title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
### *Utrum mens, notitia et amor habeant ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.*

Secundo quaeritur de istis in comparatione ad invicem, secundum triplicem comparationem, quam ponit Augustinus, videlicet ordinis, aequalitatis et consubstantialitatis, et Magister recitat in littera[^1]. Ordo est inter haec, quia mens est parens, notitia est proles, tertius est amor ab utroque procedens. Aequalitas etiam est ibi, quia mens tantum se novit, quantum est, et tantum se[^2] diligit, quantum se novit. Consubstantialitas etiam; unde Augustinus nono de Trinitate[^3]: « Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, substantialiter haec in anima existere, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, aut ulla qualitas aut quantitas; quidquid enim tale est, non excedit substantiam, in qua est. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare etiam aliud »; et ita vult, quod amor sit consubstantialis menti.

1. Sed obiicitur contra hoc: Primo videtur, quod in his non sit ordo nec[^4] origo. Aut enim accipiuntur pro habitibus innatis, aut acquisitis. Si pro innatis, nullus est ordo, quia simul sunt cum ipsa anima; si pro acquisitis, sic amor praecedit notitiam; nullus enim acquirit[^5] vel studet aliquid addiscere, nisi amet scire. Unde Augustinus in fine noni de Trinitate[^6]: « Partum mentis antecedit appetitus, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles, quae est ipsa notitia ». Aut ergo non est ordo, aut non est talis ordo.

2. Item, videtur quod non sit ibi aequalitas. Aut enim notitia et amor accipiuntur per comparationem ad res inferiores, aut ad animam. Si ad res inferiores, manifestum est, quod non est ibi aequalitas; multa enim novimus, quae non amamus; si in comparatione[^7] ad animam, aut est aequalitas quantum ad intensionem, aut quantum ad *extensionem*. Quantum ad extensionem, non; illud constat, quia unum tantum[^8] est ibi: ergo quantum ad intensionem; sed quod hoc sit falsum, videtur, quia cum sciamus animam minorem Deo et maiorem corpore, contingit quandoque, quod eam amamus magis quam Deum, et minus quam corpus; et ita quantitas[^9] amoris non sequitur quantitatem notitiae.

3. Item, quod non sit ibi consubstantialitas, videtur, quia amor et notitia sunt habitus et sunt[^10] qualitates; ergo videtur, quod essentialiter differant ab ipsa mente.

4. Item, ratio Augustini[^11] est, quod non sint in anima sicut accidentia, quia se extendunt extra; sed hoc nihil est, quia accidentia se extendunt extra, ut calor calefaciendo et color immutando visum. Praeterea, homo cognoscit aliqua cognoscibilia scientia acquisita, quae est accidens, et ita se extendit extra.

> **Conclusio.** Mens, notitia et amor habent ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus[^12] assignat, in his est ordo, aequalitas et consubstantialitas.

Ordo autem attenditur in his habitibus animae connaturalibus in comparatione ad actus, sicut ponitur ordo in[^13] fide, spe et caritate, licet simul infundantur.

*Ad 1.* Et sic patet quod obiicitur in contrarium, quia non est ordo in ipsis habitibus absolute consideratis, sed per relationem ad actus.

Similiter est ibi aequalitas secundum conversionem animae supra se et praedictorum habituum perfectionem. Unde dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinita-

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te[^14], quod non est in his habitibus aequalitas, nisi secundum quod perfecti sunt.

*Ad 2.* Et sic patet solutio ad illud quod de amore obiicitur[^15], quia ille amor non est perfectus amor, sed libidinosus et inordinatus. — Vel dicendum, quod aequales sunt, secundum quod sunt connaturales; quantum enim est quis habilis vel facilis ad cognoscendum se, tantum ad se amandum; de habitibus vero acquisitis, malis vel bonis, non est verum; et de his non intelligitur.

Similiter est ibi tertium, scilicet consubstantialitas, quia, secundum quod dictum est supra[^16], amor et notitia animae connaturales sunt, secundum quod supra se convertitur; et sic nihil omnino addunt super ipsas potentias. Per hoc enim, quod anima sibi praesens est, habet notitiam; per hoc, quod est unum sibi, habet habitum amoris: et ideo, sicut potentiae sunt consubstantiales animae, ut supra[^17] visum est, ita et huiusmodi habitus. Unde etsi videantur dicere modum habitus vel qualitatis, realiter tamen nihil supra potentias addunt.

*Ad 3.* Et sic patet responsio ad obiectum, quod[^18] non sunt qualitates isto modo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Augustini dicendum, quod illa ratio non concludit principaliter, quod amor vel notitia sint substantialiter in anima; et hoc est[^19], quia tunc pari ratione posset dici et obiici de omni amore; sed concludit ex consequenti, quod patet sic. Cum enim amor extenditur extra suum subiectum alium amando, hoc est per virtutem substantiae, sicut per se non est, nisi[^20] per substantiam. Si ergo amor et notitia extenduntur per virtutem substantialem, et hae sunt intelligentia et voluntas; et amor, quo anima amat se, est idem cum ipsa voluntate; et similiter[^21] notitia, qua cognoscit, non est aliud quam intelligentia: restat ergo, quod amor et notitia respectu sui sunt ipsi menti consubstantiales.

english:
### Question II.
### *Whether mind, knowledge, and love have order, equality, and consubstantiality.*

Secondly, the question is raised concerning these in comparison to one another, according to the threefold comparison which Augustine sets down, namely of order, of equality, and of consubstantiality, which the Master recites in the text[^1]. There is order among these, because mind is parent, knowledge is offspring, and the third is love proceeding from both. There is also equality there, because mind knows itself as much as it is, and loves itself[^2] as much as it knows itself. There is also consubstantiality; whence Augustine, in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^3], says: "We are admonished, if in any way we can see it, that these exist substantially in the soul, not as in a subject, as color in a body, nor any quality or quantity; for whatever is such does not exceed the substance in which it is. But the mind, by the love by which it loves itself, can also love something else"; and thus he holds that love is consubstantial with the mind.

1. But it is objected against this: First, it seems that in these there is neither order nor[^4] origin. For either they are taken as innate habits, or as acquired. If as innate, there is no order, because they are simultaneous with the soul itself; if as acquired, then love precedes knowledge; for no one acquires[^5] or strives to learn anything unless he loves to know. Whence Augustine at the end of the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^6]: "An appetite precedes the offspring of the mind, by which, when we seek and find what we wish to know, an offspring is born, which is knowledge itself." Therefore either there is no order, or there is not such an order.

2. Likewise, it seems that there is no equality there. For either knowledge and love are taken in comparison to inferior things, or to the soul. If to inferior things, it is manifest that there is no equality there; for we know many things which we do not love; if in comparison[^7] to the soul, either there is equality with respect to *intension*, or with respect to *extension*. As to extension, no; this is plain, because there is only one[^8] thing there: therefore as to intension; but that this is false seems clear, because, since we know the soul to be less than God and greater than body, it sometimes happens that we love it more than God and less than the body; and so the quantity[^9] of love does not follow the quantity of knowledge.

3. Likewise, that there is no consubstantiality there seems to follow, because love and knowledge are habits and are[^10] qualities; therefore it seems that they differ essentially from the mind itself.

4. Likewise, Augustine's reason[^11] is that they are not in the soul as accidents, because they extend themselves outward; but this is nothing, because accidents do extend themselves outward, as heat by heating and color by altering the sight. Moreover, a man knows certain knowable things by acquired knowledge, which is an accident, and thus extends itself outward.

> **Conclusion.** Mind, knowledge, and love have order, equality, and consubstantiality.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine[^12] assigns, in these there is order, equality, and consubstantiality.

Now order is attended to in these connatural habits of the soul in comparison to acts, just as order is posited in[^13] faith, hope, and charity, although they are infused together.

*To 1.* And thus what is objected to the contrary is clear, because there is no order in these habits considered absolutely, but through their relation to acts.

Likewise there is equality there according to the soul's turning back upon itself and the perfection of the aforesaid habits. Whence Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^14] that there is no equality in these habits except according as they are perfect.

*To 2.* And thus the solution is clear to that which is objected[^15] concerning love, because that love is not perfect love, but disordered and lustful. — Or it must be said that they are equal in so far as they are connatural; for as much as one is apt or capable of knowing himself, so much also of loving himself; but concerning acquired habits, whether evil or good, it is not true; and the statement is not understood of them.

Likewise there is the third thing there, namely consubstantiality, because, as was said above[^16], love and knowledge are connatural to the soul, in so far as the soul turns back upon itself; and thus they add nothing at all over and above the powers themselves. For by the very fact that the soul is present to itself, it has knowledge; by the fact that it is one with itself, it has the habit of love: and therefore, just as the powers are consubstantial with the soul, as was seen above[^17], so also are habits of this kind. Hence, although they may seem to bespeak the mode of a habit or quality, in reality they add nothing over the powers.

*To 3.* And thus the response to the objection is clear, that[^18] they are not qualities in that manner.

*To 4.* To that which is objected from Augustine's reasoning, it must be said that that reasoning does not principally conclude that love or knowledge are substantially in the soul; and this is so[^19], because then by parity of reasoning the same could be said and objected concerning every love; but it concludes consequentially, which is plain thus. For when love extends itself outside its subject by loving another, this is through the power of the substance, just as it does not exist of itself except[^20] through the substance. If therefore love and knowledge extend themselves through substantial power, and these are intelligence and will; and the love by which the soul loves itself is the same as the will itself; and likewise[^21] the knowledge by which it knows is nothing other than intelligence: it remains, therefore, that love and knowledge with respect to themselves are consubstantial to the mind itself.

la: Cap. 3. circa finem. — Mox Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post *ordo* addit *autem* et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponit *quod* loco *quia* ac *ultimus* pro *tertius*.

en: Chapter 3, near the end. — Shortly thereafter the Vatican edition, against most codices and edition 1, adds *autem* after *ordo*, and against older codices and edition 1 puts *quod* in place of *quia* and *ultimus* for *tertius*.

la: Fide codd. I aa adiecimus *se* certe supplendum.

en: On the trust of codices I aa we have added *se*, which certainly had to be supplied.

la: Cap. 4. n. 5: *Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum, in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se.* — In quo textu plurimi codd. falso habent *utrumque* loco *utcumque* et minus bene *animo* pro *anima*; Vat. autem ponit *consistere* loco *existere*.

en: Chapter 4, n. 5: "We are likewise admonished, if in any way we can see it, that these exist in the soul and are unfolded as it were from what is folded up, so that they may be perceived and enumerated substantially, or, so to speak, essentially, not as in a subject, as color or figure in a body or any other quality or quantity. For whatever is such does not exceed the subject in which it is. For this color or figure of this body cannot be also of another body. But the mind, by the love by which it loves itself, can love also something other than itself." — In which text many codices wrongly have *utrumque* in place of *utcumque* and less well *animo* for *anima*; the Vatican edition puts *consistere* in place of *existere*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 incongrue *vel* pro *nec*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, inappropriately reads *vel* for *nec*.

la: Ita omnes codd. et edd. Magis placeret *inquirit*, si haec lectio aliquo cod. fulciretur.

en: So all codices and editions. *Inquirit* would be more pleasing, if this reading were supported by any codex.

la: Cap. 12. n. 18, in quo textu post *appetitus* originale addit *quidam* et in fine omittit verba *quae est*; Vat. autem post *quo* addit *ad* et ponit *noscere* loco *nosse*.

en: Chapter 12, n. 18, in which text the original adds *quidam* after *appetitus* and at the end omits the words *quae est*; the Vatican edition, however, adds *ad* after *quo* and puts *noscere* in place of *nosse*.

la: Vat. *per comparationem*, sed contra mss. Mox codd. V X post *animam* addunt *tunc*, ed. 1 *et tunc*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *per comparationem*, but against the manuscripts. Shortly thereafter codices V X add *tunc* after *animam*, edition 1 *et tunc*.

la: Multi codd. ut A F T V X Y etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt *tantum*.

en: Many codices such as A F T V X Y etc., together with edition 1, omit *tantum*.

la: Plures codd. ut A CL R S U aa bb cum ed. 1 minus apte *qualitas*; agitur siquidem de gradu intensionis.

en: Several codices such as A CL R S U aa bb, with edition 1, less aptly read *qualitas*; for the matter at hand concerns the degree of intension.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *sunt*.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *sunt*.

la: Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 4. n. 5; vide supra fundam. 1. huius q. — Paulo post Vat. praeter fidem mss. *accidentia enim* pro *quia accidentia* et in fine argumenti *extendunt* loco *extendit*.

en: Book IX *On the Trinity* c. 4. n. 5; see above, fundamentum 1 of this question. — Shortly thereafter the Vatican edition, beyond the trust of the manuscripts, reads *accidentia enim* for *quia accidentia* and at the end of the argument *extendunt* in place of *extendit*.

la: Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18; vide in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem.

en: Book IX *On the Trinity* c. 12. n. 18; see in the text of the Master, c. 3, near the end.

la: Ope mss. et ed. 1 sustulimus hic additum *et*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut ACGKLST bb cum ed. 1 *crebro in* in loco *ordo in*.

en: By the aid of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed an added *et* here. Shortly before, several codices such as ACGKLST bb, with edition 1, [read] *crebro in* in place of *ordo in*.

la: Cap. 4. n. 4: *Recte igitur diximus, haec tria, cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.*

en: Chapter 4, n. 4: "Therefore we have rightly said that these three, when they are perfect, are consequently equal."

la: Cod. Z addit *quod non valet*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G I T cc post *solutio* ponunt punctum, deinde cod. cc post *obiicitur* adiungit *dicendum*; nihil tamen immutandum duximus.

en: Codex Z adds "which is not valid." Shortly before, several codices such as A G I T cc place a period after *solutio*, then codex cc adds *dicendum* after *obiicitur*; we have, however, changed nothing.

la: Supple: *mens, notitia et amor*. — Mox codd. inter se non conveniunt, alii ut A G H K T etc. cum Vat. legunt *qualitas*, alii vero ut B D E F H I X Z cum ed. 1 *qualitates*, quos sequimur.

en: Supply: "mind, knowledge, and love." — Shortly thereafter the codices do not agree among themselves: some, such as A G H K T etc., together with the Vatican edition, read *qualitas*, while others, such as B D E F H I X Z, together with edition 1, read *qualitates*, which we follow.

la: Mendum Vat. *ex hoc* pro *et hoc est*, et paulo post *conclusit* pro *concludit* castigatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.

en: An error of the Vatican edition, *ex hoc* for *et hoc est*, and shortly after *conclusit* for *concludit*, is corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *sed* loco *nisi*. Paulo ante codd. P Q *ultra* pro *extra*; deinde nonnulli codd. ut D E F H K Y *aliud*, cod. T *alterum*, codd. L O *aliquid* loco *alium*. Codd. Q (T in margine) post *substantiae* addunt *quia per se non agit*; lectio non spernenda.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *sed* in place of *nisi*. Shortly before, codices P Q read *ultra* for *extra*; then several codices such as D E F H K Y read *aliud*, codex T *alterum*, codices L O *aliquid* in place of *alium*. Codices Q (T in the margin) add after *substantiae* the words *quia per se non agit*; a reading not to be despised.

la: Ita codd. Q T cum ed. 1; multi codd. ut A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. *et sic*, Vat. *sic*, quae et paulo infra post *intelligentia* ponit punctum, quo posito argumentum, quod explicatur in Scholio, perturbatur. In fine Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *substantiales*.

en: So codices Q T, with edition 1; many codices such as A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. read *et sic*, the Vatican edition *sic*, which also, a little further on, places a period after *intelligentia*, by which punctuation the argument, which is explained in the Scholion, is disturbed. At the end, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, reads *substantiales*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro faciliore intelligentia triplicis conclusionis notandum, quod ratio ordinis, quem habent mens, notitia et amor, non intelligitur, quatenus ista tria absolute et in se considerantur, sed in respectu ad suos actus. Similiter aequalitas non attenditur quoad aequalitatem in entitate, sed quoad actus super animam reflexos, dum anima intelligit se totam et se diligit, quantum se cognoscit. Quoad solutionem argumenti contra aequalitatem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. Denique consubstantialitas non intelligitur absoluta cum exclusione cuiusvis distinctionis, sed in sensu in praecedenti quaestione explicato. — Insuper notandum, quod consubstantialitas, quam notitia et amor habent cum mente, non accipitur proprie, quatenus sunt actus (quia actus secundi et accidentia non possunt esse realiter idem cum substantia animae), sed quatenus sunt habitus concreati. In hoc sensu dicit Scot. (hic q. 9.): « Ista tria ex parte animae, ut sunt sub tribus actibus suis, in istis, inquam, tribus est consubstantialitas ».

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**II.** In solutione ad 4. supponitur, quod nullum accidens se possit extendere ad extra virtute propria, sed tantum virtute alicuius substantialis, uti iam diximus in Scholio ad q. 3. articuli praecedentis. Hoc substantiale est ipsa duplex potentia intellectus et voluntatis; et hoc est verum de actu quocumque, sive tendat ad extra, sive super se reflectatur. Si autem actus harum potentiarum ad ipsam mentem ut cognitam et amatam referuntur, non sunt in anima sicut accidens in subiecto, sed substantialiter. — Eodem modo etiam S. Thomas hanc sententiam S. Augustini explicat, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. et ad 5.

**III.** Hanc quaestionem explicite tractant Alex. Hal., p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 37. et seq.; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 11.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the easier understanding of the threefold conclusion, it must be noted that the account of the order which mind, knowledge, and love have is not understood according as these three are considered absolutely and in themselves, but in respect to their acts. Likewise, equality is not attended to with respect to equality in being, but with respect to acts reflected back upon the soul, when the soul understands itself wholly and loves itself as much as it knows itself. As to the solution of the argument against equality, see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. Finally, consubstantiality is not understood as absolute with exclusion of every distinction, but in the sense explained in the preceding question. — Moreover, it must be noted that the consubstantiality which knowledge and love have with the mind is not taken properly, in so far as they are acts (because second acts and accidents cannot be really the same with the substance of the soul), but in so far as they are con-created habits. In this sense Scotus says (here, q. 9.): "These three on the part of the soul, as they are under their three acts — in these three, I say, there is consubstantiality."

**II.** In the solution to the fourth it is supposed that no accident can extend itself outward by its own power, but only by the power of something substantial, as we have already said in the Scholion to q. 3 of the preceding article. This substantial thing is the very twofold power of intellect and will; and this is true of any act whatever, whether it tend outward or be reflected back upon itself. But if the acts of these powers are referred to the mind itself as known and loved, they are not in the soul as an accident in a subject, but substantially. — In the same way also St. Thomas explains this opinion of St. Augustine, *Summa* I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. and ad 5.

**III.** This question is treated explicitly by Alexander of Hales, p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. — Scotus, here q. 9. — Blessed Albert, here a. 37 and following; *Summa* p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. q. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 6. a. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 11.

---

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 J4 Class D/E apparatus repair.** Health scan flagged `defs=13 la=15 en=15` (labels `[^11]` and `[^12]` each appearing twice in both bodies). Diagnosis: this was **not** the benign "one note, two lemmas" case. The chunk's original apparatus (13 entries, `[^1]`–`[^13]`) is the complete, correct printed p.91 footer block. But the p.92 footer — a fresh Quaracchi per-page footnote sequence (its own `[^1]`–`[^8]`) — was never transcribed at all when this chunk was first built. Two of its 8 anchors (the p.92 `¹` after "Trinitate" and the p.92 `³` after "dictum est supra") were mistakenly mapped onto the *already-used* labels `[^11]`/`[^12]` from the p.91 footer (content mismatch — reused page-91 def text under an anchor that actually belongs to a different p.92 note), and the other 6 p.92 anchors (after *obiicitur*, *ut supra visum est*, *quod* [Ad 3], *et hoc est*, *nisi*, *similiter* — all in the Ad 2/Ad 3/Ad 4 replies) had no marker at all in either body — genuine missing apparatus content.

Verified against `raw/vision/vol1/p-092.png` (printed p.92, confirms 8-entry footer reading `¹`–`⁸` exactly matching the raw OCR at lines 22943–22973) and cross-checked content-by-content (not by position) against `raw/bonaventure_vol1_raw.txt` lines 22826–22973. Fix: relabeled the two mismapped anchors to new labels `[^14]` (was `[^11]`) and `[^16]` (was `[^12]`); added markers `[^15]`, `[^17]`–`[^21]` at the OCR/printed positions for the 6 previously-unmarked anchors; transcribed all 8 missing `**La.**/**En.**` apparatus entries verbatim from the p.92 footer (new labels `[^14]`–`[^21]`). No Latin/English body wording changed — only `[^N]` marker tokens added/relabeled and apparatus defs added. Post-fix: `defs=21 la=21 en=21`, no dupes.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

title_alt: Whether the trinity of the image — mind, knowledge, and love — necessarily leads to knowledge of the three divine persons

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum trinitas imaginis, quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore, necessario ducat in cognitionem trium divinarum personarum.*

Tertio et ultimo quaeritur, utrum haec trinitas imaginis, scilicet mentis, notitiae et amoris, ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas. Et videtur quod sic:

1. Quia in hac trinitate imaginis est relatio[^1]; non est relatio nisi quoad personas: ergo etc.

2. Item, in hac trinitate est distinctio, quia notitia non est amor; sed in Deo non est distinctio nisi personarum: ergo etc.

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3. Item, in hac trinitate est origo nascentis unius[^2] ab uno et tertii ab utroque: ergo cum ista sint propria personarum, patet etc.

4. Item, in hac trinitate est[^3] amor tertio, qui est proprium Spiritus sancti et qui est ad alterum: ergo videtur, quod necessario ducat in Trinitatem personarum.

**Contra:** 1. Haec trinitas intelligitur in creatura sine distinctione personali: ergo potest intelligi et in Deo; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

2. Item, notitia et amor sunt in qualibet personarum; sed per ea quae sunt in omnibus, non venitur in cognitionem distinctionis personalis: ergo etc.

3. Item, intellecto quod una tantum esset persona, adhuc nosceret et amaret se: ergo etc.

4. Item, philosophi istam trinitatem cognoverunt, et tamen non cognoverunt Trinitatem personarum: ergo haec non necessario[^4] ducit in illam.

> **Conclusio.** Ratio sola ab hac trinitate mentis, notitiae et amoris non ascendit ad cognitionem Trinitatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod per hanc trinitatem est attribuendo ea quae in hac trinitate sunt illi summae Trinitati. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter. Aut enim ista tria possunt Deo attribui secundum substantiam, ut per mentem[^5] intelligamus mentem in Deo, et per notitiam in anima notitiam in Deo, et sic de tertio; et sic non ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis nisi quantum ad appropriata; et sic intellexerunt philosophi.

Possunt etiam ista[^6] trahi ad Deum ratione proprietatum, quae sunt ordo et origo, distinctio et relatio; et sic ducunt in cognitionem Trinitatis quoad propria.

Sed ista ponere vel intelligere in Deo potest fides, sed[^7] non ratio; et ita perfecta cognitio imaginis non habetur nisi a fide. Unde bene concedendum est, quod imago, perfecte cognita ut imago, ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis, non autem simpliciter. Et per hoc patet utraque pars.

**Ad 1 et 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de amore, dicendum, quod amor potest dicere complacentiam, et sic est commune; vel potest dicere connexionem sive communionem vel donum, et sic habet rationem personae.[^8]

english:
### Question III. *Whether the trinity of the image, which consists in mind, knowledge, and love, necessarily leads to the knowledge of the three divine persons.*

Thirdly and lastly it is asked whether this trinity of the image — namely of mind, knowledge, and love — necessarily leads to knowledge of the Trinity with respect to the persons. And it seems that it does:

1. Because in this trinity of the image there is relation[^1]; but there is no relation except with regard to persons: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in this trinity there is distinction, since knowledge is not love; but in God there is no distinction except of persons: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in this trinity there is the origin of one being born[^2] from one, and of a third from both: therefore, since these are proper to the persons, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, in this trinity there is[^3] love in the third place, which is proper to the Holy Spirit and which is toward another: therefore it seems that it necessarily leads to the Trinity of persons.

**On the contrary:** 1. This trinity is understood in the creature without personal distinction: therefore it can also be understood in God; but this is false: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, knowledge and love are in each of the persons; but through those things which are in all, one does not arrive at knowledge of personal distinction: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, supposing that there were only one person, that person would still know and love itself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the philosophers knew this trinity, and yet they did not know the Trinity of persons: therefore this trinity does not necessarily[^4] lead to that.

> **Conclusion.** Reason alone does not ascend from this trinity of mind, knowledge, and love to knowledge of the Trinity.

**I respond:** It must be said that through this trinity [knowledge of the Trinity is had] by attributing those things which are in this trinity to that highest Trinity. But this can be done in two ways. For either these three can be attributed to God according to substance — so that by *mind*[^5] we understand the mind in God, and by *knowledge in the soul* knowledge in God, and so of the third; and in this way it does not lead to knowledge of the Trinity except as regards the appropriated [attributes]; and thus the philosophers understood it.

These [three] can also[^6] be carried over to God by reason of properties, which are order and origin, distinction and relation; and in this way they lead to knowledge of the Trinity with regard to what is proper [to the persons].

But to posit or to understand these in God is something faith can do, but[^7] not reason; and so the perfect knowledge of the image is not had except by faith. Hence it should rightly be granted that the image, perfectly known *as* image, leads to knowledge of the Trinity — but not without qualification. And by this both sides are made clear.

**To 1 and 2.** To that which is objected concerning love, it must be said that *love* can signify complacency, and so it is common [to the persons]; or it can signify connection or communion or gift, and so it has the character of a person.[^8]

la: Cap. 4. n. 4: *Recte igitur diximus, haec tria, cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.* [Augustinus, *De Trinitate* lib. IX, c. 4, n. 4.]

en: Chapter 4, n. 4: *We have therefore rightly said that these three, when they are perfect, are consequently equal.* [Augustine, *On the Trinity*, bk. IX, c. 4, n. 4.]

en: Codex Z adds *quod non valet*. A little earlier several codices, such as A, G, I, T, cc, place a period after *solutio*, and then codex cc, after *obiicitur*, appends *dicendum*; we have, however, judged that nothing should be altered.

la: Hic a. 2. q. I. ad I.

en: Here, a. 2, q. I, *ad* I.

la: Art. I. q. 3.

en: Art. I, q. 3.

en: Supply: *mind, knowledge, and love*. — Shortly afterwards the codices do not agree among themselves: some, such as A, G, H, K, T, etc., together with the Vatican edition, read *qualitas*; others, however, such as B, D, E, F, H, I, X, Z, together with edition 1, read *qualitates*, which reading we follow.

en: The error of the Vatican edition, *ex hoc* for *et hoc est*, and a little after *conclusit* for *concludit*, is corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. I *sed* loco *nisi*. Paulo ante codd. P Q *ultra* pro *extra*; deinde nonnulli codd. ut D E F H K Y *aliud*, cod. T *alterum*, codd. L O *aliquid* loco *alium*. Codd. Q (T in margine) post *substantiae* addunt *quia per se non agit*; lectio non spernenda.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *sed* in place of *nisi*. A little earlier codices P, Q read *ultra* for *extra*; then several codices, such as D, E, F, H, K, Y, *aliud*; codex T, *alterum*; codices L, O, *aliquid* in place of *alium*. Codices Q (and T in the margin) after *substantiae* add *quia per se non agit*; a reading not to be despised.

la: Ita codd. Q T cum ed. I; multi codd. ut A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. *et sic*, Vat. *sic, quae* et paulo infra post *intelligentia* ponit punctum, quo posito argumentum, quod explicatur in Scholio, perturbatur. In fine Vat. contra mss. et edd. I, 2, 3 *substantiales*.

en: So codices Q, T with edition I; many codices, such as A, B, E, F, G, H, K, P, X, Y, Z, aa, etc., read *et sic*; the Vatican edition reads *sic, quae* and a little below, after *intelligentia*, places a period — and once that period is placed, the argument which is explained in the Scholion is disturbed. At the end the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and editions I, 2, 3, reads *substantiales*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem alii antiquiores Scholastici praeter Aegid. (hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 4.) ex professo non tractant. Solutio eius pendet ab iisdem principiis, quae supra p. I. q. I. posita sunt. De proprietatibus divinarum personarum, et quatenus important ordinem et originem, relationem et distinctionem cfr. infra dd. 26. et 33. — S. Doctor primum et ultimum obiectum non solvit explicite, quia solutionis principia continentur clare in corp. quaestionis; secundum et tertium breviter solvit, loquendo expresse tantum de amore essentiali et personali, quod ad notitiam facile applicare potest.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question, apart from Giles [of Rome] (here, third principle, q. 2, a. 4), the other older Scholastics do not treat *ex professo*. Its solution depends on the same principles which were laid down above in p. I, q. I. Concerning the properties of the divine persons, and insofar as they import order and origin, relation and distinction, see below, dd. 26 and 33. — The Holy Doctor does not explicitly resolve the first and the last objection, because the principles of their solution are clearly contained in the body of the question; the second and third he resolves briefly, speaking expressly only of essential and personal love — which can easily be applied to knowledge.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts concerning the Master's text

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram[^1] de rationibus illis, quas ponit Magister quantum ad rationem probandi et vim[^2] inferendi, quia videntur omnes vel non valere vel dubium supponere.

Prima namque ratio talis est[^3]. Qui potest quod nulla creatura potest, est supra omnem creaturam; sed qui fecit mundum istum, fecit quod nulla potest creatura: ergo non est creatura, sed super omnem creaturam. Et incipit haec ratio ibi: *Nam sicut ait Ambrosius, ut Deus etc.* In ista ratione videtur supponi duplex[^4] dubium, videlicet quod mundus iste sit factus, et quod creatura ipsum non possit facere, quorum utrumque est valde dubium.

Secunda ratio est haec[^5]. Qui fecit corporalia et spiritus mutabiles, est super omnia corporalia et mutabilia: ergo est spirituale et immutabile. Hic similiter videtur supponi dubium, quod Deus fecerit spiritus. Et iterum, non sequitur ex hoc, quod[^6] si fecit mutabilia, quod sit immutabilis, immo potius videtur sequi oppositum, scilicet quod sit mutabilis.

Tertia ratio haec est. Qui fecit bona et meliora, est optimus; sed Deus fecit corporalia, quae sunt bona, et spiritualia, quae sunt meliora: ergo Deus est optimus. Haec similiter ratio videtur nullam habere apparentiam, quia tunc similiter quilibet artifex, qui facit[^7] bona et meliora, esset optimus, quod falsum est.

Quarta ratio haec est. Qui fecit pulcra et pulcriora, est ipsa pulcritudo sive species, et hoc est speciosissimum; sed videmus, corporalia esse speciosa, et spiritualia esse speciosiora[^8]: ergo qui fecit haec, est speciosissimus. Similiter videtur, quod nec ratio praedicta valeat propter praedictam instantiam.

Item quaeritur de differentia istarum rationum, et quomodo distinguuntur. Si dicas, sicut dicunt aliqui, quod sunt quatuor penes quatuor genera causarum, hoc nihil est, quia genus causae materialis non cadit in Deo. Si dicas, quod penes modos cognoscendi; contra: non sunt nisi tres, scilicet in ratione causae, ablationis et excellentiae[^9].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnes istae rationes ad hoc[^10], ut probent et inferant, supponunt aliquod certum. Prima enim ratio supponit, quod productio rei de nihilo non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita[^11]. Hoc supposito, cum certum sit, nullam creaturam habere potentiam infinitam, sequitur, quod[^12]

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actus productionis rerum de nihilo sit eius, qui[^13] est super omnem creaturam. Et ita ex hoc actu tanquam ex proprio cognoscitur Deus omnipotens, immensus. — In aliis tribus rationibus supponitur status, sicut in tota philosophia supponitur status in causis; et ideo omne mutabile reducitur ad immutabile, quia in mutabili non est status in genere efficientis nisi in movente non moto: omne enim quod movetur, ab alio movetur[^14]. Similiter bonum et melius reducuntur ad optimum, quia non est status in genere finis nisi in optimo. Similiter pulcrum et pulcrius ad pulcherrimum, quia non est status in genere speciei et formae, nisi in eo quod est ipsa species per essentiam.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de distinctione rationum, ex dictis iam patet responsio. Non enim possunt distingui penes genus causarum tantum, nec penes modos cognoscendi tantum, sed penes utrumque[^15]. Prima enim ratio sumitur secundum rationem causae; aliae sumuntur penes rationem causae et excellentiae, quia considerant ordinem et distinguuntur secundum ordinem in triplici genere causae[^16], efficientis sive moventis, finientis et exemplaris.

#### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod postea dicit Magister, quod *ex perpetuitate intelligitur Conditor aeternus.* Nihil enim valet: effectus est perpetuus[^17], ergo efficiens est aeternus.

Item quaeritur similiter[^18] de hoc quod dicit: *Ex magnitudine omnipotens.* Nihil enim valet: fecit magna, ergo est omnipotens vel potest facere omnia.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod tantum est quaedam persuasio per signum, non necessaria argumentatio. Dicunt enim, quod omnipotentia et aeternitas, cum sint infinitae, non possunt sufficienter probari per creaturas, quae sunt finitae[^19]. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod quamvis non sequatur in quolibet efficiente, tamen necessario sequitur in efficiente sive perpetuante primo. Impossibile enim est, quod creatura habeat esse et magnum esse[^20] et hoc totum ab aliquo, qui non possit in totum; et qua ratione in hoc totum, et in quodlibet. Similiter, si est primum perpetuans, est omnino in actu et nihil in potentia; et si hoc, cum possit facere durare aliud in infinitum, ipsum est actu infinitum duratione: ergo aeternum.

#### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Omnia quae arte divina condita[^21] sunt, unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem.* Videtur enim primo dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum haec tria condita sint, tunc habent unitatem, speciem et ordinem, et sic de aliis: ergo si est stare, tunc aliqua condita sunt, quae haec non habent[^22].

Item videtur male enumerare, quia Augustinus[^23] ponit ista tria: *modum, speciem et ordinem,* et haec alia: *unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem.* Quaeritur ergo de diversis modis enumerandi, unde veniant.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod hoc intelligitur de creaturis perfectis, vel si de omnibus[^24], tunc illa tria non dicunt conditiones in re creata, sed in exemplari increato. — Potest tamen dici, quod in primis intentionibus et generalibus[^25] est reflexio et ideo status, nec est ultra procedendum.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de enumeratione illorum trium, quod non videtur conveniens; dicendum quod res creata habet tripliciter considerari: aut in

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se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas, aut in comparatione ad causam primam. Et secundum hos omnes modos contingit reperire trinitatem dupliciter.

Si enim consideretur quantum in se vel quantum ad se, hoc est, aut quantum ad substantiam principiorum; et sic est illa trinitas: *materia, forma, compositio,* quae ponitur in libro *de Regula fidei*[^26]; aut quantum ad habitudines; et sic est illa, *Sapientiae* undecimo[^27]: *Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti.* In *numero* enim intelligitur principiorum distinctio, in *pondere* propria ipsorum inclinatio, in *mensura* eorum[^28] ad invicem proportio.

Item, si consideretur una creatura in comparatione ad alias creaturas, hoc potest esse[^29] aut in quantum agit actione naturali; et sic sumitur illa trinitas Dionysii[^30], *substantia, virtus et operatio*; aut in quantum agit actione spirituali; et sic illa Augustini, *de octoginta tribus Quaestionibus*[^31], «*quo constat, quo congruit, quo discernitur*», et ultimum refertur ad animam.

Si autem considerentur[^32] in comparatione ad Deum, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut in quantum referuntur tantum; et sic est illa, *modus, species et ordo*; aut in quantum referuntur et assimilantur; et sic est illa, *unitas, veritas et*[^33] *bonitas*.

Quoniam ergo vestigium attenditur in comparatione ad Deum proprie, ideo in his ultimis conditionibus proprie accipitur vestigium. Et quia magna est inter istas comparationes convenientia, ideo Magister miscet haec ad invicem propter multam convenientiam et correspondentiam[^34]; quia unitas respondet modo, qui respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; veritas speciei, quae respicit ipsum ut exemplar; bonitas ordini, qui[^35] respicit Deum ut finem.

#### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod appropriat veritatem Filio dicens: *Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris.* Sed contra Augustinus in *Soliloquio*[^36]: «*Veritas est id quod est*»; sed ens nulli personae appropriatur: ergo nec veritas.

Item videtur male appropriare ordinem Spiritui sancto, quia in praecedenti capitulo dicit, quod ex ordine intelligitur sapiens[^37]; sed sapientia appropriatur Filio: ergo et ordo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod veritas potest dupliciter considerari, sicut et[^38] color. Nam uno modo color consideratur secundum id in quo est; et sic definitur in libro *de Sensu et sensato*[^39]: «*Color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato*». Alio modo in comparatione ad visum, quem movet; et sic definitur in libro *de Anima*[^40]: «*Color est motivum visus secundum actum lucidi*».

Similiter veritas potest considerari in comparatione ad id in quo est; et sic verum est[^41] id quod est; alio modo per comparationem ad *intellectum,* quem movet; et sic veritas, ut dicit Philosophus in secundo *Metaphysicae*[^42], «*est finis intelligentiae speculativae*». Secundum primum modum dicit Anselmus[^43]: «*Veritas Patris est essentia Patris*». Quantum ad secundum modum dicit Hilarius[^44], quod «*veritas est declarativum esse*». Et quoniam Filius[^45] procedit ut Verbum, cui appropriatur ratio decla-

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randi, ideo ei appropriatur ratio exemplaris et per consequens ratio veritatis, quantum ad secundum modum veritatis; ipse autem accipit primo modo.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine, dicendum, quod est ordo rerum in universo; et hic appropriatur sapientiae; et est ordo rerum in finem; et hic appropriatur bonitati; et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas.

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the Master's text.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text[^1] regarding those reasons which the Master sets forth, with respect to their ground of proof and force[^2] of inference, since they all appear either to be invalid or to presuppose what is doubtful.

For the first reason is of this sort[^3]. Whoever can do what no creature can do is above every creature; but he who made this world did what no creature can do: therefore he is not a creature, but is above every creature. And this reason begins there: *For as Ambrose says, that God,* etc. In this reason a twofold[^4] doubt seems to be presupposed, namely, that this world has been made, and that no creature could have made it, both of which are very much in doubt.

The second reason is this[^5]. Whoever made corporeal things and changeable spirits is above all corporeal and changeable things: therefore he is spiritual and unchangeable. Here likewise it seems to presuppose a doubt, namely that God made spirits. And again, it does not follow from this — that[^6] if he made changeable things, he is therefore unchangeable; rather, the opposite seems to follow, namely that he is changeable.

The third reason is this. Whoever made good things and better things is best; but God made corporeal things, which are good, and spiritual things, which are better: therefore God is best. This reason likewise seems to have no plausibility, because in that case any craftsman whatever who makes[^7] good and better things would be best, which is false.

The fourth reason is this. Whoever made beautiful and more beautiful things is beauty itself, or beautiful form, and this is most beautiful; but we see that corporeal things are beautiful, and spiritual things more beautiful[^8]: therefore he who made them is most beautiful. Likewise this seems also not to hold, on account of the aforesaid counter-instance.

Likewise, the question is asked concerning the difference among these reasons, and how they are distinguished. If you say, as some say, that they are four corresponding to the four kinds of causes, this is nothing, because the kind of material cause does not apply in God. If you say that they correspond to modes of knowing — on the contrary: there are only three, namely, the mode of cause, of removal, and of excellence[^9].

**I respond:** It must be said that all these reasons, in order[^10] that they may prove and infer, presuppose something certain. For the first reason presupposes that the production of a thing from nothing cannot occur except from infinite power[^11]. This being supposed, since it is certain that no creature has infinite power, it follows that[^12]

the act of producing things from nothing is of him who[^13] is above every creature. And so from this act as from something proper to him, God is known to be omnipotent and immense. — In the other three reasons a stopping-point is presupposed, just as in the whole of philosophy a stopping-point is presupposed in causes; and therefore every changeable thing is reduced to an unchangeable, because in the changeable there is no stopping-point in the genus of efficient cause except in a mover that is not moved: for everything that is moved is moved by another[^14]. Likewise the good and the better are reduced to the best, because there is no stopping-point in the genus of end except in the best. Likewise the beautiful and the more beautiful are reduced to the most beautiful, because there is no stopping-point in the genus of beautiful form except in that which is beautiful form itself by essence.

As to the question raised concerning the distinction among the reasons, the answer is already clear from what has been said. For they cannot be distinguished by the kinds of causes alone, nor by the modes of knowing alone, but by both[^15]. For the first reason is taken according to the mode of cause; the others are taken according to the mode of cause and of excellence, because they consider order and are distinguished according to order in the threefold genus of cause[^16] — the efficient or moving, the final, and the exemplar.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, the question is raised concerning what the Master afterwards says, that *from perpetuity the eternal Creator is understood.* For it is worth nothing: the effect is perpetual[^17], therefore the agent is eternal.

Likewise, the question is similarly[^18] raised about what he says: *From greatness, omnipotent.* For it is worth nothing: he made great things, therefore he is omnipotent, or can make all things.

**I respond:** To this some say that it is only a kind of persuasion by sign, not a necessary argument. For they say that omnipotence and eternity, since they are infinite, cannot be sufficiently proved through creatures, which are finite[^19]. — Yet it can be said otherwise: although it does not follow in any agent whatever, it nevertheless necessarily follows in the first agent or first perpetuator. For it is impossible that a creature should have being and great being[^20] and all this from someone who cannot do the whole; and by the same reasoning by which he can do the whole, he can also do each particular thing. Likewise, if it is the first perpetuator, it is wholly in act and nothing in potency; and if so, since it can make another endure infinitely, it itself is actually infinite in duration: therefore eternal.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, the question is raised concerning what he says: *All things which have been made by divine art[^21] show in themselves a certain unity and beautiful form and order.* For he seems first to say something false, because if so — since these three are made — then they have unity, beautiful form, and order, and so for the others: therefore if there is to be a stopping-point, then some things have been made which do not have these[^22].

Likewise, he seems to enumerate badly, because Augustine[^23] sets forth these three: *mode, beautiful form, and order,* and these others: *unity, truth, and goodness.* Therefore the question is raised about the various ways of enumerating, and whence they come.

**I respond:** To this some say that this is to be understood of perfect creatures, or, if of all[^24], then those three do not name conditions in the created thing, but in the uncreated exemplar. — Yet it can be said that in first and general notions[^25] there is reflection, and therefore a stopping-point, and one ought not to proceed further.

As to the question raised concerning the enumeration of those three, that it does not seem fitting; it must be said that the created thing can be considered in three ways: either in

itself, or in comparison with other creatures, or in comparison with the first cause. And according to all these modes it happens that a trinity is found, in two ways.

For if it is considered as in itself or with respect to itself, that is, either with respect to the substance of its principles — then there is that trinity: *matter, form, composition,* which is set forth in the book *On the Rule of Faith*[^26]; or with respect to its relations — then there is that one from *Wisdom* chapter eleven[^27]: *Thou hast disposed all things in number, weight, and measure.* For in *number* is understood the distinction of principles, in *weight* their proper inclination, in *measure* their[^28] proportion to one another.

Likewise, if one creature is considered in comparison with other creatures, this can be[^29] either insofar as it acts by natural action — and so the trinity of Dionysius[^30] is taken, *substance, power, and operation*; or insofar as it acts by spiritual action — and so that of Augustine, *On Eighty-Three Questions*[^31]: «*that by which it consists, that by which it agrees, that by which it is distinguished*», and the last is referred to the soul.

But if they are considered[^32] in comparison with God, this can be in two ways: either insofar as they are merely referred to him — and so there is that one, *mode, beautiful form, and order*; or insofar as they are referred to him and made like him — and so there is that one, *unity, truth, and*[^33] *goodness*.

Therefore, since vestige is properly noted in comparison with God, vestige is properly taken in these last conditions. And because there is great agreement among these comparisons, the Master mingles them with one another on account of their great agreement and correspondence[^34]; because unity corresponds to mode, which regards God as efficient cause; truth corresponds to beautiful form, which regards him as exemplar; goodness corresponds to order, which[^35] regards God as end.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, the question is raised about his appropriating truth to the Son when he says: *Most perfect beauty is understood as the Son, namely the truth of the Father.* But on the contrary Augustine in the *Soliloquy*[^36]: «*Truth is that which is*»; but being is not appropriated to any person: therefore neither is truth.

Likewise, he seems badly to appropriate order to the Holy Spirit, because in the preceding chapter he says that from order the wise one is understood[^37]; but wisdom is appropriated to the Son: therefore so also is order.

**I respond:** It must be said that truth can be considered in two ways, just as[^38] color. For in one way color is considered according to that in which it is; and so it is defined in the book *On Sense and the Sensed*[^39]: «*Color is the extremity of the transparent in a bounded body*». In another way, in comparison with vision, which it moves; and so it is defined in the book *On the Soul*[^40]: «*Color is the mover of vision according to the act of the luminous*».

Likewise, truth can be considered in comparison with that in which it is; and so the true is[^41] that which is; in another way, by comparison with the *intellect,* which it moves; and so truth, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Metaphysics*[^42], «*is the end of speculative thought*». According to the first mode Anselm[^43] says: «*The truth of the Father is the essence of the Father*». As to the second mode Hilary[^44] says that «*truth is declarative being*». And since the Son[^45] proceeds as the Word, to whom the account of declaring

is appropriated, therefore the account of exemplar is appropriated to him, and consequently the account of truth — with respect to the second mode of truth; while he himself receives [truth] in the first mode.

To what is objected concerning order, it must be said that there is the order of things in the universe, and this is appropriated to wisdom; and there is the order of things to their end, and this is appropriated to goodness; and so it is clear that there is no contradiction.

---

la: Ope mss. substituimus *ultimo* pro *ulterius* et immediate post adiunximus *quod*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts we have substituted *ultimo* for *ulterius* and immediately after have added *quod*.

la: Cod. Y *quam ad acquirendam*; lectio haud spernenda.

en: Codex Y reads *quam ad acquirendam*; a reading not to be despised.

la: Aliqui codd. ut X Y pro *vim* minus bene *verum*, codd. G I *inde*. Mox ex mss. et ed. 1 post *omnes* supplevimus *vel*.

en: Some codices such as X Y have, less well, *verum* for *vim*; codices G I have *inde*. Then from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *vel* after *omnes*.

la: Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit *namque* et *talis est*. Paulo infra post *nulla* bis fide textus Magistri expunximus *alia*, utpote distorquens sensum, licet primo loco etiam in mss. et ed. 1 inveniatur. Deinde verba *Et incipit* usque ad *Deus* desunt in Vat., sed exstant in mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *namque* and *talis est*. A little below, after *nulla* twice, on the authority of the Master's text we have struck out *alia*, as distorting the sense, although in the first place it is found also in the manuscripts and edition 1. Further, the words *Et incipit* down to *Deus* are missing in the Vatican edition, but stand in the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *duplex* loco *dupliciter*, quod Vat. minus bene habet. Cod. I *supponere*, supple: *Magister*.

en: From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *duplex* for *dupliciter*, which the Vatican edition has less well. Codex I has *supponere*, supplying: *Magister*.

la: Vat. hic et deinceps post *ratio* omittit *est haec*; item, refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, mox post *mutabilia* legit *Deus est huiusmodi: ergo Deus est spirituale immutabile*.

en: The Vatican edition here and henceforward after *ratio* omits *est haec*; likewise, against the manuscripts and edition 1, just after *mutabilia* it reads *Deus est huiusmodi: ergo Deus est spirituale immutabile*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *quod, quia fecit mutabilia, ideo sit*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *quod, quia fecit mutabilia, ideo sit*.

la: Vat. *est*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. 1 *fecit* pro *facit*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *est*, but the manuscripts and edition 1 stand against it. A little earlier codex 1 has *fecit* for *facit*.

la: Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, sed Vat.: *Sed Deus fecit pulcra sive speciosa quia corporalia, et speciosiora quia spiritualia*; et paulo infra contra mss. et ed. 1 *videtur ratio ista non valere*.

en: So the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, but the Vatican edition reads: *But God made beautiful or specious things because corporeal, and more specious because spiritual*; and a little below, against the manuscripts and edition 1, *this reason seems not to hold*.

la: Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 7, §. 3: *Via et ordine pro viribus ascendimus in ablatione et in superlatione omnium et in omnium causa.* Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 1. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. divisio textus. — Vat. hic addit: *Ad obiectiones contra quatuor rationes iam dictas respondetur,* quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 7, §. 3: *By way and order according to our powers we ascend in the removal and in the supereminence of all things and in the cause of all.* Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* pt. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, divisio textus. — The Vatican edition here adds: *To the objections against the four reasons already given the reply is,* which is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 verba *ad hoc*. Immediate post codd. E Y *quod* loco *ut*, ac paulo infra plures codd. ut I R aa bb ff *tertium* pro *certum*.

en: We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the words *ad hoc*. Immediately after, codices E Y have *quod* for *ut*, and a little below several codices, such as I R aa bb ff, have *tertium* for *certum*.

la: Aristot., VIII. *Phys.* text. 79. (c. ult.) iuxta ed. Venet. 1489: *Non ergo finiti est potentia infinita.* Forte cod. X hanc propositionem intendit, licet falso alleget libr. IV. *Phys.* — Mox post *nihilo* cod. K legit *non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita, et quod sit actus eius quod est super naturam et super omnem creaturam*; deinde omittit cetera usque ad *In aliis*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 79 (last chapter), according to the Venice edition of 1489: *The power of the infinite is not therefore [the power] of the finite.* Codex X perhaps intends this proposition, although it falsely alleges *Physics* book IV. — Then after *nihilo* codex K reads *cannot be except from infinite power, and that it is the act of him who is above nature and above every creature*; then it omits the rest down to *In aliis*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *quae*. Paulo infra ed. 1 *primo* pro *proprio*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *quae*. A little below edition 1 reads *primo* for *proprio*.

la: Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 1. et 3. — Mox cod. R post *quia* addit *in bono* et paulo infra cod. Y post *pulcrius* adiungit *reducuntur*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VII, texts 1 and 3. — Then codex R after *quia* adds *in bono*, and a little below codex Y after *pulcrius* adds *reducuntur*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *utrumque* loco *utraque* et immediate post loco *autem* posuimus *enim*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *utrumque* for *utraque*, and immediately after we have put *enim* in place of *autem*.

la: Vat. hic addit *ut*, sed obstant mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. — Plura de his argumentis vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et *Hexaem.* Serm. 5. et 10.

en: The Vatican edition here adds *ut*, but the manuscripts with editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 stand against it. — For more on these arguments see below, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and *Hexaemeron* sermons 5 and 10.

la: Hoc est, qui licet habeat initium, non tamen habet finem. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittendo verba *Nihil enim valet,* obiectionem ita proponit: *Effectus non est perpetuus: ergo neque efficiens est aeternus*; sed minus ad rem, ut liquet ex responsione S. Doctoris ad obiectionem.

en: That is, one who, although it has a beginning, nevertheless has no end. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, omitting the words *Nihil enim valet,* proposes the objection thus: *The effect is not perpetual: therefore neither is the agent eternal*; but it is less to the point, as is clear from the holy Doctor's reply to the objection.

la: Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 verbum *similiter*.

en: We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the word *similiter*.

la: Hanc sententiam defendit Scot., 1. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 3. n. 6. et d. 42. q. unic. et *Quodlib.* q. 7.

en: Scotus defends this opinion, *Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 6, and d. 42, q. unic., and *Quodlibet* q. 7.

la: Depravatam lectionem Vat. *habeat ita magnum esse et ita dispositum,* et hoc emendavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: We have corrected the corrupt reading of the Vatican edition, *habeat ita magnum esse et ita dispositum,* from the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Plures codd. omittunt *divina,* omnes autem habent *condita* contra Vat., quae ponit *facta*.

en: Several codices omit *divina,* but all have *condita,* against the Vatican edition, which puts *facta*.

la: Perturbata lectio Vat. *falsum, quod quae condita sunt sive facta, habeant ista tria, scilicet unitatem, speciem et ordinem: quia aliqua condita sunt quae haec non habent, sicut diabolus et reprobi* castigatur ope codd. et ed. 1, qui quoad substantiam lectionis in textum receptae consentiunt, licet quoad accidentalia divergantur; sic cod. A *quia similiter* loco *quia si hoc,* cod. O post *condita sunt* satis bene addit *haec*; codd. I K *ergo* pro *tunc,* cod. M *tunc haberent* loco *tunc habent*.

en: The disturbed reading of the Vatican edition — *false, because the things that are made or fashioned have these three, namely unity, beautiful form, and order: because some things are made which do not have these, such as the devil and the reprobate* — is corrected with the help of the codices and edition 1, which agree as to the substance of the reading received into the text, although they diverge as to incidentals; thus codex A has *quia similiter* for *quia si hoc,* codex O after *condita sunt* quite well adds *haec*; codices I K have *ergo* for *tunc,* codex M *tunc haberent* in place of *tunc habent*.

la: Libr. *de Natura boni,* c. 3: *Haec ergo tria: modus, species, ordo tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis sive in spiritu, sive in corpore.* Similia habet V. *de Civ. Dei,* c. 11. De *unitate, veritate et bonitate* vide libr. *de Vera Relig.* c. 11, 36. et 55. — Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ponit* pro *enumerat* ac paulo infra post *veritatem* supplevimus *et*.

en: Book *On the Nature of the Good,* c. 3: *These three then — mode, beautiful form, order — are general goods, as it were, in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body.* Similar things are in *On the City of God* V, c. 11. On *unity, truth, and goodness* see the book *On True Religion* c. 11, 36, and 55. — With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *ponit* for *enumerat,* and a little below after *veritatem* we have supplied *et*.

la: Codd. V W hic addunt *et*.

en: Codices V W here add *et*.

la: Hoc est, in transcendentalibus rationibus unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis unaquaeque potest de se et aliis praedicari, v. g. *veritas est vera, una et bona*; in aliis autem rationibus seu formis haec reflexio proprie non admittitur; sic improprie dicitur *albedo est alba*. Cfr. infra d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad ult. — Difficultas a Seraphico hic proposita tangitur et infra d. 33. q. 4. ad. 1. et 2. Cfr. et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 1. ad 1. et p. II. q. 7. m. 2. ad 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 15. — Richard. a Med., hic circa lit. et d. 33. a. 3. q. 2.

en: That is, in the transcendental accounts of unity, truth, and goodness each can be predicated of itself and the others — e.g. *truth is true, one, and good*; but in other accounts or forms this reflection is not properly admitted; thus *whiteness is white* is said improperly. Cf. below d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad ult. — The difficulty here proposed by the Seraphic [Doctor] is touched on below d. 33, q. 4, ad 1 and 2. See also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* pt. I, q. 18, m. 1, ad 1, and pt. II, q. 7, m. 2, ad 6. — Blessed Albert, here, a. 15. — Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text and d. 33, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Alanus ab Insulis, *de Arte seu Articulis catholicae fidei,* a. 24: *Materia et forma earumque compago tria prorsus diversa sunt.* — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus convenienter *ponuntur.* Cod. V *compositum* loco *compositio*.

en: Alan of Lille, *On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith,* a. 24: *Matter and form and their joining are three wholly diverse things.* — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, less suitably has *ponuntur.* Codex V has *compositum* for *compositio*.

la: Vers. 21. — Paulo ante post *habitudines* Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit *et*.

en: Verse 21. — A little before, after *habitudines* the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *et*.

la: Cod. W *propria eorum*.

en: Codex W has *propria eorum*.

la: Cod. X adiungit *dupliciter*.

en: Codex X adds *dupliciter*.

la: *De Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 11: *In tria dividuntur secundum se supermundana ratione omnes divini intellectus: in essentiam et virtutem et operationem.*

en: *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 11: *All divine intellects are divided into three with respect to themselves by a supermundane account: into essence and power and operation.*

la: Quaest. 18: *Aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit.* — In quo textu multi mss. cum sex primis edd. loco *quo* habent *quod,* sed inepte. Cod. X glossando: *quod constat ex suis principiis, quod congruit in ordine cum creaturis aliis, quod discernitur ab aliis creaturis per rationem imaginis*.

en: Question 18: *One thing is that by which it consists, another that by which it is distinguished, another that by which it agrees.* — In which text many manuscripts with the first six editions have *quod* for *quo,* but ineptly. Codex X glossing: *that it consists of its principles, that it agrees in order with other creatures, that it is distinguished from other creatures by the account of image*.

la: Supple: *creaturae*.

en: Supply: *creatures*.

la: Ex codd. supplevimus *et*.

en: From the codices we have supplied *et*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. *respondentiam*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts, has *respondentiam*.

la: Mendum Vat. quae correximus ex mss. — Quamvis in propositione principali, quod scil. in omni creatura sit vestigium Trinitatis, omnes scholastici conveniant, tamen in enumeratione et explicatione partium huius vestigii est aliqua inter ipsos differentia, ut videre licet apud Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. Cfr. et B. Albert., S. I. tract. 3. q. 15. m. 2. et hic a. 13. seqq.; ac S. Thom., hic q. 2 a. 3; et S. I. q. 45. a. 7. ac q. 93. a. 6.

en: A blemish of the Vatican edition which we have corrected from the manuscripts. — Although in the principal proposition — that in every creature there is a vestige of the Trinity — all the scholastics agree, nevertheless in the enumeration and explanation of the parts of this vestige there is some difference among them, as may be seen in Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. Cf. also Blessed Albert, *Summa* I, tract. 3, q. 15, m. 2, and here a. 13 ff.; and St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; and *Summa* I, q. 45, a. 7, and q. 93, a. 6.

la: Libr. II. c. 5: *Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.*

en: Book II, c. 5: *The true seems to me to be that which is.*

la: Cod. V X cum edd. 2, 3 *sapientia,* sed contra textum Magistri.

en: Codices V X with editions 2, 3 read *sapientia,* but against the Master's text.

la: Restituimus ex mss. cum ed. 1 indebite omissam particulam *et*.

en: We have restored from the manuscripts with edition 1 the particle *et* unduly omitted.

la: Cap. 3: *Quare color utique erit perspicui extremitas in determinato corpore* (ed. Venet. 1489).

en: Chapter 3: *Wherefore color will be the extremity of the transparent in a determined body* (Venice edition 1489).

la: Libr. II. *de Anima,* text. 67. (c. 7.): *Omnis enim color movens est eius quod secundum actum diaphani* (ed. Venet. 1489).

en: Book II *On the Soul,* text 67 (c. 7): *For every color is a mover of that which is according to the act of the transparent* (Venice edition 1489).

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic minus apte addit: *quod dicit Augustinus: Veritas est id*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts and edition 1, here less aptly adds: *which Augustine says: Truth is that*.

la: Text. 3, secundum ed. Venet. 1489: *Finis enim scientiae speculativae est veritas.*

en: Text 3, according to the Venice edition of 1489: *For the end of speculative science is truth.*

la: Verba citata videntur esse desumta ex *Monolog.* c. 46, ubi ostendit, quod Filius sit veritas et ipsa essentia paternae substantiae.

en: The cited words appear to be drawn from the *Monologion* c. 46, where he shows that the Son is the truth and the very essence of the paternal substance.

la: Colligitur ex V. *de Trin.* n. 3. seq., ubi exponit, quod «*veritas ex natura et ex virtute est*», sive ut paulo infra habetur, quod «*naturae virtus praestat veritatem*».

en: It is gathered from *On the Trinity* V, n. 3 ff., where he expounds that «*truth is from nature and from power*», or as it is given a little below, that «*the power of nature affords truth*».

la: Fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus *est qui,* quod Vat. hic addit.

en: On the authority of very many codices and edition 1 we have struck out *est qui,* which the Vatican edition here adds.


title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Partis II
Doubts concerning the text of Part II

source_text:
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### Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Imago Dei permanet*. Contra: Psalmus[^1]: *Domine, in civitate imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges*.

**Respondeo:** Imago dicitur dupliciter: quantum ad substantiale esse; et haec[^2] respicit trinitatem[^3] potentiarum et ordinem et aequalitatem, et sic semper permanet; alio modo prout supra esse addit bene esse[^4], ut decorem et honorem; et haec[^5] potest perdi, quia *homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit*[^6].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid* etc.; ergo memoria[^7], intelligentia et voluntas sunt in praedicamento relationis.

Item quaeritur, quare mens dicitur magis ad se quam memoria vel intelligentia?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *dici ad aliquid* est[^8] dupliciter: vel proprie et per se, sicut pater et filius, vel ratione alicuius annexi, quia habet respectum annexum et inclinationem; et sic memoria dicitur ad aliquid, quia innatum habet respectum ad memoriale, similiter intelligentia ad intel-

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ligibile et voluntas ad volibile; et haec obiecta ad invicem habent respectum[^9]. Et sic patet obiectio.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de mente, dicendum, quod mens dicitur ab actu essentiali. Propterea est intelligendum, quod *quo est*[^10] dat animae esse generalissimum, et sic dicitur essentia; vel inquantum dat esse generale, et sic dicitur vita, quia anima est in genere viventium; aut[^11] inquantum dat esse spirituale, et sic mens. Mens enim non dicitur nisi quod vivit vita intellectiva. — Vel anima in se dicitur essentia, ut actus corporis vita, ut perfectibilis a Deo mens.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod tres personae non sunt *unius Dei*; quia videtur dicere falsum, quia, si sunt unius essentiae; sed essentia est[^12] Deus; ergo sunt unius Dei. Si dicas, quod non sequitur; ego quaero, quare non conceditur, quod tres personae sunt unius Dei? Si[^13] propter hoc, quod obliquus notat diversitatem; ergo cum essentia non sit diversa a persona, non potest dici: tres personae sunt unius essentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod genitivus[^14] aliquando construitur in ratione possessionis, ut si dicatur: *bos Petri* vel *Ioannis*; aliquando ex vi declarationis essentiae, ut *mulier egregiae formae*; aliquando intransitive, ut *creatura salis*. Intransitive construitur generale cum speciali; et sic potest dici: *substantia* vel *persona Dei*; ex vi declarationis essentiae, nomen[^15] importans formam per modum formae; et sic dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae. Quia ergo, quando dicitur: tres personae sunt unius Dei, *Deus* non significat[^16] nec per modum formae nec per modum specificantis, ideo intelligitur per modum possidentis vel principiantis: et ideo simpliciter est falsa.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ex maxima parte est dissimilis. Videtur quod imago est similitudo expressa: ergo si maxime est dissimilis, non est imago.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est expressio[^17] simpliciter, vel in genere. Si ergo loquamur de expressione simpliciter, sic dico, quod anima rationalis non est valde similis Deo; si autem loquamur in genere creaturae, quia tantum accedit[^18], quantum potest natura creata, sic dicitur valde similis et expressa similitudo Dei.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret*; quia secundum viam istam monstrari posset, quod non sit nisi una persona.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in personis non potest esse superfluitas, quia in eis est una sufficientia; unde si una esset superflua, et omnes. Sed[^19] non potest ibi esse aliqua insufficientia, quia nihil plus habent tres quam una. Sed si essent duae essentiae, duae essent sufficientiae, si[^20] quaelibet per se esset sufficiens; si autem altera cum altera, quaelibet esset insufficiens: et ita patet, quod non est simile de duabus essentiis, sicut de duabus personis[^21].

### Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod intellexit, Deum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est, quia intellexit, eum non esse rem fatuam; ergo videtur secundum hoc, quod Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista consequentia non est intelligenda immediate, scilicet: quia non est res fatua, ergo habet sapientiam genitam. Sed hoc intelligendum est sic: Deus est substantia spiritualis: ergo est nata cognoscere: ergo si non habet sapientiam, est res fatua; sed non est res fatua: ergo habet sapientiam; sed non est sapientia sine verbo, et non est verbum, nisi procedat a mente et ita generetur: ergo a primo[^22], si habet sapientiam, necesse est, sapientiam esse genitam. Et omnes istas consequentias oportet intelligere immediate[^23].

---

english:
### Dub. I.

In this part concerning the text, a question is raised about what he says: *The image of God remains*. On the contrary, the Psalm[^1]: *Lord, in the city you will reduce their image to nothing*.

**Respondeo:** "Image" is said in two ways: with respect to substantial being; and this[^2] regards the trinity[^3] of powers, their order, and their equality, and in this way it always remains; in another way, insofar as it adds to being a well-being[^4], such as beauty and honor; and this[^5] can be lost, since *man, when he was in honor, did not understand*[^6].

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Memory, however, is said relatively* (*ad aliquid*) etc.; therefore memory[^7], intelligence, and will are in the category of relation.

Likewise it is asked, why is mind said to be referred to itself more than memory or intelligence?

**Respondeo:** It must be said that *to be said relatively* (*dici ad aliquid*) is[^8] [understood] in two ways: either properly and *per se*, as father and son, or by reason of something annexed, because [the term] has an annexed regard and inclination; and in this way memory is said relatively, because it has an innate regard to the memorable, similarly intelligence to the intel-

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ligible, and will to the willable; and these objects have a regard to one another[^9]. And so the objection is clear.

To what is asked about mind, it must be said that "mind" is so called from an essential act. Hence it must be understood that *that by which it is* (*quo est*)[^10] gives to the soul most general being, and so it is called essence; or insofar as it gives general being, and so it is called life, because the soul is in the genus of living things; or[^11] insofar as it gives spiritual being, and so [it is called] mind. For nothing is called "mind" except what lives by an intellective life. — Or, the soul in itself is called essence, as the act of the body life, as perfectible by God mind.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the three persons are not *of one God*; for he seems to say something false, because, if they are of one essence; but essence is[^12] God; therefore they are of one God. If you say that it does not follow, I ask, why is it not granted that the three persons are of one God? If[^13] [you say it is] on account of this, that the oblique case marks diversity; then, since essence is not diverse from the person, it cannot be said: the three persons are of one essence.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that the genitive[^14] is sometimes construed in the sense of possession, as when one says: *the ox of Peter* or *of John*; sometimes by force of declaration of essence, as *a woman of outstanding form*; sometimes intransitively, as *a creature of salt*. The general is construed intransitively with the special; and thus it can be said: *the substance* or *person of God*; by force of declaration of essence, a noun[^15] importing form by way of form [is so construed]; and thus the three persons are said to be of one essence. Since therefore, when it is said: the three persons are of one God, *God* does not signify[^16] either by way of form or by way of specifying, it is therefore understood by way of possessing or originating: and therefore [the proposition] is simply false.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that for the greatest part it is unlike. It seems that the image is an expressed likeness: therefore if it is most unlike, it is not an image.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that there is expression[^17] simply, or in [its proper] genus. If therefore we speak of expression simply, then I say that the rational soul is not greatly like God; but if we speak in the genus of creature, since it approaches[^18] as much as a created nature can, in this way it is called greatly like and an expressed likeness of God.

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *If there were two, either each would be insufficient, or one would be superfluous*; because by this way it could be shown that there is only one person.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that in the persons there cannot be superfluity, because in them there is one sufficiency; whence if one were superfluous, [so would] all. But[^19] there cannot be any insufficiency there, because the three have nothing more than the one. But if there were two essences, there would be two sufficiencies, if[^20] each by itself were sufficient; but if [each] one with the other, each would be insufficient: and so it is clear that the case of two essences is not similar to that of two persons[^21].

### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that he understood that God has wisdom, which is begotten of him, because he understood that he is not a foolish thing; therefore it seems according to this that the Father is wise with begotten wisdom.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that this consequence is not to be understood immediately, namely: because he is not a foolish thing, therefore he has begotten wisdom. But this must be understood thus: God is a spiritual substance: therefore he is born to know: therefore if he does not have wisdom, he is a foolish thing; but he is not a foolish thing: therefore he has wisdom; but there is no wisdom without a word, and there is no word unless it proceeds from a mind and so is generated: therefore from the first [premise][^22], if he has wisdom, it is necessary that wisdom be begotten. And all these consequences must be understood immediately[^23].

---

la: Ps. 72, 20, ubi Vulgata post *civitate* addit *tua* et loco *ipsorum* cum Vat. habet *eorum*.

en: Ps. 72:20, where the Vulgate adds *tua* ("your") after *civitate* and, in place of *ipsorum*, has with the Vatican edition *eorum* ("of them").

la: Vat. *et*, sed obstant plurimi codd. cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition reads *et* ("and"), but very many codices, with ed. 1, stand against [that reading].

la: Codd. M aa bb non inepte adiiciunt *tria*.

en: Codd. M, aa, bb not unfittingly add *tria* ("three").

la: Cod. IY hic addunt *bene et cum subnexis cohaerenter*.

en: Codices I, Y here add *bene et cum subnexis cohaerenter* ("well, and coherently with what follows").

la: Vat. hic et paulo infra *hoc*, sed minus bene et contra plures mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition here and a little below reads *hoc* ("this" neut.), but less well, and against many manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Codd. omittunt *memoria*, sed non bene, uti ex subnexis patet.

en: The codices omit *memoria*, but not well, as is clear from what follows.

la: Corruptam lectionem Vat., in qua loco *dici* ponitur *dicitur* et omittitur *est*, correximus ope mss. et sex primarum edd.

en: We have corrected a corrupt reading of the Vatican edition, in which *dicitur* is put for *dici* and *est* is omitted, by the help of the manuscripts and the first six editions.

la: De hac duplici specie relationum vide infra d. 30. q. 3.

en: On this twofold kind of relations see below, d. 30, q. 3.

la: Videtur supplendum: *actus essentialis ut* (*quo est*). Vel intellige ut Vat., quae post *quo est* addit *potest intelligi in quantum*. Item codd. F H addunt *dicitur tripliciter vel in quantum*. Alii autem codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 exhibent textum nostrum.

en: It seems one should supply: *the essential act as* (*that by which it is*). Or understand with the Vatican edition, which after *quo est* adds *can be understood insofar as*. Likewise codices F, H add *is said in three ways or insofar as*. But other codices, with edd. 1, 2, 3, exhibit our text.

la: Cod. Y *vel*. Mox ed. 1 satis bene *speciale* loco *spirituale*; codd. V W post *sic* addunt *est*. Cod. Z post *mens* addit: *Unde isti tres actus sunt essentiales, a quibus dicuntur essentia, vita, mens, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere*; et paulo infra loco *quod* ponit *quia* ac pro *intellectiva* habet *intellectuali*.

en: Cod. Y [reads] *vel* ("or"). Shortly after, ed. 1 has, suitably enough, *speciale* in place of *spirituale*; codd. V, W after *sic* add *est*. Cod. Z after *mens* adds: *Hence these three acts are essential, from which they are called essence, life, mind, namely to be, to live, and to understand*; and a little below it puts *quia* in place of *quod*, and has *intellectuali* for *intellectiva*.

la: Vat. *cum sint unius essentiae et essentia sit*; sed contra ed. 1 et codd., qui in eo tantum discordant, quod nonnulli omittunt particulam *si*, cod. A loco *sed* ponit *si* ac cod. I pro *sed* habet *et*. Lectio in textum recepta S. Doctori familiarior esse videtur.

en: The Vatican edition reads *since they are of one essence and the essence is*; but against ed. 1 and the codices, which differ only in that some omit the particle *si* ("if"), cod. A puts *si* for *sed*, and cod. I has *et* for *sed*. The reading received in the text seems more familiar to the Holy Doctor.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addit *dicis quod*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *dicis quod* ("you say that").

la: Mendum Vat. *generatus* loco *genitivus* emendavimus ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6. Paulo infra ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus indebite omissum *essentiae*. — De varia significatione genitivi vide infra, d. 34. dub. 5. et Priscian., XVIII. Grammat. c. 2. ed. Krehl, Lipsiae, 1820. tom. 2. pag. 112. Cfr. etiam Scot., *de Grammatica speculativa* c. 46-53.

en: We have corrected the Vatican edition's error *generatus* in place of *genitivus* with the help of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6. A little below, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have supplied *essentiae*, which had been improperly omitted. — On the various meanings of the genitive see below, d. 34, dub. 5, and Priscian, *Grammaticae* XVIII, c. 2, ed. Krehl, Leipzig, 1820, tom. 2, p. 112. Cf. also Scotus, *de Grammatica speculativa* cc. 46–53.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *ut* loco *nomen*. — Post *formam* supple: *construitur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, has *ut* in place of *nomen*. — After *formam* supply: *construitur* ("is construed").

la: Aliqui codd. ut D T *significatur*; aliqui ut X Y omittunt prima vice *nec*.

en: Some codices, as D, T, read *significatur*; some, as X, Y, omit the first *nec*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. hic *excessus* et paulo infra *excessu* pro *expressione*; codd. Y et cc hic *accessus* et paulo infra *accessu*.

en: Very many codices, with the first six editions, here read *excessus* and a little below *excessu* in place of *expressione*; codd. Y and cc here read *accessus* and a little below *accessu*.

la: Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *exprimit*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, reads *exprimit* ("expresses").

la: Cod. R. *Similiter* pro *Sed*.

en: Cod. R has *Similiter* ("Likewise") for *Sed* ("But").

la: Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet *et*, quo posito vis argumentationis aufertur; cod. I falso *sed*.

en: So nearly all the codices with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, which has *et* ("and"), with which reading the force of the argument is taken away; cod. I wrongly *sed*.

la: Plura de hoc dubio vide supra d. 2. q. 4.

en: For more on this doubt see above, d. 2, q. 4.

la: Cod. Y addit *ad ultimum*.

en: Cod. Y adds *ad ultimum* ("at the last").

la: Ed. 1 *non immediate*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Ed. 1 reads *non immediate* ("not immediately"). — Cf. on this doubt, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1.