title: Dist. 26, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri.
Doubts on the letter of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 462 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Hieronymus: *Ab Arianorum praeside novellum nomen a me homini Romano exigitur*. Si enim est novellum, cum Apostolus dicat primae ad Timotheum ultimo[^1], *vocum novitates esse vitandas*, nullo modo debuit concedere. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, quod «hypostasis est substantia cum accidentibus»; sed in divinis non cadit accidens, ergo nec nomen *hypostasis*: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod novitas uno modo sonat in vitium, alio modo non. Quando est talis adinventio, quod sententiam etiam facit, quae non habet ortum ex veritate antiqua, tunc est vere novellum; et sic dicit Apostolus esse fugiendum, unde addit *profanas*. Sed illud verbum quantum ad intellectum sanum non erat novum, sed quantum ad intellectum, quem haeretici supponebant. — Quod obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, dicendum, quod nomen *hypostasis* de se non importat respectum ad accidens, sed solum ad proprietatem distinguentem, quae, quia in creaturis est accidens, ideo dicit *substantiam*[^2] *cum accidentibus*; non sic autem est in Deo.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *venenum latet sub melle*; quia cum hoc non dicat nisi propter errorem coniunctum, videtur, quod talia nomina[^3] omnino essent fugienda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod venenum non latebat sub nomine, sed sub eorum intentione, sive occasione[^4], qui ex hoc occasionaliter volebant inducere in haeresim. — Vel potest dici, quod venenum latebat non quantum ad significationem, sed propter dubitationem; et ideo nunc, cum determinata sit eius significatio, absque dubio est utendum[^5].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod *aliud est genuisse et natum esse*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia cum *aliud* dicat diversitatem in essentia, secundum hoc videtur[^6], quod generatio activa et nativitas differant per essentiam; quod est contra fidem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *aliud* non dicit ibi diversitatem a parte rei absolutae, sed per comparationem ad dicentem et intelligentem, quasi dicat[^7]: aliud est dicere sive intelligere, Patrem generare, et huiusmodi; sed huic alietati non subest diversitas essentiae, sed alietas proprietatis.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *proprium est Patris, non quia non est natus*. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dicitur infra distinctione vigesima octava[^8], ubi dicitur, quod hoc quod est *ingenitus* est proprium Patris, sed *ingenitum* non est aliud dicere quam *non genitum*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de hoc quod est *non natus*, secundum quod dicit puram negationem; et sic non dicit proprietatem. *Ingenitus* enim, prout est proprietas, non est negatio pura.

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de ista ratione Augustini, qua dicit, quod *in Deo nihil dicitur secundum accidens, quia nihil est in eo mutabile aut amissibile*. Videtur enim ratio non valere, quia aliqua sunt accidentia inseparabilia[^9]; et talia non sunt amissibilia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut ipse idem Augustinus[^10] dicit, omne accidens aut est per naturam suam amissibile, aut potest circa subiectum suum intendi vel remitti. Et ipse non dicit, quod sit accidens tantum, quia potest amitti, sed quia potuit advenire rei prius existenti vel recedere a re iam existente, vel saltem intendi vel remitti sive variari. — Et si tu obiicias, quod accidentia non possunt alterari, secundum Boethium[^11]; verum est de alteratione a subiecto in subiectum; tamen certum est, quod in eodem intenduntur et remittuntur. — Aliter

<!-- page 463 -->

potest dici, quod accidens potest comparari ad subiectum primum et ad subiectum proximum[^12]. Et habito respectu ad subiectum primum, omne accidens dicit adveniens, quod est possibile etiam abesse, quamvis non respectu subiecti, quod est subiectum et causa[^13]. — Tertius modus dicendi est iste, quod illud solum est per naturam immutabile, quod est omnino simplex. Si ergo Deus est omnino immutabilis, ergo est omnino simplex; et in nullo simplici est accidens[^14]: ergo in nullo immutabili est ponere accidens. Si ergo Pater est immutabilis, et in eo est paternitas: ergo non est accidens.

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *filii Dei sumus per facturam*; quia secundum istum modum dicendi, cum asinus sit factus, videtur quod possit dici Dei filius; et similiter, quod arca, quae facta est ab artifice, possit dici filia artificis; quorum neutrum conceditur. Si tu dicas, quod oportet quod sit ad imaginem Dei factus; contra: diabolus est ad imaginem Dei factus: ergo diabolus est filius Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc quod dico *filius* duo dicit, scilicet ortum et imitationem. Dicendum ergo, quod est imitatio per omnimodam assimilationem; et sic Filius naturalis imitatur Patrem, et quia non habet socium in imitando sic, ideo solus ipse est Filius naturalis. Est iterum[^15] imitatio expressa; et haec consistit in imagine, et haec tenet adhuc rationem filii et facturae. Est iterum imitatio longinqua; et haec tenet tantum rationem facturae, non filii. Sed attendendum, quod imitatio expressa aut[^16] consistit in sua conditione, aut est insignita ulterius sua perfectione et decore, aut est privata honore et deformata a sua conditione. Primo modo dicitur filius factura; secundo modo, filius factura et adoptione: tertio modo, neutro modo dicitur filius, nisi valde improprie et cum additione distrahente; quia Dominus Ioannis octavo[^17] dicit, peccatores habere patrem diabolum, propterea quod a Deo recedunt, et imitantur eum.

### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de distinctione illorum trium, quae ponit Hilarius, scilicet *originem, veritatem et nativitatem*; et dicendum, quod haec tria dicit ad excludendum tres haereses. Contra Photinum dicit *origine*, non *adoptione*; quia Photinus dicebat, Christum esse filium Dei adoptivum. Contra Sabellium dicit *veritate*, non *nuncupatione*; quia ipse dicebat, quod idem ipse primo nuncupabatur[^18] pater, postea filius. Contra Arium dicit *nativitate*, non *creatione*; quia Arius dicebat, Filium Dei esse creaturam.

### DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *dicitur relative, quamvis ei vicissim non respondeat vocabulum*. Videtur enim falsum, quia «proprium[^19] est relativorum dici ad convertentiam»: ergo si non dicuntur ad convertentiam, non dicuntur relative.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud verum est, si nomen impositum est utrique extremo; alioquin si deficit ex una parte, non dicitur: ut si dicatur *remus navis*[^20]. Similiter vult dicere Augustinus, quod sub istis nominibus *Pater* et *Filius* non referuntur ad Spiritum sanctum. Sed tamen, ubi deficiunt nomina, Philosophus docet *fingere*[^21], sed in divinis

<!-- page 464 -->

melius est tacere quam fingere, propter vitandum errorem.

### DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ibi non potuit inveniri usitatum vocabulum. Videtur enim falsum, quia ita bene *spirator* dicitur ad spiritum, sicut *donator* ad donum.

**Respondeo:** Unus modus dicendi est, quod Augustinus non loquitur simpliciter de hoc nomine *Spiritus*, sed de hoc toto *Spiritus sanctus*. — Vel aliter, hoc dicit, quia *spirator* tunc non erat nomen usitatum, ut *donator*.

### DUB. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *donator non dicitur nisi ex tempore*; quia secundum hoc nec *donum* dicitur nisi ex tempore, cum relativa sint *simul natura*[^22].

Et ad hoc dicendum, quod potest dici ab actu donandi vel ab habitu. Primo modo dicitur solum ex tempore, sic et[^23] *donum*; secundo modo dicitur ab aeterno.

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what Jerome says: *From the leader of the Arians a new name is being demanded of me, a Roman man*. For if it is new, since the Apostle says in the last [chapter] of the first [Letter] to Timothy[^1] that *novelties of words are to be avoided*, [Jerome] in no way ought to have conceded [it]. Furthermore, Damascene says that «*hypostasis* is substance with accidents»; but in the divine [things] no accident falls, therefore neither [does] the name *hypostasis*: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *novelty* in one way sounds [as] a vice, in another way not. When such is the invention that it also produces a meaning which does not have its origin from the ancient truth, then it is truly *novel*; and so the Apostle says it is to be fled, whence he adds *profane*. But that word, as to the sound understanding, was not new, but [only] as to the understanding which the heretics supposed. — As to what is objected from the authority of Damascene, it must be said that the name *hypostasis* of itself does not import a respect to accident, but only to a distinguishing property which, because in creatures it is an accident, [Damascene] therefore says *substance*[^2] *with accidents*; but it is not so in God.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *poison lurks under honey*; because since he does not say this except on account of the error attached [to it], it seems that such names[^3] ought altogether to be fled.

**I respond:** It must be said that the poison did not lurk under the name, but under the intention or occasion[^4] of those who from this wished occasionally to lead [people] into heresy. — Or it can be said that the poison lurked not as to the signification, but on account of the doubt; and therefore now, since its signification has been determined, it is to be used without doubt[^5].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says, that *to have begotten and to have been born are different (aliud)*. For he seems to say [it] ill, because since *aliud* (different) states diversity in essence, according to this it seems[^6] that active generation and nativity differ through essence; which is against the faith.

**I respond:** It must be said that *aliud* there does not state a diversity on the side of the absolute thing, but [only] by comparison to the one speaking and understanding, as if he were saying[^7]: it is one thing to say or to understand the Father to generate, and another thing [to say or understand] the like; but under this otherness no diversity of essence underlies, but [only] otherness of property.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *it is proper to the Father, not because he is not born*. For he seems to say [something] against what is said below in the twenty-eighth distinction[^8], where it is said that this which is *unbegotten* (*ingenitus*) is proper to the Father, but to say *unbegotten* (*ingenitum*) is not other than [to say] *not begotten* (*non genitum*).

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine speaks of this which is *not born* (*non natus*) inasmuch as it states a pure negation; and so it does not state a property. For *ingenitus*, insofar as it is a property, is not a pure negation.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this argument of Augustine's, by which he says that *in God nothing is said according to accident, because nothing in him is changeable or losable*. For the argument seems not to hold, because some accidents are inseparable[^9]; and such are not losable.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine himself says[^10], every accident either is by its own nature losable, or it can be intensified or remitted in regard to its subject. And he does not say that it is an accident only because it can be lost, but because it could come upon a thing previously existing or recede from a thing already existing, or at least be intensified or remitted or varied. — And if you object that accidents cannot be altered, according to Boethius[^11]; this is true of alteration from subject to subject; nevertheless it is certain that in the same [subject] they are intensified and remitted. — Otherwise

it can be said that an accident can be compared to its first subject and to its proximate subject[^12]. And, having regard to the first subject, every accident states something supervening, which it is also possible to be absent, although not in respect of the subject which is the subject and cause[^13]. — A third way of saying [it] is this, that that alone is by nature unchangeable which is altogether simple. If therefore God is altogether unchangeable, therefore he is altogether simple; and in nothing simple is there an accident[^14]: therefore in nothing unchangeable is there to be posited an accident. If therefore the Father is unchangeable, and in him is paternity: therefore it is not an accident.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *we are sons of God by making (per facturam)*; because according to this manner of speaking, since an ass has been made, it seems that he could be called a son of God; and likewise, that an ark which has been made by a craftsman could be called a daughter of the craftsman; neither of which is conceded. If you say that he ought to have been made to the image of God; on the contrary: the devil has been made to the image of God: therefore the devil is a son of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that this which I call *son* states two [things], namely origin and imitation. It must therefore be said that there is an imitation by every-mode assimilation; and thus the natural Son imitates the Father, and because he has no companion in imitating thus, therefore he alone is the natural Son. There is, again[^15], an expressed imitation; and this consists in [the] image, and this still keeps the account of son and of *factura* (made-thing). There is, again, a remote imitation; and this keeps only the account of *factura*, not of son. But it must be attended to that an expressed imitation either[^16] consists in its [proper] condition, or is further marked out by its perfection and adornment, or is deprived of honor and deformed from its condition. In the first way it is called a son a *factura*; in the second way, a son by making and by adoption: in the third way, in no way is one called a son, except very improperly and with a distracting addition; because the Lord, in John 8[^17], says that sinners have the devil for father, on account of the fact that they recede from God and imitate him.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about the distinction of those three [things] which Hilary posits, namely *origin, truth, and nativity*; and it must be said that he states these three to exclude three heresies. Against Photinus he says *by origin*, not *by adoption*; because Photinus said that Christ was an adopted son of God. Against Sabellius he says *by truth*, not *by name (nuncupatione)*; because he said that the same one was first named[^18] *father*, [and] afterwards *son*. Against Arius he says *by nativity*, not *by creation*; because Arius said that the Son of God was a creature.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *it is said relatively, although a [reciprocal] vocable does not in turn correspond to it*. For it seems false, because «it is proper[^19] to relatives to be said in convertibility»: therefore if they are not said in convertibility, they are not said relatively.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true if a name has been imposed on each extreme; otherwise, if it fails on one side, it is not said: as if one were to say *the oar of a ship*[^20]. Similarly Augustine wishes to say that under these names *Father* and *Son* [the relations] are not referred to the Holy Spirit. But yet, where names fail, the Philosopher teaches one to *fashion* [a name][^21], but in the divine [things]

it is better to be silent than to fashion [one], on account of avoiding error.

### Doubt IX.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that there a customary vocable could not be found. For it seems false, because *spirator* (one who breathes) is just as well said in relation to spirit, as *donator* (giver) [is said in relation] to gift.

**I respond:** One way of saying [it] is that Augustine does not speak simply about this name *Spiritus* (Spirit), but about this whole [name] *Spiritus sanctus* (Holy Spirit). — Or otherwise, he says this because *spirator* was at that time not a customary name, as *donator* [was].

### Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *donator is not said except from time*; because according to this, neither is *donum* (gift) said except from time, since relatives are *simultaneous in nature*[^22].

And to this it must be said that [*donator*] can be said either from the act of giving or from a habitus. In the first way it is said only from time, and so also[^23] *donum*; in the second way it is said from eternity.

---

la: Vers. 20. — Verba Damasceni vide supra pag. 410, nota 2.

en: Verse 20 (1 Tim. 6, 20). — For the words of Damascene see above page 410, note 2.

la: Maior pars codd. cum Vat. *subiectum* pro *substantiam*, at cod. T rectius et cum praecedentibus magis convenienter *substantiam*.

en: The greater part of the codices, with the Vatican [edition], [read] *subiectum* (subject) in place of *substantiam* (substance), but codex *T* more correctly and more in agreement with what precedes [reads] *substantiam*.

la: Agitur de nomine *hypostasis* et *usia*. — Pro immediate sequenti voce *omnino* plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *omnia*. Paulo superius Vat. cum aliquibus mss. non bene per errorem loco *propter errorem*.

en: The matter concerns the name *hypostasis* and *usia*. — In place of the word that immediately follows, *omnino* (altogether), several codices with edition 1 [read] *omnia* (all). A little above, the Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] *non bene per errorem* in place of *propter errorem*.

la: Codd. *aa bb* omittunt *sive occasione*.

en: Codices *aa bb* omit *sive occasione* (or occasion).

la: Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 nec non verbis Magistri, *tenendum*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1 as well as the words of the Master, [reads] *tenendum* (to be held).

la: Verbum *videtur* a mss. et ed. 1 exhibitum, a Vat. abest.

en: The word *videtur* (it seems), exhibited by the manuscripts and by edition 1, is absent from the Vatican [edition].

la: Codd. *G Y* cum ed. 1 *diceret*. Deinde post *huiusmodi* Vat. *et* pro *sed*.

en: Codices *G Y* with edition 1 [read] *diceret* (he might say). Then, after *huiusmodi*, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *et* (and) in place of *sed* (but).

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 1. seqq. Cfr. ibid. in Comment. q. I. 2.

en: *Letter* of the Master, c. 1 and following. Cf. *ibid.* in the Commentary, q. 1, 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 28. (c. 3.), et Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Accidente*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. *Physics* text 28 (c. 3), and Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter *On Accident*.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 8. seq., ubi et mentionem facit divisionis accidentium separabilium et inseparabilium. — Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. tantum post *naturam suam* inserit *mutabile aut*.

en: Book V *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 8 and following, where he also makes mention of the division of separable and inseparable accidents. — The Vatican [edition], with only one or another codex, after *naturam suam* inserts *mutabile aut* (changeable or).

la: Libr. I. Comment. in Categorias seu Praedicam. Aristotelis: «Sed si quis quoque obiiciat, posse locum accidentia permutare, malum namque si in manu teneatur, manus mali odore completur, adeo odor quod est accidens, in aliud subiectum transire potest. Sed non hoc ait Aristoteles, quoniam mutare accidens locum non potest, nec ita dixit impossibile esse sine eo in quo erat, sed sine eo in quo est; hoc enim significat mutare quidem posse locum, sed sine aliquo subiecto non posse subsistere». Lib. V. Comment. in Porphyr. recensens communitates et differentias generis et accidentis ait: «*Accidentis vero participatio et intenditur et remittitur. Invenies enim quemlibet paulo diutius ambulantem, et paulo amplius nigrum, et si in ipsis Aethiopibus considerabis, omnes non aeque nigro colore esse obductos invenies*». Idem repetit in fine libri *de Proprio et accidente*.

en: Book I, *Commentary on the Categories or Predicaments of Aristotle*: «But if anyone should also object that accidents can change place, for if an evil [thing] is held in the hand, the hand is filled with the odor of the evil [thing], so that the odor, which is an accident, can pass over into another subject — [we reply that] Aristotle does not say this, since an accident cannot change place, nor did he say [it] to be impossible without that in which it was, but [only] without that in which it is; for this means [that an accident] can indeed change place, but cannot subsist without some subject». Book V of the *Commentary on Porphyry*, reviewing the commonalities and differences of genus and accident, says: «*The participation of accident, however, is both intensified and remitted. For you will find anyone who has walked a little longer [to be] also a little more black, and if you consider [it] among the Ethiopians themselves, you will find them not all to be invested with equally black color*». He repeats the same at the end of the book *On Property and Accident*.

la: *Subiectum primum* est materia prima, *subiectum proximum* est compositum ex materia et forma.

en: *First subject* is prime matter; *proximate subject* is the composite of matter and form.

la: Libr. II. *Sent.* d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. S. Doctor ait: «Notandum est, quod aliquod accidens est quod comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et ad causam; aliquod, quod solum comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et ad aliud sicut ad causam; v. g. nigredo in corvo comparatur ad ipsum corvum sicut ad subiectum et causam; lumen in aere vel species in speculo comparatur solum sicut ad subiectum, non sicut ad causam, quia etsi ibi recipiatur, aliunde tamen habet ortum».

en: Book II *Sentences*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, the holy Doctor says: «It must be noted that some accident is that which is compared to something as to subject and as to cause; another, which is compared only to something as to subject and to another as to cause; e. g. blackness in a raven is compared to the raven itself as to subject and cause; the light in the air or the species in a mirror is compared only as to subject, not as to cause, because although it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin from elsewhere».

la: Cfr. Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 2. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a S. Thoma, hic circa lit.

en: Cf. Boethius, *On the Trinity* c. 2. — This doubt is also solved by St. Thomas, here near the *littera*.

la: Cod. F *etiam*, cod. *tamen*, plures codd. perperam *igitur*.

en: Codex *F* [reads] *etiam* (also); a [further] codex [reads] *tamen* (yet); several codices erroneously [read] *igitur* (therefore).

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *et*, ed. 1 *ut* pro *aut*; fortasse lectio genuina est *aut est ut*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] *et* (and); edition 1 [reads] *ut* (as) in place of *aut* (or); perhaps the genuine reading is *aut est ut*.

la: Vers. 44. — Paulo superius post *secundo modo* cod. V repetit *dicitur*. — Hoc dubium solvit etiam B. Albert., hic a. 15; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Verse 44 (John 8, 44). — A little above, after *secundo modo*, codex *V* repeats *dicitur*. — This doubt is also solved by Bl. Albert, here a. 15; [and by] St. Thomas, here near the *littera*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut *F G T W* *nuncupatur*. Mox mendum Vat., pro *nativitate* ponentis *nuncupatione*, auctoritate codd. correximus. — Huius dubii solutionem exhibet etiam S. Thomas, hic circa lit.

en: Some codices such as *F G T W* [read] *nuncupatur* (he is named). Soon [we have corrected] a textual error (*mendum*) of the Vatican, which sets *nuncupatione* (by name) in place of *nativitate* (by nativity), on the authority of the codices. — This doubt's solution is also presented by St. Thomas, here near the *littera*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Relatione*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories*, chapter *On Relation*.

la: Aristot. loc. cit. ait: *Neque enim eo quod navigium est, eo ipsius temo dicitur; sunt enim navigia, quorum temones non sunt; quare non convertitur; navigium enim non dicitur temonis navigium*.

en: Aristotle, in the place cited, says: *For neither, because it is a ship, is its rudder said in that respect; for there are ships whose rudders are not [theirs]; whence it is not converted; for a ship is not said [to be] a ship of the rudder*.

la: Ita codd. *P Q*; Vat. *nomina decet fingere*. Lectioni a nobis receptae favent etiam alii plurimi codd. cum ed. 1, ponentes *docet* pro *decet*, omittendo *Philosophus*. Revera Philosophus loc. cit. ait: *Aliquoties autem forte et nomen fingere necesse erit, si non fuerit nomen impositum, ad quod convenienter assignetur*. — Paulo post multi codd. cum ed. 1 *carere* pro *iacere*.

en: Thus codices *P Q*; the Vatican [edition] [reads] *nomina decet fingere* (it is fitting to fashion names). Several other codices with edition 1 also favor the reading we have received, putting *docet* (teaches) for *decet* (is fitting), and omitting *Philosophus*. The Philosopher in the place cited actually says: *But it will sometimes perhaps be necessary even to fashion a name, if there has not been a name imposed, to which it might be conveniently assigned*. — A little after, many codices with edition 1 [read] *carere* in place of *iacere*.

la: Aristot., loc. cit.

en: Aristotle, the place cited (back-reference; the immediately previous footnote anchor at the same locus, [^19]–[^20], gave *de Praedicam.* c. *de Relatione* — Quaracchi here uses *loc. cit.* to point back to that citation rather than restate it).

la: Sic maior pars codd. cum ed. 1; aliqui ut *L P Q W Z* *Vat.* cum cod. *cc* et *sic*.

en: Thus the majority of codices with ed. 1; some, such as *L P Q W Z*, [read with] the *Vatican* with codex *cc* and *sic*. (A textual-variant note on the conjunction *sic* in the body phrase *sic et donum*; the chunk's body word is the lemma the editors are recording variants on.)


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 27

title_alt: Distinctio XXVII littera Magistri (Pars I capp. I — III; Pars II capp. I — V)

title_alt: Lombard's text on Distinction XXVII (Part I chapters I — III; Part II chapters I — V)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 464 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXVII.

### Pars I.

#### Cap. I. *Quae sint illae proprietates, quibus distinguuntur personae.*

Hic quaeri potest, utrum proprietates, quas Hilarius supra[^1] assignavit, scilicet quod Pater semper est Pater, et Filius semper est Filius, sint illae eaedem proprietates, quas Augustinus superius distinxit dicens, proprium esse Patris, quod genuit Filium; et proprium Filii, quod genitus est a Patre; et Spiritus sancti, quod ab utroque procedit. Ac deinde, utrum et istae sint illae quae dicuntur paternitas, filiatio, processio. Videtur quod non sint eaedem proprietates, quas ponit Hilarius, et illae, quas ponit Augustinus. Si enim eaedem sunt, idem est ergo Patri esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; quod utique quidam concedunt. Si autem hoc est, cui ergo convenit ut sit Pater, ei convenit genuisse Filium. Natura ergo divina si Pater est, genuit Filium; si vero non genuit, Pater non est. Sed quis audeat dicere, aut quod ipsa genuit Filium, aut quod ipsa Pater non sit. Si autem ipsa Pater est, nec Filium genuit, non est ergo idem dicere, aliquid esse Patrem et gignere Filium. Et ita non videtur[^2] una eademque esse proprietas.

Ad quod sine praeiudicio aliorum dicimus, quod easdem proprietates notavit uterque, licet diversis verbis. Quod enim Hilarius ait, ita intelligi debet: proprium Patris est, quod semper Pater est, id est, proprietas Patris est, qua semper Pater est; semper vero Pater est, quia semper genuit Filium. Ita et proprium Filii est, quod semper Filius est, id est, proprietas Filii est, qua semper Filius est; Filius vero semper est, quia semper genitus est. Ergo proprietas, qua Pater est Pater, est quia semper genuit; et haec eadem dicitur paternitas vel generatio. Et proprietas, qua Filius semper est filius, est quia semper genitus est a Patre; et haec eadem dicitur filiatio vel genitura vel nativitas vel origo vel nascibilitas. Sic et proprietas, qua Spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus vel donum, est quia procedit ab utroque; et haec eadem dicitur processio. In praemissis ergo locutionibus eaedem significatae sunt proprietates.

#### Cap. II. *Quod non est omnino idem dicere, esse Patrem, et genuisse vel habere Filium.*

Nec tamen videtur nobis, omnino esse idem dicere aliquid esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; vel aliquid esse Filium et habere Patrem, vel esse Spiritum sanctum et procedere ab utroque. Alioquin Pater non esset nomen hypostasis, id est personae, sed proprietatis tantum; similiter Filius et Spiritus sanctus: et ita non per[^3] tria nomina significarentur tres personae. Ideoque dicimus, quia Patris nomen non tantum relationem notat, sed etiam hypostasim, id est subsistentiam significat, ita et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Relationum vero vocabula, scilicet paternitas, filiatio, processio, vel gignere, gigni, procedere, ipsas tantum relationes, non hypostases significant, sive habere filium et habere patrem. Ut verbi gratia, cum dicimus: Deus est pater, nomine patris et relationem notamus et divinam hypostasim significamus, ut sit intelligentia talis: Deus vel divina essentia est Pater, id est ille qui genuit, scilicet[^4]

<!-- page 465 -->

hypostasis, quae habet filium. Similiter: Deus est filius, id est hypostasis genita vel habens patrem. Ita etiam Deus est Spiritus sanctus, id est hypostasis procedens ab utroque, sive ille qui procedit. Cum vero nomina relationum ponimus in praedicatis, notiones ipsas tantum significamus[^5], non hypostases, ut cum dicitur: Deus genuit, id est habet filium; et Deus genitus est, id est habet patrem. Et tunc oportet intelligi in subiectis hypostases tantum, non essentiam, quae illis proprietatibus determinantur.

#### Cap. III. *Quod proprietates determinant hypostases, non substantiam, id est naturam.*

Illae enim proprietates singulae singulis proprie conveniunt personis, et per eas personae determinantur et a se invicem differunt, sed a se non secedunt. Unde Ioannes Damascenus[^6]: «Non differunt ab invicem hypostases secundum substantiam, sed secundum characteristica idiomata, id est determinativas proprietates. Characteristica vero, id est determinativa, sunt hypostaseon, et non naturae; etenim hypostases determinant». Item[^7]: «Esse quidem intemporaliter et aeternaliter dicimus divinam Verbi hypostasim, simplicem, omnia habentem, quae habet Pater, ut eius homoousion, id est consubstantialem, nativitatis modo et habitudine a paternali hypostasi differentem, nunquam vero a paternali hypostasi secedentem». Idem, apertius exprimens personales proprietates, in eodem ait[^8]: «Differentiam hypostaseon, id est personarum, in tribus proprietatibus, id est paternali et filiali et processibili, recognoscimus, insecessibiles autem ipsas hypostases et indistabiles invicem — et unitas quidem inconfusibiliter — tres enim sunt, etsi unitae — divisas autem indistanter. Etenim singula perfecta est hypostasis et propriam proprietatem, scilicet existentiae modum, proprium possidet; sed unitae sunt substantia et non distant neque secedunt a paternali hypostasi». Ecce hic habes distinctas tres illas proprietates, quae supra[^9] diversis significatae sunt modis.

### Pars II.

#### Cap. I.

Hic non est praetermittendum, quod sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nomina personarum sunt et proprietates personales designant, ita etiam sunt et alia nomina personarum, id est, quae ipsas personas significant et earum proprietates denotant, et easdem quas et nomina praedicta, unde et relative dicuntur, scilicet *genitor*, *genitus*, *verbum*, *imago*. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^10]: «Videndum est, inquit, hoc significari, cum dicitur genitus, quod significatur, cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius, quia genitus, et quia filius, utique genitus». «Sicut autem filius ad patrem, sic genitus ad genitorem refertur, et sicut pater ad filium, ita genitor ad genitum». Idem in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^11]: «Verbum quidem solus Filius accipitur, non simul Pater et Filius, tanquam ambo sint unum verbum. Sic enim verbum dicitur, quomodo imago, non autem Pater et Filius simul ambo imago, sed Filius solus est imago Patris, quemadmodum et filius». Idem in septimo libro *de Trinitate*: «Verbum, secundum quod sapientia est et essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod verbum, non hoc est quod Pater, quia verbum non est pater, et verbum relative dicitur, sicut filius». Item in eodem: «Sicut filius ad patrem refertur, ita et verbum ad eum cuius est verbum, refertur, cum dicitur verbum. Et propterea non eo verbum, quo sapientia dicitur; quia verbum non ad se dicitur, sed tantum relative ad eum cuius est verbum, sicut filius ad patrem». «Eo quippe est filius, quo verbum, et eo est verbum, quo filius; sapientia vero, quo essentia, et ideo, quia[^12] Pater et Filius sunt una essentia et una sapientia». Item in eodem[^13]: «Non est Pater ipse verbum, sicut nec filius nec imago». «Quid autem absurdius quam imaginem ad se dici»? Idem in quinto[^14]: «Dicitur relative filius, relative etiam dicitur verbum et imago, et in omnibus his vocabulis ad Patrem refertur, nihil autem horum pater dicitur».

*Epilogus.*[^19]

Aperte ostensum est, quod sicut filius vel genitus relative dicitur ad patrem, ita verbum et imago; et quod eo dicitur verbum sive imago, quo filius, id est, eadem proprietate sive notione dicitur verbum et imago, qua filius; sed non eo quo verbum, dicitur sapientia vel essentia, quia non notione, qua dicitur verbum, dicitur sapientia. Nam sapientia dicitur secundum essentiam, non secundum relationem.

<!-- page 466 -->

#### Cap. IV. *De generali regula eorum quae ad se, et eorum quae relative dicuntur.*

Et est hic advertenda quaedam generalis regula eorum quae ad se, et eorum quae relative dicuntur de Patre et Filio. «Quidquid enim ad se dicuntur, ut ait Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^15], non dicitur alter sine altero, id est, quidquid dicuntur quod substantiam eorum ostendat, ambo simul dicuntur. Ergo nec Pater est Deus sine Filio, nec Filius sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus», sed non ambo simul pater, non ambo simul filius vel verbum vel imago.

#### Cap. V. *An secundum substantiam dicatur Deus de Deo, et huiusmodi.*

Hic quaeritur, cum dicitur: Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, et huiusmodi, utrum dicantur secundum substantiam. Nam secundum relationem constat ista non dici. Si vero secundum substantiam dicuntur, simul ambo, scilicet Pater et Filius, possunt dici Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, secundum praedictam regulam. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet Deus secundum substantiam dicatur et lumen et sapientia et huiusmodi, et nunquam relative accipiantur; aliquando tamen pro relativis, id est pro personis, sed non relative accipiuntur, ut, cum dicitur: Deus genuit Deum, alterum pro Patre, alterum pro Filio ponimus; similiter, cum dicitur: Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine. In aliis quoque locutionibus saepe reperiuntur nomina essentiae ad significationem personarum deducta, ut cum dicitur: Deus natus, Deus mortuus, Deus passus, ubi Filius tantum significatur. Ita et de solo Filio intelligitur, cum dicitur: Deus de Deo, et huiusmodi. Unde Augustinus quaerens, quomodo huiusmodi dicantur, in sexto libro *de Trinitate* ait[^16]: «Quomodo Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine dicitur? Non enim simul ambo Deus de Deo, sed solus Filius de Deo, scilicet Patre; nec ambo simul lumen de lumine, sed solus Filius de lumine Patre». Et est sciendum, quod secundum nomina substantiae tantum dicitur illud de illo, licet ibi illa nomina substantiam non significent. Secundum vero eadem nomina personarum nunquam dicitur illud de illo, sicut Verbum de Verbo, vel Filius de Filio, quia huiusmodi nomina diversis personis convenire non possunt. Quod Augustinus, licet obscure, in eodem libro[^17] ita dicit: «Hoc solum de eis dici non potest illud de illo, quod simul ambo non sunt»: id est, illo solo nomine non possumus uti ad ostendendum unum de uno, quod simul ambobus non convenit, «sicut Verbum de Verbo dici non potest, quia non simul ambo Verbum, nec Imago de Imagine, nec Filius de Filio, quia non simul ambo Filius, vel Imago». — Et sicut nomina substantiae aliquando intelligentiam personarum distincte faciunt, ita etiam interdum totius Trinitatis simul. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro[^18] ait: «In Patris nomine ipse Pater per se pronuntiatur, in Dei vero nomine et ipse Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, ut cum dicitur: *Nemo bonus nisi solus Deus*, quia Trinitas est unus

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXVII.

### Part I.

#### Cap. I. *What those properties are by which the persons are distinguished.*

Here it can be asked whether the properties which Hilary above[^1] assigned, namely that the Father is always Father, and the Son is always Son, are those same properties which Augustine above distinguished, saying that it is proper to the Father that He has begotten the Son; and proper to the Son that He is begotten from the Father; and to the Holy Spirit, that He proceeds from both. And then, whether these in turn are those which are called paternity, filiation, procession. It seems that those properties which Hilary posits and those which Augustine posits are not the same. For if they are the same, then it is the same for the Father to be Father and to have begotten the Son; which indeed some concede. But if this is so, then to whom it belongs to be Father, to him it belongs to have begotten the Son. The divine nature, therefore, if it is Father, has begotten the Son; but if it has not begotten, it is not Father. But who would dare to say either that it itself begot the Son, or that it itself is not Father. But if it itself is Father, and did not beget the Son, then it is not the same to say that something is Father and that it begets the Son. And so it does not seem[^2] to be one and the same property.

To which we say, without prejudice to others, that each one noted the same properties, although in different words. For what Hilary says ought to be understood thus: it is proper to the Father that He is always Father, that is, the property of the Father is that by which He is always Father; but He is always Father, because He has always begotten the Son. So too it is proper to the Son that He is always Son, that is, the property of the Son is that by which He is always Son; the Son indeed is always [Son], because He is always begotten. Therefore the property by which the Father is Father, is that He has always begotten; and this same is called paternity or generation. And the property by which the Son is always Son, is that He is always begotten from the Father; and this same is called filiation or being-born or nativity or origin or nascibility. So too the property by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit or Gift, is that He proceeds from both; and this same is called procession. In the foregoing locutions, therefore, the same properties were signified.

#### Cap. II. *That it is not entirely the same to say "to be Father" and "to have begotten" or "to have a Son".*

Yet it does not seem to us to be entirely the same to say that something is Father and to have begotten the Son; or that something is Son and to have a Father, or to be the Holy Spirit and to proceed from both. Otherwise *Father* would not be a name of a hypostasis, that is, of a person, but only of a property; likewise *Son* and *Holy Spirit*: and so the three persons would not[^3] be signified by three names. And therefore we say, that the name of *Father* not only notes a relation, but also signifies a hypostasis, that is, a subsistence, and so too *Son* and *Holy Spirit*. But the vocabulary of relations, namely paternity, filiation, procession, or to beget, to be begotten, to proceed, signifies only the relations themselves, not the hypostases — or [signifies] to have a son and to have a father. By way of example, when we say: *God is Father*, by the name of *Father* we both note a relation and signify a divine hypostasis, so that the understanding is this: *God* or the divine essence *is Father*, that is, He who has begotten, namely[^4]

the hypostasis which has a son. Likewise: *God is Son*, that is, the hypostasis begotten or having a father. So also *God is Holy Spirit*, that is, the hypostasis proceeding from both, or He who proceeds. But when we put the names of the relations in the predicate, we signify only the notions themselves[^5], not the hypostases — as when it is said: *God has begotten*, that is, *He has a son*; and *God is begotten*, that is, *He has a father*. And then the hypostases alone, not the essence, must be understood in the subjects, [the hypostases] which are determined by those properties.

#### Cap. III. *That the properties determine the hypostases, not the substance, that is, the nature.*

For those properties belong properly each to each of the persons, and through them the persons are determined and differ from one another, but do not depart from one another. Whence John Damascene[^6]: "The hypostases do not differ from one another according to substance, but according to characteristic idioms, that is, determinative properties. But the characteristic [marks], that is, the determinative [marks], are of the hypostases, and not of the nature; for indeed they determine the hypostases." Likewise[^7]: "We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word *is* timelessly and eternally — simple, having all things which the Father has, as His *homoousion* (that is, consubstantial), differing from the paternal hypostasis by the mode and condition of [His] being-born, but never departing from the paternal hypostasis." The same, more openly expressing the personal properties, says in the same place[^8]: "We acknowledge the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties, that is, the paternal and the filial and the processible, [acknowledging] the hypostases themselves to be inseparable and not distant from one another — and the unity indeed unconfusedly: for they are three, although united — and the divisions [to be] without distance. For each is a perfect hypostasis and possesses its own property, namely a proper mode of existence; but they are united in substance and do not stand apart nor depart from the paternal hypostasis." Behold here you have distinguished those three properties, which above[^9] were signified by various modes.

### Part II.

#### Cap. I.

Here it is not to be passed over that, just as *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Spirit* are names of the persons and designate the personal properties, so also there are other names of the persons, that is, [names] which signify the persons themselves and denote their properties, and the same [properties] as the aforementioned names, whence they too are said relatively, namely *begetter*, *begotten*, *word*, *image*. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^10]: "It must be seen, he says, that the same is signified when it is said *begotten*, that is signified when it is said *son*. For therefore [He is] son, because [He is] begotten, and because [He is] son, He is certainly begotten." "But just as *son* is referred to *father*, so *begotten* to *begetter*, and just as *father* to *son*, so *begetter* to *begotten*." The same in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^11]: "*Word* is taken as the Son alone, not the Father and the Son together, as if both were one word. For *word* is said in the way *image* [is], for it is not that the Father and the Son together are both *image*, but the Son alone is the image of the Father, just as also son." The same in the seventh book *On the Trinity*: "*Word*, according as it is wisdom and essence, is that which the Father is; according as it is *word*, it is not that which the Father is, since the *word* is not father, and *word* is said relatively, just as *son*." Likewise in the same: "Just as *son* is referred to *father*, so also *word* [is referred] to him whose word it is, when it is called *word*. And on this account it is not [called] *word* by that [account] by which it is called *wisdom*; because *word* is not said with reference to itself, but only relatively to him whose word it is, just as *son* to *father*." "For He is *son* by that very [account] by which [He is] *word*, and He is *word* by that [account] by which [He is] *son*; but [He is] *wisdom* by that [account] by which [He is] *essence*, and therefore, since[^12] the Father and the Son are one essence and one wisdom." Likewise in the same[^13]: "The Father is not Himself *word*, just as neither *son* nor *image*." "What however is more absurd than to say that an image [is] with reference to itself"? The same in the fifth [book][^14]: "*Son* is said relatively, *word* and *image* are also said relatively, and in all these vocabularies He is referred to the Father, but none of these is called *father*."

*Epilogue.*[^19]

It has been openly shown that, just as *son* or *begotten* is said relatively to *father*, so [are] *word* and *image*; and that He is called *word* or *image* by that [account] by which [He is called] *son*, that is, by the same property or notion is He called *word* and *image* by which [He is called] *son*; but not by that [account] by which [He is] *word*, is He called *wisdom* or *essence*, since not by the notion by which He is called *word*, is He called *wisdom*. For *wisdom* is said according to essence, not according to relation.

#### Cap. IV. *On the general rule of those things which are said with reference to self and of those which are said relatively.*

And here a certain general rule must be observed concerning those things which are said with reference to self and those which are said relatively of the Father and the Son. "For whatever they are said [to be] with reference to self, as Augustine says in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^15], the one is not said without the other — that is, whatever they are said [to be] which shows their substance, both are said together. Therefore neither is the Father God without the Son, nor the Son without the Father, but both together [are] God"; but they are not both together *Father*, nor both together *Son* or *Word* or *Image*.

#### Cap. V. *Whether God of God, and the like, is said according to substance.*

Here it is asked whether, when it is said: *God of God, light of light*, and the like, they are said according to substance. For according to relation it is established that these are not said. But if they are said according to substance, then both together, namely Father and Son, can be called *God of God, light of light*, according to the aforesaid rule. — To which we say, that although *God* is said according to substance and [so too] *light* and *wisdom* and the like, and they are never taken relatively; yet sometimes [they are taken] for relatives, that is, for persons, but not [taken] relatively — as when it is said: *God begot God*, where we put one [*God*] for the Father, the other for the Son; likewise, when it is said: *God of God, light of light*. In other locutions too, the names of the essence are often found drawn over to the signification of the persons, as when it is said: *God born, God dead, God suffering*, where the Son alone is signified. So also it is understood of the Son alone, when it is said: *God of God*, and the like. Whence Augustine, asking how such things are said, in the sixth book *On the Trinity* says[^16]: "How is it said: *God of God, light of light*? For not are both together *God of God*, but only the Son of God, namely [of] the Father; nor both together *light of light*, but only the Son of the light [which is] the Father." And it must be known that according to the names of substance only is it said *this of that*, although there those names do not signify substance. But according to the same names of the persons, it is never said *this of that*, as *Word of Word*, or *Son of Son*, since names of this sort cannot belong to different persons. Which Augustine, although obscurely, in the same book[^17] says thus: "This alone cannot be said of them, *this of that*, [namely that] which both together are not": that is, by that name alone we cannot use [the formula] to show one of one, [a thing] which does not belong to both together; "as *Word of Word* cannot be said, since both together are not *Word*, nor *Image of Image*, nor *Son of Son*, since both together are not *Son* or *Image*." — And just as the names of substance sometimes give an understanding of the persons distinctly, so too sometimes [they give an understanding] of the whole Trinity together. Whence Augustine in the fifth book[^18] says: "In the name of *Father* the Father Himself is pronounced by Himself, but in the name of *God* both the Father Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit [are pronounced], as when it is said: *None is good but God alone*, since the Trinity is one

---

la: Dist. praeced. c. 3, et est XII. *de Trinitate* n. 23. — Codd. BE *assignaverat* pro *assignavit*. — Locus Augustini habetur ibid., et est V. *de Trinitate* c. 3. n. 6.

en: Preceding distinction, c. 3; and it is in book XII of *On the Trinity*, n. 23. — Codices B, E [read] *assignaverat* in place of *assignavit*. — The Augustine passage is in the same place, and is in book V of *On the Trinity*, c. 3, n. 6.

la: Sic maior pars codd. cum ed. 1; aliqui ut LPQ WZ *si videt et*; Vat. cum cod. cc *et sic*. — Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 *videbitur*.

en: Thus the greater part of the codices with edition 1; some such as L, P, Q, W, Z [read] *si videt et*; the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *et sic*. — The Vatican with editions 4, 6, 8 [reads] *videbitur*.

la: Vat. addit *haec*. — De ipsa huius capitis quaestione cfr. Comment. hic p. I. q. I.

en: The Vatican adds *haec*. — On the question itself of this chapter, cf. the Commentary here, Pars I, q. I.

la: Vat. et omnes aliae edd. *id est* contra codd.

en: The Vatican and all the other editions [read] *id est*, against the codices.

la: Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, *dicimus* contra codd.

en: The Vatican and the other editions, edition 1 excepted, [read] *dicimus*, against the codices.

la: *De Fide orthodoxa*, III. c. 6. In nova versione legitur: «Quo fit, ut personae inter se non differant ratione essentiae, sed accidentium, quae quidem sunt propriae et certae notae quibus sigillatur hypostasis, non natura; hypostasis enim definitur essentia cum accidentibus» (ἅτινά εἰσι τὰ χαρακτηριστικὰ ἰδιώματα· χαρακτηριστικὰ δὲ ὑποστάσεως, καὶ οὐ φύσεως. Καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὁρίζονται, οὐσίαν μετὰ συμβεβηκότων).

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, III, c. 6. In the new translation [the passage] reads: "Whence it comes about that the persons do not differ from one another by reason of essence, but [by reason] of accidents, which indeed are the proper and fixed marks by which a hypostasis is sealed, not [by which] a nature [is sealed]; for a hypostasis is defined as essence with accidents" (which are the characteristic idioms; and the characteristic [marks] are of a hypostasis and not of a nature; for they define the hypostasis as essence with accidents).

la: *Ibid.* c. 7, paucis hic omissis; ceterum versio fere ad verbum originali respondet.

en: *Ibid.*, c. 7, with a few [words] omitted here; for the rest, the [Latin] translation corresponds almost word-for-word to the original.

la: *Ibid.* c. 5. Antiqua versio fidelis est; aliqua tamen omittuntur: pro *paternali et filiali et processibili recognoscimus* legitur in originali τῇ ἀναιτίῳ καὶ πατρικῇ καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ υἱικῇ, καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ ἐκπορευτῇ ἐπιγινώσκομεν (versio in Patrolog. Migne: «quod unus sine causa sit et Pater, alter a causa et Filius, alter idem a causa et procedens esse positum agnoscimus»).

en: *Ibid.*, c. 5. The old [Latin] translation is faithful; nevertheless some things are omitted: in place of *paternali et filiali et processibili recognoscimus* ("we acknowledge as paternal and filial and processible"), the original reads τῇ ἀναιτίῳ καὶ πατρικῇ καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ υἱικῇ, καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ ἐκπορευτῇ ἐπιγινώσκομεν (the version in Migne's *Patrologia*: "we acknowledge it as set down that the one is uncaused and Father, the other from a cause and Son, and the other likewise from a cause and proceeding").

la: Dist. XXVI. c. 2, et hic c. I.

en: Distinction XXVI, c. 2, and here c. I.

la: Cap. 7, n. 8. Sequens locus est ibid. c. 6, n. 7.

en: Chapter 7, n. 8. The following passage is in the same place, c. 6, n. 7.

en: Chapter 2, n. 3.

la: Cap. 3, n. 4; et sequens textus est ibid. c. 2, n. 3, ex quo capitulo etiam sequens textus depromptus est. In secundo textu post *tantum relative* Vat. et plurimae edd. addunt *dicitur*; in tertio post *ideo* sola Vat. omittit *quia*.

en: Chapter 3, n. 4; and the following passage is in the same place, c. 2, n. 3, the chapter from which also the next passage is drawn. In the second passage, after *tantum relative*, the Vatican and most editions add *dicitur*; in the third [passage], after *ideo*, the Vatican alone omits *quia*.

la: Ibid. c. 1, n. 1. Ultima propositio est ibid. n. 2.

en: *Ibid.*, c. 1, n. 1. The last proposition is in the same place, n. 2.

la: Cap. 13, n. 14; in quo textu Vat. cum cod. C et edd. 4, 5 omittit *etiam* ante *dicitur verbum*; in originali *dicitur et verbum*.

en: Chapter 13, n. 14; in which text the Vatican with codex C and editions 4, 5 omits *etiam* before *dicitur verbum*; in the original [it reads] *dicitur et verbum*.

la: Cap. 2, n. 3. In originali legitur: *Ergo nec Deus est Pater sine Filio, nec Filius Deus sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus*.

en: Chapter 2, n. 3. In the original [it] reads: *Therefore neither is God Father without the Son, nor the Son God without the Father, but both together [are] God*.

la: *Ibid.*, sicut et sequens locus.

en: *Ibid.*, the same as the following passage as well.

la: Cap. 8, n. 9. — Locus s. Scripturae est Luc. 18, 19. — In fine textus Vat. cum pluribus edd. post *unus* addit *solus*.

en: Chapter 8, n. 9. — The passage of Sacred Scripture is Luke 18:19. — At the end of the [quoted] text, the Vatican with most editions adds *solus* after *unus*.

la: Editorial note. In the printed Quaracchi (p. 465 col. b), the rubric *Epilogus* appears in the margin at *Aperte ostensum est…*, marking this paragraph as the epilogue of Pars II Cap. I. The chapter-numbering then jumps to *Cap. IV* at the head of p. 466, with no separately-numbered *Cap. II* or *Cap. III* in between; this reflects the Quaracchi editors' typesetting of Lombard's text and is not an OCR loss.

en: Editorial note. In the printed Quaracchi (p. 465 col. b), the rubric *Epilogue* appears in the margin at *Aperte ostensum est…*, marking this paragraph as the epilogue of Pars II Cap. I. The chapter-numbering then jumps to *Cap. IV* at the head of p. 466, with no separately-numbered *Cap. II* or *Cap. III* in between; this reflects the Quaracchi editors' typesetting of Lombard's text and is not an OCR loss.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Part 1, Divisio Textus

source_text:
<!-- page 466 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVII.

### Pars I.

#### *De proprietatibus personarum, quatenus exprimuntur per vocabula magis usitata.*

> *Hic quaeri potest, utrum proprietates.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra assignavit Magister proprietates personales, hic secundo[^1] agit de ipsis proprietatibus, secundum quod per diversa vocabula exprimuntur. Et quoniam contingit eas exprimi per vocabula magis usitata et minus usitata, ideo habet haec pars duas partes. In prima agit de expressione proprietatum per vocabula magis[^2] usitata, in secunda per vocabula minus usitata, infra distinctione eadem: *Hic non est praetermittendum.*

Prima pars habet quatuor. Cum enim Hilarius et Augustinus proprietates aliis et aliis vocabulis assignent, uterque tamen consuetis[^3], quia unus, scilicet Augustinus, *per generare et generari*, alter, scilicet Hilarius, *per esse Patrem et esse Filium*, ideo Magister primo quaerit, utrum sint eaedem proprietates ab utroque assignatae. Secundo solvit ostendens, quod sunt eaedem, ibi: *Ad quod sine praeiudicio aliorum.* Tertio, ne credat aliquis, quod omnino sint eaedem, ostendit, quod re idem sunt, sed differunt quantum ad modum significandi, scilicet in concretione et in abstractione, ibi: *Nec tamen videtur nobis omnino idem.* Quarto vero, quia dixerat, proprietates significari in concretione, quia quaeri posset: respectu cuius? ostendit, quod respectu hypostasum, ibi: *Illae enim proprietates singulae singulis.*

<!-- page 467 -->

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum *esse Patrem* et *generare* sit una notio.

Secundo quaeritur, quae illarum sit alterius ratio.

Tertio, utrum proprietates contingat abstrahi.

Quarto, utrum circa eas liceat contrarie opinari.

---

english:
<!-- page 466 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXVII.

### Part I.

#### *On the properties of the persons, insofar as they are expressed through more usual terms.*

> *"Here it can be asked whether the properties..."*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master assigned the personal properties; here, in the second place[^1], he treats of these properties themselves, according as they are expressed through different terms. And since it happens that they are expressed through more usual and less usual terms, therefore this part has two divisions. In the first he treats of the expression of the properties through more[^2] usual terms; in the second, through less usual terms, below in the same distinction: *"Here it must not be passed over."*

The first part has four [subdivisions]. For since Hilary and Augustine assign the properties with different terms, yet each with customary[^3] ones — because one, namely Augustine, [does so] *through to-beget and to-be-begotten*, and the other, namely Hilary, *through to-be-the-Father and to-be-the-Son* — therefore the Master first asks whether the properties assigned by each are the same. Secondly he resolves [the question], showing that they are the same, there: *"To which, without prejudice to others."* Thirdly, lest anyone should believe that they are altogether the same, he shows that they are the same in reality, but differ as to the mode of signifying, namely in concretion and in abstraction, there: *"Yet it does not seem to us altogether the same."* Fourthly indeed, because he had said that the properties are signified in concretion, since it might be asked: in respect of what? he shows that [it is] in respect of the hypostases, there: *"For those properties, taken singly, [are assigned] to the singulars."*

<!-- page 467 -->

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part, four [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether *to-be-the-Father* and *to-beget* is one notion.

Secondly it is asked which of them is the formal account of the other.

Thirdly, whether the properties can be abstracted.

Fourthly, whether it is permitted to hold contrary opinions concerning them.

---

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *secundo*.

en: In the Vatican edition and in codex cc the word *secundo* ("in the second place") is wanting.

la: Codd. nec non ed. 1 omittunt *magis*.

en: The codices and also the first edition omit *magis* ("more").

la: Multi codd., inter quos AT VX cc, et ed. 1 *consuetas*.

en: Many codices, among which AT VX cc, and the first edition read *consuetas* (feminine accusative plural, agreeing with *proprietates*) instead of *consuetis*.


title: Dist. 27, Part 2, Divisio Textus

source_text:
<!-- page 480 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVII.

### Pars II.

#### *De proprietatibus personarum, quatenus exprimuntur per vocabula minus usitata.*

> *Hic non est praetermittendum, quod sicut Pater et Filius etc.*

### Divisio textus.

Supra egit Magister de proprietatibus personalibus, secundum quod exprimuntur per nomina magis usitata; hic agit secundo de eisdem, prout exprimuntur per vocabula minus usitata. Et habet haec pars quatuor partes. In prima Magister assignat nominum differentias, per quae convenit ipsas proprietates exprimi, auctoritatibus confirmans, nomina illa esse propria. In secunda vero assignat quandam <!-- page 481 -->regulam, in qua discernuntur propria a communibus, ibi: *Et hic est advertenda quaedam generalis regula.* In tertia opponit contra praedictam regulam et determinat, ibi: *Hic quaeritur, cum dicitur Deus de Deo.* In quarta ex illa solutione elicit aliam regulam, ibi: *Et est sciendum, quod secundum nomina substantiae etc.*

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur de verbo, in parte ista quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo, de verbi significatione.

Secundo, de connotatione.

Tertio, de ipsius comparatione.

Quarto, de translatione.

---

english:
<!-- page 480 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXVII.

### Part II.

#### *On the properties of the persons, insofar as they are expressed through less usual terms.*

> *"Here it must not be passed over, that just as the Father and the Son etc."*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of the personal properties according as they are expressed through more usual names; here he treats, in the second place, of the same [properties], according as they are expressed through less usual terms. And this part has four divisions. In the first, the Master assigns the differences of the names through which it is fitting that these properties be expressed, confirming by authorities that those names are proper. In the second, indeed, he assigns a certain <!-- page 481 -->rule by which the proper [names] are distinguished from the common, there: *"And here a certain general rule is to be noted."* In the third, he objects against the aforesaid rule and determines [the matter], there: *"Here it is asked, when it is said, God of God."* In the fourth, from that solution he draws out another rule, there: *"And it must be known that according to the names of substance etc."*

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the things that are said concerning *the Word*, in this part four [questions] are asked.

First, concerning the signification of *the Word*.

Secondly, concerning [its] connotation.

Thirdly, concerning its comparison.

Fourthly, concerning [its] transferred [usage].


title: Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum esse Patrem et generare sit una et eadem notio

title_alt: Whether to be the Father and to beget are one and the same notion

source_text:
<!-- page 467 -->

### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De proprietate paternitatis, de abstractione proprietatum, de certitudine huius doctrinae.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum esse Patrem et generare sit una et eadem[^1] notio.*

Quantum ad primum, quod sit eadem[^3] notio, ostenditur sic.

1. Una sola proprietas est hypostasis, quae dat esse distinctum. Nam non est in ratione accidentis, sed formae; sed illa est una sola unius. Sed *generare* est proprietas, per quam hypostasis Patris distinguitur, similiter et *esse patrem*: ergo est eadem notio.

2. Item, Patris ad Filium est una sola relatio, quia una tantum origo et unus modus emanandi; sed *generare* dicit relationem Patris ad Filium, similiter et *esse patrem*: ergo est eadem relatio vel notio.

3. Item[^4], si sunt diversae proprietates, tunc ergo notiones erunt plures quam quinque, immo infinitae. Sicut enim ad *generare* sequitur *esse patrem*, ita sequitur ad *referri ad patrem* distingui a patre etc.; quae si sint notiones aliae, tunc ergo infinitus est numerus notionum. Hoc autem est inconveniens, et sequitur, si illae proprietates sint diversae: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Si eadem proprietas est *esse patrem* et *generare*: ergo omnino idem importatur nomine *patris* et nomine *genitoris*. Ergo sicut est baptizatus, si quis baptizetur in nomine Patris, ita si in nomine Genitoris; sed hoc communiter negatur.

2. Item, proprietates et notiones sunt diversae et cognoscuntur esse diversae, quia de diversis praedicantur — quia de uno praedicatur una, de quo non praedicatur alia — sed haec conceditur: *essentia est Pater*; haec negatur: *essentia generat*[^2]: ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod hoc est propter diversum modum significandi[^5]; *contra*: hoc nihil est, quia tam *esse patrem* quam *generare*, utrumque in concretione dicitur.

3. Item, diversae probantur esse proprietates quando una de altera non praedicatur, ut *paternitas* et *innascibilitas*; sed *generare*, ut patebit infra[^6], non dicitur de *paternitate* — haec enim non admittitur: *paternitas generat* — ergo sunt diversae.

<!-- page 468 -->

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Paternitas et generatio sunt una proprietas secundum rem; sed secundum modum significandi est inter eas triplex differentia.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnino sunt eadem proprietas secundum rem; et huius ratio manifeste apparet. Nam una dicitur de altera non solum in concretione, ut *Pater generat*, sed etiam in abstractione, ut *paternitas est generatio*; quod non esset, si differrent.

Cum autem sit eadem proprietas, differenti tamen modo significatur, et hoc quantum ad tria. Primum quidem, quia *generatio* proprietatem personae generalius exprimit quam hoc quod est *pater*. Nam, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in libro tertio, distinctione quarta, ad *esse patrem* sequitur *generare*, sed non convertitur. Homo enim dicitur *generare* pediculos, non tamen dicitur *pater* eorum. Alia ratio est, quia hoc quod est *pater* importat intra se hypostasim, circa quam notat proprietatem; sed hoc verbum *generat* non importat hypostasim, immo eget sibi apponi ab extra; et hanc ponit Magister in littera. Tertia est, quia cum proprietas duo importet, scilicet emanationem et habitudinem, quae quamvis idem sint re, differunt tamen ratione intelligendi — quia hoc quod est *generare* importat productionem, et *generatio* emanationem; sed hoc quod est *esse patrem* proprie importat habitudinem.

1. Ex his patent obiecta. Nam quod non sit baptismus in nomine Genitoris, hoc non est propter diversitatem rei, sed modi exprimendi; et utrumque consideratur ibi, sicut patebit in quarto.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non praedicatur etc.; dicendum, quod hoc est propter diversum modum significandi. Nam hoc quod est *generare*, quia non habet suppositum intra, ponit rem circa essentiam, et ideo ipsam significat distingui; non sic autem hoc quod est *pater*, cum habeat suppositum intra. Sensus enim est: *essentia est pater*, id est *ille qui generat*.

3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod una non praedicatur de altera; dicendum, quod est praedicatio per modum denominationis, et haec est per concretionem; et est praedicatio per modum identitatis, et haec est per abstractionem. Quoniam ergo *generare* et *esse patrem* est una et eadem proprietas, ideo non secundum modum denominandi tantum, sed per abstractionem praedicatur, ut *paternitas est generatio*.

english:
### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *On the property of paternity, on the abstraction of properties, on the certainty of this teaching.*

### QUESTION I. *Whether to be the Father and to beget are one and the same[^1] notion.*

As to the first [point], that it is the same[^3] notion, is shown thus.

1. The one and only property is the hypostasis, which gives [it] to be distinct. For it is not in the account of an accident, but of a form; but that [form] is one only of one. But *to beget* is the property by which the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished, and likewise *to be the Father*: therefore it is the same notion.

2. Likewise, of the Father to the Son there is one and only relation, since there is only one origin and one mode of emanating; but *to beget* expresses the relation of the Father to the Son, and likewise *to be the Father*: therefore it is the same relation or notion.

3. Likewise[^4], if there are diverse properties, then the notions will be more than five — indeed, infinite. For just as upon *to beget* there follows *to be the Father*, so upon *being referred to the Father* there follows *to be distinguished from the Father*, etc.; and if these be other notions, then the number of notions is infinite. But this is unfitting, and it follows if those properties are diverse: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. If the same property is *to be the Father* and *to beget*: therefore altogether the same is imported by the name *Father* and by the name *Begetter*. Therefore just as one is baptized if someone is baptized in the name of the Father, so [also] if in the name of the Begetter; but this is commonly denied.

2. Likewise, properties and notions are diverse and are known to be diverse, since they are predicated of diverse [things] — for of one [thing] one is predicated, of which another is not predicated — but this is conceded: *the essence is the Father*; this is denied: *the essence begets*[^2]: therefore etc. *If you say* that this is on account of a diverse mode of signifying[^5]; *on the contrary*: this is nothing, since both *to be the Father* and *to beget*, each is said in concretion.

3. Likewise, properties are proved to be diverse when one is not predicated of the other, as *paternity* and *unbegottenness*; but *to beget*, as will be plain below[^6], is not said of *paternity* — for this is not admitted: *paternity begets* — therefore they are diverse.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Paternity and generation are one property according to the thing; but according to the mode of signifying there is a threefold difference between them.*

**I respond:** It must be said that they are altogether the same property according to the thing; and the reason for this manifestly appears. For the one is said of the other not only in concretion, as *the Father begets*, but also in abstraction, as *paternity is generation*; which would not be, if they differed.

Since, however, they are the same property, it is signified in a different mode, and this as to three [points]. The first indeed is, since *generation* expresses the property of the person more generally than this [word] *father*. For, as Augustine says and as is found in the third book, distinction four, upon *being the father* there follows *to beget*, but it does not convert. For a man is said *to beget* lice, yet is not called their *father*. Another reason is that this [word] *father* imports within itself the hypostasis, around which it notes the property; but this verb *begets* does not import the hypostasis, but rather requires [a hypostasis] to be applied to it from outside; and this the Master places in the *littera*. The third [reason] is that, since a property imports two [things], namely emanation and relation, which though they are the same in thing, yet differ in account of understanding — since this [word] *to beget* imports production, and *generation* emanation; but this [phrase] *to be the Father* properly imports relation.

1. From these things the objections are plain. For [the fact] that there is no baptism in the name of the Begetter, this is not on account of a diversity of thing, but of the mode of expressing; and both are considered there, as will be plain in the fourth [book].

2. To that which is objected, that it is not predicated etc.; it must be said that this is on account of the diverse mode of signifying. For this [word] *to beget*, since it does not have a supposit within, posits the thing around the essence, and therefore signifies it to be distinguished; not so, however, this [word] *father*, since it does have a supposit within. For the sense is: *the essence is the father*, that is, *he who begets*.

3. To that which is finally objected, that one is not predicated of the other; it must be said that there is a predication by mode of denomination, and this is through concretion; and there is a predication by mode of identity, and this is through abstraction. Therefore, since *to beget* and *to be the Father* are one and the same property, therefore [the predication] is not only according to the mode of denominating, but [also] is predicated by abstraction, as *paternity is generation*.

la: Sola Vat. *eaedem*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *eaedem* ("the same" [feminine plural]).

la: Nullo suffragante cod., Vat. omittit *quia*, et dein post *cuius* subiicit *et*.

en: With no codex supporting [it], the Vatican [edition] omits *quia* ("since"), and then after *cuius* ("of which") inserts *et* ("and").

la: Codd. Z aa cum ed. 1 *eadem*, lectio aliquanto concinnior, quia et infra in initio quaestionis legitur *eadem notio*.

en: Codices Z aa with ed. 1 [read] *eadem* ("the same"), a somewhat smoother reading, since also below at the beginning of the question one reads *eadem notio* ("the same notion").

la: Sic plurimi codd. cum ed. I; cod. V *Sed*; Vat. cum cod. cc *Vel*; codd. RSU omittunt *Item*. In subsequenti propositione ad evitandam ambiguitatem cum Vat. retinuimus particulam *ad*, verbis *generare* et *referri* praemissam, etsi in antiquioribus mss. deest.

en: Thus most codices with ed. I; cod. V [reads] *Sed* ("But"); the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *Vel* ("Or"); codices RSU omit *Item* ("Likewise"). In the following proposition, to avoid ambiguity, we have retained with the Vatican [edition] the particle *ad* placed before the words *generare* ("to beget") and *referri* ("to be referred"), even though in the older manuscripts it is missing.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. I. q. I.

en: Cf. above d. 5, a. I, q. I.

la: Dist. 33. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *quando*, quod posuimus auctoritate codd. G H P Q X et ed. I, Vat. *quin*.

en: Distinction 33, q. 1. — A little above, in place of *quando* ("when"), which we placed on the authority of codices G H P Q X and ed. I, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *quin* ("but that").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Attendendum est ad differentiam inter hanc quaestionem et eam, quae tractatur d. 33. q. 3, utrum unius personae duae notiones de se possint praedicari. Haec differentia in solut. ad 3. attingitur. — De duplici praedicatione per modum denominationis et identitatis cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3. (Scholion), et d. 34. q. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom. tangit hanc q. hic q. 1. a. 1; S. q. 33. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. S. a. 58. q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Attention must be paid to the difference between this question and that which is treated in d. 33, q. 3, [namely] whether two notions of one person can be predicated of one another. This difference is touched upon in the solution to [objection] 3. — On the twofold predication by mode of denomination and of identity, cf. below d. 33, q. 3 (Scholion), and d. 34, q. 2.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 5, a. 6, § 1. — Scotus, on this and the following question, *Reportata* here, q. 1. — St. Thomas touches this question here, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* q. 33, a. 2, ad 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question, *Summa* a. 58, q. 3. — Biel, here q. 1.

---