title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum natura spiritualis dignitate naturae praecellat compositam ex spirituali et corporali.*

Secundo quaeritur de ordine rerum ad invicem. Nam hunc tangit Magister in littera[^1], utrum videlicet natura spiritualis dignitate naturae praecellat compositam ex spirituali et corporali. Certum enim est, quod utraque praecellit corporalem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. In omni genere «nobilius est illud propter quod est alterum, sicut finis eo quod est ad finem[^2]»; sed homo est propter Angelum — nam, sicut dicunt Sancti, et Magister recitat in littera, homo factus est ad reparationem angelicae ruinae — ergo etc.

2. Item, spirituale, simpliciter loquendo, nobilius est corporali: ergo nobilius est illud quod pure est spiritus, nihil habens de corpore, quam quod est spirituale et coniunctum corpori: ergo nobilior angelica natura quam humana.

3. Item, in quolibet genere immortale et incorruptibile nobilius est mortali et corruptibili; sed Angelus per naturam est immortalis et incorruptibilis, homo vero e contrario: ergo etc.

4. Item, «quod similius est meliori est melius, si non sit similius in ridiculosioribus, ut simia homini quam equus[^3]»; sed Angelus est Deo similior et deiformior quam homo; hoc manifestum est; et non in ridiculosis, sed in optimis: ergo simpliciter melior est natura spiritualis quam composita.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus[^4]: «Mente humana solus Deus est maior». Unde in libro de Trinitate undecimo et in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum dicit, «quod immediate ipsa mens a prima veritate formatur», et «inter ipsam et Deum nihil cadit medium»: ergo Angelus non est supra mentem humanam:

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ergo per se adeo bona est, ut Angelus. Sed anima propter coniunctionem sui cum corpore non deterioratur, immo maius bonum est, cum corpus sit bonum: ergo simpliciter totus homo est Angelo melior.

2. Item, in omni genere quod tenet rationem finis, illud est melius; sed in genere creaturarum homo tenet rationem finis, non Angelus. Unde Remigius dicit et Philosophus[^5] quod «nos sumus finis quodammodo omnium quae sunt»; hoc non dicitur de Angelo: ergo etc.

3. Item, si «optimum in uno genere est melius optimo in alio, et simpliciter hoc illo melius[^6]»; sed optimus in genere hominum est melior optimo in genere Angelorum, ut patet, quia Christus: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod non in quantum homo, sed in quantum Deus; obiicitur de beata Virgine, quae est pure femina, et tamen domina Angelorum.

4. Item, maior est qui recumbit, quam qui ministrat, teste Domino, Lucae vigesimo secundo[^7]; sed Angelus ministrat homini, ad Hebraeos primo: *Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus*: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Angelus et homo quoad ordinem in finem, qui est beatitudo, sunt pares; quoad naturae dignitatem Angelus est creatura homine superior.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de ordine spiritus rationalis sive uniti ad spiritum angelicum vel separatum, de duplici ordine potest intelligi: aut de ordine quantum ad *finem*, aut quantum ad *naturae dignitatem*. — Si quantum ad *finem*; sic dico, quod sunt pares. Nam ad eundem finem, scilicet ad aeternam beatitudinem, immediate ordinantur; et eadem est mensura hominis, quae et Angeli, nec homo[^8] propter Angelum, nec Angelus propter hominem. Tamen sicut lex caritatis facit in membris corporalibus et concivibus civitatis, quod unum membrum supplet indigentiam alterius — ut patet, quia oculus videt viam sibi et pedi, et pes fert se ipsum et oculum, et in civibus terrenae civitatis similiter contingit — similiter intelligendum est in homine et Angelo, qui sunt cives civitatis supernae. Nam homo habet habilitatem ad labendum frequenter, et possibilitatem ad resurgendum; Angelus vero stans perpetuitatem in stando, et cadens impossibilitatem in resurgendo: ideo Angelus stans sustentat hominem sive infirmitatem humanam, et homo resurgens reparat ruinam angelicam; ideo quodam modo Angelus propter hominem, et quodam modo homo propter Angelum: et ideo in hoc ordine pares sunt.

Si autem loquamur de ordine quantum ad naturae dignitatem, dicendum, quod, simpliciter loquendo, Angelus est creatura superior homine. Natura enim angelica, sicut patet ex multis locis Scripturae[^9], nobilior est humana et in superiori gradu consistit.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes manifestantes, quod Angelus naturae dignitate praecellit hominem, praeter primam, ad quam solutum est.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nihil cadit medium inter mentem et Deum; dicendum, quod est medium secundum *dignitatem naturae*, vel secundum *causalitatem influentiae*. Primo modo cadit medium, secundo modo, non. Nam Deus immediate influit in mentem, et ipsa mens immediate a prima veritate formatur[^10].

2. Quod obiicitur secundo, quod homo tenet rationem finis; dicendum, quod aliquid, propter quod res est, aut est ad *supplendum indigentiam*, sicut domus propter hominem, et calceus propter pedem; aut ad *suscipiendum eius influentiam*, sicut homo propter Deum. Quod ultimo modo habet rationem finis, nobilius est; quod primo modo, non. Quia enim homo omnibus indiget, Angelus nullo nisi Deo; ideo omnia propter hominem, non omnia propter Angelum. In cuius rei signum Angelus conditus est in principio, homo vero in die sexto[^11].

3. Quod obiicitur de optimo, intelligendum est

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per se et praecise. Sed nec beata Virgo nec Christus excedunt Angelos pure ratione naturae, sed ratione multiplicis gratiae.

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur de ministerio, infra[^12] melius patebit; ad praesens tantum sufficiat dicere, quod alicui ministratur dupliciter: aut propter se, sicut regi et domino, et talis est nobilior; aut propter alium, sicut ministrat miles garcioni[^13] regis; et per hoc solvendum. Angelus enim ministrat homini propter Deum, sicut dives pauperi, et fortis aegrotanti.

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether spiritual nature surpasses in dignity of nature [that which is] composed of spiritual and corporeal.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the order of things to one another. For the Master touches on this in the *littera*[^1] — namely whether spiritual nature surpasses in dignity of nature [that which is] composed of spiritual and corporeal. For it is certain that each surpasses the corporeal. And that it is so, it seems:

1. In every genus «that is nobler on account of which the other is, as the end [is nobler] than that which is ordered to the end[^2]»; but man is for the sake of the Angel — for, as the Saints say, and the Master relates in the *littera*, man was made for the repair of the angelic ruin — therefore etc.

2. Again, the spiritual, absolutely speaking, is nobler than the corporeal: therefore that which is purely spirit, having nothing of body, is nobler than that which is spiritual and joined to body: therefore the angelic nature is nobler than the human.

3. Again, in every genus the immortal and incorruptible is nobler than the mortal and corruptible; but the Angel by nature is immortal and incorruptible, man on the contrary: therefore etc.

4. Again, «that which is more like the better is better, provided it be not more like in more ridiculous respects, as the ape [is more like] man than the horse[^3]»; but the Angel is more like and more God-formed than man; this is manifest; and not in ridiculous respects, but in the best: therefore the spiritual nature is absolutely better than the composite.

**To the contrary:**

1. Augustine[^4]: «Than the human mind God alone is greater». Whence in the eleventh book *On the Trinity* and in the book *Of Eighty-Three Questions* he says «that the mind itself is immediately formed by the first truth», and «between it and God nothing falls as a medium»: therefore the Angel is not above the human mind:

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therefore it is of itself as good as the Angel. But the soul is not made worse by its conjunction with the body — rather it is a greater good, since the body is good: therefore the whole man is absolutely better than the Angel.

2. Again, in every genus that which holds the account of the end is the better; but in the genus of creatures man holds the account of the end, not the Angel. Whence Remigius says, and the Philosopher[^5], that «we are in a certain way the end of all things that are»; this is not said of the Angel: therefore etc.

3. Again, if «the best in one genus is better than the best in another, and absolutely this is better than that[^6]»; but the best in the genus of men is better than the best in the genus of Angels, as is clear, because Christ: therefore etc. If you say that [this is] not insofar as he is man, but insofar as he is God; the objection is raised about the blessed Virgin, who is purely a woman, and yet the mistress of the Angels.

4. Again, greater is he who reclines [at table] than he who serves, by the Lord's testimony, Luke twenty-two[^7]; but the Angel serves man, to the Hebrews chapter one: *They are all ministering spirits*: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** The Angel and man, as regards the order to the end, which is beatitude, are equals; as regards dignity of nature the Angel is a creature superior to man.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when inquiry is made about the order of the rational spirit — whether united or separate — to the angelic spirit, it can be understood of a twofold order: either of the order as regards the *end*, or as regards *dignity of nature*. — If as regards the *end*, thus I say that they are equals. For they are immediately ordered to the same end, namely to eternal beatitude; and the measure of man is the same as that of the Angel, neither [is] man[^8] for the sake of the Angel, nor the Angel for the sake of man. Yet just as the law of charity brings it about, among the bodily members and among fellow-citizens of a city, that one member supplies the need of another — as is clear, because the eye sees the way for itself and for the foot, and the foot carries itself and the eye, and likewise it happens among the citizens of an earthly city — so likewise it is to be understood in man and Angel, who are citizens of the supernal city. For man has a proneness to falling frequently, and a possibility of rising again; the Angel, however, [has] when standing a perpetuity in standing, and when falling an impossibility of rising again: therefore the standing Angel sustains man, that is, human infirmity, and the rising man repairs the angelic ruin; therefore in a certain way the Angel [is] for the sake of man, and in a certain way man [is] for the sake of the Angel: and therefore in this order they are equals.

But if we speak of the order as regards dignity of nature, it must be said that, absolutely speaking, the Angel is a creature superior to man. For the angelic nature, as is clear from many places of Scripture[^9], is nobler than the human and stands in a higher grade.

The reasons that show that the Angel surpasses man in dignity of nature are therefore to be granted, except the first, to which a solution has been given.

1. To what is therefore objected on the contrary, that nothing falls as a medium between the mind and God; it must be said that there is a medium according to *dignity of nature*, or according to *causality of influence*. In the first way a medium falls [between], in the second way, not. For God immediately flows into the mind, and the mind itself is immediately formed by the first truth[^10].

2. To what is objected secondly, that man holds the account of the end; it must be said that something on account of which a thing is, either is for *supplying a need*, as a house [is] for the sake of man, and a shoe for the sake of the foot; or for *receiving its influence*, as man [is] for the sake of God. That which in the latter way has the account of the end is the nobler; that which [has it] in the former way, not. For since man needs all things, the Angel nothing except God; therefore all things [are] for the sake of man, not all things for the sake of the Angel. In sign of which thing the Angel was created in the beginning, but man on the sixth day[^11].

3. To what is objected about the best, it is to be understood

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in itself and precisely. But neither the blessed Virgin nor Christ exceed the Angels purely by reason of nature, but by reason of manifold grace.

4. To what is objected lastly about ministry, it will be made clearer below[^12]; for the present let it suffice to say that one is ministered to in two ways: either for his own sake, as a king and a lord, and such a one is nobler; or for the sake of another, as a soldier serves the king's *garcio* [page-boy][^13]; and by this [the objection] is to be solved. For the Angel ministers to man for the sake of God, as a rich man [to] a poor man, and a strong man [to] a sick man.

la: Hic c. 6. in fine.

en: Here, c. 6 [of the Master's *littera*], at the end.

la: Aristot., I. *Rhetor.* c. *de Bono maiore et utili maiore*; III. *Topic.* c. 1. et I. *Magn. Moral.* c. 3. (c. 2.). Verba Magistri mox citata vide hic c. 5, ubi etiam in nota a nobis adiecta allegatur Augustinus pro hac sententia, de qua etiam cfr. Anselm., I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 18.

en: Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I, c. *On the greater good and the greater useful*; *Topics* III, c. 1, and *Magna Moralia* I, c. 3 (c. 2). The words of the Master cited shortly [after], see here, c. 5, where also, in a note added by us, Augustine is alleged for this opinion, on which cf. also Anselm, *Why God [Became] Man* I, c. 18.

la: Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 2: *Et [melius est] quod meliori eorum est similius... Considerandum autem, si et in ridiculosioribus sit simile, ut simia homini quam equo, cum non sit similis; non enim est simia melior, similior tamen est homini.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2: *And [the better is] that which is more like the better of them... But it must be considered whether [the likeness] also be in more ridiculous respects, as the ape [is more like] man than the horse, although it is not [really] like; for the ape is not better, yet it is more like man.*

la: In multis locis v. g. I. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 10. n. 21; XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 2; libr. 83 *Qq.* q. 54; XIV. *de Trin.* c. 14. n. 20. — Textus seq. est loc. cit. c. 5. n. 8: «Sed illa sola [creatura est imago Dei], qua superior ipse solus est. Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur, inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est». Codd. et edd. allegant librum XV. *de Trin.*, ubi tamen c. 27. n. 49. solum dicitur, quod mente humana non est superior nisi Deus. In libro 83 *Qq.* q. 31. n. 1. legitur: *Quae [mens], nulla interposita substantia, ab ipsa veritate formatur.* Cfr. *de Vera Relig.* c. 55. n. 113; *de Gen. ad lit.* (liber imperf.) c. 16. n. 60; *Enarrat. in Ps.* 118. Serm. 18. n. 1; *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 10. seq.

en: In many places, e.g. *On Free Choice* I, c. 10, n. 21; *On the City of God* XI, c. 2; the book *Of 83 Questions*, q. 54; *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 14, n. 20. — The following text is from the place cited, c. 5, n. 8: «But that alone [creature is the image of God], than which he alone is superior. For it is expressed wholly from him, [the creature] between which and him no interposed nature stands». The codices and editions allege the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, where however, c. 27, n. 49, it is only said that nothing is superior to the human mind except God. In the book *Of 83 Questions*, q. 31, n. 1, one reads: *Which [mind], with no interposed substance, is formed by the truth itself.* Cf. *On True Religion* c. 55, n. 113; *On Genesis to the Letter* (the unfinished book) c. 16, n. 60; *Enarration on Psalm 118*, Sermon 18, n. 1; *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 10 seq.

la: Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 24. (c. 2.). — Quis sit laudatus Remigius, indagare non potuimus. Probabiliter autem est idem ac ille, qui scripsit quendam librum *de Anima*. Nam Ioan. a Rupella, *Sum. de Anima*, p. 1. c. 2. dicit: «Secundum hoc definitur in libro *de Anima* a Remigio: *Anima est substantia incorporea, regens corpus*». Et B. Albert., I. p. II. tr. 12. q. 69. m. 1. eandem definitionem attribuit ipsi Remigio. — Fabricius (*Biblioth. mediae et inf. latinit.*) praeter notissimum Remigium Episc. Remensem († 533) tres alios Remigios, ante S. Bonaventuram viventes, recenset, scil. Remigium *Antissiodorensem* O.S.Bened. (in fine saec. 9.), multorum librorum auctorem, Remigium, Episc. *Lugdunensem* (ab a. 852), et Remigium, Abbatem monasterii *Mediolanensis* (?) Trevirensis dioecesis. Sed nulli horum attribuitur liber *de Anima*. Neque nos in aliis libris antiquis de anima tractantibus v. g. in libris Honorii Augustodunensis (sub initio saec. 12.), praedictos locos invenire potuimus.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 24 (c. 2). — Who the praised Remigius is, we have not been able to track down. Probably, however, he is the same as the one who wrote a certain book *On the Soul*. For John of La Rochelle, *Summa on the Soul*, p. 1, c. 2, says: «According to this it is defined in the book *On the Soul* by Remigius: *The soul is an incorporeal substance, governing the body*». And Bl. Albert, I, p. II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 1, attributes the same definition to Remigius himself. — Fabricius (*Library of Middle and Lower Latinity*), besides the well-known Remigius Bishop of Reims († 533), enumerates three other Remigii living before St. Bonaventure, namely Remigius *of Auxerre* O.S.B. (at the end of the 9th century), author of many books, Remigius, Bishop *of Lyons* (from the year 852), and Remigius, Abbot of the monastery *of Mediolanum* (?) of the diocese of Trier. But to none of these is the book *On the Soul* attributed. Nor have we been able to find the aforesaid passages in other old books treating of the soul, e.g. in the books of Honorius of Autun (at the beginning of the 12th century).

la: Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 2. — Paulo inferius cod. W *pura creatura* pro *pure femina.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2. — A little below, codex W reads *pura creatura* ("a pure creature") for *pure femina* ("purely a woman").

la: Vers. 27: *Nam quis maior est, qui recumbit, an qui ministrat? nonne qui recumbit?* — Sequens textus est Hebr. 1, 14.

en: Verse 27: *For which is greater, he who reclines [at table] or he who serves? is it not he who reclines?* — The following text is Hebrews 1:14.

la: In cod. N additur *est.*

en: In codex N, *est* ("is") is added.

la: Psalm. 8, 6: *Minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis.*

en: Psalm 8:6: *Thou hast made him a little less than the Angels.*

la: Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. q. 3. ad 1. de statu innocentiae; et hic d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. — Vat. *et propterea ipsa mens* pro *et ipsa mens.*

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, q. 3, ad 1, on the state of innocence; and here, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6. — The Vatican ms. reads *et propterea ipsa mens* ("and therefore the mind itself") for *et ipsa mens* ("and the mind itself").

la: Vide infra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3, et d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: See below, d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 13, a. 2, q. 1 seq.

la: Dist. II. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Distinction 2, a. 1, q. 1.

la: *Garciones* pro famulis, maxime iis, qui castra sequuntur. Du Cange, *Glossarium.*

en: *Garciones* [is used] for servants, especially those who follow the camp. Du Cange, *Glossary.*

latin_scholion:
De hac quaestione explicite hoc loco non tractant alii Commentatores praeter Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; et Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 4, qui testatur, aliquos magistros illa aetate aliter ac S. Bonaventura opinatos esse. Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 10.) exscribit tantum verba nostri Doctoris.

---

english_scholion:
On this question the other Commentators do not treat explicitly in this place, except Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 2, sub-question 2; and Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 5, q. 4, who testifies that some masters of that age held opinions other than St. Bonaventure. Dionysius the Carthusian (here, q. 10) merely transcribes the words of our Doctor.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS III. *De modo distinguendi spiritum angelicum ab anima rationali.*

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de modo distinguendi spiritum angelicum ab anima rationali. Et quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum differant specie, an tantum numero. Secundo, quae sit illa differentia, per quam differunt.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum Angelus et anima differant specie.*

Quod autem differant specie, videtur.

1. Quae differunt specie habent diversas perfectiones secundum speciem[^1]; sed homo et Angelus differunt specie, constat, et anima dat speciem homini et actum specificum: ergo et anima et Angelus.

2. Item, quae sunt similia specie, vel simul producuntur, vel unum facit ad productionem alterius, ubi producuntur[^2] per propagationem; sed animae non simul cum Angelis sunt productae, nec Angeli faciunt ad animarum productionem: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod similiter potest argui de animabus; hoc falsum est, quia pater facit ad generationem prolis.

3. Item, plus convenit sensibile et vegetabile cum sensibili et vegetabili, quam sensibile et vegetabile cum non-sensibili et non-vegetabili; sed anima humana per essentiam est sensibilis et vegetabilis, alioquin non faceret animal: ergo cum differat specie ab anima sensibili tantum et vegetabili, multo plus differt a spiritu angelico, qui nec est sensibilis nec vegetabilis.

**Contra:**

1. Quorum perfectio et complementum ultimum est unum specie, ipsa sunt unum[^3]; sed ad eandem beatitudinem ordinatur homo et Angelus, quae est visio et fruitio Dei: ergo homo et Angelus, sive anima et Angelus sunt specie unum.

2. Item, quorum differentia ultimo completiva est specie una, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed differentia ultimo completiva animae rationalis et Angeli est hoc quod est *rationale* sive *intellectuale*, et in hoc communicant, sicut dicit Gregorius[^4], quod homo communicat «esse cum lapidibus, intelligere cum Angelis»: ergo etc.

3. Item, quorum optimum naturale est unum, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed optimum naturale hominis et Angeli est unum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium[^5]: «Optimum, inquit, tui et Angeli ratio est»: ergo cum species accipiatur ab optimo, patet etc.

> **Conclusio.** Anima rationalis ab Angelo specie differt, et quidem in genere substantiae.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit triplex opinio.

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Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod quaestio ista nulla est. Cum enim quaeritur, utrum aliqua differant specie, supponitur, quod utrumque sit in genere ut species; et quoniam anima non est species, sed speciei pars, nec est in genere secundum rectam lineam ut species vel individuum, sed a latere, vel magis per reductionem sicut principium[^6]: ideo dicunt, quod quaestio ista nulla est, cum anima non sit species. — Sed haec responsio potius est evasio *ad hominem* quam solutio *ad orationem*. Nam adhuc restat quaestio: cum anima sit substantia et forma substantialis, vel habens formam substantialem, in qua omnes animae conveniunt, utrum in eadem conveniant anima et Angelus, an sit ibi solum differentia accidentalis. *Praeterea*, anima separata spiritus est et substantia, prout est res per se existens, et per se substans accidentibus, et secundum sui mutationem susceptibilis contrariorum[^7]: ergo proprie est substantia et recte in genere substantiae sicut substantia prima, et Angelus similiter; constat. Si ergo de omnibus primis substantiis rationabiliter contingit quaerere, utrum specie conveniant vel differant: patet, quod quaestio est bona et recta, et responsio est fuga.

Secunda vero positio est, quod[^8] si consideratur anima ut spiritus, est eadem specie cum Angelo, sed differt in hoc, quod animarum ad animas est aliqua validior similitudo, sicut aqua eadem aquae dicitur esse. Et ratio, quae movet eos, est propter convenientiam in optimo et nobilissimo suo, sicut ostensum est in obiiciendo. — Sed haec positio communiter non tenetur, quia planum est, hominem et Angelum non solum specie, sed etiam genere differre: ergo et perfectio sive forma dans speciem homini ab Angelo differt; haec autem est anima: ergo differt specie ab Angelo. Et hoc melius patebit infra[^9].

Tertia positio est, quod Angelus et anima specie differunt; quae sit autem illa differentia, quaeretur iam[^10]. Nunc autem iuxta communem positionem tenendum est, quod essentialiter differant et in genere substantiae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes probantes, Angelum et animam esse specie differentes, eo modo, quo licet dicere animam rationalem esse *speciem*. Nam, proprie loquendo, potius est *forma speciei* sive pars formalis, quam species; extenso tamen nomine potest species appellari.

1. Quod obiicitur, quod perfectio Angeli et hominis eadem sunt specie; dicendum, quod est perfectio in *esse primo*, et in *esse secundo*; quorum perfectio in *esse secundo* est eadem, ipsa propter hoc non sunt eadem — nam cygnus et nix sunt alba eadem albedine secundum speciem[^11] — sed illud habet veritatem in perfectione quantum ad *primum esse*; hoc autem modo non est gloria vel gratia perfectio.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur: quorum differentia ultimo completiva est eadem etc.; dicendum, quod *rationale*, secundum quod est differentia animae et Angeli, differt. Nam *rationale* Angeli est intellectuale[^12]; sed *rationale* animae proprie est rationale. Nam Angelus natus est intelligere secundum intellectum simplicem et deiformem, anima secundum intellectum inquisitivum et possibilem. — Et per hoc patet solutio ad sequens. Nam quamvis ratio sit optimum mei et Angeli, tamen ratio mea et ratio Angeli est alia et alia, non tantum secundum accidens, sed etiam secundum speciem et essentiam, ut patet.

english:
### ARTICLE III. *On the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul.*

Consequently, in the third place, inquiry is made concerning the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul. And two things are asked. First it is asked whether they differ in species, or only in number. Secondly, what that difference is by which they differ.

### QUESTION I. *Whether the Angel and the soul differ in species.*

That they do differ in species, it seems:

1. Things that differ in species have diverse perfections according to species[^1]; but man and the Angel differ in species, that is settled, and the soul gives species to man and [his] specific act: therefore [so do] both the soul and the Angel.

2. Again, things that are alike in species are either produced together, or the one contributes to the production of the other, where they are produced[^2] by propagation; but souls are not produced together with Angels, nor do Angels contribute to the production of souls: therefore etc. If you say that the like could be argued about souls [too]; this is false, because the father contributes to the generation of the offspring.

3. Again, the sensible and the vegetable agree more with the sensible and the vegetable than the sensible and vegetable [agrees] with the non-sensible and non-vegetable; but the human soul is by its essence sensible and vegetable, otherwise it would not make an animal: therefore, since it differs in species from a soul [that is] merely sensible and vegetable, much more does it differ from the angelic spirit, which is neither sensible nor vegetable.

**To the contrary:**

1. Things whose perfection and ultimate completion is one in species are one[^3]; but man and the Angel are ordered to the same beatitude, which is the vision and enjoyment of God: therefore man and the Angel, that is, the soul and the Angel, are one in species.

2. Again, things whose ultimately-completing difference is one in species are one in species; but the ultimately-completing difference of the rational soul and of the Angel is that which is *rational* or *intellectual*, and in this they share, as Gregory says[^4], that man shares «being with stones, understanding with Angels»: therefore etc.

3. Again, things whose natural best is one are one in species; but the natural best of man and of the Angel is one, as Bernard says to Eugene[^5]: «Your best, he says, and the Angel's, is reason»: therefore, since species is taken from the best, it is clear, etc.

> **Conclusion.** The rational soul differs in species from the Angel, and indeed in the genus of substance.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there was a threefold opinion.

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For some have wished to say that this question is null. For when it is asked whether some things differ in species, it is supposed that each is in a genus as a species; and since the soul is not a species, but a part of a species, nor is it in a genus along the straight line as a species or an individual, but at the side, or rather by reduction as a principle[^6]: therefore they say that this question is null, since the soul is not a species. — But this response is rather an evasion *ad hominem* than a solution *to the question*. For the question still remains: since the soul is a substance and a substantial form, or [something] having a substantial form, in which all souls agree, whether the soul and the Angel agree in the same [substance], or whether there is there only an accidental difference. *Moreover*, the separated soul is a spirit and a substance, inasmuch as it is a thing existing through itself, and standing of itself under accidents, and according to its own change capable of contraries[^7]: therefore it is properly a substance and rightly in the genus of substance like a first substance, and the Angel likewise; this is settled. If therefore concerning all first substances it is reasonable to ask whether they agree or differ in species: it is clear that the question is good and right, and the response is a flight.

But the second position is that[^8], if the soul is considered as a spirit, it is the same in species as the Angel, but differs in this, that there is among souls, in relation to souls, a stronger likeness, as water is said to be the same as water. And the reason that moves them is on account of the agreement in their best and noblest [element], as was shown in the objecting. — But this position is not commonly held, because it is plain that man and the Angel differ not only in species but even in genus: therefore also the perfection or form giving species to man differs from the Angel; but this is the soul: therefore it differs in species from the Angel. And this will be made clearer below[^9].

The third position is that the Angel and the soul differ in species; but what that difference is, will now be asked[^10]. But for now, according to the common position, it must be held that they differ essentially and in the genus of substance. — Whence the reasons proving that the Angel and the soul are differing in species are to be granted, in that way in which it is permitted to call the rational soul a *species*. For, properly speaking, it is rather the *form of the species* or a formal part, than a species; yet by an extended name it can be called a species.

1. To what is objected, that the perfection of the Angel and of man are the same in species; it must be said that there is a perfection in *first being*, and in *second being*; of which, [though] the perfection in *second being* is the same, they are not on that account the same — for the swan and snow are white by the same whiteness according to species[^11] — but that [objection] holds true of perfection as regards *first being*; in this way, however, glory or grace is not a perfection.

2. 3. To what is objected: things whose ultimately-completing difference is the same, etc.; it must be said that the *rational*, insofar as it is the difference of the soul and of the Angel, differs. For the *rational* of the Angel is intellectual[^12]; but the *rational* of the soul is properly rational. For the Angel is born to understand by a simple and God-formed intellect, the soul by an inquiring and possible intellect. — And by this is clear the solution to the following [objection]. For although reason is the best [element] of me and of the Angel, yet my reason and the Angel's reason are diverse, not only according to accident, but even according to species and essence, as is clear.

la: Observamus, quod argumenta ista fundantur in hoc, quod ea, quae in essentia et cum ipsa necessario connexis conveniunt vel differunt, etiam in specie conveniant vel differant necesse est. Cfr. Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Specie* et seqq.

en: We observe that these arguments are founded on this, that things which agree or differ in essence and in what is necessarily connected with it must also agree or differ in species. Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species* and following.

la: Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *nisi producantur*, perperam, ut constat ex seqq.

en: Not a few codices with editions 1, 2, 3 [read] *nisi producantur* ("unless they be produced"), wrongly, as is clear from what follows.

la: Aliis verbis: *Quorum est finis unus, ipsa sunt specie unum*, quia cuilibet rei proprius finis respondet. — Codd. aa bb cc et ed. 1 *unum specie*.

en: In other words: *Things whose end is one are one in species*, because to each thing its proper end corresponds. — Codices aa, bb, cc and ed. 1 [read] *unum specie*.

la: Homil. 29. in Evang. n. 2, et VI. *Moral.* c. 16. n. 20, in quo textu cod. F *in esse* pro *esse*. — Nonnulli codd. ut F H in *minori* post *et Angeli est* adiungunt *eadem*, Vat. *una et eadem scilicet*.

en: Homily 29 *on the Gospels*, n. 2, and *Morals* VI, c. 16, n. 20, in which text codex F [reads] *in esse* for *esse*. — Some codices such as F, H, in the *minor [premise]*, after *et Angeli est* add *eadem*; the Vatican ms. [reads] *una et eadem scilicet*.

la: Libr. V. *de Consid.* c. 3. n. 5: *Unum siquidem tui et Angeli optimum ratio est.*

en: Book V *On Consideration*, c. 3, n. 5: *For the one best [element] of you and of the Angel is reason.*

la: Secundum doctrinam Scholasticorum aliquid ponitur in praedicamento i. e. ordinatione supremorum generum, tripliciter, scil. *directe* i. e. quando aliquid est in linea recta praedicamentali, cuiusmodi sunt genera, species et individua; *indirecte* i. e. quando aliquid tanquam divisivum generis et constitutivum speciei ponitur a latere, cuiusmodi sunt differentiae; *reductive* i. e. quando aliquid est vel proprietas vel pars essentialis (principium), vel pars integralis etc. eorum, quae directe ponuntur in praedicamento, sic v. g. anima, utpote pars essentialis hominis, est in eodem praedicamento, in quo homo est. — Paulo inferius Vat. *solutio ad rem* pro *solutio ad orationem*, sed contra codd. et modum loquendi Aristotelicum, de quo cfr. tom. I. pag. 131, nota 6.

en: According to the doctrine of the Scholastics something is placed in a predicament (i.e. in the ordering of the highest genera) in three ways, namely *directly*, i.e. when something is in the straight predicamental line, of which kind are genera, species and individuals; *indirectly*, i.e. when something, as dividing the genus and constituting the species, is placed at the side, of which kind are differences; *reductively*, i.e. when something is either a property, or an essential part (a principle), or an integral part, etc., of those things which are placed directly in the predicament — thus, e.g., the soul, as an essential part of man, is in the same predicament in which man is. — A little below the Vatican ms. [reads] *solutio ad rem* for *solutio ad orationem*, but against the codices and the Aristotelian manner of speaking, on which cf. vol. I, p. 131, note 6.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Substance*.

la: Codd. et primae edd. hic addunt *anima et Angelus*, incongrue. Paulo post cod. P *est in eadem specie* pro *est eadem specie*. Dein cod. N *sicut aqua similior aquae*, cod. cc et ed. 1 *sicut aqua eadem omni aquae* pro *sicut aqua eadem aquae*.

en: The codices and the first editions here add *anima et Angelus*, incongruously. A little after, codex P [reads] *est in eadem specie* for *est eadem specie*. Then codex N [reads] *sicut aqua similior aquae*, codex cc and ed. 1 *sicut aqua eadem omni aquae* for *sicut aqua eadem aquae*.

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

la: Cod. bb *infra*, nempe in quaest. seq. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. cum sola ed. 4 *in genere et specie* pro *in genere substantiae*.

en: Codex bb [reads] *infra* ("below"), namely in the following question. — Somewhat below, the Vatican ms. with ed. 4 alone [reads] *in genere et specie* for *in genere substantiae*.

la: In cod. I bene additur *et non sunt eadem specie*. In fine solutionis Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus mss. perperam *gratiae perfectio* pro *gratia perfectio*.

en: In codex I there is rightly added *et non sunt eadem specie* ("and they are not the same in species"). At the end of the solution the Vatican ms. with ed. 1 and some mss. wrongly [reads] *gratiae perfectio* for *gratia perfectio*.

la: Secundum Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 7. § 2. — Plures codd. *intelligibile*, Vat. *intelligere*. Paulo superius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *differunt* pro *differt*.

en: According to Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 7, § 2. — Several codices [read] *intelligibile*, the Vatican ms. *intelligere*. A little above, not a few codices with editions 1, 2 [read] *differunt* for *differt*.

latin_scholion:
Duas huius articuli quaestiones alii Commentatores una sola quaestione absolvunt. Et cum expositio S. Doctoris facile intelligatur, pauca hic notata sufficiant etiam pro quaest. seq. — Communiter tenetur, animam humanam et genere et specie differre a substantia angelica; sed disputatur, in quo praecise haec differentia ponenda sit, quod discutitur in quaest. seq. S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 6.) quinque opiniones de hac differentia recenset, et quoad rem cum S. Bonaventura consentit (cfr. S. I. q. 75. a. 7; S. c. Gent. II. c. 92.), sicut etiam B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. aliique. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 5. plures differentias recenset, et in fine concludit: «Si quis in esse theologico potuit convenientiorem differentiam invenire, acquiescendum est, cum res huiusmodi sint altissimae speculationis». Scotus autem (hic q. 5.) plura opponit, et resolvit, animam et Angelum essentialiter distingui per suas *entitates absolutas*, et non per respectus unionis vel potentiae. Dionys. Carth. argumenta Scoti solvere nititur, sed, ni fallimur, dissensus magis in modo loquendi consistit quam in re.

In seq. quaest. notanda est solut. ad 3, qua S. Doctor errori Petri Ioan. Olivi, quod anima rationalis non *per se* et

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immediate, sed *per partem sensitivam* sit forma substantialis corporis, praevenit docens, quod anima *se ipsa*, et quatenus rationalis est, perficit corpus ut forma substantialis. Quae doctrina decreto Concilii Vienn. sancita est. Cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. Schol.

Praeter citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 13. 14. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 3; cfr. etiam hic q. 3. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 3. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 10. — Biel, hic q. 6.

---

english_scholion:
The other Commentators settle the two questions of this article in a single question. And since the exposition of the holy Doctor is easily understood, let the few things noted here suffice also for the following question. — It is commonly held that the human soul differs from the angelic substance both in genus and in species; but it is disputed in what precisely this difference is to be placed, which is discussed in the following question. St. Thomas (*II Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 6) reviews five opinions on this difference, and as to substance agrees with St. Bonaventure (cf. *Summa* I, q. 75, a. 7; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 92), as do also Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise and others. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 20, m. 5, reviews several differences, and at the end concludes: «If anyone has been able, in theological being, to find a more fitting difference, one must acquiesce, since matters of this kind are of the highest speculation». Scotus, however (here, q. 5), raises many objections, and resolves that the soul and the Angel are essentially distinguished by their *absolute entities*, and not by relations of union or of potency. Dionysius the Carthusian endeavors to solve Scotus's arguments, but, unless we are mistaken, the dissent consists rather in the manner of speaking than in the matter.

In the following question is to be noted the solution *ad 3*, by which the holy Doctor anticipates the error of Peter John Olivi — that the rational soul is not, of itself and

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immediately, but *through the sensitive part*, the substantial form of the body — teaching that the soul, by itself, and inasmuch as it is rational, perfects the body as a substantial form. This doctrine was sanctioned by the decree of the Council of Vienne. Cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, Schol.

Besides those cited: Bl. Albert, here, a. 13–14. — Peter of Tarentaise, *II Sent.* d. 3, q. 2, a. 3; cf. also here, q. 3, a. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, p. II, q. 2, a. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12, q. 10. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 10. — Biel, here, q. 6.

---

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Quae sit differentia, per quam Angelus et anima differunt.*

Secundo circa hoc quaeritur, quae sit illa differentia, per quam Angelus et anima differunt. Quod autem differant essentialiter per hoc quod est *unibile*, videtur primo sic.

1. Sicut se habet corpus humanum ad corpus non unibile, sic se habet spiritus humanus ad spiritum non unibilem; sed corpus humanum differt specie, immo etiam genere, ut videtur, a corpore non unibili, utpote a lapide, per hoc quod est unibile animae vivificanti: ergo etc.

2. Item, esse unibile convenit animae rationali: aut ergo *essentialiter*, aut *accidentaliter*; sed non *accidentaliter*, constat; quia tunc ex corpore[^1] et anima non fieret unum per essentiam: ergo *essentialiter* hoc convenit animae. Sed quaecumque differunt in aliquo essentiali, differunt specie: ergo anima et Angelus etc.

3. Item, pars suum *esse* completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in toto: ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, suum *esse* completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in suo toto, scilicet in homine, ut pars[^2]. Sed non est pars hominis, nisi secundum quod est unibilis: ergo in unibilitate ad corpus consistit complementum animae. Sed per illud habet unumquodque essentialiter differre sive distingui ab aliquo, in quo consistit eius complementum: ergo etc.

4. Item, vivificare est actus animae rationalis, quem habet in corpus: aut ergo actus *accidentalis*, aut *essentialis*. Si *accidentalis*, ergo vita accidit homini; quod manifeste falsum est, quia tunc accideret ei esse animal. Si est actus *substantialis* sive *essentialis*, ergo inest animae ratione sui *quo est*, sive formalis et completivi. Ergo si penes illud accipitur differentia formalis et completiva uniuscuiusque, quod est formale et completivum, penes illud, quo anima nata est vivificare corpus, sumitur illa differentia; sed eo ipso nata est anima uniri corpori, quo nata est corpus vivificare: ergo penes unibilitatem sumitur animae ad Angelum differentia essentialis specifica.

**Contra:**

1. Omnis differentia prior est per naturam, quam illud cuius est differentia; sed unio sive unibilitas ad corpus consequitur animam, quia dicit relationem ad alterum, sine quo potest anima esse et intelligi[^3]: ergo unibilitas sive unibile non est illud, per quod differunt Angelus et anima.

2. Item, differentia completiva debet esse propria eius cuius est differentia; sed esse unibile non solum rationali animae convenit, sed etiam vegetabili et sensibili: ergo non est animae rationalis completiva differentia.

3. Item, differentia specifica debet accipi penes id quod in re est optimum, quia unumquodque debet definiri per id quod est optimum in ipso[^4]; sed esse unibile convenit animae penes suum infimum: ergo penes illud differentia completiva non potest accipi.

4. Item, differentia completiva ita essentialiter adhaeret, quod eius oppositum[^5] non potest inesse, vel si inest actu, non tamen naturaliter; sed anima rationalis sic est unibilis, quod separabilis; et praeterea, separabile esse convenit animae per naturam, et per hoc differt a vegetabili et sensibili: ergo esse unibile corpori nullo modo potest esse specifica differentia, per quam differunt Angelus et anima.

> **Conclusio.** Differentia specifica inter Angelum et animam humanam recte sumitur ab eo, quod anima est naturaliter unibilis corpori, Angelus vero non.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi.

Quidam enim conati sunt assignare differentiam specificam Angeli et animae per comparationem ad Deum. Et ratio, quae movit eos, haec fuit, quia

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differentia ultimo completiva penes id quod nobilius est in re, debet accipi; et ideo voluerunt dicere, quod anima et Angelus differunt, quia Angelus habet intellectum deiformem, ut vult Dionysius[^6]; unde habet sibi species innatas et videt aspectu simplici. Sed anima habet intellectum potentialem sive collativum et inquisitivum, et hoc per naturam, quidquid sit de gloria. — Sed iste modus assignandi differentiam non videtur esse omnino conveniens. *Primo*, quia differentiae rerum accipiuntur secundum comparationem, quam habent ad *se*[^7], non in relatione ad *Deum*, respectu cuius potius conveniunt. *Amplius*, deiformitas intellectus respicit potentiam intellectivam; nos autem quaerimus de differentia essentiarum, non de differentia potentiarum. *Postremo*, quod obtinetur per gratiam[^8] non est contra naturam institutam; sed deiformitatem acquirit intellectus per gloriam: ergo haec intellectui humano non est aliena; ergo per hanc non differt Angelus ab anima. Et quod *plus* est, anima separata modum intelligendi habet, quem habet Angelus[^9]; et anima Adae habuit species innatas, ut etiam Angelus; et hoc totum quid accidentale videtur dicere: ergo penes hoc essentialis differentia non debet sumi.

Alii vero fuerunt, qui conati sunt differentiam invenire secundum comparationem rerum[^10] ad invicem; et quia non potuerunt invenire actus differentes formaliter, per quos venirent in cognitionem diversarum differentiarum, sed invenerunt actus differentes gradu et dignitate; dixerunt, quod anima et Angelus differunt specie propter maiorem excessum in simplicitate et bonitate naturae. Et iste excessus in essentialibus variat speciem, quando excessus ille exit limitem speciei debitum, sicut calidum in quarto gradu est alterius speciei, quam calidum in primo; sic dicunt esse in proposito. — Sed hoc valde dubium est, quod Angelus *tantum* excedat animam, quod ex ipso excessu differentia specierum[^11] fiat, cum optima anima, scilicet Christi, nobilissima sit creatura nec exeat speciem humanam. Et *praeterea*, esto quod esset ibi excessus, penes ipsum non debet sumi differentia specifica, quia potius videtur consequi differentiam specificam quam e converso. Potius enim res diversarum bonitatum[^12] gradus habent in nobilitate propter naturas diversas specierum, quae sunt natae capere plus et minus, quam e converso. Et iterum, haec differentia valde generalis et transcendens esse videtur, quia, si ita potest accipi hic, pari ratione ubique.

Et ideo tertius est hic modus dicendi, quem probabiliorem aestimo, qui sumitur per comparationem animae rationalis ad corpus humanum, ex qua parte innotescit nobis anima non solum secundum accidentia, sed etiam secundum substantiam et naturam, et non solum secundum id quod indignitatis est, sed etiam secundum id quod nobilitatis. Hoc enim, quod est animam uniri corpori humano sive vivificare corpus humanum, non dicit actum accidentalem nec dicit actum ignobilem: non accidentalem, quia ratione illius est anima forma substantialis[^13]; non ignobilem, quia ratione illius est anima nobilissima formarum omnium, et in anima stat appetitus totius naturae. Corpus enim humanum nobilissima complexione et organizatione, quae sit in natura, est organizatum et complexionatum; ideo non completur nec natum est compleri nisi nobilissima forma sive natura[^14]. Illud ergo, quo anima est unibilis corpori, tale dicit quid essentiale respiciens, quod est nobilissimum in anima; et ita penes illud recte sumitur specifica differentia, secundum quam differt anima a natura angelica. — Unde rationes ad hoc inductae concedendae sunt. Ad illa quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, ex praedictis patet responsio.

1. Quod enim dicit primo, quod differentia debet esse prior; dicendum, quod verum est; et differentia illa, quae est esse *unibile*, non dicit puram relationem, sed naturalem aptitudinem, quae inest animae secundum principia intrinseca, quae priora sunt anima per naturam, sicut *rationale* respectu hominis.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod differentia completiva debet esse propria; dicendum, quod uniri *corpori* non est proprium animae rationalis; sed tamen[^15] uniri *corpori humano*, sicut dicit illud quod est animae essentiale et nobile, sic etiam importat, quod est proprium. — Et per hoc patet aliud. Nam illud quo mediante anima perficit corpus humanum, est illud quo anima est anima rationalis, et quod etiam est principium aliarum nobilium operationum[^16]; sed

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perficit se ipsa; se ipsa enim anima perficit corpus, sicut forma se ipsa unitur materiae.

4. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod differentia essentialiter adhaeret; dicendum, quod *esse unibile* adhaeret inseparabiliter, quia *aptitudo* semper inest, quamvis non semper insit *actus*, sicut patet in rationabilitate et gressibilitate. Et sicut gressibilis truncatur, et rationalis anima stulta efficitur non natura, sed propter defectum naturae; ita quod anima separatur[^17], hoc est in poenam peccati. Et ideo *esse separabile* non sic assignatur differentia animae, sicut *esse unibile*. — *Amplius*, anima rationalis eo ipso, quod nata est perficere corpus sic perfectum et ordinatum per naturam ad immortalitatem, est immortalis; et eo ipso nata est *separari* ab hoc corpore iam mortuo propter peccatum; et ita nunc[^18] non dicit aliam differentiam, quam hoc quod est *esse unibile*, sed consequitur illam, quia, sicut non est *separatio* nisi prioris uniti, sic non est *separabilitas* in aliquo, nisi prius fuerit unibilitas per naturam. Et ideo, si aliquid potest esse differentia animae, videtur, quod hoc maxime sit, id est illud quod per hoc nomen[^19] significatur. Intellectus enim noster rarissime pervenit ad cognitionem formae substantialis nisi *a posteriori*; et quia sicut cognoscit, sic nominat, ideo differentias per naturam priores ut plurimum nominat a posteriori. Et sic patent quaesita[^20].

---

english:
### QUESTION II. *What the difference is by which the Angel and the soul differ.*

Secondly, concerning this it is asked, what that difference is by which the Angel and the soul differ. And that they differ essentially by that which is *unitable* [to a body], it seems, first, thus:

1. As the human body is to a body not unitable, so is the human spirit to a spirit not unitable; but the human body differs in species — indeed even in genus, as it seems — from a body not unitable, such as a stone, by this, that it is unitable to a life-giving soul: therefore etc.

2. Again, to be unitable belongs to the rational soul: either therefore *essentially* or *accidentally*; but not *accidentally*, that is settled; because then from body[^1] and soul there would not come to be one [thing] by essence: therefore this belongs to the soul *essentially*. But whatever things differ in something essential, differ in species: therefore the soul and the Angel etc.

3. Again, a part does not have its complete *being* except according as it is in the whole: therefore, since the rational soul is a part of man, it does not have its complete *being* except according as it is in its whole, namely in man, as a part[^2]. But it is not a part of man except according as it is unitable: therefore the complement of the soul consists in unitability to the body. But by that in which its complement consists, each thing essentially differs or is distinguished from something else: therefore etc.

4. Again, to give life is an act of the rational soul, which it has upon the body: either therefore an *accidental* act, or an *essential* one. If *accidental*, then life is accidental to man; which is manifestly false, because then to be an animal would be accidental to him. If it is a *substantial* or *essential* act, then it is in the soul by reason of that *by which it is*, that is, of the formal and completing [principle]. Therefore, if the formal and completing difference of each thing is taken from that which is formal and completing, then from that by which the soul is born to give life to the body that difference is taken; but by the very fact that the soul is born to be united to a body, it is born to give life to the body: therefore from unitability is taken the essential, specific difference of the soul to the Angel.

**To the contrary:**

1. Every difference is prior by nature to that of which it is the difference; but the union or unitability to the body is consequent upon the soul, because it states a relation to another, without which the soul can be and be understood[^3]: therefore unitability or the unitable is not that by which the Angel and the soul differ.

2. Again, the completing difference must be proper to that of which it is the difference; but to be unitable belongs not only to the rational soul but also to the vegetable and the sensible: therefore it is not the completing difference of the rational soul.

3. Again, the specific difference must be taken from that which is best in the thing, because each thing must be defined by that which is best in it[^4]; but to be unitable belongs to the soul on the side of its lowest [element]: therefore the completing difference cannot be taken from it.

4. Again, the completing difference so essentially adheres that its opposite[^5] cannot be present, or, if it is present in act, yet not naturally; but the rational soul is so unitable that [it is also] separable; and moreover, to be separable belongs to the soul by nature, and by this it differs from the vegetable and the sensible: therefore to be unitable to a body can in no way be the specific difference by which the Angel and the soul differ.

> **Conclusion.** The specific difference between the Angel and the human soul is rightly taken from this, that the soul is naturally unitable to a body, but the Angel not.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a threefold manner of speaking.

For some have endeavored to assign the specific difference of the Angel and the soul by comparison to God. And the reason that moved them was this, that

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the ultimately-completing difference must be taken from that which is nobler in the thing; and therefore they wished to say that the soul and the Angel differ because the Angel has a God-formed intellect, as Dionysius holds[^6]; whence it has species innate to it and sees by a simple gaze. But the soul has a potential or comparative and inquiring intellect, and this by nature, whatever be the case as to glory. — But this manner of assigning the difference does not seem to be altogether fitting. *First*, because the differences of things are taken according to the comparison which they have to *themselves*[^7], not in relation to *God*, in respect of whom they rather agree. *Further*, the God-formedness of the intellect regards the intellective power; but we are inquiring about a difference of essences, not about a difference of powers. *Lastly*, what is obtained through grace[^8] is not against nature as instituted; but the intellect acquires God-formedness through glory: therefore this is not alien to the human intellect; therefore by this the Angel does not differ from the soul. And what is more, the separated soul has the manner of understanding which the Angel has[^9]; and the soul of Adam had innate species, as also the Angel; and all this seems to state something accidental: therefore the essential difference must not be taken from this.

But there were others who endeavored to find the difference according to the comparison of things[^10] to one another; and because they could not find acts differing formally, through which they might come to a knowledge of diverse differences, but found acts differing in degree and dignity; they said that the soul and the Angel differ in species on account of the greater excess in simplicity and goodness of nature. And this excess in essentials varies the species, when that excess goes beyond the limit due to the species, just as the hot in the fourth degree is of another species than the hot in the first; so they say it is in the matter at hand. — But it is very doubtful that the Angel so far exceeds the soul that from the excess itself a difference of species[^11] arises, since the best soul, namely Christ's, is the noblest creature and yet does not go beyond the human species. And *moreover*, granted that there were an excess there, the specific difference must not be taken from it, because it rather seems to follow upon the specific difference than the reverse. For rather, things of diverse goodnesses[^12] have degrees in nobility on account of the diverse natures of species, which are born to receive more and less, than the reverse. And again, this difference seems very general and transcendent, because, if it can be taken thus here, by parity of reasoning [it could be] everywhere.

And therefore the third is this manner of speaking, which I judge the more probable, which is taken by the comparison of the rational soul to the human body, on which side the soul becomes known to us not only according to accidents, but also according to *substance* and nature, and not only according to that which is of indignity, but also according to that which is of *nobility*. For this, that the soul is united to the human body or gives life to the human body, does not state an *accidental* act nor an *ignoble* act: not accidental, because by reason of it the soul is a substantial form[^13]; not ignoble, because by reason of it the soul is the noblest of all forms, and in the soul stands the appetite of the whole of nature. For the human body is organized and tempered with the noblest temperament and organization that is in nature; therefore it is not completed, nor is it born to be completed, except by the noblest form or nature[^14]. That, therefore, by which the soul is unitable to a body, states such an essential something — regarding what is noblest in the soul; and so from it is rightly taken the specific difference according to which the soul differs from the angelic nature. — Whence the reasons adduced for this are to be granted. To those things which are objected to the contrary, from the foregoing the response is clear.

1. As to what it says first, that the difference must be prior; it must be said that it is true; and that difference which is to-be-*unitable* does not state a pure relation, but a natural aptitude, which is in the soul according to intrinsic principles, which are prior to the soul by nature, just as *the rational* [is prior] in respect of man.

2. 3. To what is objected, that the completing difference must be proper; it must be said that to be united to a *body* is not proper to the rational soul; but nevertheless[^15] to be united to a *human body*, inasmuch as it states that which is essential and noble to the soul, so also imports that which is proper. — And by this is clear the other [point]. For that by mediation of which the soul perfects the human body is that by which the soul is a rational soul, and which is also the principle of the other noble operations[^16]; but

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it perfects [it] by itself; for the soul by itself perfects the body, just as a form by itself is united to matter.

4. To what is objected lastly, that the difference essentially adheres; it must be said that to-be-*unitable* adheres inseparably, because the *aptitude* is always present, although the *act* is not always present, as is clear in rationality and the power to walk. And just as the able-to-walk is maimed, and the rational soul is rendered foolish — not by nature, but on account of a defect of nature; so [too] that the soul is separated[^17], this is in punishment of sin. And therefore to-be-*separable* is not assigned as the difference of the soul in the way that to-be-*unitable* [is]. — *Further*, the rational soul, by the very fact that it is born to perfect a body so perfect and ordered by nature to immortality, is immortal; and by the very fact it is born to be *separated* from this body now dead on account of sin; and so it does not now[^18] state another difference than this, which is to-be-*unitable*, but follows upon it, because, just as there is no *separation* except of [something] previously united, so there is no *separability* in anything unless there has first been unitability by nature. And therefore, if anything can be the difference of the soul, it seems that it is this most of all, that is, that which is signified by this name[^19]. For our intellect very rarely arrives at the knowledge of a substantial form except *a posteriori*; and because as it knows, so it names, therefore it for the most part names the differences that are prior by nature *a posteriori*. And so the things sought are clear[^20].

---

la: Fide codd. U aa cc et ed. I substituimus *corpore* pro *homine*.

en: On the faith of codices U, aa, cc and ed. 1 we have substituted *corpore* ("from body") for *homine* ("from man").

la: Posuimus lectionem cod. N, quae et in se planior est, et qua aliae lectiones, quae hic in codd. occurrunt, explicantur; sic plures codd. legunt *cum ergo anima rationalis sit pars, esse suum completum consistit, ut est pars hominis*; cod. I *similiter cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, non habet suum esse completum*; plures codd. ut H T U W *ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis. Sed non est* etc. — De ultima propositione huius arg. cfr. Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Differentia*, ubi et plura alia huc spectantia tanguntur.

en: We have placed the reading of codex N, which is both plainer in itself and by which the other readings that occur here in the codices are explained; thus several codices read *cum ergo anima rationalis sit pars, esse suum completum consistit, ut est pars hominis*; codex I *similiter cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, non habet suum esse completum*; several codices such as H, T, U, W *ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis. Sed non est* etc. — On the last proposition of this argument cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Difference*, where several other things pertinent here are also touched.

la: Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. 6: *Quod vero per se est et substantia prius eo natura est, quod est ad aliquid; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est.* — In principio argumenti pro *prior* multi codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *primo*.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 6: *But that which is through itself and substance is prior by nature to that which is in relation to something; for this [latter] being seems to be a certain appendage and accident of that which is.* — At the beginning of the argument, for *prior* many codices with ed. 1 incongruously [read] *primo*.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), ubi ostendit, quod differentia ultima et finalis sit primum sive substantia rei. Cfr. etiam X. *Ethic.* c. 5. (c. 7.), ubi ostendit, optimum et praestantissimum omnium, quae in homine sunt, esse intellectum. Vide quaest. praeced. arg. 3. ad opposit.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 43 (VI, c. 12), where he shows that the ultimate and final difference is the first thing, or the substance of the thing. Cf. also *Ethics* X, c. 5 (c. 7), where he shows that the best and most excellent of all things that are in man is the intellect. See the preceding question, argument 3 *ad oppositum*.

la: Plures codd. ut C F K O R S T *opposita*.

en: Several codices such as C, F, K, O, R, S, T [read] *opposita*.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 7. § 2, ubi exponit, quod Angeli non ratiocinando neque per sensus, sed per propriam deiformis animi virtutem et naturam cognoscant. Cfr. ibid. c. 4. § 22. et c. 5. § 8.

en: *On the Divine Names*, c. 7, § 2, where he explains that the Angels know not by reasoning nor through the senses, but through the proper power and nature of a God-formed mind. Cf. ibid. c. 4, § 22, and c. 5, § 8.

la: Ita plures codd. ut X Y Z aa bb; plures alii codd. *a se*, Vat. *inter se*.

en: So several codices such as X, Y, Z, aa, bb; several other codices [read] *a se*, the Vatican ms. *inter se* ("among themselves").

la: Cod. bb *gloriam*; econtra codd. N aa paulo inferius *per gratiam* pro *per gloriam*. Vat. dein post *ergo haec* non bene adiicit *differentia*.

en: Codex bb [reads] *gloriam*; on the contrary codices N, aa a little below [read] *per gratiam* for *per gloriam*. The Vatican ms. then, after *ergo haec*, not well adds *differentia*.

la: Cfr. IV. *Sent.* d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — De cognitione, quae data est animae Adae, vide infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Cf. IV *Sent.* d. 50, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 seq. — On the knowledge that was given to the soul of Adam, see below, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cod. K *eorum*, scil. Angeli et animae.

en: Codex K [reads] *eorum* ("of them"), namely of the Angel and the soul.

la: Codd. F K *specifica*.

en: Codices F, K [read] *specifica*.

la: Cod. F *dignitatum*. Cod. I paulo inferius post *in nobilitate* adiungit *et bonitate*, et dein cod. F ponit *diversarum* pro *diversas*.

en: Codex F [reads] *dignitatum*. Codex I a little below, after *in nobilitate*, adds *et bonitate*, and then codex F puts *diversarum* for *diversas*.

la: Cod. I addit: *Accidentalem actum non dicit, quia anima naturalem appetitum habet ad corpus, quod (ita quod?) ab ea separari non possit, sicut dicit Augustinus super Gen. ad litteram.* — Ibi (VII. c. 27. n. 38.) dicitur: *Sed melius creditur hoc [ut in corpus mittatur] naturaliter velle i. e. in ea natura creari ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est velle vivere.*

en: Codex I adds: *It does not state an accidental act, because the soul has a natural appetite for the body, [so] that (so that?) it cannot be separated from it, as Augustine says on Genesis to the Letter.* — There (VII, c. 27, n. 38) it is said: *But it is better believed that [the soul] naturally wills this [to be sent into a body], i.e. to be created in that nature so as to will [it], just as it is natural to us to will to live.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2.

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vat. incongrue *tantum*; melior est lectio ed. 1, in qua, retento *tantum*, post *corpori humano* additur *et*. Cod. aa optime: *sed uniri corpori humano; sicut enim uniri corpori humano dicit illud, quod est* etc.

en: The Vatican ms. incongruously [reads] *tantum*; better is the reading of ed. 1, in which, *tantum* being retained, after *corpori humano* is added *et*. Codex aa best: *sed uniri corpori humano; sicut enim uniri corpori humano dicit illud, quod est* etc.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut V aa cum Vat. hic subiungunt *perficit... et autem* (Vat. *nam perficit*) *non mediante potentia*. Cod. T (in marg.) post *sed perficit se ipsa* addit *non mediante potentia*. Plurimi codd. *sed* (cod. N *et hoc*) *respicit se ipso* pro *sed perficit se ipsa*.

en: Some codices such as V, aa with the Vatican ms. here subjoin *perficit... et autem* (Vat. *nam perficit*) *non mediante potentia*. Codex T (in the margin), after *sed perficit se ipsa*, adds *non mediante potentia*. Very many codices [read] *sed* (cod. N *et hoc*) *respicit se ipso* for *sed perficit se ipsa*.

la: Cod. N *ita quoque anima separatur, et hoc est* etc.

en: Codex N [reads] *ita quoque anima separatur, et hoc est* etc.

la: Subaudi: *esse separabile*. — Cod. aa *et ideo* pro *et ita nunc*. Mox non pauci codd. *sed non consequitur illam* pro *sed consequitur illam*; falso. Aliquanto superius codd. F P Q *sicut perfectum* pro *sic perfectum*; dein cod. N omittit *immortalis*.

en: Supply: *to-be-separable*. — Codex aa [reads] *et ideo* for *et ita nunc*. Soon, not a few codices [read] *sed non consequitur illam* for *sed consequitur illam*; falsely. Somewhat above, codices F, P, Q [read] *sicut perfectum* for *sic perfectum*; then codex N omits *immortalis*.

la: Subaudi cum cod. N *unibilitas*. Codd. F H cum ed. 3 omittunt *id est*.

en: Supply, with codex N, *unibilitas* ("unitability"). Codices F, H with ed. 3 omit *id est*.

la: Vide Scholion ad q. 1.

en: See the Scholion to q. 1.

translators_notes:
**No scholion.** This question has no scholion of its own: the scholion of the preceding chunk (a3-q1) expressly covers it (*«pauca hic notata sufficiant etiam pro quaest. seq.»*), and the apparatus confirms it — the page-51 footer note 4 anchoring the chunk's last clause is simply *«Vide Scholion ad q. 1.»* (rendered here as [^20]). `has_scholion: false` accordingly.

**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page. This chunk uses a single sequence 1–20: notes 1–5 = the page-49 footer (Fundamentum 2 [^1]; Fundamentum 3 [^2]; Contra 1 [^3]; Contra 3 [^4]; Contra 4 [^5]); notes 6–16 = the page-50 footer, all eleven (opinio 1: Dionysius [^6], *ad se* [^7], *per gratiam* [^8], *quem habet Angelus* [^9]; opinio 2: *comparationem rerum* [^10], *differentia specierum* [^11], *diversarum bonitatum* [^12]; opinio 3: *forma substantialis* [^13], *nobilissima forma* [^14]; reply 2–3: *sed tamen* [^15], *operationum* [^16]); notes 17–20 = the page-51 footer's first four notes (reply 4: *anima separatur* [^17], *et ita nunc* [^18], *per hoc nomen* [^19], *patent quaesita* [^20]).

**Cross-chunk footer splits.**
- *Page-49 footer:* a3-q1's page-49 content was scholion-only (no `[^]` markers), so all five page-49 footer notes anchor this q2. No inheritance to skip.
- *Page-50→51 footer runover:* note 11 of the page-50 footer (`Nonnulli codd. ut V aa cum Vat. hic subiungunt perficit...`) is continued physically at the head of the page-51 footer left column (`...et autem (Vat. nam perficit) non mediante potentia. Cod. T (in marg.)... Plurimi codd. sed (cod. N et hoc) respicit se ipso pro sed perficit se ipsa.`). The full note is folded into [^16].
- *Page-51 footer:* only **notes 1–4** anchor this q2 (reply 4's four markers). The page-51 footer's **note 5** (`Hic c. 4.`) and the right-column notes 6–11 (`Sequimur cod. bb addendo et...`; `Dist. 43.`; `Dist. 43. a. 2. q. 1. et 2.`; `De hoc dubio vide I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 13. seq...`; `Sive: «Quomodo substantiae...»`; `Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. novum esse.`) anchor in the **following** chunk, `d1-p2-dubia` (DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI, raw 4187), whose body begins at the bottom of printed p. 51. They are left for that chunk.

**PDF verification (whole chunk).** The IA djvu OCR was severely diagonal-cascade-fragmented through the *triplex-modus* Respondeo and the *Solutio oppositorum* (raw 4087–4185 interleaved opinio 1 left column with opinio 2/3 + Solutio right column; the *Opinio 1/2*, *Improbatur*, *Sententia probabilior*, *Notandum*, *Conclusio*, *Solutio oppositorum* marginal glosses bled inline). The entire chunk was re-set against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 49–51 = PDF pp. 71–73) via PIL column-band crops (`tools/colcrop.py`), reading each page left column then right column, body bands then footer bands. Confirmed reconstructions: the four Fundamenta and four Contra; the three *modi dicendi* with their two *Improbatur* rebuttals; the four-fold (1 / 2–3 / 4) *Solutio oppositorum*; the reply-2/3 page-50↔51 bridge (*principium aliarum nobilium operationum; sed* | *perficit se ipsa*); the chunk's final clause *Et sic patent quaesita* (OCR split *quae-* | *sita*).

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Editorial side-glosses bleeding inline per CLAUDE.md are not rendered: *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*, *Opinio 1.*, *Opinio 2.*, *Improbatur* (×2), *Sententia probabilior*, *Notandum*, *Conclusio.* (the inline gloss; the centered `CONCLUSIO.` rubric is rendered as the standard `> **Conclusio.**` blockquote), *Solutio oppositorum*. The `S. Bonav. — Tom. II.` catchword and the gathering signature `7` at the foot of p. 49 are likewise dropped.

**Page breaks.** Chunk opens on printed p. 49 (it begins after a3-q1's scholion III; the p. 49 running head at raw 4041 falls within a3-q1's territory). p. 49 ↔ p. 50 placed within Respondeo opinio 1, after *Et ratio, quae movit eos, haec fuit, quia* (running head `50 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` — OCR digit-mangled `80` — at raw 4107). p. 50 ↔ p. 51 placed within reply 2–3, after *principium aliarum nobilium operationum; sed* (running head `DIST. I. P. II. DUBIA.` — running-head lag, dubia-labelled — at raw 4170).

**Open [?] for d.10 polish-blocker.** None blocking — the 450 dpi PDF cleared the genuine garbles. Low-confidence residuals to re-confirm at 600 dpi:
- [^16] page-50→51 runover seam: the join between the page-50-footer note 11 opener (`Nonnulli codd. ut V aa cum Vat. hic subiungunt perfi-`) and its page-51-footer continuation (`et autem (Vat. nam perficit) non mediante potentia...`) rests on two-column footer linearization at the chunk-internal page boundary; content is faithful, re-confirm the seam.
- [^20] anchor: the chunk's final clause was OCR-split *Et sic patent quae-* (p. 51 left col) | *sita* (p. 51 right col), with the marker on *sita*; reconstructed as *quaesita* and anchored to page-51 footer note 4 (`Vide Scholion ad q. 1.`) — secure on content (it is the terminal clause and the note is the terminal note before the dubia's `Hic c. 4.`), worth an eyes-on at 600 dpi.