title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. Quaestio III. *Utrum liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit in malum.*

Tertio quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad obiectum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit in malum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. De nullo vituperatur quis nec laudatur, nisi de illo quod est a libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum; sed de peccato et malo vituperatur quis et punitur: ergo peccatum est a libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum: ergo liberum arbitrium potest in peccatum, secundum quod liberum, et in malum.

2. Item, actus liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum, est *eligere*: sed liberum arbitrium de se, cum est gratia destitutum, habet eligere malum; bonum autem non eligit nisi per auxilium gratiae: ergo liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, plus habet obiectum malum quam bonum.

3. Item, potestates rationales sunt ad opposita, secundum quod huiusmodi; sed liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, est potestas rationalis: ergo est ad opposita, quantum est de sui natura. Sed non est ad opposita, quae sunt dulce et amarum, verum et falsum, et consimilia: ergo ad opposita, quae sunt bonum et malum: ergo malum est obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium potest facere malum, aut igitur se ipso, aut alio. Si alio, quaero: mediante quo? et non est dare; tunc enim esset quaerere, utrum illud esset liberum, aut non; et si non esset liberum, iam in opere suo nec esset laudabile nec vituperabile, et ita nec peccare posset. Si autem esset liberum: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel est dare, quod liberum arbitrium se ipso peccat[^1]. Si igitur se ipso potest in malum, et se ipso est liberum: ergo liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, habet pro obiecto ipsum malum.

**Sed contra:**
1. Anselmus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^2]: «Quod libertati appositum eam minuit, et separatum auget, non est libertas nec pars libertatis»; sed potestas peccandi est huiusmodi, ut dicit: et ex hoc concluditur, quod potestas peccandi nec est libertas

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nec pars libertatis. Si igitur malum non est obiectum nisi potestatis peccandi, liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, non habet pro obiecto malum.

2. Item, posse peccare plus dicit impotentiam quam potentiam, et plus dicit defectum quam complementum[^3]; sed «liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, est sub Deo potentissimum»: ergo liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, non habet obiectum malum sive peccatum.

3. Item, si malum est obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum: ergo ubicumque est libertas arbitrii, est potestas ad malum: ergo vel in Deo est potestas ad malum, vel in ipso non est liberum arbitrium; quod si utrumque horum est impossibile et contra Augustinum[^4], restat etc.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium nunquam facit nec appetit malum nisi sub ratione boni[^5]; sed vinum, quia non appetitur nisi sub ratione dulcis, ipsum per se non est appetibile, sed dulce: si ergo malum non appetitur, nisi in quantum apparet bonum, solum bonum est obiectum liberi arbitrii.

5. Item, unaquaeque potentia est completior, cum coniuncta est suo obiecto mediante actu, quam cum non est coniuncta: ergo si malum esset obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum, liberum arbitrium esset completius, cum exiret in malum. Sed hoc est falsum[^6]: manifestum ergo etc.

6. Item, si malum esset obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum, ergo insufficienter definiretur ab Anselmo[^7], cum dicitur: «Potestas servandi rectitudinem». Si tu dicas, quod bonum est obiectum per se, et malum per accidens; hoc non solvit, quia non sufficienter definit medicinam qui dicit, eam esse scientiam sani, nisi addat eius oppositum, licet medicina sit scientia sani per se, et aegri per accidens.

### Conclusio

> Obiectum liberi arbitrii tum secundum communem rationem, tum prout est in creaturis, per se est bonum, ita ut ipsum non, nisi quatenus est deficiens, eligat malum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de libero arbitrio est loqui dupliciter: aut secundum *communem rationem*, secundum quam reperitur in Creatore et in creatura; et sic obiectum eius est bonum et aequum, malum vero non est obiectum; nisi quis dicat, hoc esse obiectum, quia liberum arbitrium illud respuit et detestatur; hic autem vocatur obiectum illud, quod intendit liberum arbitrium per actum proprium, sive quod efficit. — Alio modo contingit loqui de libero arbitrio, secundum quod reperitur in *creatura*; et sic est loqui de ipso dupliciter: aut in quantum *liberum*, aut in quantum *deficiens*. Si in quantum *liberum*, sic natum est exire in actum aequitatis susceptibilem et aequitate informatum. Si autem loquamur de ipso, in quantum *deficiens*, sic liberum arbitrium, in quantum arbitrium liberum, potest et exit in actum deliberativum; quia deficiens, exit in actum deformatum, et ita in malum. Sic ergo patet, quod liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum est, habet obiectum bonum et exit in bonum, non in malum, sicut rationes ad secundam[^8] partem inductae ostendunt. Nihilominus tamen, in quantum cum libertate habet defectibilitatem, potest in malum, ita quod *malitia* non est obiectum liberi arbitrii nec a libero arbitrio, secundum quod *liberum*, sed secundum quod *deficiens*. Actus autem substratus, cum sit deliberativus, exit a libero arbitrio, secundum quod *liberum*[^9]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum.

**Ad argumenta:**

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*Ad 1.* Quod enim obiicitur, solis operibus liberi arbitrii deberi laudem et vituperium; hoc non solum verum est de his quae liberum arbitrium respiciunt, secundum quod *liberum*, sed etiam secundum quod *defectivum*. Sic enim opus ab eo veniens est vituperio dignum ratione *deformitatis*, quae non habet causam *efficientem*, sed *deficientem*, sicut infra[^10] manifestabitur.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium de se eligit malum; dicendum, quod etsi[^11] sufficiat ad eligendum malum, pro eo quod facilius est deficere quam proficere; non tamen ad illud ordinatur principaliter, quoniam hoc non convenit ei secundum naturae propriae complementum, sed potius secundum propriae naturae defectum. Praeterea, etsi de se eligat malum, nunquam tamen eligit malum, nisi in quantum apparet esse bonum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationales potestates sunt ad opposita; dicendum, quod etsi verum sit in rationalibus potestatibus defectibilibus et creatis, non tamen est verum in rationalibus potestatibus, in quibus non potest esse defectus. Absit enim, quod illud philosophicum[^12] verbum sit verum, quo dicitur, quod «Deus potest prava agere»; hoc enim est contra veritatem et contra Augustinum, sicut in primo libro[^13] ostensum fuit et inferius suo loco ostendetur. Quod enim dicuntur rationales potestates esse ad opposita, hoc non est, quia sunt rationales, sed quia sunt deficientes; maxime, si in eiusmodi oppositis intelligatur, quorum unum est privatio alterius, sicut se habent bonum et malum. Et ita ex hoc non sequitur, quod liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit ad malum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium se ipso potest in malum; dicendum, quod etsi se ipso possit, non tamen potest se ipso *sufficiente*[^14], sed potius se ipso *deficiente*; se ipso enim potest deficere, nec oportet aliud intervenire ad hoc, quod exeat in malum.

english:
### Article Unique. Question III. *Whether free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil.*

Thirdly there is an inquiry concerning free choice in relation to its object, and the question is whether free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil. And that it can, seems [to follow].

1. No one is blamed or praised except for that which is from free choice, insofar as it is free; but a person is blamed and punished for sin and evil: therefore sin is from free choice, insofar as it is free: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward sin and toward evil.

2. Likewise, the act of free choice, insofar as it is free, is *to choose*: but free choice of itself, when it is destitute of grace, has [the power] to choose evil; whereas it does not choose the good except by the help of grace: therefore free choice, so far as concerns itself, has evil for its object more than the good.

3. Likewise, rational powers are directed to opposites, insofar as they are such; but free choice, insofar as it is free, is a rational power: therefore it is directed to opposites, so far as concerns its own nature. But it is not directed to the opposites that are sweet and bitter, true and false, and the like: therefore to the opposites that are good and evil: therefore evil is the object of free choice, insofar as it is free.

4. Likewise, free choice can do evil, either therefore by itself, or by another. If by another, I ask: by means of what? and none can be given; for then one would have to ask whether that [other] were free or not; and if it were not free, then in its work it would be neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, and so it could not even sin. But if it were free: then either there will be an infinite regress, or it must be granted that free choice sins by itself[^1]. If therefore it can tend toward evil by itself, and is free by itself: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, has evil itself for its object.

**On the contrary:**
1. Anselm, *On Free Choice*[^2]: «What, when added to liberty, diminishes it, and when separated increases it, is neither liberty nor a part of liberty»; but the power of sinning is of this sort, as he says: and from this it is concluded that the power of sinning is neither liberty

nor a part of liberty. If therefore evil is not the object except of the power of sinning, free choice, insofar as it is free, does not have evil for its object.

2. Likewise, to be able to sin bespeaks impotence rather than power, and bespeaks defect rather than completion[^3]; but «free choice, insofar as it is free, is the most powerful thing under God»: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, does not have evil or sin for its object.

3. Likewise, if evil is the object of free choice, insofar as it is free: then wherever there is freedom of choice, there is the power to evil: therefore either there is in God a power to evil, or in Him there is not free choice; but if each of these is impossible and contrary to Augustine[^4], the rest follows, etc.

4. Likewise, free choice never does nor desires evil except under the aspect of the good[^5]; but wine, since it is not desired except under the aspect of the sweet, is not desirable in itself, but [only] the sweet: if therefore evil is not desired except insofar as it appears good, the good alone is the object of free choice.

5. Likewise, every power is more complete when it is conjoined to its object by means of an act than when it is not conjoined: therefore if evil were the object of free choice, insofar as it is free, free choice would be more complete when it went forth into evil. But this is false[^6]: it is manifest therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, if evil were the object of free choice, insofar as it is free, then it would be insufficiently defined by Anselm[^7], when it is said: «The power of preserving rectitude». And if you say that the good is the object *per se*, and evil *per accidens*; this does not solve it, for he does not sufficiently define medicine who says that it is the science of the healthy, unless he add its opposite, although medicine is the science of the healthy *per se*, and of the sick *per accidens*.

### Conclusion

> The object of free choice, both according to its common notion and as it is in creatures, is *per se* the good, so that it does not choose evil except insofar as it is deficient.

**I respond:** It must be said that free choice can be spoken of in two ways: either according to its *common notion*, according to which it is found in the Creator and in the creature; and thus its object is the good and the equitable, while evil is not its object — unless someone should say that this is its object, because free choice rejects and detests it; but here that is called its object which free choice intends through its proper act, or which it effects. — In another way it happens to speak of free choice as it is found in the *creature*; and thus it can be spoken of in two ways: either insofar as it is *free*, or insofar as it is *deficient*. If insofar as it is *free*, it is then naturally apt to go forth into an act capable of equity and informed by equity. But if we speak of it insofar as it is *deficient*, then free choice, insofar as it is free choice, can and does go forth into a deliberative act; for since it is deficient, it goes forth into a deformed act, and so into evil. So therefore it is plain that free choice, insofar as it is free, has the good for its object and goes forth into the good, not into evil, as the arguments adduced for the second[^8] part show. Nevertheless, insofar as together with liberty it has defectibility, it can tend toward evil, in such a way that *malice* is not the object of free choice nor [does it come] from free choice, insofar as it is *free*, but insofar as it is *deficient*. But the underlying act, since it is deliberative, goes forth from free choice insofar as it is *free*[^9]. — And by this the reply to the first objection is plain.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* As to the objection that praise and blame are owed to the works of free choice alone; this is true not only of those things which free choice regards insofar as it is *free*, but also insofar as it is *defective*. For thus the work coming from it is worthy of blame by reason of the *deformity*, which has not an *efficient* cause but a *deficient* one, as will be shown below[^10].

*To 2.* As to the objection that free choice of itself chooses evil; it must be said that although it suffices[^11] for choosing evil — because it is easier to fail than to advance — yet it is not principally ordered to it, since this does not belong to it according to the completion of its proper nature, but rather according to the defect of its proper nature. Moreover, although of itself it may choose evil, nevertheless it never chooses evil except insofar as it appears to be good.

*To 3.* As to the objection that rational powers are directed to opposites; it must be said that although this is true of defectible and created rational powers, it is nevertheless not true of rational powers in which there can be no defect. For far be it that that philosophical[^12] saying should be true, by which it is said that «God can do depraved things»; for this is against the truth and against Augustine, as was shown in the first book[^13] and will be shown below in its place. For that rational powers are said to be directed to opposites is not because they are rational, but because they are deficient; especially if it be understood of those opposites of which one is the privation of the other, as the good and evil stand. And thus from this it does not follow that free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil.

*To 4.* As to the objection that free choice can tend toward evil by itself; it must be said that although it can [do so] by itself, nevertheless it cannot [do so] by itself as *sufficient*[^14], but rather by itself as *deficient*; for by itself it can fail, nor is it necessary that anything else intervene in order that it go forth into evil.

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 17. n. 47. seqq.

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 1, nn. 1ff. and c. 17, nn. 47ff.

la: Cap. 1: *An putas, quod additum minuit et separatum auget libertatem id aut libertatem esse aut partem libertatis?... Potestas ergo peccandi, quae addita voluntati minuit eius libertatem, et, si dematur, auget, nec libertas est nec pars libertatis.*

en: [Anselm, *On Free Choice*] c. 1: *Do you think that what, when added, diminishes liberty, and when separated increases it, is itself either liberty or a part of liberty?... Therefore the power of sinning, which, added to the will, diminishes its liberty, and, if it be taken away, increases it, is neither liberty nor a part of liberty.*

la: Cfr. August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. — De minori, quae Bernardo tribuitur, cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 20, n. 54, and *City of God* XII, c. 7. — On the minor [premise], which is attributed to Bernard, cf. above p. 115, note 6.

la: Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: *City of God* XXII, c. 30, n. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 517, nota 1. — In minori plures codd. cum Vat. et ed. 1 pro *vinum* substituunt *vitium*. Sed iam Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 3.), ait: *Est enim desiderium huius aut ut finis, ut sanitatis, aut ut eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut medicinae conficiendae, aut ut eorum quae sunt secundum accidens, ut in vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est; nam per se dulce [aliquis] desiderat, vinum autem per accidens; si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat; per accidens ergo desiderabat.*

en: Cf. above p. 517, note 1. — In the minor [premise] several codices, together with the Vatican edition and ed. 1, substitute *vitium* (vice) for *vinum* (wine). But already Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 2 (c. 3), says: *For the desire of this is either as of an end, like health, or as of the things that are toward the end, like the preparing of medicine, or as of the things that are accidental, as in wine [one desires] the sweet friend, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet; for one desires the sweet per se, but the wine per accidens; for if it become sour, one desires it no longer; therefore one was desiring it per accidens.*

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.) docet, quod in bonis actus magis sit honorabilis quam potentia, at in malis magis valeat potentia. — Vat. et codd. 2, 3, 4 coniungunt hoc arg. cum sequente, omissis omnino verbis *liberum arbitrium esset completius* usque ad illa verba *ergo insufficienter* etc.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9), teaches that in good things the act is more honorable than the power, but in evil things the power has greater force. — The Vatican edition and codices 2, 3, 4 join this argument with the following, omitting entirely the words *free choice would be more complete* down to those words *therefore insufficiently*, etc.

la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3. — Propositio seq. illustratur illis verbis Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 11. (c. 10.): *Neque enim aequaliter sanitatis morbique eadem est scientia, sed illius quidem iuxta naturam, huius autem praeter naturam. Sic et voluntas secundum quidem naturam boni est, praeter naturam vero mali; et vult natura quidem bonum, praeter naturam vero et ex mentis quadam eversione malum.*

en: [Anselm,] *Dialogue on Free Choice* c. 3. — The following proposition is illustrated by those words of Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 11 (c. 10): *For the science of health and of disease is not equally the same, but that of the former is according to nature, that of the latter beside nature. So too the will is by nature [a will] of the good, but beside nature of evil; and it wills by nature the good, but beside nature and by a certain perversion of mind the evil.*

la: Fere omnes codd. cum tribus primis edd. *primam*; perperam.

en: Nearly all the codices, together with the first three editions, read *first* [part]; wrongly.

la: Cfr. infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 2. seqq., d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. Illustratur haec distinctio duorum in una actione communiter exemplo igniti gladii, vulnus adustum facientis, quod a Damasceno, III. de Fide orthod. c. 19, ita proponitur: *Igniti gladii incisam unam ustionem atque inustam sectionem dicimus, et tamen sectionem distinctam ab ustione esse nec non alius aliusque naturae asserimus, ignis nempe ustionem, ac ferri sectionem* (ed. Migne). — Paulo superius pro *substratus* Vat. *abstractus* (!); cod. B verbo *substratus* addit *tantummodo*.

en: Cf. below d. 34, a. 1, q. 2ff., d. 37, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 1. This distinction of two [things] in one action is commonly illustrated by the example of the red-hot sword inflicting a burned wound, which is set forth thus by [John] Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 19: *We say that the cut of a red-hot sword is one burning and one unburnt cutting, and yet we assert that the cutting is distinct from the burning and of one and another nature, namely the burning belonging to the fire, and the cutting to the iron* (Migne edition). — A little above, for *substratus* (underlying) the Vatican edition reads *abstractus* (abstracted) (!); codex B adds to the word *substratus* only [the word *tantummodo*].

la: Locis in nota praeced. citt. — Paulo ante pro *Sic enim*, ut legimus cum codd. IX aa bb ee, Vat. *Sic tantum*.

en: In the places cited in the preceding note. — A little before, for *Sic enim* (for thus), as we read with codices IX aa bb ee, the Vatican edition reads *Sic tantum* (thus only).

la: In codd. Y aa subiungitur *per se*. — De hac solut. cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. et 9, ubi inter alia docetur, malum esse facile, bonum vero difficile.

en: In codices Y aa there is appended *per se* (of itself). — On this solution cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6 and 9, where among other things it is taught that evil is easy, but the good difficult.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5, ubi haec propositio: «Potest enim et Deus et studiosus [i. e. virtuosus] prava agere, non sunt autem huiusmodi».

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 5, where [stands] this proposition: «For both God and the virtuous man can do depraved things, but they are not of such a sort».

la: Dist. 42. q. 2. et d. 46. q. 2. nec non infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. n. 3. et 83 Qq. q. 3. seq. — In fine solut. post *secundum quod liberum* ed. 1 addit *per se*.

en: Dist. 42, q. 2, and d. 46, q. 2, and also below d. 37, a. 2, q. 1. — Augustine, *City of God* XXII, c. 30, n. 3, and *83 Questions*, q. 3f. — At the end of the solution, after *secundum quod liberum* (insofar as it is free), ed. 1 adds *per se*.

la: Codd. L ce (bb a prima manu) *efficiente*.

en: Codices L ce (bb by the first hand) read *efficiente* (as efficient).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pelagiani contendebant, indifferentiam voluntatis ad eligendum bonum et malum esse de essentia libertatis; contra quos communiter catholici auctores cum Ss. Augustino, Anselmo et Magistro tenent, libertatem contrarietatis, scilicet quae eligit inter bonum et malum, nec de essentia nec de perfectione libertatis esse, sed tantum *defectum* eiusdem, ex defectibilitate creaturae ortum. Unde S. Thom. (S. I. q. 62. a. 8. ad 3.) docet: «Quod liberum arbitrium diversa eligere possit, *servato ordine finis*, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis eius; sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis» (cfr. idem hic q. unic. a. 1. ad 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 7. in corp.). Patet autem, quanti momenti sit haec doctrina ad solvendas multas quaestiones.

**II.** Hanc quaestionem alii commentatores Magistri tantum paucis verbis tangunt; sub aliis titulis fusius de ea loquuntur Alex. Hal., S. q. 72. m. 2. a. 2. § 1, a. 3. § 1; B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 6. quaestiunc. incid.; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 5. dub. lat. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Pelagians contended that the indifference of the will to choosing good and evil belongs to the essence of liberty; against whom the Catholic authors commonly, together with Saints Augustine, Anselm, and the Master, hold that the liberty of contrariety — namely that which chooses between good and evil — belongs neither to the essence nor to the perfection of liberty, but is only a *defect* of it, arising from the defectibility of the creature. Hence St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3) teaches: «That free choice can choose diverse things, *the order to the end being preserved*, pertains to the perfection of its liberty; but that it should choose something by turning aside from the order to the end, which is to sin, pertains to the defect of liberty» (cf. the same here, q. unic., a. 1, ad 2; *de Veritate* q. 24, a. 7, in the body). And it is plain of how great moment this doctrine is for solving many questions.

**II.** Other commentators of the Master touch this question only in a few words; under other titles they speak of it more at length: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* q. 72, m. 2, a. 2, § 1, a. 3, § 1; Bl. Albert, II *Sent.* d. 24, a. 6, incidental little question; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 5, Latin dub. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II two-column PDF-priority inversion per CLAUDE.md Override; the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Conclusio / Respondeo / footers here). Raw OCR range lines 42903–43042. Alignment CONFIRMED: opener "Tertio quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad obiectum… utrum liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit in malum" = the third sub-question (*ad obiectum*) of d.25 Pars II ARTICULUS UNICUS.

**Page-split map (q3 spans pp. 613–615):**
- **p.613** (R-col lower): title + opener + args 1–4 + Sed contra arg-1 start. q3's p.613 footers = **8** (August. III de Lib. Arb.) anchored at arg-4 *se ipso peccat*, and **9** (Anselm Cap. 1 *additum/separatum*) anchored at Sed contra arg-1 *Anselmus de Libero Arbitrio*. p.613 footers 1–7 belong to QUAESTIO II (already consumed by a1-q2 as its [^8]–[^14]).
- **p.614**: Sed contra arg-1 tail + args 2–6 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + "Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum" + reply-1 opening. q3's p.614 footers 1–7 → [^3]–[^9].
- **p.615** (top, before QUAESTIO IV): Ad-argumenta replies 1–4 + SCHOLION I–II. q3's p.615 footers 1–5 → [^10]–[^14]. p.615 footers 6–7 belong to QUAESTIO IV (Damascenus/Fide orthod.).

**Hand-offs.**
- RECEIVED from a1-q2: p.613 footers 8 (August. III de Lib. Arb.) + 9 (Anselm *additum*/*separatum*) — q3's Sed-contra footers; led the apparatus as [^1]–[^2].
- FORWARDED to a1-q4: nothing. q3 closes cleanly with SCHOLION II before QUAESTIO IV opens on p.615 ("Quarto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad aliud agens creatum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato possit cogi"); QUAESTIO IV carries its own p.615 footers 6–7 onward.

**has_scholion = true** (SCHOLION I = Pelagian-vs-Catholic doctrine on libertas contrarietatis as *defect* not essence, with the S. Thomas *servato ordine finis* citation; SCHOLION II = commentator-roll, Alex. Hal. / Albert / Giles of Rome). The Scholion carries no footnote markers (its citations are inline parentheticals).

**[?] flags:** none. Latin re-set entirely from 450 dpi PDF column bands; all 14 footnote-marker digits (8, 9 on p.613; 1–7 on p.614; 1–5 on p.615) verified eyes-on against the PDF.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato cogi possit.*

Quarto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad aliud agens creatum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato possit cogi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Tam Damascenus[^1] quam Philosophus dicunt, quod quaedam sunt operationes partim voluntariae, partim involuntariae, et quodam modo permixtae ex voluntario et involuntario, sicut iactare merces in mare, et consimilia. Si igitur involuntarium est illud quod est per violentiam, aliquas operationes exeuntes a libero arbitrio contingit permisceri violentia: ergo si contingit magis et magis permisceri, contingit, eas simpliciter esse involuntarias et coactas: ergo liberum arbitrium cogi potest in actione sua.

2. Item, maior virtus potest inferre violentiam minori; sed quod potest inferre violentiam potest compellere: ergo minor virtus a maiori potest compelli. Sed aliqua virtus potentior est libero arbitrio viatoris, utpote virtus Angeli: ergo saltem ab Angelo liberum arbitrium nostrum potest cogi.

3. Item, si aliqua virtus potest impediri ab actu suo, potest violentari; et si sufficienter potest impediri, sufficienter potest violentari; et si sufficienter potest violentari, potest cogi. Cum igitur liberum arbitrium ab actu suo et usu impediri possit, sicut patet, quod diabolus potest auferre usum liberi arbitrii et facere hominem[^2] furiosum: ergo videtur, quod ab eo liberum arbitrium nostrum possit compelli vel cogi.

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4. Item, quando radius est iunctus aquae, mota aqua, necesse est, moveri radium; sed multo maiori vinculo coniungitur anima corpori, quam coniungatur radius aquae: ergo, moto corpore, necesse est, moveri affectus animae. Si igitur aliqua virtus creata potest corpus transmutare, poterit per consequens liberum arbitrium vertere et compellere, ipso nolente.

5. Item, sicut se habet intellectus ad verum, ita se habet affectus ad bonum; sed intellectus compelli potest ad credendum aliquod verum: ergo et affectus ad amandum bonum. Si ergo liberum arbitrium non dicit aliud quam rationem et voluntatem, videtur, quod et ipsum compelli possit per actionem alicuius agentis creati.

6. Item, agens creatum sua actione potest liberum arbitrium cogere coactione inducente, quae est dispositio respectu coactionis sufficientis; sed dispositio per frequentem sui iterationem et intensionem potest fieri necessitas[^3]: ergo videtur, quod si voluntas possit cogi coactione inducente, quod processu temporis compelli possit coactione sufficienti per actionem alicuius creaturae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Bernardus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^4]: «Voluntas pro ingenita sui nobilitate nulla cogitur necessitate»: si igitur voluntas a nemine potest cogi, et hoc non est ob aliud nisi propter liberi arbitrii libertatem; ergo liberum arbitrium a nulla creatura cogi potest.

2. Item, si aliqua creatura posset liberum arbitrium hominis cogere, hoc maxime competeret ipsi diabolo, de quo dicitur *Iob*, quadragesimo primo[^5]: *Non est potestas super terram, quae ei possit comparari.* Si ergo diabolus liberum arbitrium nostrum non potest cogere, quia tunc faceret, nos continue peccare; videtur, quod nulla alia creatura possit ipsum cogere.

3. Item, nulla maior compulsio potest fieri libero arbitrio hominis quam per intentationem mortis; sed mortis intentatio ad compellendum liberum arbitrium non sufficit, sicut patet in Martyribus sanctis et aliis, qui potius volunt mori quam fidem suam diffiteri: ergo non videtur, quod liberum arbitrium ab aliqua creatura possit compelli[^6].

4. Item, liberum arbitrium est secundum id quod est supremum in anima, cum ipsius sit regere et movere omnes potentias; sed eo quod supremum est in anima, solus Deus maior est[^7]: ergo nulla creatura potest super illud: nulla ergo creatura potest in hominis liberum arbitrium compellendum.

> **Conclusio.** Liberum arbitrium ab agente creato quoad actum exteriorem quidem potest cogi; quoad actum interiorem aliquo modo induci et impediri potest, non autem cogi.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod est loqui de libero arbitrio quantum ad actum exteriorem et quantum ad actum interiorem, sive quantum ad actum proprium et quantum ad actum alienum. — Si loquamur de libero arbitrio quantum ad actum exteriorem, sic respectu talium actuum potest intervenire coactio; potest enim quis compelli, ut genua coram idolo flectat et ut manibus propriis thura altaribus imponat vel incendat. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad actum interiorem, qui scilicet est velle vel eligere aut consentire; sic respectu talis actus potest liberum arbitrium aliquo modo induci, potest et impediri, sed nullo modo potest compelli.

Induci quidem potest, quoniam[^8] amat aliud a se et quod infra se est. Unde per oblationem alicuius rei amatae, vel ablationem potest induci ad consentiendum in aliquid multum efficaci persuasione, per quem modum idololatrae tentabant sanctos Martyres consentire in idololatria, modo promittendo delectabilia, modo infligendo tristia. Ista tamen inductio longe distat a coactione; sicut probat ipse exitus, quia nec blandimentis allici nec tormentis terreri adeo potuerunt, ut a veritate iustitiae mutarentur. Et sic liberum arbitrium induci potest, quia amat aliquid infra se, utpote vitam temporalem, vel aliud consimile, quod potest agens creatum conferre vel auferre.

Potest etiam impediri propter inclinationem et coniunctionem sui ad naturam corporalem, quae subest virtuti creaturae[^9]; unde bene posset aliquis alium ita laedere, quod usum liberi arbitrii amitteret; ex hoc tamen liberum arbitrium non cogeret. Coactio enim ponit liberi arbitrii actum et usum; sed ligatio vel impeditio tollit. Et iterum, impeditio provenire potest ab inferiori, coactio provenire habet a superiori. — Et hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium, etsi possit induci ab agente creato ratione boni exterioris amati, et possit impediri ratione corporis coniuncti, non potest cogi respectu actus proprii. Hanc enim dignitatem[^10] habet liberum arbitrium, ut, in quantum liberum, soli Deo sit subiectum; et quia,

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in quantum liberum, nulli agenti creato subest, cum coactio sit a superiori, nullum agens creatum potest ipsum cogere. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod est actio mixta ex voluntario et involuntario; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de actione exteriori, et quantum ad illam potest intervenire coactio. Praeterea, intelligitur ibi de involuntario, prout dicitur involuntarium per violentiam, non inquam per violentiam coactionis sufficientis, sed solum inducentis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior virtus potest violentare minorem; iam patet responsio, quia quantum ad libertatis dignitatem, sicut ostensum fuit in primo problemate, omnes creaturae rationales habent aequalitatem; nec una nata est secundum istam proprietatem in alteram agere, et propter hoc nec alteram violentare nec cogere. Cum enim dicitur, quod maior virtus potest violentare minorem; hoc veritatem habet, si, secundum quod maior est, nata sit agere in minorem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium potest in sua actione impediri; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod possit cogi. Impedimentum enim privat actum libertatis, sed coactio ponit actum liberi arbitrii, et simul cum hoc ponit, quod non sit libertatis; et ista sunt incompossibilia, sicut si poneretur, quod aliquis actus esset voluntatis et non esset voluntarius; et hoc melius videbitur infra[^11]. Et ideo ratio illa non cogit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aqua mota, necessario movetur radius ei coniunctus; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod radii multiplicatio est naturalis, nec potest lux se ipsam non multiplicare, cum invenit materiam sibi aptam; et sicut multiplicatio radiorum est naturalis, ita et reflexio ipsorum est naturalis et repercussio; et propterea, cum aqua movetur, alio modo suscipitur radius; ideo necesse est, ipsum alio modo reflecti. Liberum autem arbitrium praeest corpori, cum[^12] in suum actum voluntarie exit, et se ipso est proprii actus variatio, non ex hoc, quod sit aliqua mutatio in corpore coniuncto.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione intellectus ad verum, et affectus ad bonum, dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo sit comparatio consimilis, non tamen est omnimoda similitudo, quoniam, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^13], libertas arbitrii plus se tenet ex parte motivae quam cognitivae; et ideo coactio plus repugnat affectioni, quam repugnet cognitioni; et propterea non sequitur, quod si intellectus potest cogi, quod et affectus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest induci; dicendum, quod etsi inductio videatur esse quaedam coactio — maxime secundum humana iura[^14], quae dicunt, illud quod fit causa metus, non esse habendum ratum, maxime de eo metu, qui potest cadere in constantem virum, pro eo quod considerant exteriora opera — secundum veritatem tamen ista inductio stat cum libertate voluntatis, nec ei repugnat in aliquo, sed potius repugnat plenitudini amoris et voluntatis. Non enim ita plene vult aliquis, quando vult ex conditione[^15], sicut quando vult absolute, sicut patet de iactatione mercium in mare; nihilominus tamen salvatur ibi ratio libertatis et voluntatis. Unde talis metus apud Deum non excusat a culpa, sicut aperte patet in negatione a Petro facta[^16]; et propterea non sequitur, quod si possit a creatura induci, quod possit cogi. — Nec valet quod obiicit de dispositione, quae habet fieri necessitas per iterationem. Hoc enim verum est respectu virtutis naturalis et actus, qui determinatur ad unam differentiam contrarietatis; non autem verum est respectu voluntatis, quae absoluta est, et quantum est de se, vertibilis est. Praeterea, illud habet locum in eo genere dispositionis, quae est eiusdem generis et proprietatis, ut est dispositio proxima et remota. Sic autem non est in proposito, ut ostensum est supra[^17]. Et sic patent obiecta.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether free choice can be compelled by some created agent.*

Fourthly, inquiry is made concerning free choice in relation to another created agent, and the question is whether free choice can be compelled by some created agent. And that it can, seems [the case].

1. Both Damascene[^1] and the Philosopher say that there are certain operations partly voluntary, partly involuntary, and in a certain way mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary, such as throwing merchandise into the sea, and the like. If, therefore, the involuntary is that which is by violence, it happens that some operations issuing from free choice are mixed with violence: therefore if it happens that they are mixed more and more, it happens that they are simply involuntary and compelled: therefore free choice can be compelled in its action.

2. Likewise, a greater power can inflict violence on a lesser; but what can inflict violence can compel: therefore a lesser power can be compelled by a greater. But some power is more powerful than the free choice of the wayfarer, such as the power of an Angel: therefore free choice of ours can be compelled at least by an Angel.

3. Likewise, if some power can be impeded from its act, it can be violated; and if it can be sufficiently impeded, it can be sufficiently violated; and if it can be sufficiently violated, it can be compelled. Since, therefore, free choice can be impeded from its act and use, as is evident — for the devil can take away the use of free choice and make a man[^2] frenzied — therefore it seems that by him our free choice can be compelled or coerced.

4. Likewise, when a ray [of light] is joined to water, when the water is moved, the ray must be moved; but the soul is joined to the body by a far greater bond than the ray is joined to the water: therefore, when the body is moved, the affections of the soul must be moved. If, therefore, some created power can transmute the body, it will consequently be able to turn and compel free choice, [the soul] itself being unwilling.

5. Likewise, as the intellect stands to the true, so the affection stands to the good; but the intellect can be compelled to believe some truth: therefore also the affection [can be compelled] to love a good. If, then, free choice says nothing other than reason and will, it seems that it too can be compelled by the action of some created agent.

6. Likewise, a created agent by its action can compel free choice by an inducing coercion, which is a disposition with respect to sufficient coercion; but a disposition can, through frequent repetition and intensification of itself, become a necessity[^3]: therefore it seems that, if the will can be compelled by an inducing coercion, then in the course of time it can be compelled by a sufficient coercion through the action of some creature.

**On the contrary:** 1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*[^4]: "The will, by reason of its innate nobility, is compelled by no necessity": if, therefore, the will can be compelled by no one, and this is for no other reason than because of the liberty of free choice; therefore free choice can be compelled by no creature.

2. Likewise, if some creature could compel a man's free choice, this would most of all belong to the devil himself, of whom it is said in *Job*, the forty-first chapter[^5]: *There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him.* If, therefore, the devil cannot compel our free choice — since then he would make us sin continually — it seems that no other creature can compel it.

3. Likewise, no greater compulsion can be brought against a man's free choice than by the threat of death; but the threat of death is not sufficient to compel free choice, as is evident in the holy Martyrs and others, who would rather die than disavow their faith: therefore it does not seem that free choice can be compelled by any creature[^6].

4. Likewise, free choice is according to that which is supreme in the soul, since it belongs to it to rule and move all the powers; but than that which is supreme in the soul, God alone is greater[^7]: therefore no creature has power over it: therefore no creature has [the power] of compelling a man's free choice.

> **Conclusion.** Free choice can indeed be compelled by a created agent as to the exterior act; as to the interior act it can in some way be induced and impeded, but not compelled.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that there is [a way of] speaking of free choice as to the exterior act and as to the interior act, or as to its proper act and as to an act belonging to another. — If we speak of free choice as to the exterior act, then with respect to such acts coercion can intervene; for someone can be compelled to bend his knees before an idol and to place incense on the altars with his own hands or to burn it. — But if we speak as to the interior act, which is, namely, to will or to choose or to consent; then with respect to such an act free choice can in some way be induced, and it can be impeded, but in no way can it be compelled.

It can indeed be induced, since[^8] it loves something other than itself and what is beneath itself. Hence, by the offering of some loved thing, or by its removal, it can be induced to consent to something by a very efficacious persuasion, in the manner in which idolaters tempted the holy Martyrs to consent to idolatry, now by promising delights, now by inflicting griefs. Yet this inducement is far removed from coercion; as the outcome itself proves, since they could neither be allured by blandishments nor terrified by torments to the point of being turned from the truth of justice. And thus free choice can be induced, because it loves something beneath itself, such as temporal life, or another like thing, which a created agent can confer or take away.

It can also be impeded on account of its inclination and conjunction to corporeal nature, which is subject to the power of a creature[^9]; hence someone could well injure another in such a way that he would lose the use of free choice; yet from this he would not compel free choice. For coercion posits the act and use of free choice; but binding or impeding takes [them] away. And again, impeding can come from below, [whereas] coercion has to come from above. — And hence it is that free choice, although it can be induced by a created agent by reason of an exterior good loved, and can be impeded by reason of the conjoined body, cannot be compelled with respect to its proper act. For free choice has this dignity[^10], that, insofar as it is free, it is subject to God alone; and because,

insofar as it is free, it is subject to no created agent, since coercion is from a superior, no created agent can compel it. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that there is an action mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary; it must be said that this is understood of the exterior action, and as to that coercion can intervene. Moreover, it is understood there of the involuntary, insofar as the involuntary is said [to be] by violence — not, I say, by the violence of sufficient coercion, but only of inducing [coercion].

2. To that which is objected, that a greater power can violate a lesser; the response is already evident, because as to the dignity of liberty, as was shown in the first problem, all rational creatures have equality; nor is one [creature] of a nature to act upon another according to this property, and on this account neither to violate nor to compel another. For when it is said that a greater power can violate a lesser, this holds true if, according as it is greater, it is of a nature to act upon the lesser.

3. To that which is objected, that free choice can be impeded in its action; it must be said that this is true; yet from this it does not follow that it can be compelled. For an impediment deprives [it] of the act of liberty, but coercion posits the act of free choice, and along with this posits that it is not [an act] of liberty; and these are incompossible, just as if it were posited that some act were of the will and were not voluntary; and this will be better seen below[^11]. And therefore that argument does not conclude.

4. To that which is objected, that when water is moved, the ray joined to it is necessarily moved; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the multiplication of the ray is natural, nor can light not multiply itself when it finds matter suitable to it; and as the multiplication of rays is natural, so too is their reflection natural, and [their] repercussion; and therefore, when the water is moved, the ray is received in another mode; thus it must necessarily be reflected in another mode. But free choice presides over the body, since[^12] it goes forth into its act voluntarily, and the variation of its proper act is from itself, not from the fact that there is some change in the conjoined body.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of the intellect to the true, and of the affection to the good, it must be said that, although there is in some way a similar comparison, nevertheless there is not an altogether perfect likeness, since, as was shown above[^13], the liberty of choice holds more on the side of the motive [power] than of the cognitive; and therefore coercion is more repugnant to the affection than it is repugnant to cognition; and on this account it does not follow that, if the intellect can be compelled, the affection [can be] also.

6. To that which is objected, that it can be induced; it must be said that, although inducement may seem to be a kind of coercion — especially according to human laws[^14], which say that what is done by reason of fear is not to be held valid, especially concerning that fear which can fall upon a constant man, for the reason that they consider exterior works — nevertheless according to truth this inducement stands together with the liberty of the will, nor is it repugnant to it in any respect, but rather is repugnant to the fullness of love and will. For one does not will so fully when he wills under a condition[^15] as when he wills absolutely, as is evident in the throwing of merchandise into the sea; nevertheless the account of liberty and will is preserved there. Hence such fear does not excuse from fault before God, as is openly evident in the denial made by Peter[^16]; and on this account it does not follow that, if it can be induced by a creature, it can be compelled. — Nor is what is objected concerning the disposition that becomes a necessity through repetition of any avail. For this is true with respect to a natural power and act, which is determined to one term of a contrariety; but it is not true with respect to the will, which is absolute, and, as far as it is concerned, is changeable. Moreover, that has place in that genus of disposition which is of the same genus and property, as is a proximate and a remote disposition. But it is not so in the case at hand, as was shown above[^17]. And thus the objections are clear.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 24; Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. — Vat., post *operationes* addita voce *voluntatis*, mox pro *et quodam modo permixtae* cum edd. 3, 4 substituit *et quaedam mixtae*, ac deinde pro *magis et magis* cum edd. 2, 3 falso *magis et minus*.

en: [John Damascene], Book II of *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 24; Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 1. — The Vatican edition, after *operationes*, adds the word *voluntatis*, then for *et quodam modo permixtae*, with editions 3 and 4, substitutes *et quaedam mixtae*, and thereafter for *magis et magis*, with editions 2 and 3, falsely [reads] *magis et minus*.

la: Codd. et edd. I, 2 *eum*, incongrue; quare lectionem Vat., quacum concordat et ed. 4, retinuimus. Ed. 3 omittit *eum*.

en: Codices and editions 1 and 2 [read] *eum* ["him"], incongruously; wherefore we have retained the reading of the Vatican edition, with which edition 4 also agrees. Edition 3 omits *eum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 301, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 301, note 3.

la: Cap. 3. n. 6: *Sola ergo voluntas, quoniam pro sui ingenita libertate nulla vi, nulla* etc.

en: [Bernard, *On Free Choice*] c. 3, n. 6: "The will alone, therefore, since by reason of its innate liberty [it is compelled] by no force, by no" etc.

la: Vers. 24.

la: Vat., bis substituto cum edd. 3, 4 *comminationem* pro *intentationem*, cum omnibus edd. omittit verba *qui potius... diffiteri*, et ultimam arg. propositionem sic exhibet: *ergo a nulla creatura potest compelli*.

en: The Vatican edition, twice substituting (with editions 3 and 4) *comminationem* ["threatening"] for *intentationem*, together with all the editions omits the words *qui potius... diffiteri* ["who would rather... disavow"], and presents the last proposition of the argument thus: *ergo a nulla creatura potest compelli* ["therefore it can be compelled by no creature"].

la: De hac Augustini sententia vide supra pag. 611, nota 2. — In principio arg. post *Item* Vat. interserit *si*, quod omisimus auctoritate codd. F aa cc ee et ed. I, et in fine arg. substituit *ad hominis* pro *in hominis*.

en: Concerning this statement of Augustine see above, p. 611, note 2. — At the beginning of the argument, after *Item*, the Vatican edition inserts *si*, which we have omitted on the authority of codices F, aa, cc, ee and edition 1, and at the end of the argument it substitutes *ad hominis* for *in hominis*.

la: Vat. cum cod. ee et aliis paucis *quando*.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex ee and a few others, [reads] *quando* ["when"].

la: Cfr. infra q. 6.

en: Cf. below, q. 6.

la: Cod. V addit *libertatis*.

en: Codex V adds *libertatis* ["of liberty"].

la: Hic q. 6. — Paulo superius pro *non sit libertatis* cod. cc cum ed. I *non sit libertas*.

en: Here, q. 6. — A little above, for *non sit libertatis* codex cc with edition 1 [reads] *non sit libertas*.

la: Codd. H T cum *ei*.

en: Codices H and T [read] *cum ei* ["with it"].

la: Huius dist. part. I. q. 6.

en: Part I of this distinction, q. 6.

la: Cfr. 1. Decret. Greg. tit. 40.

en: Cf. *Decretals* of Gregory [IX], book 1, tit. 40.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *inductione*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] *inductione* ["by inducement"].

la: Matth. 26, 69. seqq.; Luc. 22, 55. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro *necessitas* codd. B H K P Q (T a prima manu) et alii perperam *voluntas*.

en: Matthew 26:69 ff.; Luke 22:55 ff. — A little below, for *necessitas* codices B, H, K, P, Q (T by the first hand) and others [read] erroneously *voluntas*.

la: Hic in corp. quaest. — Paulo superius post *quae est* cod. aa addit *gradus*.

en: Here in the body of the question. — A little above, after *quae est* codex aa adds *gradus*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc et sequentem quaest. alii commentatores Lombardi unica quaest. absolvunt, exceptis Petro a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aegid. R. Omnes in solutionibus satis conveniunt. — Bene distinguitur in hac quaest. inter induci, impediri, compelli (sive cogi in proprio sensu). Pro distinctione inter induci et compelli S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 2.) cum aliis distinguit inter coactionem sufficientem (compulsionem) et insufficientem (impulsionem). — In seq. quaest. distinguitur inter induci, immutari et cogi. Cum autem ad essentiam liberi arbitrii pertineat, quod se ipsum moveat; manifeste implicat, quod ipsum, salva libertate, cogatur extrinsecus ad actum. Item patet, quod solus Deus speciali modo, scilicet intrinsecus, possit operari et influere in potentias animae, dum creaturae non nisi extrinsecus influendo (inducendo) in alienum intellectum et voluntatem agere possunt. Unde S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 3.), plene consentiens S. Bonaventurae, respectu actus liberi arbitrii dicit, quod «nulla virtus est ei superior, nisi Deus, quamvis forte aliqua virtus creata simpliciter potentior sit. Unde nulla virtus creata liberum arbitrium cogere nec immutare potest; Deus autem potest quidem immutare, sed non cogere» (cfr. *de Verit.* q. 22. a. 8; *S.* I. q. 105. a. 4. 5, et q. 111. a. 2.). Si autem intimius inquiritur de modo, quo Deus voluntatem, salva eius libertate, immutet; non eandem viam ineunt scholae catholicae, ut patet ex controversiis de auxiliis et de concursu generali ad actiones liberas. Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 2.) mentionem facit quorundam, qui tunc docebant, quod Deus «posset facere, quod liberum arbitrium post consiliationem in intellectu moveretur ad aliquid volendum de necessitate, non a se, sed a voluntate divina eliciente illum motum in voluntate, ita quod illo motu voluntas non esset movens, sed tantummodo mota; et hoc posset facere, salva natura potestatis liberi arbitrii». De hac autem opinione idem recte dicit: «Haec opinio videtur esse contra communem opinionem doctorum et etiam contra auctoritatem» etc. Addit etiam idem, quod Deus «bene potest ipsum [liberum arbitrium] efficaciter inclinare et facere, ut liberum arbitrium moveat se ipsum libere ad quamcumque partem Deus voluerit» (cfr. S. Thom., I. II. q. 10. a. 4, q. 21. a. 1. ad 2.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 4. § 1. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 29. n. 6; Report. ibid. n. 9. — S. Thom., praeter locos citt. S. I. II. q. 6. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. 85. seqq. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. et dub. lat. 1. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question and the following one other commentators on Lombard dispatch in a single question, except Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, and Giles of Rome. All agree well enough in their solutions. — In this question a good distinction is drawn between being induced, being impeded, being compelled (or coerced in the proper sense). For the distinction between being induced and being compelled, St. Thomas (here in the single question, a. 2.) with others distinguishes between a sufficient coercion (compulsion) and an insufficient one (impulsion). — In the following question a distinction is drawn between being induced, being changed, and being coerced. But since it pertains to the essence of free choice that it move itself, it manifestly involves a contradiction that it should, with liberty preserved, be coerced extrinsically to an act. Likewise it is evident that God alone in a special mode, namely intrinsically, can operate and have influence upon the powers of the soul, whereas creatures can act upon another's intellect and will only extrinsically, by influencing (inducing). Hence St. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 3.), fully consenting to St. Bonaventure, says concerning the act of free choice that "no power is superior to it except God, although perhaps some created power may be simply more powerful. Hence no created power can compel or change free choice; God, however, can indeed change [it], but not compel" (cf. *On Truth* q. 22, a. 8; *Summa* I, q. 105, a. 4–5, and q. 111, a. 2.). But if it is inquired more intimately concerning the mode by which God changes the will with its liberty preserved, the Catholic schools do not enter upon the same way, as is evident from the controversies *de auxiliis* and concerning the general concurrence to free actions. Richard of Middleton (here a. 4, q. 2.) makes mention of certain men who at that time were teaching that God "could bring it about that free choice, after deliberation in the intellect, should be moved to willing something of necessity, not by itself but by the divine will eliciting that motion in the will, in such a way that by that motion the will would not be the mover but only moved; and this He could do with the nature of the power of free choice preserved." But of this opinion the same [Richard] rightly says: "This opinion seems to be against the common opinion of the doctors and also against authority," etc. The same also adds that God "can well efficaciously incline it [free choice] and bring it about that free choice move itself freely to whichever side God wills" (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 4; q. 21, a. 1, ad 2.).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 72, m. 4, § 1. — Scotus, IV *Sent.* d. 29, n. 6; *Report.* ibid. n. 9. — St. Thomas, besides the places cited, *Summa* I-II, q. 6, a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, 85 seqq. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1–2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 1–2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3, and dub. lat. 1. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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**Alignment:** CONFIRMED. Opener "Quarto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad aliud agens creatum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato possit cogi" = Pars II ARTICULUS UNICUS sub-question 4 (*ad aliquod aliud agens creatum*).

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum liberum arbitrium a Deo cogi possit.*

Quinto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad movens primum, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium possit a Deo cogi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Lucae decimo quarto[^1]: *Exi in vias et sepes et compelle intrare, ut impleatur domus mea*: si ergo in domum Dei non contingit intrare nisi per usum liberi arbitrii, et Dominus intrare compellit, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium cogit.

2. Item, Ioannis sexto[^2]: *Nemo venit ad me, nisi Pater traxerit illum*; sed ad Christum non itur nisi per liberi arbitrii actum: si igitur liberum arbitrium non venit ad Filium, nisi trahatur a Patre, et tractus est motus violentus, sicut dicit Philosophus: liberum arbitrium a Deo violentatur et cogitur.

3. Item, Proverbiorum vigesimo primo[^3]: *Sicut divisiones aquarum, ita cor regis in manu Domini; quocumque voluerit, inclinabit illud*: ergo si liberum arbitrium inclinatur ad unam partem contradictionis; quantumcumque ad illam inclinetur, Deus potest perfecte facere, quod velit oppositum: ergo potest cogere liberum arbitrium ad volendum.

4. Item, omnis creatura est in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris: ergo si liberum arbitrium aliquid creatum a Deo est, necesse est, ipsum esse in perfecta obedientia respectu Dei: ergo si aliqua virtus potest a Deo compelli, potest et virtus liberi arbitrii. Sed Deus de aliis creaturis potest facere contra propriam naturam: ergo et de libero arbitrio potest facere contra propriam libertatem: ergo potest ipsum compellere.

5. Item, plus potest facere liberum arbitrium divinum super humanum, quam possit liberum arbitrium humanum super aliquod brutum; sed homo potest aliquod brutum cogere ad aliquam operationem inferendo sibi violentiam: ergo multo fortius virtus increata potest cogere voluntatem nostram.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram[^4]: «Tam non potest Deus facere contra naturam, quam bonam instituit, quam non potest facere contra voluntatem suam»: si igitur Deus voluntarie liberum arbitrium dedit homini, impossibile est, eum de libero arbitrio facere contra inditam sibi libertatem. Sed si ipsum cogeret, contra libertatem eius faceret: ergo liberum arbitrium cogi a Deo est impossibile.

2. Item, Augustinus vigesimo primo[^5] de Civitate Dei: «Illud est unicuique rei naturale, quod de ipsa facere disposuerit Omnipotentis voluntas»: ergo si nullum naturale est violentum, nihil quod facit Deus, est violentum: si igitur omnis coactio est per violentiam, quidquid Deus de libero arbitrio faciat, nulla potest sibi a Deo inferri violentia, ac per hoc nulla coactio.

3. Item, voluntas hoc ipso libere vult, quia, cum vult, vult se velle et se ipsam movet[^6]; sed impossibile est, voluntatem aliquid velle plene, quin illud velle sit a voluntate se ipsam movente, et quin voluntas velit se velle: ergo impossibile est, liberum arbitrium cogi non solum ab aliquo creato, verum etiam nec a Deo.

4. Item, nihil aliud est dicere, aliquem facere aliquid ex coactione, quam quod faciat illud invitus[^7]: ergo liberum arbitrium vel voluntatem cogi ad actum proprium non est aliud, quam quod voluntas aliquid velit invita; sed si est invita respectu alicuius, illud non vult: ergo voluntatem cogere nihil aliud est facere nisi facere, voluntatem simul et semel velle et nolle. Si ergo duo contradictoria simul esse non tantum est impossibile creaturae, verum etiam creatrici essentiae, patet etc.

5. Item, tunc aliqua virtus cogitur, quando ad oppositum suae inclinationis movetur; sed liberum arbitrium, eo ipso quod liberum, ita natum est inclinari ad unum oppositum, sicut et ad reliquum: ergo libertas eius salvatur in inclinatione ad utrumque oppositum, sive ad hoc inclinetur, sive ad illud. Si ergo coactio excludit libertatem, et libertas non excluditur, ad quodcumque inclinetur, ergo ex nulla inclinatione cogi potest libertas arbitrii; sed non est alius modus ipsum cogendi, nisi inclinando ipsum ad aliquod volitum: ergo impossibile est, ipsum cogi nec per movens creatum nec per agens primum[^8].

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> **Conclusio.** Liberum arbitrium, salva libertate, induci potest ab agente creato, immutari non nisi a Deo, cogi vero a nullo.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium possit cogi a Deo, quod illud potest intelligi dupliciter: aut ita, quod intelligatur, quod possit auferre libertatem et auferendo libertatem superinducere[^9] coactionem; et hoc modo nulli dubium esse debet, quin Deus possit hoc facere, quantum est de immensitate suae potentiae. — Alio modo, ut intelligatur, quod Deus cogat liberum arbitrium[^10], salva proprietate libertatis et eius natura: et hoc modo non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile, pro eo quod implicat in se duo contradictorie opposita. Ex hoc enim, quod liberum arbitrium liberum[^11] est, si aliquid vult, libere vult; et ex hoc, quod voluntarium est, si aliquid vult, voluntarie vult, et se ipso movente vult. Ex hoc autem, quod cogitur, si aliquid vult, serviliter vult; et si quid vult, invite vult; et si quid vult, ab alio vult, quia «violentum est, cuius principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo[^12]»: ergo liberum arbitrium, cogi non est aliud, quam actum liberi arbitrii simul et semel esse liberum et servilem, esse voluntarium et non voluntarium, esse a se et non a se. Si igitur impossibile, quod claudit intra se utramque partem contradictionis, non tantum est impossibile creaturae, verum etiam creatrici essentiae, quia illud posse non est posse, sicut in primo libro[^13] ostensum est; planum est, quod liberum arbitrium secundum hunc modum intelligendi a Deo cogi, est impossibile. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad intelligentiam autem rationum ad oppositum adductarum notandum est, quod differt dicere voluntatem induci, et voluntatem mutari, et voluntatem cogi. Tunc enim induci dicitur, quando aliqua persuasio fit, qua disponitur, ut ad aliquod appetibile inclinetur; quae si valde intensa sit, nomen coactionis sortitur, quamvis non sit vera coactio, ut ostensum est supra[^14]. — Tunc autem voluntas mutatur, quando, ipsa volente unum, potenti virtute affectio immittitur ei ad contrarium, et de volente fit nolens, ita quod una affectio expellitur, et contraria inducitur; sicut patet, cum Deus de amatore temporalium facit temporalium contemptorem; et hoc dicitur esse quaedam compulsio et tractio, dum voluntas ab ea re separatur, cui per amoris glutinum fortiter iungebatur. — Tunc autem voluntas dicitur cogi, quando intelligitur, ipsam invitam aliquid velle, et repugnante actu voluntatis deliberativae, aliena virtute movente, et repugnantia manente, ad aliquid[^15] volendo inclinari; et hoc duo opposita implicat, sicut ostensum est. — Voluntas igitur induci potest ab agente creato; mutari vero ab alio non potest nisi ab agente increato; cogi vero ab aliquo non potest. Et pro tanto dicit Bernardus, quod libertas voluntatis est ita plena suo modo in creatura, sicut in Creatore, et quod in omnibus reperitur aequaliter. Hoc enim, sicut supra[^16] explanatum fuit, intelligitur quantum ad coactionis privationem; et per hoc manifesta est responsio ad auctoritates et rationes.

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1. 2. 3. Quod enim dicitur in Scriptura, Deum voluntatem hominis compellere, et voluntatem hominis trahere, et voluntatem hominis ad quodcumque voluerit inclinare, sicut ostendunt illae tres primae auctoritates; hoc[^17] intelligitur, non quia voluntatem cogat, sed quia voluntatem creatam non solum inducit, sicut agens creatum, verum etiam immutat, immittendo affectiones varias, in qua immissione non est coactio, pro eo quod ita voluntarie volo illud quod Deus immittit, sicut illud quod ex me ipso volo; et si aliquid volo, volens volo, non invitus, et ita in volendo ad nihil compellor.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de perfecta obedientia creaturae, dicendum, quod ex hac ratione potius potest concludi oppositum quam propositum. Quia enim ibi est obedientiae perfectio, et liberum arbitrium respectu Dei ad omne quod Deus voluerit, sic habet moveri, sicut pila ad omnem partem[^18]; ideo quidquid de ipso vel circa ipsum faciat, non compellit nec violentat, nec etiam alicui creaturae violentiam inducit quantum ad illam potentiam obedientiae; quantum autem ad potentiam specialis naturae bene aliquando infert violentiam in miraculorum operatione. Sed talis violentia infertur virtuti naturali, non voluntati, quia virtus naturalis sic est determinata ad unum, ut si trahatur ad oppositum, hoc est per violentiam[^19]. Voluntas vero vertibilis est ad utrumque oppositum, sicut et rota et pila habet vertibilitatem ad motum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus potest liberum arbitrium divinum super hominem, quam[^20] humanum etc.; dicendum, quod verum est in his quae posse est potentiae; posse autem cogere brutum, hoc est potentiae, sed posse cogere liberum arbitrium manens liberum, hoc est inordinationis et impotentiae, sicut prius ostensum est. Coactio enim non sic repugnat naturae brutali, sicut repugnat libertati arbitrii; et propterea illa obiectio non concludit[^21].

---

english:
### Question V. *Whether free choice can be compelled by God.*

Fifthly, inquiry is made concerning free choice in relation to the first mover, namely to God himself, and the question is whether free choice can be compelled by God. And that it can, seems [the case].

1. Luke, the fourteenth chapter[^1]: *Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled*: if, therefore, one does not come to enter the house of God except by the use of free choice, and the Lord compels [men] to enter, it seems that free choice is compelled.

2. Likewise, John, the sixth chapter[^2]: *No one comes to me, unless the Father draw him*; but one does not come to Christ except by an act of free choice: if, therefore, free choice does not come to the Son unless it is drawn by the Father, and what is drawn is a violent motion, as the Philosopher says: free choice is violated and compelled by God.

3. Likewise, Proverbs, the twenty-first chapter[^3]: *As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever he will, he shall turn it*: therefore if free choice is inclined to one part of a contradiction, however much it is inclined to that part, God can perfectly bring it about that it will the opposite: therefore he can compel free choice to willing.

4. Likewise, every creature is in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator: therefore if free choice is something created by God, it must be in perfect obedience with respect to God: therefore if some power can be compelled by God, the power of free choice can be also. But God can act upon other creatures contrary to their proper nature: therefore he can also act upon free choice contrary to its proper liberty: therefore he can compel it.

5. Likewise, divine free choice can do more over the human than human free choice can over some brute; but a man can compel some brute to some operation by inflicting violence on it: therefore much more strongly can the uncreated power compel our will.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine on Genesis according to the letter[^4]: "God can no more act contrary to the nature which he established as good than he can act contrary to his own will": if, therefore, God voluntarily gave free choice to man, it is impossible for him to act upon free choice contrary to the liberty implanted in it. But if he were to compel it, he would act contrary to its liberty: therefore for free choice to be compelled by God is impossible.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twenty-first [book][^5] of *The City of God*: "That is natural to each thing which the will of the Omnipotent has disposed to make of it": therefore if nothing natural is violent, nothing that God does is violent: if, therefore, all coercion is by violence, whatever God may do concerning free choice, no violence can be inflicted upon it by God, and consequently no coercion.

3. Likewise, the will by this very fact wills freely, because, when it wills, it wills to will and moves itself[^6]; but it is impossible for the will to will something fully unless that willing is from the will moving itself, and unless the will wills to will: therefore it is impossible for free choice to be compelled, not only by something created, but even by God.

4. Likewise, to say that someone does something out of coercion is nothing other than that he does it unwillingly[^7]: therefore for free choice or the will to be compelled to its proper act is nothing other than that the will should will something unwillingly; but if it is unwilling with respect to something, it does not will it: therefore to compel the will is to do nothing other than to make the will will and not-will at one and the same time. If, therefore, two contradictories to exist at once is not only impossible to a creature, but even to the creating essence, it is evident, etc.

5. Likewise, then is a power compelled, when it is moved to the opposite of its inclination; but free choice, by the very fact that it is free, is of a nature to be inclined to one opposite just as to the other: therefore its liberty is preserved in its inclination to either opposite, whether it be inclined to this or to that. If, therefore, coercion excludes liberty, and liberty is not excluded, to whatever it be inclined, then by no inclination can the liberty of choice be compelled; but there is no other mode of compelling it except by inclining it to some object willed: therefore it is impossible for it to be compelled, neither by a created mover nor by the first agent[^8].

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> **Conclusion.** Free choice, with its liberty preserved, can be induced by a created agent, can be changed only by God, but can be compelled by none.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that when it is asked whether free choice can be compelled by God, this can be understood in two ways: either so that it is understood that he can take away [its] liberty and, by taking away [its] liberty, superinduce[^9] coercion; and in this mode there must be no doubt to anyone that God can do this, as far as concerns the immensity of his power. — In another way, so that it is understood that God should compel free choice[^10] with the property of liberty and its nature preserved: and in this mode it is not only impossible, but even unintelligible, for the reason that it implicates in itself two contradictorily opposite [things]. For from the fact that free choice is free[^11], if it wills something, it wills freely; and from the fact that it is voluntary, if it wills something, it wills voluntarily, and wills by moving itself. But from the fact that it is compelled, if it wills something, it wills servilely; and if it wills anything, it wills unwillingly; and if it wills anything, it wills from another, because "that is violent whose principle is from without, the one suffering [it] contributing nothing of force[^12]": therefore for free choice to be compelled is nothing other than for the act of free choice at one and the same time to be free and servile, to be voluntary and not voluntary, to be from itself and not from itself. If, therefore, the impossible, which encloses within itself both parts of a contradiction, is not only impossible to a creature, but even to the creating essence — because that capacity is not a capacity, as was shown in the first book[^13] — it is plain that for free choice, according to this mode of understanding, to be compelled by God is impossible. — Hence the arguments adduced for this are to be conceded.

But for the understanding of the arguments adduced for the opposite, it must be noted that to say the will is induced, and the will is changed, and the will is compelled differ. For it is said to be induced then, when some persuasion is made by which it is disposed to be inclined toward some appetible [thing]; and if this be very intense, it takes on the name of coercion, although it is not a true coercion, as was shown above[^14]. — But the will is changed then, when, while it itself wills one thing, by a powerful force an affection is infused into it toward the contrary, and from willing it becomes unwilling, in such a way that one affection is expelled and the contrary is induced; as is evident when God makes a lover of temporal things into a despiser of temporal things; and this is said to be a kind of compulsion and drawing, while the will is separated from that thing to which it was strongly joined by the glue of love. — But the will is said to be compelled then, when it is understood that it itself unwillingly wills something, and, the act of the deliberative will resisting, while another force moves [it] and the resistance remains, it is inclined to willing something[^15]; and this implicates two opposites, as was shown. — The will, therefore, can be induced by a created agent; but it cannot be changed by another except by the uncreated agent; and it cannot be compelled by anyone. And for this reason Bernard says that the liberty of the will is so full in its own mode in a creature as in the Creator, and that it is found equally in all. For this, as was explained above[^16], is understood as to the privation of coercion; and through this the response to the authorities and arguments is manifest.

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1. 2. 3. For as to what is said in Scripture, that God compels the will of man, and draws the will of man, and inclines the will of man to whatever he wills, as those first three authorities show; this[^17] is understood not because he compels the will, but because he not only induces the created will, as a created agent [does], but even changes it, by infusing various affections, in which infusing there is no coercion, for the reason that I will so voluntarily what God infuses as that which I will from myself; and if I will something, I will it willingly, not unwillingly, and thus in willing I am compelled to nothing.

4. To that which is objected concerning the perfect obedience of the creature, it must be said that from this argument the opposite can rather be concluded than the [original] proposition. For since there is there the perfection of obedience, and free choice with respect to God has to be moved to everything that God wills, just as a ball [is moved] to every part[^18]; therefore whatever he does of it or about it, he does not compel nor violate, nor even does he induce violence on any creature as regards that power of obedience; but as regards the power of [its] special nature he sometimes indeed inflicts violence in the working of miracles. But such violence is inflicted on the natural power, not on the will, because the natural power is so determined to one [term] that if it is drawn to the opposite, this is by violence[^19]. But the will is convertible to either opposite, just as a wheel and a ball have convertibility to motion.

5. To that which is objected, that divine free choice can do more over man than human [free choice can], etc.[^20]; it must be said that this is true in those things in which the capacity is [a capacity] of power; but to be able to compel a brute, this is [a capacity] of power, while to be able to compel free choice while it remains free, this is [a mark] of disorder and impotence, as was shown before. For coercion is not so repugnant to the brute nature as it is repugnant to the liberty of choice; and on this account that objection does not conclude[^21].

---

la: Vers. 23.

la: Vers. 44: *Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum.* — De sententia Philosophi cfr. VII. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.), ubi tractio (quae ab alio ad se ipsum, aut ad aliud) connumeratur inter motus, qui sunt ab alio, et ut tractionis species afferuntur compulsio et depulsio.

en: [John 6] v. 44: *No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him.* — On the statement of the Philosopher cf. VII *Physics* text 10 (c. 2.), where drawing (which is from another toward itself, or toward something else) is counted among the motions which are from another, and as species of drawing compulsion and repulsion are adduced.

la: Vers. 1.

en: [Proverbs 21] v. 1.

la: Libr. VI. c. 18. n. 29. Verba ipsa vide supra pag. 433, nota 1.

en: Book VI [*On Genesis according to the Letter*] c. 18, n. 29. See the words themselves above, p. 433, note 1.

la: Cap. 8. n. 2: *Quomodo est enim contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate, cum voluntas tanti utique Conditoris conditae rei cuiusque natura sit?* Cfr. ibid. c. 7. n. 1. — Mox in prima conclus. pro *violentum* edd., excepta 1, *per violentiam*.

en: [Book 21] c. 8, n. 2: "For how is it contrary to nature, what is done by the will of God, since the will of so great a Founder is surely the nature of each founded thing?" Cf. ibid. c. 7, n. 1. — Soon, in the first conclusion, for *violentum* the editions, except 1, [read] *per violentiam*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 5: *Velle autem non potest invitus, quia velle non potest nolens velle; nam omnis volens ipsum suum velle vult.* — Cod. T *quia cum vult se velle plene ipsam movet.*

en: Cf. Anselm, *Dialogue on Free Choice* c. 5: "But he cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will [while] not-willing to will; for everyone who wills, wills his own willing itself." — Codex T [reads] *quia cum vult se velle plene ipsam movet* ["because, when it wills to will itself, it fully moves itself"].

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *invite*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *invite* ["unwillingly," adverb].

la: Cod. T cum nonnullis aliis nec non cum edd., excepta 1, *liberum arbitrium*. In fine arg. ante *per agens* codd. F M Q aa bb ee et alii interserunt *etiam*.

en: Codex T, together with several others as well as the editions, except 1, [reads] *liberum arbitrium*. At the end of the argument, before *per agens*, codices F, M, Q, aa, bb, ee and others insert *etiam*.

la: Codd. F aa bb ee et alii *insuper inducere*, codd. K T cum ed. 2 *insuper ducere*.

en: Codices F, aa, bb, ee and others [read] *insuper inducere*; codices K, T with edition 2 [read] *insuper ducere*.

la: Cod. X *alio modo intelligi potest quod Deus cogere possit liberum arbitrium*; cod. aa post *Alio modo* addit *ita*.

en: Codex X [reads] *alio modo intelligi potest quod Deus cogere possit liberum arbitrium* ["in another way it can be understood that God can compel free choice"]; codex aa, after *Alio modo*, adds *ita*.

la: Ex codd. T aa adiecimus hoc secundum *liberum*. In codd. F H I K Y bb ee et aliis, sicut et in ed. 1 exhibetur tantum: *Ex hoc enim quod liberum est.*

en: From codices T and aa we have added this second *liberum* ["free"]. In codices F, H, I, K, Y, bb, ee and others, as also in edition 1, only this is exhibited: *Ex hoc enim quod liberum est* ["For from the fact that it is free"].

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. Cfr. etiam I. Magnor. Moral. c. 13. seqq. (c. 14. seqq.) et II. Moral. Eudem. c. 9. (c. 7. seq.).

en: Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 1. Cf. also I *Magna Moralia* c. 13 ff. (c. 14 ff.) and II *Eudemian Ethics* c. 9 (c. 7 f.).

la: Dist. 42. q. 3. — In edd. haec proposit. sic incipit: *Si igitur impossibile est, quod claudat*; lectio evidenter falsa, quippe quae contextum propositionis prorsus disturbat. Cum edd. etiam plures codd. in initio huius propos. post *impossibile* incongrue adiiciunt *est*, et dein Vat. sola verbis *non tantum* praemittit *et*.

en: [Book I] dist. 42, q. 3. — In the editions this proposition begins thus: *Si igitur impossibile est, quod claudat*; a reading evidently false, inasmuch as it wholly disturbs the context of the proposition. With the editions several codices also, at the beginning of this proposition, after *impossibile* incongruously add *est*, and then the Vatican edition alone prefixes *et* to the words *non tantum*.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius post *quando* cod. bb inserit *ipsi*; paulo inferius pro *et de volente fit nolens* plures codd., ut F K Y bb cc etc., cum ed. 1 *et de nolente fit volens*. Deinde pro *et tractatio, dum voluntas ab ea re separatur*, quam lect. ex codd. F X aa bb ee etc. restituimus, Vat. *et tractatio divina, ut voluntas ab eo separetur*; nonnulli codd., magis cum nostra lect. convenientes, *et tractio, dum voluntas ab ea separetur*.

en: The preceding question. — A little above, after *quando* codex bb inserts *ipsi*; a little below, for *et de volente fit nolens* several codices, such as F, K, Y, bb, cc etc., with edition 1 [read] *et de nolente fit volens*. Then for *et tractatio, dum voluntas ab ea re separatur*, the reading which we have restored from codices F, X, aa, bb, ee etc., the Vatican edition [reads] *et tractatio divina, ut voluntas ab eo separetur*; some codices, agreeing more with our reading, [read] *et tractio, dum voluntas ab ea separetur*.

la: Vat. *ad idem aliquid.* Mox edd. cum pluribus codd. *et haec*; cod. bb, posito *et haec*, deinde substituit *implicant* pro *implicat*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *ad idem aliquid*. Soon the editions, with several codices, [read] *et haec*; codex bb, having set *et haec*, then substitutes *implicant* for *implicat*.

la: Hic q. 1, ubi et sententia Bernardi, immediate ante memorata, integra redditur (sumta est ex eius libro de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 4. n. 9.).

en: Here, q. 1, where also the statement of Bernard, just mentioned above, is given in full (it is taken from his book *On Grace and Free Choice* c. 4, n. 9.).

la: Codd. aa bb *hoc dictum*, codd. F H I K T V Y et alii cum ed. 1 *hoc enim*. Circa finem solut. post *ex me ipso volo* cod. aa addit *voluntarie*.

en: Codices aa, bb [read] *hoc dictum*; codices F, H, I, K, T, V, Y and others with edition 1 [read] *hoc enim*. Near the end of the solution, after *ex me ipso volo* codex aa adds *voluntarie*.

la: Isa. 12, 28: *Quasi pilam mittet [Dominus] te in terram latam.* — Cod. O *sicut pila ad hominem*, cod. cc et ed. ... *sicut pila ad motum*. Paulo inferius pro *nec etiam alicui* codd. K T *nec etiam aliam*, cod. W *nec etiam aliquam*.

en: Isaiah 22:18: "[The Lord] will toss thee like a ball into a wide land." — Codex O [reads] *sicut pila ad hominem*; codex cc and an edition *sicut pila ad motum*. A little below, for *nec etiam alicui* codices K, T [read] *nec etiam aliam*; codex W [reads] *nec etiam aliquam*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. et 6.

en: Cf. above, [book II] dist. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5 and 6.

la: Permulti codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *vel* pro *quam*; cod. aa omittit *hominem quam*.

en: Very many codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *vel* for *quam*; codex aa omits *hominem quam*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Chunk CREATED FRESH 2026-05-29 — the auto-chunker omitted QUAESTIO V entirely (its body lived inside the over-long q4 skeleton range and inside q6's range). Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (pp. 618–620, raw OCR lines 43235–43374) per the Vol II Override — the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Conclusio, Respondeo (the *induci/mutari/cogi* distinction), and the Ad-argumenta replies (two-column bleed). Footer bands read directly from the PDF column crops; editorial margin-glosses (Ad opposita, Conclusio generalis, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum, Conclusio 1/2, Intelligitur dupliciter, Differunt induci/mutari/cogi) trimmed as marginalia.

**Page-split map.**
- p.618 = QUAESTIO V title + opener + args 1–5 + Sed contra 1–4 (footers 1–7 = this q's [^1]–[^7]; the entire page belongs to q5 — q4 closed clean with SCHOLION II above; arg-1 Lucae¹, arg-2 Ioannis sexto², arg-3 Proverbiorum³, SC-1 super Genesim⁴, SC-2 vigesimo primo⁵, SC-3 se ipsam movet⁶, SC-4 invitus⁷).
- p.619 = end of SC-5 (per agens primum) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (both the *dupliciter* analysis and the *induci/mutari/cogi* distinction) (footers 1–9 = [^8]–[^16], rendered in body-anchor order: per agens primum⁸, superinducere⁹, liberum arbitrium¹⁰, liberum¹¹, vim passo¹², primo libro¹³, supra¹⁴, ad aliquid¹⁵, supra¹⁶).
- p.620 = replies 1.2.3 + reply 4 + reply 5 (footers 1–5 = [^17]–[^21]: hoc¹⁷, sicut pila ad omnem partem¹⁸, per violentiam¹⁹, quam²⁰, non concludit²¹); p.620 footers 6–7 (de Anima / de Somno) and 8–10 belong to QUAESTIO VI.

**Hand-offs.**
- RECEIVED: NONE. QUAESTIO IV closed clean on p.618 with its SCHOLION II before QUAESTIO V opens; q5 owns all of its p.618 footers (Lucae 14, etc.) as its own opening footers.
- FORWARDED: NONE. QUAESTIO V closes clean on p.620 R-col ("…illa obiectio non concludit[^21]") before QUAESTIO VI ("Utrum liberum arbitrium propter ineptitudinem corporis ligari possit quoad usum"; raw line 43375, p.620 R-col). QUAESTIO VI owns its own p.620 footers (de Anima text 66, de Somno, Tertium Regum, etc.).

**has_scholion:** FALSE. Footer [^21] ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") explicitly defers to QUAESTIO IV's joint scholion (q4 SCHOLION I opens "Hanc et sequentem quaest. … unica quaest. absolvunt … In seq. quaest. distinguitur inter induci, immutari et cogi" — the commentator-roll for both q4 and q5 lives in q4 SCHOLION I–II). q5 carries no scholion of its own.

**Alignment:** CONFIRMED. Opener "Quinto quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad movens primum, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium possit a Deo cogi" = Pars II ARTICULUS UNICUS sub-question 5 (*ad movens primum, scilicet Deum*).

**[?] flags:** NONE. All 21 marker digits and the Latin body verified eyes-on against the 450 dpi column bands (pp. 618 L/R, 619 L/R, 620 L/R).