title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II.
### *De comparatione culpae ad poenam[^1] secundum inseparabilitatem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo reperire poenam sine merito praecedentis culpae.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ecclesiastici quinto: *Altissimus est patiens redditor*[^2]; sed patiens non statim vindicat iram suam, sed usque in tempus exspectat: ergo videtur, quod

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Deus peccatorem non statim puniat: ergo contingit, in aliquo esse culpam sine poena.

2. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; sed meritum non habet statim coniunctum praemium: ergo videtur similiter, quod culpa non statim habeat iunctam poenam: ergo etc.

3. Item, « poena est, ut dicit Augustinus[^3], labor involuntarius »; sed impiis et peccatoribus in hac vita multa prospera proveniunt; et plures sunt, qui adeo in malo laetantur, quod dolorem non sentiunt: ergo videtur, quod ponere sit peccatum absque poena, saltem ad tempus.

4. Item, si statim peccator, cum peccat, punitur, aut punitur *sufficienter*, aut *non sufficienter*. Si sufficienter: ergo non deberet amplius in inferno puniri. Si non sufficienter: ergo aliquid de culpa ad tempus remanet impunitum. Sed qua ratione aliquid remanet impunitum, eadem ratione et totum: ergo videtur, quod peccatum possit saltem ad tempus separari a poena.

5. Item, multo misericordior et benignior est Deus, quam sit aliquis homo; sed ad laudem benignitatis humanae spectat, ut in nullo vindicet iniuriam sibi factam: ergo multo fortius hoc decet facere Deum: ergo videtur, quod saltem ad tempus debeat relinquere peccatum impunitum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus primo Confessionum[^4]: « Iussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut poena sua sit sibi omnis inordinatus animus »: si ergo ad culpam necessario sequitur animi inordinatio, necessario igitur ad culpam sequitur aliqua punitio.

2. Item, ubicumque est peccatum, ibi est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis[^5]; ubicumque autem hoc est, ibi est damnificatio; ubicumque autem damnificatio est merito culpae, ibi est iusta punitio: ergo impossibile est, culpam esse in aliquo absque poena.

3. Item, quicumque inordinate convertitur ad bonum ut nunc, avertitur a bono simpliciter[^6]; et quicumque acquirit carnalem delectationem, perdit spiritualem consolationem[^7]; sed perdere spiritualem consolationem, ad quam anima nata est, et amittere Deum, qui est omne bonum animae, hoc est maximum damnum et poenam incurrere: ergo videtur, quod nunquam peccatum committitur absque poena.

4. Item, universum ideo dicitur esse valde bonum, quia optime ordinatum[^8]; sed in eo quod est optime ordinatum, non potest esse ordinis corruptio, nec simpliciter nec ad tempus; sed peccatum absque poena est inordinatum: ergo impossibile est, ad momentum peccatum esse impunitum.

5. Item, ad iustitiae perfectionem spectat superare iniustitiam, sicut ad sapientiae perfectionem spectat vincere malitiam, ut dicitur Sapientiae septimo[^9]: *Sapientia vincit malitiam*; sed quia sapientia vincit malitiam, impossibile est, aliquod malum esse, quod divina sapientia non statim ordinet et exinde bonum aliquod eliciat: ergo cum iustitia Dei similiter omnem superet iniustitiam, impossibile est, aliquam culpam committi, quin statim ad eam sequatur aliqua poena.

### Conclusio.

> Impossibile est, culpam in aliquo esse, quin ad ipsam sequatur poena inseparabiliter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod impossibile est, culpam in aliquo esse, quin ad ipsam sequatur poena inseparabiliter. — Et ratio huius potest sumi ex perfectione divinae aequitatis, et ex pulcritudine universitatis, et ex inordinatione culpae, et ex conditione peccantis naturae.

Ex perfectione divinae aequitatis ratio sumitur. Tantae enim aequitatis est Deus, qui est iudex omnium[^10], ut non patiatur dedecus peccati ad modicum esse sine decore iustitiae; omni enim modo debet iustitia iniustitiam superare. — Ex pulcritudine universitatis ratio sumitur. Universum enim ex ordine pulcritudinem habet, et talis est ista pulcritudo, qualem decuit fieri ad ostensionem summae sapientiae; et ideo nullo modo foedari potest, ac per hoc nec ad momentum esse in ea aliquid inordinatum, et ita nec peccatum a poena separatum. — Ex corruptione culpae ratio sumitur. Nunquam enim culpa committitur, quin modus, species et ordo circa actionem voluntatis privetur; et dum voluntas se voluntarie in actu suo deordinat, semetipsam incurvat; et dum incurvatur, modo, specie et ordine privatur quantum ad habilitatem ad bonum. Talis autem privatio magna est in ipsa anima damnificatio et laesio. Et ideo dicit Augustinus in quodam sermone de Innocentibus[^11]: « Nemo habet iniustum lucrum sine iusto damno; ubi lucrum, ibi damnum; lucrum in arca, et damnum in conscientia; tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem; acquirit pecuniam, et perdit iustitiam ». — Ex conditione peccantis naturae ratio sumitur. Quia voluntas rationalis, quae est causa peccati, quasi media est inter sensualitatem et synderesim, media est etiam inter Deum et alias creaturas; et cum se convertit ad haec inferiora, ab eo

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recedit, qui sursum est; et dum acquirit parvum bonum, amittit magnum bonum, quia, dum acquirit bonum ut nunc, amittit bonum simpliciter; et quae erat media facit se ipsam infimam. Similiter, cum peccando concordat cum sensualitate, discordat cum synderesi; et dum cum synderesi discordat, incurrit ex illa repugnantia remorsum quendam et afflictionem internam. Et ita, dum peccat, perdit magnum bonum, perdit honorem proprium, perdit solatium et incurrit remorsum[^12]. — Et sic patet, quod ad culpam inseparabiliter sequitur poena, sive dicatur poena quaedam damnificatio, sive dicatur poena afflictio sive involuntaria passio. Sed poena, quae est damnificatio, semper sequitur et actu et habitu, quia nunquam est homo in culpa, quin semper sit in damno. Afflictio vero sive remorsio sequitur saltem in habitu; quamvis propter delectationem intensam, vel inconsiderationem sive distractionem animi non sentiatur.

Et ex hoc patet, qualiter peccatum claudit in se poenam, et qualiter peccatum potest dici poena peccati, et etiam poena sui ipsius. Secundum enim diversam comparationem voluntatis peccantis ad synderesim et sensualitatem, idem ipsum et habet rationem peccati et habet rationem poenae, sicut ostensum est. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod poena consequitur culpam inseparabiliter.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Altissimus est patiens redditor; dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de poena, scilicet quantum ad statum inchoationis, et quantum ad statum consummationis. Et primo modo punitur homo remediabiliter, secundo irremediabiliter. Poenam igitur secundum statum inchoationis et remediabilitatis statim infert Deus, quia hoc decet suam iustitiam. Secundum statum vero consummationis et irremediabilitatis differt; hoc enim decet suam benignitatem et patientiam, secundum cuius divitias nos exspectat ad poenitentiam[^13].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non statim remunerat; dicendum, quod sicut in poena magnitudo afflictionis differtur, et interior afflictio et remorsio peccatum concomitatur, sic et in bene factis multitudo dulcedinis absconditur bene facientibus[^14]; nihilominus tamen aliquae primitiae spiritus degustantur, et in omni bono opere quaedam iucunditas conscientiae et tranquillitas bene operanti conceditur, quae est sicut fructus et remuneratio operis illius. Et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus[^15]: *Laborantem agricolam oportet primo de fructibus edere*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena est passio involuntaria et afflictiva; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam ibi est et damnificatio et afflictio, quamvis non semper sentiatur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus punit sufficienter, aut non; dicendum, quod punire sufficienter hoc est dupliciter: aut simpliciter, aut secundum quod competit statui[^16]. In praesenti igitur punitur culpa sufficienter; sed hoc non simpliciter, sed prout competit statui praesenti. Et ideo in tali punitione salvatur debitus ordo; et nihilominus post egressum animae a corpore debet fieri poenae accumulatio; nec remanet in praesenti nec in futuro aliquid impunitum, sed totum punitur, licet etiam plus et minus, secundum quod exigit tempus et locus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo benignus totum condonat; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, cum Deus sit ipsa iustitia, si propriam offensam dimitteret impunitam, iniuriam faceret ipsi iustitiae; non sic autem est de homine[^17]. *Praeterea*, cum ipse sit ultimus iudex, ei reservantur omnia punienda; unde quod ipse dimittit impunitum, alius punire non potest. Non sic autem est de homine, qui habet alium superiorem iudicem, et quod ipse non punit quasi ad Deum remittit.

english:
### ARTICLE II.
### *On the comparison of guilt to punishment[^1] according to inseparability.*

Consequently it is asked concerning the comparison of guilt to punishment according to inseparability. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following.

Second it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to find punishment without the merit of preceding guilt.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following. And that it can, it seems:

1. Ecclesiasticus, fifth [chapter]: *The Most High is a patient rewarder*[^2]; but the patient one does not at once avenge his wrath, but waits even until a [later] time: therefore it seems that

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God does not at once punish the sinner: therefore it can happen that in something there is guilt without punishment.

2. Likewise, God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but merit does not at once have a reward joined [to it]: therefore it seems likewise that guilt does not at once have a punishment joined [to it]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « punishment is, as Augustine says[^3], involuntary labor »; but to the impious and to sinners many prosperous things come in this life; and there are many who rejoice so much in evil that they feel no grief: therefore it seems that there can be sin without punishment, at least for a time.

4. Likewise, if a sinner is at once punished when he sins, he is either punished *sufficiently* or *not sufficiently*. If sufficiently: therefore he ought not to be punished further in hell. If not sufficiently: therefore something of the guilt remains for a time unpunished. But by whatever reason something remains unpunished, by the same reason also the whole: therefore it seems that sin can at least for a time be separated from punishment.

5. Likewise, God is much more merciful and kind than any human is; but it pertains to the praise of human kindness that one avenge in no way an injury done to oneself: therefore much more strongly does it befit God to do this: therefore it seems that at least for a time he ought to leave sin unpunished.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, first [book] of the Confessions[^4]: « Thou hast commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every disordered soul be its own punishment to itself »: if therefore disorder of soul necessarily follows upon guilt, therefore some punishment necessarily follows upon guilt.

2. Likewise, wherever there is sin, there is the privation of mode, species, and order[^5]; but wherever this is, there is damage; but wherever there is damage by the merit of guilt, there is just punishment: therefore it is impossible that guilt be in something without punishment.

3. Likewise, whoever is disorderedly turned toward a good as-of-now is turned away from the good without qualification[^6]; and whoever acquires carnal delight loses spiritual consolation[^7]; but to lose the spiritual consolation for which the soul is born, and to lose God, who is the whole good of the soul, this is to incur the greatest damage and punishment: therefore it seems that sin is never committed without punishment.

4. Likewise, the universe is said to be very good because it is most-well ordered[^8]; but in that which is most-well ordered there cannot be a corruption of order, neither without qualification nor for a time; but sin without punishment is disordered: therefore it is impossible that for a moment sin be unpunished.

5. Likewise, it pertains to the perfection of justice to overcome injustice, just as it pertains to the perfection of wisdom to conquer malice, as is said in Wisdom, seventh [chapter][^9]: *Wisdom conquers malice*; but because wisdom conquers malice, it is impossible that there be any evil which the divine wisdom does not at once order and from thence draw out some good: therefore since the justice of God likewise overcomes all injustice, it is impossible that any guilt be committed without some punishment at once following upon it.

### Conclusion.

> It is impossible that guilt be in anything without punishment following upon it inseparably.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is impossible that guilt be in anything without punishment following upon it inseparably. — And the reason for this can be taken from the perfection of the divine equity, and from the beauty of the universe, and from the disorder of guilt, and from the condition of the sinning nature.

From the perfection of the divine equity the reason is taken. For God, who is the judge of all[^10], is of such great equity that he does not allow the shame of sin to be even for a little while without the comeliness of justice; for in every way justice ought to overcome injustice. — From the beauty of the universe the reason is taken. For the universe has its beauty from order, and such is this beauty as it befit to be made for the showing of the highest wisdom; and therefore it can in no way be defiled, and through this neither can there be in it for a moment anything disordered, and so neither sin separated from punishment. — From the corruption of guilt the reason is taken. For never is guilt committed without the mode, species, and order being deprived as regards the action of the will; and while the will voluntarily disorders itself in its act, it bends itself in upon itself; and while it is bent inward, it is deprived of mode, species, and order as to its aptitude for the good. But such a privation is a great damage and harm in the soul itself. And therefore Augustine says in a certain sermon on the Innocents[^11]: « No one has unjust gain without just loss; where there is gain, there is loss; gain in the chest, and loss in the conscience; he took the garment, and lost faith; he acquires money, and loses justice ». — From the condition of the sinning nature the reason is taken. Because the rational will, which is the cause of sin, is as it were midway between sensuality and synderesis, it is also midway between God and the other creatures; and when it turns itself toward these lower things, it withdraws from him who is above

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it; and while it acquires a small good, it loses a great good, because, while it acquires a good as-of-now, it loses the good without qualification; and that which was midway makes itself lowest. Likewise, when in sinning it accords with sensuality, it discords with synderesis; and while it discords with synderesis, it incurs from that conflict a certain remorse and inner affliction[^12]. And so, while it sins, it loses a great good, it loses its proper honor, it loses solace, and incurs remorse. — And thus it is clear that punishment follows upon guilt inseparably, whether the punishment be called a certain damage, or whether the punishment be called affliction or involuntary suffering. But the punishment which is damage always follows both in act and in habit, because the human is never in guilt without always being in damage. But the affliction or remorse follows at least in habit; although on account of intense delight, or inconsideration or distraction of mind, it is not felt.

And from this it is clear how sin encloses in itself punishment, and how sin can be called the punishment of sin, and even the punishment of itself. For according to the diverse comparison of the will of the sinner to synderesis and sensuality, the very same thing both has the character of sin and has the character of punishment, as has been shown. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which prove that punishment follows upon guilt inseparably.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that the Most High is a patient rewarder; it must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of punishment, namely as to the state of inception, and as to the state of consummation. And in the first way the human is punished remediably, in the second irremediably. The punishment therefore according to the state of inception and remediability God inflicts at once, because this befits his justice. But according to the state of consummation and irremediability he defers [it]; for this befits his kindness and patience, according to whose riches he awaits us unto repentance[^13].

2. To that which is objected, that God does not at once reward; it must be said that just as in punishment the magnitude of affliction is deferred, and the interior affliction and remorse accompanies the sin, so also in good deeds a multitude of sweetness is hidden away from those doing good[^14]; nevertheless some first-fruits of the spirit are tasted, and in every good work a certain joy of conscience and tranquillity is granted to the one working well, which is as it were the fruit and reward of that work. And this is what the Apostle says[^15]: *The laboring husbandman ought first to eat of the fruits*.

3. To that which is objected, that punishment is an involuntary and afflictive suffering; the response is already clear from those things which have been said. For there is there both damage and affliction, although it is not always felt.

4. To that which is objected, that God punishes sufficiently, or not; it must be said that to punish sufficiently is [understood] in two ways: either without qualification, or according to what befits the state[^16]. In the present [life] therefore guilt is punished sufficiently; but this not without qualification, but as befits the present state. And therefore in such punishment the due order is preserved; and nonetheless after the departure of the soul from the body there ought to be an accumulation of punishment; nor does anything remain unpunished, either in the present or in the future, but the whole is punished, although also more and less, according as time and place require.

5. To that which is objected, that the kind human forgives all; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that, since God is justice itself, if he were to dismiss his own offense unpunished, he would do an injury to justice itself; but it is not so concerning the human[^17]. *Furthermore*, since he is the last judge, to him are reserved all things to be punished; whence what he dismisses unpunished, another cannot punish. But it is not so concerning the human, who has another higher judge, and what he himself does not punish he as it were remits to God.

la: Codd. K X Y bb cc et ed. 1 *poenae ad culpam.*

en: Codd. K X Y bb cc and ed. 1 [read] *poenae ad culpam* ("of punishment to guilt").

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Verba huius sententiae August. vide supra pag. 784, nota 6.

en: For the words of this sentence of Augustine, see above p. 784, note 6.

la: De Vera Relig. c. 10. n. 76.

en: *On True Religion* c. 10. n. 76.

en: Chapter 12. n. 19.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2.

en: Cfr. above d. 35. a. 2.

la: Cfr. Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 9. n. 16.

en: Cfr. Gregory, XVIII. *Morals* c. 9. n. 16.

la: Gen. 1, 31: *Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona.* Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 10. n. 3; et I. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. nec non d. 46. q. 6.

en: Gen. 1, 31: *And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.* Cfr. Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 10. n. 3; and I. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. as well as d. 46. q. 6.

la: Vers. 30: *Sapientiam autem non vincit malitia.*

en: Verse 30: *But malice does not conquer wisdom.*

la: Hebr. 12, 23: *Sed... et iudicem omnium Deum.* — Quoad ea quae sequuntur, vide supra pag. 770, nota 1.

en: Hebr. 12, 23: *But... and to God the judge of all.* — As to those things which follow, see above p. 770, note 1.

la: Nunc 220. in Appendice (alias 10. de Sanctis) n. 2, ubi textus originalis pro *tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem* exhibet *tollit vestem et perdit fidem.* Cfr. Serm. 8. de Decem Plagis et decem praeceptis, c. 7. n. 8. — De hac ratione vide supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.

en: Now 220. in the Appendix (otherwise 10. *On the Saints*) n. 2, where the original text for *tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem* ("he took the garment, and lost faith") gives *tollit vestem et perdit fidem* ("he takes away the garment and loses faith"). Cfr. Serm. 8. *On the Ten Plagues and the Ten Precepts*, c. 7. n. 8. — On this argument see above d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. and a. 2. q. 1.

la: Cfr. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 9. n. 12. et Epist. 140. (alias 120.) seu de Gratia novi Testam. lib. ad Honorat. c. 2. n. 3. seq. Cfr. etiam Gregor., XI. Moral. c. 9. n. 12, et XXVII. c. 25. n. 48. — De synderesi agitur infra d. 39. a. 2.

en: Cfr. Augustine, II. *On Genesis against the Manicheans* c. 9. n. 12. and Epist. 140. (otherwise 120.), that is, *On the Grace of the New Testament*, the book to Honoratus, c. 2. n. 3. seq. Cfr. also Gregory, XI. *Morals* c. 9. n. 12, and XXVII. c. 25. n. 48. — Synderesis is treated below d. 39. a. 2.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 2, 4: *An divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et longanimitatis contemnis? ignoras, quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit?* — Cod. Z *misericordiam* pro *patientiam.*

en: Reference is made to that [text of] Rom. 2, 4: *Or dost thou despise the riches of his goodness and patience and longsuffering? knowest thou not that the kindness of God leadeth thee to repentance?* — Cod. Z [reads] *misericordiam* ("mercy") for *patientiam* ("patience").

la: Psalm. 30, 20: *Quam magna multitudo dulcedinis tuae, Domine, quam abscondisti timentibus te.* — Rom. 8, 23: *Non solum autem illa, sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes* etc.

en: Psalm 30, 20: *How great is the multitude of thy sweetness, O Lord, which thou hast hidden for them that fear thee.* — Rom. 8, 23: *And not only it, but ourselves also, having the first-fruits of the spirit,* etc.

la: Epist. II. ad Tim. 2, 6, ubi Vulgata: *laborantem agricolam oportet primum de fructibus percipere.* — Cod. K *operantibus* pro *operanti.*

en: II. *To Timothy* 2, 6, where the Vulgate [reads]: *the laboring husbandman ought first to partake of the fruits.* — Cod. K [reads] *operantibus* for *operanti.*

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt *praesenti*, sed prorsus inconvenienter, cum in subnexis duplex status distinguatur, praesens et futurus. — Paulo superius post *Deus* codd. M Q addunt *aut.*

en: The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 add *praesenti* ("present"), but quite unfittingly, since in what follows a twofold state is distinguished, present and future. — A little above, after *Deus* codd. M Q add *aut* ("or").

la: Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12, ubi ostenditur, quodsi peccatum a Deo dimitteretur impunitum, tunc peccantem et non-peccantem aequales esse ante Deum, peccatum nulli legi subiacere, et iniustitiam liberiorem esse quam iustitiam sicque Deo similem.

en: Cfr. Anselm, I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 12, where it is shown that, if sin were dismissed by God unpunished, then the sinner and the non-sinner would be equal before God, sin would be subject to no law, and injustice would be freer than justice and thus like God.

latin_scholion:
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**I.** Utraque huius articuli quaestio abundat salutari doctrina. Quoad 1. quaest. recole quod supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2. dictum est, praesertim (q. 2. ad 4.) de poena *acta, inflicta* et *contracta*. — Quaestio 1. tangitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 7. 8, et a S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 33. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 1. De eadem: B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 121. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

**II.** Quoad seq. (2. quaest.) consentiunt antiqui doctores in hoc, quod poena, licet ordinari possit non tantum ad praecedens malum, sed etiam ad posterius bonum (hic ad 4.), in praesenti tamen providentia semper aliquo modo respiciat aliquod peccatum. Hinc dicit S. Thom. (de Malo, q. 1. a. 4. in corp.): « Habet autem hoc *traditio fidei*, quod nullum nocumentum creaturae rationalis potuisset incurrere, neque quantum ad animam neque quantum ad corpus neque quantum ad aliqua exteriora, nisi peccato praecedente, vel in persona, vel saltem in natura ». — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 87. a. 7. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.

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english_scholion:
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**I.** Each question of this article abounds in salutary doctrine. As to the 1st question, recall what was said above d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2., especially (q. 2. ad 4.) concerning punishment that is *enacted, inflicted,* and *contracted*. — Question 1 is touched upon by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 94. m. 7. 8, and by St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 33. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 1. On the same: B. Albert, here a. 2; *Summa* p. II. tr. 22. q. 121. m. 1. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

**II.** As to the following (the 2nd question), the ancient doctors agree in this, that punishment, although it can be ordered not only to a preceding evil, but also to a subsequent good (here ad 4.), nevertheless in the present [order] providence always in some way regards some sin. Hence St. Thomas says (*On Evil*, q. 1. a. 4. in the body): « But the tradition of faith holds this, that no harm could befall the rational creature, neither as to soul nor as to body nor as to any external things, except with sin preceding, either in the person, or at least in the nature ». — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III. q. 87. a. 7. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 7. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 59017–59182), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo (the four *rationes* + corollarium), Solutio ad-obiecta 1–5, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 847–850, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 869–872). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. ART II opener folded in per Override §5.

**Folded ART II opener.** Per Override §5 the short ARTICULUS II opener (`Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo… Secundo…`, raw 59017–59025, p.847 R-col) is folded into this q1 as headings + a question-listing — no standalone d36-a2-divisio chunk.

**Alignment check — PASSED.** ART II opener topic (1) = *Primo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente*; q1 title = *Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente*. Match confirmed at 450 dpi.

**d.36 ART II / ART III definitive quaestio mapping (re-derived at 450 dpi this session — raw line order is two-column interleaved, so raw header positions do NOT equal printed-page order):**
- **ART II** *De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem* (raw 59017, opener `quaeruntur duo`):
  - **a2-q1** *Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente* — raw **59026 → 59182** (scholion item II tail, p.850 top, ends at `Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.` immediately before `QU.\ESTIO II.` raw 59252). **Printed pp. 847–850** (q1 opener p.847 R-col bottom; fund 2–SC5+Resp p.848; Resp tail+Solutio p.849; scholion I–II tail p.850 top). **THIS CHUNK.**
  - **a2-q2** *Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente* — raw **59252 → ~59325** (ends before ART III header raw 59326). **Printed pp. 850–852** (q2 opener p.850 two-col body; running head `DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` raw 59252 over p.850, `8b2`=852 raw 59319). NB title confirmed at PDF: *Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente* (not the resume's tentative *reperire poenam sine merito praecedentis culpae*, which is the ART II opener's paraphrase of topic 2).
  - **a2-q2 CONCLUSIO (verified p.850):** *Poena potest esse in aliquo sine culpa propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elici potest.*
- **ART III** *De comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem* (raw 59326, opener `Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo`):
  - **a3-q1** *Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo* — `QUAESTIO I` raw **59335**; running head `DIST. XXXVI. ART. III. QUAEST.` raw 59381. **Printed pp. ~852–854** (verify span at promotion).
  - **a3-q2** *Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo* — `QUAESTIO II` raw **59454**; running head `DIST. XXXVI. ART. III. QUAEST. II.` raw 59507. Closes before `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` raw 59619 / `DIST. XXXVI. DUBIA.` raw 59641.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 847–850.
- p. 847 (running head `…ART. II. QUAEST. I. 847`): ART II opener + QUAESTIO I title + fund 1 (R-col bottom; the a1-q2 tail+scholion occupy the upper R-col). Footers 1–4 belong to a1-q2 (its [^17]–[^20]); footers **5** (Codd. K X Y bb cc et ed. 1 *poenae ad culpam*) + **6** (Vers. 4) received from a1-q2 → [^1]–[^2]. [^1] anchors at the ART II title *De comparatione culpae ad poenam* (the variant inverts to *poenae ad culpam*); [^2] anchors at fund 1 *Ecclesiastici quinto*.
- p. 848 (`848 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): fund 2–5 + Sed contra 1–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo (rationes 1–3 + start of ratio 4). L-col footers 1–6 → [^3]–[^8] ([^3] fund 3 Aug. *poena est*; [^4] SC1 *Confessionum*; [^5] SC2 *modi speciei ordinis*; [^6] SC3 *a bono simpliciter*; [^7] SC3 *spiritualem consolationem*; [^8] SC4 *optime ordinatum*). R-col footers 7–9 → [^9]–[^11] ([^9] SC5 *Sapientiae septimo*; [^10] Resp ratio 1 *iudex omnium*; [^11] Resp ratio 3 *de Innocentibus*).
- p. 849 (`DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 849`): Respondeo tail (ratio 4 + corollarium) + Solutio ad-1…ad-5. Footers 1–6 → [^12]–[^17] ([^12] Resp tail *remorsum*; [^13] ad-1 *poenitentiam*; [^14] ad-2 *bene facientibus*; [^15] ad-2 *Apostolus*; [^16] ad-4 *competit statui*; [^17] ad-5 *de homine*). SCHOLION begins full-width at p.849 R-col bottom.
- p. 850 (`850 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`, full-width top band): SCHOLION item I tail + item II, ending at `Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.` The SCHOLION carries only reference/commentator content — **NO numbered footers.** QUAESTIO II opens below in two columns (= a2-q2).

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at a2-q1, items I + II (`has_scholion: true`). This is the ARTICLE-level scholion: item I treats q1 (*Quoad 1. quaest.* + the Alex.Hal./S.Thom. commentator roll for q1), item II treats q2 (*Quoad seq. (2. quaest.)* + the de-Malo *traditio fidei* + q2 commentator roll). Per Override §5, a2-q2 may legitimately lack its own scholion since this article scholion is held at q1.

**Hand-off received.** From d36-a1-q2: p.847 footers 5 (Codd. K X Y bb cc et ed. 1 *poenae ad culpam*) → [^1], and 6 (Vers. 4) → [^2]. a1-q2 claimed only p.847 footers 1–4.

**Hand-off forwarded to d36-a2-q2.** NONE. This q1 closes cleanly with its SCHOLION at the top of p.850; QUAESTIO II opens fresh below with its own p.850 footer block (which is two-column and shared with a2-q1's scholion top — but the scholion carries no footers, so a2-q2 claims the entire p.850 footer set). a2-q2 begins raw 59252, printed p.850 R-col body, *Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente.*

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 847–850 read top→bottom. Seams: p.847/848 (inside fund 1, *ergo videtur, quod / Deus peccatorem non statim puniat* — continuous); p.848/849 (inside Respondeo ratio 4, *ab eo / recedit, qui sursum est* — continuous); p.849/850 (inside SCHOLION item II, *sed etiam ad posterius bonum…* — continuous, verified the de-Malo *traditio fidei* citation is whole). No mid-paragraph cascade-splice signature found. The shared p.847 footer block is fully accounted across a1-q2 (1–4) + this q1 (5–6).

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 850 -->

### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Hieronymi[^1]; ait enim sic: *Ad oppositum.* « Quidquid patimur, peccata nostra meruerunt ».

2. Item, Gregorius in quadam collecta[^2]: « Nulla eis nocebit adversitas, si nulla dominetur eis iniquitas »: ergo si non praecessit dominium culpae, videtur, quod nullo modo sequi possit supplicium poenae.

3. Item, Augustinus in primo Retractationum[^3]: « Mors et vita a Domino Deo est; sed vita ut a donante, et mors ut a vindicante »: si igitur mors est a Deo ut a vindicante, pari ratione et omnis alia poena. Sed omnis vindicta respicit meritum culpae praecedentis: ergo videtur, quod in nullo sit aliqua poena, quin in ipso prius fuerit culpa illius poenae meritoria.

4. Item, poena, quantum est de se, dicit aliquod malum; dividitur enim malum in malum culpae et malum poenae[^4]: ergo sicut malum culpae dicit privationem alicuius boni et alicuius ordinis, ita etiam et malum poenae: ergo sicut malum culpae indiget ordinari, ita et malum poenae. Sed sicut malum culpae ordinatur per sequens malum poenae, sic malum poenae per anterius malum culpae: ergo sicut culpa non potest esse sine poena, sic nec poena sine culpa.

5. Item, omnis punitio, secundum quod huiusmodi, est effectus divinae iustitiae: iustitia autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, considerat exigentiam meritorum; nullum autem est meritum poenae nisi peccatum[^5]: ergo impossibile est, aliquem puniri nisi in eo, quod praecesserit macula peccati.

**Sed contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Iob decimo septimo[^6]: *Non peccavi, et in amaritudinibus moratur oculus meus.* Et similiter Iob sexto: *Utinam appenderentur peccata mea, quibus iram merui, et calamitas, quam patior, in statera; quasi arena maris haec gravior appareret:* ergo videtur, quod poenae, quae fuerunt in Iob, non fuerunt merito praecedentium peccatorum.

2. Item, Ioannis nono[^7]: *Quis peccavit, hic, aut parentes eius, ut caecus nasceretur?* ibi dicitur: *Neque hic peccavit, neque parentes eius;* et exponit Augustinus, quod hoc non dicitur, quia non peccaverunt, sed quia caecitas non erat poena peccati: ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, pro peccato originali non meretur quis nisi semel mori[^8]; et Lazarus non tantum fuit mortuus semel, sed bis: ergo videtur, quod aut mors prima, aut secunda fuerit ei absque merito peccati inflicta.

4. Item, tota die videmus, quod impius affligit iustum; et de hoc etiam propheta conqueritur Habacuc primo[^9]: *Quare taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se?* Sed non esset iusta querela Prophetae, si iustus pro peccatis suis puniretur: ergo videtur, quod multae poenae infligantur, quae non infliguntur merito peccatorum.

5. Item, Christus fuit a Iudaeis interfectus; et planum est, quod in ipso nullum fuit omnino peccatum; et mors illa poena fuit, hoc constat: ergo videtur, quod poena possit esse absque culpa praeambula.

### Conclusio.

> Poena potest esse in aliquo sine culpa propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elici potest.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod malum poenae dupliciter potest ordinari: uno modo ad *malum* culpae, quod puniendo ordinat; alio modo in comparatione ad *bonum*, quod Deus elicit ex illa poena. *(Duplex ordinatio poenae.)*

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Dico igitur, quodsi aliqua poena infligatur, cuius ordinatio principaliter consistat in comparatione ad malum; quod necessario requirit, malum culpae praecessisse[^10], nec tantum *praecessisse*, sed etiam aliquo modo *concomitari* inseparabiliter. *(Conclusio 1.)* Poena enim aut est directe ordinata ad *puniendum*, aut est ordinata principaliter ad *malum excludendum*. *(Subdistinctio.)* Primo modo est poena infernalis, et secundo modo est poena purgatoria[^11]. Et primo modo requirit poena *praesentiam culpae* secundum *deformitatem et maculam*; secundo modo requirit culpae praesentiam secundum *reatum et sequelam*.

Si autem poena infligatur principaliter propter ordinem, quem habet ad bonum, quod inde elicitur; aut ergo propter bonum *proprium*, aut propter bonum *alienum*. Si propter bonum *proprium*, sic requirit, quod in subiecto illo aliquando *fuerit* culpa, et quod possit *esse* de futuro. *(Conclusio 2.)* Si autem propter bonum *alienum*, sic sufficit poenae, ut fuerit culpa in alio, quam in eo qui punitur, in eo videlicet, pro quo poena illa sustinetur; per quem modum fuit in Christo, cuius mors et passio ordinata erat ad redimendum genus humanum et liberandum et reparandum a lapsu, in quem ceciderat ex peccato primi parentis. *(Conclusio 3.)*

Et sic patet, quod omnis poena aliquo modo respicit culpam; sed quaedam ut *praesentem in se*, utpote poena infernalis; quaedam ut *praeteritam in se*, sed *praesentem in reatu et sequela*, sicut poena purgatoria; quaedam vero solum ut *praeteritam*, et hoc in eo, qui punitur; et sic est omnis poena iustorum, Christo excepto; quaedam vero respicit culpam non *in se*, sed *in alio*, sicut patet in Christo. *(Epilogus.)*

— Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit causata a culpa; dicendum est, quod si intelligatur de causa meritoria de condigno, sic non habet veritatem; si autem intelligatur de causa sine qua non, sic aliquo modo veritatem habet. Nulla enim esset poena in homine, nisi praecessisset culpa. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, qua scilicet quaeritur, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente; sive qua quaeritur, utrum poena possit separari a culpa. *(Corollarium.)* Concedendum est enim, quod sic, propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elicitur. *(Conclusio generalis.)*

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod Hieronymus non accipit ibi *mereri* pro merito condigni, sed potius pro merito congrui, quod quidem est sicut dispositio praeambula. Et verum est, sicut dictum est[^12], quod nisi fuisset in nobis peccatum originale, in nobis non esset contracta poenalitas, unde esset aliqua afflictio poenae; et quod in Christo fuit, hoc fuit solummodo voluntarie.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Gregorio, dicendum, quod facienda est vis in hoc quod dicit: *nulla nocebit adversitas;* nam adversitas, quae non infligitur homini, exigente merito praecedentis peccati, non est ad eius nocumentum, sed potius ad eius profectum, iuxta illud Apostoli[^13]: *Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.*

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mors est a Deo vindicante, et ita aliae poenae; dicendum, quod in opere iustitiae se multum immiscet opus misericordiae. *(Notandum.)* Et ideo, quamvis prima dispositio ad poenam fuerit vindicta, multae tamen poenae consequuntur ad illam dispositionem, quae potius sunt beneficia divinae misericordiae et divinae visitationis, quam sint instrumentum irae. Cum ergo dicitur, quod mors est a Deo vindicante, hoc intelligitur de ipsa necessitate moriendi; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod omnis alia poena sit a Dei vindicta, immo, sicut tactum est, potest esse a Dei misericordia, quae *erudit et flagellat omnem filium, quem recipit*[^14]. Sic enim competit praesenti statui.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena ordinatur ad culpam, sicut e converso; dicendum, quod non est simile. Poena[^15] enim habet ordinari, sicut dictum est, dupliciter: non solum ad *prius*, sed etiam ad *posterius*. Peccatum autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, ordinari habet solum ad *posterius*, videlicet ad poenam; et ideo culpa semper dicit inordinationem, nisi praesentialiter adsit poena; poena vero propter ordinationem ad posterius bonum, ordinata et utilis esse potest, etiam si nulla sit culpa in eo qui punitur, illius poenae meritoria. Illud enim malum recompensatur per maius bonum, quod inde elicitur, sicut patet in caeco nato et in Iob et in Lazaro et in quolibet viro iusto. Quot autem bona inde eliciantur, invenietur determinatum in quarto, distinctione decima quinta[^16].

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, iam patet responsio; quia, etsi punitio sit a divina iustitia, nihilominus tamen plerumque est a divina misericordia. Sicut enim vult Augustinus in quodam sermone[^17],

<!-- page 852 -->

quem facit de flagellatione Pharaonis: cum Deus immittebat Pharaoni flagella, impendebat misericordiae beneficia, quia cor eius ad conversionem excitabat; cum vero subtrahebat, hoc erat ex rigore iustitiae, quae propter ipsius Pharaonis peccata, dum illa flagella subtrahebat, ipsum obdurari sinebat; et pro tanto Scriptura dicit, quod cor eius indurabat[^18].

---

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether punishment can be in anything without preceding guilt.*

Secondly it is asked, whether punishment can be in anything without preceding guilt. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Jerome[^1]; for he says thus: *To the opposite.* « Whatever we suffer, our sins have merited ».

2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain collect[^2]: « No adversity shall harm them, if no iniquity holds dominion over them »: therefore if dominion of guilt has not preceded, it seems that the chastisement of punishment can in no way follow.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the first [book] of the *Retractations*[^3]: « Death and life are from the Lord God; but life as from one giving, and death as from one taking vengeance »: if therefore death is from God as from one taking vengeance, by parity of reasoning so is every other punishment. But all vengeance regards the merit of preceding guilt: therefore it seems that in no one is there any punishment, but that in him there first was the guilt meritorious of that punishment.

4. Likewise, punishment, as far as concerns itself, denotes some evil; for evil is divided into the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment[^4]: therefore just as the evil of guilt denotes the privation of some good and of some order, so also does the evil of punishment: therefore just as the evil of guilt needs to be ordered, so also the evil of punishment. But just as the evil of guilt is ordered through the following evil of punishment, so the evil of punishment [is ordered] through the prior evil of guilt: therefore just as guilt cannot be without punishment, so neither punishment without guilt.

5. Likewise, all punishment, as such, is an effect of divine justice: but justice, as such, considers the exigency of merits; but there is no merit of punishment except sin[^5]: therefore it is impossible that anyone be punished except in him in whom the stain of sin has preceded.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Job, seventeenth [chapter][^6]: *I have not sinned, and yet my eye abides in bitterness.* And likewise Job, sixth [chapter]: *Would that my sins, by which I have merited wrath, and the calamity that I suffer, were weighed in a balance; this would appear heavier than the sand of the sea:* therefore it seems that the punishments which were in Job were not by the merit of preceding sins.

2. Likewise, John, ninth [chapter][^7]: *Who has sinned, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind?* there it is said: *Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents;* and Augustine explains that this is not said because they did not sin, but because the blindness was not the punishment of sin: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, for original sin one merits only to die once[^8]; and Lazarus was dead not only once, but twice: therefore it seems that either the first death, or the second, was inflicted on him without the merit of sin.

4. Likewise, all day we see that the impious afflicts the just; and of this also the prophet complains, Habakkuk, first [chapter][^9]: *Why are you silent, while the impious tramples down one more just than himself?* But the Prophet's complaint would not be just, if the just man were punished for his own sins: therefore it seems that many punishments are inflicted which are not inflicted by the merit of sins.

5. Likewise, Christ was slain by the Jews; and it is plain that in him there was no sin whatsoever; and that death was a punishment, this is established: therefore it seems that punishment can be without preceding guilt.

### Conclusion.

> Punishment can be in anything without guilt on account of the ordination which it has toward a subsequent good, which can be elicited from it.

**I respond:** It must be said that the evil of punishment can be ordered in two ways: in one way to the *evil* of guilt, which it orders by punishing; in another way in comparison to a *good*, which God elicits from that punishment. *(The twofold ordination of punishment.)*

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I say therefore that if some punishment be inflicted whose ordination consists principally in comparison to evil; this necessarily requires that the evil of guilt have preceded[^10], and not only that it have *preceded*, but also that it in some way be inseparably *concomitant*. *(Conclusion 1.)* For punishment is either directly ordered to *punishing*, or is ordered principally to *excluding evil*. *(Subdistinction.)* In the first way is infernal punishment, and in the second way is purgatorial punishment[^11]. And in the first way punishment requires the *presence of guilt* according to *deformity and stain*; in the second way it requires the presence of guilt according to *liability and sequel*.

But if punishment be inflicted principally on account of the order which it has toward a good which is elicited from it; then either it is on account of a *proper* good, or on account of a good *of another*. If on account of a *proper* good, then it requires that in that subject guilt have *been* at some time, and that it be able to *be* in the future. *(Conclusion 2.)* But if on account of a good *of another*, then it suffices for the punishment that guilt have been in another than in him who is punished, namely in him for whom that punishment is borne; in which manner it was in Christ, whose death and passion were ordained to redeeming the human race and freeing and repairing it from the lapse into which it had fallen by the sin of the first parent. *(Conclusion 3.)*

And thus it is clear that all punishment in some way regards guilt; but some [punishment regards it] as *present in itself*, such as infernal punishment; some as *past in itself*, but *present in liability and sequel*, like purgatorial punishment; but some only as *past*, and this in him who is punished; and such is all the punishment of the just, Christ excepted; but some regards guilt not *in itself*, but *in another*, as is clear in Christ. *(Epilogue.)*

— When therefore it is asked, whether all punishment is caused by guilt; it must be said that if it be understood of a meritorious cause of condignity, then it does not hold true; but if it be understood of a cause without which not, then it holds true in some manner. For there would be no punishment in the human, unless guilt had preceded. — And by this is clear the response to the question proposed, namely by which it is asked, whether punishment can be in anything without preceding guilt; or by which it is asked, whether punishment can be separated from guilt. *(Corollary.)* For it must be granted that it can, on account of the ordination which it has toward a subsequent good, which is elicited from it. *(General conclusion.)*

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that therefore which is objected concerning Jerome, it must be said that Jerome does not there take *to merit* for the merit of condignity, but rather for the merit of congruity, which indeed is like a preambular disposition. And it is true, as has been said[^12], that unless there had been in us original sin, there would not have been contracted in us a penal condition, whence there would be some affliction of punishment; and as for what was in Christ, this was solely voluntary.

2. To that which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that force must be put on what he says: *no adversity shall harm;* for the adversity which is not inflicted on the human by the exigency of the merit of preceding sin is not to his harm, but rather to his profit, according to that [word] of the Apostle[^13]: *To those who love God all things work together unto good.*

3. To that which is objected, that death is from God taking vengeance, and so the other punishments; it must be said that into the work of justice there mingles much the work of mercy. *(To be noted.)* And therefore, although the first disposition to punishment was vengeance, yet many punishments follow upon that disposition which are rather benefits of divine mercy and of divine visitation than instruments of wrath. When therefore it is said that death is from God taking vengeance, this is understood of the very necessity of dying; but from this it does not follow that every other punishment is from God's vengeance; rather, as has been touched upon, it can be from God's mercy, which *instructs and scourges every son whom he receives*[^14]. For thus it befits the present state.

4. To that which is objected, that punishment is ordered to guilt, as conversely [guilt to punishment]; it must be said that it is not similar. For punishment[^15] has to be ordered, as has been said, in two ways: not only to what is *prior*, but also to what is *posterior*. But sin, as such, has to be ordered only to what is *posterior*, namely to punishment; and therefore guilt always denotes disorder, unless punishment be present at the moment; but punishment, on account of its ordination to a posterior good, can be ordered and useful, even if there be no guilt in him who is punished meritorious of that punishment. For that evil is recompensed by a greater good which is elicited from it, as is clear in the man born blind and in Job and in Lazarus and in every just man. But how many goods are elicited therefrom, will be found determined in the fourth [book], in distinction fifteen[^16].

5. To that which is objected last, the response is already clear; for, even though punishment be from divine justice, nevertheless it is for the most part from divine mercy. For as Augustine holds in a certain sermon[^17],

<!-- page 852 -->

which he makes about the scourging of Pharaoh: when God sent scourges upon Pharaoh, he bestowed the benefits of mercy, because he stirred his heart toward conversion; but when he withdrew [them], this was from the rigor of justice, which, on account of Pharaoh's own sins, while it withdrew those scourges, permitted him to be hardened; and to that extent Scripture says that his heart was hardened[^18].

---

la: In Ezech. c. 5, 16: *Famem et pestilentiam et bestias pessimas et quidquid aliud malorum sustinemus in saeculo, propter nostra venire peccata manifestum est.*

en: On Ezekiel, c. 5, 16: *Famine and pestilence and the worst beasts and whatever else of evils we endure in this world, that it comes on account of our sins is manifest.*

la: Libr. Sacram., sabbato infra Quinquages. in ultima collecta super populum, quae incipit *Tuere* (in Brev. Rom. feria 6. post Quinquages. ad 2. Vesp.). In textu origin. pro *Nulla eis* habetur *Nulla ei* (populo), et dein post *dominetur* omittitur *eis*, quae vocula etiam abest a codd. K (a prima manu) T V W Y bb ee et aliis.

en: Book of Sacraments, on the Saturday within Quinquagesima, in the last collect over the people, which begins *Tuere* (in the Roman Breviary on Friday after Quinquagesima at second Vespers). In the original text, for *Nulla eis* it has *Nulla ei* (to the people), and then after *dominetur* the word *eis* is omitted, which little word is also absent from codd. K (by a first hand) T V W Y bb ee and others.

la: Cap. 21. n. 2. — Textus s. Scripturae est Eccli. 11, 14.

en: Chapter 21, n. 2. — The text of sacred Scripture is Ecclesiasticus 11, 14.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 825, nota 3, et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 6. — De minori subsumta cfr. supra a. I. q. I. et quaest. praeced.

en: Cfr. above p. 825, note 3, and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 94. m. 6. — On the minor assumed [premise] cfr. above a. I. q. I. and the preceding question.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: See here the letter of the Master, c. 5.

la: Vers. 2. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 2. seq.

en: Verse 2. — The following text is in the place cited, v. 2. seq.

la: Vers. 2. seq. — Super hunc loc. August., tr. 44. n. 3. ait: *Habebant enim peccatum parentes eius, sed non ipso peccato factum est, ut caecus nasceretur.*

en: Verse 2 seq. — On this place Augustine, treatise 44, n. 3, says: *For his parents had sin, but it was not by that sin brought about that he should be born blind.*

la: Hebr. 9, 27: *Et quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori* etc. — Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 4, ubi eadem infertur obiectio et solvitur.

en: Hebrews 9, 27: *And as it is appointed for humans to die once* etc. — Cfr. above d. 33. dub. 4, where the same objection is brought forward and solved.

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13.

la: In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur: *in comparatione ad malum culpae puniendum, necesse est, aliquam culpam praecessisse;* et post pauca in Vat. sola: *Poena enim ordinata ad puniendum culpam, aut est directe ordinata ad solum puniendum, aut est ordinata* etc.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 it reads: *in comparison to the evil of guilt to be punished, it is necessary that some guilt have preceded;* and a little after, in the Vatican [edition] alone: *For punishment ordered to punishing guilt is either directly ordered to punishing alone, or is ordered* etc.

la: Vide August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 13, ubi Platonici refelluntur, qui omnes poenas et in hac vita et post mortem non nisi purgatorias esse contendebant.

en: See Augustine, *On the City of God* XXI, c. 13, where the Platonists are refuted, who contended that all punishments, both in this life and after death, are only purgatorial.

la: Supra d. 30. a. I. q. I.

en: Above d. 30. a. I. q. I.

la: Rom. 8, 28. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pluribus codd. ante *infligitur* omittit *non*.

en: Romans 8, 28. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 and several codices omits *non* before *infligitur*.

en: Hebrews 12, 6.

la: Permulti codd. cum primis edd. *Culpa;* perperam.

en: Very many codices with the first editions [read] *Culpa;* wrongly.

la: Part. I. dub. 2. — Pro *Quot autem bona* codd. T W ee et alii cum ed. 2 *Quod autem bona*.

en: Part I, dub. 2. — For *Quot autem bona* codd. T W ee and others with ed. 2 [read] *Quod autem bona*.

la: Nunc 22. in Appendice (quia sermo Caesarii est — alias 88. de Tempore) n. 2-6, super Exod. 9, 12: *Induravit Dominus cor Pharaonis.*

en: Now 22 in the Appendix (since it is a sermon of Caesarius — otherwise 88, *On the Season*) n. 2-6, on Exodus 9, 12: *The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 59191–59325), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (Conclusio, Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 850–852, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 872–874). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied to Respondeo + footers.

**Alignment check.** PASSED. q2 opener (raw, p.850 R-col below a2-q1's scholion tail): *Secundo quaeritur, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente. Et quod non, videtur.* — matches ARTICULUS II topic (2) (*secundum inseparabilitatem*: poena sine culpa praecedente). This is the LAST quaestio of ARTICULUS II. CONCLUSIO and Respondeo verified verbatim at 450 dpi (p.850 R-col).

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**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 850–852 (running heads: p.850 `DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`; p.851 `DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`; p.852 `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` [verso]).
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**Scholion disposition.** ABSENT. `has_scholion: false`. The ARTICULUS II article-level scholion (items I + II) lives in a2-q1 (per Override §5): item I treats q1, item II (the de-Malo *traditio fidei* + Scot./Thom./Richard./Aegid. commentator roll, p.850 R-col top) treats this q2. So q2 legitimately has no own scholion.

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**[?] flags.** None. (Title VERIFIED at 450 dpi p.850 = *Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente* — not the resume's earlier tentative *reperire poenam sine merito praecedentis culpae*, which was the ART II opener's paraphrase of topic 2.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo
Whether any punishment is from God

source_text:
<!-- page 852 -->

### ARTICULUS III.
### *De comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. *Primo* quaeritur, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. *Secundo*, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit ab ipso.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo.*

Quaeritur igitur, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. Et quod non, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Sapientiae primo[^1]: *Deus mortem non fecit*: ergo si mors inter omnes poenas est maxime manifestativa divinae iustitiae, et haec non est a Deo; videtur igitur, quod nulla alia poena sit ab ipso.

2. Item, Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi[^2]: *Deduc me, Domine, in iustitia tua*: « Cum punit malos Deus, non suum malum eis infert, sed suis malis eos relinquit »: ergo videtur, quod nulla poena secundum id quod est, a Deo sit.

3. Item, poena est malum repugnans naturae; sed « Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam », sicut vult Augustinus[^3]: ergo videtur, quod nulla poena sit a Deo.

4. Item, omnis poena inducit privationem alicuius boni, et privatio boni dicit boni defectum; defectus autem non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem: si ergo Deus nullius est causa deficiens, nullus defectus potest esse ab eo[^4]: ergo nec poena aliqua.

5. Item, sicut malum culpae privat bonam dispositionem voluntatis, sic malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae[^5]; sed ita est a Deo natura, sicut voluntas, et ita conservatio naturae, sicut conservatio voluntatis: si igitur mala dispositio voluntatis a Deo non est, pari ratione nec mala dispositio naturae: ergo sicut non est a Deo culpa, ita non est a Deo poena.

6. Item, sicut in Deo est summa bonitas quantum ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quae est iustitia, sic in Deo est summa bonitas quantum ad completionem et perfectionem naturae; sed Deus, quia summe bonus est et summe iustus, non potest facere aliquod malum sive aliquam iniustitiam sive peccatum: ergo pari ratione, cum sit summe bonus per naturam, non poterit ab eo egredi malum, quod sit in nocumentum naturae: ergo sicut ab ipso non exit malum culpae, sic nec malum poenae.

**Sed contra:**

1. Isaiae quadragesimo quinto[^6]: *Ego Dominus formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum*; sed hoc non intelligitur de malo culpae: ergo necesse est, quod habeat veritatem de aliquo malo poenae.

2. Item, expressius in cantico, Deuteronomii tricesimo secundo[^7]: *Ego occidam et ego vivere faciam, percutiam et ego sanabo*; sed occisio et percussio est poena: ergo etc.

3. Item, adhuc magis expresse Ecclesiastici undecimo[^8]: *Bona et mala, vita et mors, paupertas et honestas a Deo sunt*; sed huiusmodi sunt poenae: ergo etc.

4. Item, adhuc expressius de novo Testamento, Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^9]: *Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum*; sed ab illo principaliter est poena, qui dictat sententiam, sed hic est Deus: ergo etc.

5. Item, Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^10]: « Deus est auctor mali, quod patimur »; sed hoc est malum poenae, ut ibidem dicit: ergo aliqua poena est a Deo.

6. Item, sicut actus divinae misericordiae est parcere, ita actus divinae iustitiae est punire: ergo sicut peccati remissio et indulgentia est a divina misericordia, ita peccati punitio est a divina iustitia: ergo aliqua poena est a Deo tanquam a causa.

<!-- page 853 -->

### Conclusio.

> Aliquae poenae sunt a Deo vindicante.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod poena plus dicit quam malum. Malum enim importat[^11] absentiam sive defectum boni, ubi debet esse; poena vero importat ordinem ad ipsum meritum poenae, et simul cum hoc dispositionem aliquam significat circa ipsum punibile. — Quoniam igitur tam ordo quam dispositio rei dicitur esse a Deo sicut a principio; hinc est, quod rationabiliter conceditur, quod poena sit a Deo, de[^12] illa potissime, quae importat ordinem fundatum super realem dispositionem. Et quoniam dicit aliquo modo ordinem ad culpam praecedentem, et culpa praecedens non est ex constitutione naturae, sed potius ex voluntatis inordinatione; hinc est, quod etsi poena dicatur a Deo, non tamen dicitur a Deo faciente, sed a Deo vindicante. — Concedendum est igitur, aliquas poenas a Deo esse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae, pro eo quod aliquae poenae sunt dispositiones ipsius punibilis, et dispositiones non qualescumque, sed ordinatae secundum rigorem divinae iustitiae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus mortem non fecit; iam patet responsio, quia non negatur, quod mors non sit a Deo vindicante, sed quia non fuit a Deo naturam instituente. Ideo enim[^13] Deus eam inflixit, quia homo eam meruit merito culpae.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus, cum punit malos, non infert eis malum; dicendum, quod Augustinus non vult ibi negare, poenam inferri a Deo, sed hoc vult negare, quod defectus ille, qui clauditur in intellectu poenae, non causatur a Deo. Unde non dicit: non infert *poenam*, sed: non infert *malum*; malum enim dicit ipsum defectum, sicut dictum est; poena autem non tantum dicit boni defectionem, sed etiam dicit punibilis dispositionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam; dicendum, quod si natura dicatur naturalis creaturae obedientia, vel naturale iudicatorium, secundum quod homo est habilis ad iustitiam — quia utrumque horum dicit immediatam ordinationem ad Deum — sic Deus non facit contra naturam, sicut nec facit contra se ipsum[^14]. Alio modo natura dicitur vis operans secundum solitum cursum et quodcumque bonum, quod inest creaturae ex sua origine; et hoc modo Deus facit contra naturam, sive per miracula potentiae, sive per supplicia vindicantis iustitiae. Et sic non facit simpliciter contra naturam, immo potius secundum naturam, cuius *operatio* subiacet divinae potentiae, et *ordinatio* subiacet divinae iustitiae. Et cum Deus utitur creatura, sive ad manifestationem divinae potentiae, sive ad manifestationem iustitiae, utitur ea, prout debet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena dicit privationem et defectum; dicendum, quod generaliter loquendo, poena non dicit *solum defectum*, immo quaedam poena est, quae dicit *veram passionem* circa ipsum punibile. Unde sicut actio ignis aeterni, qua agit in animam, *aliquid* est; sic et passio, quam patitur anima ab igne, *aliquid* est[^15]. Et iterum, *aliquid ordinatum* est, et ita a Deo est, a quo est omnis essentia et omnis ordo. Et propter hoc deficit illa ratio, quia non omnis poena dicit defectum purum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae, sicut malum culpae dispositionem voluntatis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia malum culpae privat *inordinate* et *vituperabiliter*; malum vero poenae, secundum quod huiusmodi, privat *ordinate* et *laudabiliter*. Et quia quod laudabile est, est attribuendum Deo; quod vero vituperabile, non; hinc est, quod recte aliquod malum poenae Deo attribuitur, malum vero culpae non, sicut infra[^16] melius videbitur.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quod obiicitur de perfectione bonitatis quantum ad voluntatem et naturam Dei. Concedo enim bene, quod utriusque est summa perfectio, quia una et eadem; idem enim est in eo natura et voluntas. Comparatio tamen divinae voluntatis ad culpam et poenam, sive e converso poenae et culpae ad divinam voluntatem, differens est, quia culpa propter sui deordinationem deordinationem ponit circa *peccantem*; poena vero non deordinationem connotat circa *punientem* et ordinantem.

english:
### ARTICLE III.
### *On the comparison of punishment to the equity of divine justice.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the comparison of punishment to the equity of divine justice. And concerning this two things are asked. *First* it is asked, whether any punishment is from God. *Second*, granted that it is, it is asked, whether every punishment is from him.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether any punishment is from God.*

It is asked, therefore, whether any punishment is from God. And that it is not, it seems.

*To the opposite.*

1. Wisdom, first [chapter][^1]: *God did not make death*: therefore if death, among all punishments, is most manifestative of divine justice, and this is not from God; it seems therefore that no other punishment is from him.

2. Likewise, Augustine on that place of the Psalm[^2]: *Lead me, Lord, in your justice*: « When God punishes the wicked, he does not inflict his own evil upon them, but leaves them to their own evils »: therefore it seems that no punishment, according to that which it is, is from God.

3. Likewise, punishment is an evil repugnant to nature; but « the Author of nature does nothing against nature », as Augustine holds[^3]: therefore it seems that no punishment is from God.

4. Likewise, every punishment induces the privation of some good, and the privation of good states a defect of the good; but a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: if therefore God is the deficient cause of nothing, no defect can be from him[^4]: therefore neither any punishment.

5. Likewise, just as the evil of guilt deprives [one] of the good disposition of the will, so the evil of punishment deprives [one] of the good disposition of nature[^5]; but nature is from God just as the will is, and the conservation of nature just as the conservation of the will: if therefore the bad disposition of the will is not from God, by like reasoning neither [is] the bad disposition of nature: therefore just as guilt is not from God, so punishment is not from God.

6. Likewise, just as in God there is the highest goodness as regards the rectitude of the will, which is justice, so in God there is the highest goodness as regards the completion and perfection of nature; but God, because he is supremely good and supremely just, cannot do any evil or any injustice or sin: therefore by like reasoning, since he is supremely good by nature, no evil could go forth from him which would be to the harm of nature: therefore just as the evil of guilt does not go out from him, so neither [does] the evil of punishment.

**On the contrary:**

1. Isaiah, forty-fifth [chapter][^6]: *I am the Lord forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil*; but this is not understood of the evil of guilt: therefore it is necessary that it hold true of some evil of punishment.

2. Likewise, more expressly in the canticle, Deuteronomy, thirty-second [chapter][^7]: *I will kill and I will make to live, I will strike and I will heal*; but killing and striking are punishment: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, still more expressly, Ecclesiasticus, eleventh [chapter][^8]: *Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and honor are from God*; but such things are punishments: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, still more expressly from the new Testament, Matthew, twenty-fifth [chapter][^9]: *Go, you cursed, into eternal fire*; but punishment is principally from him who pronounces the sentence, but this is God: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Free Choice*[^10]: « God is the author of the evil which we suffer »; but this is the evil of punishment, as he says in the same place: therefore some punishment is from God.

6. Likewise, just as the act of divine mercy is to spare, so the act of divine justice is to punish: therefore just as the remission and indulgence of sin is from divine mercy, so the punishment of sin is from divine justice: therefore some punishment is from God as from a cause.

<!-- page 853 -->

### Conclusion.

> Some punishments are from God as the avenger.

**I respond:** It must be said that punishment states more than evil. For evil imports[^11] the absence or defect of a good where it ought to be; but punishment imports an order to the very merit of punishment, and together with this it signifies some disposition concerning the punishable [thing] itself. — Since therefore both the order and the disposition of a thing is said to be from God as from a principle; hence it is that it is reasonably granted that punishment is from God, most of all that [punishment][^12] which imports an order founded upon a real disposition. And since it states in some way an order to a preceding guilt, and the preceding guilt is not from the constitution of nature, but rather from the disorder of the will; hence it is that, even if punishment is said to be from God, yet it is not said to be from God doing [it], but from God avenging [it]. — It must therefore be granted that some punishments are from God, as the reasons adduced for this show, for the reason that some punishments are dispositions of the punishable [thing] itself, and dispositions not of any kind whatever, but ordered according to the rigor of divine justice.

1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary, that God did not make death; the response is now clear, because it is not denied that death is from God as the avenger, but [it is denied] that it was from God as the institutor of nature. For God inflicted it[^13] for this reason, because the human deserved it by the merit of guilt.

2. To that indeed which is objected, that God, when he punishes the wicked, does not inflict evil upon them; it must be said that Augustine does not there wish to deny that punishment is inflicted by God, but he wishes to deny this, that that defect which is enclosed in the notion of punishment is caused by God. Whence he does not say: he does not inflict *punishment*, but: he does not inflict *evil*; for evil states the defect itself, as has been said; but punishment does not only state the defection of the good, but also states the disposition of the punishable [thing].

3. To that which is objected, that the Author of nature does nothing against nature; it must be said that if nature is called the natural obedience of the creature, or the natural faculty of judgment, according to which the human is apt for justice — because each of these states an immediate ordering to God — thus God does not act against nature, just as neither does he act against himself[^14]. In another way nature is called the power operating according to its accustomed course and whatever good is in the creature from its origin; and in this way God does act against nature, whether through the miracles of [his] power, or through the punishments of avenging justice. And thus he does not act simply against nature, but rather according to nature, whose *operation* is subject to divine power, and whose *ordination* is subject to divine justice. And when God uses a creature, whether for the manifestation of divine power or for the manifestation of justice, he uses it as he ought.

4. To that which is objected, that punishment states privation and defect; it must be said that, generally speaking, punishment does not state *only defect*, but rather there is a certain punishment which states a *true passion* concerning the punishable [thing] itself. Whence just as the action of the eternal fire, by which it acts upon the soul, is *something*; so also the passion which the soul suffers from the fire is *something*[^15]. And again, it is *something ordered*, and so it is from God, from whom is all essence and all order. And on account of this that argument fails, because not every punishment states pure defect.

3. To that which is objected, that the evil of punishment deprives [one] of the good disposition of nature, just as the evil of guilt [deprives one] of the disposition of the will; it must be said that it is not alike, because the evil of guilt deprives *inordinately* and *blameworthily*; but the evil of punishment, insofar as it is of this kind, deprives *in an ordered way* and *praiseworthily*. And because that which is praiseworthy is to be attributed to God, but that which is blameworthy is not; hence it is that rightly some evil of punishment is attributed to God, but the evil of guilt is not, as will be seen better below[^16].

5. And through this the response to the last [objection] is clear, which is objected concerning the perfection of goodness as regards the will and nature of God. For I grant well that of each there is the highest perfection, because [it is] one and the same; for in him nature and will are the same. Yet the comparison of the divine will to guilt and punishment, or conversely of punishment and guilt to the divine will, is different, because guilt, on account of its own disorder, places disorder concerning the *one sinning*; but punishment does not connote disorder concerning the *one punishing* and ordering.

la: Psalm. 5, 9. — August. super hunc locum n. 10. proprie dicit: Cum punit Deus peccatores, non malum suum eis infert, sed malis eorum eos dimittit.

en: Psalm 5, 9. — Augustine on this place, n. 10, properly says: When God punishes sinners, he does not inflict his own evil upon them, but dismisses them to their own evils.

la: Libr. XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3. Vide supra pag. 435, nota 1.

en: Book XXVI. *Against Faustus*, c. 3. See above p. 435, note 1.

la: Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8.

en: Cfr. Augustine, XII. *On the City of God*, c. 8.

la: Vide supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.

en: See above d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. and a. 2. q. 1.

la: Vers. 6. seq.: Ego Dominus et non est alter formans etc. Vers. 39.

en: Verse 6 seq.: I am the Lord and there is no other, forming etc. Verse 39.

la: Vers. 39.

en: Verse 39.

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Vers. 41.

en: Verse 41.

en: Book I. c. 1. n. 1.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. verbo *importat* praemittit *plus* et mox pro *meritum poenae* (i. e. culpam) substituit *meritum culpae*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with a few codices, prefixes *plus* to the word *importat*, and presently for *meritum poenae* ("the merit of punishment," i. e. guilt) substitutes *meritum culpae* ("the merit of guilt").

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt *de*, quod pertinet ad *conceditur*. Paulo inferius post *ordinem* in multis codd., ut C F K O R S T V etc., et in primis edd. desideratur *ad culpam*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 omit *de*, which pertains to *conceditur*. A little below, after *ordinem*, in many codices, such as C F K O R S T V etc., and in the first editions, *ad culpam* is lacking.

la: in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 nec non in aliquibus codd., inter quos est cod. ee, deest *enim*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4, as also in some codices, among which is cod. ee, *enim* is absent.

la: Cfr. verba Augustini, ex VI. de Gen. ad lit. supra pag. 435, nota 1. et pag. 437, nota 3. allata. — Mox pro *et quodcumque* non pauci codd., inter quos F H V W Y bb, cum primis edd. etiam *quodcumque*.

en: Cfr. the words of Augustine, from VI. *On Genesis according to the Letter*, adduced above p. 435, note 1, and p. 437, note 3. — Presently for *et quodcumque* not a few codices, among which are F H V W Y bb, with the first editions, [read] also *quodcumque*.

la: Vide August., de Natura boni, c. 38.

en: See Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 38.

la: Quaest. seq. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.

en: The following question and d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Poenas *non* esse a Deo, asserere non dubitabant multi et antiqui et recentiores, praesertim illi qui providentiam Dei circa res humanas negabant, inter quos fuit etiam Cicero, III. de Officiis, c. 29. — In utraque huius articuli quaestione adhibentur plures distinctiones magni momenti; notanda est in primis in q. 2. distinctio triplicis poenae, et alia, quae est de poena, secundum quod *ordinata est*, et secundum id quod *subest huic ordini*. Sub *primo* respectu constat poenam omnem ratione *ordinis* esse a Deo; item sub *secundo* respectu patet, non esse a Deo id quod dicit defectum, privationem vel malum.

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Primum principium ita intelligitur, ut ordinatio illa sit a Deo secundum voluntatem *consequentem*, non *antecedentem* (cfr. infra d. 37. dub. 5, et I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.). In applicatione secundi principii est quaedam differentia opinionum, sed exigui momenti, ut notat Richard. a Med. — Plura ad hanc quaestionem spectantia vide hic dub. 3. Utramque quaestionem alii magistri plerumque una sola absolvunt.

**II.** De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 6. 7. (quoad principia solutionis). — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 37; S. 1. II. q. 87. a. 7. q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 37. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That punishments are *not* from God, many both ancient and more recent [thinkers] did not hesitate to assert, especially those who denied the providence of God concerning human affairs, among whom was also Cicero, III. *On Duties*, c. 29. — In both questions of this article several distinctions of great moment are employed; to be noted first of all is the distinction in q. 2 of the threefold punishment, and another which concerns punishment according to that which *it is ordered* and according to that which *underlies this order*. Under the *first* respect it is established that all punishment is from God by reason of *order*; likewise under the *second* respect it is clear that what states defect, privation, or evil is not from God.

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The first principle is so understood that that ordination is from God according to the *consequent* will, not the *antecedent* [will] (cfr. below d. 37. dub. 5, and I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.). In the application of the second principle there is a certain difference of opinions, but of little moment, as Richard of Middleton notes. — Many things pertaining to this question see here in dub. 3. The other masters most often resolve both questions in one alone.

**II.** On both questions: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 94. m. 6. 7. (as to the principles of the solution). — St. Thomas, II. *Sent.* d. 37; *Summa* 1. II. q. 87. a. 7. q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert, II. *Sent.* d. 37. a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, II. *Sent.* d. 37. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, II. *Sent.* d. 37. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 59326–59453), with the folded ARTICULUS III opener, the Conclusio, Respondeo, the Ad-obiecta replies, the SCHOLION (I–II), and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 852–854, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 874–876). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. The cascade-fragmented Respondeo/replies were re-set from the PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion); the videtur/contra running prose follows the OCR base with footnote-marker spacing.

**Folded ART III opener (Override §5).** The short ARTICULUS III opener (`Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo … utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. Secundo … utrum omnis poena sit ab ipso.`, raw 59326–59332, p. 852 L-col) is folded into this q1 as headings — there is no standalone d36-a3-divisio chunk. The two ART III topics are (1) *Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo* (this q1) and (2) *Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo* (a3-q2).

**Alignment (coordinator-verified, PASSED).** This chunk = ARTICULUS III, QUAESTIO I only. Opener `Quaeritur igitur, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. Et quod non, videtur.` (raw 59335–59337) matches ART III topic (1) verbatim. The chunk ENDS at the close of the SCHOLION item II (commentator roll) on p. 854 L-col, immediately before the full-width `QUAESTIO II. / Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo` header (raw 59454, p. 854) — everything from QUAESTIO II onward is d36-a3-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 852–854.
- p. 852 (running head over the page = the ART III header + QUAESTIO I title): ART III opener + QUAESTIO I opener + videtur args 1–6 (L-col) + Sed contra 1–6 (R-col). Footer 1 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) belongs to a2-q2 (its [^18], anchored at `indurabat`). Footers 2–11 are this q1's → continuous [^1]–[^10]. Marker map: [^1] arg 1 *Sapientiae primo* (Vers.13); [^2] arg 2 *Psalmi* (Psalm 5,9 + August.); [^3] arg 3 *Augustinus* (contra Faustum); [^4] arg 4 *ab eo* (Civ. Dei XII c.8); [^5] arg 5 *naturae* (d.35 cross-ref); [^6] s.c.1 *Isaiae … quinto* (Vers.6 seq.); [^7] s.c.2 *Deuteronomii … secundo* (Vers.39); [^8] s.c.3 *Ecclesiastici undecimo* (Vers.14); [^9] s.c.4 *Matthaei … quinto* (Vers.41); [^10] s.c.5 *de Libero Arbitrio* (Libr. I c.1 n.1). s.c.6 has no marker.
- p. 853 (running head `DIST. XXXVI. ART. III. QUAEST. I. 853`): Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad-obiecta replies 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 5 (printed reply numbering preserved verbatim — the original repeats "3." for the reply on *malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae*). SCHOLION item I begins at the bottom of p. 853 (full width). Footers 1–6 → continuous [^11]–[^16]: [^11] Respondeo *importat*; [^12] *de* illa potissime; [^13] reply-1 *Ideo enim*; [^14] reply-3(Conditor) *contra se ipsum*; [^15] reply-4 *aliquid est* (de Natura boni); [^16] reply-3 *infra* (Quaest. seq. + d.37).
- p. 854 (running head `834 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`, L-col top): SCHOLION item I tail (*Primum principium …*) + item II (the commentator roll, *De utraque quaestione*). No body footnote markers in the SCHOLION; no q1 footers on p. 854. QUAESTIO II opens below item II on the same page (forwarded to a3-q2).

**Hand-off received.** From d36-a2-q2: the p.852 footer block split at footer 1. a2-q2 claimed only p.852 footer 1 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` → its [^18], anchored at `indurabat`). All remaining p.852 footers (2–11) were forwarded here and serve this q1's videtur/contra args — rendered as [^1]–[^10].

**Hand-off forwarded to d36-a3-q2.** QUAESTIO II (`Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo`, raw 59454, running head raw 59507) begins on p. 854 below this q1's SCHOLION item II and continues through p. 855+. No q1 footer falls on p. 854, so the entire p. 854 footer block (q2's `Ad Romanos duodecimo` etc.) is forwarded to a3-q2 — this q1 claims no footer on p. 854. a3-q2 closes before the DUBIA opener (raw 59619).

**Scholion disposition (Override §5).** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 853 bottom – p. 854, raw 59437–59453), items I and II. `has_scholion: true`. This is the **article-level scholion held at q1**: item I explicitly treats *both* questions of the article (the threefold-punishment distinction is flagged as belonging to q. 2; the *ordinata est* / *subest huic ordini* distinction governs the whole article), and item II is headed `De utraque quaestione` ("On both questions"). a3-q2 therefore legitimately lacks its own scholion. The SCHOLION carries only reference/commentator content — no numbered footers.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 852–854 read top→bottom. The p.852/853 seam (inside Sed contra → Conclusio; the Respondeo opens cleanly at p. 853 top) and the p.853/854 seam (inside SCHOLION item I, `…sed exigui momenti, ut notat Richard. a Med.` continuous across the seam) are grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.852 footer block is fully accounted (footer 1 → a2-q2; footers 2–11 → this q1); the shared p.854 footer block belongs wholly to a3-q2.

**[?] flags.** None.