title: Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum divina essentia sit infinita
Whether the divine essence is infinite

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### Quaestio II

*Utrum divina essentia sit infinita.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum divina essentia sit infinita sive divina potentia sit infinita quantum ad *esse*. Et quod sic, videtur:

**1.** Quia nulla potentia nobilior est substantia[^1]; sed divina potentia est infinita: ergo cum non sit nobilior nec maior substantia, necesse est, substantiam esse infinitam.

**2.** Item, si aliqua duo — liceat sic dicere — sint omnino idem, si unum est infinitum, et reliquum; sed *divina essentia* et *potentia* sunt idem, et *esse* et *posse*: ergo cum ipsum divinum *posse* sit infinitum, et *esse*, et ita *essentia*.

**3.** Item, quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod ad nihil se extendit unum, ad quod pariter non se extendat reliquum, si unum est infinitum, et reliquum; sed ad nihil omnino se extendit potentia, ad quod non se extendat essentia — nunquam Deus potest facere tot quin eius substantia possit esse in tot, secundum quod dicitur tertii Regum octavo[^3]: *Si caelum et caeli caelorum* etc. — ergo etc.

**4.** Item, omni finito potest aliquid cogitari maius, scilicet infinitum ipsum; sed divina essentia est ita bona et magna, quod nihil maius nec melius cogitari potest[^4], alioquin non est Deus: ergo etc.

**5.** Item, omne finitum bonum melius est cum alio bono quam per se tantum, quia finitum additum finito facit maius: ergo si divina essentia est finita, maius aliquid cum alio erit quam per se tantum: ergo non est perfectissima nec optima; quod omnino nefas est dicere.

**6.** Item, omne finitum bonum contingit aliquando aequari et reddi per duplicationem finiti, ut patet in linea — et hoc dico, si illud quod duplatur, facit maius, hoc dico propter punctum[^5] — ergo si divina essentia est finita secundum nobilitatem et bonitatem, si dupletur bonitas creaturae, ascendendo aliquando perveniretur ad bonitatem aequalem divinae bonitati; hoc autem est falsum et impossibile, quod creatura sit proportionalis Creatori, et hoc dicit Augustinus octavo de Trinitate[^6]: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod divina essentia sit finita.

**Sed contra:**

**1.** «Finitum et infinitum, ut dicit Philosophus[^7], sunt propriae passiones ipsius quantitatis»; sed essentia ut essentia non habet quantitatem molis: ergo si consideratur ut in abstractione virtutis ut essentia, divina essentia nec est finita nec infinita.

**2.** Item, omnis potentia, quae potest unum solum, ita quod non aliud, est potentia finita: ergo pari ratione omnis essentia, quae est unum solum, ita quod nihil aliud, est essentia finita; sed divina essentia est Deus et nihil aliud: ergo etc.

**3.** Item, omne illud quod est finitum summae veritati, est simpliciter finitum — et hoc patet, quia prima veritas iudicat de unoquoque, sicut est; patet etiam in simili, ut hoc est album et nigrum et bonum Deo, ergo simpliciter bonum — sed divina essentia est veritati divinae cognitionis finita, quia Deus ipsam comprehendit et novit perfecte et «quod scitur, ut dicit Augustinus[^8], scientis comprehensione finitur»: ergo etc.

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**4.** Item, nullum infinitum finit aliud, quia nihil dat alii quod non habet[^9]: ergo si divina essentia est infinita, ergo nihil finit, ergo nullius est finis; et si hoc: ergo nihil bonum.

**5.** Item, nullum infinitum comprehenditur a finito; sed Deus comprehenditur a Beatis, quia aliter non essent beati, nisi Deum perfecte cognoscerent — semper enim appetitus ferretur ad amplius et non quiescerent, et ita non essent beati — si ergo comprehenditur, non est infinitus.

**6.** Item, nulla privatio est habitu nobilior: ergo cum infinitum dicat privationem, finitum dicat habitum, et omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum, patet etc.

### Conclusio

> *Essentia divina est omnino infinita in actu.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc voluerunt quidam dicere, quod divina essentia sub ratione essentiae est finita, sub ratione potentiae est infinita. Nam essentia nominat Deum ut in se, et sic est finitus, quia perfectus; finitus etiam, quia comprehenditur a finito ut a Beatis; et hoc dixerunt propter essentiae simplicitatem, quam dixerunt totam videri. In quantum autem consideratur sub ratione potentiae, sic dicit respectum ad effectus. Et quia non est status ibi, quia semper est aliquid extra accipere[^10], dixerunt, quod sub ratione potentiae erat infinita. — Sed ista positio erronea fuit manifeste. Nam ista duo sunt incompossibilia[^11], quod potentia sit infinita, omnino existente substantia finita, et quia idem sunt omnino, et quia prior secundum rationem intelligendi est substantia, et quia ad quidquid se extendit potentia sub ratione potentiae et essentia, ut ostensum est[^14].

Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod est infinitum[^12] simpliciter et infinitum nobis: et voluerunt dicere, quod tam essentia quam potentia est finita secundum veritatem, quia est finita Deo, qui est veritas; sed tamen utraque nobis est infinita, quia improportionaliter nos excedit. Unde «Deus infinitus dicitur, quia nec loco nec tempore nec comprehensione comprehenditur», sicut dicit Damascenus[^13]. — Sed iterum ista positio non potest stare, quoniam sicut supra probatum est de potentia, quod ipsa non habet statum in possendo, et iterum, est omnino actu, et ideo ponitur vere infinita; sic etiam probari potest de essentia.

Necesse est ergo, quod omnino infinita sit actu. Et hoc concedendum est et tenendum est tanquam verum, eo quod magis est consonum fidei, quae dicit Deum immensum, et magis consonum auctoritatibus Sanctorum, qui omnes dicunt ipsum infinitum, unde Damascenus[^15] dicit, quod Deus est «quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum»; magis etiam consonum sententiis magistrorum, magis etiam consonum rationi.

Ad intelligentiam igitur obiectorum in oppositum notandum, quod infinitum dicitur per abnegationem finis. Potest ergo dupliciter dici infinitum, scilicet a parte negationis, et similiter a parte finis[^16]. A parte finis: nam finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, quod est complementum; et sic infinitum dicitur per privationem complementi, et hoc modo

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infinitum dicitur in materia et in genere substantiae et in aliis generibus; et hoc modo non cadit in Deo, quia ipse est perfectissimus. Alio modo finis dicitur terminus, sicut finis agri, et sic infinitum dicitur quod caret termino et statu. — Et hoc potest esse dupliciter secundum negationem, quia potest intelligi *privative* et *negative*: *privative*, quia non habet terminum, sed tamen natum est habere, propter hoc quod habet esse limitatum, et hoc modo dicit incompletionem, et non est in Deo. Alio modo *negative*, quod non habet terminum nec est natum habere: et hoc modo ponitur in Deo propter summam immensitatem[^17].

**1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod infinitum est passio quantitatis; dici potest, quod sicut nomen quantitatis extenditur ad quantitatem virtutis, similiter nomen infiniti. Quantitas autem virtutis non tantum attenditur quantum ad opus, sed etiam quantum ad nobilitatem valoris; et hoc patet, quia, ut dicit Augustinus[^18], «in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius».

**2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est unum ita, quod non est aliud; dicendum, quod aliquid comparari ad multa potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum comparationem causalitatis, aut secundum comparationem identitatis. Comparari ad multa sub ratione causalitatis hoc convenit infinito, quia infinitum: sed secundum rationem identitatis, non. Unde quia infinitum, ideo se extendit ad multa[^19], sed non sequitur, quod sit multa. Unde si essentia vel potentia comparetur secundum rationem identitatis ad res, neutra est plurium: unde nec potentia divina est aliae potentiae, nec essentia aliae essentiae; si[^20] secundum rationem causalitatis, sic convenit et potentiae et essentiae. Nam sicut potentiae convenit facere plura, sic essentiae in pluribus esse.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est finitum summae veritati; dicendum, quod haec[^21] est duplex: aut enim est finitum summae veritati, quia mentes iudicat, ipsum esse finitum, aut quia non excedit eius comprehensionem. Primo modo non est Deus sibi finitus, sed infinitus; vere enim scit se esse infinitum. Secundo modo est finitus, quia se non excedit, cum sit infinitus; et sic non valet argumentum, et est ibi fallacia *secundum quid et simpliciter*: si non excedit infinitum: ergo est finitum simpliciter.

**4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum non finit; dicendum, quod *infinitum per privationem* perfectionis non finit; sed *infinitum per negationem* limitationis habet rationem finiendi, quia, cum sit summum, in ipso est omnis status: in hoc enim infinitas non repugnat simplicitati nec complemento.

**5.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod comprehenditur; dicendum, quod non comprehenditur per inclusionem, comprehenditur autem per perfectam visionem, dilectionem et tentionem, et hoc a parte comprehendentis et non comprehensi; et ideo, quia perficitur[^22], requiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat.

**6.** Quod ultimo obiicitur, solutum est; obiicit enim de infinito, secundum quod dicitur privative; sed prout dicitur de Deo, non dicit privationem secundum rem, sed solum quantum ad modum significandi[^23]; et respondet ei summa positio. Nihil enim dicitur immensum, nisi quod habet summam et perfectissimam actualitatem et nihil coarctans et determinans. Unde etsi videatur dici privative, tamen secundum veritatem excludit omnem privationem.

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### Question II

*Whether the divine essence is infinite.*

Secondly, the question is asked, whether the divine essence is infinite, or whether the divine power is infinite as to *being*. And that it is so, seems thus:

**1.** Because no power is nobler than its substance[^1]; but the divine power is infinite: therefore, since the substance is not less noble nor smaller, it is necessary that the substance be infinite.

**2.** Likewise, if any two things — let it be permitted to speak so — are altogether the same, if one is infinite, so is the other; but the *divine essence* and *power* are the same, as also *being* and *being able*: therefore, since the divine *being able* itself is infinite, so is the *being*, and thus the *essence*.

**3.** Likewise, whenever any two stand in such relation that there is nothing to which the one extends to which the other does not equally extend, if one is infinite, so is the other; but there is nothing whatever to which the power extends to which the essence does not extend — God can never make so many things but that His substance can be in so many, according to what is said in 3 Kings 8[^3]: *If heaven, and the heaven of heavens* etc. — therefore etc.

**4.** Likewise, beyond every finite thing something greater can be thought, namely the infinite itself; but the divine essence is so good and great that nothing greater nor better can be thought[^4], otherwise He is not God: therefore etc.

**5.** Likewise, every finite good is better with another good than by itself alone, because a finite added to a finite makes a greater: therefore, if the divine essence is finite, something with another will be greater than it by itself alone: therefore it is not most perfect nor best — which it is altogether unlawful to say.

**6.** Likewise, every finite good can sometimes be matched and made equal through doubling the finite, as is clear in the line — and I say this if that which is doubled makes a greater [thing]; I say this on account of the point[^5] — therefore if the divine essence is finite according to nobility and goodness, if the goodness of a creature be doubled, ascending one would eventually arrive at a goodness equal to the divine goodness; but this is false and impossible, that a creature should be proportional to the Creator, and this Augustine says in *On the Trinity* VIII[^6]: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that the divine essence be finite.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** «The finite and the infinite, as the Philosopher says[^7], are proper affections of quantity itself»; but the essence as essence has not quantity of mass: therefore, if it be considered as in the abstraction of strength as essence, the divine essence is neither finite nor infinite.

**2.** Likewise, every power which can [do] one thing only, such that not another, is a finite power: therefore by parity of reason, every essence which is one thing only, such that nothing else, is a finite essence; but the divine essence is God and nothing else: therefore etc.

**3.** Likewise, everything that is finite to the supreme truth is simply finite — and this is plain, because the first truth judges of each thing as it is; it is plain also in a similar case, just as this is white and black and good to God, therefore simply good — but the divine essence is finite to the divine truth of cognition, because God comprehends it and knows it perfectly, and «what is known, as Augustine says[^8], is bounded by the comprehension of the knower»: therefore etc.

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**4.** Likewise, no infinite delimits another, because nothing gives to another what it does not have[^9]: therefore if the divine essence is infinite, then it delimits nothing, therefore it is the end (*finis*) of nothing; and if so: therefore nothing is good.

**5.** Likewise, no infinite is comprehended by a finite; but God is comprehended by the Blessed, because otherwise they would not be blessed unless they knew God perfectly — for the appetite would always be carried toward more and they would not rest, and so they would not be blessed — if therefore He is comprehended, He is not infinite.

**6.** Likewise, no privation is more noble than a habit: therefore, since the infinite expresses a privation, and the finite a habit, and every more-noble thing must be attributed to God, it is plain etc.

### Conclusion

> *The divine essence is altogether infinite in act.*

**I respond:** To this some have wished to say that the divine essence under the aspect of essence is finite, under the aspect of power is infinite. For the essence names God as He is in Himself, and so He is finite, because perfect; finite also, because He is comprehended by a finite, as by the Blessed; and they said this on account of the simplicity of the essence, which they said is seen as a whole. Insofar, however, as He is considered under the aspect of power, so He bespeaks a respect to effects. And because there is no terminus there, since there is always something further to be received[^10], they said that under the aspect of power He was infinite. — But that position was manifestly erroneous. For these two are incompossible[^11], that the power be infinite while the substance is altogether finite, both because they are wholly the same, and because the substance is prior according to the order of understanding, and because to whatever the power extends under the aspect of power so also the essence, as has been shown[^14].

And on this account some have said that He is infinite[^12] simply and infinite for us: and they wished to say that both essence and power are finite according to truth, because [they are] finite to God, who is truth; but nevertheless each is infinite for us, because He exceeds us disproportionately. Whence «God is called infinite, because He is comprehended neither by place nor by time nor by comprehension», as Damascene[^13] says. — But again this position cannot stand, since, as has been proved above concerning the power, that it has no terminus in its capacity, and again, it is wholly in act, and therefore is rightly held to be truly infinite; so also can be proved concerning the essence.

It is necessary therefore that it be altogether infinite in act. And this is to be conceded and held as true, because it is more consonant with the faith, which calls God *immense*, and more consonant with the authorities of the Saints, who all call Him infinite, whence Damascene[^15] says that God is «a certain infinite sea of substance»; more consonant also with the judgements of the masters, more consonant also with reason.

For the understanding therefore of the objections on the opposite side, it is to be noted that the infinite is said by abnegation of an end. The infinite then can be said in two ways, namely on the side of the negation, and likewise on the side of the end[^16]. On the side of the end: for *end* is said in two ways, in one way as that which is *complement*; and so the infinite is said by privation of complement, and in this way

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the infinite is said in matter and in the genus of substance and in the other genera; and in this way it does not fall in God, because He is most perfect. In another way *end* is said *terminus*, as the boundary of a field, and so the infinite is said to be that which lacks terminus and stopping-point. — And this can be in two ways according to negation, because it can be understood *privatively* and *negatively*: *privatively*, because it has no terminus, but is nevertheless of a nature to have one, on account of the fact that it has a limited being, and in this way it bespeaks incompletion, and is not in God. In the other way *negatively*, in that it has no terminus and is not of a nature to have [one]: and in this way it is placed in God on account of His supreme immensity[^17].

**1.** To the objection therefore that the infinite is an affection of quantity, it can be said that just as the name *quantity* is extended to *quantity of strength*, so likewise the name *infinite*. Quantity of strength, however, is considered not only as to the work, but also as to the nobility of value; and this is plain because, as Augustine says[^18], «in spiritual things the greater is the same as the better».

**2.** To the objection that He is one in such a way that He is not another; it must be said that something can be compared to many in two ways: either according to the comparison of causality, or according to the comparison of identity. To be compared to many under the aspect of causality belongs to the infinite, because [He is] infinite: but according to the aspect of identity, no. Whence, because [He is] infinite, therefore He extends to many[^19], but it does not follow that He is many. Whence if the essence or the power be compared according to the aspect of identity to things, neither is of many: whence neither is the divine power some other powers, nor the essence some other essences; if[^20] according to the aspect of causality, so it belongs both to the power and to the essence. For just as it belongs to the power to make many, so to the essence to be in many.

**3.** To the objection that it is finite to the supreme truth; it must be said that this[^21] is twofold: for either it is finite to the supreme truth because the [supreme] mind judges that it is finite, or because it does not exceed His comprehension. In the first way God is not finite to Himself, but infinite; for He truly knows Himself to be infinite. In the second way He is finite, because He does not exceed Himself, since He is infinite; and so the argument is not valid, and there is the fallacy *of qualified and simple*: if it does not exceed the infinite, then it is simply finite.

**4.** To the objection that the infinite does not delimit; it must be said that *the infinite by privation* of perfection does not delimit; but *the infinite by negation* of limitation has the character of delimiting, because, since He is supreme, in Him is every stopping-place: for in this case infinity is not repugnant to simplicity nor to complement.

**5.** To the objection that He is comprehended; it must be said that He is not comprehended by inclusion, but is comprehended by perfect vision, love, and holding, and this on the side of the one comprehending and not of the one comprehended; and therefore, because [the comprehender] is perfected[^22], he rests, although he does not reach beyond.

**6.** What was lastly objected has been answered; for it objects concerning the infinite according as it is said privatively; but as it is said of God, it does not bespeak a privation according to reality, but only as to the mode of signifying[^23]; and the supreme position answers to it. For nothing is called immense, except what has the supreme and most perfect actuality and constricts and determines nothing. Whence, even though it may seem to be said privatively, yet according to truth it excludes every privation.

la: Supple cum cod. M *potentia*. Subinde idem cod. M post *maior* interserit *quam*. — Huc argumentum fundatur in axiomate: *operari sequitur esse*.

en: Supply with codex M *potentia*. Then the same codex M after *maior* inserts *quam*. — This argument is founded on the axiom: *operation follows being*.

la: Vers. 27, et II. Paralip. 2, 6. Primus locus sic prosequitur: *te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam aedificavi*. — Paulo superius voci *nunquam* cod. Y praefigit *quia*; Vat. eidem voci *nunquam* adiicit *enim*, et dein pro *eius substantia* exhibet etiam *substantia*.

en: Verse 27, and 2 Chronicles 2:6. The first passage continues thus: *cannot contain thee, how much less this house which I have built*. — A little above, codex Y prefixes *quia* to the word *nunquam*; the Vatican ed. adds *enim* to the same word *nunquam*, and then in place of *eius substantia* it also displays *substantia*.

la: Boeth., III. *de Consol.* prosa 10, et Anselm., *Proslog.* c. 2, nec non libr. contra Insipientem, c. 1 seqq. — Proxime post pro *est Deus* Vat. *esset Deus*.

en: Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 10, and Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 2, as also his book *Against the Fool*, c. 1 and following. — Just after, in place of *est Deus* the Vatican ed. [reads] *esset Deus*.

la: Nam punctum additum puncto non facit maius. Cfr. supra pag. 660, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro *duplicatur* aliqui codd. *duplicetur*, aliqui cum cod. T *duplicetur*.

en: For a point added to a point does not make a greater. Cf. above p. 660, note 6. — A little earlier, in place of *duplicatur* some codd. [read] *duplicetur*, some with codex T [read] *duplicetur*.

en: Chapter 2, number 3.

la: Libr. I. *Phys.* text. 15. (c. 2.): «Infinitum enim in quanto est… infiniti enim ratio [definitio] quanto utitur, sed non substantia nec quali». Quae verba Averroes sic interpretatur: «Infinitum enim et finitum sunt de differentiis quantitatis». De quantitate molis et virtutis cfr. August., libr. *de Quant. animae*, c. 3. n. 4. — Ante *virtutis* supple cum ed. I *a quantitate*. In Vat. desideratur *molis*, et loco *virtutis* legitur *a quantitate*. Dein post *ut essentia* codd. V X subiiciunt *est*.

en: *Physics* I, text 15 (c. 2): «For the infinite [is found] in quantity… for the account [definition] of the infinite makes use of quantity, but not of substance nor of the qualitative». Which words Averroes interprets thus: «For the infinite and the finite are among the differences of quantity». On quantity of mass and of strength cf. Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul* c. 3, n. 4. — Before *virtutis* supply with ed. 1 *a quantitate*. In the Vatican ed. *molis* is lacking, and in place of *virtutis* is read *a quantitate*. Then after *ut essentia* codd. V X subjoin *est*.

la: Libr. XII. *de Civ. Dei.* c. 18.

en: *On the City of God* XII, c. 18.

la: Aristot., II. *Elench.* c. 3. (c. 22.). — Ultima huius argumenti conclusio: *ergo nihil bonum*, plane consequitur ex praecedentibus, dummodo illud axioma adhibetur: *finis et bonum sunt idem sive convertuntur*, quod axioma apud Aristot. saepe saepius occurrit, sic I. *Rhetor.* c. de Bono et utili (c. 6.), I. *Ethic.* c. 1, I. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 2. seq. (c. 1.), V. *Metaph.* text. 3. (IV. c. 2.). — Cod. Y in fine argumenti adiungit: *sed hoc falsum: ergo et illud unde sequitur*.

en: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 3 (c. 22). — The last conclusion of this argument, *therefore nothing is good*, plainly follows from what precedes, provided that the axiom is applied: *end and good are the same, or are converted*, which axiom in Aristotle very often occurs: thus *Rhetoric* I, c. on the Good and the Useful (c. 6); *Ethics* I, c. 1; *Greater Morals* I, c. 2 and following (c. 1); *Metaphysics* V, text 3 (IV, c. 2). — Codex Y at the end of the argument adds: *but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows*.

la: Respicitur Aristotelica definitio infiniti, supra pag. 764, nota 3.

en: It refers to the Aristotelian definition of the infinite, [given] above p. 764, note 3.

la: Hic in tribus primis fundamentis.

en: Here in the first three fundamenta.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *finitum*. In ed. I legitur sic: *Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod [essentia divina] non est infinita simpliciter, sed infinita nobis*.

en: The Vatican ed., with codex cc, [reads] *finitum*. In ed. 1 it reads thus: *And on this account some have said that [the divine essence] is not infinite simply, but infinite for us*.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 4. In textu cit. pro *dicitur* plures codd. *est*; aliqui codd. omittunt *dicitur* nec pro eo substituunt aliud verbum.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* I, c. 4. In the cited text, in place of *dicitur* several codd. [read] *est*; some codd. omit *dicitur* and do not substitute another word for it.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro *actu* in Vat. habetur *actus*, et dein omittitur *vere*.

en: The preceding Question. — A little below, in place of *actu* in the Vatican ed. is found *actus*, and then *vere* is omitted.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 9. — Post verba *consonum rationi* in cod. M largum habetur additamentum, quod ex iis quae postea sequuntur, confectum videtur, paucis tantum additis. Additur igitur: *Vel melius ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod in quaestione, in qua est multiplicitas nominis, prius oportet secundum artem distinguere, quam aliquid asserere vel negare. Intelligendum ergo, quod infinitum dupliciter dicitur, scilicet privative et negative. Secundum quod dicitur privative, sic privat actum et relinquit aptitudinem, et hoc modo dicitur infinitum, quod est natum finiri, non tamen est finitum et sic sonat in incompletionem, ut materia dicitur infinita; secundum autem quod dicitur negative, sic simpliciter removet finem seu finitatem. Sed hoc dupliciter habet intelligi secundum duplicem acceptionem finis: dicitur enim finis terminus, finis complementum, et ideo infinitum dicitur vel per abnegationem finis complementi, et sic dicitur malum infinitum vel per abnegationem finis termini, et hoc dupliciter potest esse secundum duplicem terminum: est enim terminus secundum quantitatem materialem, et est terminus secundum quantitatem spiritualem. Prima dicitur quantitas molis, secunda dicitur quantitas virtutis. Infinitum igitur per abnegationem termini circa quantitatem molis semper dicit aliquam incompletionem aliquo modo vel actu vel potentia, quia dicit recessum a simplici quantitate; talis enim quantitas non simul stat cum simplicitate in eodem et secundum idem, et tale infinitum nunquam est actu, sed solum potentia, actu autem finitum. Infinitum vero per abnegationem termini circa quantitatem virtutis non dicit aliquam imperfectionem, sed summam perfectionem, quia non repugnat simplicitati, immo non potest esse nisi in summe simplici; et tali modo Scripturae auctoritas et fidei confessio ponunt infinitatem sive immensitatem in ipso Deo simplicissimo*.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* I, c. 9. — After the words *consonant with reason*, in codex M there is a large addition, which appears to have been compiled from what afterwards follows, with only a few additions. It is added therefore: *Or, better, for the understanding of what was foresaid it must be noted that in a question in which there is a multiplicity of meaning of a name, one ought first to distinguish according to art before asserting or denying anything. It is to be understood therefore that the infinite is said in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. Insofar as it is said privatively, it deprives of act and leaves [only] aptitude, and in this way the infinite is said to be that which is of a nature to be finished, but yet is not finished — and so resounds with incompletion, as matter is called infinite; insofar however as it is said negatively, it simply removes end or finitude. But this is to be understood in two ways according to the twofold sense of «end»: for end is said as terminus, end as complement, and therefore the infinite is said either by the abnegation of end-as-complement, and so an evil is called infinite, or by the abnegation of end-as-terminus, and this can be in two ways according to the twofold terminus: for there is terminus according to material quantity, and there is terminus according to spiritual quantity. The first is called quantity of mass, the second is called quantity of strength. The infinite therefore by abnegation of terminus with respect to quantity of mass always bespeaks some incompletion in some way, either in act or in potency, because it bespeaks a recession from simple quantity; for such a quantity does not stand together with simplicity in the same [thing] and in the same respect, and such an infinite is never in act, but only in potency, and is in act finite. But the infinite by abnegation of terminus with respect to quantity of strength does not bespeak any imperfection, but the supreme perfection, because it is not repugnant to simplicity — indeed it cannot be except in the supremely simple; and in this way the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith place infinity or immensity in God Himself, the most simple*.

la: Sensus est: *infinitum*, quia est vocabulum compositum ex particula negativa *in* et verbo *finitum*, dupliciter considerari potest, et secundum particulam negativam, et secundum verbum.

en: The sense is: *infinitum*, because it is a word composed from the negative particle *in* and the verb *finitum*, can be considered in two ways, both according to the negative particle, and according to the verb.

la: De hac duplici acceptione infiniti cfr. Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.), et V. *Metaph.* text. 21. (IV. c. 16). De discrimine, quod est inter negationem et privationem, cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Oppositis, et IV. *Metaph.* text. 1. nec non V. text. 27. (III. c. 2, et IV. c. 22.). — Paulo superius pro *quod habet esse limitatum* cod. T *quod dicit esse limitatum*.

en: On this twofold acceptance of the infinite cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 63 and following (c. 6), and *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16). On the distinction between negation and privation, cf. Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. on Opposites, and *Metaphysics* IV, text 1, as also V, text 27 (III, c. 2, and IV, c. 22). — A little above, in place of *quod habet esse limitatum* codex T [reads] *quod dicit esse limitatum*.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 11.: *Quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse*. — Solutionis sententia haec est: quantitas virtutis non tantum attenditur in effectu sive opere, ad magnitudinem exteriorem, sed etiam relate ad intrinsecam nobilitatem et essentialem valorem; unde divina essentia, cum sit quantitas virtutis, quia nobilissima est, erit et infinita.

en: *On the Trinity* VI, c. 8, n. 11: *In those things that are not great by mass, this is the greater being which is the better being*. — The sense of the solution is this: quantity of strength is not considered only in effect or work, with respect to outer magnitude, but also in relation to intrinsic nobility and essential worth; whence the divine essence, since it is a quantity of strength, because it is most noble, will also be infinite.

la: Codicibus nec non ed. I refragantibus, Vat. *ideo* transformavit in *in Deo*, et dein post *ad multa* prosequitur: *quia potentia vel essentia eius comparatur ad multa, ex hoc tamen non sequitur etc.*

en: Against the codd. and ed. 1, the Vatican ed. transformed *ideo* into *in Deo*, and then after *ad multa* continues: *because His power or essence is compared to many, yet from this it does not follow etc.*

la: Pro *si* Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *sed*.

en: In place of *si* the Vatican ed., with some mss., [reads] *sed*.

la: Scilicet propositio. — Aliquanto inferius pro *Secundo modo est finitus* plures codd. perperam *Secundo modo est infinitus*. Circa finem solutionis ante *non excedit* interiecimus *si*, auctoritate codd. A R T. — Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 1. ad 3.

en: Namely, the proposition. — Somewhat below, in place of *Secundo modo est finitus*, several codd. wrongly [read] *Secundo modo est infinitus*. Toward the end of the solution before *non excedit* we have inserted *si*, on the authority of codd. A R T. — Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 1, ad 3.

la: Id est, quia comprehendens completur et satiatur. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. — Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *quin perficitur res secundum suam capacitatem, quiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat*. Alii codd. non pauci sic: *quin perficitur res, requiescit, quamvis etc.* Nostra lectio, quae est receptior, descripta est ex codd. R O.

en: That is, because the one comprehending is completed and satiated. Cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2. — The Vatican ed. with some codd. [reads] *quin perficitur res secundum suam capacitatem, quiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat*. Other codd. not a few thus: *quin perficitur res, requiescit, quamvis etc.* Our reading, which is the more received, has been transcribed from codd. R O.

la: Pro *posito* Vat. cum cod. cc *potentia*. Paulo post pro *unde etsi videatur* multi codd. *Unde si dicatur*; incongrue.

en: In place of *posito* the Vatican ed. with codex cc [reads] *potentia*. A little later, in place of *unde etsi videatur*, many codd. display *Unde si dicatur*; incongruously.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Opinionem secundam, in respons. positam, S. Doctor ad 2. militat contra pantheismum. Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 3.) in eodem sensu dicit, «quod aliquid non debet dici finitum, quia sit hoc et non aliud, sed quia terminatur ad aliud, vel est propter aliud, vel quia perficitur ab alio». Mitius censurat quam primam, quia error, ut videtur, potius in perverso modo loquendi, quam in pravo intellectu consistere potest (cfr. ad 3. 4. et supra d. 35. q. 5. ad 1.). — Solut. ad 3. S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 7. a. 1. ad 3.) eandem obiectionem solvit ex hoc principio, quod esse Dei est per se subsistens, non receptum in aliquo, et ideo distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, licet sit infinitum.

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**II.** Praeter laudatos: S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 7. a. 1; *S. c. Gent.* c. 43. — B. Albert., I. *Sent.* d. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. q. 1. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The second opinion, set in the response, the Holy Doctor in [his reply] to 2. uses against pantheism. Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 6, m. 1, ad 3) in the same sense says that «something ought not to be called finite because it be this and not another, but because it is terminated at another, or is on account of another, or because it is perfected by another». He censures it more mildly than the first, because the error, as it seems, may consist rather in a perverse mode of speaking than in a depraved understanding (cf. ad 3, 4 and above d. 35, q. 5, ad 1). — Solution to 3. St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3) solves the same objection from this principle: that the being of God is per se subsistent, not received in any [other], and therefore is distinguished from all others, although it be infinite.

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**II.** Besides those praised: St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 7, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* c. 43. — Blessed Albert, I *Sent.* d. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. q. 1. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 (J4 Class D/E repair).** Health scan flagged `defs=22 la=23 en=22` — `[^16]` appeared twice in the Latin body, once in each place: "et similiter a parte finis[^16]" (p.769) and "propter summam immensitatem[^16]" (p.770). Checked printed pp.769–770 at 400 dpi (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-769.png`, `p-770.png`). Findings:

- The p.769 occurrence ("a parte finis[^16]") is correct — printed local footnote 8 on p.769, content matches def `[^16]` ("Sensus est: *infinitum*... dupliciter considerari potest...") exactly.
- The p.770 paragraph ("A parte negationis... propter summam immensitatem") carries exactly **one** printed superscript in the entire paragraph — a small "¹" after *immensitatem* — confirmed by a zoomed crop of the page image. There is **no** printed marker after *limitatum* despite the chunk having `[^17]` anchored there.
- Def `[^17]` ("De hac duplici acceptione infiniti cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63...") matches the printed p.770 local footnote 1 verbatim. So `[^17]` was mislabeled onto the wrong body position (`limitatum`, phantom) while the correct position (`immensitatem`) was mislabeled `[^16]` (duplicate of the p.769 note).

**Fix:** removed the phantom `[^17]` anchor at *limitatum* (both La. and En.); relabeled the `[^16]` anchor at *immensitatem* to `[^17]` (both La. and En.). No Latin wording, English wording, or apparatus prose changed — only marker tokens moved/relabeled. Result: `defs=22 la=22 en=22`, all label sets identical, no dupes. Verified with the corpus health-check script and `node scripts/build-content.mjs` (1815/1925/4 unchanged).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum divina potentia possit in effectum actu infinitum.*

Tertio quaeritur de infinitate divinae potentiae quantum ad opus, utrum videlicet divina potentia possit in effectum actu infinitum. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Potentia se habet proportionaliter ad opus, unde tanta potentia potest in tantum opus: ergo et maior in maius, et infinita actu in infinitum actu.

2. Item, omnis potentia, quae operatur ex se tota, si est infinita, producit infinitum, cum operetur ex tota sua virtute; sed divina potentia, cum sit simplicissima, se tota operatur; ergo videtur, quod producat effectum infinitum. Si tu dicas quod hoc non potest esse propter defectum et limitationem ipsius effectus; contra: frustra est potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum; unde et Philosophus[^1] dicit, quod frustra est potentia activa, cui non respondet passiva: ergo aut potentia divina frustra est infinita, aut ei respondet effectus infinitus et potentia passiva infinita.

3. Item, omnis potentia potest se ipsam manifestare, ergo divina potentia, cum sit infinita, potest suam infinitatem manifestare; sed infinitas non manifestatur nisi in effectu infinito: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod manifestatur in productione Filii et Spiritus sancti; tunc obiicitur, quod Spiritus sanctus habet potentiam infinitam: ergo potest ipsam manifestare, sed non in productione personae infinitae: ergo in productione creaturae.

4. Item, omne possibile ponibile in esse; sed Deus potest producere infinita: ergo infinita produci est possibile, ergo ponibile. Sed «possibili posito in esse, nullum accidit inconveniens»[^2]: ergo posito, quod Deus faciat infinita, nullum accidit inconveniens. Sed Deus potest omne illud quod non est inconveniens posse vel facere: ergo Deus potest facere, quod sint infinita actu.

5. Item, appelletur A omne creabile; tunc quaero: A aut est finitum, aut infinitum. Si finitum, et Deus non potest nisi A: ergo non potest nisi finita: ergo potentia eius est finita. Si infinitum, et Deus potest facere A: ergo potest facere aliqua actu infinita.

6. Item, «continuum est divisibile in infinitum»[^3]; quaero, utrum Deus possit reducere potentiam continui ad actum. Si non potest; ergo potentia continui excedit potentiam Dei; quod est absurdum, quia tunc potentia divina esset finita. Si eam potest reducere ad actum omnino; sed hoc non est, nisi cum est actu divisum in partes infinitas: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Quod non possit in effectum intensione infinitum[^4] videtur, quia infinito simpliciter nihil est maius: ergo si producit effectum infinitum, tunc ergo illo nihil est maius: ergo Deus non est maior. Si ergo hoc est summae nobilitatis in Deo, quod nihil possit ei aequari, producere talem effectum est contra nobilitatem divinae potentiae: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne quod est actu infinitum, est summe simplex. Nam si est aliqua compositio, tunc est ibi coarctatio et limitatio. Si ergo Deus producit effectum infinitum, illud est simplicissimum; sed in simplicissimo idem est essentia, bonitas et potentia: ergo si effectus est infinitus in potentia et bonitate, ergo summum bonum, ergo non bonum propter aliud, ergo non bonum propter Deum, ergo nec a Deo, quia «universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus»[^5], et idem est finis, quod et primum

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principium. Ergo si est infinitus, non est a Deo: ergo non est effectus; et sic patet etc.

3. Item, si Deus potest in effectum actu infinitum; quaero a te, utrum possit in aliud. Si non: ergo in agendo amittit potentiam, et sua potentia agendo debilitatur. Si ergo potest in effectum alium consimilem illi, esto quod faciat; ponatur ergo. Isti duo effectus sunt consimiles in natura, ergo sunt in eodem genere: ergo si sunt in eodem genere[^6], tunc habent aliquod in plus, in quo conveniunt, et aliqua propria, per quae differunt; ergo exceduntur ab aliquo, et arctantur per aliquod. Sed omnia talia sunt finita: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod non possit facere infinita actu, ostenditur, quia non sunt plura infinitis: ergo si produceret infinita actu, non posset producere plura: ergo Deus est impotens. Sed nihil potest facere Deum impotentem: ergo etc.

5. Item, ubi est infinitas actualis secundum numerum, ibi deficit status et ordo et distinctio; sed divina sapientia non patitur, Deum aliquid facere sine modo et mensura: ergo etc.[^7]

### Conclusio.

> *Potentia divina potest facere infinitum in potentia, sed nullatenus infinitum in actu.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum, scilicet in actu et in potentia[^8]. Infinitum in potentia Deus potest facere et facit; infinitum in actu nec potest facere nec facit. Non potest, inquam, facere, quia nec convenit sibi, nec convenit creaturae.

*Sibi non convenit:* cum enim summe bonus sit, non potest aliquid facere nisi bonum, et ita non potest facere nisi rem ad se ordinatam. Quoniam igitur ordo praesupponit numerum, et numerus praesupponit mensuram, quia non ordinantur ad aliud nisi numerata, et non numerantur nisi limitata; ideo necesse fuit, Deum facere omnia in numero, pondere et mensura[^9], nec aliter facere potuit nec potest, nec infinitum nec infinita in actu.

Ratio est etiam, quia hoc nullo modo convenit creaturae. Infinitum enim in actu est actus purus[^10]; alioquin, si aliquid haberet de limitatione et arctatione, esset finitum; sed quod est actus purus, est summum esse per essentiam, et nihil tale accipit esse ab alia essentia nec ex nihilo. Si igitur creatura, eo ipso quod creatura, aliunde est et ex nihilo, nullo modo potest esse actus purus, nullo modo potest esse infinita. — Et si non potest esse una infinita, nullo modo possunt esse infinitae secundum numerum, quia necesse est, illas plures ad aliquam unam creaturam reduci; sed infinita ad finitum reduci, est impossibile: patet ergo etc. Et quod ad aliquod finitum necessario reducantur, patet: quia necesse est ponere ordinationem in creaturis, non tantum ad Deum, sed etiam ad se invicem[^11].

Summa ergo responsionis est, quia non decet Deum facere creaturam, quin ordinem habeat et mensuram; et ratio est ex parte creaturae, quia necesse est, omnem creaturam esse limitatam, eo quod ex nihilo, et eo ipso quod composita est.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potentia tanta potest in tantum effectum sive opus; dicendum, quod est opus operans et opus operatum[^12]: opus operans, ut creare, opus operatum, ut creatura. Dicendum ergo, quod opus operans est infinitum sicut ipse Creator, sed opus operatum necesse est esse finitum. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod opus proportionatur potentiae; si intelligatur de opere operante sive de actione generaliter, verum est; si autem intelligatur de opere operato, non habet veritatem, nisi cum causa et effectus se habent per univocationem[^13] et sunt unius generis; hoc autem non est hic.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus operatur ex tota potentia; dicendum, quod agens ex tota potentia quoddam agit per naturam, et hoc agit nisi tantum quantum potest, et tantum quantum ipsum est; ubi est productio similis. Quoddam agit per deliberationem et voluntatem, et tale non agit nisi secundum ordinem et quantum vult: unde ex eadem potentia facit magnum et parvum; et sic agit Deus. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frustra est potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum; verum est de potentia, quae completur in actu; sed divina potentia non completur per actum, et ideo non est frustra, etiamsi non habeat potentiam passivam[^14]

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correspondentem. Tamen illa propositio intelligitur non habere veritatem in potentia, quae potest[^15] infinita, si intelligatur quod omnino reducatur ad actum; reducitur tamen et reduci potest secundum partem; et ideo non est frustra.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina potentia, cum sit infinita, debet suam infinitatem manifestare in infinito effectu; dicendum, quod Deus suam infinitatem manifestat in infinito secundum potentiam, sicut patet, quia, sicut supra[^16] monstratum est, interminabilis duratio manifestat virtutem infinitam. In infinito autem secundum actum non potest manifestari simpliciter, quia non decet, sed proportionaliter, quia ens in infinitum excedit non-ens; et tamen Deus ex nihilo facit ens, inter quae est distantia infinita[^17].

Unde cum divina potentia dicatur infinita tripliciter: durationis aeternitate[^18], virtutis immensitate et effectuum generalitate sive numerositate, prima manifestatur per infinitum duratione, quod est finitum actu, infinitum in potentia; secunda per creationem de nihilo, ubi est distantia infinita propter omnimodam improportionem; tertia manifestatur partim per positionem[^19], partim per privationem, quia tot fecit et adhuc potest in plura, et non tot fecit, quin adhuc possit in plura; tamen hoc manifestatur alia infinitate duplici manifesta. Et ita patet, quod non oportet, quod sit infinitum actu.

Potest tamen dici, sicut tactum est, quod virtus Patris manifestatur in productione Verbi, et per consequens tota virtus divina, cum virtus Filii et Spiritus sancti sit una, et aequales sint in virtute.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de possibili[^20], quod potest poni; dicendum, quod est possibile a potentia infinita, et possibile secundum potentiam finitam. *Possibile secundum potentiam finitam* potest poni, quia omnino potest esse ad actum reducta[^21]; sed *possibile secundum potentiam infinitam* non potest poni, quia semper est in reducendo, et nunquam in reductum esse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod A appelletur omne creabile; esto[^22]. Quod quaerit, utrum A sit finitum, vel infinitum; dico, quod infinitum, sed non est infinitum actu, sed potentia; et ideo non sequitur, quod si Deus possit A, quod possit in actu infinitum. Et si dicatur: ponatur, quod Deus faciat A; dicendum, quod non est ponibile, ratione praedicta.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum possit potentiam continui reducere ad actum; dicendum, quod sicut potentia in continuo passiva infinita est ad divisionem, sic in Deo activa infinita. Unde sicut continuum potest dividi in infinitum, tamen impossibile est, quod totaliter sit divisum, alioquin non esset infinitum; sic dividere in infinitum est possibile, ad actum reducere[^23]; sed sicut impossibile est divinam potentiam terminari, ita impossibile est, quod sit in termino divisionis. Unde Deus potest potentiam continui reducere ad actum, quia potest esse in reducendo[^24] et semper in reducendo, ita quod nunquam plus se extendat potentia quam divina actio: sed tamen continuum nunquam potest esse in reductum esse, sicut nec Deus in reduxisse.

Concedendum ergo, quod impossibile est, esse aliquid actu infinitum nisi solum Deum et eius potentiam. Et hoc est quod dicit Hugo de sancto Victore[^25]: «Sicut aeternitatem Dei non aequat tempus, nec immensitatem locus; sic nec sapientiam sensus, nec bonitatem virtus, nec potentiam opus». Unde quando dicitur, quod Deus potest facere infinita, notatur infinitas circa potentiam[^26], non circa opus. Unde aliqui distinxerunt hanc: *continuum potest dividi in infinitum*, quia illa determinatio[^27] potest determinare hoc verbum *potest*, vel hoc verbum *dividi*. Tamen quocumque modo distinguatur, semper intelligendum est, infinitatem actualem esse proprium solius Dei.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the divine power extends to an actually infinite effect.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the infinity of the divine power with regard to its work — namely, whether the divine power extends to an actually infinite effect. And that it does is shown as follows.

1. Power stands proportionate to its work, so that so great a power extends to so great a work: therefore a greater power to a greater, and an actually infinite power to an actually infinite work.

2. Likewise, every power that operates from its whole self, if it is infinite, produces an infinite, since it operates from its whole virtue; but the divine power, being most simple, operates entirely from itself: therefore it seems that it produces an infinite effect. If you say that this cannot be because of the defect and limitation of the effect itself; on the contrary: a power is in vain that is not reduced to act; whence also the Philosopher[^1] says that an active power to which no passive corresponds is in vain: therefore either the divine power is in vain infinite, or there corresponds to it an infinite effect and an infinite passive power.

3. Likewise, every power can manifest itself; therefore the divine power, since it is infinite, can manifest its own infinity; but infinity is not manifested except in an infinite effect: therefore etc. If you say that it is manifested in the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, then it is objected that the Holy Spirit has an infinite power: therefore it can manifest the same, but not in the production of an infinite person: therefore in the production of a creature.

4. Likewise, every possible is positable into being; but God can produce infinites: therefore that infinites be produced is possible, and therefore positable. But «when the possible is posited in being, nothing inconvenient follows»[^2]: therefore, supposing that God should make infinites, nothing inconvenient follows. But God can do everything that it is not inconvenient to be able to do or to make: therefore God can make there be actually infinite things.

5. Likewise, let A be called every creatable thing; then I ask: A is either finite or infinite. If finite, and God can do nothing except A: therefore He can do nothing but finite things: therefore His power is finite. If infinite, and God can make A: therefore He can make some actually infinite things.

6. Likewise, «the continuum is divisible to infinity»[^3]; I ask whether God can reduce the potency of the continuum to act. If He cannot, then the potency of the continuum exceeds God's power, which is absurd, since then the divine power would be finite. If He can reduce it to act altogether — but this is not the case unless it be actually divided into infinite parts: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. That He cannot effect a thing infinite in intensity[^4] is shown thus, since nothing is greater than the absolutely infinite: therefore if He produces an infinite effect, then nothing is greater than that effect: therefore God is not greater. If, then, it pertains to the highest nobility in God that nothing can be equated with Him, to produce such an effect is against the nobility of the divine power: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that is actually infinite is supremely simple. For if there is any composition, then there is contraction and limitation in it. If, therefore, God produces an infinite effect, that effect is most simple; but in what is most simple, essence, goodness, and power are the same: therefore if the effect is infinite in power and goodness, then it is the highest good, therefore not good on account of another, therefore not good on account of God, therefore neither from God, since «the Lord has wrought all things for Himself»[^5], and the end is the same as the first

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principle. Therefore if it is infinite, it is not from God: therefore it is not an effect; and thus it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, if God can extend to an actually infinite effect, I ask you whether He can extend to another. If not, then in acting He loses power, and His power is weakened by acting. If, therefore, He can extend to another effect like that one, suppose that He should make it; let it be supposed, then. These two effects are similar in nature, therefore they are in the same genus: therefore if they are in the same genus[^6], then they have something further in which they agree, and certain things proper to each in which they differ; therefore they are exceeded by something, and contracted by something. But all such things are finite: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that He cannot make actually infinite things is shown thus, since there is nothing more than the infinite: therefore if He produced actually infinite things, He could not produce more: therefore God is impotent. But nothing can make God impotent: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, where there is actual infinity according to number, there fails standing and order and distinction; but the divine wisdom does not suffer that God should make anything without measure and mode: therefore etc.[^7]

### Conclusion.

> *The divine power can make an infinite in potency, but in no way an infinite in act.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the infinite is twofold, namely in act and in potency[^8]. An infinite in potency God can make and does make; an infinite in act He neither can make nor does make. He cannot, I say, make one, because it is fitting neither to Himself nor to the creature.

*To Himself it is not fitting:* for since He is supremely good, He cannot make anything except what is good, and so He cannot make anything except a thing ordered to Himself. Since, therefore, order presupposes number, and number presupposes measure — because things are not ordered to anything except as numbered, and they are not numbered unless limited — therefore it was necessary that God should make all things in number, weight, and measure[^9], nor could He nor can He make them otherwise, neither an infinite nor actually infinite things.

The reason is also that this is in no way fitting to a creature. For the actually infinite is pure act[^10]; otherwise, if it had anything of limitation and contraction, it would be finite; but what is pure act is the highest being by essence, and nothing such receives being from another essence nor from nothing. If, therefore, a creature, by the very fact that it is a creature, is from elsewhere and from nothing, in no way can it be pure act, in no way can it be infinite. — And if one infinite thing cannot exist, in no way can infinites exist according to number, since it is necessary that those several be reduced to some one creature; but for infinites to be reduced to a finite is impossible: therefore it is plain etc. And that they are necessarily reduced to some finite is plain: since it is necessary to posit an ordering in creatures, not only toward God but also toward one another[^11].

The sum, therefore, of the answer is, that it does not become God to make a creature without order and measure; and the reason is on the side of the creature, since it is necessary that every creature be limited, by virtue of being from nothing and by the very fact that it is composite.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is objected, that so great a power extends to so great an effect or work: it must be said that there is *work-as-operating* and *work-as-operated*[^12]: work-as-operating, as creating; work-as-operated, as the creature. It must be said, then, that the work-as-operating is infinite, as the Creator Himself, but the work-as-operated must of necessity be finite. As to what is objected, that the work is proportioned to the power: if this be understood of the work-as-operating or of action in general, it is true; but if it be understood of the work-as-operated, it does not hold, except when cause and effect stand toward one another by univocation[^13] and are of one genus; but that is not the case here.

2. To that which is objected, that God operates from His whole power: it must be said that an agent acting from its whole power either acts by nature, and this acts only as much as it can and as much as it itself is — where the production is of like to like; or it acts by deliberation and will, and such an agent acts only according to order and as much as it wills: whence from the same power it makes a great thing and a small thing; and so God acts. — To that which is objected, that a power that is not reduced to act is in vain: this is true of a power which is completed in act; but the divine power is not completed by act, and therefore is not in vain, even if it has no corresponding passive[^14]

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power. Yet that proposition is understood not to hold true of a power that extends to[^15] infinites, if it be understood that it should be wholly reduced to act; it is nevertheless reduced, and can be reduced, in part; and therefore it is not in vain.

3. To that which is objected, that the divine power, since it is infinite, ought to manifest its own infinity in an infinite effect: it must be said that God manifests His infinity in an infinite according to power, as is plain, since, as has been shown above[^16], an interminable duration manifests an infinite virtue. In an infinite according to act, however, it cannot be manifested simpliciter, because it is not becoming, but only proportionally, since being exceeds non-being to infinity; and yet God makes being out of nothing, between which there is infinite distance[^17].

Whence since the divine power is called infinite in three ways: by the eternity of its duration[^18], by the immensity of its virtue, and by the generality or numerosity of its effects — the first is manifested through what is infinite in duration, which is finite in act, infinite in potency; the second through creation from nothing, where there is infinite distance because of complete disproportion; the third is manifested partly by position[^19], partly by privation, since He has made so many and can still extend to more, and He has not made so many that He could not still extend to more; yet this is manifested by another infinity, by the twofold manifest infinity. And thus it is plain that it is not necessary that there be an actual infinite.

It can nevertheless be said, as has been touched on, that the virtue of the Father is manifested in the production of the Word, and consequently the whole divine virtue, since the virtue of the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, and they are equal in virtue.

4. To that which is objected concerning the possible[^20], that it can be posited: it must be said that there is what is *possible from an infinite power*, and what is *possible according to a finite power*. *That which is possible according to a finite power* can be posited, since it can altogether be reduced to act[^21]; but *that which is possible according to an infinite power* cannot be posited, since it is always in being reduced and never in having-been-reduced.

5. To that which is objected, that A be called every creatable thing: granted[^22]. As to what it asks, whether A is finite or infinite, I say that it is infinite, but not actually infinite — only potentially; and therefore it does not follow that if God extends to A, He extends to the actually infinite. And if it be said: let it be supposed that God should make A — it must be said that it is not positable, for the reason already given.

6. To that which is asked, whether He can reduce the potency of the continuum to act: it must be said that just as in the continuum the passive potency is infinite with respect to division, so in God the active is infinite. Whence just as the continuum can be divided to infinity, yet it is impossible that it be totally divided, otherwise it would not be infinite; so to divide to infinity is possible, but to reduce to act[^23] [is not]; but as it is impossible that the divine power be terminated, so it is impossible that it be at the term of division. Whence God can reduce the potency of the continuum to act, since He can be in reducing[^24] and always in reducing, such that the power never extends itself more than the divine action: but yet the continuum can never be in having-been-reduced, just as neither can God be in having-reduced.

It must be granted, therefore, that it is impossible that anything be actually infinite save only God and His power. And this is what Hugh of St. Victor says[^25]: «As time does not equal the eternity of God, nor place His immensity, so neither does sense equal His wisdom, nor virtue His goodness, nor work His power». Whence when it is said that God can make infinites, infinity is noted with respect to the power[^26], not with respect to the work. Whence some have distinguished thus: *the continuum can be divided to infinity*, since that determination[^27] can determine either the verb *can*, or the verb *be-divided*. Yet in whatever way it be distinguished, it must always be understood that actual infinity is proper to God alone.

la: Propositiones istae: *frustra est potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum*, et: *frustra est potentia activa, cui non respondet passiva*, fundantur in definitionibus, quas Aristot. praebet tum de frustra, tum de potentia activa et passiva. Frustra et vanum Philosophus, libr. II. Phys. text. 62. (c. 6.) docet esse id quod ordinatum est ad aliquem finem, quem non consequitur. Et 1. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 32. (c. 1.), ubi tractat de corporibus in movendo se invicem impedientibus, quae frustra esse docet, adiungit: «frustra enim calceamentum hoc dicimus, cuius non est calceatio», sive ut in ed. Firmin-Didot legitur: «frustra enim calceum eum dicimus esse, cuius usus non est». Quod autem ad potentiam activam et potentiam passivam attinet, sic eas definit V. Metaph. text. 17. (IV. c. 12.), et IX. text. 2. (VIII. c. 1.), ut in definitione unius inclusa sit definitio alterius. Cfr. supra pag. 757, nota 6.

en: These propositions — *a power that is not reduced to act is in vain*, and *an active power to which no passive corresponds is in vain* — are grounded in the definitions which Aristotle gives both of "in-vain" and of active and passive power. The Philosopher teaches in *Phys.* II, text 62 (c. 6) that "in vain" and "vain" denote that which is ordered to some end which it does not attain. And in *de Caelo et Mundo* I, text 32 (c. 1), where he treats of bodies mutually impeding each other in motion, which he calls to be in vain, he adds: «for we call a shoe in vain when there is no putting-on of it», or as the Firmin-Didot edition reads: «we call that shoe in vain whose use there is none». As regards active power and passive power, he so defines them in *Metaph.* V, text 17 (IV c. 12) and IX, text 2 (VIII c. 1) that the definition of one is included in the definition of the other. Cf. above p. 757, note 6.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 674, nota 5. Pro *sed possibili posito* Vat. perperam *sed ponibili posito*. Quoad primam huius argumenti propositionem lectorem revocamus ad illud Aristot., *Rhetor. ad Alexandrum*, c. 1: *Possibilia sunt omnia, quaecumque fieri possunt*.

en: Cf. above p. 674, note 5. For *sed possibili posito* the Vatican edition wrongly reads *sed ponibili posito*. As to the first proposition of this argument, we refer the reader to that of Aristotle, *Rhetoric to Alexander*, c. 1: «Possible are all things, whatsoever can come to be».

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 1. et 69. (c. 1. et 7.), VI. text. 10. (c. 2.), et 1. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 2. Idem docet August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8, et XI. de Trin. c. 10, n. 17.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 1 and 69 (c. 1 and 7), VI, text 10 (c. 2), and *de Caelo et Mundo* I, text 2. Augustine teaches the same, *de Genesi ad litteram* II, c. 4, n. 8, and *de Trinitate* XI, c. 10, n. 17.

la: Intellige effectum infinitae perfectionis; unde *intensione infinitum* pertinet ad infinitum secundum essentiam. — De propositione immediate subsequenti: *idem est principium et finis* etc. cfr. Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 37. (XI. c. 7.), — Pro *quod et primum principium* cod. V *quod est primum et principium*.

en: Understand an effect of infinite perfection; whence *infinite in intensity* pertains to the infinite according to essence. — On the proposition immediately following, *the same is principle and end* etc., cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* XII, text 37 (XI c. 7). — For *quod et primum principium* codex V reads *quod est primum et principium*.

en: Proverbs 16:4.

la: Vat. praetermittit propositionem *ergo si sunt in eodem genere* (homoeoteleuton), et dein pro *in plus* (cfr. supra pag. 348, nota 8.) substituit *superius*. Aliquanto superius pro *Si ergo potest* ed. 1 *Si vero potest*, et mox post *consimilem illi* cod. V subiicit *effectui*.

en: The Vatican edition omits the proposition *therefore if they are in the same genus* (by homoeoteleuton), and then for *in plus* (cf. above p. 348, note 8) substitutes *superius*. Somewhat earlier, for *Si ergo potest* the first edition reads *Si vero potest*, and just after *consimilem illi* codex V appends *effectui*.

la: Codd. VXY et ed. 1 *esset*.

en: Codices VXY and the first edition read *esset*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 41. (c. 5.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 41 (c. 5).

la: Sap. 11, 21: *Sed omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti*. — Cfr. etiam supra d. 19. p. II. q. 4, et d. 20. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Wisdom 11:21: «But thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight». — Cf. also above d. 19, p. II, q. 4, and d. 20, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 56. (c. 6.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 56 (c. 6). (On *actus purus* and the contracted-vs-pure-act distinction.)

la: Cod. T *nec*.

en: Codex T reads *nec*. (Variant in the passage on ordering creatures *ad se invicem*.)

la: Locutio *opus operans* et *opus operatum* significat hic ipsam agentis actionem et effectum actionis.

en: The expression *work-as-operating* and *work-as-operated* signifies here the very action of the agent and the effect of the action.

la: Sive sunt univoca. Etenim causa univoca est illa quae producit effectum sibi in specie similem; cui opponitur causa aequivoca. — Paulo superius Vat. verbis *si intelligatur de opere operante* praemittit *respondeo*, et in fine solutionis pro *unius generis* cum cod. cc ponit *eiusdem generis*.

en: Or such as are univocal. For a univocal cause is one which produces an effect like itself in species; to which an equivocal cause is opposed. — A little earlier the Vatican edition, before the words *si intelligatur de opere operante*, prefixes *respondeo*, and at the end of the solution, in place of *unius generis*, with codex cc reads *eiusdem generis*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 82. (XI. c. 10.). — Paulo superius Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *necessario*, et paulo inferius loco *responsionis* exhibet *rationis*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* XII, text 82 (XI c. 10). — A little earlier the Vatican edition with codex cc omits *necessario*, and a little below, instead of *responsionis* presents *rationis*.

la: Ed. 1 addit *et perficitur*. Subinde pro *in actu* Vat. cum cod. cc *per actum*.

en: The first edition adds *et perficitur*. Then, for *in actu* the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *per actum*.

la: Cod. A hic interiicit *in*, codd. LO *esse*, Vat. cum cod. cc *habere*.

en: Codex A here interpolates *in*, codices LO *esse*, the Vatican edition with codex cc *habere*.

la: Hic q. 1.

en: Here, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 1.

en: Cf. above q. 1, ad 1.

la: Pro *aeternitate* non pauci codd. *interminabilitate*. Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc voci *tripliciter* praefigit *hoc est*.

en: For *aeternitate* not a few codices read *interminabilitate*. A little earlier, the Vatican edition with codex cc prefixes to the word *tripliciter* the phrase *hoc est*.

la: Pro *positionem* Vat. cum cod. cc *potentiam*. Mox pro *quia tot fecit* codd. GKSTVXYZ etc. *quia tot facit*, et similiter pro *et non tot fecit* cod. W *et non tot facit*. Paulo post pro *tamen hoc* cod. V *tamen haec*. In fine propositionis loco *manifestata*, ut in Vat. legitur, auctoritate codd. A H T cc ee posuimus *manifesta*.

en: For *positionem* the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *potentiam*. Next, for *quia tot fecit* codices GKSTVXYZ etc. read *quia tot facit*, and similarly for *et non tot fecit* codex W reads *et non tot facit*. A little later, for *tamen hoc* codex V reads *tamen haec*. At the end of the proposition, in place of *manifestata*, as the Vatican edition reads, on the authority of codices A, H, T, cc, ee we have placed *manifesta*.

la: In argumento 3. ad opposit.

en: In the third argument *ad oppositum*.

la: Vat. *reductum*. Lectio nostra, pro qua multi militant codd., confirmatur et explicatur lectione cod. V: *quia omnino potest illa potentia esse ad actum reducta*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *reductum*. Our reading, in favor of which many codices fight, is confirmed and explained by the reading of codex V: *quia omnino potest illa potentia esse ad actum reducta*.

la: Pro *esto* Vat. *et*, et paulo ante *quod ponitur* pro *quod obiicitur*.

en: For *esto* the Vatican edition reads *et*, and a little earlier *quod ponitur* in place of *quod obiicitur*.

la: Sensus est: Sicut continuum potest dividi in infinitum potentia, sic actio dividendi, si exerceretur, semper foret in dividendo. — Vat., paucis faventibus codd., sic: *dividere in infinitum est possibile, ad actum reducere impossibile. Et sicut impossibile est etc.*, lectio non falsa. — Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59. seq. et 69. (c. 6. seq.).

en: The sense is: As the continuum can be divided to infinity in potency, so the action of dividing, if it were exercised, would always be in dividing. — The Vatican edition, with few codices supporting, reads thus: *to divide to infinity is possible, but to reduce to act is impossible. And as it is impossible* etc. — a reading not false. — Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 59 seq. and 69 (c. 6 seq.).

la: Accipias *in reducendo* in sensu passivo et referas ad potentiam continui, ut sensus sit: quia potentia continui potest esse in reduci. — Verba *et semper in reducendo* desiderantur in cod. T.

en: Take *in reducendo* in a passive sense and refer it to the potency of the continuum, so that the sense is: that the potency of the continuum can be in *being-reduced*. — The words *et semper in reducendo* are wanting in codex T.

la: Libr. I. *de Sacram.* p. II. c. 22, ubi in textu originali post *sapientiam* adiicitur *eius*. Paulo ante pro *esse aliquid*, quam lectionem ex cod. X restituimus, Vat. incongrue *quod sit aliquid*.

en: *De Sacramentis*, book I, p. II, c. 22, where in the original text after *sapientiam* is added *eius*. A little earlier, for *esse aliquid* — the reading which we have restored from codex X — the Vatican edition incongruously reads *quod sit aliquid*.

la: Id est: in infinitum. — Paulo inferius post *potest* cod. V hic bene addit *et sic concedebant*, ac dein post *dividi* aeque bene subiicit *et sic negabant*.

en: That is: to infinity. — A little below, after *potest*, codex V here rightly adds *et sic concedebant*, and then after *dividi* equally rightly subjoins *et sic negabant*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Apud omnes constat, non posse creari infinitum secundum essentiam. Quod autem infinitum in aliquo genere, sive secundum quantitatem vel continuam (magnitudinem) vel discretam (numerum), sive secundum intensionem, sive secundum durationem creari possit, Nominales ut probabile propugnare volebant, quibus quoad durationem etiam quidam ex schola S. Thomae et Scoti assentiebantur. Sed S. Bonaventura cum magis probatis Scholasticis multis rationibus contrariam sententiam invicte comprobat. — Responsio et solut. ad 2. 3. 4. plura attentione digna continet.

**II.** S. Thom., S. I. q. 7. a. 3; de Verit. q. 2. a. 10. B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I. q. 1. n. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. 6. B. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. 8. a. 38. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. in fine, et d. 11. q. 1. in fine; II. Sent. d. 1. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** It stands agreed among all that what is infinite according to essence cannot be created. But whether what is infinite in some genus — whether according to quantity, either continuous (magnitude) or discrete (number), or according to intensity, or according to duration — can be created, the Nominalists wished to defend as probable; to whom, as regards duration, even certain from the school of St. Thomas and Scotus assented. But St. Bonaventure, with the more approved Scholastics, by many reasons invincibly proves the contrary sentence. — The response and solutions to objections 2, 3, 4 contain much worthy of attention.

**II.** St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 7, a. 3; *de Veritate* q. 2, a. 10. B. Albert, on this and the following question, here art. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, I, q. 1, n. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1, n. 6, B. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question, q. 8, art. 38, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 2. — Biel, here, q. *in fine*, and d. 11, q. 1 *in fine*; II *Sent.* d. 1, q. 3.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus.

### Quaestio IV.
#### *Utrum ratio divinae potentiae se extendat ad infinita.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–13 across the two printed pages (774, 775).

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de infinitate divinae potentiae quantum ad *rationem operandi*, et quaeritur, utrum *ratio operandi*[^1] se extendat in infinitum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia quidquid Deus potest, rationabiliter potest; sed potest infinita: ergo rationabiliter potest infinita. Et si hoc, ergo *ratio operandi* ipsius potentiae se extendit ad infinita.

2. Item, sicut se habet *ratio sciendi* ad scientiam, ita *ratio producendi* ad potentiam; sed quia divina scientia est infinita, ideo habet in se rationes infinitas cognoscendi[^2]: ergo cum divina potentia sit infinita, similiter et rationes producendi habet infinitas.

3. Item, *ratio operandi* in Deo non est aliud quam bonitas et sapientia; sed sapientia et bonitas est infinita: ergo et *ratio operandi*[^3].

4. Item, *ratio operandi* in Deo non est aliud quam Deus sive divina essentia, quidquid dicatur[^4] illa ratio; sed divina essentia est infinita: ergo et ratio operandi.

**Contra:**

1. Potentia se extendit ad opera secundum exigentiam rationis — nihil enim omittit de his quae ratio exigit — si ergo ratio se extendit ad infinita, ergo videtur, quod divina potentia producat infinita, quod falsum est.

2. Item, *ratio operandi* est ipsa ars et dispositio; sed dispositio non est nisi finitorum: ergo *ratio operandi* non est nisi finitorum[^5].

3. Item, *ratio operandi* est ipsa divina iustitia, quia *universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas*[^6]; sed iustitia non est nisi finitorum: ergo videtur, quod *ratio operandi* similiter.

4. Item, obiicitur de praescientia, quae similiter est *ratio operandi* et est in plus quam potentia, quia respectu malorum; et tamen non est respectu infinitorum. Si tu dicas, quod *dispositio* vel *praescientia* vel *iustitia* non complectitur plenam rationem, per quam potest operari divina potentia[^7]; *contra*: si non totam complectitur, ergo divina potentia sine his potest rationabiliter operari: ergo possibile est, Deum operari praeter dispositionem, praeter iustitiam et praeter praescientiam. Sed nullus talis operatur sapienter nec recte: ergo etc. Restat igitur, quod totam complectitur rationem.

### Conclusio.

> *Ratio operandi in Deo respectu actus, qui est posse, accipitur in habitu et se extendit ad infinita; respectu actus, qui est facere, accipitur in actu et est finita secundum divinam dispositionem.*

**Respondeo:** Sicut dicit *Magister in littera*[^8], aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod *ratio divinae potentiae est finita*. Et ex hoc voluerunt divinam potentiam limitare, tum quia nihil potest facere nisi ex optima <!-- page 775 -->ratione, nec dimittere, tum quia nihil potest facere nisi praesciens, nihil nisi iuste; et ideo cum haec finitorum sint, ut puta eorum quae facit, dixerunt, divinam potentiam non posse alia, quam quae facit. — Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando; et dicitur fuisse *Magistri Petri Baialardi*[^9]. Ratio autem huius stultae positionis fuit, quia nescierunt distinguere rationem potentiae nec actus eius. Actus enim potentiae duplex est: unus per modum habitus, scilicet *posse*, alius per modum actus, scilicet *operari*.

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum *ratio divinae potentiae sit infinita*: dicendum, quod sicut duplex est actus, ita[^10] dupliciter potest accipi ratio. Respectu enim actus, qui est *posse*, accipitur ratio in habitu, scilicet divina scientia et divinae bonitatis condecentia: et haec ratio se extendit ad infinita, quemadmodum et ipsa potentia respectu actus, qui est *posse*. Respectu vero actus, qui est *facere*, accipitur ratio in actu, scilicet divina dispositio sive praescientia et meritorum exigentia. Nihil enim facit[^11], nisi quod disponit; nihil etiam retribuit, nisi secundum quod merita exigunt, quando retribuit; nullam rem gubernat nec regit aliter, quam natura eius sive iustitia naturalis exigat.

Et secundum hanc distinctionem patet responsio ad primo quaesitum et ad rationes inductas; quaedam enim procedunt secundum unam viam, quaedam secundum aliam.

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud quod postea obiicitur de iustitia, dicendum, quod *iustitia*, secundum quod dicit condecentiam divinae bonitatis et potestatis, sic est generalis ratio, quae complectitur totum *posse*; sed in quantum connotat exigentiam a parte meritorum, sic non complectitur totum *posse* nec totum *agere*; in quantum vero connotat condecentiam bonitatis respectu cuiuslibet temporis[^12] in actu, sic complectitur *agere*, sed *posse* non. *Dispositio* similiter et *praescientia* *agere* complectuntur, sed non *posse*; sed *agere* est respectu finitorum, sicut et illa sunt, sed *posse* est respectu infinitorum.

Quod ergo obiicitur tunc, quod Deus potest sine eis rationabiliter operari; dicendum, quod falsum est nec sequitur ex illo. Quamvis enim Deus possit plura, quam velit, tamen non potest operari sine voluntate; quoniam nihil potest *facere*, quin possit velle, sic et praescire et disponere. Necesse est enim, potentiam[^13] exsequentem illis adaequari, scilicet dispositioni et voluntati, sed non oportet de potentia ut potente: ideo non sequitur, quod possit facere sine illis.

english:
<!-- page 774 -->

### Article unique.

### Question IV.
#### *Whether the ground of divine power extends to infinite things.*

Fourthly and lastly there is asked concerning the infinity of divine power as regards the *ground of operating* (*ratio operandi*), and it is asked whether the *ground of operating*[^1] extends to infinity. And that it does, [thus] appears:

1. Because whatever God can [do], he can do reasonably; but he can [do] infinite things: therefore he can reasonably [do] infinite things. And if this [is so], then the *ground of operating* of his very power extends to infinite things.

2. Likewise, just as the *ground of knowing* (*ratio sciendi*) stands to knowledge, so the *ground of producing* (*ratio producendi*) [stands] to power; but since the divine knowledge is infinite, it has in itself infinite grounds of knowing[^2]: therefore since the divine power is infinite, likewise it has infinite grounds of producing.

3. Likewise, the *ground of operating* in God is nothing other than goodness and wisdom; but wisdom and goodness are infinite: therefore the *ground of operating* also[^3].

4. Likewise, the *ground of operating* in God is nothing other than God or the divine essence, whatever that ground be called[^4]; but the divine essence is infinite: therefore the *ground of operating* also [is infinite].

**On the contrary:**

1. Power extends to works according to the demand of [its] ground — for it omits nothing of those things which [its] ground demands — therefore if its ground extends to infinite things, then it appears that the divine power produces infinite things, which is false.

2. Likewise, the *ground of operating* is the very art and disposition; but [a] disposition is only of finite things: therefore the *ground of operating* is only of finite things[^5].

3. Likewise, the *ground of operating* is the very divine justice, since *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*[^6]; but justice is only of finite things: therefore it appears that the *ground of operating* [is so] likewise.

4. Likewise, an objection is raised from foreknowledge, which is likewise a *ground of operating* and is of more [things] than power, since [it extends] in respect to evils; and yet it is not in respect to infinite things. If you say that *disposition* or *foreknowledge* or *justice* does not embrace the full ground through which the divine power can operate[^7]; *on the contrary*: if it does not embrace the whole [ground], then the divine power can operate reasonably without these: therefore it is possible that God operate apart from disposition, apart from justice, and apart from foreknowledge. But no such [agent] operates wisely or rightly: therefore etc. It remains, therefore, that [the *ratio operandi*] embraces the whole ground.

### Conclusion.

> *The ground of operating in God, in respect to the act which is "to be able" (posse), is taken as a habit and extends to infinite things; in respect to the act which is "to make" (facere), it is taken in act and is finite according to the divine disposition.*

**I respond:** As *the Master says in the text*[^8], some have wished to say that *the ground of divine power is finite*. And from this they wished to limit divine power, both because [God] cannot make [anything] except from the best <!-- page 775 -->ground, nor leave it aside, and because he cannot make [anything] except foreknowing, [and] nothing except justly; and therefore, since these [grounds] are of finite things, namely of those which he makes, they said that the divine power cannot [do] other things than those it makes. — But this position is erroneous, as the Master shows in the text, because by limiting it, it derogates from the immensity of the nobility of divine power; and it is said to have belonged to *Master Peter Abelard*[^9]. The ground of this foolish position was that they did not know how to distinguish the ground of power from its act. For the act of power is twofold: one through the mode of a habit, namely *to be able* (*posse*), the other through the mode of [an] act, namely *to operate* (*operari*).

When therefore it is asked whether *the ground of divine power is infinite*: it must be said that, just as the act is twofold, so[^10] the ground can be taken in two ways. For with respect to the act which is *to be able*, the ground is taken as a habit, namely the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness: and this ground extends to infinite things, just as does the power itself with respect to the act which is *to be able*. But with respect to the act which is *to make*, the ground is taken in act, namely the divine disposition or foreknowledge and the demand of merits. For he makes nothing[^11] except what he disposes; nor does he repay anything, except according as merits demand, when he repays; he governs no thing nor rules [it] otherwise than its nature or natural justice demands.

And according to this distinction the response to what was first asked and to the arguments introduced is plain; for some proceed by one way, [and] some by another.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is afterwards objected concerning justice, it must be said that *justice*, insofar as it expresses the becomingness of the divine goodness and power, is in this way a general ground which embraces the whole *to-be-able* (*posse*); but insofar as it connotes a demand on the part of merits, in this way it does not embrace the whole *to-be-able* nor the whole *to-act*; but insofar as it connotes the becomingness of goodness with respect to any time[^12] [whatsoever] in act, in this way it embraces *to-act*, but *to-be-able* [it does] not. Likewise *disposition* and *foreknowledge* embrace *to-act*, but not *to-be-able*; but *to-act* is in respect to finite things, just as those [merits] are, but *to-be-able* is in respect to infinite things.

Therefore to what is then objected, that God can operate reasonably without these; it must be said that it is false, nor does it follow from that [premise]. For although God can [do] more things than he wills, nevertheless he cannot operate without willing; since he can do nothing without being able to will, [and] likewise to foreknow and to dispose. For it is necessary that the power[^13] in carrying [the work] out be made equal to those, namely to disposition and to will, but it is not required of the power as "able" [in itself]: therefore it does not follow that he could make [anything] without these.

la: *Vat. loco verborum* et quaeritur, utrum ratio operandi*, quae suppressit, ponit* an*; cod. cc* si.

en: The Vatican [edition], in place of the words *et quaeritur, utrum ratio operandi*, which it suppressed, puts *an*; codex cc [reads] *si*.

la: *Cfr. supra d. 35. q. 5.*

en: Cf. above d. 35, q. 5.

la: *Cod. T* producendi.

en: [Quaracchi p.774 footer entry 3.] Codex T [reads] *producendi* (where the Quaracchi text has *operandi*).

la: *Vat. cum edd. 1, 3* dicat.

en: [Quaracchi p.774 footer entry 4.] The Vatican with editions 1, 3 [reads] *dicat* (for *dicatur*).

la: *Cod. M* nisi respectu finitorum. *— Vat. hoc argumentum tertio loco ponit.*

en: [Quaracchi p.774 footer entry 5.] Codex M [reads] *nisi respectu finitorum* ("[is] not [a ground] except in respect to finite things"). — The Vatican [edition] places this argument in the third position.

en: [Quaracchi p.774 footer entry 6.] Psalm 24:10 [Vulgate; = Ps. 25:10 in modern numbering].

la: *Dispositio enim et praescientia et iustitia respiciunt tantum ea quae erunt, eorumque tantum rationem continent, non autem eorum quae* possent *esse, ad quae tamen divina potentia se extendit.*

en: [Quaracchi p.774 footer entry 7.] For disposition and foreknowledge and justice regard only those things which will be, and contain the ground of those alone, but not of those things which *could* be, to which, however, the divine power does extend.

la: *Hic c. I. — Paulo post mendum Vat.* ratione exhibentis *pro* ratio *correximus auctoritate codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3.*

en: [Quaracchi p.774 footer entry 8.] Here, chapter 1 [of *I Sent.* d. 43 in the *littera*]. — A little after, we have corrected the Vatican [edition]'s error *ratione exhibentis* in place of *ratio* on the authority of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: *[Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 1.] Sive Abaelardi, cuius opinionem vide in eius* Introd. ad Theolog., *libr. III. n. 5. — Similem opinionem profert Aristot., IX.* Metaph. *text. 5. (VIII. c. 3.):* Sunt autem quidam, ut Megarici, qui dicunt, tunc solum posse [aliquem], cum agat; cum vero non agat, non posse: ut puta eum qui non aedificat, aedificare non posse, sed aedificantem, cum aedificat.

en: [Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 1.] That is, [Peter] Abelard, whose opinion see in his *Introductio ad Theologiam*, Book III, n. 5. — Aristotle proposes a similar opinion, *Metaphysics* IX, text 5 (VIII, c. 3): «There are however certain ones, like the Megarics, who say that [someone] is then alone able [to do something] when he is acting; but when he is not acting, he is not able [to do it]: such as that one who is not building cannot build, but the one who is building [can build], when he is building».

la: [Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 2.] Vat. cum cod. cc subiicit *etiam*, et mox post *Respectu* Vat. inserit *enim*, quam particulam codd. et sex primae edd. incongrue ponunt post *accipitur*, quod paulo post sequitur. — Locutionem subinde occurrentem *divinam bonitatem condecentem* intellige illud quod decet divinam bonitatem, prout in se consideratam. Locutio ipsa sumta est ex Anselmo, Proslog. c. 10.

en: [Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 2.] The Vatican with codex cc subjoins *etiam*, and soon after *Respectu* the Vatican inserts *enim*, which particle the codd. and the first six editions incongruously place after *accipitur*, which follows a little later. — The locution occurring hereafter, *divinam bonitatem condecentem* ("befitting the divine goodness"), understand [as] *that which befits the divine goodness as considered in itself*. The locution itself is taken from Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 10.

la: *[Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 3.] Ed. 1 adiicit* Deus*, et dein cum cod. M (in marg.) pro* nihil etiam *habet* nulli etiam. *Loco* disponit*, quod verbis* nihil etiam *praecedit, cod. R* disposuit. *Mox pro* quando retribuit *codd. V X* quid retribuat. *Post* retribuit *Vat. interserit* quia. *Dein locutio* iustitia naturalis *non in sensu morali accipienda est, sed tantum ut circumlocutio quaedam explicativa pro* natura.

en: [Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 3.] Edition 1 adds *Deus*, and then, with codex M (in the margin), in place of *nihil etiam* it has *nulli etiam*. In place of *disponit*, which precedes the words *nihil etiam*, codex R [reads] *disposuit*. Soon after, in place of *quando retribuit*, codices V, X [read] *quid retribuat*. After *retribuit* the Vatican inserts *quia*. Then the locution *iustitia naturalis* ("natural justice") is not to be taken in a moral sense, but only as a kind of explicative circumlocution for *natura* ("nature").

la: *[Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 4.] Id est omnium quae in tempore fiunt. Pro* temporis *— Vat.* operis.

en: [Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 4.] That is, [in respect] of all things which come to be in time. In place of *temporis*, the Vatican [reads] *operis* ("of the work").

la: *[Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 5.] Codd. V X post* potentiam *inserunt* ut. *Paulo ante pro* sic et *Vat. cum cod. cc* sicut et.

en: [Quaracchi p.775 footer entry 5.] Codices V, X after *potentiam* insert *ut*. A little before, in place of *sic et*, the Vatican with codex cc [reads] *sicut et*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Abaelardus cum aliis concessit quidem, potentiam divinam *in se* et *ad intra* esse infinitam, sed quoad *rationem operandi ad extra* (quae est aliquid quod est intra Deum) voluit divinam potentiam limitare. Contra hunc errorem Magister in tota hac distinctione disputat, et diffuse etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 1. 2. — Aliis rationibus motus, Wicleffus peiorem errorem docuit, scil. quod Deus non possit facere alia, quam facit; cum quo fere conveniunt plurimi illi philosophi antiqui et recentiores, qui Deum in operibus ad extra non libere, sed ex necessitate naturae agere, temere docuerunt. Contra multiplices hos errores haec responsio optime servire potest. Tota vis argumentationis stat in distinctione *rationis operandi secundum actum primum et secundum*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 44. q. unica, et Report. hic q. 2, et d. 44. q. 1. — S. Thom., (quoad principia) S. 1. q. 25. a. 5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 26. 27. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Abelard, with others, indeed conceded that divine power *in itself* and *ad intra* is infinite, but as regards the *ground of operating ad extra* (which is something that is within God) he wished to limit divine power. Against this error the Master disputes throughout this whole distinction, and Alex. of Hales also at length, *Summa* p. I, q. 21, m. 2, § 1, 2. — Moved by other arguments, Wycliffe taught a worse error, namely that God cannot make other [things] than those which he makes; with whom largely agree very many of those ancient and more recent philosophers who rashly taught that God acts in his works *ad extra* not freely, but from necessity of nature. Against these manifold errors this response can best serve. The whole force of the argumentation rests on the distinction of the *ground of operating according to first and second act*.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. — Scotus, I *Sent.*, d. 44, q. unica, and *Report.* here q. 2, and d. 44, q. 1. — St. Thomas, (as to principles) *Summa* I, q. 25, a. 5; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 26, 27. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 7. — Durand, here q. 5. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes: - **2026-07-17 J4 Class D/E health-scan false positive (defs=13, la=15, en=13) — CONFIRMED, NOT a real defect.** The `## Latin` section's opening apparatus-explainer blockquote (line 36) contains the backtick-quoted example range `` `[^1]`–`[^13]` `` ("this chunk renumbers them sequentially `[^1]`–`[^13]` across the two printed pages"). The corpus health-scan regex and the live-site renderer both fail to respect backtick code-spans inside blockquotes, so these two example numbers are miscounted as real body anchors — exactly accounting for the la=15 vs defs=13/en=13 gap (extras land precisely at labels `1` and `13`, matching the blockquote's endpoints). All 13 real Latin/English anchors and all 13 apparatus defs are correctly paired 1:1. This is the same corpus-wide false-positive pattern documented in `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2 (also confirmed in `I-d32-littera`, `I-d41-a2-q1`, `I-d41-a2-q2`, `I-d42-dubia`), which additionally flags a live-render bug (the renderer turns the blockquote's example numbers into spurious clickable footnote superscripts). **No edits made to this chunk** — flagged for Wilson's corpus-wide decision per the handoff (de-fence the notation or teach the regex to skip code-spans).