title: Dist. 5, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem V — Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction V — Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 110 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem V

*De comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem abstractum, qui est essentia.*

> *Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit etc.*

### Divisio Textus

In praecedenti distinctione movit Magister quaestionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem concretum, qualis est hoc nomen *Deus*. In praesenti movet quaestionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem abstractum, qui est *essentia*. Et dividitur haec pars in duas partes.

In *prima parte* movet quaestionem ex comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione *termini*, videlicet utrum essentia generetur; in *secunda* in ratione *principii*, utrum essentia generet etc., ibi: *Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium* etc.

Item prima pars habet quatuor partes. In *prima* parte proponit problemata, videlicet utrum essentia generet vel generetur. In *secunda* adducit rationes tres probantes, quod essentia non generatur a Patre, ibi: *Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit* etc. In *tertia* adducit rationes in contrarium, ibi: *Huic autem videtur contrarium* etc. In *quarta et ultima* solvit et exponit, ibi: *Ad quod respondemus*.

<!-- page 111 -->

*Ita etiam non est dicendum*[^1]. Haec est secunda pars istius distinctionis, in qua Magister determinat secundam partem quaestionis, quae est de comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione *principii*, et habet haec pars tres partes. In *prima* determinat istam quaestionem dicens, quod essentia non generat[^2]; et hoc confirmat per rationem ducentem ad impossibile. In *secunda* vero adducit auctoritates, quae sunt directe contrariae praedictae solutioni, ibi: *Praedictis videtur esse contrarium*. In *tertia* vero adducit auctoritates, ex quibus potest elici contrarietas, ibi: *Dicitur quoque, et frequenter* etc.

Item[^3] secunda pars habet quatuor partes. In *prima* parte adducit auctoritates Augustini contrarias praedictae solutioni. In *secunda* auctoritates adductas exponit, ibi: *Sed haec ita determinamus*. In *tertia* vero contra praedictas expositiones adducit auctoritates alias Hilarii, in quibus notatur expressior contrarietas, ibi: *Huic vero etiam contrarium videtur esse*. In *quarta* vero auctoritates praedictas explanat et explanationem[^4] suam per verba Hilarii confirmat, ibi: *Sed quia haec verba sane vult*.

*Dicitur quoque, et frequenter in sacra Scriptura legitur.* Haec est tertia pars, in qua obiicit contra solutionem per auctoritates, ex quibus elicitur praedictae solutionis contrarietas — quia[^5] in his non dicitur, quod essentia generet vel generetur, sed quod de essentia vel substantia Patris Filius generetur — et haec pars quatuor habet particulas. In *prima* adducit[^6] auctoritates in contrarium. In *secunda* vero adductas explanat, ibi: *His verbis praemissis innuitur*; ubi resumit praedictam expositionem. In *tertia* ex praedictorum opinione elicit quoddam corollarium, ibi: *Ostenditur quoque ex illis verbis* etc. In *quarta et ultima* redit ad propositum et ostendit, expositionem suam bonam esse, per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi: *Et hoc ita debere intelligi* etc.

### Tractatio Quaestionum

In parte ista ad intelligentiam duarum principalium partium huius distinctionis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur de comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione *principii*.

*Secundo* quaeritur de comparatione eiusdem in ratione *termini*.

Et duo quaeruntur quantum ad primum, duo vero quantum ad secundum.

Quantum ad primum quaeritur:

*Primo*, utrum substantia vel essentia generet.

*Secundo*, utrum de substantia generetur aliquis.

---

english:
## Commentary on Distinction V

*On the comparison of generation to the abstract essential term, which is essence.*

> *"After these things it is asked whether it must be conceded"* etc.

### Division of the Text

In the preceding distinction the Master raised the question of the comparison of generation to the *concrete* essential term — such as the name *God*. In the present distinction he raises the question of the comparison of generation to the *abstract* essential term — which is *essence*. And this part is divided into two sub-parts.

In the *first sub-part* he raises the question from the comparison of generation to essence in the account of *term* — namely, whether essence is begotten; in the *second*, in the account of *principle* — whether essence begets, etc., at: *"Likewise, it must not be said that the divine essence begot the Son"* etc.

Likewise, the first sub-part has four sections. In the *first* section he proposes the problems — namely, whether essence begets or is begotten. In the *second* he brings forward three reasons proving that essence is not begotten by the Father, at: *"Therefore it must not be said that the Father begot..."* etc. In the *third* he brings forward reasons to the contrary, at: *"But this seems contrary..."* etc. In the *fourth and last* he resolves and explains, at: *"To which we respond."*

*Likewise, it must not be said*[^1]. This is the second sub-part of this distinction, in which the Master determines the second part of the question, which is on the comparison of generation to essence in the account of *principle*; and this sub-part has three sections. In the *first* he determines this question, saying that essence does not generate[^2]; and this he confirms by a reasoning leading to an impossibility. In the *second* he brings forward authorities which are directly contrary to the said solution, at: *"To the foregoing things there seems to be a contrary."* In the *third* he brings forward authorities from which a contrariety can be elicited, at: *"It is also said — and frequently"* etc.

Likewise[^3], the second section has four sub-sections. In the *first* sub-section he brings forward Augustinian authorities contrary to the said solution. In the *second* he expounds the authorities adduced, at: *"But these we so determine."* In the *third* he brings forward, against the said expositions, other Hilarian authorities in which a more express contrariety is noted, at: *"To this also a contrary seems to be."* In the *fourth* he explains the said authorities and confirms his explanation[^4] by the words of Hilary, at: *"But because these words he indeed wishes [to be understood]."*

*It is also said — and frequently is read in sacred Scripture.* This is the third section, in which he objects against the solution by means of authorities from which a contrariety to the said solution is elicited — because[^5] in these it is not said that essence generates or is generated, but that the Son is generated *from* the essence or substance of the Father — and this section has four particulars. In the *first* he brings forward[^6] authorities to the contrary. In the *second* he explains the things adduced, at: *"With these words premised it is intimated"*; where he resumes the said exposition. In the *third* he elicits a certain corollary from the foregoing opinion, at: *"It is also shown from those words"* etc. In the *fourth and last* he returns to the proposition and shows that his exposition is good, by the authority of Augustine, at: *"And that it must be so understood"* etc.

### Treatment of the Questions

In this part, for the understanding of the two principal sub-parts of this distinction, two principal questions are asked.

*First* it is asked about the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the account of *principle*.

*Second* it is asked about the comparison of the same in the account of *term*.

And two questions are asked under the first, and two under the second.

Under the first it is asked:

*First*, whether substance or essence generates.

*Second*, whether anyone is generated from the substance.

---

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omittendo *Ita etiam non est dicendum*, et variando constructionem praeponit verbo *secunda* particulam *Similiter*. Item in fine propositionis legit *principii, habet tres partes*. Idem recurrit infra pro tertia parte. In medio propositionis habet *in comparatione* loco *de comparatione*, sed male.

en: The Vatican edition, against the trustworthiness of the mss. and ed. 1, omits *Ita etiam non est dicendum*, and altering the construction prefixes to the verb *secunda* the particle *Similiter*. Likewise at the end of the proposition it reads *principii, habet tres partes*. The same recurs below for the third part. In the middle of the proposition it has *in comparatione* in place of *de comparatione* — but wrongly.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit hic *sed*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, here adds *sed*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *Item*, post quod emendavimus Vat. et mss. substituendo cum ed. 1 *secunda* loco *prima*, quod manifeste est falsum.

en: We have supplied *Item* from the mss. and ed. 1; after which we have emended the Vatican edition and the mss. by substituting, with ed. 1, *secunda* in place of *prima* — which is manifestly false.

la: Vat. *expositionem*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition reads *expositionem* — but against the mss. and ed. 1.

la: Haec parenthesis explicat, quare dicitur *elicitur*, scil. quia illae auctoritates non explicite continent contrariam assertionem.

en: This parenthesis explains why he says *elicitur* ("is elicited") — namely, because those authorities do not explicitly contain the contrary assertion.

la: Plures mss. cum ed. 1 *inducit*.

en: Several mss. with ed. 1 read *inducit*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 5, Part NaN, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum substantia sive essentia generet
Whether substance or essence begets

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 111 -->

### Articulus I

*De comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione principii.*

### Quaestio I

*Utrum substantia sive essentia generet.*

Circa primum, quod substantia non generet, ostenditur sic:

**1.** *Generare* dicit relationem: ergo cui convenit generare, convenit et[^1] referri; sed essentiae non convenit referri: ergo nec generare.

**2.** Item, *generare* importat distinctionem: ergo cui convenit generare, per consequens et[^2] distingui; sed essentia cum sit una, non distinguitur: ergo etc. Aut si generat, plures sunt essentiae. Et ad haec duo inconvenientia ducit Magister.[^3]

**3.** Item, *generare* dicit actionem personalem: ergo de illo solo dicitur, quod vel supponit personam; sed essentia non significat[^4] personam, cum sit communis, nec personam supponit, cum sit omnino abstractum: ergo etc.

**4.** Item, *generare* est proprietas personae, *communicabilitas*[^5] est essentiae: ergo sicut se habet communicabilitas ad personam, ita proprietas personalis ad essentiam; sed communicabilitas nunquam est personae, quia haec est falsa: *Pater est communicabilis*; ergo nec proprietas personalis erit essentiae: ergo nec *generare*, cum sit personae.

*Contra:*

**1.** Quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est idem alii, et non habent diversas proprietates, quidquid dicitur de uno, et de altero[^6]; sed persona et essentia sunt huiusmodi, quia persona est essentia, nec habent diversas proprietates, quia proprietas in divinis est relatio distinguens; sed si essentia haberet aliquam proprietatem, tunc distingueretur et referretur: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod quamvis persona et essentia non habeant diversas proprietates, tamen differunt per habere proprietatem et non habere; contra: summa oppositio est contradictio[^7], sed talis diversitas est per contradictionem: ergo magis differunt essentia et persona quam persona et persona; sed persona non praedicatur de persona: ergo nec persona de essentia; hoc autem est falsum: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum praedicatur de altero, unum supponit pro altero, quia subiectum vere subiicitur praedicato[^8]; sed essentia vere praedicatur de Patre; unde haec est vera: *Pater est essentia*: ergo et supponit: ergo sicut *Deus Pater generat*, sic potest dici, *essentia generat*.

**3.** Item, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio[^9]; sed *generare* est sicut propria passio Patris; sed haec est vera: *divina essentia est Pater*: ergo et haec similiter: *divina essentia generat*.

**4.** Item, de quocumque praedicatur definitum, et definitio[^10]; sed definitio *patris* est *filii pater*. Cum igitur haec sit vera: *divina essentia est Pater*, et haec erit vera: *divina essentia est Filii Pater*: ergo a convertibili: *Filius est Filius essentiae*.

<!-- page 112 -->

### Conclusio

> *Haec locutio «divina essentia generat» est omnino impropria et neganda, vel saltem pie exponenda.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod fides vera[^11] dicit quasi fundamentum, Deum esse trinum et unum, et ita trinum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita unum, quod unitas non multiplicatur. Si ergo quod credimus oportuit significare, opportune inventa sunt nomina in divinis, immo a Deo nobis manifestata, quae significent trinitatem sub distinctione et unitatem sine omni multiplicatione. Sicut igitur nomina imposita personis omnino sunt incommunicabilia et quantum ad suppositum et quantum ad significatum; unde haec oratio[^12] est falsa: *Pater est Filius*, vel *Pater est communicabilis*; ita ex parte essentiae vel naturae oportuit nomina imponi, quae non distinguerentur nec quantum ad significatum nec quantum ad suppositum.

*Triplex genus nominum.* Notandum autem, quod triplex est genus nominum significantium essentiam. Quaedam enim significant *in concretione*, ut hoc nomen *Deus*; quaedam *in omnimoda abstractione*, ut hoc nomen *essentia*; quaedam *medio modo*, ut *lumen*, *sapientia*, *voluntas* et consimilia; et ista dicuntur medio modo significare, quia non concernunt suppositum per modum inhaerentiae, sed concernunt suppositum ratione eius, quod dicunt aliquam rationem actus vel originis, quae sunt ipsorum suppositorum. Cum igitur tres sint nominum differentiae, nomen *concretum* supponit pro persona proprie; nomen *medium* supponit partim proprie, partim improprie; nomen *abstractum* et *absolutum* non supponit nisi omnino improprie.[^13]

Unde haec est propria: *Deus generat*, et in usum adducenda; haec autem: *sapientia generat*[^14] *de sapientia*, partim propria, partim impropria; ideo est sustinenda, sed non extendenda; haec autem: *essentia generat*, omnino impropria, et ideo neganda est, et si legatur alicubi, est exponenda. Sancti enim quandoque ad confundendas haereses expressius loquuntur, quam proprietas sermonis sustineat.

<!-- page 113 -->

**1.** Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod essentia et persona non habent diversas proprietates; dicendum, quod diversitas rationis dupliciter[^15] est in divinis. Uno modo per habere diversas proprietates; et illud inducit distinctionem, et sic differunt ratione nec praedicantur de eodem, ut Pater et Filius; alio modo est per habere proprietatem et non habere; et illud non inducit distinctionem nec facit, quod unum non praedicetur de altero; facit tamen, quod aliquid dicitur de uno, quod non dicitur de altero, ut patet in Petro et homine: *Petrus est individuum*, *homo non*; et tamen *homo* vere praedicatur de Petro.

Ad illud, quod summa oppositio est affirmationis et negationis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi negatio nihil ponit, sicut inter *aliquid* et *nihil*; sed ubi ponit extrema, minima potest esse et surgit ex quantulacumque parva differentia sive rei sive rationis; unde non sufficit ad distinguendum.

**2.** Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod praedicatum supponit pro subiecto; dici potest uno modo, quod — sicut in inferioribus est praedicatio secundum substantiam, ut *homo est animal*, et est praedicatio secundum rationem, ut *animal est genus*; et praedicatum[^16] supponit pro eo de quo praedicatur secundum substantiam, sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem, quae est secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; unde non sequitur: *animal est genus*, *homo est animal*, ergo *homo est genus* — similiter dicunt in divinis, quod cum sint ibi res et ratio, est ibi praedicatio secundum substantiam; et illa salvata, quidquid dicitur de praedicato, et de subiecto; sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; et talis est hic[^17]: *Pater generat*, *divina essentia est Pater*: ergo *divina essentia generat*.

Sed ista similitudo non videtur conveniens, quia in divinis ratio[^18] praedicatur de essentia, unde haec est vera: *essentia est paternitas et generatio*; quod quidem in inferioribus non reperitur. Et[^19] propterea aliter dicendum, quod in divinis est *duplex modus praedicandi*: per identitatem et per inhaerentiam. Per identitatem, ut cum dicitur: *essentia est Pater*; per inhaerentiam sive denominationem, sicut faciunt adiectiva et verba.[^20] Praedicatio per identitatem est in divinis ratione summae simplicitatis, quae non patitur personam minus esse simplicem quam essentiam; quae quia non est in creaturis, ideo in eis non reperitur praedicatio per identitatem omnimodam, nisi idem enuntietur de se, ut cum dicitur: *humanitas est humanitas*; sed omnis propria praedicatio est[^21] per inhaerentiam, quia nihil est omnino simplex; unde haec est falsa: *humanitas est animalitas*. In praedicatione vero per inhaerentiam terminus[^22] aliud significat et aliud supponit, quia significat formam communem et supponit pro inferiori, et in tali verum est, quod illud quod praedicatur de altero, supponit pro illo. Sed in praedicatione per identitatem idem significat et supponit. Unde tunc est sensus, quod significatum per hunc terminum *Pater* est idem, quod significatum per hunc terminum *essentia*, et ideo *paternitas est essentia*; et quia hoc nomen *essentia* non significat personam, ideo pro ipsa non supponit, cum nullo modo de ipsa praedicetur nisi praedicatione per identitatem.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de passione et subiecto et consimilibus, dicendum, quod *duplex est species vocabulorum*: quaedam sunt vocabula in divinis substantialia, quae claudunt intra se rem, circa quam ponunt formam importatam per ipsa, ut hoc nomen *Pater*; et talia possunt praedicari per identitatem, ut cum dicitur: *essentia est Pater*, id est, *ille qui est Pater*. Quaedam sunt, quae sunt omnino in adiacentia, sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta[^23], ut *generat* et *genitus* et *natus*; et talia ponunt rem suam circa ea, de quibus praedicantur, ideo tantum per inhaerentiam praedicantur. Et ideo *generare* ponit distinctionem, quam importat, circa essentiam, cum de ea dicitur; et ideo haec est falsa: *essentia generat*; haec tamen vera: *essentia est generatio*. Et quando a praedicatione per identitatem itur[^24] ad praedicationem per inhaerentiam, potest esse ibi accidens. Quod ergo dicitur: *de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio*, istud habet instantiam, ubi proprietas est extranea ei, de quo praedicatur subiectum, ut haec intentio *species*, quamvis sit proprietas hominis, et *homo* dicatur de Petro, non tamen dicitur de eo hoc quod est *species*.

Et si obiicias, quod in divinis non cadit ratio extranei, quia non cadit ibi accidens; dicendum, quod etsi non sit extraneitas nec diversitas quantum ad rem, est tamen quoad rationem sive quoad modum praedicandi, qui triplex est in divinis, sicut infra patebit. Unde sicut hic est accidens: *essentia est persona*; sed *persona distinguitur*: ergo *et essentia*; ita et in proposito.

<!-- page 114 -->

**4.** Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de hac: *essentia est Pater Filii*; distinguitur a Praepositivo, quod *Pater* potest ponere suam rem sive respectum per ipsum importatum circa ipsum subiectum, quod est essentia; et tunc est locutio falsa; est enim sensus, quod essentia refertur ad Filium. Vel potest claudere intra se rem sui substantivi, ut sit sensus: *essentia est Pater Filii*, id est, *essentia est ille qui refertur ad Filium*; et hoc modo vera est locutio, et non valet argumentum: ergo *Filius est Filius essentiae*, immo est ibi accidens. Sicut enim non sequitur: *Filius refertur ad illum qui est Pater*, et *ille est essentia*: ergo *refertur vel distinguitur ab essentia*; sic et in proposito.

english:
### Article I

*On the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the account of principle.*

### Question I

*Whether substance or essence begets.*

On the first point: that substance does not beget, it is shown thus:

**1.** *To beget* expresses a relation: therefore to that to which it belongs to beget, it also[^1] belongs to be referred; but it does not belong to the essence to be referred: therefore neither does it belong [to the essence] to beget.

**2.** Likewise, *to beget* imports distinction: therefore to that to which it belongs to beget, consequently also[^2] [it belongs] to be distinguished; but the essence, since it is one, is not distinguished: therefore, etc. Or if it begets, there are several essences. And to these two inconveniences the Master reduces [the argument].[^3]

**3.** Likewise, *to beget* expresses a personal action: therefore it is said only of that which either supposits for a person; but the essence does not signify[^4] a person, since it is common — nor does it supposit for a person, since it is altogether abstract: therefore, etc.

**4.** Likewise, *to beget* is a property of the person, *communicability*[^5] of the essence: therefore, as communicability stands to the person, so personal property stands to the essence; but communicability is never of the person — for this is false: «*the Father is communicable*»; therefore neither will personal property be of the essence: therefore neither *to beget*, since it is of the person.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Whatever things are such that one is the same as the other and they do not have diverse properties, whatever is said of one is also said of the other[^6]; but person and essence are such, because the person is the essence, nor do they have diverse properties, because a property in divine things is a distinguishing relation; but if the essence had any property, then it would be distinguished and referred: therefore, etc. — If you say that, although person and essence do not have diverse properties, yet they differ through one having a property and the other not having it; on the contrary: the highest opposition is contradiction[^7], but such a diversity is by contradiction: therefore essence and person differ more than person and person; but person is not predicated of person: therefore neither is person predicated of essence; but this is false: therefore, etc.

**2.** Likewise, whatever things are such that one is predicated of the other, one supposits for the other, because the subject is truly subjected to the predicate[^8]; but essence is truly predicated of the Father — whence this is true: «*the Father is essence*»; therefore it also supposits: therefore, just as «*God the Father begets*», so it can be said «*essence begets*».

**3.** Likewise, of whatever the subject is predicated, also its proper property[^9]; but *to beget* is as it were the proper property of the Father; and this is true: «*the divine essence is the Father*»: therefore likewise this: «*the divine essence begets*».

**4.** Likewise, of whatever the defined is predicated, so also its definition[^10]; but the definition of *father* is *the father of a son*. Since, then, this is true: «*the divine essence is the Father*», this too will be true: «*the divine essence is the father of the Son*»: therefore, by conversion: «*the Son is the Son of the essence*».

### Conclusion

> *The expression «the divine essence begets» is altogether improper and is to be denied, or at least piously expounded.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it should be noted that the true faith[^11] says, as a kind of foundation, that God is triune and one — and so triune that the trinity is not confounded, and so one that the unity is not multiplied. If therefore what we believe had to be signified, names were aptly invented in divine matters — indeed, manifested to us by God — which signify the trinity under distinction and the unity without any multiplication. Just as, therefore, the names imposed upon the persons are altogether incommunicable, both with respect to the supposit and with respect to the signified — whence this expression[^12] is false: «*the Father is the Son*», or «*the Father is communicable*» — so on the side of the essence or nature it was necessary that names be imposed which would not be distinguished, either with respect to signification or with respect to supposition.

*Threefold genus of names.* It should be noted that there is a threefold genus of names signifying the essence. For some signify *in concretion*, as this name *God*; some *in every kind of abstraction*, as this name *essence*; some *in an intermediate mode*, as *light*, *wisdom*, *will*, and the like — and these are said to signify in an intermediate mode because they do not concern the supposit in the manner of inherence, but they concern the supposit by reason of what they express — some account of an act or origin, which belong to the supposits themselves. Since, therefore, there are three differences of names, a *concrete* name properly supposits for a person; a *medium* name supposits partly properly, partly improperly; an *abstract* and *absolute* name does not supposit except altogether improperly.[^13]

Hence this is proper: «*God begets*», and is to be brought into use; but this: «*wisdom begets*[^14] *from wisdom*» is partly proper, partly improper — therefore it is to be sustained but not extended; but this: «*essence begets*» is altogether improper, and therefore it is to be denied — and if it is read anywhere, it is to be expounded. For the Saints sometimes, in order to confound heresies, speak more expressly than the propriety of speech sustains.

**1.** To the first objection, that essence and person do not have diverse properties: it must be said that there is a twofold[^15] diversity of account in divine things. In one way — through having diverse properties; and this induces distinction, and in this way they differ in account and are not predicated of the same [subject], as Father and Son. In another way — through one having a property and the other not having it; and this does not induce distinction, nor does it cause one not to be predicated of the other; but it does cause that something is said of one which is not said of the other — as is clear in Peter and man: «*Peter is an individual*», «*man [is] not»; and yet *man* is truly predicated of Peter.

To the [objection] that the highest opposition is of affirmation and negation: it must be said that this is true where the negation posits nothing, as between *something* and *nothing*; but where it posits extremes, it can be minimal and arises from however small a difference, whether of thing or of account; whence it does not suffice for distinguishing.

**2.** To the second objection, that the predicate supposits for the subject: it can be said in one way that — just as in lower things there is *predication according to substance*, as «*man is animal*», and there is *predication according to account (ratio)*, as «*animal is a genus*»; and the predicate[^16] supposits for that of which it is predicated according to substance, but when the predication according to substance is changed into a predication that is according to account, there is an accident there; whence it does not follow: «*animal is a genus*», «*man is animal*», therefore «*man is a genus*» — similarly they say in divine matters that, since *thing* and *account* are there, there is predication according to substance; and this being preserved, whatever is said of the predicate [is said] also of the subject; but when the predication according to substance is changed into a predication according to account, there is an accident there; and such is this[^17]: «*the Father begets*», «*the divine essence is the Father*»: therefore «*the divine essence begets*».

But this similitude does not seem suitable, because in divine things *ratio* [account][^18] is predicated of the essence — whence this is true: «*the essence is paternity and generation*» — which indeed is not found in lower things. And[^19] therefore it must otherwise be said that in divine things there is a *twofold mode of predicating*: by identity and by inherence. By identity, as when it is said: «*the essence is the Father*»; by inherence or denomination, as adjectives and verbs do.[^20] Predication by identity exists in divine things by reason of the supreme simplicity, which does not allow the person to be less simple than the essence; and since this [simplicity] is not in creatures, therefore in them is not found predication by every-mode identity, unless the same be predicated of itself, as when it is said: «*humanity is humanity*»; but every proper predication is[^21] by inherence, since nothing is altogether simple; whence this is false: «*humanity is animality*». But in predication by inherence the term[^22] signifies one thing and supposits for another, because it signifies a common form and supposits for an inferior, and in such [predication] it is true that what is predicated of another supposits for it. But in predication by identity the same [thing] is signified and supposited. Whence then the sense is that what is signified by this term *Father* is the same as what is signified by this term *essence*, and therefore *paternity is essence*; and because this name *essence* does not signify a person, therefore it does not supposit for it, since it is in no way predicated of it except by predication by identity.

**3.** To the third objection concerning property (*passio*) and subject and the like: it must be said that *there is a twofold species of terms*: some are substantial terms in divine things, which enclose within themselves the thing about which they place the form imported through themselves, as this name *Father*; and such [terms] can be predicated by identity, as when it is said: «*the essence is the Father*», that is, *He who is the Father*. Some are [terms] which are altogether in adjacency, like verbs and nouns retained adjectively[^23], as *begets* and *begotten* and *born*; and such [terms] place their thing about those of which they are predicated, and therefore they are predicated only by inherence. And therefore *to beget* places the distinction which it imports about the essence, when it is said of the essence; and therefore this is false: «*the essence begets*»; this, however, is true: «*the essence is generation*». And when one passes[^24] from predication by identity to predication by inherence, an accident can be there. As to what is said: «*of whatever the subject is predicated, so also the proper property*» — this has an instance, where the property is extraneous to that of which the subject is predicated, as this intention *species*, although it is a property of man, and *man* is said of Peter, yet what is *species* is not said of him.

And if you object that in divine things the account of the extraneous does not fall, because no accident falls there: it must be said that, although there is no extraneousness nor diversity as to the thing, there is nevertheless [a diversity] as to the account or as to the mode of predicating, which is threefold in divine things, as will appear below. Whence just as here there is an accident: «*the essence is the person*»; but «*the person is distinguished*»: therefore «*also the essence*»; so also in the matter at hand.

**4.** To the final objection concerning «*the essence is the Father of the Son*»: it is distinguished, following Prepositivus, that *Father* can place its thing or [relative] respect imported through itself about the very subject, which is the essence; and then the expression is false; for the sense is that the essence is referred to the Son. Or [*Father*] can enclose within itself the thing of its substantive, so that the sense is: «*the essence is the Father of the Son*», that is, *the essence is He who is referred to the Son*; and in this way the expression is true, and the argument does not hold: «therefore the Son is the Son of the essence»; rather, there is an accident there. For just as it does not follow: «*the Son is referred to Him who is the Father*», and «*He is the essence*»: therefore «*[the Son] is referred or distinguished from the essence*»; so also in the matter at hand.

la: Vat., omisso non bene *et*, in fine argumenti post *nec* repetit *convenit*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, omitting *et* (not well), at the end of the argument repeats *convenit* after *nec* — but against the mss. and ed. 1.

la: Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet *et per consequens etiam*.

en: Thus most codd. with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, which has *et per consequens etiam*.

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here c. 1. [Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 5, c. 1.]

la: Vat. cum cod. cc ordine inverso ponit hic *supponit* pro *significat* et mox *significat* pro *supponit*, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc, in reverse order, here puts *supponit* for *significat* and shortly after *significat* for *supponit*; but the older codd. with ed. 1 stand against this.

la: Multi codd. ut A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc. ter *communitas* loco *communicabilitas*, sed minus bene.

en: Many codd. (A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc.) read three times *communitas* for *communicabilitas* — but less well.

la: Aristot., VII *Topic.* c. 1. — Mox post *quia* cod. O addit *quidquid est*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 1. — Shortly after, codex O adds *quidquid est* after *quia*.

la: Aristot., X *Metaph.* text. 13 (IX, c. 4): *Horum (oppositorum) primum contradictio*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 13 (IX, c. 4): «The first of these [opposites] is contradiction.»

la: Aristot., VII *Metaph.* text. 7 (VI, c. 3): *Subiectum autem est, de quo cetera dicuntur*. Cfr. et libr. *Praedicam.* in princ. — Paulo ante post *quod unum* cod. Z adiungit *vere et essentialiter*; cod. O vero paulo infra post *de altero* addit *essentialiter*, et in fine argumenti habet *ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 7 (VI, c. 3): «The subject is that of which the rest are said.» Cf. also the *Categories* at the beginning. — A little earlier, after *quod unum*, cod. Z adds *vere et essentialiter*; cod. O, a little further on, after *de altero* adds *essentialiter*, and at the end of the argument has *ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat*.

la: Aristot., I *Topic.* c. 7 (c. 6) init.: *Hoc enim erat proprium, quod conversim (de re sive subiecto) praedicatur*. — Cod. M addit hic *illius subiecti*. In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *ergo et similiter illa est vera* pro *ergo et haec similiter*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 7 (c. 6) at the beginning: «For this was the proper, which is predicated convertibly (of the thing or subject).» — Cod. M here adds *illius subiecti*. At the end of the argument, the Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, reads *ergo et similiter illa est vera* for *ergo et haec similiter*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI *Topic.* c. 1 (c. 3), ubi ostendit ad bonam definitionem requiri, quod ipsa conversim praedicari possit de definito; et Petr. Hispan., *Summula* tract. de Syllog. topico. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *definitio et definitum*; sed propter formam argumenti minus bene. Codd. O Z addunt *et e converso*. Paulo infra multi codd. cum ed. 1 post *et haec* omittunt *erit vera*: cod. H habet *ergo et haec: divina* etc.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 1 (c. 3), where he shows that for a good definition it is required that the definition itself can be predicated convertibly of the defined; and Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract on the topical syllogism. — The Vatican edition, against most codd. and ed. 1, reads *definitio et definitum*; but, on account of the form of the argument, less well. Codd. O Z add *et e converso*. A little further on, many codd. with ed. 1, after *et haec*, omit *erit vera*: cod. H has *ergo et haec: divina* etc.

la: Ed. 1 *nostra* pro *vera*. Paulo infra codd. V W X *et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas*; lectio certe quoad sensum praeferenda. Mox cod. I cum ed. 1 post *ergo* addit *hoc*.

en: Ed. 1 reads *nostra* for *vera*. A little further on, codd. V W X read *et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas* — a reading certainly to be preferred as to sense. Shortly after, cod. I with ed. 1, after *ergo*, adds *hoc*.

la: Codd. V X Z *omnino* pro *oratio*. Paulo infra cod. T (ab altera manu correctus) *quibus non distingueretur* loco *quae non distinguerentur*.

en: Codd. V X Z read *omnino* for *oratio*. A little further on, cod. T (corrected by a second hand) reads *quibus non distingueretur* for *quae non distinguerentur*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 transponit non ita bene *non supponit omnino nisi improprie*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older mss. and ed. 1, transposes — not so well — *non supponit omnino nisi improprie*.

la: Codd. M Y Z hic addunt *vel sapientia*. Mox Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit *sed non extendenda*; cod. O *ideo est distinguenda et non extendenda*.

en: Codd. M Y Z here add *vel sapientia*. Shortly after, the Vatican edition, against the older codd. and ed. 1, omits *sed non extendenda*; cod. O reads *ideo est distinguenda et non extendenda*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut T V Y cum ed. 1 *duplex*, et paulo infra multi codd. ut A C G K L R S T V X etc. post *et* addunt *per*, sed minus apte. Deinde sensu non mutato codd. D T *nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater*. Cfr. de hoc d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. Cod. X post *eodem* legit glossando: *nam alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius*.

en: Some codd. (T V Y) with ed. 1 read *duplex*; and a little later, many codd. (A C G K L R S T V X etc.) after *et* add *per*, though less aptly. Then — with no change of sense — codd. D T read *nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater*. Cf. on this d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. Cod. X after *eodem* reads by way of gloss: «for the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another; therefore one is not predicated of another, as *the Father is the Son*».

la: Plures codd. ut A B C L R S U X bb cum ed. 1 falso *praedicatio* loco *praedicatum*, et paulo infra post *praedicatione* omittunt multi codd. ut A F G I K T aa etc. cum ed. 1 non bene *secundum substantiam*.

en: Several codd. (A B C L R S U X bb) with ed. 1 wrongly read *praedicatio* for *praedicatum*; and a little later, after *praedicatione*, many codd. (A F G I K T aa etc.) with ed. 1 not well omit *secundum substantiam*.

la: Vat. et codd. cc contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 non bene *haec*; cod. X *ibi*.

en: The Vatican edition and codd. cc, against the older codd. and ed. 1, not well read *haec*; cod. X reads *ibi*.

la: Cod. Y *relatio*. *Ratio* hic stat pro *relatio*; cfr. supra p. 58.

en: Cod. Y reads *relatio*. *Ratio* here stands for *relatio*; cf. above, p. 58.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *Et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, omits *Et*.

la: Codd. I X addunt *sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat*. — De duplici ratione praedicandi vide infra d. 34, q. 2.

en: Codd. I X add *sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat*. — On the twofold mode of predicating, see below d. 34, q. 2.

la: Cod. W hic addit *illa quae est superioris respectu inferioris*; codd. aa bb vero *superioris de inferiore est*; cod. H tandem *in creaturis*.

en: Cod. W here adds *illa quae est superioris respectu inferioris*; codd. aa bb read *superioris de inferiore est*; cod. H finally *in creaturis*.

la: Codd. L O addunt *communis*. Paulo infra post *pro illa* cod. T continuat constructionem *sed non in praedicatione per identitatem ubi idem*. Quoad doctrinae explicationem cfr. supra d. 4, qq. 2 et 4.

en: Codd. L O add *communis*. A little further on, after *pro illa*, cod. T continues the construction *sed non in praedicatione per identitatem ubi idem*. For the explication of the doctrine cf. above d. 4, qq. 2 and 4.

la: Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A E Q V X post *omnino* omittunt *in*, in qua lectione *adiacentia* adiective sumitur.

en: The Vatican edition, beyond the testimony of the older mss. and ed. 1, omits *sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta*. A little earlier, several codd. (A E Q V X) after *omnino* omit *in* — in which reading *adiacentia* is taken adjectivally.

la: Cod. R *infertur*; cod. W *proceditur*.

en: Cod. R reads *infertur*; cod. W reads *proceditur*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec est circa principium quod divinarum productionum, quod secundum fidem catholicam ipsae sunt divinae personae producentes. Conclusiones huius et primae quaestionis sequentis articuli sunt contra abbatem Ioachim, cuius doctrina censurata est in Concilio Lateranensi IV, can. *de Fide catholica*, cap. *Damnamus*: «Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro [Lombardo], quod una quaedam res est incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis… et illa res non est generans nec genita nec procedens». — Hanc doctrinam catholicam Seraphicus gravissimis argumentis confirmat.

**II.** In solut. ad 1 distinguit S. Doctor duplicem diversitatem rationis in divinis secundum differentiam, quae est inter *habere diversas proprietates* et *habere vel non habere unam eandemque proprietatem*, de quo cfr. hic dub. 4 et infra dist. 49, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. Affirmat etiam alteram inducere distinctionem realem, alteram non. Tres enim sunt in divinis proprietates personales, scil. paternitas, filiatio et spiratio passiva, et habere distinctas has proprietates inducit realem personarum distinctionem; unde etiam una nequit praedicari de alia. Sed diversitas rationis, quae exsurgit ex *habere aliquam proprietatem et eandem non habere*, non importat realem distinctionem. Essentia enim divina non habet proprietatem generandi, quam habet Pater; nihilominus paternitas et essentia divina non distinguuntur realiter et possunt de se praedicari. Nec valet argumentatio (1 ad opp.), quod *habere proprietatem* et *non habere* sint contradictorie opposita, et quod exinde maiorem differentiam inducant inter personam et essentiam, quam quae est inter personas ad invicem. Nam bene distinguit S. Doctor inter contradictionem, cuius unum extremum nihil ponit (ut inter *aliquid* et *nihil*) et illam contradictionem, cuius extrema aliquid ponunt. Si unum extremum nihil ponit, non potest verificari de aliquo termino positivo, bene tamen si aliquid ponit. Insuper minima rationis distinctio sufficit ad hoc, ut contradictoria de distinctis dicantur. Sic terminus *incommunicabilis* verificatur de paternitate et praedicatur de ipsa, non de essentia, licet haec non realiter distinguatur a paternitate. Cfr. infra dist. 26, q. 1, ad 2; d. 34, q. 1, per totam; et d. 33, q. 2; et S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1.

**III.** Prima opinio in solut. ad 2 posita, quae distinguit inter *praedicationem secundum substantiam* et *secundum rationem*, Praepositivi fuisse dicitur. Secunda opinio distinguit inter *praedicationem per identitatem* et *per inhaerentiam*, sive denominationem, quae a Scoto dicitur *praedicatio formalis*. De hac distinctione cfr. infra d. 33, q. 3; et d. 34, q. 2. Praedicatio identica fit per abstracta; praedicatio per inhaerentiam fit semper in concreto et ratione suppositi. Differunt hae praedicationes, tum quia abstractum eandem rem significat et supponit, concretum vero saepe aliam significat et pro alia supponit (supra, d. 4, q. 1); tum quia abstractum nomen imponitur formae et a forma denominatur, concretum vero non imponitur formae, sed supposito; tum quia identica omnimodam identitatem complectitur, praedicatio vero per inhaerentiam aliquam diversitatem. Unde falsa est ratiocinatio, quae transit a praedicatione identica ad alteram et ab abstracto ad concretum; et in hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, teste S. Thom. (*Summa* I, q. 39, a. 5). — In creatis locum non habere praedicationem identicam in proprio sensu, est sententia communis, si excipias Franciscum Mayronis.

**IV.** Quoad ipsam conclusionem cfr. supra d. 4, q. 1 in corp. — Alex. Hal., p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (ubi affert et solvit 25 argumenta contraria); q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 39, a. 5. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1 quaesit.; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1 *princ.* q. 2, aa. 1 et 2. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12; et a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21, 28. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is concerned with a principle — namely, that of divine productions, which according to the Catholic faith are the divine persons themselves as producing. The conclusions of this question and of the first question of the following article are against Abbot Joachim, whose doctrine was censured at the Fourth Lateran Council, *de Fide catholica*, chap. *Damnamus*: «We, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard] that there is one certain *thing* — incomprehensible, indeed, and ineffable… and that thing is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding». — The Seraphic confirms this Catholic doctrine by the gravest arguments.

**II.** In the reply to 1, the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold diversity of account in divine things, according to the difference between *having diverse properties* and *having or not having one and the same property* — on which cf. here dub. 4, and below dist. 49, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. He affirms also that the one induces a real distinction, the other does not. For there are three personal properties in God — namely paternity, filiation, and passive spiration — and having these distinct properties induces a real distinction of the persons; hence even one cannot be predicated of another. But the diversity of account that arises from *having some property and not having the same* does not import a real distinction. For the divine essence does not have the property of begetting which the Father has; nevertheless paternity and the divine essence are not really distinguished and can be predicated of each other. Nor is the argument (1 ad opp.) valid — that *to have a property* and *not to have [it]* are contradictorily opposed and therefore induce a greater difference between person and essence than that which is between the persons among themselves. For the Holy Doctor rightly distinguishes between a contradiction whose one extreme posits nothing (as between *something* and *nothing*), and that contradiction whose extremes both posit something. If one extreme posits nothing, it cannot be verified of any positive term, but well can if it posits something. Moreover, the smallest distinction of account suffices for contradictories to be said of distinct things. Thus the term *incommunicable* is verified of paternity and predicated of it, not of the essence, though the latter is not really distinguished from paternity. Cf. below dist. 26, q. 1, ad 2; d. 34, q. 1, throughout; and d. 33, q. 2; and St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1.

**III.** The first opinion placed in the reply to 2, which distinguishes between *predication according to substance* and *according to account (ratio)*, is said to have been that of Prepositivus. The second opinion distinguishes between *predication by identity* and *predication by inherence* (or denomination), which Scotus calls *formal predication*. On this distinction, cf. below d. 33, q. 3; and d. 34, q. 2. Identical predication is made through abstracts; predication by inherence is always made in the concrete and by reason of the supposit. These predications differ: in that the abstract signifies and supposits for the same thing, while the concrete often signifies one thing and supposits for another (above, d. 4, q. 1); in that the abstract name is imposed upon the form and is named from the form, whereas the concrete is imposed not on the form but on the supposit; and in that the identical predication embraces every kind of identity, while predication by inherence [embraces] some diversity. Hence reasoning is false that passes from identical predication to the other and from abstract to concrete; and in this Abbot Joachim erred, as St. Thomas testifies (*Summa* I, q. 39, a. 5). — That in created things identical predication in the proper sense does not obtain is the common opinion, if Francis of Meyronnes be excepted.

**IV.** On the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 4, q. 1 in corp. — Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (where he brings forward and solves 25 contrary arguments); q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 39, a. 5. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1 quaesit.; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1 *princ.* q. 2, aa. 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12; and a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21, 28. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum Filius dicatur genitus de substantia Patris

title_alt: Whether the Son is said to be begotten of the substance of the Father

source_text:
<!-- page 114 -->

### Quaestio II

*Utrum concedenda sit locutio, quod Filius generetur de substantia Patris.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit concedendum, quod aliquis generetur de substantia Patris, ut Filius. Et quod sic, videtur:

**1.** Per multas auctoritates in littera[^1] et maxime per illam: *Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura legitur: Pater de sua substantia genuisse Filium*;

<!-- page 115 -->

sed Scriptura non dicit nisi verum nec frequentat nisi proprium: ergo praedictus sermo est verus et proprius.

**2.** Item, ratione ostenditur sic: quicumque est ab aliquo[^2] et est ei consubstantialis, est de eius substantia; sed Filius est a Patre et est ei consubstantialis: ergo est de eius substantia.

**3.** Item, *Pater generat Filium*: aut ergo de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de nihilo, quia tunc esset creatura: ergo de aliquo[^3]; non de aliquo alio a se: ergo de sui substantia.

**4.** Item, in inferioribus filius, qui habet partem substantiae a patre, dicitur esse *de substantia patris*: ergo multo fortius, qui habet totam substantiam, dicitur esse de substantia generantis: ergo haec est vera: *Filius est de substantia Patris*.

*Contra:*

**1.** Propositiones sunt transitivae[^4], et ubi transitio, ibi est distinctio et diversitas: ergo cum dicitur: *Filius de substantia Patris*, haec praepositio *de* notat distinctionem inter substantiam Patris et Filium: ergo cum nulla sit distinctio, quia Filius est substantia Patris, propositio praedicta est falsa. Si dicas, quod haec praepositio *de* cadit a generali significato praepositionum, retinens speciale: ergo est ibi soloecismus[^5], sicut si dicatur *sublime volat* pro *sublimiter*, quod stultum est dicere.

**2.** Item, obiicitur de significato speciali. Haec praepositio *de*, prout accipitur specialiter, aliquando tenetur *materialiter*, ut *cultellus de ferro*; aliquando *ordinaliter*, ut *de mane fit meridies*, id est post mane; aliquando *originaliter*, ut si dicatur, *radius de sole* vel *splendor de igne*. Sed quocumque istorum modorum accipiatur, falsa est locutio: si materialiter, est falsa, quia Filius caret materia; si ordinaliter, falsa, quia sensus est, quod Filius sit post Patrem sive post substantiam Patris; si originaliter, similiter falsa quia tunc est sensus, quod Filius habeat ortum a substantia Patris; sed ista non admittitur: *substantia Patris generat Filium*: ergo est omni modo[^6] falsa. Si dicas, quod nullo istorum modorum, sed tenetur quarto modo *substantialiter*; quaeritur, unde ortum habeat haec significatio et ubi consimiliter accipiatur[^7]; et videtur quod hoc nihil sit, quia tunc haec esset vera: *Pater est de substantia Filii*, quam nemo concedit.

**3.** Item, hoc idem ostenditur sic: differt haec praepositio *de* et *a*: quia *a* proprie dicit habitudinem principii activi, sed haec praepositio *de* dicit habitudinem principii passivi; sed Deo et eius substantiae magis convenit ratio principii activi quam passivi: ergo haec est magis vera: *Filius est a substantia Patris*, quam *de*; sed haec non recipitur: ergo nec alia debet recipi.

**4.** Item, *de* aut dicit identitatem aut diversitatem; si identitatem: ergo cum summa identitas sit in essentia vel substantia, haec erit vera: *substantia[^8] de substantia*, quam negat Magister; si diversitatem: sed non distinguitur substantia Patris a Filio, quia Filius est ipsa substantia Patris: ergo omnino est falsa.

### Conclusio

> *Concedendum est, Filium generari de substantia Patris.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio est concedenda.

Et ad intelligentiam praedictorum[^9] notandum, quod praeter praedictos tres modos, quibus haec praepositio *de* accipitur, quarto modo etiam potest accipi, scilicet *substantialiter*, ut dicat substantialem convenientiam inter extrema; sed hanc nunquam pure dicit, cum sit praepositio et importet aliquam habitudinem et respectum ad extrema. Si enim tantum substantialiter teneretur[^10]; sicut dicitur: *filius de substantia patris*, ita diceretur: *pater de substantia filii*; quod absonum est.

Propterea notandum, quod *substantialiter accipi* consuevit tripliciter. Aliquando accipitur *substantialiter et partialiter*, ut cum dicitur, quod partes sunt de toto sive de substantia totius, ut *urceus vini de dolio*. Aliquando accipitur *substantialiter et ordinaliter*, ut cum dicitur: *de pane fit corpus Christi*; ibi enim est ordo, quia substantia panis non manet in corpore Christi, sicut nec mane in meridie; sed ulterius substantialiter, quia substantia panis transit in substantiam corporis Christi. Aliquando accipitur[^11] *substantialiter et originaliter*, ut cum dicitur: *Filius de substantia Patris*; ratione ablativi tenetur substantialiter, ratione genitivi originaliter: et ideo importat aliquam distinctionem Filii ad Patrem, non ad eius substantiam, et ita praepositio tenet ibi generale significatum et speciale.

<!-- page 116 -->

**1. 2.** Et sic patet responsio ad primum argumentum et secundum. Tamen quod dicitur, quod praepositiones sunt transitivae, non intelligitur, quod notent ex hoc diversitatem necessario; sed sicut dicitur, quod obliqui[^12] sunt transitivi quantum ad modum; quia transitive construuntur cum verbis, ut, *video me*; similiter hoc de praepositionibus dicitur, quae[^13] cum obliquis construuntur.

**3.** Patet etiam tertium, quod *de* non tantum dicit habitudinem principii passivi nec tantum habitudinem principii activi, sed habitudinem consubstantialem cum habitudine originis; quod non facit haec praepositio *a*; et ideo non est simile.

**4.** Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio, quia *de* non dicit ibi penitus identitatem nec diversitatem, sed *consubstantialitatem cum habitudine originis*.

english:
### Question II

*Whether the expression should be conceded that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father.*

Secondly it is asked whether it should be conceded that anyone is begotten of the substance of the Father, as the Son is. And that it is so, it seems:

**1.** By many authorities in the text[^1] and especially by this: *«It is also said, and frequently read in Scripture, that the Father begot the Son from His own substance»*; but Scripture says nothing except what is true, and uses frequently nothing except what is proper: therefore the aforesaid expression is true and proper.

**2.** Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: whoever is from something[^2] and is consubstantial with it, is of its substance; but the Son is from the Father and is consubstantial with Him: therefore He is of His substance.

**3.** Likewise, *the Father begets the Son*: either, then, from something, or from nothing; not from nothing, because then He would be a creature: therefore from something[^3]; not from something other than Himself: therefore from His own substance.

**4.** Likewise, among inferior beings a son who has a part of his father's substance is said to be *of the father's substance*: therefore much more strongly, one who has the whole substance is said to be *of the substance of the begetter*: therefore this is true: *the Son is of the substance of the Father*.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Propositions are transitive[^4], and where there is transition, there is distinction and diversity: therefore when it is said *the Son of the substance of the Father*, this preposition *de* (of/from) denotes a distinction between the substance of the Father and the Son: therefore, since there is no distinction — because the Son *is* the substance of the Father — the aforesaid proposition is false. If you say that this preposition *de* falls from the general signification of prepositions, retaining the special: then there is here a solecism[^5], just as if one were to say *sublime volat* for *sublimiter* ("it flies sublime" for "sublimely"), which it is foolish to say.

**2.** Likewise, an objection is made concerning the special signified meaning. This preposition *de*, as it is taken specially, is sometimes taken *materially*, as *a knife of iron*; sometimes *ordinally*, as *from morning comes midday*, that is, after morning; sometimes *originally*, as when it is said, *a ray from the sun* or *splendor from fire*. But in whatever of these modes it is taken, the expression is false: if materially, it is false because the Son lacks matter; if ordinally, false because the sense is that the Son is after the Father, or after the substance of the Father; if originally, similarly false because then the sense is that the Son has His origin from the substance of the Father — but this is not admitted: *«the substance of the Father begets the Son»*: therefore in every way[^6] it is false. If you say that it is taken in none of those modes, but is held in a fourth mode, *substantially*, it is asked whence this signification has its origin, and where it is similarly taken[^7]; and it seems that this is nothing, because then this would be true: *the Father is of the substance of the Son*, which no one concedes.

**3.** Likewise, the same is shown thus: this preposition *de* differs from *a* (from): for *a* properly expresses the relation of an active principle, but this preposition *de* expresses the relation of a passive principle; but the account of an active principle belongs more to God and His substance than that of a passive: therefore this is more true: *the Son is from (a) the substance of the Father*, than *of (de)*; but this is not received: therefore neither should the other be received.

**4.** Likewise, *de* expresses either identity or diversity; if identity — then since the highest identity is in the essence or substance, this will be true: *substance[^8] of substance*, which the Master denies; if diversity — but the substance of the Father is not distinguished from the Son, because the Son is the very substance of the Father: therefore it is altogether false.

### Conclusion

> *It is to be conceded that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid expression is to be conceded.

And for the understanding of the foregoing[^9] it should be noted that besides the three aforementioned modes in which this preposition *de* is taken, it can also be taken in a fourth mode, namely *substantially*, so that it expresses a substantial agreement between the extremes. But it never says this purely, since it is a preposition and imports some relation and respect to the extremes. For if it were held only substantially[^10], as it is said *son from the substance of the father*, so it would be said *father from the substance of the son*; which is absurd.

Therefore it should be noted that *to be taken substantially* is customary in three ways. Sometimes it is taken *substantially and partially*, as when it is said that parts are *of the whole* or of the substance of the whole, as *a jug of wine from the cask*. Sometimes it is taken *substantially and ordinally*, as when it is said: *from bread is made the body of Christ*; for there is order there, because the substance of the bread does not remain in the body of Christ, just as morning does not remain at midday; but further substantially, because the substance of the bread passes into the substance of the body of Christ. Sometimes it is taken[^11] *substantially and originally*, as when it is said: *the Son of the substance of the Father*; by reason of the ablative it is held substantially, by reason of the genitive originally: and therefore it imports some distinction of the Son to the Father, not to His substance, and so the preposition there holds its general signified meaning together with its special one.

**1. 2.** And so the response to the first and second arguments is clear. Yet as to what is said, that prepositions are transitive — it is not understood that they thereby denote diversity necessarily; but just as it is said that oblique [cases][^12] are transitive as to manner, because they are construed transitively with verbs, as *I see myself*; likewise this is said of prepositions, which[^13] are construed with oblique cases.

**3.** The third is also clear: that *de* expresses not only the relation of a passive principle, nor only the relation of an active principle, but a consubstantial relation together with the relation of origin — which this preposition *a* does not do; and therefore they are not alike.

**4.** To that which is last objected, the response is clear, because *de* there does not express identity at all, nor diversity, but *consubstantiality with the relation of origin*.

la: Hic c. 1 post medium.

en: Here [in the *Sentences* text, distinction 5] c. 1, after the middle.

la: Ex fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquo* pro *alio*.

en: From nearly all the codd. and ed. 1 we have substituted *aliquo* ("from something") for *alio* ("from another").

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit *et*, pro quo cod. A melius habet *sed*.

en: The Vatican ed., against most codd. and ed. 1, adds *et*; for which cod. A better reads *sed*.

la: Cfr. Priscian., XIV *Grammat.* c. 1 seqq. — Mox post *ibi* Vat. habet *etiam est* loco *et*. Paulo infra ed. 1 verbo *nulla* praemittit satis bene *in substantia*.

en: Cf. Priscian, *Institutes of Grammar* XIV, c. 1 ff. — Next, after *ibi* the Vatican ed. has *etiam est* in place of *et*. A little later, ed. 1 prefixes *in substantia* before the word *nulla*, suitably enough.

la: Priscian., XV *Grammat.* c. 1: *Nam si (ordinatio partium orationis) incongrua sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus*.

en: Priscian, *Institutes of Grammar* XV, c. 1: «For if [the ordering of the parts of speech] is incongruous, it will produce a solecism, as when the elements of speech come together inelegantly».

la: Plures codd. ut A F H K T Y etc. cum ed. 4 *omni modo*, Vat. *omnino*. — Similia habet Aristot., V *Metaph.* text. 29 (IV, 24) de praepositione *ex*. — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut K V W X post *modorum* addunt *tenetur*.

en: Several codd. (A F H K T Y etc.) with ed. 4 read *omni modo* ("in every way"), Vat. *omnino* ("altogether"). — Aristotle has similar things, *Metaphysics* V, text 29 (IV, 24), on the preposition *ex* ("out of"). — A little later, several codd. (K V W X) after *modorum* add *tenetur*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *similiter accipitur*.

en: The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads *similiter accipitur* ("is similarly taken").

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit *est*. Textum Magistri vide in lit. c. 1 et 2 circa finem.

en: The Vatican ed., contrary to the testimony of the mss. and ed. 1, adds *est*. For the Master's text see in *littera* c. 1 and 2 near the end.

la: Aliqui codd. ut T V addunt *est*.

en: Some codd. (T V) add *est*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *tenetur*.

en: The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, less well reads *tenetur* ("is held").

la: Substituimus ex codd. et ed. 1 *accipitur* pro *dicitur*. Paulo infra post *Filius* cod. V addit *est*.

en: From the codd. and ed. 1 we have substituted *accipitur* ("is taken") for *dicitur* ("is said"). A little later, after *Filius*, cod. V adds *est*.

la: Supple: *casus*. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *videt me* pro *video me*, sed non bene.

en: Supply: *casus* ("[oblique] cases"). — A little later, several codd. (A C F G H K L O R S V X etc.) with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read *videt me* ("he sees me") for *video me* ("I see myself"), but not well.

la: Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungit *etiam*. Cod. H *quia* loco *quae*.

en: The Vatican ed., contrary to the testimony of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds *etiam*. Cod. H reads *quia* in place of *quae*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia aliquorum terminorum in solut. ad 1 et alibi occurrentium haec ex antiquis grammaticis notamus.

1. Duplex distinguebatur constructio *transitiva*, scil. tum *actuum* tum *personarum*. In prima constructibile dependens per modum *actus* significat, ut in verbis transitivis, v. g. *lego librum*; secunda vero est, in qua constructibile dependens per modum *substantiae* significat. Haec fit vel per casus obliquos (v. g. *filius Socratis*; *similis Ciceroni*) vel etiam per praepositiones, quae inde vocantur transitivae. Vide Scotum, *Grammatica speculativa* c. 46 usque 51, de hoc subtiliter disputantem.

2. Constructio *transitiva* secundum antiquam definitionem est illa, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa vel videntur pertinere ad diversa; *intransitiva* vero est ea, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem vel saltem ad idem videntur pertinere.

3. Quomodo casus grammaticales sint transitivi quantum ad modum significandi, late Scot. explicat ibid. c. 49.

4. Ipse S. Bonav. infra d. 37, p. I, dub. 2 docet, quod praepositiones non notent necessario diversitatem.

Ampliorem expositionem et applicationem huius solutionis exhibent Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, ad 3; et Richard. a Med., hic q. 3, ad 1.

**II.** In conclusione doctores conveniunt. Cfr. Alex. et Richard. locc. citt. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 41, a. 3. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2 *princ.* q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 54, q. 3, nn. 53 seqq. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the understanding of certain terms occurring in the reply to 1 and elsewhere, we note the following from the ancient grammarians.

1. A twofold *transitive* construction was distinguished, namely both of *acts* and of *persons*. In the first, the dependent constructible signifies in the manner of an *act*, as in transitive verbs, e.g. *I read a book*; the second is that in which the dependent constructible signifies in the manner of a *substance*. This occurs either by oblique cases (e.g. *Socrates's son*; *similar to Cicero*) or also by prepositions, which are therefore called transitive. See Scotus, *Grammatica speculativa*, cc. 46–51, who discusses this subtly.

2. A *transitive* construction, according to the ancient definition, is one in which the constructibles pertain to diverse things, or seem to pertain to diverse things; an *intransitive* is one in which the constructibles pertain to the same thing, or at least seem to pertain to the same.

3. In what manner grammatical cases are transitive as to mode of signifying, Scotus explains at length ibid. c. 49.

4. St. Bonaventure himself below at d. 37, p. I, dub. 2 teaches that prepositions do not necessarily denote diversity.

A fuller exposition and application of this solution is given by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, ad 3; and Richard of Middleton, here q. 3, ad 1.

**II.** On the conclusion the doctors agree. Cf. Alexander and Richard loc. cit. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 41, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 2 *princ.* q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 54, q. 3, nn. 53 ff. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 115 -->

### Articulus II

*De comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini.*

Consequenter circa secundum articulum huius quaestionis, qui est per comparationem generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini, duo quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.

*Secundo*, utrum per generationem communicetur.

### Quaestio I

*Utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.*

Quod autem substantia generetur, sic obiicitur[^1]:

**1.** Generatio in inferioribus est motus ad substantiam[^5]; quod motus est, hoc est imperfectionis, quod ad substantiam est, hoc est perfectionis; si ergo quod est perfectionis est transferendum ad divina: ergo et generatio terminatur ad essentiam.

**2.** Item, generatio in divinis terminatur: aut ergo ad substantiam, aut ad accidens, quia omne ens est substantia, vel accidens[^2][^6]; sed in divinis non terminatur ad accidens, cum non sit ibi: ergo ad substantiam. Si dicas, quod in divinis, quamvis non sit accidens, est tamen relatio, quae distinguitur a substantia; tunc arguitur sic: aut generatio terminabitur ad substantiam, aut ad relationem; sed non ad relationem, quia in *ad aliquid* per se non est origo, nec terminatur productio[^7]: ergo terminatur ad substantiam: ergo substantia generatur.

**3.** Item, sicut dicit Philosophus[^8]: «Motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt, et corruptis nobis, corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt»; et hoc est[^3][^4], quia universale habet idem esse cum singulari: ergo cum multo magis sit eadem substantia cum persona, et substantia sit in persona, si persona generatur, et substantia.

<!-- page 116 -->

**4.** Item, generare tam in divinis quam in creaturis est *simile sibi producere*[^9]; sed non est similitudo in persona, sed in substantia et in natura: ergo cum terminetur ad simile, in quantum est simile, ergo ad substantiam, secundum quam attenditur similitudo.

*Contra:*

**1.** Omne quod generatur ab alio generatur, quia nihil se ipsum gignit[^10]; sed substantia divina non habet alium, nec aliud est in divinis: ergo non generatur.

**2.** Item, omne quod generatur habet principium *a quo*[^11]; sed omne quod habet principium, est principiatum; sed principium et principiatum distinguuntur: si ergo substantia generatur, distinguitur: aut ergo a substantia, aut a persona; sed utrumque est impossibile: ergo etc.

**3.** Item, omne quod generatur est de substantia generantis[^12]; si ergo substantia generatur, substantia vel essentia est de substantia generantis; sed non est nisi una omnino substantia: ergo idem est de se ipso, quod est impossibile.

**4.** Item, generatio est productio[^13]; sed productio est quaedam actio, et omnis actio creaturae terminatur ad singularia[^14]: ergo cum generatio sit quaedam actio, in divinis terminabitur ad singulare sive suppositum; sed tale non est substantia: ergo non terminabitur ad ipsam.

### Conclusio

> *Cum in divinis generatio terminetur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, non ad substantiam secundam sive essentiam, minime recipitur, quod substantia generetur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod generatio de sua communi ratione ad substantiam terminatur. Sed attendendum, quod *substantia* dicitur dupliciter[^15]: *prima*, quae est individuum et hypostasis sive persona, et *secunda*, quae est commune. Dico ergo, quod est loqui de termino generationis dupliciter: aut quantum ad *productionem*, aut quantum ad *intentionem*. Quantum ad productionem, cum sit circa singulare, terminatur ad substantiam primam, et[^16] quantum ad intentionem ad naturam communem, quia natura producens hunc hominem intendit formam communem dare ei.

Sed quoniam in creaturis forma communis numeratur in suppositis, ideo in illis forma communis producitur et corrumpitur; et ideo in creaturis generatio non tantum secundum intentionem, sed etiam secundum productionem ad substantiam communem terminatur; et ideo universale in singulari generatur, quia numeratur[^17]. Sed quoniam in divinis substantia non numeratur nec advenit ei novum esse: ideo generatio secundum productionem terminatur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, quia persona secundum Boethium[^18] «est rationalis naturae individua substantia». Et quoniam illud solum dicitur proprie generari, ad quod terminatur generatio secundum rationem producendi: ideo persona generatur, non substantia vel essentia. Et ideo haec non recipitur: *essentia generatur*.

Et sic patent omnia obiecta ad utramque partem; procedunt enim[^19] diversis viis.

Patet etiam, quare in divinis non sequitur, quod, generata persona, generetur substantia, sicut in creaturis. Posset tamen aliter dici, quod non generetur commune nisi *in hoc*[^20]; et non tantum in creaturis hoc verum est, sed etiam in divinis. *Commune* autem ut *in hoc* non significatur in abstractione, sed in concretione; et ideo, quia hoc nomen *Deus* significat substantiam in concretione[^21], *Deus generatur* et *Deus generat Deum*. Quia vero *substantia* vel *essentia* significat in abstractione, ideo nec generat nec generatur; et ita procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas.

<!-- page 117 -->

english:
### Article II

*On the comparison of generation to essence in the account of term.*

Next, concerning the second article of this question — which is by the comparison of generation to essence in the account of term — two questions are asked.

*First*: whether substance or essence is begotten.

*Second*: whether through generation it is communicated.

### Question I

*Whether substance or essence is begotten.*

That substance is begotten is objected[^1] thus:

**1.** Generation in inferior beings is a motion to substance[^5]; what is motion, this belongs to imperfection; what is toward substance, this belongs to perfection; if therefore what belongs to perfection is to be transferred to the divine: therefore generation also is terminated at essence.

**2.** Likewise, generation in God is terminated: either, therefore, at substance, or at accident, since every being is substance or accident[^2][^6]; but in God it is not terminated at an accident, since none is there: therefore at substance. If you say that in God, although there is no accident, there is nevertheless relation, which is distinguished from substance, then it is argued thus: either generation will be terminated at substance, or at relation; but not at relation, since in *ad aliquid* (in relation to something) there is no origin per se, nor is production terminated[^7]: therefore it is terminated at substance: therefore substance is begotten.

**3.** Likewise, as the Philosopher says[^8]: «When we are moved, the things in us are moved, and when we are corrupted, the things in us are corrupted»; and this is so[^3][^4], because the universal has the same being as the singular: therefore, since substance is much more the same as the person — and substance is in the person — if the person is begotten, so also the substance.

**4.** Likewise, *to beget*, both in God and in creatures, is *to produce a likeness of itself*[^9]; but the likeness is not in the person, but in the substance and in the nature: therefore, since generation is terminated at the like insofar as it is like, therefore at the substance, according to which the likeness is observed.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Whatever is begotten is begotten by another, since nothing begets itself[^10]; but the divine substance does not have another, nor is there another in God: therefore it is not begotten.

**2.** Likewise, whatever is begotten has a *principle from which*[^11]; but everything that has a principle is principled; and principle and principled are distinguished: if therefore substance is begotten, it is distinguished — either from substance or from a person; but both are impossible: therefore, etc.

**3.** Likewise, whatever is begotten is from the substance of the begetter[^12]; if therefore substance is begotten, the substance or essence is from the substance of the begetter; but there is altogether only one substance: therefore the same thing is from itself, which is impossible.

**4.** Likewise, generation is production[^13]; but production is a kind of action, and every action of a creature is terminated at singulars[^14]: therefore, since generation is a kind of action, in God it will be terminated at the singular or supposit; but such is not substance: therefore it will not be terminated at it.

### Conclusion

> *Since in God generation is terminated only at the first substance, which is a person, not at second substance or essence, it is by no means received that substance is begotten.*

**I respond:** It must be said that generation, by its common account, is terminated at substance. But it should be noted that *substance* is said in two ways[^15]: *first*, that which is the individual and hypostasis or person; and *second*, that which is the common. I say therefore that one can speak of the term of generation in two ways: either as to *production*, or as to *intention*. As to production, since it concerns the singular, it is terminated at first substance, and[^16] as to intention at the common nature, because the nature producing this man intends to give him the common form.

But since in creatures the common form is numbered in supposits, therefore in them the common form is produced and corrupted; and therefore in creatures generation, not only according to intention but also according to production, is terminated at common substance; and so the universal is begotten in the singular, because it is numbered[^17]. But since in God substance is not numbered, nor does a new being come to it, therefore generation according to production is terminated only at first substance, which is the person, because a person, according to Boethius[^18], «is the individual substance of a rational nature». And since that alone is properly said to be begotten at which generation is terminated according to the account of producing, therefore the person is begotten, not the substance or essence. And therefore this is not received: *essence is begotten*.

And thus all the objections on either side are clear; for they proceed[^19] by different ways.

It is also clear why in God it does not follow that, when the person is begotten, the substance is begotten, as in creatures. Yet it could be put another way: that the common is not begotten except *in this* (i.e. in the singular)[^20]; and this is true not only in creatures, but also in God. *The common*, however, as *in this* is signified not in abstraction, but in concretion; and therefore, since this name *God* signifies substance in concretion[^21], *God is begotten* and *God begets God*. But because *substance* or *essence* signifies in abstraction, therefore it neither begets nor is begotten; and thus the arguments proceed to the opposite parts.

en: Supply: *casus* (a case [is fallen]). — A little below, several codd. (A C F G H K L O R S V X etc.) with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read *videt me* in place of *video me*, but not well.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds *etiam*. Cod. H reads *quia* in place of *quae*.

la: Vat. ponit *quod* loco *quia* et omittit *de*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition puts *quod* in place of *quia* and omits *de*, but against the mss. and ed. 1.

la: Cod. H *ostenditur*.

en: Cod. H reads *ostenditur*.

la: Propositio haec quoad sensum invenitur in Aristot., V *Phys.* text. 7 (c. 1): *Quae (mutatio) vero ex non esse simpliciter in substantiam est, generatio simpliciter est*. Cfr. etiam I *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 11–18 (c. 3).

en: This proposition, as to its sense, is found in Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 7 (c. 1): «Change which is from non-being absolutely into substance is generation absolutely». Cf. also *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 11–18 (c. 3).

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Complexis* et *de Substantia*; I *Phys.* text. 26–30 (c. 3); V *Metaph.* text. 13 seqq. (IV, c. 7).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* c. *On Complex Terms* and *On Substance*; *Physics* I, text 26–30 (c. 3); *Metaphysics* V, text 13 ff. (IV, c. 7).

la: Aristot., V *Phys.* text. 10 (c. 2): *Neque etiam in ad aliquid (est motus)*. — Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut A I T bb *arguetur* loco *arguitur*. In fine argumenti post *substantiam* cod. I addit *sed illud, ad quod terminatur generatio, illud generatur*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 10 (c. 2): «Nor again is there [motion] in *ad aliquid* (in relation)». — A little before, some codd. (A I T bb) read *arguetur* in place of *arguitur*. At the end of the argument, after *substantiam*, cod. I adds: *but that at which generation is terminated, that is generated*.

la: Aristot., II *Topic.* c. 3 (c. 7), in quo textu mss. cum sex primis edd. *moventibus* pro *motis* (κινουμένων); idem recurrit infra d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 et d. 37, p. II, a. 1, obiect. 3. Alteram propositionis partem invenies in Aristot., *de Longit. et Brevit. Vitae* c. 2 his verbis: *Corruptis* (φθειρομένων) *enim animalibus, corrumpuntur et scientia et sanitas, quae in animalibus*. — Rationem huic propositioni additam innuit Arist., II *Topic.* loc. cit. et fusius probat VII *Metaph.* text. 35 et 45 seqq. (VI, 10 et 13). Post *corrumpuntur* codd. V X addunt *omnia* et cod. K post *idem esse* adiungit *et eandem essentiam*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7), where the text of the mss. with the first six editions reads *moventibus* in place of *motis* (κινουμένων); the same recurs below at d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3, and d. 37, p. II, a. 1, obj. 3. The other part of the proposition you will find in Aristotle, *On Length and Shortness of Life* c. 2, with these words: «For when animals are corrupted (φθειρομένων), the knowledge and the health that are in animals are also corrupted». — The reason added to this proposition Aristotle hints at in *Topics* II, loc. cit., and more fully proves in *Metaphysics* VII, text 35 and 45 ff. (VI, 10 and 13). After *corrumpuntur*, codd. V X add *omnia*, and cod. K after *idem esse* appends *et eandem essentiam*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II *de Anima*, text. 34 (c. 4), ubi dicit, quod naturalissimum operum viventium est *facere quale ipsum*, id est generare; et text. 49: *Finis est generare quale ipsum*, id est simile. — Mox plerique codd. ut A C F G H I T etc. cum ed. 1 *ad similem* loco *ad simile* ac dein *similis* pro *simile*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 34 (c. 4), where he says that the most natural of the works of living things is *to make what is like itself* — that is, to generate; and text 49: «The end is to generate what is like itself» — that is, the like. — Shortly after, most codd. (A C F G H I T etc.) with ed. 1 read *ad similem* in place of *ad simile*, and then *similis* for *simile*.

la: Aristot., II *de Anima*, text. 47 (c. 4): *Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum*. — Paulo infra post *aliud* aliqui codd. ut A T V Z cc omittunt *est*, cuius loco cod. X ponit *a quo generetur*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 47 (c. 4): «But nothing generates its very self». — A little below, after *aliud*, some codd. (A T V Z cc) omit *est*; in its place cod. X puts *a quo generetur*.

la: Aristot., IV *Metaph.* text. 22 (ed. Venet. 1489), ubi secundum translationem arabico-latinam sic habetur: *Et si generetur, necesse est, ut habeat esse illud ex quo generatur, illud quod ex eo generatur, et illud per quod generatur*. Iuxta ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot) III, c. 5: *Si fit, necesse est esse, ex quo fit, et a quo generatur*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 22 (Venice ed. 1489), where according to the Arabic-Latin translation it reads thus: «And if it is generated, it is necessary that there be that from which it is generated, that which is generated from it, and that through which it is generated». According to the Paris edition (Firmin-Didot) III, c. 5: «If it comes to be, it is necessary that there be that from which it comes to be and that by which it is generated».

la: Cfr. Aristot., II *de Anima*, text. 34–50 (c. 4), ubi de nutritione et generatione agit. — Circa finem argumenti post *una* Vat. minus bene omittit *omnino* et post *idem* omittit *est*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 34–50 (c. 4), where he treats of nutrition and generation. — Near the end of the argument, after *una* the Vatican edition less well omits *omnino*, and after *idem* omits *est*, but against the mss. and ed. 1.

la: Sub hoc respectu Aristot., II *de Anima*, text. 34 (c. 4) actum generandi viventis definiens ait: *est facere quale ipsum*.

en: In this respect Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 34 (c. 4), defining the act of generating of the living, says: «it is to make what is like itself».

la: De termino actionis ait Aristot., I *Metaph.* c. 1: *Actiones autem ac generationes omnes circa singulare sunt*. — In fine argumenti aliqui codd. ut A I T cum ed. 1 *terminatur* loco *terminabitur*.

en: On the term of an action Aristotle says, *Metaphysics* I, c. 1: «But all actions and generations are concerned with the singular». — At the end of the argument, some codd. (A I T) with ed. 1 read *terminatur* in place of *terminabitur*.

la: Vide Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia*.

en: See Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On Substance*.

la: Codd. omittunt *vero* a Vat. post *quantum* additum, cuius loco voci *quantum* praemittunt plures codd. ut A F G I K S T V X Z, quos sequimur, particulam *et*, alii ut H P Q Y *sed*. Paulo infra fide mss. et ed. 1 post *quia* expunximus *haec*.

en: The codices omit *vero* (added by the Vatican edition after *quantum*); in its place, several codd. (A F G I K S T V X Z), which we follow, prefix the particle *et* to *quantum*, others (H P Q Y) prefix *sed*. A little below, on the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, after *quia* we have expunged *haec*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII *Metaph.* text. 28 (VI, c. 8).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8).

la: Libr. *de Persona et duabus naturis* c. 3 in initio (ed. Migne). — Immediate post Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Sed quia* loco *Et quoniam*. — De termino generationis cfr. Aristot., VII *Metaph.* text. 26 seqq. (VI, c. 8).

en: Book *On the Person and the Two Natures* c. 3 at the beginning (Migne edition). — Immediately after, the Vatican edition against the mss. and ed. 1 reads *Sed quia* in place of *Et quoniam*. — On the term of generation, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 26 ff. (VI, c. 8).

la: Fide mss. expunximus hic a Vat. additum *de*.

en: On the witness of the mss. we have here expunged *de*, which had been added by the Vatican edition.

la: Hoc est, in individuo sive supposito. De quo cfr. Aristot., VII *Metaph.* loc. cit. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. *ut in hoc*.

en: That is, in the individual or supposit. On which cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, loc. cit. — The Vatican edition, against the witness of the mss., reads *ut in hoc*.

la: Vat. incongrue et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit *ideo in concretione*.

en: The Vatican edition, incongruously and against the older codd. and ed. 1, adds *ideo in concretione*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec conclusio est iterum contra abbatem Ioachim (cfr. Schol. hic a. 1, q. 1). Ut recte intelligatur conclusio, notandum, quod non est sermo de subiecto generationis, quod in generatione creaturarum est materia prima, quae praesupponitur generationi, sed de termino generationis, qui incipit esse.

Perfecta generatio terminatur ad substantiam, non ad accidens; sed S. Doctor cum communi sententia distinguit duplicem substantiam: altera dicitur *substantia prima*, quae est omne individuum in genere substantiae; altera vero *secunda*, quae est aliquid «commune» in genere substantiae. *Substantia prima* est terminus totalis generationis quantum ad productionem; *substantia* vero *secunda* est terminus formalis (at partialis) quantum ad intentionem. In creaturis uterque terminus incipit esse de novo, non vero in Deo. «Unde generatio divina terminatur ad primam substantiam, non ad essentiam, neque ad relationem, in quantum est relatio, sed in quantum est persona subsistens». Ita hic Richard. a Med.

**II.** In conclusione et principalibus argumentis doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3; *Summa* I, q. 39, a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 *princ.* q. 2 *secundae quaest.* — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This conclusion is again against Abbot Joachim (cf. the Scholion here a. 1, q. 1). For the conclusion to be rightly understood, it should be noted that we are not speaking of the *subject* of generation, which in the generation of creatures is prime matter (which is presupposed to generation), but of the *term* of generation, which begins to be.

Perfect generation is terminated at substance, not at accident; but the Holy Doctor, with the common opinion, distinguishes a twofold substance: one is called *first substance*, which is every individual in the genus of substance; and the other *second*, which is something «common» in the genus of substance. *First substance* is the *total* term of generation as to production; *second substance* is the formal (but partial) term as to intention. In creatures both terms begin to be anew; in God, however, this is not so. «Hence divine generation is terminated at first substance, not at the essence, nor at the relation insofar as it is a relation, but insofar as it is a subsisting person». So Richard of Middleton here.

**II.** On the conclusion and the principal arguments the doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 3; *Summa* I, q. 39, a. 5. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 *princ.* q. 2 of the second question. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

---