title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether it is truly added on the side of the predicate

source_text:
<!-- page 381 -->

### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum dictio exclusiva vere addi possit termino substantiali a parte praedicati.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva vere possit addi termino substantiali a parte praedicati. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus sexto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Patrem dicimus esse Deum, sed non esse solum Deum, esse autem solum Deum dicimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum». Si tu dicas, quod *ly solus* intelligitur ex parte subiecti; obiicitur expressius per hoc quod dicit Augustinus *contra Maximinum*[^2]: «Ipsa Trinitas est unus solus verus Deus»; constat quod in hac *solus Deus* non potest esse dispositio ex parte subiecti, quia sic esset sermo incongruus: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum[^3] videtur per expositionem: Trinitas est Deus et non aliud quam Deus, ergo Trinitas est solus Deus; praemissae sunt verae: ergo et conclusio.

3. Item, ratione videtur per simile: quando praedicatum non inest alii quam subiecto, vere haec dictio *solus* accipitur ex parte subiecti: ergo quando subiectum non subest alii quam praedicato, vere accipitur a parte praedicati: sed istud subiectum *Trinitas* non subest[^4] alii quam Deo: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Haec dictio *solus* est dispositio subiecti, sicut hoc signum *omnis*; sed quando *omnis*[^5] additur ad praedicatum, locutio est falsa et impropria: ergo et[^6] similiter, quando haec dictio *solus*.

2. Item, haec dictio *solus* addita alicui termino excludit alium: unde sensus est: *solus homo*, id est[^7] homo et non alius; sed *alius* respicit suppositum, et terminus subiicitur ratione suppositi, et praedicatur ratione formae: ergo haec dictio *solus* de sui ratione respicit subiectum: ergo falso et improprie additur praedicato.

<!-- page 382 -->

3. Item, secundum quod additur praedicato, aut tenetur categorematice, aut[^8] syncategorematice. Si categorematice, tunc est nomen adiectivum et non recipitur in divinis; si syncategorematice, sic importat negationem implicitam; sed negatio antecedit quod negat: ergo necesse est, quod antecedat compositionem, quam negat; sed cum dicitur: *Pater est solus Deus*, *solus*[^9] sequitur compositionem: ergo videtur, quod non possit ipsam negare: ergo etc.

4. Item, ego quaero, quid excludat[^10] quando additur ad praedicatum. Si aliud a praedicato, ut sit sensus: *est solus Deus*, id est *Deus et non aliud*; tunc est ibi superfluitas, quia forma praedicati excludit aliam formam disparatim, quantum est de se — unde sequitur: *iste est homo*, ergo *non est aliud ab homine* — ergo videtur, quod dictio exclusiva faciat superfluitatem et nugationem: non ergo tenetur exclusive, et ita videtur, quod teneatur adiective solum et quod importet solitudinem circa istum[^11] terminum *Deus*; et istae sunt falsae.

> **Conclusio.** *Dictio exclusiva potest in divinis addi praedicato termini substantialis vere, sed non proprie, nisi cum determinatione et adiunctione termini partitivi.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc volunt[^12] aliqui dicere, quod haec dictio *solus* proprie non debet addi ad praedicatum, sed tantum ad subiectum; et cum additur praedicato, impropriae sunt locutiones, et tunc idem est dicere *solus* et *tantum*. Sed tamen, si aliquis inspiciat, non tantum cum hac dictione *solus*, sed etiam[^13] cum hac dictione *tantum* videbit improprietatem et superfluitatem. Quid enim est dicere: *Trinitas est tantum Deus*, nisi *est Deus, et non aliud quam Deus*? Sed[^14] hoc improprie satis dictum est, quia hoc ipso, quod *Deus est*, excluditur, quod non sit aliud a Deo. Si enim Deus est, ergo non est aliud a Deo, et nullus haereticus unquam dixit, Trinitatem esse Deum, qui diceret, aliud esse a Deo. Unde non videtur magnum quid Augustinus dicere, si hoc voluit dicere.

Et propterea aliter dicendum est, quod haec dictio *solus* dupliciter potest addi termino substantiali a parte praedicati: aut per se, aut cum termino numerali sive partitivo. Per se improprie additur; et si addatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum intellectum stat a parte subiecti. Idem enim est dicere: *est homo albus*, et *est albus homo*. Unde sensus est: non dicimus, *Patrem esse solum Deum*, id est, non dicimus, *solum Patrem esse Deum*. Si autem aliter ponatur, videtur sermo habere superfluitatem et improprietatem, quia hoc excludit, quod excludebatur ex natura ipsius praedicati.

Aliquando additur haec dictio *solus* termino substantiali cum termino numerali, sicut cum hoc termino *unus*; et tunc excludit pluralitatem, et hoc modo bene additur praedicato; et ita accipit Augustinus *contra Maximinum*, cum dicit: «Trinitas est unus solus verus Deus», ita quod non plures; et tunc est verus sermo et proprius et contra haereticos, qui dicebant, Trinitatem plures esse deos. Et importatur per istum terminum *solus* privatio multitudinis, et ita discretio, et magis proprie dicitur de Trinitate, quod Trinitas sit unus solus Deus, quam de Patre, cum tamen possit dici de utroque, quia Pater est unus Deus, et nullus unquam dixit, Patrem esse plures; sed de Trinitate sive de tribus aliqui dixerunt; et ideo congruentius dicitur: *Trinitas est unus solus Deus*. Concedendum est igitur, quod *solus* potest addi ad praedicatum termini substantialis vere in divinis, sed non proprie, nisi cum determinatione et adiunctione termini partitivi.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *solus* est dispositio subiecti, sicut hoc signum *omnis*; dicendum, quod non est ita propria dispositio subiecti, sicut hoc signum *omnis*; quia *omnis* distribuit pro suppositis, pro quibus terminus subiicitur, non pro quibus praedicatur, saltem simul sumtis; *solus* autem non solum dicitur ratione suppositi, verum etiam ratione formae, quia excludit alium et etiam potest excludere aliud.

<!-- page 383 -->

2. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia non semper excludit *alium* masculine, sed etiam potest excludere *aliud* neutraliter, vel etiam pluralitatem, quando additur termino numerali, ut visum est.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum teneatur syncategorematice, vel categorematice, prout est nomen importans formam denominantem, ut idem sit *solus* quod *solitarius*; dicendum, quod syncategorematice. Quod obiicitur, quod sequitur compositionem; dicendum, quod *solus* importat duo in se, scilicet intellectum huius nominis *alius* et intellectum negationis. Quantum ad intellectum huius nominis *alius*, respicit terminum, circa quem ponitur, et sequitur actum; quantum ad intellectum negationis praecedit; et hoc non est inconveniens quantum ad diversa praecedere et sequi. Et hoc patet exponenti. Si enim dicam: *video solum Petrum*, sensus est: *video Petrum et non video alium a Petro*. Similiter intelligendum est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid excludit, cum additur praedicato; dicendum, quod quando additur sine determinatione, excludit aliam formam; et tunc revera est ibi superfluitas et improprietas, tamen nihilominus veritas. Sed quando additur cum termino partitivo, tunc excludit pluralitatem; et tunc potest locutio habere veritatem. Pater enim et Filius sunt unus Deus et non plures, et ita unus solus Deus.

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether the exclusive word can truly be added to a substantial term on the side of the predicate.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the exclusive word can truly be added to a substantial term on the side of the predicate. And that it can be so, is shown in this manner.

1. Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^1]: «We say that the Father is God, but [we do] not [say] that he is God alone; but God alone we say to be the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit». If you should say that *the [word] solus* is understood on the side of the subject, [the point] is objected more expressly through what Augustine says *against Maximinus*[^2]: «The Trinity itself is one only true God»; it is established that in this [statement] *solus Deus* cannot be a determination on the side of the subject, since [if it were] thus, the discourse would be incongruous: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same [point][^3] seems [evident] through exposition: the Trinity is God and nothing other than God, therefore the Trinity is God alone; the premises are true: therefore so also is the conclusion.

3. Likewise, by reasoning it seems [evident] through a parallel: when the predicate does not belong to anything other than the subject, this word *solus* is truly taken on the side of the subject; therefore when the subject does not stand under anything other than the predicate, it is truly taken on the side of the predicate: but this subject *Trinity* does not stand under[^4] anything other than God: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. This word *solus* is a determination of the subject, just as this sign *omnis* [is]; but when *omnis*[^5] is added to the predicate, the locution is false and improper: therefore likewise also[^6] when [we add] this word *solus*.

2. Likewise, this word *solus* added to some term excludes another: whence the sense is: *solus homo*, that is[^7], a man and not another; but *another* concerns a supposit, and the term is made the subject by reason of its supposit, and is predicated by reason of its form: therefore this word *solus* of its own account regards the subject: therefore it is added falsely and improperly to the predicate.

3. Likewise, according as it is added to the predicate, it is taken either categorematically, or[^8] syncategorematically. If categorematically, then it is an adjectival noun and is not received in divine matters; if syncategorematically, then it imports an implicit negation; but the negation precedes that which it negates: therefore it is necessary that it precede the composition which it negates; but when it is said: *the Father is God alone*, *solus*[^9] follows the composition: therefore it seems that it cannot negate it: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, I ask, what does it exclude[^10] when it is added to the predicate. If [it excludes] something other than the predicate, so that the sense is: *est solus Deus*, that is, *God and not anything else*; then there is superfluity there, since the form of the predicate excludes another disparate form, as far as in itself — whence it follows: *this is a man*, therefore *he is not anything other than a man* — therefore it seems that the exclusive word produces superfluity and trifling: therefore it is not held exclusively, and so it seems that it is held only adjectivally and that it imports solitariness around this[^11] term *God*; and these [propositions] are false.

> **Conclusion.** *The exclusive word can in divine matters be added to the predicate of a substantial term truly, but not properly, except with the determination and adjunction of a partitive term.*

**I respond:** To this some wish[^12] to say, that this word *solus* properly ought not to be added to the predicate, but only to the subject; and when it is added to the predicate, the locutions are improper, and then it is the same to say *solus* and *tantum*. But nevertheless, if anyone considers carefully, not only with this word *solus*, but also[^13] with this word *tantum* he will see impropriety and superfluity. For what is it to say: *the Trinity is only God*, except *it is God, and not anything other than God*? But[^14] this is said improperly enough, since by this very fact, that *he is God*, it is excluded that he be anything other than God. For if he is God, therefore he is not anything other than God, and no heretic ever said the Trinity to be God who [also] said it to be something other than God. Whence Augustine does not seem to be saying anything great, if this is what he wished to say.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that this word *solus* can be added in two ways to a substantial term on the side of the predicate: either by itself, or with a numeral or partitive term. By itself it is added improperly; and if it be added in word, nevertheless according to the understanding it stands on the side of the subject. For it is the same to say: *est homo albus*, and *est albus homo* ["he is a white man" and "he is a man white"]. Whence the sense is: we do not say, *that the Father is God alone*, that is, we do not say, *that the Father alone is God*. But if it be set otherwise, the discourse seems to have superfluity and impropriety, since this excludes [what] was [already] excluded from the nature of the predicate itself.

Sometimes this word *solus* is added to a substantial term with a numeral term, as with this term *unus*; and then it excludes plurality, and in this way it is well added to the predicate; and so Augustine takes [it] *against Maximinus*, when he says: «The Trinity is one only true God», so that [there are] not several [Gods]; and then the discourse is true and proper and against the heretics, who used to say that the Trinity was several gods. And there is imported through this term *solus* the privation of multitude, and so distinction, and it is more properly said of the Trinity that the Trinity is one only God, than of the Father, although it can be said of either, since the Father is one God, and no one ever said that the Father was several; but concerning the Trinity or the three some have said [so]; and therefore it is more fittingly said: *the Trinity is one only God*. It must therefore be conceded, that *solus* can be added to the predicate of a substantial term truly in divine matters, but not properly, except with the determination and adjunction of a partitive term.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

1. To that, then, which is objected, that *solus* is a determination of the subject, just as this sign *omnis*; it must be said, that it is not so properly a determination of the subject as this sign *omnis*; since *omnis* distributes for the supposits for which the term is the subject, not for those of which it is predicated, at least taken together; but *solus* is said not only by reason of the supposit, but also by reason of the form, since it excludes [an]other [masculine] and also can exclude [an]other [neuter].

2. And through this the next [argument] is clear, since it does not always exclude *alium* (another) masculine, but can also exclude *aliud* (another) neuter, or even plurality, when it is added to a numeral term, as has been seen.

3. To that which is asked, whether it is held syncategorematically, or categorematically, inasmuch as it is a noun importing a denominating form, so that *solus* is the same as *solitarius* ("solitary"); it must be said, [that it is held] syncategorematically. As to what is objected, that it follows the composition; it must be said, that *solus* imports two [things] in itself, namely the understanding of this name *alius* ("another") and the understanding of negation. As to the understanding of this name *alius*, it regards the term about which it is set, and follows the act [of composition]; as to the understanding of negation, it precedes [it]; and this is not unfitting in respect to different things, to precede and to follow. And this is clear to one explaining [it]. For if I should say: *I see Peter alone*, the sense is: *I see Peter and I do not see another besides Peter*. Similarly it is to be understood in the present matter.

4. To that which is asked, what it excludes, when it is added to the predicate; it must be said, that when it is added without determination, it excludes another form; and then there really is superfluity and impropriety there, but nevertheless truth. But when it is added with a partitive term, then it excludes plurality; and then the locution can have truth. For the Father and the Son are one God and not several, and so one only God.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. l. 1: *Unus omnino solus Deus a nobis ipsa Trinitas praedicatur*. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2 circa finem. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *ly solus* pro *in hac solus Deus*. Per verba, quae dein sequuntur, scil. *sermo incongruus*, intellige sermonem contra grammaticae regulas.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2, l. 1: *We predicate the Trinity itself as one altogether-only God*. See here the text of the Master, c. 2 near the end. — Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *ly solus* in place of *in hac solus Deus*. By the words which then follow, namely *sermo incongruus*, understand a discourse against the rules of grammar.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ipsum*.

en: From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *ipsum*.

la: Postulantibus codd. cum ed. 1 hoc non contextu, posuimus *subest* loco *inest*.

en: With the codices together with edition 1 demanding [it], with this not [being] the [original] context, we have set *subest* in place of *inest*.

la: In Vat. deest particula *et*, quae tamen a multis mss. ut AKGTV etc. et ed. 1 exhibetur.

en: In the Vatican edition the particle *et* is missing, which however is exhibited by many manuscripts such as A, K, G, T, V etc. and by edition 1.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* omittit minus bene, et aliis mss. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, *id est*. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut SVZ post *excludit* repetunt *terminum*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* omits — less well, and with the other manuscripts together with edition 1 resisting — *id est* ("that is"). A little before, some codices such as S, V, Z after *excludit* repeat *terminum* ("the term").

la: Cod. V addit *tenetur*. Paulo infra post *si syncategorematice* plurimi mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiiciunt *sed*. Dein cod. T *implicat* loco *importat*.

en: Codex V adds *tenetur* ("is held"). A little below, after *si syncategorematice*, very many manuscripts together with editions 1, 2, 3, 6 add *sed* ("but"). Then codex T [reads] *implicat* in place of *importat*.

la: Sequimur maiorem numerum mss. ut H I M N P Q Z etc. et ed. 1 ponendo *solus*, quod aliqui codd. ut OR U omittunt, aliqui vero ut CLSY ei substituunt *sic*, cod. T *hic*, Vat. cum cod. *cc* autem falso *non*. Mox cod. Z, cum ed. 1, verbis transpositis, *ergo non videtur, quod possit* etc.

en: We follow the greater number of manuscripts such as H, I, M, N, P, Q, Z etc. and edition 1 in setting *solus*, which some codices such as O, R, U omit, while others such as C, L, S, Y substitute for it *sic* ("thus"), codex T *hic* ("here"), but the Vatican edition with codex *cc* falsely [reads] *non* ("not"). Soon after, codex Z, together with edition 1, with the words transposed, [reads] *ergo non videtur, quod possit* ("therefore it does not seem that it can") etc.

la: Ed. 1 *excludit*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *excludit* ("excludes").

la: Antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 exigentibus, substituimus *istum* pro *hunc*, et mox post *et* expunximus additum *sic*.

en: With the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 requiring [it], we have substituted *istum* for *hunc*, and soon after, we have struck out the *sic* added after *et*.

la: Vat. cum recentiore cod. *cc* *voluerunt*.

en: The Vatican edition with the more recent codex *cc* [reads] *voluerunt* ("they wished" — perfect plural).

la: Ex pluribus mss. ut G H I P Q Z *ee ff* et ed. 1 adiecimus *etiam*. Paulo infra post *Quid enim* Vat. cum cod. *cc* addit *aliud*, quod tamen deest in aliis codd. et ed. 1. Dein post *nisi* cod. V et ed. 1 repetunt *Trinitas*.

en: From several manuscripts such as G, H, I, P, Q, Z, *ee, ff* and edition 1 we have added *etiam* ("also"). A little below, after *Quid enim*, the Vatican edition with codex *cc* adds *aliud* ("anything else"), which however is missing in the other codices and in edition 1. Then after *nisi*, codex V and edition 1 repeat *Trinitas*.

la: Ope vetustiorum scriptorum supplevimus *Sed*.

en: With the help of the more ancient writers we have supplied *Sed* ("But").

la: Ad normam mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic additum *ipsam*. Paulo ante cod. *cc* et edd. 2, 3 falso *quin* pro *qui*. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *et ideo* loco *Unde*.

en: According to the standard of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have struck out the *ipsam* added here. A little before, codex *cc* and editions 2, 3 falsely [read] *quin* in place of *qui*. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and edition 1, [reads] *et ideo* in place of *Unde*.

la: Faventibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, restituimus particulam *Et*. Paulo post in mss. desiderantur verba *a parte praedicati*, certe supplenda. — Aristot., II. *Periherm*. c. 1: *Transposita vero nomina et verba idem significant, ut est albus homo, et est homo albus*. — Sequimur antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponendo *Aliquando* pro *Aliter*, et mox post *sicut cum* addendo *hoc*, ac dein substituendo *ita* loco *sic*. — Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice *distinctio*, quae et paulo post praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit haec verba *quia Pater est unus Deus*. — In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *pro quibus*, e contra in codd. *aa bb* habetur *sed non pro illis, pro quibus*. — Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *etiam*, pro quo aliqui falso exhibent *non*.

en: With the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 favoring [it], we have restored the particle *Et*. A little after, in the manuscripts the words *a parte praedicati* ("on the side of the predicate") are wanting, certainly to be supplied. — Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 1: *Nouns and verbs transposed signify the same, as "est albus homo" and "est homo albus"*. — We follow the more ancient codices and edition 1 in setting *Aliquando* ("sometimes") in place of *Aliter* ("otherwise"), and soon after, after *sicut cum* adding *hoc*, and then substituting *ita* in place of *sic*. — The Vatican edition with only one or another codex [reads] *distinctio* ("distinction"), which also a little after, against the witness of the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits these words *quia Pater est unus Deus* ("since the Father is one God"). — In very many manuscripts and edition 1 *pro quibus* ("for which") is missing; on the contrary, in codices *aa, bb* there is found *sed non pro illis, pro quibus* ("but not for those for which"). — Several codices together with edition 1 omit *etiam*, in place of which some falsely [read] *non*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Prima opinio in corp. posita asserit, omnes [propositio]nes, in quibus vocabulum *solus* ponitur ad praedicatum, esse improprias, et tunc hoc verbum *solus* aequivalere termino *tantum*. Contra hanc sententiam arguit S. Doctor, quod tunc verba S. Augustini in *fundam.* sint valde impropria, et quod insuper ibi sit superfluitas. Quare distinguendo duplicem modum, quo *solus* addi possit praedicato, suam propriam opinionem proponit et corroborat, quam magis explicat infra dub. 1. Aliqui tamen primum membrum distinctionis, quando *solus* per se additur praedicato, iterum distinguunt et in aliquo sensu ut proprie dictum admittunt. Ita S. Thomas (hic q. 2. a. 1.), B. Albertus et Petrus. Tamen in *Summa* (I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 2.) Angelicus omnes istas propositiones dicit esse improprias, «forte ex parte praedicati intelligatur aliqua implicatio, ut dicatur: *Trinitas est Deus, qui est solus Deus*». Dionys. Carth. (hic q. unic.) censet, quod S. Thomas in Commentario a S. Bonaventura «parumper dissentit. Videtur autem in hac re positio illa Bonaventurae planior ac aptior esse». Hoc argumento non spernendo probare nititur.

**II.** Praeter citatos cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 66. m. 3. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica, collater. 1. et 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The first opinion set out in the body asserts that all [proposi]tions in which the word *solus* is set with the predicate are improper, and that in such case this word *solus* is equivalent to the term *tantum* ("only"). Against this opinion the holy Doctor argues that, [if it were so,] then the words of St. Augustine in the *fundamentum* (the opening argument) would be very improper, and that moreover there would be superfluity there. For which reason, distinguishing a twofold mode by which *solus* can be added to the predicate, he proposes and corroborates his own opinion, which he explains more fully below in dub. 1. Some however further distinguish the first member of the distinction — when *solus* is added by itself to the predicate — and admit it in a certain sense as properly said. Thus St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 1), Blessed Albert and Peter [of Tarentaise]. Yet in the *Summa* (I, q. 31, a. 3, ad 2) the Angelic [Doctor] says all those propositions to be improper, «unless perhaps on the side of the predicate some implication be understood, so that it be said: *the Trinity is God, who is the only God*». Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. unic.) judges that St. Thomas in the Commentary «in some small measure dissents from St. Bonaventure. But in this matter that position of Bonaventure seems to be plainer and more apt». He strives to prove [it] by a not contemptible argument.

**II.** Besides those cited, cf. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 66, m. 3, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unic., a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ., q. unica, collater. 1 and 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum dictio exclusiva solus vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.

title_alt: Whether the exclusive word *solus* is truly added to a personal term in respect of its proper predicate

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 383 -->

### ARTICULUS II.

#### *De dictionibus exclusivis additis termino relativo.*

Consequenter secundo loco est quaestio de secundo articulo quaestionis, scilicet utrum dictio exclusiva possit addi termino relativo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.

Secundo, utrum vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati communis, ut vere dicatur: *solus Pater est Deus*.

### QUAESTIO I.

#### *Utrum dictio exclusiva* solus *vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.*

Quod autem respectu praedicati proprii vere addatur, ut scilicet haec sit vera: *solus Pater est Pater*, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum sexto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «In illa Trinitate solus Pater dicitur Pater, quia nullus nisi ipse ibi est Pater».

2. Item, hoc videtur per expositionem, quia persona Patris est Pater, et nulla alia est Pater: ergo haec est vera: *solus Pater est Pater*.

3. Item, nihil est magis proprium alicui, quam quod est idem sibi re et ratione; sed Pater est idem sibi re et ratione: ergo propriissime dicitur de se; sed quod proprie convenit alicui, convenit soli[^2]: ergo Pater dicitur de solo Patre.

<!-- page 384 -->

**Contra:** 1. «*Solus*, ut vult Philosophus[^3], idem est quod *non cum alio*»; sed impossibile est, Patrem non esse cum alio: ergo semper, quando additur huic termino *Pater* vel alii termino personali, est locutio falsa.

2. Item, *solus* excludit *alium*; sed alio est Deus, alio est Pater[^4]: ergo addita huic termino *Pater* excludit Deum: ergo si haec est vera: *solus Pater est Pater*, et haec similiter: *Deus non est Pater*; quod si haec est falsa: ergo et prima.

3. Item, *solus* excludit[^5] hoc relativum *alius*; sed *alius* ita est relativum diversitatis, quod nihilominus implicat aliquam identitatem: unde sequitur: iste vadit cum alio homine, ergo iste est homo. Si ergo excludit alium ab hoc quod est *Pater*[^6], aut alium Patrem, aut alium Deum; sed quocumque modo dicatur, est locutio falsa et implicatio falsi: ergo etc.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Terminus *solus* in divinis recte dicitur respectu praedicati proprii, quatenus excludit associationem tum respectu formae termini subiecti, tum respectu praedicati, sive in participando, sive in comparticipando.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum quod haec dictio *solus* tenetur syncategorematice, importat privationem associationis; et locutio simpliciter est vera, excluso illo sensu, quo importat solitudinem, quia sic non accipitur in divinis, sicut supra dictum est.

Secundum enim quod importat privationem associationis, vera est, quia, cum tripliciter possit eam importare, in quolibet sensu locutio est vera. Potest enim haec dictio *solus* importare privationem associationis respectu formae termini subiecti[^7], ut dicatur *solus Pater*, id est, ille qui est solus Pater; et sic absque dubio veritatem habet: *solus Pater est Pater*. Vel potest importare privationem associationis respectu praedicati, et hoc dupliciter: vel in participando, ut quia alii non conveniat; et adhuc vera est, quia hoc praedicatum quod est *Pater* soli personae Patris convenit; illa enim proprietas Patri convenit, ita[^8] quod nulli alii; vel potest importare privationem associationis in comparticipando, ut cum dicitur: Petrus comedit solus, vel vadit Romam solus, non quia alius non vadat[^9] Romam, vel non comedat, sed quia nullus comparticipat cum eo, quamvis participet; et sic adhuc locutio est vera, quia persona Patris non participat vel comparticipat cum alia in proprietate paternitatis. Et ideo, secundum quod *solus* exclusive tenetur, iudicatur locutio vera.

**Ad 1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *solus* idem est quod *non cum alio*; dicendum, quod negatio illa non simpliciter excludit alium in coexistendo, sed excludit alium respectu formae subiecti vel praedicati[^10], ut visum est. Et quamvis Pater cum alio existat et non possit sine alio esse, quia tamen proprietatem paternitatis cum alio non communicat, ideo habet simpliciter locutio veritatem.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alio est Deus, alio est Pater; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est saepe[^11], *alius* dicit diversitatem secundum rationem dicendi vel intelligendi in verbo proposito; sed in expositione huius dictionis *solus* dicit diversitatem sive distinctionem in supposito. Et quia *Deus*[^12] in supposito non differt a Patre, immo supponit pro Patre; ideo non sequitur, quod dictio exclusiva addita Patri excludat Deum.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *alius* implicat formam aliquam, secundum quam conveniat[^13]; dicendum, quod istud non oportet, quod ista sit forma per terminum importata — vere enim dicitur: *homo est aliud ab asino* — nisi quando advenit illi termino immediate, ut cum dicitur *alius asinus*, includitur convenientia in natura communi. Sed cum dicitur: *solus Pater*, non est dicere, quod Pater

<!-- page 385 -->

et non alius Pater, sed, *Pater et non alius a Patre*; et ideo non importatur convenientia in forma proprietatis paternitatis cum alietate, sed sufficit, quod sit alia persona — Pater enim est persona[^14] — vel etiam alia essentia: et illa excludit hoc quod est *solus*; et sic patet illud.

english:
<!-- page 383 -->

### ARTICLE II.

#### *On exclusive words added to a relative term.*

Consequently, in the second place, the question is concerning the second article of the question, namely whether an exclusive word can be added to a relative term. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether the exclusive word is added to a personal term with respect to its proper predicate.

Secondly, whether it is truly added to a personal term with respect to a common predicate, as when it is truly said: *the Father alone is God*.

### QUESTION I.

#### *Whether the exclusive word* solus *is truly added to a personal term with respect to its proper predicate.*

That with respect to the proper predicate it is truly added, namely so that this is true: *the Father alone is Father*, is seen:

1. Through Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book six[^1]: «In that Trinity the Father alone is called Father, because no one but he himself is there Father».

2. Likewise, this is seen by exposition, because the person of the Father is Father, and no other is Father: therefore this is true: *the Father alone is Father*.

3. Likewise, nothing is more proper to anyone than what is the same with itself in reality and in account; but the Father is the same with himself in reality and in account: therefore he is most properly said of himself; but what properly belongs to anyone, belongs to him alone[^2]: therefore *Father* is said of the Father alone.

<!-- page 384 -->

**On the contrary:** 1. «*Alone*, as the Philosopher will have it[^3], is the same as *not with another*»; but it is impossible that the Father not be with another: therefore always, when [*alone*] is added to this term *Father* or to another personal term, the locution is false.

2. Likewise, *alone* excludes *another*; but it is by one [feature] that he is God, by another that he is Father[^4]: therefore added to this term *Father* it excludes God: therefore if this is true: *the Father alone is Father*, then this likewise: *God is not Father*; and if this is false: therefore so also is the first.

3. Likewise, *alone* excludes[^5] this relative *another*; but *another* is so a relative of diversity that it nonetheless implies some identity: whence it follows: this man goes with another man, therefore this man is a man. If therefore [*alone*] excludes another from this which is *Father*[^6], either it [excludes] another Father, or another God; but in whatever way it is said, the locution is false and an implication of the false: therefore etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> The term *alone* in the divine is rightly said with respect to the proper predicate, inasmuch as it excludes association both with respect to the form of the subject term and with respect to the predicate, whether in participating or in co-participating.

**I respond:** It must be said that, insofar as this word *alone* is taken syncategorematically, it imports the privation of association; and the locution is simply true, that sense being excluded by which it imports solitude, because in this way it is not received in the divine, as has been said above.

For insofar as it imports the privation of association, [the locution] is true, because, since it can import [association] in three ways, in any sense the locution is true. For this word *alone* can import the privation of association with respect to the form of the subject term[^7], so that it is said *the Father alone*, that is, he who is the only Father; and thus without doubt it has truth: *the Father alone is Father*. Or it can import the privation of association with respect to the predicate, and this in two ways: either in participating, in that it does not belong to another; and still it is true, because this predicate which is *Father* belongs to the person of the Father alone; for that property belongs to the Father, in such a way[^8] that to no other; or it can import the privation of association in co-participating, as when it is said: Peter eats alone, or goes to Rome alone — not because another does not go[^9] to Rome, or does not eat, but because no one co-participates with him, although he [or another] participates; and thus still the locution is true, because the person of the Father does not participate or co-participate with another in the property of paternity. And therefore, insofar as *alone* is taken exclusively, the locution is judged true.

**To 1.** Therefore to that which is objected, that *alone* is the same as *not with another*; it must be said that that negation does not simply exclude another in co-existing, but excludes another with respect to the form of the subject or of the predicate[^10], as has been seen. And although the Father exists with another and cannot be without another, nevertheless because he does not communicate the property of paternity with another, therefore the locution simply has truth.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that it is by one [feature] that he is God, by another that he is Father; it must be said that, as has often been said[^11], *another* expresses diversity according to the manner of speaking or of understanding in the proposed term; but in the exposition of this word *alone*, [*another*] expresses diversity or distinction in the supposit. And because *God*[^12] in supposit does not differ from the Father, indeed it stands for the Father; therefore it does not follow that an exclusive word added to the Father excludes God.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that *another* implies some form according to which [the things compared] agree[^13]; it must be said that this is not necessary, that that be a form imported through the term — for it is truly said: *a man is other than an ass* — except when [*another*] is joined to that term immediately, as when it is said *another ass*, agreement in a common nature is included. But when it is said: *the Father alone*, it is not [a matter of] saying, *Father and not another Father*, but, *Father and not another from the Father*; and therefore agreement in the form of the property of paternity together with otherness is not imported, but it suffices

<!-- page 385 -->

that there be another person — for the Father is a person[^14] — or even another essence: and that excludes this which is *alone*; and so that [argument] is plain.

la: Cap. 9. n. 10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi in hoc textu pro *nullus nisi* habetur *nonnisi*, cui concordant originale et cod. *Z*.

en: Chapter 9, n. 10. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1, where in this text, in place of *nullus nisi* there is *nonnisi*, with which the original and codex *Z* agree.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Proprio*.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter *On the Proper*.

la: Libr. II. *Elench.* c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut *T V Y* *cum* pro *quando*.

en: Book II *[Sophistical] Refutations*, c. 3 (c. 22). — A little below, some codices such as *T V Y* [read] *cum* in place of *quando*.

la: August., VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11. et Sermo I. in Psalm. 68. n. 3. Videsis supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 1. — Mox post *addita* supple: *dictio exclusiva solus*, vel adde cum cod. *aa* *haec dictio* in principio argumenti post *Item*; minus congruam censuimus correctionem in cod. *T* a posteriori manu factam, qua scil. post *addita* subiungitur *dictione exclusiva*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII, c. 6, n. 11, and Sermon I on Psalm 68, n. 3. See above d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 1. — Next, after *addita* supply: *dictio exclusiva solus* ("the exclusive word *alone*"), or add with codex *aa* *haec dictio* ("this word") at the beginning of the argument after *Item*; we have judged less suitable the correction in codex *T* made by a later hand, by which, namely, after *addita* there is added *dictione exclusiva* ("by an exclusive word").

la: Communissimam mss. et primarum edd. (excepta ed. 1) lectionem, qua habetur *includit*, licet in se spectata possit explicari (cfr. resp. ad 3. praec. q.), considerato tamen fine argumenti, minus aptam et incompletam iudicamus. Paulo infra post *primum ergo* cod. *W* addit particulam *et*.

en: The most common reading of the manuscripts and of the earlier editions (except edition 1), in which there is *includit* ("includes"), although in itself it can be explained (cf. the response to argument 3 of the preceding question), nevertheless considering the goal of the argument, we judge less apt and incomplete. A little below, after *primum ergo*, codex *W* adds the particle *et*.

la: Cod. *V termino Pater* pro *quod est Pater*, qui et mox post *dicatur* adiicit *semper*. Dein ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *falsi* pro *falso*.

en: Codex V reads *termino Pater* in place of *quod est Pater*, and shortly afterwards adds *semper* after *dicatur*. Then on the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *falsi* for *falso*. **En.** Codex *V* [reads] *Pater* in place of *quod est Pater*, which [codex] also next, after [the second occurrence], [reads?] *semper*. Then, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *falsi* in place of *falsa*. [OCR badly garbled at "C.fv\. V Iprmiiio... ilirahii inliirii .viiipei"; reading reconstructed.]

la: In permultis codd. minus bene deest *subiecti*, melius in cod. *X*, omisso *termini*, retinetur *subiecti*.

en: In very many codices, less well, *subiecti* is missing; better, in codex *X*, *termini* being omitted, *subiecti* is retained.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus particulam *et*, quae in Vat. verbo *ita* praefigitur.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted the particle *et*, which in the Vatican edition is prefixed to the word *ita*.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primarum edd., *eat*; plures tamen mss. hic *vadit* et paulo infra *comedit*.

en: The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and the first six editions resisting, [reads] *eat* ("let him go"); however many manuscripts here [read] *vadit* ("goes") and a little below *comedit* ("eats").

la: Ed. 1 cum Vat. addit *in comparticipando*, quod tamen abest a mss. et aliis quinque primis edd. Mox post *cum* Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 propter subnexa minus congrue *aliis* pro *alio*, loco cuius pauci codd. ut *S Y Z* exhibent *Filio*.

en: Edition 1 with the Vatican edition adds *in comparticipando* ("in co-participating"), which however is absent from the manuscripts and the other five earliest editions. Next, after *cum*, the Vatican edition, against the authority of very many codices and editions 1, 2, 3, on account of what follows less suitably [reads] *aliis* in place of *alio*, in place of which a few codices such as *S Y Z* present *Filio* ("with the Son").

la: Dist. 6. dub. 2, et praesertim d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 1. — Vat. cum uno alterove codice *supra* pro *saepe*, et contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 *aliud* loco *alius*.

en: Distinction 6, dubium 2, and especially d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 1. — The Vatican edition with one or another codex [reads] *supra* ("above") in place of *saepe* ("often"), and against all codices and edition 1 [reads] *aliud* in place of *alius*.

la: In cod. *T* adiungitur: *Pater nullum dicit distinctionem*.

en: In codex T there is added: *Pater nullum dicit distinctionem* ("the Father expresses no distinction"). **En.** In codex *T* [there is added:] *Deus Pater nullum dicit distinctionem* ("'God the Father' expresses no distinction"). [OCR garbled at "iidiiiiipiiiiioi»)... iiilliim"; reading reconstructed.]

la: Plures codd. ut *V W* *convenirent*. Mox cod. *Y* *illud* pro *istud*.

en: Several codices such as *V W* [read] *convenirent* ("would agree"). Next codex *Y* [reads] *illud* in place of *istud*. [OCR garbled at "Piiiiii iml.l. lif V IV riiiiiiniiiinit"; reading reconstructed.]

la: Vat. cum solo cod. cc hic repetit *alia*. Mox ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *illa* pro *ista*.

en: The Vatican alone with codex *cc* here repeats *alia*. Soon after, on the testimony of most manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *illa* for *ista*. **En.** [Lacuna in OCR: the text after *Pater enim est* and before *— vel etiam alia essentia* is missing. Most likely *alia persona* ("another person") or similar is to be supplied.]

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia 3. oppositi et solut. eiusdem notandum primo, quod terminus *alius* potest importare distinctionem vel circa formam (*alium Deum*), vel circa suppositum (*alium Patrem*). Secundo, *alius* potest addi alicui termino vel immediate vel mediante aliqua propositione, ut exemplo in textu illustratur. In primo casu ponit identitatem specificam inter extrema; in secundo vero casu haec identitas non importatur.

**II.** Auctores in substantia solutionis non dissentiunt. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the understanding of the third opposing argument and of its solution it is to be noted, first, that the term *another* can import a distinction either concerning the form (*another God*), or concerning the supposit (*another Father*). Secondly, *another* can be added to some term either immediately or mediated by some preposition, as is illustrated by the example in the text. In the first case it posits a specific identity between the extremes; but in the second case this identity is not imported.

**II.** The authors do not dissent in the substance of the solution. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, *quaestiuncula* 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum dictio exclusiva solus vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati communis.

title_alt: Whether the exclusive word *solus* is truly added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate

source_text:
<!-- page 384 -->

### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum dictio exclusiva* solus *vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati communis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati[^1] communis, ut vere dicatur: *solus Pater est Deus*. Et quod sic, videtur auctoritate et ratione.

1. Auctoritate sic: Ecclesia cantat: «Tu solus altissimus, Iesu Christe[^2]»; et illud: «Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio», et consimiles multae inveniuntur.

2. Item, Matthaei undecimo[^3]: *Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*; sed *nemo nisi Pater* et *solus Pater* convertuntur: ergo *solus Pater novit*, et hoc praedicatum est essentiale: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia dictio exclusiva addita alicui non excludit nisi alium; sed tres personae non habent alietatem respectu praedicati substantialis: ergo addita uni non excludit aliam respectu talis praedicati; sed si non excludit, locutio est vera: ergo etc.

4. Item, dictio exclusiva addita alicui non excludit quod est in eo ut pars, ut addita[^4] Petro non excludit pedem Petri: ergo cum maiori identitate sit Filius in Patre quam pes in Petro, addita Patri, non excludit Filium.

**Contra:**

1. Nec Pater solus nec Filius solus nec Spiritus sanctus solus Deus est: ergo non vere additur respectu termini communis.

2. Item, omnis propositio, in qua praedicatum communius est subiecto, addita exclusione ad subiectum, est falsa, quia nullum tale praecise convenit subiecto; sed talis est haec et consimiles: *solus Pater est Deus*: ergo etc.

3. Item, dictio exclusiva addita alicui excludit omne illud quod ponit associationem cum termino; et hoc patet, quia privat associationem; sed Filius ponit associationem cum Patre: unde Pater cum Filio est Pater cum alio.

4. Item, dictio exclusiva excludit omne aliud, et maxime oppositum; sed relativa sunt una differentia oppositionis[^5]; ergo addita uni relativo excludit aliud: ergo addita Patri excludit Filium; et si hoc, omnes tales sunt falsae.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Dictio exclusiva addita termino personali respectu praedicati communis tunc admitti potest, si removet formam subiecti ab aliis; non vero, si removet formam praedicati.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum[^6], quod hic est duplex positio. Quidam enim simpliciter et sine distinctione concedunt has et consimiles: *solus Pater est Deus*; et positio eorum est, quod dictio exclusiva addita uni relativorum non excludit reliquum. Et ratio huius positionis est, quia[^7] non excludit quod consequitur ad terminum et intelligitur in termino, ut addita *homini* non excludit *animal*. Sed unum relativorum intelligitur in altero et consequitur ad alterum: ergo addita uni non excludit alterum. Et si opponatur, quod *solus* excludit oppositum, dicunt, quod relativa et[^8] sunt differentiae oppositionis et entis: oppositionis, secundum quod ad idem; et

<!-- page 385 -->

sic addita uni excludit aliud; unde sequitur: *iste est tantum Pater, ergo non est Filius*. Secundum[^9] quod ad diversos comparantur, sunt differentiae entis; et sic posito uno, ponitur et reliquum; et ideo unum non excluditur ab alio, quia dictio exclusiva illud[^10] solum aliud excludit, quod non necessario concomitatur.

Sed haec positio non videtur conveniens. Dictio enim exclusiva privat associationem: ergo excludit omne illud quod ponit circa ipsam associationem; et ideo addita Patri excludit Filium.

Et propter hoc alia est opinio, quod dictio exclusiva addita Patri excludit Filium; et haec positio magis est probabilis. Secundum hanc positionem procedendo, distinguendae sunt huiusmodi locutiones, secundum quod distinguit Augustinus, et Magister tangit[^11]; quia *solus* potest facere exclusionem respectu compositionis intellectae circa subiectum, vel respectu compositionis principalis. Si primo modo, tunc est sensus: *solus Pater est Deus*, id est ille qui solus est Pater, est Deus; et tunc removet formam termini subiecti ab aliis, non formam praedicati; et sub hoc sensu verae sunt omnes. Et sub hoc sensu accipit Augustinus[^12]: «Solus Spiritus sanctus est tantus, quantus est Pater et Filius».

Si autem faciat exclusionem respectu principalis compositionis, locutio est falsa, et omnes falsae sunt, proprie loquendo, nisi addatur determinatio, ut arctetur exclusio, ut patet, cum dicitur: «Tu solus altissimus, Iesu Christe, cum sancto Spiritu». Similiter[^13]: «Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio» etc[^14].

1. Et sic patet primum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod *solus Pater* aequipollet huic: *nemo nisi Pater*; dicendum, quod falsum est; quia *nemo* distribuit pro natura, non pro persona; *solus* autem additur termino personali, ideo excludit personam; ideo proprie loquendo, haec est falsa: *solus Pater novit Filium*, quamvis haec sit vera: *nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*, quia sensus est: *nemo*, id est nulla natura[^15], nisi ille qui est eiusdem naturae, ut Pater.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dictio exclusiva excludit alium; dicendum, quod excludit omne aliud vel alium, quod non praedicatur nec subiicitur, sed associatur, sive sit aliud in forma, sive in supposito. Et quoniam Pater cum Filio respectu praedicati substantialis associatur[^16], ideo respectu illius excluduntur invicem; et quia pars non associatur, ideo non excluditur. Unde identitas maior vel minor nihil facit ad exclusionem, sed ratio associandi vel non associandi. Et si obiiciat[^17], quod addita definito non excludit definitionem, et antecedenti, non excludit consequens; breviter dicendum, quod si consequens ita sequitur, quod non ponat associationem, et definitio non claudat in se diversum, tunc non excludit. Si vero aliter est, tunc excludit, et contradictorie opposita implicantur in antecedente: unde hic implicatur contradictio: *tantum Pater est*. Huic autem positioni concordat Augustinus[^18], qui negat hanc: *solus Pater est Deus*, et consimiles.

---

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether the exclusive word* solus *is truly added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate.*

Secondly it is asked whether the exclusive word is truly added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate[^1], so that it is truly said: *the Father alone is God*. And that this is so seems [to be the case] by authority and by reason.

1. By authority thus: the Church sings: «Thou alone [art] Most High, Jesus Christ[^2]»; and that [verse]: «To God the Father be glory and to His only Son»; and many similar [formulae] are found.

2. Likewise, Matthew eleven[^3]: *No one knows the Son except the Father*; but *no one except the Father* and *the Father alone* are convertible: therefore *the Father alone knows*, and this predicate is essential: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [thus], because an exclusive word added to something does not exclude anything except another; but the three persons do not have otherness in respect of a substantial predicate: therefore added to one it does not exclude another in respect of such a predicate; but if it does not exclude, the locution is true: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, an exclusive word added to something does not exclude what is in it as a part, just as added[^4] to *Peter* it does not exclude *the foot of Peter*: therefore since the Son is in the Father with greater identity than the foot is in Peter, added to *the Father* it does not exclude *the Son*.

**On the contrary:**

1. Neither the Father alone nor the Son alone nor the Holy Spirit alone is God: therefore it is not truly added in respect of a common term.

2. Likewise, every proposition in which the predicate is more common than the subject, with an exclusion added to the subject, is false, because no such [predicate] precisely belongs to the subject; but such is this and similar [propositions]: *the Father alone is God*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an exclusive word added to something excludes everything that posits association with the term; and this is plain, because it deprives [it] of association; but the Son posits association with the Father: hence *the Father with the Son* is *the Father with another*.

4. Likewise, an exclusive word excludes everything else, and most of all the opposite; but relatives are one differentia of opposition[^5]; therefore added to one relative it excludes the other: therefore added to *the Father* it excludes *the Son*; and if so, all such [propositions] are false.

### CONCLUSION.

> An exclusive word added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate can then be admitted, if it removes the form of the subject from others; but not if it removes the form of the predicate.

**I respond:** It must be said[^6] that here there is a twofold position. For some without qualification and without distinction concede these and similar [propositions]: *the Father alone is God*; and their position is that an exclusive word added to one of relatives does not exclude the other. And the reason for this position is that[^7] it does not exclude what follows upon the term and is understood in the term, just as added to *man* it does not exclude *animal*. But one of relatives is understood in the other and follows upon the other: therefore added to one it does not exclude the other. And if it be objected that *solus* excludes the opposite, they say that relatives both[^8] are differentiae of opposition and of being: of opposition, insofar as [referred] to the same; and

so added to one it excludes the other; whence it follows: *this one is only Father, therefore he is not Son*. Insofar as[^9] they are compared to diverse [things], they are differentiae of being; and so when one is posited, the other also is posited; and therefore one is not excluded by the other, because the exclusive word excludes only that[^10] other [thing] which does not necessarily accompany [it].

But this position does not seem fitting. For the exclusive word deprives [a term] of association: therefore it excludes everything that posits with respect to the association itself; and therefore added to *the Father* it excludes *the Son*.

And on account of this there is another opinion, that an exclusive word added to *the Father* excludes *the Son*; and this position is more probable. Proceeding according to this position, locutions of this sort must be distinguished, in the way Augustine distinguishes and the Master touches upon[^11]; because *solus* can effect an exclusion in respect of a composition understood concerning the subject, or in respect of the principal composition. If in the first way, then the sense is: *the Father alone is God*, that is, He who alone is the Father, is God; and then it removes the form of the subject term from others, not the form of the predicate; and under this sense all are true. And under this sense Augustine takes [it][^12]: «The Holy Spirit alone is as great as the Father and the Son [together]».

But if it makes an exclusion in respect of the principal composition, the locution is false, and all are false, properly speaking, unless a determination is added so that the exclusion may be restricted, as is plain, when it is said: «Thou alone [art] Most High, Jesus Christ, with the Holy Spirit». Likewise[^13]: «To God the Father be glory and to His only Son» etc[^14].

1. And so the first is plain.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that *the Father alone* is equivalent to this: *no one except the Father*; it must be said that it is false; because *nemo* (no one) is distributed for nature, not for person; but *solus* is added to a personal term, therefore it excludes a person; therefore properly speaking, this is false: *the Father alone knows the Son*, although this is true: *no one knows the Son except the Father*, because the sense is: *no one*, that is, no nature[^15], except the one who is of the same nature, as the Father.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that an exclusive word excludes another; it must be said that it excludes everything else (*aliud*) or another (*alium*) which is neither predicated nor made subject, but is associated, whether it be other in form or in supposit. And since the Father is associated[^16] with the Son in respect of a substantial predicate, therefore in respect of that one they exclude one another; and because a part is not associated, therefore it is not excluded. Hence greater or lesser identity does nothing toward exclusion, but [only] the ground of associating or not associating. And if it be objected[^17], that added to a defined term it does not exclude the definition, and to an antecedent it does not exclude the consequent; briefly it must be said that if the consequent so follows that it does not posit association, and the definition does not enclose in itself something diverse, then it does not exclude. But if it is otherwise, then it does exclude, and contradictorily opposed [propositions] are implied in the antecedent: whence here a contradiction is implied: *only the Father is*. With this position Augustine agrees[^18], who denies this: *the Father alone is God*, and similar [propositions].

---

la: In plurimis mss. deest *praedicati*, pro quo cod. *X* cum ed. 1 *termini*, sed contra praedeterminata in exordio huius articuli.

en: In most manuscripts *praedicati* ("of the predicate") is missing, in place of which codex *X* with edition 1 [reads] *termini* ("of the term"), but against what was predetermined at the beginning of this article.

la: In hymno angelico: *Gloria in excelsis Deo* etc. — Proxime sequens stropha invenitur in Breviario Romano in fine hymni ad Primam.

en: In the angelic hymn: *Gloria in excelsis Deo* ("Glory to God in the highest") etc. — The strophe immediately following is found in the Roman Breviary at the end of the hymn at Prime.

la: Vers. 27.

en: Verse 27.

la: Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *ut si dictio exclusiva additur*, et paulo infra participio *addita* praefigit *dictio exclusiva*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and edition 1, [reads] *ut si dictio exclusiva additur* ("as if the exclusive word is added"), and a little below to the participle *addita* it prefixes *dictio exclusiva*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam*. c. *de Oppositis*. — Mox maior pars codd. pro *aliud* ponit *alium*, in qua lectione in voce *relativo* subaudias *terminum*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On Opposites*. — Next, the greater part of the codices in place of *aliud* ("other thing") puts *alium* ("another [person]"), in which reading in the word *relativo* one is to understand *terminum* ("term").

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Dicendum, quod*.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *Dicendum, quod* ("It must be said that").

la: Subaudi: *dictio exclusiva*. Paulo infra, postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, post *et consequitur* adiecimus propositionem *ad*.

en: Understand: *dictio exclusiva* ("the exclusive word"). A little below, on the demand of most manuscripts and edition 1, after *et consequitur* we have added the preposition *ad*.

la: In Vat. deest *et*, quod tamen a mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 exhibetur. Paulo infra post *idem* codd. *OZ* addunt *referuntur*, codd. 1 *aa bb* cum ed. 1 *comparantur*. Dein post *addita* supple: *dictio exclusiva solus*. Hinc errat Vat. paulo post contra mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *excludunt* loco *excludit*.

en: In the Vatican edition *et* ("and") is missing, which nevertheless is exhibited by the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6. A little below, after *idem* codices *OZ* add *referuntur* ("are referred"); codices 1 *aa bb* with edition 1 [add] *comparantur* ("are compared"). Then after *addita* supply: *dictio exclusiva solus* ("the exclusive word *solus*"). Hence the Vatican edition errs a little later, against the manuscripts and edition 1, by putting *excludunt* in place of *excludit*.

la: In paucis codd. ut *PQ* additur *autem*.

en: In a few codices such as *PQ* *autem* ("however") is added.

la: Ex mss. et sex primis edd. substituimus *illud* pro *illa*, in qua Vaticanae lectione consequenter particula *solum* consideratur ut dictio exclusiva, de qua est quaestio, ideoque et litteris italicis exhibetur, sed minus bene. Paulo ante Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, perperam omittit *ideo*.

en: From the manuscripts and the first six editions we have substituted *illud* in place of *illa*, in which Vatican reading the particle *solum* is consequently considered as the exclusive word about which the question is, and is therefore also exhibited in italic letters, but less well. A little earlier the Vatican edition, against the resistance of the older manuscripts and edition 1, wrongly omits *ideo*.

la: Hic, in lit. c. 1, ubi et verba Augustini habentur.

en: Here, in the *littera* [of Lombard] c. 1, where also the words of Augustine are held.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin*. c. 8. n. 9; vide supra d. XIX. lit. Magistri, c. 12. — Paulo ante post *Et* plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 addunt *sic*; in cod. *M* adiicitur *talis*.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 9; see above d. XIX, *littera* of the Master, c. 12. — A little earlier, after *Et*, very many codices with edition 1 add *sic* ("thus"); in codex *M* *talis* ("such") is added.

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* desideratur propositio haec: *Similiter: Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio* etc., quae autem exstat in ceteris mss. et ed. 1.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc* this proposition is wanting: *Similiter: Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio* ("Likewise: To God the Father be glory and to His only Son") etc., which however stands in the other manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Explicationem horum verborum vide infra dub. 3.

en: For the explanation of these words see below dub. 3.

la: Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice *creatura*; sed vide infra dub. 1. Mox post *naturae* codd. *H bb* adiungunt *cum eo*, ac dein post *ut* cod. *H* addit *est*.

en: The Vatican edition with only one or another codex [reads] *creatura* ("creature"); but see below dub. 1. Next after *naturae* codices *H bb* add *cum eo* ("with him"), and then after *ut* codex *H* adds *est* ("is").

la: Ita aliqui codd. ut *I T Z*; alii cum Vat. *associantur*. Paulo infra post *maior* pauci codd. *et* loco *vel*.

en: Thus some codices such as *I T Z*; others with the Vatican edition [read] *associantur* ("they are associated"). A little below, after *maior* a few codices [read] *et* in place of *vel*.

la: Ita maior pars mss. cum ed. 1; ceteri autem *obiicias*, Vat. *obiiciatur*, quae et mox post *quod* praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. addit *dictio exclusiva*, certe supplendum.

en: Thus the greater part of the manuscripts with edition 1; but the rest [read] *obiicias* ("you might object"); the Vatican edition [reads] *obiiciatur* ("it might be objected"), which also a little after, after *quod*, against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions adds *dictio exclusiva* ("the exclusive word"), certainly to be supplied.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin*. c. 9. n. 10; hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity*, c. 9, n. 10; here in the *littera* of the Master, c. 2.


title: Dist. 21, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

source_text:
<!-- page 386 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod proprie tota Trinitas est *solus Deus*, quia videtur velle negare istam: «*Pater est solus Deus*»; sed haec videtur esse vera per expositionem, quia Pater est Deus et non alius a Deo vel aliud: ergo etc. Item, praedicatum, quod dicitur de tota Trinitate, non potest esse nisi praedicatum essentiale; ergo cum *solus Deus* sit praedicatum essentiale[^1] — quia aliter non diceretur de tota Trinitate — et essentiale praedicatum dicitur de qualibet persona singillatim: ergo Pater est solus Deus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quando *solus* per se additur ad praedicatum, ita quod non intelligitur a parte subiecti, improprius est sermo, sive dicatur de Trinitate tota, sive de Patre. Nec vult dicere Augustinus, quod *solus Deus* praedicetur de tota Trinitate, ita quod non de Patre. Sed in illis locutionibus: *soli Deo honor et gloria*[^2], et consimilibus *solus Deus* non accipitur pro unica persona, excludendo alias personas, sed pro tota Trinitate, excludendo alias naturas; et Magister ita accipit, ac si Augustinus vellet dicere[^3], quod hoc, scilicet *solus Deus*, praedicaretur de Trinitate, et non de Patre. Sed ipse vult, quod supponat pro ipsa Trinitate; pro Patre vero si supponat, non tamen praecise supponit pro solo Patre; et ideo Augustinus concedit, quod sola Trinitas est solus verus[^4] Deus, non tamen solus Pater. Unde et Magister non dicit, quod Pater non sit solus Deus, sed quod non proprie dicitur. Et illud manifestum est, si inspiciatur, qualiter *solus* debet addi ad praedicatum[^5].

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Trinitatem dicimus solum Deum, quamvis semper sit cum Sanctis, cum inseparabilis sit a rebus aliis et intimus omnibus*: propter quid magis dicit[^6] esse cum Sanctis quam cum aliis?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit in omnibus et cum omnibus, tamen specialiter dicitur esse cum Sanctis propter effectum gratiae inhabitantis, per quam ipsi conformantur et cari et similes ei fiunt. Unde Proverbiorum octavo[^7]: *Deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum*, dicit Sapientia Dei. Unde *Dominus vobiscum* dicitur hominibus, non bestiis.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hac locutione: *Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*, quia, cum *nemo* componatur ex *non* et *homo*, ergo *nemo* idem est quod *nullus homo*; sed «dictio exceptiva non excipit nisi contentum sub termino[^8]». Unde nihil est dictum: *nullus homo currit nisi asinus*. Cum ergo Pater non contineatur in suppositione huius nominis *homo*, patet etc. Si tu dicas, quod ampliatur ex usu distributio importata per istum terminum *nemo* ultra quam ad homines; tunc ego quaero: pro quo stat? aut pro creato, aut pro increato? Si pro creato, nulla est exceptio, quia simpliciter vera; et praeterea, Pater non est ibi contentum. Si pro increato, simpliciter et totaliter est[^9] falsa: ergo per exceptionem non potest verificari. Si tu dicas, quod pro utroque; quomodo potest hoc esse, cum nihil habeant commune? Et si habent commune, aut hoc quod[^10] est *nemo* distribuit pro essentiis, aut pro personis; si pro essentiis: ergo non debet excipi Pater; si pro personis: ergo debet excipi Spiritus sanctus, sicut et Pater; alioquin locutio est[^11] falsa.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *nemo* distribuit communiter pro omni[^12] cognoscente sive habente vim cognitivam, et distribuit *nemo* non pro supposito tantum sive persona, sed pro natura. Unde Pater non excipitur, quia persona, sed quia eiusdem naturae cum Filio; et ideo implicatur in illa exceptione Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et ideo locutio habet veritatem.

Vel dic, quod *nemo* distribuit pro hominibus[^13], et *nisi* tenetur non exceptive, sed adversative, sicut dicitur secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^14]: *Ad nihil valet nisi ad subversionem audientium*.

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt concerning what the Master says, namely that properly the whole Trinity is *the only God* (*solus Deus*), since he seems to wish to deny this: «*The Father is the only God*»; but this seems to be true by exposition, because the Father is God and is not another from God nor another thing: therefore etc. Likewise, a predicate which is said of the whole Trinity cannot be other than an essential predicate; therefore since *the only God* (*solus Deus*) is an essential predicate[^1] — because otherwise it would not be said of the whole Trinity — and an essential predicate is said of each person singly: therefore the Father is the only God.

**I respond:** It must be said that when *solus* is added per se to the predicate, in such a way that it is not understood on the side of the subject, the speech is improper, whether it be said of the whole Trinity or of the Father. Nor does Augustine wish to say that *solus Deus* is predicated of the whole Trinity in such a way as not [to be predicated] of the Father. But in those locutions: *to God alone honor and glory*[^2], and the like, *solus Deus* is not taken for a single person, excluding the other persons, but for the whole Trinity, excluding other natures; and the Master takes [it] thus, as if Augustine wished to say[^3] that this, namely *solus Deus*, is predicated of the Trinity, and not of the Father. But he himself means that it should supposit for the Trinity itself; but if it supposits for the Father, nevertheless it does not precisely supposit for the Father alone; and therefore Augustine concedes that the Trinity alone is the only true[^4] God, yet not the Father alone. Hence the Master also does not say that the Father is not *solus Deus*, but that it is not properly said. And this is manifest, if one considers how *solus* ought to be added to the predicate[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *We say that the Trinity is the only God, although [God] is always with the saints, since [he] is inseparable from other things and most intimate to all*: on what account does he say[^6] [that he is] more with the saints than with others?

**I respond:** It must be said that although God is in all things and with all things, nevertheless he is said to be specially with the saints because of the effect of indwelling grace, through which they themselves are conformed and become beloved and like to him. Hence Proverbs eight[^7]: *My delights [are] to be with the sons of men*, says the Wisdom of God. Hence *the Lord be with you* is said to men, not to beasts.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this locution: *No one knows the Son except the Father*, because, since *nemo* is composed of *non* and *homo*, therefore *nemo* is the same as *no man*; but «an exceptive word does not except [anything] except what is contained under the term[^8]». Hence nothing is said [in]: *no man runs except a donkey*. Therefore since the Father is not contained in the supposition of this noun *homo*, it is plain etc. If you say that the distribution imported by this term *nemo* is by usage extended beyond men; then I ask: for what does it stand? either for what is created, or for what is uncreated? If for what is created, there is no exception, because [the proposition is] simply true; and besides, the Father is not contained therein. If for what is uncreated, [it is] simply and totally[^9] false: therefore it cannot be verified by exception. If you say [that it stands] for both; how can this be, since they have nothing in common? And if they do have [something] in common, either this[^10] which is *nemo* is distributed for essences, or for persons; if for essences: therefore the Father ought not to be excepted; if for persons: therefore the Holy Spirit ought to be excepted, just as also the Father; otherwise the locution is[^11] false.

**I respond:** It must be said that *nemo* is distributed commonly for every[^12] knower or for [everyone] having a cognitive power, and *nemo* is distributed not for the supposit alone or person, but for the nature. Hence the Father is not excepted because [he is] a person, but because [he is] of the same nature with the Son; and therefore in that exception the Son and the Holy Spirit are implied, and therefore the locution has truth.

Or say that *nemo* is distributed for men[^13], and *nisi* is taken not exceptively, but adversatively, as it is said in 2 Timothy chapter 2[^14]: *It is of no avail except to the subversion of the hearers*.

---

la: In Vat. et cod. cc male omittitur *ergo cum* usque *essentiale*, quae tamen verba in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habentur.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and codex *cc* the words from *ergo cum* up to *essentiale* are wrongly omitted, which words however are present in the other manuscripts and edition 1.

la: I. Tim. 1, 17. — Paulo ante in cod. G post *non de Patre* additur *tantum*, ac dein cod. V pro *illis* ponit *his*.

en: 1 Timothy 1:17. — A little before, in codex *G*, after *non de Patre* *tantum* is added, and then codex *V* in place of *illis* puts *his*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *non*, quod Vat. contra mentem Magistri (hic, c. 2.) addit. Mox pauci codd. ut K dd post *praedicaretur de* adiiciunt *tota*, quod cod. X dein substituit pro *ipsa*.

en: On the faith of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out *non*, which the Vatican [edition], against the mind of the Master (here, c. 2), adds. Soon, a few codices such as *K dd* after *praedicaretur de* add *tota*, which codex *X* then substitutes in place of *ipsa*.

la: Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice *unus* loco *verus*. Paulo ante cod. X *tota* pro *sola*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with only one or another codex [reads] *unus* in place of *verus*. A little before, codex *X* [reads] *tota* in place of *sola*.

la: Plura de hoc vide supra a. I. q. 2. et apud Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 6.

en: See more on this above, a. I, q. 2, and in Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 6.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *dicitur*.

la: Vers. 31.

en: Verse 31.

la: Cfr. *Summula* Petri Hispani, Tract. *de Exponibilibus*.

en: Cf. the *Summula* of Peter of Spain, Tract. *On Exponibles*.

la: In pluribus mss. et ed. 1 omittitur *est*.

en: In several manuscripts and edition 1 *est* is omitted.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primis edd., hic superflue addit *hoc*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with the manuscripts and the first six editions resisting, here superfluously adds *hoc*.

la: Cod. V *esset*.

en: Codex *V* [reads] *esset*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 perperam *communi* pro *omni*, quae et mox praeter fidem codd. et sex primarum edd. omittit *nemo*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the older manuscripts and edition 1, wrongly [reads] *communi* in place of *omni*, which [edition] also a little later, against the testimony of the codices and the first six editions, omits *nemo*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. prave *omnibus* pro *hominibus*. S. Thomas hic circa lit. adducens hunc solutionis modum ait: *ut sit sensus: Nullus purus homo novit Patrem notitia comprehensionis, sed tantum Filius*.

en: The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, perversely [reads] *omnibus* in place of *hominibus*. St. Thomas, here on the *littera*, adducing this manner of solution, says: *that the sense is: No mere man knows the Father with the knowledge of comprehension, but only the Son*.

la: Vers. 14, ubi Vat. cum Vulgata *utile est* loco *valet*, quod exhibent codd. et ed. 1. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 3. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6.

en: Verse 14, where the Vatican [edition] with the Vulgate [reads] *utile est* in place of *valet*, which [reading] the codices and edition 1 exhibit. — On this doubt cf. above a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 65, m. 3, a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 6.


title: Dist. 22

title_alt:
Distinctio XXII littera Magistri
Lombard's text on Distinction XXII

source_text:
<!-- page 388 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXII.

#### Cap. I. *De nominum differentiis, quibus utimur loquentes de Deo.*

Post praedicta disserendum nobis videtur de nominum diversitate, quibus loquentes de Unitate ac Trinitate ineffabili utimur. Deinde ostendendum[^1] est, quibus modis de ea aliquid dicatur. «Illud ergo praecipue teneamus, quaedam esse nomina distincte ad singulas personas pertinentia, ut ait Augustinus in octavo libro *de Trinitate*[^2], quae de singulis tantum dicuntur personis; quaedam vero unitatem essentiae significantia sunt, quae et de singulis singillatim et de omnibus communiter dicuntur; alia vero sunt, quae translative et per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur». Unde Ambrosius in secundo libro *de Trinitate*[^3] ait: «Quo purius niteat fides, tripartita videtur derivanda distinctio. Sunt enim nomina quaedam, quae evidenter proprietatem deitatis ostendunt; et sunt quaedam, quae perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt unitatem; alia vero sunt, quae translative et per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur. Proprietatis itaque indicia sunt generatio, Filius, Verbum et huiusmodi; unitatis vero aeternae sapientia, virtus, veritas et huiusmodi; similitudinis vero splendor, character, speculum et huiusmodi».

#### Cap. II. *De his quae temporaliter Deo conveniunt et relative dicuntur.*

His adiiciendum est, quaedam etiam esse nomina, ut Augustinus ait in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^4], quae ex tempore Deo conveniunt et relative ad creaturam dicuntur, quorum quaedam de omnibus dicuntur personis, ut dominus, creator, refugium; quaedam autem non de omnibus, ut donatus, datus, missus.

#### Cap. III. *De hoc nomine quod est trinitas.*

Praeterea est unum nomen, quod de nulla persona singillatim dicitur, sed de omnibus simul, id est trinitas, quod non dicitur secundum substantiam, sed quasi collectivum pluralitatem designat personarum.

Sunt etiam quaedam nomina, quae ex tempore Deo conveniunt nec relative dicuntur, ut incarnatus, humanatus et huiusmodi. Ecce sex nominum differentias assignavimus, quibus utimur loquentes de Deo, de quibus singulis agendum est.

#### Cap. IV. *De his quae proprie ad singulas personas pertinent, et de his quae unitatem essentiae significant.*

Sciendum est igitur, quod illa quae proprie ad singulas personas pertinent, relative ad invicem dicuntur, sicut Pater et Filius, et utriusque Donum, Spiritus sanctus. Ea vero, quae unitatem essentiae significant, ad se dicuntur. Et ea quae ad se dicuntur, substantialiter utique dicuntur et de omnibus communiter et de singulis singillatim dicuntur personis et singulariter, non pluraliter accipiuntur in summa, ut Deus, bonus, potens, magnus et huiusmodi. Quae autem relative dicuntur substantialiter non dicuntur. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^5] ita ait: «Quidquid ad se dicitur, praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dicitur; quod autem ad aliquid dicitur, non substantialiter, sed relative dicitur. Tantaque est vis eiusdem substantiae in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, ut quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur, non pluraliter in summa, sed singulariter accipiatur. Dicimus enim: Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus, et Spiritus sanctus est Deus, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat; non tamen dicimus, hanc Trinitatem esse tres deos, sed unum Deum. Ita dicitur Pater magnus, Filius magnus et Spiritus sanctus magnus; non tamen tres magni, sed unus magnus. Ita etiam[^6] omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus sanctus; non tamen tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens. Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur, Deus et de singulis personis similiter dicitur, et simul de ipsa Trinitate, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicitur. Et quoniam non est aliud Deo esse et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem est illi esse quod est magnum esse, propterea, sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem».

«Deus enim non est magnus ea magnitudine, quae non est quod ipse, ut quasi particeps eius sit; alioquin maior esset illa magnitudo quam Deus; Deo autem non est aliquid maius: ea igitur magnitudine magnus est, qua ipse est. Ideoque nec tres magnitudines dicimus, sed unam magnitudinem, nec tres magnos, sed

<!-- page 389 -->

unum magnum, quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed se ipso magno magnus est, quia ipse est sua magnitudo. Ita et de bonitate et aeternitate et omnipotentia Dei dicendum est et de omnibus omnino, quae de Deo possunt pronuntiari substantialiter, quibus ad se ipsum dicitur, non translative ac per similitudinem, sed proprie, si tamen de illo proprie aliquid ore hominis dici potest[^7]». Ecce aperte docuit, quod nomina unitatem divinae maiestatis significantia et ad se dicuntur de Deo, id est sine relatione, et de omnibus personis communiter et de singulis divisim dicuntur nec pluraliter, sed singulariter in summa accipiuntur. Illa vero nomina, quae proprie ad singulas pertinent personas, relative, non substantialiter dicuntur. «Quod enim proprie singula in Trinitate persona dicitur, ut ait Augustinus in eodem[^8], nullo modo ad se ipsam, sed ad aliam invicem vel ad creaturam dicitur: et ideo relative, non substantialiter dici manifestum est».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXII.

#### Cap. I. *On the differences of names by which we speak of God.*

After what has been said, it seems that we must discourse on the diversity of names which we use in speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity. Then it must be shown[^1] in what modes anything is said of it. "Let us therefore especially hold this," as Augustine says in the eighth book *On the Trinity*[^2], "that there are certain names pertaining distinctly to single persons, which are said only of single persons; certain others, however, signifying the unity of the essence, which are said both of single persons singly and of all in common; and others again which are said of God transferred and by likeness." Whence Ambrose in the second book *On the Trinity*[^3] says: "That faith may shine the more purely, a threefold distinction is seen to be drawn. For there are certain names which evidently show forth the property of the deity; and there are certain ones which express the manifest unity of the divine majesty; and others which are said of God transferred and by likeness. The marks, therefore, of property are *generation*, *Son*, *Word*, and the like; of unity, *eternal*, *wisdom*, *power*, *truth*, and the like; of likeness, *splendor*, *character*, *mirror*, and the like."

#### Cap. II. *On those things which befit God in time and are said relatively.*

To these it must be added that there are also certain names, as Augustine says in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^4], which befit God from time and are said relatively to the creature, of which some are said of all the persons, as *Lord*, *Creator*, *refuge*; certain others, however, not of all, as *given*, *granted*, *sent*.

#### Cap. III. *On this name, which is "trinity".*

Furthermore, there is one name which is said of no person singly, but of all together, that is, *trinity*, which is not said according to substance, but, as it were collective, designates a plurality of persons.

There are also certain names which befit God from time and are not said relatively, as *incarnate*, *made man*, and the like. Behold, we have assigned six differences of names which we use in speaking of God, concerning each of which we must treat.

#### Cap. IV. *On those things which properly pertain to single persons, and on those which signify the unity of the essence.*

It must be known, therefore, that those things which properly pertain to single persons are said relatively to one another, as Father and Son, and the Gift of both, the Holy Spirit. But those which signify the unity of the essence are said *to themselves*. And those things which are said *to themselves* are said substantially, and are said both of all in common and of single persons singly, and they are taken in the singular, not the plural, in sum: as *God*, *good*, *powerful*, *great*, and the like. Those, however, which are said relatively are not said substantially. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^5] thus says: "Whatever is said *to itself*, that most excellent and divine sublimity is said substantially; but what is said *to something*, is not said substantially, but relatively. And so great is the force of the same substance in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that whatever is said of single persons in respect of themselves is taken in the sum not plurally, but singularly. For we say: the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God — which no one doubts is said according to substance; yet we do not say that this Trinity is three gods, but one God. So the Father is called great, the Son great, and the Holy Spirit great; yet not three greats, but one great. So also[^6] *omnipotent* the Father, *omnipotent* the Son, *omnipotent* the Holy Spirit; yet not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent. Whatever therefore is said *to itself*, *God* is similarly said of single persons, and at once of the Trinity itself, not plurally, but singularly. And since to be God is not one thing and to be great another, but this is the same to Him: to be is what to be great is, therefore, just as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three magnitudes, but one essence and one magnitude."

"For God is not great by a magnitude which is not what He Himself is, as though He were as it were a partaker of it; otherwise that magnitude would be greater than God; but to God nothing is greater: He is therefore great by that magnitude by which He Himself is. And therefore we do not say three magnitudes, but one magnitude, nor three greats, but

<!-- page 389 -->

one great, since God is not great by participation in magnitude, but is great by His very self being great, since He Himself is His magnitude. So too must it be said of the goodness and eternity and omnipotence of God, and of absolutely all those things which can be predicated of God substantially, by which He is said *to Himself*, not transferred and by likeness, but properly, if however anything can be properly said of Him by the mouth of man[^7]." Behold, He has plainly taught that the names which signify the unity of the divine majesty are both said *to themselves* of God, that is, without relation, and are said both of all the persons in common and of single persons divisively, and are taken in sum not plurally, but singularly. Those names, however, which properly pertain to single persons are said relatively, not substantially. "For what each single person in the Trinity is properly called, as Augustine says in the same book[^8], is in no way said *to itself*, but to another in mutual relation, or to the creature: and therefore it is manifest that it is said relatively, not substantially."

---

la: Vat. et plures edd. contra codd. *demonstrandum*.

en: The Vatican edition and several editions, against the manuscripts, read *demonstrandum* ("must be demonstrated").

la: In prooemio. — De his tribus modis significationis verborum loquitur ibid. V. c. 8. n. 9. — Hic et in sequentibus tam codd. quam edd. promiscue scribunt modo *sigillatim*, modo *singillatim*, modo *singulatim*.

en: In the prologue. — He speaks of these three modes of signification of words ibid. V, c. 8, n. 9. — Here and in what follows both the manuscripts and the editions write indiscriminately now *sigillatim*, now *singillatim*, now *singulatim*.

la: Sive *de Fide ad Gratianum*. Prolog. n. 2; sed pro verbis: *nomina quaedam, quae evidenter* legitur *evidentia indicia, quae* etc.; tamen, ut notant Maurini, quidam cod. legit cum Magistro: *Sunt enim nomina quaedam*, et ipse Magister post *Proprietates itaque* adhibet vocem *indicia*. Propositionem: *alia vero sunt, quae translative*, Magister addit, dum Ambrosius dicit: *Sint quae similitudinem* Patris et Filii scil. *ostendunt*. — Vat. et plures edd. post vocem *proprietatem* addunt *personamque* contra originale et codd. Denique edd. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 contra contextum legunt *exprimunt veritatem* loco *exprimunt unitatem*.

en: Or *On the Faith, to Gratian*. Prologue, n. 2; but for the words *nomina quaedam, quae evidenter* ("certain names which evidently") it reads *evidentia indicia, quae* ("evident marks, which"), etc.; however, as the Maurists note, a certain manuscript reads with the Master *Sunt enim nomina quaedam* ("For there are certain names"), and the Master himself, after *Proprietates itaque*, applies the word *indicia* ("marks"). The clause *alia vero sunt, quae translative* ("but there are others which transferred") is added by the Master, while Ambrose says *Sint quae similitudinem* ("Let there be those which … likeness"), namely of the Father and of the Son, *ostendunt* ("show forth"). — The Vatican edition and several editions, after the word *proprietatem*, add *personamque* against the original and the manuscripts. Finally editions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, against the context, read *exprimunt veritatem* ("express the truth") in place of *exprimunt unitatem* ("express the unity").

la: Cap. 16. n. 17. — Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 8, 9 paulo ante post *quaedam* omittunt *etiam*.

en: Chapter 16, n. 17. — The Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 8, 9 a little earlier omit *etiam* ("also") after *quaedam*.

la: Cap. 8. n. 9. — Fere omnes edd. contra codd. *ita*.

en: Chapter 8, n. 9. — Almost all the editions read, against the manuscripts, *ita* ("thus").

la: Sola Vat. et male *enim*, ed. 1 et codd. ABCE *et*, Augustinus *itaque*, cod. D *Ita omnipotens*. Infra Vat. et ed. 6 ante *idem est* omittunt *hoc*, quod habet etiam Augustinus.

en: The Vatican edition alone, and wrongly, reads *enim* ("for"); edition 1 and codices ABCE read *et* ("and"); Augustine reads *itaque* ("therefore"); codex D reads *Ita omnipotens* ("So omnipotent"). Below, the Vatican edition and edition 6, before *idem est*, omit *hoc*, which Augustine also has.

la: Ex eodem loc. cit. c. 10. n. 12.

en: From the same place cited, c. 10, n. 12.

la: Cap. 11. n. 12. — Vat. et edd. 3, 4, 9 male *se ipsum* pro *se ipsam*.

en: Chapter 11, n. 12. — The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, 9 wrongly read *se ipsum* ("itself," masculine) in place of *se ipsam* ("itself," feminine).


title: Dist. 22, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text of Distinction XXII

source_text:
<!-- page 389 -->

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de sacra Trinitate, secundum quod catholice creditur et intelligitur. In hac parte agit de ea, secundum quod credita et intellecta per catholicos sermones exprimitur. Unde, sicut ipse Magister dicit in littera, intendit hic agere de nominum divinorum diversitate. Et haec pars habet duas partes. In prima parte determinat[^1] de nominibus divinis in generali; in secunda in speciali, et hoc distinctione vigesima tertia: *Praedictis tamen adiiciendum est, quod cum omnia nomina* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima parte ponit Magister multiplices nominum divinorum differentias; in secunda omnes reducit ad duas, secundum illud Boethii in libro *Divisionum*[^2], quod omnis divisio est bimembris vel ad bimembrem reducibilis, et hoc ibi: *Sciendum est igitur, quod illa quae proprie pertinent*.

Item, prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima ponit Magister differentias nominum divinorum secundum Augustinum et secundum Ambrosium. In secunda ad maiorem explanationem superaddit alias tres differentias, ibi, secundo capitulo[^3]: *His adiiciendum est, quaedam nomina etiam esse* etc.

Similiter secunda pars, in qua reducit haec membra ad duo, habet duas partes[^4]. In prima ostendit, quod nomina in divinis quaedam dicuntur relative, et haec pertinent ad personas; quaedam ad se, et haec dicuntur de omnibus simul. In secunda ostendit, hoc esse verum, ibi: *Deus enim non est magnus ea magnitudine*.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae in hac parte dicuntur de nominibus divinis, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit nominabilis.

Secundo, utrum uno[^5] solo nomine, vel pluribus debeat nominari.

<!-- page 390 -->

Tertio, supposito quod plura sint nomina divina, quaeritur, utrum omnia dicantur translative, aut[^6] etiam quaedam dicantur proprie.

Quarto, utrum nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam, an etiam aliquo[^7] alio modo.

---

english:
### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the sacred Trinity, insofar as it is catholicly believed and understood. In this part he treats of it insofar as, having been believed and understood, it is expressed through catholic discourse. Whence, as the Master[^1] himself says in the text, he here intends to treat of the diversity of the divine names. And this part has two parts. In the first part he determines concerning the divine names in general; in the second concerning them in particular, and this in the twenty-third distinction: *Yet to the foregoing it must be added that, since all names* etc.

The first part is divided into two. In the first part the Master sets out manifold differences of the divine names; in the second he reduces them all to two, according to that saying of Boethius in the book *On Divisions*[^2], that every division is twofold-membered or reducible to a twofold-membered one, and this at: *It must be known therefore, that those things which properly pertain*.

Likewise, the first part is divided into two. In the first he sets out the differences of the divine names according to Augustine and according to Ambrose. In the second, for greater explanation, he superadds three other differences, there, in the second chapter[^3]: *To these it must be added that certain names also are* etc.

Similarly the second part, in which he reduces these members to two, has two parts[^4]. In the first he shows that, in divine matters, certain names are said relatively, and these pertain to the persons; certain are said with reference to himself, and these are said of all together. In the second he shows that this is true, there: *For God is not great by that greatness*.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of those things which are said in this part concerning the divine names, four questions are asked.

First it is asked whether God is nameable.

Secondly, whether he ought to be named by one[^5] sole name, or by several.

Thirdly, supposing that there are several divine names, it is asked whether all are said by transference, or[^6] whether some also are said properly.

Fourthly, whether the names said of God are said according to substance, or also in some[^7] other way.

---

la: Supple cum cod. Z et ed. 1 *Magister*.

en: Supply with codex Z and edition 1 the word *Magister* ("the Master").

la: Circa medium: «*Divisio quoque, nominibus positis, quoniam semper in duos terminos secatur*» etc. Et paulo post: «*Ita ergo divisio omnis in gemina secaretur, si speciebus et differentiis vocabula non deessent*».

en: Near the middle: "Division also, the names being given, since it is always cut into two terms" etc. And a little after: "So therefore every division would be cut into twin parts, if names were not lacking for the species and differences."

la: In Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 deest *secundo capitulo*.

en: In the Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, the words *secundo capitulo* ("in the second chapter") are missing.

la: Ed. 1 *particulas*.

en: Edition 1 reads *particulas* ("little parts").

la: Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus male omissum *uno*.

en: From nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *uno* ("one"), which had been wrongly omitted.

en: Edition 1 reads *an* ("whether").

la: Plures codd. ut AFGHKT etc. *aliqua*, quam lectionem etiam ed. 1 habet et insuper post *unum* addit bene *omnia*.

en: Several manuscripts such as AFGHKT etc. read *aliqua* ("some [things]"), which reading edition 1 also has, and moreover after *unum* it adds, well, *omnia* ("all").