title: Dist. 45, Art. 2, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa prima et immediata.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum voluntas divina sit causa prima et immediata. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum tertio *de Trinitate*[^1]: « Voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium specierum et motionum ».

2. Item, omnis causa, cuius actus primus et proprius est rei productio, est causa prima et immediata; sed voluntas divina est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Probatio mediae.* Super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Iustus Dominus in omnibus viis suis*, Glossa: « Deo hoc est velle quod facere, quia ex eius voluntate res habent esse ».

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia omnis causa est prima et immediata, qua non est altera prior[^3]; sed divina voluntas est causa, qua non est altera prior, cum sit idem quod Deus: ergo voluntas est causa prima et immediata.

4. Item, omnis causa est prima et immediata, quae est in totum effectum per actionem suam; sed omne quod fit, est a Deo, et nihil potest operari sine ipso, cum non possit in esse salvari[^4], et Deus toti cooperatur et in totum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis qui rem cognoscit certissime et nobilissime, cognoscit per causam proximam et immediatam; sed cognoscens Deum et videns cognoscit in eo res certissime et nobilissime tanquam in causis prioribus, ut dicit Augustinus[^5]: ergo in Deo est causa proxima et immediata; sed non nisi voluntas, ergo etc.

6. Item, quod Deo attribuitur, debet attribui ei in fine totius nobilitatis[^6]: si ergo ratio causalitatis convenit ei, nobilissima causalitas debet ei attribui. Sed haec est ratio causae primae et immediatae: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Unius est una causa immediata[^7]: ergo si Deus est causa omnium immediata, nihil habet aliam causam quam Deum; et si hoc, cessat omnis operatio, et ita potentia cessat, cessat et bonitas, et cetera sunt otiosa.

2. Item, si divina voluntas est omnium causa proxima et immediata; sed posita causa proxima et immediata, ponitur effectus[^8]: ergo cum divina voluntas fuerit ab aeterno, cetera sunt aeterna.

3. Item, omne quod habet causam proximam et immediatam et necessariam, est demonstrabile[^9]: ergo si divina voluntas est omnium causa prima et immediata, omnia sunt demonstrabilia.

4. Item, cognita causa proxima et immediata, non est ultra quaerere[^10]: ergo scito, quod Deus velit aliquid, stulte laborat qui quaerit causam aliam. Sed de omni bono, quod fit, scimus Deum causam esse: ergo non est ulterior quaerenda. Pereunt ergo et vanae sunt scientiae doctrinales, immo omnes scientiae.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Voluntas est causa immediata rerum, cum sit causa prima, universalissima et actualissima.

**Respondeo:** Ad huius[^11] intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum in creaturis sit reperire causam universalem et particularem, causa universalis

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alio modo plus influit in effectum quam particularis, alio modo minus. Quantum enim ad *intimitatem* causa universalis, quia agens prior[^12] est, magis influit, sed quantum ad *actualitatem* et quantum ad ea quae sunt propria rei, minus influit. Et ratio huius est, quia causa universalis creatam habet omnimodam actualitatem nec perfectam potentiam; et ideo non potest pervenire ad formam specialem nisi per accidens, ut per formam agentis particularis, quae non est ab ipsa[^13].

Divina autem voluntas est causa prima et universalissima et actualissima; et ideo potest in totum effectum in totam rei substantiam etiam sine adminiculo alterius causae; nec aliqua causa potest aliquid vel modicum sine ipsa. Et ideo necesse est, quod ipsa sit causa immediata in omni actione et re. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

Ad obiecta in contrarium intelligendum, quod cum Deus sit omnium causa immediata, quorundam tamen est tota causa, sicut eorum quae creantur; quorundam autem est causa cum alia causa particulari, ut eorum quae sunt a natura et a voluntate particulari[^14]. Et haec quidem causa concurrit non propter indigentiam divinae voluntatis, sed propter summam liberalitatem, quae non tantum dedit rebus esse, sed operationem et diffusionem, et propter ordinem et connexionem universi ad invicem. Nec una causa derogat alteri, sed totus effectus est a causa creata, et totus a voluntate increata.

*Ad 1.* Et sic patet responsio ad primum obiectum: obiicit enim de causa immediata respectu alterius causae creatae, quia duae causae creatae non sunt immediatae in eodem genere causae.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod posita causa immediata etc.; dicendum, quod causam poni est dupliciter, vel in esse, vel in operari. Et posita causa, non ponitur effectus[^15] in actu, nisi ponatur in operando; et sic non fuit ab aeterno, sed in tempore, in quo disposuit et voluit ab aeterno producere rem.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia essent demonstrabilia; dicendum, quod verum est, si causa illa sit propria et determinata ad tales effectus.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, quod non debet quaeri alia causa; dicendum, quod si plene cognosceretur Dei voluntas et dispositio in se, nullus unquam desideraret scire aliam causam; ita plene cognosceret in causis primordialibus. Attamen quia divina voluntas non cognoscitur, nec ipsa excludit in agendo operationem causae creatae, non excludit etiam nec in cognoscendo[^16]; et ideo bonum est et perutile exerceri in consideratione causarum creatarum, ut aliquo modo semiplene veniamus in cognitionem illius causae supremae, quae est finis omnis cognitionis.

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### Question II. *Whether the will of God is the first and immediate cause.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the divine will is the first and immediate cause. And that it is so, appears as follows:

1. Through Augustine in book III *On the Trinity*[^1]: « The will of God is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. »

2. Likewise, every cause whose first and proper act is the production of a thing is a first and immediate cause; but the divine will is of this sort: therefore, etc. *Proof of the middle [premise]:* Upon that [verse] of the Psalm[^2]: *The Lord is just in all his ways*, the Gloss [says]: « For God, to will is the same as to do, since from his will things have being. »

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], because every cause than which there is no other prior is a first and immediate cause[^3]; but the divine will is a cause than which there is no other prior, since it is the same as God: therefore the will is a first and immediate cause.

4. Likewise, every cause is a first and immediate cause which [reaches] into the whole effect through its action; but everything that comes to be is from God, and nothing can act without him, since it cannot be preserved in being [without him][^4], and God cooperates with the whole and unto the whole: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, everyone who knows a thing most certainly and most nobly knows it through its proximate and immediate cause; but he who knows and sees God knows things in him most certainly and most nobly, as in their prior causes, as Augustine says[^5]: therefore in God there is the proximate and immediate cause; but [there is] nothing [in him] except his will, therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, what is attributed to God ought to be attributed to him at the highest pitch of nobility[^6]: if therefore the character of causality befits him, the most noble causality ought to be attributed to him. But this [most noble causality] is the character of a first and immediate cause: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Of one thing there is [only] one immediate cause[^7]: therefore if God is the immediate cause of all things, nothing has any cause other than God; and if this is so, every operation ceases, and so power ceases, goodness ceases, and the rest are idle.

2. Likewise, if the divine will is the proximate and immediate cause of all things; but when the proximate and immediate cause is posited, the effect is posited[^8]: therefore, since the divine will has been from eternity, the rest are eternal.

3. Likewise, everything which has a proximate and immediate and necessary cause is demonstrable[^9]: therefore if the divine will is the first and immediate cause of all things, all things are demonstrable.

4. Likewise, [once] the proximate and immediate cause is known, [there is] no further [reason] to inquire[^10]: therefore, given that one knows God wills something, he labors foolishly who seeks another cause. But concerning every good thing that comes to be, we know God to be the cause: therefore no further [cause] is to be sought. Therefore the doctrinal sciences perish and are in vain — indeed, all the sciences.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The will [of God] is the immediate cause of things, since it is the first, most universal, and most actual cause.

**I respond:** For the understanding of this[^11] [question] it must be noted that, since in creatures there is to be found a universal cause and a particular cause, the universal cause

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in one respect contributes more to the effect than the particular [cause], and in another respect less. For as to *intimacy*, the universal cause, because it is a prior agent[^12], contributes more; but as to *actuality* and as to those things which are proper to the thing, it contributes less. And the reason of this is that the universal created cause has only partial actuality, not perfect power; and therefore it cannot attain to the specific form except by accident, namely through the form of the particular agent, which is not from it[^13].

The divine will, however, is the first and most universal and most actual cause; and therefore it is able [to act] upon the whole effect, into the whole substance of the thing, even without the support of any other cause; nor can any [other] cause [do] anything, even slightly, without it. And therefore it is necessary that it itself be the immediate cause in every action and thing. — And the reasons [adduced] for this conclusion are to be granted.

To the objections on the contrary side, it must be understood that, since God is the immediate cause of all things, yet of some he is the entire cause — namely of those things which are created; of others, however, he is the cause together with another particular cause — namely of those things which are from nature and from a particular will[^14]. And indeed this [particular] cause concurs not on account of any deficiency of the divine will, but on account of [God's] supreme generosity, which gave to things not only being, but also operation and diffusion, and on account of the order and connection of the universe with itself. Nor does one cause derogate from the other, but the whole effect is from the created cause, and the whole [effect] from the uncreated will.

*Ad 1.* And thus the reply to the first objection is plain: for it objects from the [notion of] immediate cause with respect to another created cause, [arguing] that two created causes are not immediate in the same genus of cause.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that, when the immediate cause is posited, etc.: it must be said that "to be posited as a cause" is twofold — either in being, or in operating. And when the cause is posited, the effect[^15] is not posited in act unless [the cause] is posited as operating; and thus [the world] was not [in act] from eternity, but [came to be] in time, in which [God] disposed and willed from eternity to produce the thing.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that all things would be demonstrable: it must be said that this is true if that cause is proper and determined to such [particular] effects.

*Ad 4.* To that which is asked, that another cause should not be sought: it must be said that, if God's will and disposition were known fully in itself, no one would ever desire to know any other cause; he would so fully know [things] in their primordial causes. Nevertheless, because the divine will is not [thus] known, nor does it exclude in acting the operation of the created cause, neither does it exclude [the same] in knowing[^16]; and therefore it is good and most useful to be exercised in the consideration of created causes, that we may in some way half-fully come into the knowledge of that supreme cause, which is the end of all knowledge.

la: Cap. 4. n. 3. In textu originali post *omnium* adiicitur *corporalium*.

en: Chapter 4, n. 3. In the original text, after *omnium* the word *corporalium* is added.

la: Psalm. 144, 17. Glossa, ex Cassiodoro desumta, habetur apud Lyranum, in qua pro *Deo* legitur *Apud illum*.

en: Psalm 144, 17. The Gloss, taken from Cassiodorus, is found in Lyra, in which in place of *Deo* the reading is *Apud illum*.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. de primis et immediatis principiis demonstrationis agens ait: *idem enim dico primum et principium. Est autem principium demonstrationis propositio immediata. Immediata autem est, qua non est alia prior.* — In conclusione post *voluntas* codd. P Q inserunt *eius*.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I c. 2, treating of the first and immediate principles of demonstration, says: *for I say "first" and "principle" mean the same thing. Now a principle of demonstration is an immediate proposition. And an immediate [proposition] is one than which there is no other prior.* — In the conclusion, after *voluntas*, codices P and Q insert *eius*.

la: Intellige: per se sive sine Deo. Cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2, et d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — De hoc simultaneo concursu Dei cum creaturis quoad effectum cfr. August., V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 40. seqq. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 18. (c. 14.): *Quemadmodum in universo est Deus, et vicissim cuncta in illo* [ed. Firmin-Didot: *sic etiam in anima*]: *moventur enim omnia ab inexistente in nobis numine.*

en: Understand: of itself, or without God. Cf. above d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 2, and d. 37 p. I a. 1 q. 1. — On this simultaneous concurrence of God with creatures as regards the effect, cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* V c. 20 n. 40 ff. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* VII c. 18 (c. 14): *Just as God is in the universe, and in turn all things are in him* [the Firmin-Didot edition reads: *so also in the soul*]: *for all things are moved by the indwelling divinity within us.*

la: Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 17. seqq., ibid. V. c. 14. n. 32. seqq., et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 29. — De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2.

en: Book II *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 8 n. 17 ff., the same V c. 14 n. 32 ff., and XI *On the City of God* c. 29. — On the major premise cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I c. 2.

la: Hic modus loquendi iam occurrit in Averroe, XII. Metaph. text. 39, ubi auctor Deo tribuit vitam *in fine nobilitatis* i. e. summopere.

en: This manner of speaking already occurs in Averroes, *Metaphysics* XII text 39, where the author attributes life to God *at the highest pitch of nobility* — that is, supremely.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 746, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 746, note 6.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 118, nota 2, et Avicenna, IV. Metaph. c. 1.

en: Cf. above p. 118, note 2, and Avicenna, *Metaphysics* IV c. 1.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et 24. (c. 30.) demonstratio constare debet ex primis, veris, immediatis, prioribus, notioribus, necessariis propositionibus causisque conclusionis.

en: According to Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I c. 2 and 24 (c. 30), a demonstration must be made up of first, true, immediate, prior, more-known, necessary propositions, and from the causes of the conclusion.

la: Averroes verba Aristot., II. Phys. text. 38. (c. 3.): « Oportet autem semper causam uniuscuiusque summam quaerere », exponens ait: *Oportet intendere principaliter de causis causam ultimam in quaestione, non ultimam in esse, et illa est causa propinqua; ultima enim in esse est causa remota, v. g. quando aliquis interrogat: quare aedificat aliquis homo? et dicetur, quia est aedificator, et cum dicitur: et quare est aedificator? dicetur, quia habet artem aedificandi; et hic cessat quaestio.* Cfr. etiam Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 12. (VII. c. 1.). — Paulo inferius pro *quod fit* Vat. *sic*.

en: Averroes, expounding Aristotle's words *Physics* II text 38 (c. 3): « But one must always seek the highest cause of each thing », says: *One must principally aim, concerning causes, at the ultimate cause in the question — not the ultimate in being, and this is the proximate cause; for the ultimate in being is the remote cause. For example, when someone asks: why is this man building? and it is said, because he is a builder, and when it is asked: and why is he a builder? it will be said, because he has the art of building; and here the inquiry ceases.* Cf. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VIII text 12 (VII c. 1). — A little below, for *quod fit* the Vatican [edition reads] *sic*.

la: Cod. R addit *quaestionis*.

en: Codex R adds *quaestionis* ("of [this] question").

la: Vat. *potior*. — Cfr. supra pag. 471, nota 3.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *potior* ("more powerful"). — Cf. above p. 471, note 3.

la: Scilicet causa universali creata. Cfr. supra d. 40. dub. 7. — Vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 *ipso*; perperam.

en: Namely, [not] from the created universal cause. Cf. above d. 40 dub. 7. — The older codices, with edition 1, [read] *ipso*; wrongly.

la: Vide supra d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *et a voluntate*, et aliquanto inferius post verba *totus a voluntate* interiicit *infinita*.

en: See above d. 38 a. 1 q. 1, in the body [of the article]. — The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, omits *et a voluntate*, and somewhat further below, after the words *totus a voluntate*, inserts *infinita*.

la: Vat. et cod. cc, post *Et posita causa* insertis vocibus *in esse*, omittunt *effectus*. In fine solutionis pro *rem* antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 *tunc*, cod. X *tunc produxit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc, after *Et posita causa*, with the words *in esse* inserted, omit *effectus*. At the end of the solution, for *rem* the older codices with edition 1 [read] *tunc*; codex X [reads] *tunc produxit*.

la: Vat., omisso *nec* ante *in cognoscendo*, hic adiungit *cognitionem rationis humanae*. Paulo superius pro *aliam causam* non pauci codd. *aliquam causam*.

en: The Vatican [edition], omitting *nec* before *in cognoscendo*, here adds *cognitionem rationis humanae* ("the knowledge of human reason"). A little above, for *aliam causam* not a few codices [read] *aliquam causam*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Deus vocatur causa prima, quia praecedit et perfectione et aeternitate omnes causas secundas; non autem vocatur prima in eo sensu, quod in concursu cum actione causae secundae Deus agat tempore prius. Haec conceduntur ab omnibus. Disputatur autem de quaestione, utrum in hoc concursu prima causa concipi debeat ut agens prius natura sive praemovendo. — Causa immediata vocatur a S. Doctore (supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.) ea, « inter quam et effectum non cadit alia substantia media causans ». Ab aliis duplex distinguitur immediatio, scil. *suppositi* et *virtutis*. Causa immediata secundum immediationem virtutis operatur propria virtute, non mota ab alia causa; quod non convenit causae instrumentali, quae operatur mediante virtute aliena. Immediatio autem suppositi intelligitur, quando inter ipsam causam et effectum non est medium aliud suppositum. Patet quod una immediatio potest esse sine alia. Nam in scribendo calamus est agens mediatum, quia aliena virtute movetur, sed ratione suppositi ipse immediate effectum attingit. E contrario scribens respectu effectus est causa immediata ratione virtutis, mediata autem ratione suppositi. Attamen saepe utraque immediatio coniungitur, ut aqua balnei in refrigerando habet immediationem et virtutis et suppositi.

**II.** Deum in actionibus ad extra, quarum est sola causa, ut in creatione, esse agens immediatum ratione suppositi et virtutis, manifestum est (cfr. respons. ante finem). Eandem duplicem immediationem S. Doctor (solut. ad 1.) videtur docere etiam quoad concursum cum actionibus causarum secundarum, ut bene notant Trigosus (*S.* q. 13. a. 1. dub. 3.) et Barth. de Barberiis (*Curs.* tom. I. disp. 6. q. 6.). Dicit enim Sanctus, quod idem effectus potest esse immediate ab increata causa et a creata, sed non a duabus causis creatis. Attamen immediatio solius virtutis etiam in duabus causis creatis respectu eiusdem effectus bene potest esse; non autem immediatio in utroque sensu.

**III.** Quoad Dei concursum generalem cum actionibus causarum secundarum duae fuerunt opiniones extremae et sibi oppositae. Prima opinio rebus creatis aufert omnem virtutem vere activam et causativam; quem errorem, iam a quibusdam antiquis philosophis praeformatum, aliqui posteriores sub nomine occasionalismi defendere voluerunt. Improbatur autem haec absurda opinio a S. Bonaventura, II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et alibi. — Ex opposito Durandus (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 5, d. 37. q. 1.) negat, Deum immediate in omni actione creaturae simul agere, cui opinioni et ante aetatem S. Bonaventurae et

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etiam postea aliqui adhaeserunt. De hac quaestione S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. dicit: « Circa istam quaestionem fuerunt diversae positiones adeo magnorum virorum et adeo rationabiles, ut ipse Magister ausus fuerit definire, quae earum magis contineat veritatem. Attamen, quia per multam discussionem dubia diriguntur ad manifestationem, nunc communiter tenetur, quod illa opinio verior sit, quae dicit, quod omnis actio, sive substrata peccato sive non, secundum id quod est actio, est a Deo. Nec immerito, quia illud oportet ponere, si pensetur eminentia divinae potentiae et indigentia potentiae creatae » etc.; quod ibi et a. 2. q. 1. 2, dub. 2, et II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 3. q. 1, d. 28. a. 2. q. 3, et alibi variis rationibus stabilitur. Consentiunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 3; S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3. 5, S. c. Gent. III. c. 66. 67. 70; Scot., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. (alios locos vide II. Scoti Sum., a P. Hier. de Montefortino, tom. II. p. I. q. 108. a. 3. 4. 5.); et alii communissime. De opinione, quam sequitur Durandus, dicit B. Albert. (II. Sent. d. 38. a. 7.): « Fere ab aliis et a multis modernorum reputatur haeretica ». Non defuerunt posterioribus saeculis, qui cum Suarez eandem opinionem ut erroneam vel haeresi proximam censuraverint. — Nihilominus circa modum divini concursus, praesertim utrum ille sit praevius, an simultaneus, inter scholas catholicas libere controvertitur, de quo alibi plura.

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 33. m. 2. § 1. — S. Thom., locis hic et in q. praecedenti citatis. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. 5. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 2. a. 1. partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** God is called the *first* cause, because he precedes all second causes both in perfection and in eternity; he is not, however, called "first" in the sense that, in his concurrence with the action of a second cause, God acts *prior in time*. These [points] are conceded by all. But the question is disputed whether in this concurrence the first cause is to be conceived as an agent *prior in nature* — that is, by way of premotion. — An *immediate* cause is defined by the Holy Doctor (above d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 1 ad 4) as that "between which and the effect no other intermediate substance falls as causing". By others a twofold immediacy is distinguished, namely of *supposit* and of *power*. An immediate cause according to immediacy of power operates by its own power, not as moved by another cause — which does not fit an instrumental cause, which operates by means of another's power. But immediacy of supposit is understood when between the cause itself and the effect there is no other intermediate supposit. It is plain that one [kind of] immediacy can exist without the other. For in writing, the pen is a mediate agent, because it is moved by another's power, but by reason of supposit it attains the effect immediately. On the contrary, the one writing, with respect to the effect, is an immediate cause by reason of power, but mediate by reason of supposit. Yet often both [kinds of] immediacy are joined, as the water of a bath in cooling has both an immediacy of power and of supposit.

**II.** That God in his outward actions, of which he is the sole cause — as in creation — is an immediate agent by reason both of supposit and of power, is manifest (cf. the response near its end). The same twofold immediacy the Holy Doctor (in the reply to objection 1) seems to teach also as to [his] concurrence with the actions of second causes, as Trigosus rightly notes (*Summa* q. 13 a. 1 dub. 3) and Bartholomew de Barberiis (*Cursus* tom. I disp. 6 q. 6). For the Saint says that the same effect can [come] immediately from an uncreated cause and from a created [cause], but not from two created causes. Yet an immediacy of power alone, even in two created causes with respect to the same effect, can well [come about]; but not an immediacy in both senses.

**III.** As regards God's general concurrence with the actions of second causes, there were two extreme and mutually opposed opinions. The first opinion takes away from created things every truly active and causative power — an error already prefigured by certain ancient philosophers, which some later [thinkers] wished to defend under the name of *occasionalism*. But this absurd opinion is refuted by St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.* d. 7 p. II a. 2 q. 1, and elsewhere. — On the opposite side, Durandus (II *Sent.* d. 1 q. 5, d. 37 q. 1) denies that God acts immediately at the same time in every action of a creature — an opinion to which both before St. Bonaventure's time and

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afterward some have adhered. On this question St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.* d. 37 a. 1 q. 1 says: « Concerning this question there were diverse positions of such great men and so reasonable, that the Master himself did not dare to define which of them more contained the truth. Nevertheless, because through much discussion doubts are brought to clarification, it is now commonly held that that opinion is truer which says that every action, whether underlain by sin or not, according to that which is action, is from God. Nor without reason, since this must be posited if one weighs the eminence of the divine power and the indigence of the created power » etc.; which is there [in the same place] and in a. 2 q. 1. 2, dub. 2, and II *Sent.* d. 1 p. 1 a. 3 q. 1, d. 28 a. 2 q. 3, and elsewhere established by various reasons. With this agree Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. II q. 94 m. 3 a. 6 § 3; S. Thom., *Summa* I q. 105 a. 3. 5, *Summa contra Gentiles* III c. 66. 67. 70; Scotus, II *Sent.* d. 37 q. 2 (for other places see *Summa* of Scotus, by P. Hier. de Montefortino, vol. II p. I q. 108 a. 3. 4. 5); and others most generally. Of the opinion which Durandus follows, B. Albert says (II *Sent.* d. 38 a. 7): « It is reckoned by others and by many moderns as nearly heretical. » There have not been lacking in later centuries those who, with Suarez, have censured the same opinion as erroneous or as next to heresy. — Nevertheless, as to the *mode* of the divine concurrence — especially whether it be prior or simultaneous — there is free dispute among the Catholic schools, of which [matter] more [is said] elsewhere.

**IV.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 33 m. 2 § 1. — S. Thom., in the places cited here and on the preceding question. — B. Albert, here a. 8. 5, *Summa* p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 2 a. 1 partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2 a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2 q. 2. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 45, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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## Articulus III. *De voluntate divina quantum ad rationem significandi.*

Consequenter quaeritur de voluntate divina quantum ad rationem significandi, et circa hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur. *Primo* quaeritur de convenientia illius divisionis divinae voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti et voluntatem signi. *Secundo* quaeritur de numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum voluntas divina convenienter dividatur in voluntatem signi et beneplaciti.*

Et quod prima divisio non sit conveniens, videtur:

1. Quia sicut voluntas est respectu rerum, ita et potentia et scientia; sed scientia non distinguitur per scientiam veritatis et scientiam signi, similiter nec potentia: ergo nec voluntas. *Si tu dicas*, quod illa non habent signa; *contra*: sicut creaturae sunt signa voluntatis, ita etiam innuunt ex suo ordine scientiam, et ex sua magnitudine monstrant potentiam: ergo si signum perducit in aliud[^1], patet etc.

2. Item, si contingit divinam voluntatem significari, aut per signa *naturalia*, aut per signa *voluntaria*[^2]: non per *naturalia*, quia praeceptio et prohibitio non sunt a natura, sed a voluntate; non per *voluntaria*, quia signum voluntarium est quod significat ex institutione; sed praeceptio et prohibitio significant non ex institutione voluntatem, sed ipsum quod praecipitur: ergo etc.

3. Item, res significata non communicat nomen suum signo — unde quamvis circulus sit signum vini, non tamen est vinum — ergo quamvis praeceptio et prohibitio etc. sint *signa* divinae voluntatis, non tamen debent dici *voluntates*: ergo non debet dividi voluntas in voluntatem signi et voluntatem beneplaciti.

4. Item, *praeceptio* et *prohibitio* et huiusmodi, aut sunt signa ratione *actus*, aut ratione *obiecti* sive connotati. Si ratione *actus*; sed idem est actus quod divina voluntas et Deus — quia cum dico: Deus praecipit, dicitur de Deo, et ita praedicat divinam essentiam — ergo secundum hoc idem esset signum sui ipsius. Aut ratione *effectus*, et tunc, cum praeceptio et prohibitio nullum connotent effectum, nec consilium, nullum omnino erit signum; et ita nullo modo videntur signa.

**Sed contra:**

1. Scriptura dicit, *plures esse voluntates* Dei[^3]; sed constat, unam esse voluntatem beneplaciti: ergo si *plures* sunt, oportet, quod stet pro alia voluntate quam beneplaciti. Sed nulla voluntas Dei est nisi *beneplacitum*, vel *signum* illius: ergo etc.

2. Item, contingit cognoscere voluntatem Dei;

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sed non possumus cognoscere eam per se: necesse est ergo, quod cognoscamus per signa. Sed sic nominamus, secundum quod cognoscimus: ergo non tantum debemus dicere voluntatem beneplaciti esse voluntatem, sed etiam signum eius.

3. Item, praeceptio alicuius recte dicitur voluntas illius, ergo et praeceptio Dei; sed non est voluntas causans[^4], quia praeceptio est, etiamsi nihil fiat: ergo est voluntas ut significans.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Auctoritate et ratione probatur, distinguendam esse voluntatem beneplaciti et signi.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc intelligendum est, quod et ratio et auctoritas compellit nos distinguere voluntatem Dei in voluntatem signi et voluntatem beneplaciti. *Auctoritas* quidem: quia dicit Apostolus primae ad Thessalonicenses quarto[^5]: *Haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra*; sed illud non est dictum per essentiam, ergo vel per *causam*, vel per *significationem*; non autem per *causam*, ergo per *significationem*. — Item, *ratio* dictat, quia communi usu loquendi consuevimus praeceptum nostrum voluntatem appellare.

Propter hoc intelligendum, quod sicut non absurde *intellectus* dicitur vis intellectiva et ipsum intellectum, ita *voluntas* dicitur ipsa vis volendi et ipsum volitum. Et quia voluntas Dei innotescit nobis per volitum tanquam per visibile signum, et « signum est quod facit in aliud venire, dum offert se sensui »[^6]: inde est, quod voluntatem Dei dividimus in voluntatem beneplaciti et in voluntatem signi.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia et potentia, dicendum, quod ipsa voluntas se habet immediatius ad res, et cum non sit determinata in futuris indifferentibus, ideo indiget certis signis[^7]. Et propterea, cum debeamus nos illi conformare, oportet nos ipsam cognoscere. Sed divina scientia est respectu omnium, similiter et potentia, et praeterea, neutri oportet nos conformare; ideo non sic dicitur scientia signi vel potentia, sicut voluntas dicitur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum sint signa naturalia, vel voluntaria; dicendum, quod signum est ens et est signum; potest ergo dici *naturale* in quantum *ens*, vel in quantum *signum*. Signa igitur voluntatis in quantum *entia* voluntaria sunt, quia a voluntate, sed naturalia sunt in quantum signa[^8], quia naturaliter significant, sicut effectus naturaliter significant causam.

3. Ex hoc patet sequens, quia res non communicat signo *dato* nomen, communicat tamen signo *naturali*[^9], ut patet: nam urina dicitur *sana*, quia est signum sanitatis; est enim signum quod causatur naturaliter. Hoc tamen non est generaliter verum, nec secundum sermonis proprietatem, sed secundum tropum loquendi, sicut tangit Magister in littera[^10]. Et ratio transferendi est similitudo comperta inter signum, quod naturaliter significat, et significatum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ratione cuius sunt signa? dicendum, quod ratione actus causati[^11] per comparationem ad obiectum. Obiectum enim innotescere facit voluntatem, ut est sub actu praeceptionis et prohibitionis et huiusmodi. Unde hoc quod praecipitur, signum est voluntatis, in quantum praecipitur.

english:
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## Article III. *On the divine will according to its mode of signifying.*

Consequently the divine will is inquired into according to its mode of signifying, and concerning this two things are principally asked. *First* it is asked about the fittingness of that division of the divine will into the *will of good pleasure* and the *will of sign*. *Second* it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will.

### Question I. *Whether the divine will is conveniently divided into the will of sign and of good pleasure.*

And that the first division is not fitting appears thus:

1. Because just as the will is with respect to things, so also is power and knowledge; but knowledge is not distinguished into knowledge of *truth* and knowledge of *sign*, and likewise neither is power: therefore neither will. *If you say* that these [knowledge and power] do not have signs, *to the contrary*: just as creatures are signs of the will, so also do they intimate, from their order, knowledge, and from their magnitude show power: therefore if a sign leads on to another thing[^1], the [conclusion] is plain, etc.

2. Likewise, if it happens that the divine will is signified, [this is] either by *natural* signs or by *voluntary* signs[^2]: not by *natural*, because precept and prohibition are not from nature, but from the will; not by *voluntary*, because a voluntary sign is what signifies by [conventional] institution, but precept and prohibition signify not by institution the will, but the very thing which is commanded: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the thing signified does not communicate its name to the sign — whence although a hoop is a sign of wine, yet it is not wine — therefore although precept and prohibition etc. are *signs* of the divine will, yet they should not be called *wills*: therefore the will ought not to be divided into the will of sign and the will of good pleasure.

4. Likewise, *precept* and *prohibition* and the like are signs either by reason of the *act*, or by reason of the *object* or connoted thing. If by reason of the *act*: but the act is the same as the divine will and as God — because when I say: God commands, it is said of God, and so it predicates the divine essence — therefore on this account it would be a sign of itself. Or by reason of the *effect*; and then, since precept and prohibition connote no effect, nor does counsel, there will be no sign at all; and so in no way do they appear to be signs.

**On the contrary:**

1. Scripture says, *there are many wills* of God[^3]; but it is plain that the *will of good pleasure* is one: therefore if there are *many*, it must be that [the term] stands for some will other than the [will] of good pleasure. But no will of God is anything except *good pleasure*, or *sign* of it: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it happens that we know the will of God;

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but we cannot know it through itself: it is necessary therefore that we should know [it] through signs. But we name [things] in the way that we know [them]: therefore we ought to call not only the will of good pleasure a *will*, but also its sign.

3. Likewise, anyone's precept is rightly called his will, therefore also God's precept; but it is not a will *causing*[^4], because the precept exists even if nothing comes to be: therefore it is a will *as signifying*.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** It is proved by authority and by reason that the will of good pleasure and [the will] of sign must be distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that both reason and authority compel us to distinguish God's will into the *will of sign* and the *will of good pleasure*. *Authority* indeed: because the Apostle says in the first [letter] to the Thessalonians, chapter 4[^5]: *This is the will of God, your sanctification*; but that is not said by [way of] essence — therefore either by [way of] *cause* or by [way of] *signification*; but not by *cause*, therefore by *signification*. — Likewise, *reason* dictates [this], because by common usage of speech we are accustomed to call our own precept a *will*.

On this account it must be understood that, just as it is not absurd that *intellect* should be called both the intellective power and the very thing understood, so also *will* is called both the very power of willing and the very thing willed. And because God's will becomes known to us through the thing willed as through a visible sign, and « a sign is that which makes [the mind] arrive at another thing, when it offers itself to sense »[^6]: hence it is that we divide the will of God into the *will of good pleasure* and the *will of sign*.

**To the arguments:**

1. To what is objected concerning knowledge and power, it must be said that the will itself is related more immediately to things, and since it is not determined in indifferent future things, therefore it needs certain signs[^7]. And on this account, since we must conform ourselves to it, we must come to know it. But the divine knowledge is with respect to all things, and likewise the power; and besides, we are not required to conform ourselves to either: therefore knowledge of sign or power [of sign] is not so called as the will [of sign] is.

2. To what is objected — whether [these] be natural or voluntary signs — it must be said that a sign is [both] *a being* and [also] *a sign*; therefore it can be called *natural* either insofar as it is *a being*, or insofar as it is *a sign*. Therefore the signs of the will, insofar as they are *beings*, are voluntary, because [they come] from the will; but they are *natural* insofar as they are signs[^8], because they signify naturally, as effects naturally signify their cause.

3. From this is plain the next [point], because the thing does not communicate its name to a *given* (conventional) sign, but it does communicate [it] to a *natural* sign[^9], as is plain: for urine is called *healthy*, because it is a sign of health; for it is a sign which is caused naturally. Yet this is not generally true, nor according to the propriety of speech, but according to a trope of speaking, as the Master touches on in the [main] text[^10]. And the reason for the transference is the likeness found between the sign which naturally signifies and the thing signified.

4. To what is objected: by reason of what are they signs? it must be said that by reason of the *caused* act[^11] by comparison to the object. For the object makes the will to be known, insofar as it is under the act of precept and prohibition and the like. Hence this which is commanded is a sign of the will, insofar as it is commanded.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 282, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 282, note 2.

la: De hac signorum divisione in *naturalia* et *voluntaria* cfr. supra pag. 283, nota 6.

en: On this division of signs into *natural* and *voluntary*, cf. above p. 283, note 6.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seqq. — In fine argumenti pro *nisi beneplacitum* Vat. *nisi beneplaciti*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5 and following. — At the end of the argument, for *nisi beneplacitum* ("except [the will of] good pleasure") the Vatican edition [reads] *nisi beneplaciti* ("except of good pleasure").

la: Multi codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *creans*.

en: For *causans*, many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *creans* ("creating").

la: Vers. 3. — Paulo ante sola Vat. praetermittit *voluntatem Dei in*. Paulo inferius post *non autem per causam* cod. Q (in marg.) adiicit *quia non omnes sanctificat*.

en: Verse 3. — A little before, the Vatican edition alone omits *voluntatem Dei in* ("the will of God in"). A little below, after *non autem per causam* ("but not by cause"), codex Q (in the margin) adds *quia non omnes sanctificat* ("because he does not sanctify all").

la: Verba sunt Augustini, quae integra iam supra allata sunt pag. 282, nota 2. — Plura de his quae hic docentur invenies in Anselmi libro *de Voluntate*, et in eiusdem libro *de Voluntate Dei*, nec non hic in lit. Magistri, c. 5. seqq. — Paulo ante plurimi codd. et edd. post *per visibile* omittunt *signum*, quod Vat. cum ed. 1 bene supplevit.

en: The words are Augustine's, which have already been adduced in full above on p. 282, note 2. — More on the things here taught will be found in Anselm's book *On the Will*, and in the same author's book *On the Will of God*, as also here in the text of the Master, c. 5 and following. — A little before, most codices and editions, after *per visibile*, omit *signum* ("sign"); the Vatican [edition], with edition 1, has rightly supplied it.

la: Hoc sibi vult: cum voluntas quoad res, quae esse vel non esse, et quae sic vel aliter esse possunt, hoc vel illud determinare possit, ideoque per se a nobis certe cognosci nequeat, hinc ut cognoscamus, quid voluntas determinaverit, eam certis signis manifestari necesse est. — Pro *et cum non sit determinata* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et ed. 1 *et tamen non sic determinate* (ed. 1 *determinata*). Post pauca eadem Vat. cum ed. 1 *Et praeterea* pro *Et propterea*, et deinde cum plurimis codd. et edd. perperam *oporteret* pro *oportet*, quam lectionem ex cod. T et ed. 1 restauravimus.

en: This is what [the text] means: since the will, with respect to things which can be or not be, and which can be thus or otherwise, can determine this or that, and on that account cannot be certainly known by us through itself — hence in order that we may know what the will has determined, it is necessary that it be manifested to us by certain signs. — For *et cum non sit determinata* ("and since it is not determined") the Vatican [edition], with one or two codices and edition 1, [reads] *et tamen non sic determinate* ("and yet not so determinately"; ed. 1 *determinata*). Shortly afterward, the same Vatican [edition], with edition 1, [reads] *Et praeterea* for *Et propterea*, and then, with very many codices and editions, wrongly [reads] *oporteret* for *oportet* — which reading we have restored from codex T and edition 1.

la: In cod. X hic additur *Exemplum de nutibus hominum, qui sunt naturales, et per ipsos cognoscimus voluntates*.

en: In codex X is here added: *Example of human nods, which are natural, and through which we recognize wills.*

la: Id est, quia non signum arbitrarium, sed tantum signum naturale eodem nomine nominatur, quo res nominatur. — Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *nomen*, et bis pro *communicat* exhibet *communicant*. Cod. Q (in marg.) post *signo dato* addit *id est instituto*.

en: That is, because not an arbitrary sign, but only a natural sign, is called by the same name by which the thing is named. — The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, omits *nomen* ("name"), and twice for *communicat* exhibits *communicant*. Codex Q (in the margin), after *signo dato*, adds *id est instituto* ("that is, [a sign] instituted").

la: Hic c. 6. — Subinde pro *Et ratio* permulti codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *Et ratione*; vitiose.

en: Here c. 6. — Immediately after, for *Et ratio* very many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *Et ratione*; corruptly.

la: Ex cod. Y restituimus *causati*, pro quo plurimi codd. cum edd. *creati*. Ex contextu apparet, lectionem ex cod. Y depromptam esse veram. In fine solutionis Vat. *praecipit* pro *praecipitur*.

en: From codex Y we have restored *causati* ("caused"), for which very many codices with the editions [read] *creati* ("created"). From the context it appears that the reading drawn from codex Y is the true one. At the end of the solution, the Vatican [edition reads] *praecipit* ("he commands") for *praecipitur* ("it is commanded").

latin_scholion:
Distinctio voluntatis in voluntatem *beneplaciti* et *signi* est fundata in s. Scriptura et ab omnibus doctoribus recepta; licet a paucis posterioribus Scholasticis, ut Franc. Mayronis, voluntas *signi* reducatur ad actum *beneplaciti*, sed inefficacem, quod communissime improbatur.

Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. q. 36. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 19. a. 11. — B. Albert., hic a. 9; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 80. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. 1. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
The distinction of the will into the will of *good pleasure* and of *sign* is founded in sacred Scripture and received by all the doctors, although by a few later Scholastics — such as Franciscus de Mayronis — the will of *sign* is reduced to an act of *good pleasure*, but [an act that is] inefficacious, which view is most commonly disproved.

Alex. Hal., on this and the following q., *Summa* p. I q. 36 m. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1 a. 4; *Summa* I q. 19 a. 11. — B. Albert, here a. 9; on this and the following q., *Summa* p. I tr. 20 q. 80. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3 a. 1. — Aegid. R., on this and the following q., here 3 *princ.* q. 1. — Durand., on this and the following q., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following q., I *Sent.* d. 46 q. 1.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 45, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum sufficienter assignentur quinque signa divinae voluntatis

title_alt: Whether the five signs of the divine will are sufficiently assigned

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *De numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis.*

Secundo quaeritur de numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis. Et ponit Magister quinque signa[^1], quae continentur in hoc versu:

> *Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.*

Et videtur, quod debeat ponere pauciora.

1. Quoniam *signum* et *signatum* dicuntur correlative, et si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum; sed si unum non dicitur multipliciter, nec reliquum, per artem Topicorum[^2]; sed voluntas Dei est una et uno modo se habens: ergo unum solum debet habere signum.

2. Item, aut signa haec distinguuntur ratione *modi significandi*, aut ratione *rei*. Si ratione *rei significantis*[^3], ergo tot debent esse signa, quot res, quia omnis res signum est divinae voluntatis tanquam causae. Si ratione *modi significandi*; sed eodem modo significant divinam voluntatem praeceptio et prohibitio: ergo sunt unum signum.

3. Item, voluntas Dei, sicut infra[^4] patebit, non est respectu mali: ergo nullum signum eius debet accipi per comparationem ad malum: cum ergo permissio et prohibitio sint respectu mali, non sunt signa voluntatis divinae.

Quod sint plura, videtur:

4. Quia cuilibet bono respondet malum ex opposito, immo uni bono plura mala[^5]: ergo tot vel plura signa debent accipi a parte mali, sicut ex parte boni. Cum ergo ex parte boni sint tria, patet etc.

5. Item, sicut impletioni respondet permissio, ita et cohibitio[^6], immo multo fortius et magis ex opposito: ergo videtur, quod plura sint signa.

6. Item, sicut praeceptioni opponitur prohibitio, ita consilio dissuasio: ergo videtur, quod sint plura.

> **Conclusio.** Numerus et sufficientia quinque signorum voluntatis divinae explicantur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod numerus signorum uno modo consuevit accipi sic. Voluntas enim divina, proprie loquendo, est praesentium et futurorum; praeteritorum autem aut non est, aut non alio modo quam praesentium[^7]. Secundum hoc notandum, quod si est respectu praesentis, aut illud est bonum, et sic *impletio*; aut malum, et sic *permissio*. Si respectu futuri, hoc tripliciter: aut est malum, et sic *prohibitio*; aut bonum necessarium, et sic *praeceptio*; aut bonum supererogationis, et sic *consilium*. Bonum autem supererogationis non habet malum oppositum, ideo nec consilium habet signum oppositum.

Alio modo possunt distingui sic: voluntas divina, sicut infra[^8] patebit, aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult conditionaliter sive quantum in se; et utroque modo contingit eam significari. Voluntas ergo absoluta potest ad aliquid comparari aut per modum *complacentiae*, aut per modum *displicentiae*. Si per modum displicentiae, illud nullo modo fit: et ita hanc non contingit significari nec sciri aliquo signo exteriori. Si per modum complacentiae, aut quia placet illud quod fit, et sic *impletio*; aut quia placet aliquid[^9] ex illo, et sic *permissio*; et sic habemus duo signa. Potest iterum significari divina voluntas ut antecedens sive conditionalis, et hoc dupliciter: aut per modum complacentiae, ita quod oppositum displicet, et sic *praeceptio*; aut per modum displicentiae, et sic *prohibitio*; aut per modum complacentiae, ita tamen quod oppositum non displicet, et sic *consilium*. Per modum vero[^10] displicentiae, ita quod oppositum non placet,

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non est possibile reperiri. — Et secundum hoc patet numerus et sufficientia et solutio obiectorum.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod voluntas beneplaciti non est multiplex; dicendum, quod hoc verum est quantum ad substantiam; tamen quantum ad connotata multiplex est, ut visum est. Voluntas enim absoluta connotat effectum, voluntas conditionata connotat naturalem ordinationem rei ad eventum, sicut omnium ad salutem.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum ratione modi significandi etc.; dicendum, quod ratione modi significandi. Est enim aliquis modus significandi voluntatem ut *detestantem*, quod facit prohibitio; alius modus ut *approbantem*, quod facit praeceptio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas non est respectu mali; dicendum, quod per modum approbantis non est respectu mali, sed ex malo eliciti; per modum vero detestantis est respectu mali in se.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cuilibet bono respondet malum ex opposito; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen bono supererogationis potest opponi *malum* et *non-malum*. In quantum enim supererogationis, opponitur minus bonum; in quantum autem bonum, opponitur malum, sed non aliud, et illud quidem opponitur bono praecepti; et ideo cadit sub prohibitione.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cohibitione, dicendum, quod illa impedit effectum, et propter hoc privat rationem significandi, ut visum est.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consilio opponitur dissuasio; dicendum, quod, sicut opinio est una contrariorum, quia est acceptio unius partis cum formidine alterius, sic consilium, quia non accipit alteram partem determinate, comprehendit suasionem et dissuasionem. Nam qui suadet consulit, et qui dissuadet similiter consulit aliquid.

english:
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### Question II. *On the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will.*

Secondly, it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will. And the Master sets down five signs[^1], which are contained in this verse:

> *He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, fulfils.*

And it appears that he ought to set down fewer.

1. Because *sign* and *signified* are said correlatively, and if one of opposites is said in many ways, so also is the other; but if one is not said in many ways, neither is the other, by the art of the *Topics*[^2]; but the will of God is one and is disposed in one manner: therefore it ought to have only one sign.

2. Likewise, either these signs are distinguished by reason of the *mode of signifying*, or by reason of the *thing*. If by reason of the *signifying thing*[^3], then there must be as many signs as there are things, because every thing is a sign of the divine will as of [its] cause. If by reason of the *mode of signifying*; but precept and prohibition signify the divine will in the same mode: therefore they are one sign.

3. Likewise, the will of God, as will appear below[^4], is not with respect to evil: therefore no sign of it ought to be taken by comparison to evil; since, then, *permission* and *prohibition* are with respect to evil, they are not signs of the divine will.

That there are more, appears thus:

4. Because to every good there corresponds an evil from the opposite, indeed to one good there correspond many evils[^5]: therefore as many or more signs ought to be taken on the side of evil as on the side of good. Since, then, on the side of good there are three, [the conclusion] is plain, etc.

5. Likewise, just as to *fulfilment* corresponds *permission*, so also *restraint* (*cohibitio*)[^6] — indeed much more strongly and rather, from the opposite: therefore it seems that there are more signs.

6. Likewise, just as to *precept* is opposed *prohibition*, so to *counsel* [is opposed] *dissuasion*: therefore it appears that there are more.

> **Conclusion.** The number and sufficiency of the five signs of the divine will are explained.

**I respond:** It must be said that the number of signs has been customarily taken in one way thus. For the divine will, properly speaking, is of present and future things; but of past things it either is not, or [is] in no other mode than [it is] of present things[^7]. According to this it must be noted that, if it is with respect to a present thing, that thing is either good, and so [we have] *fulfilment* (*impletio*); or evil, and so *permission*. If with respect to a future thing, this is in three ways: either it is evil, and so *prohibition*; or a necessary good, and so *precept*; or a supererogatory good, and so *counsel*. But a supererogatory good has no opposed evil; therefore neither does *counsel* have an opposed sign.

In another way they can be distinguished thus: the divine will, as will appear below[^8], wills some things absolutely, and some things conditionally or so far as in itself; and in either mode it happens that it is signified. The absolute will, therefore, can be related to something either by way of *complacency* (*complacentia*) or by way of *displeasure* (*displicentia*). If by way of displeasure, that thing in no way comes to be: and so this [absolute will of displeasure] cannot be signified or known by any exterior sign. If by way of complacency, [it is so] either because that which comes to be pleases, and so [we have] *fulfilment*; or because something[^9] [arising] out of it pleases, and so *permission*; and thus we have two signs. The divine will can again be signified as antecedent or conditional, and this in two ways: either by way of complacency, in such a way that the opposite displeases, and so [we have] *precept*; or by way of displeasure, and so *prohibition*; or by way of complacency, yet so that the opposite does not displease, and so *counsel*. But by way[^10] of displeasure such that the opposite does not please,

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it is not possible to be found. — And according to this the number and sufficiency [of the signs] and the solution of the objections are clear.

1. For to what is objected, that the will of good pleasure is not manifold; it must be said that this is true as to substance; yet as to its connotates it is manifold, as has been seen. For the absolute will connotes the *effect*, the conditional will connotes a *natural ordering of the thing to the event*, as of all things to salvation.

2. To what is asked, whether [the signs are distinguished] by reason of the mode of signifying etc.; it must be said that [it is] by reason of the mode of signifying. For there is one mode of signifying the will as *detesting*, which prohibition performs; another mode [of signifying it] as *approving*, which precept performs.

3. To what is objected, that the will is not with respect to evil; it must be said that, by way of approving, it is not with respect to evil, but to that which is elicited out of evil; but by way of detesting it is with respect to evil in itself.

4. To what is objected, that to every good there corresponds an evil from the opposite; it must be said that [this is] true; yet to a supererogatory good there can be opposed an *evil* and a *non-evil*. For insofar as [the good is] supererogatory, [there] is opposed a *lesser good*; but insofar as [it is] a good, [there] is opposed an evil, but not another [evil] — and that [evil] indeed is opposed to the good of precept; and therefore it falls under prohibition.

5. To what is objected concerning *restraint* (*cohibitio*), it must be said that it [merely] hinders the effect, and on this account is deprived of the character of signifying, as has been seen.

6. To what is objected, that to *counsel* is opposed *dissuasion*; it must be said that, just as *opinion* is one of contraries, because it is the acceptance of one part with fear of the other, so *counsel*, since it does not take the other part determinately, comprehends [both] persuasion and dissuasion. For he who persuades counsels, and he who dissuades likewise counsels something.

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here [Lombard, *Sentences*, Book I, dist. 45,] c. 6.

la: Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 13.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 13.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit *significatae*, quam vocem et proxime post substituit pro *significantis*, sed falso, quia res *significata* hic est ipsa voluntas Dei.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc adds *significatae* ("of the thing signified"), which word it also substitutes shortly afterwards for *significantis* — but mistakenly, because the *thing signified* here is the will of God itself.

en: Distinction 46, q. 2.

la: Similiter Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 6: « Peccare multis modis possumus; malum enim est infiniti, ut Pythagorici coniectabant, bonum autem finiti ». Et Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 31: *Optimorum* (τῶν ἀγαθῶν) *causa una, optimo malum contrarium, mali causae multae*.

en: Similarly Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 6: "We can err in many ways; for evil belongs to the infinite, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, but good to the finite." And Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 31: *Of the best things* (τῶν ἀγαθῶν) *there is one cause; to the best [there is] one contrary evil; of evil the causes are many*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *prohibitio*, at in solutione obiectionis etiam Vat. legit *cohibitio*.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] *prohibitio*; but in the solution of the objection even the Vatican reads *cohibitio*.

la: Vat., suppressis verbis *aut non est, aut non*, sic: *praeteritorum autem alio modo non est quam* etc. Pro *aut non alio modo* plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *aut alio modo*, omissa particula *non*, quam ex cod. T restituimus.

en: The Vatican edition, having suppressed the words *aut non est, aut non*, [reads] thus: *but of past things [the will] is in no other mode than* etc. For *aut non alio modo* very many codices, with ed. 1, [read] *aut alio modo*, having omitted the particle *non*, which we have restored from codex T.

la: Dist. 46. q. 1. — Immediate post pro *aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult* Vat. *aut vult simpliciter, aut vult*.

en: Distinction 46, q. 1. — Immediately after, for *aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult* the Vatican [reads] *aut vult simpliciter, aut vult*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *aliud*.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] *aliud*.

la: Ed. 1: *Per modum vero nec placentiae nec displicentiae*.

en: Edition 1: *But by way neither of pleasure nor of displeasure*.

latin_scholion:
In assignandis quinque signis divinae voluntatis antiqui magistri conveniunt, non autem eandem viam tenent, ut sufficientiam et congruentiam horum signorum manifestent. De opinionibus diffusius agit Alex. Hal., loc. in q. 1. cit.; et de ipsis signis ibid. in qq. 37. 38. 39.

Praeter iam in quaestione I. citatos: Scot., I. *Sent.* d. 47. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 19. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 12.

---

english_scholion:
In assigning the five signs of the divine will the ancient masters agree, but they do not hold the same way in showing the sufficiency and congruence of these signs. Concerning these opinions Alex. of Hales treats more diffusely in the place cited above in q. 1; and concerning the signs themselves [he treats] in the same place in qq. 37, 38, 39.

Besides those already cited in question I: Scotus, I *Sent.* d. 47, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 12. — B. Albert, here a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 12.

---


title: Dist. 45, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1 through 21 across the four printed pages bearing apparatus (812, 813, 814, 815). Page 811 itself carries no d.45-dubia footer — its footnotes belong to the preceding scholion of a.3 q.2.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *voluntas nunquam dicitur relative*. Videtur enim falsum, quia sicut creator dicitur ad creaturam, et praescientia ad praescitum, ita velle dicitur ad volitum; sed supra habitum est distinctione trigesima quinta, quod illa dicuntur relative: ergo et velle.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister accipit *hic dici relative*, prout relativus modus dicendi distinguitur a modo dicendi secundum substantiam, et hic est *personalis*, et ita accipitur hic. Ipse autem obiicit de relatione respectu creaturae, quae est quantum ad modum intelligendi, nec distinguitur a modo dicendi secundum substantiam. — Vel etiam potest dici, quod Magister loquitur secundum generalem nominis intellectum, quia *velle* non est tantum respectu creati, ut *praescire* et *creare*, sed etiam respectu Dei.

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#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Deus scit omnia, id est, Deus est, cuius scientiae, quae est ipsius essentia, subiecta sunt omnia*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia similiter divinae voluntati subiecta sunt omnia, quia voluntati eius nullus resistit[^1]: ergo Deus vult omnia; quod non conceditur.

Item ego quaero: cum omnia scibilia sint subiecta divinae scientiae et essentiae, et similiter volita; quare non dicimus, quod Deus volendo se velit alia, sicut sciendo se scit alia? Quod si tu concedas, tunc cetera essent aeterna. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile; quaeritur: Quare non? et videtur quod sit simile, quia, sicut divinae scientiae actus non deflectitur extra Deum, et ita sciendo se scit omnia, ita et de voluntate videtur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *subiecta* divinae scientiae non dicuntur, quia sunt *inferiora*, sed *subiecta* dicuntur, respectu quorum est actus divinae cognitionis; et haec quidem sunt omnia *cognoscibilia*; et ideo novit omnia. Similiter *subiecta voluntati sunt*[^2], et haec non sunt omnia volibilia, ideo patet illud.

Quod quaeritur, utrum volendo se velit omnia; dicendum, quod *velle* uno modo dicit *complacentiam*, alio modo dicit *causam*. Et prout dicit complacentiam, credo quod bene potest dici, quod volendo se velit omnia, quia omnia placent ei, quae ab ipso et ad ipsum sunt. Prout tamen dicit *progressum effectus ab ipso*, quamvis actus non egrediatur extra, tamen res egrediuntur, et ideo dicit respectum ad extra[^3]. Unde sicut non conceditur: *possendo se potest omnia*, sic et in proposito.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quare Deus fecit caelum et terram? Respondendum est: quia voluit*. Videtur enim mala responsio, quia tunc videtur facile omnia determinare; videtur etiam, quod voluntas Dei non habeat rationem. Sed contra: super illud ad Ephesios primo[^4]: *Secundum consilium voluntatis suae*, Glossa: *« Voluntas Dei est ex ratione »*: ergo est quaerere rationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod voluntas nostra, cum excitetur a volito, et causam et rationem habet et quantum ad se et quantum ad volitum, maxime cum vult aliquid, quod est propter finem; sed voluntas Dei, cuius actus est ipse[^5], quia non excitatur aliqua ratione alia a se, causam quantum ad se habere non potest. Volitum autem aliquando habet aliam causam quam voluntatem[^6], aliquando solam voluntatem, ut in mundi creatione. Voluntas habet rationem, sed non causam, quia non est irrationalis. Unde non habet rationem tanquam diversam a se, sed *idem*[^7] *re*; et ideo voluntas Dei non potest esse irrationalis; et propter hoc in actibus, qui totaliter sunt ab ipsa, sufficit ipsam scire, nec oportet ulterius aliam rationem quaerere. Et sic patet illud[^8].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *voluntas Dei est causa omnium specierum et motionum*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia tunc, cum voluntas Dei sit agens per intentionem, videtur quod nihil fiat casu et fortuna.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus, quamvis sit causa omnium, non tamen est tota causa, sed ipse cum causis creatis. Propter hoc notandum, quod effectus habet comparari ad causam supremam, quae Deus est, et sic nihil evenit casu et fortuna; habet etiam comparari ad voluntatem sive causam creatam, quae est natura vel intelligentia, et sic, cum multa eveniant praeter intentionem, multa fiunt casu et fortuna.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, *quod nihil fit, quod non egrediatur de interiori aula summi Imperatoris*. Videtur enim falsum, quia peccata fiunt, et non egrediuntur ab ipso.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister non assu-

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mit hanc auctoritatem, sicut habetur in originali[^9]. Nam ibi dicitur, quod non *iubeatur*, aut *permittatur*; et ita non habet locum obiectio. Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod Magister restringit distributionem suam ad res, quae sunt aliqua natura. — Vel dicendum, quod ampliat verbum egrediendi ad facere et permittere.

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *monstruosi animantium partus et terrae motus et his similia fiunt voluntate Dei*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia monstrum dicit deordinationem aliquam in natura: ergo non est a causa suprema.

**Respondeo:** Aliquibus dicendum videtur, quod monstrum dicit deordinationem aliquam in natura, et dicit etiam *substantiam aliquam*[^10]. Substantia illa causam habet positivam, quae Deus est, sed inordinatio illa non habet causam positivam, sed privationem; et haec est ut plurimum improportio virtutis agentis ad materiam: aut enim materia superabundat, aut deficit secundum proportionem caloris operantis et virtutis. Et Augustinus loquitur de monstris quantum ad id, quod habent substratum.

Tamen aliter posset dici, quod monstra etiam sunt a Deo *puniente*, quoniam[^11] poenae sunt; et sic habent rationem ordinis. Quamvis enim Deus non faciat contra ordinem in *finem*, facit tamen contra solitum cursum naturae frequenter, vel ad vindictam, vel ad misericordiam[^12].

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Placuit vanitati philosophorum causis aliis attribuere*. Videtur enim, quod non bene dicat, quia philosophi causis aliis vere attribuerunt: ergo in hoc vani non fuerunt, ut puta luna eclipsatur, eo quod terra interponitur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non *ideo* dicuntur vani, quia aliis tribuerunt; sed quia *sic* aliis tribuerunt, ut tamen ad causam praecipuam non referrent. Et ideo *evanuerunt*[^13], quia ad causam primam et praecipuam non venerunt, quae sola est causa simpliciter prima et simpliciter generalissima.

#### DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Divina voluntas non recipit in se multiplicitatem*. Videtur enim falsum, quia plures sunt *ideae*, eo quod plurium ideatorum: ergo similiter plures voluntates, quia plurium volitorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non est simile sicut patet in quaestione de ideis[^14]; quia voluntas dicit, quod plus se tenet ex parte volentis et secundum esse et secundum rationem dicendi, et ideo re et ratione una est voluntas beneplaciti: sed idea secundum rationem dicendi plus se tenet ex parte ideati, quia similitudinem eius dicit. Et cognitio secundum rationem intelligendi et dicendi motum dicit in nobis a rebus ad animam secundum rem, sed in Deo secundum *rationem intelligendi*; voluntas autem non. Ideo hac duplici ratione conceditur de ideis, non de voluntate[^15].

#### DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *voluntas non recipit mutabilitatem*. Videtur enim falsum, quia Deus nunc vult aliquid esse, quod postea non volet[^16] esse: ergo videtur, quod desinat velle et similiter incipiat: ergo videtur divina voluntas mutari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in huiusmodi locutionibus est solum respectu *connotati* mutatio, quod comparatur ad divinam voluntatem, ratione cuius ponitur inceptio et *desitio* in actibus illis, qui connotant aliquid de praesenti. Si enim dicatur: Deus vult, hoc esse futurum, ab aeterno voluit, sed tamen causa in actu sive actualiter *causans* non fuit, nisi quando *facere* voluit, id est pro illo instanti, in quo actus voluntatis[^17] copulatur operi, non autem ipsi subiecto volenti. Et sic patet, quomodo sit causa actualis in tempore, nulla facta in ea mutatione; quia continue voluit, et ita actu fuit; sed *causans in actu* non fuit nisi pro tempore, pro quo voluit, ita quod nulla circa Deum voluntas incepit, sed solus effectus incepit[^18].

#### DUB. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Et Deus iratus dicitur; sed non est ira in eo*. Videtur enim

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male dicere, quia in Deo est vis *rationalis et concupiscibilis*: ergo pari ratione ponenda est in Deo *irascibilis*: ergo sicut vere in eo est actus cognitivae et amoris, ita proprie actus furoris.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *irascibilis* aliquo modo sonat in imperfectionem de ratione sui nominis; et ideo dicunt aliqui, quod nullo modo recipiatur in Deo nec *transsumtive*. — Tamen cum actus huiusmodi *vis* in nobis sint *gloriari* et *dominari*, et hi sunt in Deo; quare non similiter et haec vis?

Et est propterea dicendum, quod in Deo vere est haec vis gloriandi et dominandi, quae est ipsa divina substantia. Tamen quia *ira*[^19] habet passionem coniunctam de ratione sui nominis, ideo non recipitur in Deo nec *irascibilis*, nec ira, nisi transsumtive et sermone tropico. Et notandum, quod Deus habet *signa irae*, non quae significent iram in ipso, sed quae significant iram in nobis et vere, quando in nobis sunt.

#### DUB. XI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *praecepit Abrahae immolare filium, nec tamen voluit*; ergo secundum hoc videtur, quod praeceptum falsum signum fuit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod voluntas Dei volebat fidem et devotionem Abrahae *manifestari*[^20] in praeparatione obediendi; et hoc Deus volebat, et hoc *signum* importabat et vere; sed tamen secundum aestimationem Abrahae plus importabat, et per illud plus, quod Abraham intelligebat, Dominus fidem eius probabat, ita quod nec in signo falsitas, nec in Abraham deceptio fuit, sed probatio[^21].

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says, that *will is never said relatively*. For this seems false, because just as creator is said with reference to creature, and foreknowledge to what is foreknown, so willing is said with reference to what is willed; but it was held above in the thirty-fifth distinction that those things are said relatively: therefore willing also [is said relatively].

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master takes *to be said relatively here* according as the relative mode of speaking is distinguished from the mode of speaking according to substance, and this is *personal*, and so it is taken here. But he himself objects from the relation with respect to a creature, which is in regard to the mode of understanding, and is not distinguished from the mode of speaking according to substance. — Or alternatively it can be said that the Master speaks according to the general understanding of the name, since *to will* is not only with respect to a created thing, as *to foreknow* and *to create*, but also with respect to God.

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#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *God knows all things, that is, God is, of whose knowledge, which is his very essence, all things are subjects*. For it seems to speak ill, because likewise all things are subjects of the divine will, since to his will no one resists[^1]: therefore God wills all things; which is not conceded.

Likewise I ask: since all knowables are subjects of the divine knowledge and essence, and likewise the things willed; why do we not say that God in willing himself wills other things, just as in knowing himself he knows other things? If you concede this, then the others would be eternal. If you say that the case is not similar, it is asked: Why not? and it seems that the case is similar, since just as the act of the divine knowledge is not turned aside outside God, and so in knowing himself he knows all things, so it seems also concerning the will.

**I respond:** It must be said that things are not called *subjects* of the divine knowledge because they are *inferior*, but they are called *subjects* with respect to which the act of the divine cognition takes place; and these indeed are all *knowables*; and therefore he knows all things. Similarly *subjects of the will are*[^2], and these are not all volibles, therefore the point is plain.

As to what is asked, whether in willing himself he wills all things; it must be said that *to will* in one mode bespeaks *complacency*, in another mode bespeaks *causality*. And in so far as it bespeaks complacency, I believe it can rightly be said that in willing himself he wills all things, since all things which are from him and toward him please him. But in so far as it bespeaks the *procession of the effect from him*, although the act does not go outside, the things nevertheless go forth, and therefore it bespeaks a respect to what is outside[^3]. Whence just as it is not conceded: *by being able [to do] himself, he is able for all things*, so also in the matter at hand.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *Why did God make heaven and earth? It must be answered: because he willed [it]*. For this seems an ill response, because then it seems that everything can easily be determined; it also seems that God's will has no reason. But on the contrary: upon that text to the Ephesians, chapter one[^4]: *According to the counsel of his will*, the Gloss: *« God's will is from reason »*: therefore a reason is to be sought.

**I respond:** It must be said that our will, when it is moved by what is willed, has both a cause and a reason both as to itself and as to what is willed, especially when it wills something which is for the sake of an end; but the will of God, whose act is himself[^5], because it is not moved by any reason other than itself, can have no cause as to itself. But the thing willed sometimes has a cause other than the will[^6], sometimes the will alone, as in the creation of the world. The will has a reason, but not a cause, because it is not irrational. Whence it does not have a reason as something diverse from itself, but [a reason] *the same*[^7] *in thing*; and therefore the will of God cannot be irrational; and on account of this, in those acts which are wholly from it, it suffices to know it itself, nor is it necessary to seek further any other reason. And so the point is plain[^8].

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *God's will is the cause of all species and motions*. For it seems to speak ill, because then, since God's will is an agent acting through intention, it seems that nothing happens by chance or by fortune.

**I respond:** It must be said that God, although he is the cause of all things, yet is not the whole cause, but he together with created causes. On account of this it must be noted that the effect is to be compared to the supreme cause, which is God, and so nothing happens by chance and fortune; it has also to be compared to the will or created cause, which is nature or intelligence, and so, since many things come about beside the intention, many things happen by chance and fortune.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, *that nothing happens which does not go forth from the inner court of the supreme Emperor*. For this seems false, since sins happen, and they do not go forth from him.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master does not

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take up this authority as it is found in the original[^9]. For there it is said that it is not *commanded*, or *permitted*; and so the objection has no place. Nevertheless it can still be said that the Master restricts his distribution to things which are something of nature. — Or it must be said that he amplifies the verb *to go forth* to *to make* and *to permit*.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *the monstrous births of living things and earthquakes and the like happen by the will of God*. For this seems false, because a monster bespeaks some disorder in nature: therefore it is not from a supreme cause.

**I respond:** To some it seems that it must be said that a monster bespeaks some disorder in nature, and it bespeaks also *some substance*[^10]. That substance has a positive cause, which is God, but that disorder has no positive cause but a privation; and this is for the most part a disproportion of the power of the agent to the matter: for either the matter superabounds, or it falls short according to the proportion of the operative heat and power. And Augustine speaks of monsters as to that which they have as a substrate.

But it could also be said otherwise that monsters are likewise from God *as punisher*, since[^11] they are penalties; and so they have the character of order. For although God does not act against order toward an *end*, he nevertheless frequently acts against the customary course of nature, either for vengeance, or for mercy[^12].

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *It pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute [things] to other causes*. For it seems that he does not speak well, because the philosophers truly attributed things to other causes: therefore in this they were not vain, for instance the moon is eclipsed because the earth is interposed.

**I respond:** It must be said that they are not called vain *therefore*, because they attributed [things] to others; but because they *so* attributed [things] to others, that yet they did not refer them to the principal cause. And therefore *they became vain*[^13], since they did not come to the first and principal cause, which alone is the cause simply first and simply most universal.

#### Doubt VIII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *The divine will does not receive multiplicity in itself*. For this seems false, because the *ideas* are many, on account of the many things ideated: therefore likewise the wills are many, because of the many things willed.

**I respond:** It must be said that the case is not similar, as is plain in the question on ideas[^14]; since *will* bespeaks [something which] holds itself more on the side of the one willing, both as to being and as to the mode of speaking, and therefore in thing and in account the will of [God's] good pleasure is one: but the *idea* according to the mode of speaking holds itself more on the side of the thing ideated, since it bespeaks its likeness. And cognition, according to the mode of understanding and speaking, bespeaks a motion in us from things to the mind according to thing, but in God according to the *mode of understanding*; will however does not. Therefore by this twofold reason it is conceded of ideas, not of will[^15].

#### Doubt IX.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *the will does not receive mutability*. For this seems false, because God now wills something to be, which afterwards he will not[^16] will to be: therefore it seems that he ceases to will and likewise begins [to will]: therefore the divine will seems to be changed.

**I respond:** It must be said that in locutions of this kind there is change only with respect to the *connotate*, which is compared to the divine will, by reason of which a beginning and *cessation* are placed in those acts which connote something of the present. For if it is said: God wills this to be future, he has willed it from eternity, but yet a cause in act, that is, *actually causing* he was not, except when he willed *to make*, that is for that instant in which the act of will[^17] is coupled to the work — but not to the very subject willing. And so it is plain how he is an actual cause in time, with no change made in him; since he willed continuously, and so was in act; but as *actually causing* he was not, except for the time for which he willed, so that no will began with respect to God, but only the effect began[^18].

#### Doubt X.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what is said: *And God is said to be angry; but there is no anger in him*. For it seems

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to speak ill, because in God there is the *rational* and *concupiscible* power: therefore by parity of reason the *irascible* power is to be posited in God: therefore just as in him there is truly the act of the cognitive [power] and of love, so [there is] properly the act of fury.

**I respond:** It must be said that *irascibility* in some way sounds toward imperfection by the ratio of its name; and therefore some say that it is in no way received in God, not even *transsumptively*. — But since the acts of this *power* in us are *to be glorified* and *to dominate*, and these are in God; why not also similarly this power?

And on account of this it must be said that in God there truly is this power of being glorified and of dominating, which is the divine substance itself. Yet because *anger*[^19] has a passion conjoined by the ratio of its name, therefore it is not received in God, neither *irascibility*, nor anger, except transsumptively and in tropic speech. And it is to be noted that God has *signs of anger*, not such as signify anger in him, but such as signify anger in us — and truly, when [anger] is in us.

#### Doubt XI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *he commanded Abraham to sacrifice [his] son, but yet did not will it*; therefore according to this it seems that the precept was a false sign.

**I respond:** It must be said that God's will willed the faith and devotion of Abraham to be *manifested*[^20] in his preparation for obeying; and this God willed, and this the *sign* imported, and truly; but nevertheless according to Abraham's estimation it imported more, and through that "more" — which Abraham understood — the Lord was testing his faith, so that there was neither falsity in the sign nor deception in Abraham, but a probation[^21].

---

la: Rom. 9, 19: *Voluntati enim eius quis resistit?*

en: Romans 9:19: *"For who resists his will?"*

la: Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. I. Vat., pro *sunt* posito *dicuntur*, hic interiicit *respectu quorum est actus divinae notitionis*, quod additamentum etiam exhibent codd. BR bb, excepto quod pro *divinae notitionis* substituunt *voluntatis*.

en: So very many codd. with ed. I. The Vatican, putting *dicuntur* for *sunt*, here inserts *respectu quorum est actus divinae notitionis* ("with respect to which there is the act of the divine knowledge"), which addition codd. BR bb also exhibit, except that for *divinae notitionis* they substitute *voluntatis*.

la: Pro *extra* plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *exemplar*. Paulo ante pro *progressum* ed. I *egressum*, et subinde cum multis codd. *ab ipsa* (scil. voluntate) pro *ab ipso*. Mox post *egrediatur* Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *extra*, et paulo inferius pro *non conceditur* cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *non sequitur*. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.

en: For *extra*, very many codd. with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read *exemplar*. A little before, for *progressum* ed. I has *egressum*, and afterwards with many codd. *ab ipsa* (namely, "by the will") for *ab ipso*. Shortly after *egrediatur*, the Vatican with cod. cc omits *extra*, and a little below for *non conceditur* cod. cc with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 has *non sequitur*. — On this doubt cf. above a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vers. 11. — *Glossa interlinearis apud Lyranum*: *Id est secundum voluntatem, quae est ex ratione*. — In fine obiectionis supple cum ed. I *voluntatis Dei*.

en: Verse 11. — The interlinear Gloss in Lyra: *"That is, according to the will, which is from reason."* — At the end of the objection supply, with ed. I, *voluntatis Dei* ("of God's will").

la: Vat., reluctantibus codd. et ed. I, hic addit *maxime cum vult se*, et mox cum paucis mss. voci *causam* praemittit *tamen*. Aliquanto superius eadem Vat. post *causam* et *rationem* interiicit *ab eo*.

en: The Vatican, against the codd. and ed. I, here adds *maxime cum vult se* ("especially when he wills himself"), and shortly with a few mss. prefixes *tamen* before the word *causam*. Somewhat earlier the same Vatican inserts *ab eo* after *causam* and *rationem*.

la: Sola Vat. hic adiicit *et tunc respectu eius habet rationem et causam*, et deinde post *creatione* interserit *et tunc*.

en: Only the Vatican here adds *et tunc respectu eius habet rationem et causam* ("and then with respect to it [the will] has both reason and cause"), and then after *creatione* inserts *et tunc*.

la: Post *idem* codd. L V subiiciunt *sibi*, et subinde cod. V voci *voluntas* praefigit *sola*.

en: After *idem*, codd. L V add *sibi*, and afterwards cod. V prefixes *sola* before the word *voluntas*.

la: Quod S. Doctor ad solvendum hoc dubium hic profert plane convenit cum illo quod supra d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. docuit de causa et ratione praedestinationis. — Cum S. Doctoris solutione conveniunt Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 35. m. 3; Scot., *de Rerum princ.* q. 4. a. 2. n. 20; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., S. I. q. 19. a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. et in expos. lit.; et Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. et circa lit.

en: What the Holy Doctor brings forward here for the resolution of this doubt plainly agrees with what he taught above at d. 41, a. 1, q. 2 concerning the cause and reason of predestination. — In agreement with the Holy Doctor's solution are Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 35. m. 3; Scotus, *On the Principles of Things* q. 4. a. 2. n. 20; Bl. Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 19, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3, and in the exposition of the text; and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 4, and in his commentary on the text.

la: Vide supra pag. 795, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro *Magister* Vat. *materia*.

en: See above p. 795, note 5. — A little below, for *Magister* the Vatican has *materia*.

la: Pro *aliquam* non pauci codd. *a materia*; perperam.

en: For *aliquam*, not a few codd. read *a materia*; wrongly.

la: Pro *quoniam* Vat. cum cod. cc *quando*.

en: For *quoniam*, the Vatican with cod. cc has *quando*.

la: De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 16. m. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit., ubi et duo seqq. dubia solvuntur; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit., quo loco et seq. dubii solutio exhibetur.

en: On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 16. m. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here in his commentary on the text, where also the two following doubts are resolved; Richard of Mediavilla, here in his commentary on the text, in which place also the solution of the following doubt is set forth.

la: Rom. 1, 21: *Sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom. et Aegid. R., hic circa lit.

en: Romans 1:21: *"But they became vain in their thoughts."* — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas and Giles of Rome, here in their commentary on the text.

la: Dist. 35. q. 1. — Paulo post pro *ex parte volentis* antiquiores codd. cum ed. I *ex parte voluntatis*.

en: Distinction 35, q. 1. — A little after, for *ex parte volentis*, the older codd. with ed. I have *ex parte voluntatis*.

la: De duplici motu, scil. a rebus ad animam et ab anima ad res, etc. supra pag. 362, nota 10. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 9.

en: On the twofold motion — namely, from things to the soul and from the soul to things — etc. see above p. 362, note 10. — Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert, here a. 9.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *vult*.

en: The Vatican with some mss. reads *vult* ("wills").

la: Pro *voluntatis* multi codd. minus bene *voluntarius*.

en: For *voluntatis*, many codd. less well read *voluntarius*.

la: De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 10, et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here a. 10, and Richard of Mediavilla, here in his commentary on the text.

la: Pro *ira* plurimi codd. cum primis edd. *iter*. Mox pro *nec irascibilis* Vat. *iis irascibilis*. — De quaestione, utrum in Deo recipienda sit vis *irascibilis*, cfr. supra d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1., et ibid. Scholion, num. II.

en: For *ira*, very many codd. with the early editions [read] *iter*. Next, for *nec irascibilis* the Vatican [reads] *iis irascibilis*. — On the question whether the power of the *irascible* is to be admitted in God, cf. above d. 10 a. 1 q. 2 ad 1, and *Scholion* there, num. II.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *manifestare*.

en: The Vatican with cod. cc reads *manifestare* ("to manifest").

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 17. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 12, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 17. m. 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 12, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3.