site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 6, Art. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 102 -->

### Articulus II. *Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas.*

Deinde quaeritur, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur.

1. Impossibile est, speciem esse sine genere[^p102-4]; sed generatio sive productio est species motus sive mutationis: ergo ubi generatio, ibi mutatio; sed

<!-- page 103 -->

trinitas non est, nisi quia una persona per generationem procedit ab alia: ergo etc.

2. Item, generatio in creaturis dicit *relationem* et dicit *mutationem* et essentialius et principalius dicit *mutationem* quam *relationem;* sed non potest poni in summa Trinitate sine relatione, alioquin non diceret veram distinctionem: ergo pari vel fortiori ratione non potest poni sine mutatione.

3. Item, impossibile est, esse nec intelligi alicuius corruptionem sine mutatione; sed generatio vel productio opponitur directe corruptioni, quia, sicut illa ad *esse*, ita ista ad *non-esse*[^p103-1]: ergo nusquam est sine mutatione: ergo nec in divinis personis.

4. Item, si aliquid sequitur ad aliquid, eodem addito, utrobique adhuc sequitur; sed sequitur: est generatio in tempore, ergo mutatio in tempore: ergo pari ratione vel fortiori generatio in aeternitate infert mutationem in aeternitate: ergo non stat cum immutabilitate.

5. Item, Augustinus[^p103-2] dicit, quod sequitur: si Spiritus sanctus possit generari, quod posset mutari: ergo in divinis *generari* infert *mutari*, ergo non potest stare cum eius opposito; sed eius oppositum est summa immutabilitas: ergo etc.

6. Item, si productio est in divinis, aut ergo *necessitate*, aut *voluntate*. Si *necessitate*: ergo non est ibi summa liberalitas nec potestas; si *voluntate:* ergo qui producitur potest non produci, ergo non esse, ac per hoc mutari: ergo idem quod prius.

7. Item, quod repugnat alicui propter statum imperfectum multo fortius secundum statum perfectum; sed in creatura non est immutabilitas nisi semiplena, et tamen in substantiis perpetuis et incorporalibus non potest esse plurificatio per productionem similis ex simili[^p103-3]: ergo nec in Deo.

8. Item, quod repugnat causae repugnat causato; sed causa, quare vis generativa data est rebus, est « propter longe distare a primo et propter corruptionem »: ergo si immutabilitas summa repugnat corruptioni, ergo productioni per generationem. *Minor* probatur per Philosophum[^p103-4].

9. Item, impossibile est, quod Deus producat aliquid de aliena substantia sine illius substantiae mutatione; sed tantum Deus potest super alia, sicut super se, sive circa se: ergo nec de sua substantia sine suae substantiae mutatione: ergo si trinitas est per productionem etc.

10. Item, plus recedit a ratione mutabilitatis *nihil* quam *aliquid*, ergo et productio rei de nihilo quam productio de aliquo; nihil enim nullo modo mutabile est[^p103-5]; sed impossibile est, aliquid produci de *nihilo* sine eius mutabilitate: ergo similiter de *aliquo*.

11. Item, secundum rationem intelligendi simplicior et prior est forma quam suppositum, et natura quam persona[^p103-6]; sed impossibile est, formam aliquam produci de aliquo sine mutatione sui et eius, de quo est: ergo pari ratione impossibile est, suppositum sive personam sine mutatione esse productam.

12. Item, sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita se habet totum ad totum; sed si Pater produceret Filium de parte substantiae, necesse esset, substantiam mutari secundum partem: ergo cum producit de tota, necesse est, ipsam mutari secundum totum: ergo etc.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Productio personae de persona in Trinitate stat cum summa simplicitate, ut patet ex praecedentibus[^p103-7]; sed ubi summa simplicitas, ibi omnimoda invariabilitas et immutabilitas: ergo trinitas et ei competens emanatio non repugnat immutabilitati.

2. Item, emanatio personae de persona stat cum summa actualitate; sed ubi summa actualitas, omnimoda est immutabilitas, quia « motus est entelechia entis in potentia[^p103-8] », et omne mutabile aliquo modo possibile; sed quod stat cum antecedente necessario stat cum consequente: ergo etc.

3. Item, in summa aeternitate nulla potest esse variabilitas, quia omnis motus stat cum priori et posteriori vel tempore, vel natura[^p103-9]; sed trinitas personarum et earundem productio stat cum aeternitate: ergo cum summa immutabilitate.

4. Item, « in *ad aliquid* non est motus[^p103-10] »; sed trinitatem et personarum pluralitatem facit relatio, secundum quod dicit Boethius: « Relatio multiplicat

<!-- page 104 -->

Trinitatem »; ergo impossibile est ibi ex hac causa ponere mutationem nec motum: stat ergo cum summa immutabilitate.

5. Item, in eo, in quo est simul *produci* et *productum esse*, non est prius et posterius, nec duratione[^p104-1] nec natura nec re; sed hoc reperitur in omni mutatione: ergo etc.

6. Item, possibile est, Deum producere creaturam sine sui mutatione, quia producit se ipso[^p104-2]: ergo similiter Pater potest producere personam sine mutatione suae personae vel naturae: ergo pari ratione et Filius sine mutatione produci: ergo productio non cogit aliquid ibi mutari.

7. Item, Deus intelligit se sine aliqua sui mutatione; sed intelligendo se dicit et dicendo Verbum generat: ergo absque omni mutatione habet Verbum generare, pari ratione et Spiritum sanctum spirare: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Trinitas personarum stat cum summa immutabilitate.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod trinitas personarum, quae in divinis est per emanationem unius ab alia, stat cum immutabilitate summa. — Et huius ratio duplex est, scilicet summa *aeternitas* et summa *simplicitas*. Summa *aeternitas* non patitur, ibi esse aliquam mutationem, summa *simplicitas* non patitur ibi esse aliquod mutabile. Si ergo trinitas est cum simplicitate et aeternitate; et ubi aeternitas, nulla mutatio, ubi simplicitas summa, nihil mutabile; et iis ablatis, tollitur omnis mutabilitas: necessario simul stant trinitas et summa immutabilitas.

Et hoc patet sic. Ubi enim est *aeternitas*, nihil est incipiens, nihil succedens; nulla igitur inceptio, nulla successio, nulla defectio. Omnis autem mutatio aut est a *non-esse* in *esse*, aut ab *esse* in *non-esse*, aut ab *uno esse* in *aliud esse*[^p104-3]; mutatio autem *ad esse* non est sine inceptione, mutatio vero *ab esse* non est sine defectione, mutatio *in esse* non potest esse sine qualicumque successione, quia non est sine variatione. Aeternitas igitur excludit omnem mutationem; haec autem stat cum trinitate: ergo in excellentia Trinitatis nulla mutatio ratione aeternitatis. — Nihil inest mutabile ratione *simplicitatis*. Est enim ibi summa *simplicitas naturae* et *personae* et *utriusque* invicem comparatae. Propter simplicitatem *naturae* nulla potest esse ibi *decisio* in eo, *de quo* est productio; propter simplicitatem *personae* nulla potest esse *compositio* in *producto;* ratione simplicitatis in *utraque* nulla potest esse *abiectio* a principio productivo. Ex hoc ergo colligitur, quod nihil est ibi mutabile, nec ille qui producitur, nec ille qui producit, nec illud, de quo producitur. Ex hoc enim, quod non fit *abiectio habiti* ex parte *principii*, nec *introductio novi* ex parte producti, nec *decisio indivisi* ex parte fundamenti, de quo intelligitur produci, nec materialiter nec causaliter, sed substantialiter; nihil est quod possit mutari. — Si igitur intelligitur summa trinitas in summa simplicitate et aeternitate, necessario oportet pariter intelligi, ut consistat in omnimoda immutabilitate[^p104-4]. — Amplius, quoniam actualis immutabilitas cum summa simplicitate et aeternitate ponit summam actualitatem, et actualitas summa est per plenam conversionem eiusdem supra se intelligendo et amando, et intellectus includit verbum, et amor includit nexum; sicut immutabilitati primi principii non solum non repugnat se ipsum intelligere et amare, quin potius est consonans, sic non repugnat, immo consonat generare Verbum et spirare Amorem. Immutabiliter enim sibi competit utrumque et semper in actu. Ideo, si recte immutabilitas intelligatur, non solum non excludit, sed includit[^p104-5] beatissimam Trinitatem; et hoc, quia summe immutabile necesse est esse simplex, aeternum et actuale secundum plenitudinem actualitatis interminatae et perfectae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ubi generatio, ibi mutatio; dicendum, quod illud verum est in creaturis, ubi generatio est exitus ab ente in potentia in ens in actu, ubi etiam per consequens est mutatio, quia quod generatur se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Secus autem est in divinis, quia alia generatio est omnimodae actualitatis et a parte principii et termini et ipsius productionis et eius, de quo fit productio. Unde quia nulla est ibi acquisitio novi *esse*, et est tamen acceptio veri et actualis et sempiterni *esse;* ideo, licet sit vera productio, non tamen est ibi vera mutatio[^p104-6].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio dicit mutationem et relationem; dicendum, quod ea quae sunt in creaturis, si ponantur in Creatore, poni debent secundum illud quod completionis habent, non secundum illud quod incompletionis. *Motus* autem et *mutatio* semper incompletionem dicunt, *relatio* autem dicit ut pluries complementum, maxime illa, quae originem dicit in nobilissimis[^p104-7] sine dependentia aliqua; et hoc modo in illa productione aeterna.

<!-- page 105 -->

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corruptio non potest intelligi sine mutatione; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia *corruptio* dicit amissionem *esse*, quae quidem non potest intelligi, nisi fiat post *esse* prius habitum; ac per hoc de necessitate *mutationem* includit, quae non potest esse nisi in re mutabili et variabili propter defectum, quem dicit. Sed *generatio* est datio vel acceptio *esse* per consubstantialitatem; et hoc potest esse circa nobilissimum ens et actualissimum, quia hoc nullum dicit defectum, ac per hoc non de necessitate includit *mutationem*, sicut corruptio. Nam *tali generationi* non opponitur *corruptio*, sed illi soli, quae erat in creatura, quam quidem corruptio quodam modo sequitur et quodam modo antecedit. « Generatio enim unius corruptio est alterius », sicut dicit Philosophus[^p105-1].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio in tempore ponit mutationem in tempore: ergo et generatio in aeternitate infert mutationem in aeternitate; dicendum, quod ille modus inferendi tenet, ubi non est *determinatio distrahens;* non sic autem est in proposito: quia generatio in aeternitate est alterius modi quam generatio in tempore, sicut dictum est; non fit de ente in potentia, sicut illa quae tempore mensuratur[^p105-2]. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi ad hanc consequitur motus, quod ad illam consequatur, immo potius oppositum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Spiritus sanctus generaretur, quod mutaretur; dicendum, quod illud argumentum sequitur, non quia *generari* sit *mutari*, sed quia, posito quod non oportet, accidit quod non oportet[^p105-3]. Posito enim, quod Spiritus sanctus, qui accipit *esse* per spirationem, quae realiter differt a generatione, accipiat *esse* per viam generationis; ponitur de necessitate, quod transeat ab uno modo emanandi ad alterum modum realiter differentem; et sic ponitur de necessitate *mutari*, non quia illi modi oriundi seu emanandi dicant motus vel mutationes, sed quia transitus ab uno in alterum non potest intelligi sine motu. Et quoniam mutatio in divino *esse* non admittitur, hinc est, quod impossibile est, quod persona, quae per spirationem producitur, generetur. Et hinc est, quod licet *Pater generet et spiret*, non tamen mutatur, quia simul ista duo stant circa personam Patris, spirare scilicet et generare, neque oportet ab uno in alterum transire. Sed hi duo modi non possunt simul competere eidem personae *productae*, ac per hoc, si per impossibile intelligatur poni circa aliquam illarum personarum, per idem impossibile ponitur et *motus*, quia ponitur variari producendi modus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scilicet productio est in divinis, aut ergo *necessitate*, aut *voluntate;* dicendum, quod, sicut in quaestione de necessitate[^p105-4] melius apparebit, ibi est quodam modo *necessitate* et quodam modo *voluntate*. Non est enim per necessitatem *coactionis*, sed *immutabilitatis;* non per voluntatem *eligentem*, sed per voluntatem *sempiternaliter acceptantem*, secundum quam producens in productione nobilissima sibi complacet et etiam delectatur. Et ideo non sequitur, quod possit ibi esse variatio mutabilitatis et coarctatio potestatis, quia simul ille qui producitur producitur necessario, liberaliter et potenter.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immutabilitas creaturae excludit generationem, sicut patet in Angelo, ergo et in Deo; dicendum, quod illud non valet, quia creatura in generando non potest totam dare substantiam suam, propter hoc quod deficit a summa simplicitate et actualitate et communicabilitate; ideo impossibile est, quod aliquid de substantia sua generetur, quin mutetur. Secus autem est in proposito, sicut praedictum est[^p105-5], quia generans in divinis generato non dat suae essentiae partem, sed totam essentiam dat simplicissimam et perfectam. — Posset tamen dici, quod et creatura spiritualis generationem habet intrinsecam, quae quidem est ipsius verbi a mente, quae inter cetera creata potissime gerit similitudinem generationis aeternae.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa generationis et corruptionis est longe distare a primo; dicendum, quod illa non est *tota* ratio. Nam homo, si stetisset in statu innocentiae, nunquam corrumperetur, et tamen generaret. Unde generatio potius est ex perfectione summa et fecunditate et actualitate ipsius primi principii, quam sit ad supplementum defectus corruptionis ipsius principii productivi. Loquitur ergo Philosophus de causa generationis secundum statum deficientis naturae, non generaliter et secundum modum generationis illius completissimae, quae est origo omnis productionis. *Nam speciei generator omnia haec constituit*[^p105-6], et ipse, qui generationem aliis tribuit, non potest sterilis esse, secundum quod dicitur ultimo Isaiae.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non potest producere aliquid de aliqua creatura sine illius commutatione; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cum creatura sit mutabilis et non omnino simplex,

<!-- page 106 -->

cum ponitur aliquid de ea produci, ponitur per consequens *commutari*, quia non potest esse idem ibi per omnimodam indifferentiam quod datur et quod accipitur et actus[^p106-1] intermedius; in divinis autem est omnino oppositum, secundum quod manifeste liquet ex praecedentibus.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest aliquid produci de nihilo sine mutatione; dicendum, quod illud non est simile: quia non potest aliquid produci de nihilo, quin habeat *esse* post *non-esse*, quin etiam habeat *esse* a[^p106-2] principio essentialiter differente. Unde quamvis *nihil* non sit mutabile de se, tamen eductio, qua aliquid, quod prius non erat ens, efficitur ens, de necessitate ponit inceptionem et mutationem. Non sic autem est de ea productione, qua persona producitur de substantia sempiterna personae sempiternaliter producentis, quia ibi nec aliud *esse* accipitur de novo, nec aliquid incipit, ac per hoc nec aliquid variatur.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod forma non potest produci sine mutatione, ergo nec suppositum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia productio formae dicit differentiam substantialem inter producentem et productum; nihil enim producit se ipsum[^p106-3]; et ideo, cum forma producitur, oportet, quod ab alia forma producatur, quae, cum sit alia ab ipsa, erit vere causa producens et prior naturaliter, quam sit ipsa forma producta; et ideo in illa productione necesse est includi mutationem. Non sic autem est in productione suppositi vel personae, pro eo quod una est natura et essentia in utrisque, et ideo simul sunt; nec est ibi mutatio seu motus, quia ibi non est prius nec posterius nec aliquid novum.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum; dicendum, quod in divinis proprie nec est pars neque totum, secundum quod *totum* dicitur quod continet partem et partem[^p106-4]. Nec valet, quodsi res producta de parte ponit mutationem in parte, quod similiter res producta de tota substantia ponat mutationem secundum totum: quia, ut prius tactum est, productio in parte ponit decisionem, ponit alicuius amissionem et alicuius acquisitionem, quae de necessitate mutationem includunt; productio autem de tota substantia nihil talium dicit, quin potius excludit omne illud, ad quod consequitur motus, sicut ex principali solutione fuit ostensum. Nam nec in principio producente est decisio, nec compositio in producto, nec in productione innovatio, nec variatio aliqua circa aliquod praedictorum.

---

english:
<!-- page 102 -->

### Article II. *Whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together. And that they are incompossible, it seems.

1. It is impossible that a species be without its genus[^p102-4]; but generation or production is a species of motion or of change: therefore where there is generation, there is change; but

<!-- page 103 -->

trinity is not, except because one person proceeds from another through generation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, generation in creatures says *relation* and says *change*, and says *change* more essentially and more principally than *relation;* but it cannot be posited in the supreme Trinity without relation, otherwise it would not say a true distinction: therefore by equal or stronger reason it cannot be posited without change.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the corruption of anything either be or be understood without change; but generation or production is directly opposed to corruption, because, just as the one is toward *being*, so the other is toward *non-being*[^p103-1]: therefore it is nowhere without change: therefore not in the divine persons either.

4. Likewise, if something follows upon something, the same thing being added on both sides, it still follows; but this follows: there is generation in time, therefore change in time: therefore by equal or stronger reason generation in eternity infers change in eternity: therefore it does not stand with immutability.

5. Likewise, Augustine[^p103-2] says that it follows: if the Holy Spirit could be generated, that He could be changed: therefore in the divine things *to be generated* infers *to be changed*, therefore it cannot stand with its opposite; but its opposite is supreme immutability: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if there is production in the divine things, then it is either by *necessity* or by *will*. If by *necessity*: then there is not supreme liberality there, nor power; if by *will:* then he who is produced can not be produced, therefore not be, and through this be changed: therefore the same as before.

7. Likewise, what is repugnant to something on account of an imperfect state is much more so according to a perfect state; but in the creature there is no immutability except a half-full one, and yet in perpetual and incorporeal substances there cannot be plurification through the production of like from like[^p103-3]: therefore not in God either.

8. Likewise, what is repugnant to the cause is repugnant to the caused; but the cause why the generative power was given to things is "on account of being far distant from the first and on account of corruption": therefore if supreme immutability is repugnant to corruption, then to production through generation. The *minor* is proved through the Philosopher[^p103-4].

9. Likewise, it is impossible that God produce something from an alien substance without the change of that substance; but God has as much power over other things as over Himself, or concerning Himself: therefore neither from His own substance without the change of His own substance: therefore if trinity is through production etc.

10. Likewise, *nothing* recedes further from the account of mutability than *something*, therefore also the production of a thing from nothing further than production from something; for nothing is in no mode mutable[^p103-5]; but it is impossible that something be produced from *nothing* without its mutability: therefore likewise from *something*.

11. Likewise, according to the account of understanding, form is simpler and prior to the supposit, and nature to the person[^p103-6]; but it is impossible that any form be produced from something without change of itself and of that from which it is: therefore by equal reason it is impossible that a supposit or person be produced without change.

12. Likewise, as part is related to part, so whole is related to whole; but if the Father were to produce the Son from part of the substance, it would be necessary that the substance be changed according to the part: therefore since He produces from the whole, it is necessary that it be changed according to the whole: therefore etc.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. The production of person from person in the Trinity stands with supreme simplicity, as is clear from the preceding[^p103-7]; but where there is supreme simplicity, there is invariability and immutability in every mode: therefore trinity and the emanation befitting it are not repugnant to immutability.

2. Likewise, the emanation of person from person stands with supreme actuality; but where there is supreme actuality, immutability is in every mode, because "motion is the entelechy of a being in potency[^p103-8]," and everything mutable is in some mode possible; but what stands with the antecedent necessarily stands with the consequent: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in supreme eternity there can be no variability, because every motion stands with a prior and a posterior, either in time or in nature[^p103-9]; but the trinity of persons and their production stands with eternity: therefore with supreme immutability.

4. Likewise, "in *relation to something* there is no motion[^p103-10]"; but relation makes the trinity and the plurality of persons, according to what Boethius says: "Relation multiplies

<!-- page 104 -->

the Trinity"; therefore it is impossible there, for this cause, to posit change or motion: it stands therefore with supreme immutability.

5. Likewise, in that in which *to be produced* and *to have been produced* are together, there is no prior and posterior, neither in duration[^p104-1] nor in nature nor in reality; but this is found in every change: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is possible for God to produce a creature without change of Himself, because He produces by Himself[^p104-2]: therefore likewise the Father can produce a person without change of His person or nature: therefore by equal reason the Son also can be produced without change: therefore production does not force anything there to be changed.

7. Likewise, God understands Himself without any change of Himself; but by understanding Himself He speaks, and by speaking He generates the Word: therefore without any change whatever He has it to generate the Word, and by equal reason to spirate the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The trinity of persons stands with supreme immutability.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the trinity of persons, which is in the divine things through the emanation of one from another, stands with supreme immutability. — And the reason for this is twofold, namely supreme *eternity* and supreme *simplicity*. Supreme *eternity* does not suffer any change to be there, supreme *simplicity* does not suffer anything mutable to be there. If therefore trinity is with simplicity and eternity; and where there is eternity, there is no change, where there is supreme simplicity, nothing mutable; and these being taken away, all mutability is removed: trinity and supreme immutability necessarily stand together.

And this is clear thus. For where there is *eternity*, nothing is beginning, nothing succeeding; no beginning, therefore, no succession, no failing. But every change is either from *non-being* into *being*, or from *being* into *non-being*, or from *one being* into *another being*[^p104-3]; but change *to being* is not without beginning, change *from being* is not without failing, change *in being* cannot be without succession of some kind, because it is not without variation. Eternity therefore excludes every change; but this stands with trinity: therefore in the excellence of the Trinity there is no change, by reason of eternity. — Nothing mutable is in it by reason of *simplicity*. For there is there a supreme *simplicity of nature* and *of person* and *of both* compared to one another. On account of the simplicity of the *nature* there can be no *cutting off* there in that *from which* the production is; on account of the simplicity of the *person* there can be no *composition* in the *product;* by reason of simplicity in *both* there can be no *casting off* from the productive principle. From this therefore it is gathered that nothing there is mutable, neither he who is produced, nor he who produces, nor that from which he is produced. For from this, that there comes about no *casting off of what was had* on the part of the *principle*, nor *introduction of anything new* on the part of the product, nor *cutting off of the undivided* on the part of the foundation from which he is understood to be produced, neither materially nor causally, but substantially — there is nothing that could be changed. — If therefore the supreme trinity is understood in supreme simplicity and eternity, it is necessary equally to understand that it consists in immutability in every mode[^p104-4]. — Further, since actual immutability with supreme simplicity and eternity posits supreme actuality, and supreme actuality is through a full conversion of the same upon itself by understanding and loving, and understanding includes a word, and love includes a bond; just as it is not only not repugnant to the immutability of the first principle to understand and to love itself, but rather is consonant with it, so it is not repugnant, nay it is consonant, to generate the Word and to spirate Love. For both belong to it immutably and always in act. Therefore, if immutability be rightly understood, it not only does not exclude, but includes[^p104-5] the most blessed Trinity; and this, because the supremely immutable must be simple, eternal and actual according to the fullness of an actuality unterminated and perfect. — Whence the reasons which are for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is generation there is change; it must be said that this is true in creatures, where generation is a going forth from a being in potency into a being in act, where also consequently there is change, because what is generated is otherwise now than before. But it is otherwise in the divine things, because that other generation is of actuality in every mode, both on the part of the principle and of the term and of the production itself and of that from which the production comes about. Whence, because there is there no acquisition of a new *being*, and there is nevertheless a receiving of a true and actual and everlasting *being;* therefore, although there is true production, there is nevertheless not true change there[^p104-6].

2. To that which is objected, that generation says change and relation; it must be said that those things which are in creatures, if they are posited in the Creator, ought to be posited according to that which they have of completion, not according to that which they have of incompletion. But *motion* and *change* always say incompletion, whereas *relation* says for the most part a complement, especially that relation which says origin in the noblest things[^p104-7] without any dependence; and in this mode in that eternal production.

<!-- page 105 -->

3. To that which is objected, that corruption cannot be understood without change; it must be said that it is not similar: because *corruption* says the loss of *being*, which indeed cannot be understood unless it come about after *being* previously had; and through this it of necessity includes *change*, which cannot be except in a mutable and variable thing, on account of the defect that it says. But *generation* is the giving or receiving of *being* through consubstantiality; and this can be concerning the noblest and most actual being, because this says no defect, and through this it does not of necessity include *change*, as corruption does. For to *such a generation* *corruption* is not opposed, but only to that which was in the creature, which corruption indeed in a certain mode follows and in a certain mode precedes. "For the generation of one is the corruption of another," as the Philosopher says[^p105-1].

4. To that which is objected, that generation in time posits change in time: therefore also generation in eternity infers change in eternity; it must be said that that mode of inferring holds where there is no *distracting determination;* but it is not so in the case proposed: because generation in eternity is of another mode than generation in time, as has been said; it does not come about from a being in potency, as that which is measured by time[^p105-2]. And therefore it does not follow that, if motion follows upon this one, it follows upon that one — rather the opposite.

5. To that which is objected, that if the Holy Spirit were generated, He would be changed; it must be said that that argument follows, not because *to be generated* is *to be changed*, but because, when what ought not to be is posited, there results what ought not to be[^p105-3]. For if it is posited that the Holy Spirit, who receives *being* through spiration, which really differs from generation, receives *being* by way of generation; it is of necessity posited that He passes from one mode of emanating to another mode really differing; and so He is of necessity posited *to be changed*, not because those modes of arising or emanating say motions or changes, but because the passage from one into the other cannot be understood without motion. And since change in the divine *being* is not admitted, hence it is that it is impossible that the person who is produced through spiration be generated. And hence it is that although *the Father generates and spirates*, He is nevertheless not changed, because these two stand together at once concerning the person of the Father, namely to spirate and to generate, nor is it necessary to pass from one into the other. But these two modes cannot belong at once to the same *produced* person, and through this, if by an impossibility it is understood to be posited concerning any of those persons, by the same impossibility *motion* also is posited, because the mode of producing is posited to vary.

6. To that which is objected, namely that production is in the divine things, then either by *necessity* or by *will;* it must be said that, as will better appear in the question on necessity[^p105-4], it is there in a certain mode by *necessity* and in a certain mode by *will*. For it is not through a necessity of *coercion*, but of *immutability;* not through an *electing* will, but through a will *everlastingly accepting*, according to which the producer in the most noble production is well pleased in himself and even delights. And therefore it does not follow that there can be there a variation of mutability and a constraint of power, because he who is produced is produced at once necessarily, liberally and powerfully.

7. To that which is objected, that the immutability of the creature excludes generation, as is clear in the Angel, therefore also in God; it must be said that this does not hold, because the creature in generating cannot give its whole substance, on account of this, that it falls short of supreme simplicity and actuality and communicability; therefore it is impossible that anything be generated from its substance without its being changed. But it is otherwise in the case proposed, as has been said before[^p105-5], because the one generating in the divine things does not give to the one generated a part of his essence, but gives the whole essence, most simple and perfect. — It could, however, be said that the spiritual creature too has an intrinsic generation, which indeed is that of the word from the mind, which among the other created things most of all bears the likeness of the eternal generation.

8. To that which is objected, that the cause of generation and corruption is being far distant from the first; it must be said that that is not the *whole* account. For man, if he had stood in the state of innocence, would never have been corrupted, and yet he would have generated. Whence generation is rather from the supreme perfection and fecundity and actuality of the first principle itself than it is for the supplying of the defect of the corruption of the productive principle itself. The Philosopher therefore speaks of the cause of generation according to the state of deficient nature, not generally and according to the mode of that most complete generation which is the origin of all production. *For the begetter of beauty established all these things*[^p105-6], and He who gives generation to others cannot be sterile, according to what is said in the last chapter of Isaias.

9. To that which is objected, that God cannot produce something from some creature without its alteration; it must be said that it is not similar: because, since the creature is mutable and not altogether simple,

<!-- page 106 -->

when something is posited to be produced from it, it is consequently posited *to be altered*, because there cannot there be the same, through an indifference in every mode, that which is given and that which is received and the intermediate act[^p106-1]; but in the divine things it is altogether the opposite, according as is manifestly evident from the preceding.

10. To that which is objected, that something cannot be produced from nothing without change; it must be said that that is not similar: because something cannot be produced from nothing without having *being* after *non-being*, without also having *being* from[^p106-2] a principle essentially differing. Whence, although *nothing* is not mutable of itself, yet the eduction by which something that before was not a being is made a being of necessity posits beginning and change. But it is not so with that production by which a person is produced from the everlasting substance of the person everlastingly producing, because there neither is another *being* received anew, nor does anything begin, and through this neither is anything varied.

11. To that which is objected, that a form cannot be produced without change, therefore neither a supposit; it must be said that it is not similar: because the production of a form says a substantial difference between the producer and the product; for nothing produces itself[^p106-3]; and therefore, when a form is produced, it must be produced by another form, which, since it is other than it, will truly be the producing cause and prior by nature to the produced form itself; and therefore in that production it is necessary that change be included. But it is not so in the production of a supposit or person, for this reason, that there is one nature and essence in both, and therefore they are together; nor is there change or motion there, because there is there no prior nor posterior nor anything new.

12. To that which is objected, that as part is to part, so whole is to whole; it must be said that in the divine things there is properly neither part nor whole, according as a *whole* is called that which contains part and part[^p106-4]. Nor does it hold that, if a thing produced from a part posits change in the part, a thing produced from the whole substance likewise posits change according to the whole: because, as was touched on before, production in part posits a cutting off, posits the loss of something and the acquisition of something, which of necessity include change; but production from the whole substance says nothing of the kind, but rather excludes all that upon which motion follows, as was shown from the principal solution. For neither is there a cutting off in the producing principle, nor composition in the product, nor innovation in the production, nor any variation concerning any of the aforesaid.

---

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et speciei:* Genera [speciebus] praeiacere oporet... unde et priora sunt naturaliter genera... et species quidem cum sit, est et genus omnino, genus vero cum sit, non omnino erit species. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1. — *Minor* insinuatur ab Aristot., de Pradicam. c. *de Motu*. Vide tom. I. pag. 664, nota 4.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. *On the common features and differences of genus and species:* "Genera must [*sic*] lie before [the species]... whence also genera are naturally prior... and when the species is, the genus also altogether is, but when the genus is, the species will not altogether be." Compare Aristotle, IV *Topics*, c. 1. — The *minor* is intimated by Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On Motion*. See vol. I, p. 664, note 4.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 93, nota 3.

en: Compare above, p. 93, note 3.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 4. m. 1: Item I. Sent. d. VII. [c. 1.] Magister: Si Spiritus sanctus nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius; et si potuit esse Filius, mutabilis esse potuit. (Magister loc. cit. praemiserat quaedam verba Augustini. S. Bonav. I. Sent. d. 7. dub. 4. ait: Item quaeritur de ista *illatione Magistri:* Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius etc.).

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. I, q. 4, m. 1: "Likewise, I *Sentences*, d. VII [c. 1], the Master: If the Holy Spirit could be born, He could be the Son; and if He could be the Son, He could be mutable." (The Master, in the place cited, had set certain words of Augustine before this. St. Bonaventure, I *Sentences*, d. 7, dub. 4, says: "Likewise, it is asked about this *inference of the Master:* the Holy Spirit could have been the Son, etc.")

la: Id est: generatione. Richard. a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 14: In angelica autem natura nulla est propagatio, sed sola simplexque creatio. Cfr. supra pag. 75, nota 7. — Superius pro *immutabilitas*, quod habet E, alii perperam *mutabilitas*.

en: That is: by generation. Richard of St. Victor, IV *On the Trinity*, c. 14: "But in the angelic nature there is no propagation, but only simple creation." Compare above, p. 75, note 7. — Above, for *immutabilitas*, which E has, the others wrongly have *mutabilitas*.

la: Libr. II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 180, nota 8. Dictio *a primo* idem ac *a principio*.

en: Book II *On Generation and Corruption*, text 59 (c. 10). Compare vol. I, p. 180, note 8. The expression *a primo* ("from the first") is the same as *a principio* ("from the principle").

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.), ubi docet, quod nihili nulla sit differentia. — Post pauca pro *aliquid*, quod praebet A, alii *aliquem*.

en: Compare Aristotle, IV *Physics*, text 67 (c. 8), where he teaches that of nothing there is no difference. — A little after, for *aliquid*, which A offers, the others have *aliquem*.

la: Vide supra q. 2. a. 2. in corp.

en: See above, q. 2, a. 2, in the body.

la: Quaest. 3. a. 2.

en: Question 3, a. 2.

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. (c. 1.). Entelechia (ἐντελέχεια) idem est ac actus.

en: Aristotle, III *Physics*, text 6 (c. 1). *Entelechia* (ἐντελέχεια) is the same as act.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 99. et 131. (c. 11. et 14.): Prius autem et posterius in motu est. — De *priori* tempore vel natura cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Priori* et c. *de Simul*. — *Minor* probata est supra q. 5. a. 2.

en: Compare Aristotle, IV *Physics*, text 99 and 131 (c. 11 and 14): "But the before and after are in motion." — On the *prior* in time or in nature compare Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On the Prior* and c. *On the Simultaneous*. — The *minor* was proved above, q. 5, a. 2.

la: Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.) et XI. Metaph. c. 11. (X. c. 12.). — Verba Boethii habentur in libro de Trin. c. 6.

en: Aristotle, V *Physics*, text 10 (c. 2), and XI *Metaphysics*, c. 11 (X, c. 12). — The words of Boethius are found in the book *On the Trinity*, c. 6.

la: E G H totam praecedentem propositionem hic repetunt, mutato *Item* in *ergo*.

en: E G H repeat the whole preceding proposition here, *Item* being changed into *ergo*.

la: Vide supra a. 1. ad 5. et 6. — Mox pro *personam* A *Filium*.

en: See above, a. 1, replies 5 and 6. — Just after, for *personam* A has *Filium*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.).

en: Compare Aristotle, V *Physics*, text 7 (c. 1).

la: Hic desinunt omnes codd., excepto D (continuato ab alia, tamen suppari manu); loca nonnulla ipsius corrupta coniectura corrigenda nobis erant, ut ex notis adiectis intelligi potest.

en: Here all the codices break off, except D (continued by another, though nearly contemporary, hand); some corrupt passages of it we have had to correct by conjecture, as can be understood from the notes added.

la: Supplevimus *sed includit*, quod D omittit.

en: We have supplied *sed includit*, which D omits.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 9, q. 1.

la: D corrupte *relatio autem dicitur ut pluries... originem dicitur nobilissimis*.

en: D corruptly reads *relatio autem dicitur ut pluries... originem dicitur nobilissimis*.

la: Libr. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 20. (c. 3.) et II. Metaph. text. 7. (I. brevior, c. 2.). — Superius inter verba *sicut corruptio* suppressimus *et*.

en: Book I *On Generation and Corruption*, text 20 (c. 3), and II *Metaphysics*, text 7 (I *brevior*, c. 2). — Above, between the words *sicut corruptio*, we have suppressed *et*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 114. seq. (c. 12.), ubi explicatur, quid sit in tempore esse et tempore mensurari.

en: Compare Aristotle, IV *Physics*, text 114 and following (c. 12), where it is explained what it is to be in time and to be measured by time.

la: Simili modo ait Aristot. VIII. Phys. text. 36. (c. 5.): Si ergo ponamus possibile esse, nullum impossibile accidet, falsum autem fortassis. — In hac solut., de qua cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. dub. 4, paulo superius voci *quia* praefiximus *sed*, et inferius *quae* voci *realiter*.

en: In a similar way Aristotle says, VIII *Physics*, text 36 (c. 5): "If therefore we posit that it is possible, nothing impossible will result, though perhaps something false." — In this solution, on which compare I *Sentences*, d. 7, dub. 4, a little above we have prefixed *sed* to the word *quia*, and below *quae* to the word *realiter*.

la: Quaest. seq. a. 2, licet in hoc cod., in principio posita, ordine praecedat. — In fine solut. D semel omittit *producitur*.

en: The following question, a. 2 — although in this codex, being placed at the beginning, it comes first in order. — At the end of the solution D omits *producitur* once.

la: Quaest. 2. a. 2. in corp. et ad 3.

en: Question 2, a. 2, in the body and reply 3.

la: Sap. 13, 3: Speciei enim generator etc. — Verba Isai. 66, 9. sunt: Si ego, qui generationem ceteris tribuo, sterilis ero, ait Dominus Deus tuus?

en: Wisdom 13:3: *For the begetter of beauty* etc. — The words of Isaias 66:9 are: *Shall I, that give generation to others, myself be barren, saith the Lord thy God?*

la: D *quod dicitur et quod accipitur ut [nec?] actus..*

en: D reads *quod dicitur et quod accipitur ut [nec?] actus..*

la: Supplevimus *a*.

en: We have supplied *a*.

la: Vide supra pag. 46, nota 7. — Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.): Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa.

en: See above, p. 46, note 7. — Aristotle, II *Posterior Analytics*, c. 17 (c. 14): "For the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause."

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 1. — De *toto* et *parte* vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 30. seq. (IV. c. 25. seq.). — Post *dicendum, quod* additum a D *nec* suppressimus, quia superfluere videtur.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 19, p. II, q. 1. — On *whole* and *part* see Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 30 and following (IV, c. 25 and following). — After *dicendum, quod* we have suppressed the *nec* added by D, because it seems superfluous.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L24533–L25100**), with every heading, subtitle, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-102..106.png`). **p. 105's left-column body raw is degraded** (*nmtalionem*, *ddcctuni*, *nobilissiniiiii*) and was re-set from the plate; p. 104's body and all five footers are usable. Fresh literal English translation. **Five printed pages, 102–106; 28 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** The chunk opens on **p. 102**, two-thirds down the leaf, below `bon-qmt-q6-a1`'s close: **`ARTICULUS II.`** full measure, its italic subtitle *Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas*, the opener *Deinde quaeritur…* and **argument 1** — **heading, subtitle and opener all unanchored**, re-read here at full width (2.5×) rather than adopted from the hand-off. Then: **twelve arguments** that trinity and supreme immutability are incompossible (marginale `Ad oppositum.`); a **`Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` series of seven** (marginale `Fundamenta.`), letter-spaced small caps, in-column; **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column; a *Respondeo* whose *ratio duplex* is **supreme eternity** (no *inceptio*, *successio*, *defectio*, hence none of the three changes) and **supreme simplicity** (no *decisio*, *compositio*, *abiectio*), with an *alia argumentatio* from **actuality** — immutability rightly understood *non solum non excludit, sed includit beatissimam Trinitatem*; and **twelve replies for twelve arguments, none combined**, answering the **OPENING** series.

### ⭐⭐ BOUNDARY 12 (p. 106): IT FORWARDS, SPLIT 4/4 — AND QUAESTIO VII'S OPENER IS ANCHORED

**p. 106 was extracted ALONE and read before pp. 103–105 were pulled**, because the raw had already said the index was wrong: `QUAESTIO VII.` opens at **L25101**, ~63 lines into p. 106, where the index gives `q6-a2 102–105`. **The plate confirms it.** Article II's replies 9 (its tail) through 12 fill both columns to about two-fifths of the leaf, closing *…nec variatio aliqua circa aliquod praedictorum.*; **`QUAESTIO VII.` then stands full measure** with its subtitle *Utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate*, its opener, its two *praeambula*, `ARTICULUS I.` with its subtitle, and the first arguments. The register holds **eight** entries: **nn. 1–4 are this chunk's** (reply 9's *actus*¹, reply 10's *a*², reply 11's *ipsum*³, reply 12's *partem*⁴ — n. 4's own *Post dicendum, quod additum a D nec* seats it in reply 12, and n. 2 *Supplevimus a.* is the very preposition); **nn. 5–8 forward to `bon-qmt-q7-a1`.**

⭐⭐ **And n. 5 anchors in Quaestio VII's OPENER** — *Secundum est, utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas*⁵, read at 1.4× on a full-width crop (*Haec secunda pars… deficiens in D, a nobis pro more auctoris suppleta est*). **The second anchored quaestio opener in the work, after p. 59's**; the openers on pp. 45, 68, 78, 87 and 96 are unanchored (re-counted from the five chunks' own Latin, not carried from a summary). ▶ **`bon-qmt-q7-a1` inherits it with the opener.** ⛔ Seven openers, two anchored: the frozen instruction — *the anchor must be looked for at every opener* — is the rule; neither expectation is.

▶ **Twelve boundaries, TEN shapes: 5/1 · LEAF EDGE · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0 · 1/6 · 3/2 · LEAF EDGE · 5/0 · 3/1 · 4/4** — **10 forwarding / 2 leaf edges.** ⚠⚠ **The index line `q6-a2 102–105` is right at its first page and WRONG at its last by one leaf** — the `q2-a2` mechanism (the index's last page is not the unit's last page), caught this time by the **raw band**, which again was exact: L24533 → L25100 ends at the article's last word. ★ The standing order (extract the span's last leaf alone, read it first) paid a **ninth** time.

### ⭐⭐ FROM p. 104 THE TEXT RESTS ON ONE CODEX

**p. 104 n. 4, anchored at the *Respondeo*'s *omnimoda immutabilitate*⁴: *Hic desinunt omnes codd., excepto D (continuato ab alia, tamen suppari manu); loca nonnulla ipsius corrupta coniectura corrigenda nobis erant.*** Everything after that anchor — the rest of the *Respondeo* and all twelve replies — is **a single witness corrected by Quaracchi's conjecture**, and the register shows the corrections one by one: p. 104 n. 5 (*sed includit* supplied), n. 7 (*D corrupte…*), p. 105 n. 1 (*et* suppressed), n. 3 (*sed* and *quae* prefixed), n. 4 (*producitur* omitted once), p. 106 n. 1 (*D quod dicitur…* with Quaracchi's own `[nec?]`), n. 2 (*a* supplied), n. 4 (*nec* suppressed). ⭐ **p. 105 n. 4 adds that in D the next question's Article II stands first** (*in principio posita, ordine praecedat*). ⚠ **p. 106 n. 5 shows D still alone at Quaestio VII's opener** (its *secunda pars* supplied *pro more auctoris*) — **`q7-a1` and everything after it should expect the same: a one-witness text.** Nothing here is ours to emend; it is recorded because a reader of the English should know where the manuscript tradition thins to one.

### ⭐⭐ A SPURIOUS ANCHOR MARK ON EACH OF TWO LEAVES — BOTH KILLED BY GLYPH AND COUNT

- **p. 104: eight raised marks in the raw against seven register entries.** The extra follows *mutatio vero ab esse* (raw `esse'`); **at 5× it is a dot at x-height with no digit shape.** The seven anchors are *duratione*¹, *ipso*², *aliud esse*³, *immutabilitate*⁴, *includit*⁵ (n. 5 *Supplevimus sed includit* — the variant names its own seat), *mutatio*⁶, *nobilissimis*⁷ (n. 7 *…originem dicitur nobilissimis*, likewise).
- **p. 105: seven marks against six entries.** The extra is a **horizontal stroke over *ipsius*** in reply 7 (raw `ipsius"`), not a figure. The six are *Philosophus*¹, *mensuratur*², *oportet*³, *necessitate*⁴, *praedictum est*⁵, *constituit*⁶.
- ⭐ **Variant notes seat themselves a third and fourth time in the work:** p. 104 nn. 5 and 7 and p. 106 nn. 2 and 4 each quote the words their anchors stand beside.

### ⭐ PRINTING ANOMALIES — ONE LETTER NEVER SET, ONE OMITTED, THE REST FOULED OR SPECKS

- ⭐⭐ **p. 102 n. 4 → p. 103: *praeiacere opor-* | *et… unde*.** Porphyry's Latin wants *oportet*, and the runover line at the head of p. 103's register begins ***et***. **Measured, not guessed:** the line's first ink stands at **x = 155** against the flush-left margin of the lines below it at **146–147** (9 px, less than a letter); the paper before it runs to **min 229** (clean, no ghost of a failed impression); its *e* prints at **min 67**, as strong as its neighbours' 48–62. **The first branch of the ratified rule governs — the forme never carried the *t*** — so the gap is reproduced, not filled: the joined word is transcribed ***oporet***, and the English carries `[*sic*]`. ⚠ It could not be caught by the register's own evidence because the fault falls exactly at the page turn.
- ⭐ **p. 103, same runover: `de Pradicam.`** — the *e* of *Praedicam.* is absent **with no room for it** (the *r* and *a* stand at ordinary spacing, both a little light) — an **omitted letter, not a gap and not a failing impression**. **Transcribed as printed**; the control is on the same page, **n. 9's `de Praedicam.`** English gives *Categories*.
- **Fouled sorts, letters present, read plain** (the `q4-a1` *sententia* / `q6-a1` *stare* rule): p. 105 reply 5 ***competere*** (a stray mark under the second *r*; raw `competene`); p. 105 reply 8 ***aliis*** — the raw's `aljis` and a 4× read both suggest a *j*, but **at 10× the first *i* carries its full foot serif at the baseline with a detached blob below it; a *j* has no foot serif.** ⛔ Contrast `q6-a1`'s `p. J.`, a real J sort — **a descender is not evidence of a *j* until the foot is checked.**
- **Specks and stray points, not transcribed:** p. 102's opener *quod .sint* (a baseline point in the word space, ungrammatical; `q6-a1` dropped the same-shape *quin. possit* on this very leaf); p. 104's *mutabilitas:.*; p. 106's *non. erat*, *incipit,· ac*, *aliqua·*; p. 104 n. 7's mark after *dicitur*. **Transcribed as printed:** p. 106 n. 1 ends **`actus..`** (two points, Quaracchi's own), with its `[nec?]` inside the note.

### ⭐⭐ THE TARGETS BEAT THE GLYPH

Every outbound citation naming a place we hold was opened; **every one lands on its note's subject**:

- ⭐ **p. 103 n. 1 `supra pag. 93, nota 3`** → `bon-qmt-q5-a2` p. 93 n. 3, Aristotle *V. Phys.* text. 7 on corruption as *ex subiecto in non-subiectum* — argument 3's *sicut illa ad esse, ita ista ad non-esse* exactly. ⭐ **And p. 104 n. 3 cites the same locus, `V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.)`, for the *Respondeo*'s three changes** — Quaracchi's doubled citation is a free control on both `7`s.
- ⭐ **p. 103 n. 3 `supra pag. 75, nota 7`** → `bon-qmt-q3-a2` p. 75 n. 7, *Libr. IV. c. 13. seq.* of Richard's *de Trinitate* — and n. 3 itself quotes **Richard IV c. 14**, inside that *seq.*
- ⭐ **p. 106 n. 3 `supra pag. 46, nota 7`** → `bon-qmt-q1-a1` p. 46 n. 7, Aristotle *II. de Anima* text. 47, ***Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum*** — reply 11's *nihil enim producit se ipsum*, word for word. **A sixth internal cross-reference closes inside this work.**
- **p. 103 n. 2's `I. Sent. d. 7. dub. 4.`** → `bon-sent-I-d7-dubia`, which carries ***de ista illatione Magistri: Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius, ergo potuit mutari*** — the note's quotation and argument 5's inference. p. 105 n. 3 cites the same dubium for reply 5, the answer to the same argument.
- **p. 104 n. 6 `I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1.`** → `bon-sent-I-d9-a1-q1`, on the generation of the Son (reply 1's *vera productio, non vera mutatio*). **p. 106 n. 4 `I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 1.`** → `bon-sent-I-d19-p2-a1-q1`, the *totum integrale* question — reply 12's part and whole. **p. 102 n. 4 `tom. I. pag. 664, nota 4`** → `bon-sent-I-d37-p2-a2-q3`, whose note on V. *Phys.* text. 7–9 names generation, corruption and motion as the species of *transmutatio* — the *minor* the note says Aristotle intimates.
- Internal `q. N. a. M.` references (p. 103 nn. 6, 7, 9; p. 104 n. 2; p. 105 nn. 4, 5) were checked by title: `q2-a2` *unitas naturae… cum trinitate personarum* (argument 11's *natura quam persona*); `q3-a2` *trinitas et summa simplicitas* (`Sed contra` 1); `q5-a2` *trinitas et aeternitas* (`Sed contra` 3's minor); `q6-a1` replies 5 and 6 (creation without change of the creator — argument 6). **p. 105 n. 4 `Quaest. seq. a. 2`** points FORWARD to `bon-qmt-q7-a2`, not yet built.
- **Digits settled on the type at 4–5× against same-line controls:** p. 103 n. 2 `q. 4. m. 1` (closed-bowl 4, flagged 1, raw `q. i.`) and `[c. 1.]`; n. 3 `c. 14` (raw right); n. 4 `c. 10.` and `pag. 180` (flagged 1s); n. 9 `text. 99. et 131. (c. 11. et 14.)` — one line setting the flagged 1 four times and a closed 4 once; n. 10 `XI. Metaph. c. 11.` (raw `c. II.`); p. 102 n. 4 `pag. 664` (open-topped 4, against the flagged 1 of `IV. Topic. c. 1.` a line above); p. 105 n. 2 `text. 114.`; n. 6 `Sap. 13, 3` — **Wisdom 13:3 *speciei enim generator haec omnia constituit* IS the body's italic**; p. 106 n. 3 `c. 17. (c. 14.)`, controlled by n. 4's `d. 19. p. II. q. 1.`, whose target is certain.

### ▶ GUTTERS — THE DEFAULT FAILED ON THE TWO SHARED LEAVES AND HELD ON THE THREE BETWEEN

102 **1409** for Article II's REGION *(rows 0.73–0.80, too thin for the window loop; band 1377–1442, 66 px, rule 1410–1411 peak 45 — `q6-a1` measured 1419 for Art. I's region above, a neighbour's figure checked against, not adopted)* · 103 **1129** *(63 px, band 1098–1160, rule 1127–1130; sound)* · 104 **1371** *(58 px; band 1343–1400 midpoint 1371, the `CONCLUSIO` heading inflating the window spread)* · 105 **1140** *(default 1139 on 59 px; band 1110–1170; ⭐ **the centre rule peaks at 1304, the most heavily inked in the work**, beating p. 93's 1242)* · 106 **1421** for Article II's REGION *(rows 0.03–0.42, most windows at 1419–1422 on 57–62 px; whole-leaf default **1435 on a 2 px run**, `QUAESTIO VII.` crossing the gutter)*.

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**One page-crossing runover and two gutter runovers.** The head of every incoming register (pp. 103–106) was read before its first numeral:

- **p. 102 n. 4 → p. 103 (PAGE-CROSSING):** p. 103's footer opens with **three unnumbered, flush-left lines** (*et… unde et priora sunt naturaliter genera… Vide tom. I. pag. 664, nota 4.*) before n. 1. Rendered joined. (Predicted by `q6-a1` from the raw; confirmed here on the plate.)
- **p. 104 n. 4** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *tamen suppari manu);*.
- **p. 105 n. 3** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *dub. 4, paulo superius…*. ⚠ The `S. Bonav. — Tom. V.` signature line and the gathering signature `14` stand at the foot of the leaf and are not apparatus.
- pp. 104, 105, 106 each open numbered and indented at n. 1 — **nothing else crosses a page.** p. 106 n. 4 ends in the left block; the right block opens at n. 5.

Ledger line: `bon-qmt-q6-a2	p.102 n.4:page,p.104 n.4:gutter,p.105 n.3:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER — AND THE SOLUTION-HEAVY SPLIT IS TOTAL A NINTH TIME

**p. 102** — `Ad oppositum.`
**p. 103** — `Fundamenta.`
**p. 104** — `Conclusio.` · `Ratio duplex.` · `Explicatur ratio sumta de aeternitate.` · `Triplex mutatio.` · `Item ratio sumta de simplicitate.` · `Alia argumentatio.` · `Solutio oppositorum.`
**p. 105** — `Differentia inter corruptionem et generationem.` · `Notandum.` · `Nota.` · `Notandum.` · `Aliter.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 106** — `Notandum.` · `In Deo ne[c] pars nec to[-]tum.`

**Seventeen in all.** ⭐ **One is CLIPPED — p. 106's gutter-side gloss at reply 12**, and it is a leaf outside the 69–73 range: on a **full-image-width strip at 3×** its three lines run *In Deo ne* · *pars nec to* · *tum.* into the scan's dark edge band. **Restored under the `bon-brev-p7-c7` test, from matter on the same page:** the *c* of *ne[c]* is fixed by the correlative the gloss itself prints on its second line (*nec … nec*) and by the body beside it (*nec est pars neque totum*), and the hyphen of *to[-]tum* by *tum.* standing alone on the third line. ⚠ **The clipping is a property of particular leaves** — pp. 102–105 are whole (p. 105's gutter-side *Differentia…* checked at 3× on a full-width strip) — **and it has now recurred outside its first range; check every leaf.** `sumta` twice as printed (not *sumpta*). ⭐ **The nineteen arguments of the two series carry TWO glosses, one at the head of each; the *Conclusio*, *Respondeo* and twelve replies carry fifteen.** The ninth chunk running.

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**The replies answer the OPENING series, checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem* — the seven `Sed contra` *fundamenta* — and reply 1 quotes argument 1's *ubi generatio, ibi mutatio*; reply 12 argument 12's *sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum*. ⛔ **The reverse of `q6-a1` immediately before it**, as in Quaestiones IV and V: the two articles of one quaestio answer opposite series again. **The marginalia swap with it**: `Ad oppositum.` on the opening series, `Fundamenta.` on the `Sed contra` — the marginale names the side the *Respondeo* takes. · **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.` in-column**, its italic sentence centred in the left column, found by content. · **`Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` is a standalone marker**, kept in Latin in both languages on the `q6-a1` precedent. · Argument 4's *eodem addito, utrobique* and reply 4's ***determinatio distrahens*** are the logicians' terms — see Translation choices. · **Argument 8's quotation marks enclose Aristotle's reason** (*« propter longe distare a primo et propter corruptionem »*), and p. 103 n. 4 glosses *a primo* as *a principio*. · The body's *Nam speciei generator omnia haec constituit* sets Wisdom 13:3's *haec omnia* as *omnia haec* — as printed. · The subtitle and opener print ***trinitas et summa immutabilitas*** identically; the Article I *praeambulum* on p. 96 (*Secundum, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas*) agrees.

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

**The multiset agrees exactly** — no spelled-out chapter number in the body except *ultimo Isaiae*, which carries no digit in either language. ▶ **The test itself was run directly:** both languages carry **the same five `<!-- page N -->` markers, 102–106, in the same order**, each at a word boundary — p. 103's before *trinitas* in both (the page breaking *tri-* | *nitas*), p. 104's before *Trinitatem* (inside Boethius' *Relatio multiplicat* | *Trinitatem*), p. 105's and p. 106's at a paragraph and a clause boundary. **28 anchors in each language, in the same order, each defined once.**

### Translation choices

- ⛔ **Ruling 5 is NOT reached**: no `fundam. N` stands in any of the 28 entries (the body's *ex parte fundamenti* is Bonaventure's word, "on the part of the foundation"). ⛔ ***vacatio*/*quies*: a stem census on `quie` and `vaca` returns ZERO** over the band; the deciding site remains **`q7-a2` L25824**. ⛔ ***lux*/*lumen* do not occur** (ruling 2 unexercised); **`contuit-` and *intelligentia* are absent.**
- ***intellectus* → "understanding" with ZERO bare "intellect"**: the one site is the *Respondeo*'s *intellectus includit verbum, et amor includit nexum* → "understanding includes a word, and love includes a bond"; *secundum rationem intelligendi* → "according to the account of understanding".
- ***decisio* → "cutting off"**, ***abiectio* → "casting off"**, ***abiectio habiti* → "casting off of what was had"**, ***introductio novi* → "introduction of anything new"**, ***decisio indivisi* → "cutting off of the undivided"** — the *Respondeo*'s three negated operations kept distinct and kept literal, since reply 12 re-uses *decisio* bare ("a cutting off").
- ***inceptio* / *successio* / *defectio* → "beginning" / "succession" / "failing"**; ***mutatio* → "change"**, ***motus* → "motion"**, ***commutatio* / *commutari* → "alteration" / "to be altered"** (reply 9, kept apart from *mutari*); ***variabilitas* / *invariabilitas* → "variability" / "invariability"**.
- ***omnimodus* → "in every mode"** (the `q5-a2` rendering); ***interminata* → "unterminated"** — the participle, kept apart from `q5-a1`'s *interminabilis* → "interminable"; ***sempiternus* / *sempiternaliter* → "everlasting" / "everlastingly"**, against *aeternus* → "eternal".
- ***determinatio distrahens* → "distracting determination"** — the logicians' term for a qualifier that alters what it qualifies, so that an inference which holds of the bare term fails of the qualified one (reply 4). Kept as the technical phrase, not paraphrased.
- ***posito quod non oportet, accidit quod non oportet* → "when what ought not to be is posited, there results what ought not to be"** (reply 5), matching the Aristotle p. 105 n. 3 quotes.
- ***semiplena* → "half-full"**; ***plurificatio* → "plurification"** (`q5-a2`); ***entelechia* → "entelechy"** in the body, *Entelechia* kept in the note with Quaracchi's Greek ἐντελέχεια as printed; ***ad aliquid* → "relation to something"** (the terminology table).
- **Scripture on the Douay base adjusted to Quaracchi's Latin**: Wis. 13:3 *speciei generator* → "**the begetter of beauty**", not Douay's "first author of beauty", because reply 8 turns on *generator*/*generatio* and the English must keep the word's root; Isa. 66:9 in the note on Douay ("Shall I, that give generation to others, myself be barren, saith the Lord thy God?"). *ultimo Isaiae* → "in the last chapter of Isaias".

### Ledger

**28 entries** (p. 102 n. 4 of four · p. 103 all ten · p. 104 all seven · p. 105 all six · p. 106 nn. 1–4 of eight). **Zero `[?]` flags. One page-crossing runover, two gutter runovers.** What this chunk inherits from `bon-qmt-q6-a1` is **p. 102 n. 4** (position re-derived at *genere*⁴ in argument 1, **right** column, and its p. 103 continuation read on the plate) and **Article II's heading, subtitle, opener and argument 1 on p. 102** (re-read at full width). What it forwards to `bon-qmt-q7-a1` is **p. 106 nn. 5–8** — n. 5 at Quaestio VII's opener, nn. 6–8 at Article I's arguments 1–3 (*necessarium*⁶, *quod*⁷, *huiusmodi*⁸) — and **Quaestio VII's heading, subtitle, opener, *praeambula*, `ARTICULUS I.` with its subtitle, and arguments 1–5 on p. 106**. **QUAESTIO VI IS COMPLETE.**

### ⚠ CITATIONS — 13 RECORDS, ZERO DANGLING, AND TWO RESOLVER ARTEFACTS NAMED

`build-citations.py` returns **13 records from this chunk: 8 chunk · 1 page-multi · 2 verse · 1 excluded · 1 anaphor; ZERO dangling, ZERO unresolvable, ZERO ambiguous.** Corpus QA stays at **202**. Named for the work-close gate, none edited here:

- **p. 103 n. 2's `Magister loc. cit.` is carried by cross-note anaphora onto p. 103 n. 1's `supra pag. 93, nota 3`** (→ `bon-qmt-q5-a2`). It means *I. Sent. d. VII.* in its own note — the `q5-a2` p. 94 n. 8 `ibid.` class a second time. And the same note's **`S. Bonav. I. Sent. d. 7. dub. 4.` is filed as `authority:Magister` and excluded**, though it is Bonaventure's own dubium and the target exists (`bon-sent-I-d7-dubia`); p. 105 n. 3's identical coordinate resolves correctly.
- ⚠ **A consequence for `q5-a2`, not a record of this chunk:** `bon-qmt-q5-a2` p. 93 n. 2's bare **`pag. 103, nota 10`** now resolves to **this chunk** (p. 103 n. 10, Aristotle *V. Phys.* text. 10). That note meant the Sentences tome its own text had just named — the `q5-a2` resolver artefact (*a bare `pag. N` inherits the volume, not the note's last-named tome*) now landing on a real Vol V chunk instead of a forward reference, **which makes it look resolved.** ⛔ **A resolver error that finds a target is harder to see than one that dangles.**
- Internal `q. N. a. M.` references (six in this chunk) produce no record — true of every chunk in the work, not new here.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0