title: Dist. 40, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether election is in God from eternity or from time

source_text:
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### Articulus III.
#### *De divina electione.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum[^1] articulum quaeritur de divina electione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum electio sit in Deo aeternaliter, vel ex tempore.

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit electio secundum rem.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum electio sit in Deo ab aeterno, an ex tempore.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem electio in Deo sit aeternaliter, ostenditur:

1. Primo *auctoritate* Apostoli ad Ephesios primo[^2]: *Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati coram ipso.*

2. Item, Ioannis decimo tertio[^3]: *Ego scio, quos elegerim*; sed omnes elegerat temporaliter, qui erant eius discipuli: ergo est alia electio in Deo quam temporalis.

3. Item, quod electio sit in Deo, videtur per *rationem*, quia omnis agens discrete et ordinate, est agens per electionem[^4]: sed Deus est huiusmodi: ergo in Deo est ponere electionem.

4. Item, quod ab aeterno videtur, quia omnis dilectio, quae est specialiter aliquorum, non tantum est dilectio, sed etiam electio[^5]; sed praedestinatio Dei non est omnium hominum, sed solum salvandorum, et praedestinatio non est sine dilectione, ergo neque sine electione; sed illa ab aeterno: ergo et ista.

**Sed contra:**

1. Damascenus[^6]: «*Electio non cadit in Deum, quia divina natura non est possibilis ad ignorantiam*».

2. Item, eligere est alterum alteri praeoptare; sed Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri[^7]: ergo videtur, quod electio non sit in Deo.

3. Item, videtur quod solum sit in Deo temporaliter — electio enim non esset, si homo non perstitisset, ergo videtur, quod lapsus hominis faciat ad electionem — sed temporale non facit ad esse aeterni[^8]: ergo electio non est aeterna, sed temporalis.

4. Item, electio est *dissimiliter entium*[^9]; sed omnia in Deo aeternaliter sunt unum et similiter: ergo electio est rerum existentium in proprio genere. Sed in proprio genere non sunt nisi ex tempore: ergo nec electio.

5. Item, electio est praeoptatio; sed Deus nihil praeoptat alii quantum ad intensionem affectus[^10]: ergo solum quantum ad excellentiam effectus. Sed effectum non est ponere nisi ex tempore: ergo etc.

6. Item, in plus est vocatio quam electio. Multi enim sunt vocati, pauci vero electi, Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^11]; sed vocatio est temporalis: ergo videtur similiter quod electio.

Quaeritur ergo, cum vocatio sit temporalis, praedestinatio vero aeterna, unde hoc est, quod electio et temporalis est et aeterna.

### Conclusio.

> *Electio, sed non deliberativa, ab aeterno est in Deo, cuius manifestatio est electio temporalis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod electio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout dicit dilectionem cum discretione solum, alio modo, prout dicit dilectionem cum discretione praecedente et deliberatione et inquisitione. Et primo modo est in Deo, secundo modo in creatura, in qua cadere potest ignorantia; et hoc secundo modo loquitur Damascenus.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas Dei et dilectio est sine discretione; dicendum, quod est voluntas antecedens et consequens: antecedens, qua vult quantum in se est, consequens, qua vult cum praescientia nostrae salutis; et prima quidem est omnium, secunda vero non[^12]. Secundum hunc modum est dilectio duplex: una, quae respicit voluntatem antecedentem, et hac diligit omnes; est et alia, quae respicit consequentem, et hac diligit omnes salvandos, et haec est electio.

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*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio non esset, nisi homo peccasset; dicendum, quod est electio, qua eligitur et separatur bonus a malo, et est electio, qua separatur melior a minus bono. Haec secunda esset, si homo non peccasset; prima autem non esset, si homo non peccasset, non quia lapsus aliquid faciat ad rationem eligendi, sed praevisio lapsus; et quamvis lapsus hominis fuerit temporalis, praevisio tamen eius fuit aeterna.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio est dissimiliter entium; dicendum, quod sicut dilectio duplex est: quaedam, quae oritur ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, quaedam, quae est principium bonitatis; sic *electio* duplex est: quaedam quae causatur a diversitate et praeeminentia eligibilium, et haec consequitur eligibilia, ut electio humana; quaedam, quae est *ratio* diversitatis in eligendo, ut divina, et haec est dissimilium, non quae sunt, sed quae futura sunt. Et talis praecedit et est aeterna; nisi enim esset divina electio, omnes essemus reprobi et mali. Et sic patet illud.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio est praeoptatio; dicendum, quod praeoptatio ratione maioritatis effectus potest esse dupliciter: aut per modum approbationis[^13], aut per modum dispositionis et praeordinationis. Per modum approbationis ponit effectum in actu, per modum praeordinationis et dispositionis ponit in potentia tantum; et sicut dispositio est aeterna, ita et praeoptatio.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de vocatione, quod solum est temporalis; dicendum, quod vocatio dicit actum ut exteriorem, electio dicit actum ut interiorem, praedestinatio dicit actum ut anteriorem. Quoniam igitur actus ut exterior connotat effectum ut exteriorem, ideo vocatio solum est temporalis. Rursus quoniam actus ut anterior non habet rationem initiandi, ideo praedestinatio est solum aeterna. Sed quoniam actus interior per manifestationem fit exterior, hinc est, quod electio et dilectio[^14] est aeterna et temporalis.

Quod ergo obiicitur de vocatione, quod in plus est, ergo prior; dicendum, quod prior est secundum rationem intelligendi tanquam communior, sed non quantum ad ordinem durandi; non enim est superius essentiale, sed effectus[^15] consequens. Et sic patent omnia.

english:
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### Article III.
#### *On divine election.*

Consequently, as regards the second[^1] article, inquiry is made concerning divine election. And on this two questions are asked.

First, it is asked whether election is in God eternally, or from time.

Second, it is asked what election is according to the thing.

### Question I.
#### *Whether election is in God from eternity, or from time.*

That election is in God eternally is shown:

1. *First, by authority*, [from] the Apostle to the Ephesians 1[^2]: "*He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in his sight.*"

2. Likewise, John 13[^3]: "*I know whom I have chosen*"; but he had chosen all temporally who were his disciples: therefore there is in God another election than the temporal.

3. Likewise, that election is in God is shown by *reason*, since every agent [acting] discretely and orderedly is an agent through election[^4]: but God is of this kind: therefore in God election is to be posited.

4. Likewise, that [election is] from eternity is shown thus, since every love that is specifically of certain ones is not only love but also election[^5]; but the predestination of God is not of all men, but only of those to be saved, and predestination is not without love, therefore neither without election; but that [predestination] is from eternity: therefore so is this [election].

**On the contrary:**

1. Damascene[^6]: "*Election does not fall in God, since the divine nature is not possible-of-ignorance.*"

2. Likewise, to elect is to prefer one to another; but God wills all men to be saved[^7]: therefore it seems that election is not in God.

3. Likewise, it seems that [election] is in God only temporally — for there would be no election if man had not fallen, therefore it seems that the fall of man contributes to election — but the temporal does not contribute to the being of the eternal[^8]: therefore election is not eternal but temporal.

4. Likewise, election is *of dissimilar beings*[^9]; but all things in God eternally are one and alike: therefore election is of things existing in their proper genus. But in their proper genus they are not except from time: therefore neither is election.

5. Likewise, election is preferential-choosing; but God prefers nothing to another by way of intensity of affection[^10]: therefore [he prefers] only by way of excellence of effect. But effect is not to be posited except from time: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, calling is wider than election. For *many are called, but few are chosen*, Matthew 22[^11]; but calling is temporal: therefore it seems likewise that [so is] election.

It is asked therefore, since calling is temporal, but predestination eternal, whence is it that election is both temporal and eternal.

### Conclusion.

> *Election — but not deliberative — is in God from eternity, of which [election] the manifestation is temporal election.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *election* is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it expresses love with discretion alone; in another way, insofar as it expresses love with preceding discretion and deliberation and inquiry. And in the first way it is in God; in the second way in the creature, in whom ignorance can occur; and in this second way Damascene speaks.

**To the arguments:**

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that the will of God and [his] love is without discretion; it must be said that there is an antecedent will and a consequent: the antecedent, by which he wills [salvation] insofar as it is in itself; the consequent, by which he wills with foreknowledge of our salvation; and the first indeed [regards] all, but the second not[^12]. According to this mode, love is twofold: one which regards the antecedent will, and by this he loves all; there is also another, which regards the consequent, and by this he loves all those to be saved, and this is election.

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*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that there would be no election if man had not sinned; it must be said that there is an election by which the good is chosen and separated from the bad, and there is an election by which the better is separated from the less good. This second [election] would have been even if man had not sinned; the first however would not have been if man had not sinned — not because the fall does anything to the *ratio* of choosing, but the foresight of the fall [does]; and although the fall of man was temporal, the foresight of it was nevertheless eternal.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that election is *of dissimilar beings*; it must be said that just as love is twofold — one which arises from consideration of the divine goodness, and one which is the principle of goodness — so *election* is twofold: one which is caused by the diversity and pre-eminence of the things to be chosen, and this follows the things to be chosen, as human election; another which is the *ratio* of diversity in choosing, as the divine [election], and this is of dissimilar things — not of those which are, but of those which will be. And such [election] precedes and is eternal; for unless there were divine election, all of us would be reprobate and evil. And so that [argument] is plain.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected, that election is preferential-choosing; it must be said that preferential-choosing, by reason of the greater [efficacy of its] effect, can be of two kinds: either by way of approbation[^13], or by way of disposition and pre-ordination. By way of approbation it places the effect in act; by way of pre-ordination and disposition it places [it] in potency only; and just as disposition is eternal, so also is preferential-choosing.

*Ad 6.* To that which is objected concerning calling, that it is only temporal; it must be said that calling expresses the act *as exterior*, election expresses the act *as interior*, predestination expresses the act *as prior*. Since therefore the act *as exterior* connotes the effect *as exterior*, hence calling is only temporal. Again, since the act *as prior* does not have the *ratio* of initiating, hence predestination is solely eternal. But since the interior act through manifestation becomes exterior, hence it is that election and love[^14] are both eternal and temporal.

As to what is therefore objected concerning calling, that it is wider, therefore prior; it must be said that it is prior according to the *ratio* of understanding, as more common, but not as regards the order of duration; for it is not an essential superior, but a consequent effect[^15]. And so all [the arguments] are plain.

la: Cum art. I. divisus sit in duos (pag. 701, col. II.), nos inscripsimus, ut aliae edd., hic art. III.

en: Since article I is divided into two (p. 701, col. II), we have inscribed [it], like the other editions, here as art. III.

la: Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata: *Elegit nos in ipso*; et infra pro *coram ipso* (Ambros. in hunc locum *coram eo*) Vulg. *in conspectu eius*.

en: Verse 4, where the Vulgate [reads]: *Elegit nos in ipso* ("He chose us in him"); and below in place of *coram ipso* ("before him") (Ambrose at this passage [reads] *coram eo*) the Vulgate [reads] *in conspectu eius* ("in his sight").

la: Vers. 18. — Pro *Item* Vat. sola substituit *Contra*, et dein post *ergo* interiicit *non*; perperam, quia, hac lectione recepta, argumentatio Doctoris disturbatur et ad irritum redigitur.

en: Verse 18. — In place of *Item* the Vatican [edition] alone substitutes *Contra*, and then after *ergo* inserts *non*; wrongly, for, this reading being accepted, the Doctor's argumentation is disturbed and brought to nothing.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 600, nota 2. Cfr. etiam Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 2, et I. *Magnor. Moralium*, c. 16. (c. 17.), ubi agitur de *prohaeresi* (περὶ προαιρέσεως), quod verbum Graecum (προαίρεσις) in antiquis versionibus Latinis modo redditur voce *electio* (sic loc. cit. *Ethic.*), modo voce *propositum* (sic loc. cit. *Magn. Moral.*); in ed. recentiore Paris. (Firmin-Didot) verbum προαίρεσις constanter vertitur *consilium*.

en: Cf. above p. 600, note 2. Cf. also Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 2, and I *Magna Moralia*, c. 16 (c. 17), where the matter treated is *prohaeresis* (περὶ προαιρέσεως), which Greek word (προαίρεσις) in old Latin versions is rendered now by the word *electio* ("election") (so loc. cit. *Ethics*), now by the word *propositum* ("proposal") (so loc. cit. *Magn. Moral.*); in the more recent Paris edition (Firmin-Didot) the word προαίρεσις is constantly rendered *consilium* ("counsel").

la: De quo vide supra d. 10. dub. 1.

en: On which see above d. 10, dub. 1.

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22: *In Deo volendi quidem actum dicimus, non autem electionem proprie* (κυρίως) *sumtam. Deus quippe non deliberat, quia ignorantis est consilium inire.* — Quoad maiorem huius argumenti commemoramus verba Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 2: «*Nam electio cum ratione et cogitatione est, quod et nomen ipsum* (προαίρεσις) *significare videtur, quasi e quibusdam propositis unum aliquod legatur i. e. capiatur*». Cfr. etiam Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22.

en: Book II, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22: "*In God we say there is indeed an act of willing, but not election properly* (κυρίως) *taken. For God does not deliberate, since to enter on counsel is [a feature] of one who is ignorant.*" — As to the major of this argument, we recall the words of Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 2: "*For election is with reason and thought, which the very name* (προαίρεσις) *seems to signify, as it were, that out of certain proposed [things] some one is selected, i.e. taken*". Cf. also Damascene, II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22.

la: Epist. I. Tim. 2, 4: *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri etc.* — Quoad maiorem huius argumenti commemoramus verba Aristot. ut supra. — Quod et August. innuit *de Divers. Qq. ad Simplic.* I. q. 2. n. 4: *Quomodo est enim iusta aut qualiscumque omnino electio, ubi nulla distantia est?* Et ibid. n. 6: *Nemo enim eligitur nisi iam distans ab illo qui reiicitur.*

en: I Timothy 2:4: "*Who wills all men to be saved etc.*" — As to the major of this argument we recall Aristotle's words as above. — Which Augustine also intimates *On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus* I, q. 2, n. 4: "*For how is there a just election, or any election at all, where there is no distinction?*" And ibid., n. 6: "*For no one is chosen unless [he is] already distant from him who is rejected.*"

la: Vat. cum paucis mss. *aeternum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with a few manuscripts [reads] *aeternum* ("eternal" [acc.]).

la: Sive, ut aliis verbis utamur: sed Deus quantum ad affectus aequaliter se habet erga omnes homines.

en: Or, to use other words: but God, as regards affection, is related equally to all men.

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14 [Matthew 22:14: *multi enim sunt vocati, pauci vero electi*].

la: Ed. 1 interiicit *est solum*. Plura de hac distinctione voluntatis invenies infra d. 46.

en: Edition 1 inserts *est solum* ("is only"). More on this distinction of [the] will you will find below at d. 46.

la: Cfr. August., *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 17. n. 34. seqq.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 17, n. 34 ff.

la: Pro verbis *per modum approbationis* Vat. absque auctoritate codd. hic et paulo inferius exhibet *per modum appropriationis* simulque primo loco his verbis addit *sive operationis vel applicationis* i. e. quae effectum ponit in actu.

en: In place of the words *per modum approbationis* ("by way of approbation") the Vatican [edition], without manuscript authority, here and a little later exhibits *per modum appropriationis* ("by way of appropriation"), and at the same time in the first place adds to these words *sive operationis vel applicationis* ("or of operation or of application") — that is, that which places the effect in act.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur verba *et dilectio*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc the words *et dilectio* ("and love") are missing.

la: Pro *effectus*, quod clare legitur in codd. H R I aa et in ed. 1, Vat. *effectu*. Multi codd. sunt dubiae lectionis nec discerni potest, utrum *effectum* exhibeant, an *effectu*. — Huc referri potest quod August., *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 17. n. 34, de electis eorumque vocatione profert. Facta enim c. 16. n. 32. distinctione inter vocatos, qui, etsi vocati, noluerunt venire, et illos, qui etiam praedestinati et electi sunt, loc. cit. ait: *Electi sunt itaque ante mundi constitutionem ea praedestinatione, in qua Deus sua futura facta praescivit; electi sunt autem de mundo ea vocatione, qua Deus id quod praedestinavit, implevit.*

en: In place of *effectus*, which is clearly read in codices H R I aa and in edition 1, the Vatican [reads] *effectu*. Many codices are of doubtful reading, nor can it be discerned whether they exhibit *effectum* or *effectu*. — Here may be referred what Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 17, n. 34, brings forward concerning the elect and their calling. For having made, c. 16, n. 32, the distinction between those called, who, although called, were unwilling to come, and those who are also predestined and elect, loc. cit. he says: "*The elect are therefore [chosen] before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his own future deeds; but they are elected out of the world by that calling by which God fulfilled what he had predestined.*"

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quid sit electio et quomodo differat a *proposito* et a *praedestinatione*, explicatur in quaest. seq. ad 2. 3. et aliquatenus hic ad 6; sed diffusius a Richardo a Med., 1. *Sent.* d. 41. a. 1. q. 1, et a S. Thom. (1. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 1. a. 2.), ubi dicitur: «*Ipsa divina ordinatio, qua quidam aliis praeferuntur ad consequendam beatitudinem, electio dicitur*»; et ibi ad 1: «*Electio est, qua aliqui ex ordine suae sapientiae ordinantur ad finem beatitudinis; sed praedestinatio est, secundum quod praeparantur eis ea quae perducunt in finem*»; et ad 2: «*Electio praeexigit diversitatem naturae in divina cognitione et facit diversitatem gratiae, sicut dispositio diversitatem naturae facit*». — Distinctionem inter aeternam et temporalem electionem approbat S. Thom., 1. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 1. a. 1, qui etiam 2. opposit. eadem distinctione voluntatis antecedentis et consequentis solvit (*S.* I. q. 23. a. 4. ad 3.). De voluntate antecedente et consequente plura vide infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. — Solutio ad 3. sumta est ex Alexandro Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 30. m. I. ad 2; et consentit B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tr. 16. q. 66. q. incid. 4. Haec solutio favet iis, qui docent, quod in hypothesi supponente, Adam non peccasse, nulli fuissent nati reprobi; sed sententia communis cum S. Thoma (*S.* I. q. 100. a. 2.) contrarium tenet. — Ex verbis: «*Non quia lapsus aliquid faciat ad rationem eligendi, sed praevisio lapsus*», et ex solutione ad 4. videtur sequi, Seraphicum cum Angelico (*de Verit.* q. 6. a. 2. ad 9; *S.* I. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3.) supponere, secundum nostrum modum intelligendi efficacem electionem praedestinatorum a Deo factam esse post praevisum peccatum originale. Sed Scot. (III. *Sent.* d. 7. q. 3.) videtur sentire aliter et secundum suam sententiam, quod Christus incarnatus fuisset, etsi Adam non peccasset.

**II.** In solutione ad 2. docetur, quod electio discretiva ad voluntatem consequentem spectat, non ad antecedentem, de qua distinctione cfr. infra d. 46. q. 1. Valde autem notandum est, quod in solut. ad 4. dicitur de differentia inter dilectionem et electionem nostram, quae supponit bonitatem et praeeminentiam in dilectis et electis et inde causatur, et divinam dilectionem et electionem, quae econtra est causa bonitatis et diversitatis in dilectis et electis. Idem omnino docet S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 23. a. 4; et B. Albert. (*S.* p. I. tr. 16. q. 65. q. incid. 2.), qui dicit: «*In electione aeterna, quae nullo merito potuit praeveniri, Deus nihil respicit in nobis, sed in se ipso suae bonitatis tantum communicationem*». Et confirmatur Conc. Arausic. II. can. 12: «*Tales nos amat Deus, quales futuri sumus ipsius dono, non quales sumus nostro merito*» (cfr. infra d. 43. dub. 7.).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 1. a. 1, et q. 30. a. 1. — S. Thom., 1. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 1. a. 1; *S.* loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 17; de hac et seq. q. *S.* p. I. tr. 16. q. 63. — Petr. a Tar., 1. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., 1. *Sent.* d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. 1. *Sent.* d. 41. princ. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. 1. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., 1. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** What election is, and how it differs from *proposal* and from *predestination*, is explained in the following question, ad 2, 3, and somewhat here ad 6; but more diffusely by Richard of Middleton, 1. *Sent.* d. 41, a. 1, q. 1, and by St. Thomas (1. *Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 2), where it is said: "*That divine ordination by which some are preferred to others for the attaining of beatitude is called election*"; and there ad 1: "*Election is that by which some, from the order of his wisdom, are ordered to the end of beatitude; but predestination is according as there are prepared for them those things which lead to the end*"; and ad 2: "*Election presupposes diversity of nature in divine cognition and makes diversity of grace, just as disposition makes diversity of nature*". — The distinction between eternal and temporal election is approved by St. Thomas, 1. *Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, who also in the second [argument] of the contrary side resolves [the matter] with the same distinction of antecedent and consequent will (*S.* I, q. 23, a. 4, ad 3). On the antecedent and consequent will see further below at d. 46, a. 1, q. 1. — The solution ad 3 is taken from Alexander of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 30, m. I, ad 2; and B. Albert agrees, *S.* p. I, tr. 16, q. 66, q. incid. 4. This solution favors those who teach that, on the hypothesis supposing that Adam had not sinned, none would have been born reprobate; but the common opinion with St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 100, a. 2) holds the contrary. — From the words: "*Not because the fall does anything to the *ratio* of choosing, but the foresight of the fall*", and from the solution ad 4, it seems to follow that the Seraphic [Doctor], with the Angelic (*de Verit.* q. 6, a. 2, ad 9; *S.* I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3), supposes — according to our mode of understanding — the efficacious election of the predestined made by God to be after the foreseen original sin. But Scotus (III *Sent.* d. 7, q. 3) seems to think otherwise and, according to his opinion, [holds] that Christ would have been incarnated even if Adam had not sinned.

**II.** In the solution ad 2 it is taught that discretive election pertains to the consequent will, not to the antecedent — concerning which distinction cf. below at d. 46, q. 1. But it must be very much noted that in the solution ad 4 it is said concerning the difference between *our* love and election — which presupposes goodness and pre-eminence in the things loved and chosen, and is caused thence — and divine love and election, which on the contrary is the cause of goodness and diversity in the things loved and chosen. The same is taught entirely by St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 23, a. 4; and by B. Albert (*S.* p. I, tr. 16, q. 65, q. incid. 2), who says: "*In eternal election, which could be preceded by no merit, God regards nothing in us, but only in himself the communication of his goodness*". And it is confirmed by the Council of Orange II, can. 12: "*God loves us such as we shall be by his gift, not such as we are by our own merit*" (cf. below d. 43, dub. 7).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 1, a. 1, and q. 30, a. 1. — St. Thomas, 1. *Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 1; *S.* loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 17; on this and the following question, *S.* p. I, tr. 16, q. 63. — Petr. a Tar., 1. *Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., 1. *Sent.* d. 41, a. 1, q. 1. — Aegid. R., on this and the following question, 1. *Sent.* d. 41, princ. 1, q. 1, 2. — Durand., on this and the following question, 1. *Sent.* d. 41, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., 1. *Sent.* d. 41, q. 2.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 40, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum electio sit idem quod praedestinatio.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit electio, et quod sit idem quod praedestinatio, videtur.

1. *Magister* dicit in littera[^1]: «*Cum autem praedestinatio sit electio, qua Deus elegit quos voluit, ante mundi constitutionem*»: ergo etc.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia omnis praedestinatus est electus, et omnis electus praedestinatus, ergo praedestinatio est electio, cum per se praedicentur ad invicem[^2].

3. Item, quorum opposita sunt eadem, ipsa sunt eadem[^3]; sed oppositum electionis est reprobatio, et haec est oppositum praedestinationis: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Quaecumque sunt diversorum, ipsa sunt diversa; sed praedestinatio est solum bonorum, electio vero omnium salvandorum et aliquorum damnandorum: ergo etc. Probatio minoris habetur Ioannis sexto[^4]: *Nonne duodecim vos elegi, et unus ex vobis diabolus est?* Si tu dicas, quod illud intelligitur de electione temporali; contra: electio temporalis signum est aeternae: aut ergo concordant, aut est signum falsum.

2. Item, si nunquam esset aliquis malus, esset praedestinatio, sed non esset electio; secundum hoc ergo aliud obiectum respicit electio, aliud praedestinatio: ergo non sunt omnino idem.

3. Item, agens secundum propositum dicitur agens per electionem[^5], et non dicitur agere secundum praedestinationem: ergo differt praedestinatio et electio.

Quaeritur ergo, quae sit *differentia*, et *quod sit prius secundum rationem intelligendi*.

### Conclusio.

> *Electio secundum affectionem dilectionis idem est quod praedestinatio, electio vero secundum effectum finalis gratificationis est signum praedestinationis infallibile.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod electio tripliciter dicitur. Est enim electio secundum *affectum dilectionis*, et secundum *effectum finalis gratificationis*, et secundum *statum praelationis*. Prima est aeterna et est idem quod praedestinatio; secunda est temporalis et signum primae infallibile; tertia similiter temporalis, nec est effectus nec signum aeternae electionis. Multi enim praeficiuntur mali et reprobi; et utinam non sint plures mali quam boni!

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de verbo Domini, Ioannis sexto, dicendum, quod intelligitur de *electione praelationis*, et haec non est tantum bonorum nec omnium bonorum; et ideo vere patet, quod non est idem quod praedestinatio. — Et quod obiicitur, quod est signum; dicendum, quod non est signum certum, nec Dominus dat pro signo, et stultus est, qui huic signo credit. Sed electio secundum effectum finalis gratificationis, haec est signum certum simpliciter, sed non est certum nobis. Et haec differt a vocatione, quia multis datur gratia, qui non perseverant; ideo dicuntur vocati, sed non electi; et de his dicitur Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^6]: *Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi.*

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio respicit malum, et convenit omni agenti a proposito, non sic praedestinatio; notandum, quod in Deo idem sunt propositum, praedestinatio et electio secundum rem, tamen differunt secundum rationem intelligendi. Nam *propositum* simpliciter dicit voluntatem faciendi aliquid. Ille enim dicitur proponere, qui firmiter vult facere aliquid. *Electio* vero et *praedestinatio* addunt supra conceptionem[^7], sed differenter, quia praedestinatio addit ordinem et directionem in finem, sed electio discretionem sive separationem a suo opposito. Unde *propositum* dicit firmam voluntatis[^8] conceptionem, *praedestinatio* cum conceptione dicit praeordinationem, et *electio* quandam discretionem. Secundum hoc igitur patet, quod propositum est prius secundum rationem intelligendi, et deinde electio, quia prius est intelligendum aliquid separari a malo sive a *massa*[^9], quam dirigi in finem; et sic patet diversitas et ordo.

*Ad 3.* Et ex hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare agens a proposito non semper dicitur agens <!-- page 716 -->secundum praedestinationem, sicut secundum electionem; quia omnis agens a proposito deliberans alteram partem contradictionis praeaccipit, ideo omnis talis dicitur eligere; sed non omnis agens sic ordinat effectum in finem, sed ut plurimum se ipsum. Praedestinare autem est praeordinare alterum in finem, et hoc quidem competit Deo proprie; et ideo patet illud. Praedestinatio enim tria connotat, scilicet *praeordinatum*, et hic est homo; et *rationem praeordinandi*, et haec est gratia; et *rationem finis*, et haec est gloria: et sic sunt tria, scilicet *quod*, et *per quod*, et *ad quod*.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether election is the same as predestination.*

Secondly it is asked what election is, and that it is the same as predestination is shown.

1. The *Master* says in the text[^1]: «*Since predestination is the election by which God chose those whom he willed, before the foundation of the world*»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems by *reason*, because every predestined person is elect, and every elect person predestined; therefore predestination is election, since they are predicated of one another *per se*[^2].

3. Likewise, those whose opposites are the same are themselves the same[^3]; but the opposite of election is reprobation, and this is the opposite of predestination: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Whatever things belong to different subjects are themselves different; but predestination is only of the good, whereas election is of all those to be saved and of some to be damned: therefore etc. The proof of the minor is had in John six[^4]: *Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?* If you say that this is to be understood of temporal election; on the contrary: temporal election is a sign of the eternal: either then they agree, or it is a false sign.

2. Likewise, if there were never anyone evil, there would still be predestination, but there would not be election; according to this, then, election regards one object, and predestination another: therefore they are not entirely the same.

3. Likewise, an agent acting from purpose is called an agent through election[^5], and is not said to act according to predestination: therefore predestination and election differ.

It is asked therefore what is the *difference*, and *what is prior according to the order of understanding*.

### Conclusion.

> *Election according to the affection of love is the same as predestination; election according to the effect of final glorification is an infallible sign of predestination.*

**I respond:** It must be said that election is spoken of in three ways. For there is election according to the *affect of love*, and according to the *effect of final glorification*, and according to the *state of pre-eminence*. The first is eternal and is the same as predestination; the second is temporal and an infallible sign of the first; the third likewise is temporal, and is neither an effect nor a sign of eternal election. For many evil and reprobate are set in pre-eminence; and would that there were not more evil than good!

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning the word of the Lord in John six, it must be said that it is to be understood of *election to pre-eminence*, and this is not only of the good, nor of all the good; and so it clearly appears that it is not the same as predestination. — And to that which is objected, that it is a sign; it must be said that it is not a certain sign, nor does the Lord give it as a sign, and foolish is he who trusts in this sign. But election according to the effect of final glorification — this is a sign certain absolutely speaking, but it is not certain to us. And this differs from vocation, because grace is given to many who do not persevere; therefore they are called *vocati* (called) but not *electi* (elect); and of these it is said in Matthew twenty-two[^6]: *Many are called, but few are chosen.*

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that election regards evil and is fitting to every agent acting from purpose, but predestination does not; it is to be noted that in God *purpose*, *predestination*, and *election* are the same in reality, yet they differ according to the order of understanding. For *purpose* simply expresses the will of doing something. For he is said to purpose who firmly wills to do something. But *election* and *predestination* add upon the [will's] conception[^7], yet differently, because predestination adds order and direction toward an end, while election adds discretion or separation from its opposite. Hence *purpose* expresses a firm conception of the will[^8], *predestination* together with conception expresses pre-ordination, and *election* expresses a certain discretion. According to this, then, it is clear that purpose is prior in the order of understanding, and election follows, since it must first be understood that something is separated from evil or from the *mass*[^9], and then directed toward an end; and so the diversity and order are clear.

*To 3.* And from this is clear what is asked last, namely why an agent from purpose is not always called acting <!-- page 716 -->according to predestination as he is according to election; because every agent who deliberates from purpose seizes upon one part of the contradiction beforehand, and therefore every such agent is said to elect; but not every such agent thus orders the effect toward an end, but for the most part toward himself. To predestine, however, is to pre-ordain another toward an end, and this properly belongs to God; and so the matter is clear. For predestination connotes three things, namely the *one pre-ordained*, and this is a human being; the *ground of pre-ordaining*, and this is grace; and the *ground of the end*, and this is glory: and so there are three, namely *that which*, *through which*, and *toward which*.

la: Cap. 2.

en: [Lombard, *Sent.* I,] d. 40, c. 2.

la: Argumentatio de concreto ad abstractum tunc tantum valet, quando concretum accipitur formaliter, scil. secundum formam, quam abstractum indicat, sicut in hoc argumento; nam praedestinatus ut praedestinatus est electus ut electus.

en: Argumentation from the concrete to the abstract is valid only when the concrete is taken formally, that is, according to the form which the abstract indicates, as in this argument; for the predestined as predestined is elect as elect.

la: Haec propositio sicut et maior seq. argumenti colligitur ex regulis, quas Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 13. de distinguendis aequivocis ab univocis profert.

en: This proposition, like the major of the following argument, is gathered from the rules which Aristotle sets forth in *Topics* I, c. 13, on distinguishing equivocal from univocal terms.

la: Vers. 71, ubi Vulgata: *Nonne ego vos* etc. — Paulo superius pro *electio vero* plurimi codd. *ei*; ac subinde pro *et aliquorum damnandorum* nonnulli codd. ut V aa bb cc *electio autem aliquorum damnandorum*, et codd. IVX *et electio aliquorum damnandorum*. Nostram lectionem sumsimus ex cod. T et ed. 1, quacum et Vat. convenit, nisi quod omittat *omnium*.

en: Verse 71, where the Vulgate has: *Have not I* (*Nonne ego vos*) etc. — Slightly above, for *electio vero* most codices have *ei*; and further on, for *et aliquorum damnandorum* some codices, namely V aa bb cc, have *electio autem aliquorum damnandorum*, and codices IVX have *et electio aliquorum damnandorum*. We have taken our reading from codex T and the first edition, with which the Vatican edition also agrees, except that it omits *omnium*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 714, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 714, note 3.

en: Verse 14.

la: In cod. O additur *sive dispositio*.

en: In codex O there is added *or disposition*.

la: Supple cum Vat. *voluntatis*.

en: Supply with the Vatican edition *voluntatis* (of the will).

la: Respiciuntur verba August., *Enchir.* c. 99. n. 25: *Sola enim gratia redemptos discernit a perditis, quos in unam perditionis concreverat massam ab origine ducta causa communis.* Cfr. et I. *ad Simplic.* q. 2. n. 17. seqq.; in qua quaestione multa invenies de his quae hic a S. Doctore tractantur. — Vat. suo nomine vocem *massa* mutavit in *malitia*. Paulo superius post *deinde electio* cod. Y interiicit *et deinde praedestinatio*.

en: The words of Augustine are referred to, *Enchiridion* c. 99, n. 25: *For grace alone distinguishes the redeemed from the lost, whom one common cause, drawn from origin, had merged into a single mass of perdition.* Cf. also *I ad Simplicianum* q. 2, n. 17ff., in which question one will find much concerning the matters here treated by the holy Doctor. — The Vatican edition on its own authority changed the word *massa* into *malitia*. Slightly above, after *deinde electio*, codex Y inserts *et deinde praedestinatio*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In responsione dicitur, quod electio secundum *affectionem dilectionis* «*idem est quod praedestinatio*»; hoc intelligendum est non secundum formalem rationem intelligendi, sed secundum rem; quod explicite declaratur hic in solut. ad 2. Consentit S. Thom. (*S.* 1. q. 23. a. 4.), ubi explicat, quod «*praedestinatio secundum rationem praesupponit electionem, et electio dilectionem*». — Quoad intentionem finis, quae tangitur in solutione ad ultimum, cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 28. dub. 4.

**II.** Auctores: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. I. a. 1, et q. 30. m. 4. — Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 41. q. I. a. I; *S.* I. q. 23. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 18. 19. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 41. q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 41. a. I. q. I.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the response it is said that election according to *the affection of love* «*is the same as predestination*»; this is to be understood not according to the formal order of understanding, but according to the thing; which is explicitly declared here in the reply to 2. S. Thomas agrees (*S.* 1. q. 23. a. 4.), where he explains that «*predestination according to its rational account presupposes election, and election presupposes love*». — As for the intention of the end, which is touched on in the reply to the last argument, cf. II. *Sent.* d. 28. dub. 4.

**II.** Authors: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. I. a. 1, and q. 30. m. 4. — Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 41. q. I. a. I; *S.* I. q. 23. a. 4. — B. Albert., here a. 18. 19. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 41. q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 41. a. I. q. I.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 40, Art. 4, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus IV.
#### *De reprobatione et specialiter de obduratione.*

Consequenter est quaestio de tertio articulo, scilicet de reprobatione. Et cum ea quae dicta sunt de praedestinatione aeterna, sint dicenda vel aptari possint reprobationi, quaeritur specialiter de obduratione, quae est eius connotatum, de qua duo quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum sit poena, an culpa.

Secundum, utrum obduratio sit a Deo.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum obduratio sit poena, an culpa.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem obduratio sit poena, ostenditur sic:

1. Super illud ad Romanos nono[^1]: *Cuius vult miseretur* etc., Glossa Augustini: «*Obduratio est nolle misereri*»: sed nolle misereri non est culpa, sed poena: ergo etc.

2. Item, ibidem[^2]: «*Miseretur secundum gratiam, quae gratis datur; obdurat autem secundum iudicium, quod meritis redditur*»; sed constat quod non redditur bonis meritis, ergo malis; sed quod malis meritis redditur est poena: ergo obduratio est poena.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia in hoc differt culpa et poena, quia culpa est affectio voluntaria, poena autem est affectio involuntaria; sed obduratio cordis est involuntaria, quia nullus vult dehabilitari sive obdurari: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut se habet excaecatio ad intellectum, sic obduratio ad affectum; sed excaecatio dicit poenam, non culpam: ergo et obduratio.

**Contra:**

1. Super illud ad Romanos secundo[^3]: *Secundum duritiam* etc., Glossa: «*Induratio est induratae mentis in malitia pertinacia, per quam fit homo impoenitens*»; sed hoc dicit culpam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*[^4]: «*Obduratio nihil aliud est quam Dei obviare mandatis*»; sed obviare mandatis dicit inobedientiam: sed «*peccatum*, ut dicit Ambrosius, *nihil aliud est quam praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum*»: ergo obduratio dicit peccatum.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia nulla poena temporalis, secundum quod huiusmodi, opponitur gratiae gratificanti; sed obduratio opponitur gratiae gratificanti et maxime gratiae finali: ergo obduratio non est poena, sed culpa.

4. Item, in hoc est differentia inter poenam et culpam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus[^5], «*poena est malum, quod patimur, culpa vero est malum, quod agimus*»; sed obdurationem unusquisque facit sibi sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Gratia et libero arbitrio*[^6]: «*Induravit Dominus Pharaonem iusto iudicio, sed ipse se libero arbitrio*». Et quod obduratio sit a nobis, patet: quia in *Psalmo* dissuadetur: *Nolite*, inquit, *obdurare corda vestra*: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Obduratio, ut dicit cor inhabile ad impressionem gratiae, est poena peccati; ut significat cor in peccato stabilitum, est dispositio praecedentis peccati; ut vero dicit cor rebelle, est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod obduratio in spiritibus est translative dicta ab obduratione in corporibus. In corporibus autem duritiam consequitur triplex proprietas, quamvis insit corpori per eandem naturam, non sic spiritui[^7]. *Durum* enim est inhabile ad suscipiendum, est stabile ad permanendum, est iterum forte ad rebellandum sive resistendum. Secundum hunc triplicem modum cor obdurari dicitur tripliciter. Primo modo dicitur cor obduratum ex hoc, quod est inhabile ad impressionem gratiae suscipiendam; et hoc modo sonat in passionem et est poena consequens culpam. Secundo modo dicitur cor obduratum, quod est in peccato stabilitum, quod scilicet est multum compactum ad amorem peccati; et hoc modo obduratio est peccatum cum dispositione sive dispositio peccati praecedentis. Tertio modo dicitur cor obduratum cor rebelle quod vult Deum et eius mandata et gratiam impugnare; et hoc modo est speciale peccati genus, scilicet peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

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**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Et secundum istum modum triplicem diversae auctoritates procedunt de obduratione, quae *bene* videntur sibi obviare: sed diversis viis procedunt secundum membra distinctionis praedictae. Concedendum est ergo, quod obduratio uno modo est poena; concedendum est nihilominus, quod aliis modis est culpa sive dispositio culpae.

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod poena gratiae non repugnat et etiam sonat in passionem; dicendum, quod triplex est poena. Est enim quaedam *poena inflicta*, quaedam *contracta*, quaedam *acta*. *Poena inflicta* simpliciter est passio et non repugnans[^8] gratiae, ut fames, sitis et aegritudo. *Poena contracta* est fomes et concupiscentia, et haec quidem passio est, et ideo poena, sed tamen inclinat ad actionem malam; et ideo gratiae repugnat non quantum ad substantiam, sed quantum ad inclinationem. *Poena acta* est sicut obduratio et gratiae expulsio, et haec quidem poena est, quia passio est; sed quia ex mala actione sive ex peccato est, et illud concomitatur inseparabiliter, ideo opponitur gratiae. Et ita patet, quod nihilominus est poena et passio; quamvis enim contingat per propriam actionem, nihilominus poena est, sicut patet in scabioso, qui in scalpendo se delectatur, sed postea sentit in carne ardorem.

### Scholion.

**1.** Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 29. m. 3. 4. 5.) enumerat et bene explicat tres effectus reprobationis, qui sunt *substractio gratiae*, *excaecatio*, *obduratio*. In solut. ad 3. tangitur a S. Doctore primum membrum huius divisionis, et bene distinguitur triplex *poena*; *excaecationis* autem mentio fit in 1. fundam. De poena eiusque ordine ad culpam cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 36. per totam. — Doctores in hac doctrina conveniunt, et Petr. a Tar. fere ad verbum sequitur nostrum Doctorem.

---

english:
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### Article IV.
#### *On reprobation, and especially on obduration.*

Next comes the question on the third article, namely on reprobation. And since the things which have been said about eternal predestination must be said, or can be applied, to reprobation, the inquiry is made specifically about obduration, which is its connoted attribute, and concerning which two things are asked.

The first is, whether it is punishment or fault.

The second, whether obduration is from God.

### Question I.
#### *Whether obduration is punishment or fault.*

That obduration is punishment is shown thus:

1. Upon that passage in Romans nine[^1]: *He has mercy on whom he wills* etc., the Gloss of Augustine: «*Obduration is to be unwilling to have mercy*»: but to be unwilling to have mercy is not fault, but punishment: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in the same place[^2]: «*He shows mercy according to grace, which is given gratuitously; but he hardens according to judgment, which is rendered to merits*»; but it is established that it is not rendered to good merits, therefore to bad ones; but that which is rendered to bad merits is punishment: therefore obduration is punishment.

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, because in this fault and punishment differ, that fault is a voluntary affection, but punishment is an involuntary affection; but obduration of the heart is involuntary, because no one wills to be disabled or hardened: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as blinding stands to the intellect, so obduration to the affection; but blinding signifies punishment, not fault: therefore obduration also.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that passage in Romans two[^3]: *According to your hardness* etc., the Gloss: «*Induration is the obstinacy of a hardened mind in malice, by which a man becomes impenitent*»; but this signifies fault: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^4]: «*Obduration is nothing else than God's standing in the way of the commandments*»; but to stand in the way of the commandments signifies disobedience: but «*sin*, as Ambrose says, *is nothing else than the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments*»: therefore obduration signifies sin.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears, because no temporal punishment, insofar as such, is opposed to gratifying grace; but obduration is opposed to gratifying grace, and most of all to final grace: therefore obduration is not punishment, but fault.

4. Likewise, in this is the difference between punishment and fault, that, as Augustine says[^5], «*punishment is the evil which we suffer, but fault is the evil which we do*»; but each one brings obduration upon himself, as Augustine says in the book *On Grace and Free Will*[^6]: «*The Lord hardened Pharaoh by a just judgment, but he himself by his own free will*». And that obduration is from us, is plain: because in the *Psalm* it is dissuaded: *Do not*, he says, *harden your hearts*: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Obduration, insofar as it signifies a heart unfit to receive the impress of grace, is the punishment of sin; insofar as it signifies a heart established in sin, it is the disposition of preceding sin; but insofar as it signifies a rebellious heart, it is sin against the Holy Spirit.*

**I respond:** It must be said that obduration in spirits is spoken of by transference from obduration in bodies. In bodies, however, hardness is followed by a threefold property, although it is in the body through the same nature, which is not the case in spirit[^7]. For *the hard* is unfit for receiving, is stable for remaining, and again is strong for rebelling or resisting. According to this threefold mode the heart is said to be hardened in three ways. In the first way the heart is called hardened from this, that it is unfit for receiving the impress of grace; and in this way it sounds as a passion and is punishment following fault. In the second way the heart is called hardened, when it is established in sin, namely when it is much compacted in love of sin; and in this way obduration is sin together with disposition, or the disposition of preceding sin. In the third way the heart is called hardened as a rebellious heart which wills to assail God and his commandments and grace; and in this way it is a special kind of sin, namely sin against the Holy Spirit.

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**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* And according to this threefold mode the various authorities proceed concerning obduration, and they seem *well* to oppose one another: but they proceed by different ways according to the members of the aforesaid distinction. It must therefore be conceded that obduration in one mode is punishment; it must nevertheless be conceded that in other modes it is fault, or the disposition of fault.

*To 3, 4.* To that, then, which is objected, that punishment is not repugnant to grace and also sounds as a passion; it must be said that punishment is threefold. For there is a certain *inflicted punishment*, a certain *contracted*, a certain *acted*. *Inflicted punishment*, simply, is passion and not repugnant[^8] to grace, such as hunger, thirst, and sickness. *Contracted punishment* is the tinder [of sin] and concupiscence, and this indeed is passion, and therefore punishment, but it nonetheless inclines to evil action; and therefore it is repugnant to grace, not as to substance, but as to inclination. *Acted punishment* is like obduration and the expulsion of grace, and this indeed is punishment, because it is passion; but because it is from evil action or from sin, and that accompanies it inseparably, therefore it is opposed to grace. And so it is plain that it is nonetheless punishment and passion; for although it comes about through one's own action, it is nonetheless punishment, as is plain in the man with scabies, who delights in scratching himself, but afterwards feels a burning in the flesh.

### Scholion.

**1.** Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 29. m. 3. 4. 5.) enumerates and well explains the three effects of reprobation, which are *withdrawal of grace*, *blinding*, *obduration*. In the solution to 3 the first member of this division is touched on by the Holy Doctor, and the threefold *punishment* is well distinguished; mention of *blinding* is made in the first fundament. Concerning punishment and its order to fault, cf. II. *Sent.* d. 36. throughout. — The Doctors agree in this teaching, and Petr. a Tar. follows our Doctor almost word for word.

---

la: Vers. 18.

la: Vide supra pag. 713, nota 4.

en: See above page 713, note 4.

la: Vers. 5. — Vat., neglecta auctoritate codd. et textus originalis, verba Glossae sic reddit: *Induratio est perseveratio mentis in malitia pertinaci, per quam* etc.

en: Verse 5 [Rom. 2:5]. — The Vatican edition, neglecting the authority of the codices and of the original text, renders the words of the Gloss thus: *Induration is the perseverance of the mind in pertinacious malice, through which* etc.

la: Melius legeretur *de Praedestinatione et gratia*, in quo libro, qui ceterum incerti auctoris est, c. 1. dicitur: *Quid enim aliud est duritia quam Dei obviare mandatis?* — Sequens textus, ex Ambrosio citatus, invenitur in eius libro *de Paradiso*, c. 8. n. 39.

en: It would be better read *On Predestination and Grace*, in which book — which is moreover of uncertain author — c. 1, it is said: *For what else is hardness than God's standing in the way of the commandments?* — The following text, cited from Ambrose, is found in his book *On Paradise*, c. 8 n. 39.

la: *Contra Adimantum, Manichaei discipulum*, c. 26: *Malum hoc loco non peccatum, sed poena intelligenda est. Dupliciter enim appellatur malum: unum, quod homo facit, alterum, quod patitur; quod facit, peccatum est; quod patitur, poena.* Cfr. et *de Vera Relig.* c. 20. n. 39, et I. *de lib. arb.* c. 1. n. 1. (c. 1.); nec non III. c. 15. et 16. n. 41. seqq. — Textus deinde allatus loc. cit. c. 23. n. 45. sic sonat: *Ac per hoc et Deus induravit per iustum iudicium, et ipse Pharao per liberum arbitrium*. — *Psalmus*, ex quo mox verba citantur, est 94, 8.

en: *Against Adimantus, the disciple of Mani*, c. 26: *Evil in this place is to be understood not as sin, but as punishment. For evil is called such in two ways: one, that which man does; the other, that which he suffers; what he does is sin; what he suffers is punishment.* Cf. also *On True Religion* c. 20 n. 39, and the first book *On Free Will* c. 1 n. 1 (c. 1); also III, c. 15 and 16 n. 41 ff. — The text subsequently cited at the same place, c. 23 n. 45, runs thus: *And by this God too hardened by a just judgment, and Pharaoh himself by his free will.* — The *Psalm* from which the words are next cited, is 94:8.

la: [The reference to Augustine's *De Gratia et libero arbitrio* (c. 23. n. 45) is given in the preceding note.]

en: [The reference to Augustine's *On Grace and Free Will* (c. 23 n. 45) is given in the preceding note.]

la: *Sensus est:* Quamvis natura corporis sit remota causa duritiae et triplicis illius proprietatis, quae duritiae attribuitur, duritia tamen est eiusdem causa proxima. Sed in spiritu duritia et proprietates consequentes nullatenus ei insunt ratione suae naturae. — De triplici proprietate duritiae cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Qualitate; III. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 11. (c. 1.); et IV. *Meteor.* c. 5. (c. 4.).

en: *The sense is:* Although the nature of the body is the remote cause of hardness and of the threefold property which is attributed to hardness, hardness nevertheless is its proximate cause. But in spirit, hardness and the properties following upon it are in no way present to it by reason of its nature. — On the threefold property of hardness cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. on Quality; III. *On the Heaven and the World*, text 11 (c. 1); and IV. *Meteorology* c. 5 (c. 4).

la: Codd. R V *repugnat*.

en: Codices R V read *repugnat*.


title: Dist. 40, Art. 4, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum obduratio sit a Deo
Whether obduration is from God

source_text:
<!-- page 719 -->

### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum obduratio sit a Deo.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum obduratio sit a Deo sive sit effectus Dei reprobantis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Ad Romanos* nono[^1]: *Cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat*; sed idem est aliquid fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente: si ergo obduratio est Deo volente, ergo et Deo auctore.

2. Item, ibidem in Glossa[^2]: «*Obduratio est nolle misereri*»: aut ergo hic est praedicatio per causam, aut per inhaerentiam, aut per essentiam. Non per inhaerentiam vel per essentiam — in Deo enim est voluntas miserendi, nec tamen obduratio — ergo est dictum per causam; sed Deus non vult misereri aliquorum ut praescitorum, ut dicit Augustinus: ergo ab ipso est eorum obduratio.

3. Item, super illud Exodi[^3]: *Ego indurabo cor eius*, dicit Augustinus: «*Induravit Deus Pharaonem iusto iudicio*», ergo secundum hoc fuit iustum Pharaonem indurari; sed omne iustum a summa iustitia procedit, quae Deus est: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne quod est aliquid, est a Deo: obduratio est aliquid: ergo secundum id quod est, est a Deo. Quod sit aliquid, patet, quia durum dicit naturalem potentiam[^4]; sed molle dicit impotentiam. Ergo si mollities et in corporibus et spiritibus est aliquid, quod habet Deum causam, patet etc.

5. Item, quicumque habet curam alicuius, si permittit eum malefacere, cum possit prohibere, vel perire, cum possit adiuvare, non inconvenienter dicitur causa sui maleficii vel peccati sive mali. Unde praelatus, qui subditos non corrigit, causa dicitur malorum in subditis; similiter, qui habet unde pascat fame morientem, et non pascit, causa est mortis eius. Si ergo Deus potest prohibere, ut affectus noster non[^5] durescat, et potest pascere, ut non deficiat, et non facit; videtur, quod sibi sit ratio et causa indurationis attribuenda.

6. Item, Philosophus dat maximam[^6]: «*Si aliquid est causa alicuius, et oppositum est causa oppositi*», ut, si *habere pulmonem* est causa respirandi, et *non habere* est causa non respirandi. Sed *velle misereri* est causa gratificationis: ergo *nolle misereri* est causa obdurationis.

7. Item, «*si aliquid per sui praesentiam causa est alicuius, per sui absentiam est causa oppositi*», haec est alia maxima Philosophi[^7]; sed Deus per sui praesentiam est causa mollificationis cordis: ergo per sui absentiam est causa obdurationis.

8. Item, si aliqua duo sunt omnino similia, aut <!-- page 720 -->proprietas aliqua non inest uni, quae non insit alii, aut si inest, aliunde inest. Ponantur ergo hic duo parvuli, sicut Iacob et Esau[^8]: Deus unum obdurat, ut Esau, alterum non obdurat, ut Iacob: ergo cum sint similes omnino quantum ad naturam et quantum ad merita, aliunde venit obduratio. Sed non est dare nisi a Deo, ergo etc. *Si tu dicas, quod a diabolo*; contra: esto quod diabolus nullo modo se intromittat, nihilominus iste obduraretur.

9. Item, omnis effectus, sive positivus sive defectivus, habet causam proximam et immediatam: quaero ergo, quae sit causa obdurationis proxima: aut enim *culpa originalis*, aut *actualis*, aut *usus liberi arbitrii*, aut *aliquid aliud*. Non culpa originalis, quia tunc omnes obdurarentur; similiter nec *culpa actualis*, quia tunc omnis actualiter peccans obduraretur; nec *usus liberi arbitrii*, quia obduratio, ut est connotatum reprobationis[^9], est in parvulis, in quibus non est usus liberi arbitrii. Restat ergo, quod *voluntas Dei* sit causa, et hoc videtur, quia ea posita ponitur effectus. Si enim Deus non vult istius misereri, necesse est, eum obdurari.

**Contra:** 1. Iesum acuto[^10], *Omnia qui erat odit ad me, ego victum facio*; ergo paratus est immuno omnes simpliciter; ergo defectus illustrationis non venit ex parte Dei, sed ex parte nostra.

2. Item, Apocalypsis tertio[^11]: *Ecce ego ad ostium et pulso, si quis mihi aperuerit*, intrabo *ad illum* etc. Sed si perceperat, voluerunt hospitari, nec recumdunt in domo, non est causa ex parte sui, sed nostra suscipi: ergo similiter et obdurationis non est causa, nisi qui non recipit Deum pulsantem.

3. Item, Augustinus super illud Ioannis[^12] *Ecce in tenebris lucet*, dicit: «*Sicut enim positis in sole praesente est lux, et ipse aborto est luci, et omni impietas, qui mens est ouli; pravorum est nubeculae*», si ipse est absoulus. Si ergo bonum est nimulae, quae caecitas siue privatio actus videtur non sit a sole, patet quod nec obduratio est a Deo.

4. Item, Anselmus[^13]: «*Non ideo non habet bonus gratiam, quia Deus non dat, sed quia homo non accipit*»; ergo non debet dici obduratio esse a Deo.

5. Item, ratione videtur, quia «*quinta est ultima ablactio*»[^14]; sed obduratio est proximum inter omnia mala: ergo ipsum non efficit Deus, qui est optimus.

6. Item, obduratio anima reddit animam impotentem ad bonum, ergo est defectus; sed defectus est non habet causam, aut si habet, habet causam deficientem[^15]. Deus autem nullam est causa deficiens: ergo obduratio nullo modo est a Deo.

### Conclusio.

> *Obduratio, prout est defectus, non est a Deo; sed prout ordinatur a retribuente divina iustitia in poenam culpae, est a Deo.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod obduratio, in quantum *poena*, dicit animae ineptitudinem, et ita dicit *defectum* poenalem; et poena omnis, in quantum talis, est iusta et *ordinata*: ideo dicit *defectum ordinatum*. In quantum ergo *defectus* est, non habet causam nisi deficientem; haec autem non est Deus, quia Deus non est causa deficiens, sed liberum arbitrium destitutum. In quantum vero *ordinatum*, habet causam *merentem*, scilicet ipsam culpam, et causam *ordinantem*, scilicet retribuentem divinam iustitiam.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Illae igitur tres auctoritates Apostoli scilicet, Augustini et Glossae, et consimiles, quae dicunt, Deum obdurasse aliquem, intelliguntur quantum ad rationem *ordinis*, non quantum ad rationem *defectus*, quia per comparationem ad *defectum* solum comparatur in ratione *permittentis*, non *efficientis*. Et est exemplum: si aliquis esset dignus perire fame, et alius posset eum pascere, et iusto indicio nollet eum pascere: si quaereretur, quae fuit in isto causa mortis, responderetur, quod defectus cibi; ille vero non diceretur occidisse, sed permisisse. Si *rursus* quaereretur, utrum iste iuste fecerit, diceretur, quod sic; cum tamen *nihil fecerit*, quia ipsum *non facere*

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ordinatus est in poena sibi debita. Per hunc modum est intelligendum in proposito.

4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod obduratio dicit positionem; dicendum, quod in corporibus dicit positionem, quia per naturam suam nata sunt sibi[^18] resistere; sed in spiritibus dicit defectum, quia de naturali aptitudine spiritus debet esse habilis ad susceptionem influentiae divinae. Unde habilitas talis est potentiae et habitus[^16]; sed econtra obduratio et ineptitudo est per modum privationis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui permittit, subditum perire, est causa etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si tenetur et debet facere; sed si non tenetur nec debet hoc facere, immo magis contrarium, nullatenus potest illi imputari periculum, sed iustitia[^17]; et ita est in Deo.

6. 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliquid est causa alicuius, quod oppositum est causa oppositi; dicendum, quod illud tenet in naturalibus et necessariis, sicut in habere pulmonem et non habere, et respirare et non respirare; non autem habet locum in voluntariis, sicut dicit Anselmus[^21]. Causa autem, quare iste habet gratiam, est quia Deus dat; causa, quare non habet, est quia non accipit. — Sed ista solutio non videtur competens, quoniam si maxima Philosophi bona est, necesse est, quod teneat in omni materia.

Et propterea est dicendum, quod ipse loquitur de causa proxima et immediata, et quae est tota causa, non exigens aliam[^22]; et in omni tali tenet. Sed quamvis voluntas Dei sit causa efficiens gratificationis, tamen ad salutem concurrit liberum arbitrium ut consentiens. Quia ergo ista duo concurrunt, quodlibet horum potest causare defectum; et non causat divina voluntas, quae est liberalissima, sed causat liberum arbitrium, quod, quamvis non possit neque sufficiat efficere, potest tamen esse deficiens causa, quae sufficiens est ad defectum effectus. In bonis enim «*facilius est destruere quam construere*»[^23].

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de absentia, dicendum, quod cum absentia alicuius est malum, aut ille est causa suae absentiae, aut non. Si ille est causa suae absentiae, dicitur per consequens esse causa eius quod incurritur ex absentia; si autem ipse non est causa, immo, quantum est de se, semper paratus est praesens esse; tunc revera nullo modo dicendus est esse causa, sed illud, ratione cuius iuste se absentat, ideo nostrum peccatum, et non Deus. *Peccata enim nostra diviserunt inter nos et Deum nostrum*[^24], et sunt quasi nubes densissimae, auferentes nobis illustrationem gratiae.

9. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae sit causa efficiens, ratione cuius insit; dicendum, quod causa[^25] est liberum arbitrium, meritorium est peccatum sive originale sive actuale. Causa vero deficiens, quae ponit defectum, est liberum arbitrium deficiens et in defectu suo permanens, sive quia ipsum negligit, sive quia, peccatis exigentibus, alius non succurrit. Quia vero, duobus existentibus similibus, potest alter habere manum sublevantem[^26], alter non; ideo unus *obduratur ex se*, alter vero *sublevatur ab alio*. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est in Iacob et Esau; Esau enim iacuit propria infirmitate, sed Iacob relevatus est aliena virtute.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether obduration is from God.*

Secondly it is asked whether obduration is from God or whether it is an effect of God reprobating. And that it is so seems thus:

1. *To the Romans*, ninth[^1]: *Of whom he wills he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens*; but it is the same thing for something to come to be with God as author and with God as willing it: if therefore obduration is by God's willing, therefore also by God as author.

2. Likewise, on the same place in the Gloss[^2]: «*Obduration is to be unwilling to have mercy*»: either, then, this is predication by *cause*, or by *inherence*, or by *essence*. Not by inherence or by essence — for in God there is the will to have mercy, and yet not obduration — therefore it is said by way of cause; but God does not will to have mercy on certain ones as foreknown, as Augustine says: therefore from him is their obduration.

3. Likewise, on that text of Exodus[^3], *I will harden his heart*, Augustine says: «*God hardened Pharaoh by a just judgment*», therefore according to this it was just that Pharaoh be hardened; but every just thing proceeds from the supreme justice, which is God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, by reason it seems so, because everything that is something is from God: obduration is something: therefore according to that which it is, it is from God. That it is something is clear, because *hard* names a natural potency[^4]; but *soft* names an impotency. Therefore if softness, both in bodies and in spirits, is something which has God for its cause, this is clear etc.

5. Likewise, whoever has charge of someone, if he permits him to do evil when he could prevent it, or to perish when he could help, is not unfittingly said to be the cause of his evildoing or sin or evil. Hence a prelate who does not correct his subjects is called the cause of evils in the subjects; likewise, he who has wherewith to feed one dying of hunger and does not feed him is the cause of his death. If therefore God can prevent our affection from[^5] hardening, and can feed it that it not fail, and does not do so; it seems that the ground and cause of the hardening is to be attributed to him.

6. Likewise, the Philosopher gives the maxim[^6]: «*If something is the cause of something, then the opposite is the cause of the opposite*», so that, if *to have a lung* is the cause of breathing, then *not to have* is the cause of not breathing. But *to will to have mercy* is the cause of glorification: therefore *not to will to have mercy* is the cause of obduration.

7. Likewise, «*if something by its presence is the cause of something, by its absence it is the cause of the opposite*», this is another maxim of the Philosopher[^7]; but God by his presence is the cause of softening of the heart: therefore by his absence he is the cause of obduration.

8. Likewise, if any two are wholly alike, either <!-- page 720 -->some property is in one which is not in the other, or, if it is in it, it is in it from elsewhere. Let there be set, then, two infants, like Iacob and Esau[^8]: God hardens one, as Esau, but not the other, as Iacob: therefore since they are wholly alike as to nature and as to merits, the obduration comes from elsewhere. But there is nothing to assign as cause except God, therefore etc. *If you say, from the devil*; on the contrary: granted that the devil in no way intervenes, nevertheless this one would be hardened.

9. Likewise, every effect, whether positive or defective, has a proximate and immediate cause: I ask therefore what is the proximate cause of obduration: either *original* fault, or *actual*, or *the use of free choice*, or *something else*. Not original fault, because then all would be hardened; likewise not *actual* fault, because then everyone actually sinning would be hardened; nor *the use of free choice*, because obduration, insofar as it is the *connoted [term] of reprobation*[^9], is in infants, in whom there is no use of free choice. There remains therefore that the *will of God* is the cause, and this seems [to follow] because, given it, the effect is given. For if God does not will to have mercy on this man, it is necessary that he be hardened.

[Note: see ambiguities log — the closing sentence of fundamentum 9 is OCR-bled in raw lines 29991–29995; the gist from PDF: *therefore from these four exhausted possibilities it follows that obduration is something which God in some way wills to bring about*.]

**On the contrary:**

1. [Cited from] Isaiah[^10]: *He invites all who come to him*; therefore he is ready to enlighten all simply; therefore the defect of illumination does not come from God's side, but from ours.

2. Likewise, in *Apocalypse* third[^11]: *Behold I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice and open to me, I will come in to him* etc. But if [men] perceive [his knock] and refuse him hospitality, and do not lodge him in the house, the cause is not on his side but on ours that he is not received: therefore likewise of obduration there is no cause, except him who does not receive God knocking.

3. Likewise, Augustine on that text of John[^12]: *Behold the light shineth in darkness*, says: «*For just as for those placed in the sun, when it is present, there is light, and the sun itself shines on the light, and on every impiety; the [defect] of perverse minds is the [defect] of the little cloud*», if it is itself absent. If therefore the *little cloud*, which is a blindness or privation of vision, is not from the sun, it is plain that neither is obduration from God.

4. Likewise, Anselm[^13]: «*The good man does not lack grace because God does not give it, but because the man does not receive it*»; therefore obduration ought not to be said to be from God.

5. Likewise, by reason it seems so, because «*the fifth [is the ultimate] privation*»[^14]; but obduration is the worst of all evils: therefore the supremely good God does not bring it about.

6. Likewise, obduration renders the soul powerless for the good, therefore it is a defect; but a defect either has no cause, or, if it does, has a deficient cause[^15]. But God is in no way a deficient cause: therefore obduration is in no way from God.

### Conclusion.

> *Obduration, insofar as it is a defect, is not from God; but insofar as it is ordained by divine justice as one repaying as a punishment for sin, it is from God.*

**I respond:** It must be said that obduration, insofar as [it is] *punishment*, signifies the soul's ineptitude, and so it signifies a penal *defect*; and every punishment, insofar as such, is just and *ordained*: therefore it signifies an *ordained defect*. Insofar therefore as it is a *defect*, it has no cause but a deficient one; and this is not God, since God is not a deficient cause, but [rather] a destitute free will. But insofar as it is *ordained*, it has a *meriting* cause, namely the fault itself, and an *ordaining* cause, namely the divine justice repaying.

**To the arguments:**

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Those three authorities therefore — namely of the Apostle, of Augustine, and of the Gloss, and the like, which say that God has hardened someone — are to be understood as regards the *ratio of order*, not as regards the *ratio of defect*; since by comparison to the *defect* [God] is compared only in the *ratio* of one *permitting*, not of one *effecting*. And there is an example: if someone were worthy to perish of hunger, and another could feed him, and by just judgment refused to feed him: if it were asked what was the cause of his death in this case, it would be answered that the lack of food [was]; but the other would not be said to have killed [him], but to have permitted [it]. If *again* it were asked whether this man acted justly, it would be answered that yes; even though indeed he *did nothing*, since this very *not-doing* was ordained by his authority to the merits of [the other] — and consequently he

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[that one] is ordered into the punishment due to himself. In this manner is it to be understood in the matter at hand.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that obduration speaks a *positing*; it must be said that in bodies it speaks a *positing*, because by their nature they are made to resist themselves[^18]; but in spirits it speaks a *defect*, because by the natural aptitude the spirit ought to be apt for the reception of divine influence. Hence such aptitude belongs to potency and habit[^16]; but on the contrary obduration and ineptitude is by way of *privation*.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that one who permits a subject to perish is a cause etc.; it must be said that this is true if he is bound and ought to act; but if he is not bound nor ought to do this, indeed rather the contrary, in no way can the danger be imputed to him, but [it is rather] justice[^17]; and so it is in God.

*To 6, 7.* To that which is objected, that if something is the cause of something, then the opposite is cause of the opposite; it must be said that this holds in things natural and necessary, as in *having a lung* and *not having one*, and *breathing* and *not breathing*; but it does not have place in voluntary matters, as Anselm says[^21]. Now the cause why this man has grace is because God gives; the cause why he does not have it is because he does not receive. — But this solution does not seem fitting, since if the Philosopher's maxim is sound, it is necessary that it hold in every matter.

And therefore it must be said that he speaks of the *proximate and immediate* cause, and the cause which is *the whole cause, requiring no other*[^22]; and in every such case it holds. But although the will of God is the efficient cause of glorification, nevertheless to salvation free choice concurs as consenting. Because therefore these two concur, any of them can cause a defect; and the divine will, which is most liberal, does not cause [it]; rather the free choice causes [it], which, although it cannot and does not suffice to effect [the good], nevertheless can be a deficient cause, which is sufficient for the defect of the effect. For in good things «*it is easier to destroy than to build up*»[^23].

*To 8.* To that which is objected concerning absence, it must be said that when the absence of something is an evil, either he is the cause of his own absence, or not. If he is the cause of his own absence, he is consequently called the cause of what is incurred from the absence; if however he is not the cause, but rather, so far as in him lies, is always ready to be present; then in truth he is in no way to be called the cause, but rather that on account of which he justly absents himself, that is our sin, and not God. *For our sins have divided between us and our God*[^24], and they are like very dense clouds taking from us the illumination of grace.

*To 9.* To that which is asked, what is the efficient cause by reason of which it is in [the soul]; it must be said that the cause[^25] is free choice; the meritorious cause is sin, whether original or actual. But the deficient cause, which posits the defect, is the free choice, deficient and remaining in its defect, either because it itself neglects, or because, sins requiring it, no other comes to its aid. Because indeed, when two stand alike, one can have a hand lifting him up[^26], the other not; therefore one is *hardened of himself*, the other is *lifted up by another*. And in this manner is it to be understood in Iacob and Esau; for Esau lay [fallen] by his own infirmity, but Iacob was raised up by another's strength.

en: Verse 18.

la: Dictum Glossae invenies in August., I. *ad Simplic.* q. 2. n. 15. — De triplici praedicatione, cuius mox fit mentio, vide supra d. 30. q. 1. in corp., et Scholion. — Sententia Augustini, quae in fine argumenti commemoratur, sumta est ex eius libro I. *de Diversis Quaest. ad Simplic.* q. 2. n. 13, ubi S. Doctor ait: *Quia si vellet* (Deus) *etiam ipsorum misereri, posset ita vocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut et moverentur et intelligerent et sequerentur.* Et ibid. n. 16: *Atque ita tenacissime firmissimeque credatur, id ipsum quod Deus cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult obdurat, hoc est, cuius vult miseretur, et cuius non vult non miseretur, esse alicuius occultae atque ab humano modulo investigabilis aequitatis* etc. — Pro *voluntas miserendi*, quae verba in medio argumento occurrunt, sola Vat. perperam *voluntas non miserendi*.

en: The saying of the Gloss is found in Augustine, I *ad Simplicianum* q. 2, n. 15. — On the threefold predication, of which mention is made just below, see above, d. 30, q. 1, in the body, and the Scholion. — The sentence of Augustine recalled at the end of the argument is taken from his book I *de Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* q. 2, n. 13, where the holy Doctor says: *Because if* (God) *willed to have mercy on them too, he could so call them, in such a way as would be fitting for them, that they would also be moved and understand and follow.* And ibid. n. 16: *And so let it be most tenaciously and firmly believed, that the very fact that God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills — that is, on whom he wills he has mercy, and on whom he does not will he does not have mercy — is of a certain hidden equity unsearchable to the human standard*, etc. — For *voluntas miserendi*, which words occur in the middle of the argument, the Vatican edition alone wrongly has *voluntas non miserendi*.

la: Cap. 4, 21. — Verba Augustini habentur in eius libro *de Gratia et lib. arb.* c. 23. n. 45. Cfr. supra pag. 718, nota 2.

en: Chapter 4, [verse] 21. — Augustine's words are found in his book *On Grace and Free Choice* c. 23, n. 45. Cf. above, p. 718, note 2.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Qualitate, inter varias qualitatis species naturalem potentiam et impotentiam secundo loco ponit et huic secundae speciei supponit *durum* et *molle* dicens: *Durum enim dicitur, quod habeat potentiam non facile secari; molle vero, quod eiusdem ipsius habeat impotentiam.* — Mox pro *Ergo si mollities* Vat. *ergo si durities*; quae lectio non ita bene respondet, quia illud argumentum procedit de minore ad maius.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. on Quality, among the various species of quality places natural potency and impotency in the second place, and to this second species he subsumes *hard* and *soft*, saying: *For that is called hard which has the power not to be easily cut; but soft, which has the impotency of that same.* — Just below, for *Therefore if softness*, the Vatican edition has *therefore if hardness*; which reading does not respond as well, because that argument proceeds from the lesser to the greater.

la: Vat. omittit *non*, codd. refragantibus. — Particulas hic separatim positas «*ne... non*» accipias pro *ne*. Vide Grammaticos. — Cfr. de hoc argumento Anselm., *de Casu diaboli*, c. 1.

en: The Vatican edition omits *non*, the codices opposing. — The particles set here separately, «*ne... non*», take for *ne* (lest). See the Grammarians. — Cf. on this argument Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 1.

la: Haec maxima eruitur ex I. *Poster.* c. 10. (c. 13.), ubi demonstrationem, in qua ponitur causa remota non convertibilis neque sufficiens ad causandum effectum per se ipsam esse, demonstrationem propter quid a Philosopho negatur, prolato hoc exemplo: *Ut propter quid non respirat paries? Quia non est animal; si enim non respirandi causa est hoc, oportet esse animal causa respirandi. Ut si negatio causa est ipsius non esse, affirmatio causa est ipsius esse.* Cfr. et Averroes in hunc locum, ubi etiam idem exemplum de pulmone invenies, quod S. Bonav. hic affert.

en: This maxim is drawn from I *Posterior Analytics* c. 10 (c. 13), where the Philosopher denies that a demonstration in which a remote, non-convertible cause, insufficient to cause the effect of itself, is laid down — denies, that is, that this is a demonstration *propter quid* — adducing this example: *Why does a wall not breathe? Because it is not an animal; for if this is the cause of not breathing, an animal must be the cause of breathing. As if negation is the cause of the not-being, affirmation is the cause of the being itself.* Cf. also Averroes on this place, where likewise you will find the same example of the lung which S. Bonaventure here adduces.

la: Libr. II. *Phys.* text. 30. (c. 3.): *Amplius autem eadem causa contrariorum est; quod enim praesens causa huius est, hoc et absens facimus aliquando causam contrarii, ut absentiam gubernatoris navis subversionis, cuius erat praesentia causa salutis.* — Pro *sed*, quod immediate sequitur, Vat. *ergo si*, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1. Dein ante verba *per sui absentiam* non pauci codd. cum Vat. omittunt *ergo*, quod ex cod. Z et ed. 1 restituimus.

en: Book II *Physics*, text 30 (c. 3): *Moreover the same is the cause of contraries; for what when present is the cause of this, we sometimes make this same as absent the cause of the contrary, as the absence of the helmsman the cause of the ship's wreck, of which his presence was the cause of safety.* — For *sed*, which immediately follows, the Vatican edition has *ergo si*, the codices and the first edition opposing. Then before the words *per sui absentiam*, not a few codices with the Vatican edition omit *ergo*, which we have restored from codex Z and the first edition.

la: Vat. omittit *sibi*; cod. H bene exhibet *sibi invicem*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *sibi*; codex H rightly exhibits *sibi invicem* (to one another).

la: Sicut praedestinatio gratiam connotat ut effectum temporalem, sic reprobatio obdurationem, quae, ut Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 29. m. 5. a. 3. ait, duplex est: una est *generalis* omnium qui ab Adam per concupiscentiam seminalem descendunt, haec sequitur peccatum originale...; alia est *specialis*, quae, inquam, est in adultis, qui habent voluntatem et propositum resistendi beneficiis Dei.

en: [Editorial reading: *consolidation of reprobation*. See ambiguities log.]

la: [Locus referred to in the Contra is from Isaiah; full citation OCR-illegible at this point. See ambiguities log.]

en: [Reference to Isaiah; locus uncertain in this OCR-bled passage.]

en: *Apocalypse* 3, 20.

la: [Reference is to Augustine, *Tract. in Ioan.* on Io. 1, 5; precise citation OCR-bled here. See ambiguities log.]

en: [Augustine on John 1:5; OCR-bled.]

la: Anselm., *de Concordia praescientiae* (or *de Casu diab.*); precise reference OCR-bled here.

en: Anselm, *On the Concord of Foreknowledge* (or *On the Fall of the Devil*); OCR-bled.

la: [OCR-bled philosophical maxim; possibly *quod ultimum est privationis*. See ambiguities log.]

en: [Reading uncertain — see ambiguities log.]

la: [OCR-bled apparatus footnote at end of Contra 6. Refers to Augustine on causa deficiens.]

la: Quae sunt duae primae species qualitatis, ab Aristotele in libr. *de Praedicam.* c. de Qualitate recensitae, de quibus vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. 3. in corp., et a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Cod. R ante verba *et habitus* interiicit *sive potentiae*, et subinde post *obduratio* omittit *et*. Mox post *per modum* Vat. adicit *praevisionis et*; demum cod. cc pro *privationis* substituit *praevisionis*.

en: [Note keyed to *potentiae et habitus* in reply ad 4:] These are the two first species of quality, recounted by Aristotle in *Categories*, ch. on Quality, on which see above d. 3, p. II, a. I, q. 3, in the body, and a. 2, q. 1, ad 1. — Codex R inserts *sive potentiae* before the words *et habitus*, and just after *obduratio* omits *et*. Just after *per modum* the Vatican edition adds *praevisionis et*; finally codex cc substitutes *praevisionis* for *privationis*.

la: Vat. *iustitiae*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *iustitiae* (of justice).

en: The Vatican edition omits *sibi*; codex H rightly has *sibi invicem* (to one another).

la: Probans propositiones quae hic immediate sequuntur et iam supra in fundam. 7. occurrerunt.

en: Proving the propositions which here immediately follow and which already occurred above in fundamentum 7.

la: Multi codd. *aliam*, ed. 1 *aliud*; incongrue.

en: Many codices have *aliam*, the first edition *aliud*; incongruously.

la: Aristot., VII. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 1.).

en: Aristotle, VII *Topics* c. 3 (c. 1).

la: *Isai.* 39, 2 [recte 59, 2]: *Iniquitates vestrae diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum.* — Paulo superius post *ideo* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. subiicit *vere*; pro *ideo* cod. Z *hoc autem est*, codd. F V *illud est*.

en: *Isaiah* [59], 2: *Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.* — Slightly above, after *ideo*, the Vatican edition with some codices adds *vere*; for *ideo*, codex Z has *hoc autem est*, codices F V *illud est*.

la: Cod. Z adiungit *efficiens*. Sola Vat. omittit *est liberum arbitrium*, et dein pro *meritorium* exhibet *meritoria*, hoc verbum referens ad *causa*. Etiam in nonnullis codd. ut lPQ, qui de cetero cum nostra lectione conveniunt, nec non in ed. 1, pro *meritorium* legitur *meritoria*. Verba, quae mox sequuntur, *quae ponit defectum est liberum arbitrium deficiens* in multis codd. desiderantur. Denique post *negligit* cod. Z addit *detestari*, et post pauca pro *succurrit* multi codd. cum ed. 1 substituunt *succedit*, cod. U *subvenit*.

en: Codex Z adds *efficiens*. The Vatican edition alone omits *est liberum arbitrium*, and then for *meritorium* shows *meritoria*, referring this word to *causa*. Also in some codices such as lPQ, which otherwise agree with our reading, and likewise in the first edition, instead of *meritorium* one reads *meritoria*. The words which immediately follow, *quae ponit defectum est liberum arbitrium deficiens*, are wanting in many codices. Finally, after *negligit* codex Z adds *detestari*, and a little after, in place of *succurrit*, many codices with the first edition substitute *succedit*, codex U *subvenit*.

la: Respicitur illud *Eccle.* 4, 10: *Vae soli, quia cum ceciderit, non habet sublevantem se.*

en: Reference is to *Ecclesiastes* 4, 10: *Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth, he hath none to lift him up.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ut iam observavit Brulifer (in hunc locum), solutio huius quaestionis est praeclarissima et plurima continet notatu dignissima, praesertim in solutione oppositorum. Omnino concordat S. Thomas (I. *Sent.* hic q. 1. a. 1.). Agitur autem de primo membro divisionis in respons. praecedentis quaest. positae, sive de obduratione, quatenus est *poena*. Haec secundum S. Doctorem ex parte hominis est dispositio vel actus voluntatis in malo obstinatae, cuius tota causa deficiens est in ipso solo; ex parte Dei est quaedam *subtractio gratiae efficacis*, non autem *omnis gratiae*, quae subtractio est ex suppositione praecedentis peccati. Quod confirmat S. Thom. (*S. c. Gent.* III. c. 162.): «*Cum ergo* (Deus) *haec auxilia aliquibus subtrahit pro merito suae actionis, secundum quod eius iustitia exigit, dicitur eos obdurare et excaecare*» (cfr. Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 41. a. 3. q. 3.). — Praecipue notandum est, 1. quod aliter loquendum est de causalitate defectus, quatenus est defectus, et quate<!-- page 722 -->nus est ordinatus (hic in corp., et S. Thom., hic loc. cit.). 2. Ad ponendum effectum requiritur concurrentia omnium causarum, ad impediendum effectum sufficit defectus unius causarum, in quo axiomate fundatur solut. ad 6. 7. (cfr. S. Thom, loc. cit. ad 3.); unde causa quae sufficit ad impediendum effectum, nondum sufficit ad ponendum eundem. 3. Inde sequitur, quod licet voluntas libere dissentiat motioni divinae gratiae, et libere eidem consentiat, aliter tamen loquendum est de causalitate, quatenus actus voluntatis *deficit*, cuius defectus ipsa est prima et sola causa deficiens, aliter quatenus voluntas ad actum *bonum proficit*, cuius profectus prima causa efficiens est Deus, sed cum causa secunda (hic ad 9.). Hoc explicatur II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 1. q. 2; et a S. Thoma, *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 189.

**II.** Praeter iam laudatos: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 29. m. 3. 4. — S. Thom., locc. citt. et *S.* I. q. 23. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 23. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** As Brulifer has already noted (on this place), the solution of this question is most splendid and contains very many things worthy of note, especially in the solution of the opposing arguments. It accords entirely with S. Thomas (I. *Sent.* here q. 1. a. 1.). The first member of the division set in the response to the preceding question is treated, that is, of obduration *insofar as it is punishment*. This, according to the holy Doctor, on the part of man is a disposition or act of the will obstinate in evil, whose whole deficient cause is in himself alone; on the part of God it is a certain *withdrawal of efficacious grace*, but not of *all grace*, which withdrawal is on the supposition of preceding sin. Which S. Thomas confirms (*S. c. Gent.* III. c. 162.): «*Since therefore* (God) *withdraws these aids from some on the merit of their own action, according to which his justice demands, he is said to harden them and blind them*» (cf. Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 41. a. 3. q. 3.). — Especially is it to be noted, 1. that one must speak otherwise of the causality of the defect insofar as it is a *defect*, and otherwise insofar as <!-- page 722 -->it is *ordained* (here in the body, and S. Thom., here loc. cit.). 2. To posit the effect, the concurrence of all causes is required; to impede the effect, the defect of one of the causes suffices — on which axiom is founded the solution to 6, 7 (cf. S. Thom, loc. cit. ad 3.); whence the cause which suffices to *impede* the effect does not yet suffice to *posit* it. 3. Hence it follows that, although the will dissents freely from the motion of divine grace, and freely consents to the same, nevertheless one must speak otherwise about causality insofar as the act of the will *fails*, of which failure that very [will] is the first and only deficient cause; and otherwise insofar as the will *progresses* toward a good act, of which progress the first efficient cause is God, but with a secondary cause (here ad 9). This is explained at II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 1. q. 2; and by S. Thomas, *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 189.

**II.** Besides those already cited: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 29. m. 3. 4. — S. Thom., locc. citt. and *S.* I. q. 23. a. 3. — B. Albert., here a. 23. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3. q. 3.

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