title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis. Et quod sic, videtur.

**Argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Primo super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Perdes omnes* etc.; Glossa: «Perfectis *omnino* mentiri non convenit»; sed hoc non dicit, nisi quia alterius generis peccatum est perfectis et imperfectis — quod enim *omnino* non licet indicatur esse mortale — ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Mendacio*[^2]: «Quomodo, inquit, diligit proximum tanquam se ipsum, cui ut praestet temporalem vitam, perdit aeternam»? loquitur de perfectis: ergo videtur, quod pro mendacio officioso perdat perfectus aeternam vitam: igitur peccat mortaliter.

3. Item, Augustinus tractans illud Proverbiorum vigesimo nono[^3], secundum translationem Septuaginta: *Verbum suscipiens filius a perditione longe aberit, et nihil falsi ex ore eius procedit;* hoc exponens Augustinus dicit sic: «Filius suscipiens per gratiam Verbum aeternum tam clausum sibi deputat ad subveniendum homini per mendacium, quam si per stuprum transire cogatur». Si ergo per stuprum transire peccatum est mortale, videtur, quod filiis supernae Ierusalem mentiri propter salutem alicuius sit mortale peccatum.

4. Item, nulli credendum est, si viris perfectis non creditur; sed si viri perfecti mentirentur, eis

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non esset credendum: si autem nulli creditur, perit fides in terra: ergo mendacium perfectorum fidem tollit et evacuat, per quam reguntur homines et regna. Si igitur talis fides auferri non potest sine mortali culpa, videtur, quod viri perfecti in qualibet specie mendacii incurrant reatum mortalis peccati[^4].

**Sed contra:**

1. Circumstantia non aggravat peccatum in infinitum: si ergo status perfectionis est circumstantia ex parte personae, non aggravabit peccatum in infinitum. Sed mortale excedit veniale in infinitum[^5]: ergo quod est veniale imperfecto non est mortale perfecto.

2. Item, *non mentiri* omni genere mendacii aut est *consilium*, aut est *praeceptum*. Si *praeceptum:* ergo cum ad praeceptum omnes obligentur, omnes qui mentiuntur, peccant mortaliter, quod supra[^6] improbatum est. Si *consilium;* sed ad consilia nemo tenetur nisi ex voto: ergo cum viri perfecti illud non voverint, videtur, quod nec mortaliter peccent in quolibet genere mendacii.

3. Item, si mendacium generaliter repugnat caritati perfectae, aut ergo in quantum est *caritas,* aut in quantum est *perfecta.* Si in quantum est *caritas:* ergo cuilibet caritati: ergo quilibet peccaret mortaliter. Si in quantum *perfecta:* ergo videtur, quod per mendacium non cadat vir perfectus a caritate, sed solum a perfectione: igitur non peccat mortaliter per quodcumque mendacium.

4. Item, vir perfectus in verbo otioso, in motu irae et in motibus carnis et in aliis, quae sunt venialia de ratione sui generis, non dicitur peccare mortaliter: ergo pari ratione nec in mendacio *iocoso* et *officioso,* cum de ratione sui generis sint venialia.

### Conclusio.

> Potest probabiliter concedi secundum Augustinum, quod viris perfectis, quorum perfectio publica est, quantumcumque parvum mendacium imputetur in peccatum mortale.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est[^7] triplex modus dicendi.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod mendacia illa, quae sunt venialia *imperfectis,* sunt etiam venialia *perfectis* viris; sed tamen, quia perfecti minorem habent pronitatem ad mendacium quam imperfecti, hinc est, quod gravius peccant. Unde Augustinus non vult ostendere, ut dicunt, quod omne mendacium sit *mortale* peccatum *perfectis,* sed[^8] cum nullum mendacium possit bene fieri, magis tamen indecens est et inconveniens circa *perfectos* quam circa *imperfectos,* non quia ipse *perfectus* propter quodcumque peccatum animam suam occidat et mereatur ire in perditionem, sed quia ex hoc ipso, dum minus adhaeret veritati, approximat iniquitati et disponit se ad lapsum et praecipitium.

*Opponitur.* Sed quoniam verba Augustini expresse videntur praetendere, quod periculosum sit viris perfectis mentiri — dicitur enim in Glossa super illud[^9]: *Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium;* quod «*perfectis* non convenit mentiri, nec etiam pro temporali vita alicuius servanda»; et post subdit, quod «*perfectus* falsum non dicat, ne pro vita alterius animam suam occidat»; et sic videtur expresse dicere, quod mendacium officiosum sit viris perfectis mortale — *Opinio 2.* ideo videtur aliter aliis esse dicendum, quod est perfectio *voti* sive religionis, et perfectio *caritatis,* per quam perfecte adhaeret homo summae Veritati et Bonitati per intellectum et affectum, prout possibile est in via; et ista dicitur perfectio *tranquillitatis*[^10]. De *primis perfectis* non intelligit Augustinus, sed de *secundis.* Illi enim *perfecti,* pro eo quod maxime adhaerent summae Veritati, non habent pronitatem ad mentiendum; et ideo, cum mentiuntur, non excusantur, sed intervenit veritatis *contemptus,* et est eis qualecumque mendacium deliberative dictum *mortale* peccatum. *Exemplum.* Et ponitur exemplum de homine primo, qui in statu innocentiae propter tranquillitatem, quam habebat, non poterat peccare venialiter, quia nulla erat in ipso pronitas infirmitatis ipsum excusans, ut in peccato suo diceretur esse dignus venia vel temporali poena[^11]. — *Improbatur multipliciter.* Sed illud adhuc calumniabile est, quia paucissimos aut nullos est reperire in ista caritatis perfectione. *Praeterea,* quantumcumque sit aliquis perfectus perfectione tranquillitatis, si dicat aliquod verbum otiosum, non peccat mortaliter. Et *iterum,* quanto homo est maioris perfectionis in vita praesenti, tanto maioris est pietatis; et quanto maioris pietatis, tanto pronior est ad subveniendum alienae saluti. Quando ergo vir perfectus videt, quod potest subvenire alienae saluti corporali vel spirituali per falsitatem verbi sui; videtur, quod non modicum[^12] debeat inclinari ex ipsa pietate et dulcedine, sicut videmus, quod magis pronus est pater ad mentiendum pro salute

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filii quam pro salute unius extranei. Esto etiam, quod nulla sit pronitas; cum mendacium *iocosum* et *officiosum* non sit prohibitum, si aliquis ad hoc non astrinxerit[^13] se per votum; quantumcumque sit perfectus, non videtur, quod incurrat mortale peccatum.

*Opinio 3.* Et propterea adhuc est tertius modus dicendi, quod ad aliquid obligatur homo specialiter praeter alios *Rationes obligandi:* vel ratione *voti emissi,* vel ratione *officii commissi,* vel ratione *scandali imminentis*[^14], vel ratione *conscientiae dictantis.* Si ergo dicamus, viros perfectos obligari ad non mentiendum aliquo genere peccati; cum hoc non sit ex *praecepto* nec ex *officio commisso* nec ex *voto,* *Axioma:* erit hoc propter *scandalum* et *conscientiae vinculum.* — *Perfecti publici et occulti.* Propter quod nota, quod quidam sunt *perfecti publici,* quidam sunt *perfecti occulti.* Viris *publice perfectis* adhibetur fides tanquam conservatoribus veritatis. Et quia mendacium deprehensum facit, ut homo alteri non credat; si viri *perfecti* mentirentur, iam nec ipsis crederetur nec aliquibus, et magnum ipsi veritati fieret praeiudicium, et daretur aliis occasio scandalizandi[^15]. Et ideo tales viri *perfecti* debent habere *conscientiam,* quod pro nulla re dicant falsum scienter; quando ergo dicunt, peccant mortaliter, tum quia faciunt contra *conscientiae dictamen,* tum etiam quia alios *scandalizant active.* — Non sic autem homines scandalizantur de his qui sunt *imperfecti,* vel etiam de *perfectis occultis;* ideo tales non sic obligantur ad omne mendacium vitandum. *Exemplum.* Et est exemplum huius: quia, si quis impugnaret fidem, licitum esset imperfectis fugere et latere; sed viri perfecti tenentur stare et libere confiteri, ne per ipsorum fugam et latitationem populus infirmus cadat a fide; unde conscientia debet eis hoc rationabiliter dictare.

*Conclusio.* Potest igitur concedi secundum Augustinum, quod viris *perfectis,* quorum perfectio *publica* est, mendacium quantumcumque parvum imputatur in mortale peccatum, quoniam propter *scandalum vitandum* dictare debet eis *conscientia,* nullatenus esse mentiendum, ne faciant veritatem venire in contemptum. Et hoc videtur sensisse Augustinus[^16], qui fuit praecipuus veritatis amator; et omnis vir, qui veritatem amat, vehementer odit mendacium. Unde dicitur in Ecclesiastico[^17]: *Potior est fur quam assiduitas viri mendacis.* — Unde et auctoritates et rationes ad hanc partem inductae concedendae sunt.

**Solutio oppositorum:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod circumstantia personae non aggravat peccatum in infinitum; dicendum, quod illud est verum, quantum est de se; *Notandum.* sed ubi aliqua *circumstantia* introducit scandalum alienum et conscientiae vinculum, per consequens mutat peccati genus et facit esse mortale, quod alias esset veniale. *Vinculum* enim conscientiae etiam in indifferentibus facit alios peccare mortaliter, quanto magis in his quae dictat rationabiliter[^18]?

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non mentiri omni genere mendacii aut est consilium, aut est praeceptum etc.; dicendum, quod quantum ad quaedam genera mendacii prohibitum est, quantum ad aliqua non est proprie prohibitum, sed cohibitum. *Notandum.* Venialia enim non dicuntur prohibita, sed cohibita[^19]. Sed quae ex divino praecepto non sunt omnino prohibita — quia praeceptum respicit omnes — ex conscientiae vinculo et scandalo, quod respicit speciales personas, efficiuntur prohibita. Et sic intelligendum est se habere in parte ista.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mendacium aut repugnat caritati simpliciter, aut caritati perfectae; dicendum, quod mendacium repugnat utrique. Repugnat enim caritati ratione perfectionis superadditae, quoniam ipsa perfectio viri iusti aliis manifesta[^20] introducit occasionaliter scandalum et conscientiae vinculum, et per consequens peccatum, quod non tantum tollit perfectionem, sed etiam ipsam caritatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir perfectus non peccat in verbo otioso nec in primis motibus, sicut nec alius imperfectus; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia ex aliis venialibus peccatis non ita oritur scandalum, nec ita veritas venit in contemptum, sicut de mendacio, si reperiatur circa virum perfectum, secundum quod superius est explanatum.

*Restrictio conclusionis.* Haec autem sunt dicta de mendacio, secundum quod verba beati Augustini praetendunt, qui propter magnum veritatis zelum maxime detestatus est mendacium[^21], et cum non posset mendacium ab omnibus excludere, saltem a viris *perfectis* voluit elongare, ut veritas in aliquibus inveniret solidam sedem. *Explicatio verborum August.* Et propterea, si quis velit intelligere, quod mendacium, quod est aliis veniale, non sit viris perfectis mortale; poterit ad verba Augustini respondere, intelligendo per ea, mendacium semper esse indecens et malum viris perfectis, qui[^22] mentiendo disponunt se et alios ad malum; non autem quod semper sit eis mortale peccatum. Et per hoc declinari possunt omnes rationes adductae ad oppositum. — *Notandum.* Quidquid autem horum verum sit, viro tamen, qui perfectionem profitetur, summopere cavendum est omne mendacium.

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english:
### Question IV. *Whether every lie is mortal for perfect men.*

Fourthly it is asked whether every lie is mortal for perfect men. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

**Arguments for the affirmative side:**

1. First, upon that text of the Psalm[^1]: *Thou wilt destroy all* etc.; the Gloss: «It is *altogether* unbecoming for the perfect to lie»; but it says this only because it is a sin of another kind for the perfect and for the imperfect — for what is *altogether* not permitted is indicated to be mortal — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On Lying*[^2]: «How, he says, does he love his neighbor as himself, who, that he may grant him temporal life, loses eternal life»? he speaks of the perfect: therefore it seems that for an officious lie the perfect man loses eternal life: therefore he sins mortally.

3. Likewise, Augustine, treating that passage of Proverbs the twenty-ninth[^3], according to the translation of the Septuagint: *A son receiving the word shall be far from perdition, and nothing false proceeds from his mouth;* Augustine, expounding this, speaks thus: «A son receiving the eternal Word through grace reckons it as much closed off to him to help a man through a lie as if he were compelled to pass through fornication». If, then, to pass through fornication is a mortal sin, it seems that for the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem to lie for the safety of someone is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, no one is to be believed, if perfect men are not believed; but if perfect men were to lie, they

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would not be believable: but if no one is believed, faith perishes from the earth: therefore the lying of the perfect destroys and empties out the faith by which men and kingdoms are governed. If, then, such faith cannot be taken away without mortal fault, it seems that perfect men in any kind of lie whatsoever incur the guilt of mortal sin[^4].

**On the contrary:**

1. A circumstance does not aggravate a sin infinitely: if, then, the state of perfection is a circumstance on the part of the person, it will not aggravate the sin infinitely. But the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely[^5]: therefore what is venial for the imperfect is not mortal for the perfect.

2. Likewise, *not to lie* by every kind of lie is either a *counsel* or a *precept.* If a *precept:* then since all are bound to a precept, all who lie sin mortally, which above[^6] was disproved. If a *counsel;* but to counsels no one is bound except by a vow: therefore since perfect men have not vowed this, it seems that they do not sin mortally even in any kind of lie whatsoever.

3. Likewise, if a lie repugns perfect charity generally, then either inasmuch as it is *charity,* or inasmuch as it is *perfect.* If inasmuch as it is *charity:* then for any charity whatsoever: then anyone would sin mortally. If inasmuch as it is *perfect:* then it seems that through a lie the perfect man does not fall from charity, but only from perfection: therefore he does not sin mortally through any lie whatsoever.

4. Likewise, the perfect man in an idle word, in a motion of anger, and in the motions of the flesh, and in other things which are venial by reason of their kind, is not said to sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning neither in a *jocose* and *officious* lie, since by reason of their kind they are venial.

### Conclusion.

> It can probably be conceded, according to Augustine, that to perfect men, whose perfection is public, a lie however small is imputed unto mortal sin.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is[^7] a threefold manner of speaking.

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that those lies which are venial for the *imperfect* are also venial for *perfect* men; yet nevertheless, because the perfect have less proneness to lying than the imperfect, hence it is that they sin more gravely. Hence Augustine does not wish to show, as they say, that every lie is *mortal* sin for the *perfect,* but[^8] since no lie can be done well, it is nevertheless more unbecoming and unfitting concerning the *perfect* than concerning the *imperfect,* not because the *perfect* man for any sin whatsoever slays his own soul and merits to go into perdition, but because by this very fact, while he adheres less to truth, he approaches iniquity and disposes himself to fall and ruin.

*An objection is raised.* But since the words of Augustine seem expressly to put forward that it is perilous for perfect men to lie — for it is said in the Gloss upon that text[^9]: *Thou wilt destroy all who speak a lie;* that «it is not becoming for the *perfect* to lie, not even for the temporal life of someone to be preserved»; and afterward it adds that «the *perfect* man should not speak a falsehood, lest for the life of another he slay his own soul»; and thus it seems expressly to say that an officious lie is mortal for perfect men — *Opinion 2.* therefore it seems that the matter must be put otherwise by others, namely that there is a perfection of *vow* or of religion, and a perfection of *charity,* by which a man perfectly adheres to the supreme Truth and Goodness through intellect and affection, as far as is possible in this life; and this is called the perfection of *tranquillity*[^10]. Of the *first perfect* Augustine does not understand [it], but of the *second.* For those *perfect,* by reason that they adhere most to the supreme Truth, do not have a proneness to lying; and therefore, when they lie, they are not excused, but there intervenes a *contempt* of truth, and any lie whatsoever deliberately spoken is for them *mortal* sin. *An example.* And the example is given of the first man, who in the state of innocence, on account of the tranquillity which he had, could not sin venially, because there was in him no proneness of infirmity excusing him, so that in his sin he might be said to be worthy of pardon or of temporal punishment[^11]. — *It is disproved on many counts.* But this is still open to objection, because very few or none are to be found in this perfection of charity. *Furthermore,* however perfect someone may be with the perfection of tranquillity, if he speaks some idle word, he does not sin mortally. And *again,* the more a man is of greater perfection in the present life, the more he is of greater piety; and the more of greater piety, the more prone he is to helping another's safety. When, therefore, the perfect man sees that he can help another's bodily or spiritual safety through the falsehood of his word; it seems that he should not a little[^12] be inclined by piety itself and sweetness, just as we see that a father is more prone to lying for the safety

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of his son than for the safety of one stranger. Granted even that there be no proneness; since a *jocose* and *officious* lie is not prohibited, if someone has not bound himself[^13] to this by a vow; however perfect he may be, it does not seem that he incurs mortal sin.

*Opinion 3.* And therefore there is still a third manner of speaking, namely that a man is bound to something specially beyond others *(grounds of obligating):* either by reason of a *vow taken,* or by reason of an *office committed [to him],* or by reason of *imminent scandal*[^14], or by reason of *conscience dictating.* If, then, we say that perfect men are bound to not lying by any kind of sin; since this is not from a *precept* nor from an *office committed* nor from a *vow,* *(an axiom)* this will be on account of *scandal* and the *bond of conscience.* — *(the perfect public and hidden).* On account of which note that some are *perfect public,* some are *perfect hidden.* To *publicly perfect* men faith is granted as to preservers of truth. And because a lie detected makes a man not believe another; if *perfect* men were to lie, then neither would they themselves be believed nor any others, and great prejudice would be done to truth itself, and occasion of scandalizing[^15] would be given to others. And therefore such *perfect* men ought to have a *conscience* such that for nothing should they knowingly speak a falsehood; when therefore they speak [it], they sin mortally, both because they act against the *dictate of conscience,* and also because they *actively scandalize* others. — Not so, however, are men scandalized about those who are *imperfect,* or even about the *hidden perfect;* therefore such are not bound in the same way to avoiding every lie. *An example.* And there is an example of this: that, if someone were to assail the faith, it would be lawful for the imperfect to flee and hide; but perfect men are bound to stand and freely confess, lest by their flight and concealment the weak people fall from the faith; whence conscience ought reasonably to dictate this to them.

*Conclusion.* It can therefore be conceded, according to Augustine, that to *perfect* men, whose perfection is *public,* a lie however small is imputed unto mortal sin, since on account of *scandal to be avoided* their *conscience* ought to dictate to them that in no way is there to be lying, lest they make truth come into contempt. And this Augustine[^16] seems to have held, who was a chief lover of truth; and every man who loves truth vehemently hates a lie. Whence it is said in Ecclesiasticus[^17]: *Better is a thief than the constancy of a lying man.* — Whence also the authorities and reasons brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposed [arguments]:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that a circumstance of the person does not aggravate a sin infinitely; it must be said that that is true, as far as it is in itself; *(to be noted)* but where some *circumstance* introduces another's scandal and a bond of conscience, consequently it changes the kind of sin and makes that to be mortal which otherwise would be venial. For the *bond* of conscience even in indifferent matters makes others sin mortally, how much more in those things which it reasonably dictates[^18]?

2. To that which is objected, that not to lie by every kind of lie is either a counsel or a precept etc.; it must be said that as to certain kinds of lie it is prohibited, as to certain others it is not properly prohibited, but restrained. *(to be noted)* For venial sins are not called prohibited, but restrained[^19]. But those which by divine precept are not altogether prohibited — because a precept regards all — by the bond of conscience and by scandal, which regards special persons, are made prohibited. And thus it must be understood to hold in this part.

3. To that which is objected, that a lie either repugns charity simply, or perfect charity; it must be said that a lie repugns both. For it repugns charity by reason of the superadded perfection, since the very perfection of the just man, manifest[^20] to others, introduces occasionally scandal and a bond of conscience, and consequently sin, which not only takes away perfection, but also charity itself.

4. To that which is objected, that the perfect man does not sin in an idle word nor in first motions, just as neither does another imperfect man; it must be said that it is not alike: because from other venial sins there does not so arise scandal, nor does truth so come into contempt, as in the case of a lie, if it be found about a perfect man, according to what was explained above.

*Restriction of the conclusion.* These things, however, have been said about lying according as the words of blessed Augustine put forward, who on account of his great zeal for truth most greatly detested a lie[^21], and since he could not exclude lying from all, [wished] at least to remove it far from *perfect* men, so that truth might find a solid seat in some. *Explanation of Augustine's words.* And therefore, if someone wishes to understand that a lie which is venial to others is not mortal for perfect men; he will be able to answer to the words of Augustine, understanding by them that a lie is always unbecoming and evil for perfect men, who[^22] by lying dispose themselves and others to evil; but not that it is always mortal sin for them. And by this all the reasons brought forward for the opposite can be set aside. — *(to be noted).* Whatever of these be true, nevertheless for a man who professes perfection, every lie is to be most exceedingly avoided.

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la: Psalm. 5, 7. — Glossa, quae est secundum August. in hunc locum, exhibetur a Strabo et Lyrano ut ordinaria. — Codd. omittunt *Glossa.*

en: Ps. 5:7. — The Gloss, which is according to Augustine on this passage, is given by Strabo and by Lyra as the ordinary [gloss]. — The codices omit *Gloss.*

la: Cap. 6. n. 9, ubi textus originalis pro *perdit aeternam* substituit *ipse amittit aeternam.* — Inferius pro *pro mendacio officioso* cod. F *per mendacium officiosum.*

en: [Augustine, *On Lying*] c. 6 n. 9, where the original text, instead of *loses eternal [life],* substitutes *he himself forfeits eternal.* — Below, for *for an officious lie,* cod. F [reads] *through an officious lie.*

la: Vers. 27; iuxta Vulgatam: *Verbum custodiens filius extra perditionem erit.* Verba August. habentur in lib. *contra Mendacium,* c. 20. n. 40, in quibus pro *subveniendum* multi codd. cum edd. *superveniendum.* — Pro fine arg. notentur ea quae proferuntur ab August., *contra Mendacium,* c. 16. n. 33: *Sed nos cum quaerimus, sitne boni hominis aliquando mentiri, non de homine quaerimus adhuc ad Aegyptum, vel ad Iericho, vel ad Babyloniam pertinente, vel adhuc ad ipsam Ierusalem terrenam, quae servit cum filiis suis, sed de cive illius civitatis, quae sursum est libera mater nostra* [Gal. 4, 25. seq.] *aeterna in caelis. Et respondetur quaerentibus nobis: Omne mendacium non est ex veritate* [I. Ioan. 2, 21.]. *Filii autem illius civitatis, illi sunt utique veritatis* etc.

en: Verse 27; according to the Vulgate: *A son keeping the word shall be outside perdition.* The words of Augustine are had in the book *Against Lying,* c. 20 n. 40, in which, for *to help,* many codices with the editions [read] *to come upon [in aid].* — For the end of the argument let there be noted those things which are brought forward by Augustine, *Against Lying,* c. 16 n. 33: *But we, when we ask whether it ever belongs to a good man to lie, do not ask about a man still pertaining to Egypt, or to Jericho, or to Babylon, or still to the earthly Jerusalem itself, which serves with her children, but about a citizen of that city which is above, our free mother* [Gal. 4:25 ff.], *eternal in the heavens. And it is answered to us asking: Every lie is not of the truth* [1 John 2:21]. *But the children of that city, they assuredly are [children] of the truth* etc.

la: Vide supra q. 2. fundam. 2. sententiam August., in qua hoc arg. fundatur.

en: See above q. 2, fundamentum 2, the saying of Augustine, on which this argument is founded.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — In initio arg. post *Circumstantia* Vat. addit *personae.*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 42 a. 2 q. 1 ff. — At the beginning of the argument, after *A circumstance,* the Vatican edition adds *of the person.*

la: Quaest. praeced. — Inferius pro *voverint* plures codd. *voverunt,* et subinde post *peccent* cod. A addit *mentiendo.*

en: The preceding question. — Below, for *have vowed,* several codices [read] *vowed,* and thereupon after *sin* cod. A adds *by lying.*

la: Cod. X *fuit.*

en: Cod. X [reads] *was.*

la: Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. *sed quod.*

en: The editions, with one and another codex, [read] *but that.*

la: Psalm. 5, 7. Glossa est secundum August., in hunc locum.

en: Ps. 5:7. The Gloss is according to Augustine, on this passage.

la: Vide supra d. 30. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius pro *Illi enim* plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *Illi etiam,* codd. O F *illi autem.*

en: See above d. 30 q. 3 in the body. — A little below, for *For those,* very many codices with edd. 1, 2 [read] *Those also,* codd. O F *but those.*

la: De quo vide II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 1.

en: Concerning which see II Sent. d. 21 a. 3 q. 1.

la: Ita codd. A B Q R S bb, alii codd. *quod hoc modicum,* edd. *quod hoc mendacium.* Mox post *debeat* cod. P supplet *ipsum,* et pro *inclinari,* quod est in cod. A, in aliis *inclinare.* Paulo inferius pro *unius extranei* cod. G *alicuius extranei.*

en: Thus codd. A B Q R S bb; other codices [read] *that this little,* the editions *that this lie.* Soon after *should* cod. P supplies *himself,* and for *be inclined,* which is in cod. A, in others *to incline.* A little below, for *of one stranger* cod. G [reads] *of some stranger.*

la: Plures codd. *astrinxit;* cod. R legit *nisi aliquis ad hoc astrinxerit.*

en: Several codices [read] *bound;* cod. R reads *unless someone has bound himself to this.*

la: Pro *imminentis,* quod habent codd. A H U Z, cod. bb *vitandi,* cod. X *intervenientis,* cod. Y *multitudinis,* alii vel *imitantis* vel *mutantis* vel *invitantis,* edd. olim: *alias vitantis.*

en: For *imminent,* which codd. A H U Z have, cod. bb [reads] *to be avoided,* cod. X *intervening,* cod. Y *of the multitude,* others either *imitating* or *changing* or *inviting,* the editions formerly: *otherwise avoiding.*

la: Cod. A et edd. *scandali.* Aliquanto superius pro *nota* cod. A *notandum.* Inferius pro *quando ergo* cod. T *cum ergo.*

en: Cod. A and the editions [read] *of scandal.* Somewhat above, for *note* cod. A [reads] *it must be noted.* Below, for *when therefore* cod. T [reads] *since therefore.*

la: Praecipue in lib. *de Mendacio,* et *contra Mendacium,* ex quibus etiam fundam. huius quaest. sumpta sunt. Cfr. etiam Enarrat. in Ps. 5. (7.) n. 7.

en: Especially in the book *On Lying,* and *Against Lying,* from which also the foundations of this question are taken. Cf. also *Enarrat. in Ps.* 5 (7) n. 7.

en: [Ecclesiasticus] c. 20:27.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. — Superius pro *quod alias* unus cod. A *quod aliter.*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 39 a. 1 q. 3. — Above, for *which otherwise* one cod. A [reads] *which in another way.*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 42 a. 2 q. 1 ad 2.

la: Cod. A *manifestat.*

en: Cod. A [reads] *manifests.*

la: Vat., refragantibus codd. et ex parte edd. 1, 2, superflue adiungit: *et conatus est illud ab omnibus excludere, saltem a viris perfectis.*

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and in part the editions 1, 2, superfluously adds: *and he endeavored to exclude it from all, at least from perfect men.*

la: Edd. *quoniam.*

en: The editions [read] *since.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec est de mendacio *officioso* vel *iocoso,* sive de eo quod per se est veniale; sed talia mendacia ratione scandali vel alius circumstantiae annexae fieri possunt mortalia. Secundam opinionem hic relatam sequitur Alex. Hal. Communiter autem cum S. Thoma (hic a. 4. ad 4; S. II. II. q. 110. a. 4. ad 5.) et Scoto (hic q. unica n. 8. 9.) improbantur duae primae opiniones, immo etiam positio in tertia opinione a nostro auctore allata, quod «publice perfectis», quibus quasi incumbit onus veritatis in societate humana conservandae, omne mendacium sit mortale. Hoc enim S. Thom. ita restringit, ut iidem ad hoc non teneantur sub mortali nisi «ex officio in iudicio, vel doctrina». Revera autem ab his non dissentit S. Bonav., licet referat ex S. Augustino istum modum loquendi; quod satis manifestat additamentum conclusionem restringens (post solutionem oppositorum). Cfr. etiam supra d. 30. q. 3.

De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. II. q. 123. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Durand., hic q. 2.

**II.** In seq. (5.) quaest. S. Augustini et Magistri distinctio trium mendacii specierum (hic c. 1.) et etiam octo generum (c. 2.) communiter est recepta. — Quoad mendacium iocosum S. Bonav. (hic ad 4. et infra q. 6. ad 5.) assentit S. Thomae (S. loc. cit. a. 3. ad 6.), qui in solutione eiusdem obiectionis dicit: «Mendacium iocosum ex ipso *genere operis* habet rationem fallendi, quamvis ex *intentione dicentis* non dicatur ad fallendum nec fallat ex *modo dicendi.* Nec est simile de hyperbolicis, aut quibuscumque figuratis locutionibus, quae in s. Scriptura inveniuntur» etc. Scot. autem (loc. cit. n. 8.) vult, quod «mendacium iocosum est, quando aliquis iocando intendit decipere, ita quod deceptus vere decipitur, non tamen in aliquo, in quo sibi nocumentum magnum inferatur; in quo etiam iocantur illi qui sciunt, ipsum decipi». Econtra dicit: «Iocosum *non* est narrare fabulam, de qua omnes audientes sciunt, quod non est verum, nec narratur tanquam verum; ubi nec audiens decipitur, nec loquens intendit decipere, nec sermo est de se deceptivus, quia non est talis, qui sit natus credi ab audientibus». Tamen in re ipsa vix videtur esse differentia, ut patet ex dictis supra q. 2. ad 2.

De eadem (5.) quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 7, ubi etiam de seq. aliisque qq. fit sermo. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2.

**III.** In ultima (6.) quaestione ostenditur, *gradus* culpae, quos ex S. Augustino refert Magister (hic c. 2.), convenienter esse distinctos. Consentiunt: S. Thom., hic a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is about the *officious* or *jocose* lie, that is, about that which is venial of itself; but such lies, by reason of scandal or of another annexed circumstance, can become mortal. The second opinion here related is followed by Alexander of Hales. But commonly, with St. Thomas (here a. 4 ad 4; Summa II–II q. 110 a. 4 ad 5) and Scotus (here q. unica n. 8, 9), the first two opinions are disproved, and indeed also the position laid down in the third opinion by our author, namely that for «the publicly perfect», upon whom as it were lies the burden of preserving truth in human society, every lie is mortal. For St. Thomas so restricts this, that the same are not bound to it under mortal [sin] except «from office, in judgment, or [in] teaching». But in truth St. Bonaventure does not dissent from these, although he reports from St. Augustine that manner of speaking; which the addition restricting the conclusion (after the solution of the opposed [arguments]) sufficiently manifests. Cf. also above d. 30 q. 3.

On this question, besides those praised: Alex. of Hales, Sum. p. II q. 123 m. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 6 quaestiunc. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here circa lit.; Durandus, here q. 2.

**II.** In the following (5th) question the distinction of St. Augustine and the Master, of the three species of lying (here c. 1) and also of the eight kinds (c. 2), is commonly received. — As to the jocose lie, St. Bonaventure (here ad 4 and below q. 6 ad 5) agrees with St. Thomas (S. loc. cit. a. 3 ad 6), who in the solution of the same objection says: «A jocose lie has, from the very *kind of the work,* the character of deceiving, although from the *intention of the speaker* it is not said [to be] for deceiving nor does it deceive by the *manner of speaking.* Nor is it like in the case of hyperbolic, or any figurative locutions whatsoever, which are found in sacred Scripture» etc. But Scotus (loc. cit. n. 8) holds that «a jocose lie is when someone, joking, intends to deceive, in such a way that the one deceived is truly deceived, yet not in anything in which great harm is inflicted on him; in which also those who know that he is being deceived join in the joke». On the contrary he says: «It is *not* jocose to tell a story about which all the hearers know that it is not true, nor is it told as true; where neither is the hearer deceived, nor does the speaker intend to deceive, nor is the speech of itself deceptive, because it is not of such a kind as is fit to be believed by the hearers». Yet in the matter itself there scarcely seems to be a difference, as is plain from what was said above q. 2 ad 2.

On the same (5th) question, besides the places cited: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 7, where also concerning the following and other questions there is discussion. — S. Thom., here a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3, 6. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 2.

**III.** In the last (6th) question it is shown that the *degrees* of fault, which the Master reports from St. Augustine (here c. 2), are fittingly distinguished. They agree: S. Thom., here a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p84{7,8,9}-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p850-{L,R}-*.png`), per the Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the two-column body and every page footer). Raw range **58792–59004** (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`), bounded forward by `QUAESTIO V.` at raw 59005.

**Alignment.** PASS, 1:1. Opener *Quarto quaeritur, utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis* = QUAESTIO IV, matching the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM's **Quarto** *utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis* (d38-divisio). This is the substantive crux of the article (the *viris perfectis* question).

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart, renumbered continuous):**
- **p.847** (PDF 869): q4 opens at the top of the L-col (running head `QUAESTIO IV.`); args 1–2 in L-col, args 3–4 in R-col. Footer band runs nn.1–11, but **nn.1–8 were q.3's** (a1-q3 picked those up); q4 begins at **n.9** → **[^1]** (Psalm 5,7 Glossa, keyed to arg-1 *super illud Psalmi⁹*), **n.10 → [^2]** (de Mendacio c.6, arg-2), **n.11 → [^3]** (Proverbiorum/contra Mendacium, arg-3).
- **p.848** (PDF 870): arg-4 tail + Sed contra (4 args) + Conclusio + Respondeo (Opinio 1, Opinio 2 w/ exemplum + improbatio). Footer **nn.1–9 → [^4]–[^12]** (n.1 peccati / n.2 infinitum / n.3 supra / n.4 *est⁴ fuit* / n.5 *sed⁵* / n.6 Psalm 5,7 *super illud⁶* / n.7 tranquillitatis / n.8 poena / n.9 modicum).
- **p.849** (PDF 871, running head `DIST. XXXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV.`): Opinio 3 + Conclusio + Solutio oppositorum (ad 1–4) + Restrictio/Explicatio. Footer **nn.1–10 → [^13]–[^22]** (n.1 astrinxerit / n.2 imminentis / n.3 scandalizandi / n.4 Augustinus / n.5 Ecclesiastico / n.6 rationabiliter / n.7 cohibita / n.8 manifesta / n.9 detestatus mendacium / n.10 qui).
- **p.850** (PDF 872): SCHOLION §I–§III only (inline citations, **no own footnote markers**). QUAESTIO V begins lower on the same page (→ a1-q5).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- **PICKED UP ← a1-q3:** p.847 footer **nn.9–11** (= [^1]–[^3]). a1-q3's own band closed at p.847 n.8 (its [^24] = *Vide scholion ad 1. quaest.* redirect).
- **a1-q4 → a1-q5: NOTHING forwarded.** q4's band closes at p.849 n.10 ([^22]); the SCHOLION on p.850 carries no markers; QUAESTIO V (*de ipsius mendacii divisione*, raw 59005) opens lower on p.850 with its own fresh footer band starting at p.850 n.1 (*Cap. 13. n. 24* / Dividit enim Augustinus et Magister¹). a1-q5 starts its own band on p.850.

**has_scholion = TRUE.** q4 carries its **own article-level SCHOLION** (header raw 58979, p.850, body-then-scholion-LAST). §I treats this (4th) question (officious/jocose lie; S. Thomas/Scotus disprove the first two opinions and the "publicly perfect → all lies mortal" position; S. Bonav. does not really dissent — note the restricting *additamentum*); §II prospectively surveys q.5 (three species / eight kinds; jocose-lie S. Thom./Scotus texts); §III prospectively surveys q.6 (degrees of fault). NOT a redirect.

**Structure note.** The 6-pro / 4-contra count: this question has **4 pro (affirmative) args** and **4 sed contra args** (PDF-verified; the cascade-shattered OCR mis-fragments the columns). Conclusio is affirmative (probabiliter concedi → publicly perfect: even small lies imputed mortal).

**`[?]` flags:** NONE. pp.847–850 fully legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 5

title_alt:
De ipsius mendacii divisione
On the division of a lie itself

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

<!-- page 850 -->

### Quaestio V. *De ipsius mendacii divisione.*

Quinto quaeritur de ipsius mendacii divisione. Dividit enim Augustinus et Magister[^1] mendacium per tres differentias primas, videlicet in officiosum, iocosum et perniciosum. Sed contra istam divisionem obiicitur:

1. *Primo* ratione *primi membri*. Officiosum enim mendacium dicitur, quod alicui prodest; sed quod mendacium prosit, hoc est valde *per accidens*, cum sit malum[^2]: ergo penes hoc quod est *prodesse*, non est aliquam speciem ipsius mendacii assignare.

2. Item, idem mendacium secundum *speciem* potest *prodesse* et potest *obesse*: ergo penes ista[^3] non contingit assignare ipsius mendacii species diversas.

3. Item, contra *secundam* differentiam obiicitur, quae quidem est mendacium *iocosum*: quoniam, sicut contingit peccatum mendacii *ioco* perpetrari, ita etiam et alias peccatorum differentias: ergo si alia peccata non habent dividi per *iocosum* et *non iocosum*, videtur, quod nec ipsum mendacium.

4. Item, cum quis falsum dicit intendens *iocare*, non intendit *fallere*; « sed mendacium, ut dicit Augustinus[^4], est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi »: ergo ubi iocus intervenit, ibi non est mendacium: videtur ergo, quod mendacium iocosum non sit species mendacii, immo potius defectus et diminutio ipsius.

5. Item, obiicitur contra *tertiam* differentiam, quae est mendacium *perniciosum*. Si enim *perniciosum* dicitur mendacium, quod inducit mortem, et omne peccatum mortale inducit mortem; esse[^5] *perniciosum* est generale omni peccato mortali: ergo non est differentia mendacii.

6. Item, mendacium *perniciosum* si distinguitur ab aliis, aut hoc est ratione *materiae*, aut ratione *voluntatis*. Ratione *materiae* non, ut videtur, quia in qualibet materia potest homo mentiri graviter et perniciose, si mentiatur ex malignitate. Nec ratione *voluntatis*, quoniam in quolibet genere mendacii potest voluntas inordinate moveri et inducere mortem sive perniciem in mentiente: ergo non videtur, quod sit differentia specialis mendacii.

Item, obiicitur contra *differentias praedictas*: quoniam Augustinus[^6] dividit mendacium in *octo* differentias: aut ergo divisio illa est *superflua*, aut ista est *diminuta*, aut necesse est, unam *reduci* ad aliam. Si ergo *reducitur*, quaeritur, per quam *viam*; quaeritur etiam, quis sit specierum mendacii *numerus*, et quae *sufficientia*.

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### Conclusio.

> Tria sunt genera mendaciorum, quae secundum varietatem intentionis mentientium subdividuntur in octo membra.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum mendacium habeat pro *formali* et *completivo* intentionem fallendi[^7], secundum intentionem ipsius mentientis habet in species diversificari. Mentiens autem aut intendit *prodesse*, aut *delectare*, aut *laedere*[^8]. Secundum quod intendit *prodesse*, est mendacium *officiosum*; secundum quod intendit *delectare*, est mendacium *iocosum*; secundum quod intendit *laedere*, est mendacium *perniciosum*. Laedere autem potest aliquis dupliciter: vel damno *temporali*, vel damno *spirituali*. Et si laedit damno *temporali*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut[^9] *simpliciter* laedit, aut ita laedit unum, quod alteri *prodest*. — Et secundum hoc sunt tres differentiae mendacii *perniciosi*, quarum una consistit in eo genere mendacii, quo quis mentitur in *doctrina religionis*; et hoc quidem facit ad nocumentum boni spiritualis, scilicet fidei. Alia differentia consistit in hoc, ut mendacium *simpliciter obsit*. Tertia vero differentia in hoc, quod mendacium *non simpliciter obest*, sed alicui prodest, alicui obest. — Si vero quis mentitur, ut *delectet*, sic est mendacium *iocosum*; et sic potest esse dupliciter: aut ut delectet *alterum*, et sic est mendacium *simpliciter iocosum*; aut ut delectet *semetipsum* in mentiendo, et sic est mendacium *libidinosum*[^10]. — Si vero quis mentitur, ut *prosit alteri*; aut mentitur, ut prosit in *rebus*, et sic est *una* differentia mendacii *officiosi*; aut ut prosit in *salute et vita corporis*, et sic est *alia*; aut ut prosit in *sanctitate et castitate mentis*, et sic est *tertia*.

Et sic patet, quod tria sunt genera mendaciorum prima, quae subdividuntur in octo membra, ita quod utraque divisio sumta est secundum variationem *intentionis* mentientis, et una illarum in altera habet includi, et hoc satis rationabiliter, sicut tactum est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod accidit mendacio, quod prosit; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est de ratione sui *generis*; quia tamen in moribus *intentio* imponit nomen operi, ex ipsa *intentione* potest illa conditio adeo fieri mendacio essentialis, ut secundum ipsam accipiantur diversae species ipsius mendacii.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem mendacium secundum speciem potest *obesse* et *prodesse*; dicendum, quod illud verum est, loquendo de mendacio quantum ad *sermonem exteriorem*, sed non est verum de ipso quantum ad *interiorem intentionem*; mendacium autem non sortitur speciem a falsa locutione, sed potius ab ipsa *intentione*, sicut tactum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alia peccata habent fieri ioco, sicut et mendacium; dicendum, quod denominationes non fiunt ab his quae raro accidunt, sed ab his quae frequenter[^11]. Licet igitur contingat, alia peccata per iocum perpetrari; quia tamen non ita frequenter alia committuntur ioco, secundum quod ipsum mendacium: hinc est, quod esse iocosum non est differentia alterius peccati, sicut mendacii. *Praeterea*, etsi *omnia* opera sortiantur denominationem ab ipsa intentione, maxime *sermo* ab intentione denominatur; et quia mendacium est in *sermone*[^12]: inde est, quod magis denominatur iocosum, quando fit intentione ludendi, quam alia peccata.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi intervenit iocus, ibi non est intentio fallendi; dicendum, quod, sicut in littera[^13] explanabitur, cum dicitur: mendacium est falsa vocis prolatio cum intentione fallendi, secundum quod *generaliter* accipitur, non idem est *fallere* quod *decipere*, sed idem est *fallere* quod *falsum dicere*. Unde sensus est: cum intentione *fallendi*, hoc est *falsum dicendi*; et hoc utique convenit mendacio *iocoso*, licet minus complete quam *pernicioso*.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod esse *perniciosum* convenit omni generi peccati mortalis; dicendum, quod *perniciosum* assignatur esse differentia ipsius peccati, non quia sit proprium eius *simpliciter*; sed hoc est ratione mendacii *officiosi*, contra quod distinguitur[^14] *perniciosum*, quia illud *prodest*, et istud *obest*; et quoniam alia genera peccatorum non ita distinguuntur per *officiosum*, sicut mendacium: hinc est, quod nec ita distinguuntur per *perniciosum*.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum distinguatur ratione *materiae*, vel *voluntatis*; dicendum, quod ratione *voluntatis*[^15] principaliter, licet etiam posset dici, quod ratione *materiae* quantum ad illam differentiam mendacii *perniciosi*, quae quidem consistit

<!-- page 852 -->

in *doctrina religionis*. Et si tu obiicias, quod ista prava voluntas potest esse in omni genere mendacii; iam patet responsio, quia hoc est falsum, secundum quod explanatum est: quia, secundum quod verba deserviunt *intentioni*, fit diversificatio specierum mendacii[^16].

---

english:
### Question V. *On the division of a lie itself.*

Fifthly it is asked concerning the division of a lie itself. For Augustine and the Master[^1] divide a lie by three primary differences, namely into the *officious*, the *jocose*, and the *pernicious*. But against this division it is objected:

1. *First*, by reason of the *first member*. For a lie is called *officious* which benefits someone; but that a lie should benefit, this is very much *by accident*, since it is an evil[^2]: therefore in respect of this, that it *benefits*, no species of the lie itself can be assigned.

2. Likewise, the same lie according to *species* can *benefit* and can *harm*: therefore in respect of these[^3] it does not happen that diverse species of a lie itself can be assigned.

3. Likewise, it is objected against the *second* difference, which indeed is the *jocose* lie: since, just as the sin of a lie happens to be perpetrated in *jest*, so too the other differences of sins: therefore if other sins do not admit of being divided by the *jocose* and the *non-jocose*, it seems that neither does the lie itself.

4. Likewise, when someone says what is false intending to *jest*, he does not intend to *deceive*; « but a lie, as Augustine says[^4], is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving »: therefore where jesting intervenes, there is no lie: it seems therefore that a jocose lie is not a species of lie, but rather a *defect* and *diminution* of it.

5. Likewise, it is objected against the *third* difference, which is the *pernicious* lie. For if that lie is called *pernicious* which induces death, and every mortal sin induces death; to be[^5] *pernicious* is general to every mortal sin: therefore it is not a difference of a lie.

6. Likewise, a *pernicious* lie, if it is distinguished from the others, this is either by reason of *matter*, or by reason of *will*. Not by reason of *matter*, as it seems, because in any matter whatever a man can lie gravely and perniciously, if he lie out of malignity. Nor by reason of *will*, since in any kind whatever of a lie the will can be moved inordinately and induce death or destruction in the one lying: therefore it does not seem that it is a special difference of a lie.

Likewise, it is objected against the *aforesaid differences*: since Augustine[^6] divides a lie into *eight* differences: therefore either that division is *superfluous*, or this one is *diminished*, or it is necessary that one be *reduced* to the other. If therefore it is *reduced*, it is asked, by what *way*; it is also asked, what is the *number* of the species of a lie, and what its *sufficiency*.

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### Conclusion.

> There are three genera of lies, which, according to the variety of the intention of those who lie, are subdivided into eight members.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that, since a lie has for its *formal* and *completive* [element] the intention of deceiving[^7], according to the intention of the one lying it admits of being diversified into species. Now the one who lies either intends to *benefit*, or to *delight*, or to *harm*[^8]. According as he intends to *benefit*, it is an *officious* lie; according as he intends to *delight*, it is a *jocose* lie; according as he intends to *harm*, it is a *pernicious* lie. But one can harm in two ways: either by *temporal* harm, or by *spiritual* harm. And if he harms by *temporal* harm, this can be in two ways: either[^9] he *simply* harms, or he so harms the one that he *benefits* the other. — And according to this there are three differences of the *pernicious* lie, of which one consists in that kind of lie by which someone lies in the *teaching of religion*; and this indeed makes for the harm of a spiritual good, namely of faith. Another difference consists in this, that the lie *simply harms*. But the third difference [consists] in this, that the lie *does not simply harm*, but benefits one and harms another. — But if someone lies in order to *delight*, thus it is a *jocose* lie; and thus it can be in two ways: either to delight *another*, and thus it is a *simply jocose* lie; or to delight *himself* in lying, and thus it is a *libidinous* lie[^10]. — But if someone lies in order to *benefit another*; either he lies to benefit in *things*, and thus it is *one* difference of the *officious* lie; or to benefit in the *health and life of the body*, and thus it is *another*; or to benefit in the *sanctity and chastity of the mind*, and thus it is *a third*.

And thus it is plain that there are three primary genera of lies, which are subdivided into eight members, in such a way that each division is taken according to the variation of the *intention* of the one lying, and one of them admits of being included in the other, and this quite reasonably, as has been touched on. And by this is plain the response to that which was asked last.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary, that it is accidental to a lie that it benefit; it must be said that this is true, as regards what is by reason of its *kind*; yet because in morals the *intention* imposes the name on the work, from the *intention* itself that condition can become so essential to the lie that according to it the diverse species of the lie itself are taken.

2. To that which is objected, that the same lie according to species can *harm* and *benefit*; it must be said that this is true, speaking of a lie as regards the *exterior speech*, but it is not true of it as regards the *interior intention*; for a lie does not take its species from the false utterance, but rather from the *intention* itself, as has been touched on.

3. To that which is objected, that other sins admit of being done in jest, just as a lie [does]; it must be said that denominations are not made from those things which rarely happen, but from those which frequently[^11]. Although therefore it may happen that other sins be perpetrated through jest; yet because the others are not so frequently committed in jest as a lie itself: hence it is that to be jocose is not a difference of another sin, as [it is] of a lie. *Moreover*, even though *all* works take their denomination from the intention itself, most of all does *speech* take its denomination from the intention; and because a lie is in *speech*[^12]: hence it is that it is more denominated jocose, when it is done with the intention of playing, than the other sins.

4. To that which is objected, that where jesting intervenes, there is no intention of deceiving; it must be said that, as will be explained in the text[^13], when it is said: a lie is a false uttering of the voice with the intention of deceiving, according as it is taken *generally*, *to deceive* is not the same as *to delude*, but *to deceive* is the same as *to say what is false*. Whence the sense is: with the intention of *deceiving*, that is, of *saying what is false*; and this certainly belongs to a *jocose* lie, although less completely than to a *pernicious* one.

5. To that which is objected, that to be *pernicious* belongs to every kind of mortal sin; it must be said that *pernicious* is assigned to be a difference of the sin itself, not because it is proper to it *simply*; but this is by reason of the *officious* lie, against which the *pernicious* is distinguished, because that one *benefits* and this one *harms*[^14]; and since the other kinds of sins are not so distinguished by the *officious*, as a lie [is]: hence it is that neither are they so distinguished by the *pernicious*.

6. To that which is objected, whether it be distinguished by reason of *matter*, or of *will*; it must be said that [it is distinguished] by reason of *will*[^15] principally, although it could also be said that [it is] by reason of *matter* as regards that difference of the *pernicious* lie which indeed consists

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in the *teaching of religion*. And if thou object that this depraved will can be in every kind of lie; the response is already plain, because that is false, according to what was explained: because, according as words serve the *intention*, the diversification of the species of a lie comes about[^16].

---

la: Hic c. 1, ubi sequitur August., Enarrat. in Ps. 5, 7. n. 7.

en: Here c. 1, where he follows Augustine, *Exposition on Psalm* 5:7, n. 7.

la: Specifica differentia autem non convenit rei per accidens. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam nulla differentia est eorum quae secundum accidens insunt, sicut neque genus; non enim contingit differentiam inesse alicui et non inesse. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.

en: Now a specific difference does not belong to a thing by accident. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 6): For there is no difference among those things which are present by accident, just as neither [is there] a genus; for it does not happen that a difference is present in something and not present. Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Difference*.

la: Edd. *istam.*

en: The editions [read] *this.*

la: Contra Mendacium, c. 12. n. 26. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Superius pro *iocare* edd. *iocari.* In fine arg. pro *defectus* codd. W Y Z *defectio.*

en: *Against Lying*, c. 12, n. 26. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — Above, for *to jest* the editions [read] *to be jested.* At the end of the argument, for *defect* codices W Y Z [read] *defection.*

la: Cod. Z praefigit *ergo.*

en: Codex Z prefixes *therefore.*

la: De Mendacio, c. 14. n. 25. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: *On Lying*, c. 14, n. 25. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. — Pro *completivo* edd. *complemento.*

en: Cf. above q. 1. — For *completive* the editions [read] *complement.*

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3, tria cadere possunt in electionem, scil. honestum, utile et iucundum.

en: According to Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 3, three things can fall under choice, namely the honorable, the useful, and the pleasant.

la: Cod. F subiungit *enim.*

en: Codex F subjoins *for.*

la: Cfr. infra dub. 2.

en: Cf. below, dub. 2.

la: Ut insinuat Ambros. supra pag. 808, nota 3. Vide etiam II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 1.

en: As Ambrose intimates above, p. 808, note 3. See also *II Sent.*, d. 36, dub. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 108. (c. 14.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the World* II, text 108 (c. 14).

la: Vide supra q. 2. ad 3. et infra dub. 3. — Superius pro *secundum quod* edd. *sicut.* In fine solut. pro *intentione* cod. A *intentionem.*

en: See above q. 2, ad 3, and below dub. 3. — Above, for *according as* the editions [read] *just as.* At the end of the solution, for *intention* codex A [reads] *intention* [accusative].

la: Edd. *distinguit.*

en: The editions [read] *distinguishes.*

la: Sive *intentionis*, ut dicitur in corp. quaest. — Inferius pro *posset* plurimi codd. *possit.*

en: Or [by reason] *of the intention,* as is said in the body of the question. — Below, for *could* very many codices [read] *can.*

la: Vide scholion ad 4. quaest.

en: See the scholion to the fourth question.

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license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 6

title_alt:
De gradibus specierum mendacii
On the degrees of the species of lies

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

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### Quaestio VI. *De gradibus specierum mendacii.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de gradibus specierum mendacii. Dicit enim Augustinus[^1], quod «primum genus mendacii est gravissimum, et ultimum est levissimum. Et quanto inter genera mendacii aliquod mendacium accedit ad primum, tanto est gravius; et quanto magis elongatur et accedit ad ultimum, tanto est levius». «Primum autem mendacii genus, ut dicit, est in *doctrina religionis* »; «ultimum autem est, ut dicit, *pro conservatione alienae castitatis* ». Contra hoc quod dicit, quod *primum* est gravissimum, obiicitur sic.

1. Esto quod aliquis dicat, Christum non ascendisse super asellum[^2], ex quadam urbanitate, et alius imponat falsum crimen proximo, ex quo proximus morte damnatur; constans est, quod gravius peccat secundus quam primus; sed primus peccat primo genere mendacii, secundus peccat secundo genere mendacii: ergo secundum genus mendacii est gravius quam primum.

2. Item, aliquis dicit aliquod mendacium in doctrina religionis, quod corrumpit fidem in uno simplici; alius vero dicit mendacium, per quod scinditur unitas ecclesiasticae pacis; constat, quod gravius peccat secundus quam primus, quia *seminat inter fratres discordias*[^3], quod maxime Dominus detestatur; et tamen primus peccat primo genere mendacii, secundus vero secundo: ergo redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, possibile est, aliquem mentiri primo genere mendacii ex infirmitate, secundo vero genere mendacii ex certa malitia: si ergo peccatum ex certa malitia est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quod est gravius aliis[^4]: videtur, quod secundum genus possit esse gravius quam primum.

4. Item, primum genus mendacii est contra fidem, secundum est contra caritatem, generaliter loquendo; sed maius bonum est caritas quam fides[^5]: si ergo privationes per habitus dignoscuntur, gravius peccatum est secundum genus mendacii, loquendo generaliter, quam primum.

Est igitur quaestio: quare primum genus peccati Augustinus dicit esse gravissimum?

5. Item, obiicitur contra ultimum gradum. Dicit enim, mendacium, quod fit pro castitate corporis alterius servanda, esse levissimum omnium et levius eo quod fit pro servanda vita. Sed contra: illud mendacium gravius est, in quo magis *salvatur*[^6] ratio mentiendi; sed mendacium, quod fit serio, plus habet de ratione mentiendi quam mendacium, quod fit ioco: si ergo quodlibet mendacium officiosum fit serio, quodlibet mendacium officiosum est gravius quam iocosum.

6. Item, castitatem non potest quis amittere invitus, vitam corporis potest amittere invitus: ergo magis indiget adiutorio et succursu pro servanda vita quam pro servanda continentia: videtur ergo, quod magis spectet ad officium pietatis, et magis leve peccatum sit mentiri pro servanda *vita corporis* quam pro servanda *continentia carnis*.

7. Item, qui perdit vitam perdit spatium merendi et poenitendi, non sic autem qui perdit carnis continentiam: ergo periculosius et damnosius est alicui interfici quam carnaliter violari: ergo magis pium est in tali casu mentiri.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: si quis est in periculo constitutus de castitate amittenda sua vel aliena, quod sit sibi magis eligendum, utrum mentiri, vel sustinere se vel alium corporaliter[^7] violari.

Quaeritur etiam, utrum melius faciat ille qui mentitur, ut alium trahat de statu periculoso, ut intret religionem, de quo vehementer praesumit, ut possit ipsum per mendacium attrahere; an ille qui simpliciter negligit et non vult mentiri pro alicuius salute. Et videtur, quod *primus* melius faciat, quia non magnum est facere unum peccatum veniale, ut alius aeternam consequatur salutem. Quod autem *secundus* melius faciat, videtur, quia maioris perfectionis est in nullo casu mentiri aliqua de causa, secundum quod multipliciter ostendit beatus Augustinus[^8].

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### Conclusio.

> Maximum mendacium est illud quod fit in doctrina religionis; levissimum vero, quod fit pro servanda castitate corporis, vel pro aliquo simili.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, secundum quod beatus Augustinus dicit, gradus mendaciorum sequitur ordinem, ita quod primum est magnum, et ultimum minimum. — Et ratio huius est ista: quoniam, secundum quod vult Philosophus[^9], «si maximum in uno genere excedit maximum in alio genere, simpliciter hoc genus excedit illud ». Unde ad hoc, quod aliquod *genus* excedat alterum, non est necesse, quod *singula* illius generis excedant singula alterius generis, sed quod *summum* in illo genere sit maius omnibus ceteris alterius generis. Quoniam ergo inter mendacia omnia illud est maximum, quo quis intendit alteri nocere in *via veritatis et salutis*, quia infert ei nocumentum spirituale et irrecompensabile et quantum ad maxima bona; hinc est, quod mendacium, quod est in *doctrina religionis*, cum sit ad hoc ordinatum, est inter cetera mendacia maximum et summum. — Ulterius, quia non potest aliquis maiori causa moveri ad mentiendum quam pro servando bono spirituali vel annexo spirituali; hinc est, quod illud mendacium est levissimum, quod fit pro servanda castitate corporis, vel pro aliquo simili; et sic gradatim descendendo et ascendendo est[^10] videre in ceteris aliis. Unde valde rationabiliter beatus Augustinus species mendaciorum distinxit et gradus ordinavit.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de illo qui mentitur dicendo, Christum non ascendisse super asellum, vel aliquod consimile, qui non ita mentitur, sicut ille qui suo mendacio proximum interficit; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod gradus ille non excedat istum, pro eo quod illud non est *summum* mendacium in doctrina religionis, sed quando quis ex certa scientia et malitia impugnat veritatem *secundum pietatem*[^11], ut fidem christianam et bonos mores subvertat, hoc, inquam, modo mentiendi non contingit reperire gravius mendacium in secundo genere. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad duas rationes sequentes, videlicet de mendacio, quod inducit schisma, et de mendacio, quod est ex certa malitia: quoniam mendacium in doctrina religionis non tantum inducit infidelitatem, immo et schisma et cetera mala; nec tantum est ex infirmitate, immo ex certa malitia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primum mendacii genus opponitur fidei, secundum vero opponitur caritati; dicendum, quod ratio illa dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia non sequitur, si aliqua duo *bona* sic se habent, quod unum excedat reliquum, quod similiter sit et in eorum *privationibus* reperire, quoniam, sicut negationes e contrario se habent affirmationibus[^12], sic etiam esse potest in privationibus et habitibus. Unde nihil impedit, quod caritas sit maius bonum quam fides; et tamen maius malum est infidelitas quam odium. Et ratio huius est, quia plus privat infidelitas quam ipsum odium. — Alius etiam defectus est ibi, quia mendacium, quod est in doctrina religionis, non tantum repugnat fidei, sed etiam moribus bonis. *Veritas* enim *secundum pietatem*, quae est in doctrina religionis, non tantum consistit in credendis, verum etiam in agendis; unde si quis diceret, fornicationem non esse vitandam, et parentes non esse honorandos, mentiretur primo genere mendacii. Et quia in doctrina religionis non tantum docetur, quid credendum, sed etiam quid secundum singulas virtutes operandum: hinc est, quod illud mendacium potest opponi cuilibet virtuti et bono spirituali, licet primo et principaliter opponatur ipsi fidei.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ulterius, quod mendacium *iocosum* est magis leve quam *officiosum*; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia in neutro illorum mendaciorum intendit quis *decipere* alium; intendit tamen *dicere falsum* in uno, ut delectet, in altero, ut prosit[^13]. Minus autem inordinata est intentio, quando intendit *prodesse*, quam quando intendit *delectari*. Cum ergo dicit, quod mendacium iocosum non fit serio; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia serio mentitur quis illo mendacio, non tamen ad seducendum, sed ad delectandum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis pium est mentiri pro servanda vita quam pro servanda continentia; dicendum, quod falsum est. Licet enim non possit aliquis alicui invito auferre virtutem continentiae, quantum ad id quod *mentis* est; quia tamen potest auferre illud quod est *ei annexum*, videlicet continentiam *carnis*, in cuius ablatione maximum est periculum propter carnis lubricum: ex hoc est, quod magis accedit ad pietatem mentiri pro illa continentia servanda quam pro vita, secundum quod vita spiritualis praefertur vitae carnali. Unde etsi pietas *naturalis* aliquo modo plus mo-

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veat ad servandam vitam naturae, tamen pietas *gratuita*, quae movetur secundum regulam fidei, magis movet ad conservandam vitam gratiae et virtutis.

7. Ad illud vero quod obiicit, quod qui aufert vitam aufert spatium poenitendi et merendi; dicendum, quod et simul cum hoc aufert spatium peccandi, et nescitur, utrum homo liberatus a morte vitam futuram expendat in bonis, vel in malis; ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur de aliquo, qui est in periculo constitutus; dicendum, quod ille qui est in periculo constitutus de amittenda integritate carnis, aut est *perfectus* amator continentiae, aut *imperfectus*. Si *perfectus* est, ut possit de continentia mentis confidere, non debet propter hoc mendacium dicere pro vitanda corruptione carnis, quoniam, sicut dixit Lucia[^14], «si me invitam violaveris, castitas mihi duplicabitur ad coronam». In tali enim sustinere passionem illam potest esse sine culpa, sed mentiri non potest esse sine culpa. Si autem est *imperfectus*, rationabiliter debet timere, ne succumbat, si ad illum statum venerit; et ideo tali propter infirmitatem suam conceditur redimere periculum maioris peccati per minus peccatum. Unde si probabiliter videt, quod per mendacium possit declinare stuprum, sanius consilium est isti aliquod falsum dicere, quam corruptionem illam sustinere. Et hoc est quod dicit beatus Augustinus in libro de Mendacio[^15]: «Illa peccata, quae ita committuntur in homine, ut eum faciant immundum, etiam peccatis nostris evitare debemus; ac per hoc nec peccata dicenda sunt, quia ideo fiunt, ut illa immunditia evitetur»; — quod intelligendum est, non quod non sint simpliciter peccata, sed quia non sunt gravia. Et sicut dicimus de viro imperfecto respectu sui, sic etiam intelligendum est de viro imperfecto respectu alterius imperfecti; et ita debet homo cavere periculum alienum, sicut et proprium.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum sanius sit consilium mentiri, ut alius reducatur ad viam veritatis; dicendum, quod nec perfecto nec imperfecto convenit mentiri propter hoc, ut alterum ad viam veritatis provocet, quia non indiget Deus nostro mendacio; nec debet aliquis credere, quod aliquis convertatur a malo per falsi suggestionem, sed potius per Spiritus sancti inspirationem, quia, secundum quod dicit Gregorius[^16], « in vanum laborat sermo praedicatoris, nisi intus operetur gratia Salvatoris »[^17].

---

english:
### Question VI. *On the degrees of the species of lies.*

Sixthly and last it is asked concerning the degrees of the species of lies. For Augustine[^1] says that «the first kind of lie is the gravest, and the last is the lightest. And by however much, among the kinds of lie, some lie draws near to the first, by so much is it graver; and by however much it is removed farther and draws near to the last, by so much is it lighter». «But the first kind of lie, as he says, is in the *teaching of religion* »; «and the last, as he says, is *for the preservation of another's chastity* ». Against this which he says, that the *first* is the gravest, it is objected thus.

1. Suppose that someone says that Christ did not ascend upon the ass[^2], out of a certain pleasantry, and another lays a false charge upon his neighbor, by which the neighbor is condemned to death; it is established that the second sins more gravely than the first; but the first sins by the first kind of lie, the second sins by the second kind of lie: therefore the second kind of lie is graver than the first.

2. Likewise, someone tells some lie in the teaching of religion, which corrupts the faith in one simple person; but another tells a lie by which the unity of ecclesiastical peace is split apart; it is established that the second sins more gravely than the first, because he *sows discords among brothers*[^3], which the Lord most of all detests; and yet the first sins by the first kind of lie, but the second by the second: therefore the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, it is possible that someone lie by the first kind of lie out of infirmity, but by the second kind of lie out of settled malice: if therefore a sin out of settled malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is graver than the others[^4]: it seems that the second kind can be graver than the first.

4. Likewise, the first kind of lie is against faith, the second is against charity, generally speaking; but charity is a greater good than faith[^5]: if therefore privations are discerned by their habits, the second kind of lie is a graver sin, speaking generally, than the first.

It is therefore a question: why does Augustine say that the first kind of sin is the gravest?

5. Likewise, it is objected against the last degree. For he says that the lie which is made for the preservation of another's bodily chastity is the lightest of all and lighter than that which is made for the preservation of life. But on the contrary: that lie is graver in which the *account of lying is more preserved*[^6]; but a lie which is made in earnest has more of the account of lying than a lie which is made in jest: if therefore every officious lie is made in earnest, every officious lie is graver than a jocose one.

6. Likewise, one cannot lose chastity unwillingly, [but] one can lose bodily life unwillingly: therefore one has more need of help and succor for the preservation of life than for the preservation of continence: it seems therefore that it pertains more to the office of piety, and is a lighter sin, to lie for the preservation of *bodily life* than for the preservation of the *continence of the flesh*.

7. Likewise, he who loses life loses the space of meriting and of repenting, but not so he who loses the continence of the flesh: therefore it is more perilous and more harmful for someone to be killed than to be carnally violated: therefore it is more pious in such a case to lie.

In connection with this it is asked: if someone is set in danger of losing his own or another's chastity, what ought rather to be chosen by him, whether to lie, or to allow himself or another to be carnally[^7] violated.

It is also asked whether he does better who lies, in order to draw another from a perilous state, that he may enter religion, of whom he strongly presumes that he can attract him by the lie; or he who simply neglects and is unwilling to lie for someone's salvation. And it seems that the *first* does better, because it is no great thing to do one venial sin, that another may attain eternal salvation. But that the *second* does better seems [to be the case], because it is of greater perfection in no case to lie for any cause whatever, according as blessed Augustine shows in many ways[^8].

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### Conclusion.

> The greatest lie is that which is made in the teaching of religion; but the lightest [is that] which is made for the preservation of bodily chastity, or for something similar.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as blessed Augustine says, the degrees of lies follow an order, in such a way that the first is great, and the last least. — And the reason of this is this: that, according as the Philosopher holds[^9], «if the greatest in one genus exceeds the greatest in another genus, this genus simply exceeds that one ». Whence, for some *genus* to exceed another, it is not necessary that the *individuals* of that genus exceed the individuals of the other genus, but that the *highest* in that genus be greater than all the rest of the other genus. Since therefore among all lies that is the greatest by which someone intends to harm another in the *way of truth and of salvation*, because he inflicts upon him a spiritual and irrecompensable harm and as regards the greatest goods; hence it is that the lie which is in the *teaching of religion*, since it is ordered to this, is among the other lies the greatest and highest. — Further, since one cannot be moved to lying by a greater cause than for the preservation of a spiritual good or of one annexed to the spiritual; hence it is that that lie is the lightest which is made for the preservation of bodily chastity, or for something similar; and thus, descending and ascending step by step, it is[^10] to be seen in the other [cases] also. Whence very reasonably did blessed Augustine distinguish the species of lies and order their degrees.

1. 2. 3. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, concerning him who lies by saying that Christ did not ascend upon the ass, or something similar, who does not so lie as he who by his lie kills his neighbor; it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that that degree does not exceed this one, for the reason that this is not the *highest* lie in the teaching of religion, but [it is] when someone out of settled knowledge and malice attacks the truth *according to piety*[^11], so as to subvert the Christian faith and good morals — in this way of lying, I say, it does not happen to find a graver lie in the second kind. — And by this is plain the response to the two following reasons, namely concerning the lie which induces schism, and concerning the lie which is out of settled malice: since a lie in the teaching of religion not only induces infidelity, but rather schism and other evils as well; nor is it only out of infirmity, but rather out of settled malice.

4. To that which is objected, that the first kind of lie is opposed to faith, but the second is opposed to charity; it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways. First indeed, because it does not follow that, if any two *goods* are so disposed that one exceeds the rest, that the like is to be found also in their *privations*, since, just as negations are disposed contrariwise to affirmations[^12], so too it can be in privations and habits. Whence nothing prevents charity from being a greater good than faith; and yet infidelity is a greater evil than hatred. And the reason of this is, because infidelity deprives more than hatred itself. — There is also another defect there, because a lie which is in the teaching of religion not only conflicts with faith, but also with good morals. For the *truth according to piety*, which is in the teaching of religion, consists not only in things to be believed, but also in things to be done; whence if someone were to say that fornication is not to be avoided, and that parents are not to be honored, he would lie by the first kind of lie. And because in the teaching of religion not only is it taught what is to be believed, but also what is to be done according to each virtue: hence it is that that lie can be opposed to any virtue whatever and to a spiritual good, although first and principally it is opposed to faith itself.

5. To that which is objected further, that a *jocose* lie is lighter than an *officious* one; it must be said that it is false, because in neither of those lies does someone intend to *deceive* another; he intends nevertheless *to say what is false* in the one, in order to delight, in the other, in order to benefit[^13]. But the intention is less disordered when it intends to *benefit* than when it intends to *be delighted*. When therefore he says that a jocose lie is not made in earnest; it must be said that it is false, because someone lies in earnest by that lie, not however for the purpose of seducing, but for the purpose of delighting.

6. To that which is objected, that it is more pious to lie for the preservation of life than for the preservation of continence; it must be said that it is false. For although one cannot take from someone unwilling the virtue of continence, as regards that which is of the *mind*; yet because one can take away that which is *annexed to it*, namely the continence of the *flesh*, in the taking-away of which there is the greatest danger on account of the slipperiness of the flesh: from this it is that it draws nearer to piety to lie for the preservation of that continence than for life, according as the spiritual life is preferred to the carnal life. Whence although *natural* piety in some way moves more to the preservation of the life of nature, yet *gratuitous* piety, which is moved according to the rule of faith, moves more to the conservation of the life of grace and of virtue.

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7. To that indeed which it objects, that he who takes away life takes away the space of repenting and of meriting; it must be said that together with this he also takes away the space of sinning, and it is not known whether a man delivered from death would spend his future life in good things, or in evil things; therefore it is not similar on the one side and on the other.

To that indeed which is asked concerning someone who is set in danger; it must be said that he who is set in danger of losing the integrity of the flesh is either a *perfect* lover of continence, or an *imperfect* one. If he is *perfect*, so that he can have confidence in the continence of the mind, he ought not on this account to tell a lie for the avoiding of the corruption of the flesh, since, as Lucy said[^14], «if thou violate me unwilling, my chastity will be doubled unto a crown». For in such [a case] to endure that suffering can be without fault, but to lie cannot be without fault. But if he is *imperfect*, he ought reasonably to fear lest he succumb, if he come into that state; and therefore to such a one, on account of his infirmity, it is conceded to redeem the danger of a greater sin by a lesser sin. Whence if he probably sees that by a lie he can avert the rape, the sounder counsel is for him to say something false, than to endure that corruption. And this is what blessed Augustine says in the book *On Lying*[^15]: «Those sins which are so committed in a man as to make him unclean, we ought to avoid even by our [own] sins; and on this account they are not even to be called sins, because they are done for this, that that uncleanness may be avoided»; — which is to be understood, not that they are not simply sins, but that they are not grave. And just as we say of an imperfect man with respect to himself, so too it is to be understood of an imperfect man with respect to another imperfect [man]; and so a man ought to beware of another's danger, just as also of his own.

To that which is asked last, whether it be the sounder counsel to lie, in order that another be brought back to the way of truth; it must be said that it befits neither the perfect nor the imperfect to lie for this, that he provoke another to the way of truth, because God does not need our lie; nor ought anyone to believe that anyone is converted from evil by the suggestion of what is false, but rather by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, because, according as Gregory says[^16], « the speech of the preacher labors in vain, unless within the grace of the Savior works »[^17].

---

la: De Mendacio, c. 21. n. 42; cfr. etiam c. 14. n. 25, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: *On Lying*, c. 21, n. 42; cf. also c. 14, n. 25, and here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cfr. Matth. 21, 7. — Cod. K *asellam.*

en: Cf. Matthew 21:7. — Codex K [reads] *she-ass.*

la: Prov. 6, 19. — Codd. GIL *aa discordiam.*

en: Proverbs 6:19. — Codices GIL [read] *aa discord.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 13, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec, maior autem horum est caritas. — De seq. proposit. cfr. supra pag. 802, nota 8. — Aliquanto inferius pro *peccati* edd. 1. 2 *mendacii*, Vat. *peccati mendacii.*

en: 1 Corinthians 13:13: But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three, but the greater of these is charity. — On the following proposition cf. above p. 802, note 8. — Somewhat below, for *of sin* editions 1, 2 [read] *of a lie*, the Vatican [edition reads] *of the sin of a lie.*

la: Vat. *servatur.* Paulo ante post *gravius* cod. F supplet *peccatum.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *is preserved.* A little before, after *graver* codex F supplies *sin.*

la: Edd. *carnaliter.* Superius ob auctoritatem codd. et edd. retinuimus *quod sit*, pro *quid sit.*

en: The editions [read] *carnally.* Above, on the authority of the codices and editions, we have retained *that it be*, for *what it be.*

la: In lib. de Mendacio, et contra Mendacium. — Superius pro *salutem* codd. U Z *vitam.*

en: In the book *On Lying*, and *Against Lying*. — Above, for *salvation* codices U Z [read] *life.*

la: Libr. III. Topic. c. 2. Vide supra pag. 740, nota 8. — Paulo superius pro *sequitur* edd. *sequuntur.* Aliquanto inferius pro *excedat* plures codd. *excedit.*

en: *Topics* III, c. 2. See above p. 740, note 8. — A little above, for *follows* the editions [read] *follow.* Somewhat below, for *should exceed* several codices [read] *exceeds.*

la: Edd. *oportet.*

en: The editions [read] *it behooves.*

la: Respicitur 1. Tim. 6, 3. seq.: Si quis aliter docet et non acquiescit sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Iesu Christi et ei quae secundum pietatem est doctrinae, superbus est etc. — Edd. *sive pietatem.*

en: Reference is made to 1 Timothy 6:3 ff.: If anyone teaches otherwise and does not consent to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ and to that doctrine which is according to piety, he is proud, etc. — The editions [read] *or piety.*

la: Terminus *affirmativus* significat rem determinate, v. g. album, terminus *negativus* vero indeterminate, v. g. non-album; in propositione affirmativa praedicatum sumitur secundum totam suam comprehensionem, econtra in propositione negativa etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 28. q. 1. in corp. et ad 3, necnon s. Thom., in l. de Caelo et mundo, lect. 24. n. 6.

en: An *affirmative* term signifies a thing determinately, e.g. *white*, but a *negative* term [signifies it] indeterminately, e.g. *non-white*; in an affirmative proposition the predicate is taken according to its whole comprehension, contrariwise in a negative proposition, etc. Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, in the body and ad 3, as well as St. Thomas, on the book *On the Heavens and the World*, lect. 24, n. 6.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro *ut delectet* cod. A *ut deletetur.*

en: Cf. the preceding question. — For *in order to delight* codex A [reads] *that it be destroyed.*

la: Breviar. Roman. in festo S. Luciae (13. Dec.), 3. lect. II. Nocturn. — Inferius pro *In tali enim sustinere passionem* edd. *In tali periculo sustinere pollutionem.*

en: *Roman Breviary*, on the feast of St. Lucy (13 Dec.), 3rd lection of the 2nd Nocturn. — Below, for *For in such [a case] to endure that suffering* the editions [read] *In such danger to endure pollution.*

la: Cap. 9. n. 15. — Paulo superius pro *stuprum* edd. *corruptionem.*

en: C. 9, n. 15. — A little above, for *rape* the editions [read] *corruption.*

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 3: Nemo ergo docenti homini tribuat quod ex ore docentis intelligit, quia nisi intus sit qui doceat, doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborat.

en: *Homilies on the Gospels*, Book II, homily 30, n. 3: Let no one therefore attribute to the teaching man what he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because unless there be within one who teaches, the tongue of the teacher labors outwardly in vain.

translators_notes:
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