title: Dist. 22, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXII)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si vir non peccasset, humanum genus minime peccatis corruptum periret.* Sed contra: ita contrahit homo massam carnis a muliere, sicut a viro, et magis: si ergo originale peccatum contrahimus ex corruptione massae damnatae, ergo ita contraheret originale peccatum ex corruptione mulieris, sicut ex corruptione viri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quia principale principium propagationis residet penes virum, potestas servandi iustitiam maxime penes virum residebat, et Deus hanc viro servandam commiserat; et ideo, si vir non peccasset, posteri originali iustitia non carerent. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de muliere, respondetur dupliciter: vel quod homo
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tunc ex parte mulieris contraheret corruptionem poenalitatis, non corruptionem foeditatis, quae principaliter habet ortum ex parte viri; vel certe, quod probabilius videtur, vir mulieri commixtus amplius non esset, sed ei Deus aliam novam formasset, hoc salvo, quod sententia damnationis et mortis et corruptionis permansisset in ea[^1].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Tribus modis,* ut ait Isidorus, *peccatum geritur* etc.; quoniam Beda[^2] dicit, quod quatuor sunt nobis inflicta propter primum peccatum, videlicet « infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia et concupiscentia »: ergo cum omnia ista sint peccatorum principia, videtur divisio Isidori insufficiens esse, quae ponit tantum tria membra. — Item, sicut *ignorantiae* opponitur industria, ita *infirmitati* opponitur potentia: ergo sicut ponitur, aliud genus peccati esse ex *ignorantia,* et aliud esse ex *industria,* similiter deberet poni aliud ex *infirmitate,* aliud ex *potentia.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista divisio peccati accipitur penes corruptionem virium animae, ita quod *ignorantia* respicit rationalem, *infirmitas* irascibilem, et *malitia* respicit concupiscibilem; et vocatur hic idem peccatum ex *industria* et ex *malitia.* Ideo, cum omnes vires motivae sub his tribus comprehendi possint, omne peccatum, quod fit in statu naturae lapsae, ad ista tria genera habet reduci. — Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de *concupiscentia,* dicendum, quod illud membrum non distinguit contra alia, quia, sicut idem Beda dicit, concupiscentia ex omnibus his est conflata[^3]; et ideo penes concupiscentiam non sumitur aliqua differentia, cum omnia peccata procedant ab ipsa. Sic enim dicit Augustinus[^4]: « Dum lex prohibet concupiscentiam, prohibet omne malum ».

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia opponitur infirmitati, sicut industria ignorantiae; dicendum, quod industria non stat ibi principaliter pro scientia, quae est ignorantiae opposita, sed stat ibi pro malitia, quam concomitatur scientia. Quare autem peccatum ex malitia dicatur ex industria, infra[^5] patebit, cum agetur de peccato in Spiritum sanctum.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ignorantia eorum qui scire nolunt, dum possint, non excusat;* quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^6], « omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant »; sed quod naturale est nullo modo assuescit in contrarium: ergo videtur, quod nullus homo scientiam respuat. — Item, sic se habet *scientia* ad intellectum, sicut se habet *pax* ad affectum; sed quia pax est perfectio affectus, nullus est, qui non appetat pacem, sicut dicit Augustinus[^7]: « Propter pacem enim bellant omnes quicumque bellant »: ergo videtur similiter, quod nullus scientiam respuat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut contingit aliquid *nosse* in universali et *ignorare* in particulari, sic contingit aliquid *appetere* in universali, et tamen *contemnere* in particulari. Et hoc patet: omnis enim homo appetit beatitudinem; illam tamen beatitudinem, quam Christiani exspectant, multi sunt, qui aspernantur et recusant; et primus quidem appetitus est a voluntate *naturali,* secundus est a voluntate *electiva.* Per hunc modum est in proposito. Etsi omnes homines natura scire desiderent et velint esse scientes, scientiam tamen mandatorum Dei plurimi aspernantur. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa duo obiecta; nam scientiam recusare, hoc non est *naturae,* sed *voluntatis electivae.* Etsi etiam pacem in universali nullus recuset, tamen hunc modum pacis, vel illum multi refugiunt, et ideo confugiunt ad bellum[^8].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non est confugiendum ad ignorantiae tenebras.* Cum enim
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ignorantia sit pura privatio, et nihil appetatur nisi sub ratione boni et utilis[^9], videtur, quod ignorantia non possit affectari, vel ad eam confugi. *Praeterea,* nihil amatur nisi cognitum[^10]: sed ignorantiae tenebrae non cognoscuntur: ergo videtur, quod ad eas nullus confugiat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam appetuntur propter aliquid appetibile et delectabile, quod habent *in se,* sicut bona spiritualia et corporalia. Quaedam appetuntur propter bonum, quod ad ea *consequitur* et ex ipsis elicitur, sicut aliquis appetit angustias et tribulationes, ex quibus pervenit homo ad perfectionem in merito et praemio. Quaedam appetuntur propter *comparationem maioris mali,* sicut aliquis, ne capiatur, proiicit se de alto; et illud proprie non est *appetere,* sed ad ipsum *confugere.* Per hunc modum intelligendum est esse in proposito. Quia enim homo timet deprehendi in scelere, ideo fugit lucem; *non enim venit ad lucem, ne arguantur opera eius*[^11]. Et quia non contingit fugere lucem nisi in tenebris et per tenebras, ideo *oculus adulteri observat caliginem,* et qui vult male facere divinorum mandatorum requirit ignorantiam: non quia illam propter se appetat, sed quia refugit sceleris deprehensionem et amat delectationem, quam amat[^12] in sceleris perpetratione.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In ipso homine et in alio causa exstitit, ut fieret deterior.* Ex hoc enim videtur, quod homo non peccasset, nisi diabolus fuisset; et hoc videtur falsum, quia homo habebat liberum arbitrium vertibile: ergo circumscripta omni tentatione diaboli, in malum poterat consentire ac per hoc peccare. — Item Augustinus probat, quod « alio auctore nullus potest fieri deterior », in principio Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^13], quia nec a *minori* nec a *pari* nec a *superiori.* *Minus* enim non potest; *par* aequali non praevalet; *superius* non vult, quia nihil est superius bono nisi bonum, et bonum non vult bonum deteriorare.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, nulla tentatione pellente, homo peccare poterat, sicut patet in lucifero, qui peccavit sine impulsu alieno, qui etiam excellentior erat homine primo. Magister autem loquitur supponendo modum peccandi, secundum quod[^14] homo lapsus est, videlicet ad suggestionem diaboli; et ideo dicit, quod in ipso homine et in diabolo erat, quod fieret homo deterior; sed aliter et aliter, quia diabolus solum erat causa *inducens* et quasi adminiculans, sed homo fuit causa *perficiens* et consummans. Et quia omne peccatum, quod facimus, quodam modo habet ortum a peccato primo propter corruptionem, quae inolevit per originalis transfusionem; hinc est, quod non solum primus parens deterioratus dicitur fuisse a diabolo, immo etiam omne peccatum dicitur esse ab ipso. Unde Hieronymus super Ieremiam[^15] in originali dicit: « Quidquid peccamus, quidquid nocte et die malorum operum perpetramus, imperium est daemonum »; quia vel omne peccatum procedit ex suggestione daemonum immediata, vel ex illa suggestione primaria. — Et sic patet illud quod dicit Magister in littera; nec obstat illud Augustini, qui intelligit de principali agente, volens ostendere, quod corruptionis primariae nullus potuit esse principalis auctor, nisi[^16] ipse homo.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *If man had not sinned, the human race would not have perished corrupted by sins.* But on the contrary: man contracts the mass of flesh from the woman just as from the man, and more so: if therefore we contract original sin from the corruption of the condemned mass, then it would likewise contract original sin from the corruption of the woman just as from the corruption of the man.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because the principal source of propagation resides in the man, the power of preserving justice resided chiefly in the man, and God had committed this to the man to be preserved; and therefore, if the man had not sinned, his posterity would not be deprived of original justice. — To that, then, which is objected concerning the woman, the reply is twofold: either that man would then have contracted from the woman's side the corruption of penalty, not the corruption of foulness, which chiefly takes its origin from the man's side; or rather, what seems more probable, that the man would no longer have been joined to the woman, but God would have formed for him another, new woman, this being preserved, that the sentence of condemnation and of death and of corruption would have remained in her[^1].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In three modes,* as Isidore says, *sin is carried on,* etc.; for Bede[^2] says that four things were inflicted upon us on account of the first sin, namely « infirmity, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence »: therefore, since all these are sources of sins, Isidore's division seems to be insufficient, which posits only three members. — Likewise, just as *industry* is opposed to *ignorance,* so *potency* is opposed to *infirmity*: therefore, just as it is posited that one kind of sin is from *ignorance,* and another from *industry,* so likewise another ought to be posited from *infirmity,* another from *potency.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this division of sin is taken according to the corruption of the powers of the soul, so that *ignorance* regards the rational, *infirmity* the irascible, and *malice* regards the concupiscible; and the same sin is here called both sin from *industry* and from *malice.* Therefore, since all the motive powers can be comprehended under these three, every sin that occurs in the state of fallen nature must be reduced to these three kinds. — But to that which is objected concerning *concupiscence,* it must be said that that member is not distinguished against the others, because, as the same Bede says, concupiscence is compounded out of all these[^3]; and therefore no difference is taken according to concupiscence, since all sins proceed from it. For thus Augustine says[^4]: « When the law prohibits concupiscence, it prohibits every evil ».

To that which is objected, that *potency* is opposed to *infirmity* as *industry* to *ignorance*; it must be said that *industry* does not stand here principally for the *knowledge* that is opposed to ignorance, but stands there for the *malice* that knowledge accompanies. But why sin from malice is called sin from industry will appear below[^5], when treatment is made of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The ignorance of those who refuse to know, when they are able, does not excuse;* because, as the Philosopher says[^6], « all men naturally desire to know »; but what is natural is in no way habituated to its contrary: therefore it seems that no man rejects knowledge. — Likewise, *knowledge* is related to the intellect as *peace* is related to the affection; but since peace is the perfection of the affection, there is no one who does not desire peace, as Augustine says[^7]: « For all who make war make war for the sake of peace »: therefore it likewise seems that no one rejects knowledge.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as it happens that one *knows* something in the universal and is *ignorant* of it in the particular, so it happens that one *desires* something in the universal and yet *despises* it in the particular. And this is clear: for every man desires beatitude; yet that beatitude which Christians await, many there are who spurn and refuse; and the first desire is from the *natural* will, the second is from the *elective* will. In this manner it is in the matter at hand. Although all men by nature desire to know and wish to be knowing, yet very many spurn the knowledge of God's commandments. — And thus the reply to those two objections is clear; for to refuse knowledge, this belongs not to *nature,* but to the *elective will.* And although no one refuses peace in the universal, yet many shun this mode of peace, or that, and therefore flee to war[^8].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *One must not flee to the shadows of ignorance.* For since
ignorance is a pure privation, and nothing is desired except under the aspect of the good and the useful[^9], it seems that ignorance cannot be sought after, or fled to. *Moreover,* nothing is loved unless known[^10]: but the shadows of ignorance are not known: therefore it seems that no one flees to them.

**I respond:** It must be said that some things are desired on account of something desirable and delightful which they have *in themselves,* like spiritual and corporeal goods. Some things are desired on account of a good which *follows* upon them and is drawn out of them, as one desires distresses and tribulations, through which a man comes to perfection in merit and reward. Some things are desired on account of the *comparison of a greater evil,* as one, lest he be captured, throws himself down from a height; and that is not properly *to desire,* but to *flee* to it. In this manner it is to be understood in the matter at hand. For because a man fears to be caught in a crime, therefore he flees the light; *for he does not come to the light, lest his works be reproved*[^11]. And because one cannot flee the light except in darkness and through darkness, therefore *the eye of the adulterer watches for the gloom,* and he who wishes to do evil seeks the ignorance of the divine commandments: not because he desires it for its own sake, but because he shuns the detection of his crime and loves the delight which he loves[^12] in the perpetration of the crime.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In man himself and in another the cause existed, that he should become worse.* For from this it seems that man would not have sinned unless the devil had existed; and this seems false, because man had a changeable free will: therefore, every temptation of the devil being set aside, he was able to consent to evil and thereby to sin. — Likewise Augustine proves that « by another author no one can be made worse », at the beginning of the *Eighty-three Questions*[^13], because neither by a *lesser* nor by an *equal* nor by a *superior.* For the *lesser* cannot; the *equal* does not prevail over its equal; the *superior* does not will it, because nothing is superior to the good except the good, and the good does not will to make the good worse.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, with no temptation impelling, man was able to sin, as is clear in Lucifer, who sinned without an impulse from another, who also was more excellent than the first man. But the Master speaks by supposing the mode of sinning according to which[^14] man fell, namely at the suggestion of the devil; and therefore he says that in man himself and in the devil it lay, that man should become worse; but in different ways, because the devil was only the *inducing* cause and, as it were, an assisting one, but man was the *perfecting* and consummating cause. And because every sin which we commit in some way takes its origin from the first sin on account of the corruption which grew in through the transmission of the original [sin]; hence it is that not only is the first parent said to have been made worse by the devil, but rather every sin is also said to be from him. Whence Jerome on Jeremiah[^15] says in the original: « Whatever we sin, whatever evil works we perpetrate night and day, is the command of the demons »; because either every sin proceeds from the immediate suggestion of demons, or from that primary suggestion. — And thus is made clear that which the Master says in the text; nor does that of Augustine stand in the way, who understands it of the principal agent, wishing to show that of the primary corruption no one could be the principal author, except[^16] man himself.

---

la: Anselm., de Conceptu virg. et pecc. orig. c. 9. solvit quaestionem, cur peccatum, quo damnatur genus humanum, magis imputetur Adae, quam Evae, cum ille post et per illam peccaverit. Allegatis verbis Apostoli (Rom. 5, 14.): *Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen* etc., tres adducit rationes: Quia illa duorum copula tota intelligitur in nomine principalis partis, sicut saepe per partem totum solet significari; aut quoniam Adam cum costa sua, quamvis in mulierem aedificata, dici poterat Adam... aut idcirco, quia si non Adam, sed sola Eva peccasset, non necesse erat, totum humanum genus perire. Poterat namque Deus de Adam, in quo semen omnium hominum creaverat, aliam facere mulierem, per quam de Adam propositum Dei perficeretur. Cfr. infra d. 31. dub. 3; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 3. a. 2; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit. Magistri.

en: Anselm, *On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin* c. 9, resolves the question why the sin by which the human race is condemned is imputed more to Adam than to Eve, since he sinned after her and through her. Citing the Apostle's words (Rom. 5:14): *But death reigned from Adam to Moses,* etc., he adduces three reasons: Because that union of the two is wholly understood under the name of the principal part, as often the whole is wont to be signified by the part; or because Adam together with his rib, although built into a woman, could be called Adam... or for this reason, that if not Adam, but Eve alone had sinned, it would not have been necessary for the whole human race to perish. For God could have made from Adam, in whom He had created the seed of all men, another woman, through whom God's purpose concerning Adam would be accomplished. Cf. below, d. 31, dub. 3; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 106, m. 3, a. 2; B. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master.

la: A Scholasticis communiter allegatur eius expositio (ab aliis homilia) in Luc. 10, 30., de quo vide supra pag. 306, nota 3. Cfr. August., Enchir. c. 24. n. 8; Hugo de S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 31.

en: His exposition (by others called a homily) on Luke 10:30 is commonly cited by the Scholastics, concerning which see above p. 306, note 3. Cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 24, n. 8; Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments* bk. I, p. VII, c. 31.

la: Ita plures codd., inter quos T V cc cum ed. I; Vat. hic *contracta,* sed infra, d. 30. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 2. ipsa cum omnibus codd. et edd. *conflata.*

en: Thus several codices, among them T V cc with ed. I; the Vatican edition here [reads] *contracta* (compounded together), but below, d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2, it [reads], with all the codices and editions, *conflata* (fused together).

la: Libr. de Spiritu et lit. c. 4. n. 6: Nam hoc ideo elegit Apostolus generale quiddam, quo cuncta complexus est, tanquam haec esset vox legis ab omni peccato prohibentis, quod ait: *Non concupisces;* neque enim ullum peccatum nisi concupiscendo committitur; proinde quae hoc praecipit, bona et laudabilis lex est. Cfr. Glossa ordinaria Rom. 7, 7. apud Lyranum.

en: *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 4, n. 6: For the Apostle chose this for this reason, something general by which he embraced all things, as though this were the voice of the law prohibiting from every sin, in that it says: *Thou shalt not covet;* for no sin is committed except by coveting; consequently the law which commands this is a good and praiseworthy law. Cf. the Ordinary Gloss on Rom. 7:7 in Lyra.

la: Dist. 43. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius Vat. omittit verba *non stat ibi* usque *stat ibi.* — Idem dubium solvit S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit. Magistri.

en: Distinction 43, a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, the Vatican edition omits the words *non stat ibi* down to *stat ibi.* — St. Thomas resolves the same doubt, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master.

la: Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1.

en: *Metaphysics* bk. I, c. 1.

la: Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. n. 1: *Omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem requirit.*

en: *City of God* bk. XIX, c. 12, n. 1: *For every man, even in waging war, seeks peace.*

la: August., I. de Lib. Arb. c. 14. n. 30. — Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit.

en: Augustine, *On Free Will* bk. I, c. 14, n. 30. — Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 517, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 517, note 1.

la: Vide August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2: *Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest.*

en: See Augustine, *On the Trinity* bk. X, c. 1, n. 2: *For certainly something cannot be loved unless it is known.*

la: Ioan. 3, 20: *Et non venit ad lucem, ut non arguantur* etc. — Seq. textus est Iob 24, 13.

en: John 3:20: *And he does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved,* etc. — The following text is Job 24:13.

la: Vat. *habet.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *habet* (he has).

la: Quaest. 3. et 4. — Subinde Vat. substituit *Minor* pro *Minus* et *superior* pro *superius.*

en: Questions 3 and 4. — Thereafter the Vatican edition substitutes *Minor* for *Minus* and *superior* for *superius.*

la: Codd. Y cc (F T a secunda manu) et ed. 1 *quem.*

en: Codices Y cc (F T by a second hand) and ed. 1 [read] *quem.*

en: Chapter 16, 13.

la: Vat. *nec.* — Vide Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit. Magistri.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *nec.* — See Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 527–529 = pdf 549–551, offset +22) against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 37063–37189). The DUBIA block is short (~127 raw lines); column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p52{7,8,9}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`.

**Structure.** Five doubts on the Master's text: **DUB I** (whether original sin would be contracted from the woman as from the man), **DUB II** (whether Isidore's three-fold division of sin is sufficient against Bede's four), **DUB III** (whether the ignorance of those who refuse to know excuses, given that all naturally desire to know), **DUB IV** (whether one can flee to the shadows of ignorance, given ignorance is a pure privation), **DUB V** (whether man would have sinned without the devil). `has_scholion: false` — no SCHOLION header in the dubia range.

**Page-split map (apparatus).** Renumbered continuously [^1]–[^16]:
- p.527 footers: ALL belong to a2-q3 (received there last session); the DUBIA header sits at the foot of p.527, its body footers begin on p.528.
- p.528 footers ¹–⁸ → [^1] (DUB I, Anselm), [^2]–[^5] (DUB II: Bede exposition / *conflata* variant / Augustine *de Spiritu et lit.* / d.43 cross-ref), [^6]–[^8] (DUB III: Metaph. I / *de Civ. Dei* XIX / *de Lib. Arb.* I).
- p.529 footers ¹–⁸ → [^9]–[^12] (DUB IV: supra p.517 / *de Trin.* X / John 3:20+Job 24:13 / *habet* variant), [^13]–[^16] (DUB V: 83 Questions / *quem* variant / Jeremiah 16:13 / *nec* variant).
- p.529's running head "DISTINCTIO XXIII." (raw 37154) is a page-top running head, NOT the distinction start; DUB IV/V continue below it. The real DISTINCTIO XXIII (Cap. I, *Quare Deus permiserit hominem tentari*) begins at raw 37192 (p.529 L bottom) and is OUT of scope. The "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footer ¹–² on p.529 R belong to that next-distinction Cap. I and are excluded here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none (a2-q3 closed clean at the Loth example; all p.527 footers anchored in a2-q3). FORWARDED: none — DUB V closes clean at "...nisi ipse homo"; DISTINCTIO XXIII opens fresh with its own footer block.

**Dup cleanup.** The auto-chunker emitted a duplicate `bon-sent-II-d22-dubia-dup2` (line_start 37065 / line_end 37191) carrying the same DUB I–V raw range; it is a superseded skeleton with no unique Tier-2 content. Removed via `git rm`. The original `bon-sent-II-d22-dubia` skeleton had mis-set line bounds (37022–37064 = a2-q3's tail), corrected by this rebuild.

**`[?]` flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 23

title_alt: Distinction XXIII — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 529 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXIII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Quare Deus permiserit, hominem tentari, quem sciebat casurum.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, « cur Deus hominem tentari permiserit, quem decipiendum esse[^1] praesciebat. — Sed non esset laudabile homini, si ideo bene vivere posset, quia nemo male vivere suaderet, cum in natura posse et in potestate haberet velle non consentire suadenti, Deo iuvante[^2] »; « et est gloriosius non consentire quam tentari non posse ». — Moventur etiam quidam dicentes: « Cur creavit Deus quos futuros malos praesciebat? — Quia praevidit quid boni de malis eorum esset facturus. Sic enim eos fecit, ut relinqueret eis unde aliquid facerent; et si culpabiliter aliquid facerent, illum de se laudabiliter operantem invenirent. A se habent voluntatem malam, ab illo naturam bonam et iustam poenam ». « Frustra igitur dicitur, non deberet Deus creare quos praesciebat malos futuros; sciebat enim, bonis profuturos et iuste pro mala voluntate puniendos »: — Addunt etiam, « talem hominem deberet facere, qui nollet omnino peccare. — Concedimus quidem, meliorem naturam esse, quae omnino peccare nollet. Concedant et ipsi, non esse malam, quae talis facta est, ut posset non peccare, si vellet; et iuste punitam, quae voluntate, non necessitate peccavit. Cum ergo haec bona sit, illa melior, cur non utramque faceret, ut uberius laudaretur de utraque? Illa enim in[^3] sanctis Angelis, haec in hominibus est ». — Item inquiunt: « Si Deus vellet, et illi boni essent. — Et hoc quidem concedimus; sed melius voluit, ut quod vellent essent, et boni quidem non infructuose, mali vero non impune essent ». — Item inquiunt: « Posset Deus voluntatem eorum vertere in bonum, quia omnipotens est. — Posset revera. Cur non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluit? Ipse novit. Non debemus plus sapere, quam oportet ».

<!-- page 530 -->

#### Cap. II.

#### *Qualis secundum animam fuerit homo ante peccatum.*

« Et quidem secundum animam[^4] rationalis fuit homo, habens discretionem boni et mali. Scientiam quoque rerum creatarum et cognitionem veritatis, quae primae perfectioni congruebat, mox conditus non incongrue accepisse putatur, et ad illam non studio vel disciplina aliqua per intervallum[^5] temporis profecisse, sed ab exordio suae conditionis divinitus illam percepisse ».

#### Cap. III.

#### *De triplici scientia hominis ante lapsum.*

« Fuitque[^6] homo primus ante lapsum triplici cognitione praeditus, rerum scilicet propter se factarum et Creatoris et sui ». « Rerum quippe cognitionem hominem accepisse, perspicuum est, cum non ipse Creator vel Angelus aliquis, sed homo omnibus animantibus nomina imposuerit, ut ostenderetur, quod singulorum notitiam homo ipse habuerit. Quae enim propter illum creata erant et ab illo regenda et disponenda erant, horum omnium Deus illi et scientiam tribuit et providentiam atque curam reliquit, quia, ut ait Apostolus[^7], *non est cura Deo de bobus*. Quorum aliorumque animalium Deus homini curam reliquit et providentiam, ut dominationi eius subiicerentur et ratione illius gubernarentur; ut sciret illis necessaria providere, a quibus emolumentum debebat recipere. Hanc autem scientiam homo peccando non perdidit, sicut nec illam, qua carnis necessaria providentur[^8]; et idcirco in Scriptura homo de huiusmodi non eruditur, sed de scientia animae, quam peccando amisit ». « Cognitionem quoque Creatoris primus homo habuisse creditur. Cognovit enim, a quo creatus fuerat, non eo modo cognoscendi, quo ex auditu solo[^9] percipitur, quo modo a credentibus absens quaeritur, sed quadam interiori aspiratione, qua Dei praesentiam contemplabatur; non tamen ita excellenter, sicut post hanc vitam Sancti visuri sunt, neque ita *in aenigmate*, qualiter in hac vita videmus ». « Porro sui cognitionem idem homo talem accepisse videtur, ut et quid deberet superiori et quid aequali et inferiori non ignoraret. Conditionem quoque suam et ordinem, scilicet qualis factus esset, et qualiter incedere deberet, quid agere, quid[^10] cavere, intellexit. Si horum notitiam non habuisset, non esset reus praevaricationis neque se ipsum cognovisset ».

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Utrum homo praescius fuerit eorum quae sibi futura erant.*

« Si autem quaeratur, utrum homo scientiam habuerit eorum quae circa eum futura erant, id est, si ruinam suam praesciverit; et similiter, si[^11] praesciverit bona, quae habiturus fuisset, si in obedientia perstitisset; responderi potest, quod ei magis facienda indicta sunt, quam futura revelata. Accepit enim scientiam et praeceptum eorum quae facienda fuerant, sed non habuit praescientiam eorum quae futura erant ». Non fuit ergo homo praescius sui casus, sicut et de Angelo diximus; quod Augustinus super Genesim asserit, ratione utens, quam supra[^12] posuimus[^13]. — « Haec de scientia hominis, quantum ad primum statum pertinet, dixisse sufficiat ».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXIII.

#### Chapter I.

#### *Why God permitted man to be tempted, whom He knew would fall.*

Moreover it is wont to be asked, “why God permitted man to be tempted, whom He foreknew was to be deceived[^1]. — But it would not be praiseworthy for man, if he could therefore live well because no one was urging him to live ill, since by nature he had the power and in his power had the willing not to consent to one urging him, with God helping[^2];” “and it is more glorious not to consent than not to be able to be tempted.” — Some are moved also, saying: “Why did God create those whom He foreknew would be evil? — Because He foresaw what good He was to make out of their evils. For He so made them that He should leave to them whence they might do something; and if they did something culpably, they should find Him operating laudably concerning Himself. Of themselves they have an evil will, from Him a good nature and a just punishment.” “In vain therefore is it said that God ought not to create those whom He foreknew would be evil; for He knew that they would profit the good and would justly be punished for their evil will:” — They add also, “He ought to make such a man as would by no means will to sin. — We grant indeed that the better nature is one which would by no means will to sin. Let them also grant that the nature is not evil which was so made that it could not sin, if it willed; and that it was justly punished, since it sinned by will, not by necessity. Since therefore this is good, that is better, why would He not make both, so that He might be the more abundantly praised concerning each? For the one is in[^3] the holy Angels, the other in men.” — Likewise they say: “If God willed it, those too would be good. — And this indeed we grant; but He willed better, that what they willed they should be, and the good indeed not unprofitably, but the evil not unpunished.” — Likewise they say: “God could turn their will into good, because He is omnipotent. — He could indeed. Why did He not do it? Because He did not will to. Why did He not will to? He Himself knows. We ought not to be wiser than is fitting.”

#### Chapter II.

#### *What man was according to the soul before sin.*

“And indeed according to the soul[^4] man was rational, having discernment of good and evil. He is supposed also, not unfittingly, to have received as soon as he was made the knowledge of created things and the cognition of truth, which befitted his first perfection, and not to have advanced to it by study or any discipline over an interval[^5] of time, but to have received it divinely from the beginning of his condition.”

#### Chapter III.

#### *On the threefold knowledge of man before the fall.*

“And the first man was[^6] before the fall endowed with a threefold cognition, namely of the things made for his sake, and of the Creator, and of himself.” “That man received cognition of things is evident, since not the Creator Himself nor any Angel, but man imposed names on all living creatures, so that it might be shown that man himself had knowledge of each. For the things which had been created for his sake and were to be ruled and disposed by him — of all these God granted him both knowledge and left him providence and care, because, as the Apostle says[^7], *God hath no care for oxen*. Of these and the other animals God left to man care and providence, that they might be subjected to his dominion and governed by his reason; that he might know how to provide necessaries for those from which he ought to receive benefit. But this knowledge man did not lose by sinning, just as neither that one by which the necessaries of the flesh are provided[^8]; and therefore in Scripture man is not instructed about such things, but about the knowledge of the soul, which he lost by sinning.” “The first man is believed also to have had cognition of the Creator. For he knew by whom he had been created, not in that mode of knowing by which He is perceived from hearing alone[^9], in the way in which He is sought as absent by believers, but by a certain interior breathing, by which he contemplated the presence of God; yet not so excellently as the Saints shall see after this life, nor so *in an enigma* as we see in this life.” “Further, the same man seems to have received such cognition of himself that he was not ignorant both of what he owed to his superior and what to an equal and to an inferior. He understood also his condition and order, namely of what sort he had been made, and how he ought to walk, what to do, what[^10] to beware of. If he had not had knowledge of these things, he would not be guilty of transgression nor would he have known himself.”

#### Chapter IV.

#### *Whether man was foreknowing of the things which were to befall him.*

“But if it be asked whether man had knowledge of the things which were going to befall him, that is, whether he foreknew his own ruin; and likewise, whether[^11] he foreknew the goods which he would have had, if he had persisted in obedience; it can be answered that the things to be done were enjoined upon him rather than the future things revealed. For he received knowledge and a precept of the things which were to be done, but he did not have foreknowledge of the things which were to come.” Man therefore was not foreknowing of his own fall, just as we have said also of the Angel; which Augustine asserts on Genesis, using the reason which we set down above[^12][^13]. — “Let this suffice to have said concerning the knowledge of man, so far as pertains to the first state.”

---

la: Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 8, *fore*, refragantibus codd. Paulo inferius post *in natura* cod. D bene addit *haberet*.

en: The Vatican edition, with other editions except 1, 8, [reads] *fore* (“will be”), the codices being against it. A little below, after *in natura* codex D rightly adds *haberet* (“would have”).

la: August., XI. Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 6, ex quo libro etiam sequentes huius capituli loci sumti sunt, nempe seq. locus c. 6. n. 8; tertius c. 9. n. 12; quartus c. 6. n. 8. — Teste cod. Erf., eadem usque ad verba *Addunt etiam* occurrunt etiam apud Gandolphum, II. c. 187. seq.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 4, n. 6, from which book also the following passages of this chapter are taken, namely the following passage c. 6, n. 8; the third c. 9, n. 12; the fourth c. 6, n. 8. — By the witness of codex Erf., the same things down to the words *Addunt etiam* (“They add also”) occur also in Gandulph, *Sentences* II, c. 187 ff.

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 8 *de*, et mox *de hominibus*. Paulo inferius post *melius voluit* cod. C addit *id est permisit*.

en: The codices and editions 1, 8 [read] *de*, and soon *de hominibus* (“of men”). A little below, after *melius voluit* codex C adds *id est permisit* (“that is, He permitted”).

la: August., ibid. c. 7. n. 9; seq. locus c. 9. n. 12; tertius c. 10. n. 13. — In fine respicitur Rom. 12, 3, in quo cum Vulgata edd. 1, 8 post *oportet* addunt *sapere*.

en: Augustine, in the same place, c. 7, n. 9; the following passage c. 9, n. 12; the third c. 10, n. 13. — At the end reference is to Romans 12:3, in which, with the Vulgate, editions 1, 8 add *sapere* (“to be wise”) after *oportet*.

la: Ita codd. et edd. 1, 8; Vat. cum reliquis edd. *intervalla*.

en: So the codices and editions 1, 8; the Vatican edition with the remaining editions reads *intervalla* (“intervals”).

la: Ita Vat. cum pluribus edd. et cod. D, sed edd. 1, 8 et codd. ABCE, *animum*. Hoc integrum capitulum et seqq. Magister accepit ex Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 12-15, sed contraxit.

en: So the Vatican edition with several editions and codex D, but editions 1, 8 and codices ABCE [read] *animum*. This entire chapter and the following the Master took from Hugh (of St. Victor), book *On the Sacraments* part VI, cc. 12–15, but abridged it.

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. solummodo *Fuit*; sed edd. 1, 8 *Fuit itaque*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few editions [reads] only *Fuit* (“Was”); but editions 1, 8 [read] *Fuit itaque* (“And so it was”).

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 9, 9.

en: Epistle, 1 Corinthians 9:9.

la: Vat. *providerentur*, refragantibus edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 et codd.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *providerentur*, the editions 1, 2, 3, 7 and the codices being against it.

la: Respicitur Rom. 10, 16. et paulo inferius I. Cor. 13, 12.

en: Reference is to Romans 10:16, and a little below 1 Corinthians 13:12.

la: Codd. B D addunt *etiam*.

en: Codices B, D add *etiam* (“also”).

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. omittit *si*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few editions omits *si* (“whether/if”).

la: Dist. IV. c. 1, ubi etiam locus Augustini citatur.

en: Distinction IV, c. 1, where the passage of Augustine is also cited. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 529–530. Per the Vol II Override the column-band PDF read is authoritative; the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 37192–37289) cascade-fragments the chapter headings and footer blocks (two-column bleed: e.g. raw line 37242 carries `Cap. II.` from the L column spliced to Cap. IV body from the R column; the p. 529 d.22-commentary footers and the littera NOTAE block surface interleaved on the same raw lines).
- **Littera scope = Cap. I–IV only.** The COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII / DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM that follow (raw 37290 ff., p. 531) belong to the separate `d23-divisio` chunk. Cap. IV ends the littera at *…dixisse sufficiat* (p. 530 R, top). **No pars split** for d.23.
- **Page-split map.**
  - **p. 529** (running head verified "529", R-top): the top + middle of the page is the **d.22 DUB V** commentary (`In ipso homine et in alio causa exstitit…` … `…nisi ipse homo`) — out of scope, owned by `d22-dubia`. Below the `DISTINCTIO XXIII.` divider (L-bottom + R-bottom): Cap. I title + opener (*Praeterea quaeri solet…* through *…quam oportet* — the *quam oportet* close actually lands at the top of p. 530 L). p. 529 littera footers: the L-column footer series ¹–⁷ + R ⁸ (`Cfr. supra pag. 517…`; `Vide August. X de Trin.`; `Ioan. 3, 20`; `Vat. habet`; `Quaest. 3 et 4`; `Codd. Y cc`; `Cap. 16, 13`; `Vat. nec.`) is the **d.22 DUB V** (Bonaventure-commentary) apparatus and is **NOT** the littera's. The littera's apparatus on p. 529 is the separate **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** block (footers ¹–²) → [^1]–[^2]: ¹ Vat. *fore* / cod. D *haberet* (= *decipiendum esse*); ² August. XI Gen. ad lit. c.4 n.6 + Gandolph. II c.187 (= *Deo iuvante*).
  - **p. 530** (running head "530"): L column = Cap. I tail (*iustam poenam* … *quam oportet*) + Cap. II (full) + Cap. III opener; R column = Cap. III body (*propter illum creata erant* … *se ipsum cognovisset*) + Cap. IV (full, through *dixisse sufficiat*). p. 530 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers ¹–¹¹ (L ¹–⁴, R ⁵–¹¹) → [^3]–[^13]: ¹ Codd./edd. *de* (= Cap. I tail *Illa enim in… sanctis Angelis*); ² August. ibid. c.7 n.9 / Rom. 12,3 (= Cap. II *secundum animam*); ³ Vat. *animum* / Hugo de Sacram. (= *animam*-variant, anchored at the *secundum animam* marker — the per-page series re-numbers, so this is body marker ⁴ in OCR but apparatus [^4] here); ④ codd./edd. *intervalla* (= *intervallum*); ⑤ Vat. *Fuit* (= Cap. III *Fuitque*); ⑥ 1 Cor. 9,9 (= *non est cura Deo de bobus*); ⑦ Vat. *providerentur* (= *carnis necessaria providentur*); ⑧ Rom. 10,16 / 1 Cor. 13,12 (= *ex auditu solo*); ⑨ Codd. B D *etiam* (= *quid cavere*); ⑩ Vat. omittit *si* (= Cap. IV *si praesciverit bona*); ⑪ Dist. IV c.1 (= *quam supra posuimus*).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d22-dubia`: none — d22-dubia closes clean at *…nisi ipse homo* (p. 529 R, above the DISTINCTIO XXIII divider) and the p. 529 L-column commentary footers ¹–⁸ are DUB V's, not the littera's. The littera opens fresh with the NOTAE block. *Forwarded* to `d23-divisio`: none of the littera footers — the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS (*Postquam egit Magister de…*) opens on p. 531 with its own footer series.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 13 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 529–530; the four Lombard capitula titles and the chained Augustine/Hugh authority refs are clean.
- **Four Lombard capitula** preserved verbatim with Quaracchi's italic chapter titles: I *Quare Deus permiserit, hominem tentari, quem sciebat casurum*; II *Qualis secundum animam fuerit homo ante peccatum*; III *De triplici scientia hominis ante lapsum*; IV *Utrum homo praescius fuerit eorum quae sibi futura erant*. Cap. IV ends the littera at *dixisse sufficiat*.
- **Lombard marginals** on pp. 529–530 (`Dubium 1/2/3/4`, `Quorundam instantia 1`, `Instantia 2/3/4`, `Triplex ratio aliquid appetendi`, `Notandum`, `Cognitio Creatoris`, `Cognitio creaturarum`, `Cognitio sui`) are editorial running-margin labels; per Vol II convention they are not rendered as separate margin nodes here.
</content>
</invoke>

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 23, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Distinctio XXIII — Commentarius, Divisio textus, Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Distinction XXIII — Commentary, Division of the Text, Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 531 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.
### *De primae tentationis permissione ex parte Dei.*

> *Praeterea quaeri solet, cur Deus hominem* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de lapsu primorum parentum in comparatione ad diabolum tentantem et hominem transgredientem; in hac parte agit de lapsu primorum parentum in comparatione ad Deum permittentem. Et quia non est aequum permittere, aliquem inscium ab astuto circumveniri; ideo, ut ostendatur prima permissio esse iusta[^1], pars ista duas habet. In prima determinat, cur Deus hominem tentari permisit. In secunda vero determinat, quantum et qualem cognitionis habitum ei dedit, ibi: *Et quidem secundum animam* etc.

Prima parte remanente indivisa, secunda dividitur in duas[^2] partes. In prima determinat, qualiter homo cognitionem habuit, utrum per disciplinam et studium, an per divinum donum. In secunda vero determinat, quorum cognitionem habuit, ibi: *Fuitque primus homo ante lapsum triplici cognitione praeditus*. Et illa pars habet tres. In prima determinat, qualem cognitionem habuit de rebus creatis[^3]. In secunda, qualem cognitionem habuit de Deo, ibi: *Cognitionem quoque Creatoris* etc. In tertia, qualem cognitionem habuit de se ipso, ibi: *Porro sui cognitionem* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis circa duo incidit hic quaestio secundum duo, circa quae principaliter versatur totalis distinctionis intentio.

Primo quaeritur de primae tentationis permissione.

Secundo quaeritur de primorum parentum cognitione.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit hominem facere inexpugnabilem, an talem, quod[^4] posset expugnari.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum hominem, quem praesciebat expugnandum, debuerit permittere per tentationem impugnari.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum tentationis pugna a viris iustis debeat desiderari.

---

english:
<!-- page 531 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII.
### *On the permission of the first temptation on the part of God.*

> *Furthermore it is wont to be asked why God [permitted] man* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the fall of the first parents in their relation to the devil who tempts and to man who transgresses; in this part he treats of the fall of the first parents in their relation to God who permits. And because it is not equitable to permit that one who is unaware should be circumvented by a crafty one, therefore, in order that it may be shown that the first permission was just[^1], this part has two [sections]. In the first he determines why God permitted man to be tempted. In the second he determines how much and what sort of habit of knowledge he gave him, at the place: *And indeed according to the soul* etc.

The first part remaining undivided, the second is divided into two[^2] parts. In the first he determines in what manner man had knowledge — whether through teaching and study, or through a divine gift. In the second he determines of what things he had knowledge, at: *And the first man before the fall was endowed with a threefold knowledge*. And that part has three [sections]. In the first he determines what sort of knowledge he had of created things[^3]. In the second, what sort of knowledge he had of God, at: *Likewise the knowledge of the Creator* etc. In the third, what sort of knowledge he had of himself, at: *Further his knowledge of himself* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part a question arises here on two heads, according to the two things on which the whole intention of the distinction principally turns.

First it is asked about the permission of the first temptation.

Second it is asked about the knowledge of the first parents.

About the first three things are asked.

First it is asked whether God ought to have made man unconquerable, or such that[^4] he could be conquered.

Second it is asked whether God ought to have permitted man, whom he foreknew would be conquered, to be assailed through temptation.

Third it is asked whether the struggle of temptation ought to be desired by just men.

---

la: In cod. I additur *excusat Magister divinam permissionem tum ex ratione permittendi tum, ex collata homini sufficienti scientia praecavendi, unde et.*

en: In codex I there is added: *the Master excuses the divine permission both from the reason for permitting and from the sufficient knowledge of guarding against [it] conferred on man, whence also.*

la: Ita cod. cc cum ed. 1; aliae edd. cum codd. perperam *tres.*

en: Thus codex cc with edition 1; the other editions, together with the codices, wrongly [read] *three.*

la: Nonnulli codd., ut F aa, *concreatis,* cod. W *conditis;* plures codd., inter quos I K cc ee, cum edd. 1, 2 *contentis.*

en: Some codices, such as F and aa, [read] *concreatis* (concreated); codex W *conditis* (created); the majority of codices, among them I, K, cc, ee, together with editions 1 and 2, [read] *contentis* (contained).

la: Cod. Y *qui;* Vat. *taliter, quod.*

en: Codex Y [reads] *qui* (who); the Vatican edition *taliter, quod* (in such a way that). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of p. 531 (crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p531-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). The full-width spanner header `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.` / title *De primae tentationis permissione ex parte Dei.* / lemma *Praeterea quaeri solet, cur Deus hominem* etc. / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` was read from the band tops; the DIVISIO TEXTUS and TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM were reflowed Left-column then Right-column. The IA djvu OCR (raw 37290–37324) is unusually clean here but still column-bleeds (`paren-tum` / `divi-ditur` line-wraps), so the PDF column bands are authoritative per the Vol II Override. Running head `DIST. XXIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 531` confirms printed p. 531 (PDF 553, offset +22).
- **Section coverage.** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII (lemma only) + DIVISIO TEXTUS (full, both principal parts and the threefold subdivision of the second) + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (the two principal heads + the *Circa primum quaeruntur tria* three-sub-question listing for ART I). Chunk closes at *…a viris iustis debeat desiderari*; immediately below, `ARTICULUS I.` / *De permissione primae tentationis.* / `QUAESTIO I.` / *Utrum Deus debuerit facere hominem impeccabilem.* / *Circa primum sic proceditur* open `d23-a1-q1`.
- **Page-split map.** All content on a single printed page (p. 531). No mid-page cross-chunk seam above (d23-littera closed on p. 530); the seam below (ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I) falls on p. 531 itself and is handed to `d23-a1-q1`.
- **Apparatus + footer-split map.** p. 531 carries a single footer series ¹–⁶. Footers **¹–⁴ anchor in the divisio body** and are this chunk's `[^1]`–`[^4]`: ¹ (*iusta*¹, cod. I addition), ² (*duas*² partes, cc/ed.1 vs *tres*), ³ (*creatis*³ variant codd.), ⁴ (*quod*⁴, Cod. Y/Vat. variant). Footers **⁵–⁶ anchor in the ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I body** (⁵ *Dionysius*⁵ = De Div. Nom. c. 4 § 19, Vide supra pag. 113 nota 7; ⁶ *velociter*⁶ = Prov. 3, 28) and are **forwarded to `d23-a1-q1`** as its first native apparatus entries (to be renumbered [^1]– per the Vol II per-chunk convention).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d23-littera`: NONE — d23-littera (resume 2026-05-29) forwarded none; it closed on p. 530, above the COMMENTARIUS spanner which opens p. 531 with its own fresh footer series. *Forwarded* to `d23-a1-q1`: p. 531 footers ⁵ (Dionysius, De Div. Nom. c. 4 § 19) and ⁶ (Prov. 3, 28) — they anchor at the *1. Primo per divinam bonitatem … Dionysius* and *2. Item … dare velociter* lemmas of QUAESTIO I, which open immediately below this chunk on p. 531.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All headings, division-lemmas, and footer notes crisp at 450 dpi.
- **TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, for q-alignment when ARTICULUS quaestiones are built):**
  - Two principal heads: **Primo** — *de primae tentationis permissione* (ARTICULUS I); **Secundo** — *de primorum parentum cognitione* (ARTICULUS II).
  - ARTICULUS I sub-questions (*Circa primum quaeruntur tria*): **Primo** — *utrum Deus debuerit hominem facere inexpugnabilem, an talem, quod posset expugnari* (= q1; the ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I header below states it as *Utrum Deus debuerit facere hominem impeccabilem*, raw ~37326); **Secundo** — *utrum hominem, quem praesciebat expugnandum, debuerit permittere per tentationem impugnari* (= q2, raw ~37458); **Tertio** — *utrum tentationis pugna a viris iustis debeat desiderari* (= q3, raw ~37567).
  - NB: per Override §5 the short ARTICULUS I opener (*De permissione primae tentationis.*) folds into `d23-a1-q1`; no standalone d23-a1-divisio chunk.
  - ARTICULUS II (*De primorum parentum cognitione*, raw ~37691) and DUBIA (raw ~38448, DUB I–II to running head DISTINCTIO XXIV raw ~38497) remain skeletons.


title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De permissione primae tentationis.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus debuerit facere hominem impeccabilem.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod Deus debuit facere hominem impeccabilem sive inexpugnabilem, et hoc:

1. *Primo* per divinam *bonitatem*, quia, ut dicit Dionysius[^1], « optimi est optima adducere »; sed melior est natura rationalis, quae non potest peccare, quam quae potest: ergo videtur, quod decuerit Deum optimum, facere hominem ad peccandum impossibilem, et ita inexpugnabilem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per divinam *liberalitatem*. Ad excellentiam enim liberalitatis non solum facit dare multa et magna, sed etiam dare velociter[^2]; sed donum gratiae confirmantis et beatificantis hoc maius est quam donum cuiuslibet gratiae

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gratum facientis: ergo si hoc Deus dare homini disposuerat, et homo ex prima sui conditione ad hoc idoneus erat; videtur, quod statim cum eum fecit, debuit ei hoc donum dare; sed si hoc haberet, esset inexpugnabilis: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur tertio ex parte *sapientiae*[^3]. Maioris enim sapientiae est scire mala praecavere, quam, postquam facta sunt, remedium adhibere: ergo si divina sapientia maxime manifestanda erat in hominis conditione, videtur, quod talem debuit eum facere et tantam sibi cautelam adhibere, quod non posset in malum incidere.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex parte divinae *potentiae*. Quanto enim potentia maior est, tanto velocius operatur: magis igitur divina potentia manifestatur in operatione subita quam in operatione successiva. Si igitur hominis gratificatio et confirmatio et glorificatio est immediate a Deo, videtur, quod Deus subito et in eodem instanti, in quo hominem fecit, debuit eum gratificare et in gratia confirmare, ac per hoc inexpugnabilem facere.

**Sed contra:**
1. Gloria est bonum laudabile; sed nullus est laudandus in eo quod habet, nisi habeat illud per merita: ergo si Deus fecit hominem ad hoc, ut perveniret ad statum gloriae et praemii; videtur, quod debuit etiam facere hominem in *statu meriti*. Sed *status meriti* et *praemii* debent esse distincti, sicut status viae et patriae, secundum legem communem: ergo et *dona* viae et patriae. Si igitur habere impossibilitatem ad peccandum hoc[^4] spectat ad securitatem beatitudinis, videtur, quod a principio non debuit homini dari: ergo debuit homo expugnabilis fieri.

2. Item, ad plenam perfectionem universi decuit, fieri omnem creaturam, quae a ratione recta potuit excogitari, sicut dicit Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio[^5]; sed rationabiliter cogitari potest, ad perfectionem universi spectare creaturam, quae haberet libertatem arbitrii et *relicta esset in manu consilii sui*: hanc igitur decuit fieri et in statu vertibilitatis constitui. Sed hoc nulli creaturae magis competit quam homini: ergo etc.

3. Item, universum ex oppositione mali ad bonum decoratur « quasi quibusdam antithetis », sicut dicit Augustinus[^6], et Ecclesiasticus innuit trigesimo tertio: *Contra malum bonum* etc. Si ergo Deus universum venustare debuit et decorare, videtur, quod hunc decorem universo non debuit auferre; sed si fecisset hominem inexpugnabilem, iam hic decor non esset: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc videtur quarto, quia Deus universum fecit ad sui ipsius manifestationem[^7]; et sicut Deus est summe potens et sapiens, sic est summe iustus et misericors: ergo tale debuit facere universum, in quo manifestaretur eius summa *iustitia* et summa *misericordia*. Sed summa *iustitia* non manifestatur nisi in severitate punitionis malorum; summa *misericordia* non manifestatur perfecte nisi in liberatione miserorum et remissione delictorum; haec autem non possent esse, nisi rationalis creatura facta esset in statu, in quo posset peccare et expugnari: ergo divina iustitia et misericordia exigebat, hominem vertibilem et expugnabilem fieri.

### Conclusio
> *Ad manifestandam Dei potentiam, sapientiam, misericordiam et iustitiam congruum fuit, hominem peccabilem creari.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod etsi ipsa divina operatio non indigeat approbatione, pro eo quod quidquid Deus facit, bene facit et recte facit; verumtamen ad excitandam devotionem in mente fidelium, et compescendam rabiem in ore blasphemantium et Deum in suis operibus inculpantium, quadruplex potest ratio assignari, quare Deus talem fecit hominem, ut posset ab adversario expugnari.

Et prima est manifestatio divinae *potentiae*. Voluit enim Deus ostendere homini, quia, sicut sine eo factus non fuerat, ita nec sine ipso persistere poterat. Ut igitur homo nosset, quod divinum *posse* non solummodo est omnis potentiae causativum, sed etiam omnis potentiae conservativum, et quod ipsum solum est, quod non potest deficere nec expugnari: ideo placuit sibi, creaturam rationalem facere vertibilem et expugnabilem, nec ipsam confirmare, quousque experimento disceret, quod ipse solus est, in quo non cadit *non-posse*[^8].

Secunda ratio est manifestatio divinae *sapientiae*. Maioris enim sapientiae ostensivum est scire ordinare bona cum malis et elicere bona ex malis, quam ordinare solum bona cum bonis; et ideo, cum non deceret Deum mala facere, debuit talem facere creaturam, quae posset in operando deficere et malum committere, ut Deus mala illa ordinando suam sapientiam declararet[^9].

Tertia ratio sumitur ex manifestatione divinae *misericordiae*, quae potissime manifestata est, cum

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unigenitum Filium suum tradidit ad liberationem servi[^10].

Quarta ratio sumitur ex manifestatione divinae *iustitiae*, quae potissime manifestatur in hoc, quod Deus retribuit unicuique secundum opera sua, praecipue in aeterna punitione malorum. Haec autem retributio et punitio et etiam praefata misericordiae liberatio non esset, nisi Deus creaturam rationalem, et praecipue hominem, in statu vertibilitatis fecisset, et ita potentem impugnari et expugnari. — Et ideo congruum fuit, Deum hominem in tali statu facere; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

1. *Ad illud* quod primo obiicitur, quod Deus debuit facere hominem optimum; dicendum, quod est optimum *simpliciter*, et est optimum *in ordine*. Cum autem dicit Dionysius, quod optimi est optima adducere, non intelligit *absolute*, sed *in ordine*[^11]; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod homo debuerit fieri in optimo statu *simpliciter*, sed in statu, in quo optime salvaretur universitatis ordo et pulcritudo. Et sic factus est, cum productus fuit in statu vertibilitatis, ut ordinato processu perveniret a merito ad praemium, ab imperfecto ad perfectum, ab inferiori ad supremum.

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur de summa liberalitate, dicendum, quod etsi Deus sit liberalissimus, tamen liberalitas non praecludit viam iustitiae et sapientiae. Ideo sic dona sua distribuit largiter, ut tamen non excludatur sapientiae recta ordinatio et iustitiae iusta retributio. Ideo non statim debuit beatificare et confirmare, sed merita hominis exspectare.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod maioris sapientiae est praecavere malum etc.; dicendum, quod falsum est; immo multo maioris sapientiae est morbum bene curare, quam naturam a morbo praeservare. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^12]: « Melius iudicavit Deus de malis bona facere, quam mala nulla permittere ». Et maiori etiam sapientiae attestatur, ut praedictum est, sic res ordinare, ut ex superveniente etiam deordinatione non deturpentur, sed earum ordinatio decoretur.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur de potentia, dicendum, quod si in omnibus operibus divinis manifestetur divina potentia, ea tamen quae spectant ad hominis gratificationem et glorificationem, plus sunt ad manifestationem divinae misericordiae et iustitiae quam potentiae. Ideo maior est congruentia in proposito quam in opposito. Nihilominus tamen quantum ad aliquem modum ex ipsa humana infirmitate et indigentia plus innotescit homini divina potentia, quam si homo nunquam conspexisset vertibilitatem in rationali creatura.

english:
### Article I. *On the permission of the first temptation.*
### Question I. *Whether God ought to have made man impeccable.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that God ought to have made man impeccable or unconquerable, and this:

1. *First*, through the divine *goodness*, because, as Dionysius says[^1], "it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things"; but a rational nature that cannot sin is better than one that can: therefore it seems that it befitted God, who is best, to make man incapable of sinning, and thus unconquerable.

2. Likewise, the same thing seems [to follow] through the divine *liberality*. For it pertains to the excellence of liberality not only to give many and great things, but also to give *swiftly*[^2]; but the gift of confirming and beatifying grace is greater than the gift of any grace

that makes pleasing [to God]: therefore if God had disposed to give this to man, and man from his first condition was suited for it; it seems that immediately when He made him, He ought to have given him this gift; but if he had this, he would be unconquerable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the same thing is shown, thirdly, on the part of *wisdom*[^3]. For it belongs to a greater wisdom to know how to guard against evils beforehand, than, after they have been done, to apply a remedy: therefore if the divine wisdom was especially to be manifested in the making of man, it seems that He ought to have made him such, and to have applied to him such caution, that he could not fall into evil.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown on the part of the divine *power*. For the greater the power, the more swiftly it works: therefore the divine power is more manifested in a sudden operation than in a successive one. If, then, man's gratification and confirmation and glorification are immediately from God, it seems that God, suddenly and in the same instant in which He made man, ought to have made him pleasing [to Himself] and confirmed him in grace, and thereby made him unconquerable.

**On the contrary:**
1. Glory is a praiseworthy good; but no one is to be praised for what he has, unless he has it through merits: therefore if God made man for this, that he should arrive at the state of glory and reward; it seems that He also ought to have made man in a *state of merit*. But the *state of merit* and [the state] *of reward* ought to be distinct, as the state of the way and of the homeland, according to the common law: therefore also the *gifts* of the way and of the homeland. If, then, to have an incapacity for sinning[^4] pertains to the security of beatitude, it seems that it ought not to have been given to man from the beginning: therefore man ought to have been made conquerable.

2. Likewise, for the full perfection of the universe it befitted that every creature be made which could be conceived by right reason, as Augustine says in the third book of *On Free Choice*[^5]; but it can reasonably be thought that there pertains to the perfection of the universe a creature which would have freedom of choice and *be left in the hand of its own counsel*: this, therefore, it befitted to be made and to be established in a state of changeableness. But this belongs to no creature more than to man: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the universe is adorned from the opposition of evil to good "as it were by certain antitheses," as Augustine says[^6], and Ecclesiasticus intimates in the thirty-third chapter: *Against evil, good* etc. If, then, God ought to have beautified and adorned the universe, it seems that He ought not to have taken away this adornment from the universe; but if He had made man unconquerable, this adornment would no longer be: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] in a fourth way, because God made the universe for the manifestation of Himself[^7]; and just as God is supremely powerful and wise, so He is supremely just and merciful: therefore He ought to have made such a universe, in which His supreme *justice* and supreme *mercy* would be manifested. But supreme *justice* is not manifested except in the severity of the punishment of the wicked; supreme *mercy* is not manifested perfectly except in the liberation of the wretched and the remission of sins; but these could not be, unless the rational creature had been made in a state in which it could sin and be conquered: therefore the divine justice and mercy demanded that man be made changeable and conquerable.

### Conclusion
> *For manifesting God's power, wisdom, mercy, and justice, it was fitting that man be created capable of sinning.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, although the divine operation itself needs no approval, for the reason that whatever God does, He does well and does rightly; nevertheless, to stir up devotion in the mind of the faithful, and to restrain the rage in the mouth of those who blaspheme and blame God in His works, a fourfold reason can be assigned why God made man such that he could be conquered by the adversary.

And the first is the manifestation of the divine *power*. For God willed to show man that, just as he had not been made without Him, so neither could he persist without Him. Therefore, that man might know that the divine *power* is not only the cause of all power, but also the conserver of all power, and that it alone is that which cannot fail nor be conquered: therefore it pleased Him to make the rational creature changeable and conquerable, and not to confirm it, until by experience it should learn that He alone is the one in whom *not-being-able* does not occur[^8].

The second reason is the manifestation of the divine *wisdom*. For it is more indicative of a greater wisdom to know how to order good things together with evil ones and to draw forth good things from evil ones, than to order good things alone together with good ones; and therefore, since it did not befit God to make evils, He ought to make such a creature as could fail in acting and commit evil, that God, by ordering those evils, might declare His wisdom[^9].

The third reason is taken from the manifestation of the divine *mercy*, which was most powerfully manifested when

He handed over His only-begotten Son for the liberation of the servant[^10].

The fourth reason is taken from the manifestation of the divine *justice*, which is most powerfully manifested in this, that God repays each one according to his works, especially in the eternal punishment of the wicked. But this retribution and punishment, and also the aforesaid liberation of mercy, would not be, unless God had made the rational creature, and especially man, in a state of changeableness, and thus capable of being assailed and conquered. — And therefore it was fitting that God make man in such a state; and the reasons adduced for this are to be granted.

1. *To that* which is objected first, that God ought to have made man best; it must be said that there is what is best *simply*, and there is what is best *in [a given] order*. But when Dionysius says that it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things, he does not understand it *absolutely*, but *in [a given] order*[^11]; and therefore from this it does not follow that man ought to have been made in the best state *simply*, but in a state in which the order and beauty of the whole [of things] would best be preserved. And so he was made, when he was produced in a state of changeableness, so that by an ordered progression he might arrive from merit to reward, from the imperfect to the perfect, from the lower to the supreme.

2. *To that* which is objected concerning supreme liberality, it must be said that, although God is most liberal, nevertheless liberality does not bar the way of justice and wisdom. Therefore He distributes His gifts so liberally that nevertheless the right ordering of wisdom and the just retribution of justice are not excluded. Therefore He ought not immediately to beatify and confirm, but to await the merits of man.

3. *To that* which is objected, that it belongs to a greater wisdom to guard against evil beforehand, etc.; it must be said that this is false; rather, it belongs to a much greater wisdom to cure a disease well than to preserve nature from disease. Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^12]: "God judged it better to make good things out of evils than to permit no evils." And it bears witness to a greater wisdom also, as has been said, so to order things that, from a supervening disorder also, they are not deformed, but their ordering is adorned.

4. *To that* which is objected concerning power, it must be said that, although in all the divine works the divine power is manifested, nevertheless those things which pertain to man's gratification and glorification are more for the manifestation of the divine mercy and justice than of power. Therefore there is greater fittingness in the proposed [course] than in the opposite. Nevertheless, as to a certain mode, from human infirmity and indigence itself the divine power becomes more known to man than if man had never beheld changeableness in a rational creature.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 4, § 19. Vide supra pag. 113, nota 7.

en: [Dionysius,] *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 19. See above, p. 113, note 7.

la: Prov. 3, 28: *Ne dicas amico tuo: Vade et revertere, cras dabo tibi, cum statim possis dare.* — Paulo inferius post *conditione* in codd. I K W ee cum ed. 2 additur *et*, in ed. 1 etiam.

en: Prov. 3:28: *Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at once.* — A little below, after *conditione*, in codices I K W ee with ed. 2 *et* is added, in ed. 1 likewise.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *divinae sapientiae.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *divinae sapientiae* [of the divine wisdom].

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit *hoc.*

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, omits *hoc* [this].

la: Cap. 5, n. 13; c. 9, n. 24. seqq.; c. 12. n. 33. — Sequens textus est Eccli. 15, 14. — In *maiori* plures codd., inter quos C R S T ce, substituunt *ratione iusta* pro *ratione recta.*

en: Chapter 5, n. 13; c. 9, n. 24 ff.; c. 12, n. 33. — The following text is Ecclesiasticus 15:14. — In the major [premise] several codices, among them C R S T ce, substitute *ratione iusta* [by just reason] for *ratione recta* [by right reason].

la: Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. — Textus Eccli. habetur c. 33, 15.

en: Book XI of *The City of God*, c. 18. — The text of Ecclesiasticus is found at c. 33:15.

la: Sicut ostensum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — Alii [codd.] ... quanto inferius post *primum* *non manifestatur* in cod. cc et ed. 1 subiungitur *perfecte*, et in fine argumenti verbis *expugnabilem fieri* cod. Q praemittit *ita*, ubi nonnulli codd., ut F K P, perperam legunt *inexpugnabilem fieri.*

en: As was shown above in d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. — Other [codices] ... a little below, after *primum*, [after] *non manifestatur* in codex cc and ed. 1 is added *perfecte*, and at the end of the argument, before the words *expugnabilem fieri*, codex Q prefixes *ita*, where some codices, such as F K P, wrongly read *inexpugnabilem fieri* [to be made unconquerable].

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *nisi posse.* — Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 7; Enchirid. c. 106. n. 28.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *nisi posse.* — Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 5, n. 7; *Enchiridion* c. 106, n. 28.

la: Vide August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18; Enchirid. c. 11. n. 3. et c. 27. n. 8.

en: See Augustine, *The City of God* XI, c. 18; *Enchiridion* c. 11, n. 3 and c. 27, n. 8.

la: Haec nec non seq. ratio insinuantur et ab August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12; Enchirid. c. 106. seqq. et XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 10. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.

en: This reason, as well as the following one, is intimated also by Augustine, *The City of God* XXI, c. 12; *Enchiridion* c. 106 ff.; and *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 8, n. 10. Cf. also I *Sentences* d. 47, q. 3.

en: Cf. I *Sentences* d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1.

la: Cap. 27. n. 8, quo loco in textu originali legitur *bene* pro *bona* et post *mala nulla* adiicitur *esse.*

en: Chapter 27, n. 8, in which place in the original text *bene* is read for *bona*, and after *mala nulla* the word *esse* is added. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Doctor hoc loco tantum inquirit de *congruentia* dispositionis divinae, qua hominem fecit peccabilem; pro qua congruentia gravissimas affert rationes, eo magis notandas, quia haec divina dispositio et etiam permissio tentationis, de qua in sequente quaest. agitur, defendenda est « contra rabiem in ore blasphemantium et Deum in suis operibus inculpantium » (hic in corp.). — Alia quaestio connexa tractatur infra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, scil. utrum *possibile* sit Deo creaturam, stante libero arbitrio, facere *naturaliter* impeccabilem. Ceteri autem commentatores hoc loco de ista altera quaestione disputant, omissa ea quae de congruentia facti agit. Haec tamen tractatur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 2. § 2; ab aliis tangitur in quaestione, quare Deus in genere mala fieri permittat, de quo conferri potest S. Thom., S. I. q. 48. a. 2.

**II.** De sequente quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 103. m. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 165. a. 1. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2; — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The holy Doctor here inquires only into the *fittingness* of the divine disposition by which He made man capable of sinning; for which fittingness he brings forward most weighty reasons, the more to be noted because this divine disposition, and also the permission of the temptation treated in the following question, must be defended "against the rage in the mouth of those who blaspheme and blame God in His works" (here in the body). — Another connected question is treated below in d. 24, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, namely whether it is *possible* for God to make a creature, its free choice standing, *naturally* impeccable. But the other commentators here dispute about that other question, omitting what concerns the fittingness of the deed. This, however, is treated by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 2, § 2; and is touched on by others in the question why God permits evils to be done in general, on which one may consult St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 48, a. 2.

**II.** On the following question there treat: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 103, m. 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* II-II, q. 165, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2; — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p53{1,2,3}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`); raw OCR `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 37312–37456 cross-checked for footnote-marker positions. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (pp. 531–533 = PDF 553–555). Running heads `DIST. XXIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` (p. 531) / `... QUAEST. II.` (pp. 532–533) — the QUAEST. II head on pp. 532–533 is a page-top running head; the body is still q1 until SCHOLION closes near the bottom of p. 533.
- **Structure.** ARTICULUS I opener *De permissione primae tentationis* folded into this q1 per CLAUDE.md Vol II Override §5 (no standalone divisio chunk). `has_scholion: true` — SCHOLION I (on this q1's congruentia inquiry) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll for the *following* question, q2).
- **Page-split map (footers, per-page Quaracchi sequences):**
  - p. 531 footers ⁵–⁶ → **[^1]–[^2]** (received hand-off from `d23-divisio`: ⁵ Dionysius *De Div. Nom.* c.4 §19; ⁶ Prov. 3,28). p. 531 footers ¹–⁴ belong to the divisio (already placed there).
  - p. 532 footers ¹–⁷ → **[^3]–[^9]** (¹ sapientiae, ² hoc, ³ Lib. Arb., ⁴ Civ. Dei, ⁵ cross-ref d.1, ⁶ non-posse, ⁷ declararet).
  - p. 533 footers ¹–³ → **[^10]–[^12]** (¹ misericordiae/Civ.Dei, ² cross-ref d.44, ³ Enchirid. c.27). **p. 533 footers ⁴–⁵ forwarded to `d23-a1-q2`** — they anchor in the *Secundo quaeritur* (q2) body that opens at the bottom of p. 533 (⁴ *Hic c. 1…*; ⁵ *Vers. 5: Nam et qui certat in agone…*).
- **Hand-offs.** Received: p. 531 ⁵–⁶ from divisio. Forwarded: p. 533 ⁴–⁵ to a1-q2 (q2 body opens raw 37457, bottom of p. 533).
- **[?] flags.** **[^7]** (= p.532 footer ⁵): a short connective phrase between the cross-reference head (*Sicut ostensum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.*) and the codex-variant continuation (*quanto inferius post primum…*) wraps from the bottom of the left footer column to the top of the right; the two intervening words after *Alii [codd.]* are clipped at the column break and are left elided with `…`. Both verified anchored parts are present. ACCEPT-PARTIAL pending 600 dpi pass (d.21–d.30 decade-polish gate). No other `[?]`.