title: Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum hoc nomen persona sit vere commune personis increatis.

title_alt: Whether this name 'person' is truly common to the uncreated persons

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II. *De communitate nominis persona.*

Secundo quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de communitate huius nominis *persona*. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *persona* sit vere commune personis increatis. Secundo, utrum sit commune univocum personis creatis et increatis.

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### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomen persona sit commune personis increatis.*

Quod autem sit vere commune personis increatis, ostenditur:

1. Per Augustinum septimo *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Ideo, inquit, dicuntur tres personae, quia commune est eis quod est persona»; sed constat, quod ad plurificationem non sufficit communitas nominis solum: ergo vere est commune secundum rem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omne nomen, quod recipit supra se signum distributivum, est vere commune ad illa, in quae distribuitur[^2]; sed tale est hoc nomen *persona*: ergo est commune ad tres. Dicitur enim convenienter: *quaelibet persona refertur*.

3. Item, omne quod secundum idem nomen et secundum eandem rationem dicitur de pluribus, est vere commune ad illa; sed *persona* est huiusmodi, quia secundum idem nomen[^3] et eandem rationem, scilicet praeassignatam, dicitur de tribus: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum dico: *Pater est persona*, hoc nomen *persona* praedicatur, aut ergo tanquam ens de ratione Patris, aut tanquam accidentale[^4]. Constat quod non tanquam accidentale: ergo tanquam ens de ratione Patris. Aut ergo dicit totum quod est Pater, aut non; si totum, ergo sicut *pater* praedicatur de solo Patre, ita et *persona*; quod falsum est. Ergo non dicit totum, ergo *in plus* est hoc quod est *persona* quam *pater*, et *in plus*[^5], quod est de ratione Patris, et similiter de ratione Filii: ergo est vere commune.

**Contra:**

1. Omne commune ad aliqua, quod numeratur in illis, est vere universale ad illa, maxime si non dicitur accidentaliter de illis. Hoc patet, quia Augustinus dicebat supra, distinctione decima nona[^6], quod non ob aliud essentia non est universale, nisi quod non numeratur in singularibus. Si ergo *persona* est commune ad tres, et ulterius numeratur sive plurificatur in illis: ergo est universale, ergo in divinis est ponere universale; quod est contra praedeterminata et contra Augustinum[^7], qui vult, quod in divinis non sit universale nec particulare.

2. Item, nihil est commune, quod de sui ratione et nomine privat communitatem; sed *persona* dicit individuum sive incommunicabile de ratione sui nominis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam et est commune, dicitur secundum substantiam communem; sed nihil quod dicitur secundum substantiam communem, plurificatur: ergo *persona* non plurificatur. Sed constat quod plurificatur, et tamen dicitur secundum substantiam: ergo non dicit quid commune.

4. Item, si dicit quid commune, aut nominis tantum, aut nominis et rationis tantum, aut nominis et rationis et rei. Si tantum nominis: ergo est aequivocum[^8], ergo non est commune. Si tantum nominis et rationis, ita quod nihil est commune in re: ergo est vanitas solum. Si vero nominis et rationis et rei; sed communitas realis, ut vult Damascenus[^9], non est nisi communitas substantiae et naturae, et haec nullo modo plurificatur: ergo hoc nomen *persona* nullo modo potest esse commune.

> **Conclusio.** *Nomen personae est commune personis increatis, sed alia communitate quam ea, qua essentia ipsis est communis.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod *persona* absque dubio est communis tribus, et essentia communis; sed tamen alius modus communitatis est in essentia et persona. Et huius signum est, quia plurificatur persona, non essentia.

Differentia autem harum[^10] communitatum differenter accipitur a diversis. *(Opinio 1.)* Quidam enim dicunt, scilicet secundum positionem, et secundum privationem: secundum positionem, ut *animal* est[^11] commune ad hominem et asinum; secundum privatio-

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nem vero, ut *non-animal* est commune ad lapidem et ad lignum. Et dicunt, quod communitas secundum positionem est in natura et essentia et in nomine hoc significante; communitas vero secundum privationem est in persona, quia dicitur *persona* quasi incommunicabilis, id est secundum privationem communitatis.

*(Opinio 2.)* Alii dicunt, quod duplex est communitas: quaedam secundum unitatem naturae absolutae, quaedam secundum similitudinem habitudinis comparatae. Communitas secundum unitatem naturae absolutae est *humanitas*[^12] respectu Petri et Pauli, quia una natura universalis reperitur in utrisque. Communitas vero secundum similitudinem habitudinis relatae est illa quae attenditur in consimili comparatione[^13], sicut modus regendi communis est nautae ad regendam navem, et doctoris ad regendas scholas, quia uterque debet esse non sorte, sed arte peritus. Et primus quidem modus attenditur in essentia, secundus vero attenditur in persona. Nam *persona* dicitur quasi proprietate distincta; et ita dicit habitudinem ad proprietatem, quae consimilis est in qualibet personarum. Non[^14] dicit, quantum est de se, unam formam naturalem nisi in obliquo; sed essentia vel substantia dicit formam et naturam absolutam, in qua communicant.

*(Opinio 3.)* Alii dicunt tertio modo, quod duplex est communitas, rei scilicet et rationis: rei, sicut universale ad singularia, rationis vero, sicut aliqua intentio accepta ab anima secundum consimilem modum accipiendi; et sic hoc nomen *individuum* est commune secundum rationem ad Petrum et Paulum. Primo modo dicunt essentiam esse communem; secundo modo dicunt esse communem personam, quia hoc dicit *persona* in divinis, quod *individuum* in creaturis.

*(Iudicium auctoris.)* Omnes autem isti modi dicendi, si diligentius attendamus, convenientes sunt, et sumti sunt ex significatione huius nominis quod est *persona*, sive ex distinctione[^15]. Persona enim dicit incommunicabile secundum rationem; et hoc dicit privationem communitatis. Persona ulterius, quia incommunicabilitatem habet ratione eius quod subest proprietati distinguenti, dicit habitudinem ad proprietatem, sicut per nomen *hypostasis*. Rursus, ex his habetur, quod *persona* ponit circa suppositum, de quo dicitur, intentionem subiiciendi, et non praedicandi de pluribus. Et ita patet, quod de ratione sui nominis importat privationem communitatis, similitudinem habitudinis[^16] et intentionem rationis. Et quia communitas eius accipitur secundum rationem nominis, ideo importat communitatem secundum privationem, et proportionem sive analogiam, et rationem. — Tamen inter omnes hos modos medius magis accedit ad naturam rei, quia revera privatio illa in persona magis est positio quam privatio. Et rursus, nominis intentio fundamentum et radicem habet in re.

Concedendae[^17] ergo sunt rationes, quod *persona* dicit commune in divinis.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)* 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod plurificatur; iam patet responsio: quia universale dicit communitatem secundum positionem et secundum unitatem naturae et secundum rem, non solum secundum rationem; et quoniam *persona* hoc modo non importat communitatem, ideo non est universale. — *(Alia ratio.)* Nihilominus tamen ratio non valet, quia universale plurificatur, ita quod vere numeratur propter veram additionem, per quam contrahitur ad individuum; sed haec persona non addit supra personam, quoniam, ut praedictum est[^18], non est distinctio in divinis per additionem, sed per originem: ideo *persona* nec vere numeratur, nec trahitur in partem illo modo, quo universale.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod privat communitatem; dicendum, quod illud quod privat communitatem, non est commune secundum illam communitatem, quam privat; sed *persona* privat communitatem rei, sed non communitatem rationis; et secundum illam non est communis, sed secundum communitatem rationis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est commune et dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur secundum substantiam[^19] communem; dicendum, quod hic est accidens, sicut hic: *iste est albus, et est monachus, ergo est albus monachus*; quia aliam rationem denominandi importat iste terminus *albus* in praemissa et in conclusione. Sic recte dicendum de hoc ter-

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mino *commune*, quia prius secundum habitudinem, secundo secundum naturae unitatem accipitur.

4. Quod quaeritur: aut est communitas rei, aut rationis, aut nominis; dicendum, quod omnibus his modis; sed communitas realis duplex est, sicut visum est, scilicet secundum naturae unitatem[^20], et secundum similem habitudinem; et primo modo loquitur Damascenus, et ideo patent cetera.

english:
### ARTICLE II. *On the commonness of the name "person."*

Secondly inquiry is made concerning the second article, namely concerning the commonness of this name *persona*. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether this name *persona* is truly common to the uncreated persons. Secondly, whether it is a univocal common [name] for created and uncreated persons.

### QUESTION I. *Whether the name "person" is common to the uncreated persons.*

That it is truly common to the uncreated persons is shown thus:

1. Through Augustine in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*[^1]: «Therefore, he says, three persons are spoken of, because that which is *person* is common to them»; but it is established that for plurification the commonness of name alone does not suffice: therefore it is truly common according to the thing itself.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reason, since every name which receives upon itself a distributive sign is truly common to those into which it is distributed[^2]; but such is this name *persona*: therefore it is common to the three. For it is fittingly said: *every person is referred*.

3. Likewise, every [name] which is said of many according to the same name and according to the same account is truly common to them; but *persona* is of this kind, since according to the same name[^3] and the same account, namely the previously assigned one, it is said of the three: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when I say: *the Father is a person*, this name *persona* is predicated either as a being belonging to the account of the Father, or as something accidental[^4]. It is established that not as accidental: therefore as a being belonging to the account of the Father. Either, then, it expresses the whole of what the Father is, or not; if the whole, then just as *father* is predicated of the Father alone, so also *person*; which is false. Therefore it does not express the whole, therefore *in plus* [extending further] is that which is *person* than *father*, and *in plus*[^5], that which is of the account of the Father, and likewise of the account of the Son: therefore it is truly common.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every common [name] for some things, which is numbered in them, is truly universal for them, especially if it is not said accidentally of them. This is plain, since Augustine said above, in the nineteenth distinction[^6], that essence is not universal for no other reason than that it is not numbered in the singulars. If therefore *person* is common to the three, and further is numbered or plurified in them: therefore it is universal, therefore in the divine one must posit a universal; which is against what has been determined and against Augustine[^7], who holds that in the divine there is neither universal nor particular.

2. Likewise, nothing is common which from its own account and name removes commonness; but *persona* expresses the individual or the incommunicable from the account of its name: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every [name] which is said according to substance and is common is said according to a common substance; but nothing which is said according to a common substance is plurified: therefore *persona* is not plurified. But it is established that it is plurified, and yet it is said according to substance: therefore it does not express something common.

4. Likewise, if it expresses something common, [it does so] either of name only, or of name and account only, or of name and account and thing. If of name only: therefore it is equivocal[^8], therefore it is not common. If [only] of name and account, such that nothing is common in the thing: therefore it is sheer emptiness. But if of name and account and thing; yet real commonness, as Damascene[^9] holds, is nothing other than commonness of substance and nature, and this is in no way plurified: therefore this name *persona* can in no way be common.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "person" is common to the uncreated persons, but by another commonness than that by which the essence is common to them.*

**I respond:** It must be said for understanding what has been set forth that *persona* without doubt is common to the three, and the essence [is] common; but nevertheless there is another mode of commonness in essence and in person. And the sign of this is that the person is plurified, [but] not the essence.

But the difference of these[^10] commonnesses is taken differently by different [authors]. *(Opinion 1.)* For some say [that there are two kinds of commonness], namely according to position and according to privation: according to position, as *animal* is[^11] common to man and ass; according to priva-

tion indeed, as *non-animal* is common to stone and to wood. And they say that commonness according to position is in nature and essence and in the name signifying this; but commonness according to privation is in person, since *persona* is said as it were [to mean] incommunicable, that is, according to a privation of commonness.

*(Opinion 2.)* Others say that commonness is twofold: one according to the unity of an absolute nature, another according to the likeness of a compared relation. Commonness according to the unity of an absolute nature is *humanity*[^12] with respect to Peter and Paul, since one universal nature is found in both. But commonness according to the likeness of a related relation is that which is observed in a similar comparison[^13], as the mode of governing is common to the sailor in steering a ship, and to the teacher in directing schools, since each ought to be skilled not by chance but by art. And the first mode indeed is observed in the essence, but the second is observed in the person. For *persona* is said as it were [to be] distinct by a property; and so it expresses a relation to a property, which is similar in any of the persons. It does not[^14], so far as it is in itself, express one natural form except obliquely; but essence or substance expresses a form and an absolute nature in which they communicate.

*(Opinion 3.)* Others say in a third way that commonness is twofold, namely of thing and of account: of thing, as the universal [is common] to the singulars; of account indeed, as some intention received by the soul according to a similar mode of receiving; and thus this name *individual* is common according to account to Peter and Paul. In the first mode they say the essence to be common; in the second mode they say the person to be common, since this *persona* expresses in the divine, what *individual* [expresses] in creatures.

*(The author's judgment.)* Now all these modes of speaking, if we attend more diligently, are convergent, and are taken from the signification of this name which is *persona*, or from distinction[^15]. For *persona* expresses the incommunicable according to account; and this expresses a privation of commonness. Furthermore *persona*, since it has incommunicability by reason of that which underlies a distinguishing property, expresses a relation to a property, as does the name *hypostasis*. Again, from these things it is had that *persona* sets about the supposit, of which it is said, the intention of subjecting [it] and not of predicating it of many. And thus it is plain that from the account of its name it imports a privation of commonness, a likeness of relation[^16], and the intention of account [or: a notional intention]. And since its commonness is taken according to the account of the name, therefore it imports commonness according to privation, and proportion or analogy, and account. — Yet among all these modes the middle one approaches more closely to the nature of the thing, since in truth that privation in person is more a position than a privation. And again, the intention of the name has its foundation and root in the thing.

Therefore the reasonings[^17] are to be conceded, that *persona* expresses something common in the divine.

*(Solution to the opposed [arguments].)* 1. To that, then, which is objected, that it is plurified; the response is now plain: because the universal expresses commonness according to position and according to unity of nature and according to thing, not only according to account; and since *persona* in this mode does not import commonness, therefore it is not universal. — *(Another reason.)* Nevertheless the reason does not hold, since the universal is plurified in such a way that it is truly numbered on account of a true addition by which it is contracted to the individual; but this person does not add upon person, since, as has been said[^18] above, there is no distinction in the divine through addition, but through origin: therefore *persona* is neither truly numbered, nor drawn into [its] part in that mode in which the universal [is].

2. To that which is objected, that it removes commonness; it must be said that what removes commonness is not common according to that commonness which it removes; but *persona* removes commonness of thing, but not commonness of account; and according to that [commonness of thing] it is not common, but [it is common] according to commonness of account.

3. To that which is objected, that what is common and is said according to substance is said according to a common substance[^19]; it must be said that here there is an accident [i.e. the fallacy of accident], as here: *this man is white, and is a monk, therefore he is a white monk*; since the term *white* imports another account of denomination in the premise and in the conclusion. So it must rightly be said of this term

*common*, since it is taken first according to relation, second according to unity of nature.

4. As to what is asked: whether it is commonness of thing, or of account, or of name; it must be said, by all these modes; but real commonness is twofold, as has been seen, namely according to unity of nature[^20], and according to similar relation; and in the first mode Damascene speaks, and so the rest are clear.

la: Cap. 4. n. 8. — De principiis horum argumentorum vide supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2.

en: Chapter 4, n. 8. — On the principles of these arguments see above d. 19, p. II, q. 2.

la: Cfr. Petr. Hispan., *Summul.* tract. *de Distributione*, ubi signa distributiva dividuntur in distributiva *substantiae* v. g. *omnis*, *nullus*, et *accidentium* v. g. *qualiscumque*, *quilibet*. — Paulo superius Vat., favente cod. cc, pro *signum* exhibet *nomen*, et dein inferius post *tres* omittit ultimam huius argumenti propositionem.

en: Cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, treatise *On Distribution*, where distributive signs are divided into distributives *of substance*, e.g. *omnis* ("every"), *nullus* ("no"), and *of accidents*, e.g. *qualiscumque* ("of whatever sort"), *quilibet* ("any whatever"). — A little before, the Vatican [edition], with cod. cc supporting, for *signum* ("sign") exhibits *nomen* ("name"), and then below after *tres* ("three") omits the last proposition of this argument.

la: In Vat. et solo cod. cc deest haec propositio: *quia secundum idem* etc.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and only cod. cc this proposition is missing: *quia secundum idem* etc.

la: Cod. bb adiungit *sive extraneum*.

en: Cod. bb adds *sive extraneum* ("or extraneous").

la: Intellige: *et quidem in plus*. De sensu verborum *in plus* est, vide supra pag. 348, nota 5.

en: Understand: *and indeed* in plus *[extending further]*. On the sense of the words *in plus est*, see above p. 348, note 5.

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 7. seqq.

en: *Littera* of the Master, c. 7 ff.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11, de quo vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XIX. c. 7. seqq., et ibid. in *Comment.* p. II. q. 2.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 11, on which see above the *littera* of the Master, d. XIX, c. 7 ff., and ibid. in the *Commentary*, p. II, q. 2.

la: Sic plerique codd.; Vat. cum cod. cc *aequivocatio*. Paulo inferius sola Vat. *analogum* pro *vanitas solum*.

en: So most codices; the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *aequivocatio* ("equivocation"). A little below, the Vatican alone [reads] *analogum* ("analogous") in place of *vanitas solum* ("sheer emptiness").

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 8. Cfr. etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XIX. c. 9. — Paulo superius post *si vero nominis* codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *et rationis*, male.

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 8. Cf. also above the *littera* of the Master, d. XIX, c. 9. — A little above, after *si vero nominis* the codices and ed. 1 omit *et rationis*, wrongly.

la: A Vat. abest *harum*, quod auctoritate complurium codd. ut G H M aa bb et ed. 1 restituimus.

en: From the Vatican [edition] *harum* ("of these") is missing, which by the authority of several codices such as G H M aa bb and ed. 1 we have restored.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *dicitur animal esse*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *dicitur animal esse* ("animal is said to be").

la: Aliqui codd. ut F G I R S V cum ed. 1 *humanitatis*.

en: Some codices such as F G I R S V with ed. 1 [read] *humanitatis* (genitive).

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *operatione*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the faith of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *operatione* ("by operation") [in place of *comparatione*].

la: Vat. adiicit *enim*.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *enim* ("for").

la: Cod. Y *definitione*; cod. T *distinctione vel definitione*.

en: Cod. Y [reads] *definitione* ("by definition"); cod. T [reads] *distinctione vel definitione* ("by distinction or by definition").

la: Auctoritate cod. T adiecimus verba *similitudinem habitudinis*, quae in Vat. desiderantur. Lectio nostra comprobatur et ex contextu (quia S. Doctor praecedentia summatim exhibet) et ex mutila lectione aliorum codd. *importat privationem habitudinis*.

en: On the authority of cod. T we have added the words *similitudinem habitudinis* ("a likeness of relation"), which are missing in the Vatican [edition]. Our reading is confirmed both from the context (since the Holy Doctor summarily exhibits the preceding) and from the mutilated reading of other codices, *importat privationem habitudinis* ("it imports a privation of relation").

la: Cod. V subiicit *quae probant*.

en: Cod. V subjoins *quae probant* ("which prove [it]").

la: Dist. 19. p. II. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *ita quod* Vat. cum cod. cc *ut*, et subinde pro *per quam* exhibet *propter quam*. Demum Vat. pro verbis *sed haec persona non addit supra personam* substituit *et hic persona non addit supra essentiam*, cum qua lectione aliquo modo convenit lectio ed. 1: *sed haec persona non addit supra naturam*; at utraque lectio, etsi in se non sit falsa, tamen non est ad propositum, quia, ut ex obiectione liquet, non agitur de respectu, quem persona habet ad essentiam, sed de respectu, quem haec persona in particulari habet ad personam in communi sive in generali sumtam. Codd. recte habent *personam* pro *essentiam*, sed plurimi eorum non bene *additur* pro *addit*.

en: Distinction 19, p. II, q. 2. — A little above, in place of *ita quod* the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *ut*, and immediately after, in place of *per quam* it exhibits *propter quam*. Finally the Vatican, in place of the words *sed haec persona non addit supra personam* ("but this person does not add upon person"), substitutes *et hic persona non addit supra essentiam* ("and here person does not add upon essence"), with which reading the reading of ed. 1 in some manner agrees: *sed haec persona non addit supra naturam* ("but this person does not add upon nature"); but each reading, even if in itself it is not false, is nevertheless not to the point, since, as is plain from the objection, the matter at issue is not the relation which person has to essence, but the relation which this person in particular has to person taken in common or in general. The codices rightly have *personam* in place of *essentiam*, but most of them not well [read] *additur* in place of *addit*.

la: Mutilam lectionem Vat., quae verba *dicitur secundum substantiam* omittit, ope mss. resarcimus, et iustissime, quia illa verba in obiectione habentur. — Vox *accidens*, quae proxime post occurrit, accipitur pro *fallacia accidentis*. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum cod. cc *ergo aliam* pro *quia aliam*.

en: The mutilated reading of the Vatican [edition], which omits the words *dicitur secundum substantiam* ("is said according to substance"), we restore by means of the manuscripts, and most justly, since those words are had in the objection. — The word *accidens*, which occurs immediately after, is taken for *fallacia accidentis* ("the fallacy of accident"). — A little below, the Vatican with cod. cc [reads] *ergo aliam* ("therefore another") in place of *quia aliam* ("since another").

la: A nostris codd. et ed. 1 abest *et*.

en: From our codices and ed. 1 *et* ("and") is absent.

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. p. II. q. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 6, p. II, q. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec orta est ex difficultate satis subtili, qua ratione nomen *personae* possit esse commune tribus personis divinis. Patet enim, illud non esse commune communitate rei, sicut essentia est communis illis tribus personis; non potest etiam esse illis commune per modum universalis, cum in Deo non sit ratio universalis. — S. Bonav. tres refert solutiones probabiles, secundam autem praefert. Magis explicatur eius sententia in seq. quaestione his verbis: «*Dicitur (persona) secundum comparationem rerum eiusdem naturae, ideo* analogice *et* aequaliter, *et ideo quodam modo* univoce». — S. Thomas (loc. infra cit.) eligit et bene explicat tertiam solutionem, contra quam arguit Scotus, dicendo, quod nihil positum in definitione sit ens rationis. *Fallacia accidentis* in solut. ad 3. in hoc consistit, quod, ratione nominis[^21], terminus *commune* accipitur in maiori secundum similitudinem habitudinis (iuxta secundam solutionem); in minori vero absolute secundum unitatem naturae.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 4. a. 2. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. *Report.* hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 30. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question has arisen from a sufficiently subtle difficulty, by what account the name *persona* can be common to the three divine persons. For it is plain that it is not common by commonness of thing, as the essence is common to those three persons; nor can it be common to them by mode of a universal, since in God there is no account of a universal. — St. Bonaventure cites three probable solutions, but prefers the second. His view is more fully explained in the following question, in these words: «*[Persona] is said according to the comparison of things of the same nature, therefore* analogously *and* equally, *and so in a certain way* univocally». — St. Thomas (loc. cited below) chooses and well explains the third solution, against which Scotus argues, saying that nothing posited in a definition is a being of reason. — The *fallacy of accident* in the solution to [arg.] 3 consists in this, that, by reason of the name[^21], the term *common* is taken in the major [premise] according to a likeness of relation (as in the second solution); but in the minor [premise] absolutely according to unity of nature.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 56, m. 4, a. 2. — Scotus, on this and the following question, *Reportata* here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *Summa* I, q. 30, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; *Summa* p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here I, *princ.* q. 1, 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 53, q. 7. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. unica.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether the name 'person', said of created and uncreated persons, is a univocal common term

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 444 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum nomen personae, dictum de creatis et increatis personis, sit commune univocum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *persona* sit commune univocum creatis et increatis personis.

Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia eadem est ratio et idem nomen personae, secundum quod dicitur de his et de illis.

2. Item, hoc videtur, quia personae communitas est communitas consimilis habitudinis; sed consimilis habitudo, quae reperitur in Deo, reperitur et[^1] in creatura, quia sicut Pater est suppositum divinae naturae, ita Petrus humanae: ergo etc.

3. Item, complementum rationis personae consistit in incommunicabilitate; sed incommunicabilitas communis est personis divinis et creatis: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. *(Fundamenta.)* Deus et creaturae summe distant: ergo nihil habent commune, ergo nihil univocum.

2. Item, persona est substantia: ergo quae univocantur in persona univocantur in substantia. Sed Creator et creatura non univocantur in substantia, quia tunc Deus esset in genere[^2]: ergo nec in persona.

3. Item, quae univocantur in aliquo aequaliter sunt in illo; sed nihil participat aequaliter creatura cum Deo: ergo hoc ipsum quod est *persona*, non dicitur univoce de Deo et creatura.

*(Quaestio incidens.)* 4. Quaeritur ergo, de quo per prius dicatur *persona*[^3]; et videtur, quod per prius dicatur de creaturis, quia inde translatum est ad divina. **Contra:** natura intellectualis et substantia et distinctio per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis; et non sunt plura de ratione personae: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Nomen personae de creatis et increatis personis dicitur analogice, et quidem analogia secundum aequalitatem de divinis personis ad se comparatis, analogia vero longinqua de personis divinis simul et creatis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc nomen *persona*, sicut visum est prius[^4], non dicit nisi communitatem habitudinis, super quam fundatur communitas rationis. Quoniam ergo consimilis habitudo reperitur in personis creatis et in increatis, hinc est, quod hoc nomen *persona* non dicitur aequivoce, sed analogice. *(Conclusio 1.)*

Sed attendendum, *(Distinctio.)* quod communitas habitudinis potest esse per respectum ad res eiusdem generis; et tunc est univocatio et analogia secundum aequalitatem — ut Petrus est individuum et Paulus — et aequaliter eis convenit ratio individui. Potest etiam esse per comparationem ad res[^5] diversorum generum, ut Petrus et albedo Petri in hoc, quod est esse individuum, uniuntur; et per prius convenit ratio individui Petro quam eius albedini. Sic dicendum quod hoc nomen *persona*, dictum de personis di-

<!-- page 445 -->

vinis, quia dicitur secundum comparationem rerum eiusdem naturae, ideo analogice[^6] et aequaliter; et ideo quodam modo univoce; similiter, cum dicitur de personis creatis. *(Conclusio 2.)* Cum autem dicitur de personis creatis et increatis, dicitur per comparationem rerum diversarum naturarum, et ideo per prius et posterius. *(Conclusio 3.)* Et sic *persona* prius dicitur de personis creatis secundum nomen, sed secundum rem nominis per prius dicitur de personis increatis.

Et quod quaeritur, utrum *persona* sit commune personis creatis et increatis; dicendum, quod si dicitur commune univocum, non. Et rationes ad hoc concedendae sunt. *(Conclusio 4.)*

*(Solutio oppositorum.)* 1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod eadem est ratio etc.; dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio nisi secundum analogiam; quia longe nobilius et aliter est natura intellectualis et hypostasis et distinctio et proprietas in Deo quam in creaturis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est habitudo consimilis; dicendum, quod non est similitudo aequalitatis; et propterea talis similitudo non facit univocationem, sed analogiam solum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de incommunicabilitate, dicendum, quod non est pura privatio, immo importat distinctionem; et cum[^7] alia ratio distinguendi, distans multum ab ista, sit in Deo, et hoc non tantum secundum rem, immo etiam secundum rationem rectam, intellectus non attribuit Deo modum distinguendi, qui competit compositis. Ideo nec ratione univocum est, sed solum analogum[^8].

english:
### Question II. *Whether the name "person", said of created and uncreated persons, is a univocal common term.*

Secondly it is asked whether this name *person* is a univocal common term [applicable] to created and uncreated persons.

And that it is so, is shown thus:

1. Because there is the same account [*ratio*] and the same name "person" according as it is said of these and of those.

2. Likewise, this is shown because the commonality of "person" is a commonality of similar relation; but a similar relation, which is found in God, is found also[^1] in the creature, since just as the Father is a supposit of the divine nature, so Peter [is a supposit] of human [nature]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the completion of the account of person consists in incommunicability; but incommunicability is common to divine and created persons: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *(Foundations.)* God and creatures are at the highest distance: therefore they have nothing in common, therefore nothing univocal.

2. Likewise, "person" is substance: therefore [those] which are univocally [predicated] in "person" are univocally [predicated] in substance. But Creator and creature are not univocally [predicated] in substance, because then God would be in a genus[^2]: therefore neither in "person."

3. Likewise, [things] which are univocally [predicated] in something equally are in it; but the creature in no way participates equally with God: therefore the very thing that is *person* is not said univocally of God and creature.

*(Incidental question.)* 4. It is asked, then, of which it is said by priority — *person*[^3]; and it seems that it is said by priority of creatures, since it has been transferred from there to the divine. **On the contrary:** intellectual nature and substance and distinction are by priority in God rather than in creatures; and there are not many things [pertaining] to the account of person: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "person" is said of created and uncreated persons analogically, and indeed by an analogy of equality of the divine persons compared to themselves, but by a remote analogy of the divine persons together with the created [ones].*

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *person*, as has been seen previously[^4], expresses nothing other than a commonality of relation, upon which a commonality of account [*ratio*] is founded. Since therefore a similar relation is found in created and in uncreated persons, hence it is that this name *person* is not said equivocally, but analogically. *(Conclusion 1.)*

But it must be attended to *(Distinction.)* that a commonality of relation can be by reference to things of the same genus; and then there is univocation and analogy according to equality — as Peter is an individual and Paul [is an individual] — and the account of individual belongs to them equally. It can also be by comparison to things[^5] of diverse genera, as Peter and Peter's whiteness are united in this, that they are individuals; and the account of individual belongs by priority to Peter rather than to his whiteness. Thus it must be said that this name *person*, said of the divine

persons, since it is said by comparison of things of the same nature, [is said] therefore analogically[^6] and equally; and therefore in a certain way univocally; likewise, when it is said of created persons. *(Conclusion 2.)* But when it is said of created and uncreated persons, it is said by comparison of things of diverse natures, and therefore by priority and posteriority. *(Conclusion 3.)* And thus *person* is said by priority of created persons according to the name, but according to the reality [*res*] of the name it is said by priority of uncreated persons.

And as to what is asked, whether *person* is common to created and uncreated persons; it must be said that if it is called a univocal common term, no. And the reasons for this must be conceded. *(Conclusion 4.)*

*(Solution to the opposing arguments.)* 1. To what is therefore objected, that there is the same *ratio* etc.; it must be said that there is not the same *ratio* except according to analogy; because intellectual nature and hypostasis and distinction and property are in God far more nobly and otherwise than in creatures.

2. To that which is objected, that there is a similar relation; it must be said that it is not a likeness of equality; and therefore such a likeness does not produce univocation, but analogy alone.

3. To that which is objected concerning incommunicability, it must be said that it is not a pure privation, but rather imports distinction; and since[^7] another account of distinguishing, distant much from this one, is in God — and this not only according to the thing, but rather also according to right reason — the intellect does not attribute to God a mode of distinguishing which belongs to composite [things]. Therefore neither by reason is it univocal, but only analogous[^8].

la: A multis codd. et ed. 1 abest *et*.

en: From many codices and ed. 1 the word *et* ("also") is absent.

la: Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 1.

la: Supple cum cod. G et ed. 1 *de creaturis*.

en: Supply with cod. G and ed. 1 *de creaturis* ("of creatures").

la: In quaest. praeced.

en: In the preceding question.

la: In multis codicibus desunt voces *ad res*; in ed. 1 legitur *rerum* pro *ad res*. — Mox post *quod est* cod. T omittit *esse*.

en: In many codices the words *ad res* ("to things") are absent; in ed. 1 *rerum* ("of things") is read in place of *ad res*. — Soon after, after *quod est* cod. T omits *esse*.

la: [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to *analogice* in the second *Conclusio* (Sic dicendum quod hoc nomen *persona*, dictum de personis divinis ... ideo analogice et aequaliter).

en: [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to *analogice* ("analogically") in the second *Conclusio*.

la: [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to *cum* in the *Solutio ad 3* (et cum alia ratio distinguendi).

en: [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to *cum* ("since") in the third solution.

la: [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to the closing *analogum* (Ideo nec ratione univocum est, sed solum analogum).

en: [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to the closing *analogum* ("analogous").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ex solutione praecedentis quaestionis arguere quis posset, nomen *personae* esse commune univocum divinis et creatis personis, cum communitas similis habitudinis, quae inter divinas personas esse asseritur, etiam inter creatas et divinas personas statuenda esse videatur. Ipsa quaestio specificatur, dum S. Doctor distincte respondet tum comparando divinas personas inter se, tum creatas cum creatis, tum creatas cum divinis. — Et notandum, quod comparando creatas personas cum creatis, illud commune univocum non potest intelligi de generica vel specifica unitate, quam habent plura individua humana, sed de communitate in ratione singularitatis. Singulare autem in concreto differt a singulari, tamen, ut dicitur in corp., aequaliter eis convenit ratio individui. — De duplici analogia cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 1, et d. 7. q. 1. — Ad quaest. in 4. fundam. respondetur in 3. conclusione.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 4. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; de principiis solutionis cfr. S. I. q. 13. a. 6. et 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** From the solution of the preceding question someone could argue that the name *person* is a univocal common term [applicable] to divine and created persons, since the commonality of similar relation, which is asserted to exist between the divine persons, would seem to have to be established also between created and divine persons. The question itself is specified, since the Holy Doctor responds distinctly, both by comparing the divine persons among themselves, and the created [persons] with the created, and the created with the divine. — And it is to be noted that, in comparing created persons with created [ones], that "univocal common" cannot be understood concerning the generic or specific unity which several human individuals have, but concerning a commonality in the account of singularity. Singular [things] in the concrete differ from singular [things], yet, as is said in the *corpus*, the account of individual belongs to them equally. — On the twofold analogy cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, and d. 7, q. 1. — To the question in the 4th *fundamentum* it is responded in the 3rd conclusion.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 36, m. 4, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; on the principles of the solution cf. *Summa* I, q. 13, a. 6 and 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2nd *principium*, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 53, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

source_text:
<!-- page 445 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Dicimus, quod tres personae sunt, id est tres subsistentiae*; quia contrarium dicit Boethius in libro *de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi*[^1], assignans differentiam inter *subsistere* et *substare*, quia «subsistit illud quod non indiget alio ut sit; substat vero quod subiectum aliis, ut esse valeant, subministrat»[^4]. Videtur ergo, quod *subsistere* sit idem quod *esse*, et *subsistentia* idem quod *essentia*: ergo nullo modo potest dici, quod sint plures subsistentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Boethius accipit ibi hoc nomen *subsistentia* secundum Marcum Tullium[^2], prout accipit significationem ab actu sistendi[^5] sive per se standi; et sic tantum una est subsistentia. Sed nunc doctores sacrae Scripturae accipiunt prout magis importat respectum ad proprietatem, cui subsistentia est; et sic plurificatur. Ratio[^3] autem huius est communis usus. Quia accipiunt *substantiam* pro natura rei; ideo pro supposito magis voluerunt accipere *subsistentiam*.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *tres personas esse unam essentiam vel eiusdem essentiae dicimus, non ex eadem essentia*. Videtur enim falsum, quia Pater generat Filium de sua substantia et spirat Spiritum sanctum: ergo videtur, quod omnes personae sint de eadem substantia.

Item quaeritur: quare non conceditur ista, quod personae sunt *ex eadem essentia*, sicut conceditur ista, quod sunt *eiusdem essentiae*? Et videtur, quod debeat concedi, quia *ex* dicit in divinis habitudinem originis, et similiter genitivus originem importat. Si tu dicas, quod propter transitiones, quia

<!-- page 446 -->

praepositiones sunt transitivae[^6] — ita et obliqui casus sunt transitivi. Praeterea, haec recipitur: *personae sunt in eadem essentia*, et tamen hoc quod dico *in* est praepositio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quando[^7] aliquid comparatur ad aliud ut informans sive denominans, non ponitur propter hoc diversitas sive distinctio unius ad alterum; sic enim comparatur deitas ad Deum. Alio modo comparatur alterum sicut principium ad principiatum; et tunc de necessitate importatur distinctio. Quoniam igitur haec praepositio *ex* importat habitudinem causae vel saltem principii, ideo de necessitate dicit distinctionem inter extrema: et ideo haec non potest esse vera, quod *personae sint ex eadem essentia*. Sed quia genitivus non tantum construitur in ratione principii, immo ex declaratione essentiae, cum dicitur: *mulier egregiae formae*, ut dicit Priscianus[^8]; ideo cum genitivo haec est vera: *tres personae sunt eiusdem essentiae*.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Tres res*, et accipit hoc ab Augustino in primo libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^9]. Videtur enim male dicere, dicendo *tres res*, quia *res* est nomen absolutum et generale: ergo videtur, quod si aliquid dicat in divinis, quod dicat essentiam sive substantiam: ergo sicut nullo modo recipitur *tres essentiae*, ita nullo modo debet recipi *tres res*. Et si tu dicas, quod recipitur[^10] *tres entes*; hoc non est simile, quia *ens* est participium, et ita trahit numerum aliunde et non numeratur secundum formam propriam entitatis; *res* autem est nomen substantivum. Si tu dicas, quod *res* nominat mihi formam a parte animae, vel istud nomen impositum est a parte animae; hoc nihil est, quia illa sunt nomina intentionum, et *res* dividitur contra intentionem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod unaquaeque[^11] res potest considerari tripliciter: aut secundum proprietates, quas habet in propria natura; aut secundum modum, per quem fit apud animam; aut secundum proprietatem consequentem, quae inest ei ab actibus animae, qui sunt subiicere et praedicare, componere et dividere[^12]. Secundum ergo hanc triplicem acceptionem contingit rem tripliciter nominari. Uno modo per nomen, quod indicat existentiam a parte suae naturae, sicut dicitur *album* et *nigrum* et huiusmodi. Alio modo, secundum quod anima accipit; et sic, quia anima omnia accipit[^13] per modum entis, nominat hoc modo *res*. Unde omne illud *res* dicitur, quod anima cogitat ut existens in natura. Alio modo contingit nominare per intentiones secundas, sicut dicitur *genus*, *species*, *subiectum*, *praedicatum*.

Quoniam igitur hoc nomen *res* dicit quasi medium inter nomen, quod dicit pure formam naturae, et nomen quod dicit formam intentionis; ideo non tantum essentiae convenit, sed etiam personis; et ideo *tres res* dicimus *tres personas*, non sic *tres essentias*; et huic significationi alludit ipsum nomen. *Res* enim dicitur a *reor*, *reris*, quod dicit actum a parte animae; et alio modo *res* venit ab hoc quod est *ratus*, quod dicit stabilitatem a parte naturae; et sic *res* dicit stabilitatem sive ratitudinem ex parte entitatis. Et sic patent obiecta, quia uno modo est nomen naturae, alio modo est nomen rationis[^14].

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc verbo Hieronymi: *Non est prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus*. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dicit Augustinus nono *Confessionum*[^15]: «Pater et Filius non differunt substantia, sed causa et gradu». — Item, in divinis est subsistentia[^16], ergo ibi est *sub*; sed *sub* dicitur relative

<!-- page 447 -->

ad superius: ergo ibi est *sub* et *super*, ergo inferius et superius, ergo et gradus. — Item ubicumque auctoritas et subauctoritas, ibi est gradus; sed haec est in Patre et Filio: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, sicut dicit Glossa[^17], *Exodi*: «*Non ascendes per gradus ad altare* etc. Per gradus ascendit ad altare, qui dicit Patrem maiorem Filio, et Filium Spiritu sancto, sicut dicit Arius». Unde cum *gradus* de ratione sui nominis tollat personarum aequalitatem, ideo bene dicit Hieronymus, quod non est prorsus in divinitate gradus; nihilominus ponitur ordo. Differunt enim *gradus* et *ordo*, sicut *punctus* et *unitas*. Nam *punctus* est substantia posita; ideo solum est in corporalibus. *Unitas* est substantia non habens positionem[^18]; ideo est in spiritualibus. Sic *gradus* dicit superpositionem vel est loci, vel dignitatis. *Ordo* vero dicit habitudinem ad principium sine superpositione[^19].

Ad illud ergo quod dicit Augustinus, dicendum, quod improprie loquitur in utroque verbo, et *causa* sumitur ibi pro *principio*, *gradus* vero sumitur pro *ordine*.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de *sub*, dicendum, quod *sub* in divinis non dicit inferioritatem, sed solum habitudinem secundum rationem intelligendi. — Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate, dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *auctoritas* sonat in rationem dominii, quod ponit gradum; sed sic non est in divinis, sed solum, prout sonat in rationem principii; et hoc ponit ordinem in cognoscendo[^20].

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first it is asked about what the Master says: *We say that there are three persons, that is, three subsistences*; because the contrary is said by Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*[^1], assigning a difference between *to subsist* and *to substand*, since «that subsists which does not need another in order to be; but that substands which, being a subject for others so that they may be able to be, supplies [the support]»[^4]. It seems therefore that *to subsist* is the same as *to be*, and *subsistence* the same as *essence*: therefore in no way can it be said that there are several subsistences.

**I respond:** It must be said that Boethius takes the name *subsistentia* there according to Marcus Tullius[^2], inasmuch as it takes its signification from the act of standing or of standing by itself[^5]; and so there is only one subsistence. But now the doctors of sacred Scripture take it inasmuch as it more imports a respect to property, to which the subsistence belongs; and so it is multiplied. The reason[^3] for this is the common usage. Because they take *substance* for the nature of the thing; therefore for the supposit they preferred more to take *subsistence*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *we say that the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, [but] not from the same essence*. For it seems false, because the Father generates the Son from his own substance and spirates the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that all the persons are from the same substance.

Likewise it is asked: why is this not conceded, that the persons are *from the same essence*, just as this is conceded, that they are *of the same essence*? And it seems that it ought to be conceded, because *ex* (from) in the divine [things] expresses the relation of origin, and likewise the genitive imports origin. If you say that [it is] on account of transitions, since

prepositions are transitive[^6] — so also the oblique cases are transitive. Furthermore, this [proposition] is received: *the persons are in the same essence*, and yet this which I say *in* is a preposition.

**I respond:** It must be said that when[^7] something is compared to another as informing or denominating, on this account a diversity or distinction of one to the other is not posited; for thus is divinity compared to God. In another way one is compared to the other as principle to that which proceeds from a principle; and then of necessity a distinction is imported. Since therefore this preposition *ex* imports a relation of cause or at least of principle, therefore of necessity it states a distinction between the extremes: and therefore this cannot be true, that *the persons are from the same essence*. But because the genitive is not only construed in the relation of principle, but also from the declaration of essence, when it is said: *a woman of remarkable form*, as Priscian says[^8]; therefore with the genitive this is true: *the three persons are of the same essence*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Three things*, and he takes this from Augustine in the first book *On Christian Doctrine*[^9]. For it seems that he speaks ill in saying *three things* (*tres res*), because *res* is an absolute and general name: therefore it seems that if it says anything in the divine [things], it says the essence or substance: therefore just as in no way is *three essences* received, so in no way ought *three things* to be received. And if you say that *three beings* (*tres entes*) is received[^10], this is not similar, because *ens* (being) is a participle, and so it draws its number from elsewhere and is not numbered according to its own form of entity; *res* however is a substantive name. If you say that *res* names for me a form on the part of the soul, or that this name is imposed on the part of the soul; this is nothing, because those are names of intentions, and *res* is divided against intention.

**I respond:** It must be said that each[^11] thing can be considered in three ways: either according to the properties which it has in its proper nature; or according to the mode by which it comes-to-be in the soul; or according to the consequent property which is in it from the acts of the soul, which are subjecting and predicating, composing and dividing[^12]. According therefore to this triple acceptation it happens that a thing is named in three ways. In one way, by a name which indicates existence on the part of its own nature, just as it is called *white* and *black* and the like. In another way, according to what the soul receives; and so, because the soul receives[^13] all [things] through the mode of being, it names a thing in this way. Whence everything is called *res* (thing) which the soul thinks of as existing in nature. In another way it happens to name through second intentions, just as it is called *genus*, *species*, *subject*, *predicate*.

Since therefore this name *res* says as it were a middle [term] between the name which says purely the form of nature, and the name which says the form of intention; therefore it suits not only the essence, but also the persons; and therefore we say *three things* [meaning] *three persons*, not so [as we say] *three essences*; and the name itself alludes to this signification. For *res* is said from *reor*, *reris* (I think, you think), which says an act on the part of the soul; and in another way *res* comes from this which is *ratus* (settled, determined), which says stability on the part of nature; and so *res* says stability or determinacy on the part of entity. And so the objections are clear, since in one way it is a name of nature, in another way a name of reason[^14].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this saying of Jerome: *There is in the Trinity no degree (gradus) at all*. For he seems to say [something] against what Augustine says in the ninth [book] of the *Confessions*[^15]: «The Father and the Son do not differ in substance, but in cause and degree». — Likewise, in the divine [things] there is *subsistentia*[^16] (sub-stance), therefore there is *sub* (under); but *sub* is said relatively

to *superius* (above): therefore there is *sub* and *super* there, therefore inferior and superior, therefore also degree. — Likewise, wherever there is authority and sub-authority, there is degree; but this is in the Father and Son: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said, as the Gloss says[^17], on *Exodus*: «*Thou shalt not ascend by steps to the altar* etc. He ascends to the altar by steps who says that the Father is greater than the Son, and the Son [greater] than the Holy Spirit, as Arius says». Whence since *gradus* (degree) by the very meaning of its name takes away the equality of the persons, therefore Jerome rightly says that there is no degree at all in the divinity; nevertheless order is posited. For *gradus* and *ordo* differ as *point* and *unity*. For *point* is a posited substance; therefore it is only in corporeal [things]. *Unity* is a substance not having position[^18]; therefore it is in spiritual [things]. Thus *gradus* says a superposition either of place or of dignity. But *ordo* says a relation to a principle without superposition[^19].

To that, therefore, which Augustine says, it must be said that he speaks improperly in both words, and *cause* is taken there for *principle*, and *degree* is taken for *order*.

To that which is objected concerning *sub*, it must be said that *sub* in the divine [things] does not state inferiority, but only a relation according to the manner of understanding. — To that which is objected concerning authority, it must be said that it is true insofar as *authority* sounds in the meaning of dominion, which posits a degree; but thus it is not in the divine [things], but only insofar as it sounds in the meaning of principle; and this posits an order in cognition[^20].

---

la: Codd. *aa bb cc* cum ed. 1 *antonomastice*, non omnino perperam, quia *antonomasia* est figura, quae fit, quoties pro nomine proprio substituitur eius epitheton.

en: Codices *aa bb cc* with edition 1 [read] *antonomastice* (by antonomasia), not entirely incorrectly, because *antonomasia* is the figure which occurs whenever in place of a proper noun its epithet is substituted.

la: Ed. 1 *subiicit etiam*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *subiicit etiam* (subjoins also).

la: Cod. *G* *sola analogia*.

en: Codex *G* [reads] *sola analogia* (analogy alone).

la: Cap. 3: *Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget; substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse valeant, subministrat.* — Paulo infra post verba *subsistere sit idem quod* ex mss. restauravimus verba a Vat. omissa: *esse et subsistentia idem quod*.

en: Chapter 3: *For that subsists which does not itself need accidents in order to be; but that substands which supplies a kind of subject for other accidents, so that they may be able to be.* — A little below, after the words *subsistere sit idem quod*, we have restored from the manuscripts the words omitted by the Vatican [edition]: *esse et subsistentia idem quod*.

la: Vide supra pag. 412, nota 7. — Proxime post Vat., suffragante cod. *cc*, *secundum actum subsistendi* pro *ab actu sistendi*.

en: See above page 412, note 7. — Just after, the Vatican [edition], with the support of codex *cc*, [reads] *secundum actum subsistendi* (according to the act of subsisting) in place of *ab actu sistendi* (from the act of standing).

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp., et solutio huius argumenti.

en: Cf. above d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, *ad oppositum*, and the solution of this argument.

la: Vat. sola *aliquando*, et mox post *denominans* addit *et tamen*. — Paulo inferius cod. *sic vero* pro *sic enim*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *aliquando* (sometimes), and soon after *denominans* adds *et tamen* (and yet). — A little below, the codex [reads] *sic vero* (thus indeed) in place of *sic enim* (for thus).

la: Sic vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. cum cod. *cc* *comparatur aliquid ad aliud*.

en: Thus the older codices with edition 1; the Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* [reads] *comparatur aliquid ad aliud* (something is compared to another).

la: Libr. XVIII. *Grammat.* c. 1. Cfr. etiam supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3; et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 7. a. 3. ad 1; nec non B. Albert., hic a. 5; et S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Book 18 of the *Grammar*, c. 1. Cf. also above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3; and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 56, m. 7, a. 3, ad 1; as well as Bl. Albert, here a. 5; and St. Thomas, here near the *littera*.

en: Chapter 5, n. 5.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* omittit verba *quod recipitur*, substituit pro vocula *hoc*, quae proxime sequitur, *hic*, et paulo inferius mutat *propriam* in *propriae*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* omits the words *quod recipitur*, substitutes for the little word *hoc*, which immediately follows, *hic*, and a little below changes *propriam* into *propriae*.

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* supprimitur *unaquaeque*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and in codex *cc* [the word] *unaquaeque* (each) is suppressed.

la: Notamus, quod *rei* primo et tertio modo consideratae respondet conceptus, qui a Scholasticis *prima intentio* et *secunda intentio* vocabatur, a modernis autem *idea realis* et *logica* nuncupatur. Prima igitur intentio est conceptus, quo intellectui repraesentatur res, prout est in se, sive secundum proprietates, quae ei conveniunt, nulla habita ratione operationis intellectus, v. g. *homo*, prout est animal rationale. Secunda autem intentio est conceptus, quo intellectui repraesentatur res, non prout est in se, sed sub proprietatibus ei ab intellectu attributis, v. g. *homo*, quatenus est *species*, vel quatenus est *subiectum* in propositione. Medius modus, quo res considerari potest iuxta S. Bonaventuram, scil. per quem fit res apud animam, complectitur generales conditiones, quae actum intellectus concomitantur, v. g. quod intellectus cognoscat rem per modum abstractionis, universalitatis, entis etc. — Paulo superius pro *consequentem* Vat. cum cod. *cc* *communem*, refragantibus vetustioribus codd., nec non repugnante Scholasticorum modo loquendi.

en: We note that to the *res* considered in the first and third ways there corresponds the concept which by the Scholastics was called *prima intentio* (first intention) and *secunda intentio* (second intention), but by the moderns is termed *real idea* and *logical idea*. The first intention, then, is the concept by which there is represented to the intellect a thing inasmuch as it is in itself, or according to the properties which suit it, with no account being taken of the operation of the intellect — e. g. *man*, inasmuch as he is a rational animal. The second intention is the concept by which there is represented to the intellect a thing not inasmuch as it is in itself, but under the properties attributed to it by the intellect — e. g. *man*, insofar as he is a *species*, or insofar as he is a *subject* in a proposition. The middle way, in which a thing can be considered according to St. Bonaventure, namely that by which the thing comes-to-be in the soul, comprehends the general conditions which accompany the act of the intellect — e. g. that the intellect cognizes the thing by way of abstraction, of universality, of being, etc. — A little above, in place of *consequentem* (consequent), the Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* [reads] *communem* (common), against the older codices, and against the manner of speaking of the Scholastics.

la: Verba *et sic, quia anima omnia accipit*, a Vat. suppressa, auctoritate plurium codd. ut *G H M O T Z bb* et ed. 1 in textum recepimus.

en: The words *et sic, quia anima omnia accipit* (and so, because the soul receives all [things]), suppressed by the Vatican [edition], we have received into the text on the authority of several codices such as *G H M O T Z bb* and edition 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic a. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 1, dub. 7; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas, here a. 1.

la: Etsi codd. et edd. concordes allegant Librum 9. (vel 11.) *Confessionum*, verba tamen citata ibi non exstant, sed habentur in libro, qui quondam inter opera S. Augustini perperam recensebatur et inscribitur: *Quaestiones ex utroque Testamento mixtim*, q. 122: «Nihil differt a Patre Filius? Nihil plane differt in substantia, quia verus Filius est; differt autem in causalitatis gradu (alias: in causa vel gradu)». Tertullianus *adv. Prax.* c. 2. ait: «Tres autem non statu, sed gradu; nec substantia, sed forma; nec potestate, sed specie».

en: Although the codices and editions concordantly allege Book 9 (or 11) of the *Confessions*, the words cited there nevertheless do not exist, but are had in the book which was once erroneously reckoned among the works of St. Augustine and is inscribed: *Questions from both Testaments mixed*, q. 122: «Does the Son in nothing differ from the Father? In substance plainly he differs in nothing, because he is a true Son; but he differs in the degree of causality (or: in cause or degree)». Tertullian, *Against Praxeas* c. 2, says: «But [they are] three not in status, but in degree; not in substance, but in form; not in power, but in species».

la: Vers. 26. — Glossa apud Lyr. in hunc locum: *Gradus in Trinitate non facies sicut Arius, qui maiorem Patrem, minorem Filium, minimum Spiritum sanctum docuit*.

en: Verse 26. — Gloss in [Nicholas of] Lyra at this place: *Thou shalt not make a degree in the Trinity, like Arius, who taught the Father greater, the Son lesser, the Holy Spirit least*.

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 23. (c. 27.): «*Unitas substantia est sine positione, punctum autem substantia posita*». Simile habetur V. *Metaph.* text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). S. Bonav., II. *Sent.* d. 2. p. II. q. 3. fundam. 2. ait: «*Punctus est substantia posita*, ut dicit Philosophus, i. e. essentia habens positionem, in quo differt ab unitate».

en: Aristotle, I. *Posterior [Analytics]*, c. 23 (c. 27): «*Unity is a substance without position, but a point is a posited substance*». A similar [statement] is had in V. *Metaph.* text 12 (IV. c. 6). St. Bonaventure, II. *Sent.* d. 2, p. II, q. 3, fundam. 2, says: «*A point is a posited substance*, as the Philosopher says, i. e. an essence having position, wherein it differs from unity».

la: Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Vat. cum cod. *cc* *positione* pro *superpositione*.

en: Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — The Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* [reads] *positione* (position) in place of *superpositione* (superposition).

la: Cfr. supra d. 16. dub. 4. 5. — Hoc dubium solvit etiam S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above d. 16, dub. 4, 5. — This doubt is also solved by St. Thomas, here near the *littera*.

translators_notes: This chunk contains DUB. I, DUB. II, DUB. III, and DUB. IV — the full set of four dubia for d. 25, drawn from `raw/bonaventure_vol1_pt2_raw.txt` lines 2773–2999. The text spans printed pages 445–447 of the Quaracchi edition, set in two columns throughout. On p. 447 the dubia conclude in the body of DUB. IV's response (last anchor [^d]); col-B of p. 447 already begins *DISTINCTIO XXVI* and is therefore excluded from this chunk and from its apparatus block. The 16 numbered apparatus entries [^1]–[^16] cover pp. 445–446 footers; entries [^17]–[^20] cover the col-A footer of p. 447 (which carries d. 25 dubia notes only — the col-B footer of p. 447 belongs to d. 26 and is handled in `bon-sent-I-d26-littera.md`).