title: Dist. 29, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicitur, quod Pater[^1] est principium totius deitatis. Quaeritur ergo, pro quo stat ibi hoc nomen *principium*. Non enim potest stare pro essentia nec pro persona, quia utrumque dicit, quantum est de se, absolutum. Aut ergo stat pro paternitate, et hoc falsum, quia non est pater Spiritus sancti: nec pro spiratione, quia spiratio non est respectu Filii: nec communiter ad utrumque, quia nihil habent commune nisi essentiam; nec pro innascibilitate, quia innascibilitas non dicit respectum ad personam, sed privationem respectus: ergo omni modo[^2] est falsa.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sensus locutionis hic est: Pater est principium totius deitatis, id est omnium personarum in deitate; et est distributio accommoda[^3], sicut cum dicitur: *caelum continet omnia*, se scilicet excepto. — Si autem quaeratur, pro quo stat hoc nomen *principium*; dicendum, quod stat pro paternitate simul et spiratione, quia per paternitatem est principium Filii, per spirationem principium Spiritus sancti, et per utrumque principium utriusque. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod non habent commune; dicendum, quod[^4] non conveniunt in notione unica convenientia formali; tamen conveniunt convenientia originali in eadem persona et eiusdem personae proprietate. Quia enim persona Patris a nullo est, ut dicitur in littera[^5], ideo omni modo productionis producit, et ideo est principium totius deitatis. Unde idem importatur nomine principii, cum dicitur principium deitatis intellectu principali, quod importatur nomine innascibilitatis[^6] quantum ad intellectum consequentem. Et ex hoc verbo et ex hac ratione verbi confirmationem recipit ista positio quae dicit, quod innascibilitas dicit in Patre plenitudinem fontalitatis sive fontalem plenitudinem, licet ex consequenti intellectu[^7].

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de huiusmodi circumlocutionibus, qualiter accipiatur ibi hoc nomen *principium*, cum dicitur: *principium sine principio*, *principium de principio*. Aut enim accipitur essentialiter, aut personaliter: non personaliter, ut videtur, quia Spiritus sanctus dicitur esse principium de principio, et principium non convenit ei nisi temporaliter. — Praeterea, sicut dicit Magister distinctione vigesima septima[^8], non potest dici hoc de illo nisi quantum ad nomina substantialia: ergo principium non potest accipi notionaliter. — Et iterum, pro qua notione acciperetur[^9], cum dicitur *Filius principium de principio*? quia non pro filiatione, quia hoc convenit Spiritui sancto, scilicet esse principium de principio; non pro communi spiratione, quia communis spiratio convenit Patri, cui non convenit esse principium de principio. — Si tu dicas, quod accipitur essentialiter; contra: essentia non est personae principium nec dicit respectum ad personam: ergo cum *principium* dicat respectum ad personam, non potest accipi essentialiter, et ita nullo modo.

**Respondeo:** Posset dici, quod hoc nomen *principium* accipitur in comparatione ad creaturam, et trahitur ad personas per praepositiones additas, sicut si dicatur: *Deus de Deo*, et *Deus non de Deo*, et consimilia; et sic cessant obiectiones. — Aliter potest dici[^10], quod hoc nomen *principium* non est impositum ad significandum respectum essentialem vel personalem, quantum est de se, sed indifferenter se habet ad utrumque, et eius acceptio determinatur per adiunctum. Quando ergo dicitur de Patre, stat pro notione paternitatis et spirationis communiter, et arctatur per proprietatem innascibilitatis per hoc, quod dicitur *non de principio*. Similiter in Filio stat pro communi spiratione cum filiatione, quae importatur per hoc, quod dicitur *de principio*. De Spiritu vero sancto dicendum, quod stat essentialiter tantum et arctatur ad personam per hoc, quod dicitur *de utroque*.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Spiritus sanctus esse coepit principium creaturarum. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dictum est supra distinctione tertia[^11]: «*Ex perpetuitate creaturarum intelligitur Conditor aeternus*». Si ergo Spiritus sanctus est aeternus Conditor, ergo aeternaliter principium. — Item in hymno[^12]: *Aeterne rerum Conditor*. — Item ab ratione videtur, quia res ab aeterno fuerunt in Deo; sed non nisi sicut in principio: ergo ab aeterno fuit principium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomina, quae dicunt effectum in creatura, possunt illum dicere actu, vel habitu: si actu, ex tempore dicuntur; si habitu, possunt dici aeternaliter. Et quoniam *principium* potest sonare in actum, vel in habitum, ideo potest dici non solum temporaliter, immo etiam aeternaliter.

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Sed quoniam usus magis accipit hoc nomen *principium*, prout dicitur in actu quam in habitu, ideo dicit Magister, quod dicitur temporaliter.

Quod obiicitur, quod dicitur *Conditor aeternus*; dicendum, quod haec[^13] locutio duplex est: tum ex parte eius quod est *Conditor*, quia potest dicere actum, vel habitum; tum ex parte eius quod est *aeternus*, quia potest teneri adiective, vel substantive. Et si *aeternus* teneatur substantive, sic non ponit aeternitatem circa conditionem, sed circa suppositum, et est locutio vera. Si adiective et *Conditor* tenetur habitualiter[^14], adhuc est locutio vera; si actualiter, tunc falsa. Sensus sunt manifesti. Nam uno modo sensus est: *aeternus Conditor*, id est aeternus, qui est Conditor. Alio modo *aeternus Conditor*, id est ab aeterno potens condere in tempore. Et tertio modo *aeternus Conditor*, quia aeternaliter condidit. Duobus primis sensibus est vera locutio, sed tertio sensu est falsa.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater ab aeterno principium est Filii; sed Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non sunt principium nisi ex tempore: ergo secundum hoc, cum aeternum sit ante temporale, per prius dicitur principium notionaliter in divinis quam essentialiter. Sed contra: omne essentialiter dictum est communius; et quanto aliquid communius, tanto prius[^15]: ergo per prius debet dici principium essentialiter quam notionaliter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de hoc nomine *principium*: aut respectu subiecti, aut respectu termini. Si respectu subiecti[^16], sic cum intellectus essentiae sit ante intellectum personae, sic principium essentialiter dictum secundum rationem intelligendi praeit principium notionaliter dictum, sicut opponit. Si autem respectu termini, sic principium essentialiter dictum respicit quid diversum per essentiam, et ita[^17] creatum; principium vero notionaliter dictum respicit personam consubstantialem et increatam et aeternam; et ideo principium notionaliter dictum dicitur aeternaliter, et quantum ad hanc viam prius dicitur in Deo non solum quantum ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad rem. Et sic patet, de qua acceptione hoc nomen *principium* dicitur per prius secundum diversas comparationes[^18].

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod cum Filius se dixit principium, creatorem se voluit ostendere. Videtur enim falsum; quia ipse respondit ad quaestionem Pharisaeorum quaerentium: *Tu quis es*[^19]? Sed quis quaerit de persona; sed *principium*, secundum quod pro creatore accipitur, tenetur essentialiter: ergo aut Dominus non respondit convenienter, aut *principium* non stat pro creatore ibi. — Si dicas, quod appropriatur Filio; contra: tam ratio creationis quam ratio principii appropriatur Patri[^20]: non ergo Filio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *principium* tenetur essentialiter ibi, sicut dicitur in littera[^21]: sed tractum est ad personam Filii. — Sed quod obiicis, quod appropriatur Patri; dicendum, quod *principium* de ratione sui nominis non appropriatur Filio nisi per additionem; et sic in proposito, quia appropriatur per actum verbi. Non enim dixit simpliciter: *ego principium*, sed *ego principium, qui et loquor vobis*[^22].

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod non est concedendum, quod Filius habet principium, cum et Filius sit principium de principio. Videtur enim debere concedi, quia omne relativum debet habere correlativum sibi respondens[^23]: ergo si Filius, cum dicitur *principium de principio*, dicitur relative, debet habere correlativum, quod est principium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod habere principium est dupliciter: aut sicut correlativum, sicut filius dicitur habere patrem,

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et sic Filius habet principium; aut sicut dispositionem sui, et sic dicitur habere principium quod incipit esse, et sic Filius non habet principium, quia non incipit. — Vel aliter: aliter est habere principium essendi et durandi; primo modo Filius habet principium, secundo modo non.

---

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what is said: that the Father[^1] is the principle of the whole godhead. It is asked, therefore, for what the name *principle* there stands. For it cannot stand for the essence nor for the person, since either of these states, of itself, what is absolute. Either, therefore, it stands for paternity — and this is false, because [the Father] is not father of the Holy Spirit: nor for spiration, because spiration is not in regard to the Son: nor commonly to both, because they have nothing in common except the essence; nor for unbegottenness, because unbegottenness does not state a relation to a person, but a privation of relation: therefore in every way[^2] [the proposition] is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that the sense of the locution here is: the Father is the principle of the whole godhead, that is, of all persons in the godhead; and it is an accommodated distribution[^3], as when it is said: *heaven contains all things*, with itself, namely, excepted. — But if it be asked for what the name *principle* stands; it must be said that it stands for paternity together with spiration, because through paternity he is the principle of the Son, through spiration the principle of the Holy Spirit, and through both the principle of both. — As to what is objected, that they have nothing in common; it must be said that[^4] they do not agree in a single notion by formal agreement; yet they agree by an originative agreement in the same person and in a property of the same person. For since the person of the Father is from no one, as is said in the *littera*[^5], therefore he produces by every mode of production, and therefore is the principle of the whole godhead. Hence the same [reality] is conveyed by the name *principle*, when [the Father] is called principle of the godhead by the principal understanding, [as] is conveyed by the name *unbegottenness*[^6] as far as the consequent understanding. And from this word and from this account of the word that position receives confirmation which says that *unbegottenness* states in the Father the fullness of fontality or fontal fullness, although by a consequent understanding[^7].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about such circumlocutions: how the name *principle* is to be taken there, when it is said: *principle without principle*, *principle from a principle*. For either it is taken essentially, or personally: not personally, as it seems, because the Holy Spirit is said to be principle from a principle, and *principle* does not belong to him except temporally. — Furthermore, as the Master says in distinction twenty-seven[^8], this cannot be said of that except with regard to substantial names: therefore *principle* cannot be taken notionally. — And again, in what notion would it be taken[^9], when it is said *the Son [is] principle from a principle*? Because not for filiation, since this belongs to the Holy Spirit, namely, to be principle from a principle; not for common spiration, since common spiration belongs to the Father, to whom it does not belong to be principle from a principle. — If you say that it is taken essentially; on the contrary: the essence is not the principle of a person nor does it state a relation to a person: therefore since *principle* states a relation to a person, it cannot be taken essentially, and so in no way.

**I respond:** It could be said that the name *principle* is taken in comparison to the creature, and is drawn to the persons through added prepositions, as if it be said: *God from God*, and *God not from God*, and the like; and so the objections cease. — Otherwise it can be said[^10] that the name *principle* is not imposed to signify an essential or personal relation, as far as it is of itself, but is indifferently disposed toward either, and its acceptation is determined by what is adjoined. When therefore it is said of the Father, it stands for the notion of paternity and spiration commonly, and is restricted by the property of unbegottenness through the fact that it is said *not from a principle*. Similarly in the Son it stands for common spiration with filiation, which is conveyed through the fact that it is said *from a principle*. But concerning the Holy Spirit it must be said that it stands essentially only and is restricted to the person through the fact that it is said *from both*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Holy Spirit began to be principle of creatures. For it seems to say [something] against what was said above in distinction three[^11]: «*From the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Creator is understood*». If therefore the Holy Spirit is the eternal Creator, then [he is] eternally principle. — Likewise in the hymn[^12]: *Eternal Creator of things*. — Likewise it appears from reason, because things were from eternity in God; but only as in a principle: therefore from eternity he was principle.

**I respond:** It must be said that names which state an effect in a creature can state it either in act or in habit: if in act, they are said from time; if in habit, they can be said eternally. And since *principle* can sound either in act or in habit, therefore it can be said not only temporally, but even eternally.

But because usage takes this name *principle* more as said in act than in habit, therefore the Master says that it is said temporally.

As to what is objected, that he is called *eternal Creator*; it must be said that this[^13] locution is twofold: both on the part of *Creator*, because it can state an act or a habit; and on the part of *eternal*, because it can be taken adjectivally or substantively. And if *eternal* is taken substantively, then it does not posit eternity concerning the act of creating, but concerning the supposit, and the locution is true. If [it is taken] adjectivally and *Creator* is taken habitually[^14], it is still a true locution; if actually, then false. The senses are manifest. For in one way the sense is: *eternal Creator*, that is, the eternal one who is Creator. In another way *eternal Creator*, that is, from eternity able to create in time. And in a third way *eternal Creator*, because he created eternally. In the first two senses the locution is true, but in the third sense it is false.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Father from eternity is principle of the Son; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not principle except from time: therefore according to this, since the eternal is before the temporal, *principle* is said in the divine [persons] notionally before [it is said] essentially. But on the contrary: every [name] said essentially is more common; and the more anything is common, the prior it is[^15]: therefore *principle* ought to be said essentially before [it is said] notionally.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of this name *principle* in two ways: either with regard to the subject, or with regard to the term. If with regard to the subject[^16], then since the understanding of essence is before the understanding of person, *principle* said essentially according to the order of understanding precedes *principle* said notionally, just as he opposes [it]. But if with regard to the term, then *principle* said essentially regards what is diverse by essence, and so[^17] [regards] a created [thing]; but *principle* said notionally regards a person consubstantial and uncreated and eternal; and therefore *principle* said notionally is said eternally, and according to this way it is said in God prior not only with regard to the understanding, but also with regard to the reality. And so it is plain in which acceptation this name *principle* is said priorly according to diverse comparisons[^18].

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that when the Son called himself *principle*, he wished to show himself the Creator. For it seems false; because he himself replied to the question of the Pharisees who were asking: *Who are you*[^19]? But [the question] asks about the person; but *principle*, insofar as it is taken for *Creator*, is taken essentially: therefore either the Lord did not respond suitably, or *principle* does not stand for *Creator* there. — If you say that it is appropriated to the Son; on the contrary: both the account of creation and the account of principle are appropriated to the Father[^20]: therefore not to the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that *principle* is taken essentially there, as is said in the *littera*[^21]: but it has been drawn to the person of the Son. — But as to what you object, that it is appropriated to the Father; it must be said that *principle* by the account of its name is not appropriated to the Son except by addition; and so in the matter at hand, because it is appropriated through the act of speaking. For he did not say simply: *I am the principle*, but *I am the principle who also speak to you*[^22].

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that it is not to be conceded that the Son has a principle, since the Son is also principle from a principle. For it seems that it ought to be conceded, because every relative ought to have a correlative corresponding to itself[^23]: therefore if the Son, when he is called *principle from a principle*, is said relatively, he ought to have a correlative, which is the principle.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to have a principle* is in two ways: either as a correlative, as the son is said to have a father, and so the Son has a principle; or as a disposition of itself, and so [a thing] is said to have a principle which begins to be, and so the Son does not have a principle, because he does not begin. — Or otherwise: it is one thing to have a principle of being and [another] of duration; in the first way the Son has a principle, in the second way not.

---

la: Pro *Pater* cod. T *respectu*. Proxime post pro *sanctus* Vat. *sandus*.

en: In place of *Pater* codex T [reads] *respectu*. Just after, in place of *sanctus* the Vatican edition [reads] *sandus*.

la: Codd. A K S V W Y aa cc cum ed. 1 *omnino*.

en: Codices A, K, S, V, W, Y, aa, cc, with edition 1, [read] *omnino*.

la: Scil. *distributio*, in qua terminus non distribuitur pro omnibus suis inferioribus simpliciter, quia ex loquendi usu unum excipitur, scil. ipsum subiectum propositionis. Cfr. supra d. 7. q. 4. in corp., et infra d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. — Mox pro *continet* cod. V *legit*.

en: Namely, *distribution*, in which the term is not distributed for all its inferiors absolutely, because by usage of speech one [item] is excepted, namely, the subject of the proposition itself. Cf. above d. 7, q. 4, in the body, and below d. 45, a. 1, q. 2, in the body. — Soon, in place of *continet* codex V [reads] *legit*.

la: Cod. [I?] hic subiicit: *sicut isti duo actus personales generare et spirare conveniunt in hoc communi, quod est producere, sic istae relationes in eo quod est principium.*

en: Codex [I?] here adds: *just as these two personal acts, to beget and to spirate, agree in this common [feature], that it is to produce, so these relations [agree] in that which is principle.*

la: Cap. 1.

en: Chapter 1.

la: Plures codd. ut A T W X Y Z cc cum ed. 1 *innascibilis*.

en: Many codices such as A, T, W, X, Y, Z, cc, with edition 1, [read] *innascibilis*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 18. p. II. dub. 6. Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a S. Thoma, hic circa lit., et S. p. I. q. 33. a. 1, et a Richardo, hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above d. 18, p. II, dub. 6. This doubt is also resolved by St. Thomas, here on the *littera*, and *Summa* p. I, q. 33, a. 1, and by Richard, here on the *littera*.

la: Cap. 5.

en: Chapter 5.

la: Codd. A Z *accipitur*.

en: Codices A and Z [read] *accipitur*.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 70. m. 3. a. 1. — M. Albert., hic a. 3. et 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 7. — Richard., hic q. 4.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 70, m. 3, a. 1. — Master Albert, here a. 3 and 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 7. — Richard, here q. 4.

la: Cap. 1. — Propositio, quae dein sequitur: *Si ergo Spiritus sanctus est aeternus Conditor*, in multis mss. desideratur.

en: Chapter 1. — The proposition which then follows: *If therefore the Holy Spirit is the eternal Creator*, is missing in many manuscripts.

la: Qui S. Ambrosio attribuitur et habetur in Breviar. Roman. in officio Dominicae ad Laudes.

en: [The hymn] which is attributed to St. Ambrose and is found in the Roman Breviary in the Sunday office at Lauds.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc deest *haec*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc the [word] *haec* is missing.

la: Permulti codd. perperam *habitudinaliter*; cfr. supra pag. 323, nota 10. — Paulo inferius post *id est* Vat. cum cod. cc textum sic distorquet: *conditor, qui est aeternus*, et cod. I sic: *qui est aeternus, est conditor*. In fine solutionis codd. P Q voci *Duobus*, et paulo post codd. I S V W Y voci *tertio* praemittunt particulam *in*.

en: Very many codices wrongly [read] *habitudinaliter*; cf. above p. 323, note 10. — A little below, after *id est* the Vatican edition with codex cc twists the text thus: *conditor, qui est aeternus*, and codex I thus: *qui est aeternus, est conditor*. At the end of the solution codices P and Q prefix the particle *in* to the word *Duobus*, and a little after codices I, S, V, W, Y [prefix it] to the word *tertio*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 2, et V. *Metaph.* text. 16. (IV. c. 11.), ac supra pag. 487, nota 2.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 2, and *Metaphysics* V, text 16 (IV, c. 11), and above p. 487, note 2.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur verba *aut respectu termini. Si respectu subiecti.*

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc the words *aut respectu termini. Si respectu subiecti.* are missing.

la: Vocula *ita* a Vat. abest, sed in plerisque codd. et in ed. 1 habetur; in nonnullis codd. tamen non ante, sed post verbum *creatum* posita est. Paulo superius pro *quid* Vat. cum cod. cc *quod est*. Paulo inferius pro *ideo* codd. S V W *ita*.

en: The little word *ita* is absent from the Vatican edition, but is found in most codices and in edition 1; in some codices, however, it is placed not before but after the word *creatum*. A little above, in place of *quid* the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *quod est*. A little below, in place of *ideo* codices S, V, W [read] *ita*.

la: Distinctione, quam S. Bonav. in hac solutione facit, etiam Petrus a Tar. utitur, hic q. 1. Sed Richard. (hic q. 2.) cum Aegidio absolute concedit, principium personarum per prius dici relate ad principium creaturarum. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 70. m. 1. § 1.), B. Albert. (hic a. 2.) et S. Thom. (hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) respondent, eandem quoad rem distinctionem facientes, qua utitur S. Bonav.

en: The distinction which St. Bonaventure makes in this solution is also used by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. But Richard (here q. 2) with Giles concedes absolutely that the principle of persons is said priorly relative to the principle of creatures. Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 70, m. 1, § 1), B. Albert (here a. 2), and St. Thomas (here a. 2, quaestiunc. 2) respond making the same distinction in substance which St. Bonaventure uses.

la: Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 3, et d. 34. q. 3. — Aliquanto superius pro *ratio creationis* aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *ratio creatoris*.

en: Cf. below d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 34, q. 3. — Somewhat above, in place of *ratio creationis* some codices with edition 1 [read] *ratio creatoris*.

la: Cap. 2.

en: Chapter 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on Relation.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 30

title_alt: Distinctio XXX littera Magistri — De his quae temporaliter de Deo dicuntur et relative secundum accidens

title_alt: Lombard's text on Distinction XXX — On those things that are said of God temporally and relatively according to accident

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 518 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXX.

#### *De his quae temporaliter de Deo dicuntur et relative secundum accidens, quod non Deo, sed creaturis accidit.*

Sunt enim quaedam, quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur eique temporaliter conveniunt sine sui mutatione et relative dicuntur secundum accidens, non quod accidat Deo, sed quod accidit creaturis, ut creator, dominus, refugium, datum vel donatum et huiusmodi. De his Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^3] ait: «Creator relative dicitur ad creaturam, sicut dominus ad servum.» Item[^4]: «Non moveat, quod Spiritus sanctus, cum sit coaeternus Patri et Filio, dicitur tamen aliquid ex tempore, veluti hoc ipsum quod donatum diximus. Nam sempiterne Spiritus est donum, temporaliter autem donatum. Et si dominus non dicitur, nisi cum habere incipit servum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est Deo. Non enim sempiterna creatura est, cuius ille dominus est: ergo dominum esse non sempiternum habet, ne cogamur etiam creaturam sempiternam dicere, quia ille sempiterne non dominaretur, nisi etiam ista sempiterne famularetur. Sicut autem non potest esse servus qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet servum.»

Sed hic aliquis dicet, quod non ex tempore competit Deo haec appellatio, qua dicitur dominus, quia non est tantum dominus rerum, quae ex tempore coeperunt, sed etiam illius rei, quae non coepit ex tempore, id est ipsius temporis, quod non coepit ex tempore, quia non erat ante[^5] tempus quam inciperet: et ideo non coepit esse dominus ex tempore.

Ad quod dici potest, quia licet non coeperit ex tempore esse dominus temporis, coepit tamen esse dominus temporis, quia non semper fuit tempus; et ipsius hominis ex tempore coepit esse dominus[^1][^6]. De hoc Augustinus in eodem libro[^7] continue ita dicit: «Quisquis extiterit, qui aeternum Deum solum dicat, tempora vero non esse aeterna propter varietatem et mutabilitatem, sed tamen ipsa tempora non in tempore esse coepisse, quia non erat tempus, antequam tempora inciperent, et ideo non in tempore accidere[^8] Deo, ut dominus esset, quia ipsorum temporum dominus erat, quae utique non in tempore esse coeperunt — quid respondebit de homine, qui in tempore factus est, cuius utique dominus non erat, antequam esset? Certe, ut dominus hominis esset, ex tempore accidit Deo, et ut omnis amoveatur controversia, certe ut tuus dominus esset, vel meus, qui modo esse coepimus, ex tempore habuit. Quomodo igitur obtinebimus, nihil secundum accidens dici de Deo? Nisi quia ipsius naturae nihil accidit, quo mutetur; ut ea sint accidentia relativa, quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum, de quibus dicuntur, accidunt, sicut amicus relative dicitur. Non enim amicus esse incipit, nisi cum amare coeperit: fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis, ut amicus dicatur. Nummus vero, cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur; nec tamen mutatus est, cum esse coeperit pretium, nec cum dicitur pignus et huiusmodi. Si ergo nummus potest nulla sui mutatione toties dici relative, ut neque cum incipit dici neque cum desinit, aliquid in eius natura vel forma, qua nummus est, mutationis fiat; quanto facilius de illa incommutabili Dei substantia debemus accipere, quod ita dicatur relative aliquid ad creaturam, ut, quamvis temporaliter incipiat dici, non tamen ipsi substantiae Dei accidisse aliqua intelligatur, sed illi creaturae, ad quam dicitur. Qualiter etiam refugium nostrum[^9] dicitur: refugium enim nostrum dicitur Deus relative; ad nos enim refertur, et tunc refugium nostrum fit, cum ad eum refugimus. Nunquid tunc fit aliquid in eius natura, quod, antequam

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refugiens ad eum, non erat? In nobis ergo fit aliqua mutatio, qui ad eum refugiendo efficimur meliores; in illo autem nulla. Sic et *pater noster esse incipit*, cum per eius gratiam regeneramur, *qui dedit nobis potestatem filios Dei fieri*. Substantia igitur nostra mutatur in melius, cum filii eius efficimur. Similiter et ille *pater noster esse incipit*, sed nulla suae commutationis substantiae. Quod ergo temporaliter dici incipit Deus, quod antea non dicebatur, manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens Dei, quod ei aliquid acciderit, sed plane secundum accidens eius, ad quod dici aliquid Deus incipit relative.» Ex his aperte ostendilur, quod quaedam de Deo temporaliter dicuntur relative ad creaturas sine mutatione *Dei*, sed non sine mutatione *creaturae*: et ita accidens est in creatura, non in Creatore, et appellatio, qua creatura relative dicitur ad Creatorem, relativa est et relationem notat, quae est in ipsa creatura. Appellatio vero illa, qua Creator relative dicitur ad creaturam, relativa quidem est, sed nullam notat relationem, quae sit in Creatore.

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#### *An Spiritus sanctus dicatur datum vel donatum relative ad se, cum a se detur.*

Hic potest solvi quaestio superius[^2] proposita, ubi quaerebatur, cum Spiritus sanctus dicatur datum vel donatum — quod autem datur refertur et ad eum qui dat, et ad illum cui datur — et quod Spiritus sanctus det se ipsum, utrum ad se ipsum relative dicatur, cum dicitur dari vel donari. Cui quaestioni respondentes dicimus, Spiritum sanctum dici datum vel donatum relative et ad dantem, et ad illum cui datur[^10]. Dans autem sive donator est Pater cum Filio et Spiritu sancto. Nec tamen dicimus, Spiritum sanctum referri ad se, sed appellatio dati vel donati refertur et ad dantem et ad recipientem, quia non potest aliquid dici datum, nisi ab aliquo et alicui detur. Cum autem Spiritus sanctus dari a se vel datus a se dicitur, relative quidem dicitur ad illum cui datur; et est appellatio relativa, et in illo cui datur mutatio fit, non in dante.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXX.

#### *On those things that are said of God temporally and relatively according to accident, which befalls not God but creatures.*

For there are certain things that are said of God in time and are suited to Him temporally without any change in Himself, and they are said relatively according to accident — not because the accident befalls God, but because it befalls creatures: such as *creator*, *lord*, *refuge*, *gift* or *donated* and the like. Concerning these things Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^3] says: "Creator is said relatively in relation to the creature, just as lord in relation to servant." Likewise[^4]: "Let it not trouble anyone that the Holy Spirit, although He is co-eternal with the Father and the Son, is yet said to be something in time, as for instance this very thing which we called *donated*. For the Spirit is eternally *gift*, but temporally *donated*. And if He is not called lord except when He begins to have a servant, then even that relative appellation exists for God in time. For the creature of which He is lord is not eternal: therefore He does not have it as an eternal thing to be lord, lest we be compelled to say the creature is also eternal, since He would not have ruled eternally unless the creature had also served eternally. But just as there cannot be a servant who has no lord, so neither a lord who has no servant."

But someone here will say that this appellation by which He is called *lord* did not come to God in time, because He is lord not only of things that began to be in time, but also of that thing that did not begin in time, namely of time itself, which did not begin in time, because there was no time[^5] before time began: and therefore He did not begin to be lord in time.

To which it can be said: although He did not begin in time to be lord of time, He nevertheless began to be lord of time, because time did not always exist; and of man himself He began in time to be lord[^1][^6]. Concerning this Augustine in the same book[^7] continues thus saying: "Whoever maintains that God alone is eternal, but that the times are not eternal on account of their variability and mutability — but that the times themselves did not begin to be in time, since there was no time before the times began, and therefore that it did not happen[^8] to God in time that He should be lord, since He was lord of those times themselves which certainly did not begin to be in time — what will he answer concerning man, who was made in time, whose lord certainly He was not before man existed? Surely, that He should be lord of man happened to God in time, and that all controversy might be removed — surely that He should be your lord, or mine, we who have recently begun to be, He obtained in time. How then will we maintain that nothing is said of God according to accident? Only because nothing happens to His own nature whereby He is changed; so that there are relative accidents, which happen together with some change in the things of which they are said, just as *friend* is said relatively. For one does not begin to be a friend except when one has begun to love: therefore some change of will occurs, that one may be called *friend*. A coin, on the other hand, when it is called *price*, is said relatively; and yet it has not been changed when it has begun to be *price*, nor when it is called *pledge* and the like. If therefore a coin can be said relatively so many times without any change of itself, so that neither when it begins to be said [such] nor when it ceases [to be so called] does any change occur in its nature or form by which it is a coin; how much more easily ought we to accept concerning that unchangeable substance of God, that something is thus said of Him relatively in relation to the creature, so that, although it begins to be said temporally, yet no accident is understood to have happened to the very substance of God, but to that creature in relation to which it is said. In like manner also *our refuge*[^9] is spoken of: for God is called our refuge relatively; for He is referred to us, and then our refuge comes to be, when we flee to Him. Is anything then brought into being in His nature, when someone

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flees to Him, which was not there before? In us therefore some change occurs, who by fleeing to Him are made better; but in Him none. So also *He begins to be our father*, when through His grace we are regenerated, *who gave us power to become sons of God*. Our substance therefore is changed for the better when we become His sons. Likewise also *He begins to be our father*, but with no change of His own substance. Therefore that which God begins to be called temporally, which He was not called before, is manifestly said relatively, yet not according to an accident of God, as if something had happened to Him, but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins to be said relatively." From these things it is plainly shown that certain things are said of God temporally, relatively to creatures, without any change in *God*, but not without change in the *creature*: and so the accident is in the creature, not in the Creator, and the appellation by which the creature is said relatively to the Creator is relative and denotes a relation which is in the creature itself. But that appellation by which the Creator is said relatively to the creature is indeed relative, but denotes no relation which is in the Creator.

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#### *Whether the Holy Spirit is said to be given or donated relatively to Himself, when He is given from Himself.*

Here can be solved the question proposed above[^2], where it was asked — since the Holy Spirit is said to be *gift* or *donated*, but what is given is referred both to the one who gives and to the one to whom it is given — and since the Holy Spirit gives Himself, whether He is said relatively to Himself when He is said to be given or donated. In answering this question we say that the Holy Spirit is said to be given or donated relatively both in relation to the giver and in relation to the one to whom He is given[^10]. The giver or donor is the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit. Yet we do not say the Holy Spirit is referred to Himself; rather, the appellation of *given* or *donated* is referred both to the giver and to the recipient, since nothing can be called given unless it is given by someone and to someone. But when the Holy Spirit is said to be given from Himself or to have been given from Himself, He is indeed said relatively to the one to whom He is given; and the appellation is relative, and in the one to whom He is given a change occurs, not in the giver.

---

la: Pro *habet principium* Vat. cum cod. cc perperam *incipit esse*; nonnulli codd. post *principium* adiungunt *et*, ac cod. (in marg.) post *incipit* addit *esse*.

en: For *habet principium* ("has a beginning"), the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc reads, erroneously, *incipit esse* ("begins to be"); several codices add *et* after *principium*, and a codex (in the margin) adds *esse* after *incipit*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 9. q. 3. ad 3.

en: Compare above, dist. 9, q. 3, ad 3.

la: Cap. 13. n. 14. — Paulo superius fide codd. BCE et ed. 1 posuimus *accidat Deo* pro *accidit Deo*.

en: Chapter 13, n. 14. — A little above, following codices BCE and edition 1, we placed *accidat Deo* in place of *accidit Deo*.

la: Ibid. c. 16. n. 17: in quo textu Vat. excepta ante *moveat* addit *aliquem* contra codd. et originale, et paulo post eadem cum aliis edd. *sanctus* post *Spiritus*.

en: The same, c. 16, n. 17: in this text the Vatican [edition] alone, against the codices and the original, adds *aliquem* before *moveat*, and a little later the same [Vatican] with the other editions [adds] *sanctus* after *Spiritus*.

la: Cod. A. et ed. 1 verba hunc transponunt sic: *non erat tempus, antequam inciperet*.

en: Codex A and edition 1 transpose these words thus: *non erat tempus, antequam inciperet*.

la: Nostri codd. hic adiiciunt notulam hanc: *Quando coepit tempus, Deus coepit esse dominus, nec ante tempus fuit dominus, sed cum tempore, non ex tempore vel in tempore, quia non ante fuit tempus quam ipse dominus, sed simul.* Cfr. S. Bonav. hic dub. 2.

en: Our codices here add this note: "When time began, God began to be lord, nor was He lord before time, but with time — not from time or in time — because time did not exist before the lord Himself, but simultaneously." Compare St. Bonaventure here, dubium 2.

la: Loc. cit. Sed nonnulla a Magistro omissa vel mutata sunt.

en: Same place cited. But several things [are] omitted or changed by the Master.

la: Omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 *acciderit*, sed incongruе. Originale, utendo alia constructione, recte *accidit*.

en: All the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 [read] *acciderit*, but incongruously. The original, using a different construction, correctly [has] *accidit*.

la: *Psalm.* 17, 2, et passim; alius locus s. Scripturae est *Ioan.* 1, 12.

en: *Psalm.* 17:2, and passim; another passage of holy Scripture is *John* 1:12.

la: Codd. DE *donatur*.

en: Codices DE [read] *donatur*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 30, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXX — De nominibus relativis, quae temporaliter et communiter de Deo dicuntur. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXX — On relative names which are said of God temporally and commonly. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXX.

#### *De nominibus relativis, quae temporaliter et communiter de Deo dicuntur.*

> *Sunt enim quaedam, quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de relativis, quae conveniunt Deo proprie et aeternaliter[^1][^3]. Hic agit de his quae conveniunt Deo temporaliter et communiter, et habet haec pars duas. In prima Magister agit de relativis, quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur. In secunda de his quae pluribus personis conveniunt, sed tamen appropriari possunt, ut similis et aequalis, infra distinctione trigesima prima: *Praeterea considerari oportet, cum tres personae.*

Prima pars habet quatuor partes. In prima ostendit, aliqua nomina dici de Deo ex tempore, exemplificans de pluribus. In secunda, quia exemplum videbatur inconveniens de hoc nomine *dominus*, opponit et solvit, ibi: *Sed hic aliquis dicet, quod non ex tempore.* In tertia vero, quia dictum videbatur falsum, quod aliquid ex tempore diceretur de Deo, ideo movet et solvit dubium, ibi: *Quomodo ergo obtinebimus, nihil secundum accidens etc.* In quarta vero ex praedeterminatione solvit quoddam[^2][^4] dubium in praecedentibus quaesitum, ibi: *Hic potest solvi quaestio superius proposita.*

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### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur in hac distinctione, tria quaeruntur.

Primo, utrum aliquid dicatur de Deo ex tempore.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum ea quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, dicantur per se, vel per accidens.

Tertio, utrum dicantur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.

---

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## Commentary on Distinction XXX.

#### *On relative names which are said of God temporally and commonly.*

> *"For there are certain things which are said of God in time."*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of the relatives which belong to God properly and eternally[^1][^3]. Here he treats of those which belong to God temporally and commonly, and this part has two [subdivisions]. In the first, the Master treats of the relatives which are said of God in time. In the second, of those which belong to several persons, yet can be appropriated, such as *similar* and *equal*, below in distinction thirty-one: *"Moreover, it must be considered, when the three persons."*

The first part has four parts. In the first he shows that certain names are said of God in time, giving examples from many [cases]. In the second, because the example concerning this name *lord* seemed unsuitable, he raises an objection and resolves it, there: *"But here someone will say, that not from time."* In the third, however, because what was said seemed false — that something is said of God from time — he raises and resolves a doubt, there: *"How then shall we maintain that nothing is according to accident etc."* In the fourth, moreover, from what has been previously determined, he resolves a certain[^2][^4] doubt raised in the preceding [pages], there: *"Here the question proposed above can be resolved."*

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### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the things said in this distinction, three [questions] are asked.

First, whether anything is said of God in time.

Second, granted that this is so, it is asked whether the things which are said of God in time are said *per se* [essentially], or according to accident.

Third, whether they are said according to substance, or according to relation.

---

la: Dist. XXVIII. c. 6.

en: Distinction XXVIII, chapter 6 [of the Sentences of Peter Lombard].

en: Codices D and E read *donatur* ["is given"] [in place of *quoddam* ("a certain")].

la: Pro *aeternaliter* plurimi codd. *essentialiter*, et *temporaliter et communiter* sola Vat. *proprie et temporaliter*; perperam. Nostra lectio comprobatur ex d. 26. expos. textus.

en: In place of *aeternaliter* ("eternally"), the majority of codices read *essentialiter* ("essentially"), and for *temporaliter et communiter* the Vatican edition alone reads *proprie et temporaliter* ("properly and temporally"); [both are] incorrect. Our reading is confirmed by d. 26, exposition of the text.

la: Pro *quoddam* codd. AFG I (T a prima manu) V cc *ad*, cod. Z *aliud*, cod. Y *illud*.

en: In place of *quoddam* ("a certain"), codices AFG I (T in the first hand) V [and] cc read *ad* ("to"), codex Z reads *aliud* ("another"), codex Y reads *illud* ("that").


title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De iis quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum de Deo aliquid ex tempore dicatur.*

Quod autem dicantur aliqua de Deo ex tempore, ostenditur sic.

1. «Non est dominus, nisi servum»[^1], sicut dicit Augustinus; sed Deus dicitur dominus et non habuit ab aeterno servum, ergo ex tempore: ergo etc.

2. Item, actioni respondet passio, ita quod sunt simul[^2]; sed Deus creat, ergo aliquid creatur; sed non creatur aliquid nisi ex tempore, ergo non creat nisi ex tempore: ergo etc.

3. Item, nulli convenit esse hominem nisi ex tempore, eo quod esse hominem[^3] habet principium; sed Deo convenit esse hominem: ergo ex tempore.

4. Item, sicut se habet temporale ad temporale, ita aeternum ad aeternum: ergo mutata proportione, sicut se habet aeternum ad temporale, ita temporale ad aeternum. Sed aeternum sic se habet, quod dicitur de temporali, ut cum dicitur: Petrus est praedestinatus: ergo et temporale poterit dici de aeterno.

**Contra:**

1. Omne temporale est creatum, sed Deus est increatus, et horum est summa distantia; sed illorum, inter quae est summa distantia, unum non praedicatur de altero: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne temporale est mutabile et variabile; sed omne illud, de quo praedicatur mutabile, ipsum est mutabile[^4]: cum igitur Deus non sit mutabilis et variabilis, patet etc.

3. Item, nihil aeternum est ex tempore; sed omne quod praedicatur de Deo, est Deus, et ita aeternum: ergo nihil tale potest dici ex tempore.

4. Item, omne quod est aliquid ex tempore, incipit esse aliquid, quod non erat prius; et omne tale est mutabile: ergo nihil tale est in Deo, ergo etc.

Si dicas, quod non praedicatur aliquid de Deo statim[^5] ex tempore praedicatione per essentiam vel inhaerentiam, sed per causam, quae non ponit aliquid in Deo, sed in effectu; *contra*: cum dicitur: Deus est creator, hoc dicitur ex tempore, et non statim per causam: ergo responsio illa nulla. Probatio: Omne quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, de alio dicitur per essentiam, vel inhaerentiam; sed creator de nullo alio a Deo dicitur nec per essentiam, nec per inhaerentiam: ergo etc.

Item, quod dicitur de alio per causam, potest inferri per modum habitudinis causalis, ut: dies est sol lucens super terram[^6], ergo dies est a sole: ergo si per causam Deus est creator, pari ratione Deus a creatura, vel e converso.

Item, quod praedicatur solum per causam non est idem illi, de quo praedicatur; sed cum dicitur: Deus creat, actio Dei est Deus: ergo non praedicatur per causam.

Item, cum dicitur Deus dominus, dominus non dicit aliquod genus causae, et tamen dicitur de Deo: ergo praedicta responsio non est sufficiens.

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### Conclusio.

> Aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore non ratione principalis significati, sed ratione connotati in creatura.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid dici ex tempore est dupliciter: aut quia ipsum est temporale, aut quia dicit respectum ad temporale.

Primo modo nihil praedicatur de Deo per essentiam vel per inhaerentiam, sicut probant quatuor rationes ad hoc inductae; praedicatur tamen per causam, ut si dicatur Deus est patientia mea[^7]; vel per unionem, ut si dicatur: Deus est homo; et hoc non ponit mutationem vel esse temporale circa Deum, sed circa creaturam.

Alio modo dicitur aliquid ex tempore eo quod, de ratione sui nominis, dicit comparationem ad aliquid temporale, ut *dominus* et *creator*, sed tamen de sua principali significatione importat *essentiam*. Nam *dominus* importat dominium, quod est potestas coercendi subditos[^8]; et haec est divina essentia. Similiter *creator* importat divinam actionem, quae est divina essentia. Utrumque tamen significat in respectu ad creaturam, et ita connotat creatum et temporale.

Quoniam ergo quod implicat in se contingens et necessarium denominatur totum contingens; similiter, quod aeternum et temporale totum denominatur temporale propter naturam totius copulati, quod ponit utramque partem et falsificatur pro utraque parte et pro altera[^9]; hinc est, quod talia dicuntur ex tempore non ratione principalis significati, sed ratione connotati in creatura. Et per hoc patent quatuor argumenta sequentia[^10]. Concedendum est enim, quod non omne quod ex tempore dicitur de Deo, dicitur per causam, sed vel dicitur per causam, vel per unionem, vel per quandam comparationem ad temporale. Et sic patent omnia.

*1. 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod temporale est creatum, et mutabile; dicendum, quod loquitur de temporali primo modo; et hoc non dicitur de Deo nisi per causam vel per unionem.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod praedicatur de Deo est aeternum; dicendum, quod haec est duplex, quia *aeternum* potest teneri adiective, vel substantive. Si adiective, sic falsa est: aliquid enim praedicatur de Deo, cuius duratio non est aeterna. Si substantive, vera est, et est: omne quod praedicatur de Deo, est aliquid aeternum. Nec tamen sequitur: est[^11] aeternum; immo est ibi fallacia accidentis, sicut hic: creatio est Deus; et Deus est aeternus: ergo creatio est aeterna; ita et in praedicta. Aliquid enim, quod est aeternum ratione principalis significati, id est, quod est aliquid aeternum, ratione connotati dicitur temporale.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod est ex tempore, incipit aliquid esse; dicendum, quod illud non est in Deo propter mutationem aliquam factam in ipso, sed in creatura: et illud determinatum est supra, distinctione octava[^12].

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### Article Unicus. *On those things that are said of God in time.*
### Question I. *Whether anything is predicated of God in time.*

That certain things are said of God in time is shown as follows.

1. "There is no lord, unless there be a servant"[^1], as Augustine says; but God is called lord and did not have a servant from eternity, therefore [he is lord] in time: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, action corresponds to passion, so that they are simultaneous[^2]; but God creates, therefore something is created; but nothing is created except in time, therefore [God] does not create except in time: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it belongs to nothing to be a human being except in time, because being a human being[^3] has a beginning; but it belongs to God to be a human being: therefore [it belongs to him] in time.

4. Likewise, as the temporal stands to the temporal, so the eternal [stands] to the eternal: therefore, changing the proportion, as the eternal stands to the temporal, so the temporal [stands] to the eternal. But the eternal stands thus, that it is said of the temporal, as when it is said: Peter is predestined: therefore the temporal also will be able to be said of the eternal.

**On the contrary:**

1. Everything temporal is created, but God is uncreated, and between these there is the greatest distance; but of those things between which there is the greatest distance, one is not predicated of the other: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything temporal is mutable and variable; but everything of which the mutable is predicated is itself mutable[^4]: since therefore God is not mutable and variable, it is clear etc.

3. Likewise, nothing eternal is [predicated] in time; but everything that is predicated of God is God, and thus eternal: therefore nothing of that kind can be said in time.

4. Likewise, everything that is something in time begins to be something that it was not before; and everything of that kind is mutable: therefore nothing of that kind is in God, therefore etc.

If you say that something is not predicated of God *at once*[^5] in time by a predication through essence or inherence, but through cause, which places nothing in God but [only] in the effect; *on the contrary*: when it is said: God is creator, this is said in time, and not at once through cause: therefore that response is of no avail. Proof: Everything that is said of something through cause, is said of something else through essence or inherence; but *creator* is not said of anything other than God either through essence or through inherence: therefore etc.

Likewise, what is said of another through cause can be inferred by way of causal relation, as: the day is the sun shining upon the earth[^6], therefore the day is from the sun: therefore if through cause God is creator, by equal reasoning God [comes] from the creature, or conversely.

Likewise, what is predicated only through cause is not identical with that of which it is predicated; but when it is said: God creates, the action of God is God: therefore it is not predicated through cause.

Likewise, when it is said *God is lord*, *lord* does not express any genus of cause, and yet is said of God: therefore the aforesaid response is not sufficient.

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### Conclusion.

> Certain names are said of God in time not by reason of the principal signified, but by reason of what is connoted in the creature.

**I respond:** It must be said that something is said in time in two ways: either because it itself is temporal, or because it expresses a relation to what is temporal.

In the first way nothing is predicated of God through essence or through inherence, as the four reasons adduced for this prove; it is predicated, however, through cause, as if it were said "God is my patience"[^7]; or through union, as if it were said: God is man; and this places no change or temporal being around God, but around the creature.

In the other way something is said in time because, by the account of its name, it expresses a comparison to something temporal, as *lord* and *creator*, but it imports *essence* in its principal signification. For *lord* imports lordship, which is the power of constraining subjects[^8]; and this is the divine essence. Likewise *creator* imports the divine action, which is the divine essence. Each, however, signifies in relation to the creature, and thus connotes the created and the temporal.

Since, therefore, what in itself implies the contingent and the necessary is denominated wholly contingent; likewise, what [implies] the eternal and the temporal is denominated wholly temporal by reason of the nature of the whole compound, which posits both parts and is falsified with respect to each part and with respect to either[^9]; hence it is that such things are said in time not by reason of the principal signified, but by reason of what is connoted in the creature. And through this the following four arguments are made manifest[^10]. For it must be conceded that not everything which is said of God in time is said through cause, but it is said either through cause, or through union, or through a certain comparison to what is temporal. And thus all is made manifest.

*1. 2.* To that, therefore, which is objected, that the temporal is created and mutable; it must be said that [this] speaks of the temporal in the first way; and this is not said of God except through cause or through union.

*3.* To that which is objected, that everything that is predicated of God is eternal; it must be said that this is twofold, because *eternal* can be taken adjectively or substantively. If adjectively, it is false in that sense: for something is predicated of God whose duration is not eternal. If substantively, it is true, and is: everything that is predicated of God is something eternal. Nor does it follow: it is[^11] eternal; rather there is there a fallacy of accident, as here: creation is God; and God is eternal: therefore creation is eternal; so also in the aforesaid. For something that is eternal by reason of the principal signified, that is, that is something eternal, is said to be temporal by reason of what is connoted.

*4.* To that which is objected, that what is in time begins to be something; it must be said that that does not obtain in God on account of any change made in him, but in the creature: and that was determined above, in the eighth distinction[^12].

la: August., V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, c. 16, n. 17. See here the text of the Master.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.), ubi actio et passio ponuntur inter relativa; et III. Phys. text. 19. (c. 3.) dicitur, quod actio et passio sint unus motus in passo sicut in subiecto. Et Gilbert. Porret., de Sex princ. c. de Actione: Omnis enim actus passionis est effectiva, et omne passionem inferens actio est.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV, c. 15), where action and passion are placed among relatives; and *Physics* III, text 19 (c. 3), where it is said that action and passion are one motion in the patient as in a subject. And Gilbert of Poitiers, *De Sex Principiis*, c. On Action: "For every act of passion is effective, and everything that brings about passion is an action."

la: Cod. M *omne esse humanum*.

en: Codex M reads *omne esse humanum* ["all human being"].

la: Permulti codd. ut C F G H K R S T U V X cc cum edd. 1, 2, 3 voci *ipsum* praefigunt *circa*.

en: Very many codices, as C F G H K R S T U V X cc together with editions 1, 2, 3, prefix *circa* to the word *ipsum*.

la: Cod. I *nullum*.

en: Codex I reads *nullum*.

la: Similis definitio diei habetur in Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 1.): Dies est solis latio super terram. — Mox post *pari ratione* Deus in cod. I repetitur *est*.

en: A similar definition of the day is found in Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 1.): "The day is the passage of the sun over the earth." — Shortly after *by equal reasoning*, Codex I repeats *est* after *Deus*.

la: Psalm. 70, 5: Quoniam tu es patientia mea, Domine.

en: Psalm 70, 5: "For thou art my patience, O Lord."

la: Boeth., de Trin. c. 5. dominium sic definit: Potestas quaedam, qua servus coercetur. Cfr. et Ambros., I. de Fide, c. 1. n. 7. Verba Ambrosii invenies supra pag. 47, nota 3.

en: Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 5, defines lordship thus: "A certain power by which a servant is constrained." Cf. also Ambrose, *On the Faith* I, c. 1, n. 7. The words of Ambrose are found above p. 47, note 3.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 118. m. 1: Nam destruere facilius est quam construere omnino, ut dicit Aristoteles (VII. Topic. c. 3.). Ad hoc enim, ut sim homo albus, necessaria sunt duo, scilicet ut sim homo et ut sim albus; et ad hoc, ut non sim homo albus, sufficit, ut non sim albus. Cfr. etiam supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6, et Aristot., I. Prior. c. 15, ubi idem docetur respectu syllogismi, cuius una propositio est necessaria, altera contingens. — Paulo superius post *similiter*, quod suppple cum cod. I *in se implicat*.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 118, m. 1: "For to destroy is easier than to construct altogether, as Aristotle says (*Topics* VII, c. 3.). For to this end, that I be a white man, two things are necessary, namely that I be a man and that I be white; and to this end, that I not be a white man, it suffices that I not be white." Cf. also above d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6, and Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, c. 15, where the same is taught with respect to a syllogism, of which one proposition is necessary, the other contingent. — A little above, after *similarly*, supply with Codex I *in se implicat* ["implies in itself"].

la: Nempe ultima argumenta, quae replicant ad instantiam in 1. opposit. factam.

en: Namely the final arguments, which respond to the instantiation made in the 1st objection on the opposite side.

la: Codd. M bb *ergo est*.

en: Codices M and bb read *ergo est* ["therefore it is"].

la: Pars II. d. 1. 2.

en: Part II, d. 1. 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De differentia quae est inter *incipere ex tempore*, *in tempore*, *cum tempore* cfr. hic dub. 2. — Quinque modi praedicandi aliquid de Deo in respons. enumerantur, scil. per essentiam (ut Deus est suum esse), per inhaerentiam (i. e. quasi inhaerentiam, ut Deus est sapiens), per causam (Deus spes mea), per unionem (Deus homo factus est), per quandam relationem ad temporale (Deus est creator). Cfr. III. Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Ab aliis enumerantur tantum quatuor modi, ut a Petro a Tar. (I. Sent. d. 30. q. I. a. 1.): «Quatuor modis invenitur aliquid de aliquo praedicari: primo per essentiam, ut homo est animal; secundo modo per denominationem vel inhaerentiam accidentalem, ut homo est albus; tertio modo per causam, ut dies est sol; quarto modo per respectum seu habitudinem, ut iste est dexter illi». Richard. a Med. (hic q. 1.) habet octo, scilicet: «Illud quod dicitur de aliquo aut significat essentiam illius, aut aliquid de essentia, aut aliquid accidens absolutum inhaerens ei, aut causam illius sive illius effectum, aut rationem ipsam denominantem, aut actionem illius transeuntem in rem exteriorem, aut actionem alterius modo passivo significatam, aut rem unitam ei de quo dicitur». Ui octo modi ad illos quinque reduci possunt. Plura vide infra d. 33. q. 3, d. 34. q. 2.

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**II.** Non defuerunt qui nomina *dominus* et *creator* acceperunt pro habitu sive potentia dominandi vel creandi; unde concluserunt, ea dicenda esse de Deo ab aeterno (cfr. hic dub. 1.). Sed communis sententia tenet, ipsa accipi pro actu et dici tantum ex tempore.

Cum Alexandro Hal. (S. p. I. q. 53. m. 3, et m. 1. a. 3.) S. Bonav. dicit, quod tum nomen *dominus*, tum nomen *creator*, «de suo principali significato important essentiam». At S. Thom. (S. I. q. 13. a. 7. ad 1.) distinguit inter nomen *dominus* et *creator*. Quod *creator* «significat actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia», ipse concedit; *dominus* autem, ut ait, «non significat substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte». Attamen vix videtur esse dissensio inter utramque sententiam. Aliud enim est aliquid significare principalius, aliud significare directe.

**III.** Fallacia accidentis, quae notatur in 3. arg. ad opposit., in hoc consistit, quod ibi non attenditur ad differentiam inter duplicem significationem quae est in nomine *dominus* et *creator*. Nam quatenus haec verba significant divinam essentiam, dicunt aliquid aeternum; sed non, quatenus significant respectum ad creaturam, qui Deo per accidens convenit.

**IV.** Notandum est, quod in 1. arg. ad opposit. ad instantiam affirmatur, ea quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, de ipso dici per causam. Ad hanc non sufficientem evasionem eludendam opponens affert quatuor argumenta, ut probet, nomina *creator* et *dominus* non praedicari per causam de Deo. S. Bonav. non respondet explicite ad haec argumenta, sed tantum generaliter in fine respons. concedenrdo quod non omne ex tempore de Deo dictum per causam dicatur, sed plura vel per unionem (ut Deus est homo), vel per respectum ad creaturam (ut Deus est

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creator). Manifestum enim est, quod nomen *creator* non potest Deo ex tempore convenire a parte actionis divinae, quae est ipsa aeterna Dei essentia. Ut autem melius duo prima argumenta replicationis, quae sunt satis subtilia, intelligantur, notandum quod aliqua dici de Deo praedicatione causali dupliciter intelligi potest: primo, quia Deus id quod praedicato significatur, causat; sic dicitur: Deus patientia mea, quae locutio respondet exemplo allato: dies est sol lucens super terram; et tunc recte infertur: dies est a sole, patientia est a Deo. Secundo intelligi potest, non quia ipsum praedicatum causetur, sed quia in eo implicatur habitudo causae. Sic in nomine *creator* importatur habitudo ad id quod causatur, scil. ad creaturam, manifeste autem non importatur, quod ipse Creator causetur. Alia duo argumenta non habent difficultatem.

**V.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 53. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 13. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. 1. tr. 13. q. 32. 53. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** On the difference between *to begin from time*, *in time*, *with time*, see hic dub. 2. — Five modes of predicating something of God are enumerated in the response, namely: through essence (as "God is his own being"), through inherence (i.e. quasi-inherence, as "God is wise"), through cause ("God [is] my hope"), through union ("God was made man"), through a certain relation to the temporal ("God is creator"). Cf. III Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Others enumerate only four modes, as Peter of Tarentaise (I Sent. d. 30. q. I. a. 1.): "In four modes is something found to be predicated of something: first through essence, as 'man is an animal'; in the second mode through denomination or accidental inherence, as 'man is white'; in the third mode through cause, as 'the day is the sun'; in the fourth mode through respect or relation, as 'this one is to the right of that one'." Richard of Middleton (hic q. 1.) has eight, namely: "That which is said of something either signifies the essence of that thing, or something of the essence, or some absolute accident inhering in it, or its cause or the effect of it, or the denominating account itself, or its action passing over into an external thing, or the action of another signified in the passive mode, or the thing united to that of which it is said." These eight modes can be reduced to those five. See more below d. 33. q. 3, d. 34. q. 2.

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**II.** There were those who received the names *lord* and *creator* as a habit or potency of ruling and creating; hence they concluded that these ought to be said of God from eternity (cf. hic dub. 1.). But the common opinion holds that they are taken for the act and said only in time.

With Alexander of Hales (S. p. I. q. 53. m. 3, et m. 1. a. 3.), St. Bonaventure says that both the name *lord* and the name *creator* "import essence from their principal signified." But St. Thomas (S. I. q. 13. a. 7. ad 1.) distinguishes between the name *lord* and *creator*. That *creator* "signifies the action of God, which is his essence," he concedes; *lord*, however, as he says, "does not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly." Yet there scarcely seems to be disagreement between the two opinions. For it is one thing for something to signify more principally, another to signify directly.

**III.** The fallacy of accident that is noted in the 3rd argument on the opposite side consists in this, that there the difference between the twofold signification that is in the name *lord* and *creator* is not attended to. For insofar as these words signify the divine essence, they express something eternal; but not insofar as they signify the relation to the creature, which belongs to God by accident.

**IV.** It must be noted that in the 1st argument on the opposite side, to the instantiation, it is affirmed that those things that are said of God in time are said of him through cause. In order to defeat this insufficient escape, the objector adduces four arguments to prove that the names *creator* and *lord* are not predicated of God through cause. St. Bonaventure does not respond explicitly to these arguments, but only generally at the end of the response, conceding that not everything said of God in time is said through cause, but many things either through union (as "God is man"), or through relation to the creature (as "God is

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creator"). For it is manifest that the name *creator* cannot belong to God in time from the side of the divine action, which is the divine essence itself eternal. But so that the two first arguments of the replication, which are rather subtle, may be better understood, it must be noted that something being said of God by a causal predication can be understood in two ways: first, because God causes that which the predicate signifies; thus it is said: "God [is] my patience," which locution corresponds to the adduced example: "the day is the sun shining upon the earth"; and then it is rightly inferred: the day is from the sun, patience is from God. In the second way it can be understood, not because the predicate itself is caused, but because in it is implied a relation of cause. Thus in the name *creator* is imported a relation to that which is caused, namely to the creature; but it is manifestly not imported that the Creator himself is caused. The other two arguments present no difficulty.

**V.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 53. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 13. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. 1. tr. 13. q. 32. 53. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. 2.

---


title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. Quaestio II. *Utrum nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, dicantur per se, vel per accidens.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomina, quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, dicantur per se, vel per accidens.

Et quod secundum accidens, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate* et habetur in littera[^1]: «Quod dominus esset hominis, ex tempore accidit ei.»

2. Item hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omne quod adest et abest praeter eius, de quo dicitur, corruptionem, praedicatur secundum accidens[^2] — haec est per se nota — sed omnia haec quae temporaliter dicuntur de Deo, sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod praedicatur per se de aliquo, semper inest illi[^3]; ergo ab oppositis, quod praedicatur de aliquo et non semper inest, praedicatur non per se, ergo per accidens: sed talia sunt huiusmodi nomina: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne quod praedicatur de aliquo, aut est convertibile cum subiecto, aut de ratione subiecti, aut praedicatur per accidens[^4]; sed huiusmodi nomina nec sunt de ratione Dei, nec convertibilia, ut patet de hoc nomine *dominus*: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate*[^5]: «Nihil secundum accidens dicitur de Deo.»

2. Item, ostenditur ratione: quia in quocumque accidens, est ponere compositionem[^6] et per consequens varietatem; sed neutrum est in Deo: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne per accidens reducitur ad per se[^7]; sed reductio est posterioris ad prius, non e converso, Deus autem non habet prius, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid: ergo nihil de Deo dicitur secundum accidens.

4. Item, omne quod dicitur de duobus, de uno per se, de altero per accidens, perfectiori modo dicitur de eo, de quo dicitur per se[^8]; sed quidquid dicitur de Deo dicitur perfectissime: ergo nihil dicitur de Deo secundum accidens, ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo per accidens, ergo per se.

### Conclusio.

> Nomina, quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur, praedicantur per accidens solummodo in eo sensu, quo per accidens opponitur necessario.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dici secundum accidens est tripliciter. Uno modo accidens dicitur per oppositionem ad substantiam; et sic dicitur accidens proprietas alii inhaerens, quae non est de rei

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essentia.[^9] Et hoc quidem modo «nihil dicitur de Deo secundum accidens», sicut dicit Augustinus, eo quod hoc modo accidens ponit compositionem et varietatem in eo, de quo dicitur. — Alio modo dici secundum accidens est per oppositionem ad per se; et sic dicitur secundum accidens aut quod dicitur per aliud in essentia, ut si dicatur: *paries disgregat*[^10]; aut per aliquid, cui est quodam modo idem, quodam modo diversum, ut puta, cum dicitur de superiori per inferius, ut: *figura habet tres*, vel de inferiori per superius: ut, *isosceles habet tres*[^11]. Hoc modo non est aliquid dici de Deo secundum accidens. Hoc enim dici per accidens ponit in aliquo posterioritatem et imperfectionem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae; Deus autem nihil habet imperfecte, nihil habet ab alio[^12], quod omnino sit aliud, nec a superiori vel inferiori, quia haec non cadunt in Deo. — Tertio modo dici secundum accidens est per oppositionem ad necessarium, ut illud dicatur accidere, quod necessario non inest. Et hoc modo huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo secundum accidens, quia non dicuntur de ipso necessario; sed dicuntur de ipso per se, quia per comparationem ad creaturam. Comparatio autem ad creaturam per se est, quia Deus est sua actio; sed tamen, quia Deus agit per voluntatem, quae non semper nec de necessitate coniuncta est actui[^13], ideo non necessaria; et quantum ad hoc cadit ibi ratio dicendi secundum accidens. Unde hic modus dicendi per accidens opponitur per se in creaturis ratione eius, quod ad dici per se sequitur necessarium in creaturis; in Deo autem non, quoniam idem[^14] se ipso facit et voluntarie facit: et ideo in Deo non habet oppositionem ad per se.

Rationes ergo ostendentes, quod non dicuntur de Deo secundum accidens, procedunt secundum primam et secundam acceptionem.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**

*Ad 1.* Quod autem obiicitur, quod esse dominum accidit; sic intelligendum est, id est, non necessario nec semper convenit.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod absunt praeter corruptionem[^15]; dicendum quod ista definitio est accidentis, secundum quod adesse est per inhaérentiam; sed sic non convenit Deo, ut visum est, sed solum creaturis: unde patet illud.

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de per se, dicendum, quod loquitur de per se in creaturis. Ad per se enim in creaturis sequitur necessarium, sed non sic in Deo.

english:
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### Articulus Unicus. Question II. *Whether the names which are predicated of God in time are predicated per se or per accidens.*

Second, it is asked whether the names that are said of God in time are said *per se* or *per accidens*.

And that they are said according to accident is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, in the fifth book *On the Trinity*, and found in the letter[^1]: "That he was Lord of the human being accrued to him in time."

2. Likewise, this same point seems clear from reason, because everything that is present and absent apart from the corruption of that of which it is predicated, is predicated according to accident[^2] — this is self-evident — but all those things that are predicated of God temporally are of this kind: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, what is predicated *per se* of something always inheres in it[^3]; therefore, by the opposite, what is predicated of something and does not always inhere in it, is predicated not *per se*, therefore *per accidens*: but such are names of this kind: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is predicated of something is either convertible with the subject, or of the formal character of the subject, or is predicated *per accidens*[^4]; but names of this kind are neither of the formal character of God nor convertible with him, as is clear for the name *lord*: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^5]: "Nothing is said of God according to accident."

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason: because wherever there is accident, there is positing of composition[^6] and consequently of variety; but neither is in God: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything *per accidens* is reduced to *per se*[^7]; but reduction is of the posterior to the prior, not the other way around; yet God has no prior, neither simply nor in some respect: therefore, nothing is said of God according to accident.

4. Likewise, everything that is said of two things — of one *per se* and of the other *per accidens* — is said in a more perfect manner of that of which it is said *per se*[^8]; but whatever is said of God is said most perfectly: therefore, nothing is said of God according to accident; therefore, names of this kind are not said of God *per accidens*; therefore, they are said *per se*.

### Conclusion.

> The names that are said of God in time are predicated *per accidens* only in that sense in which *per accidens* is opposed to the necessary.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be said according to accident is threefold. In one way, accident is said by opposition to substance; and in this way, accident is said to be a property inhering in another, which is not of the essence of the thing.

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And in this way[^9] "nothing is said of God according to accident," as Augustine says, because in this way accident posits composition and variety in that of which it is said. — In another way, to be said according to accident is by opposition to *per se*; and in this way, something is said *per accidens* either because it is said through another in essence, as when one says: *the wall disperses*[^10]; or through something with which it is in some way the same and in some way different, as when something is predicated of a superior through an inferior, as: *a figure has three*, or of an inferior through a superior, as: *an isosceles has three*[^11]. In this way, nothing is said of God according to accident. For to be said *per accidens* in this way posits in something posteriority and imperfection, as the arguments adduced for this show; but God has nothing imperfectly, nothing from another[^12] that is wholly other, nor from something superior or inferior, because these do not obtain in God. — In the third way, to be said according to accident is by opposition to the necessary, such that what does not necessarily inhere is said to happen accidentally. And in this way, names of this kind are said of God according to accident, because they are not said of him necessarily; but they are said of him *per se*, because through comparison to the creature. Now comparison to the creature is *per se*, because God is his own action; but yet, because God acts through will, which is not always and not necessarily joined to the act[^13], it is therefore not necessary; and to this extent the reason for saying it *per accidens* obtains there. Hence this mode of saying *per accidens* is opposed to *per se* in creatures by reason of the fact that, for *per se* in creatures, the necessary follows; but not so in God, because he himself[^14] does the same thing and does it voluntarily: and therefore in God this does not stand in opposition to *per se*.

The reasons, therefore, that show that these names are not said of God according to accident, proceed according to the first and second acceptation.

**To the arguments on the opposing side:**

*To 1.* As for what is objected, that to be Lord accrued to him: this is to be understood in this way, that is, it does not belong necessarily nor always.

*To 2.* To the objection that they are absent apart from corruption[^15]: it must be said that this definition belongs to accident insofar as being-present-in is through inherence; but this does not apply to God, as has been seen, but only to creatures: hence the point is clear.

*To 3. 4.* To the objection about *per se*, it must be said that the argument speaks of *per se* in creatures. For in creatures the necessary follows upon *per se*, but not so in God.

la: Cap. I.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Bk. V, c. 1.

la: Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 4.

en: Aristotle, *Topics*, Bk. I, c. 4.

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 4.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, c. 4.

la: Cap. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Bk. V, c. 16, n. 17. See here the letter of the Master, c. 1.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 21. (VI. c. 6.): Quod autem secundum accidens dicitur, ut musicum aut album, propterea quod duplex significat [scil. formam et subiectum], non est verum dicere quod idem sit quod quid erat esse [i. e. essentia] et ipsum. Cfr. et I. *Phys.* text. 26. seqq. (c. 3.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, text. 21 (Bk. VI, c. 6): "What is said according to accident, such as the musical or the white, because it signifies something twofold [namely form and subject], it is not true to say that it is identical with what it was to be [i.e., the essence] and itself." Cf. also *Physics*, Bk. I, text. 26 ff. (c. 3).

la: Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 66. (c. 6.): Nihil autem secundum accidens est prius iis quae per se sunt. Cfr. et XI. *Metaph.* c. 7. (X. c. 8.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics*, Bk. II, text. 66 (c. 6): "But nothing according to accident is prior to those things that are *per se*." Cf. also *Metaphysics*, Bk. XI, c. 7 (Bk. X, c. 8).

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics*, Bk. III, c. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 2. seqq. (VI. c. 1.) — Pro modo dicendi per se et per accidens cfr. Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 4–8, et V. *Metaph.* text. 23. (IV. c. 18.). Essentia cod. K substantia. Paulo ante pro *oppositionem* Vat. et plures codd. *oppositum*. Cod. Y *aliquo*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, text. 2 ff. (Bk. VI, c. 1). — For the mode of saying *per se* and *per accidens*, cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, c. 4–8, and *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, text. 23 (Bk. IV, c. 18). Codex K reads *substantia* for *essentia*. Shortly before, for *oppositionem*, the Vatican edition and several codices read *oppositum*. Codex Y reads *aliquo*.

la: Intellige: visum, ratione albedinis. Nam, ut ait Aristot., X. *Metaph.* text. 23. (IX. c. 7.): «hic (albus) quidem disgregativus color, et ille (niger) vero congregativus color». Si igitur dicitur: *paries disgregat*, hoc convenit parieti non ratione sui, sed ratione albedinis ab ipso distinctae.

en: Understand: "seen," by reason of whiteness. For as Aristotle says (*Metaphysics*, Bk. X, text. 23, Bk. IX, c. 7): "this (white) is the dispersive color, and that (black) the congregative color." If therefore one says: *the wall disperses*, this belongs to the wall not by reason of itself, but by reason of the whiteness distinct from it.

la: Supple hic et paulo superius post *tres* vocabulum *angulos*. Figurae enim, quae est genus, convenit habere tres angulos ratione speciei, scil. trianguli; sed isosceles (τὸ ἰσοσκελές) sive triangulum, quod duo tantum latera habet aequalia, est species inferior triangulo simpliciter dicto, et habere tres angulos ipsi convenit ratione superioris, scil. trianguli.

en: Supply here and a little above after *three* the word *angles*. For to "figure," which is the genus, it belongs to have three angles by reason of the species, namely the triangle; but the isosceles (τὸ ἰσοσκελές), that is, the triangle having only two equal sides, is a species inferior to the triangle simply so called, and to have three angles belongs to it by reason of the superior, namely the triangle.

la: Cod. Y *aliquo*.

en: Codex Y reads *aliquo* [for *aliud*].

la: Intelligas hoc de actu voluntatis, quatenus transit in creaturam sive respicit ipsam, non quatenus est in ipso Deo. Immediate post particulae *non* aliqui codd. ut V W Y aa adiungunt *est*. Deinde pro *secundum accidens* codd. P Q *per accidens*.

en: Understand this of the act of will insofar as it passes into the creature or regards it, not insofar as it is in God himself. Immediately after the particle *not*, some codices such as V W Y aa add *is*. Then in place of *secundum accidens*, codices P Q read *per accidens*.

la: Cod. M addit *ipsum*.

en: Codex M adds *ipsum* [sc. *idem ipsum*].

la: Cod. K hic bene intericit *et*. Subinde cod. Q (in marg.) voci *corruptionem* praemittit *subiecti*.

en: Codex K here rightly inserts *et*. Then codex Q (in margin) prefixes to the word *corruption* [the word] *of the subject*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Thom. (hic q. 1. ad 2.) duos tantum modos ponit, quibus aliquid dicitur per accidens. S. Bonav. autem hic triplicem modum distinguit, quibus aliquid tum per accidens tum per se dicitur. — Ad tres conclusiones principales Seraphicus hic addit corollarium, quo docetur, quod ea quae contingenter et ita per accidens de Deo dicuntur, nihilominus etiam per se de ipso praedicantur. In creaturis enim id quod de aliquo per accidens dicitur et ideo contingenter, non potest dici de eo per se, quia id quod dicitur per se, est necessarium (cfr. text. Aristotelis in 3. ad opposit.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. 1. q. 53. m. 3. 4. — S. Thom., loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. 1. tr. 13. q. 52. q. 3. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** St. Thomas (*hic* q. 1, ad 2) posits only two modes in which something is said *per accidens*. St. Bonaventure here distinguishes a threefold mode by which something is said both *per accidens* and *per se*. — To the three principal conclusions the Seraphic Doctor here adds a corollary, by which it is taught that what is said of God contingently and thus *per accidens* is nevertheless also predicated of him *per se*. For in creatures, what is said of something *per accidens* and therefore contingently, cannot be said of it *per se*, because what is said *per se* is necessary (cf. the text of Aristotle in argument 3 against).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, *Summa* p. 1, q. 53, m. 3. 4. — St. Thomas, *loc. cit.* — Blessed Albert., *hic* a. 2; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 13, q. 52, q. 3, incidentally. — Peter of Tarantaise, *hic* q. unica, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, *hic* q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, *hic* 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, *hic* q. 1.

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