word, but by approval, in praising places something in the one praised. Hence from this it does not follow that divine grace places nothing. — Yet it could be said that *praise* and *grace* are not similar, because *praise* regards an extrinsic person, to whom the one praised is made manifest: but *acceptance* regards intrinsic goods, by which one person is rendered acceptable to another.

*To 6.* As for that which is objected, that it belongs to a greater charity to accept him who is less worthy; it must be said that *acceptance* regards not only the *work* or effect or gift of *generosity*, but also the *judgment of truth.* For whoever accepts another also approves him. And since divine truth and equity cannot approve anything except the good and the equitable; no one, so long as he remains in his iniquity, can be pleasing to God, even though many benefits be bestowed upon him by God. And thus it is plain that his argument does not compel, because the immensity of the divine generosity is such that the infallible[^14] equity of the divine truth is not excluded.

la: Pro *gratia sit* cod. F hic et paulo post *gratia ponat.*

en: For *gratia sit* ["grace be"], codex F here and a little later reads *gratia ponat* ["grace place"].

la: Vers. 16: De plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus et gratiam pro gratia.

en: Verse 16: Of his fullness we have all received, and grace for grace. [John 1:16.]

la: Vers. 4.

la: De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.

en: On this mode of arguing, cf. tome I, p. 835, note 5.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 31. n. 3: Gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude; dignitas, alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas.

en: Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 31, n. 3: Glory is frequent report of someone together with praise; dignity is the honorable authority of someone, worthy of cultivation, honor, and reverence.

la: Prov. 16, 2: Spirituum ponderator est Dominus.

en: Prov. 16:2: The Lord is the weigher of spirits.

la: Vers. 9.

la: Vers. 4: Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 8. — In fine arg. pro *ponet,* quae lectio est codd. F K W bb cc et aliorum nec non ed. 1, Vat. *ponit.*

en: Verse 4: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world. [Eph. 1:4.] — The following text [to the Romans] is at the cited place, v. 8 [Rom. 5:8]. — At the end of the argument, for *ponet* ["will place"], which is the reading of codices F K W bb cc and others as well as ed. 1, the Vatican edition reads *ponit* ["places"].

la: Namque iuxta Aristot, I. Rhetor. c. 21. (c. 9.) «laus est oratio, quae virtutis magnitudinem explicat». II. Moral. Eudem. c. 1: «Encomium enim oratio est, facta cuiusque singularia exponens; laus vero universalia celebrans; [beati] praedicatio autem finem intendit». Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 1. arg. 1. ad opposit. addit hanc rationem: Quia indifferenter est de ente et de non-ente, ut possumus laudare Caesarem, qui non est, de sapientia, nec tamen in eo ponitur sapientia.

en: For according to Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I, c. 21 (c. 9), "praise is a discourse that sets forth the magnitude of virtue." *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 1: "For an encomium is a discourse setting forth the particular deeds of each; praise, however, celebrating the universal; while the proclamation [of the blessed] intends the end." Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, arg. 1 to the opposite, adds this reason: That it [praise] regards being and non-being indifferently, so that we can praise Caesar, who does not exist, for his wisdom, and yet wisdom is not placed in him.

la: Cod. F *sive.*

en: Codex F reads *sive* ["or"].

la: Codd. F Q X aa bb ee et alii *in eo,* Vat. verbis *circa eum* praemittit *esse.*

en: Codices F Q X aa bb ee and others read *in eo* ["in him"]; the Vatican edition prefixes *esse* ["to be"] to the words *circa eum* ["around him"].

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 31. seq., ubi fusius agitur de dilectione Dei ad creaturam.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 31 ff., where the love of God toward the creature is treated more fully.

la: Gen. 6, 6; Exod. 4, 14. Cfr. supra pag. 288, nota 2, ubi etiam vox *anthropopathon* etymologice explicatur. — Post *dici videatur* Vat. addit *irasci vel iratus.*

en: Gen. 6:6; Exod. 4:14. Cf. above p. 288, note 2, where the word *anthropopathon* is also explained etymologically. — After *dici videatur* the Vatican edition adds *irasci vel iratus* ["to be angry or angered"].

la: Codd. A bb cc cum ed. 1 *ineffabilis.*

en: Codices A bb cc, with ed. 1, read *ineffabilis* ["ineffable"].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Tractatum de gratia (d. 26-29.) S. Doctor incipit ab hac fundamentali quaestione, quae proprie est de gratia gratum faciente. — Quoad terminos hic et passim occurrentes praenotanda est quaedam differentia, quae est tum inter antiquos theologos et recentiores, tum inter ipsos antiquos. — Gratia sanctificans, ab antiquis dicta *gratum faciens,* a recentioribus theologis etiam *habitualis* vocatur, ut distinguatur a gratia actuali. Antiqui autem Scholastici solebant gratiam supernaturalem dividere in duo membra principalia, videlicet, in gratiam *gratis datam* et gratiam *gratum facientem.* Gratia *gratis data* iam a S. Thoma (S. 1. II. q. 111. a. 1.) cum recentioribus accipitur ut illud donum Dei supernaturale, quod «non datur ad hoc, ut homo ipse per eam iustificetur, sed potius, ut ad iustificationem alterius cooperetur». Divisiones huius gratiae, enumeratae ab Apostolo (I. Cor. 12, 8. seqq.), explicantur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 63. m. 3.) et a S. Thoma (loc. cit. a. 4.). Etiam S. Bonav. saepe in hoc sensu intelligit gratias gratis datas, v. g. infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2, et IV. Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2, d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. In aliis autem locis idem etiam gratiam a nobis dictam *actualem* inter gratias gratis datas recenset, ut infra d. 27. dub., immo d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. explicite declarat, quod hoc nomen, praeter ea quae enumerat Apostolus I. Cor. 12, 8, indicat «quidquid illud sit, quod superadditum est naturalibus, adiuvans aliquo modo et praeparans voluntatem ad habitum, vel usum gratiae». Sequitur autem S. Bonav. in hoc modo loquendi Alexandrum Hal., qui non tantum gratias actuales, sed etiam habitus fidei et spei tunc vocat gratias gratis datas, quando non sunt coniuncta cum gratia sanctificante; in habentibus autem eandem nec nomine *actualem* distinguit a gratia gratum faciente. Ita enim Alex. (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 6. a. 3. ad 1.) loquitur de excitatione gratiae: «Gratia duplex est, scil. gratum faciens et gratis data, et haec non est gratum faciens, sed tamen *disponens...* Dicendum ergo, quod in existentibus in peccato mortali non est excitatio a gratia gratum faciente, sed a gratia disponente vel gratis data; quia habent fidem informem, quae excitat eos ad cogitandum de divino iudicio» etc. Idem (ibid. q. 63. m. 2.) dicit: «Gratia gratis data proprie dicitur donum infusum rationali naturae sine meritis... disponens ad salutem propriam, vel aedificationem alterius»; cuius definitionis singula verba ibi explicans, de verbis *disponens ad salutem* dicit: «Ad differentiam gratiae gratum facientis, quae non est sicut dispositio ad salutem, quasi distans, sed est dispositio salutis, quia habens illam dignus est salute aeterna; immo gratia gratum faciens est ipsa salus, ad quam disponit gratia gratis data» (cfr. etiam ibid. m. 3.). — Eodem modo loquendi utitur etiam Petr. a Tar. Scotus autem modum distinguendi a S. Thoma adhibitum approbat, dum (IV. Sent. d. 6. q. 9. n. 11.) dicit: Omne donum Dei datum homini aut est «gratum faciens, vel gratis datum, sic intelligendo hoc quod est gratum faciens vel actualiter, vel dispositive». — De acceptatione Dei, qua homo adoptatur in filium, cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1, et Breviloq. p. V. c. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3. § 1; S. Thom., de Verit. q. 27. a. 1. — De hac et seq. quaest. alii auctores unica quaest. agere solent, et plerique commentatores tantum ad I. Sent. d. 17. Sed Alex. Hal. et Petr. a Tar. specialiter disputant de hac 1. quaest.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 1. (edd. Veneta et Colon.). — Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1; S. I. II. q. 110. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 150; de Verit. q. 27. a. 1. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 17. a. 1; S. p. II. fr. 16. q. 98. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The treatise on grace (d. 26-29) the holy Doctor begins from this fundamental question, which is properly concerning grace that makes pleasing (*gratia gratum faciens*). — Concerning the terms occurring here and throughout, a certain distinction must be noted, which exists both between the ancient theologians and the more recent ones, and among the ancients themselves. — Sanctifying grace, called by the ancients *grace that makes pleasing*, is also called *habitual* by more recent theologians, that it may be distinguished from actual grace. The ancient Scholastics, moreover, used to divide supernatural grace into two principal members, namely, into *gratuitously given grace* and *grace that makes pleasing*. *Gratuitously given grace* is already taken by St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 111, a. 1), along with the more recent theologians, as that supernatural gift of God which "is not given that a man himself be justified by it, but rather that he cooperate toward the justification of another." The divisions of this grace, enumerated by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:8 ff.), are explained by Alexander of Hales (Summa p. III, q. 63, m. 3) and by St. Thomas (loc. cit., a. 4). St. Bonaventure too often understands gratuitously given graces in this sense, e.g. below d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, and IV Sent. d. 7, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 5. But in other places the same author also reckons among the gratuitously given graces the grace called by us *actual*, as below d. 27, dub., indeed d. 28, a. 2, q. 1, he explicitly declares that this name, besides those things which the Apostle enumerates in 1 Cor. 12:8, indicates "whatever it may be that is superadded to the natural endowments, aiding in some way and preparing the will toward the habit or use of grace." But St. Bonaventure follows in this manner of speaking Alexander of Hales, who calls not only actual graces, but also the habits of faith and hope, gratuitously given graces when these are not joined with sanctifying grace; but in those who have the same he does not distinguish it even by the name *actual* from grace that makes pleasing. For thus Alexander (Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 6, a. 3, ad 1) speaks of the excitation of grace: "Grace is twofold, namely that which makes pleasing and that which is gratuitously given, and this latter is not what-makes-pleasing, but is nevertheless *disposing...* It must therefore be said that in those existing in mortal sin there is no excitation from grace that makes pleasing, but from disposing or gratuitously given grace; for they have unformed faith, which excites them to think about the divine judgment" etc. The same author (ibid. q. 63, m. 2) says: "Gratuitously given grace is properly called a gift infused into a rational nature without merits... disposing toward one's own salvation, or the edification of another"; and explaining there the individual words of this definition, concerning the words *disposing toward salvation* he says: "As distinct from grace that makes pleasing, which is not like a disposition toward salvation, as it were at a distance, but is a disposition of salvation, because one who has it is worthy of eternal salvation; indeed grace that makes pleasing is salvation itself, toward which gratuitously given grace disposes" (cf. also ibid. m. 3). — Peter of Tarentaise uses the same manner of speaking. Scotus, however, approves the manner of distinguishing employed by St. Thomas, when (IV Sent. d. 6, q. 9, n. 11) he says: Every gift of God given to a man is either "what-makes-pleasing or gratuitously given, understanding in this way that it is what-makes-pleasing either actually or dispositively." — Concerning the acceptance of God, by which a man is adopted as a son, cf. below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, and Breviloquium p. V, c. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 3, § 1; St. Thomas, de Veritate q. 27, a. 1. — Concerning this and the following question other authors are wont to treat in a single question, and most commentators only at I Sent. d. 17. But Alexander of Hales and Peter of Tarentaise dispute specially concerning this first question.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1 (Venetian and Cologne editions). — Scotus, in both Writings, I Sent. d. 17, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1; Summa I-II, q. 110, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 150; de Veritate q. 27, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 17, a. 1; Summa p. II, fr. 16, q. 98, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, sole question, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, I Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, I Sent. d. 17, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 17, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF per the Vol II Override (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the Respondeo, the *Ad*-replies, the SCHOLION, and the page footers); clean running prose of the *videtur*/*sed contra* arguments cross-checked against the raw OCR. ARTICULUS UNICUS opener (header *De gratiae quidditate*) folded into this q1 per Override §5 — there is no standalone ART-UNICUS chunk. All 14 footnote-marker digits verified eyes-on against the p.630/631/632 L+R column bands.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.630** (running head `630 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` then `DIST. XXVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I.`): TRACTATIO tail (belongs to d26-divisio) → ARTICULUS UNICUS / *De gratiae quidditate* / QUAESTIO I header + opener + arguments *pro* 1–6 (ends "…et acceptatum a Deo.").
- **p.631** (running head `DIST. XXVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 631`): *Sed contra* arguments 1–6 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + replies *Ad 1.2.* and *Ad 3.* opener (ends "…ad futurum — unde").
- **p.632** (running head `632 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): replies *Ad 3* tail + *Ad 4* + *Ad 5* + *Ad 6* (ends "…infallibilis aequitas.") + SCHOLION I + SCHOLION II. SCHOLION II runs to "…— Biel, I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1."; QUAESTIO II header opens p.633 (raw ~44242).

Body seams 630→631 (".../et acceptatum a Deo." → "Sed contra: 1. Danielis primo") and 631→632 ("...ad futurum — unde / non tantum diligit nos Deus") grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**Apparatus split map (14 entries, renumbered [^1]–[^14] in body-anchor order).**
- p.630 footers 3–8 → [^1]–[^6]: **footers 3–4 RECEIVED via hand-off from d26-divisio** (footer 3 = "Pro *gratia sit* cod. F" anchored at the q-title; footer 4 = Ioan 1:16 *De plenitudine* anchored arg-1). Footer 5 = 1 Cor 12:4 (arg-2); footer 6 = "De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835" (arg-2 *a minori*); footer 7 = August. 83 Qq. q.31 (arg-3 *in eo in quo est*); footer 8 = Prov 16:2 *ponderator* (arg-6). [Footers 1–2 of p.630 belong to d26-divisio — already placed there.]
- p.631 footers 1–5 → [^7]–[^11]: Dan 1:9 (SC arg-1); Eph 1:4 + Rom 5:8 + *ponet/ponit* variant (SC arg-3); Aristot Rhetor/Eudem. Ethic + Alex.Hal. *laus* (SC arg-5); Cod.F *sive* (SC arg-6); Vat. *circa eum*/*esse* variant (Respondeo).
- p.632 footers 1–3 → [^12]–[^14]: Alex.Hal. S.p.II q.31 *dilectione* (reply-3); Gen 6:6/Exod 4:14 + *anthropopathon* + Vat. *irasci* (reply-4); Codd. *ineffabilis* variant (reply-6).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: p.630 footers 3–4 from d26-divisio. FORWARDED: none — q1 closes clean with SCHOLION II on p.632 before QUAESTIO II opens on p.633 (raw ~44242); QUAESTIO II owns its own p.633 footers (Vers. 9 etc.). d26-a1-q2 ("utrum donum creatum vel increatum") opens at the QUAESTIO II boundary raw ~44242.

**has_scholion = TRUE.** Genuine SCHOLION I (the *gratum faciens* / *gratis data* terminology distinction across the antiqui/recentiores) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll Alex.Hal./Scotus/S.Thom/Albert/Petr.a Tar./Richard/Aegid./Durand/Dionys.Carth/Biel). The SCHOLION carries no footnote markers. Note SCHOLION I states *De hac et seq. quaest. alii auctores unica quaest. agere solent* — q2 may carry a *pro quaest. seq.* sibling-pointer scholion; verify at q2.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR garbles silently corrected vs the 450 dpi PDF: ahquid→aliquid, gratiftcatum→gratificatum, loannis→Ioannis, graliam→gratiam, dignitas/dignitatis OCR noise, ch-gnus→dignus, contr.→contra, niliil→nihil, aifici-→affici-, approl)ando→approbando, donuni→donum, lioc→hoc, simiie→simile, afjicilur→afficitur, anthropopatlion→anthropopathon, infallibihs→infallibilis.

**d.26 structure carried forward** (DISTINCTIO XXVI raw 43831 → d.27 at raw 45349): single pars; ARTICULUS UNICUS QUAESTIO I–VI (QI raw 44068 DONE, QII ~44242, QIII ~44541, QIV ~44697, QV ~44817, QVI ~45024); DUBIA I–III (DUB.I ~45233, DUB.II ~45265, DUB.III ~45322). **⚠ d26-dubia-dup2 (raw 45233–45348) still to resolve at the dubia chunk** (same misranged-stray pattern resolved for divisio). d.26 build order: a1-q1 (done) → q2…q6 → dubia.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum id quod ponit gratia in gratificato sit creatum, vel increatum

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 633 -->

### Articulus unicus. *De gratiae quidditate.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum id quod ponit gratia in gratificato, sit creatum, vel increatum.*

Secundo quaeritur, supposito quod gratia aliquid ponat circa gratificatum, utrum illud sit creatum, vel increatum.

1. Quod sit increatum, videtur per illud quod dicit Didymus in libro de Spiritu sancto[^1]: « Dicimus, substantiam donorum Dei esse Spiritum sanctum, nec aestimare debemus, Spiritum sanctum secundum substantiam esse divisum, quia multitudo donorum dicatur; impassibilis enim est et indivisibilis; sed iuxta differentes intellectus multis donorum vocabulis nuncupatur ». Si igitur Spiritus sanctus est donum increatum, restat, quod gratia gratum faciens dicit quid increatum.

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *effectus* sive actus gratiae, quos dicitur habere in gratificato, qui ex diversis auctoritatibus novem esse colliguntur. Gratiae enim est recreare, gratiae est animam *reformare, vivificare, illuminare, assimilare, unire, stabilire, acceptabilem Deo reddere* et *affectum sursum ducere* et *elevare*[^2].

2. Ex primo actu arguitur sic. « Eodem recreat Deus, quo creat, et aequalis virtutis, ut dicit Augustinus[^3], est recreare et creare »: si igitur Deus se ipso creat, non per aliquid creatum; ergo se ipso recreat et reformat, non per aliquid creatum. Sed illud quo recreat, est gratia: ergo etc.

3. Ex secundo actu arguitur sic. Paris virtutis est reformare mentem quantum ad *affectum* et quantum ad *intellectum*; sed « mens immediate a prima veritate formatur » quantum ad *intellectum*, ut dicit Augustinus[^4]: ergo et immediate quantum ad *affectum* a prima bonitate formatur. Sed animam formare quantum ad *affectum* est ipsius gratiae: ergo gratia non est aliud quam bonitas summa.

4. Ex tertio actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Si vivificare animam est actus gratiae gratum facientis; et Deus animam vivificat se ipso, non per medium creatum: ergo gratia non est aliud quam Deus. *Minor* probatur per Augustinum[^5], qui dicit, quod « sicut corpus vivit anima, ita anima vivit Deo »; sed anima se ipsa vivificat corpus: ergo Deus se ipso vivificat spiritum.

5. Ex quarto actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Si sol per sui praesentiam esset praesens oculo, non esset necessaria aliqua luminis influentia ad hoc, quod efficeretur oculus luminosus. Si igitur sol iustitiae Deus est praesens omni creaturae, et essentialiter est in anima uniuscuiusque; videtur, quod nulla influentia luminis sit necessaria ad illuminationem animae. Si igitur impossibile est, Deum aliquid facere frustra[^6]: videtur, quod gratia illuminans animam nihil aliud sit quam divina essentia.

6. Ex quinto actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Si color esset sua similitudo, non esset necessaria novae similitudinis generatio ad hoc, quod oculus conformaretur ipsi colori, maxime si ipse color esse posset in oculo; sed in Deo propter suam[^7] simplicitatem non differt veritas et similitudo — Filius enim, qui est similitudo Patris, est eiusdem essentiae cum Patre — si ergo gratiae est Deo assimilare, et gratia est similitudo Dei, impossibile est, gratiam esse aliud a Deo.

7. Ex sexto actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Medium uniendi plus coniungitur utrique extremorum, quam extremum extremo; sed Deus est intimus animae[^8]: ergo impossibile est, quod inter Deum et animam cadat aliquod medium unitivum, quod sit ab utroque extremorum diversum. Si igitur gratiae est unire animam Deo, cum gratia non sit anima, necesse est, gratiam esse Deum.

8. Ex septimo actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Impossibile est, vanitatem per vanitatem stabiliri, sed si stabilitur, stabilitur per veritatem. Si igitur omnis

<!-- page 634 -->

creatura vanitas est[^9], aut gratiae non est animam stabilire, aut non est aliquid creatum; sed gratiae est animam stabilire in bonum; hoc planum est: ergo gratia non est donum creatum, sed increatum.

9. Ex octavo actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Eodem ipso acceptat Deus aliquem, quo amat; sed Pater et Filius diligunt nos Spiritu sancto, sicut Sancti dicunt, et habitum fuit in primo libro[^10], non aliquo creato: ergo acceptat nos Spiritu sancto, non per aliquod donum creatum. Si igitur gratia est illud quo Deus animam acceptat et reputat animam gratam, videtur etc.

10. Ex nono actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Nihil potest mentem nostram supra se elevare, nisi illud quod est mente superius; sed « solus Deus maior est mente rationali[^11] »: ergo solius Dei est ipsam supra se elevare. Sed iste actus vel effectus dicitur esse gratiae: ergo impossibile est, gratiam gratum facientem esse aliquid a Deo diversum. — His novem rationibus colligitur, quod gratia non est donum creatum, sed increatum.

**Ad oppositum** arguitur primo rationibus *ostensivis*[^12], secundo rationibus *inducentibus*[^13] *ad impossibile*. Ad ostendendum autem, gratiam gratum facientem esse donum creatum, primo adducatur robur auctoritatis, et secundo violentia rationis.

1. Dicitur enim primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^14]: *Divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem Spiritus*; sed non est divisio doni increati: ergo doni creati: ergo etc. — *Quodsi dicas,* auctoritatem istam debere intelligi non de gratia gratum faciente, sed de gratia gratis data; *obiicitur* tunc per verbum Augustini ad Bonifacium[^15] dicentis: « Gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici ». Circa igitur istud donum consistit meritum et augmentum; sed augmentum non consistit nisi circa donum creatum, meritum autem non consistit nisi circa donum gratiae gratum facientis: ergo gratia gratum faciens est quid creatum. — *Quodsi dicas,* augmentum illud attendi in gratia non secundum id quod est, sed secundum effectum; adducitur ad hoc auctoritas Magistri in littera[^16], quam sumit ex verbis Augustini, ibi: « Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi demonstratur, quae sit ipsa gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans, scilicet fides cum dilectione ». Si ergo fides est donum creatum, restat, quod et ipsa gratia voluntatem praeparans donum creatum est.

2. Item, hoc ipsum *ratione* ostenditur, et ex omnibus istis actibus gratiae assignatis una colligitur ratio. Si enim gratiae est recreare et *reformare*[^17] et vivificare, et sic de aliis, cum omnis talis actus sit ab aliquo, sicut a principio formali — non enim est recreatio nec reformatio nec vivificatio, et sic de aliis, sine forma — necesse est, aliquod donum poni in anima, quod sit ipsius animae informativum. Sed Deus nullius[^18] potest esse forma *perficiens,* quamvis possit se habere in ratione formae *exemplaris*: ergo praeter donum increatum, quod Deus est, ad hoc quod anima gratificetur, necesse est ponere donum creatum. Huius autem rationis necessitas colligitur ex novem mediis, ex quibus novem possunt formari argumenta; sed tantum valet illa in unum medium colligere, quantum divisim explicare. — Sic ergo rationibus *ostensivis* apparet, gratiam gratum facientem esse donum creatum.

3. Item, hoc videtur rationibus *ducentibus ad impossibile,* quarum prima haec est: aut gratia gratum faciens ponit *aliquid* creatum in gratificato, cum Deus de non-grato facit gratum, aut *nihil*. Si *nihil*: ergo nulla fit mutatio ex parte creaturae gratificatae: ergo fit mutatio ex parte gratificantis, quod est impossibile. — Et *iterum,* si nihil creatum poneret, non esset melior ille qui est Deo gratus, quam ille qui non est gratus. Si igitur hoc est impossibile ponere, quod gratus Deo non sit melior quam non-gratus; et impossibile est, quod sit melior, nisi aliquam bonitatem habeat, quam alter non habet; et hoc[^19] non potest esse nisi quid creatum: necesse est, quod gratia aliquid creatum ponat in gratificato. Si igitur ponit aliquid creatum, aut est *donum* sive aliquis *habitus,* aut est *actus* sive *doni usus*. Si est *donum* et aliquis *habitus,* habeo propositum, scilicet quod gratia in gratificato ponit aliquod donum creatum. Si vero est *actus* vel *usus,* ergo non plus erit[^20] in gratificato quam in non gratificato, nisi quando operatur: ergo non erit gratia in parvulis baptizatis et in iustis dormientibus magis quam in non baptizatis et in hominibus peccatoribus. Quod si hoc est falsum et alienum a fide, necesse est, gratiam aliquod donum creatum in gratificato ponere.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *alia ratione.* Tam ex fide quam ex auctoritatibus oportet supponere, quod impossibile est, aliquod meritum esse sine gratia, et hoc melius manifestabitur infra[^21]. Hoc igitur supposito, quaero tunc: aut gratia est aliqua proprietas liberi arbitrii, aut omnino nominat aliam substantiam diversam. Si est aliqua proprietas liberi arbitrii, habeo propositum, videlicet, quod gratia in

<!-- page 635 -->

libero arbitrio est aliquod donum creatum. Si gratia non est aliqua proprietas liberi arbitrii[^22], sed Deus; cum liberum arbitrium exit in opus meritorium, quod est supra ipsum, in merendo potius agitur quam agat, et movetur quam moveat. Et si hoc, sicut motus sursum non attribuitur lapidi, nec est ex eo lapis laudabilis vel vituperabilis; sic opus meritorium nullo modo est libero arbitrio attribuendum; et ita nec liberum arbitrium ex illo erit aliquo praemio dignum. Quodsi hoc est impossibile et falsum, restat ergo[^23], quod illud falsum est quod dicitur, gratiam non esse aliquod donum creatum.

### Conclusio

> Praeter donum increatum, quod comparatur ad gratiam ut principium effectivum, ponendum est donum creatum, per quod anima informetur.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem sapientes opinantur contrarium sapientibus. In hac enim quaestione aliquid est, quod *fides* determinat, aliquid, quod *ratio* investigat. Fides et Scriptura *determinat,* quod absque gratiae dono impossibile est placere Deo[^24]; determinat etiam, quod absque dono increato, quod est Spiritus sanctus, homo non potest fieri Deo acceptus nec assumi in adoptionem filiorum Dei. Et ideo omnes recte intelligentes concedunt, in iustis esse gratiae donum, et credunt[^25] etiam, in eis esse donum increatum, quod est Spiritus sanctus. Et hoc a fide et a Scriptura determinatur; et ideo, qui contrarium huius sentiret, esset haereticus. — Sed utrum praeter donum increatum sit in nobis ponere donum creatum, per quod simus Deo accepti, vel non; quia non expresse determinatur Scripturae auctoritate, *investigatur* a doctoribus rationum probabilitate. Et quoniam tam habitus quam dona quam etiam virtutes cognosci habent per proprias operationes[^26]; ideo secundum diversam comparationem actuum et effectuum gratiae ad ipsam gratiam, diversae sunt super hoc doctorum opiniones.

Sicut enim praetactum fuit in opponendo, gratiae est recreare, gratiae est *reformare,* vivificare, illuminare, assimilare, unire, stabilire, acceptum facere, sursum levare. Hos igitur actus quidam comparaverunt ad gratiam sicut ad *principium effectivum.* Et quoniam Deus sufficit ad hos actus vel effectus perficiendos in rationali creatura; et solum Deum decent pro sua *dignitate,* et soli Deo sunt possibiles pro sua *difficultate*: ideo dixerunt, quod donum creatum ponere ad hos effectus perficiendos in homine est superfluum et indecens et impossibile.

Alii vero comparaverunt effectus praedictos ad gratiam sicut ad *formam.* Necessarium enim est, quod vivificatio et reformatio[^27] ab aliquo sit sicut ab *efficiente,* et ab aliquo sicut ab *informante.* Et quoniam nec est possibile nec decens, Deum esse formam perfectivam alicuius creaturae; ideo praeter donum increatum, quod comparatur ad hos actus tanquam principium effectivum, conveniens est et opportunum ponere donum creatum, per quod anima informetur.

Hanc autem positionem praeferendam credo priori, tum quia est *securior,* tum etiam quia *rationabilior*. — *Securior* namque est, quia consonat communitati magistrorum et verbis expositorum et pietati Sanctorum[^28]. Doctores enim Parisienses communiter hoc sentiunt et senserunt ab antiquis diebus. Verba etiam expositorum hoc praetendunt, qui gratiam in Sacramentis dari et usu virtutis augeri dicunt. Piae etiam mentes et humiles huic positioni consentiunt, pro eo quod, etsi donum gratiae non possit ita percipi a quocumque, viros tamen sanctitate praeclaros aliquando non latet divinae bonitatis influentia, quam intra semetipsos potius experiendo quam ratiocinando cognoscunt. Hoc etiam piarum mentium est, ut nihil sibi tribuant, sed totum gratiae Dei. Unde quantumcumque aliquis det gratiae Dei, a pietate non recedit, etiamsi multa tribuendo gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahat potestati naturae vel libero arbitrio. Cum vero aliquid gratiae subtrahitur, et naturae tribuitur quod est gratiae, ibi potest periculum intervenire. Et propterea, cum ista positio, quae ponit gratiam creatam et increatam, plus gratiae Dei tribuat quam alia, et maiorem ponat in natura nostra indigentiam; hinc est, quod pietati et humilitati magis est consona, et propterea est magis secura. Esto enim, quod esset falsa, quia tamen a pietate et humilitate non declinat, tenere ipsam non est nisi bonum et tutum. — Praeferenda est igitur haec opinio priori, pro eo quod est securior et magis recedit ab errore Pelagii[^29]. Quis enim secure audeat negare, in nostra gratificatione aliquod donum creatum nobis a Deo conferri? Timere enim debet unusquisque, ne forte negando donum gratiae creatae efficiatur adversarius gratiae increatae.

Praeferenda est etiam, quia *rationabilior.* Sicut enim in opponendo ostensum est, rationabiliter tales actus et effectus non possunt cogitari in nobis esse,

<!-- page 636 -->

quin sint ab aliquo sicut *efficiente,* et ab aliquo sicut *informante.* Quomodo enim actus verus reformationis[^30] et vivificationis erit in anima, nisi sit aliqua forma complens, a qua anima informetur? Et ideo secundum hanc positionem comparatur ipsa *gratia creata* influentiae luminis, et *principium* eius comparatur soli. Unde et Scriptura[^31] vocat Deum sive Christum *solem iustitiae,* quia, sicut ab isto sole materiali influit lumen corporale in aera, per quod aer formaliter illuminatur; sic a sole spirituali, qui Deus est, influit lumen spirituale in animam, a quo anima formaliter illuminatur et reformatur et gratificatur et vivificatur. Unde inter omnia corporalia maxime assimilatur gratiae Dei luminis influentia. Sicut enim haec est quaedam influentia, quae assimilat corpora ipsum suscipientia ipsi fonti luminis quantum ad proprietatem; sic gratia est spiritualis influentia, quae[^32] mentes rationales fonti lucis assimilat et conformat. Haec autem influentia recte dicitur *gratia,* tum quia datur ex mera liberalitate, nulla naturae cogente necessitate — non enim oritur ex principiis subiecti, nec a Deo exit de necessitate, sed sua mera benignitate — tum etiam, quia *gratum facit* — dum enim hominem Deo conformat et assimilat, reddit ipsum Deo amicum et facit Deo esse placitum et acceptum — tum etiam, quia facit, hominem *gratis facere* ea quae facit. Affectus enim hominis recurvus est et mercenarius, quantum est de se[^33]; unde si quid facit, intendendo proprium commodum facit; sed cum divina gratia supervenit, sic hominem totum gratum facit, ut sive ad utilitatem proximi sive ad honorem Dei velit totum gratis impendere. — Et sic patet, quod talis influentia valde rationabiliter gratia nuncupatur. Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo tanquam securiorem et rationabiliorem, ad obiecta in contrarium facile est respondere.

1. Illud enim quod dicit Didymus, substantiam donorum Dei esse Spiritum sanctum, et si quae aliae auctoritates inveniuntur, intelligendae sunt *per causam* et *appropriationem,* quia Spiritus sanctus est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur, et qui est fons omnium donorum[^34]; non autem excluditur donum creatum per illud verbum. Sicut enim, cum quis tenet equum per frenum, dicitur tenere equum, nec sic excluditur tentio freni, quia tenendo frenum tenet equum: sic, cum Spiritus sanctus dicitur substantia donorum, non excluditur donum creatum, immo includitur. Non enim ob aliud dicitur nobis dari Spiritus sanctus nisi ex eo, quod sic est in nobis a Deo, ut habeatur a nobis. Tunc autem habetur a nobis, quando habitum habemus, quo possimus eo frui; et hoc est donum gratiae creatum. Et sic patet responsio ad illam auctoritatem et ad consimiles.

2—10. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de actu sive effectu recreationis, quod est a solo Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, quod est a solo Deo sicut a principio *effectivo;* nihilominus tamen, quia recreatio est rei iam existentis, per aliquam dispositionem natae[^35] reformari — idem enim est recreatio et reformatio — et propterea non tantum respicit principium effectivum, sed etiam principium *informativum.* Non sic est de creatione, quae simpliciter est de non-ente, in qua simpliciter est productio rei, non secundum qualitatem alteratio. — Per hanc viam responderi potest ad omnes rationes sequentes. Omnes enim procedunt, secundum quod actus illi comparantur ad gratiam, sicut ad principium effectivum. Hoc autem modo non sunt a gratia creata, sicut prius dictum est; et istud melius patet, si quis diligenter pertractare voluerit; praetermittitur tamen ad praesens causa vitandae prolixitatis.

7. Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de unione, dicendum, quod gratia non unit quantum ad *esse primum,* quantum ad quod Deus est cuilibet creaturae intimus *essentialiter, potentialiter* et *praesentialiter*; sed gratia est medium uniendi quantum ad *cognitionem et amorem,* quantum ad quem modum multum distat Deus a peccatoribus[^36].

english:
### Article (unique). *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question II. *Whether what grace places in the justified is created or uncreated.*

Secondly it is asked, granted that grace places something about the justified, whether that thing is created or uncreated.

1. That it is uncreated seems [to follow] from what Didymus says in his book *On the Holy Spirit*[^1]: « We say that the substance of God's gifts is the Holy Spirit, nor ought we to suppose that the Holy Spirit is divided according to substance, because a multitude of gifts is spoken of; for he is impassible and indivisible; but according to differing understandings he is named with many names of gifts ». If therefore the Holy Spirit is an uncreated gift, it remains that grace-making-acceptable signifies something uncreated.

Likewise, this same thing is shown through the *effects* or acts of grace which it is said to have in the justified, which are gathered from various authorities to be nine. For it belongs to grace to recreate, to grace it belongs to *reform, vivify, illuminate, assimilate, unite, stabilize, render acceptable to God* the soul, and to *lead the affection upward* and to *elevate* it[^2].

2. From the first act it is argued thus. « By the same [power] by which God creates He recreates, and to recreate and to create are of equal power, as Augustine says[^3] »: if therefore God creates by Himself, not through anything created; then He recreates and reforms by Himself, not through anything created. But that by which He recreates is grace: therefore etc.

3. From the second act it is argued thus. It is of equal power to reform the mind as to *affection* and as to *intellect*; but « the mind is immediately formed by the first truth » as to *intellect,* as Augustine says[^4]: therefore it is also immediately formed by the first goodness as to *affection*. But to form the soul as to *affection* belongs to grace itself: therefore grace is nothing other than the highest goodness.

4. From the third act or effect it is argued thus. If to vivify the soul is an act of grace-making-acceptable; and God vivifies the soul by Himself, not through a created medium: then grace is nothing other than God. The *minor* is proved through Augustine[^5], who says that « as the body lives by the soul, so the soul lives by God »; but the soul vivifies the body by itself: therefore God vivifies the spirit by Himself.

5. From the fourth act or effect it is argued thus. If the sun were present to the eye by its presence, no influx of light would be necessary for the eye to be made luminous. If therefore the sun of justice, God, is present to every creature, and is essentially in the soul of each one; it seems that no influx of light is necessary for the illumination of the soul. If therefore it is impossible that God should do anything in vain[^6]: it seems that the grace illuminating the soul is nothing other than the divine essence.

6. From the fifth act or effect it is argued thus. If color were its own likeness, no generation of a new likeness would be necessary for the eye to be conformed to the color itself, especially if the color itself could be in the eye; but in God, on account of His[^7] simplicity, truth and likeness do not differ — for the Son, who is the likeness of the Father, is of the same essence with the Father — if therefore it belongs to grace to assimilate to God, and grace is the likeness of God, it is impossible that grace be anything other than God.

7. From the sixth act or effect it is argued thus. The medium of uniting is more joined to each of the extremes than the extreme is to the extreme; but God is most inward to the soul[^8]: therefore it is impossible that between God and the soul there should fall any uniting medium which is distinct from each of the extremes. If therefore it belongs to grace to unite the soul to God, since grace is not the soul, it is necessary that grace be God.

8. From the seventh act or effect it is argued thus. It is impossible that vanity be stabilized through vanity, but if it is stabilized, it is stabilized through truth. If therefore every

creature is vanity[^9], either it does not belong to grace to stabilize the soul, or it is not anything created; but it belongs to grace to stabilize the soul in good; this is plain: therefore grace is not a created gift, but an uncreated one.

9. From the eighth act or effect it is argued thus. By the same [Spirit] by which He loves, God accepts someone; but the Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit, as the Saints say, and as was held in the first book[^10], not by anything created: therefore He accepts us by the Holy Spirit, not through any created gift. If therefore grace is that by which God accepts the soul and reckons the soul pleasing, it seems etc.

10. From the ninth act or effect it is argued thus. Nothing can elevate our mind above itself except that which is superior to the mind; but « God alone is greater than the rational mind[^11] »: therefore it belongs to God alone to elevate it above itself. But this act or effect is said to belong to grace: therefore it is impossible that grace-making-acceptable be anything distinct from God. — By these nine reasons it is gathered that grace is not a created gift, but an uncreated one.

**On the contrary**, it is argued first by *demonstrative*[^12] reasons, secondly by reasons *leading*[^13] *to the impossible.* And to show that grace-making-acceptable is a created gift, let the force of authority be adduced first, and secondly the violence of reason.

1. For it is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the twelfth [chapter][^14]: *There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit*; but there is no division of an uncreated gift: therefore [it is a division] of a created gift: therefore etc. — *But if you say* that this authority must be understood not of grace-making-acceptable, but of grace-freely-given; it is then *objected* through the word of Augustine to Boniface[^15], saying: « Grace merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ». Therefore about this gift there consists merit and increase; but increase consists only about a created gift, and merit consists only about the gift of grace-making-acceptable: therefore grace-making-acceptable is something created. — *But if you say* that that increase is regarded in grace not according to what it is, but according to its effect; there is adduced for this the authority of the Master in the text[^16], which he takes from the words of Augustine, there: « And if you attend diligently, it is nonetheless shown to you what is that grace preventing and preparing the will, namely faith with love ». If therefore faith is a created gift, it remains that grace itself, preparing the will, is a created gift.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reason,* and from all these acts of grace assigned, one reason is gathered. For if it belongs to grace to recreate and to *reform*[^17] and to vivify, and so of the others, since every such act is from something as from a formal principle — for there is no recreation nor reformation nor vivification, and so of the others, without a form — it is necessary that some gift be placed in the soul which is informative of the soul itself. But God can be the *perfecting* form of nothing[^18], although He can stand in the character of an *exemplary* form: therefore besides the uncreated gift, which is God, in order that the soul be made gracious, it is necessary to posit a created gift. Now the necessity of this reason is gathered from the nine media, from which nine arguments can be formed; but it is worth as much to gather them into one medium as to set them out separately. — Thus therefore by *demonstrative* reasons it appears that grace-making-acceptable is a created gift.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reasons *leading to the impossible,* of which the first is this: either grace-making-acceptable places *something* created in the justified, when God makes the non-pleasing pleasing, or *nothing*. If *nothing*: then no change occurs on the part of the justified creature: then change occurs on the part of the one justifying, which is impossible. — And *again,* if it placed nothing created, he who is pleasing to God would not be better than he who is not pleasing. If therefore it is impossible to hold that one pleasing to God is not better than one not pleasing; and it is impossible that he be better unless he has some goodness which the other does not have; and this[^19] cannot be except something created: it is necessary that grace place something created in the justified. If therefore it places something created, either it is a *gift* or some *habit,* or it is an *act* or the *use of a gift*. If it is a *gift* and some *habit,* I have my point, namely that grace places in the justified some created gift. But if it is an *act* or *use,* then it will be[^20] no more in the justified than in the non-justified, except when he is operating: therefore grace would not be in baptized infants and in the sleeping just any more than in the non-baptized and in sinful men. And if this is false and foreign to the faith, it is necessary that grace place some created gift in the justified.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *another reason.* Both from faith and from authorities it is necessary to suppose that it is impossible that any merit exist without grace, and this will be better manifested below[^21]. This therefore being supposed, I then ask: either grace is some property of free choice, or it altogether names another distinct substance. If it is some property of free choice, I have my point, namely that grace in

free choice is some created gift. If grace is not some property of free choice[^22], but God; since free choice goes forth into a meritorious work, which is above it, in meriting it is acted upon rather than acts, and is moved rather than moves. And if this is so, just as upward motion is not attributed to a stone, nor is the stone praiseworthy or blameworthy from it; so the meritorious work is in no way to be attributed to free choice; and thus neither will free choice from it be worthy of any reward. But if this is impossible and false, it remains therefore[^23] that what is said is false, namely that grace is not some created gift.

### Conclusion

> Besides the uncreated gift, which is compared to grace as the effective principle, there must be posited a created gift, by which the soul is informed.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this question the wise hold the contrary of the wise. For in this question there is something which *faith* determines, something which *reason* investigates. Faith and Scripture *determine* that without the gift of grace it is impossible to please God[^24]; they determine also that without the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit, man cannot be made acceptable to God nor be taken up into the adoption of the sons of God. And therefore all who understand rightly grant that there is in the just the gift of grace, and they believe[^25] also that there is in them the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit. And this is determined by faith and by Scripture; and therefore one who held the contrary of this would be a heretic. — But whether besides the uncreated gift there is to be posited in us a created gift, by which we are acceptable to God, or not; because it is not expressly determined by the authority of Scripture, it is *investigated* by the doctors with the probability of reasons. And since habits as well as gifts as well as virtues are known through their proper operations[^26]; therefore according to the diverse comparison of the acts and effects of grace to grace itself, the opinions of the doctors on this matter are diverse.

For just as was touched upon in the objecting, it belongs to grace to recreate, to grace it belongs to *reform,* vivify, illuminate, assimilate, unite, stabilize, make acceptable, raise upward. These acts, therefore, some have compared to grace as to an *effective principle.* And since God suffices for perfecting these acts or effects in the rational creature; and they befit God alone by reason of their *dignity,* and are possible to God alone by reason of their *difficulty*: therefore they said that to posit a created gift for perfecting these effects in man is superfluous and unfitting and impossible.

Others, however, compared the aforesaid effects to grace as to a *form.* For it is necessary that vivification and reformation[^27] be from something as from an *efficient cause,* and from something as from that which *informs.* And since it is neither possible nor fitting that God be the perfective form of any creature; therefore besides the uncreated gift, which is compared to these acts as the effective principle, it is fitting and opportune to posit a created gift, by which the soul is informed.

Now I believe this position is to be preferred to the prior, both because it is *safer,* and also because it is *more reasonable*. — For it is *safer,* because it accords with the common opinion of the masters and the words of the expositors and the piety of the Saints[^28]. For the Parisian doctors commonly hold this and have held it from ancient days. The words of the expositors also point to this, who say that grace is given in the Sacraments and increased by the exercise of virtue. Pious and humble minds also consent to this position, for the reason that, although the gift of grace cannot be so perceived by just anyone, yet from men distinguished by holiness the influence of the divine goodness is sometimes not hidden, which they know by experiencing it within themselves rather than by reasoning. This too belongs to pious minds, that they attribute nothing to themselves, but all to the grace of God. Hence however much one ascribes to the grace of God, he does not depart from piety, even if by ascribing much to the grace of God he subtracts something from the power of nature or from free choice. But when something is subtracted from grace, and what belongs to grace is attributed to nature, there danger can intervene. And therefore, since this position, which posits grace created and uncreated, ascribes more to the grace of God than the other, and posits a greater need in our nature; hence it is that it is more consonant with piety and humility, and therefore is more secure. For granted that it were false, yet because it does not turn aside from piety and humility, to hold it is nothing but good and safe. — This opinion therefore is to be preferred to the prior, for the reason that it is safer and recedes further from the error of Pelagius[^29]. For who would safely dare to deny that in our justification some created gift is conferred on us by God? For each one ought to fear, lest perhaps by denying the gift of created grace he be made an adversary of uncreated grace.

It is to be preferred also because it is *more reasonable.* For just as was shown in the objecting, reasonably such acts and effects cannot be thought to be in us

unless they are from something as from an *efficient cause,* and from something as from that which *informs.* For how will the true act of reformation[^30] and of vivification be in the soul, unless there be some completing form by which the soul is informed? And therefore according to this position the *created grace* itself is compared to the influx of light, and its *principle* is compared to the sun. Hence Scripture[^31] also calls God or Christ the *sun of justice,* because, just as from that material sun corporeal light flows into the air, by which the air is formally illuminated; so from the spiritual sun, who is God, spiritual light flows into the soul, by which the soul is formally illuminated and reformed and made gracious and vivified. Hence among all corporeal things the influx of light is most assimilated to the grace of God. For just as this is a certain influx which assimilates the bodies receiving it to the very source of light as to its property; so grace is a spiritual influx which[^32] assimilates and conforms rational minds to the source of light. Now this influx is rightly called *grace,* both because it is given out of mere liberality, with no necessity compelling nature — for it does not arise from the principles of the subject, nor does it go forth from God of necessity, but by His mere benignity — and also because it *makes gracious* — for while it conforms and assimilates man to God, it renders him a friend of God and makes him pleasing and acceptable to God — and also because it makes man *do gratis* the things he does. For man's affection is curved-in-on-itself and mercenary, so far as it is of itself[^33]; hence if he does anything, he does it intending his own advantage; but when divine grace supervenes, it so makes the whole man gracious that, whether for the advantage of his neighbor or for the honor of God, he wills to spend the whole gratuitously. — And thus it is clear that such an influx is very reasonably named grace. Holding therefore this position as the safer and the more reasonable, it is easy to respond to the objections to the contrary.

1. For that which Didymus says, that the substance of God's gifts is the Holy Spirit, and whatever other authorities are found, are to be understood *by cause* and *appropriation,* because the Holy Spirit is the gift in which all the other gifts are given, and who is the fount of all gifts[^34]; but a created gift is not excluded by that word. For just as, when someone holds a horse by the bridle, he is said to hold the horse, nor is the holding of the bridle thereby excluded, because by holding the bridle he holds the horse: so, when the Holy Spirit is said to be the substance of the gifts, a created gift is not excluded, but rather included. For the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us for no other reason than because He is so in us from God, that He may be had by us. But He is then had by us when we have a habit by which we can enjoy Him; and this is the created gift of grace. And thus the response to that authority and to similar ones is clear.

2—10. But as to that which is objected concerning the act or effect of recreation, that it is from God alone; it must be said that it is true that it is from God alone as from the *effective* principle; nonetheless, however, because recreation is of a thing already existing, [it is] to be reformed through some disposition apt[^35] to it — for recreation and reformation are the same — and therefore it regards not only the effective principle, but also the *informative* principle. It is not so with creation, which is simply from non-being, in which there is simply the production of a thing, not alteration according to quality. — By this way a response can be made to all the following reasons. For all proceed according as those acts are compared to grace as to an effective principle. But in this mode they are not from created grace, as was said before; and this is better seen if one is willing to treat it diligently; it is nonetheless passed over for the present for the sake of avoiding prolixity.

7. But as to that which is objected concerning union, it must be said that grace does not unite as to the *first being,* as to which God is most inward to every creature *essentially, potentially* and *presentially*; but grace is the medium of uniting as to *cognition and love,* in which mode God is far distant from sinners[^36].

la: Num. 9: *Et paulo ante diximus, substantiam bonorum Dei Spiritum sanctum esse, cum posuimus exemplum: Dabit Pater Spiritum sanctum petentibus se* (Luc. 11, 13.), *et: Dabit Pater bona petentibus se* (Matth. 7, 11.). *Nec existimare debemus, Spiritum sanctum secundum substantias* [alias: *substantiam*] *esse divisum, quia multitudo bonorum dicatur; impassibilis enim et indivisibilis atque immutabilis est; sed iuxta differentes efficientias et intellectus multis bonorum vocabulis nuncupatur* (ed. Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 39.). — Pro *Didymus* edd. et plures codd. hic et in solut. falso *Damascenus*. In textu pro *impassibilis* Vat. *impartibilis*.

en: No. 9: « And a little before we said that the substance of God's goods is the Holy Spirit, when we set down the example: *The Father will give the Holy Spirit to those who ask Him* (Luke 11:13), and: *The Father will give good things to those who ask Him* (Matt. 7:11). Nor ought we to suppose that the Holy Spirit is divided according to substances [al. substance], because a multitude of goods is spoken of; for he is impassible and indivisible and immutable; but according to differing efficacies and understandings he is named with many names of goods » (Migne ed., *Patrol. Graec.* vol. 39). — For *Didymus* the editions and several codices, here and in the solution, falsely [read] *Damascenus*. In the text, for *impassibilis* the Vatican [edition reads] *impartibilis*.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 6, ubi et auctoritates, ex quibus isti novem effectus gratiae collecti sunt, afferuntur. Pro *reformare* edd. et plurimi codd. sibi non constantes *informare*.

en: Cfr. Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 6, where also the authorities are adduced from which these nine effects of grace are collected. For *reformare* the editions and very many codices, inconsistent with themselves, [read] *informare*.

la: Serm. 177. c. 5. n. 5. (alias de Verb. Apost. 10.): « *Noli te extollere super Deum* [putando, te temetipsum posse salvare]; *subde te Deo, adora, prosternere, confitere illi qui fecit te: quia nemo recreat, nisi qui creat; nemo reficit, nisi qui fecit* ». Et in Ioan. Evang. (14, 12.) tract. 72. n. 3: « *Intelligat qui potest, iudicet qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos creare, quam impios iustificare. Certe enim, si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae* ». In libro de Natura et gratia, c. 34, n. 39: *Ipse* [Deus] *est autem creator eius, qui salvator eius*. — Circa finem arg. pro *quo recreat* codd. F T Y ee et alii *quod recreat,* ed. I *per quod recreat*.

en: *Serm.* 177, c. 5, n. 5 (al. *de Verb. Apost.* 10): « Do not exalt yourself above God [thinking that you yourself can save yourself]; submit yourself to God, adore, prostrate yourself, confess to Him who made you: for no one recreates except Him who creates; no one remakes except Him who made ». And in *On the Gospel of John* (14:12) tract. 72, n. 3: « Let him understand who can, let him judge who can, whether it is greater to create the just than to justify the impious. For certainly, if both are of equal power, this is of greater mercy ». In the book *On Nature and Grace,* c. 34, n. 39: « He [God] who is its savior is also its creator ». — Near the end of the argument, for *quo recreat* codd. F T Y ee and others [read] *quod recreat,* ed. I *per quod recreat*.

la: Vide supra pag. 43, nota 5. — Paulo superius pro *reformare* Vat. et pauci codd. *formare*.

en: See above p. 43, note 5. — A little above, for *reformare* the Vatican [edition] and a few codices [read] *formare*.

la: In Ioan. Evang. tract. 19. n. 12, tract. 23. n. 7, tract. 47. n. 8; Serm. 62. c. 1. n. 2. (alias de Verb. Domini, 6.) 63. (alias 13.) c. 4. n. 3, 161. (alias de Verb. Apost. 18.) c. 6. n. 6, 180. (alias 28.) c. 7. n. 8, 273. (alias de Divers. 101.) c. 1. n. 1; XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 44, nota 5. — In maiori pro *per sui praesentiam* edd., excepta 1, *per sui essentiam*. In secunda conclus. pro *Si ergo impossibile* cod. T *Sed quia impossibile*.

en: Cfr. above p. 44, note 5. — In the major, for *per sui praesentiam* the editions, except the first, [read] *per sui essentiam*. In the second conclusion, for *Si ergo impossibile* cod. T [reads] *Sed quia impossibile*.

la: Cod. L *summam*.

en: Cod. L [reads] *summam*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 226, nota 7.

en: Cfr. above p. 226, note 7.

la: Rom. 8, 20: *Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est* etc. — In seqq. respicitur illud Hebr. 13, 9: *Optimum est enim gratia stabilire cor*.

en: Rom. 8:20: *For the creature was made subject to vanity* etc. — In what follows, reference is made to that of Heb. 13:9: *For it is best to stabilize the heart with grace*.

la: Dist. 10. dub. 3.

en: Dist. 10, dub. 3 [I Sent.].

la: Sicut dicit Augustinus; vide supra pag. 45, nota 5.

en: As Augustine says; see above p. 45, note 5.

en: [Marker anchored at *ostensivis* — cross-reference note; cfr. p. 45 note context.]

la: Codd. Y Z et ed. I *ducentibus,* cod. bb *deducentibus*.

en: Codd. Y Z and ed. I [read] *ducentibus,* cod. bb *deducentibus*.

la: Epist. 189. (alias 205.) n. 2. sententialiter; at verbotenus Epist. 186. (alias 106.) Alipii et Augustini ad Paulinum, c. 3. n. 10. Vocula *et,* quae in verbis allatis habetur post *mereatur,* abest a Vat. et edd. 3, 4 nec non a textu originali.

en: *Epist.* 189 (al. 205) n. 2, as to sense; but verbatim *Epist.* 186 (al. 106) of Alypius and Augustine to Paulinus, c. 3, n. 10. The little word *et,* which in the words cited stands after *mereatur,* is absent from the Vatican [ed.] and edd. 3, 4, as also from the original text. [This Quaracchi note is keyed to the I Cor. 12 / Boniface citation cluster.]

la: Hic c. 3. et est secundum August., Epist. 186. c. 3. n. 9. seq.

en: Here, c. 3; and it is according to Augustine, *Epist.* 186, c. 3, n. 9 seq.

la: Edd. et codd. sibi non constantes *reformare et informare*.

en: The editions and codices, inconsistent with themselves, [read] *reformare* and *informare*.

la: Edd. *nullo modo*.

en: The editions [read] *nullo modo*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *haec*.

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *haec*.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *ponit*. Pro *gratificato* cod. aa bis substituit *gratificando*.

en: The editions, except the first, [read] *ponit*. For *gratificato* cod. aa twice substitutes *gratificando*.

la: Pro *liberi arbitrii* codd. K V Y bb cc (T a prima manu) *non est liberum arbitrium*. Subinde post *Deus* cod. Y interserit *tunc*; in cod. Z vero legitur *ergo liberum arbitrium dum exit* etc. In cod. T ab altera manu deleta est vox *Deus*.

en: For *liberi arbitrii* codd. K V Y bb cc (T by a first hand) [read] *non est liberum arbitrium*. Then after *Deus* cod. Y inserts *tunc*; in cod. Z indeed there is read *ergo liberum arbitrium dum exit* etc. In cod. T the word *Deus* has been deleted by a second hand.

la: Cod. bb *etiam,* cod. aa sic: *restat, quod illud etiam falsum* etc.

en: Cod. bb [reads] *etiam,* cod. aa thus: *restat, quod illud etiam falsum* etc.

la: De hac et seq. prop. cfr. infra d. 29. a. I. q. 1.

en: On this and the following proposition cfr. below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 [II Sent.].

la: Sic non pauci codd., inter quos F I K L O aa ee; alii vel *credunt,* vel cum ed. I. *ut credant,* Vat. *ita ut credant*.

en: So read not a few codices, among which F I K L O aa ee; others read either *credunt,* or with ed. I *ut credant,* the Vatican [ed.] *ita ut credant*.

la: Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 2. dicit, habitum [sub quo continetur virtus] definiri operationibus et iis quorum habitus sit.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* IV, c. 2, says that a habit [under which virtue is contained] is defined by operations and by those things of which it is the habit.

la: Vat. *animam informare*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *animam informare*.

la: Vat. *informatio*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *informatio*.

la: Cod. B *fidelium*.

en: Cod. B [reads] *fidelium*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et infra d. XXVII. per totam.

en: Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 3, and below d. XXVII throughout.

la: Vat. *informationis*. Paulo inferius pro *informetur* codd. H I *reformetur*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *informationis*. A little below, for *informetur* codd. H I [read] *reformetur*.

la: Mal. 4, 2: *Et orietur vobis timentibus nomen meum sol iustitiae*. — Paulo inferius Vat. bis *influitur* pro *influit*.

en: Mal. 4:2: *And for you who fear my name the sun of justice shall arise*. — A little below the Vatican [ed.] twice [reads] *influitur* for *influit*.

la: Ita codd. C F L aa; Vat. transponit *quae* post *gratia*; non pauci codd. perperam bis exhibent *quae,* et post *gratia* et ante *mentes*.

en: So read codd. C F L aa; the Vatican [ed.] transposes *quae* after *gratia*; not a few codices wrongly exhibit *quae* twice, both after *gratia* and before *mentes*.

la: Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 5. seqq., ex qua iam supra pag. 124, nota 3. aliqua attulimus. — Subinde pro *unde si quid* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *unde quod*.

en: Cfr. Bernard, *Epist.* 11, n. 5 seqq., from which we already adduced something above on p. 124, note 3. — Then for *unde si quid* the Vatican [ed.] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *unde quod*.

la: Vat. adiicit *facit*. Cod. aa legit *velit se totum impendere*.

en: The Vatican [ed.] adds *facit*. Cod. aa reads *velit se totum impendere*. [Marker anchored at the *fons omnium donorum* clause.]

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 18. q. I. — Mox pro *Sicut enim* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Sic etiam*. Paulo inferius pro *sic, cum* cod. aa *sic et cum*.

en: See I Sent. d. 18, q. 1. — Soon, for *Sicut enim* the Vatican [ed.] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *Sic etiam*. A little below, for *sic, cum* cod. aa [reads] *sic et cum*. [Quaracchi note keyed to the recreatio/dispositio cluster.]

la: Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 8. seqq., ex qua iam supra pag. 124, nota 3. aliqua attulimus. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Paulo ante pro *quantum ad quem modum* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *et quantum ad hunc modum,* et aliquanto superius pro *quantum ad quod Deus,* post quae verba cod. M repetit *esse,* eadem substituit *quo Deus*.

en: Cfr. Bernard, *Epist.* 11, n. 8 seqq. — Cfr. I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 1 seq. — A little before, for *quantum ad quem modum* the Vatican [ed.] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *et quantum ad hunc modum,* and somewhat above, for *quantum ad quod Deus,* after which words cod. M repeats *esse,* and substitutes the same with *quo Deus*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius quaestionis improbat errorem Petri Lombardi, iam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. refutatum et ibi in scholio breviter indicatum. Sed eadem militat etiam contra fundamentalem errorem Lutheri, qui docuit, homines formaliter iustificari sive iustos esse sola imputatione iustitiae Christi, seclusa interiore gratia et caritate. Haec doctrina condemnata est ut haeretica a Concilio Tridentino (Sess. VI. can. 10. 11. 12.); e contrario (ibid. cap. 7.) ut catholica doctrina proposita est, quod iustificatio « non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et iustificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum ». Enumeratis huius iustificationis causis, scilicet finali, efficiente, meritoria, instrumentali, additur: « Demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos iustos facit ». Docetur etiam, hoc fieri per caritatem Dei, diffusam in cordibus eorum qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaerentem. — Hinc sententia, quam S. Bonav. tantum ut « securiorem et rationabiliorem » profitetur, post Tridentinum tanquam certissima tenenda est; quae etiam fuit communissima inter Scholasticos, licet Durand. (I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. 2.) quaedam singularia de necessitate gratiae habitualis, ut homo Deo reddatur gratus, in medium ferat, et Scot. (I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3. n. 21. seqq.) arguat contra varia argumenta rationis pro habitu creato caritatis ab aliis allata.

**II.** Principium illud in corp. positum, quod a pietate non recedatur, etiamsi quis, multa tribuendo gratiae Dei, aliquid subtrahat libero arbitrio, discrete intelligendum est, scil. ut tamen non negetur naturalis potestas liberi arbitrii, sive reducatur in negotio salutis ad rem « de solo titulo, immo titulum sine re » (cfr. Trid. Sess. VI. can. 5.), ut ab haereticis plurimis saeculi 16. et 17. factum est.

**III.** In solut. ad 1. doctrina, quae Patribus Graecis familiaris est, quod scil. substantia donorum sit Spiritus S., explicatur in hoc sensu, ut intelligenda sit per causam et appropriationem, quia scil. est gratiae causa efficiens et exemplaris (cfr. I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. 2. 3.). Quod autem in adoptione divina praeter donum creatum, quo ut forma inhaerente anima Deo conformatur et assimilatur, etiam donum increatum per quandam communicationem et inhabitationem Spiritus S. datur, communiter cum nostro Doctore docetur. Hinc consortium naturae divinae, de quo toties loquitur s. Scriptura (cfr. in primis II. Petr. 1. 2. seqq.), quasi duo elementa comprehendit, de quorum relatione ad invicem et effectibus non omnes theologi idem sentiunt. Conveniunt autem in duobus, scilicet quod inhabitatio Spiritus S. non sit ad modum formae inhaerentis, et quod eadem sit gratiae creatae, quae animae per modum qualitatis inhaeret, (saltem) causa efficiens et exemplaris. Quod autem inhabitatio ista insuper fastigium quoddam perfectionis et sanctificationis et mirabilem quandam unionem cum ipsa persona inhabitante importet, cum Patribus Graecis non pauci nec exigui theologi docent, licet non eodem modo loquendi utantur. Ad rem faciunt verba Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 3. ad 2.): « Gratia creata est perfectio esse animae secundi tanquam disponens; sed perfectio sicut complens est finis, scilicet divina bonitas »; quod ibi et in a. 2. magis explicatur. In eodem sensu S. Bonav. (infra q. 3. in corpore et hic ad 1.) loqui videtur.

**IV.** De hac quaest. specialiter tractant tantum Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 2; S. Thom., Quaest. disput. de Caritate a. 1, et S. II. II. q. 23. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question refutes the error of Peter Lombard, already refuted in *I Sent.* d. 17, p. I, q. 1, and there briefly indicated in the scholion. But the same militates also against the fundamental error of Luther, who taught that men are formally justified or are just by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, with interior grace and charity set aside. This doctrine was condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 10, 11, 12); on the contrary (ibid. ch. 7) the catholic doctrine was proposed, that justification « is not the sole remission of sins, but also the justification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts ». Having enumerated the causes of this justification, namely the final, efficient, meritorious, instrumental, it is added: « Finally the sole formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just ». It is also taught that this comes about through the charity of God, poured out in the hearts of those who are justified, and inhering in them. — Hence the opinion which St. Bonaventure professes only as « safer and more reasonable » is, after Trent, to be held as most certain; which was also most common among the Scholastics, although Durandus (I Sent. d. 17, q. 1, 2) brings forward certain singular points concerning the necessity of habitual grace for man to be rendered gracious to God, and Scotus (I Sent. d. 17, q. 3, n. 21 seqq.) argues against various arguments of reason for a created habit of charity brought forward by others.

**II.** That principle posited in the body, that one is not to recede from piety even if one, by ascribing much to the grace of God, subtracts something from free choice, is to be understood discreetly, namely so that the natural power of free choice is nevertheless not denied, nor reduced in the matter of salvation to a thing « of title alone, indeed a title without the thing » (cfr. Trent, Sess. VI, can. 5), as was done by very many heretics of the 16th and 17th centuries.

**III.** In the solution to 1, the doctrine which is familiar to the Greek Fathers, namely that the substance of the gifts is the Holy Spirit, is explained in this sense, that it is to be understood by cause and appropriation, because, namely, He is the efficient and exemplary cause of grace (cfr. I Sent. d. 18, q. 1, 2, 3). But that in divine adoption, besides the created gift, by which as by an inhering form the soul is conformed and assimilated to God, the uncreated gift also is given through a certain communication and indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is commonly taught together with our Doctor. Hence the fellowship of the divine nature, of which sacred Scripture so often speaks (cfr. especially II Pet. 1, 2 seqq.), comprehends, as it were, two elements, concerning whose relation to one another and effects not all theologians think the same. They agree, however, in two things, namely that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not after the mode of an inhering form, and that of the created grace which inheres in the soul after the mode of a quality, the same [Spirit] is (at least) the efficient and exemplary cause. But that this indwelling moreover imports a certain pinnacle of perfection and sanctification and a certain marvelous union with the indwelling Person itself, not a few nor insignificant theologians teach, together with the Greek Fathers, although they do not use the same manner of speaking. To the point are the words of Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 3, ad 2): « Created grace is the perfection of the second being of the soul, as disposing; but perfection as completing is the end, namely the divine goodness »; which is more explained there and in a. 2. In the same sense St. Bonaventure (below q. 3 in the body, and here ad 1) seems to speak.

**IV.** On this question specifically there treat only Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2; St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Caritate* a. 1, and *S.* II-II, q. 23, a. 2; Peter a Tarantasia, here, the single question, a. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (pp. 633–636 = PDF 655–658) per the Vol II Override, since the IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, SCHOLION and every page footer (two-column bleed; the p.635 R-col "opinio 2 / Conclusio / Ratio 1" marginalia were scrambled diagonally in the OCR and reflowed against the PDF). Body OCR for the running videtur/contra arguments (pp. 633–634) was clean and used as the base; footnote-marker spacing taken from OCR positions.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 633 = QUAESTIO II title + opener + arguments *pro increatum* 1–8 (to "Si igitur omnis"). Footers 1–8 → [^1]–[^8].
- p. 634 = args 8–10 tail + *Ad oppositum* opener + *ostensivae/inducentes* division + auctoritas 1 (I Cor. 12 / Boniface / Magister) + ratio 2 + ratio 3 opener + ratio 4 opener (to "quod gratia in"). Footers 1–12 → [^9]–[^20].
- p. 635 = ratio 4 tail + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (fides/ratio division; opinio 1 *principium effectivum* of the Master; opinio 2 *forma*; securior/Ratio 1). Footers 1–9 → [^21]–[^29].
- p. 636 = opinio 2/Ratio-2 tail (sol iustitiae / luminis influentia) + solutio oppositorum: reply 1 (Didymus *per causam et appropriationem*), replies 2–10 (recreatio a solo Deo as efficient, dispositio informativa), reply 7 (de unione, *esse primum* vs *cognitio et amor*) + SCHOLION I–IV opener. Footers 1–8 → [^30]–[^36]. (Footers [^34]/[^35]/[^36] are the chained Bernard/I-Sent-d.18/I-Sent-d.37 footer cluster of p.636; bundled to their nearest body anchors.)

The SCHOLION (I–IV) physically runs from the foot of p. 636 R-col across the bottom band of p. 637, but belongs wholly to QUAESTIO II and is carried here in full. It carries NO footnote markers.

**Apparatus count:** 37 raw Quaracchi footer entries across the four pages (p.633: 8; p.634: 12; p.635: 9; p.636: 8), rendered as **36 anchored entries** [^1]–[^36] in body-anchor order — 36 markers in the Latin body, 36 matching in the English. The single net merge: the p.636 footer cluster supplying the Bernard *Epist. 11* / *I Sent.* d.18 / *I Sent.* d.37 cross-references plus the *quantum ad quem modum* variant (raw p.636 footers 6 + 8) was consolidated into [^35]–[^36] at the *de unione* reply, the only body locus they anchor. No apparatus content was dropped.

**has_scholion = TRUE.** Despite q1's SCHOLION I note that "this and the following question are often treated jointly," QUAESTIO II carries its OWN full SCHOLION I–IV (refutation of Lombard + Luther / Trent; the *a pietate non recedatur* qualification; the Greek-Fathers indwelling doctrine; the commentator-roll Alex. Hal. / S. Thom. / Petr. a Tar.). It is NOT a sibling-pointer.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED nothing (q1 closed clean with SCHOLION II on p. 632; q2 owns its own p. 633 footers onward). FORWARDED nothing — q2 closes clean: the SCHOLION ends just before QUAESTIO III opens on p. 637 (raw 44541); QUAESTIO III owns its own p. 637 footers.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR garbles silently corrected against the PDF: *animara*→*animam*, *viviflcat*→*vivificat*, *Augustinuin*→*Augustinum*, *probalur*→*probatur*, *muititudo*→*multitudo*, *Utrim icl quocl ponit cjrcUia*→*Utrum id quod ponit gratia*, *illurainans*→*illuminans*, *sirailitudo*→*similitudo*, *irapossibile*→*impossibile*, *donnm*→*donum*, *substautiam*→*substantiam*, *gratiftcato*→*gratificato*, *novera*→*novem*, *raagis*→*magis*, and the scrambled p.635 R-col Conclusio/Ratio marginalia reflowed in printed reading order.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0