title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum Pater communicet Filio potentiam generandi

title_alt: Whether the Father communicates to the Son the power of begetting

source_text:
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### Quaestio II

*Utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio; et quod sic, videtur auctoritatibus et rationibus.

**1.** Primo sic: Hilarius nono *de Trinitate*[^1] dicit: «Filius habet in se naturaliter naturam gignentem»: ergo natura in Filio est nata generare.

**2.** Item, Augustinus in libro *contra Maximinum*[^2]: «Neque enim non potuit Filius generare», sed duae negationes aequivalent uni affirmationi: ergo potuit generare.

**3.** Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: plus ordinatur generare ad generandi potentiam, quam ad potentiam spirandi: sed Pater generans Filium communicat ei[^3] potentiam spirandi: ergo multo fortius potentiam generandi.

**4.** Item, Filius est expressissima imago Patris: ergo tantum imitatur Patrem, quod non potest cogitari similior; sed si Filius cogitatur ut generans, magis cogitatur imitari: ergo si imitatur amplius, quam possit quis cogitare, ergo et in actu generandi.

**5.** Item, *per simile* videtur sic: maior communicatio et diffusio est in luce aeterna quam in luce creata; sed lux creata dat splendori potentiam producendi alium, et[^4] sic procedendo; et si esset infinitae virtutis, produceret infinitos splendores: ergo etc.

**6.** Item, in generatione carnali pater non dicitur perfectum filium generare, nisi det ei potentiam generandi: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortius[^5], non erit Filius perfectus, nisi habeat potentiam ad id, ad quod Pater potest; ergo ad generandum. Aut si non est ita in divinis, tunc ego quaero rationem, quare de perfectione generationis aeternae non sic est communicatio potentiae generandi, sicut in generatione creata.

*Sed contra:*

**1.** Augustinus *contra Maximinum*[^6] dicit, «quod non oportuit Filium generare»; sed si non fuit opportunum, nec conveniens; sed omne inconveniens in Deo est impossibile[^7]: ergo impossibile fuit, Filium generare: ergo Filius non potest generare; ergo non habet potentiam generandi, quia omni potentia est potens ille qui habet eam: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, Anselmus in *Proslogio*[^8]: «Qui potest quod sibi non convenit, quanto magis illud potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in eum»: ergo cum Filio non conveniat generare, si posset, potentia illa esset in eo miseria; sed nullam habet miseriam: ergo nec potentiam generandi.

**3.** Item, *ratione* probatur hoc idem sic[^9]: omne illud, in quo aliqua duo necessario distinguuntur, si necessario convenit uni, impossibile est unquam convenire alii, sicut patet: si Petrus et Ioannes necessario differunt in albedine, et albedo convenit Petro, impossibile est, quod Ioanni conveniat; sed Pater et Filius sunt personaliter distincti, ita quod necesse est esse distinctos, et non est dare in quo

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distinguantur[^10] nisi in hoc, quod ille est generans, iste genitus: ergo cum generare conveniat Patri, impossibile est, quod conveniat Filio: ergo Filius non potest generare: ergo non habet potentiam generandi.

**4.** Item, generatio Filii a Patre similis est expresse ipsi[^11] generationi verbi a mente; sed verbum genitum non habet potentiam generandi aliud verbum, immo oportet, quod omne verbum immediate sit a mente: ergo si recte simile est Verbum increatum, non habet potentiam generandi, sed generandi potentia est in solo Patre.

**5.** Item, fiat argumentatio Augustini[^12] ducens ad impossibile. Si Filius habet potentiam sive posse generandi, ponatur quod generet; quaero de secundo similiter; et si non est stare in primo, oportet ponere infinitos filios, quia qua ratione non statur in primo, ergo nec in aliquo: ergo si est stare — quia hoc[^13] repugnat divinae completioni — sed qua ratione statur in aliquo, statur in primo: ergo primus non habet potentiam generandi.

**6.** Item, fiat argumentatio Richardi[^14]: si generaret Filius alium filium: ergo cum filius genitus magis attineat patri quam avo, secundum hoc non esset ibi summa et aequalis connexio: ergo nec summa et aequalis dilectio[^15]: ergo nec perfecta beatitudo: quae omnia tanquam summe impossibilia respuit pia fides.

### Conclusio

> *Pater potentiam generandi non communicat Filio, quod duabus rationibus probatur.*

**Respondeo:** Opinio aliquorum est, quod in Filio est potentia generandi, sed non generat. Hoc autem non est, quia non potest, sed quia non convenit ei[^16]. Et ponunt simile in creaturarum productione sive creatione. Deus potest infinitas creaturas producere; sed quod non producit, hoc non est ex impotentia, sed quia non convenit ei; sic et in proposito.

*Sed contra:* Ponatur tunc, quod illa potentia, quae est in Filio ad generandum, ducatur in actum; constat quod Filius generabit Deum aeternum: ergo aliquid poterit[^17] incipere habere esse et esse aeternum; hoc autem est impossibile et non intelligibile.

Propterea[^18] dicendum, quod Pater non communicat Filio *posse generare* propter duo. Unum est, quia *non potest*, aliud, quia *non debet*.

Ratio autem, quare *non potest*, haec est: quia fecunditas ad generandum est in Patre, quia principium, et ideo principium, quia primum. Impossibile autem est, quod primum[^19] communicet alii primitatem. Nam hic est oppositio in adiecto, quod persona producta sit prima. Quia ergo fecunditas ad generandum ex primitate Patri inerat, ideo non potest eam communicare Filio; et hanc credo propriam esse rationem huius, sicut infra patebit distinctione vigesima septima[^20], ubi agetur, quare Pater generat.

Similiter *non debet* communicare, quoniam[^21] in emanatione divinarum personarum debet attendi *originalis distinctio* et *plenissima communicatio*: *originalis distinctio*, quia necesse est, ea quae communicant in natura distingui vel per materiam[^22], vel per originem. Per materiam distingui personas est impossibile; quia ubi est talis modus distinguendi, est compositio et variatio et formae multiplicatio, quae omnia Deo repugnant, qui est simplex et invariabilis et vere unum. Et ideo necesse est distingui per originem sive habitudinem: ergo per *generare* et *generari*: ergo si Filius potest generare, potest etiam non distingui. Si tu dicas, quod adhuc est distinctio, quia unus tantum Pater, alius tantum Filius, alius Pater et Filius; tunc ego oppono tibi, quod secundus filius posset generare eadem ratione, qua primus; et tunc duo essent, quorum uterque esset pater et filius.

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Similiter propter *plenissimam communicationem* non debet communicare, quia multiplicatio suppositorum secundum similem modum egrediendi non est nisi aut propter defectum durationis, sicut dictum est[^23], in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, ut per successivam generationem perpetuetur esse, aut propter defectum perfectae actionis, ut fiat per plures, quod non potest per unum. Sicut sunt factae[^24] plures stellae, quia non sufficeret una ad hoc quod faciunt omnes, sic etiam plures Angeli et plures animae ad implendam illam civitatem et manifestandam Dei bonitatem, quam nec una anima nec unus Angelus poterat sufficienter manifestare. Cum ergo in Filio Dei sit plenissima communicatio, quia totam infinitatem suam dat sibi Pater, non fuit conveniens, quod communicaret Filio illam potentiam: et ideo fuit impossibile, quia inconveniens quodlibet in divinis est impossibile[^25].

**1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Hilarii, quod Filius habet in se naturam gignentem; dicendum, quod verbum illud est improprium, et ex verbis impropriis non est arguendum, sed magis eorum improprietas exponenda, ut Magister superius exposuit. Est enim sensus: *habet in se naturam gignentem*, id est naturam Patris.

**2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *neque*[^26] non potuit; dicendum, quod Magister bene exponit, id est, *non fuit ex hoc impotens*. Unde secundum artem distinguendum est, quando dicitur, *Filius non potuit generare*: quia *non potest* teneri *privative*; et tunc est sensus, *non potuit*, id est, impotens fuit; et tunc negatur potentia et relinquitur aptitudo, sicut de truncato dicitur, quod non potest gradi, quia aptus natus est ad gradiendum et non potest gradi[^27]: hoc modo non potest dici de Filio, quia non habet ad hoc aptitudinem; et in hoc sensu loquitur Augustinus. Alio modo *non posse* tenetur *negative*; et in hoc sensu concedendum est, quod Filius non potuit generare.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Pater communicat Filio potentiam spirativam: patet responsio: quia cum Filius generetur, non potest habere primitatem respectu generationis; sed cum non spiretur, est *inspirabilis*: et ideo potuit habere primitatem et fecunditatem respectu illius; et sic patet quod[^28] non valet ratio.

**4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius est expressissima imago etc.; dicendum, quod ideo[^29] Filius dicitur expressissima imago, quia repraesentat in omnibus, in quibus imago nata est repraesentare; sed imago sic nata est repraesentare, ut tamen ipsa non sit imaginatum; alioquin non esset imago. Si autem Filius repraesentaret in actu generandi, iam esset Pater: et ideo nec intelligibile nec possibile est, Filium generare sive in generatione Patrem imitari.

**5.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de luce et splendore, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lux non perfecte se multiplicat in primo splendore: ideo in pluribus facit quod non potest in uno.

**6.** Similiter et in filio carnali[^30] intelligendum; unde unus pater generat plures filios. Haec tamen ratio non est principalis, sed illa quae dicta est supra[^31], quia in his inferioribus non est fecunditas per rationem primitatis, sed per rationem perfectionis. In Deo autem, quia est perfectissimum et primum, non tantum est per naturam perfectionis; quia tunc in omnibus personis esset, et status[^32] esse non posset; sed per rationem primitatis. Item rationes istae non procedunt per simile, immo magis per dissimile.

english:
### Question II

*Whether the power of begetting is in the Son.*

Second it is asked whether the power of begetting is in the Son; and that it is, seems evident by authorities and by reasons.

**1.** First thus: Hilary in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^1] says: «The Son has in Himself naturally a generating nature»: therefore the nature in the Son is naturally suited to generate.

**2.** Likewise, Augustine in the book *Against Maximinus*[^2]: «For not that the Son could not generate»; but two negations equal one affirmation: therefore He could generate.

**3.** Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: *to generate* is more ordered to the *power of generating* than to the *power of spirating*; but the Father, by generating the Son, communicates to Him[^3] the power of spirating: therefore much more strongly the power of generating.

**4.** Likewise, the Son is the most express image of the Father: therefore He imitates the Father so perfectly that no greater likeness can be conceived; but if the Son is conceived as generating, He is conceived as imitating still more: therefore if He imitates more than can be conceived, then also in the act of generating.

**5.** Likewise, *by analogy* it seems thus: greater communication and diffusion is in the eternal Light than in created light; but created light gives to its splendor the power of producing another, and[^4] so on; and if it were of infinite power, it would produce infinite splendors: therefore, etc.

**6.** Likewise, in carnal generation a father is not said to generate a perfect son unless he gives him the power of generating: therefore by parity of reason — indeed much more strongly[^5] — the Son will not be perfect unless He has the power for that which the Father can [do]; therefore for generating. Or if it is not so in divine things, then I ask the reason why concerning the perfection of eternal generation there is not such a communication of the power of generating as in created generation.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Augustine *Against Maximinus*[^6] says, «that it was not fitting that the Son should generate»; but if it was not opportune, then not fitting either; but every unfitting thing in God is impossible[^7]: therefore it was impossible that the Son should generate: therefore the Son cannot generate; therefore He does not have the power of generating, because that one is powerful by every power who has it: therefore, etc.

**2.** Likewise, Anselm in the *Proslogion*[^8]: «He who can [do] what is not fitting for him — the more he can [do] it, the more adversity and perversity prevail against him»: therefore since generating is not fitting for the Son, if He could [generate], that power would be in Him a misery; but He has no misery: therefore neither the power of generating.

**3.** Likewise, *by reason* the same is proved thus[^9]: everything in which any two are necessarily distinguished, if it necessarily belongs to one, it is impossible that it ever belong to the other, as is plain: if Peter and John necessarily differ in whiteness, and whiteness belongs to Peter, it is impossible that it belong to John; but the Father and the Son are personally distinct, so that they must necessarily be distinct, and there is nothing to give in which

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they are distinguished[^10] except in this, that the one is generating, the other generated: therefore since generating belongs to the Father, it is impossible that it belong to the Son: therefore the Son cannot generate: therefore He does not have the power of generating.

**4.** Likewise, the generation of the Son by the Father is similar in expression to the very[^11] generation of a word from the mind; but a generated word does not have the power of generating another word — rather every word must be immediately from the mind: therefore if the uncreated Word is rightly similar [to it], He does not have the power of generating, but the power of generating is in the Father alone.

**5.** Likewise, let the Augustinian argument[^12] be made leading to the impossible. If the Son has a power or ability for generating, suppose that He generates; I ask similarly of the second; and if there is no stopping at the first, infinite sons must be posited, because by the same reason that there is no stopping at the first, there is no stopping anywhere: therefore if there is a stop — because this[^13] is repugnant to divine completion — but by the same reason that there is a stopping anywhere, there is a stopping at the first: therefore the first does not have the power of generating.

**6.** Likewise, let Richard's argument[^14] be made: if the Son were to generate another son: then since a begotten son belongs more to his father than to his grandfather, accordingly there would not there be the supreme and equal connection: therefore neither supreme and equal love[^15]: therefore neither perfect beatitude — all of which, as supremely impossible things, pious faith rejects.

### Conclusion

> *The Father does not communicate the power of begetting to the Son, which is proved by two reasons.*

**I respond:** The opinion of some is that the power of begetting is in the Son, but that He does not generate. This, however, is not because He cannot, but because it is not fitting for Him[^16]. And they posit a similar case in the production of creatures or in creation: God can produce infinite creatures; but that He does not produce [them] is not from impotence, but because it is not fitting for Him; so also in the matter at hand.

*But on the contrary:* Suppose, then, that the power that is in the Son for generating is brought into act; it is plain that the Son will generate an eternal God: therefore something will be able[^17] to begin to have being and to be eternal; but this is impossible and unintelligible.

Therefore[^18] it must be said that the Father does not communicate to the Son *to be able to generate*, for two reasons. One is that *He cannot*, the other, that *He ought not*.

The reason, then, why *He cannot* is this: because fruitfulness for generating is in the Father because [He is] principle, and so [He is] principle because [He is] first. But it is impossible that the first[^19] communicate primacy to another. For it is a contradiction in terms that a produced person be first. Since therefore fruitfulness for generating was in the Father from primacy, He cannot communicate it to the Son; and I believe this to be the proper reason for it, as will appear below in the twenty-seventh distinction[^20], where it will be treated why the Father generates.

Likewise, *He ought not* to communicate, because[^21] in the emanation of the divine persons must be observed *original distinction* and *most full communication*: *original distinction*, because what communicate in nature must necessarily be distinguished either by matter[^22] or by origin. To be distinguished by matter is impossible for persons; because where there is such a mode of distinguishing, there is composition and variation and multiplication of form — all which are repugnant to God, who is simple and invariable and truly one. And therefore they must necessarily be distinguished by origin or by relation: therefore by *generating* and *being generated*: therefore if the Son can generate, He can also fail to be distinguished. If you say that there is still a distinction, because one is only Father, another only Son, another Father and Son; then I object to you that the second son could generate by the same reason as the first; and then there would be two, each of which would be a father and a son.

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Likewise, on account of the *most full communication* He ought not to communicate, because the multiplication of supposita according to a similar mode of issuing forth is only either on account of *a defect of duration* — as has been said[^23] — in generable and corruptible things, that being may be perpetuated through successive generation; or on account of *a defect of perfect action*, that there may be done through many what cannot be done through one. Just as many stars have been made[^24], because one would not suffice for what they all do, so also many Angels and many souls for filling that City and manifesting the goodness of God, which neither one soul nor one Angel was able sufficiently to manifest. Since therefore in the Son of God there is most full communication — because the Father gives to Him His whole infinity — it was not fitting that He should communicate to the Son that power: and therefore it was impossible, because whatever is unfitting in divine matters is impossible[^25].

**1.** To that, then, which is objected on the contrary through Hilary's authority — that the Son has in Himself a generating nature: it must be said that this expression is improper, and from improper expressions one must not argue, but rather their impropriety must be expounded, as the Master above expounded. The sense is: *He has in Himself a generating nature* — that is, the nature of the Father.

**2.** To that which is objected — that *not*[^26] that He could not: it must be said that the Master rightly explains it, that is, *He was not on this account impotent*. Hence according to the art [of grammar] a distinction must be made when it is said *the Son could not generate*: for *not able* can be taken *privatively*; and then the sense is, *He could not* — that is, *He was impotent*; and then the power is denied and aptitude is left, as is said of one maimed [of legs], that he cannot walk, because he is naturally suited to walking and yet cannot walk[^27]: in this way it cannot be said of the Son, because He does not have the aptitude for this; and in this sense Augustine speaks. In another way *not to be able* is taken *negatively*; and in this sense it is to be conceded that the Son could not generate.

**3.** To that which is objected — that the Father communicates to the Son the spirative power: the response is plain: because, since the Son is generated, He cannot have primacy with respect to generation; but since He is not spirated, He is *un-spiratable*: and therefore He could have primacy and fruitfulness with respect to it; and thus it is plain that[^28] the reasoning does not hold.

**4.** To that which is objected — that the Son is the most express image, etc.: it must be said that the Son is therefore[^29] called the most express image because He represents in all things in which an image is naturally suited to represent; but an image is so suited to represent that it itself nevertheless is not the imaged; otherwise it would not be an image. But if the Son represented [the Father] in the act of generating, He would already be the Father: and therefore it is neither intelligible nor possible that the Son generate or imitate the Father in generating.

**5.** To that which is objected concerning light and splendor, it must be said that it is not similar, because light does not perfectly multiply itself in the first splendor: therefore in many it does what it cannot in one.

**6.** Likewise [the same is to be] understood in the case of the carnal son[^30]; whence one father generates many sons. This reasoning, however, is not principal, but the one given above[^31] — because in these inferior things fruitfulness is not by reason of *primacy*, but by reason of *perfection*. In God, however, since He is most perfect and first, [fruitfulness] is not only by nature of perfection — because then it would be in all the persons, and a stop[^32] could not exist — but by reason of *primacy*. Likewise these reasonings do not proceed by similarity, but rather by dissimilarity.

la: Num. 51: *Neque rursum corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo eiusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem se habuisse naturam.*

en: No. 51: «Nor again do we preach the Father in the Son by bodily implantation, but [we say that] from Him [the Son] had the begotten nature of the same kind, naturally generating in Himself the [same] nature».

la: Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium; in quo textu aliqui codd. *non* pro *neque*, alii *non volunt Filius non generare*.

en: Bk. II c. 12 n. 3; see above in the Master's text c. 1 around the middle; in which text some codices [read] *non* for *neque*, others *non volunt Filius non generare*.

la: Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *ei*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit.

en: We supplied *ei* from older manuscripts and ed. 1, which the Vatican edition with codex *cc* less well omits.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits *et*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *fortiori*, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. et ed. I post *ad id* omittit *ad*. Mox pauci codd. ut Iff cum ed. I *habet* pro *potest*.

en: The Vatican edition against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1 [reads] *fortiori*, and a little below, against many codices and ed. I, omits *ad* after *ad id*. Soon a few codices such as Iff with ed. I [read] *habet* for *potest*.

la: Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium.

en: Bk. II c. 12 n. 3; see above in the Master's text c. 1 around the middle.

la: Cap. 7: *Nam qui haec potest, quod sibi non expedit, et quod non debet, potest, quae quanto magis potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in illum.* — Sub nomine *adversitas* intelligitur hic non tribulatio (utpote quae sanctis est bonum), sed nocivum. — Vat. contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 *hoc potest* pro *illud potest*.

en: Ch. 7: «For he who can do these things — what is not expedient for him, and what he ought not to do — can them; the more he can do them, the more adversity and perversity prevail against him». — Under the name *adversitas* is here understood not tribulation (since this is a good for the saints) but what is harmful. — The Vatican edition against the ancient codices and ed. 1 [reads] *hoc potest* for *illud potest*.

la: Confusam Vat. et cod. cc lectionem emendavimus ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1 ponendo *sic* loco *sicut*, et paulo infra *sicut patet* pro *ut patet sic*. Plures codd. *aliqui* loco *aliqua*.

en: We emended the confused reading of the Vatican edition and codex *cc* with the help of other codices and ed. 1 by putting *sic* for *sicut*, and a little below *sicut patet* for *ut patet sic*. Several codices [read] *aliqui* for *aliqua*.

la: Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *distinguantur* pro *distinguuntur*.

en: From many codices and ed. 1 we substituted *distinguantur* for *distinguuntur*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit *ipsi*.

en: The Vatican edition against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions omits *ipsi*.

la: Libr. II. *contra Maximin.* c. 12. n. 3; vide in lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut AFGHIKWY etc. cum ed. 1 *quaeram* loco *quaero*.

en: Bk. II *Against Maximinus* c. 12 n. 3; see in the Master's text c. 1 around the middle. — A little below several codices such as AFGHIKWY etc. with ed. 1 [read] *quaeram* for *quaero*.

la: Locus difficilis et fortasse corruptus. Subintellige: *ponere infinitos filios*, sive potius: *non stare in aliquo*; ideoque particula *quia* in hac sua positione non directam rationem, sed potius praesuppositionem respectu propositionis conditionalis *si est stare* indicat, quod hac meliore positione apparet: *ergo — quia hoc repugnat divinae completioni — si est stare*. — Cod. Z *ergo necesse est stare*. Paulo infra post *completioni* ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *sed*.

en: A difficult and perhaps corrupt passage. Understand: *to posit infinite sons*, or rather: *not to stop at any [son]*; and so the particle *quia* in this its position indicates not the direct reason but rather a presupposition with respect to the conditional proposition *si est stare*, as appears more clearly in this better arrangement: *therefore — because this is repugnant to divine completion — if there is a stop*. — Codex Z [reads] *ergo necesse est stare*. A little below, after *completioni*, we added *sed* from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 10. seqq. et VI. c. 2. seqq. — Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. I, post *Richardi* addit *ut* et paulo infra praeter fidem antiquiorum codd. et ed. I nec non operum Richardi (VI. *de Trin.* c. 6.) loco *patri quam avo* ponit *ad patrem quam alius*.

en: Bk. V *On the Trinity* c. 10 ff. and VI c. 2 ff. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. I, after *Richardi* adds *ut*; and a little below, against the testimony of older codices and ed. I, and indeed of Richard's own works (VI *de Trin.* c. 6), substitutes for *patri quam avo* the reading *ad patrem quam alius*.

la: Sequimur cod. O, dum alii codd. et edd. legunt *distinctio*, quod nec contextui nec argumentationi Richardi correspondere videtur.

en: We follow codex O, while other codices and editions read *distinctio*, which seems to correspond neither to the context nor to Richard's argumentation.

la: Plerique codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *ei*, quod tamen, sibi ipsis non constantes, paulo infra, ubi eadem propositio recurrit, apponunt. Mox ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. *producat* loco *producit*.

en: Most codices with ed. 1 omit *ei*, which however, inconsistently with themselves, they supply a little below where the same proposition recurs. Soon ed. 1 with one or another codex [reads] *producat* for *producit*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *poterat*, sed obstant antiquiores mss. cum ed. I.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *poterat*, but the older manuscripts with ed. I oppose [this].

la: Substituimus *Propterea* loco *Propter hoc* fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, aliqui tamen mss. deinde addunt *vel hoc* vel *ad hoc*. Mox auctoritate eorundem mss. et ed. 1 *posse generare* posuimus loco *potentiam generandi*.

en: We substituted *Propterea* for *Propter hoc* on the testimony of older manuscripts and ed. 1, though some manuscripts then add *vel hoc* or *ad hoc*. Soon, on the authority of the same manuscripts and ed. 1, we put *posse generare* for *potentiam generandi*.

la: Ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc, qui habent *principium* pro *primum*, sed minus concinne. Mox codd. inter se dissident; alii enim ut FGHIK cc ee legunt *nam haec est*, alii ut PQ cum edd. 1, 5 *nam hoc est*, alii demum cum Vat. et ed. I *nam hic est*.

en: So the older codices with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition and codex *cc*, which have *principium* for *primum*, but less aptly. Soon the codices disagree among themselves; for some, such as FGHIK *cc ee*, read *nam haec est*; others, such as PQ with edd. 1, 5, *nam hoc est*; others finally, with the Vatican edition and ed. I, *nam hic est*.

la: Parte I. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Part I a. 1 q. 2.

la: Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *quoniam* pro *quia*. Cod. R post *Similiter* addit *propter emanationem*.

en: With the manuscripts and ed. 1 favoring [this], we substituted *quoniam* for *quia*. Codex R after *Similiter* adds *propter emanationem*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et immediate infra *naturam* loco *materiam*, sed falso, ut ex contextu patet.

en: Many codices with ed. 1, here and immediately below, [read] *naturam* for *materiam*, but wrongly, as is clear from the context.

la: Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. omittit *dictum*, sed obstant fere omnes codd. cum ed. I.

en: Dist. 5 a. 2 q. 1. — The Vatican edition omits *dictum*, but nearly all the codices with ed. I oppose [this].

la: Supple cum cod. Z *fieri*, vel lege cum nonnullis codd. ut ASTV et ed. 1 *potest unum*. Mox ope mss. vetustiorum et ed. 1 substituimus *factae* loco *perfectae*. Cod. M cum ed. 1 *sic* pro *sicut*.

en: Supply with codex Z *fieri*, or read with some codices such as ASTV and ed. 1 *potest unum*. Soon, with the help of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted *factae* for *perfectae*. Codex M with ed. 1 [reads] *sic* for *sicut*.

la: Vide supra d. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ergo* loco *autem*.

en: See above d. 2 q. 1 ad 1. — Soon, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted *ergo* for *autem*.

la: Adiecimus particulam *neque*, quae ex obiectione et contextu requiritur, pro qua cod. T ponit *non*; plurimi codd. particulam illam omittunt legentes *quod non potuit*, fortasse eo quod, sicut supra in obiectione notavimus, verba Augustini alio modo allegant, scil. *non potuit Filius non generare*; in qua lectione hic supplenda sunt verba *non generare*. Cod. T paulo infra post *Filius habet non non potuit*; sed duplex negatio hic non ita necessaria videtur, sicut paulo supra.

en: We added the particle *neque*, which the objection and context require, for which codex T puts *non*; many codices omit that particle, reading *quod non potuit*, perhaps because, as we noted above in the objection, they allege Augustine's words in another way, viz. *non potuit Filius non generare*; in which reading the words *non generare* must be supplied here. Codex T a little below after *Filius habet* [reads] *non non potuit*; but the double negation here does not seem so necessary as a little above.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba *quia aptus* usque ad *gradi*, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* omits the words *quia aptus* down to *gradi*, but the older codices with ed. 1 oppose [this].

la: Nonnulli codd. ut bb ff cum ed. 1 *quare*.

en: Some codices such as *bb ff* with ed. 1 [read] *quare*.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ideo* et loco *est* substituimus *dicitur*, ac paulo infra post *sed* expunximus *tamen*.

en: On the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we supplied *ideo* and substituted *dicitur* for *est*, and a little below after *sed* we deleted *tamen*.

la: Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *carnales*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc superflue addit.

en: The older codices with ed. 1 omit *carnales*, which the Vatican edition with codex *cc* superfluously adds.

la: Scil., prima in corp. huius quaestionis. — Mox post *perfectionis* codd. LO non male adiiciunt *tantum*.

en: Namely, the first [reason] in the body of this question. — Soon after *perfectionis* codices LO not badly add *tantum*.

la: Cod. K *principiatus* loco *status*. In fine responsionis codd. aa bb addunt *quia lux et pater producunt diversum a se*.

en: Codex K [reads] *principiatus* for *status*. At the end of the response codices *aa bb* add *quia lux et pater producunt diversum a se*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio intime cohaeret cum praecedenti. In respons. dicitur: personas distingui per originem sive habitudinem. Hoc non disiunctive intelligi debet, sed sic: per originem cum relationibus inde resultantibus; cfr. infra d. 26 q. 3 et Scholion. — In solut. ad 2 verba: «et tunc negatur potentia et relinquitur aptitudo» etc. facile intelliguntur, si attenditur, quod oratio cum negatione privativa exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una negat actum, altera ponit subiectum ex natura sua aptum ad actum. Si igitur verba: *Filius non potuit*, sumuntur privative, i. e. ut impotens, tunc supponitur primo, quod ex natura sua sit ad hoc aptus, et deinde asseritur, quod hoc non potest. Cfr. S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

**II.** Cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I q. 51 m. 3 a. 2. — Scot., *Report.*, hic q. 2 (ubi expressis bis solutionem Seraphici approbat). — S. Thom., hic q. 2 a. 1; *S.* I q. 42 a. 6 ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 10. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 *princ.* — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 54 q. 8 etc. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is intimately connected with the preceding one. In the response it is said: persons are distinguished by origin or relation. This must not be understood disjunctively, but thus: by origin together with the relations resulting therefrom; cf. below d. 26 q. 3 and Scholion. — In the solution to 2 the words: «and then the power is denied and the aptitude is left» etc. are easily understood, if attention is paid to the fact that a clause with a privative negation is unfolded into two propositions, of which one denies the act, the other posits the subject as by its nature apt for the act. If therefore the words: *the Son could not*, are taken privatively, i.e. as *impotent*, then it is first supposed that by its nature it is apt for this, and then it is asserted that it cannot [do] this. Cf. St. Thomas and Richard, here on this passage.

**II.** Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 51 m. 3 a. 2. — Scotus, *Reportata*, here q. 2 (where he twice expressly approves the solution of the Seraphic Doctor). — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1; *Summa* I q. 42 a. 6 ad 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 5. 10. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 *princ.* — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 54 q. 8 etc. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 141 -->

### Quaestio III

*Utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint unica potentia.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum *posse generare* et *posse creare* sit[^1] unicum posse; et quod non sit unicum, videtur:

**1.** Augustinus[^2]: «Alio est Pater, alio est Deus»: ergo alio est generans, alio creans: sed potentia generandi est generans, potentia creandi est creans: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus per obiecta[^3]; ergo si generatio terminatur ad Deum et creatio ad creaturam, et haec sunt omnino diversa: ergo etc.

**3.** Item, potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, quoniam in pluribus potentibus[^4] plures sunt potentiae; sed potentia creandi est in Filio sive posse creare, in eo autem non est posse generare: ergo non sunt unum posse.

**4.** Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum potest intelligi, altero non intellecto, et e converso, illa non sunt unum; sed posse generare potest intelligi, circumscripta potentia creandi; et e converso posse creare, circumscripta potentia generandi[^5]: ergo etc.

*Contra:*

**1.** Unius potentis omnino simplicis unicum tantum est posse; sed[^6] Pater est potens omnino simplex: ergo unicum tantum habet posse; sed habet posse generare et posse creare: ergo illa duo sunt unicum posse.

**2.** Item, si posse est aliud et aliud[^7], cum posse generare respiciat personam, posse creare naturam: ergo natura et persona sunt duo: ergo nec natura de persona, nec e converso dicitur, quod est omnino falsum.

**3.** Item, si est distinctio inter posse generare et posse creare: ergo est ibi ordo. Quaero igitur, quid sit prius[^8] secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod potentia generandi, videtur, quia est respectu aeterni, et aeternum ante temporale. Sed contra: intellectus communis est ante intellectum proprii; sed potentia creandi dicit commune tribus, potentia generandi proprium Patris: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Potentia generandi et potentia creandi non secundum rem, sed solummodo secundum rationem intelligendi differunt.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod posse generare et posse creare est[^9] posse unicum, tamen dupliciter dictum. Unum enim esse est in re *esse Patrem* et *esse Deum*, differens autem secundum rationem intelligendi; quia hoc[^10] est absolutum, cum dico *esse Deum*, illud relatum, cum dico *esse Patrem*. Similiter et in posse est intelligendum. Unde sicut essentia et persona unum sunt in re, tamen est[^11] differentia rationis in intelligendo et in dicendo; similiter dicendum est de potentia generandi et creandi.

Et[^12] sicut est ibi differentia non re, sed secundum rationem, ita est ibi ordo secundum rationem intelligendi. Unde secundum diversas comparationes habent alium et alium ordinem. Comparando enim posse creare et posse generare *ad illud cuius sunt*; cum posse creare sit naturae, posse generare sit personae, et intellectus communis[^13] ante intellectum proprii; sic absque calumnia prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia *creandi*. Comparando autem *ad illud ad quod terminatur*; cum potentia creandi respiciat temporale, potentia vero generandi aeternum; prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia *generandi* quam potentia creandi: et sic patent obiecta de ordine.

Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod non differunt posse generare et posse creare differentia secundum rem sive secundum essentiam.

**1.** Ad illud ergo[^14] quod obiicitur, quod *alio est <!-- page 142 -->Deus, alio Pater*; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de alio et alio *alietate rationis*, et non rei. Et intelligitur *alietas rationis* per illum modum, quo supra dictum est distinctione quinta[^15], ubi quaeritur, utrum essentia generet.

**2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[^16] potentiae distinguuntur per actus etc.; dicendum, quod verum est hoc de illis actibus, qui habent *completionem ab obiectis*; sed non sunt sic actus divini. Unde quamvis creatura et Filius omnino differant, attamen generatio et creatio idem sunt, sicut essentia et persona. Deus enim in agendo non completur ab obiecto, quia *se ipso agit*.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae plurificantur per subiecta; dicendum, quod istud verum est de *subiecto proprio*; sed Filius non in quantum Filius est subiectum potentiae creandi, sed in quantum Deus. Et constat, quod natura divina non facit numerum cum Patre; ita nec potentia respiciens naturam cum potentia Patris.

**4.** Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero et e converso; dicendum, quod aut loqueris quantum ad[^17] *significatum*, aut quantum ad *connotatum*. Si quantum ad connotatum, verum dicis, quod creatura potest intelligi, non intellecta persona Filii, et e converso. Si quantum ad *principale significatum*, dicis[^18] falsum; impossibile est enim, intelligi potentiam generandi sine potentia creandi, sicut impossibile est intelligere personam sine essentia.

english:
### Question III

*Whether the power of begetting and the power of creating are one power.*

Third it is asked whether *to be able to beget* and *to be able to create* is[^1] one being-able; and that it is not one, seems evident:

**1.** Augustine[^2]: «He is Father by one [thing], God by another»: therefore by one He is generator, by another creator: but the power of begetting is generative, the power of creating is creative: therefore, etc.

**2.** Likewise, powers are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects[^3]; therefore if generation is terminated at God and creation at the creature, and these are altogether diverse: therefore, etc.

**3.** Likewise, powers are pluralized by subjects, since in many having power[^4] there are many powers; but the power of creating is in the Son — that is, *to be able to create* — yet in Him there is not *to be able to beget*: therefore they are not one *being-able*.

**4.** Likewise, whatever things are such that one can be understood without the other being understood, and conversely, those are not one; but *to be able to beget* can be understood when the power of creating is set aside, and conversely *to be able to create* when the power of begetting is set aside[^5]: therefore, etc.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Of one altogether simple having-power there is only one being-able; but[^6] the Father is altogether simple having-power: therefore He has only one being-able; but He has *to be able to beget* and *to be able to create*: therefore those two are one being-able.

**2.** Likewise, if being-able is one [thing] and another[^7], since *to be able to beget* regards person and *to be able to create* regards nature: therefore nature and person are two: therefore neither is the nature said of the person, nor conversely — which is altogether false.

**3.** Likewise, if there is a distinction between *to be able to beget* and *to be able to create*: then there is order there. I ask, therefore, what is prior[^8] according to the account of understanding. And that the power of begetting is, seems evident — because it is with respect to the eternal, and the eternal is prior to the temporal. But on the contrary: the understanding of the common is before the understanding of the proper; but the power of creating denotes what is common to the three, while the power of begetting denotes what is proper to the Father: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *The power of begetting and the power of creating differ not in reality but only according to the account of understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *to be able to beget* and *to be able to create* are[^9] one being-able, yet said in two ways. For *to be Father* and *to be God* are one being in reality, but differ according to the account of understanding — because this[^10] is absolute, when I say *to be God*; that is relative, when I say *to be Father*. Likewise it must also be understood in *being-able*. Hence as essence and person are one in reality, yet there is[^11] a difference of account in understanding and in speaking, so it must be said of the power of begetting and creating.

And[^12] just as there is there a difference not in reality but according to account, so there is also order according to the account of understanding. Hence according to diverse comparisons they have one and another order. For comparing *to be able to create* and *to be able to beget* *to that to which they belong* — since the power of creating belongs to nature, and the power of begetting to person, and the understanding of the common[^13] is before the understanding of the proper — thus without dispute the power of *creating* is prior according to the account of understanding. But comparing them *to that at which they are terminated* — since the power of creating regards the temporal, while the power of begetting regards the eternal — the power of *begetting* is prior according to the account of understanding to the power of creating; and so the objections concerning order are clear.

The arguments showing that *to be able to beget* and *to be able to create* do not differ by a difference according to reality or essence are therefore to be conceded.

**1.** To the objection, therefore[^14], that *He is God by one, Father by another*: it must be said that Augustine speaks of *one and another* with an *otherness of account*, and not of reality. And *otherness of account* is understood in that way which was said above in distinction five[^15], where it is asked whether the essence begets.

**2.** To the objection that[^16] powers are distinguished by their acts, etc.: it must be said that this is true of those acts which have their *completion from their objects*; but divine acts are not so. Hence although the creature and the Son altogether differ, nevertheless generation and creation are the same, just as essence and person. For God in acting is not completed by an object, since *He acts by Himself*.

**3.** To the objection that powers are pluralized by subjects: it must be said that this is true of the *proper subject*; but the Son, *insofar as He is Son*, is not the subject of the power of creating, but *insofar as He is God*. And it is plain that the divine nature does not make number with the Father; thus neither does the power regarding the nature with the power of the Father.

**4.** To the last objection, that one can be understood without the other and conversely: it must be said that you speak either as to[^17] *what is signified* or as to *what is connoted*. If as to what is connoted, you speak truly — that the creature can be understood without the person of the Son being understood, and conversely. If as to *the principal signified*, you speak[^18] falsely: for it is impossible to understand the power of begetting without the power of creating, just as it is impossible to understand person without essence.

la: Vat. hic et paulo post praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *sint*.

en: The Vatican edition here and shortly after, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *sint*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 1. et 6.; ac *Serm.* 1. in *Psalm.* 68. n. 5. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. *per Augustinum*; ed. 1 *dicere Augustinus*.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 1 and 6; and *Sermon* 1 on *Psalm* 68, n. 5. — The Vatican edition, against the older codices, [introduces] *per Augustinum* ['through Augustine']; ed. 1 reads *dicere Augustinus* ['Augustine says'].

la: Aristotelis verba hac de re vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.

en: For Aristotle's words on this point see above, q. 1, fundamentum 2.

la: Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc *quia in pluribus subiectis*.

en: So the older codices with ed. 1; but the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *quia in pluribus subiectis* ['since in many subjects'].

la: Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, qui omittunt verba *et e converso* usque *generandi*, restauramus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: We restore — by the help of the other manuscripts and of ed. 1 — the mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, which omit the words *et e converso* down to *generandi*.

la: Adiecimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omissum *sed*.

en: We have supplied, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1, the *sed* that had been less aptly omitted.

la: Cod. bb satis bene *si posse creare et posse generare est aliud et aliud posse*.

en: Codex bb, well enough, reads *si posse creare et posse generare est aliud et aliud posse* ['if to be able to create and to be able to beget is one being-able and another'].

la: Plurimi codd. non ita bene nec cum subnexis cohaerenter *principatus*.

en: Most codices read *principatus* — not so well and not coherent with what follows.

la: Vat. contra mss. *sunt*. Mox post *enim* nonnulli codd. ut CRS omittunt *esse*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, reads *sunt*. Shortly after, after *enim*, some codices such as CRS omit *esse*.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *quod* pro *hoc*, et paulo infra *idem est* loco *illud*.

en: The Vatican edition, against almost all the codices and ed. 1, reads *quod* for *hoc*, and a little later *idem est* in place of *illud*.

la: Codd. inter se non conveniunt; alii ut AFGHKMTV cum ed. 1 pro *tamen est* habent *cum*, alii cum Vat. exhibent textum nostrum, cod. R *tamen differunt ratione*. Mox post *rationis* nonnulli codd. ut ATX etc. cum ed. 1 addunt particulam *et*.

en: The codices do not agree with one another: some, such as AFGHKMTV with ed. 1, have *cum* instead of *tamen est*; others, with the Vatican edition, show our text; codex R reads *tamen differunt ratione*. Shortly after, after *rationis*, some codices such as ATX etc. with ed. 1 add the particle *et*.

la: Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. supplevimus *Et*. Mox pauci codd. ut HK post *rationem* habent *intelligendi, ita*.

en: On the witness of the manuscripts and of the first six editions we have supplied *Et*. Shortly after, a few codices such as HK have, after *rationem*, *intelligendi, ita*.

la: Faventibus plurimis codd. et ed. 1, expunximus hic additum *est*.

en: With the support of most codices and ed. 1, we have expunged the *est* added here.

la: Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *ergo*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have added *ergo*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit *quod*. — Proxime sequens propositio intelligitur de illis actibus, qui causantur aliquo modo ab obiectis, sicuti fit in intellectione nostra.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, omits *quod*. — The proposition immediately following is to be understood of those acts which are caused in some way by their objects, as happens in our act of understanding.

la: Cod. Z propter subnexa non incongrue addit *principale* i. e. quod primo et per se significatur, exclusa omni connotatione.

en: Codex Z, because of what follows, not inappropriately adds *principale* — that is, what is primarily and per se signified, with every connotation excluded.

la: Antiquiores codd. ut AFGHKSW etc. vel omittunt *dicis*, quod tunc certe est supplendum, vel cum ed. 1 loco ipsius ponunt *est*.

en: The older codices such as AFGHKSW etc. either omit *dicis* — which then certainly must be supplied — or, with ed. 1, put *est* in its place.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De differentia inter essentiam et personam cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2. et Scholion. — Ad verba in solut. ad 3: «Verum est de subiecto proprio», notandum, quod distinguitur *subiectum proximum et adaequatum* alicuius potentiae et *remotum*. Subiectum proximum sive primarium potentiae divinae creativae est unicum, scil. essentia divina. Et axioma: *potentiae plurificantur per subiecta*, non oportet quod sit verum, quando agitur de subiecto remoto, quod est persona divina.

**II.** Hanc quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici non nisi breviter tractant. Ipsam tangit S. Doctor infra d. 20. a. 1. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; *de Potentia* q. 2. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** On the difference between essence and person, see below d. 33, q. 2, and the Scholion. — To the words in the reply to 3, *«this is true of the proper subject»*, it should be noted that we distinguish a *proximate and adequate* subject of some power from a *remote* one. The proximate or primary subject of the divine creative power is one — namely the divine essence. And the axiom *powers are pluralized by subjects* need not be true when the matter concerns the *remote* subject, which is the divine person.

**II.** Other older Scholastics treat this question only briefly. The Holy Doctor touches it below at d. 20, a. 1, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 20, mm. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *de Potentia* q. 2, a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, on this and the following question here, 1 *princ.* q. 3. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 142 -->

### Quaestio IV

*Utrum posse generari et posse creari sint univocum posse.*

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum *posse generari* et *posse creari* sint[^1] univocum posse. Et quod non, videtur:

**1.** Quia quamvis idem sit generare et creare quantum ad principale significatum, aliud tamen est generari et creari, sicut Creator et creatura: ergo cum non habeant[^2] esse univocum creatura et Creator: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, creatio dicit egressum et mutationem, generatio vero omnem excludit mutationem: ergo cum *posse creari* importet potentiam transmutandi, *posse generari* non, cum potentiae differant in sua generalitate in potentia transmutandi[^3], et in hac non conveniunt: ergo in nulla.

**3.** Item, omne distribuit terminum pro omnibus, quae univocantur vel analogantur in illo[^4]; sed cum dico *omnipotens*, non fit distributio pro illo, quod potest generare, quia tunc Filius non esset omnipotens: ergo manifestum est, quod utrumque posse nec est univocum nec analogum; alioquin omnipotentia non convenit Filio.

*Sed contra:*

**1.** *Res* est commune ad fruibile et utibile: ergo cum aequalis ambitus vel maioris sit *possibile* quam *res*, et non sit maior differentia inter generatum et creatum[^5] quam inter fruibile et utibile, pari ratione *possibile* sive *posse* est commune ad utrumque.

**2.** Item, in aeternis non potest esse multiplicitas

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nec diversitas: ergo cum *posse creari* et *posse generari* ab aeterno ante conditionem creaturae fuerint, ergo non[^6] habent multiplicationem in ipsa potentia.

**3.** Item, cum dico: *creatura potest creari*, nihil dico[^7] creatum; quia illud vere dicitur de eo quod omnino nihil est, sicut de anima antichristi: ergo solum dico potentiam agentis; sed potentia Dei est unica, non habens aliquam multiplicitatem: ergo eius *posse* univocum est ad *posse creari* et *posse generari*.

### Conclusio

> *Posse generari et posse creari quoad principale significatum re idem sunt et univoce dicuntur, quoad connotatum vero analogice.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dico *posse creari* et *posse generari*, dico principale significatum et dico connotatum. Quantum ad principale significatum, dico, quod *posse creari* idem dicit re, quod *posse creare*, differens solum[^8] modo loquendi vel dicendi: quia quod dicitur per modum actionis per *posse creare*, dicit *posse creari* per modum passionis. Quantum vero ad connotatum dicit effectum in creatura.

Quando[^9] ergo comparantur *posse creari* et *posse generari*, si comparentur ratione *principalis significati*, dico, quod non tantum est univocum, immo etiam unicum, ut visum est[^10], aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum, sicut *posse generare* et *posse creare*. Si autem ratione *connotati* comparentur, sic concedo, quod est analogum, sicut hoc nomen *res* ad fruibilia et utibilia. Quamvis enim Creator et creatura non habeant commune univocum, habent tamen analogum.

Notandum tamen, quod duplex est analogia: quaedam per reductionem ad unitatem naturae secundum prius et posterius; et haec potest esse[^11] comparando creaturam ad creaturam, et in hac signum[^12] distribuit pro omnibus contentis, nisi sit distributio restricta ex additione, vel ex usu sive modo loquendi, sicut dicitur distributio accommoda[^13], ut si dicatur: *caelum tegit omnia*. Alia est analogia per reductionem ad unitatem *similitudinis proportionalis*, non naturae; et quod sic analogatur non est inter alia, sed super alia[^14]. Unde distributio proprie pro illo non distribuit, nisi sit extensa. Unde Deus non est ens *inter* omnia, sed *super* omnia.

Et hinc est, quod *omnipotens* non distribuit pro potentia generandi proprie accepta distributione, nisi fiat quaedam extensio, et ex illa per consequens fiat quaedam appropriatio circa suppositum. Unde proprie *omnipotens* convenit tribus, quia non distribuit[^15] pro potentia generandi; appropriate autem, secundum quod fit ampliatio ex parte signi, solius est Patris.

Ex his patent omnia obiecta; procedunt enim per diversas vias, ut patet intuenti.

english:
### Question IV

*Whether to-be-able-to-be-begotten and to-be-able-to-be-created are a univocal being-able.*

Last it is asked whether *to be able to be begotten* and *to be able to be created* are a univocal being-able. And that they are not, seems evident:

**1.** Because although *to beget* and *to create* are the same as to the principal signified, *to be begotten* and *to be created* are nevertheless different, just as Creator and creature [are different]: therefore since[^2] creature and Creator do not have a univocal being: therefore etc.[^1]

**2.** Likewise, creation expresses a coming-forth and a change; generation, however, excludes all change: therefore since *to be able to be created* imports a power of being-changed, and *to be able to be begotten* does not, since the powers differ in their general account in the power of being-changed[^3], and they do not agree in this: therefore [they agree] in nothing.

**3.** Likewise, *every* (omne) distributes a term for all things which are univocally or analogically [signified] in it[^4]; but when I say *omnipotent*, no distribution is made for that which can beget, because then the Son would not be omnipotent: therefore it is manifest that the two beings-able are neither univocal nor analogical; otherwise omnipotence would not belong to the Son.

*But on the contrary:*

**1.** *Thing* (res) is common to the enjoyable and the useful: therefore since *possible* has equal or greater extension than *thing*, and there is not a greater difference between the begotten and the created[^5] than between the enjoyable and the useful, by parity of reason *possible* or *being-able* is common to both.

**2.** Likewise, in eternal things there can be no multiplicity nor diversity: therefore since *to be able to be created* and *to be able to be begotten* have existed from eternity before the establishment of the creature, therefore they do not[^6] have multiplication in the power itself.

**3.** Likewise, when I say: *the creature can be created*, I say nothing[^7] [is] created; for that is truly said of what is altogether nothing, as of the soul of the Antichrist: therefore I speak only of the agent's power; but the power of God is one, having no multiplicity: therefore His *being-able* is univocal to *to be able to be created* and *to be able to be begotten*.

### Conclusion

> *To-be-able-to-be-begotten and to-be-able-to-be-created, as to the principal signified, are the same in reality and are said univocally; as to the connoted, however, [they are said] analogically.*

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *to be able to be created* and *to be able to be begotten*, I speak of a principal signified and I speak of a connoted. As to the principal signified, I say that *to be able to be created* says the same in reality as *to be able to create*, differing only[^8] in the mode of speaking or saying: because what is said by way of action through *to be able to create*, *to be able to be created* says by way of passion. As to what is connoted, however, it says an effect in the creature.

When[^9], therefore, *to be able to be created* and *to be able to be begotten* are compared, if they are compared by reason of the *principal signified*, I say that it is not only univocal, but indeed one [thing], as has been seen[^10], yet understood and uttered in one way and another, as *to be able to beget* and *to be able to create*. But if they are compared by reason of the *connoted*, then I concede that it is analogical, like this name *thing* (res) for the enjoyable and the useful. For although Creator and creature do not have a common univocal [term], they nevertheless have an analogical one.

It should be noted, however, that analogy is twofold: one [is] by reduction to the unity of *nature* according to prior and posterior; and this can be[^11] by comparing creature to creature, and in this [analogy] the sign[^12] distributes for all the things contained, unless the distribution be restricted by addition, or by use or mode of speaking — as is called an accommodated distribution[^13] — as when it is said: *the sky covers all things*. The other is analogy by reduction to the unity of *proportional likeness*, not of nature; and what is so analogically related is not *among* others, but *above* others[^14]. Hence a distribution does not properly distribute for it unless it be extended. Hence God is not a being *among* all things, but *above* all things.

And hence *omnipotent* does not distribute for the power of begetting, taken in the proper distributive sense, unless a certain extension is made — and from that, by consequence, a certain appropriation is made regarding the supposit. Hence properly *omnipotent* belongs to the three [persons], because it does not distribute[^15] for the power of begetting; appropriately, however, according as an extension is made on the side of the sign, [it belongs] to the Father alone.

From these [things] the responses to all the objections are clear; for they proceed by different paths, as is plain to one who looks.

la: Mss. plurimi cum sex primis edd. *sit*.

en: Most manuscripts together with the first six editions [read] *sit* [singular] [for *sint*].

la: Vat., obnitentibus multis codd. ut HISTWZ aa etc. et ed. 1, minus apte *habeat*.

en: The Vatican edition, against many codices (such as HISTWZ aa etc.) and ed. 1, less aptly [reads] *habeat* [singular].

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 17. et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12. et VIII. c. 1.), ubi species potentiae recensentur et pro genere earum proximo, in quo omnes conveniunt, assignatur, quod sint principium motus aut transmutationis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V text 17 and IX text 2 (IV c. 12 and VIII c. 1), where the species of potency are reviewed, and for their proximate genus — in which all agree — it is assigned that they are a principle of motion or change.

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 31. (IV. c. 26): *Quorum quidem non facit positio differentiam, omne dicitur*. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., *Summulae* tract. de *Distributione*. — Mox antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 *generare*; Vat. et cod. cc non bene *generari*. Agitur quidem de generatione passiva, sed argumentatio incipit a potentia activa, importata in voce *omnipotens*, et recte infertur, si potentia activa generandi non cadit proprie sub *omnipotentia*, tunc et generatio passiva non cadit sub *omnia quae potest*; ergo etc.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V text 31 (IV c. 26): *Of those things whose position makes no difference, "every" is said.* Cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract. *On Distribution*. — Just after, the older codices with ed. 1 [have] *generare* ("to beget"); the Vatican edition and codex cc, not well, [have] *generari* ("to be begotten"). The matter at issue is indeed passive generation, but the argumentation begins from active potency imported in the word *omnipotent*, and it is rightly inferred: if the active power of begetting does not properly fall under *omnipotence*, then passive generation likewise does not fall under *all things which He can [do]*; therefore etc.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *creatum* pro *creaturam*.

en: On the trust of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *creatum* ("the created") for *creaturam* ("creature").

la: Cod. W *nec*.

en: Codex W [reads] *nec* [for *non*].

la: Vat. cum cod. cc contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 *dicit*; cod. I *creaturam posse creari, nihil dico esse creatum*. Paulo infra post *sicut* cod. M addit *est*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, [reads] *dicit*; codex I [has] *the creature can be created, I say nothing is created*. A little below, after *sicut*, codex M adds *est*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *in*; aliqui codd. *solo* pro *solum*. Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, *dicitur per* loco *dicit*.

en: On the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged here the added *in*; some codices [have] *solo* for *solum*. Just after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [has] *dicitur per* in place of *dicit*.

la: Mendosa lectio Vat. *Quo modo* pro *Quando* castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: The faulty reading of the Vatican edition, *Quo modo* ("In what way") for *Quando* ("When"), is corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Paulo supra; vide etiam quaest. praeced.

en: A little above; see also the preceding question.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc praemittit *est*, quod tamen abest a ceteris mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc prefixes *est*, which however is absent from the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Id est *omne*, quod ideo vocatur *signum*, quia per ipsum indicatur, quantum alius terminus valeat.

en: That is, *every* — which is for this reason called a *sign*, because by it is indicated how far another term reaches.

la: Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *accomodata*, et paulo infra *proportionis* loco *proportionalis*. Pauci codd. *regit* pro *tegit*, sed incongrue et contra Petr. Hispan. *Summulam* tract. de *Distributione*. — Mox post *naturae* codd. aa bb addunt *ut Creatoris ad creaturam*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the trust of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *accomodata*, and a little below *proportionis* in place of *proportionalis*. A few codices [have] *regit* for *tegit*, but incongruously and against Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract. *On Distribution*. — Just after *naturae*, codices aa bb add *as of Creator to creature*.

la: Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *sed super alia*, et paulo infra, consentientibus omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus *sed super omnia*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *but above others*, and a little below, with all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 agreeing, we have added *but above all things*.

la: Cod. M X addunt *proprie*.

en: Codices M [and] X add *proprie* ("properly").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ut subtilis haec quaestio, quae a paucis antiquis Scholasticis tractatur, recte intelligatur, attendendum est, quo sensu S. Doctor accipiat locutionem: *posse creari*. Non sumitur in sensu passivae potentiae, quae est ex parte creaturae, sed in sensu activae potentiae, quae est in Deo, ut patet ex ult. arg. Ratio huius modi loquendi explicatur infra d. 42. q. 1., ubi S. Doctor inter alia haec habet (ad 2.): «*mundum creari*, quamvis dicat potentiam per modum passionis, tamen secundum rem non dicit nisi potentiam activam, quia ante mundi creationem nihil est nisi potentia activa.» Item (ad 1.): «*Possibile* potest dici denominative a potentia passiva vel activa; et quia in Deo proprie est potentia activa, ideo dicitur *possibile simpliciter* secundum quod ab illa denominatur, non secundum quod a passiva». Hanc sententiam probat in corp. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 2. et 3, et S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. a. 2. Certe res creabilis ante suam creationem nihil omnino est nec habet, ergo nec potentiam passivam; unde solummodo denominatione extrinseca i. e. cum respectu ad primam causam, attribuitur ipsi *posse creari*.

**II.** His suppositis, tres propositiones S. Doctoris sunt manifestae: 1. *Posse creari* et *posse creare*, licet differant grammaticaliter, non differunt in re, si attenditur principale significatum, quod est creatrix essentia divina. — 2. *Posse creari* et *posse generari* ratione *principalis significati* sunt univoca, immo unicum. «Nam ipsa divina substantia sub ratione, qua communicabilis est per generationem, est potentia, qua Filius potuit generari», Richard. (hic q. 3.). — 3. *Posse generari* et *posse creari* ratione *connotati* non habent aliquid commune nisi analogum, cum primum connotet Filium aeternum, secundum vero creaturam.

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**III.** Quoad analogiam in genere cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 5. et ibid. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1. ac Scholion. Duplicem analogiam distinguit textus: prima species est quae fit per reductionem ad unitatem naturae; secunda, per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis. Circa primam speciem haec notamus. In unoquoque genere rerum creatarum est unum, quod sic est mensura aliorum, ut unumquodque in tantum habeat perfectionem suae naturae, in quantum plus minusve ad hanc mensuram accedit. In prima hac specie analogiae «signum distributivum (v. g. *omnis*) distribuit pro omnibus contentis» i. e. applicat conceptum termini ad omnia et singula sub ipso comprehensa. Sed hoc non valet quoad secundam speciem. Secunda species sive analogia *proportionalitatis* declaratur in textu. Ex hoc principio S. Doctor deducit, quod potentia generandi in Deo non comprehendatur proprie sub omnipotentia (in corp. et dub. 1. 2.). Idem docent: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Report., 1. Sent. d. 20. q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., 1. Sent. d. 20. princ. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Consentit etiam S. Thom. I. Sent. d. 20. q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 42. a. 6. ad 3; tamen *de Potentia* q. 2. a. 5. aliter loquitur. Videtur autem, quod solus modus loquendi sit diversus.

**IV.** Quoad conclusionem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That this subtle question, which is treated by few of the older Scholastics, be rightly understood, attention must be paid to the sense in which the Holy Doctor takes the locution *posse creari* ("to be able to be created"). It is not taken in the sense of passive potency, which is on the side of the creature, but in the sense of active potency, which is in God — as is clear from the last argument. The ground of this mode of speaking is explained below at d. 42, q. 1, where the Holy Doctor among other things has this (ad 2): «*for the world to be created*, although it expresses potency by way of passion, nevertheless according to reality says nothing but active potency, because before the creation of the world there is nothing except active potency.» Likewise (ad 1): «*Possible* can be said denominatively from passive or active potency; and because in God it is properly active potency, therefore *possible simply* is said insofar as it is denominated from that, not insofar as [it is denominated] from passive [potency].» This sententia he proves in the corpus. Cf. also Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 2 and 3, and St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 42. q. 2. a. 2. Certainly the createable thing before its creation is altogether nothing and has nothing, therefore neither passive potency; whence only by extrinsic denomination — i. e. with regard to the first cause — is *posse creari* attributed to it.

**II.** With these things supposed, three propositions of the Holy Doctor are manifest: 1. *Posse creari* and *posse creare*, though they differ grammatically, do not differ in reality, if the principal signified is regarded — which is the creating divine essence. — 2. *Posse creari* and *posse generari* by reason of the *principal signified* are univocal, indeed one [thing]. «For the divine substance itself, under the account by which it is communicable through generation, is the potency by which the Son could be begotten», Richard (here q. 3). — 3. *Posse generari* and *posse creari* by reason of the *connoted* have nothing in common except [what is] analogical, since the first connotes the eternal Son, but the second the creature.

**III.** On analogy in general, cf. above d. 1. dub. 5. and ibid. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1. and the Scholion. The text distinguishes a twofold analogy: the first species is that which is made by reduction to the unity of nature; the second, by reduction to the unity of proportional likeness. Concerning the first species we note this. In each genus of created things there is one [item] which is so the measure of the others that each one has perfection of its nature in the degree to which it more or less approaches this measure. In this first species of analogy «a distributive sign (e. g. *every*) distributes for all things contained» — i. e. applies the concept of the term to each and every thing comprehended under it. But this does not hold for the second species. The second species — analogy *of proportionality* — is declared in the text. From this principle the Holy Doctor deduces that the power of begetting in God is not properly comprehended under omnipotence (in the corpus and dubia 1 and 2). The same is taught by: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scotus, *Report.*, 1 Sent. d. 20. q. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., 1 Sent. d. 20. princ. 1. q. 1 and 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3. — St. Thomas also agrees: I Sent. d. 20. q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 42. a. 6 ad 3; nevertheless in *de Potentia* q. 2. a. 5 he speaks otherwise. It seems, however, that only the mode of speaking is different.

**IV.** As to the conclusion, cf. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1 and 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4.

---


title: Dist. 7, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts concerning the Master's text

source_text:
### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima est de solutione ista Magistri, qua dicit, quod non sequitur: *Pater potest generare, quod non*[^1] *Filium: ergo potest aliquid, quod non Filius;* et respondet, quod *posse generare non est posse aliquid subiectum divinae potentiae*. Sed hoc non videtur solvere, sed aggravare argumentum. Tunc enim, cum *posse generare*[^2] sit posse maximum, videtur quod maius inconveniens sequatur, et magis derogetur potentiae Filii, si in hoc deficit, quam si in subiectis[^3] divinae potentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister bene solvit. Potentia enim Patris habet comparari ad inferius et ad aequale, sed ad superius non, cum careat superiori. Cum comparatur ad inferius, tunc est potentia essentialis et essentialiter retenta[^4], quia connotat respectum in creatura; et respectu talis potentiae inconveniens esset, quod aliquid posset Pater, quod non posset Filius, quia tunc differrent per essentiam. Cum autem comparatur ad aequale, ut ad personam, tunc trahitur ad personam; et tunc nullum inconveniens est, si aliqua proprietas personalis est in Patre, quae non est in Filio. Ideo non sequitur, quod aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.

#### Dub. II.

Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicitur, quod generatio Filii non est de omnibus. Videtur enim Richardus de sancto Victore[^5] dicere contrarium, qui dicit, quod *quia omnipotens est, excusari non potest, quin Filium genuerit:* ergo generatio Filii continetur sub omnipotentia: ergo Filius inter omnia continetur et est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister, generatio Filii non continetur sub omnipotentia, nisi acciperetur omnipotentia per appropriationem. Et quod dicit Richardus non intelligitur[^6], tanquam Filius sit inter omnia, sed tanquam ante omnia; unde arguit a posteriori. Si enim emanatio naturae secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit emanationem secundum rationem voluntatis, nunquam Deus esset potens producere creaturam per voluntatem, nisi etiam produxisset Filium per naturam.

#### Dub. III.

Item videtur male dicere, cum dicit, quod *esse Patrem non est esse aliquid;* quia cum inter aliquid et nihil non cadat medium, si non est esse aliquid: ergo est esse nihil[^7].

**Respondeo:** Esse aliquid dicitur dupliciter: vel communiter ad essentiam et personam; et sic non cadit medium, et in hoc sensu esse Patrem est esse aliquid; alio modo, prout trahitur[^8] ad essentiam; et sic cadit inter esse aliquid et esse nihil medium, scilicet esse aliquem; persona enim praedicatur ut *quis*, non ut *quid*[^9].

#### Dub. IV.[^10]

Item quaeritur de ista illatione Magistri: *Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius, ergo potuit mutari,* et ponitur ibi: *Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius* etc. Videtur ista illatio non valere, quia in creaturis, ubi

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magis differt relatio a supposito, potest dici, quod[^11] similis potest esse alteri dissimilis sine sui mutatione: ergo cum filiatio et spiratio sint relationes, pari ratione Filius poterit esse Spiritus sanctus, et e converso sine mutatione. Item, omne mutabile est aliquid praeter illud, secundum quod mutatur, ut si non album fiat album, est aliud quam albedo: ergo si intelligatur Spiritus sanctus mutari, si generetur, tunc aliud esset in eo generatio, aliud ille qui generatur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis existere; unde sine illis potest res esse et cum illis; in divinis autem dant personis existere; et ideo si in personis intelligatur, quod proprietas[^12] insit hypostasi, intelligitur esse hypostasis, et similiter, si intelligitur non inesse, intelligitur hypostasis non esse. Cum ergo Spiritus sanctus non possit simul spirari et generari — quia quamvis una persona possit duobus modis producere, tamen una persona non potest nisi uno modo produci — sequitur de necessitate: si potest Spiritus sanctus esse Filius vel potuit, potest non esse Spiritus sive non spirari; et si potuit non spirari, potuit non esse; et iterum si potuit generari, potuit esse: et ita potuit fieri de ente non ens et de non ente ens, ac per hoc mutari.

Et sic[^13] patet ultimum, quia non dicitur mutari propter diversificationem proprietatum circa idem suppositum, sicut est in mutatione naturali, sed propter corruptionem et inceptionem eiusdem. Nec est illud simile: *Pater potest generare et spirare sine sui mutatione: ergo Spiritus sanctus*[^14] *generari et spirari;* quia non est inconveniens, unum principium pluribus modis producere, sed unum principiatum pluribus modis produci est impossibile et incompossibile; et ideo patet illud.

#### Dub. V.

Item videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: *Pater non est potens nisi natura;* eius enim potentia est essentia, quia secundum hoc generare, quod nullo modo est essentiae, nullo modo esset potentiae.

**Respondeo:** Quamvis potentia, absolute considerata, sit idem quod essentia, tamen potentia, quia non est nomen adeo abstractum sicut essentia, trahitur ad personam. Unde potentia generandi non dicit naturam divinam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in tali persona, scilicet innascibili; ideo non est simile de hoc nomine *essentia* et de hoc nomine *potentia*[^15].

#### Dub. VI.

Item videtur male dicere ibi: *Aliam significes potentiam, qua Pater potest gignere* etc.; quia potentiae divisio sufficiens est per activam et passivam[^16]; sed *posse gignere* dicit potentiam activam, *posse gigni* potentiam passivam: ergo non potest alia potentia significari. Si tu dicas, quod generare non est agere proprie, similiter nec generari pati; obiicitur, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus[^17]; sed aliud est gignere et aliud gigni: ergo alia est potentia huius et illius.

**Respondeo:** Ista distinctio, quam ponit Magister de potentia gignendi active et passive, fundatur super hoc, quod potentia potest considerari secundum *id quod est;* et sic dicit naturam, et sicut una natura est in generante et genito, sed alio et alio modo, sic eadem potentia. Potest iterum considerari secundum *id ad quod est;* et sic dicit modum existendi naturam in persona in comparatione ad alium, qui est principium vel principiatum. Et sic, cum diversi modi sint, diversae dicuntur proprietates *posse generare* et *posse generari* et distinguuntur secundum actus personales; sed primo modo non.

#### Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius sive qua potest gigni.* Videtur enim dubium vel falsum, quia gigni omnino est a gignere, et gignere est a potentia Patris: ergo et gigni.

**Respondeo:** Sicut potentia gignendi in Patre non dicit nisi naturam in persona ut natam ex se producere aliam, sic potentia gignendi in Filio non dicit nisi naturam[^18] in persona ut natam produci ab alia; sicut enim hypostasi Patris convenit generare, sic hypostasi Filii convenit generari. Nec valet quod obiicitur in contrarium. Nam omne quod habet Filius, sive essentiale sive personale, habet a Patre. Ideo quamvis ipsum gigni sit a potentia Patris, non excluditur tamen[^19] quin potentia gignendi passiva sit in Filio. Sed illa potentia non est principium generationis, sed idoneitas sive hypostasis cum sua proprietate ad generari. Unde quod dicitur *posse gigni*, potentia potest intelligi *originaliter*, et sic est in solo Patre; vel *formaliter*, et sic ponitur esse in Filio; alio autem modo non.

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### Doubts concerning the Master's text.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there arise doubts concerning the text, and the first is about that solution of the Master, in which he says that it does not follow: *The Father can generate that which*[^1] *the Son cannot: therefore he can do something which the Son cannot;* and he answers that *to be able to generate is not to be able [to do] something subject to the divine power*. But this seems not to solve but to aggravate the argument. For then, since *to be able to generate*[^2] is to be able [to do] the greatest thing, it seems that a greater unfittingness follows, and the power of the Son is more derogated, if he is deficient in this, than if [he were deficient] in things subject[^3] to the divine power.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master solves [it] well. For the power of the Father can be compared to what is below and to what is equal, but not to what is above, since it has nothing above it. When it is compared to what is below, then it is essential power and essentially retained[^4], because it connotes a respect to the creature; and with respect to such a power it would be unfitting that the Father should be able to do something which the Son could not do, because then they would differ by essence. But when it is compared to what is equal, namely to a person, then it is drawn to the person; and then it is no unfittingness, if some personal property is in the Father, which is not in the Son. Therefore it does not follow that some power is in the Father which is not in the Son.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, there is doubt about the statement that the generation of the Son is not [included] among "all things." For Richard of St. Victor[^5] seems to say the contrary, who says that *because he is omnipotent, he cannot be excused from having generated the Son:* therefore the generation of the Son is contained under omnipotence: therefore the Son is contained among all things and is [one of them].

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says, the generation of the Son is not contained under omnipotence, unless omnipotence be taken by appropriation. And what Richard says is not to be understood[^6] as though the Son were among all things, but as though [he were] before all things; whence he argues a posteriori. For if the emanation of nature according to the rational order of the intellect precedes the emanation according to the rational order of the will, God would never be able to produce a creature through the will, unless he had also produced the Son through nature.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, he seems to speak ill when he says that *to be the Father is not to be something;* because, since between something and nothing there falls no middle, if it is not to be something: therefore it is to be nothing[^7].

**I respond:** "To be something" is said in two ways: either commonly, with reference to essence and person; and so no middle falls, and in this sense to be the Father is to be something; in another way, insofar as it is drawn[^8] to the essence; and thus a middle falls between to be something and to be nothing, namely to be someone; for a person is predicated as *who*, not as *what*[^9].

#### Doubt IV.[^10]

Likewise it is asked concerning this inference of the Master: *The Holy Spirit could have been the Son, therefore he could have been changed,* and there is added: *For if he could have been born, he could have been the Son* etc. This inference seems not to hold, because in creatures, where

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a relation differs more from a supposit, it can be said that[^11] one similar [thing] can be dissimilar to another without its being changed: therefore, since filiation and spiration are relations, by parity of reasoning the Son could be the Holy Spirit, and conversely, without change. Likewise, every changeable thing is something besides that according to which it is changed, as if a non-white [thing] becomes white, it is other than the whiteness: therefore if the Holy Spirit be understood to be changed, if he were generated, then in him the generation would be one thing, and the one who is generated another; but this is false: therefore etc.

**I respond:** The case is otherwise in the relations of the creature and of God: because relations in creatures do not give the related things existence; whence without them the thing can exist and with them; but in the divine they give the persons existence; and therefore if it be understood in the persons that a property[^12] is in the hypostasis, it is understood that the hypostasis is, and likewise, if it is understood not to be in [it], it is understood that the hypostasis is not. Since therefore the Holy Spirit cannot be at once spirated and generated — because, although one person can produce in two modes, nevertheless one person cannot be produced except in one mode — it follows of necessity: if the Holy Spirit can be the Son or could have been, he can not be the Spirit or not be spirated; and if he could not be spirated, he could not be; and again if he could be generated, he could be: and so he could become a non-being from a being, and a being from a non-being, and through this be changed.

And thus[^13] the last point is clear, because [he] is not said to be changed on account of a diversification of properties about the same supposit, as is the case in natural change, but on account of the corruption and inception of the same. Nor is that similar: *The Father can generate and spirate without his being changed: therefore the Holy Spirit*[^14] *[can] be generated and spirated;* because it is not unfitting that one principle produce in many modes, but that one thing originated be produced in many modes is impossible and incompossible; and therefore that is clear.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, he seems to speak falsely when he says: *The Father is not powerful except by nature;* for his power is essence, since according to this, "to generate," which in no way is of the essence, in no way would be of the power.

**I respond:** Although power, considered absolutely, is the same as essence, nevertheless power, because it is not a name as abstract as essence, is drawn to the person. Hence the power of generating does not signify the divine nature simply, but the nature as in such a person, namely the unbegotten one; therefore there is no parallel between this name *essence* and this name *power*[^15].

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, he seems to speak ill there: *That you should signify another power, by which the Father is able to beget* etc.; because the division of power is sufficient by [its division into] active and passive[^16]; but *to be able to beget* signifies active power, *to be able to be begotten* passive power: therefore no other power can be signified. If you should say that to generate is not properly to act, similarly neither is to be generated to undergo; it is objected that powers are distinguished by their acts[^17]; but to beget is one thing and to be begotten another: therefore the power of this and of that is different.

**I respond:** This distinction which the Master sets down concerning the power of begetting actively and passively, is founded on this, that power can be considered according to *that which it is;* and so it signifies the nature, and as one nature is in the begetter and the begotten, but in one and another mode, so it is the same power. It can again be considered according to *that to which it is;* and so it signifies the mode of the nature's existing in the person in comparison to another, which is the principle or that which is originated. And so, since the modes are diverse, the properties *to be able to generate* and *to be able to be generated* are said to be diverse and are distinguished according to personal acts; but in the first mode, [they are] not.

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning this, that he says that *the Son has the power by which he can be the Son or by which he can be begotten.* For this seems doubtful or false, because to be begotten is wholly from to beget, and to beget is from the power of the Father: therefore so is to be begotten.

**I respond:** Just as the power of begetting in the Father signifies nothing other than the nature in the person as apt of itself to produce another, so the power of begetting in the Son signifies nothing other than the nature[^18] in the person as apt to be produced from another; for as it belongs to the hypostasis of the Father to generate, so it belongs to the hypostasis of the Son to be generated. Nor does what is objected to the contrary hold. For everything that the Son has, whether essential or personal, he has from the Father. Therefore, although the very being-begotten is from the power of the Father, it is nevertheless[^19] not excluded that the passive power of begetting is in the Son. But that power is not the principle of generation, but the suitability or hypostasis with its property to be generated. Hence what is called *the ability to be begotten*, the power can be understood *originally*, and so it is in the Father alone; or *formally*, and thus is posited to be in the Son; but in no other way.

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la: Supple hic et paulo infra cum codd. X dd *et potest*.

en: Supply here and a little below, with codices X dd, *and is able*.

la: Vat. confuse et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *Cum* loco *Tunc*, et deinde prosequitur: *enim generare cum posse sit posse* etc.

en: The Vatican edition, confusedly and against the older codices and ed. 1, [reads] *Cum* in place of *Tunc*, and then continues: *for since to-generate, having-power is to be powerful* etc.

la: Vat. falso pro *in subiectis* ponit *eum generare Filium esset aliquid subiectum* et contra omnes codd. cum ed. 1, qui in eo tantum dissident, quod multi ut ACKGHIKMST etc. post *quam* minus bene omittunt *si*. Cod. O *si enim in hoc deficit, plus deficit, quam si deficit in subiectis*.

en: The Vatican edition falsely, for *in subiectis*, puts *that he should generate the Son would be something subject*, and against all the codices with ed. 1, which differ in this only, that many such as ACKGHIKMST etc. after *quam* less suitably omit *si*. Codex O [reads]: *for if he is deficient in this, he is more deficient than if he is deficient in things subject*.

la: Praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 praemittit Vat. *effectum seu*, ut paulo ante ponit *tenta* pro *retenta*.

en: Beyond the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, the Vatican edition prefixes *effectum seu*, as a little before it puts *tenta* in place of *retenta*.

la: Libr. III. de Trin. c. 4: *Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est, per impossibilitatem excusari non potest*.

en: Book III *On the Trinity*, c. 4: *But he who is without doubt omnipotent cannot be excused on the ground of impossibility*.

la: Aliqui codd. *intelligit*; codd. HO *intelligas*. Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 post *arguit* substituimus *a* pro *ex*.

en: Some codices [read] *intelligit*; codices HO *intelligas*. A little below, on the basis of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, after *arguit* we have substituted *a* for *ex*.

la: Ita mss. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. *si Pater non esset aliquid, ergo esset nihil. Resp. Dicendum quod esse* etc.

en: So the manuscripts with ed. 1, but the Vatican edition [reads]: *if the Father were not something, therefore he would be nothing. Resp. It must be said that to be* etc.

la: Plerique codd. ut AFGKTUVY etc. cum ed. 1 *contrahitur*.

en: Most codices, such as AFGKTUVY etc., with ed. 1 [read] *contrahitur*.

la: Infra d. 23.

en: Below, distinction 23.

la: De hoc et sequenti dubio vide hic q. 3. et 4. cum Scholiis.

en: On this and the following doubt, see here q. 3 and 4 with the Scholia.

la: Vat. praeter finem mss. et ed. 1 addit *idem*.

en: The Vatican edition, beyond the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *idem*.

la: De varia acceptione huius nominis *proprietas*, quatenus scilicet convenit cum relatione et ab ea distinguitur, sicuti et de relationibus in Deo vide infra d. 26. per totam. — Codd. hoc loco inter se non conveniunt; aliqui enim ut X cc post *ideo si* omittunt *in personis*, e contra cod. T cum ed. 1 addit *divinis*; mox post *esse* multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt *hypostasim*, quod cod. cc, interpunctione mutata, ponit loco *hypostasi*.

en: On the various acceptations of this name *property*, namely insofar as it agrees with relation and is distinguished from it, just as on the relations in God, see below distinction 26 throughout. — The codices do not agree with each other in this place; for some such as X cc after *ideo si* omit *in personis*, while on the contrary codex T with ed. 1 adds *divinis*; soon after *esse* many codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 omit *hypostasim*, which codex cc, with the punctuation changed, puts in place of *hypostasi*.

la: Plures codd. ut AGHIKSTWXZ ... *sic*, et paulo infra fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. *diversificationem* ponunt pro *diversitatem*.

en: Many codices, such as AGHIKSTWXZ ... *sic*, and a little below almost all codices with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, put *diversificationem* in place of *diversitatem*.

la: Cod. dd addit *potest*.

en: Codex dd adds *potest*.

la: Plura de hoc dubio, sicut et de duobus seqq. vide hic q. 2. et 3. ac apud Richardum, hic q. 3.

en: More on this doubt, as also on the two following, see here q. 2 and 3, and in Richard, here q. 3.

la: Vide Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 17. et ibid. IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12. et VIII. c. 1.).

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 17, and ibid. IX, text 2 (IV, c. 12, and VIII, c. 1).

la: Vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.

en: See above q. 1, fundamentum 2.

la: Aliqui codd. ut T cc *modo positivo in Filio dicit naturam*. Cod. bb post *persona* addit *Filii*.

en: Some codices, such as T cc, [read] *in a positive mode in the Son it signifies the nature*. Codex bb after *persona* adds *Filii*.

la: Codd. omittunt *tamen*.

en: The codices omit *tamen*.