title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 784 -->

### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum primus parens potuerit satisfacere pro posteris, sicut potuit eos ex culpa sua vitiare.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum primus parens pro posteris suis potuerit satisfacere, sicut potuit eos ex culpa sua vitiare. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*, capitulo vigesimo quarto: « Si Adam nequisset ad eos quos generaturus erat, iustitiam suam producere[^1], nequaquam posset ad eos iniustitiam transmittere »: si ergo hoc verum est, sequitur, quod si Adam potuit sua culpa filios reddere culpabiles, sua satisfactione potuit eos facere excusabiles.

2. Item, omnes in Adam peccaverunt, quia fuerunt in Adam peccante: ergo pari ratione, si omnes fuerunt in Adam satisfaciente, videtur, quod omnes in ipso satisfecerunt per locum a simili[^2].

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. « Si oppositum est causa oppositi, ergo propositum est causa propositi[^3] »; sed Adae transgressio fuit causa nostrae corruptionis: ergo videtur, quod eius iustificatio et satisfactio fuerit causa nostrae reparationis. Sicut igitur in Adam peccavimus, ita videtur, quod in eodem satisfecerimus. — Et istae tres rationes sumtae sunt per locum a simili.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per locum a minori[^4]. Pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; sed divina iustitia pro transgressione Adae condemnavit totam posteritatem poena mortalitatis: ergo multo fortius divina misericordia pro satisfactione Adae debuit reddere gratiam iustificationis.

5. Item, potentior est gratia in bono, quam sit culpa in malo; sed culpa Adae potuit totam posteritatem inficere et reddere Deo odiosam: ergo multo

<!-- page 785 -->

fortius gratia, quae fuit collata Adae, potuit totam posteritatem reparare et reddere Deo gratam.

6. Item, secundum leges humanas tutor potius potest pupilli conditionem meliorare quam deteriorare. Si ergo multo maioris benignitatis est lex divina, quam sit humana; videtur, quod potius conditio nostra in primo parente[^5] de peiori potuit fieri melior, quam de meliori deterior: ergo si transgrediendo potuit transfundere culpam, multo fortius satisfaciendo potuit transmittere iustitiam.

**Sed contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Statim Adam, cum peccavit, ab immortalitate cecidit in necessitatem moriendi: ergo si gratia superveniens non aufert immutabilitatem divinae sententiae, remansit igitur post gratiam mortalis. Sed mortalis de necessitate generat mortalem: ergo quantumcumque Adam satisfaceret, generaret filios suos morti obnoxios. Sed nulla creatura rationalis est morti obnoxia nisi propter culpam[^6]: ergo nunquam potuit satisfacere, quin transmitteret culpam.

2. Item, iustitia originalis consistit in quadam mentis et carnis integritate; sed quia virginitas dicit incorruptionem mentis et carnis, ex quo semel perditur, nunquam per satisfactionem potest recuperari: ergo pari ratione neque originalis iustitiae donum per satisfactionem recuperatur. Si ergo ex illius iustitiae privatione est in nobis originalis culpa, impossibile fuit, quod Adam satisfaceret pro posteritate sua.

3. Item, omnis satisfactio peccatoris fundatur super gratiam gratum facientem; sed gratia gratum faciens nunquam potest transire ab uno homine in alium, sicut in primo libro[^7] probatum est, sed gratia immediate a solo Deo datur: videtur ergo, quod in primo parente satisfacere non potuerit genus humanum.

4. Item, efficacior est in unoquoque fides sua sibi et gratia, quam sit alii; sed Adam non potuit pro se ipso satisfacere, sed opportunum fuit, Filium Dei pati, sicut ostendit Anselmus in libro *Cur Deus homo*[^8]: ergo non videtur, quod potuerit satisfactionis iustitiam in alios derivare.

### Conclusio.

> Impossibile fuit, Adam pro posteris suis satisfacere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum tota posteritas in Adam potuerit satisfacere, sicut in eo potuit vitiari, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod Adam posteris communicaret et[^9] culpam et satisfactionem simul; aut ita, quod communicaret satisfactionem, sed non culpam; aut ita, quod in se satisfaceret et pro se, ita quod posteris non communicaret culpam. *(Conclusio 1.)* — Primi duo modi non solum sunt impossibiles, sed etiam non intelligibiles, quia claudunt in se duo opposita. Si enim Adam communicasset posteris simul culpam et satisfactionem, simul essent culpabiles et satisfacerent: ergo simul essent iusti et iniusti. — Similiter, si communicaret satisfactionem, et non culpam: ergo innocentes satisfacerent; et hoc similiter non est intelligibile, non enim fit satisfactio nisi pro offensa; et si Adam non communicaret posteris culpam, ipsi haberent omnimodam innocentiam; et si hoc, locum non haberet in eis satisfactio aliqua; pro innocente enim satisfacere non est intelligibile. — *(Conclusio 2.)* Tertius autem modus dicendi, videlicet quod Adam sic satisfaceret pro culpa sua, ut sua satisfactione impediretur transfusio originalis culpae, etsi intelligibilis sit, impossibilis tamen fuit ipsi Adae.

Et ratio huius melius reddetur in tertio[^10], cum agetur de modo redemptionis humanae. Ad praesens autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod Adam sic satisfacere non poterat, ut impediretur transfusio culpae originalis in posteritatem suam. *(Triplex ratio.)* Et ratio huius sumitur et a parte ipsius *Adae* et a parte *gratiae* et a parte *corruptionis naturae*. A parte *Adae*, quoniam ipse debitor mortis erat et dignus poenalitate et miseria; et ideo, quamcumque mortem vel poenam sustineret pro transgressione sua, Deo satisfacere non poterat sufficienter. — A parte vero *gratiae*, per quam satisfaciebat, ratio sumitur, quoniam illa gratia erat gratia poenitentialis, quae quidem respiciebat ipsam voluntatem *personae*; et ideo per ipsam non curabatur morbus concupiscentiae, quae[^11] radicabatur in carne; et propterea, quantumcumque satisfaceret, remanebat *natura* corrupta, et ita necessitas ad transfundendam originalem culpam. — Ex parte vero *naturae* sumitur ratio, quia, cum natura humana tota in ipso vitiata esset, tantum pensabatur illa corruptio naturae, quanti pretii est tota humana natura; et ideo quidquid Adam faceret, longe inferius esset eo quod exigebat Deus ad tantae corruptionis et damnationis recompensationem; et ideo pro illa non poterat satisfacere.

*(Additur 4. ratio.)* Posset etiam[^12] nihilominus assignari ratio ex parte *divinae offensae*, quae, cum esset infinita ratione eius, quia est contra infinitum, non recipiebat recompensationem, nisi aliquis satisfaceret, qui esset infinite bonus. Et ideo non indocte dicunt aliqui, quod non solum satisfactio pro peccato Adae, sed

<!-- page 786 -->

etiam pro quocumque alio peccato fundata est super meritum et satisfactionem Christi, in cuius fide et Sacramentis Deus parcit quibuscumque parcit. Et ideo contingit, omnes *de plenitudine eius accipere* et ipsum dici *caput totius Ecclesiae*, tam finalis quam primitivae[^13]. — Patet igitur, quod quocumque modo dicatur, impossibile fuit, Adam pro posteris satisfacere. Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Anselmi, quod si nequisset iustitiam *producere*..... etc.; dicendum, quod Anselmus loquitur ibi de iustitia originali, et illam dicit quod Adam et servare potuit posteris et transfundere. Hoc autem intelligendum est *(Notandum.)* sane, non quia aliqua qualitas, quae esset in anima Adae, per multiplicationem ad posteros descenderet, sed quia anima Adae innocens coniuncta fuerat carni purae et immaculatae; et si stetisset, anima potuisset illam carnem servare et a corruptione mortis et a corruptione libidinis; et haec rectitudo erat originalis iustitia. Si autem in hac Adam perstitisset, cum generaret posteros, carnem immaculatam transfunderet. Et similiter, dum anima creata a Deo innocens tali carni uniretur, illud idem posse[^14] et eandem rectitudinem haberet, quam habuit anima Adae, et per hoc originalem iustitiam. Et pro tanto originalis iustitia *transfundi* dicitur, quia, si hanc habet pater, necesse est, quod hanc habeat filius; et hoc est ex ratione bonae dispositionis ex parte carnis, quam originalis iustitia concernit. Non sic est de iustitia satisfactionis, quae voluntatem respicit, non carnis integritatem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut fuimus in Adam peccante, ita fuimus in ipso satisfaciente; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia peccatum Adae, pro eo quod illam iustitiam originalem privabat, non tantum respiciebat personam, sed etiam naturam. Sed quia illa[^15] satisfactio illam innocentiam non restituebat, personam, non naturam respiciebat; et ideo non sic in posteros redundare potuit satisfactio, sicut redundavit ibi transgressio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si oppositum est causa oppositi etc.; dicendum, quod istud *(Notandum.)* intelligendum est in his oppositis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura, et in eis quae recte[^16] sunt opposita, et secundum illud, in quo opponuntur. Et *(Desunt 3 conditiones.)* ratione huius triplicis conditionis illa propositio non habet locum in proposito. Primum quidem, quia culpa non dicit aliquam naturam[^17], sed potius privationem. — Secundo vero, quia iustitia satisfactionis non directe opponitur culpae originali, sed potius originalis iustitia; et si illa originalis iustitia fuisset in Adam generante, fuisset causa oppositi. — Tertio vero, quia culpa ipsius Adae opponitur ipsi satisfactioni, in quantum corrumpebat *personam*, non in quantum corrumpebat *naturam*; et in quantum corrumpebat *personam*, meritum erat aeternae damnationis; in quantum vero corrumpebat *naturam*, principium erat universalis corruptionis. Iustitia ergo satisfactionis auferebat ab ipso Adam meritum aeternae damnationis; et secundum illud opponebatur ei et erat causa oppositi, videlicet aeternae beatitudinis per modum meriti; vitium autem corruptionis non auferebat nec eius oppositum causabat, quia secundum illud non opponebatur ei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; *(Notandum.)* dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi *misericordia* sic habet locum, quod non excludit *iustitiam*. Iustitia autem requirebat maiorem satisfactionem, quam Adam posset facere; et ideo *misericordia* pro illa modica satisfactione Adae non debebat toti generi humano donare offensam, sed quod nobis et sibi deerat decebat eum supplere; quod et fecit, cum *propter nimiam caritatem suam Filium suum unigenitum misit in similitudinem carnis peccati*, et *cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos Christo*[^18].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentior est gratia, quam sit culpa; responderi potest dupliciter: primo, quod illud intelligendum est respectu illius effectus, ad quem gratia ordinatur. Gratia autem gratum faciens, ipsi Adae collata, non ordinabatur ad removendam *carnis corruptionem*, sed *voluntatis deordinationem*, quia reformativa erat imaginis, non reparativa carnis. Nihilominus tamen in reparatione carnis potentior est aliquo modo quam culpa, dum per gratiam meretur homo secundam stolam[^19]. — *(Alia solutio.)* Aliter potest dici, quod etsi gratia potentior sit quam culpa, non tamen sequitur, quod totum reformet, quod culpa destruxit. Multo enim « facilius est destruere quam construere[^20] ». Unde unus malus cibus aliquando plus corrumpit naturam, quam centum bonae medicinae possint eam reparare, quamvis medicinae illae sint valde potentes et virtuosae.

<!-- page 787 -->

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de lege pupillorum, dicendum, quod Adam ad posteros non comparatur sicut tutor ad pupillos, sed sicut pater ad filios. Unde sicut pater facilius potest bona sua dissipare et destruere, et per consequens hereditatem filiorum suorum devastare, quam possit illam post devastationem et consumtionem reparare; sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere.

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether the first parent could make satisfaction for his posterity, just as he could vitiate them by his own fault.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the first parent could make satisfaction for his posterity, just as he could vitiate them by his own fault. And that he could, it seems.

*To the opposite.*

1. Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter twenty-four: « If Adam had not been able to produce[^1] justice in those whom he was going to generate, he could in no way transmit injustice to them »: if therefore this is true, it follows that, if Adam was able by his fault to render his sons culpable, by his satisfaction he was able to render them excusable.

2. Likewise, all sinned in Adam, because they were in Adam when he sinned: therefore by parity of reasoning, if all were in Adam when he made satisfaction, it seems that all made satisfaction in him by a place from the like[^2].

3. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [to follow] by reason. « If the opposite is the cause of the opposite, then the proposed is the cause of the proposed[^3] »; but Adam's transgression was the cause of our corruption: therefore it seems that his justification and satisfaction was the cause of our reparation. As therefore we sinned in Adam, so it seems that we made satisfaction in the same. — And these three reasons are taken by a place from the like.

4. Likewise, this same [thing] is shown by a place from the lesser[^4]. God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but the divine justice, for Adam's transgression, condemned the whole posterity with the penalty of mortality: therefore much more strongly ought the divine mercy, for Adam's satisfaction, to have rendered the grace of justification.

5. Likewise, grace is more powerful in good than fault is in evil; but Adam's fault was able to infect the whole posterity and render it odious to God: therefore much more

<!-- page 785 -->

strongly was the grace, which was conferred on Adam, able to repair the whole posterity and render it pleasing to God.

6. Likewise, according to human laws a guardian is rather able to better the condition of his ward than to worsen it. If therefore the divine law is of much greater benignity than the human, it seems that rather our condition in the first parent[^5] could be made better from a worse [state] than [be made] worse from a better: therefore if by transgressing he was able to transfuse fault, much more strongly by making satisfaction was he able to transmit justice.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. As soon as Adam sinned, he fell from immortality into the necessity of dying: therefore if supervening grace does not take away the immutability of the divine sentence, he remained, then, mortal after grace. But a mortal of necessity generates a mortal: therefore however much Adam might make satisfaction, he would generate his sons subject to death. But no rational creature is subject to death except on account of fault[^6]: therefore he could never make satisfaction without transmitting fault.

2. Likewise, original justice consists in a certain integrity of mind and flesh; but since virginity bespeaks an incorruption of mind and flesh, once it is lost it can never be recovered by satisfaction: therefore by parity of reasoning neither is the gift of original justice recovered by satisfaction. If therefore original fault is in us from the privation of that justice, it was impossible that Adam should make satisfaction for his posterity.

3. Likewise, every satisfaction of a sinner is founded upon sanctifying grace; but sanctifying grace can never pass from one human to another, as was proved in the first book[^7], but grace is given immediately by God alone: it seems therefore that the human race could not make satisfaction in the first parent.

4. Likewise, in each one his own faith and grace are more efficacious for himself than for another; but Adam could not make satisfaction for himself, but it was needful that the Son of God should suffer, as Anselm shows in the book *Why God [Became] Man*[^8]: therefore it does not seem that he could derive the justice of satisfaction unto others.

### Conclusion.

> It was impossible for Adam to make satisfaction for his posterity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked whether the whole posterity could make satisfaction in Adam, just as it could be vitiated in him, this can be understood in three ways: either thus, that Adam should communicate to his posterity both[^9] fault and satisfaction at once; or thus, that he should communicate satisfaction, but not fault; or thus, that he should make satisfaction in himself and for himself, in such a way that he should not communicate fault to his posterity. *(Conclusion 1.)* — The first two modes are not only impossible, but also unintelligible, because they enclose in themselves two opposites. For if Adam had communicated to his posterity at once fault and satisfaction, they would be at once culpable and would be making satisfaction: therefore they would be at once just and unjust. — Likewise, if he should communicate satisfaction, and not fault: then the innocent would be making satisfaction; and this likewise is not intelligible, for satisfaction is not made except for an offense; and if Adam should not communicate fault to his posterity, they would have complete innocence; and if so, no satisfaction would have place in them; for to make satisfaction for an innocent [person] is not intelligible. — *(Conclusion 2.)* But the third mode of speaking, namely that Adam should so make satisfaction for his fault that by his satisfaction the transfusion of original fault should be impeded, although it is intelligible, was nevertheless impossible for Adam himself.

And the reason of this will be better rendered in the third [book][^10], when treatment is made of the mode of human redemption. But for the present let it suffice to have said this, that Adam could not so make satisfaction that the transfusion of original fault into his posterity should be impeded. *(A threefold reason.)* And the reason of this is taken both on the part of *Adam* himself, and on the part of *grace*, and on the part of *the corruption of the nature*. On the part of *Adam*, because he himself was a debtor of death and worthy of penalty and misery; and therefore, whatever death or penalty he might sustain for his transgression, he could not sufficiently make satisfaction to God. — But on the part of *grace*, by which he made satisfaction, the reason is taken because that grace was a penitential grace, which indeed regarded the will itself of the *person*; and therefore through it the disease of concupiscence was not cured, which[^11] was rooted in the flesh; and on that account, however much he might make satisfaction, the *nature* remained corrupted, and thus the necessity of transfusing original fault. — But on the part of the *nature* the reason is taken because, since the whole human nature was vitiated in him, that corruption of nature was weighed at as much as the whole human nature is worth in price; and therefore whatever Adam might do would be far inferior to what God demanded for the recompense of so great a corruption and damnation; and therefore for it he could not make satisfaction.

*(A fourth reason is added.)* Nonetheless a reason could also[^12] be assigned on the part of the *divine offense*, which, since it was infinite by reason of this, that it is against the infinite, did not admit of recompense, unless someone should make satisfaction who was infinitely good. And therefore not unlearnedly do some say that not only satisfaction for the sin of Adam, but

<!-- page 786 -->

also for any other sin whatsoever is founded upon the merit and satisfaction of Christ, in whose faith and Sacraments God spares whomsoever he spares. And therefore it comes about that all *receive of his fullness* and that he is called the *head of the whole Church*, both of the final and of the primitive [Church][^13]. — It is clear therefore that, in whatever way it be said, it was impossible for Adam to make satisfaction for his posterity. Whence the reasons showing this are to be granted.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that which is objected concerning the word of Anselm, that if he had not been able to produce justice... etc.; it must be said that Anselm there speaks of original justice, and says of it that Adam could both preserve it for his posterity and transfuse it. But this is to be understood *(To be noted.)* soundly, not as if some quality which was in the soul of Adam should descend to his posterity through multiplication, but because the innocent soul of Adam had been joined to pure and immaculate flesh; and, if he had stood [firm], the soul could have preserved that flesh both from the corruption of death and from the corruption of lust; and this rectitude was original justice. But if Adam had persisted in this, when he generated posterity, he would transfuse immaculate flesh. And likewise, while a soul created innocent by God should be united to such flesh, it could have[^14] that same [power] and the same rectitude which the soul of Adam had, and through this original justice. And to that extent original justice is said to be *transfused*, because, if the father has this, it is necessary that the son have this; and this is from the ground of the good disposition on the part of the flesh, which original justice concerns. It is not so with the justice of satisfaction, which regards the will, not the integrity of the flesh.

2. To that which is objected, that as we were in Adam when he sinned, so we were in him when he made satisfaction; it must be said that it is not similar, because the sin of Adam, in that it deprived [him] of that original justice, regarded not only the person, but also the nature. But because that[^15] satisfaction did not restore that innocence, it regarded the person, not the nature; and therefore satisfaction could not so redound upon the posterity as the transgression redounded there.

3. To that which is objected, that if the opposite is the cause of the opposite etc.; it must be said that this is *(To be noted.)* to be understood in those opposites, of which each is some nature, and in those things which are properly[^16] opposed, and according to that in which they are opposed. And *(Three conditions are lacking.)* by reason of this threefold condition that proposition does not have place in the matter proposed. First indeed, because fault does not bespeak any nature[^17], but rather a privation. — Secondly, because the justice of satisfaction is not directly opposed to original fault, but rather original justice [is]; and if that original justice had been in Adam when generating, it would have been the cause of the opposite. — Thirdly, because the fault of Adam himself is opposed to satisfaction itself insofar as it corrupted the *person*, not insofar as it corrupted the *nature*; and insofar as it corrupted the *person*, it was the merit of eternal damnation; but insofar as it corrupted the *nature*, it was the principle of universal corruption. The justice of satisfaction therefore took away from Adam himself the merit of eternal damnation; and according to that it was opposed to it and was the cause of the opposite, namely of eternal beatitude by way of merit; but the vice of corruption it did not take away, nor did it cause the opposite of it, because according to that it was not opposed to it.

4. To that which is objected, that God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; *(To be noted.)* it must be said that this is true where *mercy* has place in such a way that it does not exclude *justice*. But justice required a greater satisfaction than Adam could make; and therefore *mercy*, for that slight satisfaction of Adam, ought not to have remitted the offense for the whole human race, but what was lacking to us and to him it was fitting that he should supply; which also he did, when *on account of his exceeding charity he sent his only-begotten Son in the likeness of sinful flesh*, and *when we were dead in sins, he made us alive together in Christ*[^18].

5. To that which is objected, that grace is more powerful than fault; it can be answered in two ways: first, that this is to be understood with respect to that effect to which grace is ordained. But sanctifying grace, conferred on Adam himself, was not ordained to removing the *corruption of the flesh*, but the *disorder of the will*, because it was reformative of the image, not reparative of the flesh. Nevertheless in the reparation of the flesh it is in some manner more powerful than fault, while through grace the human merits the second stole[^19]. — *(Another solution.)* It can be said otherwise, that even if grace be more powerful than fault, it does not nevertheless follow that it should reform the whole which fault destroyed. For « it is much easier to destroy than to construct[^20] ». Whence one bad food sometimes corrupts the nature more than a hundred good medicines could repair it, although those medicines be very potent and efficacious.

<!-- page 787 -->

6. To that which is objected concerning the law of wards, it must be said that Adam is not compared to his posterity as a guardian to wards, but as a father to sons. Whence just as a father can more easily squander and destroy his goods, and consequently devastate the inheritance of his sons, than he can repair it after the devastation and consumption; so also in the matter proposed it is to be understood to be.

la: Vat. cum textu origin. et edd. 3, 4 hic, sicut in corp. quaest. praeced., *perducere* pro *producere.* Cfr. de hoc supra pag. 783, nota 6.

en: The Vatican [edition] with the original text and edd. 3, 4 here, just as in the body of the preceding question, [reads] *perducere* for *producere.* Cfr. concerning this above p. 783, note 6.

la: Qui locus a simili secundum Boeth., III. de Differ. topic. hac exprimitur propositione: « De similibus idem est iudicium ». Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topicis. — Pro *satisfecerunt* cod. cc et ed. 1 *satisfecerint.*

en: Which place from the like, according to Boethius, III. *On Topical Differences*, is expressed by this proposition: « Of like [things] the judgment is the same ». Cfr. Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract on Topical Places. — For *satisfecerunt* cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *satisfecerint.*

la: Huius axiomatis verba qualiter in Aristot. habeantur, vide supra pag. 763, nota 2. Pro *ergo propositum* omnes edd. *et propositum*, et paulo inferius, excepta 1, *redemptionis* pro *reparationis.*

en: As to how the words of this axiom are had in Aristotle, see above p. 763, note 2. For *ergo propositum* all the editions [read] *et propositum*, and a little below, except 1, *redemptionis* for *reparationis.*

la: De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. Pro *a minori* cod. M *a maiori.* — August., Serm. 18 (alias 220 de Tempore) c. 2. n. 2: *Non enim amat Deus damnare, sed salvare.* — Paulo inferius pro *mortalitatis* edd., excepta 1, nec non aliqui codd. *mortis.*

en: Concerning this mode of arguing cfr. tom. I. p. 835, note 5. For *a minori* cod. M [reads] *a maiori.* — Augustine, Sermon 18 (alias 220 *On the Season*) c. 2. n. 2: *For God does not love to condemn, but to save.* — A little below, for *mortalitatis* the editions, except 1, as well as some codices [read] *mortis.*

la: Cod. aa *de ipso parente.*

en: Cod. aa [reads] *de ipso parente.*

la: Vide supra pag. 714, nota 4.

en: See above p. 714, note 4.

la: Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2, ubi ostensum est, omnino falsum et impossibile esse, gratiam sive Spiritum sanctum dari ab homine sicut a principio effectivo.

en: Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2, where it was shown that it is wholly false and impossible that grace or the Holy Spirit be given by a human as by an effective principle.

la: Libr. I. c. 20. 23. 25; II. c. 6. 15. 17. seqq. — De maiori vide supra pag. 661, nota 6.

en: Book I. c. 20. 23. 25; II. c. 6. 15. 17. seqq. — On the major [premise] see above p. 661, note 6.

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 hic omittunt *ita*, et paulo ante cum multis codd. post *aut ita* voculam *quod.*

en: The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 here omit *ita*, and a little before, with many codices, [omit] after *aut ita* the little word *quod.*

la: Dist. 20. q. 3. seq.

en: Dist. 20. q. 3. seq.

la: Codd. F Y ee *qui*; subinde pro *radicabatur* cod. F *radicatur.*

en: Codd. F Y ee [read] *qui*; thereupon for *radicabatur* cod. F [reads] *radicatur.*

la: Cod. aa *tamen.* Mox pro *ratione eius, quia* cod. T *ratione eius, quod.*

en: Cod. aa [reads] *tamen.* Presently for *ratione eius, quia* cod. T [reads] *ratione eius, quod.*

la: Ioan. 1, 16: *Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus.* Eph. 1, 22: *Et ipsum dedit caput super omnem Ecclesiam*; et ibid. 5, 23: *Sicut Christus caput est Ecclesiae.* Cfr. III. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *dici* Vat. *dedit.*

en: John 1, 16: *And of his fullness we have all received.* Eph. 1, 22: *And he gave him as head over the whole Church*; and ibid. 5, 23: *As Christ is the head of the Church.* Cfr. III. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. — For *dici* the Vatican [edition reads] *dedit.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, *posset.* Subinde Vat. omittit *eandem.*

en: The editions, except 1, [read] *posset.* Thereupon the Vatican [edition] omits *eandem.*

la: In codd. K T Y aa cc et aliis nec non in ed. 1 deest *illa*; in cod. bb sic legitur: *sed quia satisfactio illa innocentiam* etc. Post pauca pro *redundavit* codd. T V substituunt *redundat.*

en: In codd. K T Y aa cc and others, as well as in ed. 1, *illa* is lacking; in cod. bb it reads thus: *sed quia satisfactio illa innocentiam* etc. After a few [words], for *redundavit* codd. T V substitute *redundat.*

la: Vox *recte* hic idem dicit ac *directe*, ut ex subnexis apparet.

en: The word *recte* ("rightly") here says the same as *directe* ("directly"), as appears from what is subjoined.

la: Edd. 2, 3 *positionem*, Vat. *positionem sine naturam.* Paulo inferius pro *sed potius originalis iustitia* codd. cum primis edd. perperam *sed potius originali iustitiae.* Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. ad 6.

en: Edd. 2, 3 [read] *positionem*, the Vatican [edition] *positionem* without *naturam.* A little below, for *sed potius originalis iustitia* the codices with the first editions wrongly [read] *sed potius originali iustitiae.* Cfr. below a. 2. q. 1. ad 6.

la: Vide Eph. 2, 4; Rom. 8, 3; Eph. 2, 5. Vulgata: *convivificavit nos in Christo.*

en: See Eph. 2, 4; Rom. 8, 3; Eph. 2, 5. The Vulgate [reads]: *he made us alive together in Christ.*

la: Id est glorificationem corporis, quod quatuor ornatur dotibus, scil. agilitate, claritate, subtilitate et impassibilitate. Opponitur haec secunda stola primae, quae significat ornamentum animae, quod consistit in visione, tentione et fruitione (cfr. III. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.).

en: That is, the glorification of the body, which is adorned with four endowments, namely agility, clarity, subtlety, and impassibility. This second stole is opposed to the first, which signifies the adornment of the soul, which consists in vision, holding, and fruition (cfr. III. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. in the body).

la: Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 155, nota 9.

en: Aristotle, VII. *Topics* c. 3 (c. 4). See above p. 155, note 9.

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Bonav. (hic in corp.) ipse observat, hanc quaestionem magis determinari in tractatu de Incarnatione (III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 2-4.). Posita autem est ipsa hoc loco, quia nonnulla de iustitia originali et de propagatione eiusdem ac iniustitiae originalis dicta in eadem illustrantur ac determinantur. — De hac quaest. in hoc tractatu tantum tractat Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2. — Quoad ipsam doctrinam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 1. m. 5; S. Thom., S. III. q. 1. a. 2. 4, et alii commentatores Magistri in III. Sent. d. 20.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** S. Bonaventure (here in the body) himself observes that this question is more fully determined in the treatise on the Incarnation (III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 2-4.). But it is placed here because certain [things] said about original justice and about the propagation of the same and of original injustice are illustrated and determined in the same. — Of this question in this treatise only Petrus a Tarantasia treats, II. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2. — As to the doctrine itself, cfr. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 1. m. 5; St. Thomas, *Summa* III. q. 1. a. 2. 4, and the other commentators of the Master on III. Sent. d. 20.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 54670–54852), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (Respondeo, triplex-ratio, Solutio oppositorum replies, SCHOLION) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 784–787, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 806–809). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Boundary (verified).** This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO II only. Opener (PDF-verified at p.784 bottom-right, full-width header `QUAESTIO II.`): "Secundo quaeritur, utrum primus parens pro posteris suis potuerit satisfacere, sicut potuit eos ex culpa sua vitiare. Et quod sic, videtur." — ALIGNMENT CONFIRMED. The ARTICULUS I header is NOT repeated (carried by sibling a1-q1, Override §5). The chunk ENDS at raw ~54852, immediately before the full-width `ARTICULUS II. / De quantitate originalis peccati.` (p.787, body "Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeritur de quantitate originalis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.") — everything from ARTICULUS II onward is d33-a2-q1.

**OCR page-number scramble corrected.** The IA djvu OCR linearizes the two-column footers and running heads out of physical order: it places a bare page-number `783` and the running head `DIST. XXXIII. ART. I. QUAEST. II.` immediately after the q2 opener block, which made the auto-chunk frontmatter record printed pp. 784–786 ambiguously. The 450 dpi PDF read establishes the true sequence: q1 ends on pp. 783 (recto) + 784 (verso, with q1's SCHOLION); **q2 opens at the bottom of p.784 (right column)**, runs all of p.785, the Respondeo tail + Solutio oppositorum on p.786, and the reply-6 tail + q2's SCHOLION (item I) on the top of p.787 before ART. II. Printed_pages corrected to [784, 785, 786, 787]; pdf_pages [806, 807, 808, 809].

**Page-split / footer map.**
- p.784 (verso, running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): q2 opener + args 1–5 (right column, lower). Footers 1–2 (`Dist. 30… virtutem naturae`; `Vat. cum edd. 3,4 qui`) were claimed by sibling a1-q1 (its [^18],[^19]); footers 3–6 forwarded here → [^1]–[^4]: [^1] *producere/perducere* (arg.1 Anselm), [^2] *a simili* (arg.2, Boeth.), [^3] *propositi* (arg.3, the axiom), [^4] *a minori* (arg.4, Aug. Serm. 18).
- p.785 (recto, running head `DIST. XXXIII. ART. I. QUAEST. II.`): arg.5 tail + arg.6 + Sed contra 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo (three modi, Conclusio 1/2, Triplex ratio, Additur 4. ratio). Footers 1–8 → [^5]–[^12]: [^5] *in primo parente* (arg.6), [^6] *propter culpam* (SC1), [^7] *primo libro* (SC3, Dist.14), [^8] *Cur Deus homo* (SC4), [^9] *aut ita* (Respondeo), [^10] *in tertio* (Dist.20), [^11] *quae radicabatur* (codd. qui), [^12] *Posset etiam* (cod. aa tamen).
- p.786 (verso, running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): Additur-4-ratio tail + "Patet igitur" + Solutio oppositorum replies 1–5. Footers 1–8 → [^13]–[^20]: [^13] *caput totius Ecclesiae* (Ioan.1,16/Eph.), [^14] *posse* (reply 1 Notandum), [^15] *illa satisfactio* (reply 2), [^16] *recte* (reply 3 Notandum), [^17] *aliquam naturam* (reply 3, positionem/naturam), [^18] *convivificavit nos Christo* (reply 4, Eph.2,4), [^19] *secundam stolam* (reply 5), [^20] *facilius est destruere quam construere* (reply 5, Aristot. VII. Topic.).
- p.787 (recto, running head `DIST. XXXIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`): reply 6 tail (de lege pupillorum — NO footnote marker) + q2 SCHOLION (item I only). p.787's footer block (footer 1 `De divisione quantitatis in continuam et discretam cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto`, etc.) belongs to ARTICULUS II body and is forwarded to d33-a2-q1.

**Hand-off received.** From d33-a1-q1: the p.784 footer block split by body anchor. a1-q1 claimed footers 1 (`Dist. 30… virtutem naturae`) and 2 (`Vat. cum edd. 3,4 qui`) as its own [^18],[^19] (the `qui` variant marker physically anchors at q2 arg.1 "ad eos quos" but a1-q1 retained the note; q2's arg.1 here carries only the *producere* marker [^1]). Footers 3–6 forwarded → q2's [^1]–[^4].

**Hand-off forwarded to d33-a2-q1.** ARTICULUS II = *De quantitate originalis peccati* (NOT "De originali quoad causam concomitantem" as an earlier resume note had it). Body: "Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeritur de quantitate originalis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur de ipso originali sub ratione quantitatis continuae… Secundo quaeritur quantum ad rationem quantitatis discretae…", then QUAESTIO I. *Utrum originale peccatum reperiatur in omnibus aequaliter.* (raw ~54853→). Begins on p.787 immediately after q2's scholion. The p.787 footers serving ART. II body (footer 1 `De divisione quantitatis… Aristot. de Praedicam. c. de Quanto`; footer 2 `Ubi textus originalis sic sonat…`; footer 3 `Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1.…`; footer 4 `Anselm., loc. cit. eandem rationem affert…`; footer 5 `Anselm., loc. cit. c. 27…`) are forwarded to d33-a2-q1.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q2 (p.787 top, full-width), item **I** only (no item II — distinct from a1-q1's scholion, which carried items I–III for the article). `has_scholion: true`. Item I notes the question is more fully treated in III. Sent. d. 20 (de Incarnatione), names Petr. a Tar. and the commentators.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 784–787 read top→bottom. Seams verified grammatically continuous: p.784/785 seam (inside arg.5, "ergo multo / fortius gratia, quae fuit collata Adae"); p.785/786 seam (inside Additur-4-ratio, "satisfactio pro peccato Adae, sed / etiam pro quocumque alio peccato"); p.786/787 seam (inside reply 6, "bona sua dissipare et / destruere, et per consequens hereditatem"). No mid-paragraph splice signature found.

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 33, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 787 -->

### ARTICULUS II.
### *De quantitate originalis peccati.*

Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeritur de quantitate originalis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur de ipso originali sub ratione quantitatis continuae[^1], utrum unum originale possit esse maius altero.

Secundo quaeritur quantum ad rationem quantitatis discretae, utrum videlicet sit ponere unum originale, vel plura.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum originale peccatum reperiatur in omnibus aequaliter.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum originale in omnibus reperiatur aequaliter. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Anselmus *de Originali Peccato*, capitulo vigesimo septimo[^2]: « Originale peccatum in omnibus aestimo esse aequale ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. Originale peccatum est carentia debitae iustitiae, sicut saepe dictum est[^3]; sed quilibet illa iustitia originali est simpliciter nudatus et privatus: ergo si aequaliter omnes sunt privati, aequaliter originali macula sunt infecti: ergo in quibuscumque reperitur originale peccatum, aequaliter reperitur.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *per causam*. Originale peccatum est in nobis propter Adae inobedientiam; sed inobedientia Adae una fuit et aequaliter omnes posteros respiciebat[^4]: ergo videtur, quod omnes aequaliter culpabiles faciebat.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *per poenam*. Omnes enim habentes culpam originalem aequaliter puniuntur, videlicet omnimoda carentia visionis Dei[^5]: si igitur quantitas poenae respondet quantitati culpae, videtur, quod si est aequalitas in carentia visionis, quod sit aequalitas in corruptione originalis.

5. Item, hoc ipsum probatur *per concupiscentiam annexam*. Originale enim peccatum ad omne malum reddit pronum per concupiscentiam — unde dum lex prohibet concupiscentiam, prohibere dicitur omne malum[^6] — ergo originale peccatum unumquemque corrumpit universaliter. Sed universalem corruptionem non contingit reperire secundum maius et minus, immo in omnibus, in quibus reperitur, in termino reperitur: ergo videtur, quod originalis culpa non possit esse maior in una persona quam in alia.

6. Item, si maius est originale in uno quam in alio, aut hoc est ex actu *parentis*, aut ex actu *prolis*. Ex actu *parentis* esse non potest; nam, sicut

<!-- page 788 -->

probatum est supra[^7], peccatum parentis in prolem non transit. Ex actu vero *prolis* esse non potest, sicut planum est: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo originale in uno quam in alio reperiatur intensius.

**Sed contra:**

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*[^8]: « Sicut propter naturam nascitur corrupta persona, ita natura per personam efficitur magis peccatrix »; sed peccatum, quod inficit naturam, est peccatum originale: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum in aliquo possit fieri maius et intensius.

2. Item, hoc videtur *ratione*. Nullum malum est in summo, quia nihil est summe malum[^9]; sed originale peccatum malum est: ergo non est in summo. Sed quod est citra summum intendi potest et augeri: ergo originale peccatum intensibile est, igitur potest maius in uno quam in altero reperiri.

3. Item, originale peccatum est concupiscentia[^10]; sed concupiscentia potest intendi, sicut et potest remitti, et aliquando intenditur, sicut patet per experimentum: ergo videtur, quod peccatum originale intendi valeat, ut sit maius in uno quam in alio, vel etiam intensius in eodem secundum status diversos.

4. Item, foeditas carnis est ratio, quare anima contrahit originale[^11]; sed caro non est infecta in summo, et quod non est infectum in summo, dum transit per viam infectionis, potest magis et magis infici: si igitur caro nostra transit per viam infectionis, dum propagatur; videtur, quod magis et magis inficitur, ac per hoc quotidie originale peccatum augmentatur.

5. Item, omnis proprietas, quanto magis appropinquat suae causae, est intensior et fortior, et quanto magis elongatur, debilior[^12]; sed corruptio originalis ab Adam producitur tanquam a fontali principio et radice: ergo videtur, quod quanto aliquis est Adae proximior, quod tanto originalis culpa sit in eo intensior.

6. Item, una anima meliora habet naturalia quam alia, sicut in praecedenti distinctione[^13] habitum est; sed tanto corruptio peior est, quanto est in meliori natura, sicut Augustinus dicit et expresse ratio manifestat, propter dignitatem eius quod corrumpitur: ergo originalis corruptio peior est in una anima quam in altera; et si hoc, videtur, quod culpa sit intensior.

### Conclusio.

> Originale peccatum in omnibus reperitur aequaliter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut, si Adam stetisset, omnes aequaliter essent innocentes, ita nunc, cum Adam peccavit, omnes facti sunt aequaliter peccatores; et ita culpa originalis in omnibus reperitur aequaliter, ita quod non est maior in uno quam in altero, nec etiam intendi habet in eodem subiecto.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quod ista tria concurrunt ad originale peccatum, scilicet debitae iustitiae carentia et concupiscentia et carnis foeditas; et primum est ipsi originali essentiale, secundum vero materiale et tertium causale, sicut supra[^14] explanatum fuit. Si igitur originale deberet augeri, ex aliquo istorum oporteret ipsum intendi; cum autem per nullum horum intendi habeat, in omnibus aequaliter habet reperiri. — Quantum ad *carentiam* namque debitae iustitiae non potest intendi. Ista enim carentia non potest esse maior in uno quam in alio nisi triplici de causa: aut quia sit *obligatio fortior*, aut quia sit ibi *privatio maior*, aut quia *modus privandi sit detestabilior*. Nullo istorum modorum maior habet esse carentia in uno homine quam in alio. Non est enim *obligatio fortior*, quia omnes aequaliter obligantur[^15] in Adam; nec *privatio maior*, quia eodem dono, scilicet originalis iustitiae, omnes per originalem culpam nudantur; nec *modus privandi detestabilior*, quia omnes privati sunt per unam inobedientiam Adae; et sic originale ratione *carentiae debitae iustitiae* non recipit magis et minus, sed in omnibus est aequaliter.

Similiter nec quantum ad *concupiscentiam* intendi habet. Si enim intenditur appetitus vel concupiscentia respectu alicuius delectabilis in aliquo, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut ex *complexione*, aut ex *assuefactione*, aut ex *vinculi refrenantis confractione*. Primo modo absque dubio concupiscentia augeri potest, sicut patet de concupiscentia carnis, quae

<!-- page 789 -->

magis fervet in cholericis et sanguineis quam in melancholicis; sed talis intensio nihil facit ad culpam; non enim est culpabilis, sed naturalis vel poenalis. — Similiter et secundo modo concupiscentia intendi potest[^16] in eodem homine, sicut patet in eo qui assuefactus est luxuriari et bona cibaria comedere, quod magis est pronus et ardentius concupiscit quam is qui talia non gustavit. Sed haec intensio non facit ad originale peccatum, sed potius ad actuale, quia non dicitur originale peccatum concupiscentia quocumque modo, sed solum prout ab origine est contracta. — Tertio modo non potest intendi, sed in omnibus habet aequaliter reperiri, pro eo quod illud retinaculum originalis iustitiae merito culpae Adae in omnibus est confractum. Et quoniam secundum istum tertium modum attenditur quantitas originalis ex parte concupiscentiae, hinc est, quod quantum ad *concupiscentiam* originalis culpa in omnibus, in quibus est, reperitur aequaliter.

Similiter quantum ad *foeditatem*, quae est in carne, non potest esse maius et minus originale; et hoc patet. Nam quod aliqua proprietas intendatur, requiritur idoneitas ad intensionem tam ex parte *susceptibilis*, quam ex parte *proprietatis*, quae intenditur, quam etiam ex parte *agentis*; et si aliquod horum defuerit, proprietas illa non habet intendi, sicut patet consideranti. Omnia autem haec deficiunt in proposito. Defectus enim est ex parte *susceptibilis*. Nam sicut speculum novum inficitur a muliere menstruata, sed postquam inveteratum est, ex aliquo aspectu non recipit novam infectionem; sic humana natura, in sui primordio[^17] quasi nova existens, infici habuit a corruptione personae; postmodum vero quasi inveterata, ex nova corruptione non recipit novam infectionem. — Defectus etiam est ex parte *agentis*, quia nullus est post primum hominem, cuius transgressio respiciat obligationem *naturae*, sed obligationem *personae*[^18]. Hinc est, quod talis culpa non habet inficere carnem coniunctam. — Defectus etiam est ex parte *proprietatis intensibilis*. « Illa enim, quorum impositio est in termino, non habent recipere maius et minus », sicut vult Philosophus[^19]. Foeditas autem carnis, secundum quod est principium contractionis originalis, ortum habet ex carentia originalis iustitiae; et quia carentia illa nuditas quaedam est, et nudo non est reperire magis nudum[^20], sicut originalis iustitiae nuditas non recipit magis et minus, sic nec carnis foeditas.

Et sic patet, quod ex parte *foeditatis carnis* originale non habet intendi vel augmentari in eodem vel in diversis, nec ex parte *concupiscentiae*, vel[^21] *carentia debitae iustitiae*, sicut ostensum est; nec sunt plura concurrentia ad originale. Manifestum est igitur, quod originale peccatum in omnibus, in quibus reperitur, habet esse aequaliter; et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Anselmo, quod natura per personam efficitur magis peccatrix; dicendum, quod *natura* dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo natura dicitur « vis insita rebus, ex similibus similia procreans[^22] »; alio modo dicitur natura ipsum *commune*. His duobus modis distinguitur natura contra personam. Et cum dicitur, quod natura corrumpit personam, accipitur natura pro vi propagativa, et corruptio personae dicitur illa quae respicit voluntatem rationalem. Cum autem dicit Anselmus, quod natura efficitur per personam magis peccatrix; accipit naturam pro *communi*, prout consideratur in supposito — et hoc patet per exemplum suum, quod dicit[^23]: sicut Adam peccante, peccat homo, sic Adam magis peccante, magis peccat homo — et hoc modo natura non habet corrumpi solum per peccatum originale, sed etiam per peccatum actuale. Ex hoc igitur non sequitur, quod originale habeat esse maius et intensius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum malum est in summo; dicendum, quod est *summum simpliciter* et *summum in genere*[^24]; et quamvis non contingat, reperiri summum malum simpliciter, est tamen reperire malum, quod est summum in *proprio genere*, sicut videmus aliquem ita privatum visu, quod non potest esse magis. Sic et in proposito potest intelligi, quod originale simpliciter privat iustitiam originalem; et ideo eius infectio est in termino. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi non esset in summo, non tamen sequitur, quod possit intendi, quia potest esse defectus ex parte *susceptibilis*[^25], vel ex parte *agentis*; et utrumque hic deficit, sicut supra ostensum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod concupiscentia potest crescere; dicendum, quod verum est *intensive*, sed non *extensive*. Illud tamen crementum[^26] nihil facit ad originale peccatum, cum non sit nisi vel ex complexione, vel ex assuefactione, sicut ostensum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod foeditas carnis potest esse maior; dicendum, quod etsi foeditas carnis, prout est corruptio *poenalis*, intendatur et crescat, sicut patet in leprosis et seminifluis et aliis foedis infirmitatibus oppressis, prout tamen ipsa est principium originalis, aequaliter habet reperiri in singulis, quia ab uno solo et primo fonte procedit.

<!-- page 790 -->

5. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod proprietas intensior est, cum appropinquat suae origini; dicendum, quod illud verum est de proprietate, quae quidem dicit *naturam* et *positionem*, et de illa, quae habet *continuari* cum sua origine, sicut est in virtute movente et luminis effusione; aliter non habet veritatem, sicut patet: nam candela inflammata ab alia ita bene inflammabit, sicut inflammabat illa. Utrumque enim deficit in proposito, tum quia illa carnis foeditas plus dicit rationem privationis quam positionis; tum etiam quia illius foeditatis transfusio est per generationem, in qua generatum primum et secundum habent eandem vim, quam habebat generans primum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una anima habet meliora naturalia quam alia; dicendum, quod etsi hoc verum sit et concedendum, tamen, quantum pertinet ad puritatem innocentiae, omnes animae aequales essent[^27]; et quia illius privationem directe respicit originale, hinc est, quod licet alia naturalia sint excellentiora, non tamen propter hoc intenditur corruptio originalis culpae. Quando enim dicitur, quod tanto peior est corruptio, quanto melior est natura; hoc intelligitur secundum illud, secundum quod natura per vitium corrumpitur; aliter enim non habet veritatem, quia frequenter ille qui habet meliora naturalia, non habet ita gravia peccata, sicut ille qui habet minus bona, et[^28] in eodem genere peccati.

english:
### ARTICLE II.
### *On the quantity of original sin.*

Consequently, concerning the second article, it is asked about the quantity of original [sin]. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked about original [sin] itself under the character of *continuous* quantity[^1], whether one original [sin] can be greater than another.

Secondly it is asked as to the character of *discrete* quantity, namely whether one is to posit one original [sin], or several.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether original sin is found in all equally.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether original [sin] is found in all equally. And that it is, it seems:

1. Anselm, *On Original Sin*, chapter twenty-seventh[^2]: « Original sin I judge to be equal in all ».

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] *by reason*. Original sin is the lack of due justice, as has often been said[^3]; but anyone is simply stripped and deprived of that original justice: therefore if all are equally deprived, they are equally infected with the original stain: therefore in whomever original sin is found, it is found equally.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown *by its cause*. Original sin is in us on account of Adam's disobedience; but Adam's disobedience was one and regarded all his posterity equally[^4]: therefore it seems that it made all equally culpable.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] *by punishment*. For all who have original guilt are punished equally, namely by the complete lack of the vision of God[^5]: if therefore the quantity of punishment corresponds to the quantity of guilt, it seems that, if there is equality in the lack of vision, there is equality in the corruption of original [sin].

5. Likewise, this same thing is proved *by the annexed concupiscence*. For original sin renders one prone to every evil through concupiscence — whence when the law prohibits concupiscence, it is said to prohibit every evil[^6] — therefore original sin corrupts each one universally. But universal corruption is not found according to greater and less, but rather in all in whom it is found it is found at the limit: therefore it seems that original guilt cannot be greater in one person than in another.

6. Likewise, if original [sin] is greater in one than in another, either this is from the act of the *parent*, or from the act of the *offspring*. From the act of the *parent* it cannot be; for, as

<!-- page 788 -->

has been proved above[^7], the sin of the parent does not pass into the offspring. But from the act of the *offspring* it cannot be, as is plain: therefore it seems that in no way is original [sin] found more intensely in one than in another.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception*[^8]: « Just as on account of nature a corrupt person is born, so nature through the person is made more sinful »; but the sin which infects nature is original sin: therefore it seems that original sin in someone can become greater and more intense.

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by reason*. No evil is at the highest [degree], because nothing is supremely evil[^9]; but original sin is an evil: therefore it is not at the highest. But what is below the highest can be intensified and increased: therefore original sin is intensifiable, therefore it can be found greater in one than in another.

3. Likewise, original sin is concupiscence[^10]; but concupiscence can be intensified, just as it can also be remitted, and is sometimes intensified, as is plain by experience: therefore it seems that original sin can be intensified, so that it is greater in one than in another, or even more intense in the same [subject] according to diverse states.

4. Likewise, the foulness of the flesh is the reason why the soul contracts original [sin][^11]; but the flesh is not infected at the highest [degree], and what is not infected at the highest, while it passes through the way of infection, can be infected more and more: if therefore our flesh passes through the way of infection while it is propagated, it seems that it is infected more and more, and through this original sin is daily augmented.

5. Likewise, every property, the more it approaches its cause, is the more intense and stronger, and the more it is removed [from it], the weaker[^12]; but the corruption of original [sin] is produced from Adam as from a source-principle and root: therefore it seems that the nearer one is to Adam, the more intense original guilt is in him.

6. Likewise, one soul has better natural endowments than another, as was held in the preceding distinction[^13]; but corruption is the worse, the more it is in a better nature, as Augustine says and reason manifestly shows, on account of the dignity of that which is corrupted: therefore the corruption of original [sin] is worse in one soul than in another; and if this is so, it seems that the guilt is more intense.

### Conclusion.

> Original sin is found in all equally.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as, if Adam had stood, all would equally be innocent, so now, since Adam sinned, all are made equally sinners; and so original guilt is found in all equally, such that it is not greater in one than in another, nor does it even have it [in its power] to be intensified in the same subject.

For the understanding of this it is to be noted that these three things concur in original sin, namely the lack of due justice and concupiscence and the foulness of the flesh; and the first is essential to original [sin] itself, the second material and the third causal, as was explained above[^14]. If therefore original [sin] ought to be augmented, it would have to be intensified from one of these; but since it has [it in its power] to be intensified through none of these, it has [it in its power] to be found equally in all. — As to the *lack* of due justice it cannot be intensified. For this lack cannot be greater in one than in another except for a threefold cause: either because there is a *stronger obligation*, or because there is there a *greater privation*, or because the *mode of depriving is more detestable*. By none of these modes is the lack greater in one human than in another. For there is not a *stronger obligation*, because all are obligated equally[^15] in Adam; nor a *greater privation*, because by the same gift, namely of original justice, all are stripped by original guilt; nor a *more detestable mode of depriving*, because all are deprived by the one disobedience of Adam; and so original [sin] by reason of the *lack of due justice* does not receive more and less, but is in all equally.

Likewise neither as to *concupiscence* does it have [it in its power] to be intensified. For if appetite or concupiscence with respect to some delectable [thing] is intensified in someone, this can be in three ways: either from *complexion*, or from *habituation*, or from the *breaking of the restraining bond*. In the first way concupiscence can undoubtedly be increased, as is plain of the concupiscence of the flesh, which

<!-- page 789 -->

burns more in the choleric and sanguine than in the melancholic; but such intensity does nothing toward guilt; for it is not culpable, but natural or penal. — Likewise also in the second way concupiscence can be intensified[^16] in the same human, as is plain in one who is habituated to being lustful and to eating good food, who is more prone and more ardently concupisces than one who has not tasted such things. But this intensity does nothing toward original sin, but rather toward actual [sin], because original sin is not called concupiscence in any mode whatever, but only insofar as it is contracted from origin. — In the third way it cannot be intensified, but has [it in its power] to be found equally in all, for the reason that that restraint of original justice is broken in all by the merit of Adam's guilt. And since according to that third mode the quantity of original [sin] is attended to on the part of concupiscence, hence it is that as to *concupiscence* original guilt is found equally in all in whom it is.

Likewise as to the *foulness* which is in the flesh, original [sin] cannot be greater and less; and this is plain. For that some property be intensified, an aptitude for intensification is required both on the part of the *receivable* [subject], and on the part of the *property* which is intensified, and also on the part of the *agent*; and if any of these be lacking, that property does not have [it in its power] to be intensified, as is plain to one considering. But all these are lacking in the case at hand. For there is a defect on the part of the *receivable* [subject]. For just as a new mirror is infected by a menstruating woman, but after it has grown old, from some aspect it does not receive a new infection; so human nature, in its origin[^17] existing as if new, was capable of being infected by the corruption of the person; but afterward, as if grown old, it does not receive a new infection from a new corruption. — There is also a defect on the part of the *agent*, because there is no one after the first human whose transgression regards the obligation of *nature*, but the obligation of the *person*[^18]. Hence it is that such guilt does not have [it in its power] to infect the conjoined flesh. — There is also a defect on the part of the *intensifiable property*. « For those things whose imposition is at the limit do not have [it in their power] to receive greater and less », as the Philosopher holds[^19]. But the foulness of the flesh, insofar as it is the principle of the contraction of original [sin], has its origin from the lack of original justice; and because that lack is a certain nakedness, and of the naked there is no finding [anything] more naked[^20], just as the nakedness of original justice does not receive greater and less, so neither does the foulness of the flesh.

And so it is plain that on the part of the *foulness of the flesh* original [sin] does not have [it in its power] to be intensified or augmented in the same or in diverse [subjects], nor on the part of *concupiscence*, or[^21] [on the part of] the *lack of due justice*, as has been shown; nor are there several [things] concurring in original [sin]. It is manifest therefore that original sin in all in whom it is found has [it in its power] to be equally; and the reasons showing this are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning Anselm, that nature through the person is made more sinful; it must be said that *nature* is taken in two ways. In one way nature is called « a force implanted in things, procreating like from like[^22] »; in another way nature is called the *common* [thing] itself. By these two modes nature is distinguished against the person. And when it is said that nature corrupts the person, nature is taken for the propagative force, and the corruption of the person is called that which regards the rational will. But when Anselm says that nature is made more sinful through the person, he takes nature for the *common* [thing], insofar as it is considered in the supposit — and this is plain by his own example, which he gives[^23]: just as, when Adam sins, the human sins, so, when Adam sins more, the human sins more — and in this mode nature does not have [it in its power] to be corrupted only by original sin, but also by actual sin. From this therefore it does not follow that original [sin] has [it in its power] to be greater and more intense.

2. To that which is objected, that no evil is at the highest [degree]; it must be said that there is the *highest simply* and the *highest in a genus*[^24]; and although it does not happen that the highest evil is found simply, yet there is found an evil which is highest in its *own genus*, as we see someone so deprived of sight that he cannot be [deprived] more. So also in the case at hand it can be understood that original [sin] simply deprives [one of] original justice; and therefore its infection is at the limit. — Yet it could be said that even if it were not at the highest, it still does not follow that it can be intensified, because there can be a defect on the part of the *receivable* [subject][^25], or on the part of the *agent*; and both are lacking here, as was shown above.

3. To that which is objected, that concupiscence can grow; it must be said that it is true *intensively*, but not *extensively*. Yet that increase[^26] does nothing toward original sin, since it is only either from complexion, or from habituation, as has been shown.

4. To that which is objected, that the foulness of the flesh can be greater; it must be said that even if the foulness of the flesh, insofar as it is a *penal* corruption, be intensified and grow, as is plain in lepers and those with a flux of seed and others oppressed by foul infirmities, yet insofar as it is itself the principle of original [sin], it has [it in its power] to be found equally in individuals, because it proceeds from one sole and first source.

<!-- page 790 -->

5. To that which is objected, that a property is more intense when it approaches its origin; it must be said that that is true of a property which indeed states a *nature* and a *position*, and of that which has [it in its power] to be *continued* with its origin, as is the case in the moving power and the effusion of light; otherwise it does not hold true, as is plain: for a candle kindled from another will kindle just as well as that one was kindling. For both [conditions] are lacking in the case at hand, both because that foulness of the flesh states the character of privation rather than of position; and also because the transfusion of that foulness is through generation, in which the first and second generated have the same force which the first generator had.

6. To that which is objected, that one soul has better natural endowments than another; it must be said that even if this be true and is to be conceded, yet, as far as pertains to the purity of innocence, all souls would be equal[^27]; and because original [sin] directly regards the privation of that [purity], hence it is that, although other natural endowments be more excellent, yet on this account the corruption of original guilt is not intensified. For when it is said that corruption is the worse, the more the nature is better; this is understood according to that [respect] according to which the nature is corrupted by the vice; for otherwise it does not hold true, because frequently he who has better natural endowments does not have such grave sins as he who has lesser goods, even[^28] in the same genus of sin.

la: De divisione quantitatis in continuam et discretam cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto.

en: On the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cfr. Aristotle, *Categories* [*On the Predicaments*], the chapter on Quantity.

la: Ubi textus originalis sic sonat: « Quod [originale peccatum] propter praedictas aestimo rationes in omnibus infantibus naturaliter propagatis esse aequale ». Similis huic sententia habetur ibid. c. 24. in fine.

en: Where the original text runs thus: « That [original sin], for the aforesaid reasons, I judge to be equal in all infants naturally propagated ». A similar sentence to this is found in the same place c. 24, at the end.

la: Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — De hoc arg. cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 24.

en: Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. and a. 3. q. 1. — On this argument cfr. Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 24.

la: Anselm., loc. cit. eandem rationem affert his verbis: Sicut peccatum Adae, quod est causa, cur [infantes] nascantur in illo, ad omnes pertinet aequaliter.

en: Anselm, in the cited place, brings the same reason in these words: Just as the sin of Adam, which is the cause why [infants] are born in it, pertains to all equally.

la: Anselm., loc. cit. c. 27: Et omnes, qui in illo [originali] solo moriuntur, aequaliter damnari [aestimo]. — Paulo inferius voci *visionis* edd. adiiciunt *Dei*.

en: Anselm, in the cited place c. 27: And all who die in it [original sin] alone, [I judge] to be equally damned. — A little below, to the word *visionis* the editions add *Dei*.

la: Secundum Glossam in Rom. 7, 7. supra pag. 721, nota 2. allatam. Quoad minorem subsumtam considerentur quae Gilb. Porret. in libro Sex Princip. c. ult. ait: Huiusmodi impositio [vocis] in termino facta est, ultra quem transgredi non licet, quemadmodum in superlativis; etenim albissimus et nigerrimus et huiusmodi sine *amplius* sunt et *minus*, eo quod huiusmodi impositio in termino est, ultra quem porrigi impossibile est et citra permanere. Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 9. — Pro *maius et minus* edd., excepta 1, cum codd. T aa bb et aliis *magis et minus*.

en: According to the Gloss on Rom. 7, 7, adduced above p. 721, note 2. As to the minor [premise] subsumed, let one consider what Gilbert de la Porrée says in the book *Six Principles*, the last chapter: An imposition of this kind [of a word] is made at the limit, beyond which it is not permitted to transgress, just as in superlatives; for *whitest* and *blackest* and the like are without [a] *more* and [a] *less*, for the reason that an imposition of this kind is at the limit, beyond which it is impossible to extend and short of which to remain. Cfr. above p. 111, note 9. — For *maius et minus* ("greater and less") the editions, except 1, with codd. T aa bb and others [read] *magis et minus* ("more and less").

la: Hic a. 1. q. 1. — Hoc arg. adducitur ab Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 24.

en: Here a. 1. q. 1. — This argument is adduced by Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 24.

la: Cap. 27: Sicut persona propter naturam peccatrix nascitur, ita natura per personam magis peccatrix redditur.

en: Chapter 27: Just as the person is born sinful on account of nature, so nature is rendered more sinful through the person.

la: Ut monstratum est supra d. 30. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As was shown above d. 30. a. 2. q. 1.

la: De quo vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. 2.

en: On which see above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. and dub. 1. 2.

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 17.

en: Cfr. the *Book of Causes*, proposition 17.

la: Dub. 6. — Quoad dictum Augustini vide supra pag. 790, nota 5. — Circa finem arg. pro *in una anima quam in altera* (codd. T bb cc et ed. 1 *alia*) cod. aa *in uno quam in altero*.

en: Dub. 6. — As to the saying of Augustine see above p. 790, note 5. — Near the end of the argument, for *in una anima quam in altera* ("in one soul than in another") (codd. T bb cc and ed. 1 [read] *alia*) cod. aa [reads] *in uno quam in altero* ("in one than in another").

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *obligabantur*, codd. H Y aa *obligabamur*, alii codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *obligamur*. Cum in subnexis omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 exhibeant *nudantur* (Vat. tantum cum edd. 3, 4 *nudamur*), cum cod. K posuimus *obligantur*.

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *obligabantur*, codd. H Y aa *obligabamur*, other codices with the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 *obligamur*. Since in what follows all the codices and edd. 1, 2 exhibit *nudantur* (the Vatican [edition] only, with edd. 3, 4, [reads] *nudamur*), with cod. K we have put *obligantur*.

la: Cod. T addit *et remitti*.

en: Cod. T adds *et remitti*.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *in statu primordiali* (ed. 2 *primordio*).

en: The editions, except 1, [read] *in statu primordiali* ("in the primordial state") (ed. 2 *primordio*).

la: Vat. cum ed. 1 sic: *respiciat nisi obligationem personae*, codd. V Z et edd. 2, 3: *respiciat obligationem personae*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 [reads] thus: *respiciat nisi obligationem personae*; codd. V Z and edd. 2, 3: *respiciat obligationem personae*.

la: Intellige hic Gilbert. Porretanum, cuius verba supra attulimus pag. 787, nota 6. — Pro *imposito* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *potentia*.

en: Understand here Gilbert de la Porrée, whose words we adduced above p. 787, note 6. — For *imposito* the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *potentia*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3.

en: Cfr. above p. 111, note 3.

la: Vat. *sincerius* nec.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *sincerius* [for] *nec*.

la: De hac definitione vide tom. 1. pag. 134, nota 10.

en: On this definition see vol. 1, p. 134, note 10.

la: De Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 23: Quia cum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota 5. Ibid. c. 27: Quia cum peccat persona quaelibet, peccat homo.

en: *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 23: Because when Adam sinned, the human sinned. Cfr. above p. 720, note 5. In the same place c. 27: Because when any person whatever sins, the human sins.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.). — In fine huius propos. post *esse magis* codd. L O adiungunt *caecus*.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, V. *Metaphysics* text 21 (IV. c. 16). — At the end of this proposition, after *esse magis* codd. L O add *caecus* ("blind").

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum paucis codd. voci *susceptibilis* praefigunt *sui*. Paulo superius edd., excepta 1, pro *possit intendi* substituunt *posset intendi*.

en: The editions, except 1, with a few codices prefix *sui* to the word *susceptibilis*. A little above, the editions, except 1, for *possit intendi* substitute *posset intendi*.

la: Vat. *incrementum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *incrementum*.

la: Codd. aa ee omittunt *et*, pro quo cod. A substituit *etiam*, Vat. *et etiam*.

en: Codd. aa ee omit *et*, for which cod. A substitutes *etiam*; the Vatican [edition] [reads] *et etiam*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Secundum principia in praecedentibus tractata solutio utriusque quaestionis huius articuli non habet difficultatem.

De quaest. agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 6, m. 9. a. 1-3. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 32. q. unica n. 6. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 82. a. 4. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 32. a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 3. q. incid. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 30. q. 1, d. 32. q. 2.

**II.** De seq. (2.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 8. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 31. a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 112. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. a. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** According to the principles treated in what precedes, the solution of both questions of this article presents no difficulty.

On the [first] question treat: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 6, m. 9. a. 1-3. — Scotus, II. *Sent.* d. 32. q. unica n. 6. — St. Thomas, II. *Sent.* d. 32. q. 1. a. 3; *Summa* I. II. q. 82. a. 4. — B. Albert, II. *Sent.* d. 32. a. 4; *Summa* p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 3. q. incid. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, II. *Sent.* d. 32. q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. *Sent.* d. 30. q. 1, d. 32. q. 2.

**II.** On the following (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, in the cited place m. 8. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; *Summa* in the cited place a. 2. — B. Albert, II. *Sent.* d. 31. a. 3; *Summa* p. II. tr. 17. q. 112. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. a. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 54857–55061), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Solutio (Ad obiecta 1–6), SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 787–790, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 809–812). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. The IA OCR badly fragmented the Respondeo column-flow and dropped the q1-share footers on p.790 (note 5 + the *et*-variant note), which were recovered from the PDF.

**Folded ARTICULUS II opener (Override §5).** The short article-listing (`Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeritur de quantitate originalis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo… quantitatis continuae… Secundo… quantitatis discretae…`, raw 54857–54864, p. 787) is folded into this q1 chunk as the ARTICULUS II head — NO standalone d33-a2-divisio chunk. The q1 body opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum originale in omnibus reperiatur aequaliter` (alignment check: confirmed verbatim) immediately follows.

**Boundary.** This chunk = ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO I only. It ENDS at raw 55061, after SCHOLION items I–II (the commentator roll for both questions of the article). The `QUAESTIO II.` header at raw 55064 (*Utrum ponendum sit peccatum originale unum, vel plura*, body "Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere unum originale, vel plura") and everything from there onward is d33-a2-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 787–790 (running heads `DIST. XXXIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`).
- p. 787 (ART II opener + QUAESTIO I opener + fundamenta 1–6 begin): 6 footers. Footers 1–5 received from a1-q2 (which claimed no p.787 footer — the entire block was forwarded). Footer 6 (Gloss in Rom. 7, 7 / Gilb. Porret.) anchors at fundamentum 5 `prohibere dicitur omne malum`. → [^1]–[^6].
- p. 788 (fundamentum 6 tail + Sed contra 1–6 + Conclusio + Respondeo first part): 10 footers → [^7]–[^16].
- p. 789 (Respondeo continued: concupiscentia / foeditas / Epilogus + Ad obiecta 1–4): 10 footers → [^17]–[^26]. (Quaracchi numbered notes 1–10 across both columns of p.789; notes 1–6 anchor in the Respondeo tail [primordio, personae, Philosophus, nudum, vel, procreans], notes 7–10 in Ad-obiecta 1–3 [exemplum/dicit, summum in genere, susceptibilis, crementum].)
- p. 790 (Ad obiecta 5–6 + SCHOLION I–II): q1 holds two footer anchors in Ad 6 — `aequales essent` → p.790 note 5 (`Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.`) = [^27], and `et… in eodem genere peccati` → the *et*-variant note (`Codd. aa ee omittunt et…`) = [^28]. The SCHOLION carries NO numbered footers (pure commentator/reference roll). The remaining p.790 footers (notes 1, 3, 4 of the left block + note 6 Psalm) belong to QUAESTIO II and are forwarded to d33-a2-q2.

**Hand-off received.** From d33-a1-q2 (shared printed p.787): the entire p.787 footer block. Anchored here as [^1] (continua/discreta — Aristot. Praedicam., at the ART II opener `quantitatis continuae`), [^2] (Anselm c.27 textus originalis — fundamentum 1), [^3] (Dist. cross-refs + Anselm de Conceptu — fundamentum 2), [^4] (Anselm eandem rationem — fundamentum 3), [^5] (Anselm c.27 Et omnes — fundamentum 4). Footer 6 (Gloss Rom. 7,7) is p.787's own → [^6].

**Hand-off forwarded to d33-a2-q2.** The QUAESTIO II header (raw 55064, *Utrum ponendum sit peccatum originale unum, vel plura*) and all of p.790's QUAESTIO II footer share: left-block note 1 (`Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 sunt` — q2 arg 1), note 2 (`Codd. aa ee omittunt et` — NOTE: this is q1's [^28] *et*-variant; the q2 arg-4 `et status` variant is distinct — verify at q2 build), note 3 (`Hic c. 2…` — q2 arg 1 Magister Alioquin), note 4 (`Aristot., V. Topic. c. 3.` — q2 arg 4), and note 6 (`Psalm. 50. 7. — Glossa interlinearis` — q2 Sed contra 1). q2 begins on p.790 right column.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 790, raw 55056–55061), items I and II. `has_scholion: true`. Item I treats `solutio utriusque quaestionis huius articuli non habet difficultatem` + the commentator roll for the first question; item II is the commentator roll for the following (2nd) question. Per Override §5, q2 may legitimately lack its own scholion since this article scholion covers both questions (`pro utraque quaest.`).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 787–790 read top→bottom. Seams: p.787/788 (inside fundamentum 6 — `Ex actu parentis esse non potest; nam, sicut` / `probatum est supra`), p.788/789 (inside Respondeo concupiscentia first mode — `quae` / `magis fervet in cholericis`), p.789/790 (inside Ad obiectum 4 — `…procedit.` to p.790 Ad 5) are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found.

**[?] flags.** **RESOLVED (2026-05-31, d.31–d.40 polish).** [^28] attribution confirmed: the p.790 *et*-variant note (`Codd. aa ee omittunt et, pro quo cod. A substituit etiam, Vat. et etiam`) belongs to **q1's Ad-6** `et… in eodem genere peccati`. The IA djvu OCR (raw line ~55055) prints the footer superscript glued directly to this *et* — `…sicut ille qui habet minus bona, et'' in eodem genere peccati.` — placing the marker unambiguously on q1's Ad-6 *et*. QUAESTIO II's arg-4 `et status` carries no such variant note (its own p.790 footers are the *sunt* / Magister-*Alioquin* / *Aristot.* / Psalm notes, none touching *et*). No body text was at risk; [^28] is correct as placed.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0