title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 638 -->

### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De ordine caritatis.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum ordo sit in caritate respectu diligibilium.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ordo sit in caritate respectu diligibilium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Canticorum secundo[^p638-1]: *Ordinavit in me caritatem*; sed ordo caritatis non attenditur nisi in diligendo: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Doctrina christiana*[^p638-2] dicit, quod «primo diligendus est Deus, qui est *supra nos*, secundo, quod *nos* sumus, tertio, quod *iuxta nos*, quarto, quod *infra nos*»: ergo secundum hoc patet, quod ordo est in caritate respectu diligendorum. Constat enim, quod illa non ordinantur ad invicem secundum ordinem temporis, sed secundum ordinem excellentiae et dignitatis.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritate Ambrosii, qui assignat in littera[^p638-3] ordinem caritatis in diligendo: si ergo recte, videtur, quod ordo sit ponendus in caritate respectu eorum quae ex caritate diliguntur.

4. Item, hoc videtur *ratione*: caritatis est rectificare affectum[^p638-4]; sed affectus non est rectus, nisi praeponat maius bonum minori bono, et hoc dicit ordinem: ergo in caritate ponendus est ordo.

5. Item, caritas diligit plura diligibilia; aut ergo *aeque primo*, aut *non aeque primo*. Non *aeque primo*; hoc constat, cum caritas habitus sit unus[^p638-5], et unus habitus unum principale habet obiectum. Si *non aeque primo*: ergo unum per prius, et alterum per posterius: ergo est ibi necessarius ordo.

6. Item, magis competit ordo amori deliberativo quam naturali; sed videmus, amorem naturalem ordinatum esse respectu diligibilium[^p638-6]: ergo multo fortius videtur esse circa amorem deliberativum. Sed talis est amor caritatis: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Ordo praesupponit distinctionem[^p638-7]: ergo ubi non est distinctio, ibi non est ordo; sed caritas respectu diversorum diligibilium non est distincta nec multiplicata: ergo nec respectu eorundem erit ordinata.

2. Item, ubicumque est ordo, ibi est proportio; sed diligibilium ex caritate nulla est proportio, quia nulla est proportio creati ad increatum[^p638-8], modica, vel nulla est proportio corporis ad spiritum: ergo si non est ordo vel proportio inter diligibilia, videtur, quod caritas respectu eorum non sit ordinata.

3. Item, ordo maxime spectat ad cognitionem, quia «sapientis est ordinare[^p638-9]»: ergo si non ponitur ordo in cognitione respectu cognoscendorum, multo minus debet poni ordo in caritate respectu diligendorum. *Si tu dicas*, quod immo ordo est in scientiis; *obiicitur* de ipsa fide, quae est habitus cognitivus, qua etiam creduntur diversi articuli, se invicem excedentes secundum gradum et dignitatem, sicut illi qui sunt de divinitate, excellentiores sunt, quam illi qui sunt de humanitate[^p638-10]: si ergo non ponitur ordo in fide respectu credibilium, non debet poni ordo in caritate respectu diligibilium.

4. Item, sicut in fide una est ratio credendi, scilicet summa Veritas, sic in caritate una est ratio diligendi, videlicet summa Bonitas[^p638-11]; sed propter unicam rationem credendi fides omnibus articulis assentit aequaliter: ergo pari ratione videtur de caritate, quod et ipsa omnia diligenda debeat aequaliter diligere.

5. Item, caritas naturali quadam inclinatione inclinat ad diligendum bonum: si ergo ipsa est habitus unus et idem, et «idem, manens idem, semper est natum facere idem[^p638-12]» in his quae naturaliter

<!-- page 639 -->

inclinant ad aliquid: videtur ergo, quod caritas omnino uniformiter et aequaliter moveat ad amandum omne diligibile.

6. Item, si ordo attenditur in caritate, aut attenditur quantum ad *habitum*, aut quantum ad *actum*. Quantum ad *habitum* non; constat, cum ille sit unus et idem. Si quantum ad *actum*: ergo videtur, quod in dormiente non sit caritas ordinata, cum in eo non exerceat actum suum.

Est igitur quaestio, penes quid attendatur ordo in caritate; et quare magis attendatur ordo in ipsa quam in alia virtute, cum omnis virtus, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae[^p638-13], sit «amor ordinatus»; et rursus, cum circa omne bonum sit modus, species et ordo; cur potius caritas dicitur *ordinata* quam *modificata*?

### CONCLUSIO.

> Caritas ordinata est respectu eorum quae sunt ex caritate diligenda.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod caritas est *vinculum ligans*, iuxta illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Colossenses tertio[^p639-1], ubi vocat eam *vinculum perfectionis*; et Dionysius in capitulo quarto de Divinis Nominibus dicit, quod «amor est virtus unitiva». Unde cum amor caritatis sit amor maxime liberalis, multa circumplectitur et in unum colligit. Unde caritas non tantum unit fini eum, in quo est, sed etiam quodam modo ligat ei quod natum est ad eundem finem pervenire.

Nec tantum est caritas vinculum ligans, sed etiam *pondus inclinans*; «quod enim est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus[^p639-2]». Quoniam igitur unumquodque per suum pondus habet ordinari, et caritas pondus est et aequa ponderatrix: hinc est, quod ipsi caritati maxime competit ratio *ordinis*. Et quoniam ipsa est *vinculum ligans et circumplectens multa*; ideo non tantum ordinat ipsum diligentem in *finem*, sed etiam ad[^p639-4] *ipsa dilecta*, secundum quod ratio diligendi et ipse habitus caritatis diversimode comparatur ad illa. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, caritatem esse ordinatam respectu eorum quae sunt ex caritate diligenda.

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur, quod ordo praesupponit distinctionem; dicendum, quod ordo attenditur in caritate ratione *habitus relati ad actum et obiectum*. Quamvis autem in caritate non sit distinctio ex parte *habitus*, est tamen distinctio ex parte ipsorum *diligendorum* et ex parte *actuum*, ratione cuius diversitatis *mandata* caritatis habent multiplicari, et ipsa *caritas* habet ordinari[^p639-5].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi est ordo, ibi est proportio; dicendum, quod *proportio* dupliciter accipitur: *stricte* et *large*. Si *stricte* dicatur proportio, sic dicit quandam commensurationem et est rerum eiusdem generis; et hoc modo non habet veritatem praedicta propositio, quod ubicumque est ordo, ibi sit proportio. Si vero accipiatur *large*, ut dicatur proportio quaecumque habitudo, quae attenditur secundum convenientiam analogiae: hoc modo *proportio* est boni creati ad increatum, et etiam *ordo* secundum rationem causalitatis et primitatis[^p639-6]. Finis enim dignior est et excellentior et praeponitur his quae sunt ad finem, et quantum ad hoc attenditur ordo in caritate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordo maxime videtur spectare ad actum cognitivae, cum sapientis sit ordinare; responderi potest primo *distinguendo*, quod duplex est ordo: *quidam* partium in toto et rerum in universo, *quidam* vero eorum quae sunt in finem ad ipsum finem[^p639-3]. Et quamvis primus ordo principaliter sit circa *cognitionem*, secundus tamen principalius consistit circa *affectionem et dilectionem*, cuius est in finem inclinare. Ordo autem caritatis attenditur per comparationem ad finem; et ideo non est simile de ipsa et de habitu cognitivae.

Aliter potest dici, quod ordo in habitu attenditur per comparationem ad actum et obiectum, sicut prius dictum est. Quoniam igitur summa Bonitas aliter et aliter habet comparari diversis diligibilibus

<!-- page 640 -->

et ab eis habet participari secundum plus et minus, ut patet in corpore et spiritu[^p640-1]; hinc est, quod amor caritatis dicitur *ordinatus*. Per hunc etiam modum, si quis habitus cognitivus consideret aliqua, in quibus sit maior et minor veritatis evidentia, utique in tali habet reperiri ordo, sicut prior est scientia principiorum quam conclusionum[^p640-2]; et sic potest ad illud responderi *per interemptionem*. Et si *obiiciat* de fide, dicendum, quod non est simile: omnes enim articuli ad summam Veritatem uniformiter comparantur, secundum quod a fide creduntur. Fides enim in credendo omnes articulos assentit primae Veritati, tanquam dictanti et asserenti; ideo uniformiter et aequaliter omnes illos credit[^p640-3].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una est ratio diligendi in caritate, sicut una ratio credendi in fide; dicendum, quod etsi una sit, non tamen sic uniformiter habet comparari ipsa Caritas ad diligibilia, sicut ipsa Veritas ad credibilia; plus enim est optabilis ipsa summa Bonitas Deo quam nobis, et spiritui nostro quam corpori[^p640-4]; ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem, manens idem, natum est facere idem; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de eo quod naturaliter inclinatur[^p640-5], tam ratione sui quam ratione sibi adiuncti, et hoc respectu eiusdem obiecti. Nam secundum diversitatem obiectorum fit diversificatio operationum[^p640-6]; unde sol amplius illuminat crystallum, quam illuminet lapidem vel lignum; utrumque autem horum deficit in caritate. Nam ipsa caritas regitiva est ipsius voluntatis et simul cum illa habet moveri, quae quidem voluntas voluntarie inclinatur ad ipsa volita. Praeterea, unum obiectorum est magis amabile quam reliquum, sicut unum corpus est magis illuminabile quam aliud et ab eodem lumine magis illustratur[^p640-7].

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, utrum attendatur[^p640-8] quantum ad habitum, aut quantum ad actum; dicendum, quod attenditur quantum ad *habitum comparatum*. Unde quamvis habitus caritatis sit unus, tamen dicitur *ordinatus*, etiam si non sit in actu, quia habilitat animam ad hoc, ut ordinate moveatur; unde iustus dormiens dicitur habere caritatem ordinatam. — Ex his autem, quae dicta sunt, patet, quare caritas magis dicitur *ordinata* quam virtus alia, magis etiam dicitur *ordinata* quam *modificata*. Hoc enim est, quia proprium est ipsius simul habere rationem *vinculi ligantis* et *ponderis inclinantis*; pondus autem ordini correspondet[^p640-9].

english:
### SOLE ARTICLE. *On the order of charity.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether there is an order in charity with respect to the things to be loved.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether there is an order in charity with respect to the things able to be loved. And that there is, it seems.

1. Song of Songs, chapter two[^p638-1]: *He has set charity in order within me*; but the order of charity is observed only in loving: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine*[^p638-2] says that «first God is to be loved, who is *above us*; second, that which *we* are; third, that which is *beside us*; fourth, that which is *beneath us*»: therefore from this it is plain that there is an order in charity with respect to the things to be loved. For it is established that these are not ordered to one another according to the order of time, but according to the order of excellence and dignity.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the authority of Ambrose, who assigns in the text[^p638-3] an order of charity in loving: if therefore he does so rightly, it seems that an order must be posited in charity with respect to those things which are loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, this seems to follow *by reason*: it belongs to charity to rectify the affection[^p638-4]; but the affection is not right unless it sets the greater good before the lesser good, and this expresses an order: therefore an order must be posited in charity.

5. Likewise, charity loves many things able to be loved; either, then, *equally primarily*, or *not equally primarily*. Not *equally primarily*; this is established, since charity is a single habit[^p638-5], and a single habit has a single principal object. If *not equally primarily*: therefore one is prior, and the other posterior: therefore there is a necessary order there.

6. Likewise, an order belongs more to deliberative love than to natural love; but we see that natural love is ordered with respect to the things able to be loved[^p638-6]: therefore much more strongly does it seem to be so concerning deliberative love. But the love of charity is of this kind: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Order presupposes distinction[^p638-7]: therefore where there is no distinction, there is no order; but charity with respect to the diverse things able to be loved is not distinct nor multiplied: therefore neither will it be ordered with respect to them.

2. Likewise, wherever there is order, there is proportion; but among the things loved out of charity there is no proportion, because there is no proportion of the created to the uncreated[^p638-8], and the proportion of body to spirit is slight or none: therefore if there is no order or proportion among the things able to be loved, it seems that charity is not ordered with respect to them.

3. Likewise, order pertains most of all to cognition, because «it belongs to the wise man to order[^p638-9]»: therefore if no order is posited in cognition with respect to the things to be known, much less should an order be posited in charity with respect to the things to be loved. *If you say* that on the contrary there is order in the sciences; *it is objected* concerning faith itself, which is a cognitive habit, by which also the diverse articles are believed, exceeding one another according to degree and dignity, as those which concern the divinity are more excellent than those which concern the humanity[^p638-10]: if therefore no order is posited in faith with respect to the things to be believed, no order should be posited in charity with respect to the things able to be loved.

4. Likewise, just as in faith there is one ground of believing, namely the supreme Truth, so in charity there is one ground of loving, namely the supreme Goodness[^p638-11]; but on account of the single ground of believing, faith assents equally to all the articles: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems with regard to charity that it too ought to love all the things to be loved equally.

5. Likewise, charity by a certain natural inclination inclines to loving the good: if therefore it is one and the same habit, and «the same, remaining the same, is always apt to do the same[^p638-12]» in those things which naturally

incline toward something: it seems therefore that charity moves altogether uniformly and equally to loving every thing able to be loved.

6. Likewise, if an order is observed in charity, either it is observed as regards the *habit*, or as regards the *act*. As regards the *habit*, no; this is established, since the habit is one and the same. If as regards the *act*: then it seems that in one who is asleep charity is not ordered, since in him it does not exercise its act.

There is therefore a question: by what is order observed in charity; and why is an order observed in it more than in another virtue, since every virtue, as Augustine says in the book *On the Morals of the Church*[^p638-13], is «ordered love»; and again, since concerning every good there is *measure, species, and order*; why is charity called *ordered* rather than *measured*?

### CONCLUSION.

> Charity is ordered with respect to those things which are to be loved out of charity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that charity is a *binding bond*, according to that which the Apostle says to the Colossians, chapter three[^p639-1], where he calls it the *bond of perfection*; and Dionysius in chapter four of *On the Divine Names* says that «love is a unitive power». Hence, since the love of charity is a most liberal love, it embraces many things and gathers them into one. Hence charity not only unites to the end him in whom it is, but also in a certain way binds to him that which is apt to attain to the same end.

Nor is charity only a binding bond, but also an *inclining weight*; for «what weight is in bodies, that love is in spirits[^p639-2]». Since therefore each thing is ordered through its own weight, and charity is a weight and an even balancer: hence it is that the formal character of *order* belongs most of all to charity. And since it is a *bond binding and embracing many things*, therefore it not only orders the one loving toward the *end*, but also toward[^p639-4] the *things loved themselves*, according as the ground of loving and the habit of charity itself are compared in diverse ways to them. — Therefore the reasons showing that charity is ordered with respect to those things which are to be loved out of charity are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that order presupposes distinction; it must be said that order is observed in charity by reason of the *habit related to act and object*. For although in charity there is no distinction on the part of the *habit*, there is nevertheless distinction on the part of the *things to be loved* themselves and on the part of the *acts*, by reason of which diversity the *commandments* of charity must be multiplied, and charity itself must be ordered[^p639-5].

2. To that which is objected, that where there is order, there is proportion; it must be said that *proportion* is taken in two ways: *strictly* and *broadly*. If proportion is said *strictly*, then it expresses a certain commensuration and is of things of the same genus; and in this way the aforesaid proposition does not hold true, that wherever there is order, there is proportion. But if it is taken *broadly*, so that proportion is called any relation observed according to the agreement of analogy: in this way there is *proportion* of the created good to the uncreated, and also *order* according to the formal character of causality and priority[^p639-6]. For the end is more worthy and more excellent and is set before those things which are toward the end, and as regards this an order is observed in charity.

3. To that which is objected, that order seems to pertain most of all to the act of the cognitive power, since it belongs to the wise man to order; it can be answered first by *distinguishing* that order is twofold: *one* of the parts in a whole and of things in the universe, and *another* of those things which are toward the end with respect to the end itself[^p639-3]. And although the first order is principally about *cognition*, the second consists more principally about *affection and love*, whose office it is to incline toward the end. But the order of charity is observed by comparison to the end; and therefore the case of charity and of the cognitive habit is not alike.

Otherwise it can be said that order in the habit is observed by comparison to act and object, as was said before. Since therefore the supreme Goodness is compared in one way and another to the diverse things able to be loved

and is participated by them according to more and less, as is plain in body and spirit[^p640-1]; hence it is that the love of charity is called *ordered*. By this manner too, if any cognitive habit considers certain things in which there is greater and lesser evidence of truth, certainly in such a one an order can be found, just as the science of principles is prior to that of conclusions[^p640-2]; and thus that objection can be answered *by removal*. And if one *objects* concerning faith, it must be said that the case is not alike: for all the articles are compared uniformly to the supreme Truth, according as they are believed by faith. For faith in believing assents to all the articles as to the first Truth, as to one dictating and asserting; therefore it believes them all uniformly and equally[^p640-3].

4. To that which is objected, that there is one ground of loving in charity, just as one ground of believing in faith; it must be said that although it be one, nevertheless Charity itself is not compared so uniformly to the things able to be loved as Truth itself is to the things able to be believed; for the supreme Goodness itself is more desirable for God than for us, and for our spirit than for our body[^p640-4]; therefore the case is not alike on the one side and the other.

5. To that which is objected, that the same, remaining the same, is apt to do the same; it must be said that this holds true of that which is naturally inclined[^p640-5], both by reason of itself and by reason of what is joined to it, and this with respect to the same object. For according to the diversity of objects there comes about a diversification of operations[^p640-6]; hence the sun illumines crystal more than it illumines stone or wood; but each of these falls short in charity. For charity itself is the ruler of the will itself and must be moved together with it, which will indeed is voluntarily inclined toward the things willed themselves. Moreover, one of the objects is more lovable than the other, just as one body is more illuminable than another and is more brightly lit by the same light[^p640-7].

6. To that which is objected lastly, whether it is observed[^p640-8] as regards the habit, or as regards the act; it must be said that it is observed as regards the *habit compared*. Hence although the habit of charity be one, nevertheless it is called *ordered*, even if it be not in act, because it disposes the soul to this, that it be moved in an ordered way; hence the just man asleep is said to have ordered charity. — From these things which have been said, it is plain why charity is called *ordered* more than another virtue, and is also called *ordered* more than *measured*. For this is because it is proper to it to have at once the formal character of a *binding bond* and of an *inclining weight*; but weight corresponds to order[^p640-9].

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Libr. I. c. 23. n. 22. — De ordine *temporis* et *dignitatis* cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Priori*, et V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. II.).

en: Book I, c. 23, n. 22. — On the order of *time* and of *dignity* cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On the Prior*, and *Metaphysics* V, text 16 (IV, c. II).

la: Hic c. 2. Loco nominis *Ambrosius* rectius haberetur *Origenes*. — Inferius post *recte* Vat. supplet *assignat*.

en: Here c. 2. In place of the name *Ambrose* one would more rightly have *Origen*. — Below, after *rightly*, the Vatican edition supplies *assigns*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. I. et pag. 596, nota 7.

en: Cf. above d. 27 a. I q. I and p. 596, note 7.

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2, ubi etiam alia tanguntur, quae hic proponuntur.

en: See above d. 27 a. I q. 2, where also other things are touched on which are proposed here.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 7. et 12.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 7 and 12.

la: Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Priori*. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. I. ordinem sic definit: *Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.* — De *minori* cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2.

en: See Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On the Prior*. Augustine, *City of God* XIX, c. 13, n. I, defines order thus: *Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things assigning to each its own place.* — On the *lesser* cf. above d. 27 a. I q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 9, nota I. — Edd. *creati enim ad increatum modica vel nulla est proportio, nec corporis ad spiritum*.

en: Cf. above p. 9, note I. — The editions read *for of the created to the uncreated there is slight or no proportion, nor of body to spirit*.

la: Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 685, nota I. — Mox post *multo minus* multi codd. nec non edd. perperam addunt *non*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, c. 2. Cf. vol. I, p. 685, note I. — Soon after *much less* many codices and also editions wrongly add *not*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 25. dub. I.

en: Cf. above d. 25, dub. I.

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. De *fide* cfr. d. 24. a. I. q. 2. — In Conclus. pro *diligenda* codd. T U V exhibent *diligibilia*.

en: See above d. 27 a. I q. 2. On *faith* cf. d. 24 a. I q. 2. — In the Conclusion, for *to be loved* codices T U V give *able to be loved*.

la: Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 383, nota 8. — Quod caritas sit *habitus unus*, ostensum est supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2; — Pro *idem, et idem, manens* Vat. cum pluribus codd. *idem manens*.

en: Aristotle, on whom see above p. 383, note 8. — That charity is *a single habit* was shown above d. 27 a. I q. 2; — For *the same, and the same, remaining* the Vatican edition with several codices reads *remaining the same*.

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 24; sed cfr. IV. supra pag. 173, nota I. — In seq. propos. respici videtur illud August., de *Genesi ad litteram* (de Natura boni, c. 3): *Haec ergo tria: modus, species, ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis, sive in spiritu, sive in corpore... Haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt, ubi parva sunt, parva bona sunt, ubi nulla sunt, nullum bonum est.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. q. I. seqq.

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 24; but cf. IV above p. 173, note I. — In the following proposition there seems to be a reference to that of Augustine, in *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 3: *These three, then — measure, species, order — are as it were general goods in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body... These three, where they are great, are great goods; where they are small, are small goods; where they are none, there is no good.* Cf. II Sent. d. 35 a. 2 q. I and following.

la: Vers. 14. — Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 12.

en: Verse 14. — Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 12.

la: Secundum August., de quo videsis supra pag. 289, nota 5. In libro de Natura et dignit. amoris (inter opera Bernardi), c. I. dicuntur haec: *Est quippe amor vis animae, naturali quodam pondere ferens eam in locum vel finem suum. Omnis enim creatura, sive spiritualis sive corporea, et certum habet locum, quo naturaliter fertur, et naturale quoddam pondus, quo fertur. Pondus enim, ut aliquidam unus philosophus (August., XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10; Enarrat. 8. in Ps. 89. n. 10.), non semper fert ad ima: ignem sursum, aqua deorsum, et de ceteris. Nam et hominem agit pondus suum, naturaliter spiritum ferens sursum, corpus deorsum, unumquodque in locum vel finem suum* etc.

en: According to Augustine, on whom see above p. 289, note 5. In the book *On the Nature and Dignity of Love* (among the works of Bernard), c. I, these things are said: *Love indeed is a force of the soul, bearing it by a certain natural weight into its place or end. For every creature, whether spiritual or corporeal, both has a fixed place to which it is naturally borne, and a certain natural weight by which it is borne. For weight, as a certain philosopher [says] (Augustine, Confessions XIII, c. 9, n. 10; Enarration 8 on Ps. 89, n. 10), does not always bear toward the depths: fire upward, water downward, and so of the rest. For a man too is driven by his own weight, naturally bearing the spirit upward, the body downward, each into its own place or end,* etc.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. I. q. 3. in corp. — Superius pro *actum cognitivae* cod. aa *actum cognitionis*, codd. A K *actum scientiae cognitivae*. Deinde pro *quidam vero eorum* cod. A *quidam vero respectu eorum*. In fine huius primae respons. pro *de habitu cognitivae* codd. A K *de habitu cognitivo*, cod. aa *de habitu cognitionis*.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 44 a. I q. 3 in the body. — Above, for *the act of the cognitive [power]* codex aa reads *the act of cognition*, codices A K read *the act of cognitive science*. Then for *but some indeed of these* codex A reads *but some indeed with respect to these*. At the end of this first reply, for *of the cognitive habit* codices A K read *of the cognitive [power]*, codex aa *of the habit of cognition*.

la: In Vat. deest *ad*. Paulo inferius pro *comparatur* cod. U *comparantur*.

en: In the Vatican edition *ad* is lacking. A little below, for *is compared* codex U reads *are compared*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad I. et 2.

en: Cf. above d. 27 a. I q. 2, ad I and 2.

la: Vide supra d. I. a. I. q. I. ad I. Cfr. etiam Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 24. seqq. (c. I.), et II. de General. et corrupt. text. 37. (c. II.). Idem ait III. Topic. c. I: *Trinis iis quae sunt ad finem eligibilior videtur esse.* — Pro *primitatis* cod. Z *prioritatis*. Superius pro *ibi sit proportio* codd. A K U *ibi est proportio*.

en: See above d. I a. I q. I ad I. Cf. also Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 24 ff. (c. I), and *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 37 (c. II). The same author says in *Topics* III, c. I: *Among those things which are toward the end, the more eligible seems to be...* — For *priority* [primitatis] codex Z reads *priority* [prioritatis]. Above, for *there is proportion there* [sit] codices A K U read *there is proportion there* [est].

la: Vide supra d. 28. q. 4. in corp. et ad 4.

en: See above d. 28 q. 4 in the body and ad 4.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Priori*, et I. Poster. c. 1. 2. — Locutio *per interemptionem* idem dicit ac *per negationem*; cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On the Prior*, and *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 1, 2. — The expression *by removal* says the same as *by negation*; cf. vol. I, p. 87, note 4.

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. et d. 24. a. I. q. 2. — Pro *ideo* cod. Z *unde*.

en: See above d. 23 a. I q. 3 and d. 24 a. I q. 2. — For *therefore* codex Z reads *whence*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. et d. 28. q. 4. — Cod. Z adiicit *nostro*.

en: Cf. above d. 27 a. I q. 2 and d. 28 q. 4. — Codex Z adds *our*.

la: Edd. *inclinat*.

en: The editions read *inclines*.

la: Ut docet Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. — Cod. Z *fit diversitas actionum* et aliquanto inferius pro *simul cum illa* cum codd. A K *simul cum ipsa*.

en: As Aristotle teaches, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4). Cf. vol. II, p. 561, note 3. — Codex Z reads *there comes a diversity of actions*, and somewhat below, for *together with it* with codices A K *together with the same*.

la: Codd. B D O *illuminatur*. Pro *magis* codd. A K bb *amplius*.

en: Codices B D O read *is illuminated*. For *more* codices A K bb read *more abundantly*.

la: Supple cum cod. U *ordo*, vel cum edd. *ordo in caritate*. Mox post *ad actum* edd. addunt *et obiectum* et dein omittunt *comparatum ad actum et obiectum*. Pro *comparatum* cod. F substituit *per relationem*.

en: Supply with codex U *order*, or with the editions *order in charity*. Soon after *as regards the act* the editions add *and the object*, and then omit *compared as regards act and object*. For *compared* codex F substitutes *by relation*.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 828, nota 5. — Paulo ante pro *proprium* cod. A *proprietas*.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 828, note 5. — A little before, for *proper* codex A reads *a property*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum motus caritatis sit duplex: interior in *affectu* et exterior in *effectu*, et affectus se habeat ad effectum ut eius principium; atque dubitatum fuerit respectu affectus, utrum dilectio proximi habeat ordinem: ideo ordo caritatis in hac tota distinctione consideratur principaliter secundum affectum (cfr. infra q. 6. et q. 3. ad 6.). Porro ordo «includit in se aliquem modum prioris et posterioris»; et «prius et posterius dicitur secundum relationem ad aliquod principium» (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 26. a. I.). Cum autem principium dilectionis sub diverso respectu sit duplex, scilicet Deus ut ratio motiva, et ipse diligens (ibid. a. 6.); hinc recte S. Bonav. (infra q. 5, et cfr. dub. 3. 4.) duplicem distinguit ordinem in caritate: «*unus*, qui ei competit secundum *se ipsam*; et iste ordo attenditur penes bonum et magis bonum et maxime bonum... *Alius* vero est ordo, qui competit ei ratione *naturae substratae*; et hic attenditur secundum has differentias, quae sunt *proprium* et *alienum*, *propinquum* et *extraneum*». — Observatione dignum est etiam quod infra q. 6. dicitur de triplici *affectu* et *effectu*, et quod II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. dictum est de triplici modo magis aliquem diligendi.

De hac (I.) quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I; S. loc. cit. a. I; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic q. I. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** In conclusione et solutione obiectorum magistri satis conveniunt.

**III.** Circa sequentem (2.) quaestionem nulla potest esse controversia respectu supernaturalis caritatis, cuius ratio motiva est ipsum divinum et infinitum bonum. Sed respectu naturalis dilectionis Dei, duplex fuit opinio, ut notat S. Thom. (hic n. 4.). Prima igitur opinio, quam sequuntur Ss. Thom. et Bonav. (hic ad I, infra q. 3. ad 3, et II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. I.) ac Scot. (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica n. 13.), docet, quod in statu naturae institutae sive ante lapsum «etiam amore amicitiae naturaliter Deus ab homine plus se ipso diligitur. Et quia caritas naturam perficit, ideo etiam secundum caritatem Deum super se ipsum diligit et super omnia alia particularia bona» (S. Thom., loc. cit.). Idem (ibid.) pro hac assertione affert hoc generale principium, quod «etiam naturali amore pars plus tendit ad conservationem sui totius quam sui ipsius. Unde etiam naturaliter animal opponit brachium ad defensionem capitis, ex quo pendet salus totius» (cfr. Sum. loc. cit. a. 3, et Durand., hic q. 2, qui diffuse de his disputat). — Alia vero opinio utitur hic distinctione inter amorem concupiscentiae et amorem benevolentiae sive amicitiae, et tenet, quod amore benevolentiae homo naturaliter plus diligat se quam Deum, quia magis appetit esse et conservari bonum proprium quam divinum; quod autem amore concupiscentiae possit amare plus Deum quam se, quatenus bonum divinum sit magis expetendum et delectabile quam proprium. Durandus insuper recenset et refutat alios, qui dicunt generaliter, «quod naturali dilectione homo debet diligere se ipsum plus quam Deum; sed per caritatem elevatur ad diligendum Deum plus quam se ipsum». — Notatu digna est doctrina in solut. ad I–II.

De hac 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert. (de hac et seqq. qq.), hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since the motion of charity is twofold: interior in *affection* and exterior in *effect*, and the affection stands to the effect as its principle; and since it had been doubted with respect to the affection whether the love of neighbor has an order: therefore the order of charity in this whole distinction is considered principally according to affection (cf. below q. 6 and q. 3 ad 6). Furthermore, order «includes in itself a certain mode of prior and posterior»; and «prior and posterior is said according to a relation to some principle» (St. Thomas, S. II–II q. 26 a. I). But since the principle of love under a diverse respect is twofold, namely God as the motive ground, and the one loving himself (ibid. a. 6); hence rightly St. Bonaventure (below q. 5, and cf. dub. 3, 4) distinguishes a twofold order in charity: «*one*, which belongs to it according to *itself*; and this order is observed by reference to the good and the more good and the most good... *another* is the order which belongs to it by reason of the *underlying nature*; and this is observed according to those differences which are *one's own* and *another's*, *near* and *foreign*». — It is also worthy of note what is said below in q. 6 concerning the threefold *affection* and *effect*, and what was said in II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 3 q. 2 concerning the threefold manner of loving someone more.

On this (first) question: St. Thomas, here a. I; S. loc. cit. a. I; Disputed Questions on Charity a. 9. — B. Albert, here a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. — Richard of Middleton, here q. I. — Durandus, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. unica.

**II.** In the conclusion and the solution of the objections the masters agree well enough.

**III.** Concerning the following (2nd) question there can be no controversy with respect to supernatural charity, whose motive ground is the divine and infinite good itself. But with respect to the natural love of God, there was a twofold opinion, as St. Thomas notes (here n. 4). The first opinion, then, which Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure follow (here ad I, below q. 3 ad 3, and II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 3 q. I) and Scotus (III Sent. d. 27 q. unica n. 13), teaches that in the state of instituted nature, that is, before the fall, «even by the love of friendship God is naturally loved by man more than himself. And because charity perfects nature, therefore also according to charity he loves God above himself and above all other particular goods» (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). The same author (ibid.) brings forward for this assertion this general principle, that «even by natural love a part tends more to the conservation of its whole than of itself. Hence also naturally an animal sets its arm against the defense of its head, on which the safety of the whole depends» (cf. Sum. loc. cit. a. 3, and Durandus, here q. 2, who disputes about these things at length). — But the other opinion here uses the distinction between the love of concupiscence and the love of benevolence or friendship, and holds that by the love of benevolence man naturally loves himself more than God, because he desires more to be and to preserve his own good than the divine; but that by the love of concupiscence he can love God more than himself, inasmuch as the divine good is more to be sought and more delightful than his own. Durandus moreover recounts and refutes others, who say generally «that by natural love man ought to love himself more than God; but by charity he is elevated to loving God more than himself». — Worthy of note is the doctrine in the solution ad I–II.

On this 2nd question, besides those praised: B. Albert (on this and the following questions), here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{638,639,640}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw 44342–44570) as the base for clean running prose and exact footnote-marker spacing. PDF authoritative in the two-column cascade-shattered Respondeo/Ad-replies/footer regions (Vol III PDF-priority inversion).

**Alignment: PASS.** ARTICULUS UNICUS header raw 44342; QUAESTIO I header raw 44347; opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ordo sit in caritate respectu diligibilium* confirmed. Title = *Utrum ordo sit in caritate respectu diligibilium* (the TRACTATIO theme phrase *communiter respectu diligendorum* names the topic; the body QUAESTIO I title reads as transcribed). Upper boundary: QUAESTIO II at raw 44571 (mid p.641, R-column), confirmed grep-forward. No q-swap.

**Page span.** Opens at top of printed p.638 (PDF 660) with ARTICULUS UNICUS / QUAESTIO I headings, then objections 1–6 (L-col) and *Contra* 1–5 (R-col, *Contra* 5 + 6 run onto p.639). p.639 (PDF 661): *Contra* 6 tail, the question-setup, CONCLUSIO, and Respondeo + Ad 1–3 (Ad 3 runs onto p.640). p.640 (PDF 662): Ad 3 tail, Ad 4–6, then the full-width SCHOLION §I–III (§III runs onto p.641, which is q2's page; §III is forward-pointing scholion for q2, captured here as it physically prints under q1 — same convention as d28-a1-q1 §II).

**Apparatus: 28 entries, per-page restart.** p.638 nn.1–12 (`[^1]`–`[^12]`: nn.1–7 left-column footers, nn.8–12 right-column footers); p.639 nn.1–7 (`[^1]`–`[^7]`: nn.1–3 left-column, nn.4–7 right-column); p.640 nn.1–9 (`[^1]`–`[^9]`: nn.1–6 left-column, nn.7–9 right-column). Markers paired in both Latin and English bodies.

**Footer split (hand-off from d29-divisio).** Confirmed: none of p.637's NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footers (nn.1–5, consumed by d29-divisio) belong to q1. p.638 starts a fresh NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM sequence keyed to the q1 body, read eyes-on from the 450 dpi bands.

**Scholion: PRESENT (§I–III).** §I = the affect-vs-effect framing + Thomist twofold-order distinction + "De hac (I.) quaestione" bibliography; §II = "masters agree" note; §III = forward-pointing material on the *following* (2nd) question (natural love of God: Thomist/Bonaventuran vs concupiscence/benevolence opinions) + "De hac 2. quaestione" bibliography. Body-then-scholion order preserved; `### Scholion` is the last subsection of each language block.

**`[?]` flags: none.** All readings confirmed against the column-band crops; the few OCR garbles in the two-column footers (e.g. *creati enim ad increatum*, *primitatis*/*prioritatis*) were resolved eyes-on from the bands.

**Hand-off forwarded → d29-a1-q2.** §III scholion's "De hac 2. quaestione" bibliography on p.641 belongs conceptually to q2 but is captured here (q2 may cross-reference it). q2 (*per comparationem nostri ad Deum*) opens at QUAESTIO II raw 44571 (mid p.641, R-column). p.641 starts a fresh NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM sequence; none of p.640's footers belong to q2.

**J4 Class A fix (2026-07-17): p.639 apparatus group reconciled against 450 dpi PDF bands** (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p639-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). The p.639 group had 7 bare defs but only 6 body anchors (the auto-relabel tool's greedy partition caught the mismatch). PDF read of the p.639 footer column (nn.1–7, left col 1–3 / right col 4–7) and body superscripts established:
- The prior `[^3]` def (anchored at "et ipse[^3] habitus caritatis", Respondeo) was a **garbled duplicate transcription** of the true printed footnote 7 ("Superius pro *actum cognitivae*..."), with a mis-OCR'd citation (`d. 11` for `d. 44`), mis-OCR'd lemma (`ipse habitum` for `actum cognitivae`), and mis-OCR'd codex sigla (`K K` for `A K`). Corrected the La/En prose against the page image and moved the marker to its true anchor at "ad ipsum finem" in Ad 3 (where the printed superscript 7 actually sits).
- The word "ipse" in the Respondeo never carried a printed superscript at all — it was a spurious anchor from an earlier positional (not content-keyed) transcription pass. Removed.
- The word "ad" in "sed etiam ad *ipsa dilecta*" (Respondeo) DOES carry a printed superscript (4, "In Vat. deest *ad*...") that had never been anchored. Added.
- Markers at "ordinari" (Ad 1) and "primitatis" (Ad 2) had been bound by simple body-position count (1st→[^4], 2nd→[^5], 3rd→[^6]...) rather than by content; the true defs for those two lemmas were swapped one position over. Re-bound each anchor to the def whose prose actually names its lemma (ordinari↔"Cfr. supra d.27...", primitatis↔the Aristotle *VII Phys.*/*primitatis*-*prioritatis* note).
- The old `[^7]` def ("Locutio *per interemptionem*...") was a **verbatim duplicate of p.640's own `[^2]`** (already correctly anchored there at "conclusionum") filed erroneously under p.639 with no matching anchor anywhere on p.639. Deleted as spurious — not a genuine p.639 footnote.
After these fixes the p.639 group is 6 defs / 6 anchors, self-contained and content-correct; `tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py` then proved the 3-group partition (13/6/9) mechanically and relabeled the whole chunk to the `[^p{page}-{n}]` scheme (`--apply`, backed up to `_backup-apparatus-labels/`). Verified: 28 defs = 28 Latin anchors = 28 English anchors, zero duplicates, zero orphans.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 641 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum caritas in diligendo praeponat Deum nobis.*

Secundo quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad Deum, et est quaestio, utrum caritas in diligendo praeponat Deum nobis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud mandatum, Deuteronomii sexto[^p641-1]: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua*; hoc dicitur esse[^p641-2] primum et summum mandatum: si ergo nulli alii praecipitur ut impendamus totum affectum nisi soli Deo; videtur, quod in dilectione caritatis Deus teneat primum et summum locum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Augustinum et Ambrosium, quorum uterque, sicut in littera ponitur, in ordine diligendi Deum nobis praeponit.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per *rationem*: quoniam «propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis[^p641-3]»; sed caritas, quidquid diligit, diligit propter Deum: ergo primo et principaliter et maxime diligit ipsum Deum: ergo secundum ordinem caritatis Deus praeponitur nobis.

4. Item, secundum quod vult philosophicum documentum[^p641-4], «finis magis est eligendus, quam ea quae sunt ad finem»; sed ad ordinem caritatis spectat, ut magis diligat ea quae sunt magis eligenda: si ergo Bonum increatum est finis, et bonum creatum est quod est ad finem; videtur, quod in ordine caritatis semper bonum increatum, quod est Deus, praeponatur bono creato, quod nos sumus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Gratia est perfectio naturae, natura autem carens gratia magis diligit se ipsam quam Deum[^p641-5]: si ergo perfectio non pervertit ordinem sui perfectibilis, videtur, quod idem ordo in caritate habeat salvari: igitur caritate magis debemus diligere nosmetipsos quam Deum.

2. Item, «si aliquod unum addatur aliquibus aequalibus, necesse est, illa post additionem esse aequalia[^p641-6]»: ergo pari ratione, si addatur inaequalibus, post additionem erunt inaequalia; sed amor nostri ante adventum caritatis praeponderat amori Dei, ergo et post ipsius adventum: igitur secundum ordinem caritatis magis debemus nos diligere quam Deum.

3. Item, affectus amoris sequitur notitiam cognitionis, «incognita enim non possumus diligere[^p641-7]»; sed magis cognoscimus nosmetipsos, quam cognoscamus Deum, quamdiu sumus in statu viae: videtur ergo, quod ad ordinem caritatis spectet plus nos quam Deum diligere, secundum statum praesentem.

4. Item, videtur, quod saltem *aequaliter*: quia quantum aliquis diligit Deum, tantum appetit frui Deo et beatificari in ipso[^p641-8]; et quantum appetit frui Deo, tantum appetit suam beatitudinem; et quantum suam beatitudinem appetit, tantum se diligit: ergo videtur, quod quantum quis diligit Deum, tantum diligat semetipsum.

5. Item, motus caritatis in Deum finitus est, cum sit a virtute finita; similiter motus caritatis in se ipsum; et possibile est, motum caritatis in Deum remitti, et motum caritatis in se ipsum intendi; sed quando aliqua duo sunt finita, quorum unum intenditur, et aliud remittitur[^p641-9], possibile est, illa pervenire ad aequalitatem: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate possumus nos et Deum aequaliter diligere: et sic redit idem quod prius.

6. Item, amor est «vis unitiva[^p641-10]»; sed impossibile est, quod aliquis uniatur alii magis quam sibi: ergo impossibile est, magis alium amare quam se: igitur non videtur, quod in caritatis ordine Deus nobis ipsis sit praeponendus.

<!-- page 642 -->

### CONCLUSIO.

> Secundum ordinem caritatis Deus praeponendus est nobis in tantum, ut amor respectu nostri nec aequari possit nec praeponi amori Dei, salva substantia habitus caritatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum ordinem caritatis Deus praeponendus est nobis in tantum, ut amor respectu nostri nec *aequari* possit nec *praeponi* amori Dei, salva substantia habitus caritatis.

Ratio autem huius est ista: quoniam caritas facit, Deum diligi[^p642-1] tanquam finem ultimum et tanquam summum bonum; et quia finis ultimus est unus solus, et summum bonum similiter non habens aliquid *superius se*, vel *sibi aequale*: hinc est, quod secundum caritatis legem impossibile est aliquid *plus* Deo, vel *aequaliter* ipsi Deo amare. Caritas enim, quia diligit Deum sicut *summum bonum*, diligit eum super omnia; quia diligit ipsum sicut *finem ultimum*, diligit eum propter se. Quod autem diligitur *propter se* et *super omnia* diligitur dilectione *fruitionis*; quod vero *propter aliud* diligitur diligitur dilectione *usus*[^p642-2]. Cum ergo *caritatis* sit omnia ad Deum tanquam ad finem ultimum referre, sicut *ponderis* est corpus ad locum proprium inclinare; hinc est, quod caritas facit, nos Deum plus quam nosmetipsos diligere. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem illam.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est perfectio naturae; dicendum, quod in natura est considerare aliquid per modum *positionis*, et aliquid per modum *privationis* et defectus et corruptionis. Illud autem, quod est[^p642-3] in natura per modum *positionis*, a gratia habet *perfici* et *salvari*; quod autem est ibi per modum corruptionis et *privationis* a gratia habet *corrigi* et *suppleri*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod naturae est plus se ipsam quam Deum diligere; dicendum, quod haec non est conditio reperta in natura, spectans ad ipsius *perfectionem*, sed potius ad ipsius *corruptionem*; ideo non sequitur, quod per gratiam habeat *salvari*, immo potius sequitur, quod per gratiam habeat *amoveri*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si unum addatur inaequalibus, adhuc erunt inaequalia eadem inaequalitate qua prius; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando illud additum *aequaliter* respicit utrumque illorum inaequalium: sic autem non est in proposito. Nam caritas principalius respicit illum affectum hominis, qui est in Deum, quam illum qui est in semetipsum; unde in adventu caritatis minuitur amor sui et intenditur amor Dei.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affectio sequitur cognitionem; dicendum, quod affectio dicitur sequi cognitionem non solum a parte *claritatis* in cognoscendo, sed etiam a parte *bonitatis* consideratae in ipso cognito. Licet autem clarius cognoscat se ipsum homo quam Deum, tamen nullus habens caritatem aestimat se tam bonum et tam amabilem, quantum aestimat Deum. Et ideo dilectio sequens cognitionem praeponit ipsum Deum nobis in diligendo magis quam e converso.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quantum quis diligit Deum, tantum desiderat frui Deo; dicendum, quod duplici motu dilectionis contingit Deum diligere, videlicet *affectu amicitiae* et *affectu concupiscentiae* sive desiderii[^p642-4]. Cum ergo dicitur: quantum quis diligit Deum, tantum desiderat frui Deo; *diligere* potest dicere motum *amicitiae*, vel motum *concupiscentiae*. Si dicat motum *concupiscentiae*, absque dubio veritatem habet; sed hic motus non ponit in numerum cum dilectione nostri: et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod aequaliter Deum et nos diligamus. Diligere enim nos ex caritate non est aliud, quam summum Bonum nobis optare[^p642-5]. — Si vero *diligere Deum* dicat motum *amicitiae*; tunc hoc quod est *tantum* et *quantum*, possunt importare *proportionalitatem*, ut sit sensus: si multum vis Deo bonum, multum desideras Deo frui; vel potest importare *proportionis commensurationem* sive aequalitatem. Primo modo habet veritatem, secundo vero modo veritatem non habet. Per caritatem enim diligo summum bonum Deo et[^p642-6] summum bonum mihi, ita quod volo, quod Deus habeat summum bonum et sit summum bonum *per essentiam*, mihi vero *per participationem*; et multo magis opto sibi quam mihi. Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod amor Dei possit aequari amori nostri, salva caritate, vel etiam amori alicuius creaturae, utpote amori gloriae et fruitionis Dei sive beatitudinis creatae.

Posset etiam responderi aliter *per interemptionem* ad illam[^p642-7]: quantum desideras frui Deo, tantum diligis temetipsum, secundum quod *tantum* et *quantum* dicunt *commensurationem*, quia potest quis desiderare frui Deo *propter se* et *super omnia*, quamvis nullo modo concedendum sit, quod ex caritate diligat se *propter se* et *super omnia*[^p642-8].

<!-- page 643 -->

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus caritatis in Deum est finitus et in nos ipsos similiter, et ita per intensionem et remissionem possunt aequari; dicendum, quod licet uterque sit finitus, quia a virtute finita procedit; tamen ratione ipsius obiecti unum excedit reliquum in infinitum. Nec hoc est inconveniens, quia finitum potest aliud finitum excedere in infinitum, sicut linea punctum, et superficies lineam[^p643-1]. Unde sicut infinita puncta non possunt lineae aequari, sic nec amor ipsarum creaturarum secundum legem caritatis potest aequari amori Creatoris. Sicut enim ex punctis nunquam potest constitui linea, sic nec ex infinitis bonis creatis potest constitui summum bonum animae rationalis[^p643-2]. Amor autem Dei, salva caritate, nunquam potest sic remitti, quin Deus diligatur ut finis et ut summum bonum; nec amor creaturae potest ita intendi, quin creatura diligatur ut bonum ad summum Bonum ordinatum: et ideo non sequitur, quod motus illi ad aequalitatem venire possint.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil potest alii magis uniri quam sibi; responderi potest dupliciter: primum, quod hoc potest intelligi de unione quantum ad *naturalem convenientiam*, vel quantum ad *amoris inhaerentiam*. Primo modo verum est, secundo modo falsum, quia hoc secundo modo amor dicitur virtus unitiva.

Aliter potest dici, quod Deus magis est intimus unicuique rei quam ipsa sibi; et plus pendet *esse* rei a Deo conservante quam ab ipsis principiis intrinsecis[^p643-3]; et complementum beatitudinis spiritus rationalis habet a Deo, non a se ipso. Et ideo, cum dicitur, quod nihil potest alteri magis uniri quam sibi ipsi; si hoc intelligatur de ipsis *creaturis*, veritatem habere potest; si vero intelligatur de ipso *Deo*, veritatem non habet. Deus enim intime illabitur ipsi animae[^p643-4]; et ideo anima ex intimis medullis affectionis habet Deo adhaerere; et cum habet caritatem, amplius tendit in ipsum quam in se, et in eo requiescit amplius quam in se, quia melius est Deus ei quam ipsa sibi[^p643-5].

---

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether charity in loving sets God before us.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the order of charity by comparison of ourselves to God, and the question is whether charity in loving sets God before us. And that it does, it seems:

1. First, by that commandment, Deuteronomy six[^p641-1]: *You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul*; this is said to be[^p641-2] the first and greatest commandment: if therefore it is enjoined upon no other thing that we should expend our whole affection except on God alone; it seems that in the love of charity God holds the first and highest place.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Augustine and Ambrose, each of whom, as is set down in the text, in the order of loving sets God before us.

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen *by reason*: since «on account of which each thing is such, that thing itself is so all the more[^p641-3]»; but charity, whatever it loves, loves on account of God: therefore first and principally and most of all it loves God himself: therefore according to the order of charity God is set before us.

4. Likewise, according to what the philosophical doctrine maintains[^p641-4], «the end is more to be chosen than those things which are toward the end»; but it pertains to the order of charity that it love more those things which are more to be chosen: if therefore the uncreated Good is the end, and the created good is that which is toward the end; it seems that in the order of charity the uncreated good, which is God, is always set before the created good, which we are.

**On the contrary:** 1. Grace is the perfection of nature, but nature lacking grace loves itself more than God[^p641-5]: if therefore perfection does not pervert the order of that which it perfects, it seems that the same order ought to be preserved in charity: therefore by charity we ought to love ourselves more than God.

2. Likewise, «if some one thing be added to certain equal things, it is necessary that those, after the addition, be equal[^p641-6]»: therefore by parity of reasoning, if it be added to unequal things, after the addition they will be unequal; but the love of ourselves before the coming of charity outweighs the love of God, therefore also after its coming: therefore according to the order of charity we ought to love ourselves more than God.

3. Likewise, the affection of love follows the knowledge of cognition, «for we cannot love things unknown[^p641-7]»; but we know ourselves more than we know God, so long as we are in the state of the wayfarer: it seems therefore that it pertains to the order of charity to love ourselves more than God, according to the present state.

4. Likewise, it seems that at least *equally*: because as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God and to be made blessed in him[^p641-8]; and as much as he desires to enjoy God, so much does he desire his own blessedness; and as much as he desires his own blessedness, so much does he love himself: therefore it seems that as much as one loves God, so much does he love himself.

5. Likewise, the motion of charity toward God is finite, since it is from a finite power; likewise the motion of charity toward oneself; and it is possible that the motion of charity toward God be remitted, and the motion of charity toward oneself be intensified; but when two things are finite, of which one is intensified and the other remitted[^p641-9], it is possible that they arrive at equality: therefore it seems that out of charity we can love ourselves and God equally: and thus the same conclusion returns as before.

6. Likewise, love is a «unitive power[^p641-10]»; but it is impossible that anyone be united to another more than to himself: therefore it is impossible to love another more than oneself: therefore it does not seem that in the order of charity God is to be set before our very selves.

### CONCLUSION.

> According to the order of charity God is to be set before us to such a degree that love with respect to ourselves can neither be made equal to nor set before the love of God, the substance of the habit of charity being preserved.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the order of charity God is to be set before us to such a degree that love with respect to ourselves can neither be made *equal to* nor *set before* the love of God, the substance of the habit of charity being preserved.

Now the ground of this is the following: since charity causes God to be loved[^p642-1] as the ultimate end and as the supreme good; and since the ultimate end is one only, and likewise the supreme good has nothing *above itself* or *equal to itself*: hence it is that according to the law of charity it is impossible to love anything *more* than God, or *equally* with God himself. For charity, because it loves God as the *supreme good*, loves him above all things; because it loves him as the *ultimate end*, it loves him for his own sake. But that which is loved *for its own sake* and *above all things* is loved with the love of *fruition*; whereas that which is loved *for the sake of another* is loved with the love of *use*[^p642-2]. Since therefore it belongs to *charity* to refer all things to God as to the ultimate end, just as it belongs to *weight* to incline a body to its proper place; hence it is that charity causes us to love God more than ourselves. — Whence the reasons which are for that side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that grace is the perfection of nature; it must be said that in nature one may consider something by way of *position*, and something by way of *privation* and defect and corruption. But that which is[^p642-3] in nature by way of *position* is *perfected* and *preserved* by grace; whereas that which is there by way of corruption and *privation* is *corrected* and *supplied* by grace. Since therefore it is said that it belongs to nature to love itself more than God; it must be said that this is not a condition found in nature looking to its *perfection*, but rather to its *corruption*; therefore it does not follow that it ought to be *preserved* by grace, but rather it follows that it ought to be *removed* by grace.

2. To that which is objected, that if one thing be added to unequal things, they will still be unequal by the same inequality as before; it must be said that this holds true when the thing added regards *equally* both of those unequal things: but it is not so in the present case. For charity more principally regards that affection of man which is toward God than that which is toward himself; whence at the coming of charity the love of self is diminished and the love of God is intensified.

3. To that which is objected, that affection follows cognition; it must be said that affection is said to follow cognition not only on the side of the *clarity* in knowing, but also on the side of the *goodness* considered in the very thing known. But although a man know himself more clearly than God, nevertheless no one having charity esteems himself as good and as lovable as he esteems God. And therefore love following cognition sets God himself before us in loving rather than the contrary.

4. To that which is objected, that as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; it must be said that it happens to love God by a twofold motion of love, namely by the *affection of friendship* and by the *affection of concupiscence* or desire[^p642-4]. Since therefore it is said: as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; *to love* can denote the motion of *friendship*, or the motion of *concupiscence*. If it denotes the motion of *concupiscence*, it has the truth without doubt; but this motion is not reckoned together with the love of ourselves: and therefore it does not follow from this that we love God and ourselves equally. For to love ourselves out of charity is nothing else than to wish the supreme Good for ourselves[^p642-5]. — But if *to love God* denotes the motion of *friendship*; then this *as much* and *how much* can import *proportionality*, so that the sense is: if you greatly wish good to God, you greatly desire to enjoy God; or it can import the *commensuration of proportion* or equality. In the first way it has the truth, but in the second way it does not have the truth. For by charity I love the supreme good for God and[^p642-6] the supreme good for myself, in such wise that I will that God have the supreme good and be the supreme good *by essence*, but I [have it] *by participation*; and I wish much more for him than for myself. And therefore it does not follow from this that the love of God can be made equal to the love of ourselves, the substance of charity being preserved, or even to the love of any creature, such as the love of the glory and fruition of God or of created blessedness.

It could also be answered otherwise *by removal* to that objection[^p642-7]: as much as you desire to enjoy God, so much do you love yourself, according as *as much* and *how much* denote *commensuration*, because one can desire to enjoy God *for his own sake* and *above all things*, although it is in no way to be conceded that out of charity he loves himself *for his own sake* and *above all things*[^p642-8].

5. To that which is objected, that the motion of charity toward God is finite and toward ourselves likewise, and so by intensification and remission they can be made equal; it must be said that although each be finite, since it proceeds from a finite power; nevertheless by reason of the object itself the one exceeds the other to infinity. Nor is this unfitting, because the finite can exceed another finite to infinity, as a line exceeds a point, and a surface a line[^p643-1]. Whence just as infinite points cannot be made equal to a line, so neither can the love of creatures themselves according to the law of charity be made equal to the love of the Creator. For just as a line can never be constituted out of points, so neither can the supreme good of the rational soul be constituted out of infinite created goods[^p643-2]. But the love of God, the substance of charity being preserved, can never be so remitted that God be not loved as end and as supreme good; nor can the love of a creature be so intensified that the creature be not loved as a good ordered to the supreme Good: and therefore it does not follow that those motions can come to equality.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing can be more united to another than to itself; it can be answered in two ways: first, that this can be understood of union as regards *natural agreement*, or as regards *the inherence of love*. In the first way it is true, in the second way false, because in this second way love is called a unitive power.

Otherwise it can be said that God is more intimate to each thing than the thing itself is to itself; and the *being* of a thing depends more on God conserving it than on the intrinsic principles themselves[^p643-3]; and the completion of the blessedness of the rational spirit it has from God, not from itself. And therefore, when it is said that nothing can be more united to another than to itself; if this be understood of *creatures* themselves, it can have the truth; but if it be understood of *God* himself, it does not have the truth. For God enters intimately into the soul itself[^p643-4]; and therefore the soul out of the inmost marrow of its affection cleaves to God; and when it has charity, it tends toward him more than toward itself, and rests in him more than in itself, because God is better to it than it is to itself[^p643-5].

---

la: Vers. 5. — Matth. 22, 38: *Hoc est maximum et primum mandatum.*

en: Verse 5. — Matthew 22:38: *This is the greatest and first commandment.*

la: Hic c. 1. et 2. — Pro *quorum* edd. *quod.*

en: Here c. 1 and 2. — For *quorum* the editions read *quod.*

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — Edd. *unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis.*

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2. — The editions read *each thing such, and itself more.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1. Vide supra pag. 639, nota 6. — Sententia *minoris* probata est in quaest. praeced. — Pro *philosophicum documentum* cod. M *Philosophus*, cod. O item, *secundum Philosophum*. Pro *eligendus* cod. A *diligendus*; similiter paulo inferius pro *eligenda* codd. K bb *diligenda.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 1. See above p. 639, note 6. — The statement of the *minor* was proved in the preceding question. — For *philosophical doctrine* codex M reads *the Philosopher*, codex O likewise *according to the Philosopher*. For *to be chosen* codex A reads *to be loved*; likewise a little below, for *to be chosen* codices K bb read *to be loved.*

la: Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 8, et de Diligendo Deo, c. 15. n. 39.

en: Cf. Bernard, *Letter* 11, n. 8, and *On Loving God* c. 15, n. 39.

la: Euclides, I. Geometr.

en: Euclid, *Geometry* I.

la: August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1, et de Spiritu et lit. c. 36. n. 64. — In fine arg. pro *secundum statum praesentem* cod. F *quamdiu sumus in statu praesenti.*

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* X, c. 1, n. 1, and *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 36, n. 64. — At the end of the argument, for *according to the present state* codex F reads *as long as we are in the present state.*

la: Cfr. secunda definitio caritatis, supra d. 27. dub. 1. allata. — In fine arg. pro *diligat* bene multi codd. *diligit.*

en: Cf. the second definition of charity, adduced above d. 27, dub. 1. — At the end of the argument, for *love* [diligat] many codices rightly read *loves* [diligit].

la: Codd. F G H I L N T V aa et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. 3. 2. adiiciunt *ita.*

en: Codices F G H I L N T V aa and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, 3, 2, add *thus.*

la: Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 15.

en: According to Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 15.

la: Cod. U *diligere.*

en: Codex U reads *to love.*

la: Sicut docet August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 3. n. 3. seqq., de quo iam fusius agebatur I. Sent. d. 1. tum in lit. Magistri, tum in ipso Comment.

en: As Augustine teaches, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 3, n. 3 ff., concerning which it was already treated more fully in I Sent. d. 1, both in the text of the Master and in the Commentary itself.

la: Pro *quod est* codd. B C D W X aa *quod semper est.* Aliquanto inferius voci *perfectionem* Vat. adiungit *sive positionem.*

en: For *which is* codices B C D W X aa read *which always is.* Somewhat below, to the word *perfection* the Vatican edition adds *or position.*

la: Vide supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. — Mox post *frui Deo* cod. A subdit *dicendum, quod.* Subinde pro *dicere* Vat. substituit *dici*, et post *concupiscentiae* cod. Z addit *sive desiderii.*

en: See above d. 26 a. 2 q. 3 and d. 27 a. 1 q. 2 ad 6. — Soon after *to enjoy God* codex A adds *it must be said that.* Then for *to denote* the Vatican edition substitutes *to be denoted*, and after *of concupiscence* codex Z adds *or of desire.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam illustrantur quae in seq. propos. proponuntur. — Mox pro *proportionalitatem* cod. X *proportionem*, Vat. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. nec non aliquot codd. *proportionabilitatem.*

en: Cf. above d. 27 a. 1 q. 2, where also the things proposed in the following proposition are illustrated. — Soon for *proportionality* codex X reads *proportion*, the Vatican edition and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales as well as some codices *proportionability.*

la: Edd.: *Per caritatem enim summum bonum diligo optoque.*

en: The editions read: *For by charity I love and wish the supreme good.*

la: Vide supra pag. 640, nota 2. — Pro *ad illam* edd. *ad propositionem illam.*

en: See above p. 640, note 2. — For *to that* the editions read *to that proposition.*

la: In rem esse ducimus haec Guliel. Antissiod. verba, S. p. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 4, hic afferre: *Haec est falsa: quantum aliquis desiderat Deum sibi, tantum desiderat habere Deum vel frui Deo; quoniam cum dicitur: aliquis desiderat Deum sibi, desiderium transit immediate in Deum; sed cum dicitur: iste desiderat habere Deum vel frui Deo, desiderium transit in creaturam; et ideo non est idem desiderare Deum sibi et desiderare habere Deum vel frui Deo. Per hoc patet, quod aliquis diligit se magis uno motu quam alio; quoniam magis diligit se in infinitum motu, quo desiderat Deum, quam motu, quo desiderat frui Deo.*

en: We deem it to the purpose to adduce here these words of William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 4: *This is false: that as much as one desires God for himself, so much does he desire to have God or to enjoy God; because when it is said: one desires God for himself, the desire passes immediately into God; but when it is said: this one desires to have God or to enjoy God, the desire passes into a creature; and therefore it is not the same to desire God for oneself and to desire to have God or to enjoy God. By this it is plain that one loves himself more by one motion than by another; since he loves himself infinitely more by the motion by which he desires God, than by the motion by which he desires to enjoy God.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 280, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 280, note 5.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. — Subinde pro *Amor autem* edd. *Amor enim.*

en: See I Sent. d. 1 a. 3 q. 2. — Then for *But the love* the editions read *For the love.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Mox pro *habet a Deo* codd. A K *habet esse a Deo.*

en: See II Sent. d. 37 a. 1 q. 2. — Soon for *has from God* codices A K read *has being from God.*

la: De qua vide II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 2, et Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 5. n. 8. (cfr. serm. 31. n. 6.): *Illud autem sentite, nullum creaturae Spiritum per se nostris mentibus applicari... Sequestretur proinde praerogativa haec summo incircumscripto Spiritui... per se infunditur, per se innotescit, purus capitur a puris.* — In fine solut. pro *melius* edd. cum uno alteroque cod. *melior.*

en: Concerning which see II Sent. d. 8 p. II a. 2, and Bernard, *Sermons on the Canticle* serm. 5, n. 8 (cf. serm. 31, n. 6): *But understand this, that no created spirit is applied of itself to our minds... Let this prerogative therefore be set apart for the supreme uncircumscribed Spirit... of itself it is infused, of itself it becomes known, pure it is received by the pure.* — At the end of the solution, for *better* the editions with one or two codices read *better* [melior].

la: Vide Scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the Scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{641,642,643}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw 44571–44720) as the base for clean running prose and exact footnote-marker spacing. PDF authoritative in the two-column cascade-shattered Respondeo/Ad-replies/footer regions (Vol III PDF-priority inversion).

**Alignment: PASS.** QUAESTIO II header raw 44571; opener *Secundo quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad Deum, et est quaestio, utrum caritas in diligendo praeponat Deum nobis* confirmed against the p.641-R column band. Upper boundary: QUAESTIO III at raw 44721 (*Tertio quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum*), confirmed grep-forward. No q-swap. **Exact title corrected:** the prompt guessed *Utrum debeamus Deum diligere plus quam nos ipsos*; the actual printed title (OCR garble *Utram carilas in diligeiulo praeponat Deum nobis*) is **Utrum caritas in diligendo praeponat Deum nobis**.

**Page span.** Opens mid-p.641 (PDF 663) R-column, immediately below q1's scholion §III "De hac 2. quaestione" bibliography tail (which is captured in q1). On p.641: QUAESTIO II header + title, then the *videtur* objections 1–4 print in the L-column and *Sed contra* 1 (L-col tail) + contra 2–6 in the R-column, ending at *praeponendus*. p.642 (PDF 664): CONCLUSIO, Respondeo + Ratio, and Ad 1–4 (Ad 4 with the "Alia solutio" *per interemptionem* addendum runs to the foot of p.642). p.643 (PDF 665): Ad 5 and Ad 6 (with "Solutio 1 / Solutio 2 / Ratio notabilis" marginalia), q2 ending at *quia melius est Deus ei quam ipsa sibi*; QUAESTIO III then begins lower on p.643.

**Apparatus: 23 entries, per-page restart.** p.641 nn.1–10 (`[^1]`–`[^10]`: nn.1–4 left-column footers keyed to objections 1–4 + contra 1; nn.5–10 right-column footers keyed to contra 1–6); p.642 nn.1–8 (`[^1]`–`[^8]`: nn.1–4 left-column = Respondeo/Ratio + Ad 1, nn.5–8 right-column = Ad 3–4, n.8 = the long William-of-Auxerre quotation continuing into p.643's footer head); p.643 nn.1–5 (`[^1]`–`[^5]`: Ad 5 nn.1–2, Ad 6 nn.3–5). Markers paired in both Latin and English bodies.

**Footer split (hand-off from d29-a1-q1).** Confirmed: p.641 starts a fresh NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM sequence keyed to the q2 body — none of p.640's footers belong to q2 (q1 consumed them). On p.643 the footer splits by body anchor: q2 takes nn.1–5 (the last, n.5 = «Vide Scholion ad praecedentem quaest.», anchors Ad 6's closing *sibi*); nn.6–10 on p.643 belong to q3 (their body anchors — *in littera*, the Augustine/Ambrose objections — fall in q3) and are forwarded to d29-a1-q3. Note: p.642's n.8 (William of Auxerre) physically continues into the head of p.643's L-column footer block but is q2's note, captured in full here.

**Scholion: ABSENT — REDIRECT to q1 §III.** q2 has no own scholion. The SCHOLION header at raw 44879 prints under q3 (past the q3 boundary at 44721), and q2's own apparatus note `[^5]` reads «Vide Scholion ad praecedentem quaest.» — i.e. Quaracchi explicitly redirects q2's scholion material to the §III of q1's scholion (the forward-pointing natural-love-of-God controversy already captured in d29-a1-q1). `has_scholion: false`.

**`[?]` flags: none.** All readings confirmed against the column-band crops; OCR garbles in the two-column footers (e.g. *Euclides I. Geometr.*, the Bernard *Epist. 11* citation, *proportionalitatem*/*proportionabilitatem* variant) were resolved eyes-on from the bands.

**J4 apparatus repair (2026-07-17, Class A duplicate defs).** The three per-page footnote groups (p.641 nn.1–10, p.642 nn.1–8, p.643 nn.1–5) shared duplicate `[^N]:` numbering across page-groups, which J1's automated relabel tool could not safely resolve because the English body was missing one anchor: `[^3]` in the p.642 group (Ad 1, on *quod est[^3] in natura per modum positionis*) was present in the Latin body and confirmed on the printed page (450 dpi band `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p642-L-1.png`, superscript ³ on *est*) but absent from the English translation. Added the missing English anchor at the parallel word ("that which is[^3] in nature") — no wording changed, only the marker inserted. With Latin/English marker sequences now identical across all three page-groups (23/23/23, matching content per def [^3]'s own gloss: *"Pro quod est codd. ... quod semper est"*), re-ran `tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py --apply`, which relabeled all 23 markers+defs to globally-unique `p641-N`/`p642-N`/`p643-N` keys. Verify: defs=23, la=23, en=23, dupDefs=0, orphanDefs=[].

**Hand-off forwarded → d29-a1-q3.** q3 (*per comparationem nostri ad proximum*) opens at QUAESTIO III raw 44721, printed mid-p.643 (PDF 665) below q2's Ad 6, title *Utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi*; opener *Tertio quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum, et est quaestio, utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi.* q3 has its OWN scholion (SCHOLION header at raw 44879, lower on p.644/645). **Footer split:** p.643 nn.6–10 belong to q3 (n.6 «Hic c. 1. et 2.», n.7 Vers. 5 / cod. Z *patet*, n.8 Cap. 76 n. 20 / Luke 11, 41, n.9 Aristot. II. de Generat. + de Anima + Boeth., n.10 Vers. 5 / Eccli. 30, 24 / cod. Z *Nemo*); q2 already took p.643 nn.1–5, so q3 starts its NOTAE pickup at p.643 n.6 and continues on p.644+.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0