title: Dist. 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem I — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction I — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
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### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

In parte ista incipit tractatus libri, qui dividitur in quatuor libros partiales. Prima pars habet duas partes. In prima parte venatur Magister materiam huius libri et per consequens aliorum. In secunda exsequitur divisionem suam, quae incipit ibi distinctione secunda[^1]: *Hoc itaque vera ac pia fide* etc.

Item prima pars, in qua venatur materiam, habet duas[^2] partes. In prima parte venatur materiam per divisiones, et ideo primo ponit divisionem, per quam distinguuntur tres libri a quarto, scilicet per *res* et *signa*. Secundo[^3] ponit divisionem, per quam distinguitur primus liber a tribus aliis, quae est per *frui* et *uti*, ibi: *Id ergo in rebus considerandum*[^4].

Item, prima pars habet tres particulas. In prima proponit divisionem et auctoritate Augustini confirmat eam, quae est, quod tota doctrina theologica est de rebus, vel de signis, id est, subiectum commune theologiae in haec duo dividitur. In secunda membra divisionis explanat, ibi: *Proprie autem hic res appellantur*, ostendens, quid sit res et quid signum secundum membra praedictae divisionis. In tertia vero particula divisionem ad propositum applicat, ibi: *Cumque his intenderit theologorum speculatio*, dicens, quod de rebus et signis sit[^5] dicturus, primo tamen de rebus.

Item, pars illa, in qua ponit divisionem per *frui* et *uti*, per quam primus liber distinguitur ab aliis tribus, habet duas partes. In prima ponit divisionem et explanat ipsam[^6]. In secunda quae dicta sunt epilogat, ibi: *Omnium igitur, quae dicta sunt* etc. Prima igitur pars habet tres partes: in prima ponit divisionem in res, quibus fruendum, et res quibus utendum: in secunda ad maiorem evidentiam assignat quasdam definitiones, ibi: *Frui autem est amore inhaerere* etc. In tertia vero proponit et determinat quasdam dubitationes, ibi: *Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur* etc.

Et in prima particula primo ponit divisionem secundum auctoritatem Augustini, secundo exemplificat, ibi: *Illae, quibus fruendum* etc.[^7]

*Frui autem est amore inhaerere.* Haec secunda[^8] particula illius partis, in qua ponit divisionem in qua distinguitur primus liber ab aliis tribus, quae est de quibusdam notificationibus, quatuor habet particulas. Primo enim ponit notificationes *frui* et *uti*; secundo applicat eas ad propositum, scilicet ad res, quibus fruendum est[^9] et utendum, ibi: *Res igitur quibus fruendum*; tertio comparat ad alias assignationes, ibi: *Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus*; quarto, quia videntur[^10] sibi contradicere, movet et determinat quandam dubitationem, ibi: *Et attende quod videtur Augustinus dicere* etc.

*Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur.* Haec tertia pars, in qua movet et tractat dubitationes quasdam, habet tres partes secundum tres dubitationes, quarum[^11] prima est, utrum homo homine debeat frui, *secunda*, utrum Deus homine fruatur, vel utatur, et hanc movet ibi: *Sed cum Deus diligat* etc.; tertia quaestio[^12] est, utrum virtutibus sit fruendum, vel utendum, ibi: *Hic considerandum est, utrum virtutibus* etc. Et in qualibet istarum trium partium primo movet quaestionem, secundo motam determinat, tertio determinationem per auctoritatem confirmat. Et particulae in suis locis sunt manifestae.

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## SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad evidentiam definitionum et aliorum, quae Magister ponit de his verbis *frui* et *uti*, sex quaeruntur in parte ista, quorum tria pertinent ad *uti*, tria ad *frui*.

*De uti tria quaeruntur.*

Primo quaeritur, quid sit *uti* per essentiam.

*Secundo*, utrum omni creato contingat uti.

*Tertio*, utrum solo bono creato sit utendum.

*De frui similiter quaeruntur tria.*

*Primo*, quid sit *frui* per essentiam.

*Secundo*, utrum bono increato fruendum sit.

*Tertio*, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo bono increato.

---

english:
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### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

In this part begins the treatise of the book, which is divided into four partial books. The first part has two parts. In the first part the Master pursues the subject-matter of this book and, in consequence, of the others. In the second he carries out his division, which begins there in the second distinction[^1]: *Therefore by true and pious faith* etc.

Likewise the first part, in which he pursues the subject-matter, has two[^2] parts. In the first part he pursues the subject-matter by divisions, and so first he sets down a division, by which the three books are distinguished from the fourth, namely by *things* and *signs*. Secondly[^3] he sets down a division, by which the first book is distinguished from the three others, which is by *to enjoy* and *to use*, there: *That therefore in things is to be considered*[^4].

Likewise, the first part has three small parts. In the first he proposes the division and confirms it by the authority of Augustine, which is, that the whole of theological doctrine is about things or about signs, that is, the common subject of theology is divided into these two. In the second he explains the members of the division, there: *Properly however here things are called*, showing what is a thing and what is a sign according to the members of the aforesaid division. In the third small part he applies the division to the matter at hand, there: *And when toward these the speculation of theologians shall have been directed*, saying that he is about to speak[^5] of things and of signs, yet first of things.

Likewise, that part, in which he sets down the division by *to enjoy* and *to use*, by which the first book is distinguished from the other three, has two parts. In the first he sets down the division and explains it[^6]. In the second he sums up what has been said, there: *Therefore of all the things which have been said* etc. Therefore the first part has three parts: in the first he sets down the division into things, by which one ought to enjoy, and things by which one ought to use: in the second, for greater clarity, he assigns certain definitions, there: *To enjoy however is to cleave to with love* etc. In the third he proposes and determines certain doubts, there: *When however men, who enjoy and use* etc.

And in the first small part he first sets down the division according to the authority of Augustine, secondly he exemplifies, there: *Those, by which one ought to enjoy* etc.[^7]

*To enjoy however is to cleave to with love.* This second[^8] small part of that part, in which he sets down the division in which the first book is distinguished from the other three, which is concerning certain notifications, has four small parts. For first he sets down the notifications of *to enjoy* and *to use*; secondly he applies them to the matter at hand, namely to the things by which one ought to enjoy[^9] and to use, there: *The things therefore by which one ought to enjoy*; thirdly he compares to other designations, there: *Now it must be noted, that the same Augustine*; fourthly, since they seem[^10] to contradict each other, he raises and determines a certain doubt, there: *And note that Augustine seems to say* etc.

*When however men, who enjoy and use.* This third part, in which he raises and treats certain doubts, has three parts according to three doubts, of which[^11] the first is, whether man ought to enjoy man; *the second*, whether God enjoys or uses man, and this he raises there: *But since God loves* etc.; the third question[^12] is, whether the virtues are to be enjoyed or used, there: *Here it must be considered, whether the virtues* etc. And in each of these three parts he first raises the question, secondly he determines what has been raised, thirdly he confirms the determination by authority. And the small parts are manifest in their places.

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## BOOK I OF THE SENTENCES.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the elucidation of the definitions and of the other matters which the Master sets down concerning these words *to enjoy* and *to use*, six [questions] are inquired into in this part, of which three pertain to *to use*, three to *to enjoy*.

*Concerning to use three are inquired.*

First it is asked, what is *to use* by essence.

*Secondly*, whether to use befalls every created thing.

*Thirdly*, whether one ought to use only a created good.

*Concerning to enjoy likewise three are inquired.*

*First*, what is *to enjoy* by essence.

*Secondly*, whether the uncreated good is to be enjoyed.

*Thirdly*, whether it is to be enjoyed only the uncreated good itself.

---

la: Vat., post *suam* addendo *et hoc*, transponit verba *dist. 2* ante relativum *quae*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, by adding *and this* after *suam*, transposes the words *dist. 2* before the relative *quae*, but against the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Vat. paulo infra, contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, tertium membrum subdivisionis adiungendo ponit hic *tres* loco *duas*; sed falso, uti ex dicendis patebit. Error editorum Vat. forte inde provenit, quod ipsi putarent, per verba immediate sequentia *In prima parte* significari primam partem subdivisionis, cum tamen revera per illa nihil aliud significetur nisi prima pars principalis i. e. tota prima distinctio.

en: The Vatican edition a little below, with the manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting [it], by adjoining a third member of the subdivision, puts here *three* in place of *two*; but falsely, as will be clear from what is to be said. The error of the Vatican editors perhaps arises from this, that they thought, by the words immediately following *In the first part* the first part of the subdivision was signified, when however in truth by those words nothing else is signified except the first principal part, i.e. the whole first distinction.

la: Auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *secundo* pro *in secunda*, postulante hoc insuper contextu, cum *secundo* referatur ad *primo* paulo superius positum.

en: On the authority of the codices and of edition 1 we have substituted *secundo* for *in secunda*, the context moreover demanding this, since *secundo* refers to *primo* placed a little above.

la: Nullo adstipulante mss. nec favente ed. 1, Vat. adiungit hic *In tertia determinat dubitationes quasdam ex praemissis ortas, ibi: Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur*; sed falso, cum haec pars sit tertia particula subdivisionis partis primae, sicuti infra expresse habetur.

en: With no manuscript supporting and edition 1 not favoring [it], the Vatican edition adjoins here *In the third he determines certain doubts arising from what has gone before, there: When however men, who enjoy*; but falsely, since this part is the third small part of the subdivision of the first part, as is expressly held below.

la: Contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 minus bene Vat. *fuerit*. Mox codd. CS cc *Iterum* pro *Item*.

en: Against the older codices and edition 1, less well the Vatican edition [reads] *fuerit*. Shortly after, codices CS, cc [read] *Iterum* in place of *Item*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *et explanat ipsam* et mox ex fere omnibus codd. cum ed. 1 post *Prima* addidimus *igitur*, pro quo codd. P et Q habent *iterum*.

en: On the faith of the manuscripts and of edition 1 we have supplied *et explanat ipsam* and shortly afterwards from almost all the codices together with edition 1 after *Prima* we have added *igitur*, in place of which codices P and Q have *iterum*.

la: Ita mss. cum ed. 1; in Vat. autem subdivisio, quae incipit a verbis *Et in prima particula* usque ad *Frui autem*, deest.

en: Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1; in the Vatican edition however the subdivision, which begins from the words *Et in prima particula* up to *Frui autem*, is absent.

la: Vat. hic interserens verbum *est*, ob variatam constructionem in fine propositionis ante *quatuor* praefixam habet particulam *et*; insuper in media propositione post *divisionem* pro *in qua ponit* *per quam*, sed contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition here inserting the word *est*, on account of the varied construction at the end of the proposition before *quatuor* has the particle *et* prefixed; moreover in the middle of the proposition after *divisionem* [it has] *per quam* in place of *in qua ponit*, but with the manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 addimus *est*.

en: On the faith of the manuscripts and of edition 1 we add *est*.

la: Ita plurimi codd. ut ACFGIKRTVXWZ etc. et ed. 1 necnon textus Magistri Sentent. contra Vat., quae habet *videretur*, et aliquos codd. ut HLOS, qui legunt *videtur*.

en: Thus the great majority of codices such as ACFGIKRTVXWZ etc. and edition 1 as well as the text of the Master of the Sentences against the Vatican edition, which has *videretur*, and against some codices such as HLOS, which read *videtur*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quarum*, sicuti et paulo infra post *fruatur* substituimus *vel* pro *et*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *quarum*, just as also a little below after *fruatur* we have substituted *vel* in place of *et*.

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. *quaestio*.

en: Contrary to the faith of the manuscripts and of edition 1, the Vatican edition omits *quaestio*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 1

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem I: Divisio libri Sententiarum et disputatio circa frui et uti

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction I: Division of the Book of Sentences and disputation concerning enjoying and using

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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## Distinctio I.

### Commentarius in Distinctionem I.

*Divisio libri Sententiarum et disputatio circa frui et uti.*

> *«Veteris ac novae Legis continentiam»* etc.

---

english:
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## Distinction I.

### Commentary on Distinction I.

*Division of the Book of Sentences and disputation concerning enjoying and using.*

> *«The contents of the Old and New Law»* etc.

---

translators_notes:
The chunk holds only Bonaventure's prefatory matter for d.1: the running
heading (DISTINCTIO I.), the section heading (COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM
I.), the editorial subtitle naming the topic of d.1, and the Lombard incipit
lemma which Bonaventure is about to comment on. The substantive divisio
textus begins in the next chunk (`bon-sent-I-d1-divisio.md`, raw line 13224).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *Quid sit uti et de utibili.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum uti sit actus voluntatis, an rationis, vel omnis potentiae.*

Circa primum[^1] de uti, quid sit per essentiam, utrum sit actus voluntatis, an rationis, sic proceditur. Quod sit actus voluntatis ostenditur sic.

1. Ab actu utendi denominatur unusquisque bonus[^2]; sed nullus dicitur bonus nisi ab actu voluntatis: ergo actus utendi pertinet ad voluntatem.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis»: ergo uti est actus voluntatis.

3. Item, hoc videtur per divisionem ipsius uti contra alia, quia decimo *de Trinitate*[^4] dividit Augustinus haec tria, ingenium, doctrinam et usum, et dicit, quod ingenium respicit, quid homo possit, doctrina, quid homo sciat, usus, quid[^5] velit: ergo usus est actus voluntatis.

4. Item, «Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem»[^6]; sed uti et abuti sunt opposita, ergo cum abuti sit solius voluntatis, quia eius solius est peccare: ergo et uti similiter erit actus solius voluntatis.

**Contra:** 1. Usus sive assuefactio est via in habitum acquirendum[^7]; sed omnis potentia nata est acquirere habitum: ergo uti videtur esse omnis potentiae.

2. Item, omnis potentia mediante operatione sua ordinatur in finem[^8]; sed eo dicitur aliquid utibile sive uti, quo in finem est ordinabile; sed ordinari in finem mediante propria operatione est omnis potentiae: ergo et uti similiter.

3. Item, sicut Augustinus dicit et habetur in littera[^9], uti est id quod in usum venerit referre etc. Sed eius est referre, cuius est conferre; sed conferre est solius rationis, ergo et referre: ergo et uti a definitione.

4. Item, ars utitur suis instrumentis[^10]; sed ars est in potentia rationali sive cognitiva, cum sit scientia: ergo cum habitus et actus sint eiusdem potentiae, si ars est in potentia rationali, et usus similiter erit in eadem.

> **Conclusio.** Uti quinque modis potest intelligi: si sumitur communissime et communiter, est actus omnis potentiae; si sumitur proprie, magis proprie et propriissime, est actus voluntatis.

**Respondeo**[^11]**:** Dicendum, quod uti quinque modis accipitur, et secundum hoc diversificatur secundum rem et secundum definitionem.

Accipitur enim usus sive uti communissime, secundum quod dividitur contra otium vel otiositatem, pro naturali operatione debita cuilibet rei, sive

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ad quam unaquaeque res ordinatur, et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus[^12]: «Cuius usus bonus etc.».

Secundo modo dicitur communiter; et sic usus dividitur contra dissuetudinem. Et hoc modo definitur a Victorino[^13]: «Usus est actus frequenter elicitus a potentia», et hoc modo potest dici, quod est actus omnis potentiae nec addit super actum nisi frequentiam.

Tertio modo accipitur uti proprie; et sic dividitur contra habitus memoriae et intelligentiae, scilicet[^14] contra ingenium et doctrinam. Et sic definitur ab Augustino decimo *de Trinitate*: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis», et sic dicit actum voluntatis proprie.

Quarto modo accipitur magis proprie; et sic dividitur contra actum quietativum, scilicet contra frui. Et sic definitur ab Augustino[^15]: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis propter aliud», et sic est actus voluntatis ut ad aliud relatae.

Quinto accipitur propriissime; et sic dividitur contra actum inordinatum, scilicet contra abuti. Et sic definitur ab Augustino *de Doctrina christiana*[^16]: «Uti est id quod in usum venerit referre ad id, quo fruendum est», et sic uti dicit actum voluntatis relatum et ordinatum in finem.

Ratio ergo diversarum notificationum est multiplex acceptio eius quod est uti; et ratio multiplicis acceptionis est oppositio eius ad diversa.

Si ergo quaeratur, cuius potentiae est[^17] actus: dicendum, quod, communissime et communiter loquendo, est actus omnis potentiae; et sic non loquitur Augustinus; proprie vero, magis proprie et propriissime actus est ipsius voluntatis.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

1. Et sic patet primo obiectum in contrarium, scilicet quod[^18] sit omnis potentiae.

2. Quod obiicitur secundo, quod omnis potentia refertur in finem per actum suum; dicendum, quod illa potentia dicitur uti suo actu, quae est domina sui actus; et talis potentiae est referre suum actum, non tantum referri. Et quoniam sola voluntas est domina sui actus et sola est se ipsam movens, ideo ipsa sola est, cuius est active uti. Aliis autem potentiis contingit uti materialiter et passive, quia habent referri, et non referre. Et hinc est, quod ab Augustino dicitur[^19]: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis»; facultas enim dicitur eius dominium, quo faciliter potest in actum suum tanquam illius princeps.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationis est referre; dicendum, quod dupliciter est referre, scilicet per collationem et illationem, sicut praemissae referuntur ad conclusionem; et hoc est rationis, et hoc non est uti. Et est referre per[^20] inclinationem et ordinationem ad aliud; et hoc est proprie voluntatis, quia potest aliquid assumere quiescendo ibi, vel aliud intendendo; et hoc est referre[^21], per quod definitur uti etc.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de arte, dicendum, quod ars dicit quod est operationis, et quod est speculationis. Secundum quod dicit[^22] quod est speculationis, non habet uti, et sic est rationis; secundum vero quod dicit quod est operationis, sic extenditur ad voluntatem et eam regulat in utendo.

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english:
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### Article I. *What use is, and concerning the useful.*
### Question I. *Whether use is an act of the will, of reason, or of every faculty.*

Concerning the first[^1] point about use — what it is by essence, whether it is an act of the will or of reason — one proceeds thus. That it is an act of the will is shown thus.

1. By the act of using, each one is called good[^2]; but no one is called good except from an act of the will: therefore the act of using pertains to the will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the tenth book *On the Trinity*[^3]: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will": therefore to use is an act of the will.

3. Likewise, this is apparent by the division of use itself against other things, because in the tenth book *On the Trinity*[^4] Augustine divides these three — talent (*ingenium*), doctrine, and use — and says that talent regards what a man can do, doctrine what a man knows, use what[^5] he wills: therefore use is an act of the will.

4. Likewise, "Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"[^6]; but to use and to misuse are opposites; therefore, since to misuse belongs to the will alone, because to sin belongs to it alone: therefore to use will likewise be an act of the will alone.

**On the contrary:** 1. Use or habituation is the way to acquiring a habit[^7]; but every faculty is by nature able to acquire a habit: therefore use seems to belong to every faculty.

2. Likewise, every faculty is ordered to an end through its own operation[^8]; but something is called useful or to be used insofar as it is orderable to an end; but to be ordered to an end through its proper operation belongs to every faculty: therefore use likewise.

3. Likewise, as Augustine says and as is held in the *Lectio* [of the Master][^9], to use is to refer that which has come into use, and so on. But it belongs to that which can refer, to which it belongs to compare; but to compare belongs to reason alone, therefore so does to refer: therefore so also does to use, from its definition.

4. Likewise, art uses its own instruments[^10]; but art is in the rational or cognitive faculty, since it is a science: therefore, since habit and act belong to the same faculty, if art is in the rational faculty, use likewise will be in the same.

> **Conclusion.** Use can be understood in five ways: if it is taken most commonly and commonly, it is an act of every faculty; if it is taken properly, more properly, and most properly, it is an act of the will.

**I respond**[^11]**:** It must be said that use is taken in five ways, and accordingly it is diversified both with respect to the thing and with respect to the definition.

For use or *uti* is taken most commonly insofar as it is divided against idleness or leisure, for the natural operation due to any given thing, or that

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to which each thing is ordered; and according to this the Philosopher says[^12]: "Whose use is good, etc."

In a second mode it is said commonly; and thus use is divided against disuse. And in this mode it is defined by Victorinus[^13]: "Use is an act frequently elicited from a faculty," and in this mode it can be said that it is an act of every faculty, and it adds nothing to the act except frequency.

In a third mode use is taken properly; and thus it is divided against the habits of memory and intelligence, namely[^14] against talent and doctrine. And thus it is defined by Augustine in the tenth book *On the Trinity*: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will," and thus it names an act of the will properly.

In a fourth mode it is taken more properly; and thus it is divided against the quietative act, namely against enjoyment (*frui*). And thus it is defined by Augustine[^15]: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will on account of another thing," and thus it is an act of the will as referred to another.

In a fifth mode it is taken most properly; and thus it is divided against the disordered act, namely against misuse (*abuti*). And thus it is defined by Augustine *On Christian Doctrine*[^16]: "To use is to refer what has come into use to that which is to be enjoyed," and thus *uti* names an act of the will referred and ordered to an end.

Therefore the reason for the diverse definitions is the manifold acceptation of *uti*; and the reason for the manifold acceptation is its opposition to diverse things.

If, then, it be asked of which faculty it is[^17] the act: it must be said that, speaking most commonly and commonly, it is the act of every faculty; and in this way Augustine does not speak; but properly, more properly, and most properly, it is the act of the will itself.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**

1. And thus the first objection on the contrary side is clear, namely that[^18] it is of every faculty.

2. As to what is objected secondly, that every faculty is referred to its end through its own act: it must be said that that faculty is said to use its own act which is mistress of its act; and it belongs to such a faculty to refer its act, not only to be referred. And since the will alone is mistress of its act and alone is self-moving, therefore it alone is that to which it belongs actively to use. To the other faculties, however, it pertains to be used materially and passively, because they are referable, not refer-ers. And hence it is that it is said by Augustine[^19]: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will"; for *facultas* is called its dominion, by which it can easily proceed into its act as the prince of that act.

3. To what is objected, that to refer belongs to reason: it must be said that to refer is twofold, namely by collation and by inference, as premises are referred to a conclusion; and this belongs to reason, and this is not to use. And there is to refer by[^20] inclination and ordering to another; and this belongs properly to the will, because it can take up something either by resting in it or by directing it toward another; and this is to refer[^21] by which use is defined, and so on.

4. To what is objected concerning art, it must be said that art expresses both what belongs to operation and what belongs to speculation. According to what it says[^22] belongs to speculation, it has no use, and so it belongs to reason; but according to what it says belongs to operation, it extends to the will and regulates it in using.

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la: Consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, restituimus verba *Circa primum* et mox mutavimus *aut* in *an*, quod et grammatice melius est.

en: With the agreement of the manuscripts and the first edition, we have restored the words *Circa primum*, and we have at once changed *aut* into *an*, which is also grammatically better.

la: Forsitan respicitur illud Aristot. II. *Ethic.* c. 3. in fine: *Qui enim bene his* (voluptatibus et doloribus) *utetur, bonus; qui male, erit malus.*

en: Perhaps reference is being made to that passage of Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 3, at the end: "For he who uses these things (pleasures and pains) well, will be good; he who uses them badly, will be evil."

la: Cap. 11. n. 17; vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. in initio.

en: Chap. 11, n. 17; see above in the Master's text, c. 3, at the beginning.

la: Ibidem, paulo ante; et XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 25.

en: Ibid., a little before; and *On the City of God* XI, c. 25.

la: Cod. X hic iterum addit *homo*.

en: Codex X here again adds *homo*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Oppositis circa finem: *Palam vero est, quod circa idem aut specie aut genere nata sunt fieri contraria.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on Opposites, near the end: "It is plain that contraries are by nature produced about the same thing, either in species or in genus."

la: Idem B. Albert., S. I. tr. 2. q. 8. m. 1. his verbis exprimit: *Secundo dicitur uti rei exercitium ad inducendum habitum, secundum quod dicit Victorinus in Rhetoricis suis* (seu Comment. in Rhetor. Ciceronis, l. c. 25. et n. c. 89.), *quod natura habilem facit, ars potentem, usus facilem.* — Vide et Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 1.

en: The same point Blessed Albert, *Summa* I, tr. 2, q. 8, m. 1, expresses in these words: "Secondly, *uti* is called the exercising of a thing for the inducing of a habit, in accordance with what Victorinus says in his *Rhetorica*" (or *Commentary on Cicero's Rhetoric*, l. c. 25 and n. c. 89), "that nature makes one apt, art makes one able, use makes one ready." — See also Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 1.

la: Vide Aristot., IX. *Metaph.* text. 16. (Ed. Paris. VIII. c. 8.). — Mox codd. C F G H K L O R S U cc et ed. 1 *utile* pro *utibile*; cod. Z *utile sive utibile quo* etc.

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 16 (Paris ed. VIII, c. 8). — Soon after, codices C F G H K L O R S U cc and ed. 1 read *utile* for *utibile*; cod. Z, *utile sive utibile quo*, etc.

la: Hic, c. 2. — Faventibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, pro *infra* substituimus *in littera*. In conclusione huius argumenti Vat. *ergo referre et per consequens uti*; praeferimus tamen lectionem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 tanquam distinctiorem.

en: Here, c. 2. — With the support of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have substituted *in littera* for *infra*. In the conclusion of this argument the Vatican edition has *ergo referre et per consequens uti*; we however prefer the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1 as more distinct.

la: Aristot., I. *de Anima*, text. 53. (c. 3.). — Circa finem argumenti mendum Vat. *ponentis* sic pro *si* castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1. — Mox Vat. post *usus* addit *sive uti*; quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 53 (c. 3). — Near the end of the argument the Vatican error *ponentis sic* in place of *si* is corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1. — Soon after, the Vatican edition adds *sive uti* after *usus*; this is absent from the older manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Plures codd. ut A I T etc. *Solutio* pro *Respondeo*.

en: Several codices, such as A, I, T, etc., have *Solutio* in place of *Respondeo*.

la: Sententia: *Cuius usus bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est*, verbotenus legitur apud Boethium, *de Differentiis topicis*, libr. II. circa medium, in quo libro auctor proponit locorum topicorum divisiones, quae ex una parte, duce Aristotele, a Themistio, et ex altera parte a Cicerone exhibentur, earumque differentias indicat.

en: The sentence *Whose use is good, that itself is also good* is read verbatim in Boethius, *On Topical Differences*, book II, near the middle, in which book the author sets out the divisions of topical places — which on one side are presented by Themistius (following Aristotle) and on the other by Cicero — and indicates their differences.

la: Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetor († inter 370–382), qui praeter opuscula theologica contra Arianos varios confecit libros philosophicos et rhetoricos; sic transtulit Porphyrii librum *de Praedicabilibus* in linguam latinam (cfr. Boeth., Dialogus I. in Porphyrium) scripsitque commentarium in Rhetorica et Topica Ciceronis (cfr. Boeth. Comment. in Topica Ciceronis; et ed. Operum Ciceronis per Orelli, ubi Victorini Comment. in Rhetor. invenitur). Licet definitio *usus*, de qua hic agitur, explicite non inveniatur in praenotatis Victorini operibus, colligi tamen posse videtur ex supra (argum. 1. ad opp.) allatis eius verbis una cum hac *exercitationis* definitione, quam in Comment. super I. Rhetor. Ciceronis, c. 2. proponit: *Exercitatio est suscepti operis continuatio.* Cfr. et ibid. c. 28., ubi de definitione *habitus* agitur, in qua ponitur *usus sive exercitatio*.

en: Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetor († between 370 and 382), who, besides theological tracts against the Arians, composed various philosophical and rhetorical books; thus he translated Porphyry's book *On the Predicables* into Latin (cf. Boethius, *Dialogus I in Porphyrium*) and wrote commentaries on Cicero's *Rhetorica* and *Topica* (cf. Boethius, *Comment. in Topica Ciceronis*; and the edition of Cicero's works by Orelli, where Victorinus's *Commentary on the Rhetoric* is found). Although the definition of *use* here in question is not explicitly found in Victorinus's noted works, it nevertheless seems gatherable from the words of his cited above (argum. 1 on the opposite side) together with this definition of *exercise* which he sets out in his *Commentary on Cicero's Rhetoric* I, c. 2: "Exercise is the continuation of an undertaken work." Cf. also ibid. c. 28, where the definition of *habit* is treated, in which *use or exercise* is set down.

la: Perturbatam lectionem Vat. *et* pro *scilicet* emendavimus ope mss. et sex primarum edd. Vide etiam supra fundam. 3, sicuti et de sequenti definitione ab Augustino data cfr. fundam. 2.

en: We have emended the corrupt Vatican reading *et* in place of *scilicet* with the help of the manuscripts and the first six editions. See also above, fundamentum 3, and likewise concerning the following definition given by Augustine, cf. fundamentum 2.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 3. in princ. — In fine propositionis Vat. male et contra mss. et ed. 1 *relative* pro *relatae*.

en: See here the Master's text, c. 3, at the beginning. — At the end of the proposition the Vatican edition wrongly, and against the manuscripts and ed. 1, has *relative* in place of *relatae*.

la: Vide supra in lit. Magistri c. 2, in quo textu codd. A F G H I K S X Y etc. sibi non constantes habent *venit* pro *venerit*.

en: See above in the Master's text, c. 2, in which text codices A F G H I K S X Y etc., inconsistent with themselves, have *venit* in place of *venerit*.

la: Codd. S Y Z satis bene *sit*. Mox Vat., reluctantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, post *quod* addit *duobus primis modis est actus omnis potentiae, tribus vero ultimis est actus ipsius voluntatis*; sed superflue, quia verbis immediate sequentibus idem dicitur. Dein multi codd. ut C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc. cum edd. 2 et 3 post *communissime*, omissis verbis *et communiter*, transponunt ea post *Augustinus* simulque omittunt *et propriissime*, sic legendo: *Communiter vero et proprie actus est ipsius voluntatis*; quae lectio praecedentibus manifeste contradicit. Codd. D P Q T post *propriissime* addunt *loquendo*, id est tribus ultimis modis.

en: Codices S, Y, Z [read] *sit* well enough. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, adds after *quod*: *in the first two modes it is an act of every faculty, but in the last three modes it is an act of the will itself* — but superfluously, since the same thing is said in the words immediately following. Then many codices, such as C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc., together with editions 2 and 3, after *communissime*, omitting the words *et communiter*, transpose them after *Augustinus* and at the same time omit *et propriissime*, so reading: *But commonly and properly it is an act of the will itself*; which reading manifestly contradicts what precedes. Codices D P Q T after *propriissime* add *loquendo*, that is, in the last three modes.

la: Supple cum cod. bb *uti*; Vat. autem praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit *uti communissime sumtum*, qua additione non quidem falsus, sed alius sensus obtinetur; in lectione siquidem mss. a S. Doctore hic non datur explicita responsio ad primo obiectum, sed breviter repetitur ipsa obiectio; e contra est in lectione Vat.

en: Supply with codex bb *uti*; the Vatican edition, however, beyond the faith of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here adds *uti communissime sumtum* — by which addition not indeed a false but a different sense is obtained; for in the reading of the manuscripts no explicit response is here given by the Holy Doctor to the first objection, but the objection itself is briefly repeated; the contrary is the case in the Vatican reading.

la: Postulante maiore parte codd. F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1, posuimus modum passivum pro activo *Augustinus dicit*.

en: At the demand of the greater part of the codices F G H I R S T etc. and ed. 1, we have set down the passive mode in place of the active *Augustinus dicit*.

la: Cod. D *secundum*.

en: Codex D [reads] *secundum*.

la: Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc addit *quo vel*, quod tamen abest ab antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, with the later codex cc, adds *quo vel*, which however is absent from the older manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Ed. 1 hic et paulo infra *illud* loco *quod dicit*.

en: Ed. 1, here and a little below, [reads] *illud* in place of *quod dicit*.

latin_scholion:
Plurimi scholastici satis consentiunt. Scot., I. *Sent.* d. 1. q. 2. et 5. in fine. — S. Thom., hic q. 1; S. *Theol.* 1. 2. q. 16. a. 1. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 13. 16. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. qui doctrinam S. Bonavent. breviter repetit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic a. 1. principalis q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 6. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Brul., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
Most scholastics agree well enough on this. Scotus, I *Sent.* d. 1, q. 2 and 5, at the end. — St. Thomas, here q. 1; *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 16, a. 1. — Bl. Albert M., here a. 13, 16, and 17. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, which briefly repeats the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here a. 1, principal q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 6, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Brulefer, here q. 1.

---


title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Articulus I. Quaestio II. *Utrum omni creato utendum sit.*

Secundo, viso quid sit *uti* per essentiam, quaeritur de *utibili*, utrum scilicet omni creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. *Proverbiorum* decimo sexto[^1]: *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus*: ergo omnia sunt ordinabilia in Deum; sed omne ordinabile in Deum contingit ordinare; sed ordinando ad Deum ordinabile recte utimur: ergo si omnia contingit ordinare, omnibus est utendum.

2. Item, ens et bonum convertuntur, sicut vult Dionysius[^2]; sed omnia sunt entia: ergo omnia sunt bona. Sed omne bonum diligendum: ergo omne creatum est diligendum; sed non est diligendum propter se: ergo propter aliud; sed hoc est uti: ergo uti contingit omni creato.

3. Item, omni virtute contingit recte uti[^3]: ergo opus omnis virtutis est rectus usus; sed usus alicuius virtutis est respectu mali poenae, ut patientiae, alicuius respectu mali culpae, ut poenitentiae: ergo malis omnibus, scilicet culpae et poenae, contingit recte uti: ergo multo fortius bonis: ergo etc.

4. Item, «Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem[^4]»; sed omnibus contingit abuti: ergo omnibus contingit recte uti: ergo utendum est omni creato.

**Contra:**

1. Caritas est, per quam recte utimur, quia omnia ordinantur in finem per caritatem quaecumque recte ordinantur; sed sicut dicit Augustinus *de Doctrina christiana*[^5]: «Tantum quatuor diligenda sunt ex caritate et tria tantum creata, ut nos, proximus et corpus proprium»: ergo tantum tria referuntur sive ordinantur in finem per caritatem, cum non sit uti recte nisi per caritatem: ergo tantum tribus est utendum, non ergo omni creato.

2. Item, omnia, quibus utimur, subiacent nostrae voluntati; sed quaedam sunt, quae non subiacent nostrae voluntati, ut necessaria et perpetua: ergo illis non est utendum.

3. Item, omne illud, quo recte utimur, bono fine facimus; sed quaedam sunt, quae nullo bono fine possunt fieri, ut mentiri et talia, «quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo[^6]»: ergo talibus non est utendum.

4. Item, virtute non contingit male uti, sicut patet ex eius definitione[^7]: ergo ab oppositis malo culpae sive vitiis non contingit recte uti: ergo non omnibus aliis a Deo est utendum.

### Conclusio.

> Non omni re creata possumus uti ut instrumento neque ut habitu neque ut actu, omni tamen re uti possumus ut obiecto, sed quadrupliciter, vel operando, vel acceptando, vel tolerando, vel respuendo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod uti aliquo dicitur quatuor modis: aut sicut instrumento, quo operamur, sicut aliquis utitur[^8] instrumento vel organo; et sic non omnibus contingit uti, utpote potentiis, quae sunt pure naturales, accipiendo *uti* proprie, sicut accipit Augustinus[^9]; aut sicut habitu, quo regulamur, utpote virtute; et sic non omnibus contingit recte uti, ut habitu vitii, quo potius contingit obliquari; aut sicut actu, quo movemur; et sic non omni actu contingit bene[^10] uti, sicut illis

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quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo; aut sicut obiecto, ad quod inclinamur; et sic omnibus contingit uti et abuti. Omnia enim possunt sumi in facultatem voluntatis ad approbandum vel respuendum; et hoc patet per Augustinum libro *octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^11]: «Utimur assumendis vel respuendis ad valetudinem, tolerandis ad patientiam, ordinandis ad iustitiam».

Item, Augustinus decimo *de Trinitate*[^12]: «Voluntas totam intelligentiam capit, dum utor omni eo quod intelligo»; sed mala intelliguntur: ergo contingit uti malis.

Aliter tamen utimur bonis, aliter malis. Ratio enim ordinationis in bonis non tantum est ex parte ordinantis, sed etiam ex parte ordinati, quia per se bona sunt utibilia et ordinabilia, et de sui natura; sed in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed potius ex parte ordinantis; et ideo mala non dicuntur utibilia.

Unde nota, quod, cum *uti* sit assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter: vel in facultatem voluntatis operantis[^13], sicut est de his quae proprie pertinent ad usum humanum; vel in facultatem voluntatis acceptantis, sicut est dilectio proximi et huiusmodi; vel in facultatem voluntatis tolerantis, sicut sunt mala poenae; vel in facultatem voluntatis respuentis, et sic assumuntur mala culpae et ordinantur. Primis duobus modis intelligitur illud: «Cuius usus bonus etc.».

**Ad opposita:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de caritate, quod tantum tria creata[^14] sunt diligenda; dicendum, quod diligi aliquid ex caritate hoc est ordinari in summum bonum, quod per se caritas diligit. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: aut enim contingit ordinare quod natum est devenire in finem; et sic tantum tria creata diligenda sunt ex caritate; aut illud per quod devenire est in summum bonum; et quia hoc potest esse suo modo per omnem creaturam, omnis creatura potest diligi ex caritate, et omni creatura contingit uti.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non omnia subiacent voluntati; dicendum, quod aliquid[^15] dicitur subesse dominio voluntatis dupliciter: aut quantum ad esse ipsius rei; et sic non omnia subiacent; aut quantum ad actum voluntatis, qui est in respuendo ipsam rem vel approbando, et hoc[^16] propter se vel propter aliud; et tali modo omnia subiacent voluntati nostrae, scilicet quantum ad actum appetitionis vel respuitionis, licet non primo modo.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam nullo bono fine possunt fieri, similiter, quod semper vitiis abutimur; dicendum, quod obiicitur secundum viam, qua contingit uti aliquo ut actu medio; et sic non contingit[^17] uti peccato; vel sicut habitu regulante, similiter; contingit tamen eo uti sicut obiecto recte per motum contritionis et detestationis.

english:
### Article I. Question II. *Whether every created thing is to be used.*

Secondly, having seen what *to use* is per essence, the question is asked about the *useable*, namely whether every created thing is to be used. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. *Proverbs* sixteen[^1]: *God has worked all things for his own sake*: therefore all things are orderable to God; but whatever is orderable to God can be ordered; but in ordering to God we rightly use the orderable: therefore if all things can be ordered, all things are to be used.

2. Likewise, being and good are convertible, as Dionysius holds[^2]; but all things are beings: therefore all things are good. But every good is to be loved: therefore every created thing is to be loved; but it is not to be loved for its own sake: therefore for the sake of another; but this is to use: therefore it can be used in the case of every created thing.

3. Likewise, every virtue can be rightly used[^3]: therefore the work of every virtue is right use; but the use of a certain virtue is with respect to the evil of penalty, as patience, of another with respect to the evil of fault, as penitence: therefore all evils, namely of fault and of penalty, can be rightly used: therefore much more strongly, goods: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, «Opposites are naturally to arise about the same thing[^4]»; but all things can be misused: therefore all things can be rightly used: therefore every created thing is to be used.

**On the contrary:**

1. Charity is that by which we rightly use, because all things are ordered to the end through charity, whatever things are rightly ordered; but as Augustine says in *On Christian Doctrine*[^5]: «Only four things are to be loved out of charity, and only three created, namely ourselves, our neighbor, and our own body»: therefore only three are referred or ordered to the end through charity, since there is no right using except through charity: therefore only three are to be used, therefore not every created thing.

2. Likewise, all things which we use are subject to our will; but there are certain things which are not subject to our will, such as necessary and perpetual things: therefore those are not to be used.

3. Likewise, everything that we rightly use, we do with a good end; but there are certain things which can be done with no good end, such as lying and the like, «which, as soon as named, are conjoined with evil[^6]»: therefore such things are not to be used.

4. Likewise, a virtue cannot be ill used, as is clear from its definition[^7]: therefore from things opposite to the evil of fault, that is, from vices, one cannot rightly use: therefore not all things other than God are to be used.

### Conclusion.

> Not every created thing can we use as an instrument, nor as a habit, nor as an act; but every thing we can use as an object, yet in fourfold manner: either by operating, or by accepting, or by tolerating, or by spurning.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to use* something is said in four modes: either as an instrument, by which we operate, just as someone uses[^8] an instrument or organ; and thus it is not possible to use all things, namely the powers which are purely natural, taking *to use* properly, as Augustine takes it[^9]; or as a habit, by which we are regulated, namely virtue; and thus it is not possible to rightly use all things, as the habit of vice, by which rather one can be turned aside; or as an act, by which we are moved; and thus it is not possible to use well[^10] every act, such as those

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which, as soon as named, are conjoined with evil; or as an object, to which we are inclined; and thus all things can be used and misused. For all things can be taken up into the faculty of the will for approving or spurning; and this is clear from Augustine in the book *On Eighty-Three Questions*[^11]: «We use things to-be-taken-up or to-be-spurned for health, things to-be-tolerated for patience, things to-be-ordered for justice».

Likewise, Augustine in book ten *On the Trinity*[^12]: «The will grasps the whole intellect, while I use all of that which I understand»; but evils are understood: therefore evils can be used.

Yet otherwise we use goods, and otherwise evils. For the ground of the ordering in goods is not only on the part of the one ordering, but also on the part of the thing ordered, because of themselves goods are useable and orderable, and from their own nature; but in evils the ground of ordering is not on the part of the things ordered, but rather on the part of the one ordering; and therefore evils are not called useable.

Hence note that, since *to use* is to take up something into the faculty of the will, this can be in a fourfold manner: either into the faculty of the operating will[^13], as is the case with those things which properly pertain to human use; or into the faculty of the accepting will, as is the love of neighbor and the like; or into the faculty of the tolerating will, as are the evils of penalty; or into the faculty of the spurning will, and thus evils of fault are taken up and ordered. By the first two modes is understood that saying: «Whose use is good etc.».

**To the opposing arguments:**

1. To that which is objected concerning charity, that only three created things[^14] are to be loved; it must be said that for something to be loved out of charity is for it to be ordered to the highest good, which charity loves *per se*. But this happens in two ways: either it is possible to order that which is naturally fitted to come to the end; and thus only three created things are to be loved out of charity; or that through which one comes to the highest good; and because this can be in its own way through every creature, every creature can be loved out of charity, and every creature can be used.

2. To that which is objected, that not all things are subject to the will; it must be said that something[^15] is said to be under the dominion of the will in two ways: either as to the being of the thing itself; and thus not all things are subject; or as to the act of the will, which is in spurning the thing itself or approving, and this[^16] either for its own sake or for the sake of another; and in such a way all things are subject to our will, namely as to the act of seeking-after or spurning, although not in the first way.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that certain things can be done with no good end, similarly, that we always misuse vices; it must be said that the objection proceeds along the way in which one can use something as a middle act; and thus[^17] one cannot use sin; or as a regulating habit, similarly; yet it can be used as an object rightly through the motion of contrition and detestation.

la: Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata pro *Deus* legit *Dominus*. — Mox et pluries in seqq. argg. posuimus *contingit* loco *convenit*. Notamus hic et pro semper, quod codd. praesertim antiquiores saepissime ista duo vocabula eodem modo exhibeant abbreviata, ita ut sive *contingit* sive *convenit* legi possit.

en: Verse 4, where the Vulgate reads *Dominus* (Lord) instead of *Deus* (God). — Hereafter and several times in the following arguments we have placed *contingit* in place of *convenit*. We note here once for all that the codices, especially the older ones, very often present these two words abbreviated in the same way, so that either *contingit* or *convenit* may be read.

la: Cap. 5. *de Div. Nom.*, ubi secundum textum Graecum legitur: *Non aliud dicit esse bonum et aliud ens*. — Mox cod. *cc* *sed si omnia*.

en: Chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*, where according to the Greek text it is read: *He does not say that the good is one thing and being another*. — Next, codex *cc* reads *sed si omnia* (but if all).

la: Elicitur ex definitione virtutis, quam August., II. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 18. et 19. ponit: *Bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur*. — Mox multi codd. ut C G H K O P Q R S U etc. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post *poenae* omittunt *ut patientiae*, quod tamen codd. praedicti postea male loco *ut poenitentiae* ponunt, editiones autem praeallegatae verbis *ut poenitentiae* praemittunt.

en: Drawn from the definition of virtue which Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 18 and 19, sets down: *A good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly and which no one uses ill*. — Next, many codices such as C G H K O P Q R S U etc. and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, after *poenae* omit *ut patientiae*, which however the said codices afterward wrongly put in place of *ut poenitentiae*; the editions just cited prepose the words *ut poenitentiae*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Oppositis circa finem. Vide supra q. I. fundam. 1.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter on Opposites, near the end. See above q. I, fundament 1.

la: Lib. I. c. 23. n. 22: *Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum, quod supra nos est; alterum, quod nos sumus; tertium, quod iuxta nos est; quartum, quod infra nos est: de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant*. — Et ibidem c. 26. n. 27: *Quod si te totum intelligas, id est animum et corpus tuum et proximum tuum, id est animum et corpus eius*. — Cod. *W* post *caritate* addit *scilicet Deus*. — Paulo ante fide codd. et ed. 1 addidimus *sicut*.

en: Book I, c. 23, n. 22: *Since therefore there are four things to be loved: one, which is above us; another, which we ourselves are; a third, which is alongside us; a fourth, which is below us: concerning the second and the fourth no precepts had to be given*. — And in the same place, c. 26, n. 27: *But if you understand yourself whole, that is your soul and your body, and your neighbor, that is his soul and body*. — Codex *W* after *caritate* adds *scilicet Deus* (namely God). — Slightly earlier, on the faith of the codices and ed. 1, we have added *sicut*.

la: Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 6: *Quaedam enim confestim nominata convoluta sunt cum malitia*. (Translatio antiqua in ed. Operum S. Thomae a P. Fiaccadori 1866. tom. 21.)

en: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 6: *For certain things as soon as named are wrapped up with wickedness*. (Old translation in the edition of the Works of St. Thomas by P. Fiaccadori, 1866, tom. 21.)

la: August., II. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 18. et 19. n. 50. Vide paulo supra fundam. 3.

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 18 and 19, n. 50. See slightly above, fundament 3.

la: Substituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 *aliquis utitur* pro *utimur*. Cod. *V* *sicut aliquo utimur*. Mox ex plurimis codd. cum ed. 1 bis substituimus *utpote* loco *ut puta*.

en: From almost all manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *aliquis utitur* (someone uses) for *utimur* (we use). Codex *V* reads *sicut aliquo utimur* (as we use something). Next, from very many codices with ed. 1, we have twice substituted *utpote* for *ut puta*.

la: Quatenus *uti* est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis. Vid. supra q. 1. Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. ult., ubi agit de potentiis, quae non subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis.

en: Inasmuch as *to use* is to take up something into the faculty of the will. See above, q. 1. Compare also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, last chapter, where he treats of the powers which are not subject to the command of reason and the will.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* male omittit *bene*, quod antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 suppeditant, mutavimusque *convenit* in *contingit*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* wrongly omits *bene*, which the older manuscripts and ed. 1 supply; and we have changed *convenit* into *contingit*.

la: Quaest. 30: *Sic enim utitur suo corpore: quibusdam assumendis vel respuendis ad valitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustitiam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod veritatis documentum*. — In quo textu plurimi codd. ut A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omittunt *assumendis vel*, pro quo ed. 1 ponit *conferendis aut*.

en: Question 30: *For thus he uses his body: by taking up or spurning some things for health, by tolerating some for patience, by ordering some for justice, by considering some for some demonstration of truth*. — In which text very many codices such as A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omit *assumendis vel*, for which ed. 1 puts *conferendis aut*.

la: Cap. 11. n. 18: *Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam, totam memoriam meam capit, dum toto utor, quod intelligo et memini*.

en: Chapter 11, n. 18: *My will also grasps my whole intellect and my whole memory, while I use the whole of what I understand and remember*.

la: Renitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, Vat. pro *operantis* ponit *imperantis*, sed mendose, quia hoc membrum non excludit tria alia membra divisionis. Eamdem distinctionem Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. breviter sic proponit: *Potest aliquid assumi in facultatem voluntatis quadrupliciter: vel voluntatis operantis, ut bona nostra, vel approbantis, ut aliena bona, vel tolerantis, ut mala poenae propria et culpae alienae, vel respuentis, ut mala culpae propriae*.

en: Against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, the Vatican puts *imperantis* (commanding) for *operantis* (operating), but erroneously, because this member does not exclude the three other members of the division. The same distinction is briefly proposed by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, thus: *Something can be taken up into the faculty of the will in fourfold manner: either of the operating will, as our own goods, or of the approving, as the goods of another, or of the tolerating, as the evils of penalty of oneself and of fault of another, or of the spurning, as the evils of one's own fault*.

la: Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *creata*, quod, ut certo subintelligendum, claritatis gratia retinuimus, praesertim cum et paulo post in mss. inveniatur. Mox Vat., post *caritate* omisso *hoc*, propositionem ipsam exhibet modo activo: *diligere aliquid ex caritate est ordinare*, renitentibus tamen mss. et ed. 1. — Obiectionem, quam hic S. Doctor solvit, infra d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. sub alio respectu pertractat.

en: The codices with ed. 1 omit *creata*, which, as certainly to be understood, we have retained for the sake of clarity, especially since it is also found shortly after in the manuscripts. Next the Vatican, having omitted *hoc* after *caritate*, presents the proposition itself in the active mode: *to love something out of charity is to order [it]*, though against the manuscripts and ed. 1. — The objection which the holy Doctor here resolves, he treats below at d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, under another aspect.

la: Nullo suffragante ms. nec ed. 1, Vat. *aliquis*.

en: With no manuscript or ed. 1 supporting it, the Vatican reads *aliquis* (someone).

la: Cod. *Z* hic non male addit *vel*.

en: Codex *Z* here not badly adds *vel* (or).

la: Postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *sic* pro *hoc modo*, et bis *contingit* loco *convenit*. Mox mendum Vat. *recto per modum* castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: At the demand of almost all manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *sic* (thus) for *hoc modo* (in this way), and twice *contingit* in place of *convenit*. Next we have corrected the Vatican error *recto per modum* (rightly through the mode) from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc et sequentem quaestionem antiqui doctores sub una quaestione et minus accurate tractare solent. — Ostensum iam supra est, quod *uti* in sensu activo sit solius voluntatis; in secunda hac quaestione inquiritur, ad quae obiecta se extendat usus voluntatis, sive quibus rebus *uti* passive conveniat. In responsione S. Doctor primo ponit quadruplicem distinctionem circa obiecta voluntatis ordinanda et resolvit quaestionem in genere. Quoad primum membrum huius distinctionis, patet quod voluntas non possit omnia assumere in facultatem suam, ut iis utatur sicut instrumento. Nam aliquae potentiae ipsius animae non subiacent imperio voluntatis; unde vocantur pure naturales, ut potentiae vegetativae. Secundo, incidendo in specialem quaestionem, scil. quo sensu quis malis uti possit, iterum quadrupliciter distinguit modum voluntatis ordinantis, scil. operantis, acceptantis, tolerantis et respuentis. Hic usus mali ex parte ordinantis est «usus per accidens», ut bene dicit Richard. (hic q. 2. ad ult.), «eo quod ordinatum aliunde accipit ordinabilitatem, scil. a voluntate». — Circa hanc quaestionem de usu mali S. Thom. (hic loc. cit.) aliis verbis quam S. Bonaventura loquitur, sed in sententia nulla est differentia, immo in S. II. II. q. 78. a. 4. Angelicus etiam in modo loquendi cum illo convenit.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 3. et 5. et Quodl., q. 17. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 16. a. 3. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 10. et 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. ita presse sequitur S. Doctorem, ut Dionys. Carth. de ipso dicat: «Petrus, qui scripsit post Bonaventuram, ex ipso Bonaventura suam responsionem videtur sumsisse». — Richard., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This and the following question the ancient doctors are accustomed to treat under one question and less accurately. — It has already been shown above, that *to use* in the active sense belongs only to the will; in this second question it is asked, to what objects the use of the will extends, or with what things *to use* in the passive sense agrees. In the response the holy Doctor first sets down a fourfold distinction concerning the objects of the will to be ordered and resolves the question in general. As to the first member of this distinction, it is clear that the will cannot take up all things into its faculty, so as to use them as an instrument. For some powers of the soul itself are not subject to the command of the will; whence they are called purely natural, such as the vegetative powers. Secondly, falling into a special question, namely in what sense one can use evils, again he distinguishes in fourfold manner the mode of the ordering will, namely operating, accepting, tolerating, and spurning. This use of evil on the part of the one ordering is a «use *per accidens*», as Richard well says (here q. 2. ad ult.), «because the ordered thing receives its orderability from elsewhere, namely from the will». — Concerning this question of the use of evil, St. Thomas (here at the cited place) speaks in other words than St. Bonaventure, but in substance there is no difference; indeed in *Summa* II–II, q. 78, a. 4, the Angelic Doctor also agrees with him even in the mode of speaking.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 3 and 5, and *Quodl.*, q. 17. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; *Summa* I–II, q. 16, a. 3. — Bl. Albert the Great, here a. 10 and 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, so closely follows the holy Doctor that Dionysius the Carthusian says of him: «Peter, who wrote after Bonaventure, seems to have taken his response from Bonaventure himself». — Richard, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 72, q. 3, n. 11. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius [the Carthusian], here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

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title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum solo bono creato utendum sit.*

Tertio, ostenso, utrum omni creato sit utendum et[^1] omni alio a Deo, est quaestio, utrum solo bono creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. «Omne bonum aut est finis, aut ad finem[^2]»; sed solo bono, quod est ad finem, est utendum, quia ratio utilis est ducere in finem: ergo cum solum bonum creatum sit ad finem, solo bono creato est utendum.

2. Item, omne bonum aut est creatum, aut increatum. Sed si contingit uti bono increato, contingit illud referre ad aliud: aut ergo ad creatum, aut[^3] increatum; sed non ad increatum, quia non est nisi unum increatum: ergo ad creatum. Sed sic refertur terminus ad viam et causa ad effectum; sed hoc est abusio, non usus: ergo solo bono creato sive creatura est utendum.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro octoginta trium *Quaestionum*[^4] dividit honestum contra utile: ergo nullum utile honestum vel e converso; sed Deus est honestum per essentiam: ergo Deo non est utendum.

4. Item, videtur quod non solum non sit utendum Deo sive bono increato, sed uti eo semper sit peccatum mortale, quia Augustinus in libro octoginta trium *Quaestionum*[^5] dicit: «Summa perversitas est frui utendis et uti fruendis»; sed qui utitur bono increato, utitur bono fruendo: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Contingit Deo recte servire intuitu mercedis, quia multi sunt boni mercenarii, ut dicit Ambrosius[^6]; sed non contingit Deo servire nisi amando: ergo contingit Deum recte amare intuitu mercedis; sed sic amans utitur Deo, quia refert ad aliud: ergo etc.

2. Item, sic summa bonitas habet se ad amorem, sicut[^7] summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed contingit veritatem creatam cognoscere clarius sine praeiudicio summae veritatis et sine errore: ergo similiter contingit aliam bonitatem quam summam ardentius diligere sine praeiudicio summae bonitatis et deordinatione: ergo contingit amore ordinato aliud plus diligi quam Deum: ergo contingit Deum diligi propter aliud ordinate et ita uti eo.

3. Item, videtur quod nullum peccatum sit, cum quis utitur Deo propter suam salutem, quia «cuius finis bonus, ipsum bonum[^8]»; sed huius usus bonus est, scilicet nostra salus: ergo usus Dei bonus: ergo non erit peccatum.

4. Item, usus Dei aut est bonus; et sic utendum Deo; aut est malus; et sic Deus malus, quia «cuius usus malus, ipsum malum[^9]»; quod si Deus bonus, et eius usus bonus: ergo Deo est utendum.

> **Conclusio.** Solo bono creato est utendum, et bono increato uti est abuti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod solo bono creato est utendum, quia, si bono increato utimur, semper est abusus, et abusus talis est mortale peccatum propter perversitatem in finem[^10] cum delectatione, et propter voluntatis inordinationem, quae minus diligit ipsum quo utitur, quam propter quod utitur.

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**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod contingit recte servire Deo intuitu mercedis; dicendum, quod illa merces aut est ipse Deus, sicut dixit Abrahae Genesis decimo quinto[^11]: *Ego merces tua*; et sic intuens mercedem non utitur, quia non refert ad aliud; aut merces illa est aliud, et tunc potest eam quis intueri aut ut causam moventem; et sic est malus mercenarius[^12]; aut ut rationem inducentem; et sic bonus, et hoc modo non utitur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod clarior cognitio creaturae non praeiudicat Creatori, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia claritas cognitionis non est in nostra potestate, sed ardor affectionis est in nostra potestate; ideo requiritur a nobis, quod istum ordinemus, non illam[^13]. Aliquis tamen actus cognitionis est in nostra potestate, utpote actus fidei, quo si aliquis assentiat veritati primae propter aliud, bene praeiudicat veritati, sicut amare propter aliud, bonitati.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis usus Dei est bonus; dicendum, quod finis dicitur bonus dupliciter: aut quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad intentionem finiendi; et propositio illa intelligitur quantum ad intentionem finiendi, et haec[^14] consistit in recta ordinatione.

4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod illa propositio[^15] intelligitur de habentibus ordinationem ad finem, sed non de ipso fine. — Vel intelligitur de actu naturali ipsarum rerum et proprio, qui frequentius ab ipsa re elicitur, non de ordinatione in[^16] finem; et sic non valet propositio ad propositum.

english:
### Question III. *Whether only a created good is to be used.*

Thirdly, it having been shown whether every created thing is to be used and[^1] every other thing besides God, the question is whether only a created good is to be used. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. «Every good is either an end, or [ordered] to an end[^2]»; but use is only of the good which is to an end, since the rational character of the useful is to lead to the end: therefore, since only a created good is to an end, only a created good is to be used.

2. Likewise, every good is either created or uncreated. But if it is possible to use an uncreated good, it is possible to refer it to another: either, therefore, to a created [good], or [to an] uncreated[^3]; but not to an uncreated, since there is only one uncreated: therefore to a created. But thus the term is referred to the way, and the cause to the effect; but this is abuse, not use: therefore only a created good or creature is to be used.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Eighty-Three Questions*[^4] divides the honorable against the useful: therefore no useful thing is honorable, or conversely; but God is the honorable by essence: therefore God is not to be used.

4. Likewise, it seems that not only is God or the uncreated good not to be used, but to use Him is always a mortal sin, since Augustine in the book *On the Eighty-Three Questions*[^5] says: «It is the highest perversity to enjoy things to be used and to use things to be enjoyed»; but he who uses an uncreated good, uses a good [meant] for enjoying: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is possible to serve God rightly with a view to reward, since there are many good hirelings, as Ambrose says[^6]; but it is not possible to serve God except by loving: therefore it is possible to love God rightly with a view to reward; but the one so loving uses God, since he refers [Him] to another: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the highest goodness stands to love as[^7] the highest truth stands to cognition; but it is possible to know a created truth more clearly without prejudice to the highest truth and without error: therefore likewise it is possible to love some goodness other than the highest more ardently without prejudice to the highest goodness and without disorder: therefore it is possible by ordered love that another be loved more than God: therefore it is possible that God be loved on account of another in an ordered way, and so to use Him.

3. Likewise, it seems that there is no sin when someone uses God for the sake of his own salvation, since «that whose end is good, is itself good[^8]»; but the use of this is good, namely our salvation: therefore the use of God is good: therefore it will not be a sin.

4. Likewise, the use of God either is good — and so God is to be used; or is evil — and so God is evil, since «that whose use is evil, is itself evil[^9]»; but if God is good, His use is also good: therefore God is to be used.

> **Conclusion.** Only a created good is to be used, and to use an uncreated good is to abuse.

**I respond:** It must be said that only a created good is to be used, since, if we use an uncreated good, it is always abuse, and such abuse is a mortal sin on account of the perversity toward the end[^10] with delectation, and on account of the disorder of the will, which loves less the very thing by which it uses than that on account of which it uses.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is objected, that it is possible to serve God rightly with a view to reward; it must be said that that reward is either God Himself, as He said to Abraham, Genesis fifteen[^11]: *I am thy reward*; and so the one looking to the reward does not use [Him], since he does not refer [Him] to another; or that reward is something else, and then someone can look to it either as a cause [or "the carnal"] moving [him]; and so he is a bad hireling[^12]; or as a reason inducing [him]; and so [he is] good, and in this way he does not use.

2. To that which is objected, that a clearer cognition of the creature does not prejudice the Creator, therefore etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar, since the clarity of cognition is not in our power, but the ardor of affection is in our power; therefore it is required of us that we order this latter, not that former[^13]. Some act of cognition, however, is in our power, namely the act of faith, by which if anyone assent to the first truth on account of another, he indeed prejudices the truth, just as to love on account of another [prejudices] goodness.

3. To that which is objected, that the end of the use of God is good; it must be said that the end is called good in two ways: either as to substance, or as to the intention of finalizing; and that proposition is understood as to the intention of finalizing, and this[^14] consists in right ordering.

4. To the last it must be said that that proposition[^15] is understood of things having ordering to an end, but not of the end itself. — Or it is understood of the natural and proper act of the things themselves, which is most frequently elicited from the thing itself, not of the ordering to[^16] an end; and so the proposition is not valid for the matter at hand.

la: Codd. R et W *vel* pro *et*.

en: Codices R and W [read] *vel* instead of *et*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1–7; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 3. et III. Topic. c. 1, ubi haec divisio diversimode insinuatur.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, I. *Ethics* c. 1–7; I. *Magna Moralia* c. 3, and III. *Topics* c. 1, where this division is insinuated in various ways.

la: Cod. A cum ed. 1 satis bene adiungit *ad*. Mox Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 4, post *unum* omittit *increatum*.

en: Codex A with ed. 1 quite suitably adds *ad*. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the older mss. and ed. 4, omits *increatum* after *unum*.

la: Quaest. 30: *Honestum dicitur quod propter se ipsum expetendum est, utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est.* — Mox ex multis codd. ut A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff cum ed. 1 posuimus *vel* pro *et*. Paulo infra Vat. ante *honestum* praemittit *quid*, quod tamen melius cum mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 omittitur, quia Deus est ipsum honestum per essentiam.

en: Question 30: *The honorable is said to be that which is to be sought on account of itself, but the useful that which is to be referred to something else.* — Soon after, from many codices such as A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff with ed. 1 we have placed *vel* in place of *et*. A little below, the Vatican edition places *quid* before *honestum*, which however is better omitted with the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, since God is the honorable itself by essence.

la: Quaest. 30: *Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui.*

en: Question 30: *Every human perversion, therefore, which is also called vice, is to wish to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used.*

la: In Evangel. S. Lucae c. 15, ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1748: *At vero filius, qui habet Spiritus S. pignus in corde, saecularis mercedis lucella non quaerit, quibus serviat. Haeredes sunt etiam mercenarii, qui ducuntur ad vineam. Bonus mercenarius Petrus etc.* — Codex autem, sub n. 507 Bibliothecae Laurentianae Florentiis, membr. in fol. saec. XI. fol. 116. recto, col. 2. ultimam partem sic exhibet: *non quaerit, qui ius servat haeredis. Sunt etiam qui conducuntur ad vineam. Bonus etc.* Cum quo concordat cod. m. Plut. XIV. in fol. saec. XV. libr. VII. c. 35. Lectio istius ed. in verbis et interpunctione errat.

en: In [Commentary on] the Gospel of S. Luke c. 15, where according to the Venice edition of 1748: *But truly the son, who has the pledge of the Holy Spirit in his heart, does not seek the petty gains of secular reward, that he may serve them. Heirs too are hirelings, who are led to the vineyard. Peter [is] a good hireling, etc.* — But the codex under n. 507 of the Laurentian Library in Florence, parchment, in folio, of the 11th century, fol. 116 recto, col. 2, gives the last part thus: *he does not seek, who preserves the right of an heir. There are also those who are hired to the vineyard. A good [hireling] etc.* With which agrees cod. m. Plut. XIV., in folio, 15th century, bk. VII. c. 35. The reading of that [Venice] edition errs in wording and punctuation.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, invertendo comparationem, nempe *sicut summa bonitas, sic summa veritas*, argumentationem, uti ex subnexis patet, perturbat. Mox cod. X post *clarius* satis bene addit *veritate increata*. Dein, faventibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, expunximus *aliquam*, quod Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc praemittit voci *aliam*. In ultima propositione huius argumenti multi codd. CFGKLRSUVW aa bb cum ed. 1 ante *diligi* falso repetunt *plus*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, by inverting the comparison — namely *as the highest goodness, so the highest truth* — disturbs the argument, as is evident from what follows. Soon after, cod. X after *clarius* quite suitably adds *veritate increata*. Then, with the older mss. and ed. 1 in favor, we have expunged *aliquam*, which the Vatican edition with the more recent cod. cc places before the word *aliam*. In the last proposition of this argument many codices CFGKLRSUVW aa bb with ed. 1 falsely repeat *plus* before *diligi*.

la: Boeth., II. *de Differentiis topicis*. Locus a fine: *Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est.* Vide supra q. 1. in corp. Propositio ista derivata esse videtur ex illa Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: *Cuius finis melior, et ipsum melius.* Ad normam codd. et ed. 1 omisimus *est* et *quoque*, quod Vat. cum Boethio habet.

en: Boethius, II. *On Topical Differences*. The passage near the end: *That whose end is good, is itself also good.* See above q. 1. in the body. This proposition appears to be derived from that of Aristotle, III. *Topics* c. 1: *That whose end is better, is itself better.* According to the norm of the codices and ed. 1 we have omitted *est* and *quoque*, which the Vatican edition with Boethius has.

la: Boeth., II. *de Differentiis topic.* — Codd. F O X addunt post *malus* particulam *et*. Immediate post ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*, cod. R autem habet *ergo si Deus*.

en: Boethius, II. *On Topical Differences*. — Codices F O X add the particle *et* after *malus*. Immediately after, from almost all mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted *quod* in place of *quia*, while cod. R has *ergo si Deus*.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 reiecimus lectionem Vat. *aversionem a fine* tanquam minus rectam, quia talis abusus non dicit solum simplicem aversionem a fine, sed etiam directam perversionem ipsius finis, quatenus nempe ipse finis convertitur in medium. Cod. O post *perversitatem* addit *intentionis*. Cod. R totam propositionem sic exhibet: *et abusus talis semper est mortale peccatum, non* (forsan omissum: *solum*) *propter perversitatem in finem cum delectatione, sed propter voluntatis* etc. Mox maiorem partem codd. ut ACGIKLUVX etc. et ed. 1 secuti, bis pro *utimur* substituimus *utitur*, quod grammatice melius est; alii codd. primo loco habent *utitur*, secundo loco *utimur*. Propositio ista relativa a S. Doctore adducta, quae immediate refertur ad substantivum *voluntatis*, continet implicite rationem inordinationis in voluntate hic notatae; sensus enim est: voluntas ordinata minus diligit ipsum quo *utitur*, i. e. medium, quam propter quod *utitur* i. e. finem; atqui in hoc casu habetur contrarium: ergo voluntas est inordinata.

en: On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1 we have rejected the reading of the Vatican edition *aversionem a fine* as less correct, since such abuse signifies not only a simple aversion from the end, but also a direct perversion of the end itself, inasmuch, namely, as the end itself is converted into a means. Cod. O after *perversitatem* adds *intentionis*. Cod. R gives the whole proposition thus: *and such abuse is always a mortal sin, not* (perhaps with *solum* omitted) *on account of perversity toward the end with delectation, but on account of the will's* etc. Soon after, following the greater part of the codices such as ACGIKLUVX etc. and ed. 1, we have twice substituted *utitur* for *utimur*, which is grammatically better; other codices in the first place have *utitur*, in the second place *utimur*. That relative proposition adduced by the Holy Doctor, which immediately refers to the substantive *voluntatis*, contains implicitly the rationale of disorder in the will here noted; for the sense is: an ordered will loves less the very thing by which it *uses*, i. e. the means, than that on account of which it *uses*, i. e. the end; but in this case the contrary obtains: therefore the will is disordered.

la: Vers. 1. — Paulo ante exhibemus lectionem codd. RVWXYZ aa bb; alii codd. autem, omisso *Deus*, ponunt *Dominus* post *Abrahae*, a quibus non multum dissidet Vat. legendo: *est ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam*. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 post *utitur* expunximus *Deo*.

en: Verse 1. — A little before we exhibit the reading of codices RVWXYZ aa bb; but other codices, omitting *Deus*, place *Dominus* after *Abrahae*, from which the Vatican edition does not much differ in reading: *He is Himself, as the Lord said to Abram.* Soon after, on the faith of the older mss. and ed. 1, we have expunged *Deo* after *utitur*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit *et sic utitur*.

en: The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the mss. and ed. 1, here adds *et sic utitur*.

la: Vat. post *istum* addit *amorem* et post *illam* adiungit *cognitionem*, quae tamen auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 tanquam superflua expunximus.

en: The Vatican edition after *istum* adds *amorem* and after *illam* adjoins *cognitionem*, which however on the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, as superfluous, we have expunged.

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 *hoc*. Mox antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem, quae habetur in Vat. et cod. cc post *ordinatione*, scil.: *et illo modo non contingit uti Deo, quia non convenit ordinari.* — Fusius de hac re tractat S. Doctor II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cod. cc with ed. 1 [reads] *hoc*. Soon after, the older codices and ed. 1 omit the proposition which is found in the Vatican edition and cod. cc after *ordinatione*, namely: *and in that mode it is not possible to use God, since it is not fitting [for Him] to be ordered.* — The Holy Doctor treats this matter more fully in II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Scilicet, *cuius usus bonus, et ipsum bonum*. — Vat. cum cod. cc paulo ante post *ultimum* praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 addit *scilicet usus Dei aut est bonus aut malus* etc.

en: Namely, *that whose use is good, is itself also good*. — The Vatican edition with cod. cc a little before, after *ultimum*, contrary to the testimony of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds *namely the use of God is either good or evil*, etc.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *in* loco *ad*. — De hoc secundo responsionis membro vide supra q. 1. circa principium conclusionis.

en: From the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted *in* in place of *ad*. — On this second member of the response see above q. 1. near the beginning of the conclusion. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In conclusione S. Doctor propositionem, quod bono increato uti sit abusus et peccatum, duplici ratione probat, quae sumitur tum ex parte finis ultimi, tum ex parte voluntatis. Ex parte *finis ultimi* est abusus, quia aversio a fine non fit sine contemtu eius et offensa Dei, uti probatur II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 2; ex parte *voluntatis* propter inordinationem, quia voluntas, quando Deo utitur, in aliquo creato ponit finem; sed finis est melior his quae sunt ad finem (infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.) et «quantum est de se, dicit excessum bonitatis respectu eius, quod est ad finem» (ibid. ad *s.*). Ex quo patet inordinatio in proposito. Voluntas enim in utendo minus diligit medium quam finem. Ad rem facit illud generalissimum principium Aristotelis, toties a S. Doctore repetitum: *Propter quod unumquodque (tale) est, illud magis est.* Cfr. etiam hic dub. 6, ubi dicit, quod omnis res sit aut finis, aut medium ad finem, aut perveniens ad finem. — Quoad solut. ad 1, nempe quomodo Deo servire possimus intuitu mercedis, cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Quoad axioma: *Cuius finis bonus, ipsum quoque bonum* (ad 3.), cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. III., q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. et 2, et p. II. q. 142. m. 2. — Ceteros auctores videsis in Scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In the conclusion the Holy Doctor proves the proposition, that to use an uncreated good is abuse and sin, by a twofold reason, which is drawn both on the side of the ultimate end and on the side of the will. On the side of the *ultimate end* it is abuse, since aversion from the end does not occur without contempt of it and offense against God, as is proved in II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, and a. 3. q. 2; on the side of the *will*, on account of disorder, since the will, when it uses God, places its end in some created thing; but the end is better than the things which are to the end (below, d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in the body) and «as far as itself is concerned, expresses an excess of goodness in respect of that which is to the end» (ibid. ad *s.*). Whence the disorder in the matter at hand is evident. For the will in using loves the medium less than the end. To the point applies that most general principle of Aristotle, so often repeated by the Holy Doctor: *That on account of which each thing is (such), is itself more so.* Cfr. also here dub. 6, where he says that every thing is either an end, or a medium to an end, or [something] arriving at an end. — As to the solution to 1, namely how we may serve God with a view to reward, cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. and III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — As to the axiom: *Whose end is good, is itself also good* (ad 3.), cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** As to the question itself: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III., q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. and 2, and p. II. q. 142. m. 2. — For other authors see the Scholion to the preceding question.

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translators_notes: - **J4 Class C disposition (2026-07-17):** The chunk carried a stray `[^?]` marker in both bodies at "...aut ut causam[^?] moventem; et sic est malus mercenarius[^12]..." — a transcription-uncertainty placeholder, not a real footnote reference (16 real defs `[^1]`–`[^16]` are otherwise fully paired). Checked against the printed page: extracted p.35 (Vol I pt.1, `pdf = printed + 102`) at 450 dpi and confirmed by close crop that the print shows **no superscript numeral anywhere near "causam moventem"** — the only superscript on that line of print is the "²" that already anchors `[^12]` after "mercenarius". So `[^?]` had no printed counterpart at all; it was a stray artifact, not an OCR-illegible footnote number. Removed the `[^?]` token from both the Latin and English bodies (marker only — no other Latin/English wording touched). Apparatus count remains 16 defs / 16 Latin anchors / 16 English anchors, fully paired.