title: Dist. 35, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXXV)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXV)

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

**Dub. I.** In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione, quam primo ponit: *Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei.* Videtur enim dicere falsum. Aut enim hoc intelligitur *disiunctive*, aut *subdisiunctive*[^1]. Si *subdisiunctive*: ergo membra non possunt simul stare: ergo nullum idem peccatum est concupitum et factum; sed hoc falsum est, quia omne peccatum factum est concupitum[^2]. — Item, videtur, quod non conveniat *omni* peccato, quia peccatum omissionis nec est factum nec concupitum nec dictum: ergo videtur, quod male sit assignata, quia non convenit omni peccato mortali actuali.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedicta definitio est peccati *actualis* et *mortalis.* Pro hoc, quod est peccati *actualis*, dicitur, quod est *dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum*, secundum triplicem actum, videlicet potentiae *interpretativae* et *operativae* et *affectivae*, quae omnes sunt potentiae quodam modo motivae. Secundum quod est *mortale*, dicitur, quod est *contra legem Dei*; et sic convenit omni et soli. Omni, quia omne peccatum actuale aut est concupitum tantum, aut est concupitum et exterius consummatum, et hoc vel per verbum, vel per opus. Soli vero convenit, quia non convenit veniali, cum non sit *contra legem Dei*[^3]; nec originali, cum non sit *dictum, vel factum.* — Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum vel teneatur ibi *disiunctive*, vel *subdisiunctive*; dicendum, quod *disiunctive*; sed ultimum membrum intelligendum est cum praecisione; reliqua vero minime. Unde sensus est, quod omne peccatum aut est dictum et concupitum, aut factum et concupitum, aut concupitum tantum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de peccato omissionis, dicendum, quod omne peccatum, sicut vult Augustinus[^4], radicem habet amorem malum; et ideo, quamvis in peccato omissionis sit privatio alicuius actus principalis; quia tamen illa privatio ortum habet ex amore alicuius boni commutabilis — quod patet, quia aliquis non vult ad matutinas surgere, quia vult in lecto quiescere — ideo peccatum omissionis cadit sub hoc membro, quod dicitur *concupitum*[^5].

**Dub. II.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Peccatum est voluntas retinendi, vel assequendi quod iustitia vetat.* Aliquod enim est peccatum, in quo aliquis nec vult aliquid retinere nec aliquid assequi, immo potius intendit destruere, sicut est in ira et odio et invidia. — Item, velle assequi quod iustitia vetat, vel retinere, hoc est avaritiae vel rapinae: ergo omne peccatum erit rapina.

Est igitur quaestio, cum peccata ita bene sint contra alias virtutes, sicut contra iustitiam: quare magis definitur peccatum per oppositum[^6] ad iustitiam, quam per oppositum ad virtutes alias?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus[^7] definit peccatum per illud quod est radix omnis mali; hoc autem est amor libidinosus. Et quoniam omnis amor libidinosus vel est rei habitae, vel habendae, et hoc praeter ordinem et regulam legis aeternae; ideo dicit, quod peccatum est voluntas assequendi, vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, ita quod describit amorem inordinatum, qui est radix omnis peccati, et per *id ad quod* est, et per *id contra quod* est.

Quod ergo obiicitur de ira et odio, dicendum, quod etsi ibi sit detestatio consequens, est tamen ibi delectatio antecedens, et propterea continetur sub hac assignatione.

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Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc omne peccatum erit rapina; dicendum, quod *assecutio* ibi stat non solummodo pro cupiditate rerum terrenarum, immo etiam cuiuslibet appetibilis: *iustitia* vero non tantum ibi stat, prout est *cardinalis* virtus, sed prout est virtus *generalis*, quae omnes virtutes complectitur, et cui omnia vitia opponuntur[^8].

**Dub. III.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In utraque assignatione de actuali peccato agitur et mortali, non veniali.* Videtur enim, quod male fiat assignatio peccati. Si enim recta descriptio vel assignatio debeat convenire omni descripto[^9]; et praedictae definitiones non conveniant omni peccato: ergo non recte assignantur. Si tu dicas, quod peccatum non dicitur de eis *univoce*, sed *aequivoce; contra*: quae conveniunt in causa et effectu, habent *univocationem*[^10]. Sed omne genus peccati ortum habet ex peccato Adae, tam originale quam actuale quam etiam veniale; omnia etiam genera peccatorum in hoc conveniunt, quod animam reddunt dignam poena et privant ab ea aliquod bonum, quod est iustitia, vel ad iustitiam ordinatum: ergo videtur, quod de eis *univoce* dicatur peccatum; et si hoc: ergo videtur, quod una ratio communis debeat assignari de peccato, prout dicitur de his omnibus generibus.

Est igitur quaestio, utrum contingat unam communem rationem assignare omni generi peccati; hoc est quaerere, utrum peccatum de eis dicatur *univoce.* Et si tu dicas, quod sic; in contrarium est, quia quae univocantur in aliquo habent *proportionem*[^11]: sed mortalis et venialis nulla est proportio: ergo nec univocatio. — Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod praedictae assignationes non conveniunt peccato veniali. Veniale enim peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, et contra legem Dei, sicut dicitur ad Romanos septimo[^12] super illud: *Non concupisces*, Glossa: «Bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet»; ergo venialia prohibentur a lege Dei, sunt igitur contra legem Dei: ergo praedicta ratio convenit veniali.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod peccatum, prout dicitur de originali, actuali mortali et veniali, nec dicitur omnino *univoce* nec dicitur omnino *aequivoce*, sed quasi *medio modo*, scilicet *analogice.* Ratio enim culpabilitatis primo et principaliter reperitur in peccato actuali mortali, et consequenter in originali, et postremo in veniali; et ideo notificationes, quae dantur de peccato *simpliciter*, potissime referuntur ad peccatum actuale mortale, quod est peccatum simpliciter.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa quae obiiciuntur. Nam ex hoc, quod illa tria genera peccatorum conveniunt in causa et in effectu, non concluditur, quod peccatum dicatur de eis *univoce*, sed *analogice*, quia in his non communicant aequaliter, sed secundum prius et posterius.

Et ideo cum quaeritur, utrum possit una communis ratio assignari, dicendum, quod potest una assignari ratio, quae conveniat eis secundum prius et posterius, et ita secundum communitatem *analogice*, utpote si dicatur, quod peccatum est meritum poenae vel privatio boni. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nulla est proportio; dicendum, quod etsi nulla est proportio quantum ad commensurationem quantitatis demeriti, est tamen proportio inter veniale et mortale secundum consimilem comparationem et ad originem et ad effectum consequentem.

**Dub. IV.** Item quaeritur de alia definitione Ambrosii, quam ponit: *Peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum.* Videtur enim, quod haec ratio non conveniat omni peccato. Quaedam enim, ut dicit Augustinus[^13], sunt *mala, quia prohibita*; quaedam *prohibita, quia mala*: ergo si nulla esset lex, nec aliqua praecepta data, adhuc essent peccata: non ergo omne peccatum est praevaricatio legis etc. — Item, sicut obedientia distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus, ita inobedientia ab aliis vitiis: ergo male definitur omne peccatum per inobedientiam. — Item, ita peccat qui non obedit praelato, sicut qui non obedit Deo: ergo non tantum est peccatum inobedientia caelestium praeceptorum, sed etiam terrenorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *lex* aliquando accipitur *stricte* pro lege scripta vel data; aliquando *large*, prout comprehendit legem naturae et legem Scripturae et legem gratiae. Et in praedicta notificatione lex accipitur *large.*

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Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia, dicendum, quod obedientia dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, prout dicit observantiam mandatorum Dei, et sic est communis omnibus virtutibus; alio modo, prout specialiter considerat rationem praecepti, et sic est virtus divisa ab aliis, quia potissime habet usum suum in his quae ideo sunt bona, quia praecepta. Et sic obedientia dupliciter accipitur, scilicet *large* et *stricte*, et in praedicta notificatione accipitur *large.* — Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia praelati, dicendum, quod totum pendet ex mandato Dei, quia Deus mandat, quod obediatur homini[^14].

**Dub. V.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non consistente peccato, virtus fortasse non esset.* Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia, si non esset culpa, purior esset caritas: ergo virtus perfectior et verior. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non asserit, sed sub dubitatione dicit; *contra*: ita falsum dicit qui certum proponit ut dubium, sicut qui dubium asserit ut certum.

Et dicendum, quod in illo verbo non ponitur nec significatur virtus non esse, non existente malitia, sed hoc significatur, quod non ita appareret, sicut nunc apparet; et ideo dicit: *fortassis non esset*, id est, non cognosceretur ita esse.

**Dub. VI.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in illo capitulo[^15]: *Potest etiam quaeri, quod peccatum est privatio sive corruptio boni.* Si enim privatio et positio opponuntur, et peccatum recte definitum est supra: *peccatum est dictum, vel factum* etc.: ergo male definitur per privationem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum unius rei una sit definitio: unde est hoc, quod peccatum ita multipliciter et varie definitur a Sanctis? Quaeritur etiam, penes quid illae definitiones distinguantur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de peccato est loqui *formaliter*, et est loqui *materialiter*, scilicet ratione substrati. Et quia, *formaliter* loquendo, privatio est, *materialiter* vero loquendo substernit sibi actum; ideo aliquando definitur per *privationem*, aliquando per *positionem*, quia quaedam sunt *formales* definitiones, quaedam *materiales*; et utroque modo multipliciter.

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Si enim consideremus peccatum, secundum quod dicit *privationem*, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut in quantum *simpliciter*[^16] dicit recessum *a bono*, aut in quantum dicit recessum *a rectitudine naturae*, aut in quantum dicit recessum *ab omnis boni complemento et perfectione.*

Primo modo sumitur definitio triplex ab Augustino, quae omnes idem circumloquuntur diversis verbis, quarum prima sumitur in libro de Civitate Dei[^17], et est haec: «Peccatum est absentia boni, ubi debet esse». — Secunda, de libro de Vera Religione: «Peccatum non est appetitio naturarum malarum, sed desertio meliorum». — Tertia, de libro de Natura boni: «Peccatum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis».

Secundo modo, scilicet prout peccatum dicit recessum *a rectitudine naturae*, inveniuntur tres definitiones, quae idem circumloquuntur, quamvis aliter et aliter; quarum una est Damasceni[^18], quae est: «Peccatum est ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam aversio». — Alia est Anselmi: «Peccatum est carentia debitae iustitiae». — Tertia est Augustini: «Peccatum est defectus quidam a luce veritatis, naturam non perimens, sed obscurans».

Tertio vero modo, videlicet prout dicit recessum *ab omnis boni complemento et perfectione*, sic reperitur triplex definitio, quae differt solo dicendi modo, quarum prima sumitur ab Augustino in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^19]: «Malum est aversio a bono incommutabili». — Altera vero ab eodem, in libro de Vera Religione: «Peccatum est carere bonis incommutabilibus, quibus fruendum est.» — Tertia sumitur ab eodem Augustino: «Peccatum est tenebra intelligibilis»; hoc enim dictum est, in quantum privat a visione lucis aeternae. — Hae omnes sunt notificationes peccati quasi *formales.*

Sunt et aliae notificationes, quae concernunt *actum substratum.* Et istae variantur secundum triplicem considerationem peccati, quam habet sub hac ratione: aut videlicet ad *Deum*, quem offendit; aut ad *virtutem*, quam excludit; aut ad *bonum ut nunc*, quod praetendit.

Si in comparatione ad *Deum*, quem offendit, sic est triplex, quarum una accipitur ab Augustino, in libro contra Manichaeos[^20]: «Peccatum est in veritatis praeceptis, vel in ipsa veritate errare». — Alia ab Ambrosio, in libro de Paradiso: «Peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia praeceptorum». — Tertia ab eodem Augustino, et habetur in littera: «Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei».

Secundo modo, scilicet per comparationem ad *virtutem*, quam excludit, sic reperitur triplex definitio, quarum una sumta est a Basilio[^21]: «Peccatum est dispositio animae contrarie se habens ad virtutem». — Secunda ab Augustino, in libro de Duabus Animabus: «Peccatum est voluntas retinendi, vel assequendi quod iustitia vetat»; accipitur enim ibi iustitia *generaliter*, prout omnem virtutem complectitur. — Tertia ab eodem Augustino, in libro de Vera Religione: «Peccatum est appetere quae Christus contempsit, vel contemnere quae Christus appetiit». Nam Christus fuit omnis virtutis speculum et exemplar.

Tertio modo, scilicet per comparationem ad *bonum*, quod praetendit, similiter invenitur triplex assignatio re conveniens, licet differat modo dicendi, quarum una est ab Augustino, in libro de Civitate Dei[^22]: «Peccatum est male uti bono». — Secunda vero, in libro de Trinitate: «Peccatum est uti fruendis et frui utendis»; et similiter in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum. — Tertia est eiusdem Augustini, in libro de Libero Arbitrio: «Peccatum est, spreto incommutabili bono, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere».

Fortassis autem et aliae notificationes ab istis duodeviginti poterunt reperiri. Nam duae aliae sunt, quae videntur circumloqui peccatum secundum utramque acceptionem, ut est illa: *Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni*[^23]. Et illa: *Peccatum est meritum poenae aeternae.* — Et sic in universo sunt viginti.

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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which he first sets down: *Sin is a thing said, or done, or desired against the law of God.* For it seems to say what is false. For either this is understood *disjunctively*, or *subdisjunctively*[^1]. If *subdisjunctively*: then the members cannot stand together: therefore no one and the same sin is both desired and done; but this is false, because every sin done is desired[^2]. — Likewise, it seems that it does not suit *every* sin, because the sin of omission is neither done nor desired nor said: therefore it seems that it is badly assigned, because it does not suit every actual mortal sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid definition is of *actual* and *mortal* sin. For that which belongs to *actual* sin, it is said to be *a thing said, or done, or desired*, according to the threefold act, namely of the *interpretative* and *operative* and *affective* power, which are all in a certain manner motive powers. Insofar as it is *mortal*, it is said to be *against the law of God*; and thus it suits all and only [such sins]. All, because every actual sin is either only desired, or is both desired and outwardly consummated, and this either by word or by deed. And it suits only [such], because it does not suit the venial [sin], since this is not *against the law of God*[^3]; nor original [sin], since this is not *a thing said, or done.* — To that which is asked, whether it is to be held there *disjunctively* or *subdisjunctively*; it must be said, *disjunctively*; but the last member is to be understood with precision, the rest by no means. Hence the sense is, that every sin is either said and desired, or done and desired, or only desired.

But to that which is objected concerning the sin of omission, it must be said that every sin, as Augustine holds[^4], has for its root an evil love; and therefore, although in the sin of omission there is the privation of some principal act; yet because that privation takes its origin from the love of some changeable good — which is plain, because someone is unwilling to rise for matins, because he wishes to rest in bed — therefore the sin of omission falls under this member, which is called *desired*[^5].

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Sin is the will of retaining, or of obtaining, that which justice forbids.* For there is some sin in which one neither wishes to retain anything nor to obtain anything, but rather intends to destroy, as is the case in anger and hatred and envy. — Likewise, to wish to obtain or to retain that which justice forbids, this belongs to avarice or to rapine: therefore every sin will be rapine.

There is therefore a question, since sins are as much against the other virtues as against justice: why is sin rather defined by what is opposed[^6] to justice, than by what is opposed to the other virtues?

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine[^7] defines sin by that which is the root of all evil; but this is libidinous love. And since all libidinous love is either of a thing possessed or to be possessed, and this apart from the order and rule of the eternal law; therefore he says that sin is the will of obtaining, or of retaining, that which justice forbids, so that he describes the inordinate love, which is the root of all sin, both by *that toward which* it is, and by *that against which* it is.

As for that, then, which is objected concerning anger and hatred, it must be said that although there is there a consequent detestation, yet there is there an antecedent delight, and therefore it is contained under this assignation.

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To that which is objected, that then every sin will be rapine; it must be said that *obtaining* there stands not only for the cupidity of earthly things, but indeed of any appetible whatever: but *justice* does not there stand only insofar as it is the *cardinal* virtue, but insofar as it is the *general* virtue, which embraces all the virtues, and to which all vices are opposed[^8].

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In each assignation it is treated of actual and mortal sin, not venial.* For it seems that the assignation of sin is badly made. For if a right description or assignation ought to suit everything described[^9]; and the aforesaid definitions do not suit every sin: then they are not rightly assigned. If you say that sin is not said of them *univocally*, but *equivocally; on the contrary*: things which agree in cause and effect have *univocation*[^10]. But every genus of sin takes its origin from the sin of Adam, both original and actual and also venial; all the genera of sins also agree in this, that they render the soul worthy of punishment and deprive it of some good, which is justice, or ordered to justice: therefore it seems that sin is said of them *univocally*; and if this: then it seems that one common account ought to be assigned of sin, insofar as it is said of all these genera.

There is therefore a question, whether it happens that one common account may be assigned to every genus of sin; that is to ask, whether sin is said of them *univocally.* And if you say that yes; on the contrary it stands, because things which are univocated in something have a *proportion*[^11]: but between mortal and venial there is no proportion: therefore neither univocation. — Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that the aforesaid assignations do not suit venial sin. For venial sin is a thing said, or done, or desired, and against the law of God, as it is said in Romans seven[^12] upon that text: *You shall not covet*, Gloss: «The law is good, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils»; therefore venial [sins] are forbidden by the law of God, they are therefore against the law of God: therefore the aforesaid account suits the venial [sin].

**I respond:** It must be said that sin, insofar as it is said of original, actual mortal, and venial [sin], is neither said altogether *univocally* nor said altogether *equivocally*, but as it were in a *middle manner*, namely *analogically.* For the formal character of culpability is found first and principally in actual mortal sin, and consequently in original [sin], and lastly in venial [sin]; and therefore the notifications which are given of sin *simply* are most of all referred to actual mortal sin, which is sin simply.

And by this the answer to those things which are objected becomes plain. For from this, that those three genera of sins agree in cause and in effect, it is not concluded that sin is said of them *univocally*, but *analogically*, because in these they do not communicate equally, but according to prior and posterior.

And therefore when it is asked whether one common account can be assigned, it must be said that one account can be assigned which suits them according to prior and posterior, and thus according to the *analogical* commonness, as for instance if it be said that sin is the meriting of punishment or the privation of good. — To that, then, which is objected, that there is no proportion; it must be said that although there is no proportion with regard to the commensuration of the quantity of demerit, yet there is a proportion between venial and mortal according to a like comparison both to the origin and to the consequent effect.

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about the other definition of Ambrose, which he sets down: *Sin is the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience to the heavenly commandments.* For it seems that this account does not suit every sin. For some things, as Augustine says[^13], are *evil because forbidden*; some *forbidden because evil*: therefore if there were no law, nor any precepts given, there would still be sins: therefore not every sin is the transgression of a law, etc. — Likewise, just as obedience is distinguished from the other virtues, so disobedience [is distinguished] from the other vices: therefore every sin is badly defined by disobedience. — Likewise, he sins who does not obey a prelate, just as he who does not obey God: therefore sin is not only the disobedience to the heavenly precepts, but also to the earthly.

**I respond:** It must be said that *law* is sometimes taken *strictly* for the written or given law; sometimes *broadly*, insofar as it comprehends the law of nature and the law of Scripture and the law of grace. And in the aforesaid notification law is taken *broadly.*

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To that which is objected concerning obedience, it must be said that obedience is taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it bespeaks the observance of the commandments of God, and thus it is common to all the virtues; in another way, insofar as it specially considers the formal character of precept, and thus it is a virtue divided from the others, because it has its use most of all in those things which are good for the reason that they are commanded. And thus obedience is taken in two ways, namely *broadly* and *strictly*, and in the aforesaid notification it is taken *broadly.* — To that which is objected concerning obedience to a prelate, it must be said that the whole depends on the commandment of God, because God commands that one obey man[^14].

**Doubt V.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Sin not existing, virtue perhaps would not be.* For it seems to say what is false, because, if there were no fault, charity would be purer: therefore virtue more perfect and truer. If you say that he does not assert this, but says it under doubt; *on the contrary*: he speaks as falsely who proposes what is certain as doubtful, as he who asserts what is doubtful as certain.

And it must be said that in that word it is neither posited nor signified that virtue does not exist, malice not existing, but this is signified, that it would not so appear as it now appears; and therefore he says: *perhaps it would not be*, that is, it would not be known to be so.

**Doubt VI.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says in that chapter[^15]: *It can also be asked, since sin is the privation or corruption of good.* For if privation and position are opposed, and sin was rightly defined above: *sin is a thing said, or done* etc.: then it is badly defined by privation.

In connection with this it is asked, since of one thing there is one definition: whence is it, that sin is so manifoldly and variously defined by the Saints? It is also asked, by what those definitions are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that of sin one may speak *formally*, and one may speak *materially*, namely by reason of the substratum. And because, speaking *formally*, it is a privation, but speaking *materially* it spreads beneath itself an act; therefore it is sometimes defined by *privation*, sometimes by *position*, because some definitions are *formal*, some *material*; and in each way manifoldly.

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For if we consider sin insofar as it bespeaks *privation*, this can be in three ways: either insofar as it *simply*[^16] bespeaks a withdrawal *from good*, or insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal *from the rectitude of nature*, or insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal *from the completion and perfection of all good.*

In the first manner is taken a threefold definition from Augustine, which all express the same thing in different words, of which the first is taken in the book *On the City of God*[^17], and is this: «Sin is the absence of good, where it ought to be». — The second, from the book *On True Religion*: «Sin is not the appetite of evil natures, but the desertion of better ones». — The third, from the book *On the Nature of Good*: «Sin is the corruption of measure, species, and order».

In the second manner, namely insofar as sin bespeaks a withdrawal *from the rectitude of nature*, three definitions are found, which express the same thing, though in different ways; of which one is of Damascene[^18], which is: «Sin is the turning-away from that which is according to nature into that which is beside nature». — Another is of Anselm: «Sin is the lack of due justice». — The third is of Augustine: «Sin is a certain defect from the light of truth, not destroying nature, but obscuring it».

In the third manner, namely insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal *from the completion and perfection of all good*, there is found a threefold definition, which differs only in the manner of speaking, of which the first is taken from Augustine in the book *On Free Choice*[^19]: «Evil is a turning-away from the unchangeable good». — The other from the same, in the book *On True Religion*: «Sin is to be without the unchangeable goods, which are to be enjoyed.» — The third is taken from the same Augustine: «Sin is an intelligible darkness»; for this was said insofar as it deprives [one] of the vision of the eternal light. — All these are as it were *formal* notifications of sin.

There are also other notifications, which concern the *underlying act.* And these vary according to the threefold consideration of sin, which it has under this aspect: namely either to *God*, whom it offends; or to *virtue*, which it excludes; or to *the good as now*, which it puts forward.

If in comparison to *God*, whom it offends, thus it is threefold, of which one is taken from Augustine, in the book *Against the Manichees*[^20]: «Sin is to err in the precepts of truth, or in the truth itself». — Another from Ambrose, in the book *On Paradise*: «Sin is the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience to the heavenly precepts». — The third from the same Augustine, and it is had in the text: «Sin is a thing said, or done, or desired against the law of God».

In the second manner, namely by comparison to *virtue*, which it excludes, there is found a threefold definition, of which one is taken from Basil[^21]: «Sin is a disposition of the soul holding itself contrarily to virtue». — The second from Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*: «Sin is the will of retaining, or of obtaining, that which justice forbids»; for justice is there taken *generally*, insofar as it embraces every virtue. — The third from the same Augustine, in the book *On True Religion*: «Sin is to desire those things which Christ despised, or to despise those things which Christ desired». For Christ was the mirror and exemplar of every virtue.

In the third manner, namely by comparison to *the good* which it puts forward, there is likewise found a threefold assignation agreeing in reality, although it differs in the manner of speaking, of which one is from Augustine, in the book *On the City of God*[^22]: «Sin is to use a good badly». — The second, in the book *On the Trinity*: «Sin is to use the things to be enjoyed and to enjoy the things to be used»; and likewise in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions.* — The third is of the same Augustine, in the book *On Free Choice*: «Sin is, the unchangeable good being spurned, to cleave to changeable things».

But perhaps still other notifications beyond these eighteen will be able to be found. For there are two others, which seem to express sin according to either acceptation, as is that one: *Sin is an act befalling from the defect of good*[^23]. And that one: *Sin is the meriting of eternal punishment.* — And thus in all there are twenty.

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la: Priscian., XVI. Grammat. c. 1: *Disiunctivae* [coniunctiones] *sunt quae, quamvis dictiones coniungant, sensum tamen disiunctum habent, et alteram quidem rem esse, alteram vero non esse significant, ut* ve, vel, aut... [v. g.] vel dies est, vel nox... *Subdisiunctivae sunt quae voce disiunctivarum utrumque tamen esse significant vel simul, ut copulativae, vel discrete. Simul, ut Terentius in Eunucho:* «Vel rex semper maximas mihi gratias agebat», *pro:* etiam rex... *Discrete, utrumque tamen esse significat, ut:* tota die vel legit iste, vel cogitat; *significat enim et legere et cogitare, sed non simul utrumque facere, sed aliis horis legere, aliis cogitare etc.* — Post *Aut enim hoc* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt *quod est, vel.* Mox pro *Si subdisiunctive* cod. cc et ed. 1 perperam *Si disiunctive.*

en: Priscian, *Grammar*, Bk. XVI, c. 1: *Disjunctive* [conjunctions] *are those which, although they conjoin words, yet have a disjoined sense, and signify that the one thing indeed is, but the other is not, as* ve, vel, aut [or]... [e.g.] vel dies est, vel nox [either it is day, or night]... *Subdisjunctive are those which, with the voice of disjunctives, yet signify that both are, either at once, like the copulatives, or separately. At once, as Terence in the* Eunuch: «Vel rex semper maximas mihi gratias agebat» [Even the king always gave me the greatest thanks], *for:* etiam rex [even the king]... *Separately, it yet signifies that both are, as:* tota die vel legit iste, vel cogitat [all day this man either reads or thinks]; *for it signifies both to read and to think, but not to do both at once, but at some hours to read, at others to think, etc.* — After *Aut enim hoc* the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add *quod est, vel.* Soon after, for *Si subdisiunctive* codex cc and edition 1 wrongly read *Si disiunctive.*

la: In cod. L a manu secunda, sed suppari adiectum est: *si disiunctive, ergo potest esse peccatum oris et operis sine peccato voluntatis, quod est falsum.* Aliquanto inferius post *assignata* cod. T supplet *definitio.*

en: In codex L, by a second hand, but of nearly the same age, there is added: *if disjunctively, then there can be a sin of mouth and of deed without a sin of will, which is false.* Somewhat below, after *assignata* codex T supplies *definitio.*

la: Codd. I O R X Z bb dd et alii cum ed. 1 *Per*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Secundum.*

en: Codices I, O, R, X, Z, bb, dd, and others with edition 1 read *Per*; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 *Secundum.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. below, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 22. n. 1. Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 7. n. 2; Enarrat. in Ps. 9. n. 15. et in Ps. 79. n. 13; de Gratia Christi contra Pelag. et Caelest. c. 20. n. 21.

en: *On the City of God*, Bk. XXII, c. 22, n. 1. Cf. ibid., Bk. XIV, c. 7, n. 2; *Enarrations on the Psalms*, on Ps. 9, n. 15, and on Ps. 79, n. 13; *On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius*, c. 20, n. 21.

la: Vide supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 107. m. 1. et q. 114. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3; S. Thom., hic a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. Locis hic citt. tanguntur etiam dubia, quae subsequuntur.

en: See above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 107, m. 1, and q. 114, m. 1; B. Albert, here, a. 3; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 3; St. Thomas, here, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 1, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 1. In the places here cited the doubts which follow are also touched upon.

la: Propter abbreviationem vocis *oppositum*, a librariis factam, in nonnullis codd. pro ea legi posset *oppositionem*, quam lectionem cod. bb hic et paulo inferius praebet.

en: On account of the abbreviation of the word *oppositum*, made by the scribes, in several codices in its place might be read *oppositionem*, which reading codex bb here and a little below presents.

la: Libr. de Duabus Animabus, c. 11. n. 13, unde textus huius dubii depromptus est.

en: The book *On the Two Souls*, c. 11, n. 13, whence the text of this doubt is drawn.

la: Huius dubii solutionem dant etiam S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: The solution of this doubt is also given by St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 1.

la: Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. Vide supra pag. 828, nota 2.

en: According to Aristotle, *Topics*, Bk. VI, c. 1. See above, p. 828, note 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. et tom. I. pag. 51, nota 11. — Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13: *Nam univocum omne, comparabile.* Cfr. VII. Physic. text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics*, Bk. VII, c. 1, and vol. I, p. 51, note 11. — Aristotle, *Topics*, Bk. I, c. 13: *For everything univocal is comparable.* Cf. *Physics*, Bk. VII, text 24 ff. (c. 4).

la: Vers. 7. De Glossa adiuncta vide supra pag. 721, nota 2. — Paulo superius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt *et* ante *contra.*

en: Verse 7. Concerning the adjoined Gloss see above, p. 721, note 2. — A little above, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 omit *et* before *contra.*

la: Cfr. quae Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6, de analogis profert, quae describens docet, quod *ab uno* sint, vel *ad unum* conferantur et quandam proportionem inter se habeant. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *analogiae.* Mox pro *vel* cod. cc et ed. 1 *et.* — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 4; B. Albert., hic a. 1. seq.; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4. a. 1. partic. 1. — Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 6: *Non sane ideo* [adulterium] *malum est, quia vetatur lege, sed ideo vetatur lege, quia malum est.*

en: Cf. what Aristotle, *Ethics*, Bk. I, c. 6, brings forward concerning analogous things, which in describing he teaches to be *from one*, or to be referred *to one* and to have a certain proportion among themselves. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 read *analogiae.* Soon after, for *vel* codex cc and edition 1 read *et.* — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 108, m. 4; B. Albert, here, a. 1 ff.; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4, a. 1, partic. 1. — *On Free Choice*, Bk. I, c. 3, n. 6: *It is not indeed for this reason that* [adultery] *is evil, because it is forbidden by law, but for this reason is it forbidden by law, because it is evil.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 2. et 3. Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 3. — Paulo superius plures codd., ut I bb cc ee, cum ed. 1 *Et sicut* pro *Et sic.* — Cfr. supra d. 29. a. 3. q. 2. — Vide August., de Mendacio, c. 3. n. 3. — Cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., dub. lit. 5.

en: Cf. below, d. 44, a. 2 and 3; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 3. — A little above, several codices, such as I, bb, cc, ee, with edition 1 read *Et sicut* for *Et sic.* — Cf. above, d. 29, a. 3, q. 2. — See Augustine, *On Lying*, c. 3, n. 3. — Cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, doubt on the text, 5.

la: Cap. 3. — Hic dub. 1. — Quod unius rei una tantum sit definitio, docet Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.).

en: Chapter 3. — Here, doubt 1. — That of one thing there is but one definition, Aristotle teaches, *Topics*, Bk. VI, c. 3 (c. 4).

la: Edd., excepta 1, abstulerunt hinc vocem *simpliciter* eamque posuerunt in tertio disiunctionis membro ante *recessum ab omnis boni.*

en: The editions, except the first, removed from here the word *simpliciter* and placed it in the third member of the disjunction before *recessum ab omnis boni.*

la: Libr. XI. c. 9. et 22, ubi S. Doctor malum amissionem sive privationem boni definit. Deinde c. 17. et XII. c. 1-9 ostendit, malum et vitium esse non posse, nisi in eis quibus adimendo bonum noceat naturae. Cfr. etiam XIX. c. 13. n. 2. — Secunda definitio est in libro de Vera Relig. c. 20. n. 38, ubi exposito, quod nulla substantia mala sit, sed omnis substantia bona; quodque duplex sit bonum, aeternum scil. et temporale etc, concluditur: «*Est igitur quoddam bonum, quod si diligit anima rationalis, peccat, quia infra illam ordinatum est; quare ipsum peccatum malum est, non ea substantia, quae peccando diligitur. Non ergo arbor illa malum est, quae in medio paradiso plantata scribitur, sed divini praecepti transgressio*» etc. Similiter in libro de Natura boni, c. 34. et 36. ait: *Peccatum vel iniquitas non est appetitio naturarum malarum, sed desertio meliorum.* Cfr. etiam Contra Secundinum Manich. c. 15, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8. — Tertia definitio est in libro de Natura boni, c. 4. — Pro *in libro de Civitate Dei* cod. W rectius *de libro de Civitate Dei.*

en: *On the City of God*, Bk. XI, c. 9 and 22, where the holy Doctor defines evil as the loss or privation of good. Then in c. 17 and Bk. XII, c. 1–9, he shows that evil and vice cannot be except in those things to which by taking away the good it harms nature. Cf. also Bk. XIX, c. 13, n. 2. — The second definition is in the book *On True Religion*, c. 20, n. 38, where, having explained that no substance is evil, but every substance is good, and that good is twofold, namely eternal and temporal, etc., it is concluded: «*There is therefore a certain good which, if the rational soul love it, it sins, because it is ordered beneath that [soul]; wherefore the sin itself is evil, not that substance which is loved in sinning. Therefore not that tree is the evil which is written to have been planted in the midst of paradise, but the transgression of the divine precept*» etc. Likewise in the book *On the Nature of Good*, c. 34 and 36, he says: *Sin or iniquity is not the appetite of evil natures, but the desertion of better ones.* Cf. also *Against Secundinus the Manichee*, c. 15, and Bk. XII *On the City of God*, c. 8. — The third definition is in the book *On the Nature of Good*, c. 4. — For *in libro de Civitate Dei* codex W more correctly *de libro de Civitate Dei.*

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 20. Cfr. etiam II. c. 30. et Dialog. contra Manich., ubi plures definitionum peccati, hic propositarum, explicantur. — Seq. Anselmi definitio est in libro de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et 6; vide supra pag. 722, nota 3. et pag. 816, nota 8. — Tertia Augustini definitio habetur Enarrat. in Ps. 58. serm. 1. n. 18, ubi inter alia haec: «*Est quaedam origo fonsque virtutis, est quaedam radix sapientiae, est quaedam, ut ita dicam, si et hoc dicendum est, regio incommutabilis veritatis; ab hac anima recedens tenebratur, accedens illuminatur*» etc. Ibid. in Ps. 7. n. 19; iam vero tenebris significari peccata et in Propheta invenitur... et in Apostolo dicente... *Abiiciamus opera tenebrarum et induamur arma lucis* (Rom. 13, 12.). Non quod aliqua sit natura tenebrarum. Omnis enim natura, in quantum natura est, *esse* cogitur; *esse* autem ad lucem pertinet, *non-esse* ad tenebras. Qui ergo deserit eum, a quo factus est, et inclinatur in id, unde factus est, id est in nihilum, in hoc peccato tenebratur, et tamen non penitus perit, sed in infimis ordinatur. Cfr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 9. et XII. c. 9, ubi S. Auctor de peccato angelorum tractans docet, istos aversione a luce aeterna et incommutabili factos esse tenebras. Cfr. et XIX. c. 13. n. 2.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, Bk. IV, c. 20. Cf. also Bk. II, c. 30, and the *Dialogue against the Manichees*, where several of the definitions of sin here proposed are explained. — The following definition of Anselm is in the book *On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin*, c. 3 and 6; see above, p. 722, note 3, and p. 816, note 8. — The third definition, of Augustine, is had in the *Enarrations on the Psalms*, on Ps. 58, sermon 1, n. 18, where among other things [is] this: «*There is a certain origin and fountain of virtue, there is a certain root of wisdom, there is, so to speak, if this too must be said, a certain region of unchangeable truth; from this the soul, withdrawing, is darkened, drawing near, is illumined*» etc. Ibid., on Ps. 7, n. 19; that indeed sins are signified by darkness is found both in the Prophet... and in the Apostle saying... *Let us cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light* (Rom. 13:12). Not that there is any nature of darkness. For every nature, insofar as it is nature, is compelled *to be*; but *to be* pertains to light, *not-to-be* to darkness. He therefore who deserts him by whom he was made, and is inclined into that whence he was made, that is into nothing, is darkened in this sin, and yet does not utterly perish, but is ordered among the lowest things. Cf. Bk. XI *On the City of God*, c. 9, and Bk. XII, c. 9, where the holy Author, treating of the sin of the angels, teaches that they were made darkness by a turning-away from the eternal and unchangeable light. Cf. also Bk. XIX, c. 13, n. 2.

la: Libr. I. c. 16. n. 35; II. c. 19. n. 53; III. c. 1. n. 2. — Secunda definitio eruitur ex iis quae c. 11-14 libri de Vera Relig. docentur de vita eiusque opposito, scil. morte, quae vocatur *nequitia* (quae vox, secundum quod ipse interpretatur, derivatur ab eo quod *ne quidquam* est), qua voluntas deficiendo ab eo cuius essentia fruenda est, et inhaerendo inferioribus tendit ad nihilum, unde privatur bonis incommutabilibus etc. — Tertia definitio, quae sententialiter potius quam verbotenus apud August. esse videtur, non ita intelligenda est, tanquam tenebrae peccati essent aliquid *in se* et *per se* intelligibile — hoc enim Augustinus expresse negat in Exposit. propos. ex Epist. ad Rom., propos. 43, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, afferens illud Ps. 81, 12: *Delicta quis intelligit?* — sed intelligenda est et in oppositione ad tenebras corporales, et in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo tenebrae sunt, scil. in substantiis intellectu praeditis. Nam in Gen. ad lit. imperf. lib. c. 5. n. 24. seq. distinguit triplicem lucem, scil. corporalem, sensualem et rationalem, eique contrarias triplices tenebras, scil. corporales, sensuales (cognitioni sensuum convenientes) et rationales, scil. ignorantia et peccata, quatenus afficiunt superiorem partem rationis, quae Deo et aeternis intendit et intelligentia vocatur. I. de Baptismo contra Donat. c. 11. n. 16. autem ait: «*Peccata enim tenebrae animarum sunt*», et Enarrat. in Ps. 17. n. 29: «*Nos enim peccatis nostris tenebrae sumus*». De voce *intelligibilis* dicta de materia cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 88. a. 1. ad 2. — Paulo superius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *differunt* pro *differt.*

en: Bk. I, c. 16, n. 35; Bk. II, c. 19, n. 53; Bk. III, c. 1, n. 2. — The second definition is drawn out from those things which are taught in c. 11–14 of the book *On True Religion* concerning life and its opposite, namely death, which is called *nequitia* ("worthlessness") (which word, according as he himself interprets it, is derived from this, that it is *ne quidquam*, "not anything"), by which the will, by failing from that whose essence is to be enjoyed, and by cleaving to lower things, tends toward nothing, whence it is deprived of the unchangeable goods, etc. — The third definition, which seems to be in Augustine sententially rather than word for word, is not to be understood as though the darkness of sin were something intelligible *in itself* and *through itself* — for this Augustine expressly denies in the *Exposition of Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans*, prop. 43, and Bk. XII *On the City of God*, c. 7, citing that text of Ps. 81:12: *Who understands his faults?* — but it is to be understood both in opposition to corporeal darkness, and in comparison to the subject in which the darkness is, namely in substances endowed with intellect. For in the *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, c. 5, n. 24 ff., he distinguishes a threefold light, namely corporeal, sensual, and rational, and contrary to it a threefold darkness, namely corporeal, sensual (corresponding to the cognition of the senses), and rational, namely ignorance and sins, insofar as they affect the higher part of the reason, which is intent upon God and eternal things and is called intelligence. But in Bk. I *On Baptism against the Donatists*, c. 11, n. 16, he says: «*For sins are the darkness of souls*», and *Enarrations on the Psalms*, on Ps. 17, n. 29: «*For we by our sins are darkness*». Concerning the word *intelligibilis* said of matter, cf. St. Thomas, *Summa*, I, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2. — A little above, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 read *differunt* for *differt.*

la: De Fide contra Manich. c. 8: *Peccare enim quid aliud est, nisi in veritatis praeceptis, vel in ipsa non stare veritate?* — Secunda definitio, ex Ambrosio allata, habetur in libro cit. c. 8. n. 39. — De tertia vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: *On Faith against the Manichees*, c. 8: *For what else is it to sin, than not to stand in the precepts of truth, or in the truth itself?* — The second definition, brought from Ambrose, is had in the book cited, c. 8, n. 39. — Concerning the third, see here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: In Hexaem. homil. 2. n. 4, ubi contra Manichaeos dicit: *Quid igitur dicimus? Quod malum non est substantia vivens aut animata, sed dispositio* (διάθεσις) *in anima contrarie se habens ad virtutem* etc. — Pro *Basilio* codd. 1 N Z ee et alii *Anselmo*, cod. A *Ambrosio.* — Secunda definitio invenitur loc. cit. c. 11. n. 15. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. In hac secunda definitione edd. praeter 1 cum pluribus codd. pro *retinendi* substituunt *recipiendi*, et textus origin. pro *assequendi* habet *consequendi.* — Tertia definitio sententialiter habetur loc. cit. c. 16. n. 31, ubi S. Doctor ait: *Non enim ullum peccatum committi potest, nisi aut dum appetuntur ea quae ille* [Christus] *contempsit, aut fugiuntur quae ille sustinuit.*

en: *On the Hexaemeron*, homily 2, n. 4, where against the Manichees he says: *What therefore do we say? That evil is not a living or animate substance, but a disposition* (διάθεσις) *in the soul holding itself contrarily to virtue* etc. — For *Basilio* codices 1, N, Z, ee and others read *Anselmo*; codex A *Ambrosio.* — The second definition is found in the place cited, c. 11, n. 15. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. In this second definition the editions except the first, with several codices, for *retinendi* substitute *recipiendi*, and the original text for *assequendi* has *consequendi.* — The third definition is had sententially in the place cited, c. 16, n. 31, where the holy Doctor says: *For no sin can be committed, except either when those things are desired which he* [Christ] *despised, or those are fled which he endured.*

la: Libr. XII. c. 8, ubi sententialiter habetur, S. Doctore docente, amorem perversum et inordinatum, non res ipsas, vitium constituere. Definitio ad verbum habetur in libr. de Natura boni, c. 36: *Malum est enim male uti bono.* — Secunda definitio innititur verbis X. de Trin., c. 10. n. 13. prolatis: «*Nec est alia vita hominum vitiosa atque culpabilis, quam male utens et male fruens*». Similia occurrunt in libr. 83 Qq. q. 30: *Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui.* — Tertia definitio exprimitur, II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53, his verbis: *Sed malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona.* — Paulo superius pro *re conveniens* Vat. *rei conveniens.*

en: *On the City of God*, Bk. XII, c. 8, where it is had sententially, the holy Doctor teaching that perverse and inordinate love, not the things themselves, constitutes vice. The definition is had word for word in the book *On the Nature of Good*, c. 36: *For evil is to use a good badly.* — The second definition rests on the words set forth in Bk. X *On the Trinity*, c. 10, n. 13: «*Nor is there another life of men, vicious and culpable, than [one] using badly and enjoying badly*». Similar things occur in the book *Of the 83 Questions*, q. 30: *And so all human perversion, which is also called vice, is to wish to use the things to be enjoyed and to enjoy the things to be used.* — The third definition is expressed, Bk. II *On Free Choice*, c. 19, n. 53, in these words: *But let evil be its turning-away from the unchangeable good and its turning toward changeable goods.* — A little above, for *re conveniens* the Vatican edition reads *rei conveniens.*

la: Hanc definitionem, quae Augustino tribuitur (cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVII. c. 1.), Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 107. m. 1.) sic enucleat: *Peccatum dicitur actus incidens, non quia casualiter incidat, sed quia non ex necessitate, sed contingenter provenit ex voluntate; in voluntate enim est peccare, vel non peccare... Defectus boni dicitur dupliciter: vel ut notet causam ipsius actus contingentis ex voluntate* (voluntas enim aliquando ex infirmitate, aliquando ex certa malitia peccat), *vel potest defectus boni dicere privationem quandam boni, quod est virtus, et secundum hoc haec praepositio* ex *non notat causam materialem, sed causam formalem, ut sit sensus: peccatum est actus deformatus.* — De Fide ad Petr. c. 21. n. 64. Fulgent. ait: *Unde constat, geminum esse creaturae rationalis malum: unum, quo voluntarie ipsa defecit a summo bono Creatore suo; alterum, quo invita punietur ignis aeterni supplicio; illud passura iuste, quia hoc admisit iniuste, et quae ordinem in se non servavit divinae institutionis, ordinem divinae non effugiet ultionis.* — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 2, q. 97. et q. 107. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3. et 8; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3; S. Thom., hic a. 2.

en: This definition, which is attributed to Augustine (cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XXXVII, c. 1), Alexander of Hales (*Summa*, p. II, q. 107, m. 1) thus unfolds: *Sin is called an act befalling, not because it befalls by chance, but because it comes forth not from necessity, but contingently from the will; for it is in the will to sin or not to sin... The defect of good is said in two ways: either so as to note the cause of the act itself contingent from the will* (for the will sometimes sins from weakness, sometimes from settled malice), *or the defect of good can bespeak a certain privation of good, which is virtue, and according to this the preposition* ex (from) *does not note a material cause, but a formal cause, so that the sense is: sin is a deformed act.* — *On Faith, to Peter*, c. 21, n. 64, Fulgentius says: *Whence it is clear that the evil of the rational creature is twofold: one, by which it itself voluntarily failed from the highest good, its Creator; the other, by which unwillingly it will be punished by the torment of eternal fire; the former it will suffer justly, because it admitted the latter unjustly, and that which did not keep in itself the order of the divine institution, will not escape the order of the divine vengeance.* — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 94, m. 2, q. 97, and q. 107, m. 1; B. Albert, here, a. 3 and 8; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 3; St. Thomas, here, a. 2.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 836–839 (PDF pp. 858–861, offset +22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 58179–58467). FINAL unit of DISTINCTIO XXXV — after this chunk **d.35 is fully Tier-2** (9 units: littera + divisio + a1-q1/q2/q3 + a2-q1/q2/q3 [a2-q3 was created from scratch] + dubia). The DUBIA opens at the top of p.836 L-col (header `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` immediately after a2-q3's closing scholion apparatus `…ad mentem S. Bonaventurae… II. Praeter locos…`) and closes at the bottom of p.839 R-col (*…Et sic in universo sunt viginti.*) immediately before DISTINCTIO XXXVI / Cap. I (which begins on p.840).

**Verified DUB count = 6 (I–VI)** at 450 dpi (the raw OCR interleaves the two columns and the apparatus audit reports ~40 footers, but the column-band PDF read confirms exactly six dubia headers `DUB. I`–`DUB. VI`):
- DUB. I — *Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei* (whether this definition is false / does not suit every sin; resolved: it is the definition of *actual mortal* sin — *dictum/factum/concupitum* per the triplex *potentia interpretativa/operativa/affectiva*, *contra legem Dei* per its mortality; held *disiunctive* with the last member taken *cum praecisione*; sin of omission falls under *concupitum* since its root is an evil love).
- DUB. II — *Peccatum est voluntas retinendi, vel assequendi quod iustitia vetat* (why sin is defined by opposition to *iustitia* rather than to other virtues; resolved: Augustine describes the *amor libidinosus* / inordinate love that is the root of all sin, taking *iustitia generaliter* for the general virtue embracing all virtues — so it is not all *rapina*).
- DUB. III — *In utraque assignatione de actuali peccato agitur et mortali, non veniali* (whether *peccatum* is said univocally / one common ratio can be assigned; resolved: said *analogice*, neither wholly *univoce* nor wholly *aequivoce* — *secundum prius et posterius*, principally of actual mortal sin).
- DUB. IV — *Peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum* (Ambrose's definition; resolved by the *lex large/stricte* and *obedientia large/stricte* distinctions; obedience to a prelate ultimately depends on God's mandate).
- DUB. V — *Non consistente peccato, virtus fortasse non esset* (whether the Master speaks falsely; resolved: the *verbum* signifies not that virtue would not exist without malice, but that it would not so *appear* — *non cognosceretur ita esse*).
- DUB. VI — *Potest etiam quaeri, quod peccatum est privatio sive corruptio boni* + the sub-question *cum unius rei una sit definitio, unde… peccatum ita multipliciter definitur* (with margin *Quaestiones duae*; resolved by the *formaliter/materialiter* distinction, generating the great catalogue of **20 definitions of sin**: privation [3 modes × 3 = 9 *formal* definitions] + substratum-act [ad Deum / ad virtutem / ad bonum = 9 *material*] + 2 mixed = 18 + 2 = 20).

**Page-split map.**
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- **p.837** (L-col + R-col): DUB. II tail (*assecutio/iustitia generalis*) + DUB. III (full) + DUB. IV (opener + Respondeo *lex large/stricte*); 9 footers → [^6]–[^12].
- **p.838** (L-col + R-col): DUB. IV tail (*obedientia*) + DUB. V (full) + DUB. VI (opener + *Iuxta hoc* sub-question + Respondeo *formaliter/materialiter* + start of definition catalogue); 9 footers → [^13]–[^15] (mostly long Augustine/Damascene/Anselm source-notes for the catalogue).
- **p.839** (L-col + R-col): DUB. VI definition catalogue (the 20 definitions) to *…Et sic in universo sunt viginti.*; 5 footers → [^16]–[^23].
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**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q3: none — the DUBIA opens fresh at the top of p.836 (a2-q3's apparatus closes immediately before the DUBIA header on the same page; a2-q3 retains its scholion footers). FORWARDED: none — the DUBIA closes the distinction; DISTINCTIO XXXVI opens fresh on p.840 with `Cap. I` and its own footer block.

**Cascade-dropout check.** All three internal page seams (836→837, 837→838, 838→839) read against the 450 dpi column bands and confirmed grammatically continuous with no mid-paragraph splice. The IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the DUB. VI definition catalogue (the *Modus 1/2/3* margins + the «Peccatum est…» quotation series) and interleaved the two columns; the body was reconstructed column-by-column from the PDF. No body text or footnote lost at the seams.

**has_scholion = false** — DUBIA chunks carry no scholion.

**[?] flags:** none. All six DUB bodies, both/all Respondeo opinions, the DUB. VI 20-definition catalogue, and the full p.836 (f1–8), p.837 (f1–9), p.838 (f1–9) and p.839 (f1–5) footer blocks were read against the 450 dpi column bands and parse cleanly.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 36

title_alt: Distinction XXXVI — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 840 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Quaedam simul sunt peccatum et poena peccati, quaedam peccatum et causa peccati, alia vero peccatum et causa et poena peccati.*

Sciendum est tamen, quaedam sic esse peccata, ut sint etiam poenae peccatorum. Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi quinquagesimi septimi[^1]: *Supercecidit ignis, et non viderunt solem*, ait: « Ignis superbiae et concupiscentiae et irae intelligitur. Istas poenas pauci vident; ideo eas maxime commemorat Apostolus in Epistola ad Romanos et enumerat multa, quae sunt peccata et poena peccati. Inter primum enim peccatum apostasiae et ultimam poenam ignis aeterni media quae sunt, et *peccata* sunt et *poena* peccati ». Gregorius quoque super Ezechielem[^2] ait: « Contemnenti, qui non vult poenitere, ponit Deus offendiculum, ut scilicet gravius impingat. Peccatum enim, quod per poenitentiam citius non deletur, aut *peccatum* est et *causa* peccati, aut *peccatum* et *poena* peccati, aut *peccatum* simul et *causa* et *poena* peccati. Unde Moyses: *Nondum sunt completa peccata Amorrhaeorum*; et David inquit: *Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum*; et alius Propheta: *Sanguis sanguinem tetigit*, id est, peccatum peccato additum est. Paulus quoque ait: *Propterea tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae* etc.; et item: *Ut impleant peccata sua semper*. Ioanni quoque per Angelum dicitur: *Qui in sordibus est sordescat adhuc* ». — Ex his testimoniis colligitur, peccatum aliquod et peccatum esse et poenam peccati.

#### Cap. II.

#### *An peccatum sit causa peccati, in quantum est peccatum.*

Et ideo merito quaeritur, utrum, in quantum peccatum est, sit poena peccati. — Quod non videtur, cum omnis poena peccati iusta sit. Unde Augustinus in libro Retractationum[^3]: « Omnis poena peccati iusta est et supplicium nominatur ». Si ergo peccatum, quod est peccatum et poena peccati, in quantum peccatum est, poena peccati est; cum omnis poena iusta de iustitia Dei veniat, videtur, in quantum peccatum est, iustum esse et a Deo provenire. — Ad quod illi respondent, peccatum sic dici poenam peccati, quia *per peccatum*, in quod merito praecedentis peccati homo labitur, deserente Deo, corrumpitur bona natura. Sicut ignis aeternus dicitur poena malorum, quia ea cruciantur; nec tamen ipse cruciatus malorum *ignis* est, sed *per ignem* fit in homine. Ita *per peccatum* corrumpitur natura, et imminuitur[^4] bonum naturae; et est ipsa imminutio et corruptio boni *passio* et *poena*; et non est *essentialiter* ipsum peccatum, per quod fit, sed ideo peccatum dicitur, ut praemissum est, quia per peccatum illico, ut peccat homo, fit in homine illa corruptio, quae tamen fit Deo auctore. Illa enim poena sive passio, quae est boni corruptio, a Deo est. Illius tamen, ut sic dicam, *materia* et *causa* est peccatum, quod a Deo non est[^5]. Quod videtur Augustinus notasse et iuxta hunc sensum intellexisse, cum ait in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum[^6]: « Praedestinatione Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturus. Sed praescivit Deus etiam quae non est ipse facturus, id est omnia mala, quia, etsi sunt quaedam, quae ita *peccata* sunt, ut etiam *poenae* sint peccati, secundum illud Apostoli: *Tradidit illos Deus in passiones* etc., non tamen peccatum Dei est, sed *iudicium* », scilicet poena. In Scriptura enim saepe nomine *iudicii* poena intelligitur. — Hic diligenter intendentibus insinuare videtur: ea quae peccata sunt et poenae peccati, non in quantum *peccata* sunt, sed in quantum *poenae*, Dei esse dicuntur[^7]. Nam cum dixisset, Deum non esse facturum mala aliqua, id est peccata; quia posset ei obiici, quaedam peccata esse etiam *poenas* peccati — et *poena* peccati omnis iusta est, et ideo a Deo est — quasi determinando, secundum quid faciat ea, vel secundum quid non faciat, addidit reliqua. Iuxta vero praedictam intelligentiam peccata sane dicuntur *poenae*. Unde Apostolus appellat ea *passiones ignominiae*, quia, ut ait auctoritas[^8], « licet quaedam peccata sint, quae delectant, sunt tamen passiones naturae non nominandae », quia per ea corrumpitur natura.

#### Cap. III.

#### *Quod non omne peccatum est poena peccati.*

Et licet ex hoc sensu omne peccatum mortale possit dici *poena*, non tamen omne[^9] potest dici *poena* peccati. Poena enim *peccati*, ut praedictum est, est illud cuius causa est aliud praecedens peccatum. Nam peccatum sic dicitur *poena* peccati respectu praecedentis, sicut dicitur *causa* peccati respectu sequentis. Quo fit, ut idem peccatum et *causa* sit et *poena* peccati, sed *alterius* peccati poena et *alterius* causa. Ut enim Gregorius in Moralibus[^10] ait: « Peccatum, quod poenitentia non diluitur, suo pondere mox ad aliud trahit. Unde

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fit, ut non solum *peccatum* sit, sed et *causa* peccati, ex illo quippe culpa subsequens oritur. Peccatum vero, quod ex peccato oritur, non solum peccatum, sed et *poena* peccati est, quia iusto iudicio Deus cor peccantis obnubilat, ut praecedentis peccati merito etiam in alia cadat. Quem enim liberare noluit deserendo percussit ». Proinde, ut Augustinus[^11] ait: « Praecedentis est haec *poena* peccati, et tamen etiam ipsa *peccatum* est ». « Iudicio enim iustissimi Dei *traditi sunt*, ut ait Apostolus de quibusdam — sive deserendo, sive alio modo explicabili, vel inexplicabili — *in passiones ignominiae*, ut crimina criminibus vindicarentur, et supplicia peccantium non tantum sint tormenta, sed et vitiorum incrementa ». Illa ergo peccata, quae enumerat Apostolus, quia de superbia sunt, non solum *peccata*, sed etiam *supplicia* sunt. — Ecce ex his iam fit perspicuum, quaedam peccata etiam *poenas* et *causas* peccati esse; et illud peccatum esse *poenam* peccati, quod causam praecedentem habet peccatum; atque illud peccatum esse *causam* peccati, quod est meritum sequentis culpae.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Utrum peccata aliqua essentialiter sint poenae peccati.*

Sed cum ait, crimina criminibus vindicari, videtur insinuare, ea ipsa, quae peccata sunt, *essentialiter* esse poenas peccati, id est punitiones peccati. Ad hoc autem inquiunt illi, haec et similia dicta esse secundum rationem praedictam, et ideo intelligenda fore secundum praemissam expositionem. « Intelligentia enim dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi »[^12]. In nullo tamen praeiudicium fieri veritati putatur, si quis dicat, ipsa eadem, quae peccata sunt, *essentialiter*, ut ita dicam, esse poenas, id est punitiones peccatorum praecedentium, quae iustae sunt et a Deo sunt. Nec tamen, in quantum *peccata*, a Deo sunt, nec in quantum *peccata* sunt, poenae peccati sunt; et tamen, in quantum *peccata* sunt, *privationes* boni sunt; sed ut supra[^13] dictum est, *causaliter* et *active* dicuntur privationes.

#### Cap. V.

#### *Quod, cum peccatum etiam sit poena peccati, peccatum est ab homine, poena a Deo.*

Quod autem quaedam peccata poenae sint, et ipsa poena iusta sit et a Deo sit, evidenter tradit Augustinus, in libro Retractationum primo[^14] dicens, quaedam necessitate fieri ab homine, quae mala sunt, et eadem iusta poena peccati sunt. « Sunt, inquit, quaedam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi homo vult recte facere et non potest. Unde est illud Apostoli: *Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago*. Et illud: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. Haec enim invicem sibi adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis*; sed haec omnia ex illa mortis damnatione sunt. Nam si non est ista poena hominis, sed *natura*, nulla ista peccata sunt. Si enim non receditur ab eo modo, quo naturaliter factus est homo, cum haec facit, ea utique facit, quae debet. Si autem homo, quia ita est, non est bonus nec habet in potestate, ut sit bonus — sive non videndo, qualis esse debeat, sive videndo et non valendo esse, qualem se esse debere videt — poenam istam esse, quis dubitet? Omnis autem *poena*, si peccati poena est, *iusta* est et *supplicium* nominatur. Si autem *iniusta* est poena — quoniam poenam esse, nemo ambigit — iniusto aliquo dominante homini imposita est. Porro, quia de omnipotentia[^15] Dei et iustitia dubitare dementis est, *iusta* est haec poena et pro peccato aliquo impenditur. Non enim quisquam iniuste dominans aut surripere hominem potuit, veluti ignoranti Deo, aut extorquere invito tanquam invalidiori, ut hominem iniusta poena cruciaret. Relinquitur ergo, ut haec poena iusta de damnatione hominis veniat ». — His atque aliis pluribus testimoniis docetur, quaedam esse peccata et poenas peccati essentialiter.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *De quibusdam, quae indubitanter peccata sunt et poenae, et in quantum eis patimur, peccata non sunt.*

Praeterea, nullatenus ambigendum est, quaedam peccata absque ullo scrupulo poenas esse, ut invidia, quae est dolor alieni boni, et ira, quae etiam, non in quantum poenae sunt, peccata sunt; ita etiam de cupiditate et timore et aliis huiusmodi sentiendum est. Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^16] ait: « Omnis perturbatio passio; omnis cupiditas perturbatio: omnis ergo cupiditas passio. Omnis vero passio cum est in nobis, ipsa passione patimur. Omnis igitur cupiditas cum est in nobis, ipsa cupiditate patimur[^17], et in quantum cupiditas est, patimur. Omnis autem passio, in quantum ipsa patimur, non est peccatum; ita et de timore. Non enim consequens est, ut, si patimur timorem, ideo non sit peccatum, quia multa sunt peccata, quae patimur, sed non in quantum patimur eis ».

Illud autem diligenter est annotandum, quod supra[^18] positis verbis Augustini dicentis, quaedam necessitate facta esse improbanda et mala, videtur obviare quod Hieronymus ait in Explanatione fidei[^19]; quod licet supra sit positum, tamen, ut perfectius sciatur, iterare non piget. « Exsecramur, inquit, eorum blasphemiam,

<!-- page 842 -->

qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo esse praeceptum, et mandata Dei non a singulis, sed ab omnibus in commune posse servari ». Et paulo post: « Et tam illos errare dicimus, qui cum Manichaeo dicunt, hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Ioviniano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare ». — Ecce Hieronymus dicit, errorem esse, si quis dicat, hominem vitare peccatum non posse. Qui autem dicit, quaedam necessitate fieri, quaedam dicit non posse vitari. Cum ergo id Augustinus dicat, videtur aut erroris esse quod tradit, aut non esse verum quod Hieronymus ait.

Ad quod dici potest, quia Augustinus secundum statum huius miseriae — ad quam pertinet ignorantia et difficultas, ut idem ait in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^20], quae ex iusta damnatione descenderunt — illud tradidit, ubi et venialia peccata inclusit. Hieronymus vero tantum de mortalibus peccatis loquitur, quae unusquisque, gratia illuminatus, vitare valet; vel de homine secundum statum liberi arbitrii ante peccatum illud ait.

Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam, qui dicunt, omnes actus *naturas*[^21] esse, et in quantum sunt, *bonos* esse. In quo tractatu quaedam interseruimus, quae non ex eorum tantum persona accipienda sunt, quia ab omnibus catholice sapientibus absque haesitatione tenentur; atque auctoritatum testimoniis et rationibus eorundem traditionem munivimus, qui dicunt, omnes actus essentia sui, id est, in quantum sunt, esse bonos, quosdam vero, in quantum inordinate fiunt, peccata esse. Addunt quoque, quosdam non tantum *essentia*, sed etiam *genere* bonos esse, ut reficere esurientem, qui actus est de genere operum[^22] misericordiae; quosdam vero actus absolute ac perfecte bonos dicunt, quos non solum *essentia* vel *genus*, sed etiam *causa* et *finis* commendat, ut sunt illi qui ex bona voluntate proveniunt et bonum finem metiuntur.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXVI.

#### Chapter I.

#### *Certain things are at once sin and the penalty of sin, certain ones sin and the cause of sin, and others sin and both the cause and the penalty of sin.*

It must be known, however, that certain things are so sins that they are also the penalties of sins. Whence Augustine, on that passage of the fifty-seventh Psalm[^1], *Fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun*, says: "It is understood of the fire of pride and concupiscence and anger. Few see these penalties; therefore the Apostle especially commemorates them in the Epistle to the Romans and enumerates many things which are sins and the penalty of sin. For between the first sin of apostasy and the last penalty of eternal fire, the things that are in between are both *sins* and the *penalty* of sin." Gregory too, on Ezekiel[^2], says: "On the one who despises and is unwilling to repent, God places a stumbling-block, that he may strike the more grievously. For sin which is not the sooner blotted out through penance is either *sin* and the *cause* of sin, or *sin* and the *penalty* of sin, or at once *sin* and the *cause* and the *penalty* of sin. Whence Moses: *The sins of the Amorrhites are not yet complete*; and David says: *Add iniquity upon their iniquity*; and another Prophet: *Blood has touched blood*, that is, sin has been added to sin. Paul too says: *Therefore God delivered them up to passions of ignominy* etc.; and likewise: *That they may always fill up their sins*. To John too it is said through the Angel: *He who is in filth, let him be filthy still*." — From these testimonies it is gathered that some sin is both a sin and the penalty of sin.

#### Chapter II.

#### *Whether sin is the cause of sin, insofar as it is sin.*

And therefore it is rightly asked whether, insofar as it is sin, it is the penalty of sin. — This does not seem to be so, since every penalty of sin is just. Whence Augustine in the book of Retractations[^3]: "Every penalty of sin is just and is called a punishment." If, therefore, the sin which is sin and the penalty of sin, insofar as it is sin, is the penalty of sin; since every just penalty comes from the justice of God, it seems that, insofar as it is sin, it is just and comes from God. — To which those men respond that sin is so called the penalty of sin because *through sin*, into which a man falls by the merit of a preceding sin, with God deserting, the good nature is corrupted. Just as eternal fire is called the penalty of the wicked, because they are tormented by it; yet the torment itself of the wicked is not *fire*, but comes to be in man *through fire*. So *through sin* nature is corrupted, and the good of nature is diminished[^4]; and that very diminution and corruption of good is a *passion* and a *penalty*; and it is not *essentially* the sin itself, through which it comes to be, but it is called sin, as was premised, because through sin, the moment a man sins, there comes to be in man that corruption, which nevertheless comes to be with God as author. For that penalty or passion, which is the corruption of good, is from God. Yet its *matter* and *cause*, so to say, is the sin, which is not from God[^5]. Which Augustine seems to have noted and to have understood according to this sense, when he says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints[^6]: "By predestination God foreknew the things which He Himself was going to do. But God also foreknew the things which He Himself is not going to do, that is, all evils, because, although there are certain things which are so *sins* that they are also *penalties* of sin, according to that saying of the Apostle, *God delivered them up to passions* etc., yet it is not God's sin, but His *judgment*" — namely the penalty. For in Scripture by the name of *judgment* a penalty is often understood. — Here he seems to suggest to those attending diligently that the things which are sins and penalties of sin are said to be of God, not insofar as they are *sins*, but insofar as they are *penalties*[^7]. For when he had said that God would not do any evils, that is sins; since it could be objected to him that certain sins are also *penalties* of sin — and every *penalty* of sin is just, and therefore is from God — as if determining according to what He does them, or according to what He does not do, he added the rest. But according to the aforesaid understanding sins are rightly called *penalties*. Whence the Apostle calls them *passions of ignominy*, because, as the authority[^8] says, "although there are certain sins which give delight, they are nevertheless passions of nature not to be named," because through them nature is corrupted.

#### Chapter III.

#### *That not every sin is the penalty of sin.*

And although from this sense every mortal sin can be called a *penalty*, yet not every one[^9] can be called the *penalty* of sin. For the penalty of *sin*, as has been said, is that whose cause is another preceding sin. For sin is so called the *penalty* of sin in respect of the preceding one, as it is called the *cause* of sin in respect of the following one. Whence it comes about that the same sin is both the *cause* and the *penalty* of sin, but the penalty of *one* sin and the cause of *another*. For as Gregory in the Morals[^10] says: "Sin which is not washed away by penance soon by its own weight draws toward another. Whence

<!-- page 841 -->

it comes about that it is not only *sin*, but also the *cause* of sin, since from it the following fault arises. But sin which arises from sin is not only sin, but also the *penalty* of sin, because by His just judgment God darkens the heart of the sinner, so that by the merit of the preceding sin he falls also into another. For whom He was unwilling to free, by deserting He struck." Hence, as Augustine[^11] says: "This is the *penalty* of the preceding sin, and yet it too is *sin*." "For by the judgment of the most just God they were *delivered up*, as the Apostle says of certain men — whether by deserting, or in some other way explicable or inexplicable — *to passions of ignominy*, that crimes might be punished by crimes, and that the punishments of sinners might be not only torments, but also increases of vices." Therefore those sins which the Apostle enumerates, because they are of pride, are not only *sins*, but also *punishments*. — Behold, from these things it now becomes clear that certain sins are also *penalties* and *causes* of sin; and that that sin is the *penalty* of sin which has a preceding sin as its cause; and that that sin is the *cause* of sin which is the merit of a following fault.

#### Chapter IV.

#### *Whether any sins are essentially penalties of sin.*

But when he says that crimes are punished by crimes, he seems to suggest that those very things which are sins are *essentially* penalties of sin, that is, punishments of sin. But to this those men say that these and similar things are said according to the aforesaid reasoning, and therefore are to be understood according to the foregoing exposition. "For the understanding of the things said is to be derived from the causes of the speaking"[^12]. Yet it is judged that no prejudice is done to the truth if anyone says that those same things which are sins are *essentially*, so to say, penalties, that is, punishments of preceding sins, which are just and are from God. Yet neither, insofar as they are *sins*, are they from God, nor, insofar as they are *sins*, are they penalties of sin; and yet, insofar as they are *sins*, they are *privations* of good; but as has been said above[^13], they are called privations *causally* and *actively*.

#### Chapter V.

#### *That, since sin is also the penalty of sin, sin is from man, the penalty from God.*

But that certain sins are penalties, and that this penalty is just and is from God, Augustine evidently hands down, saying in the first book of Retractations[^14] that certain things which are evil come to be by necessity from man, and these same are the just penalty of sin. "There are, he says, certain things done by necessity, things to be reproved, where a man wills to act rightly and cannot. Whence comes that saying of the Apostle: *I do not the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, that I do*. And that other: *The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these are mutually opposed to one another, so that you do not the things that you will*; but all these things are from that condemnation of death. For if this is not a penalty of man, but *nature*, these are not sins at all. For if there is no departure from the mode in which man was naturally made, when he does these things, he assuredly does the things which he ought. But if man, because he is so, is not good nor has it in his power to be good — whether by not seeing what he ought to be, or by seeing and not being able to be what he sees he ought to be — who would doubt that this is a penalty? But every *penalty*, if it is the penalty of sin, is *just* and is called a *punishment*. But if the penalty is *unjust* — since no one doubts that it is a penalty — it has been imposed on man by some unjust one dominating him. Moreover, since to doubt of the omnipotence[^15] and justice of God is the mark of a madman, this penalty is *just* and is paid out for some sin. For no one unjustly dominating could either steal man away, as though God were ignorant, or wrest him away unwilling, as though from one less strong, so as to torment man with an unjust penalty. It remains, therefore, that this just penalty comes from the condemnation of man." — By these and many other testimonies it is taught that certain things are sins and penalties of sin essentially.

#### Chapter VI.

#### *Concerning certain things which are undoubtedly sins and penalties, and insofar as we suffer them, are not sins.*

Moreover, it is in no way to be doubted that certain sins are without any scruple penalties, such as envy, which is grief at another's good, and anger, which also, not insofar as they are penalties, are sins; so too must we think concerning cupidity and fear and other such things. Whence Augustine in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^16] says: "Every disturbance is a passion; every cupidity is a disturbance: therefore every cupidity is a passion. But every passion, when it is in us, we suffer by that very passion. Therefore every cupidity, when it is in us, we suffer by that very cupidity[^17], and insofar as it is cupidity, we suffer. But every passion, insofar as we suffer it, is not sin; so too concerning fear. For it does not follow that, if we suffer fear, therefore it is not sin, because there are many sins which we suffer, but not insofar as we suffer them."

But it must be diligently noted that to the words of Augustine set down above[^18], saying that certain things done by necessity are to be reproved and are evil, there seems to be opposed what Jerome says in the Explanation of the Faith[^19]; which, although it was set down above, yet, that it may be more perfectly known, it is no burden to repeat. "We execrate, he says, the blasphemy of those

<!-- page 842 -->

who say that something impossible has been commanded to man by God, and that the commandments of God can be kept not by individuals, but by all in common." And a little after: "And we say that those err who with Manichaeus say that man cannot avoid sin, as much as those who with Jovinian assert that man cannot sin." — Behold, Jerome says that it is an error if anyone says that man cannot avoid sin. But he who says that certain things come to be by necessity, says that certain things cannot be avoided. Since, therefore, Augustine says this, it seems either that what he hands down is erroneous, or that what Jerome says is not true.

To which it can be said that Augustine handed that down according to the state of this misery — to which pertain ignorance and difficulty, as the same one says in the book On Free Choice[^20], which have descended from a just condemnation — wherein he also included venial sins. But Jerome speaks only of mortal sins, which each one, illumined by grace, is able to avoid; or he says that of man according to the state of free choice before sin.

Diligently enough have we set forth the opinion of those who say that all acts are *natures*[^21], and, insofar as they are, are *good*. In which treatment we have interspersed certain things which are not to be taken from their person only, since they are held by all who are catholically wise without hesitation; and by the testimonies of authorities and by reasons we have fortified the tradition of those who say that all acts by their own essence, that is, insofar as they are, are good, but that certain ones, insofar as they come to be in a disordered way, are sins. They add too that certain ones are good not only by *essence*, but also by *genus*, as to feed the hungry, which act is of the genus of works[^22] of mercy; and certain acts they call absolutely and perfectly good, which not only *essence* or *genus*, but also *cause* and *end* commend, such as are those which proceed from a good will and are measured by a good end.

---

la: Vers. 9. Enarrat. n. 18. — Locus Scripturae est Rom. 1, 23. seqq. — Pro *poena peccati* edd. 1, 8 *poenae peccati.*

en: Verse 9. Commentary, n. 18. — The scriptural passage is Romans 1, 23 ff. — For *the penalty of sin* editions 1, 8 read *penalties of sin.*

en: Book I, homily 11, nn. 23, 24, 25. See also Morals XXV, c. 9, nn. 22, 23. Scriptural passages: Genesis 15, 16; Psalm 68, 28; Hosea 4, 2; Romans 1, 26; I Thessalonians 2, 16; Apocalypse 22, 11.

la: Libr. I. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.

en: Book I, c. 9, n. 5, and On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51.

la: Ed. 1 *minuatur* et *minutio;* paulo superius edd. 1, 8 *eo cruciantur* pro *ea cruciantur,* quae etiam infra pro *Illius tamen* habent *Illius autem.*

en: Edition 1 reads *is lessened* and *lessening;* a little above, editions 1, 8 read *by it they are tormented* for *by them they are tormented,* which also below, for *Yet its,* read *But its.*

la: Aliam sententiam Magister hic c. 4. satis approbat; quae communis est posterioribus (cfr. Comment. hic a. 1. q. 1.).

en: The Master sufficiently approves another opinion here in c. 4; which is common among the later writers (cf. the Commentary here, a. 1, q. 1).

la: Cap. 10. n. 19 (cum interpolationibus). Locus Apostoli est Rom. 1, 26.

en: Chapter 10, n. 19 (with interpolations). The passage of the Apostle is Romans 1, 26.

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. et codd. omittit *dicuntur.*

en: The Vatican edition with a few editions and codices omits *are said.*

la: Glossa ad Rom. 1, 26. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 7 *eos passiones* pro *ea passiones.*

en: Gloss on Romans 1, 26. — A little above, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4, 7 reads *them, passions* for *them passions.*

la: Edd. 1, 8 addunt *peccatum.*

en: Editions 1, 8 add *sin.*

la: Libr. XXV. c. 9. n. 22.

en: Book XXV, c. 9, n. 22.

la: Libr. V. contra Iulian. c. 3. n. 10. Seq. locus est ibi et aliqua ex parte I. Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophet. c. 24. n. 51, ubi alluditur ad Rom. 1, 26. — Pro *iustissimi Dei* edd. 1, 8 *iustissimo Dei,* contra originale, et infra pro *enumerat* codd. A B C E *meminerat.*

en: Book V, against Julian, c. 3, n. 10. The following passage is there and in part in On the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets I, c. 24, n. 51, where allusion is made to Romans 1, 26. — For *of the most just God* editions 1, 8 read *to the most just God,* against the original, and below, for *enumerates,* codices A, B, C, E read *had recalled.*

la: Hilarius, IV. de Trin. n. 14.

en: Hilary, On the Trinity IV, n. 14.

la: Dist. XXXV. c. 3. — Supra pro *praeiudicium fieri* Vat. cum multis edd. *praeiudicium factum,* refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.

en: Distinction XXXV, c. 3. — Above, for *prejudice is done* the Vatican edition with many editions reads *prejudice was done,* against the codices and editions 1, 8.

la: Cap. 9. n. 5. Cfr. etiam III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. — Loci Scripturae sunt Rom. 7, 15, et Gal. 5, 17.

en: Chapter 9, n. 5. Cf. also On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51. — The scriptural passages are Romans 7, 15, and Galatians 5, 17.

la: Codd. *potentia,* contra edd. et originale.

en: The codices read *power,* against the editions and the original.

la: Quaest. 77.

en: Question 77.

la: Edd., excepta 6, addunt *ea,* refragantibus codd. A B C E et originali.

en: The editions, except edition 6, add *it,* against codices A, B, C, E and the original.

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, c. 5.

la: Symboli explanatio ad Damasum (inter opera Hieronymi); vide supra d. XXVIII. c. 4.

en: The Explanation of the Creed to Damasus (among the works of Jerome); see above, Distinction XXVIII, c. 4.

la: Cap. 18. n. 51; de Dono perseverant. c. 11. n. 27; I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5.

en: Chapter 18, n. 51; On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 11, n. 27; Retractations I, c. 9, n. 5.

la: Vat. et edd. 1, 8 cum cod. C addunt *bonas.* — De hac re actum est supra d. XXXV. c. 3.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1, 8 with codex C add *good.* — This matter was treated above, Distinction XXXV, c. 3.

la: Codd. omnes *operis.*

en: All the codices read *of the work.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 840–842 = PDF 862–864, offset `pdf = printed + 22`) authoritative wherever the two-column IA djvu OCR (raw 58468–58642) was cascade-fragmented, reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXXVI (on the threefold relation of sin to penalty and cause — whether sin is the penalty of sin, whether sin is the cause of sin, that not every sin is the penalty of sin, whether sins are essentially penalties, that sin is from man and the penalty from God, and the penal sins we suffer), Cap. I–VI plus the closing Epilogus. The littera opens with the `DISTINCTIO XXXVI.` header at the top of the p.840 L-col (raw 58468), and closes at the bottom of p.842 R-col with "…et bonum finem metiuntur.", immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.` (raw 58643) / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`, which is the `d36-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (6), order verified at 450 dpi.** Cap. I *Quaedam simul sunt peccatum et poena peccati, quaedam peccatum et causa peccati, alia vero peccatum et causa et poena peccati*; Cap. II *An peccatum sit causa peccati, in quantum est peccatum*; Cap. III *Quod non omne peccatum est poena peccati*; Cap. IV *Utrum peccata aliqua essentialiter sint poenae peccati*; Cap. V *Quod, cum peccatum etiam sit poena peccati, peccatum est ab homine, poena a Deo*; Cap. VI *De quibusdam, quae indubitanter peccata sunt et poenae, et in quantum eis patimur, peccata non sunt*. All six present and in printed reading order (L-column-then-R-column per page). The closing unnumbered *Epilogus* paragraph (*Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam…*) sits at the foot of p.842 R-col, just before COMMENTARIUS; it is part of the littera. The editorial margin labels (*Augustinus*, *Gregorius*, *Dubium 4*, *Obiicitur*, *Resp. secundum opinionem aliorum*, *Praed. resp. in explanat.*, *Conciliantur auctoritates*, *Difficultas*, *Hieronymus*, *Epilogus*) are Quaracchi cross-reference marginalia, not Lombard's text, and are omitted per the Vol II littera convention.

**Page-split map.** Reading order is Left column top→bottom, then Right column top→bottom, per printed page. **p.840:** L-col = DISTINCTIO XXXVI header + Cap. I (*Sciendum est tamen… peccatum esse et poenam peccati*) + Cap. II opener (*Et ideo merito quaeritur… deserente Deo, corrumpitur bona natura. Sicut ignis ae-*); R-col = Cap. II tail (*-ternus dicitur poena malorum… per ea corrumpitur natura*) + Cap. III opener (*Et licet ex hoc sensu… suo pondere mox ad aliud trahit. Unde*). **p.841:** L-col = Cap. III tail (*fit, ut non solum peccatum sit… meritum sequentis culpae*) + Cap. IV (*Sed cum ait… causaliter et active dicuntur privationes*) + Cap. V opener (*Quod autem quaedam peccata poenae sint… ubi homo vult recte facere*); R-col = Cap. V tail (*et non potest. Unde est illud Apostoli… et poenas peccati essentialiter*) + Cap. VI opener (*Praeterea, nullatenus ambigendum est… non piget. «Exsecramur, inquit, eorum blasphemiam,*). **p.842:** L-col = Cap. VI continued (*qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid… Hieronymus vero tantum de mortalibus peccatis loquitur, quae unusquisque,*) [the COMMENTARIUS / divisio body also begins lower on this L-col — NOT claimed here]; R-col = Cap. VI tail (*gratia illuminatus, vitare valet… ante peccatum illud ait*) + Epilogus (*Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam… et bonum finem metiuntur*), immediately before the COMMENTARIUS header. Body seams across page/column breaks all grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified): 840 L→R (Cap. II "…Sicut ignis ae‖ternus dicitur poena malorum"); 840 R→841 L (Cap. III "…suo pondere mox ad aliud trahit. Unde ‖ fit, ut non solum peccatum sit"); 841 L→R (Cap. V "…ubi homo vult recte facere ‖ et non potest. Unde est illud Apostoli"); 841 R→842 L (Cap. VI "…eorum blasphemiam, ‖ qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid"); 842 L→R (Cap. VI "…quae unusquisque, ‖ gratia illuminatus, vitare valet").

**Apparatus split map (22 printed footer entries → 22 sequential markers; footer numbering restarts per printed page, so body superscripts and footer numbers both reset 1 at each page top). p.840** (10 footers — L-col band f1–f4 + R-col band f5–f10, in body-marker order 1→10): f1→[^1] (Vers. 9. Enarrat. n. 18, Ps. 57) at Cap. I *Psalmi quinquagesimi septimi*; f2→[^2] (Libr. I. hom. 11, Greg. in Ezech.) at Cap. I *Gregorius super Ezechielem*; f3→[^3] (Retract. I. c. 9 n. 5 + de Lib. Arb. III) at Cap. II *in libro Retractationum*; f4→[^4] (Ed. 1 *minuatur*) at Cap. II *imminuitur bonum naturae*; f5→[^5] (Aliam sententiam Magister c. 4 / cfr. Comment. a. 1 q. 1) at Cap. II *quod a Deo non est*; f6→[^6] (Cap. 10 n. 19, de Praedestinatione Sanct., Rom. 1, 26) at Cap. II *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*; f7→[^7] (Vat. omittit *dicuntur*) at Cap. II *Dei esse dicuntur*; f8→[^8] (Glossa ad Rom. 1, 26) at Cap. II *ut ait auctoritas*; f9→[^9] (Edd. 1, 8 addunt *peccatum*) at Cap. III *non tamen omne*; f10→[^10] (Libr. XXV. c. 9 n. 22, Moralia) at Cap. III *Gregorius in Moralibus*. **p.841** (9 footers — L-col band f1–f3 + R-col band f4–f9, body-marker order 1→9): f1→[^11] (Libr. V contra Iulian. c. 3 n. 10, *iustissimi Dei* / *enumerat–meminerat* variant) at Cap. III *ut Augustinus ait*; f2→[^12] (Hilarius IV. de Trin. n. 14) at Cap. IV *est assumenda dicendi*; f3→[^13] (Dist. XXXV c. 3, *praeiudicium fieri / factum* variant) at Cap. IV *ut supra dictum est, causaliter et active*; f4→[^14] (Cap. 9 n. 5 + de Lib. Arb. III c. 18 n. 51, Rom. 7,15 / Gal. 5,17 — Retract. I) at Cap. V *in libro Retractationum primo*; f5→[^15] (Codd. *potentia*) at Cap. V *de omnipotentia Dei*; f6→[^16] (Quaest. 77, Octoginta trium) at Cap. VI *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*; f7→[^17] (Edd. excepta 6 addunt *ea*) at Cap. VI *ipsa cupiditate patimur*; f8→[^18] (Hic c. 5) at Cap. VI *supra positis verbis Augustini*; f9→[^19] (Symboli explanatio ad Damasum, d. XXVIII c. 4) at Cap. VI *in Explanatione fidei*. **p.842** (3 footers, body-marker order 1→3): f1→[^20] (Cap. 18 n. 51 + de Dono perseverant. + Retract. I, de Lib. Arb.) at Cap. VI *in libro de Libero Arbitrio*; f2→[^21] (Vat. + edd. 1,8 cum cod. C addunt *bonas*; d. XXXV c. 3) at Epilogus *omnes actus naturas esse*; f3→[^22] (Codd. omnes *operis*) at Epilogus *de genere operum*. Total = 10 + 9 + 3 = 22 printed footers → 22 sequential markers ([^1]–[^22]); one-to-one, no folded or duplicated entries.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: nothing — DISTINCTIO XXXVI opens fresh at the top of the p.840 L-col with its own footer block; `d35-dubia` closed cleanly at the bottom of p.839 R-col and forwarded nothing. FORWARDED: nothing to `d36-divisio` — the littera closes cleanly at the bottom of p.842 R-col before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.` (raw 58643). The p.842 L-col COMMENTARIUS body (DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, *Primo/Secundo/Tertio quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam…*) and any footers anchoring in COMMENTARIUS body all belong to `d36-divisio`. NOTE: the p.842 footer band (f1 de Libero Arbitrio, f2 *bonas*/d.XXXV, f3 *operis*) anchors entirely in the littera Cap. VI + Epilogus, so all three p.842 footers are claimed here; the COMMENTARIUS on p.842 carries no footer yet.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. peccalum→peccatum, imminuilur→imminuitur, corrumpilur→corrumpitur, praedestinatione retained, iustissimi retained, omnipotentia retained, perturbatio retained, blasphemiam retained, Ezechielem retained, Amorrhaeorum retained). The OCR running-head digits (840/841/842) are clean; offset pdf=printed+22 confirmed against running-head text (`840 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`, `DISTINCTIO XXXVI. 841`, `842 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`). The gathering signature `S. Bonav. — Tom. II.` + `106` at the foot of p.841 is printer's apparatus, not text.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0