title: Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### QUAESTIO III.

*Utrum processio Spiritus sancti differat a generatione Filii realiter, vel solum secundum rationem intelligendi.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum processio Spiritus sancti realiter differat a generatione Filii, an solum secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod realiter, videtur:

1. Quia personae differunt secundum suas emanationes; ergo[^1] cum personae realiter differant, non tantum intellectualiter — quia, omni intellectu circumscripto, adhuc remanet trinitas — ergo emanationes, quae sunt processio et generatio, differunt realiter.

2. Item, quae sunt a diversis principiis, realiter differunt; sed generatio est ab uno in divinis, processio Spiritus sancti a duobus, quia a Patre et Filio: ergo realiter differunt.

3. Item, secundum rem[^2] et veritatem aliquorum est principium divina substantia ut voluntas, quorum non est principium ut natura, sicut patet, quia creaturae sunt a Deo agente per modum voluntatis, non per modum naturae: si ergo processio est voluntatis per modum voluntatis, generatio per modum naturae ut naturae, processio et generatio realiter differunt.

4. Item, in imagine creata egressus verbi et egressus amoris distinguuntur, quia differunt realiter; hoc[^3] perfectionis est, quia ex hoc faciunt imaginis trinitatem; sed quod differunt essentialiter, hoc est imperfectionis; sed omne quod perfectionis est, ponendum est in divinis: ergo processio et generatio realiter differunt, quamvis non essentialiter.

**Contra:**

1. Pater[^4] spirat et generat, aut ergo in quantum unus, aut in quantum plures vel plura. Si in quantum plures vel plura, Pater est compositus; si in quantum unus; sed quia Pater et Filius spirant in quantum unum, non sunt duae spirationes, sed una: ergo similiter, si Pater spirat et generat in quantum unum, spiratio et generatio est una productio.

2. Item, secundum omnes verum est, quod Pater ratione fecunditatis naturae[^5] generat, ratione fecunditatis voluntatis spirat; sed in Deo idem est voluntas et natura: ergo etc.

3. Item, emanationes[^6] penes terminos distinguuntur; sed Pater omnino idem et totum, quod dat Filio per generationem, dat Spiritui sancto per processionem: ergo spiratio et generatio sunt omnino una emanatio.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile. Si differunt, aut se ipsis, aut aliis: non se ipsis, quia emanationes nec sunt a se nec ad se: ergo si unumquodque distinguitur per illud quod est, vel a quo est[^7], emanationes huiusmodi se ipsis non distinguuntur; si aliis: aut essentia, aut notione, aut persona. Non essentia; constat, quia illa non distinguit nec distinguitur; non persona, quia eius est distingui, non distinguere: ergo si differunt, hoc erit aliis notionibus; et similiter erit quaerere de illis aliis, et sic in infinitum: ergo etc.

5. Item, si differunt, aut differentia substantiali, aut accidentali: non substantiali, quia talis differentia non est in divinis; non accidentali, quia in Deo non est accidens: ergo etc.

6. Item, plus differt Filius a creatura quam a Spiritu sancto: ergo plus differt generatio a creatione quam a processione; sed generatio non distinguitur a creatione: ergo nec a processione. Probatio mediae: creatio est divina essentia[^8]; sed persona et essentia non distinguuntur ab invicem: ergo nec generatio et creatio.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Generatio et spiratio non tantum secundum modum dicendi differunt, sed etiam secundum differentiam tum originis, tum habitudinis, et etiam se ipsis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod generatio et spiratio sive processio differunt non tantum secundum rationem dicendi, sed etiam secundum differentiam[^9] originis et habitudinis, quia diversus est modus se habendi et differens modus originis; talis autem differentia unitati essentiae non repugnat.

Si autem quaeratur ratio differentiae harum emanationum, dicendum, quod prima ratio differendi non potest assignari a parte terminorum. Termini enim sunt personae, quae non important rationem differendi active, sed passive[^10].

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Si ergo personae[^11] differunt, quaeritur: quibus? et necesse est redire ad emanationes et relationes, quae sunt generatio et processio; et ita in hac assignatione erit circulus.

Similiter ex parte principiorum. Si enim dicatur, quod differunt hae duae emanationes secundum fecunditatem duplicem naturae et voluntatis, quaeritur[^12], quo modo differat fecunditas a fecunditate. Si dicas, quod fecunditas naturae est in solo Patre, voluntatis in Patre et Filio: hoc ulteriorem habet quaestionem, unde veniat haec differentia, et oportet ad hoc venire, quod fecunditas naturae est in *uno*, quia imago procedens per illam nata est esse solum ab uno, fecunditas voluntatis in *duobus*, quia nexus sive processio per modum nexus est in duobus; et ita redit differentia in primum, et est ibi ratio circularis. Ergo patet secundum hoc, quod harum emanationum differentia prima nec est sumenda a parte termini, nec a parte principii.

Et ideo notandum, quod est loqui de huiusmodi emanationibus quantum ad *esse* et quantum ad *distingui*.

Si quantum ad esse, sic habent rationem essendi a suis perfectis principiis et fecundis. Quia enim in Deo est perfectissima natura et natura vera, ideo perfecta et vera fecunditas[^13] in hypostasi, quae habet rationem principii. Et quia vera et perfecta et propria est fecunditas naturae, ideo veram et propriam habet emanationem; et haec est generatio. Similiter intelligendum est de spiratione quantum ad voluntatem. Unde *ratio*, quare huiusmodi vere sunt[^14] in Deo, est vera fecunditas naturae et voluntatis.

Si autem loquamur quantum ad differre, dicendum, quod *se ipsis* differunt, sicut ostensum est[^15], quia omnis distinctio in divinis venit a modis originis et relationis. Unde sicut duae differentiae se ipsis differunt, ut *rationale* et *irrationale*, similiter[^16] in divinis hae duae emanationes. Et sicut differentiae differentiarum innotescunt nobis per alias differentias, quae ab illis oriuntur, sic et in divinis. Quia enim se ipsis distinguuntur generatio et spiratio, ad eas consequitur secundum rationem intelligendi differentia duplex: *una*, quia generatio est ab uno, sed spiratio a duobus. Quia enim generatio est emanatio per modum perfectae assimilationis, ideo ad unum principium respicit; quia vero spiratio est emanatio per modum connexionis, ideo est a duobus. *Alia* differentia est in comparatione ad nos. Quia enim Spiritus sanctus spiratur ut nectens et ita in alterum tendens, ideo Spiritus sanctus procedit ut *donabilis*; Filius vero generatur, et generatio non respicit tertium.

Per has differentias necessario elicitur harum emanationum *concomitantia*. Quia spiratio dat praeintelligere generationem — non enim nectuntur nisi distincti et similes, et ita illi quorum unus est ab alio per generationem — similiter generatio dat consequenter intelligere spirationem; necesse est enim distinctos et omnino similes per deliciosum amorem coniungi.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod differunt, sicut est manifestatum in rationibus; sed illae rationes non sunt sumtae *a priori*.

Aliqui tamen voluerunt assignare alias differentias: et quidam per *vim spirativam* et *generativam*[^17] dicunt differre; sed haec differentia declarat ignotum per ignotius. Alii etiam dixerunt, quod Filius procedit per modum *esse*, Spiritus sanctus per modum *bene esse*; sed haec verba non sunt sana nec tali materiae convenientia.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, utrum Pater spiret in quantum unus etc.; dicendum, quod nec in quantum unus, nec in quantum plures, sed in quantum alio et alio modo se habens; quia alio modo se habet ad Filium, alio modo ad Spiritum sanctum. Iste autem alius et alius modus se habendi non repugnat unitati substantiae vel personae; sed Pater et Filius spirant in eo, quod unum uno modo se habens. Inde est, quod duplex est processio[^18] Filii et Spiritus sancti a Patre, sed una est spiratio sive processio Spiritus sancti a Patre et Filio.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura et voluntas in Deo sunt idem; dicendum, quod etsi natura et voluntas in Deo considerata absolute sint idem, tamen aliquid respicit voluntas ut voluntas in ratione principii, quod non respicit natura ut natura. Et inde est, quod, sicut non sequitur: «creatura est a Deo per modum voluntatis, [ergo] quod ideo sit etiam per modum naturae»; similiter, quia natura et voluntas comparantur ad has emanationes sub ratione principii, ideo nihil prohibet, has emanationes differre, quamvis idem sint in substantia natura et voluntas.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod emanationes differunt penes terminos; dicendum, quod in his inferioribus est verum, ubi emanatio dicit ens in potentia et ita imperfectum; non autem est verum in Deo, quia ibi non dicunt ens in potentia nec imperfectum[^19]; unde in divinis sunt ratio distinguendi. Tamen si velimus dicere, quod differunt penes terminum,

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non accipiemus terminum pro substantia vel essentia, sed pro hypostasi, ut prius habitum est[^20].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum se ipsis vel aliis: patet, quod se ipsis. Et ad id[^21] quod obiicitur, quod non habent esse a se, ergo nec distingui; dicendum, quod illud non tenet in esse originali. Quamvis enim differentiae habeant ortum a genere, tamen non distinguuntur a genere, sed se ipsis[^22].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quo modo differunt, aut substantiali aut accidentali differentia; dicendum, quod insufficienter dividit, quia in divinis est *relationum* differentia, ut dicit Augustinus in quinto *de Trinitate*[^23], quae nec accidentalis nec substantialis est, sed magis dicitur *originalis*.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de creatione, dicendum, quod *ratione connotati* magis differt creatio; sed *ratione principalis significati* non tantum differunt, quia non tantum differt essentia a persona, quantum persona a persona. Unde praedicatur essentia[^24] de persona nec facit aliquo modo aliquem numerum; persona vero distinguitur ab alia persona; et ideo non valet argumentum.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** In solutione huius subtilis quaestionis antiqui Scholastici diversis viis incedunt. Ut status quaestionis accurate discernatur, attendendum est, quod hic agitur de *generatione et spiratione activa*, non de passiva. Unde haec quaestio differt tum a quaestione de differentia inter secundam et tertiam divinam personam (de qua supra d. 9. q. 2), tum ab illa, quid sit *potentia generandi* (d. 7. q. 1), cum qua tamen cohaeret.

Quaeritur igitur primo, cuius naturae sit distinctio inter generationem et spirationem activam. Primo cum sententia communi resolvitur, quod non sit distinctio mere rationis sive secundum modum dicendi; insuper in fundam. asseritur, has emanationes *realiter* differre. Sensus huius distinctionis realis a Brulifero et Barth. de Barberiis (*Cursus Theol.* disp. 12. q. 7. conclus. 3) explicatur, ut idem dicat ac *distinctio formalis* Scoti. Alii eam intelligunt in sensu *distinctionis virtualis*. Plura de hoc vide infra d. 26. q. 1, ubi in Scholio mens Seraphici, collatis variis eiusdem locis, explicabitur. Sufficiat hic notare, non intelligi sub hoc nomine distinctionem stricte realem absolutam, sed «secundum differentiam originis et habitudinis», i. e. «distincta est una ab alia non re essentiali, sed notionali», ut dicit Richard. (hic q. 3.). Insuper constat, S. Doctorem interdum omnem distinctionem maiorem, quam quae est rationis ratiocinantis, nominare *realem*.

Deinde supposita hac duarum emanationum differentia, iterum quaeritur, quae sit ratio huius differentiae, et cum plures assignari possint rationes, quae sit prima eiusdem ratio. In hac secunda quaestione stat praecipua difficultas, quae tanta est, ut Aureolus cum Nominalibus temeritatis arguat eos qui hoc indagare praesumant. Etiam Augustinus cum Magistro (hic in textu) propriam circa hoc ignorantiam confitetur. Quid alii Scholastici circa hanc difficultatem doceant, paucis dicamus.

**II.** Praecipui doctores et antiqui et moderni conveniunt in nonnullis assertionibus, in aliis dissident. Conveniunt (praeter Durand.):

1. in hoc, quod radicalis ratio diversitatis huius ponenda sit in differenti ratione utriusque productionis, cum Filius producatur per modum *intellectus et naturae*, Spiritus sanctus per modum *voluntatis et liberalitatis*. Hoc docet S. Bonav. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 2, d. 10. a. 1. q. 1, hic et in fundam. et in corp. — Communiter theologi, praesertim post Conc. Florentinum, docent, harum emanationum *principium quod* esse personas producentes, *principium vero quo* proximum primae emanationis esse essentiam divinam cum intellectu, sive *memoriam fecundam* (uti multi cum Seraphico loquuntur); secundae vero *principium quo* esse eandem essentiam cum voluntate sive *voluntatem fecundam*.

2. Natura divina aeque formaliter et per se communicatur Spiritui sancto ac Filio. Licet huic positioni nonnulli contradicant, videtur esse certa doctrina, quam docet S. Bonav. praesertim d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. Unde sequitur, radicem illius differentiae quaerendam esse in proprietate duplicis huius fecunditatis (cfr. hic q. 2. ad 1. et 2.).

3. Plures possunt et debent assignari differentiae harum emanationum: nempe *differentia terminorum*, sive personarum emanatarum, quae certe realiter distinguuntur; *differentia principiorum*, tum quia generatio est ab uno, et spiratio a duobus (hic in 2. fundam. et corp.), tum quia *principium quo* proximum est aliud et aliud (3. fundam.); denique est *differentia in comparatione ad nos* (in corp.), quia in secunda emanatione est aliquis specialis respectus ad creaturam secundum aptitudinem donabilitatis, de quo cfr. infra d. 18. q. 2. et 3. Nec est controversia, utrum hae differentiae subsistant, sed quae earum sit *prima ratio* et quasi *a priori*.

**III.** Dissident vero theologi circa aliquas determinationes specialiores.

1. Durandus cum nonnullis nullam aliam differentiam admittere videtur nisi hanc, quod generatio procedat ab uno, spiratio a duobus, quam sententiam merito S. Doctor cum communi impugnat.

2. Disputatur, utrum praeter differentias petitas quasi extrinsecus (sive originaliter a suis principiis, i. e. personis producentibus, sive consequenter a suis terminis) emanationes hae etiam *intrinsecus et formaliter (a priori) differant se ipsis*, i. e. *propriis ipsarum rationibus*, analogo modo, sicut ultimae differentiae (v. g. *rationale* et *irrationale*) differunt. Si hoc affirmatur, haec differentia dici debet *prima* et quasi *formalis*. Illud affirmat S. Doctor in corp. et ad 4. Consentiunt praeter alios Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. et praecipue Scot., qui etiam addit: «differunt se totis». Haec ultima particula explicatur a Scotistis in hoc sensu, quod duabus emanationibus non sit communis aliqua realitas per differentias contrahibilis, licet conveniant in conceptu communi *entis* et *relationis* (Rada, *Controv.* 11. a. 2; Macedo, *Coll.* 7. diff. 2, qui acriter Scotum contra interpretationem ipsius, quam facit Caietanus, defendit). — S. Thomas in *Summa* (I. q. 27. a. 4. ad 1.) concordat cum S. Bonaventura docendo, quod *propriis ipsarum rationibus* differant, quod idem est ac *se ipsis differre*, uti concedit Caietanus (ad hunc locum). Sed idem, *de Potentia* q. 10. a. 2. hanc sententiam non admittit; de alia vero, quod *penes principia* distinguantur, sic iudicat: «Non sufficit, nisi aliud addatur»; denique tertiam ponit, quod «solus *ordo* processionum, qui attenditur secundum

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originem, processiones multiplicat in divinis». In *Comment.* (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad ult.) idem contra rationem S. Bonaventurae de circulo vitioso dicit: «Quod ergo obiicitur, quod relationes consequuntur processiones, unde magis videtur, quod processiones diversae causent diversitatem relationum, quam e converso, vel ad minus erit ibi circulatio; dicendum, quod relatio in divinis non tantum habet, quod sit notio, sed etiam quod sit personalis, id est constituens personam, et ex hoc habet quasi actum differentiae constitutivae et formae propriae ipsius personae, cuius est operatio generationis et spirationis; et ideo non est inconveniens, quod secundum relationis rationem relationes consequantur ipsas processiones et recipiant differentiam ab eis; secundum autem quod sunt formae propriae ipsarum personarum, causent differentiam processionum». Quomodo varia Angelici dicta concilianda sint, disputatur, et conferri potest Caietanus (ad q. 27. a. 4; q. 36. a. 2.). Porro aliquae rationes S. Thomae impugnantur a Scoto, de quo cfr. Rada et Macedo locis citatis. Ceterum eadem difficultas et quaedam differentia opinionis inter Seraphicum et Angelicum redit infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2, ubi plura dicentur in Scholio de hac subtilissima materia.

3. Diversus modus loquendi est circa rationem propriam, cur processio *per modum naturae* differat ab alia *per modum voluntatis*. In prima secundum Bonaventuram (hic in corp.) est «emanatio per modum perfectae assimilationis», et antea dicit, quod per illam procedat *imago*. Quae verba, si conferantur cum explicatione *imaginis*, quam dat d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 2, et cum dictis d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. 3, clare probant, Seraphicum consentire sententiae S. Thomae, qui (S. I. q. 27. a. 4.) docet, in prima emanatione esse rationem similitudinis vi ipsius processionis, non in secunda. Hinc sequitur, falso attribui Seraphico sententiam, cui Richardus (hic q. 3.) favere videtur, quod ista ratio quaerenda sit in hoc, quod Filius accipiat solummodo voluntatem fecundam, non naturam fecundam.

4. Disputatur, utrum dici queat, Spiritum sanctum procedere *necessario* quidem, sed tamen *libere*, quod cum aliis dicit Sirmondus etiam S. Thomas *de Potent.* q. 10. a. 2. ad 5, qui tamen aliis in locis docet, procedere *naturaliter*, quamvis per modum voluntatis. Certe hoc vocabulum *libere* sumitur hic non in sensu stricto et nunc communiter recepto, sed pro *voluntarie*, quatenus non excludit *necessarium*, ut apud plurimos antiquos Patres et doctores et etiam apud S. Bonav., II. *Sent.* d. 25. p. II. q. 2. Unde Rada (*Contr.* 13.) et Macedo (*Coll.* 7.) recte probant, esse hic potius litem de nomine.

5. Disputatur, utrum *Verbum* procedat per actum *dicendi*, ut vult Scotus, cui favet Bonaventura, an per actum *intelligendi*, uti docet S. Thomas cum suis. De hac controversia cfr. infra d. 27. p. II. q. 1. et 3. et Scholion.

**IV.** Sensus solutionis ad 4. hic est. Licet hi actus notionales non habeant esse a se i. e. *extrinsecus* distinctionem a suis principiis originalibus, tamen *intrinsece* distinguuntur se ipsis. Neganda enim est ista illatio («non tenet illud»), quod in esse ab alio orto non possit intrinsecus esse distinctio. Sic albedo et nigredo, licet sint ab aliis causis, differunt se ipsis. Ipse S. Doctor exemplum ponit *ultimarum differentiarum*, quae se ipsis distinguuntur, «quamvis a genere ortum habeant». Genus enim, quod iuxta Aristotelicos in se potentia continet species et differentias, aliquo modo est principium differentiarum. In obiectione igitur commissa est *fallacia figurae dictionis*, quia mutatum est genus unius causae, scil. *efficientis*, in aliud genus, scil. *formalis*.

**V.** Praeter iam laudatos auctores cfr. Scot., in utroque scripto hic q. unica. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 11. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 1. n. 36. et seq.

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### Question III.

*Whether the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the generation of the Son really, or only according to the mode of understanding.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether the procession of the Holy Spirit really differs from the generation of the Son, or only according to the mode of understanding. And that it differs really, is shown:

1. Because the persons differ according to their emanations; therefore[^1], since the persons really differ — not only intellectually, since, with every act of intellect set aside, the trinity still remains — therefore the emanations, which are procession and generation, really differ.

2. Likewise, things which are from diverse principles really differ; but generation in divine things is from one, the procession of the Holy Spirit from two, since [it is] from the Father and the Son: therefore they really differ.

3. Likewise, according to the matter[^2] and the truth of certain things, the divine substance is the principle *as will*, of which it is not the principle *as nature* — as is plain, since creatures are from God acting by way of will, not by way of nature: if therefore procession is of the will *by way of will*, and generation by way of nature *as nature*, then procession and generation really differ.

4. Likewise, in a created image the going-forth of the *word* and the going-forth of the *love* are distinguished, since they really differ; this[^3] belongs to perfection, since from this they make the trinity of the image; but that they should differ *essentially* — this belongs to imperfection; but everything that belongs to perfection is to be posited in divine things: therefore procession and generation really differ, although not essentially.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Father[^4] spirates and generates — therefore either insofar as he is one, or insofar as he is several or many things. If insofar as several or many, the Father is composite; if insofar as one — but since the Father and Son spirate insofar as they are one, the spirations are not two, but one: therefore likewise, if the Father spirates and generates insofar as one, spiration and generation are one production.

2. Likewise, according to all it is true that the Father generates by reason of the *fecundity of nature*[^5], and spirates by reason of the *fecundity of will*; but in God will and nature are the same: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, emanations[^6] are distinguished by their terms; but the Father gives wholly the same and the whole, which he gives to the Son by generation, to the Holy Spirit by procession: therefore spiration and generation are wholly one emanation.

4. Likewise, the same point is shown by *reductio ad impossibile*. If they differ, [they differ] either by themselves or by other things: not by themselves, since emanations are neither *from themselves* nor *to themselves*: therefore if each thing is distinguished by that which it *is*, or by that *from which* it is[^7], emanations of this kind are not distinguished by themselves; if by other things: either by *essence*, or by *notion*, or by *person*. Not by essence — it is plain, since essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished; not by person, since it belongs to person to *be distinguished*, not *to distinguish*: therefore if they differ, this will be by other notions; and similarly we will have to ask about those others, and so on to infinity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if they differ, [they differ] either by *substantial* difference or by *accidental*: not by substantial, since such a difference is not in divine things; not by accidental, since in God there is no accident: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the Son differs more from a creature than from the Holy Spirit: therefore generation differs more from creation than from procession; but generation is not distinguished from creation: therefore neither from procession. Proof of the middle [premise]: creation is the divine essence[^8]; but person and essence are not distinguished from each other: therefore neither generation and creation.

### Conclusion.

> Generation and spiration differ not only according to the mode of speaking, but also according to a difference both of *origin* and of *relation [habitudo]*, and even *by themselves*.

**I respond:** It must be said that generation and spiration — i.e. procession — differ not only according to the mode of speaking, but also according to a difference[^9] of origin and of relation, since the mode of self-relating is diverse and the mode of origin is differing; and such a difference is not repugnant to the unity of essence.

But if the reason of the difference of these emanations is asked, it must be said that the *first* reason of differing cannot be assigned *from the side of the terms*. For the terms are persons, who do not import the account of differing *actively*, but *passively*[^10].

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If therefore the persons[^11] differ, it is asked: by what? — and we have to come back to the emanations and relations, which are generation and procession; and so in this assignment there will be a circle.

Likewise from the side of the principles. For if it be said that these two emanations differ according to the twofold fecundity of nature and of will, it is asked[^12] in what manner one fecundity differs from the other. If you say that the fecundity of nature is in the Father alone, of will in the Father and the Son: this has the further question whence this difference comes, and we have to come round to this — that the fecundity of nature is in *one*, since the image proceeding through it is by nature only from one; the fecundity of will is in *two*, since the bond, or procession by way of bond, is in two; and so the difference returns to the first [point], and the account is circular there. Therefore it is plain on this account that the *first* difference of these emanations is not to be taken from the side of the term, nor from the side of the principle.

And therefore it is to be noted that one can speak of emanations of this kind both as to *being* and as to *being-distinguished*.

If as to being, they thus have the account of being from their perfect and fecund principles. For since in God there is the most perfect nature and a true nature, therefore there is perfect and true fecundity[^13] in the hypostasis which has the account of principle. And since the fecundity of nature is true and perfect and proper, therefore it has a true and proper emanation; and this is generation. Similarly we are to understand of spiration with respect to will. Hence the *reason* why these are truly[^14] in God is the true fecundity of nature and of will.

But if we speak as to the differing, it must be said that they differ *by themselves*, as has been shown[^15], since every distinction in divine things comes from the modes of origin and relation. Hence just as two differences differ by themselves — as *rational* and *irrational* — so likewise[^16] in divine things these two emanations. And just as the differences of differences become known to us through other differences which arise from them, so also in divine things. For since generation and spiration are distinguished by themselves, there follow upon them, according to our mode of understanding, a twofold difference: *one*, since generation is from one, but spiration from two. For since generation is emanation by way of perfect assimilation, therefore it regards one principle; while spiration is emanation by way of connection, therefore it is from two. The *other* difference is in comparison to us. For since the Holy Spirit is spirated as connecting and so tending toward another, therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds as *donable*; the Son, however, is generated, and generation does not regard a third.

Through these differences there is necessarily elicited the *concomitance* of these emanations. For spiration gives [us] to understand generation in advance — since [persons] are not connected unless they are distinct and like, and so [unless they are] those of whom one is from the other by generation; — likewise generation gives [us] to understand spiration consequently, for it is necessary that the distinct and wholly like be conjoined by delightful love.

The arguments proving that they differ are therefore to be granted, as has been made plain in the [pro-]arguments; but those arguments are not taken *a priori*.

Some, however, have wished to assign other differences: certain ones say that they differ by the *power of spirating* and *of generating*[^17]; but this difference declares the unknown by what is more unknown. Others have said that the Son proceeds by way of *being*, the Holy Spirit by way of *well-being*; but these words are neither sound nor suitable to such matter.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected — whether the Father spirates insofar as he is one, etc. — it must be said that [he spirates] neither insofar as he is one, nor insofar as he is several, but insofar as he is *self-relating in one mode and another*; since he relates to the Son in one mode, to the Holy Spirit in another mode. This other-and-other mode of self-relating, however, is not repugnant to the unity of substance or person; but the Father and the Son spirate in this — that they are *one self-relating in one mode*. Hence it is that there is a twofold procession[^18] of the Son and of the Holy Spirit from the Father, but the spiration or procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is one.

*To 2.* To what is objected — that nature and will in God are the same — it must be said that, although nature and will in God considered absolutely are the same, nevertheless something is regarded by *will-as-will* in the account of principle which is not regarded by *nature-as-nature*. And hence it is that, just as it does not follow that "the creature is from God by way of will, [therefore] for that reason it is also by way of nature," similarly, since nature and will are compared to these emanations under the account of principle, therefore nothing prohibits these emanations from differing, although nature and will are the same in substance.

*To 3.* To what is objected — that emanations differ by their terms — it must be said that this is true in lower things, where emanation signifies a being in potency and so something imperfect; but it is not true in God, since there [the emanations] do not signify a being in potency, nor anything imperfect[^19]; hence in divine things [the terms] are *not* the [first] reason of distinguishing. Yet if we wish to say that they differ by their term,

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we will not take *term* for substance or essence, but for hypostasis, as was held above[^20].

*To 4.* To what is asked — whether by themselves or by other things: it is plain, by themselves. And to that[^21] which is objected — that they do not have being from themselves, therefore neither [do they have] being-distinguished — it must be said that this does not hold in *original* being. For although differences have origin from the genus, yet they are not distinguished from the genus, but by themselves[^22].

*To 5.* To what is objected — in what manner do they differ, by *substantial* or by *accidental* difference: it must be said that the division is insufficient, since in divine things there is the difference *of relations*, as Augustine says in book V *On the Trinity*[^23], which is neither accidental nor substantial, but is rather called *original*.

*To 6.* To what is objected concerning creation, it must be said that *by reason of what is connoted* creation differs more; but *by reason of what is principally signified* they do not differ as much, since essence does not differ from person as much as person from person. Hence essence is predicated[^24] of person and does not in any way make any number; person, however, is distinguished from another person; and therefore the argument does not hold.

### Scholion.

**I.** In the solution of this subtle question the older Scholastics proceed by various paths. That the state of the question may be accurately discerned, it must be attended to that here we are dealing with *active generation and spiration*, not with passive. Hence this question differs both from the question on the difference between the second and third divine person (on which see above d. 9, q. 2), and from that question on what the *power of generating* is (d. 7, q. 1), with which, however, it coheres.

It is asked therefore in the first place, of what nature is the distinction between active generation and active spiration. First, with the common opinion, it is settled that it is not a distinction of mere reason, or according to the mode of speaking; in addition, in the *fundamenta*, it is asserted that these emanations *really* differ. The sense of this real distinction is explained by Bruliferus and Bartholomaeus de Barberiis (*Cursus Theologicus* disp. 12, q. 7, conclus. 3) as saying the same as the *formal distinction* of Scotus. Others understand it in the sense of *virtual distinction*. On this see further below at d. 26, q. 1, where in the Scholion the Seraphic Doctor's mind, after collating various places of his, will be explained. Let it suffice here to note that under this name we are not to understand a strictly real absolute distinction, but [a distinction] "according to a difference of origin and relation," i.e. "one is distinguished from the other not by an essential reality, but by a notional [reality]," as Richard says (here q. 3). Furthermore, it is plain that the Holy Doctor sometimes calls *real* every distinction greater than that of *reason reasoning [rationis ratiocinantis]*.

Then, with this difference of the two emanations supposed, it is asked again what is the reason of this difference; and since several reasons can be assigned, what is the *first* reason of it. In this second question lies the chief difficulty — so great that Aureolus with the Nominalists charges with rashness those who presume to investigate this. Augustine too, with the Master (here in the text), confesses his own ignorance on this point. Let us say briefly what other Scholastics teach on this difficulty.

**II.** The chief doctors, both ancient and modern, agree on some assertions, and differ on others. They agree (except for Durandus):

1. in this — that the radical reason of this diversity is to be placed in the differing account of the two productions, since the Son is produced by way of *intellect and nature*, the Holy Spirit by way of *will and liberality*. This St. Bonaventure teaches above d. 6, a. 1, q. 2; d. 10, a. 1, q. 1; here both in the *fundamenta* and in the *corpus*. — Theologians commonly, especially after the Council of Florence, teach that the *principium quod* of these emanations are the producing persons; the proximate *principium quo* of the first emanation is the divine essence with intellect, or *fecund memory* (as many speak with the Seraphic Doctor); but the *principium quo* of the second is the same essence with will, or *fecund will*.

2. The divine nature is communicated equally formally and *per se* to the Holy Spirit as to the Son. Although some contradict this position, it appears to be certain doctrine, which St. Bonaventure teaches especially d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. Whence it follows that the root of that difference is to be sought in the property of this twofold fecundity (cf. here q. 2, ad 1 and 2).

3. Several differences of these emanations can and ought to be assigned: namely the *difference of terms*, or of the persons emanated, which certainly are really distinguished; the *difference of principles*, both since generation is from one and spiration from two (here in the second *fundamentum* and in the corpus), and since the proximate *principium quo* is one and another (third *fundamentum*); finally there is the *difference in comparison to us* (in the corpus), since in the second emanation there is some special regard to the creature according to the aptitude of *donability*, on which see below d. 18, q. 2 and 3. Nor is there controversy about whether these differences subsist, but about which of them is the *first reason* and as it were *a priori*.

**III.** Theologians differ, however, on certain more particular determinations.

1. Durandus with some seems to admit no other difference except this — that generation proceeds from one, spiration from two — which opinion the Holy Doctor with the common [tradition] rightly opposes.

2. It is disputed whether, beyond the differences sought as it were extrinsically (whether *originally* from their principles, i.e. the producing persons, or *consequently* from their terms), these emanations also *intrinsically and formally (a priori) differ by themselves*, i.e. *by their own proper accounts*, in an analogous way to that in which ultimate differences (e.g. *rational* and *irrational*) differ. If this is affirmed, this difference must be called the *first* and as it were *formal*. The Holy Doctor affirms this in the *corpus* and *ad 4*. Among others Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla agree, and especially Scotus, who also adds: "they differ *by their wholes*." This last clause is explained by Scotists in this sense — that the two emanations have no common reality contractible by differences, although they agree in the common concept of *being* and *relation* (Rada, *Controversiae* 11, a. 2; Macedo, *Collationes* 7, diff. 2 — who keenly defends Scotus against the interpretation of him made by Cajetan). — St. Thomas in the *Summa* (I, q. 27, a. 4, ad 1) agrees with St. Bonaventure in teaching that they differ *by their own proper accounts*, which is the same as *to differ by themselves*, as Cajetan grants (on this place). But the same [Thomas], *De Potentia* q. 10, a. 2, does not admit this opinion; and on the other [opinion] — that they are distinguished *by their principles* — he judges thus: "It is not enough, unless something else is added"; finally he posits a third — that "the order of processions alone, which is attended to according to

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origin, multiplies processions in divine things." In his *Commentary* (here q. 1, a. 2, ad ult.) the same [Thomas] against Bonaventure's argument from the vicious circle says: "What therefore is objected — that the relations follow upon the processions, whence it appears rather that diverse processions cause the diversity of relations, than conversely, or at least there will be a circle there — is to be answered: that relation in divine things has not only that it is *notion*, but also that it is *personal*, that is, constituting the person; and from this it has as it were the act of a *constitutive difference* and of *the proper form* of the very person, whose [act] is the operation of generating and of spirating; and therefore it is not unsuitable that, according to the account of relation, the relations follow upon the processions themselves and receive a difference from them; whereas insofar as they are the proper forms of the persons themselves, they cause the difference of the processions." How the various sayings of the Angelic Doctor are to be reconciled, is disputed, and Cajetan can be consulted (on q. 27, a. 4; q. 36, a. 2). Furthermore some of St. Thomas's reasonings are impugned by Scotus; on which see Rada and Macedo at the cited places. The same difficulty and a certain difference of opinion between the Seraphic and the Angelic Doctor returns below at d. 27, p. I, q. 2, where more will be said in the Scholion on this most subtle matter.

3. There is a different mode of speaking concerning the proper reason why procession *by way of nature* differs from the other *by way of will*. In the first, according to Bonaventure (here in corp.), there is "emanation by way of perfect assimilation," and earlier he says that through it the *image* proceeds. These words, if compared with the explanation of *image* which he gives at d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and with what is said at d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2 and 3, clearly prove that the Seraphic Doctor agrees with the opinion of St. Thomas, who (S. I, q. 27, a. 4) teaches that in the first emanation there is the account of likeness *by force of the procession itself*, not in the second. Hence it follows that the opinion is wrongly attributed to the Seraphic Doctor, to which Richard (here q. 3) seems to incline — that this reason is to be sought in the fact that the Son receives only the *fecund will*, not *fecund nature*.

4. It is disputed whether it can be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds *necessarily* indeed but yet *freely*, which Sirmondus says with others — also St. Thomas, *de Potentia* q. 10, a. 2, ad 5 — who however in other places teaches that he proceeds *naturally*, although *by way of will*. Certainly this word *libere* is taken here not in the strict and now commonly received sense, but for *voluntarie*, insofar as it does not exclude the *necessarium*, as among very many ancient Fathers and doctors and even with St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.* d. 25, p. II, q. 2. Hence Rada (*Controversiae* 13) and Macedo (*Collationes* 7) rightly prove that this is rather a dispute over a name.

5. It is disputed whether the *Word* proceeds by an act of *speaking [dicere]*, as Scotus holds — to whom Bonaventure inclines — or by an act of *understanding [intelligere]*, as St. Thomas teaches with his [followers]. On this controversy see below d. 27, p. II, q. 1 and 3, and the Scholion.

**IV.** The sense of the response *to 4* here is this. Although these notional acts do not have being from themselves — i.e. *extrinsically* [do not have] distinction from their original principles — yet *intrinsically* they are distinguished by themselves. For the inference must be denied ("that does not hold") that in being arisen from another there cannot intrinsically be distinction. Thus *whiteness* and *blackness*, although they are from other causes, differ by themselves. The Holy Doctor himself sets the example of *ultimate differences*, which are distinguished by themselves "although they have origin from the genus." For the genus, which according to the Aristotelians contains in itself in potency the species and differences, is in some manner the principle of the differences. In the objection, then, there has been committed the *fallacy of figure of speech*, since the genus of one cause — namely the *efficient* — has been changed into another genus — namely the *formal*.

**V.** Besides the authors already cited, cf. Scotus, in both *scripta* here, q. unica. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 11, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Aegidius of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 60, q. 1, n. 36 ff.

---

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hic *ergo* et paulo ante *Quia*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here supplied *ergo* ("therefore"), and a little earlier *Quia* ("Because").

la: Ed. 1 *rationem* loco *rem*.

en: Ed. 1 reads *rationem* ("the account") in place of *rem* ("the matter").

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum *enim*, sicuti mox post *sed* adiunctum *secundum*.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here struck out *enim* ("for"), added by the Vatican edition, just as shortly after, *secundum* ("according to") joined after *sed* ("but").

la: Vat. nomini *Pater* praefigit *sic*, cod. cc *quia sic*, cod. Y *ergo*; sed plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 quamlibet particulam omittunt.

en: The Vatican edition prefixes *sic* ("thus") to the name *Pater*, codex cc reads *quia sic* ("since thus"), codex Y reads *ergo* ("therefore"); but most codices, with ed. 1, omit any such particle.

la: Auctoritate fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 removimus hic a Vat. additum *intellectualis*.

en: On the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here removed *intellectualis* ("intellectual"), added by the Vatican edition [reading "fecundity of intellectual nature"].

la: Vat. praeter fidem vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 addit *Patris*, et paulo infra post *idem* contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 omittit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *Patris* ("of the Father") [reading "the emanations of the Father"], and a little below, after *idem* ("the same"), against the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, omits *et* ("and").

la: Pauci codd. ut MZ addunt *est*.

en: A few codices, such as M and Z, add *est* ("is") [reading "vel a quo *est*", "or by which it is"].

la: In codd. O Z satis bene adiicitur: *generatio vero est divina persona*.

en: In codices O and Z there is added, well enough: "but generation is the divine *person*" [parallel to "creation is the divine *essence*"].

la: Codd. P Q addunt *et rationem*.

en: Codices P and Q add *et rationem* ("and an account") [reading "according to a difference *and an account* of origin and of relation"].

la: Sensus est: non important ipsam rationem, quae facit differentiam, sed sunt subiecta, inter quae habetur differentia. — Paulo ante cod. X post *enim* adiungit *proprie*.

en: The sense is: [the persons] do not import the very account that *makes* the difference, but are the subjects between which the difference is held. — A little earlier, codex X after *enim* adds *proprie* ("properly").

la: Ita mss. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. initium huius propositionis variis adiectis ita exhibet: *si ergo personae differunt, quare et in quibus differant, si ostendere voluerimus necesse est etc.* Mox ed. 1 *esset* loco *erit*.

en: Thus the manuscripts with ed. 1, while the Vatican edition, with various additions, presents the opening of this proposition thus: "if therefore the persons differ, *why and in what they differ, if we should wish to show*, it is necessary, etc." Shortly after, ed. 1 reads *esset* ("would be") in place of *erit* ("will be").

la: Sequimur vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 ponendo *quaeritur* pro *quaero*.

en: We follow the older codices with ed. 1 in placing *quaeritur* ("it is asked") for *quaero* ("I ask").

la: In cod. Y additur *dupliciter*.

en: In codex Y is added *dupliciter* ("in two ways") [reading "perfect and true fecundity in two ways"].

la: Cfr. supra d. 9. q. I; de voluntate d. 10. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. above [I *Sent.*] d. 9, q. I; on the will, d. 10, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *sint*.

en: The Vatican edition, despite the resistance of most manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *sint* ("they should be") [for *sunt*, "they are"].

la: In hac ipsa quaestione; cfr. etiam q. praec. praesertim ad 1. et 2.

en: [The back-reference] is to this very question; cf. also the preceding question, especially *ad 1* and *ad 2*.

la: Cod. V loco *similiter* habet *sic*, cod. X *sic etiam*. Mox aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 prave *tunc* loco *sicut*.

en: Codex V in place of *similiter* ("likewise") reads *sic* ("thus"); codex X *sic etiam* ("thus also"). Shortly after, some codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 perversely [read] *tunc* ("then") in place of *sicut* ("just as").

la: In cod. bb additur *scilicet*.

en: In codex bb is added *scilicet* ("namely") [glossing the *vim spirativam et generativam* phrase].

la: Vat. sibi non constans et contra plurimos codd. nec non ed. 1 *imperfectionem*, dum cod. 1 et hic et paulo supra legit *imperfectionem*. Mox post *divinis* Vat. addit *non*, quod codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt, et bene, quia subiectum huius propositionis non sunt termini, sed emanationes, quae, uti supra dictum est, in Deo se ipsis differunt et sunt ratio distinguendi. Unus alterve codex ut B O cum ed. 1 modo singulari *in divinis est ratio*, sed non ita bene propter subiecti mutationem; simile dicas de lectione cod. bb *in divinis sunt rationes*.

en: The Vatican edition, inconsistent with itself and against most codices and ed. 1, [reads] *imperfectionem* ("imperfection") [for *imperfectum*, "imperfect"], while codex 1 both here and a little above reads *imperfectionem*. Shortly after, after *divinis* the Vatican edition adds *non* ("not"), which the codices with the first six editions omit, and rightly, because the subject of this proposition is not the *terms* but the *emanations*, which, as was said above, in God differ by themselves and are the [first] reason of distinguishing. One or another codex, like B and O, with ed. 1, in the singular [reads] *in divinis est ratio* ("in divine things [the term] is the reason"), but not so well, because of the change of subject; you may say the like of the reading of codex bb *in divinis sunt rationes* ("are reasons").

la: Quaest. praeced. ad 3.

en: [I.e.] in the preceding question [d. 13, q. 2], *ad 3*.

la: Plures codd. ut F H K T etc. *illud*.

en: Several codices, such as F, H, K, T, etc., read *illud* ("that") [for *id*].

la: Vat. cum ed. 1 *sed a se ipsis*; obstant autem mss.

en: The Vatican edition with ed. 1 reads *sed a se ipsis* ("but *from* themselves"); the manuscripts, however, are against this.

la: Cap. 5. n. 6. — Mox cod. Z *differentia* loco *dicitur*.

en: [Augustine, *De Trinitate* V,] c. 5, n. 6. — Shortly after, codex Z reads *differentia* ("a difference") in place of *dicitur* ("is called").

la: Vat. et cod. cc *essentialiter* pro *essentia*, sed emendavimus ex ceteris mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition and codex cc read *essentialiter* ("essentially") for *essentia* ("essence"); but we have emended from the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

translators_notes:
**Ambiguities flagged.** Several textual spots required care — see `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities.md`. Summary:

- **fn 18 anchor (cod. bb adds *scilicet*)**: Anchor placed at *vim spirativam et generativam* (the rejected first opinion), which is the most plausible spot for a glossing *scilicet*. Could equally belong at the *Filius procedit per modum esse, Spiritus per modum bene esse* clause. → PDF spot-check p. 236 fn 8.
- **fn 19 (long *imperfectum*/*imperfectionem* note)**: The OCR's break between cod. variants on p. 236 and the continuation on p. 237 (where the Quaracchi editor's exegesis "subiectum huius propositionis non sunt termini, sed emanationes" sits) was reassembled by linking content. High confidence on the join, but worth verifying alignment against PDF p. 236 fn 9 / p. 237 marginal continuation.

**Doctrinal:** Bonaventure's settled position is the strong one: generation and spiration *se ipsis* differ — by themselves, not derivatively from anything else. This is the fully *a priori* difference. The two derivative differences (one principle vs two; image vs donable bond) are real but consequent. The respondeo's pivotal move is the rejection of *both* candidate "first reasons" for the difference: not from the side of the terms (persons-as-distinguished are passive, not the active source of distinction; appealing to them runs in a circle through the emanations), and not from the side of the principles (appealing to the duplex fecundity of nature/will runs the same circle through the question why one fecundity is in *one* and the other in *two*, and the answer turns out to be the very emanations under investigation). With both extrinsic routes blocked, the only remaining ground is the intrinsic one: ultimate differences (*rationale*/*irrationale*) differ by themselves; so do these two divine emanations. The scholion situates this within Scotus's *distinctio formalis* / *differunt se totis* — where Bonaventure's "*se ipsis*" anticipates Scotus's full thesis — and notes that Aquinas in the *Summa* (I.27.4 ad 1) ratifies Bonaventure's "*propriis ipsarum rationibus*" formula but in *De Potentia* q.10 a.2 backs away from it. The dispute over whether the Spirit proceeds *libere* (Sirmond, Thomas in *De Pot.*) or only *naturaliter per modum voluntatis* (Thomas elsewhere) is a *lis de nomine*, since *libere* in the older Patristic usage means *voluntarie* and is compatible with *necessarium*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt:
Utrum Spiritus sanctus sit ingenitus
Whether the Holy Spirit is unbegotten

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 235 -->

### QUAESTIO IV.

*Utrum Spiritus sanctus sit ingenitus.*

Supposita differentia generationis et processionis, quaeritur hic quarto, utrum Spiritus sanctus sit ingenitus. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Hieronymi, quam Magister ponit in littera[^1].

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione Hieronymi: «Quia omne quod est, aut est ingenitum, aut genitum, aut factum»; sed Spiritus sanctus non est genitus, aut factus: ergo est ingenitus.

3. Item, negatio privativa cum constantia subiecti aequipollet termino privativo. Unde *non par* circa numerum idem est quod *impar*[^2]; et sic, cum Spiritus sanctus genitus non sit, ergo est ingenitus.

4. Item, plus distat a ratione generationis Spiritus sanctus quam Pater; quia Pater generat, quamvis non generetur, Spiritus vero sanctus nec generat nec [generatur]: ergo aeque vere privatur generatio a Spiritu sancto ut a Patre: ergo, sicut Pater dicitur ingenitus, sic et Spiritus sanctus.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus *ad Orosium*[^3] dicit, quod «solus Pater est ingenitus»: ergo secundum hoc non convenit Spiritui sancto.

2. Item, *ingenitus* aut dicitur secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Si secundum relationem, ergo est notio: ergo Spiritus sanctus habet duas notiones, et ita essent sex; quod est contra communem opinionem. Si secundum substantiam: ergo pari ratione diceretur de Filio, cum illud quod secundum substantiam dicitur, conveniat tribus.

3. Item, cum divina essentia non sit genita, nec Spiritus sanctus sit genitus, nec Pater sit genitus, nec etiam aliquod istorum sit factum: ergo ratio *ingeniti* secundum Hieronymum omnibus convenit; *[quaestio incidens]* quaeritur ergo, quo modo differenter[^4] [singulis conveniat].

### CONCLUSIO.

> Spiritus sanctus dici potest ingenitus in sensu privativo, non autem quatenus *ingenitus* est notio Patris.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt[^5] distinguere de hoc nomine *ingenitum*, quod potest scribi per unum *n*, et sic tantum valet quantum *increatum*; vel per duo, et sic opponitur ei quod est *genitum* proprie dictum. Sed haec distinctio, etsi valeat apud Graecos, non tamen valet apud Latinos, quia *ingenitum* per duo *n* est vox non significativa apud nos. Damascenus[^6] autem assignat hanc differentiam in lingua sua, quia Graecus erat. Praeterea, non valet ad propositum; quia nihil quaeritur hic de *ingenito* prout tantum valet quantum *increatum*, sed prout tantum valet quantum *non genitum* sive *innascibile*.

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Et propterea aliter dicendum est, et breviter, quod *ingenitum* uno modo pure accipitur privative, scilicet *quod non generatur*[^7]; et hoc modo dicitur de Spiritu sancto et de essentia. Alio modo, prout[^8] *ingenitum* tantum valet quantum *non ens ab alio, et a quo alii*; et hoc modo dicit notionem solius Patris, quia dicit proprietatem et dignitatem in Patre. Et secundum primum sensum loquitur Hieronymus, secundum alium loquitur Augustinus. Unde autem habeant ortum isti sensus, et quare *innascibilis* sit notio et non *improcessibilis*, infra dicetur[^9].

Ex his patet solutio contrarietatis; patent etiam obiecta.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod negatio cum constantia subiecti aequipollet termino privativo, verum est, si sit mere[^10] privativum; sed illa ratio concludit solum de hoc nomine secundum quod *privat*, non secundum quod aliquid *ponit*.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, aut praedicat[^11] essentiam, aut relationem; dicendum, quod, secundum quod dicitur de essentia, solum privative sive negative tenetur. Et ideo non praedicat aliquid, sicut quando dicitur: «essentia non generat». Cetera alia[^12] manifesta sunt.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Haec quaestio orta esse videtur ex diverso modo loquendi, quo in hac re SS. Doctores Augustinus et Hieronymus usi sunt. S. Bonav. duas istorum sententias apte conciliat. Plurima de ratione *innascibilitatis* habentur infra d. 28. per totam.

**II.** Quoad ordinem solutionum ad opposita notandum, quod verba in fine corporis: «patent obiecta» referuntur ad 1, 2, 4 pro parte affirmativa. Deinde explicite solvit argum. 3 pro affirm.; et ultimo respondet ad distinctionem in 2 pro parte negativa.

**III.** Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 69. m. 3. — Scot., hic q. unic., et d. 28. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 33. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. seq. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english:
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### Question IV.

*Whether the Holy Spirit is unbegotten.*

With the difference of generation and procession supposed, it is asked here in the fourth place whether the Holy Spirit is *unbegotten* [*ingenitus*]. And that he is, is shown:

1. By the authority of Jerome, which the Master sets down in the *littera*[^1].

2. Likewise, the same point is shown by the reasoning of Jerome: "Since everything that is, is either *unbegotten*, or *begotten*, or *made*"; but the Holy Spirit is neither begotten nor made: therefore he is unbegotten.

3. Likewise, a privative negation, with the subject standing fast, is equivalent to a privative term. Hence *non-even* concerning number is the same as *odd*[^2]; and so, since the Holy Spirit is not begotten, therefore he is unbegotten.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is more distant from the account of generation than the Father; for the Father generates, although he is not generated; the Holy Spirit, however, neither generates nor [is generated]: therefore generation is denied of the Holy Spirit just as truly as of the Father: therefore, as the Father is called *unbegotten*, so also the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine *ad Orosium*[^3] says that "the Father alone is unbegotten": therefore on this account it does not belong to the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, *unbegotten* is said either according to substance or according to relation. If according to relation, then it is a *notion*: therefore the Holy Spirit has two notions, and so there would be six [notions in all] — which is against common opinion. If according to substance: then by parity of reasoning it would be said of the Son too, since what is said according to substance belongs to all three.

3. Likewise, since the divine essence is not begotten, nor is the Holy Spirit begotten, nor is the Father begotten, nor moreover is any of these *made*: therefore the account of *unbegotten* according to Jerome belongs to all; *[an incidental question:]* it is asked, then, in what differing way[^4] [it belongs to each].

### Conclusion.

> The Holy Spirit can be called *unbegotten* in a privative sense, but not insofar as *unbegotten* is a notion of the Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that some have wished[^5] to distinguish concerning this name *ingenitum*, [namely] that it can be written with one *n* — and so it has the value of *uncreated* [*increatum*] — or with two, and so is opposed to that which is *begotten* properly so called. But this distinction, although it holds among the Greeks, does not hold among the Latins, since *ingenitum* with two *n*'s is not a significative utterance among us. Damascene[^6], however, assigns this difference in his own language, since he was a Greek. Moreover, it is not relevant to the matter at hand; since nothing is asked here about *ingenitum* as it is equivalent to *uncreated*, but as it is equivalent to *not-begotten* or *unbegettable*.

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And therefore it must be said otherwise, and briefly, that *ingenitum* is taken in one mode purely privatively, namely *that which is not generated*[^7]; and in this mode it is said both of the Holy Spirit and of the [divine] essence. In another mode, insofar as[^8] *ingenitum* has the value of *not being from another, and one from whom others are*; and in this mode it signifies the notion of the Father alone, since it signifies a property and dignity in the Father. And in the first sense Jerome speaks; in the second, Augustine. Whence, however, these senses arise — and why *unbegettable* [*innascibilis*] is a notion and not *unproceedable* [*improcessibilis*] — will be said below[^9].

From these things the solution of the apparent contrariety is plain; the [other] objections are likewise plain.

To what is objected, then — that negation with the subject standing fast is equivalent to a privative term — it is true if [the term] is merely[^10] privative; but that reasoning concludes only of this name [*ingenitum*] insofar as it *deprives*, not insofar as it *posits* something.

To what is objected — [whether *ingenitum*] predicates[^11] essence or relation — it must be said that, insofar as it is said of essence, it is taken only privatively or negatively. And therefore it does not predicate something, as when it is said: "the essence does not generate." The other matters[^12] are clear.

### Scholion.

**I.** This question seems to have arisen from the different mode of speaking which the Holy Doctors Augustine and Jerome have used in this matter. St. Bonaventure aptly reconciles their two opinions. Much on the account of *unbegettability* is found below at d. 28 throughout.

**II.** As to the order of the solutions of the opposing arguments, it is to be noted that the words at the end of the corpus — "the objections are plain" — refer to *[arguments] 1, 2, 4* on the affirmative side. Then he explicitly solves argument 3 on the affirmative; and finally he replies to the distinction in *[argument] 2* on the negative side.

**III.** Cf. Alex. Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 69, m. 3. — Scotus, here q. unic., and d. 28, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 33, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8 ff. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

la: Vide lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Mox aliqui codd. ut A W X Y *Quod* loco *Quia*.

en: See the Master's *littera* [Lombard, *Sententiae* I, d. 13], c. 4. — Shortly after, some codices such as A, W, X, Y read *Quod* ("That") in place of *Quia* ("Since") [opening pro-arg 2's quotation].

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Periher.* c. 1. (c. 10.) et Comment. Boethii in hunc locum, ubi ait: *Idem enim valet ad intelligentiam quod dicitur «iniustus», tanquam si dicatur «non iustus»*. — Paulo infra ope mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *sanctus*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 1 (c. 10), and Boethius's commentary on this place, where he says: "For *iniustus* ['unjust'] has the same value for understanding as if one said *non iustus* ['not just']." — A little below, with the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have added *sanctus* ["nor *Spiritus* (*sanctus*) generates," in pro-arg 4].

la: Quaest. 2. et 8. Vide lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: [Augustine, *ad Orosium*,] qq. 2 and 8. See the Master's *littera*, c. 4.

la: Sequimur multos codd. loco *differunt* ponendo *differenter*, supple: *singulis conveniat*.

en: We follow many codices in placing *differenter* ("differently") in place of *differunt* ("they differ"); supply: *singulis conveniat* ("[in what differing way] it belongs to each").

la: In cod. V additur *dicere sive*.

en: In codex V is added *dicere sive* [reading "have wished *to say or to* distinguish"].

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 8: *Sciendum enim vocem* ἀγένητον, *cum scribitur cum unico* ν, *increatum significare seu quod minime factum est;* ἀγέννητον *autem, cum scribitur cum duplici* νν, *id indicare quod non est genitum*.

en: [John Damascene,] *On the Orthodox Faith* I, c. 8: "It must be known that the word *agenēton*, when it is written with a single *nu*, signifies *uncreated* or what has by no means been *made*; whereas *agennēton*, when it is written with a double *nu*, indicates that which is *not begotten*."

la: Vat. minus distincte, et mss. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, *quod ingenitum dicitur uno modo, prout accipitur privative, scilicet pro eo quod non generatur*.

en: The Vatican edition, less distinctly — and with the manuscripts and ed. 1 resisting — reads: "that *ingenitum* is said in one way, insofar as it is taken privatively, namely for that which is not generated" [conflating the two phases of Bonaventure's distinction].

la: Cod. K *quantum ens non ab alio, sed*.

en: Codex K reads *quantum ens non ab alio, sed* [inverting the order: "as a being not-from-another, but…"].

la: Dist. 28. per totam.

en: [See below, I *Sent.*] d. 28, throughout.

la: Multi codd. ut AGHISTUVWX etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 minus bene *vere* loco *mere*; ed. 1 autem *pure*.

en: Many codices — A, G, H, I, S, T, U, V, W, X, etc. — with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read, less well, *vere* ("truly") in place of *mere* ("merely"); ed. 1, however, reads *pure* ("purely").

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 incongrue *privat* loco *praedicat*.

en: Most codices, with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, incongruously read *privat* ("deprives") in place of *praedicat* ("predicates").

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *alia*.

en: From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *alia* ("other [matters]"; reading *Cetera alia*).

translators_notes:
**Ambiguities flagged.** Two spots required care — see `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities.md`:

- **Pro-arg 2 anchor**: OCR shows what looks like a footnote marker after "*ratione Hieronymi*" but the corresponding apparatus entry is absent (page-235 fn block has fns 1, then jumps to 3). Most likely an OCR artifact (the `^` glyph reading the colon-quotation glyph). Anchor dropped; combined-Hieronymus reference covered by [^1].
- **Pro-arg 4 closing word**: OCR's "*nec generat nec*" at line ~46 is followed by a column break and the verb is lost. Restored editorially as *generatur* ("nor is generated") — required by parallelism with the immediately-following clause "aeque vere privatur generatio a Spiritu sancto ut a Patre". → Confirm against PDF p. 235 col-2.

**Doctrinal:** This question reconciles Jerome (Spirit *is* ingenitus) and Augustine (only the Father is). Bonaventure's solution turns on a precise distinction in the use of *ingenitus*:
- **Pure privative sense** (= *non genitus*): true of the Holy Spirit *and* of the divine essence. Jerome's usage.
- **Notional sense** (= *non ens ab alio, et a quo alii sunt*): peculiar to the Father, since it both denies origin-from-another *and* posits being-source-of-others. Augustine's usage.

The notional *ingenitus* is asymmetric with *processibilis* (no parallel notion *improcessibilis* exists for the Spirit) — a point Bonaventure defers to d. 28. The reply to contra-2 (essence-vs-relation) hangs on the privative reading: when said of essence, *ingenitus* posits nothing, just as "the essence does not generate" posits nothing — so the worry about counting six notions dissolves. Note Bonaventure's elegant rejection of the Greek *ἀγένητον* / *ἀγέννητον* spelling distinction as Latin-irrelevant (the Latin *ingenitum* with double *n* is simply not a Latin word) while still crediting Damascene for noting the Greek lexical fact.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 13, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In praesenti distinctione sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de ratione Augustini, quam ponit ibi: «*Si Spiritus sanctus Filius diceretur, amborum utique Filius diceretur*»; et videtur sua ratio magis ad oppositum quam ad propositum: ex hoc enim similior esset generationi in creaturis, quae est ex duobus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis similior sit quantum ad dualitatem producentium, non tamen quantum ad modum producendi posset esse similitudo, quia sic oporteret, quod altera personarum esset principium passivum; quantum autem ad hoc nulla[^1] potest esse similitudo.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «*Idem Spiritus sanctus procedit quomodo datus vel donum*»; quia videtur male dicere, quia, cum non sit datus nisi ex tempore, videtur quod non procedat nisi ex tempore.

**Respondeo:** Sicut infra patebit[^2], si intelligitur de processione temporali, *datus* dicit actum; si autem de aeterna, *datus* dicit aptitudinem.

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### DUB. III.

Unde Augustinus *Maximino* praemissam quaestionem refricanti[^3]. Maximinus refricabat dictam quaestionem sic: «Spiritus sanctus est Deus, et non est Deus nascendo: ergo non Deus naturaliter: ergo adoptive.» Et quod hoc argumentum sit bonum, videtur, quia quod inest alicui naturaliter, inest ei a nativitate: ergo quod non inest a nativitate, non inest naturaliter: ergo cum Spiritus sanctus non procedat ut natus, non inest ei esse Deum a nativitate: ergo non est Deus naturaliter.

Et est responsio Augustini ad hoc[^4], quod argumentum istud non valet, nisi in eis quae generantur, in aliis non. Et hoc patet, quia Adam erat homo natura, sicut unusquisque nostrum, et tamen ipse habuit per creationem, quod nos habemus per generationem; sic Deus Pater communicat naturam suam Spiritui sancto per spirationem, sicut Filio per generationem.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «*Pater processionis eius est auctor*». Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut hoc quod est *auctor* dicit essentiam, aut notionem: non essentiam, quia tunc diceretur de Spiritu sancto; si notionem, quaero, quam? non innascibilitatem, quia illa non dicit respectum ad processionem; item, non generationem nec spirationem, quia nihil esset dictum, ut videtur. — Item quaeritur, utrum Pater possit dici *auctor generationis*? Et quod non, videtur, quia Pater dicitur *auctor Filii*: ergo, sicut supra dixit Hilarius et habetur distinctione nona[^5], sensus est: *id est genitor Filii*; ergo tunc idem esset dicere «est auctor generationis», quod «genitor».

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *auctor* dicit in Patre fontalem plenitudinem, quia ipse non est ab alio, sed alii ab ipso; et inde dicit, ut credo, eandem notionem, quam dicit *innascibilis*, sed differenti modo: quia *innascibilis* dicit per privationem prioris[^6], sed *auctor* dicit fecunditatem et plenitudinem respectu procedentium ab ipso, quam habet non aliunde; et ideo dicitur *auctor* ab *auctoritate*. Auctoritas autem est in Patre, quia quod habet, ab alio non habet, et hoc est, quod est[^7] *innascibilis*; et ita patet, quod potest dici *auctor* omnium personarum, quae sunt ab ipso. Ex his patet responsio. Dico enim, quod dicit eandem notionem quam *innascibilitas*, sed alio modo. Ex hoc patet, quod nunquam dicitur Filius *auctor spirationis*, quamvis spiret, quia non habet *a se*, sed *ab alio*; unde *auctor* proprie dicitur principium alterius non ab alio[^8].

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «*Distinguere inter illam generationem et istam processionem nescio*». Videtur enim talis ignorantia esse peccatum, quia distinctio personarum de necessitate est fidei et salutis; sed qui ignorat ea quae sunt de necessitate fidei, damnabiliter ignorat: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duplex[^9] est *scire*, scilicet *si est* et *sicuti est*. Scire *si est*: hoc modo certitudinaliter credere distinctionem de necessitate salutis est, large sumto *scire*. Scire autem *sicuti est* non pertinet ad statum meriti, sed praemii; et de hac scientia loquitur hic Magister et Augustinus. Et nota, quod tria dicit: *nescio* quantum ad habitum scientiae; *non valeo* quantum ad ingenium; *non sufficio* quantum ad utrumque[^10].

### DUB. VI.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: «*Appellatur ingenitus, non quidem in Scripturis, sed in consuetudine disputantium*». Contra: Dionysius[^11]: «*Non est audendum aliquid dicere de illa supersubstantiali et sancta divinitate praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sacris eloquiis claruerunt*»: ergo male fecerunt qui hoc nomen invenerunt.

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**Respondeo:** Quamvis istud verbum non dicatur in Scripturis, dicitur tamen verbi huius intellectus. Et quia verbum non est profanum nec errori coniunctum, cum intellectus verbi ex Scriptura et fide habeatur, non fuit contra fas illud Deo attribuere, ut ipsam Trinitatem conferendo[^12] apertius possimus intelligere.

### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister: «*Et aliter Augustinus accipit ingenitum, qui vel quod non est ab alio, quod dicit convenire soli Patri.*» Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia hoc modo *ingenitum* convenit essentiae: ergo non est Patris proprium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod licet Magister dicat intellectum Augustini, tamen non totum[^13]. *Ingenitum* enim, secundum quod dicitur proprietas Patris, privat *esse ab alio*, nec hoc sufficit ad hoc, ut sit notio, nisi etiam consequenter dicat, quod *alius sit ab ipso*; quia, sicut obiectum est, *non esse ab alio* sive *non generari* convenit essentiae[^14].

### DUB. VIII.

Item contra hoc quod dicit Hieronymus: «*Est quod natum est, et factum non est*», obiicit Arius, quod duodecim sint modi generationis, quorum quolibet dato sequitur, quod Filius non tantum *natus*, sed etiam *factus* est; et hos modos ponit disputans contra Victorinum[^15]:

*Primus* modus est per defluxum lineae a puncto. *Secundus* est penes emissionem radii a sole vel ab alio luminoso corpore. *Tertius* est penes sigillationem characteris, sicut figura fit in cera a sigillo. *Quartus* est penes immissionem, ut quando a Deo datur bona voluntas. *Quintus* est penes exitum proprietatis vel accidentis a principiis subiecti, quae sunt materia et forma. *Sextus* est penes intentionis sive speciei abstractionem, sicut species rerum generatur in anima. *Septimus* est penes excitationem, sicut liberum arbitrium excitatum a gratia procedit in bona opera. *Octavus* est penes transfigurationem, sicut ex aere fit statua, vel sicut in figura incisionis. *Nonus* est penes productionem, sicut a primo movente immobili producitur motus. *Decimus* est penes exitum specierum de[^16] genere per differentias dividentes genus et constituentes speciem. *Undecimus* est penes ideationem, sicut arca exterior ab arca, quae est in mente artificis. *Duodecimus* est penes nascentiam, ut homo generatur ab homine.

Quocumque autem praedictorum modorum generetur Filius, non tantum genitus[^17], sed etiam factus est.

Ad hoc est responsio, quia aut Arius accipit *generationem* communiter ad creatam et divinam, aut specialiter in creatura. Si communiter, dico, quod insufficienter dividit, quia ultra istos modos est generatio Filii a Patre secundum modum singularem, qui[^18] est *de tota substantia generantis* — sicut supra dictum fuit nona distinctione[^19] — ubi, quia non potest esse mutatio, nullo modo potest esse factio. Si autem dividat generationem, ut est in creaturis, dicendum, quod divisio illa insufficiens est adhuc, quia omittit generationem aequivocam, quae est secundum[^20] putrefactionem. Sed esto quod comprehendat eam sub generatione, quae est secundum nascentiam, tamen adhuc non valet ad propositum, quod, si non generatur, sicut creatura dicitur generari, nullo modo generatur. Quamvis enim creatura sit Deo similis, tamen plus est dissimilis quam similis, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^21], et Hilarius[^22] similiter: «Omnis comparatio inferiorum plus habeatur hominibus utilis quam Deo apta»; et ideo haeretici erraverunt, quia[^23] credebant, omnino esse in Deo sicut videbant in creatura. Et hoc bene tangitur in *Glossa* super *primum ad Hebraeos*[^24], ubi dicitur: «Non possunt temporalia comparari aeternis integra collatione, sed aliqua tenui similitudine»; et ideo, sicut supra ostensum est[^25], secundum diversas conditiones diversae generationes illam repraesentant. Ratione enim *conformitatis* est similis generationi verbi a mente; ratione *coaevitatis* similis generationi splendoris de sole sive de luce; ratione *aequalitatis* generationi viventis de vivente[^26].

---

english:
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### Doubts on the Master's text.

### Doubt I.

In the present distinction there are doubts concerning the *littera*; and first, doubt is raised about Augustine's reasoning, which the Master sets down there: "*If the Holy Spirit were called Son, he would be called the Son of both*"; and his reasoning seems to make rather for the opposite than for the proposition — for from this [premise that the Spirit is from two] he would be more like generation in creatures, which is from two.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although there would be a greater likeness as to the *duality of the producers*, nevertheless as to the *mode of producing* there could be no likeness, since [otherwise] it would have to be the case that one of the persons was a passive principle; and as to this no[^1] likeness is possible.

### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked about what he says: "*The same Holy Spirit proceeds in the manner of one given or of a gift*"; for this seems to speak ill, since, since he is *given* only in time, it appears that he proceeds only in time.

**I respond:** As will be plain below[^2], if it is understood of *temporal* procession, *datus* signifies act; if of *eternal*, *datus* signifies aptitude.

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### Doubt III.

Hence Augustine [replies] to Maximinus, who was reviving the aforesaid question[^3]. Maximinus was reviving the said question thus: "The Holy Spirit is God, and is not God by being-born: therefore he is not God naturally: therefore [he is so] adoptively." And that this argument is sound appears, since what is in something *naturally* is in it *from birth*: therefore what is not in it from birth is not in it naturally: therefore, since the Holy Spirit does not proceed *as one born*, being God is not in him from birth: therefore he is not God naturally.

And the response of Augustine to this[^4] is that this argument does not hold except in the case of those things which are *generated*, in others not. And this is plain, since Adam was a man by nature, just as each of us, and yet he had through *creation* what we have through *generation*; so God the Father communicates his nature to the Holy Spirit by *spiration*, just as to the Son by *generation*.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked about what he says: "*The Father is the author of his procession*." For this seems to speak ill, since either *auctor* signifies the essence or [it signifies] a notion: not essence, since then it would be said of the Holy Spirit; if a notion, I ask, which? not unbegettability, since that does not signify a respect to procession; likewise, neither generation nor spiration, since [otherwise] nothing would have been said, as it appears. — Likewise it is asked, can the Father be called *author of [the] generation*? And that he cannot, appears: since the Father is called *author of the Son* — therefore, as Hilary said above and is held in d. 9[^5], the sense is: "*that is, begetter of the Son*"; therefore then to say "he is author of the generation" would be the same as [to say] "begetter."

**I respond:** It must be said that *auctor* signifies in the Father the *fontal plenitude*, since he himself is not from another, but others are from him; and hence it signifies, as I believe, the same notion which *innascibilis* signifies, but in a different mode: since *innascibilis* signifies by privation of a prior[^6], whereas *auctor* signifies the fecundity and plenitude with respect to those proceeding from him, which he has not from elsewhere; and therefore he is called *auctor* from *auctoritas* ("authority"). Now *auctoritas* is in the Father, since what he has, he does not have from another, and this is what *innascibilis*[^7] is; and so it is plain that he can be called *auctor* of all the persons that are from him. From these things the response is plain. For I say that [*auctor*] signifies the same notion as *innascibilitas*, but in another mode. Hence it is plain that the Son is never called *author of spiration*, although he spirates, since he does not have [it] *from himself* but *from another*; whence *auctor* is properly called *the principle of another which is itself not from another*[^8].

### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked about what he says: "*To distinguish between that generation and this procession I do not know how*." For such ignorance appears to be a sin, since the distinction of persons is of the necessity of faith and of salvation; but he who is ignorant of those things which are of the necessity of faith, is damnably ignorant: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to know* is twofold[^9], namely [to know] *that it is* and *as it is*. To know *that it is*: in this mode to believe the distinction with certitude is of the necessity of salvation, with *to know* taken broadly. But to know *as it is* does not pertain to the state of merit, but of reward; and of this knowledge speaks here the Master and Augustine. And note that he says three things: *I do not know* — as to the habit of knowledge; *I am not able* — as to ability of mind; *I do not suffice* — as to both[^10].

### Doubt VI.

Likewise, an objection is raised about what he says: "*He is called* unbegotten *— not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the custom of disputants*." On the contrary, Dionysius[^11]: "*Nothing must be ventured to say of that supersubstantial and holy divinity beyond those things which have been made plain to us divinely from the sacred utterances*": therefore those who invented this name did wrong.

<!-- page 241 -->

**I respond:** Although that word is not said in the Scriptures, yet the *understanding* of this word is said. And since the word is neither profane nor coupled with error — since the understanding of the word is had from Scripture and faith — it was not against right to attribute it to God, that by comparing[^12] we might more openly understand the Trinity itself.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked about what the Master says: "*And in another way Augustine takes ingenitum: namely as that which is not from another, which he says belongs to the Father alone.*" But this does not appear true, since in this mode *ingenitum* belongs to the essence: therefore it is not proper to the Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although the Master expresses Augustine's meaning, yet not the whole of it[^13]. For *ingenitum*, insofar as it is said to be the property of the Father, deprives [him] of *being from another*; nor is this enough for it to be a notion, unless it consequently also says that *another is from him*; since, as was objected, *not to be from another* — or *not to be generated* — belongs [also] to the essence[^14].

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise, against what Jerome says: "*[The Holy Spirit] is what is born and what is not made*," Arius objects that there are twelve modes of generation, on any one of which it follows that the Son is not only *born* but also *made*; and these modes he sets down disputing against Victorinus[^15]:

*The first* mode is by the flowing-down of a line from a point. *The second* is by the emission of a ray from the sun or from another luminous body. *The third* is by the sealing of a character, as a figure is made in wax by a seal. *The fourth* is by infusion, as when good will is given by God. *The fifth* is by the going-forth of a property or accident from the principles of the subject, which are matter and form. *The sixth* is by the abstraction of an intention or species, as the species of things are generated in the soul. *The seventh* is by excitation, as free will excited by grace proceeds into good works. *The eighth* is by transfiguration, as a statue is made from bronze, or as in the figure of an incision. *The ninth* is by production, as motion is produced by the unmoved first mover. *The tenth* is by the going-forth of species from[^16] genus, by differences dividing the genus and constituting the species. *The eleventh* is by *ideation*, as the exterior chest is from the chest which is in the mind of the craftsman. *The twelfth* is by being-born, as a man is generated from a man.

By whichever of the aforesaid modes the Son is generated, [says Arius,] he is not only *begotten*[^17] but also *made*.

To this the response is: either Arius takes *generation* commonly to created and divine, or specifically in the creature. If commonly, I say that he divides insufficiently, since beyond these modes there is the generation of the Son from the Father according to a singular mode, which[^18] is *of the whole substance of the begetter* — as was said above in the ninth distinction[^19] — where, since there can be no change, there can in no way be making. If, however, he divides generation as it is in creatures, it must be said that that division is still insufficient, since it omits *equivocal* generation, which is by[^20] putrefaction. But suppose that he comprehends it under the generation which is by being-born — yet still it does not avail for the proposition that, if [the Son] is not generated as a creature is said to be generated, then in no way is he generated. For although the creature is like to God, yet it is more *unlike* than like, as Augustine says in book XV *On the Trinity*[^21], and Hilary[^22] similarly: "*Every comparison of lower things should be regarded as more useful to men than fitting to God*"; and therefore the heretics erred, since[^23] they believed that things are wholly in God just as they saw them in the creature. And this is well touched on in the *Gloss* on *first [Epistle] to the Hebrews*[^24], where it is said: "*Temporal things cannot be compared to eternal things by an integral collation, but [only] by some slender likeness*"; and therefore, as was shown above[^25], according to diverse conditions diverse generations represent that [generation]. For by reason of *conformity* [generation in God] is like the generation of a word from the mind; by reason of *co-eternity* like the generation of splendor from the sun or from light; by reason of *equality* [like the generation] of the living from the living[^26].

---

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *nulla* loco *non*.

en: On the testimony of most manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *nulla* ("no") in place of *non* ("not").

la: Scil. denuo vel instanter quaerenti, cur Spiritus sanctus non diceretur Filius, cum de Patris esset substantia. Verba ex lit. Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. August., II. *contra Maximin.* c. 14. et 15. — Mss. et ed. 1 perperam *refutanti* pro *refricanti*, sicuti et mox *refutabat* loco *refricabat*; Vat. omittit verba *Maximinus* usque *sic*.

en: That is, [to Maximinus] asking again or insistently why the Holy Spirit is not called Son, since he is from the substance of the Father. The words [are] from the Master's *littera*, c. 3. Cf. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* II, cc. 14 and 15. — The manuscripts and ed. 1 wrongly read *refutanti* for *refricanti* ("reviving"), as also shortly afterwards *refutabat* in place of *refricabat*; the Vatican edition omits the words from *Maximinus* through *sic*.

la: Vat. absque mss. et ed. 1 auctoritate: *Resp. Dicendum ad hoc secundum Augustinum*. Plures codd. inepte *ratio* loco *responsio*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads]: "*Reply: It must be said to this according to Augustine*." Several codices ineptly read *ratio* ("reasoning") in place of *responsio* ("response").

la: In lit. Magistri, c. 4. circa finem. — Vat., mss. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, *et* loco *ergo*; deinde omittit *et habetur distinctione nona*.

en: [The reference is to a passage] in the Master's *littera*, c. 4, near the end. — The Vatican edition, despite the resistance of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *et* in place of *ergo*; then it omits the words *et habetur distinctione nona* ("and is held in d. 9").

la: Supple: *notionem*; quam suppletionem non attendendo Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 omittit *per*.

en: Supply *notionem* ("a notion") [reading "*innascibilis* signifies a notion by privation of a prior"]; not heeding this suppletion, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, omits *per* ("by").

la: Aliqui codd. ut A T X Z aa bb omittunt *est*, qui et cum ed. 1 *quia* loco *quod* substituunt.

en: Some codices — A, T, X, Z, aa, bb — omit *est* ("is"), and these, with ed. 1, also substitute *quia* ("since") for *quod* ("that").

la: In ultimis hisce verbis summa solutionis continetur. Quia enim *auctor* non dicit quodlibet principium emanationis, sed tale principium, quod quidquid habet, ab alio non habet, et quia hoc solum Patri convenit; ideo Pater dici potest *auctor generationis et processionis*. Idem infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. fusius exponitur, ubi inter alia S. Doctor haec dicit: *Quoniam igitur ratio primitatis in aliquo genere est ratio principiati in illo, ideo quia Pater est primum respectu emanationis, generationis et processionis, generat et spirat*. Cfr. etiam d. 2. q. 2, d. 9. dub. 11, et d. 13. p. 2. dub. 6. — Quomodo Pater possit dici *auctor* explicatur et a S. Fulgentio, Fragment. 35. (ed. Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* tom. 65. col. 822.), ubi ait: *Deus quippe Pater non est auctor Trinitatis, sed auctor est Filii et Spiritus sancti, in eo quod de illo natus est Filius et de illo procedit Spiritus sanctus. Nam quisquis recte intelligit auctoris vocabulum, relationis nomen inveniet, non naturae. Auctor enim nemo esse dicitur sibi, sed alteri: unde non ad se ipsum, sed ad alterum auctor veraciter nuncupatur. Nemo autem quolibet relativo nomine sic potest ad suam sicut ad alterius referri personam… Deum itaque Patrem non totius Trinitatis, sed Filii et Spiritus sancti fatemur auctorem: de quo habet et unigenitus Filius aeternae nativitatis, et Spiritus sanctus aeternae processionis originem.*

en: In these last words is contained the sum of the solution. For since *auctor* does not signify any principle of emanation whatever, but such a principle as has whatever it has *not from another* — and since this belongs to the Father alone — therefore the Father can be called *author of generation and of procession*. The same point is more fully expounded below at d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3, where among other things the Holy Doctor says: "*Since therefore the account of priority in any genus is the account of the principiated in that [genus], therefore because the Father is first with respect to emanation, generation, and procession, [for that reason] he generates and spirates.*" Cf. also d. 2, q. 2; d. 9, dub. 11; and d. 13, p. 2, dub. 6. — How the Father can be called *auctor* is also explained by St. Fulgentius, Fragment 35 (Migne, *PL* t. 65, col. 822), where he says: "*God the Father is not indeed the author of the Trinity, but he is the author of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in that the Son is born of him and from him the Holy Spirit proceeds. For whoever rightly understands the word* author*, will find it the name of a relation, not of a nature. For no one is said to be author* to himself*, but* to another*: hence the author is truly so called not in relation to himself, but to another. But no one can refer himself by any relative name to his own person as he can to another's person… So we confess God the Father not the author of the whole Trinity, but of the Son and the Holy Spirit: from whom both the Only-Begotten Son has the origin of his eternal birth, and the Holy Spirit the origin of his eternal procession.*"

la: Ed. 1 *dupliciter*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *dupliciter* ("in two ways") [for *duplex*].

la: De hac ultima divisione vide supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3.

en: On this last division [knowledge–ability–sufficiency] see above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, *fundam.* 3.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 1, in quo textu Vat. contra multos codd. et ed. 1 necnon ed. oper. Dionysii *Trinitate* loco *divinitate*.

en: [Pseudo-Dionysius,] *On the Divine Names*, c. 1; in which text the Vatican edition, against many codices and ed. 1 and also against the [printed] edition of Dionysius's works, [reads] *Trinitate* ("Trinity") in place of *divinitate* ("divinity").

la: Cod. Y *confitendo*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *confitendo* ("by confessing") [for *conferendo*, "by comparing"].

la: Aliqui codd. ut H M ff cum ed. 1 satis bene addunt *dicit*. Mox codd. aa bb *est* loco *dicitur*; ed. 1 *dicit proprietatem*.

en: Some codices — H, M, ff — with ed. 1, add, well enough, *dicit* [reading "yet does not *say* the whole"]. Shortly after, codices aa and bb [read] *est* in place of *dicitur*; ed. 1 [reads] *dicit proprietatem*.

la: De significatione *ingeniti* vide infra d. 28. q. 1, et hic q. 4.

en: On the signification of *ingenitum* see below d. 28, q. 1, and [in this distinction] q. 4.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 falso *Victorianum*. Marius Victorinus Rhetor (cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.) scripsit libros quatuor *contra Arium* et disputabat cum Candido, Arii defensore, qui in libro *de Generatione divina* n. 4. duodecim istos modos generationis proponebat.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices and ed. 1, falsely [reads] *Victorianum*. Marius Victorinus the Rhetor (cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in corp.) wrote four books *against Arius* and disputed with Candidus, Arius's defender — who in the book *On Divine Generation*, n. 4, was proposing these twelve modes of generation.

la: Fide mss. et trium primarum edd. substituimus *de* loco *in*.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts and the first three editions we have substituted *de* ("from") in place of *in* ("in").

la: In Vat. additur *est*, quod tamen nec in mss. nec in 1, 2, 3, 6 edd. habetur.

en: In the Vatican edition *est* is added, which however is not in the manuscripts nor in editions 1, 2, 3, 6.

la: Multi mss. ut A F G H K T V W etc. loco *qui* habent *quae* — quod refertur ad *generatio*. Ed. 1 *significatum* pro *singularem*.

en: Many manuscripts — A, F, G, H, K, T, V, W, etc. — in place of *qui* ("which" m.) read *quae* ("which" f.) — which [feminine relative] refers to *generatio*. Ed. 1 [reads] *significatum* ("signified") for *singularem* ("singular").

la: Quaest. 1. — Mox ed. 1 transponit verba legendo *quia ubi*.

en: [I.e.] q. 1 [of d. 9]. — Shortly after, ed. 1 transposes the words, reading *quia ubi* [for *ubi quia*].

la: Ed. 1 *per*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *per* [for *secundum*, "by"; "per putrefactionem"].

en: [Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV,] c. 20, n. 39.

la: Libr. I. *de Trin.* n. 19. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, interpunctione mutata, confundit omnia legens *et Hilarius. Similiter cum omnis* etc.

en: [Hilary,] *On the Trinity* I, n. 19. — The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, with the punctuation altered, confuses everything by reading "*and Hilary. Likewise, since every*…" etc.

la: Praeferimus lectionem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *quia* loco *qui*. Mox cod. E post *omnino* addit *simile*.

en: We prefer the reading of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 in placing *quia* ("since") in place of *qui*. Shortly after, codex E after *omnino* adds *simile*.

la: Vers. 3. *Glossam* vide apud Lyranum, super locum cit., in qua post *tenui* additur *et parva*.

en: [*Heb.* I,] verse 3. See the *Gloss* in Lyra, on the cited place, in which after *tenui* ("slender") is added *et parva* ("and small").

la: Dist. 9. q. 1. et dub. 10.

en: [See above, I *Sent.*] d. 9, q. 1, and dub. 10.

la: Cfr. *Hex.* Serm. 11. Fere idem invenies in Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 8. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 5; Richard., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. [Bonaventure,] *Collations on the Hexaemeron*, sermon 11. You will find nearly the same in Alex. Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 8, a. 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 5; Richard, here on the *littera*.

translators_notes:
**Doctrinal:** Eight dubia clearing up Lombard's *littera*. Highlights:

- **DUB I** — saves Augustine's "*amborum filius*" reasoning by distinguishing duality of producers (where the analogy with creaturely generation does run) from mode of producing (where it would force one of the two divine producers to be a passive principle, which is impossible).
- **DUB III** — Augustine vs Maximinus on whether the Spirit being God *not by being-born* implies *not naturally*. Adam parallel: he was a man by nature without being born; ditto the Spirit is God by nature without being generated — communicated *per spirationem*.
- **DUB IV** — *Auctor* is *innascibilis* under another aspect: *innascibilis* names the Father by privation of a prior; *auctor* names the same notion positively as fontal plenitude with respect to those who proceed from him. Hence the Father can be called *auctor generationis et processionis*; the Son cannot be called *auctor spirationis* though he spirates, since he does not have it *a se* but *ab alio*.
- **DUB V** — Lombard's *nescio* read through Aristotelian *scire si est / sicuti est*: the *that* is necessary for salvation, the *as it is* is reserved for the *status praemii*.
- **DUB VII** — Lombard captured only half of Augustine on *ingenitum*: as a notion of the Father it must say *both* "not from another" *and* "others from him"; the first half alone belongs equally to the divine essence.
- **DUB VIII** — Arius's twelve modes of generation, drawn from Candidus's *On Divine Generation* (Marius Victorinus's debate-partner), are dispatched on a strict dilemma: if "generation" is taken broadly enough to cover both creaturely and divine, then it omits the singular mode "from the whole substance of the begetter" (d. 9); if taken only of creatures, it still omits equivocal/putrefactive generation, and in any case the inference "if not generated *as a creature is*, then not generated at all" fails because creatures are more unlike than like God. Three creaturely analogies remain useful for the divine generation under specific *rationes*: word from mind (conformity), splendor from light (co-eternity), living from living (equality).

**OCR-resolution notes:** No `[?]` flags in this chunk — apparatus block was complete in OCR. The two cross-block fns ([^1] *nulla*, [^2] *Dist. 11. a. 1, q. 1*) live in the q. 4 footnote panel on p. 236 but anchor in DUB I / DUB II respectively.