title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I.
#### *De perfectione cognitionis quantum ad numerum cognoscibilium.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus cognoscat alia a se.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem Deus cognoscat alia a se[^14], ostenditur auctoritate et ratione.[^15]

1. *Auctoritate* sic: Psalmus[^1]: *Qui plantavit aurem non audiet? aut qui finxit oculum non considerat?* quasi dicat, hoc est impossibile, quod det aliis potentiam cognoscendi, et ipse non cognoscat.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici vigesimo tertio[^2]: *Domino Deo antequam crearentur omnia sunt agnita, sic* <!-- page 685 -->*et post perfectum respicit omnia*: ergo si non creat se, sed aliud, non tantum cognoscit se, sed etiam aliud.

3. Item, hoc probatur ratione ostensiva sic: omne producens res secundum ordinem et libertatem producit eas praecognoscens[^3] — si enim producit ordinate, necesse est, quod producat secundum sapientiam; rursum, si secundum libertatem, necesse est, quod secundum sapientiam propriam, non alienam — ergo in ipso est omnium cognitio.

4. Item, in entibus est status[^4], ergo pari ratione et in cognoscibilibus; sed primum ens, in quo est status, est principium, a quo est omnis entitas, et sine quo nihil est, nec aliquid est nisi ab eo: ergo eadem ratione in primo cognoscente, si status est, necesse est, quod ab ipso sit omnis cognitio, et quod per ipsum omnia cognoscantur, et sine ipso nihil. Si ergo «*propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis*»: patet etc.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile, quia si non cognoscit aliud a se, aut ergo quia non potest, aut quia non vult. Non quia non vult, quia in Deo voluntas non praecedit cognitionem: ergo quia non potest. Sed omne cognoscens, quod non potest cognoscere aliquid, quod est cognoscibile, habet cognitionem deficientem et arctatam; quod impossibile est esse in Deo: ergo etc.

6. Item, nihil potest Deus, nisi quod novit, alioquin aliquid posset ignorans, quod absurdum est: ergo si non novit aliquid aliud a se[^5], nec in se potest. Cum non sit supra se, ergo nihil in toto mundo potest: ergo Deus est impotentissimus, quod est absurdissimum dicere.

**Sed contra:**

1. Opponitur secundum rationem Philosophi in duodecimo *Metaphysicae*[^6]: «*Intelligibile est perfectio intellectus*»: ergo si Deus intelligit aliud a se, intellectus eius perficitur ab alio; et si hoc, tunc sequitur triplex inconveniens: primum, quod eius cognitio vilescit, cum perficiatur a re minus nobili, quam sit Deus: secundum, quod eius cognitio vel ipse Deus transmutatur — omne enim quod ab alio perficitur, habet potentiam passivam, quae est principium transmutandi; et tertium inconveniens est, quod Deus non sit sua actio, cum actio sit a perfectione et Deus alio perficiatur etc.

2. Item, si Deus cognoscit aliud a se, cum omne quod est in Deo[^7] sit idem quod Deus, necesse est, quod illud quod cognoscit, sit extra Deum: ergo si cognoscit aliud, cognoscit aliquid extra se. Et ex hoc similiter oritur triplex inconveniens, scilicet quod cognitio eius sit indigens exteriori, sit etiam transmutabilis, et quod sit aliud quam ipse; quae omnia sunt inconvenientia.

3. Item, ostenditur illud idem per rationem cognoscendi, quoniam ratio cognoscendi est ipsa veritas; sed veritas idem est quod rei entitas, ut dicit Augustinus[^8]: ergo nihil cognoscitur a Deo nisi ens. Sed Deus nihil cognoscit nisi ab aeterno: ergo nihil cognoscitur ab ipso nisi ens, quod est ab aeterno; sed tale est unum solum, scilicet ipse Deus: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratio cognoscendi est assimilatio[^9] — ubi enim est cognitio, necesse est, quod ibi sit assimilatio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile — ergo ubi summa cognitio, ibi summa assimilatio; sed Dei cognitio est summa et perfectissima: ergo debet attendi secundum summam assimilationem. Sed nihil summe assimilatur Deo nisi ipse: ergo solum se ipsum cognoscit.

5. Item, videtur quod nulla necessitas sit ponere, Deum cognoscere alia a se, quoniam, sicut potentia se habet ad productionem, ita intelligentia ad cognitionem: sed Dei potentia, etiamsi nihil producat, non est minus potens: ergo si intelligentia Dei nihil aliud a se cognoscat, nihilominus est summe intelligens.

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6. Item, bonitas creaturae comparata ad bonitatem Creatoris est sicut punctus ad lineam, ergo similiter veritas ad veritatem; sed si intelligatur punctus amoveri a linea, non est linea minor nec imperfectior: ergo si Deus veritatem suam cognoscit sine veritate creaturae, nihilominus sua cognitio perfecta est.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus cognoscit aliud a se, at non per aliud, sed per se.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod pium et necessarium est dicere, quod Deus aliud a se cognoscat: pium quidem, quia omnis rectus animus hoc dicit, quia non latet Deum quod cognoscit noster animus; necessarium, quoniam non potest opus latere sapientissimum opificem. Et ideo oppositum dicere est impium et impossibile.

Et propterea ad intelligentiam obiectorum notandum, quod cognoscere aliud est dupliciter: aut per aliud a se cognoscente, aut per se. Quando cognoscens cognoscit aliud et per aliud, tunc verum est, quod perfectionem habet aliunde, et tunc eius intellectus est in potentia et recipit aliunde perfectionem et ideo additionem et transmutationem, et hoc omnino impossibile est circa Deum. Est iterum aliud cognoscere per se; et tunc cognoscens est actus[^10] respectu cognoscibilis, et tunc non recipit perfectionem a cognoscibili, sed magis e converso. Et hoc modo ponimus Deum cognoscere aliud a se per se ipsum.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Et sic non procedit prima ratio, sed secundum primam viam, et intellexit ita Philosophus, si verum dixit.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod si Deus cognoscit aliud a se, ergo aliquid extra se; dicendum, quod cognoscere aliquid extra se est tripliciter: aut per aliquid conceptum[^11] ab extra, et sic dependet cognitio ab extrinseco, et sic non est possibile ponere in Deo; aut cognoscere aliquid extra, quia aspectus cognoscentis deflectitur extra, sicut cognoscit Angelus; aut quia illud quod est aliud et diversum, habet ortum ab intra, et ita quod est extra cognoscitur per omnino intrinsecum, et hoc modo cognoscit Deus, scilicet per exemplar, quod est idem quod ipse, a quo res cognoscuntur. Et hoc modo nihil valet obiectio.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, quod ab aeterno fuit unum solum ens; dicendum, quod duplex est rei esse, scilicet in se, et in sua causa, id est in proprio genere, et in exemplari. Et ad cognitionem rei sufficit existentia eius in causa sive in exemplari; et quia per exemplar repraesentatur sicut futura est in proprio genere, ideo per existentiam in exemplari omnino cognoscitur, sicut futura est, nec aliter cognoscitur, postquam facta est. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod ab aeterno fuit unum solum ens; dicendum, quod verum est, in proprio genere sive in esse actuali; multa tamen fuerunt in causa, et esse illud erat ratio cognoscendi secundum utrumque modum essendi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto de assimilatione, dicendum, sicut supra dictum fuit in quaestione de ideis[^12], quod ad cognitionem requiritur assimilatio, non per convenientiam in genere vel specie, sed secundum rationem exprimendi. Et quoniam divina veritas una et summa expressione exprimit se et alia, ideo summa assimilatio est, non tantum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu aliorum. Et ita patet illud.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia dicitur perfecta, etiam si nihil faciat, ergo etc; dicendum, quod non est simile de actu faciendi respectu potentiae, et sciendi respectu intelligentiae. Nam facere est actus ut actus et ut egrediens, qui non facit perfectionem, sed consequitur et attestatur: sed scire est actus ut habitus, qui significatur ut perfectio potentiae[^13]. Quoniam igitur divina intelligentia est perfectissima, ideo non tantum cognoscit aliqua, sed omne quod potest cognosci, non autem facit omne quod potest fieri.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod veritas creaturae nihil facit ad primam veritatem etc; dicendum, quod verum est, et ideo aeque nobilis et perfecta erat prima veritas ante creationem veritatum aliarum, sicut post. Sed tamen ponere, quod aliqua veritas sit, et non sit a Veritate aeterna, est ponere primam veritatem non esse summam; sic ponere, aliquam veritatem esse, et non esse cognitam, tollit rationem perfectae veritatis, ut est ratio cognoscendi. Et ideo patet, quod de perfectione summae veritatis est cognitio creaturae, sicut et potentia producendi.

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english:
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### Article I.
#### *On the perfection of cognition as regards the number of knowables.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether God knows things other than himself.*

That God knows things other than himself[^14] is shown by authority and by reason.[^15]

1. *By authority* thus: the Psalm[^1]: *"He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? or he that formed the eye, shall he not consider?"* — as if to say: it is impossible that he should give to others the power of knowing, and himself not know.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 23[^2]: *"To the Lord God, before they were created, all things were known; thus also <!-- page 685 -->after their completion he beholds all"*: therefore if he creates not himself, but another, he knows not only himself, but also another.

3. Likewise, this is proved by ostensive reason thus: every producer of things according to order and freedom produces them by foreknowing[^3] them — for if he produces in an ordered way, it is necessary that he produce according to wisdom; again, if according to freedom, it is necessary that [it be] according to his own wisdom, not another's — therefore in him is the cognition of all things.

4. Likewise, in beings there is a stopping-point[^4]; therefore by parity of reasoning also in knowables; but the first being, in which there is a stopping-point, is the principle from which is all entity, and without which nothing is, nor is anything except from him: therefore by the same reasoning in the first knower, if there is a stopping-point, it is necessary that from him be all cognition, and that through him all things be known, and without him nothing. If therefore "*on account of which a thing is such, that itself [is so] more*": it is plain etc.

5. Likewise, this same is shown through impossibility, for if he does not know another than himself, [it is] either because he cannot, or because he does not will [to]. Not because he does not will, since in God will does not precede cognition: therefore because he cannot. But every knower who cannot know something which is knowable has a deficient and constricted cognition; which it is impossible to be in God: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, God can [do] nothing except what he knows, otherwise something ignorant could [do something], which is absurd: therefore if he does not know anything other than himself[^5], neither in himself can he [do it]. Since he is not above himself, therefore he can [do] nothing in the whole world: therefore God is most powerless, which is most absurd to say.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is objected according to the reasoning of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* XII[^6]: "*The intelligible is the perfection of the intellect*": therefore if God understands another than himself, his intellect is perfected by another; and if so, then a threefold inconvenience follows: first, that his cognition becomes worthless, since it is perfected by a thing less noble than God is: second, that his cognition or God himself is changed — for everything which is perfected by another has a passive potency, which is the principle of being changed; and the third inconvenience is that God is not his own action, since action is from perfection and God is perfected by another, etc.

2. Likewise, if God knows another than himself, since everything which is in God[^7] is the same as God, it is necessary that what he knows be outside God: therefore if he knows another, he knows something outside himself. And from this likewise arises a threefold inconvenience, namely that his cognition is in need of an exterior [object], is also changeable, and that it is other than himself; all of which are inconveniences.

3. Likewise, the same is shown through the *ratio* of knowing, since the *ratio* of knowing is truth itself; but truth is the same as the entity of the thing, as Augustine says[^8]: therefore nothing is known by God except being. But God knows nothing except from eternity: therefore nothing is known by him except being which is from eternity; but such is one alone, namely God himself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the *ratio* of knowing is assimilation[^9] — for where there is cognition, it is necessary that there be assimilation of the knower to the knowable — therefore where [there is] supreme cognition, there [is] supreme assimilation; but God's cognition is supreme and most perfect: therefore it must be attended-to according to supreme assimilation. But nothing is supremely assimilated to God except himself: therefore he knows only himself.

5. Likewise, it seems that there is no necessity to posit that God knows things other than himself, since, just as power is related to production, so understanding [is related] to cognition: but God's power, even if it produces nothing, is no less powerful: therefore if God's understanding knows nothing other than himself, none-the-less he is supremely understanding.

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6. Likewise, the goodness of the creature compared to the goodness of the Creator is as a point to a line; therefore similarly truth [is to] truth; but if a point is conceived as removed from a line, the line is not lesser nor more imperfect: therefore if God knows his own truth without the truth of the creature, none-the-less his cognition is perfect.

### Conclusion.

> *God knows another than himself, but not through another, but through himself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that it is pious and necessary to say that God knows another than himself: pious indeed, because every right mind says this — that what our mind knows is not hidden from God; necessary, since the work cannot be hidden from the wisest workman. And therefore to say the opposite is impious and impossible.

And therefore for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that to know another is twofold: either through another distinct from the knower, or through oneself. When the knower knows another and through another, then it is true that he has perfection from elsewhere, and then his intellect is in potency and receives perfection from elsewhere, and therefore [is open to] addition and change; and this is altogether impossible regarding God. There is, again, [another way:] to know another through oneself; and then the knower is act[^10] with respect to the knowable, and then he does not receive perfection from the knowable, but rather conversely. And in this way we hold that God knows another than himself through himself.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* And so the first reasoning does not proceed [as objection], but [proceeds] according to the first way [described above], and so the Philosopher understood [it], if he spoke truly.

*To 2.* To that which is objected secondly, that if God knows another than himself, therefore something outside himself; it must be said that to know something outside oneself is in three ways: either through something conceived[^11] from outside, and so cognition depends on the extrinsic, and so it is not possible to posit [this] in God; or to know something outside, since the gaze of the knower is bent outward, as the Angel knows; or because that which is other and diverse has its origin from within, and so what is outside is known through that which is wholly intrinsic — and in this way God knows, namely through the exemplar, which is the same as himself, from which things are known. And in this way the objection is of no force.

*To 3.* To that which is objected thirdly, that from eternity there was one being only; it must be said that the being of a thing is twofold, namely in itself and in its cause, that is, in its proper genus, and in [its] exemplar. And for the cognition of a thing, its existence in [its] cause or in [its] exemplar suffices; and since it is represented through the exemplar as it will be in its proper genus, therefore through its existence in the exemplar it is wholly known as it is to-be, nor is it known otherwise after it has been made. As to what is therefore objected, that from eternity there was one being only; it must be said that this is true in the proper genus or in actual being; many things, however, were in [their] cause, and that being was the *ratio* of knowing according to either mode of being.

*To 4.* To that which is objected fourthly concerning assimilation, it must be said, as was said above in the question on ideas[^12], that for cognition assimilation is required, not through agreement in genus or species, but according to the *ratio* of expressing. And since the divine truth, by one and supreme expression, expresses itself and others, therefore [there is] supreme assimilation, not only with respect to itself, but also with respect to other things. And so that [argument] is plain.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that power is called perfect even if it does nothing, therefore etc; it must be said that the case of the act of making with respect to power is not similar to that of knowing with respect to understanding. For making is an act *as act* and *as going-out*, which does not make perfection, but follows and attests [it]: but to know is an act *as habit*, which is signified as perfection of [its] power[^13]. Since therefore divine understanding is most perfect, therefore it knows not only some things, but all that can be known — though it does not make all that can be made.

*To 6.* To that which is objected last, that the truth of the creature contributes nothing to the first truth etc; it must be said that this is true, and therefore the first truth was equally noble and perfect before the creation of other truths, as after. Yet to posit that any truth is, and is not from the eternal Truth, is to posit that the first truth is not the supreme; thus to posit that any truth is, and is not known, takes away the *ratio* of perfect truth as it is the *ratio* of knowing. And therefore it is plain that the cognition of the creature pertains to the perfection of supreme truth, as does the power of producing.

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en: Psalm 93[:9] [Vulgate; = Ps 94:9 in Hebrew numbering].

en: Verse 29 [Ecclesiasticus 23:29].

la: De hac propositione cfr. supra pag. 600, nota 2. — Verba *secundum ordinem* sic explicanda sunt: ordinate destinando in finem determinatum. De connexu inter ordinem et sapientiam, cuius mox fit mentio, respice illud Aristot., I. *Metaph.* c. 2: *Non enim ordinari (τάττεσθαι), sed ordinare (τάττειν) oportet sapientem.*

en: On this proposition cf. above p. 600, note 2. — The words *secundum ordinem* ("according to order") are to be explained thus: by ordainedly directing to a determinate end. On the connection between order and wisdom, of which mention is shortly made, see that of Aristotle, I *Metaphysics* c. 2: "*For it is not for the wise man to be ordered (τάττεσθαι), but to order (τάττειν).*"

la: Cfr. supra pag. 78, nota 2. — Post pauca pro *cognoscibilibus* plures codd. ut KVYZ *bene cognoscentibus*. — Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2.

en: Cf. above p. 78, note 2. — A little further on, in place of *cognoscibilibus* several codices such as KVYZ [read] *bene cognoscentibus*. — Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 2.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc hic addit *nec potest supra aliud a se*; cod. bb *non potest aliquid aliud a se*; in ceteris codd. et ed. 1 nihil additur. Mox pro *cum non sit* multi codd. *cum sit*; perperam.

en: The Vatican [edition] together with codex cc here adds *nec potest supra aliud a se* ("nor can he [do anything] above another than himself"); codex bb *non potest aliquid aliud a se* ("he cannot [do] anything other than himself"); in the other codices and edition 1 nothing is added. Soon, in place of *cum non sit* many codices [read] *cum sit*; wrongly.

la: Text. 51. (XI. c. 9.), ubi pro erronea sententia, quod primus intellectus non intelligit alia a se, haec affertur ratio I: *Deinde dilucidum, quod aliquid aliud honorabilius esset quam intellectus, id scilicet quod intelligitur*. Averroes in *Comment.* de hoc textu ait: «*Quapropter erit aliud ens nobilius isto; intellectum enim est perfectio intelligentis*». — Triplex inconveniens, quod S. Doctor mox commemorat, insinuatur etiam ab Aristot., loc. cit. — Pro *intellectus eius perficitur ab alio* codd. AT *intellectus eius perficitur ab illo*, cod. bb *ab aliquo*. In fine argumenti pro *perfectione*, i. e. forma (de quo cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 7.), Vat. cum edd. 4, 5 *perficiente*, et subinde eadem Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *alio*.

en: Text 51 (XI, c. 9), where, against the erroneous opinion that the First Intellect does not understand things other than itself, this reasoning is brought forward: "*Then it [would be] clear that something else would be more honorable than the intellect, namely that which is understood*". Averroes, *Commentary* on this text, says: "*Wherefore there will be another being more noble than this one; for the understood is the perfection of the understander*". — The threefold inconvenience which the Holy Doctor presently mentions is also insinuated by Aristotle, loc. cit. — In place of *intellectus eius perficitur ab alio* codices AT [read] *intellectus eius perficitur ab illo*, codex bb *ab aliquo*. At the end of the argument, in place of *perfectione*, that is *form* (on which cf. above p. 84, note 7), the Vatican with edd. 4, 5 [reads] *perficiente*, and immediately after the same Vatican with codex cc omits *alio*.

la: Verba *est in Deo* Vat. non absque auctoritate codd. immutavit in *cognoscit Deus*, simul suo nomine inserens ante verba praecedentia *omne quod* particulam *hoc*, ut rationabilem redderet suam lectionem. At nostram lectionem, quam ex codd. KVX restituimus, veram esse evidens est, nec non ex contextu probatur.

en: The Vatican, not without the authority of codices, changed the words *est in Deo* into *cognoscit Deus*, at the same time, on its own initiative, inserting before the preceding words *omne quod* the particle *hoc*, in order to render its reading reasonable. But that our reading, which we have restored from codices KVX, is the true one is evident, and is also proved from the context.

la: Libr. II. *Soliloq.* c. 5. n. 8: *Nam verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.* — Maior huius argumenti sic exprimi solet: *Quidquid cognoscitur, cognoscitur sub ratione veri*. — Pro intelligentia ultimae propositionis huius argumenti: *sed tale est etc.*, non inutile erit illud August., 83 *Qq.* q. 46. n. 2. afferre, ubi S. Doctor ideas Platonicas falso acceptas impugnans sic eloquitur: *Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est.*

en: Augustine, *Soliloquies* II, c. 5, n. 8: "*For the true seems to me to be that which is*". — The major of this argument is usually expressed thus: "*Whatever is known, is known under the *ratio* of the true*". — For understanding the last proposition of this argument: *sed tale est etc.* ("but such [a being] is etc."), it will not be useless to bring forward that of Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 46, n. 2, where the Holy Doctor, attacking Platonic ideas falsely received, speaks thus: "*For he did not contemplate anything posited outside himself, in order that according to it he should constitute what he was constituting; for to think this is sacrilege*".

la: Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 1: *Siquidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis* (scil. potentiis animae).

en: Aristotle, VI *Ethics*, c. 1: "*If indeed cognition exists for them* [scil. for the powers of the soul] *out of a certain likeness and affinity*".

la: Cod. T *actu*.

en: Codex T [reads] *actu* ("in act").

la: Ed. 1 *acceptum*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *acceptum* ("accepted/received").

la: Dist. 35. q. 1. in corp. et ad 2.

en: Distinction 35, q. 1, in the body and ad 2.

la: Aristot., IX. *Metaph.* text. 16. (VIII. c. 8.) differentiam inter *actionem transeuntem* et *immanentem*, quae hic respicitur, sic proponit: «*Quorumcumque itaque aliud quiddam praeter usum est id quod fit, horum actus in eo quod fit, est ut aedificatio in eo quod aedificatur, et contextio in eo quod contexitur; similiter et in aliis, et omnino motus in moto. Quorum vero non est aliud quoddam opus praeter actionem, in ipsismet actio est, ut visio in vidente, et speculatio in speculante, et vita in anima*». Ex his responsio S. Doctoris facile intelligitur. Nam *facere* ut actio transiens praesupponit perfectionem potentiae, et ideo potentia, sive faciat sive non, perfectissima et actus purus esse potest; at *scire*, ut actio immanens, perfectissimum et actus purus esse nequit, nisi in ipso comprehendatur actualis cognitio omnium rerum. — Codd. AV *sed*.

en: Aristotle, IX *Metaphysics*, text 16 (VIII, c. 8) sets forth the difference between *transient action* and *immanent action*, which is here in view, thus: "*Of whatsoever things, accordingly, there is something else besides the use that is what comes-to-be, of these the act is in that which comes-to-be, as the building [is] in what is built, and the weaving in what is woven; and similarly also in others, and altogether motion [is] in the moved. But of those of which there is not some other work besides the action, in the agents themselves is the action, as vision in the seer, and speculation in the speculator, and life in the soul*". From these the response of the Holy Doctor is easily understood. For *to make*, as transient action, presupposes the perfection of the power, and therefore the power, whether it makes or not, can be most perfect and pure act; but *to know*, as immanent action, cannot be most perfect and pure act, unless in itself it comprehends the actual cognition of all things. — Codices AV [read] *sed* ("but"; in place of *et* — variant on a particle in the body).

en: Cf. above p. 312, note 8 [editor's cross-reference attached to the question's opening statement].

la: Supple cum Vat. ibi: *Simul itaque*.

en: Supply, with the Vatican [edition], at that point: "*Simul itaque*" ("at the same time, therefore") [editor's textual supplement].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Deum res creatas cognoscere non tantum secundum esse intelligibile, quod ab aeterno in ipso Deo habent, sed etiam secundum illud, quod in proprio genere habent, est communis sententia Scholasticorum, excepto, ut videtur, Aureolo, et manifeste a S. Doctore (hic ad 3.) asseritur. Res igitur etiam in se ipsis cognoscuntur, quatenus sunt terminus divinae cognitionis. Sed aliter dicendum, si verba *in se ipsis* intelliguntur de medio sive ratione cognoscendi. Distinguitur igitur *medium quo*, et *medium in quo*. *Medium quo* est id quod potentiam cognoscentem proxime habilem reddit ad cognoscendum, et vocatur etiam *medium non cognitum*, quod in nobis est species intelligibilis et etiam lumen intellectus agentis. *Medium in quo* (medium cognitum) est id quod cognitum ducit in cognitionem alterius rei, ut in speculo videntur res, et in principiis conclusiones. — Solam autem divinam essentiam esse *medium quo* Deus cognoscit, evidens est et ab omnibus receptum; eandem solam esse etiam *medium in quo*, ita ut Deus omnia creata cognoscat in sua essentia ut in *medio cognito*, est sententia antiquorum Scholasticorum. Unde Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 1.) dicit: «*Scientia Dei, quae est ad res, est sub eis, sed res sub illa* (a. 4.); *unde cum ipse sit causa immutabilis, per causam immutabilem et necessariam cognoscit etiam contingentia*». Consentiunt S. Thomas (*S. c. Gent.* I. c. 48.), B. Albert., Richard. a Med. et S. Bonaventura (hic ad 2. et ad 6, a. 2. q. 1. argg. in fundam. et in corp.). — Bene autem notandum est, quod (hic ad 2.) dicitur de triplici modo, quo aliquid extra cognoscentem existens cognosci potest, ne quis putet, Deum ita res creatas cognoscere, ut eius scientia sit, sicut nostra, discursiva, vel ut aspectus cognoscentis deflectatur ad extra, «*sicut cognoscit Angelus*» (quod explicatur II. *Sent.* d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.).

Aliter censent plures auctores post exortas saeculo XVI. controversias de divinis auxiliis, qui docent, Deum res creatas, prout sunt in se ipsis, cognoscere non in se ut *medio cognito*, sed immediate in ipsis. Iidem hoc principium applicant cum Suarez ad cognitionem contingentium conditionate futurorum, et dicunt, haec cognosci in veritate ipsorum obiectiva, ante et independenter ab omni decreto voluntatis divinae. Huic sententiae a multis contradictum est, et etiam a non paucis defensoribus scientiae mediae, inter quos est cl. P. Kleutgen S. I. in praeclaro suo opere: *Institutiones theolog.*, Ratisbonae 1881, tom. 1. n. 548.

**II.** Incidimus hic in quaestionem difficillimam, et a tribus saeculis inter theologos valde agitatam, de ratione sive medio quo Deus cognoscit contingentia libera absolute vel conditionate futura. Nostrum non est de tot sententiis, circa rem in hanc medium prolatis, iudicare; sed sufficiat, ut primo praeter iam nominatam alias principaliores opiniones breviter referamus, et deinde sententiam S. Bonaventurae proponamus.

1. *Nominales* hanc quaestionem humano intellectui esse insolubilem affirmant, atque recurrunt ad infinitam intellectus divini perfectionem, cuius «*aeternus oculus intuitivam omnium rerum visionem habet, immo, ut proprius loquar, ipse est incomprehensibilis quaedam intuitio, quae immediate super quamlibet rem actualiter vel possibiliter existentem simul fertur*» (Gregor. Ariminens., hic q. 2. a. 2.). — Nonnulli inter antiquiores *Thomistas*, inter quos Capreolus et Caietanus, clavem ad revelandum hoc secretum se reperisse putant in verbis S. Thomae (*S.* p. I. q. 14. a. 13.), quod *Dei intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate*, de qua sententia hic a. 2. q. 3. in *Scholio* nonnihil dicetur. — Alii scholae S. Thomae addicti nunc communiter tenent, Deum libera absolute futura cognoscere in suae voluntatis decretis ab intrinseco efficacibus, libera autem conditionate futura in decretis ex parte subiecti absolutis, ex parte obiecti conditionatis (Goth, *Theolog. Scholast.* tom. I. tr. 4. q. 5. dub. 5, q. 6. dub. 2.). — *Scotus* (hic q. unica, n. 23, d. 41. q. unica, n. 10, *Report.* d. 40 q. unica) docet, divinam essentiam repraesentare res, quatenus determinate futurae sunt, ex determinatione suae voluntatis. Hanc determinationem Mastrius (*Disputat. theolog.* tom. I. d. 3. q. 3. a. 8.) in sensu decreti concomitantis explicare nititur, quae expositio post eum a pluribus recepta est. Sed tum ipsa verba Scoti, tum auctoritas meliorum eius interpretum, ut Lycheti, Roda, Frassenii aliorumque plurimorum, probabiliorem reddunt aliam interpretationem, quae istam determinationem intelligit in sensu decretorum antecedentium, ita ut haec determinatio sit causa, quod res a statu merae possibilitatis transeant ad existentiam in futuro infallibiliter quidem habendam, sed ita ut contingenter et libere a sua causa proxima procedant.

2. S. Bonav. alio loquendi modo utitur, scilicet quod «*Deus omnium ideas habet praesentes et simul, per quas cognoscit res futuras ita certitudinaliter, sicut si essent praesentes*» (hic a. 2. q. 3.), sive aliis verbis: «*Quia per exemplar (res) repraesentatur, sicut futura est in proprio genere, ideo per existentiam in exemplari omnino cognoscitur, sicut futura est, nec aliter cognoscitur, postquam facta est*» (hic ad 3.). Haec formula loquendi, quod Deus in suis ideis futura omnia cognoscat, etiam nonnullis antiquioribus discipulis S. Thomae placuit (cfr. Mastrius, loc. cit. a. 1.), sed a Scoto (hic q. unica, n. 7.) improbatur ea praecipue ratione, quia ideae repraesentent tantum res ut mere possibiles; item quia repraesentent eas solum ut terminos simplices, non autem, quatenus contingenter hi termini copulantur in propositionibus complexis. Hae rationes procedunt ex ea quam Scotus de ideis profitetur doctrina, sed non valent, supposita acceptione idearum, quam profitetur S. Bonav., ut supra d. 35. q. 1. in *Scholio* commemoravimus. Idea enim ab ipso in sensu largiore accipitur, quatenus repraesentat non tantum res in statu possibilitatis, sed etiam eas, quatenus in proprio genere existunt et determinationem divinae voluntatis praesupponunt. Sumsit ipse hanc idearum significationem ex Dionysio (*de Div. Nom.* c. 5. n. 8. in fine), qui secundum versionem Corderii docet: «*Exemplaria* (παραδείγματα) *dicimus esse rationes in Deo substantificas rerum et unite praeexistentes, quas divinus sermo vocat praedefinitiones et divinas atque bonas voluntates, rerum definitrices et effectrices, secundum quas qui est supra substantiam omnia, quae sunt, praedefinivit et produxit*». Etiam S. Thom. interdum ideas in eodem largiore sensu accipit, ut *de Verit.* q. 3. a. 6, ubi distinguit «*ideas quodammodo indeterminatas*», quae respiciunt ea quae nunquam sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, et ideam, quae «*ad ea quae sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt producenda determinatur ex proposito divinae voluntatis*» (cfr. ibid. a. 1, ubi idem locus Dionysii refertur, et *S.* p. I. q. 14. a. 13.). Favet etiam B. Albert. (hic a. 12.), qui in idea duplicem rationem distinguit, quatenus est lux ut ratio cognoscendi, et vita ut principium motus; et *ut vita et lux est «principium universi esse creati»*. In *Summa* autem p. I. tr. 15. q. 60. m. 4. a. 1. partic. 5. explicite dicit, quod Deus «*per rationes exemplares cognoscit, ut dicit Dionysius*».

— Quod autem S. Bonav., cum ideas dicit esse Deo rationem cognoscendi omnia alia ab ipso, causalitatem divinae voluntatis non excludat, sed praesupponat, ex multis locis manifeste apparet: v. g. hic a. 2. q. 1. inter alia dicit, quod scientia Dei comparatur «*ad creaturam secundum rationem diversitatis et causalitatis, et ideo ad creaturam secundum rationem ideandi*» (cfr. supra d. 36. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim arg. 1. in fundam. et ad 2, a. 2. q. 1.). — Omnino hoc confirmatur profunda doctrina eiusdem de voluntate ut causa rerum, infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1, ubi ad 2. dicitur: «*In voluntate primo invenitur ratio actualitatis. Potentia enim et scientia, etsi habeant rationem causae habitualis, non tamen actualis nisi per voluntatem. Unde voluntas facit de scientia dispositionem sive facit, scientiam esse disponentem, et potentiam exsequentem*» (cfr. d. 40. dub. 7.). Docet etiam d. 45. a. 2. q. 2, quo sensu divina voluntas sit causa immediata omnium quae sunt, non excludendo causas secundas, et ibi (ad 1.) affirmat, quod voluntas Dei, plene cognita, sit sufficiens causa ad cognoscendum omnia alia. Unde S. Doctor non dissentit a S. Thoma, qui toties dicit, quod Deus omnia alia extra ipsum cognoscit, in quantum est eis causa (*S. c. Gent.* I. c. 65. 67.), «*et quod scientia Dei in tantum se extendit, in quantum se extendit eius causalitas*» (*S.* I. q. 14. a. 11.). Idem saepe docent B. Albert., ut *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 60. m. 4. a. 1. part. 3. ad 1, et Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3.

Notandum autem, quod secundum verba S. Bonaventurae haec causalitas non videtur restringenda esse ad solam causam efficientem, quae supponit beneplacitum voluntatis (d. 40. dub. 7.), sed potius extendenda ad triplex genus causae, secundum quod res enim in Deo esse dicuntur, «*videlicet ut in principio producente, et sic sunt ibi ratione potentiae; ut in exemplari exprimente, et sic sunt ibi ratione notitiae; ut in fine conservante, et sic sunt ibi ratione voluntatis*» (supra d. 36. a. 2. q. 1.). Explicite dicit, quod duo ad rationem exemplaris concurrunt, scil. *ratio potentiae* et *notitiae*: «*non enim est exemplar Deus nisi eorum quae cognoscit et potest*» (ibid. ad 2, et d. 36. dub. 1. et 4. et multa argg. in fundamentis quaestionum d. 35. et 36.). Hinc est, quod toties docet, omne verum dependere a prima causa exemplari (hic ad 6.), sicut omne ens a prima causa efficiente, omne bonum a prima causa finali; et quod toties in distinctionibus 35. 36. 38. 39. 40. praeter causam efficientem nominet primam veritatem omnem veritatem exprimentem. Speciatim, quando agitur de cognitione contingentium futurorum, ad perfectionem et claritatem luminis aeterni provocat, ut d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. 3, et d. 39. a. 2. q. 2.

Fundamentum huius doctrinae inconcussum est, scil. quod una simplicissima Dei essentia sub diversis rationibus intelligendi est causa efficiens, exemplaris, finalis totius ordinis rerum realis et idealis. Dissensio inter theologos tantum incipit, quando descenditur ad species et diversos modos huius causalitatis determinandos; nec hucusque inventum est systema, quod communi calculo approbatum est.

**III.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. per totum. — Scot. de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica; I. *Report.* d. 36. q. 1, et d. 38. q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. unica, a. 2. 3; *S.* I. q. 14. a. 5. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 36. a. 4, d. 39. a. 9; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 60. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 3. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 35. princ. I. q. 1. 2, d. 38. p. II. q. 1, d. 39. princ. I. q. 3. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 1. — Biel, de hac I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 2. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That God knows created things not only according to the intelligible being which from eternity they have in God himself, but also according to that which they have in their proper genus, is the common opinion of the Schoolmen, with the exception, as it seems, of Aureolus, and is plainly asserted by the Holy Doctor (here ad 3). Things therefore are known also in themselves, inasmuch as they are the term of divine cognition. But it must be said otherwise if the words *in themselves* are understood of the medium or *ratio* of knowing. There is therefore distinguished *medium quo* (medium-by-which) and *medium in quo* (medium-in-which). The *medium quo* is that which renders the knowing power proximately apt for knowing, and is called also the *medium not-known*, which in us is the intelligible *species* and also the light of the agent intellect. The *medium in quo* (medium known) is that which, [itself] known, leads into the cognition of another thing, as in a mirror things are seen, and in principles conclusions. — That the divine essence alone is the *medium quo* by which God knows, is evident and accepted by all; that the same alone is also the *medium in quo*, so that God knows all created things in his essence as in a *medium known*, is the opinion of the older Schoolmen. Whence Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 1) says: "*God's knowledge, which is toward things, is under them, but the things [are] under it* (a. 4.); *whence since he is the immutable cause, through an immutable and necessary cause he knows even contingent things*". S. Thomas (*S. c. Gent.* I, c. 48), B. Albert, Richard of Middleton, and St. Bonaventure (here ad 2 and ad 6, a. 2, q. 1, in the arguments and in the body) agree. — But it must be well noted that what is said (here ad 2) about the threefold mode by which something existing outside the knower can be known [is given] lest someone think God knows created things in such a way that his knowledge is, like ours, discursive, or that the gaze of the knower is bent outward, "*as the Angel knows*" (which is explained at II *Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1).

Otherwise judge several authors after the controversies on divine assistances arose in the 16th century, who teach that God knows created things, as they are in themselves, not in himself as the *medium known*, but immediately in them. The same apply this principle, with Suarez, to the cognition of conditionally future contingents, and say that these are known in their objective truth, before and independently of any decree of the divine will. This opinion has been contradicted by many, and even by not a few defenders of *scientia media*, among whom is the noted Fr. Kleutgen S. J., in his celebrated work *Institutiones theologicae*, Regensburg 1881, vol. 1, n. 548.

**II.** We here fall upon a most difficult question, agitated for three centuries among theologians with great force, concerning the *ratio* or medium by which God knows freely contingent things absolutely or conditionally future. It is not for us to judge of so many opinions on this matter set forth in this medium; let it suffice that, first, besides the one already named, we briefly refer to other principal opinions, and then propose the opinion of St. Bonaventure.

1. The *Nominalists* affirm this question to be insoluble to the human intellect, and have recourse to the infinite perfection of the divine intellect, of which "*the eternal eye has the intuitive vision of all things — nay, more properly speaking, [the eternal eye] is itself a certain incomprehensible intuition, which is borne immediately upon every thing actually or possibly existing, simultaneously*" (Greg. of Rimini, here q. 2, a. 2). — Some among the older *Thomists*, among them Capreolus and Cajetan, think they have found the key to revealing this secret in the words of St. Thomas (*S.* p. I, q. 14, a. 13), that "*God's intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality*", concerning which opinion something will be said at a. 2, q. 3 *in Scholio*. — Others now adhering to St. Thomas's school commonly hold that God knows freely-and-absolutely future things in the decrees of his will intrinsically efficacious, but freely-and-conditionally future things in decrees absolute on the side of the subject and conditional on the side of the object (Goth, *Theol. Schol.* tom. I, tr. 4, q. 5, dub. 5, q. 6, dub. 2). — *Scotus* (here q. *unica*, n. 23; d. 41, q. *unica*, n. 10; *Report.* d. 40 q. *unica*) teaches that the divine essence represents things, as they are determinately future, by the determination of his will. Mastrius (*Disp. theol.* tom. I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 8) strives to explain this determination in the sense of a *concomitant decree*, an exposition received after him by many. But both the words of Scotus themselves, and the authority of his better interpreters, such as Lychetus, Roda, Frassen, and many others, render more probable another interpretation, which understands this determination in the sense of *antecedent decrees*, so that this determination is the cause that things pass from the state of mere possibility to existence to be infallibly had in the future, yet so that they proceed contingently and freely from their proximate cause.

2. St. Bonaventure uses another mode of speaking, namely that "*God has the ideas of all things present and at once, through which he knows future things as certitudinally as if they were present*" (here a. 2, q. 3), or in other words: "*Because through the exemplar [the thing] is represented as it will be in its proper genus, therefore through its existence in the exemplar it is wholly known, as it will be, nor is it known otherwise after it has been made*" (here ad 3). This formula of speech, that God knows all future things in his ideas, was pleasing also to some older disciples of St. Thomas (cf. Mastrius, loc. cit., a. 1), but is disapproved by Scotus (here q. *unica*, n. 7) chiefly for this reason, that ideas represent things only as merely possible; likewise that they represent them only as simple terms, not however inasmuch as these terms are contingently coupled in complex propositions. These reasons proceed from the doctrine which Scotus professes concerning ideas, but are not valid given the acceptation of *ideas* which St. Bonaventure professes, as we noted above at d. 35, q. 1 *in Scholio*. For *idea* is taken by him in a wider sense, inasmuch as it represents not only things in the state of possibility, but also them inasmuch as they exist in their proper genus and presuppose the determination of the divine will. He took this signification of ideas from Dionysius (*On Divine Names*, c. 5, n. 8 in fine), who according to Corderius's version teaches: "*We say the exemplars (παραδείγματα) are the substantific reasons of things in God, pre-existing in [him] in a unified way, which the divine word calls predefinitions and divine and good wills, defining and effective of things, according to which He who is above substance has predefined and produced all things which are*". Even St. Thomas sometimes takes ideas in the same wider sense, as at *de Verit.* q. 3, a. 6, where he distinguishes "*ideas in some way indeterminate*", which regard things which never are nor will be nor were, and the idea which "*is determined to those things which are or will be or were to-be-produced from the proposal of the divine will*" (cf. ibid. a. 1, where the same passage of Dionysius is cited, and *S.* p. I, q. 14, a. 13). B. Albert favors [this] (here a. 12) too, who in the *idea* distinguishes a twofold *ratio*, inasmuch as it is light as a *ratio* of knowing, and life as a principle of motion; and *as life and light it is "the principle of all created being"*. In the *Summa* p. I, tr. 15, q. 60, m. 4, a. 1, partic. 5, he explicitly says that God "*knows through exemplary reasons, as Dionysius says*".

— But that St. Bonaventure, when he says that ideas are God's *ratio* of knowing all things other than himself, does not exclude but presupposes the causality of the divine will, is manifest from many places: e.g. here a. 2, q. 1, among other things, he says that God's knowledge is compared "*to the creature according to the *ratio* of diversity and causality, and therefore to the creature according to the *ratio* of ideating*" (cf. above d. 36, a. 1, q. 1, especially arg. 1 in *fundamentis* and ad 2, a. 2, q. 1). — All of this is confirmed by the same author's profound doctrine on the will as cause of things, below at d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, where ad 2 it is said: "*In the will is first found the *ratio* of actuality. For potency and knowledge, although they have the *ratio* of habitual cause, do not however [have it] of actual [cause] except through the will. Whence the will makes of knowledge a disposition, or makes knowledge to be disposing, and potency executing*" (cf. d. 40, dub. 7). He also teaches at d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, in what sense the divine will is the immediate cause of all things which are, not excluding secondary causes, and there (ad 1) he affirms that the will of God, fully known, is sufficient cause for knowing all other things. Whence the Holy Doctor does not dissent from St. Thomas, who so often says that God knows all other things outside himself inasmuch as he is cause to them (*S. c. Gent.* I, c. 65, 67), "*and that God's knowledge extends so far as his causality extends*" (*S.* I, q. 14, a. 11). The same is often taught by B. Albert, as *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 60, m. 4, a. 1, part. 3, ad 1, and by Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3.

It must, however, be noted that, according to the words of St. Bonaventure, this causality does not seem to be restricted to efficient causality alone, which presupposes the good-pleasure of the will (d. 40, dub. 7), but rather extended to a threefold genus of cause, according as things are said to be in God: "*namely as in the producing principle, and so they are there by *ratio* of potency; as in the expressing exemplar, and so they are there by *ratio* of cognizance; as in the conserving end, and so they are there by *ratio* of will*" (above d. 36, a. 2, q. 1). He explicitly says that two things concur in the *ratio* of exemplar, namely the *ratio* of potency and of cognizance: "*for God is exemplar only of those things which he knows and can [do]*" (ibid. ad 2, and d. 36, dub. 1 and 4, and many arguments in the *fundamenta* of questions d. 35 and 36). Hence it is that he so often teaches that every truth depends on the first exemplar cause (here ad 6), as every being on the first efficient cause, and every good on the first final cause; and that he so often, in distinctions 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, beyond the efficient cause, names the first truth as expressing every truth. Especially when he treats of the cognition of contingent futures, he appeals to the perfection and clarity of the eternal light, as at d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, 2, 3, and d. 39, a. 2, q. 2.

The unshakable foundation of this doctrine is, namely, that the one most simple essence of God, under diverse *rationes* of understanding, is the efficient, exemplar, and final cause of the entire order of real and ideal things. Dissension among theologians only begins when one descends to determining the species and diverse modes of this causality; nor has any system been found up to now which is approved by common reckoning.

**III.** Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, throughout. — Scotus, on this and the following question, here q. *unica*; I *Report.* d. 36, q. 1, and d. 38, q. 1. 2. — St. Thomas, on this and the following question, I *Sent.* d. 38, q. *unica*, a. 2, 3; *S.* I, q. 14, a. 5, 6. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, I *Sent.* d. 36, a. 4, d. 39, a. 9; *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 60, m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 1, a. 4. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 3. — Aegid. R., on this and the following question, I *Sent.* d. 35, princ. I, q. 1, 2; d. 38, p. II, q. 1; d. 39, princ. I, q. 3. — Durand., I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 1. — Biel, on this I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 2, 4.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum Deus cognoscat omnia alia a se.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo, dato quod Deus cognoscat alia a se, quaeritur, utrum cognoscat omnia alia a se. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Ieremiae decimo septimo[^1]: *Pravum est cor hominis etc.*, et post: *Ego Dominus scrutans corda et renes*; sed nihil incertius, nihil occultius nostris cogitationibus: ergo si has cognoscit, et omnia alia.

2. Item, ad Hebraeos quarto[^2]: *Omnia sunt nuda et aperta oculis eius ad quem nobis sermo*. Et iterum: *Vivus est sermo Dei et efficax,* usque ibi, *et non est aliqua creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius.*

3. Item, Ioannes ultimo[^3]: *Domine, tu omnia nosti*.

4. Item, Augustinus tertio *de Trinitate*[^4]: «Nihil fit visibile nec intelligibile, quod non de aula interiori atque invisibili summi Imperatoris aut iubeatur, aut permittatur secundum ineffabilem iustitiam poenarum et praemiorum et gratiarum et meritorum». Et si hoc: ergo omnia cognoscit.

5. Item, ratione videtur: quia quanto substantia est spiritualior atque simplicior, tanto plurium est cognitiva[^5]; sed Deus est substantia simplicissima et spiritualissima: ergo est omnium cognitiva.

6. Item, Deus est creator et remunerator; sed in quantum creator est artifex, in quantum remunerator iudex; sed perfectus artifex cognoscit omnia producta, perfectus iudex omnia remuneranda: si ergo omnis creatura spectat ad artificium, et omne bonum et malum ad iudicium, ergo Deus omnem creaturam cognoscit, et omnem bonitatem et malitiam.

7. Item, impossibile est, aliquid esse, in quo non sit Deus per praesentiam essentiae, ut supra probatum est[^6]; sed[^7] cuicumque praesens est per essentiam, et cognitionem: ergo impossibile est, aliquid Deo esse incognitum.

8. Item, si esset in una re ita, quod non in alia, esset eius essentia limitata: ergo si ita cognosceret, quod aliqua essent incognita, esset eius cognitio limitata et arctata, et ita imperfecta.

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**Sed contra:**

1. Omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum; sed «quaedam melius est nescire quam scire», sicut dicit Augustinus in *Enchiridio*[^8]: ergo necesse est ponere, quod Deus illa non sciat.

2. Item, intellectus noster propter sui immaterialitatem non intelligit singularia — unde, ut Philosophus[^9] dicit, «intellectus est universalium, et sensus singularium» — sed divinus intellectus multo magis est immaterialis quam noster; ergo si noster non intelligit singularia, nec divinus.

3. Item, noster habitus scientialis propter sui certitudinem non est nisi necessariorum, et non contingentium, quia dicit Boethius[^10] quod «scientia est eorum quae sui immutabilem existentiam sortiuntur». Si ergo divina cognitio est multo certior quam nostra scientia, patet etc.

4. Item, quae necessitas est Deum ponere cognoscere omnia? Et videtur quod nulla, quia cognitio nostra non minus dicitur perfecta, si non cognoscit unam muscam; si ergo divina cognitio multo minus perficitur a scibili, non erit imperfecta, si non cognoscit ista vilia.

5. Item, sicut Deus est[^11] omnisciens, ita est omnipotens; sed potentia mali non est de omnipotentia nec de perfectione potentiae; ergo et similiter cognitio mali non est de perfectione scientiae, ergo etc.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritatibus[^12], et primo auctoritate Habacuc[^13]: *Mundi sunt oculi tui, Domine, ne videant malum etc.* Item de malis dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^14]: *Nescio vos*.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus cognitione simplicis notitiae omnia cognoscit, bona et mala, approbationis vero tantum bona.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum ad intelligentiam obiectorum, quod in Deo est notitia approbationis, et simplicis notitiae. Et notitia approbationis connotat complacentiam voluntatis. Hac non cognoscit Deus omnia, quia nec mala nec malos, sed tantum bona et bonos; et de hac intelliguntur duae ultimae auctoritates[^15]. Est alia cognitio simplicis notitiae; et haec quia habet rationem cognoscendi a Veritate, quae est lux summa, cui nihil potest occultari, nec etiam tenebrae obscurantur ab ipsa[^16]; ideo de necessitate cognoscit omnia, magna et parva, bona et mala, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum; dicendum, quod est melius simpliciter, et est melius huic et secundum statum. Dico ergo, quod omnia scire simpliciter melius et nobilius est; sed homini corrupto, qui accipit occasionem peccandi ex cognitione, melius est quaedam nescire. Ideo non sequitur, quod sit Deo attribuendum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de immaterialitate intellectus, dicendum, quod hoc, quod non cognoscat singularia, non tantum venit ex immaterialitate, immo ex materialitate coniuncti et immaterialitate sua. Quoniam enim coniungitur corpori, ideo habet potentias, secundum quas dependet a corpore quantum ad operationem, et per quas intellectus, quamdiu est in corpore, exit ad exteriora, quia illae sunt mediae, scilicet sensus particularis et imaginatio. Quoniam ergo singulare non pervenit ad intellectum nisi per istas potentias, et ascensus per has est secundum abstractionem et depurationem, et abstractio facit de singulari universale[^17]; ideo non potest singularia cognoscere ut intellectus, nisi intellectus sit separatus vel divinus.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de certitudine scientiae, dicendum, quod hoc non est propter certitudinem simpliciter, sed propter certitudinem causatam a re. Et quoniam causatur certitudo in nostra cognitione vel[^18] pendet ex re, ideo non potest nostra cognitio esse certa, nisi res sit necessaria. Divina autem cognitio, quoniam a re non causatur nec dependet, ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia mali non est de omnipotentia; ergo etc; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia rectitudo, manens rectitudo, est ratio cognoscendi malum; sed rectitudo non est causa mali, nisi declinando a rectitudine et defi<!-- page 690 -->ciendo. Ideo scire malum est de perfectione scientiae, sed posse malum non est de perfectione potentiae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae necessitas est cognoscendi Deum omnia: dicendum, quod infinitas et immensitas veritatis, quae non patitur, aliquid latere Deum, sicut immensitas divinae praesentiae non patitur, aliquid absentari a Deo.

english:
<!-- page 688 -->

### Question II.
#### *Whether God knows all things other than himself.*

Secondly, granting that God knows things other than himself, it is asked whether he knows *all* things other than himself. And that he does, [it] seems:

1. By the authority of Jeremiah seventeen[^1]: *The heart of man is perverse etc.*, and after: *I am the Lord searching hearts and reins*; but nothing is more uncertain, nothing more hidden than our thoughts: therefore if he knows these, [he knows] all other things too.

2. Likewise, to the Hebrews four[^2]: *All things are bare and open to the eyes of him to whom is our discourse.* And again: *The word of God is living and effective,* up to: *and there is no creature invisible in his sight.*

3. Likewise, John final [chapter][^3]: *Lord, thou knowest all things.*

4. Likewise, Augustine in the third [book] *On the Trinity*[^4]: «Nothing becomes visible nor intelligible which is not, from the inner and invisible court of the supreme Emperor, either commanded or permitted according to [his] ineffable justice of punishments and rewards and graces and merits». And if this [is so]: therefore he knows all things.

5. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]: because the more spiritual and simpler a substance is, the more it is cognoscitive of[^5]; but God is a most simple and most spiritual substance: therefore he is cognoscitive of all things.

6. Likewise, God is creator and rewarder; but inasmuch as he is creator he is artisan, inasmuch as rewarder he is judge; but a perfect artisan knows all things produced, a perfect judge all things to be rewarded: if therefore every creature pertains to [his] handiwork, and every good and evil to [his] judgment, therefore God knows every creature, and every goodness and malice.

7. Likewise, it is impossible that anything be in which God is not by the presence of essence, as was proved above[^6]; but[^7] to whatever he is present by essence, [also by] cognition: therefore it is impossible that anything be unknown to God.

8. Likewise, if he were in one thing in such a way that not in another, his essence would be limited: therefore if he so knew, that some things were unknown, his cognition would be limited and constricted, and so imperfect.

<!-- page 689 -->

**On the contrary:**

1. Everything more noble is to be attributed to God; but «some things it is better not to know than to know», as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^8]: therefore it is necessary to posit that God does not know those things.

2. Likewise, our intellect, on account of its immateriality, does not understand singulars — whence, as the Philosopher[^9] says, «the intellect is of universals, and sense of singulars» — but the divine intellect is far more immaterial than ours; therefore if ours does not understand singulars, neither does the divine.

3. Likewise, our scientific *habit*, on account of its certitude, is only of necessary things, and not of contingents, since Boethius[^10] says that «science is of those things which obtain unchangeable existence of themselves». If therefore divine cognition is far more certain than our science, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, what necessity is there to posit that God knows all things? And it seems [there is] none, because our cognition is no less called perfect, if it does not know one fly; if therefore divine cognition is far less perfected by the knowable, it will not be imperfect, if it does not know these vile [things].

5. Likewise, just as God is[^11] omniscient, so he is omnipotent; but the power of evil is not part of omnipotence nor of the perfection of power; therefore likewise neither is the cognition of evil part of the perfection of knowledge, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the same is shown by authorities[^12], and first by the authority of Habakkuk[^13]: *Thy eyes are clean, Lord, lest they see evil etc.* Likewise of evils it is said in Matthew twenty-five[^14]: *I know you not.*

### Conclusion.

> *God by the cognition of simple cognizance knows all things, good and evil, but [by the cognition] of approbation only the good.*

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the objections, that in God there is the cognizance of approbation, and of simple cognizance. And the cognizance of approbation connotes the complacency of the will. By this God does not know all things, since neither evils nor evil-doers, but only the good and the good-doers; and of this are understood the last two authorities[^15]. There is another cognition of simple cognizance; and this, since it has the *ratio* of knowing from Truth, which is the supreme light, to which nothing can be hidden, nor are even darknesses obscured before it[^16]; therefore of necessity it knows all things, great and small, good and evil, as the reasons for the first part show.

*To 1.* To that which is first objected, that everything more noble is to be attributed to God; it must be said that there is what is better simply, and what is better for this [creature] and according to [its] state. I say therefore that to know all things simply is better and more noble; but for corrupt man, who takes occasion of sinning from cognition, it is better to be ignorant of certain things. Therefore it does not follow, that it [must] be attributed to God.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the immateriality of the intellect, it must be said that this — that it does not know singulars — comes not only from immateriality, rather from the materiality of the conjoined [body] and its own immateriality. For since it is conjoined to a body, it has powers according to which it depends on the body as regards [its] operation, and through which the intellect, while it is in the body, goes out to exterior things, since these [powers] are the means, namely the particular sense and imagination. Since therefore the singular does not arrive at the intellect except through these powers, and the ascent through these is according to abstraction and purification, and abstraction makes a universal of the singular[^17]; therefore [the intellect] cannot know singulars *as* intellect, unless the intellect be separated or divine.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the certitude of science, it must be said that this is not on account of certitude simply, but on account of certitude caused by the thing. And since certitude in our cognition is caused [by] or[^18] depends on the thing, therefore our cognition cannot be certain unless the thing be necessary. But divine cognition, since it is neither caused nor depends from the thing, can be certain about a contingent thing.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the power of evil is not part of omnipotence; therefore etc; it must be said, that it is not similar, since rectitude, remaining rectitude, is the *ratio* of knowing evil; but rectitude is not the cause of evil, except by deviating from rectitude and falling away<!-- page 690 -->. Therefore to know evil is part of the perfection of knowledge, but to be able [to do] evil is not part of the perfection of power.

*To 4.* To that which is asked, what necessity there is for God to know all things: it must be said that the infinity and immensity of truth, which does not allow anything to be hidden from God, just as the immensity of divine presence does not allow anything to be absent from God.

la: Vers. 9. et 1, ubi Vulgata pro *hominis* exhibet et voci *renes* praemittit *probans*. — Mox pro *incertius* codd. *interius*.

en: Verses 9 and 1, where the Vulgate, in place of *hominis*, has [a different reading], and prefixes *probans* to the word *renes*. — Soon, in place of *incertius* codices [read] *interius*.

la: Vers. 13. Textus sequens ibid., ubi pro *aliqua creatura* Vulg. *ulla creatura*.

en: Verse 13. The following text [is from] the same place, where in place of *aliqua creatura* the Vulgate [has] *ulla creatura*.

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: Cap. 4. n. 9. In textu originali pro *visibile nec intelligibile* legitur *visibiliter et sensibiliter*, et in fine *retributionum* pro *meritorum*.

en: Chapter 4, n. 9. In the original text, in place of *visibile nec intelligibile* there is read *visibiliter et sensibiliter*, and at the end *retributionum* in place of *meritorum*.

la: Cfr. liber *de Causis*, prop. 10, et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. the book *On Causes*, prop. 10, and Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 3 ff. (c. 4).

la: Dist. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — In propositione minori, quae sequitur, inter verba *et cognitionem* supple ; *praesens est per*. Ratio sententiae in hac propositione minori enuntiatae est, quia in Deo essentia idem est ac cognitio. Pro *cuicumque* multi codd. cum ed. minus concinne *cuique*.

en: Distinction 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — In the minor proposition which follows, between the words *et cognitionem* supply ; *praesens est per* ["is present by"]. The reason of the sentence enunciated in this minor proposition is, that in God essence is the same as cognition. In place of *cuicumque* many codices with the [printed] edition, less elegantly, [read] *cuique*.

la: Cum codd. D PQ (T a secunda manu) et ed. 1 posuimus *si ergo* pro *sed*, quod exstat in Vat.

en: With codices D, P, Q (T from a second hand) and ed. 1 we have placed *si ergo* ["if therefore"] in place of *sed* ["but"], which stands in the Vatican [edition].

la: Cap. 17. n. 3. Et Aristot., XII. *Metaph.* text. 31. (c. 9.): «Etenim quaedam melius est non videre quam videre».

en: Chapter 17, n. 3. And Aristotle, XII *Metaphysics* text 31 (c. 9): «For there are some things [of which] it is better not to see than to see».

en: In many places. Cf. I *Posterior [Analytics]* c. 14, 20, 24 (18, 21, 31); II *On the Soul*, text 60 (c. 3); I *Metaphysics* c. 1.

la: Libr. I. *de Arithmetica*, c. 1: «Est enim sapientia rerum, quae sunt suique immutabilem substantiam sortiuntur, comprehensio veritatis». Idem docet Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. ult., et VI. *Ethic.* c. 3. 6.

en: Book I *On Arithmetic*, c. 1: «For wisdom is the comprehension of [the] truth of [those] things which are and which obtain their unchangeable substance». The same is taught by Aristotle, I *Posterior [Analytics]* c. ult., and VI *Ethics* c. 3, 6.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *dicitur*. Mox post *potentiae* Vat. adiungit *naturaliter*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *dicitur* ["is said"]. Soon, after *potentiae* the Vatican adds *naturaliter* ["naturally"].

la: Quae allegantur in 6. arg. ad opposit.

en: Those [authorities] which are alleged in the 6th argument *ad oppositum*.

la: Cap. 1, 13, ubi Vulgata, omissa voce *Domine*, prosequitur: *ne videas malum*. Nostra lectio, ut testatur editio Hieronymi, alias erat in usu.

en: Chapter 1, [v.] 13, where the Vulgate, with the word *Domine* omitted, continues: *ne videas malum*. Our reading, as the edition of Jerome attests, was elsewhere in use.

la: Vers. 12.

en: Verse 12.

la: Quae litterantur in 6. arg. ad opposit.

en: Those [authorities] cited in the 6th argument *ad oppositum*.

la: Psalm. 138, 12: *Quia tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te*.

en: Psalm 138 [Vulg.], 12: *For darknesses are not obscured by thee*.

la: Sicut intellectus in eliciendo cognitione[m] exteriorum, per medias i. e. sensibiles potentias quasi exit et descendit ad exteriora, sic singulare sive species, quam singulare generat in medio et organo, intrat et ascendit a sensu particulari ad sensum communem indeque per phantasiam usque ad intellectum. Sic ascendens species abstrahitur et depuratur a conditionibus singularibus sive individuantibus. Cfr. *Itiner. mentis in Deum*, c. 2, et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 39. (c. 8.). — Mox pro *ut intellectus* cod. *noster intellectus*, et subinde multi codd. ut CGHKLORSUVY prosequuntur: *non sic intellectus et divinus*.

en: Just as the intellect, in eliciting cognition of exterior things, through middle (i.e. sensible) powers as it were goes out and descends to exterior things, so the singular — or the *species* which the singular generates in the middle [body] and the organ — enters and ascends from the particular sense to the common sense, and thence through phantasy up to the intellect. Thus the ascending *species* is abstracted and purified from singular or individuating conditions. Cf. *Itinerary of the Mind into God*, c. 2, and Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 39 (c. 8). — Soon, in place of *ut intellectus* a codex [reads] *noster intellectus*, and thereupon many codices such as CGHKLORSUVY continue: *non sic intellectus et divinus*.

la: Pro *vel* cod. *necessario*.

en: In place of *vel* a codex [reads] *necessario*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac generali quaestione Seraphicus solvit etiam problemata specialia, quae ab aliis magistris (ut Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 1–7.) distinctis quaestionibus tractantur. In specie solvitur (ad 2.) quaestio, utrum Deus *singularia* cognoscat, ubi tangitur etiam quaestio, utrum intellectus *noster* pro statu *viatoris directe* cognoscat singularia; quod S. Doctor negat cum Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 6. ad 1.) et S. Thoma (*S.* I. q. 86. a. 1.). Aliter sentit Scotus (II. *Sent.* d. 3. q. 2. et passim) cum Durando aliisque. Cohaeret haec opinionum differentia cum controversia de adaequato intellectus humani obiecto, utrum sit *quidditas rei materialis*, ut docet schola S. Thomae, an *ens communissime sumtum*, ut est ens *reale in communi*, non tantum quidditas rei sensibilis, ut Scotus censet; de quo diffuse disputatur in utriusque scholae libris philosophicis.

**II.** In respons. et in solut. ad 5. agitur breviter de cognitione *mali*. Quae hic tanguntur magis explicantur supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. 2, et infra d. 46. q. 1. 5. Antiqui Scholastici in hoc conveniunt, quod malum a Deo non cognoscitur nisi per aliud, «*quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio boni, et sic nec definiri nec cognosci potest nisi per bonum*» (S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 14. a. 10. ad 4.). Fundamentum huius doctrinae est, quod «*malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito*» (S. Bonav., II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 2. q. 2.), et quod *purum* malum non est possibile, dicente eodem (loc. cit. q. 1.): «*Ponere malum aliquod esse, quod nihil habeat de bono, non solum est perversitatis haereticae, sed etiam manifestae caecitatis et stultitiae*». Hinc est, quod «*quamvis* malum non subsit divinae *productioni*, subest tamen *provisioni*» (infra d. 46. q. 5. ad 3.); et quamvis ut *privatio* non habeat nisi causam *deficientem* et nullatenus *in Deo* aliquam causam, tamen potest «*esse* in Dei praescientia, quae non est nisi veri. Ad hoc autem, quod aliquid sit in Dei praescientia, sufficit, quod *ipsum*, vel eius *causa*, vel eius *oppositum* sit in Deo tanquam in causa» (ibid. q. 4. ad 4.). Quod *posse* facere malum non sit de ratione potentiae, explicatur infra d. 42. q. 2.

**III.** Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 1. a. 1. 2, d. 38. q. 2. a. 2, d. 39. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 6, d. 36. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 38. q. 5. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 33. q. 1. 2. 3, d. 38. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In this general question the Seraphic resolves also particular problems, which are treated in distinct questions by other masters (e.g. by Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 1–7). In particular, the question is solved (ad 2) whether God knows *singulars*, where also the question is touched whether *our* intellect, for the state of [its] *wayfaring*, *directly* knows singulars; which the Holy Doctor denies with Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 6, ad 1) and St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 86, a. 1). Otherwise thinks Scotus (II *Sent.* d. 3, q. 2, and passim) with Durandus and others. This difference of opinions hangs together with the controversy concerning the adequate object of the human intellect, whether it be the *quiddity of a material thing*, as the school of St. Thomas teaches, or *being most commonly taken*, as it is *real being in common*, not only the quiddity of a sensible thing, as Scotus thinks; concerning which there is diffuse disputation in the philosophical books of both schools.

**II.** In the response and in the solution to [argument] 5 there is brief treatment of the cognition of *evil*. The matters here touched are more fully explained above at d. 36, a. 3, q. 1, 2, and below at d. 46, q. 1, 5. The ancient Schoolmen agree in this, that evil is not known by God except through another, «*since it is of the ratio of evil that it be a privation of the good, and so it can neither be defined nor known except through the good*» (St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 14, a. 10, ad 4). The foundation of this doctrine is, that «*evil is given subsistence in the good, and not only in the good, but even in the good [taken] in some way as opposed to itself*» (St. Bonav., II *Sent.* d. 34, a. 2, q. 2), and that *pure* evil is not possible, the same one saying (loc. cit. q. 1): «*To posit some evil to be, which would have nothing of the good, is not only of heretical perversity, but even of manifest blindness and folly*». Hence it is, that «*although* evil does not lie under divine *production*, yet it lies under [his] *provision*» (below d. 46, q. 5, ad 3); and although as a *privation* it has only a *deficient* cause and in no way any cause *in God*, nevertheless it can «*be* in God's foreknowledge, which is only of the true. But for this — that something be in God's foreknowledge — it suffices, that *itself*, or its *cause*, or its *opposite* be in God as in [its] cause» (ibid. q. 4, ad 4). That *to be able* to do evil is not part of the *ratio* of power is explained below at d. 42, q. 2.

**III.** Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 1, a. 1–2, d. 38, q. 2, a. 2, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1–2. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 6, d. 36, a. 1, q. 1–2, d. 38, q. 5. — Durand., I *Sent.* d. 33, q. 1, 2, 3, d. 38, q. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum Deus possit scire plura, quam sciat.*[^1]

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus possit scire vel praescire plura, quam sciat. Et quod possit plura scire, ostenditur sic.

1. Nihil scitur nisi ens et verum[^2]; sed multa possunt esse, quae non sunt, et verificari, quae falsa sunt: ergo multa possunt sciri a Deo, quae tamen non sciuntur.

2. Item, quod possit plura praescire, videtur, quia praescientia est tantum futurorum; sed multa possunt esse futura, quae nunquam fient nec erunt: ergo multa possunt praesciri, quae non praesciuntur: ergo Deus potest plura praescire, quam sciat[^3].

**Sed contra:**

1. Quod non possit plura scire, videtur, quia scientia Dei est infinitorum, cum sit Infinita, sicut probatum est supra[^4]; sed infinitis non possunt esse plura nec cogitari: ergo etc.

2. Item, si potest praescire plura, aut plura incomplexa sive plures res, aut plura complexa sive enuntiabilia. Non plura incomplexa, quia res scit Deus, etiamsi nunquam sint; scit enim omnia quae possunt fieri. Similiter non plura complexa, quia cuiuslibet contradictionis semper altera pars est vera, altera falsa[^5]: ergo de complexis semper tot sunt vera quot sunt falsa: ergo qui scit omnia non potest scire plura, quia non possunt plura esse vera.

3. Item, quod non possit plura praescire, quam praesciat, videtur, quia quaecumque Deus praescit, simul praescit nec potest praescire nisi simul: si <!-- page 691 -->ergo potest plura praescire, quam praesciat, aut simul, aut successive. Simul est impossibile; ergo, quod successive similiter impossibile, quia in aeternitate non est successio: ergo nullo modo.

4. Item, si potest plura praescire, ergo cum maior sit praescientia plurium saltem extensive, et quod potest esse maius potest augeri, ergo divina praescientia potest augeri; sed ubi augmentum, ibi mutatio et variatio: ergo divina scientia potest mutari et variari.

### Conclusio.

> *Scientia approbationis[^6] et visionis potest esse plurium, non autem scientia simplicis intelligentiae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus possit plura praescire vel scire, aliter est iudicandum de praescientia quam de scientia. Nam, sicut dici consuevit, triplex est Dei cognitio, non quantum ad diversitatem cognitionum, sed connotatorum[^7], scilicet cognitio approbationis, visionis et intelligentiae. Cognitio approbationis est solummodo de eis ad quae se extendit beneplacitum voluntatis, et hoc est solummodo de his quae fiunt et bona sunt; et haec absque dubio potest esse plurium. Cognitio vero intelligentiae dicitur cognitio, qua Deus cognoscit omne possibile et sibi et aliis, et hac cognoscit Deus infinita; et haec nullo modo potest esse plurium. Cognitio visionis est eorum quorum ab aeterno fuit praevisio[^8], et haec solum est eorum quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt; et haec cognitio potest esse plurium, quam sit. Et quia eiusdem est haec cognitio, cuius est praescientia, potest esse plurium. — Concedendum ergo, quod quaedam scientia potest esse plurium, quaedam non. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta de scientia.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1 et 2.* Quod enim obiicit, quod scientia Dei est infinitorum, et quod nihil connotat circa incomplexum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de scientia intelligentiae, sed non est verum de scientia visionis. — Quod autem obiicitur de praescientia, concedendum est, quod potest esse plurium.

*Ad 3.* Quod autem obiicitur ad oppositum, quod si potest scire plura, aut simul, aut non simul plura; dicendum, quod simultas potest attendi dupliciter[^9]: aut quantum ad substantiam praescitorum sive cognitionem: sic est verum, quod simul, quia ab aeterno praescivit quaedam et ab aeterno potuit praescire plura et potest praescisse. Si autem attendatur simultas quantum ad rationem paucitatis et pluralitatis; sic est implicatio oppositorum, et sic est sensus, quod simul praesciat plura et pauciora. Et primo sensu obiectio habet veritatem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, si potest plura praescire, quod potest praescientia augeri; dicendum, quod esto, quod praescita possent augeri, non tamen augeretur praescientia, quia uno et eodem praescit Deus et multa et unum, et plura et pauca. Tamen quamvis praescita possint esse plura, non tamen possunt augeri, quia augeri est de paucioribus fieri plura; sed haec: *posse esse plura* habet duas causas veritatis: aut quia de paucioribus possunt fieri plura, aut quia ab initio potuerunt esse plura; et hoc ultimo sensu est oratio vera. Et ideo, cum procedat a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam, facit sophisma secundum consequens[^10].

english:
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### Question III.
#### *Whether God can know more things than he knows.*[^1]

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Thirdly it is asked, whether God can know or foreknow more things than he knows. And that he can know more, is shown thus.

1. Nothing is known except being and the true[^2]; but many things can be which are not, and many things which are false can be made true: therefore many things can be known by God which nevertheless are not known.

2. Likewise, that he can foreknow more things, seems clear, because foreknowledge is only of future things; but many things can be future which will never come about nor be: therefore many things can be foreknown which are not foreknown: therefore God can foreknow more than he knows[^3].

**On the contrary:**

1. That he cannot know more, seems so, because the knowledge of God is of infinite things, since it is itself infinite, as has been proved above[^4]; but more cannot exist than the infinite, nor be thought: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if he can foreknow more, then either more incomplex things, that is, more things, or more complex things, that is, propositions. Not more incomplex things, because God knows things even though they never exist; for he knows all things that can come about. Similarly not more complex things, because of any contradiction one part is always true, the other false[^5]: therefore among complex things there are always as many true as there are false: therefore he who knows all things cannot know more, because more cannot be true.

3. Likewise, that he cannot foreknow more than he foreknows, seems so, because whatever God foreknows he foreknows simultaneously, nor can he foreknow except simultaneously: if <!-- page 691 -->therefore he can foreknow more than he foreknows, it must be either simultaneously, or successively. Simultaneously is impossible; therefore so is successively, equally impossible, because in eternity there is no succession: therefore in no way.

4. Likewise, if he can foreknow more, then since the foreknowledge of more is greater, at least extensively, and what can be greater can be increased, therefore divine foreknowledge can be increased; but where there is increase, there is change and variation: therefore divine knowledge can change and vary.

### Conclusion.

> *The knowledge of approbation[^6] and of vision can be of more, but not the knowledge of simple intelligence.*

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether God can foreknow or know more, it must be judged differently of foreknowledge than of knowledge. For, as it has been customary to say, threefold is God's cognition — not as to diversity of cognitions, but of things connoted[^7], namely the cognition of approbation, of vision, and of intelligence. The cognition of approbation is only of those things to which the good pleasure of his will extends, and this is only of the things which come about and are good; and this without doubt can be of more. The cognition called of intelligence is that by which God knows every possible, both for himself and for others, and by this God knows infinite things; and this in no way can be of more. The cognition of vision is of those of which there has been from eternity foreknowing[^8], and this is only of those things which are or have been or will be; and this cognition can be of more than there is. And because the cognition is the same as that of which foreknowledge is, foreknowledge can be of more. — It must therefore be granted that a certain knowledge can be of more, and a certain knowledge cannot. And by this is clear the response to the objections concerning knowledge.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1 and 2.* As to what he objects, that the knowledge of God is of infinite things, and that it connotes nothing about an incomplex; it must be said that this is true of the knowledge of intelligence, but not true of the knowledge of vision. — As to what is objected concerning foreknowledge, it must be granted that it can be of more.

*To 3.* As to what is objected on the opposite side, that if he can know more, either simultaneously or not simultaneously; it must be said that simultaneity can be considered in two ways[^9]: either as to the substance of foreknown things, that is, the cognition: thus it is true that simultaneously, because from eternity he foreknew certain things and from eternity could have foreknown more and can have foreknown. But if simultaneity is considered as to the formal character of fewness and plurality; thus it is an entanglement of opposites, and the sense is that simultaneously he foreknows more and fewer. And in the first sense the objection has truth.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that if he can foreknow more, then foreknowledge can be increased; it must be said that, granted that the foreknown things could be increased, foreknowledge nevertheless would not be increased, because by one and the same God foreknows both many and one, both more and fewer. Yet although the foreknown can be more, they nevertheless cannot be increased, because to be increased is, from being fewer, to become more; but this — *to be able to be more* — has two grounds of truth: either because from being fewer they can become more, or because from the beginning they could have been more; and in the latter sense the proposition is true. And therefore, since it proceeds from many grounds of truth to one, it commits the fallacy of the consequent[^10].

la: Codd. hanc solutionem ultimo loco ponunt, forlasse quia respondet ad quaestionem incidentem.

en: The codices place this solution in the last position, perhaps because it answers an incidental question.

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2., de conditionibus ad scire requisitis disserens ait: *Vera* (scil. principia) *quidem igitur oportet esse, quoniam quod non est, non est scire.*

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2, discussing the conditions required for knowing, says: *True (namely, principles) therefore must they be, since what is not, is not to be known.*

la: Vat. cum paucis mss. *praesciat*.

en: The Vatican edition, with a few manuscripts, reads *praesciat* (he may foreknow).

en: Distinction 35, question 5.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis*, et I. *Periherm.* c. 6. (c. 7.), et IV. *Metaph.* text. 9. seqq. (III. c. 3.). — In initio huius argumenti post *Item* auctoritate codd. II M V bb restituimus *si*, quod Vat. omittit, quae et deinde pro *praescire* exhibet *scire*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. *On Opposites*, and *On Interpretation* I, c. 6 (c. 7), and *Metaphysics* IV, text 9 ff. (III, c. 3). — At the beginning of this argument, after *Item*, on the authority of codices II M V bb, we have restored *si*, which the Vatican edition omits, and which thereafter, for *praescire*, displays *scire*.

la: Cod. T *praescientia*.

en: Codex T reads *praescientia* (foreknowledge).

la: Pro *connotatorum* Vat. cum cod. cc *cognitorum*.

en: For *connotatorum* the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *cognitorum* (of things known).

la: Cod. T *praevisor*.

en: Codex T reads *praevisor* (foreseer).

la: Scilicet quatenus sunt praescita. — Pro *praescitori* sola Vat. *praescientiae*. Mox pro *potest pra...* quibus mss. *potuit praescisse*.

en: That is, insofar as they are foreknown. — For *praescitori* the Vatican edition alone reads *praescientiae*. Shortly after, for *potest pra...*, certain manuscripts read *potuit praescisse* (could have foreknown).

la: De quo vide Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4. (c. 2.), ubi ad ostendendam falsitatem huius sophismatis inter alia et hoc exemplum affertur: *Quemadmodum neque si febriens calidus, etiam calidum necesse est febrire.* — Paulo ante verbis hoc ultimo cod. I praefigit *in*; deinde pro *oratio* codd. P Q Z *omnino*.

en: On which see Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 2), where, to show the falsity of this sophism, this example among others is brought forward: *Just as, even if a feverish person is hot, it is not necessary that what is hot be feverish.* — A little before, before this last word, codex I prefixes *in*; then, for *oratio*, codices P Q Z read *omnino* (altogether).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ad hanc quaestionem solvendam distinctione utendum est inter *scientiam simplicis intelligentiae* et *scientiam visionis*. Eandem quaestionem S. Thom. (S. I. q. 14. a. 15.) proponit sub titulo: *utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis*. Differentia, quae est inter solutiones antiquorum doctorum, in solo modo loquendi consistere videtur. Communiter enim receptum est: 1. quod scientia simplicis intelligentiae est omnino invariabilis; 2. item, etiam scientia visionis et approbationis, quatenus consideratur ex parte cognoscentis; 3. sed quatenus consideratur ex parte rerum cognitarum, cum Deus ab aeterno plura in tempore creanda sibi proponere potuisset, scientia visionis et «praescientia potest esse plurium» (hic in corp., cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 14. a. 15. ad 2.). Hoc valet etiam de scientia approbationis, si accipitur respectu rerum unquam existentium. Alii idem sic dicunt: scientia visionis est invariabilis in sensu composito, id est supposita determinatione voluntatis iam facta; variabilis autem in sensu diviso, sive ut separata ab illa determinatione. — Pro meliore explicatione cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2; infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2; et quoad solut. ad 2. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. 2. Nam, quod obiicitur quoad scientiam complexorum, quorum tot sunt falsa quot sunt vera, et falsa sunt praevisa sicut et vera, sub<!-- page 692 -->tilitatem aliquorum posteriorum Scholasticorum non parum exagitavit eosque movit, ut solutionem hic datam negarent. Sed generalis responsio S. Doctoris sufficiens esse videtur. — Ad obiect. 4. duplex solutio datur. Prima patet, secunda procedit a distinctione inter *esse plura* et *augeri sive fieri plura*; illud potest concedi, quia locutio admittit *sensum dictum*, hoc autem non, quia importat *sensum compositum*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; *S.* I. q. 14. a. 15. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 8; *S.* p. I. tr. 15. q. 61. m. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** To solve this question one must use the distinction between the *knowledge of simple intelligence* and the *knowledge of vision*. The same question St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 14, a. 15) proposes under the title: *whether the knowledge of God is variable*. The difference between the solutions of the ancient doctors seems to consist only in the manner of speaking. For it is commonly received: 1. that the knowledge of simple intelligence is altogether invariable; 2. likewise, also the knowledge of vision and of approbation, insofar as it is considered on the side of the knower; 3. but insofar as it is considered on the side of the things known, since God from eternity could have proposed to himself more things to be created in time, the knowledge of vision and "foreknowledge can be of more" (here in the corpus; cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 2). This holds also of the knowledge of approbation, if it is taken with respect to things at any time existing. Others say the same thing thus: the knowledge of vision is invariable in the composite sense, that is, given the determination of the will already made; variable, however, in the divided sense, that is, as separated from that determination. — For a better explanation cf. above d. 38, a. 2, q. 2; below d. 41, a. 2, q. 2; and as to the solution to 2, below d. 42, a. 2, q. 1. 2. For what is objected as to the knowledge of complexes — of which there are as many false as true, and the false are foreseen as well as the true — has not a little exercised the sub<!-- page 692 -->tlety of certain later Scholastics and moved them to deny the solution here given. But the general response of the holy Doctor seems sufficient. — To objection 4 a twofold solution is given. The first is plain; the second proceeds from the distinction between *to be more* and *to be increased or to become more*; the former can be conceded, since the expression admits the *sense divided*, but the latter cannot, since it imports the *sense composite*.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 5. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 2; *Summa* I, q. 14, a. 15. — B. Albert, here a. 1, 8; *S.* p. I, tr. 15, q. 61, m. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, I principal q. 2. — Durandus, here, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 1. — Biel, here, q. unica.

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