title: Dist. 40

title_alt: De praedestinatione et reprobatione — littera Magistri

title_alt: On predestination and reprobation — text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 699 -->

### DISTINCTIO XL.

Praedestinatio[^1] vero de bonis salutaribus est et de hominibus salvandis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum[^2]: « praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, quae sine praescientia esse non potest. Potest autem sine praedestinatione esse praescientia. Praedestinatione quippe Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturus; sed praescivit Deus etiam quae non esset ipse facturus, id est omnia mala ». Praedestinavit eos quos elegit, reliquos vero reprobavit, id est, ad mortem aeternam praescivit peccaturos.

#### Cap. I.

*An aliquis praedestinatus possit damnari, vel reprobus salvari.*

Praedestinatorum nullus videtur posse damnari, nec reproborum aliquis posse salvari. Unde Augustinus in libro de Correptione et gratia[^3]: « In Apocalypsi[^4], inquit, dicitur: *Tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam*. Si alius non est accepturus, nisi iste per-

<!-- page 700 -->

differt, certus est electorum numerus », id est, non potest augeri vel minui. — Ad hoc autem obiiciunt[^5] quidam, nitentes probare, numerum electorum posse augeri et minui, sic: posset Deus non apponere gratiam quibus apponit, et posset subtrahere quibus non subtrahit; quod si fieret, utique damnarentur. Possent ergo damnari isti, qui tamen salvabuntur. Posset itaque minui electorum numerus; ita etiam posset augeri, quia posset apponi gratia quibus non apponitur, per quam salvarentur. Possent ergo salvari, habita gratia, qui tamen sine ea damnabuntur: posset itaque augeri numerus electorum. — Quibus respondemus[^6] ex ea ratione dictum esse et verum esse, numerum electorum non posse augeri vel minui, quia non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet, ut aliquis salvetur et non sit praedestinatus, vel ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Intelligentia enim conditionis implicitae veritatem facit in dicto, et impossibilitatem in re. Si vero simpliciter intelligatur, impossibilitas non admittitur, ut cum dicitur: *praedestinatus non potest [damnari], vel reprobus potest salvari*. In his enim et huiusmodi locutionibus ex ratione dicti diiudicanda est sententia dictionis. Alia namque fit intelligentia, si per coniunctionem haec accipiantur dicta, atque alia, si per disiunctionem, ut supra[^7], cum de praescientia agebatur, praetaxatum est. Si enim, cum dicis: *praedestinatus non potest damnari*, intelligas ita: id est non potest esse, ut praedestinatus sit et damnetur, verum dicis, quia coniunctim intelligis; falsum autem, si disiunctim, ut si intelligas, istum non posse damnari, quem dico praedestinatum. Potuit enim non esse praedestinatus, et ita damnaretur.

Verumtamen adhuc instant et secundum coniunctionem argumentando ita procedunt. Non enim, inquiunt, potest esse, ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Utrumque istorum simul esse non potest; sed alterum horum non potest non esse, scilicet, quin iste sit praedestinatus: ab aeterno enim praedestinatus est et non potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Cum ergo impossibile sit, simul utrumque esse, et impossibile sit, alterum non esse, videtur, non posse alterum esse, scilicet ut damnetur. Quod si est, ergo non potest esse, ut non salvetur. — In huius quaestionis solutione mallem alios audire quam docere. Dicimus tamen, similem de praescientia posse moveri quaestionem; ideoque, tam hic quam ibi, unam facimus responsionem dicentes determinandum fore illud, cui innititur tota haec quaestio, scilicet *impossibile est, alterum*[^8] *non esse*, scilicet, quin iste modo sit praedestinatus; ab aeterno enim iste praedestinatus est. Distinguendum enim est, cum ait: *iste non potest modo non esse praedestinatus*, vel *non potest modo esse, quin sit praedestinatus*. Hoc enim et coniunctim et disiunctim intelligi potest. Non enim potest esse, ut ab aeterno sit praedestinatus et modo non sit praedestinatus, nec potest esse simul, ut sit praedestinatus et non sit praedestinatus; sed tamen potuit esse ab aeterno, quod non esset praedestinatus, et potuit ab aeterno non esse praedestinatus. Et sicut ab aeterno Deus potuit eum non praedestinare, ita conceditur a quibusdam, quod et modo potest Deus eum non praedestinasse. Ab aeterno ergo potest Deus non praedestinasse eum: ergo potest iste non fuisse praedestinatus. Si vero non fuisset praedestinatus, nec modo esset praedestinatus: ergo potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Ita et de praescientia et de praescitis dicunt; quod in actionibus vel in operationibus Dei et hominum nullatenus concedunt. Ex quo enim aliquid factum est vel dictum, non concedunt, quod possit non esse vel non fuisse, immo impossibile est, non esse vel fuisse quod factum est vel dictum, referentes possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem ad naturam rei existentis. Cum vero de praescientia vel praedestinatione Dei agitur, possibilitas vel impossibilitas ad potentiam Dei refertur, quae semper eadem fuit et est, quia praedestinatio, praescientia, potentia unum in Deo est.

#### Cap. II.

*Quid sit reprobatio Dei, et in quibus consideretur, et quis sit praedestinationis effectus.*

Cumque praedestinatio sit gratiae praeparatio, id est divina electio, qua elegit quos voluit ante mundi constitutionem, ut ait Apostolus[^9]; reprobatio e converso intelligenda est praescientia iniquitatis quorumdam et praeparatio damnationis eorundem. Sicut enim praedestinationis effectus illa gratia est, qua in praesenti iustificamur atque ad recte vivendum et in bono perseverandum adiuvamur, et illa qua in futuro beatificamur; ita reprobatio Dei, qua ab aeterno non eligendo quosdam reprobavit, secundum duo consideratur, quorum alterum praescit et non praeparat, id est iniquitatem, alterum praescit et praeparat, scilicet aeternam poenam. Unde Augustinus ad Prosperum et Hilarium[^10]: « Haec, inquit, regula inconcusse tenenda est, peccatores in peccatis praescitos esse, non praeparatos, poenam autem esse praeparatam ». « Praeparavit enim Deus, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Bono perseverantiae[^11], in praescientia sua, quibus voluit bona sua; et quibuscumque donat, proculdubio se donaturum esse praescivit ». « Praeparavit etiam Deus, ut ait Fulgentius[^12], malis ignem aeternum, illis utique, quos iuste praeparavit ad luenda supplicia; nec tamen

<!-- page 701 -->

praeparavit ad facienda peccata. Praeparavit enim Deus, quod divina aequitas redderet, non quod humana iniquitas admitteret. Non enim, sicut praeparavit Sanctos ad iustitiam percipiendam, sic praeparavit iniquos ad iustitiam amittendam, quia pravitatis praeparator nunquam fuit ».

Sicut ergo praedestinatio Dei proprie est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur[^13]; ita reprobatio Dei est praescientia malitiae in quibusdam non finiendae et praeparatio poenae non terminandae. Et sicut praedestinationis effectus est gratiae appositio, ita reprobationis aeternae quodam modo *effectus esse videtur obduratio*. « Nec obdurat Deus, ut ait Augustinus ad Sixtum[^14], impertiendo malitiam, sed non impertiendo gratiam, sicut nec digni sunt. Quibus enim non impertitur nec digni sunt nec merentur; potius ut non impertiatur, hoc digni sunt, hoc merentur ». Unde Apostolus[^15] ait: *Cuius vult miseretur Deus, et quem vult indurat*; misericordiam appellans praedestinationem et praecipue praedestinationis effectum, id est gratiae appositionem, obdurationem vero gratiae privationem. « Non enim, ut ait Augustinus ad Simplicianum[^16], intelligendum est, quod Deus ita induret, quasi quemquam peccare cogat; sed tamen quibusdam peccatoribus misericordiam iustificationis suae non largitur, et ob hoc eos indurare dicitur, quia non eorum miseretur, non quia impellit, ut peccent. Eorum autem non miseretur, quibus gratiam non esse praebendam aequitate occultissima et ab humanis sensibus remotissima iudicat »; « quam non aperit, sed miratur Apostolus dicens: *altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei!* »

---

english:
<!-- page 699 -->

### DISTINCTION XL.

Predestination[^1], however, is of saving goods and of human beings to be saved. For as Augustine says in [his] book *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^2]: « predestination is the preparation of grace, which cannot be without foreknowledge. But foreknowledge can be without predestination. For by predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was about to do; but God also foreknew those things which He was not Himself about to do, that is, all evils ». He predestined those whom He chose, but the rest He reprobated, that is, He foreknew [them] as being about to sin unto eternal death.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether any predestined [person] can be damned, or any reprobate be saved.*

None of the predestined seems able to be damned, nor any of the reprobate able to be saved. Whence Augustine in [his] book *On Rebuke and Grace*[^3]: « In the Apocalypse[^4], he says, it is said: *Hold what you have, lest another receive your crown*. If another is not going to receive [it], unless this man dif-

<!-- page 700 -->

fers, the number of the elect is certain », that is, [it] cannot be increased or diminished. — But against this certain [persons] object[^5], striving to prove that the number of the elect can be increased and diminished, thus: God could not apply grace to those to whom He [does] apply [it], and could withdraw [it] from those from whom He does not withdraw [it]; if this should happen, they would assuredly be damned. Therefore those could be damned who nevertheless will be saved. Thus the number of the elect could be diminished; just so it could be increased, because grace could be applied to those to whom it is not applied, by which they would be saved. Therefore those could be saved, having received grace, who nevertheless without it will be damned: thus the number of the elect could be increased. — To which we respond[^6] [that] from that ratio [of speaking] it is said and is true, [that] the number of the elect cannot be increased or diminished, because both cannot be at once, namely that anyone be saved and not be predestined, or that anyone be predestined and damned. For the understanding of an implicit condition makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the matter. But if [the saying] is understood simply [i.e., absolutely], the impossibility is not admitted, as when it is said: *the predestined [one] cannot [be damned], or the reprobate can be saved*. For in these and similar locutions, the meaning of the expression is to be judged from the ground of the saying. For one understanding arises if these sayings are taken by way of conjunction, and another if [taken] by way of disjunction, as was previously prefaced[^7] above, when foreknowledge was being treated. For if, when you say *the predestined [one] cannot be damned*, you understand it thus — that is, [it] cannot be that he be predestined and [also] damned — you speak truly, because you understand [it] conjunctively; but [it is] false if [understood] disjunctively, as if you should understand that this [person] cannot be damned whom I call predestined. For he could have been not predestined, and so be damned.

Yet still they press on and, arguing by way of conjunction, proceed thus. For, they say, it cannot be that anyone be predestined and damned. Both of these cannot be at once; but one of them cannot not-be, namely that this [person] be predestined: for he is predestined from eternity and cannot now not-be predestined. Since therefore it is impossible that both be at once, and impossible that one not-be, it seems that the other cannot be — namely, that he be damned. But if this is so, then it cannot be that he not be saved. — In the solution of this question I would rather hear others than teach. Yet we say [that] a similar question can be raised about foreknowledge; and so, both here and there, we make one response, saying that what must be determined is that on which the whole of this question rests, namely *it is impossible that the other*[^8] *not-be*, namely, that this [person] now is predestined; for from eternity this [person] is predestined. For a distinction must be made when he says: *this [one] cannot now not-be predestined*, or *cannot now be without being predestined*. For this can be understood both conjunctively and disjunctively. For [it] cannot be that he be predestined from eternity and now not be predestined, nor can [it] be at once that he be predestined and not be predestined; yet it could have been from eternity that he were not predestined, and he could from eternity not have been predestined. And just as from eternity God could have not predestined him, so it is conceded by certain [persons] that even now God can not have predestined him. Therefore from eternity God can not have predestined him: therefore this [person] can not have been predestined. But if he had not been predestined, neither would he now be predestined: therefore he can now not-be predestined. So also they say of foreknowledge and of the foreknown; which they in no way concede with regard to actions or operations of God and human beings. For from the [moment] something has been done or said, they do not concede that it can not-be or not have been; on the contrary, [it is] impossible that what has been done or said not-be or [not] have been — referring possibility or impossibility to the nature of the existing thing. But when treating God's foreknowledge or predestination, possibility or impossibility is referred to God's power, which always was and is the same, because predestination, foreknowledge, [and] power are one in God.

#### Chapter II.

*What God's reprobation is, and in what it is considered, and what the effect of predestination is.*

And since predestination is the preparation of grace — that is, the divine election by which He chose those whom He willed *before the founding of the world*, as the Apostle says[^9] — reprobation, conversely, is to be understood as the foreknowledge of certain ones' iniquity and the preparation of damnation for those same. For just as the effect of predestination is that grace by which in the present we are justified and helped to live rightly and to persevere in the good, and that [grace] by which we are beatified in the future; so God's reprobation, by which from eternity by not electing He reprobated certain ones, is considered according to two [things], one of which He foreknows and does not prepare, that is iniquity, [and] the other He foreknows and prepares, namely eternal punishment. Whence Augustine to Prosper and Hilary[^10]: « This, he says, rule must be unshakably held: that sinners have been foreknown in [their] sins, not prepared [for them], but punishment has been prepared ». « For God prepared, as Augustine says in [his] book *On the Gift of Perseverance*[^11], in His foreknowledge those to whom He willed His own good things; and to whomever He gives, undoubtedly He foreknew Himself as about to give ». « God also prepared, as Fulgentius says[^12], an eternal fire for the wicked — for those, namely, whom He justly prepared for the suffering of punishments; yet He did not

<!-- page 701 -->

prepare [them] for the doing of sins. For God prepared what divine equity would render, not what human iniquity would commit. For He did not, just as He prepared the saints for the receiving of justice, [so also] prepare the wicked for the losing of justice — because He has never been a preparer of depravity ».

Therefore just as God's predestination, properly [speaking], is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which most certainly are freed whoever are freed[^13]; so God's reprobation is the foreknowledge of malice in certain [persons] not [to be] ended and the preparation of punishment not [to be] terminated. And just as the effect of predestination is the application of grace, so of eternal reprobation *the effect seems in some manner to be hardening*. « God does not harden, as Augustine says to Sixtus[^14], by imparting malice, but by not imparting grace, just as [the wicked] are not worthy. For those to whom [grace] is not imparted are neither worthy nor deserving; rather they are worthy and deserve that it should not be imparted ». Whence the Apostle says[^15]: *On whom He wills, God has mercy, and whom He wills He hardens* — calling mercy predestination and especially the effect of predestination, that is, the application of grace, and [calling] hardening the privation of grace. « For one ought not, as Augustine says to Simplician[^16], understand that God so hardens as if He compelled anyone to sin; yet to certain sinners He does not bestow the mercy of His justification, and on this account He is said to harden them, because He does not have mercy on them — not because He impels [them] to sin. But He does not have mercy on those to whom He judges grace not [to be] given, by an equity most hidden and most remote from human senses »; « which the Apostle does not unveil but admires, saying: *O depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!* »

---

la: In codd. CDE et ed. 1 d. XL. incipit cum sequente capitulo: *Praedestinatorum nullus videtur*. Et revera, secundum distributionem capitulorum hae quinque propositiones pertinent ad ultimum capitulum distinctionis praecedentis. S. Bonaventura autem, ut patet ex divisione textus, hic incipit distinctionem XL.

en: In codices CDE and edition 1, distinction XL begins with the following chapter: *Praedestinatorum nullus videtur* ("None of the predestined seems"). And in fact, according to [their] distribution of chapters, these five propositions belong to the last chapter of the preceding distinction. St. Bonaventure however, as is plain from his division of the text, here begins distinction XL.

la: Cap. 10. n. 19; sed ultima verba ex Glossa ad Rom. 8, 29.

en: [Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*,] c. 10, n. 19; but the last words [are taken] from the Gloss on Romans 8:29.

la: Cap. 13. n. 39. In codd. et edd., excepta 9, intitulatur liber *de Correctione et gratia*.

en: [Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace*,] c. 13, n. 39. In the codices and editions, with the exception of [edition] 9, the book is titled *On Correction and Grace*.

en: [Apocalypse,] c. 3, [v.] 11.

la: In codd. et ed. 1 (5 in margine) *in aliis faceret*. — Unde Magister plura quae sequuntur, nonnullis mutatis, depromsit.

en: In the codices and edition 1 (with [edition] 5 in the margin) [the reading is] *in aliis faceret* ("in others he would make [it]"). — Whence the Master drew much of what follows, with several [things] changed.

la: Dist. XXXVIII. c. 2. — Paulo superius post *dicta*, atque edd. 4, 6, 8, 9 omittunt *alia*.

en: [Cf.] Distinction XXXVIII, c. 2. — A little above, after *dicta* ("sayings") and before *atque* ("and"), editions 4, 6, 8, 9 omit *alia* ("other").

la: Vel *de Dono perseverantiae*, c. 17. n. 41.

en: Or [equivalently, Augustine,] *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 17, n. 41.

la: Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd. et ed. 1 addunt *istorum*.

en: The Vatican edition and other editions, against the codices and edition 1, add *istorum* ("of these").

la: Libr. I. ad Monimum, c. 25; secundum sensum, sed ad verbum in Glossa (loc. cit.). In quo textu codd. B E ante *ad facienda peccata* praemittunt *eos*. — Paulo inferius codd. A B D et edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 (5 in margine) *iniustitiam admittendam* pro *iustitiam amittendam*.

en: [Cf. Fulgentius,] book I *to Monimus*, c. 25; according to the sense, but verbatim in the Gloss (at the place cited). In which text codices B and E, before *ad facienda peccata* ("to the doing of sins"), prefix *eos* ("them"). — A little below, codices A B D and editions 2, 3, 7, 8 (with [edition] 5 in the margin) [read] *iniustitiam admittendam* ("admitting injustice") in place of *iustitiam amittendam* ("losing justice").

la: Cod. D addit *et erit*.

en: Codex D adds *et erit* ("and will be").

la: Ephes. I, 4.

en: Ephesians 1:4.

la: Non invenitur in citatis libris, sed in VI. *Hypognosticon*. Vide etiam Glossam ad Rom. 8, 29 apud Lyranum.

en: [The passage] is not found in the books cited, but in [book] VI of the *Hypognosticon*. See also the Gloss on Romans 8:29 in [Nicholas of] Lyra.

la: August., *de Bono persever.* c. 14. n. 33.

en: Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 14, n. 33.

en: [Augustine,] *Letter* 194, c. 3, n. 14.

en: Romans 9:19.

la: Libr. I. *quaest.* 2. n. 19; sed plurimum a Magistro mutatis. Ultima verba *paene non aperit* etc. usque sunt ex *Epist.* (loc. cit.). — Lectio b. Scripturae est Rom. 11, 33.

en: [Augustine, *To Simplician*,] book I, *question* 2, n. 19; but with very much changed by the Master. The last words *paene non aperit* ("almost does not unveil") etc. and onward are from the *Letter* (at the place cited). — The reading of holy Scripture is Romans 11:33. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 40, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XL. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XL. Division of the text.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 701 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XL.

#### *De praedestinatione et reprobatione quantum ad causam activam.*

> *Praedestinatio vero de bonis salutaribus etc.*

### Divisio textus.

Haec est tertia pars, in qua agit Magister de divina scientia contracta ad speciales effectus. Et dividitur haec pars in duas partes. In prima agitur de praedestinatione et reprobatione quantum ad causalitatem activam. In secunda inquiritur, utrum habeant causalitatem passivam, utrum videlicet sint ex meritis nostris, infra distinctione proxima: *Si autem quaerimus meritum obdurationis* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima agit de praedestinatione; in secunda de reprobatione, ibi: *Cumque praedestinatio sit praeparatio gratiae* etc.

Prima iterum pars dividitur in duas. In prima agit de praedestinationis quidditate; in secunda inquirit de eius necessitate, ibi: *Praedestinatorum autem nullus videtur posse* etc.; in qua parte primo movet dubitationem et opponit, et deinde solvit, tertio opponit contra responsionem, et ultimo solvit. Partes manifeste apparent in littera.

*Cumque praedestinatio sit gratiae praeparatio.* Haec est secunda pars distinctionis, in qua agit Magister de reprobatione, et habet haec pars duas. In prima ostendit, quid sit et quid connotet in quantum praecognitio. In secunda vero ostendit, cuius sit causa, sive quis sit eius effectus, et hoc ibi: *Et sicut praedestinationis effectus est gratiae appositio* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis principaliter quaeruntur:

Primo quaeritur de praedestinatione.

Secundo de electione.

Tertio de reprobatione.

Primus articulus duos habet:

<!-- page 702 -->

Primo enim quaeritur de praedestinatione quantum ad entitatem.

Secundo, quantum ad necessitatem.

De entitate autem duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum praedestinatio sit quid aeternum, an temporale.

Secundo, quid sit praedestinatio secundum rem.

---

english:
<!-- page 701 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XL.

#### *On predestination and reprobation with regard to active causality.*

> *"Predestination, however, [is] of saving goods etc."*

### Division of the text.

This is the third part, in which the Master treats of the divine knowledge as contracted to special effects. And this part is divided into two parts. In the first he treats of predestination and reprobation with regard to active causality. In the second he inquires whether they have passive causality — that is, whether they are from our merits — below in the next distinction: *"But if we ask the merit of hardening"* etc.

The first part has two [divisions]. In the first he treats of predestination; in the second of reprobation, there: *"And since predestination is a preparation of grace"* etc.

The first part again is divided into two. In the first he treats of the quiddity of predestination; in the second he inquires concerning its necessity, there: *"But of those predestined none seems to be able"* etc.; in which part first he raises a doubt and objects, and then resolves [it], thirdly objects against the response, and finally resolves [it]. The parts appear plainly in the letter [of the text].

*"And since predestination is a preparation of grace."* This is the second part of the distinction, in which the Master treats of reprobation, and this part has two [divisions]. In the first he shows what it is and what it connotes inasmuch as [it is] foreknowledge. In the second [part] he shows of what it is the cause, or what is its effect, and this [is] there: *"And just as the effect of predestination is the bestowal of grace"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, [the matters] principally asked are:

First it is asked concerning predestination.

Second concerning election.

Third concerning reprobation.

The first article has two [questions]:

<!-- page 702 -->

For first it is asked concerning predestination as to entity.

Second, as to necessity.

Concerning entity, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether predestination is something eternal or temporal.

Second, what predestination is according to the thing (*rem*).

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 702 -->

### Articulus I.
#### *De praedestinatione quantum ad entitatem.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum praedestinatio sit quid aeternum, an temporale.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem praedestinatio sit quid aeternum, videtur:

1. Quia quod est ante mundi constitutionem est quid aeternum; praedestinatio est huiusmodi, quia praedestinatio est electio, ad Ephesios primo[^1]: *Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem*: ergo etc.

2. Item, «*praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum*»[^2]; sed quidquid Deus praescit, aeternaliter praescit: ergo cum omnis praescientia sit aeterna, et omnis praedestinatio est praescientia, omnis praedestinatio est aeterna.

3. Item, «*praedestinatio est propositum miserendi*»[^3]; sed propositum est quid proponentis praecedens res, quae proponuntur: ergo cum sit propositum Dei, et Deus aeternaliter proponit, patet etc.

4. Item, de ratione sui nominis praedestinatio dicit praecessionem sive antecessionem, sed non nisi praedestinantis ad praedestinatum; sed praedestinans est aeternus: ergo dicit ordinem et antecessionem aeterni ad temporale. Sed antecessio illa est aeterna: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Praedestinatio importat relationem ad praedestinatum; sed omnis relatio ponit respectum verum[^4] vel in utroque extremorum, vel saltem in altero; sed praedestinatio non potest verum respectum ponere in praedestinante: ergo ponit respectum verum in praedestinato. Sed verus respectus non fundatur nisi supra quid creatum: ergo praedestinatio dicit quid creatum et temporale.

2. Item, praedestinatio importat actionem, et omni actioni respondet passio: cum ergo actio et passio non sint in eodem, quia non est idem praedestinans et praedestinatus, necesse est, quod sit in alio. Sed aliud non est nisi quid temporale et creatum: ergo praedestinatio importat quid temporale et creatum: ergo non est aeterna.

3. Item, praedestinatio importat ordinem praedestinantis ad praedestinatum, aut ergo secundum esse, quod habet in Deo, aut secundum esse quod habet in proprio genere. Non secundum esse, quod habet in Deo, quia sic est Deus et non sequitur Deum: ergo secundum esse, quod habet in proprio genere. Sed esse, quod habet in proprio genere, est quid temporale et creatum: ergo praedestinatio similiter: et sic etc.

4. Item, omnis actus divinus, qui non reflectitur supra essentiam vel personam, transit extra, et omnis actus transiens extra ex tempore[^5] dicitur de Deo: cum ergo praedestinatio non transeat in personam vel essentiam, sed extra, ergo est temporalis.

5. Item, praedestinatio est praeparatio[^6]; sed nihil dicitur praeparari, antequam incipiat aliquid fieri secundum principia intrinseca — artifex enim non dicitur praeparare domum ante ligna et lapides sola cogitatione — ergo necesse est, quod ponatur in re.

<!-- page 703 -->

### Conclusio.

> *Praedestinatio est aeterna, ratione principalis significati et antecessionis ad connotatum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in praedestinatione non sunt nisi duo, scilicet principale significatum et connotatum. Principale significatum est divina essentia, connotatum vero est creatura, ut gratia et gloria et persona salvanda[^7]. Et haec duo importat praedestinatio cum ordine antecessionis unius ad alterum ratione praepositionis.

Quoniam igitur significatum principale est aeternum, ita praedestinatio est quid aeternum[^8]. Rursus, quoniam importat antecessionem significati ad connotatum, et illa antecessio est ab aeterno: ideo praedestinatio est quid aeternum et ab aeterno. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de relatione, dicendum, quod res[^9] sive relatio potest significari in Deo dupliciter: vel respectu existentis in actu, vel respectu existentis in potentia, futuri aliquando in actu; et quando respectu existentis in actu, tunc necesse est, quod respondeat verus respectus in actu; quando vero respectu existentis in potentia, sufficit quod respondeat in potentia, et talis fundatur super ens in potentia; et ideo actu nihil ponit nisi Deum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de actione, dicendum, quod est actio secundum rem, et est actio secundum modum[^10]. Actioni secundum rem, quae est principium efficiens aliquid, respondet passio differens secundum rem, ut creationi-actioni creationi-passio[^11]. Actioni vero secundum modum non respondet nisi passio secundum modum differens, ut cognitioni-actioni ipsius Dei respondet ipsum cognosci; et hoc quidem realiter non est aliud, sed secundum modum. Quoniam igitur praedestinatio non importat nisi praecognitionem sive active sive passive; ideo est quid aeternum et non est aliud quam Deus[^12].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine, dicendum, quod est ordo secundum nobilitatem, et secundum durationem[^13]; et ordo secundum nobilitatem ponit extrema simul, ordo vero secundum durationem, eo ipso quod ordo est, ponit, extrema non esse simul; et secundum rationem antecedendi ordo simul est cum antecedente sive cum praecedente, similiter secundum rationem subsequendi simul est cum subsequente. Quoniam igitur praedestinatio importat ordinem secundum rationem praecedendi, ideo aeterna est, quamvis sit respectu temporalis; quoniam non est simul cum illo, sed antecedit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatio transit extra; dicendum, quod transire extra est dupliciter: aut in aliquid quod est extra, aut in aliquid quod est intra, sed erit extra. Et primo modo connotat aliquid in actu et dicit quid temporale, ut creare et conservare; secundo modo non, ut praedestinare[^14].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de praeparatione, quod attenditur[^15] secundum principia intrinseca, non secundum causam efficientem; dicendum, quod quaedam est causa efficiens, quae operatur secundum materiam praeiacentem; et ista quidem, quia alio indiget, non dicitur praeparare, quando solum vult et disponit intus, sed quando materiam aptat exterius. Quaedam est causa efficiens, quae nullo indiget ad operandum, sed statim, cum vult, operatur; et in tali praeparare non est aliud quam disponere et proponere; et talis est Deus, quia nullo alio a se indiget ad operandum.

english:
<!-- page 702 -->

### Article I.
#### *On predestination as regards its entity.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether predestination is something eternal or temporal.*

That predestination is something eternal seems [to be the case]:

1. Because what is before the foundation of the world is something eternal; predestination is of this sort, since predestination is election, [as] in *Ephesians* 1[^1]: *"He chose us before the foundation of the world"*: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, "*predestination is the foreknowledge of [God's] benefits*"[^2]; but whatever God foreknows, he foreknows from eternity: therefore since all foreknowledge is eternal, and all predestination is foreknowledge, all predestination is eternal.

3. Likewise, "*predestination is the purpose of having mercy*"[^3]; but a purpose is something of the one purposing, preceding the things which are proposed: therefore since it is the purpose of God, and God purposes from eternity, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, by the *ratio* of its name, *predestination* says a precession or antecedence — but only of the predestiner to the predestined; but the predestiner is eternal: therefore it says an order and antecedence of the eternal to the temporal. But that antecedence is eternal: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Predestination involves a relation to the predestined; but every relation places a true respect[^4] either in both extremes, or at least in one; but predestination cannot place a true respect in the predestiner: therefore it places a true respect in the predestined. But a true respect is founded only on something created: therefore predestination says something created and temporal.

2. Likewise, predestination involves an action, and to every action a passion corresponds: therefore since action and passion are not in the same [subject] — for the predestiner and the predestined are not the same — it is necessary that [the passion] be in another. But "another" is nothing but something temporal and created: therefore predestination involves something temporal and created: therefore it is not eternal.

3. Likewise, predestination involves an order of the predestiner to the predestined, either then according to the being which it has in God, or according to the being which it has in its proper genus. Not according to the being which it has in God, since thus it is God and does not follow God: therefore according to the being which it has in its proper genus. But the being which it has in its proper genus is something temporal and created: therefore predestination [is] likewise: and so etc.

4. Likewise, every divine act which is not bent back upon the essence or person passes outward, and every act passing outward is said of God from time[^5]: therefore since predestination does not pass into the person or essence, but outward, therefore it is temporal.

5. Likewise, predestination is preparation[^6]; but nothing is said to be prepared before something begins to come-to-be according to intrinsic principles — for an artisan is not said to prepare a house by mere thought before the wood and stones — therefore it is necessary that it be placed in the thing.

<!-- page 703 -->

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination is eternal, by reason of [its] principal significate and of [its] antecedence to its connotatum.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in predestination there are only two [things], namely the principal significate and the connotatum. The principal significate is the divine essence; the connotatum, however, is the creature, namely grace and glory and the person to-be-saved[^7]. And these two [things] predestination involves, with the order of antecedence of one to the other by reason of [its] preposition.

Since therefore the principal significate is eternal, so predestination is something eternal[^8]. Again, since it involves an antecedence of the significate to the connotatum, and that antecedence is from eternity: therefore predestination is something eternal and from eternity. And the reasonings to this effect are to be granted.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning relation, it must be said that a thing[^9] or relation can be signified in God in two ways: either with respect to one existing in act, or with respect to one existing in potency, [as] one to be at some time in act; and when [it is signified] with respect to one existing in act, then it is necessary that there correspond a true respect in act; but when [it is signified] with respect to one existing in potency, it suffices that [a respect] correspond in potency, and such [a respect] is founded upon being-in-potency; and therefore in act it places nothing but God.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning action, it must be said that there is action *according to thing* (*secundum rem*), and there is action *according to mode* (*secundum modum*)[^10]. To action *secundum rem*, which is the principle efficient of something, there corresponds a passion differing *secundum rem*, as to the action of creating [there corresponds] the passion of being-created[^11]. But to action *secundum modum* there corresponds only a passion differing *secundum modum*, as to the action of God's own knowing there corresponds the very being-known; and this is not really another [thing], but [is so only] *secundum modum*. Since therefore predestination does not involve anything except foreknowledge — whether actively or passively — therefore it is something eternal and is not other than God[^12].

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning order, it must be said that there is order according to nobility and [order] according to duration[^13]; and order according to nobility places its extremes [as] simultaneous, but order according to duration, by the very fact that it is order, places [its] extremes [as] not-simultaneous; and according to the *ratio* of antecedence, order is simultaneous with the antecedent, that is, with the preceding [term]; likewise according to the *ratio* of subsequence it is simultaneous with the subsequent [term]. Since therefore predestination involves an order according to the *ratio* of preceding, therefore it is eternal — although it [is] with respect to a temporal [term]; since it is not simultaneous with that [temporal term], but precedes [it].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that predestination passes outward; it must be said that to-pass-outward is twofold: either into something which is outside, or into something which is within, but will be outside. And in the first mode it connotes something in act and says something temporal, as *to create* and *to conserve*; in the second mode not so, as *to predestine*[^14].

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning preparation, that it is reckoned[^15] according to intrinsic principles, not according to efficient cause; it must be said that there is a certain efficient cause which operates according to a pre-lying matter; and this indeed, since it has need of another, is not said to *prepare* when it only wills and disposes within, but [only] when it fits the matter outwardly. There is [also] a certain efficient cause which has need of nothing for operating, but as soon as it wills, it operates; and in such a one *to prepare* is nothing other than to dispose and propose; and such is God, since he has need of no other beside himself for operating.

la: Vers. 4, ubi in Vulg. post *nos* additur *in ipso*. — Plura de hoc, quod praedestinatio sit electio, invenies infra a. 3. q. 2.

en: Verse 4, where in the Vulgate after *nos* ("us") *in ipso* ("in him") is added. — More on this, that predestination is election, will be found below at a. 3, q. 2.

la: Haec definitio est Augustini, *de Dono persev.* c. 14. n. 35. Cfr. q. seq. in corp. — Cod. B voci *beneficiorum* adiungit *Dei*.

en: This definition is Augustine's, *On the Gift of Perseverance* c. 14, n. 35. Cf. the following question in the body. — Codex B adds *Dei* ("of God") to the word *beneficiorum* ("of benefits").

la: Definitio haec est etiam Augustini, *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 17. n. 34, et fundatur in verbis Apostoli ad Romanos 9, 13–18, ubi concluditur: «*Ergo cuius vult miseretur*», et ad Ephes. I, 5: *Qui praedestinavit nos... secundum propositum voluntatis suae*. Cfr. q. seq. in corp.

en: This definition is also Augustine's, *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 17, n. 34, and is founded on the words of the Apostle to the Romans 9:13–18, where it is concluded: "*Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will*", and to Ephesians 1:5: *"Who hath predestinated us... according to the purpose of his will"*. Cf. the following question in the body.

la: Id est realem, de quo vide supra d. 30. q. 3. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba conclusionis: *ergo praedestinatio dicit quid creatum*.

en: That is, real [respect], on which see above d. 30, q. 3. — At the end of the argument, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc omits the concluding words: *ergo praedestinatio dicit quid creatum* ("therefore predestination says something created").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 521, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 521, note 2.

la: Respicitur definitio praedestinationis sumta ex libro Fulgentii *de Fide ad Petrum*, c. 35. n. 78. Cfr. q. seq.

en: Reference is made to the definition of predestination taken from Fulgentius's book *On the Faith, to Peter*, c. 35, n. 78. Cf. the following question.

la: Et quidem gratia ut medium per quod, gloria ut terminus ad quem, persona salvanda ut subiectum. Quod sequitur: *haec duo etc.* refertur ad principale significatum et connotatum.

en: And indeed grace [is] as the medium through which, glory as the terminus toward which, [and] the person to-be-saved as the subject. What follows: *haec duo etc.* ("these two etc.") refers to the principal significate and the connotatum.

la: Obiici posset de creatione, quae active sumta etiam quoad principale significatum est divina essentia, nec tamen dicitur aeterna; sed vide infra solut. ad 2. et 4, et S. Thom. hic q. 4. a. 1. ad 1.

en: It could be objected concerning creation, which, taken actively, is also as regards [its] principal significate the divine essence, and yet is not called eternal; but see below the solution to [arg.] 2 and 4, and St. Thomas here, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1.

la: Pro *res* cod. X (V in marg.) *respectus*. Aliquanto inferius post *verus respectus* Vat. cum cod. cc non bene omittit *in actu*.

en: In place of *res* ("thing") codex X (V in the margin) [reads] *respectus* ("respect"). Somewhat below, after *verus respectus* ("a true respect"), the Vatican with codex cc, not rightly, omits *in actu* ("in act").

la: Scilicet intelligendi. Haec distinctio actionis fundatur in illa, qua actio distinguitur in actionem transeuntem et immanentem. Actioni transeunti respondet passio in effectu, non vero immanenti, etiamsi respiciat rem externam, v. g. visioni respectu rei visae. Cfr. supra pag. 686, nota 4.

en: That is, [a mode] of understanding. This distinction of action is founded on that by which action is distinguished into transient and immanent action. To transient action there corresponds a passion in the effect, but not to immanent [action], even if it regards an external thing — e.g. vision with respect to the thing seen. Cf. above p. 686, note 4.

la: Eodem modo loquendi utitur Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 6. m. 2. a. 5.

en: Alex. Hal. uses the same mode of speaking, *S.* p. II, q. 6, m. 2, a. 5.

la: Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Hoc magis explicatur supra solut. ad 2. et 3. — Paulo ante pro *connotat aliquid*, quae lectio invenitur in codd. A T Y, Vat. cum aliis codd. et ed. 1 *connotat aliud*.

en: This is more explicated above in the solutions to [args.] 2 and 3. — A little earlier, in place of *connotat aliquid* ("connotes something") — the reading found in codices A T Y — the Vatican with the other codices and edition 1 [reads] *connotat aliud* ("connotes another").

la: Cod. *quae attenditur*; Vat. cum cod. cc *quod antecedititur*.

en: Codex [reads] *quae attenditur* ("which is reckoned"); Vatican with codex cc [reads] *quod antecedititur* ("which is preceded" [sic]).

la: Vat. cum cod. cc pro *praeparare* substituit *praeparatione*.

en: Vatican with codex cc, in place of *praeparare* ("to prepare"), substitutes *praeparatione* ("by preparation").

latin_scholion:
**I.** «*Praedestinare est praeordinare in finem... Praedestinatio tria connotat, scilicet praeordinatum, et hoc est homo; et rationem praeordinandi, et haec est gratia; et rationem finis et haec est gloria: et sic sunt tria, scilicet quod, et per quod, et ad quod*» (infra a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.). Praedestinatio secundum Augustinum (*de Dono persever.* c. 14. n. 35.) est: «*et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur*»; secundum S. Thomam (*S.* I. q. 23. a. 1.) est «*ratio transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae*»; secundum Scotum (hic q. unica, n. 2.) est <!-- page 704 -->«*ratio electionis per voluntatem divinam alicuius creaturae intellectualis vel rationalis ad gratiam et gloriam*». Cum his definitionibus convenit triplex descriptio praedestinationis, quae ex S. Augustino infra q. 2. proponitur. Pro ampliore explicatione servire potest quod a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. dicitur de differentia inter *propositum*, *electionem* et *praedestinationem*, nec non hic dub. 7. de triplici causalitate, quae importatur in praedestinatione, et III. *Sent.* d. 11. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3. de praedestinatione Christi.

Catholica de praedestinatione doctrina media via incedit inter innumeros errores, ad extrema delapsos, dum alii praedestinationem distorquent in perniciosissimum fatalismum, qui liberum arbitrium bonorumque operum merita suffocat, alii vero eandem sub specie humanae independentiae omnino eliminant, vel saltem ita infirmant, ut nimis derogetur gratuitis Dei donis gratiae, perseverantiae finalis et electionis. In hoc autem omnes catholici doctores conveniunt, infallibilem et immutabilem esse electorum praedestinationem, sed ita, ut minime libertatem laedat creaturarum; item, ab aeterno praeparasse Deum bona opera, «*ut in illis ambulemus*» (*Eph.* 2, 10), sed ita, ut «*dona Dei sint etiam bona ipsius iustificati merita*» (Trident. sess. 6. can. 32.), cum «*tanta sit (Dei) erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsius dona*» (ibid. c. 16.); denique, esse aeternam Dei inter electos et reprobos distinctionem, sed ita, ut nemo adultus nisi ob propriam culpam reprobetur, nemo autem nisi per divinam misericordiam salvetur. — Si autem descenditur ad specialiores quaestiones, praesertim ad eas quae dependent a modo, quo voluntas creata cooperatur divinae gratiae, et in genere a determinatione concursus divini ad actiones liberas creaturarum, difficultates et controversiae scholarum fere in immensum crescunt, ita ut sapientes in nonnullis stent contra sapientes, et ut sapientiores, propriam ignorantiam confitentes, cum Apostolo (*Rom.* 11, 33.) dicant: *altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius!* Vide praeclara verba Seraphici infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.

**II.** Praedestinationem esse aeternam non tantum quoad ipsum actum praedestinantis, sed etiam ratione aeternae connotationis ad personam praedestinati, ad gratiam et ad gloriam (cfr. hic dub. 1.), communiter docetur (cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 1. a. 1.; S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 23. a. 2. ad 2.). — Solutio ad 2. fundatur in hoc, quod differt actio secundum rem, quae est principium efficiens aliquid, id est, quae transit in materiam extraneam, et actio secundum modum intelligendi, non transiens extra subiectum, ut est in Deo actus cognoscendi creaturam. Huic non respondet in creatura nisi passio secundum modum, quia creatura praecise ut cognita tantum denominationem, non aliquid reale ab extrinseco recipit (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. ad 1.). — Notabilis est etiam solut. ad 5, de quo conferri potest Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3.; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 2.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.

**III.** Praeter auctores iam citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 2. 8.; *S.* p. I. tr. 16. q. 63. m. 1. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1, et a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. R. — Aegid., de hac et seq. q. hic I. princ. q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** "*To predestine is to pre-ordain to an end... Predestination connotes three [things], namely the pre-ordained, and this is the human being; and the *ratio* of pre-ordaining, and this is grace; and the *ratio* of the end, and this is glory: and so there are three, namely the *that-which*, and the *through-which*, and the *toward-which**" (below a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.). Predestination according to Augustine (*On the Gift of Perseverance* c. 14, n. 35) is: "*and the preparation of God's benefits, by which most certainly are freed whoever are freed*"; according to St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 23, a. 1) it is "*the *ratio* of the transmission of the rational creature into the end of eternal life*"; according to Scotus (here q. *unica*, n. 2) it is <!-- page 704 -->"*the *ratio* of the election by the divine will of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory*". To these definitions corresponds the threefold description of predestination, which is set forth from St. Augustine below at q. 2. For a fuller explanation, what is said at a. 3, q. 2, ad 2 about the difference between *purpose*, *election*, and *predestination* can serve, as also here at *dub.* 7 about the threefold causality which is involved in predestination, and *III Sent.* d. 11, a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3 on the predestination of Christ.

The Catholic doctrine on predestination proceeds by a middle way among innumerable errors which have lapsed to extremes — while some distort predestination into a most pernicious fatalism, which suffocates free choice and the merits of good works; and others, in turn, eliminate the same [doctrine] altogether under the appearance of human independence, or at least so weaken it that the gratuitous gifts of God — of grace, of final perseverance, and of election — are too much detracted from. In this, however, all Catholic doctors agree: that the predestination of the elect is infallible and immutable, but in such a way that it in no way harms the freedom of creatures; likewise, that God from eternity prepared good works "*that we should walk in them*" (*Eph.* 2:10), but in such a way that "*the gifts of God are also the good merits of the justified one*" (Trent, sess. 6, can. 32), since "*so great is (God's) goodness toward all men, that he wills their merits, which are his own gifts, to be theirs*" (ibid. c. 16); and finally, that the eternal distinction between elect and reprobate by God is real, but in such a way that no adult is reprobated except for his own fault, and no one is saved except through divine mercy. — But if one descends to more particular questions — especially to those which depend upon the mode in which the created will cooperates with divine grace, and in general upon the determination of the divine concurrence to the free actions of creatures — the difficulties and controversies of the schools grow almost beyond measure, so that the wise stand in some matters against the wise; and the wiser ones, confessing their own ignorance, say with the Apostle (*Rom.* 11:33): *"O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments!"* See the brilliant words of the Seraphic [Doctor] below at d. 41, a. 1, q. 2, at the end.

**II.** That predestination is eternal not only as regards the act itself of the predestiner, but also by reason of the eternal connotation toward the person of the predestined, toward grace, and toward glory (cf. here *dub.* 1), is commonly taught (cf. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 1, a. 1; St. Thom., *S.* I, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2). — The solution to [arg.] 2 is founded on this, that action *secundum rem* — which is the principle efficient of something, that is, which passes into extraneous matter — differs from action according to the mode of understanding, not passing outside the subject, as in God is the act of knowing the creature. To this no [passion] corresponds in the creature except a passion *secundum modum*, since the creature, precisely as known, receives only a denomination, not anything real, from the extrinsic [agent] (cf. St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). — Notable also is the solution to [arg.] 5, on which Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3, may be consulted; St. Thom., here q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.

**III.** Besides authors already cited: B. Albert, here a. 2, 8; *S.* p. I, tr. 16, q. 63, m. 1, q. *incid.* — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1, *quaestiunc.* 1, and a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, R. — Aegid., on this and the following question here, I, *princ.* q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Durand., on this and the following question here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. *unica*.

---


title: Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 704 -->

### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum praedestinatio sit Dei scientia, an voluntas.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit praedestinatio, utrum scilicet Dei scientia, vel voluntas. Et supposito, quod dicat aliquid, quod sit in utroque genere, — est enim sicut dicit Augustinus[^1] *praescientia beneficiorum*, et *propositum miserendi* — quaeritur, quod istorum importet principalius et per modum complementi. Et quod importet scientiam, videtur:

1. Quia compositum trahit significatum a componentibus; sed *destinatio*, cum dicatur et *missio* et *ordinatio*, in ratione praedestinationis accipitur ut *ordinatio* — nam, sicut dicit Augustinus[^2], praedestinare idem est quod praeordinare — sed artifex licet volens et sciens praeordinet, non tamen ordinat in quantum volens, sed in quantum sciens: ergo etc.

2. Item, scientia non dividitur secundum rationem accipiendi in virtutes vel in ea quae sunt voluntatis, sed in ea quae sunt cognitionis: sed nos dividimus divinam scientiam in praedestinationem et reprobationem: ergo praedestinatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, ad scientiam spectat.

**Contra:**

1. Praedestinatio est causa gratiae et gloriae[^3]; sed gratia et gloria immediate sunt a voluntate: ergo praedestinatio de se dicit quid in genere voluntatis. Si dicas, quod ex vi nominis non importat illam causalitatem; contra: esto, quod Deus praesciret, aliquem habiturum gratiam et gloriam aliunde quam ab ipso, non diceretur praedestinare: ergo de se dicit causalitatem.

2. Item, praedestinatio importat scientiam et voluntatem; sed quoties haec duo in aliquo importantur, voluntas se habet per modum consequentis et addentis ad scientiam[^4]; sed quod consequitur et addit, se habet per modum differentiae et complementi, et a tali est res denominanda: videtur ergo, quod completius importet voluntatem, et ita male situet Magister.

<!-- page 705 -->

### Conclusio.

> *Praedestinatio, quae est causa gratiae et gloriae, importat et scientiam et potentiam et voluntatem, sed principalius est in genere voluntatis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum praedestinatio significet divinam essentiam ut causam gratiae et gloriae, et hoc secundum ordinatam distributionem gratiae et gloriae, quantum est de se, non tantum importat scientiam, sed etiam voluntatem et potentiam. Sed quoniam causalitas gratiae et gloriae attribuitur proprie voluntati ut efficienti, sed scientiae ut disponenti, et potentiae ut exsequenti; ideo, etsi praedestinatio importet illa tria, tamen principalius est in genere voluntatis. Et ideo ab Augustino definitur praedestinatio per illa tria: primo per illud quod respicit potentiam, in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^5]: «*Praedestinatio est gratuitae donationis praeparatio*»; secundo per illud quod respicit *scientiam*, in libro *de Bono perseverantiae*[^6]: «*Praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum Dei*»; tertio per illud quod respicit voluntatem et propriissime, in libro *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*[^7]: «*Praedestinatio*, inquit ibi, *est propositum miserendi*».

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur quod dicit ordinem; dicendum, quod est ordo duplex: unus, dispositio rerum in universo, et hic appropriatur scientiae; alius, directio in finem, et hic appropriatur bonitati sive voluntati, et hoc modo est de ratione praedestinationis.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est pars praescientiae; dicendum, quod quemadmodum fides et prudentia sunt in genere cognitionis, tamen addunt supra cognitionem aliquid, quod distrahit in genus virtutis, quod respicit voluntatem; per hunc modum et in proposito est intelligendum. Et quoniam *scientia* non tantum accipitur pro simplici notitia, sed etiam, ut frequenter, pro practica, et hoc modo complectitur scientiam cum voluntate, et Magister sic accipit generaliter; ideo enumerat praedestinationem inter ea quae sunt scientiae. — Voluerunt tamen aliqui dicere, quod principalius est in genere scientiae, eo quod in ratione praedestinationis cadit scientia in recto, sed voluntas in obliquo; est enim praedestinatio *scientia beneplaciti*. Uterque modus dicendi satis est probabilis, sed primus magis.

english:
<!-- page 704 -->

### Question II.
#### *Whether predestination is God's knowledge or [his] will.*

Secondly it is asked what predestination is, namely whether it is God's knowledge or [his] will. And given that it states something which is in both genera — for it is, as Augustine says[^1], *the foreknowledge of benefits*, and *the proposal of having mercy* — it is asked which of these it imports more principally and by way of completion. And that it imports knowledge seems [to be the case]:

1. Because a compound takes its signified from its components; but *destinatio* (sending-fixing), since it is said both as *missio* (sending) and *ordinatio* (ordering), is taken in the *ratio* of predestination as *ordinatio* — for, as Augustine says[^2], to predestinate is the same as to pre-ordain — but a craftsman, although he pre-ordains willingly and knowingly, nevertheless does not ordain inasmuch as he wills, but inasmuch as he knows: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, knowledge is not divided according to the *ratio* of taking [it] into virtues or into things which belong to the will, but into things which belong to cognition: but we divide divine knowledge into predestination and reprobation: therefore predestination, as such, pertains to knowledge.

**On the contrary:**

1. Predestination is the cause of grace and glory[^3]; but grace and glory are immediately from the will: therefore predestination of itself states something in the genus of will. If you say that from the force of the name it does not import that causality; on the contrary: suppose that God foreknew that someone would have grace and glory from elsewhere than from himself, he would not be said to predestinate: therefore of itself it states causality.

2. Likewise, predestination imports knowledge and will; but as often as these two are imported in something, the will is related by way of consequent and as adding to knowledge[^4]; but what is consequent and adds, is related by way of difference and completion, and from such is the thing to be denominated: it seems therefore that it imports the will more completely, and so the Master places [it] badly.

<!-- page 705 -->

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination, which is the cause of grace and glory, imports both knowledge and power and will, but is more principally in the genus of will.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since predestination signifies the divine essence as cause of grace and glory, and this according to the ordained distribution of grace and glory, of itself it imports not only knowledge, but also will and power. But since the causality of grace and glory is properly attributed to the will as efficient [cause], to knowledge as disposing, and to power as executing; therefore, although predestination imports those three, yet it is more principally in the genus of will. And therefore predestination is defined by Augustine through those three: first, through that which regards power, in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^5]: «*Predestination is the preparation of a gratuitous gift*»; secondly, through that which regards *knowledge*, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*[^6]: «*Predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits*»; thirdly, through that which regards the will and most properly, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^7]: «*Predestination*», he says there, «*is the proposal of having mercy*».

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected — that it states an order; it must be said that order is twofold: one, the disposition of things in the universe, and this is appropriated to knowledge; the other, the directing toward an end, and this is appropriated to goodness or the will, and in this way it belongs to the *ratio* of predestination.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is a part of foreknowledge; it must be said that just as faith and prudence are in the genus of cognition, yet add something above cognition which draws [them] into the genus of virtue, which regards the will; in this way [the matter] is also to be understood in the matter at hand. And since *knowledge* is not only taken for simple notice, but also, as frequently [happens], for practical [knowledge], and in this way it embraces knowledge together with will, and the Master takes [it] thus generally; therefore he enumerates predestination among the things that belong to knowledge. — Some, however, have wished to say that it is more principally in the genus of knowledge, on this account that in the *ratio* of predestination knowledge falls in the direct case (*in recto*), but the will in the oblique (*in obliquo*); for predestination is the *knowledge of [God's] good-pleasure*. Either mode of speaking is sufficiently probable, but the first more so.

la: Vide supra q. praeced. fundam. 2. et 3, et hic in corp. quaest. — Paulo ante verbis *utroque genere* significantur scientia et voluntas.

en: See above the preceding question, *fundamenta* 2 and 3, and here in the body of the question. — A little earlier by the words *utroque genere* ("in both genera") knowledge and will are signified.

la: Libr. VI. *Hypognost.* (Augustini nomini quondam addict.) c. 2: «*Praedestinatio quippe a praevidendo et praeveniendo vel praeordinando futurum aliquid dicitur*». Sub hoc respectu in libro *de Dono persev.* c. 17. n. 41. ait: *Namque in sua quae falli mutarique non potest praescientia, opera sua futura disponere, id omnino nec aliud quidquam est praedestinare*. — Paulo superius pro *significatum* cod. K cum ed. 1 bene *significationem*.

en: Book VI of the *Hypognosticon* (formerly attributed to the name of Augustine), c. 2: "*For predestination is so called from foreseeing and pre-coming or pre-ordaining something future*". Under this respect in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 17, n. 41, he says: "*For to dispose his future works in his foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived or changed — this is altogether nothing other than to predestinate*". — A little above, in place of *significatum*, codex K with edition 1 [reads] rightly *significationem*.

la: Sic sumta, praedestinatio communiter definitur praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Taken thus, predestination is commonly defined as the preparation of grace in the present and glory in the future. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Voluntas enim, quia est appetitus rationalis, praesupponit et sequitur rationem et scientiam. Hinc est, quod relate ad scientiam se habet per modum complentis et specificantis, addens scilicet efficaciam respectu eorum, quae per scientiam simpliciter erant cognita. — Paulo ante pro *quoties* codd. AV *quotiescumque*. — Ultimis huius argumenti verbis *quod male situet Magister* indicatur, Magistrum quaestionem de praedestinatione perperam posuisse in tractatu de scientia Dei, cum iuxta hoc argumentum pertineat ad tractatum de voluntate. Pro *situet* cod. T *insinuet*.

en: For the will, since it is a rational appetite, presupposes and follows reason and knowledge. Hence it is that, related to knowledge, it is had by way of completing and specifying — namely by adding efficacy with respect to those things which by knowledge were known simply. — A little earlier, in place of *quoties* codices AV [read] *quotiescumque*. — By the final words of this argument, *quod male situet Magister* ("that the Master places [it] badly"), it is indicated that the Master placed the question on predestination wrongly in the tract on the knowledge of God, since according to this argument it pertains to the tract on the will. For *situet* codex T [reads] *insinuet*.

en: Chapter 35, n. 78.

la: Nunc *de Dono perseverantiae* nuncupato, c. 17. n. 41, ubi est haec definitio secundum sensum. Ipsa verba Augustini exhibentur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: [The book] now called *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 17, n. 41, where this definition is found according to its sense. Augustine's actual words are presented here in the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cap. 17. n. 34, ubi sententia citata, si verba spectas, non quidem invenitur, sed facile erui potest ex verbis, quae ibi leguntur: *Electi sunt itaque ante mundi constitutionem... illa scilicet vocatione secundum propositum*. Cfr. etiam libr. VI. *Hypognost.* c. 6. seq.

en: Chapter 17, n. 34, where the sentence cited, if you regard the words, is not indeed found [verbatim], but can easily be drawn out from the words which are there read: "*The elect are therefore [chosen] before the foundation of the world... by that calling, namely, according to [his] purpose*". Cf. also Book VI of the *Hypognosticon*, c. 6 ff.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Omnes doctores catholici docent, in praedestinatione includi tum actum divini intellectus tum actum voluntatis, sed inter eosdem controvertitur, quid in ipsa significetur principalius. S. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 23. a. 1. [ad] 4.) iuxta sua principia docet, eam formaliter consistere in actu intellectus ut imperantis, qui supponit finem volitum et media electa. Hanc sententiam etiam S. Bonav. (hic in fine) iudicat esse satis probabilem, eamque tenent Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 1. a. 2.), B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Durand. aliique. Attamen S. Bonav. ut probabiliorem reputat modum dicendi quod eadem consistat potius in actu voluntatis, quo Deus illum ordinem, ab intellectu propositum, approbat et exsequi proponit, ita ut directio in finem approprietur voluntati (hic ad 1.). Haec est etiam sententia Scoti (hic q. unica, n. 2.) cum sua schola et non paucis aliis. P. Trigosus (q. 18. a. 2. dub. 1.), suffragante P. Marco a Baudunio (*Paradis. theolog.* tom. 1. q. 23. a. 2.), utramque sententiam hoc modo conciliare vult: Praedestinatio completive consistit in actu voluntatis, sicut ipse S. Bonav. (arg. 2. in *fundam.*) dicit, quod «*completius importet voluntatem*»; sed essentialiter in actu intellectus, cum actus voluntatis, quo Deus diligit et eligit, etiam in via S. Bonaventurae non sit formaliter praedestinatio, sed praesupponatur ad illam, ut patet ex ipsius verbis (hic a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. 3.). Nobis autem videtur hic occurrere eadem qualiscumque differentia inter duos Ss. Doctores, quam observavimus supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1, *Scholion*, quoad conceptum beatitudinis. — De doctrina, quae tribuit causalitatem «*proprie voluntati ut efficienti, sed scientiae ut disponenti, et potentiae ut exsequenti*», cfr. infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. (praecipue ad 3.) et q. 2. — In *solut.* ad 2, ut explicetur, quomodo additio super cognitionem distrahit praedestinationem ex genere intellectus in genus voluntatis, duplex exemplum affertur: primum de fide (cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 23. q. 1. 2.), secundum de prudentia (ibid. d. 33. q. 3.).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 1. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 23. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. in princip.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** All Catholic doctors teach that in predestination there is included both an act of the divine intellect and an act of the will, but among them it is disputed which is signified more principally in [predestination] itself. St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 23, a. 1, [ad] 4), according to his principles, teaches that it consists formally in an act of the intellect as commanding, which presupposes the willed end and the chosen means. St. Bonaventure (here at the end) judges this opinion also to be sufficiently probable, and Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 1, a. 2), B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, Durandus, and others hold it. Yet St. Bonaventure regards as more probable the mode of speaking [which says] that the same consists rather in an act of the will, by which God approves and proposes to carry out that order which has been proposed by the intellect, in such a way that the directing toward the end is appropriated to the will (here ad 1). This is also the opinion of Scotus (here q. *unica*, n. 2) with his school and not a few others. Fr. Trigosus (q. 18, a. 2, dub. 1), with the support of Fr. Marcus of Bauduen (*Paradisus theologicus* tom. 1, q. 23, a. 2), wishes to reconcile both opinions in this way: Predestination consists *completively* in an act of the will, as St. Bonaventure himself (arg. 2 in the *fundamenta*) says, that «*it imports the will more completely*»; but *essentially* in an act of the intellect, since the act of will, by which God loves and chooses, even on St. Bonaventure's path is not formally predestination, but is presupposed to it, as is plain from his own words (here a. 3, q. 2, ad 2, 3). To us, however, it seems that here there occurs the same kind of difference between the two Holy Doctors, whatever it may be, which we observed above at d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, *Scholion*, with regard to the concept of beatitude. — On the doctrine which attributes causality «*properly to the will as efficient, but to knowledge as disposing, and to power as executing*», cf. below at d. 45, a. 2, q. 1 (especially ad 3) and q. 2. — In the *solution* ad 2, in order that it be explained how addition above cognition draws predestination from the genus of intellect into the genus of will, a twofold example is brought forward: first concerning faith (cf. III *Sent.* d. 23, q. 1, 2), second concerning prudence (ibid. d. 33, q. 3).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. *unica*. — St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 23, a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, *quaestiuncula* 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1, in the beginning.

---