title: Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### ARTICULUS I.
### *Utrum originale peccatum traducatur mediante sensibili portione.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum anima sensibilis in hominibus sit a generante.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima sensibilis in hominibus sit a generante. Et quod sit a generante, videtur:

1. *Primo* per verbum Philosophi in secundo de Anima[^1], ubi dicit, quod « sensitivi prima mutatio est a generante »; sed prima mutatio sensitivi est illa quae est ad esse: ergo videtur, quod pars sensitiva in nobis educatur in esse a generante.

2. Item, decimo sexto Animalium[^2]: « Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco »: ergo solus intellectus intrat per creationem: ergo videtur, quod anima sensitiva in nobis educatur de principiis materiae et per generationem.

3. Item, sicut operatio animae sensitivae in brutis pendet a corpore, ita et in hominibus — unde sicut brutum impeditur ab operatione videndi, laeso organo, sic etiam homo — sed quod similiter se habet ad operationem, similiter se habet ad generationem: ergo si in brutis est anima sensibilis non per creationem, sed per generationem, sicut communiter tenetur, et supra ostensum est distinctione decima quinta[^3]; videtur, quod in homine similiter sit per generationem.

4. Item, sicut in generatione brutorum « prius est animal quam equus », sic et in generatione hominis « prius est animal quam homo[^4] »: ergo prius habet operationem et perfectionem partis sensitivae, quam habeat perfectionem intellectivae. Et huius signum est, quia embryo prius nutritur et sentit, quam perficiatur anima rationali. Ergo videtur, quod ante productionem rationalis educatur in nobis sensibilis; sed hoc non est per creationem: ergo per generationem.

5. Item, anima sensitiva est in potentia materiae, alioquin nunquam ab agente naturali in his quae per putrefactionem generantur, posset produci in esse[^5]. Si ergo aeque potens vel magis potens est vis generativa in homine, quam sit in bruto; et brutum potest per vim generativam animam sensitivam ad esse producere: multo fortius ergo hoc videtur in homine.

6. Item, si in nobis est sensitiva per creationem, in brutis per generationem: ergo non videtur, quod sit in nobis vel in ipsis univoce; et si hoc, animal dicetur aequivoce de asino et de homine. Quod si hoc est inconveniens[^6], restat, quodsi in brutis est per generationem, quod similiter in homine.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et anima[^7]: « Cum recedit anima a corpore, secum trahit sensum et imaginationem et rationem et intellectum »; sed nihil quod separatur a corpore, est per generationem; sensibilis autem in homine est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

2. Item, in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus[^8]: « Animae animalium non sunt substantiae, sed cum carne ipsa carnis vivacitate nascuntur et cum carnis morte finiuntur », « anima vero humana non cum carne moritur, quia nec cum carne seminatur ».

3. Item, Philosophus in secundo de Anima[^9] dicit, quod « sensitivum est in intellectivo, sicut tetragonus in pentagono; et vegetativum in sensitivo, sicut trigonus in tetragono ». Si ergo ab eodem principio est tetragonus, a quo et pentagonus; ab eodem erit anima sensitiva et intellectiva; sed intellectiva non est a generante, ut monstratum fuit supra[^10]: ergo nec sensitiva.

4. Item, quaecumque sunt idem in substantia ab eodem principio educuntur in esse; sed anima sensitiva et intellectiva in eodem homine sunt idem in substantia, quia unius perfectibilis una est perfectio[^11]: ergo si rationalis non est per generationem, videtur, quod nec sensibilis.

5. Item, quae simul corrumpuntur simul etiam producuntur: ergo pari ratione, quae simul separantur simul et infunduntur. Sed recedente anima rationali, nullo modo remanet potentia sentiendi in corpore[^12]: ergo sicut amittitur potentia sentiendi in recessu animae, ita infunditur in adventu; non est igitur a generatione, sed a creatione.

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6. Item, cum intenditur operatio sensus, minuitur operatio intellectus, et e converso, sicut patet per experientiam[^13]: ergo necesse est, sensum et intellectum vel esse unam potentiam, vel esse potentias eiusdem substantiae. Sed quodcumque eorum sit, eodem modo habent educi in esse: cum igitur rationalis non sit ex traduce, videtur, quod nec portio sensibilis in homine. Quodsi tu dicas[^14], quod una retrahit alteram propter ordinem et unionem in uno perfectibili, non in una substantia animae; obiicitur contra hoc: quia anima rationalis aut potest sentire, aut non. Si non potest: ergo videtur, quod non possit corpus vivificare. Quodsi potest sentire; restat, quod istae potentiae fundantur in eadem substantia. Si tu dicas ad hoc, quod duplex est in nobis sensitiva: una a generante, et haec corrumpitur; alia a creante, et haec cum anima separatur; obiicitur contra hoc: quia natura non facit per plura, quod potest facere per pauciora[^15]. Si ergo sensitiva illa, quae est a generante, sufficit in brutis ad sentiendum, multo fortius illa, quae est a creante, sufficit homini: ergo non est aliam ponere sensitivam, quae sit a generante. Quodsi tu dicas, quod est illi non ad sentiendum, sed ad disponendum corpus ad susceptionem rationalis; hoc non videtur sufficere, quia, si talis anima est substantia aeque completa in homine, sicut in brutis, et in brutis non caret operatione sensitiva, videtur ergo, quod nec in homine. Aut igitur erit in nobis ponere duplicem actum sentiendi simul et semel[^16], aut est ponere, quod sensitiva sit in nobis a creatione. Sed primum manifeste est falsum: restat igitur, quod ultimum sit verum.

### Conclusio.

> Anima sensitiva in homine non habet esse per generationem, sed per creationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi. Aliter enim hic senserunt quidam haeretici, aliter videntur sensisse philosophi, aliter sentiunt doctores catholici.

Quidam enim haeretici[^17] senserunt, esse in nobis animas diversas, ita quod una sit a Deo bono, et altera a Deo malo; et ex hoc, dixerunt, quod venit in nobis controversia et rebellio appetituum, ita quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem[^18], quia una illarum animarum, scilicet quae est a bono Deo, non potest facere malum, altera vero, scilicet illa quae est a Deo malo, non potest facere bonum. — Hunc modum dicendi tanquam haereticum reprobat Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus[^19], ostendens, quod ista positio implicat in se duo contradictoria, dum ponit, talem rebellionem esse in homine, et ponit simul cum hoc, hominem peccare et hominem poenitere posse. Hanc etiam positionem facile esset improbare secundum viam philosophiae: quoniam in uno perfectibili necesse est unam esse perfectionem; et cum homo sit unum quid per essentiam, impossibile est, ab omnino diversis principiis in esse produci: si ergo anima[^20] rationalis est a Deo bono, sensibilis nostra non potest esse a Deo malo.

Quidam autem dixerunt, quod rationalis et sensibilis sunt in nobis duae substantiae; non tamen sunt duae animae, pro eo quod anima nomen est officii, et illae duae substantiae ordinatae sunt ad unius corporis perfectionem, ita quod una disponit ad alteram. Una tamen illarum est per generationem, scilicet sensibilis; et huius signum est, quia dependet a corpore et est perfectio alicuius partis corporis: rationalis vero, quae nullius partis corporis est actus, est per creationem. — Sed hunc modum dicendi respuit Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus[^21] dicens: « Non duas animas in homine uno esse dicimus — sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum[^22] scribunt — unam animalem, qua animetur corpus et mixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem, quae rationem administret ». Et si tu dicas, quod negat, duas esse animas, non negat, duas esse substantias; per litteram sequentem apparet, quod negat, duas substantias esse. Ait enim sic[^23]: « Sed dicimus unam eandemque animam in homine, quae corpus sua societate vivificet et semetipsam sua ratione disponat ». Et expressius in libro de Spiritu et anima[^24] dicit, quod una et eadem anima dicitur sensus, dum sentit, et ratio, dum discernit. Et iterum dicit, quod anima cum recedit, trahit secum potentias sensitivas.

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Doctores autem theologici dicunt, quod sensibilis et rationalis in homine eiusdem sunt substantiae et ab eodem principio habent educi in esse, videlicet a Creatore, pro eo quod in nobis non nominant diversas substantias, sed diversas potentias eiusdem substantiae, sicut Augustinus[^25], ubi de hac materia loquitur, insinuat expresse. Et hoc idem valde est rationabile, ponere in homine unam substantiam perficientem, quae det ei vitam et sensum et intellectum. Nec repugnat illud verbis Philosophi, si recte intelligantur.

Propter quod notandum, quod sensualitas tribus modis accipitur. Uno modo sensualitas dicit dispositionem ex parte carnis ad actum virtutis sensitivae; et hoc modo accipitur in libro de Spiritu et anima, decimo quarto capitulo, ubi dicitur: « Anima, quae vere spiritus est, et caro, quae vere corpus est, in suis extremitatibus facile iunguntur[^26] », id est in phantastico animae, quod corpus non est, sed simile corpori, et sensualitate carnis, quae fere spiritus est ». — Alio modo sensualitas dicit dispositionem ex parte carnis ad sentiendum cum virtute spirituali movente, nondum anima carnem perficiente; et talis sensualitas est in embryone ante ipsius completam animationem. Ibi enim non potest esse substantia animae perficiens, cum sit « perfectio corporis physici, organici[^27] »; nec possit actualiter existere, nisi corpore existente in debita complexione et organizatione. Potest tamen ibi esse virtus animae patris, quae quidem est in semine, sicut in subiecto deferente, sicut virtus motoris defertur simul cum lapide proiecto; et ideo haec cessat, quando operatio eius consummatur; quod fit, quando corpori organizato inducitur anima sensitiva perficiens, sive educatur de potentia materiae subito, sive cum rationali infundatur ab extrinseco[^28]. — Tertia vero sensualitas est, quae non tantum dicit dispositionem cum virtute movente, sed etiam habilitatem, quae inest ex anima perficiente. — Primo et secundo modo accipiendo sensualitatem, sic est in nobis a generante[^29], quia cum semine deciduntur calores et spiritus, per quos caro disponitur ad sentiendum. Transfunditur etiam simul cum hoc aliqua virtus animae, quae movet et reget et operatur usque ad formae inductionem. Tertio modo sensualitas est in homine ab anima perficiente, quae quidem non habet esse per generationem, sed per creationem. — His visis, patet responsio ad quaestionem.

Concedendum est enim, quod anima sensibilis non est in nobis ex traduce, sicut ostendunt rationes ad secundam partem obiectae. Ad rationes vero, quae adducuntur in oppositum, facile est respondere.

1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod sensitivi prima mutatio est a generante; dicendum, quod loquitur de sensitivo, secundum quod nominat substantiam, non secundum quod nominat potentiam substantiae incorruptibilis. — Vel etiam hoc dicit ratione illius sensualitatis secundo modo dictae, quae quidem habet esse a generante.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco; dicendum, quod ibi vocatur intellectus substantia intellectiva; et quia eadem est substantia intellectiva et sensitiva hominis, ideo per hoc non excluditur sensitiva hominis, sed sensitiva brutalis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio sensitivae pendet ex corpore; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod substantia dependeat, quoniam in eadem substantia reperitur operatio, quae ei potest competere praeter corpus. Haec[^30] autem non convenit ipsi animae, nisi secundum quod animat, et ita secundum quod corpori iuncta est, et propterea pendet ex corpore, nec anima utitur illa potentia, postquam a corpore separatur; nec sequitur, quod sit otiosa, quia substantia illa aliam habet operationem. Hoc autem planius invenietur determinatum in quarto[^31], in quaestione de cognitione animae separatae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est animal quam homo; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur, quia prius reperitur in embryone operatio animalis quam operatio hominis; prius enim movetur et sentit, quam ratiocinetur. Sed hoc est a sensualitate secundo modo dicta, prout est a virtute movente, non prout est a virtute perficiente.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis est in potentia materiae; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod anima sensibilis nominat substantiam generabilem et corruptibilem, sed non prout nominat potentiam substantiae incorruptibilis. Et quia anima sensitiva in brutis huiusmodi substantiam nominat; hinc est, quod bruta suam animam sensitivam educunt de materia, sicut et[^32] in his potissime, quae generantur per putrefactionem.

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Sensibilis vero in homine dicit potentiam rationalis substantiae; et ideo ab eo solo producitur, a quo substantia rationalis. Et ideo, quod sensibilis non possit propagari in homine sicut in brutis, hoc non est imperfectionis ex parte virtutis generantis, sed ratione perfectionis, quae consistit in sensitiva hominis.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est univoce in homine et in asino: dicendum, quod aliquid produci per generationem, et aliquid produci per creationem non tollit univocationem; sicut si Deus modo crearet unum hominem, eiusdem speciei esset cum aliis hominibus. Si igitur maior requiritur univocatio in specie quam in genere, planum est ex hoc, quod diversus modus producendi animam sensibilem in homine et asino non facit, hominem et asinum dici aequivoce. Et si tu obiicias, quod sensibilis in homine nominat potentiam, et in asino nominat substantiam, ergo aequivoce dicitur; dicendum, quod in asino et potest nominare substantiam, et potest nominare potentiam, principalius tamen nominat potentiam, quia nomen eius sumtum est ab actu sentiendi. In homine similiter nominare potest et substantiam et potentiam; sed prout nominat substantiam, non dicitur aliquid diversum a rationali; eadem enim est substantia, quae facit, hominem et sentire et ratiocinari, quamvis alia et alia sit potentia. Et sic patet, quod ex hoc non tollitur univocatio in genere animalis respectu rationalis et irrationalis.

english:
### ARTICLE I.
### *Whether original sin is transmitted by means of the sensible portion.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether the sensible soul in humans is from the begetter.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether the sensible soul in humans is from the begetter. And that it is from the begetter, it seems:

1. *First*, by the word of the Philosopher in the second [book] of *On the Soul*[^1], where he says that « the first change of the sensitive [soul] is from the begetter »; but the first change of the sensitive [soul] is that which is toward being: therefore it seems that the sensitive part in us is brought into being by the begetter.

2. Likewise, in the sixteenth [book] of *On Animals*[^2]: « The intellect alone enters from without »: therefore the intellect alone enters by creation: therefore it seems that the sensitive soul in us is educed from the principles of matter and by generation.

3. Likewise, just as the operation of the sensitive soul in brutes depends on the body, so also in humans — whence just as a brute is hindered from the operation of seeing when the organ is injured, so also is a human — but what is similarly disposed toward operation, is similarly disposed toward generation: therefore if in brutes the sensible soul is not by creation, but by generation, as is commonly held, and as was shown above in the fifteenth distinction[^3]; it seems that in a human it is likewise by generation.

4. Likewise, just as in the generation of brutes « the animal is prior to the horse », so also in the generation of a human « the animal is prior to the human[^4] »: therefore it has the operation and perfection of the sensitive part prior to having the perfection of the intellective. And a sign of this is that the embryo is first nourished and senses before it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore it seems that before the production of the rational [soul] the sensible [soul] is educed in us; but this is not by creation: therefore by generation.

5. Likewise, the sensitive soul is in the potency of matter, otherwise it could never be produced into being by a natural agent in those things which are generated by putrefaction[^5]. If therefore the generative power in a human is equally potent or more potent than it is in a brute; and a brute can by its generative power produce a sensitive soul into being: much more, therefore, does this seem [to hold] in a human.

6. Likewise, if in us the sensitive [soul] is by creation, in brutes by generation: therefore it does not seem that it is in us or in them univocally; and if so, "animal" will be said equivocally of an ass and of a human. But if this is unfitting[^6], it remains that, if in brutes it is by generation, it is likewise in a human.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^7]: « When the soul departs from the body, it draws with itself sense and imagination and reason and intellect »; but nothing which is separated from the body is by generation; but the sensible [soul] in a human is of this kind: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^8]: « The souls of animals are not substances, but are born together with the flesh by the very vivacity of the flesh and are ended with the death of the flesh », « but the human soul does not die with the flesh, because neither is it sown with the flesh ».

3. Likewise, the Philosopher in the second [book] of *On the Soul*[^9] says that « the sensitive is in the intellective, as the tetragon in the pentagon; and the vegetative in the sensitive, as the trigon in the tetragon ». If therefore the tetragon is from the same principle from which the pentagon also is; the sensitive and intellective soul will be from the same [principle]; but the intellective is not from the begetter, as was shown above[^10]: therefore neither is the sensitive.

4. Likewise, whatever things are the same in substance are educed into being from the same principle; but the sensitive and intellective soul in the same human are the same in substance, because of one perfectible thing there is one perfection[^11]: therefore if the rational [soul] is not by generation, it seems that neither is the sensible.

5. Likewise, those things which are corrupted together are also produced together: therefore by parity of reason, those things which are separated together are also infused together. But when the rational soul withdraws, the power of sensing in no way remains in the body[^12]: therefore just as the power of sensing is lost at the departure of the soul, so it is infused at its arrival; it is not, therefore, from generation, but from creation.

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6. Likewise, when the operation of sense is intensified, the operation of the intellect is diminished, and conversely, as is clear from experience[^13]: therefore it is necessary that sense and intellect are either one power, or powers of the same substance. But whichever of these it is, they must be educed into being in the same manner: since therefore the rational [soul] is not from transmission, it seems that neither is the sensible portion in a human. But if you say[^14] that one draws back the other on account of the order and union in one perfectible thing, not in one substance of the soul; it is objected against this: that the rational soul either can sense, or cannot. If it cannot: then it seems that it cannot vivify the body. But if it can sense; it remains that these powers are founded in the same substance. If you say to this, that there is a twofold sensitive [soul] in us: one from the begetter, and this is corrupted; another from the Creator, and this is separated together with the soul; it is objected against this: that nature does not do through many what it can do through fewer[^15]. If therefore that sensitive [soul] which is from the begetter suffices in brutes for sensing, much more does that which is from the Creator suffice for a human: therefore one must not posit another sensitive [soul] which is from the begetter. But if you say that it is in it not for sensing, but for disposing the body for the reception of the rational [soul]; this does not seem to suffice, because, if such a soul is a substance equally complete in a human as in brutes, and in brutes it does not lack sensitive operation, it seems therefore that neither [does it lack it] in a human. Either, therefore, we must posit in us a twofold act of sensing at one and the same time[^16], or we must posit that the sensitive [soul] is in us from creation. But the first is manifestly false: it remains, therefore, that the latter is true.

### Conclusion.

> The sensitive soul in a human does not have being by generation, but by creation.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking. For certain heretics thought one way here, the philosophers seem to have thought another way, the Catholic doctors think another way.

For certain heretics[^17] thought that there are diverse souls in us, such that one is from the good God, and the other from an evil God; and from this, they said, there comes about in us the conflict and rebellion of appetites, such that the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh[^18], because one of those souls, namely that which is from the good God, cannot do evil, but the other, namely that which is from the evil God, cannot do good. — Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*[^19], reproves this mode of speaking as heretical, showing that this position implies in itself two contradictories, since it posits that there is such a rebellion in a human, and posits together with this that a human can sin and a human can repent. This position would also be easy to disprove by the way of philosophy: because in one perfectible thing there must be one perfection; and since a human is one something by essence, it is impossible to be produced into being from altogether diverse principles: if therefore the rational soul[^20] is from the good God, our sensible [soul] cannot be from the evil God.

But certain ones said that the rational and the sensible are in us two substances; yet they are not two souls, for the reason that "soul" is a name of office, and those two substances are ordered to the perfection of one body, such that one disposes toward the other. Yet one of them is by generation, namely the sensible; and a sign of this is that it depends on the body and is the perfection of some part of the body: but the rational, which is the act of no part of the body, is by creation. — But Augustine rejects this mode of speaking in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^21], saying: « We do not say that there are two souls in one human — as James and others of the Syrians[^22] write — one animal [soul], by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual [soul], which administers reason ». And if you say that he denies there to be two souls, [but] does not deny there to be two substances; by the following text it appears that he denies two substances to be. For he says thus[^23]: « But we say that there is one and the same soul in a human, which vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason ». And more expressly in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^24] he says that one and the same soul is called sense, while it senses, and reason, while it discerns. And again he says that the soul, when it withdraws, draws the sensitive powers with itself.

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But the theological doctors say that the sensible and the rational in a human are of the same substance and are to be educed into being from the same principle, namely from the Creator, for the reason that in us they do not name diverse substances, but diverse powers of the same substance, as Augustine[^25], where he speaks about this matter, expressly intimates. And this same [view] is very reasonable, to posit in a human one perfecting substance, which gives it life and sense and intellect. Nor does that conflict with the words of the Philosopher, if they are rightly understood.

On account of which it is to be noted that "sensuality" is taken in three modes. In one mode sensuality names the disposition on the part of the flesh toward the act of the sensitive power; and in this mode it is taken in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, in the fourteenth chapter, where it is said: « The soul, which is truly spirit, and the flesh, which is truly body, are easily joined at their extremities[^26] », that is in the phantastic [faculty] of the soul, which is not body, but like body, and by the sensuality of the flesh, which is almost spirit ». — In another mode sensuality names the disposition on the part of the flesh toward sensing with a moving spiritual power, the soul not yet perfecting the flesh; and such sensuality is in the embryo before its complete animation. For there the perfecting substance of the soul cannot be present, since it is « the perfection of a physical, organic body[^27] »; nor could it actually exist, except with the body existing in due complexion and organization. Yet there can be present the power of the father's soul, which indeed is in the seed, as in a subject conveying [it], just as the power of a mover is conveyed together with a thrown stone; and therefore this ceases when its operation is consummated; which happens when the perfecting sensitive soul is introduced into the organized body, whether it is educed from the potency of matter suddenly, or is infused from without together with the rational [soul][^28]. — But the third sensuality is that which names not only the disposition with the moving power, but also the aptitude which is present from the perfecting soul. — Taking sensuality in the first and second mode, thus it is in us from the begetter[^29], because together with the seed there fall down heats and spirits, by which the flesh is disposed for sensing. There is also transfused together with this a certain power of the soul, which moves and rules and operates until the introduction of the form. In the third mode sensuality is in a human from the perfecting soul, which indeed does not have being by generation, but by creation. — These things having been seen, the response to the question is clear.

For it must be granted that the sensible soul is not in us from transmission, as the reasons objected to the second part show. But to the reasons which are adduced to the opposite, it is easy to respond.

1. For to that which is objected, that the first change of the sensitive [soul] is from the begetter; it must be said that he speaks of the sensitive insofar as it names a substance, not insofar as it names a power of an incorruptible substance. — Or also he says this by reason of that sensuality said in the second mode, which indeed has being from the begetter.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect alone enters from without; it must be said that there the intellect is called the intellective substance; and because the intellective and sensitive substance of a human is the same, therefore by this the sensitive [substance] of a human is not excluded, but the brute sensitive [substance].

3. To that which is objected, that the operation of the sensitive [soul] depends on the body; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the substance depends [on it], since in the same substance there is found an operation which can belong to it apart from the body. This[^30], however, does not belong to the soul itself, except insofar as it animates, and thus insofar as it is joined to the body, and therefore it depends on the body, nor does the soul use that power after it is separated from the body; nor does it follow that it is idle, because that substance has another operation. But this will be found more plainly determined in the fourth [book][^31], in the question on the cognition of the separated soul.

4. To that which is objected, that the animal is prior to the human; it must be said that this is said because in the embryo the animal operation is found prior to the operation of the human; for it is first moved and senses before it reasons. But this is from the sensuality said in the second mode, insofar as it is from the moving power, not insofar as it is from the perfecting power.

5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is in the potency of matter; it must be said that it is true insofar as the sensible soul names a generable and corruptible substance, but not insofar as it names a power of an incorruptible substance. And because the sensitive soul in brutes names a substance of this kind; hence it is that brutes educe their sensitive soul from matter, as also[^32] in those things especially which are generated by putrefaction.

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But the sensible [soul] in a human names a power of the rational substance; and therefore it is produced by that alone by which the rational substance [is produced]. And therefore, that the sensible [soul] cannot be propagated in a human as in brutes, this is not from imperfection on the part of the generating power, but by reason of the perfection which consists in the sensitive [soul] of a human.

6. To that which is objected, that it is not univocal in a human and in an ass: it must be said that for something to be produced by generation, and something to be produced by creation, does not take away univocation; just as if God were now to create one human, it would be of the same species as other humans. If therefore a greater univocation is required in species than in genus, it is plain from this that the diverse mode of producing the sensible soul in a human and an ass does not cause "human" and "ass" to be said equivocally. And if you object that the sensible [soul] in a human names a power, and in an ass names a substance, therefore it is said equivocally; it must be said that in an ass it can both name a substance and can name a power, yet it principally names a power, because its name is taken from the act of sensing. In a human likewise it can name both a substance and a power; but insofar as it names a substance, it is not said to be something diverse from the rational; for it is the same substance which makes the human both sense and reason, although the power is one and another. And thus it is clear that from this the univocation in the genus of animal with respect to the rational and the irrational is not taken away.

la: Text. 59. (c. 5.). — In hoc arg. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bis *sensitivae* pro *sensitivi* (αἰσθητικοῦ).

en: Text 59 (c. 5). — In this argument the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] twice *sensitivae* for *sensitivi* (αἰσθητικοῦ).

la: Sive II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. Vide supra pag. 622, nota 9.

en: Or II. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 3. See above p. 622, note 9.

la: Art. 1. q. 1. — Ed. 4 adiicit *et etiam d. 47*; Vat. *et etiam* praefigit verbo *videtur*, prius posito commate, sed ad marginem habet *etiam; dist. 15. et 17.* Paulo superius pro *sensibilis* codd. X Z substituunt *sensitiva*.

en: Art. 1. q. 1. — Ed. 4 adds *and also d. 47*; the Vatican [edition] prefixes *et etiam* to the word *videtur*, a comma having first been placed, but in the margin has *etiam; dist. 15. et 17.* A little above, for *sensibilis* codices X Z substitute *sensitiva*.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Aliquantulum inferius ante *perfectionem intellectivae* Vat. repetit *operationem et*, ac post pauca cum edd. 3, 4 *sentit* commutat in *sentitur*.

en: Aristotle, II. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 3. — A little below, before *perfectionem intellectivae* the Vatican [edition] repeats *operationem et*, and after a few [words], with edd. 3, 4, changes *sentit* to *sentitur*.

la: Deinde post *productionem* cod. cc et ed. I interserunt *animae* et mox pro *sed hoc* legunt *sed haec*.

en: Then after *productionem* cod. cc and ed. I insert *animae*, and presently for *sed hoc* read *sed haec*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.

en: Cfr. above d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.

la: Vide Cap. 15. supra pag. 608, nota 9.

en: See Cap. 15, above p. 608, note 9.

la: Cap. 17, ubi textus originalis pro *substantiae* habet *substantivae* et post *finiuntur* plura addit.

en: Cap. 17, where the original text for *substantiae* has *substantivae* and after *finiuntur* adds more.

la: Text. 31. (c. 3.), ubi explicite tantum ultima pars prop. ponitur.

en: Text 31 (c. 3), where only the last part of the proposition is explicitly stated.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 223, nota 6.

en: Cfr. above p. 223, note 6.

la: Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 90. (c. 5.): *Egrediente enim [anima], exspirat et putrescit [corpus].*

en: Aristotle, I. *On the Soul*, text 90 (c. 5): *For when [the soul] departs, [the body] expires and putrefies.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 260, nota 1, et Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 51. (c. 6.).

en: Cfr. above p. 260, note 1, and Aristotle, VIII. *Physics* text 51 (c. 6).

la: In obiectionibus, quae hic ponuntur, fundamenta afferuntur, quibus secunda opinio, postea in corp. quaest. proposita, innititur.

en: In the objections which are here set down, the grounds are brought forward upon which the second opinion, later proposed in the body of the question, rests.

la: Vide Aristot., IV. de Partib. animal. c. 6, et supra pag. 44, nota 8.

en: See Aristotle, IV. *On the Parts of Animals* c. 6, and above p. 44, note 8.

la: Simili modo Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.) arguit Platonem, qui tres in homine animas esse tenet dicens: *Si autem tria sit anima, in unoquoque erit appetitus.*

en: In a similar way Aristotle, III. *On the Soul*, text 42 (c. 9), argues against Plato, who holds that there are three souls in a human, saying: *But if the soul be three, in each one there will be appetite.*

la: Scil. Manichaei. — Paulo ante pro *sentiunt* nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *senserunt*, quam verbi formam ceterae quoque edd. exhibent, simul praefigentes *etiam hic*.

en: Namely the Manichaeans. — A little before, for *sentiunt* some codices with ed. 1 [read] *senserunt*, which form of the verb the other editions also exhibit, prefixing at the same time *etiam hic*.

en: Galatians 5, 17 [Vulg. *Gal. 3, 17*].

la: Plures codd., ut A H T W aa bb, cum edd. 2, 3 *nostra*, cod. V *nostra anima*.

en: Several codices, such as A H T W aa bb, with edd. 2, 3 [read] *nostra*, cod. V *nostra anima*.

la: Scil. sectatores Apollinaris, Episc. Laodiceae in Syria.

en: Namely the followers of Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea in Syria.

la: Loc. cit.

en: Loc. cit.

la: Cap. 4. et 13, ubi animam in substantia unam esse docetur, propter varia autem officia variis nominibus nuncupari; quae nomina exponuntur ibid. c. 11. — Ibid. c. 13. habetur et seq. sententia. — Paulo inferius pro *theologici* codd. K T W bb ee et alii cum ed. 2 *theologi*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *theologiae*.

en: Cap. 4. and 13, where the soul is taught to be one in substance, but to be called by various names on account of its various offices; which names are explained ibid. c. 11. — Ibid. c. 13. the following sentence is also found. — A little below, for *theologici* codd. K T W bb ee and others with ed. 2 [read] *theologi*, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 *theologiae*.

la: De duabus Animabus, c. 13. n. 19; de Quant. animae, c. 33. n. 70. seqq.; de Fide et symb. c. 10. n. 23. Cfr. etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4, et de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. — Mox post *rationabile* cod. F interserit *scilicet*, cod. aa *videlicet*.

en: *On the Two Souls*, c. 13. n. 19; *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 33. n. 70. seqq.; *On Faith and the Creed* c. 10. n. 23. Cfr. also above, the Master's text, d. XXIV. c. 4, and *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 13. — Presently after *rationabile* cod. F inserts *scilicet*, cod. aa *videlicet*.

la: Textus originalis sic: *facile et convenienter uniuntur.* — Mox pro *phantastico* cod. C *phantastica*, et subinde pro *quod* multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *quae*.

en: The original text thus: *facile et convenienter uniuntur* [easily and fittingly are united]. — Presently for *phantastico* cod. C [reads] *phantastica*, and thereupon for *quod* many codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 [read] *quae*.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 1.).

en: Aristotle, II. *On the Soul*, text 6 (c. 1).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro *ex anima* codd. I X Z et alii *ab anima*.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 3. — A little below, for *ex anima* codd. I X Z and others [read] *ab anima*.

la: Cod. X hic addit: *Quod primo modo, patet,* et terminata hac propos. verbo *sentiendum*, sic prosequitur: *Similiter de secundo, quod sit in nobis a generante, quia transfunditur* etc. Pro *deciduntur* codd. F H K T et alii *descinduntur*, codd. V W Y *discinduntur*.

en: Cod. X here adds: *Quod primo modo, patet* [that in the first mode, is clear], and having ended this proposition with the word *sentiendum*, continues thus: *Similiter de secundo, quod sit in nobis a generante, quia transfunditur* etc. For *deciduntur* codd. F H K T and others [read] *descinduntur*, codd. V W Y *discinduntur*.

la: Scil. operatio sensitiva. — Paulo ante Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bis *anima* pro *substantia*.

en: Namely the sensitive operation. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] twice *anima* for *substantia*.

la: Codd. F V aa ee et alii *est*, refragantibus edd. et multis codd. Fortasse legendum *est et.* Immediate post plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 verba male sic transposuerunt: *in his quae potissime generantur.* Paulo inferius post *a quo* cod. aa repetit *producitur*.

en: Codd. F V aa ee and others [read] *est*, the editions and many codices opposing. Perhaps it should be read *est et*. Immediately after, several codices with the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 wrongly transposed the words thus: *in his quae potissime generantur.* A little below, after *a quo* cod. aa repeats *producitur*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius quaest. dependet ab alia, scilicet utrum praeter animam rationalem sit alia anima in homine tanquam principium vitae sensibilis. Unicam autem eamque rationalem sive intellectualem animam esse in homine, pluries definitum est ab Ecclesia, scilicet contra Apollinaristas in Concilio oecumenico V. (adversus Origenem) can. 9; contra Manichaeos in Concilio oecumenico VIII, can. 11; contra Averroistas in Conciliis Viennensi et Lateranensi V. — Quoad plura hic dicta cfr. supra d. 18. a. 1. q. 1, d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. 3, d. 18. a. 1. 3, d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 10. a. 1. (cfr. ibid. a. 3), et in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 1. 3; S. 1. q. 76. a. 4, q. 90. a. 2, q. 118. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86-89. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 70. m. 3, q. 72. m. 3, q. 73. m. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. 4. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, d. 18. q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question depends on another, namely whether besides the rational soul there is another soul in a human as the principle of sensible life. But that there is one soul in a human, and that a rational or intellectual one, has been defined many times by the Church, namely against the Apollinarists in the Fifth Ecumenical Council (against Origen) can. 9; against the Manichaeans in the Eighth Ecumenical Council, can. 11; against the Averroists in the Councils of Vienne and the Fifth Lateran. — As to the many things said here cfr. above d. 18. a. 1. q. 1, d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. 3, d. 18. a. 1. 3, d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. 2.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scotus, *On the Principle of Things*, q. 10. a. 1. (cfr. ibid. a. 3), and in each *Scriptum*, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 1. 3; *Summa* I. q. 76. a. 4, q. 90. a. 2, q. 118. a. 1. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* II. c. 86-89. — B. Albert, II. Sent. d. 18. a. 8; *Summa* p. II. tr. 12. q. 70. m. 3, q. 72. m. 3, q. 73. m. 1. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. 4. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, d. 18. q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 51575–51815), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo/Tripiex-sensualitas exposition, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (pp. 740–743, offset pdf = printed + 22). The OCR body for this quaestio was unusually clean; the PDF was authoritative for footer numbering and for the two-column reflow of pp. 742–743.

**ARTICULUS I opener folded in** (Override §5): the short ART I theme line *Utrum originale peccatum traducatur mediante sensibili portione* (raw 51577, printed p. 740) is rendered as a heading at the top of this q1 — no standalone divisio chunk for the article.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Ratione cuius partis primo insit animae peccatum originale.*

Secundo quaeritur, ratione cuius partis primo insit animae peccatum originale. Et quod primo insit ratione potentiae vegetativae, videtur:

1. Quia originale inest animae ex coniunctione sui ad carnem corruptam[^1]; sed anima maxime unitur carni secundum potentiam vegetativam, quae est prima potentia in ipsa: ergo videtur, quod primo insit ei ratione potentiae vegetabilis.

2. Item, hoc videtur alia ratione. Potentia generativa est ipsius animae vegetabilis; sed illa est, mediante qua originale transfunditur[^2], et quae maxime per originale peccatum inficitur, sicut patebit inferius[^3]: ergo videtur, quod ratione vegetabilis primo et principaliter insit animae culpa originalis.

Quod autem ratione partis sensibilis, videtur.

3. Originale enim, sicut dicit Augustinus[^4], est concupiscentia; sed concupiscentia primo et principaliter in parte sensibili radicatur, quoniam concupiscentia dicit appetitum boni *ut nunc*, praevia cognitione, et hoc competit parti sensitivae: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum primo habeat fieri in anima secundum illam partem.

4. Item, in actuali perpetratione peccati videmus, quod peccatum pervenit ad rationem mediante sensualitate, pro eo quod perversio hominis incipit ab inferiori et a conversione ad bonum commutabile[^5]: ergo si peccatum originale incipit ab inferiori, videlicet a carnis infectione, et animam ab inferiori habet inficere; videtur, quod primo habeat animae inesse ratione potentiae sensitivae.

Quod autem primo insit ratione partis rationalis, videtur.

5. «Originale enim est carentia debitae iustitiae»; sed «iustitia habet esse in sola rationali voluntate primo et principaliter», sicut dicit Anselmus in libro *de Conceptu virginali*[^6]: ergo originale peccatum primo et principaliter ratione partis rationalis habet animae inesse.

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6. Item, originale peccatum est peccatum mortale, ergo per ipsum anima est a Deo aversa; sed averti est ipsius portionis rationalis primo et principaliter: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum primo habeat inesse animae ratione rationalis potentiae.

Sed quod primo insit ipsi animae ratione suae substantiae vel essentiae, videtur:

7. Quia originale contrahitur in anima ex unione ipsius ad carnem; sed per prius per naturam unitur substantia animae ipsi corpori quam potentiae organis; prius enim est *vivere* quam *moveri*[^7]: ergo prius per naturam inficitur animae substantia, quam inficiantur potentiae. Et si hoc verum est, originale primo inest animae ex parte suae substantiae.

8. Item, originale cum sit unum, inficit omnes potentias animae[^8]; sed nihil unum est commune omnibus potentiis animae nisi eius substantia: ergo originale primo est in anima ratione suae substantiae.

Est igitur quaestio, secundum quid originale primo insit animae: utrum scilicet ratione *substantiae*, aut *potentiae*; et si potentiae: utrum *vegetativae*, aut *sensitivae*, aut *intellectivae*.

### Conclusio.

> *Originale peccatum, prout est vitium, inest animae primo ratione partis sensitivae, sed prout est culpa, est in sola parte rationali.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, originale peccatum sic traduci et contrahi ab anima, ut primo insit animae ratione substantiae suae, quae primo carni coniungitur; et consequenter mediante substantia ab ipso[^9] potentiae inficiuntur, pro eo quod non uniuntur potentiae carni infectae nisi per unionem substantiae. Et sicut una est gratia, quae reformat animam et eius potentias, quae, inquam, dicitur una, quia primo respicit animae substantiam, ut dicunt; sic est unum originale, quod omnes potentias animae inficit et deordinat. — Sed si istud quis ita intelligeret, quod per originale peccatum primo haberet infici substantia quam potentiae, ita quod originale insit animae non ratione potentiae, sed ratione ipsius substantiae[^10] unitae; hoc non videtur intelligibile: tum quia originale est carentia debitae iustitiae, iustitia autem, cum sit rectitudo voluntatis, est primo in voluntate; tum etiam quia originale est concupiscentia, concupiscere autem non est actus substantiae nisi ratione potentiae; tum etiam quia in originali est deordinatio ipsius animae, deordinatio autem non est in anima nisi ratione potentiae, quia per ipsam potest ordinari et deordinari.

Unde sicut supra[^11] dictum fuit de *gratia*, quod ipsa respicit *substantiam*, non quia possit esse in animae substantia, circumscripta potentia, sed quia est in potentiis animae, secundum quod continuantur ad unam substantiam; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, ut originale peccatum dicatur *substantiam animae respicere*, quia inest potentiis animae, non ex actibus propriis, sed prout continuari habent in unam substantiam[^12] animae, prout est unita carni infectae, ita tamen, quod primo insit ipsa deordinatio *potentiae* quam *substantiae*. Non enim dicitur substantia ordinata vel deordinata nisi ratione potentiae.

Hoc igitur supposito, quod originale insit animae primo ratione *potentiae*, intelligendum est, quod dupliciter est loqui de originali peccato: aut prout est *culpa* reddens animam Deo odiosam; aut prout est *vitium* deordinans ipsam potentiam[^13]. Primo modo accipiendo, proprie inest animae secundum *liberum arbitrium*, et maxime secundum voluntatem. Ipsum enim solum est, secundum quod anima culpatur, vel laudatur, cum est *in actu*, et secundum quod est culpabilis vel laudabilis *a suo ortu*. Secundo modo accipiendo, scilicet prout dicit vitium deordinans potentiam, sic, quia fomentum istius deordinationis ortum habet a carne, et rationalis motiva curvari habet per appetitum sive concupiscentiam sensitivae, quae ad illicitum impellit et movet; sic dicendum est, quod peccatum originale sive vitium, quod nascendo contrahimus, inest animae primo ratione partis sensitivae. — Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam in parte responsio ad obiecta. Concedo enim, quod originale, prout est vitium in nobis, primo inchoat[^14] a parte sensitiva, quia modus corrumpendi e contrario est in nobis, quam fuerit in Adam. Ibi enim *persona* corrupit naturam, et ratio partem sensibilem, et voluntas carnem; et sic, cum e contrario sit in nobis[^15], originalis corruptio ascendit ad partem rationalem mediante portione sensibili, secundum quod est vitiositas; licet, secundum quod est culpa, habeat esse in sola parte rationali, in qua est libertas arbitrii. Unde quatuor rationes mediae verum concludunt et concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de parte animae vegetativa, dicendum, quod unio ad corpus non est tota causa contrahendi originale, sed *unio* cum *possibilitate ad deordinationem*. Non enim corrumpitur per originale, secundum quod est vitium, nisi quod est ad iustitiam aliquo modo ordinabile. Et quoniam vegetativa plus tenet modum agendi naturalem quam voluntarium; hinc est, quod originale non sic respicit vegetativam, sicut respicit sensitivam, in qua potest esse appetitus et delectatio coniuncta.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de vi generativa, iam patet responsio, quia in ea viget corruptio, non solum quia sit potentia animae vegetabilis, sed etiam quia ratione sensus adiuncti potest delectatione et concupiscentia deordinari.

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7. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod primo sit originale peccatum in animae substantia, et per unionem; dicendum, quod, sicut tactum est, unio non est tota causa, sed requiritur ibi cum hoc possibilitas ad deordinationem peccati; talis autem non est in substantia, sed in potentia, ut praedictum est supra.

8. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de unitate originalis, dicendum, quod hoc non concludit, quod originale primo sit in substantia, sed quod sit in potentiis, secundum quod continuantur ad unam substantiam, sicut prius explanatum est de gratia. Hoc autem melius explanabitur infra, cum agetur de unitate originalis peccati.

english:
### Question II. *By reason of which part original sin first inheres in the soul.*

Secondly it is asked, by reason of which part original sin first inheres in the soul. And that it first inheres by reason of the vegetative power seems so:

1. Because original sin is in the soul from its conjunction to the corrupt flesh[^1]; but the soul is most of all united to the flesh according to the vegetative power, which is the first power in it: therefore it seems that it first inheres in it by reason of the vegetable power.

2. Likewise, this seems so by another argument. The generative power belongs to the vegetable soul itself; but that is the power by means of which original sin is transmitted[^2], and which is most of all infected by original sin, as will be made clear below[^3]: therefore it seems that by reason of the vegetable power the original fault first and principally inheres in the soul.

But that it inheres by reason of the sensible part seems so.

3. For original sin, as Augustine says[^4], is concupiscence; but concupiscence is rooted first and principally in the sensible part, since concupiscence denotes an appetite for a good *as here-and-now*, with cognition going before, and this belongs to the sensitive part: therefore it seems that original sin must first come to be in the soul according to that part.

4. Likewise, in the actual perpetration of sin we see that sin reaches reason by means of sensuality, for the reason that the perversion of man begins from the lower and from a turning to a changeable good[^5]: therefore if original sin begins from the lower, namely from the infection of the flesh, and has to infect the soul from the lower; it seems that it must first inhere in the soul by reason of the sensitive power.

But that it first inheres by reason of the rational part seems so.

5. «For original sin is the lack of due justice»; but «justice has its being first and principally in the rational will alone», as Anselm says in the book *On the Virginal Conception*[^6]: therefore original sin must inhere in the soul first and principally by reason of the rational part.

6. Likewise, original sin is a mortal sin, therefore through it the soul is turned away from God; but to be turned away belongs to the rational portion first and principally: therefore it seems that original sin must first inhere in the soul by reason of the rational power.

But that it first inheres in the soul itself by reason of its substance or essence seems so:

7. Because original sin is contracted in the soul from its union to the flesh; but by priority of nature the substance of the soul is united to the body itself rather than the powers to the bodily organs; for to *live* is prior to to *be moved*[^7]: therefore by priority of nature the substance of the soul is infected, rather than that the powers are infected. And if this is true, original sin is first in the soul on the part of its substance.

8. Likewise, original sin, since it is one, infects all the powers of the soul[^8]; but nothing one is common to all the powers of the soul except its substance: therefore original sin is first in the soul by reason of its substance.

The question therefore is, by reason of what original sin first inheres in the soul: namely whether by reason of *substance*, or of *power*; and if of power: whether of the *vegetative*, or of the *sensitive*, or of the *intellective*.

### Conclusion.

> *Original sin, insofar as it is a vice, inheres in the soul first by reason of the sensitive part, but insofar as it is fault, it is in the rational part alone.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that original sin is so transmitted and contracted by the soul that it first inheres in the soul by reason of its substance, which is first conjoined to the flesh; and consequently the powers are infected by it[^9] by means of the substance, for the reason that the powers are not united to the infected flesh except through the union of the substance. And just as grace is one, which reforms the soul and its powers — which grace, I say, is called one because it first regards the substance of the soul, as they say — so original sin is one, which infects and disorders all the powers of the soul. — But if anyone were to understand this in such a way that through original sin the substance would be infected before the powers, so that original sin inheres in the soul not by reason of power, but by reason of the substance[^10] itself as united; this does not seem intelligible: both because original sin is the lack of due justice, while justice, since it is the rectitude of the will, is first in the will; and also because original sin is concupiscence, but to be concupiscent is not an act of the substance except by reason of power; and also because in original sin there is a disordering of the soul itself, but disordering is not in the soul except by reason of power, since through it the soul can be ordered and disordered.

Hence, just as it was said above[^11] concerning *grace*, that it regards the *substance* — not because it could be in the substance of the soul with power set aside, but because it is in the powers of the soul, insofar as they are continued into one substance — so too in the matter at hand it must be understood that original sin is said to *regard the substance of the soul*, because it is in the powers of the soul, not from their proper acts, but insofar as they are to be continued into one substance[^12] of the soul, insofar as it is united to the infected flesh; yet in such a way that the disordering itself inheres first in the *power* than in the *substance*. For the substance is not said to be ordered or disordered except by reason of power.

This therefore being supposed, that original sin inheres in the soul first by reason of *power*, it must be understood that there are two ways of speaking of original sin: either insofar as it is *fault* rendering the soul hateful to God; or insofar as it is a *vice* disordering the power itself[^13]. Taking it the first way, it properly inheres in the soul according to *free choice*, and most of all according to the will. For it is this alone according to which the soul is blamed or praised when it is *in act*, and according to which it is blameworthy or praiseworthy *from its origin*. Taking it the second way, namely insofar as it denotes a vice disordering the power, thus, because the kindling of this disordering has its rise from the flesh, and the rational movers have to be bent by the appetite or concupiscence of the sensitive part, which impels and moves to the illicit; thus it must be said that the original sin or vice which we contract in being born inheres in the soul first by reason of the sensitive part. — And thus the answer to the question proposed is clear; the answer to the objections is also in part clear. For I concede that original sin, insofar as it is a vice in us, first begins[^14] from the sensitive part, because the manner of corrupting is the reverse in us from what it was in Adam. For there the *person* corrupted the nature, and reason the sensible part, and the will the flesh; and so, since it is the reverse in us[^15], the original corruption ascends to the rational part by means of the sensible portion, insofar as it is viciousness; although, insofar as it is fault, it has its being in the rational part alone, in which there is freedom of choice. Hence the four middle arguments conclude truly and are to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the vegetative part of the soul, it must be said that the union to the body is not the whole cause of contracting original sin, but the *union* together with a *possibility for disordering*. For nothing is corrupted by original sin, insofar as it is a vice, except what is in some way orderable to justice. And since the vegetative power holds more to the natural manner of acting than to the voluntary; hence it is that original sin does not regard the vegetative as it regards the sensitive, in which there can be conjoined appetite and delight.

2. To that which is objected concerning the generative power, the answer is now clear, because in it corruption flourishes, not only because it is a power of the vegetable soul, but also because by reason of the adjoined sense it can be disordered by delight and concupiscence.

7. To that which is objected last, that original sin is first in the substance of the soul, and through the union; it must be said that, as has been touched on, the union is not the whole cause, but there is required together with this a possibility for disordering by sin; but such a possibility is not in the substance, but in the power, as was said above.

8. To that which is objected concerning the unity of original sin, it must be said that this does not conclude that original sin is first in the substance, but that it is in the powers, insofar as they are continued into one substance, as was previously explained concerning grace. But this will be better explained below, when the unity of original sin is treated.

la: Codd. H X Z et alii cum ed. 2 *colligitur*.

en: Codices H X Z and others, with ed. 2, read *colligitur* (is gathered).

la: Ut ostenditur infra a. 2. q. 1. — De minori, quae sequitur, cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.). In fine arg. pro *vegetabilis* edd., excepta 2, *vegetativae*. — Vat., in initio huius arg. pro *Et* substituto *Sed*, hoc ipsum arg. cum seq. reiecit post arg. sextum, haec duo argg. nec non septimum et octavum coniungens ut argg. ad oppositum. Sed hoc loco S. Bonav. specialem ordinem observat, incipiens ab inferiore potentia.

en: As is shown below, a. 2, q. 1. — On the minor [premise] which follows, cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 31 (c. 3). At the end of the argument, for *vegetabilis* the editions, except 2, [read] *vegetativae*. — The Vatican edition, at the beginning of this argument substituting *Sed* for *Et*, rejected this very argument together with the following one after the sixth argument, joining these two arguments as well as the seventh and eighth as arguments to the contrary. But in this place St. Bonaventure observes a special order, beginning from the lower power.

la: Quaest. seq. De maiori cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: The following question. On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 34 seqq. (c. 4).

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXX. c. 8. seqq. — De propos. seq. (minori) cfr. infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. — *Vvo praevia* non pauci codd., inter quos B C D E R S, cum edd. 1, 2 *prima*; subinde pro *cognitione* memorati codd. *cognatione*.

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. XXX, c. 8 seqq. — On the following proposition (the minor) cf. below, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1. — For *praevia* not a few codices, among them B C D E R S, with edd. 1, 2, [read] *prima*; thereupon for *cognitione* the said codices [read] *cognatione*.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq.

en: Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 6 seqq.

la: Cap. 3. Verba habentur supra pag. 722, nota 3.

en: Chapter 3. The words are found above, page 722, note 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 36. seq. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 36 seq. (c. 4).

la: Ut ostenditur infra d. 33. a. 2. q. 2.

en: As is shown below, d. 33, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Cod. X supplet *scilicet originali*.

en: Codex X supplies *scilicet originali* (namely, by original sin).

la: Cod. aa adiicit *carnis*.

en: Codex aa adds *carnis* (of the flesh).

en: Distinction 26, q. 5.

la: Vat. *in una substantia*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *in una substantia* (in one substance).

la: Haec distinctio recurrit etiam infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2 et supponitur passim, praesertim d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. 2.

en: This distinction recurs also below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and is presupposed throughout, especially d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, 2.

la: Codd. aa bb *inchoatur*.

en: Codices aa bb [read] *inchoatur* (is begun).

la: Pro *et sic* Vat. *sed*; cod. aa verba *et sic* et seqq. sic auxit: *in nobis autem caro corrumpit voluntatem et sensibilis rationem et natura personam; et sic originalis* etc.

en: For *et sic* the Vatican edition [reads] *sed*; codex aa expanded the words *et sic* and the following thus: *but in us the flesh corrupts the will, and the sensible [part] corrupts reason, and the nature corrupts the person; and thus the original* etc. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primam sententiam, hic relatam et a S. Bonav. non probatam, tenet S. Thom. Haec autem differentia opinionum nascitur ex diversis principiis, quae quoad subiectum primarium gratiae sanctificantis et quoad iustitiam originalem Angelicus et Seraphicus (cui adhaeret Scot.) profitentur. Ut prima illa sententia intelligatur, notanda sunt verba S. Thomae, S. 1. II. q. 83. a. 2. ad 2: «Potentiae magis videntur pertinere ad personam, in quantum sunt principia personalium actuum; unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia». Idem distinguit (ibid. a. 3. ad 2.) duplicem huius peccati progressum: «unum quidem a carne ad animam, alium vero ab essentia animae ad potentiam»; ac quoad ordinem, secundum quem ipsae potentiae corrumpuntur, ipse docet, quod considerando inclinationem ad actum, peccatum originale in genere per prius respiciat voluntatem. Sed S. Bonaventura, constans suis principiis de originali iustitia et peccato, hic distinctionem adhibet inter peccatum originale, prout est culpa, et prout est vitium deordinans potentiam, sicut in textu clare exponitur.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 10. a. 1. (cfr. ibid. a. 3), et in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. q. 76. a. 4, q. 90. a. 2, q. 118. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86-89. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 70. m. 3, q. 72. m. 3, q. 73. m. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. 4. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, d. 18. q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Scot., hic q. 2. et infra d. 42. q. 4. n. 1. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. art. citt.; de Malo, q. 4. a. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The first opinion, related here and not approved by St. Bonaventure, is held by St. Thomas. Now this difference of opinions arises from the diverse principles which the Angelic and the Seraphic (to whom Scotus adheres) profess concerning the primary subject of sanctifying grace and concerning original justice. That the first opinion may be understood, the words of St. Thomas are to be noted, *Summa* I-II, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2: «The powers seem rather to pertain to the person, inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts; whence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are personal sins». He distinguishes the same (ibid. a. 3, ad 2.) a twofold progress of this sin: «one indeed from the flesh to the soul, the other from the essence of the soul to the power»; and as to the order according to which the powers themselves are corrupted, he teaches that, considering the inclination to act, original sin in general regards the will by priority. But St. Bonaventure, consistent with his principles concerning original justice and sin, here applies the distinction between original sin insofar as it is fault, and insofar as it is a vice disordering the power, as is clearly set forth in the text.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 62, m. 2. — Scotus, *On the Principle of Things*, q. 10, a. 1 (cf. ibid. a. 3), and in both Commentaries, II Sent. d. 18, q. unica. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 18, q. 2, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 76, a. 4, q. 90, a. 2, q. 118, a. 1, 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 86-89. — Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 18, a. 8; *Summa* p. II, tr. 12, q. 70, m. 3, q. 72, m. 3, q. 73, m. 1. — Richard of Middleton, II Sent. d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 19, a. 3, 4. — Durandus, II Sent. d. 18, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 17, q. 1, d. 18, q. 3. — Biel, II Sent. d. 17, q. 1. — Scotus, here q. 2, and below d. 42, q. 4, n. 1 seqq. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; the articles cited; *de Malo*, q. 4, a. 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 51816–51953), with the cascade-shattered Respondeo, Ad obiecta, and scholion reflowed column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{743,744,745}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (printed 743–745 = pdf 765–767), confirmed by running heads `DIST. XXXI. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` (p.745) and page numbers 744/745.

**Page span / structure.** Q2 opens at the bottom of **p.743** (a1-q1's scholion + commentator roll occupy the top of p.743; the `QUAESTIO II.` header sits mid-page). Fundamenta 1–5 are on p.743; fundamenta 6–8, the Conclusio, the full Respondeo, and replies 1–2 are on p.744; replies 7–8 and the SCHOLION (parts I–II) are on p.745. The scholion's commentator roll ends `… Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.` immediately before the `QUAESTIO III.` header (raw 51954).

**Apparatus / page-split map (15 entries).**
- **p.743 footer = `[^1]`–`[^6]` (6 notes), RECEIVED from a1-q1.** This page's footer block annotates q2's opening fundamenta (the a1-q1 subagent forwarded all p.743 footers for this reason). Anchors in body reading order: `[^1]` carnem corruptam, `[^2]` transfunditur, `[^3]` patebit inferius, `[^4]` Augustinus, `[^5]` commutabile, `[^6]` Anselmus de Conceptu virginali.
- **p.744 footer = `[^7]`–`[^15]` (9 notes).** Left footer 1–6 = `[^7]`–`[^12]` (Aristot. text 36; infra d.33; Cod. X; Cod. aa; Dist. 26 q.5; Vat. in una substantia); right footer 7–9 = `[^13]`–`[^15]`.
- **p.745 footer is NOT q2's.** The p.745 footer (notes 1–6: *Sapientiae undecimo*, *Verba sunt Magistri hic c.4*, *Vers. 17*, etc.) annotates q3's Sed contra. Q2's Solutio replies 2/7/8 on p.745 carry no footnote markers. → **FORWARDED to a1-q3.**

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a1-q1: entire p.743 footer block (= `[^1]`–`[^6]`). FORWARDED to a1-q3: the entire p.745 footer block (q3's Sed contra annotations).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true` — q2 has its own scholion (parts I–II), translated in full. Part I expounds the St. Thomas position; part II is the commentator roll.

**Cascade-dropout check.** Verified the Respondeo and Ad obiecta against the PDF column bands. The IA OCR cascade-shattered both columns of pp.744–745 (interleaved fragments), but no body text or footnote was dropped at the column seams: reply numbering runs 1, 2, 7, 8 (the OCR's apparent gap of 3–6 reflects Bonaventure's own text — replies to the four "middle" arguments 3–6 are handled collectively by "Unde quatuor rationes mediae verum concludunt et concedendae sunt," and the explicit replies address objections 1, 2, 7, 8). Opening sentence of q2 is grammatically continuous; closing sentence ("…cum agetur de unitate originalis peccati.") parses cleanly before the SCHOLION header.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum maior sit infectio generativae per originale peccatum quam alterius potentiae.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum maior sit infectio generativae per originale quam alterius potentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Illa vis est in nobis magis corrupta per peccatum, in qua maior est rebellio et inobedientia; sed talis est potentia generativa, sicut patet, quia membra illa non subiacent imperio rationis: ergo videtur, quod illa vis est magis corrupta.

2. Item, illa vis est magis per peccatum infecta, in cuius actu est maior erubescentia; sed maior est erubescentia in actu potentiae generativae quam in actu alterius potentiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, illa vis magis est in nobis corrupta, cuius actui magis necessaria est *medicina*; sed talis est generativa, cuius actus non potest fieri absque peccato, « nisi excusetur per Sacramentum matrimonii »[^1]; quod quidem non contingit in aliis animae potentiis: ergo etc.

4. Item, illa vis magis est in nobis corrupta, in cuius actu maior est *incurvatio*; sed talis est potentia generativa, nam in eius actu totaliter absorbetur ratio, et efficitur homo totus caro: ergo maior est in ea corruptio.

5. Item, illa vis magis est in nobis corrupta, in qua magis regnat concupiscentia; sed talis est vis generativa, sicut patet per pruritum, qui sentitur in membris genitalibus: ergo illa vis maxime inter ceteras corrupta videtur per originalis concupiscentiae vitium.

**Sed contra:** 1. Per quae quis peccat, per haec et torquetur, ut dicitur *Sapientiae* undecimo[^2]: si ergo peccatum primorum parentum perpetratum fuit magis per nutritivam quam per generativam, immo minime per generativam; videtur, quod nutritiva magis debuerit esse corrupta.

2. Item, illa potentia est magis corrupta, quae minus potest refrenari; sed magis potest homo compescere appetitum potentiae generativae quam potentiae nutritivae: ergo videtur, quod vis nutritiva magis sit corrupta.

3. Item, si corruptio animae est ex carne[^3], videtur, quod illa vis potissime sit corrupta, quae primo in
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carne et per carnem exercet suam operationem; sed talis est potentia nutritiva; longe enim ante nutritur homo quam generet, et prius appetit delectabilia gustus quam delectabilia tactus: ergo videtur idem quod prius.

4. Item, augmentativa tenet medium inter nutritivam et generativam — prius enim est nutriri, et postmodum augeri, et tertio generare — sed inter omnes vires animae augmentativa minime corrupta est: ergo si medium sapit naturam extremorum[^4], videtur similiter, quod et generativa minime deberet esse corrupta.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quare inter omnes sensus tactus illius[^5] habet de corruptione; et inter omnes potentias animae vegetativae generativa inter ceteras est in nobis magis corrupta.

### Conclusio.

> Per peccatum originale maxime corrupta est vis generativa.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio inter omnes potentias sensibiles maxime corrupta est vis generativa. Unde, sicut communiter consuevit dici, aliae vires solummodo dicuntur corruptae; ipsa vero corrupta dicitur et infecta propter concupiscentiae pruritum et vehementiam, quae residet in ipsa.

Ratio autem, quare magis inficitur vis generativa quam alia potentia, sumitur ex hoc, quod ipsa est vis non solum deserviens personae, sed etiam deserviens naturae. Et ideo originalis corruptio sive vitium, quod inest naturae ex corruptione personae, per prius respicit illam potentiam quam aliam; deservit autem vis generativa naturae, in quantum per ipsam fit transfusio seminis in prolem. Et quoniam in illo semine est radix infectionis et corruptionis, hinc est, quod illa vis, quae[^11] est illius seminis[^6] administrativa[^12], plus habet in se de infectione et corruptione originalis. — Rursus, quia potentiae generativae in nobis iunctus est *sensus*, et potentia sensitiva respicit ipsum hominem in se, quodam modo habet vis ista deservire personae. Et quoniam inter omnes sensus tactus est maxime materialis et apprehendens cum maiori adhaerentia sensibilitatis ad sensibile[^7]; et hic maxime viget in membris genitalibus ratione multitudinis nervorum: hinc est, quod modica corruptio ratione magnitudinis sensus plus inficit illam potentiam, quam inficeret aliam; et propterea maxime in ea regnat pruritus et concupiscentia. Et quia post sensum tactus sensus *gustus* maxime est materialis inter alios[^8], hinc est, quod inter alias vires magis sentitur inordinatio circa actum nutritivae sive gustativae. — Ex hac igitur duplici ratione una colligitur ratio sufficiens, quare anima per vitium originale plus inficitur in generativa quam in alia potentia. Et quia hoc probant rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nutritiva debet magis puniri, quia peccatum fuit primo perpetratum per eam; dicendum, quod illa ratio tenet, secundum quod peccatum Adae respiciebat *personam*, non secundum quod respiciebat *naturam*; et verum est, quod quantum ad illam vim acrius fuit punitus, quia fame et siti; et etiam eius posteri puniuntur per ieiuniorum abstinentiam, in quibus maior est poena, quam sit in carnis continentia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nutritiva minus potest refrenari; dicendum, quod aliquam potentiam minus posse refrenari, hoc est dupliciter: vel ratione vehementiae appetitus et delectationis, vel ratione indigentiae naturalis. Et cum[^9] non potest de facili refrenari propter vehementiam appetitus et inclinationis, magis est vitiata et corrupta. Cum vero hoc habet ratione indigentiae naturalis, non sequitur ex hoc, quod magis corrupta sit. Cum ergo dicitur, quod nutritiva minus potest refrenari, hoc non est ratione maioris vehementiae appetitus, sed hoc est ratione indigentiae naturalis, quia non potest sustentari sine cibo. Non sic est de generativa, in qua non est improbitas appetitus propter necessitatem, sed propter corruptionis foeditatem. Et hinc est, quod primi motus generativae potius dicuntur peccata quam primi motus nutritivae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nutritiva magis unitur carni et per prius habet actum suum in carne; dicendum, quod ex hoc non concluditur, quod corrumpatur intensius, sed quod eius corruptio sentiatur diuturnius. — Praeterea, unio non est tota causa, sicut praedictum est supra[^10].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potentia augmentativa, dicendum, quod potentia augmentativa pure movet *naturaliter* nec habet *sensum coniunctum*, ratione cuius sentiatur delectatio. Et quoniam non subiacet voluntati, ideo per peccatum non habet deordinari. Rursus, quia *sensum adiunctum* non habet, hinc est, quod non est in ea delectatio concupiscentiae;
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non sic autem est in nutritiva et generativa. Utraque enim harum subiacet voluntatis imperio, et utraque harum habet sensum adiunctum. Et quia plus est in potestate voluntatis abstinere a coitu quam a cibo; et sensus tactus, qui maxime materialis est, viget in organo generativae: hinc est, quod maior est in ea corruptio, non solum respectu potentiarum animae vegetabilis, sed etiam respectu potentiarum animae sensibilis. — Et per hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the infection of the generative power through original sin is greater than that of another power.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the infection of the generative [power] through original [sin] is greater than that of another power. And that it is so, it seems.

1. That power is more corrupted in us through sin in which there is greater rebellion and disobedience; but such is the generative power, as is evident, because those members are not subject to the command of reason: therefore it seems that that power is more corrupted.

2. Likewise, that power is more infected through sin in whose act there is greater shame; but there is greater shame in the act of the generative power than in the act of another power: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that power is more corrupted in us whose act has more need of *medicine*; but such is the generative [power], whose act cannot take place without sin, « unless it be excused through the Sacrament of matrimony »[^1]; which indeed does not happen in the other powers of the soul: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that power is more corrupted in us in whose act there is greater *bending-down*; but such is the generative power, for in its act reason is wholly absorbed, and man is made wholly flesh: therefore the corruption is greater in it.

5. Likewise, that power is more corrupted in us in which concupiscence reigns more; but such is the generative power, as is evident from the itch which is felt in the genital members: therefore that power seems most of all among the rest to be corrupted through the vice of original concupiscence.

**On the contrary:** 1. By the things through which one sins, by these also is one tormented, as is said in *Wisdom* eleven[^2]: if therefore the sin of the first parents was perpetrated more through the nutritive than through the generative [power] — indeed least of all through the generative — it seems that the nutritive ought to have been more corrupted.

2. Likewise, that power is more corrupted which can less be restrained; but a man can more compress the appetite of the generative power than of the nutritive power: therefore it seems that the nutritive power is more corrupted.

3. Likewise, if the corruption of the soul is from the flesh[^3], it seems that that power is most of all corrupted which first
operates in the flesh and through the flesh; but such is the nutritive power; for man is nourished long before he generates, and desires the delectable things of taste before the delectable things of touch: therefore it seems the same as before.

4. Likewise, the augmentative [power] holds the middle between the nutritive and the generative — for first is being nourished, and afterward being increased, and thirdly generating — but among all the powers of the soul the augmentative is least corrupted: therefore if the middle savors the nature of the extremes[^4], it seems likewise that the generative also ought to be least corrupted.

Along with this it is asked why among all the senses touch has [the most] of corruption[^5]; and why among all the powers of the vegetative soul the generative is, among the rest, the more corrupted in us.

### Conclusion.

> Through original sin the generative power is most corrupted.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt among all the sensible powers the generative power is most corrupted. Hence, as it is commonly wont to be said, the other powers are called only corrupted; but it [the generative] is called corrupted and infected on account of the itch and vehemence of concupiscence which resides in it.

But the reason why the generative power is more infected than another power is taken from this, that it is a power not only serving the person, but also serving the nature. And therefore the original corruption or vice, which is in the nature from the corruption of the person, regards that power before another; and the generative power serves the nature inasmuch as through it the seed is transmitted into the offspring. And since in that seed is the root of infection and corruption, hence it is that that power, which[^11] is the administrator of that seed[^6][^12], has in itself more of original infection and corruption. — Again, because *sense* is joined to the generative power in us, and the sensitive power regards man himself in himself, this power has in a certain manner to serve the person. And since among all the senses touch is the most material and apprehends with the greatest adherence of sensibility to the sensible[^7]; and this flourishes most in the genital members by reason of the multitude of nerves: hence it is that a slight corruption, by reason of the magnitude of the sense, infects that power more than it would infect another; and on this account the itch and concupiscence reign most of all in it. And because after the sense of touch the sense of *taste* is the most material among the others[^8], hence it is that among the other powers disorder is felt more in the act of the nutritive or gustative [power]. — From this twofold reason, therefore, one sufficient reason is gathered why the soul, through the original vice, is more infected in the generative than in another power. And because the reasons that are adduced for the first part prove this, therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the nutritive ought to be more punished because the sin was first perpetrated through it; it must be said that that reason holds according as the sin of Adam regarded the *person*, not according as it regarded the *nature*; and it is true that with respect to that power [Adam] was more sharply punished, namely by hunger and thirst; and his posterity also are punished by the abstinence of fasts, in which there is greater penalty than there is in continence of the flesh.

2. To that which is objected, that the nutritive can less be restrained; it must be said that for some power to be able to be less restrained is so in two ways: either by reason of the vehemence of appetite and delight, or by reason of natural need. And when[^9] it cannot easily be restrained on account of the vehemence of appetite and inclination, it is the more vitiated and corrupted. But when it has this by reason of natural need, it does not follow from this that it is more corrupted. When therefore it is said that the nutritive can less be restrained, this is not by reason of the greater vehemence of appetite, but it is by reason of natural need, because it cannot be sustained without food. It is not so with the generative, in which there is not depravity of appetite on account of necessity, but on account of the foulness of corruption. And hence it is that the first motions of the generative are rather called sins than the first motions of the nutritive.

3. To that which is objected, that the nutritive is more united to the flesh and has its act in the flesh before [the generative]; it must be said that from this it is not concluded that it is corrupted more intensely, but that its corruption is felt more lastingly. — Moreover, the union is not the whole cause, as was said above[^10].

4. To that which is objected concerning the augmentative power, it must be said that the augmentative power moves purely *naturally* and does not have a *conjoined sense*, by reason of which delight might be felt. And since it is not subject to the will, therefore through sin it has no disorder. Again, because it does not have an *adjoined sense*, hence it is that there is in it no delight of concupiscence;
it is not so, however, in the nutritive and the generative. For each of these is subject to the command of the will, and each of these has an adjoined sense. And because it is more in the power of the will to abstain from coition than from food; and the sense of touch, which is most material, flourishes in the organ of the generative [power]: hence it is that the corruption is greater in it, not only in respect of the powers of the vegetable soul, but also in respect of the powers of the sensible soul. — And by this is made evident that which was lastly asked.

la: *Vat. cum edd.* 3, 4 *delectatio.*

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads *delectatio* (delight).

la: Dist. 33. a. 2. q. 2. — De unitate gratiae vide supra d. 26. q. 5. — Paulo superius post *continuantur* codd. B P T et alii interserunt *ad unam potentiam.* Pro *unam* cod. ee substituit *primam.*

en: Distinction 33, a. 2, q. 2. — On the unity of grace see above d. 26, q. 5. — A little earlier, after *continuantur*, codices B P T and others insert *ad unam potentiam* (to one power). For *unam* codex ee substitutes *primam* (the first).

la: Plures codd., ut T aa cc ee, cum ed. 1 *sit.*

en: Several codices, such as T aa cc ee, with edition 1, read *sit*.

la: Verba sunt Magistri, hic c. 4.

en: These are the words of the Master, here c. 4.

en: [*Wisdom* 11,] verse 17.

la: Vide hic a. 2. q. 1.

en: See here a. 2, q. 1.

la: Aristot., IV. *Polit.* c. 9. (c. 7.): In eo [medio] enim utrumque extremorum apparet.

en: Aristotle, *Politics* IV, c. 9 (c. 7): for in it [the middle] each of the extremes appears.

la: Codd. D H Q omittunt *seminis*; codd. B E F K T V bb ee et alii nec non edd. 2, 3 pro *seminis* habent *vis.*

en: Codices D H Q omit *seminis* (of the seed); codices B E F K T V bb ee and others, as well as editions 2 and 3, read *vis* (power) in place of *seminis*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 106. seqq. (c. 11.) et III. text. 66. seqq. (c. 13.); II. *de Part. animal.* c. 1. et 8. — Immediate ante pro *sensibilitatis* plures codd., ut A T aa bb ee, *sentientis*, ed. 1 *sensitivae.* Mox pro *et hic*, quod habent codd. F K T Y et alii, Vat. *et haec*, codd. A ee cum ed. 1 *et hoc.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 106 ff. (c. 11) and III, text 66 ff. (c. 13); *On the Parts of Animals* II, c. 1 and 8. — Immediately before, in place of *sensibilitatis* several codices, such as A T aa bb ee, read *sentientis*, edition 1 *sensitivae*. Shortly after, in place of *et hic*, which codices F K T Y and others have, the Vatican edition reads *et haec*, and codices A ee with edition 1 *et hoc*.

la: Vide Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 101. seqq. (c. 10.).

en: See Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 101 ff. (c. 10).

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *quae*, scil. potentia.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *quae* (which), i.e. potentia (power).

la: *Quaest. praeced.*

en: The preceding question.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Consentit S. Thom. conclusioni et probationi. Notandum autem, quod illa infectio, quae praeter corruptionem esse dicitur in generativa potentia vel in semine, quam Magister (hic c. 2.) vocat *morbidum affectum*, non debet intelligi, quasi sit positiva quaedam *qualitas morbida*, ut opinabantur nonnulli antiqui Scholastici, et postea Iansenius. Contra hanc opinionem merito arguit Scot. (II. *Sent.* d. 32. q. unica n. 5.); eaque omnino aliena est a sententia principalium Scholasticorum et S. Bonaventurae, ut tota hac distinctione manifestatur (cfr. S. Thom., *de Malo*, q. 4. a. 1. ad 9. et a. 3.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 3. § 3. — Scot., loc. cit. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. 1. 11. q. 83. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** St. Thomas agrees with the conclusion and the proof. But it must be noted that the infection which, beyond corruption, is said to be in the generative power or in the seed — which the Master (here c. 2) calls a *morbid affection* — must not be understood as if it were a certain positive *morbid quality*, as some ancient Scholastics, and afterward Jansenius, supposed. Against this opinion Scotus rightly argues (II *Sent.* d. 32, q. unica, n. 5); and it is altogether foreign to the opinion of the principal Scholastics and of St. Bonaventure, as is manifested throughout this whole distinction (cf. St. Thomas, *de Malo*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 9, and a. 3).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 106, m. 7, a. 3, § 3. — Scotus, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. 1.2, q. 83, a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` raw 51954–52078), with the cascade-shattered Respondeo, Ad obiecta, scholion, and footers reflowed column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{745,746,747}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (printed 745–747 = pdf 767–769), confirmed by running heads `DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` (top of p.747) and page numbers 746/747.

**Page span / structure.** Q3 opens mid-**p.745** (q2's scholion + commentator roll occupy the top of p.745; the `QUAESTIO III.` header sits below). Affirmative fundamenta 1–5 and the *Sed contra* 1–3 (opening) are on p.745; *Sed contra* 3 (continuation), 4, the *Iuxta hoc* connexed sub-question, the Conclusio, the Respondeo, and replies 1–4 (through "delectatio concupiscentiae") are on p.746; the tail of reply 4, plus the SCHOLION (parts I–II) closing ARTICULUS I, are on p.747. Note Bonaventure's own argument-numbering: the affirmative pars runs 1–5, and the *Sed contra* runs 1–4 (the p.746 marginalia "Quaestio connexa duplex" attaches to the *Iuxta hoc* clause, which folds the two connexed sub-questions into the body — not a separate quaestio). Reply numbering 1–4 answers the four *Sed contra* arguments.

**Apparatus / page-split map (12 entries).**
- **p.745 footer = `[^1]`–`[^6]` (6 notes), RECEIVED from a1-q2.** This page's footer block annotates q3's opening fundamenta and *Sed contra* (a1-q2 forwarded all p.745 footers because q2's Solutio replies on p.745 carry no markers). Anchors in body reading order: `[^1]` matrimonii (fund. 3), `[^2]` Sapientiae undecimo (Sed contra 1), `[^3]` ex carne (Sed contra 3), `[^4]` extremorum (Sed contra 4), `[^5]` tactus illius / de corruptione (Iuxta hoc), `[^6]` seminis administrativa (Respondeo, Ratio 1). NB the OCR raw read "vide supra d. 26. q. 3" but the 450dpi PDF (`vol2-p745-L-2.png`) reads "q. 5" — corrected per PDF authority.
- **p.746 footer = `[^7]`–`[^12]` (6 notes).** Left footer 1–3 = `[^7]` (Aristot. Polit. IV), `[^8]` (Codd. seminis/vis), `[^9]` (Aristot. de Anima II/III — long note continuing into right footer); right footer = `[^10]` (Aristot. de Anima text 101), `[^11]` (Cod. cc quae), `[^12]` (Quaest. praeced.). Anchors: `[^7]` sensibile (Respondeo, Ratio 2), `[^8]` inter alios (Respondeo, gustus), `[^9]` Et cum (reply 2), `[^10]` praedictum est supra (reply 3), `[^11]` quae (Respondeo, Ratio 1 — "illa vis, quae est illius seminis administrativa"), `[^12]` administrativa (Respondeo, Ratio 1, same clause). (NB: `[^11]` "Cod. cc et ed. 1 *quae*, scil. potentia" = printed p.746 footer ⁵, anchored at the word *quae* in "illa vis, quae est illius seminis administrativa"; `[^12]` "Quaest. praeced." = printed p.746 footer ⁶, the editors' cross-reference following the ⁵ marker, anchored at the close of the same Ratio-1 clause. Both now carry inline body anchors in Latin and English at the printed-marker positions — resolved 2026-05-31 polish.)
- **p.747 footer: NONE.** The p.747 body (Respondeo tail + SCHOLION I–II) carries no footnote markers — verified against `vol2-p747-{L,R}-0.png`.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a1-q2: entire p.745 footer block (= `[^1]`–`[^6]`). FORWARDED to a2-q1: NONE — ARTICULUS II opens at the top of p.747 (raw 52079, after the q3 scholion), and the p.747 page carries no footer notes, so there is no shared-page footer to split.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true` — q3 has its own scholion (parts I–II), closing ARTICULUS I; translated in full. Part I treats the *morbidus affectus* / *qualitas morbida* dispute (Scotus contra the antiqui Scholastici and Jansenius); part II is the commentator roll. (This is the article-closing roll; per Override §5 a missing scholion would have been normal here, but q3 in fact carries one.)

**Cascade-dropout check.** Verified the Respondeo, Ad obiecta, and scholion against the PDF column bands. The IA OCR cascade-shattered both columns of pp.746–747 (interleaved fragments + the marginal labels "Conclusio", "Ratio 1/2", "Solutio oppositorum", "Distinctio", "Notandum", "Quaestio connexa duplex" bleeding inline), but no body text or footnote was dropped at the column seams. The fundamentum numbering 1–5 (affirmative) and 1–4 (Sed contra) is continuous; the Respondeo opening sentence is grammatically continuous with q3's Conclusio; the closing sentence ("…patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur.") parses cleanly before the SCHOLION header. Reply numbering 1–4 matches the four Sed contra arguments.

**[?] flags.** None.