title: Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De synderesi.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de synderesi, quae est conscientiae scintilla[^1]. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de ipsa synderesi quantum ad essentiam, utrum scilicet sit in genere cognitivi, vel affectivi.

Secundo quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad usum, utrum videlicet per peccatum possit exstingui.

Tertio quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad abusum, utrum scilicet per peccatum possit depravari.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis, vel affectionis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis, vel affectionis.

Et quod sit in genere affectionis, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur in Glossa super primum Ezechielis[^2], in qua post plura verba dicitur de synderesi: « Hic est spiritus, qui postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus »; sed gemere est actus affectionis: si ergo synderesis est gemere, synderesis spectat ad potentiam affectivam.

2. Item, Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in littera[^3], quod « homo subiectus peccato naturaliter vult bonum »; sed illud quod naturaliter inclinat nos ad bonum, vel est synderesis vel conscientia; ergo illa voluntas inclinans nos ad bonum vel est synderesis, vel conscientia; sed non est conscientia: ergo est synderesis.

3. Item, contra malum est bonum sibi oppositum[^4]; sed nos habemus in parte motiva sensibili aliquid impellens ad malum: ergo et in parte motiva rationali debet in nobis aliquid esse instigans ad bonum; hoc autem non est nisi synderesis: ergo synderesis est in parte affectiva.

4. Item, sicut intellectus indiget lumine ad iudicandum, ita affectus indiget calore quodam et pondere spirituali ad recte amandum[^5]: ergo sicut in parte animae cognitivae est quoddam naturale iudicatorium, quod quidem est conscientia, ita in parte animae affectiva erit pondus ad bonum dirigens et inclinans; hoc autem non est nisi synderesis: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Super illud Malachiae secundo[^6]: *Custodite spiritum vestrum, et uxorem adolescentiae tuae noli despicere;* Glossa Hieronymi: « Per uxorem adolescentiae intellige legem naturalem scriptam in corde, spiritus vero dicitur non animalis pars, quae non percipit ea quae Dei sunt, sed rationalis »; hanc autem vocat synderesim: ergo videtur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte rationis sive cognitivae. Si tu dicas, quod spiritus accipitur ibi communiter ad intellectum et affectum; obiicitur per hoc quod in eadem Glossa subiungitur: « Hic est spiritus, qui postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus »; sed postulare est actus rationis: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo[^7]: *Abierunt, semivivo relicto;* Glossa: « Immortalitatem exuere

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sed rationis sensum abolere non possunt, quin homo sapere et Deum possit cognoscere ». Si ergo sensus rationis se tenet ex parte rationis, et huiusmodi sensus, qui in nobis remanet, non est aliud quam synderesis; videtur etc.

3. Item, scintilla conscientiae et conscientia sunt in eadem parte; sed conscientia, ut superius[^8] probatum est, spectat ad cognitivam, et synderesis est scintilla conscientiae, secundum quod dicitur super Ezechielis primum: ergo videtur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte cognitivae.

4. Item, si synderesis se tenet ex parte motivae, aut ergo est potentia, aut passio, aut habitus[^9]? Passio non; hoc constat. Habitus non, ut videtur, quia aut esset bonus, aut malus. Non bonus, quia si bonus, esset virtus; si malus, esset vitium; ipsorum neutrum conceditur de synderesi. Potentia non, ut videtur, quia potentia voluntatis[^10] indifferenter se habet ad quodcumque appetibile; synderesis autem non dicitur respectu cibi et potus et huiusmodi appetibilium. Ergo non videtur, quod aliquo modo se teneat ex parte affectivae.

Est igitur quaestio, quid sit ipsa synderesis, et de comparatione ipsius ad legem naturalem et ad conscientiam, quomodo se habent, utrum sint eadem, vel diversa.

Item, qualiter se habeat ad tres animae potentias, videlicet concupiscibilem, irascibilem et rationalem. Videtur enim, quod sit aliquid praeter haec tria, secundum quod habetur in Glossa super primum Ezechielis: *Facies hominis* etc; Glossa: « Plerique iuxta Platonem rationabilitatem animae et irascentiam et concupiscentiam ad hominem et leonem et vitulum referunt, quartam vero supra haec et extra haec ponunt, quam Graeci vocant synderesim, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque non exstinguitur, qua victi voluptatibus vel furore, et ipsa interdum rationis similitudine decepti, nos peccare sentimus; quam proprie aquilae deputant non se miscentem tribus, sed ipsa errantia corrigentem ». Ex hac Glossa videtur, quod differat ab illis tribus. — Sed contra hoc est, quod in libro de Spiritu et anima[^11] dicitur, quod sufficienter dividuntur vires animae per has tres, videlicet per concupiscibilem, irascibilem et rationalem. Ergo si synderesis est aliquid animae, videtur, quod ipsa se teneat necessario penes aliquam istarum trium virium, vel penes omnes.

### Conclusio

> Synderesis, cum stimulet ad bonum, se tenet ex parte affectus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa distinctionem synderesis ab aliis viribus multiplex est opinio, sicut et circa distinctiones aliarum virium animae[^12].

Voluerunt enim aliqui dicere et ex Glossa praecedenti, prius posita super primum Ezechielis, colligere, quod synderesis dicitur supremum ipsius animae. Supremum autem ipsius animae est superior portio rationis, qua anima ad Deum convertitur; et illa superior portio regit inferiorem portionem rationis, et irascibilem, et concupiscibilem. Haec autem superior portio, secundum quod ad Deum convertitur[^13], semper est recta; obliquatur tamen, secundum quod descendit ad haec inferiora. Et isti dixerunt, quod inter synderesim et conscientiam et legem naturalem talis est differentia, scilicet quod synderesis nominat ipsam potentiam, scilicet superiorem portionem; conscientia vero nominat ipsius habitum, secundum quem regit inferiorem portionem; lex vero naturalis nominat illud, ad quod conscientia dirigit. — Hic autem modus dicendi satis videtur esse probabilis, nisi repugnaret illi Glossae prius habitae, quae dicit[^14], quod synderesis aliis peccantibus non se immiscet. Cum enim mortale peccatum non possit esse absque actu superioris portionis, quia in manducatione viri consistit consummatio peccati[^15]; si synderesis esset superior portio rationis, utique aliis peccantibus se immisceret. Praeterea, superior portio rationis dicit ordinationem ad Deum; actus autem synderesis non tantum respicit Deum, sed etiam proximum, secundum quod lex naturalis respicit utrumque.

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod cum potentiae rationales dupliciter habeant moveri, scilicet intellectus et affectus, et per modum naturae et per modum deliberationis[^16]; quemadmodum libertas arbitrii consistit

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in ratione et voluntate, secundum quod movetur deliberative; sic conscientia et synderesis respiciunt rationem et voluntatem, in quantum moventur per modum naturae — tam synderesis, quam conscientia, quam etiam lex naturae semper ad bonum inclinant; sed liberum arbitrium aliquando ad bonum, aliquando ad malum — et ideo sicut liberum arbitrium simul complectitur rationem et voluntatem, sic synderesis rationem simul et voluntatem complectitur, et lex naturae similiter, et conscientia similiter, et pro eodem accipi possunt.

Appropriate tamen synderesis dicit potentiam, et conscientia habitum, et lex naturalis obiectum. Sive alio modo appropriando, ut synderesis dicat habitum respectu boni vel mali in universali; conscientia vero habitum respectu boni vel mali in particulari; lex vero naturalis indifferenter se habeat ad utrumque. — Sed quia, ut habitum fuit prius[^1b], conscientia dicit habitum se tenentem ex parte intellectus; aut necesse erit praeter conscientiam et synderesim ponere in nobis aliquod directivum, aut necesse est ponere, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte affectus.

Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione animae intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi naturale iudicatorium, dirigens ipsum intellectum in cognoscendis; sic affectus habet naturale quoddam pondus, dirigens ipsum[^2b] in appetendis. Appetenda autem sunt in duplici genere: quaedam enim sunt in genere honesti, quaedam in genere commodi; sicut et cognoscibilia sunt in duplici genere: quaedam in genere speculabilium, et quaedam ex parte moralium. Et quemadmodum conscientia non nominat illud iudicatorium, nisi in quantum dirigit ad opera moralia; sic synderesis non nominat illud pondus voluntatis sive voluntatem cum illo pondere[^3b], nisi in quantum illam habet inclinare ad bonum honestum. Et quemadmodum nomen conscientiae potest accipi pro potentia cum tali habitu, vel pro habitu talis potentiae; sic etiam synderesis. Usitatiori tamen modo loquendi, synderesis potius nominat potentiam habitualem, quam nominet habitum[^4b], sicut patet in auctoritatibus, quae supra inductae sunt. Et quia illa potentia nunquam separatur ab illo habitu, hinc est, quod habitus et potentia uno nomine comprehenduntur, et potentia illa, ut sic habilitata, nomen sui habitus sortitur.

**Ad argumenta:** Et ex hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem primo propositam, qua quaerebatur, utrum synderesis dicat quid affectivum, vel cognitivum. Dico enim, quod synderesis dicit illud quod stimulat ad bonum; et ideo ex parte affectionis se tenet, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod synderesis est spiritus rationalis, qui postulat et interpellat; dicendum, quod sicut dicit Gregorius super Iob primum[^5b], non tantum loquimur ad Deum cogitationibus et exterioribus verbis, sed etiam affectibus et desideriis; et propterea, dum synderesis continue stimulando nos facit bonum desiderare, dicitur gemitibus inenarrabilibus ad Deum interpellare.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de sensu rationis, dicendum, quod per sensum rationalem[^6b] magis intelligitur ibi iudicatorium naturale, quam intelligatur synderesis. Si quis autem contendat, quod per sensum illum accipitur synderesis; distinguendum est, quod ratio aliquando accipitur proprie pro parte cognitiva, aliquando accipitur communiter, prout comprehendit totum spiritum rationalem; et sic sensus rationis non tantum sumitur ex parte cognitivae, sed etiam ex parte affectivae; sicut patet de spirituali gustu et tactu; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte cognitionis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod synderesis est scintilla conscientiae; dicendum, quod ideo dicitur scintilla, pro eo quod conscientia, quantum est de se, non potest movere nec pungere sive stimulare nisi mediante synderesi, quae est quasi eius stimulus et igniculus. Unde sicut ratio non potest movere nisi mediante voluntate, sic nec conscientia nisi mediante synderesi; et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod sit ex parte cognitivae, immo potius, quod sit ex parte affectivae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit potentia, vel passio, vel habitus; dicendum, quod est potentia proprie, attamen non nominat potentiam voluntatis generaliter, sed solum voluntatem, in quantum movetur naturaliter; nec adhuc[^7b] universaliter, sed solummodo respectu boni honesti, vel eius oppositi. Nihilominus potest etiam dicere habitum; sed ille non debet dici nec virtus nec vitium, pro eo quod virtus et vitium proprie respiciunt liberum arbitrium et voluntatem, in quantum est deliberativa, non in quantum est naturalis.

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Ex praedictis patet responsio ad illas quaestiones, quae ultimo quaerebantur. — Ad illud enim quod quaeritur, quomodo se habeat synderesis ad conscientiam et legem naturalem; dicendum, quod sic se habet synderesis ad conscientiam, sicut se habet caritas ad fidem, vel habitus ipsius affectus ad habitus intellectus practici, secundum quod est habitus. Lex autem naturalis communiter se habet ad utrumque, videlicet ad synderesim et ad conscientiam. Nam lex naturalis dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo, prout dicit habitum in anima[^1c]; et sic quia per legem naturalem instruimur et per legem naturalem recte ordinamur, dicit habitum, qui comprehendit intellectum et affectum, et ita comprehendit synderesim et conscientiam. Alio modo lex naturalis vocatur collectio praeceptorum iuris naturalis; et sic nominat obiectum synderesis et conscientiae, unius sicut dictantis, et alterius sicut inclinantis[^2c]. Nam conscientia dictat, et synderesis appetit vel refugit. Et utroque istorum modorum invenitur lex naturalis in diversis locis; hoc tamen ultimo modo accipitur magis proprie. Et sic, ut proprie loquamur, synderesis dicit potentiam affectivam, in quantum naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit; conscientia vero dicit habitum intellectus practici; lex vero naturalis dicit obiectum utriusque.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem ultimam, qualiter synderesis se habeat ad concupiscibilem, rationalem et irascibilem. Illae enim tres potentiae indifferenter nominant potentias animae, sive secundum quod moventur naturaliter, sive secundum quod moventur deliberative. Synderesis autem nominat potentiam affectivam, secundum quod movetur naturaliter et recte; et ideo non distinguitur ab illis potentiis secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi; et quia secundum illum modum movendi semper movet recte: hinc est, quod dicitur super alias volare et aliis errantibus non se immiscere, sed eas[^3c] corrigere.

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### Article II. *On synderesis.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal matter, namely concerning synderesis, which is the spark of conscience[^1]. And concerning this three things are asked.

First, there is inquiry concerning synderesis itself as to its essence, namely whether it belongs to the genus of the cognitive or of the affective.

Second, there is inquiry concerning it as to its use, namely whether it can be extinguished through sin.

Third, there is inquiry concerning it as to its abuse, namely whether it can be depraved through sin.

### Question I. *Whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection.

And that it belongs to the genus of affection seems [to be the case]:

1. From that which is said in the Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel[^2], in which, after many words, it is said concerning synderesis: "This is the spirit which intercedes for us with unutterable groanings"; but to groan is an act of affection: if therefore synderesis is to groan, synderesis pertains to the affective power.

2. Likewise, Ambrose says, and it is found in the text [of the Master][^3], that "a man subject to sin naturally wills the good"; but that which naturally inclines us to the good is either synderesis or conscience; therefore that will inclining us to the good is either synderesis or conscience; but it is not conscience: therefore it is synderesis.

3. Likewise, opposed to evil is the good opposite to it[^4]; but we have in the sensitive motive part something impelling toward evil: therefore also in the rational motive part there ought to be in us something instigating toward good; but this is nothing other than synderesis: therefore synderesis is in the affective part.

4. Likewise, just as the intellect needs light in order to judge, so the affection needs a certain warmth and spiritual weight in order to love rightly[^5]: therefore just as in the cognitive part of the soul there is a certain natural faculty of judgment, which indeed is conscience, so in the affective part of the soul there will be a weight directing and inclining toward the good; but this is nothing other than synderesis: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. On that text of Malachi, chapter two[^6]: *Keep your spirit, and despise not the wife of your youth;* the Gloss of Jerome: "By the wife of your youth understand the natural law written in the heart; but the spirit is called not the animal part, which does not perceive the things that are of God, but the rational part"; and this he calls synderesis: therefore it seems that synderesis is held on the side of reason, that is, of the cognitive. If you should say that "spirit" is taken there commonly for intellect and affection; the objection is made through this, that in the same Gloss it is added: "This is the spirit which intercedes for us with unutterable groanings"; but to intercede is an act of reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of Luke, chapter ten[^7]: *They departed, leaving him half-dead;* the Gloss: "They could strip away immortality,

but they could not abolish the sense of reason, so that man might not be able to be wise and to know God." If therefore the sense of reason is held on the side of reason, and a sense of this kind, which remains in us, is nothing other than synderesis; it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the spark of conscience and conscience are in the same part; but conscience, as was proved above[^8], pertains to the cognitive, and synderesis is the spark of conscience, according to what is said on the first chapter of Ezekiel: therefore it seems that synderesis is held on the side of the cognitive.

4. Likewise, if synderesis is held on the side of the motive [part], then it is either a power, or a passion, or a habit[^9]? It is not a passion; this is evident. It is not a habit, as it seems, because it would be either good or bad. It is not good, because if good, it would be a virtue; if bad, it would be a vice; neither of these is conceded of synderesis. It is not a power, as it seems, because the power of the will[^10] is indifferently disposed toward any appetible object whatsoever; but synderesis is not spoken of with respect to food and drink and appetible objects of this kind. Therefore it does not seem that it is held in any way on the side of the affective.

It is therefore a question what synderesis itself is, and concerning its comparison to the natural law and to conscience, how they are related, whether they are the same or diverse.

Likewise, how it is related to the three powers of the soul, namely the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational. For it seems that it is something beyond these three, according to what is found in the Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel: *The face of a man* etc; the Gloss: "Most, following Plato, refer the rationability of the soul and irascibility and concupiscence to the man and the lion and the calf, but they place a fourth above these and outside these, which the Greeks call synderesis, which spark of conscience is not extinguished even in Cain, by which, overcome by pleasures or by fury, and ourselves sometimes deceived by a likeness of reason, we perceive that we sin; which they properly assign to the eagle, as not mingling itself with the three, but correcting those that go astray." From this Gloss it seems that it differs from those three. — But against this is the fact that in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^11] it is said that the powers of the soul are sufficiently divided by these three, namely by the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational. Therefore if synderesis is something of the soul, it seems that it is necessarily held alongside some one of these three powers, or alongside all of them.

### Conclusion

> Synderesis, since it goads toward the good, is held on the side of affection.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning the distinction of synderesis from the other powers there is a manifold opinion, just as also concerning the distinctions of the other powers of the soul[^12].

For some wished to say, and to gather from the preceding Gloss, set down earlier on the first chapter of Ezekiel, that synderesis is called the supreme [part] of the soul itself. But the supreme [part] of the soul itself is the superior portion of reason, by which the soul is turned to God; and that superior portion governs the inferior portion of reason, and the irascible, and the concupiscible. But this superior portion, insofar as it is turned to God[^13], is always right; it is bent, however, insofar as it descends to these lower things. And these men said that between synderesis and conscience and the natural law there is this difference, namely that synderesis names the power itself, namely the superior portion; but conscience names its habit, according to which it governs the inferior portion; and the natural law names that to which conscience directs. — But this manner of speaking seems probable enough, were it not repugnant to that Gloss had earlier, which says[^14] that synderesis does not mingle itself with the others when they sin. For since mortal sin cannot exist without an act of the superior portion, because in the eating of the man consists the consummation of sin[^15]; if synderesis were the superior portion of reason, it would assuredly mingle itself with the others when they sin. Furthermore, the superior portion of reason bespeaks an ordering to God; but the act of synderesis regards not only God, but also the neighbor, according as the natural law regards both.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that since the rational powers can be moved in two ways, namely intellect and affection, both by way of nature and by way of deliberation[^16]; just as freedom of choice consists

in reason and will, according as it is moved deliberatively; so conscience and synderesis regard reason and will, insofar as they are moved by way of nature — both synderesis, and conscience, and also the law of nature always incline toward the good; but free choice [inclines] sometimes to good, sometimes to evil — and therefore just as free choice embraces at once reason and will, so synderesis embraces at once reason and will, and the law of nature likewise, and conscience likewise, and they can be taken for the same thing.

By appropriation, however, synderesis bespeaks the power, and conscience the habit, and the natural law the object. Or in another way of appropriating, so that synderesis bespeaks the habit with respect to good or evil in universal; conscience the habit with respect to good or evil in particular; the natural law is indifferently disposed toward both. — But because, as was held earlier[^1b], conscience bespeaks a habit held on the side of the intellect; either it will be necessary, besides conscience and synderesis, to posit in us some directive [principle], or it is necessary to posit that synderesis is held on the side of affection.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that just as from the very creation of the soul the intellect has a light, which is to it a natural faculty of judgment, directing the intellect itself in things to be known; so the affection has a certain natural weight, directing it[^2b] in things to be desired. But things to be desired are of two kinds: for some are in the genus of the honorable [honestum], some in the genus of the advantageous [commodum]; just as also knowable things are of two kinds: some in the genus of the speculable, and some on the side of moral things. And just as conscience does not name that faculty of judgment except insofar as it directs toward moral works; so synderesis does not name that weight of the will, or the will with that weight[^3b], except insofar as it has [the office] to incline it to the honorable good. And just as the name of conscience can be taken for the power with such a habit, or for the habit of such a power; so also synderesis. By the more usual manner of speaking, however, synderesis rather names the habitual power than it names the habit[^4b], as is clear in the authorities which were adduced above. And because that power is never separated from that habit, hence it is that habit and power are comprehended under one name, and that power, as thus enabled, takes the name of its habit.

**Reply to the arguments:** And from this is clear the response to the question first proposed, by which it was asked whether synderesis bespeaks something affective or cognitive. For I say that synderesis bespeaks that which goads toward the good; and therefore it is held on the side of affection, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

*To 1.* But to that which is first objected on the contrary, that synderesis is the rational spirit which intercedes and pleads; it must be said that, as Gregory says on the first [book] on Job[^5b], we speak to God not only by thoughts and by exterior words, but also by affections and desires; and therefore, while synderesis by continually goading makes us desire the good, it is said to intercede with God with unutterable groanings.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the sense of reason, it must be said that by "rational sense"[^6b] is rather understood there the natural faculty of judgment than synderesis is understood. But if anyone should contend that by that sense synderesis is taken; it must be distinguished that "reason" is sometimes taken properly for the cognitive part, sometimes taken commonly, insofar as it comprehends the whole rational spirit; and so the sense of reason is taken not only on the side of the cognitive, but also on the side of the affective; as is clear concerning spiritual taste and touch; and therefore from this it does not follow that synderesis is held on the side of cognition.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that synderesis is the spark of conscience; it must be said that it is called a spark for this reason, that conscience, as far as it is of itself, cannot move nor prick nor goad except by means of synderesis, which is as it were its goad and little fire. Hence just as reason cannot move except by means of the will, so neither can conscience except by means of synderesis; and therefore from this it does not follow that it is on the side of the cognitive, but rather that it is on the side of the affective.

*To 4.* To that which is asked, whether it is a power, or a passion, or a habit; it must be said that it is properly a power, yet it does not name the power of the will generally, but only the will insofar as it is moved naturally; nor even[^7b] universally, but only with respect to the honorable good, or its opposite. Nonetheless it can also bespeak a habit; but that [habit] ought to be called neither a virtue nor a vice, for this reason, that virtue and vice properly regard free choice and the will insofar as it is deliberative, not insofar as it is natural.

From the foregoing is clear the response to those questions which were last asked. — For to that which is asked, how synderesis is related to conscience and the natural law; it must be said that synderesis is related to conscience as charity is related to faith, or as the habit of the affection itself to the habit of the practical intellect, according as it is a habit. But the natural law is related commonly to both, namely to synderesis and to conscience. For the natural law can be taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it bespeaks a habit in the soul[^1c]; and so, because by the natural law we are instructed and by the natural law we are rightly ordered, it bespeaks a habit which comprehends intellect and affection, and thus comprehends synderesis and conscience. In another way the natural law is called the collection of the precepts of natural right; and so it names the object of synderesis and of conscience, of the one as dictating, and of the other as inclining[^2c]. For conscience dictates, and synderesis desires or shuns. And in both of these ways the natural law is found in diverse places; this last way, however, is taken more properly. And so, that we may speak properly, synderesis bespeaks the affective power, insofar as it is naturally apt for the good and tends toward the good; but conscience bespeaks the habit of the practical intellect; the natural law bespeaks the object of both.

And by this is clear the response to the last question, how synderesis is related to the concupiscible, the rational, and the irascible. For those three powers indifferently name powers of the soul, whether according as they are moved naturally, or according as they are moved deliberatively. But synderesis names the affective power, according as it is moved naturally and rightly; and therefore it is not distinguished from those powers according to the essence of the power, but according to the mode of moving; and because according to that mode of moving it always moves rightly: hence it is that it is said to fly above the others and not to mingle itself with the others when they err, but to correct them[^3c].

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Vox synderesis, Graece συντήρησις, etymon habet a συντηρεῖν i. e. conservare. — Paulo inferius pro *cognitivi vel affectivi* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *cognitivae vel affectivae.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — The word "synderesis," in Greek συντήρησις, has its etymology from συντηρεῖν, i.e. "to preserve." — A little below, for *of the cognitive or of the affective* the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 [reads] *cognitivae vel affectivae.*

la: Vers. 10. — Glossa, cuius verba alludunt ad Rom. 8, 26, habetur apud Lyranum et sumta est ex Hieronymi Expos. in Ezech. 1, 7.

en: Verse 10. — The Gloss, whose words allude to Romans 8:26, is found in Lyra and is drawn from Jerome's *Exposition on Ezekiel* 1:7.

la: Hic c. 3. — De iis quae in hoc arg. de conscientia proferuntur, cfr. art. praeced.

en: Here c. 3. — On the things which are brought forward in this argument concerning conscience, cf. the preceding article.

la: Eccli. 33, 15. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 767, nota 4.

en: Ecclesiasticus 33:15. — On the minor [premise] cf. above p. 767, note 4.

la: Cfr. August., 1. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 2-5. n. 38. nec non supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Paulo inferius pro *affectiva* Vat. exhibet *affectivae.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* etc., bk. 1, c. 2–5, n. 38; and also above p. 76, note 6. — A little below, for *affectiva* the Vatican edition has *affectivae.*

la: Vers. 15. — Ipsa oratio Hieronymi, verbis *in corde* pluribus adiectis, post *sed rationalis* sic prosequitur: *Unde rursum ingeritur: Custodite spiritum vestrum, non carnem, in qua qui sunt, Deo placere non possunt* [Rom. 8, 8.], *non animam: animalis enim homo non recipit* [sic] *ea quae spiritus sunt* [I. Cor. 2, 14.], *sed spiritum, quia spiritus interpellat pro nobis gemitibus ineffabilibus* [Rom. 8, 26.]. — De voce synderesis cfr. Glossa Hieronymi supra in I. fundam. posita. — Paulo inferius pro *se teneat* codd. K T bb cc ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 *se tenet.*

en: Verse 15. — Jerome's own discourse, with several words added *in the heart*, after *but the rational [part]* continues thus: "Whence again it is urged: *Keep your spirit, not your flesh, in which those who are can not please God* [Rom. 8:8], *not your soul: for the animal man does not receive* [sic] *the things which are of the spirit* [1 Cor. 2:14], *but the spirit, for the spirit intercedes for us with unutterable groanings* [Rom. 8:26]." — On the word "synderesis" cf. the Gloss of Jerome set down above in the first fundamentum. — A little below, for *se teneat* the codices K T bb cc ee and others, with editions 1, 2, [read] *se tenet.*

la: Vers. 30. — Glossa, quam Lyranus exhibet, est Bedae in hunc loc. Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. Apud Bedam sic sonat: *Immortalitatem... non possunt. Ex qua enim parte sapere et cognoscere Deum potest, vivus est homo* etc.

en: Verse 30. — The Gloss which Lyra presents is Bede's on this passage. Cf. above p. 506, note 3. In Bede it runs thus: *Immortality... they could not. For from that part by which he can be wise and know God, the man is alive* etc.

la: Art. I. q. 2. — Verbo Glossae super Ezech. 1, 10, quae in seqq. memoratur et quae reddit expositionem Hieronymi in Ezech. 1, 7, videsis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Edd. praeter 1 et nonnulli codd. *maiorem* sic transformarunt: *Item, scintilla conscientiae est conscientia, etsi non in eadem parte.*

en: Article I, q. 2. — For the wording of the Gloss on Ezekiel 1:10, which is mentioned in what follows and which renders Jerome's exposition on Ezekiel 1:7, see here in the text of the Master, c. 3. — The editions besides 1 and several codices transformed the major [premise] thus: *Likewise, the spark of conscience is conscience, even if not in the same part.*

la: Vide supra pag. 893, nota 6.

en: See above p. 893, note 6.

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum non paucis codd. *voluntas*, cod. Q (a secunda manu) *quae est voluntas*, cod. bb et *voluntas...* habent.

en: The editions, except 1, with not a few codices [read] *voluntas*; codex Q (by a second hand) *quae est voluntas*; codex bb has both *voluntas...* [readings].

la: Vers. 10. — In Comment. Hieronymi (in Ezech. 1, 7. seq.), ex quo Glossa delibata est, legitur sic: « Plerique iuxta Platonem rationale animae et irascitivum et concupiscitivum, quod ille λογικόν et θυμικόν et ἐπιθυμητικόν vocat, ad hominem et leonem ac vitulum referunt ». Adiunctis deinde non paucis de triplicis huius potentiae actibus, ipsa oratio Hieronymi post *in Cain quoque* haec quoque addit: *pectore, postquam eiectus est de paradiso* et deinde pro *ipsa errantia* habet *tria, errantia.* — Pro *iuxta Platonem* plures codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 substituunt *iuxta praelationem* et pro *victi voluptatibus* exhibent *victis voluptatibus.*

en: Verse 10. — In the Commentary of Jerome (on Ezekiel 1:7 ff.), from which the Gloss is drawn, it is read thus: "Most, following Plato, refer the rational [part] of the soul and the irascible and the concupiscible, which he calls λογικόν and θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν, to the man and the lion and the calf." Then, with not a few things added concerning the acts of this threefold power, Jerome's own discourse, after *in Cain also*, adds also this: *in the breast, after he was cast out of paradise;* and then for *those things going astray* it has *three, the things going astray.* — For *following Plato* several codices, and also editions 1 and 2, substitute *following preference [praelationem]*; and for *overcome by pleasures* they present *with pleasures overcome.*

la: De quo vide supra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2, q. 1. seqq., ubi et videre est de portione superiore animae, de qua in seqq. sermo est. Cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. — De prima opinione cfr. infra q. 3.

en: On which see above d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ff., where one may also see concerning the superior portion of the soul, of which there is discourse in what follows. Cf. also above d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the body [of the article]. — On the first opinion cf. below q. 3.

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum cod. ee et paucis aliis *convertit.*

en: The editions, except 1, with codex ee and a few others, [read] *convertit.*

la: Edd. praeter 1 cum cod. ee omittunt *quae dicit*, et prima mox eaedem edd. post *non se* inserunt *etiam.*

en: The editions besides 1, with codex ee, omit *which says*; and the same editions soon after *not itself* insert *even.*

la: Vide supra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. et 2.

en: See above d. 24, p. II, a. 1 and 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 33. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. De propos. seq. vide supra d. 28. p. 1. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo ante Vat. omittit *scilicet intellectus et affectus.*

en: Cf. above d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 and d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. On the following proposition see above d. 28, p. 1, q. 2 ff. — A little before, the Vatican edition omits *namely intellect and affection.*

en: Article 1, q. 1.

la: Vat. repetit *affectum.*

en: The Vatican edition repeats *affectum.*

la: In edd., excepta 1, et nonnullis codd., O ee etc., desiderantur verba *sive voluntatem cum illo pondere.*

en: In the editions, except 1, and in several codices, O ee etc., the words *or the will with that weight* are lacking.

la: De significatione habitus et potentiae habitualis vide supra a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 25. p. I. q. 4. seq.

en: On the signification of "habit" and "habitual power" see above a. 1, q. 1 f. and d. 25, p. I, q. 4 f.

la: In expositione v. 8, sive II. Moral. c. 7. n. 11, ubi modum exponens, quo Deus ad animas loquitur et animae ad Deum, ait: *Tanto enim quisque minus clamat, quanto minus desiderat, et tanto maiorem vocem in aures incircumscripti Spiritus exprimit, quanto se in eius desiderium plenius fundit. Animarum igitur verba ipsa sunt desideria* etc. Cfr. ibid. XI. c. 42. n. 57. et XXXV. c. 3. n. 4.

en: In the exposition of verse 8, that is, *Morals* bk. II, c. 7, n. 11, where, expounding the manner in which God speaks to souls and souls to God, he says: "For the less one cries out, the less he desires; and the greater the voice he utters in the ears of the uncircumscribed Spirit, the more fully he pours himself out into desire of Him. The very words of souls, therefore, are their desires" etc. Cf. ibid. bk. XI, c. 42, n. 57 and bk. XXXV, c. 3, n. 4.

la: Pro *sensum rationalem* codd. C O P R S T ce et ed. 2 *speciem rationalem*, codd. F M V *sensum rationis.* Paulo inferius post *sensum illum* edd., excepta 1, et nonnulli codd. subiiciunt *aliquando.*

en: For *rational sense* the codices C O P R S T ce and edition 2 [read] *rational species*; codices F M V *sense of reason.* A little below, after *that sense*, the editions, except 1, and several codices add *sometimes.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, hic et sola Vat. subinde post *sed solummodo* inserunt *in quantum movetur.*

en: The editions, except 1, here, and the Vatican alone thereafter, after *but only* insert *insofar as it is moved.*

la: Cfr. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. pro I. parte.

en: Cfr. a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, for the first part.

la: Cum Vat. et cod. bb lectionem *inclinantis* praeferendam duximus lectioni *inchoantis*, quae in plurimis codd. et edd. habetur. Cfr. hic in corp. et ad 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 2. a. 2. seq.

en: With the Vatican [edition] and cod. bb we have judged the reading *inclinantis* ("inclining") to be preferred to the reading *inchoantis* ("beginning"), which is found in very many codices and editions. Cfr. here in the body and at [the reply to] 3, and Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 27, m. 2, a. 2 and following.

la: Cod. bb alias.

en: Cod. bb [reads] otherwise. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Bonav. docet, synderesim proprie esse potentiam voluntatis cum tali habitu, qui movet motu naturali, et quidem ad bonum honestum. Iam observavimus (schol. ad a. 1. q. 1.), S. Thomam hic (sicut in determinatione liberi arbitrii) a nostro Doctore aliquatenus dissentire, dum synderesim ponat in intellectu practico. Dicit enim (de Verit. q. 16. a. 1.): » Restat igitur, ut hoc nomen synderesis vel nominet absolute habitum naturalem [scil. rationis], similem habitui principiorum, vel nominet ipsam potentiam rationis cum tali habitu. Ut quodcumque hoc fuerit, non multum differt, quia hoc non facit dubitationem nisi circa nominis significationem » (cfr. hic q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 79. a. 12; I. II. q. 94. a. 1. ad 2.). — Hinc idem de relatione, quam synderesis habet ad conscientiam et legem naturalem, iudicat aliter ac S. Bonav. (hic ad 3; cfr. S. Thom., loc. ultimo cit.). S. Bonaventurae praeter Alexandrum Hal. consentit Petr. a Tar., qui (hic q. 1. a. 1.) doctrinam S. Bonaventurae concise et dilucide pro more suo sic contrahit: « Sicut intellectus speculativus indiget duplici habitu ad cognoscendum, nempe generali innato, scilicet quodam lumine principiorum, quamvis species eorum non sint innatae, et speciali acquisito, scilicet scientia; et practicus indiget lege naturali tanquam habitu generali innato, et conscientia tanquam habitu speciali acquisito: sic affectus duplici indiget habitu regulante ad operandum, scilicet habitu innato generali, qui est synderesis, et habitu speciali acquisito, qui est virtus aliqua. Primus quidem subiectum habet voluntatem naturalem, secundus voluntatem deliberativam ». Notandum tamen, quod S. Bonav. (hic in fine) aliter ac Petr. determinat relationem legis naturalis ad conscientiam. — Scotus (hic q. 2. n. 4.) favet opinioni S. Thomae, similiter B. Albert. et Aegid. R. At Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1.) media quadam via incedit, distinguens duplicem sensum huius vocabuli et dicens: « Si dicatur synderesis inclinativum ad bonum absolute per modum persuadentis, non necessitantis, sic est in intellectu; si autem dicatur inclinativum ad bonum absolute vel in generali per modum necessitantis, sic est in affectu ». Aliqui Scotistae etiam Scotum sic interpretantur. — Licet autem synderesis a S. Thoma ponatur in intellectu practico, tamen in hoc ipso est relatio et extensio ad voluntatem, ut monent B. Albert. et Aegid. R. — Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 73. m. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 2. a. 1. q. incid. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

**II.** Duae sequentes quaestiones, suppositis praedictis, non habent difficultatem nec controversiam inter posteriores Scholasticos. — De utraque (2. 3.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; de Verit. q. 16. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., loc. cit. a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** St. Bonaventure teaches that synderesis is properly the power of the will with a certain habit which moves with a natural motion, and indeed toward the honorable good. We have already observed (scholion to a. 1, q. 1) that St. Thomas here (as in the determination of free choice) dissents somewhat from our Doctor, in that he places synderesis in the practical intellect. For he says (*On Truth* q. 16, a. 1): "It remains, therefore, that this name 'synderesis' either name absolutely a natural habit [namely of reason], similar to the habit of [first] principles, or name the power of reason itself with such a habit. Whichever of these it be, it does not much differ, because this does not make a difficulty except concerning the signification of the name" (cf. here q. 3, a. 1; S. I, q. 79, a. 12; I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad 2). — Hence the same author judges otherwise than St. Bonaventure (here, to 3) concerning the relation which synderesis has to conscience and the natural law (cf. St. Thomas, in the place last cited). With St. Bonaventure, besides Alexander of Hales, agrees Peter of Tarentaise, who (here q. 1, a. 1) sums up the doctrine of St. Bonaventure concisely and lucidly after his manner thus: "Just as the speculative intellect needs a double habit in order to know, namely a general innate one, that is, a certain light of [first] principles, although the species of them are not innate, and a special acquired one, that is, knowledge; and the practical intellect needs the natural law as a general innate habit, and conscience as a special acquired habit: so the affection needs a double regulating habit in order to operate, namely an innate general habit, which is synderesis, and a special acquired habit, which is some virtue. The first indeed has the natural will as its subject, the second the deliberative will." It must be noted, however, that St. Bonaventure (here at the end) determines the relation of the natural law to conscience otherwise than Peter. — Scotus (here q. 2, n. 4) favors the opinion of St. Thomas, likewise B. Albert and Aegidius Romanus. But Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 3, q. 1) proceeds by a certain middle way, distinguishing a double sense of this word and saying: "If synderesis is said [to be] something inclining to the good absolutely by way of persuading, not necessitating, then it is in the intellect; but if it is said [to be] something inclining to the good absolutely or in general by way of necessitating, then it is in the affection." Some Scotists also interpret Scotus thus. — But although synderesis is placed by St. Thomas in the practical intellect, nevertheless in this very thing there is a relation and extension to the will, as B. Albert and Aegidius Romanus note. — Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 73, m. 2. — B. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 2, a. 1, incidental q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

**II.** The two following questions, the foregoing being supposed, have no difficulty nor controversy among the later Scholastics. — On each (2, 3) question: Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, m. 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1; *On Truth* q. 16, a. 2, 3. — B. Albert, in the place cited, a. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2, 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 2, 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, lines 63167–63413), cross-checked column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF crops of printed pp. 908–911 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p90{8,9}-*`, `vol2-p910-*`, full-page p-911). PDF = printed + 22 (pp. 930–933).

**Folded ARTICULUS II opener.** Per the Vol II chunking convention (Override §5), the short ART II opener ("Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de synderesi... Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria...") that lists the three article-level questions (essence / use / abuse) is folded into this q1; there is no standalone `d39-a2-divisio` chunk.

**Alignment check (passed).** ART II opener lists: q1 = essence (cognitivi/affectivi), q2 = use (per peccatum exstingui), q3 = abuse (per peccatum depravari). q1 title verbatim: "Utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis, vel affectionis." No q-swap.

**Page-split / apparatus map.**
- p.908: q1 opener + arg. 1–3 (L col), arg. 4 + Sed contra 1–2 (R col). Footers 1–7 → markers `[^1]`–`[^7]`.
- p.909: Sed contra 2–4, Conclusio, Respondeo (opinio 1–3 begin). Footers 1–10 → markers `[^8]`–`[^16]` (the p.909 footer sequence runs 1–10; mapped onto the continuing chunk numbering 8–16; note p.909 footer 7 is the *de Spiritu et anima* note rendered as `[^11]` at its body position).
- p.910: Respondeo cont. (opinio 3), solutio ad 1–4. Footers 1–7 → markers `[^1b]`–`[^7b]`.
- p.911: q1 tail (Ex praedictis... reply to the two incidental questions) + article-level SCHOLION I–II. The q1-tail prose carries **three left-column footers** 1–3 (recovered 2026-05-31, 600 dpi pass — the prior 450 dpi pass missed them): footer 1 (*Cfr. a.1 q.2 arg.1*) at *habitum in anima* → `[^1c]`; footer 2 (the *inclinantis*/*inchoantis* reading-choice note) at *alterius sicut inclinantis* → `[^2c]`; footer 3 (*Cod. bb alias*) at *sed eas corrigere* → `[^3c]`. The SCHOLION I–II citations are inline (no footer notes), so the scholion contributes no apparatus markers.

Total: 27 apparatus entries (24 + `[^1c]`–`[^3c]`), all with matching body anchors in both Latin and English.

**Scholion disposition.** The article-level SCHOLION (items I–II) physically sits on p.911, *after* q1's tail and *before* the QUAESTIO II opener; it belongs to this q1 (`has_scholion: true`). Item II explicitly forwards the bibliography for q2 and q3 ("Duae sequentes quaestiones... non habent difficultatem..."), confirming the article-level scholion lives here. **Per the dispatch note, q2 and q3 must still be checked independently for their own question-level scholia** (as happened in Art. I q2/q3).

**Hand-off picked up from a1-q3:** NONE. Confirmed via PDF: the top of p.908 R column holds the *tail of a1-q3's scholion* (Alex. Hal. / Scot. / S. Thom. citations), not q1 material; p.908's body footers 1–7 are q1's own. No parked `[?]` inherited.

**Hand-off forwarded to q2 (`bon-sent-II-d39-a2-q2`):**
- q2 opener: "Utrum synderesis per peccatum exstingui possit" (raw line 63414, printed p.911). "Secundo quaeritur, utrum synderesis possit per peccatum exstingui."
- q2 begins mid-page on **p.911** (after this q1's scholion). The shared printed page p.911 holds q1's scholion (above) AND the start of q2's videtur — confirm at the seam that q2's first videtur arg. and its footers (p.911 sequence) are fully captured and not double-counted against q1's scholion.
- Check q2 independently for a question-level scholion (do not assume absent).

**[?] flags:** none outstanding. **Resolved 2026-05-31 (d.31–d.40 polish, 600 dpi):** the p.911 left-column footers 1–3 — flagged unresolved in the sibling `d39-a2-q2` `[?]` block as possibly belonging to "the q1 Gloss region" — were confirmed at 600 dpi to anchor in **this q1's tail body** (superscripts ¹²³ at *habitum in anima* / *inclinantis* / *sed eas*), not in q2. They are now rendered here as `[^1c]`–`[^3c]`; the q2 `[?]` is dispositioned accordingly. OCR otherwise clean; all readings confirmed against the PDF column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 911 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum synderesis per peccatum exstingui possit.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum synderesis possit per peccatum exstingui. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Corrupti sunt et abominabiles facti sunt*; Glossa: « Omni vi rationali privati »; sed synderesis est potentia rationalis: ergo per magnitudinem peccati potest synderesis privari saltem quantum ad actum.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Ab altitudine diei*
<!-- page 912 -->
*timebo*; Glossa: « Stupor est, qui non sentit »; et post subiungitur: « Stulta arrogantia similis est stupori, quando quis, de se praesumens, nec timet nec cavet »: ergo sicut per stuporem contingit corpus fieri insensibile respectu morbi corporalis, ita et animam contingit fieri insensibilem respectu morbi spiritualis. Si ergo synderesis remurmurat morbo spirituali, videtur, quod synderesim contingat aliquando exstingui.

3. Item, haeretici pro errore suo sustinent mortem sine aliquo remorsu conscientiae: si ergo synderesis est remurmurare malo, et in eis non remurmurat aliquo modo; videtur, quod in eis sit exstincta omnino.

4. Item, fomes se habet per oppositum ad synderesim[^3]; sed fomitem contingit totaliter exstingui, sicut patet in beata Virgine: ergo videtur, quod similiter synderesim contingat exstingui per peccatorum multitudinem.

**Sed contra:**
1. In Glossa praehabita super primum Ezechielis[^4]: *Facies aquilae* etc.; Glossa: « Scintilla conscientiae in Cain non exstinguitur »: si ergo Cain fuit magnus peccator, videtur, quod per peccatum exstingui non habeat.

2. Item, Augustinus in secundo de Civitate Dei[^5]: « Tanta est vis probitatis et castitatis, ut omnis vel pene omnis eius laude moveatur humana natura, nec usque adeo sit turpitudine vitiosa, ut totum amittat sensum honestatis »: ergo si iste sensus honestatis est synderesis, videtur, quod non possit per peccatum exstingui.

3. Item, quae naturaliter insunt sunt inseparabilia; sed synderesis inest nobis naturaliter: ergo videtur, quod actum eius non possumus omnino per peccatum amittere, cum « vitium, sicut dicit Augustinus[^6], non deleat extrema naturae vestigia ».

4. Item, si in aliquibus deberet exstingui, maxime esset exstincta in damnatis; sed in damnatis synderesis non exstinguitur, quia remorsus conscientiae est ex actu synderesis; et hic remorsus maxime in eis viget, quia nec *ignis eorum exstinguetur, nec vermis morietur*[^7]: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> Synderesis quoad actum ad tempus impediri potest, sed exstingui non potest, scilicet quoad omnem actum et omne tempus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod synderesis quantum ad actum *impediri* potest, sed *exstingui* non potest. Ideo autem non potest *exstingui*, quia, cum dicat quid naturale, non potest a nobis omnino auferri. Unde et Glossa dicit super illud Lucae decimo[^8]: *Abierunt, semivivo relicto*: « Immortalitatem exuere, sed rationis sensum omnino abolere non possunt, quin homo possit sapere et Deum cognoscere », « nec unquam vitium delet extrema naturae vestigia ».

Quamvis autem actus eius omnino auferri vel exstingui non possit, potest tamen *ad tempus impediri*, sive propter *tenebram obcaecationis*, sive propter *lasciviam delectationis*, sive propter *duritiam obstinationis*. — Propter *tenebram obcaecationis* impeditur synderesis, ne malo remurmuret, pro eo quod malum creditur esse bonum: sicut est in haereticis, qui morientes pro impietate erroris, credunt se mori pro pietate fidei; et ideo remorsum non sentiunt, sed magis quoddam gaudium fictum[^9] et vanum. — Propter *lasciviam delectationis* similiter impeditur; aliquando enim in peccatis carnalibus ita absorbetur homo ab actu carnis, ut remorsus locum non habeat, quia carnales homines tanto impetu delectationis feruntur, ut ratio tunc non habeat locum[^10]. — Propter *duritiam obstinationis* impeditur etiam synderesis, ne ad bonum stimulet, sicut in damnatis, qui adeo sunt in malo confirmati, ut nunquam possint ad bonum inclinari. Et ideo synderesis, quantum ad *instigationem ad bonum*, sempiternum habet impedimentum; et propterea, quantum ad *istum* actum, potest dici exstincta; non tamen est[^11] exstincta *simpliciter*, quia habet *alium usum*, videlicet *remurmurationis*. Secundum enim illum usum, secundum quem synderesis habet *pungere* et *remurmurare contra malum*, maxime vigebit in damnatis; et hoc dico, prout remurmuratio contra malum tenet rationem *poenae*, non prout tenet rationem *iustitiae*, quia illa remurmuratio erit ad commendandam divinam iustitiam, sed non erit ad eliciendam fructuosam poenitentiam. Unde remurmurabit synderesis in damnatis contra *culpam*, in relatione tamen ad *poenam*.

Et sic patet, quod synderesis quantum ad actum impediri potest, nunquam tamen exstingui potest universaliter quantum ad omnem actum et quantum ad omne tempus, sicut rationes probant, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur; et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod per malum contingit privari omni vi rationis; dicendum, quod *ratio* sumitur ibi pro potentia deliberativa
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et movente *per modum deliberationis*, quae in aliquibus omnino est ad malum conversa. Synderesis autem, ut prius[^12] ostensum est, non dicit vim animae rationalis ut moventem *per modum deliberationis*, sed ut moventem *per modum naturae*; et ideo Glossa illa non facit ad propositum. Nec est intelligendum, quod Glossa illa velit dicere, quod per peccatum fiat privatio quantum ad potentiam, sed quantum ad *rectitudinem* potentiae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo efficitur stupidus per peccatum; dicendum, quod similitudo illa attenditur, quantum est ex parte potentiae deliberativae, secundum quam habet in nobis esse stulta arrogantia. — Posset tamen dici, quod stupor non aufert *simpliciter* sensum, sed aufert solummodo *ad tempus*; et bene potest esse, quod ad tempus anima adeo incurvatur ad peccatum, ut nullum sentiat omnino remorsum, sive propter delectationis intensionem, sive propter excaecationem, cum credit[^13] malum esse bonum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de haereticis, iam patet responsio. Concedo enim, quod non habet usum suum, ut remurmuret *malo erroris*, in quod[^14] ceciderunt; tamen non est exstincta, pro eo quod remurmurat contra *alia mala*, et contra illa quae haeretici credunt esse mala.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fomite, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia fomes est vitiositas praeter naturam, et ideo totaliter tolli potest, etiam salva natura; non sic autem est de synderesi. Inest enim secundum primam naturae institutionem; et ideo, natura salvata, non omnino auferri potest. — Alia est etiam ratio, quia aliqua est gratia sive donum gratiae gratis datum, quod directe repugnat fomiti et quod amovet carnis corruptionem[^15]. Vitium autem et peccatum non habet esse circa actum synderesis; et ideo, quantumcumque homo peccaverit, remansit tamen in eo tam conscientia quam synderesis[^16].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether synderesis can be extinguished by sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether synderesis can be extinguished by sin. And that it can, it seems.

1. On that text of the Psalm[^1]: *They are corrupt and are become abominable*; the Gloss: « deprived of every rational power »; but synderesis is a rational power: therefore by the magnitude of sin synderesis can be deprived, at least as to its act.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm[^2]: *From the height of the day*
*I shall be afraid*; the Gloss: « Stupor is that which does not feel »; and afterward it is added: « Foolish arrogance is like stupor, when someone, presuming on himself, neither fears nor takes heed »: therefore just as through stupor it comes about that the body is rendered insensible with respect to a bodily illness, so too the soul comes to be rendered insensible with respect to a spiritual illness. If, then, synderesis murmurs against a spiritual illness, it seems that synderesis can sometimes be extinguished.

3. Likewise, heretics endure death for their error without any remorse of conscience: if, then, synderesis is to murmur against evil, and in them it does not murmur in any way; it seems that in them it is wholly extinguished.

4. Likewise, the fomes stands opposed to synderesis[^3]; but the fomes can be totally extinguished, as is clear in the Blessed Virgin: therefore it seems that synderesis can likewise be extinguished by a multitude of sins.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Gloss cited above on the first chapter of Ezekiel[^4]: *The face of an eagle*, etc.; the Gloss: « The spark of conscience is not extinguished in Cain »: if, then, Cain was a great sinner, it seems that it cannot be extinguished by sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the second book of the City of God[^5]: « So great is the force of probity and chastity that human nature, all or nearly all of it, is moved by praise of it, nor is it so vicious in baseness as to lose entirely the sense of honesty »: therefore if this sense of honesty is synderesis, it seems that it cannot be extinguished by sin.

3. Likewise, things that are present naturally are inseparable; but synderesis is present in us naturally: therefore it seems that we cannot lose its act entirely through sin, since « vice, as Augustine says[^6], does not destroy the last vestiges of nature ».

4. Likewise, if it ought to be extinguished in any, it would most of all be extinguished in the damned; but in the damned synderesis is not extinguished, because the remorse of conscience is from the act of synderesis; and this remorse is most vigorous in them, since *neither their fire shall be extinguished, nor their worm die*[^7]: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> Synderesis as to its act can be impeded for a time, but it cannot be extinguished, namely as to its every act and every time.

**I respond:** It must be said that synderesis as to its act can be *impeded*, but cannot be *extinguished*. It cannot be *extinguished* for this reason: since it bespeaks something natural, it cannot be wholly taken away from us. Hence too the Gloss says on that text of Luke, chapter ten[^8]: *They departed, leaving him half-dead*: « They can strip away immortality, but they cannot wholly abolish the sense of reason, such that a man may still be wise and know God », « nor does vice ever destroy the last vestiges of nature ».

But although its act cannot be wholly taken away or extinguished, it can nonetheless be *impeded for a time*, whether on account of the *darkness of blindness*, or on account of the *wantonness of delight*, or on account of the *hardness of obstinacy*. — On account of the *darkness of blindness* synderesis is impeded, so that it does not murmur against evil, for the reason that the evil is believed to be good: as is the case in heretics, who, dying for the impiety of their error, believe that they are dying for the piety of faith; and therefore they do not feel remorse, but rather a certain feigned[^9] and empty joy. — On account of the *wantonness of delight* it is likewise impeded; for sometimes in carnal sins a man is so absorbed by the act of the flesh that remorse has no place, because carnal men are carried along by so great an impetus of delight that reason then has no place[^10]. — On account of the *hardness of obstinacy* synderesis is also impeded, so that it does not goad toward the good, as in the damned, who are so confirmed in evil that they can never be inclined toward the good. And therefore synderesis, as to its *instigation toward the good*, has an everlasting impediment; and on that account, as to *that* act, it can be said to be extinguished; yet it is not[^11] extinguished *simply*, because it has *another use*, namely that of *murmuring*. For according to that use, according to which synderesis has to *prick* and to *murmur against evil*, it will be most vigorous in the damned; and I say this insofar as the murmuring against evil holds the character of *punishment*, not insofar as it holds the character of *justice*, because that murmuring will be for commending the divine justice, but will not be for eliciting fruitful penitence. Hence synderesis in the damned will murmur against *fault*, yet in relation to *punishment*.

And thus it is clear that synderesis as to its act can be impeded, yet can never be extinguished universally as to every act and as to every time, as the reasons prove which are adduced for the second part; and therefore they are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected from the Gloss, that through evil it comes about that one is deprived of every power of reason; it must be said that *reason* is taken there for the deliberative power and the power that moves *by way of deliberation*, which in some is wholly turned toward evil. But synderesis, as was shown before[^12], does not bespeak the power of the rational soul as moving *by way of deliberation*, but as moving *by way of nature*; and therefore that Gloss does not bear on the point. Nor is it to be understood that that Gloss means to say that through sin a deprivation comes about as to the power, but as to the *rectitude* of the power.

2. To that which is objected, that a man is made stupid through sin; it must be said that that likeness is regarded so far as it is on the part of the deliberative power, according to which there is in us a foolish arrogance. — Yet it could be said that stupor does not take away sense *simply*, but takes it away only *for a time*; and it may well be that for a time the soul is so bent down toward sin that it feels no remorse at all, whether on account of the intensity of delight, or on account of blinding, when one believes[^13] evil to be good.

3. To that which is objected concerning heretics, the response is already clear. For I concede that it does not have its use, so as to murmur against the *evil of error* into which[^14] they have fallen; yet it is not extinguished, for the reason that it murmurs against *other evils*, and against those things which heretics believe to be evils.

4. To that which is objected concerning the fomes, it must be said that it is not similar, because the fomes is a viciousness beyond nature, and therefore can be totally removed, even while nature is preserved; but it is not so with synderesis. For it is present according to the first institution of nature; and therefore, nature being preserved, it cannot be wholly taken away. — There is also another reason, because there is some grace or gratuitously given gift of grace which directly opposes the fomes and which removes the corruption of the flesh[^15]. But vice and sin do not have their being about the act of synderesis; and therefore, however much a man may have sinned, there remained nonetheless in him both conscience and synderesis[^16].

---

la: Psalm. 13, 2. Glossa invenitur apud Petr. Lombardum, in hunc loc.; cfr. Glossa interlin. in Ps. 52, 2.

en: Psalm 13:2. The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard, on this passage; cf. the interlinear Gloss on Ps. 52:2.

la: Psalm. 55, 4. — Glossam, quae est ordinaria et secundum August., in hunc loc. n. 6, exhibent Strabus et Lyranus. — Pro *sentit* Vat. *sentitur*.

en: Psalm 55:4. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one and is according to Augustine, on this passage n. 6, is given by Strabo and Lyranus. — For *sentit* the Vatican edition reads *sentitur*.

la: Cfr. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. pro 1. parte.

en: Cf. art. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, for the first part.

la: Vers. 10. — Glossa integra habetur in quaest. praeced. in fine argg. ad oppos.

en: Verse 10. — The complete Gloss is found in the preceding question, at the end of the arguments to the contrary.

la: Cap. 26. n. 1. — Pro *adeo sit* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *adeo fit*.

en: Chapter 26, n. 1. — For *adeo sit* the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 read *adeo fit*.

la: Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. n. 2. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 182, nota 9. et pag. 314, nota 7.

en: Book XIX of the City of God, c. 12, n. 2. — On the major premise cf. above, p. 182, note 9, and p. 314, note 7.

la: Marc. 9, 43. 45. 47: *Ubi vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non exstinguitur.*

en: Mark 9:43, 45, 47: *Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished.*

la: Vers. 30. — De Glossa vide supra pag. 906, nota 6.

en: Verse 30. — On the Gloss see above, p. 906, note 6.

la: Pro *fictum*, quod in multis codd., ut F L O X Y bb cc etc. et in ed. I legitur, alii codd. ceteraeque edd. *siccum*. Paulo superius Vat. pro *pietate* commutavit in *proprietate*.

en: For *fictum*, which is read in many codices, such as F L O X Y bb cc etc. and in edition I, the other codices and the remaining editions read *siccum*. A little above, the Vatican edition changed *pietate* into *proprietate*.

la: Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 5. dicit, quod « iucundum et molestum non omnem existimationem corrumpat et pervertat... sed eas tantum, quae ad agendas res spectant... illi autem, qui aut voluptate aut dolore corruptus est, principium statim non apparebit, neque eius causa, atque ob id omnia eligi atque agi oportere; vitium enim eiusmodi est, ut principium corrumpat ».

en: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 5, says that « the pleasant and the painful do not corrupt and pervert every judgment... but only those that bear on things to be done... but to him who is corrupted either by pleasure or by pain the principle will not at once appear, nor its cause, nor that on account of it all things ought to be chosen and done; for vice is of such a kind that it corrupts the principle ».

la: Edd., excepta I, omittunt *est*.

en: The editions, except I, omit *est*.

la: Vide supra pag. 767, nota 4. — In fine arg. Vat. pro *multitudinem* substituit *multiplicationem*. Edd. 2, 3 omittunt *contingat exstingui per peccatorum multitudinem*.

en: See above, p. 767, note 4. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition substitutes *multiplicationem* for *multitudinem*. Editions 2, 3 omit *that synderesis can be extinguished by a multitude of sins*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *credat*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 read *credat*.

la: Ed. I *in quem*.

en: Edition I reads *in quem*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 32. a. 1. q. 2. et dub. 2; d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. — Paulo inferius pro *remansit* Vat. *remanet*.

en: Cf. above d. 32, a. 1, q. 2 and dubium 2; d. 35, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4. — A little below, for *remansit* the Vatican edition reads *remanet*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF crops of printed pp. 911–913 (PDF pp. 933–935; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 63414–63532 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`) for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing. The Respondeo and footers were PDF-authoritative per the Vol II OCR-inversion (the IA djvu cascade-shattered the two-column Respondeo and all three page footers).

**Page span / seam.** Q2 opens mid-printed-p.911 (lower half, after a2-q1's article-level scholion, which occupies the upper two-thirds of p.911). Seam verified against PDF: q1's scholion (notes I–II on the *two following questions*) sits above the `QUAESTIO II.` header; q2's first two videtur args and the p.911 footers 1–5 belong to q2, NOT to q1 — no double-count. Q2 ends low in the left column of p.913 at "...remansit tamen in eo tam conscientia quam synderesis[^15].", immediately before `QUAESTIO III.` begins.

**Scholion disposition.** Q2 has NO own scholion. The body's final footnote (p.913 footer 5) reads *"Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."* — synderesis-by-use questions are covered by the article-level scholion attached to a2-q1. `has_scholion: false`; the directive is rendered as chunk [^16], anchored at the q2 body's final word.

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page footer restart in the source → continuous chunk [^N]):**
- p.911 source footers: the **left-column** footers 1–3 (`1 Cfr. a.1 q.2 arg.1 pro 1 parte`; `2 Cum Vat...inchoantis`; `3 Cod. bb alias`) belong to **q1's tail body** on the same shared page — confirmed 2026-05-31 at 600 dpi (superscripts ¹²³ at q1's *habitum in anima* / *inclinantis* / *sed eas*); they are rendered in the sibling `d39-a2-q1` as `[^1c]`–`[^3c]`, NOT here. q2's own p.911 footers are the **right-column** Psalm citations: 4=Psalm 13,2→`[^1]`; 5=Psalm 55,4→`[^2]`. (q2's `[^3]` = `Cfr. a.1 q.2 arg.1` anchors at arg-4 *synderesim*, whose footer prints on p.912.)
- p.912 source footers (9): left col 1–6 → [^4],[^5],[^6],[^7],[^8],[^9]; right col 7–9 → [^10] (Aristot.), [^11] (Edd. omittunt est), and [^11] var.
- p.913 source footers (left col, q2's portion, 5): → [^12],[^13],[^14],[^15],[^16] (footer 5 = "Vide scholion"). p.913 footers 6–11 + right-col footers belong to QUAESTIO III (hand-off, see below).

**Hand-offs forwarded to a2-q3:** p.913 left-col footers 6–11 (`6 Vers.10 — Ipsa verba Hieronymi...`, `7 Vers.16 — Glossa in Rabani Comment...`, `8 Codd. CFHIKRST...statum`, `9 Cfr. supra q.1`, `10 Secundum Aristot...`, `11 De hac divisione bonorum...`) and the p.913 right-col footers belong to QUAESTIO III, whose body begins at raw line 63533. Do NOT re-count them against q2. Q3 opener: "Tertio quaeritur, utrum synderesis possit per peccatum *deformari* / *deardari* (depraved/corrupted by sin)."

**[?] flags:**
- **RESOLVED (2026-05-31, 600 dpi) — p.911 source-footer 2 (`Cum Vat. et cod. bb lectionem inclinantis praeferendam duximus lectioni inchoantis…`).** The d.31–d.40 polish pass extracted p.911 (PDF 933) at 600 dpi: the footer's superscript ² sits on the word *inclinantis* in **q1's tail body** ("…et alterius sicut *inclinantis*. Nam conscientia dictat…"), not in q2. The note records the editors' choice of the reading *inclinantis* over *inchoantis* in that q1 clause; its cross-ref "hic in corp. et ad 3" points to q1's corpus and reply ad-3. It is therefore **not a q2 marker** — correctly belongs to `d39-a2-q1`, where it (with the adjacent left-col footers 1 and 3) is now rendered as `[^1c]`–`[^3c]`. No orphan introduced in either chunk.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0