site: bonaventure

collection: Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi

title: Quaest. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio I. *Utrum scientia Christi, secundum quod est Verbum, actu se extendat ad infinita.*

Quaeritur de scientia Christi, secundum quod Verbum, utrum actu se extendat ad infinita[^p3-1]. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo *auctoritate* Augustini, duodecimo de Civitate Dei, decimo octavo capitulo: « Infinitas numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei cuius *intelligentiae non est numerus* ».

2. Item, idem undecimo de Civitate Dei, decimo capitulo[^p3-2], loquens de sapientia Dei, ait sic: « Neque multae, sed una est sapientia, in qua sunt infinita quaedam eique finiti thesauri rerum intelligibilium » etc.

3. Item, per *rationem* ostenditur sic. Quanto substantia simplicior, tanto plurium est cognoscitiva[^p3-3]: ergo substantia, quae in infinitum magis simplex est quam aliqua substantia creata, in infinitum plura scit quam aliqua creatura: ergo etc.

4. Item, Deus comprehendit actualiter et suam essentiam et suam potentiam; sed Deus potest infinita: ergo si actualiter cognoscit totum suum *posse*, actualiter comprehendit infinita: ergo etc.

5. Item, nobilitatis est in creatura cognoscere multa, et maioris nobilitatis adhuc scire plura[^p3-4]: ergo scientia, quae est infinitae nobilitatis, ad infinita se extendit: ergo etc.

6. Item, Deus scit plura, quam possit, quia scit mala culpae, quae non potest facere; sed potest infinita: ergo et scit plura infinitis.

7. Item, qui cognoscit punctum secundum suam substantiam et virtutem cognoscit illum non solum in se, sed etiam illa quae possunt ab eo emanare; sed infinitae lineae possunt emanare ab uno puncto: ergo si in qualibet linea sunt infinita puncta, et a quolibet puncto infinitae possunt exire lineae, et Deus *posse* omnis creaturae[^p3-5] comprehendit; ergo non tantum scit infinita, sed etiam infinities infinita.

8. Item, quidquid intellectus humanus intelligit in potentia vel habet in potentia, intellectus divinus habet in actu et amplius, quia creatum nec actu nec potentia aequari potest increato; sed intellectus humanus possibilis est ad infinita, quia nunquam tot scit, quin plura possit scire: ergo si intellectus divinus actu est in plura quam intellectus humanus, actualiter se extendit ad plura[^p3-6] quam infinita.

9. Item, *per impossibile*: quia, si Deus tantum sciret finita, cum omni finito possit aliquid maius excogitari, aliquid posset cogitari maius divina scientia[^p3-7]; sed non potest: ergo etc.

10. Item, si finita sciret, aut *posset* aliquid ultra scire, aut *non*. Si *non*; ergo limitata esset eius scientia; si *sic*; sed qui potest aliquid scire, quod nescit, potest addiscere; quod de Deo nefas est dicere: ergo[^p3-8] etc.

11. Item, si sciret tantum ea quae sunt[^p3-9], et non ea quae possunt fieri; cum artifex creatus cognoscat multa, quae potest facere et nunquam fa-

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ciet, aliquid sciret homo, quod lateret Deum; sed hoc est falsum et impossibile: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Omne scitum verum, omne verum ens[^p4-1]: ergo si infinita sunt scita, infinita sunt entia; sed consequens est impossibile: ergo et antecedens.

2. Item, quaecumque Deus scit iudicat; sed quaecumque iudicat talia sunt, qualia iudicat, et tot; quaecumque autem Deus iudicat accipit ut finita: ergo quaecumque cognoscit sunt finita. — *Si tu dicas*, quod non sequitur: quia est finitum Deo, ergo est finitum; *contra*: tale est unumquodque in se, quale est apud iudicium veritatis: ergo si aliquid est finitum Deo, necesse est, quod sit finitum simpliciter.

3. Item, omne infinitum est impertransibile tam ab infinito quam a finito[^p4-2], quia a quocumque pertransiretur acciperet terminum: ergo esset finitum; sed quaecumque divinus intellectus cognoscit comprehendit et pertransit: ergo si infinita sunt impertransibilia, infinita sunt incognoscibilia.

4. Item, quaecumque Deus cognoscit distincte cognoscit; sed quaecumque distinguit numerat, quaecumque autem numerantur mensurantur, et omnia talia sunt finita[^p4-3]: ergo quaecumque cognoscuntur a Deo sunt finita.

5. Item, omnis numerus aut est par, aut impar: ergo quaecumque numerantur a Deo numerantur numero pari, vel impari; sed omnis numerus par est divisibilis in duo aequalia, similiter et omnis numerus impar, unitate sublata; omnis autem talis numerus est finitus: ergo si Deus numerat quaecumque scit, necesse est, quod illa numeret numero finito: ergo sunt finita: ergo etc.

6. Item, quaecumque Deus scit ordinate scit; sed ubicumque est ordo, ibi est ratio primi et ultimi[^p4-4], quae est ratio finiti: si ergo ubicumque est ratio ordinis est ratio finitatis, et Deus nulla novit sine ordine, quia nulla scit inordinate; impossibile est, Deum infinita scire.

7. Item, si Deus scit infinita, aut infinita *sibi*, aut *nobis*, aut *in se*. Si infinita *nobis*, hoc non est magnum quid dicere, quia illa sunt finita simpliciter. Si *sibi*; sed quaecumque sunt infinita alicui non sunt ab illo cognoscibilia nec ab illo comprehenduntur: ergo si Deus scit infinita, non comprehendit infinita. Si infinita *in se*; sed res alia a Deo, hoc ipso quod est alia, est creatura, et hoc ipso quod creatura, est limitata[^p4-5]: ergo scire res alias infinitas, hoc est scire finita infinita; quod falsum est et non intelligibile, quia implicat in se contradictionem.

8. Item, si Deus scit infinita, aut infinita in causa, aut in proprio genere. Si infinita in causa; sed omne, quod est in causa, est unum[^p4-6]: ergo quaecumque cognoscit ut in causa cognoscit per modum unius, non ergo per modum infinitorum. Si *infinita actu et in proprio genere*; sed esse infinita actu in proprio genere est falsum et impossibile: ergo falsum est et impossibile, Deum infinita scire.

9. Item, omne scibile a Deo appelletur A; tunc quaero sic: A aut est Deus, aut aliud a Deo. Si est Deus: ergo scitum a Deo est Deus: ergo asinus est Deus. Si aliud a Deo; omne tale est actu finitum: ergo A est actu finitum; et A nominat omnia scibilia: ergo omnia scibilia sunt finita: ergo etc.

10. Item, A aut est *aequale* Deo, aut est *minus*, aut *maius*. Si *minus* Deo: ergo finitum; si *aequale*, vel *maius*; ergo est Deus: ergo si Deus scit infinita, Deus non scit nisi Deum; et si non scit nisi Deum, non scit infinita: ergo si scit infinita, non scit infinita.

11. Item, cum sit potentia faciendi et potentia cognoscendi in Deo, et utraque infinita, et potentia faciendi semper faciat[^p4-7] finita; videtur, quod potentia cognoscendi semper cognoscat finita actu; aut si non, quare non? Hoc est quaerere, cum in Deo sit *velle*, *scire* et *facere*, et *velle* et *facere* non se extendant ad infinita; quomodo *scire* se extendat ad infinita, cum medium non excedat extrema.

> **Conclusio.** Deus scientia simplicis intelligentiae scit et comprehendit infinita.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod secundum doctores antiquos compellimur ponere, Deum scire infinita, Propheta David dicente in Psalmo[^p4-8]: *Magnus Dominus noster et magna virtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus*; et Augustino non solum istud asserente, verum etiam probante duodecimo de Civitate Dei, decimo octavo capitulo, ubi ait sic: « Illud ergo, quod dicunt quidam, scilicet philosophi, nec Dei scientia posse infinita comprehendi; restat eis, ut dicere audeant atque huic[^p4-9] se voragini impietatis immergant,

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quod non omnes numeros Deus noverit. Eos quippe infinitos esse, certissimum est, quoniam in quocumque numero finem ponendum putaveris, idem ipse, non dico, uno addito augeri, sed quantumlibet sit magnus et quamlibet ingentem multitudinem continens, in ipsa ratione atque scientia numerorum non solum duplicari, verum etiam multiplicari potest. Ita vero suis quisque numerus proprietatibus terminatur, ut nullus eorum par esse cuiquam alteri possit: ergo et dispares inter se atque diversi sunt, et singuli quique finiti sunt, et omnes infiniti sunt. Itane numeros propter infinitatem nescit Deus omnes, et usque ad quandam summam numerorum scientia Dei pervenit et ceteros ignorat? Quis hoc vel dementissimus dixerit »? Et parum infra: « Infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei cuius *intelligentiae non est numerus*[^p5-1]. Quapropter, si quidquid scientia comprehenditur scientis comprehensione finitur; profecto et omnis infinitas quodam ineffabili modo Deo finita est, quia scientiae ipsius incomprehensibilis non est. Quare si infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, qua comprehenditur, esse non potest infinita; qui tandem nos sumus homunculi, qui eius scientiae figere limitem praesumamus »? — His ergo, tanquam certissimis testibus compellimur dicere vel ponere, Deum scire infinita.

Modus autem istius positionis assignatur[^p5-2] per doctores moderniores, qui dixerunt, quod triplex est modus divinae cognitionis, non propter diversitatem divinae scientiae *in se*, sed *in connotatione*. Est enim in Deo cognitio *approbationis*, *visionis* et *intelligentiae*. Cognitio *approbationis* est bonorum tantum et finitorum. Cognitio *visionis* est malorum et bonorum, sed finitorum, pro eo quod concernit tempus; est enim eorum solum, quae fuerunt, sunt et futura sunt. Cognitio vero *intelligentiae* est infinitorum, pro eo quod Deus intelligit non tantum futura, verum etiam possibilia; possibilia autem Deo non sunt finita, sed infinita[^p5-3].

Ratio autem huius positionis, quare videlicet ponimus, Deum *scire* infinita et non *facere* vel *velle* vel *disponere*, est, quia *divinum scire* secundum tertium modum accipiendi est actus Dei *intrinsecus*. *Intrinsecum* autem dico non tantum, quia fit *ab intrinseco*, sed etiam, quia est *ad intrinsecum* et *per intrinsecum* et *secundum modum intrinsecum*. *Ad intrinsecum*, inquam, est, quia divinus aspectus in cognoscendo non desilit extra se, sed aspiciendo se ut veritatem cognoscit omnem veritatem. — *Per intrinsecum*, quia per rationes aeternas, quae sunt idem quod ipse, cognoscit quaecumque cognoscit[^p5-4]. — *Secundum modum intrinsecum*, quia divinum *scire* non solum abstrahit a ratione *causae actualis*, sed etiam *causae simpliciter*. Scit enim *mala*, quorum non est causa; scit etiam *futura*, quae nondum facit; scit etiam *possibilia*, quae nunquam faciet. Et ideo, quia ipsum *scire* non concernit neque connotat aliquid actuale exterius, ideo dicit ibi actum *per modum habitus*, actum, inquam, ipsi potentiae adaequatum — quidquid enim Deus potest scire scit — *actum* etiam dicit *in nullo coarctatum* nec quantum *ad se* nec quantum *ad connotatum*, ideo *universalem* quantum ad *loca*, quantum ad *tempora* et quantum ad *obiecta*. Quidquid enim alicubi scivit ubique novit, et quidquid semel scit semper scit, et sicut unum novit, ita omnia scibilia novit[^p5-5]. Unde quia scibilia non tantummodo sunt entia *actu*, sed etiam *in potentia*; cum non sit inconveniens ponere infinita *in potentia*, non est inconveniens ponere infinita actu a Deo scita. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem et ad obiecta.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur: omne scitum verum etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est scientia, scilicet *causans res* et *causata a rebus*. Scitum a scientia causata a rebus est verum in *se* et in *effectu*; scitum autem a scientia causante res est verum in *causa* et in *potentia*, et illud verum non infert ens actu, sed ens in potentia causae; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quodsi Deus scit infinita, quod infinita sunt entia, sed quod infinita Deo sunt possibilia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus quaecumque scit iudicat etc.; dicendum, quod Deus in cognoscendo infinita iudicat illa *infinita simpliciter*, sed *finita sibi*; et hoc non est inconveniens. Sicut enim non sequitur, quodsi aliquid est infinitum *finito*, quod sit infinitum *simpliciter*; sic non sequitur, quodsi aliquid est finitum *infinito*, quod sit finitum *simpliciter*; et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in praemissa auctoritate[^p5-6].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne infinitum est impertransibile etc.; dicendum, quod *pertransibile* dicitur duobus modis: uno modo per modum discursivum ab uno in aliud; et hoc modo habet veritatem verbum praemissum, et sic intelligit Philosophus in sexto Physicorum[^p5-7]; alio modo per universalem et plenarium contuitum eius quod cognoscitur ab intelligentia; et sic infinitum, cum non sit incomprehensibile infinito, non est ei impertransibile, sed finito tantum.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque scit et cognoscit distincte cognoscit etc.; dicendum, quod illa consequentia deficit in hoc, quod dicit: quaecumque distinguit numerat; quia *distinguere* est in plus[^p6-1] quam *numerare*. — Vel dic, quod quaecumque distinguit numerat numero finito, vel infinito; sed tunc non sequitur, quod mensuret, quia mensura dicit quid finitum tantum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: si numerat, aut numero pari, vel impari etc.; dicendum, quod illa consequentia non tenet, pro eo quod numerus infinitus comprehendit utrumque; unde sicut non tenet ista consequentia: homo et asinus sunt animalia, ergo rationalia, vel irrationalia; sic nec consequentia praedicta.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque Deus cognoscit ordinate cognoscit etc.; dicendum, quod divina cognitio habet comparationem et ad *cognoscentem* et ad *cognitum*; per comparationem ad *cognoscentem* quidquid cognoscit simul cognoscit, sicut simul et semel dicit quidquid dicit[^p6-2]; per comparationem autem ad *cognitum*, dico, quod *ordinate* cognoscit; sed sicut cognitum a Deo non tantum est praesens, sed etiam futurum et possibile; sic et *ordo* ille non est tantum ordo *actualis*, sed etiam *potentialis*, quia non tantum cognoscit res ordinate ordine, qui factus est, sed etiam ordine, quem potest facere. — Quod ergo dicit, quod omnis ordo habet primum et ultimum; verum est de ordine *actuali*, non de ordine *potentiali*; sicut patet in numeris, qui infinitatem habent, et tamen sunt ordinati; habent enim ordinem possibilem, sicut et infinitatem.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut scit infinita nobis etc.; dicendum, quod scit infinita *in se*, non quidem *actu* infinita, sed *in potentia*; quae autem sunt in potentia sunt actu a Deo scita. Unde infinitas potentialis in cognitis sufficit ad infinitatem actualem divinae comprehensionis; sicut ergo infinitas *in potentia*[^p6-3] non repugnat finitati actuali in creatura, sic nec infinitas *actualis* cognitionis divinae repugnat finitati creaturae.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut scit infinita in causa etc.; dicendum, quod utroque modo. — Et *si obiicias*, quod in causa sunt unum; non valet, quia, licet sit una ars et potentia, tamen plures sunt rationes rerum cognoscendarum[^p6-4]. — Si *obiicias*, quod in proprio genere sint finita; verum est secundum *esse*, quod habent; sed tamen secundum *esse*, quod possunt habere, sunt saltem infinita *in potentia*, et sic infinita a Deo scita, quia, ut saepe dictum est, quae sunt *in potentia* sunt *actu* a Deo scita.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur: A aut est Deus, aut aliud a Deo etc.; dicendum, quod *scitum a Deo* aliquando nominat ipsam *rationem cognoscendi*, aliquando ipsum *cognitum extra*. Primo modo est Deus, quia, ut dicit Anselmus in Monologio[^p6-5], « creatura in Creatore est creatrix essentia ». Secundo autem modo est aliud a Deo; sed tunc non sequitur, quod sit infinitum actu, quia ad hoc, quod infinita sint *actu* scita a Deo, non oportet, quod sint *actu* infinita, sed sufficit, quod sint infinita *in potentia* in proprio genere.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut A est aequale Deo etc.; dicendum secundum distinctionem praedictam, quod primo modo est idem quod Deus; secundo modo est aliud a Deo, pro eo quod, licet habeat infinitatem *in potentia*, non tamen habet infinitatem *actualem*; Deus autem habet actualem.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de potentia faciendi et sciendi et de *velle* sicut et *facere*, patet responsio ex principali solutione[^p6-6].

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### Question I. *Whether the knowledge of Christ, insofar as he is the Word, actually extends to infinite things.*

The question is asked concerning the knowledge of Christ, insofar as he is the Word, whether it actually extends to infinite things[^p3-1]. And that it does is shown as follows:

1. First, by the *authority* of Augustine, *On the City of God* XII, chapter eighteen: "The infinity of number, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to him *of whose intelligence there is no number*."

2. Likewise, the same author, *On the City of God* XI, chapter ten[^p3-2], speaking of the wisdom of God, says thus: "Nor are there many, but there is one wisdom, in which there are certain infinite and, to it, finite treasures of intelligible things," etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown by *reasoning* as follows. The simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing[^p3-3]: therefore a substance which is infinitely more simple than any created substance knows infinitely more things than any creature: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, God actually comprehends both his own essence and his own power; but God can do infinite things: therefore if he actually knows the whole of his *being-able*, he actually comprehends infinite things: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, it belongs to nobility in a creature to know many things, and to a greater nobility still to know more[^p3-4]: therefore a knowledge which is of infinite nobility extends to infinite things: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, God knows more things than he can do, since he knows the evils of guilt, which he cannot do; but he can do infinite things: therefore he also knows more things than infinite things.

7. Likewise, whoever knows a point according to its substance and power knows it not only in itself, but also those things which can emanate from it; but infinite lines can emanate from one point: therefore if in any line whatever there are infinite points, and from any point whatever infinite lines can issue, and God comprehends the *being-able* of every creature[^p3-5]; therefore he not only knows infinite things, but even infinitely infinite things.

8. Likewise, whatever the human understanding understands in potency or has in potency, the divine understanding has in act and more besides, since the created can be equalled to the uncreated neither in act nor in potency; but the human understanding is capable of infinite things, since it never knows so many that it could not know more: therefore if the divine understanding is actually directed to more things than the human understanding is, it actually extends to more things[^p3-6] than infinite things.

9. Likewise, *by way of the impossible*: because, if God knew only finite things, then, since with respect to every finite thing something greater can be thought out, something could be thought greater than the divine knowledge[^p3-7]; but this cannot be: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, if he knew finite things, either he *could* know something beyond them, or *not*. If *not*, then his knowledge would be limited; if *so*, then — but one who can know something which he does not know is able to learn; which it is impious to say of God: therefore[^p3-8], etc.

11. Likewise, if he knew only those things which are[^p3-9], and not those which can come to be — then, since a created craftsman knows many things which he can make and never will

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make, a man would know something that lay hidden from God; but this is false and impossible: therefore, etc.

**Contra:** 1. Everything known is true, and everything true is a being[^p4-1]: therefore if infinite things are known, infinite things are beings; but the consequent is impossible: therefore so is the antecedent.

2. Likewise, whatever God knows he judges; but whatever things he judges are such as he judges them to be, and as many; and whatever God judges he takes as finite: therefore whatever he knows is finite. — *If you say* that it does not follow — because a thing is finite to God, therefore it is finite — *on the contrary*: each thing is in itself such as it is in the judgment of truth: therefore if something is finite to God, it is necessary that it be finite without qualification.

3. Likewise, everything infinite is untraversable both by the infinite and by the finite[^p4-2], since by whatever it were traversed it would receive a limit: therefore it would be finite; but whatever the divine understanding knows it comprehends and traverses: therefore if infinite things are untraversable, infinite things are unknowable.

4. Likewise, whatever God knows he knows distinctly; but whatever he distinguishes he numbers, and whatever things are numbered are measured, and all such things are finite[^p4-3]: therefore whatever things are known by God are finite.

5. Likewise, every number is either even or odd: therefore whatever things are numbered by God are numbered by an even or an odd number; but every even number is divisible into two equals, and likewise every odd number, once unity has been subtracted; but every such number is finite: therefore if God numbers whatever he knows, it is necessary that he number those things by a finite number: therefore they are finite: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, whatever God knows he knows in an ordered way; but wherever there is order, there is the account of a first and a last[^p4-4], which is the account of the finite: if therefore wherever there is the account of order there is the account of finitude, and God knows nothing without order, since he knows nothing in a disordered way — it is impossible that God should know infinite things.

7. Likewise, if God knows infinite things, then either things infinite *to himself*, or *to us*, or *in themselves*. If things infinite *to us*, this is nothing great to say, since those things are finite without qualification. If *to himself* — but whatever things are infinite to someone are not knowable by him nor comprehended by him: therefore if God knows infinite things, he does not comprehend infinite things. If things infinite *in themselves* — but a thing other than God, by the very fact that it is other, is a creature, and by the very fact that it is a creature, is limited[^p4-5]: therefore to know other things that are infinite is to know infinite finite things; which is false and unintelligible, since it implies a contradiction in itself.

8. Likewise, if God knows infinite things, then either infinite things in their cause, or in their proper genus. If infinite things in their cause — but everything which is in a cause is one[^p4-6]: therefore whatever things he knows as in a cause he knows after the manner of one, and therefore not after the manner of infinite things. If *infinite things in act and in their proper genus* — but to be infinite in act in one's proper genus is false and impossible: therefore it is false and impossible that God should know infinite things.

9. Likewise, let everything knowable by God be called A; then I ask thus: A is either God, or other than God. If it is God, then what is known by God is God: therefore an ass is God. If other than God, then every such thing is actually finite: therefore A is actually finite; and A names all knowable things: therefore all knowable things are finite: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, A is either *equal* to God, or *less*, or *greater*. If *less* than God, then it is finite; if *equal* or *greater*, then it is God: therefore if God knows infinite things, God knows nothing but God; and if he knows nothing but God, he does not know infinite things: therefore if he knows infinite things, he does not know infinite things.

11. Likewise, since there is in God a power of making and a power of knowing, and each is infinite, and the power of making always makes[^p4-7] finite things, it seems that the power of knowing always knows finite things in act; or if not, why not? This is to ask — since in God there is *willing*, *knowing* and *making*, and *willing* and *making* do not extend to infinite things — how *knowing* extends to infinite things, when the mean does not exceed the extremes.

> **Conclusion.** By the knowledge of simple intelligence God knows and comprehends infinite things.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, according to the ancient doctors, we are compelled to hold that God knows infinite things, since the Prophet David says in the Psalm[^p4-8]: *Great is our Lord, and great is his power, and of his wisdom there is no number*; and since Augustine not only asserts this but even proves it in *On the City of God* XII, chapter eighteen, where he says thus: "That, then, which certain men — namely the philosophers — say, that not even by God's knowledge can infinite things be comprehended: it remains for them to dare to say and to plunge themselves into this[^p4-9] abyss of impiety, namely

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that God does not know all numbers. That these are infinite is most certain, since in whatever number you should think a limit is to be set, that very number can — I do not say, be increased by the addition of one, but, however great it may be and however immense a multitude it may contain, in the very account and knowledge of numbers it can not only be doubled but even multiplied. Yet each number is so bounded by its own properties that none of them can be equal to any other: therefore they are unlike one another and diverse, and each single one of them is finite, and all of them are infinite. Is it then the case that God does not know all numbers on account of their infinity, and that the knowledge of God reaches up to a certain sum of numbers and is ignorant of the rest? Who, however demented, would say this?" And a little further down: "The infinity of number, therefore, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to him *of whose intelligence there is no number*[^p5-1]. Wherefore, if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the knower, then assuredly all infinity too is in some ineffable way finite to God, since it is not incomprehensible to his knowledge. And so, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God by which it is comprehended, who at last are we manikins, that we should presume to fix a limit to his knowledge?" — By these, therefore, as by the most certain witnesses, we are compelled to say or to hold that God knows infinite things.

But the manner of this position is assigned[^p5-2] by the more modern doctors, who said that the manner of divine cognition is threefold, not on account of any diversity in the divine knowledge *in itself*, but *in what it connotes*. For there is in God a cognition *of approval*, *of vision* and *of intelligence*. The cognition *of approval* is of good things only, and of finite things. The cognition *of vision* is of evil and of good things, but of finite ones, for the reason that it concerns time; for it is only of those things which have been, are, and will be. But the cognition *of intelligence* is of infinite things, for the reason that God understands not only future things but also possible ones; and possible things are not finite to God, but infinite[^p5-3].

But the ground of this position — that is, why we hold that God *knows* infinite things and does not *make* or *will* or *dispose* them — is that *divine knowing*, taken according to the third manner, is an *intrinsic* act of God. And I call it *intrinsic* not only because it comes about *from what is intrinsic*, but also because it is *toward what is intrinsic* and *through what is intrinsic* and *according to an intrinsic manner*. It is *toward what is intrinsic*, I say, because the divine gaze in knowing does not leap outside itself, but by looking upon itself as truth it knows all truth. — It is *through what is intrinsic*, because it is through the eternal reasons, which are the same as himself, that he knows whatever he knows[^p5-4]. — It is *according to an intrinsic manner*, because divine *knowing* abstracts not only from the account of an *actual cause*, but even from that of a *cause without qualification*. For he knows *evils*, of which he is not the cause; he knows also *future things*, which he does not yet make; he knows also *possible things*, which he never will make. And therefore, since *knowing* itself neither concerns nor connotes anything actual outside, therefore it denotes there an act *after the manner of a habit* — an act, I say, adequate to the power itself, for whatever God can know he knows — and it also denotes an *act* that is *in no way constricted*, neither as regards *itself* nor as regards *what it connotes*, and therefore one that is *universal* as regards *places*, as regards *times* and as regards *objects*. For whatever he knew anywhere he knows everywhere, and whatever he knows once he knows always, and as he knows one thing, so he knows all knowable things[^p5-5]. Hence, since knowable things are not only beings *in act* but also *in potency*, and since it is not unfitting to posit infinite things *in potency*, it is not unfitting to posit infinite things actually known by God. — And by this the answer to the question and to the objections is clear.

1. To that, then, which is objected — everything known is true, etc. — it must be said that knowledge is twofold, namely that which *causes things* and that which is *caused by things*. What is known by a knowledge caused by things is true in *itself* and in *effect*; but what is known by a knowledge causing things is true in its *cause* and in *potency*, and that truth does not entail a being in act, but a being in the potency of the cause; and therefore from this it does not follow that, if God knows infinite things, infinite things are beings, but rather that infinite things are possible to God.

2. To that which is objected, that God judges whatever he knows, etc., it must be said that God, in knowing infinite things, judges them *infinite without qualification*, but *finite to himself*; and this is not unfitting. For just as it does not follow that, if something is infinite *to a finite thing*, it is infinite *without qualification*, so it does not follow that, if something is finite *to an infinite thing*, it is finite *without qualification*; and this is what Augustine says in the authority set out above[^p5-6].

3. To that which is objected, that everything infinite is untraversable, etc., it must be said that *traversable* is said in two ways: in one way after a discursive manner, from one thing to another; and in this way the aforesaid statement holds true, and thus the Philosopher understands it in *Physics* VI[^p5-7]; in another way, by a universal and full intuition of that which is known by the intelligence; and in this way the infinite, since it is not incomprehensible to the infinite, is not untraversable to it, but only to the finite.

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4. To that which is objected, that whatever he knows and knows distinctly he knows, etc., it must be said that that consequence fails in this, that it says: whatever he distinguishes he numbers; because *to distinguish* extends to more[^p6-1] than *to number*. — Or say that whatever he distinguishes he numbers by a finite or an infinite number; but then it does not follow that he measures, since measure states only something finite.

5. To that which is objected — if he numbers, then either by an even or an odd number, etc. — it must be said that that consequence does not hold, for the reason that an infinite number comprehends both; hence, just as this consequence does not hold — man and ass are animals, therefore they are rational or irrational — so neither does the aforesaid one.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever God knows he knows in an ordered way, etc., it must be said that divine cognition has a relation both to the *knower* and to the *known*; by relation to the *knower*, whatever he knows he knows all at once, just as all at once and at one stroke he says whatever he says[^p6-2]; but by relation to the *known*, I say that he knows in an *ordered* way; yet just as what is known by God is not only present but also future and possible, so too that *order* is not only an *actual* order but also a *potential* one, since he knows things in an ordered way not only by the order which has been made, but also by the order which he can make. — As to what is said, then, that every order has a first and a last: this is true of *actual* order, not of *potential* order; as is clear in numbers, which have infinity and are nevertheless ordered; for they have a possible order, just as they have infinity.

7. To that which is objected — either he knows things infinite to us, etc. — it must be said that he knows infinite things *in themselves*, not indeed infinite *in act*, but *in potency*; and those things which are in potency are actually known by God. Hence a potential infinity in the things known suffices for the actual infinity of the divine comprehension; therefore, just as infinity *in potency*[^p6-3] is not repugnant to actual finitude in a creature, so neither is the *actual* infinity of the divine cognition repugnant to the finitude of the creature.

8. To that which is objected — either he knows infinite things in their cause, etc. — it must be said that it is in both ways. — And *if you object* that in the cause they are one, this is of no force, since, although the art and the power be one, nevertheless the accounts of the things to be known are many[^p6-4]. — If *you object* that in their proper genus they are finite, this is true according to the *being* which they have; but nevertheless according to the *being* which they can have, they are at least infinite *in potency*, and thus infinite things are known by God, since, as has often been said, those things which are *in potency* are *in act* known by God.

9. To that which is objected — A is either God or other than God, etc. — it must be said that *what is known by God* sometimes names the very *account of knowing*, and sometimes the *thing known outside*. In the first way it is God, since, as Anselm says in the *Monologion*[^p6-5], "the creature in the Creator is creating essence." But in the second way it is other than God; yet then it does not follow that it is infinite in act, because for infinite things to be *actually* known by God it is not required that they be *actually* infinite, but it suffices that they be infinite *in potency* in their proper genus.

10. To that which is objected — either A is equal to God, etc. — it must be said, according to the aforesaid distinction, that in the first way it is the same as God; in the second way it is other than God, for the reason that, although it has infinity *in potency*, it does not on that account have *actual* infinity; whereas God has actual infinity.

11. To that which is objected last, concerning the power of making and of knowing and concerning *willing* as also *making*, the answer is clear from the principal solution[^p6-6].

---

la: De scientia Christi in genere cfr. III. Sent. d. 14; de hac vero quaestione I. Sent. d. 35. q. 5, d. 39. a. 1. q. 1-3, d. 43. q. 1-4, et infra Quaest. disp. de Trin. q. 6. a. 1. — Haec quaestio deest in cod. C.

en: On the knowledge of Christ in general compare III *Sentences,* d. 14; but on this question in particular, I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 5; d. 39, a. 1, qq. 1–3; d. 43, qq. 1–4; and below, *Disputed Questions on the Trinity,* q. 6, a. 1. — This question is missing in codex C.

la: Num. 3, ubi textus originalis *immensi quidam atque infiniti* pro *infinita quaedam eique finiti*. Idem locus occurrit infra q. 2. in corp., ubi nostri codd. fere omnes idem repetunt. Eadem lectio a Maurinis in nota adiecta refertur.

en: Number 3, where the original text has *immensi quidam atque infiniti* in place of *infinita quaedam eique finiti*. The same passage occurs below in q. 2, in the body, where nearly all our codices repeat the same thing. The same reading is reported by the Maurists in an appended note.

la: Cfr. tom. III. pag. 314, nota 4. — Infra pro *in infinitum* D E H bis *infinita*, et pro *creatura* G *substantia creata*.

en: Compare tome III, p. 314, note 4. — Below, in place of *in infinitum*, D E H twice have *infinita*, and in place of *creatura*, G has *substantia creata*.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2, sapientis est *omnia*, ut possibile est, scire.

en: According to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, c. 2, it belongs to the wise man to know *all things*, so far as is possible.

la: D H *omnis creati plenarie*.

en: D H have *omnis creati plenarie*.

la: Pro *ad plura* F *ergo scit plura actu*. Superius pro *ergo si intellectus divinus* B *ergo intellectus divinus, qui*. Fortasse post *intellectus humanus* excidit *potentia*.

en: In place of *ad plura*, F has *ergo scit plura actu*. Above, in place of *ergo si intellectus divinus*, B has *ergo intellectus divinus, qui*. Perhaps *potentia* has dropped out after *intellectus humanus*.

la: F *sapientia* (Ps. 146, 5: Sapientiae eius non est numerus).

en: F has *sapientia* (Ps. 146:5: *of his wisdom there is no number*).

la: D H *potest addiscere: ergo Deus posset addiscere; quod falsum est.*

en: D H have *potest addiscere: ergo Deus posset addiscere; quod falsum est* ("he is able to learn: therefore God could learn; which is false").

la: D H *quae fiunt*. Inferius pro *sed* F *quodsi*.

en: D H have *quae fiunt*. Below, in place of *sed*, F has *quodsi*.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 685, nota 7. et pag. 690, nota 2. verba August. et Aristot.

en: See tome I, p. 685, note 7, and p. 690, note 2, the words of Augustine and Aristotle.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 21, nota 6. — Inferius pro *esset finitum* F *esse finitum*, et pro *sunt incognoscibilia* substituit *non sunt cognoscibilia*.

en: Compare tome II, p. 21, note 6. — Below, in place of *esset finitum*, F has *esse finitum*, and for *sunt incognoscibilia* it substitutes *non sunt cognoscibilia*.

la: Secundum Aristot., V. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.), et X. Metaph. text. 2-5. (IX. c. 1.). — D pro *distinguit* habet *distincte cognoscit*, deinde legit *et quaecumque mensurantur sunt finita*.

en: According to Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 24 (c. 3), and *Metaphysics* X, texts 2–5 (IX, c. 1). — In place of *distinguit*, D has *distincte cognoscit*, and then reads *et quaecumque mensurantur sunt finita*.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 21, nota 3. — Immediate post pro *quae* D H *sed ubi est hoc, ibi*.

en: See tome II, p. 21, note 3. — Immediately after, in place of *quae*, D H have *sed ubi est hoc, ibi*.

la: F addit *et hoc ipso est finita*, et mox vocibus *finita infinita* D H interserunt *et*.

en: F adds *et hoc ipso est finita*, and presently D H insert *et* between the words *finita infinita*.

la: Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. 12. — Immediate post pro *ergo quaecumque* D H *ergo qui*. Subinde post *sed esse infinita actu* G addit *et*.

en: Compare the *Book of Causes,* proposition 12. — Immediately after, in place of *ergo quaecumque*, D H have *ergo qui*. Presently, after *sed esse infinita actu*, G adds *et*.

la: D H supplent *actu*.

en: D H supply *actu*.

la: Pro *atque huic* A B E G *aut huic*. Inferius pro *ponendum* textus originalis *faciendum*, et *quamlibet* pro *quantumlibet*. Voci *multitudinem* A B E F praefigunt *magnitudinem vel*. In fine textus post *Quis hoc* B G habent *nisi* pro *vel*.

en: In place of *atque huic*, A B E G have *aut huic*. Below, in place of *ponendum*, the original text has *faciendum*, and *quamlibet* for *quantumlibet*. Before the word *multitudinem*, A B E F prefix *magnitudinem vel*. At the end of the text, after *Quis hoc*, B G have *nisi* in place of *vel*.

la: Psalm. 146, 5. Pro *intelligentiae* H *scientiae*, Vulgata *sapientiae*. — Inferius pro *qui tandem* D E H *quid tandem*.

en: Psalm 146:5. In place of *intelligentiae*, H has *scientiae*, the Vulgate *sapientiae*. — Below, in place of *qui tandem*, D E H have *quid tandem*.

la: D H *assignatus est*. Subinde pro *moderniores* A H *modernos*.

en: D H have *assignatus est*. Presently, in place of *moderniores*, A H have *modernos*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. et III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Ante *Deo* codd., exceptis D H, addunt *a*.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, and III *Sentences,* d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — Before *Deo* the codices, except D H, add *a*.

la: Vide infra q. 2. De seqq. cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.

en: See below, q. 2. On what follows compare I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 1.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. — Superius post *connotat* B legit *aliquid actuale exterius in Deo, dicit ibi* etc; D H omittunt primum *ideo*.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 45, a. 1, q. 2. — Above, after *connotat*, B reads *aliquid actuale exterius in Deo, dicit ibi*, etc.; D H omit the first *ideo*.

la: In principio corp. — Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 15. et I. Sent. d. 35. q. 5. ad 1.

en: At the beginning of the body. — Compare Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions,* q. 15, and I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 5, ad 1.

la: Text. 19. seqq. et text. 60. seqq. (c. 2. et 7.).

en: Text 19 and following, and text 60 and following (cc. 2 and 7).

la: De hac Aristot. dictione cfr. tom. I. pag. 348, nota 5. — Superius post *quod quaecumque* D supplet *Deus*.

en: On this Aristotelian expression compare tome I, p. 348, note 5. — Above, after *quod quaecumque*, D supplies *Deus*.

la: Psalm. 61, 12: Semel locutus est Deus; cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2. explicatio huius verbi.

en: Psalm 61:12: *God hath spoken once*; compare I *Sentences,* d. 27, p. II, q. 2, for the explanation of this word.

la: D H *infinitas potentialis*.

en: D H have *infinitas potentialis*.

la: Vide infra q. 3.

en: See below, q. 3.

la: Cap. 34. et 36. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 623, nota 3. — In fine solut. verbis *in proprio genere* B praemittit *vel*.

en: Chapters 34 and 36. For the words see tome I, p. 623, note 3. — At the end of the solution, before the words *in proprio genere*, B prefixes *vel*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 45, a. 1, q. 2, at the end. ---

translators_notes:
**THIS IS THE WORK'S FIRST CHUNK, and the first *quaestio disputata* in Vol V.** The Sentences quaestio conventions port essentially entire — *Quaeritur…* opener, numbered affirmative arguments, a `CONTRA:` series, the full-measure small-cap `CONCLUSIO.` rendered as a `> **Conclusio.**` blockquote, `RESPONDEO:`, and the numbered replies — exactly as the mini-pilot froze them. `vol1/bon-sent-I-d1-a1-q1.md` was the shape followed.

**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi plate of pp. 3–6 (`extract-pages.py --volume vol5 --pages 4-5 --dpi 450`; pp. 3 and 6 were already on disk from the pilot). Page size verified at 2571×3823 for all four leaves. Read via `colcrop.py` column bands at 1.8× (each band re-read at the displayed 1.3–1.5×), plus thresholded targeted crops at 2–3× for the p. 5 right margin. English translated fresh and literally against the corrected Latin. The Psalm 146:5 quotation in the *Respondeo* is on the Douay-Rheims base, which matches Quaracchi's Latin word for word.

**⭐ BOUNDARY AT p. 6 RE-DERIVED, AND IT FORWARDS — confirmed, not adopted.** The pilot's measurement was re-taken independently on the plate rather than carried over. p. 6 is shared: Q. I's replies 4–11 fill both columns down to ~62 % of the leaf; `QUAESTIO II.` then stands full-measure across the leaf with its italic subtitle *Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines rerum, an per earum essentiam.*; and **Q. II's own numbered body begins on the same leaf** (*Supposito, quod Deus cognoscat infinita, quaeritur…*, then arguments 1 and 2, the second running to the foot of the right column). By the p. 498 rule — a shared page forwards only when the incoming unit's numbered *body* reaches it — **p. 6 FORWARDS.** The leaf's nine footnotes split by anchor exactly as predicted: **nn. 1–6 are Q. I's** (n. 1 → reply 4's *in plus*¹; n. 2 → reply 6's *quidquid dicit*²; n. 3 → reply 7's *in potentia*³; n. 4 → reply 8's *cognoscendarum*⁴; n. 5 → reply 9's *Monologio*⁵; n. 6 → reply 11's *solutione*⁶) and **nn. 7–9 are Q. II's** (n. 7 answers Q. II's opening *essentiam*⁷). This chunk closes its register at **p. 6 n. 6**; `bon-qsc-q2` opens at n. 7.

**⛔ The other five boundaries (pp. 10, 17, 27, 32, 37) remain UNMEASURED.** One measurement licenses nothing — *De decem praeceptis* answered "no" at its first boundary and "yes" at five under the same test. Re-ask the p. 498 rule on the plate at each.

**`QUAESTIO I.` carries no apparatus anchor, and the italic subtitle is unanchored too** — re-read here at the column band and confirmed. ⭐ Note what the plate does carry: **p. 3 n. 1 is a note of exactly the Hexaemeron's kind** (it surveys the parallel Sentences questions and records *Haec quaestio deest in cod. C.*), **but it is anchored in the BODY**, at the opening sentence's *ad infinita*¹. The presence of such a note is not evidence of an anchored heading — the fourth work running to answer this way.

**No `SUMMARIUM`, no scholion, no articuli** — all three confirmed on this chunk's own leaves, as the pilot had them negatively on the band.

**Gutter, measured per leaf; the parity model was not used as a predictor.**
- **p. 3: ADOPT 1130.** The pilot's figure, re-derived: `colcrop.py vol5 3` returns 1103 on an **8 px** run — the work-opening failure, the `QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE` / `DE SCIENTIA CHRISTI` display stack crossing the gutter. Profiling rows 0.34–0.62 gives eleven windows at 1129 on 58–59 px runs, band 1100–1160 (61 px), centre-rule island 1129–1133 (peak 447).
- **p. 4: 1417.** Clean whole-page profile; twenty-four windows, twenty-one agreeing at 1415–1417 on 55–58 px runs, band 1389–1445 (57 px), rule island 1412–1421 (peak 222). Three outliers (1311–1459 on 144–441 px runs) discounted as the standard blow-out signal.
- **p. 5: 1152.** The tightest reading of the four: all twenty-four windows agree at 1151–1154 on 51–58 px runs, band 1126–1177 (52 px), rule island 1146–1160 (peak 360). ⚠ It sits ~265 px from p. 4's and ~270 px from p. 6's, which reads as an anomaly if you are still predicting from parity; it is not one. Each leaf was profiled on its own low-ink run, per the frozen rule, and each returned an independently sound consensus.
- **p. 6: ADOPT 1424 — the default is WRONG here and loudly so.** `colcrop.py vol5 6` returns 1398 on a **2 px** run, and the default 0.45–0.92 body window splits into two failure modes at once: fourteen windows at 1398/2 px (far below the sound 58–64 px band) and ten at ~1242/315 px (far above it). Both are nonsense, and for the reason the rule names: the full-measure `QUAESTIO II.` heading and subtitle sit mid-leaf, inside the default body window. Re-profiling **rows 0.20–0.50** — Q. I's own region, above the heading — resolves it completely: fifteen windows, spread 1423–1424 (**1 px**), runs 59–61 px, band 1394–1453 (60 px), rule island 1421–1425 (peak 782). The lower region (rows 0.62–0.88) is still contaminated by Q. II's short opening block, but its band midpoint of 1425 corroborates. **This is a fresh instance of the "display heading wrecks the body window" rule, now attested at a mid-leaf work-unit opening as well as at a leaf-top work opening.**

**Digits — five OCR digit defects caught on the plate, all in the apparatus.** The raw djvu OCR is unusually clean in this band, which makes its digit errors correspondingly easy to trust by mistake. Every one of these was corrected against the 450 dpi plate: p. 3 n. 1 raw `III. Sent. j. U` → **d. 14**; p. 4 n. 1 raw `pag. 683` → **pag. 685**; p. 4 n. 3 raw `text. 2-3. (I.V. c. 1.)` → **text. 2-5. (IX. c. 1.)**; p. 4 n. 8 raw `Psalm. 146, 3` → **146, 5**; p. 5 n. 5 raw `d. 43. a. 1. q. 2` → **d. 45. a. 1. q. 2**. ⭐ **This is the Vol I cross-reference digit-defect class showing up in Vol V's apparatus, and the plate is the only control that catches it** — do not trust a `pag. N, nota M` or a `d. N. a. M. q. K` in this work from the OCR alone.

**⚠ A defective marginale on p. 5, resolved on the plate, not guessed.** At reply 3 the right margin prints only **`tinctio.`** — the line above it is blank paper at full threshold (verified by an autocontrasted, binarised 3× crop of rows 0.615–0.685, which shows the margin empty above the word). The word is transcribed here as **Distinctio.**: `tinctio` is not a Latin word, the same marginale prints in full as `Distinctio.` on the very next leaf at reply 9, and the content matches (reply 3 draws the twofold distinction on *pertransibile*). This is a defective impression, not an ambiguous reading, so it is recorded here rather than carried as a `[?]` flag.

**⚠ No footnote runs over a page boundary or the gutter anywhere in this span.** All thirty-one entries open and close inside the block they begin in. p. 4 n. 9 is the one that looks like a runover and is not: its lemma (*ponendum*, *quamlibet*, *multitudinem*, *Quis hoc*) is drawn from the Augustine quotation that continues onto p. 5, but the note itself stands whole in p. 4's register.

**Register.**
- ***intellectus* → understanding · *intelligentia* → intelligence — the rule was under its predicted maximum pressure here, and it PAID.** p. 3 ¶ 8 sets *intellectus humanus* against *intellectus divinus* four times in a single argument; the rule holds those together as "human understanding" / "divine understanding" without once reaching for "intellect." The *Respondeo*'s threefold division — *cognitio approbationis, visionis et intelligentiae* — then lands on the received scholastic English of its own accord: *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* → **"the knowledge of simple intelligence,"** the very phrase the printed Conclusio uses. **No departure was taken, and the ratified narrow exception was not reached for.**
- **ONE disclosed cost site, and it is the Augustine quotation.** *cuius intelligentiae non est numerus* is rendered "of whose intelligence there is no number" at both its occurrences (p. 3 ¶ 1 and the *Respondeo* on pp. 4–5). The idiomatic English of Augustine's sentence is "understanding"; the received English of the Psalm behind it is "wisdom" — and Quaracchi's own p. 5 n. 1 says exactly this, that H reads *scientiae* and the Vulgate *sapientiae*. The rule was followed rather than reopened. ⭐ **This is a cleaner cost site than the *praeceptis* ones**, because here the apparatus itself names the three-way variation the rule is standing on top of; offered to the work-close gate on that footing.
- ***ratio* → account / ground / formal character (context-dependent), per the standing table.** Exercised heavily and consistently: *ratio primi et ultimi* → "the account of a first and a last" (p. 4 CONTRA 6, where *ratio* recurs four times in three lines and the single English word carries all four); *rationes aeternas* → "the eternal reasons" (the fixed Bonaventurean term, kept); *rationem cognoscendi* → "the account of knowing"; *rationes rerum cognoscendarum* → "the accounts of the things to be known"; and *per rationem* in p. 3 ¶ 3, where the argument-type marker is "by reasoning." No new rule proposed.
- ***posse* substantivised** (p. 3 ¶¶ 4 and 7, *totum suum posse* / *posse omnis creaturae*, italic in the print) → "his being-able" / "the being-able of every creature," preserving the print's italic and the substantive force. Not a table entry; recorded so the next QD chunk does not re-decide it.
- ***vacatio* / *quies* — NOT TESTED, and by measurement, not by oversight.** The pilot measured this on the whole band: *vacatio*/*vacare*/*vacat* occur **zero** times in pp. 3–43, and *quies*'s two hits are the verb *quiescat*. Neither family occurs in this chunk. **The question carries forward untested into a second work; no chunk in this work has to re-ask it.**

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention, listed here in body order):
p. 3 — Fundamenta.
p. 4 — Ad oppositum. · Conclusio 1.
p. 5 — Modus triplex cognitionis. · Conclusio 2. · Ratio pro solut. 11. arg. ad oppos. · Explicatio. · Notandum. · Distinctio. *(printed defectively as `tinctio.` — see above)*
p. 6 — Aliter. · Comparatio duplex. · Notandum. · Distinctio.

They are dense here, as the pilot said — eleven across four leaves, and the raw splices them mid-word (`Fmdamenta.Civitate` at p. 3 ¶ 1, `Noiandam.` at p. 5, `'inciio` at p. 5). Every one was read off the plate, not off the OCR.

**Apparatus count: 31 entries** — p. 3 nine (nn. 1–9) · p. 4 nine (nn. 1–9) · p. 5 seven (nn. 1–7) · p. 6 six (nn. 1–6, the leaf's nn. 7–9 forwarded to `bon-qsc-q2`). The pilot's counts for pp. 3 and 6 (nine each) are confirmed exactly; p. 4's nine and p. 5's seven are new. At ~7.75 entries per leaf this chunk sits just under the pilot's ~9/page planning figure — which is a planning figure only, not a defect threshold.

**Registry.** `WORKS["scientia-christi"]` goes in with this chunk (book 8, tome 5, `divisionLabel: "Quaestiones"`, `divisions` seeded with division 1 only), together with a new branch in `buildWorkChunkTitle` returning `Quaest. ${meta.division}` for the QD slugs, beside the existing `Coll. ${meta.division}` branch. Each later chunk adds its own `divisions` line after verifying the printed subtitle in place word for word. Division 1's title was verified in place against the italic subtitle on p. 3.

**Cadence: TWO gates for this work.** ▶ A **shakedown gate at the close of `bon-qsc-q4` (p. 27, 24 pp. in)** — the trigger fires because this is a new genre in Vol V and has not fired since the Hexaemeron — then the **work-close gate at p. 43**. **Deploy boundary = work close**, not before. ⚠ `bon-qsc-q4` (pp. 17–27, 11 printed pp.) is the largest single chunk Vol V has attempted and is **not** to be split; build it with the small-incremental-append content-filter discipline from the start. **Plates per quaestio, never in bulk.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0