title: Dist. 18, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De potestate ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitentiali.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de potestate ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitentiali, de qua duo quaeruntur:

Primo, utrum haec potestas possit in culpam.

Secundo, utrum possit in poenam.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum potestas clavium habeat posse in culpam.*

Circa primum sic proceditur: quod habeat posse in culpam.

1. Ioannis vigesimo[^1]: *Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur* etc.: ergo videtur, quod habeat posse super peccata.

2. Item, Sacramentum poenitentiae est remedium contra mortale actuale, sicut baptismus contra originale: ergo sicut virtute baptismi deletur originale, ita virtute poenitentiae actuale[^2]; sed virtus poenitentiae principaliter consistit penes claves: ergo etc.

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3. Item, vir iustus merito vitae potest alii primam gratiam impetrare, cui non est commissum officium mediatoris; sed sacerdoti per officium clavium est commissum officium mediatoris[^3]: ergo multo fortius sacerdos gratiam impetrare potest: ergo et peccata dimittere.

4. Item, communiter conceditur, quod Sacramentum baptismi delet omnem culpam, sed tamen in hoc non derogatur divinae potentiae in aliquo; sed maioris virtutis est susceptivus spiritus rationalis quam aqua: ergo videtur, quod sine aliquo inconvenienti possit dici, quod sacerdos virtute clavium ministerialiter absolvit a culpa.

**Contra:** 1. Matthaei nono[^4], cum Dominus dixisset: *Fili, dimittuntur tibi peccata tua,* statim dixerunt: *Hic blasphemat;* sed non credebant blasphemare ob aliud, nisi quia peccata dimittere est solius Dei: non ergo sacerdotis.

2. Item, Augustinus[^5] et Gregorius dicunt, quod in suscitatione Lazari significata est resuscitatio peccatoris; sed Lazarus est prius a Domino vivificatus, quam traderetur discipulis exsolvendus: ergo absolutio sacerdotis nihil valet, antequam homo sit vivificatus per gratiam et suscitatus a morte culpae: ergo sacerdos non potest super culpam.

3. Item, paris potestatis est interius baptizare et a culpa mortali absolvere; sed Deus non debuit potestatem baptizandi *interius* communicare, ne spes poneretur in homine[^6]: ergo pari ratione nec potestatem absolvendi ab actuali.

5. Item, nullo modo fit remissio culpae nisi per gratiam; sed gratiam dare est potentiae infinitae, sicut monstratum est in praecedentibus: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Claves Ecclesiae ad delendam culpam se extendunt per modum deprecantis et impetrantis, sed, proprie loquendo sive per modum activi et impertientis, non se extendunt supra culpam.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi secundum diversos doctores.

Aliqui enim dicere voluerunt, quod dupliciter est loqui de clavium potestate: aut prout operatur in proposito confitendi, aut in *actu* confessionis. Si prout operatur in proposito confitendi; sic, quia illud propositum clauditur in contritione, et in contritione primo deletur culpa, sic virtus clavium quodam modo se extendit ad delendam culpam. Non enim a culpa potest iustificari[^8], nisi proponat sacerdoti confiteri. Si autem loquamur de potestate prout operatur in actu absolvendi; sic non potest in culpam, pro eo quod digne accedens ad absolutionem accedit contritus et suscitatus: et ita est ei iam culpa remissa. — Sed iste modus dicendi, licet videatur probabilis, tamen habet in superficie phantasiam: primum, quia baptismus-Sacramentum non dicitur operari, antequam homo baptizetur, alioquin operatum fuisset ab initio; pari ratione nec clavis. — Item, plus potest unumquodque in *re* quam in solo proposito: si ergo in proposito delet culpam quanto magis, dum exhibetur in *re ipsa?* — Et iterum, possibile est, quod aliquis ad absolutionem accedat *attritus,* sicut ad baptismum; quare tunc non fiet attritio contritio, cum non sit fictus?

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod habens clavem per potestatem clavis mediator est Dei ad hominem et hominis ad Deum. Unde per ipsum peccator ascendit ad Deum, et sic est sacerdos os peccatoris sive loquens pro peccatore; per ipsum descendit Deus ad hominem, et sic est sacerdos angelus Dei, immo os, eo quod ipse *separat pretiosum a vili*[^9]. — Secundum quod ascendit, habet se per modum inferioris et supplicantis; secundum quod descendit, per modum superioris et iudicantis. Secundum primum modum potest gratiam impetrare, et ad hoc est idoneus; secundum secundum modum potest Ecclesiae reconciliare. Et ideo in huius significationem in forma absolutionis praemittitur deprecatio per modum deprecativum, et subiungitur absolutio per modum indicativum[^10]; et deprecatio gratiam impetrat, sed absolutio praesupponit. Nunquam enim sacerdos absolveret quemquam, de quo non praesumeret, quod esset absolutus a Deo.

Si ergo quaeratur, utrum potestas clavium se extendat ad delendam culpam; dicendum, quod bene potest se extendere per modum deprecantis et impetrantis; et illud significatum est in benedictione sacerdotum, Numerorum sexto[^11]; sed per modum impertientis non. Quoniam ergo potestas sonat per modum activi et impertientis ex se; hinc est, quod potestas clavium, *proprie loquendo,* non se extendit

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supra culpam. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ioanne, dicendum, quod vel illud de remissione dicitur quantum ad ostensionem, vel solum quantum ad poenam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Sacramentum poenitentiae est contra morbum actualis[^7]; dicendum, quod Sacramentum poenitentiae accipitur, prout comprehendit *rem interiorem,* scilicet contritionem per eum modum, per quem « in perfectione poenitentiae tria concurrunt, scilicet contritio, confessio et satisfactio[^12] ».

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir iustus impetrat gratiam; dicendum, quod verum est, tamen non *largitur;* et bene potest sacerdos ibi[^13], ut gratiam impetret peccatori, sed ipse non *dat* eam, sed alius, et ideo illi soli attribuitur absolutio a culpa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Sacramento baptismi, dicendum, quod baptismus delet culpam per gratiam, sed illius non est causa *efficiens,* sicut supra[^14] ostensum est, sed *virtus divina.* Et baptismus dicitur peccata remittere ratione *rei interioris,* quam solus Deus infundit; similiter et poenitentiae Sacramentum. Sed potestas clavis dicit potestatem *creaturae rationalis* nec concernit *gratiam,* sed quod *exterius* est; quia clavis est extra in sacerdote, et ideo non *sic* ei attribuitur. Si enim sibi attribueretur *mundatio,* cum hoc non possit intelligi per modum *informandi,* intelligeretur per modum *efficiendi.*

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### Article II. *On the power of binding and loosing in the penitential forum.*

Next, with regard to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the power of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, about which two questions are asked:

First, whether this power has power over the fault.

Second, whether it has power over the punishment.

### Question I. *Whether the power of the keys has power over the fault.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus: that it has power over the fault.

1. In John, chapter twenty[^1]: *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven* etc.: therefore it seems that it has power over sins.

2. Likewise, the Sacrament of penance is a remedy against actual mortal [sin], just as baptism is against original [sin]: therefore, just as by the power of baptism original [sin] is destroyed, so by the power of penance is actual [sin][^2]; but the power of penance consists principally in the keys: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a just man by the merit of his life can obtain first grace for another, to whom the office of mediator has not been committed; but to the priest the office of mediator has been committed through the office of the keys[^3]: therefore much more strongly can the priest obtain grace: therefore also [can he] forgive sins.

4. Likewise, it is commonly conceded that the Sacrament of baptism destroys every fault, and yet in this nothing is taken away from the divine power; but a rational spirit is receptive of greater power than water: therefore it seems that, without any incongruity, it can be said that the priest, by the power of the keys, ministerially absolves from the fault.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Matthew, chapter nine[^4], when the Lord had said, *Son, your sins are forgiven you,* at once they said: *This man blasphemes;* but they did not believe [him] to blaspheme on any other account than that to forgive sins belongs to God alone: therefore not to the priest.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^5] and Gregory say that in the raising of Lazarus the resuscitation of the sinner is signified; but Lazarus was first given life by the Lord before he was handed to the disciples to be loosed: therefore the priest's absolution avails nothing before a man is given life through grace and raised from the death of fault: therefore the priest has no power over the fault.

3. Likewise, it is of equal power to baptize inwardly and to absolve from mortal fault; but God ought not to communicate the power of baptizing *inwardly,* lest hope be placed in man[^6]: therefore by parity of reasoning neither the power of absolving from actual [sin].

5. Likewise, in no way does remission of fault come about except through grace; but to give grace belongs to infinite power, as was shown in the preceding [matters]: therefore etc.

### Conclusio

> The keys of the Church extend to the destruction of the fault by way of beseeching and obtaining, but, properly speaking, that is, by way of acting and imparting, they do not extend over the fault.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that on this matter there is a twofold manner of speaking according to different doctors.

For some have wished to say that there are two ways to speak of the power of the keys: either as it operates in the intention of confessing, or in the *act* of confession. If as it operates in the intention of confessing; then, since that intention is contained in contrition, and in contrition the fault is first destroyed, in this way the power of the keys extends in a certain manner to destroying the fault. For one cannot be justified[^8] from the fault unless he intends to confess to the priest. But if we speak of the power as it operates in the act of absolving; then it has no power over the fault, because one who approaches absolution worthily approaches contrite and raised: and so the fault is already remitted to him. — But this manner of speaking, although it may appear probable, nevertheless has on its surface an illusion: first, because the Sacrament of baptism is not said to operate before a man is baptized, otherwise it would have operated from the beginning; by parity of reasoning neither does the key. — Likewise, each thing has more power in *fact* than in intention alone: if therefore in intention it destroys the fault, how much more when it is exhibited in *the fact itself?* — And again, it is possible that someone approach absolution *attrite,* as he approaches baptism; why then will not attrition become contrition, since he is not feigning?

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that one who holds the key, through the power of the key, is mediator of God to man and of man to God. Hence through him the sinner ascends to God, and thus the priest is the mouth of the sinner, that is, one speaking on the sinner's behalf; through him God descends to man, and thus the priest is the angel of God, indeed a mouth, in that he himself *separates the precious from the vile*[^9]. — In respect of his ascending, he stands in the manner of an inferior and a suppliant; in respect of his descending, in the manner of a superior and a judge. According to the first manner he can obtain grace, and for this he is suitable; according to the second manner he can reconcile to the Church. And therefore, as a signification of this, in the form of absolution a beseeching is set first, in the deprecatory mode, and absolution is added in the indicative mode[^10]; and the beseeching obtains grace, but the absolution presupposes [it]. For never would the priest absolve anyone of whom he did not presume that he was absolved by God.

If therefore it be asked whether the power of the keys extends to destroying the fault; it must be said that it can well extend [to it] by way of beseeching and obtaining; and that is signified in the blessing of the priests, in Numbers, chapter six[^11]; but by way of imparting, no. Since therefore power, of itself, sounds by way of acting and imparting; hence it is that the power of the keys, *properly speaking,* does not extend

over the fault. And the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected concerning John, it must be said that either that is said of remission with respect to manifestation, or only with respect to the punishment.

2. To that which is objected, that the Sacrament of penance is against the disease of actual [sin][^7]; it must be said that the Sacrament of penance is taken as it comprehends the *inward reality,* namely contrition, in that manner by which « in the perfection of penance three [things] concur, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction[^12] ».

3. To that which is objected, that the just man obtains grace; it must be said that this is true, yet he does not *bestow* [it]; and the priest can well [act] there[^13], so as to obtain grace for the sinner, but he himself does not *give* it, but another, and therefore to Him alone is the absolution from the fault attributed.

4. To that which is objected concerning the Sacrament of baptism, it must be said that baptism destroys the fault through grace, but of that [grace] it is not the *efficient* cause, as was shown above[^14], but the *divine power.* And baptism is said to remit sins by reason of the *inward reality,* which God alone infuses; likewise also the Sacrament of penance. But the power of the key denotes a power of the *rational creature* and does not concern *grace,* but that which is *outward;* because the key is outside, in the priest, and therefore it is not attributed to it *in that way.* For if *cleansing* were attributed to it, since this cannot be understood by way of *informing,* it would be understood by way of *effecting.*

la: Vers. 23. — Sc. Ioann. 20, 23.

en: Verse 23. — That is, John 20:23.

la: Vat. *mortale actuale.* In prima propos. plurimi codd. tantum *actuale,* cod. E et ed. 1 *mortale.* Codd. hoc arg. exhibent tertio loco; cum edd. servavimus hunc ordinem, qui solutionibus argg. respondet.

en: The Vatican edition reads *mortale actuale* (actual mortal [sin]). In the first proposition very many codices [read] only *actuale,* codex E and edition 1 *mortale.* The codices present this argument in the third place; with the editions we have kept this order, which corresponds to the solutions of the arguments.

la: In codd. plurimis *minor* desideratur, loco cuius in cod. P secunda manus inferius post *sacerdos* addidit: *cui commissum est officium mediatoris* (cfr. Hebr. 5, 1. seqq.). Subinde pro *gratiam* codd. F G *veniam.*

en: In very many codices the *minor* [premise] is wanting, in place of which in codex P a second hand added below, after *sacerdos: cui commissum est officium mediatoris* ("to whom the office of mediator has been committed") (cf. Heb. 5:1 ff.). Thereupon, for *gratiam* codices F G read *veniam.*

la: Vers. 2. seq., ubi Vulgata *remittuntur.* Cfr. Marc. 2, 5. seqq.

en: Verses 2 f. [Matt. 9:2 ff.], where the Vulgate reads *remittuntur.* Cf. Mark 2:5 ff.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 344, nota 3; lit. Magistri, d. XVI. c. 1. et d. XVII. c. 1. et hic c. 4. seqq., ex quibus hoc arg. sumtum est. Sententia Gregorii habetur in II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 344, note 3; the text of the Master, d. XVI, c. 1, and d. XVII, c. 1, and here c. 4 ff., from which this argument is taken. The opinion of Gregory is found in the second [book of] Homilies on the Gospel, homily 26, n. 6.

la: Vide supra d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Post *communicare* cod. U supplet *homini.*

en: See above, d. 5, a. 3, q. 1. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — After *communicare* codex U supplies *homini* ("to man").

la: Ut dicit Magister supra d. XVI. c. 1. — De re interiori Sacramenti poenitentiae cfr. infra d. 22. a. 2. q. 2. — In principio solut. post *actualis* edd. addunt *peccati mortalis.*

en: As the Master says above, d. XVI, c. 1. — On the inward reality of the Sacrament of penance, cf. below, d. 22, a. 2, q. 2. — At the beginning of the solution, after *actualis* the editions add *peccati mortalis.*

la: In cod. X secunda manus supplevit *quis.* Idem cod. paulo inferius pro *suscitatus* substituit *iustificatus.*

en: In codex X a second hand supplied *quis.* The same codex a little below substitutes *iustificatus* for *suscitatus.*

la: Ierem. 15, 19: *Si separaveris pretiosum a vili, quasi os meum eris.*

en: Jeremiah 15:19: *If you separate the precious from the vile, you shall be as my mouth.*

la: Vide supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 5.

en: See above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 5.

la: Vers. 11. et 23. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — In codd. plurimis pro *impertientis* edd. bis *imperantis.*

en: Verses 11 and 23 ff. [Num. 6]. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6. — In very many codices, for *impertientis* the editions twice [read] *imperantis.*

la: Dist. 16. p. I. a. 4. q. 1. ad 2, et praecipue I. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq.

en: D. 16, p. I, a. 4, q. 1, ad 2, and especially I Sent., d. 14, a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 4 f.

la: Cod. X supplet *cooperari.* Edd. legunt *ibi gratiam impetret;* codd. R S T prosequuntur: *peccatorum, sed per se non dat* etc.

en: Codex X supplies *cooperari.* The editions read *ibi gratiam impetret* ("there obtain grace"); codices R S T continue: *peccatorum, sed per se non dat* etc. ("of sins, but of himself does not give" etc.).

la: Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. — De re interiori baptismi vide ibid. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in fine. Vocem *extra* referas ad poenitentem iustificandum. — Circa finem solut. pro *non possit* codd. F H L *non posset.*

en: D. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2. — On the inward reality of baptism see ibid. p. I, a. 1, q. 1, at the end. Refer the word *extra* ("outward") to the penitent who is to be justified. — Near the end of the solution, for *non possit* codices F H L [read] *non posset.*

la: De qua in seq. quaest.

en: On which [the punishment], in the following question.

la: Sc. Estius, *In IV. Sent.* d. 18. (in fine) § 3. et 4.

en: That is, Estius, *On the Fourth [Book] of the Sentences,* d. 18 (at the end), §§ 3 and 4. (Reference for the Scholion's opening attribution.) ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Estius (hic § 3. 4.)[^16], cui multi alii theologi consentiunt, contendit, S. Bonaventuram, Alexandrum Hal., Gabrielem et nonnullos alios quoad hanc I. quaestionem sequi errorem Magistri et Richardi a S. Vict. docentium, sacerdotem utentem potestate absolvendi sibi a Christo data non vere a peccatis absolvere poenitentem nec ei quoad culpam seu poenae aeternae obligationem peccata remittere, sed tantum ostendere et declarare sive annuntiare, peccata esse a Deo remissa. Veram autem sententiam, ait, tenere Hugonem, S. Thomam, Scotum, Durandum aliosque communiter. — Concedendum est, Magistrum (hic c. 4. 5.) et Richardum a S. Vict. (in libello de Potestate ligandi et solvendi, qui a B. Alberto aliisque antiquis Hugoni a S. Vict. falso tribuebatur) hic errasse vel insufficienter locutos esse. Sed valde mirandum est, a multis gravibus theologis tribui eundem errorem Alexandro et S. Bonaventurae, qui tot locis manifeste comprobant, se ab illis opinionibus alienos esse nec a communi doctrina recedere nisi in modo loquendi. — Alexander quidem tantum abest, ut dissentiat ab Hugone, ut eum fere integrum transcripserit; immo ipse etiam singularem eiusdem opinionem (hic q. 2. notatam) explicare nititur, quod scilicet Deus, qui culpam per se remittat, poenam aeternam clavibus sacerdotum solvendam reliquerit. Praedictam autem opinionem, quod sacerdotes non habeant potestatem *ligandi et solvendi,* nisi quatenus *ostendant,* homines esse solutos sive ligatos, Alexander explicite reprobat verbis Hugonis, « quod haec sententia tam frivola est quam ridenda »; et adductis eiusdem rationibus, concludit: « Tenendum est ergo, hanc sententiam esse nullam » (S. p. IV. q. 20. m. 3. a. 2. in argg.). Ibidem in resp. resolvit: « Potestas autem solvendi et ligandi *a peccato* est solius Dei, proprie et per se loquendo, et quodam modo *cooperative* est ipsorum sacerdotum »... « De hac ergo *cooperatione* intelliguntur verba Domini in Matthaeo et Ioanne, et alio modo, ut infra patebit ». Deinde idem in solutione argumentorum nominat et refellit Richardum a S. Vict. Denique (ibid. m. 6. a. 3.) cum Hugone explicat, quo sensu ista potestas intelligatur esse « solius Dei, scil. *auctoritate* sive a se, praelatorum Ecclesiae est *ministerio* dato a Deo, non a se »... « Illi etiam, nisi eo, a quo sunt hoc quod sunt, *in eis et per eos operante* et eis cooperante peccata dimittere non possunt. Quomodo ergo solus Deus bonus est, nec inde sequitur, bonos non esse etiam eos qui Deo serviunt; et quomodo solus Deus mirabilia facit, et tamen de iusto homine dicitur: *Fecit enim mirabilia in vita sua;* ita etiam solus Deus peccata dimittit, tunc quoque, quando sacerdos ab eo et per eum dimittit; ipse enim hoc in homine facit, quod per eum homo facit ». Clarissima sunt haec verba et optime concordant verbis Concilii Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 6.): « Quamvis autem absolutio sacerdotis alieni [scil. Dei] *beneficii* sit dispensatio, tamen non est solum nudum ministerium vel annuntiandi Evangelium, vel declarandi, remissa esse peccata, sed ad instar actus iudicialis » etc.

S. Bonav. in tota hac doctrina non recedit a suo magistro; praesertim autem in hac I. quaestione eiusdem doctrinam (loc. cit. q. 21. m. 1.), paucis mutatis, exscribit; unde potius Hugonem (excepta praedicta singulari opinione) quam Magistrum sequitur, ut patet locis supra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. in scholio citatis et infra citandis. Sufficiat hic notare verba eius (infra dub. 2.), ubi refert « triplicem modum dimittendi peccata, scilicet secundum clavem *auctoritatis,* et haec est Dei iudicantis; secundum clavem *excellentiae,* et haec est ipsius Verbi incarnati; secundum clavem *ministerii,* et haec est ipsius sacerdotis... Peccata dicuntur dimitti a sacerdote non per modum *efficientis,* sed *ministrantis* ».

**II.** Sed operae pretium est, eandem doctrinam diligentius demonstrare ex ipsa hac I. quaestione, quae fuit lapis offensionis, dum ipsa, attente lecta, genuinam sententiam S. Doctoris nobis aperit, ut manifestatur triplici consideratione.

Primo enim ipse disertis verbis et perspicuis rationibus refutat opinionem Magistri et Richardi a S. Vict., hic primo loco relatam; qua supposita, re vera etiam absolutio ut signum tantum ostendit hominem iustificatum, non hoc facit (licet alias effectus quoad augmentum gratiae et remissionem poenae habere possit). Cum igitur antiquiores illi magistri urgerent haec duo principia, quod contritio ut medium iustificationis actum absolutionis semper praecedat, et quidem tempore, et quod solus Deus per se immediate peccata remittat; inciderunt in difficultates disputationesque inextricabiles et opiniones ineptas, ut ex verbis Magistri et Richardi apparet. Si autem etiam *attritus* per sacramentalem confessionem et absolutionem fieri potest contritus; tunc confessio et absolutio « valet ad deletionem culpae quantum ad eos qui se non praeparaverunt sufficienter omnino, et etiam poenae quantum ad alios et ad multas utilitates » etc. (supra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2; cfr. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. per totam).

Secundo, adversarii non attenderunt statum quaestionis qualis a Ss. Bonav., Thoma et aliis coaevis in hoc problemate ponebatur. Quemadmodum igitur in omnibus Sacramentis ad totalem effectum uniuntur virtus Dei ut causa principalis et efficiens, virtus Christi ut causa meritoria (et secundum S. Thomam etiam ut instrumentum coniunctum physice influens), et tertio minister Sacramenti, qui materiam et formam sensibilem administrat; sic etiam in Sacramenti poenitentiae administratione fit (cfr. hic dub. 2.), cum quadam differentia infra d. 22. a. 2. q. 1. exposita. Antiqui igitur hic non de causalitate totali huius Sacramenti eiusque effectu inquirebant, sed praecise de causalitate clavium, quae tanquam vera potestas spiritualis, a Deo data radicatur in charactere sacerdotali, animae inhaerente. Sic intellecta, quaestio solvenda est secundum principia, quae in quaestione de causali influxu materiae et formae Sacramentorum, sive sit physicalis, sive moralis, ponuntur. De hac duplici via scholarum cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. q. 3; III. Sent. d. 40. dub. 3. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. Haec principia supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. applicantur ad quaestionem, utrum aquis baptismi collata sit aliqua vis; item d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. 2. ad potestatem remittendi peccata, quam Christus habuit (ubi in scholio ponitur et antiquior et posterior opinio S. Thomae); denique d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. applicantur ad verba in transsubstantiatione adhibita. In hac autem quaestione eadem principia adhibentur. Status autem quaestionis ex solut. ad 4, quae sumta est ex Alexandro, satis apparet. Minime igitur negatur, divina institutione absolutioni datam esse infallibilem ordinationem ad effectum reconciliationis rite disposito conferendum; atque simul docetur, potestatem clavium esse qualitatem absolutam (quam negat quoad aquam baptismi). Tamen negatur, eandem potestatem sacerdoti inhaerentem concurrere per modum causae *efficientis* (nec etiam instrumentaliter) ad infundendam *gratiam,* qua fit remissio peccatorum. Eundem statum quaestionis et eandem doctrinam in hac quaestione solvenda tenet S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1.), excepta illa sententia, qua profitetur doctrinam de causalitate physica Sacramentorum. Iam verba eius: « Eodem modo se habet potestas clavium, quae est in sacerdote, ad effectum Sacramenti poenitentiae, sicut se habet virtus, quae est in aqua baptismi, ad effectum baptismi »; clare praedictum statum quaestionis indicant. Idem apparet ex eiusdem solutione, ubi inter alia dicit: « Virtus clavium operatur ad culpae remissionem (vel in volo existens, vel etiam in actu se exercens), sicut et aqua baptismi. Sed sicut baptismus non agit ut principale agens, sed ut instrumentum, non quidem pertingens ad ipsam gratiae susceptionem causandam etiam instrumentaliter [hoc autem affirmat in Summa]... ita est de potestate clavium. Unde solus Deus remittit per se culpam, et in virtute eius agit instrumentaliter et baptismus ut instrumentum inanimatum, et sacerdos ut instrumentum animatum... Et sic patet, quod potestas clavium ordinatur aliquo modo ad remissionem culpae non sicut causans, sed sicut disponens ad eam ». — Mirum igitur est, ita offendisse verba S. Bonaventurae (in fine corporis), scilicet quod « proprie loquendo », id est, « per modum activi et impertientis », potestas clavium non se extendat ad culpam. Non ita censet S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 1.), qui verba illa Magistri, absolutionem ostendere remissionem peccatorum a Deo factam, benigne interpretatur, et etiam sententiam S. Bonaventurae fideliter refert nec improbat. Nam illud ostendere tripliciter dicit posse intelligi: vel tantum promittendo in futuro, ut fiebat in Sacramentis veteris legis; vel « ut significent praesentem et nihil operentur ad eam; et sic quidam dicunt, quod Sacramenta novae legis significant collationem gratiae, quam Deus in ipsa Sacramentorum collatione dat sine hoc, quod in Sacramentis sit aliqua virtus [scil. absoluta] operans ad gratiam. Et secundum hanc opinionem, quae in 1. dist. tacta est, etiam potestas clavium esset tantum ostendens [ut signum] divinam operationem in remissione culpae in ipsa Sacramenti collatione factam. Deinde refert tertium modum, quod « significent divinam operationem in remissione culpae praesentem et ad ipsam aliquid dispositive et instrumentaliter operentur ». « Neque Sacramentum poenitentiae neque Sacramentum baptismi operando pertingit directe ad gratiam nec ad culpae remissionem, sed dispositive (ad 2.). — Secundum quidem modum sequitur S. Bonav., quam recepit Scot. (hic d. 19. n. 23.). Docet enim hic, quod in hoc Sacramento, quando poenitens est tantum attritus tanta attritione, quae non sufficeret per modum meriti ad iustificationem suscipiendam in termino attritionis... recipitur gratia prima, quia a Deo confertur, et absolutio sacramentalis est signum efficax illius absolutionis sequentis in ultimo instanti ipsius, sicut prolatio verborum est signum confectionis corporis Christi ». — Hoc statu quaestionis supposito, solutio est optima.

Tertio, confirmatur idem sensus per illa verba recte intellecta, quod habens clavem sit mediator Dei ad hominem et hominis ad Deum, et quod habeat duplex os, et quod ut os Dei descendat ut angelus Dei et per modum superioris et iudicantis, scilicet ut « est mediator in absolvendo » (supra d. 17. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.). Sic enim eius absolutio non vi clavium, quatenus in eo est potestas creata, sed virtute et voce Dei agit, quia in persona Dei divinam sententiam pronuntiat ligando, vel absolvendo. Nam « non data est virtus Sacramenti ipsi confessioni, sed absolutioni » (supra d. 17. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.). Alia igitur vis tribuitur absolutioni, alia clavibus. — Verba illa sumta sunt ex Alexandro; sed hic sensum eorum (loc. cit. q. 20. m. 8. a. 1.) fusius et clarius sic exprimit: « Sacerdos secundum habitudinem subiectionis, quam habet ad Deum, est promulgator sententiae et ei unitus; sic enim sacerdos loquitur et promulgat sententiam iudicis, quasi in persona eius dicens: excommunico te, vel absolvo te, id est, iudico te absolutum, scilicet a culpa... non quod omnium horum habeat sacerdos potestatem [scil. in se], sed hoc eius est, ut os vel lingua est tantum habentis hanc potestatem, et ministerium est subiectionis, non potestatis, et proinde non dicitur clavis ». En, modus loquendi antiquorum diversus a consuetudine recentiorum, qui solent virtutem clavium non praecise in se considerare, sed ut unitam principali virtuti divinae, in absolutione simul operante. Hinc orta est etiam occasio alterius sinistrae interpretationis, ita ut plures in his verbis invenerint errorem, quasi sacerdos non nisi per modum deprecativum gratiam et absolutionem a culpa in hoc Sacramento conferat, dum S. Doctor loquatur praecise de ea potestate clavium, quae illi inhaeret, non de absolutione, quatenus ut os Dei divinam sententiam promulgat (cfr. supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 5.). — Verba autem « absolutio praesupponit » recte dicuntur, quatenus sacerdos ut os et praeco Dei sententiam ipsius effective operantis promulgat verbis absolutionis; intelliguntur autem vel secundum ordinem temporis, si absolutio dat tantum gratiam secundam iam antea contrito; vel secundum ordinem naturae, si attrito confert primam gratiam. — De forma deprecativa cfr. supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 3.

Haec fusius dicenda erant, ut vera sententia Alexandri et S. Bonav., a plurimis obscurata, ostendatur, et etiam, ut cum S. Thoma mitius de aliis opinionibus illius aetatis, quamvis insufficientibus, iudicetur. Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) refert de hac re quinque opiniones, quarum quartam sequitur auctor noster, quintam S. Thomas, sed B. Albert. (hic a. 7. 11) fere loquitur ut Magister.

**III.** Praeter locos citt.: Scot., loc. cit. et supra d. 14. q. 4. n. 6. seqq. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

**IV.** Seq. (2.) quaestio, praedictis suppositis, facile intelligitur. Si enim potestas clavium directe non attingit culpam, saltem poenam[^15] attingere debet, ut aliquid per se operetur. — Opinio in principio resp. tacta fuit Hugonis. Communius antiqui cum Magistro et S. Thoma docent, vi clavium remitti aliquid de poena temporali, cuius reatus post absolutionem a poena aeterna remanere potuerit; quae poena etiam in purgatorio solvenda sit. Scot. autem (locc. citt.) hoc restringit ad casum, quando absolutio propter iam dimissam culpam et poenam aeternam non invenit nisi poenam temporalem, sed eam censet non habere hunc effectum in attrito, quando cum culpa remissa poena aeterna permutatur in temporalem. — De eadem quaestione Alex. Hal. loc. cit. q. 21. m. 2. a. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom. loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 18. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Estius (here § 3, 4)[^16], with whom many other theologians agree, contends that St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Gabriel [Biel], and several others, as regards this first question, follow the error of the Master and of Richard of St. Victor, who teach that a priest using the power of absolving given him by Christ does not truly absolve the penitent from sins, nor remit sins to him as to the fault or the obligation of eternal punishment, but only shows and declares, that is, announces, that the sins have been remitted by God. But the true opinion, he says, is held by Hugh, St. Thomas, Scotus, Durandus, and others commonly. — It must be conceded that the Master (here c. 4, 5) and Richard of St. Victor (in the little book *On the Power of Binding and Loosing,* which by Blessed Albert and other ancients was falsely attributed to Hugh of St. Victor) here erred or spoke insufficiently. But it is much to be wondered at that the same error is attributed by many weighty theologians to Alexander and St. Bonaventure, who in so many places manifestly prove that they are strangers to those opinions and do not depart from the common doctrine except in the manner of speaking. — Alexander indeed is so far from dissenting from Hugh that he has transcribed him almost entire; nay, he himself even attempts to explain the singular opinion of the same [Hugh] (noted here in q. 2), namely that God, who remits the fault of himself, has left the eternal punishment to be loosed by the keys of the priests. But the aforesaid opinion, that priests do not have the power of *binding and loosing* except insofar as they *show* that men are loosed or bound, Alexander explicitly reproves in the words of Hugh, « that this opinion is as frivolous as it is laughable »; and having adduced the same [Hugh's] reasons, he concludes: « It must therefore be held that this opinion is null » (Summa, p. IV, q. 20, m. 3, a. 2, in the arguments). In the same place, in the response, he resolves: « But the power of loosing and binding *from sin* belongs to God alone, properly and per se speaking, and in a certain way *cooperatively* it is of the priests themselves »... « Of this *cooperation,* then, are the words of the Lord in Matthew and John to be understood, and in another way, as will appear below. » Then the same [Alexander], in the solution of the arguments, names and refutes Richard of St. Victor. Finally (ibid. m. 6, a. 3) with Hugh he explains in what sense this power is to be understood as being « of God alone, namely by *authority* or of himself; [yet] of the prelates of the Church it is by the *ministry* given by God, not of themselves »... « They too, except by Him from whom they are what they are, *working in them and through them* and cooperating with them, cannot forgive sins. As therefore God alone is good, nor does it follow from this that those who serve God are not also good; and as God alone works wonders, and yet of a just man it is said, *He did wonders in his life;* so also God alone forgives sins, even then, when the priest forgives from Him and through Him; for He himself does in the man that which the man does through Him. » Most clear are these words and they agree perfectly with the words of the Council of Trent (Session XIV, c. 6): « Although the absolution of the priest is a dispensation of another's [namely God's] *benefit,* yet it is not merely a bare ministry either of announcing the Gospel or of declaring that sins have been remitted, but is after the manner of a judicial act » etc.

St. Bonaventure in this whole doctrine does not depart from his master; but especially in this first question he transcribes his [the master's] doctrine (loc. cit. q. 21, m. 1), with few changes; whence he rather follows Hugh (except for the aforesaid singular opinion) than the Master, as is plain from the places cited above at d. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. 3 in the scholion and to be cited below. Let it suffice here to note his words (below, dub. 2), where he reports « a threefold manner of forgiving sins, namely according to the key of *authority,* and this is of God who judges; according to the key of *excellence,* and this is of the incarnate Word himself; according to the key of *ministry,* and this is of the priest himself... Sins are said to be forgiven by the priest not by way of *one who effects,* but of *one who ministers.* »

**II.** But it is worth the effort to demonstrate the same doctrine more diligently from this very first question, which was a stone of stumbling, since the question itself, attentively read, lays open to us the genuine opinion of the holy Doctor, as is made manifest by a threefold consideration.

For, first, he himself in plain words and with clear reasons refutes the opinion of the Master and of Richard of St. Victor, here related in the first place; on which supposition, in fact, even absolution as a sign only shows the man to be justified, it does not do this (although it may otherwise have an effect as to the increase of grace and the remission of punishment). Since therefore those older masters pressed these two principles, that contrition as the means of justification always precedes the act of absolution, and indeed in time, and that God alone of himself immediately remits sins; they fell into inextricable difficulties and disputes and inept opinions, as appears from the words of the Master and of Richard. But if even one who is *attrite* can be made contrite through sacramental confession and absolution; then confession and absolution « avails for the destruction of the fault as regards those who have not prepared themselves altogether sufficiently, and also of the punishment as regards others and for many uses » etc. (above, d. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; cf. p. II, a. 2, q. 3, throughout).

Secondly, the adversaries did not attend to the state of the question as it was posed by Sts. Bonaventure, Thomas, and others of the same age in this problem. As therefore in all the Sacraments, for the total effect, there are united the power of God as principal and efficient cause, the power of Christ as meritorious cause (and according to St. Thomas also as a conjoined instrument physically influencing), and thirdly the minister of the Sacrament, who administers the sensible matter and form; so also it happens in the administration of the Sacrament of penance (cf. here dub. 2), with a certain difference set forth below at d. 22, a. 2, q. 1. The ancients therefore here were not inquiring about the total causality of this Sacrament and its effect, but precisely about the causality of the keys, which, as a true spiritual power, given by God, is rooted in the priestly character inhering in the soul. So understood, the question is to be solved according to the principles which are laid down in the question on the causal influx of the matter and form of the Sacraments, whether it be *physical* or *moral.* On this twofold way of the schools cf. above, d. 1, p. I, q. 3; III Sent., d. 40, dub. 3, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3. These principles are applied above at d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2 to the question whether any power is conferred upon the waters of baptism; likewise at d. 5, a. 3, q. 1, 2 to the power of remitting sins which Christ had (where in the scholion both the earlier and the later opinion of St. Thomas is set down); finally at d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3 they are applied to the words used in transubstantiation. But in this question the same principles are employed. And the state of the question appears sufficiently from the solution to [argument] 4, which is taken from Alexander. By no means therefore is it denied that, by divine institution, there has been given to absolution an infallible ordination to the effect of reconciliation, to be conferred upon one duly disposed; and at the same time it is taught that the power of the keys is an *absolute* quality (which he denies as to the water of baptism). Yet it is denied that the same power inhering in the priest concurs by way of *efficient* cause (nor even instrumentally) to infusing the *grace* by which the remission of sins comes about. The same state of the question and the same doctrine in solving this question is held by St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1), except for that opinion by which he professes the doctrine of the physical causality of the Sacraments. Now his words: « In the same way is the power of the keys, which is in the priest, related to the effect of the Sacrament of penance as the power which is in the water of baptism is related to the effect of baptism »; clearly indicate the aforesaid state of the question. The same appears from his solution, where among other things he says: « The power of the keys operates toward the remission of the fault (whether existing in the will, or even exercising itself in act), just as the water of baptism does. But just as baptism does not act as the principal agent, but as an instrument, not indeed reaching to the very reception of grace to be caused even instrumentally [but this he affirms in the *Summa*]... so it is with the power of the keys. Hence God alone of himself remits the fault, and in his power there acts instrumentally both baptism as an inanimate instrument and the priest as an animate instrument... And so it is plain that the power of the keys is ordained in some way to the remission of the fault not as causing, but as disposing toward it. » — It is therefore a wonder that the words of St. Bonaventure (at the end of the body) gave such offense, namely that « properly speaking », that is, « by way of acting and imparting », the power of the keys does not extend to the fault. St. Thomas does not so judge (loc. cit. ad 1), who interprets benignly those words of the Master, that absolution shows the remission of sins made by God, and also faithfully reports the opinion of St. Bonaventure and does not disapprove it. For he says that that *showing* can be understood in three ways: either only by promising in the future, as was done in the Sacraments of the old law; or « so that they signify the present and effect nothing toward it; and thus some say that the Sacraments of the new law signify the conferring of grace, which God in the very conferring of the Sacraments gives, without there being in the Sacraments any [absolute] power operating toward grace. And according to this opinion, which was touched on in the first distinction, even the power of the keys would be only showing [as a sign] the divine operation in the remission of the fault made in the very conferring of the Sacrament. » Then he reports a third manner, that « they signify the divine operation in the remission of the fault as present and operate something toward it dispositively and instrumentally. » « Neither the Sacrament of penance nor the Sacrament of baptism by operating reaches directly to grace nor to the remission of the fault, but dispositively (ad 2). » — The second manner indeed is followed by St. Bonaventure, which Scotus received (here d. 19, n. 23). For he teaches here that in this Sacrament, when the penitent is only attrite with so great an attrition as would not suffice by way of merit for receiving justification at the term of attrition... the first grace is received, because it is conferred by God, and the sacramental absolution is the efficacious sign of that absolution following in the last instant of it [the attrition], just as the utterance of the words is the sign of the confecting of the body of Christ. » — This state of the question being supposed, the solution is excellent.

Thirdly, the same sense is confirmed by those words rightly understood, that one who holds the key is mediator of God to man and of man to God, and that he has a twofold mouth, and that as the mouth of God he descends as the angel of God and by way of a superior and a judge, namely as he « is mediator in absolving » (above, d. 17, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3). For thus his absolution acts not by force of the keys, insofar as in him there is a created power, but by the power and voice of God, because in the person of God he pronounces the divine sentence in binding or absolving. For « the power of the Sacrament has not been given to the confession itself, but to the absolution » (above, d. 17, p. II, a. 1, q. 3). A different power therefore is attributed to absolution, another to the keys. — Those words are taken from Alexander; but here he expresses their sense (loc. cit. q. 20, m. 8, a. 1) more fully and clearly thus: « The priest, according to the relation of subjection which he has to God, is the promulgator of the sentence and united to Him; for thus the priest speaks and promulgates the sentence of the judge, as if saying in His person: I excommunicate you, or I absolve you, that is, I judge you absolved, namely from the fault... not that the priest has power over all these things [namely in himself], but this belongs to him, that he is as the mouth or tongue of one who alone has this power, and the ministry is one of subjection, not of power, and therefore it is not called a key. » Behold, the manner of speaking of the ancients different from the custom of more recent [theologians], who are wont to consider the power of the keys not precisely in itself, but as united to the principal divine power, operating together in absolution. Hence too arose the occasion of another wrong interpretation, so that many have found in these words an error, as though the priest confers grace and absolution from the fault in this Sacrament only by way of beseeching, whereas the holy Doctor speaks precisely of that power of the keys which inheres in him, not of absolution insofar as, as the mouth of God, it promulgates the divine sentence (cf. above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 5). — But the words « absolution presupposes [it] » are rightly said, insofar as the priest, as the mouth and herald of God, promulgates by the words of absolution the sentence of Him who effectively operates; and they are understood either according to the order of time, if absolution gives only the second grace to one already contrite beforehand; or according to the order of nature, if it confers the first grace on one attrite. — On the deprecatory form, cf. above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 3.

These things had to be said more fully, that the true opinion of Alexander and St. Bonaventure, obscured by very many, might be shown, and also that, with St. Thomas, a milder judgment might be made of the other opinions of that age, however insufficient. Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1) reports on this matter five opinions, the fourth of which our author follows, the fifth St. Thomas, but Blessed Albert (here a. 7, 11) speaks more or less like the Master.

**III.** Besides the places cited: Scotus, loc. cit. and above, d. 14, q. 4, n. 6 ff. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — On this and the following question, Durandus, here q. 2; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

**IV.** The following (2nd) question, the foregoing being supposed, is easily understood. For if the power of the keys does not directly attain the fault, it ought at least to attain the punishment[^15], so that it may operate something of itself. — The opinion touched on at the beginning of the response was that of Hugh. More commonly the ancients with the Master and St. Thomas teach that by the force of the keys something of the temporal punishment is remitted, the guilt of which could remain after absolution from the eternal punishment; which punishment is also to be discharged in purgatory. But Scotus (locc. citt.) restricts this to the case when absolution, on account of the fault and the eternal punishment already remitted, finds nothing but temporal punishment, yet he judges that it does not have this effect in one attrite, when, with the fault remitted, the eternal punishment is commuted into temporal. — On the same question, Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 21, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. quaestiuncula 2; Suppl. q. 18, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 52664–53053), with full PDF column-band reflow of pp. 472–474 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p47{2,3,4}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, pdf = printed + 20) because the Articulus II opener, the Respondeo (Opinio 1/Opinio 2 with the *mediator*/*os* doctrine), the two Conclusiones, and the entire SCHOLION are cascade-shattered and two-column-bled in the OCR. Running heads verified: "DIST. XVIII. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. I." on pp. 473–474 (p. 475/476 running heads are OCR-digit-mangled as "473"/"476" but the +20 offset and surrounding text confirm the sequence). The Scholion runs from p. 474 R through pp. 475–476; the colcrop bands stop at p. 474, so the Scholion text on pp. 475–476 was taken from the OCR (clean running prose) cross-checked against the OCR footers.

**Chunking convention.** Per the locked d.1 sessions 8/10/11 convention, the short ARTICULUS II opener ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum… de qua duo quaeruntur. Primo… Secundo…") is folded into this article's q1 — no standalone divisio chunk. Opener verified to align with q1 (the "Primo, utrum… in culpam" lemma matches `title_la`); STOP-check passed.

**Scholion finding.** The Articulus II SCHOLION lives in THIS chunk (q1). It is rendered IN FULL (points **I–IV**) after the body, per the parser rule. The Scholion explicitly **covers both q1 and q2**: points I–III treat q1 (the Estius charge, the *status quaestionis*, the *mediator/os* doctrine, Trent/Alexander/Aquinas concordance); point **IV** ("Seq. [2.] quaestio, praedictis suppositis, facile intelligitur…") treats q2 (whether the keys reach the punishment) — so **q2 has no scholion of its own** and should cite this chunk's Scholion §IV.

**Cross-chunk hand-offs.**
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**[?] flags.** None unresolved. Minor: the page-475/476 running-head digits are OCR-mangled (read "473"/"476"); resolved by the +20 offset and continuous text, not the OCR digits.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 18, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 476 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum sacerdos possit aliquid in poenam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sacerdos possit aliquid supra poenam. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Per Magistrum in littera in illo capitulo[^1]: «Ligant quoque sacerdotes, dum satisfactionem poenitentibus imponunt; solvunt autem, dum de ea aliquid remittunt»: ergo videtur, quod aliquid remittant de poena.

2. Item, nihil est in peccatore remittendum nisi vel offensa, vel poena; sed offensam remittit Deus, non sacerdos: ergo si poenam solus Deus remittit, videtur ergo, quod sacerdos[^2] a nullo absolvit: falsum ergo dicit sacerdos, dicens: Ego te absolvo.

3. Item, sic sacerdos novae legis se habet ad sacerdotem veteris, sicut Sacramenta novae legis ad Sacramenta veteris; sed Sacramenta novae legis exhibent quod illa demonstrabant et significabant[^3]: ergo sacerdotes novae legis dant quod illi praefigurabant. Sed illi praefigurabant in suis actibus remissionem: ergo videtur, quod isti sacerdotes eam tribuant. Sed non nisi remissionem culpae, aut poenae; sed non culpae: ergo poenae.

4. Item, qui peccavit peccato occulto et post conteritur ante absolutionem sacerdotis, non apparet ligatus nec *sibi* nec *aliis*: sibi non, quia videt, se habere bonam voluntatem; aliis non, quia non vident in eo nisi bonum: ergo videtur, quod non sit alicuius utilitatis ipsum *ostendere absolutum*, immo quod non ostendatur.

**Contra:**
1. Hieronymus[^4]: «In remittendis vel in retinendis culpis id iuris habent evangelici sacerdotes, quod olim habebant sub Lege legales»; sed illi non ostendebant nisi mundatum, ita quod non mundabant a culpa nec absolvebant a poena: ergo similiter et isti.

2. Item, si remittit poenam; aut *aeternam*, aut *temporalem*. Aeternam non; istud constat, quia illa inseparabilis est a culpa, et praeterea est infinita: ergo non potest remitti nisi a virtute remittente culpam et a virtute infinita: non ergo a sacerdote. *Praeterea*, si Deus remitteret culpam sine poena aeterna, ergo aliquis esset sine culpa et reus mortis aeternae; sed non caret quis culpa nisi per caritatem: ergo simul haberet caritatem et reatum poenae aeternae, et ita simul esset dignus morte aeterna et gloria, quod est impossibile: non ergo remittit culpam sine poena[^5]: ergo sacerdos non remittit poenam *aeternam*.

3. Item, non remittit poenam *temporalem*, quoniam ad illam ligat; et constat, quod non ligat et solvit respectu eiusdem. *Si tu dicas*, quod absolvit a poena *purgatoria*, et ligat *expiatoria*[^6] sive satisfactoria; *contra*: poena purgatoria est de alio foro: ergo ab illa non potest sacerdos absolvere.

4. Item, si quis moriatur ante perfectionem poenitentiae, punietur in purgatorio; sed non debet puniri poena, a qua est absolutus: ergo ab illa nunquam fuit absolutus.

5. Item, Dominus, dum remittit culpam, remittit poenam totam[^7] nec obligat ad poenam, nisi quantum exigit sua iustitia: ergo si aliquis remittit aliquid ulterius de illa poena, praeiudicat divinae iustitiae; sed nullus potest divinae iustitiae praeiudicare: ergo nullus de poena temporali, ad quam obligatur peccator, potest aliquid remittere.

6. Item, si posset partem remittere, aut plus remittit ei qui *plus* peccavit, aut plus ei qui *minus*. Si *plus* vel tantum ei qui *minus*, ergo videtur, quod si aliquis parum peccavit, et ita parum debetur ei de poena, quod totum relinqueret: ergo pro parvo peccato non est imponenda aliqua poena; quod est inconveniens. Si remittit *minus*: ergo ei qui minus dignus est, magis remittit; sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

7. Item, si remittit partem, alius sacerdos potest remittere aliam partem, et sic deinceps, et sic totum remitti[^8]; quod non competit, ut videtur, secundum forum commune.

<!-- page 477 -->

> **Conclusio.** Sacerdos remittit aliquam partem poenae, non aeternae nec purgatoriae, sed illius poenae, ad quam Deus obligat peccatorem post absolutionem a culpa.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praeter positionem illam, quam Magister ponit in littera[^9], qua aliqui senserunt, quod absolvit a poena aeterna, quam etiam satis efficaciter improbat; tres sunt hic modi dicendi.

Unus modus dicendi est, quod sacerdos absolvit non a poena, sed a vinculo confessionis ligando ad poenam satisfactionis. Et ista positio videtur trahi ex verbis Hugonis[^10] in libro de Potestate ligandi, ubi distinguuntur septem vincula, scilicet *obdurationis, servitutis, captivitatis, aeternae damnationis* sive *punitionis, perpetuae detestationis, confessionis* et *poenalis expiationis*. A *primis tribus* absolvit Deus per gratiam et misericordiam; a vinculo *obdurationis* absolvit per gratiam praeparantem, quae emollit cor ad poenitentiam et est gratia gratis data; a vinculo *servitutis* per gratiam praevenientem, quae est gratum faciens et liberat a servitute peccati; a vinculo *captivitatis* per gratiam cooperantem, quae expedit hominem et solvit ad bona opera. A vinculo *quarto*, scilicet *aeternae damnationis*, solvit ligando ad *quintum*, scilicet ad vinculum *perpetuae detestationis*. A *sexto* vero solvit per ministrum ligando ad *septimum*. Sacerdos enim solvit peccatorem confitentem, ut non teneatur *confiteri*, sed ligat ad vinculum *satisfactionis*. — Sed illud non sufficit, quia sacerdos in absolvendo non dicit: Absolvo te a confessione, sed a peccatis. Ab illis ergo absolvit vel quantum ad *poenam*, vel quantum ad *culpam*: ergo plus oportet dicere.

Et ideo est secundus modus dicendi, quod sacerdos absolvit non tantum ab hoc vinculo[^11], sed etiam a poena *purgatoria*, ligando ad poenam *satisfactoriam*; sed non solvit aliquam partem poenae relaxando, sed solum commutando, et hoc sub conditione, si explet satisfactionem iniunctam. Et si illa satisfactio sit condigna, absolvit a *tota*; si non, absolvit a *tanta*; et ideo, si peccator moriatur ante complementum satisfactionis condignae, oportet eum puniri in purgatorio. — Sed nec illud sufficit adhuc, quia iste peccator post absolutionem divinam non ligatur ad poenam purgatoriam magis quam ad aliam. — Et hoc patet, quia tantum potest conteri, quod Deus totum remittit, et statim evolabit: ergo non oportet, quod illam commutet. Et *iterum*, si non facit nisi commutare et ligat ad condignam, ergo nullum fructum reportat inde poenitens, et pro nihilo dicit: Ego te absolvo ab omnibus peccatis. — Quae omnia magna[^12] sunt inconvenientia; sunt et alia, quae omittuntur brevitatis causa.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi magis consonus rationi et fidei pietati, quod sacerdos aliquam partem poenae absolvendo dimittit ex vi clavium. — Et hoc possumus intelligere sic: quia *universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas*[^13], ideo in iustificatione, quae est opus misericordiae, misericordia sic remittit culpam, ut iustitiae regulam non praetereat; propterea adhuc detinet obligatum ad poenam. Illa autem poena ob rigorem divinae iustitiae est viribus nostris improportionalis et nostrae cognitioni ignota; et pro illa oportet quod satisfaciat Deo. Providit adhuc igitur nobis viam misericordia divina et constituit arbitrum sacerdotem, cui dedit potestatem arbitrandi et taxandi poenam et manifestandi nobis, et partem poenae remittere ex virtute passionis Christi, ut divina iustitia pro illa parte solutionem ab isto non exigat, sed ex passionis Christi poena sit contenta. Quanta sit illa pars, nostrum non est determinare, sed Dei. Et tunc Sacramentum poenitentiae non tantum erit onerosum, sed etiam fructuosum.

Hanc igitur opinionem sustinendo concedendum est, quod sacerdos remittit aliquam partem poenae, sicut ostendunt rationes, non aeternae, sicut ostendunt aliae, non purgatoriae, sed communiter illius poenae, qua Deus obligat peccatorem post absolutionem a culpa; et pro illa nunquam punitur in purgatorio nec alibi. Sed pro alia parte, a qua non absolvitur[^14], vel punietur hic sufficienter, vel Dominus exiget in purgatorio.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod est *ostendere* per solam demonstrationem, sicut ostendit ille qui digito monstrat aliquid; et est *ostendere* per quandam exhibitionem, ut artifex ostendit imaginem inchoatam, quando eam consummat. Dico ergo, quod Hieronymus vult dicere, quod sacerdos evangelicus quantum ad absolutionem a culpa absolvit solum *ostendendo*, scilicet demonstrando absolutum, absolvit autem a poena[^15]; et hoc verum est, ut intelligatur *ostendere* non solum sensui *manifestando*, sed etiam perficiendo et exhibendo.

*Ad 2, 3, 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de poena purgatoria et aeterna, dicendum, quod concedendum est, sed aliter et aliter:

<!-- page 478 -->

quia ab *aeterna* nullo modo solvit; a *purgatoria* absolvit non *per se*, sed *per accidens*, quia, cum in poenitente virtute clavium minuitur debitum poenae temporalis, non ita acriter punitur in purgatorio, sicut si non esset absolutus.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod hoc praeiudicat divinae iustitiae; dicendum, quod falsum est. Sicut enim in baptismo per passionis Christi meritum et solutionem solvitur peccator a tota poena, ita in poenitentia per eiusdem passionis Christi virtutem solvitur a parte poenae, ita quod in nullo praeiudicatur iustitiae, immo verificatur illud Psalmi[^16]: *Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi*; misericordia enim supererogando pretium iustitiae satisfacit.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, si remittit partem, aut maiorem ei qui magis etc.; dicendum, quod misericordia non considerat meritum, sed miseriam; et ideo divina misericordia, quae subvenit hic miseris, non considerando in eis meritum, sed miseriam, subvenit per meritum Christi et remittit partem aequalem omnibus, non, inquam, secundum *absolutam* comparationem, sed *proportionalem*, ut si illi qui debet centum, remittit decem; et ei qui debet decem, remittit unum. Et ideo qui magis peccavit, dum poenitet, tenetur ad magnas gratiarum actiones, et hoc melius patebit, cum ostendetur, quomodo in omni opere Domini est misericordia et veritas.

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si quilibet remittit partem, tunc videtur, quod tota aliquando remittatur; dicendum, quod primus sacerdos, cui confitetur, si paratus est, totum remittit de ipsis culpis, quod per vim clavium debet remitti; et ideo alius non remittit. Bonum est tamen alteri confiteri, tum propter instructionem, tum propter maiorem certitudinem, tum propter eius intercessionem, tum propter verecundiae meritum et arctam satisfactionem et humiliationem.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the priest can do anything with respect to the penalty.*

Secondly it is asked whether the priest can do anything with respect to the penalty. And that he can is shown:

1. Through the Master in the text, in that chapter[^1]: «Priests likewise bind when they impose satisfaction on penitents; but they loose when they remit something of it»: therefore it seems that they remit something of the penalty.

2. Likewise, nothing is to be remitted in the sinner except either the offense or the penalty; but God remits the offense, not the priest: therefore if God alone remits the penalty, it then seems that the priest[^2] absolves from nothing: the priest therefore speaks falsely when he says: I absolve you.

3. Likewise, the priest of the new law stands to the priest of the old as the Sacraments of the new law stand to the Sacraments of the old; but the Sacraments of the new law exhibit what those [old ones] demonstrated and signified[^3]: therefore the priests of the new law give what those [old ones] prefigured. But those prefigured remission in their acts: therefore it seems that these priests confer it. But [they confer] only the remission of guilt or of penalty; but not of guilt: therefore of penalty.

4. Likewise, one who has sinned with a hidden sin and afterward is contrite before the priest's absolution does not appear bound either to *himself* or to *others*: not to himself, because he sees that he has a good will; not to others, because they see nothing in him but good: therefore it seems that it is of no use to *show him absolved*, indeed that he should not be shown [as such].

**On the contrary:**
1. Jerome[^4]: «In remitting or in retaining guilt the priests of the Gospel have the same right which the priests of the Law once had under the Law»; but those showed only the cleansed person, in such a way that they did not cleanse from guilt nor absolve from penalty: therefore likewise these.

2. Likewise, if he remits the penalty; either *eternal* or *temporal*. Not the eternal; that is established, because it is inseparable from guilt, and besides it is infinite: therefore it cannot be remitted except by a power remitting guilt and by an infinite power: therefore not by the priest. *Moreover*, if God were to remit the guilt without the eternal penalty, then someone would be without guilt and yet liable to eternal death; but no one is free of guilt except through charity: therefore he would have at once both charity and liability to eternal penalty, and thus at once would be worthy of eternal death and of glory, which is impossible: therefore he does not remit guilt without penalty[^5]: therefore the priest does not remit the *eternal* penalty.

3. Likewise, he does not remit the *temporal* penalty, since to it he binds; and it is established that he does not bind and loose with respect to the same thing. *If you say* that he absolves from the *purgatorial* penalty, and binds to the *expiatory*[^6] or satisfactory; *on the contrary*: purgatorial penalty belongs to another forum: therefore from it the priest cannot absolve.

4. Likewise, if someone should die before the completion of his penance, he will be punished in purgatory; but he ought not to be punished with a penalty from which he has been absolved: therefore from it he was never absolved.

5. Likewise, the Lord, when he remits guilt, remits the whole penalty[^7] nor binds to penalty except so far as his justice requires: therefore if anyone remits anything further of that penalty, he prejudices the divine justice; but no one can prejudice the divine justice: therefore no one can remit anything of the temporal penalty to which the sinner is bound.

6. Likewise, if he could remit a part, either he remits more to him who sinned *more*, or more to him who sinned *less*. If [he remits] more or as much to him who [sinned] *less*, then it seems that if someone sinned little, and so little is owed to him by way of penalty, he would relinquish the whole: therefore for a small sin no penalty at all is to be imposed; which is unfitting. If he remits *less* [to him who sinned more]: therefore to him who is less worthy he remits more; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, if he remits a part, another priest can remit another part, and so on in turn, and thus the whole is remitted[^8]; which is not fitting, as it seems, according to the common forum.

> **Conclusion.** The priest remits some part of the penalty — not the eternal nor the purgatorial, but that penalty to which God binds the sinner after absolution from guilt.

**I respond:** It must be said that, apart from the position which the Master sets forth in the text[^9], by which some have held that he absolves from the eternal penalty — which he also refutes quite effectively — there are here three modes of speaking.

One mode of speaking is that the priest absolves not from the penalty, but from the bond of confession, binding to the penalty of satisfaction. And this position seems to be drawn from the words of Hugh[^10] in the book *On the Power of Binding*, where seven bonds are distinguished, namely: *of obduration, of servitude, of captivity, of eternal damnation* or *punishment, of perpetual detestation, of confession,* and *of penal expiation*. From the *first three* God absolves through grace and mercy; from the bond *of obduration* he absolves through preparing grace, which softens the heart to penitence and is grace freely given; from the bond *of servitude* through prevenient grace, which is grace making pleasing and frees from the servitude of sin; from the bond *of captivity* through cooperating grace, which sets a man free and looses him for good works. From the *fourth* bond, namely *of eternal damnation*, he looses by binding to the *fifth*, namely to the bond *of perpetual detestation*. From the *sixth*, however, he looses through his minister by binding to the *seventh*. For the priest looses the confessing sinner, that he be not bound to *confess*, but binds him to the bond *of satisfaction*. — But that does not suffice, because the priest in absolving does not say: I absolve you from confession, but from sins. From those, therefore, he absolves either with respect to the *penalty* or with respect to the *guilt*: therefore one must say more.

And therefore there is a second mode of speaking: that the priest absolves not only from this bond[^11], but also from the *purgatorial* penalty, binding to the *satisfactory* penalty; but he does not loose any part of the penalty by relaxing it, but only by commuting it, and this under condition, if he fulfills the satisfaction enjoined. And if that satisfaction be condign, he absolves from the *whole*; if not, he absolves from *so much*; and therefore, if the sinner should die before the completion of condign satisfaction, he must be punished in purgatory. — But neither does that suffice as yet, because this sinner after the divine absolution is not bound to the purgatorial penalty any more than to another. — And this is clear, because he can be so contrite that God remits the whole, and he will straightway fly forth: therefore there is no need that he commute it. And *again*, if he does nothing but commute and binds to the condign [penalty], then the penitent reaps no fruit from it, and to no purpose does he say: I absolve you from all sins. — All of which are great[^12] unfitting consequences; there are others too, which are omitted for brevity's sake.

And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, more consonant with reason and the piety of faith: that the priest by absolving remits some part of the penalty by the power of the keys. — And this we can understand thus: that since *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*[^13], therefore in justification, which is a work of mercy, mercy so remits the guilt as not to overstep the rule of justice; for this reason it still keeps [the man] obligated to the penalty. But that penalty, by reason of the rigor of the divine justice, is disproportionate to our powers and unknown to our cognition; and for it he must make satisfaction to God. The divine mercy has therefore further provided us a way and has appointed the priest as arbiter, to whom it has given the power of arbitrating and assessing the penalty and of making it known to us, and of remitting part of the penalty by virtue of Christ's passion, so that the divine justice may not exact payment for that part from him, but may be content with the penalty of Christ's passion. How great that part is, it is not for us to determine, but for God. And then the Sacrament of penance will be not only burdensome but also fruitful.

Holding therefore to this opinion, it must be conceded that the priest remits some part of the penalty, as the arguments show — not the eternal, as the others show, nor the purgatorial, but in general that penalty by which God binds the sinner after absolution from guilt; and for it he is never punished in purgatory or elsewhere. But for the other part, from which he is not absolved[^14], either he will be punished here sufficiently, or the Lord will exact it in purgatory.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected concerning Jerome, it must be said that there is a *showing* by mere demonstration, as he shows who points to something with the finger; and there is a *showing* by a certain exhibiting, as a craftsman shows a begun image when he completes it. I say therefore that Jerome means that the priest of the Gospel, with respect to absolution from guilt, absolves only by *showing*, namely by demonstrating [the man] absolved; but he absolves from the penalty[^15]; and this is true, provided that *showing* be understood not only as *manifesting* to the senses, but also as perfecting and exhibiting.

*To 2, 3, 4.* To that which is objected concerning purgatorial and eternal penalty, it must be said that it is to be conceded, but in different respects:

because from the *eternal* he in no way looses; from the *purgatorial* he absolves not *per se*, but *per accidens*, because, when in the penitent the debt of temporal penalty is diminished by the power of the keys, he is not punished so sharply in purgatory as if he had not been absolved.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that this prejudices the divine justice; it must be said that it is false. For just as in baptism, through the merit and the payment of Christ's passion, the sinner is loosed from the whole penalty, so in penance, through the virtue of the same passion of Christ, he is loosed from a part of the penalty, in such a way that justice is in no way prejudiced, but rather that of the Psalm is verified[^16]: *Mercy and truth have met each other*; for mercy by overpaying satisfies the price of justice.

*To 6.* To that which is asked, whether he remits a part, or a greater [part] to him who [sinned] more, etc.; it must be said that mercy considers not merit but misery; and therefore the divine mercy, which here succors the wretched, considering in them not merit but misery, succors through the merit of Christ and remits an equal part to all — not, I say, according to *absolute* comparison, but *proportional* — as if to him who owes a hundred he remits ten; and to him who owes ten he remits one. And therefore he who sinned more, while he repents, is bound to great acts of thanksgiving, and this will appear better when it is shown how in every work of the Lord there is mercy and truth.

*To 7.* To that which is objected, that if everyone remits a part, then it seems that the whole would sometimes be remitted; it must be said that the first priest, to whom one confesses, if he is ready, remits the whole of those very sins which by the power of the keys ought to be remitted; and therefore another does not remit. It is good, nevertheless, to confess to another, both for the sake of instruction, and for the sake of greater certitude, and for the sake of his intercession, and for the sake of the merit of shame and of stricter satisfaction and humiliation.

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here c. 6.

la: Cod. U addit *nihil remittat et sic*. Pro *a nullo* cod. H *nullus*.

en: Codex U adds *nihil remittat et sic* ("let him remit nothing, and thus"). For *a nullo* ("from nothing") codex H reads *nullus* ("no one").

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. q. 5. — In *maiori* edd. comparatione inversa: *sicut sacerdos... sic Sacramenta novae legis* [cod. F supplet *se habent*].

en: Cf. above, d. 1, p. I, q. 5. — In the *maior* [premise] the editions [give] the comparison inverted: *sicut sacerdos... sic Sacramenta novae legis* ("as the priest... so the Sacraments of the new law") [codex F supplies *se habent*].

la: Libr. III. Comment. in Matth. 16, 19: *Quomodo ibi* [in Lege] *leprosum sacerdos mundum vel immundum facit, sic et hic alligat vel solvit episcopus et presbyter, non eos qui insontes sunt, vel noxii, sed pro officio suo, cum peccatorum audierit varietates, scit, qui ligandus sit, quive solvendus.*

en: Book III, Commentary on Matthew 16:19: *Just as there* [under the Law] *the priest makes the leper clean or unclean, so here too the bishop and presbyter bind or loose — not those who are guiltless or guilty, but by their office, when they have heard the varieties of sins, they know who is to be bound and who is to be loosed.*

la: In edd. additur *aeterna*.

en: In the editions *aeterna* ("eternal") is added.

la: Codd. R S T U *expurgatoria*.

en: Codices R S T U read *expurgatoria*.

la: Cfr. Matth. 18, 32: *Omne debitum dimisi tibi.* Vide etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 7, ubi dicitur, quod infidelitatis sit, dimidiam sperare veniam a Deo.

en: Cf. Matthew 18:32: *I forgave you all the debt.* See also above, the Master's text, d. XV, c. 7, where it is said that it is a mark of unbelief to hope for half a pardon from God.

la: Codd. F G supplent *posset*, cod. Z *potest*. In fine arg. codd. M O addunt *Ecclesiae*, quod codd. K substituunt pro *commune*.

en: Codices F G supply *posset* ("could"), codex Z *potest* ("can"). At the end of the argument codices M O add *Ecclesiae* ("of the Church"), which codices K substitute for *commune* ("common").

la: S. Bonav. allegat verba eius secundum Magistrum, hic in lit. c. 6. — In fine arg. pro *et isti* cod. U *nec isti*.

en: St. Bonaventure cites his [Hugh's] words according to the Master, here in the text, c. 6. — At the end of the argument, for *et isti* codex U reads *nec isti*.

la: Potius *Richardi* a S. Vict., c. 2. seqq. (Ex hoc loco conici potest, verba superius d. 16. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et ab aliis antiquis attributa Hugoni verisimilius esse Richardi, sicuti in nota adiecta insinuavimus).

en: Rather [the words] of *Richard* of St. Victor, c. 2 ff. (From this passage it can be conjectured that the words above, in d. 16, p. I, a. 3, q. 2, in the body, and attributed by other ancients to Hugh, are more probably Richard's, as we have intimated in an appended note.)

la: Cod. Z addit *scilicet ad poenam satisfactionis temporalis*. Mox post *confitentem* codd. R S T prosequuntur: *et non tenetur confiteri, sed ad vinculum* etc.

en: Codex Z adds *scilicet ad poenam satisfactionis temporalis* ("namely to the penalty of temporal satisfaction"). Shortly after *confitentem* codices R S T continue: *et non tenetur confiteri, sed ad vinculum* ("and he is not bound to confess, but to the bond"), etc.

la: Plures codd. *mala*, ed. 1 *mala sunt et inconvenientia*.

en: Several codices read *mala* ("evils"), edition 1 *mala sunt et inconvenientia* ("are evils and unfitting").

la: Ita codd. N aa, alii et edd. *absolvit*.

en: Thus codices N aa; others and the editions read *absolvit* ("he absolves").

la: Scilicet confessionis.

en: Namely [absolution] of confession.

la: Non pauci codd. perperam omittunt *absolvit autem a poena*, edd. legunt: *sed quantum ad absolutionem a poena ostendit non solum sensui* etc. — Cfr. infra dub. 4.

en: Not a few codices wrongly omit *absolvit autem a poena* ("but he absolves from the penalty"); the editions read: *sed quantum ad absolutionem a poena ostendit non solum sensui* ("but with respect to absolution from the penalty he shows not only to the senses"), etc. — Cf. below, dub. 4. ---

english_scholion:
The scholion for Articulus II (Quaracchi §IV, treating both questions of this article) is rendered with **Question I** of this article ([bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a2-q1](bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a2-q1)); this question carries no separate scholion. — *El escolio del Artículo II (Quaracchi §IV, que abarca ambas cuestiones de este artículo) se presenta con la Cuestión I de este artículo; esta cuestión no lleva escolio propio.*

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 53054–53316) with the Quaracchi Vol. IV two-column PDF as the authority for the cascade-shattered regions (Respondeo, the three *modi dicendi*, and every page footer), read column-band by column-band off `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p47{6,7,8}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`. Running heads verified: p476 (bare page number top-left), p477 "DIST. XVIII. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. II.", p478 "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." Offset pdf = printed + 20.
- **Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. Quaracchi prints a single scholion for the whole of Articulus II (§§ I–IV); its § IV is the one bearing on this question (the *tertius modus dicendi* / *potestas in poenam*), and the entire scholion is rendered with Question I of this article (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a2-q1`). A one-line La+En cross-reference stands in the `### Scholion` slot above.
- **Page-footer split.** Page 476 footers 1–8 and page 477 footers 4–8 (the editions number them 4–8 on the right, restarting; here continued as [^9]–[^16] following the body order) all fall wholly within this quaestio. Page 478's body text ("est, sed aliter et aliter..." through "...humiliationem") belongs to this quaestio, but page 478's *numbered footers* (1–9) belong entirely to ARTICULUS III, q. 1 — none are claimed here.
- **[?] flags.** Body word *humiliationem* at the very end (raw line 261 shows a trailing mark `"`) carries no corresponding numbered footer on p478 within this quaestio's footer allotment; rendered as plain text with no marker (no apparatus entry dropped). No other ambiguities — the PDF bands resolved every OCR cascade-fragment.
- **Hand-off to ARTICULUS III.** This quaestio ends mid-page 478 (left column, after "...humiliationem"); ARTICULUS III (*De clave scientiae specialiter*) opens immediately below on the same page (raw line 53317; "Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum..."). Page 478's footer notes 1–9 are ARTICULUS III's — the next agent should claim them. The Art. III opener "Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur" folds into its q1 per the chunking convention.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0