title: Dist. 2

title_alt: Quod Verbum carnem assumsit mediante anima; et quid nomine humanae naturae intelligatur

title_alt: The Word assumed flesh through the medium of a soul; what He assumed of human nature

source_text:
<!-- page 35 -->

# DISTINCTIO II.

### Cap. I.
*Quare totam humanam naturam accepit, et quid nomine humanitatis vel humanae naturae intelligendum sit.*

Et quia in homine tota humana natura vitio corrupta erat, totam assumsit, id est animam et carnem, ut totam curaret et sanctificaret. — Quod autem humanae naturae sive *humanitatis* vocabulo anima et caro intelligi debeant, aperte docet Hieronymus[^1] in Expositione catholicae fidei dicens: « Sic confitemur in Christo unam Filii esse personam, ut dicamus, duas perfectas et integras esse substantias, id est deitatis et humanitatis, quae ex anima continetur et corpore ». — Ecce aperte ostendit, *humanitatis* nomine animam et corpus intelligi, quae duo assumsisse Dei Filius intelligitur, ubi hominem sive humanitatem vel humanam naturam accepisse[^2] legitur. — Errant igitur qui nomine *humanitatis* non substantiam, sed proprietatem quandam, a qua homo nominatur, significari contendunt, ubicumque Christi humanitas memoratur. Ait enim Ioannes Damascenus[^3]: « Sciendum quidem est, quod deitatis et humanitatis nomen substantiarum, scilicet naturarum, est repraesentativum ». Natura enim non sic accipitur in Christo, ut cum dicitur una natura esse omnium hominum; quod evidenter idem Ioannes ostendit, differentem rationem dicti assignans, cum natura humana in Christo nominatur, et cum dicitur una natura omnium hominum. Ait enim[^4]: « Cum unam hominum naturam dicimus, sciendum est, quod non considerantes ad animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus[^5]. Impossibile enim est unius naturae dicere Domini corpus et animam, ad invicem comparata. Sed quia plurimae personae hominum sunt, omnes autem eandem suscipiunt rationem naturae — omnes enim ex anima et corpore compositi sunt, et omnes naturam animae participant et substantiam corporis possident — communem speciem plurimarum et differentium personarum unam naturam dicimus, uniuscuiusque scilicet personae duas naturas habentis et in duabus perfecte naturis existentis, animae scilicet et corporis. In Domino autem Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque enim factus est, nec est nec aliquando fiet *alius*. Sed Christus, ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate Deus perfectus, idem et homo perfectus ». — Totam igitur hominis naturam, id est animam et carnem, et horum proprietates sive accidentia assumsit Deus, non carnem sine anima, nec animam sine ratione[^6], ut haeretici voluerunt, sed et carnem et animam cum sensibus suis. Unde Ioannes Damascenus ait[^7]: « Omnia quae in nostra natura plantavit Deus, Verbum assumsit, scilicet corpus et animam intellectualem, et horum idiomata ». « Totus enim totum assumsit me, ut toti mihi salutem gratificaret. Quod enim inassumtibile est incurabile est ».

### Cap. II.
*De unione Verbi et carnis mediante anima.*

Assumsit igitur Dei Filius carnem et animam, sed carnem mediante anima[^8]: « Unitum est carni per medium intellectum, Verbum Dei ». Tantae enim subtilitatis atque simplicitatis est divina essentia, ut corpori de limo terrae formato uniri non congruerit, nisi mediante rationali essentia. Illa autem unio inexplicabilis est adeo, ut etiam Ioannes[^9], ab utero sanctificatus, se non esse dignum fateatur solvere corrigiam calceamenti Iesu, quia illius unionis modum investigare aliisque explicare non erat sufficiens. « Non sunt igitur audiendi qui non verum hominem Filium Dei suscepisse dicunt, neque natum de femina, sed falsam carnem et imaginem corporis simulatam ostendisse videntibus[^10] ». In quem errorem prorumpunt, quia timent, quod fieri non potest, scilicet, ne humana carne veritas et substantia Dei inquinetur; « et tamen praedicant, istum visibilem solem radios suos per omnes faeces et sordes corporum spargere et eos mundos et sinceros servare. Si ergo visibilia munda a visibilibus immundis contingi possunt et non coinquinari, quanto magis incommutabilis et invisibilis Veritas, per spiritum animam et per animam corpus suscipiens, totum hominem sine sui contaminatione assumsit et ab omnibus infirmitatibus liberavit ». — Ecce hic dicit, Dei Sapientiam per spiritum assumsisse animam, et per animam corpus. Spiritus enim, scilicet pars animae superior, maiori similitudine Deo propinquat quam anima, scilicet ipsa eadem secundum inferiorem partem, et anima magis quam corpus; et ideo non incongrue anima dicitur assumta per spiritum, et corpus per animam[^11].

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### Cap. III.
*Quod simul assumsit animam et carnem Verbum, nec caro prius est concepta quam assumta.*

Si autem quaeritur, utrum Verbum carnem simul et animam assumserit, an prius animam quam carnem, vel carnem quam animam; et utrum caro illa prius fuerit in utero Virginis concepta et postea assumta; verissime et absque ulla ambiguitate dicitur, quia, ex quo hominem Deus assumsit, totum assumsit simulque sibi univit animam et carnem; nec caro prius fuit concepta, et postmodum assumta, sed in conceptione assumta et in assumtione concepta. Unde Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum[^12]: « Firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, non carnem Christi sine divinitate conceptam in utero Virginis, priusquam susciperetur a Verbo, sed ipsum Deum suae carnis acceptione conceptum, ipsamque carnem Verbi incarnatione conceptam ». Idem in libro de Trinitate[^13]: Non esset Dei hominumque mediator, nisi esset idem Deus, idem homo, in utroque unus et verus, quam servilem formam, a solo Filio susceptam, tota Trinitas, cuius una est voluntas et operatio, fecit. Non autem in utero Virginis prius caro suscepta est, et postmodum divinitas venit in carnem, sed mox ut Verbum venit in uterum, servata veritate propriae naturae, factum est caro et perfectus homo, id est, in veritate carnis et animae natus est. — De hoc etiam Gregorius in Moralibus[^14] ait: « Angelo nuntiante et Spiritu adveniente, mox Verbum in utero, mox intra uterum Verbum caro ».

english:
# DISTINCTION II.

### Chapter I.
*Why He assumed the whole human nature, and what is to be understood by the name of humanity or human nature.*

And because in man the whole human nature had been corrupted by sin, He assumed the whole, that is, soul and flesh, in order to heal and sanctify the whole. — But that by the word of human nature or *humanity* soul and flesh ought to be understood, Jerome[^1] plainly teaches in his Exposition of the Catholic Faith, saying: "Thus we confess in Christ that there is one person of the Son, in such a way that we say there are two perfect and integral substances, that is, of deity and of humanity, which [latter] is constituted of soul and body." — Behold, he plainly shows that by the name of *humanity* are understood soul and body, which two the Son of God is understood to have assumed, wherever He is read[^2] to have assumed man, or humanity, or human nature. — They err, therefore, who contend that by the name of *humanity* is signified not a substance, but a certain property, from which a man is named, wherever Christ's humanity is mentioned. For John Damascene says[^3]: "It must indeed be known that the name of deity and of humanity is representative of substances, that is, of natures." For nature is not taken in Christ in the way it is when one nature is said to be of all men; which the same John evidently shows, assigning a different account of the statement, when human nature is named in Christ, and when one nature of all men is spoken of. For he says[^4]: "When we say one nature of men, it must be known that we say this without regard to the account of soul and body[^5]. For it is impossible to call the Lord's body and soul of one nature, compared to one another. But because there are many persons of men, and all receive the same account of nature — for all are composed of soul and body, and all participate in the nature of soul and possess the substance of body — we call the common species of the many and differing persons one nature, namely of each person having two natures and existing perfectly in two natures, namely of soul and of body. But in the Lord Jesus Christ there is no common species to be taken. For He was not made, nor is, nor ever will be *another*. But Christ, of deity and of humanity, in deity and humanity perfect God, is likewise perfect man." — Therefore God assumed the whole nature of man, that is, soul and flesh, and their properties or accidents — not flesh without soul, nor soul without reason[^6], as the heretics wished, but both flesh and soul with their senses. Hence John Damascene says[^7]: "All things that God planted in our nature the Word assumed, namely body and intellectual soul, and their idioms." "For the whole assumed the whole of me, that He might bestow salvation on the whole of me. For what is unassumable is incurable."

### Chapter II.
*On the union of the Word and the flesh through the medium of a soul.*

The Son of God therefore assumed flesh and soul, but flesh through the medium of a soul[^8]: "United to flesh through the medium of the intellect is the Word of God." For the divine essence is of such great subtlety and simplicity that it would not have been fitting for it to be united to a body formed from the slime of the earth, except through the medium of a rational essence. And that union is so inexplicable that even John[^9], sanctified from the womb, confesses himself not worthy to loose the strap of Jesus' sandal, because he was not sufficient to investigate the mode of that union and to explain it to others. "Therefore those are not to be heard who say that the Son of God did not take up a true man, nor was born of a woman, but showed false flesh and a simulated image of a body to those who saw[^10]." Into which error they rush headlong because they fear what cannot happen, namely, that the truth and substance of God should be defiled by human flesh; "and yet they preach that this visible sun scatters its rays through all the dregs and filth of bodies and keeps them clean and pure. If, therefore, clean visible things can be touched by filthy visible things and not be polluted, how much more did the immutable and invisible Truth, taking up a soul through the spirit and a body through the soul, assume the whole man without contamination of itself and free him from all infirmities." — Behold, here he says that the Wisdom of God assumed a soul through the spirit, and a body through the soul. For the spirit, namely the superior part of the soul, approaches God by a greater likeness than the soul, namely the same [soul] in its inferior part, and the soul more than the body; and therefore not unfittingly is the soul said to be assumed through the spirit, and the body through the soul[^11].

### Chapter III.
*That the Word assumed soul and flesh simultaneously, and the flesh was not conceived before it was assumed.*

But if it is asked whether the Word assumed flesh and soul simultaneously, or the soul before the flesh, or the flesh before the soul; and whether that flesh was first conceived in the Virgin's womb and afterwards assumed; it is said most truly and without any ambiguity that, from the moment God assumed man, He assumed the whole and at once united to Himself soul and flesh; nor was the flesh first conceived and afterwards assumed, but conceived in being assumed and assumed in being conceived. Hence Augustine in the book On the Faith to Peter[^12]: "Hold most firmly, and in no way doubt, that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the Virgin's womb without the divinity, before it was taken up by the Word, but that God Himself was conceived by the assumption of His flesh, and that the very flesh was conceived by the incarnation of the Word." The same in the book On the Trinity[^13]: He would not be the mediator of God and men, were He not the same God, the same man, in both one and true — which servile form, taken up by the Son alone, the whole Trinity, whose will and operation is one, made. Nor in the Virgin's womb was the flesh first taken up and the divinity afterwards came into the flesh, but as soon as the Word came into the womb, the truth of His proper nature being preserved, He was made flesh and perfect man, that is, was born in the truth of flesh and soul. — Concerning this Gregory also in the Morals[^14] says: "When the angel announced and the Spirit came, at once the Word was in the womb, at once within the womb the Word was flesh."

la: Explanatio Symboli ad Damasum. — Edd. I, 6, 8 cum cod. D *id est divinitatis* pro *id est deitatis*, refragante etiam originali.

en: Explanation of the Creed to Damasus. — Editions I, 6, 8, with codex D, [read] *that is, of divinity* for *that is, of deity*, the original also being against it.

la: Cod. D *assumsisse*. — De praepositione sequenti cfr. de Ecclesiast. Dogm. c. 2. 5.

en: Codex D [reads] *to have assumed*. — On the following preposition, cf. *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* c. 2, 5.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 4.

en: Book III of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 4.

la: Ibid. c. 3.

en: Ibid., c. 3.

la: Edd. I, 8 addunt: *ut dicimus, in singulis hominibus eandem esse naturam corporis et animae, quia alia est natura animae, alia corporis*, refragantibus aliis edd. cum codd. et originali. Deinde post *speciem accipere* ed. 8 addit *quid prius fuit*, at ed. I *si quid sit res alicuius speciei, ipsum fit aliud ab omni re, quae prius fuit; non sic factus est homo, quia homo scilicet non confert ei esse, sicut aliis hominibus*. Etiam hoc deest in originali.

en: Editions I, 8 add: *as we say, that in individual men the nature of body and soul is the same, because the nature of the soul is one, that of the body another*, the other editions, with the codices and the original, being against it. Then after *to take a species* edition 8 adds *what was before*, but edition I [adds] *if a thing be something of some species, it itself becomes another from every thing that was before; man was not made thus, because man, namely, does not confer being on him, as on other men*. This too is absent from the original.

la: Vat. et edd. 5, 6 cum cod. E et Erf. non ita bene *sine carne*. Sed cod. Erf. in marg. dicit alii: *sine ratione*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 5, 6, with codex E and Erfurt, [read] not so well *without flesh*. But the Erfurt codex in the margin says others [read]: *without reason*.

la: Ibid. c. 6.; seq. locus paulum inferius, ubi codd. A B C D cum edd. I, 8 et originali Graeco transpositis verbis, legunt *Totum enim totus assumsit me*, et in fine cum plerisque codd. *gratificet* pro *gratificavet*.

en: Ibid., c. 6; the following passage a little below, where codices A B C D, with editions I, 8 and the Greek original, with the words transposed, read *For the whole assumed the whole of me*, and at the end, with most codices, *that He may bestow* for *bestowed*.

la: Edd. I, 8 addunt *Unde Ioannes Damascenus*. Locus cit. est ibid. Sanam huius sententiae explanationem exhibet Comment. infra n. 3. q. I.

en: Editions I, 8 add *Hence John Damascene*. The cited passage is in the same place. The Commentary below, n. 3, q. I, presents a sound explanation of this sentence.

la: Baptista, ut narratur Io. 1, 27. — Edd. I, 8 post *sanctificatus* addunt hanc glossam *id est ab originali mundatus*.

en: The Baptist, as related in John 1:27. — Editions I, 8, after *sanctified*, add this gloss: *that is, cleansed from original [sin]*.

la: August. de Agone christiano c. 18. n. 20, ubi est etiam seq. locus.

en: Augustine, *On the Christian Struggle* c. 18, n. 20, where the following passage also is found.

la: De his cfr. auctor libri de Spiritu et anima c. 14.

en: On these matters cf. the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 14.

la: Cap. 18. n. 61. — Pro *ipsum Deum* cod. D et ed. I *ipsum Verbum Domini*, sed originale *Verbum Deum*.

en: Chapter 18, n. 61. — For *God Himself* codex D and edition I [read] *the Word of the Lord Himself*, but the original [reads] *the Word, God*.

la: Scilicet variis in locis in unum collectis. Prop. prima: *Non esset* etc. collecta esse videtur ex II. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9, et IV. c. 7. 8, c. 20. n. 30. Secunda prop.: *Non autem* etc. (quae etiam a S. Bonav., infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. fund. 3. Augustino tribuitur) quoad sensum occurrit XIII. c. 17. n. 22. his verbis: *Ex quo homo esse coepit, ex illo est et Deus, unde dictum est: Verbum caro factum est*. Cfr. etiam Enchirid. c. 36. n. 11. et libr. contra Sermonem Arianorum c. 8. n. 6: « Ipse namque unus Christus et Dei Filius semper natura et hominis filius, qui ex tempore assumtus est gratia, nec sic assumtus est, ut prius creatus post assumeretur, sed ut ipsa assumtione crearetur ». Convenit in sententia et nonnullis verbis etiam Gregor. loco mox citato.

en: That is, [a text] gathered into one from various places. The first proposition, *He would not be* etc., seems to be collected from *On the Trinity* II, c. 8, n. 9, and IV, c. 7, 8, c. 20, n. 30. The second proposition, *Nor however* etc. (which is also attributed to Augustine by St. Bonaventure below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, fund. 3), occurs as to its sense in XIII, c. 17, n. 22, in these words: *From the time man began to be, from that time God too is [man], whence it is said: The Word was made flesh*. Cf. also the *Enchiridion* c. 36, n. 11, and the book *Against the Sermon of the Arians* c. 8, n. 6: "For He, the one Christ and Son of God, is always by nature also son of man, who in time was assumed by grace, and was not so assumed that, having first been created, He was afterwards taken up, but so that He was created in the very assumption." It agrees in sense and in some words also with Gregory in the passage just cited.

la: Libr. XVIII. c. 52. n. 85.

en: Book XVIII, c. 52, n. 85.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p035-{L,R}-{0,2}.png`, `vol3-p036-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`) as base for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing. Littera body = raw lines **3043–3126** (`DISTINCTIO II.` opener through Cap. III tail `…mox intra uterum Verbum caro ».`). Running heads confirm pages: p.35 L `DISTINCTIO II.` / R `35`; p.36 L `36` / R `…IARUM LIB. III.`

**Content.** Lombard's *littera* for Distinctio II in three chapters: **Cap. I** (`Quare totam humanam naturam accepit…`, ends `…idem et homo perfectus`), **Cap. II** (`De unione Verbi et carnis mediante anima`), **Cap. III** (`Quod simul assumsit animam et carnem…`). `type: littera`, `has_scholion: false` (the littera carries no scholion; the commentary apparatus belongs to the divisio).

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page footer restart, 14 entries).** **p.35** = `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footers 1–11 → `[^1]`–`[^11]` (Cap. I + Cap. II markers; L-col footers 1–5, R-col footers 6–11, confirmed on the column bands). **p.36** = `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footers 1–3 → `[^12]`–`[^14]` (Cap. III markers `1`/`2`/`3`: Fide ad Petrum, de Trinitate, Moralibus). These three p.36 littera notes print physically ABOVE the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` divider.

**COMMENTARIUS forward (NOT included here).** `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.` (OCR `IN BISTINCTIONEM II`) begins at raw **3127** (printed p.36, immediately after Cap. III's tail), followed by `DIVISIO TEXTUS` (raw 3133) and `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (raw 3144). All three belong to **`bon-sent-III-d2-divisio`** and are excluded. The **`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.`** footer block (raw 3160+: `1 Cum edd. supplevimus de eadem…`, `2 In cod. bb…`, `3 Edd. congruitas ad unionem…`) annotates the commentary body and is FORWARDED to the divisio — not rendered here.

**Boundary lock.** Cap. III ends grammatically complete at `…mox intra uterum Verbum caro ».` (p.36 R-col, raw 3126). The COMMENTARIUS opener (`Et quia in homine tota humana natura vitio corrupta erat etc.`, raw 3127–3128) is continuous and is the divisio's lemma — verified no cascade-merge splice at the seam.

**Marker pairing.** 14 La = 14 En = 14 defs; 0 anchorless, 0 defless (verified programmatically).

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in distinctionem II: divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Division of the text and the questions of Distinction II

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 36 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

#### *De incarnatione ex parte naturae assumtae.*

*Et quia in homine tota humana natura vitio corrupta erat etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de incarnatione ex parte personae assumentis; in hac parte agit de eadem[^1] ex parte naturae assumtae. Dividitur autem pars ista in tres partes. In quarum prima determinat veritatem. In secunda confutat errores, ibi: *Non sunt ergo audiendi* etc. In tertia vero removet quandam dubitationem, ibi: *Si autem quaeritur, utrum Verbum carnem* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas partes. In quarum prima parte determinat Magister de natura assumta quantum ad partium suarum integritatem[^2]. Secundo quantum ad ordinem, ibi: *Assumsit igitur Dei Filius carnem et animam.* Subdivisiones autem partium manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidunt quaestiones circa tria. Et quaeritur primo de natura assumta quantum ad unionis congruitatem.

Secundo vero quaeritur quantum ad partium integritatem.

Tertio vero quaeritur quantum ad dispositionis sive medii necessitatem.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in rationali natura quam in toto universo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in homine[^3] quam in Angelo.

Tertio, utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in tota specie quam in uno individuo.

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II.

#### *On the incarnation with respect to the nature assumed.*

*And because in man the whole of human nature had been corrupted by sin, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the incarnation with respect to the person assuming; in this part he treats of the same[^1] with respect to the nature assumed. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he determines the truth [of the matter]. In the second he refutes errors, there: *They are therefore not to be heard,* etc. In the third he removes a certain doubt, there: *But if it is asked whether the Word [took on] flesh,* etc.

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the nature assumed with respect to the integrity of its parts[^2]. Secondly, with respect to order, there: *The Son of God therefore assumed flesh and a soul.* But the subdivisions of the parts are manifest in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, questions arise concerning three things. And it is asked first concerning the nature assumed with respect to the fittingness of the union.

Secondly, it is asked with respect to the integrity of the parts.

Thirdly, it is asked with respect to the necessity of the disposition or of the means.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether there is greater fittingness for union in a rational nature than in the whole universe.

Secondly it is asked whether there is greater fittingness in man[^3] than in an Angel.

Thirdly, whether there is greater fittingness for union in a whole species than in a single individual.

la: Cum edd. supplevimus *de eadem,* quae verba in codd. desunt.

en: With the editions we have supplied *de eadem* ("of the same"), which words are lacking in the codices.

la: In cod. bb legitur sic: *Prima pars dividitur in tres partes. In quarum prima... natura assumta quantum ad congruitatem. Secundo quantum ad suarum partium integritatem, ibi:* Totam igitur naturam hominis. *Tertio quantum ad ordinem* etc. Quae lectio respondet rubricae infra art. 1. praemissae.

en: In codex bb it reads thus: *The first part is divided into three parts. In the first of these... the nature assumed with respect to fittingness. Secondly with respect to the integrity of its parts, there:* The whole nature of man therefore. *Thirdly with respect to order,* etc. This reading corresponds to the rubric set out below before article 1.

la: Edd. *congruitas ad unionem in humana natura.*

en: The editions [read]: *fittingness for union in human nature.*

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column bands of PDF p.58 (printed p.36), raw OCR lines 3127–3172. OCR base used only for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing; the column-band PDF read is authoritative per the Vol II/III override. Running heads confirmed on the bands: p.36 L-col `36 SENTENTIARU[M]`, R-col `[SENTEN]TIARUM LIB. III.`
- **Content:** `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.` (OCR `IN BISTINCTIONEM II`) + subtitle *De incarnatione ex parte naturae assumtae* + lemma *Et quia in homine tota humana natura vitio corrupta erat etc.* + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` (two-paragraph split, reflowed L-col then R-col) + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the question listing for d.2's first article; only the divisio is translated, the question list is rendered as printed).
- **Page-split map:** ALL of the divisio's body and ALL three of its apparatus footers print on **printed p.36** (PDF 58). The hand-off briefing listed `printed_pages: [36, 37]` / `pdf_pages: [58, 59]`; this was based on the running head `DiST. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 37` (raw 3170) appearing inside the naive raw line range. Verified on the column bands that no divisio body or footer falls on p.37 — p.37 holds only the `ARTICULUS I.` / `QUAESTIO I.` opener and its own footers (which annotate q1's body, e.g. *Persona enim est, ut Boeth., de Una Persona...*). Set to `[36]` / `[58]` for accuracy.
- **Incoming hand-off picked up (from d2-littera, commit 791a961):** The p.36 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footers (the three entries beneath the divider) are THIS chunk's. Rendered as `[^1]`–`[^3]`: `[^1]` *de eadem* anchors the DIVISIO opener; `[^2]` *bb-codex tres partes* anchors the DIVISIO `integritatem²`; `[^3]` *Edd. congruitas* anchors the TRACTATIO `in homine³`. The p.36 footers printed ABOVE the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` divider (`1 Cap. 18. n. 61. — Pro ipsum Deum cod. D et ed. 1...`, `2 Scilicet variis in locis...`, `3 Libr. XVIII. c. 52. n. 85.`) are the littera's `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` notes — already consumed by d2-littera as `[^12]`–`[^14]`; NOT re-rendered here.
- **Forward hand-off to d2-a1-q1 (raw 3173–~3346, printed p.37+):** `ARTICULUS I.` (raw 3173, subtitle *De natura assumta quantum ad unionis congruitatem*) folds into `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 3178, title *Utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in rationali creatura quam in toto universo*). Opener: *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in rationali natura quam in toto universo, an e contrario. Et quod maior sit con[gruitas...].* Sed contra opener: *Augustinus ad Volusianum: « In rebus mirabilibus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis »: ergo cum incarnatio sit assumtio creaturae...* Marginal labels seen on p.36/37 bands: *Dubium 3.*, *Fulgentius*, *Augustinus*, *Gregorius* (these are the littera's Cap. III margin labels), and *Ad oppositum* on p.37. The p.37 footers (`1 Persona enim est, ut Boeth., de Una Persona...`, `2 Vide infra d. 6...`, `3 Cfr. II. Sent. d. 15...`, `4 Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16...`, `5 Epist. 137...`, `6 Gregor. Nyssen., Orat. catechet. c. 27...`) all belong to d2-a1-q1 — no p.37 footer splits back to the divisio. Check for an ART. I scholion when building d2-a1-q1.
- **No `[?]` flags.** Marker pairing: 3 La = 3 En = 3 defs, 0 anchorless / 0 defless (verified). The OCR `de eadem1` superscript-on-text and the damaged `integritatem -.` superscript `²` were resolved against the column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De natura assumta quantum ad unionis congruitatem.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in rationali creatura quam in toto universo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in rationali natura quam in toto universo, an e contrario. Et quod maior sit congruitas in rationali natura, videtur:

1. *Primo*, quia Deus assumsit solam rationalem naturam: si ergo Deus semper facit quod melius est et magis congruum, videtur, quod maior sit congruitas in rationali natura quam in tota machina mundana.

2. *Item*, natura creata assumta est in unitatem personae; et quod magis idoneum est ad unitatem personalem, magis idoneum est ad assumtionem: si ergo dignitas personalis non est nisi in creatura rationali[^1], videtur, quod illam solam maxime congruum sit uniri.

3. *Item*, unionis gratia maior est, quam sit gratia fruitionis vel beatificationis[^2]; sed sola natura rationalis est disposita ad fruitionem: ergo sola videtur quod habeat congruentiam ad unionem.

4. *Item*, totum universum factum est propter creaturam rationalem[^3]: ergo rationalis creatura excellentior est omnibus aliis, quae sunt de constitutione universi: ergo ad Deum magis accedit; et quod magis ad Deum accedit magis est congruum Deo uniri: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, universum totum non dicitur factum ad Dei imaginem et similitudinem, sed sola rationalis creatura; sed imago dicit similitudinem expressam: ergo inter omnes creaturas sola rationalis creatura expressius assimilatur Deo[^4]. Sed illud solum est congruum ad unionem cum Deo, quod habet expressam similitudinem cum eo: ergo idem quod prius.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus *ad Volusianum*[^5]: « In rebus mirabilibus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis »: ergo cum incarnatio sit assumtio creaturae et sit opus mirabile, videtur, quod tota ratio assumtionis sit ex parte facientis: ergo non est maior congruitas in rationali natura quam in alia natura creata.

2. *Item*, infinite distantium non magis approximat unum quam alterum; sed omnis creatura distat a divina natura in infinitum: ergo non est congruitas in rationali creatura magis quam in aliis[^6].

3. *Item*, incarnatio facit aliquo modo ad complementum totius universi[^7]; sed magis perficeretur universum, si Deus uniretur ipsi toti quam ipsi parti: ergo videtur, quod magis sit habilis ad unionem universitas tota quam rationalis creatura.

4. *Item*, effectus universalis magis assimilatur causae universali quam effectus particularis[^8]; sed universum claudit in se universaliter omnem effectum Dei: ergo magis assimilatur Deo quam rationalis natura. Sed quod magis assimilatur Deo maiorem habet congruentiam ad unionem: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, illud est magis unibile, in cuius assumtione magis manifestatur divina potentia, sapientia et bonitas; sed universum est huiusmodi. *Probatio minoris:* magis enim manifestatur divina potentia, sapientia et bonitas in conditione totius universitatis quam alicuius eius partis, quia, cum quaelibet pars eius sit bona, eius universum est non solum bonum, sed etiam *valde bonum*[^9]: ergo si magis manifestatur in universitatis conditione, multo magis videtur, quod manifestetur in universitatis assumtione.

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### Conclusio.

> Non est tanta congruitas ad unionem in tota universitate, sicut est in eius parte aliqua, scilicet rationali creatura.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non est tanta nobilitas[^10] ad unionem in tota universitate, sicut est in eius parte aliqua, utpote in rationali natura.

Et ratio huius est defectus *unitatis*, et *personalis dignitatis*, et *similitudinis* sive conformitatis, qui quidem reperitur[^11] in tota universitate; et propterea non est idonea ad unionem cum persona divina, sicut rationalis creatura. — Universum enim habet *partium multitudinem* differentium numero, genere et specie; et ideo non competit ad unionem cum Deo in *hypostasis unitate*[^12]. — Habet etiam partes *carentes vita et ratione et sensu*, et ideo deficientes ab excellentia proprietatis personalis, et propter hoc non habet idoneitatem ad unionem in unitate *personae*. — Habet etiam partes, in quibus reperitur solum ratio vestigii, et ideo *deficientes a conformitate expressae similitudinis*, et propterea ineptas ad tantam *excellentiam unionis*. — In rationali autem creatura reperiri potest *unitas*, et *personalis dignitas*, et *expressa conformitas*; et ideo maior est in ea ad assumtionem idoneitas sive congruitas. — Et propterea rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

*1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Augustini, quod tota ratio facti est potentia facientis; dicendum, quod est ratio *causalitatis* et ratio *congruitatis*: causalitatis in efficiendo, congruitatis in suscipiendo. Cum ergo dicit Augustinus, quod ratio facti tota est potentia facientis, intelligit de ratione *causalitatis*, non de ratione *congruitatis*.

*2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinitate distantium, dicendum, quod sicut habitum est in primo et secundo[^13], cum dicitur, quod omnis creatura distat a Deo in infinitum, intelligitur de distantia *per recessum ab aequalitate et participatione tertiae naturae*, quia nihil univocum est creaturae ad Creatorem, in nullo etiam creatura Creatori potest aequari; sed non habet veritatem de distantia, quae attenditur *per oppositionem*[^14] *ad convenientiam secundum rationem ordinis et imitationis*. Nam rationalis creatura *immediate in Deum ordinatur* et *expressissime* inter creaturas *Deum imitatur*; et ratione huius *assimilationis* et *convenientiae* habet rationem imaginis et congruitatem respectu divinae unionis.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnatio[^15] facit ad completionem universi; dicendum, quod hoc *accidit*; nihilominus tamen congruentius facit ad complementum universi in assumtione nobilissimae creaturae quam omnium; quoniam *multitudo* habet reduci ad aliquod *unum* sicut ad complementum, quia status est in unitate magis quam in multitudine[^16]. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis assimilatur universum totum[^17] quam rationalis creatura; dicendum, quod assimilari dicitur dupliciter: *intensive* vel *extensive*. Et extensive verum est, quod magis assimilatur mundo archetypo sive Deo maior mundus quam minor, sive universitas tota quam rationalis creatura. *Qualitative* sive *intensive* est e converso propter magnam distantiam aliquarum partium eius, in quibus relucet divina bonitas de longinquo sicut in vestigio.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis manifestatur divina potentia, sapientia et bonitas, si assumeret universum; dicendum, quod falsum est; quia facere per unionem, quod asinus fieret Deus vel aliquod aliud[^18] brutum, potius dedeceret divinam potentiam et sapientiam, quam commendaret. Facere autem, quod homo sit Deus, in nullo praeiudicat nec potentiae nec sapientiae, cum homo natus sit effici deiformis. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod magis manifestatur divina potentia et sapientia in conditione universitatis quam in conditione alicuius suae partis; pro eo quod decet divinam potentiam et sapientiam non solum producere ad esse creaturas magis nobiles, sed etiam minus nobiles; et ideo tam in his quam in illis commen-

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datur, et magis manifestatur in omnibus simul quam in aliqua earum per se; non sic autem est de assumtione, sicut visum est.

english:
### Article I. *On the assumed nature with respect to the fittingness of the union.*
### Question I. *Whether the fittingness for union is greater in a rational creature than in the whole universe.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and it is asked whether the fittingness is greater in a rational nature than in the whole universe, or the contrary. And that the fittingness is greater in a rational nature seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, because God assumed only a rational nature: if therefore God always does what is better and more fitting, it seems that the fittingness is greater in a rational nature than in the whole world-machine.

2. *Likewise*, the created nature [that was] assumed is [assumed] into the unity of a person; and what is more suited to personal unity is more suited to being assumed: if therefore personal dignity exists only in a rational creature[^1], it seems that it is most fitting that it alone be united.

3. *Likewise*, the grace of union is greater than the grace of fruition or beatification[^2]; but only the rational nature is disposed to fruition: therefore it alone seems to have a fittingness for union.

4. *Likewise*, the whole universe was made for the sake of the rational creature[^3]: therefore the rational creature is more excellent than all the other things which belong to the constitution of the universe: therefore it draws nearer to God; and what draws nearer to God is more fitting to be united to God: therefore, etc.

5. *Likewise*, the whole universe is not said to be made to the image and likeness of God, but only the rational creature; but the image bespeaks an express likeness: therefore among all creatures only the rational creature is more expressly assimilated to God[^4]. But that alone is fitting for union with God which has an express likeness with him: therefore the same as before.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustine *to Volusianus*[^5]: « In marvelous things the whole account of the deed is the power of the doer »: therefore, since the incarnation is the assumption of a creature and is a marvelous work, it seems that the whole account of the assumption is on the part of the doer: therefore the fittingness is not greater in a rational nature than in another created nature.

2. *Likewise*, of things infinitely distant, the one does not approach [the other] more than the other does; but every creature is distant from the divine nature to infinity: therefore there is no greater fittingness in a rational creature than in others[^6].

3. *Likewise*, the incarnation contributes in some way to the completion of the whole universe[^7]; but the universe would be more perfected if God were united to the whole itself than to the part itself: therefore it seems that the whole universe is more apt for union than the rational creature.

4. *Likewise*, a universal effect is more assimilated to a universal cause than a particular effect is[^8]; but the universe encloses within itself universally every effect of God: therefore it is more assimilated to God than the rational nature. But what is more assimilated to God has a greater fittingness for union: therefore, etc.

5. *Likewise*, that is more unitable in whose assumption the divine power, wisdom, and goodness are more manifested; but the universe is of this kind. *Proof of the minor:* for the divine power, wisdom, and goodness are more manifested in the making of the whole universe than of any part of it, because, since each of its parts is good, its universe is not only good, but even *very good*[^9]: therefore if [it] is more manifested in the making of the universe, much more does it seem that it would be manifested in the assumption of the universe.

### Conclusio.

> The fittingness for union in the whole universe is not so great as it is in some part of it, namely in the rational creature.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that the nobility[^10] for union is not so great in the whole universe as it is in some part of it, namely in the rational nature.

And the reason for this is the defect of *unity*, and of *personal dignity*, and of *likeness* or conformity, which indeed is found[^11] in the whole universe; and therefore it is not suited for union with a divine person, as the rational creature is. — For the universe has a *multitude of parts* differing in number, genus, and species; and therefore it is not fit for union with God in the *unity of a hypostasis*[^12]. — It also has parts *lacking life and reason and sense*, and therefore falling short of the excellence of personal property, and on this account it does not have aptitude for union in the unity of a *person*. — It also has parts in which only the account of a vestige is found, and therefore *falling short of conformity to an express likeness*, and consequently unfit for so great an *excellence of union*. — But in the rational creature there can be found *unity*, and *personal dignity*, and *express conformity*; and therefore in it the aptitude or fittingness for being assumed is greater. — And consequently the arguments which show this must be granted.

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning the word of Augustine, that the whole account of the deed is the power of the doer; it must be said that there is an account of *causality* and an account of *fittingness*: of causality in the effecting, of fittingness in the receiving. When therefore Augustine says that the account of the deed is wholly the power of the doer, he understands it of the account of *causality*, not of the account of *fittingness*.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the infinity of distance, it must be said that, as was held in the first and second [book][^13], when it is said that every creature is distant from God to infinity, it is understood of the distance *by recession from the equality and participation of a third nature*, because nothing is univocal of the creature and the Creator, nor in anything can the creature be made equal to the Creator; but it does not hold true of the distance which is regarded *by opposition*[^14] *to agreement according to the account of order and imitation*. For the rational creature is *ordered immediately to God* and *most expressly* among creatures *imitates God*; and by reason of this *assimilation* and *agreement* it has the account of an image and a fittingness with respect to the divine union.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the incarnation[^15] contributes to the completion of the universe; it must be said that this is *accidental*; nevertheless it more fittingly contributes to the complement of the universe in the assumption of the noblest creature than of all of them; since a *multitude* must be reduced to some *one* as to a complement, because stability lies in unity rather than in multitude[^16]. — To that which is objected, that the whole universe is more assimilated[^17] than the rational creature; it must be said that to be assimilated is said in two ways: *intensively* or *extensively*. And extensively it is true that a greater world is more assimilated to the archetypal world or to God than a lesser one, or the whole universe more than the rational creature. *Qualitatively* or *intensively* it is the converse, on account of the great distance of some of its parts, in which the divine goodness shines back from afar as in a vestige.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the divine power, wisdom, and goodness would be more manifested if it were to assume the universe; it must be said that this is false; because to bring it about by union that an ass should become God or any other[^18] brute would rather disgrace the divine power and wisdom than commend it. But to bring it about that man should be God in no way prejudices either the power or the wisdom, since man is born to be made deiform. — Nor is that valid which it objects, that the divine power and wisdom are more manifested in the making of the universe than in the making of some part of it; for the reason that it befits the divine power and wisdom to produce into being not only the more noble creatures but also the less noble; and therefore both in these and in those [it is] commended,

and is more manifested in all together than in any of them by itself; but it is not so concerning the assumption, as has been seen.

la: Persona enim est, ut Boeth., *de Una Persona et duabus naturis*, c. 3. ait, naturae rationalis individua substantia. Cfr. infra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3; d. 10. a. 1. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. — Cod. Q *in natura rationali*.

en: For a person is, as Boethius says (*On the One Person and the Two Natures*, c. 3), the individual substance of a rational nature. Cf. below d. 5, a. 2, q. 3; d. 10, a. 1, q. 2, and I Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1. — Cod. Q [reads] *in a rational nature*.

la: Vide infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — De *minori* cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. et 3.

en: See below d. 6, a. 2, q. 2 ff. — On the *minor* cf. I Sent., d. 1, a. 2 and 3.

en: Letter 137 (otherwise 3), c. 2, n. 8.

la: Gregor. Nyssen., *Orat. catechet.* c. 27, contra eos qui turpitudini et dedecori ducunt, Deum carnem et corpus terrestre assumsisse, ait: Nihilo tolerabilior videtur esse turpitudo et dedecus, quod Deus coelestis corporis figuram susceperit quam terrestris. Ab eius enim, qui est altissimus et ad cuius altitudinem non patet aditus, natura ex aequo distat omnis creatura, et sunt omnia ei aequaliter subiecta... Neque ergo terra est remotior a suprema illa dignitate, neque caelum propinquius etc. Cfr. Tertull., *de Carne Christi*, c. 4.

en: Gregory of Nyssa, *Catechetical Oration* c. 27, against those who hold it shameful and disgraceful that God assumed flesh and an earthly body, says: The shame and disgrace seem in no way more tolerable that God took on the figure of a heavenly body than of an earthly one. For from him who is highest, and to whose height there is no access, every creature is equally distant by nature, and all things are equally subject to him... Therefore the earth is no more remote from that supreme dignity, nor the heaven nearer, etc. Cf. Tertullian, *On the Flesh of Christ*, c. 4.

la: De quo vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — In fine arg. pro *universitas* codd. A G H L N T U V perperam *universitatis*.

en: On which see above d. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — At the end of the argument, for *universitas* codices A G H L N T U V wrongly [read] *universitatis*.

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 1. et 4.

en: Cf. the *Book of Causes*, propositions 1 and 4.

la: Gen. 1, 31: Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. — De hac re August., *Enchirid.* c. 10. n. 3. dicit, quod « a bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia, et nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona, sed tamen bona etiam singula, simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo ».

en: Gen. 1:31: And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. — On this matter Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 10, n. 3, says that « all things were created by the good Trinity, and [are] neither supremely nor equally nor immutably good, yet good even singly, and together [are] all very good, because from all there results the admirable beauty of the universe ».

la: Cod. F *habilitas*, codd. M O *nobilitas vel habilitas*, cod. N a secunda manu *congruitas*, Vat. *nobilitas vel congruitas*. Subinde cod. T omittit *ad unionem*; pro *in tota universitate* Vat. substituit *in totius universitatis assumtione*.

en: Cod. F [reads] *habilitas* [aptitude], codd. M O *nobilitas vel habilitas*, cod. N in a second hand *congruitas*, the Vatican [edition] *nobilitas vel congruitas*. Then cod. T omits *ad unionem*; for *in tota universitate* the Vatican substitutes *in totius universitatis assumtione*.

la: Edd. *quae quidem non reperitur*; plurimi codd., textum obscurantes, *quae quidem reperitur*, quam lectionem fide codd. P R U emendavimus substituentes *qui* (defectus) pro *quae*.

en: The editions [read] *quae quidem non reperitur*; very many codices, obscuring the text, [read] *quae quidem reperitur*, which reading we have emended on the authority of codices P R U, substituting *qui* (defect) for *quae*.

la: Libr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1, d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 3, d. 7. q. 4, d. 8. p. II. q. 1, d. 25. a. 2. q. 2, d. 35. q. 1; II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Codd. H Z addunt *libro*, Vat. *libris*. Mox post *de distantia* codd. L aa subiungunt *quae attenditur*; subinde pro *tertiae* edd. substituunt *aeternae*, et post pauca Vat. sola *in nullo enim* pro *in nullo etiam*.

en: Book I Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, ad 3, d. 7, q. 4, d. 8, p. II, q. 1, d. 25, a. 2, q. 2, d. 35, q. 1; II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — Codd. H Z add *libro*, the Vatican *libris*. Soon after *de distantia* codd. L aa append *quae attenditur*; then for *tertiae* the editions substitute *aeternae*, and a little after, the Vatican alone [reads] *in nullo enim* for *in nullo etiam*.

la: Cod. E (K a secunda manu) *comparationem*. Circa finem solut. post *convenientiae* codd. M O inserunt *magis*, et subinde pro *et congruitatem* cod. K exhibet *et per hoc congruitatem*.

en: Cod. E (K in a second hand) [reads] *comparationem*. Near the end of the solution, after *convenientiae* codd. M O insert *magis*, and then for *et congruitatem* cod. K presents *et per hoc congruitatem*.

la: Vox *incarnatio* deest in multis codd.

en: The word *incarnatio* is lacking in many codices.

la: Aristot., II. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 22. (c. 4.): Prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis. Cfr. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 5. § 6. seq., et Boeth., *de Unitate et uno*, atque I. *de Arithmet.* c. 2. 3. et 7.

en: Aristotle, II *On the Heaven and the World*, text 22 (c. 4): By nature, in each genus, the one is prior to the many. Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 5, § 6 ff., and Boethius, *On Unity and the One*, and I *On Arithmetic* c. 2, 3, and 7.

la: Codd. M O adiungunt *suae causae*. Mox pro *dicitur* codd. F K Z habent *est*. Subinde post *Et extensive* cod. F adicit *sive quantitate*, et paulo inferius post *Qualitative* idem cod. F inserit *autem*. — De mundo archetypo vide tom. II. pag. 16, nota 1, ubi et verba Platonis de eo. Non possumus non afferre ex Boeth., III. *de Consol.* metr. 9, pulcros hos versus: *Tu cuncta superno / Ducis ab exemplo, pulcrum pulcherrimus ipse, / Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans, / Perfectasque iubens perfectum absolvere partes.*

en: Codd. M O add *suae causae*. Soon, for *dicitur* codd. F K Z have *est*. Then after *Et extensive* cod. F adds *sive quantitate*, and a little below, after *Qualitative* the same cod. F inserts *autem*. — On the archetypal world see tom. II, p. 16, note 1, where also are the words of Plato about it. We cannot but adduce from Boethius, III *On Consolation*, meter 9, these beautiful verses: *Thou drawest all things from the supernal exemplar, most beautiful, [thyself] bearing the beautiful world in [thy] mind, and forming [it] after a like image, and bidding the perfect [whole] complete [its] parts as perfect.*

la: Codd. G H K L N P V Z *aliquod animal*.

en: Codd. G H K L N P V Z [read] *aliquod animal* [some animal].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conveniunt auctores in hoc, quod nulla creatura dicitur assumtibilis secundum unionem hypostaticam nec a potentia aliqua *activa*, nec a potentia *passiva*, sed a potentia *obedientiali* et susceptiva solummodo respectu Creatoris; item in hoc, quod haec susceptibilitas potest considerari secundum potentiam Dei vel *absolutam* vel *ordinatam*. Communius etiam cum S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 1.) affirmatur, quod « loquendo de potentia Dei *absoluta*, Deus potest assumere quamcumque creaturam vult... Loquendo autem de potentia *ordinata*, illam creaturam assumere potest, quam congruit eum assumere ex ordine suae sapientiae ». Scot., contra Henr. Gand. disputans, insuper putat, non repugnare, creaturam rationalem hypostatice assumi, quin habeat fruitionem Dei. — Non desunt tamen auctores antiqui et recentiores, qui cum Henrico Gand. et Dionys. Carth. sustinent, omnino implicare, creaturam irrationalem, quae non sit capax *personalitatis propriae* nec unionis per *gratiam* et *gloriam*, per se uniri Deo in *personalitate divina*, cum haec unio maior sit, quam ea quae fit per gratiam et gloriam. Huius sententiae patroni pro se afferunt etiam S. Bonaventuram hic in corp. et ad 1. 5; d. 21. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, qui in hoc ultimo loco illud vulgare argumentum pro prima opinione, quod divinitas in triduo post mortem Christi remansit unita corpori eius, ita solvit, ut non tantum *paritatem* quoad utrumque casum neget, sed etiam, ut videtur, ipsam *possibilitatem* unionis hypostaticae respectu irrationabilium entium. Item provocant ad Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. III. q. 2. m. 7, q. 12. m. 1. a. 1, cfr. q. 7. m. 2. a. 1.). Insuper Richard. a Med. utramque opinionem reputat probabilem. — Attamen S. Bonav. in istis locis loquitur tantum de *congruitate*, non explicite de potentia Dei absoluta; tamen insistit, quod ex parte irrationalium non sit congruitas in suscipiendo, nec idoneitas ad unionem in unitate *personae*. Nam animalia secundum naturam suam non habent capacitatem formaliter suscipiendi personalitatem, quae implicat rationalem naturam; unde etiam supposita illa unione cum Deo solummodo in ratione subsistentiae, talis unio deficeret in multis effectibus, quos perfecta unio hypostatica in Christo habet; v. g. manifeste deesset ille « effectus, secundum quem comparatur creatura ad Deum ut perveniens; et hic est effectus unionis, in qua uniuntur in unitate personae creatura et Creator, ut homo-Deus » (ita I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2.). — Quidquid autem sit de potentia absoluta abstracte considerata, quam coarctare non debemus; certe ex parte *creaturae irrationalis* manifeste et summopere deficit *ratio congruitatis* ad unionem hypostaticam, ita ut, si quis animalia *per se* ad hanc dignitatem esse *incapacia* dixerit, de vocabulo eo minus litigandum videatur, quia piae fidelium aures perhorrescunt verba parum religiosa, quibus a nonnullis Nominalibus opposita sententia proponitur et defenditur.

**II.** Praeter auctores citatos: Scot., hic q. 1: Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 54. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 13. q. 5, et (de creatura rationali assumta, utrum possit esse sine fruitione Dei) Quodl. 6. q. 6. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. et 4. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Authors agree in this, that no creature is said to be assumable according to a hypostatic union either by any *active* power or by a *passive* power, but only by an *obediential* and receptive power with respect to the Creator; likewise in this, that this receptivity can be considered according to the power of God, whether *absolute* or *ordained*. It is also more commonly affirmed, with St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1), that « speaking of the *absolute* power of God, God can assume whatever creature he wills... But speaking of the *ordained* power, he can assume that creature which it is fitting for him to assume from the order of his wisdom ». Scotus, disputing against Henry of Ghent, holds in addition that it is not repugnant for a rational creature to be hypostatically assumed without its having the fruition of God. — Yet there are authors both ancient and more recent who, with Henry of Ghent and Dionysius the Carthusian, maintain that it is altogether contradictory for an irrational creature, which is not capable of *its own personality* nor of union through *grace* and *glory*, to be united in itself to God in the *divine personality*, since this union is greater than that which comes about through grace and glory. The patrons of this opinion adduce in their favor even St. Bonaventure here in the body and in [the reply] to 1 and 5; [and] d. 21, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3, who in this last place solves that common argument for the first opinion — that the divinity remained united to his body during the three days after Christ's death — in such a way that he not only denies the *parity* as regards each case, but even, as it seems, the very *possibility* of a hypostatic union with respect to irrational beings. They likewise appeal to Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 2, m. 7, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1, cf. q. 7, m. 2, a. 1). Moreover Richard of Mediavilla reckons each opinion probable. — Nevertheless St. Bonaventure in these places speaks only of *fittingness*, not explicitly of the absolute power of God; yet he insists that on the part of the irrational there is no fittingness in receiving, nor aptitude for union in the unity of a *person*. For animals according to their nature do not have the capacity formally to receive a personality which implies a rational nature; whence even on the supposition of that union with God solely in the account of subsistence, such a union would fall short in many of the effects which the perfect hypostatic union in Christ has; e.g., there would manifestly be lacking that « effect according to which the creature is compared to God as one arriving; and this is the effect of the union, in which the creature and the Creator are united in the unity of a person, as God-man » (so I Sent., d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2). — But whatever may be the case concerning the absolute power considered in the abstract, which we ought not to restrict; certainly on the part of the *irrational creature* the *account of fittingness* for a hypostatic union is manifestly and in the highest degree lacking, so that, if anyone should say that animals are *of themselves incapable* of this dignity, the less ought there to be dispute about the word, because the pious ears of the faithful shudder at the irreligious words by which the opposite opinion is proposed and defended by certain Nominalists.

**II.** Besides the authors cited: Scotus, here q. 1; Report. here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. III, q. 4, a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV, c. 54. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 1, a. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 13, q. 5, and (on a rational creature [that has been] assumed, whether it can be without the fruition of God) Quodl. 6, q. 6. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 and 4. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p037..039`) per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override; OCR base from `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` raw lines **3173–3346** (ART. I opener raw 3173, QUAESTIO I raw 3178). English is a fresh literal translation. Quaracchi italics/punctuation preserved. The two-column OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo/replies and footers — body and footers reflowed L-col then R-col from the bands.

**Page-split map.** **p.37** (PDF 59, running head `DIST. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 37`): ART. I + QUAESTIO I titles + opener + 5 fundamenta + Sed contra (5 objections), with footers 1–9 (L-col 1–6, R-col 7–9; footer 6 Gregor. Nyssen. wraps L→R). **p.38** (PDF 60, running head `38 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): Conclusio + Respondeo + replies *Ad 1*–*Ad 4* and the start of the Respondeo body, with footers 1–9 (L-col 1–6, R-col 7–9; footer 7 Aristot. wraps L→R). **p.39** (PDF 61, running head `DIST. II. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 39`): reply-4 tail (`datur…sicut visum est.`) + the entire SCHOLION I–II. **The reply-4 tail and the SCHOLION carry NO footnote markers**, and p.39's printed footers (1–4: Ioan. 4 *Cod. K*, Gregor. *XXXII Moral.*, *Libr. IV de Trin.*, *Edd. convenit reperiri*) all anchor QUAESTIO II's body — they are FORWARDED to d2-a1-q2, not rendered here (no anchorless defs).

**Apparatus = 18 entries** (p.37 footers 1–9 → `[^1]`–`[^9]`; p.38 footers 1–9 → `[^10]`–`[^18]`; per-page restart, continuous unique slugs). Marker pairing: 18 La = 18 En = 18 defs, 0 anchorless / 0 defless (verified programmatically).

**NO footer inheritance from the divisio.** As forecast in the d2-divisio hand-off (commit 084613a), the divisio's 3 footers were all on p.36 and fully consumed; q1 begins a fresh p.37 footer sequence (Boethius `[^1]`, Gregory of Nyssa `[^6]` among them). Confirmed on the bands.

**Alignment check: PASS.** q1 opener = *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in rationali natura quam in toto universo* = ART. I TRACTATIO q1 (`Primo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas … in rationali natura quam in toto universo`). No q-swap.

**Scholion disposition (PDF eyes-on, p.39):** `has_scholion: true`. The SCHOLION prints after q1's reply-4 tail, before QUAESTIO II. §I = prose excursus on potentia obedientialis / absoluta vs. ordinata and whether an irrational creature could be hypostatically assumed (Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Dionysius Carthus., Alexander Hal., ends with the Nominalist caveat). §II = the q1 parallel-treatments citation list, ending `…Biel, hic q. 1.` **It treats q1 only and does NOT forward-cover q2/q3** — q2 (`Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. et 4.`) and q3 carry their own scholia per the d.1 per-question pattern. So d2-a1-q2 should `has_scholion: per its own PDF finding` (NOT covered here).

**Boundary / cascade-merge check.** q1's scholion §II ends grammatically complete at *…Biel, hic q. 1.* (p.39 R-col, raw 3346). `QUAESTIO II.` (`Utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in humana natura quam in Angelo`; opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in humana natura quam in Angelo, an e converso`) begins raw **3350** on p.39 R-col — NOT included. Tail + q2 opener continuous (no cascade-merge splice).

**Forward hand-off to d2-a1-q2:** raw **3350–~3511**, printed **p.39 → onward** (q2 opens on the lower R-col of p.39, so p.39 is shared — q2 INHERITS p.39's footers 1–4). q2 opener: *Secundo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in humana natura quam in Angelo, an e converso. Et quod maior sit in Angelo, videtur.* (marginal label *Ad oppositum*, fund-1 `Deus spiritus est, sicut dicitur Ioannis quarto`). **Footer split:** q2 begins its apparatus with p.39's 4 footers (1 `Cod. K et ideo…Y substituit parte`; 2 `Vers. 24. — Gregor., XXXII. Moral. c. 23. n. 47…`; 3 `Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 25…ceteris addit aliis`; 4 `Edd. et… convenit reperiri…exhibent contingat`), THEN fresh p.40+ sequences. **`has_scholion` for q2:** verify on its own PDF page — q1's scholion did NOT forward-cover it.

**`[?]` flags:** none.


title: Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in humana natura quam in Angelo, an e converso.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in humana natura quam in Angelo, an e converso. Et quod maior sit in Angelo, videtur.

1. Deus spiritus est, sicut dicitur Ioannis quarto[^1]: ergo creatura, quae plus habet de ratione spiritualitatis, plus convenit cum Deo; et quae plus convenit cum Deo, plus est ei unibilis in unitate personae: cum ergo natura angelica sit spiritualior quam humana, videtur etc.

2. Item, natura assumta, eo ipso quo assumta est, exaltata est super ceteras creaturas; sed quanto creatura est excellentior, tanto est idoneior exaltari: ergo cum natura angelica iure ceteris anteponatur — iuxta quod dicit Richardus de sancto Victore[^2]: *Ipsa est totius universitatis caput* — videtur, quod magis decens fuerit, ipsam uniri quam humanam naturam.

3. Item, natura angelica passa est ruinam et in malum culpae et in malum poenae: ergo si divina misericordia condescendit miseriae, cum[^3] maiorem abundantiam miseriae contingat reperire in angelica natura quam in humana; videtur, quod maior sit in ea congruitas ad unionem quam in humana.

4. Item, natura assumta principium est nostrae reparationis: si ergo conveniens est, ut reparatio fiat per ea, per quae fuit destructio; cum angelus fuerit principium totius praevaricationis, videtur, quod Angelus debuerit assumi ad complendum mysterium[^4] redemptionis: et ita maior fuit congruitas in natura angelica quam humana.

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**Sed contra:**

1. Assumtio est actus personae habentis distinctionem secundum originem, cuiusmodi distinctio est in divinis personis: ergo illa natura, in qua habet esse distinctio personalis secundum originem, maiorem habet congruitatem ad unionem personalem, quam illa quae caret huiusmodi distinctione; sed in hominibus est huiusmodi distinctio, in Angelis vero non[^5]: ergo etc.

2. Item, assumtio creaturae ad Creatorem in unitate personae fuit ad humilitatis commendationem[^6]; sed maior apparet humilitatis dignatio in assumtione hominis mortalis quam spiritus immortalis: ergo videtur, quod magis congruum fuerit ad unionem humana natura quam angelica.

3. Item, assumtio est principaliter propter generis assumti reparationem; sed angeli, qui lapsi sunt, peccaverunt peccato irremediabili, sicut superius in secundo[^7] fuit ostensum, homines vero peccato remediabili: ergo magis congruum fuit assumere humanam naturam quam angelicam.

4. Item, Deus, quidquid facit, congruentissime facit; sed Deus nusquam Angelos apprehendit, ad Hebraeos secundo[^8]: ergo maior fuit congruentia ad unionem in humana natura quam in angelica.

### Conclusio

> Maior fuit congruentia ad unionem in creatura humana quam in angelica.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio maior fuit congruentia ad unionem in creatura humana quam in angelica. Et hoc quidem satis manifestat ipsa operatio divina. Deus enim nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit.

Ratio autem maioris congruentiae dupliciter accipitur, videlicet secundum humanae naturae institutionem et secundum eiusdem reparationem.

Secundum namque humanae naturae institutionem maior est congruitas in humana natura quam in angelica; et hoc triplici de causa. — Prima est propter personalem discretionem, quae quidem in humana[^9] reperitur secundum originem, et non in angelica; et ideo magis congruebat, quod persona Filii, quae distinguitur a persona Patris secundum originem, eam naturam acciperet, in qua proprietatem filiationis retineret; et hoc quidem factum est in humanae naturae assumtione. Nam idem ipse, qui ab aeterno erat Patris Filius, ex tempore factus est filius Virginis matris.

Secunda ratio est propter maiorem divini exemplaris repraesentationem, ratione cuius homo dicitur minor mundus. Anima enim rationalis non tantum repraesentat Deum, prout consideratur in se, sed in quantum unitur corpori, quod regit et in quo toto inhabitat, sicut Deus in maiori mundo; et hoc pluries dicit Augustinus[^10]. Ratione huius maioris conformitatis maior erat ratio unibilitatis.

Tertia ratio est propter multiplicem hominis compositionem. Quia enim homo compositus est ex natura corporali et spirituali, et quodam modo communicat cum omni creatura, sicut dicit Gregorius[^11]; hinc est, quod cum humana natura assumitur et deificatur, quodam modo omnis natura in ea exaltatur, dum in suo simili Deitati unitur. Et hinc est, quod assumtio humanae naturae plus facit ad totius universi perfectionem quam angelicae. — Et ideo maior est in ea congruitas ad unionem etiam secundum suam institutionem.

Similiter et secundum reparationem maior congruitas in ea reperitur ad unionem triplici ex causa, scilicet quia homo magis indigebat, et minus indignus erat, et amplius ei proderat, ut Filius Dei assumeret naturam suam. — Magis indigebat, quia totus lapsus fuerat[^12]; minus indignus erat, quia per alium corruerat; amplius ei proderat, quia adhuc in malo obstinatus non erat. — Quoniam igitur divina misericordia ista tria pensat in beneficiis, quae impendit; hinc est, quod Deus, qui est dives in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem, qua dilexit nos[^13], magis assumsit humanam naturam quam angelicam, quia maior reperiebatur in ea congruentia ad suscipiendum tantum beneficium divinae misericordiae, ut per illud relevaretur a miseria. — Haec autem ratio, quae sumta est ad humani generis reparationem, efficacior et principalior est quam praecedens, quia, sicut supra[^14] ostensum fuit, praecipua incarnationis ratio fuit humani generis reparatio.

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*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod Angelus ratione spiritualitatis plus convenit cum Deo quam homo; dicendum, quod etsi plus convenit intensive, non tamen plus convenit extensive. Homo enim convenit in spiritualitate ratione animae, et corpus superadditum facit ad conformitatis maioritatem; et sic utroque, videlicet spiritu et corpore, maior fit repraesentatio exemplaritatis divinae[^15]. Praeterea, praecipua ratio congruentiae respectu unionis non attenditur respectu maioris convenientiae in spiritualitate, sed potius ratione maioris idoneitatis ad suscipiendum beneficium divinae misericordiae.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de exaltatione naturae assumtae, dicendum, quod etsi Angelus altior sit natura quam homo, per gratiam tamen unionis decuit magis hominem quam Angelum exaltari, et ad confutandam superbiam luciferi, qui Deo voluit aequari, et ad commendandam gratiam Dei, ut appareat, quod sublimatio in gloria non sit ex natura, sed potius ex gratia divina[^16]. — Et haec est etiam ratio, quare Dominus noster Iesus Christus magis elegit pauperes et ignobiles quam potentes, ut confunderet alta et fortia, et non gloriaretur in conspectu eius omnis creatura, quia Regi saeculorum immortali et invisibili, soli Deo, debet esse honor et gloria[^17].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angelus magis indigebat quam homo; dicendum, quod falsum est. Homo enim totaliter indigebat, quia totaliter lapsus fuerat: Angelus vero non. Et si tu obiicis, quod angelus lapsus magis indigebat quam homo lapsus; dicendum, quod etsi magis indigebat, minus tamen dignus erat, quoniam ex maiori superbia peccaverat. Unde Bernardus in Canticum[^18]: « Quis tam indiget misericordia, sicut miser? et quis tam indignus est misericordia, sicut miser superbus »? Praeterea, ipsa assumtio angelicae naturae angelo lapso non prodesset, quia, cum obstinati sint universaliter in malitia, non inflammarentur ad humilitatem nec ad caritatem per exhibitionem tanti beneficii et exempli. Et illud videmus hodie in multis peccatoribus, quibus propter suam perversitatem valde parum prodest incarnatio Christi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praevaricatio sumsit exordium ab Angelo, ergo et reparatio similiter debet ab illo inchoare; dicendum, quod praevaricatio humani generis sumsit exordium a daemone et ab homine; sed ab homine tanquam a principali auctore, a daemone sicut a suggestore; et quoniam Christus auctor est nostrae redemptionis, ideo magis debet homo assumi[^19] quam angelus, ut sic reparatio directe respondeat lapsui. Et quemadmodum in lapsu diabolus decepit Evam, sic in reparatione Gabriel instruxit Mariam[^20]. Et quemadmodum in primo Adam facta est nostrae praevaricationis consummatio, sic per secundum Adam facta est nostrae redemptionis perfectio. — Et sic patet responsio ad ea quae obiiciebantur.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the fittingness for union is greater in human nature than in an angel, or conversely.*

Secondly it is asked whether the fittingness for union is greater in human nature than in an angel, or conversely. And that it is greater in the angel, it seems.

1. God is a spirit, as is said in John, chapter four[^1]: therefore the creature that has more of the character of spirituality is more in agreement with God; and what is more in agreement with God is more uniteable to him in unity of person: since therefore the angelic nature is more spiritual than the human, it seems, and so forth.

2. Likewise, the assumed nature, by the very fact that it is assumed, is exalted above the other creatures; but the more excellent a creature is, the more fit it is to be exalted: therefore since the angelic nature is by right set before the rest — according to what Richard of Saint Victor says[^2]: *It is the head of the whole universe* — it seems that it would have been more becoming for it to be united than human nature.

3. Likewise, the angelic nature suffered a fall both into the evil of fault and into the evil of punishment: therefore if the divine mercy condescends to misery, since[^3] a greater abundance of misery happens to be found in the angelic nature than in the human; it seems that there is in it a greater fittingness for union than in the human.

4. Likewise, the assumed nature is the principle of our reparation: if therefore it is fitting that reparation be made through those things by which the destruction came about; since the angel was the principle of the whole transgression, it seems that the Angel ought to have been assumed for the completing of the mystery[^4] of redemption: and so the fittingness was greater in the angelic nature than in the human.

**Sed contra:**

1. Assumption is the act of a person having distinction according to origin, of which kind is the distinction in the divine persons: therefore that nature in which there is distinction of person according to origin has a greater fittingness for personal union than that which lacks such a distinction; but in men there is such a distinction, whereas in angels there is not[^5]: therefore, and so forth.

2. Likewise, the assumption of a creature to the Creator in unity of person was for the commending of humility[^6]; but a greater condescension of humility appears in the assumption of a mortal man than of an immortal spirit: therefore it seems that human nature was more suitable for union than the angelic.

3. Likewise, assumption is principally on account of the reparation of the assumed kind; but the angels who fell sinned with an irremediable sin, as was shown above in the Second Book[^7], whereas men sinned with a remediable sin: therefore it was more fitting to assume human nature than the angelic.

4. Likewise, God, whatever he does, he does most fittingly; but God nowhere takes hold of the Angels, in Hebrews, chapter two[^8]: therefore the fittingness for union was greater in human nature than in the angelic.

### Conclusion

> The fittingness for union was greater in the human creature than in the angelic.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that without doubt the fittingness for union was greater in the human creature than in the angelic. And this indeed the divine working sufficiently shows. For God nowhere takes hold of the Angels, but takes hold of the seed of Abraham.

Now the ground of the greater fittingness is taken in two ways, namely according to the institution of human nature and according to its reparation.

For according to the institution of human nature the fittingness is greater in human nature than in the angelic; and this for a threefold cause. — The first is on account of the personal distinction, which indeed is found in the human nature[^9] according to origin, and not in the angelic; and therefore it was more fitting that the person of the Son, who is distinguished from the person of the Father according to origin, should take that nature in which he would retain the property of sonship; and this indeed was done in the assumption of human nature. For the very same one who from eternity was the Son of the Father, in time became the son of the Virgin mother.

The second ground is on account of the greater representation of the divine exemplar, by reason of which man is called a lesser world. For the rational soul represents God not only as it is considered in itself, but inasmuch as it is united to the body, which it rules and in the whole of which it dwells, as God in the greater world; and this Augustine says many times[^10]. By reason of this greater conformity there was a greater ground of uniteability.

The third ground is on account of the manifold composition of man. For since man is composed of a corporeal and a spiritual nature, and in a certain way communicates with every creature, as Gregory says[^11]; hence it is that when human nature is assumed and deified, in a certain way every nature is exalted in it, while in its like it is united to the Deity. And hence it is that the assumption of human nature does more for the perfection of the whole universe than that of the angelic. — And therefore the fittingness for union is greater in it even according to its institution.

Likewise also according to reparation a greater fittingness is found in it for union, from a threefold cause, namely because man had more need, and was less unworthy, and it profited him more, that the Son of God should assume his nature. — He had more need, because he had wholly fallen[^12]; he was less unworthy, because he had been corrupted through another; it profited him more, because he was not yet obstinate in evil. — Since therefore the divine mercy weighs these three things in the benefits which it bestows; hence it is that God, who is rich in mercy, on account of the exceeding charity with which he loved us[^13], assumed human nature rather than the angelic, because there was found in it a greater fittingness for receiving so great a benefit of the divine mercy, that through it he might be relieved from misery. — Now this ground, which is taken from the reparation of the human race, is more efficacious and more principal than the preceding, because, as was shown above[^14], the chief ground of the incarnation was the reparation of the human race.

*To the 1.* To that, then, which is objected first, that the Angel by reason of spirituality is more in agreement with God than man; it must be said that although it is more in agreement intensively, nevertheless it is not more in agreement extensively. For man agrees in spirituality by reason of the soul, and the superadded body makes for a greater conformity; and thus by both, namely spirit and body, a greater representation of the divine exemplarity comes about[^15]. Moreover, the chief ground of fittingness in respect of union is not regarded in respect of greater agreement in spirituality, but rather by reason of greater suitability for receiving the benefit of the divine mercy.

*To the 2.* To that which is objected concerning the exaltation of the assumed nature, it must be said that although the Angel is higher in nature than man, nevertheless by the grace of union it was becoming that man rather than the Angel be exalted, both for the confounding of the pride of Lucifer, who wished to be made equal to God, and for the commending of the grace of God, that it might appear that elevation into glory is not from nature, but rather from divine grace[^16]. — And this is also the reason why our Lord Jesus Christ chose rather the poor and ignoble than the powerful, that he might confound the high and strong things, and that no creature might glory in his sight, because to the King of ages, immortal and invisible, to God alone, ought to be honor and glory[^17].

*To the 3.* To that which is objected, that the Angel had more need than man; it must be said that it is false. For man had wholly need, because he had wholly fallen: but the Angel had not. And if you object that the fallen angel had more need than fallen man; it must be said that although he had more need, nevertheless he was less worthy, since he had sinned out of greater pride. Hence Bernard on the Canticle[^18]: « Who so needs mercy as the wretched? and who is so unworthy of mercy as the proud wretch »? Moreover, the assumption itself of the angelic nature would not profit the fallen angel, because, since they are universally obstinate in malice, they would not be kindled to humility nor to charity by the showing of so great a benefit and example. And this we see today in many sinners, to whom on account of their perversity the incarnation of Christ profits very little.

*To the 4.* To that which is objected, that the transgression took its beginning from the Angel, therefore the reparation likewise ought to begin from him; it must be said that the transgression of the human race took its beginning from the demon and from man; but from man as from the principal author, from the demon as from the suggester; and since Christ is the author of our redemption, therefore man ought to be assumed[^19] rather than the angel, so that the reparation may directly correspond to the fall. And just as in the fall the devil deceived Eve, so in the reparation Gabriel instructed Mary[^20]. And just as in the first Adam the consummation of our transgression came about, so through the second Adam the perfection of our redemption came about. — And thus the answer to the things that were objected is clear.

la: Vers. 24. — Gregor., XXXII. *Moral.* c. 23. n. 47: *Et licet homo ad similitudinem Dei creatus sit* (Gen. 1, 27.), *Angelo tamen quasi maius aliquid tribuens, non eum ad similitudinem Dei conditum, sed ipsum signaculum Dei similitudinis dicit* (Ezech. 28, 12.), *ut quo subtilior est in natura, eo in illo similitudo Dei plenius credatur expressa.* Cfr. Isidor., I. *Sent.* c. 10. n. 6.

en: Verse 24 [John 4]. — Gregory, *Moralia* XXXII, c. 23, n. 47: *And although man was created to the likeness of God* (Gen. 1:27), *yet attributing to the Angel something as it were greater, [Scripture] says that he was not made to the likeness of God, but calls him the very seal of God's likeness* (Ezek. 28:12), *so that, the subtler he is in nature, the more fully the likeness of God is believed to be expressed in him.* Cf. Isidore, *Sentences* I, c. 10, n. 6.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* c. 25: *Quod ergo est in operatione humana humani corporis effigies sine capite, hoc esse videtur in operatione divina universalitatis fabrica sine optimo genere creaturae* [scil. Angelo]. Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius cod. R. post *ceteris* addit *aliis.*

en: *On the Trinity* IV, c. 25: *Therefore, what in a human work is the figure of a human body without a head, this seems to be in the divine work the fabric of the universe without the best kind of creature* [namely, the Angel]. Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — A little before, cod. R after *ceteris* adds *aliis.*

la: Edd. *et... convenit reperiri.* Codd. A E G L T V omittunt *et,* pro quo codd. F U bene substituunt *cum,* a nobis in textum receptum; qui etiam deinde cum aliis codd. pro *convenit* exhibent *contingat.*

en: The editions [read] *et... convenit reperiri.* Codd. A E G L T V omit *et,* in place of which codd. F U rightly substitute *cum,* received by us into the text; which [codices] also then, with other codices, in place of *convenit* present *contingat.*

la: Vat. *ministerium.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *ministerium.*

la: Vide verba, quae tom. II. pag. 103, nota 6. et pag. 104, nota 5. e Richardo a S. Vict., IV. *de Trin.* c. 13. seqq. attulimus. Cfr. etiam Anselm., II. *Cur Deus homo,* c. 21. — Circa initium arg. codd. M O pro *cuiusmodi* habent *qualis.*

en: See the words which in vol. II, p. 103, note 6, and p. 104, note 5, we adduced from Richard of St. Victor, *On the Trinity* IV, c. 13 ff. Cf. also Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 21. — Near the beginning of the argument codd. M O in place of *cuiusmodi* have *qualis.*

la: Cfr. Phil. 2, 6. seqq. Cfr. etiam August., *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 18. n. 31. — Pro *ad Creatorem* codd. M O *a Creatore.* Circa finem arg. pro *congruum* cod. Q melius *congrua.*

en: Cf. Phil. 2:6 ff. Cf. also Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 18, n. 31. — In place of *ad Creatorem* codd. M O [read] *a Creatore.* Near the end of the argument, in place of *congruum* cod. Q better [reads] *congrua.*

la: Vers. 16.

en: Verse 16 [Heb. 2].

la: Codd. A F K N addunt *natura.* Pro *discretionem* edd. et nonnulli codd. *distinctionem.* Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

en: Codd. A F K N add *natura.* In place of *discretionem* the editions and several codices [read] *distinctionem.* Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 1 ff.

la: In libro *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera August.) c. 18. et 35. Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 16. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. post *Augustinus* interiiciens *quod,* sequentia falso ut Augustini verba exhibet.

en: In the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine) c. 18 and 35. Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. — The Vatican edition, interposing *quod* after *Augustinus,* falsely presents what follows as the words of Augustine.

la: Libr. VI. *Moral.* c. 16. n. 20. et II. in *Evang.* homil. 29. n. 2. Idem docet August., *Serm.* 43. (alias 27. *de Verbis Apostoli*) c. 3. n. 4.

en: *Moralia* VI, c. 16, n. 20, and *Homilies on the Gospel* II, homily 29, n. 2. The same Augustine teaches, *Sermon* 43 (otherwise 27, *On the Words of the Apostle*) c. 3, n. 4.

la: De hac prima ratione (*quia totus lapsus fuerat*) cfr. August., *Enchirid.* c. 28. n. 9; de secunda (*quia minus indignus erat*) cfr. August., *Exposit. Epist. ad Gal.* 3, 19. n. 24. nec non Anselm., II. *Cur Deus homo,* c. 21. et etiam tom. II. pag. 506, nota 6; de tertia ratione cfr. Bernard., *Serm.* 1. de Adventu Domini, n. 4. seq. et II. *Sent.* d. 7. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro *in malo obstinatus* codd. minus bene *in malum obstinatus.*

en: On this first ground (*because he had wholly fallen*) cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 28, n. 9; on the second (*because he was less unworthy*) cf. Augustine, *Exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians* 3, 19, n. 24, and also Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 21, and also vol. II, p. 506, note 6; on the third ground cf. Bernard, *Sermon* 1 on the Advent of the Lord, n. 4 f., and *Sentences* II, d. 7, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1. — In place of *in malo obstinatus* the codices less well [read] *in malum obstinatus.*

la: Eph. 2, 4. — Paulo inferius pro *suscipiendum* codd. B C D E G H L (N a prima manu) T U V aa *suscitandum.* Subinde pro *ut* codd. A T *ut et,* edd. *et ut.* Post pauca pro *ad humani generis reparationem* Vat. *ab humani generis reparatione.*

en: Eph. 2:4. — A little below, in place of *suscipiendum* codd. B C D E G H L (N by the first hand) T U V aa [read] *suscitandum.* Then in place of *ut* codd. A T [read] *ut et,* the editions *et ut.* After a few [words], in place of *ad humani generis reparationem* the Vatican edition [reads] *ab humani generis reparatione.*

la: Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 16. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *maior fit* cod. H *maior fuit.*

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. — In place of *maior fit* cod. H [reads] *maior fuit.*

la: Cfr. August., XIII. *de Trin.* c. 17. n. 22.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIII, c. 17, n. 22.

la: Epist. I. Tim. 1, 17. In praecedentibus respicitur I. Cor. 1, 26. seqq. — Paulo superius post *pauperes* cod. G addit *quam divites* et dein pro *et non* substituit *ut non.*

en: Epistle, 1 Tim. 1:17. In what precedes, reference is made to 1 Cor. 1:26 ff. — A little above, after *pauperes* cod. G adds *quam divites* and then in place of *et non* substitutes *ut non.*

la: Serm. 51. n. 5, sed tantum sententialiter. Verba ipsa sumta sunt ex August., III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 10. n. 29, ubi sic legitur: *Quid enim tam opus habetis misericordia quam miser? Et quid tam indignum misericordia quam superbus miser?* — Paulo inferius pro *universaliter* edd. 1, 2 *naturaliter.*

en: *Sermon* 51, n. 5, but only in sense. The very words are taken from Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 10, n. 29, where it reads thus: *For what has such need of mercy as the wretched? And what is so unworthy of mercy as the proud wretch?* — A little below, in place of *universaliter* the editions 1, 2 [read] *naturaliter.*

la: Pro *magis debet homo assumi quam angelus, quam* lectionem ex codd. R U bb restauravimus, edd. *magis debet reparatio inchoari ab homine quam ab angelo.* Pro *assumi* codd. K M O *esse,* cod. C *reparari;* in aliis codd. omnino deest *assumi,* quin aliquod aliud verbum substitutum sit pro eo.

en: For *magis debet homo assumi quam angelus, quam* — a reading which we have restored from codd. R U bb — the editions [read] *magis debet reparatio inchoari ab homine quam ab angelo.* In place of *assumi* codd. K M O [read] *esse,* cod. C *reparari;* in other codices *assumi* is entirely absent, without any other word being substituted for it.

la: Cfr. Gen. 3, 1. seqq.; Luc. 1, 28. seqq. Vide etiam tom. II. pag. 516, nota 10, et Serm. 2. de Symbolo ad catechum. (inter opera August.) c. 4. n. 4. Quoad subnexa cfr. Rom. 5, 14. seqq. et I. Cor. 15, 22. seqq. — Pro *nostrae praevaricationis consummatio* cod. H *omnium praevaricatio;* pro *praevaricationis* cod. H *damnationis,* codd. A G L N T V aa et edd. 1, 2 falso *redemptionis;* cod. H subinde pro *sic per secundum* exhibet *sic in secundo.*

en: Cf. Gen. 3:1 ff.; Luke 1:28 ff. See also vol. II, p. 516, note 10, and *Sermon* 2 on the Symbol, to the catechumens (among the works of Augustine) c. 4, n. 4. As to what follows, cf. Rom. 5:14 ff. and 1 Cor. 15:22 ff. — In place of *nostrae praevaricationis consummatio* cod. H [reads] *omnium praevaricatio;* in place of *praevaricationis* cod. H [reads] *damnationis,* codd. A G L N T V aa and editions 1, 2 falsely *redemptionis;* cod. H then in place of *sic per secundum* presents *sic in secundo.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Egregie et copiose S. Doctor conclusionem satis communem probat. Quidam autem, ut B. Albert. (hic a. 2.), ulterius progressi, penitus negabant, naturam angelicam esse assumtibilem, praesertim quia ab ea inseparabilis sit discretio personalis. Etiam Petrus a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.) vult, quod praescindendo a potentia Dei absoluta, « nec creatura pure corporalis nec pure spiritualis unibilis est in personalitate aliena, cum non debeat per unionem dari personalitas habere non valenti, nec auferri sine transmutatione eiusdem numero naturae possit habenti ». Sed alii doctores communiter cum S. Thoma (S. III. q. 4. a. 1. ad 3.) nolunt « excludere totaliter congruitatem assumtionis angelicae naturae », licet desit congruitas ex parte necessitatis.

**II.** Praeter laudatos auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 6. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 5; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. art. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic p. I. q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**III.** De sequenti (3.) quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Excellently and copiously the holy Doctor proves a conclusion that is fairly common. But some, such as Blessed Albert (here a. 2.), going further, utterly denied that the angelic nature is assumeable, especially because the personal distinction is inseparable from it. Peter of Tarentaise also (here q. 1. a. 1.) holds that, prescinding from the absolute power of God, « neither a purely corporeal nor a purely spiritual creature is uniteable in an alien personality, since personality ought not to be given through union to one not able to have it, nor be taken away from one having it without transmutation of the same numerical nature ». But other doctors commonly, with St. Thomas (S. III. q. 4. a. 1. ad 3.), are unwilling « to exclude totally the fittingness of an assumption of the angelic nature », although the fittingness is lacking on the side of necessity.

**II.** Besides the authors praised: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 2. m. 6. — Scotus, here q. 1. n. 5; Reportata here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiuncula 2; S. art. cit. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here p. I. q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**III.** On the following (3.) question: St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, loc. cit. a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 39–41 (PDF 61–63; Vol III offset pdf = printed + 22) per the VOL II/III override (two-column djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo + footers); the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 3347–3511 of `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`) served as the base for clean running prose (fundamenta, Sed contra, replies) and for footnote-marker spacing. English is a fresh literal translation, paragraph-for-paragraph.

**Running heads (verified on bands):** p.39 R `QUAEST. II. 39`; p.40 L `40 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.41 L `DIST. II. ART. I. QUA[EST. II.]`, R `QUAEST. II. 41`.

**Page-split map.** q2 opens on the lower portions of p.39 (after q1's scholion §I/§II, which occupy both columns above): QUAESTIO II header + italic title + opener + fundamenta 1–4 (fund-4 ends top of p.40). p.40 = Sed contra 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo (through `humani generis reparatio`). p.41 = replies *Ad 1–4* + SCHOLION I–III; the scholion ends at the bottom of p.41 R-col. QUAESTIO III (`Tertio quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in tota specie quam in uno individuo`) begins fresh at the top of p.42 (PDF 64) — NOT included.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline / not as footnote anchors (Quaracchi side-notes): *Ad oppositum* (fund-1), *Fundamenta* (Sed contra 1), *Duplex ratio principalis* (Respondeo), *Ratio 1. triplex / Ratio 1 / Ratio 2 / Ratio 3* (institution-rationes), *Ratio 2. principalis triplex* (reparation-rationes), *Notandum* (×3), *Solutio oppositorum / Distinctio / Alia ratio* (replies).

**Incoming hand-off picked up (from d2-a1-q1, commit cdb32ec).** q1's reply-4 tail + its SCHOLION I–II carry NO footnote markers, so q1 consumed NONE of p.39's footers; the hand-off forwarded all 4 p.39 footers to q2. **Disposition: only p.39 footers 2, 3, 4 anchor q2 body (fund-1 `Ioannis quarto`, fund-2 `Richardus de sancto Victore`, fund-3 `cum`) and are rendered here as `[^1]`–`[^3]`.** **p.39 footer 1 (`Cod. K et ideo… omittunt in ante omnibus… pro per se cod. Y substituit parte`) is a textual-variant note on the phrase `…manifestatur in omnibus simul quam in aliqua earum per se…`, which belongs to q1's SCHOLION §I (out-of-chunk text already committed under q1, where it carries no marker). Per the marker-pairing rule it is OMITTED here rather than rendered anchorless.** This refines the q1 forward hand-off (which had assumed all 4 forward).

**Apparatus count: 20 entries.** Per-page split: **p.39 → 3** (printed footers 2–4 = `[^1]`–`[^3]`; printed footer 1 omitted, see above); **p.40 → 10** (printed footers 1–10 = `[^4]`–`[^13]`, per-page restart); **p.41 → 7** (printed footers 1–7 = `[^14]`–`[^20]`, per-page restart). Marker pairing verified programmatically: 20 La anchors = 20 En anchors = 20 defs, continuous 1–20, 0 anchorless / 0 defless. (Markers are renumbered continuously 1–20 across the chunk; the per-page printed superscripts are noted in this map.)

**Scholion disposition: `has_scholion: true` — VERIFIED on PDF p.41.** q2 carries its OWN scholion (I–III) printed after reply 4, before QUAESTIO III. §I = the assumeability-of-angelic-nature excursus (Albert, Petrus a Tar., S. Thom.); §II = the q2 parallel-treatments list (ends `Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.`); **§III = the parallel-treatments list for the FOLLOWING (3.) question** (`De sequenti (3.) quaestione…`, ends `Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.`). §III forward-*references* q3 but does NOT translate/cover it — it is q2's scholion noting where q3 is treated by other doctors (the d.1 per-question pattern). q3's own scholion (if any) belongs to d2-a1-q3.

**Alignment check: PASS.** Opener = `Secundo quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in humana natura quam in Angelo, an e converso` = ART. I TRACTATIO q2. No q-swap.

**Forward hand-off to d2-a1-q3.** Raw **3515–~3614**, printed **p.42+** (PDF 64+). q3 opener: *Tertio quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in tota specie quam in uno individuo. Et quod maior sit in tota humana specie, videtur.* (marginal *Ad oppositum* on p.42 L-col; fund-1 ends `…in tota specie¹`, fund-1 cites Damascenus `quod erat inassumtibile erat incurabile`). q3 is the LAST question of ART. I; after it, ART. II opener (raw ~3615, p.43) folds into d2-a2-q1. **Footer split:** p.42's footers all appear to begin fresh on p.42 (q2's scholion + footers are fully consumed on p.41; p.42 opens with QUAESTIO III at the column top, so NO shared-page footer carries from q2 into q3 — verify on the p.42 bands when building q3). **Scholion:** check the page after q3's replies for q3's own SCHOLION (per the d.1 per-question pattern); q2's §III only *references* q3, it does not cover it.

**Boundary lock.** q2's scholion §III ends grammatically complete at `…Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.` (p.41 R-col, raw 3511). `QUAESTIO III.` (raw 3512) / `Tertio quaeritur` (raw 3515) begin d2-a1-q3 at the top of p.42 — continuous, no cascade-merge splice.

**`[?]` flags:** none.