title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum ponenda sit intentio personalitatis in anima separata, omni unione circumscripta.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit ponere intentionem personalitatis in anima separata, omni unione circumscripta. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primo patet per Magistrum in littera[^1]: «Anima absoluta a corpore persona est, sicut Angelus»; sed Angelus vere et proprie persona est: ergo et anima separata. (*Ad oppositum.*)

2. Item, sicut consuevit communiter distingui: persona est res distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente[^2]; sed anima separata est distincta res, quod patet: ergo est persona.

3. Item, ratio, quare humana natura in Christo non est persona, est propter unionem ad dignius: sed cum anima unitur corpori, non unitur digniori rei, et anima, circumscripta assumtione et unione, complete habet illam rationem in se, quam ponit Boethius[^3]: «Persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae»: ergo videtur, quod ratio personalitatis conveniat animae separatae et proprie et vere.

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4. Item, contingit, animam separatam comparari ad Angelum, et contingit, comparari ad alteram animam, et quae est comparatio unius Angeli ad alterum, eadem est comparatio unius animae ad alteram; sed anima separata differt secundum speciem ab Angelo, sicut et Angelus ab anima[^1b]: ergo a simili, sicut inter unum Angelum et alterum est discretio personalis, sic inter unam animam et alteram. Sed quae habent discretionem personalem habent intentionem personalitatis: ergo plenam rationem personalitatis contingit reperiri in anima separata.

5. Item, cuicumque convenit loqui de se ut de se, est persona; sed animae separatae convenit loqui de se ut de se — contingit enim ad ipsam dirigere sermonem, sicut ad animam Petri et Pauli dirigimus; et constat[^2b], quod versa vice possunt nobis voluntatem suam exprimere, sicut aliquibus expresserunt — ergo videtur, quod anima separata vere et proprie sit persona.

6. Item, anima[^3b] per separationem sui a corpore non habet conditionem deteriorem, sed statum digniorem; sed quamdiu spiritus rationalis erat in corpore et corpori unitus, non carebat ratione personali: ergo nec quando est a corpore separatus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Persona est per se una[^4b]; sed quod venit aliquando ad constitutionem tertii non est per se unum et distinctum: ergo quod est natum uniri ad constitutionem tertii non est persona. Sed anima rationalis est huiusmodi: ergo etc. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Item, persona dicit quid completissimum in genere substantiae, ita quod non est ordinatum[^5b] ad ulteriorem perfectionem in eodem genere; sed anima rationalis est ordinata ad constituendum hominem: ergo non habet intentionem personae.

3. Item, anima rationalis, cum est unita carni, ut dicit Magister[^6b], non est persona: ergo si, quando est separata, habet rationem personae; igitur digniorem modum habet existendi extra corpus. Si ergo «natura semper desiderat quod melius est», videtur, quod anima nunquam desideret uniri corpori; videtur etiam ex hoc, quod cum anima unitur corpori, sit ei praeiudicium, et cum separatur, quod non sit ei poena, sed praemium; quae omnia falsa sunt et absurda: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod anima separata etc.

4. Item, si anima separata est persona; cum assumere sit actus personae conveniens[^7b], sicut divina persona dicitur corpus assumere, cum corpus ei unitur, et similiter Angelus, per consimilem modum anima diceretur assumere corpus proprium, cum eidem rursus coniungitur; quodsi hoc non recipitur, videtur, quod nec praemissum esset concedendum, scilicet quod anima separata sit persona, sicut Angelus.

### Conclusio.

> Anima separata a corpore non habet plene rationem personalitatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut apparet ex textu[^8b], opinio Magistri fuit, quod anima separata sit persona; et haec opinio fuit magistri Hugonis de sancto Victore. (*Opinio Magistri et Hugonis.*) Ratio autem, quae movit eos ad hoc ponendum, fuit actualis distinctio et completio reperta in anima separata, quoniam actus nobiles liberius exercet et perfectius, quam exerceat in corpore.

Haec tamen opinio non sustinetur communiter a doctoribus. (*Non probatur.*) Ratio huius est, quoniam ad completam rationem personae requiritur, ut dictum fuit supra[^9b], distinctio singularitatis et incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis. (*Tria in persona.*) Quamvis autem in anima separata sit reperire singularitatem et dignitatem, non est tamen reperire incommunicabilitatem, quia appetitum et aptitudinem habet, ut uniatur corpori ad constitutionem tertii. Et ideo necesse est, ipsam carere distinctione personalitatis; (*Conclusio.*) quoniam, si completior est anima, dum appetitus eius terminatur, quem habet respectu corporis resumendi, sicut vult Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram[^10b], et tunc non habet in se intentionem personae; necessario sequitur, quod personalitate careat, cum est separata a corpore. Alioquin sequerentur praedicta inconvenientia, videlicet quod unio esset praeternaturalis, et separatio non esset poenalis; iterum, quod unio esset in animae praeiudicium, et separatio in praemium; quorum quodlibet falsum est.

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Et ideo non immerito in hac opinione communiter non sustinent[^11b] Magistrum, quamvis aliqui velint dicere, quod Magister intellexerit de anima separata, circumscripta unibilitate ad corpus; et hoc est potius verbi palliatio quam expositio, sicut patet aspiciendo ad verba ipsius. (*Excusat auctor.*) Praeterea, unibilitas sive aptitudo uniendi cum corpore non est animae accidentalis, sed est ipsi animae essentialis, et ita non potest ab ea separari vel circumscribi, salva ipsius natura, sicut superius in secundo libro[^1c] ostensum fuit. — Posset tamen dici ob reverentiam ipsius, quod non voluit dicere, quod tota ratio personalitatis competeret animae separatae, sed quod, hoc supposito, quod anima separata esset persona, adhuc non esset persona in Christo, quia esset coniuncta cum divina persona. Quidquid autem sit de intentione Magistri, hoc concedendum est, quod ratio personalitatis non est plene circa animam separatam. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Solutio oppositorum.** 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Magistri, iam patet responsio per iam dicta.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod anima separata est res distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente; dicendum, quod non est ibi ratio distinctionis, secundum quod convenit personae intentioni secundum illam triplicem conditionem, quae superius[^2c] assignata est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum anima unitur corpori, non unitur digniori rei, et ita unibilitas ad corpus non aufert animae personae[^3c] proprietatem; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si anima esset persona *per se*; tunc enim ratione personae non privaretur ex hoc, quod corpori coniungeretur. Si ergo ratione personae caret, cum corpori coniungitur, patet, quod non est persona, cum est a corpore separata. Hoc autem non est propter defectum *dignitatis,* sed propter defectum *incommunicabilitatis*; quamvis non incongrue posset dici, quod ad ipsam unibilitatem per modum compositionis sequitur quaedam indigentia et defectus a completione dignissima. (*Notandum.*)

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima differt specie ab Angelo, secundum quod ei comparatur; dicendum, quod *ratio personalitatis* plus dicit completionem quam *intentio speciei.*[^4c] Nam Christus secundum humanam naturam continetur sub *specie hominis,* quamvis secundum illam naturam non habeat intentionem *personalitatis.* Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi animae separatae conveniat specifica differentia respectu Angeli, quod propter hoc conveniat et discretio personalis respectu alterius animae. Nec sequitur: differt *numero* ab alia anima, ergo differt *personaliter*; quia distinctio secundum *numerum* in plus est quam distinctio[^5c] personalis. (*Notandum.*)

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cui competit loqui de se ut de se etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, accipiendo *large* personam, secundum quod persona dicitur esse in nomine vel pronomine, secundum quod reddit suppositum verbo; hoc autem modo non loquimur hic de persona, quia haec est consideratio grammatici, non theologi; sic enim magis respicit modum significandi quam proprietatem rei[^6c]. (*Notandum.*)

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod anima gloriosa propter separationem a corpore non habet conditionem deteriorem; dicendum, quod illa ratio deficit dupliciter: primo quidem, quia, quamvis non habeat conditionem deteriorem quantum ad bene esse, utpote quantum ad Dei fruitionem[^7c], minus tamen bonam habet conditionem quantum ad esse naturae. Personalitas tamen non attenditur quantum ad bene esse vel esse gratiae, sed quantum ad esse naturae sive ad esse primum. (*Dupliciter ratio deficit.*) — Alius etiam defectus est, quoniam intentio personalitatis consequitur animam unitam corpori, ita tamen, quod nec anima nec corpus est persona, sed totum coniunctum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod talis dignitas remaneat in anima separata vel proprietas; sicut nec risibilitas, quae est proprietas respectu coniuncti[^8c], post separationem nec remanet in anima nec circa corpus.

english:
### Question III. *Whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. First it is plain through the Master in the text[^1]: «A soul released from the body is a person, just as an Angel»; but an Angel is truly and properly a person: therefore the separated soul also. (*To the contrary.*)

2. Likewise, as it is commonly accustomed to be distinguished: a person is a thing distinct by a property pertaining to dignity[^2]; but the separated soul is a distinct thing, which is plain: therefore it is a person.

3. Likewise, the reason why the human nature in Christ is not a person is on account of the union to something more worthy: but when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, and the soul, the assumption and union being set aside, completely has in itself that account which Boethius posits[^3]: «A person is an individual substance of a rational nature»: therefore it seems that the account of personality befits the separated soul both properly and truly.

4. Likewise, it happens that the separated soul is compared to an Angel, and it happens to be compared to another soul, and what is the comparison of one Angel to another, the same is the comparison of one soul to another; but the separated soul differs in species from an Angel, just as also an Angel from a soul[^1b]: therefore by a similar [reasoning], just as between one Angel and another there is a personal distinction, so between one soul and another. But things that have a personal distinction have an intention of personality: therefore it happens that the full account of personality is found in the separated soul.

5. Likewise, to whatever it befits to speak of itself as of itself, that is a person; but it befits the separated soul to speak of itself as of itself — for it happens that one directs speech to it, just as we direct it to the soul of Peter and Paul; and it is established[^2b] that conversely they can express their will to us, just as they have expressed it to some — therefore it seems that the separated soul truly and properly is a person.

6. Likewise, the soul[^3b] by its separation from the body does not have a worse condition, but a more worthy state; but as long as the rational spirit was in the body and united to the body, it did not lack a personal account: therefore neither when it is separated from the body.

**On the contrary:** 1. A person is one through itself[^4b]; but what at some time comes to the constitution of a third is not one through itself and distinct: therefore what is born to be united to the constitution of a third is not a person. But the rational soul is of this sort: therefore etc. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Likewise, a person signifies what is most complete in the genus of substance, in such a way that it is not ordered[^5b] to a further perfection in the same genus; but the rational soul is ordered to constituting a human being: therefore it does not have the intention of a person.

3. Likewise, the rational soul, when it is united to flesh, as the Master says[^6b], is not a person: therefore if, when it is separated, it has the account of a person; then it has a more worthy mode of existing outside the body. If therefore «nature always desires what is better», it seems that the soul would never desire to be united to a body; it also seems from this, that when the soul is united to the body, it is to its prejudice, and when it is separated, that it is not a punishment to it, but a reward; all of which are false and absurd: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that the separated soul etc.

4. Likewise, if the separated soul is a person; since to assume is an act befitting a person[^7b], just as a divine person is said to assume a body, when a body is united to it, and similarly an Angel, by a like mode a soul would be said to assume its own body, when it is again conjoined to it; but if this is not received, it seems that neither should the premise be conceded, namely that the separated soul is a person, just as an Angel.

### Conclusion.

> The soul separated from the body does not fully have the account of personality.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as appears from the text[^8b], the opinion of the Master was that the separated soul is a person; and this opinion was that of master Hugh of Saint Victor. (*The opinion of the Master and of Hugh.*) But the reason that moved them to posit this was the actual distinction and completion found in the separated soul, since it exercises noble acts more freely and more perfectly than it exercises [them] in the body.

This opinion, however, is not commonly upheld by the doctors. (*It is not proved.*) The reason for this is that for the complete account of a person there is required, as was said above[^9b], a distinction of singularity and of incommunicability and of supereminent dignity. (*Three things in a person.*) But although in the separated soul singularity and dignity are to be found, yet incommunicability is not to be found, because it has an appetite and an aptitude to be united to a body for the constitution of a third. And therefore it is necessary that it lack the distinction of personality; (*Conclusion.*) since, if the soul is more complete, while the appetite which it has with respect to resuming the body is terminated, as Augustine wills in the twelfth [book] on Genesis according to the letter[^10b], and then it does not have in itself the intention of a person; it follows necessarily that it lacks personality, when it is separated from the body. Otherwise the aforesaid unsuitable consequences would follow, namely that the union would be preternatural, and the separation would not be penal; again, that the union would be to the soul's prejudice, and the separation [its] reward; each of which is false.

And therefore not without reason in this opinion do they commonly not uphold[^11b] the Master, although some wish to say that the Master understood it of the separated soul, the unibility to the body being set aside; and this is rather a glossing-over of the words than an exposition, as is plain by looking at his words. (*The author excuses [the Master].*) Furthermore, the unibility or aptitude for uniting with the body is not accidental to the soul, but is essential to the soul itself, and thus cannot be separated or set aside from it, its nature being preserved, as was shown above in the second book[^1c]. — Yet it could be said, out of reverence for him, that he did not wish to say that the whole account of personality belonged to the separated soul, but that, this being supposed, that the separated soul were a person, even so it would not be a person in Christ, because it would be conjoined with the divine person. But whatever may be the case about the Master's intention, this must be conceded, that the account of personality is not fully present in the separated soul. — Hence the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposing [arguments].** 1. To that which is objected from the authority of the Master, the response is already plain through the things already said.

2. To that which is objected, that the separated soul is a thing distinct by a property pertaining to dignity; it must be said that there is not there an account of distinction according to which it befits the intention of a person according to that threefold condition which was assigned above[^2c].

3. To that which is objected, that when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, and thus the unibility to the body does not take away from the soul the property of a person[^3c]; it must be said that this would be true, if the soul were a person *through itself*; for then it would not be deprived of the account of a person from this, that it were conjoined to a body. If therefore it lacks the account of a person when it is conjoined to a body, it is plain that it is not a person when it is separated from the body. But this is not on account of a defect of *dignity,* but on account of a defect of *incommunicability*; although it could not unsuitably be said that to that very unibility, by way of composition, there follows a certain neediness and a defect from the most worthy completion. (*Note.*)

4. To that which is objected, that the soul differs in species from an Angel, according as it is compared to it; it must be said that the *account of personality* signifies completion more than the *intention of the species.*[^4c] For Christ according to his human nature is contained under the *species of a human being,* although according to that nature he does not have the intention of *personality.* And therefore it does not follow, that if a specific difference befits the separated soul with respect to an Angel, that on account of this there should also befit it a personal distinction with respect to another soul. Nor does it follow: it differs in *number* from another soul, therefore it differs *personally*; because distinction according to *number* extends further than distinction[^5c] of personality.

5. To that which is objected, that to whatever it befits to speak of itself as of itself etc.; it must be said that it is true, taking «person» *broadly,* according as a person is said to be in a noun or a pronoun, according as it renders a supposit to a verb; but in this way we do not here speak of a person, because this is the consideration of the grammarian, not of the theologian; for thus it regards the mode of signifying more than the property of the thing[^6c]. (*Note.*)

6. To that which is objected last, that the glorified soul on account of its separation from the body does not have a worse condition; it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways: first indeed, because, although it does not have a worse condition as regards well-being, namely as regards the enjoyment of God[^7c], yet it has a less good condition as regards the being of nature. Yet personality is not considered as regards well-being or the being of grace, but as regards the being of nature or first being. (*The reasoning fails in two ways.*) — There is also another defect, since the intention of personality follows the soul united to the body, yet in such a way that neither the soul nor the body is a person, but the whole conjoined thing. And therefore it does not follow that such a dignity or property remains in the separated soul; just as neither does risibility, which is a property with respect to the conjoined thing[^8c], after the separation remain either in the soul or about the body.

la: Hic c. 3. — De minori vide II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo ante edd. omittunt *patet.*

en: Here c. 3. — On the minor [premise] see II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and following. — A little before, the editions omit *patet.*

la: De hac definitione vide I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. in fine. — Mox post *quod patet* Vat. sola ex seq. arg. apponit verba: *anima etiam circumscripta assumtione... et proprie et vere,* quibus verbis adiungit conclusionem *ergo est persona.* Pro *distingui* cod. K *dici.*

en: On this definition see I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. at the end. — Soon after *quod patet* the Vatican [edition] alone, from the following argument, adds the words: *anima etiam circumscripta assumtione... et proprie et vere,* to which words it joins the conclusion *ergo est persona.* For *distingui* codex K [reads] *dici.*

la: Libr. de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 3. — In hoc tertio arg. codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt verba *cum anima nititur corpori, non unitur digniori rei,* quam omissionem non nisi incuriae librariorum tribuimus, qui, cum immediate post iterum verbum *anima* occurrat, verbo praecedente et a nobis e solutione huius obiect. restituta non animadvertisse videntur. Quod necesse fuerit ea restituere, ex ipsa solut. elucescit. Vat., quae, ut iam notavimus, verbo subinde seqq. *anima [etiam] circumscripta assumtione... et proprie et vere* cum praeced. arg. annexuit, hic post *digniori rei* e solutione infra habita suo marte addit *ergo unibilitas vel unio ad corpus non aufert ipsi animae proprietatem personae.* Sed tota hac mutatione argumenti vis debilitatur.

en: The book *On the One Person and the Two Natures,* c. 3. — In this third argument the codices and editions 1, 2 omit the words *when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing,* an omission which we attribute to nothing but the carelessness of the copyists, who, since immediately afterward the word *anima* occurs again, seem not to have noticed [it] in the preceding word, which has been restored by us from the solution of this objection. That it was necessary to restore them is clear from the solution itself. The Vatican [edition], which, as we have already noted, joined to the preceding argument the words next following *anima [also] the assumption being set aside... and properly and truly,* here after *digniori rei,* from the solution given below, on its own authority adds *therefore unibility or union to a body does not take away from the soul itself the property of a person.* But by this whole alteration the force of the argument is weakened.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — Cod. Z *ab Angelo.*

en: Cf. II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — Codex Z [reads] *ab Angelo.*

la: Codd. H K Z bb *constans est.*

en: Codices H, K, Z, bb [read] *constans est.*

la: Vat. addit *gloriosa,* quod etiam infra in solut. habetur. Subinde pro *per* codd. M O *post.*

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *gloriosa,* which is also had below in the solution. Thereupon for *per* codices M, O [read] *post.*

la: Alanus ab Insul., *Theolog. Regul.,* regul. 102: *Persona, id est res per se una.* Cfr. tom. I. pag. 405, nota 9.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules,* rule 102: *A person, that is, a thing one through itself.* Cf. tom. I. p. 405, note 9.

la: Codd. T U *ordinata.*

en: Codices T, U [read] *ordinata.*

la: Hic c. 3. — Seq. testimonium est Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.). — Paulo inferius pro *sit ei praeiudicium* edd. *fit ei praeiudicium.*

en: Here c. 3. — The following testimony is from Aristotle, II. *On Generation and Corruption,* text 59 (c. 10). — A little lower, for *sit ei praeiudicium* the editions [read] *fit ei praeiudicium.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Circa finem arg. pro *praemissum esset concedendum* edd. *praemissa esset concedenda.*

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 1, and following. — Near the end of the argument, for *praemissum esset concedendum* the editions [read] *praemissa esset concedenda.*

la: Hic c. 3. — Hug. de S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. I. c. 11. — Ante *magistri Hugonis* cod. K interiicit *etiam.*

en: Here c. 3. — Hugh of St. Victor, II. *On the Sacraments,* p. I. c. 11. — Before *magistri Hugonis* codex K interposes *etiam.*

la: Quaest. praeced. ad 1.

la: Cap. 35. n. 68: *Inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi.* Cfr. VII. c. 27. n. 38.

en: Chapter 35, n. 68: *There is in it a certain natural appetite for governing a body.* Cf. VII. c. 27. n. 38.

la: Codd. K Z bb supplent *doctores.* — B. Albertus quoque, hic a. 15, ait: *Si autem volumus sustinere Magistrum, tunc dicendum est, quod absoluta a corpore dicitur duobus modis, scil. absoluta i. e. divisa a corpore, et sic non est verum; vel absoluta a corpore i. e. ab ordine ad corpus, et tunc loquitur Magister per hypothesim, scil. si ponatur absolvi a dependentia, quam habet ad corpus; quia tunc erit Intelligentia quaedam de natura simili Angelorum.*

en: Codices K, Z, bb supply *doctores.* — Bl. Albert also, here a. 15, says: *But if we wish to uphold the Master, then it must be said that «released from the body» is said in two ways, namely «released» i.e. divided from the body, and thus it is not true; or «released from the body» i.e. from the ordering to a body, and then the Master speaks by hypothesis, namely if it be posited to be released from the dependence which it has on the body; because then it would be a certain Intelligence of a nature similar to the Angels.*

la: Quaest. praeced. ad 1. — Paulo superius post *ad dignitatem pertinente* Vat. propter immutationem ab ea in ipsa obiect. factam addit *et quod, circumscripta assumtione et unione, complete habet rationem personae, illam ponit Boethius.*

en: The preceding question, to [argument] 1. — A little above, after *ad dignitatem pertinente,* the Vatican [edition], on account of the alteration made by it in the objection itself, adds *and that, the assumption and union being set aside, it completely has the account of a person, which Boethius posits.*

la: Multi codd. perperam omittunt *personae.*

en: Many codices wrongly omit *personae.*

la: Cfr. d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *quam intentio speciei* edd. cum paucis codd. *quam intentionem* [cod. K subiicit *in modo*] *speciei.*

en: Cf. d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. — A little above, for *quam intentio speciei* the editions with a few codices [read] *quam intentionem* [codex K subjoins *in modo*] *speciei.*

la: Codd. K P Q Z bb *discretio.*

en: Codices K, P, Q, Z, bb [read] *discretio.*

la: Priscian., VIII. Grammat. c. 18: *In verbo vero et nomine et pronomine et participio omnes voces vel singulares habent numeros, vel plurales, et personas simul cum numero vel finitas vel infinitas... Sunt igitur personae verborum tres. Prima est, quae de se loquitur vel sola vel cum aliis, ut dico, dicimus... Et prima quidem et secunda verborum persona finitae sunt; praesentes enim demonstrantur; tertia vero infinita est; itaque eget plerumque pronomine, ut definiatur etc.* — Paulo superius pro *theologi* non pauci codd. *theologici.*

en: Priscian, VIII. *Grammar,* c. 18: *But in the verb and the noun and the pronoun and the participle all words, whether singular or plural, have numbers, and persons together with number, whether finite or infinite... There are therefore three persons of verbs. The first is that which speaks of itself, whether alone or with others, as «I say,» «we say»... And the first and second person of verbs indeed are finite; for they are demonstrated as present; but the third is infinite; and so it generally needs a pronoun, that it may be defined, etc.* — A little above, for *theologi* not a few codices [read] *theologici.*

la: Cod. Z et edd. 1, 2 *similitudinem.* Paulo inferius pro *Personalitas tamen* [scil. autem] edd. *Personalitas enim.*

en: Codex Z and editions 1, 2 [read] *similitudinem.* A little lower, for *Personalitas tamen* [namely *autem*] the editions [read] *Personalitas enim.*

la: Cfr. Aristot. III. de Part. animal. c. 10. et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio. — Pro *risibilitas* Vat. *visibilitas.*

en: Cf. Aristotle III. *On the Parts of Animals,* c. 10, and Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* the chapter on the Proper. — For *risibilitas* the Vatican [edition] [reads] *visibilitas.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solutione huius quaestionis posteriores Scholastici conveniunt, reprobantes tum opinionem Magistri et Hugonis a S. Victore, quod anima *separata,* proprie loquendo, sit persona, tum alteram, ex falsa sententia Platonis de unione animae corporisque ortam, quae tenet, quod anima *coniuncta in se sola* sit persona, quasi *pars* personae iam sit persona (cfr. hic solut. ad 6.). Communis autem scholae sententia est, quod ubi ipsa *natura* non est completa, nec ratio personalitatis est perfecta.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6. in fine. — Scol., Quodl. 9. n. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 29. a. 1. ad 5, q. 74. a. 4. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 15. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., a. 2. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the solution of this question the later Scholastics agree, rejecting both the opinion of the Master and of Hugh of Saint Victor, that the *separated* soul, properly speaking, is a person, and also the other [opinion], arising from the false view of Plato concerning the union of soul and body, which holds that the soul *conjoined in itself alone* is a person, as though a *part* of a person were already a person (cf. here the solution to [argument] 6). But the common view of the school is that, where the *nature* itself is not complete, neither is the account of personality perfect.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. III. q. 4. m. 6, at the end. — Scotus, *Quodlibet* 9, n. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; *Summa* I. q. 29, a. 1, ad 5, q. 74, a. 4, ad 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 15. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, a. 2, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 135–137 (PDF 157–159; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 9917–10086). Per the VOL II/III override, the column-band PDF read is authoritative for the cascade-shattered Respondeo + Solutio oppositorum + every page footer; the OCR carried the clean running-prose arguments and footnote-marker spacing.

**Alignment.** Verified: QUAESTIO III concerns *intentio personalitatis in anima separata* (the separated soul). Distinct from q1 (*naturam humanam assumtam esse a Deo*), q2 (*humanam personam,* DONE), q4 (*Deus assumserit hominem*), q5 (*assumserit humanitatem*). No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
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- p. 136 (L → R): args 4–6, Sed contra 1–4, CONCLUSIO, opening of Respondeo. Footer notes 1b–11b (continuous across both columns; Quaracchi numbers per page, not per column).
- p. 137 (L → R): tail of Respondeo + Solutio oppositorum (ad 1–6) + standalone SCHOLION (I–II). Footer notes 1c–8c (body markers; the scholion itself carries no markers).

**Footer ownership / hand-off.** Picked up from d5-a2-q2: NONE migrated — q2's scholion sits on p.135 markerless, so all p.135 footers belong to q3. p.135, p.136, and p.137 footer sequences are fully exhausted within this chunk. **Footer forwarded to d5-a2-q4: NONE** — QUAESTIO IV opens fresh at the top of printed p.138 with its own per-page footer sequence starting at note 1.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: TRUE`. A standalone SCHOLION (sections I–II) prints at q3's tail, spanning p.137 L bottom → R bottom, ending "Richard. a Med., a. 2. q. 1." just before the p.138 running head and QUAESTIO IV. The scholion text carries no footnote markers (consistent with q1/q2 scholia). Section I cross-references "hic solut. ad 6." (this question's reply to arg. 6).

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not as anchors: *Ad oppositum, Fundamenta, Opinio Magistri et Hugonis, Non probatur, Tria in persona, Conclusio, Excusat auctor, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum* (×4), *Dupliciter ratio deficit.*

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 138 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur in Psalmo[^1]: *Beatus quem eligisti et assumsisti*; sed beatus stat ibi pro aliquo; non est autem dare aliquem nisi hominem: ergo etc. (*Ad oppositum.*)

2. Item, Augustinus in Expositione Symboli[^2]: «Si quis dixerit, hominem a Christo assumtum depositum esse, anathema sit».

3. Item, Anselmus dicit in libro de Incarnatione[^3], quod «non assumsit hominem in communi, sed hunc hominem»; sed ad hunc hominem sequitur homo: ergo si hunc hominem assumsit, bene sequitur, quod assumserit hominem.

4. Item, proprietas unius partis denominat totum — unde Petrus dicitur albus, si solum corpus sit album[^4] — ergo multo fortius proprietas utriusque; sed verum est dicere, Christum assumsisse carnem et animam: ergo verum est dicere, quod assumserit hominem.

5. Item, Filius Dei assumsit animam et corpus et haec assumsit unita: ergo si corpus et anima unita faciunt hominem, ergo videtur, quod assumserit hominem. Si tu dicas, quod non fuerunt prius unita quam assumta[^5]; per hoc non dissolvitur et effugitur ratio, quia, si anima et corpus non fuerunt ante unita quam assumta prioritate temporis, saltem simul fuerunt invicem tempore unita et assumta: ergo videtur, quod in sua assumtione hominem faciebant; et si hoc verum est, ergo etc.

6. Item, Filius Dei[^6] est homo, aut homo, quem assumsit, aut homo, quem non assumsit. Si homo, quem assumsit, ergo assumsit hominem; si est homo, quem non assumsit, ergo aut Petrus, vel Paulus, vel de ceteris. Si ergo nullum talium est dare, videtur ergo simpliciter esse verum, quod assumserit hominem.

**Sed contra:** 1. In libro de Regulis fidei[^7] dicitur, quod «assumens non est assumtum»: ergo si Filius Dei est homo, falsum est, Filium Dei assumsisse hominem. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Item, si assumsit hominem et nunquam deponit quem assumsit, ergo semper fuit homo: ergo quando erat mortuus, erat homo; quod non videtur verum, cum sit «oppositio in adiecto»[^8].

3. Item, si assumsit hominem, aut hominem in communi, aut hunc hominem. Non hominem in communi, assumsit igitur hunc hominem[^9]; sed hic homo nominat personam vel saltem hypostasim: ergo in Christo sunt duae personae vel duae hypostases. Sed hoc est falsum et fidei contrarium: ergo etc.

4. Item, assumtio dicit usum aliquem rei assumtae; sed usus rei tempore, vel natura consequitur ipsam rem: ergo prius est assumtum naturaliter, quam sit ipsum assumi. Si ergo homo dicit humanam naturam in comparatione ad hypostasim sive personam; necesse est, quod in Christo sit alia persona quam persona assumens, ad quam comparetur humanitas ante assumtionem. Quodsi hoc simpliciter est falsum, restat, quod et illud est falsum: Filius Dei assumsit hominem.

### Conclusio.

> Impropria est locutio: Filius Dei assumsit hominem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt sustinere locutionem istam, sicut illi qui fuerunt de prima opinione[^10], dicentes, quod Christus est duo, scilicet duae res naturae, homo videlicet et Deus. (*Opinio 1.*)

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Sed quia illud non potest rationabiliter sustineri, sicut infra[^1b] videbitur, ideo alii distinguere voluerunt, quod est loqui de assumtione vel quantum ad *fieri*, vel quantum ad *factum esse*. Si loquamur de assumtione quantum ad *fieri*, sic falsum est, quod assumserit hominem, immo animam et carnem. Si autem loquamur de assumtione quantum ad *terminum* vel *assumtum esse*, concedere voluerunt, personam Dei assumsisse hominem. Tunc enim non videtur[^2b], quod homo ille fuerit ante assumtionem, sed quod ex ipsa assumtione aliquis factus est homo. (*Opinio 2.*) — Sed adhuc illud non videtur multum rationabiliter dictum. Nam si ex assumtione vestimenti vere possit aliquis dici *vestitus esse*, haec rationabiliter conceditur: hic assumit vestimentum; et haec non admittitur: iste assumit se vestitum, vel calceatum. Per hunc modum nec ista videtur esse admittenda: Filius Dei assumsit hominem, quamvis ex ipsa assumtione factus sit homo. (*Non probatur.*)

Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi communior et verior, quod haec est impropria: Filius Dei assumsit hominem. — Et ratio huius est, quia *homo* significat humanam formam sive naturam in concretione ad suppositum, de quo vere praedicatur secundum quandam *identitatem*. Et ideo de ipso supposito vere praedicatur, ut dicatur: iste est homo. Verbum autem *assumendi* de sua ratione plus importat, videlicet *distinctionem* assumentis ad assumtum, in hoc quod importat *relationem*; et *ordinem* etiam quendam importat respectu eius quod naturaliter *antecedit* ipsam assumtionem, et respectu eius quod *consequitur*. Nam res assumta naturaliter ipsam assumtionem *antecedit*, quamvis possit dici[^3b] *tempore* simul; concretio vero et unio assumentis ad assumtum *consequitur* ipsam assumtionem. (*Opinio 3 et conclusio 1.*) — Et ideo dupliciter haec est falsa: Filius Dei assumsit hominem: tum propter defectum *distinctionis*, quia *homo* praedicatur de Filio Dei; tum propter defectum *ordinis*, quia comparatio[^4b] humanitatis ad personam vel hypostasim consequitur ipsam assumtionem, et non antecedit, res autem assumta antecedit. — Et ideo praedictus sermo falsus est ex duplici causa, et rationes concedendae sunt ex ista parte. (*Conclusio 2.*)

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Ad illas vero auctoritates in contrarium adductas dicendum, quod aliquid habent improprietatis et sunt exponendae. Sancti enim loquuntur aliquando multum expresse. Unde *homo*[^5b] in praedictis auctoritatibus magis accipitur abstractive quam concretive, magis pro humana natura quam pro re naturae. Et per hunc modum ad consimiles auctoritates potest responderi unica responsione: quia *hominis* nomine humana natura habet intelligi; quamvis secundum communem usum et secundum virtutem vocabuli hoc nomen *homo* non ita consuetum sit accipi. (*Solutio oppositorum.*)

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas partis denominat totum; dicendum, quod illud habet instantiam in proprietatibus *respectivis*, quamvis veritatem habeat in proprietatibus *absolutis*. Quamvis enim verum sit, quod manus Petri sit minor Petro, vel quaelibet eius pars quodam modo; haec tamen est falsa: Petrus est minor Petro, vel differt a Petro. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est in proposito, quia *assumens*, sicut dictum est, vel *assumi* dicit aliquem ordinem, vel distinctionem, quae reperiri potest inter *personam* Christi et *partes compositi*[^6b] hominis, quae sunt corpus et anima, quamvis ille respectus vel ordo inter *personam* Christi et ipsum *Christum hominem* reperiri non valeat. (*Notandum.*)

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod assumsit animam et corpus unita; dicendum, quod est unio animae et corporis respectu *suppositi*, in quo sunt, et respectu *humanae naturae*, quam constituunt; et *utraque* unio animae ad corpus fuit in ipsa assumtione. Et una quidem antecedebat secundum ordinem naturae, scilicet animae ad corpus ad constitutionem unius naturae; altera vero, scilicet animae ad corpus in unam personam vel hypostasim, consequebatur ipsam assumtionem, quia persona et hypostasis Verbi, assumendo carnem, carnem et animam similiter[^7b] uniebat. (*Duplex unio.*) — Cum ergo dicitur, quod anima et corpus unita faciunt hominem; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod uniuntur isto duplici modo. Et quoniam alter istorum modorum consequitur ad assumtionem, ideo non conceditur ista, quod assumserit hominem, quamvis concedatur, quod assumserit animam et corpus coniuncta. — Posset etiam dici, quod non tenet illa consequentia: assumsit animam et corpus coniuncta[^8b], ergo assumsit hominem; quia *homo* supponit aliquem hominem, et ideo supponit aliquem, anima vero et corpus dicunt *quid*. Apud vero theologos reputatur fieri permutatio praedicamenti, cum proceditur ab eo quod dicitur *quis*, ad id quod praedicatur *in quid*, vel e converso, sicut in primo libro[^9b] habitum fuit. (*Alia solutio.*)

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*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus homo est, aut quem assumsit, aut quem non assumsit; dico, quod non recte dividis et sufficienter, quia contradictio non accipitur per negationem, quae fertur ad *implicationem*, sed per negationem, quae fertur ad *principale praedicatum*; et ideo non sic est dividendum: aut est homo *assumtus*, aut *non assumtus*; immo sic: aut *est* homo assumtus, aut *non est* homo assumtus, secundum legem contradictionis[^1c]. (*Notandum.*) Sed si obiiciatur, quod homo sufficienter dividitur per assumtum et non assumtum, tanquam per immediata; tunc respondendum est ad aliam inductionem: ergo vel est Petrus, vel Paulus etc.; quia nec est Petrus nec Paulus nec Virgilius, sed Iesus; et Iesus non est homo assumtus a Filio Dei, quamvis natura eius sit assumta. Iesus enim non est nomen impositum naturae, sed nomen impositum *personae*[^2c].

english:
### Question IV. *Whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man.*

Fourth, it is asked whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man. And that He did, it seems:

1. By that which is said in the Psalm[^1]: *Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken up*; but "blessed" stands there for some [individual]; and there is no one to point to except a man: therefore etc. (*To the opposite.*)

2. Likewise, Augustine in the Exposition of the Creed[^2]: "If anyone shall say that the man assumed by Christ was laid down, let him be anathema."

3. Likewise, Anselm says in the book *On the Incarnation*[^3] that "He did not assume a man in general, but this man"; but from "this man" there follows "man": therefore if He assumed this man, it well follows that He assumed a man.

4. Likewise, the property of one part denominates the whole — whence Peter is called white if only his body is white[^4] — therefore much more the property of both; but it is true to say that Christ assumed flesh and soul: therefore it is true to say that He assumed a man.

5. Likewise, the Son of God assumed soul and body, and He assumed them united: therefore if body and soul united make a man, it therefore seems that He assumed a man. If you should say that they were not united before they were assumed[^5]; by this the reasoning is not dissolved and evaded, because, if soul and body were not united before they were assumed by priority of time, at least they were simultaneously united and assumed to one another in time: therefore it seems that in His assumption they were making a man; and if this is true, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the Son of God[^6] is a man, either a man whom He assumed, or a man whom He did not assume. If a man whom He assumed, then He assumed a man; if He is a man whom He did not assume, then either Peter, or Paul, or of the rest. If, then, none of such can be pointed to, it therefore seems simply to be true that He assumed a man.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the book *On the Rules of Faith*[^7] it is said that "the assumer is not the assumed": therefore if the Son of God is a man, it is false that the Son of God assumed a man. (*The grounds.*)

2. Likewise, if He assumed a man and never lays down whom He assumed, then He always was a man: therefore when He was dead, He was a man; which does not seem true, since it is "a contradiction in the predicate"[^8].

3. Likewise, if He assumed a man, then either a man in general, or this man. Not a man in general; therefore He assumed this man[^9]; but this man names a person or at least a hypostasis: therefore in Christ there are two persons or two hypostases. But this is false and contrary to faith: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, assumption asserts some use of the thing assumed; but the use of a thing follows the thing itself either in time or in nature: therefore the assumed is prior naturally to the assuming itself. If, then, "man" asserts human nature in comparison to a hypostasis or person; it is necessary that in Christ there be a person other than the assuming person, to which the humanity is compared before the assumption. But if this is simply false, it remains that that too is false: the Son of God assumed a man.

### Conclusion.

> The expression "the Son of God assumed a man" is improper.

**I respond:** It must be said that some wished to maintain that expression, like those who held the first opinion[^10], saying that Christ is two things, namely two things of nature, that is, a man and God. (*Opinion 1.*)

But because that cannot be reasonably maintained, as will be seen below[^1b], therefore others wished to distinguish, that there is a speaking of assumption either as to its *becoming* (*fieri*), or as to its *being-done* (*factum esse*). If we speak of assumption as to its *becoming*, then it is false that He assumed a man, but rather a soul and flesh. But if we speak of assumption as to its *term* or *being-assumed*, they wished to concede that the person of God assumed a man. For then it does not seem[^2b] that that man existed before the assumption, but that from the assumption itself someone was made a man. (*Opinion 2.*) — But still that does not seem to have been said very reasonably. For if from the assuming of a garment someone can truly be said to *be clothed*, this is reasonably conceded: "this one assumes a garment"; and this is not admitted: "this one assumes himself clothed, or shod." In this manner neither does this seem to be admissible: "the Son of God assumed a man," although from the assumption itself He was made a man. (*Not proven.*)

And therefore there is a third, more common and more true, manner of speaking, namely that this is improper: "the Son of God assumed a man." — And the reason for this is that *man* signifies the human form or nature in concretion with the supposit, of which it is truly predicated according to a certain *identity*. And therefore it is truly predicated of the supposit itself, so that it is said: "this one is a man." But the verb *to assume* of its very account asserts more, namely the *distinction* of the assumer to the assumed, in this that it asserts a *relation*; and it also asserts a certain *order* with respect to that which naturally *precedes* the assumption itself, and with respect to that which *follows*. For the thing assumed naturally *precedes* the assumption itself, although it can be said[^3b] to be simultaneous in *time*; whereas the concretion and union of the assumer to the assumed *follows* the assumption itself. (*Opinion 3 and conclusion 1.*) — And therefore in two ways this is false: "the Son of God assumed a man": both on account of a defect of *distinction*, because *man* is predicated of the Son of God; and on account of a defect of *order*, because the comparison[^4b] of the humanity to the person or hypostasis follows the assumption itself, and does not precede it, whereas the thing assumed precedes. — And therefore the aforesaid statement is false from a twofold cause, and the reasons [against it] are to be conceded on that side. (*Conclusion 2.*)

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* As for those authorities adduced to the contrary, it must be said that they have something of impropriety and are to be expounded. For the saints sometimes speak very expressly. Whence *man*[^5b] in the aforesaid authorities is taken rather abstractly than concretely, rather for the human nature than for the thing of nature. And in this manner the like authorities can be answered with a single response: because by the name *of a man* the human nature is to be understood; although according to common usage and according to the force of the word this name *man* is not so customarily taken. (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)

*To 4.* As for what is objected, that the property of a part denominates the whole; it must be said that this has an instance [to the contrary] in *respective* properties, although it has truth in *absolute* properties. For although it is true that Peter's hand is smaller than Peter, or any part of him in a certain manner; nevertheless this is false: "Peter is smaller than Peter," or "differs from Peter." In this manner too it is to be understood in the matter proposed, because *assuming*, as has been said, or *being-assumed* asserts some order, or distinction, which can be found between the *person* of Christ and the *parts of the composite*[^6b] man, which are body and soul, although that respect or order between the *person* of Christ and *Christ the man* himself cannot be found. (*Note.*)

*To 5.* As for what is objected, that He assumed soul and body united; it must be said that there is a union of soul and body with respect to the *supposit*, in which they are, and with respect to the *human nature*, which they constitute; and *both* unions of soul to body were in the assumption itself. And the one indeed preceded according to the order of nature, namely [the union] of soul to body for the constitution of one nature; but the other, namely [the union] of soul to body into one person or hypostasis, followed the assumption itself, because the person and hypostasis of the Word, by assuming flesh, was likewise[^7b] uniting flesh and soul. (*Twofold union.*) — When therefore it is said that soul and body united make a man; it must be said that it is true, according as they are united in this twofold manner. And since one of these manners follows upon the assumption, therefore this is not conceded, that He assumed a man, although it is conceded that He assumed soul and body conjoined. — It could also be said that this consequence does not hold: "He assumed soul and body conjoined[^8b], therefore He assumed a man"; because *man* supposits for some man, and therefore supposits for someone, whereas soul and body assert a *what*. But among theologians it is reckoned that a change of predicament occurs, when one proceeds from that which is said *who* to that which is predicated *in [the category of] what*, or conversely, as was held in the first book[^9b]. (*Another solution.*)

*To 6.* As for what is objected, that Christ is a man, either whom He assumed or whom He did not assume; I say that you do not divide rightly and sufficiently, because the contradiction is not taken by the negation that bears upon the *implication*, but by the negation that bears upon the *principal predicate*; and therefore it is not to be divided thus: either He is a man *assumed*, or *not assumed*; but rather thus: either He *is* an assumed man, or He *is not* an assumed man, according to the law of contradiction[^1c]. (*Note.*) But if it be objected that "man" is sufficiently divided by "assumed" and "not assumed," as by immediates; then a response must be made to the other inference: "therefore either He is Peter, or Paul, etc."; because He is neither Peter nor Paul nor Virgil, but Jesus; and Jesus is not a man assumed by the Son of God, although His nature is assumed. For "Jesus" is not a name imposed on a nature, but a name imposed on a *person*[^2c].

la: Psalm. 64, 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Psalm 64:5 [Vulgate]. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Sive de Fide Trinitatis, c. 6. — In minori codd. A G (T a prima manu) U V omittunt *ad*.

en: Or *On the Faith of the Trinity*, c. 6. — In the lesser [edition], codices A G (T, by a first hand) U V omit *ad*.

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.) ait: Cum enim sint partes totius, et id in quo, et id quod in hoc, dicetur totum in se ipso [esse]; dicitur enim et secundum partes, ut albus, quia superficies alba sit; et sciens, quia ratiocinativum.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 24 (c. 3) says: For since there are parts of the whole, both that in which and that which [is] in this, the whole will be said to be in itself; for it is also called [such] according to its parts, as "white," because the surface is white; and "knowing," because the reasoning [part is so].

la: De quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et supra d. II. c. 3, et Comment. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *et effugitur* codd. F U *nec effugitur*, cod. Y *vel effugitur*.

en: On which see here the text of the Master, c. 3, and above d. 2, c. 3, and the Commentary on d. 3, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — Presently, for *et effugitur* codices F U read *nec effugitur*, codex Y *vel effugitur*.

la: Vocem *Dei*, quae a Vat. abest, adiecimus fide codd. K P S (U a prima manu) Z bb.

en: The word *Dei*, which is absent from the Vatican [edition], we have added on the authority of codices K P S (U, by a first hand) Z bb.

la: Alani ab Insul., regula 101: «Sicut pars non potest esse totum, vel constituens constitutum, ita assumens non potest esse assumtum». Quam regulam Alanus sic probat: Omnis clamat philosophia, quod nihil potest esse de se ipso, nihil apud se; pars ergo totum esse non potest, quia de toto est; similiter componens compositum. A simili, cum assumtum de assumenti sit, ipsum assumens esse non potest. — Ambros., de Incarn. domin. sacram. c. 6. n. 61. ait: Aliud est enim quod assumsit, et aliud quod assumtum est.

en: Alan of Lille, rule 101: "Just as a part cannot be the whole, or the constituent the thing constituted, so the assumer cannot be the assumed." Alan proves this rule thus: All philosophy proclaims that nothing can be from itself, nothing in regard to itself; a part therefore cannot be the whole, because it is of the whole; likewise the composing [element cannot be] the composite. By a similar [argument], since the assumed is of the assumer, it cannot be the assumer itself. — Ambrose, *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation* c. 6, n. 61, says: For it is one thing that He assumed, and another that was assumed.

la: Aristot. II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11.). — Cfr. infra d. 22. q. I. — In maiori Vat. cum nonnullis codd. pro *deponit* exhibet *deposuit*; et quod ibi profertur noto illo nititur axiomate theologico: «Quod Verbum semel assumsit nunquam dimisit»; quod axioma ab aliis Gregorio Nysseno, ab aliis Damasceno tribuitur. Ille dicit II. contra Eunomium (ed. Migne, col. 548): «Χωρισθεῖσα δὲ οὐδετέρου ᾧ ἅπαξ συνανεκράθη» i. e. a neutro [corpore scil. et anima] separata est [scil. divinitas], cui semel contemperata est». Simili modo eloquitur Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 27, ibid. IV. c. 1, et Homil. in Sabbat. sanct. n. 29.

en: Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 2 (c. 11). — Cf. below d. 22, q. 1. — In the greater Vatican [edition], with several codices, for *deponit* it presents *deposuit*; and what is there brought forward rests on that well-known theological axiom: "What the Word once assumed it never let go"; which axiom is ascribed by some to Gregory of Nyssa, by others to the Damascene. The former says in *Against Eunomius* II (ed. Migne, col. 548): "Χωρισθεῖσα δὲ οὐδετέρου ᾧ ἅπαξ συνανεκράθη," i.e. [the divinity] is separated from neither [body, namely, and soul] with which it was once commingled. In a similar manner the Damascene speaks, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 27, and ibid. IV, c. 1, and in the *Homily on Holy Saturday*, n. 29.

la: Vide verba Damasc. supra q. I. in fine argg. allata. Inferius sumitur *hypostasis* pro *supposito*.

en: See the words of the Damascene adduced above in q. 1 at the end of the arguments. Below, *hypostasis* is taken for *supposit*.

la: Tres enim opiniones de hac re, scil. de modo unionis divinae naturae cum humana in Christo, a Magistro in lit. d. VI. c. 2. seqq. afferuntur, quae in Comment., et quidem in *divisione textus*, accuratius explicantur.

en: For three opinions on this matter, namely on the manner of the union of the divine nature with the human in Christ, are brought forward by the Master in the text of d. 6, c. 2 ff., which are more accurately explained in the Commentary, and indeed in the *division of the text*.

la: Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro *distinguere voluerunt* codd. U *distinguunt*.

en: Dist. 6, a. 1, q. 1. — Thereupon, for *distinguere voluerunt* codices U [read] *distinguunt*.

la: Codd. H (K a prima manu) z *notatur*, cod. bb *sequitur*.

en: Codices H (K, by a first hand) z [read] *notatur*, codex bb *sequitur*.

la: Codd. K Z *possit esse*.

en: Codices K Z [read] *possit esse*.

la: Vat. *concretio*, quae mutatio contra auctoritatem codd. et edd. non videtur esse necessaria. Sensus autem est: in nomine concreto *homo* iam praesupponitur in Christo *suppositum* infinitum, *cui* assumtum (cfr. hic ad 5. et d. 6. a. 1. q. 1.); sed in locutione *assumere hominem* res assumta, scilicet *homo*, vi verbi antecedit hanc unionem, non consequitur.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *concretio*, which change against the authority of the codices and editions does not seem to be necessary. But the sense is: in the concrete name *man* there is already presupposed in Christ the infinite *supposit*, *to which* [is] the assumed (cf. here ad 5 and d. 6, a. 1, q. 1); but in the expression *to assume a man* the thing assumed, namely *man*, by force of the verb precedes this union, [and] does not follow it.

la: Edd. voci *homo* praemittunt *hoc nomen*.

en: The editions prefix to the word *homo* [the words] *hoc nomen*.

la: Pro *compositi*, quod codd. K bb prorsus omittunt, codd. A G H I L N T U V aa et edd. 1, 2 indiligenter substituerunt *corporis*.

en: For *compositi*, which codices K bb omit altogether, codices A G H I L N T U V aa and editions 1, 2 carelessly substituted *corporis*.

la: Pro *similiter* codd. K P Q Z *sibi* (i. e. ad invicem), Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *simul*. Proxime ante perquam multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 semel vocem *carnem* omittunt.

en: For *similiter* codices K P Q Z [read] *sibi* (i.e. "to one another"), the Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, *simul*. Just before, very many codices and editions 1, 2 omit the word *carnem* once.

la: Codd. W X *unita*.

en: Codices W X [read] *unita*.

la: Dist. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. et d. 26. q. I. in fine corp. — Paulo superius pro *Apud vero theologos* edd. *Apud veros ergo theologos*.

en: Dist. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3, and d. 26, q. 1, at the end of the body. — A little above, for *Apud vero theologos* the editions [read] *Apud veros ergo theologos*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 6. (c. 7.) nec non II. c. 1. (c. 10.), quo ultimo loco agitur de oppositione terminorum infinitorum v. gr. *non-homo* (non assumtus), qui quidem contradictionis speciem prae se ferunt, revera autem contradictionem non efficiunt. — Per *implicationem* intelligitur propositio relativa, subiectum propositionis determinans. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. *de Restrictione*. — Paulo inferius pro *aliam* edd. *illam*. Vox *aliam* opponitur primae distinctioni.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 6 (c. 7) and also II, c. 1 (c. 10), in which last place there is treated the opposition of infinite terms, e.g. *non-man* (not assumed), which indeed bear the appearance of a contradiction, but in reality do not effect a contradiction. — By *implication* is understood the relative proposition determining the subject of the proposition. Cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract *On Restriction*. — A little below, for *aliam* the editions [read] *illam*. The word *aliam* is opposed to the first distinction.

la: Vide Anselm., de Fide Trin. c. 6.

en: See Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity*, c. 6.

la: *(Scholion source-reference — no body marker.)* Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 7. q. incid. — Scot., in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 6. q. 3. — S. Thom., artt. supra citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 4. — Biel, III. Sent. d. 6. q. 1.

en: *(Scholion source-reference — no body marker.)* Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 4, m. 7, incidental q. — Scotus, in both Writings, III Sent. d. 6, q. 3. — St. Thomas, the articles cited above. — Bl. Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, III Sent. d. 6, q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, III Sent. d. 6, a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, III Sent. d. 6, q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III Sent. d. 6, q. 4. — Biel, III Sent. d. 6, q. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter antiqui Scholastici docent, locutionem, de qua agitur, impropriam esse nec in sensu formali admittendam, licet non raro in libris Ss. Patrum et ipsius Augustini occurrat (cfr. hic solut. ad 1. 2. 3.), sicut etiam ab aliquibus recentioribus admittitur. Haec doctrina sponte fluit ex duobus principiis, quorum primum est, quod id quod assumitur secundum intellectum praecedit unionem, unde in locutione *homo assumtus* saltem natura prius homo esse ponitur, quam assumatur. Alterum est, quod *homo*, proprie loquendo, non significat humanam naturam in *abstracto*, sed in *concreto*, scilicet ut quid subsistens; unde supponit pro supposito subsistente in natura humana. Manifestum autem est, quod Christi suppositum sive persona non potest dici assumtum. — Secundam rationem sumsit S. Bonav. ex ipso verbo *assumere*, quod implicat distinctionem, cum assumens non sit assumtum. Recte quidem dicitur: Filius Dei est homo, at non bene dicitur: est homo, quem assumsit, sed potius est homo, cuius humanam naturam assumsit (ita S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. a. 2. ad 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 3. ad 3.). Eundem sensum habet hic solut. ad 6. — Tota haec quaestio magis explicatur pluribus quaestionibus distinctionum 6. et 7.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The ancient Scholastics commonly teach that the expression in question is improper and not to be admitted in the formal sense, although it occurs not rarely in the books of the holy Fathers and of Augustine himself (cf. here the solution to 1, 2, 3), as it is also admitted by certain more recent [authors]. This doctrine flows of itself from two principles, of which the first is that what is assumed precedes the union according to the understanding, whence in the expression *assumed man* the man is at least by nature posited as being a man before he is assumed. The second is that *man*, properly speaking, does not signify the human nature in the *abstract*, but in the *concrete*, namely as something subsisting; whence it supposits for the supposit subsisting in the human nature. But it is manifest that Christ's supposit or person cannot be said to be assumed. — The second reason St. Bonaventure took from the very word *to assume*, which implies a distinction, since the assumer is not the assumed. It is indeed rightly said: "the Son of God is a man," but it is not well said: "He is a man whom He assumed," but rather "He is a man whose human nature He assumed" (so St. Thomas, III Sent. d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; S. [Th.] III, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3). The solution to 6 here has the same sense. — This whole question is more fully explained in several questions of distinctions 6 and 7.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.138–140 (PDF 160–162; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion (the Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum ad 1–6, and every page footer are cascade-shattered in the IA djvu OCR). Raw OCR lines 10087–10244 used as the marker-position base. Fresh literal English. No `[?]` flags.

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- p.139 (raw 10149–10215): rest of Respondeo (Opinio 2 *fieri/factum esse*, *Non probatur*, Opinio 3 + Conclusio 1, Conclusio 2) + replies *Ad 1.2.3.* (Solutio oppositorum), *Ad 4.* (Notandum), *Ad 5.* (Duplex unio + Alia solutio). Footer notes 1–9 → suffixed `[^1b]`–`[^9b]`.
- p.140 (raw 10216–10244): reply *Ad 6.* (Notandum) ending at *personae*, then the SCHOLION (section I) + its source list. q4's body footers on p.140 are notes 1–2 → suffixed `[^1c]`–`[^2c]`. The remaining p.140 footer notes (3–8: Anselm de Fide Trin., Libr. III de Fide orthod., Loc. cit., Vulgata Philipp., temporaliter, Damasc. de Fide orthod.) belong to QUAESTIO V and are NOT captured here.

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**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (single section **I.**) prints at q4's tail on p.140-R, beginning "Communiter antiqui Scholastici docent…" and ending "…distinctionum 6. et 7." just before QUAESTIO V (raw 10245). The scholion body carries NO footnote markers (it cross-refers "hic solut. ad 1. 2. 3." and "hic solut. ad 6." internally). Its appended source list is `[^11]`.

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**J4 Class-B re-verification (2026-07-17):** `[^11]` (the scholion's Alex. Hal./Scot./S. Thom./…/Biel source-reference list) was flagged as an orphaned apparatus def by the corpus classifier. Pulled 450 dpi PDF bands for printed p.140 (colcrop `vol3-p140-R-1.png`/`-R-2.png`) to check for a printed superscript numeral. Found none: the source-reference block is introduced in print by a marginal Roman-numeral sigil ("II"), not a footnote-style superscript digit, and p.140's numbered footnote sequence (notes 1–8, all belonging to Quaestio V per the hand-off note below) contains no "11". **REFUSED** — there is no printed body anchor for this entry to place; it is legitimately unanchored by Quaracchi's own layout, exactly as already documented above. Left `[^11]` in the Apparatus section as-is, unanchored in both bodies.

**Footer hand-off forwarded to d5-a2-q5:** NONE forwarded as a parked note, BUT note the shared printed page 140: q4 owns only p.140 footer notes 1–2 (`[^1c]`/`[^2c]`); p.140 footer notes 3+ (Anselm de Fide Trin., Libr. III de Fide orthod., Loc. cit., then the Damascenus/Vulgate/temporaliter notes) belong to QUAESTIO V, which opens at p.140-R bottom (raw 10245) and continues onto p.141+. q5 must build its p.140 footer sequence from note 3 onward (its body markers begin *Damascenus⁸*… on p.140; the Quaracchi p.140 footer notes for q5's first markers are the 5/6/7/8 group read in this session). q5 opens: `Quinto quaeritur, utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.`

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

(*Fundamenta.*)

1. Damascenus[^3c]: «Omnia quae in nostra natura plantavit, assumsit Dei Verbum»; sed unicuique nostrum dedit humanitatem: ergo videtur, quod assumsit humanitatem.

2. Item, humanitas non est aliud quam hominis natura, secundum quod dicit Damascenus[^4c]: «Divinitatis et humanitatis nomina naturam sunt repraesentativa»; sed haec simpliciter est concedenda: Filius Dei assumsit humanam naturam: ergo et haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.

3. Item, humanitas est forma hominis; sed haec simpliciter conceditur: Filius Dei assumsit formam hominis, sicut dicitur ad Philippenses secundo[^5c]: *Humiliavit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens:* ergo et ista: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.

4. Item, haec est simpliciter vera: Filius Dei habet humanitatem; et eam non habuit ab aeterno, sed temporaliter[^6c]: ergo videtur, quod eam assumsit.

**Sed contra:** (*Ad oppositum.*) 1. Humanitas consequitur unionem animae cum corpore; sed anima et corpus non fuerunt prius unita quam assumta[^7c]: ergo si assumtum secundum ordinem naturalem praecedit ipsam assumtionem, videtur, quod haec sit falsa: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.

2. Item, magis significat in abstractione hoc nomen *humanitas* quam hoc nomen *homo:* ergo si «Deus non assumsit humanam naturam in universali, sed in atomo[^8c]», ergo haec est magis impropria: assumsit humanitatem, quam: assumsit hominem: ergo est falsa.

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3. Item, si assumsit humanitatem et nunquam deposuit quod assumsit, semper habuit humanitatem; sed quod habet humanitatem semper est homo semper; ergo in triduo fuit homo[^1d].

(*Quaestio incidens.*) Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quid nomine *humanitatis* intelligitur, cum dicitur, Dei Filium assumsisse humanitatem?

### Conclusio.

> Concedendum est, quod Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.

**Respondeo:** (*Tripliciter dicitur humanitas.*) Dicendum, quod nomen[^2d] *humanitatis* consuevit tripliciter accipi: uno modo per *humanitatem* possunt intelligi *principia constituentia* hominem; alio modo per *humanitatem* potest intelligi *forma consequens* totum compositum; tertio modo nomine *humanitatis* potest intelligi *proprietas consequens* ipsum hominem, in quantum est homo. Et iste triplex intellectus habetur ex verbis Magistri, distinctione secunda[^3d], ubi confirmat Magister et ostendit auctoritate Hieronymi, nomine *humanitatis* corpus et animam intelligi.

(*Conclusio cum triplici applicatione.*) Omnibus autem his modis concedendum est, Filium Dei assumsisse humanitatem. Si enim nomine *humanitatis* intelligantur ipsa *principia constituentia* hominem, videlicet anima et caro, absque dubio verum est, quod Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem, id est animam et carnem[^4d]. — Item, si nomine *humanitatis* intelligatur *forma totius,* adhuc veritatem habet: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem, id est formam humanam, iuxta illud quod dicitur ad Philippenses secundo[^5d]: *Humiliavit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens.* — Postremo, si nomine *humanitatis* intelligatur ipsa *proprietas consequens,* adhuc veritatem habet: Filius Dei assumsit humanam naturam, quia non solum nostram naturam humanam assumsit, sed proprietates consequentes, sicut dicit Damascenus[^6d]. — (*Corollarium.*) Si quis autem hoc ultimo modo *solum* intelligat, quod assumserit humanitatem, id est hominis proprietatem, errat circa incarnationis veritatem. Oportet enim ponere, quod hoc triplici modo dicendi Filius Dei assumsit naturam humanam[^7d]. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

(*Solutio oppositorum.*) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod humanitas consequitur unionem; dicendum, quod consequitur unionem animae ad corpus, secundum quod uniuntur in constitutionem naturae, non secundum quod uniuntur in unitatem personae[^8d]. — (*Alia solutio cum distinctione.*) Posset etiam dici, quod cum quaedam sunt *prius assumta,* et quaedam *coassumta;* et quamvis anima et corpus primo assumta sint a Verbo, tamen omnia quae ad ea consequuntur, dici possunt *coassumta.* Unde, quia anima et corpus habebant proprietatem passibilitatis, Filius Dei assumsit passibilitatem. Et per hunc modum concedendum est, quod assumserit humanitatem, quemadmodum conceditur, quod assumserit passibilitatem, quamvis non concedatur, quod assumserit se passibilem, sed quod assumendo passibilitatem fecerit se passibilem. Sic conceditur, quod assumserit humanitatem, licet non concedatur, quod assumserit se hominem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de abstractione, dicendum, quod potius facit ad oppositum quam ad propositum. (*Notandum.*) Quia enim significat *abstractive,* ideo significat in quadam diversitate a supposito; et ideo salvari potest ista conditio assumtionis, quae quidem est distinctio assumentis ad assumtum; non sic autem est in hoc quod dicitur *homo*[^9d].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nunquam deposuit quod assumsit; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur quantum ad *principia naturae,* quae prius fuerunt assumta, scilicet anima et caro; quantum vero ad *coassumta* veritatem non habet; deposuit enim passibilitatem. (*Notandum.*) Sed si hoc modo accipiatur *humanitas* ratione principiorum constituentium hominem, sic nunquam deposuit humanitatem. Sed ex hoc non sequitur: in triduo habuit humanitatem, ergo fuit homo; quia principia hominis non faciunt hominem, nisi in quantum coniunguntur *ad invicem,* et uniuntur in *unitatem personae;* et alter istorum modorum deficiebat in triduo. Quodsi nomine *humanitatis* intelligatur ipsa forma consequens compositum[^10d], vel ipsa proprietas; non oportet, quod in triduo Christus habuerit humanitatem; quia, sicut dictum est, talia non fuerunt primo assumta, sed magis coassumta.

(*Ad quaestionem incidentem.*) 4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, patet responsio ex his quae iam dicta sunt.

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english:
### Question V. *Whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God assumed humanity.*

Fifthly it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God assumed humanity. And that it is so, it seems.

(*Fundamentals.*)

1. Damascene[^3c]: "All things which He planted in our nature, the Word of God assumed"; but to each of us He gave humanity: therefore it seems that He assumed humanity.

2. Likewise, humanity is nothing other than the nature of man, according to what Damascene says[^4c]: "The names 'divinity' and 'humanity' are representative of a nature"; but this is simply to be conceded: the Son of God assumed human nature: therefore also this: the Son of God assumed humanity.

3. Likewise, humanity is the form of man; but this is simply conceded: the Son of God assumed the form of man, as is said in Philippians, chapter two[^5c]: *He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant:* therefore also this: the Son of God assumed humanity.

4. Likewise, this is simply true: the Son of God has humanity; and He did not have it from eternity, but temporally[^6c]: therefore it seems that He assumed it.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite.*) 1. Humanity follows upon the union of soul with body; but the soul and the body were not united prior to being assumed[^7c]: therefore if the thing assumed precedes, according to the natural order, the assumption itself, it seems that this is false: the Son of God assumed humanity.

2. Likewise, the name *humanity* signifies more in abstraction than does the name *man:* therefore if "God did not assume human nature in the universal, but in the individual[^8c]," then this is more improper: He assumed humanity, than: He assumed a man: therefore it is false.

3. Likewise, if He assumed humanity and never laid aside what He assumed, He always had humanity; but what has humanity is always a man always; therefore in the three days [in the tomb] He was a man[^1d].

(*Incidental question.*) In connection with this it is asked: what is understood by the name *humanity* when it is said that the Son of God assumed humanity?

### Conclusion.

> It is to be conceded that the Son of God assumed humanity.

**I respond:** (*"Humanity" is said in three ways.*) It must be said that the name[^2d] *humanity* is customarily taken in three ways: in one way, by *humanity* can be understood the *constituent principles* of man; in another way, by *humanity* can be understood the *form following upon* the whole composite; in a third way, by the name *humanity* can be understood the *property following upon* man himself, insofar as he is a man. And this threefold understanding is had from the words of the Master, in the second distinction[^3d], where the Master confirms and shows, on the authority of Jerome, that by the name *humanity* the body and the soul are understood.

(*The conclusion with its threefold application.*) Now in all these ways it must be conceded that the Son of God assumed humanity. For if by the name *humanity* are understood the *constituent principles* of man, namely the soul and the flesh, it is without doubt true that the Son of God assumed humanity, that is, a soul and flesh[^4d]. — Likewise, if by the name *humanity* is understood the *form of the whole,* it still holds the truth: the Son of God assumed humanity, that is, a human form, according to that which is said in Philippians, chapter two[^5d]: *He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant.* — Finally, if by the name *humanity* is understood the *property following upon* it, it still holds the truth: the Son of God assumed human nature, because He assumed not only our human nature, but also its consequent properties, as Damascene says[^6d]. — (*Corollary.*) But if anyone understands *only* in this last way that He assumed humanity, that is, the property of man, he errs concerning the truth of the Incarnation. For one must hold that in this threefold manner of speaking the Son of God assumed human nature[^7d]. — And the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. As for what is objected, that humanity follows upon the union; it must be said that it follows upon the union of the soul to the body insofar as they are united into the constitution of a nature, not insofar as they are united into the unity of a person[^8d]. — (*Another solution with a distinction.*) It could also be said that since some things are *first assumed* and some *co-assumed;* and although the soul and the body are first assumed by the Word, nevertheless all the things which follow upon them can be called *co-assumed.* Hence, because the soul and the body had the property of passibility, the Son of God assumed passibility. And in this manner it must be conceded that He assumed humanity, just as it is conceded that He assumed passibility, although it is not conceded that He assumed Himself as passible, but that by assuming passibility He made Himself passible. Thus it is conceded that He assumed humanity, although it is not conceded that He assumed Himself as a man.

2. As for what is objected concerning abstraction, it must be said that it tells rather for the opposite than for the proposed view. (*Note.*) For because it signifies *abstractly,* it therefore signifies in a certain diversity from the supposit; and therefore that condition of the assumption can be safeguarded, which indeed is the distinction of the one assuming from the thing assumed; but it is not so in this, that it is called *man*[^9d].

3. As for what is objected, that He never laid aside what He assumed; it must be said that this is understood with respect to the *principles of the nature,* which were first assumed, namely the soul and the flesh; but with respect to the *co-assumed* it does not hold the truth; for He laid aside passibility. (*Note.*) But if *humanity* is taken in this way, by reason of the principles constituting man, then He never laid aside humanity. But from this it does not follow: in the three days [in the tomb] He had humanity, therefore He was a man; because the principles of man do not make a man, except insofar as they are joined *to one another* and are united into the *unity of a person;* and one of these modes was lacking in the three days. But if by the name *humanity* is understood the form itself following upon the composite[^10d], or the property itself; it is not necessary that in the three days Christ had humanity; because, as has been said, such things were not first assumed, but rather co-assumed.

(*To the incidental question.*) 4. As for what was asked last, the response is clear from the things which have already been said.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6.

la: Loc. cit. c. 4. Cfr. ibid. c. 11. — In testim. allato codd. et edd. 1, 2 (sicut et textus origin.) pro *nomina* exhibent *nomen,* praedicati tamen pluralem numerum servantes. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I.

en: The place cited, c. 4. Cf. ibid. c. 11. — In the testimony adduced, the codices and editions 1, 2 (as also the original text) read *nomen* for *nomina,* yet retaining the plural number of the predicate. Cf. above, the Master's text, d. II. c. I.

la: Vers. 7, ubi Vulgata: *Semetipsum exinanivit, formam* etc. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c. I. — Paulo ante pro *assumsit* cod. K *accepit,* cod. Z *accipit.*

en: Verse 7, where the Vulgate has: *He emptied Himself, the form* etc. Cf. here the Master's text, c. I. — A little before, for *assumsit* codex K reads *accepit,* codex Z *accipit.*

la: Pro *sed temporaliter,* quae verba in cod. T desiderantur, codd. A G H I K L U V Z aa *sed sempiternaliter,* codd. N X Y *sed per incarnationem.*

en: For *sed temporaliter,* which words are lacking in codex T, codices A G H I K L U V Z aa read *sed sempiternaliter,* codices N X Y *sed per incarnationem.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Ut docet Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. Vide supra q. 1. in fine, argg. — Mox post *quam* Vat. cum paucis codd. repetit *haec.*

en: As Damascene teaches, Book III of *On the Orthodox Faith,* c. 11. See above, q. 1, at the end, in the arguments. — Soon after *quam,* the Vatican edition with a few codices repeats *haec.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 138, nota 8. et infra d. 22. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *Dei Filium* codd. K Z bb *Dei Filius.*

en: Cf. above, p. 138, note 8, and below, d. 22, q. 1. — A little below, for *Dei Filium* codices K Z bb read *Dei Filius.*

la: Codd. H N U V W voci *nomen* praefigunt *hoc.*

en: Codices H N U V W prefix *hoc* to the word *nomen.*

la: Cap. I. — Paulo post codd., omisso nomine *Hieronymi,* pro *intelligi* habent *se nomine... intelligere.*

en: Chapter I. — A little after, the codices, omitting the name of *Jerome,* read for *intelligi* instead *se nomine... intelligere.*

la: Quod et ostensum est supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: Which was also shown above, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 and following.

la: Vers. 7. Pro *Humiliavit* cod. K cum Vulgata *Exinanivit.*

en: Verse 7. For *Humiliavit* codex K, with the Vulgate, reads *Exinanivit.*

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I. in fine. — Paulo superius codd. N T U omittunt *humanam* post *nostram naturam,* et immediate post plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *assumsit.*

en: Book III of *On the Orthodox Faith,* c. 6. See above, the Master's text, d. II. c. I, at the end. — A little above, codices N T U omit *humanam* after *nostram naturam,* and immediately after, most codices and editions 1, 2 read *assumsit.*

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I. — Pro *naturam humanam,* quam lectionem invenimus in cod. bb, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *naturaliter humanitatem,* cod. F *bene nostram humanitatem,* Vat. *assumserit veram humanitatem.*

en: Cf. above, the Master's text, d. II. c. I. — For *naturam humanam,* which reading we find in codex bb, the other codices and editions 1, 2 read *naturaliter humanitatem,* codex F *bene nostram humanitatem,* the Vatican edition *assumserit veram humanitatem.*

la: Cod. G *in unitate personae* et paulo ante *aequaliter in constitutione naturae.* Paulo inferius pro *primo assumta* codd. K Z *prius assumta.*

en: Codex G reads *in unitate personae* and a little before *aequaliter in constitutione naturae.* A little below, for *primo assumta* codices K Z read *prius assumta.*

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro *a supposito* cod. Z *ad suppositum.* Pro *et ideo* cod. A *et ita.*

en: Cf. the preceding question. — For *a supposito* codex Z reads *ad suppositum.* For *et ideo* codex A reads *et ita.*

la: Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 *suppositum,* sed contra determinata in corp. quaest. Paulo superius pro *et alter* codd. K Z (bb primitus) *et quoquo modo alter,* Vat. *et alteri.*

en: Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read *suppositum,* but against the matter determined in the body of the question. A little above, for *et alter* codices K Z (bb originally) read *et quoquo modo alter,* the Vatican edition *et alteri.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis notandum est quod dicit Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 8. ad 3: Differt «dicere *humanam naturam* et *hominem* et *humanitatem,* quia humana natura dicit componentia unita, homo vero nominat *quod est* ex his; humanitas vero nominat illud *quo est*». — Sed ipsum vocabulum *humanitas* iterum diversimode intelligi potest. Praeter tres modos in corp. quaest. relatos est quartus, qui in arg. 2. ad oppos. tangitur, scilicet prout humana natura prorsus abstracte est in intellectu humano. Manifestum autem est, quod incarnatio, si ad hunc sensum restringeretur, non esset nisi *fictio* (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1, et S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 4.). Item interdum ille terminus sumitur pro *tota specie* sive pro omnibus eius individuis, de quo sensu supra d. 2. a. 1. q. 3. actum est.

**II.** Alii antiqui commentatores Petri Lombardi rem principalem quaestionis tractant vel tangunt supra in dist. 2, scilicet S. Thom., ibi q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. (cfr. S. III. q. 6. a. 5.). — B. Albert., ibi a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., ibi q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., ibi a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., ibi q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. — Durand., ibi q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., ibi q. 5.

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english_scholion:
**I.** For the understanding of this question it must be noted what Alexander of Hales says, S. p. III. q. 4. m. 8. ad 3: It differs "to say *human nature* and *man* and *humanity,* because human nature names the united components, man, however, names *that which is* out of these; but humanity names that *by which it is*." — But the very word *humanity* can again be understood in diverse ways. Besides the three modes set forth in the body of the question, there is a fourth, which is touched upon in the second argument to the opposite, namely insofar as human nature is altogether abstractly in the human intellect. Now it is manifest that the Incarnation, if it were restricted to this sense, would be nothing but a *fiction* (cf. above a. 1. q. 1, and St. Thomas, S. III. q. 4. a. 4.). Likewise, that term is sometimes taken for the *whole species* or for all its individuals, in which sense it was treated above in d. 2. a. 1. q. 3.

**II.** Other ancient commentators on Peter Lombard treat or touch upon the principal matter of the question above in distinction 2, namely St. Thomas, there q. 1. a. 3. little-question 3 (cf. S. III. q. 6. a. 5.). — Bl. Albert, there a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, there q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, there a. 1. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, there q. 1. a. 1. broad doubt. — Durandus, there q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, there q. 5.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.140–142 (PDF 162–164; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo, the Solutio oppositorum ad 1–4, and every page footer). The English is a fresh literal translation. Raw OCR lines 10245–10374.

**Alignment verified.** QUAESTIO V reads *Utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem* — whether the Son of God assumed **humanity** (*humanitatem*). Distinct from q4 (*Deus assumserit hominem* — assumed a **man** [DONE]) and q3 (*intentio personalitatis in anima separata* [DONE]). Body opener: *Quinto quaeritur, utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.* — confirmed.

**Page-split map.**
- p.140-R bottom (raw 10245–10279): QUAESTIO V opens — title, the four *Fundamenta* arguments (args 1–2 on p.140-L bottom, arg 3 on p.140-L, arg 4 + Sed contra args 1–2 on p.140-R). q5's p.140 footers = notes **3–8** (`[^3c]`–`[^8c]`). NOTE: p.140 footer notes **1–2** (Aristot./Anselm) belong to the preceding QUAESTIO IV (its `[^1c]`/`[^2c]`, keying q4's *legem contradictionis* / *personae*); the q4 chunk owns them.
- p.141 (raw 10281–10349): Sed contra arg 3, the *Quaestio incidens,* the CONCLUSIO, the full RESPONDEO (the three modes of *humanitas* + corollary), and the Solutio oppositorum ad 1–4. q5's p.141 footers = notes **1–10** (`[^1d]`–`[^10d]`).
- p.142 (raw 10351–10374): the standalone SCHOLION (sections I–II) prints at q5's tail. Carries NO footnote markers. After it comes `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` (raw 10375) — the next chunk.

**Per-page marker disambiguation.** Each printed page restarts Quaracchi numbering at 1. q4 already used `[^1c]`/`[^2c]` for p.140 notes 1–2; q5 therefore renders its p.140 notes 3–8 as `[^3c]`–`[^8c]` and its p.141 notes 1–10 as `[^1d]`–`[^10d]` to avoid a collision on the shared page 140.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (sections **I** and **II**) prints on p.142-L→R at q5's tail, immediately before the DUBIA block. Section I treats the Alexander-of-Hales *humana natura / homo / humanitas* distinction and the fourth (abstract-fiction) sense of *humanitas;* section II lists the parallel treatments in the other ancient Lombard commentators (St. Thomas, Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, Giles of Rome, Durandus, Dionysius the Carthusian). The scholion text carries NO footnote markers (cross-refs only: *supra a. 1. q. 1,* *S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 4.,* *supra d. 2. a. 1. q. 3.*).

**Footer hand-off picked up from d5-a2-q4:** RECEIVED — q4 owned only p.140 notes 1–2; q5 owns p.140 notes 3–8 (rendered `[^3c]`–`[^8c]`). Eyes-on the PDF confirmed the split: p.140 footnotes 1 (Aristot.) and 2 (Anselm *de Fide Trin.* c. 6) semantically key q4's *implicationem* / *personae* tail, so they correctly stay with q4; q5's body markers begin at footnote 3 (Damasc., *de Fide orthod.* c. 6).

**Footer hand-off forwarded to d5-dubia:** NONE. p.142 (scholion + DUBIA opener) carries no q5 footers; q5's p.141 footer sequence is fully exhausted here. The d.5 DUBIA block (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI`, raw 10375; Dub. I–IV = 4 dubia) has its own footer sequences starting on p.142 (the Dub. I–II footers print at the foot of p.142-L/R, notes 1–6) and DISTINCTIO VI begins at raw 10421.

**[?] flags:** none.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses, not as anchors: *Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Quaestio incidens, Tripliciter dicitur humanitas, Conclusio cum triplici applicatione, Corollarium, Solutio oppositorum, Alia solutio cum distinctione, Notandum* (×2), *Ad quaestionem incidentem.*