title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 454 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Quid sint in divinis proprietates personarum.*

Secundo quaeritur de proprietatibus, quid sint. Et quod sint relationes, videtur:

1. Quia dicit Hilarius duodecimo *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Proprium est Deo nato esse filium»; sed filiatio est relatio: ergo etc.

2. Item, Damascenus[^2]: «Dicimus divinam Verbi hypostasim, nativitatis modo et habitudine a paternali hypostasi differentem»; sed modus habitudinis est relatio: ergo etc.

3. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore in libro *de Trinitate*[^3] dicit, quod personae distinguuntur proprietate originis; sed origo in divinis non est motus, sed habitudo, ergo relatio: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia proprium est quod convenit soli[^4]; sed nihil absolutum est incommunicabile in divinis et conveniens soli: ergo omnis proprietas personalis est relativa, ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Sicut paternitas est relatio, ita magnitudo quantitas, et ita bonitas qualitas; sed magnitudo Dei non est quantitas, nec bonitas qualitas[^5]: ergo nec paternitas est relatio. Sed paternitas est proprietas: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia alia transeunt in substantiam, relatio non; contrarium ostenditur primo sic:

<!-- page 455 -->

2. Sicut quantitas est unum genus accidentis[^6] distinctum a substantia, ita et relatio; sed quia in Deo non cadit diversitas, ideo necessario genus quantitatis transit in substantiam, cum ibi non sit accidens nec diversitas generum: ergo pari ratione relatio.

3. Item, sicut Deus est sua magnitudo, ita Deus est sua[^7] paternitas; sed quia Deus est sua magnitudo, ideo quantitas non differt a substantia, sed in eam transit: ergo et paternitas similiter.

4. Item, videtur quod relatio magis transit, quia inter omnia genera accidentium relatio importat maiorem dependentiam, quia ad subiectum et obiectum; sed Deus omnino est independens: ergo et relatio minime manet in Deo.

5. Item, inter omnia genera entium relatio minus habet de entitate[^8], sicut patet, quia advenit et recedit sine mutatione illius quod refertur; sed in summo ente non debet poni, nisi quod multum habet de entitate: ergo etc.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Proprietates personarum sunt relationes.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod proprietates personales necesse est esse relationes. Et hoc duplici ratione: tum quia sunt incommunicabiles et soli conveniunt, tum etiam quia realiter differunt, ut

<!-- page 456 -->

ostensum est prius[^9]. Sola autem relatio manet in divinis.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum, quod relatio in aliquibus convenit cum aliis generibus[^10], in aliquibus differt. Convenit enim[^11] in hoc, quod est praedicamentum et genus entis, et in hoc, quod est accidens; et disconvenit in hoc, quod praeter alia genera habet respectum non solum ad subiectum, sed etiam ad obiectum secundum habitudinem et dependentiam.

Quantum ad primas conditiones impossibile est relationem manere in divinis, sicut alia genera, et hoc propter summam simplicitatem. In Deo enim relatio non est praedicamentum nec accidens, sed substantia est. Quantum vero ad conditiones, quas habet respectu obiecti, necesse est quodam modo manere, scilicet quantum ad habitudinem[^12], et hoc propter veram distinctionem, quae est in divinis, et veram originem et habitudinem; et necesse est quodam modo non manere, scilicet quantum ad dependentiam, et hoc propter omnimodam absolutionem quae est in divinis. Alia igitur genera simpliciter transeunt, sed relatio quodam modo manet ibi, quodam modo transit; quia alia genera respectum solum ad subiectum dicunt et secundum illum transeunt. Sed relatio ultra[^13] dicit respectum ad obiectum, et secundum illum respectum dicit pluralitatem, quae vere est in divinis; et ita relatio manet. Patet etiam, quomodo transit, videlicet quantum ad omne quod dicit compositionem. Unde non est genus neque in genere, non est accidens nec est aliud.

1. 2. 3. Et sic patent prima[^14] tria obiecta circa solutionem oppositorum hoc, quia unum sumitur a natura generis, aliud a natura accidentis, tertium a praedicatione identitatis. Patet etiam, quomodo manet, scilicet quantum ad illud quod dicit distinctionem, non quantum ad id quod dicit dependentiam et inclinationem, quia sic privat absolutionis perfectionem.

4. Et per hoc patet quartum argumentum, quod obiicit de dependentia relationis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minus habet de ente; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, cum differt essentialiter a substantia; in Deo autem non sic est. — Posset tamen praeter rationem praedictam haec ratio reddi, quod non transit: quia enim minimum habet de ente, ideo minimam vel nullam facit compositionem, etiam cum[^15] manet secundum suam proprietatem. Alia vero, quae habent aliquid de ente absoluto, faciunt compositionem; et hinc est, quod relatio melius valet in summo simplici quam aliquod aliorum.

english:
### QUESTION II. *What the properties of the persons are in divine matters.*

Secondly, inquiry is made about the properties: what they are. And that they are relations, is shown:

1. Since Hilary says in book XII *On the Trinity*[^1]: «It is proper to God once born to be a son»; but sonship is a relation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^2]: «We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word differs from the paternal hypostasis by the mode of nativity and by relation»; but the mode of relation is a relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor in the book *On the Trinity*[^3] says that the persons are distinguished by a property of origin; but origin in divine matters is not a motion, but a relation, therefore [it is] a relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since *proper* is what belongs to one alone[^4]; but nothing absolute is incommunicable in divine matters and belonging to one alone: therefore every personal property is relative, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Just as paternity is a relation, so magnitude is a quantity, and so goodness is a quality; but the magnitude of God is not a quantity, nor is goodness a quality[^5]: therefore neither is paternity a relation. But paternity is a property: therefore etc. If you say that this is not similar, since the others pass into the substance, [whereas] relation does not; the contrary is shown first thus:

2. Just as quantity is one genus of accident[^6] distinct from substance, so also is relation; but since in God no diversity falls, therefore necessarily the genus of quantity passes into the substance, since there is there neither accident nor diversity of genera: therefore by parity of reason [so does] relation.

3. Likewise, just as God is his own magnitude, so [God is his own][^7] paternity; but since God is his own magnitude, therefore quantity does not differ from substance, but passes into it: therefore likewise also paternity.

4. Likewise, it seems that relation passes [into substance] more, since among all the genera of accidents relation imports a greater dependence, since [it has reference] to subject and to object; but God is altogether independent: therefore relation in no way remains in God.

5. Likewise, among all the genera of beings relation has the least of entity[^8], as is plain since it comes and goes without change of that which is referred; but in the supreme being there ought to be posited only what has much of entity: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The properties of the persons are relations.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the personal properties must necessarily be relations. And this for a twofold reason: both because they are incommunicable and belong to one alone, and also because they really differ, as has been shown previously[^9]. And only relation remains in divine matters.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that relation in some [respects] agrees with the other genera[^10], in some differs. For it agrees[^11] in this, that it is a predicament and a genus of being, and in this, that it is an accident; and it disagrees in this, that beyond the other genera it has a respect not only to a subject, but also to an object according to relation and dependence.

As to the first conditions, it is impossible for relation to remain in divine matters, just like the other genera, and this on account of the supreme simplicity. For in God relation is not a predicament nor an accident, but is substance. As to those conditions, however, which it has with respect to the object, it is necessary that it remain in some way, namely as to relation[^12], and this on account of the true distinction which is in divine matters, and the true origin and relation; and it is necessary that it not remain in some way, namely as to dependence, and this on account of the every-way absoluteness which is in divine matters. The other genera therefore simply pass over, but relation in some way remains there, in some way passes over; since the other genera express only a respect to the subject and according to that they pass over. But relation expresses moreover[^13] a respect to the object, and according to that respect expresses a plurality which truly is in divine matters; and so relation remains. It is plain also how it passes over, namely as to everything which expresses composition. Hence it is not a genus nor in a genus, it is not an accident nor anything else.

1, 2, 3. And so the first[^14] three objections in the [section of] solution to the opposed [arguments] are plain by this, since one is taken from the nature of the genus, another from the nature of the accident, the third from the predication of identity. It is plain also how it remains, namely as to that which expresses distinction, not as to what expresses dependence and inclination, since thus it would deprive [it of] the perfection of absoluteness.

4. And by this the fourth argument is plain, which objects from the dependence of relation.

5. To that which is objected, that it has less of being; it must be said that this is true when it differs essentially from substance; but in God it is not so. — Yet besides the aforesaid reason this reason could be given that it does not pass over: since precisely because it has the least of being, therefore it makes the least or no composition, even when[^15] it remains according to its own propriety. The others, however, which have something of absolute being, make composition; and hence it is that relation has more force in the supremely simple than any of the others.

la: Num. 15. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: n. 15. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 3.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 7.

en: Book III *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 7.

la: Libr. IV. c. 18: *Nullatenus possunt iuxta aliquam qualitatis proprietatem alternatim differre; relinquitur, ut credantur iuxta modum originis aliquam differentiam habere.*

en: Book IV, c. 18: *In no way can they differ alternately according to any property of quality; it remains that they be believed to have some difference according to the mode of origin.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 152, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 152, note 1.

la: Vide supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 4, et Boeth. de Trin. c. 4.

en: See above d. 8, p. II, dub. 4, and Boethius *On the Trinity*, c. 4.

la: Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *accidentis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and cod. cc omit *accidentis* ("of accident").

la: Supple cum Vat. *Deus est sua.*

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *Deus est sua* ("God is his own").

la: Cfr. Aristot., XIV. Metaph. c. 3. (XIII. c. 1.), ubi hoc fusius probatur; et Averroes, XII. Metaph. text. 19. ait: *Quia (relatio) est debilioris esse aliis praedicamentis, ita quod quidam reputaverunt, ipsam esse ex secundis intellectis.* — De ratione proxime allata cfr. quaest. praec. solut. ad 3. — Codd. K V cc et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 falso *ad quod refertur* pro *quod refertur*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, XIV *Metaph.* c. 3 (XIII, c. 1), where this is more fully proved; and Averroes, XII *Metaph.* text 19, says: *Because (relation) is of weaker being than the other predicaments, so that some have reputed it to be from second intentions.* — On the reason most recently adduced cf. preceding question, sol. ad 3. — Codices K V cc and edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 wrongly [read] *ad quod refertur* in place of *quod refertur*.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Pro *generibus* Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. I *praedicamentis*, i. e. supremis rerum generibus, quae praedicari possunt de individuo, quae sunt decem secundum Aristotelem. — Pro *enim*, quod sequitur verbum *Convenit*, ed. I *quidem*.

en: In place of *generibus* the Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and ed. I, [reads] *praedicamentis*, that is, supreme genera of things which can be predicated of an individual, which are ten according to Aristotle. — In place of *enim*, which follows the word *Convenit*, ed. I [reads] *quidem*.

la: [Lectional note attached to *Convenit enim*; see note 10.]

la: Auctoritate praestantiorum mss. et ed. I restituimus hic *scilicet quantum ad habitudinem*, quae verba in Vat. desunt.

en: On the authority of the more excellent manuscripts and ed. I we restore here *scilicet quantum ad habitudinem* ("namely as to relation"), which words are missing in the Vatican [edition].

la: Cod. V addit *hoc*. Non multo post pro *dicit pluralitatem*, quae complures codd. ut FGMTZ aa bb ff *manet, quae*; aliqui codd. ut AHR omittunt *dicit pluralitatem*, subinde *qui* exhibentes pro *quae*. Paulo inferius pro *ita* cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *illa*.

en: Cod. V adds *hoc* ("this"). Not much later, in place of *dicit pluralitatem*, several codices such as FGMTZ aa bb ff [read] *manet, quae*; some codices such as AHR omit *dicit pluralitatem*, thereupon exhibiting *qui* in place of *quae*. A little below, in place of *ita* cod. cc with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [reads] *illa*.

la: Sensus est: sicut alia praedicamenta divinae essentiae identificantur, sic etiam relatio, tam quantum ad conditiones, in quibus convenit cum aliis praedicamentis, quam, ut paulo inferius dicetur, quantum ad aliquam conditionem ipsi specialem, scil. dependentiam. — Ed. I immediate superius post voculam *sicut* apte interiicit *nec*.

en: The sense is: just as the other predicaments are identified [with] the divine essence, so also relation, both as to the conditions in which it agrees with the other predicaments, and, as will be said a little below, as to some condition special to itself, namely dependence. — Ed. I immediately above, after the particle *sicut*, aptly interjects *nec*.

la: In pluribus codd. et ed. I deest *prima*. Mox cod. M *contra* pro *circa*, et dein cod. Y *secundum* pro *aliud*.

en: In several codices and ed. I, *prima* is missing. Soon cod. M [reads] *contra* in place of *circa*, and then cod. Y [reads] *secundum* in place of *aliud*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Praeter solutionem quaestionis principalis explicatur etiam natura relationis in communi, nec non differentia, quae est inter relationes in Deo et relationes in creaturis. — Ex hoc loco manifeste apparet falsum esse, quod a quibusdam S. Bonaventurae imponitur, eum scilicet docere, quod personae divinae constituantur per aliquid absolutum, de quo vide quaest. seq. et d. 33. q. 1.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 2. — Scot., Report. I. Sent. d. 33. q. 3. — S. Thom., S. q. 40. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2, et d. 27. 1. princ. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Beyond the solution of the principal question, the nature of relation in general is also explained, as well as the difference which is between relations in God and relations in creatures. — From this place it manifestly appears to be false what is imputed to St. Bonaventure by certain ones, namely that he teaches that the divine persons are constituted by something absolute, on which see the following question and d. 33, q. 1.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 2. — Scotus, *Reportata* I *Sent.* d. 33, q. 3. — St. Thomas, *Summa* q. 40, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.* q. 2, and d. 27, 1 *princ.* q. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 456 -->

### QUAESTIO III. *Utrum actus personalium proprietatum sit hypostases distinguere, an distinctas ostendere.*

Tertio quaeritur de proprietatibus quantum ad actum. Et quaeritur, utrum actus[^1] huiusmodi proprietatum sit hypostases distinguere, aut distinctas ostendere. Et quod sit distinguere, videtur:

1. Per Boethium *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Substantiam continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem»: sed si multiplicat, ergo distinguit.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore *de Trinitate*[^3] dicit, quod

<!-- page 457 -->

persona distinguitur proprietate originis; sed proprietas dicit originem et relationem: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione[^4], quia, cum personae distinguantur, aut distinguuntur per aliquid absolutum, aut respectivum. Per absolutum non, quia, sicut vult Augustinus[^5], «quod ad se dicitur de singulis dicitur»: ergo necesse est, quod differant per aliquid respectivum.

4. Item, proprietas Patris aut accidit ipsi hypostasi, aut est ei consubstantialis; quod si[^6] accidit, ergo sunt ibi aliqua accidentia: ergo est ibi aliqua compositio. Si autem est consubstantialis et connaturalis: ergo cum non consequatur esse hypostasis, non tantum est ratio innotescendi, sed etiam distinguendi.

5. Item, in summe simplici idem est omnino ratio essendi et cognoscendi; sed persona Patris est summe simplex: ergo eodem distinguitur, quo distingui cognoscitur. Hoc autem est per proprietatem: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Omne respectivum reducitur ad absolutum; sed quod reducitur ad aliquid secundum rationem intelligendi consequitur illud: ergo cum proprietates sint respectivae, hypostases absolutae, proprietates reducuntur ad hypostases: ergo hypostases sunt[^7] priores. Sed quod prius est non distinguitur eo quod est posterius, quia ab eodem est esse et esse distinctum: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne[^8] quod distinguit aliquid, dat ei tale esse, quale ipsum est vel habet; sed proprietates habent de se solum esse respectivum: ergo si hypostases per proprietates distinguuntur, habent solum esse respectivum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia cum sint supposita essentiae, habent esse substantiae absolutum.

3. Item, in divinis personis est plurificatio per originem, ergo et distinctio. Sed origo dicit emanationem vel exitum, relatio autem per se non emanat nisi prius alio emanante, quia in *ad aliquid* non est motus[^9]: ergo prius oritur hypostasis ab hypostasi secundum rationem intelligendi, quam sit intelligere relationem esse. Et si hoc, relatio consequitur esse distinctum in hypostasibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, «omne quod relative dicitur, est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur», sicut ratio dictat, et Augustinus dicit septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^10]. Sed Pater et Filius dicuntur relative: ergo uterque eorum est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur; ergo abstracta relatione, contingit aliquid intelligere. Quaero ergo, quid sit illud: aut essentia, aut hypostasis. Si essentia, ergo relatio est in essentia: ergo multiplicat eam. Si hypostasis: aut ergo una, aut duae. Non una, quia impossibile est intelligere, quod Pater et Filius sint una hypostasis: ergo duae. Et si hoc, patet etc.

5. Item, abstractis omnibus proprietatibus duorum individuorum, ut Petri et Pauli, solis hypostasibus remanentibus, adhuc contingit intelligere, remanere distinctionem: ergo pari ratione in hypostasibus divinis. Quod si verum est, tunc ergo sunt[^11] solum ratio distinguendi quoad nos.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Proprietates personales sunt rationes non tantum manifestandi distinctionem, verum etiam distinguendi.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex opinio fuit. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod abstractis proprietatibus, impossibile est intelligere hypostases distinctas, quia huiusmodi proprietates in divinis non solum dant personis innotescere, immo etiam dant esse[^12]; unde ipsis abstractis, abstrahitur esse et esse distinctum.

Aliorum opinio fuit, quod proprietatibus abstractis, adhuc est intelligere distinctionem in hypostasibus, quoniam proprietates secundum ipsos non sunt ratio distinguendi secundum rem, sed distinctionem manifestandi[^13]. Unde dicunt, quod abstracta paternitate et filiatione, adhuc contingit intelligere qui ab alio, et a quo alius. — Et si quaeras, quomodo distinguuntur, dicunt[^14], quod se ipsis, sicut prin-

<!-- page 458 -->

cipia et genera generalissima se ipsis distinguuntur et differunt. Unde haec est immediata: substantia non est quantitas.

Et si respiciamus interius, utraque opinio continet aliquid probabilitatis; et hoc patet sic. In divinis enim hypostasibus intelligimus originem sive emanationem, intelligimus etiam habitudinem. Secundum rationem intelligendi origo praecedit ipsum qui oritur; et secundum rationem intelligendi habitudo consequitur ipsum qui refertur. Potest igitur proprietas relativa importare solum habitudinem; et hoc modo consequitur rationem distinctionis et est ratio innotescendi distinctionem, non distinguendi, sicut dicit secunda opinio, et probant rationes inductae ad secundam partem de ipsa relatione. Potest enim intelligi tunc distinctio, quia intelligitur qui ab alio, et a quo alius. — Potest etiam utrumque proprietas importare, scilicet habitudinem et originem; et tunc non tantum est ratio innotescendi, sed etiam distinguendi. Circumscripta enim origine sive emanatione, impossibile est intelligere in divinis pluralitatem, immo sicut est essentia una, ita etiam intelligitur hypostasis una. Et sic procedit prima opinio et rationes ad primam partem.

Sed notandum, quod cum idem sit divinis[^15] personis oriri et esse et ad alterum se habere, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi sunt ordinata, ut primum sit oriri, deinde esse intelligatur in his quae habent esse ab alio, et deinde se ad alterum habere. Quia vero idem sunt in Deo, ideo eodem nomine designantur. Unde generatio dicit originem et habitudinem; tamen proprie loquendo generatio dicit originem, et paternitas habitudinem[^16]. Quoniam igitur proprietas divina secundum communem usum loquendi importat habitudinem et originem, ideo tenendum, quod proprietates non solum sunt ratio innotescendi distinctionem, sed etiam distinguendi.

1. Et ad illud quod obiicitur, quod respectivum reducitur ad absolutum; dicendum, quod reduci ad aliquid est dupliciter: aut sicut ad principium, aut sicut ad terminum. Proprietas originis his duobus modis reducitur ad absolutum: ad hypostasim Patris reducitur innascibilitas[^17] sicut ad principium, ad hypostasim autem Geniti et Spirati sicut ad terminum. Quoniam igitur quod reducitur ad aliquid sicut ad principium ipsum consequitur, ideo abstracta origine, solum intelligitur Deus innascibilis non ens ab alio, et ita in unitate hypostasis. Quia vero quod reducitur ad aliquid[^18] sicut ad terminum, intelligitur praecedere; hinc est, quod abstracta origine, iam non est intelligere hypostasim procedentem. — Vel illud intelligendum, ubi respectivum dicit dependentiam, ratione cuius[^19] deficit a summa simplicitate, quod non est in Deo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod respectivum solum dat esse respectivum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de respectivo, quod dicit solum habitudinem; sed non est verum de respectivo, quod dicit originem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio non oritur per se; dicendum, quod relatio est proprietas, secundum quod est ipsa, origo vero, prout est id quod oritur; et quia origo proprie non oritur[^20], sed est illud quo oriens oritur, ita quod non consequitur tempore vel natura, sed secundum rationem intelligendi, vel est simul necessario vel praecedit. Ideo patet illud.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod relative dicitur est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur[^21]; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem in summe simplici quod sic differat esse et referri, quod unum possit ab altero separari secundum rem — sed[^22] — quia ibi unum sunt — solum secundum intellectum nostrum; nec adhuc intellectus noster sic abstrahit, ut intelligat hypostases distinctas, abstractis proprietatibus et relationibus. Si enim ab hypostasi Patris abstrahatur paternitas, vel e converso, iam non habet[^23] aliquid speciale, quod sit principium intelligendi ipsam; et ita consideratur sub ratione generali et incompleta. Unde et bene videntur mihi dicere qui dicunt, quod remanet intellectus huius nominis *res*, secundum quod est generale vocabulum. Et sic patet, quod, abstractis proprietatibus, non remanet distinctio nec re nec intellectu; et ideo utroque modo sunt ratio distinguendi.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Petrus et Paulus distingui intelliguntur, abstractis proprietatibus; dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam distinctio est ibi a parte propriae materiae et propriae formae, quae innotescit per proprietates accidentales; sed in divinis solum est distinctio per originem. Ideo patet illud.

<!-- page 459 -->

english:
### QUESTION III. *Whether the act of the personal properties is to distinguish the hypostases, or to manifest them as already distinct.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made about the properties as to their act. And it is asked whether the act[^1] of properties of this kind is to distinguish the hypostases, or to manifest them as distinct. And that it is to distinguish, is shown:

1. Through Boethius *On the Trinity*[^2]: «Substance contains unity, relation multiplies trinity»: but if it multiplies, therefore it distinguishes.

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity*[^3] says that the person is distinguished by a property of origin; but the property expresses origin and relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason[^4], since, when persons are distinguished, either they are distinguished through something absolute, or [something] respective. Through an absolute, no, since, as Augustine wills[^5], «what is said with reference to itself is said of each one severally»: therefore it is necessary that they differ through something respective.

4. Likewise, the property of the Father either is accidental to the hypostasis itself, or is consubstantial to it; if it[^6] is accidental, then there are some accidents there: therefore there is some composition there. If, however, it is consubstantial and connatural: therefore since it does not follow upon the being of the hypostasis, it is not only an account for being made known, but also for being distinguished.

5. Likewise, in the supremely simple the account of being and the account of being known are altogether the same; but the person of the Father is supremely simple: therefore he is distinguished by the same [account] by which he is known to be distinguished. But this is by a property: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every respective is reduced to an absolute; but what is reduced to something according to the account of understanding follows it: therefore since the properties are respective, [and] the hypostases absolute, the properties are reduced to the hypostases: therefore the hypostases are[^7] prior. But what is prior is not distinguished by what is posterior, since being and being-distinct are from the same [source]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every[^8] [thing] which distinguishes something gives it such being as it itself is or has; but the properties have of themselves only respective being: therefore if hypostases are distinguished by properties, they have only respective being. But this is false, since since they are supposits of the essence, they have absolute substantial being.

3. Likewise, in the divine persons there is plurification through origin, therefore also distinction. But origin expresses an emanation or going-out, and relation per se does not emanate unless something else has emanated first, since in the [category of] *toward something* there is no motion[^9]: therefore hypostasis arises from hypostasis according to the account of understanding before there is an understanding that relation is. And if so, relation follows distinct being in the hypostases: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, «everything that is said relatively, is something, except that which is said relatively», as reason dictates, and Augustine says in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^10]. But Father and Son are said relatively: therefore each of them is something, except that which is said relatively; therefore with the relation abstracted [away], it happens that something is understood. I ask therefore what that is: either essence, or hypostasis. If essence, therefore relation is in the essence: therefore it multiplies it. If hypostasis: then either one, or two. Not one, since it is impossible to understand that Father and Son are one hypostasis: therefore two. And if so, the rest is plain etc.

5. Likewise, with all the properties of two individuals abstracted, e.g. of Peter and of Paul, the hypostases alone remaining, it still happens that one understands the distinction to remain: therefore by parity of reason in the divine hypostases. But if this is true, then they are[^11] only an account of distinguishing as far as we are concerned.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The personal properties are accounts not only of manifesting distinction, but also of distinguishing.*

**I respond:** It must be said that on this point a twofold opinion has existed. For some have said that, with the properties abstracted, it is impossible to understand the hypostases as distinct, since properties of this kind in divine matters not only give the persons to be made known, but also give being[^12]; whence with these themselves abstracted, [their] being and distinct being are abstracted [away].

The opinion of others was that, with the properties abstracted, it is still [possible] to understand a distinction in the hypostases, since according to them properties are not the account of distinguishing according to the thing, but [an account] of manifesting the distinction[^13]. Whence they say that, with paternity and filiation abstracted, it still happens that one understands [the one] who [is] from another, and from whom [is] another. — And if you ask how they are distinguished, they say[^14] that [they are distinguished] by themselves, just as principles and most general genera are distinguished and differ by themselves. Whence this is immediate: substance is not quantity.

And if we look more deeply, both opinions contain something of probability; and this is plain thus. For in the divine hypostases we understand origin or emanation, we also understand relation. According to the account of understanding, origin precedes him who arises; and according to the account of understanding, relation follows him who is referred. The relative property therefore can import only relation; and in this mode it follows the account of distinction and is the account for making the distinction known, not for distinguishing, as the second opinion says, and the reasons brought forward to the second part concerning relation itself prove. For the distinction can then be understood, since the one [is] understood [as] from another, and from whom [is] another. — The property can also import both, namely relation and origin; and then it is not only the account of making known, but also of distinguishing. For with origin or emanation circumscribed [away], it is impossible to understand a plurality in divine matters, but rather just as the essence is one, so also is the hypostasis understood [as] one. And so the first opinion proceeds, and the reasons to the first part.

But it must be noted that, since in the divine[^15] persons it is the same to arise and to be and to stand toward another, yet according to the account of understanding [these] are ordered, so that the first [thing] is to arise, then being is understood in those things which have being from another, and then [for them] to stand toward another. But since they are the same in God, therefore they are designated by the same name. Hence generation expresses origin and relation; yet properly speaking generation expresses origin, and paternity [expresses] relation[^16]. Since therefore divine property according to the common usage of speaking imports relation and origin, therefore it must be held that the properties are not only an account of making the distinction known, but also of distinguishing.

1. And to that which is objected, that the respective is reduced to the absolute; it must be said that to be reduced to something is twofold: either as to a principle, or as to a term. The property of origin in these two ways is reduced to the absolute: to the hypostasis of the Father unbegottenness[^17] is reduced as to a principle, but to the hypostasis of the Begotten and the Spirated as to a term. Since therefore what is reduced to something as to a principle follows it, therefore with origin abstracted, only God is understood [as] unbegotten, [as] not being from another, and so in the unity of hypostasis. But since what is reduced to something[^18] as to a term is understood to precede [it], hence it is that, with origin abstracted, there is no longer [any way] to understand a proceeding hypostasis. — Or that is to be understood [of cases] where the respective expresses dependence, by reason of which[^19] it falls short of supreme simplicity, which is not [the case] in God.

2. To that which is objected, that the respective gives only respective being; it must be said that this is true of a respective which expresses only relation; but it is not true of a respective which expresses origin.

3. To that which is objected, that relation does not arise per se; it must be said that relation is a property, according as it is itself, but origin [is] as it is that which arises; and since origin properly does not arise[^20], but is that by which the arising thing arises, in such wise that it does not follow in time or in nature, but according to the account of understanding, [origin] either is necessarily simultaneous or precedes. Therefore that is plain.

4. To that which is objected, that everything that is said relatively is something, except that which is said relatively[^21]; it must be said that this does not have truth in the supremely simple, [namely] that being and being-referred should differ in such wise that one could be separated from the other according to the thing — but[^22] — since there they are one — only according to our intellect; and even so our intellect does not abstract in such a way as to understand the hypostases [as] distinct, with the properties and relations abstracted [away]. For if from the hypostasis of the Father paternity be abstracted, or conversely, [the hypostasis] no longer has[^23] anything special which would be the principle of understanding it; and so it is considered under a general and incomplete account. Whence those also seem to me to speak well who say that there remains the understanding of this name *thing*, according as it is a general vocable. And so it is plain that, with the properties abstracted, no distinction remains either in thing or in intellect; and therefore in both modes they are an account of distinguishing.

5. To that which is finally objected, that Peter and Paul are understood to be distinguished, with their properties abstracted; it must be said that the case is not similar. For there the distinction is on the side of the proper matter and proper form, which is made known through accidental properties; but in divine matters there is distinction only through origin. Therefore that is plain.

la: Vat. cum paucis tantum codd. et *tamen* pro *etiam cum*; male. Circa finem solutionis nonnulli codd. ut GH aa et ed. 1 *manet* pro *valet*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with only a few codices, [reads] *tamen* in place of *etiam cum*; badly. Near the end of the solution some codices such as GH aa and ed. 1 [read] *manet* in place of *valet*.

la: In multis codd. et ed. I desideratur *actus*.

en: In many codices and ed. I, *actus* is missing.

la: Cap. 6.

en: Chapter 6.

la: Libr. IV. c. 15. Vide pag. 453, nota 3. — Minorem huius argumenti fere omnes codd. antiquiores cum ed. 1 ita exhibent: *sed habitudo dicit originem relativam* (plures codd. *respectivam*); melius cod. O: *sed origo dicit habitudinem relativam*; sed utraque lectio hic non videtur esse conveniens; ipsae sumtae videntur ex fundam. 3. quaest. praec.

en: Book IV, c. 15. See p. 453, note 3. — The minor of this argument almost all the older codices with ed. 1 thus exhibit: *sed habitudo dicit originem relativam* ("but relation expresses a relative origin"; several codices [read] *respectivam*); better cod. O: *sed origo dicit habitudinem relativam* ("but origin expresses a relative relation"); but neither reading here seems to be fitting; they themselves seem to be taken from fundamentum 3 of the preceding question.

la: Verba *ipsum* et *ratione* desunt in antiquioribus codd. et ed. I. Cum Vat. ea retinuimus, quia a S. Doctore apponi solent.

en: The words *ipsum* and *ratione* are missing in the older codices and ed. I. With the Vatican [edition] we have retained them, since they are usually appended by the holy Doctor.

la: Libr. V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9: *Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur Deus, et de singulis personis singulariter dicitur.*

en: Book V *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 9: *Whatever therefore is said of God with reference to himself, is also said of each person severally.*

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. *quia si*.

en: Several codices with the Vatican [edition] [read] *quia si* ("since if").

la: Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6: *Id autem, quod per se est et substantia, illo quod est ad aliquid prius est natura; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est.*

en: Aristotle, I *Ethics* c. 6: *But that which is per se and substance is prior in nature to that which is toward something; for this [latter] being seems to be a certain appendix and accident of that which is.*

la: Ed. I adiicit *proprietatibus*. Mox pro *distinguitur eo* fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. *distinguitur ab eo* quod male sonat: melius cod.: *distinguitur per illud*.

en: Ed. I adds *proprietatibus* ("by properties"). Soon, in place of *distinguitur eo*, almost all the codices with the first six editions [read] *distinguitur ab eo*, which sounds badly: better the cod.: *distinguitur per illud*.

la: In multis codd. deest *omne*, et paulo inferius post *Sed* hoc verbum *est*.

en: In many codices *omne* is missing, and a little below, after *Sed*, [there is] this word *est*.

la: Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.).

en: Aristotle, V *Phys.* text 10 (c. 2).

en: Chapter 1, n. 2.

la: Codd. F P Q pro *sunt* substituunt *non sunt nisi*, cui lectioni favent plerique codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibentes *non sunt*, omisso tamen perperam *nisi*.

en: Codices F P Q in place of *sunt* substitute *non sunt nisi* ("are nothing but"), which reading is favored by very many codices with the first six editions exhibiting *non sunt* ("are not"), with *nisi*, however, wrongly omitted.

la: Intellige: esse personale.

en: Understand: personal being.

la: Verba *sed distinctionem manifestandi*, in Vat. desiderata, restituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1.

en: The words *sed distinctionem manifestandi* ("but [an account] of manifesting the distinction"), wanting in the Vatican [edition], we restore from the older manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: In quibus est Praepositivus. — Mox post *principia* et ex cod. T restauravimus *genera*.

en: Among whom is Praepositivus. — Soon after *principia*, also from cod. T, we have restored *genera* ("genera").

la: Sola Vat. *relatio*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *relatio* ("relation").

la: Plures codd. ut F H X Z bb cc nec non edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 voci *divinis* praemittunt *in*; cod. cc cum dictis edd. dein omittit subsequens vocabulum *personis*.

en: Several codices such as F H X Z bb cc as well as edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 prefix *in* to the word *divinis*; cod. cc with the said editions then omits the subsequent word *personis*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 27. p. I. q. 1. in fine corp.

en: Cf. below d. 27, p. I, q. 1, at the end of the body.

la: Sic Vat., quam sequimur contra lectionem mss. et ed. I: *innascibilis*.

en: Thus the Vatican [edition], which we follow against the reading of the manuscripts and ed. I: *innascibilis* ("unbegotten").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *aliud*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *aliud* ("another").

la: Pro *ratione cuius* cod. T *tunc enim*.

en: In place of *ratione cuius* cod. T [reads] *tunc enim* ("for then").

la: Plures ex antiquioribus codd. omittunt *et quia origo proprie non oritur*, substituentes etiam paulo ante *origo non* pro *origo vero*; perperam. Mox aliqui codd. ut FIT *sequitur* pro *consequitur*. — Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 brevius sic: *obiicitur, quod est aliquid excepto quod relative dicitur*. — Fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 *nisi* pro *sed*; minus congrue. Paulo superius post verbum *separari* Vat. cum nonnullis codd. adiungit *sive abstrahi*. — Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 *habetur* pro *habet*, et paulo ante, paucis tantum suffragantibus codd., *abstraheretur* pro *abstrahatur*.

en: Several of the older codices omit *et quia origo proprie non oritur*, substituting also a little before *origo non* in place of *origo vero*; wrongly. Soon, some codices such as FIT [read] *sequitur* in place of *consequitur*. — The older codices with ed. 1 [give it] more briefly thus: *obiicitur, quod est aliquid excepto quod relative dicitur*. — Almost all the codices with ed. 1 [read] *nisi* in place of *sed*; less fittingly. A little above, after the word *separari*, the Vatican [edition] with some codices adds *sive abstrahi* ("or to be abstracted"). — The Vatican [edition], against the trust of the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *habetur* in place of *habet*, and a little before, with only a few codices supporting [it], *abstraheretur* in place of *abstrahatur*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Differentiae attribuuntur tres actus, scilicet dividere genus, constituere speciem, distinguere. Hinc data est occasio quaerendi, quos actus in divinis habeat proprietas personalis, quae est quasi loco differentiae. Primus ille actus dividendi genus manifeste impossibilis est in Deo. Sed de duobus aliis actibus inquiri potest, utrum scilicet proprietates et distinguant et constituant hypostasim, an solummodo quasi adventitiae iam distinctas hypostases manifestent, ut nomen Socratis personam iam distinctam notificat. Haec quaestio fere coincidit cum difficillima magisque subtili quam utili quaestione, per quid praecise constituantur divinae personae. Cum autem recta intelligentia et solutio plurium quaestionum in dd. 27. 29. 33. dependeat ab hac quaestione, nonnulla dicenda videntur primum de statu quaestionis, deinde de sententia principalium magistrorum.

**II.** Pro declarando quaestionis statu haec notamus.

1. In Deo quatuor distinguuntur: natura divina absoluta; principia duarum emanationum immediata, quae sunt intellectus et voluntas; ipsae emanationes sive origines; denique relationes et subsistentes et formales, quae sunt quasi termini illarum emanationum sive originum.

2. Natura est absoluta sine relatione ad aliud; intellectus et voluntas etiam sunt absoluta, tamen respiciunt aliquo modo suas emanationes, quarum sunt immediata principia. Emanationes sive origines in se quidem non sunt aliquid relativum, at ipsae sunt «viae quaedam ad personas» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 40. a. 2. et 4.).

3. Ratio hypostasis in divinis est relativa. Cum autem in omni relatione distinguendum sit fundamentum relationis (*esse in*) et ipsa relatio (*esse ad*), etiam relationes divinae considerantur, tum quatenus consistunt in natura divina, tum quatenus referuntur ad invicem. Sub ultimo respectu non sunt nisi aliquid relativum; sub primo vero quodammodo aliquid absolutum.

4. Omnino constat, personas divinas non constitui nec per naturam, nec per intellectum et voluntatem; remanent igitur tantum duae rationes, de quibus quaeri possit, utrum sint personarum distinctivae et constitutivae, scilicet origines et relationes, et hae quidem secundum *esse in* et *esse ad*.

**III.** Diversae de quaestione sic proposita propugnatae sunt sententiae.

1. Praepositivus, cui favet Petrus Lombardus, aliique putaverunt, per solas origines distingui personas; proprietates autem non distinguere personas, sed distinctas ostendere. Haec opinio, secundo loco in respons. posita, a S. Thoma et Scoto reprobatur, nec ab ipso S. Bonav. approbatur, quidquid nonnulli dixerint, contradicentes perspicuis verbis S. Doctoris.

2. Thomas, Scotus et alii communiter tenent opinionem hic primo loco positam, quod personae et constituuntur et distinguuntur per proprietates relativas. Eandem sententiam etiam S. Bonaventuram sustinere, comprobatur praesertim ex ultima responsionis propositione. Ipse tamen eam sic explicat, ut etiam secundae sententiae aliquid veri inesse demonstret.

In ulteriore huius sententiae explicatione modus loquendi principalium doctorum, quos in re omnino convenire opinamur, non parum discrepat, et quod mirum est, expositores posteriores S. Bonaventurae, S. Thomae et Scoti in sensu vario eorum verba intelligunt. — Nonnulli Scotum graviter censurant, quod cum Ioan. a Ripa docuerit, personas constitui per aliquid absolutum. Sed ex ipsius Scoti verbis (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. 4, 3; Report. d. 28. q. 4, 3; Report. d. 26. q. 1.) et ex melioribus eius commentatoribus constat, eum tenere opinionem communem, quod personae constituantur per relationes. Opinionem autem Ioan. a Ripa in sensu differente ab illo, quem censores huius opinionis supponunt, at probabilem admittit (cfr. Report. hic q. 3; Rada, controv. 23; Macedo, col. 7. diff. 4. sect. 1-5.). Attamen in nonnullis specialioribus rebus Scotus tum a S. Thoma tum a S. Bonav. dissentit, de quo consuli possunt eiusdem Commentatores.

3. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 40. a. 2.) opinionem Praepositivi reprobat et addit: «Unde melius dicitur, quod personae seu hypostases distinguantur relationibus quam per originem. Licet enim distinguantur utroque modo, tamen prius et principalius per relationes secundum modum intelligendi» (cfr. ibid. a. 3, et I. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 2.). — Quomodo autem relationes constituunt personas? Ad hoc explicandum S. Thomas (ibid. a. 4.) utitur distinctione inter proprietatem, relatio, quatenus praesupponit actum notionalem, et proprietatem, quatenus est constitutiva personae et praeintelligitur actui notionali. Haec distinctio a Scoto (I. Sent. d. 28. q. 3.) impugnatur; sententia autem S. Thomae non eodem modo exponitur a Commentatoribus eius, qui de hoc consuli possunt.

4. S. Bonaventurae a pluribus auctoribus perperam imputatur opinio Ioannis a Ripa, quod per solam originem et per aliquid absolutum personae distinguantur; immo ab iisdem asseritur, ipsum Scotum (hic q. 1. n. 23. 24.) ita S. Bonaventuram intellexisse. Inter alios Lychetus ad hunc locum dicit: «Est D. Bonaventurae et Ioan. de Ripa»; etiam Caietanus (ad S. I. q. 40. a. 2.) reprehendit Scotum, quod hanc sententiam falso attribuerit S. Bonaventurae. Revera autem nec S. Bonav. hoc docuit, nec Scotus eundem reprehendit (cfr. auctor Scholiorum et notarum marginalium in editione Scoti, Lugduni 1639, et Macedo, coll. 7. diff. 4. Prolog.). Unde dicendum est, Scotum nec illud asserere de S. Bonaventura, nec improbasse genuinam eius sententiam. Nam (loc. cit.) postquam protulit sententiam, «quod proprietates, secundum quod sunt habitudines non distinguant personas, sed secundum quod sunt origines», addit: «Quod verbum, licet forte ipse non sic intelligat, potest exponi, quod origines non distinguunt personas formaliter sed quasi principiative». Et d. 28. q. 3. n. 3. dicit, quod origo sit quasi via ad personam; deinde subnectit: «Si tamen ista via intelligitur de distinguere quasi principiative alicuius correspondentis causae effectivae in creaturis, sicut expositum est d. 26, et non per modum principii formalis, tunc ista positio posset habere veritatem, nec hoc argumentum esset contra eam».

Genuina sententia S. Bonaventurae non differt a sententia communi, nisi in hoc quod (ut opinionem antiquorum doctorum, praesertim Magistri, aliquo modo sane exponat) in modo loquendi mediam viam tenet, scilicet quod personae constituuntur tum per origines tum per proprietates: per origines quidem inchoative, per relationes formaliter. Intelligit autem relationes, non quatenus nudae relationes sunt, sed cum originibus, et iterum origines non sine relationibus. Haec nostra assertio iam satis patet ex collatione eorum quae hic in corp. et ad 1. 2. 4; d. 27. p. I. q. 2; d. 28. q. 2. proferuntur, et peremptorie probatur authentica suae sententiae interpretatione, quam Seraphicus Doctor facit in anecdoto suo Prologo ad II. Sent., loquens de quaestione infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. tractata (vide ibi Scholion). Cum S. Bonaventura convenit praeter Dionysium Carth. Richard. a Med., qui duas opiniones in respons. tactas conciliat dicens, quod emanationes sint principium quasi effectivum distinctionis personarum, relationes vero eiusdem principia formalia. S. Thomam quoad rem idem docere, iam patet ex loco eius supra relato, scil. S. I. q. 40. a. 2.

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 38. m. 7. — Scot., hic q. unica, et d. 28. q. 3; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2, q. 1. a. 2; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 36. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. et 3. — Biel, hic q. 1. et seqq.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** To difference are attributed three acts, namely to divide a genus, to constitute a species, [and] to distinguish. Hence the occasion was given for asking what acts in divine matters the personal property has, which [property] stands as it were in the place of difference. The first act, that of dividing a genus, is manifestly impossible in God. But concerning the other two acts it can be inquired, namely whether the properties both distinguish and constitute the hypostasis, or only as it were adventitiously manifest the hypostases [as] already distinct, as the name of Socrates makes known a person already distinct. This question almost coincides with that most difficult and more subtle than useful question, by what precisely the divine persons are constituted. But since the right understanding and solution of several questions in dd. 27, 29, 33 depends on this question, some [things] seem to need to be said first about the state of the question, then about the judgement of the principal masters.

**II.** For declaring the state of the question we note these [things].

1. In God four [things] are distinguished: the absolute divine nature; the immediate principles of the two emanations, which are intellect and will; the emanations or origins themselves; and finally the relations both subsistent and formal, which are as it were terms of those emanations or origins.

2. The nature is absolute without relation to another; the intellect and the will also are absolute, yet they regard in some way their emanations, of which they are the immediate principles. The emanations or origins in themselves are not anything relative, but they themselves are «certain ways to the persons» (St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 40, a. 2 and 4).

3. The account of hypostasis in divine matters is relative. But since in every relation must be distinguished the foundation of the relation (*esse in*) and the relation itself (*esse ad*), the divine relations also are considered both insofar as they consist in the divine nature, and insofar as they are referred to one another. Under the latter respect they are nothing but something relative; but under the former, in some way something absolute.

4. It is altogether established that the divine persons are not constituted either by the nature, or by the intellect and will; therefore there remain only two accounts about which it can be asked whether they are distinctive and constitutive of the persons, namely origins and relations, and these indeed according to *esse in* and *esse ad*.

**III.** Various opinions have been defended on the question thus proposed.

1. Praepositivus, whom Peter Lombard favors, and others have thought that persons are distinguished by origins alone; but that the properties do not distinguish the persons, but manifest them [as already] distinct. This opinion, placed in the second place in the response, is reproved by St. Thomas and Scotus, and is not approved by St. Bonaventure himself, whatever some have said, contradicting the perspicuous words of the holy Doctor.

2. Thomas, Scotus, and others commonly hold the opinion placed here in the first place, that the persons are both constituted and distinguished through relative properties. That St. Bonaventure also sustains the same judgement is corroborated especially from the last proposition of the response. He himself, however, so explains it that he shows that something true is also in the second judgement.

In the further explanation of this judgement, the mode of speaking of the principal doctors, whom we judge altogether to agree on the matter, differs not a little, and what is wonderful, the later expositors of St. Bonaventure, of St. Thomas, and of Scotus understand their words in a varied sense. — Some gravely censure Scotus, that with John of Ripa he has taught that the persons are constituted by something absolute. But from Scotus's own words (I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 2, 4, 3; *Reportata* d. 28, q. 4, 3; *Reportata* d. 26, q. 1) and from his better commentators it is established that he holds the common opinion, that the persons are constituted by relations. The opinion of John of Ripa, however, in a sense different from that which the censurers of this opinion suppose, he admits as probable (cf. *Reportata* here q. 3; Rada, controv. 23; Macedo, col. 7, diff. 4, sect. 1–5). Yet in some more particular matters Scotus dissents both from St. Thomas and from St. Bonaventure, on which his Commentators may be consulted.

3. St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 40, a. 2) reproves the opinion of Praepositivus and adds: «Whence it is better said that the persons or hypostases are distinguished by relations rather than through origin. For although they are distinguished in either mode, yet first and principally through relations according to the mode of understanding» (cf. ibid. a. 3, and I *Sent.* d. 26, q. 2, a. 2). — But how do the relations constitute the persons? For explaining this St. Thomas (ibid. a. 4) makes use of a distinction between property [as] relation, insofar as it presupposes a notional act, and property, insofar as it is constitutive of the person and is pre-understood to the notional act. This distinction is impugned by Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 3); but the judgement of St. Thomas is not expounded in the same way by his Commentators, who may be consulted on this.

4. To St. Bonaventure is wrongly imputed by several authors the opinion of John of Ripa, that the persons are distinguished through origin alone and through something absolute; indeed, by the same it is asserted that Scotus himself (here q. 1, n. 23, 24) so understood St. Bonaventure. Among others, Lychetus on this place says: «It is [the opinion] of D. Bonaventure and of John de Ripa»; also Cajetan (on *Summa* I, q. 40, a. 2) reproves Scotus that he falsely attributed this judgement to St. Bonaventure. But in fact neither did St. Bonaventure teach this, nor does Scotus reprove the same (cf. the author of the *Scholia* and marginal notes in the edition of Scotus, Lyon 1639, and Macedo, coll. 7, diff. 4, *Prol.*). Whence it must be said that Scotus neither asserts that of St. Bonaventure, nor disapproves his genuine judgement. For (loc. cit.) after he has put forward the judgement, «that properties, according as they are relations, do not distinguish persons, but according as they are origins», he adds: «Which word, although perhaps he does not so understand it, can be expounded as [meaning] that origins do not distinguish persons formally but as it were principiatively». And in d. 28, q. 3, n. 3 he says that origin is as it were a way to the person; then he adds: «If, however, that *way* is understood concerning a distinguishing as it were principiatively of some corresponding effective cause in creatures, as has been expounded in d. 26, and not by way of a formal principle, then this position could have truth, nor would this argument be against it».

The genuine judgement of St. Bonaventure does not differ from the common judgement, except in this that (so as to expound the opinion of the ancient doctors, especially of the Master, in some sound mode) in his mode of speaking he holds a middle way, namely that the persons are constituted both through origins and through properties: through origins indeed inchoatively, through relations formally. He understands the relations, however, not as bare relations are, but [taken] with origins, and again the origins not without relations. This our assertion already is sufficiently plain from the collation of those things which here in the body and ad 1, 2, 4; d. 27, p. I, q. 2; d. 28, q. 2 are brought forward, and is peremptorily proved by the authentic interpretation of his judgement, which the Seraphic Doctor makes in his anecdotal Prologue to the II *Sent.*, speaking of the question treated below in d. 27, p. I, q. 2 (see the Scholion there). With St. Bonaventure agrees, besides Dionysius the Carthusian, Richard of Mediavilla, who reconciles the two opinions touched in the response, saying that the emanations are an as-it-were effective principle of the distinction of the persons, but the relations [are] formal principles of the same. That St. Thomas teaches the same as to the matter is already plain from his place referred to above, namely *Summa* I, q. 40, a. 2.

**IV.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 38, m. 7. — Scotus, here q. unica, and d. 28, q. 3; *Reportata* here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* loc. cit. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.* q. 2, 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 36, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 and 3. — Biel, here q. 1 and following.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 460 -->

### QUAESTIO IV. *Quot sint in divinis proprietates personarum.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de proprietatibus quantum ad numerum. Et videtur:

1. Quod sint infinitae, quia proprietates sunt respectus per quos Deus nobis innotescit; sed illi sunt infiniti, sicut patet de respectibus idealibus[^1]: ergo etc.

2. Item, Pater et Filius ad invicem assimilantur secundum omnes conditiones essentiales; ergo secundum omnes comparantur et secundum omnes innotescunt nobis; sed illae sunt in numero indefinito: ergo etc.

3. Item, quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto plures habet respectus, ut punctus quam linea, et linea quam superficies; sed divinum esse est simplicissimum: ergo in eo sunt infiniti respectus. Sed omnes sunt ratio innotescendi: ergo notiones sunt infinitae.

4. Sed quod tres sint tantum, videtur per Damascenum[^2], qui dicit, quod in divinis omnia sunt unum praeter generationem, ingenerationem et processionem; sed istae non sunt nisi tres proprietates: ergo etc.

5. Item, videtur ratione, quia proprietas convertitur cum eo cuius est proprietas[^3]: sed proprietas est personae: ergo quot sunt personae, tot sunt proprietates et non plures. Sed personae sunt tres: ergo etc.

6. Item, fiat talis ratio: omnis persona est aliqua trium proprietatum[^4] — haec est vera — omnis notio est persona, igitur omnis proprietas sive notio est aliqua trium: ergo etc.

Quod autem sint plures tribus, sic ostenditur.

1. Notiones sive proprietates sunt relationes. In omni autem habitudine sunt duae relationes secundum duo extrema; sed in divinis sunt duae origines: ergo saltem quatuor relationes.

2. Item, proprietas est quae convenit uni soli[^5]; sed innascibilitas convenit soli Patri: ergo est proprietas. Et non est aliqua illarum quatuor relationum: ergo sunt quinque.

Quaeritur ergo sufficientia et numerus notionum in divinis, et penes quid accipiantur, et utrum sit idem numerus proprietatum et relationum.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Proprie loquendo, in divinis sunt quatuor relationes et proprietates, et quinque notiones; in sensu minus stricto nomina confunduntur et habent aequalem numerum quinarium.*

**Respondeo:** Intelligendum est ad illud ultimum, quod vis consuevit fieri inter ista tria nomina: proprietas, relatio, et notio. Nam proprietas dicitur, in quantum convenit soli; relatio, in quantum dicit habitudinem ad alium; notio, in quantum est principium cognoscendi. Et quia omnis proprietas est ratio cognoscendi[^6], similiter et omnis relatio; ideo nomen notionis est in plus quam illa duo. Quia quaedam proprietas est relatio, ut paternitas, quaedam non, ut innascibilitas, quae non dicit respectum, sed privat; similiter quaedam relatio est proprietas, ut filiatio, quaedam non, ut activa spiratio — ideo quia convenit pluribus, non uni soli — et hinc[^7] est, quod nomen proprietatis et relationis se habent ut excedentia et excessa. Nomen vero notionis est in plus. Unde plures sunt notiones quam proprietates, plures etiam quam relationes. Sed proprietates et relationes mutuo se excedunt et aequaliter; ideo sunt numero aequales.

Tamen non oportet facere vim. Nam omnis relatio distinguit aliquo modo ab alio, et ita est aliquo modo proprietas. Similiter omne quod distinguit, aliquo modo importat relationem; ergo omnis relatio proprietas, et omnis proprietas relatio. Sed omnis notio est proprietas vel relatio: ergo omnis

<!-- page 461 -->

notio est proprietas et similiter relatio. Et ita extenso nomine sunt aequalia; ideo idem est numerus et eadem ratio assignandi numerum in omnibus istis nominibus.

Intelligendum igitur[^8], quod circa numerum proprietatum tres fuerunt opiniones. Quidam dixerunt, quod sunt infinitae; quidam, quod tres; quidam, quod quinque. — Ratio autem huius[^9] diversae opinionis fuit, quia diversimode notiones consideraverunt. Qui consideraverunt illas in comparatione ad eos quibus innotescunt, dixerunt, eas infinitas esse, quia per infinitas comparationes et similitudines et respectus Deus nobis innotescit. — Qui vero consideraverunt in comparatione ad hypostases, quae distinguuntur vel innotescunt, dixerunt, esse tantum tres, quia tantum tres sunt personae; ideo tantum tria habent[^10] propria, per quae sufficienter innotescunt. — Qui vero consideraverunt per comparationem ad rationes, quibus innotescunt, dixerunt, esse quinque.

Eadem enim est ratio innotescendi et distinguendi. Sed ratio distinguendi accipitur a parte originis: aut quo positive, aut privative. Si privative; aut privat originem per modum producentis, et hoc non dicit nobilitatem, scilicet non producere, ideo non est notio; aut privat originem per modum producti, et hoc vel specialiter, vel generaliter. Si specialiter, non dicit nobilitatem; si generaliter, sic dicit nobilitatem; et ita notio est una sola[^11]. Si autem accipiatur a parte originis positive, cum duplex sit origo, et cuilibet respondeat de necessitate duplex habitudo; de necessitate erunt quatuor, scilicet generatio activa et passiva, et spiratio activa et passiva: et in universo quinque[^12].

Prima opinio sumsit rationem magis a longinquo, et ideo magis a veritate recessit; secunda magis de propinquo, et ideo magis veritati appropinquavit; tertia, sicut debuit, et ideo veritatem posuit et invenit. Et haec est positio, quam tenet communis opinio magistrorum, notiones esse quinque; et ratio huius prius visa est.

**1. 2. 3.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de respectibus et comparationibus infinitis, dicendum, quod nec proprietates nec relationes sunt notiones, nisi quae important respectum distinguentem personam a persona; et hic est respectus originis, qui tantum quinque modis, spectantibus ad dignitatem, potest comparari; ideo patet illud.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum tres, per verbum Damasceni; dicendum, quod sub generatione comprehendit duas generationes[^13], similiter sub processione.

*5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas debet converti cum persona; dicendum, quod verum est de illa quae est proprietas personalis, faciens personam esse personam[^14]; tamen non sequitur, si convertitur, quod tot sint, et non plures, quoniam unum et idem potest habere plura convertibilia.

*6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de syllogismo illo, dicendum, quod in processu illo est fallacia accidentis, sicut hic: Pater est innascibilitas, et Pater est paternitas; ergo paternitas est innascibilitas; quia quod attribuitur subiecto sive hypostasi attribuitur habitudini. — Posset tamen poni figura dictionis ex mutatione modi praedicandi, quia in divinis essentia praedicatur ut *quid*, persona ut *quis*, et notio ut *quae*; et proceditur a persona ad notionem.

english:
### QUESTION IV. *How many properties of the persons there are in divine matters.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked concerning the properties as to number. And it seems:

1. That they are infinite, since the properties are respects through which God becomes known to us; but those are infinite, as is plain concerning the ideal respects[^1]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Father and the Son are likened to one another according to all essential conditions; therefore they are compared according to all and according to all become known to us; but those are in an indefinite number: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more respects it has, as a point [more] than a line, and a line [more] than a surface; but the divine being is most simple: therefore in it there are infinite respects. But all are an account of becoming-known: therefore the notions are infinite.

4. But that they are only three, seems [to be shown] through Damascene[^2], who says that in divine matters all things are one apart from generation, ingeneration, and procession; but these are only three properties: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems by reason, since a property is converted with that of which it is the property[^3]: but a property is of the person: therefore as many as the persons are, so many are the properties and not more. But the persons are three: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, let such an argument be made: every person is one of the three properties[^4] — this is true — every notion is a person, therefore every property or notion is one of the three: therefore etc.

That, however, they are more than three is shown thus.

1. Notions or properties are relations. But in every relation there are two relations according to the two extremes; but in divine matters there are two origins: therefore at least four relations.

2. Likewise, a property is what belongs to one alone[^5]; but unbegottenness belongs to the Father alone: therefore it is a property. And it is not any of those four relations: therefore there are five.

Therefore the question concerns the sufficiency and number of the notions in divine matters, and on what basis they are taken, and whether the number of properties and of relations be the same.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Properly speaking, in divine matters there are four relations and properties, and five notions; in a less strict sense the names are blurred together and have an equal quinary number.*

**I respond:** It must be understood as to that last [point], that a kind of force is wont to occur between these three names: *property*, *relation*, and *notion*. For *property* is so called insofar as it belongs to one alone; *relation*, insofar as it expresses a relation to another; *notion*, insofar as it is a principle of knowing. And since every property is an account of knowing[^6], likewise also every relation; therefore the name *notion* extends further than those two. Since some property is a relation, as paternity, [and] some is not, as unbegottenness, which does not express a respect but rather privates [it]; likewise some relation is a property, as filiation, [and] some is not, as active spiration — therefore because it belongs to several, not to one alone — and hence[^7] it is, that the name *property* and the name *relation* stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded. But the name *notion* is in [the position of] more. Whence there are more notions than properties, [and] more also than relations. But properties and relations mutually exceed one another and equally; therefore they are equal in number.

Yet one need not press the point. For every relation distinguishes in some mode from another, and so is in some mode a property. Likewise everything which distinguishes in some mode imports a relation; therefore every relation [is a] property, and every property [a] relation. But every notion is a property or a relation: therefore every notion is a property and likewise a relation. And so by the extended use of the name they are equal; therefore the number is the same and the same the account of assigning the number in all these names.

It must be understood, therefore[^8], that concerning the number of the properties there have been three opinions. Some have said that they are infinite; some, that [they are] three; some, that [they are] five. — But the reason of this[^9] diverse opinion was, that they considered the notions in diverse modes. Those who considered them in comparison to those to whom they become known, said them to be infinite, since through infinite comparisons and likenesses and respects God becomes known to us. — But those who considered [them] in comparison to the hypostases, which are distinguished or become known, said [them] to be only three, since there are only three persons; therefore they have only three things proper[^10], through which they sufficiently become known. — But those who considered [them] by comparison to the accounts by which they become known, said [them] to be five.

For the same is the account of becoming-known and of distinguishing. But the account of distinguishing is taken from the side of origin: either positively or privatively. If privatively; either it privates origin by way of producing, and this does not express nobility, namely *not to produce*, and therefore it is not a notion; or it privates origin by way of [being] produced, and this either specifically or generally. If specifically, it does not express nobility; if generally, then it does express nobility; and so the notion is one alone[^11]. If, however, [it be] taken from the side of origin positively, since the origin is twofold, and to each there corresponds of necessity a twofold relation; of necessity there will be four, namely active and passive generation, and active and passive spiration: and in all, five[^12].

The first opinion took its reason rather from afar, and therefore receded farther from the truth; the second [took it] more from near at hand, and therefore drew nearer to the truth; the third [took it] just as it ought, and therefore posited and found the truth. And this is the position which the common opinion of the masters holds, that the notions are five; and the reason of this has been seen before.

**1. 2. 3.** To that, then, which is objected concerning infinite respects and comparisons, it must be said that neither properties nor relations are notions, except those which import a respect distinguishing person from person; and this is the respect of origin, which can be compared in only five modes pertaining to dignity; and so that is plain.

*4.* To that which is objected, that [there are] only three, by the word of Damascene; it must be said that under generation he comprehends two generations[^13], likewise under procession.

*5.* To that which is objected, that a property must be converted with the person; it must be said that this is true of that [property] which is a personal property, making the person to be the person[^14]; nevertheless it does not follow, if it is converted, that there be only so many and not more, since one and the same [thing] can have several convertible [terms].

*6.* To that which is objected concerning that syllogism, it must be said that in that procedure there is the fallacy of accident, as here: *the Father is unbegottenness, and the Father is paternity; therefore paternity is unbegottenness*; since what is attributed to a subject or hypostasis is attributed to a relation. — Yet a figure of speech could be assigned, from the change of mode of predicating, since in divine matters the essence is predicated as *what*, the person as *who*, and the notion as *which*; and one proceeds from person to notion.

la: Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 5. — Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. *ex respectibus* pro *de respectibus*.

en: Cf. below d. 35, q. 5. — The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] *ex respectibus* in place of *de respectibus*.

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8: *Rursusque propter Patrem habet Filius quidquid habet et Spiritus, hoc est, propterea quod Pater haec habet, modo tamen ingeniti, geniti et processionis proprietates excipias. In his enim dumtaxat personalibus proprietatibus tres sanctae Trinitatis personae inter se distinguuntur, non essentia, sed peculiari cuiusque personae nota individisim discretae.* Cfr. et ibid. III. c. 3, quod allegatur infra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 3.

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 8: *And again, on account of the Father the Son has whatever he has, and [so does] the Spirit, that is, since the Father has these things, [though] in such a mode that you except the properties of unbegottenness, of being-begotten, and of procession. For in these personal properties alone the three persons of the holy Trinity are distinguished from one another, not in essence, but discretely [marked off] by the proper note of each person individually.* Cf. also ibid. III, c. 3, which is alleged below in the *littera* of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3.

la: Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4, et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc omittit conclusionem: *ergo quot sunt personae, tot sunt proprietates et non plures*, quae conclusio in antiquioribus mss. exstat.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 4, and Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. on the *proprium*. — Soon afterwards the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc omits the conclusion: *therefore as many as the persons are, so many are the properties and not more*, which conclusion is found in the older manuscripts.

la: In sola Vat. desideratur *proprietatum*. Paulo inferius codd. et ed. 1 *sed* pro *igitur*. Cum autem argumentatio lectione ista confundatur, retinuimus textum Vat., praesertim quia sub eadem fere forma etiam ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 3. hoc argumentum proponitur.

en: In the Vatican edition alone *proprietatum* is missing. A little below, the codices and ed. 1 [read] *sed* in place of *igitur*. But since the argumentation is confused by that reading, we have retained the Vatican text, especially because under nearly the same form this argument is also proposed by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 3.

la: Ita Avicenna, si audias B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 39. m. I.

en: Thus Avicenna, if you trust Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. I.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 132, nota 1; et supra pag. 152, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 132, n. 1; and above p. 152, n. 1.

la: Melius omitteretur *et* vel poneretur post *hinc*. Fortasse est vitium codicum, occasione praecedentis *ideo* ortum.

en: *Et* would better be omitted or placed after *hinc*. Perhaps it is a fault of the codices, arising on the occasion of the preceding *ideo*.

la: Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 brevius: *Notandum quod*. — Cod. bb *Sed intelligendum est*. — Pro prima opinione, quae mox tangitur, B. Albertus hic a. 10. allegat Gilbertum Porretanum et Simonem Tornacensem, qui et asserebant, huiusmodi infinitas relationes, ab aeterno existentes, in Deo fuisse assistentes, et non Deum; de quo vide infra d. 33. q. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and ed. 1, [reads] more briefly: *Notandum quod* ("It must be noted that"). — Cod. bb [reads] *Sed intelligendum est* ("But it must be understood"). — For the first opinion, which is touched on shortly, Bl. Albert here in a. 10 cites Gilbert of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai, who also asserted that infinite relations of this kind, existing from eternity, were in God as assistants, and not [as] God; on which see below d. 33, q. 1.

la: A Vat. et cod. cc abest *huius*. Pro subsequenti voce *opinionis* aliqui codd. ut P Q aa et ed. 1 *positionis*, aliqui ut A T Y *rationis*.

en: From the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc *huius* is missing. In place of the following word *opinionis* some codices such as P Q aa and ed. 1 [read] *positionis*, [and] some such as A T Y [read] *rationis*.

la: Perpauci codd. cum cod. cc et Vat. substituunt *sunt* pro *habent*, et paulo superius post *dixerunt* praetermittunt *esse*, atque infra loco verborum *per comparationem* exhibent *quantum*.

en: Very few codices with cod. cc and the Vatican [edition] substitute *sunt* for *habent*, and a little above, after *dixerunt*, omit *esse*, and below, in place of the words *per comparationem*, exhibit *quantum*.

la: Sic codd. quasi una voce contra Vat., in qua legitur: *et ideo notio privativa est una sola, scilicet innascibilitas*. Nonnulli codd. ut P Q voci *notio* praemittunt *haec*.

en: Thus the codices as if with one voice against the Vatican [edition], in which is read: *and therefore the privative notion is one alone, namely unbegottenness*. Some codices, such as P Q, prefix *haec* ("this") to the word *notio*.

la: Codd. P Q clarius: *et ita in universo sunt quinque*.

en: Codices P Q [read] more clearly: *and so in all there are five*.

la: Scil. generationem activam et passivam. — Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *relationes* pro *generationes*. Subinde post *processione* cod. Q in marg. exhibet addita verba *duas processiones*.

en: Namely active and passive generation. — The Vatican [edition], with some codices, [reads] *relationes* in place of *generationes*. Soon after *processione* cod. Q in the margin shows the added words *duas processiones* ("two processions").

la: In pluribus mss. AC L I R S T etc. desiderantur voces *esse personam*.

en: In several manuscripts AC L I R S T etc. the words *esse personam* are missing.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Sub duplici respectu S. Doctor de numero proprietatum inquirit. Primo enim vocabula *proprietas*, *relatio*, *notio* inter se distinguuntur, et unumquodque in proprio et stricto sensu accipitur («vis consuevit fieri inter ista tria nomina»); secundo accipiuntur ista tria vocabula extenso nomine ut synonyma («Tamen non oportet facere vim»). Ab his verbis incipit secunda pars responsionis ad ultimum quaesitum. In Vaticana autem editione ibi non incipit ne propositio quidem nova. — Secundum primam viam enumerantur quatuor proprietates et quatuor relationes, sed quinque notiones; secundum alteram viam numerus quinarius tribus illis vocabulis convenit. — Scotus (I. Sent. d. 28. q. 1. ad 3.) dubitat, utrum inspirabilitas addenda sit ut sexta notio; sed in *Report.* (I. Sent. d. 28. q. 5), quasi se retractans, istam non esse notionem affirmat. — Tres aliae quaestiones hic tractatae satis patent. — De notionibus etiam agitur supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4, et infra d. 27. p. I. q. 1. in fine corp.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 3. — Scot., *Report.* d. 28. q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; — S. I. q. 32. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. 13. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 35. q. 3. — Durand., hic a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Under a twofold respect the holy Doctor inquires concerning the number of the properties. For first the words *property*, *relation*, *notion* are distinguished from one another, and each is taken in its proper and strict sense («a force is wont to occur between these three names»); secondly these three words are taken with extended sense as synonyms («Yet one need not press the point»). From these words begins the second part of the response to the last question. In the Vatican edition, however, no new sentence even begins there. — According to the first way there are enumerated four properties and four relations, but five notions; according to the other way the quinary number suits all three of those words. — Scotus (*I Sent.* d. 28, q. 1, ad 3) doubts whether *inspirability* is to be added as a sixth notion; but in the *Reportata* (*I Sent.* d. 28, q. 5), as if retracting himself, he affirms that this is not a notion. — The three other questions treated here are sufficiently plain. — On the notions there is also discussion above d. 24, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4, and below d. 27, p. I, q. 1, at the end of the body.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 3. — Scotus, *Reportata* d. 28, q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; — *Summa* I, q. 32, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10, 13. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 *princ.* q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 35, q. 3. — Durandus, here a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---