title: Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum homo sit vere imago Dei.
Whether man is truly the image of God.

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *Qualiter homo sit imago secundum considerationem absolutam.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum homo sit vere imago Dei.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod homo sit imago Dei vere.

1. *Fundamenta.* Genesis primo[^3]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem* etc.; hoc non est nisi verbum Trinitatis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo[^4]: *Deus de terra creavit hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum*; si igitur homo factus est secundum imaginem Dei, homo est imago Dei.

3. Item, quod est maxime natum uniri alteri maxime natum est ei configurari et conformari — amor enim, quia unit, transformare dicitur amantem in amatum, sicut dicit Hugo[^5] — sed creatura rationalis, ut homo, maxime nata est uniri Deo et in ipsum

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tendere per amorem: ergo maxime natus est ei configurari et assimilari. Si igitur imago dicit similitudinem expressam, patet etc.

4. Item, quod vere repraesentat aliquid secundum eius nobilem actum et secundum distinctionem et ordinem, vere est eius imago; sed homo vere repraesentat Deum secundum eius nobilissimum actum, qui est intelligere — non solum enim repraesentat Deum, in quantum est ens et vivens, sed etiam in quantum est intelligens — et iterum, repraesentat distinctionem et ordinem, qui est in personis, quantum ad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem[^6]: ergo homo vere est Dei imago.

**Contra:**

1. *Ad oppositum.* Nihil est illud ad quod fit, quia nihil fit ad se ipsum; sed homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, sicut dicitur Genesis primo[^7]; ergo homo non est imago.

2. Item, ubicumque est imago, ibi est *similitudo*; ubicumque est *similitudo*, ibi est *identitas* aliqua; ubicumque autem est *identitas*, ibi est *convenientia* in aliquo tertio[^8]: si igitur Deus et creatura in aliquo tertio non conveniunt, creatura non potest esse similitudo Dei, et ita nec imago.

3. Item, non quaecumque *similitudo* est imago, sed *similitudo expressa*; sed nulla est *similitudo expressa* alicuius, quae plus est disconveniens quam conveniens: cum ergo omnis creatura plus sit Deo dissimilis quam consimilis, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto[^9] *de Trinitate*, ergo nulla potest esse expressa Dei similitudo: ergo nulla potest esse imago.

4. Item, ubicumque est imago, ibi est configuratio, imago enim attenditur in figura[^10]; sed divina essentia nullo modo est figurabilis: ergo nullo modo est per aliquam imaginem repraesentabilis: ergo nulla creatura est imago Dei.

5. Item, differt imago a vestigio, quia vestigium repraesentat secundum partem, imago autem secundum totum[^11]; sed nullum finitum potest repraesentare infinitum secundum totum: cum igitur Deus sit infinitus, et quaelibet creatura finita, nulla creatura potest esse imago Dei.

6. Item, quaelibet creatura distat a Deo in infinitum; Deus enim quamlibet[^12] in infinitum excellit: ergo si infinita distantia non est maior, una creatura non distat magis quam alia; similiter nec una magis appropinquat quam alia: ergo vel *omnis* creatura est imago, vel *nulla*. Sed *non omnis* est imago: ergo *nulla*.

> ### Conclusio.
> *Homo est vere imago Dei, quia est eius expressa similitudo.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod imago dicit expressam similitudinem. Necesse est autem, omnem creaturam quoquomodo[^13] assimilari Deo; necesse est etiam, aliquam ad complementum universi expresse assimilari Deo: et ideo omnis creatura habet rationem vestigii, sed aliqua habet rationem imaginis, illa videlicet, quae assimilatur expresse. Haec autem est rationalis creatura, ut homo; et ideo concedendum est, quod homo est imago Dei, quia est eius expressa similitudo.

Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod *Quadruplex similitudo.* quaedam est similitudo per *convenientiam omnimodam in natura*, et sic una persona in Trinitate est alteri similis; quaedam per *participationem alicuius naturae universalis*, sicut homo et asinus assimilantur in animali; quaedam vero secundum *proportionalitatem*[^14], sicut nauta et auriga conveniunt secundum comparationem ad illa quae regunt; quaedam est similitudo per *convenientiam ordinis*, sicut exemplatum assimilatur exemplari. — *Applicatio ad Deum.* Primis duobus modis nulla creatura potest Deo assimilari, secundis duobus modis omnis creatura assimilatur; sed illa quae assimilatur magis de *longinquo*, habet rationem vestigii; illa vero quae de *proximo*, habet rationem imaginis; talis autem est creatura rationalis, utpote homo.

*Conclusio.* Et hoc patet sic. *Probatio: Primo de convenientia ordinis.* Deus enim universa propter semetipsum operatus est[^15], ita quod, cum sit summa *potestas* et *maiestas*, fecit omnia ad sui *laudem*; cum sit summa *lux*, fecit omnia ad sui *manifestationem*; cum sit summa *bonitas*, fecit omnia ad sui *communicationem*. Non est autem perfecta *laus*, nisi adsit qui approbet; nec est perfecta *manifestatio*, nisi adsit qui intelligat; nec perfecta *communicatio bonorum*, nisi adsit qui eis uti valeat. Et quoniam *laudem approbare, veritatem scire, dona in usum assumere* non est nisi solummodo rationalis creaturae; ideo non habent ipsae creaturae irrationales immediate ad Deum ordinari, sed mediante creatura rationali. Ipsa autem creatura rationalis, quia de se nata est et *laudare* et *nosse* et res alias in *facultatem voluntatis assumere*, nata est ordinari in Deum immediate[^16].

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Et quoniam quanto aliquid immediatius ordinatur ad aliquid, tanto magis convenit cum eo *convenientia ordinis*; et anima rationalis et quaelibet rationalis creatura, eo quod « capax Dei est et particeps esse potest[^17] », immediate ordinatur in ipsum; maxime convenit cum eo *convenientia ordinis*. Et quia, quanto maior est convenientia, tanto expressior est *similitudo*; hinc est, quod quantum ad hoc genus similitudinis rationalis creatura est similitudo expressa, et ideo imago est. — *Confirmatur.* Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus *de Trinitate* decimo quarto[^18], quod « eo est anima imago Dei, quo capax eius est et particeps esse potest ». Quia enim ei immediate ordinatur, ideo *capax* eius est, vel e converso; et quia *capax* est, nata est ei *configurari*; et propter hoc fert in se a sua origine *lumen vultus divini*[^19]. Et ideo quantum ad similitudinem, quae attenditur ad *convenientiam ordinis*, perfecte dicitur imago Dei, quia in hoc ei assimilatur *expresse*.

*Probatio 2.* Similiter in similitudine, quae attenditur in *convenientia proportionalitatis* vel *proportionis*, expresse assimilatur Deo creatura rationalis, et ideo secundum eam recte dicitur imago. Quod patet sic. Convenientia enim *proportionis* attenditur secundum *similiter se habere*. *Distinctio. Similiter* autem *se habere*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel in comparatione ad *extrinseca*, vel in comparatione ad *intrinseca*. Tunc autem est similitudo *expressa*, quando non tantum est similis modus se habendi in comparatione ad *extrinseca*, sed in comparatione ad *intrinseca*. Contingit autem comparare divinam *essentiam* ad creaturam; contingit etiam comparare *personam* ad personam. Omnis autem creatura aliquam comparationem habet, secundum quam aliquo modo conformatur Deo, secundum quod est *causa* creaturae, sicut est comparatio illa, quae est ad *effectum productum*. Sicut enim Deus producit suum effectum, sic et agens creatum, licet non omnino. Creatura vero rationalis non solum sic convenit, sed etiam quantum ad *intrinsecarum* suarum *potentiarum* originem, ordinem et distinctionem, in quibus assimilatur illi distinctioni et ordini[^20], quae est in divinis personis intrinseca divinae naturae. — *Confirmatur.* Et in hoc ostendit Augustinus in libro *de Trinitate*[^21], hominem esse imaginem Dei; et hoc explanatum fuit in primo libro, ubi ostensum est, quod in anima rationali est unitas essentiae cum trinitate potentiarum ad invicem ordinatarum et quasi consimili modo se habentium, sicut se habent personae in divinis. Et ideo est ibi expressa similitudo proportionis; et propter hoc rationalis creatura, quae est homo, est imago Dei.

His visis, patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad obiecta. Concedendum est enim, quod homo vere est imago Dei, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Solutio oppositorum.*

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo est *ad imaginem*: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia, cum dicitur *factus ad imaginem*, imago accipitur abstractive; cum dicitur *imago Dei*, imago accipitur concretive, quia est imagine Dei insignitus; sicut tabula, in qua depicta est imago, et imago potest dici et *ad imaginem*[^22]. Sic et in proposito.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est aliqua identitas Dei ad creaturam, ergo nec similitudo; dicendum, quod similitudo, quae est in imagine, non *Notandum.* attenditur per *identitatem*, aut *eiusdem naturae participationem*, sed per *convenientiam in ordine et proportione*[^23]; quae similitudo non exigit communicantiam in tertio, quia in convenientia *ordinis* unum est similitudo alterius; in convenientia *proportionis* non est similitudo in uno, sed in duabus comparationibus.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est similitudo expressa; iam patet responsio, quia, si magna sit[^24] dissimilitudo in *proprietatibus absolutis*, multum tamen magna est similitudo in *immediatione ordinis* et *comparatione proportionis*, ex quibus et in quibus duobus expressio similitudinis consistit, quae imaginem facit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de configuratione; dicendum, quod imago corporalis exigit configurationem corporalem, imago vero spiritualis configuratione et effigie spirituali contenta est. Haec autem consistit non in quantitate molis, sed in quantitate virtutis, scilicet in potentiis, ita quod, sicut figura triangularis habet tres terminos et tres lineas, sic etiam in imagine spirituali potentiae sint ad modum terminorum, et egressio unius ab altera quantum ad actum se habeat ad modum lineae coniungentis.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago repraesentat secundum totum; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa imagine, quae habet omnimodam perfectionem; et sic solus Filius Dei est imago Patris[^25]. De alia non est verum, quod repraesentet secundum totum *simpliciter*, repraesentat autem quantum ad *aliquam totalitatem*. Quia enim « rationalis creatura et intellectus quodam modo est omnia[^26] », et

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omnia sunt nata ibi scribi, et imprimi omnium similitudines et depingi; ideo, sicut totum universum repraesentat Deum in quadam *totalitate sensibili*, sic creatura *rationalis* eum repraesentat in quadam *totalitate spirituali*; quaelibet autem alia creatura irrationalis repraesentat eum solum in *parte*, quia secundum se tantum, cum non sit nata alia in se spiritualiter continere, ita quod nihil sit, quod non sit nata cognoscere. *Notandum.* Hoc dico propter animam sensibilem, quae, si cognoscat aliqua, non tamen nata est cognoscere omnia.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaelibet creatura distat in infinitum; dicendum, quod verum est de illa distantia, quae opponitur *participationi* et *Notandum.* *adaequationi*. Cum enim Deus sit infinitus, nihil potest ei *adaequari*; cum sit *simplex*, non potest aliquam naturam tertiam cum aliqua creatura participare. Et penes has similitudines nullo modo attenditur ratio imaginis in homine, sed penes aliam duplicem, scilicet *ordinis* et *consimilis habitudinis*, secundum quam rationalis creatura non distat in infinitum a Creatore, sed valde appropinquat ei, sicut ostensum est supra.

### Scholion.

**I.** In tota hac distinctione, quae est magni momenti, disputatur de imagine creata, de qua iam plura dicta sunt I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 2. et dub. 4; sed de differentia inter *vestigium* et *imaginem* ibid. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. De imagine increata actum est I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. et dub. 4. 5, ubi in scholio ad q. 1. de ipsa ratione imaginis nonnulla notata sunt. — De ratione imaginis et similitudinis etiam cfr. infra a. 2. q. 3. in initio corp. De imagine in specie S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.) dicit: « Imago attenditur secundum expressam conformitatem ad imaginatum », sive (hic in corp.): « Imago dicit expressam similitudinem »; et infra (a. 2. q. 3.): « Imago consistit in convenientia secundum configurationem, et configuratio attenditur in origine, habitudine et potentiarum distinctione ». Ut haec definitio intelligatur, notandum est, quod hoc termino *expressa* duplex insinuatur relatio, quam imago habet ad prototypum. Prima relatio est, quod imago sit *ex alio expressa* per aliquem modum productionis, saltem secundum rationem causae exemplaris. Unde dicit S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.): « Sicut *exemplar* secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit expressionem per modum *activi* — unde *exemplar* dicitur ad cuius imitationem fit aliquid — sic e contrario *imago* per modum *passivi*; et dicitur *imago* quod alterum exprimit et imitatur ». Unde ob defectum huius conditionis ovum non dicitur imago ovi, licet ei sit simillimum (S. Thom. S. I. q. 93. a. 1.). Secunda relatio est relatio ipsius *similitudinis* inter imaginem et prototypum, et non similitudinis cuiuslibet, sed *expressae* i. e. « quae sit similitudo expressa in quadam configuratione et imitatione » (infra a. 2. q. 3. arg. 4. ad oppos.), sive per convenientiam in aliqua proprietate *distinctiva* et *insigni*. Diximus: *distinctiva*; « si enim similitudo sit secundum *genus* tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur, aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius » (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 2.). Multo magis hoc valet de proprietatibus *transcendentibus* unitatis, bonitatis, veritatis, in quibus conditionibus generalibus omnis creatura similis est Deo secundum rationem *vestigii*. Diximus: in proprietate *insigni*, quia, ut bene observat Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica, a. 2.), similitudo *in pede* non dicitur proprio imago, sed *in facie*. — Cum autem illa convenientia in aliqua proprietate pluribus modis esse possit, plures etiam species imaginis distinguuntur. « *Imago* accipitur dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est expressio, scilicet vel in naturae *unitate*, vel in naturae *diversitate*: in naturae communitate sive unitate, sicut filius imperatoris dicitur imago patris; in naturae *diversitate*, sicut imago imperatoris est in nummo ». (I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). Unitas autem *naturae* accipi potest vel ut unitas *numerica* (identitas), qualis est inter divinas personas, vel ut unitas *specifica*, qualis est inter patrem humanum eiusque filium. — His suppositis, facile intelligitur distinctio in seq. quaest. inter imaginem *connaturalem*, *naturalem* et *artificialem*. Aliter enim filius est imago naturalis sui patris, nempe in unitate specifica naturae, aliter imago naturalis Dei, nempe « in diversitate naturae » (loc. cit.); tamen est Dei imago per suam formam naturalem, quae convenientiam habet cum suo exemplari divino tum in intellectualitate naturae, tum in origine, habitudine et distinctione suarum potentiarum, quibus adumbratur personarum divinarum trinitas. Haec autem secunda convenientia praecipue a Seraphico urgetur hic et infra a. 2. q. 1. — De imagine corporali et spirituali cfr. hic ad 4. et I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

**II.** Alii commentatores plerumque de hac materia diffuse, sed sub aliis titulis, disputant I. Sent. d. 3, imprimis Dionys. Carth., ubi plura in seqq. quaestionibus tractata inveniuntur. — Alex. Hal., de hac et pluribus seqq. qq. inquirit S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 1-7. et etiam q. 55. m. 4. — Item Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica et I. Sent. d. 3. q. 9.

Hanc et seq. quaestionem alii (exceptis Petr. a Tar. et Ægid. R.) una quaestione absolvunt; S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 93. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1: (de hac et seqq. qq.) S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 71. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica n. 1. 7. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. hic q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 3. q. 10.

**III.** De 3. huius articuli quaestione sub aliis titulis tractant: S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 93. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. — Ægid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

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english:
### Article I. *In what way man is the image [of God] considered absolutely.*
### Question I. *Whether man is truly the image of God.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus and it is shown that man is truly the image of God.

1. *Fundamenta.* Genesis 1[^3]: *Let us make man to our image* etc.; this is none other than the word of the Trinity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 17[^4]: *God created man of the earth, and made him after his own image*; if therefore man was made according to the image of God, man is the image of God.

3. Likewise, that which is in the highest degree apt to be united to another is in the highest degree apt to be configured and conformed to it — for love, since it unites, is said to transform the lover into the beloved, as Hugh says[^5] — but the rational creature, such as man, is in the highest degree apt to be united to God and to tend toward him

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through love: therefore he is in the highest degree apt to be configured and assimilated to him. If therefore "image" denotes an expressed likeness, the conclusion is clear etc.

4. Likewise, that which truly represents something according to its noble act and according to distinction and order, is truly its image; but man truly represents God according to his most noble act, which is to understand — for he represents God not only inasmuch as he is being and living, but also inasmuch as he is intelligent — and again, he represents the distinction and order which is in the [divine] persons, with respect to memory, intelligence, and will[^6]: therefore man is truly the image of God.

**On the contrary:**

1. *To the opposite.* That to which something is made is not the thing itself, since nothing is made unto itself; but man was made unto the image of God, as is said in Genesis 1[^7]; therefore man is not the image [of God].

2. Likewise, wherever there is an image, there is *likeness*; wherever there is *likeness*, there is some *identity*; and wherever there is *identity*, there is *agreement* in some third thing[^8]: if therefore God and the creature do not agree in any third thing, the creature cannot be the likeness of God, and so neither the image.

3. Likewise, not every *likeness* is an image, but [only] an *expressed likeness*; but no *expressed likeness* of anything can have more that is dissimilar than what agrees: since therefore every creature is more unlike than like to God, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 15[^9], therefore no [creature] can be an expressed likeness of God: therefore none can be an image.

4. Likewise, wherever there is an image, there is configuration, for an image is considered with respect to figure[^10]; but the divine essence is in no way capable of being figured: therefore in no way can it be represented by any image: therefore no creature is the image of God.

5. Likewise, the image differs from the vestige, since the vestige represents according to a part, but the image according to the whole[^11]; but nothing finite can represent the infinite according to the whole: since therefore God is infinite, and every creature finite, no creature can be the image of God.

6. Likewise, every creature is distant from God infinitely; for God excels every [creature][^12] infinitely: therefore if an infinite distance cannot be greater, one creature is not more distant than another; likewise, neither does one approach more nearly than another: therefore either *every* creature is an image, or *none*. But *not every* one is an image: therefore *none*.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Man is truly the image of God, because he is His expressed likeness.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that "image" signifies an expressed likeness. Now it is necessary that every creature in some way[^13] be assimilated to God; it is also necessary that some [creature], for the completion of the universe, be assimilated to God *expressly*: and therefore every creature has the character of a vestige, but some [creature] has the character of an image — namely, that which is assimilated *expressly*. And this is the rational creature, namely man; and therefore it must be conceded that man is the image of God, because he is His expressed likeness.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that — *A fourfold likeness.* — there is a certain likeness through *agreement entirely in nature*, and in this way one person in the Trinity is like the other; and another through *participation in some universal nature*, as a man and an ass are assimilated in [the genus] *animal*; and another according to *proportionality*[^14], as a sailor and a charioteer agree according to the comparison with the things which they govern; and another is a likeness through *agreement in order*, as the thing exemplified is assimilated to the exemplar. — *Application to God.* In the first two modes no creature can be assimilated to God; in the second two modes every creature is assimilated; but that which is assimilated more *from afar* has the character of a vestige, while that which is assimilated *more closely* has the character of an image; and such is the rational creature, namely man.

*Conclusion.* And this is shown thus. *Proof: First, from the agreement of order.* For God wrought all things on account of Himself[^15], so that, since He is highest *power* and *majesty*, He made all things for His own *praise*; since He is highest *light*, He made all things for His own *manifestation*; since He is highest *goodness*, He made all things for His own *communication*. But there is no perfect *praise* unless there be one who approves; nor perfect *manifestation* unless there be one who understands; nor perfect *communication of goods* unless there be one who is able to use them. And since *to approve praise, to know truth, [and] to receive gifts into use* belongs only to the rational creature; therefore the irrational creatures themselves are not ordered to God immediately, but through the mediation of the rational creature. But the rational creature itself, since it is naturally able both *to praise* and *to know* and to receive other things into *the power of the will*, is naturally ordered to God immediately[^16].

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And since the more immediately something is ordered to something, the more it agrees with it in *agreement of order*; and the rational soul and every rational creature, in that "it is *capable of God* and able to be partaker of Him[^17]," is immediately ordered to Him; it agrees with Him in the highest degree in *agreement of order*. And since, the greater the agreement, the more expressed is the *likeness*; hence it is that, with respect to this kind of likeness, the rational creature is an expressed likeness, and therefore is an image. — *It is confirmed.* And this is what Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 14[^18], that "the soul is the image of God in this, that it is capable of Him and able to be partaker [of Him]." For since it is immediately ordered to Him, therefore it is *capable* of Him, or conversely; and because it is *capable*, it is naturally apt to be *configured* to Him; and on account of this it bears in itself from its origin *the light of the divine countenance*[^19]. And therefore, as regards the likeness which is considered with respect to *agreement of order*, [the rational creature] is perfectly called the image of God, because in this it is assimilated to Him *expressly*.

*Second proof.* Likewise, with respect to the likeness which is considered in the *agreement of proportionality* or *proportion*, the rational creature is expressly assimilated to God, and therefore according to it is rightly called an image. This is shown thus. For the agreement of *proportion* is considered according to *being-disposed-similarly*. *Distinction.* Now *being-disposed-similarly* can be twofold: either in comparison to *extrinsic* things, or in comparison to *intrinsic* things. And the likeness is *expressed* when there is a similar mode of being disposed not only in comparison to *extrinsic*, but in comparison to *intrinsic* things. Now one can compare the divine *essence* to the creature; one can also compare *person* to person. But every creature has a certain comparison, according to which it is in some way conformed to God, inasmuch as He is the *cause* of the creature, as is the comparison which [the creature] has to the *effect produced*. For as God produces His effect, so does the created agent, although not in every respect. But the rational creature agrees [with God] not only in this way, but also as regards the origin, order, and distinction of its *intrinsic powers*, in which it is assimilated to that distinction and order[^20] which is in the divine persons intrinsic to the divine nature. — *It is confirmed.* And in this Augustine in the book *On the Trinity*[^21] shows man to be the image of God; and this was explained in the first book, where it was shown that in the rational soul there is unity of essence with a trinity of powers ordered to one another and disposed in an almost consimilar way, as the persons in the divine [nature] are disposed. And therefore there is there an expressed likeness of proportion; and on account of this the rational creature, which is man, is the image of God.

These things being seen, the answer to the proposed question and also to the objections is clear. For it must be conceded that man is truly the image of God, as the reasons adduced for this show.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*Solution of the opposites.*

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that man is *unto the image*: therefore etc.; it must be said that it does not follow, because, when one says *made unto the image*, "image" is taken abstractly; when one says *the image of God*, "image" is taken concretely, because [man] is marked with the image of God; just as a tablet on which an image is painted, both can be called "image" and "unto the image"[^22]. So also in the matter at hand.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that there is no identity of God to the creature, therefore neither likeness; it must be said that the likeness which is in the image is *Note.* not considered through *identity*, or through *participation of the same nature*, but through *agreement in order and proportion*[^23]; and this likeness does not require communication in a third thing, because in agreement of *order* one [thing] is the likeness of the other; in agreement of *proportion* the likeness is not in one [thing], but in two comparisons.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the image is an expressed likeness; the answer is already clear, because, although there is[^24] great dissimilitude in the *absolute properties*, yet very great is the likeness in the *immediacy of order* and the *comparison of proportion*, from which and in which two [things] consists the expression of likeness which constitutes the image.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning configuration; it must be said that a bodily image requires bodily configuration, but a spiritual image is content with spiritual configuration and effigy. And this consists not in quantity of mass, but in quantity of power, namely in the [soul's] potencies, so that, just as a triangular figure has three terminals and three lines, so also in the spiritual image the potencies are in the manner of terminals, and the procession of one from another as regards its act has the manner of a line joining [them].

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the image represents according to the whole; it must be said that that is true of that image which has every-mode perfection; and in this way the Son of God alone is the image of the Father[^25]. Of the other [image] it is not true that it represents according to the whole *simply*, but it represents according to a certain *totality*. For since "the rational creature and the intellect is in some way all things[^26]," and

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all things are naturally apt to be inscribed there, and likenesses of all things to be imprinted and depicted [there]; therefore, just as the whole universe represents God in a certain *sensible totality*, so the *rational* creature represents Him in a certain *spiritual totality*; but every other irrational creature represents Him only in *part*, because [it represents Him] only according to itself, since it is not naturally apt to contain others in itself spiritually, in such a way that there be nothing which it is not apt to know. *Note.* I say this on account of the sensible soul, which, even if it knows some things, is nevertheless not naturally apt to know all things.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that every creature is distant infinitely; it must be said that this is true of that distance which is opposed to *participation* and *Note.* *adequation*. For since God is infinite, nothing can be *adequated* to Him; since He is *simple*, He cannot share any third nature with any creature. And it is not according to these [kinds of] likenesses in any way that the character of image in man is considered, but according to another twofold [likeness], namely of *order* and of *similar habitude*, according to which the rational creature is not distant infinitely from the Creator, but very nearly approaches Him, as has been shown above.

### Scholion.

**I.** In this whole distinction, which is of great moment, the created image is discussed, of which many things have already been said in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 2. and dub. 4; and concerning the difference between *vestige* and *image*, ibid. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. The uncreated image was treated in I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. and dub. 4. 5, where in the scholion to q. 1. several things were noted concerning the very character of the image. — On the character of image and likeness see also below a. 2. q. 3. at the beginning of the body. On the image in particular the Holy Doctor (I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.) says: "The image is considered according to expressed conformity to that which is imaged"; or (here in the body): "The image signifies an expressed likeness"; and below (a. 2. q. 3.): "The image consists in agreement according to configuration, and configuration is considered in origin, habitude, and distinction of powers." That this definition may be understood, it must be noted that by the term *expressed* a twofold relation which the image has to its prototype is insinuated. The first relation is that the image be *expressed from another* by some mode of production, at least according to the character of exemplary cause. Whence the Holy Doctor says (I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.): "Just as *exemplar* according to the propriety of the word signifies expression through the manner of the *active* — whence the *exemplar* is said to be that to whose imitation something is made — so on the contrary the *image* [signifies expression] through the manner of the *passive*; and *image* is said of that which expresses and imitates another." Whence on account of the defect of this condition the egg is not called an image of [another] egg, although it be most like it (S. Thomas, S. I q. 93. a. 1.). The second relation is the relation of the *likeness* itself between image and prototype, and not of any likeness whatsoever, but of an *expressed* one, i.e. "which is an expressed likeness in a certain configuration and imitation" (below a. 2. q. 3. arg. 4. ad oppos.), or through agreement in some *distinctive* and *notable* property. We said *distinctive*; "for if the likeness be only according to *genus*, or according to some common accident, on this account it is not said that something is unto the image of another" (S. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 2.). Much more does this hold of the *transcendental* properties of unity, goodness, and truth, in which general conditions every creature is like to God according to the character of the *vestige*. We said *in a notable property*, because, as Petrus a Tarantasia well observes (here q. unica, a. 2.), the likeness *in the foot* is not properly called an image, but [the likeness] *in the face*. — Now since that agreement in some property can be in many modes, several species of image are also distinguished. "*Image* is taken in two ways, according as expression is twofold, namely either in *unity* of nature, or in *diversity* of nature: in community or unity of nature, as the son of the emperor is called the image of his father; in *diversity* of nature, as the image of the emperor is on a coin" (I Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). And unity of *nature* can be taken either as *numerical* unity (identity), such as is between the divine persons, or as *specific* unity, such as is between a human father and his son. — These things being supposed, the distinction in the next question between the *connatural*, *natural*, and *artificial* image is easily understood. For in one way the son is the natural image of his father, namely in specific unity of nature; in another way [man is] the natural image of God, namely "in diversity of nature" (loc. cit.); yet he is the image of God through his natural form, which has agreement with its divine exemplar both in the intellectuality of the nature, and in the origin, habitude, and distinction of his powers, by which the trinity of the divine persons is adumbrated. And this second agreement is especially urged by the Seraphic [Doctor] here and below a. 2. q. 1. — On the bodily and spiritual image see here ad 4. and I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

**II.** The other commentators most often treat of this matter diffusely, but under other titles, in I Sent. d. 3, especially Dionysius Carthusianus, where many things are found treated in the following questions. — Alexander of Hales inquires into this and many of the following questions in S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 1-7. and also q. 55. m. 4. — Likewise Scotus, in both Scripta, here q. unica and I Sent. d. 3. q. 9.

This and the following question others (except Petrus a Tarantasia and Aegidius Romanus) settle in one question; S. Thomas, here q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 93. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1: (on this and the following qq.) S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 71. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica n. 1. 7. — Richardus a Mediavilla, II. Sent. here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. and dub. lat. 2. — Durandus, I Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 3. q. 10.

**III.** On the third question of this article they treat under other titles: S. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 93. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2.

---

la: Vers. 26.

en: Verse 26.

la: Vers. 1.

en: Verse 1.

la: *De Arrha animae*: *Qui per affectum coniungeris, in ipsius similitudinem ipsa quodammodo dilectionis societate transformaris.*

en: [Hugh of St. Victor], *De Arrha animae*: "You who are joined [to another] by affection are, by that very fellowship of love, in some way transformed into his likeness."

la: Sicut explanatum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. per totam. — Vat. *et originem, quae* pro *et ordinem, qui.*

en: As was explained in I Sent. d. 3 p. II throughout. — The Vatican [edition reads] *and origin, which* for *and order, which*.

la: Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2. ait: « *Imago* id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est ». Et V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. 9.) *similitudo* definitur rerum diversarum qualitas eadem; *identitas* autem unitas quaedam plurium in essentia.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI c. 2, says: "*An image* is that whose generation is by imitation." And *Metaphysics* V text. 16 (IV. 9.) *likeness* is defined as the same quality of diverse things; while *identity* [is] a certain unity of many in essence.

la: Cap. 11. n. 20. seqq., ubi et *similitudo* et *dissimilitudo*, quae est inter Verbum increatum et verbum creatum, inter imaginem increatam et creatam ostenditur. Cfr. lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. III. c. 3. — De maiori cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 74.

en: Cap. 11 n. 20 ff., where both the *likeness* and the *unlikeness* between the uncreated Word and the created word, between the uncreated and created image, is shown. Compare the text of the Master, I Sent. d. III c. 3. — On the major [premise] compare Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 74.

la: Hugo a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 2: *Imago* pertinet ad figuram. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem. — *Minorem* exhibet Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16. Cfr. etiam eiusdem Orationes de imaginibus, ubi et haec sententia, sicut et plura alia huc spectantia occurrunt.

en: Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I p. VI c. 2: *Image* pertains to figure. Compare here the text of the Master, c. 3 near the end. — The *minor [premise]* is supplied by [John] Damascene, *De Fide orthodoxa* IV c. 16. See also his *Orations on Images*, where this sentence is found, as also many other things bearing on this point.

la: De quo vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4.

en: On which see I Sent. d. 3 p. I q. 2 ad 4.

la: Aliqui codd. hic repetunt *creaturam*. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *Deus enim quodlibet finitum excellit in infinitum.*

en: Some codices here repeat *creaturam*. The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads]: *For God excels every finite thing infinitely.*

la: Codd. IQ *quodam modo*; bene. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 2 *autem* pro *etiam*; incongrue.

en: Codices IQ [read] *quodam modo* ("in a certain mode"); well. Then many codices with ed. 2 [read] *autem* for *etiam*; incongruously.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 *proportionem*.

en: Several codices with ed. 1 [read] *proportionem* ("proportion").

en: Proverbs 16, 4.

la: Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 44. n. 82.

en: Compare Augustine, *De Vera Religione* c. 44 n. 82.

la: August., XIV de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.

en: Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV c. 8 n. 11.

la: Cap. 8. n. 11. — Paulo superius post *similitudo expressa* non pauci codd. addunt *et imago*.

en: Cap. 8 n. 11. — A little above, after *similitudo expressa*, not a few codices add *et imago*.

la: Alluditur ad illud Ps. 4, 7: *Signatum est super nos* etc.

en: Allusion to Ps. 4, 7: *It is signed upon us* etc.

la: Cod. T (a manu suppari) bene addit *et origini*.

en: Codex T (by a contemporary hand) well adds *et origini* ("and to the origin").

la: Praesertim libr. IX. X. XIV. et XV. Cfr. lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. III. c. 2. et ibid. Comment. p. II. per totam.

en: Especially books IX, X, XIV, and XV. Compare the text of the Master, I Sent. d. III c. 2, and ibid. Commentary p. II throughout.

la: Cfr. August., XV. de Trin. c. 22. n. 43. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine et Comment. infra dub. 3.

en: Compare Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV c. 22 n. 43, and here the text of the Master, c. 3 at the end, and the Commentary below dub. 3.

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *proportionem*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] *proportionem*.

la: Vat. *etsi magna est*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *etsi magna est* ("although it is great").

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et dub. 4.

en: Compare I Sent. d. 31 p. II a. 1 q. 1 seq. and dub. 4.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.): « *Anima entia quodam modo est omnia* ». Ibid. text. 14. (c. 4.): *Potentia quodam modo est intelligibilia intellectus, sed actu nullum antequam intelligat. Oportet autem sic, ut in tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum actu* etc.

en: Aristotle, *De Anima* III text. 37 (c. 8): "*The soul in some way is all things.*" Ibid. text. 14 (c. 4): *The intellect is in potency in some way the intelligibles, but actually none [of them] before it understands. It must be so, as in a tablet on which nothing is actually written* etc.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum homo sit imago Dei naturaliter.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo sit imago Dei naturaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Fundamenta.* Quod inest alicui a sua prima origine inest ei naturaliter[^1]; sed esse imaginem Dei convenit homini a sua prima conditione: ergo est ei naturale[^2].

2. Item, quod inest omnibus communiter et

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inseparabiliter, inest naturaliter[^3]; sed esse imaginem convenit homini universaliter et inseparabiliter: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod convenit alicui secundum naturales eius proprietates convenit ei naturaliter; sed esse imaginem convenit homini secundum intrinsecas potentias et naturales: ergo convenit ei naturaliter.

4. Item, *esse imaginem Dei* non est homini accidens, sed potius substantiale, sicut *esse vestigium* nulli accidit creaturae: si ergo homo non est imago Dei naturalis, ergo non est res naturalis, sed artificialis. Si igitur hoc est plane falsum, scilicet quod homo sit artificialis: ergo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis.

5. Item, asinus artificialis non est asinus verus, ergo imago artificialis non est imago vera; sed homo est imago vera: ergo non est imago artificialis; et est artificialis vel naturalis: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. *Ad oppositum.* Hilarius in libro *de Synodo*[^4] definiens naturalem imaginem dicit: «*Imago est eius rei, ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens*»; sed homo non est species indifferens ipsius Dei: ergo non est imago naturalis.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Decem Chordis*[^5]: «*Sicut differt imago imperatoris in filio et in nummo, sic differt imago in Filio Dei et in homine*»: si igitur imago in filio imperatoris est naturalis, in nummo est artificialis, videtur, quod solus Filius Dei sit imago naturalis, homo vero solum artificialis.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. Sicut proprium est personae Filii esse filium, ita proprium est esse imaginem[^6]; sed sola persona Filii est filius naturalis, et non homo: ergo pari ratione sola persona Filii est imago naturalis, et non homo.

4. Item, quod est a voluntate non est a natura[^7]; sed productio hominis est a voluntate Dei: ergo non est a natura. Sed ab eo habet *esse imaginem*, a quo habet et *produci*: si igitur anima hominis non producitur a Deo secundum naturam, sed secundum voluntatem, non erit imago Dei naturalis, sed voluntaria.

5. Item, imago dicit imitationem et similitudinem: ergo si aliquid est imago alicuius naturalis, assimilatur cum eo in natura; sed homo cum Deo in natura assimilari non potest[^8]: ergo non potest esse eius imago naturalis.

> ### Conclusio.
> *Homo est Dei imago nec artificialis nec connaturalis, sed naturalis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum imago dicatur ab actu repraesentandi[^9] — nam *imago refertur ad prototypum*, ut dicit Damascenus[^10] — et repraesentatio dupliciter possit convenire alicui: vel per formam naturalem, vel per formam artificialem; *Duplex imago.* quod duplex est imago, naturalis scilicet et artificialis. Et cum homo non repraesentet per formam artificialem, sed per suam formam naturalem et potentias ei naturaliter inditas; *Conclusio 1.* homo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis.

*Tertia species Imaginis.* Differt autem dicere imaginem naturalem et connaturalem. Nam imago *naturalis* est, quae repraesentat per id quod habet a natura, sive cum illo quod repraesentat, conveniat in natura, sive non. Imago vero *connaturalis* dicitur, quae imitatur et refertur non solum per id quod *habet a natura*, sed per *convenientiam in eadem natura*. *Conclusio 2.* Ideo, etsi esse imaginem[^11] conveniat homini, esse tamen imaginem connaturalem non convenit homini, sed soli Filio Dei.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod homo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod Hilarius definit imaginem connaturalem, non naturalem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, dicendum, quod non intendit ponere similitudinem quantum ad naturale et artificiale, sed quantum ad convenientiam et discrepantiam in natura. Sicut enim nummus cum imperatore in natura non convenit, sed filius eius convenit; sic in proposito intelligendum est.

3. Ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod sola persona Filii est filius naturalis; dicendum, quod non est simile. *Notandum.* Aliter enim accipitur *naturale*, prout adiacet Filio, aliter, prout adiacet imagini; non enim differt dicere Filium *naturalem* et *connaturalem*, sicut differt in imagine. — *Ratio* Et ratio huius est ista: quia Filius dicit ut *a quo*, quantum est de suo principali intellectu; imago dicit ut *ad quem*. Ideo *naturale*, dictum de Filio, significat, quod egressus Filii sit per modum *naturae*, et ita, quod cum Patre conveniat in natura; sed cum dicitur imago

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*naturalis*, significatur, quod illa repraesentatio est a naturali principio sive proprietate; et propter hoc non datur intelligi, quod sit inter imaginem et eum cuius est imago, convenientia naturae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est a voluntate non est a natura; dicendum, quod verum est ex ea parte, ex qua est a voluntate; unde, cum creatura a Deo producitur voluntarie, *Notandum.* non dicitur ab eo *exire naturaliter*, sed *voluntarie*; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod voluntarie repraesentet, immo est ibi *accidens*[^12]. Quamvis enim Deus voluntarie produxerit hominem, homo tamen habet operationes naturales, quia divina voluntas fabricavit et fecit ipsam naturam; non sic autem est de voluntate artificis creati, qui naturalem formam non potest producere.

5. *Notandum.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago dicit similitudinem in natura; dicendum, quod haec determinatio *naturaliter*, addita alicui termino, qui quidem nec dicit habitudinem ut *a quo*, nec ut *ad quem*, ambiguam reddit locutionem, quia potest dicere habitudinem vel in ratione *causae*, vel in ratione *formae*[^13]. Unde haec est duplex: iste naturaliter assimilatur illi: vel ut intelligatur *causaliter*, quia assimilatur in eo quod *habet a natura*; vel ut intelligatur *formaliter*, quia assimilatur in *ipsa natura*. Primo modo accipiendo, haec est vera: homo naturaliter assimilatur Deo; secundo modo falsa; et primo modo sequitur ad hanc: homo naturaliter est imago Dei: alio vero modo non[^14].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether man is the image of God naturally.*

Secondly it is asked whether man is the image of God naturally. And that he is, seems [the case].

1. *Fundamenta.* What belongs to something from its first origin belongs to it naturally[^1]; but to be the image of God belongs to man from his first condition: therefore it is natural to him[^2].

2. Likewise, what belongs to all in common and

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inseparably belongs naturally[^3]; but to be image belongs to man universally and inseparably: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, what belongs to something according to its natural properties belongs to it naturally; but to be image belongs to man according to his intrinsic and natural potencies: therefore it belongs to him naturally.

4. Likewise, *to be the image of God* is not accidental to man, but rather substantial, as *to be a vestige* is not accidental to any creature: if therefore man is not the natural image of God, then he is not a natural thing, but artificial. If therefore this is plainly false — namely that man is artificial — therefore he is not an artificial image, but natural.

5. Likewise, an artificial ass is not a true ass; therefore an artificial image is not a true image; but man is a true image: therefore he is not an artificial image; and [it] is either artificial or natural: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Ad oppositum.* Hilary in the book *On the Synod*[^4], defining a natural image, says: «*The image is of that thing to which it is imaged, an undifferentiated species*»; but man is not an undifferentiated species of God himself: therefore he is not a natural image.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On the Ten Strings*[^5]: «*Just as the image of the emperor differs in his son and in a coin, so the image differs in the Son of God and in man*»: if therefore the image in the emperor's son is natural, and in a coin is artificial, it seems that the Son of God alone is the natural image, while man is only artificial.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *reason*. Just as it is proper to the person of the Son to be a son, so it is proper [to him] to be image[^6]; but the person of the Son alone is the natural son, and not man: therefore by parallel reasoning the person of the Son alone is the natural image, and not man.

4. Likewise, what is from will is not from nature[^7]; but the production of man is from the will of God: therefore it is not from nature. But from him from whom he has *to be produced*, from him he has *to be image*: if therefore the soul of man is not produced by God according to nature, but according to will, he will not be the natural image of God, but a voluntary one.

5. Likewise, *image* says imitation and likeness: therefore if something is the image of something natural, it is assimilated to it in nature; but man cannot be assimilated to God in nature[^8]: therefore he cannot be his natural image.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Man is the image of God neither artificial nor connatural, but natural.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since image is named from the act of representing[^9] — for the *image is referred to the prototype*, as Damascene says[^10] — and representation can belong to something in two ways, namely either through a natural form or through an artificial form; *Twofold image.* the image is twofold, namely natural and artificial. And since man does not represent through an artificial form, but through his own natural form and the potencies naturally implanted in him; *Conclusion 1.* man is not an artificial image, but a natural one.

*The third species of Image.* It is one thing, however, to say "natural image" and another to say "connatural." For an image is *natural*, which represents through that which it has from nature, whether it agree in nature with that which it represents or not. But an image is called *connatural*, which imitates and is referred not only through that which it *has from nature*, but through *agreement in the same nature*. *Conclusion 2.* Therefore, even though to be image[^11] belongs to man, yet to be a connatural image does not belong to man, but to the Son of God alone.

The reasons showing that man is not an artificial image but a natural one are therefore to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].* 1. To that which is objected on the contrary, it must be said that Hilary is defining the connatural image, not the natural one.

2. To that which is objected from Augustine, it must be said that he does not intend to set down a likeness with respect to the natural and the artificial, but with respect to agreement and discrepancy in nature. For just as a coin does not agree with the emperor in nature, but his son does agree; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To the other [objection] which is brought, that the person of the Son alone is the natural son; it must be said that there is no parallel. *Note.* For *natural* is taken otherwise as it stands beside the Son, and otherwise as it stands beside image; for it does not differ to say of the Son *natural* and *connatural*, as it differs with respect to image. — *Reason.* And the reason for this is the following: that the Son says [the mode of] *that from which*, with respect to its principal sense; image says [the mode of] *that to which*. Therefore *natural*, said of the Son, signifies that the Son's procession is through the mode of *nature*, and so that he agrees with the Father in nature; but when one says

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*natural* image, it is signified that that representation is from a natural principle or property; and on account of this it is not given to understand that there is, between the image and that of which it is the image, an agreement of nature.

4. To that which is objected, that what is from will is not from nature; it must be said that this is true on the side from which it is from will; whence, since the creature is produced by God voluntarily, *Note.* it is not said to *go forth naturally* from him, but *voluntarily*; from this, however, it does not follow that it represents voluntarily, indeed the [voluntary mode] is there [as an] *accident*[^12]. For although God voluntarily produced man, yet man has natural operations, because the divine will fabricated and made nature itself; it is not so, however, with the will of a created artisan, who cannot produce a natural form.

5. *Note.* To that which is objected, that *image* says likeness in nature; it must be said that this determination *naturally*, added to some term which neither says a relationship as *that from which* nor as *that to which*, renders the locution ambiguous, because it can say a relationship either in the manner of *cause* or in the manner of *form*[^13]. Whence this [statement] is twofold: *this is naturally assimilated to that*: either as understood *causally*, because it is assimilated in that which it *has from nature*; or as understood *formally*, because it is assimilated in *the very nature*. Taken in the first mode, this is true: *man is naturally assimilated to God*; in the second mode, false; and in the first mode there follows on this: *man is naturally the image of God*: but not in the other mode[^14].

---

la: Intellige *etsi*, quod etiam Vat. ponit.

en: Understand "etsi" ["even though"], which the Vatican edition also supplies.

la: Hic in corp. quaest.

en: See here in the body of the question.

la: Vat. *ergo inest ei naturaliter.*

en: The Vatican edition reads: *therefore it belongs to him naturally.*

la: Secundum Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 1. seq., naturale est idem apud omnes. Cfr. eius *Problem.* sect. 15. n. 3.

en: According to Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 1 sqq., the natural is what is the same with all. Cf. his *Problems* sect. 15, n. 3.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. I, q. 2, ad 4.

la: Num. 13: *Imago itaque est rei ad rem coaequandae imaginata et indiscreta similitudo.*

en: N. 13: *Image, therefore, is the imaged and undivided likeness of a thing to a thing to be made equal to it.*

la: Serm. IX. c. 8. n. 9. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 540, nota 3.

en: Sermon IX, c. 8, n. 9. See the words in vol. I, p. 540, note 3.

la: Sicut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: As was shown in I Sent. d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6. et pag. 127, nota 2.

en: See vol. I, p. 56, note 6, and p. 127, note 2.

la: Libr. IV. *de Fide orthod.* c. 16., adductis his Basilii verbis: «*imaginis honor ad exemplar transfertur*», dicit: *Exemplar porro est id cuius effigies exprimitur, ex quo forma derivatur* (πρωτότυπον δέ ἐστι τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ τὸ παράγωγον γίνεται). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 82, nota 10, ubi similia ex eiusdem *Orationibus de imaginibus* allata sunt.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* IV, c. 16, having adduced these words of Basil: «*the honor of the image is transferred to the exemplar*», says: *Furthermore the exemplar is that of which the effigy is expressed, from which the form is derived* (πρωτότυπον δέ ἐστι τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ τὸ παράγωγον γίνεται). Cf. vol. I, p. 82, note 10, where similar passages are adduced from his *Orations on the Images*.

la: In cod. F (Q a secunda manu) additur *naturalem*.

en: In codex F (Q by a second hand) the word *naturalem* is added.

la: De fallacia accidentis cfr. tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5.

en: On the fallacy of accident cf. vol. I, p. 58, note 5.

la: Codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *finis*, quod explicari potest *finis vel est extrinsecus, vel intrinsecus*; posterior coniungitur cum ipsa rei forma. — Paulo superius Vat. *sed ut ad quem* pro *nec ut ad quem*. Subinde in multis codd. et ed. 1 deest *saliter* et in paucis codd. etiam *formaliter*.

en: The codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, read *finis*, which can be explained as: *the end either is extrinsic or intrinsic*; the latter is conjoined with the very form of the thing. — A little higher up the Vatican edition reads *sed ut ad quem* for *nec ut ad quem*. Then in many codices and ed. 1 the word *[cau]saliter* is missing, and in a few codices also *formaliter*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

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license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum esse imaginem conveniat homini proprie, ita quod nulli alii.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum esse imaginem conveniat homini proprie, ita quod nulli alii. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. *Fundamenta.* In solius hominis conditione dictum est[^1]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem* etc.; sed haec est nobilissima conditio, quae si daretur aliis, nullo modo deberet praetermitti: ergo videtur, quod nulli alii quam homini *esse ad imaginem suam* Deus dederit. Quod si praetermisit de aliis, et non de homine, tunc est quaestio: quare Scriptura fecit?

2. Item, Augustinus in sermone de imagine[^2]: « Ad imaginem et similitudinem suam Deus illum creavit — loquitur de homine — quod nulli alii creaturae dedit ».

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia « quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit »[^3]; sed imago dicit similitudinem *expressissimam* in genere creaturae: ergo oportet, quod conveniat vel uni soli speciei, vel uni soli individuo.

4. Item, eo ipso homo est imago Dei, quia immediate tendit in Deum[^4]; si ergo universum est ordinatum secundum omnem sui partem, impossibile est, quod aliquae creaturae diversarum specierum ordinentur in Deum ex aequo et immediate: ergo vel homo et Angelus erunt eiusdem speciei, vel esse imaginem convenit soli homini.

5. Item, homo, eo ipso quod est imago Dei, est finis omnium aliorum[^5]; sed hoc non potest pluribus diversis specie convenire, et planum est, quod Angelo non convenit: ergo videtur, quod esse imaginem conveniat soli homini.

6. Item, quia homo est imago Dei, fuit unibilis divinae naturae[^6]; hoc autem est eius proprium: ergo proprium est homini esse Dei imaginem.

**Contra:**

1. *Fundamenta.* Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus[^7] dicit, quod « Angelus est imago Dei, manifestatio occulti luminis » etc.

2. Item, « Anima eo ipso est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest »[^8]; sed hoc competit Angelo, sicut animae: ergo non soli homini competit esse imaginem.

3. Item, ista est nobilissima omnium conditionum naturalium, videlicet esse imaginem: ergo nobilissima omnium creaturarum huiusmodi proprietatis non debuit esse expers; si igitur creatura angelica est huiusmodi[^9], patet etc.

4. Item, imago inest animae secundum superiorem partem, sicut in primo libro[^10] ostensum est; sed in illa parte homo et Angelus habent convenientiam: ergo videtur similiter, quod in dignitate imaginis conveniunt: ergo esse imaginem non est proprium solius hominis.

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> **Conclusio.** Esse imaginem Dei proprie convenit homini respectu brutorum, non tamen respectu Angelorum, cum quibus hoc est ei commune.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *proprium* dicitur dupliciter. Est enim *proprium simpliciter*, et *proprium alicui*[^11]. *Proprium simpliciter* est quod convenit omni et soli; *proprium alicui* est quod convenit omni contento sub illa specie, ita quod quibusdam aliis convenit, quibusdam vero minime; sicut esse bipedem proprie convenit homini respectu quadrupedum, non respectu volatilium. — Dicendum est igitur, quod sicut esse rationale vel intellectuale non est proprium homini *simpliciter*, quia convenit in hoc cum Angelo, sed est proprium respectu rerum corporalium; sic esse imaginem proprie convenit homini respectu brutorum, non tamen respectu Angelorum, immo communiter convenit hominibus et Angelis, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Solutio oppositorum.*

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Scriptura non exprimit; dicendum, quod Scriptura non determinat conditionem Angeli expresse; ideo non est mirum, si non determinat eius modum nec dicit, eam ad imaginem esse factam. Si autem quaeras, quare non determinat, hoc determinatum est supra, distinctione decima tertia[^12].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud Augustini dicendum, quod Augustinus non excludit creaturas spirituales, sed creaturas corporales et visibiles, quando dicit, quod nulli alii creaturae dedit. Item, hoc dicit propter aliquam proprietatem repraesentationis, quam Deus dedit homini, non alii creaturae spirituali, vel corporali, non propter rationem imaginis principalem, quae consequitur omnem naturam rationalem.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similitudo expressissima; dicendum, quod *superlativum* dupliciter potest exponi: uno modo per suum *positivum* cum *valde* adverbio, ut *albissimum*, id est valde album; et sic intelligitur, cum dicitur *ad imaginem*; et non oportet, ipsum Angelum superponi. Aliquando superlativum intelligitur *respective*, et tunc dicit excessum respectu omnium, ad quae comparatur; et hoc modo non potest convenire pluribus; et sic non accipitur in proposito[^13]. *Duplex sensus superlativi.*

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eo ipso quo est imago, est finis; dicendum, quod ista non est tota ratio; immo, quia sic est imago in anima, quod ex parte corporis cum omnibus corporalibus habet quandam convenientiam; et ideo solus homo dicitur *omnis creatura*[^14], et omnia propter ipsum quodam modo *fieri*, et ad ipsum etiam *referri*.

*Ad 5–6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de unione, dicendum, quod etsi ratio imaginis sit dispositio ad unionem, non tamen est dispositio sufficiens de se, nisi competat hoc *personali proprietati* et *culpabili infirmitati*; et hoc est reperire in homine, non in Angelo, sicut infra melius patebit in tertio[^15]. *Notandum.* Ad praesens autem sufficiat, quod quidquid sit de unibilitate, imago tamen universaliter consequitur creaturam rationalem, ita quod omnis creatura rationalis est imago Dei veraciter et naturaliter. Et ratio huius est expressio similitudinis quantum ad convenientiam ordinis, quae supra in principio quaestionis explanata fuit.

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether to be an image properly befits man, so that it befits no other.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether to be an image properly befits man, so that it befits no other. And that it does, it seems.

*On the affirmative side.*

1. *Foundations.* In the condition of man alone it was said[^1]: *Let us make man to our image* etc.; but this is the noblest condition, which, if it were given to others, ought in no way to be passed over: therefore it seems that to no other than man did God grant *to be made to his image*. But if he passed it over in regard to others and not in regard to man, then the question arises: why did Scripture do so?

2. Likewise, Augustine in his sermon *On the Image*[^2]: « To his image and likeness God created him — he is speaking of man — which he gave to no other creature ».

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason, because « what is said by way of superabundance befits one only »[^3]; but *image* signifies the *most expressed* likeness in the genus of creatures: therefore it must befit either one species only, or one individual only.

4. Likewise, by the very fact that man is the image of God, he immediately tends toward God[^4]; if therefore the universe is ordered according to every one of its parts, it is impossible that some creatures of different species be ordered to God equally and immediately: therefore either man and the Angel will be of the same species, or to be an image befits man alone.

5. Likewise, man, by the very fact that he is the image of God, is the end of all the others[^5]; but this cannot befit many things differing in species, and it is plain that it does not befit the Angel: therefore it seems that to be an image befits man alone.

6. Likewise, because man is the image of God, he was unitable to the divine nature[^6]; but this is proper to him: therefore it is proper to man to be the image of God.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Foundations.* Dionysius in *On the Divine Names*[^7] says that « the Angel is the image of God, a manifestation of the hidden light » etc.

2. Likewise, « the soul is the image of God by the very fact that it is capable of God and can be a partaker [of him] »[^8]; but this befits the Angel as well as the soul: therefore to be an image does not befit man alone.

3. Likewise, this is the noblest of all natural conditions, namely to be an image: therefore the noblest of all creatures ought not to be deprived of such a property; if therefore the angelic creature is such[^9], the rest is clear.

4. Likewise, the image is in the soul according to its higher part, as was shown in the first book[^10]; but in that part man and the Angel share a likeness: therefore it seems likewise that they share in the dignity of the image: therefore to be an image is not proper to man alone.

> **Conclusion.** To be the image of God properly befits man with respect to the brutes, not however with respect to the Angels, with whom this is common to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that *proper* is spoken of in two ways. For there is *proper simply* and *proper to something*[^11]. *Proper simply* is that which befits all and only [of a kind]; *proper to something* is that which befits everyone contained under that species, in such a way that it befits certain others and certain others not at all; just as being two-footed properly befits man with respect to four-footed creatures, not with respect to flying creatures. — It must therefore be said that, just as being rational or intellectual is not proper to man *simply*, since in this he shares with the Angel, but is proper [to him] with respect to corporeal things; so to be an image properly befits man with respect to the brutes, not however with respect to the Angels, but rather befits men and Angels in common, as the reasons adduced for this show.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

*To 1.* To that which is objected first to the contrary, that Scripture does not express it; it must be said that Scripture does not determine the condition of the Angel expressly; therefore it is no wonder if it does not determine its manner nor say that he was made to the image. But if you ask why it does not determine [this], that has been determined above, in the thirteenth distinction[^12].

*To 2.* To that of Augustine it must be said that Augustine does not exclude spiritual creatures, but corporeal and visible creatures, when he says that he gave it to no other creature. Also, he says this on account of a certain property of representation which God gave to man, not to another spiritual or corporeal creature — not on account of the principal account of *image*, which follows upon every rational nature.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is the most expressed likeness; it must be said that the *superlative* can be expounded in two ways: in one way through its *positive* with the adverb *very*, as *whitest*, that is, very white; and so it is understood when it is said *to the image*; and it is not necessary that the Angel himself be set above. Sometimes the superlative is understood *relatively*, and then it indicates excess with respect to all to which it is compared; and in this way it cannot befit many; and so it is not taken in the present case[^13]. *Twofold sense of the superlative.*

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that by the very fact that [man] is the image, he is the end; it must be said that this is not the whole account; rather, because [man] is so the image in the soul, that on the side of the body he has a certain agreement with all corporeal things; and therefore man alone is called *every creature*[^14], and all things are said in a certain manner to *be made* for his sake, and also to be *referred* to him.

*To 5–6.* To that which is objected concerning union, it must be said that even if the account of image is a disposition to union, nevertheless it is not a disposition sufficient of itself, unless this be joined to a *personal property* and to a *culpable infirmity*; and this is to be found in man, not in the Angel, as will appear better below in the third [book][^15]. *Note.* For the present, however, let it suffice that whatever may be the case concerning unitability, image nevertheless universally follows upon a rational creature, in such a way that every rational creature is the image of God truly and naturally. And the reason for this is the expression of likeness as regards the agreement of order, which was explained above at the beginning of the question.

---

en: Genesis 1:26.

la: Serm. 43. (alias *de Verbis Apostoli*, serm. 27.) c. 2. n. 3. seq., ubi recenset dona, quae homo et aliae creaturae a Deo receperunt, ac dicit: *Sed tamen amplius, quid habemus? Mentem, rationem, consilium, quod non habent bestiae, non habent volucres, non habent pisces: in eo facti sumus ad imaginem Dei... Imaginem in nobis Dei deformare potuimus, reformare non possumus. Habemus ergo, ut cuncta breviter retexamus, ipsum esse cum lignis et lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum bestiis, intelligere cum Angelis.* Cfr. Serm. 24. (alias 6. ex Sirmond.) n. 3., ubi, enumeratis ceteris creaturis, ait: *Nonne istorum omnium artifex Deus? Sed hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam fecit.*

en: Sermon 43 (alias *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 27), c. 2, n. 3 ff., where he reviews the gifts which man and other creatures have received from God, and says: *But still, what further do we have? Mind, reason, counsel — which the beasts do not have, the birds do not have, the fishes do not have: in this we were made to the image of God... We have been able to deform the image of God in us; to reform it we cannot. We have therefore, to retrace all things briefly, being itself in common with woods and stones, life with trees, sensation with beasts, understanding with Angels.* Cf. Sermon 24 (alias 6 from Sirmond), n. 3, where, having enumerated the rest of the creatures, he says: *Is not God the artisan of them all? But man he made to his own image and likeness.*

la: Aristot., V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 542, nota 2.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* V, c. 3 (c. 5). Cf. tome I, p. 542, note 2.

la: Sicut supra q. I. in corp. ostensum est.

en: As was shown above in question I, in the body.

la: Vide supra d. 13. a. 2. q. I. Cfr. etiam Ambros., Epist. 43. ad Honoratian. n. 13. seq.

en: See above, d. 13, a. 2, q. I. Cf. also Ambrose, *Letter* 43 to Honoratianus, n. 13 ff.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. q. I. seq.

en: Cf. III *Sentences*, d. 2, a. 1, q. I ff.

la: Cap. 4. § 22. Cfr. supra d. 9. *Praenotata*, ubi haec definitio Angeli exponitur.

en: Chapter 4, § 22. Cf. above, d. 9, *Praenotata*, where this definition of the Angel is expounded.

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — Circa finem arg. multi codd. cum Vat. *convenit esse* pro *competit esse*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — Near the end of the argument many codices with the Vatican edition read *convenit esse* in place of *competit esse*.

la: De quo vide supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Concerning which see above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.

en: Distinction 3, part II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1: *Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper, aut ad aliud... Est autem per se quidem proprium, quod ad omnia assignatur et ab omni separat... ad aliquod autem, quod non ab omni, sed ab aliquo statuto determinat.* — Cod. B. *et proprium secundum quid vel alicui.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* V, c. 1: *The proper is assigned either per se and always, or in relation to another... per se proper is what is assigned to all and separates [it] from all; relative [proper] is what determines not from all, but from some fixed [subject].* — Codex B: *and proper in a certain respect or to something.*

en: Article 1, question 1, reply to 2.

la: Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *materiales.*

en: Some codices with edition 1 read *materiales.*

la: Prisician., III. Grammat. c. 3: *Superlativum est, quod vel ad plures sui generis comparatum superponitur omnibus, vel per se prolatum, intellectum habet cum* valde *adverbio positivi, ut fortissimus fuit Graecorum Achilles, i. e. fortis super omnes Graecos; sin autem dicam: fortissimus Hercules fuit, non adiiciens quorum, intelligo valde fortis.* Tale est apud Ciceronem pro Marco Marcello: *simillimum Deo iudico*, pro *valde similem Deo.* — Vat. *supponi* pro *superponi.* — Nota, quod S. Doctor ad 4. arg. non respondet; sed solutionis principia data sunt hic in fundam. 2, 4, et q. 1. et supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2, q. 2 in corp. et ad 2.

en: Priscian, *Grammar* III, c. 3: *The superlative is that which, compared with more of its own kind, is set above them all, or, taken by itself, has the sense of the positive with the adverb* very, *as "Achilles was the bravest of the Greeks," i.e. brave above all the Greeks; but if I say "Hercules was bravest," not adding "of whom," I understand "very brave."* Such is the usage in Cicero, *Pro Marco Marcello*: *I judge him most like to God*, for *very like to God.* — The Vatican edition reads *supponi* for *superponi.* — Note that the holy Doctor does not respond to the 4th argument; but the principles of the solution are given here in *Fundamenta* 2, 4, and q. 1, and above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, in the body and in the reply to 2.

la: Gregor., in Evang. homil. 29. n. 2: *Sed omnis creaturae nomine signatur homo.*

en: Gregory, *Homilies on the Gospels* 29, n. 2: *But by the name of "every creature" man is signified.* ---

translators_notes:
**Cross-chunk footer hand-off (resolved this session):** p.398 L footers 4 (Gen. 1, 26) and 5 (Serm. 43 / *de Verbis Apostoli* serm. 27) were forwarded from `d16-a1-q2` (per that chunk's Notes) and anchor here as [^1] and [^2] in *Fundamenta* args 1 and 2 of this q3 body. p.398 L footers 1–3 already consumed by d16-a1-q2 ([^12]–[^14] there). p.398 R footers 6–13 anchor wholly in q3 *Fundamenta* args 3–6 + *Contra* args 1–4. p.399 L footers 1–4 = [^11]–[^14]; p.399 R footers 5–7 = [^15] plus apparatus stragglers consolidated into [^15] as the Gregory *omnis creatura* gloss.

**Apparatus renumbering:** the chunk uses fresh per-chunk numbering [^1]–[^15] (not continuing the q2 sequence) per the locked Vol II convention (each Tier-2 quaestio starts at [^1]).

**`has_scholion: false`** — q3 has no scholion of its own. Per the locked Vol II sibling-shared-scholion pattern (see CLAUDE.md Vol II Override step 5 + d16-a1-q1 Notes), the doctrinal scholion for Article I lives in `d16-a1-q1` SCHOLION I (the substantial note on the *imago naturalis / connaturalis / artificialis* trichotomy, which covers all three questions of this article). The printed page 399 carries no SCHOLION after the q3 *explanata fuit.* close — ARTICULUS II opens directly.

**Forward hand-off to d16-a2-q1:** none — ARTICULUS II opens on p.399 R band 1 bottom with its own opener (`Consequenter quaeritur de imagine secundum considerationem relatam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.` + 3-question sub-divisio folded into q1 per Vol II Override step 5). p.399 R footer 8 (*Multi codd. cum ed. 2 hic activa, sed infra in ipsa quaestione affectiva.*) anchors in d16-a2-divisio/q1's TRACTATIO sub-divisio listing; does not migrate here.

**Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention:** *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.* (×2 — once at affirmative-side opener as the printed gutter marginal, once at Contra opener), *Conclusio.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Duplex sensus superlativi.* (gutter at *Ad 3* in p.399 R band 0), *Notandum.* (gutter at *Ad 5–6* in p.399 R band 1).

**No `[?]` flags** — all 15 anchors + 7 marginal labels crisp at 450 dpi across pp.398–399.