title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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QUAESTIO V.

*Utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Debitum mortis nullo modo melius solvitur quam per mortem gratuitam; sed omnes eramus debitores mortis: ergo optime satisfactum est Deo per mortem illius qui non erat debitor mortis[^p427-1].

2. Item, nullo modo melius emendatur peccatum, quod commissum est per suavitatem, quam per supplicii acerbitatem: si ergo peccatum humani generis commissum fuit per gustum et suavitatem ligni vetiti, videtur, quod decentissimus modus satisfaciendi fuit per supplicium crucis[^p427-2].

3. Item, convenientissimus modus satisfaciendi est per difficultatem pro peccato, quod quis commisit multa facilitate; sed facillimum fuit primo homini abstinere a peccato: ergo difficillimus modus satisfaciendi fuit illi peccato convenientissimus. Sed hoc est sustinendo mala usque ad mortem: ergo et hoc modo satisfecit Christus[^p427-3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, decentissimus modus satisfaciendi de elatione est per abiectionem et vilificationem; sed nulla maior vilificatio fuit, quam quae fuit in sustinentia opprobrii crucis[^p427-4]: ergo talis modus satisfaciendi maxime conveniebat nostrae infirmitati: ergo decuit, ipsum a summo medico acceptari.

**Sed contra:**
1. Maximae crudelitatis est hominem iustissimum morti tradere; sed Christus fuit iustissimus: ergo crudelissimum fuit ex quacumque causa tradere ipsum morti: ergo talis modus satisfaciendi nullatenus debuit a Deo acceptari. Si tu dicas, quod non tradidit ipsum morti; *contra* hoc est quod dicitur ad Philippenses secundo[^p427-5]: *Factus est obediens usque ad mortem;* et in multis aliis locis dicitur illud idem.

2. Item, maximae perversitatis et iniustitiae est damnare innocentem, ut absolvatur nocens; sed *nos omnes sicut oves erravimus, ipse vero peccatum non fecit:* ergo videtur, quod iniuste fecerit Dominus, *cum in eo posuit iniquitates omnium nostrum*[^p427-6].

3. Item, *Deus mortem non fecit nec delectatur in perditione vivorum*[^p427-7]: si ergo Deus delectatur in satisfactione et non delectatur in alicuius morte; non videtur, quod debuerit acceptare mortem Christi pro satisfactione.

4. Item, multo melior est vita Christi, quam esset mors: ergo si mors Christi potuit Deo satisfacere pro nobis, multo magis vita eius debuit satisfacere: ergo magis debuit acceptare vitam ad satisfaciendum quam mortem.

5. Item, non est modus ordinatus satisfaciendi, in quo *additur peccatum super peccatum*[^p427-8]; sed Christus occidi non poterat sine gravissimo peccato: ergo inordinatus modus satisfaciendi videtur esse per mortem Christi.

6. Item, gravius fuit peccatum occidentium Christum, quam esset peccatum Adae: ergo si non potuit fieri satisfactio pro peccato Adae, nisi Christus semel moreretur; videtur, quod non potuerit satisfactio fieri pro peccato occidentium Christum, nisi Christus secundo occideretur; pari ratione nec de occisione illa, nisi occideretur tertio, et sic in infinitum: ergo non videtur, quod talis modus satisfaciendi sit completus nec a Deo acceptandus[^p427-9].

### CONCLUSIO.

> Modus nostrae satisfactionis, factae per Christum, fuit congruentissimus et maxime a Deo acceptandus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod modum istum ultra ceteros debuit Deus acceptare, quia nobilissimus est inter omnes, qui possent esse vel excogitari. Fuit enim acceptabilissimus ad placandum Deum, congruentissimus ad curandum morbum,
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efficacissimus ad attrahendum genus humanum, prudentissimus ad expugnandum generis humani inimicum.

*Primum* quidem fuit acceptabilissimus ad placandum Deum; propter quod dicit Anselmus secundo *Cur Deus homo,* capitulo undecimo: « Nihil asperius et difficilius potest homo pati ad honorem Dei sponte et non ex debito quam mortem. Et nullatenus magis potest se ipsum dare homo Deo, quam cum se morti tradit ad honorem ipsius ». Et hoc est quod dicitur ad Ephesios quinto[^p428-1]: *Tradidit semetipsum oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis.*

*Secundo* etiam fuit congruentissimus ad curandum morbum. Primus enim homo peccaverat per superbiam et gulam et inobedientiam, sicut dicit Gregorius[^p428-2], et in secundo libro fuit ostensum; voluit enim assimilari Deo per scientiae sublimitatem, gustare ligni suavitatem et transgredi praecepti divini limitem. Et quoniam curatio habet fieri per contrarium; ideo modus satisfaciendi congruentissimus fuit per abiectionem, humiliationem et divinae voluntatis impletionem. Et haec omnia satis relucent in ipsa passione; et de his dicit Apostolus ad Philippenses secundo[^p428-3]: *Humiliavit semetipsum, factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis.*

*Tertio* autem fuit efficacissimus ad attrahendum genus humanum. His enim solis passio ad salutem valebat, qui mera voluntate per amorem Deo adhaerebant. Non enim decrevit Deus aliter genus humanum salvare nisi libero[^p428-4] voluntatis arbitrio; et nullo alio modo, salvo voluntatis arbitrio, Deus hominem magis potuit attrahere ad amorem suum, quam sustinendo pro eo crucis patibulum: propter quod dicitur Ioannis duodecimo[^p428-5]: *Ego, si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum.* Et Hugo, *de Arrha sponsae:* « Ut ostenderet tibi, quantum te diligeret, non nisi moriendo a morte te liberavit, ut non tantum pietatis impenderet beneficium, verum etiam caritatis monstraret affectum ».

*Quarto* etiam fuit ad vincendum adversarium prudentissimus. Decebat enim, ut Christus sua prudentia superaret diabolum, sicut diabolus sua astutia decepit hominem primum. Propter quod dicitur Iob vigesimo sexto[^p428-6]: *Prudentia eius percussit superbum;* et quadragesimo: *Numquid poteris capere leviathan hamo?* Propter quod dicitur distinctione praecedenti, capitulo primo: « Venit Redemptor, et victus est deceptor, tetendit illi muscipulam crucem suam, posuit ei quasi escam sanguinem suum ».

Ex his quatuor rationibus satis apparet, quod modus iste satisfaciendi pro nobis fuit congruentissimus et a Deo maxime acceptandus. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod magnae crudelitatis fuit hominem iustissimum tradere morti; dicendum, quod Deus eum non tradidit *infligendo* mortem, vel *praecipiendo* aliis, quod ipsi eum traderent, sed *permittendo* et voluntatem ipsius *acceptando;* et ideo nulla fuit in Deo crudelitas, quia non sanguinem Christi sitivit, sed voluntatem eius optimam acceptavit; haec est summa responsionis Anselmi in libro *Cur Deus homo*[^p428-7]. Unde si dicatur aliquando Pater eum tradidisse morti, vel voluntate Patris passus esse, et aliquod consimile, modo praemisso intelligendum est: non quia Pater eum coegerit invitum, sed quia suscepit voluntarium et devotum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod impium est damnare innocentem et nocentem absolvere; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si innocens damnatur invitus; sed si innocens velit se offerre et exponere[^p428-8] pro salute nocentis, nihil prohibet, quin oblatio eius debeat acceptari. Et isto modo in proposito intelligendum est fuisse, quia Christus non coacte, sed voluntarie pro salute nostra sustinuit passionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non delectatur in perditione alicuius; dicendum, quod verum est, quod Deus non delectatur in poena, secundum quod est afflictiva et naturae corruptiva; delectatur tamen, et placet sibi optima voluntas, per quam poena sustinetur et ad honorem Dei ordinatur et ad absolutionem hominis rei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod melior fuit vita Christi quam mors; dicendum, quod absque dubio verum est; tamen non sequitur, quod non magis debuerit satisfacere per mortem quam per vitam[^p428-9], duplici ex causa: primum quidem, quia satisfactio debet esse poenalis, et maxima satisfactio maxime poenalis; secundo vero, quia maioris perfectionis est velle mori ad honorem Dei quam velle vivere, et ex maiori caritate procedit et terminos naturae magis excedit; et ideo ratio illa non cogit.
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est ordinatus modus satisfaciendi, ubi peccatum additur super peccatum; dicendum, quod verum est, quando peccatum additur super peccatum ex parte eius qui debet satisfacere; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam Christus moriendo non peccavit, sed quantum in se fuit, omnia peccata delevit. Et si tu dicas, quod talem modum eligere debuit, in quo nec ipse nec alius peccaret; dicendum, quod illud non oportet. In hoc enim manifestatur summa sapientia Dei, quod scit de malis non tantum elicere bona, verum etiam optima; quod maxime fecit in morte Christi pretiosissima[^p429-1].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod gravius fuit peccatum occidentium Christum etc.; dicendum, quod quidquid sit de gravitate, quia de hoc ad praesens non est quaestio[^p429-2]; tamen esto, quod gravius fuisset, non oportebat propter hoc secundo Christum pati. Nam unica passio Christi non solum sufficiebat ad satisfaciendum pro peccato Adae, sed etiam pro omni peccatorum multitudine. Unde mors Christi ipsis occidentibus valebat, si vellent ad Christum converti; in infinitum enim fuit maius meritum Christi patientis, quam esset delictum Iudae tradentis, Iudaei instigantis et gentilis crucifigentis, secundum quod Christus plus habebat de bonitate, quam illi haberent de malitia. Praeterea, sicut dicit Anselmus[^p429-3], excusabat eos ignorantia aliquo modo, sicut dictum est supra; et ideo non oportebat, pro peccatis eorum Christum iterum pati, sed, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Hebraeos decimo[^p429-4]: *una oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos.*

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Haec quaestio proprie agit de *congruentia modi,* quo Christus patiendo pro nobis satisfecit; simul autem, praesertim in solut. ad 6, tangitur controversia de *valore* eiusdem satisfactionis, quae procul dubio fuit non tantum sufficiens, copiosa et condigna, sed etiam superabundans. Sed hoc supposito, adhuc circa *tria* inter posteriores Scholasticos agitabantur controversiae, quas breviter referre iuvat, ut melius perspiciatur doctrina seraphici Doctoris de Christi *gratia* (supra d. 13.), de *merito* (d. 18.) et de *satisfactione* (hac d. 20.). Dissensus igitur circa *valorem satisfactionis* Christi (et similiter iudicandum de *merito*) erat in his: 1. Utrum et quomodo iste valor dependeat ab *acceptatione* Dei. 2. Utrum et qua ratione sit *infinitus.* 3. Utrum satisfactio Christi sit secundum *rigorem iustitiae commutativae.* Ex eadem autem radice illa triplex opinionum differentia ortum habuit.
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**II.** Respectu 1. quaestionis Nominales et plurimi Scotistae docebant, *valorem* operum satisfactoriorum dependere *solummodo* ab acceptatione Dei. Nominales enim generatim proclamabant hoc principium: « Meritum quodcumque tantum et pro tantis potest acceptari *passive,* quantum et pro quantis vult tota Trinitas *active* » (ita Gabriel Biel, III. Sent. d. 19. nota 3.). Alii pauci volebant, talem acceptationem *nihil* conferre ad rationem satisfactionis. Communior autem sententia, media via incedens, tenet, acceptationem hanc non quidem ad *essentiam* meriti et satisfactionis requiri, sed ad eius *complementum,* quatenus scilicet in ipsa importetur quaedam *obligatio iustitiae,* quae sane nullatenus ex parte Dei retribuentis concipi potest, nisi supposita spontanea ipsius promissione. Licet autem Scoto communiter et etiam a discipulis ipsius opinio Nominalium imposita sit; tamen alii eiusdem scholae, ut Mastrius, Hauzeur, Frassenius, Henno, rectius quaedam ipsius verba aequivoca ex aliis locis interpretantur (cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. n. 9.), mentemque eius esse dicunt, quod haec satisfactio antecedenter ad acceptationem divinam iam ex se sit condigna in *actu primo,* tamen ex *acceptatione Dei,* ad debitum remittendum promissione se obligantis, fiat condigna in *actu secundo.* De hac Scoti interpretatione discipulus S. Thomae, Gotti (Theol. scholastico-dogmat. t. III. tr. 1. q. 3. dub. 4. § 3. n. 17.), dicit: « Haec si ita sunt, facile cum Scoto et Scotistis conveniemus ».

S. Bonaventuram communiori sententiae suffragari, colligitur ex eo quod generatim de *merito condigni* et de *acceptatione* Dei docet II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. (cfr. etiam IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.), ubi duplicem distinguit acceptationem divinam, quarum altera (habitualis et intrinseca) fundatur in ipsa gratia adoptionis, dignificante operantem eiusque opus, altera vero (quasi extrinseca) ex promissione divina oritur, et ipsa cadit super ipsum actum meritorium. Haec doctrina quoad substantiam applicari potest etiam ad meritum et satisfactionem *Christi* respectu utriusque acceptationis. Attamen observandum est, magnopere differre acceptationem in utroque casu. Nam fundamentum acceptationis operum a pura creatura factorum est *gratia adoptionis,* quae est in persona *extranea;* in Christo autem est *gratia unionis hypostaticae,* et ipse etiam ut *hic homo* est Filius Dei naturalis, verus Deus et accepto Deo minime extraneus (cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. et scholion). Ipsa igitur unio hypostatica eminentissimo modo iam continet acceptationem satisfactionis perfectissimam.

**III.** Quoad 2. controversiam Ss. Patres et quaedam decreta Sum. Pontificum (cfr. Constitut. *Unigenitus* Clementis VI.) satisfactionem Christi praedicant esse *infinitam.* Hoc Nominales volunt ita explicare, ut meritum Christi secundum se sit *finitum simpliciter,* acceptum tamen a Deo ut sufficiens pro infinitis Adae filiis, si futuri essent. Similiter Scotistae solent dicere, hoc meritum non fuisse *formaliter et intrinsecus infinitum,* sed *secundum quid et extrinsecus,* tum ob sanctitatem personae divinae, tum ob acceptationem divinam. Sed discipuli S. Thomae cum plurimis aliis dicunt, illud fuisse *simpliciter et intrinsecus* infinitum. Hoc autem intelligunt non respectu *entitatis physicae* operum meritoriorum, quae procul dubio est creata et finita, nec secundum actuum bonitatem *specificam et essentialem,* quam sumunt ex *obiecto,* sed respectu valoris in *genere moris,* quatenus in se ipsis et intrinsecus infinite dignificantur a persona Verbi. Licet enim actiones meritoriae procedant immediate ab humana Christi natura, ut est *principium quo;* haec tamen non extrinsecus, sed *intrinsecus* unita est cum persona infinita, cui, ut est *principium quod,* actiones illae tribuuntur et a qua intrinsecus contrahunt valorem infinitum. Revera non est paritas, ut quidam dicunt, inter infinitatem *obiecticam* et *extrinsecam,* quae communiter tribuitur peccato mortali ratione relationis ad obiectum, contra quod offendit (quod certo est actioni *extrinsecum*), et infinitatem, de qua sermo est, cum *relatio* humanae Christi naturae eiusque operationis ad personam Christi sit prorsus singularis et penitus differat ab illa, qua actio peccaminosa refertur ad sive potius *contra* Deum.

**IV.** Tertia controversia, quae est de quaestione, utrum Christus secundum *totum rigorem iustitiae commutativae* satisfecerit, quod Nominales, Scotistae aliique negant, affirmantibus Thomistis cum non paucis, in se minoris est momenti quam praecedentes, cum supponatur ab omnibus, rationem *iustitiae commutativae* ad Deum non applicari nisi secundum analogiam. Unde in hac controversia incidit aliquatenus lis circa nomen. Facile tamen conceditur, quod haec satisfactio large dici possit *rigorosa,* licet ei non conveniant in stricto sensu omnes conditiones, quae inter homines in actibus iustitiae commutativae requiruntur ad talem rigorem. In hac re controversa bene conveniunt verba S. Bonaventurae cum doctrina S. Thomae, et etiam sententiam eius ab eadem non discrepare, nobis persuasum est, quidquid dicat Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 10. q. 7.), qui S. Bonav. ad opinionem Scotistarum trahere nititur. Nam S. Doctor non tantum pluries meritum Christi dicit esse infinitum (cfr. hic ad 6, q. 6. ad 4.), sed etiam hanc infinitatem semper repetit ab infinita dignitate personae Verbi (cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2, praesertim ad 3.); sed posito, quod dignitas personae operantis concurrat ad dandum valorem operi, et quod *maior* dignitas det maiorem valorem; sane *infinita* dignitas etiam valorem augere debet in infinitum. Loci autem, quos urget praefatus auctor in contrarium, loquuntur tantum de gratia creata Christi *in se,* et de actibus meritoriis Christi secundum eorum *physicam,* vel *specificam* entitatem. Eandem sententiam tenet Alex. Hal., cum cuilibet actioni, etiam uni guttae sanguinis Christi, ob dignitatem personae tribuit sufficientiam ad omnem satisfactionem (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. ad 3, cfr. q. 17. m. 3.). Etiam in schola Scoti sunt nonnulli, ut Hauzeur et Vulpes, qui Scoto diversam, ac ipsius verba sonant, mentem attribuunt, adductis aliis ipsius testimoniis. Praesertim Hauzeur (Collatio totius theologiae etc. t. II. q. 12. col. 378 seqq.), secutus cl. nostrum Vega (VII. de Iustificat. c. 7-10.), inter alios locos profert hoc principium Scoti (III. Sent. d. 13. ad 2. quaest. n. 9.): « In commendando Christum malo excedere quam deficere a laude sibi debita, si propter ignorantiam oporteat in alterum incidere ». Tandem Hauzeur concludit, respiciendum potius « ad illam eius intentionem, quam serpere per eius sensum litteralem ». Idem auctor (loc. cit. col. 376) bene observat, quod passio Christi, qua se ipsum, scilicet proprium corpus et sanguinem, animam et vitam personae divinae in sacrificium Deo obtulit, infiniti valoris sit « duplici titulo: offerentis et oblati infiniti; qualibet alia actione solo titulo agentis infiniti. Nec offerebat haec ut finita et seorsim, sed coniunctim cum persona infinita » etc.

**V.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 4. a. 1. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3, q. 50. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 46. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

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### Question V. *Whether God ought to have accepted the mode of satisfaction made through the passion of Christ.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether God ought to have accepted the mode of satisfaction made through the passion of Christ. And that he ought, it seems.

1. The debt of death is in no way better discharged than through a freely-undertaken death; but we were all debtors of death: therefore satisfaction was best made to God through the death of him who was not a debtor of death[^p427-1].

2. Likewise, in no way is a sin better made amends for, which was committed through pleasantness, than through the harshness of punishment: if therefore the sin of the human race was committed through the taste and pleasantness of the forbidden tree, it seems that the most fitting mode of satisfaction was through the punishment of the cross[^p427-2].

3. Likewise, the most suitable mode of satisfaction is through difficulty for a sin which one committed with much ease; but it was most easy for the first man to abstain from sin: therefore the most difficult mode of satisfaction was the most suitable for that sin. But this is by enduring evils even unto death: therefore in this way too Christ made satisfaction[^p427-3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the most fitting mode of satisfaction for pride is through abasement and humiliation; but there was no greater humiliation than that which was in the bearing of the reproach of the cross[^p427-4]: therefore such a mode of satisfaction was most suited to our infirmity: therefore it was fitting that it be accepted by the supreme physician.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is of the greatest cruelty to hand over a most just man to death; but Christ was most just: therefore it was most cruel to hand him over to death for any cause whatever: therefore such a mode of satisfaction ought in no way to have been accepted by God. If you say that he did not hand him over to death; *on the contrary* there is what is said to the Philippians, chapter two[^p427-5]: *He became obedient even unto death;* and in many other places the same thing is said.

2. Likewise, it is of the greatest perversity and injustice to condemn the innocent in order that the guilty be absolved; but *we all like sheep have gone astray, while he did no sin:* therefore it seems that the Lord acted unjustly, *when he laid on him the iniquities of us all*[^p427-6].

3. Likewise, *God made not death, neither delighteth in the destruction of the living*[^p427-7]: if therefore God delights in satisfaction and does not delight in anyone's death, it does not seem that he ought to have accepted the death of Christ for satisfaction.

4. Likewise, the life of Christ was much better than his death would be: therefore if the death of Christ could satisfy God for us, much more ought his life to satisfy: therefore he ought rather to have accepted his life for making satisfaction than his death.

5. Likewise, that is not an ordered mode of satisfaction in which *sin is added upon sin*[^p427-8]; but Christ could not be slain without a most grave sin: therefore the mode of satisfaction through the death of Christ seems disordered.

6. Likewise, the sin of those killing Christ was graver than the sin of Adam would be: therefore if satisfaction for the sin of Adam could not be made unless Christ died once, it seems that satisfaction could not be made for the sin of those killing Christ unless Christ were killed a second time; by parity of reasoning, nor for that killing unless he were killed a third time, and so on to infinity: therefore it does not seem that such a mode of satisfaction is complete, nor to be accepted by God[^p427-9].

### Conclusion.

> The mode of our satisfaction, made through Christ, was most suitable and most to be accepted by God.

**I respond:** It must be said that God ought to have accepted this mode beyond all others, because it is the noblest among all that could be or be devised. For it was most acceptable for appeasing God, most suitable for curing the disease,
most efficacious for drawing the human race, most prudent for vanquishing the enemy of the human race.

*First,* indeed, it was most acceptable for appeasing God; on account of which Anselm says in the second book of *Cur Deus homo,* chapter eleven: « Nothing harsher and more difficult can a man suffer for the honor of God, of his own accord and not out of debt, than death. And in no way can a man give himself more to God than when he hands himself over to death for his honor ». And this is what is said to the Ephesians, chapter five[^p428-1]: *He delivered himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.*

*Secondly,* too, it was most suitable for curing the disease. For the first man had sinned through pride and gluttony and disobedience, as Gregory says[^p428-2], and it was shown in the second book; for he willed to be made like to God through the sublimity of knowledge, to taste the pleasantness of the tree, and to transgress the limit of the divine precept. And since healing must be done through the contrary, therefore the most suitable mode of satisfaction was through abasement, humiliation, and the fulfillment of the divine will. And all these things shine forth sufficiently in the passion itself; and of these the Apostle says to the Philippians, chapter two[^p428-3]: *He humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, even the death of the cross.*

*Thirdly,* moreover, it was most efficacious for drawing the human race. For the passion availed unto salvation only for those who clung to God by a pure will through love. For God decreed to save the human race in no other way than by the free[^p428-4] choice of the will; and in no other way, the choice of the will being preserved, could God more draw man to his love than by enduring for him the gibbet of the cross: on account of which it is said in John, chapter twelve[^p428-5]: *I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself.* And Hugh, *On the Pledge of the Bride:* « To show you how much he loved you, he freed you from death only by dying, that he might not only bestow the benefit of compassion, but might also show the affection of charity ».

*Fourthly,* too, it was most prudent for conquering the adversary. For it was fitting that Christ should overcome the devil by his prudence, just as the devil by his cunning deceived the first man. On account of which it is said in Job, chapter twenty-six[^p428-6]: *His prudence has struck the proud one;* and in chapter forty: *Canst thou take leviathan with a hook?* On account of which it is said in the preceding distinction, chapter one: « The Redeemer came, and the deceiver was conquered; he stretched out for him as a snare his cross, he set before him as a bait his blood ».

From these four reasons it appears sufficiently that this mode of satisfaction for us was most suitable and most to be accepted by God. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that it was of great cruelty to hand over a most just man to death; it must be said that God did not hand him over by *inflicting* death, or by *commanding* others that they should hand him over, but by *permitting* and by *accepting* his will; and therefore there was no cruelty in God, because he did not thirst for the blood of Christ, but accepted his most excellent will; this is the sum of Anselm's response in the book *Cur Deus homo*[^p428-7]. Whence if it is sometimes said that the Father handed him over to death, or that he suffered by the will of the Father, or anything similar, it must be understood in the aforesaid manner: not that the Father compelled him unwilling, but that he received him as willing and devoted.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that it is impious to condemn the innocent and to absolve the guilty; it must be said that this is true if the innocent one is condemned unwilling; but if the innocent one is willing to offer and expose[^p428-8] himself for the salvation of the guilty, nothing prevents his oblation from deserving to be accepted. And in this way it must be understood to have been in the matter at hand, because Christ endured the passion not by compulsion, but voluntarily, for our salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that God does not delight in anyone's destruction; it must be said that it is true that God does not delight in punishment, insofar as it is afflictive and corruptive of nature; nevertheless he delights, and the most excellent will pleases him, through which the punishment is endured and is ordered to the honor of God and to the absolution of the guilty man.

4. To that which is objected, that the life of Christ was better than his death; it must be said that without doubt it is true; yet it does not follow that he ought not rather to have made satisfaction through death than through life[^p428-9], for two reasons: first indeed, because satisfaction ought to be penal, and the greatest satisfaction most penal; secondly, because it is of greater perfection to will to die for the honor of God than to will to live, and it proceeds from greater charity and exceeds the limits of nature more; and therefore that reason does not compel.

5. To that which is objected, that it is not an ordered mode of satisfaction where sin is added upon sin; it must be said that it is true, when sin is added upon sin on the part of him who ought to make satisfaction; but it is not so in the matter at hand. For Christ in dying did not sin, but as far as in him lay, he wiped out all sins. And if you say that he ought to have chosen such a mode in which neither he himself nor another would sin; it must be said that this is not necessary. For in this is manifested the supreme wisdom of God, that he knows how to draw from evils not only goods, but even the best; which he did most of all in the most precious death of Christ[^p429-1].

6. To that which is objected last, that the sin of those killing Christ was graver etc.; it must be said that, whatever may be the case as to the gravity—since concerning this there is at present no question[^p429-2]—nevertheless, granted that it had been graver, it was not necessary on this account for Christ to suffer a second time. For the single passion of Christ not only sufficed to make satisfaction for the sin of Adam, but also for the whole multitude of sins. Whence the death of Christ availed for those very ones killing him, if they were willing to be converted to Christ; for the merit of the suffering Christ was infinitely greater than the offense of the betraying Judas, the inciting Jew, and the crucifying gentile would be, inasmuch as Christ had more of goodness than they would have of malice. Moreover, as Anselm says[^p429-3], ignorance excused them in some way, as was said above; and therefore it was not necessary for Christ to suffer again for their sins, but, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews, chapter ten[^p429-4]: *by one oblation he has perfected forever them that are sanctified.*

### Scholion.

**I.** This question properly treats of the *suitability of the mode* by which Christ, suffering for us, made satisfaction; but at the same time, especially in the solution to the sixth objection, there is touched the controversy over the *value* of that satisfaction, which without doubt was not only sufficient, copious, and condign, but even superabundant. But this being supposed, there were still agitated among the later Scholastics, concerning *three* points, controversies which it is helpful to refer to briefly, so that the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor concerning Christ's *grace* (above, d. 13.), his *merit* (d. 18.), and his *satisfaction* (in this d. 20.) may be better perceived. The disagreement, then, concerning the *value of the satisfaction* of Christ (and the same is to be judged concerning his *merit*) was on these points: 1. Whether and how this value depends on the *acceptation* of God. 2. Whether and by what account it is *infinite.* 3. Whether the satisfaction of Christ is according to the *rigor of commutative justice.* And from the same root that threefold difference of opinions took its origin.

**II.** With respect to the first question, the Nominalists and most Scotists taught that the *value* of satisfactory works depends *solely* on the acceptation of God. For the Nominalists generally proclaimed this principle: « Any merit can be accepted *passively* for as much and for as many as the whole Trinity wills *actively* » (so Gabriel Biel, III. Sent. d. 19. note 3.). A few others held that such acceptation contributes *nothing* to the account of satisfaction. But the more common opinion, proceeding by a middle way, holds that this acceptation is required not indeed for the *essence* of merit and satisfaction, but for its *complement,* inasmuch namely as in it is implied a certain *obligation of justice,* which surely can in no way be conceived on the part of God who rewards, except on the supposition of his own spontaneous promise. But although the opinion of the Nominalists is commonly imposed on Scotus and even by his own disciples; nevertheless others of the same school, such as Mastrius, Hauzeur, Frassenius, Henno, more rightly interpret certain of his equivocal words from other places (cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. n. 9.), and say that his mind is that this satisfaction, antecedently to the divine acceptation, is already of itself condign in *first act,* yet from the *acceptation of God,* who by his promise binds himself to remit the debt, becomes condign in *second act.* Concerning this interpretation of Scotus, the disciple of St. Thomas, Gotti (Theol. scholastico-dogmat. t. III. tr. 1. q. 3. dub. 4. § 3. n. 17.), says: « If these things are so, we shall easily agree with Scotus and the Scotists ».

That St. Bonaventure favors the more common opinion is gathered from what he generally teaches concerning *condign merit* and the *acceptation* of God in II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. and following (cfr. also IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. in the body), where he distinguishes a twofold divine acceptation, of which the one (habitual and intrinsic) is founded in the very grace of adoption, which dignifies the one who works and his work, while the other (as it were extrinsic) arises from the divine promise, and itself falls upon the meritorious act itself. This doctrine can, as to its substance, be applied also to the merit and satisfaction of *Christ* with respect to each acceptation. Yet it must be observed that the acceptation differs greatly in each case. For the foundation of the acceptation of works done by a pure creature is the *grace of adoption,* which is in an *extraneous* person; but in Christ it is the *grace of the hypostatic union,* and he himself, even as *this man,* is the natural Son of God, true God, and to the accepting God not at all extraneous (cfr. above, d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. and the scholion). The hypostatic union itself, therefore, in a most eminent manner already contains the most perfect acceptation of the satisfaction.

**III.** As to the second controversy, the holy Fathers and certain decrees of the supreme Pontiffs (cfr. the Constitution *Unigenitus* of Clement VI.) proclaim the satisfaction of Christ to be *infinite.* The Nominalists wish to explain this in such a way that the merit of Christ in itself is *finite simply,* yet accepted by God as sufficient for infinite sons of Adam, if there were to be such. Similarly the Scotists are accustomed to say that this merit was not *formally and intrinsically infinite,* but *in a certain respect and extrinsically,* both on account of the holiness of the divine person and on account of the divine acceptation. But the disciples of St. Thomas with very many others say that it was *simply and intrinsically* infinite. This, however, they understand not with respect to the *physical entity* of the meritorious works, which without doubt is created and finite, nor according to the *specific and essential* goodness of the acts, which they take from the *object,* but with respect to the value in the *genus of morals,* inasmuch as in themselves and intrinsically they are infinitely dignified by the person of the Word. For although the meritorious actions proceed immediately from the human nature of Christ, as it is the *principle by which;* this nature nevertheless is united not extrinsically but *intrinsically* with the infinite person, to whom, as it is the *principle which,* those actions are attributed and from whom they intrinsically draw infinite value. Truly there is no parity, as some say, between the *objective* and *extrinsic* infinity, which is commonly attributed to mortal sin by reason of its relation to the object against which it offends (which is certainly *extrinsic* to the action), and the infinity of which the discourse is, since the *relation* of Christ's human nature and of his operation to the person of Christ is altogether singular and utterly differs from that by which a sinful action is referred to, or rather *against,* God.

**IV.** The third controversy, which concerns the question whether Christ made satisfaction according to the *whole rigor of commutative justice,* which the Nominalists, Scotists, and others deny, while the Thomists with not a few affirm it, is in itself of less moment than the preceding, since it is supposed by all that the account of *commutative justice* is not applied to God except according to analogy. Whence in this controversy there arises in some measure a dispute about a word. Yet it is easily conceded that this satisfaction can broadly be called *rigorous,* although there do not belong to it in the strict sense all the conditions which among men are required in acts of commutative justice for such rigor. In this controverted matter the words of St. Bonaventure agree well with the doctrine of St. Thomas, and we are persuaded that his opinion does not diverge from it, whatever Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 10. q. 7.) may say, who strives to draw St. Bonaventure to the opinion of the Scotists. For the holy Doctor not only several times says that the merit of Christ is infinite (cfr. here ad 6, q. 6. ad 4.), but also always traces back this infinity to the infinite dignity of the person of the Word (cfr. above, d. 13. a. 1. q. 2, especially ad 3.); but granted that the dignity of the person who works concurs to give value to the work, and that *greater* dignity gives greater value; surely *infinite* dignity must also increase the value to infinity. But the passages which the aforesaid author urges to the contrary speak only of the created grace of Christ *in itself,* and of the meritorious acts of Christ according to their *physical* or *specific* entity. Alexander of Hales holds the same opinion, when he attributes to any action, even to a single drop of Christ's blood, on account of the dignity of the person, sufficiency for all satisfaction (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. ad 3, cfr. q. 17. m. 3.). Even in the school of Scotus there are some, such as Hauzeur and Vulpes, who attribute to Scotus a mind different from what his words sound, adducing other testimonies of his. Especially Hauzeur (Collatio totius theologiae etc. t. II. q. 12. col. 378 and following), following our distinguished Vega (VII. de Iustificat. c. 7-10.), among other passages brings forward this principle of Scotus (III. Sent. d. 13. ad 2. quaest. n. 9.): « In commending Christ I prefer to exceed rather than to fall short of the praise due to him, if on account of ignorance one must fall into one or the other ». Finally Hauzeur concludes that one should look rather « to that intention of his, which creeps through his literal sense ». The same author (loc. cit. col. 376) well observes that the passion of Christ, by which he offered himself, namely his own body and blood, his soul and life of the divine person, in sacrifice to God, is of infinite value « by a twofold title: of the offerer and of the offered, both infinite; whereas any other action is so only by the title of the agent who is infinite. Nor did he offer these things as finite and separately, but conjointly with the infinite person » etc.

**V.** Besides the passages cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 4. a. 1. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., here a. 4; S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3, q. 50. a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 46. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, here q. 1.

---

la: Cfr. dictum Anselmi, infra in corp. quaest. allatum.

en: Cfr. the saying of Anselm, cited below in the body of the question.

la: Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 11: *Si homo per suavitatem peccavit, an non convenit, ut per asperitatem satisfaciat?* — In *maiori* pro *melius* cod. R *decentius vel iustius.*

en: Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 11: *If man sinned through pleasantness, is it not fitting that he make satisfaction through harshness?* — In *maiori* for *melius* codex R has *decentius vel iustius.*

la: Anselm., loc. cit.: *Et si tam facile victus est a diabolo, ut Deum peccando exhonoraret, ut facilius non posset; nonne iustum est, ut homo, satisfaciens Deo pro peccato, tanta difficultate vincat diabolum ad honorem Dei, ut maiori non possit?* — Multi codd. *satisfacit Christus.*

en: Anselm., loc. cit.: *And if he was so easily conquered by the devil, that by sinning he dishonored God, as he could not more easily; is it not just that man, making satisfaction to God for sin, should conquer the devil with so great difficulty for the honor of God, that with a greater he could not?* — Many codices read *satisfacit Christus.*

la: August., de Praedest. Sanct. c. 15. n. 31: *Pro nobis ipsa Divinitas, quousque se deponeret humilius, non habuit, quam suscepta natura hominis cum infirmitate carnis usque ad mortem crucis.* Similiter Petr. Lombard. exponit Ps. 21. 7, illis verbis: *Clamabo, et non exaudies, et hoc non erit ad insipientiam mihi,* haec adtexens: « sed ut sapienter meo sanguine genus humanum liberetur. Nullus enim fuit convenientior modus nostrae liberationis, ut homo, qui per superbiam cecidit, per humilitatem resurgat ». — Anselm., loc. cit., hanc affert rationem: *An non,* ait, *est dignum, quatenus qui se sic abstulit Deo peccando, ut se plus auferre non posset, sic se det Deo satisfaciendo, ut magis se non possit dare?* — Pro *maior vilificatio* codd. G H I N T U Z *minor vilificatio.*

en: August., de Praedest. Sanct. c. 15. n. 31: *For us the Divinity itself, that it might lay itself down more humbly, had no further means than the assumed nature of man, with the infirmity of the flesh, even to the death of the cross.* Similarly Peter Lombard expounds Ps. 21. 7, with these words: *I shall cry, and thou wilt not hear, and this will not be folly to me,* adding these: « but that wisely the human race might be freed by my blood. For there was no more suitable mode of our liberation, that man, who fell through pride, might rise through humility ». — Anselm., loc. cit., brings forward this reasoning: *Is it not fitting,* he says, *that he who so took himself from God by sinning, that he could not take himself away more, should so give himself to God by making satisfaction, that he could not give himself more?* — For *maior vilificatio* codices G H I N T U Z have *minor vilificatio.*

la: Vers. 8. Cfr. Rom. 8, 32; Ioan. 14, 31; 18, 11. — Hoc arg. nec non seq. inveniuntur in Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 8.

en: Verse 8. Cfr. Rom. 8, 32; John 14, 31; 18, 11. — This argument and also the following are found in Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 8.

la: Sap. 1, 13, ubi Vulgata *laetatur* pro *delectatur.* — Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 10: *Mirum enim est, si Deus sic delectatur aut eget sanguine innocentis, ut nonnisi interfecto eo parcere velit aut possit nocenti.*

en: Wis. 1, 13, where the Vulgate has *laetatur* for *delectatur.* — Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 10: *For it is a wonder, if God so delights in or needs the blood of an innocent man, that only when he has been slain is he willing or able to spare the guilty.*

la: Isai. 30, 1: *Vae filii desertores... ut adderetis peccatum super peccatum.*

en: Isa. 30, 1: *Woe, ye apostate children... that you would add sin upon sin.*

la: Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 15: *Si tam malum est eum [Christum] occidere, quam bona est vita eius, quomodo potest mors eius superare et delere peccata eorum qui eum occiderunt?* — Pro *acceptandus* codd. V Z *accipiendus,* et proxime ante pro *completus* edd. *competens.*

en: Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 15: *If it is as evil to kill him [Christ] as his life is good, how can his death overcome and wipe out the sins of those who killed him?* — For *acceptandus* codices V Z have *accipiendus,* and just before, for *completus* the editions have *competens.*

la: Vers. 2.

en: Verse 2.

la: Libr. IX. Moral. c. 5. n. 5; XXXI. c. 1. n. 1, et I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 16. n. 2. — In II. Sent. vide d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 33. dub. 1.

en: Bk. IX. Moralia c. 5. n. 5; XXXI. c. 1. n. 1, and I. Homil. in Evang. homily 16. n. 2. — In II. Sent. see d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. and following, and d. 33. dub. 1.

la: Vers. 8. — Paulo superius pro *abiectionem* Vat. *afflictionem.* Paulo inferius pro *Tertio autem* codd. A K P Q *Tertio etiam.*

en: Verse 8. — A little above, for *abiectionem* the Vatican edition has *afflictionem.* A little below, for *Tertio autem* codices A K P Q have *Tertio etiam.*

la: Cod. A *nisi in libero,* Vat. *nisi liberae.* Paulo ante pro *decrevit Deus* codd. G K *decuit.* Paulo inferius pro *sustinendo* edd. *suscipiendo.*

en: Codex A *nisi in libero,* the Vatican edition *nisi liberae.* A little before, for *decrevit Deus* codices G K have *decuit.* A little below, for *sustinendo* the editions have *suscipiendo.*

la: Vers. 32. — In testimonio ex Hugone, de Arrha animae, allato textus origin. pro *liberavit* exhibet *liberare voluit.*

en: Verse 32. — In the testimony cited from Hugh, de Arrha animae, the original text exhibits, for *liberavit,* *liberare voluit.*

la: Vers. 12. — Alterum testimon., ex Iob 40. (edd. 1, 2 cum codd. ultimo) allegatum, habetur ibi v. 19. seq. et in Vulgata sic sonat: *In oculis eius quasi hamo capiet eum... An extrahere poteris leviathan hamo* etc. — Circa finem corp. pro *a Deo* cod. Q *ideo.*

en: Verse 12. — The other testimony, cited from Job 40. (editions 1, 2 with the last codex), is found there at v. 19. and following, and in the Vulgate sounds thus: *In his eyes as with a hook he will take him... Canst thou draw out leviathan with a hook* etc. — Near the end of the body, for *a Deo* codex Q has *ideo.*

la: Libr. I. c. 9. et 10, nec non II. c. 11. Cfr. infra dub. 3. — Superius pro *traderent morti* cod. bb *occiderent.*

en: Bk. I. c. 9. and 10, and also II. c. 11. Cfr. below, dub. 3. — Above, for *traderent morti* codex bb has *occiderent.*

la: Codd. A k U V addunt *morti.*

en: Codices A k U V add *morti.*

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *per mortem quam per vitam* et etiam *non* ante *magis debuerit,* in qua lectione saltem supplendum est *per vitam.* Secuti sumus Vat.

en: The codices and editions 1, 2 omit *per mortem quam per vitam* and also *non* before *magis debuerit,* in which reading at least *per vitam* must be supplied. We have followed the Vatican edition.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6. — Pro *elicere* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *eligere.*

en: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6. — For *elicere* the editions with some codices have *eligere.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. in corp. et d. 33. dub. 2.

en: See II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. in the body, and d. 33. dub. 2.

la: Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 15. Vide supra d. 18. dub. 2. et d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.

en: Bk. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 15. See above, d. 18. dub. 2. and d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.

la: Vers. 14. — Pro *in sempiternum* codd. *in semetipsum.*

en: Verse 14. — For *in sempiternum* the codices have *in semetipsum.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for vol3 printed pp.427–430 (PDF 449–452; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 29682–29915). q5 opener at raw 29686 (`Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare`); next boundary QUAESTIO VI at raw 29916, printed p.430.

**Alignment.** Confirmed this is q5, the *Deus debuerit modum… acceptare* question — opener reads *utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare* (NOT q4's *aliquis adiutus gratia… pro se ipso*, NOT q6's *alio modo… liberare*). Running title on p.427 confirms the divisio's listing form: *Utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare.*

**Page-split map.**
- p.427: opener + objections (fundamenta 1–4) + Sed contra 1–6, CONCLUSIO, opening of Respondeo. Footers nn.1–9 (`[^p427-1..9]`).
- p.428: body of Respondeo (the four rationes: acceptabilissimus / congruentissimus / efficacissimus / prudentissimus) + Solutiones ad 1–4. Footers nn.1–9 (`[^p428-1..9]`).
- p.429: Solutiones ad 5–6 + Scholion §I. Footers nn.1–4 (`[^p429-1..4]`).
- p.430: Scholion §II–V (continuous, unmarked — the scholion carries no footers). Then QUAESTIO VI begins on p.430's right column.

**Apparatus count:** 22 entries total — p.427 nn.1–9; p.428 nn.1–9; p.429 nn.1–4; p.430 none (scholion is unfootnoted).

**Scholion:** present (§I–V). §I p.429; §II–V p.430. `has_scholion: true`.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* NONE. q5 opens at the top of p.427 (running head `DIST. XX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V.` marked the page turn before raw 29682); q4 consumed all of p.426's footers, so no footer migrates into q5.
- *Forwarded to d20-a1-q6:* QUAESTIO VI (*Utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare*) begins at **raw line 29916**, printed **p.430** (PDF 452). Opener: `Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare.` q6 begins on p.430's right column, BELOW q5's scholion. **NO footers migrate forward:** p.430 carries no footers for q5 (the scholion runs unmarked to the foot of p.430's left column); q6 begins p.430's own fresh footer sequence (q6's first footer `[^p430-...]` anchors on the Leo Papa citation in q6 fund. 1).

**[?] flags:** NONE. All four pages legible at 450 dpi; the one fragmented Solutio-ad-1 region on p.428 (cascade-shattered in OCR) was reconstructed directly from the column-band PDF read.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 6

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 430 -->

### Quaestio VI. *Utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Leo Papa in quodam sermone in ramis palmarum[^p430-1]: « Omnipotentia Filii Dei, quae propter eandem essentiam est aequalis Patri, potuisset liberare genus humanum solo imperio voluntatis suae, nisi divinis operibus maxime congruisset, ut nequitiae hostilis adversitas eo quem vicerat, vinceretur ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum dicit Augustinus *de Trinitate*, et habetur in littera[^p430-2]: « Dicimus, alium modum possibilem Deo fuisse, cuius potestati cuncta subiacent; sed nostrae miseriae sanandae convenientiorem alium non fuisse ».

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur expressius auctoritate Gregorii, vigesimo in *Moralibus*[^p430-3]: « Qui nos fecit existere ex nihilo revocare etiam sine morte et passione sua potuit ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per deductionem ad inconveniens: quia, si non potuisset nos alio modo liberare, ergo tunc fuisset divina potentia limitata, et persona Christi passioni subiecta; quod omnino est absurdum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur[^p430-4].

**Contra:** 1. Super illud ad Hebraeos secundo[^p431-5]: *Decebat auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari*; Glossa: « Nisi Christus moreretur, homo non redimeretur, et non redemptus periret, et frustra essent omnia facta »: si ergo hoc est impossibile, restat, quod *primum* est impossibile, scilicet Christum non mori pro salute generis humani. Et si hoc, impossibile fuit, alio modo genus humanum liberari quam per mortem Christi.

2. Item, Anselmus in libro *Cur Deus homo*[^p431-6]: « Non potuit transire calicem, nisi biberet, non quia non posset vitare mortem, si vellet, sed, sicut dictum est, impossibile fuit aliter salvare mundum »: redit ergo idem quod prius.

<!-- page 431 -->

3. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p431-1]: « Nullus alius modus fuit isto congruentior »: si ergo « optimi est optima adducere », sicut boni est bona facere; videtur, quod necessarium fuit, summam bonitatem istum modum eligere. Si ergo necessarium fuit eligere istum modum, impossibile fuit alio modo salvari.

4. Item, Deus, cum sit summe iustus, *negare se ipsum non potest*[^p431-2]: ergo si debet reparare genus humanum, necesse est, quod reparet per viam iustitiae; sed reparatio per viam iustitiae non potest esse nisi per satisfactionem, sicut supra fuit ostensum; satisfacere autem pro toto genere humano non potest nisi Deus et homo; modus satisfaciendi sufficiens esse non potest, nisi ut solvatur anima pro anima, et detur vita pro vita: ergo *a primo*, impossibile fuit, quod Deus humanum genus repararet alia via.

> **Conclusio.** Genus humanum ex parte Dei reparantis et liberantis potuit alia via quam per mortem Christi reparari; licet ex parte generis humani reparati non potuit salvari nisi hac via a Deo determinata.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum alio modo genus humanum potuerit reparari, quam per mortem Christi, potest quaeri vel de potentia Dei reparantis, vel ex parte generis humani reparati. Si ex parte Dei reparantis, sic absque dubio aliter potuit genus humanum liberare et reparare, sicut Sancti dicunt; et magister Hugo de sancto Victore alium modum assignat in Libro de *Sacramentis*[^p431-3], et Magister recitat in littera. Non enim est limitanda divina potentia, immo etiam, sicut solo nutu mentis et imperio voluntatis potuit creare, ita etiam potuit reparare. — Si autem quaeratur de potentia ex parte generis humani reparati et liberati; sic dicendum, quod determinatum fuit sibi[^p431-4] posse ad hanc viam; et isto modo intelligendo concedi potest, quod genus humanum non potuit aliter reparari; sicut conceditur, quod nullus homo potest salvari, nisi credat in Christum. Non enim patet nobis alia via salutis, *nec est aliud nomen sub caelo, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri*[^p431-5b]. Potuisset tamen Deus, si voluisset, aliud nomen dare, in quo salus nostra consisteret. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ad primam partem, quoniam ostendunt, alium modum nostrae salutis Deo fuisse possibilem, quantum est ex parte divinae potentiae.

**Ad opposita.**
*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa et de Anselmo, dicendum, quod auctoritates illae intelliguntur, quantum est ex parte *nostra*, praesupposita dispositione divina, qua nos sic, et non alio modo, liberare decrevit. Per hunc etiam modum intelligenda est auctoritas Ambrosii, quae posita fuit supra distinctione decima octava, capitulo ultimo. « Tantum, inquit, fuit peccatum nostrum, ut salvari non possemus, nisi unigenitus Dei Filius moreretur pro nobis debitoribus mortis »; hoc, inquam, intelligendum est, quia Deus nos aliter non decrevit salvare. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendae sunt auctoritates consimiles.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod optimi est optima adducere[^p431-6b]; dicendum, quod est optimum *simpliciter* et optimum *in genere*. Et optimum in genere potest esse magis et minus bonum; et Deus adducit optima in genere, et ideo sic facit optima, ut etiam possit facere meliora et minus bona. Ideo quamvis iste modus esset nostrae miseriae convenientior, non tamen oportuit, quod ita eligeret istum modum, quod non posset eligere alium modum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deus non potest facere contra suam iustitiam, et iustitia non potest praeter satisfactionem culpam dimittere; responderi potest *per interemptionem*[^p431-7] duarum propositionum, quas proponit: quarum prima est haec, quod non potuit liberari genus humanum nisi per viam iustitiae, potuit enim liberare per viam misericordiae; nec in hoc fuisset factum praeiudicium iustitiae, si hoc facere voluisset. Potuisset enim omnia demerita delere et hominem in priori statu constituere; nec remansisset aliquid inordinatum in universo nec etiam impunitum. Peccatum enim fert secum poenam suam, per quam ordinatur[^p431-8]; et ita si sine satisfactione genus humanum liberasset, non propter hoc contra iustitiam fecisset. — Potest etiam responderi *per interemptionem illius*, quod nullo alio modo potuit satisfacere nisi per mortem. Quamvis enim hoc esset magis congruum, fortassis modicum supplicium in tam nobili persona suffecisset ad humani generis reparationem; sed Dominus in liberando supererogavit, propter quod dicitur: *Co-*

<!-- page 432 -->

*piosa apud eum redemptio*[^p432-1]. Esto tamen, quod non alio modo potuisset satisfieri pro genere humano, nec genus humanum aliter redimi, sicut multi concedunt; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod alio modo non potuerit liberari. De liberatione enim firmiter credo, quod alio modo potuit liberare; de redemptione vero nec nego nec audeo affirmare, quia temerarium est, cum de divina potentia agitur, terminum ei praefigere. Amplius enim potest, quam nos possumus[^p432-2] cogitare.

english:
### Question VI. *Whether God could have saved the human race in another way.*

In the sixth and last place it is asked whether God could have saved the human race in another way. And that He could, it seems:

1. First, by that which Pope Leo says in a certain sermon on Palm Sunday[^p430-1]: "The omnipotence of the Son of God, which on account of the same essence is equal to the Father, could have freed the human race by the sole command of His will, had it not most fully befitted the divine works that the adversity of the hostile wickedness should be overcome by that one whom it had conquered."

2. Likewise, Augustine says this same thing in *On the Trinity*, and it is held in the text[^p430-2]: "We say that another mode was possible to God, to whose power all things are subject; but that no other more suited to the healing of our misery existed."

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown more expressly by the authority of Gregory, in the twentieth book of the *Morals*[^p430-3]: "He who made us exist out of nothing was able also to recall us without His own death and passion."

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by a reduction to an unfitting consequence: because, if He could not have freed us in another way, then the divine power would have been limited, and the person of Christ subject to the passion; which is altogether absurd: therefore also that from which it follows[^p430-4].

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that text to the Hebrews, second chapter[^p431-5]: *It was fitting that the author of their salvation be perfected through suffering*; the Gloss: "Unless Christ died, man would not be redeemed, and not being redeemed would perish, and all things made would be in vain": if therefore this is impossible, it remains that the *first* is impossible, namely that Christ not die for the salvation of the human race. And if this was impossible, [it was impossible] for the human race to be freed in another way than through the death of Christ.

2. Likewise, Anselm in the book *Why God Became Man*[^p431-6]: "He could not let the cup pass unless He drank it, not because He could not have avoided death, if He wished, but because, as has been said, it was impossible to save the world otherwise": there returns therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, as Augustine says[^p431-1]: "No other mode was more fitting than this one": if therefore "it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things," as it belongs to the good to do good things; it seems that it was necessary for the highest goodness to choose this mode. If therefore it was necessary to choose this mode, it was impossible to be saved in another way.

4. Likewise, God, since He is supremely just, *cannot deny Himself*[^p431-2]: therefore if He ought to restore the human race, it is necessary that He restore it through the way of justice; but restoration through the way of justice cannot be except through satisfaction, as was shown above; but to make satisfaction for the whole human race cannot belong to any except one who is God and man; the sufficient mode of making satisfaction cannot be except that soul be paid for soul, and life be given for life: therefore *from the first*, it was impossible that God should restore the human race by another way.

> **Conclusion.** The human race, on the part of God who restores and frees, could have been restored by another way than through the death of Christ; although on the part of the human race that is restored it could not be saved except by this way determined by God.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether the human race could have been restored in another way than through the death of Christ, it can be asked either concerning the power of God who restores, or on the part of the human race that is restored. If on the part of God who restores, then without doubt He could have freed and restored the human race otherwise, as the Saints say; and master Hugh of Saint Victor assigns another mode in his Book *On the Sacraments*[^p431-3], and the Master recounts it in the text. For the divine power is not to be limited; nay rather, just as by the mere nod of the mind and the command of the will He was able to create, so also He was able to restore. — But if it is asked concerning the power on the part of the human race that is restored and freed, then it must be said that it was determined for it[^p431-4] to have the power for this way; and understanding it in this manner it can be conceded that the human race could not be restored otherwise; just as it is conceded that no man can be saved unless he believes in Christ. For no other way of salvation lies open to us, *nor is there another name under heaven in which it behooves us to be saved*[^p431-5b]. Yet God could, if He had willed, have given another name in which our salvation would consist. — The arguments for the first part are therefore to be granted, since they show that another mode of our salvation was possible to God, so far as it is on the part of the divine power.

**To the opposing arguments.**
*To 1 and 2.* But to that which is objected to the contrary from the Gloss and from Anselm, it must be said that those authorities are understood so far as it is on *our* part, the divine disposition being presupposed, by which He decreed to free us thus, and not in another way. By this mode also is to be understood the authority of Ambrose, which was set down above in the eighteenth distinction, in the last chapter. "So great," he says, "was our sin, that we could not be saved unless the only-begotten Son of God should die for us, debtors of death"; this, I say, is to be understood as meaning that God did not decree to save us otherwise. By this mode also are similar authorities to be understood.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things[^p431-6b]; it must be said that there is the best *absolutely* and the best *in its kind*. And the best in its kind can be more and less good; and God brings forth the best in its kind, and so He does the best things in such a way that He can also do better and less good things. Therefore although this mode was more suited to our misery, it nevertheless was not necessary that He so choose this mode that He could not choose another mode.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that God cannot act against His own justice, and justice cannot remit guilt apart from satisfaction; it can be answered *by the destruction*[^p431-7] of the two propositions which he sets forth: of which the first is this, that the human race could not be freed except through the way of justice, for He was able to free it through the way of mercy; nor in this would prejudice have been done to justice, if He had willed to do this. For He could have blotted out all the demerits and established man in his former state; nor would anything disordered have remained in the universe, nor even anything unpunished. For sin bears with it its own punishment, by which it is set in order[^p431-8]; and so if He had freed the human race without satisfaction, He would not on this account have acted against justice. — It can also be answered *by the destruction of that* [proposition], that there was no other mode by which He could make satisfaction except through death. For although this was more fitting, perhaps a slight punishment in so noble a person would have sufficed for the reparation of the human race; but the Lord in freeing us did more than was required, on account of which it is said: *Co-*

*pious is redemption with Him*[^p432-1]. Yet granted that He could not have made satisfaction for the human race in another way, nor the human race be redeemed otherwise, as many concede; nevertheless from this it does not follow that He could not have freed it in another way. For concerning the freeing I firmly believe that He could have freed it in another way; but concerning the redemption I neither deny nor dare to affirm, because it is rash, when one treats of the divine power, to set a limit to it. For He can do more than we are able[^p432-2] to conceive.

la: Serm. 63. (serm. 12. vel 14. in Passione Domini) c. I: *Omnipotentia... potuisset humanum genus a dominatu diaboli solo imperio suae voluntatis eruere, nisi... adversitas de eo quod vicerat, vinceretur.*

en: Sermon 63 (sermon 12 or 14 On the Passion of the Lord) c. 1: *The omnipotence... could have rescued the human race from the dominion of the devil by the sole command of His will, had not... the adversity been overcome by that which it had conquered.*

la: Hic c. I. — Paulo inferius pro *sed nostrae* edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. *et nostrae.*

en: Here c. 1. — A little below, for *sed nostrae* ("but... of our"), editions 1, 2 together with not a few codices read *et nostrae* ("and... of our").

la: Cap. 36. n. 69. In textu origin. sic legitur: *Qui nos... revocare videlicet etiam sine sua morte potuit a passione.*

en: Chapter 36, n. 69. In the original text it reads thus: *He who... was able, namely, to recall us even without His own death from the passion.*

la: Etiam Bernard., Tract. de errorib. Abaelardi, c. 8. n. 19, de hoc inconvenienti ait: *Porro ratio huius facti fuit dignatio facientis. Quis negat, Omnipotenti ad manum fuisse alios et alios modos nostrae redemptionis, iustificationis, liberationis?* — Ante *passioni subiecta* cod. aa (La secunda manu) interiicit *necessario*, cod. K *et* (i. e. etiam).

en: Bernard too, *Treatise on the Errors of Abelard*, c. 8 n. 19, says of this unfitting consequence: *Moreover the reason for this deed was the gracious condescension of the doer. Who denies that the Omnipotent had at hand other and other modes of our redemption, justification, freeing?* — Before *passioni subiecta* codex aa (by a second hand) inserts *necessario*, codex K *et* (that is, "even").

la: Vers. 10. — Glossa est ordinaria. Apud Strabum nec non apud Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc. Tamen ibi post *periret* omisso *et*, eiusque loco posito puncto, sic pergitur: *Quod si esset, frustra facta essent omnia* etc. Cfr. testimonium supra lit. Magistri, d. XVIII. c. S. sub Ambrosii nomine allegatum. — Paulo inferius inter *Et si hoc* et *impossibile fuit* edd. interiiciunt *est impossibile.*

en: Verse 10. — The Gloss is the *Ordinary* one. In Strabo and also in Peter Lombard, on this passage. Yet there, after *periret*, with *et* omitted and a period put in its place, it proceeds thus: *And if it were so, all things would have been made in vain*, etc. Compare the testimony cited above in the Master's text, d. XVIII c. S under the name of Ambrose. — A little below, between *Et si hoc* and *impossibile fuit* the editions insert *est impossibile.*

la: Libr. I. c. 10: *Non autem potuisse calicem transire, nisi biberet illum, dixit: non quia... sed quoniam, sicut dictum est, mundum erat impossibile aliter salvari.* — Pro *Non potuit* Vat. *Non voluit*, et dein pro *non posset* cod. D *non potuisset*, cod. U *non potuit*. Lectio *transire calicem* (Matth. 26, 42: *hic calix transire*) est in codd. et ex citatis verbis Anselmi fluxisse videtur.

en: Book I c. 10: *But He said that the cup could not pass unless He drank it: not because... but because, as has been said, it was impossible for the world to be saved otherwise.* — For *Non potuit* the Vatican reads *Non voluit* ("He would not"), and then for *non posset* codex D reads *non potuisset*, codex U *non potuit*. The reading *transire calicem* (Matt. 26:42: *let this cup pass*) is in the codices and seems to have flowed from the cited words of Anselm.

la: Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 10. n. 13. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I. — Seq. testimonium est Dionysii, de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 113, nota 7. — Deinde cod. A bis *elicere* pro *eligere.*

en: Book XIII *On the Trinity* c. 10 n. 13. See here the Master's text, c. 1. — The following testimony is that of Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 19. Compare tom. II p. 113, note 7. — Then codex A twice reads *elicere* for *eligere.*

la: Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13. — De minori vide supra q. 2. seq. — Paulo inferius post *modus* codd. AKV subdunt *autem*, Vat. *etiam*. Subinde pro *esse non potest* cod. U *non est.*

en: Epistle, 2 Tim. 2:13. — Concerning the minor [premise] see above, q. 2 and following. — A little below, after *modus* codices AKV add *autem*, the Vatican *etiam*. Thereafter for *esse non potest* codex U reads *non est.*

la: Libr. I. p. VIII. c. 10. — Magistri sententia invenitur hic in lit. c. 4; cfr. supra d. XVIII. c. I. seq. — Paulo superius codd. omittunt *aliter*, pro quo solus cod. Z substituit *aliquo (alio?) modo*; et subinde edd. passive *liberari* et *reparari.*

en: Book I p. VIII c. 10. — The Master's opinion is found here in the text, c. 4; compare above d. XVIII c. 1 and following. — A little above, the codices omit *aliter*, for which codex Z alone substitutes *aliquo (alio?) modo* ("by some [other?] mode"); and thereafter the editions read passively *liberari* and *reparari.*

la: Cod. U *determinavit sibi*, cod. A *determinatum supra fuit*, scil. quaest. 2.

en: Codex U reads *determinavit sibi* ("He determined for Himself"), codex A *determinatum supra fuit* ("it was determined above"), namely q. 2.

la: Act. 4, 12. Cfr. supra pag. 236, nota 10. — Paulo inferius pro *quoniam* codd. K L aa *quae.*

en: Acts 4:12. Compare above p. 236, note 10. — A little below, for *quoniam* codices K L aa read *quae.*

la: Plurimi codd. *producere*. — Eodem modo explicatur hoc dictum Dionysii etiam I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1, et II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.

en: Very many codices read *producere* ("to produce"). — This saying of Dionysius is explained in the same manner also in I Sent. d. 44 a. 1 q. 2 ad 1, and II Sent. d. 23 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1.

la: Sive negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Post pauca pro *quod non potuit liberari* cod. K *quia non potuit liberare.*

en: That is, by negation. Compare tom. I p. 87, note 4. — A little after, for *quod non potuit liberari* codex K reads *quia non potuit liberare.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 1.

en: See II Sent. d. 36 a. 2 q. 1.

la: Psalm. 129, 7. — Mox pro *satisfieri* codd. A U *satisfacere.*

en: Psalm 129:7. — Presently, for *satisfieri* codices A U read *satisfacere.*

la: Codd. A H L aa bb *possimus*. Paulo superius pro *potuit liberare* edd. *potuit liberari.*

en: Codices A H L aa bb read *possimus*. A little above, for *potuit liberare* the editions read *potuit liberari.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter antiqui doctores cum Alexandro Hal. et S. Bonav. (hic ad 4.) distinguunt redemptionem stricte sumtam, cui proprium est, ut fiat iusto pretio soluto, a liberatione quocumque modo facta, at sine solutione pretii. Simplicem liberationem generis humani sine incarnatione fieri potuisse, si Deo placuisset, omnes confitentur; etiam verba Anselmi aliorumque Patrum, quae contrarium asserere videntur, iidem cum nostro Doctore (hic ad 1. 2.) mitius interpretantur, scilicet quod Anselmus loquatur de eadem, quantum est ex parte nostra, supposita Dei ordinatione (S. Thom., hic a. 4. ad 2.). Item communiter conceditur, ut supra (qq. 3. 4.) dictum est, etiam redemptionem per satisfactionem imperfectam alia via fieri potuisse. Sed quoad redemptionem per condignam satisfactionem et secundum potentiam Dei absolutam, communius oppositum tenetur; cui responsioni negativae contradicitur a Nominalibus et etiam a Scoto, ut supra dictum est in scholiis ad qq. 3. 4. 5. — Ex parte autem hominis alius modus vel redemptionis, vel simplicis liberationis non fuit possibilis, nisi quem Deo placuit hominibus providere.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 7. seqq., et Report. hic q. unica n. 4. seq. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. III. q. 46. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Durand., hic q. I.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Commonly the ancient doctors, together with Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure (here at reply 4), distinguish redemption taken strictly, whose proper character is that it be done by a just price paid, from a freeing done in any way whatsoever, but without the payment of a price. That a simple freeing of the human race could have come about without the incarnation, had it pleased God, all confess; even the words of Anselm and of the other Fathers, which seem to assert the contrary, these same [doctors], with our Doctor (here at replies 1 and 2), interpret more gently, namely that Anselm speaks of the same, so far as it is on our part, the ordination of God being supposed (St. Thomas, here a. 4 ad 2). Likewise it is commonly conceded, as was said above (qq. 3 and 4), that redemption too, through imperfect satisfaction, could have come about by another way. But as for redemption through condign satisfaction and according to the absolute power of God, the opposite is more commonly held; to which negative response contradiction is made by the Nominalists and also by Scotus, as was said above in the scholia to qq. 3, 4, 5. — But on the part of man no other mode either of redemption or of simple freeing was possible, except that which it pleased God to provide for men.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III q. 18 m. 3 a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 7 ff., and *Report.* here q. unica n. 4 f. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; *Summa* III q. 46 a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1, 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.430–432 (PDF 452–454, offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, lines 29916–30056). q6 is the LAST quaestio of d.20's single (unicus) article; the next semantic boundary is `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` at raw line 30057 (printed p.432, lower).

**Alignment.** Confirmed: opener reads *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare* (q6, *alio modo… salvare/liberare*), NOT q5 (*Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare*).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.430** (right column, opening below q5's scholion §IV–V which fills the column top; fundamenta on the left column): QUAESTIO VI header + title; fund. 1 (Leo Papa), fund. 2 (Augustinus *de Trinitate*), fund. 3 (Gregorius *Moralia*), fund. 4 (deductio ad inconveniens); **Contra** 1 (Hebr. 2 + Glossa), Contra 2 (Anselmus *Cur Deus homo*, ending *redit ergo idem quod prius*). Footers **nn.1–4** (`[^p430-1..4]`).
- **p.431**: Contra 3 (Augustinus, *Nullus alius modus… congruentior*), Contra 4 (*negare se ipsum non potest*); CONCLUSIO; Respondeo (Conclusio 1 / Conclusio 2 marginalia); Ad opposita — *Ad 1.2*, *Ad 3*, *Ad 4* begins and overflows. Footers **nn.1–8** (`[^p431-1..4]`, `[^p431-5..8]`); the two Contra footers physically printed at p.430's foot bottom that key Hebr.+Anselm are the p.431-sequence nn.5–6 in print order — kept here as `[^p431-5]`/`[^p431-6]` anchored on the p.430 Contra body, and Respondeo's Acts-4 footer as `[^p431-5b]` and the *optima adducere* footer as `[^p431-6b]` (per-page numbering reuses 5/6; suffixed to keep unique slugs).
- **p.432**: *Ad 4* tail (*Copiosa apud eum redemptio*) + closing (*…amplius enim potest quam nos possumus cogitare*); SCHOLION §I–II (last subsection). Footers **nn.1–2** (`[^p432-1..2]`) = q6's share; p.432 nn.3–5 (*seducendo* / *subiugari* / *supra d.19 dub.3*) belong to **Dub. I–II** and do NOT migrate to q6.

**Apparatus count.** 14 entries total: p.430 nn.1–4; p.431 nn.1–8 (rendered as nn.1–4 plus the Contra/Respondeo per-page 5,5b,6,6b,7,8); p.432 nn.1–2.

**Scholion.** Present (§I–II), rendered as the LAST subsection of both Latin and English blocks per the parser rule.

**Hand-offs picked up.** NONE — per the prior subagent's hand-off, no footers migrate from q5 into q6 (q5's p.430 scholion runs unmarked); q6 opens its own fresh p.430 footer sequence on the Leo Papa citation.

**Hand-off forwarded → `bon-sent-III-d20-dubia`.** **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** begins at **raw line 30057**, printed **p.432** (PDF 454, lower). Opener: `In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Iuste illo deserente…` (Dub. I). **Migrating footers:** p.432 **nn.3–5** belong to the dubia body — n.3 (`seducendo`), n.4 (`subiugari` / *diabolo*), n.5 (`Cfr. supra d. 19. dub. 3.`); the dubia then continues onto p.433+ (`DIST. XX. DUBIA. 433` running head at raw 30101) with its own per-page footers. **Expected DUB count:** Dub. I, Dub. II, Dub. III visible on pp.432–433 (more may follow on p.433); the dubia chunk should carry at minimum **DUB. I–III**. Offset reminder: **pdf = printed + 22.**

**[?] flags.** NONE — pp.430–432 fully legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0