title: Dist. 37, Divisio Textus

source_text:
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## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII.

### *Utrum actio malitiae substrata sit a Deo.*

*Sunt autem et alii plurimi, longe aliter de peccato* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, quomodo peccatum sit peccati poena, ad declarandum qualiter peccatum est privatio. In hac parte intendit Magister inquirere, utrum actio, in qua peccatum committitur, sit a Deo, propter hoc quod supra[^1] dictum fuit, quod peccatum est actus. Et quoniam supra prosecutus fuit opinionem illorum qui dicunt, actionem substratam malitiae esse a Deo, hic secundo prosequitur aliam opinionem, qua quidam ponebant, nec malitiam nec actionem malam esse a Deo. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In quarum prima ponit praedictam opinionem. In secunda vero opponit contra opinionem partis adversae, ibi: *In hoc autem verbo superiorum sententiae* etc.

Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima explicat Magister illam opinionem. In secunda vero subiungit eius defensionem, ibi: *Illa quoque Augustini verba, quibus dicit* etc. In tertia vero ex praedictis elicit quandam conclusionem, ibi: *Ex quo colligitur, res aliquas* etc.

Similiter secunda pars principalis habet tres partes. In prima parte opponit contra adversam opinionem. In secunda vero loco determinationis ponit quandam commonitionem ad auditoris eruditionem, ibi: *Intendant diligenter his verbis* etc. In tertia vero removet quandam dubitationem, ibi: *Cum igitur omnes in hoc consentiant catholici tractatores* etc.

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### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis, in qua Magister inquirit, utrum actio culpabilis sit a Deo, incidit hic quaestio circa duo principaliter.

Et primo quaeritur, utrum omnis actio, secundum quod actio, sit a Deo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum actio defectiva, secundum quod defectiva, a Deo sit.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis actio, secundum quod actio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis conservatio.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis compositio.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVII.

### *Whether the action underlying malice is from God.*

*But there are also many others who think of sin in a far different way* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed how sin is the penalty of sin, in order to declare in what way sin is a privation. In this part he intends to inquire whether the action in which sin is committed is from God, on account of what was said above[^1] — that sin is an act. And since above he pursued the opinion of those who say that the action underlying malice is from God, here he secondly pursues another opinion, by which certain men held that neither malice nor an evil action is from God. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he sets forth the aforesaid opinion. In the second he argues against the opinion of the opposing side, there: *But in this expression of the views of his predecessors* etc.

The first part has three parts. In the first the Master explains that opinion. In the second he subjoins its defense, there: *Those words of Augustine also, by which he says* etc. In the third he draws from the foregoing a certain conclusion, there: *From which it is gathered that certain things* etc.

Likewise the second principal part has three parts. In the first part he argues against the contrary opinion. In the second, in place of a determination, he sets down a certain admonition for the instruction of the hearer, there: *Let them attend diligently to these words* etc. In the third he removes a certain doubt, there: *Since therefore all catholic teachers agree in this* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, in which the Master inquires whether a culpable action is from God, a question falls here concerning two matters principally.

And first it is asked whether every action, insofar as it is action, is from God.

Secondly it is asked whether a defective action, insofar as it is defective, is from God.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether every action, insofar as it is action, is from God.

Secondly it is asked whether all conservation is from God.

Thirdly it is asked whether all composition is from God.

---

la: Dist. XXXV. c. 1. seqq.

en: Distinction XXXV, chapter 1 and following. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 59904–59947) cross-checked against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.860–861 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p860-{L,R}-{1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p861-{L,R}-0.png`). Offset pdf = printed + 22 → PDF 882–883.
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    - Q1 (raw 60472; p.869) — *Utrum actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta, sit a Deo*
    - Q2 (raw 60620; p.~871) — *Utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo*
    - Q3 (raw 60772; p.~873) — *Utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, sit a Deo*
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- **Apparatus / footer split (p.860):** p.860 has TWO footer note-groups. The **text/littera footnotes 1–5** (L-col: `1 Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 concreta.` / `2 Enarrat. serm. 1. n. 5. super Ps. 68, 3 … Hymnus trium puerorum est Dan. 3, 24. seqq.` / `3 Amos 3, 6; seq. locus Isai. 45, 6. 7. Vulgata: Ego Dominus, et non est alter…` — R-col: `4 Quaest. 21; alius locus est I. Retract. c. 26. Duo loci Scripturae sunt Sap. 1, 13, et Eccli. 11, 14.` / `5 Ed. 4 formatur.`) anchor in the **d37-littera** Magister text and are claimed by d37-littera — NOT this chunk. The separate **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note 1** (`Dist. XXXV. c. 1. seqq.`, R-col bottom) anchors at *supra¹* in this DIVISIO TEXTUS and is THIS chunk's only apparatus entry.
- **Hand-off picked up (from d37-littera):** the p.860 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` note `Dist. XXXV. c. 1. seqq.` — placed here as [^1] at *supra¹*. Consumed in full.
- **Hand-off forwarded to d37-a1-q1:** NONE from p.860 commentary footers (the single NOTAE entry is consumed here). a1-q1's footers begin on p.861 (`Sine me nihil potestis facere`, etc.).
- **OCR corrections:** `IN DISTmCTIONEM`→*IN DISTINCTIONEM*, `Sunt aulem el alii plwrimi, longe aliler`→*Sunt autem et alii plurimi, longe aliter*, `quoraoilo peccatuin`→*quomodo peccatum*, `Wagister inqnirere`→*Magister inquirere*, `qna`→*qua*, `snpra prosecutus`→*supra prosecutus*, `actionein substratam`→*actionem substratam*, `aliam opinionein`→*aliam opinionem*, `quarmu prima`→*quarum prima*, `praedictam opinioneni`→*praedictam opinionem*, `In hoc autem verbo`→retained, `subiungit eius`→retained, `IHa quoque`→*Illa quoque*, `Ex quo colligitur`→retained, `principaiis`→*principalis*, `cominonitionem`→*commonitionem*, `Infendanl diligenter`→*Intendant diligenter*, `Cum igitur omnes m hoc conseiitiant`→*Cum igitur omnes in hoc consentiant*, `tractatores`→retained, `quaeslio circa duo`→*quaestio circa duo*, `ulrum actio defectiva`→*utrum actio defectiva*.
- No scholion (divisio chunk). No `[?]` flags.
</content>
</invoke>


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS I.
### *Utrum omnis actio, secundum quod actio, sit a Deo.*

Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis actio, secundum quod actio. Secundo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis conservatio. Tertio quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit omnis compositio.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum a Deo sit omnis actio, secundum quod actio.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnis actio, secundum quod actio, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ioannis decimo quinto[^1]: *Sine me nihil potestis facere*; sed omnis actio aliquo modo est ens, sive sit actio peccati, sive alia: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod illud intelligitur de actione bona; *contra*: Isaiae decimo[^2]: *Nunquid elevabitur securis contra eum qui secat in ea*; Glossa: « Sicut instrumenta nihil sunt per se agentia, ita Sennacherib nihil per se operatus est »: si ergo actio Sennacherib mala erat et crudelis, et Sennacherib in illa actione erat instrumentum Dei; videtur ergo, quod omnis mala actio sit ab ipso tanquam a primo principio.

2. Item, quae sunt eiusdem generis, habent eadem principia prima[^3]; sed dare eleemosynam propter Deum, et dare eleemosynam propter vanam gloriam eiusdem generis actiones sunt in genere naturae: si ergo actio ista, qua quis dat eleemosynam propter Deum, est a Deo; videtur, quod et actio illa, qua quis dat eleemosynam causa inanis gloriae, sit a Deo.

3. Item, operatio miraculorum est a solo Deo; sed aliquis in faciendo miracula peccat, quia facit propter vanam gloriam: ergo videtur, quod aliqua actio substrata deformitati culpae sit a Deo: ergo pari ratione et omnis alia.

4. Item, omnis scientia a Domino Deo est[^4]; sed aliquis addiscit propter avaritiam: ergo cum addiscere non possit, nisi Deo coadiuvante et cooperante, et illud addiscere sit peccatum; actio substrata peccato comparatur ad Deum sicut ad principium.

5. Item, aliquis adulterando generat prolem; quaero igitur, utrum illa actio sive coitus ille sit a Deo, vel non. Si est a Deo, habeo propositum. Si non est a Deo, ergo proles genita non est a Deo. Si igitur hoc est impossibile ponere, quod aliquis homo sit, qui non sit a Deo: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod actio substrata peccato non sit a Deo.

6. Item, actio, quae substernitur peccato, non omnino nihil est, sicut manifeste apparet. Si igitur aliquo modo est ens; quaero, a quo sit. Si est a potentia creaturae, necesse est, quod sit ab ea secundum id quod habet de entitate: illud ergo, secundum quod actio est ab illa potentia, aut est a Deo, aut non. Si est a Deo, cum « omne illud, quod est causa causae, sit causa causati[^5] », per se intelligendo — videlicet, si *medium* causatum est causa *postremi*, secundum id quod habet a *primo* — tunc sequitur necessario, quod talis actio sit a Deo. Si vero non est a Deo, tunc quaero: aut est *a se*, aut *ab alio*. Si *ab alio*, tunc quaero similiter de illo alio: aut est *a se*, aut *ab alio*: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel erit ponere, quod creatura aliquid habeat *a se ipsa*, vel quod habeat *ab alio* quam a Deo, quod sit primum principium, in quo sit status. Sed haec omnia sunt impossibilia et sequuntur ex hoc, quod ponitur aliqua actio non esse a Deo[^6]: ergo etc.

*Ad oppositum.*

**Sed contra:**

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1. Deus non facit contra suam prohibitionem, quia tunc sibi ipsi contrarius esset; sed Deus prohibet aliquam actionem, secundum quod actio est, sicut prohibuit Adae non comedere de pomo[^7]: ergo videtur, quod illa comestio Adae non fuerit a Deo. Quod autem illa actio prohibita fuerit, secundum quod actio, apparet, quia comedere de pomo illo de se erat bonum, et nulla erat in eo deformitas, nisi postquam fuit prohibitum.

2. Item, omnis actio, quae est a bona voluntate, ut est operans per caritatem, est bona bonitate perfecta in genere moris[^8]; sed omnis actio, quae egreditur a Deo, egreditur a voluntate optima, in qua est summa caritas: ergo omnis actio, cuius Deus principium est, est bona bonitate moris. Sed actio substrata peccato non est bona bonitate moris: ergo non est a Deo.

3. Item, omnia quaecumque Deus facit, facit bono fine — *universa enim operatur propter se*[^9] — omne autem, quod fit bono fine, simpliciter bonum est; actio autem substrata peccato non est simpliciter bona: ergo non potest esse a Deo tanquam a causa.

4. Item, quandocumque operans continuatur regulae[^10] in operando, recte operatur et bene; sed regula liberi arbitrii est ipsa rectitudo voluntatis divinae: ergo in omni operatione, in qua Deus cooperatur libero arbitrio, cum fit continuatio operantis ad regulam, est rectitudo. Si igitur in aliqua operatione per totum est obliquatio, videtur, quod cooperatio eius non sit a Deo.

5. Item, si operatio, quae est subiecta peccato, est a Deo et a libero arbitrio, aut tota est a Deo et tota a libero arbitrio, aut pars a Deo et pars a libero arbitrio. Si tota a Deo et tota a libero arbitrio: ergo videtur, quod tota sit simul et bona et mala; quod est omnino impossibile. Si pars a Deo et pars a libero arbitrio; sed qua ratione ponitur una pars esse a libero arbitrio, eadem ratione potest poni et altera: et sic videtur, quod tota operatio ita sit a libero arbitrio, quod non sit a Deo.

6. Item, si Deus cooperatur libero arbitrio in actione, quae est substrata peccato; aut igitur liberum arbitrium movet *principalius* quam Deus, aut e converso. Constat, quod liberum arbitrium in nulla operatione neque *principalius* neque *aeque principaliter* potest movere, sicut Deus, cum Deus tam in movendo quam in causando, cuiuscumque dicatur esse sive causa sive motor, principalissimus intelligatur. Si[^11] ergo Deus movet *principalius*, ergo si motor principalis excitat et movet motorem non principalem; videtur, quod in operatione culpabili liberum arbitrium excitetur a Deo: ergo cum adulter luxuriatur, et latro furatur, ad tales actiones a Deo excitantur; quod omnino est absurdum.

### Conclusio.

> Omnis actio, sive substrata peccato sive non, quatenus est actio, est a Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut Magister dicit in littera[^12], circa istam quaestionem fuerunt diversae positiones adeo magnorum virorum et adeo rationabiles, ut nec Magister ausus fuerit definire, quae earum magis contineat veritatem. Attamen, quia per multam discussionem dubia ducuntur ad manifestationem, nunc communiter tenetur, quod illa opinio verior sit, quae dicit, quod omnis actio, sive substrata peccato sive non, secundum id quod est actio, est a Deo. — Nec immerito, quia istud oportet ponere, si pensetur eminentia divinae potentiae et indigentia potentiae creaturae.

Quia enim Deus est causa primordialissima, ideo est influentiae maximae in causas secundas, et adeo magnae influentiae, ut nec modicum seu quantumcumque parvum, dum tamen aliquo modo sit ens, procedat ab aliqua causa creata, nisi cooperante divina omnipotentia[^13]. — Omnis etiam potentia creata, quantum est de se, defectiva est nec est pure activa: ergo quantumcumque faciat modicam operationem, necesse habet adiuvari ab ea potentia, quae est actus purus propter omnimodam impermixtionem cum materia, et quae sola sibi sufficit, nullo modo indigens iuvari a causa alia.

Et ideo haec positio, quae dicit, omnem actionem esse a Deo, secundum quod actio est, absque omni ambiguitate tenenda est. Unde Anselmus in libro de Concordia praedestinationis et praescientiae[^14]: « Omnis qualitas et omnis actio et quidquid habet aliquam essentiam, a Deo est, a quo est omnis iustitia et nulla iniustitia. Facit igitur Deus omnia, quae iusta vel iniusta voluntate fiunt, id est bona opera et mala. In bonis quidem facit, quod sunt et quod bona sunt; in malis vero facit, quod sunt, sed non, quod mala sunt ». Et iterum ibidem: « Omnes actiones et omnes motus facit Deus, quia

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ipse facit res, a quibus et ex quibus et per quas et in quibus fiunt: et nulla res habet ullam potentiam volendi aut faciendi, nisi illo dante; ipsum quoque velle, quod aliquando iustum est, aliquando iniustum[^15], a Deo est ». « Non esse vero rectum, non est quid, nec a Deo est ». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ad primam partem inductae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus non facit contra suam prohibitionem; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed Deus cum prohibet aliquam actionem, non prohibet sibi, sed alii; nec prohibet[^16] suam cooperationem, quam non subtrahit creaturae, sed ipsi creaturae prohibet operationem; et ideo, dum cooperatur ei, non facit contra suam prohibitionem. Et *si tu obiicias mihi*, quod nihilominus actio prohibita a Deo est a Deo; dicendum, quod in actione prohibita est duo considerare: et quod est *actio* et quod est *prohibita*; ab eo autem fit, secundum quod est *actio*, non autem secundum quod *prohibita*; et ideo non sequitur, quod contra se ipsum faciat.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis actio, quae est a voluntate bona, est bona; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet in voluntate *creata*, sed non oportet, quod veritatem habeat in voluntate *increata*, loquendo de bonitate *moris*. Et ratio huius est ista: quia, cum aliqua actio est a bona voluntate creata, cum voluntas increata, quae ei cooperatur, absque dubio bona sit, simpliciter actio illa bona est, quia *tota* eius causa est bona. Sed cum[^17] voluntas increata est bona, quae cooperatur voluntati creatae, voluntas creata potest esse deordinata, et ratione illius potest venire defectus circa operationem illam. Unde sicut videmus, quod in aliqua operatione, quae est a Deo et a virtute creata, ex defectu virtutis *creatae* totaliter deficit operatio illa; sic etiam ex deordinatione voluntatis creatae contingit, depravari illam actionem. — Aliter posset dici, quod *operatio* dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur operatio opus *operans*; alio modo opus *operatum*. Et cum dicitur: si voluntas est bona, opus est bonum; hoc intelligendum est de opere *operante*, quod scilicet est actus ipsius voluntatis, ut velle; et sic non habet instantiam in Deo, quia *velle* Dei Deus est, et *actio* Dei Deus est, isto modo. Si autem dicatur operatio ipsum opus *operatum*, sic non sequitur, quod tale opus sit bonum bonitate *completa* sive *meritoria*, sed sufficit, quod sit bonum bonitate *naturae*, sicut patet. Opera, quae procedunt a voluntate Dei, bona sunt bonitate *naturae*, et hanc bonitatem habet actio, quae substrata est malitiae.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus facit omnia propter se; dicendum, quod verum est; et concedendum est etiam, quod actionem malitiae substratam propter se facit; propter se enim cooperatur creaturae. Cum autem dicitur, quod operatio, quae fit propter Deum, est bona bonitate *moris*; hoc intelligitur de operatione rationalis creaturae. Nam de Deo intelligi non potest, pro eo quod Deus non tantum cooperatur creaturae rationali, sed etiam irrationali; illa tamen operatio non dicitur esse bona bonitate *moris*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quando agens creatum continuatur regulae dirigenti, non errat; dicendum, quod verum est, si simpliciter continuetur ei. Tunc autem continuatur ei *simpliciter*, quando continuatur et quantum ad *operationem* et quantum ad *circumstantias*. Cum vero exit in operationem *circumstantiis debitis privatam*, in hoc, quod *exit in operationem*, ei continuatur, sed in hoc, quod *privat eam debitis circumstantiis*, deficit et ab ea discontinuatur; et ita discontinuatur, non *agendo*, sed *deficiendo*, et *deficiendo* est principium mali; et in hoc, quod deficit, a Deo recedit, quia defectus ille a Deo non est. Quamvis enim Deus cooperetur operanti, non tamen deficit cum deficiente[^18].

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut tota operatio est a Deo etc.; dicendum, quod *tota* est a Deo, et *tota a libero arbitrio*. Non enim est intelligendum, quod Deus cooperetur libero arbitrio, sicut cum duo ferunt lapidem, unus cooperatur alteri; sed quia Deus est intime agens in omni actione, et intimus est ipsi potentiae operanti, ita quod potentia ipsa in nihil exit, quod non sit ab ipso. — Et *si obiiciat*, quod eadem actio erit tota bona et tota mala; dicendum, quod Deus illi actioni non dat nisi bonitatem *naturae*; liberum autem arbitrium non privat eam bonitate *naturae*, sed bonitate *moris*. Et ista duo non habent oppositionem, videlicet, quod aliquid habeat bonitatem *naturae* et privatum sit bonitate *moris*.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est principale movens in tali actione; dicendum, quod verum est; attamen non sequitur ex hoc, quod *excitet* liberum arbitrium ad faciendam illam operationem. *Excitatio* enim dicit aliquem effectum gratiae, *praevenientem*[^19] ipsam voluntatem. Hoc autem requiritur in bonis meritoriis; in aliis vero operibus indifferentibus vel etiam malis non est nisi sola *cooperatio* divinae virtutis, quae existens in creatura potentialiter, essentialiter et praesentialiter, sicut conservat eam in essendo, sic adiuvat in operando; propter quod conceditur ibi esse *cooperatio*, non tamen *praeventio*, vel *subsecutio*.

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english:
### ARTICLE I.
### *Whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God.*

Concerning the first point three things are asked. First it is asked, whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God. Second it is asked, whether every conservation is from God. Third it is asked, whether every composition is from God.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether every action, insofar as it is an action, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. John, fifteenth [chapter][^1]: *Without me you can do nothing*; but every action is in some way a being, whether it be an action of sin, or another: therefore etc. If you say that this is understood of a good action; *on the contrary*: Isaiah, tenth [chapter][^2]: *Shall the axe be exalted against him that cutteth with it*; the Gloss: « Just as instruments are nothing acting by themselves, so Sennacherib wrought nothing by himself »: if therefore the action of Sennacherib was evil and cruel, and Sennacherib in that action was the instrument of God; it seems therefore that every evil action is from him as from a first principle.

2. Likewise, things which are of the same genus have the same first principles[^3]; but to give alms for the sake of God, and to give alms for the sake of vainglory are actions of the same genus in the genus of nature: if therefore that action by which one gives alms for the sake of God is from God; it seems that also that action by which one gives alms for the cause of empty glory is from God.

3. Likewise, the working of miracles is from God alone; but someone in working miracles sins, because he does it for the sake of vainglory: therefore it seems that some action subjected to the deformity of fault is from God: therefore by parity of reasoning so is every other.

4. Likewise, all knowledge is from the Lord God[^4]; but someone learns for the sake of avarice: therefore since he cannot learn except with God aiding and cooperating, and that learning is sin; the action subjected to sin is related to God as to a principle.

5. Likewise, someone by committing adultery generates offspring; I ask therefore, whether that action or that coitus is from God, or not. If it is from God, I have what I propose. If it is not from God, therefore the offspring generated is not from God. If therefore it is impossible to posit that there be some human who is not from God: therefore also that [is impossible] from which it follows, namely that the action subjected to sin be not from God.

6. Likewise, the action which is subjected to sin is not altogether nothing, as is manifestly apparent. If therefore it is in some way a being; I ask, from what it is. If it is from the potency of the creature, it is necessary that it be from it according to that which it has of entity: that therefore, insofar as it is an action from that potency, is either from God, or not. If it is from God, since « everything which is the cause of a cause, is the cause of the caused[^5] », understood per se — namely, if the *middle* caused is the cause of the *last*, according to that which it has from the *first* — then it follows necessarily that such an action is from God. But if it is not from God, then I ask: it is either *from itself*, or *from another*. If *from another*, then I ask likewise concerning that other: it is either *from itself*, or *from another*: therefore either it will be a going to infinity, or it will be to posit that the creature has something *from itself*, or that it has *from another* than from God, which is a first principle, in which there is a stopping-point. But all these are impossible and follow from this, that some action is posited not to be from God[^6]: therefore etc.

*To the opposite.*

**On the contrary:**

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1. God does not act against his own prohibition, because then he would be contrary to himself; but God prohibits some action, insofar as it is an action, just as he prohibited Adam not to eat of the apple[^7]: therefore it seems that that eating of Adam was not from God. But that that action was prohibited, insofar as it is an action, appears, because to eat of that apple was of itself good, and there was no deformity in it, except after it was prohibited.

2. Likewise, every action which is from a good will, as is one operating through charity, is good with a perfect goodness in the genus of morals[^8]; but every action which goes forth from God goes forth from the best will, in which is the highest charity: therefore every action of which God is the principle is good with the goodness of morals. But the action subjected to sin is not good with the goodness of morals: therefore it is not from God.

3. Likewise, all things whatsoever God does, he does with a good end — *for he wrought all things for himself*[^9] — but everything which is done with a good end is simply good; but the action subjected to sin is not simply good: therefore it cannot be from God as from a cause.

4. Likewise, whenever the agent is conjoined to the rule[^10] in operating, he operates rightly and well; but the rule of free choice is the rectitude itself of the divine will: therefore in every operation in which God cooperates with free choice, when there is a conjoining of the agent to the rule, there is rectitude. If therefore in some operation throughout the whole there is a swerving, it seems that its cooperation is not from God.

5. Likewise, if the operation which is subject to sin is from God and from free choice, either it is wholly from God and wholly from free choice, or part from God and part from free choice. If wholly from God and wholly from free choice: therefore it seems that the whole is at once both good and evil; which is altogether impossible. If part from God and part from free choice; but by whatever reasoning one part is posited to be from free choice, by the same reasoning the other can also be posited: and so it seems that the whole operation is so from free choice that it is not from God.

6. Likewise, if God cooperates with free choice in an action which is subjected to sin; either therefore free choice moves *more principally* than God, or conversely. It is established that free choice in no operation can move either *more principally* or *equally principally* as God, since God, both in moving and in causing — of whatever it be said to be either cause or mover — is understood to be the most principal. If[^11] therefore God moves *more principally*, therefore if the principal mover excites and moves the non-principal mover; it seems that in a culpable operation free choice is excited by God: therefore when the adulterer commits lust, and the thief steals, they are excited by God to such actions; which is altogether absurd.

### Conclusion.

> Every action, whether subjected to sin or not, insofar as it is an action, is from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^12], concerning this question there were diverse positions of men so great and so reasonable, that not even the Master dared to define which of them contained the more truth. Yet, because through much discussion doubts are led to manifestation, now it is commonly held that that opinion is the truer which says that every action, whether subjected to sin or not, according to that which is action, is from God. — And not without reason, because this must be posited, if the eminence of the divine power and the indigence of the power of the creature be weighed.

For because God is the most primordial cause, therefore he is of the greatest influence into secondary causes, and of so great influence that not even a little or however small a thing, provided it be in some way a being, proceeds from any created cause, except with the divine omnipotence cooperating[^13]. — Also every created potency, so far as is of itself, is defective and is not purely active: therefore however small an operation it makes, it has need to be aided by that potency which is pure act on account of its complete unmixedness with matter, and which alone suffices for itself, in no way needing to be aided by another cause.

And therefore this position, which says that every action is from God, insofar as it is action, is to be held without any ambiguity. Whence Anselm in the book *On the Concord of Predestination and Foreknowledge*[^14]: « Every quality and every action and whatever has any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice and no injustice. God therefore does all things which are done by a just or unjust will, that is, good works and evil. In good [works] indeed he does that they are and that they are good; but in evil he does that they are, but not that they are evil ». And again in the same place: « God does all actions and all motions, because

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he himself makes the things from which and out of which and through which and in which they are done: and no thing has any power of willing or doing, except by his giving; the willing itself also, which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust[^15], is from God ». « But not-to-be-right is not anything, nor is it from God ». — The reasons therefore adduced for the first part are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected, that God does not act against his own prohibition; it must be said that it is true. But God, when he prohibits some action, does not prohibit [it] to himself, but to another; nor does he prohibit[^16] his own cooperation, which he does not withdraw from the creature, but he prohibits the operation to the creature itself; and therefore, while he cooperates with it, he does not act against his own prohibition. And *if you object to me*, that nonetheless the action prohibited by God is from God; it must be said that in a prohibited action there are two things to consider: both that it is an *action* and that it is *prohibited*; but by him it is done, insofar as it is *action*, but not insofar as *prohibited*; and therefore it does not follow that he acts against himself.

2. To that which is objected, that every action which is from a good will is good; it must be said that this has truth in a *created* will, but it is not necessary that it have truth in an *uncreated* will, speaking of the goodness of *morals*. And the reason for this is this: that, when some action is from a good created will, since the uncreated will, which cooperates with it, is without doubt good, that action is simply good, because its *whole* cause is good. But when[^17] the uncreated will is good, which cooperates with the created will, the created will can be disordered, and by reason of that a defect can come about concerning that operation. Whence just as we see that in some operation which is from God and from a created power, from the defect of the *created* power that operation wholly fails; so also from the disorder of the created will it happens that that action is depraved. — Otherwise it could be said that *operation* is spoken of in two ways. In one way operation is called the work *operating*; in another way the work *operated*. And when it is said: if the will is good, the work is good; this is to be understood of the *operating* work, which namely is the act of the will itself, as the willing; and so it does not have an instance in God, because the *willing* of God is God, and the *action* of God is God, in this manner. But if operation be called the work *operated* itself, then it does not follow that such a work be good with *complete* or *meritorious* goodness, but it suffices that it be good with the goodness of *nature*, as is clear. Works which proceed from the will of God are good with the goodness of *nature*, and this goodness the action has which is subjected to malice.

3. But to that which is objected, that God does all things for himself; it must be said that it is true; and it must also be granted that he does for himself the action subjected to malice; for he cooperates with the creature for his own sake. But when it is said that the operation which is done for the sake of God is good with the goodness of *morals*; this is understood of the operation of a rational creature. For it cannot be understood of God, for the reason that God cooperates not only with the rational creature, but also with the irrational; yet that operation is not said to be good with the goodness of *morals*.

4. To that which is objected, that when a created agent is conjoined to the directing rule, he does not err; it must be said that it is true, if he is simply conjoined to it. But then he is conjoined to it *simply*, when he is conjoined both as to the *operation* and as to the *circumstances*. But when he goes out into an operation *deprived of due circumstances*, in this, that he *goes out into the operation*, he is conjoined to it, but in this, that he *deprives it of due circumstances*, he fails and is disjoined from it; and so he is disjoined, not by *acting*, but by *failing*, and by *failing* is the principle of evil; and in this, that he fails, he recedes from God, because that defect is not from God. For although God cooperates with the one operating, yet he does not fail with the one failing[^18].

5. To that which is asked: whether the whole operation is from God etc.; it must be said that it is *wholly* from God, and *wholly from free choice*. For it is not to be understood that God cooperates with free choice as when two carry a stone, one cooperates with the other; but because God is intimately acting in every action, and is intimate to the operating potency itself, so that the potency itself goes out into nothing which is not from him. — And *if one object* that the same action will be wholly good and wholly evil; it must be said that God gives to that action only the goodness of *nature*; but free choice does not deprive it of the goodness of *nature*, but of the goodness of *morals*. And these two do not have opposition, namely, that something have the goodness of *nature* and be deprived of the goodness of *morals*.

6. To that which is objected, that God is the principal mover in such an action; it must be said that it is true; yet it does not follow from this that he *excites* free choice to the doing of that operation. For *excitation* says some effect of grace, *preceding*[^19] the will itself. But this is required in meritorious goods; in other works, indifferent or even evil, there is nothing except the sole *cooperation* of the divine power, which existing in the creature potentially, essentially, and presentially, just as it conserves it in being, so it aids it in operating; on account of which it is granted that there is there *cooperation*, yet not *prevention*, or *consequence*.

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la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Vers. 15. Vulg. ibi *gloriabitur* pro *elevabitur*. — Glossam habet Lyranus. — In fine arg. pro *omnis mala actio* codd. K Y *omnis alia actio*.

en: Verse 15. There the Vulgate [reads] *gloriabitur* ("shall glory") for *elevabitur* ("shall be exalted"). — Lyranus has the Gloss. — At the end of the argument, for *omnis mala actio* ("every evil action") codd. K Y [read] *omnis alia actio* ("every other action").

la: Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 33. et X. text. 12. seqq. (IV. c. 28. et IX. c. 3. seq.).

en: See Aristotle, V. *Metaphysics* text 33 and X. text 12 seqq. (IV. c. 28. and IX. c. 3. seq.).

la: Libr. I. Reg. 2, 3: *Deus scientiarum Dominus est.* — Mox pro *cooperante* codd. F K T W cc ee et alii cum ed. 1 *operante*.

en: I. Kings 2, 3: *The Lord is the God of knowledge.* — Soon, for *cooperante* ("cooperating") codd. F K T W cc ee and others, with ed. 1, [read] *operante* ("operating").

la: Alanus ab Insulis, I. de Arte seu articulis cathol. fidei, n. 1.

en: Alan of Lille, I. *On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith*, n. 1.

la: Edd. praeter 1 sic: *et sequitur ex hoc, quod aliqua actio non est a Deo.*

en: The editions except 1 [read] thus: *and it follows from this, that some action is not from God.*

la: Gen. 2, 17. — Pro *non comedere* ed. 1 *ne comederet*; codd. L O bene omittunt *non* ante *comedere*. In fine arg. pro *prohibitum* cod. bb *prohibita*.

en: Genesis 2, 17. — For *non comedere* ("not to eat") ed. 1 [reads] *ne comederet* ("that he should not eat"); codd. L O rightly omit *non* before *comedere*. At the end of the argument, for *prohibitum* cod. bb [reads] *prohibita*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et dub. 2.

en: Cfr. below d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. and dub. 2.

la: Prov. 16, 4: *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus.* — De propos. seq. vide infra d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Proverbs 16, 4: *The Lord wrought all things for himself.* — Concerning the following proposition see below d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Edd. subdunt *dirigenti*. Paulo inferius pro *cum fit* codd. P Q Z et edd. 2, 3 *quando fit*, Vat. *quoniam fit*.

en: The editions add *dirigenti* ("directing"). A little below, for *cum fit* codd. P Q Z and edd. 2, 3 [read] *quando fit*, the Vatican [edition] *quoniam fit*.

la: Edd., excepta 1, omissa vocula *Si*, conclusionem *ergo Deus movet principalius* praecedentibus adnectunt. Aliquanto superius pro *in nulla operatione* Vat. *in illa operatione*.

en: The editions, except 1, omitting the little word *Si* ("if"), attach the conclusion *therefore God moves more principally* to the preceding [clauses]. Somewhat above, for *in nulla operatione* ("in no operation") the Vatican [edition reads] *in illa operatione* ("in that operation").

la: Hic c. 1. seq. — Mox pro *positiones* cod. F *opiniones*.

en: Here c. 1. seq. — Soon, for *positiones* ("positions") cod. F [reads] *opiniones* ("opinions").

la: Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 18. (c. 14.): *Patet autem sic esse, quemadmodum in universo est Deus, et vicissim cuncta in illo* [in textu Graeco κἂν ἐκείνῃ (scil. ψυχῇ), cuius verba ed. Didot sic reddit, vel potius interpretatur: *sic etiam in anima*]; *moventur enim omnia ab inexistente in nobis numine.* Cfr. de Mundo, c. 7. (c. 6.), et Liber de Causis, propos. 1. — Pro *omnipotentia* edd., excepta 1, *potentia*, et deinde pro *Omnis etiam* codd. B D Q *Omnis enim*. Paulo ante pro *parvum* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *parum*.

en: Aristotle, VII. *Eudemian Ethics* c. 18. (c. 14.): *But it is clear to be thus, just as in the universe there is God, and in turn all things are in him* [in the Greek text κἂν ἐκείνῃ (that is, "in the soul"), whose words the Didot edition renders, or rather interprets, thus: *so also in the soul*]; *for all things are moved by the divine power existing within us.* Cfr. *On the World*, c. 7. (c. 6.), and the *Book of Causes*, prop. 1. — For *omnipotentia* the editions, except 1, [read] *potentia*, and then for *Omnis etiam* codd. B D Q [read] *Omnis enim*. A little before, for *parvum* the Vatican [edition], with edd. 3, 4, [reads] *parum*.

la: Quaest. 1. c. 7. Ibidem et duo textus seqq. — In primo textu pro *iusta vel iniusta* codd. F I K T V Y bb ee et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *iusta sive iniusta*.

en: Question 1. c. 7. In the same place and the two following texts. — In the first text, for *iusta vel iniusta* ("just or unjust") codd. F I K T V Y bb ee and others, with edd. 2, 3, 4, [read] *iusta sive iniusta* ("just or unjust").

la: Textus originalis prosequitur: *nec est aliud quam uti potestate volendi et voluntate, quas Deus dat; in quantum est, bonum est etc.* — Idem textus origin. pro *potentiam volendi* exhibet *potestatem volendi* et in testimonio seq. recte pro *rectum*, loco cuius vocabuli Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 posuerunt *bonum*.

en: The original text continues: *nor is it anything other than to use the power of willing and the will, which God gives; insofar as it is, it is good, etc.* — The same original text, for *potentiam volendi* exhibits *potestatem volendi*, and in the following testimony rightly [has] *rectum* ("right"), in place of which word the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 put *bonum* ("good").

la: In cod. C additur *sibi*.

en: In cod. C is added *sibi* ("to himself").

la: Vat. addit *hoc quod*.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *hoc quod*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp.

en: Cfr. above d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. at the end of the body.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *praevenientis*. Mox pro *in bonis* cod. N *in operibus*.

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *praevenientis*. Soon, for *in bonis* ("in goods") cod. N [reads] *in operibus* ("in works").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hic incidit difficilis quaestio de concursu Dei ad actiones malas. In hac 1. quaestione inquiritur generatim de concursu Dei ad *omnem* actionem; deinde autem in tribus quaest. seq. articuli principia iam demonstrata applicantur ad actiones diversis defectibus affectas; ubi praenotanda est distinctio triplicis defectus, quae a. 2. q. 3. in corp. explicatur. De *immediato* concursu Dei ad omnes actiones creaturarum iam actum est I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2, ubi in scholio nonnulla de opinionibus theologorum notata sunt (cfr. etiam hic dub. 2, supra d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1, d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.). In quo sensu Deus dicitur causa *universalis* et *particularis*, vide I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. Duplex autem difficultas concursui praedicto generatim obstare videtur, scilicet, quod deroget tum verae *causalitati* secundarum causarum (de quo vide supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.) tum *libertati* creaturarum intellectualium (de quo aliqua dicuntur supra d. 26. a. 6, d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.). Specialis autem et tertia difficultas est circa actus moraliter malos, quae tam difficilis esse videbatur Magistro, ut dubius circa hanc quaestionem determinandam haeserit. De eadem re multum disputatum est etiam inter antiquiores Scholasticos, ut constat ex Summa Praepositivi (p. II.), qui opinatur, *nullo modo* actiones malas a Deo esse, contra quem specialiter disputat Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 3.). Communem autem posteriorum Scholasticorum opinionem defendit Guliel. Antissiodorensis in sua Summa aurea, « cuius dicta Alex. Hal. communiter inserit », ut dicit Dionys. Carth. (II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2.). Inter subsequentes Scholasticos solum Durandum (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4. et hic q. 1.), concursum Dei *immediatum* ad actiones creaturarum, in specie ad actiones malas, impugnasse iam observatum est in scholio ad I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Ipse S. Bonav., suffragante S. Thoma, concludit, quod communis doctrina « absque omni ambiguitate tenenda est ».

**II.** Aegid. R. (loc. cit.), qui quinque viis probat hanc sententiam, observat: « Actio et est *ens* et est *actio*; et ut est *ens* est a Deo tanquam a primo ente, a quo sunt omnia alia entia; sed ut est *actio*, est etiam a Deo quodam speciali modo, quia reducitur in Deum non solum generaliter, prout reducuntur in Deum omnia entia generaliter tanquam in primum ens, sed etiam specialiter, prout omnes actiones specialiter reducuntur in Deum tanquam in primum agens ». Quae doctrina sumta est ex S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 79. a. 2.) dicente: « Actus peccati et est *ens* et est *actus*; et ex utroque habet, quod sit a Deo ». Idem S. Doctor in Quaest. disput. de Potent. q. 3. a. 7. profundam suam inquisitionem sic concludit: « Sic ergo Deus est causa actionis cuiuslibet, in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conservat eam, et in quantum applicat actioni, et in quantum eius virtute omnis alia virtus agit ». — Notum est, praesertim circa illa verba: « in quantum applicat actioni », ortam esse inter posteriores theologos et scholas controversiam, quae intime cohaeret cum diversis sententiis de efficacia gratiae (cfr. supra d. 26. q. 6.). Utriusque sententiae summa vulgo exprimitur terminis *praemotio physica* et *concursus simultaneus*; de quibus consulantur utriusque scholae probati auctores.

**III.** Praeter citatos locos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2, et Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2, q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 105. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 66. 67. 89. 90. 162, de Malo, hic q. 3. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 35. a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 14. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica et II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Here arises the difficult question concerning the concurrence of God to evil actions. In this first question it is inquired in general concerning the concurrence of God to *every* action; but then in the three following questions of the article the principles already demonstrated are applied to actions affected by diverse defects; where the distinction of a threefold defect is to be noted beforehand, which is explained in a. 2. q. 3. in the body. Concerning the *immediate* concurrence of God to all the actions of creatures it has already been treated in I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2, where in the scholion some things were noted concerning the opinions of theologians (cfr. also here dub. 2, above d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1, d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.). In what sense God is called the *universal* and *particular* cause, see I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. But a twofold difficulty seems generally to oppose the aforesaid concurrence, namely, that it derogates both from the true *causality* of secondary causes (concerning which see above d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.) and from the *liberty* of intellectual creatures (concerning which some things are said above d. 26. a. 6, d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.). But a special and third difficulty is concerning morally evil acts, which seemed so difficult to the Master that he stuck, doubtful, concerning the determining of this question. Concerning the same matter much was disputed also among the more ancient Scholastics, as is established from the *Summa* of Praepositivus (p. II.), who is of the opinion that *in no way* are evil actions from God, against whom Aegid. R. specially disputes (here q. 1. a. 3.). But the common opinion of the later Scholastics is defended by Guliel. of Auxerre in his *Summa aurea*, « whose sayings Alex. Hal. commonly inserts », as Dionys. Carth. says (II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2.). Among the subsequent Scholastics it has already been observed in the scholion to I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. that Durandus alone (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4. and here q. 1.) impugned the *immediate* concurrence of God to the actions of creatures, specially to evil actions. S. Bonaventure himself, with St. Thomas favoring, concludes that the common doctrine « is to be held without any ambiguity ».

**II.** Aegid. R. (in the cited place), who proves this opinion by five ways, observes: « Action is both *being* and *action*; and as it is *being* it is from God as from the first being, from whom are all other beings; but as it is *action*, it is also from God in a certain special way, because it is led back into God not only generally, as all beings are led back into God generally as into the first being, but also specially, as all actions are specially led back into God as into the first agent ». Which doctrine is taken from St. Thomas (S. I. II. q. 79. a. 2.) saying: « The act of sin is both *being* and *act*; and from both it has that it is from God ». The same holy Doctor in the *Disputed Questions on Power* q. 3. a. 7. concludes his profound inquiry thus: « Thus therefore God is the cause of every action, insofar as he gives the power of acting, and insofar as he conserves it, and insofar as he applies it to the action, and insofar as by his power every other power acts ». — It is known, especially concerning those words: « insofar as he applies it to the action », that there arose among later theologians and schools a controversy which intimately coheres with the diverse opinions concerning the efficacy of grace (cfr. above d. 26. q. 6.). The sum of each opinion is commonly expressed by the terms *physical premotion* and *simultaneous concurrence*; concerning which let the approved authors of each school be consulted.

**III.** Besides the cited places: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 3. — Scot., here q. 1. 2, and Report. here q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1. a. 2, q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 105. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 66. 67. 89. 90. 162, de Malo, here q. 3. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 35. a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 14. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica and II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 59953–60175), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 861–864, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 883–886). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. The Respondeo and Ad-obiecta replies were heavily column-bled in the OCR (marginal annotations *Praenotandum / Conclusio / Ratio 1 / Ratio 2 / Confirmatur / Notanda ratio / Opus operans et operatum / Principium notabile / Notandum / Solutio oppositorum* spliced inline); these were stripped and the text reflowed column-by-column from the PDF.

**Boundary (coordinator-verified, held).** This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I only. The ARTICULUS I opener (`ARTICULUS I.` + the short `Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo… Secundo… Tertio…`, raw 59948–59952, top of p. 861) is folded in as headings per Override §5 — the article-level material precedes the QUAESTIO I `Circa primum sic proceditur` opener. The pars/article DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (`Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis… Et primo quaeritur… Secundo quaeritur…`, raw ~59940–59947) belongs to d37-divisio. The chunk ENDS at raw 60175, immediately before the OCR-garbled `QU.\ESTIO II.` header at raw ~60180 (*Utrum omnis rei conservatio sit a Deo*, body "Secundo quaeritur…") — everything from there onward is d37-a1-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 861–864.
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- p. 862: Sed contra 1–6 + Conclusio + Respondeo (first half, through the first Anselm quote). Footers 1–8 → continuous [^7]–[^14]: [^7] Gen. 2,17 (Adae); [^8] d.38 cross-ref (moris); [^9] Prov. 16,4 (propter se); [^10] Edd. dirigenti (regulae); [^11] Edd. om. Si (movet principalius); [^12] Magister c.1 (Respondeo opener); [^13] Aristot. Eudem. + omnipotentia variant; [^14] Anselm de Concordia (Quaest. 1 c.7).
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum omnis rei conservatio sit a Deo.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis rei conservatio sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Fundamenta.*

1. *Primo* per Gregorium[^1]: « Cuncta in nihilum cederent, nisi manus Conditoris ea contineret »: ergo omnia quae conservantur, a Deo conservantur.

2. Item, *esse* est actus entis, et *vivere* viventis: sed nullus actus est, qui non sit a Deo immediate: ergo nullum *esse* et nullum *vivere*[^2]. Si ergo creatura continue est, et continuatio in *esse* non est aliud quam duratio, cum *esse* eius non possit esse nisi a Deo, omnis rei conservatio est a Deo.

3. Item, nihil mutabile subsistit nec salvatur in *esse* nisi per immutabile et fixum; sed omne *esse* creatum mutabile est et variabile, saltem a praeterito in futurum — sicut enim dicit Hieronymus[^3]: « Solus enim Deus est, qui non novit praeteritum vel futurum » — ergo nihil potest subsistere, nisi Deo conservante.

4. Item, quanto effectus magis percipit a causa, tanto magis pendet ab ipsa, et quanto magis pendet ab ipsa, tanto minus potest durare vel subsistere sine ipsa[^4]; sed omne creatum totum, quod *est* et quod *habet*, a Deo habet: ergo impossibile est, aliquid nec ad momentum conservari in *esse*, nisi Deo conservante.

5. Item, sicut se habet *essentia* ad primam essentiam, et *sapientia* ad primam sapientiam, ita se habet *duratio* ad primam durationem; sed omnis *essentia* a prima essentia, et omnis *sapientia* a prima sapientia est: ergo omnis *duratio* a prima duratione producitur sicut a principio: ergo nihil in *esse* conservatur nisi per Deum[^5].

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**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in libro de Natura boni, tractans illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastis octavo[^6]: *Sermo eius potestate plenus est*, dicit, quod « suum *dicere* est suum *facere* ». Sed statim, quando Deus fecit creaturam, simul cum hoc disposuit, quantum creatura durare debuit: ergo videtur, quod statim dederit ei virtutem continuandi se in *esse*: ergo non videtur, quod amplius Deus immediate eam conservet. Quodsi tu dicas, quod virtus creaturae data indiget adhuc virtute divina simul cooperante; *contra:* si suum *dicere* est suum *facere*, et *dicere* non potest esse successivum, ergo nec *facere*; sed conservatio creaturae est cum successione: ergo non videtur, quod illa conservatio sit a Deo sicut a conservante.

2. Item, ad nobilitatem agentis creati pertinet, quod potest facere opus per se stabile, non indigens ipso artifice continue sustentante; sed Deus est artifex multo nobilior et multo potentior: ergo videtur, quod operibus suis det tale *esse*, quod non indigeant[^7] ipso conservante continue: igitur conservatio rerum non videtur immediate esse a Deo.

3. Item, idem est principium essendi et conservandi[^8]; sed forma sufficienter dat unicuique rei *esse*: ergo videtur, quod ad conservationem uniuscuiusque rei sufficit virtus propriae formae. Quodsi tu dicas, quod forma non potest conservare suam materiam; planum est, hoc esse falsum in anima, quae habet vim vegetativam et regitivam corporis.

4. Item, si omnis res conservatur a Deo immediate; cum divina virtus non possit a se deficere nec possit ab alio superari[^9], videtur, quod nulla operatio creaturae, nec per defectum sui ipsius nec per actionem contrarii, possit aliquando terminari; nunquam enim deficit duratio sine defectu virtutis conservantis. Et planum est istud, quod multorum[^10] actio terminatur: ergo videtur, quod talium conservatio non sit a Deo tanquam a principio immediato.

5. Item, esto, quod creatura sibi ipsi relinquatur; aut conservatur in *esse*, aut corrumpitur. Si conservatur in *esse*, habeo propositum, videlicet, quod non omnis conservatio est a Deo. Si corrumpitur; aut hoc est aliena actione, aut propria inclinatione. Aliena actione non, quia nulla creatura potest aliam in nihilum redigere. Propria inclinatione non, quia « natura semper desiderat quod melius est[^11] », et forma appetit uniri materiae et materia formae: ergo si motus sequitur inclinationem et appetitum, semper durabit et nunquam deficiet: ergo redit idem, quod prius, videlicet, quod non omnis conservatio est a Deo.

### Conclusio.

> Omnis rei conservatio est a Deo sicut ab immediato principio, non tamen ut a tota causa.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non solum omnem actionem, verum etiam omnem conservationem necesse est a Deo esse. *(Conclusio 1.)*

Et ratio huius est necessitas et indigentia ex parte creaturae. *(Ratio.)* Creatura enim omnis ex nihilo est, et aliunde habet *esse*. Quia ex nihilo est, ideo quodam modo *vana* est et *vanitati subiecta est*[^12]; quia vero aliunde habet *esse*, ideo *esse* est sibi quodam modo *accidentale*. Contrario modo est in Deo; unde Hilarius in septimo de Trinitate[^13]: « Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas ». Sicut igitur *vanum* non potest fulciri nisi per verum et stabile, et *accidens* non potest fulciri nisi per subiectum; sic *esse* creaturae non potest conservari absque munificentia creatricis essentiae. Unde sicut creatura habet *essentiam* et *actionem*, ita etiam habet et *durationem*; et propter hoc, quamvis creatura non possit esse actu infinita, nihilominus tamen ponitur duratione infinita. Infinitas enim durationis non ponit in creatura aliquam actualem infinitatem. *(Notandum.)* — Et ratio huius est, quia potentia, per quam durat creatura, non tantum est ipsius creaturae, immo etiam creatricis essentiae. Verum est enim[^14], quod in creatura est aliqua potentia ad durandum; sed illa non est omnino in actu, immo est in potentia quodam modo respectu illius virtutis, quae est in actu infinita. *(Conclusio 2.)* Et hoc est quod vult dicere Philosophus in libro de Causis[^15], quod « omnes virtutes infinitae pendentes sunt per unum infinitum primum, quod est virtus virtutum ». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod omnis rei conservatio est a Deo tanquam ab immediato principio; non tamen est ab ipso sicut a *tota* causa. Sicut enim in creatura est aliqua virtus operativa creata, sic etiam aliqua virtus conservativa.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod suum *dicere* est suum *facere*; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur *immediate*, propter hoc quod ad *dicere* sequatur *facere*; quoniam Deus dixit ab aeterno

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et fecit in tempore; sed hoc dictum est, quia non est nova operatio ex parte Dei, ipsum *facere* superadditum ad *dicere*, sicut contingit in operatione creaturae. — Nec valet quod *obiicitur*, quod *dicere* non est successivum. Dicendum enim, quod nec *dicere* Dei nec *facere* est successivum secundum *id quod est*, quia *dicere* et *facere* Dei Deus est et aeternum *quid est*. *(Notandum.)* Verumtamen, sicut ab aeterno potest procedere temporale, sic a divino *dicere*, in quo nulla est successio, potest procedere successiva duratio, quae quidem successiva est, non ratione exigentiae ex parte Dei conservantis, sed ex parte rei conservatae[^16].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod artifex creatus potest facere opus per se stabile; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod artifex creatus sic facit rem, quod non facit eius principia intrinseca; non enim potest in totam rei substantiam. Et propterea res facta conservari potest in propriis[^17] principiis, quae non dependent a potestate artificis. Non sic autem est in opere Dei. Omne enim opus, quod Deus facit, secundum totum sui facit; et ideo totaliter ab ipso dependet et sine eius adiutorio conservari non potest.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et conservandi; dicendum, quod verum est in genere causae *formalis*; et similiter verum est in genere causae *efficientis*. *(Notandum.)* Quamvis igitur *esse* in creatura sit a forma creata tanquam ab informante, nihilominus tamen a Deo est tanquam ab efficiente. Ideo, sicut ad conservationem rei necessaria est virtus *formae complentis*, sic etiam necessarium est adiutorium *primi et immediati efficientis*[^18].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus conservaret res, nihil corrumperetur; dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia Deus conservat *voluntarie*; et ideo tantum conservat, quantum placet sibi, et secundum dispositionem sapientiae suae. — Praeterea, conservatio rei non est a Deo tanquam a *tota causa*, sed requiritur ex parte creaturae idoneitas ad conservationem, et virtus quodam modo conservativa, ad cuius defectum velociorem vel tardiorem sequitur diuturnior vel minus diuturna duratio creaturae; et cum est idoneitas creaturae ad durandum in perpetuum, utpote simplicitas, Deus *esse* eius aeternaliter continuat. *(Notandum.)*

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum si creatura sibi relinqueretur, corrumperetur; dico, quod sic. — Et si *quaerat*, utrum aliquo agente, vel non; dico, quod nullo agente, sed propter defectum in se ipsa. Talis enim corruptio, quae est annihilatio, dicit purum defectum; et ideo non requirit causam efficientem, sed deficientem; haec autem in creatura est ex hoc, quod ex nihilo est. — Et si *obiiciat*, quod naturalis inclinatio cuiuslibet rei est ad durandum in *esse*, et quod motus sequitur inclinationem; dicendum, quod verum est de inclinatione motus dicente positionem. *(Notandum.)* Verum est etiam de principiis rei salvatis in *esse*, super quae fundatur illa inclinatio. Si autem creatura sibi relinqueretur, principia rei in *esse* non servarentur, immo in se ipsis deficerent; et ideo inclinatio ad *esse* periret[^19]. — Posset etiam *aliter* dici, quod cum ponitur, quod creatura sibi relinquatur, ponitur, quod divina virtus se subtrahat; et cum ponitur, quod divina virtus se subtrahat, per consequens ponitur creaturae annihilatio. *(Aliter.)* Sicut enim per operationem[^20] virtutis infinitae potest fieri eductio de nihilo in *esse*, ita etiam per subtractionem potest fieri annihilatio; et pro tanto dicit Hugo[^21], quod soli divinae virtuti possibilis est annihilatio creaturae. Verumtamen illud verbum intelligendum est sane, quia multum est calumniabile.

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether the conservation of every thing is from God.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the conservation of every thing is from God. And that it is, it seems:

*Fundamenta.*

1. *First*, through Gregory[^1]: « All things would fall back into nothing, did not the hand of the Creator hold them together »: therefore all things that are conserved are conserved by God.

2. Likewise, *to-be* is the act of a being, and *to-live* of a living being: but there is no act which is not immediately from God: therefore no *to-be* and no *to-live*[^2]. If therefore a creature continuously is, and continuation in *being* is nothing other than duration, since its *being* cannot be except from God, the conservation of every thing is from God.

3. Likewise, nothing mutable subsists or is preserved in *being* except through what is immutable and fixed; but every created *being* is mutable and variable, at least from past to future — for as Jerome says[^3]: « For God alone is he who knows not past or future » — therefore nothing can subsist except with God conserving it.

4. Likewise, the more an effect receives from a cause, the more it depends on it, and the more it depends on it, the less it can endure or subsist without it[^4]; but every created thing, both what it *is* and what it *has*, has from God: therefore it is impossible that anything be conserved in *being* even for a moment, except with God conserving it.

5. Likewise, as *essence* stands to the first essence, and *wisdom* to the first wisdom, so *duration* stands to the first duration; but every *essence* is from the first essence, and every *wisdom* from the first wisdom: therefore every *duration* is produced from the first duration as from a principle: therefore nothing is conserved in *being* except through God[^5].

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**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, treating that which is said in Ecclesiastes, eighth [chapter][^6]: *His word is full of power*, says that « his *saying* is his *making* ». But at once, when God made the creature, together with this he disposed how long the creature ought to endure: therefore it seems that he at once gave it the power of continuing itself in *being*: therefore it does not seem that God further conserves it immediately. And if you say that the power given to the creature still needs the divine power cooperating at the same time; *on the contrary:* if his *saying* is his *making*, and *saying* cannot be successive, then neither [can] *making*; but the conservation of a creature is with succession: therefore it does not seem that that conservation is from God as from a conserver.

2. Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of a created agent that it can make a work stable of itself, not needing the artificer himself continually to sustain it; but God is an artificer much nobler and much more powerful: therefore it seems that he gives to his works such a *being* that they do not need[^7] him conserving them continually: therefore the conservation of things does not seem to be immediately from God.

3. Likewise, the same is the principle of being and of conserving[^8]; but form sufficiently gives to each thing its *being*: therefore it seems that for the conservation of each thing the power of its own form suffices. And if you say that the form cannot conserve its own matter; it is plain that this is false in the soul, which has a power vegetative and governing of the body.

4. Likewise, if every thing is conserved by God immediately; since the divine power cannot fail of itself nor can be overcome by another[^9], it seems that no operation of a creature, neither through its own defect nor through the action of a contrary, could ever be terminated; for duration never fails without a defect of the conserving power. And it is plain that the action of many things[^10] is terminated: therefore it seems that the conservation of such things is not from God as from an immediate principle.

5. Likewise, suppose that a creature be left to itself; either it is conserved in *being*, or it is corrupted. If it is conserved in *being*, I have my point, namely, that not every conservation is from God. If it is corrupted; this is either by an alien action, or by its own inclination. Not by an alien action, since no creature can reduce another to nothing. Not by its own inclination, since « nature always desires what is better[^11] », and form seeks to be united to matter and matter to form: therefore if motion follows inclination and appetite, [the creature] will always endure and never fail: therefore the same returns as before, namely, that not every conservation is from God.

### Conclusion.

> The conservation of every thing is from God as from an immediate principle, yet not as from a total cause.

**I respond:** It must be said that not only every action, but also every conservation, must be from God. *(Conclusion 1.)*

And the reason of this is the necessity and neediness on the part of the creature. *(Reason.)* For every creature is from nothing, and has its *being* from elsewhere. Because it is from nothing, it is therefore in a certain manner *vain* and *subject to vanity*[^12]; but because it has its *being* from elsewhere, therefore *being* is to it in a certain manner *accidental*. The contrary manner is in God; whence Hilary, in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*[^13]: « Being is not an accident to God, but a subsisting truth and an abiding cause and a natural property of his kind ». As therefore the *vain* cannot be propped up except by the true and stable, and the *accident* cannot be propped up except by a subject; so the *being* of a creature cannot be conserved without the munificence of the creative essence. Whence, just as a creature has *essence* and *action*, so also it has *duration*; and on account of this, although a creature cannot be actually infinite, nonetheless it is posited as infinite in duration. For infinity of duration does not posit in a creature any actual infinity. *(To be noted.)* — And the reason of this is that the power by which a creature endures is not only of the creature itself, but indeed also of the creative essence. For it is true[^14] that in a creature there is some power to endure; but that is not wholly in act, but rather is in potency in a certain manner with respect to that power which is infinite in act. *(Conclusion 2.)* And this is what the Philosopher means to say in the book *On Causes*[^15], that « all infinite powers that are dependent are [so] through one first infinite, which is the power of powers ». — Therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that the conservation of every thing is from God as from an immediate principle; yet it is not from him as from a *total* cause. For just as in a creature there is some created operative power, so also there is some conservative power.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that therefore which is first objected, that his *saying* is his *making*; it must be said that this is not said *immediately*, on the ground that the *making* follows upon the *saying*; for God said from eternity

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and made in time; but this is said because there is no new operation on the part of God, the *making* itself being superadded to the *saying*, as happens in the operation of a creature. — Nor is it valid what is *objected*, that *saying* is not successive. For it must be said that neither the *saying* of God nor [his] *making* is successive according to *that which it is*, since the *saying* and the *making* of God is God and an eternal *what-it-is*. *(To be noted.)* Nevertheless, just as from the eternal the temporal can proceed, so from the divine *saying*, in which there is no succession, a successive duration can proceed, which indeed is successive not by reason of an exigency on the part of God conserving, but on the part of the thing conserved[^16].

2. To that which is objected, that a created artificer can make a work stable of itself; it must be said that it is not similar, on the ground that a created artificer so makes a thing that he does not make its intrinsic principles; for he has no power over the whole substance of the thing. And therefore the thing made can be conserved in its own[^17] principles, which do not depend on the power of the artificer. But it is not so in the work of God. For every work which God makes, he makes according to the whole of it; and therefore it depends totally on him and cannot be conserved without his aid.

3. To that which is objected, that the same is the principle of being and of conserving; it must be said that it is true in the genus of *formal* cause; and likewise it is true in the genus of *efficient* cause. *(To be noted.)* Although therefore *being* in a creature is from the created form as from that which informs it, nonetheless it is from God as from the efficient [cause]. Therefore, just as for the conservation of a thing the power of the *completing form* is necessary, so also the aid of the *first and immediate efficient* is necessary[^18].

4. To that which is objected, that if God conserved things, nothing would be corrupted; it must be said that that argument fails in two ways. First indeed, because God conserves *voluntarily*; and therefore he conserves only as much as pleases him, and according to the disposition of his wisdom. — Furthermore, the conservation of a thing is not from God as from a *total cause*, but there is required on the part of the creature an aptitude for conservation, and a power in a certain manner conservative, upon whose swifter or slower defect follows a longer or less long duration of the creature; and when there is an aptitude in the creature for enduring in perpetuity, such as simplicity, God continues its *being* eternally. *(To be noted.)*

5. To that which is asked, whether, if a creature were left to itself, it would be corrupted; I say that it would. — And if he should *ask* whether [it would be corrupted] by some agent, or not; I say that by no agent, but on account of a defect in itself. For such a corruption, which is annihilation, denotes a pure defect; and therefore it requires not an efficient cause, but a deficient one; and this is in a creature from this, that it is from nothing. — And if he should *object* that the natural inclination of every thing is to endure in *being*, and that motion follows inclination; it must be said that this is true of the inclination of motion stating a position. *(To be noted.)* It is also true of the principles of a thing preserved in *being*, upon which that inclination is founded. But if a creature were left to itself, the principles of the thing would not be preserved in *being*, but rather would fail in themselves; and therefore the inclination to *being* would perish[^19]. — It could also be said *otherwise*, that when it is posited that a creature is left to itself, it is posited that the divine power withdraws itself; and when it is posited that the divine power withdraws itself, consequently the annihilation of the creature is posited. *(Otherwise.)* For just as through the operation[^20] of the infinite power there can be an eduction from nothing into *being*, so also through withdrawal there can be an annihilation; and to this extent Hugh says[^21] that annihilation of a creature is possible to the divine power alone. Nevertheless that statement must be understood soundly, since it is very open to cavil.

la: Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 37. n. 43: *Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam Auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret.*

en: Book XVI. *Moralia* c. 37. n. 43: *For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would again tend toward nothing, did not the Author of all hold it back with the hand of his governance.*

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 1. et 18. Cfr. etiam August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 25, nec non IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 22. seq. et IX. c. 15. n. 27.

en: Cfr. the *Book on Causes*, propositions 1 and 18. Cfr. also Augustine, XIII. *On the City of God* c. 25, and also IV. *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 12. n. 22. seq. and IX. c. 15. n. 27.

la: De hoc dicto, quod etiam a Magistro, I. Sent. d. VIII. c. 1, Hieronymo tribuitur, sed Isidori est, vide tom. I. pag. 146, nota 4. — In hoc testimonio pro *novit* Vat. substituit *notat*. In edd. 2, 3 desunt verba *sicut enim dicit Hieronymus* usque ad *ergo nihil*.

en: Concerning this saying, which is also attributed to Jerome by the Master, I. Sent. d. VIII. c. 1, but is Isidore's, see tom. I. p. 146, note 4. — In this testimony, for *novit* the Vatican [edition] substitutes *notat*. In edd. 2, 3 the words *sicut enim dicit Hieronymus* down to *ergo nihil* are wanting.

la: August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 26: *Aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit; quia si factus esset, non autem fieret, etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret.* Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 1.

en: Augustine, VIII. *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 12. n. 26: *The air, when light is present, has not been made bright, but is being made [bright]; because if it had been made, but were not being made, it would remain bright even with the light absent.* Cfr. the *Book on Causes*, proposition 1.

la: Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 13.

en: Cfr. Anselm, *Monologion* c. 13.

la: Vers. 4. — Verba, quae hic ut ex Augustini libro de Natura boni desumta signantur, ibi non habentur. In libro autem cit. (c. 24-27.) Augustinus exponens illud Ioan. 1, 1: *In principio erat Verbum* etc., dicit, quod Deus omnia quae fecit, « non de se genuerit, sed in verbo atque imperio fecerit ». Lyranus verba Augustino tributa ut Glossam interlinearem exhibet. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2.

en: Verse 4. — The words which here are marked as taken from Augustine's book *On the Nature of the Good* are not found there. But in the cited book (c. 24-27) Augustine, expounding that of John 1, 1: *In the beginning was the Word* etc., says that God all the things which he made « did not generate from himself, but made by word and command ». Lyranus presents the words attributed to Augustine as an interlinear Gloss. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2.

la: Ed. 1 et Vat. *indigeat*.

en: Ed. 1 and the Vatican [edition] [read] *indigeat*.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): *Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum, sed conservat.*

en: Aristotle, II. *On the Soul*, text 47 (c. 4): *But nothing generates itself, but conserves [itself].*

la: Ita cod. T correctus a prima manu. Codd., Vat., edd. 2, 3, 4 *separari*, ed. 1 *ab alia separari*, cod. bb *ab illo separari*.

en: Thus cod. T corrected by the first hand. The codices, the Vatican [edition], edd. 2, 3, 4 [read] *separari*, ed. 1 *ab alia separari*, cod. bb *ab illo separari*.

la: Edd. praeter 1 *multarum*.

en: The editions except 1 [read] *multarum*.

la: Ut ait Aristoteles. Cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 1. — Idem dicit I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), materiam appetere formam.

en: As Aristotle says. Cfr. above p. 341, note 1. — He says the same, I. *Physics* text 81 (c. 9), that matter desires form.

en: Romans 8, 20.

la: Num. 11. Textus originalis loco *Deo* habet *nomen*. — Cfr. de his rationibus I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Number 11. The original text, in place of *Deo*, has *nomen*. — Cfr. concerning these reasons I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in the body.

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum paucis codd., ut bb ee, *etiam*.

en: The editions, except 1, with a few codices, such as bb ee, [read] *etiam*.

la: Propos. 16. — Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.

en: Proposition 16. — Cfr. above d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in the body.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1. seqq. nec non d. 36. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — Aliquanto superius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt verba: *Dicendum enim* usque ad *successivum* inclusive.

en: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1. seqq. and also d. 36. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. and a. 3. q. 1. — Somewhat above, the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 omit the words: *Dicendum enim* down to *successivum* inclusive.

la: Edd. 2, 3 *primis*, Vat. *primis et propriis*.

en: Edd. 2, 3 [read] *primis*, the Vatican [edition] *primis et propriis*.

la: Vide supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.

en: See above d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, et I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Edd. 3, 4 et Vat. *conservarentur* pro *servarentur*.

en: Cfr. above d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, and I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Edd. 3, 4 and the Vatican [edition] [read] *conservarentur* for *servarentur*.

la: Codd. plurimi et ed. 1, 2, 3 *comparationem*.

en: Very many codices and edd. 1, 2, 3 [read] *comparationem*.

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 37. Vide supra pag. 729, nota 6 et pag. 854, nota 4.

en: Book I. *On the Sacraments* p. VI. c. 37. See above p. 729, note 6 and p. 854, note 4.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod creaturae per immediatum Dei influxum conservantur, ita tamen, ut non omnino a conservatione excludantur causae secundae, certa est doctrina. Insuper docet S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 104. a. 1. ad 4.), « quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis, qua dat *esse*, quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore; sicut etiam conservatio luminis in aere est per continuum influxum a sole ». Consentit in hoc omnino Scot. et etiam S. Bonav., cuius doctrina hic tradita illustratur iis quae supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. dicit de duratione rerum aeviternarum, ubi etiam ait, quod *esse* per creationem « datum per continuam Dei influentiam continuatur » (cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4.); in hac autem quaestione addit, quod conservatio non est immediate a Deo ut a *tota* causa. — Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 10. q. 7, Quodl. 1. q. 9.) omnino negat, quod Deus eadem actione res creet atque conservet, quemadmodum eadem actione lumen in medio causetur et conservetur; atque simul multis argumentis probare nititur, *esse* rei creatae non differre realiter ab essentia eiusdem; quae sententia etiam multis posterioribus placuit. Etiam Richard. a Med. et Durand. in hac quaestione aliquatenus a S. Thoma discedunt.

**II.** Alii Commentatores hanc quaestionem hoc loco non tractant, sed vel in II. Sent. d. 1, aut 2, vel eam penitus omittunt. — De ea praeter citatos agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 13. m. 3. 4. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. n. 3. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 65. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1-4. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 7. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

**III.** De sequente (3.) quaest. neminem invenimus specialiter tractantem nisi Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 12. m. 2, et B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3. a. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** That creatures are conserved through God's immediate influx, yet in such a way that secondary causes are not wholly excluded from the conservation, is certain doctrine. Moreover St. Thomas teaches (S. 1. q. 104. a. 1. ad 4) « that the conservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through the continuation of the action by which he gives *being*, which action indeed is without motion and time; just as also the conservation of light in the air is through the continuous influx from the sun ». Scotus agrees wholly in this, and also S. Bonaventure, whose doctrine here handed down is illustrated by what he says above at d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3 concerning the duration of aeviternal things, where he also says that *being*, given through creation, « is continued through the continuous influence of God » (cfr. also I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4); but in this question he adds that conservation is not immediately from God as from a *total* cause. — Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 10. q. 7, Quodl. 1. q. 9) wholly denies that God by the same action creates and conserves things, just as by the same action light is caused and conserved in the medium; and at the same time he strives to prove by many arguments that the *being* of a created thing does not really differ from its essence; which opinion has pleased many later [authors] also. Richard of Middleton and Durandus too, in this question, depart somewhat from St. Thomas.

**II.** Other Commentators do not treat this question in this place, but either in II. Sent. d. 1, or 2, or omit it entirely. — Besides those cited, the following treat of it: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 13. m. 3. 4. — Scotus, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. n. 3. seqq. — St. Thomas, in the place cited a. 1. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* III. c. 65. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1-4. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 1. q. 7. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

**III.** Concerning the following (3rd) question we have found no one treating specifically except Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 12. m. 2, and B. Albert, *Summa* p. II. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3. a. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 60176–60342), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (Sed contra, Respondeo with the *Conclusio 1 / Ratio / Notandum / Conclusio 2* marginalia, Solutio-oppositorum replies 1–5, SCHOLION) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 864–866, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 886–888). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. The Respondeo and replies were heavily column-bled in the OCR (marginal annotations *Conclusio 1 / Ratio / Notandum / Conclusio 3 / Solutio oppositorum / Aliter* spliced mid-word, e.g. `conciusio i.`, `NoiaDdom.`, `''o''''"!»'»`); these were stripped and the text reflowed column-by-column from the PDF.

**Boundary (coordinator-verified, held).** This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO II only. Opens at the OCR-garbled header `QU.\ESTIO II.` (= QUAESTIO II, raw 60179, p.864 mid-right, full-width below the q1 SCHOLION), body "Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis rei conservatio sit a Deo." The ARTICULUS I header is NOT repeated — it is carried by the sibling a1-q1 (per Override §5). The chunk ENDS at raw ~60342, immediately before the full-width `QUAESTIO III. / Utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo` header (p.867, body "Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo") — everything from QUAESTIO III onward is d37-a1-q3.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 864–866 (running heads: p.864 carries the q1 SCHOLION above this q's opener, no q2 running head as the page top belongs to q1; p.865 `DIST. XXXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. II.`; p.866 `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` [verso]). The QUAESTIO II header and entire body + scholion fit within pp. 864–866; the `DIST. XXXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. III. 867` running head + `QUAESTIO III.` header begin p.867.
- p.864 (mid/bottom): QU.\ESTIO II. opener + *Fundamenta* 1–5. Footers 1–5 → continuous [^1]–[^5]: [^1] Gregorius *Cuncta in nihilum* (Moral. XVI), [^2] Liber de Causis + Civ. Dei (the *nullum esse… vivere* marker), [^3] Hieronymus *Solus enim Deus* (Isidori est; Vat. *notat*), [^4] Augustine *de Gen. ad lit.* (the *quanto effectus magis percipit* marker), [^5] Anselm *Monolog.* (the *prima duratione* marker).
- p.865: Sed contra 1–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo (Conclusio 1 / Ratio / Notandum / Conclusio 2) + start of Solutio reply 1. Footers 1–10 → continuous [^6]–[^15]: L-column [^6] Ecclesiastis (Vers. 4, *de Natura boni*), [^7] *indigeat* (Vat.), [^8] Aristot. *de Anima* (*idem principium essendi*); R-column [^9] *separari* (cod. T, the *ab alio superari* marker), [^10] *multarum* (the *multorum* marker), [^11] Aristot. *natura semper desiderat melius* (Phys.), [^12] Rom. 8, 20 (*vanitati subiecta*), [^13] Hilarius *de Trin.* (Num. 11; *nomen* pro *Deo*), [^14] *etiam* (the *Verum est enim* marker), [^15] Liber de Causis Propos. 16 (the *virtus virtutum* marker).
- p.866 (verso, running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): Solutio replies 1-tail through 5 + SCHOLION (items I, II, III). Footers 1–6 → continuous [^16]–[^21]: L-column [^16] I. Sent. d.27 (reply 1, *ex parte rei conservatae*; Vat. omits *Dicendum enim… successivum*), [^17] *primis* (reply 2, *propriis principiis*), [^18] d.19 a.3 q.1 ad 3 (reply 3, *primi et immediati efficientis*); R-column [^19] d.19 a.3 q.1 ad 4 (reply 5, *inclinatio ad esse periret*; Vat. *conservarentur*), [^20] *comparationem* (reply 5 *aliter*, *per operationem virtutis infinitae*), [^21] Hugo *de Sacram.* I. p. VI. c. 37 (the *soli divinae virtuti possibilis annihilatio* marker). The SCHOLION (I–III) carries only cross-reference/parenthetical content and no numbered footers.

**Hand-off received.** From d37-a1-q1: the entire p.864 footer block (notes 1–5) anchors here in q2's body (q1's scholion occupied the top of p.864 but claimed no footer there). note 1 → [^1] (Gregorius *Cuncta in nihilum*, Moral. XVI c.37 n.43); note 2 → [^2] (Liber de Causis + de Civ. Dei, the *nullum esse/vivere* marker); note 3 → [^3] (Hieronymus *Solus enim Deus*, = Isidori est, tom. I p.146); note 4 → [^4] (Augustine *de Gen. ad lit.* VIII c.12 n.26); note 5 → [^5] (Anselm *Monolog.* c.13).

**Hand-off forwarded to d37-a1-q3.** QUAESTIO III (`Utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo`, body "Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo… 1. Ubicumque est aliqua compositio…") begins on p.867 immediately after this q2's scholion. q2 claims NO footer on p.867 — all p.867 footers anchor in q3's *Fundamenta* (the *componentis actio*, *prima unitate*, *de Vera Religione* markers etc.) and are forwarded entirely to d37-a1-q3.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q2 (p.866 bottom full-width + p.866 R-column), items I, II, III. `has_scholion: true`. Item I treats the conservation doctrine (S. Thom. S.1 q.104 a.1 ad 4 quoted, Scot./Bonav. agreement, cross-ref d.2 p.I a.1 q.3 + I. Sent. d.9 q.4; Henr. Gand. *esse*-essentia identity; Richard. a Med./Durand. dissent). Item II is the commentator roll for *this* question (Alex. Hal. through Biel). Item III anticipates the *next* (3rd) question's sparse commentator coverage (Alex. Hal., B. Albert). This is q2's own scholion — distinct from q1's (which treated the *concursus Dei ad actiones malas* history).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 864–866 read top→bottom. The p.864/865 seam (between *Fundamentum* 5 end "ergo nihil in esse conservatur nisi per Deum" and the full-width `Sed contra:` opener — clean boundary, no mid-sentence splice), the p.865/866 seam (inside Solutio reply 1, "...quoniam Deus dixit ab aeterno / et fecit in tempore" — grammatically continuous), are each verified continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The p.864 footer block is fully accounted for here (1–5 received); p.865 footers 1–10 and p.866 footers 1–6 are all present; p.867's footers belong wholly to q3 (forwarded).

**[?] flags.** None. Note: raw OCR rendered the p.866 footer 6 (Hugo) page cross-ref as "pag. 834, nota 4"; the 450 dpi PDF reads clearly *pag. 854, nota 4* — corrected to [^21]. The de Sacram. citation is *Libr. I. p. VI. c. 37* per both OCR and PDF.