title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum necessario Deus praesciat quae praescit.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum divina praescientia habeat in se necessitatem, hoc est, utrum sit, Deum praescire quod praescit. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* per auctoritatem Anselmi in libro *de Concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii*[^1]: «Quod praescit Deus, impossibile est non praescire»: ergo ab aequipollenti, necesse est praescire.

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne dictum de praeterito verum est necessarium — unde si cucurrit, necesse est cucurrisse — sed si praescit, praescivit: ergo cum hoc sit dictum de praeterito, ergo necessarium.

3. Item, licet potentia Dei sit indifferens ad exeundum vel non exeundum, tamen ex quo exivit in actum, necesse est exisse. Unde quamvis potuerit creare et non creare, antequam crearet, tamen ex quo creavit, necesse est creasse: ergo ex quo praescivit, necesse est praescisse.

4. Item, si homo voluit et praescivit aliquid, necesse est, hominem scivisse et voluisse: ergo si circa scientiam Dei non est minor certitudo, immo maior, quam circa scientiam hominis, multo fortius est necesse. Si tu dicas, sicut aliqui dicunt[^2], quod in hac: *Deus praescivit*, totum ex futuro est secundum rem, quamvis intelligatur sub ratione praeteriti, unde nihil plus est dicere: *Deus praescit*, nisi: *Deus est, et hoc erit*; contra: tunc, esto quod Deus nullam haberet cognitionem, dum tamen res esset futura, haec esset vera: *Deus praescit*; quod manifeste falsum est. Praeterea, esto quod praescientiae addatur actus transiens in praeteritum, ut promissio[^3] vel praedictio vel prophetatio, ibi transit in praeteritum aliquid, et vere fit idem sophisma et idem dubium: ergo hoc non solvit.

5. Item, plus distat esse et non esse, quam necessarium et contingens; sed aliquid, quod simpliciter non est, habet esse in Dei praescientia: ergo multo fortius aliquid, quod in se contingens est, potest esse necessarium in praescientia Dei: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne immutabile est necessarium; sed cum dicitur: *Deus praescit*, est immutabile: ergo est necessarium. Prima est manifesta, secunda patet, quia cum dicitur: *Deus praescit*, si mutatur, ut fiat non praesciens, aut[^4] secundum mutationem rei, aut Dei. Rei non, quia res adhuc nihil est, ergo non mutatur nec mutari potest. Si secundum mutationem sui, ergo Deus mutatur.

7. Item, omne aeternum est necessarium, quia unum solum est aeternum, et illud est in quo non cadit contingentia, sed summa necessitas; sed *praescire Dei* est aeternum: ergo necessarium est, Deum praescire quod praescit.

**Contra:**

1. Regula est, si antecedens conditionalis est necessarium, et consequens; et si consequens non est necessarium, nec antecedens[^5]. Sed sequitur: si Deus praescit, hoc esse futurum, hoc erit, quocumque contingenti demonstrato, quia oppositum non potest stare: ergo cum consequens non sit necessarium, ergo nec antecedens.

2. Item, regula est, quod necessarium compatitur se cum omni possibili. Omne enim repugnans necessario est impossibile[^6]; sed demonstrato aliquo qui praescitus est damnari, possibile est, istum salvari: ergo ista duo possunt simul stare, quod sit praescitus damnari, et salvetur: ei hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

3. Item, regula est, quod oppositum contingentis est contingens, et oppositum necessarii est impossibile. Et regula iterum est, quod si ad antecedens sequitur consequens, ad oppositum consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis[^7]. Ex his arguo sic: sit *A* contingens praescitum a Deo, si Deus praescit, *A* erit: ergo per regulam[^8], si *A* non erit, Deus non praescit. Sed *A* non esse fuit contingens, Deum non praescisse fuit impossibile:

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ergo ad contingens sequitur impossibile. Sed hoc est contra artem[^9]: necesse est igitur, hoc esse contingens, Deum scilicet praescire hoc.

4. Item, omnis divina actio, quae respicit obiectum, quod potest non esse, potest desinere. Unde cum Deus conservet rem creatam, potest desinere conservare: ergo cum praescire sit respectu contingentis, erit contingens.

### Conclusio.

> *In dicto, Deum praescire futurum contingens, licet actus Dei in se sit aeternus et necessarius, iudicanda est contingentia in totali dicto, ratione connotati contingentis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut necessario probatum est, illud constat et non est dubium quod *Deum praescire contingens aliquod* — cum antecedit ad contingens et connotat aliquid, quod habet veritatem contingentem — quod ipsum iudicandum est contingens.

Sed aliqui voluerunt ipsum iudicare contingens, quia totum quod dicit, dicit de futuro. — Et illud improbatum est, quia falsum est, et non intelligibile. Omnis enim intellectus, qui intelligit hoc, quamvis non intelligat tempus circa Deum, intelligit, quod actus divinae praecognitionis ab aeterno fuit in Deo, et ille differt a re futura. Et praeterea, sicut dictum est, hoc non solvit.

Alii voluerunt iudicare contingens, quia, cum sit dictum de praeterito, pendet tamen ex futuro. Et hoc dicunt in *credito* et *prophetico* et dicto a Christo, et consimilibus, quae inferunt de necessitate propositionem de futuro. — Et illud est improbabile, ut videtur, quoniam si actus divinae praecognitionis pendet ex futuro, tunc, cum in futuro, quantum est ex parte rei contingentis, nulla sit certitudo, nec in divina praecognitione esset. Praeterea, quomodo dependet, cum ab eo non causetur aliquo modo? Et iterum, quomodo dependet illud quod necessarium est fuisse, ut actus cognoscendi et credendi et praedicendi, ab eo quod futurum est? Non videtur nec probabile nec intelligibile.

Et ideo alio modo dicendum, quod quoddam est dictum de praeterito, et pro praeterito, sicut si dicatur, *Petrum legisse*; quoddam de praeterito, sed pro futuro, ut *antichristus fuit nasciturus*; quoddam de praeterito et pro praeterito, tamen dependet ex futuro, ut hoc dictum: *Petrum verum dixisse, navale bellum fore*; ad hoc enim, quod dictum habeat veritatem, exigitur belli eventus; et ab illo dependet veritas nostrae assertionis et cognitionis, quae causatur a re; quoddam est dictum de praeterito, quod non dependet, sed connotat, sicut si dicatur: *Deus praescivit hoc futurum*.

Quia enim Dei scientia est solum respectu veri, ideo connotat veritatem circa illud dictum futurum; sed quoniam divina cognitio non habet certitudinem a re, quia ab ipsa nec causatur nec oritur, ideo ab illa non dependet; et propterea falli non potest, quamvis connotet futurum. Unde in praescientia haec duo dicuntur, scilicet actus divinae cognitionis, et hunc necessarium est esse sive fuisse; et ordinatio futuri ad illum actum, et haec ordinatio futuri ad illum actum non est necessaria. Et iudicanda est contingentia in totali dicto, non ratione totalitatis sive principalis significati, sed connotati. Et si ponatur, *Deum non praescire aliquid, quod praescit*, potest et debet intelligi non per remotionem principalis significati sed ipsius connotati, sive illius ordinis ipsius temporalis ad aeternum, qui quidem est contingens ratione alterius, scilicet temporalis. Contingentia ergo est in totali dicto, quia connotat aliquid esse verum de futuro, quod quidem est contingens.

Et hoc patet sic. Cum enim dicitur: *Deus praescit te salvandum*; hic duplex includitur actus et

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compositio, videlicet hic[^10]: *tu salvaberis*, et hic: *Deus habet cognitionem de salute tua* et habuit cognitionem ab aeterno. Habere quidem cognitionem est actus aeternus et necessarius, quia non dependet a re; sed *salvari* est actus futurus et contingens. Quoniam igitur actus divinae cognitionis non dependet a cognito, ideo potest esse certitudo in ipso, re contingente existente. Sed quoniam, ut significatur per modum praescientiae, connotat futurum contingens, et omne dictum, quod claudit in se contingens, iudicandum est contingens; ideo totale contingens iudicatur. — Et haec solutio est vera et generalis. Nam actus credulitatis, actus prophetationis et divinae assertionis propter hoc, quod currunt secundum illustrationem divinae praescientiae, ideo connotant, et non dependent; ideo certi et infallibiles sunt de rebus in se non certis.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod necesse est praescire quod praescit; dicendum, quod hoc intelligit quantum ad actum praecognitionis, quem necesse est fuisse, sed non quantum ad connotationem futuritionis.

*Ad 2, 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dictum est de praeterito: dicendum, quod quantum est de ratione praeteritionis, necessarium est: sed quoniam connotatur futurum, ideo est contingens. Et ex hoc patet sequens, quia quantum ad illud futurum non est adhuc potentia in actu, immo adhuc potest exire, ideo etc.

*Ad 4, 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est cognitio sine existentia rei, ergo necessitatis sine rei necessitate; dicendum, quod verum est, quod in actu cognitionis est necessitas, sed non in toto. Nec est simile, quia praecognitio non connotat actualem rei existentiam, sed connotat rei futuritionem; et ad hoc, quod dictum sit necessarium, necesse est, quod sit necessitas in connotato.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne immutabile necessarium; dicendum, quod ad esse mutabilis duo concurrunt: quod se habeat uno modo prius, et alio modo posterius; et per oppositum immutabile potest dici dupliciter: aut quia nihil actu est, aut quia actu est et non potest aliter se habere. Illud ergo immutabile, quod est et non potest aliter se habere, convertitur cum *necessario*, sed illud quod dicitur immutabile, quod non est aliquid actu, non convertitur. Et sic est verum contingens de futuro, antequam res sit. Hoc dictum *antichristum fore*, est modo verum immutabile, quia si ponatur, esse verum, ponitur, quod semper fuerit; et similiter si falsum, et hoc, quia nihil actu ponit. Quoniam igitur *Deum praescisse* connotat futurum contingens, ideo est dictum immutabile; nec ex hoc sequitur, quod sit necessarium, ut visum est.

Tamen aliqui volunt aliter dicere quod *Deum praescire hoc futurum contingens* est immutabile a parte praescientis, sed a parte rei praescitae est mutabile, et ideo ex parte illa contingens. Sed tamen illud difficile est dicere; quod enim praescitur semel semper praescitum fuit, et Deus potest non praescire futurum contingens, ita quod nihil fiat circa futurum, et ita nulla mutatio. Et propter hoc modus alius dicendi est rationabilior.

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod nihil ens aeternum est contingens; dicendum, quod ens aeternum est dupliciter: aut pure aeternum, aut quod connotat temporale de futuro; et pure aeternum est necessarium, sed connotans temporale de futuro ratione connotati potest iudicari contingens, sicut etiam ratione illius potest desinere.

*Summa* dictorum est ista, quod *Deum praescire futurum contingens* est quoddam dictum, quod claudit in se actum divinae cognitionis aeternum, et ordinationem dicit ad futurum contingens. Et quamvis actus divinae cognitionis ponat aliquid existens necessarium et aeternum; illa tamen ordinatio ponit futurum, quod contingens est. Et iterum, quamvis dicat ordinationem, non tamen dicit dependentiam, sed solum connotationem; et ideo non ponit incertitudinem. Et hinc est, quod *Deum praescire futurum* est *contingens* ratione connotationis ad contingens; est *immutabile* ratione ordinationis ad futurum, quod potest non esse, nulla facta mutatione; est *certum* ratione independentiae ab eodem. Et hoc patebit infra planius in distinctione de praedestinatione.

english:
### Question II.
#### *Whether God necessarily foreknows what he foreknows.*

Secondly it is asked whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in itself, that is, whether it is [the case] that God [necessarily] foreknows what he foreknows. And that he does, is shown:

1. *First*, by the authority of Anselm in the book *On the Concord of Predestination and Free Choice*[^1]: "What God foreknows, it is impossible that he should not foreknow": therefore by equivalence, it is necessary that he foreknow [it].

2. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], because every saying about the past is necessarily true — whence if [someone] ran, it is necessary that he ran — but if he foreknows, he foreknew: therefore since this is a saying about the past, therefore [it is] necessary.

3. Likewise, although God's potency is indifferent to going forth or not going forth, nevertheless from the [moment] it has gone forth into act, it is necessary that it has gone forth. Hence although he could have created and not created, before he created, nevertheless from the [moment] he created, it is necessary that he has created: therefore from the [moment] he foreknew, it is necessary that he has foreknown.

4. Likewise, if a man willed and foreknew something, it is necessary that the man knew and willed: therefore if concerning God's knowledge there is no lesser certitude, indeed greater, than concerning man's knowledge, much more strongly is it necessary. If you say, as some say[^2], that in this [proposition] *Deus praescivit* ["God foreknew"], the whole is from the future according to the thing, although it is understood under the formal character of the past, whence to say *Deus praescit* ["God foreknows"] is to say nothing more than *Deus est, et hoc erit* ["God is, and this will be"]; on the contrary: then, supposing that God had no cognition, while nevertheless the thing were future, this would be true: *Deus praescit*; which is manifestly false. Furthermore, supposing that to the foreknowledge there be added an act passing into the past, such as a promise[^3] or a prediction or a prophecy, there [too] something passes into the past, and there truly arises the same sophism and the same doubt: therefore this does not solve [the question].

5. Likewise, *to be* and *not to be* are further apart than *necessary* and *contingent*; but something which simply is not has being in God's foreknowledge: therefore much more strongly can something which in itself is contingent be necessary in God's foreknowledge: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every immutable [thing] is necessary; but when one says *Deus praescit* ["God foreknows"], it is immutable: therefore it is necessary. The first [premise] is manifest, the second is clear, because when one says *Deus praescit*, if it is changed, so as to become *non praesciens* [not-foreknowing], either[^4] it is according to a change in the thing, or in God. Not in the thing, because the thing as yet is nothing, therefore it is not changed nor can it be changed. If according to a change in itself, then God is changed.

7. Likewise, every eternal [thing] is necessary, because there is only one eternal, and that is [the one] in which contingency does not fall, but the highest necessity; but *praescire Dei* [God's foreknowing] is eternal: therefore it is necessary that God foreknow what he foreknows.

**On the contrary:**

1. There is a rule: if the antecedent of a conditional is necessary, so is the consequent; and if the consequent is not necessary, neither is the antecedent[^5]. But it follows: if God foreknows that this will be future, this will be — given any contingent whatsoever — because the opposite cannot stand: therefore since the consequent is not necessary, neither, then, is the antecedent.

2. Likewise, there is a rule, that the necessary is compatible with every possible. For everything that conflicts with the necessary is impossible[^6]; but given some [person] who is foreknown to be damned, it is possible that he be saved: therefore these two can stand together, that he be foreknown to be damned, and that he be saved: but this is impossible: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, there is a rule that the opposite of the contingent is contingent, and the opposite of the necessary is impossible. And again the rule is, that if the consequent follows from the antecedent, the opposite of the antecedent follows from the opposite of the consequent[^7]. From these I argue thus: let *A* be a contingent foreknown by God; if God foreknows, *A* will be: therefore by the rule[^8], if *A* will not be, God does not foreknow. But *A*'s not being was contingent, [yet] God's not having foreknown was impossible:

therefore from a contingent there follows an impossible. But this is contrary to the [logical] art[^9]: it is necessary therefore that this be contingent — namely, that God foreknow this.

4. Likewise, every divine action which regards an object that can not be can cease. Hence since God conserves the created thing, he can cease to conserve [it]: therefore since to foreknow is in respect of the contingent, it will be contingent.

### Conclusion.

> *In the saying* "God foreknows a future contingent," *although the act of God in itself is eternal and necessary, contingency is to be judged of the total saying, by reason of the contingent connotatum.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been necessarily proven, it is established and not in doubt that *God's foreknowing some contingent* — since it precedes [as antecedent] to a contingent and connotes something which has contingent truth — is itself to be judged contingent.

But some have wished to judge it contingent because all that it says, it says about the future. — And that has been disproved, because it is false, and unintelligible. For every intellect that understands this, although it does not understand time with respect to God, understands that the act of divine pre-cognition was in God from eternity, and that [act] differs from the future thing. And furthermore, as has been said, this does not solve [the problem].

Others have wished to judge it contingent because, although it be a saying about the past, it nevertheless depends on the future. And this they say in the *credited* and the *prophetic* and what is said by Christ, and the like, which infer the necessity of a proposition about the future. — And that is improbable, as it seems, because if the act of divine pre-cognition depends on the future, then, since in the future, as far as is on the side of the contingent thing, there is no certitude, neither would there be in the divine pre-cognition. Furthermore, how does it depend, since by it [the future] is in no way caused? And again, how does that which is necessarily to have been depend — such as the act of knowing and believing and predicting — on that which is future? It does not seem either probable or intelligible.

And therefore it must be said in another way, that one [kind] of saying is about the past and for the past, as if one says *Petrum legisse* ["that Peter has read"]; another about the past, but for the future, as *antichristus fuit nasciturus* ["antichrist was about to be born"]; another about the past and for the past, yet [it] depends on the future, as this saying: *Petrum verum dixisse, navale bellum fore* ["that Peter spoke truly that there will be a naval battle"]; for the saying, in order to have truth, requires the outcome of the battle; and on that depends the truth of our assertion and cognition, which is caused by the thing; another is a saying about the past which does not depend [on the future] but [merely] connotes [it], as if one says: *Deus praescivit hoc futurum* ["God foreknew this [as] future"].

For since God's knowledge is only in respect of the true, therefore it connotes truth concerning that future saying; but since divine cognition does not have its certitude from the thing, since it is neither caused nor arises from it, therefore it does not depend on it; and accordingly it cannot be deceived, although it connotes the future. Hence in foreknowledge two things are said, namely the act of divine cognition — and this is necessary to be or to have been; and the ordering of the future to that act, and this ordering of the future to that act is not necessary. And contingency is to be judged of the total saying — not by reason of the totality or the principal *significatum*, but of the *connotatum*. And if it be supposed *that God does not foreknow something which he foreknows*, this can and ought to be understood not as the removal of the principal *significatum* but of the *connotatum* itself, that is, of that order of the temporal itself to the eternal, which is indeed contingent by reason of the other, namely the temporal. Therefore contingency is in the total saying, because it connotes something to be true about the future, which indeed is contingent.

And this is clear thus. For when it is said *Deus praescit te salvandum* ["God foreknows that you are to be saved"], two acts and a composition are here included, namely this[^10]: *tu salvaberis* ["you will be saved"], and this: *Deus habet cognitionem de salute tua* ["God has cognition of your salvation"] — and he had cognition from eternity. To have cognition is indeed an eternal and necessary act, because it does not depend on the thing; but *to be saved* is a future and contingent act. Since therefore the act of divine cognition does not depend on the [thing] cognized, therefore there can be certitude in it, [even] when the contingent thing exists. But since, as it is signified through the mode of *foreknowledge*, it connotes a future contingent, and every saying which encloses a contingent in itself is to be judged contingent; therefore the total [saying] is judged contingent. — And this solution is true and general. For the act of believing, the act of prophesying, and of divine assertion — because they run according to the illumination of divine foreknowledge — therefore connote, and do not depend; therefore they are certain and infallible about things in themselves not certain.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected from Anselm, that it is necessary to foreknow what he foreknows; it must be said that this is to be understood as regards the act of pre-cognition, which it is necessary to have been, but not as regards the connotation of futurition.

*To 2, 3.* To that which is objected, that it is a saying about the past: it must be said that, as far as the formal character of past-ness is concerned, it is necessary; but since the future is connoted, therefore it is contingent. And from this the following [argument] is clear, because as regards that future, the potency is not yet in act, indeed it can still go forth — therefore etc.

*To 4, 5.* To that which is objected, that there is cognition without the existence of the thing, therefore [there is the existence] of necessity without the necessity of the thing; it must be said that it is true that in the act of cognition there is necessity, but not in the whole. Nor is the case parallel, because pre-cognition does not connote the actual existence of the thing, but connotes the *futuritio* [futurition, future-ness] of the thing; and for the saying to be necessary, it is necessary that there be necessity in the *connotatum*.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that every immutable [thing] is necessary; it must be said that for the being of the mutable, two [conditions] concur: that it have itself in one mode prior, and in another mode afterwards; and conversely the immutable can be called [so] in two ways: either because nothing is in act, or because it is in act and cannot have itself otherwise. That immutable, then, which is and cannot have itself otherwise, is convertible with the *necessary*; but that which is called immutable [merely] because it is not something in act, is not convertible. And so a future contingent is true, before the thing is. This saying, *antichristum fore* ["that antichrist will be"], is now an immutable truth, because if it be supposed to be true, it is supposed that it always was [true]; and likewise if false; and this, because it puts nothing in act. Since therefore *Deum praescisse* ["that God foreknew"] connotes a future contingent, therefore the saying is immutable; nor from this does it follow that it is necessary, as has been seen.

Yet some wish to say otherwise, that *that God foreknows this future contingent* is immutable on the side of the foreknower, but on the side of the thing foreknown is mutable, and therefore on that side contingent. But nevertheless this is difficult to say; for what is foreknown once was always foreknown, and God can not-foreknow a future contingent — in such a way that nothing happen concerning the future, and so [there be] no change. And on this account the other manner of speaking is more reasonable.

*To 7.* To that which is objected last — that no eternal being is contingent; it must be said that an eternal being is so in two ways: either purely eternal, or [eternal in such a way] that it connotes a temporal [thing] of the future; and the purely eternal is necessary, but [that which is] connoting a temporal [thing] of the future, by reason of the *connotatum*, can be judged contingent — just as also by reason of that [*connotatum*] it can cease.

*The summary* of what has been said is this: that *that God foreknows a future contingent* is a certain saying which encloses in itself the eternal act of divine cognition, and bespeaks an ordering toward a future contingent. And although the act of divine cognition posits something existing as necessary and eternal; nevertheless that ordering posits a future, which is contingent. And again, although it speaks an ordering, yet it does not speak a dependence, but only a connotation; and therefore it does not posit uncertainty. And hence it is that *that God foreknows the future* is *contingent* by reason of the connotation to the contingent; is *immutable* by reason of the ordering to the future, which can not-be, with no change made; is *certain* by reason of the independence from the same. And this will appear more plainly below in the distinction on predestination.

la: Allata Anselmi sententia in cit. libro iisdem verbis, quibus hic, expressa non invenitur. Sed habentur ibi, praesertim q. 1. c. 1. 2. 5, aliquae propositiones docentes, Deum futura praescire et quidem immutabiliter in aeternitate; ex quibus hanc sententiam formatam esse, verisimile est.

en: The cited sentence of Anselm is not found in the cited book in the same words as here. But there are had there, especially in q. 1, c. 1, 2, 5, certain propositions teaching that God foreknows future things — and indeed immutably in eternity; from which it is likely that this sentence has been formed.

la: Vide hic in corp. quaest.

en: See here in the body of the question.

la: Ed. 1 *praevisio*; in corp. quaest. ponitur *credulitas*. — Vat. adiungit *hoc erit*. Paulo superius verbis *est immutabile* cod. V praefigit *praescire*. Paulo interius Vat. *Dei* pro *sui*.

en: Ed. 1 reads *praevisio* [foresight]; in the body of the question is placed *credulitas* [believing]. — The Vatican [edition] adds *hoc erit* ["this will be"]. A little above, before the words *est immutabile*, codex V prefixes *praescire*. A little within [the text], the Vatican [reads] *Dei* in place of *sui*.

la: Haec regula quantum ad simplices syllogismos insinuatur ab Aristot., I. *Prior.* c. 8. seqq. et derivatur ex illo generali principio Aristot., II. *Prior.* c. 2: *Ex veris non est falsum syllogizare*; quod innititur I. *Poster.* c. 6: *Cum autem medium ex necessitate est, et conclusio ex necessitate, sicut ex veris verum est semper.* — Pro *bonae conditionalis* Vat. cum edd. 4, 5 *bonae consequentiae*.

en: This rule, as regards simple syllogisms, is intimated by Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, c. 8 ff., and is derived from that general principle of Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, c. 2: *From true [premises] one cannot syllogize a false [conclusion]*; which rests upon *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 6: *When, however, the middle [term] is [there] of necessity, also the conclusion is of necessity — just as from true [premises] the true [conclusion] is always [had]*. — For *bonae conditionalis* the Vatican [edition] with editions 4, 5 [reads] *bonae consequentiae*.

la: Cfr. de hac et sequenti regula Aristot., II. *Periherm.* c. 3. (c. 12. seq.), ubi de consequentiis et oppositione propositionum modalium agitur, et I. *Prior.* c. 12.

en: Cf. concerning this and the following rule Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 3 (c. 12 ff.), where he treats of consequences and the opposition of modal propositions, and *Prior Analytics* I, c. 12.

la: Haec regula habetur I. *Prior.* cap. *ult.*, ubi Philosophus de propositionum simplicium et privatoriarum ordine ac consequentiis agens ait: *Simpliciter autem, quando sic se habent* etc. — In multis codd. et ed. 1 legitur, ordine inverso, sic: *ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur oppositum consequentis*.

en: This rule is had in *Prior Analytics* I, last chapter, where the Philosopher, treating of the order and consequences of simple and privative propositions, says: *Simply [speaking], however, when they so stand* etc. — In many codices and ed. 1 it is read, in inverted order, thus: *to the opposite of the antecedent there follows the opposite of the consequent*.

la: Scilicet: quae hic ultimo ponitur.

en: Namely: that which is here last set down.

la: Scilicet: logicam, vel specialiter syllogisticam (cfr. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.), in qua habetur regula contraria, primo loco in hoc argumento posita. Ut praedicta melius intelligantur verba Mastrii ex eius *Curs. Philos.* tom. I. tr. 2. c. 9. n. 77. de hac re hic ascribimus: *Sicut contrariantur* omnis *et* nullus, *ita* necesse *et* impossibile; *et sicut subcontrariantur* quidam *et* quidam non, *ita subcontrariantur* possibile *et* possibile non. *Et rursus, sicut contradicunt* nullus *et* quidam, omnes *et* quidam non, *ita contradicunt* impossibile *et* possibile *seu* contingens; *item* necesse *et* possibile non *seu* contingens non; *et tandem, sicut* omnis *et* aliquis, nullus *et* aliquis non *subalternantur, ita etiam* necesse *et* possibile *seu* contingens, *ac* impossibile *et* possibile non *seu* contingens non.

en: Namely: logic, or specifically syllogistic (cf. d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4), in which there is the contrary rule, set in the first place in this argument. So that the foregoing may be better understood, we here transcribe the words of Mastrius from his *Cursus Philosophicus*, vol. I, tr. 2, c. 9, n. 77, on this matter: "*As* every *and* no *are contraries, so [are]* necessary *and* impossible; *and as* some *and* some-not *are subcontraries, so are subcontraries* possible *and* possible-not. *And again, as* no *and* some, every *and* some-not *contradict, so* impossible *and* possible *or* contingent *contradict, likewise* necessary *and* possible-not *or* contingent-not; *and finally, as* every *and* some-one, no *and* some-not *are subalternate, so also* necessary *and* possible *or* contingent, *and* impossible *and* possible-not *or* contingent-not."

la: Hic in fundam. — In Vat. deest *necessario*. Mox pro *antecedit* ed. 1 *antecedat* et *connotet* pro *connotat*.

en: Here in the [body of the] fundamentum. — In the Vatican [edition] *necessario* is wanting. Soon, for *antecedit* ed. 1 [reads] *antecedat*, and *connotet* for *connotat*.

la: Pro *hic* codd. A M S aa bb cum ed. 1 tum hoc loco tum proxime post exhibent *haec*, scil. *compositio*. — Cod. T *contingenter*. Subinde pro *quoniam* ut Vat. *quando*. Paulo inferius post *ideo totale* supple cum cod. R *dictum*. Pro *futuritionis* cod. K *futuri contingentis*.

en: For *hic* codices A, M, S, aa, bb with ed. 1 — both at this place and immediately after — exhibit *haec*, namely *compositio*. — Codex T [reads] *contingenter*. Thereupon for *quoniam* with the Vatican [reads] *quando*. A little below, after *ideo totale*, supply with codex R *dictum*. For *futuritionis* codex K [reads] *futuri contingentis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Eandem quaestionem Alex. Hal. tractat sub titulo: *Utrum praescientia Dei sit immutabilis*; et Richard. a Med. sub titulo: *Utrum sit possibile, Deum non praescire vel non praescivisse illud quod praescit.* Quaestio non est de *principali significato* divinae praescientiae, sive de actu divino in se, qui manifeste aeternus et necessarius est, sed de ordinatione *connotati*, quod est contingens, ad scientiam; vel clarius, est de propositionibus (*sive dictis*) complexis, quae continent assertionem, Deum praescire vel praescivisse aliquod futurum contingens, v. g. Deus praescit vel praescivit, incarnatum esse Salvatorem. Cum actus praecognitionis in praeterito vel praesenti non possit simul non esse, quando revera fuit vel est, ipse videtur importare, quod ista propositio sit necessaria; et si hoc, videtur sequi, omnia futura, etiam contingentia, esse necessaria. Patet autem, hanc quaestionem potius ad logicam spectare; nec vacat discutere quasdam subtiles difficultates, quas Scotus (I. *Sent.* d. 39. q. unica, n. 25.) urget contra distinctionem hic circa istum corp. et infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 2. adhibitam, scil. quod propositio: *Deus necessario scit*, in sensu composito sit falsa, in sensu diviso vera.

**II.** Ad quaestionem ipsam, qua respondet S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 14. a. 13, et I. *Sent.* hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 5.) docet, propositionem: *Deus scit hoc contingens esse futurum*, esse necessariam absolute (quod intelligitur scil. de *necessario immutabilitatis*). — S. Bonav. vero cum Scoto (I. *Sent.* d. 39. q. unica, n. 25, alleg.) eandem propositionem dicit *contingentem* in *rigore*, sed *de necessario immutabilitatis*. — Hoc autem differt verbotenus a S. Thoma quidem, *re* tamen non multum.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 24, m. 7. — Scot., I *Sent.* d. 39, q. unica; I *Report.* d. 39, q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 5; *S.* I, q. 14, a. 15. — B. Albert., *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 61, m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R., I. *Sent.* d. 39 (cited at p. 680 col-b at end of scholion).

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Alex. of Hales treats this same question under the title: *Whether God's foreknowledge is immutable*; and Richard of Mediavilla under the title: *Whether it is possible that God should not foreknow, or have not foreknown, that which he foreknows.* The question is not about the *principal signified* of divine foreknowledge — that is, the divine act in itself, which is manifestly eternal and necessary — but about the ordering of the *connotatum*, which is contingent, to that knowledge; or, more clearly, about the complex propositions (*dicta*) which contain the assertion that God foreknows or has foreknown some future contingent (e.g., *God foreknows or foreknew that the Saviour was to be incarnate*). Since the act of pre-cognition cannot at the same time fail to be in the past or present when in fact it was or is, it seems to import that this proposition be necessary; and if so, it would seem to follow that all future things, even contingents, are necessary. It is plain however that this question pertains rather to logic; nor is there room here to discuss certain subtle difficulties which Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 39, q. *unica*, n. 25) urges against the distinction here applied around this *corpus* and below in d. 39, a. 2, q. 2 — namely, that the proposition *God knows necessarily* is, in *sensus compositus*, false, but in *sensus divisus*, true.

**II.** To the question itself, in his reply, St. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 14, a. 13, and I *Sent.* here q. 1, a. 5, ad 5) teaches that the proposition *God knows this contingent to be future* is necessary absolutely (understood, that is, of the *necessity of immutability*). — St. Bonaventure however with Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 39, q. *unica*, n. 25, alleg.) calls this same proposition *contingent* in *the strict sense*, but [admits it as necessary] *of the necessity of immutability*. — This differs from St. Thomas verbally, but in substance not greatly.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 24, m. 7. — Scotus, I *Sent.* d. 39, q. *unica*; I *Report.* d. 39, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5; *S.* I, q. 14, a. 15. — B. Albert, *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 61, m. 6. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. — Richardus a Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, I *Sent.* d. 39 (cited at p. 680 col-b at end of scholion).

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 38, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: *Nec aliter scilicet creata quam creanda.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia res, si vere cognoscatur, cognoscitur sicut est; sed aliter fuerunt, cum fuerunt creanda, quam cum erant creata — primo enim res fuerunt in causa et secundum quid, postea in proprio genere et simpliciter — ergo aut Deus non vere cognoscit, aut aliter cognovit.

Item, Angelus cognoscit res in Verbo, cognoscit etiam eas in proprio genere, et alius et alius modus cognoscendi est hic ab illo[^1]: ergo cum non possit latere Deum quod novit Angelus, videtur, quod Deus utroque modo cognoscat, et ita aliter et aliter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dico, *aliter cognosci*, dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita quod adverbium dicat alietatem quantum ad *cognitionem*, aut quantum ad *esse rei cognitae*. Si quantum ad *esse rei cognitae*, sic est verum[^2], et est sensus: Deus cognoscit rem istam aliter se vel se habere, quam se prius habuit; et sic non intelligit Augustinus. Si autem dicat alietatem quantum ad *cognitionem*, sic est falsa; et est sensus: Deus cognoscit aliter rem factam, quam prius faciendam cognoverit; et ita est falsum, quia sic significatur divina cognitio alterata, et quod aliquid receperit a re extra. Et per hoc patet obiectum primum.

Quod obiicitur, quod Deus cognoscit res in proprio genere, sicut Angelus; dicendum, quod *cognoscere res in proprio genere* dupliciter intelligitur: aut ita quod hoc dicat, quod habet in proprio genere, cognoscatur, et hoc perfectionis est, et non latet Deum, et sic non dicit novum modum cognoscendi a cognitione in Verbo; aut ita quod aspectus intelligentiae sive vis cognitivae deflectatur[^3] supra

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rem ut est in proprio genere, et hoc est imperfectionis, quia scilicet tunc[^4] cognoscens egreditur extra se; et hoc nullo modo potest poni in Deo, et ita facit in Angelo alium modum cognoscendi. Et sic patet illud.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Tunc eius quod aeternum est, aliqua existeret causa* etc. Vult enim dicere, quod praescientia dicat quid aeternum; sed hoc videtur falsum, quia praescientia dicit respectum ad creaturam futuram; sed nihil est futurum secundum esse, quod habet in Deo, sed in proprio genere: ergo connotat aliquod temporale, ergo videtur, quod cognoscatur[^5] *ex tempore*. — Praeterea, respectus ille nihil dicit a parte Dei nisi solum modum intelligendi nostrum: ergo tunc coepit ille respectus, quando coepit noster intellectus, non ergo fuit ab aeterno.

**Respondeo:** Sicut dicit Magister[^6], *praescientia* dicit quid aeternum et ab aeterno. Cum enim non importet nisi duo, scilicet antecessionem et scientiam, et antecessio omnis creaturae sit ante omnem creaturam, et scientia naturaliter, patet quod praescientia quid aeternum dicit[^7]. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod importat rei *futuritionem*; dicendum, quod futuritio uno modo importat *successionem* temporis, et ita non est de ratione praescientiae; hoc enim modo futurum coepit cum tempore. Alio modo futurum importat *ordinem* temporalis ad aeternum secundum *consecutionem*, sicut praescientia *antecessionem*; et quoniam iste ordo solum exigit primum extremum in actu, et illud fuit ab aeterno, ideo et futuritio et praescientia.

Quod obiicitur, quod respectus ille a parte Dei nihil dicit secundum rem; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia respectus ille est divina essentia; sed verum est, quod nihil dicit respectivum sive dependens, nisi solum secundum modum intelligendi; et ideo non coepit secundum rem, sed solum modus significandi coepit. Et quando Magister dicit, quod praescientia dicit aeternum, non loquitur de ratione nominandi, sed de eo quod significatur per nomen[^8].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Scientiam vel praescientiam non esse causam* etc., si scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur beneplacitum atque dispositio, recte potest dici. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut scientia, hoc modo et illo dicta, dicit eundem modum sciendi, aut alium; si eundem, ergo si uno modo est causa, et alio; si alium modum, ergo in Deo est multiplex modus sciendi, non ergo uniformis per omnia. — Item, scientia simplicis notitiae est Deus; et Deus est causa omnium: ergo scientia illa est causa omnium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in nobis notitia simplex et notitia beneplaciti dicunt diversas cognitiones et diversos modos cognoscendi, et per consequens connotant diversa: in Deo autem una tantum cognitio est, sed illa una facit Deus, quod nos multis; et ideo illa una dupliciter potest significari[^9]. Et cum significatur per modum approbationis, connotat effectum et bonitatem; quando vero per modum simplicis notitiae, solum eventum. Et quoniam esse causam alicuius connotat effectum sive respectum — quamvis eadem sit scientia sive sapientia a parte principalis significati[^10] — ideo dicitur, quod haec[^11] est causa illorum quae praescit, et illa non. Et hoc dicitur, non quia res significata non sit causa, sed quia, ut sic significata est, non significatur per modum causae, quoniam comparatur ad ea quae nullo modo sunt a Deo. Et sic patet illud.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc verbo Augustini: *Deus per Prophetam praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum;* quia, cum dictum Prophetae fuerit verum certitudinaliter[^12], videtur, quod Deus revelaverit Iudaeis suum casum sive damnationem; quod est contra ipsum super Genesim ad litteram[^13], qui dicit, quod nulli debet revelari, ne cogatur desperare.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod casus potest prae-

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dici; sed non propter hoc revelatur, sive quia dicenti non creditur, sive quia dictum de conditione intelligitur, sive intelligens intelligit de alio, non de se ipso. Et quia verbum Isaiae prophetae comminatorie et generaliter erat dictum, et hominibus iam in parte incredulis non advertentibus, omnibus his modis potuit intelligi, ut esset praedictio, non revelatio.

---

english:
<!-- page 680 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what Augustine says: *Not otherwise [did He know things] as already created than as about to be created.* For he seems to speak ill, because a thing, if it is truly known, is known as it is; but [things] were otherwise when they were about to be created than when they were created — for first the things were in [their] cause and *secundum quid*, [and] afterwards in [their] proper genus and simply — therefore either God does not truly know, or He has known otherwise.

Likewise, an Angel knows things in the Word, and also knows them in [their] proper genus, and there is one mode of knowing here, [and] another there[^1]: therefore since what an Angel knows cannot lie hidden from God, it seems that God [too] knows in both modes, and so [knows things] otherwise and otherwise.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *to be otherwise known*, it can be understood in two ways: either so that the adverb states an otherness with respect to the *cognition*, or [an otherness] with respect to the *being of the thing known*. If [it is taken] with respect to the *being of the thing known*, thus it is true[^2], and the sense is: God knows that this thing is otherwise, or holds itself otherwise, than it has held itself before; and thus Augustine does not [intend it]. But if it states an otherness with respect to the *cognition*, thus it is false; and the sense is: God knows a thing once made otherwise than as He had previously known it as needing to be made; and this is false, because thus the divine cognition is signified as altered, and as having received something from a thing outside. And by this the first objection is plain.

What is objected, that God knows things in their proper genus, as the Angel does; it must be said that *to know things in their proper genus* is understood in two ways: either so that this says that what is in the proper genus, is known [in that genus], and this is of perfection, and does not lie hidden from God, and thus [it] does not state a new mode of knowing [different] from the cognition in the Word; or so that the gaze of the intelligence or cognitive power is bent[^3] over

<!-- page 681 -->

a thing as it is in its proper genus, and this is of imperfection, namely because then[^4] the knower goes outside himself; and this can in no way be put in God, and so it makes another mode of knowing in the Angel. And so that is plain.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Then of that which is eternal, some cause would have to exist* etc. For he wishes to say that *praescientia* (foreknowledge) says something eternal; but this seems false, because foreknowledge says a respect to a future creature; but nothing is future according to the being which it has in God, but [only] in its proper genus: therefore it connotes something temporal, therefore it seems that it is known[^5] *from time*. — Furthermore, that respect says nothing on the side of God except only our mode of understanding: therefore that respect began when our intellect began, therefore it was not from eternity.

**I respond:** As the Master says[^6], *praescientia* says something eternal and from eternity. For since it imports nothing but two things, namely antecession and knowledge, and the antecession of every creature is before every creature, and knowledge naturally [is so], it is plain that praescientia says something eternal[^7]. — As to what is objected, that it imports the *futurition* of a thing; it must be said that *futurition* in one way imports a *succession* of time, and so it is not of the account of foreknowledge; for in this way the future began with time. In another way the future imports an *order* of the temporal to the eternal according to *consecution*, just as foreknowledge [imports] *antecession*; and since this order requires only the first extreme in act, and that was from eternity, therefore both *futurition* and *praescientia* [are from eternity].

As to what is objected, that that respect on the side of God says nothing according to the thing; it must be said that this is false, because that respect is the divine essence; but it is true that it says nothing relative or dependent except only according to the mode of understanding; and therefore it did not begin according to the thing, but only the mode of signifying began. And when the Master says that *praescientia* says something eternal, he is not speaking of the account of naming, but of that which is signified through the name[^8].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *That science or foreknowledge is not a cause* etc., if we refer *science* to bare cognition. But if under the name of *science* there is included [divine] good-pleasure and disposition, it can rightly be said. For he seems to speak ill, because either *science*, said in this way and in that, says the same mode of knowing, or another; if the same, then if [it is a cause] in one way, [it is so] in the other; if another mode, then in God there is a manifold mode of knowing, therefore not uniform through all things. — Likewise, the science of *simplex notitia* (simple cognition) is God; and God is the cause of all things: therefore that science is the cause of all things.

**I respond:** It must be said that in us simple cognition and the cognition of [divine] good-pleasure say diverse cognitions and diverse modes of knowing, and consequently they connote diverse things: but in God there is one cognition only, but that one God makes [to do] what we [do] with many; and therefore that one [cognition] can be signified in two ways[^9]. And when it is signified by way of approbation, it connotes the effect and the goodness; but when by way of *simplex notitia*, only the event. And since to be the cause of something connotes an effect or respect — although on the side of the principal signified[^10] the science or wisdom is the same — therefore it is said that this one[^11] is the cause of those things which it foreknows, and that [other] is not. And this is said, not because the thing signified is not the cause, but because, as so signified, it is not signified by way of cause, since it is compared to those things which are in no way from God. And so that is plain.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this saying of Augustine: *God through the Prophet foretold the unbelief of the Jews;* because, since the saying of the Prophet was certainly[^12] true, it seems that God revealed to the Jews their fall or damnation; which is against [Augustine] himself in *On Genesis to the Letter*[^13], who says that [it] ought to be revealed to no one, lest he be driven to despair.

**I respond:** It must be said that a fall can be fore-

<!-- page 682 -->

told; but not on this account is it revealed, either because the speaker is not believed, or because the saying is understood of a [conditional] condition, or [because] the one understanding understands [it] of another, not of himself. And since the word of Isaiah the Prophet was uttered minatorily and generally, and to men in part already unbelieving and not heeding, it could be understood in all these ways, so as to be a prediction, not a revelation.

---

la: Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. *I.* a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Paulo superius verbo *res* cod. X adiungit *creatas*.

en: Cf. II *Sent.* d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, seq. — A little above, at the word *res*, cod. X adds *creatas*.

la: Codd. V X *vera*. Mox pro *habuit* codd. T cc *habuerit*.

en: Codd. V X read *vera*. Just below, for *habuit* codd. T cc read *habuerit*.

la: Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *reflectatur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, reads *reflectatur*.

la: Verba *scilicet tunc*, quae substituimus pro lectione Vat. et cod. cc, quae eorum loco exhibet *vis*, inveniuntur in ed. 1, et favent huic lectioni non pauci codd., in quibus pro *scilicet tunc* legitur, etsi incongrue, *licet tunc*. In cod. O sic: *quia tunc cognoscere est per aliud sive sit per species innatas vel receptas a re egreditur* etc.

en: The words *scilicet tunc*, which we have substituted for the reading of the Vatican edition and cod. cc — which in their place exhibits *vis* — are found in ed. 1, and not a few codices favor this reading, in which for *scilicet tunc* is read, though incongruously, *licet tunc*. In cod. O thus: *quia tunc cognoscere est per aliud sive sit per species innatas vel receptas a re egreditur* etc.

la: Pro *cognoscatur* Vat. cum paucis codd. *dicatur*. Paulo ante pro *aliquod temporale* cod. Y *quid temporale*.

en: For *cognoscatur* the Vatican edition with a few codices reads *dicatur*. A little before, for *aliquod temporale* cod. Y reads *quid temporale*.

la: Hic c. 1. circa medium, et supra d. XXXV. c. 8, nec non infra d. XXXIX. c. 2.

en: Here c. 1, near the middle, and above d. XXXV, c. 8, and also below d. XXXIX, c. 2.

la: Codd. V X *dicit*.

en: Codd. V X read *dicit*.

la: Hic duplex modus, quo consideratur rei *futuritio*, non parum servit ad bene intelligendam quaestionem de modo, quo Deus omnia cognoscit praesentialiter.

en: This twofold way in which the *futuritio* of a thing is considered serves not a little to a right understanding of the question concerning the mode in which God knows all things presentially.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 24, m. 1; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 15, q. 61, m. 1.

la: Vat. hic addit: *scilicet per modum approbationis et per modum notitiae simplicis*.

en: The Vatican edition here adds: *scilicet per modum approbationis et per modum notitiae simplicis*.

la: Intellige: *scientia approbationis*. — Paulo superius post *significati* in Vat. adiungitur *tamen diversimode signatur*.

en: Understand: *scientia approbationis* (the science of approbation). — A little above, after *significati*, in the Vatican edition is added *tamen diversimode signatur*.

la: Dictum Prophetae, quod Augustinus respicit (*Tract.* 53. *in Ioan.* n. 5, ex quo tractatu sumtum est hoc dubium), est Isaiae 6, 10: *Excaeca cor populi huius et aures eius aggrava et oculos eius claude: ne forte videat oculis suis, et auribus suis audiat, et corde suo intelligat, et convertatur, et sanem eum.*

en: The saying of the Prophet to which Augustine refers (*Tractate* 53 *on John*, n. 5, from which tractate this doubt is taken) is Isaiah 6:10: *Blind the heart of this people, and burden their ears, and shut their eyes: lest perhaps they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I heal them.*

la: Libr. XI. c. 18. n. 24. seq. et c. 26. n. 33. Immediate post Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *ubi* pro *qui*.

en: [Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter*,] Book XI, c. 18, n. 24 ff. and c. 26, n. 33. Immediately after, the Vatican edition with some codices reads *ubi* in place of *qui*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39

title_alt: De divina scientia rerum — littera Magistri

title_alt: On the divine knowledge of things — text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 682 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXXIX.

#### Cap. I.

*Utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui vel aliquo modo mutari.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui. Utrumque enim videtur posse probari. Quod enim divina scientia possit augeri vel mutari[^1], hoc modo probatur: quia potest Deus scire quod nunquam scit. Est enim aliquis, qui non est lecturus hodie, et tamen potest esse, ut legat hodie; potest enim hodie legere. Nihil autem potest fieri, quod non possit a Deo sciri. Potest ergo Deus scire, hunc lecturum hodie, potest igitur aliquid scire, quod non scit: ergo potest eius scientia augeri vel mutari. Eademque videtur posse minui. Est enim aliquis hodie lecturus, quem Deus scit lecturum. At potest esse, ut non legat, ergo potest Deus non scire, hunc lecturum, potest igitur non scire aliquid quod scit: ergo potest minui eius scientia, vel mutari. — Ad quod dicimus, quia Dei scientia omnino immutabilis est, nec augeri potest vel minui. Nam, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate[^2]: « Scientia Dei est ipsa sapientia, et sapientia est ipsa essentia sive substantia Dei; quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili non est aliud sapere, aliud esse, sed quod est sapere, hoc est et esse ». « Ideoque novit omnia Verbum, quae novit Pater; sed ei nosse de Patre est, sicut esse; nosse enim et esse ibi unum est. Et ideo Patri, sicut esse non est a Filio, ita nec nosse. Proinde, tanquam se ipsum dicens, Pater genuit Verbum sibi coaequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset, si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in eius Verbo quam in se ipso. Hoc est ergo omnino Verbum, quod Pater, non tamen est Pater, quia iste Filius, ille Pater. Sciunt ergo invicem Pater et Filius, sed ille gignendo, iste nascendo. Et omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, in eorum sapientia, in eorum essentia, unusquisque eorum simul videt, non particulatim aut singillatim, velut alternante conspectu hinc illinc, et inde huc et rursum inde, vel inde in aliud atque aliud, ut aliqua videre non possit, nisi non videns alia; sed omnia simul videt, quorum nullum est, quod non semper videat et sciat ». « Eius itaque scientia inamissibilis et invariabilis est. Nostra vero scientia et amissibilis est et receptibilis, quia non hoc est nobis esse, quod scire. Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei dissimilis est, sic et nostrum verbum quod nascitur de scientia nostra, dissimile est illi Verbo quod natum est de Patre scientia ». — Ex hac auctoritate clare ostenditur, scientiam Dei omnino invariabilem esse, sicut ipsa essentia Dei omnino invariabilis est; et quod Pater et Filius cum Spiritu sancto simul omnia sciunt et vident. Sicut ergo non potest augeri vel minui divina essentia, ita nec divina scientia. Et tamen conceditur, posse scire quod non scit, et posse non scire quod scit; quia posset aliquid esse subiectum eius scientiae quod non est, et posset non esse subiectum aliquid, quod est, sine permutatione ipsius scientiae.

#### Cap. II.

*An Deus possit noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid.*

Hic opponitur a quibusdam ita: si Deus potest scire vel praescire quod nunquam scivit vel praescivit, potest ergo ex tempore aliquid scire vel praescire. — Ad quod dicimus: potest quidem Deus scire vel praescire omne quod potest facere, et potest facere quod nunquam fiet. Potest igitur scire vel praescire, quod nunquam fiet nec est nec fuit. Nec illud scit vel scivit, neque praescit vel praescivit, quia scientia eius non est, nisi de his quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt; et praescientia non est nisi de futuris. Et licet possit scire vel prae-

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scire quod nunquam est nec erit; non tamen potest aliquid scire vel praescire ex tempore. Potest utique scire vel praescire quod nunquam est nec erit, nec illud scitum vel praescitum est ab aeterno; non tamen potest incipere scire vel praescire illud, sed ita potest modo scire vel praescire, sicut potest scisse vel praescisse ab aeterno. Si enim dicas, eum modo posse scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit, id est, ita quod ab aeterno non sciverit vel praesciverit, quasi utrumque simul esse possit; falsum est. Si vero dicas, eum posse modo scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit, id est, habere potentiam sciendi vel praesciendi ab aeterno et modo aliquid, nec illud tamen praescitum est vel futurum; verum est. Non potest ergo noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid, sicut non potest noviter vel ex tempore velle aliquid; et tamen potest velle quod nunquam voluit.

#### Cap. III.

*Utrum Deus possit scire plura, quam scit.*

Item a quibusdam dicitur Deus posse plura scire, quam sciat, quia potest scire omnia quae scit, et potest aliqua facere, quae nunquam erunt, et illa potest scire. Non enim aliqua incognita facere potest. Si vero omnia essent, quae modo sunt, et alia quaedam faceret, quae non sunt nec erunt, et illa omnia sciret, pro certo plura sciret, quam modo sciat. Nec tamen eius scientia augeri potest[^3], quia hoc totum fieri posset sine mutabilitate scientiae. Constat ergo, Dei scientiam omnino esse immutabilem nec augeri posse vel minui, sed ei subiecta.

#### Cap. IV.

*Quod Deus et semper et simul scit omnia.*

Ei vero quod praedictum est, scilicet quod Deus omnia semper videt et simul, videtur obviare, quod ait Hieronymus in expositione Habacuc[^4]: « Absurdum est, inquit, ad hoc deducere Dei maiestatem, ut sciat per momenta singula, quot culices nascantur, quotve moriantur, quota pulicum et muscarum sit multitudo, quotve pisces natent in aquis, et similia. Non simus tam fatui adulatores Dei, ut dum providentiam eius etiam ad ima retrudimus, in nos ipsos iniuriosi simus, eandem irrationabilium et rationabilium providentiam esse dicentes ». Hic videtur dicere Hieronymus, quod Deus illorum minimorum scientiam sive providentiam non habeat. Quodsi hoc est, tunc non omnia simul scit et semper. — Ex tali itaque sensu illud dictum esse noverimus, ut Deum illa alternatim vel particulatim scire neget, nec per diversa temporum momenta sic illa cognovit, sicut per varia momenta illorum quaedam deficiunt, quaedam incipiunt. Neque illis aliisque irrationabilibus ita providet, quemadmodum rationabilibus. Numquid enim, ut ait Apostolus[^5], cura est Deo de bobus? Et sicut non est cura Deo de bobus, ita nec de aliis irrationabilibus. Dicit tamen Scriptura, quia ipsi cura est de omnibus. Providentiam ergo et curam universaliter de cunctis, quae condidit, habet, ut habeat unumquodque quod sibi debetur et convenit. Sed specialem providentiam atque curam habet de rationabilibus, de quibus[^6] praecepta tradidit eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit ac praemia promisit. Hanc providentiam et curam de irrationabilibus non habet. Ideo Apostolus dicit, quia non est cura Deo de bobus. Providet tamen omnibus et curat, id est gubernat omnia, qui omnibus solem suum oriri facit et pluviam dat[^7]. Scit itaque Deus, quanta sit multitudo pulicum, culicum ac muscarum et piscium, et quot nascantur, quotve moriantur; sed non scit hoc per momenta singula, immo simul et semper[^8] omnia, neque ita scit, ut eandem habeat providentiam irrationabilium et rationabilium, id est, ut eodem penitus modo provideat irrationabilibus et rationabilibus. Rationabilibus enim et praecepta dedit et Angelos ad custodiam delegavit. Simul itaque et immutabiliter scit Deus omnia quae fuerunt et sunt et erunt, tam bona quam mala; praescit quoque omnia futura, tam bona quam mala.

---

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### DISTINCTION XXXIX.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether God's science can be increased or diminished or in any way changed.*

Furthermore it is wont to be asked whether God's science can be increased or diminished. For both seem capable of being proved. That divine science can be increased or changed[^1] is proved in this way: because God can know what He never knows. For there is someone who is not going to read today, and yet it can be that he reads today; for he can read today. But nothing can come to be which cannot be known by God. Therefore God can know that this man will read today; therefore He can know something which He does not know: therefore His science can be increased or changed. And the same [thing] seems capable of being diminished. For there is someone who is going to read today, whom God knows is going to read. But it can be that he does not read; therefore God can not know that this man is going to read; therefore He can not know something which He does know: therefore His science can be diminished, or changed. — To which we say that God's science is wholly immutable, and cannot be increased or diminished. For, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^2]: « God's science is His very wisdom, and [His] wisdom is His very essence or substance; because in the wonderful simplicity of that nature it is not one thing to be wise and another to be, but what it is to be wise, this also is to be ». « And therefore the Word knows all things which the Father knows; but for Him to know is from the Father, just as to be [is from the Father]; for to know and to be are there one. And therefore for the Father, just as to be is not from the Son, so neither [is] to know. Accordingly, as it were saying Himself, the Father has begotten a Word coequal to Himself in all things. For He would not have said Himself entirely and perfectly, if there were anything less or more in His Word than in Himself. This therefore is wholly the Word, that the Father [is], yet [it] is not the Father, because this [one] is the Son, that [one] the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son know each other in turn — but the [Father] by begetting, the [Son] by being born. And all things which are in their science, in their wisdom, in their essence, each of them sees at once — not in piecemeal or one-by-one fashion, as though by an alternating gaze [moving] from here to there, and from there hither and back again, or from there to one thing and another, so that He could not see some things unless not seeing others; but He sees all at once, and there is none of them which He does not always see and know ». « His science therefore is unlosable and unchangeable. But our science is both losable and receptible, because for us to be is not [the same as] to know. For this reason, just as our science is unlike that science of God, so also our word, which is born of our science, is unlike that Word which has been born of the Father by [the divine] science ». — From this authority it is clearly shown that God's science is wholly unchangeable, just as the very essence of God is wholly unchangeable; and that the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit at once know and see all things. As therefore the divine essence cannot be increased or diminished, so neither [can] the divine science. And yet it is conceded that He can know what He does not know, and can not know what He knows; because something could be the subject of His science which is not, and something which is could not be a subject, without any change of the science itself.

#### Chapter II.

*Whether God can know or foreknow anything anew or in time.*

Here it is objected by certain [persons] thus: if God can know or foreknow what He never knew or foreknew, He can therefore know or foreknow something in time. — To which we say: God can indeed know or foreknow everything which He can do, and He can do what will never come to pass. Therefore He can know or foreknow what will never come to pass and is not nor has been. Nor does He know or has known [it], nor does He foreknow or has foreknown [it], because His science is only of those things which are or were or will be; and [His] foreknowledge is only of future things. And although He can know or fore-

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know what neither is nor will be; yet He cannot know or foreknow anything in time. He can certainly know or foreknow what neither is nor will be, nor [is] that thing known or foreknown from eternity; yet He cannot begin to know or foreknow it, but He can know or foreknow [it] now in such [a] way as He could have known or foreknown [it] from eternity. For if you should say [that] He can now know or foreknow what from eternity He did not know or foreknow — that is, in such a way that from eternity He did not know or foreknow [it], as though both could be at once — [it is] false. But if you should say [that] He can now know or foreknow what from eternity He did not know or foreknow — that is, [that He has] the power of knowing or foreknowing from eternity and [also] now something — yet [that thing] is neither foreknown nor future — [it is] true. Therefore He cannot know or foreknow anything anew or in time, just as He cannot will anything anew or in time; and yet He can will what He never has willed.

#### Chapter III.

*Whether God can know more [things] than He knows.*

Likewise it is said by certain [persons] that God can know more [things] than He knows, because He can know all things which He knows, and He can do certain things which will never be, and these He can know. For He cannot do anything unknown. But if all things were [there] which now are, and He should make certain other things which neither are nor will be, and should know all those things, He would assuredly know more things than He now knows. And yet His science cannot be increased[^3], because all this could come to pass without any mutability of [His] science. It is established therefore that God's science is wholly immutable, nor can it be increased or diminished, but [only] the things subject to it.

#### Chapter IV.

*That God knows all things both always and at once.*

But to that which has been said before — namely that God always sees all things and at once — there seems to run contrary what Jerome says in [his] exposition of Habakkuk[^4]: « It is absurd, he says, to bring down God's majesty to such [a degree] that He should know moment by moment how many gnats are born or how many die, what is the number of fleas and flies, how many fishes swim in the waters, and the like. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God that, while we drag down His providence even to the lowest things, we should be injurious to ourselves, saying that the providence of irrational and rational [creatures] is the same ». Here Jerome seems to say that God does not have science or providence of those least things. But if this is so, then He does not know all things at once and always. — From such a sense therefore let us understand that saying [to mean]: that He denies God to know those [things] alternately or piecemeal, nor [does He know them] through diverse moments of time as [if] through varied moments of those [things] some perish and some begin. Nor does He provide for those and other irrational [creatures] in the way [He does] for rational ones. For "Is there any care to God for oxen?" as the Apostle says[^5]. And as there is no care to God for oxen, so neither for the other irrational [creatures]. Yet Scripture says that to Him is care for all [things]. He has therefore providence and care universally for all [things] which He has founded, so that each may have what is owed and fitting to it. But He has special providence and care for the rational [creatures], to whom[^6] He has handed down precepts and prescribed for them a law of right living and promised rewards. This providence and care for the irrational [creatures] He does not have. Therefore the Apostle says that there is no care to God for oxen. Yet He provides for and cares for all [things] — that is, He governs all [things] — He who makes His sun rise upon all and gives rain[^7]. God therefore knows what is the multitude of fleas, gnats and flies and fishes, and how many are born, and how many die; but He does not know this moment by moment, nay rather at once and always[^8] [knows] all things — nor does He know [them] in such [a] way as to have the same providence of irrational and rational [creatures], that is, so as to provide for the irrational and the rational in entirely the same manner. For to the rational [creatures] He has given precepts and has assigned Angels for [their] custody. So therefore at once and immutably God knows all things which were and are and will be, both good and evil; and He also foreknows all future things, both good and evil.

---

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3 *sub*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2 and 3 [reads] *sub* [in place of *mutari*].

la: Cap. 13. n. 22. Sequens locus est c. 14. — In ultimo textu solummodo Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 post *inamissibilis* addunt *et invariabilis*, refragante etiam originali. Immediate post pro *quod scire* legit Vat. *quod sapere vel scire*; originale *quod scire vel sapere*. Cod. D *minui*, cod. E *minui vel mutari*.

en: [Augustine, *On the Trinity* book XV,] c. 13, n. 22. The next passage [quoted] is c. 14. — In the last text, only the Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 after *inamissibilis* ("unlosable") add *et invariabilis* ("and unchangeable") — the original [of Augustine] also opposing. Immediately after, in place of *quod scire* ("what [it is] to know"), the Vatican reads *quod sapere vel scire* ("what [it is] to be wise or to know"); the original [reads] *quod scire vel sapere* ("what [it is] to know or to be wise"). Codex D [reads] *minui* ("to be diminished"), codex E *minui vel mutari* ("to be diminished or changed").

la: Cod. R addit *vel mutari*.

en: Codex R adds *vel mutari* ("or changed").

en: [Jerome, *Commentary on Habakkuk*,] on c. 1, [v.] 14.

la: I. Cor. 9, 9; alius locus est Sap. 12, 13.

en: 1 Corinthians 9:9; the other passage is Wisdom 12:13.

la: Intellige: respectu quorum dedit septem praecepta posteriora decalogi. Haec est lectio codd. et ed. 1; aliae edd. omittunt *de*, quia tunc sensus verborum idem est cum eo, quem exprimunt verba, quae sequuntur: *eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit*.

en: Understand: with respect to whom He gave the [last] seven precepts of the decalogue. This is the reading of the codices and edition 1; the other editions omit *de*, because then the sense of the words is the same as that which is expressed by the words which follow: *eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit* ("and prescribed for them a law of right living").

la: Respicitur Matth. 5, 45: *Qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos et pluit super iustos et iniustos*.

en: [The text] looks back to Matthew 5:45: *He who makes His sun rise upon the good and the wicked and rains upon the just and the unjust*.

la: Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 *semel*.

en: Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 [read] *semel* ("once") [in place of *semper*]. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]


title: Dist. 39, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIX. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXIX. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIX.

#### *De perfectione divinae scientiae.*

> *Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de scientiae divinae certitudine, hic agit de perfectione. Et quoniam vere perfectum est cui non est possibilis additio[^1], ideo Magister quaerit, utrum divina scientia possit augeri vel minui. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In prima Magister quaerit et determinat quod divina scientia non recipit augmentum nec diminutionem nec alterationem, sed omnia simul et uno aspectu cognoscit. In secunda opponit contra hoc, quod divina scientia non potest augeri, per hoc, quod videtur aliquid posse scire ex tempore, et determinat, et hoc facit secundo capitulo, ibi: *Hic opponitur a quibusdam.* In tertia obiicit auctoritate Hieronymi contra hoc quod dictum erat, divinam scientiam esse respectu omnium, et hoc ibi: *Ei autem quod praedictum est, scilicet quod Deus etc.*

Et quaelibet harum trium partium potest subdividi, quia primo in eis opponit et secundo solvit; tamen in secunda ponit duplicem responsionem, et in tertia post responsionem subiungit epilogationem, ultimo capitulo[^2].

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de perfectione divinae cognitionis, et circa hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de perfectione divinae cognitionis quantum ad numerum cognoscibilium.

Secundo quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad modum cognoscendi.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat omnia alia a se.

Tertio, utrum Deus possit scire vel praescire plura, quam sciat.

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## Commentary on Distinction XXXIX.

#### *On the perfection of the divine knowledge.*

> *"Furthermore, it is wont to be asked whether the knowledge of God can be increased or diminished."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the certitude of the divine knowledge; here he treats of [its] perfection. And since that is truly perfect to which no addition is possible[^1], therefore the Master inquires whether the divine knowledge can be increased or diminished. And this part has three parts. In the first the Master inquires and determines that the divine knowledge admits neither increase nor diminution nor alteration, but knows all things at once and by a single regard. In the second he raises an objection against this — namely, that the divine knowledge cannot be increased — through this, that it seems that [God] can know something from [a point in] time, and he determines [the matter], and he does this in the second chapter, there: *"Here it is objected by some."* In the third he objects with the authority of Jerome against this which had been said, namely that the divine knowledge is in respect of all things, and this [is] there: *"To this however which was said before, namely that God etc."*

And each of these three parts can be subdivided, because in them he first raises an objection and second resolves [it]; however, in the second [part] he sets forth a twofold response, and in the third, after the response, he appends a recapitulation, in the last chapter[^2].

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, the perfection of divine cognition is asked about, and concerning this two [matters] are principally asked.

First, [the question] is asked concerning the perfection of the divine cognition as to the number of knowables.

Second, [the question] is asked concerning the same as to the mode of knowing.

As to the first, three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God knows things other than himself.

Second it is asked, whether God knows all things other than himself.

Third, whether God can know or foreknow more [things] than he [actually] knows.

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 312, nota 8.

en: Cf. above p. 312, note 8.

la: Supple cum Vat. ibi: *Simul itaque.*

en: Supply, with the Vatican edition, there: *"Simul itaque"* ("Therefore at once"). ---