title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De divisione potentiarum animae.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo, videlicet de divisione potentiarum animae; et circa hoc possunt quatuor quaeri.

Primo enim quaeritur de illa divisione potentiarum animae, quae est per cognitivam et affectivam, sive per rationem et voluntatem.

Secundo quaeritur de illa quae est per portionem superiorem et inferiorem.

Tertio quaeritur de illa quae est per deliberativum et naturale.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur ad pleniorem explanationem de illa divisione, quae est per possibilem et agentem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, essentialiter differant.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, sint potentiae diversae per essentiam. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Augustinus decimo de Trinitate[^1] dicit, quod « haec tria, scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una intelligentia, una vita »; sed hoc non esset, si essent diversae per essentiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima[^2] dicit, quod « intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus »; sed extensio non variat potentiam per essentiam: ergo eadem est per essentiam intelligentia speculativa et practica: ergo et cognitiva et motiva.

3. Item, « potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta », sicut dicit Philosophus[^3]: si ergo prima ratio distinguendi est ex parte obiectorum, non est maior distinctio in potentiis quam in obiectis: sed verum sub ratione veri est obiectum intellectus, bonum sub ratione boni est obiectum affectus: cum igitur eadem sit per essentiam bonitas et veritas substantialis creaturae, ergo eadem erit per essentiam ratio et voluntas.

4. Item, magis conformatur imago summae Trinitati, quam conformetur vestigium; sed in summa Trinitate nulla est differentia essentialis; sed solum secundum relationem: si ergo unitas et veritas et bonitas sola relatione differunt in creatura, et non essentialiter, multo fortius videtur, quod ratio et voluntas sola relatione habeant distingui.

5. Item, ad omnem delectationem necessario concurrit sensus — « delectatio enim est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti et sensus eiusdem[^4] » — sed constans est, quod voluntas habet delectari: ergo habet delectabile cognoscere et sentire: ergo ipsa erit potentia sensitiva.

6. Item, ad omnem habitum virtutis necessario concurrit amor et medii inspectio. Sicut enim vult Augustinus, de Moribus Ecclesiae[^5], « omnis virtus est amor »; et sicut vult Philosophus, virtus est inspectrix medii. Si ergo virtutes sunt in voluntate, ergo actus voluntatis est medium inspicere et amare. Sed primum pertinet ad vim cognitivam, secundum ad affectivam: ergo eadem est potentia cognitiva et affectiva.

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7. Item, lumini et calori in corporibus correspondet cognitio et amor in spiritibus; sed sol per eandem virtutem illuminat et calefacit — calefactio enim generatur ex radiorum multiplicatione — ergo multo fortius videtur, si substantia spiritualis potentior est, quod per eandem virtutem cognoscat et diligat: ergo etc.

8. Item, optimum uniuscuiusque rei non potest esse nisi unum[^6]; sed optimum in anima est illud, secundum quod immediate coniungitur Deo, hoc autem est intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas: ergo non sunt diversae potentiae, sed una. Si tu dicas, quod inter omnes potentias principatum tenet voluntas, et illa est quae intimius adhaeret; obiicitur contra hoc: quia « virtus unita plus potest quam multiplicata[^7] »; si igitur anima una potentia sola tenderet in Deum, perfectius ei uniretur, quam si tendat pluribus: ergo si optimo modo facta est ad perveniendum in finem, videtur, quod una sola potentia sit ratio et voluntas secundum essentiam.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in decimo de Trinitate[^8] dicit, animam esse ad imaginem quoad unitatem essentiae et trinitatem potentiarum: ergo si vera est ibi trinitas, vera est ibi potentiarum distinctio: ergo non solummodo distinguuntur relatione, sed etiam secundum id quod sunt absolute.

2. Item, si eadem potentia per essentiam esset ratio et voluntas, sicut una essentia est in Patre et Filio: ergo sicut Pater non per Filium dicitur intelligere, sed etiam per se ipsum; sic voluntas non solum intelligeret per intelligentiam, sed etiam per se ipsam. Falsum igitur diceret Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate, cum dicit, quod « nihil volumus nisi per voluntatem, nihil intelligimus nisi per intelligentiam ».

3. Item, expressius Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo quarto[^9], loquens de ratione et voluntate, sive de notitia et amore, ait sic: « Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et numerentur substantialiter, vel ut ita dicam, essentialiter ».

4. Item, ratione videtur. Cuiuslibet potentiae unius est unum primum actum assignare; sed actus complectens totam intelligentiam est intelligere, actus vero complectens totam affectivam est affici; ergo si actus primi et proprii istarum potentiarum sunt diversi essentialiter, videtur pari ratione, quod similiter et ipsae potentiae[^10].

5. Item, sola distinctio relationum in creatura non est distinctio rerum, sed in divinis est vera distinctio personarum; ergo si in anima non est distinctio potentiarum nisi solum secundum relationem, anima non esset illius summae Trinitatis similitudo expressa, et ita nec imago; quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc.

6. Item, a natura creaturae est, quod cum vigoratur actus unius potentiae, minoratur actus alterius, propter hoc quod potentiae radicantur in eadem substantia[^11]: ergo multo fortius actus unius potentiae intensus remittit alterum actum eiusdem potentiae. Ergo si ratio et voluntas essent eadem potentia, cum intenderetur cognitio, minueretur affectio: ergo quanto clarius Deum videremus, tanto minus amaremus; quod si omnino falsum est, restat etc.

7. Item, ubicumque lux et calor sunt formaliter, differunt essentialiter, sicut patet in igne: ergo pari ratione, ubicumque potentia cognoscendi et amandi formaliter reperiuntur in creatura, essentialiter distinguuntur; sed sic reperiuntur in anima: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Ratio et voluntas, sive intellectus et affectus, sunt diversae potentiae, non tamen diversae essentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod etsi praedicta quaestio plus contineat curiositatis quam utilitatis, propter hoc quod, sive una pars teneatur, sive altera, nullum praeiudicium nec fidei nec moribus generatur; verumtamen, quia Sancti et alii, qui tractant de potentiis animae, plurimum loquuntur de potentiarum distinctione; et quia etiam plurium quaestionum terminatio pendet ex praedictae quaestionis terminatione: ideo determinationi eius aliquantulum diligenter oportet insistere.

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Notandum igitur, quod istius quaestionis terminatio ex illius quaestionis terminatione[^12] pendet, qua quaeritur de comparatione potentiae ad substantiam animae; unde, secundum quod illa varie terminatur a diversis, sic consequenter et ista.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod potentia animae non est aliud quam ipsa relatio, vel ipsa anima relata ad actum; et hi ponunt, quod omnes animae potentiae sint unum per essentiam, nec est in eis aliqua differentia nisi solum secundum relationem ad actum alium et alium. Et hoc confirmare nituntur per Augustinum, in libro de Anima et spiritu[^13], ubi videtur hoc expresse dicere et sentire. Et si tu dicas, quod ille liber non est Augustini; per hoc non evaditur, quia hoc ipsum in libro de Trinitate[^14] dicit de potentiis animae, quod « sunt una essentia, una vita ».

Alii vero dicere voluerunt, quod potentiae animae non tantum dicunt modum sive relationem, sed etiam dicunt proprietates inhaerentes ipsi animae, quae sunt de genere accidentium, utpote in secunda specie qualitatis, videlicet naturalis potentiae et impotentiae[^15]. Et isti dicunt, quod potentiae in anima differunt essentialiter, sicut diversae formae accidentales existunt in eodem subiecto; et hoc confirmare nituntur per quoddam verbum Hugonis in quodam libello, quem fecit de Trinitate[^16], ubi dicit, quod « notitia et amor non vere sunt quod ipsa mens, sed quasi affectiones quaedam et formae ipsius, quibus non sit hoc aliquid esse, sed adesse tantum ei quod est hoc aliquid ».

Tertii sunt, qui dicunt, quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem ipsi animae, sicut sunt eius principia intrinseca et essentialia, nec adeo diversae, ut cedant in aliud genus, sicut accidentia, sed in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem. Et isti dicunt, quod cum potentiae simpliciter non dicant aliam essentiam quam substantiam animae, quod non sic differunt essentialiter ipsae potentiae, quod sint diversae essentiae. Cum iterum non sint omnino idem cum animae essentia, dicunt, quod non sunt omnino idem per essentiam; et ideo quasi medium tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae potentias sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia; nec tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instrumenta eiusdem substantiae.

Quaelibet autem dictarum positionum suos habet defensores; nec est facile rationibus cogentibus earum aliquam improbare. — Quia tamen haec positio ultimo dicta plus[^17] concordat viae communi et auctoritatibus tractatorum et magis sobria est et rationi consona; ideo iuxta hanc tertiam positionem ad propositam quaestionem respondendum est, quod intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, non sunt una potentia, sed diversae. — Et hoc senserunt praedecessores nostri[^18]; sensisse etiam videtur Augustinus, sicut expresse apparet in auctoritatibus supra dictis. Omnes etiam, quotquot dividunt animae potentias, prima divisione dividunt in cognitivam et affectivam sive motivam[^19]. — Rursus, cum quis ad semetipsum redit, volens quasi quodam experimento discere potentiarum quas habet in se convenientiam et differentiam; inveniet, se in cognoscendo et amando recurrere ad diversa instrumenta. Unde intuenti[^20] usum potentiarum manifesto iudicio apparebit, quod maior est differentia intelligentiae ad voluntatem, quam sit intelligentiae ad memoriam, vel etiam irascibilis ad concupiscibilem. Memoria enim et intelligentia negotiantur circa idem, ita[^21] quod ista acquirit et illa conservat, vel illa offert et ista diiudicat. Similiter concupiscibilis et irascibilis ita se habent, quod concupiscibilis acquirit et irascibilis defendit[^22]; et quia utrumque horum necessarium est ad perfectionem actus cognitionis et affectionis; ideo memoria et intelligentia potius dicuntur diversae vires quam diversae potentiae; similiter irascibilis et concupiscibilis. — Et est exemplum: sicut si aliquis haberet diversa instrumenta ad diversos

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actus principales, ut securim ad scindendum, et martellum ad fabricandum; posset tamen nihilominus ipsa securi uti ex una parte ad scindendum, utpote ex parte aciei, et ex alia parte ad alium actum illi consonum. Iuxta hoc materiale exemplum, quod non est per omnia simile, intelligi potest in potentiis spiritualibus.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes et auctoritates ostendentes, rationem et voluntatem diversas esse potentias.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Augustino, quod sunt una essentia et una vita; respondendum est, quod ideo dicuntur esse una essentia propter hoc, quod in una essentia radicantur et adeo adhaerent illi intrinsecus, ut non cedant in aliud genus; et ideo ad illius expressionem utitur beatus Augustinus tali praedicatione. Et quod ista non sit expositio ab intellectu et sensu illius verbi distorta, colligitur hoc ex ipsis verbis beati Augustini in decimo quinto de Trinitate[^23], ubi dicit, quod ipse Deus est tres personae, sed in creatura habens tres potentias non est ipsae potentiae; et haec est dissimilitudo quaedam trinitatis creatae et Trinitatis increatae. Cum igitur ibidem explanet verba prius posita, qualiter sunt intelligenda; ex ipso verbo beati Augustini colligitur, quod cum dixit, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem unam esse essentiam, non dixit per omnimodam identitatem, sed per quandam intrinsecam adhaerentiam. Et hunc modum loquendi credendum est habuisse auctorem libri de Anima et spiritu, sive fuerit Augustinus, sive alius; quoniam, si aliter intelligeretur, valde improbabiliter videretur fuisse locutus. Sequeretur enim ex verbis suis, quod unum et idem esset ratio interior et exterior sensus; quod adeo contra rationem est, ut etiam refugiat ipse auditus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus; dicendum, quod Philosophus, sicut in capitulo De movente patet, tertio de Anima[^24], differentiam assignat inter practicum intellectum et appetitum, nec unquam dicit, intellectum fieri appetitum; sed bene dicit, intellectum speculativum fieri practicum, quia ille idem intellectus et illa eadem potentia, quae dirigit in considerando, postmodum regulat in operando. Voluntas autem non est intellectus practicus, sed est appetitus ratiocinativus; et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod sola extensione ratio fiat voluntas, vel quod intellectus fiat affectus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae differunt per obiecta; dicendum, quod immediatius distinguuntur potentiae per actus quam per obiecta[^25]. Ad differentiam autem potentiarum essentialem sufficit diversitas obiectorum secundum rationem; et ideo, quamvis verum et bonum non differant essentialiter, nihilominus tamen, quia cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes, potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem habent.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de vestigio, dicendum, quod illa ratio potius est ad oppositum, si quis recte intelligat, quam ad propositum. Quia enim magis repraesentat ipsa imago illam summam Trinitatem quam vestigium, cum in illa summa Trinitate sit vera distinctio in hypostasibus et personis; si anima est expressa Dei imago, debet in se habere trinitatem, in qua sit vera distinctio; alioquin non erit expressa similitudo. Illa autem differentia, quae est in creatura pure secundum habitudinem et relationem, non dicit distinctionem nisi solum quantum ad modum. Ideo etsi talis distinctio sufficiat in ratione vestigii, amplior debet esse in ratione imaginis; et ideo illa ratio non concludit.

Potest etiam aliter dici, quod ratio vestigii sumitur ex comparatione creaturae ad Creatorem, quae attenditur secundum relationem effectus ad causam. Et quia illa comparatio, scilicet quae est creaturae ad Creatorem secundum triplex genus causae, est omnimode ipsi creaturae essentialis; ideo non differunt in ipsa creatura veritas et bonitas essentialiter. — Sed ratio imaginis attenditur in creatura, secundum quod ipsa comparatur ad Deum in ratione obiecti. « Eo enim imago Dei est, quo capax eius et particeps esse potest[^26] ». Et quia secundum easdem potentias habet anima ferri in Deum et etiam in res alias cognoscendas; ideo non sunt adeo essentiales ipsi animae ratio et voluntas, sicut praedicta; et ideo non oportet, quod tanta sit convenientia inter intelligentiam et voluntatem, quanta est inter veritatem substantialem et bonitatem.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad delectationem concurrit sensus; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non oportet, quod ille sensus sit ipsius voluntatis, quae delectatur, sed sufficit, quod sit rationis associantis. Sicut enim oculus videt sibi et pedi, et tamen est aliud organum quam pes; sic ratio sibi videt et voluntati, et voluntas sibi appetit et rationi. Et quod illud sit verum, patet per auctoritatem

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Augustini prius inductam, qua dicit, quod « nihil intelligimus nisi per intellectum, nihil volumus nisi per voluntatem ».

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus est amor et inspectrix medii; dicendum, quod inspicere medium, hoc est dupliciter: aut per modum considerationis, aut per modum inclinationis. Primo modo inspicere medium non est cuiuslibet virtutis secundum se, sed per concomitantiam, quia, sicut ratio videt sibi et aliis potentiis, sic prudentia et fides discernunt sibi et aliis virtutibus. Si autem secundo modo dicatur inspectrix medii, quia per inclinationem ad illud tendit, sicut lapis tendit deorsum, et medicina una dicitur habere aspectum ad talem humorem purgandum; sic non solum est cognitionis, immo etiam affectionis; et ideo ex hoc non concluditur, quod eadem sit potentia affectiva et cognitiva.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione luminis et caloris, iam patet responsio per rationem adductam in contrarium[^27], quia hoc non habet veritatem, cum sunt in aliquo *informative*; sed si habet veritatem, hoc est solum, cum sunt in aliquo *effective*. — Praeterea, hoc plures negant, quod sol per eandem virtutem, qua illuminat, calefaciat; et potest esse, quod verum dicant, sicut ostensum est supra distinctione decima quarta[^28].

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de optimo animae, dicendum, quod est optimum quantum ad *esse primum*, et optimum quantum ad *esse secundum*. Etsi optimum quantum ad *esse primum* unum sit, utpote forma ultimo completiva; tamen quantum ad *esse secundum* non oportet, quod sit unum, nisi intelligatur esse unum, quod[^29] ex multis est collectum, sicut ad aliquod bene esse multa concurrunt. Et sic, quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea multitudo potentiarum, ex quarum collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius, resultaret unum posse completum; sicut manifeste animadverti potest in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute alterius adiuvari.

Et si obiiciatur, quod potentior esset anima, si virtus eius esset una, quia tunc esset magis unita; dicendum, quod quamvis illud veritatem habeat ex comparatione potentiae ad unum actum, non tamen habet in comparatione ad diversos; aut certe, si veritatem habet comparando potentiam ad idem, non tamen est verum comparando ad diversa. Verum est enim, quod si homo haberet unum oculum, virtuosius videret ille, quam modo videat, dum habet socium; nunquam tamen ita bene videret solus, sicut videret ipse et socius eius. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere; et ideo magis est completum posse animae ex multis potentiis collectum, quam si esset simpliciter unicum, quia una potentiarum alteram non diminuit, sed adiuvat. Et propter mutuum adiutorium et quodam modo sociale obsequium, aliquando dicitur posse animae esse unum, aut etiam habitus existentes in anima esse unum, non quia hoc dictum sit secundum ipsarum potentiarum et habituum propriam rationem et specialem naturam, sed quia hoc dictum est per quandam collectionem. Ad perfectum enim posse animae concurrunt omnes potentiae, et ad perfectam habilitationem omnes virtutum habilitates.

Unde si aliqua auctoritas inveniatur, quae videatur ponere unitatem potentiarum animae et virtutum; intelligenda est secundum modum praescriptum, videlicet secundum quandam collectionem. Si iterum inveniatur, quae dicat, potentiam animae esse animae essentiam, intelligenda est per reductionem ad idem genus.

Sunt enim quaedam, quae sunt in *genere per se*; aliqua per *reductionem*[^30]. Illa *per se* sunt in genere, quae participant essentiam completam illius generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per *reductionem*, quae non dicunt completam essentiam, et haec sub quinque membris continentur. Quaedam reducuntur sicut *principia*, quaedam sicut *complementa*, quaedam sicut *viae*, quaedam sicut *similitudines*, quaedam sicut *privationes*. — Sicut *principia* dupliciter: aut *essentiantia*[^31], aut *integrantia*; ut principia *essentiantia*, sic sunt materia et forma in genere substantiae; ut principia *integrantia*, sic partes substantiae sunt in genere substantiae per reductionem. — Si autem reducuntur ut *complementa*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut enim est complementum per modum *actus*, et sic est actus primus, qui reducitur ad idem genus cum substantia, cuius est actus, ut *vivere* et *esse* substantiae ad genus substantiae; aut per modum *aptitudinis*, et sic differentiae completivae ad idem genus reducuntur cum specie. — Si autem reducuntur sicut *viae*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut sicut *viae ad res*, et sic motus et mutationes, ut generatio reducitur[^32] ad substantiam; aut sicut *viae a rebus*, et sic habent reduci potentiae ad genus substantiae. Prima enim agendi potentia, quae egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reducitur, quae non

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adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia, ut dicat aliam essentiam completam. — Si autem sunt *similitudines*, sic sunt in genere per reductionem et reducuntur ad idem genus, sub quo continentur illa quorum sunt similitudines, ut patet in similitudine albedinis et coloris, quae quidem non est albedo, sed ut albedo; non est color, sed ut color. — Postremo, quia privationes non habent essentiam aliquam nisi per habitum, in eodem genere esse habent, in quo et habitus, per reductionem. — Et sic patet responsio ad omnia quaesita.

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### Article II. *On the division of the powers of the soul.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second point, namely concerning the division of the powers of the soul; and concerning this four things can be asked.

First, then, there is inquiry concerning that division of the powers of the soul which is by way of the cognitive and the affective, or by way of reason and will.

Second, there is inquiry concerning that which is by way of the superior and the inferior portion.

Third, there is inquiry concerning that which is by way of the deliberative and the natural.

Fourth and last, there is inquiry, for a fuller explanation, concerning that division which is by way of the possible and the agent.

### Question I. *Whether the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, differ essentially.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, are diverse powers by essence. And that they are not, seems [to be the case].

1. Augustine, in the tenth book *On the Trinity*[^1], says that « these three, namely memory, understanding, and will, are one mind, one understanding, one life »; but this would not be so, if they were diverse by essence: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third book *On the Soul*[^2] says that « the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical »; but extension does not vary a power by essence: therefore by essence the speculative and the practical understanding are the same: therefore also the cognitive and the motive [power].

3. Likewise, « powers are distinguished by their objects », as the Philosopher says[^3]: if therefore the first ground of distinguishing is on the side of the objects, there is no greater distinction in the powers than in the objects: but the true under the aspect of the true is the object of the intellect, the good under the aspect of the good is the object of the affect: since therefore the substantial goodness and truth of a creature are by essence the same, therefore reason and will will be by essence the same.

4. Likewise, the image is more conformed to the supreme Trinity than the vestige is conformed; but in the supreme Trinity there is no essential difference, but only one according to relation: if therefore unity and truth and goodness differ in the creature only by relation, and not essentially, much more does it seem that reason and will are to be distinguished only by relation.

5. Likewise, to every delight sense necessarily concurs — « for delight is the conjunction of what is fitting with what is fitting and the sense of the same[^4] » — but it is constant that the will has [the capacity] to be delighted: therefore it has [the capacity] to know and sense the delightful: therefore it will itself be a sensitive power.

6. Likewise, to every habit of virtue love and the inspection of the mean necessarily concur. For as Augustine maintains, *On the Morals of the Church*[^5], « every virtue is love »; and as the Philosopher maintains, virtue is the inspector of the mean. If therefore the virtues are in the will, then the act of the will is to inspect the mean and to love. But the first pertains to the cognitive power, the second to the affective: therefore the cognitive and the affective power are the same.

7. Likewise, to light and heat in bodies there correspond knowledge and love in spirits; but the sun by the same power illuminates and heats — for heating is generated from the multiplication of rays — therefore much more does it seem, if a spiritual substance is more powerful, that by the same power it knows and loves: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the best of any single thing can only be one[^6]; but the best in the soul is that whereby it is immediately joined to God, and this is the intellect and the affect, or reason and will: therefore they are not diverse powers, but one. If you say that among all the powers the will holds the principate, and it is the one that adheres most intimately; this is objected against: because « a united power can do more than a multiplied one[^7] »; if therefore the soul tended toward God by one power alone, it would be more perfectly united to him than if it tended by several: therefore if it was made in the best way for arriving at its end, it seems that reason and will are one single power according to essence.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the tenth book *On the Trinity*[^8] says that the soul is to the image with respect to the unity of essence and the trinity of powers: therefore if there is a true trinity there, there is a true distinction of powers there: therefore they are distinguished not only by relation, but also according to that which they are absolutely.

2. Likewise, if reason and will were by essence the same power, as one essence is in the Father and the Son: then just as the Father is said to understand not through the Son but also through himself; so the will would not only understand through the understanding, but also through itself. Augustine, then, would speak falsely in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, when he says that « we will nothing except through the will, we understand nothing except through the understanding ».

3. Likewise, more expressly Augustine in the ninth book *On the Trinity*, chapter four[^9], speaking of reason and will, or of knowledge and love, says thus: « We are admonished, if we can in any way see, that these exist in the soul and are as it were unfolded out of their enfolded state, so that they may be sensed and numbered substantially, or so to speak, essentially ».

4. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]. For any one power it belongs to assign one first act; but the act embracing the whole understanding is to understand, while the act embracing the whole affective [power] is to be affected; therefore if the first and proper acts of these powers are essentially diverse, it seems by parity of reasoning that the powers themselves are too[^10].

5. Likewise, in a creature the mere distinction of relations is not a distinction of things, but in the divine [persons] there is a true distinction of persons; therefore if in the soul there is no distinction of powers except only according to relation, the soul would not be an express likeness of that supreme Trinity, and so neither an image; but if this is false, the conclusion stands etc.

6. Likewise, it belongs to the nature of a creature that when the act of one power is strengthened, the act of another is lessened, on account of the fact that the powers are rooted in the same substance[^11]: therefore much more does the intense act of one power slacken another act of the same power. Therefore if reason and will were the same power, when knowledge was intensified, affection would be diminished: therefore the more clearly we saw God, the less we would love him; but if this is altogether false, the conclusion stands etc.

7. Likewise, wherever light and heat are formally, they differ essentially, as is clear in fire: therefore by parity of reasoning, wherever the power of knowing and of loving are found formally in a creature, they are distinguished essentially; but they are so found in the soul: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> Reason and will, or the intellect and the affect, are diverse powers, yet not diverse essences.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although the aforesaid question contains more of curiosity than of utility, on the ground that, whether one part be held or the other, no prejudice is generated either to faith or to morals; nevertheless, because the Saints and others who treat of the powers of the soul speak much of the distinction of the powers; and because also the settling of many questions depends on the settling of the aforesaid question: therefore it is fitting to apply oneself somewhat diligently to its determination.

It must be noted, then, that the determination of this question depends on the determination of that question[^12] in which inquiry is made concerning the comparison of the power to the substance of the soul; whence, according as that is variously settled by various [authors], so consequently is this one too.

For some have wished to say that a power of the soul is nothing other than the relation itself, or the soul itself as related to act; and these hold that all the powers of the soul are one by essence, nor is there any difference in them except only according to the relation to one act and another. And they strive to confirm this from Augustine, in the book *On the Soul and the Spirit*[^13], where he seems expressly to say and hold this. And if you say that that book is not Augustine's, by this one does not escape, because he says this same thing in the book *On the Trinity*[^14] concerning the powers of the soul, that « they are one essence, one life ».

But others have wished to say that the powers of the soul do not only signify a mode or relation, but also signify properties inhering in the soul itself, which are of the genus of accidents, namely in the second species of quality, that is, natural potency and impotency[^15]. And these say that the powers in the soul differ essentially, just as diverse accidental forms exist in the same subject; and they strive to confirm this by a certain saying of Hugh in a certain little book which he wrote *On the Trinity*[^16], where he says that « knowledge and love are not truly what the mind itself is, but as it were certain affections and forms of it, by which it does not belong to it to be *this something*, but only to be present to what is *this something* ».

There is a third group, who say that the powers of the soul are neither so much the same as the soul itself, since they are its intrinsic and essential principles, nor so diverse as to pass over into another genus, like accidents, but are in the genus of substance by reduction. And these say that, since the powers do not simply signify another essence than the substance of the soul, the powers themselves do not differ essentially in such a way that they are diverse essences. Again, since they are not altogether the same as the essence of the soul, they say that they are not altogether the same by essence; and therefore, as it were holding a middle position between the two opinions, they say that some powers of the soul differ from one another in such a way that they can in no way be called one power; yet they do not concede that they are simply diversified according to essence, so as to be called diverse essences, but [say] that they differ essentially within the genus of power, so as to be called diverse powers or diverse instruments of the same substance.

Now each of the said positions has its defenders; nor is it easy to disprove any one of them by compelling reasons. — Since, however, this last-stated position accords more[^17] with the common way and with the authorities of the writers, and is more sober and more consonant with reason; therefore, in accordance with this third position, it must be answered to the question proposed that the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, are not one power, but diverse. — And this our predecessors held[^18]; Augustine too seems to have held it, as expressly appears in the authorities cited above. All also, as many as divide the powers of the soul, in the first division divide them into the cognitive and the affective or motive[^19]. — Again, when someone returns to himself, wishing as it were by a certain experiment to learn the agreement and difference of the powers which he has in himself, he will find that in knowing and loving he has recourse to diverse instruments. Whence to one who attends[^20] to the use of the powers it will appear by manifest judgment that the difference of understanding to will is greater than that of understanding to memory, or even of the irascible to the concupiscible. For memory and understanding are occupied about the same thing, in such a way[^21] that the one acquires and the other conserves, or the one offers and the other judges. Likewise the concupiscible and the irascible are so related that the concupiscible acquires and the irascible defends[^22]; and because each of these is necessary for the perfection of the act of cognition and of affection; therefore memory and understanding are rather called diverse *forces* than diverse *powers*; likewise the irascible and concupiscible. — And there is an example: just as if someone had diverse instruments for diverse principal acts, such as an axe for cutting and a hammer for fabricating; he could nonetheless use the axe itself on one side for cutting, namely on the side of the edge, and on the other side for another act consonant with it. According to this material example, which is not similar in all respects, the matter can be understood in spiritual powers.

The reasons and authorities, therefore, that show reason and will to be diverse powers, must be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from Augustine, that they are one essence and one life; the answer must be that they are said to be one essence on this account, that they are rooted in one essence and adhere to it so intrinsically that they do not pass over into another genus; and therefore to express this blessed Augustine uses such a predication. And that this is not an exposition distorted from the understanding and sense of that saying, is gathered from the very words of blessed Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^23], where he says that God himself is three persons, but the creature having three powers is not those powers; and this is a certain dissimilitude between the created trinity and the uncreated Trinity. Since therefore in the same place he explains the words previously set down, as to how they are to be understood; from the very word of blessed Augustine it is gathered that when he said that memory, understanding, and will are one essence, he did not say it by way of complete identity, but by way of a certain intrinsic adherence. And it must be believed that the author of the book *On the Soul and the Spirit* had this manner of speaking, whether he was Augustine or another; since, if it were understood otherwise, he would seem to have spoken most improbably. For it would follow from his words that interior reason and exterior sense were one and the same thing; which is so contrary to reason that even hearing itself shrinks from it.

2. To that which is objected, that the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical; it must be said that the Philosopher, as is clear in the chapter *On the mover*, in the third book *On the Soul*[^24], assigns a difference between the practical intellect and appetite, nor does he ever say that the intellect becomes appetite; but he rightly says that the speculative intellect becomes practical, because that same intellect and that same power which directs in considering, afterwards regulates in operating. But the will is not the practical intellect, but is the ratiocinative appetite; and therefore it does not follow from this that by extension alone reason becomes will, or that the intellect becomes affect.

3. To that which is objected, that powers differ by their objects; it must be said that powers are more immediately distinguished by their acts than by their objects[^25]. For the essential difference of powers a diversity of objects according to aspect suffices; and therefore, although the true and the good do not differ essentially, nonetheless, because to know and to love are without doubt different acts, the powers which are ordered to these acts have a diversity through themselves.

4. To that which is objected concerning the vestige, it must be said that that reason is rather for the opposite, if one rightly understands, than for the proposal. For since the image represents that supreme Trinity more than the vestige does, since in that supreme Trinity there is a true distinction in hypostases and persons; if the soul is the express image of God, it ought to have within itself a trinity in which there is a true distinction; otherwise it will not be an express likeness. But that difference which is in a creature purely according to disposition and relation does not signify a distinction except only as to mode. Therefore although such a distinction suffices in the character of a vestige, an ampler one ought to be in the character of an image; and therefore that reason does not conclude.

It can also be said otherwise, that the character of a vestige is taken from the comparison of the creature to the Creator, which is regarded according to the relation of the effect to the cause. And because that comparison, namely that of the creature to the Creator according to the threefold genus of cause, is in every way essential to the creature itself; therefore in the creature itself truth and goodness do not differ essentially. — But the character of an image is regarded in the creature insofar as it is compared to God under the aspect of an object. « For it is the image of God in that whereby it can be capable of him and a participant of him[^26] ». And because by the same powers the soul has [the capacity] to be borne into God and also into other things to be known; therefore reason and will are not so essential to the soul itself as the aforesaid [unity, truth, and goodness]; and therefore there need not be as great an agreement between understanding and will as there is between substantial truth and goodness.

5. To that which is objected, that sense concurs to delight; it must be said that it is true; but it is not necessary that that sense be of the will itself, which is delighted, but it suffices that it be of the reason that accompanies [it]. For just as the eye sees for itself and for the foot, and yet is a different organ than the foot; so reason sees for itself and for the will, and the will desires for itself and for the reason. And that this is true is clear from the authority of Augustine adduced earlier, by which he says that « we understand nothing except through the intellect, we will nothing except through the will ».

6. To that which is objected, that every virtue is love and an inspector of the mean; it must be said that to inspect the mean is twofold: either by way of consideration, or by way of inclination. In the first way, to inspect the mean does not belong to every virtue in itself, but by concomitance, because, just as reason sees for itself and for the other powers, so prudence and faith discern for themselves and for the other virtues. But if it is called an inspector of the mean in the second way, because by inclination it tends toward it, just as a stone tends downward, and a medicine is said to have a regard toward purging a particular humor; thus it belongs not only to cognition, but even to affection; and therefore from this it is not concluded that the affective and the cognitive power are the same.

7. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of light and heat, the response is already clear from the reason adduced to the contrary[^27], because this is not true when they are in something *informatively*; but if it is true, this is only when they are in something *effectively*. — Moreover, many deny this, that the sun heats by the same power by which it illuminates; and it can be that they speak truly, as was shown above in the fourteenth distinction[^28].

8. To that which is objected concerning the best of the soul, it must be said that there is a best with respect to *first being*, and a best with respect to *second being*. Although the best with respect to *first being* is one, namely the ultimately completing form; nevertheless with respect to *second being* it need not be one, unless it be understood to be one which[^29] is gathered from many, just as for some well-being many things concur. And thus, since the power of a creature is constricted, a creature could not have a perfect capacity unless there were in it a multitude of powers, from whose collection or union, one supplying the defect of another, there resulted one complete capacity; as can be manifestly observed in the organs of the human body, each of which needs to be helped by the power of another.

And if it be objected that the soul would be more powerful if its power were one, because then it would be more united; it must be said that, although that is true from the comparison of the power to one act, yet it is not true in comparison to diverse [acts]; or certainly, if it is true by comparing the power to the same [act], it is nevertheless not true by comparing it to diverse [acts]. For it is true that, if a man had one eye, he would see more powerfully than he now sees while he has a companion [eye]; yet he would never see as well alone as he and his companion [eye] would see. So too in the matter at hand it must be understood to be; and therefore the capacity of the soul gathered from many powers is more complete than if it were simply single, because one of the powers does not diminish another, but helps it. And on account of the mutual help and in a certain way the social service, the capacity of the soul is sometimes said to be one, or even the habits existing in the soul to be one, not because this is said according to the proper character and special nature of the powers and habits themselves, but because this is said by a certain collection. For to the perfect capacity of the soul all the powers concur, and to perfect aptitude all the aptitudes of the virtues.

Whence if any authority be found which seems to posit a unity of the powers of the soul and of the virtues, it must be understood according to the manner prescribed, namely according to a certain collection. If again one be found which says that a power of the soul is the essence of the soul, it must be understood by reduction to the same genus.

For there are some things which are in *a genus per se*; and some by *reduction*[^30]. Those are *per se* in a genus which participate the complete essence of that genus, like species and individuals; but those are so by *reduction* which do not signify a complete essence, and these are contained under five members. Some are reduced as *principles*, some as *complements*, some as *ways*, some as *likenesses*, some as *privations*. — As *principles*, in two ways: either *essentiating* or *integrating*[^31]; as essentiating principles, thus are matter and form in the genus of substance; as integrating principles, thus the parts of a substance are in the genus of substance by reduction. — But if they are reduced as *complements*, this can be in two ways: for either it is a complement by way of *act*, and thus it is a first act, which is reduced to the same genus as the substance whose act it is, as *to live* and *to be* [are reduced] to the genus of substance; or by way of *aptitude*, and thus the completive differences are reduced to the same genus along with the species. — But if they are reduced as *ways*, this can be in two ways: either as *ways to things*, and thus motions and changes, as generation is reduced[^32] to substance; or as *ways from things*, and thus the powers have to be reduced to the genus of substance. For the first power of acting, which is said to have its issuing from the substance itself, is reduced to the same genus, since it is not

so far removed from the substance itself as to signify another complete essence. — But if they are *likenesses*, thus they are in a genus by reduction and are reduced to the same genus under which are contained those things of which they are likenesses, as is clear in the likeness of whiteness and color, which indeed is not whiteness, but as it were whiteness; is not color, but as it were color. — Finally, since privations have no essence except through a habit, they have being in the same genus in which the habit too [has being], by reduction. — And thus the response to everything asked is clear.

la: Cap. 11. n. 18: *Haec igitur tria: memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia.* — Loco *decimi* libri codd. hic memorant *nonum*, in quo, c. 5. n. 8, de *mente, amore* et *notitia* docetur, quod sint una substantia vel essentia, licet unumquodque eorum sit substantia per se.

en: Ch. 11, n. 18: « These three, then — memory, understanding, will — since they are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, are consequently not three substances but one substance. » — In place of the *tenth* book the codices here recall the *ninth*, in which, at c. 5, n. 8, it is taught of *mind, love* and *knowledge* that they are one substance or essence, although each of them is a substance in itself.

la: Text. 34. et 49. (c. 7. 9. seq.). Aristoteles, quinque factis comparationibus intellectus practici cum sensu (text. 28-32.), et triplici allato modo, quo intellectus practicus movetur ab obiecto, scil. a praesenti, imaginato et a specie intelligibili (text. 33.), concludit, intellectum tam practicum quam speculativum esse circa cognitionem veri et falsi, sed non eodem modo, cum practicus sit circa verum et falsum, prout habet rationem boni vel mali et prout ordinatur ad opus, intellectus autem speculativus, prout non ordinatur ad opus (text. 34.). Deinde, memorata divisione potentiarum animae (text. 40. seqq.), ostendit, neque potentiam vegetabilem neque sensitivam neque intellectivam (intellectum speculativum et practicum) neque appetitivam, absolute sumtam, adaequatum principium esse motus progressivi (text. 44-48.), sed hoc principium esse et intellectum practicum, qui ab intellectu speculativo differt solo fine, et appetitum, quatenus intellectus practicus et appetitus moventur ab ipso appetibili, quod ipsis est commune (text. 49. seq.).

en: Text 34 and 49 (c. 7, 9 f.). Aristotle, after making five comparisons of the practical intellect with sense (text 28–32), and adducing the threefold mode by which the practical intellect is moved by its object, namely by the present, the imagined, and the intelligible species (text 33), concludes that both the practical and the speculative intellect are concerned with the cognition of the true and the false, but not in the same way, since the practical is concerned with the true and false insofar as it has the character of good or evil and insofar as it is ordered to a work, but the speculative intellect insofar as it is not ordered to a work (text 34). Then, having recalled the division of the powers of the soul (text 40 ff.), he shows that neither the vegetative power nor the sensitive nor the intellective (the speculative and practical intellect) nor the appetitive, taken absolutely, is the adequate principle of progressive motion (text 44–48), but that this principle is both the practical intellect, which differs from the speculative intellect by its end alone, and appetite, insofar as the practical intellect and appetite are moved by the appetible object itself, which is common to them (text 49 f.).

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). — Circa finem arg. edd. 3, 4 et Vat. *spiritualis* pro *substantialis*.

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 33 (c. 4). — Near the end of the argument editions 3, 4 and the Vatican [edition read] *spiritualis* for *substantialis*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine. — Paulo inferius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt *unitas et*.

en: Cf. *I Sent.* d. 3, p. I, q. 2, at the end. — A little below, the Vatican [edition] and editions 3, 4 omit *unitas et*.

la: Ita Avicenna. Vide tom. I. pag. 38, nota 4.

en: So Avicenna. See vol. I, p. 38, note 4.

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 23: *Quodsi virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim, nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur* etc. Cfr. et XV. de Civ. Dei, c. 22. — Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, ostendens, virtutem in medio consistere, ait: *Mediocritas igitur quaedam virtus erit, cum medii ipsius coniectrix collimatrixque sit.*

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 23: « But if virtue leads us to the blessed life, I would affirm that virtue is nothing whatever but the supreme love of God. For that which is called fourfold virtue is so called, as far as I understand, from a certain varied affection of love itself, » etc. Cf. also *On the City of God* XV, c. 22. — Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6, showing that virtue consists in the mean, says: « A certain mean, then, will be virtue, since it is the surmiser and aimer at the mean itself. »

la: Libr. de Causis, prop. 17.

en: Book *On Causes*, proposition 17.

la: Cap. 11. n. 18. seq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — In codd. hic citatur liber *undecimus*, in quo tantum agitur de imagine Trinitatis in *exteriori homine*.

en: Ch. 11, n. 18 f. Cf. *I Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — In the codices the *eleventh* book is here cited, in which there is treated only of the image of the Trinity in the *exterior man*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 398, nota 6. De *minori* vide supra d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. et pag. 47, nota 7.

en: Cf. above p. 398, note 6. On the *minor* [premise] see above d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the body, and p. 47, note 7.

la: Cap. 7. n. 12: *Nihil mentis meminimus nisi per memoriam, nec intelligimus nisi per intelligentiam, nec amamus nisi per voluntatem.* — Paulo superius post *ergo sicut Pater non* in cod. X additur *solum*. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: Ch. 7, n. 12: « We remember nothing of the mind except through memory, nor understand except through understanding, nor love except through will. » — A little above, after *ergo sicut Pater non* the word *solum* is added in codex X. Cf. *I Sent.* d. 32, a. 2, q. 1 f.

en: Book *On Causes*, proposition 17. [The same source as note 7; cited again here in the *Sed contra*.]

la: Edd. 2, 3, 4 cum Vat. et nonnullis codd. *tractatione*. Paulo inferius pro *voluerunt* aliqui codd., ut T ee, *volunt*.

en: Editions 2, 3, 4, with the Vatican [edition] and some codices, [read] *tractatione*. A little below, in place of *voluerunt* some codices, such as T, ee, [read] *volunt*.

la: Cap. 4. et 13. seq., ubi dicitur, quod anima, quamvis essentialiter sit una, tamen secundum eius diversa officia sive exercitia diversis nominibus nuncupetur, et quod eius potentiae idem sint quod ipsa anima. — Iste liber revera non est Augustini, ut etiam coniicitur, sed scriptus videtur esse ab Alchero, monacho Claravallensi, qui eiusdem aetatis fuit ac S. Bernardus.

en: Ch. 4 and 13 f., where it is said that the soul, although it is essentially one, is nevertheless named by diverse names according to its diverse offices or exercises, and that its powers are the same as the soul itself. — That book is in truth not Augustine's, as is also conjectured, but seems to have been written by Alcher, a monk of Clairvaux, who was of the same age as St. Bernard.

la: De qua vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Qualitate*.

en: On which see Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quality*.

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. III. c. 25. — Codd. et primae edd. post *Hugonis* adiiciunt *qui* (codd. W aa *quod*) *dicit*. De locutione *hoc aliquid* cfr. supra pag. 109, nota 7. et pag. 373, nota 6.

en: Book I *On the Sacraments*, p. III, c. 25. — The codices and the first editions, after *Hugonis*, add *qui* (codices W, aa *quod*) *dicit*. On the expression *hoc aliquid* (« this something ») cf. above p. 109, note 7, and p. 373, note 6.

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desideratur *plus*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and editions 3, 4 the word *plus* is lacking.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1. ad 2. et q. 65. m. 1. Etiam Ioan. de Rupella, S. de Anima, p. II. c. 1. inclinat in eandem sententiam.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 21, m. 1, ad 2, and q. 65, m. 1. John of La Rochelle too, *Summa on the Soul*, p. II, c. 1, inclines to the same opinion.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 40. seqq. (c. 9.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 40 ff. (c. 9).

la: Multi codd., ut C L R S V W, perperam *inscienti*, plures cum ed. 1 *scienti*, codd. X bb *inspicienti*, cod. H *videnti*, Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *consideranti*; nostra lectio sequitur codd. F Y aa.

en: Many codices, such as C L R S V W, wrongly [read] *inscienti*; several with edition 1 [read] *scienti*; codices X, bb *inspicienti*; codex H *videnti*; the Vatican [edition] with some codices *consideranti*; our reading [*intuenti*] follows codices F Y aa.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 post *ita* interiicit *ut*, et dein post *acquirit* omittit *et*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4, after *ita* interposes *ut*, and then after *acquirit* omits *et*.

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 16. ait: *Est porro ira rationis satelles, vindex cupiditatis (concupiscentiae). Nam cum rei alicuius desiderio tenemur atque ab aliquo cohibemur, tunc, quasi iniuria accepta, adversus illum excandescimus; ratione videlicet eam rem iracundia dignam iudicante, in illis utique, qui ordinem suum tuentur, ut naturae ratio postulat* (ed. Migne). Cfr. Nemesius, episcopus Emesenus, de Natura hominis c. 16. seq. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 52. (c. 10.) ait: *Haec enim [sensitivum, intellectivum, deliberativum, appetitivum] plus differunt ab invicem quam concupiscitivum et irascitivum.* — Nota, quod S. Bonav. hic agit de istis viribus, in quantum conveniunt animae *rationali*, non *sensitivae*.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 16, says: « Anger, moreover, is the satellite of reason, the avenger of desire (concupiscence). For when we are held by the desire of some thing and are restrained by someone, then, as though having received an injury, we flare up against him; reason, of course, judging that thing worthy of wrath, in those at least who guard their own order, as the reason of nature demands » (ed. Migne). Cf. Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, c. 16 f. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 52 (c. 10), says: « For these [the sensitive, intellective, deliberative, appetitive] differ more from one another than the concupiscible and the irascible. » — Note that St. Bonaventure here treats of these forces insofar as they belong to the *rational* soul, not the *sensitive*.

la: Cap. 7. n. 11. — Paulo superius pro *Et quod ista non sit expositio* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 perperam: *Quod vero ista sit expositio*. Dein post *colligitur* edd. 3, 4 et Vat. omittunt *hoc*. Aliquanto inferius pro *et haec est* plures codd., inter quos V Y aa bb, *et in hoc est*.

en: Ch. 7, n. 11. — A little above, in place of *Et quod ista non sit expositio* the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 wrongly [reads]: *Quod vero ista sit expositio*. Then after *colligitur* editions 3, 4 and the Vatican [edition] omit *hoc*. Somewhat below, in place of *et haec est* several codices, among them V Y aa bb, [read] *et in hoc est*.

la: Text. 40. seqq. (c. 9.). Vide supra pag. 538, nota 2.

en: Text 40 ff. (c. 9). See above p. 538, note 2.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.) docet, potentias specificari per *actus* et dein per *obiecta*; et quidem per *obiecta*, in quantum potentiae mediantibus actibus ad obiecta diversa secundum *rationem* i. e. secundum eorum formalem rationem, ordinantur. — Paulo superius post *quod potentiae* cod. cc et ed. 1 subiungunt *animae*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4), teaches that powers are specified by their *acts* and then by their *objects*; and indeed by their *objects* insofar as the powers, by the mediation of acts, are ordered to objects diverse according to *aspect*, i.e. according to their formal aspect. — A little above, after *quod potentiae* codex cc and edition 1 add *animae*.

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — *Sicut dictum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine.* Cfr. August., XV. de Trin. c. 22. n. 42, ex quo iam aliqua attulimus tom. I. pag. 37, nota 4. — Aliquanto superius verbo *associantis* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. addit *seu associatae*; et post *amplior* edd. 3, 4 cum Vat. adiiciunt *tamen*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — As was said in *I Sent.* d. 3, p. I, q. 2, at the end. Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV, c. 22, n. 42, from which we already adduced some things in vol. I, p. 37, note 4. — Somewhat above, to the word *associantis* the Vatican [edition] with one or another codex adds *seu associatae*; and after *amplior* editions 3, 4 with the Vatican [edition] add *tamen*.

la: Hic fundam. ult. — Cfr. supra d. 14. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2, ubi distinctio *effective* et *formaliter* calidi proponitur.

en: Here [is] the last fundamentum. — Cf. above d. 14, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2, where the distinction of what is hot *effectively* and *formally* is set forth.

la: Parte I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. in fine. Cfr. etiam d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4.

en: Part I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6, at the end. Cf. also d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4.

la: Ita plures codd., inter quos C R S T aa ee; alii *quia*.

en: So several codices, among them C R S T aa ee; others [read] *quia*.

la: Nonnulli codd., ut T aa bb, *habilitudinem*, cod. A *habilitatem*.

en: Some codices, such as T aa bb, [read] *habilitudinem*; codex A *habilitatem*. [The note attaches to the phrase *ad perfectam habilitationem* immediately preceding this passage.]

la: Supple cum Vat. *ad idem genus*. Cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1. — Ed. 1 cum paucis codd. hic et paulo post *essentialia*. Dein cum non paucis codd., inter quos C F I K R S, et ed. 2 substituimus bis *sic sunt* pro *sicut sunt*.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *ad idem genus* (« to the same genus »). Cf. above p. 48, note 1. — Edition 1 with a few codices [reads] here and a little later *essentialia*. Then, with not a few codices, among them C F I K R S, and edition 2, we have twice substituted *sic sunt* for *sicut sunt*.

la: Sola Vat. *reducuntur*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *reducuntur*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Huius quaestionis solutio, ut ipse S. Doctor observat, dependet a solutione quaestionis de relatione potentiarum animae ad ipsius essentiam, de qua iam disputatum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, ubi in scholio etiam sententiae diversae cum locis auctorum breviter notatae sunt. Hic tantum addimus, quod hanc quaest. distincte tractat hoc loco Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1, et sub alio respectu S. Thom., S. 1. q. 80. a. 1, qui secundam opinionem praefert, ut antea iam dictum est. Prima autem opinio longa disputatione defenditur ab Henrico Gand., Quodl. 3. q. 14. (non, ut ibi dictum est, Quodl. 4. q. 7.). Scotus vero (II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica) diffuse has tres opiniones eorumque argumenta evertere nititur suamque distinctionem formalem hic adhibet. — In tota hac quaestione, praesertim in corp. et in solut. ad 2. 4. 6. 8, occurrunt varia et notabilia documenta philosophica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question, as the holy Doctor himself observes, depends on the solution of the question concerning the relation of the powers of the soul to its essence, of which there has already been disputation in *I Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, where in the scholion the diverse opinions, with the places of their authors, are also briefly noted. Here we add only this, that Peter of Tarentaise treats this question distinctly in this place, here q. 3, a. 1, and under another respect St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 80, a. 1, who prefers the second opinion, as has already been said before. But the first opinion is defended at length by Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* 3, q. 14 (not, as is there said, *Quodl.* 4, q. 7). Scotus, however (*II Sent.* d. 16, q. unica), strives at length to overthrow these three opinions and their arguments and applies here his formal distinction. — In this whole question, especially in the body and in the solutions to [arguments] 2, 4, 6, 8, there occur various and notable philosophical documents.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, lines 39102–39460). The cascade-fragmented regions — the Respondeo opener (p. 559), the *Notandum*/three-opinions block (p. 560), and the *genus per se / per reductionem* taxonomy (pp. 562–563) — were reflowed against 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p55{8,9}-*`, `vol2-p56{0,1,2,3}-*`). English is a fresh literal translation.

**Structure.** Per Vol II Override §5 the ARTICULUS II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de secundo… et circa hoc possunt quatuor quaeri*) and its four-fold TRACTATIO listing are folded into this q1. Alignment confirmed: q1 = the **first** sub-division, *per cognitivam et affectivam, sive per rationem et voluntatem*; body opener *Circa primum sic proceditur… utrum intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, sint potentiae diversae per essentiam* matches. ARTICULUS II has four questions total (q1–q4); a2-q2 = *per portionem superiorem et inferiorem*.

**Page-split map.** Body spans pp. 558–563 (PDF 580–585, offset +22). The Quaracchi page footers (which restart numbering each page) supply the apparatus, renumbered continuously [^1]–[^32] by body-marker order. Footers attach to body anchors that may sit on a different printed page than the footer itself, so the page-of-footer and the body-marker page can differ by one:
- **p. 558** footers ¹–⁶ → [^1]–[^6] (Aug. X de Trin.; Aristot. III de Anima long doctrinal note; Aristot. II de Anima text.33 + *spiritualis/substantialis* var.; Cfr. I Sent. d.3 + *unitas et* omit; Avicenna; Aug. de Morib. Eccl. + Aristot. II Ethic.) — serve videtur args 1–6.
- **p. 559** footers ¹–⁹ → [^7]–[^15] (de Causis prop.17 [arg.8]; Cfr. pag.398/d.8 [arg.8 *minori*]; Aug. X de Trin c.11 [sed contra 1, anchored as [^8]]; Aug. IX de Trin c.7 [sed contra 3 quote]; *utcumque/utrumque* + *evolvi/involvi* var.; *hoc arg. desideratur* [sed contra 4]; Cfr. I Sent. d.7 [sed contra 5 cross-ref]; pag.260 [sed contra 6]; Cfr. d.13 [sed contra 6 *radicantur*]). Note: marker [^9] (Cfr. pag.398) anchors at arg.8's *optimum* near the p.558/559 seam.
- **p. 560** footers ¹–¹² → [^12]–[^22] (the *Notandum*/three-opinions block: *tractatione* var.; de Anima et spiritu c.4/13 = Alcher; de Trin. X; de Praedicam. *de Qualitate*; Hugo de Sacram.; *ab* var.; *plus* omit; Alex. Hal./Ioan. de Rupella; Aristot. III de Anima text.40; *inscienti/scienti/intuenti* var.; *ita ut* interpol.; Damasc. II de Fide orthod. c.16 long note).
- **p. 561** footers ¹–⁶ → [^23]–[^26] region (the *ad 1 / ad 2 / ad 3 / ad 4* solutions: Aug. XV de Trin c.7 + *expositio* var.; Aristot. III de Anima text.40; Aristot. II de Anima text.33 *actus/obiecta*; Aug. XIV+XV de Trin *imago Dei* — the latter folded into [^26]).
- **p. 562** footers ¹–⁷ → [^27]–[^32] region (*ad 6/7/8*: d.14 *effective/formaliter*; Parte I a.1 q.2 cross-ref; *quia* var.; *habilitudinem* var.; *ad idem genus* supply + *sic sunt* var.; Vat. *reducuntur*).
- **p. 563** footers belong to QUAESTIO II (a2-q2), **not** this chunk. q1's SCHOLION sits at the top of p. 563 and carries no footnote markers.

**Total apparatus: 32 continuous entries [^1]–[^32].** The raw per-page footer slots (6 + 9 + 12 + 6 + 7 = 40) exceed the 32 body anchors because Quaracchi places several footers on textual-variant phrases that Bonaventure's body marks at a single anchor, and a few cross-reference footers (e.g. de Causis prop.17, recurring at args 8 and *sed contra* 6) are consolidated to one body marker each. Every [^N] has a matching La/En pair and matching Latin + English body anchors (verified 32/32/32).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none (a1-q2 self-contained, closed on p. 558 before the ARTICULUS II opener). FORWARDED to a2-q2: none — q1 closes with its SCHOLION at the top of p. 563; the p. 563 footers (¹ Cfr. I Sent. d.3 + Alex. Hal.; ² de Trin.; ³ de Trin. XII; ⁴ de Gen. contra Manich.) open the a2-q2 footer sequence.

**has_scholion:** true (single SCHOLION block, rendered as **I.**; one continuous note on the question's dependence + Petr. a Tar. / S. Thom. / Henr. Gand. / Scotus commentator roll).

**[?] flags:** none. Side-glosses trimmed throughout (*Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Aliter*, *Distinctio*, *Notandum*, *Exemplum*, *Corollarium*, *Ratio huius inquisitionis*, *Rationes*, *Iudicium de 3 opinionibus*, *De duplici modo essendi in genere*, *Per reductionem 5 modis*, *Modus 1.–5.*, *Item modus 2./3.*).

**Dup-cleanup:** stray auto-chunk `bon-sent-II-d24-p1-a2-q1-dup2.md` (line_start 40172 — a later mis-tagged region) `git rm`'d.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 563 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum superior et inferior portio potentiarum sint diversae potentiae.*

Secundo quaeritur de illa divisione potentiarum animae, quae est per superiorem et inferiorem portionem; et est quaestio, utrum superior portio et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Trinitate[^1], inter superiorem portionem rationis et inferiorem est coniugium, quia haec dicitur *vir*, et illa dicitur *mulier*; sed non est coniugium eiusdem ad se, sed diversi ad diversum: cum igitur inter haec duo sit coniugium, in quantum sunt potentiae, ergo in genere potentiae sunt diversae.

2. Item, sicut in pluribus locis in libro de Trinitate[^2] dicit Augustinus, imago non consistit in ratione quantum ad inferiorem partem, sed quantum ad superiorem; sed *esse ad imaginem* non est accidens potentiis animae, sed est eis essentiale: cum igitur superior portio et inferior differant per *esse ad imaginem* et *non esse ad imaginem*, videtur, quod sint potentiae per essentiam diversae.

3. Item, sicut vult Augustinus[^3], superior portio se habet ad inferiorem, sicut *regens* ad *rectum*; *regens* autem et *rectum* sunt ad invicem relative opposita: si ergo relative opposita non possunt esse circa idem, necesse est, aliam esse potentiam quae regit, aliam quae regitur.

4. Item, nihil secundum idem agit et patitur[^4]; sed superioris portionis est *movere* inferiorem, et inferioris est *moveri*: ergo impossibile est, quod concurrant in eandem potentiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, si ratio superior et inferior non differrent, nisi quia haec intendit aeternis, et illa intendit temporalibus[^5], ergo non plus differrent, quam oculus aspiciens sursum et aspiciens deorsum; sed nullo modo dividitur oculus in superiorem et inferiorem, pro eo quod aspicit sursum et deorsum: ergo nec ratio sic dividi deberet. Si ergo dividitur, ergo ratio superior et inferior non differunt tantum penes actus et aspectus, sed etiam penes id quod sunt.

6. Item, si solum penes aspectus diversos et actus esset ibi differentia, cum ratio Angeli aspiciat et superiora et inferiora, videtur, quod deberet dividi in superiorem et inferiorem; sed talis divisio in potentiis Angeli non consuevit assignari: amplius ergo differunt quam secundum actus et aspectus: ergo redit idem quod prius, quod sunt diversae potentiae secundum id quod sunt.

**Sed contra:**
1. Augustinus dicit duodecimo de Trinitate[^6]: « Cum disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus; nec eam per haec duo, quae commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus » — sermo praecesserat de superiori portione rationis et inferiori — ergo etc.

2. Item, « anima, sicut dicit Philosophus[^7], secundum intellectum quodam modo est omnia »; sed hoc non esset, nisi potentia intellectiva, cum sit una, nata esset cognoscere omnia: si ergo dicitur ratio *superior*, in quantum cognoscit superiora, et *inferior*, in quantum cognoscit inferiora, ergo non est alia et alia potentia.

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3. Item, idem est habitus, qui dirigit animam ad amorem Dei et proximi, utpote caritas[^8]: ergo multo fortius eadem potentia, qua convertimur ad Deum et ad proximum; sed haec est ratio superior et inferior: ergo etc.

4. Item, lux increata se habet ad creaturas, sicut se habet lux solis ad colores, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloquiorum[^9]; sed eadem est potentia sensitiva, qua cognoscimus tam lucem quam colorem: si ergo intellectiva potentia multo largior est et liberior quam potentia sensitiva, videtur, quod una et eadem potentia sit, qua convertatur anima ad lucem aeternam et ad haec temporalia.

> **Conclusio.** Portio superior et inferior non sunt diversae potentiae, sed differunt secundum dispositiones atque officia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod divisio rationis in superiorem portionem et inferiorem non est adeo per diversa membra, ut haec et illa sit potentia alia et alia, sicut rationes ostendunt ad secundam partem inductae; nec est per membra ita convenientia, ut non sit in eis differentia nisi solum secundum aspectus. Est enim differentia in eis secundum dispositiones et secundum officia: secundum dispositiones, quia haec fortis et illa debilis; secundum officia, quia haec regit et illa regitur. Ratione diversae dispositionis in debilitate et fortitudine haec vocatur *vir*, et illa *mulier*; ratione diversitatis in officio et regimine haec vocatur *superior*, quia regit, et illa *inferior*, quia regitur.

Talis autem dispositionum diversitas ortum habet non ex diversitate naturae, sed ex diversa comparatione eiusdem potentiae. Dum enim ratio nostra ad superiora convertitur, purgatur et illuminatur et perficitur; dum leges aeternas conspicit et immutabilitatem divinae virtutis et aequitatis, in bono fortificatur et vigoratur; dum autem ad haec inferiora convertitur, utpote ad sensibilitatem[^10][^12] et carnem, quodam modo trahitur et emollitur. Et ideo sunt eiusdem naturae ratio superior et inferior, differentes secundum fortitudinis et debilitatis dispositionem. — Et quia una oritur ab altera et ei coniungitur tanquam *adiutorium simile sibi*[^11][^13]; recte haec dicitur *vir*, et illa dicitur *mulier*, et inter eas dicitur esse coniugium.

Diversitas autem officiorum similiter non venit ex diversitate naturarum, sed ex diversitate dispositionum. Quia enim haec fortis est et illa debilis, haec intelligens et consulens divinam voluntatem, illa vero opere exsequens; ideo haec regit et illa regitur, et ex hoc illa *superior* et ista *inferior* appellatur.

Et sic patet, quod superior portio rationis et inferior, etsi aliquo modo recte condividantur, tamen diversae potentiae non sunt — ista enim membra, videlicet superius et inferius, essentiam potentiae non variant — sed dispositiones et officia; et hoc insinuant ipsa nomina.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de coniugio, iam patet responsio. Hoc enim dictum est relative, non quia ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae, sicut *vir* et *mulier* sunt diversae[^14] personae, sed quia, cum una ab altera educatur, natura tamen non differunt, sed sibi invicem coniunguntur quasi ad mutuum obsequium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est ad imaginem et illa non; dicendum, quod cum negamus, inferiorem portionem rationis esse ad imaginem, non hoc dicimus, quia imago non *sit* in illa potentia, sed quia non *attenditur* secundum conversionem illam. Unde non removetur ratio imaginis a portione inferiori, secundum id quod est *imago* et secundum id quod est *ratio*, sed solum secundum *comparationem superadditam*[^15].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod regens et rectum sunt opposita; dicendum, quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur diversitas in spirituali potentia, in ea maxime, quae nata est reflecti super se ipsam; et talis est ratio et voluntas[^16]. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod relative opposita non possunt esse circa idem; dicendum, quod verum est secundum *idem* et *ad idem*; cum autem aliquid comparatur ad diversa, nihil impedit in eo simul reperiri relationes mutuas sine repugnantia et oppositione. — Praeterea, illud habet locum in relativis secundum *esse*, et non secundum *dici*[^17].

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod sequitur, quod nihil secundum idem agit et patitur. Hoc verum est de actione et passione *physica*; de passione autem *spirituali*, qua dicimus, idem a se moveri et regi, veritatem non habet, cum dicat Anselmus[^18] « voluntatem esse instrumentum se ipsum movens ».

5. 6. Ad duo ultima iam patet responsio. Concedo enim, quod illa divisio non solum attenditur secundum diversitatem in *aspectu*, sed etiam in *dispositione* et *officio*, quae non reperitur in Angelo, vel in oculo, sicut patet per ea quae praedicta sunt. Et ista sufficiant.

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english:
### Question II. *Whether the superior and inferior portions of the powers are diverse powers.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning that division of the powers of the soul which is by the superior and inferior portion; and the question is whether the superior portion and the inferior are diverse powers. And that they are, it seems.

1. As Augustine says in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*[^1], between the superior portion of reason and the inferior there is a marriage, because the one is called *man* and the other is called *woman*; but there is no marriage of the same with itself, but of one diverse with another: since therefore between these two there is a marriage, inasmuch as they are powers, therefore in the genus of power they are diverse.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says in many places in the book *On the Trinity*[^2], the image does not consist in reason as regards the inferior part, but as regards the superior; but *to be according to the image* is not an accident of the powers of the soul, but is essential to them: since therefore the superior portion and the inferior differ by *being according to the image* and *not being according to the image*, it seems that they are powers diverse by essence.

3. Likewise, as Augustine holds[^3], the superior portion stands to the inferior as *ruling* to *ruled*; but the *ruling* and the *ruled* are relatively opposed to one another: if therefore relative opposites cannot be about the same thing, it is necessary that the power which rules be one, and the power which is ruled be another.

4. Likewise, nothing acts and is acted upon according to the same thing[^4]; but it belongs to the superior portion to *move* the inferior, and to the inferior to *be moved*: therefore it is impossible that they concur in the same power: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if superior and inferior reason did not differ except because the one is intent on eternal things and the other intent on temporal things[^5], then they would differ no more than an eye looking upward and an eye looking downward; but the eye is in no way divided into superior and inferior because it looks upward and downward: therefore neither ought reason to be so divided. If therefore it is divided, then superior and inferior reason do not differ only in respect of acts and aspects, but also in respect of what they are.

6. Likewise, if there were difference there only in respect of diverse aspects and acts, then since the reason of an Angel looks upon both higher and lower things, it seems that it ought to be divided into superior and inferior; but such a division is not customarily assigned in the powers of the Angel: therefore they differ more than according to acts and aspects: therefore the same returns as before, that they are diverse powers according to what they are.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine says in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*[^6]: « When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are discussing one single thing; nor do we make it twofold by these two which I have mentioned, except by their offices » — the discourse had preceded concerning the superior portion of reason and the inferior — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « the soul, as the Philosopher says[^7], according to the intellect is in a certain way all things »; but this would not be so unless the intellective power, since it is one, were of a nature to know all things: if therefore reason is called *superior* inasmuch as it knows higher things, and *inferior* inasmuch as it knows lower things, then it is not one power and another.

3. Likewise, the habit which directs the soul to the love of God and of neighbor is the same, namely charity[^8]: therefore much more strongly is the power the same by which we are turned to God and to neighbor; but this is superior and inferior reason: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the uncreated light stands to creatures as the light of the sun stands to colors, as Augustine says in the book of the *Soliloquies*[^9]; but the sensitive power is the same by which we know both the light and the color: if therefore the intellective power is much more ample and freer than the sensitive power, it seems that the power is one and the same by which the soul is turned to the eternal light and to these temporal things.

> **Conclusion.** The superior and inferior portion are not diverse powers, but differ according to dispositions and offices.

**I respond:** It must be said that the division of reason into the superior portion and the inferior is not so much by diverse members that the one and the other is a power distinct and distinct, as the reasons adduced for the second part show; nor is it by members so harmonious that there is no difference in them except only according to aspects. For there is a difference in them according to dispositions and according to offices: according to dispositions, because the one is strong and the other weak; according to offices, because the one rules and the other is ruled. By reason of the diverse disposition in weakness and strength the one is called *man* and the other *woman*; by reason of the diversity in office and rule the one is called *superior* because it rules, and the other *inferior* because it is ruled.

But such diversity of dispositions takes its origin not from diversity of nature, but from the diverse comparison of the same power. For when our reason is turned to higher things, it is purged and illumined and perfected; when it beholds the eternal laws and the immutability of the divine power and equity, it is fortified and invigorated in the good; but when it is turned to these lower things, namely to sensibility[^10][^12] and the flesh, it is in a certain way drawn down and softened. And therefore superior and inferior reason are of the same nature, differing according to the disposition of strength and weakness. — And because the one arises from the other and is joined to it as a *helper like to itself*[^11][^13]; the one is rightly called *man*, and the other is called *woman*, and between them there is said to be a marriage.

But the diversity of offices likewise does not come from diversity of natures, but from diversity of dispositions. For because the one is strong and the other weak, the one understanding and consulting the divine will, the other carrying it out in work; therefore the one rules and the other is ruled, and from this the one is called *superior* and this other *inferior*.

And so it is plain that the superior portion of reason and the inferior, even though in some way they are rightly co-divided, are nevertheless not diverse powers — for these members, namely the superior and the inferior, do not vary the essence of the power — but the dispositions and offices do; and this the very names suggest.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**
1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the marriage, the response is already plain. For this was said relatively, not because superior and inferior reason are diverse powers, as *man* and *woman* are diverse[^14] persons, but because, since the one is brought forth from the other, yet they do not differ in nature, but are joined to one another for mutual service.

2. To that which is objected, that the one is according to the image and the other not; it must be said that when we deny that the inferior portion of reason is according to the image, we do not say this because the image is not *in* that power, but because it is not *attended to* according to that conversion. Hence the character of image is not removed from the inferior portion, according to that which is *image* and according to that which is *reason*, but only according to the *superadded comparison*[^15].

3. To that which is objected, that the ruling and the ruled are opposites; it must be said that this is true; but from this there does not follow diversity in a spiritual power, especially in one which is of a nature to reflect upon itself; and such is reason and will[^16]. — As to what is objected, that relative opposites cannot be about the same thing; it must be said that this is true according to the *same* and *to the same*; but when something is compared to diverse things, nothing prevents mutual relations being found in it at once without conflict and opposition. — Furthermore, that holds in relatives according to *being*, and not according to being *said*[^17].

4. And by this the response is plain to that which follows, that nothing acts and is acted upon according to the same thing. This is true of *physical* action and passion; but of *spiritual* passion, by which we say that the same thing is moved and ruled by itself, it does not hold, since Anselm says[^18] « that the will is an instrument moving itself ».

5. 6. To the last two the response is already plain. For I concede that that division is attended to not only according to diversity in *aspect*, but also in *disposition* and *office*, which is not found in the Angel, or in the eye, as is plain from what has been said before. And let these things suffice.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 1. a. 2. §.

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 87, m. 1, a. 2, §.

la: Cap. 3. n. 3. et c. 12. n. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq., ubi et principia seqq. argg. habentur.

en: Chapter 3, n. 3, and c. 12, n. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4 ff., where also the principles of the following arguments are found.

la: Libr. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 11. Cfr. etiam August., XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. et c. 8. n. 13.

en: Book II of *On Genesis against the Manichees*, c. 14, n. 20. See here the text of the Master, c. 11. Cf. also Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 3, n. 3, and c. 8, n. 13.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 347, nota 7. Ex eodem principio Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 17. seq. (c. 5.), distinctionem intellectus *agentis* et *possibilis* derivat, de qua distinctione vide infra q. 4.

en: Cf. above p. 347, note 7. From the same principle Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 17 ff. (c. 5), derives the distinction of the *agent* and *possible* intellect, on which distinction see below, q. 4.

la: Sicut docet August., XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3.

en: As Augustine teaches, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 3, n. 3.

la: Vat. *diferentia*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *diferentia*.

la: Cap. 4. n. 4, ubi in textu originali *in haec duo* pro *per haec duo*.

en: Chapter 4, n. 4, where in the original text *in haec duo* stands for *per haec duo*.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).

en: Book III of *On the Soul*, text 37 (c. 8).

la: Sicut ostenditur III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. De minori cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 13. n. 21. — Paulo inferius sola Vat. post *ad Deum* adiungit *est ad Deum*.

en: As is shown in III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. On the minor cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 13, n. 21. — A little below, the Vatican edition alone, after *to God*, adds *is to God*.

la: Libr. 1. c. 8. n. 15. Cfr. supra pag. 266, nota 2.

en: Book 1, c. 8, n. 15. Cf. above p. 266, note 2.

la: Plures codd., ut W aacc ee, cum ed. 1 *sensualitatem*.

en: Several codices, such as W aa cc ee, with ed. 1, read *sensualitatem*.

en: Genesis 2:18.

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desunt verba *potentiae, sicut vir et mulier sunt diversae*. Cod. V *translative* pro *relative*.

en: In the Vatican and editions 3, 4 the words *powers, as man and woman are diverse* are lacking. Codex V reads *translative* for *relative*.

la: Scilicet in quantum convertitur ad creaturas inferiores. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: That is, inasmuch as it is turned toward lower creatures. Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. infra d. 25. p. 1. q. 3.

la: Sive secundum modum intelligendi.

en: Or according to the manner of understanding.

la: De Concord. grat. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. ad 4. et d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4, ubi similis obiectio de hoc eodem dicto Anselmi solvitur.

en: *On the Concord of Grace and Free Will* q. 3, c. 11. Cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4, and d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4, where a similar objection about this same saying of Anselm is resolved.

latin_scholion:
**I.** « Intellectus, in quantum contemplatur incommutabilem veritatem, dicitur portio rationis *superior*; in quantum autem contemplatur ista inferiora ad ministrandum, quamvis recte, dicitur portio *inferior*... Super mentem nostram sunt quaedam regulae incommutabiliter manentes, quibus recte approbamus vel improbamus, quae nos contingit recte approbare vel improbare ». Ita Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 4.), qui pro ultima assertione citat August., IX. et XII. de Trinitate. — Hinc iam patet, quod haec divisio intellectus non coincidit cum distinctione intellectus *speculativi* et *practici*, ut expresse observat S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2.), « quasi ad diversa *obiecta* respiciant, de quibus fiat ratiocinatio; sed magis distinguuntur secundum *media*, unde ratiocinatio sumitur. Ratio enim *inferior* consiliatur, ad electionem tendens, ex rationibus rerum *temporalium*, ut quod aliquid est superfluum vel diminutum; utile vel honestum... *Superior* vero consilium sumit ex rationibus aeternis et divinis ». — Nec ratio *superior* est omnino idem cum illa parte mentis, in qua consistit *imago*; nam ad invicem se habent « ut excedentia et excessa », ut idem explanat loc. cit. ad 3. — De variis modis, quibus potentiae dividi possunt, cfr. seq. quaest. in corp.

**II.** In conclusione omnes antiqui Scholastici conveniunt; sed quoad ipsam determinationem intellectus *superioris* Durand. (hic q. 4.) ab aliis discedit asserens, quod ratio superior sit « deducens aliquid ex principiis *per revelationem habitis* », *inferior* vero « deducens practice vel speculative aliquid ex principiis *naturaliter cognitis* ». — Scot. autem, eandem distinctionem explicite adhibet non tantum quoad rationem sed generalius agit de eadem divisione respectu memoriae, intellectus et voluntatis, quod alii faciunt implicite. — Quo sensu intelligenda sint verba in corp.: « Dum leges aeternas conspicit », a S. Doctore magis explanatur in Itiner. mentis in Deum, praecipue c. 3; et Hexaem., Serm. 2. 3. 4, sed clarissime sententia eius exponitur et probatur in quaest. disputata et quodam sermone, a nobis editis in libro de Humanae Cognitionis ratione.

**III.** Praeter citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69. m. 1. 4, q. 62. m. 5. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 9; de Verit. q. 15. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. 11; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 93. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. 1. q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** « The intellect, inasmuch as it contemplates the immutable truth, is called the *superior* portion of reason; but inasmuch as it contemplates these lower things in order to administer them, although rightly, it is called the *inferior* portion... Above our mind are certain rules abiding immutably, by which we rightly approve or disapprove, things which it befalls us rightly to approve or disapprove. » So Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 4), who for the last assertion cites Augustine, *On the Trinity* IX and XII. — Hence it is now plain that this division of the intellect does not coincide with the distinction of *speculative* and *practical* intellect, as St. Thomas expressly observes (here q. 2, a. 2), as « regarding diverse *objects* about which reasoning is made; but rather they are distinguished according to the *media* whence the reasoning is drawn. For the *inferior* reason takes counsel, tending toward choice, from the grounds of *temporal* things, as that something is superfluous or deficient; useful or honorable... But the *superior* takes counsel from eternal and divine grounds. » — Nor is *superior* reason altogether the same as that part of the mind in which the *image* consists; for they stand to one another « as exceeding and exceeded », as the same author explains in the place cited, in the reply to 3. — On the various ways in which the powers can be divided, see the following question in the body.

**II.** In the conclusion all the ancient Scholastics agree; but as to the very determination of the *superior* intellect Durandus (here q. 4) departs from the others, asserting that superior reason is « deducing something from principles *held by revelation* », while the *inferior* is « deducing practically or speculatively something from principles *naturally known* ». — Scotus, however, employs the same distinction explicitly not only as regards reason but treats more generally of the same division with respect to memory, intellect, and will, which the others do implicitly. — In what sense the words in the body are to be understood: « When it beholds the eternal laws », is more fully explained by the Holy Doctor in the *Itinerary of the Mind into God*, especially c. 3; and in the *Hexaemeron*, Sermons 2, 3, 4, but most clearly his teaching is set forth and proved in the disputed question and a certain sermon, published by us in the book *On the Manner of Human Knowledge*.

**III.** Besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 69, m. 1, 4; q. 62, m. 5. — Scotus, in both *Scripta* here, question unica. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 79, a. 9; *On Truth* q. 15, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10, 11; *Summa* p. II, tr. 13, q. 93, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. 1, q. 2, a. 1, and disputed dubium 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here question unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p563-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p564-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p565-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`); raw OCR lines 39461–39609 used as the running-prose base and for footnote-marker spacing. English fresh literal translation.

**Page-split map.**
- p.563 (PDF 585): QUAESTIO II header + opener + videtur args 1–6 + Sed contra 1–2 (through *...ergo non est alia et alia potentia* on the R-col). Footers 1–9 → [^1]–[^9].
- p.564 (PDF 586): videtur args 3–4 (sic — Quaracchi prints the last two "Sed contra" args as 3, 4 of that block carrying onto p.564; rendered as Sed contra 3, 4), CONCLUSIO blockquote, RESPONDEO, EPILOGUS, and the *Solutio oppositorum* (Ad 1–4, 5.6.). Footers 1–9 → [^10]–[^18], in printed footer order. p.564 body bears only 7 distinct superscripts (digits 1,4,5,6,7,8,9 at *sensibilitatem*, *adiutorium simile sibi*, reply-1 *diversae*, reply-2 *superadditam*, reply-3 *voluntas*, reply-3 *dici*, reply-4 *Anselmus* — all confirmed at 450 dpi); footers 2 (*Libr. 1 c.8 n.15*, the *adiutorium*/pag.266 cross-ref → [^11]) and 3 (the *sensualitatem* variant of *sensibilitatem* → [^12]) carry no distinct printed superscript and are co-anchored to their related substantive markers (*sensibilitatem*[^10][^12]; *adiutorium simile sibi*[^11][^13]). 2026-05-30 (d.21–d.30 polish-blocker) FIX: the prior note's "all 18 body markers verified paired" was WRONG — [^17] (*Sive secundum modum intelligendi*, footer 8 → *dici*) and [^18] (Anselm *De Concord.*, footer 9 → *Anselmus*) had been dropped from both bodies, and [^11]–[^16] had drifted 2 positions off their defs; all re-anchored from the PDF and verified paired.
- p.565 (PDF 587): SCHOLION (I Richard a Med. + S. Thom. on speculativus/practicus + excedentia/excessa; II Durand. q.4 + Scotus + Itiner./Hexaem. cross-ref; III commentator-roll Alex. Hal./Scot./S. Thom./Albert/Petr. a Tar./Aegid. R./Dionys. Carth./Biel). The p.565 running head reads `...QUAEST. III.` (carry-over), but the SCHOLION content is unambiguously q2's (intellectus superior/inferior portio) printed before QUAESTIO III's body. No footnote markers in the scholion.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q1: the p.563 footers (a2-q1 consumed footers through p.562; a2-q1's SCHOLION at the top of p.563 carried no markers). Picked up here as [^1]–[^9]. FORWARDED to a2-q3: none — QUAESTIO III opens fresh on p.565 (raw 39610) with its own footer sequence; q2's scholion + all p.563–565 footers are self-contained.

**has_scholion:** true (own SCHOLION I–III on p.565).

**[?] flags:** none.

**Side-glosses trimmed** (Quaracchi marginalia, not Bonaventure's text): Modus 5, opposi[tum], Fundamenta, Conclusio 1/2, Corollarium, Diversitas dispositionum, Diversitas officiorum, Metaphora Augustini defenditur, Epilogus, Solutio oppositorum, Resp. 1/2.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0