title: Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum haec sit vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.*

Tertio quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum. Et quod vera sit, videtur.

*(Argg. pro parte affirmativa.)*

1. Christus est *aliquid*, secundum quod homo, sicut habitum est in praecedentibus[^p229-8], aut ergo *quid universale*, aut *quid singulare*; sed non *universale*, quia Damascenus dicit, quod «Filius Dei assumsit humanam naturam *in atomo*», hoc est in singulari, et hoc est individuum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, habet proprietates, quarum collectionem impossibile est in alio reperire; hoc autem est esse individuum, sicut patet per notificationem individui, quam dat Porphyrius[^p229-9]: «Individuum est quod constat ex proprietatibus, quarum collectionem impossibile est in alio reperire»; sed hoc convenit Christo, secundum quod homo: ergo etc.

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3. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, praedicatur de uno solo; sed «singulare et individuum est illud quod de uno solo praedicatur[^p230-1]»: ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.

4. Item, haec est vera: Christus est homo; aut ergo praedicatur ibi praedicatum *accidentale*, aut *substantiale*. Non *accidentale*, hoc constat, cum homo vere dicatur de Christo, sicut et de aliis hominibus; si *essentiale*: ergo vel est *genus*, vel *species*, vel *differentia*. Non *genus*, vel *differentia*: ergo *species*; sed *species specialissima* praedicatur de individuis solum sub ipsa contentis[^p230-2]: ergo Christus est individuum hominis.

5. Item, haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia; sed substantia dividitur sufficienti divisione a Philosopho[^p230-3] per primam et secundam: aut igitur Christus est substantia *prima*, aut *secunda*; non *secunda*, cum non sit genus, vel species: ergo *prima*. Sed *prima substantia* idem est quod *individuum*: ergo etc.

6. Item, haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est albus, et albedo inest Christo, secundum quod homo; sed accidentia primo et per se sunt in individuis[^p230-4]: ergo albedo inest Christo, secundum quod est hominis individuum.

**Sed contra:**

*(Pro parte negativa.)*

1. Idem est esse individuum substantiae et hypostasim; sed in Christo una sola est hypostasis, quoniam in hypostasi fit unio, ut dicit Damascenus[^p230-5], et illa hypostasis est divina, non humana nisi per unionem: ergo si haec est falsa: Christus, secundum quod homo, est hypostasis; haec similiter est falsa: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod *homo*, est individuum, et secundum quod *Deus*, est substantia individua — hoc constat — et secundum rationem individuationis est numeratio: ergo Christus est duo. Sed hoc est falsum, sicut ostensum est supra[^p230-6]: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne individuum est *per se unum* et *unum numero*[^p230-7]; sed nihil tale est unitum alii substantiae antecedenti secundum *esse*: ergo cum humana natura in Christo sit unita Verbo aeterno, videtur, quod rationem individuationis non teneat in ipso.

4. Item, quidquid dicitur de filio hominis, dicitur de Filio Dei: ergo cum individuum dicat «collectionem proprietatum, quam impossibile est in alio reperiri et de alio individuo dici[^p230-8]»; impossibile est, quod Christus sit aliud et aliud individuum, secundum quod homo, et secundum quod Deus: ergo sicut in Christo est unitas personalitatis, ita est unitas individuationis: ergo sicut haec est falsa: Christus est persona, secundum quod homo; ita, ut videtur, haec erit falsa: Christus est individuum, secundum quod homo.

*(Quaestio generalis.)* Quaeritur igitur de hac et de consimilibus, videlicet utrum sint concedendae: Christus est individuum, secundum quod homo; Christus est suppositum, secundum quod homo; Christus est hypostasis, secundum quod homo; et de aliis consimilibus, quid veritatis habeant et quid proprietatis.

> ### Conclusio.
> *(De duplici locutione, conclusio.)* Locutio: Christus, secundum quod est homo, est individuum, conceditur, quatenus individuum accipitur largiori modo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod accipiendo proprie hanc dictionem *secundum*, prout dicit habitudinem causae[^p230-9], quaedam ex huiusmodi locutionibus simpliciter sunt falsae et impropriae, quaedam sunt distinguendae, pro eo quod habent aliquid proprietatis, aliquid improprietatis. *(Conclusio generalis ad quaestiones.)*

Haec enim est falsa et impropria: Christus, secundum quod homo, est *persona*; et haec similiter: Christus, secundum quod homo, est *hypostasis*. Sed prima est falsa ex duplici causa: tum quia persona importat proprietatem dignitatis, tum etiam, quia importat fundamentum totius existentiae naturalis. *(Notandum.)* Neutrum autem horum inest Christo ratione naturae assumtae, sed assumentis[^p230-10]. — Secunda vero est falsa altera illarum causarum, quoniam, etsi

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hypostasis non dicat proprietatem excellentiae, dicit tamen fundamentum existentiae; hoc autem in Christo non est anima nec caro nec ex utroque compositum, sed Verbum increatum. Et propterea praedictae duae locutiones impropriae sunt et falsae; et si legantur alicubi, sunt exponendae et secundum aliam acceptionem illius determinationis, secundum quod est homo[^p231-1], sunt intelligendae.

*(De duabus aliis.)* Haec autem, de qua nunc est sermo, scilicet Christus est *individuum*, secundum quod homo; et haec: Christus est *suppositum*, secundum quod homo, possunt habere proprietatem et improprietatem secundum diversam intentionem istorum vocabulorum. — *(De individuo distinctio.)* Dicitur enim aliquid *individuum* dupliciter: uno modo, quia dicitur de *uno solo*; et hoc modo albedo Petri est *individuum*, et hoc modo *individuum* dicitur quod est *indivisum in se*. Et sic *(Conclusio 1.)* absque dubio Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum. Alio modo dicitur *individuum* quod est *ab aliis divisum* et *subsistit in se* et *per se*; et *(Conclusio 2.)* hoc modo accipiendo individuum, humana natura in Christo non est individuum. Est enim unita Verbo increato, sicut suo supposito.

*(Conclusio 3.)* Per hunc etiam modum distinguendum est, cum dicitur: Christus, secundum quod homo, est *suppositum*. *(De supposito distinctio.)* Est enim *suppositum in quo* et *suppositum de quo*[^p231-2]. Si dicatur suppositum illud, *de quo* alterum praedicatur et quod subiicitur superiori; *(Conclusio 4.)* Christus, secundum quod homo, est suppositum. Si vero dicatur illud suppositum, *in quo* totum *esse* rei stabilitur et fundatur; sic non est concedendum, *(Conclusio 5.)* Christum esse suppositum, secundum quod homo, nisi arctetur ratio suppositi, ut dicatur suppositum accidentium et proprietatum accidentalium.

*(Epilogus.)* Unde quia in unica sui acceptione tam nomen individui quam nomen suppositi aequipollet hypostasi, falsae sunt praedictae locutiones ex eadem causa, ex qua et locutio praedicta, scilicet: Christus est hypostasis, secundum quod homo. Sequeretur enim, quod in Christo essent duo supposita et duae hypostases; et ita non esset unum, nec esset in eo vera unio. — Secundum autem aliam acceptionem possunt concedi; et per hoc possunt dissolvi rationes, quae inducuntur ad utramque partem. *(Ad argg. pro utraque parte.)* Rationes enim, quae inducuntur ad primam partem, procedunt de individuo, secundum quod *individuum* dicitur quod de uno solo dicitur. Rationes vero ad partem sequentem procedunt de individuo, secundum quod non solum non dividitur in alia[^p231-3], sed etiam in quantum dividitur ab alio supposito, et hoc quidem non habet in Christo. Et hoc totum patet pertractanti singulas rationes.

*(Ad quaestionem generalem.)* Ex his patet quod ultimo quaerebatur, quae scilicet locutiones in hac materia sint admittendae, et quae non. Illae enim concedendae sunt, quae sic veritatem et proprietatem naturarum important, quod illi summae unioni non praeiudicant, in qua quidem facta est unio in persona Verbi, non solum in quantum dicit *dignitatem proprietatis*, sed[^p231-4] in quantum dicit *suppositum incommunicabile*, scilicet ipsam hypostasim, ratione cuius est mutua praedicatio et idiomatum communicatio. — *(Directivum principium.)* Et hoc tanquam pro directivo principio est habendum, quia in illa unione beata persona Verbi fecit se suppositum humanae naturae, sicut pluries in praecedentibus[^p231-5] dictum est. Et pro tanto humana natura in Christo dicitur *vergere in accidens*: et ideo aliquod praedicatum, quod dicit modum existendi, vere attribuitur *nobis* secundum humanam naturam, quod tamen non vere attribuitur Christo secundum humanam, sed secundum divinam, scilicet esse *personam*, et esse *hypostasim*, esse *suppositum*, esse *individuum*, secundum quod vocabulo hypostasis aequipollent; licet secundum largiorem modum accipiendi duo ultima possint attribui, ut praetactum est.

*(Obiectio de individuo.)* Sed contra praedicta videtur posse obiici, quoniam videtur, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, vere et proprie sit individuum. Sicut enim in secundo libro[^p231-6] ostensum fuit, individuatio est ex communicatione materiae cum forma, et innotescere habet per accidentium collectionem; Christus autem, secundum quod homo, ex anima et carne componitur, sicut et alii homines: ergo ita vere et proprie habet individuationem, sicut et alii homines: non videtur igitur, quod praedictum est sufficere. — *(Quaestio incidens.)* Propter hoc est quaestio, quantum sit de proprietate individuationis in Christo, secundum quod homo. Si enim non est amplior, nisi quia dicitur de uno solo; tunc non habet magis de ratione individuationis quam accidentia; quod absurdum est penitus, cum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit vera substantia[^p231-7].

*(Solutio.)* Et dicendum, quod circumscriptis accidentibus et proprietatibus, quae individuationem non *faciunt*, sed *ostendunt*, individuatio est a *principiis intrinsecis*, secundum quod unum constituunt suppositum, in quo totum esse rei stabilitur. Et quia ex concursu

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illorum principiorum constituitur individuum, et resultat forma totius, quae est forma specifica; hinc est, quemadmodum dicit Boethius[^p232-1], quod «species est totum esse individui». In Christo autem anima et caro, sive materia et forma, uniuntur non solum in eo quod *constituunt*, sed etiam in *hypostasi Verbi aeterni*. *(Notandum.)* Et ideo forma specifica non dicit totum esse Christi, ac per hoc Christus, secundum quod homo, non habet omnino *plenam rationem* individui; unde quasi medium tenet inter individuum, *proprie dictum*, et individuum, secundum quod *accidens* dicitur aliquid individuum. Nam in individuo proprie dicto est principiorum substantialium unio et primi suppositi constitutio in se ipso, non in altero. Utrumque autem horum deest in *accidentibus*, quae nec *in se* nec *per se* subsistunt[^p232-2]. Medio modo est in Christo, ubi principia conveniunt secundum humanam naturam; tamen primum suppositum est alterius naturae, non ab eis constitutum. — Et sic patet, quod veritatem habent quae praedicta sunt. Ad haec autem valent praedeterminata libro secundo, distinctione tertia[^p232-3].

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### Question III. *Whether this is true: Christ, as man, is an individual.*

Thirdly it is asked about this: Christ, as man, is an individual. And that it is true seems so.

*(Arguments for the affirmative side.)*

1. Christ is *something*, as man, as was held in the foregoing[^p229-8]; therefore he is either *something universal* or *something singular*; but not *universal*, because Damascene says that "the Son of God assumed human nature *in an atom*," that is, in a singular, and this is an individual: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Christ, as man, has properties whose collection it is impossible to find in another; but this is to be an individual, as is clear from the description of an individual which Porphyry[^p229-9] gives: "An individual is what consists of properties whose collection it is impossible to find in another"; but this belongs to Christ, as man: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Christ, as man, is predicated of one alone; but "the singular and the individual is that which is predicated of one alone[^p230-1]": therefore Christ, as man, is an individual.

4. Likewise, this is true: Christ is man; therefore either an *accidental* predicate is predicated there, or a *substantial* one. Not *accidental*, this is clear, since man is truly said of Christ, as also of other men; if *essential*: therefore it is either a *genus*, or a *species*, or a *difference*. Not a *genus* or a *difference*: therefore a *species*; but the *most specific species* is predicated only of the individuals contained under it[^p230-2]: therefore Christ is an individual of man.

5. Likewise, this is true: Christ, as man, is a substance; but substance is divided by a sufficient division by the Philosopher[^p230-3] into first and second: therefore either Christ is a *first* substance or a *second*; not a *second*, since he is neither a genus nor a species: therefore a *first*. But *first substance* is the same as *individual*: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, this is true: Christ, as man, is white, and whiteness is in Christ, as man; but accidents are primarily and per se in individuals[^p230-4]: therefore whiteness is in Christ insofar as he is an individual of man.

**On the contrary:**

*(For the negative side.)*

1. To be the individual of a substance and to be a hypostasis are the same; but in Christ there is only one hypostasis, since the union takes place in the hypostasis, as Damascene says[^p230-5], and that hypostasis is divine, not human except through the union: therefore if this is false: Christ, as man, is a hypostasis; this likewise is false: Christ, as man, is an individual.

2. Likewise, Christ, as *man*, is an individual, and as *God* is an individual substance — this is clear — and according to the account of individuation there is numbering: therefore Christ is two. But this is false, as was shown above[^p230-6]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every individual is *one per se* and *one in number*[^p230-7]; but nothing of this kind is united to another substance prior to it according to *being*: therefore since human nature in Christ is united to the eternal Word, it seems that it does not hold the account of individuation in him.

4. Likewise, whatever is said of the son of man is said of the Son of God: therefore, since "individual" denotes "a collection of properties which it is impossible to find in another and to be said of another individual[^p230-8]"; it is impossible that Christ should be a different and different individual as man and as God: therefore just as in Christ there is a unity of personality, so there is a unity of individuation: therefore just as this is false: Christ is a person as man; so, as it seems, this will be false: Christ is an individual as man.

*(General question.)* It is asked therefore concerning this and similar matters, namely whether these are to be conceded: Christ is an individual as man; Christ is a suppositum as man; Christ is a hypostasis as man; and concerning other similar ones, what they have of truth and what of propriety.

> ### Conclusion.
> *(On the twofold mode of speech, conclusion.)* The locution: Christ, as he is man, is an individual, is conceded, insofar as "individual" is taken in the broader mode.

**I respond:** It must be said that, taking this word *secundum* (insofar as) properly, as it expresses the relation of a cause[^p230-9], some of such locutions are simply false and improper, and some are to be distinguished, in that they have something of propriety and something of impropriety. *(General conclusion to the questions.)*

For this is false and improper: Christ, as man, is a *person*; and this likewise: Christ, as man, is a *hypostasis*. But the first is false from a twofold cause: both because person imports a property of dignity, and also because it imports the foundation of the whole of natural existence. *(Note.)* But neither of these is in Christ by reason of the assumed nature, but of the assuming[^p230-10]. — But the second is false by the other of those causes, since, although

a hypostasis does not express a property of excellence, it nevertheless expresses the foundation of existence; but this in Christ is not soul nor flesh nor that composed of both, but the uncreated Word. And therefore the aforesaid two locutions are improper and false; and if they are read anywhere, they are to be expounded and to be understood according to another acceptation of that determination "insofar as he is man[^p231-1]."

*(On the two others.)* But this, of which there is now discourse, namely Christ is an *individual*, as man; and this: Christ is a *suppositum*, as man, can have propriety and impropriety according to the diverse intention of these words. — *(Distinction concerning "individual.")* For "individual" is said of something in two ways: in one way, because it is said *of one alone*; and in this way the whiteness of Peter is an *individual*, and in this way an *individual* is said to be what is *undivided in itself*. And so *(Conclusion 1.)* without doubt Christ, as man, is an individual. In another way an *individual* is said to be what is *divided from others* and *subsists in itself* and *per se*; and *(Conclusion 2.)* taking "individual" in this way, human nature in Christ is not an individual. For it is united to the uncreated Word, as to its suppositum.

*(Conclusion 3.)* In this same way too a distinction must be made, when it is said: Christ, as man, is a *suppositum*. *(Distinction concerning "suppositum.")* For there is a *suppositum in which* and a *suppositum of which*[^p231-2]. If by "suppositum" is meant that *of which* another is predicated and which is subjected to a higher term; *(Conclusion 4.)* Christ, as man, is a suppositum. But if by it is meant that suppositum *in which* the whole *being* of the thing is established and founded; thus it is not to be conceded *(Conclusion 5.)* that Christ is a suppositum as man, unless the account of suppositum is narrowed, so that it be called a suppositum of accidents and of accidental properties.

*(Epilogue.)* Hence, since in its single acceptation both the name "individual" and the name "suppositum" are equivalent to "hypostasis," the aforesaid locutions are false from the same cause from which the aforesaid locution is also false, namely: Christ is a hypostasis as man. For it would follow that in Christ there would be two supposita and two hypostases; and so he would not be one, nor would there be in him a true union. — But according to another acceptation they can be conceded; and through this the reasons that are brought forward for both sides can be resolved. *(To the arguments for both sides.)* For the reasons that are brought forward for the first side proceed concerning the individual insofar as *individual* is said to be what is said of one alone. But the reasons for the following side proceed concerning the individual insofar as it not only is not divided into others[^p231-3], but also insofar as it is divided from another suppositum, and this indeed it does not have in Christ. And all this is clear to one who treats the individual reasons thoroughly.

*(To the general question.)* From these things it is clear what was asked last, namely which locutions in this matter are to be admitted, and which not. For those are to be conceded which so import the truth and propriety of the natures that they do not prejudice that supreme union, in which indeed the union was made in the person of the Word, not only insofar as it expresses *the dignity of a property*, but[^p231-4] insofar as it expresses *an incommunicable suppositum*, namely the hypostasis itself, by reason of which there is mutual predication and communication of idioms. — *(The directive principle.)* And this is to be held as a directive principle, because in that union the blessed person of the Word made itself the suppositum of human nature, as was said many times in the foregoing[^p231-5]. And to that extent human nature in Christ is said *to incline toward an accident*: and therefore some predicate which expresses a mode of existing is truly attributed to *us* according to human nature, which nevertheless is not truly attributed to Christ according to the human nature, but according to the divine, namely to be a *person*, and to be a *hypostasis*, to be a *suppositum*, to be an *individual*, insofar as they are equivalent to the word "hypostasis"; although, according to the broader mode of taking them, the last two can be attributed, as has been touched upon.

*(Objection concerning the individual.)* But against the aforesaid it seems possible to object, since it seems that Christ, as man, is truly and properly an individual. For as was shown in the second book[^p231-6], individuation is from the communication of matter with form, and comes to be known through the collection of accidents; but Christ, as man, is composed of soul and flesh, just as other men are: therefore he truly and properly has individuation, just as other men do: it does not seem therefore that what was said suffices. — *(Incidental question.)* On account of this there is a question, how much there is of the propriety of individuation in Christ, as man. For if it is not greater, except because it is said of one alone; then it has no more of the account of individuation than accidents do; which is utterly absurd, since Christ, as man, is a true substance[^p231-7].

*(Solution.)* And it must be said that, the accidents and properties being set aside, which do not *make* individuation but *show* it, individuation is from *intrinsic principles*, insofar as they constitute one suppositum, in which the whole being of the thing is established. And because from the concurrence

of those principles the individual is constituted, and there results the form of the whole, which is the specific form; hence it is, as Boethius says[^p232-1], that "the species is the whole being of the individual." But in Christ soul and flesh, or matter and form, are united not only in that which they *constitute*, but also in the *hypostasis of the eternal Word*. *(Note.)* And therefore the specific form does not express the whole being of Christ, and through this Christ, as man, does not altogether have the *full account* of an individual; whence he holds as it were a middle between the individual *properly said* and the individual according to which an *accident* is said to be something individual. For in an individual properly said there is the union of substantial principles and the constitution of a first suppositum in itself, not in another. But both of these are lacking in *accidents*, which subsist neither *in themselves* nor *per se*[^p232-2]. In a middle way it is in Christ, where the principles come together according to human nature; yet the first suppositum is of another nature, not constituted from them. — And so it is clear that the things said above hold truth. And for these things the matters predetermined in the second book, distinction three[^p232-3], are of value.

la: Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 3. — De dicto Damasceni (III. de Fide orthod. c. 11.) vide supra pag. 15, nota 5.

en: Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 3. — On the saying of Damascene (*On the Orthodox Faith*, bk. III, c. 11), see above p. 15, note 5.

la: De Praedicab. c. de Specie, in fine. In maiori Vat. inepte omittit *homo*.

en: *On the Predicables*, chapter "On Species," at the end. In the major [premise] the Vatican edition ineptly omits *homo* (man).

la: Quod Aristot. docet I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.). Cfr. supra pag. 133, nota 5. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Genere, ait: «Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua, ut Socrates et hic et hoc; alia vero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentia et propria et accidentia» etc.

en: Which Aristotle teaches in *On Interpretation* I, c. 5 (c. 7). Cf. above p. 133, note 5. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter "On Genus," says: "For of the things which are predicated, some are said of one alone, like individuals, as Socrates and 'this' and 'this'; but others of many, as genera and species and differences and propria and accidents," etc.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie. Vide supra pag. 49, nota 4. — Paulo superius pro *si essentiale* codd. F U *si substantiale*. Subinde in initio seq. enuntiati pro *vel differentia* cod. U *nec differentia*.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter "On Species." See above p. 49, note 4. — A little above, for *si essentiale* (if essential) codices F U read *si substantiale* (if substantial). Then at the beginning of the next clause, for *vel differentia* (or difference) codex U reads *nec differentia* (nor difference).

la: De Praedicam. c. de Substantia, ubi et illustrantur quae hic in arg. amplius proponuntur.

en: *On the Categories*, chapter "On Substance," where the things proposed more fully here in the argument are also illustrated.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: Color in corpore est, ergo et in quodam corpore; nam si non in aliquo esset singulorum, nec omnino in corpore. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 105, nota 8, ubi Boethii expositio in hunc loc. allegatur.

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories*, chapter "On Substance": Color is in body, therefore also in some body; for if it were in none of the singulars, it would not be in body at all. Cf. vol. II, p. 105, note 8, where Boethius's exposition on this passage is cited.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 5, ubi statuit, quod in incarnatione duas naturas «secundum hypostasim unitas esse confitemur». Cfr. ibid. c. 3. et 11. nec non supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1. in fine et d. VI. c. 3. — Quod in maiori proponitur Damasc. loc. cit. c. 4. insinuat dicens, quod «persona ac hypostasis individuum denotet». Et in Dialect. c. 11. ait: De isto [individuo] philosophi loquuntur, quod quidem in substantia hypostasim significat.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, bk. III, c. 5, where he lays down that in the incarnation "we confess two natures united according to the hypostasis." Cf. ibid. c. 3 and 11, as well as above the Master's text, d. V, c. 1 at the end, and d. VI, c. 3. — What is proposed in the major Damascene insinuates in the cited passage, c. 4, saying that "person and hypostasis denote an individual." And in the *Dialectica*, c. 11, he says: The philosophers speak of this [individual] which in substance signifies a hypostasis.

la: Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 1. — Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto, ait: «Numerus quidem *discretorum* est». Et V. Metaph. text. 11. seq. (IV. c. 6.) docet, numerum sequi divisionem (quae includitur in notione individui i. e. divisi ab aliis). Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 8.

en: Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 1. — Aristotle, *On the Categories*, chapter "On Quantity," says: "Number indeed belongs to the *discrete*." And in *Metaphysics* V, text 11f. (IV, c. 6) he teaches that number follows division (which is included in the notion of an individual, i.e. of what is divided from others). Cf. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, bk. III, c. 8.

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 1. (IX. c. 1.): Numero igitur indivisibile est *singulare*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 1 (IX, c. 1): What is indivisible in number, therefore, is the *singular*.

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, in fine. — In initio arg. post *quidquid dicitur* edd. cum paucis codd. adiungunt *vere*. De maiori cfr. supra d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter "On Species," at the end. — At the beginning of the argument, after *quidquid dicitur* (whatever is said), the editions with a few codices add *vere* (truly). On the major premise cf. above d. 7, a. 1, q. 1ff.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, in the body [of the response].

la: Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. et 4. nec non d. 6. a. 1. q. 1, ubi et plura invenies de iis quae in textu procedente proferuntur. — Inferius pro *ex utroque* cod. K (bb a prima manu) *ex utraque*.

en: See above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 and 4, as well as d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, where you will also find more on the things brought forward in the following text. — Below, for *ex utroque* (from both) codex K (and bb by the first hand) reads *ex utraque* (from each).

la: Intellige: secundum unitatem concomitantiae, ut dictum est supra q. 1. in corp. — Aliquanto inferius pro *intentionem* Vat. *acceptionem*.

en: Understand: according to the unity of concomitance, as was said above, q. 1, in the body. — Somewhat below, for *intentionem* (intention) the Vatican edition reads *acceptionem* (acceptation).

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.

la: Edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. *non solum dividitur in alia*, perperam omissa vocula *non* ante *dividitur*; Vat. *non solum dividitur ab alio*; nostram lectionem tuentur codd. A F U bb. Mox post *supposito* Vat. cum cod. cc addit *vel suppositaliter*.

en: Editions 1, 2 with many codices read *non solum dividitur in alia* (not only is divided into others), the particle *non* before *dividitur* being wrongly omitted; the Vatican edition *non solum dividitur ab alio* (not only is divided from another); our reading is supported by codices A F U bb. Shortly after *supposito* the Vatican edition with codex cc adds *vel suppositaliter* (or suppositally).

la: Edd. *sed etiam*.

en: The editions read *sed etiam* (but also).

la: Dist. 1. a. 1. q. 1; d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.; d. 6. per totam. — Paulo superius pro *directivo* codd. C D E T X *ductivo*, Vat. *ductivo* vel *directivo*. Subinde post *habendum* cod. A *quod* pro *quia*. De enuntiato seq. cfr. supra pag. 155, nota 6.

en: Distinction 1, a. 1, q. 1; d. 5, a. 2, q. 1ff.; d. 6 throughout. — A little above, for *directivo* (directive) codices C D E T X read *ductivo* (leading), the Vatican edition *ductivo* or *directivo*. Then after *habendum* codex A reads *quod* for *quia*. On the following statement cf. above p. 155, note 6.

la: Dist. 3. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Mox pro *ex communicatione* cod. bb *ex coniunctione*, et pro *materiae cum forma* cod. K *formae cum materia*. Paulo inferius pro *non videtur igitur* cod. N *et ita non videtur*.

en: Distinction 3, part 1, a. 2, q. 1ff. — Shortly, for *ex communicatione* (from the communication) codex bb reads *ex coniunctione* (from the conjunction), and for *materiae cum forma* (of matter with form) codex K *formae cum materia* (of form with matter). A little below, for *non videtur igitur* (it does not seem therefore) codex N reads *et ita non videtur* (and so it does not seem).

la: Vide supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. — Codd. C N X *sit una substantia*, edd. *sit una vera substantia*.

en: See above d. 6, a. 1, q. 3. — Codices C N X read *sit una substantia* (is one substance), the editions *sit una vera substantia* (is one true substance).

la: Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. c. de Specie, et lib. de Divisione. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 441, nota 8. — Pro *individui* cod. K *individuorum*. Paulo inferius pro *totum esse Christi* codd. W X *totum esse individui*, cod. N *totum esse individui Christi*.

en: [Boethius,] bk. III of the *Commentary on Porphyry*, chapter "On Species," and the book *On Division*. Cf. vol. II, p. 441, note 8. — For *individui* (of the individual) codex K reads *individuorum* (of individuals). A little below, for *totum esse Christi* (the whole being of Christ) codices W X read *totum esse individui* (the whole being of the individual), codex N *totum esse individui Christi* (the whole being of the individual of Christ).

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1).

la: Part. I. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Cfr. etiam supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 6. a. 1. q. 3.

en: Part I, a. 2, q. 1ff. — Cf. also above d. 2, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 6, a. 1, q. 3.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter antiqui Scholastici non concedunt simpliciter locutionem, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, sit individuum. Nam, ut dicit Ægid. R. (hic q. 2. dub. lat. 1.) ad mentem S. Thomae, «illa humana natura (in Christo), licet sit quoddam individuum, non tamen praedicatur de Christo in abstracto, et ut est quoddam individuum, quia Christus non est humanitas». — Aliis verbis ac S. Bonav., sed in re idem dicentibus, rem explicat Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.) sic: «Uno modo individuum accipitur communiter, secundum quod est in quolibet genere; altero modo specialiter, secundum quod est in genere substantiae solius. Primo modo individuum dicitur quod de uno solo praedicatur; secundo, quod per se subsistit, ab aliis divisum. Primo modo pes vel albedo Socratis potest dici individuum; secundo modo non. Primo modo plura sunt in Christo individua, sed ipse non est nisi unum solum individuum; secundo modo unum solum in Christo est individuum, specialiter dictum, et ipse est illud, scilicet persona divina». Deinde resolvit, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum, primo modo intellectum, nec tamen aliud a persona; non autem in altero sensu acceptum. — Quoad terminum *suppositum* S. Bonav. praeter sensum vulgarem alium sensum cum antiquis Scholasticis distinguit, scilicet ut aliquid sub communi natura positum, ad quam habet respectum, et quae de illo praedicatur. Si ita intelligitur, «Christus, secundum quod homo, supponitur humanae naturae, vel est aliquod suppositum humanae naturae»; ita S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3.). — In fine quaestionis notanda sunt quae dicuntur ad quaestionem generalem et incidentem de ratione individui in Christo.

**II.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Commonly the older Scholastics do not simply concede the locution that Christ, as man, is an individual. For, as Giles of Rome (here q. 2, Latin dub. 1) says according to the mind of St. Thomas, "that human nature (in Christ), although it is a certain individual, is nevertheless not predicated of Christ in the abstract, and as it is a certain individual, because Christ is not humanity." — In other words than St. Bonaventure, but saying in substance the same thing, Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 1, subquestion 2) explains the matter thus: "In one way 'individual' is taken commonly, insofar as it is in any genus whatever; in another way specially, insofar as it is in the genus of substance alone. In the first way an individual is said to be what is predicated of one alone; in the second, what subsists per se, divided from others. In the first way the foot or whiteness of Socrates can be called an individual; in the second way not. In the first way there are several individuals in Christ, but he is only one single individual; in the second way only one in Christ is an individual, specially so called, and he is that one, namely the divine person." Then he resolves that Christ, as man, is an individual understood in the first way, yet not other than the person; but not taken in the other sense. — As to the term *suppositum*, St. Bonaventure, besides the common sense, distinguishes another sense together with the older Scholastics, namely as something placed under a common nature, to which it has reference, and which is predicated of it. If it is understood thus, "Christ, as man, is placed under human nature, or is some suppositum of human nature"; so St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, subquestion 3). — At the end of the question, what is said in reply to the general and incidental question concerning the account of the individual in Christ is to be noted.

**II.** Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 6, m. 2, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, subquestions 2, 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{229–232}-{L,R}-*.png`) because the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 16278–16497) cascade-fragments the Respondeo, the *De individuo/De supposito* distinctions, the scholion, and every page footer (one-token-per-line + two-column bleed). Clean running prose (the affirmative args, the Sed contra args) was base-checked against the OCR. Offset pdf = printed + 22 (PDF pp. 251–254).

**Page-split map (per-page restarted footer markers, page-suffixed):**
- **p.229** (PDF 251): q3 opener + affirmative args 1–2. Footer notes 8–9 (`[^p229-8]` Damascenus/Dist.6; `[^p229-9]` Porphyry, De Praedicab. c. de Specie). *Received hand-off from q2:* the p.229 footer sequence runs 1–9; q2 consumed nn.1–7 (its solution), q3 takes nn.8–9 (its args 1–2). Confirmed eyes-on (p229-R-2 footer band).
- **p.230** (PDF 252): args 3–6, Sed contra 1–4, general question, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo opening. Footer notes 1–10 → `[^p230-1]`…`[^p230-10]`.
- **p.231** (PDF 253): Respondeo continues (the *individuum/suppositum* distinctions, epilogue, reply to the general question, incidental objection + solution). Footer notes 1–7 → `[^p231-1]`…`[^p231-7]`.
- **p.232** (PDF 254): solution conclusion (Boethius, "species est totum esse individui") + SCHOLION I–II. Footer notes 1–3 → `[^p232-1]`…`[^p232-3]`. *Note 4 (Hilarius, de Trinitate) is the first footer of the following question (d.10 a.2 q.1) — forwarded, not held here.*

**Footer hand-off to d10-a2-q1.** ARTICULUS II (*De filiatione adoptionis*) opens at the foot of p.232 R col (raw 16498). Its q.1 (*Utrum filiatio adoptionis sit in Christo*) begins on p.232 and its first footer note is **p.232 n.4 (Hilarius, lib. II [de Trinitate] n. 27; with the long Hincmarus/Alcuin/Maurini *adoratur* vs *adoptatur* textual note)** — forwarded to d10-a2-q1 as its leading apparatus entry.

**Scholion disposition.** q3 has its **own distinct SCHOLION** (printed p.232, raw 16481–16497), sections **I** and **II** — `has_scholion: true`. (This differs from q1/q2: the article-wide a.1 scholion held in q1 did not forward-cover q3; q3 prints a fresh scholion treating Giles of Rome / Peter of Tarentaise / Thomas on whether "individuum" is predicated of Christ, plus the *suppositum* sense.)

**Alignment.** VERIFIED: opener raw 16280 *Tertio quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum* — concerns whether Christ as man is an individual / "this something." NOT q1 (*est Deus*, 16001) or q2 (*est persona*, 16138). Eyes-on confirmed on p229-L-1.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All four footer blocks and the scholion were read cleanly from the 450 dpi bands; OCR garbles (`9st`→*est* in CONCLUSIO, `impnssibile`→*impossibile*, `Porphyrius'`→*Porphyrius*, `k. Uem`→*4. Item*, marginal-label bleed) were resolved unambiguously against the PDF.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 10, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 232 -->

### Articulus II. *De filiatione adoptionis.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, scilicet de filiatione adoptionis. Et circa hoc incidunt tria inquirenda. Primum est, utrum filiatio adoptionis sit in Christo. Secundum est, utrum sit in aliis per Christum. Tertium est, utrum sit in nobis per comparationem ad Christum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum filiatio adoptionis sit in Christo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum filiatio adoptionis sit in Christo; quod est quaerere, utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus. Et quod sic, videtur.

*(Argg. pro parte affirmativa.)*

1. Hilarius *de Trinitate*[^p232-4]: «Potestatis dignitas non amovetur, dum carnis humanitas adoptatur»: si ergo hoc dicit quantum ad assumtionem humanae naturae a Verbo, videtur, quod in Christo humana natura sit adoptata.

2. Item, Spiritus caritatis est ille qui facit filios adoptionis, sicut patet ad Romanos octavo[^p233-1]: *Non accepistis iterum spiritum servitutis in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis filiorum*; sed Christus habuit spiritum dilectionis, secundum quod alii, quem et accepit per donum gratiae, in quantum homo: ergo est filius adoptivus.

3. Item, aut Christus est filius Dei, secundum quod homo, aut non. Si *non*; et alii homines sunt filii Dei: ergo maioris dignitatis sunt alii homines, quam ille qui est Deus; quod absurdum est. Si igitur est Filius Dei, secundum quod homo, aut *naturalis*, aut *adoptivus*; sed non *naturalis*, quia tunc esset eiusdem naturae, secundum quod homo[^p233-2]: restat ergo, quod sit filius *adoptivus*.

4. Item, omnes sumus filii Dei per creationem[^p233-3]; sed hoc non impedit, quin possimus esse filii per adoptionem mediante dono gratiae: ergo pari ratione, quamvis Christus sit Filius Dei per aeternam generationem, nihil impedit, quin sit filius Dei adoptivus per susceptionem gratiae divinae in tempore. *Si tu dicas*, quod hoc est propter culpam, per quam facti sumus *filii irae*[^p233-4], quae non fuit in Christo; sed contra: Angeli sunt filii per adoptionem gratiae, sicut scribitur Iob trigesimo octavo: *Cum me laudarent astra matutina, et iubilarent omnes filii Dei*: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

*(Pro parte negativa.)*

1. Ad Philippenses secundo[^p233-5]: *Dominus noster Iesus Christus in gloria* etc., ibi Glossa: «In quantum homo, assumsit nomen Dei non per gratiam adoptionis, sed per gratiam unionis». *Si tu dicas*, quod non negat, Christum esse filium adoptivum, sed negat, ipsum esse Deum adoptivum, cum sit Deus verus; sed contra: sicut Christus est Deus verus, ita est Filius Dei verus: ergo sicut veritas Deitatis non patitur, ipsum dici Deum per adoptionem, sic veritas filiationis non admittit gratiam adoptionis.

2. Item, Ambrosius tractans illud verbum ad Romanos primo[^p233-6]: *Praedestinatus est* etc.: «Legi et relegi Scripturas; Iesum Filium Dei nunquam adoptione inveni»; sed non debemus Christo attribuere quod non possumus per Scripturas authenticas, aut rationes necessarias confirmare: ergo omnino est reiiciendum, Christum esse filium Dei adoptivum.

3. Item, Augustinus, *de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*[^p233-7]: «Natus est secundum veritatem naturae ex Deo Dei Filius, secundum veritatem naturae ex homine hominis filius, ut non *adoptione*, non *appellatione*, sed in utraque nativitate filii nomen *nascendo* haberet». Si ergo tam Filius Dei quam Virginis non *adoptione*, non *nuncupatione*, sed *natura*; ergo neutrius est filius adoptivus.

4. Item, quicumque adoptatur, de *non-filio* fit *filius* — si enim esset filius, iam non adoptaretur in filium — sed Christus ab aeterno fuit filius secundum divinam naturam; statim cum fuit[^p233-8], filius fuit secundum humanam: ergo etc. Et quia multae ad hoc inducuntur auctoritates in littera, ista sufficiant.

<!-- page 234 -->

### Conclusio.

> Nullatenus admittitur, Christum esse filium Dei per adoptionem, sive proferatur simpliciter, sive cum determinatione.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio haec *conclusio* non admittitur, scilicet Christum esse filium Dei per adoptionem, sive proferatur *simpliciter*, sive *cum determinatione*, utpote si addatur: in quantum homo.

*Ratio* autem huius est, quia *filiatio* respicit personam, sicut dictum fuit supra[^p234-1]; sed *adoptio* in adoptato praesupponit *extraneitatem*, et ponit *gratificationem*, et *ordinat ad possidendam hereditatem*; et ista sunt tria substantialia ipsi adoptioni. *(Tria in adoptione.)* Ad hoc ergo, quod aliquis sit filius per adoptionem, necessario requiritur, quod persona illa habeat ante adoptionem aliquo modo *extraneitatem*; quia non adoptantur filii proprii, sed alieni. Necesse est etiam, quod *recipiat donum gratiae*, per quod *ordinatur ad possidendam hereditatem*. — Quamvis autem in[^p234-2] Christo competant duo ultima, scilicet *gratiae susceptio* et *hereditatio* secundum naturam assumtam; *extraneitas* tamen non competit. Ille namque extraneus est a filiatione, qui est *non-filius*. *(Distinctio.)* *Non-filius* autem dupliciter potest dici: vel *negative*, vel *contrarie*[^p234-3]. *Non-filius* negative dicitur, qui non habet filiationem Dei, sive habeat oppositam filiationem, sive non. *Non-filius* contrarie sive privative dicitur ille qui est *filius irae*. — Ad hoc ergo, quod aliqua persona sit adoptabilis, necesse est, quod secundum suam primam originem vel sit indifferens ad filiationem gratiae et irae, vel habeat filiationem irae. Et quia persona Christi nullo istorum modorum etiam secundum naturam assumtam habuit *extraneitatem*, quia nec peccatum habuit nec habere potuit; omnes autem aliae personae, habentes gratiam, habuerunt aliquam extraneitatem: hinc est, quod de omnibus habentibus gratiam potest dici, quod sint *filii adoptivi*, excepta sola persona Christi, ratione iam dicta. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ad partem istam.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*(Solutio oppositorum.)*

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Hilario, quod in Christo humanitas adoptatur; dicendum, quod humanitas dicitur *adoptari* non ratione illius *singularis naturae*, quae assumta fuit a Verbo in unitatem[^p234-4] personae, sed ratione *consimilium*, quia per illam unionem adoptati sunt alii homines.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritus caritatis facit illos adoptivos; dicendum, quod verum est in his quae habent *extraneitatem* aliquam; et quia hanc non est reperire in Christo, ideo non tenet ratio illa, quia procedit ab insufficienti.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum Christus sit filius Dei, secundum quod homo; potest concedi, quod sic. — Et si quaeratur, utrum sit filius per *gratiam*, vel per *naturam*; dicendum, quod secundum quod homo, est filius *per gratiam*; sed tunc non sequitur: ergo est filius *adoptivus*, quia hoc non est per gratiam *adoptionis*, sed per gratiam *unionis*, quae multo est excellentior nec habet repugnantiam ad filiationem naturalem, immo facit illam communicari; nec importat aliquam imperfectionem nec amittitur nec consumitur, sicut gratia adoptionis, prout explicatum fuit[^p234-5]. *(Notandum.)*

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod filii per *creationem* fiunt filii per *adoptionem*; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia filii per creationem, quamvis non sint omnino extranei a Deo, tamen possunt esse extranei, si per culpam fiant filii diaboli; nec per *creationem* sunt perfecti filii, quia non sunt similitudine gratiae insigniti. Non sic autem est de eo qui per *generationem* est filius; ille enim non *est* extraneus nec *potest fieri*, nec potest magis consignari; et ideo non potest per adoptionem Filius Dei de novo fieri. Et ideo ratio illa non valet, quoniam non est simile hinc et inde[^p234-6].

english:
### Article II. *On the sonship of adoption.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the sonship of adoption. And concerning this three things fall to be investigated. The first is, whether the sonship of adoption is in Christ. The second is, whether it is in others through Christ. The third is, whether it is in us by comparison to Christ.

### Question I. *Whether the sonship of adoption is in Christ.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the sonship of adoption is in Christ; which is to ask whether Christ is an adoptive son. And that he is, it seems.

*(Arguments for the affirmative side.)*

1. Hilary, *On the Trinity*[^p232-4]: "The dignity of power is not removed while the lowliness of the flesh is adopted": if therefore he says this with regard to the assumption of the human nature by the Word, it seems that in Christ the human nature is adopted.

2. Likewise, the Spirit of charity is the one who makes sons of adoption, as is clear at Romans 8[^p233-1]: *You have not received again the spirit of bondage in fear, but the spirit of the adoption of sons*; but Christ had the spirit of love, as others do, which he also received through the gift of grace, insofar as he is man: therefore he is an adoptive son.

3. Likewise, either Christ is the Son of God, as man, or not. If *not*; then other men are sons of God: therefore other men are of greater dignity than he who is God; which is absurd. If therefore he is the Son of God, as man, [he is] either *natural* or *adoptive*; but not *natural*, because then he would be of the same nature, as man[^p233-2]: it remains, therefore, that he is an *adoptive* son.

4. Likewise, we are all sons of God by creation[^p233-3]; but this does not prevent us from being able to be sons by adoption through the gift of grace: therefore by like reasoning, although Christ is the Son of God by eternal generation, nothing prevents him from being an adoptive son of God through the reception of divine grace in time. *If you say* that this is on account of fault, through which we became *sons of wrath*[^p233-4], which was not in Christ; on the contrary: the angels are sons by the adoption of grace, as is written at Job 38: *When the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God rejoiced*: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

*(For the negative side.)*

1. At Philippians 2[^p233-5]: *Our Lord Jesus Christ in glory* etc., where the Gloss [says]: "Insofar as he is man, he assumed the name of God not through the grace of adoption, but through the grace of union." *If you say* that this does not deny that Christ is an adoptive son, but denies that he is an adoptive God, since he is true God; on the contrary: just as Christ is true God, so is he the true Son of God: therefore just as the truth of the Deity does not allow that he be called God by adoption, so the truth of the sonship does not admit the grace of adoption.

2. Likewise, Ambrose, treating that word at Romans 1[^p233-6]: *He was predestined* etc.: "I have read and reread the Scriptures; I have never found Jesus the Son of God by adoption"; but we ought not to attribute to Christ what we cannot confirm through authentic Scriptures or necessary reasons: therefore it is altogether to be rejected that Christ is an adoptive son of God.

3. Likewise, Augustine, *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^p233-7]: "He was born, according to the truth of nature, the Son of God from God; according to the truth of nature, the son of man from man, so that not by *adoption*, not by *appellation*, but in each nativity he had the name of son by *being born*." If therefore both as Son of God and as [son] of the Virgin he is so not by *adoption*, not by *naming*, but by *nature*; then he is the adoptive son of neither.

4. Likewise, whoever is adopted is made a *son* from a *non-son* — for if he were a son, he would not now be adopted into a son — but Christ from eternity was a son according to the divine nature; the moment he was[^p233-8], he was a son according to the human [nature]: therefore etc. And since many authorities are adduced for this in the text, let these suffice.

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### Conclusion.

> It is in no way admitted that Christ is the Son of God by adoption, whether it be uttered simply or with a qualification.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt this *conclusion* is not admitted, namely that Christ is the Son of God by adoption, whether it be uttered *simply* or *with a qualification*, as for instance if it be added: insofar as he is man.

Now the *reason* for this is that *sonship* regards a person, as was said above[^p234-1]; but *adoption* presupposes in the one adopted an *extraneousness*, and posits a *gracing*, and *orders [him] to the possessing of an inheritance*; and these are the three things substantial to adoption itself. *(The three [elements] in adoption.)* For this, then, that someone be a son by adoption, it is necessarily required that that person have, before the adoption, in some way an *extraneousness*; because proper sons are not adopted, but strangers. It is also necessary that he *receive the gift of grace*, through which he is *ordered to the possessing of an inheritance*. — Although, however, in[^p234-2] Christ the last two belong, namely the *reception of grace* and the *inheritance* according to the assumed nature; nevertheless *extraneousness* does not belong. For he is a stranger to sonship who is a *non-son*. *(A distinction.)* But *non-son* can be said in two ways: either *negatively* or *contrarily*[^p234-3]. A *non-son* is said negatively [of one] who does not have the sonship of God, whether he have an opposite sonship or not. A *non-son* contrarily or privatively is said of him who is a *son of wrath*. — For this, then, that some person be adoptable, it is necessary that, according to its first origin, it be either indifferent to the sonship of grace and of wrath, or have the sonship of wrath. And since the person of Christ in none of these ways, even according to the assumed nature, had *extraneousness*, because he neither had sin nor could have it; whereas all other persons having grace had some extraneousness: hence it is that of all who have grace it can be said that they are *adoptive sons*, except the person of Christ alone, for the reason already given. — Therefore the reasons for this side are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*(Solution of the opposed [arguments].)*

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected from Hilary, that in Christ the humanity is adopted; it must be said that the humanity is said to be *adopted* not by reason of that *singular nature* which was assumed by the Word into the unity[^p234-4] of the person, but by reason of *those like it*, because through that union other men have been adopted.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the spirit of charity makes them adoptive; it must be said that this is true in those things which have some *extraneousness*; and because this is not to be found in Christ, therefore that reasoning does not hold, because it proceeds from an insufficient [ground].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, whether Christ is the Son of God, as man; it can be granted that he is. — And if it be asked whether he is a son by *grace* or by *nature*; it must be said that as man he is a son *by grace*; but then it does not follow: therefore he is an *adoptive* son, because this is not through the grace of *adoption*, but through the grace of *union*, which is much more excellent and has no repugnance to natural sonship, but rather causes it to be communicated; nor does it imply any imperfection, nor is it lost nor consumed, as the grace of adoption [is], as was explained[^p234-5]. *(Note.)*

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that sons by *creation* become sons by *adoption*; it must be said that it is not alike, because sons by creation, although they are not altogether strangers to God, nevertheless can be strangers, if through fault they become sons of the devil; nor are they perfect sons by *creation*, because they are not marked with the likeness of grace. But it is not so with him who is a son by *generation*; for he neither *is* a stranger nor *can become* [one], nor can he be more [deeply] sealed; and therefore he cannot by adoption be made the Son of God anew. And therefore that reasoning does not hold, since it is not alike on the one side and the other[^p234-6].

la: Libr. II. n. 27: «Ita potestatis dignitas non amittitur, dum carnis humilitas adoptatur». In quae verba (ut etiam editores Maurini animadverterunt) Hincmarus, archiepiscopus Rhemensis (✝ 882), in prooemio Dissertat. posterioris de Praedestinatione hanc fecit annotationem: «Sicut ipsorum qui interfuerunt concilio relatione didicimus, Domnus Carolus Felicem, infelicem Orgellitanae civitatis episcopum, synodali decreto haereticum comprobatum atque damnatum comperit, etiam revictum invenit, quia, corrupto muneribus iuniore bibliothecario Aquensis palatii, librum beati Hilarii rasit et, ubi scriptum erat: quia in Dei Filio carnis humilitas *adoratur*, immisit carnis humilitas *adoptatur*». Alcuin., VI. contra Felicem Urgellitan. episc. c. 6. ait: «Tu omnino perverse dicis *adoptatur*, ubi beatus Hilarius ait *adoratur*». Nihilominus editores Maurini verbum *adoptatur* retinendum esse duxerunt, tum quia, ut referunt, in nonnullis codd. iam ante Felicem exaratis sic scriptum sit; tum quia *adoptatur* hic omnino idem significet atque *assumitur*; tum demum, quia verbum *adoratur*, licet a dictionibus proxime antecedentibus *(panni sordent; Deus adoratur, quas Alcuinus contra Felicem affert)* non dissentiat, tamen contextui non congruat. Ambrosius haec Hilarii verba ante oculos habuisse videtur, cum scriberet I. de Fide, c. 4. n. 32: *Caro est, quae involvitur, divinitas, cui ab Angelis ministratur. Ita nec dignitas naturalis maiestatis amittitur, et assumtae carnis veritas comprobatur.* — Pro *amovetur*, quae est vera scriptura codd. B H M N U W, alii codd. non pauci et Vat. *admovetur*, codd. A bb *admittitur*. Lectionem variantem *admittitur* pro *amittitur*, sicut et scripturam codd. nostr. *humanitas* pro *humilitas*, commemorant etiam editores Maurini.

en: Bk. II, n. 27: "So the dignity of power is not lost while the lowliness of the flesh is adopted." On which words (as the Maurist editors also noted) Hincmarus, archbishop of Reims (✝ 882), in the preface of the latter Dissertation on Predestination made this annotation: "As we have learned from the report of those who were present at the council, Lord Charles found that Felix, the unhappy bishop of the city of Urgel, proven a heretic and condemned by synodal decree, was also refuted, because, the younger librarian of the palace of Aachen having been corrupted by bribes, he scraped out a book of blessed Hilary and, where it was written: that in the Son of God the lowliness of the flesh *is adored*, he inserted: the lowliness of the flesh *is adopted*." Alcuin, *Against Felix bishop of Urgel*, bk. VI, c. 6, says: "You speak altogether perversely [saying] *is adopted* where blessed Hilary says *is adored*." Nevertheless the Maurist editors judged that the word *adoptatur* ["is adopted"] should be retained, both because, as they report, it is so written in some codices copied already before Felix; and because *adoptatur* here means altogether the same as *is assumed*; and finally because the word *adoratur* ["is adored"], although it does not disagree with the immediately preceding phrases *(the garments are soiled; God is adored, which Alcuin cites against Felix)*, nevertheless does not fit the context. Ambrose seems to have had these words of Hilary before his eyes when he wrote *On the Faith* I, c. 4, n. 32: *It is flesh that is wrapped about; it is the divinity that is ministered to by the angels. So neither is the natural dignity of the majesty lost, and the truth of the assumed flesh is proven.* — For *amovetur* ["is removed"], which is the true reading, codices B H M N U W, not a few other codices, and the Vatican [edition] read *admovetur*; codices A bb *admittitur*. The variant reading *admittitur* for *amittitur*, as also the reading of our codices *humanitas* for *humilitas*, the Maurist editors also mention.

la: Vers. 15. — Paulo inferius pro *alii, quem et* (cod. G *etiam*) Vat. *et alii, quem*.

en: Verse 15. — A little below, for *alii, quem et* (cod. G *etiam*) the Vatican [edition reads] *et alii, quem*.

la: Cod. bb (K ad marginem) addit *et secundum quod Deus*. Paulo superius post *absurdum est* edd. subiungunt *dicere*.

en: Cod. bb (K in the margin) adds *and as God*. A little above, after *absurdum est* the editions subjoin *dicere*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 102, nota 4. — Mox pro *quin possimus* edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. *quin possumus*. Subinde post *esse filii* codd. c bb supplent *Dei*. Paulo inferius pro *nihil impedit* cod. bb *nihil impellet*.

en: Cf. above p. 102, note 4. — Presently, for *quin possimus* editions 1, 2 with many codices [read] *quin possumus*. Then, after *esse filii* codices c bb supply *Dei*. A little below, for *nihil impedit* cod. bb [reads] *nihil impellet*.

la: Eph. 2, 3: *Eramus natura filii irae.* — Seq. loc. Script. est Iob 38, 7, quae verba etiam Gregorius accipit de Angelis. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 72, nota 3.

en: Eph. 2:3: *We were by nature sons of wrath.* — The following scriptural place is Job 38:7, which words Gregory too takes of the angels. Cf. tom. II, p. 72, note 3.

la: Vers. 11. — Glossa in hunc loc. apud Petr. Lombard. sic sonat: *Cave, qualiter intelligas virorum illustrium, Ambrosii et Augustini verba praemissa, ne sibi contraire putentur. Scito ergo, quia est donatio naturalis et est donatio gratuita. Naturali donatione dedit Pater nomen, quod est super omne nomen, Deo Filio, non homini i. e. Christo, secundum quod Deus, non secundum quod homo; nec fuit aliud dare, quam sibi aequalem generare. Gratuita vero donatione dedit homini Christo, non Deo; quia Christus non in quantum Deus, sed in quantum homo per gratiam accepit nomen Dei, nec per gratiam adoptionis, sed per gratiam unionis, ut non sit adoptivus Deus, sed verus Deus, cui flectitur omne genu.*

en: Verse 11. — The Gloss on this place in Peter Lombard runs thus: *Beware how you understand the foregoing words of the illustrious men, Ambrose and Augustine, lest they be thought to contradict one another. Know therefore that there is a natural gift and there is a gratuitous gift. By a natural gift the Father gave the name which is above every name to God the Son, not to man, that is, to Christ as God, not as man; nor was it anything else to give than to generate one equal to himself. But by a gratuitous gift he gave [it] to the man Christ, not to God; because Christ, not insofar as God but insofar as man, received the name of God through grace, and not through the grace of adoption, but through the grace of union, so that he is not an adoptive God, but the true God, to whom every knee bows.*

la: Vers. 4. — Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc., testimonium, quod hic affertur, Ambrosio tribuit; sed P. Nicolai annotat in ed. oper. S. Thomae, hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3: «Nihil tale Commentarius in Epistolas Pauli, qui ementito Ambrosii nomine praenotatur, nec alibi apud verum et legitimum Ambrosium occurrit; etsi lib. I. de Fide, c. 17. (n. 111.): *Non est idem* [ed. Maurin. Ambros. *unum*] *adoptivus et verus*, inquit, *nec Filius diceret: Unum sumus* (Ioan. 10, 30.), *si se cum Filio* [ed. Maurin. *vero*], *qui verus non esset, ipse conferret*» etc. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine. Sententia similis illi, quae hic Ambrosio adscribitur, habetur apud August., contra Secundin. Manich. c. 5: *Lege itaque Scripturas, nusquam invenies de Christo dictum, quod adoptione sit Filius Dei.* — Pro *adoptione* codd. K L *adoptivum*. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 24, nota 8.

en: Verse 4. — Peter Lombard, on this place, attributes to Ambrose the testimony here brought forward; but P. Nicolai notes in the edition of the works of St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3: "Nothing of the kind occurs in the Commentary on the Epistles of Paul, which is prefaced under the falsely-assumed name of Ambrose, nor elsewhere in the true and legitimate Ambrose; although in bk. I *On the Faith*, c. 17 (n. 111): *The adoptive and the true [son] are not the same* [Maurist ed. Ambros. *one*], he says, *nor would the Son say: We are one* (John 10:30), *if he were conferring himself with a Son* [Maurist ed. *true*] *who were not true*" etc. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 2, at the end. A sentence similar to that which is here ascribed to Ambrose is found in Augustine, *Against Secundinus the Manichee*, c. 5: *Read the Scriptures, therefore, and you will nowhere find it said of Christ that he is the Son of God by adoption.* — For *adoptione* codices K L [read] *adoptivum*. — On the minor [premise] cf. above p. 24, note 8.

la: Cap. 2; in quo testimonio textus origin. post *ut* addit *veritas geniti*, et codd. M O pro *in*, quod edd. cum cod. cc omittunt, substituunt *ut*. — Paulo inferius post *si ergo* edd. cum pluribus codd. supplent *est*, et dein pro *nuncupatione* codd. G K L T W Z aa habent *nuncupative*.

en: Chapter 2; in which testimony the original text after *ut* adds *the truth of the begotten one*, and codices M O substitute *ut* for *in*, which the editions together with cod. cc omit. — A little below, after *si ergo* the editions with several codices supply *est*, and then for *nuncupatione* codices G K L T W Z aa have *nuncupative*.

la: Vat. post *fuit* subiicit *homo*; deinde post *humanam* codd. Q bb repetunt *naturam*. — Hoc arg. insinuatur ab August., Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 4. n. 10. his verbis: *Haec [nativitas spiritualis] enim adoptio dicitur. Eramus enim aliquid, antequam essemus filii Dei, et accepimus beneficium, ut fieremus quod non eramus; sicut qui adoptatur, antequam adoptaretur, nondum erat filius eius, a quo adoptatur, iam tamen erat qui adoptaretur. Et ab hac generatione gratiae discernitur ille Filius, qui cum esset Filius Dei, venit, ut fieret filius hominis, donaretque nobis, qui eramus filii hominum, filios Dei fieri. Factus est quippe ille quod non erat, sed tamen aliquid aliud erat; et hoc ipsum aliquid Verbum Dei erat* etc. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: The Vatican [edition] after *fuit* adds *homo*; then after *humanam* codices Q bb repeat *naturam*. — This argument is hinted at by Augustine, *Letter* 140 (otherwise 120), c. 4, n. 10, in these words: *For this [spiritual nativity] is called adoption. For we were something before we were sons of God, and we received the benefit that we should be made what we were not; just as he who is adopted, before he was adopted, was not yet the son of him by whom he is adopted, yet was already one who might be adopted. And from this generation of grace is distinguished that Son who, although he was the Son of God, came to be made the son of man, and to grant to us, who were sons of men, to be made sons of God. For he was made what he was not, yet was nevertheless something else; and that very something was the Word of God* etc. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Dist. 8. a. 2. q. 2. — Secundum Aul. Gellium, lib. V. c. 19, *adoptio* consistit in eo, quod «in alienam familiam inque liberorum locum extranei sumuntur». Cfr. Iustinian., I. Institut. iur. civil. c. 11; August., II. de Consensu evang. c. 3. n. 5. seq.; Serm. 139. (alias 31. de Verbis Domini) c. 1. n. 1. A concilio Francoford. (an. 794) adoptio sic definita est: *Quid est adoptio, nisi caritatis copulatio, qua pater adoptione sibi copulat filium, quem proprium non habet?* Cfr. etiam S. Paulini, patriarch. Aquileiens., libellus Sacrosyllabus contra Elipandum, concilii Francofordiensis an. 794 decreto missus ad provincias Hispaniae, c. 7.

en: Distinction 8, a. 2, q. 2. — According to Aulus Gellius, bk. V, c. 19, *adoption* consists in this, that "strangers are taken into an alien family and into the place of children." Cf. Justinian, *Institutes of Civil Law* I, c. 11; Augustine, *On the Agreement of the Evangelists* II, c. 3, n. 5 f.; *Sermon* 139 (otherwise 31, *On the Words of the Lord*), c. 1, n. 1. By the Council of Frankfurt (an. 794) adoption was thus defined: *What is adoption, but a binding of charity, by which a father binds to himself by adoption a son whom he does not have as his own?* Cf. also the *Sacrosyllabus* of St. Paulinus, patriarch of Aquileia, against Elipandus, sent by decree of the Council of Frankfurt of the year 794 to the provinces of Spain, c. 7.

la: Vocula *in* abest a cod. G. Mox pro *susceptio* cod. F *plenitudo*. Post pauca pro *tamen* codd. N W X *autem*.

en: The little word *in* is absent from cod. G. Presently, for *susceptio* cod. F [reads] *plenitudo*. After a few [words], for *tamen* codices N W X [read] *autem*.

la: De differentia inter negationem et privationem cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 4. (III. c. 2.). — Pro *potest dici* cod. G *potest considerari*.

en: On the difference between negation and privation cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 4 (III, c. 2). — For *potest dici* cod. G [reads] *potest considerari*.

la: Cod. G *unitate*. Vide expositionem Maurinorum in hunc loc., supra pag. 232, nota 4. allatam.

en: Cod. G [reads] *unitate*. See the exposition of the Maurists on this place, brought forward above at p. 232, note 4.

en: In the foundation, and d. 4, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 8, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1.

la: Cfr. August., I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 23. n. 78, et III. contra Faust. c. 3. — Paulo superius pro *consignari* cod. bb *configurari*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* I, c. 23, n. 78, and *Against Faustus* III, c. 3. — A little above, for *consignari* cod. bb [reads] *configurari*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio cohaeret cum alia de filiatione, quae supra d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. tractata est; ipsa elidit haeresim Adoptianorum, nec non quasdam opiniones inter catholicos disputatas, quae illi errori nimis videntur favere. Adoptianismi auctores (ab an. 783) fuerunt Elipandus, archiepisc. Toletanus, et Felix, episc. Urgelitanus, qui, teste Epistola synodica Concilii Francofordiensi (an. 794), docuerunt: «Confitemur et credimus, eum factum ex muliere, factum sub lege, *non genere* [scilicet generatione] *esse Filium Dei, sed adoptione, non natura, sed gratia*». Disputatum est inter posteriores doctos viros, quo praecise sensu isti haec verba intellexerint, utrum scilicet *omnino* negaverint, Christum esse Filium Dei naturalem, renovantes purum Nestorii errorem, an potius statuerint duas filiationes, alteram *naturalem*, quatenus est Deus verus, alteram *adoptivam*, quatenus est homo. Certum autem est, Epistolam illam Concilii Francofordiensis illis opprobrasse: «Per adoptionem vos separatis hominem Christum a Deo». Reprobatus est hic error iam an. 785 in Epistola Hadriani I. ad episcopos Hispaniae, tum in praedicto Concilio, praesidentibus Legatis Hadriani celebrato, tum altera Hadriani Epistola ex Concilio Romano an. 794 emissa ad episcopos Hispaniae. Inter alia plurima Hadrianus notat, quod isti «eum adoptivum et non proprium Filium confitentur, quasi *alienus* a Patre aliquando fuerit, aut per carnis *extraneus* ab eo factus fuisset assumtionem». Hanc haeresim scriptis confutarunt primo abbas Beatus et Etherius episc. Osmae, Hispani; deinde S. Paulinus Aquileiensis, Alcuinus aliique.

**II.** Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis observamus haec pauca. Fide constat tum contra Arium, quod Christus secundum personam divinam est Filius naturalis Patris eique consubstantialis et coaeternus; tum contra Nestorium, quod Christus homo propter unitatem personae vi communicationis idiomatum est Filius Dei naturalis. Restabat autem quaestio solvenda, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, dici debeat vel possit Filius Dei naturalis, an adoptivus. Praepositio autem *secundum*, ut iam notant Magister (hic c. 1.) et auctor noster (supra a. 1. q. 1. et dubium I.), dupliciter intelligi potest, scilicet proprie *reduplicative*, ut notet causam, vel *specificative* (cfr. pag. 226, nota 4.). Si *reduplicative*, sensus est, quod Christus per humanitatem sive mediante humanitate sit filius Dei naturalis; quod nemo unquam dixit, cum manifestum sit, quod humana natura, in se considerata, nec secundum suam essentiam nec secundum suam originem (quae est per creationem) habeat relationem divinae generationis naturalis. Si *specificative*; tunc sumitur homo concrete ut in humana natura subsistens. Et secundum hunc sensum media aetate et etiam posterius in scholis in utramque partem disputatum est, et exortae sunt variae opiniones, quae nunc communiter non satis distare ab errore Adoptianismi censentur. Pro aliquali excusatione affertur, quod antiqui Scholastici non cognoverint praecise decreta Hadriani I. et Concilii Francofordiensis. Certa omnino igitur censenda est conclusio S. Bonaventurae, S. Thomae, Alexandri Hal. aliorumque; pro qua stabilienda auctor noster duo affert fundamenta inconcussa, scilicet primo, quod filiatio respicit personam, unde, supposita una persona, una est etiam filiatio.

**III.** Scot. (hic in utroque Scripto q. unica) impugnat primum conclusionis fundamentum supra notatum atque negat, quod filiatio sit praecise suppositi et non naturae; unde circa ipsam conclusionem loquitur problematice et videtur (in Report. loc. cit.) putare, quod locutio: Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus, vitanda sit vel tantum ob malum intellectum haereticorum, vel quia Christus iam habuit ius hereditatis. Nec Richardus a Med. penitus reprobat praedictam locutionem. Durand. autem (II. Sent. d. 4. q. 1.) eam expressius affirmat esse in se veram; quem nonnulli Nominales secuti sunt. De quibusdam aliis posteriorum theologorum opinionibus circa hanc quaestionem consulantur libri recentiores. — Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 10. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; S. III. q. 23. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 13. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question coheres with the other concerning sonship, which was treated above in d. 8, a. 2, q. 2; it itself destroys the heresy of the Adoptianists, as also certain opinions disputed among Catholics which seem to favor that error too much. The authors of Adoptianism (from the year 783) were Elipandus, archbishop of Toledo, and Felix, bishop of Urgel, who, as the synodal letter of the Council of Frankfurt (an. 794) witnesses, taught: "We confess and believe that he, made of a woman, made under the law, is the Son of God *not by descent* [that is, by generation], *but by adoption, not by nature, but by grace*." It has been disputed among later learned men in what precise sense these men understood these words, namely whether they *altogether* denied that Christ is the natural Son of God, renewing the pure error of Nestorius, or rather established two sonships, the one *natural*, insofar as he is true God, the other *adoptive*, insofar as he is man. But it is certain that that letter of the Council of Frankfurt reproached them: "By adoption you separate the man Christ from God." This error was condemned already in the year 785 in the letter of Hadrian I to the bishops of Spain, then in the aforesaid Council, celebrated under the presidency of Hadrian's legates, then in another letter of Hadrian issued from the Roman Council of the year 794 to the bishops of Spain. Among many other things Hadrian notes that these men "confess him an adoptive and not a proper Son, as though he had at some time been *a stranger* to the Father, or had been made *extraneous* from him through the assumption of the flesh." This heresy was refuted in writing first by the abbot Beatus and Etherius, bishop of Osma, Spaniards; then by St. Paulinus of Aquileia, Alcuin, and others.

**II.** For the understanding of this question we observe these few [points]. It is certain by faith, both against Arius, that Christ according to the divine person is the natural Son of the Father and consubstantial and coeternal with him; and against Nestorius, that Christ as man, on account of the unity of the person, is by the force of the communication of idioms the natural Son of God. But there remained a question to be solved, whether Christ, as man, ought to be or can be called the natural Son of God, or adoptive. Now the preposition *secundum* ["according to"], as the Master (here c. 1) and our author (above a. 1, q. 1, and dubium I) already note, can be understood in two ways, namely properly *reduplicatively*, so that it denotes a cause, or *specificatively* (cf. p. 226, note 4). If *reduplicatively*, the sense is that Christ through his humanity, or by means of his humanity, is the natural Son of God; which no one ever said, since it is manifest that human nature, considered in itself, neither according to its essence nor according to its origin (which is by creation) has a relation of natural divine generation. If *specificatively*; then man is taken concretely as subsisting in human nature. And according to this sense it was disputed on both sides in the middle age, and also later in the schools, and various opinions arose, which now are commonly held not to stand far enough from the error of Adoptianism. By way of some excuse it is brought forward that the old Scholastics did not precisely know the decrees of Hadrian I and of the Council of Frankfurt. Altogether certain, therefore, is to be held the conclusion of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, and others; for the establishing of which our author brings forward two unshaken foundations, namely first, that sonship regards a person, whence, one person being supposed, the sonship also is one.

**III.** Scotus (here, in both Writings, q. unica) attacks the first foundation of the conclusion noted above, and denies that sonship is precisely of a suppositum and not of a nature; whence concerning the conclusion itself he speaks problematically, and seems (in the *Reportata*, loc. cit.) to think that the locution "Christ, as man, is an adoptive son" is to be avoided either only on account of the bad understanding of the heretics, or because Christ already had the right of inheritance. Nor does Richard of Mediavilla utterly reject the aforesaid locution. Durandus, however (II Sent., d. 4, q. 1), more expressly affirms it to be true in itself; whom certain Nominalists followed. Concerning certain other opinions of later theologians on this question let more recent books be consulted. — Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 10, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3; *Summa* III, q. 23, a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 9, 13. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.232–235 (PDF 254–257; offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 16498–16705 in `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`) used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker positions. Per the VOL II/III override the PDF column bands are authoritative wherever the OCR cascade-fragmented (Respondeo, scholion, all footers). Read column-by-column: p.232 R (foot) → p.233 L→R → p.234 L→R → p.235 L→R top (scholion tail).

**Chunking.** The short ARTICULUS II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali … tria inquirenda*) is folded into this q1 per the locked chunking convention — no standalone divisio chunk. Art. II's three questions: q1 (this) *utrum filiatio adoptionis sit in Christo*; q2 *utrum sit in aliis per Christum* (raw 16706); q3 *utrum sit in nobis per comparationem ad Christum* (raw 16836).

**Page-split map (per-page footnote restart; markers page-suffixed):**
- **p.232** (PDF 254): ART. II opener + q1 opener + arg. 1 (Hilarius), at foot of R col. Footer note 4 (Hilarius, *de Trinitate* lib. II n.27, with the long Hincmarus/Alcuin/Maurini *adoratur* vs *adoptatur* annotation) → `[^p232-4]`, **received as hand-off from d10-a1-q3** (which held p.232 nn.1–3).
- **p.233** (PDF 255): args 2–4 + sed-contra args 1–4. Footer notes 1–8 → `[^p233-1]`…`[^p233-8]`.
- **p.234** (PDF 256): CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + replies Ad 1–4 + SCHOLION I (start). Footer notes 1–6 → `[^p234-1]`…`[^p234-6]`.
- **p.235** (PDF 257): SCHOLION I (tail) + II + III. **No q1 footer markers on p.235** — the scholion carries no apparatus markers, and p.235's footer notes 1–6 all belong to the following q2 (whose body begins on p.235). Nothing forwarded.

**Footer hand-off (forward).** None forwarded to d10-a2-q2. q2 begins cleanly under its own running head with its own per-page footer sequence on p.235; q1's content (incl. scholion) is fully accounted for across pp.232–235.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: true`. q1 prints its own free-standing SCHOLION (§I–III): the history of Adoptianism (Elipandus/Felix, Council of Frankfurt 794, Hadrian I), the *reduplicative* vs *specificative* sense of *secundum*, and the later Scotus/Richard/Durandus discussion. (Distinct from a1-q1's article-wide scholion.)

**`[?]` flags:** NONE. The cascade-fragmented Respondeo and the long n.4 annotation were fully resolved against the 450 dpi column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0