title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum in divinis sit ponere translationem

title_alt: Whether translation is to be posited in divine matters

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV.
#### *Utrum in divinis ponenda sit translatio.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere translationem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Ambrosium in libro *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Sunt nomina, quae translative et per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur».

2. Item, Dionysius in libro *de Divinis Nominibus*[^2]: «Theologi tanquam innominabilem Deum laudant ex omni nomine»; sed hoc non potest esse nisi per translationem: ergo in divinis est ponere translationem.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia sacra Scriptura[^3] dicit, Deum irasci et dolere; sed hoc non potest dici proprie: ergo necesse est, quod dicatur translative. Sed inter omnia quae contingit nominare, dolor et ira maxime distant a Deo: ergo si haec contingit transferre, et omnia alia nomina.

4. Item, per quae contingit rem intelligere, contingit et significare, et per quae contingit significare, contingit et nominare; sed per omnia creata contingit Deum intelligere: ergo et nominare.

**Sed contra:**

1. «Omnes transferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt»[^4]; sed Dei ad creaturam non est similitudo, cum sit summa distantia: ergo etc.

2. Item, similitudo est relatio aequiparantiae[^5]: ergo si propter similitudinem contingit nomina creaturarum transferri ad Creatorem, pari ratione et e converso. Sed illa non transferuntur: ergo nec ista.

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3. Item, similitudo est ratio translationis[^6]: ergo nomina rerum magis Deo similium magis debent ad Deum transferri; talia autem sunt nomina Angelorum: ergo illa transferuntur. — Quaeritur ergo, quae nomina debeant transferri, et quae non.

### Conclusio.

> *Translatio ponenda est in divinis propter duplicem rationem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ratio vel finis translationis duplex est: una, inquam, est laus Dei, alia manuductio intellectus nostri. — Propter laudem Dei necessaria est translatio. Quoniam enim Deus multum est laudabilis, ne propter inopiam vocabulorum contingeret cessare a laude, sacra Scriptura docuit nomina creaturarum ad Deum transferri[^7], et hoc in numero indefinito, ut, sicut omnis creatura laudat Deum, sic Deus laudetur ex omni nomine creaturae, et qui non poterit uno nomine laudari tanquam superexcellens omne nomen, laudaretur ex omni nomine. — Alia ratio est manuductio intellectus nostri. Quia enim per creaturas ad cognoscendum Creatorem venimus[^8], et, ut plurimum, fere omnes creaturae habent proprietates nobiles, quae sunt ratio intelligendi Deum, ut leo fortitudinem, agnus mansuetudinem, petra soliditatem, serpens prudentiam et consimilia: ideo oportuit, plura nomina transferri ad Deum.

Quoniam igitur finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem, cum translatio sit ad laudem Dei; ideo nomina importantia deformitatem non debent transferri, ut diabolus, bufo, vulpes, quia magis transferuntur ad vituperium quam ad laudem. — Rursus, quia translatio est propter nostram instructionem, et similitudo incipiens a notiori est via cognoscendi; ideo est translatio a creaturis tanquam a notioribus ad Creatorem, sed non convertitur. Et quia magna similitudo mater est falsitatis[^9], ideo non transferuntur nomina multum similia, sicut sunt nomina Angelorum, ne forte Angelus credatur esse Deus. — Ex hoc patet, quod translatio est in divinis, et quantum ad nominum multiformitatem ratione cuius dicitur Deus omninominabilis[^10]; et patent omnia praeter primum.

Quod enim obiicitur, quod nulla est similitudo, quia summa est distantia; dicendum, quod non est similitudo per unius naturae participationem, est tamen similitudo secundum analogiam et habitudinem, et hoc in comparatione ad effectus. Sed de hoc magis alibi habitum est[^11].

english:
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### Question IV.
#### *Whether translation [i.e. metaphorical transfer of names] is to be posited in divine matters.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, whether in the divine there is to be posited a translation [transfer]. And that there is, appears thus:

1. From Ambrose in the book *On the Trinity*[^1]: "There are names which are said of God by translation [metaphorically] and by likeness."

2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*[^2]: "The theologians praise God as unnameable from every name"; but this cannot be except through translation: therefore in the divine a translation is to be posited.

3. Likewise, this appears by reason, since sacred Scripture[^3] says that God is wrathful and grieves; but this cannot be said properly: therefore it is necessary that it be said by translation. But among all the things which can be named, grief and wrath are most distant from God: therefore if these can be transferred [to God], so can all other names.

4. Likewise, by those things through which one can understand a thing, one can also signify it, and by those things through which one can signify, one can also name; but through all created things one can understand God: therefore [one can] also [name him].

**On the contrary:**

1. "All who transfer, transfer according to some likeness"[^4]; but there is no likeness of God to a creature, since there is supreme distance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, likeness is a relation of equiparancy[^5]: therefore if on account of likeness the names of creatures can be transferred to the Creator, by parity of reason also the converse. But those [divine names] are not transferred [to creatures]: therefore neither these.

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3. Likewise, likeness is the ground of translation[^6]: therefore the names of things more like God ought more to be transferred to God; but such are the names of the Angels: therefore those are transferred. — It is therefore asked, which names ought to be transferred, and which not.

### Conclusion.

> *Translation is to be posited in the divine on account of a twofold reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the reason or end of translation is twofold: one, I say, is the praise of God, the other, the leading-by-the-hand of our intellect. — On account of the praise of God a translation is necessary. For since God is greatly praiseworthy, lest on account of the poverty of vocabulary praise should chance to cease, sacred Scripture taught that the names of creatures be transferred to God[^7], and this in indefinite number, so that, just as every creature praises God, so God may be praised from every name of a creature, and he who cannot be praised by one name as super-excelling every name, may be praised from every name. — The other reason is the leading-by-the-hand of our intellect. For since through creatures we come to knowing the Creator[^8], and, for the most part, almost all creatures have noble properties, which are the ground for understanding God — as a lion [signifies] fortitude, a lamb meekness, a rock solidity, a serpent prudence, and the like — therefore it was fitting that many names be transferred to God.

Since therefore the end imposes necessity on those things which are ordered to the end, since the translation is to the praise of God; therefore names importing deformity ought not to be transferred, like devil, toad, fox, since they are transferred more to vituperation than to praise. — Again, since translation is for the sake of our instruction, and likeness beginning from what is more known is the way of knowing; therefore translation is from creatures as from things more known to the Creator, but not vice versa. And since great likeness is the mother of falsity[^9], therefore names too similar are not transferred, such as the names of the Angels, lest perhaps an Angel be believed to be God. — From this it is clear that translation is in the divine, and as regards the multiformity of names by reason of which God is said to be all-nameable[^10]; and all [the objections] are clear except the first.

For what is objected, that there is no likeness because there is the greatest distance; it must be said that there is not a likeness through participation of one nature, but there is nevertheless a likeness according to analogy and habitude [relation], and this in comparison to effects. But of this more has been treated elsewhere[^11].

la: Sive *de Fide* II. Prolog. n. 2. Videsis quod de hoc textu annotatum est supra pag. 388, nota 3.

en: Or *On the Faith* II, Prologue, n. 2. See what is noted on this text above at p. 388, n. 3.

la: Cap. I. § 6.

en: Chapter 1, § 6.

la: Genes. 6, 6, et Exod. 4, 14. — In principio huius argumenti post *hoc* codd. P Q adiiciunt *ipsum*, et circa finem pro *maxime* cod. T cum nonnullis aliis substituit *magis*.

en: Genesis 6:6, and Exodus 4:14. — At the beginning of this argument, after *hoc*, codices P Q add *ipsum*, and toward the end, in place of *maxime*, codex T with some others substitutes *magis*.

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 1, nota 8.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 2. Cf. above p. 1, n. 8.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 346, nota 5. — In initio huius argumenti cod. V et ed. 1 voci *similitudo* praemittunt *omnis*.

en: Cf. above p. 346, n. 5. — At the beginning of this argument, codex V and edition 1 prefix *omnis* to the word *similitudo*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 72, nota 3. — Paulo inferius post *transferuntur* supplendum est: «sed illa non transferuntur»; quae verba excidisse videntur.

en: Cf. above p. 72, n. 3. — A little below, after *transferuntur*, there is to be supplied: "but those are not transferred"; which words seem to have fallen out.

la: Vide Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 1, § 6, ubi principaliora nomina a s. Scriptura Deo attributa invenies.

en: See Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 1, § 6, where you will find the principal names attributed to God by sacred Scripture.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2.

en: Cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2.

la: Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 6. (c. 7.): *Deceptio quidem ex similitudine.*

en: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 6 (c. 7): "Deception indeed [arises] from likeness."

la: Vide Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 1, § 7. — Subinde pro *omnia* ed. 1 *obiecta*.

en: See Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 1, § 7. — Then, in place of *omnia*, edition 1 [reads] *obiecta*.

la: Dist. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1; d. 7. q. 4; d. 25. a. 2. q. 1. Cfr. etiam d. 35. q. 1, et II. *Sent.* d. 16. a. 1. q. 1, ubi quatuor species similitudinis afferuntur, scil. similitudo per convenientiam omnimodam in natura: sic in Trinitate una persona est similis alteri; similitudo per participationem alicuius naturae universalis: sic homo et asinus assimilantur in animali; similitudo secundum proportionalitatem: sic nauta et auriga sunt sibi similes in regendo vehiculo; et similitudo per convenientiam ordinis: sic exemplatum assimilatur exemplari. — Verbo *est* cod. B adiungit *scilicet supra d. 3.* in secundo problemate (d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 3.); et aliquanto superius post *dicendum, quod* edd. (excepta 1) interserunt *etsi*.

en: Distinction 1, a. 3, q. 1, *ad* 1; d. 7, q. 4; d. 25, a. 2, q. 1. Cf. also d. 35, q. 1, and Book II of the *Sentences*, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, where four species of likeness are brought forward, namely: likeness through every-mode agreement in nature: thus in the Trinity one person is like another; likeness through participation of some universal nature: thus man and ass are likened in [the genus] animal; likeness according to proportionality: thus a sailor and a charioteer are like each other in steering a vehicle; and likeness through agreement of order: thus the exemplate is likened to the exemplar. — To the word *est*, codex B adds *namely above at d. 3* on the second problem (d. 3, p. I, q. 2, *ad* 3); and somewhat earlier, after *dicendum, quod*, the editions (except 1) insert *etsi*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Translatio* idem est ac *metaphora*; ipsa in genere accipitur a proprietatibus omnibus rerum creatarum, quae ratione *similitudinis* ad res divinas significandas adhibentur. Hoc magis explanatur supra d. 22. q. 3, ubi etiam (ad 2.) docetur idem quod hic in corp. dicitur, scilicet quod nomina multum similia non apte ad divina transferuntur (cfr. Dionys. Areop., *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 2; et S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 1. a. 9. ad 3.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 35, q. 48. m. 1. 2. 3, q. 1. a. 4. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2; *S.* I. q. 1. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; *S.* p. I. tr. 14. q. 56. 59. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 32. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. in fine, d. 22. q. 2. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** *Translatio* is the same as *metaphor*; it is taken in general from all the properties of created things, which by reason of *likeness* are employed to signify divine things. This is more fully explained above at d. 22, q. 3, where also (in *ad* 2) the same is taught as is said here in the body, namely that names too similar are not aptly transferred to divine things (cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 2; and St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 1, a. 9, *ad* 3).

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 35, q. 48, m. 1, 2, 3, q. 1, a. 4, a. 5. — St. Thom., here q. 3, a. 1, 2; *S.* I, q. 1, a. 9. — B. Albert., here a. 6; *S.* p. I, tr. 14, q. 56, 59. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3, q. 1, 2. — Ægid. R., here 2, *princ.* q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 32, q. 1. — Durand., here q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1, *in fine*; d. 22, q. 2, 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 34, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Huius dicti occasione praefati haeretici etc.* Videtur enim, quod Magister male reputet haereticos illos, qui dicebant, naturam non dici de personis. Quia videtur Damascenus dicere idem quod illi dicebant, cum dicit: «De hypostasi non est deitatem dicere»[^1]: ergo cum deitas dicat naturam, patet etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum Damasceni, simpliciter intellectum, generat sinistrum intellectum, et qui sic intelligeret, sicut sonat, haereticus esset. Sed ipse Damascenus intelligit cum praecisione, scilicet quod deitas non dicitur de unica hypostasi tantum, immo de omnibus.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In spiritu Dei aliquando significari Patrem*, sicut illud Isaiae sexagesimo primo: *Spiritus Domini super me etc.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia Hieronymus dicit ibi in Glossa, quod de illo spiritu intelligitur, de quo dicitur Isaiae undecimo[^2]: *Requiescet super eum Spiritus Domini etc.*; et constat, quod ibi accipitur pro persona Spiritus sancti. Item, hoc videtur alia auctoritate, quia alius evangelista Lucas undecimo[^3] dicit: *Si in digito Dei eiicio daemonia*, et Glossa exponit *digito* pro Spiritu sancto, qui est tertia in Trinitate persona.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod istae rationes non concludunt contrarietates[^4], quia una Scriptura pluribus modis potest exponi. Nam in illa auctoritate, in qua dicitur Isaiae sexagesimo primo: *Spiritus Domini super me etc.*, agitur de missione Filii[^5]; et quoniam Filius potest intelligi missus secundum divinam naturam, et sic intelligitur, proprie loquendo, missus a Patre solum; ideo *Spiritus Domini* stat ibi pro Patre. Si autem intelligatur de missione secundum humanam naturam, sic intelligitur de Spiritu sancto, prout est tertia in Trinitate persona. — Similiter intelligendum de auctoritate sequenti, quod potest intelligi utroque modo, sed tamen *spiritus* accipitur aliter et aliter.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius, quod *in aliquo differt Christi et Dei natura, ne eadem sit, si praestari potest, quod spiritus, qui Dei est, non sit etiam Christi*. Videtur enim sic male dicere, quia argumentum hoc non valet: Filius est filius Patris et non Spiritus sancti, ergo differt natura Patris et Spiritus sancti: ergo cum spiritus dicat personam, argumentum illud non valet, quod facit Hilarius[^6].

**Respondeo:** Potest dici, quod Hilarius loquitur de spiritu, secundum quod nominat naturam; sic autem non habet instantiam suum verbum. Nihilominus tamen, si intelligatur de spiritu, prout dicitur personaliter, adhuc veritatem habet. Nam cum Verbum non possit esse sine spiritu, tunc haberent Pater et suum Verbum duos spiritus, et ita non essent unius naturae.[^7] — Praeterea, si spiritus Patris non esset Filii, non oriretur a Christo, et si non procederet ab eo, non distingueretur originaliter, ergo essentialiter; sed spiritus Dei et Deus sunt unum essentialiter: ergo oporteret, quod spiritus et Deus essentialiter differrent a Filio[^8] sive distinguerentur.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod verbum Hilarii: *Non est idem natura quod naturae res*, intelligitur solum in creaturis. Videtur illa solutio non esse conveniens, quia Hilarius loquitur de spiritu Dei, prout significat *naturam* et *rem naturae*; quodsi nulla est differentia, nullam deberet vim facere[^9], ut videtur; quodsi facit vim in *spiritu*, prout significat *naturam* et *rem naturae*, ergo videtur distinctio inter huiusmodi facienda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicitur ab Hilario: *aliud est natura, aliud res naturae*, aut intelligitur de alietate a parte rei, sicut illi haeretici intelligebant; et sic habet veritatem solum in creaturis. Alio modo potest dicere alietatem sive differentiam secundum rationem; et sic habet veritatem in divinis, et sic intelligit Hilarius, et dicit Augustinus[^10], quod «aliud est esse Patrem, aliud esse Deum»: non, inquam, aliud secundum rem, sed aliud secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi et se habendi.

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#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hac responsione Magistri, quod *non debet dici persona unius Dei*, quia *nihil est in Trinitate creatum, vel serviens, vel subiectum*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia genitivus de sui ratione non importat subiectionem nec dominium: ergo non videtur sufficiens ratio. Si dicas, quod hoc venit a parte termini; hoc nihil est, quia terminus de se non importat respectum dominii.[^11]

Item quaeritur, quare hoc nomen *essentia* non importat superexcellentiam in genitivo, sicut hoc nomen *Deus*? — Item, quare non dicitur: *Tres personae essentiae*, sicut *unius essentiae*?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod[^12] genitivus vere construatur et proprie, necesse est aliquam habitudinem secundum rem, vel importari vel secundum modum intelligendi. Genitivus autem importat habitudinem principiati ad principium, vel e converso, ut possidentis ad possessum, vel formae ad informatum, vel specificantis ad specificatum. Habitudinem autem formae non importat nisi cum termino abstracto, quod significat per modum formae; et quoniam forma se habet per modum exprimentis et declarationis: ideo talis constructio non attenditur nisi cum genitivo nominis abstracti alio determinato. Unde convenienter dicitur: *mulier egregiae formae*, sed nihil est dictum: *mulier formae*. Ideo bene dicitur: *tres personae unius essentiae*, non autem: *tres personae essentiae*[^13]. — *Deus* autem non est nomen abstractum, ideo non construitur cum genitivo nisi vel in habitudine subiecti, ut *forma Dei*; vel in habitudine specificantis, ut *persona Dei*, sicut *creatura salis*; vel in habitudine principii, ut *creatura Dei*. Et quoniam, quando dicitur: *tres personae unius Dei*, nulla habitudinum importatur proprie nisi habitudo principii sive possessoris; hinc est, quod cum in illo sensu sit falsa locutio, non est recipienda. — Alia ratio est ista, quia locutio, quae est in vi declarationis essentiae, convertitur, ut, cum dicitur: *mulier egregiae formae*, potest dici: *egregia forma mulieris*. Ergo si diceretur: *tres personae unius Dei*, diceretur: *unus Deus trium personarum*; et iste intellectus non est sanus, ut videtur: sic enim posset intelligi, sicut dicitur: *unus Deus trium hominum*.[^14]

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod in istis tribus consistit summum bonum, scilicet potentia, sapientia, bonitate. Videtur enim male dicere, quia summum bonum specificat bonum: ergo si bonitas distinguitur contra potentiam et sapientiam, pari ratione summum bonum. Item, non videtur in his tribus esse, quia summum bonum est aggregativum omnium bonorum et collectivum[^15]: ergo non tantum horum trium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *bonum* uno modo distinguitur contra potentiam et sapientiam, alio modo non. Si enim accipiatur pro bonitate moris, sic consistit in voluntate et distinguitur contra alia duo. Si autem *bonum* accipiatur communiter, sic complectitur omnia. Est enim bonum naturae, et hoc ad potentiam; et bonum gratiae, et hoc aut perficit intellectum, et sic est scientia, aut affectum, et ita bonitas: et haec tria complectitur bonum in sua universalitate, et summum in sua integritate. Quoniam igitur omne bonum ad haec reducibile est, ideo summum bonum in his tribus consistit.

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Scriptura appropriat Patri potentiam, ne videatur minus potens. Videtur hoc plus debere dici de Filio, quod minus potens, cum fuerit passus et mortuus: ergo magis deberet ei potentia appropriari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, quia propter passionem visus est fecisse stultitiam et habuisse impotentiam — propter quod Iudaeis praedicatio crucis erat in scandalum, et Graecis in stultitiam[^16] — ipse Apostolus, egregius doctor, non tantum sapientiam appropriat Christo, immo etiam virtutem, ut sic excludat a divinitate infirmitatem: et maluit ei appropriare virtutem quam potentiam, quia *virtus* dicit potentiam ultimam et summum de potentia, sicut vult Philosophus[^17], quod «virtus est ultimum de potentia»; ideo maluit ei appropriare virtutem. Nec est inconveniens ex diversis considerationibus idem modo appropriari uni, modo alii, cum aequaliter conveniat tribus. Unde Patri attribuimus potentiam, ne videatur impotens propter antiquitatem; Filio virtutem, ne videatur impotens sive debilitatus propter assumtam infirmitatem. Nihilominus tamen facienda est vis inter potentiam et virtutem, sicut dictum est trigesima secunda distinctione.[^18]

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---

english:
<!-- page 595 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: *On occasion of this saying the aforesaid heretics etc.* For it seems that the Master ill-judges those heretics who said that *nature* is not predicated of the persons. Because Damascene seems to say the same thing as those said, when he says: "It is not [permitted] to predicate *deity* of the hypostasis"[^1]: therefore since *deity* says the nature, this is plain etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the word of Damascene, taken simply, generates a sinister understanding, and one who would so understand it as it sounds would be a heretic. But Damascene himself understands it with a precision, namely that *deity* is not predicated of one hypostasis alone, but rather of all.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *that in [the term] "Spirit of God" the Father is sometimes signified*, as that of Isaiah 61: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me etc.* For he seems to speak ill, because Jerome says there in the Gloss that this is to be understood of that Spirit of whom is said in Isaiah 11[^2]: *The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him etc.*; and it is established that there it is taken for the person of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, this seems [shown] by another authority, because another evangelist, Luke 11[^3], says: *If by the finger of God I cast out demons*, and the Gloss expounds *finger* for the Holy Spirit, who is the third person in the Trinity.

**I respond:** It must be said that these reasons do not conclude contraries[^4], because one Scripture can be expounded in many ways. For in that authority, in which is said in Isaiah 61: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me etc.*, it is treating of the mission of the Son[^5]; and since the Son can be understood as sent according to the divine nature, and so it is understood, properly speaking, of one sent by the Father alone; therefore *Spirit of the Lord* there stands for the Father. But if it be understood of the mission according to the human nature, so it is understood of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is the third person in the Trinity. — Similarly is to be understood of the following authority, which can be understood in either way, but nevertheless *spirit* is taken in one way and another.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Hilary says, that *the nature of Christ and of God differs in something, lest it be the same, if it can be granted that the spirit which is of God should not also be of Christ*. For thus he seems to speak ill, because this argument does not hold: The Son is son of the Father and not of the Holy Spirit, therefore the nature of the Father and of the Holy Spirit differs: therefore since *spirit* says a person, that argument is not valid, which Hilary makes[^6].

**I respond:** It can be said that Hilary speaks of the spirit insofar as it names the nature; and so his word does not have a counter-instance. Nevertheless, if it be understood of the spirit insofar as it is said personally, it still holds the truth. For since the Word cannot be without spirit, then the Father and his Word would have two spirits, and so they would not be of one nature.[^7] — Moreover, if the Spirit of the Father were not [the Spirit] of the Son, he would not arise from Christ, and if he did not proceed from him, he would not be distinguished originally, therefore essentially; but the Spirit of God and God are one essentially: therefore it would have to follow that *Spirit* and *God* would essentially differ from the Son[^8], or be distinguished [from him].

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that the word of Hilary: *Nature is not the same as the thing of nature*, is to be understood only in creatures. That solution seems not to be fitting, because Hilary speaks of the Spirit of God, insofar as he signifies *nature* and *the thing of nature*; whereas if there is no difference, [the Master] should give it no force[^9], as it seems; but if [the Master] does give force in *spirit*, insofar as it signifies *nature* and *the thing of nature*, therefore the distinction seems to be made between such things.

**I respond:** It must be said that when Hilary says: *nature is one thing, the thing of nature another*, either it is understood of an otherness on the side of the thing, as those heretics understood; and so it holds the truth only in creatures. In another way it can mean an otherness or difference according to reason; and so it holds the truth in divine things, and so Hilary understands it, and Augustine says[^10] that "to be Father is one thing, to be God another": not, I say, another according to the thing, but another according to the account of signifying and of understanding and of comporting.

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#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that response of the Master, that *one is not to say "the person of one God,"* because *nothing in the Trinity is created, or serving, or subject*. For he seems to speak ill, because the genitive does not by its own account import subjection or dominion: therefore the reason does not seem sufficient. If you say that this comes on the side of the term, this is nothing, because the term of itself does not import a respect of dominion.[^11]

Likewise it is asked, why the noun *essentia* does not import super-excellence in the genitive, as does this noun *Deus*? — Likewise, why is it not said: *Three persons of the essence*, as [it is said] *of one essence*?

**I respond:** It must be said that, for the genitive truly and properly to be construed, it is necessary that[^12] some relation according to the thing be imported, either according to the mode of understanding. Now the genitive imports a relation of the principiated to the principle, or conversely, as of the possessor to the possessed, or of the form to the informed, or of the specifying to the specified. But it does not import the relation of form except with an abstract term, which signifies in the manner of a form; and since form holds itself in the manner of an expressing and declaration: therefore such a construction is not allowed except with the genitive of an abstract noun [accompanied by] another determinant. Hence it is fittingly said: *a woman of distinguished form*, but it is nothing said: *a woman of form*. Therefore it is well said: *three persons of one essence*, not however: *three persons of essence*.[^13] — But *Deus* is not an abstract noun, therefore it is not construed with the genitive except either in the relation of subject, as *form of God*; or in the relation of specifying, as *person of God*, just as *creature of salt*; or in the relation of principle, as *creature of God*. And since, when it is said: *three persons of one God*, no relation is properly imported except the relation of principle or of possessor; hence it is, that since in that sense it is a false locution, it is not to be received. — Another reason is this, that a locution which is in the force of declaring the essence is convertible, so that, when it is said: *a woman of distinguished form*, it can be said: *distinguished form of a woman*. Therefore if it were said: *three persons of one God*, it would be said: *one God of three persons*; and that understanding is not sound, as is seen: for so it could be understood, just as is said: *one God of three men*.[^14]

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that in these three the highest good consists, namely in power, wisdom, goodness. For he seems to speak ill, because the highest good specifies *good*: therefore if goodness is distinguished against power and wisdom, by parity of reasoning [so is] the highest good. Likewise, it does not seem to be in these three, because the highest good is aggregative of all goods and collective[^15]: therefore not only of these three.

**I respond:** It must be said that *good* in one way is distinguished against power and wisdom, in another way not. For if it is taken for goodness of moral life, so it consists in the will and is distinguished against the other two. But if *good* is taken commonly, so it embraces all things. For there is good of nature, and this [pertains] to power; and good of grace, and this either perfects the intellect, and so is knowledge, or the affection, and so is goodness: and these three [the term] *good* embraces in its universality, and *the highest* in its integrity. Since therefore every good is reducible to these, therefore the highest good consists in these three.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that Scripture appropriates power to the Father, lest he seem less powerful. This seems rather to have to be said of the Son, [namely] that [he was] less powerful, since he suffered and died: therefore power should rather be appropriated to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because on account of the passion he was seen to have committed folly and to have had impotence — on account of which the preaching of the cross was to the Jews a scandal, and to the Greeks for folly[^16] — the Apostle himself, the eminent doctor, appropriates to Christ not only wisdom but also virtue, so as to exclude infirmity from divinity: and he preferred to appropriate to him *virtue* rather than *power*, because *virtue* says ultimate power and the highest of power, as the Philosopher will have it[^17], that "virtue is the utmost of power"; therefore he preferred to appropriate to him *virtue*. Nor is it unfitting, from diverse considerations, that the same be appropriated now to one, now to another, since it equally belongs to the three. Hence to the Father we attribute power, lest he seem impotent on account of [his] antiquity; to the Son virtue, lest he seem impotent or weakened on account of the assumed infirmity. Nevertheless force must be put on [the distinction between] power and virtue, as was said in the thirty-second distinction.[^18]

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---

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 11: *At divinitatis vocabulum de persona usurpare non possumus.*

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 11: *But we cannot appropriate the term of "divinity" to the [single] person.*

la: Vers. 2. — Glossam Hieronymi invenies apud Lyranum in hunc locum.

en: Verse 2. — You will find Jerome's gloss in [Nicholas of] Lyra on this passage.

la: Vers. 20. — Glossa habetur apud Lyranum hunc in locum.

en: Verse 20. — The gloss is in Lyra on this passage.

la: Cod. Y et ed. 1 *contrarietatem*. Paulo superius pro *istae rationes* cod. V *illae auctoritates*.

en: Cod. Y and ed. 1 read *contrarietatem*. A little above, for *istae rationes* cod. V reads *illae auctoritates*.

la: De quo vide supra d. 15. p. I. q. 1.

en: On which see above d. 15, pars I, q. 1.

la: Argumentum Hilarii hoc est: Si verum esset, quod spiritus Dei non sit etiam spiritus Christi, tunc sequeretur, Christi et Dei naturam differre.

en: Hilary's argument is this: If it were true that the Spirit of God is not also the Spirit of Christ, then it would follow that the nature of Christ and of God differs.

la: Cfr. supra d. 11. q. 1. fundam. 1, et ibid. Scholion, n. V.

en: Cf. above d. 11, q. 1, fundamentum 1, and the same place, Scholion, n. V.

la: In fine solutionis auctoritate cod. Z, et contextu postulante, adiecimus *a Filio*, quod in Vat. desideratur. In eadem propositione cod. B et ed. 1 pro *spiritus et Deus* exhibent *Christus et Deus*, et dein etiam omittunt *a Filio*. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: At the end of the solution, on the authority of cod. Z, and as the context requires, we have added *a Filio*, which is wanting in the Vatican edition. In the same proposition cod. B and ed. 1, for *spiritus et Deus*, exhibit *Christus et Deus*, and then also omit *a Filio*. — This doubt is also resolved by St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: Intellige: non deberet urgere istam distinctionem. — Paulo superius post *significat* cod. V addit *ipsam*.

en: Understand: he should not press that distinction. — A little above, after *significat* cod. V adds *ipsam*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine, et d. XXXIII. c. 2. — Plura de hoc dubio habentur supra q. 1.

en: Book VII, *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 11. See also here the text of the Master, c. 1 at the end, and d. 33, c. 2. — More on this doubt is found above q. 1.

la: Sensus obiectionis est: cum in ista locutione secundum Magistrum in genitivo *Dei* implicetur superexcellentia respectu nominativi *tres personae*, quae quasi servientes vel subiectae considerantur, etiam genitivus *essentiae* idem importare videtur.

en: The sense of the objection is: since in that locution, according to the Master, super-excellence is implied in the genitive *Dei* with respect to the nominative *tres personae*, which are considered as serving or subject, the genitive *essentiae* also seems to import the same.

la: Accipe *quod* pro *quia*; legere mallemus *qui*. Paulo superius pro *ut possidentis* codd. L cum ed. 1 *vel possidentis*. Paulo inferius pro *declarationis* cod. T cum ed. 1 *declarantis*, codd. L O *determinantis*, plures alii codd. *declarationem*.

en: Take *quod* for *quia*; we should rather read *qui*. A little above, for *ut possidentis* the L codices with ed. 1 read *vel possidentis*. A little below, for *declarationis* cod. T with ed. 1 reads *declarantis*, codd. L O *determinantis*, several other codices *declarationem*.

la: In Vat. desiderantur verba *non autem: tres personae essentiae*, et paulo inferius post *genitivo* verba *nisi vel*.

en: In the Vatican edition the words *non autem: tres personae essentiae* are wanting, and a little below, after *genitivo*, the words *nisi vel*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. ad 6. — De vi genitivi vide supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3; d. 11. dub. 3, et d. 25. dub. 2.

en: Cf. above q. 2 ad 6. — On the force of the genitive see above d. 3, pars II, dub. 3; d. 11, dub. 3; and d. 25, dub. 2.

la: Quare Boeth. III. *de Consol.* prosa 2. beatitudinem, quae est supremum bonum, sic definit: *statum bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum*.

en: Hence Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 2, defines beatitude — which is the supreme good — thus: *a state perfect by the congregation of all goods*.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 1, 23: *Nos autem praedicamus Christum crucifixum, Iudaeis quidem scandalum, gentibus autem stultitiam, ipsis autem vocatis Iudaeis atque Graecis Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam.*

en: Epistle 1 Corinthians 1:23: *But we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews indeed a stumbling-block, but to the Gentiles foolishness; but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.*

la: Libr. I. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 116. (c. 11.), de quo vide supra pag. 564, nota 7.

en: Book I, *On the Heavens and the World*, text 116 (c. 11); on which see above p. 564, note 7.

la: Paulo ante pro *infirmitatem* Vat. *humanitatem*. — Verba *facienda est vis* etc. sensum habent: distinguendum est, accipiendo utrumque vocabulum sensu stricto. Cfr. etiam hic q. 3. ad ult. — Art. 2. q. 2.

en: A little before, for *infirmitatem* the Vatican edition reads *humanitatem*. — The words *facienda est vis* etc. have the sense: a distinction must be made, taking each word in a strict sense. Cf. also here q. 3 ad ult. — Art. 2, q. 2.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 35

title_alt:
De ideis — littera Magistri
On the ideas — text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXV.

#### Cap. I.

*De scientia, praescientia, providentia, dispositione et praedestinatione Dei.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (*Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum*, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 597–598) in Latin, followed by an English rendering.

Cumque supra[^1] disseruerimus ac plura dixerimus de his quae communiter secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, eorum tamen quaedam specialem efflagitant tractatum; de quibus amodo tractandum est, id est de scientia, praescientia, providentia, dispositione, praedestinatione, voluntate et potentia. — Sciendum est igitur, quod sapientia vel scientia Dei, cum sit una et simplex, tamen propter varios rerum status et diversos effectus plura ac diversa sortitur nomina. Dicitur enim non tantum scientia, sed etiam praescientia vel praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio et[^2] providentia.

#### Cap. II.

*De quibus sit praescientia vel praevidentia*[^3]*.*

Et est praescientia sive praevidentia de futuris tantum, sed de omnibus, de bonis scilicet et de malis.

#### Cap. III.

*De quibus dispositio.*

Dispositio vero de faciendis.

#### Cap. IV.

*De quibus praedestinatio.*

Praedestinatio de hominibus[^4] salvandis et de bonis, quibus et hic liberantur et in futuro coronabuntur. Praedestinavit enim Deus ab aeterno homines ad bona eligendo, et praedestinavit eis bona praeparando. Quod homines praedestinavit, Apostolus[^5] ostendit dicens: *Praedestinavit quos praescivit fieri conformes imaginis Filii sui*. Et alibi: *Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati*. Quod autem bona eis praeparaverit, propheta Isaias ostendit dicens: *Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus vel exspectantibus te*. Ergo ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam futuros bonos et beatos, id est elegit, ut essent boni et beati, et bona eis praedestinavit, id est praeparavit.

#### Cap. V.

*De quibus providentia.*

Providentia autem est gubernandorum, quae utique eodem modo videtur accipi, quo dispositio. Interdum tamen providentia accipitur pro praescientia.

#### Cap. VI.

*De quibus sapientia vel scientia.*

Sapientia vero vel scientia de omnibus est, scilicet bonis et malis, et de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, et non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis. Non enim ita scit Deus ista temporalia, ut se ipsum nesciat, sed ipse solus se ipsum perfecte novit, cuius scientiae comparatione omnis creaturae scientia imperfecta est.

#### Cap. VII.

*Utrum praescientia, vel dispositio Dei esse potuerit, si nulla essent futura.*

Hic considerari oportet, utrum scientia, vel praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio potuerit esse in Deo, si nulla fuissent futura. Cum enim praescientia sit futurorum, et dispositio faciendorum, et praedestinatio salvandorum, si nulla essent futura, si nihil esset facturus Deus, vel aliquos salvaturus, non videtur potuisse in Deo esse praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio; potuit autem Deus nulla praescire futura, potuit non creare aliquid, vel non salvare aliquos: potuit ergo non esse in Deo praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio. — Ad hoc autem ita a quibusdam opponitur: Si, inquiunt, potuit praescientia Dei non esse in Deo ab aeterno, et potuit non esse; si vero potuit non esse, cum praescientia Dei sit eius scientia,

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et scientia sit eius essentia: potuit ergo non esse ab aeterno id quod est divina essentia. Ita et de dispositione et praedestinatione, quae est divina essentia, obiiciunt. Addunt quoque et alia, ita dicentes: Si potuit Deus non praescire aliqua, cum idem sit Deo[^6] praescire quod scire, et scire quod esse; potuit ergo non esse. Item, cum idem sit Deo praescium esse et Deum esse, si potuit non esse praescius, potuit non esse Deus; potuit autem non esse praescius, si potuit nulla praescire; at potuit nulla praescire, quia potuit nulla facere.

Ad hoc iuxta modulum nostrae intelligentiae ita dicimus: Praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio ad aliquid dici videntur. Sicut enim creator ad creaturam relative dicitur, ita praescientia vel praescius ad futura referri videtur, et dispositio ad facienda, ac praedestinatio ad salvanda. Verumtamen creator ita relative dicitur, ut essentiam non significet. Praescientia vero vel praescius et in respectu futurorum dicitur, et essentiam designat; ita etiam dispositio et praedestinatio. Ideoque cum dicitur: si nulla essent futura, non esset in Deo praescientia, vel non esset Deus praescius, quia varia est ibi causa dicendi, distingui oportet rationem dicti. Cum ergo dicis: si nulla essent futura, non esset in Deo praescientia, vel non esset praescius[^7], si in dicendo hanc causam attendis, scilicet quia nulla essent subiecta eius praescientiae, unde ipsa possit dici praescientia, vel ipse praescius, quod utrumque dicitur propter futura; verus est intellectus. Sin autem ea ratione id dicis, quod non sit in eo scientia, qua praescit futura, vel quod ipse non sit Deus, qui est futurorum praescius, falsa est intelligentia. Similiter et illae locutiones determinandae sunt: potuit non esse praescientia Dei, vel potuit non esse praescius, et potuit Deus non praescire aliqua; id est, potuit esse, quod nulla futura subiecta essent eius scientiae, et ita non posset dici praescius vel praescire, vel eius scientia praescientia; non tamen eo minus ipse esset vel eius scientia, sed non posset dici praescius vel praescire vel praescientia, si eius scientiae futura nulla forent subiecta. Similiter de dispositione et praedestinatione vel providentia. Haec enim, ut dictum est, ad temporalia referuntur et de temporalibus tantum sunt.

#### Cap. VIII.

*Quod scientia Dei sit de temporalibus et aeternis.*

Scientia vero vel sapientia non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis est; ideoque, etsi nulla fuissent futura, esset tamen in Deo scientia eadem, quae modo est, nec minor esset quam modo nec maior[^8] quam esset. Scivit ergo Deus ab aeterno aeternum et omne quod futurum erat, et scivit immutabiliter. Scit quoque non minus praeterita vel futura quam praesentia, et sua aeterna sapientia et immutabili scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur. « Omnis enim ratio supernae et terrenae[^9] sapientiae, ut ait Ambrosius, in eo est, quia omnem sapientiam et essentiam capit sua immensa scientia ».

#### Cap. IX.

*Quomodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo et vita in eo.*

Propterea[^10] omnia dicuntur esse in Deo et fuisse ab aeterno. Unde Augustinus super Genesim[^11]: « Haec visibilia, inquit, antequam fierent, non erant. Quomodo ergo Deo nota erant quae non erant? Et rursus: Quomodo ea faceret quae sibi nota non erant? non enim quidquam fecit ignorans. Nota ergo fecit, non facta cognovit. Proinde, antequam fierent, et erant et non erant: erant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua natura. Ipsi autem Deo non audeo dicere alio modo innotuisse, cum ea fecisset, quam illo quo ea noverat, ut faceret, apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio ». — Ecce hic habes, quod haec visibilia, antequam fierent, in Dei scientia erant. Ex hoc igitur sensu omnia dicuntur esse in Deo, et omne quod factum est dicitur[^12] esse vita in ipso: non ideo, quod creatura sit Creator, vel quod ista temporalia essentialiter sint in Deo, sed quia in eius scientia semper sunt, quae vita est.

Inde est etiam, quod omnia dicuntur ei praesentia esse, non solum ea quae sunt, sed etiam ea quae praeterierunt, et ea quae futura sunt, secundum illud[^13]: *Qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt:* « quia, ut ait Ambrosius in libro de Trinitate[^14], ita cognoscit ea quae non sunt, ut ea quae sunt». Et hac ratione omnia dicuntur esse in eo vel apud eum sive ei praesentia. Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi[^15]: « Et pulchritudo agri mecum est, ideo, inquit, mecum est, quia apud Deum nihil praeteriit, nihil futurum est. Cum illo sunt omnia futura, et ei non detrahuntur praeterita. Cum illo sunt omnia cognitione quadam ineffabili sapientiae Dei». — Ecce hic aperit Augustinus, ex qua intelligentia accipienda sint huiusmodi verba: omnia sunt Deo praesentia, in Deo sunt omnia, vel cum Deo, vel apud Deum, vel in eo vita; quia ineffabilis omnium cognitio in eo est.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXXV.

#### Chapter I.

*On the science, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, and predestination of God.*

Since we have above[^1] discoursed and said many things about those things which are commonly said of God according to substance, certain of these nevertheless demand a special treatment; concerning which we must from now on treat — that is, of science, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, predestination, will, and power. — It must be known, therefore, that the wisdom or science of God, although it is one and simple, nevertheless on account of the various states of things and diverse effects obtains many and diverse names. For it is called not only *science*, but also *foreknowledge* or *foresight*, *disposition*, *predestination*, and[^2] *providence*.

#### Chapter II.

*Of which things foreknowledge or foresight is*[^3]*.*

And foreknowledge or foresight is of future things only, but [is] of all of them, namely of good and of evil [things].

#### Chapter III.

*Of which things disposition is.*

Disposition, however, is of things to be done.

#### Chapter IV.

*Of which things predestination is.*

Predestination is of men[^4] to be saved, and of the goods by which they are both delivered here and shall be crowned in the future. For God from eternity predestined men to goods by electing [them], and predestined goods for them by preparing [them]. That He predestined men, the Apostle[^5] shows when he says: *He predestined those whom He foreknew to be made conformable to the image of His Son*. And elsewhere: *He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy and unspotted*. That He has prepared goods for them, the prophet Isaiah shows when he says: *Eye has not seen, O God, besides You, what You have prepared for those who love You or wait for You*. Therefore from eternity He predestined certain ones who were going to be good and blessed — that is, He chose [them], that they might be good and blessed — and predestined goods for them, that is, prepared [them].

#### Chapter V.

*Of which things providence is.*

Providence, however, is of things to be governed; which assuredly seems to be taken in the same way as disposition. Sometimes nevertheless providence is taken for foreknowledge.

#### Chapter VI.

*Of which things wisdom or science is.*

Wisdom, however, or science is of all things, namely of good and evil, and of present, past, and future things, and not only of temporal but also of eternal [things]. For God does not so know these temporal things that He should not know Himself, but He alone perfectly knows Himself; in comparison with whose science the science of every creature is imperfect.

#### Chapter VII.

*Whether the foreknowledge or disposition of God could exist, if no future things were to be.*

Here it must be considered whether science, or foreknowledge, or disposition, or predestination could be in God, if no future things had been [going to be]. For since foreknowledge is of future things, and disposition of things to be done, and predestination of those to be saved — if no future things were [to be], if God were not going to do anything, or to save anyone, foreknowledge or disposition or predestination does not seem to have been able to be in God; but God could foreknow no future things, He could not create anything, or not save any: He could therefore not have foreknowledge, or disposition, or predestination. — But to this it is thus objected by some: If, they say, God's foreknowledge could not be in God from eternity, and could not be; if indeed it could not be, since God's foreknowledge is His science,

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and [His] science is His essence: therefore that which is the divine essence could not have been from eternity. So also concerning disposition and predestination, which are the divine essence, they object. They add yet other things, speaking thus: If God could not foreknow some things — since for God[^6] to foreknow is the same as to know, and to know is the same as to be — He could therefore not be. Likewise, since for God to be foreknowing is the same as to be God, if He could not be foreknowing, He could not be God; but He could not be foreknowing, if He could foreknow nothing; but He could foreknow nothing, because He could do nothing.

To this, according to the measure of our understanding, we say thus: foreknowledge, or disposition, or predestination seem to be said relative to something. For just as the creator is said relatively to the creature, so foreknowledge or [being] foreknowing seems to be referred to future things, and disposition to things to be done, and predestination to things to be saved. Yet *creator* is said relatively in such a way as not to signify the essence. But *foreknowledge*, or *foreknowing*, is said both with respect to future things, and signifies the essence; and so also disposition and predestination. And therefore when it is said: if no future things were [to be], there would be no foreknowledge in God, nor would God be foreknowing[^7] — since the cause of speaking is various here, the reason of the saying must be distinguished. Therefore when you say: if no future things were [to be], there would be no foreknowledge in God, nor would He be foreknowing, if in saying [this] you attend to this cause, namely that there would be no things subject to His foreknowledge, whence it could be called foreknowledge, or He foreknowing — both of which are said on account of future things — the understanding is true. But if you say it on this ground, that there would not be in Him the science by which He foreknows future things, or that He Himself would not be God who is foreknowing of future things, the understanding is false. Likewise also those locutions must be determined: there could be no foreknowledge of God, or He could not be foreknowing, or God could not foreknow some things; that is, it could be that no future things would be subject to His science, and so He could not be called foreknowing, or to foreknow, or His science foreknowledge; not, however, that He any the less would be, or His science [be], but [that] He could not be called foreknowing or to foreknow, or His [knowledge be called] foreknowledge, if no future things were subject to His science. Likewise concerning disposition and predestination or providence. For these, as has been said, are referred to temporal things, and are only of temporal things.

#### Chapter VIII.

*That the science of God is of temporal and of eternal things.*

But science or wisdom is not only of temporal but also of eternal things; and therefore, even if no future things had been [to be], there would still be in God the same science as there is now, neither would it be less than now nor greater[^8] than it would be. Therefore God knew from eternity the eternal and all that was to be, and knew immutably. He also knows past or future things no less than present, and by His eternal and immutable wisdom He Himself knows all things which are known. "For all the reason of supernal and earthly[^9] wisdom — as Ambrose says — is in this, that His immense science encompasses all wisdom and essence."

#### Chapter IX.

*How all things are said to be in God and life in Him.*

Therefore[^10] all things are said to be in God and to have been from eternity. Whence Augustine, on Genesis[^11]: "These visible things, he says, before they were made, were not. How then were they known to God which were not? And again: How would He have made those things which were not known to Him? for He did not make anything in ignorance. He therefore made known things, He did not [merely] come to know things [already] made. Accordingly, before they were made, both they were and they were not: they were in God's science, they were not in their own nature. As to God Himself, however, I dare not say that they became known to Him in any other way, when He had made them, than that by which He knew them in order to make them — with whom is no transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude." — Behold, here you have it, that these visible things, before they were made, were in the science of God. From this sense, therefore, all things are said to be in God, and everything that has been made is said[^12] to be life in Him: not for the reason that the creature is the Creator, or that these temporal things are essentially in God, but because they are always in His science, which is life.

Hence it is also that all things are said to be present to Him — not only those things which are, but also those which have passed away, and those which are to come, according to that[^13]: *Who calls things that are not, as those that are:* "because, as Ambrose says in his book *On the Trinity*[^14], He so knows the things that are not as the things that are." And by this reason all things are said to be in Him or with Him or to be present to Him. Whence Augustine, on that place of the Psalm[^15]: "*And the beauty of the field is with me*: therefore, he says, it is with me, because with God nothing has passed away, nothing is to come. With Him are all future things, and past things are not taken from Him. With Him are all things by a certain ineffable knowledge of God's wisdom." — Behold, here Augustine opens up out of what understanding such expressions are to be received: *all things are present to God*, *in God are all things*, or *with God*, or *near God*, or *in Him is life*; because the ineffable cognition of all things is in Him.

---

la: *Dist.* VIII. XIX. XXII. XXX.

en: Distinctions VIII, XIX, XXII, XXX.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 6 omittunt *praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio* et contra omnes codd. et ed. I aliasque edd., quae tamen aliquatenus inter se differunt.

en: The Vatican and editions 4, 6 omit *praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio* ("foresight, disposition, predestination"), against all the codices and ed. I and the other editions, which nevertheless differ somewhat among themselves.

la: Ita melius codd. A B D, alii cum plurimis edd. *providentia*. In ipso capitulo plurimae edd. falso habent *sive providentia non de futuris*.

en: Thus better codices A B D; the others with most editions [read] *providentia* ("providence"). In the chapter [heading] itself, most editions falsely have *sive providentia non de futuris* ("or providence not of future things").

la: Ita codd. A B D E et edd. 1, 6: cod. C et aliae edd. omittunt. Non quidem excludendi sunt Angeli, sed Magister etiam in sequentibus tantum de hominibus explicite loquitur. Immediate post Vat. cum plurimis edd. repetit *omnibus* ante *bonis*.

en: Thus codices A B D E and editions 1, 6: codex C and the other editions omit. Indeed the Angels are not to be excluded, but the Master also in what follows speaks explicitly only of men. Immediately after, the Vatican with most editions repeats *omnibus* ("all") before *bonis* ("good").

la: Rom. 8, 29. Vulgata: *Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui*. — Alius locus est Ephes. I, 4, ubi Vulgata post *nos* addit: *in ipso*; tertius locus conflatus est ex Isai. 64, 4, et I. Cor. 2, 9.

en: Romans 8:29. The Vulgate: *For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son*. — The other passage is Ephesians 1:4, where the Vulgate adds after *nos* ("us"): *in ipso* ("in Him"); the third passage is conflated from Isaiah 64:4 and 1 Corinthians 2:9.

la: Vat. cum plurimis edd. *Deum* contra codd. et ed. I.

en: The Vatican with most editions [reads] *Deum* ("God" [accusative]), against the codices and ed. I.

la: Cod. D addit *Deus*; et paulo inferius idem cum codd. A E et ed. I *ex ea ratione* pro *ea ratione*.

en: Codex D adds *Deus* ("God"); and a little below the same [codex] with codices A E and ed. I [reads] *ex ea ratione* ("on this ground") in place of *ea ratione* ("by this reason").

la: Ita recte codd. C D cum omnibus edd.; cod. A *maior esset quam modo*, B E *maior quam modo*.

en: Thus rightly codices C D with all editions; codex A [reads] *maior esset quam modo* ("would be greater than now"), [codices] B E *maior quam modo* ("greater than now").

la: In Epistolam ad Colos. 2, 3; nonnullis immutatis. In quo textu fide codd. A B D E, ed. I et originalis restituimus *terrenae* pro *aeternae*.

en: [Ambrose] on the Epistle to the Colossians 2:3, with some [words] altered. In which text, on the faith of codices A B D E, ed. I, and the original, we have restored *terrenae* ("earthly") in place of *aeternae* ("eternal").

la: Codd. A C E *Praeterea*.

en: Codices A C E [read] *Praeterea* ("Moreover") [in place of *Propterea*, "Therefore"].

la: Libr. V. c. 18. n. 36. — Locus s. Scripturae est Iac. 1, 17.

en: Book V, c. 18, n. 36 [of Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*]. — The Scripture passage is James 1:17.

la: Ioan. 1, 3, 4, secundum lectionem antiquam: *quod factum est, in ipso vita erat*.

en: John 1:3–4, according to the ancient reading: *what has been made, was life in Him*.

en: Romans 4:17.

la: Id est V. *de Fide ad Gratian*. c. 16. n. 198.

en: That is, [Ambrose] book V *On the Faith, to Gratian*, c. 16, n. 198.

la: Psalm. 19, 11; August. in hunc Psalm. n. 18, nonnullis a Magistro omissis vel mutatis.

en: Psalm 19:11 (Vulgate); Augustine *Enarratio in Psalmum* on this Psalm, n. 18, with some [things] omitted or altered by the Master. ---

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 J4 Class D/E repair.** Health scan flagged defs=15/la=16/en=16 (duplicate `[^3]` anchor).
Diagnosed against 400dpi printed p.597 (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-597.png`, pdf p.187, offset
`pdf = printed - 410`): a small mislabel cluster, not a benign double-cite. The chunk had placed
`[^2]` after "praevidentia" in Cap. I's list of names (*praescientia vel praevidentia, dispositio,
praedestinatio et providentia*) and `[^3]` after "et" at the end of that same list. The printed
page shows only ONE superscript in that sentence — a "²" positioned after "et", immediately before
"providentia" — with no mark at all after "praevidentia". Def `[^2]`'s content ("Vat. et edd. 4, 6
omittunt *praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio* ...") describes the omission of the whole
preceding list of names and matches the "et___providentia" position exactly, confirming that spot
is the genuine `[^2]`. Def `[^3]`'s content ("Ita melius codd. A B D ... *providentia*. In ipso
capitulo plurimae edd. falso habent *sive providentia non de futuris*") is about the Cap. II
chapter-heading reading and matches only the Cap. II heading's "praevidentia" superscript-3
(confirmed present on the printed page), which the chunk already had correctly labeled. Fix:
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the surviving Cap. I marker from `[^3]` to `[^2]` (both languages) so it matches its def content
and position. Cap. II's `[^3]` (heading) was untouched — it was already correct. No Latin wording,
English wording, or apparatus prose was changed; only marker labels/positions. Post-fix: defs=15,
la=15, en=15, all matching, no dupes. Not the §2 backtick-blockquote false-positive pattern — the
chunk's blockquote intro note contains no `[^N]` tokens at all.


title: Dist. 35, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXV. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXV. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 599 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXV.

#### *De scientia Dei in generali secundum se.*

> *Cumque supra disseruerimus ac plura dixerimus* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de sacramento Trinitatis et Unitatis; in hac parte agit de conditionibus, secundum quas est in Deo ratio causalitatis, quae sunt scilicet potentia, sapientia et voluntas. Habet autem haec pars tres partes. In quarum prima agit de scientia; in secunda de potentia, infra distinctione quadragesima secunda: *Nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est;* in tertia de voluntate, infra distinctione quadragesima quinta: *Iam de voluntate Dei* etc.

Prima pars habet tres[^1]. In prima agit de scientia in generali secundum se. In secunda agit de modis divinae cognitionis, utrum Deus cognoscat mutabiliter, vel immutabiliter, et quo modo, distinctione trigesima octava: *Nunc ergo ad propositum revertentes.* In tertia vero agit quantum ad speciales effectus, infra distinctione quadragesima: *Praedestinatio vero est de bonis salutaribus.*

Prima pars dividitur in tres. In prima Magister determinat de ipsa Dei scientia. In secunda, quia res agnitae sunt in sciente per modum scientis, determinat, quomodo res sunt in Deo, infra distinctione trigesima sexta: *Solet hic quaeri, cum omnia dicantur esse in Dei cognitione.* In tertia vero incidenter determinat, quomodo Deus est in rebus infra distinctione trigesima septima: *Et quoniam demonstratum est ex parte.*

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, tres habet[^2]. In prima, cum Dei scientia sit una, determinat, quomodo sortitur plura nomina. In secunda, cum Dei scientia vel praescientia sit aeterna, determinat, quomodo se habeat ad temporalia vel creata, ibi: *Hic considerari oportet, utrum scientia vel praescientia.* In tertia, cum Dei scientia sit ens, quomodo cognoscat non entia, ibi: *Propterea omnia dicuntur esse in Deo* etc.

In prima parte, se ipsum continuans dicit, quod divina essentia plura habet nomina propter connotata[^3]. In secunda dicit, quod Dei scientia esset, si nihil futurum esset, et esset scientia, sed non diceretur praescientia. In tertia ostendit, quod omnes res[^4] habent rationes in Deo, per quas cognoscuntur et sunt in ipsa, et ita omnia sunt sibi praesentia; et sic patet divisio et sententia. Subdivisiones enim[^5] partium manifestae sunt in littera.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de ratione divinae cognitionis, quae idea consuevit appellari.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit ponenda ratio idealis.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum rem.

Tertio, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum rationem.

Quarto, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum numerum universalium, an singularium.

Quinto, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum numerum finitum, vel infinitum.

Sexto, utrum in ideis sit pluralitas secundum numerum ordinatum, vel confusum.

---

english:
<!-- page 599 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXXV.

#### *On the knowledge of God in general, in itself.*

> *"And since above we have discoursed and said many things"* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the mystery of the Trinity and of the Unity; in this part he treats of the conditions according to which there is in God the formal character of causality, which are namely power, wisdom and will. Now this part has three divisions. In the first of which he treats of knowledge; in the second of power, below at distinction forty-two: *"Now it must be treated of the omnipotence of God;"* in the third of will, below at distinction forty-five: *"Now of the will of God"* etc.

The first part has three [divisions][^1]. In the first he treats of knowledge in general, in itself. In the second he treats of the modes of divine cognition, whether God knows mutably or immutably, and in what way, at distinction thirty-eight: *"Now therefore returning to our proposed subject."* In the third he treats with regard to special effects, below at distinction forty: *"Predestination, however, concerns saving goods."*

The first part is divided into three. In the first the Master determines concerning God's knowledge itself. In the second, because things known are in the knower after the manner of the knower, he determines how things are in God, below at distinction thirty-six: *"It is wont here to be asked, since all things are said to be in God's cognition."* In the third he determines incidentally how God is in things, below at distinction thirty-seven: *"And since it has been demonstrated in part."*

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has three [divisions][^2]. In the first, since God's knowledge is one, he determines how it receives many names. In the second, since God's knowledge or foreknowledge is eternal, he determines how it stands with respect to temporal or created things, there: *"Here it must be considered, whether knowledge or foreknowledge."* In the third, since God's knowledge is of being, [he determines] how it knows non-beings, there: *"Therefore all things are said to be in God"* etc.

In the first part, continuing himself, he says that the divine essence has many names on account of what it connotes[^3]. In the second he says that God's knowledge would be, if nothing were future, and would be knowledge, but would not be called foreknowledge. In the third he shows that all things[^4] have their formal grounds in God, through which they are known and are in him, and thus all things are present to him; and so the division and sense are clear. For[^5] the subdivisions of the parts are evident in the letter [of the text itself].

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction it is asked concerning the formal character of divine cognition, which is wont to be called *idea*.

First it is asked, whether in God an ideal *ratio* is to be posited.

Second, given that it is, it is asked whether it has plurality according to the thing.

Third, whether it has plurality according to the *ratio*.

Fourth, whether it has plurality according to a number of universals, or of singulars.

Fifth, whether it has plurality according to a finite or an infinite number.

Sixth, whether in the ideas there is plurality according to an ordered or a confused number.

---

la: Cod. I subiungit *partes*.

en: Codex I subjoins *partes* ("divisions").

la: Vat. addit *partes*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *partes* ("divisions").

la: Vat. ante *connotata* repetit *nomina*, codd. non suffragantibus.

en: The Vatican edition before *connotata* repeats *nomina* ("names"), the codices not supporting [it].

la: Pro *omnes res*, quam lectionem ex codd. P Q restituimus, ceteri codd. cum ed. 1 substituunt solummodo *omnes*; Vat. *omnia*.

en: For *omnes res* ("all things"), which reading we have restored from codices P and Q, the remaining codices with edition 1 substitute only *omnes* ("all"); the Vatican edition [reads] *omnia* ("all things", neuter).

la: Cod. V *autem*.

en: Codex V [reads] *autem* ("however") [for *enim* ("for")]. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]