title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XVI, Pars I)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XVI, Part I)

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod Magister dicit in littera: *In perfectione autem poenitentiae tria observanda sunt.* Quaeritur enim, utrum ista tria sint partes poenitentiae *subiectivae*, vel *integrales*[^1]. Et quod non sint integrales, videtur: quia totum non praedicatur de parte integrali; sed *conteri* est poenitere, similiter *confiteri* est poenitere et *satisfacere*: ergo non sunt partes integrales. Si tu dicas, quod istud fallit in toto homogeneo, quia quaelibet pars panis est panis; obiicitur, quia totum homogeneum habet partes unius naturae; poenitentia autem non habet partes unius naturae et conformis. Nam poenitentia continet contritionem et confessionem et satisfactionem, quae sunt diversa secundum formam. — Item, partes integrales constituentes aliquod totum, sive homogeneum, sive heterogeneum, debent esse simul; sed hae partes poenitentiae non sunt simul: ergo etc.

Quod autem non sint *subiectivae*, videtur: quia tota natura totius universalis salvatur in qualibet parte — unde ratio tota animalis est in homine[^2] — sed contritio non est tota et perfecta poenitentia, nec confessio: ergo non sunt subiectivae. — Item, numeratis partibus subiectivis, numeratur totum: ergo istae sunt partes poenitentiae subiectivae, cum sint tres, tres sunt poenitentiae: aut ergo poenitentiae tres virtutes, aut tria Sacramenta; quorum utrumque falsum est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod poenitentia sumitur dupliciter, scilicet pro poenitentia-*virtute* et pro poenitentia-*Sacramento*. Si loquamur de poenitentia-*virtute*; sic contritio et confessio et satisfactio non sunt partes integrales, sed *potestativae*[^3]. Sicut enim ab una essentia plures egrediuntur potentiae, sic ab uno habitu plures actus consequuntur[^4]. Virtus enim poenitentiae ordinat hominem, ut puniendo se faciat emendam secundum omne forum; et ideo quilibet horum actuum denominationem recipit ab habitu, ut poenitere dicatur; et sic videtur habere rationem partium subiectivarum, sed re vera non habent, quia confessio et satisfactio[^5] non est poenitentia, sed actus egrediens a poenitentia, similiter satisfactio et contritio. — Si autem loquamur de poenitentia-*Sacramento*; sic sunt partes integrales quantum ad esse perfectum — unde rationabiliter loquitur Magister, cum dicit, quod in perfectione poenitentiae etc. — et sic patet, quod nullum horum est perfectum Sacramentum sine alio.

Et si tu obiicias, quod non habent esse simul; dicendum, quod quamvis non sint simul *actu*, sunt tamen simul *voto*, vel *effectu*. Unde quando quis conteritur, habet confessionem et satisfactionem in proposito; et quando quis satisfacit, habet duorum praecedentium effectum. Et sic patet illud.

### Dub. II

Item, quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ut, sicut tribus modis Deum offendimus, ita tribus modis satisfaciamus in contritione* etc. Secundum hoc enim videtur, quod satisfactio non debet distingui contra alias partes. — Item, si tribus modis est satisfacere secundum triplicem modum peccandi: ergo qui peccavit in corde, non videtur, quod debeat sibi imponi poena in carne, quia per quae quis peccat, per haec et punietur[^6]. Tunc ergo pro nullo peccato spirituali est imponenda satisfactio; et illud est manifeste falsum, cum peccata spiritualia sint graviora carnalibus: ergo gravius puniuntur a Deo et gravius debent puniri a sacerdote.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod satisfactio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo satisfactio dicitur ipsa reconciliatio; et sic, quia omnes partes poenitentiae sunt ad reconciliationem ordinatae, quaelibet potest dici satisfactio sive satisfactoria. Alio modo dicitur satisfactio persolutio poenae debitae; et sic competit proprie uni parti poenitentiae, quae est assumtio sive adimpletio poenae iniunctae. Nihilominus tamen aliis partibus competit per accidens, utpote contritioni ratione doloris coniuncti, qui est in parte sensibili; similiter confessioni ratione erubescentiae. — Et sic patet primum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non debemus satisfacere exterius pro peccato cordis; dicendum, quod illud verbum Chrysostomi[^7] et similiter Augustini per *appropriationem* intelligitur: quoniam ista tria respondent omni peccato mortali, quia quodli-

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bet meretur poenam aeternam animae et corporis, et cuilibet debetur poena interior et exterior, nisi tanta sit interior, quod exterior non sit opportuna, et eius locum suppleat. Unde sicut certum est, quod non sufficit confiteri peccatum oris, immo etiam pro illo oportet conteri et satisfacere; ita et in proposito intelligendum est[^8].

### Dub. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Compunctio ibi commendatur.* Videtur enim accipere compunctionem pro eodem et contritionem. Sed contra: super illud Psalmi[^9]: *In cubilibus vestris compungimini*; Glossa: «Quibusdam stimulis excitate vos, non pro dolore peccatorum, sed ad videndam lucem Christi, et ut invisibilium amore inardescatis»; sed contritio est de peccatis tantum: ergo non sunt idem, male ergo accipit pro eodem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dolor dicitur *contritio*, et dolor dicitur *compunctio*: contritio, quia cor terit, vel peccata in corde illo dolore teruntur[^10]; sed compunctio, quia cor compungitur. Sed compungitur cor secundum duplicem aspectum: aut carentia gloriae, aut consideratione offensae; et secundum hoc attenditur duplex dolor et duplex *irriguum*, scilicet superius et inferius[^11]; et ita compunctio communior est quam contritio, sicut patet ex Glossa illa. Magister autem appropriat hic compunctionem ad dolorem de peccatis, ex quorum consideratione pungitur cor quasi quibusdam aculeis[^12].

### Dub. IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Confessio ibi commendatur: Iustus in principio est accusator sui.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut accusat se iustus in quantum iustus, aut in quantum peccator. Si in quantum iustus; sed omnis qui accusat iustum in quantum huiusmodi, accusat iustitiam; et omnis qui accusat iustitiam, est iniustus: ergo si accusat se in quantum iustus, est iniustus. Si accusat se secundum quod *peccator*; sed omnis qui accusat peccatorem secundum quod peccator, accusat peccatum; et omnis talis iuste accusat et est iustus: ergo si accusat secundum quod *peccator*, accusator est iustus, et ita secundum quod peccator est iustus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in accusatione est accusans et accusatus; et cum iustus accusat se, adest[^13] accusans et accusatus, sed tamen habens quasi duplicis personae rationem; et secundum quod tenet duplicis[^14] personae rationem, ita et duplicis proprietatis, quia ille idem secundum quod iustus accusat se, secundum quod peccator est. Et sic patet, quod sophisma est de illa reduplicatione, quod potest referri ad actum accusandi ratione *subiecti*, vel ratione *obiecti*.

### Dub. V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Satisfactio praecipitur a Ioanne.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia Ioannes non potuit Sacramenta novae legis instituere: ergo nec satisfactionem praecipere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Ioannes praecepit insinuando vel praedicando; sed Christus mandavit tanquam principalis auctor, quia Ioannes praecucurrit et dixit, Matthaeus tertio[^15], sed Salvator confirmavit et instituit, ut habetur quarto eiusdem.

### Dub. VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Facite dignos fructus poenitentiae.* Videtur enim non esse praeceptum conveniens: quia digni fructus poenitentiae sunt Deo accepti; sed non est in nostra potestate nec in nostra cognitione ea facere, quae sunt in divina acceptatione: ergo etc. — Item, si satisfactio est in praecepto, cum nemo sciat, utrum satisfecerit, quia nemo scit se esse in caritate[^16]; videtur, quod semper est iteranda satisfactio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dignitas fructus[^17] dupliciter potest accipi: aut per comparationem ad meritum *culpae*, aut in comparatione ad divinam

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acceptationem. Et nota, quod hic vocat *dignos fructus poenitentiae* non in comparatione ad divinam acceptationem, quia hoc non praecipitur; sed quantum ad meritum culpae. — Similiter intelligendum, quod satisfacere Deo dupliciter est: vel secundum forum suum et secundum veritatem, et sic non est in praecepto; vel secundum probabilitatem conscientiae, et sic est in praecepto[^18].

Sed tunc videtur, quod ille peccator, qui non vult suscipere satisfactionem condignam a sacerdote impositam, mortaliter peccat; et dicendum, quod illud[^19] est praeceptum affirmativum, quod non obligat ad semper, et praeterea commissum est in potestate sacerdotis; et ita, si poenitens hic condignam poenam a sacerdote suscipit, plenam poenitentiam facit; si non[^20], propter hoc quod sacerdos non imponit, attendens fragilitatem peccatoris; Dominus exspectat, et solvet in purgatorio.

### Dub. VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ut secundum qualitatem et quantitatem culpae*; quae sit differentia inter *qualitatem* culpae et *quantitatem*. Cum enim non habeat culpa quantitatem *molis*, sed *virtutis*[^21], et haec sit qualitas; videtur, quod non differant. — Item, si secundum quantitatem culpae est quantitas poenae; sed tanta est culpa, quanta est offensa; et tanta est offensa, quantus est is qui offenditur; sed ille est infinitus: ergo debet imponi poena infinita. — Item, quomodo poena potest esse secundum qualitatem, cum sint diversorum generum culpa et poena?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod possibile est, quantitatem et qualitatem culpae causari ab eodem principio, sed tamen secundum aliam rationem, sicut cognoscere coniugatam auget culpam et ulterius ponit in specie peccati. Unde qualitas culpae attenditur secundum id quod distinguit peccatum, secundum quod dicitur, quod est *inquinamentum carnis et spiritus*[^22]; quantitas, secundum quod aggravat in eodem genere. Et his etiam duobus modis respondet qualitas poenae, ut peccato spirituali poena spiritualis, scilicet oratio, peccato carnali poena in carne, scilicet ieiunium, et quantitas quantitati in eodem genere. — Et nota, quod quantitas peccati non accipitur hic penes eum, contra quem, sed penes libidinem peccantis. — Et sic patent obiecta, quia haec quantitas est finita; et assimilatio qualitatum[^23] poenae et culpae attenditur in eodem genere.

### Dub. VIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Purgans lacrymis omnem qualitatem vitii*; quia aut hoc est praeceptum, aut consilium. Si praeceptum est; videtur periculum, quia pauci aut nulli ita discurrunt deflendo singula; et constans est, quod unica contritione iustificatur homo, quae[^24] non potest omnes qualitates considerare. Si consilium; contra: sicut dicit Philosophus[^25], «species delectationis movet appetitum»: ergo si aliquis ita singillatim vitium recogitet, videtur, quod det sibi occasionem tentationis et lapsus: ergo melius est oblivisci quam ita ante oculos reducere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quantum ad aliquam qualitatem vitii est in praecepto, utpote quantum ad illam quae trahit in genus peccati aliud; quantum ad aliquas est in consilio, scilicet quantum ad illas quae non mutant peccati genus. Sive autem sit consilium, sive praeceptum; non obligat ad semper, sed quando est locus et tempus, et quando poenitens ita maceravit se et domuit sensualitatem, ita[^26] quod ad recogitationem circumstantiarum ignis concupiscentiae non incalescit, sed magis indignatio voluntatis; tunc debet talia recogitare, maxime quando est in actu orationis et gemitu; alias potius debet abigere quam talia ruminare, maxime in peccatis carnis, in quibus habet homo incitationem intra, propter quod signanter dicitur primae ad Corinthios sexto[^27]: *Fugite fornicationem*, quasi, non tantum in opere, vel in voluntate, sed etiam in recogitatione.

### Dub. IX

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Defleat virtutem, qua interim caruit.* Contritus enim non de-

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bet dolere nisi de culpa: ergo si debet dolere de carentia virtutis, videtur, quod haec sit culpa; sed in infinitis instantibus caruit: ergo in infinitis peccavit. — Item, cum multae sint aliae circumstantiae, sicut determinat Tullius[^28], scilicet *quis, quid, cur, quando, ubi, quomodo, quibus auxiliis*; et illam quae est *quis*, dividit in undecim circumstantias, scilicet nomen, naturam, convictum, fortunam etc., quae ibi patent: videtur, quod Augustinus[^29] insufficienter hic tangat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non solum contritione deflentur peccata, sed etiam poenae peccatorum, poenae, inquam, quae sunt sequelae et quae dehabilitant et reddunt hominem ineptum ad bonum. Inter has praecipua est carentia virtutum; et per hanc Augustinus intelligit alias sequelas vitiorum, quae considerandae sunt et deflendae, non quia sint culpa, sed poena, non inflicta, sed acta[^30].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plures ponit Tullius; dicendum, quod Augustinus non ponit hic omnes circumstantias, sed solum aggravantes; Tullius vero ponit omnes circumstantias, quae contingunt negotium vel personam. Possunt autem omnes circumstantiae reduci ad quatuordecim, quae his versibus[^31] notantur:

> *Aggravat ordo, locus, persona, scientia, tempus,*
> *Aetas, conditio, numerus, mora, copia, causa,*
> *Est modus in culpa, status altus, lucta pusilla.*

Ex his autem quinque[^32] respiciunt *personam*, scilicet scientia, ordo, aetas, conditio et status. Tres respiciunt criminis *actum*, scilicet numerus, mora et modus agendi. Tres respiciunt *causam*, scilicet copia, causa, lucta pusilla. Et duae sunt *adiacentes*, scilicet locus et tempus[^33].

### Dub. X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Cum gaudio enim debet facere immortalis futurus* etc. Videtur enim maledicere, quia poenitentia maxime consistit in dolore et lacrymis: ergo non debet facere cum gaudio, sed potius cum dolore. Si tu dicas, quod utrumque ibi concurrit; quaeritur: quare potius dicit, cum gaudio esse faciendum?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ideo hortatur ad gaudium, quia illud est conservativum omnium virtutum, et maxime virtutum, quae consistunt circa poenalitatem. Unde Philosophus[^34] dicit: «Qui continet et hoc ipso gaudet vere castus est; et ille vere habet perfectam fortitudinem, qui non solum non succumbit, sed etiam in poenalitatibus vel poenalibus gaudet». Et haec est principalis ratio, quare hortatur ad gaudium, quia aliter assumtio poenalitatis non est virtuosa.

Ratio autem, quare gaudendum est in poenitentia, est duplex. Prima est consideratio *aequitatis*, secunda est consideratio *utilitatis*. Aequitas est maxima ibi, ut caro, quae traxit spiritum et subiugavit[^35] per delectationem et inimica est Spiritui veritatis, e contrario subiiciatur per afflictionem et per hoc reconcilietur, et de inimico vindicta sumatur. Unde sicut homo carnalis multum gaudet in depressione inimici, ita spiritualis debet gaudere de afflictione carnis. Et sicut iudex iustus multum gaudet in exercitatione iustitiae, sic poenitens debet gaudere; et ideo Proverbiorum vigesimo primo[^36]: *Gaudium est iusto facere iustitiam*; propterea etiam Proverbiorum decimo quarto: *Cor, quod novit amaritudinem animae suae* etc.

Alia est consideratio *multiplicis utilitatis*, quia

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est *tabula liberationis a naufragio*[^37]. Unde sicut gaudet quis, quando de naufragio evadit, sic poenitens debet gaudere. — Alia ratio potest esse ex parte *boni*, quia renovat hominem, secundum illud Psalmi[^38]: *Renovabitur ut aquilae iuventus tua.* — Damna etiam spiritualia ibi restaurantur. Et sic patet multiplex ratio gaudii.

Et quod obiicit, quod debet facere cum dolore; dicendum, quod illud non impedit, quia, quando quis vehementer dolet, in solo dolore invenit delectationem. Unde exemplum est de Augustino, qui narrat in quarto Confessionum[^39], quod quando mortuus erat socius, in nullo delectabatur nisi in gemitu, et erat ei omnis alia delectatio poena, et in hac sola quiescebat. Quanto magis igitur debet quis in dolore de propria morte laetari? Et ideo recte dicit, quod cum gaudio facere debet.

### Dub. XI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Caveat, ne verecundia ductus dividat apud se confessionem* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia quanto pluribus revelat, tanto maior erit verecundia, et plus habet, unde erubescat. Unde non videtur, quod hoc sit ex verecundia, sed contra verecundiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verecundia maior potest esse dupliciter: aut quia reputatur quis peccator enormis et magnus, aut quia a pluribus esse peccator cognoscitur; et prima verecundia maior est: et ideo pro vitanda maiori bene assumeret quis minorem, ac per hoc derogaret veritati confessionis, quae non est dividenda, sicut patebit infra[^40].

### Dub. XII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ne prius ad dominicum corpus accedat, quam confortetur bona conscientia*; quid vocatur hic *confortari bona conscientia*? Videtur, quod qui est in gratia possit accedere sine culpa; et talis est contritus ante confessionem. — Sed in contrarium est quod dicit Hugo in epistola ad Bernardum[^41]: «Audacter dico, si fuerit contritus, non tamen debet communicare, antequam confessus fuerit». — Propter hoc est quaestio, utrum aliquis contritus in casu aliquo possit accedere ante confessionem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tunc aliquis confortat se bona conscientia, dum probabiliter percipit, culpam sibi esse dimissam; hoc autem percipit, quando facit quod in se est ad obtinendam veniam. Hoc autem non plene facit ante confessionem[^42], si habet sacerdotis copiam; tunc enim, si confitetur exterius, conscientia interior confortatur, et bene potest accedere. Si autem habet copiam et non confitetur, male facit, si accedit. Si vero non habet copiam; aut habet necessitatem conficiendi, ut sacerdos parochialis, et tunc potest accedere cum dolore et proposito confitendi; aut non habet necessitatem et sic nullo modo debet accedere ante confessionem, quia qui fuit per mortale excommunicatus ad Sacramentum unitatis Ecclesiae non debet accedere nisi prius reconciliatus Ecclesiae, nisi alias cogatur; et tunc evidens excusatio habetur[^43].

### Dub. XIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Cohibeat se a ludis et a spectaculis*; quid vocantur ista duo? Et quare dicit, ipsum debere se cohibere? Aut enim sunt mala, aut bona et licita. Si mala; tunc ergo omnes debent se cohibere. Si vero bona et licita; ergo nullus debet se cohibere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo[^44] in Glossa, ludus est gesticulatio libidinosa, cuiusmodi est in choreis; spectacula sunt, sicut dicit Augustinus[^45], sicut ci-

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thara et venatio et huiusmodi. Dico igitur, quod ludus chorearum non est malus secundum se, sicut patet de sorore Moysi Exodi decimo quinto[^46]; sed fit malus quadruplici de causa, scilicet propter modum, quando est modus lascivus; propter finem, quando fit ad provocandam libidinem; propter tempus, ut non fiat tempore tristitiae; propter personam, ut non fiat a persona religiosa. His remotis, potest fieri. Quoniam igitur poenitens et persona est, cui non competit, et quamdiu vere poenitet, est in tempore tristitiae: ideo ei non competit. Similiter iudicandum est de spectaculis; his enim quatuor de causis possunt male fieri et[^47] fiunt; his exclusis, bene possunt fieri.

### Dub. XIV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *non omnes digni fructus sunt digni fructus poenitentiae.* Videtur enim male dicere: quia opera, quae facit poenitens ex virtute poenitentiae, sunt fructus virtutis; et non nisi *poenitentiae*: ergo etc. — Praeterea, sicut virtus poenitentiae est circa bonum et difficile, ita aliae virtutes[^48]: ergo etc. — Item, cum fructus dicatur a *fruendo*, quomodo opera poenitentiae possunt dici fructus?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod opera poenitentiae dicuntur fructus, non quia eis fruamur, sed quia ad fruitionem ducunt[^49]; vel fructus metaphorice: sicut ex arbore nascitur pomum, quod dicitur fructus arboris, ita ex voluntate bonum poenitentis opus. — Et nota, quod differt dicere *bonum* fructum et *dignum* fructum poenitentiae. Bonus fructus potest dici omne opus bonum; dignus fructus plus dicit, scilicet bonum opus cum convenientia ad statum. Bonum enim est opus et ita perfectum, si competit statui. Sed dignus fructus poenitentiae non dicit solummodo bonum opus, prout competit statui, sed ut competit merito peccati; quia qui plus peccavit ampliora debet pati, ut Gregorius determinat in homilia[^50].

### Dub. XV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Miles, vel negotiator, vel alicui officio deditus* etc.; quia, si hoc verum est, ergo nullus negotiator, nullus miles salvatur; et hoc est contra sacram Scripturam. Nam beatus Ioannes militiam non reprobavit, sed dixit: *Contenti estote stipendiis vestris*, Lucae tertio[^51]. Item de negotiatoribus, Genesis quadragesimo nono: *Zabulon in littore maris habitabit*, ubi secundum litteram terra Zabulon benedicitur negotiationibus. — Item, si hoc verum esset, periret militia, quae necessaria est ad defendendam fidem; perirent negotiationes, sine quibus multae terrae non possent vivere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod militia et negotiatione et officio telonii sive vectigalium exactione, a qua dicitur Matthaeus *publicanus*[^52], potest quis recte uti, si faciat eo modo, quo instituta sunt: ut miles nemini iniurietur, negotiator neminem circumveniat et telonearius non exigat vectigal immoderatum, sed quod institutum est ex certa causa et utili; et hoc totum potest esse sine peccato, et hoc modo poenitens potest in hoc statu salvari. Sed his propinquissimae sunt abusiones: in militibus *violentiae*, in negotiatoribus *deceptiones*, in aliis *immoderatae exactiones*; et ideo huiusmodi sunt periculosa. Et quantum ad tales abusiones dicit Gregorius[^53]: «Non poenitet quis, quousque dimittat haec», scilicet quantum ad abusionem.

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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that the Master says in the text: *Now in the perfection of penitence three things are to be observed.* For it is asked whether these three are *subjective* parts of penitence, or *integral* ones[^1]. And that they are not integral, it seems: because the whole is not predicated of an integral part; but to *be contrite* is to do penitence, likewise to *confess* is to do penitence, and to *make satisfaction*: therefore they are not integral parts. If you say that this fails in a homogeneous whole, because every part of bread is bread; it is objected, that a homogeneous whole has parts of one nature; but penitence does not have parts of one and conformable nature. For penitence contains contrition and confession and satisfaction, which are diverse according to form. — Likewise, integral parts constituting some whole, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, ought to be simultaneous; but these parts of penitence are not simultaneous: therefore etc.

And that they are not *subjective*, it seems: because the whole nature of a universal whole is preserved in each part — whence the whole notion of "animal" is in man[^2] — but contrition is not the whole and perfect penitence, nor [is] confession: therefore they are not subjective. — Likewise, when the subjective parts are numbered, the whole is numbered: therefore these are subjective parts of penitence, [and] since they are three, there are three penitences: therefore either three virtues of penitence, or three Sacraments; both of which are false.

**I respond:** It must be said that penitence is taken in two ways, namely for penitence-as-*virtue* and for penitence-as-*Sacrament*. If we speak of penitence-as-*virtue*; thus contrition and confession and satisfaction are not integral parts, but *potestative* ones[^3]. For just as from one essence several powers issue, so from one habit several acts follow[^4]. For the virtue of penitence orders man so that by punishing himself he makes amends according to every forum; and therefore each of these acts receives its denomination from the habit, so as to be called "doing penitence"; and thus it seems to have the character of subjective parts, but in truth they do not have it, because confession and satisfaction[^5] is not penitence, but an act issuing from penitence, likewise satisfaction and contrition. — But if we speak of penitence-as-*Sacrament*; thus they are integral parts as to perfect being — whence the Master speaks reasonably, when he says, that in the perfection of penitence etc. — and thus it is plain that none of these is a perfect Sacrament without the other.

And if you object that they do not have simultaneous being; it must be said that although they are not simultaneous *in act*, they are nevertheless simultaneous *in vow*, or *in effect*. Whence when one is contrite, he has confession and satisfaction in purpose; and when one makes satisfaction, he has the effect of the two preceding. And so that is plain.

### Doubt II

Likewise, it is asked about this, that he says: *That, just as we offend God in three ways, so in three ways we make satisfaction, in contrition* etc. For according to this it seems that satisfaction ought not to be distinguished against the other parts. — Likewise, if there is satisfaction in three ways according to the threefold mode of sinning: therefore he who has sinned in heart, it does not seem that a penalty in the flesh ought to be imposed on him, because by the things by which one sins, by these also will he be punished[^6]. Therefore then for no spiritual sin is satisfaction to be imposed; and that is manifestly false, since spiritual sins are graver than carnal ones: therefore they are punished more gravely by God and ought to be punished more gravely by the priest.

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfaction is spoken of in two ways. In one way satisfaction is called the reconciliation itself; and thus, because all the parts of penitence are ordered to reconciliation, each can be called satisfaction or satisfactory. In another way satisfaction is called the paying-out of the penalty owed; and thus it belongs properly to one part of penitence, which is the assuming or fulfilling of the enjoined penalty. Nevertheless it belongs to the other parts by accident, as to contrition by reason of the conjoined sorrow, which is in the sensible part; likewise to confession by reason of shame. — And so the first [objection] is plain.

To that which is objected, that we ought not to make satisfaction outwardly for a sin of the heart; it must be said that that word of Chrysostom[^7] and likewise of Augustine is understood by *appropriation*: since these three correspond to every mortal sin, because every [mortal sin]

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merits eternal penalty of soul and body, and to each is owed an interior and exterior penalty, unless the interior is so great that the exterior is not opportune, and supplies its place. Whence just as it is certain that it does not suffice to confess the sin with the mouth, but rather for it one must be contrite and make satisfaction; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood[^8].

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Compunction is there commended.* For it seems to take compunction for the same as contrition. But on the contrary: upon that [text] of the Psalm[^9]: *In your chambers be ye compunct*; the Gloss: «By certain goads rouse yourselves, not for sorrow of sins, but to see the light of Christ, and that you may be inflamed with the love of invisible things»; but contrition is of sins only: therefore they are not the same, and so he wrongly takes [one] for the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that sorrow is called *contrition*, and sorrow is called *compunction*: contrition, because it grinds the heart, or sins are ground in the heart by that sorrow[^10]; but compunction, because the heart is pricked. But the heart is pricked according to a twofold regard: either [by] the lack of glory, or [by] consideration of the offense; and according to this a twofold sorrow and a twofold *watering* is considered, namely an upper and a lower[^11]; and thus compunction is more common than contrition, as is plain from that Gloss. But the Master here appropriates compunction to sorrow over sins, from the consideration of which the heart is pricked as if by certain stings[^12].

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Confession is there commended: The just man in the beginning is the accuser of himself.* For it seems to be said badly, because either the just man accuses himself insofar as he is just, or insofar as he is a sinner. If insofar as just; but everyone who accuses a just man insofar as such accuses justice; and everyone who accuses justice is unjust: therefore if he accuses himself insofar as just, he is unjust. If he accuses himself insofar as a *sinner*; but everyone who accuses a sinner insofar as a sinner accuses sin; and every such one justly accuses and is just: therefore if he accuses insofar as a *sinner*, the accuser is just, and so insofar as a sinner he is just.

**I respond:** It must be said that in accusation there is the one accusing and the one accused; and when a just man accuses himself, the one accusing and the one accused are present[^13], but yet having as it were the character of a double person; and insofar as he holds the character of a double[^14] person, so also [the character] of a double property, because that same man insofar as just accuses himself insofar as he is a sinner. And so it is plain that there is a sophism concerning that reduplication, which can be referred to the act of accusing by reason of the *subject*, or by reason of the *object*.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Satisfaction is enjoined by John.* For it seems to be said badly, because John could not institute the Sacraments of the new law: therefore neither [could he] enjoin satisfaction.

**I respond:** It must be said that John enjoined [it] by intimating or preaching; but Christ commanded [it] as the principal author, because John ran ahead and said [it], Matthew three[^15], but the Savior confirmed and instituted [it], as is had in the fourth [chapter] of the same.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Bring forth worthy fruits of penitence.* For it seems not to be a fitting precept: because worthy fruits of penitence are acceptable to God; but it is not in our power nor in our cognition to do those things which are in the divine acceptation: therefore etc. — Likewise, if satisfaction is under precept, since no one knows whether he has made satisfaction, because no one knows that he is in charity[^16]; it seems that satisfaction must always be repeated.

**I respond:** It must be said that the worthiness of fruit[^17] can be taken in two ways: either by comparison to the merit of *fault*, or in comparison to the divine

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acceptation. And note that he here calls them *worthy fruits of penitence* not in comparison to the divine acceptation, because this is not enjoined; but as to the merit of fault. — Likewise it is to be understood that to make satisfaction to God is twofold: either according to His forum and according to truth, and thus it is not under precept; or according to the probability of conscience, and thus it is under precept[^18].

But then it seems that that sinner who is unwilling to undertake the worthy satisfaction imposed by the priest sins mortally; and it must be said that that[^19] is an affirmative precept, which does not bind for always, and moreover [its] committing is in the power of the priest; and so, if the penitent here undertakes a worthy penalty from the priest, he makes full penitence; if not[^20] — because the priest does not impose [it], attending to the frailty of the sinner — the Lord waits, and will exact [it] in purgatory.

### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *That [it be] according to the quality and quantity of the fault*; what is the difference between the *quality* of fault and the *quantity*. For since fault does not have a quantity of *mass*, but of *virtue* [i.e. power][^21], and this is a quality; it seems that they do not differ. — Likewise, if according to the quantity of fault there is a quantity of penalty; but the fault is as great as the offense; and the offense is as great as is he who is offended; but he is infinite: therefore an infinite penalty ought to be imposed. — Likewise, how can the penalty be according to quality, since fault and penalty are of diverse genera?

**I respond:** It must be said that it is possible for the quantity and quality of fault to be caused from the same principle, but yet according to a different ground, just as to know a married woman increases the fault and further places [it] in a [distinct] species of sin. Whence the quality of fault is considered according to that which distinguishes the sin, according as it is said that it is the *defilement of flesh and spirit*[^22]; the quantity, according as it aggravates within the same genus. And in these two ways also the quality of penalty corresponds, so that to a spiritual sin [corresponds] a spiritual penalty, namely prayer, to a carnal sin a penalty in the flesh, namely fasting, and quantity [corresponds] to quantity within the same genus. — And note that the quantity of sin is not taken here in respect of him against whom [it is], but in respect of the lust of the sinner. — And so the objections are plain, because this quantity is finite; and the assimilation of the qualities[^23] of penalty and fault is considered within the same genus.

### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Purging by tears every quality of vice*; because either this is a precept, or a counsel. If it is a precept; there seems [to be] danger, because few or none thus run through, lamenting each single thing; and it is established that a man is justified by a single contrition, which[^24] cannot consider all the qualities. If a counsel; on the contrary: as the Philosopher says[^25], «the species of the delight moves the appetite»: therefore if anyone thus singly recalls the vice, it seems that he gives himself occasion of temptation and lapse: therefore it is better to forget than thus to bring [it] back before the eyes.

**I respond:** It must be said that as to some quality of vice it is under precept, namely as to that which draws into another genus of sin; as to some [qualities] it is under counsel, namely as to those which do not change the genus of the sin. But whether it be counsel or precept; it does not bind for always, but when there is place and time, and when the penitent has so mortified himself and tamed his sensuality, so[^26] that at the recalling of the circumstances the fire of concupiscence does not grow hot, but rather the indignation of the will; then he ought to recall such things, especially when he is in the act of prayer and lamentation; otherwise he ought rather to drive [them] away than to ruminate on such things, especially in sins of the flesh, in which man has an incitement within, on account of which it is pointedly said in the first to the Corinthians six[^27]: *Flee fornication*, as if [to say], not only in the deed, or in the will, but even in the recalling.

### Doubt IX

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him bewail the virtue which meanwhile he lacked.* For the contrite man ought

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not to grieve except over fault: therefore if he ought to grieve over the lack of virtue, it seems that this is a fault; but he lacked [it] in infinite instants: therefore he sinned in infinite [instants]. — Likewise, since there are many other circumstances, as Tully determines[^28], namely *who, what, why, when, where, how, with what aids*; and the one which is *who*, he divides into eleven circumstances, namely name, nature, manner of life, fortune, etc., which are plain there: it seems that Augustine[^29] touches [them] here insufficiently.

**I respond:** It must be said that not only are sins bewailed by contrition, but also the penalties of sins, the penalties, I say, which are sequels and which disable and render man unfit for good. Among these the chief is the lack of virtues; and by this Augustine understands the other sequels of vices, which are to be considered and bewailed, not because they are fault, but penalty, not inflicted, but contracted[^30].

To that which is objected, that Tully posits more; it must be said that Augustine does not here posit all the circumstances, but only the aggravating ones; but Tully posits all the circumstances which touch the deed or the person. Now all the circumstances can be reduced to fourteen, which are noted in these verses[^31]:

> *Order, place, person, knowledge, time aggravate,*
> *Age, condition, number, delay, abundance, cause,*
> *The manner in the fault, high status, scant struggle.*

Now of these five[^32] regard the *person*, namely knowledge, order, age, condition, and status. Three regard the *act* of the crime, namely number, delay, and manner of acting. Three regard the *cause*, namely abundance, cause, scant struggle. And two are *adjacent*, namely place and time[^33].

### Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *For with joy ought he to do [it] who is to be immortal* etc. For it seems to speak ill, because penitence consists chiefly in sorrow and tears: therefore he ought not to do [it] with joy, but rather with sorrow. If you say that both concur there; it is asked: why does he rather say that it is to be done with joy?

**I respond:** It must be said that he exhorts to joy for this reason, that it is conservative of all the virtues, and especially of those virtues which consist about penalty. Whence the Philosopher[^34] says: «He who is continent and rejoices in this very thing is truly chaste; and he truly has perfect fortitude who not only does not succumb, but even rejoices in painful or penal things». And this is the principal reason why he exhorts to joy, because otherwise the assuming of the penalty is not virtuous.

But the ground why one ought to rejoice in penitence is twofold. The first is the consideration of *equity*, the second is the consideration of *utility*. Equity is greatest there, namely that the flesh, which drew the spirit and subjugated[^35] [it] through delight and is an enemy to the Spirit of truth, should on the contrary be subjected through affliction and through this be reconciled, and that vengeance be taken on the enemy. Whence just as a carnal man rejoices much in the casting-down of an enemy, so the spiritual man ought to rejoice over the affliction of the flesh. And just as a just judge rejoices much in the exercise of justice, so the penitent ought to rejoice; and therefore Proverbs twenty-one[^36]: *It is joy to the just to do justice*; therefore also Proverbs fourteen: *The heart that knoweth the bitterness of its own soul* etc.

The other is the consideration of *manifold utility*, because [penitence]

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is a *plank of deliverance from shipwreck*[^37]. Whence just as one rejoices when he escapes from shipwreck, so the penitent ought to rejoice. — Another reason can be on the part of the *good*, because it renews man, according to that [text] of the Psalm[^38]: *Thy youth shall be renewed like the eagle's.* — Spiritual losses too are there restored. And so the manifold reason for joy is plain.

And as to what he objects, that he ought to do [it] with sorrow; it must be said that this is no impediment, because, when one grieves vehemently, in sorrow alone he finds delight. Whence there is the example of Augustine, who relates in the fourth [book] of the Confessions[^39], that when his companion had died, he delighted in nothing except in groaning, and every other delight was a penalty to him, and in this alone he rested. How much more therefore ought one to rejoice amid sorrow over his own death? And therefore he rightly says that he ought to do [it] with joy.

### Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him beware lest, led by shame, he divide his confession within himself* etc. For it seems to be said badly, because the more he reveals to, the greater will be the shame, and the more he has whereof to blush. Whence it does not seem that this is from shame, but against shame.

**I respond:** It must be said that the greater shame can be [so] in two ways: either because one is reckoned an enormous and great sinner, or because he is known by many to be a sinner; and the first shame is the greater: and therefore for avoiding the greater one might well assume the lesser, and through this he would derogate from the truth of confession, which is not to be divided, as will appear below[^40].

### Doubt XII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him not approach the Lord's body before he is strengthened by a good conscience*; what is called here being *strengthened by a good conscience*? It seems that he who is in grace can approach without fault; and such is one contrite before confession. — But on the contrary is what Hugh says in the letter to Bernard[^41]: «I say boldly, if he be contrite, yet he ought not to communicate before he has confessed». — On account of this there is a question, whether someone contrite can in some case approach before confession.

**I respond:** It must be said that someone strengthens himself by a good conscience when he probably perceives that his fault has been forgiven him; and this he perceives when he does what is in him to obtain pardon. But this he does not fully do before confession[^42], if he has access to a priest; for then, if he confesses outwardly, the interior conscience is strengthened, and he can well approach. But if he has access and does not confess, he does ill if he approaches. But if he does not have access; either he has necessity of consecrating, as a parish priest, and then he can approach with sorrow and the purpose of confessing; or he does not have necessity, and thus in no way ought he to approach before confession, because he who was excommunicated through a mortal [sin] from the Sacrament of the unity of the Church ought not to approach unless first reconciled to the Church, unless he is otherwise compelled; and then an evident excuse is had[^43].

### Doubt XIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *Let him restrain himself from games and from spectacles*; what are these two called? And why does he say that he ought to restrain himself? For either they are evil, or good and lawful. If evil; then therefore all ought to restrain themselves. If however good and lawful; then no one ought to restrain himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is said in the first to the Corinthians ten[^44] in the Gloss, a game is a lustful gesticulation, of which kind is [that] in dances; spectacles are, as Augustine says[^45], like the ci-

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thara and hunting and the like. I say therefore that the game of dances is not evil in itself, as is plain concerning the sister of Moses [in] Exodus fifteen[^46]; but it is made evil from a fourfold cause, namely on account of the manner, when the manner is lascivious; on account of the end, when it is done to provoke lust; on account of the time, that it not be done in a time of sorrow; on account of the person, that it not be done by a religious person. These removed, it can be done. Since therefore the penitent both is a person to whom it does not belong, and, as long as he truly does penitence, is in a time of sorrow: therefore it does not belong to him. Likewise it is to be judged concerning spectacles; for from these four causes they can be done ill, and[^47] are; these excluded, they can be done well.

### Doubt XIV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that *not all worthy fruits are worthy fruits of penitence.* For it seems to be said badly: because the works which the penitent does from the virtue of penitence are fruits of the virtue; and not [of any] except *penitence*: therefore etc. — Moreover, just as the virtue of penitence is about the good and the difficult, so [are] the other virtues[^48]: therefore etc. — Likewise, since "fruit" is so called from *enjoying* [frui], how can the works of penitence be called fruits?

**I respond:** It must be said that the works of penitence are called fruits, not because we enjoy them, but because they lead to enjoyment[^49]; or fruits metaphorically: just as from a tree is born an apple, which is called the fruit of the tree, so from the will [is born] the good work of the penitent. — And note that it is a different thing to say a *good* fruit and a *worthy* fruit of penitence. A good fruit can be called every good work; a worthy fruit says more, namely a good work with fittingness to the state. For a work is good and thus perfect, if it befits the state. But a worthy fruit of penitence does not say only a good work, as it befits the state, but as it befits the merit of the sin; because he who has sinned more ought to suffer more, as Gregory determines in a homily[^50].

### Doubt XV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *A soldier, or a merchant, or one given to some office* etc.; because, if this is true, then no merchant, no soldier is saved; and this is against sacred Scripture. For blessed John did not reprove soldiering, but said: *Be content with your wages*, Luke three[^51]. Likewise concerning merchants, Genesis forty-nine: *Zabulon shall dwell on the seashore*, where according to the letter the land of Zabulon is blessed for [its] trafficking. — Likewise, if this were true, soldiering would perish, which is necessary for defending the faith; trafficking would perish, without which many lands could not live.

**I respond:** It must be said that of soldiering and trafficking and the office of toll-gathering or the exaction of tolls, from which Matthew is called a *publican*[^52], one can rightly make use, if he does [it] in the manner in which they were instituted: that the soldier injure no one, the merchant defraud no one, and the toll-gatherer not exact an immoderate toll, but that which was instituted from a certain and useful cause; and all this can be without sin, and in this manner the penitent can be saved in this state. But very near to these are abuses: in soldiers *violences*, in merchants *deceptions*, in the others *immoderate exactions*; and therefore such things are perilous. And as to such abuses Gregory[^53] says: «One does not do penitence until he relinquishes these», namely as to the abuse.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 598, nota 9, et Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 30. seq. (IV. c. 23. seq.).

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 598, note 9, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 30 f. (IV, c. 23 f.).

la: Cod. aa *in quolibet homine.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *in quolibet homine* ("in every man").

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 600, nota 1. — Mox pro *ab una essentia* cod. U *ab uno actu* (substantiali sive forma).

en: See vol. II, p. 600, note 1. — Soon, for *ab una essentia* ("from one essence") codex U [reads] *ab uno actu* ("from one act") (substantial or form).

la: Cod. Z, hic addito *et contritio*, inferius omittit *similiter satisfactio et contritio.*

en: Codex Z, here adding *et contritio* ("and contrition"), below omits *similiter satisfactio et contritio* ("likewise satisfaction and contrition").

la: Plures codd. substituunt *conteritur*, edd. *conteritur et.* — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 16. m. 1. et 2; B. Albert., hic a. 2. seq.; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1.

en: Several codices substitute *conteritur* ("is contrite"), the editions *conteritur et.* — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 16, m. 1 and 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 2 f.; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1, quaestiunculae 1-4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1.

la: Sap. 11, 17, ubi Vulgata et codd. EH *torquetur* pro *punietur.*

en: Wisdom 11:17, where the Vulgate and codices EH [read] *torquetur* ("is tormented") for *punietur* ("is punished").

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. De confessione cfr. infra d. 17. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 1. On confession cf. below, d. 17, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4.

la: Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1, allegatum, cui etiam verba Augustini subnectuntur. — Aliquanto inferius ex codd. FGH PQ supplevimus *debetur*, pro quo cod. B *respondet.*

en: Cited here in the text of the Master, c. 1, to which also the words of Augustine are subjoined. — Somewhat below, from codices FGH PQ we have supplied *debetur* ("is owed"), for which codex B [reads] *respondet* ("corresponds").

la: Psalm. 4, 5. — Glossam refert Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc., addito cum Augustino (Enarrat. in Ps. 4. n. 6.) adhibitis post *stimulis.* Subinde post *Christi* Petr. Lombard. pro *et* subiungit *scilicet*, non pro *irriguo inferiori*, sed pro *irriguo superiori*, quae verba inferius referuntur a S. Bonav. et exponuntur a Gregor., III. Dialog. c. 34, de compunctione procedente ex *timore* et *amore.*

en: Psalm 4:5. — The Gloss is reported by Peter Lombard, on this passage, with *adhibitis* ("applied") added after *stimulis* ("goads"), following Augustine (*Enarrations on the Psalms*, Ps. 4, n. 6). Thereupon, after *Christi* ("of Christ") Peter Lombard for *et* subjoins *scilicet* ("namely"), not for the *lower watering*, but for the *upper watering*; which words are reported below by St. Bonaventure and expounded by Gregory, *Dialogues* III, c. 34, on compunction proceeding from *fear* and *love.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in fine. — Pro *cor terit* codd. F G *cor teritur*, Vat. *conterit.*

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, at the end. — For *cor terit* ("grinds the heart") codices F G [read] *cor teritur* ("the heart is ground"), the Vatican [edition] *conterit.*

la: Respicitur Iosue 15, 19; cfr. Gregor., loc. paulo superius cit.: *Qui prius flebat, ne duceretur ad supplicium, postmodum amarissime flere incipit, quia differtur a regno...* Irriguum quippe *superius* accipit anima, cum sese in lacrymis caelestis regni desiderio affligit. Irriguum vero *inferius* accipit, cum inferni supplicia flendo pertimescit.

en: Reference is to Joshua 15:19; cf. Gregory, the place cited a little above: *He who before wept lest he be led to punishment, afterward begins to weep most bitterly, because he is deferred from the kingdom...* For the soul receives the *upper* watering, when it afflicts itself in tears from desire of the heavenly kingdom. But it receives the *lower* watering, when by weeping it dreads the punishments of hell.

la: Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 8.

en: The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 17, m. 1, a. 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 8.

la: Codd. K aa (I a secunda manu) *idem est.*

en: Codices K aa (I by a second hand) [read] *idem est* ("it is the same").

la: Cod. R tenet *quasi duplicis.* Inferius pro *quod potest* cod. F *secundum quod potest.* — Vide de hoc dubio Quaestion. ex veteri Test. (inter opera August.) p. 1. q. 30.

en: Codex R holds *quasi duplicis* ("as it were of a double"). Below, for *quod potest* ("which can") codex F [reads] *secundum quod potest* ("insofar as it can"). — See on this doubt the *Questions on the Old Testament* (among the works of Augustine), p. 1, q. 30.

la: Vers. 3. et 11. — Seq. locus est ibid. 4, 17. Cfr. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum in praedictos locos. Vide etiam supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro *et dixit*, quod habent plurimi codd. et ed. 1, Vat. *ut dicitur.* — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 14. m. 1. a. 3. in fine; B. Albert., hic a. 19; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Verse 3 and 11. — The following passage is in the same place, 4:17. Cf. the *Glossa ordinaria* in Strabus and Lyra on the said passages. See also above, d. 2, a. 2, q. 2. — For *et dixit* ("and said"), which most codices and ed. 1 have, the Vatican [edition reads] *ut dicitur* ("as is said"). — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 14, m. 1, a. 3, at the end; Blessed Albert, here a. 19; St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 353, nota 4.

en: Cf. above, p. 353, note 4.

la: Cod. n bene supplet *poenitentiae.*

en: Codex n well supplies *poenitentiae* ("of penitence").

la: Cfr. infra d. 18. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. Vide etiam Mich. 6, 6. seqq.; Matth. 18, 23. seqq. et Luc. 7, 40. seqq.

en: Cf. below, d. 18, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. See also Micah 6:6 ff.; Matthew 18:23 ff. and Luke 7:40 ff.

la: Edd. pro *illud* substituunt: *indignitas fructus dupliciter potest accipi: aut per comparationem ad meritum culpae, aut in comparatione ad meritum poenae. Si in comparatione ad meritum poenae.*

en: The editions for *illud* ("that") substitute: *the unworthiness of fruit can be taken in two ways: either by comparison to the merit of fault, or in comparison to the merit of penalty. If in comparison to the merit of penalty.*

la: Edd. cum aliquot codd. perperam omittunt *non.* Codd. O S paulo inferius omittunt *non.* — Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 20.

en: The editions, with several codices, wrongly omit *non* ("not"). Codices O S a little below omit *non.* — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 20.

la: Haec divisio quantitatis insinuatur ab August., de Quantit. animae, c. 3. n. 4.

en: This division of quantity is intimated by Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 3, n. 4.

la: Respicitur II. Cor. 7, 1. superius pag. 367, nota 2. relatum. — Superius pro *in specie* [diversa] edd. *in speciem.*

en: Reference is to 2 Corinthians 7:1, reported above, p. 367, note 2. — Above, for *in specie* [diversa] ("in a [distinct] species") the editions [read] *in speciem* ("into a species").

la: Edd. *quantitatis.* — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 16. m. 1. a. 2. ad 7; B. Albert., hic a. 21.

en: The editions [read] *quantitatis* ("of quantity"). — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 16, m. 1, a. 2, ad 7; Blessed Albert, here a. 21.

la: Edd. *qui*; sed cfr. supra a. 4. q. 2. arg. 2.

en: The editions [read] *qui* ("who"); but cf. above, a. 4, q. 2, arg. 2.

la: De Motu animalium, c. 5. (c. 7.): *Imaginatio vero et intellectio rerum habent virtutem; aliquo enim modo forma* [εἶδος i. e. forma sive species] *intellecta calidi aut frigidi, aut iucundi aut terribilis, talis quidem est, qualis quidem et rerum unaquaeque; quapropter et horrent et timent intelligentes solum.* Cfr. III. de Anima, text. 48. seqq. (c. 10.), et VII. Phys. text. 19. (c. 3.). Lib. III. Ethic. c. 12. insinuat, quod delectabile, quanto magis in particulari consideratur, tanto magis appetitum moveat. B. Albert., hic a. 23. ait: *Avicenna dicit, quod species delectabilis corporalis etiam quandoque reminiscentem movet* (cfr. Avicenna, de Anima, p. IV. c. 3. et 4; Metaph. tr. 6. c. 5. et tr. 9. c. 7). — Pro *species delectationis* cod. aa *species delectabilis.*

en: *On the Motion of Animals*, c. 5 (c. 7): *But imagination and the intellection of things have power; for in some way the form* [εἶδος, i.e. form or species] *of the hot or the cold, or the pleasant or the terrible, when understood, is just such as is each of the things themselves; wherefore those who merely understand both shudder and fear.* Cf. *On the Soul* III, text 48 ff. (c. 10), and *Physics* VII, text 19 (c. 3). Book III of the *Ethics*, c. 12, intimates that the delectable, the more it is considered in particular, the more it moves the appetite. Blessed Albert, here a. 23, says: *Avicenna says that the species of a corporeal delectable thing sometimes also moves one who recalls it* (cf. Avicenna, *On the Soul*, p. IV, c. 3 and 4; *Metaphysics*, tr. 6, c. 5, and tr. 9, c. 7). — For *species delectationis* ("species of the delight") codex aa [reads] *species delectabilis* ("species of the delectable thing").

la: Cod. E omittit *ita.* Mox ex codd. HLUY (bb a secunda manu) supplevimus *concupiscentiae.*

en: Codex E omits *ita* ("so"). Soon, from codices HLUY (bb by a second hand) we have supplied *concupiscentiae* ("of concupiscence").

la: Vers. 18. — Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 23.

en: Verse 18. — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 23.

la: Potius Marius Victorinus (cfr. tom. I. pag. 31, nota 2.) in Comment. super 1. Rhetor. Ciceronis, c. 24. seqq., et post eum Boeth., IV. de Differentiis topic., qui ad has communiter receptas circumstantias (cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1; Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 24, et opusculum, cui titulus Principia rhetorices, inter opera August., c. 4.) reducunt illas quas Cicero enumerat. Ipse siquidem loc. cit. distinguit duplex genus circumstantiarum seu attributorum, scil. eorum quae personis et eorum quae negotio sive facto conveniunt. Personis conveniunt undecim, scil. nomen, natura [utrum sit vir, an mulier, an sit barbarus, an puer, an Atheniensis etc.], inctas [i. e. tempus a pueritia usque ad factum illud, de quo agitur, apud quos scil. et quo more etc. sit educatus], fortuna [utrum sit servus, an liber, dives etc.], habitus [utrum sit virtuosus, sapiens etc.], affectio [i. e. animi aut corporis ex tempore aliqua de causa commutatio, ut laetitia, cupiditas, morbus etc.], studium [ut poeta], consilium [i. e. non faciendi faciendive excogitata ratio], factum, casus et oratio (i. e. quid fecerit, aut quid ipsi acciderit, aut quid dixerit). Respectu negotii, in quantum hic consideratur, distinguit Cicero inter ea quae concernunt ipsum negotium et gestionem negotii. Negotium concernunt duo, scil. quid sit factum et quamobrem [cur]; gestionem vero negotii concernunt locus [ubi], tempus [quando], modus [quomodo], facultates [quibus auxiliis] et occasio (i. e. pars temporis, habens in se alicuius rei idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem). Cfr. ibid. II. c. 9. seqq. — Pro *undecim* codd. et edd. *duodecim*, perperam, ut ex praenotatis constat. Subinde pro *nomen, naturam, convictum, fortunam* edd. falso *numerus, mora, conditio, scientia* (cfr. inferius).

en: Rather Marius Victorinus (cf. vol. I, p. 31, note 2) in [his] *Commentary on Cicero's first [book] of Rhetoric*, c. 24 ff., and after him Boethius, *On Topical Differences* IV, who reduce to these commonly received circumstances (cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 1; Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 24, and the opusculum entitled *Principles of Rhetoric*, among the works of Augustine, c. 4) those which Cicero enumerates. For he in the place cited distinguishes two kinds of circumstances or attributes, namely those which befit persons and those which befit the deed or fact. To persons befit eleven, namely name, nature [whether one be man or woman, whether barbarian, or boy, or Athenian, etc.], manner of life [i.e. the time from boyhood up to the deed in question, among whom namely and by what custom etc. he was reared], fortune [whether he be slave or free, rich, etc.], habit [whether he be virtuous, wise, etc.], affection [i.e. a change of mind or body for some cause from time, such as joy, desire, sickness, etc.], pursuit [as a poet], counsel [i.e. a reasoning thought out for not doing or doing], deed, chance, and speech (i.e. what he did, or what happened to him, or what he said). With respect to the deed, insofar as it is here considered, Cicero distinguishes between those things which concern the deed itself and the conduct of the deed. Two things concern the deed, namely what was done and wherefore [why]; but the conduct of the deed is concerned by place [where], time [when], manner [how], means [with what aids], and occasion (i.e. the portion of time having in itself a fit opportunity of doing or not doing some thing). Cf. the same, II, c. 9 ff. — For *undecim* ("eleven") the codices and editions [read] *duodecim* ("twelve"), wrongly, as is clear from the foregoing. Thereupon, for *nomen, naturam, convictum, fortunam* the editions falsely [read] *numerus, mora, conditio, scientia* (cf. below).

la: Ex cuius verbis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2, allegatis textus huius dubii sumtus est. — Paulo inferius voci *contritione* codd. F G praemittunt *in.*

en: From whose words, cited here in the text of the Master, c. 2, the text of this doubt is taken. — A little below, before the word *contritione* ("by contrition") codices F G prefix *in* ("in").

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 767, nota 6. et pag. 826, nota 4.

en: See vol. II, p. 767, note 6, and p. 826, note 4.

la: Qui habentur in Petri Bles. poemate (4.) de Poenitentia. Pro *persona* in ed. Migne substituitur *peccata*, et pro *Est* ponitur *Et.*

en: Which are found in the poem (4) of Peter of Blois, *On Penitence.* For *persona* ("person") in the Migne edition is substituted *peccata* ("sins"), and for *Est* ("is") is put *Et* ("and").

la: Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. *sex*, inferius post *conditio* addito *persona.* Pro explicatione numeri (14) observandum est, quod licet tantum quinque circumstantiae respiciant personam, tamen ipsa persona cum eisdem circumstantiis bis considerari debet, scil. ut peccans et ut ea cum qua peccatur. Post pauca non pauci codd. omittunt *sive actum.*

en: The editions, with one or another codex, [read] *sex* ("six"), below after *conditio* ("condition") adding *persona* ("person"). For the explanation of the number (14) it is to be noted that although only five circumstances regard the person, nevertheless the person herself, with the same circumstances, ought to be considered twice, namely as sinning and as that with which one sins. After a few [words] not a few codices omit *sive actum* ("or the act").

la: Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 18. m. 4. a. 3. § 1; B. Albert., hic a. 26; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1.

en: The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 18, m. 4, a. 3, § 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 26; St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 359, nota 6.

en: Book II of the *Ethics*, c. 3. Cf. vol. III, p. 359, note 6.

la: Respicitur Ioan. 14, 17: *Spiritum veritatis [dabit Pater] vobis, quem mundus non potest accipere.* Rom. 8, 7: *Sapientia carnis inimica est Deo.* — Pro *traxit spiritum* edd. *traxit peccatum.* Codd. H L N U Y aa hic addunt *nunc.*

en: Reference is to John 14:17: *[The Father will give] you the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive.* Romans 8:7: *The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God.* — For *traxit spiritum* ("drew the spirit") the editions [read] *traxit peccatum* ("drew sin"). Codices H L N U Y aa here add *nunc* ("now").

la: Vers. 15, ubi Vulgata *iudicium* pro *iustitiam.* — Seq. textus est ibid. 14, 10, cuius ultima verba sunt: *in gaudio eius non miscebitur extraneus.*

en: Verse 15, where the Vulgate [reads] *iudicium* ("judgment") for *iustitiam* ("justice"). — The following text is in the same place, 14:10, whose last words are: *in his joy the stranger shall not intermeddle.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. p. I. dub. 1.

en: Cf. above, d. 14, p. I, dub. 1.

la: Cap. 4. n. 9. et c. 7. n. 12. Cfr. supra d. 14. p. II. dub. 7. — Inferius post *socius* cod. F addit *eius.*

en: Chapter 4, n. 9, and c. 7, n. 12. Cf. above, d. 14, p. II, dub. 7. — Below, after *socius* ("companion") codex F adds *eius* ("his").

la: Dist. 17. p. III. a. 2. q. 2.; d. 21. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 1. 3. Alii commentatores hoc dub. solvunt in d. 17, praeter B. Albert., qui hic a. 30. de ipso agit, et Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 18. m. 4. a. 1. § 2.

en: Dist. 17, p. III, a. 2, q. 2; d. 21, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 1, 3. Other commentators resolve this doubt in d. 17, except Blessed Albert, who here a. 30 treats of it, and Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 18, m. 4, a. 1, § 2.

la: Ita allegatur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. 42, adiungente: *de epha (?) paschali.* Inter opera Hugonis haec epistola non invenitur; apud Richard. a S. Victore occurrit opusculum, cui titulus *Declarationes nonnullarum difficultatum Scripturae ad B. Bernardum*, in quo exponitur verbum Apostoli I. Cor. 5, 7: *Expurgate vetus fermentum... azymi*, et inter alia dicitur: *In criminalium expurgatione opus est pro certo confessione et satisfactione; nam compunctio et oratio quandoque solent ad venialium expurgationem sufficere.* Petr. a Tar., IV. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. a. 2, adducit *Librum de potestate ligandi et solvendi*, qui est Richardi a S. Victore, et in quo (c. 21.) legitur: *Audacter dico, si ante sacerdotis absolutionem ad communionem corporis et sanguinis Christi accesserit [criminosus Christianus], iudicium sibi pro certo manducat et bibit, etsi eum peccasse iam multum poeniteat et vehementer doleat et ingemiscat.*

en: It is so cited also by Blessed Albert, here a. 42, adding: *of the paschal epha (?).* Among the works of Hugh this letter is not found; in Richard of St. Victor there occurs an opusculum entitled *Declarations of certain difficulties of Scripture, to Blessed Bernard*, in which the word of the Apostle 1 Corinthians 5:7 is expounded: *Purge out the old leaven... unleavened*, and among other things it is said: *In the purgation of criminal [sins] there is need, for certain, of confession and satisfaction; for compunction and prayer are sometimes wont to suffice for the purgation of venial [sins].* Peter of Tarentaise, IV *Sentences*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 2, adduces the *Book on the Power of Binding and Loosing*, which is Richard of St. Victor's, and in which (c. 21) is read: *I say boldly, if [a criminous Christian] approaches the communion of the body and blood of Christ before the priest's absolution, he eats and drinks judgment to himself for certain, even though he now repents much that he has sinned and grieves vehemently and groans.*

la: Edd. *Tunc autem plene facit quod in se est ante communionem.* Paulo post pro *exterius* codd. I K *contritus.*

en: The editions [read] *Then however he fully does what is in him before communion.* A little after, for *exterius* ("outwardly") codices I K [read] *contritus* ("contrite").

la: Codd. FG *haberetur.* — Cfr. supra d. 13. dub. 1; B. Albert. et Petr. a Tar., locc. citt.

en: Codices FG [read] *haberetur* ("would be had"). — Cf. above, d. 13, dub. 1; Blessed Albert and Peter of Tarentaise, in the places cited.

la: Vers. 7, ubi Exod. 32, 6 allegatur: *Sedit populus manducare et bibere, et surrexerunt ludere* etc. — Glossa citata occurrit neque apud Strabum neque apud Petr. Lombard. neque apud Lyranum. Cfr. Chrysost., in Matth., homil. 6. n. 6. seqq.; Isidor., XVIII. Etymolog. c. 16. n. 1. seqq. et c. 43. seqq.; Serm. 129. et 130. in appendice Sermonum Augustini.

en: Verse 7, where Exodus 32:6 is cited: *The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play* etc. — The cited Gloss occurs neither in Strabus nor in Peter Lombard nor in Lyra. Cf. Chrysostom, *On Matthew*, homily 6, n. 6 ff.; Isidore, *Etymologies* XVIII, c. 16, n. 1 ff. and c. 43 ff.; Sermons 129 and 130 in the appendix of the Sermons of Augustine.

la: Serm. 9. (alias 96. de Tempore) sive de Decem Chordis, c. 9. n. 13: *In illis spectaculis [hominum] non id est venator, quod citharista; aliud agit venator, aliud citharista; in spectaculo Dei unum est; tange easdem decem chordas [praecepta], et feras occidas, utrumque simul facis.* — Referuntur haec verba a Petro Lombard., in Rom. 13, 10.

en: Sermon 9 (otherwise 96, *On the Season*) or *On the Ten Strings*, c. 9, n. 13: *In those [human] spectacles the hunter is not the same as the citharist; the hunter does one thing, the citharist another; in the spectacle of God there is one thing; touch the same ten strings [the precepts], and slay the beasts, you do both at once.* — These words are reported by Peter Lombard, on Romans 13:10.

la: Vers. 20: *Sumsit ergo Maria... tympanum in manu sua, egressaeque sunt omnes mulieres post eam cum tympanis et choris.* — De seqq. rationibus, et quidem de 1. et 2. vide Clement. Alexand., III. Paedag. c. 11. (Migne Patrol. Graec. tom. col. 654. seq.); de 3. Eccli. 22, 6: *Musica in luctu importuna narratio*; de 4. cfr. C. *Non oportet ministros altaris* (37.), de Consecrat. d. 5. et C. *Cum decorem* (12), X. de Vita et honest. clericor. (lib. III. tit. 1.). — Inferius pro *ut non* edd. bis *ut si.*

en: Verse 20: *Mary therefore took... a timbrel in her hand, and all the women went forth after her with timbrels and dances.* — On the following reasons, and indeed on the 1st and 2nd, see Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogue* III, c. 11 (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol., col. 654 f.); on the 3rd, Ecclesiasticus 22:6: *A tale out of season [is like] music in mourning*; on the 4th cf. canon *Non oportet ministros altaris* (37), *De Consecratione*, d. 5, and canon *Cum decorem* (12), in the *Decretals* under *On the Life and Honesty of Clerics* (book III, tit. 1). — Below, for *ut non* ("that not") the editions twice [read] *ut si* ("as if").

la: Cod. K (I a secunda manu) *et si fiunt, his* etc. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 133; B. Albert., hic a. 43; S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2; quaestiunc. 1. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1.

en: Codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] *et si fiunt, his* ("and if they are done, by these") etc. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 133; Blessed Albert, here a. 43; St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 2, quaestiunculae 1, 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3, quaestiunculae 1, 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 318, nota 5. — August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 25. dicit, «quod proprie fructus fruentis, usus utentis est».

en: Cf. above, p. 318, note 5. — Augustine, *On the City of God* XI, c. 25, says, «that fruit properly belongs to the one enjoying, use to the one using».

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 4. — Mox post *sicut* cod. G addit *enim.*

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4. — Soon, after *sicut* ("just as") codex G adds *enim* ("for").

la: Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 20. n. 8: *Neque enim par fructus boni operis esse debet eius qui minus, et eius qui amplius deliquit* etc. Cfr. supra pag. 364, nota 6. et pag. 370, nota 2. — Post *sed* edd. supplent *etiam.* — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 16. m. 1. a. 2. ad 7; B. Albert., hic a. 44.

en: Book I of the *Homilies on the Gospel*, homily 20, n. 8: *For the fruit of a good work ought not to be equal for him who has offended less and for him who [has offended] more* etc. Cf. above, p. 364, note 6, and p. 370, note 2. — After *sed* ("but") the editions supply *etiam* ("also"). — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. IV, q. 16, m. 1, a. 2, ad 7; Blessed Albert, here a. 44.

la: Vers. 14. — Seq. textus est Gen. 49, 13: *Iacob filiis suis benedicens Zabulon praedicta ut benedictionem impertit, addens: Et in statione navium pertingens usque ad Sidonem.* — Superius pro *verum est* codd. F G *verum esset.* Inferius pro *negotiationibus* edd. cum pluribus codd. *negotiatoribus.*

en: Verse 14. — The following text is Genesis 49:13: *Jacob, blessing his sons, imparts the aforesaid to Zabulon as a blessing, adding: And [reaching] to the station of ships as far as Sidon.* — Above, for *verum est* ("is true") codices F G [read] *verum esset* ("were true"). Below, for *negotiationibus* ("for trafficking") the editions, with several codices, [read] *negotiatoribus* ("for merchants").

la: Matth. 9, 9. et 10, 3; Luc. 3, 27. Cfr. Ambros., II. in Luc. 3, 7. seq. n. 77. — Inferius pro *faciat* codd. H aa *fiat*, et post *ut* cod. U addit *si.*

en: Matthew 9:9 and 10:3; Luke 3:27. Cf. Ambrose, *On Luke* II, 3:7 f., n. 77. — Below, for *faciat* ("he does") codices H aa [read] *fiat* ("it be done"), and after *ut* ("that") codex U adds *si* ("if").

la: Scil. Gregor. VII. hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. allegatus. Idem docet Gregor. Magnus, II. Homil. in Evang. hom. 24. n. 1. Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 46; S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2.

en: Namely Gregory VII, cited here in the text of the Master, c. 3. The same is taught by Gregory the Great, *Homilies on the Gospel* II, hom. 24, n. 1. Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 46; St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3, quaestiuncula 3, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set from PDF column bands (`vol4-p397-{L,R}-*` through `vol4-p402-{L,R}-*`, split x=1880) per the Vol IV two-column PDF-priority inversion (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters this dubia region with heavy two-column bleed and diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation — every Respondeo and footer is fragmented), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 45088–45718. English is a fresh literal translation. The dubia open on printed p.397 (PDF 417) under the centered header DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI and conclude on printed p.402 (PDF 422) at the close of Dub. XV (*…scilicet quantum ad abusionem.*), immediately before the Pars II COMMENTARIUS / DISTINCTIO XVI header that opens on p.403. Running heads read **DIST. XVI. P. I. DUBIA. 397 / 399 / 401** (odd pages) and **SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. 398 / 400 / 402** (even pages) — confirmed DIST. XVI, P. I.

**Page-span correction:** the auto-chunk skeleton and the dispatch brief estimated pp.394–401, but the running heads place the actual dubia on **pp.397–402** (PDF 417–422). The skeleton's raw line range (45091–45718) corresponds to these printed pages; the leading OCR lines belonged to the Pars I question-replies that precede the dubia header on p.397.

**Dubia count: 15** (Dub. I–XV). Each follows the Master's-text format: a lemma from Lombard (*Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit…*) + objection (*Videtur enim…* / *Sed contra…*) + **Respondeo** (Dub. III, IX, XII, XIII have two-pronged objections; a few short dubia, e.g. V, XI, omit a second objection).
- **Dub. I** — Whether the three (contrition/confession/satisfaction) are *subjective* or *integral* parts of penitence. Ans.: penitence-as-virtue → *potestative* parts (acts issuing from one habit); penitence-as-Sacrament → integral parts (simultaneous in vow/effect, not act).
- **Dub. II** — On *tribus modis satisfaciamus:* does this collapse satisfaction into the other parts / abolish carnal penance for spiritual sin? Ans.: *satisfactio* = (a) reconciliation (common to all parts), (b) paying the owed penalty (proper to one part); Chrysostom/Augustine read by *appropriation.*
- **Dub. III** — On *compunctio:* is it the same as contrition? Ans.: contrition grinds the heart (sins only); compunction pricks it (twofold: lack of glory / offense — upper & lower *irriguum*), so compunction is wider; the Master appropriates it to sorrow over sin.
- **Dub. IV** — On *Iustus in principio est accusator sui:* does he accuse himself qua just or qua sinner (sophism either way)? Ans.: one person under a double *ratio* (accuser/accused, just/sinner); reduplication referred to subject or object.
- **Dub. V** — On *satisfactio praecipitur a Ioanne:* but John could not institute new-law Sacraments. Ans.: John enjoined by preaching, Christ as principal author confirmed/instituted.
- **Dub. VI** — On *Facite dignos fructus poenitentiae:* the divine acceptation is beyond our power/knowledge. Ans.: "worthy fruits" taken as to merit of fault, not divine acceptation; satisfaction under precept only *secundum probabilitatem conscientiae.*
- **Dub. VII** — On *qualitatem et quantitatem culpae:* what distinguishes quality from quantity of fault; is infinite penalty owed? Ans.: quality = what distinguishes/specifies the sin (*inquinamentum carnis et spiritus*); quantity = what aggravates within a genus (finite, measured by the sinner's lust).
- **Dub. VIII** — On *Purgans lacrymis omnem qualitatem vitii:* precept (dangerous — no one weeps each) or counsel (re-recalling vice tempts)? Ans.: precept for qualities drawing into another genus, counsel for the rest; recall only when sensuality is tamed and in prayer.
- **Dub. IX** — On *Defleat virtutem qua interim caruit:* is lack-of-virtue a fault (→ infinite sins)? Tully's circumstances vs Augustine. Ans.: contrition bewails also *penalties* (sequels of vice), chief = lack of virtue; the 14-circumstance verse *Aggravat ordo…* (5 person, 3 act, 3 cause, 2 adjacent).
- **Dub. X** — On *Cum gaudio… debet facere:* penitence is sorrow, not joy. Ans.: joy preserves the penal virtues (Aristotle); twofold ground — *aequitas* (flesh subjected, enemy avenged) and *multiplex utilitas* (plank from shipwreck, renewal); Augustine's grief-delight (Confessions IV).
- **Dub. XI** — On *Caveat ne… dividat confessionem:* more hearers → more shame, so dividing is *from* shame, not against it. Ans.: shame of being-a-great-sinner > shame of being-known-to-many; dividing to avoid the greater derogates from confession's truth.
- **Dub. XII** — On *confortetur bona conscientia:* can a contrite (not-yet-confessed) man approach the Eucharist? (Hugo-to-Bernard: no.) Ans.: a *quaestio incidens* — strengthening = doing what's in oneself for pardon; full only via confession if a priest is available; cases (priest available/not, necessity of consecrating, otherwise compelled).
- **Dub. XIII** — On *Cohibeat se a ludis et spectaculis:* are games/spectacles evil or licit? Ans.: a game (lustful gesticulation, dances) / spectacle (cithara, hunting) is not evil *per se* (Miriam, Exod. 15), but made evil by manner/end/time/person; barred to the penitent (a person in a time of sorrow).
- **Dub. XIV** — On *non omnes digni fructus sunt digni fructus poenitentiae:* penitence-works are its fruits; how "fruit" (from *frui*)? Ans.: called fruits because they *lead to* fruition / metaphorically; *bonum* fruct (any good work) vs *dignus* fruct (good work fitting the *state* + the *merit of sin* — more sin, more suffering, Gregory).
- **Dub. XV** — On *Miles, vel negotiator…* etc.: are soldiers/merchants/toll-gatherers excluded from salvation? Ans.: soldiering, trade, toll-gathering (Matthew the *publican*) used rightly are sinless and savable; their near abuses (violence/deception/immoderate exaction) are perilous — Gregory VII: no penitence till these are relinquished.

**Page-split map (mid-page seams, all verified grammatically continuous against the column bands; within each page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column):**
- `<!-- page 398 -->` falls **inside Dub. II** (Respondeo to the Chrysostom objection), at the *…quia quodli- | bet meretur poenam aeternam* seam (p.397 R-bottom → p.398 L-top).
- `<!-- page 399 -->` falls **inside Dub. VI** (Respondeo), at the *…in comparatione ad divinam | acceptationem* seam (p.398 R-bottom → p.399 L-top).
- `<!-- page 400 -->` falls **inside Dub. IX** (opening objection), at the *Contritus enim non de- | bet dolere nisi de culpa* seam (p.399 R-bottom → p.400 L-top).
- `<!-- page 401 -->` falls **inside Dub. X** (the *multiplex utilitas* ground), at the *…multiplicis utilitatis, quia | est tabula liberationis a naufragio* seam (p.400 R-bottom → p.401 L-top).
- `<!-- page 402 -->` falls **inside Dub. XIII** (Respondeo), at the *…sicut dicit Augustinus, sicut ci- | thara et venatio* seam (p.401 R-bottom → p.402 L-top).
- The centered DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI header on p.397 spans both columns; DUB. I begins at p.397 L, its Respondeo tail (*Si autem loquamur de poenitentia-Sacramento…*) at the top of p.397 R, and DUB. II opener follows at p.397 R-bottom.

**Footer ownership (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; markers re-mapped to a single chunk-wide [^1]–[^53] sequence, anchored by content not OCR digit order):**
- **p.397** — 8 footers → [^1]–[^8]. Dub. I owns 1–4 ([^1]–[^4]); Dub. II owns 5–8 ([^5] *Sap. 11,17*; [^6] *Idem dub.…q.16*; [^7] *Vide supra a.1 q.1*; [^8] *Hic in lit. Magistri c.1*).
- **p.398** — 10 footers → [^9]–[^18]. Dub. III: [^9] *Psalm. 4,5*, [^10] *cor terit*, [^11] *Iosue 15,19*, [^12] *Idem dub.…q.17*; Dub. IV: [^13] *idem est*, [^14] *quasi duplicis*; Dub. V: [^15] *Matth. 3*; Dub. VI: [^16] *caritate*, [^17] *poenitentiae* supplet, [^18] *infra d.18*.
- **p.399** — 10 footers → [^19]–[^28]. Dub. VI tail: [^19] *illud* edd., [^20] *non* omit; Dub. VII: [^21] *de Quantit. animae*, [^22] *II. Cor. 7,1*, [^23] *quantitatis* edd.; Dub. VIII: [^24] *qui* edd., [^25] *De Motu animalium* (the long Aristotle/Avicenna footer), [^26] *concupiscentiae* supplet, [^27] *Vers. 18*. (One p.399 footer slot is a cross-column continuation of the Aristotle note.)
- **p.400** — 9 footers → [^28]–[^36]. Dub. IX: [^28] *Marius Victorinus* (the long Cicero-circumstances footer), [^29] *Ex cuius verbis* (Augustine), [^30] *Vide tom. II pag. 767*, [^31] *Petri Bles. poema* (the *Aggravat ordo* verse), [^32] *Edd. sex* (the 14-circumstance explanation), [^33] *Idem dub.…q.18*; Dub. X: [^34] *Libr. II. Ethic.* (the Aristotle "Qui continet" quote), [^35] *Ioan. 14,17 / Rom. 8,7 / traxit spiritum* (covers both *subiugavit* and *Spiritui veritatis*), [^36] *Vers. 15 / Prov. 21,15*.
- **p.401** — 9 footers → [^37]–[^45]. Dub. X: [^37] *d.14 p.I dub.1*, [^38] *Psalm. 102,5*, [^39] *Confessions IV*; Dub. XI: [^40] *Dist. 17…*; Dub. XII: [^41] *Hugo/Richard ad Bernardum* (long), [^42] *plene facit* edd., [^43] *haberetur*; Dub. XIII: [^44] *I Cor. 10 / Exod. 32,6*, [^45] *Serm. 9 de Decem Chordis*.
- **p.402** — 8 footers → [^46]–[^53]. Dub. XIII tail / Dub. XIV: [^46] *Exod. 15,20 / Miriam* (long, with the 4-causes sources), [^47] *et si fiunt* + commentator list; Dub. XIV: [^48] *de Civ. Dei XI,25*, [^49] *I Sent. d.1*, [^50] *Homil. 20 / Gregory*; Dub. XV: [^51] *Luc. 3,14 / Gen. 49,13*, [^52] *Matth. publican*, [^53] *Gregor. VII / Homil. 24*.

**[?] flags:** None at the body level — all 15 dubia bodies read cleanly from the column bands. The Quaracchi footnote *numbers* in the cascade-shattered OCR are unreliable, so the [^N] anchors were placed by *content* (the lemma each footer glosses) against the printed footer text read off the band L-2/R-2 crops, not by trusting OCR digit order. Per-page footer counts (8/10/10/9/9/8 = **53**) match the printed footer blocks. One editorial caution: p.400 footer [^35] (the John 14:17 / Rom 8:7 note) covers two adjacent body anchors that the printed footer treats as one (*traxit spiritum* and *inimica est Spiritui veritatis*), so they are carried by a single marker rather than split — the only consolidation in the chunk.

**Pars II boundary confirmed:** Dub. XV is the last dubium of Pars I; it closes on p.402 (*…scilicet quantum ad abusionem.*). The next page (p.403, running head DIST. XVI. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I.) opens the **Pars II COMMENTARIUS** (Bonaventure's commentary on Dist. XVI Pars II), which is a separate chunk (`bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-*`). Hand-off to Pars II: the p.402 footer block is fully owned here ([^46]–[^53]); p.403's footers belong to the Pars II divisio/q.1 chunk. This dubia chunk ends cleanly above the p.403 COMMENTARIUS header.