title: Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De culpa primorum parentum in comparatione ad ignorantiam intellectus.*

Consequenter quaeritur de peccato primorum parentum in relatione ad ignorantiam ex parte intellectus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ex ignorantia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ignorantia aliquo modo sit culpa.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit culpae excusatio[^1].

### Quaestio I. *Utrum peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ex ignorantia.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod peccatum primorum parentum fuit ex ignorantia, ad minus peccatum mulieris.

1. *Genesis* tertio[^2]: *Serpens seduxit me* etc.; sed ubi est seductio, ibi est scientiae privatio: ubi autem hoc est, ibi est ignorantia: ergo etc.

2. Item, qui dubitat de aliquo, de quo debet esse certus, potius dicitur illud ignorare quam scire; sed mulier de verbo Domini debuit esse certa, quod dixerat[^3]: *Quacumque die comederis, morte morieris,* et de hoc dubitavit, cum dixit: *Ne forte moriamur:* ergo ex ignorantia peccasse videtur.

3. Item, qui credit, mortale peccatum esse veniale, ignorat veritatem iuris divini; sed Adam credidit, peccatum illud esse veniale, sicut dicit Augustinus, et Magister adducit in littera[^4]: «Arbitratus est, illud esse veniale non mortale delictum»: ergo videtur, quod tam vir quam mulier peccaverint ex ignorantia.

4. Item, omne peccatum aut «est ex ignorantia, aut est ex infirmitate, aut est ex malitia»[^5]. Sed peccatum primorum parentum non fuit ex malitia, quia tunc esset peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; nec ex infirmitate, quia nullam habebant pronitatem ad peccandum: ergo fuit ex ignorantia.

5. Item, si Adam et Eva credidissent Deum tam graviter offendere et tantas poenalitates incurrere, cum nullam haberent ad peccatum pronitatem, nullo modo videtur, quod culpam commisissent: si ergo culpam commiserunt, videtur, quod hoc ignoraverunt, et ita ex ignorantia peccaverunt.

**Sed contra:**
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1. Si peccaverunt ex ignorantia, aut illa ignorantia fuit poena, aut culpa. Si culpa: ergo culpa fuit in eis ante primam culpam, quod est impossibile, cum implicentur hic duo opposita. Si poena: ergo poena fuit ante culpam[^6].

2. Item, si fuit ibi ignorantia, aut ergo iuris, aut facti. Non facti, quia bene sciebant, se de ligno vetito comedere. Non iuris, quia bene sciebant, se debere Deo obedire et contra eius imperium nullo modo facere. Nulla ergo videtur in eis ignorantia fuisse[^7].

3. Item, si fuit ibi ignorantia, aut ergo voluntaria, aut involuntaria. Si voluntaria: ergo videtur, quod iam voluntas eorum in appetendo ignorantiam esset inordinata. Si involuntaria: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo debuit eis imputari culpa. Si ergo est imputata, non videtur, quod fuisset ex aliqua ignorantia.

4. Item, si fuit ex ignorantia: aut ergo innata, aut contracta, aut inflicta, aut procurata. Non ex procurata nec contracta nec inflicta: ergo fuit ex ignorantia innata. Sed non decebat Deum facere naturam humanam cum pronitate et impotentia: ergo pari ratione non debuit eam facere cum caecitate et ignorantia: si ergo ex ignorantia peccaverunt, videtur, quod hoc possit imputari Deo.

5. Item, si aliquo modo dicitur ex ignorantia peccasse mulier, hoc est, quia a serpente seducta fuit; sed vir non fuit seductus, sicut dicit Apostolus[^8]: ergo ex ignorantia peccatum eius non processit. Si ergo radix peccati in viro et muliere non fuit altera et altera, videtur etiam, quod nec mulier peccaverit ex ignorantia.

### Conclusio
> Peccatum Evae et etiam Adae fuit ex quadam ignorantia, accepta in sensu largo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod peccatum esse ex ignorantia potest dici dupliciter, videlicet *proprie* et *communiter:* proprie, prout distinguitur peccatum ex ignorantia contra peccatum ex infirmitate et ex industria; et hoc modo ignorantia dicit privationem scientiae, quae[^9] non competit homini ex natura, sed merito primae culpae fuit contracta. Et hoc modo peccatum primorum parentum non potest dici ex ignorantia, nec continetur sub illa divisione, qua dicitur, quod omne peccatum aut est ex ignorantia, aut etc. Illa enim divisio peccati est secundum statum naturae lapsae. — Communiter autem dicitur peccatum esse ex ignorantia, quod committitur, aliqua nescientia existente circa peccantem, ratione cuius nec considerat gravitatem culpae nec gravitatem poenae. Et sic peccatum primorum parentum ex ignorantia dici potest fuisse, quia tam in viro quam in muliere fuit quaedam nescientia, quae non fuit poena, sed quaedam naturalis imperfectio, magis reperta in muliere quam in viro. Mulier enim ignoravit, utrum serpens sibi verum, vel falsum suggereret; ignoravit etiam severitatem divinae iustitiae. Vir autem alterum horum dicitur ignorasse, videlicet divinae iustitiae severitatem, in hoc quod aestimavit de illa transgressione cito veniam invenire: inexpertus enim erat severitatem divinae iustitiae. Uterque tamen cognoscere potuit per scientiam, quam habebat, se male facere.

Et sic large accipiendo ignorantiam dici potest, peccatum primorum parentum fuisse ex ignorantia; et magis peccatum Evae quam Adae[^10]. Et hoc concludunt rationes ad primam partem inductae. — *Proprie* vero accipiendo ignorantiam, secundum quod dicit poenam, et hoc est, prout dicit nescientiam eius rei, quam homo deberet scire secundum exigentiam[^11]; sic peccatum primorum parentum non fuit ex ignorantia, sicut ostendunt rationes adductae ad partem contrariam; et hoc patet discurrendo per singulas.

**Ad argumenta pro parte contraria:**
1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod ignorantia aut est poena, aut culpa; dici potest, quod ista divisio non est sufficiens, nisi accipiatur ignorantia *proprie.* Nam non solum homo primo institutus, sed etiam Angelus beatus aliqua ignorat, cum multa *innotescant Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam*[^12]. Unde talis ignorantia nec culpa nec poena est, quia est respectu horum quae non debet scire, quantum est de prima conditione naturae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut fuit ignorantia *iuris,* aut *facti;* dicendum, quod non fuit ibi, proprie loquendo, ignorantia *iuris* quantum ad principale, sed quantum ad *aliquid annexum,* utpote quantum ad severitatem iudicis. Similiter non fuit ibi ignorantia *facti* quantum ad principale, quia bene sciebant, se gustare lignum vetitum; fuit tamen in muliere quaedam ignorantia quantum ad illud quod credebat assequi per illud, videlicet assimilationem ad Deum; et ita non fuit ibi ignorantia *proprie* dicta, sed *communiter.*

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia aut erat voluntaria, aut involuntaria; dicendum, quod ista non est divisio *per immediata,* si large accipiatur ignorantia. Aliquis enim est, qui nihil[^13] cogitat de eo quod ignorat; et tunc nec circa illud afficitur voluntarie nec involuntarie; et sic erat de illa ignorantia Evae.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut erat innata, aut contracta etc.: dicendum, quod illa ignorantia dicebat quandam scientiae incompletionem et imperfectionem, quae inerat animabus primorum parentum ex defectu propriae naturae, per hoc quod animae eorum non erant in omnimoda lucis plenitudine. In tali autem statu decuit sic hominem fieri, quia, sicut infra[^14] patebit, prius debuit esse *viator* quam *comprehensor.* Nec tamen ex illa ignorantia dicitur homo fuisse in tenebris vel in caecitate, quia sufficiens lumen habebat ad incedendum per viam iustitiae; et ideo non est simile de *pronitate.* Pronitas enim non solummodo dicit imperfectionem, sed etiam quandam naturae curvationem, ac per hoc deordinationem.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod vir non peccavit ex ignorantia, quia non fuit seductus; dicendum, quod non solummodo mulier ignorasse dicitur propter *seductionem,* sed etiam quia ignoravit poenae subsequentis acerbitatem. Et licet in Adam non fuerit ignorantia illius *seductionis,* fuit tamen ignorantia per inexperientiam *divinae ultionis;* et ideo aliqua ignorantia sive nescientia fuit in Adam, licet minor quam in Eva. — Nec valet illud quod obiicitur de *radice,* quia ignorantia non ponitur ibi esse tanquam ex una radice, sed quia quodam modo talis nescientia occasionem praebuit ad peccandum.

english:
### Article II. *On the fault of the first parents in relation to the ignorance of the intellect.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the sin of the first parents in relation to ignorance on the part of the intellect. And concerning this, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether the sin of the first parents was from ignorance.

Second it is asked whether ignorance is in any way a fault.

Third it is asked whether there is an excuse for the fault[^1].

### Question I. *Whether the sin of the first parents was from ignorance.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the sin of the first parents was from ignorance, at least the sin of the woman.

1. *Genesis* third chapter[^2]: *The serpent deceived me,* etc.; but where there is deception, there is privation of knowledge; and where this is, there is ignorance: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, one who doubts about something about which he ought to be certain is rather said to be ignorant of it than to know it; but the woman ought to have been certain about the word of the Lord, who had said[^3]: *On whatever day you eat, you shall die the death,* and she doubted about this when she said: *Lest perhaps we die:* therefore she seems to have sinned from ignorance.

3. Likewise, one who believes a mortal sin to be venial is ignorant of the truth of the divine law; but Adam believed that sin to be venial, as Augustine says, and the Master adduces in the text[^4]: «He reckoned it to be a venial, not a mortal, offense»: therefore it seems that both the man and the woman sinned from ignorance.

4. Likewise, every sin is either «from ignorance, or from infirmity, or from malice»[^5]. But the sin of the first parents was not from malice, because then it would be a sin against the Holy Spirit; nor from infirmity, because they had no proneness to sinning: therefore it was from ignorance.

5. Likewise, if Adam and Eve had believed that they were offending God so gravely and incurring such great penalties, since they had no proneness to sin, it in no way seems that they would have committed a fault: if therefore they committed a fault, it seems that they were ignorant of this, and so sinned from ignorance.

**On the contrary:**
1. If they sinned from ignorance, that ignorance was either a punishment or a fault. If a fault: then there was a fault in them before the first fault, which is impossible, since two opposites are here implied. If a punishment: then a punishment was before the fault[^6].

2. Likewise, if there was ignorance there, then it was either of law or of fact. Not of fact, because they well knew that they were eating from the forbidden tree. Not of law, because they well knew that they ought to obey God and in no way act against His command. Therefore no ignorance seems to have been in them[^7].

3. Likewise, if there was ignorance there, then it was either voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary: then it seems that already their will, in desiring ignorance, was disordered. If involuntary: then it seems that in no way ought a fault to be imputed to them. If therefore it was imputed, it does not seem that it was from any ignorance.

4. Likewise, if it was from ignorance, then it was either innate, or contracted, or inflicted, or procured. Not from one procured nor contracted nor inflicted: therefore it was from innate ignorance. But it was not fitting for God to make human nature with proneness and impotence: therefore by parity of reasoning He ought not to have made it with blindness and ignorance: if therefore they sinned from ignorance, it seems that this could be imputed to God.

5. Likewise, if in any way the woman is said to have sinned from ignorance, this is because she was deceived by the serpent; but the man was not deceived, as the Apostle says[^8]: therefore his sin did not proceed from ignorance. If therefore the root of sin in the man and in the woman was not one and another, it seems also that not even the woman sinned from ignorance.

### Conclusion
> The sin of Eve and also of Adam was from a certain ignorance, taken in the broad sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that for a sin to be from ignorance can be said in two ways, namely *properly* and *commonly:* properly, insofar as sin from ignorance is distinguished against sin from infirmity and from deliberation; and in this way ignorance signifies a privation of knowledge which[^9] does not belong to man by nature, but was contracted by the merit of the first fault. And in this way the sin of the first parents cannot be said to be from ignorance, nor is it contained under that division by which it is said that every sin is either from ignorance, or etc. For that division of sin is according to the state of fallen nature. — But commonly a sin is said to be from ignorance which is committed while some not-knowing exists in the one sinning, by reason of which he considers neither the gravity of the fault nor the gravity of the punishment. And in this way the sin of the first parents can be said to have been from ignorance, because both in the man and in the woman there was a certain not-knowing, which was not a punishment, but a certain natural imperfection, more found in the woman than in the man. For the woman was ignorant whether the serpent was suggesting to her something true or false; she was also ignorant of the severity of divine justice. The man, however, is said to have been ignorant of one of these, namely of the severity of divine justice, in that he reckoned that for that transgression he would quickly find pardon: for he was inexperienced in the severity of divine justice. Yet each was able to know, by the knowledge which he had, that he was doing wrong.

And so, taking ignorance broadly, it can be said that the sin of the first parents was from ignorance; and the sin of Eve more than that of Adam[^10]. And this is what the reasons adduced for the first part conclude. — But taking ignorance *properly,* insofar as it signifies a punishment, and this is, insofar as it signifies a not-knowing of that thing which a man ought to know according to requirement[^11]; in this way the sin of the first parents was not from ignorance, as the reasons adduced for the contrary part show; and this is plain by running through them one by one.

**To the arguments for the contrary part:**
1. As to what is objected, that ignorance is either a punishment or a fault; it can be said that this division is not sufficient, unless ignorance is taken *properly.* For not only man as first instituted, but even the blessed Angel is ignorant of some things, since *many things become known to the Principalities and Powers through the Church*[^12]. Hence such ignorance is neither a fault nor a punishment, because it is in respect of those things which he need not know, so far as pertains to the first condition of nature.

2. To what is objected, that it was either ignorance *of law* or *of fact;* it must be said that there was not there, properly speaking, ignorance *of law* as regards the principal point, but as regards *something annexed,* namely as regards the severity of the judge. Likewise there was not there ignorance *of fact* as regards the principal point, because they well knew that they were tasting the forbidden tree; yet there was in the woman a certain ignorance as regards that which she believed she would attain through it, namely likeness to God; and so there was not there ignorance *properly* called, but *commonly.*

3. To what is objected, that ignorance was either voluntary or involuntary; it must be said that this is not a division *through immediates,* if ignorance is taken broadly. For someone there is who thinks nothing[^13] about that which he is ignorant of; and then he is affected toward it neither voluntarily nor involuntarily; and so it was with that ignorance of Eve.

4. To what is objected, that it was either innate, or contracted, etc.: it must be said that that ignorance signified a certain incompleteness and imperfection of knowledge, which was in the souls of the first parents from the defect of their own nature, in that their souls were not in the entire fullness of light. But in such a state it was fitting that man should be made so, because, as will be plain below[^14], he had to be a *wayfarer* before a *comprehender.* Yet man is not said to have been in darkness or in blindness by that ignorance, because he had sufficient light to walk along the way of justice; and therefore it is not similar in the case of *proneness.* For proneness signifies not only an imperfection, but also a certain curving of nature, and through this a disorder.

5. To what is objected last, that the man did not sin from ignorance, because he was not deceived; it must be said that the woman is said to have been ignorant not only on account of the *deception,* but also because she was ignorant of the bitterness of the subsequent punishment. And although in Adam there was not the ignorance of that *deception,* yet there was ignorance through inexperience of the *divine vengeance;* and therefore some ignorance or not-knowing was in Adam, though less than in Eve. — Nor does what is objected about the *root* avail, because ignorance is not posited there as being from one root, but because in a certain way such not-knowing furnished an occasion for sinning.

la: Edd., excepta I, *excusatoria.*

en: The editions, except the first, read *excusatoria* ["of excuse"].

la: Vers. 13. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Verse 13. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Gen. 2, 17. — Seq. textus est Gen. 3, 3.

en: Genesis 2:17. — The following text is Genesis 3:3.

la: Hic c. 4. seq., ubi et istae duae de hac re opiniones exhibentur, quae hic proponuntur.

en: Here c. 4 ff., where also these two opinions on this matter are set forth, which are here proposed.

la: Isidor., II. *Sent.* c. 17. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. in fine.

en: Isidore, *Sentences* II, c. 17, n. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, at the end.

la: Quod sane iniustum esset; nam, sicut August., III. de *Lib. Arb.* c. 18. n. 51. ait, «Omnis poena, si iusta est, peccati poena est.»

en: Which would surely be unjust; for, as Augustine says, *On Free Will* III, c. 18, n. 51, «Every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of a sin.»

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Epist. I. *Tim.* 2, 14: *Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit.* Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. in fine.

en: First Epistle to *Timothy* 2:14: *And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression.* See here the text of the Master, c. 4, at the end.

la: Scil. privatio.

en: That is, the privation.

la: De quo cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. 3. 4. 5.

en: On which cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, 3, 4, 5.

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 adiungit *sui status.*

en: The Vatican edition together with edition 4 adds *sui status* ["of his state"].

la: *Eph.* 3, 10. — Quoad additamentum *per Ecclesiam,* quod abest a s. Script., consulas supra, pag. 118, nota 8, expositionem s. Hieronymi. — Pro *Principatibus* codd. et edd. 1, 2 *Principibus.*

en: *Ephesians* 3:10. — As to the addition *through the Church,* which is absent from Holy Scripture, consult above, p. 118, note 8, the exposition of St. Jerome. — For *Principalities* the codices and editions 1, 2 read *Princes.*

la: Non pauci codd., inter quos CFIKORS, male omittunt *nihil.*

en: Not a few codices, among them CFIKORS, wrongly omit *nihil* ["nothing"].

en: Distinction 23, a. 2, q. 2 and following.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Responsio ad hanc quaestionem eruitur ex distinctione communiter recepta, quae fit inter ignorantiam *proprie* dictam (quae importat *privationem* nec non culpam, vel saltem poenam, ac supponit, subiectum et aptum esse et teneri pro eo tempore ad sciendum), atque inter ignorantiam *large* acceptam, quae nihil nisi negationem alicuius scientiae importat et esse potest sine culpa et poena. Attamen nullum peccatum esse potest, nisi supposita aliqua nescientia, ut patet. De divisione peccatorum, quam habet etiam Magister (hic c. 5.), scil. in peccata ignorantiae, infirmitatis et industriae, cfr. hic dub. 2. et infra d. 43. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et ad 4, nec non dub. 1. Et notandum, quod aliud est peccatum *ex ignorantia,* aliud peccatum *ignorantiae.* Hoc enim est culpabilis omissio debitae scientiae, illud vero est peccatum qualecumque, quod committitur ignoranter (Centiloq. p. I. sect. 25.).

**II.** Hanc quaestionem tangit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 1. ad 3. — De ea: Scot., hic q. unica. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The answer to this question is drawn from the commonly received distinction made between ignorance *properly* called (which implies a *privation* as well as a fault, or at least a punishment, and presupposes that the subject is both fit and bound, for that time, to know), and ignorance taken *broadly,* which implies nothing but the negation of some knowledge and can exist without fault and punishment. Nevertheless, no sin can exist except on the supposition of some not-knowing, as is plain. On the division of sins, which the Master also has (here c. 5.), namely into sins of ignorance, of infirmity, and of deliberation, cf. here dub. 2 and below d. 43, a. 3, q. 2, in the body and at the reply to 4, as well as dub. 1. And it is to be noted that a sin *from ignorance* is one thing, a sin *of ignorance* another. For the latter is a culpable omission of the knowledge owed, while the former is any sin whatever which is committed ignorantly (Centiloquium, p. I, sect. 25.).

**II.** This question is touched by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 104, m. 1, ad 3. — On it: Scotus, here in the single question. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here in the single question. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum ignorantia in aliquo homine possit esse culpa.*

Secundo quaeritur gratia huius[^1], utrum ignorantia in aliquo homine possit esse culpa. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo quarto[^2]: *Ignorans ignorabitur*; sed nullus ignoratur a Deo nisi propter culpam: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi[^3]: *Noluit intelligere* etc., Glossa Augustini: «Ignorantia in his qui intelligere nolunt, est peccatum».

3. Item, ratione videtur. *Cognoscere* credenda et operanda est actus virtutis, scilicet fidei et prudentiae[^4]: ergo haec *ignorare* est virtutibus privari; sed privationes virtutum sunt vitia et peccata: ergo aliqua ignorantia est culpa.

4. Item, non *facere* ea quae homo tenetur facere, est peccatum, similiter non *dicere*, similiter non *amare* ea quae homo tenetur amare, est peccatum: ergo similiter *nescire* quod[^5] tenetur scire est peccatum; sed multi sunt, qui ignorant ea quae tenentur scire, utpote ea, sine quibus salvari non possunt: ergo in talibus ignorantia est culpa.

5. Item, error est peccatum[^6]: aut ergo ratione eius quod ponit, aut ratione eius quod privat. Non ratione eius quod *ponit*, quia peccatum privatio est, non positio. Si ratione eius quod *privat*; sed error privat scientiam, et privatio scientiae est ignorantia: ergo ignorantia est culpa.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio[^7] dicit, quod «inflicta est nobis ignorantia rerum agendarum et concupiscentia noxiarum»; sed nullum peccatum est nobis inflictum: ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.

2. Item, ratione videtur. In omni enim peccato est aversio a bono incommutabili et conversio ad commutabile[^8]; sed in ignorantia nulla est ad bonum commutabile conversio: ergo ignorantia non est culpa.

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3. Item, nullum peccatum remanet post poenitentiam; sed ignorantia remanet in homine post poenitentiam et contritionem; ergo ignorantia non est culpa. Si tu dicas, quod remanet actu, sed transit reatu; ergo tunc videtur, quod ignorantia non esset culpa actualis, sed originalis. Sed non est *originalis*, quia remanet post baptismum, et hoc melius patebit infra[^9]; nec actualis: ergo non est culpa.

4. Item, omne peccatum est in affectu, cum omne peccatum sit voluntarium[^10]; sed ignorantia est in intellectu: ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.

5. Item, si ignorantia est peccatum, ergo ignorare est peccare; sed de viro ignorante verum est dicere, quod in omni instanti ignorat: ergo in omni instanti peccat: ergo tot sunt in eo peccata, quot sunt instantia. Quod si hoc est falsum et impossibile, restat, ignorantiam peccatum non esse.

### Conclusio

> Ignorantia rerum ad salutem necessariarum potest interdum esse peccatum, interdum non.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum privationes cognoscantur per habitus[^11], cognitio ignorantiae pendet ex cognitione scientiae. — Attendendum autem, quod quaedam est cognitio aliquorum, quae nec est necessaria ad virtutem nec est necessaria ad salutem, sicut est artium mechanicarum et liberalium[^12]; et talis cognitio nec est virtus nec de esse virtutis; et illa ignorantia, quae est huius cognitionis privatio, culpa non est, sive sit ignorantia negationis sive dispositionis, sive etiam sit voluntaria, sive non. — Alia est cognitio credibilium et operabilium, quae ad salutem necessaria est in adulto; et haec est cognitio fidei et prudentiae; et ad hanc cognitionem habendam tenemur, quia sine hac nullus potest recte vivere. — Huius autem cognitionis privatio potest dupliciter in nobis esse: aut manente tentione, aut non manente. Si manente tentione, tunc est ibi culpa, quia, cum quis tenetur ad aliquid et illud non implet, ex hoc ipso culpatur et dignus est poena. Si autem sit in nobis privatio, non manente tentione, utpote cum non potest scire, et impotentia excusat ab obligatione; sic[^13] privatio huius cognitionis culpa non est, sicut in furiosis. — Et secundum hoc ignorantia, quae dicit privationem cognitionis ad salutem necessariae, uno modo peccatum est, alio vero modo minime.

Aliter potest dici, et quasi in idem redit, quod privatio cognitionis ad salutem necessariae dupliciter potest esse: aut ita, quod est in nobis, sed non a nobis, et hoc modo culpa non est, sed magis poena, et cum non simus eius principium, in ipsa nec meremur nec demeremur; aut ita, quod est in nobis et a nobis, et sic culpa est. — Hoc autem potest esse tripliciter: vel cum in via veritatis existentes voluntarie ab ea recedimus et in erroris foveam nos praecipitamus, et haec privatio potest dici ignorantia erronea, quae est in haereticis; vel cum, ad viam veritatis valentes pertingere, cupimus in tenebris ambulare, et haec potest dici ignorantia affectata; aut quia ex quadam pigritia et negligentia non curamus veritatem addiscere, et haec dicitur ignorantia crassa et supina. — Et quaelibet istarum est culpa, licet prima maior quam secunda, et secunda quam tertia.

Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod ignorantia aliquo modo potest esse culpa.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod ignorantia est nobis inflicta; dicendum, quod prout nobis inflicta est, poena est et non culpa; prout tamen voluntas nostra aliquo modo deordinatur circa illam, sicut prius dictum est, incipit esse culpa; sicut passiones sanctis Martyribus illatae poenae erant, consideratae secundum se, comparatae tamen ad voluntatem Sanctorum libenter eas perferentem pro amore Christi, erant eis meritoriae. Utrum autem aliquo modo sit culpa, prout scilicet contracta est, videbitur infra[^14] cum agetur de originali peccato.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia non est conversio; dicendum, quod verum est, prout est pura privatio; prout tamen ipsam concomitatur aliquo modo nostra affectio, non habet veritatem; et hoc modo dicitur esse culpa, non primo.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia remanet post poenitentiam; dicendum, quod non remanet, prout habet rationem culpae, scilicet ratione voluntatis concomitantis, vel quodam modo eam causantis; sed si remanet, hoc est in quantum habet rationem poenae ex originali contractae. Ideo quantum ad primum, in quo habet rationem actualis, transit non solum actu, sed etiam reatu, cum quis poenitet; quantum vero ad secundum, quodam modo remanet, et ita videtur ignorantia remanere actu; et in hoc habet quandam approximationem ad peccatum originale; secundum id tamen, quod culpa est, actuale peccatum est[^15].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia est in intellectu; dicendum, quod illa ignorantia, quae <!-- page 525 -->opponitur cognitioni virtutis, ad quam tenemur, non tantum respicit intellectum, sed etiam affectum, sicut et virtus sibi opposita. Unde non tantum dicit scientiae carentiam, sed etiam voluntatis incuriam et negligentiam ad scientiam percipiendam.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in quolibet instanti ignorat; dicendum, quod ignorare non dicitur esse culpa nisi eatenus, qua quis tenetur scire quod ignorat. Et ideo, etsi in quolibet instanti ignoret et in quolibet teneatur, quia tamen praeceptum affirmativum non obligat pro[^16] semper, sed pro loco et tempore; ignorans ignorando non peccat nisi in illo instanti et tempore, in quo tenetur nosse vel addiscere quod ignorat; ideo, quamvis semper dicatur ignorare, non tamen semper dicitur peccare.

english:
### Question II. *Whether ignorance in some person can be a fault.*

Secondly, in connection with this[^1], it is asked whether ignorance in some person can be a fault. And that it can, it seems.

1. First Corinthians, chapter fourteen[^2]: *He who is ignorant shall be ignored*; but no one is ignored by God except on account of a fault: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm[^3]: *He would not understand* etc., the Gloss of Augustine: «Ignorance in those who refuse to understand is a sin».

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. *To know* what is to be believed and what is to be done is an act of virtue, namely of faith and prudence[^4]: therefore *to be ignorant* of these is to be deprived of virtues; but the privations of virtues are vices and sins: therefore some ignorance is a fault.

4. Likewise, not *to do* the things which a man is bound to do is a sin, likewise not *to say* them, likewise not *to love* the things which a man is bound to love is a sin: therefore likewise *not to know* what[^5] one is bound to know is a sin; but there are many who are ignorant of those things which they are bound to know, namely those things without which they cannot be saved: therefore in such people ignorance is a fault.

5. Likewise, error is a sin[^6]: therefore either by reason of what it posits, or by reason of what it deprives. Not by reason of what it *posits*, because sin is a privation, not a positing. If by reason of what it *deprives*; but error deprives of knowledge, and the privation of knowledge is ignorance: therefore ignorance is a fault.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^7] says that «ignorance of the things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things have been inflicted upon us»; but no sin has been inflicted upon us: therefore ignorance is not a sin.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason. For in every sin there is a turning away from the unchangeable good and a turning toward the changeable[^8]; but in ignorance there is no turning toward the changeable good: therefore ignorance is not a fault.

3. Likewise, no sin remains after penance; but ignorance remains in a man after penance and contrition; therefore ignorance is not a fault. If you say that it remains in act, but passes away as to guilt; then it seems that ignorance would not be an actual fault, but an original one. But it is not *original*, because it remains after baptism, and this will appear better below[^9]; nor is it actual: therefore it is not a fault.

4. Likewise, every sin is in the affection, since every sin is voluntary[^10]; but ignorance is in the intellect: therefore ignorance is not a sin.

5. Likewise, if ignorance is a sin, then to be ignorant is to sin; but of an ignorant man it is true to say that at every instant he is ignorant: therefore at every instant he sins: therefore there are as many sins in him as there are instants. But if this is false and impossible, it remains that ignorance is not a sin.

### Conclusion

> Ignorance of things necessary for salvation can sometimes be a sin, sometimes not.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since privations are known through the habits[^11], the knowledge of ignorance depends upon the knowledge of the corresponding knowledge. — But it must be attended to that there is a certain knowledge of some things which is neither necessary for virtue nor necessary for salvation, as is the knowledge of the mechanical and liberal arts[^12]; and such knowledge is neither a virtue nor of the being of virtue; and that ignorance which is the privation of this knowledge is not a fault, whether it be an ignorance of negation or of disposition, whether also it be voluntary or not. — There is another knowledge, of things to be believed and to be done, which is necessary for salvation in an adult; and this is the knowledge of faith and prudence; and we are bound to have this knowledge, because without it no one can live rightly. — But the privation of this knowledge can be in us in two ways: either with the obligation remaining, or with it not remaining. If with the obligation remaining, then there is a fault there, because, when someone is bound to something and does not fulfill it, by that very fact he is at fault and worthy of punishment. If, however, the privation is in us with the obligation not remaining, as when one cannot know, and incapacity excuses from obligation; then[^13] the privation of this knowledge is not a fault, as in the insane. — And accordingly ignorance, which states the privation of knowledge necessary for salvation, is in one way a sin, but in another way not at all.

It can be said otherwise, and it comes back to almost the same thing, that the privation of knowledge necessary for salvation can be in two ways: either such that it is in us, but not from us, and in this way it is not a fault, but rather a punishment, and since we are not its principle, in it we neither merit nor demerit; or such that it is in us and from us, and thus it is a fault. — But this can be in three ways: either when, existing on the way of truth, we voluntarily withdraw from it and cast ourselves into the pit of error, and this privation can be called *erroneous ignorance*, which is in heretics; or when, being able to attain to the way of truth, we desire to walk in darkness, and this can be called *affected ignorance*; or because, out of a certain laziness and negligence, we do not care to learn the truth, and this is called *gross and supine ignorance*. — And each of these is a fault, although the first is greater than the second, and the second than the third.

And thus the reasons showing that ignorance can in some way be a fault are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that ignorance is inflicted upon us; it must be said that, insofar as it is inflicted upon us, it is a punishment and not a fault; insofar, however, as our will is in some way disordered concerning it, as was said before, it begins to be a fault; just as the sufferings inflicted on the holy Martyrs were punishments, considered in themselves, yet compared to the will of the Saints willingly bearing them for the love of Christ, they were meritorious for them. But whether it is in some way a fault, insofar namely as it is contracted, will be seen below[^14] when original sin is treated of.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that ignorance is not a turning-toward; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is a pure privation; insofar, however, as our affection in some way accompanies it, it does not hold true; and in this way it is said to be a fault, not primarily.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that ignorance remains after penance; it must be said that it does not remain insofar as it has the character of a fault, namely by reason of the accompanying will, or in some way causing it; but if it remains, this is insofar as it has the character of a punishment contracted from the original. Therefore, as to the first, in which it has the character of an actual sin, it passes away not only in act but also in guilt, when one repents; but as to the second, it remains in some way, and thus ignorance seems to remain in act; and in this it has a certain approximation to original sin; yet according to that by which it is a fault, it is an actual sin[^15].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that ignorance is in the intellect; it must be said that that ignorance which is opposed to the knowledge of virtue, to which we are bound, regards not only the intellect, but also the affection, just as the virtue opposed to it. Hence it states not only a lack of knowledge, but also a heedlessness of the will and a negligence in acquiring knowledge.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that at every instant he is ignorant; it must be said that to be ignorant is not said to be a fault except insofar as one is bound to know what he is ignorant of. And therefore, even if at every instant he is ignorant and at every instant he is bound, yet because an affirmative precept does not oblige for[^16] all time, but for a place and a time; one who is ignorant, in being ignorant, does not sin except in that instant and time in which he is bound to know or to learn what he is ignorant of; therefore, although he is always said to be ignorant, he is not nevertheless always said to sin.

la: Vers. 38.

en: Verse 38.

la: Psalm. 35, 4. — August., Epist. 194. (alias 105.) ad Sixtum, c. 6. n. 27. sic ait: Quia et ipsa ignorantia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, sine dubitatione peccatum est. Cfr. etiam eius Enarrat. in Ps. 35. n. 1. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Psalm 35:4. — Augustine, *Letter* 194 (otherwise 105) to Sixtus, c. 6, n. 27, says thus: For ignorance itself too, in those who refused to understand, is without doubt a sin. Cf. also his *Commentary on Psalm* 35, n. 1, and here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Vide III. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. et 4.

en: See III *Sentences*, d. 33, q. 1 and 4.

la: Cod. T *quae.*

en: Codex T reads *quae.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. below, d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.

la: Cap. 24. n. 8: Deinde iam etiam nolentibus subintravit ignorantia rerum agendarum et concupiscentia noxiarum.

en: Chapter 24, n. 8: Thereafter ignorance of the things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things crept in, even upon those unwilling.

la: Cfr. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *in ignorantia*, ut legimus fide codd. T aa cc et ed. I, Vat. *ignorantia.*

en: Cf. below, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 2. — Presently, for *in ignorantia*, as we read on the faith of codices T, aa, cc and edition I, the Vatican edition reads *ignorantia.*

la: Sicut infra probatur d. 41. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As is proved below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1.

en: Distinction 30, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 32, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Secundum Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.).

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 25 (c. 6).

la: Quae illa aetate septem numerabantur, scil. Grammatica, Dialectica, Rhetorica, Musica, Arithmetica, Geometria, Astronomia. De artibus mechanicis cfr. S. Bonav., opuscul. de Reductione artium ad theologiam. — Codd. Y aa post *sicut est* supplent *cognitio.*

en: Which at that time were numbered as seven, namely Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy. On the mechanical arts cf. St. Bonaventure, the little work *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology.* — Codices Y, aa, after *sicut est* supply *cognitio.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. I, post *scire* suppressa vocula *et*, hic ante *sic* eam interserunt.

en: Codex cc and edition I, having suppressed the little word *et* after *scire*, here insert it before *sic.*

la: Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *perferentem* Vat. *perferentium.*

en: Distinction 30, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, for *perferentem* the Vatican edition reads *perferentium.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Cf. below, d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Ex cod. cc et ed. I adiecimus *pro.*

en: From codex cc and edition I we have added *pro.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Catholici auctores in hoc principio conveniunt, quod ignorantia, quatenus caret voluntario, eatenus caret culpa actuali in ignorante; unde ignorantia *invincibilis* (antecedens) excusat a peccato. Hoc principium negatum est a pluribus haereticis, et etiam a Iansenio quoad ignorantiam circa legem naturalem.

Duplici via, sed in eodem sensu, S. Doctor, adhibitis variis distinctionibus, quaestionem solvit. A S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 6. a. 8.), Scoto (hic q. unica) aliisque communiter distinguitur ignorantia *antecedens*, *concomitans* et *consequens*, et secundum has distinctiones quaestio solvitur.

Differentia tamen quaedam inter doctores antiquos fuit circa hoc, utrum ignorantia *privative* accepta secundum se culpa sit, quod tenet S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), an sit tantum *materia* culpae, sive sit culpa non nisi ratione adiuncti, quod est negligentia addiscendi, vel voluntas non addiscendi», ut vult Durand. (hic q. 3.), cui sententiae favet etiam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) his verbis: Nec ignorantia affectata culpa est *formaliter*, nisi ratione commissionis voluntatis; nec etiam ignorantia crassa nisi ratione negligentiae vel omissionis ipsius voluntatis».

**II.** De hac quaestione praeter citatos cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 113. m. 1-8. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. p. II. q. 76. a. 2. — S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 76. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7.; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 89. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. et dub. lat. I.

**III.** De sequente quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 135. m. 1-6. — Scot. apud eundem loc. cit. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic. q. 2. a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 3. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9-11; S. loc. cit. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic. a. 2. q. 3. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 23.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Catholic authors agree on this principle, that ignorance, insofar as it lacks the voluntary, to that extent lacks actual fault in the ignorant person; hence *invincible* ignorance (antecedent) excuses from sin. This principle has been denied by several heretics, and also by Jansenius as regards ignorance concerning the natural law.

By a twofold way, but in the same sense, the holy Doctor, employing various distinctions, solves the question. By St. Thomas (*Summa* I-II, q. 6, a. 8), Scotus (here, the single question), and others, ignorance is commonly distinguished into *antecedent*, *concomitant*, and *consequent*, and according to these distinctions the question is solved.

There was, however, a certain difference among the ancient doctors on this point, whether ignorance taken *privatively* is in itself a fault, which St. Thomas holds (here, q. 2, a. 1), or whether it is only the *matter* of a fault, that is, whether it is a fault only by reason of something adjoined, which is the negligence of learning, or the will of not learning», as Durandus holds (here, q. 3), to which opinion Richard of Middleton also inclines (here, a. 2, q. 2) in these words: «Neither is affected ignorance a fault *formally*, except by reason of an act of the will; nor likewise is gross ignorance, except by reason of negligence or omission of the will itself».

**II.** On this question, besides those cited, cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 113, m. 1-8. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III, p. II, q. 76, a. 2. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I-II, q. 76, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 7; *Summa* p. II, tr. 14, q. 89, partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 2, and the broad dubium I.

**III.** On the following question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 135, m. 1-6. — Scotus, in the same, loc. cit., a. 4. — St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2; *Summa* loc. cit., a. 3, 1. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 9-11; *Summa* loc. cit., partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 3, 4. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12, q. 23.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, raw lines 36786–36917), cross-checked against 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p52{3,4,5}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`; PDF pp. 545–547 = printed 523–525, offset +22). English is a fresh literal translation.

**Alignment confirmed.** ART II TRACTATIO sub-question 2 = *Secundo quaeritur gratia huius, utrum ignorantia in aliquo homine possit esse culpa* (raw 36786, p. 523 R). QUAESTIO III boundary at raw 36918 (p. 525 L, *Tertio quaeritur, utrum ignorantia sit culpae excusatio*). No q-swap.

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**has_scholion: true** — own SCHOLION I (solution doctrine), II (parallel literature for this q.), III (parallel literature *de sequente quaest.* = a2-q3). SCHOLION sits on p.525 L–R.

**No [?] flags.** OCR garbles silently corrected against PDF (e.g. *cujpa*→culpa, *noxiarura*→noxiarum, *nuUum*→nullum, *07-iginalis*→originalis, *palebit*→patebit, *Med.*→a Med. expansion, *Iansenio* retained).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 525 -->

### Articulus II. *De peccato primorum parentum in relatione ad ignorantiam ex parte intellectus.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum ignorantia sit culpae excusatio.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ignorantia sit culpae excusatio. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum primo[^1]: *Misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans hoc feci*: si ergo ignorantia fuit ratio, quare pervenit ad misericordiam, videtur, quod ignorantia excusabilem fecerit eius culpam.

2. Item, scientia aggravat culpam, sicut dicitur Lucae duodecimo[^2]: *Servus sciens voluntatem Domini sui* etc.: ergo per oppositum ignorantia alleviat, ergo excusat.

3. Item, omne peccatum est voluntarium: ergo quod diminuit de ratione voluntarii diminuit de ratione peccati; sed ignorantia diminuit de ratione voluntarii, quia «voluntarium est, ut dicit Philosophus[^3], cuius principium est in ipso cognoscente singularia»; ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut ad resistendum peccato requiritur fortitudo, sic etiam requiritur et cognitio; sed defectus fortitudinis, utpote infirmitas, excusat culpam[^4]: ergo similiter videtur, quod et defectus cognitionis, scilicet ignorantia.

5. Item, quod in sua plenitudine omnino tollit culpam, citra plenitudinem aliquo modo diminuit; sed cum aliquis simpliciter est ignarus, «sicut parvulus et furiosus, nihil quod faciat, imputatur ei in peccatum», sicut dicit Bernardus[^5] et alii doctores: ergo videtur, quod omnis ignorantia, peccato perpetrato, aliquo modo praebeat excusationis patrocinium.

**Contra:**
1. Isidorus in libro de Ecclesiastica Institutione[^6]: «Nullus in culpa maior est, quam qui Deum nescit»: ergo videtur, quod ignorantia non excuset, sed aggravet.

<!-- page 526 -->

2. Item super illud ad Romanos secundo[^7]: *An ignoras* etc., Ambrosii Glossa: «Gravissime peccas, quia ignoras»: ergo videtur ignorantia gravare culpam.

3. Item, ignorantia de se malum est, sed malum additum malo facit maius malum: ergo videtur, quod ignorantia peccatum augeat, non excuset.

4. Item, scientia nec auget nec minuit meritum, sed sola gratia et caritas[^8]: ergo pari ratione nec ignorantia auget nec diminuit demeritum, ergo non excusat peccatum.

5. Item, esto, quod unus sciens peccet ex aliquanta libidine, et alter ignorans ex tanta libidine; si aequalis est ibi libido, ergo aequalis debet esse punitio: ergo videtur, quod aequalis sit utrobique excusatio, vel accusatio: ergo non magis excusat, vel accusat ignorantia quam scientia.

Est igitur quaestio: propter quid magis excusat ignorantia quam scientia[^9]? Et cum tam ignorantia quam infirmitas excuset, similiter est quaestio, quae istarum magis excuset.

Rursus, cum sint multae differentiae ignorantiae, cum hoc quaeritur, quae earum excusent et quae non, et quae magis et quae minus.

### Conclusio
> Quaelibet ignorantia aliquo modo excusat peccatum vel a toto vel a tanto.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod omnis ignorantia aliquo modo excusat peccatum. — Et ratio huius est, quia minuit de ratione voluntarii, minuit etiam de ratione contemptus. Ceteris enim paribus, magis contemnit qui peccat ex industria, quam qui ignoranter peccat. Et iterum, cum voluntarium includat in se cognitionem, quod privat cognitionem privat de ratione voluntarii. — Quia ergo peccatum mensuratur secundum quantitatem[^10] libidinis et contemptus, et ignorantia diminuit de ratione horum; generaliter verum est, quod omnis ignorantia, in quantum huiusmodi, excusat peccatum; et si tanta sit, quod privet omnino rationem voluntarii et rationem contemptus, excusat a toto; si vero non omnino privet, excusat a tanto[^11]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod ignorantia excusat peccatum.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Isidoro: *Gravissime peccat, qui Deum nescit*; dicendum, quod Isidorus ibi comparat peccatum infidelitatis ad alia peccatorum genera; et ipsum in se valde grave est, quia non est sine magna animae deordinatione. Nihilominus tamen, cum quis ignorans aliquid facit et in incredulitate[^12], sicut dicit Apostolus de se, minus graviter peccat, quam ille qui facit ex certa scientia.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud Ambrosii, quod dicit, quod gravissime peccat qui ignorat; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur non ratione maioris culpae, sed ratione infirmitatis magis periculosae; quia cum non habeat scientiam de morbo sive culpa, non quaerit medicinam; et ita semper remanet morbus et corruptio. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro Confessionum[^13]: «Eo insanabilius peccabam, quo me non peccare arbitrabar».

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum additum malo facit maius malum; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, cum malum malo conformatur[^14]. Malum autem poenae cum sit involuntarium, non conformatur malo culpae, quod est voluntarium; et ideo non auget, sed potius diminuit. Et quoniam ignorantia in nobis non est sic culpa, quin etiam aliquo modo sit poena, ideo culpam perpetratam excusat.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scientia non auget meritum; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur. Quantitas enim meriti non est a nobis, sed a gratia Dei; demeritum vero et eius quantitas ortum habet a voluntate liberi arbitrii: et ideo quod facit ad rationem voluntarii facit aliquo modo ad augmentum peccati, et similiter, quod diminuit facit ad alleviationem peccati. Talis autem est ignorantia, ut dictum fuit supra[^15].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccantes ex pari libidine aequaliter puniuntur; dicendum, quod hoc non cogit, quin ignorantia excuset; quia si ille qui ignorat, peccat ex tanta libidine, ex quanta ille qui cognoscit; in statu ignorantiae existens, si haberet scientiam, peccaret multo maiori; et ita gravius peccaret et gravius puniretur; et ideo ignorantia, quae in ipso est, excusat peccatum, excusat, inquam, et minuit quantitatem peccati, non quam habet, sed quam haberet, si ignorantia non esset.

<!-- page 527 -->

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae magis excuset, utrum ignorantia, vel infirmitas; responderi potest, quod duo sunt de ratione voluntarii, videlicet cognitio singularium sive circumstantiarum, et quod operationis principium sit intrinsecum. Ignorantia igitur excusat, quia privat de ratione *cognoscendi*; infirmitas excusat, quia privat de ratione *perfecte principiandi*; et quoniam privato priori, privatur posterius, et non convertitur, et cognoscere praeambulum est ad facere: plus tollit de ratione voluntarii ignorantia quam infirmitas vel impotentia: et ideo magis excusat, ceteris paribus[^16]. Adeo tamen potest infirmitas praecellere et ignorantia parva esse, sive ex culpa nostra procedere, quod erit e converso. Unde etsi, in generalitate loquendo, verum est dicere, quod magis excuset ignorantia quam infirmitas; descendendo tamen ad *specialia* peccata, possunt se habere sicut excedentia et excessa.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae ignorantia excuset et quantum; dicendum, quod est ignorantia *facti* et ignorantia *iuris*. — Ignorantia facti potest esse dupliciter: aut adhibita debita diligentia, aut non. Si adhibita debita diligentia, excusat a toto; si non adhibita, non excusat a toto, sed a tanto.

Si autem sit ignorantia iuris, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut est vincibilis, aut invincibilis. Si vincibilis, tunc est ignorantia, quae est culpa. Et haec aut est ex *consensu vero*, ut ignorantia *affectata*, et ista sic ex una parte excusat, quod ex alia parte magis aggravat; aut est ex *negligentia* et *ignavia*, sicut ignorantia *crassa et supina*, et ista, etsi aliquo modo excuset, non tamen «ita excusat, ut sempiterno igne non ardeat[^17]», sicut dicit Augustinus, et Magister in littera.

Si autem sit ignorantia invincibilis, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ista ignorantia est in nobis introducta per culpam praeambulam, aut praeter omnem culpam. Si praeter omnem culpam, aut simpliciter privat cognitionem iuris, sicut in infantibus et furiosis, qui omnino carent usu rationis; et haec excusat a toto — unde dicit Bernardus, «quod pueris infantibus et dormientibus nihil quod faciunt, imputatur». — Aut non tollit omnino usum rationis, sed plenum[^18]; et tunc non excusat a toto, sed a tanto, sicut est in his qui non sunt plene furiosi, sed habent aliquo modo lucida intervalla, et in pueris, qui aliquo modo sunt capaces praecepti, licet non plene. — Si autem ignorantia est introducta per culpam propriam, sicut est in ebrio et furioso, quorum uterque se praecipitavit in hoc per culpam suam; sic non excusat a toto, sed a tanto, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^19], «ebrius habebit duplices maledictiones, maledictionem scilicet pro culpa praecedenti et maledictionem pro culpa subsequenti».

Quantum autem et qualiter excuset sequentem culpam, diversimode quidam determinant. — Quidam enim dicunt, quod nec ebrius nec furiosus, qui usu rationis caret, committit[^20] novam culpam, sed ex inordinatione sequenti aggravatur culpa prima; potest enim culpa aggravari ex eventu sequenti. — Aliis autem videtur, quod nec sic excuset, quin novam culpam committat; non tamen est adeo gravis, sicut si illam[^21] faceret ex certa scientia. Primus tamen modus dicendi probabilior esse videtur. — Ex his patet, quod Loth non omnino excusatur a culpa incestus, cum cognovit filias suas[^22]. Primum quidem, quia non fuit in eo plena ignorantia; licet enim dicatur in textu, quod non senserit, quando filiae accubuerunt, hoc dicitur, quia non discrevit. Secundo vero, quia in illam ignorantiam pervenit per ebrietatem, quam debuisset vitare; et ideo Sancti dicunt, eum fuisse culpabilem, licet ex alia parte dicant, eum fuisse aliquatenus excusabilem[^23].

---

english:
### Article II. *On the sin of our first parents in relation to ignorance on the part of the intellect.*
### Question III. *Whether ignorance is an excuse for fault.*

Thirdly it is asked whether ignorance is an excuse for fault. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. First, to Timothy chapter one[^1]: *I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly*: if therefore ignorance was the reason why he attained to mercy, it seems that ignorance made his fault excusable.

2. Likewise, knowledge aggravates fault, as is said in Luke chapter twelve[^2]: *The servant who knew the will of his Lord* etc.: therefore, by the opposite, ignorance lightens [it], therefore it excuses.

3. Likewise, every sin is voluntary: therefore what diminishes from the character of the voluntary diminishes from the character of sin; but ignorance diminishes from the character of the voluntary, because «the voluntary, as the Philosopher says[^3], is that whose principle is in the very one who knows the singulars»; therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as fortitude is required for resisting sin, so too knowledge is required; but a defect of fortitude, namely weakness, excuses fault[^4]: therefore it seems likewise that a defect of knowledge, namely ignorance, [excuses too].

5. Likewise, what in its fullness wholly removes fault, short of fullness diminishes it in some way; but when someone is simply ignorant, «as is an infant and a madman, nothing he does is imputed to him as sin», as Bernard[^5] and other doctors say: therefore it seems that all ignorance, once a sin has been perpetrated, in some way affords the protection of an excuse.

**On the contrary:**
1. Isidore, in the book *On Ecclesiastical Institution*[^6]: «No one is greater in fault than he who does not know God»: therefore it seems that ignorance does not excuse, but aggravates.

2. Likewise, upon that passage to the Romans chapter two[^7]: *Or are you ignorant* etc., the Gloss of Ambrose: «You sin most grievously, because you are ignorant»: therefore it seems that ignorance aggravates fault.

3. Likewise, ignorance is of itself an evil, but an evil added to an evil makes a greater evil: therefore it seems that ignorance increases sin, [and] does not excuse [it].

4. Likewise, knowledge neither increases nor diminishes merit, but grace and charity alone do[^8]: therefore by parity of reasoning neither does ignorance increase nor diminish demerit, therefore it does not excuse sin.

5. Likewise, suppose that one who knows sins from a certain amount of lust, and another who is ignorant from as great a lust; if the lust there is equal, then the punishment ought to be equal: therefore it seems that the excuse, or the accusation, is equal on both sides: therefore ignorance does not excuse, or accuse, any more than knowledge does.

There is therefore a question: on account of what does ignorance excuse more than knowledge[^9]? And since both ignorance and weakness excuse, there is likewise a question, which of these excuses more.

Again, since there are many differences of ignorance, along with this it is asked which of them excuse and which not, and which more and which less.

### Conclusion
> Every ignorance in some way excuses sin, either wholly or to a degree.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that all ignorance in some way excuses sin. — And the reason for this is that it diminishes from the character of the voluntary, [and] diminishes also from the character of contempt. For, other things being equal, he who sins on purpose shows more contempt than he who sins ignorantly. And again, since the voluntary includes within itself knowledge, what removes knowledge removes from the character of the voluntary. — Since therefore sin is measured according to the quantity[^10] of lust and of contempt, and ignorance diminishes from the character of these; it is generally true that all ignorance, insofar as it is such, excuses sin; and if it be so great that it wholly removes the character of the voluntary and the character of contempt, it excuses wholly; but if it does not wholly remove [them], it excuses to a degree[^11]. — The reasons showing that ignorance excuses sin are therefore to be granted.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**
*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Isidore: *He sins most grievously who does not know God*; it must be said that Isidore there compares the sin of unbelief to the other kinds of sins; and it is in itself very grave, because it is not without a great disordering of the soul. Nevertheless, when someone does something ignorantly and in unbelief[^12], as the Apostle says of himself, he sins less grievously than he who does it from certain knowledge.

*To 2.* To that of Ambrose, who says that he who is ignorant sins most grievously; it must be said that this is said not by reason of greater fault, but by reason of a more dangerous weakness; for since he has no knowledge of the disease or fault, he does not seek the medicine; and so the disease and corruption always remain. And this is what Augustine says in the book of *Confessions*[^13]: «I sinned the more incurably, the more I judged myself not to be sinning».

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that an evil added to an evil makes a greater evil; it must be said that this holds true when an evil conforms to an evil[^14]. But the evil of punishment, since it is involuntary, does not conform to the evil of fault, which is voluntary; and therefore it does not increase but rather diminishes [it]. And since ignorance in us is not so much a fault but that it is also in some way a punishment, therefore it excuses the sin perpetrated.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that knowledge does not increase merit; it must be said that this does not follow. For the quantity of merit is not from us, but from the grace of God; whereas demerit and its quantity have their origin from the will of free choice: and therefore what contributes to the character of the voluntary contributes in some way to the increase of sin, and likewise, what diminishes [it] contributes to the lightening of sin. But ignorance is such, as was said above[^15].

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that those who sin from equal lust are equally punished; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion] that ignorance does not excuse; because if he who is ignorant sins from as great a lust as he who knows; existing in the state of ignorance, if he had knowledge, he would sin with a much greater [lust]; and so he would sin more gravely and be punished more gravely; and therefore the ignorance which is in him excuses the sin — excuses, I say, and diminishes the quantity of the sin, not [the quantity] which it has, but [the quantity] which it would have if the ignorance were not present.

To that which is asked, which excuses more, ignorance or weakness; it can be answered that there are two things belonging to the character of the voluntary, namely the knowledge of singulars or of circumstances, and that the principle of the operation be intrinsic. Ignorance therefore excuses, because it deprives [it] of the character of *knowing*; weakness excuses, because it deprives [it] of the character of *acting perfectly as a principle*; and since, when the prior is taken away, the posterior is taken away, and not conversely, and to know is preliminary to acting: ignorance removes more from the character of the voluntary than does weakness or impotence: and therefore it excuses more, other things being equal[^16]. Yet weakness can so far surpass and the ignorance be so slight, or proceed from our own fault, that it will be the reverse. Hence although, speaking in general, it is true to say that ignorance excuses more than weakness; yet descending to *particular* sins, they can stand as exceeding and exceeded.

To that which is asked, which ignorance excuses and how much; it must be said that there is ignorance *of fact* and ignorance *of law*. — Ignorance of fact can be twofold: either due diligence has been applied, or not. If due diligence has been applied, it excuses wholly; if it has not been applied, it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree.

But if it be ignorance of law, this can be twofold: either it is vincible, or invincible. If vincible, then it is the ignorance which is a fault. And this is either from *true consent*, as *affected* ignorance, and this so excuses on the one side that on the other side it aggravates the more; or it is from *negligence* and *sloth*, as *crass and supine* ignorance, and this, although it excuses in some way, yet does not «so excuse that one does not burn in everlasting fire[^17]», as Augustine says, and the Master in the text.

But if it be invincible ignorance, this can be twofold: either this ignorance has been introduced in us through a preceding fault, or apart from all fault. If apart from all fault, either it simply deprives [one] of the knowledge of law, as in infants and madmen, who entirely lack the use of reason; and this excuses wholly — whence Bernard says «that to infant children and to the sleeping, nothing they do is imputed». — Or it does not wholly remove the use of reason, but [removes its] fullness[^18]; and then it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree, as is the case in those who are not fully mad, but have in some way lucid intervals, and in children, who are in some way capable of a precept, though not fully. — But if the ignorance has been introduced through one's own fault, as is the case in the drunkard and the madman, each of whom has cast himself into this through his own fault; thus it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree, because, as the Philosopher says[^19], «the drunkard shall have a twofold malediction, namely a malediction for the preceding fault and a malediction for the subsequent [fault]».

But how much and in what manner it excuses the subsequent fault, certain men determine in various ways. — For some say that neither the drunkard nor the madman, who lacks the use of reason, commits[^20] a new fault, but the first fault is aggravated by the subsequent disorder; for a fault can be aggravated by the subsequent outcome. — But to others it seems that it does not so excuse but that he commits a new fault; yet it is not so grave as if he did that same thing[^21] from certain knowledge. The first manner of speaking, however, seems more probable. — From these things it is clear that Lot is not entirely excused from the fault of incest, when he knew his daughters[^22]. First indeed, because there was not in him full ignorance; for although it is said in the text that he did not perceive when his daughters lay down, this is said because he did not discern. But secondly, because he came into that ignorance through the drunkenness which he ought to have avoided; and therefore the Saints say that he was culpable, although on the other side they say that he was to some extent excusable[^23].

---

la: Vers. 13. In textu a Vulg. exhibito post *Misericordiam* adiunctum *vero*, hoc est *Dei*, et suppressum post *ignorans* demonstrativum *hoc*.

en: Verse 13. In the text given from the Vulgate, *vero* — that is, *Dei* — is added after *Misericordiam*, and the demonstrative *hoc* after *ignorans* is suppressed.

la: Vers. 47: *Servus, qui cognovit voluntatem Domini sui et non praeparavit, et non fecit secundum voluntatem eius, vapulabit multis.*

en: Verse 47: *The servant who knew the will of his Lord and did not prepare, and did not act according to his will, shall be beaten with many [stripes].*

la: Lib. III. Ethic. c. 1. Averroes, ibid. ea quae Aristoteles docet de voluntario et involuntario, sic breviter complectitur: *Cum igitur dicitur de eo quod fit coacte aut inscienter, quod fit inspontanee; palam est, quod hoc quod agitur sponte, est cuius agendi principium est in agente ipsum, et agens ipsum scit particularia, in quibus fit actio.*

en: Book III of the *Ethics*, ch. 1. Averroes, in the same place, briefly sums up what Aristotle teaches on the voluntary and involuntary thus: *When therefore it is said of that which is done under compulsion or in ignorance that it is done involuntarily; it is plain that what is done voluntarily is that whose principle of acting is in the agent himself, and the agent himself knows the particulars in which the action takes place.*

la: Cod. *a culpa*.

en: Codex [reads] *a culpa* (from fault).

la: *De Gratia et lib. arb.* c. 2. n. 5: *Hinc est, quod insanis, infantibus itemque dormientibus nihil quod faciant, vel bonum vel malum, imputatur, quia nimirum, sicut suae non sunt compotes rationis, sic nec usum retinent propriae voluntatis, ac per hoc nec iudicium libertatis.* Cfr. Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 24. et Nemes. episc. Emes., *de Natura hominis*, c. 31, quo loco Damasc. nititur.

en: *On Grace and Free Choice* ch. 2, n. 5: *Hence it is that to the insane, to infants, and likewise to the sleeping, nothing they do, whether good or evil, is imputed, because, no doubt, just as they are not possessed of their reason, so neither do they retain the use of their own will, and through this neither the judgment of freedom.* Cf. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, ch. 24, and Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, ch. 31, on which passage Damascene relies.

la: Libr. II. *Sent.* c. 1. n. 6.

en: *Sentences* Book II, ch. 1, n. 6.

la: Vers. 1. — Glossam Ambrosii Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 113. m. 6. citat sic: «*Peccas, homo, dum impunitatem tibi promittis; gravius, cum Dei bonitatem contemnis; gravissime, cum ignoras*». Haec sumta et contracta videntur ex Commentario super Epist. ad Rom. 2, 5. seq., olim Ambrosio tributo, ubi sic legitur: *Impunitatem sperans peccatorum, non solum durat inconvertibilis et intractabilis manens; sed adhuc acerbius peccat securus, quod non sit ultio futura, cor habens impoenitens, ignorans, quia iram sibi congregat in die irae.* Eadem verba habet Lyranus in hunc locum. — Mox cod. T *aggravare* pro *gravare*.

en: Verse 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 113, m. 6, cites the Gloss of Ambrose thus: «*You sin, O man, while you promise yourself impunity; more grievously, when you despise the goodness of God; most grievously, when you are ignorant*». These [words] seem taken and abridged from the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 2, 5 ff., formerly attributed to Ambrose, where it reads thus: *Hoping for impunity for his sins, he not only continues, remaining unconvertible and intractable; but he sins yet more bitterly, secure that there will be no future vengeance, having an impenitent heart, ignorant that he is heaping up wrath for himself in the day of wrath.* Lyra has the same words on this passage. — Further on, codex T [reads] *aggravare* (aggravate) for *gravare* (weigh down).

la: Cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. below, dist. 29, art. 1, q. 2.

la: Haec propositio abest a pluribus codd., inter quos FH K T.

en: This proposition is absent from several codices, among which FH, K, T.

la: Vat. *qualitatem*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *qualitatem* (quality).

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 5.

la: Vide hic, fundam. 1. — Pro *in incredulitate* Vat. et nonnulli codd. *ex incredulitate*, alii plures codd., ut K T W ee, *incredulitate* tantum.

en: See here, fundamentum 1. — For *in incredulitate* (in unbelief) the Vatican [edition] and several codices [read] *ex incredulitate* (from unbelief), several other codices, such as K, T, W, ee, [read] *incredulitate* only.

la: Libr. V. c. 10. n. 18: *Id erat peccatum insanabilius, quo me peccatorem non esse arbitrabar.* — In pluribus codd., ut FHIKTU ee, suppressa est vox *morbus*, quae paulo ante habetur, in non paucis aliis, ut BDEPQVWY aa, *corruptio*.

en: Book V, ch. 10, n. 18: *That was the more incurable sin, by which I judged myself not to be a sinner.* — In several codices, such as FHIKTU, ee, the word *morbus* (disease), which occurs a little before, is suppressed; in not a few others, such as BDEPQVWY, aa, *corruptio* (corruption) [is suppressed].

la: Cod. F hic et paulo inferius *confortatur*. Circa finem solut. Vat. *sine culpa* pro *sic culpa*.

en: Codex F here and a little below [reads] *confortatur* (is strengthened). Near the end of the solution, the Vatican [edition reads] *sine culpa* (without fault) for *sic culpa* (so a fault).

la: In corp. quaest. — Vat., omisso *est*, hic addit *potest minuere peccatum*.

en: In the body of the question. — The Vatican [edition], omitting *est*, here adds *potest minuere peccatum* (it can diminish the sin).

la: Simul audi *quam infirmitas*, quae verba cod. cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt.

en: Hear at the same time *quam infirmitas* (than weakness), which words codex cc and edition 1 add.

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, ch. 5.

la: Vat. *semiplenum*, quae et mox pro *qui aliquo modo* substituit *qui aliquando*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *semiplenum* (half-full), which also, just after, substitutes *qui aliquando* for *qui aliquo modo*.

la: Libr. III. *Ethic.* c. 5: *His attestari et privatim singuli et ipsi legumlatores videntur, qui eos qui mala perpetrant, castigant ac puniunt... ob ignorantiam etiam puniunt, si sibi ipse ignorationis causa quispiam fuisse videatur. Unde ebriis duplices poenae institutae sunt; in ipso enim qui inebriatur, principium est, cum sui quisque in eo dominus sit, ut non inebrietur, id quod ignorationis est causa.*

en: Book III of the *Ethics*, ch. 5: *Both individuals privately and the lawgivers themselves seem to attest to these things, who chastise and punish those who perpetrate evils... they also punish on account of ignorance, if someone seems himself to have been the cause of the ignorance. Hence twofold punishments have been instituted for the drunken; for in the very one who gets drunk the principle lies, since each is his own master not to get drunk — which is the cause of the ignorance.*

la: Vat. *committere potest*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *committere potest* (is able to commit).

la: Codd. H aa cc et ed. 1 *illa*.

en: Codices H, aa, cc and edition 1 [read] *illa*.

en: Genesis 19, 33 ff.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p52{5,6,7}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 36918–37062. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (pp. 525–527 → PDF 547–549). Last quaestio of ARTICULUS II; **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** follows at raw 37063 (printed p.527, running head OCR-garbled as "DIST. XXII. DUBIA. 827" — the 827 is a digit-mangle of 527).

**Alignment confirmed** against ART II TRACTATIO sub-question 3 (*Tertio quaeritur, utrum ignorantia sit culpae excusatio*). Body: 5 *for* args (1 = 1 Tim 1 *Misericordiam consecutus quia ignorans*; 2 = Luke 12 *Servus sciens*; 3 = omne peccatum voluntarium / Philosophus; 4 = defectus fortitudinis excusat → defectus cognitionis; 5 = parvulus et furiosus / Bernardus); Contra 1–5 (1 = Isidore *Nullus in culpa maior quam qui Deum nescit*; 2 = Rom 2 Ambrose Gloss *Gravissime peccas quia ignoras*; 3 = malum additum malo; 4 = scientia nec auget meritum; 5 = pari libidine aequalis punitio) + two *quaestiones incidentes* (ignorantia-vs-infirmitas; differentiae ignorantiae); CONCLUSIO (*Quaelibet ignorantia aliquo modo excusat vel a toto vel a tanto*); Respondeo (omnis ignorantia minuit de ratione voluntarii/contemptus); Solutio Ad 1–5; then the two incidental-question determinations (ignorantia > infirmitas; ignorantia facti vs iuris → vincibilis/invincibilis taxonomy, ending on the Loth/incest example).

**`has_scholion: false`** — verified: no SCHOLION header in the raw range. Footer ⁸ on p.527 reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ([^23]) — an explicit sibling-pointer to **a2-q2 SCHOLION III**, which carries the joint commentator-roll for the article per Override §5.

**Apparatus — 23 entries [^1]–[^23]. Page-split map:**
- p.525 footers ²–⁷ → [^1]–[^6] (² Vers.13 Timotheum; ³ Vers.47 Servus; ⁴ Averroes III Ethic.; ⁵ Cod. a culpa; ⁶ Bernardus *De Gratia*; ⁷ Isidore *Libr. II Sent.*). **Received hand-off from a2-q2** (a2-q2 retained p.525 footer ¹ *Ex cod. cc adiecimus pro* as its [^16]).
- p.526 footers ¹–⁹ → [^7]–[^15] (¹ Vers.1 Glossa Ambrosii @Contra-2 [^7]; ² infra d.29 @Contra-4 [^8]; ³ *Haec propositio abest* @quaestio-incidens [^9]; ⁴ Vat. *qualitatem* @Respondeo [^10]; ⁵ *Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c.5* @a-tanto [^11]; ⁶ *in incredulitate* @Ad-1 [^12]; ⁷ Confessions V @Ad-2 [^13]; ⁸ *confortatur/sine culpa* @Ad-3 [^14]; ⁹ *In corp. quaest.* @Ad-4 [^15]).
- p.527 footers ¹–⁸ → [^16]–[^23] (¹ *quam infirmitas* @ceteris-paribus [^16]; ² *Hic c.5* @non-ardeat [^17]; ³ Vat. *semiplenum* @plenum [^18]; ⁴ Averroes/Philosophus III Ethic. c.5 @ebrius [^19]; ⁵ Vat. *committere potest* @committit [^20]; ⁶ Codd. *illa* @illam [^21]; ⁷ Gen 19.33 @filias suas [^22]; ⁸ *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* @excusabilem [^23]).

**Forwarded:** NONE — q3 closes clean at the Loth determination (*...eum fuisse aliquatenus excusabilem*); **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** (next chunk d22-dubia) opens immediately below on p.527 R with its own DUB. I body. All 8 of p.527's footers (¹–⁸) anchor in q3's determination/Loth text and are fully captured here as [^16]–[^23]; the DUBIA body had not yet reached any footnote on p.527.

**No `[?]` flags.**