site: bonaventure

collection: Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi

title: Quaest. 7

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio VII. *Utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata.*

Quaeritur, utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata. Et videtur, quod sic.

1. Ad Romanos undecimo[^p37-4]: *O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius!* Ex quo colligitur, quod illa quae pertinent ad divinam sapientiam magis comprehensibilia sunt quam divina iudicia; sed Ioannis quinto dicitur, quod *Pater omne iudicium dedit Filio, quia Filius hominis est*; ex quo colligitur, quod anima Christi comprehendit divina iudicia: ergo si illa sunt minus comprehensibilia quam alia, multo fortius comprehendit omnia alia.

2. Item, Apocalypsis quinto[^p37-5]: *Dignus est Agnus, qui occisus est, accipere sapientiam*; Glossa: « Cognitionem omnium, sicut Verbum sibi unitum »; sed Verbum unitum comprehendit quaecumque cognoscit: ergo et anima Christi.

3. Item, Damascenus, in tertio libro[^p37-6]: « Aimus, Christum hominem omnia scientem; in Christo enim sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae ». — Si dicas, quod intelligitur secundum divinam naturam; contra: nihil scit aliquis, quod anima eius ignorat: ergo si Christus omnia comprehendit, necesse est, quod et illud comprehendat eius anima.

4. Item, Gregorius, in Dialogis[^p37-7]: « Animae videnti Creatorem angusta est omnis creatura »: ergo si anima Christi perfecte videt Verbum sibi unitum, angusta est ergo sibi omnis creatura; sed ultra omnem creaturam nihil restat nisi immensitas eorum quae sunt Deo possibilia: ergo anima Christi comprehendit illa omnia.

5. Item, anima Christi perfectissime est unita Verbo, et secundum quod est Verbum et secundum quod est exemplar; sed si aliquid esset in Verbo vel in exemplari aeterno, quod animam Christi lateret, posset cogitari adhuc perfectius unita: si ergo unita

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est unione perfectissima, necesse est, quod comprehendat omnia.

6. Item, anima Christi cognoscit in Verbo; et quia uno cognoscit multa, ideo simul multa cognoscit, licet de naturali cognitione non habeat intelligere nisi unum[^p38-1]: ergo cum illud unum non tantum se extendat ad multa, verum etiam ad infinita; qua ratione simul multa cognoscit, eadem ratione infinita cognoscit.

7. Item, Verbum aeternum aeternaliter repraesentat quaecumque repraesentat, cum sit unum et uniforme: ergo non alia ratione[^p38-2] ducit in unum, et in quodlibet: ergo anima Christi aut nulla in Verbo videt, aut si aliqua videt, infinita videt.

8. Item, potentior est anima Christi ad cognoscendum per Verbum sibi unitum, quam aliqua anima per habitum sibi datum; sed anima habens habitum sapientiae comprehendit omnia, ad quae se extendit habitus ille[^p38-3]: ergo pari ratione anima Christi per Verbum aeternum comprehendit omnia, ad quae se extendit ipsum Verbum.

9. Item, anima Christi cognoscit ipsum Verbum totum, cum totum habeat sibi unitum; sed in Verbo idem sunt potentia et essentia: ergo comprehendit totam potentiam Verbi. Sed potentia Verbi se extendit ad infinita: ergo anima Christi comprehendit infinita.

10. Item, propinquior est anima Christi ipsis rebus, ut sunt in Verbo, quam secundum quod sunt in proprio genere; sed nulla res habet esse in proprio genere, quin cognoscatur ab anima Christi; scit enim omnia, quaecumque fiunt: ergo multo fortius scit omnia, quaecumque sciuntur a Verbo aeterno.

11. Item, aeque impossibile est contingentia certitudinaliter scire[^p38-4], sicut comprehendere infinita; sed anima Christi propter unionem sui ad Verbum certitudinaliter habet scientiam futurorum contingentium: ergo pari ratione et infinitorum.

12. Item, aeque difficile est cognoscere secreta, sicut cognoscere multa; sed anima Christi propter unionem sui ad Verbum scit secretissima cordium, quantumcumque sint intima: ergo pari ratione cognoscit quantumcumque multa: ergo infinita.

13. Item, anima Christi comprehendit omne comprehensibile a creatura; sed quaelibet species numeri est comprehensibilis a creatura: ergo comprehendit omnes species numeri. Sed species numeri, ut dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate[^p38-5], sunt infinitae: ergo anima Christi comprehendit infinita.

14. Item, anima Christi comprehendit totum universum, ergo ens et omnes entis differentias: ergo non solum cognoscit differentias generales, verum etiam individuales, non solum ens actu, verum etiam ens in potentia; sed quaelibet species, quantum est de se, habet individua infinita in potentia[^p38-6]: ergo anima Christi comprehendit infinita.

15. Item, anima Christi comprehendit aliquod finitum, utpote lineam, ergo cognoscit principium lineae; sed principium lineae est punctus: ergo comprehendit punctum. Sed qui comprehendit aliquid novit illud secundum totum posse suum: ergo cum potentia puncti se extendat ad infinitas lineas, et anima Christi comprehendat totam puncti potentiam; necesse est, quod comprehendat infinita.

16. Item, anima Christi amat omne amabile, ergo pari ratione scit omne scibile; sed omne, quod scitur a Deo, est scibile: ergo anima Christi scit omne, quod scitur a Deo.

17. Item, anima Christi est omnino perfecta; sed in eo quod est omnino perfectum omne, quod est in potentia, est reductum ad actum; intellectus autem animae Christi est in potentia ad infinita, quia nunquam intelligit tot, quin plura possit intelligere: ergo cum intelligibilia in intelligente non se coangustent[^p38-7], ergo si tota ipsius potentia est ad actum reducta, necesse est, quod cognoscat infinita.

18. Item, si intellectus agens esset in plena actualitate respectu omnium, ad quae est possibilis in potentia; quilibet intelligeret infinita[^p38-8]: ergo cum in anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum sit in plena actualitate respectu omnium, respectu quorum est

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intellectus animae Christi in potentia: ergo anima Christi intelligit infinita.

19. Item, anima Christi aut potest aliquid addiscere, aut nihil. Si aliquid potest addiscere: ergo non est plene perfecta in scientia, pari ratione nec in gratia; si nihil potest addiscere: ergo tot scit, quod non potest plura scire: ergo necesse est, quod cognoscat infinita.

20. Item, anima Christi aut cognoscit aliqua eorum quae Deus potest facere et non faciet, aut nihil. Si nihil cognoscit eorum; quaero, quid impediat; aut enim hoc est, quia ipsa non potest ad illa se extendere, et illud est manifeste falsum; aut quia Deus non vult sibi revelare, et hoc est manifestum inconveniens, quia aufert illi animae summam familiaritatem ad Verbum sibi unitum. Si cognoscit aliqua eorum quae potest facere et non faciet; sed non est maior ratio, quare magis cognoscat hoc quam illud: ergo videtur, quod cognoscat omnia, quae sunt Deo possibilia: ergo infinita.

21. Item, anima Christi aut cognoscit finita, aut infinita. Si finita cognoscit; cum omnibus finitis possint cogitari plura: ergo poterit aliqua anima plura cogitare, quam cognoscat anima Christi; sed hoc est inconveniens, quod aliqua anima in aliquo illam excedat: ergo necesse est ponere, quod cognoscat infinita.

**Contra:** 1. Psalmus[^p39-1]: *Mirabilis facta est scientia tua* etc.; Glossa: « Homo assumtus divinae substantiae non potest aequari in substantia nec in aliquo alio »: ergo anima Christi non comprehendit omnia, quae comprehenduntur a sapientia aeterna.

2. Item, Augustinus, duodecimo de Civitate Dei[^p39-2]: « Infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, quae comprehendit, non potest esse infinita »: ergo si anima Christi comprehendit infinita, infinita sunt ei finita; sed si infinita sunt ei finita, cum ipsa sit finita, non sunt infinita: ergo si comprehendit finita, non comprehendit infinita.

3. Item, Hugo, de Sapientia animae Christi[^p39-3]: « Hoc unum indubitanter affirmo, quod alia sapientia praeter divinam in anima Christi non fuit, aut si aliqua fuit, aequalis illi non fuit »; sed constans est, quod alia fuit, sicut ex praemissis apparet: ergo cum sapientia informativa et perfectiva animae et habilitativa non possit esse nisi creata, sapientia illa in Christo non se extendet ad comprehendenda omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata.

4. Item, omne creatum dispositum est in certo pondere, numero et mensura[^p39-4]: ergo anima Christi et eius sapientia habet certum numerum et mensuram; ergo non se extendit ad infinita.

5. Item, comprehendere infinita est actus pertransiens totaliter super immensitatem cognoscibilium; omnis autem talis actus est infinitus; actus autem infinitus non est nisi a virtute infinita, neque virtus infinita nisi in substantia infinita[^p39-5]: si ergo anima Christi finita est et limitata, cum sit creatura, impossibile est, quod infinita comprehendat.

6. Item, quanto substantia simplicior, tanto plurium est cognoscitiva[^p39-6]; sed anima Christi nec per naturam nec per gratiam sublimatur usque ad divinam simplicitatem: ergo non elevatur ad tot cognoscenda, quot cognoscit divina sapientia.

7. Item, sapientia Verbi est immensa limpiditate et numerositate; sed anima Christi nunquam pervenit ad comprehendendum immensitatem lucis aeternae secundum omnimodam limpiditatem: ergo nunquam pervenit ad cognoscendam omnimodam numerositatem.

8. Item, licet anima Christi uniatur essentiae Verbi, nunquam tamen in tot existit rebus, in quot est ipsum Verbum; sed sicut se habet essentia ad essentiam, ita scientia ad scientiam: ergo nunquam cognoscit omnia, quae cognoscit ipsum Verbum.

9. Item, scientia includit potentiam, quia *posse scire posse* aliquid est[^p39-7]; sed anima Christi non est capax potentiae infinitae, sicut potentiae creandi: ergo pari ratione nec scientiae se extendentis ad infinita.

10. Item, infinitas in creaturis attestatur imperfectionem[^p39-8]: si ergo sapientia animae Christi est perfectissima, ergo non admittit infinitatem nec ex parte cognoscentis nec ex parte cogniti nec ex parte modi cognoscendi.

11. Item, nullum creatum excedit aliud creatum in infinitum; sed si anima Christi cognosceret infinita; cum aliae animae non cognoscant nisi finita, excederet illas in infinitum: ergo exiret extra genus creatum. Sed hoc est manifeste falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod anima Christi sit comprehensiva infinitorum.

12. Item, omne cognitum est in cognoscente[^p39-9]: ergo si anima Christi actu comprehenderet infinita, infinita actu essent in anima Christi; sed impossibile est ponere infinitum actu circa ens creatum: ergo impossibile est, quod anima Christi sit comprehensiva infinitorum.

> **Conclusio.** Anima Christi in Verbo non comprehendit proprie infinita; quatenus tamen Verbum est exemplar factivum, fertur in illud comprehendendo; sed quatenus est exemplar expressivum, in idem fertur non comprehendendo, sed excedendo.

*Respondeo:* Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod dupliciter contingit loqui de sapientia increata: aut secundum quod est *exemplar factivum* et *dispositivum*, aut secundum quod est *exemplar expressivum* sive *repraesentativum*. Primo

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modo relucent in arte divinae sapientiae ea quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt; et haec sunt finita. Secundo modo relucent omnia, quae Deus potest facere et intelligere; et haec quidem sunt infinita, sicut in praecedentibus[^p40-1] monstratum fuit, et Augustinus expresse dicit duodecimo de Civitate Dei. — Anima igitur Christi utroque modo per cognitionem fertur in divinam sapientiam, sed differenter. In ipsam enim, secundum quod est *exemplar factivum*, fertur *comprehendendo*, quia illa quae in exemplari ut factivo et dispositivo continentur et repraesentantur finita sunt, ac per hoc et comprehensibilia. In exemplar vero, secundum quod est exemplar *expressivum* seu *repraesentativum*, fertur non *comprehendendo*, sed *excedendo*; quia, cum in ipso repraesententur infinita, incomprehensibilia sunt, scilicet a substantia finita. Et ideo anima Christi, cum sit creatura ac per hoc finita, quantumcumque sit unita Verbo, infinita non comprehendit, quia nec illis aequatur nec illa excedit; et ideo illa non omnimode *capit*, sed potius *capitur*, ac per hoc in illa non fertur per modum *comprehensionis*, sed potius per modum *excessus*. *Excessivum* autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum. De quo cognoscendi modo Dionysius loquitur in libro de Mystica Theologia, et septimo capitulo de Divinis Nominibus[^p40-2] dicit sic: « Oportet agnoscere, nostrum intellectum quandam habere potentiam ad intelligendum, per quam videt intelligibilia, unionem vero excedentem intellectus naturam, per quam coniungitur ad ea quae sunt ultra se. Secundum hanc igitur divina intelligendo, non secundum nos, sed nos totos a nobis totis extra factos et totos deificatos; melius est enim Dei esse et non esse sui; sic enim erunt omnia credibilia iis qui sunt cum Deo ». — Hic autem modus cognoscendi per excessum est in via et in patria; sed in via ex parte, in patria vero est perfecte in Christo et in aliis comprehensoribus; sed in aliis est *coarctate* tum ex parte mensurae propriae gratiae, tum ex parte voluntatis divinae, quae non se cuilibet offert in omnimoda familiaritate; sed in anima Christi est *liberalissime*, tum quia ab ipsa habet gratiam implentem omnimode capacitatem suam, tum quia speculum aeternum praebet se ei manifestabile[^p40-3] secundum familiaritatem omnimodam.

Differt autem in Christo modus *comprehensionis* et *excessus* multipliciter: primo, quia in comprehensivo cognoscens capit cognitum, in excessivo vero cognitum capit cognoscentem. — Secundo, quia in comprehensivo terminatur intelligentiae[^p40-4] aspectus, in excessivo vero intelligentiae appetitus. — Tertio, quia in comprehensivo fit actu considerans omnia praeterita, praesentia et futura; in excessu vero fit ad considerandum prompta. — Quarto, quia ex comprehensione percepta fit, ut nihil de novo addiscat; propter vero excessum fit, ut nihil addiscere possit[^p40-5]; et ideo, licet cognitio animae Christi per modum excessus quodam modo dici possit respectu infinitorum, cognitio tamen comprehensiva non est nisi respectu finitorum. Unde si secundum illam dicatur anima Christi cognoscere quaecumque Verbum cognoscit, hoc intelligitur de praeteritis, praesentibus et futuris, quae aliquo modo faciunt ad integritatem ipsius universi, quod plene et totaliter fuit ab instanti conceptionis descriptum in anima Christi Iesu. Et pro tanto dicitur anima illa habuisse omnem scientiam, non quia comprehendit omnia, quae cognoscit divina sapientia, cum illa sit infinita et comprehendi non possit a potentia finita, secundum quod ostensum est supra[^p40-6]. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae, quia irrefragabiliter verum concludunt.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod anima Christi comprehendit omnia divina iudicia, et quod habet omnem scientiam, sicut habet Verbum sibi unitum; dici potest, quod illa dicuntur de homine assumto propter communicationem idiomatum; vel certe dicuntur de iis quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt, quae quidem ab anima Christi comprehendi possunt; non autem est verum respectu omnium, quae intelligit divina sapientia, cum infinita cognoscat, sicut patet ex iis quae sunt praedeterminata. — Illud tamen quod obiicitur, quod nullus potest aliquid scire, quod anima eius ignorat; veritatem habet, cum aliquis nihil cognoscat nisi per animam, sicut est purus homo. In Christo autem, qui non tantum cognoscit per animam, sed etiam per divinam naturam, locum non habet propositio illa. Et per hoc patet responsio ad tria primo obiecta.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod animae videnti Deum angusta est omnis creatura; dicendum, quod illud est verum de creatura secundum *esse*, quod habet in proprio genere, non tamen secundum *esse*, quod habet in arte, quia ars illa nobilissima et perfectissima est, non angustiam habens, sed potius perfectionem. Unde si anima cognosceret totum universum secundum *esse*, quod habet in proprio genere; non tamen adhuc esset in perfecta cognitione et comprehensione, nisi et artem illam cognosceret, per

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quam universa fiunt. Et quia anima Christi omnia facta perfectissime comprehendit in illa arte, ideo in illa et per illam dicitur habere comprehensionem perfectam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi perfectissime est unita Verbo; dicendum, quod verum est, salva tamen limitatione naturae creatae, quam anima Christi non perdit, quia non desinit esse creatura; et quia infinita comprehendere repugnat limitationi creaturae: hinc est, quod non potest inferri ex unione illa, quantumcumque intelligatur perfecta.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi simul cognoscit multa, quia cognoscit uno, quod pari ratione debeat cognoscere infinita; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia multitudo cum simultate non repugnat limitationi creaturae, infinitas autem cum actualitate et simultate omnimode repugnat; et ideo non est argumentum *a simili*, sed a valde dissimili.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum aeternum aequaliter repraesentat; dici potest, quod illud habet falsitatem, quia *repraesentare* dicit actum ad alterum; Deus autem, etsi in se uniformis sit, tamen multiformiter illustrat et manifestat; et cum infinita cognoscat, quaedam ex eis approbat et quaedam reprobat, quaedam disponit facere, quaedam vero minime, quaedam voluntarie ostendit, quaedam occulte. — Praeterea, esto quod quantum est de se, uniformiter omnia cognoscat, adhuc ratio non concludit, quia « omne receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis et non per modum recepti[^p41-1] »; et ideo, cum virtus illa capiens finita sit, impossibile est, etsi totum sibi ultro offeratur, quod totum capiat et comprehendat, sed secundum quod competit sibi; sicut exemplo apparet, si totus Sequana[^p41-2] offert se afferenti amphoram, non tamen totus comprehenditur, sed quantum et quomodo capacitas amphorae se extendit.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentior est anima Christi ad cognoscendum per Verbum sibi unitum, quam aliqua alia[^p41-3] anima per habitum sibi datum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed ex hoc non sequitur, quodsi anima comprehendit omnia, ad quae se extendit habitus, quod propter hoc cognoscat anima Christi omnia, quae cognoscit per ipsum Verbum: quia anima comprehendit ipsum habitum tanquam sibi proportionalem et in nullo excedentem ipsius capacitatem; non sic anima Christi comprehendit Verbum sibi unitum, cum eius capacitatem excedat in infinitum.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totum cognoscit, ergo totam potentiam; dicendum, quod ratio illa non valet, quia *totum*, dictum de *Verbo*, dicit privationem partis et partis vel positionem omnimodae perfectionis; dictum autem de *potentia*, quia potentia dicit comparationem ad possibilia, dicit distributionem respectu omnium possibilium; et sic variatur eius acceptio, et ideo non procedit ratio illa.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propinquior est anima Christi ipsis rebus, prout sunt in Verbo, quam prout sunt in proprio genere; dicendum, quod licet sit propinquior, non tamen est proportionalior. Comprehensio autem aliquo modo claudit in se rationem proportionalitatis, et quod finitum sit cognitum cognoscenti; et ideo, quia in proprio genere finitae sunt et proportionales illi animae, ideo comprehensibiles sunt, non autem prout sunt in illius artis immensitate, nisi forte intelligatur, secundum quod sunt in ipsa tanquam in exemplari *factivo*. Et hoc modo concedi potest, ipsas comprehendi ab anima Christi, alio vero modo non, propter immensitatem et improportionalitatem.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeque impossibile est contingentia certitudinaliter scire, sicut et infinita comprehendere; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem: quia, licet *contingentia certitudinaliter cognoscere* sit impossibile secundum cognitionem naturae; fit tamen possibile secundum illustrationem supra naturam, quae elevat animam ad cognoscendum res in arte aeterna, in qua incommutabiliter sunt tam contingentia quam necessaria; sed *comprehendere actu infinita* non tantum est impossibile cognitione naturali, verum etiam cognitione gratuita, pro eo quod utraque est creata et limitata, ac per hoc non se extendit ad actu infinita.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione secretorum et infinitorum, dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut ex dictis patet: quia perceptio secreti quantumcumque occulti non dicit aliquid incompossibile naturae ipsius intellectus creati. Non sic est de comprehensione infiniti, quae implicat infinitatem in actu, et per hoc in substantia et virtute; quod nullo modo admittit aliqua creatura, nec per gratiam nec per gloriam.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quodlibet comprehensum est comprehensibile a creatura; dicendum, quod licet singillatim de qualibet re possit concedi, quod sit comprehensibilis a creatura, quia quaelibet est finita; omnes tamen insimul sunt infinitae, et ideo incomprehensibiles. Et ideo ratio illa non procedit, pro eo quod proceditur a partibus divisim sumtis ad easdem, ut colliguntur in unum. Unde sicut non valet illud argumentum: domus ista potest capere quemlibet hominem per se, ergo potest capere omnes homines; sic nec illud valet.

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14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi comprehendit omnes entis differentias, et quod potentia cuiuslibet speciei se extendit ad infinita individua; dicendum, quod dupliciter est intelligere potentiam ad infinita, scilicet potentiam *activam* et potentiam *passivam*. Potentia *activa* ad infinita non est nisi in creatrice essentia, quae est actu infinita. Si autem ponatur in creatura potentia respectu infinitorum, est potentia *passiva* tantum, quae radicatur super finitum, habet tamen respectum ad infinitum principium activum, secundum illud quod dicitur in Libro de Causis[^p42-1]: « Omnes virtutes infinitae pendentes sunt per unum infinitum principium, quod est virtus virtutum ». Secundum hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, cognosci sive comprehendi potentia infinita in creatura: vel quantum ad id, *supra quod radicatur* in creatura; et quia illud est actu finitum, ideo est comprehensibile; vel quantum ad *principium activum* extra, quod est actu infinitum. *Primo* modo anima Christi comprehendit omnes entis differentias, tam in generibus respectu specierum, quam in speciebus respectu individuorum; *secundo* modo, prout refertur ad activam potentiam infinitam, cognoscit utique, non tamen per modum cognitionis *comprehensivae*, sed *excessivae*, sicut supra monstratum est. Et per hoc patet responsio.

15. 16. Ad illud quod obiicitur de puncto et de amabili et scibili, dicendum, quod[^p42-2] verum est, quod comprehendit omne amabile et scibile secundum *esse*, quod habet in propria natura; secundum autem *esse*, quod habet in causa prima infinita, sic dicitur scibile et comprehensibile soli potentiae infinitae; quia, licet secundum *modum* videatur aliquid creatum dicere, tamen secundum *rem* nihil dicit nisi potentiam efficientis, quae, cum sit infinita, a nullo finito potest comprehendi.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi est omnino perfecta, et quod nihil remansit in potentia, quod non sit reductum ad actum; dicendum, quod verum est de potentia, quae est reducibilis ad actum omnino; potentia autem ad infinita nunquam ad actum reduci potest secundum totum[^p42-3] nisi secundum partem. Unde impossibile est, quod Deus faciat, quod continuum sit omnino divisum in omnia, in quae potest dividi; hoc enim repugnat perfectioni potentiae ipsius agentis et completioni creaturae, quae nata est esse in finitate[^p42-4]; et talis est potentia intellectus possibilis.

18. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quodsi intellectus agens esset in actu respectu omnium, ad quae possibilis est in potentia, quod tunc anima intelligeret infinita etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, si intellectus agens esset actu respectu infinitorum, secundum quod est potentia animae; tunc anima propria sua virtute se extenderet ad infinita. Non sic autem est in anima unita sapientiae aeternae: quia sapientia illa, etsi se extendat ad infinita, non est aliquid ipsius animae, sed supra animam; et ideo non oportet propter hoc, quod competat ipsi animae scire infinita. *Praeterea, possibilis* intellectus est proportionalis *agenti*, non sic sapientia increata ipsi animae intelligenti.

19. 20. 21. Ad illud quod obiicitur de anima Christi, utrum possit aliquid addiscere, et utrum cognoscat aliqua eorum quae Deus facturus non est et facere potest, et utrum cognoscat finita tantum, vel etiam infinita; patet responsio per distinctionem superius habitam: quia, cum anima Christi cognitionem *comprehensivam* habeat respectu omnium, quaecumque in universo fiunt, et *excessivam* respectu omnium, quae in divina arte continentur, et *excessus* ille sit in totalitate virtutis cognoscentis, et in summa familiaritate respectu speculi repraesentantis; oportet[^p42-5], quod anima Christi etsi non omnia *comprehendat*, quae divina sapientia comprehendit, quia tamen in omnia illa *excedit*, ideo totus eius *appetitus* est terminatus; ut, sicut nihil ultra adiici possit eius *gratiae*, sic nihil ultra adiici possit eius *sapientiae*, quia tantum datum est ei, quantum concedi potest alicui creaturae.

Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt et praedeterminata de sapientia Christi et quantum ad *divinam* naturam et quantum ad *humanam*, apparere potest modus cognoscendi tam in cognitione Creatoris quam in cognitione creaturae, non solum in statu *patriae*, verum etiam in statu *viae*. Ut enim sit ad unum dicere, fatendum est, Deum scire infinita, scire, inquam, se ipso, non similitudine; et similitudine non accepta, sed ipsa veritate exprimente et exemplativa rerum universarum, respectu quarum multae dicuntur similitudines et expressiones, non propter multitudinem et distinctionem secundum se[^p42-6], sed secundum intelligendi rationem; hae autem similitudines sive rationes aeternae sunt, a quibus manat omnis certitudo cognitionis creatae, tam in anima Christi quam in aliis spiritibus creatis; nec ipsae solae sunt rationes cognoscendi, sed cum his etiam similitudines acceptae ab extra; secundum statum viae et secundum statum patriae non solum requiritur lucis aeternae praesentia, sed etiam lucis aeternae influentia, non tantum Verbum increatum, sed etiam verbum interius conceptum; quod cum sit finitum, nec anima Christi nec aliqua alia anima potest esse *comprehensiva* Verbi aeterni nec scibilium infinitorum,

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licet in ea ferri habeat *per excessum*; qui quidem excessus est ultimus modus cognoscendi et nobilissimus, quem in omnibus libris suis laudat Dionysius, et maxime in libro de Mystica Theologia. De quo etiam mystice quasi est tota Scriptura divina, et de quo Apocalypsis secundo[^p43-1]: *Dabo ei calculum, et in calculo nomen novum scriptum, quod nemo scit, nisi qui accipit*; quia istum cognoscendi modum vix aut nunquam intelligit nisi expertus, nec expertus, nisi qui est *in caritate radicatus et fundatus, ut possit comprehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo* etc.; in quo etiam experimentalis et vera consistit sapientia, quae inchoatur in via et consummatur in patria; ad cuius circumlocutionem magis sunt idoneae negationes quam affirmationes, et superpositiones quam positivae praedicationes; ad cuius experientiam plus valet internum silentium quam exterius verbum. Et ideo hic finis verbi habendus est, et orandus Dominus, ut experiri[^p43-2] donet quod loquimur[^p43-3].

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### Question VII. *Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends.*

It is asked whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends. And it seems that it does.

1. Romans eleven[^p37-4]: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!* From which it is gathered that those things which pertain to the divine wisdom are more comprehensible than the divine judgments; but in John five it is said that *the Father hath given all judgment to the Son, because he is the Son of man*; from which it is gathered that the soul of Christ comprehends the divine judgments: therefore if those are less comprehensible than the others, much more strongly does it comprehend all the others.

2. Again, Apocalypse five[^p37-5]: *The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive wisdom*; the Gloss: « The cognition of all things, as the Word united to him has it »; but the united Word comprehends whatever it knows: therefore so also does the soul of Christ.

3. Again, the Damascene, in the third book[^p37-6]: « We affirm that the man Christ knows all things; for in Christ are all the treasures of wisdom ». — If you say that this is understood according to the divine nature; on the contrary: no one knows anything of which his soul is ignorant: therefore if Christ comprehends all things, it is necessary that his soul too should comprehend that.

4. Again, Gregory, in the *Dialogues*[^p37-7]: « To a soul that sees the Creator every creature is narrow »: therefore if the soul of Christ perfectly sees the Word united to it, then every creature is narrow to it; but beyond every creature nothing remains except the immensity of those things which are possible to God: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends all those things.

5. Again, the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word, both according as it is the Word and according as it is the exemplar; but if there were anything in the Word or in the eternal exemplar that lay hidden from the soul of Christ, it could be thought still more perfectly united: if therefore it is united

by a most perfect union, it is necessary that it should comprehend all things.

6. Again, the soul of Christ knows in the Word; and because it knows many things by one, therefore it knows many things at once, although as regards natural cognition it has no understanding except of one[^p38-1]: therefore since that one extends itself not only to many things but even to infinite things; by the same account by which it knows many things at once, by that same account it knows infinite things.

7. Again, the eternal Word eternally represents whatever it represents, since it is one and uniform: therefore it is not by another account[^p38-2] that it leads into one thing and into any other whatever: therefore the soul of Christ either sees nothing in the Word, or, if it sees anything, sees infinite things.

8. Again, the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any soul is through a habit given to it; but a soul having the habit of wisdom comprehends all things to which that habit extends itself[^p38-3]: therefore by parity of reasoning the soul of Christ through the eternal Word comprehends all things to which that same Word extends itself.

9. Again, the soul of Christ knows the whole Word itself, since it has the whole united to itself; but in the Word power and essence are the same: therefore it comprehends the whole power of the Word. But the power of the Word extends itself to infinite things: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

10. Again, the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than according as they are in their own kind; but no thing has being in its own kind without being known by the soul of Christ; for it knows all things whatsoever that come to be: therefore much more strongly does it know all things whatsoever that are known by the eternal Word.

11. Again, it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude[^p38-4] as to comprehend infinite things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union to the Word, has with certitude the knowledge of future contingents: therefore by parity of reasoning it has also the knowledge of infinite things.

12. Again, it is equally difficult to know secrets as to know many things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union to the Word, knows the most secret things of hearts, however inward they may be: therefore by parity of reasoning it knows however many things there may be: therefore infinite things.

13. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends everything comprehensible by a creature; but any species of number whatever is comprehensible by a creature: therefore it comprehends all the species of number. But the species of number, as Augustine says in the twelfth book *On the City*[^p38-5], are infinite: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

14. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends the whole universe, therefore being and all the differences of being: therefore it knows not only the generic differences but also the individual ones, not only being in act but also being in potency; but any species whatever, so far as lies in itself, has infinite individuals in potency[^p38-6]: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

15. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends some finite thing, for instance a line, therefore it knows the beginning of the line; but the beginning of a line is a point: therefore it comprehends the point. But whoever comprehends a thing knows it according to the whole of its power: therefore since the power of a point extends itself to infinite lines, and the soul of Christ comprehends the whole power of the point, it is necessary that it should comprehend infinite things.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves everything lovable, therefore by parity of reasoning it knows everything knowable; but everything that is known by God is knowable: therefore the soul of Christ knows everything that is known by God.

17. Again, the soul of Christ is altogether perfect; but in that which is altogether perfect everything that is in potency has been reduced to act; but the understanding of the soul of Christ is in potency to infinite things, because it never understands so many things that it could not understand more: therefore since intelligibles do not crowd one another in the one who understands[^p38-7], therefore if the whole of its potency has been reduced to act, it is necessary that it should know infinite things.

18. Again, if the agent intellect were in full actuality with respect to all the things to which it is possible in potency, anyone whatever would understand infinite things[^p38-8]: therefore since in the soul of Christ the Word united to it is in full actuality with respect to all those things with respect to which

the understanding of the soul of Christ is in potency: therefore the soul of Christ understands infinite things.

19. Again, the soul of Christ either can learn something or nothing. If it can learn something: therefore it is not fully perfect in knowledge, and by parity of reasoning neither in grace; if it can learn nothing: therefore it knows so much that it cannot know more: therefore it is necessary that it should know infinite things.

20. Again, the soul of Christ either knows some of those things which God can do and will not do, or nothing. If it knows nothing of them, I ask what hinders it; for either this is because it cannot extend itself to them, and that is manifestly false; or because God does not will to reveal them to it, and this is a manifest incongruity, because it takes away from that soul the highest familiarity with the Word united to it. If it knows some of those things which he can do and will not do; but there is no greater reason why it should know this rather than that: therefore it seems that it knows all things that are possible to God: therefore infinite things.

21. Again, the soul of Christ knows either finite things or infinite things. If it knows finite things; since more can be thought than any finite things whatever: therefore some soul will be able to think more things than the soul of Christ knows; but it is incongruous that any soul should exceed it in anything: therefore it is necessary to hold that it knows infinite things.

**Contra:** 1. The Psalm[^p39-1]: *Thy knowledge is become wonderful* etc.; the Gloss: « The man assumed cannot be equalled to the divine substance either in substance or in anything else »: therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend all that is comprehended by eternal wisdom.

2. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book *On the City of God*[^p39-2]: « The infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, which comprehends it »: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things, infinite things are finite to it; but if infinite things are finite to it, since it is itself finite, they are not infinite: therefore if it comprehends finite things, it does not comprehend infinite things.

3. Again, Hugh, *On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ*[^p39-3]: « This one thing I affirm without doubt, that there was in the soul of Christ no other wisdom besides the divine, or, if there was any, it was not equal to it »; but it is settled that there was another, as appears from the premises: therefore since a wisdom that informs and perfects and enables the soul cannot be other than created, that wisdom in Christ will not extend itself to comprehending all that uncreated wisdom comprehends.

4. Again, everything created is disposed in a fixed weight, number and measure[^p39-4]: therefore the soul of Christ and its wisdom has a fixed number and measure; therefore it does not extend itself to infinite things.

5. Again, to comprehend infinite things is an act passing wholly over the immensity of the knowable; but every such act is infinite; and an infinite act is only from an infinite power, nor is there an infinite power except in an infinite substance[^p39-5]: if therefore the soul of Christ is finite and limited, since it is a creature, it is impossible that it should comprehend infinite things.

6. Again, the simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing[^p39-6]; but the soul of Christ is raised neither by nature nor by grace as far as the divine simplicity: therefore it is not elevated to knowing as many things as the divine wisdom knows.

7. Again, the wisdom of the Word is immense in clarity and in numerousness; but the soul of Christ never arrives at comprehending the immensity of the eternal light according to its every mode of clarity: therefore it never arrives at knowing its every mode of numerousness.

8. Again, although the soul of Christ is united to the essence of the Word, it nevertheless never exists in as many things as the Word itself is in; but as essence stands to essence, so knowledge to knowledge: therefore it never knows all that the Word itself knows.

9. Again, knowledge includes power, because *to be able to know* is to be able to do something[^p39-7]; but the soul of Christ is not capable of infinite power, as of the power of creating: therefore by parity of reasoning neither of a knowledge extending itself to infinite things.

10. Again, infinity in creatures testifies to imperfection[^p39-8]: if therefore the wisdom of the soul of Christ is most perfect, therefore it does not admit infinity, neither on the side of the knower nor on the side of the known nor on the side of the mode of knowing.

11. Again, no created thing exceeds another created thing infinitely; but if the soul of Christ were to know infinite things, then, since other souls know only finite things, it would exceed them infinitely: therefore it would pass outside the created genus. But this is manifestly false: therefore so also is that from which it follows, namely that the soul of Christ is comprehensive of infinite things.

12. Again, everything known is in the knower[^p39-9]: therefore if the soul of Christ were actually to comprehend infinite things, infinite things would actually be in the soul of Christ; but it is impossible to posit an actual infinite about created being: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ should be comprehensive of infinite things.

> **Conclusio.** The soul of Christ does not properly comprehend infinite things in the Word; yet in so far as the Word is a *productive exemplar*, it is borne into it by comprehending; but in so far as it is an *expressive exemplar*, it is borne into the same not by comprehending but by exceeding.

*I answer:* For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that there are two ways of speaking of uncreated wisdom: either according as it is a *productive* and *dispositive exemplar*, or according as it is an *expressive* or *representative exemplar*. In the first

way there shine back in the art of the divine wisdom those things which are, have been, and will be; and these are finite. In the second way there shine back all the things which God can make and understand; and these indeed are infinite, as was shown in what precedes[^p40-1], and as Augustine expressly says in the twelfth book *On the City of God*. — The soul of Christ therefore is borne by cognition into the divine wisdom in both ways, but differently. For into it, according as it is a *productive exemplar*, it is borne *by comprehending*, because those things which are contained and represented in the exemplar as productive and dispositive are finite, and by this very fact also comprehensible. But into the exemplar according as it is an *expressive* or *representative exemplar* it is borne not *by comprehending*, but *by exceeding*; because, since infinite things are represented in it, they are incomprehensible, namely by a finite substance. And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a creature and by this very fact finite, however much it may be united to the Word, does not comprehend infinite things, because it is neither equalled to them nor does it exceed them; and therefore it does not in every mode *grasp* them, but is rather *grasped* by them, and by this very fact it is not borne into them by way of *comprehension*, but rather by way of *excess*. And by an *excessive* mode of knowing I mean, not one by which the knower exceeds the known, but one by which the knower is borne into an object that exceeds it in a certain excessive manner, raising itself above itself. Of which mode of knowing Dionysius speaks in the book *On Mystical Theology*, and in the seventh chapter *On the Divine Names*[^p40-2] he says thus: « It must be acknowledged that our understanding has a certain power for understanding, through which it sees intelligibles, but also a union exceeding the nature of the understanding, through which it is joined to those things which are beyond it. According to this, therefore, divine things are to be understood, not according to ourselves, but with ourselves wholly put outside ourselves wholly and wholly deified; for it is better to be God's and not one's own; for so will all things be believable to those who are with God ». — But this mode of knowing by excess is in the way and in the fatherland; but in the way partially, whereas in the fatherland it is perfectly so in Christ and in the other comprehensors; but in the others it is *constrictedly*, both on the side of the measure of their own grace and on the side of the divine will, which does not offer itself to just anyone in every mode of familiarity; but in the soul of Christ it is *most freely*, both because from it that soul has a grace filling its capacity in every mode, and because the eternal mirror offers itself to it as manifestable[^p40-3] according to a familiarity of every mode.

But in Christ the mode of *comprehension* and of *excess* differ in many ways: first, because in the comprehensive mode the knower grasps the known, whereas in the excessive mode the known grasps the knower. — Secondly, because in the comprehensive mode the gaze of intelligence[^p40-4] is terminated, whereas in the excessive mode the appetite of intelligence is. — Thirdly, because in the comprehensive mode it becomes actually considering all things past, present and future; whereas in excess it becomes ready for considering. — Fourthly, because from a comprehension that has been received it comes about that it learns nothing anew; but on account of excess it comes about that it can learn nothing[^p40-5]; and therefore, although the cognition of the soul of Christ can in a certain manner be spoken of with respect to infinite things by way of excess, nevertheless comprehensive cognition is only with respect to finite things. Hence if according to that cognition the soul of Christ is said to know whatever the Word knows, this is understood of past, present and future things, which in some way make for the integrity of the universe itself, which was fully and totally described in the soul of Christ Jesus from the instant of his conception. And to this extent that soul is said to have had all knowledge, not because it comprehends all that the divine wisdom knows, since that wisdom is infinite and cannot be comprehended by a finite power, according to what was shown above[^p40-6]. — Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded, because they conclude the truth irrefragably.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the divine judgments, and that it has all knowledge, as the Word united to it has; it can be said that those things are said of the assumed man on account of the communication of idioms; or else certainly they are said of those things which are, have been and will be, which indeed can be comprehended by the soul of Christ; but it is not true with respect to all the things which the divine wisdom understands, since it knows infinite things, as is clear from the things that have been predetermined. — Yet as to what is objected, that no one can know anything of which his soul is ignorant; it holds true when someone knows nothing except through a soul, as is a mere man. But in Christ, who knows not only through his soul but also through the divine nature, that proposition has no place. And by this the response to the three first objections is clear.

4. To that which is objected, that to a soul that sees God every creature is narrow; it is to be said that this is true of a creature according to the *being* which it has in its own kind, but not according to the *being* which it has in the art, because that art is most noble and most perfect, having no narrowness but rather perfection. Hence if a soul were to know the whole universe according to the *being* which it has in its own kind, it would still not yet be in perfect cognition and comprehension, unless it also knew that art through

which all things come to be. And because the soul of Christ most perfectly comprehends all made things in that art, therefore in it and through it it is said to have perfect comprehension.

5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word; it is to be said that this is true, saving nevertheless the limitation of created nature, which the soul of Christ does not lose, because it does not cease to be a creature; and because to comprehend infinite things is repugnant to the limitation of a creature: hence it is that it cannot be inferred from that union, however perfect it be understood to be.

6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ knows many things at once because it knows by one, and that by parity of reasoning it ought to know infinite things; it is to be said that the case is not alike: because multitude together with simultaneity is not repugnant to the limitation of a creature, whereas infinity together with actuality and simultaneity is repugnant in every mode; and therefore it is not an argument *from the like*, but from what is very unlike.

7. To that which is objected, that the eternal Word represents equally; it can be said that this is false, because *to represent* states an act toward another; but God, although in himself uniform, nevertheless illumines and manifests in manifold ways; and since he knows infinite things, some of them he approves and some he reproves, some he disposes to make and some by no means, some he shows willingly, some in a hidden way. — Moreover, granted that so far as lies in himself he knows all things uniformly, still the argument does not conclude, because « everything received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient and not after the mode of the received[^p41-1] »; and therefore, since that receiving power is finite, it is impossible, even if the whole should offer itself to it unasked, that it should grasp and comprehend the whole, but only according to what befits it; as appears by an example, if the whole Seine[^p41-2] offers itself to one who brings a jar, it is nevertheless not wholly comprehended, but only so far and in such manner as the capacity of the jar extends.

8. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any other[^p41-3] soul is through a habit given to it; it is to be said that this is true, but from this it does not follow that, if a soul comprehends all the things to which the habit extends itself, therefore on that account the soul of Christ knows all that it knows through the Word itself: because a soul comprehends the habit itself as proportional to itself and in no way exceeding its own capacity; the soul of Christ does not in this way comprehend the Word united to it, since it exceeds its capacity infinitely.

9. To that which is objected, that it knows the whole, therefore the whole power; it is to be said that that argument is not valid, because *whole*, said of the *Word*, states the privation of part and part, or the positing of perfection in every mode; but said of *power*, since power states a comparison to possible things, it states a distribution with respect to all possible things; and thus its acceptation is varied, and therefore that argument does not proceed.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than as they are in their own kind; it is to be said that although it is nearer, it is nevertheless not more proportional. But comprehension in some way encloses in itself an account of proportionality, and that the known should be finite to the knower; and therefore, because in their own kind they are finite and proportional to that soul, therefore they are comprehensible, but not as they are in the immensity of that art, unless perhaps it be understood according as they are in it as in a *productive* exemplar. And in this way it can be conceded that they are comprehended by the soul of Christ, but in the other way not, on account of immensity and improportionality.

11. To that which is objected, that it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things; it is to be said that this is not true: because, although *to know contingent things with certitude* is impossible according to the cognition of nature, it nevertheless becomes possible according to an illumination above nature, which elevates the soul to knowing things in the eternal art, in which contingent things no less than necessary ones are unchangeably; but *to comprehend infinite things in act* is impossible not only by natural cognition but also by gratuitous cognition, for the reason that each is created and limited, and by this very fact does not extend itself to things actually infinite.

12. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of secret things and infinite things, it is to be said that the case is not alike, as is clear from what has been said: because the perception of a secret, however hidden, does not state anything incompossible with the nature of the created understanding itself. It is not so with the comprehension of the infinite, which implies infinity in act, and by this in substance and in power; which no creature whatever admits, neither through grace nor through glory.

13. To that which is objected, that whatever is comprehended is comprehensible by a creature; it is to be said that, although it can be conceded singly of any thing whatever that it is comprehensible by a creature, because each is finite, nevertheless all together are infinite, and therefore incomprehensible. And therefore that argument does not proceed, for the reason that it proceeds from the parts taken separately to the same parts as they are gathered into one. Hence just as that argument is not valid: this house can hold any man whatever by himself, therefore it can hold all men; so neither is that one valid.

14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, and that the potency of any species whatever extends itself to infinite individuals; it is to be said that there are two ways of understanding a potency to infinite things, namely an *active* potency and a *passive* potency. An *active* potency to infinite things is only in the creating essence, which is actually infinite. But if a potency with respect to infinite things be posited in a creature, it is a *passive* potency only, which is rooted upon something finite, yet has a relation to an infinite active principle, according to what is said in the *Book of Causes*[^p42-1]: « All infinite powers are dependent through one infinite principle, which is the power of powers ». According to this, an infinite potency in a creature can be understood, known or comprehended in two ways: either as regards that *upon which it is rooted* in the creature — and because that is actually finite, therefore it is comprehensible; or as regards the *active principle* outside, which is actually infinite. In the *first* way the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, both in the genera with respect to species and in the species with respect to individuals; in the *second* way, as it is referred to the infinite active potency, it certainly knows them, yet not by way of *comprehensive* cognition but of *excessive* cognition, as was shown above. And by this the response is clear.

15. 16. To that which is objected concerning the point and concerning the lovable and the knowable, it is to be said that[^p42-2] it is true that it comprehends everything lovable and knowable according to the *being* which it has in its own proper nature; but according to the *being* which it has in the infinite first cause, it is thus said to be knowable and comprehensible to an infinite power alone; because, although according to the *mode* it may seem to state something created, nevertheless according to the *thing* it states nothing but the power of the efficient cause, which, since it is infinite, can be comprehended by nothing finite.

17. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is altogether perfect, and that nothing remained in potency which has not been reduced to act; it is to be said that this is true of a potency which is reducible to act altogether; but a potency to infinite things can never be reduced to act according to the whole[^p42-3] but only according to a part. Hence it is impossible that God should bring it about that a continuum be altogether divided into all the things into which it can be divided; for this is repugnant to the perfection of the power of the agent itself and to the completion of the creature, which is born to be in finitude[^p42-4]; and such is the potency of the possible intellect.

18. But to that which is objected, that if the agent intellect were in act with respect to all the things to which it is possible in potency, then the soul would understand infinite things, etc.; it is to be said that the case is not alike: because, if the agent intellect were in act with respect to infinite things, according as it is a potency of the soul, then the soul by its own power would extend itself to infinite things. But it is not so in a soul united to eternal wisdom: because that wisdom, although it extends itself to infinite things, is not something of the soul itself, but above the soul; and therefore it is not necessary on this account that it should belong to that soul to know infinite things. *Moreover, the possible* intellect is proportional to the *agent* intellect, whereas uncreated wisdom is not so to the soul that understands.

19. 20. 21. To that which is objected concerning the soul of Christ, whether it can learn anything, and whether it knows any of those things which God is not going to make and can make, and whether it knows finite things only or infinite things also; the response is clear from the distinction made above: because, since the soul of Christ has *comprehensive* cognition with respect to all things whatsoever that come to be in the universe, and *excessive* cognition with respect to all things which are contained in the divine art, and that *excess* lies in the totality of the knowing power and in the highest familiarity with respect to the representing mirror, it must be[^p42-5] that the soul of Christ, even if it does not *comprehend* all that the divine wisdom comprehends, yet because it *exceeds* into all those things, therefore its whole *appetite* is terminated; so that, just as nothing further can be added to its *grace*, so nothing further can be added to its *wisdom*, because as much has been given to it as can be granted to any creature.

From these things, therefore, which have been said and predetermined concerning the wisdom of Christ, both as regards the *divine* nature and as regards the *human*, there can appear the mode of knowing both in the cognition of the Creator and in the cognition of the creature, not only in the state of the *fatherland* but also in the state of the *way*. For, to say it in one word, it must be confessed that God knows infinite things — knows them, I say, by himself, not by a likeness; and by a likeness not received, but by the very truth which expresses and exemplifies all things whatsoever, with respect to which many likenesses and expressions are spoken of, not on account of multitude and distinction in themselves[^p42-6], but according to an account of understanding; and these likenesses or eternal accounts are those from which flows all the certitude of created cognition, both in the soul of Christ and in the other created spirits; nor are they alone the accounts of knowing, but together with them also the likenesses received from without; according to the state of the way and according to the state of the fatherland there is required not only the presence of the eternal light, but also the influence of the eternal light, not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; and since this is finite, neither the soul of Christ nor any other soul can be *comprehensive* of the eternal Word nor of infinite knowables,

although it has to be borne into it *by excess*; and this excess is the last and noblest mode of knowing, which Dionysius praises in all his books, and most of all in the book *On Mystical Theology*. Of which also the whole of divine Scripture is, as it were, mystically; and of which the Apocalypse says in the second chapter[^p43-1]: *I will give him a white counter, and in the counter a new name written, which no man knoweth but he that receiveth it*; because scarcely anyone, or no one, understands that mode of knowing except one who has experienced it, nor has anyone experienced it except one who is *rooted and founded in charity, that he may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the length, the breadth*, etc.; in which also experimental and true wisdom consists, which is begun in the way and consummated in the fatherland; for the circumlocution of which negations are more fitting than affirmations, and superpositions than positive predications; for the experience of which inward silence avails more than outward speech. And therefore here an end of speaking is to be made, and the Lord is to be prayed that he grant us to experience[^p43-2] what we speak[^p43-3].

---

la: Vers. 33. Deinde citatur Ioan. 5, 22. et 27. — Codd. *magis incomprehensibilia*; sed in hac lectione deficit argumentum. — Eadem quaestio solvitur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Verse 33. Then John 5:22 and 27 are cited. — The codices read *magis incomprehensibilia*; but on that reading the argument fails. — The same question is solved in III *Sentences,* d. 14, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vers. 12: *Dignus... accipere virtutem et divinitatem et sapientiam.* — Glossa Haymonis est *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum: *Cognitionem omnium rerum, sicut habet Verbum* etc.

en: Verse 12: *Worthy... to receive power and divinity and wisdom.* — The Gloss of Haymo is the *ordinary* one in Strabo and Lyra: *The cognition of all things, as the Word has it,* etc.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 21. Locus Script. est Col. 2, 3: *In quo* etc.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith,* c. 21. The scriptural place is Col. 2:3: *In whom* etc.

la: Libr. II. c. 35. Pro *angusta* D F *agnita* (idem recurrit inferius), pro qua lectione afferri possunt verba Gregor., IV. Dialog. c. 33: *Quid est quod ibi nesciant, ubi scientem omnia sciunt?* Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 953, nota 8.

en: Book II, c. 35. For *angusta* D F read *agnita* (the same recurs below), in favour of which reading the words of Gregory, IV *Dialogues* c. 33, can be adduced: *What is there that they do not know there, where they know him who knows all things?* Compare tom. IV, p. 953, note 8.

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.): *Contingit enim plura scire, intelligere autem non.* Cfr. tom. III. pag. 114, nota 5.

en: Aristotle, II *Topics* c. 4 (c. 10): *For it happens that one knows many things, but does not understand them.* Compare tom. III, p. 114, note 5.

la: G *ergo ratione una*.

en: G reads *ergo ratione una*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 3, nota 4.

en: Compare above, p. 3, note 4.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 7. (c. 9.) et I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 30.).

en: See Aristotle, I *On Interpretation* c. 7 (c. 9) and I *Posterior Analytics* c. 24 (c. 30).

la: Cap. 18. Vide supra q. 1. in corp.

en: Chapter 18. See above, q. 1, in the body.

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie: *Individua, quae sunt post specialissima* [i. e. ultimam speciem], *infinita sunt.*

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* the chapter *On Species: The individuals which come after the most special things* [i.e. the lowest species] *are infinite.*

la: Cfr. tom. III. pag. 313, nota 3.

en: Compare tom. III, p. 313, note 3.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. — F prosequitur *ergo cum anima Christi per Verbum* etc.

en: See II *Sentences,* d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4. — F continues *ergo cum anima Christi per Verbum* etc.

la: Psalm. 138, 6. — Glossa est secundum Cassiod. in hunc loc. Cfr. supra pag. 35, nota 5.

en: Psalm 138:6. — The Gloss is according to Cassiodorus on this place. Compare above, p. 35, note 5.

la: Cap. 18, ubi textus originalis *qua comprehenditur* pro *quae comprehendit*.

en: Chapter 18, where the original text has *qua comprehenditur* for *quae comprehendit*.

la: In fine. Textus originalis: *Hoc... quod aut alia* [codd. *illa*] *sapientia..., aut si alia fuit, qualis illi non fuit.* Cfr. tom. III. pag. 297, nota 4. — *Minor* ostensa est supra q. 5. — Inferius post *animae* F addit *Christi*.

en: At the end. The original text: *This... that either another* [the codices: *that*] *wisdom..., or, if there was another, it was not such as that one.* Compare tom. III, p. 297, note 4. — The *minor* premiss was shown above in q. 5. — Below, after *animae* F adds *Christi*.

la: Sap. 11, 21: *Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.*

en: Wisdom 11:21: *Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight.*

la: Nam, ut communiter dicitur, *operari sequitur esse*; cfr. tom. I. pag. 84, nota 7.

en: For, as is commonly said, *acting follows being*; compare tom. I, p. 84, note 7.

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 10. et 17, nec non Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: Compare the *Book of Causes,* propositions 10 and 17, and also Aristotle, III *On the Soul,* text 3 and following (c. 4).

la: Richard. a S. Vict., VI. de Trin. c. 15: *Potest esse multiplex potentia, ubi* [v. g. in insensatis et brutis] *nulla potest esse sapientia; econtra autem ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse; dat igitur esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae.*

en: Richard of St Victor, VI *On the Trinity* c. 15: *There can be manifold power where* [e.g. in things without sense and in brutes] *there can be no wisdom; but conversely, where there is no power, no wisdom can be present. For to be able to be wise is without doubt to be able to do something; it is therefore not wisdom that gives power its being able, but power that gives wisdom its being able.*

la: Ut in *materia* secundum Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59-72. (c. 6. et 7.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 360, nota 5. et pag. 765, nota 6.

en: As in *matter,* according to Aristotle, III *Physics,* texts 59–72 (c. 6 and 7). Compare tom. I, p. 360, note 5, and p. 765, note 6.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 68, nota 2. — Inferius fide E F G elegimus lectionem *circa ens*, in aliis *esse ens*.

en: Compare tom. I, p. 68, note 2. — Below, on the faith of E F G we have chosen the reading *circa ens*; in the others, *esse ens*.

la: Quaest. 1, in cuius 4. fundam. atque in corp. allegatur etiam August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18, et in 2. fundam. citatur XI. c. 10. n. 3.

en: Question 1, in whose fundamentum 4 and in the body Augustine, XII *On the City of God* c. 18, is also adduced, and in fundamentum 2, XI, c. 10, n. 3 is cited.

la: Paragr. 1, ex quo seqq. verba. De Mystica Theolog. cfr. c. 1. § 1. — Pro *intelligendo* versio Scoti Erig. *intelligendum* (νοητέον), pro *deificatos*, quod habet A, E F *deifactos*, B *deificos* (Θεοῦ γιγνομένους). Finem verborum versio Scoti Erig. sic exhibet: *Sic enim erunt divina data cum Deo futuris* (τὰ θεῖα δοτὰ τοῖς μετὰ Θεοῦ γιγνομένοις).

en: Paragraph 1, from which the following words come. For the *Mystical Theology* compare c. 1, § 1. — For *intelligendo* the version of Scotus Eriugena has *intelligendum* (νοητέον); for *deificatos*, which A has, E F have *deifactos*, B *deificos* (Θεοῦ γιγνομένους). The end of the words the version of Scotus Eriugena gives thus: *For so will divine things be given to those who are to be with God* (τὰ θεῖα δοτὰ τοῖς μετὰ Θεοῦ γιγνομένοις).

la: F minus bene *manifestissime*.

en: F less well reads *manifestissime*.

la: Codd. bis *intelligentia*, sed videtur esse error.

en: The codices read *intelligentia* twice, but this seems to be an error.

la: Cfr. infra solut. ad 19, 20, 21.

en: Compare below, the solution to 19, 20, 21.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Superius pro *omnem scientiam* A B *divinam scientiam*. Mox pro *illa sit... possit* F *illa sint... possint*.

en: The preceding question. — Above, for *omnem scientiam* A B read *divinam scientiam*. Shortly after, for *illa sit... possit* F reads *illa sint... possint*.

la: Hoc communissimum Scholasticorum axioma ex Aristotele, II. de anima text. 24. (c. 2.), formavit Boethius, sed verbis aliquatenus diversis; de quo cfr. tom. II. pag. 364, nota 3.

en: This most common axiom of the Scholastics Boethius formed out of Aristotle, II *On the Soul,* text 24 (c. 2), but in somewhat different words; on which compare tom. II, p. 364, note 3.

la: Fluvius Galliae, qui vulgo dicitur *la Seine*; codd. scribunt *secane*, vel *secana*, vel *feceva*.

en: A river of Gaul, commonly called *la Seine*; the codices write *secane*, or *secana*, or *feceva*.

la: Ex F adiecimus *alia*.

en: From F we have added *alia*.

la: Propos. 16: *Omnes virtutes, quibus non est finis, pendentes sunt per infinitum primum, quod est* etc.

en: Proposition 16: *All powers to which there is no end are dependent through the first infinite, which is* etc.

la: Posuimus cum F *dicendum, quod*, pro quo alii tantum *quia*, et inferius cum eodem *prima infinita* pro *potentia infinita*.

en: With F we have put *dicendum, quod*, for which the others have only *quia*; and below, with the same manuscript, *prima infinita* for *potentia infinita*.

la: Videtur excidisse *sed non* post *totum*.

en: *Sed non* seems to have dropped out after *totum*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 6.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 43, q. 3, ad 6.

la: Ita F, in aliis omittitur *oportet*.

en: So F; in the others *oportet* is omitted.

la: D F *secundum rem*.

en: D F read *secundum rem*.

la: Vers. 17: *Vincenti dabo manna absconditum et dabo illi calculum candidum et in calculo* etc. — Alter textus est Eph. 3, 17: *In caritate radicati et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere* etc. — Inferius pro *experimentalis*, quod habet A, alii *experibilis*; deinde pro *et* A B E G *est*, alii *in*, denique substituimus *quae* pro *aut*.

en: Verse 17: *To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna, and I will give him a white counter, and in the counter* etc. — The other text is Eph. 3:17: *Rooted and founded in charity, that you may be able to comprehend* etc. — Below, for *experimentalis*, which A has, the others read *experibilis*; then for *et* A B E G read *est*, the others *in*; finally we have substituted *quae* for *aut*.

la: A B E addunt *nos*. — Cfr. Dionys., de Mystica Theolog. c. 1. seqq.

en: A B E add *nos*. — Compare Dionysius, *On Mystical Theology,* c. 1 and following.

la: In hac quaestione solvenda S. Doctor aliquatenus recedit a via (vel saltem a modo loquendi), quam secutus est in III. Sent., d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. 3, ut ibi (in scholio ad q. 3.) iam observavimus, ubi simul recensuimus diversas de hac re opiniones antiquorum magistrorum, praesertim S. Thomae, qui diffuse de hoc disputat (de Veritate q. 20. a. 4. 5.). Attamen S. Bonaventura in utroque loco firmiter tenet, quod anima Christi, cum sit finita, non possit *actu cognoscere* sive *considerare* infinita, et quod hoc sensu nequeat omnia cognoscere, quae aeterno actu cognoscit ipsum Verbum. Nihilominus idem in utroque loco « propter auctoritates Sanctorum... et pro reverentia Christi » (loc. cit. q. 3. in fine) nititur animae Christi hanc dignitatem vindicare, quod aliquo alio sensu et modo cognoscat omnia, quae cognoscit Verbum ipsi unitum. Hinc in Commentario suo utitur distinctione inter cognitionem *actualem* et *habitualem*, atque huic habituali, quae quoad obiectum primarium semper est *in actu*, simul attribuit *infinitatem respectuum* ad obiecta secundaria, ita ut *eodem habitu* et vi *eiusdem actus* obiectum principale respicientis facile et pro libitu etiam secundaria possint considerari. Unde illa « habitualis cognitio non ponit infinitatem actualem in ipso *habitu*, vel in *potentia* cognoscente, sed solum in *ratione cognoscendi*, vel in *comparatione* habitus cognoscendi *ad ipsa cognoscibilia* » (ibid.). Nulla autem ibidem fit mentio distinctionis inter cognitionem per *modum comprehensionis* et per modum *excessivum*, qua S. Doctor hic utitur ad eundem finem obtinendum. Ceterum neque hoc loco meminit illius distinctionis, quam ponit in Commentario. — Consideratis omnibus, nobis nunc videtur, tum quod hi duo modi rem explicandi non se excludant, sed potius invicem magis declarent, tum quod incertum sit, quae via tempore prius a S. Doctore sit excogitata.

en: In solving this question the holy Doctor departs somewhat from the way (or at least from the manner of speaking) which he followed in III *Sentences,* d. 14, a. 2, qq. 2 and 3, as we have already observed there (in the scholion to q. 3), where we at the same time reviewed the various opinions of the older masters on this matter, especially that of St Thomas, who disputes about it at length (*On Truth,* q. 20, a. 4 and 5). Nevertheless St Bonaventure in both places firmly holds that the soul of Christ, since it is finite, cannot *actually know* or *consider* infinite things, and that in this sense it cannot know all that the Word itself knows by its eternal act. None the less in both places, « on account of the authorities of the saints... and out of reverence for Christ » (loc. cit., q. 3, at the end), he strives to vindicate for the soul of Christ this dignity, that in some other sense and manner it knows all that the Word united to it knows. Hence in his *Commentary* he employs the distinction between *actual* and *habitual* cognition, and to this habitual cognition, which as regards its primary object is always *in act*, he at the same time attributes an *infinity of relations* to secondary objects, so that *by the same habit* and by force of *the same act* of one regarding the principal object the secondary objects too can easily and at will be considered. Hence that « habitual cognition does not posit an actual infinity in the *habit* itself, or in the knowing *power*, but only in the *account of knowing*, or in the *comparison* of the habit of knowing *to the knowables themselves* » (ibid.). But no mention is made there of the distinction between cognition by way of *comprehension* and by an *excessive* way, which the holy Doctor here employs to obtain the same end. Nor, for that matter, does he in this place recall that distinction which he lays down in the *Commentary*. — All things considered, it now seems to us both that these two ways of explaining the matter do not exclude one another but rather declare one another the more, and that it is uncertain which way was thought out earlier in time by the holy Doctor. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi plate of pp. 37–43 (`python3.11 tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol5 --pages 37-43 --dpi 450`; all seven leaves re-extracted for this chunk only, per quaestio, never in bulk — Pass 4 had deleted `bon-qsc-q6`'s). Read via `python3.11 tools/colcrop.py vol5 <page> <split_x> 3 1.6` column bands (left column top-to-bottom, then right column), with every apparatus entry read separately through `python3.11 tools/footcrop.py <page> <split_x> <row_lo> <row_hi> <scale> vol5` at 4.2–5.5×. English translated fresh and literally against the corrected Latin.

**⛔⛔⛔ THIS IS THE WORK'S LAST QUAESTIO, AND THE CLOSE AT p. 43 IS AS THE PILOT FIXED IT.** Q. VII's body ends level in both columns at **~20 % of the leaf** with *…et orandus Dominus, ut experiri donet quod loquimur*; there is **no `EXPLICIUNT` colophon**, unlike all three Collationes sets; the footer register (nn. 1–3) follows beneath the rule and runs to ~48 %; the leaf is then blank except an **ornamental rule at ~64 %**. p. 44 measures blank and p. 45 opens directly on the `QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE / DE MYSTERIO TRINITATIS` display heading — so **p. 1's half-title covers all three QD, as the pilot said, and works 3 and 4 have no half-title leaf of their own.** ⚠ **The pilot's one over-estimate:** p. 43 n. 3 was budgeted as "a full editorial dissertation filling half the leaf." It is a dissertation, and it is the longest single entry in the work — but it fills **a quarter of the leaf across both columns**, about twenty lines, not half. The count of **three** was exactly right; the extent was not. **A planning figure for an entry's LENGTH is not a measurement, even when the same note's COUNT was measured.**

**⛔ There was no boundary left to measure, and none appeared.** All six of this work's boundaries were settled by `bon-qsc-q6`; p. 43 is a work close, not a boundary, and this chunk adds nothing to the boundary series. **Six boundaries, no two split alike: 6/3 · 7/1 · leaf edge · 1/7 · 1/8 · 3/4.**

**⭐ The hand-off this chunk PICKED UP, re-derived down to its digits.** p. 37 nn. 1–3 are Q. VI's; **nn. 4–7 are Q. VII's** and are transcribed here. Ownership was re-derived positively on the plate: n. 4 (*Vers. 33. Deinde citatur Ioan. 5, 22. et 27…*) anchors Q. VII's argument 1 at *Ad Romanos undecimo*⁴, and the register runs on to n. 7 and stops. **And re-deriving the digits paid again** — n. 7 carried two OCR defects the forwarding note could not have caught (below). p. 37's total of **7** clears the PENDING that `bon-qsc-q6` left in `tools/check-vol5-apparatus.py`, with no interior gap. **This chunk forwards nothing: the work ends here.**

**Two gutter runovers; no page-crossing runover.** p. 40 n. 2 breaks at the foot of the left register (*…Finem verborum versio Scoti Erig.*) and completes at the head of the right (*sic exhibet: Sic enim erunt divina data…* with the Greek); **p. 43 n. 3 breaks at *…hanc dignitatem vindicare,* at the foot of the left register and completes at the head of the right with *quod aliquo alio sensu et modo cognoscat omnia…*** Each is transcribed as the single entry it is and counted on the leaf where it opens. `bon-qsc-q4`'s two page-crossing runovers are not repeated; every register on these seven leaves opens with its own numeral.

**⭐ THE OPPOSING SERIES IS `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` — the fourth question to use it, and the forms still do not run in a series.** `q1`, `q2`, `q6` and now `q7` print `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:`; `q3` and `q5` printed `Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:`; `q4` printed neither. p. 39's left column prints the letter-spaced small-cap `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ :` in the text measure at the head of the paragraph, immediately followed by `1.`, with the marginale `Fundamenta.` beside it. Rendered `**Contra:** 1.` **Final tally for the work: four `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ`, two `Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ`, one none — in no series whatever. Find the opposing series by content; the rule retires only because the work does.**

**`CONCLUSIO.` prints correctly a sixth time, and NOT at full measure.** p. 39's right column carries the letter-spaced small-cap heading centred **inside the column**, with the conclusion in indented italic beneath — `q3`'s, `q5`'s and `q6`'s setting rather than `q2`'s and `q4`'s. Rendered in the standing `> **Conclusio.**` blockquote, which encodes the unit and not the measure. ⭐ **Final tally: `CONCLUSIO` was found by content seven times out of seven and never by header grep, and it garbled in the raw every time.** The rule was right for the whole work.

**⭐ THE REPLY SERIES ANSWERS THE AFFIRMATIVE SIDE — as in `q3`, `q5` and `q6`, and the *Respondeo* says so twice over.** *Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae, quia irrefragabiliter verum concludunt* concedes the twelve `Contra` arguments wholesale; the replies then open *Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium* and the **twenty-one replies answer the twenty-one affirmative arguments**. ★ **And the apparatus confirms it independently**: p. 40 n. 5 reads *Cfr. infra solut. ad 19, 20, 21* — the editors' own cross-reference to a reply numbered 21, which only the affirmative series reaches. **Never assume the pairing; here it is checkable in the register.**

**⚠ Three replies are printed as combined paragraphs** — `1. 2. 3.` (the three authorities of the opening: Romans/John, the Apocalypse Gloss, and the Damascene, answered together by the communication of idioms), `15. 16.` (the point and the lovable/knowable) and `19. 20. 21.` (learning, the things God can do and will not, and finite-versus-infinite — answered together *per distinctionem superius habitam*). Preserved as printed and not split, following `q2`, `q4`, `q5` and `q6`. **Fifteen numbered paragraphs therefore carry twenty-one replies.**

**Structure.** Twenty-one affirmative arguments in one undivided run, then `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` with twelve, `CONCLUSIO`, a *Respondeo* built on a single distinction — *exemplar factivum et dispositivum* against *exemplar expressivum sive repraesentativum* — with the four numbered differences between the *modus comprehensionis* and the *modus excessus*, then the twenty-one replies, and finally the **epilogue of the whole treatise** (marginale *Epilogus omnium huius tractatus quaestionum.*), which gathers all seven questions and closes on the *modus excessivus*, Apoc. 2:17 and Eph. 3:17. **No `SUMMARIUM`, no scholion, no articuli** — all three confirmed again, and now for the last time, on this chunk's own seven leaves.

**Gutter, measured per leaf; the parity model was not used as a predictor.** Adopted: p. 37 **1147** (carried from `bon-qsc-q6`, whose own profile is reproduced by this chunk's) · p. 38 **1446** · p. 39 **1155** · p. 40 **1398** · p. 41 **1139** · p. 42 **1368** · p. 43 **1172**.
- Each value is the midpoint of the **intersection** of the upper-region band (rows 0.20–0.50) with the lower-region band (rows 0.55–0.85), per the rule frozen at `bon-qsc-q3`. Bands run 56–65 px with Quaracchi's printed centre rule showing as an ink island at the centre on all seven leaves (peaks 95–994).
- ⭐ **p. 43 is the leaf the `bon-itin-c7` rule was written for, and it needed the region argument, not the page.** Its body occupies rows 0.04–0.20 only; the register runs 0.24–0.48; everything below is blank but for the ornament. A whole-leaf window returns a 199–720 px "band" — the blank-leaf signature, not a gutter. Profiled by region: **body 1142–1208, register 1138–1202, intersection midpoint 1172.** The two regions here *do* share a measure, unlike p. 313's; **that is a result of the measurement, not an assumption that licensed skipping it.**

**⚠ Digits — read off the plate, and the register is the only source for them.** In Vol V the djvu raw carries no footnote numerals at all, so all thirty-nine entries and every `pag. N`, `d. N. a. M. q. K`, `text. N`, `c. N` and verse in them is a 450 dpi plate reading. **Seven places where the raw and the plate disagree, all resolved to the plate:**
- p. 37 n. 7 — raw `Libr. II. c. 3.0.` → plate **c. 35.**; and raw `Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 933` → plate **pag. 953** (settled at 5.5×, where the 5 shows its straight top bar against the 3 in the same line's `c. 33`).
- p. 39 n. 1 — raw `Cfr. supra pag. 33, nota 5` → plate **pag. 35** (settled at 5.5× against the two unambiguous 3s in `Psalm. 138`).
- p. 39 n. 7 — raw `VI. de Trin. c. 1.3` → plate **c. 15**.
- p. 39 n. 8 — raw `III. Phys. text. 39-72` → plate **text. 59-72**; and raw `pag. 763` → plate **pag. 765**.
- p. 40 n. 1 — raw `Quaest. 1, in cuius 1. fundam.` → plate **in cuius 4. fundam.**
- p. 41, body — the raw numbers the third reply paragraph `3.`; the plate prints **5.**, in sequence between `4.` and `6.` The raw's numeral would have produced a duplicate reply number and a gap at 5.
- p. 43 n. 3 — raw `III. Sent., d. li. a. 2. q. 2. .S` → plate **d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. 3**; and raw `(de Veritate q. 20. a. i. o.)` → plate **a. 4. 5.**

**⭐⭐ THE `q6` GLYPH RULE PAID FIVE TIMES IN ONE CHUNK — AND IT IS THE MOST PRODUCTIVE SINGLE RULE THE WORK HAS PRODUCED.** *In this scan a worn `5` reads as a `3`.* Five of the seven disagreements above are that one failure — `35`→`33`, `15`→`1.3`, `59`→`39`, `765`→`763`, and the body's reply numeral `5`→`3`. ⚠ **Check any `3` that sits where a `5` belongs in a sequence**, and check it in a *reference* too, not only in a numbered series: three of the five are inside `pag. N` / `c. N` / `text. N`, where no sequence exists to catch them and only the plate can.
**⭐ And the `q5` 1-vs-4 calibration finally got its control INSIDE ONE LINE.** p. 40 n. 1 prints *Quaest. **1**, in cuius **4**. fundam.* — both glyphs, four words apart, in the same size and the same ink: the 1 with its heavy top flag and no diagonal, the 4 with an open counter and a clear diagonal. **The raw read the 4 as a 1** (the reverse of `q5`'s failure direction), which would have manufactured a false cross-reference to the first ground of Q. I. A second control stands in p. 38's register, where n. 5's `q. 1.` and n. 8's `q. 4.` sit four lines apart. **Read a 1-vs-4 at 5× in this volume, never at 2–3× — settled, twice over, and not open again.**

**Register.** ★ **Every claim below was verified against this chunk's own text by the per-segment instrument the shakedown gate prescribed**, not asserted: the Latin and English halves carry **the same 39 anchors in the same order** (verified mechanically), so splitting both on the `p<page>-<n>` pattern yields 40 matched segments and a term of art can be counted per segment rather than per chunk.
- **⚠ *lux* → light · *lumen* → lumen — THE PAIR IS NOT TESTED HERE, because *lumen* DOES NOT OCCUR AT ALL**, in the body or in the apparatus (mechanically checked, zero). *lux* occurs three times, all in the epilogue's *lucis aeternae praesentia… lucis aeternae influentia* and *contra* 7's *immensitatem lucis aeternae*, and goes to "light" three times with **zero mismatched segments**. **Ps. 35:10 does not occur, so the standing exemption is neither exercised nor extended — a third consecutive chunk in which it is not reached.** ⭐ Recorded plainly so the work-close gate is not misled: **the *lux*/*lumen* ruling was exercised in `q3`, `q4` and `q6` and is simply absent from `q7`. An absent term is not a broken one.**
- **⭐ *intellectus* → understanding · the narrow exception IS reached here, for the first time since `q4`, and it stayed scoped to the PHRASE.** Ten Latin `intellect-` nouns. **Five go to "understanding"** — argument 17's *intellectus autem animae Christi*, its continuation across the p. 38/39 break, the Dionysius quotation's *nostrum intellectum* and *intellectus naturam*, and reply 12's *naturae ipsius intellectus creati*. **Five go to bare "intellect", and every one of them is inside *intellectus agens* or *intellectus possibilis*** (argument 18, reply 17's *potentia intellectus possibilis*, and reply 18, which sets *possibilis intellectus est proportionalis agenti* in one clause): the ratified narrow exception, founded at `bon-praec-c2` on the Averroist unity of the intellect. **Zero bare "intellect" outside the phrase**, mechanically checked. ⚠ **And ruling 4 was applied, not quietly dropped:** the Dionysius quotation is a *quotation* rendering Greek νοῦς, exactly `q3`'s disputed case — and it goes to **"understanding"**, because "quotation boundary" was NOT ratified as a licence class at the shakedown gate. **The one place in this chunk where the rejected licence would have applied, and it was refused.**
- ***intelligentia* → intelligence — HELD, and the apparatus is what makes it load-bearing.** Two sites, both in the four differences: *terminatur intelligentiae aspectus* / *intelligentiae appetitus*. **p. 40 n. 4 records that the codices read *intelligentia* twice here and that the editors judge it an error** — so the term is contested in the manuscripts at precisely the place where it is doing technical work, and collapsing it into "understanding" would have hidden the note's point. The two occurrences of ***Ad praedictorum intelligentiam* → "for the understanding of the foregoing"** follow the identical formula ruled on at `q1`, `q2`, `q4`, `q5` and `q6` — the ordinary idiom, **not** a departure.
- ***sapientia* → wisdom · *scientia* → knowledge — HELD.** Twenty-nine Latin *sapientia* → thirty English "wisdom", **one mismatched segment, confirmed by eye as a pronoun expansion** (*cum illa sit infinita et comprehendi non possit* → "since **that wisdom** is infinite and cannot be comprehended"). *scientia* is held at all eleven of its sites, including the Psalm 138:6 quotation of `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` 1 (*Mirabilis facta est* scientia *tua* → "Thy **knowledge** is become wonderful") and the *Respondeo*'s *dicitur anima illa habuisse omnem* scientiam → "is said to have had all **knowledge**". **Cost disclosed, unchanged since `q2`: *scientia* in the work's own title is also "knowledge."** The two extra English "knowledge" are elided-noun expansions (*ergo pari ratione et infinitorum* → "the **knowledge** of infinite things"), confirmed by eye.
- **⚠ *notitia* / *cognitio* — the pair is NOT tested here either: *notitia* does not occur** (mechanically checked, zero), for the first time in the work. *cognitio* goes to "cognition" at all fourteen of its sites; **three mismatched segments, all confirmed by eye as the elided-noun or pronoun expansion the gate warned about** (*non tamen per modum cognitionis* comprehensivae, *sed* excessivae → "not by way of **comprehensive cognition** but of **excessive cognition**"; *cognitionem* comprehensivam *habeat… et* excessivam → the same shape; and *si secundum illam dicatur* → "if according to **that cognition**"). **Not breaks.**
- ***excessus* → excess · *excessivus* → excessive · *excedere* → exceed — HELD, and this is the chunk the family was waiting for.** The pair *comprehensio*/*excessus* is the whole architecture of the *Respondeo*, of the four differences, and of the epilogue's close (*qui quidem excessus est ultimus modus cognoscendi et nobilissimus*). Following `q5` and `q6` without change. ⚠ **The Itinerarium's *excessus* → "transport" does NOT port here and was not reached for**: that ruling was made for the ecstatic *excessus mentis* of a different work, and in this question *excessus* is a named mode of cognition set against *comprehensio*, where "transport" would destroy the contrast the four differences are built on. **Two works, one word, two renderings — disclosed, not silently reconciled.**
- ***ratio* → account** throughout (*non alia ratione*, *rationem proportionalitatis*, *secundum intelligendi rationem*, *rationes aeternae*), **except where it names the argument mode** — *pari ratione* → "by parity of reasoning", seven times, following `q3`, `q5` and `q6`. ***certitudinaliter* → with certitude** and ***contingentia* → contingent things** as at `q4`.
- **⛔ *vacatio* / *quies* — NEVER TESTED, and the work is now over.** The *quiet-* family is **wholly absent from this chunk** — not merely the noun, as in `q2` and `q4`–`q6`, but the verb and the verbal noun too (mechanically checked, zero). **Six consecutive chunks; the noun *quies* never once occurred, and *vacatio* / *vacare* never occurred in the work at all.** ⭐ **This question closes as UNTESTABLE ON THIS WORK, not as untested.** It should be carried to the *de mysterio Trinitatis* or the *de perfectione evangelica*, and the work-close gate should record it as closed-out here rather than re-opening it against a text that has no data for it.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention, listed here in body order):
p. 37 — Ad oppositum.
p. 38 — *(none)*
p. 39 — Fundamenta. · Distinctio.
p. 40 — Conclusio 1. · Conclusio 2. · Conclusio 3. · Conclusio 4. · Quid sit modus excessivus. · Corollarium. · Differunt duo modi quadrupliciter. · Conclusio 5. · Solutio oppositorum. · Notandum. · Distinctio.
p. 41 — Notandum. · Quid sit repraesentare. · Alia ratio. · Notandum. · Totum dupliciter intelligitur. · Notandum.
p. 42 — De duplici potentia. · Duplex modus intelligendi. · Notandum. · Notandum. · Notandum. · Epilogus omnium huius tractatus quaestionum.
p. 43 — *(none)*

Twenty-six across seven leaves. ⭐⭐ **The finding of `q3`, `q4`, `q5` and `q6` — that marginalia density belongs to the SOLUTION and not to the argument series — holds a fifth time, and this chunk gives it its cleanest case yet.** pp. 37–39 carry **twenty-one affirmative arguments, the whole opposing series of twelve, and the `CONCLUSIO`, and hold three marginalia**, of which two do nothing but announce a group (`Ad oppositum.`, `Fundamenta.`). pp. 40–42 carry the *Respondeo*, the replies and the epilogue and hold **twenty-three**. ★ **And p. 38 is the work's second wholly empty margin** — thirteen arguments, not one marginale — after `q3`'s p. 11 (thirteen arguments, likewise none). **The empty margin is an argument-series leaf both times.** None printed defectively; the p. 5 `tinctio.` and p. 23 `…eprobatur.` class does not recur on these leaves. ⚠ p. 43 carries none because it is nine lines of body and a register.

**Apparatus count: 39 entries** — p. 37 four (nn. 4–7, **picked up** from `bon-qsc-q6`) · p. 38 eight · p. 39 nine · p. 40 six · p. 41 three · p. 42 six · p. 43 three. Per-page totals fed to `tools/check-vol5-apparatus.py`; p. 37's PENDING nn. 4–7 clear with this chunk, with no interior gap, and **nothing is forwarded — this is the work's last leaf.** Every marker is paired: thirty-nine definitions, each cited exactly twice (Latin and English), in the same order in both halves. ⭐ **Work total: 31 + 34 + 48 + 93 + 39 + 39 + 39 = 323 entries over 41 printed pages**, against the pilot's planning figure of ~370 — inside the band, and the shortfall is where the pilot said the density claim was weakest.

**Zero `[?]` flags.** Nothing in this span was left ambiguous, and **no Quaracchi-side slip was met** — every cross-reference and every quotation in these seven registers is internally consistent, and two of them (p. 40 n. 5's *solut. ad 19, 20, 21* and p. 40 n. 1's cross-reference to Q. I's fourth ground) were checked against the text they name and hold. The seven raw-versus-plate disagreements above are OCR defects, not editorial ones. ⚠ **One transcription judgment, recorded rather than flagged:** p. 37 argument 3 prints the Damascene as « **Aimus**, Christum hominem omnia scientem » — an unusual form (for *aiimus*), read at 3.2× and again at 5.5×, and **transcribed as printed**, not normalised to *Aimus*→*Ait* or *Dicimus*. It is the reading of the leaf.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0