title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 719 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum virtutes cardinales debeant esse tantum quatuor, an plures.*

Quarto quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad numerum, et est quaestio, utrum tantum debeant esse quatuor, an plures vel pauciores. Et quod tantum sint quatuor, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur Sapientiae octavo[^1], quod sapientia *docet sobrietatem, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem*: si ergo nominat virtutes cardinales sufficienter, videtur, quod sint quatuor, et non plures nec pauciores.

2. Item, hoc ipsum probatur per Glossam, Genesis secundo[^2], ubi dicitur, quod fluvius, qui egrediebatur *de paradiso, dividebatur in quatuor capita*; ibi dicit Glossa, quod per illa quatuor capita intelliguntur « quatuor virtutes cardinales ».

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Augustinum, qui in libro *de Moribus Ecclesiae*[^3] dicit, affectum virtutis esse quadripartitum; sed constat, quod hoc non potest intelligi nisi de cardinalibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Philosophum[^4] et per alios tractatores, qui de hac materia loquuntur, quae omnes virtutes consuetudinales et politicas reducunt ad numerum quaternarium.

**Sed contra:**
1. Virtutes theologicae sunt tres propter trinitatem obiectorum et potentiarum; sed in eisdem potentiis sunt virtutes cardinales et theologicae, licet secundum aliam et aliam comparationem[^5]: ergo videtur, quod sint tantum tres.

2. Item, virtus, quae ordinat ad alterum, est tantum una, videlicet iustitia ad proximum[^6]: ergo videtur, quod una sit tantum virtus, per quam homo ordinatur ad se ipsum; aut si tres sunt virtutes, per quas ordinatur in se, videtur, quod tres sint, per quas ordinetur homo ad proximum, ita quod non tantum sint quatuor, sed etiam se extendant usque ad numerum senarium.

3. Item, super illud Matthaei decimo quinto[^7]: *Erant qui manducaverunt quasi quatuor millia hominum*; Glossa: « Per prudentiam est cognitio rerum appetendarum et vitandarum; secunda est refrenatio cupiditatis ab his quae temporaliter delectant; tertia est firmitas contra molestias saeculi; quarta vero, quae per omnes diffunditur, est dilectio Dei et proximi »: si ergo dilectio Dei et proximi ponitur una inter cardinales virtutes, videtur, quod sint plures quam quatuor.

4. Item, humilitas, patientia et obedientia sunt magnae virtutes, nec tamen sunt aliqua praedictarum nec videntur theologicae[^8]: ergo videtur, quod cardinalis virtus non sufficienter dividatur per quatuor membra.

Est ergo quaestio de praedictarum virtutum cardinalium numero et sufficientia. *[quaestio connexa]*

### Conclusio.

> Numerus et sufficientia virtutum cardinalium consistit in quaternario.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio numerus et sufficientia virtutum cardinalium consistit in quaternario. — Huius autem numeri ratio et sufficientia assignatur multis modis, qui, etsi per omnia non sint rationabiles, tamen conficiunt unum modum dicendi rationabilem et sufficientem. Possunt autem hi modi dicendi ad quatuor reduci secundum quadruplicem comparationem ipsius cardinalis virtutis,

<!-- page 720 -->

videlicet ad *proprium subiectum*, ad *actum intrinsecum*, ad *suum oppositum* et ad *proprium obiectum*.

*Primus* igitur modus sumendi est penes diversitatem *subiectorum*. Subiecta enim proxima et immediata ipsarum virtutum sunt potentiae animae, sive vires, quae sunt tres, videlicet *rationalis, concupiscibilis* et *irascibilis*, ita quod fortitudo est in *irascibili*, temperantia est in *concupiscibili*, sed iustitia et prudentia sunt in *rationali*, secundum quod dupliciter habet ad alias vires comparari: vel in ratione *consiliantis*, et sic est prudentia; vel in ratione *sententiantis*, et sic est iustitia; sive secundum quod habet considerari *in se*, et sic perficitur habitu prudentiae; vel secundum quod habet alias regere et ordinare[^9], et sic perficitur habitu iustitiae.

*Secundus* autem modus sumendi sufficientiam virtutum attenditur secundum diversitatem *actuum intrinsecorum*. Tres enim sunt actus, qui necessario concurrunt ad virtutem, videlicet « *scire, velle* et impermutabiliter *operari*[^10] ». Scire autem, quid sit agendum, est ipsius prudentiae; velle vero bonum est ipsius iustitiae; impermutabiliter vero operari est temperantiae et fortitudinis, sed temperantiae in prosperis, fortitudinis in adversis.

*Tertius* vero modus sumendi attenditur penes comparationem *ad opposita*, quae sunt quatuor nobis per peccatum inflicta, videlicet *ignorantia, concupiscentia, infirmitas* et *malitia*[^11]. Et contra ignorantiam est virtus prudentiae, contra concupiscentiam est virtus temperantiae, contra infirmitatem est virtus fortitudinis, et contra malitiam est virtus iustitiae. Et hic modus dicendi videtur satis rationabilis esse; verumtamen *a posteriori* sumtus est, quia non virtutes per vitia, sed vitia per virtutum merita distinguuntur[^12].

*Quartus* autem modus sumendi est ex parte ipsorum *obiectorum*, et iste modus sumendi videtur esse rationabilior, quia « habitus per actus, et actus per obiecta diversificari habent[^13] ». Et hic modus sumendi habet quadruplicari; uno modo sic: nam virtutes aut sunt circa *passiones*, aut circa *actiones*[^14]. Si circa *passiones*; aut *illatas*, et sic est fortitudo; aut *innatas*, et sic est temperantia. Si circa *actiones*; aut circa actiones *intrinsecas*, quae quidem consistunt in *eligendo*, et sic est prudentia; aut circa *extrinsecas*, quae quidem consistunt in *exsequendo*, et sic est iustitia, ad quam spectat unicuique tribuere iura sua[^15]. — Alio modo potest sumi sic, a parte obiecti, quia virtus aut negotiatur circa *malum*, aut circa *bonum*. Si circa *malum*; aut est *innatum*, et sic est temperantia; aut *illatum*, et sic est fortitudo. Si circa *bonum*; aut ratione[^16] *utilis* et *expedientis*, et sic est prudentia; aut ratione *honesti* et *laudabilis*, et sic est iustitia. — Alio vero modo sumitur sic: quia virtus cardinalis aut ordinat[^17] ad *proximum*, aut ordinat ad *se ipsum*. Si ad se ipsum; aut in *eligendis*, et sic est prudentia; aut in *respuendis*, et sic est temperantia. Si vero ordinat ad *proximum*; aut hoc est in *reddendis*, et sic est iustitia; aut in *sustinendis*, et sic est fortitudo.

Omnes tamen hi modi dicendi aliquam videntur habere calumniam nec usquequaque attingere ad rationem propriam. Et ideo adhuc restat alius modus dicendi, qui respectu praedictorum est *septimus* et omnibus praedictis videtur esse magis idoneus. Cum enim virtus cardinalis dicatur, quia ordinat hominem circa ea quae sunt ad finem sive circa quid creatum[^18]; cum homo habeat comparari ad se ipsum et ad alterum, virtus cardinalis aut est regulativa actuum hominis respectu sui, aut respectu proximi. Si respectu sui; hoc potest esse tripliciter secundum actum principalem triplicis virtutis, videlicet *rationalis*, circa quam est prudentia, *concupiscibilis*, circa quam est temperantia, et *irascibilis*, circa quam fortitudo consistit. — Si vero ordinet ad *alterum*, sic est una virtus, quae quidem dicitur iustitia, quia una est ratio, secundum quam ad alterum ordinat, videlicet ratio debiti. Et quia haec ratio potest attendi secundum actum cuiuslibet potentiae; hinc est, quod iustitia cardinalis circuire dicitur omnes vires[^19], et tamen una est propter unam rationem ordinandi ad alterum. — Et sic patet numerus et sufficientia praedictarum quatuor virtutum.

<!-- page 721 -->

**Ad obiecta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod virtutes theologicae sunt tres secundum trinitatem potentiarum etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia virtutum theologicarum est ordinare hominem ad Deum, qui solus est finis omnium bonorum; cardinalium vero est hominem ordinare ad se et ad proximum: et ideo necesse est, plures virtutes reperiri ex parte ista quam ex illa, propter unam comparationis differentiam superadditam, ratione cuius attenditur iustitia.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod iustitia, quae ordinat ad alterum, est tantum una: ergo similiter et aliae virtutes cardinales, quae ordinant hominem ad se ipsum; dicendum, quod non est simile. Et ratio huius est: quia virtutes, quae respiciunt hominem in se, attenduntur penes actus virium principales, qui quoniam diversi sunt, necesse est, illas esse diversas: sed virtus, quae ordinat ad alterum, non sumit[^20] rationem distinctionis ab actibus principalibus ipsarum virium, pro eo quod per eosdem actus, secundum quos ordinatur homo in se, ordinatur etiam ad proximum: et ideo distinctionem sumit ex ratione comparandi ad alterum. Et quia ratio illa, ut dictum est, unica est; ideo virtus iustitiae, quae est ad alterum ordinativa, habet unitatem; nec ex hoc oportet de aliis similiter concludere, quia non est simile hinc et inde.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praeter has virtutes cardinales Glossa ponit dilectionem Dei et proximi; dicendum, quod ipsa dilectio proximi non ponitur ibi, quia sit virtus cardinalis, sed quia ipsa est, quae maxime adiuvat iustitiam-virtutem, ut affectum nostrum possit respectu proximi recte regulare. Nisi enim quis proximum suum diligat, non est facile, ut ius[^21] debitum sibi reddat.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis virtutibus, utpote de humilitate, patientia et obedientia; dicendum, quod omnes illae virtutes pro magna parte reduci habent ad istas, sicut ad radicalia principia, in quibus residens est ratio movendi et dirigendi primaria; propter quod etiam cardinales a cardine nuncupantur. Unde patientia ad fortitudinem reducitur et aliae plures, quae sunt ipsius species materiales, secundum quod innuunt tractatores morales[^22]. Humilitas vero et obedientia reduci habent ad ipsam iustitiam. — Et si tu obiicias, quod humilitas non semper ordinat ad alterum, et similiter patientia; responderi potest, quod idem homo sortitur rationem duplicis personae, sicut patet: homo cum accusat se ipsum, idem est accusator et reus; et cum iudicat se ipsum, idem est iudex et condemnatus. Sic intelligendum est in humilitate et patientia et aliis etiam specialibus virtutibus, quae reduci habent ad ipsam iustitiam, secundum quod est virtus cardinalis et specialis. Dicitur tamen omnes vires circuire, quia aliqui habitus, qui ad ipsam reducuntur, spectant ad partem rationalem, sicut veritas; aliqui ad concupiscibilem, sicut largitas; aliqui ad irascibilem, sicut ira per zelum et poenitentia, secundum quod in quarto libro, distinctione decima quarta dicitur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether the cardinal virtues ought to be only four, or more.*

Fourthly there is inquiry concerning the cardinal virtues as regards their number, and the question is whether they ought to be only four, or more or fewer. And that there are only four seems to be the case:

1. By that which is said in Wisdom the eighth chapter[^1], that wisdom *teaches sobriety, prudence, justice, and fortitude*: if therefore it names the cardinal virtues sufficiently, it seems that they are four, and not more nor fewer.

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the Gloss, on Genesis the second chapter[^2], where it is said that the river which went out *from paradise was divided into four heads*; there the Gloss says that by those four heads are understood « the four cardinal virtues ».

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Augustine, who in the book *On the Morals of the Church*[^3] says that the affection of virtue is fourfold; but it is established that this cannot be understood except of the cardinal virtues: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the Philosopher[^4] and by other treatise-writers who speak on this matter, who reduce all the customary and political virtues to the number four.

**On the contrary:**
1. The theological virtues are three on account of the trinity of objects and powers; but in the same powers are the cardinal and theological virtues, although according to one comparison and another[^5]: therefore it seems that there are only three.

2. Likewise, the virtue which orders to another is only one, namely justice toward the neighbor[^6]: therefore it seems that there is only one virtue by which man is ordered to himself; or if there are three virtues by which he is ordered to himself, it seems that there are three by which man is ordered to the neighbor, so that there are not only four, but they even extend as far as the number six.

3. Likewise, on that text of Matthew the fifteenth chapter[^7]: *There were those who ate, about four thousand men*; the Gloss: « Through prudence there is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be avoided; the second is the curbing of cupidity from those things which delight temporally; the third is firmness against the troubles of the world; but the fourth, which is diffused through all, is the love of God and of neighbor »: if therefore the love of God and of neighbor is placed as one among the cardinal virtues, it seems that there are more than four.

4. Likewise, humility, patience, and obedience are great virtues, and yet they are not any of the aforesaid, nor do they seem theological[^8]: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtue is not sufficiently divided by four members.

There is therefore a question concerning the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid cardinal virtues. *[a connected question]*

### Conclusion.

> The number and sufficiency of the cardinal virtues consists in the number four.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the number and sufficiency of the cardinal virtues consists in the number four. — But the ground and sufficiency of this number is assigned in many ways, which, although they are not in all respects reasonable, nevertheless make up one reasonable and sufficient way of speaking. Now these ways of speaking can be reduced to four according to a fourfold comparison of the cardinal virtue itself,

<!-- page 720 -->

namely to its *proper subject*, to its *intrinsic act*, to its *opposite*, and to its *proper object*.

The *first* way of taking [it], then, is according to the diversity of the *subjects*. For the proximate and immediate subjects of the virtues themselves are the powers of the soul, or the forces, which are three, namely the *rational*, the *concupiscible*, and the *irascible*, such that fortitude is in the *irascible*, temperance is in the *concupiscible*, but justice and prudence are in the *rational*, according as it has to be compared with the other forces in two ways: either in the character of *deliberating*, and so it is prudence; or in the character of *passing sentence*, and so it is justice; or according as it has to be considered *in itself*, and so it is perfected by the habit of prudence; or according as it has to rule and order the others[^9], and so it is perfected by the habit of justice.

But the *second* way of taking the sufficiency of the virtues is regarded according to the diversity of the *intrinsic acts*. For there are three acts which necessarily concur for virtue, namely « *to know, to will*, and immutably to *operate*[^10] ». But to know what is to be done belongs to prudence; to will the good belongs to justice; but immutably to operate belongs to temperance and fortitude, but to temperance in prosperity, to fortitude in adversity.

But the *third* way of taking [it] is regarded according to the comparison *to the opposites*, which are four, inflicted on us through sin, namely *ignorance, concupiscence, infirmity*, and *malice*[^11]. And against ignorance is the virtue of prudence, against concupiscence is the virtue of temperance, against infirmity is the virtue of fortitude, and against malice is the virtue of justice. And this way of speaking seems to be sufficiently reasonable; nevertheless it is taken *a posteriori*, since the virtues are not distinguished through the vices, but the vices through the merits of the virtues[^12].

But the *fourth* way of taking [it] is from the side of the *objects* themselves, and this way of taking [it] seems to be more reasonable, because « habits have to be diversified through acts, and acts through objects[^13] ». And this way of taking [it] has to be fourfold; in one way thus: for virtues are either about the *passions* or about the *actions*[^14]. If about the *passions*; either those *inflicted*, and so it is fortitude; or those *innate*, and so it is temperance. If about the *actions*; either about *intrinsic* actions, which indeed consist in *choosing*, and so it is prudence; or about *extrinsic* [actions], which indeed consist in *carrying out*, and so it is justice, to which it belongs to render to each one his rights[^15]. — In another way it can be taken thus, from the side of the object, because virtue either deals with *evil* or with *good*. If about *evil*; either it is *innate*, and so it is temperance; or *inflicted*, and so it is fortitude. If about *good*; either by reason[^16] of the *useful* and *expedient*, and so it is prudence; or by reason of the *honorable* and *praiseworthy*, and so it is justice. — But in another way it is taken thus: because the cardinal virtue either orders[^17] to the *neighbor* or orders to *itself*. If to itself; either in things to be *chosen*, and so it is prudence; or in things to be *rejected*, and so it is temperance. But if it orders to the *neighbor*; either this is in things to be *rendered*, and so it is justice; or in things to be *endured*, and so it is fortitude.

Yet all these ways of speaking seem to have some flaw and not in every respect to attain to the proper ground. And therefore there yet remains another way of speaking, which with respect to the aforesaid is the *seventh*, and to all the aforesaid seems to be more suitable. For since the cardinal virtue is so called because it orders man about those things which are toward the end, or about something created[^18]; since man has to be compared to himself and to another, the cardinal virtue is either regulative of the acts of man with respect to himself, or with respect to the neighbor. If with respect to himself; this can be in three ways according to the principal act of a threefold virtue, namely the *rational*, about which is prudence, the *concupiscible*, about which is temperance, and the *irascible*, about which fortitude consists. — But if it orders to *another*, then it is one virtue, which indeed is called justice, because there is one ground according to which it orders to another, namely the ground of what is owed. And because this ground can be regarded according to the act of any power whatever; hence it is that the cardinal justice is said to traverse all the forces[^19], and yet it is one on account of one ground of ordering to another. — And so the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid four virtues is clear.

<!-- page 721 -->

**To the objections:**

*To 1.* But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that the theological virtues are three according to the trinity of powers etc.; it must be said that the case is not alike, because it belongs to the theological virtues to order man to God, who alone is the end of all goods; but to the cardinal it belongs to order man to himself and to the neighbor: and therefore it is necessary that more virtues be found on this side than on that, on account of one difference of comparison superadded, by reason of which justice is regarded.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that justice, which orders to another, is only one: therefore likewise the other cardinal virtues also, which order man to himself; it must be said that the case is not alike. And the reason of this is: that the virtues which regard man in himself are regarded according to the principal acts of the forces, which, since they are diverse, it is necessary that those [virtues] be diverse: but the virtue which orders to another does not take[^20] the ground of its distinction from the principal acts of the forces themselves, for the reason that through the same acts, according to which man is ordered in himself, he is also ordered to the neighbor: and therefore it takes its distinction from the ground of comparison to another. And because that ground, as has been said, is single; therefore the virtue of justice, which is ordinative to another, has unity; nor from this is it necessary to conclude likewise about the others, because the case is not alike on this side and that.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that besides these cardinal virtues the Gloss places the love of God and of neighbor; it must be said that the love of neighbor itself is not placed there because it is a cardinal virtue, but because it is that which most of all aids the virtue of justice, that it may be able rightly to regulate our affection with respect to the neighbor. For unless one loves his neighbor, it is not easy that he render to him the right[^21] owed.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the other virtues, namely concerning humility, patience, and obedience; it must be said that all those virtues for the most part have to be reduced to these, as to radical principles, in which resides the primary ground of moving and directing; on account of which also they are called cardinal, from the hinge [*cardo*]. Hence patience is reduced to fortitude, and many others, which are its material species, according as the moral treatise-writers indicate[^22]. But humility and obedience have to be reduced to justice itself. — And if you object that humility does not always order to another, and likewise patience; it can be answered that the same man takes on the character of a double person, as is evident: a man, when he accuses himself, is the same accuser and accused; and when he judges himself, is the same judge and condemned. So it is to be understood in humility and patience and other special virtues also, which have to be reduced to justice itself, according as it is a cardinal and special virtue. Yet it is said to traverse all the forces, because certain habits which are reduced to it pertain to the rational part, as truth; certain ones to the concupiscible, as liberality; certain ones to the irascible, as anger through zeal and penitence, according as is said in the fourth book, distinction fourteen. And by this the response to the objections is clear.

---

la: Vers. 7. Cfr. supra pag. 711, nota 2.

en: Verse 7 [Wisd. 8, 7]. Cfr. above, p. 711, note 2.

la: Vers. 10. — De Glossa, quae est *ordinaria*, cfr. Ambros., *de Paradiso*, c. 3. n. 14; August., II. *de Gen. contra Manich.* c. 10. n. 13; XIII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 21; Gregor., II. *Moral.* c. 49. n. 76. — Pro *probatur per Glossam* plurimi codd. *de paradiso, qui dividebatur*, *Glossa*.

en: Verse 10 [Gen. 2, 10]. — On the Gloss, which is the *Ordinary* [Gloss], cfr. Ambrose, *On Paradise* c. 3 n. 14; Augustine, *On Genesis against the Manichees* II c. 10 n. 13; *City of God* XIII c. 21; Gregory, *Morals* II c. 49 n. 76. — For *probatur per Glossam* very many codices read *de paradiso, qui dividebatur*, *Glossa*.

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. — Vide supra q. 2. arg. 1. ad oppos.

en: Book I c. 15 n. 25. — See above, q. 2, argument 1 to the opposite [side].

la: Libr. *de Virtut. et vitiis*, c. 1, et III. *Ethic.* c. 6. seqq.; Plato, IV. Dialog. *de Republ.* (ed. Serrani, tom. 2. pag. 427); Cicero, II. *Rhetor.* c. 53; Macrob., I. *In Somnium Scipionis*, c. 8. — Paulo inferius pro *politicas reducunt* Vat. *quae... politicae reducuntur*. Pro *qui* codd. BCDW X *no ubi*, cod. A *quia*, codd. GLNQ *ubi*.

en: Book *On Virtues and Vices* c. 1, and *Ethics* III c. 6 ff.; Plato, *Republic* dialogue IV (Serranus's ed., tom. 2 p. 427); Cicero, *Rhetoric* II c. 53; Macrobius, *On the Dream of Scipio* I c. 8. — A little below, for *politicas reducunt* the Vatican reads *quae... politicae reducuntur*. For *qui* codices BCDW X read *no ubi*, codex A *quia*, codices GLNQ *ubi*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 3. — De maiori vide supra d. 26. n. 1. q. 3. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2. et 3.

en: Cfr. above, q. 1 ad 3. — On the major premise see above, d. 26 n. 1 q. 3 and d. 27 a. 1 q. 1, fundamentum 2 and 3.

la: Vide supra q. 2. ad 1. — In fine arg. pro *senarium* cod. Z *septenarium*.

en: See above, q. 2 ad 1. — At the end of the argument, for *senarium* ("six") codex Z reads *septenarium* ("seven").

la: Vers. 38. Verba Glossae sumta sunt ex August., 83 Qq. q. 61. n. 4. et referuntur etiam a Beda, in hunc loc. Cod. bb initium Glossae sic refert: *Unum est cognitio rerum* etc., edd. autem sic: *Per quaternarium quatuor virtutes cardinales intelliguntur. Prima est prudentia cognitio rerum* etc. August. loco laudato ait: *Neque in ipsa turba quinque millia hominum fuerunt, sicut illic, ubi carnales legem accipientes, id est quinque sensibus carnis dediti significantur, sed quatuor millia potius, quo numero significantur spirituales propter quatuor animi virtutes, quibus in hac vita spiritaliter vivitur, prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem et iustitiam. Quarum prima est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum... tertia firmitas animi adversus ea quae temporaliter molesta sunt* etc.

en: Verse 38 [Matt. 15, 38]. The words of the Gloss are taken from Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 61 n. 4, and are reported also by Bede on this place. Codex bb reports the beginning of the Gloss thus: *One is the knowledge of things* etc.; but the editions thus: *By the number four the four cardinal virtues are understood. The first is prudence, the knowledge of things* etc. Augustine in the place cited says: *Nor in that crowd itself were there five thousand men, as there, where those receiving the law carnally, that is, given over to the five senses of the flesh, are signified; but rather four thousand, by which number are signified the spiritual, on account of the four virtues of the soul by which one lives spiritually in this life, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. Of which the first is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be fled... the third [is] firmness of soul against those things which are temporally troublesome* etc.

la: Pro *nec videntur theologicae* edd. *ut videtur*. — Codd. et edd. 1, 2 non ita bene *rationales* et mox *rationalem;* multi codd., cum abbreviate scribant, sunt dubiae interpretationis.

en: For *nec videntur theologicae* ("nor do they seem theological") the editions read *ut videtur* ("as it seems"). — Codices and editions 1, 2 [read], not so well, *rationales* ("reasonable") and shortly after *rationalem;* many codices, since they write in abbreviated form, are of doubtful interpretation. <!-- p.720 (Respondeo band: modi 1–4, nn.1–6) -->

la: Aristot., V. *Topic.* c. 1: *Rationalis proprium [est] principare ad concupiscibile et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat, haec autem parent.* Cfr. tom. II. pag. 604, nota 5. — Hunc (I.) modum dicendi insinuat Aristot., *de Virtut. et vitiis*, c. 1. Cfr. etiam quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius pro *vel in ratione consiliantis* cod. A *videlicet in ratione consiliantis*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* V c. 1: *It is proper to the rational to rule over the concupiscible and irascible, because the former commands, but these obey.* Cfr. tom. II p. 604 note 5. — This (first) way of speaking Aristotle insinuates in *On Virtues and Vices* c. 1. Cfr. also the preceding question. — A little above, for *vel in ratione consiliantis* codex A reads *videlicet in ratione consiliantis*.

la: Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 4. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 924, nota 12.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* II c. 4. Cfr. tom. II p. 924 note 12.

la: Ut Scholastici docent, provocantes ad Bedam; cfr. tom. II. pag. 721, nota 6. — Inferius pro *videtur satis rationabilis* [multi codd. *rationalis*] *esse* cod. K *ut videtur, satis rationabilis est*.

en: As the Scholastics teach, appealing to Bede; cfr. tom. II p. 721 note 6. — Below, for *videtur satis rationabilis* [many codices *rationalis*] *esse* codex K reads *ut videtur, satis rationabilis est*.

la: Quia, ut Aristot., II. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 18. (c. 3.) ait, « privatione prior affirmatio », sive secundum translationem Arabico-latinam: *habitus est ante privationem*. Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 3. — Pro *sumtus est* plurimi codd. *sumtum est*.

en: Because, as Aristotle says in *On the Heavens and the World* II text 18 (c. 3), « affirmation is prior to privation », or according to the Arabic-Latin translation: *the habit is before the privation*. Cfr. above, p. 570 note 3. — For *sumtus est* very many codices read *sumtum est*.

la: Vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.

en: See above, p. 470 note 8, at the end.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 472, nota 2.

en: Cfr. above, p. 472 note 2. <!-- p.721 (Respondeo-tail nn.7–11 + replies nn.1–4; nn.5 ff. forwarded to q5) -->

la: Cod. K *attribuere quod suum est*, codd. FT *merita sua*.

en: Codex K reads *to attribute what is one's own*, codices FT *his merits*.

la: Permulti codd. et edd. 1, 2 *in ratione*. Paulo post cod. V iterum *in ratione*.

en: Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read *in ratione*. A little after, codex V again [reads] *in ratione*.

la: Supple: *hominem*.

en: Supply: *man*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1.

en: Cfr. above, q. 1.

la: August., II. *de Gen. contra Manich.* c. 10. n. 14: « *Quartus fluvius* [paradisi, scil. Euphrates; cfr. Gen. 2, 14.] *non dictum est contra quid vadat, aut quam terram circumeat; iustitia enim ad omnes partes animae pertinet, quia ipsa ordo et aequitas animae est, qua sibi ista tria concorditer copulantur: prima prudentia, secunda fortitudo, tertia temperantia; et in ista tota copulatione atque ordinatione iustitia* » [consistit]. Idem insinuat Aristot., *de Virtut. et vitiis*, c. 1. dicens: *Rationalis quidem [partis animae] virtus est prudentia... totius autem animae, iustitia.* — Codd. A M *omnes virtutes*, quae lectio respondet Glossae in arg. 3. ad oppos. allegatae.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis against the Manichees* II c. 10 n. 14: « *Of the fourth river* [of paradise, namely the Euphrates; cfr. Gen. 2, 14] *it is not said against what it goes, or what land it skirts; for justice pertains to all the parts of the soul, since it is itself the order and equity of the soul, by which those three are harmoniously joined to one another: first prudence, second fortitude, third temperance; and in this whole joining and ordering* justice [consists] ». The same Aristotle insinuates in *On Virtues and Vices* c. 1, saying: *The virtue of the rational [part of the soul] indeed is prudence... but of the whole soul, justice.* — Codices A M read *all the virtues*, which reading corresponds to the Gloss alleged in argument 3 to the opposite.

la: Vat. subdit *tantum*. Paulo inferius post *ordinatur etiam* non pauci codd. adiiciunt *et*. Deinde pro *est ad alterum ordinativa* cod. K *ad alterum ordinativa*.

en: The Vatican adds *tantum* ("only"). A little below, after *ordinatur etiam* not a few codices add *et*. Then for *est ad alterum ordinativa* codex K reads *ad alterum ordinativa*.

la: Cod. Y *iuris*.

en: Codex Y reads *iuris* ["of the right," genitive].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 7. De proposito seq. vide infra dub. 1.

en: Cfr. above, p. 561 note 7. On the following proposition see below, dub. 1.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p7{19,20,21}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion (CLAUDE.md "VOL II OVERRIDE"; Vol III shares the recipe). IA djvu OCR base raw 49924–50085, used only for clean running prose and marker spacing. Offset pdf = printed + 22; running-head TEXT trusted over OCR'd digits (`DIST. XXXIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V.` on p.721 is the p.721 running head, not p.720's; the `720 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` head at raw 49986 is p.720's).

**Page span.** Printed **pp.719–721** (PDF 741–743). QUAESTIO IV header + opener at the top-left of **p.719** (raw 49924); the Sed contra args + CONCLUSIO fill the right column of p.719; the Respondeo (four-fold *comparatio* → seven *modi dicendi*) runs p.719-foot → p.720 → top of p.721-R; the four replies (*Ad obiecta*) fill p.721 L-col + top R-col, ending `Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.` mid-p.721 (raw 50083). QUAESTIO V opens below it on **p.721** (raw 50086).

**Scholion disposition — REDIRECT to q3 §III.** q4 has **NO own scholion**: there is NO `SCHOLION.` header anywhere in raw 49924–50085 (header grep returns only QUAESTIO IV / CONCLUSIO / QUAESTIO V; eyes-on the p.719–721 bands confirms none). Per the q3→q4 hand-off, the *numerus quaternarius* scholion was opened by **q3 §III** (S. Thom. *Summa* I-II q.61 a.2 duplex via, "secunda convenit cum septima, quam auctor noster iudicat esse magis probabilem [cfr. hic dubia circa lit.]"). q4 is the body that scholion glosses, so q4 redirects to **`bon-sent-III-d33-a1-q3.md` §III** (the numerus quaternarius scholion). `has_scholion: false`.

**Apparatus — 22-entry NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart, renumbered continuous.** Page-split map:
- **p.719 (Quaestio IV opener + Sed contra band) printed nn.1–8 → [^1]–[^8].** PICKED-UP per hand-off: q4 owns p.719's ENTIRE footer band (q3 forwarded nothing on the footer axis). Map: n.1 (*Vers. 7…pag. 711*)→[^1]; n.2 (*Vers. 10…De Glossa ordinaria*)→[^2]; n.3 (*Libr. I. c. 15…Vide supra q.2*)→[^3]; n.4 (*Libr. de Virtut. et vitiis…Plato…Cicero…Macrob.*)→[^4]; the two *Sed contra* cross-refs (*Cfr. supra q.1. ad 3…d.26*)→[^5] and (*Vide supra q.2. ad 1…arg. pro senarium…septenarium*)→[^6]; n.7 (*Vers. 38. Verba Glossae…83 Qq.*)→[^7]. The two short R-col variant notes — **n.8** (*Pro nec videntur theologicae edd. ut videtur*) + **n.9** (*Codd. et edd. 1, 2 non ita bene rationales et mox rationalem; multi codd., cum abbreviate scribant, sunt dubiae interpretationis*) — are consolidated into **[^8]** (both clauses now resolved at 600 dpi, p.719 R-col footer band, PDF 741). The p.719 footer band thus runs nn.1–9 (L-col nn.1–6, R-col nn.7–9), not nn.1–8.
- **p.720 (Respondeo band: modi 1–4) printed nn.1–6 → [^9]–[^14].** n.1 (*Aristot. V. Topic.…tom.II pag.604*)→[^9]; n.2 (*Aristot. II. Ethic. c.4*)→[^10]; n.3 (*Ut Scholastici…Bedam…tom.II pag.721*)→[^11]; n.4 (*Aristot. II. de Caelo…privatione prior affirmatio*)→[^12]; n.5 (*Vide supra pag.470 nota 8*)→[^13]; n.6 (*Cfr. supra pag.472 nota 2*)→[^14].
- **p.721 (Respondeo-tail nn.7–11 + replies nn.1–3) → [^15]–[^22].** The p.720→721 boundary falls inside the Respondeo, so p.721's R-col head carries notes still keyed to the *modi*-4/7 tail (the *obiecta* sub-modus + iustitia-circuire): n.7 (*Cod.K attribuere quod suum est…FT merita sua*)→[^15]; n.8 (*Permulti codd.…in ratione*)→[^16]; n.9 (*Supple: hominem*)→[^17]; n.10 (*Cfr. supra q.1*)→[^18]; n.11 (*August. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c.10 n.14…Quartus fluvius…*)→[^19]. Then the L-band reply notes: n.1 (*Vat. subdit tantum…*)→[^20]; n.2 (*Cod. Y iuris*)→[^21]; n.3 (*Cfr. supra pag.561 nota 7…vide infra dub.1*)→[^22]. Marker pairing 22/22 clean across Latin + English bodies.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- PICKED-UP: **p.719's entire footer band** ([^1]–[^8] + [^var-a]) as q4's opening footers — NONE forwarded from q3 (q3's scholion footers were fully in the p.718 band; the §III text merely concluded on p.719 with no q3 footer there).
- FORWARDED to **d33-a1-q5**: **p.721 note 5 onward.** q4 owns only p.721 L-band nn.1–4 ([^21]–[^23]; n.4 unused — see below) and the R-head Respondeo-tail nn.1–11→[^16]–[^20]. **p.721 note 5** (`Partis 1. a. 2. q. 1. … Superius pro aliqua habitus cod. A aliqui actus. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) anchors to **q5's fundamentum 1** (*consuetudinalis… ab assuefactione*) and is **q5's first NOTAE entry**, redirecting q5's scholion to q4/q3. **p.721 R-band notes 6 + 7** (n.6 = the long *de assuefactione* Aristotle *Vetus Ethica* note with the Greek `ἀλλὰ περιοσότεροι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς…`; n.7 = `Libr. II. Ethic. c. 2: At vero non solum generationes…`) also anchor to q5's fundamenta 1–2 → FORWARD all three (p.721 nn.5, 6, 7) to q5.

**`[?]` flags.** None. **RESOLVED** at the d.31–d.40 decade-polish Pass 1 (600 dpi, p.719 R-col footer band, PDF 741): the formerly OCR-degraded second clause of [^8] reads `Codd. et edd. 1, 2 non ita bene *rationales* et mox *rationalem;* multi codd., cum abbreviate scribant, sunt dubiae interpretationis` — the earlier provisional reading (`iam iste bene rationabiles… intelligunt`) was a 450 dpi garble and has been corrected. Both clauses of [^8] (p.719 R-col nn.8 + 9) are now faithful to the print. See `manual-review/vol3-d31-d40-polish-resolution-log.md`.