title: Dist. 24, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text of Distinction XXIV

source_text:
<!-- page 419 -->

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra excepit[^1] Magister hoc nomen *persona* a generali regula nominum substantialium, ostendens quod dicendum est *tres personae*, non *tres essentiae* vel *tres substantiae*. Hic incipit secunda pars, in qua determinat, quid significetur, cum dicitur *tres personae*; et haec pars habet duas partes. In prima ostendit, quid significetur[^2] per dictionem numeralem; in secunda, quid significetur per hoc nomen *persona*, infra distinctione vigesima quinta: *Praeterea considerandum est, cum hoc nomen persona, ut praedictum est*.

Prima iterum pars habet duas: in prima quaerit et solvit generaliter; in secunda solutionem suam adaptat nominibus distinctivis in speciali, ibi: *Cum enim dicitur unus Deus*. Et haec secunda pars habet quatuor partes. In prima parte determinat, quid significent *unus* et *plures*; in secunda quid significent *duo* et *tres*, ibi: *Ita etiam, cum dicimus tres personas nomine ternarii*; in tertia, quid significent *discretus* et *distinctus*[^3], ibi: *Cum autem dicimus: distinctae sunt personae*; in quarta, quid significent *trinitas* et *trinus*, ibi: *Cum ergo dicitur trinitas* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum, quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione, est quaestio de terminis numeralibus, qualiter accipiantur in divinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur principaliter tria.

Primo quaeritur de termino[^4] numerali et partitivo, sicut est hoc nomen *unus*.

Secundo, de termino simpliciter numerali, sicut est hoc nomen *tres*.

Tertio, de nomine complectente utrumque, sicut hoc nomen *trinus*.

Et quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *unus* dicatur positive, vel privative in divinis.

Secundo, utrum dicatur secundum substantiam, vel secundum relationem.

---

english:
### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master excepted[^1] this name *person* from the general rule of substantial names, showing that it must be said *three persons*, not *three essences* or *three substances*. Here begins the second part, in which he determines what is signified when *three persons* is said; and this part has two parts. In the first he shows what is signified[^2] by a numerical word; in the second, what is signified by this name *person*, below in the twenty-fifth distinction: *Furthermore it must be considered, since this name person, as has been said before*.

The first part again has two: in the first he inquires and resolves in general; in the second he adapts his solution to the distinctive names in particular, there: *For when it is said one God*. And this second part has four parts. In the first part he determines what *one* and *many* signify; in the second what *two* and *three* signify, there: *Likewise also, when we say three persons by the name of the ternary*; in the third, what *discrete* and *distinct*[^3] signify, there: *But when we say: the persons are distinct*; in the fourth, what *trinity* and *triune* signify, there: *When therefore it is said trinity* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of those things which are said in the present distinction, there is a question concerning numerical terms, how they are taken in the divine. And concerning this three things are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning the numerical and partitive term[^4], such as this name *one*.

Secondly, concerning the simply numerical term, such as this name *three*.

Thirdly, concerning the name embracing both, such as this name *triune*.

And as to the first, two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether this name *one* is said positively, or privatively, in the divine.

Secondly, whether it is said according to substance, or according to relation.

---

la: Vat. sola *excipit*. Mox plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *generalium* pro *substantialium*, sed hoc minus respondet verbis Magistri, d. praeced. c. 1. Paulo infra Vat. cum uno alterove codice post *vel* addit *tres dii vel*.

en: The Vatican edition alone reads *excipit* ("excepts"). Soon after, very many codices with edition 1 read *generalium* ("of general") in place of *substantialium* ("of substantial"), but this less corresponds to the Master's words, preceding distinction, c. 1. A little below, the Vatican edition with one or another codex adds after *vel* the words *tres dii vel* ("three gods or").

la: In Vat., fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 dissentientibus, additur *per nomen numerale sive*.

en: In the Vatican edition, with nearly all manuscripts and edition 1 dissenting, the words *per nomen numerale sive* ("through a numerical name or") are added.

la: Vat. perperam cum aliquibus mss. *distinctis*. Mox post haec fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *secunda*, quo vocabulo lectio distinctior redditur. In subnexis propositionibus Vat. cum paucis codd. pro *significent* bis ponit *significetur* addito *per*, et tertia vice *significet*.

en: The Vatican edition wrongly, with some manuscripts, reads *distinctis*. Soon after this, on the witness of very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *secunda* ("second"), by which word the reading is rendered more distinct. In the appended propositions the Vatican edition, with a few codices, in place of *significent* twice puts *significetur* with *per* added, and the third time *significet*.

la: Cod. bb *termino*. Inferius post *sicut* ed. 1 addit *est*.

en: Codex bb reads *termino* ("by the term"). Below, after *sicut* edition 1 adds *est* ("is").


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum hoc nomen unus positive vel privative dicatur in divinis.

title_alt: Whether this name 'one' is said positively or privatively in divine matters

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 420 -->

### ARTICULUS I. *De termino numerali et partitivo unus.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum hoc nomen unus positive, vel privative dicatur in divinis.*

Quod autem[^1] dicatur privative, videtur:

1. Per eius rationem. Nam Philosophus[^2] dicit, quod *unum est quod non dividitur*; sed ista ratio data est per privationem: ergo unum dicitur privative.

2. Item, Commentator dicit super Metaphysicam[^3], quod *unum et multa opponuntur sicut privatio et habitus*, quia unum dicit privationem, multitudo dicit habitum; quod si verum est, unum non tantum in Deo, sed etiam in omnibus dicitur privative.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia unum opponitur ei quod est multa: aut ergo contradictorie, aut contrarie, aut privative, aut relative.[^4] Non contradictorie; hoc patet. Iterum nec relative, quia relativa sunt simul[^5], et unum dependet ab alio mutuo; sed unum non dependet a multis. Non contrarie, quia unum contrariorum non est alterius principium: sed unum est principium multorum[^6]: ergo per locum a divisione opponitur privative. Sed constat, quod multa dicit positionem: ergo unum non dicit nisi privationem.

4. Item, quod in Deo specialiter dicatur privative, videtur, quia unum, secundum quod dicitur positive, est principium multitudinis et quantitatis[^7]: sed in Deo nulla est quantitas: ergo nec unum positive dicitur.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur, quia, si Deus est positive unus et lapis unus, ergo Deus et lapis sunt duo: ergo Deus et creatura constituunt numerum, et si hoc, Deus est pars numeri, quod supra improbatum est[^8]. Si dicas, quod non sequitur, quia unum non dicitur univoce; illud enim[^9] nihil est, ut videtur; quia, si aliquid ponit, cum istud etiam possit convenire creaturae, ad minus analogice, et secundum analogiam attendatur numeratio, ut cum dicitur: humanitas et albedo sunt duae essentiae: ergo hoc non solvit.

**Contra:**

1. Ab eodem habet aliquid esse et unum[^10], quoniam forma, quae dat esse, dat esse distinctum; si ergo ens non dicitur privative, sed positive, pari ratione nec unum de aliquo dicitur privative.

2. Item, quod sonat in complementum sonat in habitum, non in privationem; sed unum sonat in complementum, quia quanto aliquid perfectius, tanto magis accedit ad unitatem[^11]: ergo unum non dicitur privative.

<!-- page 421 -->

3. Item, si unum est privativum, constat quod non nisi[^12] multitudinis. Sed contra: nulla privatio antecedit habitum naturaliter[^13]; sed unum naturaliter antecedit multa: ergo unum non est privatio.

4. Item, nulla privatio constituit suum habitum nec salvatur in illo; sed unum salvatur in multis et illa constituit[^14]: ergo non opponitur ut privatio: non ergo accipitur privative.

> **Conclusio.** *Unum in Deo dicitur solummodo positive, et non privative; in creaturis vero aliquando positive, aliquando privative etiam secundum rem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quorundam opinio fuit, et Magistri principaliter, quod quidquid sit de hoc nomine *unum* in creaturis, in Deo non dicitur positive, sed privative, ut dicit in littera et assumit auctoritatem ab Hilario; quamvis Hilarius non dicat expresse, nisi quod horum nominum usus in Deo inventus est magis causa privandi quam aliquid ponendi. Et ratio sua fuit, quia unum, positive dictum, est principium quantitatis et numeri; Deus autem non habet in se quantitatem nec in se est numerabilis nec alii connumerabilis.

Sed quamvis haec positio probabilis videatur[^15], tamen communiter non tenetur. Et ratio huius est, quia, cum unum multo completius sit in Deo quam in creaturis, multo fortius ibi dicitur positive. Et rursus, cum omnis unitas ad primam unitatem reducatur, et non est reductio habitus ad privationem, necesse est, quod unus[^16] in Deo aliquid ponat.

Et propterea dicendum, quod est loqui de hoc nomine *unus* in creaturis quantum ad rem intellectam, vel quantum ad rationem intelligendi. Si loquamur quantum ad rationem intelligendi, sic dico, quod dicitur privative; unde et ratio eius assignatur per privationem divisionis sive multitudinis. Et hoc est, quia unum est primum, et prima non habent intelligi a nobis neque notificari nisi per posteriora; et inde est, quod privative dicitur[^17]. Unde unitas in substantia, vel quantitate, vel qualitate, quia habet aliquid prius, per quod possit intelligi, dicitur positive, ut identitas, aequalitas, similitudo, et eorum opposita privative[^18].

Si autem loquamur quantum ad rem intellectam, sic unum habet respectum ad materiam, et habet respectum ad formam. Ratione respectus ad materiam est in se indivisum, tamen potentia divisibile est; et quia potentia materialis se habet per modum privationis, similiter et unum. Ratione respectus ad formam, quae dat esse distinctum et limitatum, sic dicit positionem[^19]. Quoniam igitur in Deo unum est omnino secundum formam, in creaturis attenditur et secundum formam et secundum materiam, hinc est, quod in Deo solum positive, in creaturis aliquando accipitur positive, aliquando privative etiam[^20] secundum rem.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod definitur sive notificatur privative; patet responsio, quia secundum rationem sui nominis, eo quod primum, sic debet notificari.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod opponitur ut privatio; dicendum, quod unum per respectum ad materiam accipitur privative, et sic accipit Commentator; per respectum ad *formam*, accipitur contrarie, secundum quod multitudo formaliter accipitur; per respectum ad actum consequentem, qui est mensurare, accipitur relative et secundum genus relativorum in quo unum non dependet ab altero, sicut patet in scientia et scibili[^21]; et sic diversae super hoc opiniones sunt verae.

<!-- page 422 -->

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Deo non est principium numerandi etc.; dicendum, quod unum dicit privationem multitudinis secundum generalem nominis rationem; sed illa privatio, etsi nomine tenus sit privatio, tamen realiter est positio; quia quanto magis est privatio divisionis in aliquo, tanto illud est completius et perfectius. Cum igitur in Deo sit perfectissima unitas, ibi accipitur secundum omnimodam privationem multitudinis. Hoc autem modo dicitur unum, quod non habet in se[^22] actu multitudinem, nec est in potentia ad multitudinem, neque per divisionem neque per aggregationem. Hoc autem unum est perfectissimum et summum et infinitum, et illud[^23] non est in potentia ad numerum, et hoc non est alii connumerabile; et hoc modo est in solo Deo. Et sic patet, quod dicitur Deus unus positive et quomodo differat unitas eius a creatura.

*Ad 4.* Quod ergo obiicitur, quod unum est principium multitudinis; dicendum, quod verum est in unitate creata, sed non est verum in unitate perfecta et increata — dico principium *intra*, sicut pars[^24].

*Ad 5.* Unde si dicatur: Deus et creatura sunt duo, aut hoc improprie dictum est, et duo cadit a ratione numeri secundum rem; aut si dicit numerum, hoc est solum a parte intelligentis; quia, cum intelligit diversa et distincta, accipit sub ratione numeri, sicut, cum intelligit intellectus noster, concernit tempus[^25].

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the numeral and partitive term "one."*

### Question I. *Whether this name "one" is said positively or privatively in divine matters.*

That[^1] [it is said] privatively, however, is shown:

1. By its account. For the Philosopher[^2] says that *one is that which is not divided*; but this account is given through privation: therefore "one" is said privatively.

2. Likewise, the Commentator says on the *Metaphysics*[^3] that *"one" and "many" are opposed as privation and habit*, since "one" expresses privation, "many" expresses habit; and if this is true, "one" is said privatively not only in God but also in all things.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, since "one" is opposed to that which is "many": either then contradictorily, or contrarily, or privatively, or relatively.[^4] Not contradictorily; this is plain. Again, neither relatively, since relatives are simultaneous[^5], and one depends on the other mutually; but "one" does not depend on "many." Not contrarily, since one of contraries is not the principle of the other: but "one" is the principle of many[^6]: therefore by the topic from division it is opposed privatively. But it is established that "many" expresses position: therefore "one" expresses nothing but privation.

4. Likewise, that in God it is said privatively in a special way is plain, since "one," insofar as it is said positively, is the principle of multitude and quantity[^7]: but in God there is no quantity: therefore neither is "one" said positively.

5. Likewise, this same thing is plain, since, if God is positively one and a stone is one, therefore God and a stone are two: therefore God and a creature constitute a number, and if so, God is part of a number, which has been disproved above[^8]. If you say that this does not follow, since "one" is not said univocally; this[^9] is nothing, as it seems; for if it posits something — since this could also belong to a creature, at least analogically, and numbering be reckoned according to analogy, as when one says: humanity and whiteness are two essences — therefore this does not solve [the difficulty].

**On the contrary:**

1. From the same source a thing has being and being-one[^10], since the form, which gives being, gives distinct being; if therefore "being" is not said privatively but positively, by parity of reason neither is "one" said privatively of anything.

2. Likewise, what sounds in the direction of completion sounds in the direction of habit, not of privation; but "one" sounds in the direction of completion, since the more perfect a thing is, the more it approaches unity[^11]: therefore "one" is not said privatively.

3. Likewise, if "one" is privative, it is established that it is so only[^12] of multitude. But on the contrary: no privation precedes habit naturally[^13]; but "one" naturally precedes "many": therefore "one" is not a privation.

4. Likewise, no privation constitutes its own habit nor is preserved in it; but "one" is preserved in many [things] and constitutes them[^14]: therefore it is not opposed as a privation: therefore it is not received privatively.

> **Conclusion.** *"One" in God is said only positively, and not privatively; in creatures, however, sometimes positively, sometimes privatively even according to the thing itself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the opinion of certain ones, and of the Master principally, was that whatever may be the case about this name *one* in creatures, in God it is not said positively but privatively, as he says in the *littera* and takes up an authority from Hilary; although Hilary does not say it expressly, except that the use of these names in [reference to] God is found rather for the sake of denying [something] than of positing something. And his reason was that "one," said positively, is the principle of quantity and of number; but God does not have quantity in himself, nor is he in himself numerable, nor numerable along with another.

But although this position seems probable[^15], nevertheless it is not commonly held. And the reason for this is that, since "one" is much more completely in God than in creatures, much more strongly is it there said positively. And again, since every unity is reduced to the first unity, and there is no reduction of habit to privation, it is necessary that "one"[^16] in God posit something.

And therefore it must be said that one [way] is to speak of this name *one* in creatures with respect to the thing understood, [another] with respect to the account by which [it is] understood. If we speak with respect to the account by which [it is] understood, thus I say that it is said privatively; whence its account is also assigned through privation of division or multitude. And this is because "one" is first, and first things cannot be understood by us nor made known except through posterior things; and hence it is that it is said privatively[^17]. Whence unity in substance, or quantity, or quality, since it has something prior through which it can be understood, is said positively, as identity, equality, likeness, and their opposites privatively[^18].

If, however, we speak with respect to the thing understood, then "one" has a relation to matter, and has a relation to form. By reason of the relation to matter, it is in itself undivided, yet it is potentially divisible; and since material potency stands by way of privation, so likewise does "one." By reason of the relation to form, which gives distinct and limited being, thus it expresses position[^19]. Since therefore in God "one" is wholly according to form, [whereas] in creatures it is considered both according to form and according to matter, hence it is that in God it is taken only positively, [but] in creatures sometimes positively, sometimes privatively even[^20] according to the thing itself.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected first, that it is defined or made known privatively; the response is plain, since according to the account of its name, in that it is first, it must be made known thus.

*To 2.* To that which is objected secondly, that it is opposed as a privation; it must be said that "one" by relation to matter is taken privatively, and so the Commentator takes it; by relation to *form*, it is taken contrarily, according as multitude is taken formally; by relation to the consequent act, which is to measure, it is taken relatively and according to the genus of relatives in which one [member] does not depend on the other, as is plain in knowledge and the knowable[^21]; and so the various opinions on this are true.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that in God there is no principle of numbering etc.; it must be said that "one" expresses privation of multitude according to the general account of the name; but that privation, although in name it is a privation, nevertheless really is a position; since the more there is privation of division in something, the more complete and perfect that thing is. Since therefore in God there is the most perfect unity, there it is taken according to every-way privation of multitude. In this way, however, that is called "one" which does not have in itself[^22] multitude in act, nor is it in potency to multitude, neither through division nor through aggregation. Now this "one" is most perfect and supreme and infinite, and that[^23] is not in potency to number, and this is not numerable along with another; and in this way it is in God alone. And so it is plain that God is called "one" positively, and how his unity differs from [that of] a creature.

*To 4.* What then is objected, that "one" is the principle of multitude; it must be said that this is true in created unity, but is not true in perfect and uncreated unity — I mean a principle *within*, as a part[^24].

*To 5.* Hence if it be said: God and a creature are two, either this is said improperly, and "two" falls away from the account of number according to the thing itself; or if it expresses a number, this is only on the part of the one understanding; since, when [the intellect] understands diverse and distinct [things], it takes [them] under the account of number, just as, when our intellect understands, it concerns time[^25].

la: Supple cum ed. 4 mss. Mox ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *hoc et eius*.

en: Supply with ed. 4 [and the] mss. Soon afterwards, from the mss. and ed. 1 we have added *hoc et eius* ("this and its").

la: Verba Aristotelis invenies supra pag. 408, nota 1 transcripta. — In fine argumenti cod. Y *per privationem* pro *privative*.

en: You will find the words of Aristotle transcribed above on p. 408, note 1. — At the end of the argument, cod. Y [reads] *per privationem* ("through privation") in place of *privative* ("privatively").

la: Libr. X. text. 9: *Multum igitur et unum sunt contraria ea contrarietate, secundum quam sunt contraria privatio et habitus... quia indivisibilitas est privatio divisibilitatis, et divisibilitas est quasi habitus.* — In fine argumenti, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, Vat., omisso etiam, exhibet *dicit privationem* pro *dicitur privative*.

en: Book X, text 9: *"Many" therefore and "one" are contraries by that contrariety according to which privation and habit are contraries... since indivisibility is privation of divisibility, and divisibility is as it were habit.* — At the end of the argument, with nearly all the mss. and ed. 1 resisting, the Vatican [edition], with *etiam* also omitted, exhibits *dicit privationem* in place of *dicitur privative*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. *Item*; cod. Y quamlibet particulam omittit. Mox post *simul* cod. X addit *natura*, quod et ab Aristotele, de Praedicam. c. de Ad aliquid sive de Relatione, additur.

en: The Vatican [edition] with several codices [reads] *Item* ("likewise"); cod. Y omits any particle. Soon afterwards, after *simul*, cod. X adds *natura* ("by nature"), which is also added by Aristotle in *Categories*, c. on *Ad aliquid* or on Relation.

la: Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. et 13. Vide etiam argum. immediate subsequens. — Locum a divisione, de quo mox est sermo, Petrus Hispanus in *Summula* super librum Topicorum, circa finem, sic definit: *Est habitudo unius condividentium ad reliquum, ut: si Socrates est animal, aut est animal rationale aut irrationale; sed non est irrationale: ergo rationale. Maxima: Posito uno membrorum dividentium in aliquo subiecto, removetur reliquum (et remoto uno, ponitur reliquum).*

en: Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 5 and 13. See also the argument immediately following. — The "topic from division," about which there is presently discussion, Peter of Spain in his *Summula* on the book of *Topics*, near the end, defines thus: *It is the relation of one of the co-dividing [members] to the remainder, e.g.: if Socrates is an animal, [he] is either a rational animal or an irrational; but he is not irrational: therefore rational. Maxim: When one of the dividing members is posited in a subject, the remainder is removed (and when one is removed, the remainder is posited).*

la: Plura de hac quadruplici oppositione eiusque principiis invenies in Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis.

en: You will find more on this fourfold opposition and its principles in Aristotle, *Categories*, c. on *Opposites*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 12, et X. text 21. (IV. c. 6, et IX. c. 6). Boeth., I. Arithmeticae, c. 7. dicit: *Quare constat, primam esse unitatem cunctorum, qui sunt in naturali dispositione numerorum, et etiam rite totius, quamvis prolixae, genitricem pluralitatis agnosci.* — Paulo ante Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit *secundum*. Mox post *nulla est* Vat. cum aliquibus mss. addit *omnino*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, V *Metaph.*, text 12, and X, text 21 (IV, c. 6, and IX, c. 6). Boethius, I *Arithmetic*, c. 7, says: *Whence it is established that unity is the first of all [the things] which are in the natural arrangement of numbers, and also rightly that it is to be acknowledged as the begetter of the entire — though prolix — totality of plurality.* — A little before, the Vatican [edition], without any authority of mss. or ed. 1, omits *secundum*. Soon after *nulla est*, the Vatican [edition] with some mss. adds *omnino* ("at all").

la: Dist. 19. p. II. q. 4. — In principio huius argumenti in pluribus codd. et ed. 1 deest *ipsum*. Dein Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 *videtur igitur, quod lapis et Deus* pro *ergo Deus et lapis*. Mox nonnulli codd. ut SZ bb *Deus cum creatura* pro *Deus et creatura*.

en: Distinction 19, p. II, q. 4. — At the beginning of this argument, in several codices and ed. 1 *ipsum* is missing. Then the Vatican [edition], against the older mss. and ed. 1, [reads] *videtur igitur, quod lapis et Deus* in place of *ergo Deus et lapis*. Soon, several codices such as SZ bb [read] *Deus cum creatura* in place of *Deus et creatura*.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 restauravimus *enim*, pro quo Vat. *certe*.

en: From very many mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we have restored *enim* ("for"), in place of which the Vatican [edition reads] *certe* ("certainly").

la: Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. et 13; Boeth., de Unitate et Uno. De ratione addita vide supra pag. 84, nota 7. — Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *esse* secundo loco positum.

en: Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 5 and 13; Boethius, *On Unity and the One*. On the added account see above p. 84, note 7. — The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, other codices and ed. 1 resisting, omits *esse* placed in the second position.

la: In libr. de Causis, prop. 17: *« Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata »*. Vide etiam Dionys., loc. paulo ante cit.

en: In the *Book of Causes*, proposition 17: *« Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power »*. See also Dionysius, the place cited a little before.

la: Supple: *privativum*, vel cum Vat. et aliquibus codd. *respectu*.

en: Supply: *privativum*, or with the Vatican [edition] and some codices *respectu* ("with respect to").

la: Aristot., II. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 18. (c. 3.): καὶ τῆς στερήσεως πρότερον ἡ κατάφασις (affirmatio), iuxta translationem Arabico-latinam: *Habitus est ante privationem, ut calidum et frigidum.* Et text. 22. (c. 4.) reperitur propositio subsequens: *Quoniam autem prius natura in unoquoque genere unum multis et simplex compositis* etc.

en: Aristotle, II *On the Heavens and the World*, text 18 (c. 3): καὶ τῆς στερήσεως πρότερον ἡ κατάφασις (affirmation), according to the Arabic-Latin translation: *Habit is before privation, as hot and cold.* And in text 22 (c. 4) the following proposition is found: *But since in each genus "one" is by nature prior to many, and simple to composites* etc.

la: Sub hoc respectu Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 13. § 1. ait: *« Non enim est multitudo non participans uno »*. Vide etiam supra d. 19. p. II. q. 4. definitionem numeri ex Aristotele et Boethio allatam. — Plura similia argumenta invenies apud Avicennam, III. Metaph. c. 6.

en: Under this respect Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 13, § 1, says: *« For there is no multitude not participating in one »*. See also above d. 19, p. II, q. 4, the definition of number adduced from Aristotle and Boethius. — You will find many similar arguments in Avicenna, III *Metaph.* c. 6.

la: Vat. cum solo recentiore codd. cc *habeatur*, et inferius *multo formalius* pro *multo fortius*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with only the more recent cod. cc, [reads] *habeatur*, and below *multo formalius* ("much more formally") in place of *multo fortius* ("much more strongly").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *unum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *unum* [in place of *unus*].

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 9. (IX. c. 3.) *Dicitur autem ex contrario ipsum unum, et significatur ex divisibili indivisibile, eo quod multitudinem esse et divisibile magis est sensibile quam esse indivisibile. Quare multitudo ratione prior quam indivisibile propter sensum est.* — Paulo ante, antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. *et* pro *neque*; hic vero contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 mutata interpunctione, legit *dicitur unum. Unitas autem in substantia* etc. Cod.: *dicitur unum simpliciter; sed unum et unitas in* etc.

en: Aristotle, X *Metaph.*, text 9 (IX, c. 3): *"One" itself is said from the contrary, and the indivisible is signified from the divisible, since to be a multitude and to be divisible is more sensible than to be indivisible. Whence multitude is by reason prior to the indivisible because of sense.* — A little before, with the older mss. and ed. 1 resisting, the Vatican [edition reads] *et* in place of *neque*; here, however, against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, with the punctuation changed, it reads *dicitur unum. Unitas autem in substantia* etc. Cod.: *dicitur unum simpliciter; sed unum et unitas in* etc.

la: Aristot., loc. cit. text. 1: *Item unius quidem est... idem, simile et aequale; multitudinis vero diversum, dissimile et inaequale est.* Cfr. etiam V. Metaph. text. 27. (IV. c. 22.).

en: Aristotle, loc. cit. text 1: *Likewise of one indeed... is the same, the like, and the equal; but of multitude, the diverse, the unlike, and the unequal.* Cf. also V *Metaph.*, text 27 (IV, c. 22).

la: August., de Genesi ad Lit., libr. imperfect. c. 10. n. 32: *« Vis ipsa formae commendatur nomine unitatis. Hoc est enim vere formari, in unum aliquid redigi; quoniam summe unum est omnis formae principium ».* Cfr. etiam libr. de Vera Religione, c. 36. n. 66. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. ait: *Sunt enim tres actus formae sive eius, quo res est id quod est: primus est dare esse, secundus autem dare rationem naturae, et tertius est terminare; et ab isto ultimo actu formae est ratio unius, quia per hoc efficitur in se indivisa et ab aliis divisa; et haec est eius definitio, et hoc intendit Philosophus, quando dixit, quod id quod non dividitur, dicitur unum, secundum quod non dividitur; hoc modo bene dicimus, quod haec res una, haec res et illa sunt duae, et hoc modo bene dicimus, quod Deus est unus.*

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, unfinished book, c. 10, n. 32: *« The very power of form is commended by the name of unity. For this is truly to be formed, to be brought back into something one; since the supremely one is the principle of every form ».* Cf. also the book *On True Religion*, c. 36, n. 66. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, says: *For there are three acts of form, or of that by which a thing is what it is: the first is to give being, the second is to give the account of [its] nature, and the third is to terminate; and from this last act of form is the account of "one," since through this it is made undivided in itself and divided from others; and this is its definition, and this is what the Philosopher intends when he said that "what is not divided is called one according as it is not divided"; in this way we rightly say that this thing [is] one, [that] this thing and that are two, and in this way we rightly say that God is one.*

la: In Vat. desideratur *etiam*, quod exhibetur a mss. et ed. 1.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *etiam* is missing, which is exhibited by the mss. and ed. 1.

la: Cfr. de hoc Aristot., X. Metaph. text 2-22. (IX. c. 1-6.).

en: Cf. on this Aristotle, X *Metaph.*, text 2–22 (IX, c. 1–6).

la: Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent *in se*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus apte omittit.

en: The older codices with ed. 1 exhibit *in se* ("in itself"), which the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc less suitably omits.

la: Codd. GZ et ed. 1 addunt *unum*. Mox codd. V X *ideo* pro *illud*.

en: Codices GZ and ed. 1 add *unum* ("one"). Soon, codices V X [read] *ideo* ("therefore") in place of *illud* ("that").

la: Id est: *Unum tunc est principium multitudinis, quando ipsum sicut pars intrat multitudinem.* — Vat. contra fere omnes mss. et ed. 1 post *intra* perperam adiungit *se*, et mox post *Unde* addit *non est verum*.

en: That is: *"One" is then the principle of multitude, when it itself as a part enters into the multitude.* — The Vatican [edition], against nearly all the mss. and ed. 1, after *intra* wrongly adds *se*, and soon after *Unde* adds *non est verum*.

la: Aristot., de Memoria et Reminiscentia, c. 1: *Non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo, neque sine tempore quae non in tempore sunt* etc.

en: Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminiscence*, c. 1: *It is not possible to understand anything without the continuous, nor without time those things which are not in time* etc.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis haec praenotamus.

1. Unum dupliciter accipitur: vel quatenus convertitur cum ente, vel quatenus est formaliter principium numeri. Primum est transcendens omne genus, sicut ens, verum, bonum, et haec unitas essentialis invenitur in omnibus rebus; secundum est in praedicamento quantitatis et dicitur unitas accidentalis. Unitatem accidentalem non esse in Deo, una omnium est sententia. Unde tota quaestio est de unitate essentiali.

2. Controversia est inter philosophos et theologos, quid hoc unum, secundum rationem addat super ens. Differentia sententiarum principalium doctorum a multis auctoribus determinatur, ut sequitur. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 11. a. 1.), Henr. Gand. (Quodl. I. q. 1.) aliique, Aristotelem et eius commentatorem Averroem secuti, resolvunt: *« quod unum non addit super ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem divisionis »*. Et (S. I. q. 11. a. 1. ad 3.) dicit S. Thom.: *« Unum addit aliquid secundum rationem super ens »*. — Omnino oppositum docuit Avicenna, teste S. Thoma (loc. cit.), asserendo, quod unum addat rem aliquam positivam super substantiam entis, ut albus super hominem. Ipse enim tenuit falsam opinionem, non dari nisi accidentalem unitatem, quae est principium numeri. — Mediam viam inter opinionem Avicennae et Averrois tenent S. Bonav. (hic), Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 13. m. 1. 2, et q. 65. m. 2. a. 1.), B. Albert. (hic. a. 3.), Petr. a Tar. (qui hic q. I. a. 2. doctrinam Seraphici dilucide contrahit), Richard. a Med. (hic q. 1. a. 1. praesertim ad 1.). Hi docent, unum importare aliquid positivum, sed tantum virtualiter ab ente distinctum. Scot. (IV. Metaph. c. 2, et II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2.) cum suis putat, unum esse quid positivum et ex natura rei formaliter distinctum ab ente.

**II.** S. Bonaventura praeter duplicem speciem unitatis distinguit duplicem modum loquendi de unitate, scilicet quoad rem intellectam, id est secundum rationem essendi, et quoad rationem intelligendi, id est secundum modum, quo intellectui nostro ratio unitatis innotescit. Intellectus enim humanus simplicissima, quae sensui minus sunt obvia, semper a posteriori intelligit et notificat, unde etiam unum vel punctum per negationem divisionis explicat. Itaque sanctus Doctor concedit, quod unitas secundum rationem innotescendi dicat privationem *divisionis*. — Secundum rationem vero essendi iterum ipse unum dupliciter distinguit: primo, quatenus habet respectum ad materiam, quae tum est potentia divisibilis, tum ad formam se habet per modum privationis; et sic iterum concedit, quod unum non dicat quid positivum. Secundo, quatenus unum respicit *formam*; sub hoc respectu unum iuxta eius sententiam importat aliquid positivum, identificatum tamen cum eius subiecto, ut aliquis actus formae; et sic unum addit super ens rationem positivae perfectionis. De hac controversia cfr. Caietanus (ad S. I. q. 11. a. 1.) et Forestus (de Trinitatis Mysterio q. 5. pag. 235 seqq.), qui nititur sententiam S. Thomae praesertim ex q. 1. de Verit. a. 1. ita interpretari, ut in re parum vel nihil a Seraphico discedat.

**III.** Solutiones ad 2. 3. 4. fundantur in hoc, quod unum et multa sub diversa ratione opponuntur vel privative, vel contrarie, vel relative. Respectu ad materiam unum privat divisionem et multitudinem actualem, ad quam ratione materiae est in potentia; respectu ad formam, quae tum esse tum unum esse confert, unum sumitur positive et contrarie ad multa; respectu *« ad actum consequentem qui est mensurare »*, cum unum sit mensura multorum, accipitur relative; nam sic est pars multitudinis et non privatio. Haec oppositio relativa ad multitudinem pertinet ad genus imperfecte relativorum, quae nec semper sunt simul, nec unum ab alio dependet; cuius exemplum est in scientia et scibili. — De hac specie relationis cf. infra d. 30. q. 3. et Scholion.

Haec doctrina Seraphici amplius explicatur a B. Alberto M. (hic a. 3.) his verbis: *« Dicendum, quod est unum indivisibile reductum ad materiam vel dispositionem materiae, et unum reductum ad naturam formae, sicut dicimus continuitate unum; et cum dicimus continuitate unum, dicimus materia unum et forma unum, quia continuitas dispositio materiae est. Quidquid autem continuitate est unum, potentia est multa; omnis autem potentia in genere privationis est, praecipue potentia materiae, quae est potentia continui; quod patet, quia continuum potentia passiva multum est, et non potentia activa. Unum ergo reductum ad materiae unitatem oppositionem habet ad multum, sicut privatio ad habitum; quia talis unitas susceptibilis est multitudinis; et haec est intentio Philosophi et commenti (commentatoris) hoc dicentis. Unum autem, quod reductum est ad formam, habet tres considerationes, scil. secundum formalem rationem unius, et secundum id quod est, et secundum id quod est proximum et consequens ipsum. Primo modo consideratum habet rationem contrarietatis ad multum, quia utrumque ponitur in specie, et mutuo se expellunt ab eodem susceptibili... Si autem accipiatur unum secundum id quod est, ipsum nullam habet oppositionem ad multum, sed potius est principium multi et salvatur substantialiter in ipso multo. Et hoc attendit Avicenna dicens, quod non habet oppositionem, quia nec privatio facit habitum nec salvatur in ipso... Si accipiatur unum secundum rationem proximo se consequentem, quae est ratio mensurae; tunc unum, quod est certum, est mensurans multum, quod est incertum; et sic opponuntur ut mensura et mensuratum. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles in X. Primae philosophiae et Commentator ibidem et Avicenna in sua Metaphysica dicentes, quod opponuntur relative unum et multum. Sed distinguitur ibidem in relativis, quod quaedam sunt, quorum utrumque dependet ad alterum, et illorum utrumque ponit reliquum, ut pater et filius, et dominus et servus; quaedam autem sunt, quorum unum dependet ad alterum, et non e converso, et ideo ibi unum ponit alterum et non e converso, ut scientia et scibile; et sic opponuntur relative unum et multum, quia multum ponit unum et non convertitur ».*

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For an understanding of this question we note these [things] beforehand.

1. "One" is taken in two ways: either insofar as it is converted with being, or insofar as it is formally a principle of number. The first is transcendent of every genus, like being, true, good, and this essential unity is found in all things; the second is in the predicament of quantity and is called accidental unity. That accidental unity is not in God is the one [common] judgement of all. Hence the whole question is about essential unity.

2. There is a controversy among philosophers and theologians [as to] what this *one*, according to its account, adds over being. The difference of the principal opinions of the doctors is determined by many authors as follows. St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 11, a. 1), Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* I, q. 1), and others, following Aristotle and his commentator Averroes, resolve: *« that "one" does not add over being any thing, but only the negation of division »*. And (*Summa* I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3) St. Thomas says: *« "One" adds something according to reason over being »*. — Quite the opposite Avicenna taught, on the testimony of St. Thomas (loc. cit.), asserting that "one" adds some positive thing over the substance of being, as "white" over "man." For he himself held the false opinion that there is given only an accidental unity, which is the principle of number. — A middle way between the opinion of Avicenna and Averroes is held by St. Bonaventure (here), Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 13, m. 1, 2, and q. 65, m. 2, a. 1), Bl. Albert (here, a. 3), Petrus a Tarantasia (who here, q. I, a. 2, lucidly summarizes the Seraphic Doctor's teaching), Richard of Mediavilla (here, q. 1, a. 1, especially ad 1). These [doctors] teach that "one" imports something positive, but only virtually distinct from being. Scotus (IV *Metaph.* c. 2, and II *Sent.* d. 3, q. 2) with his [followers] thinks that "one" is something positive and from the nature of the thing formally distinct from being.

**II.** Beyond the twofold species of unity, St. Bonaventure distinguishes a twofold mode of speaking about unity, namely with respect to the thing understood, that is, according to the account of being, and with respect to the account of understanding, that is, according to the mode by which the account of unity becomes known to our intellect. For the human intellect always understands and makes known the most simple things, which are less obvious to sense, *a posteriori*; whence also it explains "one" or "point" through negation of division. And so the holy Doctor concedes that unity, according to the account of being made known, expresses privation of *division*. — But according to the account of being, again he himself distinguishes "one" in two ways: first, insofar as it has a relation to matter, which both is potentially divisible, and stands toward form by way of privation; and so again he concedes that "one" does not express anything positive. Second, insofar as "one" looks to *form*; under this respect "one," according to his judgement, imports something positive, identified however with its subject, as some act of form; and so "one" adds over being the account of positive perfection. On this controversy, cf. Cajetan (on *Summa* I, q. 11, a. 1) and Forestus (*On the Mystery of the Trinity*, q. 5, pp. 235 ff.), who endeavors so to interpret the judgement of St. Thomas, especially from q. 1 *de Verit.* a. 1, that he departs little or nothing in fact from the Seraphic Doctor.

**III.** The solutions to [objections] 2, 3, 4 are founded on this, that "one" and "many" under diverse accounts are opposed either privatively, or contrarily, or relatively. With respect to matter, "one" denies division and actual multitude, to which by reason of matter it is in potency; with respect to form, which confers both being and being-one, "one" is taken positively and contrarily to "many"; with respect *« to the consequent act which is to measure »*, since "one" is the measure of many, it is taken relatively; for so it is part of multitude and not a privation. This relative opposition to multitude pertains to the genus of imperfectly relative [things], which neither are always simultaneous, nor does one depend on the other; an example of which is in knowledge and the knowable. — On this species of relation cf. below d. 30, q. 3, and the Scholion.

This doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor] is more amply explained by Bl. Albert the Great (here, a. 3) in these words: *« It must be said that there is one indivisible reduced to matter or to a disposition of matter, and one reduced to the nature of form, as we say "one by continuity"; and when we say "one by continuity," we say "one in matter" and "one in form," because continuity is a disposition of matter. But whatever is one by continuity is many in potency; and every potency is in the genus of privation, especially the potency of matter, which is the potency of the continuum; which is plain, since the continuum in passive potency is many, and not in active potency. Therefore "one" reduced to the unity of matter has opposition to "many," as privation to habit; since such unity is susceptible of multitude; and this is the intention of the Philosopher and the commentary (the Commentator) saying this. But "one" which is reduced to form has three considerations, namely according to the formal account of "one," and according to that which it is, and according to that which is proximate and consequent to it. Considered in the first way it has the account of contrariety to "many," since both are placed in a species, and they mutually expel each other from the same recipient... If, however, "one" is taken according to that which it is, it itself has no opposition to "many," but rather is the principle of "many" and is preserved substantially in the "many" itself. And this Avicenna attends to, saying that it does not have opposition, since neither does privation produce habit, nor is it preserved in it... If "one" is taken according to the account proximately consequent to it, which is the account of measure; then "one," which is certain, is what measures the "many," which is uncertain; and so they are opposed as measure and measured. And this Aristotle intends in book X of the *First Philosophy* and the Commentator at the same place and Avicenna in his *Metaphysics*, saying that "one" and "many" are opposed relatively. But it is distinguished there in relatives, that some there are of which both [members] depend on the other, and of those each posits the other, as father and son, and master and servant; but some there are of which one depends on the other and not conversely, and therefore there one [member] posits the other and not conversely, as knowledge and the knowable; and so "one" and "many" are opposed relatively, since "many" posits "one" and is not converted ».*

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether 'one' in divine matters is said according to substance or according to relation

source_text:
<!-- page 423 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum unus in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem dicatur.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum *unus* dicatur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur:

1. Quia *« ens et unum convertuntur »*, sicut vult Philosophus[^1] et Boethius; sed ens dicitur secundum substantiam: ergo et unum.

2. Item, haec conceditur: *« Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt unus Deus »*; sed si sunt unus Deus, cum Deus non diminuat de ratione unius, ergo sunt unus. Sed nihil dicitur in summa de tribus singulariter, quod non dicatur substantialiter[^2]: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod, quando adiective tenetur, tunc non dicitur substantialiter; contra: eadem est significatio termini, quando tenetur adiective, et quando tenetur substantive. Item, cum substantivatur in neutro[^3], dicitur substantialiter; cum ergo eadem sit significatio termini in masculino et in neutro, cum una sit impositio, ergo dicitur substantialiter in masculino. Praeterea, alia nomina in masculino dicuntur substantialiter, ut hoc nomen *aeternus*; unde in Symbolo[^4]: *« Non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus »*: ergo similiter unus.

3. Item, cum dicitur: *« Pater est unus »*, aut tenetur substantialiter, aut notionaliter. Si substantialiter, habeo propositum; si notionaliter — sed Pater habet duas notiones: ergo non debet dici unus, sed duo.

4. Item, notio et proprietas sunt idem: ergo cum proprietas dicatur, *« quod convenit uni soli »*[^5], nulla notio potest dici de tribus. Sed hoc nomen *unus* praedicatur de qualibet persona: ergo non dicit notionem.

**Contra:**

1. Regula est superius habita distinctione vigesima secunda[^6]: *« Omne quod praedicat substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur de tribus singulariter in summa »*; sed hoc non convenit huic nomini quod est *unus*[^7]: ergo etc.

2. Item, nihil pertinens ad essentiam sive substantiam multiplicatur sive plurificatur; sed hoc quod est *unus* plurificatur, quia Pater est unus, et Filius est unus, et sunt duo, quia unus et unus: ergo etc.

3. Item, idem est esse unum et esse distinctum; sed cum dico: *Pater est distinctus*, hoc quod est *distinctus* non dicitur substantialiter: ergo nec hoc quod est *unus*.

4. Item, respectu cuiuscumque termini est dicere *alium* in divinis, ille terminus dicit relationem — unde non dicitur *alius Deus*, sed respectu eius quod est *unus* est dicere *alium*, nam Pater est unus, et Filius est alius: ergo etc.

<!-- page 424 -->

> **Conclusio.** *Cum in Deo sit unitas tum essentialis, tum personalis, qua una persona distinguitur ab alia, terminus unus, si adiective usurpatur, utramque unitatem potest significare; si vero substantive, tunc unitas attribuitur personali unitati, unum autem essentiali.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, cum ratio unitatis sit ratio distinctionis cum indivisione, in divinis autem ponamus et[^8] essentiam distinctam ab aliis essentiis per se ipsam, et personam distingui ab aliis per proprietatem, necesse est in divinis ponere et unitatem essentialem et personalem. Quoniam igitur persona non est aliud ab essentia, unitas essentiae et personae non sunt duae unitates secundum rem, sed una, ratione differens: ideo unitas de hac et illa non dicitur aequivoce, quoniam nec isti nec illi imponitur specialiter.

Quia ergo concretum accipit specialem significationem ab abstracto, hoc nomen *unus* importat in divinis unitatem essentialem et personalem. Et cum adiective tenetur, indifferenter importat utramque; determinatur autem per adiunctum. Cum ergo additur termino essentiali, importat essentialem; cum additur notionali, importat personalem.

Cum autem substantivatur, tunc[^9] necesse est, quod se ipso determinetur. Et ideo, cum neutrum genus importet, quod dicit, sub indistinctione[^10], in neutro genere convenienter attributum est sive appropriatum unitati essentiali. In masculino vero, quia importat distinctionem et suppositum certum et dicit rationem producentis, appropriatum est unitati personali.

*Ad 1.* Et ideo patet[^11], quod sic non accipitur ut ens neque ut convertibile cum eo, sed solum in neutro.

*Ad 2.* Patet etiam secundum, quod ibi est fallacia figurae dictionis ex commutatione[^12] istius termini *unus*. Quamvis enim non varietur significatio per substantivationem neque per generis diversitatem, potest nihilominus variari modus supponendi, maxime si usus hoc faciat, et ratio sit conveniens usui.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *aeternus* dicitur essentialiter; patet responsio, quia aeternitas dicitur solum essentialiter, sed unitas[^13] personaliter. — Aliqui tamen dicunt, quod hoc est in hoc nomine *unus*, quia est nomen partitivum et habens in se articulum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur[^14]: aut praedicat notionem, etc; dicendum, quod praedicat notionem, sed attendendum, quod non quamcumque, sed personalem, quae facit esse unum, et illa est una in qualibet persona.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod notio dicitur de uno; dicendum, quod est significare notionem sub ratione propria, ut per hoc nomen *paternitas*, et communiter, ut per hoc nomen *relatio*, *notio*, *unitas* et *proprietas*, quae idem dicunt sub rationibus diversis. Sensus enim est: *« persona est[^15] una »*, id est, unica personali proprietate in se indistincta et ab aliis distincta.

english:
### Question II. *Whether "one" in divine matters is said according to substance or according to relation.*

Secondly it is asked whether *one* is said according to substance or according to relation. And that [it is said] according to substance is shown:

1. Since *« being and one are convertible »*, as the Philosopher[^1] and Boethius hold; but "being" is said according to substance: therefore "one" also.

2. Likewise, this is conceded: *« the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God »*; but if they are one God, since "God" does not diminish from the account of "one," therefore they are one. But nothing is said in summation of the three singularly, which is not said substantially[^2]: therefore etc. If you say that, when [the term] is taken adjectively, then it is not said substantially; on the contrary: the signification of the term is the same when it is taken adjectively and when it is taken substantively. Likewise, when it is substantivated in the neuter[^3], it is said substantially; since therefore the signification of the term is the same in the masculine and in the neuter, [and] since there is a single imposition, therefore in the masculine it is said substantially. Furthermore, other names in the masculine are said substantially, as this name *eternal*; whence in the [Athanasian] Creed[^4]: *« not three eternals, but one eternal »*: therefore likewise [for] "one."

3. Likewise, when it is said: *« the Father is one »*, [the term] is taken either substantially or notionally. If substantially, I have what I propose; if notionally — but the Father has two notions: therefore he ought not be called "one," but "two."

4. Likewise, notion and property are the same: therefore since "property" is said to be *« that which belongs to one alone »*[^5], no notion can be said of three. But this name *one* is predicated of any person whatsoever: therefore it does not express a notion.

**On the contrary:**

1. The rule was had above in distinction twenty-two[^6]: *« Everything which predicates substance or essence is said of the three singularly in summation »*; but this does not fit this name which is *one*[^7]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nothing pertaining to essence or substance is multiplied or pluralized; but this [term] *one* is pluralized, since the Father is one, and the Son is one, and they are two, since one and one: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to be one and to be distinct are the same; but when I say: *the Father is distinct*, this [term] *distinct* is not said substantially: therefore neither this [term] *one*.

4. Likewise, with respect to whatever term it is [possible] to say *another* in divine matters, that term expresses a relation — whence it is not said *another God*, but with respect to that which is *one* it is [possible] to say *another*, for the Father is one, and the Son is another: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *Since in God there is unity both essential and personal, by which one person is distinguished from another, the term "one," if used adjectively, can signify either unity; but if [used] substantively, then "unitas" [unity, fem.] is attributed to personal unity, and "unum" [one, neut.] to essential.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the account of unity is the account of distinction with indivision, [and] since in divine matters we posit both[^8] [an] essence distinct from other essences by itself, and a person distinguished from others by a property, it is necessary in divine matters to posit both an essential and a personal unity. Since therefore the person is not other than the essence, the unity of the essence and of the person are not two unities according to the thing, but one, differing in account: therefore unity is not said equivocally of this and that, since neither is it specially imposed on this nor on that.

Since therefore the concrete takes a special signification from the abstract, this name *one* imports in divine matters [both] essential and personal unity. And when it is taken adjectively, it imports either indifferently; it is determined, however, by what is adjoined. When therefore it is added to an essential term, it imports the essential; when it is added to a notional, it imports the personal.

When, however, it is substantivated, then[^9] it is necessary that it be determined by itself. And therefore, since [the substantivated form] imports the neuter gender, [in] which it expresses [unity] under indistinction[^10], in the neuter gender it is fittingly attributed or appropriated to essential unity. In the masculine, however, since it imports distinction and a determinate supposit, and expresses the account of one producing, it is appropriated to personal unity.

*To 1.* And therefore it is plain[^11] that thus it is not taken as "being" nor as convertible with it, but only in the neuter.

*To 2.* The second [point] also is plain, that there [in that argument] there is a fallacy of figure of speech from the commutation[^12] of this term *one*. For although the signification is not varied through substantivation nor through diversity of gender, the mode of suppositing can nevertheless be varied, especially if usage makes it so, and the account is fitting to usage.

To that, then, which is objected, that *eternal* is said essentially; the response is plain, since "eternity" is said only essentially, but "unity"[^13] [is said also] personally. — Some, however, say that this is [the case] in this name *unus* ["one," masc.], because it is a partitive name and has the article in itself.

*To 3.* To that which is objected[^14]: either it predicates a notion, etc.; it must be said that it does predicate a notion, but it must be noted that not just any [notion], but the personal [one], which makes [a person] to be one, and that [notion] is one in any person whatsoever.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that "notion" is said of [the] one; it must be said that [there is] signifying [a] notion under [its] proper account, as through this name *paternity*, and commonly, as through this name *relation*, *notion*, *unity* and *property*, which say the same [thing] under diverse accounts. For the sense is: *« the person is[^15] one »*, that is, undivided in herself by a single personal property and divided from others.

la: Libr. IV. Metaph. text. 3. (III. c. 2.): *« Si itaque ens et unum idem ac una natura sunt, propterea quod se invicem sequuntur etc ».* Cfr. etiam X. text. 8. (IX. c. 2.). — Boeth., *de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi*, c. 4. ait: *« Quod enim non est unum, nec esse omnino potest; esse enim atque unum convertitur ».* Vide etiam eiusdem librum *de Unitate et Uno*.

en: Book IV *Metaph.*, text 3 (III, c. 2): *« If therefore being and one are the same and one nature, since they follow each other reciprocally, etc. ».* Cf. also X, text 8 (IX, c. 2). — Boethius, *On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ*, c. 4, says: *« For what is not one cannot at all even be; for "to be" and "one" are convertible ».* See also his book *On Unity and the One*.

la: Vide supra d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 3, et ibid. dub. 2. circa lit. — Infra post *tunc* plurimi mss. cum ed. 1 omittunt *non*, sed falso, quia contra scopum obiectionis. S. Doctor forte alludit ad ultimam partem verborum Alani de Insulis, *Theologic. Regulae*, reg. 23: *Ideo autem apponimus substantivo modo, quia nomina significantia substantiam vel substantiae circumstantiam, si adiective teneantur, ut hoc nomen* potens, *hoc nomen* iustus, *de tribus personis dicuntur in summa in plurali numero, ut: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt* iusti, *sunt* potentes.

en: See above d. XXII, *littera Magistri*, c. 3, and the same place, dub. 2 *circa litteram*. — Below, after *tunc*, very many mss. with ed. 1 omit *non*, but wrongly, since [it is] against the scope of the objection. The holy Doctor perhaps alludes to the last part of the words of Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 23: *« We add [it] in a substantive mode, however, since names signifying substance or a circumstance of substance, if they are taken adjectively — as this name* potens *['powerful'], this name* iustus *['just'] — are said of the three persons in summation in the plural number, as: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are* iusti *['just (pl.)'], are* potentes *['powerful (pl.)'] ».*

la: Vat. cum uno alterove cod. adiicit *genere*, et paulo infra cum cod. cc loco *una* exhibet *eadem*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, adds *genere* ("gender"), and a little below, with cod. cc, in place of *una* exhibits *eadem* ("the same").

la: Athanasiano.

en: [The Creed referred to is] the Athanasian.

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio. — Plures codd. ut AVXY cum ed. 1 *quia* pro *quod*.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. on the *Proprium*. — Several codices such as AVXY with ed. 1 [read] *quia* ("because") in place of *quod* ("that which").

la: In lit. Magistri, c. 4, et dub. 2. circa lit.

en: In the *littera Magistri*, c. 4, and dub. 2 *circa litteram*.

la: Sequimur communiorem mss. et ed. 1 lectionem, addendo *quod est*.

en: We follow the more common reading of the mss. and ed. 1, by adding *quod est*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. omittit *et*, ac paulo infra post *necesse est* addit *etiam*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with several codices omits *et*, and a little below, after *necesse est*, adds *etiam*.

la: Ita maior pars mss., dum ceteri cum ed. 1 et Vat. ponunt *enim*.

en: So the greater part of the mss., while the rest with ed. 1 and the Vatican [edition] put *enim* ("for") [in place of *tunc*, "then"].

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hic *tunc*, et paulo infra post *in neutro* adiecimus *genere*. Pro *se ipso* ed. 1 *in se ipso*, codd. K aa bb *se ipsum determinet* pro *se ipso determinetur*. Dein plures mss. ut G I M V Y Z cum ed. 1 *sine distinctione* loco *sub indistinctione*.

en: From the older mss. and ed. 1 we have here supplied *tunc* ("then"), and a little below, after *in neutro*, we have added *genere* ("gender"). In place of *se ipso*, ed. 1 [reads] *in se ipso*; codd. K aa bb [read] *se ipsum determinet* in place of *se ipso determinetur*. Then several mss. such as G I M V Y Z with ed. 1 [read] *sine distinctione* ("without distinction") in place of *sub indistinctione* ("under indistinction").

la: In ed. 1 additur *primum*.

en: In ed. 1 *primum* ("first") is added.

la: Vat. cum nonnullis mss. et ed. 1 *mutatione*. Deinde post *potest* eadem cum solo cod. cc addit *tamen*, denique ponit *diversificari* pro *variari*, ac *facit* loco *faciat*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with some mss. and ed. 1 [reads] *mutatione* ("by change") [in place of *commutatione*]. Then, after *potest*, the same [edition] with only cod. cc adds *tamen* ("nevertheless"); finally it puts *diversificari* in place of *variari*, and *facit* in place of *faciat*.

la: Supple: *etiam*; et mox post *hoc est* subaudi: *ideo*, pro quo Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit *speciale*.

en: Supply: *etiam* ("also"); and soon after *hoc est* understand: *ideo* ("therefore"), in place of which the Vatican [edition], without the warrant of the mss. and ed. 1, adds *speciale* ("special").

la: In cod. Y additur *quod unus*. — De notione personali, quae hic occurrit, vide infra d. 26. q. 1. et 4.

en: In cod. Y *quod unus* ("which [is] 'one'") is added. — On the personal notion, which occurs here, see below d. 26, q. 1 and 4.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *est*.

en: From very many mss. and ed. 1 we have added *est*.

latin_scholion:
Quoad solut. ad 1. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 1, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. ad 3. — Praeter hos quoad conclusionem cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 30. a. 3. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
For the solution to [objection] 1, cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 1, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3, ad 3. — Besides these, for the conclusion cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *Summa* I, q. 30, a. 3, ad 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1, princ. q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---


title: Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 425 -->

### ARTICULUS II. *De nominibus pure numeralibus.*

Secundo principaliter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de nominibus pure numeralibus, ut sunt *duo* et *tres* etc. Et circa hoc similiter quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum dicantur positive, aut privative. Secundo, utrum dicantur secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomina pure numeralia in divinis positive, an privative dicantur.*

Et quod dicantur privative solum, videtur:

1. Per auctoritatem Magistri in littera[^1], qui dicit, quod « horum usus magis inductus est causa privandi quam ponendi »; et videtur per auctoritates aliorum firmari auctoritas Magistri. Dicit enim Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^2]: « Illud vere unum est, in quo nullus est numerus»; sed in divinis unum est verissime: ergo in divinis non est numerus: ergo isti termini in divinis aut falso dicuntur, aut non praedicant numerum. Sed non dicunt aliud quam numerum, si aliquid ponunt: ergo etc.

2. Item, Isidorus[^3] dicit, quod numerus est *virtus[?] memoris*, id est divisionis, secundum etymologiam; sed in Deo non cadit divisio, ergo nec numerus: ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, Philosophus[^4] dicit, quod « numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum »; sed in Deo non cadit mensuratio, cum ipse sit immensus: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc videtur per rationem: quia a quocumque removetur genus, et species; sed genus quantitatis removetur a Deo: ergo etc.

5. Item, in quocumque est genus, necesse est ponere aliquam specierum[^5]: ergo si numerus est in Deo, vel est ibi binarius, vel ternarius, vel aliquis aliorum. Sed Sancti omnes species negant, ergo et genus: ergo idem quod prius.

**Contra:**

1. Si tantum *privative* dicerentur, quia non sunt unus vel duo, tunc ergo pari ratione posset dici: chimaerae sunt tres, quia non sunt una vel duae; sed illud non dicitur: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod dicat numerum, videtur. Eusebius[^6] dicit: « In divinis est numerus, sed non ordo »; sed si est ibi numerus: ergo contingit illum significare esse. Et si hoc: ergo positive tenentur dictiones, quae illum significant.

3. Item, Bernardus[^7]: « Si una est essentia, tres quis numerum neget»? quasi dicat, nullus: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia discreta quantitas est maioris abstractionis quam continua: ergo et discretio magis quam duratio. Sed nomen dicens durationem in divinis dicitur positive, ut *aeternus*: ergo et nomen dicens discretionem.

5. Item, in quocumque est ponere speciem positive, est ponere genus; sed in Deo est ponere trinitatem: ergo et pluralitatem.

> **Conclusio.** *In divinis numerus dicitur quidem positive, sed non est ibi simpliciter, sed numerus personarum.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam dicendum[^8], quod positio Magistri fuit, quod huiusmodi nomina numeralia in divinis non ponerent aliquid, sed privarent, sicut patet in *littera*. Et ratio huius positionis fuit, quia huiusmodi nomina, si aliquid ponunt, numerum utique ponunt; sed numerum non esse in divinis ponendum, et ratio dicit et auctoritas Sanctorum confirmat. Cum enim in divinis non sit divisio et separatio, non sit etiam aggregatio, non sit etiam mensuratio; numerus separationem importet antecedenter, et aggregationem et mensurationem consequenter: numerus in divinis non videtur esse[^9] ponendus. Et ideo dictiones numerales in divinis non dicunt aliquid, sed magis privant, maiorem scilicet numerum et minorem.

Sed nec positio nec ratio positionis est[^10] conveniens, si interius attendatur. Positio enim destruit

<!-- page 426 -->

se ipsam. Ponit enim, quod nomina designantia pluralitatem dicantur privative, similiter et nomina designantia unitatem. Et si hoc, si sic invicem opponuntur, ut utrumque sit privatio alterius, erit ibi circulatio in notificando; et si utrumque alterius privatio est — cum privatio non sit privationis, sed habitus — utrumque aliquid ponit; et ita, si dicuntur privative, dicuntur positive; et propterea[?] positio non est conveniens.

Ratio similiter positionis non est convenienter sumpta. Nam numerus importat distinctionem et super hoc compositionem *aggregationis*; et quamvis in divinis non sit aggregatio, nihilominus est distinctio; et ideo numerus non est simpliciter removendus a divinis, sed numerus talis. Et Magister omnino removet; ideo positione sua defecit. Et in isto articulo non sustinetur[?] communiter a magistris Parisiensibus.

Concedendum ergo, quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur positive, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae. Et concedendum, quod in divinis aliquo modo est numerus, aliquo modo non. Nam secundum quod dicit distinctionem personarum secundum originem, sic dicendum est esse in divinis; secundum autem quod aggregationem et divisionem substantialem dicit, non est ponendus numerus in divinis.

Ex his patent obiecta. Nam rationes ad primam partem procedunt de numero secundum eam acceptionem, qua sumitur in his inferioribus quantum ad conditiones praedictas. Unde in sensu suo verum concludunt, quod ibi non est numerus.

Similiter rationes ad partem oppositam procedunt, secundum quod numerus distinctionem certam importat, et hoc quidem est ponere in divinis; et ideo verum concludunt in suo sensu. Unde in divinis negandum est esse numerum simpliciter, sed concedendum est esse numerum personarum.

*Ad 4. 5.* Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de quantitate continua, et de specie numeri, dicendum, quod nec quantitas continua est in Deo, quia aeternitas non est quantitas, nec Trinitas est species numeri.

english:
### ARTICLE II. *On the purely numeral names.*

Secondly, the principal inquiry concerns the second article, namely on the purely numeral names, such as *two* and *three* etc. And concerning this, two [questions] are likewise asked. First, it is asked whether they are said positively or privatively. Second, whether they are said according to substance or according to relation.

### Question I. *Whether the purely numeral names in God are said positively or privatively.*

And that they are said only privatively is shown:

1. By the authority of the Master in the *littera*[^1], who says that « the use of these is rather brought in for the sake of denying than of positing »; and the Master's authority seems to be confirmed by the authorities of others. For Boethius says in his book *On the Trinity*[^2]: « That is truly one in which there is no number »; but in God "one" is most truly: therefore in God there is no number: therefore these terms in God are either said falsely, or they do not predicate number. But they say nothing other than number, if they posit anything: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Isidore[^3] says that number is *the power[?] of the memorial-mark*, that is, of division, according to the etymology; but in God division does not occur, therefore neither does number: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher[^4] says that « number is a multitude measured by one »; but in God measuring does not occur, since he himself is immeasurable: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason: since from whatever the genus is removed, the species also [is removed]; but the genus of quantity is removed from God: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, in whatever the genus is, it is necessary to posit some one of the species[^5]: therefore if number is in God, either there is there the binary, or the ternary, or some [one] of the others. But all the saints deny the species, therefore also the genus: therefore the same as before.

**On the contrary:**

1. If they were said only *privatively*, since they are not one or two, then by parity of reason it could be said: chimaeras are three, since they are not one or two; but that is not said: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it expresses number, is plain. Eusebius[^6] says: « In God there is number, but not order »; but if there is number there: therefore it happens that it signifies being. And if so: therefore the words which signify it are taken positively.

3. Likewise, Bernard[^7]: « If one is the essence, [and] three [are the persons], who would deny the number »? as if to say, no one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since discrete quantity is of greater abstraction than continuous: therefore also discreteness more than duration. But a name expressing duration in God is said positively, as *eternal*: therefore also a name expressing discreteness.

5. Likewise, in whatever the species is to be posited positively, the genus is to be posited; but in God trinity is to be posited: therefore also plurality.

> **Conclusion.** *In God number is indeed said positively, but it is not there simply, but [rather] number of persons.*

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be said[^8] that the position of the Master was that such numeral names in God did not posit anything, but were privative, as is plain in the *littera*. And the reason for this position was that such names, if they posit anything, posit number absolutely; but that number is not to be posited in God, both reason says and the authority of the saints confirms. For since in God there is no division and separation, neither is there aggregation, nor is there measuring; and number imports separation antecedently, and aggregation and measuring consequently: number in God does not seem[^9] to be posited. And therefore the numeral words in God do not say anything, but rather privatively deny, namely a greater number and a lesser.

But neither the position nor the reason of the position is[^10] suitable, if attention be turned inwardly. For the position destroys

<!-- page 426 -->

itself. For it posits that names designating plurality are said privatively, and similarly the names designating unity. And if so, [and] if they are thus mutually opposed, so that each is the privation of the other, there will be there a circle in making known; and if each is the privation of the other — since privation is not of privation, but of habit — each posits something; and so, if they are said privatively, they are said positively; and on this account[?] the position is not suitable.

The reason of the position is likewise not suitably taken. For number imports distinction and beyond this composition of *aggregation*; and although in God there is no aggregation, nevertheless there is distinction; and therefore number is not simply to be removed from God, but [only] such-and-such number. And the Master removes [it] altogether; therefore by his position he failed. And in this article he is not commonly upheld[?] by the masters of Paris.

It must therefore be conceded that such names are said positively, as the reasons adduced for this prove. And it must be conceded that in God in some way there is number, in some way not. For according as it expresses the distinction of persons according to origin, so it must be said to be in God; but according as it expresses aggregation and substantial division, number is not to be posited in God.

From these things the objections are plain. For the reasons for the first part proceed concerning number according to that acceptation in which it is taken in these lower things with respect to the aforesaid conditions. Whence in their own sense they conclude truly, that there is no number there.

Likewise the reasons for the opposite part proceed according as number imports a certain distinction, and this indeed is to posit [it] in God; and therefore they conclude truly in their own sense. Whence in God it must be denied that there is number simply, but it must be conceded that there is number of persons.

*To 4 and 5.* To that, however, which is objected concerning continuous quantity, and concerning the species of number, it must be said that neither is continuous quantity in God, since eternity is not a quantity, nor is the Trinity a species of number.

la: Circa principium. — In Vat. et cod. cc, omissis verbis *in littera*, legitur *auctoritate* pro *per auctoritatem*. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut A T U X cum ed. 1 *auctoritatem* loco *auctoritates*.

en: Near the beginning. — In the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc, with the words *in littera* omitted, *auctoritate* is read in place of *per auctoritatem*. A little below, several codices such as A T U X with ed. 1 [read] *auctoritatem* in place of *auctoritates*.

la: Cap. 2.

en: Chapter 2.

la: Locus citatus ex Isidoro nec inveniri nec a corruptione emendari potuit; maxima pars codicum habet *virtus vel nutus memoris*, pauci *nutus memoriae*. Idem locus apud B. Albertum hic a. 1. occurrit: *nutus memoris*; et in Comment. 1. Poster. tract. 2. c. 1. ait: *« Numerus enim fit ex iteratione unitatis secundum mentem acceptae, propter quod et numerus dicatur nutus mentis vel memoris, hoc est divisionis »*; et in antiquis edd. Commentarii S. Thomae, hic a. 2: *unicus merus scilicet divisionis*, quam lectionem per coniecturam parum feliciter P. Nicolai mutavit in *unius meros vel unius merismos*, scilicet *divisio*, adiungens: quod subiungitur ex Isidoro, nullibi apud illum occurrit. — In III. Etymolog. c. 3. Isidorus ait: *« Numerus est multitudo ex unitatibus constituta; nam unum semen numeri esse (volunt), non numerum. Numero nummus nomen dedit et a sui frequentatione vocabulum indidit »*. — In fine argumenti ante *numerus* Vat. perperam et praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 omittit *nec*.

en: The passage cited from Isidore could neither be found nor emended from corruption; the greater part of the codices has *virtus vel nutus memoris*, a few *nutus memoriae*. The same passage in Bl. Albert here a. 1 occurs as: *nutus memoris*; and in *Commentary on I Posterior [Analytics]*, tract. 2, c. 1, he says: *« For number arises from the iteration of unity received according to the mind, on account of which number is also called the nod (nutus) of the mind or of the memorial-mark, that is, of division »*; and in the old editions of the *Commentary* of St. Thomas, here a. 2: *unicus merus scilicet divisionis* ("a single 'merus' namely of division"), which reading P. Nicolai by conjecture not very felicitously changed into *unius meros vel unius merismos*, namely *divisio*, adding: that which is appended from Isidore, nowhere in him occurs. — In III *Etymologies* c. 3 Isidore says: *« Number is a multitude constituted of units; for they hold that the one is the seed of number, not [itself] a number. To "numerus" the "nummus" (coin) gave its name, and from its frequent use bestowed the term »*. — At the end of the argument, before *numerus*, the Vatican [edition], wrongly and against the trust of the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, omits *nec*.

la: Libr. X. Metaph. text. 21. (IX. c. 6.).

en: Book X *Metaphysics*, text 21 (IX, c. 6).

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 4.): *Necessarium, de quibus genus praedicatur, et specierum aliquam praedicari.*

en: Aristotle, II *Topics*, c. 2 (c. 4): *It is necessary that, of those things of which the genus is predicated, some one of the species also is predicated.*

la: Cfr. *De Trin. Confessio S. Eusebii Vercellensis*, n. 8. Paulo post ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *esse*.

en: Cf. *On the Trinity, Confession of St. Eusebius of Vercelli*, n. 8. A little later, from very many mss. and ed. 1 we have added *esse*.

la: Libr. V. *de Consid.* c. 7. n. 17: *Cum tres illae personae illa substantia sint, et illa una substantia tres illae personae, quis numerum neget?*

en: Book V *On Consideration*, c. 7, n. 17: *Since those three persons are that substance, and that one substance is those three persons, who would deny the number?*

la: Vat. *notandum*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *notandum* ("it is to be noted") [in place of *dicendum*].

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. *est* pro *videtur esse*, et deinde *ideo etiam* pro *Et ideo*; post *dictiones* adiungit *vel rationes*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with a few codices [reads] *est* in place of *videtur esse*, and then *ideo etiam* in place of *Et ideo*; after *dictiones* it adds *vel rationes* ("or accounts").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *videtur esse*. Cod. W *continens veritatem* pro [...][?]

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *videtur esse*. Cod. W [reads] *continens veritatem* in place of [...][?] *(end of note truncated in the IA djvu OCR; see ambiguities log)*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Circa quaestionem, quid numeri in divinis formaliter significent, eadem redit differentia opinionum, quam supra (a. 1. q. 1.) circa rationem unius observavimus. Sententiam Petri Lombardi, quam S. Bonav. minus sufficientem esse censet, S. Thom. tum in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), tum in Sum. (1. q. 30. a. 3.) approbat eamque in hoc sensu explicat, quod numerus in divinis sit transcendentalis, qui numeratis personis addat duplicem negationem, scil. negationem divisionis in se et indivisionis ab alio, et quod praeter hanc negationem nihil aliud significet. Quod autem contra hanc sententiam obiicitur, scilicet eam incidere « in circulationem », id est circulum vitiosum, Angelicus (S. loc. cit. ad 3.) solvere nititur hac assertione, quod non *unum* et *multum*, sed *unum* et *divisum* sint formaliter opposita. Ad quod contrariae sententiae assertores respondent, *divisum* et *multum* esse idem. — Ceterum duae sententiae in hac assertione conveniunt, numerum addere entitatibus illam duplicem negationem; differunt vero circa hoc, quid *unum* et *plura* formaliter significent in Deo. Hic iterum asserit S. Bonav., *unum*, sicut alii termini rerum simplicium, cognosci quidem et definiri per negationem tanquam quid notius, ipsam vero negationem esse potius aliquid consequens ad constitutionem unius et plurium; sicut etiam incommunicabilitas personam iam constitutam consequitur, ut in distinctione sequenti docetur. S. Thomas convenit cum Magistro in conclusione, sed aliquatenus differt ab ipso, procedendo ab alio fundamento, de quo videri potest Caietanus (ad S. I. q. 30. a. 3.).

**II.** Cfr. praeter iam laudatos Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 73. q. 11. n. 8. et seq.; a. 74. q. 5[?]. n. 11; a. 75. q. 1. n. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the question, what the numbers in God formally signify, the same difference of opinions returns which we observed above (a. 1, q. 1) concerning the account of *one*. The judgement of Peter Lombard, which St. Bonaventure judges to be less sufficient, St. Thomas both in his *Commentary* (here, q. 1, a. 1), and in the *Summa* (I, q. 30, a. 3), approves and explains in this sense, that number in God is transcendental, which adds to the persons numbered a twofold negation, namely the negation of division in itself and of indivision from another, and that beyond this negation it signifies nothing else. As to what is objected against this judgement, namely that it falls « into circulation », that is, into a vicious circle, the Angelic Doctor (*Summa* loc. cit. ad 3) endeavors to solve by this assertion, that not *one* and *many*, but *one* and *divided* are formally opposed. To which the assertors of the contrary judgement reply, that *divided* and *many* are the same. — For the rest, the two judgements agree in this assertion, that number adds to entities that twofold negation; but they differ on this, what *one* and *many* formally signify in God. Here again St. Bonaventure asserts that *one*, like the other terms of simple things, is indeed known and defined through negation as something more known [to us], but the negation itself is rather something consequent to the constitution of the one and the many; just as also incommunicability follows upon the person already constituted, as is taught in the following distinction. St. Thomas agrees with the Master in the conclusion, but differs from him in some measure, proceeding from another foundation, on which Cajetan (on *Summa* I, q. 30, a. 3) may be consulted.

**II.** Cf., besides those already cited, Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here, q. 2, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.*, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 73, q. 11, n. 8 ff.; a. 74, q. 5[?], n. 11; a. 75, q. 1, n. 9. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2, 3.

---