title: Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus I. *Unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

**Ad oppositum.**

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini super Psalmum[^1], et Magister adducit in littera: « Nocendi voluntas potest esse ab hominis animo; *potestas* autem non nisi a Deo »; sed voluntas nocendi, quae est hominis a se ipso, non est nisi respectu nocumenti, quo quis peccat: ergo si respectu illius eiusdem est a Deo potestas, videtur, quod potestas peccandi sit a Deo in ipso.

2. Item, Philosophus in Topicis[^2]: « Potest Deus et studiosus prava agere »; sed omne illud, in quo communicat homo cum Deo, habet ab ipso tanquam a causa et principio: si ergo in potentia peccandi homo cum Deo communicat, videtur, quod potentiam peccandi a Deo accipiat.

3. Item, omne illud, quod attestatur nobilitati naturae, est a Deo; sed potestas peccandi in eo, in quo est, attestatur nobilitati naturae — non enim reperiri potest nisi in creatura rationali, quae est nobilissima omnium creaturarum[^3] — ergo videtur, quod potentia peccandi sit in homine a Deo.

4. Item, omne illud, quod facit ad amplificationem laudis, a Deo est, cuius est omnis honor et laus; sed posse peccare facit ad laudem viri iusti, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo[^4]: *Qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus, et facere malum, et non fecit:* ergo videtur, quod posse peccare sit in homine a Deo.

5. Item, potentia peccandi aut est in creatura rationali secundum quod est a Deo, aut secundum quod est ex nihilo. Si secundum quod est a Deo, habeo propositum, scilicet quod talem potentiam homo a Deo accipiat. Si secundum quod est ex nihilo: ergo cum omnis creatura sit ex nihilo, omnis creatura habet potentiam peccandi: si igitur hoc est falsum, restat etc.

**Fundamenta. Sed contra:**

1. Peccare est deficere[^5]; sed posse deficere est non-posse et privatio potentiae: si igitur privatio et defectus potentiae non est a Deo, videtur, quod potentia peccandi non sit in homine a Deo, sed potius a se ipso.

2. Item, ab eodem principio sunt actus et potentia[^6]: ergo si peccatum non est a Deo aliquo modo, ergo nec potentia peccandi in homine est ab ipso.

3. Item, gloria est perfectiva et salvativa naturae[^7]; sed per gloriam aufertur potentia peccandi: si ergo gloria non aufert quod Deus dedit, videtur igitur, quod potentiam peccandi homo a Deo non acceperit.

4. Item, potentia peccandi est potentia faciendi contra Deum: ergo potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, adversatur divinae potentiae[^8]: si igitur

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divina potentia nihil contra se facit, videtur igitur, quod ab ipso non sit potentia peccandi.

5. Item, omne quod est in homine a Deo, habet exemplar in Deo; sed potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet exemplar in Deo; impossibile est enim, quod Deus peccet, sicut in locis pluribus[^9] Augustinus ostendit; et impossibile est etiam, defectus habere exemplar in Deo. Si igitur homo secundum potentiam peccandi Deo non assimilatur, immo potius assimilatur diabolo; et omne illud, quod homo habet a Deo, habet in ipso exemplaritatem et similitudinem: videtur, quod potentia peccandi in homine non habeat a Deo causam et originem.

> **Conclusio.** Potentia peccandi uno modo accepta est a Deo, alio autem modo minime.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dico potentiam peccandi, duo dico: et dico aliquam potentiam, et dico potentiam ad talem actum ordinabilem. — Si igitur loquamur de potentia peccandi, secundum quod *potentia* est; cum illa potentia sit liberum arbitrium, sic absque dubio a Deo est. — Si autem loquamur de *ordinabilitate* illius potentiae ad peccatum, tunc dicendum est, quod sicut peccatum aliquando accipitur *abstracte*, aliquando *concrete* — aliquando enim nominat actionem deformem, aliquando ipsam deformitatem[^10] — sic dupliciter est loqui de illa ordinabilitate ad peccandum: aut respectu *deformitatis*, aut respectu *actionis substratae*. Si respectu *actionis substratae*, sic talis ordinabilitas a Deo est, sicut et actio substrata peccato. Si autem loquamur de ordinabilitate illa respectu *deformitatis*, sic, cum illa deformitas nihil aliud sit quam privatio et defectus, talis ordinabilitas nihil aliud est quam defectibilitas; et ideo, sicut *defectus* deformitatis non est a Deo, sic nec talis *defectibilitas* est a Deo, sed est in[^11] ipsa creatura rationali, quia ex nihilo. Sic igitur potentia peccandi uno modo conceditur esse a Deo, alio modo minime. — Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad oppositas partes, et etiam diversae fuerunt opiniones.

Nam sicut Magister dicit in littera[^12], quidam dixerunt, quod potentia peccandi non est a Deo; alii vero dixerunt, quod potentia peccandi a Deo est; quod nititur probare Magister multis auctoritatibus. Illae autem auctoritates non valent ad hoc concludendum, nisi accipiatur *potentia peccandi* secundum *illud quod est*, sive[^13] respectu actionis, *ad quam est*, quia hoc modo continetur sub genere potentiae. Secundum autem quod *potentia peccandi* consideratur in comparatione ad *ipsam deformitatem*, sic non est in genere *potentiae*, immo potius *impotentiae*; sic enim non nominat potentiam, sed defectum. Et sicut non sequitur: Deus potest omnia facere, ergo potest peccare; sic non sequitur isto modo: omnis potestas a Deo est, ergo potestas peccandi a Deo est. Et isto modo loquendo dicit Anselmus[^14], quod « potestas peccandi non est libertas nec pars libertatis ». — Et hoc modo procedunt rationes ostendentes, quod potestas peccandi non sit in homine a Deo; et ideo concedendae sunt.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

1. Ad illam vero, quae obiicitur de potentia nocendi, quod est a Deo, quamvis voluntas non sit ab ipso; dicendum, quod Augustinus vim facit in verbo illo inter *ipsam potentiam*, qua peccatur, et *actualem ordinationem* illius potentiae, qua peccatur[^15]; et vult dicere, quod ipsa potentia a Deo est, quamvis ipsa ordinatio ad peccatum ab ipso non sit, quia potius est deordinatio quam ordinatio. Et ideo ex hoc non habetur, nisi quod potentia peccandi, secundum *id quod est*, a Deo sit; secundum autem quod *est ad peccandum*, non potest elici ex illa auctoritate, quod sit a Deo, immo potius oppositum, quia potentia peccandi non pervenit in peccatum nisi mediante voluntaria deordinatione, quam a Deo esse negat Augustinus in praedicta auctoritate.

2. Ad illud verbum Philosophi, quo dicit, quod Deus et studiosus potest prava facere; exponunt quidam, quod Philosophus intellexit de malo poenae. Sed hoc plane repugnat eius textui; et ideo, cum sacra Scriptura dicat, et omnes expositores concordant, quod nullo modo potest peccare, sicut nec mentiri, nec etiam se ipsum negare[^16]; dicendum est, quod illud verbum Philosophi non habet veritatem. Nec credo, ipsum constituisse magnam vim in verbo illo, pro eo quod dixit hoc solum exemplificando et pertranseundo; et exemplum suum satis sufficiebat ad propositum pro parte, in qua habet veritatem, pro hac videlicet, quod studiosus potest mala agere, licet hoc non sit, unde *studiosus*, sed unde potest a *virtute deficere*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia peccandi attestatur nobilitati naturae; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, in quantum dicit ordinem[^17] ad

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defectum, sed in quantum dicit ordinationem ad actum substratum; nam nullus actus est deformabilis per culpam, nisi qui procedit a potentia deliberativa, quae nobilis est, quia sola illa informabilis est per iustitiam. — Vel dicendum, quod attestari nobilitati est dupliciter: aut per se, aut per accidens. Potentia autem peccandi et peccatum attestatur nobilitati naturae per *accidens*, sicut dicit Augustinus[^18], quod « dolor boni amissi testis est naturae bonae ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facit ad amplificationem laudis; dicendum, quod sicut virtus commendabilior redditur ex peccatis, sic potentia bene faciendi commendabilior redditur ex potentia male faciendi; non quia vitium aliquid addat bonitati virtutis, nec potentia deficiendi aliquid addat potentiae bene faciendi; sed quia ex praesentia oppositi magis in sua bonitate clarescit[^19]. Sic magis apparet virtuositas hominis, quando potest mala facere et non vult, quam si non posset nec vellet; et ideo laudatur vir iustus in hoc, quod potuit mala facere et non fecit, hoc est, laudatur in hoc, quod fecit bonum et non fecit malum, cum posset; ita quod laus essentialiter respicit hoc quod est facere bonum, hoc autem quod est posse peccare, non respicit nisi *per accidens*; unde circumscripta potentia faciendi malum, si bonum faceret voluntarie, adhuc laudaretur.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi insit creaturae a Deo, vel ex nihilo; dicendum, quod ratione actus substrati, qui est actus deliberativus, inest ei a Deo; ratione vero defectus inest ei ex nihilo. Et hinc est, quod potentia peccandi non reperitur in omni creatura, quia ratione imperfectionis non reperitur in creatura irrationali, pro eo quod non potest in ea esse actus deliberationis. Ratione vero omnimodae perfectionis non reperitur in creatura beata, quia non potest in ea esse defectus; adeo[^20] suo Creatori est coniuncta. Et sic potentia peccandi quodam modo tollitur per gloriam, quodam modo relinquitur; quodam modo est ipsa *libertas*, quodam modo *minuit libertatem*; quodam modo est *potentia*, et quodam modo *impotentia*; quia[^21] quodam modo dicit *positionem*, et quodam modo *privationem*. Et ideo, cum quaeritur, utrum sit a Deo, non est respondendum simpliciter, sed secundum praedictam distinctionem.

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### Article I. *Whence the power of sinning takes its origin.*
### Question I. *Whether the power of sinning is in us from God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the power of sinning is in us from God. And that it is, seems to be the case:

**On the affirmative side.**

1. First, by the authority of Augustine on the Psalm[^1], which the Master also adduces in the text: « The will to harm can be from man's own mind; but the *power* is only from God »; but the will to harm, which belongs to man from himself, exists only in respect of the harm by which one sins: therefore if in respect of that same thing the power is from God, it seems that the power of sinning is from God in him.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the *Topics*[^2]: « Both God and the virtuous man are able to do depraved things »; but everything in which man shares with God, he has from him as from a cause and principle: if therefore man shares with God in the power of sinning, it seems that he receives the power of sinning from God.

3. Likewise, everything that bears witness to the nobility of nature is from God; but the power of sinning, in that in which it exists, bears witness to the nobility of nature — for it cannot be found except in a rational creature, which is the noblest of all creatures[^3] — therefore it seems that the power of sinning is in man from God.

4. Likewise, everything that makes for the amplification of praise is from God, to whom belongs all honor and praise; but to be able to sin makes for the praise of the just man, according to what is said in Ecclesiasticus 31[^4]: *He that could have transgressed and has not transgressed, and could have done evil and has not done it:* therefore it seems that to be able to sin is in man from God.

5. Likewise, the power of sinning is in the rational creature either according to that which is from God, or according to that which is from nothing. If according to that which is from God, I have my thesis, namely that man receives such a power from God. If according to that which is from nothing: then since every creature is from nothing, every creature has the power of sinning: if therefore this is false, the rest follows, etc.

**The foundations. On the contrary:**

1. To sin is to fail[^5]; but to be able to fail is a non-ability and a privation of power: if therefore the privation and defect of power is not from God, it seems that the power of sinning is not in man from God, but rather from himself.

2. Likewise, acts and potency are from the same principle[^6]: therefore if sin is in no way from God, then neither is the power of sinning in man from him.

3. Likewise, glory is perfective and preservative of nature[^7]; but through glory the power of sinning is taken away: if therefore glory does not take away what God has given, it seems therefore that man has not received the power of sinning from God.

4. Likewise, the power of sinning is the power of acting against God: therefore the power of sinning, as such, is opposed to the divine power[^8]: if therefore

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the divine power does nothing against itself, it seems therefore that the power of sinning is not from him.

5. Likewise, everything that is in man from God has an exemplar in God; but the power of sinning, as such, does not have an exemplar in God; for it is impossible that God should sin, as Augustine shows in many places[^9]; and it is also impossible that a defect should have an exemplar in God. If therefore man, according to the power of sinning, is not made like to God, but rather is made like to the devil; and everything that man has from God has in him an exemplarity and likeness: it seems that the power of sinning in man does not have its cause and origin from God.

> **Conclusion.** The power of sinning, taken in one way, is from God, but in another way not at all.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say "the power of sinning," I say two things: I say some power, and I say a power orderable to such an act. — If therefore we speak of the power of sinning, according as it is a *power*; since that power is free choice, in this way it is without doubt from God. — But if we speak of the *orderability* of that power toward sin, then it must be said that, just as sin is sometimes taken *abstractly*, sometimes *concretely* — for sometimes it names the deformed action, sometimes the deformity itself[^10] — so there are two ways of speaking of that orderability toward sinning: either in respect of the *deformity*, or in respect of the *underlying action*. If in respect of the *underlying action*, then such orderability is from God, just as is the action underlying the sin. But if we speak of that orderability in respect of the *deformity*, then, since that deformity is nothing other than a privation and defect, such orderability is nothing other than defectibility; and therefore, just as the *defect* of deformity is not from God, so neither is such *defectibility* from God, but it is in[^11] the rational creature itself, because it is from nothing. Thus then the power of sinning in one way is granted to be from God, in another way not at all. — And according to this the reasons run to the opposite sides, and there were also diverse opinions.

For as the Master says in the text[^12], some have said that the power of sinning is not from God; but others have said that the power of sinning is from God; which the Master strives to prove by many authorities. But those authorities are not valid for concluding this, unless *the power of sinning* be taken according to *that which it is*, that is[^13], in respect of the action *to which it is ordered*, since in this way it is contained under the genus of power. But according as *the power of sinning* is considered in comparison to *the deformity itself*, then it is not in the genus of *power*, but rather of *impotence*; for thus it does not name a power, but a defect. And just as it does not follow: God can do all things, therefore he can sin; so it does not follow in this way: all power is from God, therefore the power of sinning is from God. And speaking in this way Anselm says[^14] that « the power of sinning is not liberty nor a part of liberty ». — And in this way proceed the reasons showing that the power of sinning is not in man from God; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposing arguments.**

1. To that argument which is raised about the power of harming, that it is from God although the will is not from him; it must be said that Augustine lays weight in that statement upon the distinction between *the power itself*, by which one sins, and the *actual ordering* of that power, by which one sins[^15]; and he means to say that the power itself is from God, although the ordering of it toward sin is not from him, because it is rather a disordering than an ordering. And therefore from this it is not gathered, except that the power of sinning, according to *that which it is*, is from God; but according as it *is ordered to sinning*, it cannot be elicited from that authority that it is from God, but rather the opposite, because the power of sinning does not arrive at sin except by the mediation of a voluntary disordering, which Augustine denies to be from God in the aforesaid authority.

2. To that statement of the Philosopher, by which he says that God and the virtuous man can do depraved things; some explain that the Philosopher understood it of the evil of punishment. But this plainly contradicts his text; and therefore, since sacred Scripture says, and all expositors agree, that he can in no way sin, just as he can neither lie nor even deny himself[^16]; it must be said that that statement of the Philosopher does not hold true. Nor do I believe that he placed great weight on that statement, since he said it only by way of example and in passing; and his example sufficed well enough for his purpose as regards the part in which it holds true, namely this, that the virtuous man can do evil things, although this is not so insofar as he is *virtuous*, but insofar as he can *fail from virtue*.

3. To that argument which is raised, that the power of sinning bears witness to the nobility of nature; it must be said that this is not true insofar as it bespeaks an ordering[^17] toward

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a defect, but insofar as it bespeaks an ordering toward the underlying act; for no act is deformable through fault except one that proceeds from the deliberative power, which is noble, because that alone is informable through justice. — Or it must be said that to bear witness to nobility is twofold: either *per se* or *per accidens*. But the power of sinning and sin bear witness to the nobility of nature *per accidens*, as Augustine says[^18], that « the grief over a good that is lost is a witness of a good nature ».

4. To that argument which is raised, that it makes for the amplification of praise; it must be said that, just as virtue is rendered more commendable by sins, so the power of doing well is rendered more commendable by the power of doing ill; not because vice adds anything to the goodness of virtue, nor because the power of failing adds anything to the power of doing well; but because by the presence of its opposite it shines forth the more in its goodness[^19]. Thus the virtuousness of a man appears the more when he can do evil things and does not will to, than if he could not nor would; and therefore the just man is praised in this, that he could do evil and did not, that is, he is praised in this, that he did good and did not do evil, although he could; so that praise essentially regards that which is doing good, while that which is being able to sin it regards only *per accidens*; whence, even were the power of doing evil removed, if he were to do good voluntarily, he would still be praised.

5. To that which is asked, whether the power of sinning is present in the creature from God or from nothing; it must be said that by reason of the underlying act, which is a deliberative act, it is present in it from God; but by reason of the defect it is present in it from nothing. And hence it is that the power of sinning is not found in every creature, because by reason of imperfection it is not found in the irrational creature, in that there cannot be in it an act of deliberation. And by reason of total perfection it is not found in the beatified creature, because there cannot be in it a defect; so closely[^20] is it joined to its Creator. And thus the power of sinning is in a certain way taken away through glory, in a certain way left remaining; in a certain way it is *liberty* itself, in a certain way it *diminishes liberty*; in a certain way it is a *power*, and in a certain way an *impotence*; for[^21] in a certain way it bespeaks *position*, and in a certain way *privation*. And therefore, when it is asked whether it is from God, one must not answer simply, but according to the aforesaid distinction.

la: Psalm. 29. serm. 2. n. 6. sententialiter; verba ipsa habentur XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Paulo inferius post *eiusdem est a Deo* codd., exceptis F X Y (bb a prima manu), et edd. malo omittunt *potestas*, et in fine arg. Vat. addit *homine*.

en: On Psalm 29, sermon 2, n. 6, in substance; the words themselves are found in *On Genesis to the Letter*, bk. XI, c. 3, n. 5. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — A little below, after *eiusdem est a Deo*, the codices, except F X Y (bb in the first hand), and the editions wrongly omit *potestas*, and at the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds *homine*.

la: Libr. IV. c. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 615, nota 3.

en: *Topics*, bk. IV, c. 5. Cf. above p. 615, note 3.

la: Cfr. August., ill. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12. seqq., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 3, et supra lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 4.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice*, bk. III, c. 5, n. 12 ff.; *On the City of God*, bk. XII, c. 1, n. 3; and above, the text of the Master, d. XXV, c. 4.

la: Vers. 10. — De *maiori*, in qua pro *amplificationem* cod. F et ed. I exhibent *ampliationem*, vide supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXXVII. c. 2. verba Augustini super Ps. 68, 3.

en: Verse 10. — On the *major* premise, in which for *amplificationem* cod. F and ed. 1 read *ampliationem*, see above in the text of the Master, d. XXXVII, c. 2, the words of Augustine on Ps. 68, 3.

la: Codd. F Y bene supplent *ergo posse peccare est posse deficere*. — De principiis, quibus hoc arg. innititur, vide supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Codd. F Y rightly supply *therefore to be able to sin is to be able to fail*. — On the principles upon which this argument rests, see above d. 31, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Nam quidquid est causa causae [potentiae] est causa causati [actus]; de quo cfr. supra pag. 803, nota 10. — De minori cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.

en: For whatever is cause of the cause [of the potency] is cause of the caused [act]; on which cf. above p. 803, note 10. — On the minor premise cf. above d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro *salvativa* cod. cc et ed. I *sanativa*.

en: Cf. above d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 29, a. 1, q. 1. — For *salvativa* cod. cc and ed. 1 read *sanativa*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. circa finem corp. De sequente prop. vide supra pag. 435, nota 1.

en: Cf. above d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, near the end of the body. On the following proposition see above p. 435, note 1.

la: De Symbolo sermo ad Catechum. c. 1. n. 2; 83 Qq. q. 3. et 21; V. de Civ. Dei, c. 10. n. 1; XII. c. 8; XXII. c. 25. nec non c. 30. n. 3; contra Serm. Arianorum, c. 14. n. 9. — Quae res et quomodo exemplar habeant in Deo, ostensum est I. Sent. d. 36. per totam.

en: *Sermon to the Catechumens on the Creed*, c. 1, n. 2; *Eighty-Three Questions*, qq. 3 and 21; *On the City of God*, bk. V, c. 10, n. 1; bk. XII, c. 8; bk. XXII, c. 25, and also c. 30, n. 3; *Against the Sermon of the Arians*, c. 14, n. 9. — How things and in what manner they have an exemplar in God was shown in I Sent., d. 36, throughout.

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo superius pro *ordinabilitate* in codd. W X Z legitur *ordinatione*.

en: Cf. above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — A little above, for *ordinabilitate* in codd. W X Z is read *ordinatione*.

la: Cod. F *ab*.

en: Cod. F reads *ab* (from).

la: Hic c. 1. Cfr. infra dub. 3.

en: Here, c. 1. Cf. below, dubium 3.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *sine*.

en: The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads *sine* (without).

la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 615, nota 9.

en: *Dialogue on Free Choice*, c. 1. Cf. above p. 615, note 9.

la: Codd. L O *qua peccat peccator*.

en: Codd. L O read *by which the sinner sins*.

la: Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13. — De sententia Aristot. cfr. eius X. Ethic. c. 8. — In fine solut. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 bis pro *unde* substituunt *ut*.

en: 2 Tim. 2, 13. — On the opinion of Aristotle cf. his *Ethics*, bk. X, c. 8. — At the end of the solution the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 twice substitute *ut* for *unde*.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *ordinationem*. Edd. 2, 3 omittunt *in quantum dicit ordinem ad defectum, sed*; perperam, cum omissis his verbis sententia reddatur falsa.

en: The Vatican edition with some codices reads *ordinationem*. Edd. 2, 3 omit *insofar as it bespeaks an order toward a defect, but*; wrongly, since with these words omitted the sense is rendered false.

la: Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 2. In Augustini testimonio textus originalis post *amissi* adiungit *in supplicio*.

en: *On the City of God*, bk. XIX, c. 13, n. 2. In Augustine's testimony the original text after *amissi* adds *in supplicio* (in punishment).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 428, nota 5. et pag. 532, nota 4. — Subinde pro *Sic* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *sicut*, et mox pro *mala facere* codd. F I K T W ee etc. et edd. 1, 2 *male facere*.

en: Cf. above p. 428, note 5, and p. 532, note 4. — Thereupon for *Sic* the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads *sicut*, and shortly for *mala facere* codd. F I K T W ee etc. and edd. 1, 2 read *male facere*.

la: Pro *adeo* in cod. F habetur *pro eo quod*, in cod. T (a secunda manu) *cum*; codd. L O *voculae adeo praeligunt quae*, edd. 3, 4 *eo quod*; edd. 1, 2 post *adeo* subiiciunt *enim*. Paulo inferius pro *tollitur* codd. B K P (T a prima manu) V bb ee et ed. 2 perperam substituunt *intelligitur*, ed. 3 *evellitur*.

en: For *adeo* cod. F has *pro eo quod*, cod. T (in a second hand) *cum*; codd. L O prefix *quae* to the little word *adeo*, edd. 3, 4 read *eo quod*; edd. 1, 2 after *adeo* add *enim*. A little below, for *tollitur* codd. B K P (T in the first hand) V bb ee and ed. 2 wrongly substitute *intelligitur*, ed. 3 *evellitur*.

la: Cod. bb omittit *quia*, pro quo cod. V et ed. I substituunt *et*.

en: Cod. bb omits *quia*, for which cod. V and ed. 1 substitute *et*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Suppositis principiis, quae supra d. 37. respectu actus mali probata sunt, duae quaestiones huius articuli de potentia peccandi eodem fere modo ab aliis solvuntur, nempe distinguendo in ipsa id quod est in se et ordinem ad actum peccandi sive ad defectum, qui non ex Deo, sed ex nihilo est (hic in corp. et in solut. ad 5.). Hinc etiam communiter tenetur, quod posse peccare non est libertas nec pars libertatis, sed est eiusdem defectus (cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1-3, d. 25. p. II. q. 3; IV. Sent. d. 18. p. II. dub. 1.). — Paulo tamen subtilius Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica) de hac quaestione loquitur, cum distinguat potentiam peccandi, ut accipitur *formaliter*, quatenus scilicet dicit tantum ordinem fundatum in aliquo et terminatum ad aliud, et *fundamentaliter*, prout accipitur pro fundamento talis ordinis. Primum membrum divisionis distinguit, sicut S. Bonav., idemque resolvit. De secundo autem membro resolvit, « quod aliquid *positivum* est fundamentum illius ordinis, utroque modo sumtum » i. e. tum quoad actum substratum tum quoad ipsam deformitatem; quod satis convenit cum iis quae S. Bonav. dicit infra q. 2. ad 5. Biel autem cum aliis Nominalibus vult, potentiam peccandi simpliciter esse a Deo, et fundamenta S. Bonaventurae solvere nititur. Etiam Durand. plura satis inepta profert contra communem doctrinam.

**II.** De utraque huius art. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-3; S. p. II. tr. 2-4. q. 111. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Granted the principles which were proved above in d. 37 concerning the evil act, the two questions of this article concerning the power of sinning are solved by others in nearly the same way, namely by distinguishing in it that which it is in itself and the ordering toward the act of sinning or toward the defect, which is not from God but from nothing (here in the body and in the reply to 5). Hence too it is commonly held that to be able to sin is not liberty nor a part of liberty, but is a defect of the same (cf. above d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1-3, d. 25, p. II, q. 3; IV Sent., d. 18, p. II, dub. 1). — Yet Scotus (in both *Scripta*, here in the single question) speaks somewhat more subtly of this question, since he distinguishes the power of sinning as it is taken *formally*, namely insofar as it bespeaks only an order founded in something and terminated at another, and *fundamentally*, as it is taken for the foundation of such an order. The first member of the division he distinguishes as St. Bonaventure does, and resolves it likewise. But concerning the second member he resolves « that something *positive* is the foundation of that order, taken in either way » i.e. both as regards the underlying act and as regards the deformity itself; which agrees well enough with what St. Bonaventure says below in q. 2 ad 5. Biel, however, with the other Nominalists, holds that the power of sinning is simply from God, and strives to solve St. Bonaventure's foundations. Durandus too brings forward many quite inept things against the common doctrine.

**II.** On both questions of this article: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 94, m. 3, a. 6, § 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1-3; S. p. II, tr. 2-4, q. 111, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here in the single question.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion for the cascade-fragmented Respondeo + footers), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 69449–69621). English is a fresh literal translation. Printed pp. 1000–1002 (PDF 1022–1024) confirmed via low-dpi render of running heads (p.1000 `1000 ... TRACTATIO`; p.1001 `DIST. XLIV. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 1001`; p.1002 `1002 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Alignment PASS: `Primo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit in homine a Deo` = q1.

**Apparatus page-split map (per-page restart, continuous slugs):**
- **p.1000** footers **2–9** → `[^1]`–`[^8]`. **Footer 1 (the *praesidendi* variant) was consumed by d44-divisio as its `[^2]` — NOT re-claimed here** (per hand-off). The left-column footer block (2–5) annotates the *Ad oppositum* arguments; footers 6–9 (right column) annotate the *Sed contra* arguments (Fundamenta).
- **p.1001** footers **1–9** → `[^9]`–`[^17]` (left col 1–4 = `[^9]`–`[^12]`: the *exemplar* arg + Respondeo *ordinabilitate*/*creatura*/Magister-littera markers; right col 5–9 = `[^13]`–`[^17]`: Respondeo *sive*/Anselm + replies 1–3).
- **p.1002** footers **1–4** → `[^18]`–`[^21]` (reply 3 Augustine, reply 4 *clarescit*, reply 5 *adeo/tollitur* + *quia*). **p.1002 footers 5–6 (`Vide hic lit. Magistri c.1` + Boethius *de Differ. topic.*) belong to QUAESTIO II — forwarded to d44-a1-q2, NOT claimed here.**

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: true` — Scholion I–II are held in a1-q1; **Scholion II ("De utraque huius art. quaestione…") covers a1-q2**, so a1-q2 should set `has_scholion: false`. Scholion I explicitly cross-references "infra q. 2. ad 5."

**Hand-off forwarded to d44-a1-q2:** QUAESTIO II (`Utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala`, `Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala`, raw **~69622**) opens at the bottom of the **L-column of printed p.1002** (PDF 1024), immediately after the SCHOLION block, and continues onto p.1003+. **a1-q2's first body-footers are p.1002 footers 5 (`Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in principio.`) and 6 (Boethius, *de Differentiis topicis* bk. II, c. 3 — the *cuius usus malus* / *cuius usus bonus* note, Cfr. Aristotle *Topics* III c. 3 + supra p. 803 nota 8)** — these annotate q2 fund. 1–2 and are NOT claimed by q1. a1-q2 has NO scholion of its own (Scholion II covers it). Then fresh p.1003+ footer sequences. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; OCR running-head digits mangled — confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render. **d.44 is the LAST distinction of Vol II.**

**No `[?]` flags.** OCR body prose was clean; the cascade-fragmented Respondeo + replies + footers were fully reconstructed from the 450 dpi column-band crops (p.1000–1002, L then R, body then footer bands). Every reading confirmed line-by-line against the crops.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *Unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala. Et quod sit mala, in quantum huiusmodi, videtur.

1. Potentia peccandi non est aliud quam voluntas; sed voluntas peccandi est mala: ergo potentia peccandi est mala, secundum quod huiusmodi.

2. Item, « cuius usus malus est, ipsum quoque malum est », sicut « cuius usus bonus est, ipsum bonum[^1] »; sed usus potentiae peccandi est peccare, et peccare est malum: ergo et potentia peccandi est mala.

3. Item, sicut se habet potentia bene faciendi[^2] respectu boni, ita se habet potentia male faciendi respectu mali; sed omnis potentia bene faciendi, in quantum huiusmodi, est bona: ergo potentia male faciendi, in quantum huiusmodi, est mala.

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4. Item, unaquaeque potentia completior est, quando est suo actui coniuncta[^3]; sed potentia male faciendi, dum est coniuncta actui male faciendi, mala est: ergo si minus completa est, quando est separata ab actu, ergo videtur, quod etiam separata ab actu mala sit.

5. Item, potentia male faciendi aut est *bona*, aut est *mala*. Si est *bona*, et omne bonum est in Deo et a Deo[^4]: ergo videtur, quod potentia male faciendi, in quantum huiusmodi, et a Deo sit et in Deo sit, quorum utrumque falsum est: restat igitur, quod potentia peccandi sit mala.

**Sed contra:** 1. Si potentia peccandi est mala, ergo potens peccare est malus; sed iustus et sanctus potest peccare[^5]: ergo iustus et sanctus est malus.

2. Item, si potentia peccandi est mala, aut ergo malo poenae, aut malo culpae. Malo poenae non; quia illud sequitur malum culpae[^6]. Malo culpae non; quia culpa consequitur peccandi potentiam tempore et natura; prius enim et homo et Angelus peccare potuit, quam peccavit.

3. Item, si potentia peccandi est mala, aut ergo malitia, quam fecit, aut malitia, quae facta est in ipsa. Malitia, quam fecit, non oportet, quia multi possunt male facere, qui non faciunt nec fecerunt. Si malitia, quae facta est in ipsa; sed contra: Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum probat, quod « nullo alio auctore potest homo fieri malus nisi se ipso »: ergo non videtur, quod potentia peccandi, quantum est de se, mala sit.

4. Item, non sequitur: iste potest adulterari, ergo est adulter; ergo non sequitur: iste potest malum facere, ergo est malus; sed si potentia male faciendi esset mala, necessario sequeretur ad ipsam, esse malum: ergo etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: unde hoc est, quod *voluntas* male faciendi est mala[^7], et *potentia* male faciendi non dicitur esse mala[^8]? — Quaeritur etiam: propter quid *voluntas peccandi* non dicitur involuntas, sicut *potentia peccandi* dicitur impotentia? Videtur enim, quod magis. Si enim voluntas peccandi maiorem dicit approximationem ad peccati defectum quam potentia peccandi; magis videtur, quod deberet cadere a propria ratione, ut *voluntas peccandi* diceretur involuntas, quam *potentia peccandi* dicatur impotentia.

### Conclusio.

> *Potentia peccandi, ut talis, non est mala.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut *potentia* respectu bonorum non dicit *actualem* ordinationem ad effectum, sed solum *habitualem*, *voluntas* vero dicit *actualem* ordinationem; sic et in malis intelligendum est, quod *potentia* non dicit actualem ordinationem ad defectum, sed potius habitualem. Unde non dicitur aliquis habere potentiam male faciendi, quia *actualiter* tendat[^9] in mala, sed quia *potest* tendere in malum. *Voluntas* autem *actualem* ordinationem dicit; non enim dicitur: iste vult malum, nisi quando actualiter tendit in malum. Sicut enim dictum fuit in primo libro[^10], voluntas est approximativa ipsius potentiae ad agendum. — Et ideo, quia esse malum dicit aliquem defectum praesentem in eo vel circa id, de quo dicitur; hinc est, quod *voluntas peccandi* mala est, et *velle peccare* est malum; *potentia* autem *peccandi* sive *posse peccare* non dicitur esse mala. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, quod potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, non est mala.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de voluntate, dicendum, quod illud non valet, quia voluntas male faciendi plus ponit quam potentia male faciendi; dicit enim actualem ordinationem ad malum, vel, ut proprius dicam, actualem deordinationem. Unde sicut argumentum illud non valet: *velle male facere* est malum, ergo *posse male facere* est malum; ita nec illud valet, quod obiicit[^11], quod potentia male faciendi non est aliud quam voluntas. Quamvis enim non sit aliud, alio tamen modo importatur per hoc nomen *potentia*, et alio modo per hoc nomen *voluntas*; quia in uno importatur in maiori elongatione, in altero vero in maiori approximatione; et ideo est ibi sophisma *secundum accidens*[^12], sicut hic: eadem est voluntas, quae distat a malo, et quae approximatur malo: ergo si

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mala est, prout est approximata, ex comparatione ad malum similiter mala erit, prout est distans; assignatur enim hic, aliquid similiter accidenti et rei subiectae inesse.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod usus potentiae peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, est malus; dicendum, quod illa maxima intelligitur de usu, ad quem unaquaeque res directe et de proximo ordinatur; sed potentia peccandi non ordinatur, nec directe nec de proximo ad actum peccandi; pro eo quod illa eadem potentia est ad opposita et ad suum oppositum ordinatur *per se*, ad hoc autem ordinatur *per accidens*[^13]. Unde oppositum peccati est eius *usus*, et peccatum est eius *abusus*; et ideo non sequitur, quod si peccare sit malum, quod propter hoc *potentia peccandi*, in quantum huiusmodi, sit malum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in bonis potentia bene faciendi est bona, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia in bonis bonitas actus est a bonitate potentiae; unde consuevit dici, quod non, quia *bona facimus*, boni sumus, sed quia *boni sumus*, bona facimus. Non sic autem est in malis; immo econtra, quia mala facimus, *mali sumus*[^14]. Et ratio huius est, quia, quamvis potentia non possit se per suum actum *perficere*, potest tamen se per suum actum *deordinare* et deficientem facere; et propter hoc non tantum addit bonum opus super bonum opus quantum ad rationem merendi, sicut peccatum super peccatum quantum ad rationem demerendi[^15].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod completior est potentia, cum est suo actui coniuncta; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de actu, ad quem ordinatur *simpliciter*; sed non est verum de eo, ad quem ordinatur *per accidens*, maxime cum actus ille plus tenet rationem defectus quam effectus. Tunc enim magis deordinat, quam perficiat; et sic est in potentia peccandi respectu actus peccandi; et ideo magis recedit potentia a completione in hoc, quod peccat, quam in eo, quod potuit peccare[^16].

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit bona, an mala; dicendum, quod si dicatur *potentia peccandi* potentia, qua quis potest peccare, absque dubio bona est et a Deo est. Similiter, si dicatur *potentia peccandi* ordinata ad actum peccato substratum, similiter est a Deo. Si autem dicatur *potentia peccandi* ipsa potestas deficiendi, hoc modo non debet dici *bona* nec *mala*. Bona non debet dici, quia non dicit aliquod ens, et nihil habet rationem entis, quod non habeat rationem boni[^17]. Mala non debet dici propter hoc, quod non dicit privationem alicuius boni nati inesse, nec dicit actualem defectum, sed habitualem; unde talis potentia non debet dici *potentia mala* vel *deficiens*, sed *potentia defectiva*; nec est proprie *potentia*, sed *impotentia*. Unde sicut *non posse videre* in lapide nec est bonum nec est malum, quia nec dicit positionem nec dicit privationem alicuius boni nati inesse[^18]: sic intelligendum est de potentia peccandi in creatura rationali, secundum quod potentia peccandi dicit defectibilitatem, quae inest ei ex ratione creaturae, secundum quam ex nihilo habet esse.

Ex his patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quare videlicet *voluntas peccandi* dicitur esse mala, et non sic *potestas*. Hoc enim est ex hoc, quia voluntas est causa immediata et proxima respectu actuum, qui ex deliberatione procedunt. — Magis autem peccandi potentia dicitur impotentia, quam voluntas peccandi dicatur involuntas, pro eo quod nomen *potentiae* impositum est a positione et complemento; et ideo peccare diminuit de ratione potentiae, cum dicat defectum, sicut *mortuus* diminuit de ratione *hominis*. Nomen autem *voluntatis* impositum est a libertate et complacentia[^19]. Et quia peccatum est placitum et committi habet per liberum arbitrium; hinc est, quod quamvis depravet potentiam voluntatis, tamen non diminuit de ratione voluntatis, quia non habet ad ipsam repugnantiam, secundum quod sic nominatur; et propterea velle peccare velle est, posse autem peccare non est posse; et ideo dictum fuit in primo libro[^20], quod Deus est *omnipotens*, et tamen non dicitur *omnivolens*[^21].

---

english:
### Article I. *On the origin of the power of sinning.*
### Question II. *Whether the power of sinning, as such, is evil.*

Secondly it is asked whether the power of sinning, as such, is evil. And it seems that it is evil, insofar as it is such.

1. The power of sinning is nothing other than the will; but the will to sin is evil: therefore the power of sinning is evil, as such.

2. Likewise, "that whose use is evil is itself also evil," just as "that whose use is good is itself good[^1]"; but the use of the power of sinning is to sin, and to sin is evil: therefore the power of sinning too is evil.

3. Likewise, as the power of doing well[^2] stands toward the good, so the power of doing ill stands toward evil; but every power of doing well, as such, is good: therefore the power of doing ill, as such, is evil.

4. Likewise, every power is more complete when it is joined to its act[^3]; but the power of doing ill, while it is joined to the act of doing ill, is evil: therefore if it is less complete when it is separated from the act, then it seems that even separated from the act it is evil.

5. Likewise, the power of doing ill is either *good* or *evil*. If it is *good*, and every good is in God and from God[^4]: then it seems that the power of doing ill, as such, both is from God and is in God, both of which are false: it remains, therefore, that the power of sinning is evil.

**On the contrary:** 1. If the power of sinning is evil, then one able to sin is evil; but the just and holy man is able to sin[^5]: therefore the just and holy man is evil.

2. Likewise, if the power of sinning is evil, then either by the evil of penalty or by the evil of fault. Not by the evil of penalty; because that follows upon the evil of fault[^6]. Not by the evil of fault; because fault follows upon the power of sinning in time and by nature; for both man and angel were able to sin before they sinned.

3. Likewise, if the power of sinning is evil, then either by a malice which it produced, or by a malice which has been produced in it. By a malice which it produced is not required, because many are able to do ill who do not and have not done so. If by a malice which has been produced in it; but on the contrary: Augustine in the book of Eighty-three Questions proves that "by no other author can a man be made evil except by himself": therefore it does not seem that the power of sinning, as far as it is of itself, is evil.

4. Likewise, it does not follow: this man is able to commit adultery, therefore he is an adulterer; therefore it does not follow: this man is able to do evil, therefore he is evil; but if the power of doing ill were evil, it would necessarily follow upon it, that there be evil: therefore etc.

Together with this it is asked: whence is it that the *will* to do ill is evil[^7], and the *power* of doing ill is not said to be evil[^8]? — It is also asked: for what reason is the *will to sin* not called a non-will, just as the *power to sin* is called a non-power? For it seems that it ought rather to be so. For if the will to sin states a greater approximation to the defect of sin than the power of sinning does; the more it seems that it ought to fall away from its proper character, so that the *will to sin* should be called a non-will, than that the *power to sin* should be called a non-power.

### Conclusion.

> *The power of sinning, as such, is not evil.*

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, just as *power* with respect to goods does not state an *actual* ordering to the effect, but only a *habitual* one, whereas *will* states an *actual* ordering; so too in the case of evils it must be understood that *power* does not state an actual ordering to defect, but rather a habitual one. Hence one is not said to have the power of doing ill because he *actually* tends[^9] toward evils, but because he *is able* to tend toward evil. But *will* states an *actual* ordering; for one is not said to will evil, except when he actually tends toward evil. For as was said in the first book[^10], the will is what brings the power near to acting. — And therefore, since to be evil states some present defect in that of which, or about that of which, it is said; hence it is that the *will to sin* is evil, and *to will to sin* is evil; but the *power of sinning* or *to be able to sin* is not said to be evil. — Therefore the reasons that show that the power of sinning, as such, is not evil must be granted.

**Replies to the arguments for the affirmative:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the will, it must be said that it does not hold, because the will to do ill posits more than the power of doing ill; for it states an actual ordering to evil, or, to speak more properly, an actual disordering. Hence, just as that argument does not hold: *to will to do ill* is evil, therefore *to be able to do ill* is evil; so neither does that hold which it objects[^11], namely that the power of doing ill is nothing other than the will. For although it is not something other, yet it is signified in one way by the name *power*, and in another way by the name *will*; because in the one it is signified in greater remoteness, but in the other in greater nearness; and therefore there is here a fallacy *of accident*[^12], as here: it is the same will which is distant from evil and which is brought near to evil: therefore if

it is evil, insofar as it is brought near, by comparison to evil it will likewise be evil, insofar as it is distant; for here it is assigned that something belongs alike to the accident and to the underlying thing.

2. To that which is objected, that the use of the power of sinning, as such, is evil; it must be said that that maxim is to be understood of the use to which each thing is directly and proximately ordered; but the power of sinning is not ordered, neither directly nor proximately, to the act of sinning; for the reason that that same power is toward opposites, and is ordered *per se* to its opposite, but to this it is ordered *per accidens*[^13]. Hence the opposite of sin is its *use*, and sin is its *abuse*; and therefore it does not follow that, if to sin is evil, on account of this the *power of sinning*, as such, is evil.

3. To that which is objected, that among goods the power of doing well is good, therefore etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because among goods the goodness of the act is from the goodness of the power; whence it is wont to be said that it is not because *we do good things* that we are good, but because *we are good* that we do good things. But it is not so in the case of evils; rather the contrary, because we do evil things, *we are evil*[^14]. And the reason for this is that, although the power cannot *perfect* itself through its act, yet it can *disorder* itself through its act and make itself deficient; and on account of this a good work does not add to a good work as much, in respect of meriting, as sin adds to sin in respect of demeriting[^15].

4. To that which is objected, that the power is more complete when it is joined to its act; it must be said that this is true of the act to which it is ordered *simply*; but it is not true of that to which it is ordered *per accidens*, especially when that act holds more the character of a defect than of an effect. For then it disorders more than it perfects; and so it is in the power of sinning with respect to the act of sinning; and therefore the power recedes more from completion in this, that it sins, than in this, that it was able to sin[^16].

5. To that which is asked, whether the power of sinning is good or evil; it must be said that if the *power of sinning* be called the power by which one is able to sin, without doubt it is good and is from God. Likewise, if the *power of sinning* be called as ordered to the act underlying the sin, it is likewise from God. But if the *power of sinning* be called the very capacity for failing, in this way it ought to be called neither *good* nor *evil*. It ought not to be called good, because it does not state any being, and nothing has the character of being which does not have the character of good[^17]. It ought not to be called evil for this reason, that it does not state the privation of any good naturally apt to be present, nor does it state an actual defect, but a habitual one; whence such a power ought not to be called an *evil power* or *deficient*, but a *defective power*; nor is it properly a *power*, but a *non-power*. Hence just as *not being able to see* in a stone is neither good nor evil, because it states neither a position nor the privation of any good naturally apt to be present[^18]: so it must be understood concerning the power of sinning in the rational creature, insofar as the power of sinning states a defectibility which belongs to it from the character of a creature, according to which it has being from nothing.

From these things appears the answer to what was asked last, namely why the *will to sin* is said to be evil, and not so the *capacity*. For this is from the fact that the will is the immediate and proximate cause with respect to the acts which proceed from deliberation. — But the power of sinning is rather called a non-power, than the will to sin should be called a non-will, for the reason that the name *power* was imposed from positing and completion; and therefore to sin diminishes from the character of power, since it states a defect, just as a *dead man* diminishes from the character of *man*. But the name *will* was imposed from liberty and complacency[^19]. And because sin is something pleasing and is to be committed through free choice; hence it is that, although it depraves the power of the will, yet it does not diminish from the character of the will, because it has no repugnance toward it, according as it is so named; and therefore to will to sin is to will, but to be able to sin is not to be able; and therefore it was said in the first book[^20] that God is *omnipotent*, and yet he is not called *omnivolent*[^21].

---

la: Boëth., II. de Differ. topic., ubi ad verbum sic: *Cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum est, et e converso.* Cfr. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 3. Vide etiam supra pag. 803, nota 8.

en: Boethius, *On Topical Differences* bk. II, where verbatim thus: "That whose use is good is itself also good, and conversely." Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 3. See also above, p. 803, note 8.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in principio.

en: See here the Master's text, c. 1, at the beginning.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 681, nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 681, note 7.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. et dub. 1. seqq.

en: See *I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 3, q. 1, and dub. 1 and following.

la: Eccli. 31, 10: *Qui potuit transgredi* etc. Cfr. etiam Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4.

en: Ecclesiasticus 31:10: "Who was able to transgress" etc. Cf. also Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 4.

la: Cfr. dicta Augusl., supra pag. 432, nota 4. et pag. 711, nota 1. allata. De ultima propos. argumenti cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2.

en: Cf. the sayings of Augustine cited above, p. 432, note 4, and p. 711, note 1. On the last proposition of the argument cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 and 2.

la: Quaest. 3. seq. — Paulo superius pro *male facere, qui non faciunt* Vat. *mala facere, quae non faciunt.*

en: Question 3, following. — A little above, for *to do ill, who do not do it* the Vatican edition reads *to do evils, which they do not do.*

la: Vat. addit *et potentia malefaciendi est mala.* In seqq. edd. 2, 3 nec non complures codd. bis perperam substituunt *voluntas* pro *involuntas*, quod vitium repetunt infra in solut. huius quaest. incid.

en: The Vatican edition adds *and the power of doing ill is evil.* In what follows, editions 2 and 3 as well as several codices twice wrongly substitute *will* for *non-will*, a fault they repeat below in the solution of this incidental question.

la: Codd. F K L O et alii *tendit.* Paulo inferius pro *non enim dicitur* codd. F T W cc et ed. 1 exhibent *cum enim dicitur,* et deinde pro *nisi quando actualiter tendit* substituunt *notatur, quod actualiter tendat.*

en: Codices F K L O and others read *tendit.* A little below, for *for it is not said* codices F T W cc and ed. 1 give *for when it is said,* and then for *except when it actually tends* they substitute *it is noted that it actually tends.*

en: Distinction 45, a. 2, q. 1.

la: In edd. legitur: *ita nec valet illud. Nec valet quod obiicit.* In multis codd. nec non in edd. 1, 2 aegre desiderantur verba, quae paulo post sequuntur: *per hoc nomen potentia... voluntas.*

en: In the editions it reads: "so neither does that hold. Nor does that hold which it objects." In many codices, and also in editions 1 and 2, the words which follow a little after are awkwardly lacking: "by this name *power*... *will*."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 870, nota 8. — Mox pro *quae* [Vat. cum edd. 2, 3 *qua*] *approximatur* codd. D F (T a secunda manu) cc et ed. 1 *quae approximat,* et dein pro *malo* cod. T *ad malum.*

en: Cf. above, p. 870, note 8. — Presently for *which* [the Vatican edition with editions 2 and 3, *by which*] *is brought near*, codices D F (T in a second hand) cc and ed. 1 read *which brings near,* and then for *to evil* codex T reads *unto evil.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. p. II. q. 3. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.), ubi recensens vitia definitionum, quae sunt *ad aliquid*, ait: *In quibusdam profecto secundum veritatem se habet, ut dictum est, in quibusdam autem non, ut in quibuscumque non per se dicitur ad utrumque, ut medicinam scientiam sanitatem et aegritudinem efficiendi; nam de illa quidem per se dicitur, de hac autem per accidens; simpliciter enim alienum a medicina aegritudinem efficere.* — In fine solut. pro *malum* codd. M T Z cc et ed. 1 exhibent *mala.*

en: Cf. above, d. 23, p. II, q. 3. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 5), where reviewing the faults of definitions which are *relative to something*, he says: "In some cases indeed it holds according to truth, as has been said, but in others not, as in whatever is not said *per se* of both, as that medicine is the science of producing health and sickness; for of the former it is said *per se*, but of the latter *per accidens*; for it is simply foreign to medicine to produce sickness." — At the end of the solution, for *malum* codices M T Z cc and ed. 1 give *mala.*

la: Vide supra pag. 718, nota 9.

en: See above, p. 718, note 9.

en: Cf. above, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1, reply 4, and a. 2, q. 3, reply 4.

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.) docet, in bonis actum meliorem esse et praestantiorem potentia, in malis vero potentiam meliorem praestantioremque esse actu.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9), teaches that in good things the act is better and more excellent than the potency, but in evil things the potency is better and more excellent than the act.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 805, nota 4. — In Vat., pro *entis* posito *boni* et pro *boni* substituto *entis*, legitur sic: *et nihil habet rationem boni, quod non habeat rationem entis.*

en: Cf. above, p. 805, note 4. — In the Vatican edition, with *good* put for *being* and *being* substituted for *good*, it reads thus: "and nothing has the character of good which does not have the character of being."

la: Sed solum negationem; de quo cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis; IV. Metaph. text. 4. et V. text. 27. (III. c. 2. et IV. c. 22.). — De propos. seq. vide supra d. 34. a. 1. q. 2.

en: But only a negation; on which cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter on Opposites; *Metaphysics* IV, text 4, and V, text 27 (III, c. 2, and IV, c. 22). — On the following proposition see above, d. 34, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. p. I. q. 6. et dub. 1.

en: Cf. above, d. 23, p. I, q. 6, and dub. 1.

la: Dist. 45. a. 1. q. 2. Cfr. ibid. d. 42. q. 2. Referre iuvat etiam illud quod Anselmus dicit, de Casu diaboli, c. 8, ubi ostendit, voluntatem eiusque conversionem non esse ipsum malum. « Denique, ait, bona voluntas non magis est aliquid quam mala voluntas, nec ista magis malum, quam illa bonum. Non enim magis est aliquid voluntas, quae vult dare misericorditer, quam illa quae vult rapere violenter; nec magis haec malum, quam illa bonum est. »

en: Distinction 45, a. 1, q. 2. Cf. ibid., d. 42, q. 2. It is worth relating also that which Anselm says, *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 8, where he shows that the will and its conversion are not evil itself. "In fine," he says, "a good will is no more something than an evil will, nor is the latter any more an evil than the former is a good. For a will which wills to give mercifully is no more something than one which wills to seize violently; nor is the former any more an evil than the latter is a good."

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p100{2,3,4}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion — the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 69622–69791) cascade-fragments the Respondeo and the two-column footers, so the column-band PDF read is authoritative; OCR used only as base for the clean running prose (videtur/contra args) and footnote-marker spacing. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`.

**Page span:** printed **pp.1002–1004** (PDF 1024–1026). Running heads confirmed via crops: p.1003 `DIST. XLIV. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 1003`; p.1004 `1004 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`. q2 opener sits at the bottom of the **L-column of printed p.1002**, immediately below the a1-q1 Scholion; q2 body ends on p.1004 R-col with `...non dicitur omnivolens`. **p.1005 begins ARTICULUS II** — confirmed via p.1005 L-col crop (`ARTICULUS II. De potestate praesidendi.` + `QUAESTIO I.`), so q2 does NOT spill onto p.1005.

**Alignment:** PASS. Opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit mala` = q2 of article I.

**Scholion:** `has_scholion: false`. a1-q1's Scholion II ("De utraque huius art. quaestione…") covers this question — confirmed by the q2 tail footnote `[^21]` (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`).

**Apparatus — 21 entries, per-page restart, page-split map:**
- **p.1002 footers 5–6 PICKED UP** from a1-q1 = `[^1]` (Boethius, *de Differ. topic.* II) and `[^2]` (`Vide hic lit. Magistri c.1 in principio`). a1-q1 consumed p.1002 footers 1–4; not re-claimed.
- **p.1003 L-col** footers 1–6 = `[^3]`–`[^8]` (the args/Sed contra block: pag.681 / I Sent. d.36 / Eccli.31:10 / Augustine pag.432+711 / Quaest.3 seq. / Vat. *et potentia malefaciendi est mala*).
- **p.1003 R-col** footers 7–10 = `[^9]`–`[^12]` (the Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad 1 block: tendit-variant / Dist.45 a.2 q.1 / *ita nec valet illud* / pag.870 + *quae approximatur* variant).
- **p.1004 L-col** footers 1–5 = `[^13]`–`[^17]` (Ad 1–5: Aristot. VI Topic. *ad aliquid* / pag.718 / d.40 a.1 q.1 / Aristot. IX Metaph. / pag.805 + Vat. *entis/boni* swap).
- **p.1004 R-col** footers 6–9 = `[^18]`–`[^21]` (Ad 5 + resolution: Aristot. *de Oppositis* / d.23 p.I q.6 / Dist.45 a.1 q.2 + Anselm *de Casu diaboli* / `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`).

Slugs `[^1]`–`[^21]` are continuous (`[^8]` = p.1003 L footer 6, the `Vat. addit et potentia malefaciendi est mala…` variant-note anchored on the "Iuxta hoc quaeritur" lemma). Marker pairing 21/21 (Latin = English = 21 defs).

**Hand-off forwarded → d44-a2-q1:**
- `ARTICULUS II. De potestate praesidendi.` opener folds into a2-q1 (Vol II convention): `Consequenter quaeritur de potestate praesidendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum omnis potentia [potestas] dominandi sit a Deo.` Begins in the **L-col top of printed p.1005** (PDF 1027), raw line **69792**, immediately after q2's tail; q1 title `QUAESTIO I. Utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo.` (raw 69802), body opens `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur: 1. Ioannis decimo nono: Non haberes in me potestatem, nisi tibi datum esset desuper…` (raw 69804).
- a2-q1 gets a **fresh p.1005 footer sequence** — no q2 footer migrates forward (q2 consumed all p.1004 footers; p.1005 footers start clean for ARTICULUS II). The p.1005/q1 first body-footer is the Ioan. 19:11 reference.
- Confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render (OCR running-head digits mangled).

**[?] flags:** none. OCR/PDF cross-read clean; every reading confirmed line-by-line against the column-band crops.

**Vol II completion:** d.44 is the LAST distinction of Vol II. Remaining d.44 units: a2-q1/q2, a3-q1/q2, dubia. When d.44 completes, Vol II is DONE (update landing/About copy per MEMORY.md `update-about-copy-after-vol2`). d.50 polish gate does NOT apply.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De potestate praesidendi.*

Consequenter quaeritur de potestate praesidendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum omnis potentia dominandi sit a Deo.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ioannis decimo nono[^1]: *Non haberes in me potestatem, nisi tibi datum esset desuper*, dixit Dominus Pilato: ergo si potestas Pilati super Christum erat a Deo, et tamen minime videbatur, quod super ipsum deberet habere potestatem; ergo videtur, quod multo fortius omnis potestas talis a Deo est.

2. Item, expressius ad Romanos decimo tertio[^2]: *Non est potestas nisi a Deo*; et constat, quod ibi loquitur de potestate praesidendi: ergo etc. — Et istae duae auctoritates sufficiant, quia plures aliae adducuntur in littera.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. Potestas praesidendi dicit potentiam in excellentia[^3], et omne tale dicit positionem aliquam; sed omne quod dicit positionem aliquam, a summa potentia est: ergo omnis potentia praesidendi a Deo est, qualitercumque quis praesit.

4. Item, omnis poena a Deo est, quae habet simpliciter rationem poenae[^4]; sed omnis servitus est poena: ergo a Deo est. Sed ab eodem, a quo est servitus, ab eodem est dominandi potestas: igitur omnis potestas dominandi est a Deo.

**Sed contra:**
1. Oseae octavo[^5]: *Ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me; principes exstiterunt, et non cognovi*: ergo videtur, quod talis praesidentia malorum non sit a Deo.

2. Item, nihil iniustum est a Deo; sed multi iniuste dominantur aliis: ergo videtur, quod non omnis potestas sive dominium, quod est in hominibus, sit a Deo.

3. Item, nihil inordinatum est a Deo; sed cum stultus praeficitur sapienti, et malus bonis, hoc est inordinatum: ergo non videtur esse a Deo.

4. Item, nihil quod est contra ius naturae, est a Deo; sed potestas dominandi in homines est contra ius naturae: ergo non est a Deo. *Maior* manifesta est. *Minor* probatur per illud quod dicitur in libro Institutionum[^6]: « Bella exorta sunt, et captivitates secutae et servitus, quae sunt iuri naturali contraria ».

5. Item, nihil auferendum est alicui, quod est ei datum a Deo[^7]: ergo si omnis potestas vel praelatio est a Deo, nulli auferenda est praelatio vel potestas: ergo nullus praelatus vel princeps esset deponendus, quantumcumque malus.

6. Item, nihil quod habet quis per Dei donationem, habet per usurpationem: ergo si omnis potestas est a Deo collata, nulla est usurpata; sed planum est, quod multae potestates usurpantur: ergo non omnis potestas a Deo donatur.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Omnis potestas praesidendi, secundum id quod est, et etiam respectu illius super quem est, iusta est et a Deo est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod potestas praesidendi dicitur esse illud, per quod quis praesidet et dominatur alteri. Illud autem, per quod praesidet, dupliciter potest dici: uno modo dicitur ipsa *virtus*, per quam quis praevalet alteri, et haec virtus absque dubio a Deo est; alio modo illud, per quod praesidet, dicitur *modus deveniendi* vel *permanendi*[^8] ad hanc virtutis excellentiam; et sic distinguendum est. Nam quidam praesunt aliis ex *iustitia*, quidam ex *astutia*, et quidam ex *violentia*. Quando autem praeest aliquis aliis per *iustitiam*, tunc illa potestas dominandi, simpliciter loquendo, a Deo est et respectu praesidentis et respectu subiacentium.

<!-- page 1006 -->

Quando autem praeest aliquis per *astutiam*, vel per *violentiam*, tunc dicendum est, quod talis potestas et habet comparari ad voluntatem praesidentis, et habet comparari ad meritum subiacentis. In comparatione ad meritum subiacentis talis praesidentia iusta est, quia aut est ad *bonorum probationem*, aut ad *malorum punitionem*. Si autem comparetur ad voluntatem *praesidentis*; sic iniusta est. — Et primo quidem modo dicitur esse a Deo *faciente* et ordinante, secundum quod dicitur Iob trigesimo quarto[^9]: *Facit regnare hypocritam propter peccata populi*; et Oseae decimo tertio: *Dabo eis regem in furore meo*. Secundo autem modo, scilicet in comparatione ad voluntatem *praesidentis*, sic dicitur esse a Deo *permissive*, non autem approbatorie, propter quod dicitur[^10]: *Ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me, et principes exstiterunt, et non cognovi*.

Concedendum est igitur, quod omnis potestas praesidendi secundum *id quod est*, et etiam respectu eius super quem est, iusta est et a Deo est; et hoc ostendunt rationes et auctoritates, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, et ideo concedendae sunt. Concedendum est nihilominus, quod *modus deveniendi* ad hanc praesidentiam in comparatione ad voluntatem *praesidentis* potest esse iustus et iniustus; et secundum quod iustus est, a Deo est, secundum quod iniustus est, a Deo non est. Quia vero nunquam est ita iniustus ex una parte, quin sit iustus ex altera; ideo de nulla potentia praesidendi dici potest, quod non procedat a Deo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Dominus dicit, quod regnaverunt, sed non ex ipso; dicendum, quod non est ibi negatio cuiuscumque voluntatis, sed voluntatis *antecedentis* et voluntatis *approbantis*. Dominium enim malorum potius est a Deo *vindicante*, quam sit a Deo *acceptante*. Unde in eis verificatur illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastis octavo[^11]: *Interdum dominatur homo homini in malum suum*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil iniustum est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod iniustum. Quamvis autem potentia dominandi iniusta sit frequenter in comparatione ad voluntatem *praesidentis*, semper tamen iusta est in comparatione ad meritum *subiacentis*, quia est *ad vindictam malefactorum, ad laudem vero bonorum*, sicut dicitur primae Petri secundo[^12].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliqua potestas inordinata est; dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo aliqua potestas possit ex inordinata voluntate procedere, potestas tamen ipsa semper ordinata est, sicut dicit Gregorius in Moralibus[^13], quod « tumoris elatio, non potestatis ordo, in crimine est; potentiam Deus dedit, elationem potentiae malitia nostrae mentis invenit ». — Et si obiiciat, quod inordinatum est, quod stulti praesunt sapientibus, et mali bonis, et servi liberis[^14]; dicendum, quod etsi aliqua inordinatio appareat exterius, nihilominus latet pulcra ordinatio interius secundum divinum iudicium, quod frequenter est occultum, nunquam tamen iniustum. Propter quod dicitur Ecclesiastis decimo[^15]: *Vidi malum quasi per errorem egrediens a facie principis, stultum positum in dignitate sublimi* etc.; quasi dicat: quia, quamvis appareat ibi error, magna tamen est ibi ordinatio, dum ex hoc mali puniuntur, et boni promoventur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla potestas est a Deo, quae est contra ius naturae; dicendum, quod *esse contra ius naturae* hoc est dupliciter: vel *simpliciter*, vel *secundum aliquem statum*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod potestas dominandi est contra ius naturae, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad universale dictamen naturae, sed quantum ad dictamen naturae alicuius status determinati, in quo quidem non esset subiectio servitutis nec praelatio potestatis[^16].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil quod est a Deo datum, est auferendum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si Deus simpliciter ei dedit; si autem solum ad *tempus* datum est, sicut Dominus voluit dare, ita etiam voluit per ministerium humanum auferre. Hoc autem cognoscimus, quod Deus velit, quando videmus, ordinem iustitiae sic exigere. Deus enim dedit vitam latroni, et tamen iudex iuste illam aufert ei, exigente hoc mandato iustitiae, quo dicitur[^17]: *Maleficum non patieris vivere*. Sic etiam intelligendum est se habere in potestate nostra et principum, quia secundum iuris rectitudinem tam dominium quam potestatis privilegium meretur amittere qui concessa sibi abutitur potestate.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla potestas a Deo collata est usurpata; dicendum, quod verum est, si *totaliter* detur a Deo. Sed Deus sic dat potestatem, quod frequenter *homo cooperatur* in illius potestatis adeptione; et cum recte cooperatur ad illius potestatis adeptionem, tunc dicitur dominari ea ex *iustitia*; quando vero iniuste, tunc dicitur illa potestas *usurpata*, in qua non praeest de *iure*, quamvis praesit de *facto*; nihilominus tamen, quia talis potestas non caret omnino ordine iustitiae, conceditur esse a Deo. Et simul sunt haec duo vera secundum diversos respectus, videlicet quod eadem potestas sit usurpata et a Deo collata, absque aliqua repugnantia.

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english:
### Article II. *On the power of presiding.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the power of presiding. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether all power of ruling is from God.

### Question I. *Whether all power of ruling is from God.*

Concerning the first the matter proceeds thus, and it is asked whether all power of ruling is from God. And that it is, seems [so]:

1. John nineteen[^1]: *Thou wouldst have no power over me, unless it were given thee from above*, the Lord said to Pilate: therefore if Pilate's power over Christ was from God — and yet it by no means appeared that he ought to have power over him — therefore it seems that much more is all such power from God.

2. Likewise, more expressly to the Romans thirteen[^2]: *There is no power but from God*; and it is agreed that there he speaks of the power of presiding: therefore etc. — And let these two authorities suffice, since several others are adduced in the text.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] *by reason*. The power of presiding bespeaks a potency in eminence[^3], and everything of this sort bespeaks some positing; but everything that bespeaks some positing is from the highest power: therefore all power of presiding is from God, in whatever way one presides.

4. Likewise, all punishment is from God which has simply the character of punishment[^4]; but all servitude is a punishment: therefore it is from God. But from the same source from which servitude is, from the same is the power of ruling: therefore all power of ruling is from God.

**On the contrary:**
1. Hosea eight[^5]: *They have reigned, but not by me; they have been princes, and I knew not*: therefore it seems that such presiding of the wicked is not from God.

2. Likewise, nothing unjust is from God; but many rule over others unjustly: therefore it seems that not all power or dominion that is among men is from God.

3. Likewise, nothing disordered is from God; but when a fool is set over a wise man, and an evil man over the good, this is disordered: therefore it does not seem to be from God.

4. Likewise, nothing that is against the law of nature is from God; but the power of ruling over men is against the law of nature: therefore it is not from God. The *major* is manifest. The *minor* is proved by what is said in the book of the Institutes[^6]: « Wars have arisen, and captivities have followed, and servitude, which are contrary to the law of nature ».

5. Likewise, nothing is to be taken away from anyone which is given to him by God[^7]: therefore if all power or prelacy is from God, prelacy or power is to be taken from no one: therefore no prelate or prince should be deposed, however evil he be.

6. Likewise, nothing that one has by God's donation does one have by usurpation: therefore if all power is conferred by God, none is usurped; but it is plain that many powers are usurped: therefore not all power is bestowed by God.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** All power of presiding, according to what it is, and also in respect of him over whom it is, is just and is from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the power of presiding is said to be that by which one presides over and rules another. But that by which one presides can be spoken of in two ways: in one way the *virtue* itself is meant, by which one prevails over another, and this virtue is without doubt from God; in another way that by which one presides is meant as the *mode of arriving at* or *of remaining*[^8] in this excellence of virtue; and so a distinction must be made. For some preside over others out of *justice*, some out of *cunning*, and some out of *violence*. But when anyone presides over others through *justice*, then that power of ruling, speaking simply, is from God both in respect of the one presiding and in respect of the subjects.

But when anyone presides through *cunning* or through *violence*, then it must be said that such power both has to be compared to the will of the one presiding, and has to be compared to the merit of the subject. In comparison to the merit of the subject such presiding is just, since it is either for the *proving of the good* or for the *punishment of the wicked*. But if it be compared to the will of the *one presiding*, thus it is unjust. — And in the first way indeed it is said to be from God *as doing* and ordaining, according to what is said in Job thirty-four[^9]: *He maketh a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people*; and Hosea thirteen: *I will give thee a king in my wrath*. But in the second way, namely in comparison to the will of the *one presiding*, it is thus said to be from God *permissively*, but not approvingly, on account of which it is said[^10]: *They have reigned, but not by me, and they have been princes, and I knew not*.

It must therefore be granted that all power of presiding according to *what it is*, and also in respect of him over whom it is, is just and is from God; and this the reasons and authorities that are adduced for the first part show, and therefore they are to be granted. It must nonetheless be granted that the *mode of arriving* at this presiding, in comparison to the will of the *one presiding*, can be just and unjust; and insofar as it is just, it is from God, insofar as it is unjust, it is not from God. But because it is never so unjust on the one side but that it is just on the other, therefore of no power of presiding can it be said that it does not proceed from God.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the Lord says that they have reigned but not by him; it must be said that there is not there a negation of any and every will, but of the *antecedent* will and of the *approving* will. For the dominion of the wicked is rather from God *avenging* than from God *accepting*. Hence in them is verified what is said in Ecclesiastes eight[^11]: *Sometimes one man ruleth over another to his own hurt*.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing unjust is from God; it must be said that it is true, insofar as it is unjust. But although the potency of ruling is often unjust in comparison to the will of the *one presiding*, nevertheless it is always just in comparison to the merit of the *subject*, since it is *for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good*, as is said in the first [epistle] of Peter, two[^12].

3. To that which is objected, that some power is disordered; it must be said that although in some way some power can proceed from a disordered will, the power itself is nevertheless always ordered, as Gregory says in the Morals[^13], that « the swelling of pride, not the order of power, is in the crime; God gave the potency, the malice of our mind devised the puffing-up of the potency ». — And if it be objected that it is disordered that fools preside over the wise, and the evil over the good, and slaves over the free[^14]; it must be said that although some disorder may appear exteriorly, nonetheless a fair ordering lies hidden interiorly according to the divine judgment, which is frequently hidden, yet never unjust. On account of which it is said in Ecclesiastes ten[^15]: *I have seen an evil, as it were by an error, proceeding from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity* etc.; as if to say: that, although an error may appear there, yet there is great ordering there, since by it the wicked are punished and the good are advanced.

4. To that which is objected, that no power is from God which is against the law of nature; it must be said that *to be against the law of nature* is twofold: either *simply*, or *according to some state*. When therefore it is said that the power of ruling is against the law of nature, this is not understood with regard to the universal dictate of nature, but with regard to the dictate of the nature of some determinate state, in which indeed there would be no subjection of servitude nor prelacy of power[^16].

5. To that which is objected, that nothing which is given by God is to be taken away; it must be said that this is true if God gave it to him simply; but if it was given only for a *time*, as the Lord willed to give, so also he willed to take it away through human ministry. And this we know that God wills, when we see the order of justice so to require. For God gave life to the robber, and yet the judge justly takes it away from him, this command of justice requiring it, by which it is said[^17]: *Thou shalt not suffer a wrongdoer to live*. So too it is to be understood to hold in our power and in that of princes, since according to the rectitude of right both dominion and the privilege of power he deserves to lose who abuses the power granted to him.

6. To that which is objected, that no power conferred by God is usurped; it must be said that it is true, if it be given *wholly* by God. But God so gives power that frequently *man cooperates* in the obtaining of that power; and when he rightly cooperates toward the obtaining of that power, then he is said to rule it out of *justice*; but when [he does so] unjustly, then that power is said to be *usurped*, in which he does not preside by *right*, although he presides in *fact*; nevertheless, because such power is not altogether without the order of justice, it is granted to be from God. And these two are at once true according to different respects, namely that the same power is usurped and conferred by God, without any contradiction.

la: Vers. 11. Vulgata: *Non haberes adversum me* etc.

en: Verse 11. The Vulgate: *Thou wouldst have no [power] against me* etc.

la: Vers. 1. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Verse 1. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Polit. c. 4. et 12. (c. 11. seq.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, III. Politics c. 4 and 12 (c. 11 ff.).

la: Cfr. supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — De *minori* cfr. verba Ambrosii, quae supra pag. 168, nota 3. exhibentur; cfr. etiam infra quaest. seq.

en: Cf. above d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. ff. — On the *minor* cf. the words of Ambrose, which are given above on page 168, note 3; cf. also below in the following question.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Libr. 1. c. 2. § *Ius autem gentium*. In sententia allata, quae ex Hermogeniani Responso delibata est, textus originalis pro *servitus* et dein pro *contraria* habet *servitutes* et *contrariae*.

en: Book 1, c. 2, § *Ius autem gentium* [But the law of nations]. In the cited passage, which is excerpted from the Response of Hermogenianus, the original text, for *servitus* and then for *contraria*, has *servitutes* and *contrariae*.

la: S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. arg. 4.) addit: *Sicut quod Deus coniunxit, homo non separet.* (Matth. 19, 6.).

en: St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. arg. 4) adds: *As what God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.* (Matt. 19:6).

la: Cod. O *pertingendi*. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 legitur *dicitur modus perveniendi vel promovendi*. Mox pro *distinguendum est* codd. B C D E H K L P R S T ee et ed. 2 *intelligendum est*. Vat. post *distinguendum est* subiicit *tripliciter*.

en: Codex O: *pertingendi* [of attaining]. In the Vatican and edd. 3, 4 is read *it is said [to be] the mode of arriving or of advancing*. Soon, for *distinguendum est* [a distinction must be made], codd. B C D E H K L P R S T ee and ed. 2 read *intelligendum est* [it must be understood]. The Vatican, after *distinguendum est*, adds *threefoldly*.

la: Vers. 30. — Seq. Script. loc. est ibid. v. 11. — Hos locos explicat Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 16. n. 34. seqq.

en: Verse 30. — The following passage of Scripture is in the same place, v. 11. — Gregory explains these passages, XXV. Morals c. 16. n. 34. ff.

la: Oseae 8, 4. — Paulo ante pro *approbatorie* edd. substituunt *approbative*.

en: Hosea 8:4. — A little before, for *approbatorie* [approvingly] the editions substitute *approbative*.

la: Vers. 9. — Haec solutio est secundum Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 16. n. 41. — De voluntate Dei antecedente et approbante vide I. Sent. d. 48. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 46. q. 1. in corp. — Pro *antecedentis* cod. Y habet *acceptantis*.

en: Verse 9. — This solution is according to Gregory, XXV. Morals c. 16. n. 41. — On the antecedent and approving will of God see I. Sent. d. 48. a. 3. q. 2. and d. 46. q. 1. in the body. — For *antecedentis* codex Y has *acceptantis*.

la: Vers. 14, in quo textu codd. H K W Y ce et ed. 1 *malefactorum* mutarunt in *maleficiorum*.

en: Verse 14, in which text codd. H K W Y ce and ed. 1 changed *malefactorum* [of evildoers] into *maleficiorum* [of misdeeds].

la: Libr. XXVI. c. 26. n. 48. In testimonio allato textus originalis pro *dedit* exhibet *tribuit*.

en: Book XXVI. c. 26. n. 48. In the cited testimony the original text, for *dedit* [gave], shows *tribuit* [bestowed].

la: Primae edd. *dominis*, Vat. *dominis vel liberis*.

en: The first editions: *dominis* [over masters]; the Vatican: *dominis vel liberis* [over masters or the free].

la: Vers. 5. seq. — Paulo inferius pro *ibi error, magna* [ed. 1 *magis*] *tamen* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *ibi error magnus, tamen*.

en: Verse 5 ff. — A little below, for *ibi error, magna* [there an error, great] (ed. 1: *magis*) *tamen*, the Vatican and edd. 3, 4 have *ibi error magnus, tamen* [there a great error, yet].

la: Vide infra quaest. seq.

en: See below in the following question.

la: Exod. 22. 18. — Mox codd. D F H M V bb omittunt *nostra* et ante *principum*, cod. T ibi omittit solummodo *et*. Post *principum* cod. D addit *quando perverse et contra iustitiae ordinem abutuntur ea*.

en: Exod. 22:18. — Soon codd. D F H M V bb omit *nostra* and before *principum*, cod. T there omits only *et*. After *principum* cod. D adds *when they abuse it perversely and against the order of justice*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ut haec et sequentes quaestiones solvantur, tria secundum communem doctrinam distinguenda sunt, scilicet *essentia potestatis*, *modus eam acquirendi* et *modus ea utendi*. Primum, scilicet ordo superioris ad inferiorem, semper et bonum est et a Deo. Sed *modus acquirendi* et *utendi* potest esse malus et non a Deo nisi secundum permissionem. Haec principia valent respectu potestatis tum spiritualis tum saecularis.
De hac (I.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 48. m. 1. a. 1-3. (ubi plura habet de duplici potestate, regali et sacerdotali, nec non de comparatione utriusque inter se) et q. 40. m. 1-5. (ubi de praeeminentia spiritualis potestatis loquitur). — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; Opusc. 16. (alias 20.) de Regimine principum, III. c. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 24. q. 141. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**II.** Quod attinet sequentem quaest., Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. eodem quo S. Bonav. modo distinguunt triplicem potestatem dominandi. Omnes autem concedunt, quod tertia species, scilicet potestas coercendi vi subditos, non conveniat statui innocentiae, et a fortiori nec servitus proprie dicta.
De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 93. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, IV. Sent. d. 36. q. 1, et Oxon. IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. n. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 96. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That this and the following questions may be solved, three things according to common doctrine must be distinguished, namely the *essence of power*, the *mode of acquiring it*, and the *mode of using it*. The first, namely the order of the superior to the inferior, is always both good and from God. But the *mode of acquiring* and *of using* can be evil and not from God except by permission. These principles hold with respect to power, both spiritual and secular.
On this (1st) question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 48. m. 1. a. 1-3. (where he treats much of the twofold power, royal and sacerdotal, as also of the comparison of the two to each other) and q. 40. m. 1-5. (where he speaks of the pre-eminence of spiritual power). — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 2; Opusc. 16. (alias 20.) On the Governance of Princes, III. c. 1-3. — B. Albert, here a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 24. q. 141. m. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**II.** As regards the following question, Alex. of Hales, Petrus a Tarantasia, and Richard of Mediavilla distinguish the threefold power of ruling in the same way as St. Bonaventure. But all concede that the third species, namely the power of coercing subjects by force, does not befit the state of innocence, and a fortiori neither does servitude properly so called.
On this (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 93. m. 1. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, IV. Sent. d. 36. q. 1, and Oxon. IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. n. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 96. a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` raw lines 69792–69936) and cross-checked line-by-line against 450 dpi column-band PDF crops of printed pp. 1005–1007 (PDF 1027–1029). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Running heads confirmed via crops: p.1005 `DIST. XLIV. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 1005`; p.1006 `1006 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; p.1007 `DIST. XLIV. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 1007`.

**ARTICULUS II opener** (*De potestate praesidendi*, raw 69792) is folded into this q1 per the Vol II chunking convention. Begins at the L-col top of p.1005, immediately after d44-a1-q2's tail.

**Alignment check: PASS.** ARTICULUS II opener lists `Primo quaeritur, utrum omnis potentia dominandi sit a Deo` = q1; `Secundo quaeritur, utrum potestas dominandi sit a Deo secundum institutionem naturae, an secundum punitionem culpae` = q2 (raw 69937).

**Apparatus per-page split map (17 numbered entries):**
- **p.1005** footers 1–8 = `[^1]`–`[^8]` (fresh ARTICULUS II sequence; NO footer migrated in from a1-q2 — q2 there consumed all of p.1004; confirmed clean seam).
- **p.1006** footers 1–9 = `[^9]`–`[^17]` (L-col footers 1–4 = `[^9]`–`[^12]`; R-col footers 5–9 = `[^13]`–`[^17]`).
- **p.1007** carries the q1 tail (R-col top) + the SCHOLION block + the start of QUAESTIO II. **The p.1007 footers (L-col 1–6, R-col 7) all annotate QUAESTIO II's body and belong to a2-q2 — NOT re-claimed here.** The SCHOLION block carries only the Quaracchi lettered source-note "a" (the *De hac (1.) quaestione* author listing), which is reproduced inline within the Scholion text itself rather than as a numbered apparatus entry. q1 therefore claims NO p.1007 footer.

**Scholion location.** This chunk holds **Scholion I and Scholion II** (the SCHOLION block spans p.1007 L-col bottom into R-col top). `has_scholion: true`. **Scholion II ("Quod attinet sequentem quaest…") covers a2-q2** — therefore **a2-q2 has NO scholion of its own; set `has_scholion: false` there.** The Quaracchi scholion source-notes (the *De hac (1.) / (2.) quaestione* author listings, marked by the lettered "a" footnote in Quaracchi) are reproduced inline within the Scholion text.

> **HAND-OFF TO d44-a2-q2 (forwarded):** QUAESTIO II (`Utrum potestas praesidendi sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae, vel secundum punitionem culpae`; opener `Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum potestas praesidendi sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae, vel secundum punitionem culpae. Et quod primo modo, videtur`) begins at raw line **69937**, in the **R-column of printed p.1007** (PDF 1029), immediately after the SCHOLION block; continues onto p.1008+. **a2-q2 has NO scholion of its own** — Scholion II (held here in a2-q1) covers it; set `has_scholion: false`. **a2-q2's first body-footers are the p.1007 footer sequence** (p.1007 L-col footers 1–6 + R-col footer 7 — e.g. footer 1 = `Vers. 26.` [Gen. 1:26]; footer 2 = `Vers. 3. — Pro evadetur cod. F substituit evades`; footer 3 = `Ut supra d. 9. per totam ostensum est. — Mox pro non cod. T habet nec`; footer 4 = Aristot. III. Polit. c. 4 et 12; footer 5 = `Cap. 15.` [de Civitate Dei XIX]; footer 6 = `Libr. XXI. Moral. c. 15. n. 22`; footer 7 = `Cap. 15.` [de Civ. Dei]). **a2-q1 consumed NO p.1007 footer** (q1's body ends in the scholion, which carries only the lettered "a" source-note). So a2-q2 claims the ENTIRE p.1007 footer block as its first sequence, then fresh p.1008+ sequences. q2 fund.: 1 (Genesis 1: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem… et praesit*); 2 (in the Angels, order and grades by natural excellence); 3 (potestas dominandi is a property of dignity and nobility); 4 (omne quod pertinet ad conservationem ordinis naturalis pertinet ad institutionem naturae). Sed contra: 1 (Gregory, *Omnes homines natura aequales fecit*); 2 (Augustine, de Civ. Dei XIX, *dominari noluit Deus nisi irrationalibus*); 3 (ratione: libertas/dominium impeditiva). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render. **d.44 is the LAST distinction of Vol II** — when d.44 completes, Vol II is DONE (update landing/About copy per MEMORY.md `update-about-copy-after-vol2`). d.50 polish gate does NOT apply. Remaining d.44: a2-q2, a3-q1/q2, dubia.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR clean for this region; every reading confirmed line-by-line against the 450 dpi column-band crops.