title: Dist. 10

title_alt: Littera Magistri — Distinctio X (Cap. I–III)

title_alt: The Master's Text — Distinction X (Chapters I–III)

source_text:
<!-- page 223 -->

# DISTINCTIO X.

### Cap. I. *An Christus, secundum quod homo, sit persona, vel aliquid.*

Solet etiam a quibusdam inquiri, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit *persona*, vel etiam sit *aliquid*. — Ex utraque parte quaestionis[^p224-q1][^p223-1] argumenta concurrunt. Quod enim persona sit, his edisserunt rationibus. Si, secundum quod homo, *aliquid* est; vel *persona*, vel *substantia*, vel *aliud* est. Sed *aliud* non: ergo vel *persona*, vel *substantia*. Sed si *substantia* est; vel *rationalis*, vel *irrationalis*; sed non est *irrationalis* substantia: ergo *rationalis*. Si vero, secundum quod homo, est *rationalis substantia*[^p223-2], ergo *persona*, quia haec est definitio personae: « Substantia rationalis individuae naturae[^p223-3] ». Si ergo, secundum quod homo, est *aliquid*, et, secundum quod homo, *persona* est.

Sed e converso: si, secundum quod homo, *persona* est, vel *tertia* in Trinitate[^p223-4], vel *alia*; sed *alia* non: ergo *tertia* in Trinitate persona. At si, secundum quod homo, persona est tertia in Trinitate, ergo Deus. — Propter haec inconvenientia et alia quidam dicunt, Christum secundum hominem non esse *personam* nec *aliquid*, nisi forte secundum sit expressivum unitatis personae. Secundum enim multiplicem habet rationem. Aliquando enim exprimit conditionem vel proprietatem naturae divinae, vel humanae; aliquando unitatem personae; aliquando notat *habitum*; aliquando *causam*. Cuius distinctionis rationem diligenter lector animadvertat atque in sinu memoriae recondat, ne eius confundatur[^p223-5] sensus, cum de Christo sermo occurrerit.

Illud tamen non sequitur, quod in argumentatione superiori inductum est, quod si Christus, secundum quod homo, est *substantia rationalis*, ergo *persona*. Nam et modo anima Christi est substantia rationalis, non tamen persona, quia non est per se sonans, immo alii rei coniuncta. Illa tamen *personae* descriptio non est data pro illis tribus personis.

Sed adhuc aliter nituntur probare, Christum secundum hominem esse *personam*: quia Christus, secundum quod homo, *praedestinatus est, ut sit Dei filius*[^p223-6]; sed illud est quod ut sit, praedestinatus est: ergo si praedestinatus est, secundum quod homo, ut sit filius Dei; et, secundum quod homo, est filius Dei. — Ad quod dici potest, Christum esse id quod ut sit, praedestinatus est. Est enim praedestinatus, ut sit filius Dei, et ipse vere est filius Dei. Sed *secundum hominem* praedestinatus est, ut sit filius Dei, quia per gratiam hoc habet, secundum hominem; nec tamen *secundum hominem* est filius Dei, nisi forte secundum unitatis personae sit expressivum, ut sit sensus: ipse qui est homo, est filius Dei; ut autem ipse, ens homo, sit filius Dei, per gratiam habet. Sed si *causa* notetur, falsum est; non enim, quo homo est, eo Dei filius est.

### Cap. II. *An Christus, secundum quod homo, sit adoptivus filius.*

Si vero quaeritur, an Christus sit *adoptivus filius*, secundum quod homo, sive[^p223-7] alio modo; respondemus, Christum non esse adoptivum filium aliquo modo, sed tantum naturalem, quia natura filius est, non adoptionis gratia. Non autem sic dicitur filius natura, ut dicitur Deus natura. Non enim eo filius est, quo Deus est, quia proprietate nativitatis filius, natura divinitatis Deus est; et tamen dicitur natura, vel naturae filius, quia naturaliter est filius, eandem scilicet habens<!-- page 224 --> naturam, quam ille qui genuit. Adoptivus autem filius non est, quia non prius fuit, et postmodum adoptatus est in filium, sicut nos dicimur adoptivi filii, quia cum nati fuerimus irae filii, per gratiam facti sumus filii Dei[^p224-1]. Christus vero nunquam fuit non filius; et ideo non est adoptivus filius.

Sed ad hoc opponitur sic: Christus filius hominis est, id est Virginis, aut *gratia*, aut *natura*, vel utroque modo. Si vero *natura*, aut divina, aut humana; sed divina non: ergo aut humana natura, aut non natura est filius hominis. Si non natura, ergo gratia tantum; et si etiam[^p224-2] natura humana, non ideo minus per gratiam. Si ergo *gratia* filius Virginis est, adoptivus filius esse videtur, ut idem sit naturalis filius Patris, et adoptivus filius Virginis. — Ad quod dici potest, Christum filium Virginis esse et natura vel naturaliter et gratia; nec tamen adoptivus filius Virginis est, quia non per adoptionem, sed per unionem filius Virginis esse dicitur. Filius enim Virginis dicitur, eo quod in Virgine hominem accepit in unitatem personae, et hoc fuit gratiae, non naturae. Unde Augustinus super Ioannem[^p224-3]: « Quod Unigenitus est aequalis Patri, non est gratiae, sed naturae. Quod autem in unitatem personae Unigeniti assumtus est homo, gratiae est, non naturae ». Christus ergo nec Dei nec hominis est adoptivus filius, sed Dei naturaliter, et hominis naturaliter et gratia filius. Quod vero naturaliter sit hominis filius, Augustinus ostendit in libro de Fide ad Petrum[^p224-4]: « Ille, scilicet Deus, factus est naturaliter hominis filius, qui est naturaliter filius unigenitus Dei Patris ». Quod autem non sit adoptivus filius, et tamen gratia sit filius, ex subditis probatur testimoniis. Hieronymus super Epistolam ad Ephesios[^p224-5] ait: « De Christo Iesu scriptum est, quia semper cum Patre fuit, et nunquam eum, ut esset, voluntas paterna praecessit »; « et ille quidem natura filius est, nos vero adoptione. Ille nunquam filius non fuit; nos, antequam essemus, praedestinati sumus, et tunc Spiritum adoptionis accepimus, quando credidimus in Filium Dei ». Hilarius quoque in libro tertio de Trinitate[^p224-6] ait: « Dominus dicens: Clarifica Filium tuum, non solo nomine contestatus est, se esse filium Dei, sed etiam proprietate. Nos filii Dei sumus, sed non talis hic filius. Hic enim verus et proprius est filius origine, non adoptione; veritate, non nuncupatione; nativitate, non creatione ». Augustinus etiam super Ioannem[^p224-7] ait: « Nos sumus filii gratia, non natura; Unigenitus autem natura, non gratia. An hoc etiam in ipso Filio ad hominem referendum est? Ita sane ». Ambrosius quoque in libro primo de Trinitate[^p224-8] ait: « Christus filius est non per adoptionem, sed per naturam; per adoptionem nos filii dicimur, ille per veritatem naturae est ». — Ex his evidenter ostenditur, quod Christus non sit filius gratia adoptionis. Illa enim gratia intelligitur, cum Augustinus eum non esse gratia filium asserit; gratia enim, sed non adoptionis, immo unionis Filius Dei est filius hominis, et e converso.

### Cap. III. *An persona, vel natura praedestinata sit.*

Deinde, si quaeritur, utrum praedestinatio illa, quam commemorat Apostolus, sit de *persona*, an de *natura*; sane dici potest, et personam filii, quae semper fuit, esse praedestinatam secundum hominem assumtum, ut ipsa, scilicet ens homo, esset Dei filius; et naturam humanam esse praedestinatam, ut Verbo Patris personaliter uniretur.

---

english:
# DISTINCTION X.

### Chapter I. *Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person, or something.*

It is also wont to be inquired by some, whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is a *person*, or even is *something*. — On both sides of the question[^p224-q1][^p223-1] arguments run together. For that he is a person, they set forth by these reasonings. If, insofar as he is man, he is *something*; he is either a *person*, or a *substance*, or *something else*. But *something else* he is not: therefore either a *person* or a *substance*. But if he is a *substance*; it is either *rational* or *irrational*; but it is not an *irrational* substance: therefore *rational*. But if, insofar as he is man, he is a *rational substance*[^p223-2], then a *person*, for this is the definition of a person: "An individual substance of a rational nature[^p223-3]." If therefore, insofar as he is man, he is *something*, then also, insofar as he is man, he is a *person*.

But on the contrary: if, insofar as he is man, he is a *person*, he is either the *third* in the Trinity[^p223-4], or *another*; but *another* he is not: therefore the *third* person in the Trinity. And if, insofar as he is man, he is the third person in the Trinity, then he is God. — On account of these incongruities and others, certain ones say that Christ, insofar as he is man, is not a *person* nor *something*, unless perhaps "insofar as" be expressive of the unity of the person. For "insofar as" has a manifold sense. For sometimes it expresses the condition or property of the divine nature, or of the human; sometimes the unity of the person; sometimes it denotes a *habit*; sometimes a *cause*. Let the reader diligently attend to the ground of this distinction and store it away in the recess of his memory, lest its sense be confounded[^p223-5] when speech about Christ shall occur.

Yet that does not follow which was adduced in the foregoing argumentation, namely that if Christ, insofar as he is man, is a *rational substance*, then a *person*. For even now the soul of Christ is a rational substance, yet not a person, because it does not subsist of itself, but rather is conjoined to another thing. That description of a *person*, however, was not given for those three persons.

But still in another way they strive to prove that Christ, insofar as he is man, is a *person*: because Christ, insofar as he is man, *was predestined to be the Son of God*[^p223-6]; but that is what he was predestined to be: therefore if he was predestined, insofar as he is man, to be the Son of God; then also, insofar as he is man, he is the Son of God. — To which it can be said that Christ is that which he was predestined to be. For he was predestined to be the Son of God, and he truly is the Son of God. But *insofar as he is man* he was predestined to be the Son of God, because he has this by grace, insofar as he is man; yet not *insofar as he is man* is he the Son of God, unless perhaps "insofar as" be expressive of the unity of the person, so that the sense be: he who is man is the Son of God; but that he himself, being man, should be the Son of God, he has by grace. But if a *cause* be denoted, it is false; for it is not by that whereby he is man that he is the Son of God.

### Chapter II. *Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is an adoptive son.*

But if it be asked whether Christ is an *adoptive son*, insofar as he is man, or[^p223-7] in some other way; we answer that Christ is in no way an adoptive son, but only a natural one, because he is a son by nature, not by the grace of adoption. He is not, however, called a son by nature in the way that he is called God by nature. For he is not a son by that whereby he is God, since he is a son by the property of his nativity, but God by the nature of the divinity; and yet he is called a son by nature, or a son of a nature, because he is naturally a son, having, namely, the same<!-- page 224 --> nature as he who begot him. But he is not an adoptive son, because he did not first exist and afterwards was adopted into a son, as we are called adoptive sons, because, whereas we were born sons of wrath, by grace we have been made sons of God[^p224-1]. But Christ never was a non-son; and therefore he is not an adoptive son.

But against this it is objected thus: Christ is the son of man, that is, of the Virgin, either by *grace*, or by *nature*, or in both ways. But if by *nature*, either divine or human; but divine, no: therefore he is the son of man either by a human nature, or by no nature. If by no nature, then by grace only; and even if[^p224-2] by a human nature, none the less by grace. If therefore he is the son of the Virgin by *grace*, he seems to be an adoptive son, so that the same one is the natural son of the Father, and the adoptive son of the Virgin. — To which it can be said that Christ is the son of the Virgin both by nature, or naturally, and by grace; yet he is not the adoptive son of the Virgin, because he is said to be the son of the Virgin not by adoption, but by union. For he is called the son of the Virgin because in the Virgin he took up the man into the unity of the person, and this was of grace, not of nature. Hence Augustine on John[^p224-3]: "That the Only-begotten is equal to the Father is not of grace, but of nature. But that the man was assumed into the unity of the person of the Only-begotten is of grace, not of nature." Christ therefore is the adoptive son neither of God nor of man, but the son of God naturally, and the son of man both naturally and by grace. And that he is naturally the son of man, Augustine shows in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^p224-4]: "He, namely God, was made naturally the son of man, who is naturally the only-begotten Son of God the Father." But that he is not an adoptive son, and yet is a son by grace, is proved from what follows in the testimonies. Jerome on the *Epistle to the Ephesians*[^p224-5] says: "Of Christ Jesus it is written that he always was with the Father, and the paternal will never preceded him that he might be"; "and he indeed is a son by nature, but we by adoption. He never was not a son; we, before we existed, were predestined, and then we received the Spirit of adoption, when we believed in the Son of God." Hilary too, in the third book *On the Trinity*[^p224-6], says: "The Lord, in saying, 'Glorify thy Son,' attested not by name alone that he is the Son of God, but also by property. We are sons of God, but not such as this Son. For he is a true and proper son by origin, not by adoption; by truth, not by appellation; by birth, not by creation." Augustine also on John[^p224-7] says: "We are sons by grace, not by nature; but the Only-begotten is a son by nature, not by grace. Is this also, in the Son himself, to be referred to the man? Yes indeed." Ambrose too, in the first book *On the Trinity*[^p224-8], says: "Christ is a son not by adoption, but by nature; by adoption we are called sons, but he is by the truth of nature." — From these it is evidently shown that Christ is not a son by the grace of adoption. For that grace is understood when Augustine asserts that he is not a son by grace; for it is by grace, but not of adoption, nay rather of union, that the Son of God is the son of man, and conversely.

### Chapter III. *Whether the person, or the nature, was predestined.*

Next, if it be asked whether that predestination which the Apostle mentions is of the *person*, or of the *nature*; it can rightly be said both that the person of the Son, which always existed, was predestined according to the man assumed, so that it, namely being man, should be the Son of God; and that the human nature was predestined to be personally united to the Word of the Father.

---

la: *Cap. I, II, III, et notae ad textum, p.223–224.* In hac distinctione textus Magistri (cap. I–III) impressus est pp. 223–224; apparatus criticus restituitur ex notis « NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM » (p.223, nn.1–7) et ex notis paginae 224 (nn.1–8).

en: *Chapters I, II, III, and notes to the text, pp. 223–224.* In this distinction the Master's text (chs. I–III) is printed on pp. 223–224; the critical apparatus is restored from the notes "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" (p. 223, nn. 1–7) and from the notes of p. 224 (nn. 1–8).

la: Cod. C cum Vat. et pluribus edd. praefigit *huius*.

en: Codex C, with the Vatican edition and several editions, prefixes *huius* ("of this").

la: Ed. 1. bene addit *est*.

en: Edition 1 rightly adds *est* ("is").

la: Haec autem definitio Boethii (*de Una Persona* etc. c. 3.) ita legitur: « Substantia *individua* rationalis naturae », quam ed. 8 in textum recepit, refragantibus omnibus codd. et ceteris edd. Sensus vix variatur, si *rationalis* trahitur ad *naturae*.

en: This definition of Boethius (*On the One Person* etc., c. 3) reads thus: "An individual substance of a rational nature," which edition 8 received into the text, against all the codices and the other editions. The sense scarcely varies, if *rationalis* be drawn to *naturae*.

la: Cod. E et edd. 1, 5, 8 addunt *persona*.

en: Codex E and editions 1, 5, 8 add *persona* ("person").

la: Ita codd. A B D et edd. 1, 8; in aliis *confundantur*; deinde cod. D et edd. 6, 8 *occurrit* pro *occurrerit*.

en: Thus codices A B D and editions 1, 8; in the others, *confundantur*; then codex D and editions 6, 8 read *occurrit* for *occurrerit*.

la: Rom. 1, 4. — Inferius post *si praedestinatus est*, edd. 1, R addunt *Christus*. — De distinctione, quae est in seq. responsione, cfr. Glossa apud Lyranum ad Rom. 1, 4.

en: Romans 1:4. — Below, after *si praedestinatus est*, editions 1, R add *Christus*. — On the distinction which is in the following reply, cf. the Gloss in Lyra on Romans 1:4.

la: Cod. E et edd. 1, 8 *an*. Inferius post *filius* edd., exceptis 1, 8, addunt *Dei*, refragantibus codd.

en: Codex E and editions 1, 8 read *an* ("whether"). Below, after *filius*, the editions, except 1 and 8, add *Dei* ("of God"), against the codices.

la: Eph. 2, 3. — Mox post *non filius* solae edd., exceptis 1, 8, addunt *Dei*.

en: Ephesians 2:3. — Soon after, following *non filius*, the editions alone, except 1 and 8, add *Dei* ("of God").

la: Edd. 1, 8 omittunt *etiam*. Deinde pro *Virginis* solae edd., exceptis 1, 8, *hominis*.

en: Editions 1, 8 omit *etiam*. Then for *Virginis* the editions alone, except 1 and 8, read *hominis* ("of man").

la: *Tract.* 74. in Ioan. Evang. (14, 16.) n. 3. — Pro *unitatem personae*, quod est in originali et edd. 1, 8, in aliis *unitate*.

en: *Tractate* 74 on the Gospel of John (14:16), n. 3. — For *unitatem personae*, which is in the original and editions 1, 8, the others read *unitate*.

en: Chapter 2, n. 14.

la: Cap. 1, 5; seq. locus ibid. parum inferius.

en: Chapters 1, 5; the following passage is in the same place, a little below.

la: Num. 11, ubi respicitur Ioan. 17, 5: *Et nunc clarifica me, tu Pater.* — In illo textu codd. et ed. 1 post *esse filium* omittunt *Dei*. Cod. C ibi post *filius* glossando addit *contra Nestorium*: origine, non adoptione; *contra Sabellium*: veritate, non nuncupatione; *contra Arium*: nativitate etc.

en: N. 11, where reference is made to John 17:5: *And now glorify me, thou Father.* — In that text the codices and edition 1, after *esse filium*, omit *Dei*. Codex C there, after *filius*, adds by way of gloss *against Nestorius*: by origin, not by adoption; *against Sabellius*: by truth, not by appellation; *against Arius*: by birth, etc.

en: *Tractate* 82 on the Gospel of John (15:10), n. 4.

la: Sive *de Fide*, c. 19. n. 126.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p223-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p224-{L,R}-{1,2}.png`), reflowed column-by-column (Left top→bottom, then Right), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 15853–15947. The Lombard *littera* for DISTINCTIO X comprises three chapters: Cap. I (*An Christus, secundum quod homo, sit persona, vel aliquid*), Cap. II (*An Christus … sit adoptivus filius*), Cap. III (*An persona, vel natura praedestinata sit*). Bonaventure's COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM X (raw 15948) begins immediately after `…Verbo Patris personaliter uniretur.` and belongs to the next chunk `bon-sent-III-d10-divisio`.

**Page-split map.** p.223 (foot, after the d.9 dubia): DISTINCTIO X header + Cap. I (full) + Cap. II opener, ending mid-word at `…eandem scilicet habens` (continues onto p.224). p.224: Cap. II tail (from `naturam, quam ille qui genuit…`) + Cap. III (full), ending `…Verbo Patris personaliter uniretur.` The page break falls inside Cap. II at `habens|naturam` — joined continuously across the `<!-- page 224 -->` marker.

**Apparatus / per-page restart.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each printed page. p.223's littera apparatus opens under a fresh `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` heading (notes 1–7) — note 1 (`Cod. C cum Vat. … praefigit huius.`) is the first d.10 littera note. p.224 has notes 1–8 (`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` heading and its note 1 follow on p.224 and belong to `bon-sent-III-d10-divisio`, NOT the littera). Disambiguated `[^p223-N]` / `[^p224-N]`; the `[^p224-q1]` marker is a chunk-level provenance anchor placed at the opening sentence.

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED from d9-dubia: NONE.** Confirmed eyes-on (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p223-L-2.png`): on p.223 the d.9 dubia's two footer notes (Tract. 27 / Dist. 9) are immediately followed by the NEW heading `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` whose note 1 opens the d.10 littera apparatus — clean break, no leak.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to d10-divisio: the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` block on p.224.** The littera's p.224 footer sequence is fully consumed by notes 1–8 (markers in the Cap. II/III body). After note 8 a new heading `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` with its own note 1 (`Edd. proprietatum idiomata; in cod. K a secunda manu pro et ante idiomatum substitutum est sive…`) begins the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS apparatus — this belongs to `bon-sent-III-d10-divisio`, which opens at raw 15948.

**`[?]` flags: NONE.** All readings legible at 450 dpi; OCR garbles (`ho7)io`→*homo*, `niiquid`→*aliquid*, `Sunstantia`→*Substantia*, `nalurae3`→*naturae*³, `praedeslinala`→*praedestinata*) silently corrected against the PDF column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 10, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem X — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction X — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 224 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem X.
### *De communicatione idiomatum in comparatione ad personam.*

*Solet etiam quaeri a quibusdam etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de communicatione idiomatum per comparationem naturae ad naturam, hic agit de communicatione idiomatum in comparatione ad personam. Et quoniam talium proprietatum et idiomatum[^p224-comm1] quaedam sunt, quae sonant in nobilitatem et dignitatem, quaedam vero in quandam defectibilitatem; ideo pars ista dividitur in duas; in quarum prima determinat de primis; in secunda vero de secundis, et incipit secunda pars ultimo capitulo huius distinctionis, ibi: *Deinde, si quaeritur, utrum* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima inquirit Magister, utrum conditio personalitatis conveniat Christo, secundum quod homo sive secundum humanam naturam. In secunda vero, utrum filiatio adoptionis secundum humanam naturam conveniat eidem, ibi:
<!-- page 225 -->
*Si vero quaeritur, an Christus sit filius* etc. Utrumque autem horum dignitatem et nobilitatem importare videtur, scilicet tam personalitatis conditio quam adoptionis filiatio. Prima pars habet partes duas. In prima movet quaestionem et determinat. In secunda vero dissolvit rationem sophisticam, quae veritatem determinatam impugnat, ibi: *Sed nituntur probare aliter* etc.

Similiter secunda pars principalis habet duas. In prima determinat quaestionem, qua quaeritur, utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus secundum humanam naturam. In secunda contra hoc opponit et determinat, ibi: *Sed ad hoc opponitur sic* etc. Subdivisiones autem partium manifestae sunt in littera. — Generalis autem intellectus distinctionis circa duo versatur, scilicet in ostendendo, quod nec personalitatis conditio nec adoptionis filiatio convenit Christo, secundum quod homo.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo. Primo quaeritur de comparatione Christi hominis ad conditionem personalitatis. Secundo vero de comparatione eiusdem ad filiationem adoptionis.

Circa primum breviter quaerenda sunt tria. Primum est, utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Secundo quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona. Tertio quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.

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english:
## Commentary on Distinction X.
### *On the communication of idioms in comparison to the person.*

*It is also wont to be asked by some, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the communication of idioms by the comparison of nature to nature; here he treats of the communication of idioms in comparison to the person. And since, of such properties and idioms[^p224-comm1], some are such as ring of nobility and dignity, and others of a certain defectibility, therefore this part is divided into two: in the first of these he determines concerning the first kind; in the second, concerning the second kind, and the second part begins in the last chapter of this distinction, there: *But if it be asked whether,* etc.

The first part has two [parts]. In the first the Master inquires whether the condition of personality belongs to Christ as man, that is, according to His human nature. In the second, whether the filiation of adoption according to the human nature belongs to the same, there:
*But if it be asked whether Christ is a son,* etc. And each of these — namely both the condition of personality and the filiation of adoption — seems to import dignity and nobility. The first part has two parts. In the first he raises the question and determines it. In the second he refutes the sophistical reasoning which impugns the determined truth, there: *But they strive to prove otherwise,* etc.

Likewise the second principal part has two [parts]. In the first he determines the question by which it is asked whether Christ is an adoptive son according to the human nature. In the second he objects against this and determines it, there: *But against this it is objected thus,* etc. The subdivisions of the parts, moreover, are manifest in the text. — Now the general sense of the distinction turns upon two things, namely upon showing that neither the condition of personality nor the filiation of adoption belongs to Christ as man.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part there falls here a question concerning two matters. First it is asked concerning the comparison of Christ as man to the condition of personality. Second, concerning the comparison of the same to the filiation of adoption.

Concerning the first, three things are briefly to be inquired into. The first is, whether this is to be conceded: Christ, as man, is God. Second it is asked concerning this: Christ, as man, is a person. Third it is asked whether this is to be conceded: Christ, as man, is an individual.

---

la: *Edd.* proprietatum idiomata; in cod. K a secunda manu pro *et* ante *idiomatum* substitutum est *sive.* Paulo inferius edd. omittunt *et incipit secunda pars, ultimo capitulo huius distinctionis.*

en: The editions [read] *of properties, idioms*; in codex K, by a second hand, *or* has been substituted for *and* before *idioms.* A little below, the editions omit *and the second part begins, in the last chapter of this distinction.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.224–225 (PDF 246–247; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 15948–15996. `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM X` at raw 15948; `DIVISIO TEXTUS` at raw 15953; `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` at raw 15988; chunk ends just before `ARTICULUS I.` at raw 15997. d.10 has **no pars division** (2 articles × 3 quaestiones; scaffold: littera + divisio + a1-q1/q2/q3 + a2-q1/q2/q3 + dubia).

**Page-split map.** The COMMENTARIUS heading + lemma (*Solet etiam quaeri a quibusdam etc.*) + DIVISIO TEXTUS open at the **bottom of p.224** (two-column), immediately after the littera (Cap. III) closes with *…Verbo Patris personaliter uniretur.* The divisio body continues across the top of **p.225** (running head `DIST. X. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`, page number `225`), where the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM also sits, and ends just before the `ARTICULUS I.` header. The OCR-interleaved `223` digit in the raw is misplaced page-number noise (the two pages are 224→225, verified eyes-on).

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED (from d10-littera).** The `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` block at the foot of p.224 (after the littera's own notes 1–8) is the divisio's first and only apparatus note — rendered here as `[^p224-comm1]`, keyed to *idiomatum* in the DIVISIO TEXTUS opener. The littera's p.224 footer (nn.1–8) is exhausted by the littera chunk.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED (to d10-a1-q1).** The p.225 footer notes (nn.1–3: *Vers. 9. — Glossa hic allegata…* [Rich. a Med./August. contra Maximin.]; *Vers. 4. Cfr. supra d.7…*; *Vox* homo *desideratur in non paucis codd. et edd. 1, 2…*) belong to the body of **ARTICULUS I, QUAEST. I** (which opens at the top of p.225 with *…si ergo praedestinatus fuit esse filius Dei…*) — NOT to the divisio. They carry forward to d10-a1-q1's apparatus, which restarts its own p.225 footer sequence. (Page bottom carries the volume signature *S. Bonav. — Tom. III.*)

**ARTICULUS I (next chunk d10-a1-q1) — TRACTATIO three-question list (verified p.225 R-col):**
1. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus.*
2. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona.*
3. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.*

**`has_scholion: false`** — this is a divisio/tractatio chunk; no scholion. There is a marginal *Nota.* gloss on p.225 R-col beside *Generalis autem intellectus distinctionis…*, treated as an editorial margin label (not rendered as body).

**`[?]` flags:** NONE.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De comparatione Christi hominis ad conditionem personalitatis.*

### Quaestio I. *Utrum haec sit admittenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit admittenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *(Ad oppositum.)* Ad Philippenses secundo[^p225-1]: *Dedit illi nomen* etc.; Glossa: « In quantum homo assumsit nomen Dei non usurpative, sed vere »; sed quod vere assumsit vere habet: ergo si, secundum quod homo, assumsit nomen Dei, secundum quod homo, est vere Deus.

2. Item, Christus fuit *praedestinatus esse filius Dei in virtute*, sicut dicitur ad Romanos primo[^p225-2]; sed Christus est illud, secundum quod homo, ad quod praedestinatus fuit, secundum quod homo: si ergo praedestinatus fuit esse filius Dei, secundum quod homo; Christus est Deus et Dei filius, secundum quod homo.

3. Item, Christus secundum gratiam unionis est Deus et homo; sed gratia unionis et quaelibet gratia competit ipsi Christo secundum humanam naturam: ergo si secundum gratiam unionis est Deus, et secundum quod homo[^p225-3], habet gratiam unionis, ergo secundum quod homo, est Deus.

4. Item, Christus, secundum quod peccata dimittebat, est Deus: sed secundum quod homo, peccata dimittebat: ergo secundum quod homo, est Deus. *Maior* manifesta est; *minor* probatur per illud quod dicitur Matthaei nono[^p225-4]: *Ut autem sciatis, quia filius hominis habet potestatem in terra dimittendi peccata* etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. *(Fundamenta.)* Omne illud quod convenit alicui, secundum quod ipsum, aut est *per se accidens*, aut *definitio*, sive *pars definitionis*; sed Deus non se habet hoc modo ad hominem sive ad humanam naturam: ergo etc. *Prima* manifesta est per doctrinam demonstrativam[^p225-5]; *secunda* vero manifesta est per se ipsam.

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2. Item, quae sunt disparata non praedicantur de eodem et secundum idem[^p226-1]; sed esse animal et esse Deum sunt praedicata disparata: si ergo esse animal convenit ipsi Christo, secundum quod homo, ergo esse Deum non convenit eidem secundum humanitatem.

3. Item, Christus, secundum quod Deus, caret principio: si ergo est Deus, secundum quod homo; sequitur, quod Deus, secundum quod homo, careat principio. Sed secundum quod homo, habet principium: ergo secundum quod habet principium, caret principio: ergo oppositum est ratio sui oppositi; quod est absurdum[^p226-2].

4. Item, si aliquod praedicatum convenit alicui subiecto secundum aliquid, illo remoto, non convenit ei: ergo si Christus est Deus, secundum quod homo, si Christus non esset homo, non esset Deus. Sed non fuit homo nisi ex tempore: ergo Christus est Deus solum ex tempore[^p226-3]. Sed constat, quod hoc est falsum: ergo falsum est, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus.

### Conclusio.

> Christum esse Deum, secundum quod homo, non debet admitti, nisi improprie accipiatur, scilicet secundum indivisionem concomitantiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quemadmodum Magister dicit in littera[^p226-4], haec dictio *secundum* multiplicem facit intelligentiam. *(Secundum dupliciter intelligitur.)* Potest enim importare habitudinem causae, vel indivisionem sive unitatem concomitantiae. Si dicat habitudinem causae, *(conclusio 1.)* sic absque dubio falsa est locutio, pro eo quod conditio apposita nullo modo est causa praedicati, nec ratio, secundum quam nec per quam tale praedicatum insit illi subiecto. — Si autem dicat indivisionem concomitantiae, *(conclusio 2.)* sic potest habere veritatem. Tunc enim dicere, quod Christus sit Deus, secundum quod homo, non est aliud quam dicere, quod esse Deum competit personae Christi existenti in humana natura, ita quod divinitas et humanitas concomitantur se inseparabiliter circa eandem personam.

Iste autem modus accipiendi hanc dictionem *secundum* non est ita communis et[^p226-5] proprius, sicut *(conclusio 3.)* praecedens, licet inveniatur quandoque. — Et sic patet, quod sermo praedictus, scilicet Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus, secundum diversam intelligentiam huius praepositionis *secundum* quodam modo potest concedi, quodam modo negari. Negari enim debet, secundum quod dicit causam sive rationem formalem; et secundum istam viam procedunt rationes ad secundam partem; et quia verum concludunt secundum illam viam, ideo concedendae sunt.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)* 1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod assumsit nomen Dei, secundum quod homo; responderi potest, quod *secundum* dicit ibi concomitantiam per indivisionem unionis; quia enim unio illa fecit hominem Deum, ideo dicitur assumsisse nomen supremum, secundum quod homo. — *(Alia solutio.)* Aliter potest dici, quod cum dico assumere nomen Dei, duo dico, scilicet nominis ipsius celsitudinem et ipsius nominis acquisitionem. Cum ergo dicit[^p226-6], quod assumsit nomen Dei, secundum quod homo, illa reduplicatio non dicit rationem *nominis*, sed *acquisitionis*. Nam Christus secundum divinam naturam habet nomen, quod est super omne nomen, per generationem, non per acquisitionem sive assumtionem; et ideo ex hoc non licet inferre: ergo est Deus, secundum quod homo, accipiendo *secundum quod* secundum eandem acceptionem; immo est *accidens*[^p226-7] in illo processu.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatus fuit esse filius Dei, secundum quod homo; iam patet responsio per idem, quod nunc dictum est, quia haec dictio *secundum* potius dicit concomitantiam secundum expressionem conditionis naturae, quam dicat habitudinem causae. — *(Alia solutio.)* Vel potest dici, quod ille sermo dicit rationem *antecessionis*, quae importatur in vocabulo praedestinationis, quae, inquam, non est respectu Christi secundum divinam naturam, sed solum secundum humanam[^p226-8]. Non sic autem est de eo quod est esse Deum; et ideo consimilis defectus est in hac ratione, sicut in praecedente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de gratia unionis, dicendum, quod Christus significat personam in duabus naturis; et illa persona Deus est per naturam, non per gratiam unionis; dicitur attamen[^p226-9] simul,

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quod sit Deus et homo per gratiam unionis. *(Notandum.)* Esto tamen, quod ista sit concedenda: iste homo est Deus secundum gratiam unionis; ex hoc non habetur, quod sit Deus, secundum quod homo; quia gratia unionis non convenit illi homini, secundum quod homo *simpliciter*, sed secundum quod homo *unitus*, sive secundum assumtionem ipsius a Verbo.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod dimittebat peccata, secundum quod homo[^p227-1]; si proprie loquamur de dimissione peccati, falsum est, nisi accipiatur haec dictio *secundum*, prout importat concomitantiam. *(Notandum.)* Nec potest inferri ex illa auctoritate: *filius hominis habet potestatem dimittendi peccata*; hanc enim potestatem, etsi in se haberet *in* forma hominis, non tamen habebat *secundum* hominis formam et in quantum homo, sed in quantum habebat formam Dei. Si vero dimissio peccatorum attribueretur alicui quantum ad *meritum*, tunc posset concedi, quod conveniret Christo, secundum quod homo; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod sit Deus in quantum homo, quia hoc non est Dei proprium[^p227-2].

english:
### Article I. *On the comparison of Christ as man to the condition of personality.*

### Question I. *Whether this is to be admitted: that Christ, as man, is God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether this is to be admitted: that Christ, as man, is God. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. *(On the affirmative side.)* In Philippians 2[^p225-1]: *He gave him a name* etc.; the Gloss: « Inasmuch as a man he assumed the name of God not by usurpation, but truly »; but what one truly assumed one truly has: therefore if, as man, he assumed the name of God, then, as man, he is truly God.

2. Likewise, Christ was *predestined to be Son of God in power*, as is said in Romans 1[^p225-2]; but Christ is, as man, that to which he was predestined, as man: if therefore he was predestined to be Son of God, as man, then Christ is God and Son of God, as man.

3. Likewise, Christ according to the grace of union is God and man; but the grace of union and any grace whatever belongs to Christ himself according to his human nature: therefore if according to the grace of union he is God, and as man[^p225-3] he has the grace of union, then as man he is God.

4. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he was forgiving sins, is God: but as man he was forgiving sins: therefore as man he is God. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved through that which is said in Matthew 9[^p225-4]: *But that you may know that the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins* etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. *(The foundations.)* Everything that belongs to anything, insofar as it is that thing, is either a *per se accident*, or a *definition*, or *part of a definition*; but God is not related in this way to man or to human nature: therefore etc. The *first* is manifest through demonstrative doctrine[^p225-5]; the *second* is manifest through itself.

2. Likewise, things that are disparate are not predicated of the same thing and according to the same respect[^p226-1]; but to be an animal and to be God are disparate predicates: if therefore to be an animal belongs to Christ himself, as man, then to be God does not belong to the same according to his humanity.

3. Likewise, Christ, as God, lacks a beginning: if therefore he is God, as man; it follows that God, as man, lacks a beginning. But as man he has a beginning: therefore insofar as he has a beginning, he lacks a beginning: therefore the opposite is the ground of its opposite; which is absurd[^p226-2].

4. Likewise, if some predicate belongs to a subject according to something, then with that removed, it does not belong to it: therefore if Christ is God, as man, then if Christ were not man, he would not be God. But he was not man except in time: therefore Christ is God only in time[^p226-3]. But it is established that this is false: therefore it is false that Christ, as man, is God.

### Conclusion.

> That Christ is God, as man, ought not to be admitted, unless it be taken improperly, namely according to the indivision of concomitance.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as the Master says in the text[^p226-4], this word *secundum* (insofar as) admits of multiple understandings. *(The word "secundum" is understood in two ways.)* For it can import the relation of a cause, or the indivision or unity of concomitance. If it states the relation of a cause, *(first conclusion)* then without doubt the locution is false, because the condition appended is in no way the cause of the predicate, nor the ground according to which nor through which such a predicate is in that subject. — But if it states the indivision of concomitance, *(second conclusion)* then it can hold truth. For then to say that Christ is God, as man, is nothing other than to say that to be God belongs to the person of Christ existing in a human nature, in such a way that divinity and humanity accompany one another inseparably about the same person.

But this way of taking this word *secundum* is not so common and[^p226-5] proper, as *(third conclusion)* the preceding one, although it is found sometimes. — And thus it is clear that the aforesaid statement, namely that Christ, as man, is God, according to the diverse understanding of this preposition *secundum*, can in one way be conceded, in another way denied. For it ought to be denied, insofar as it states a cause or formal ground; and along this path proceed the reasons for the second part; and because they conclude truly along that path, therefore they are to be conceded.

*(The resolution of the opposed arguments.)* 1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that he assumed the name of God, as man; it can be answered that *secundum* there states a concomitance through the indivision of the union; for because that union made the man God, therefore he is said to have assumed the supreme name, as man. — *(Another solution.)* Otherwise it can be said that when I say "to assume the name of God," I say two things, namely the loftiness of the name itself and the acquisition of that name. When therefore he says[^p226-6] that he assumed the name of God, as man, that reduplication does not state the ground of the *name*, but of the *acquisition*. For Christ according to his divine nature has the name which is above every name, by generation, not by acquisition or assumption; and therefore from this it is not licit to infer: therefore he is God, as man, taking the *secundum quod* (insofar as) according to the same acceptation; rather it is an *accident*[^p226-7] in that process.

2. To that which is objected, that he was predestined to be Son of God, as man; the response is now clear by the same point that has just been said, because this word *secundum* states rather a concomitance according to the expression of the condition of the nature, than that it states the relation of a cause. — *(Another solution.)* Or it can be said that that statement states the ground of *antecedence*, which is imported in the word "predestination," which, I say, is not with respect to Christ according to his divine nature, but only according to his human[^p226-8]. But it is not so concerning that which is to be God; and therefore there is a like defect in this reason, as in the preceding.

3. To that which is objected concerning the grace of union, it must be said that "Christ" signifies the person in two natures; and that person is God by nature, not by the grace of union; nevertheless it is said[^p226-9] at the same time that he is God and man by the grace of union. *(Note.)* Yet granted that this is to be conceded: that this man is God according to the grace of union; from this it is not had that he is God, as man; because the grace of union does not belong to that man, as man *simply*, but as man *united*, or according to his assumption by the Word.

4. To that which is objected last, that he was forgiving sins, as man[^p227-1]; if we speak properly of the forgiveness of sin, it is false, unless this word *secundum* be taken as it imports concomitance. *(Note.)* Nor can it be inferred from that authority: *the Son of man has the power of forgiving sins*; for this power, even if he had it in himself *in* the form of a man, he nevertheless did not have *according to* the form of a man and inasmuch as man, but inasmuch as he had the form of God. But if the forgiveness of sins were attributed to someone as regards *merit*, then it could be conceded that it would belong to Christ, as man; but from this it does not follow that he is God inasmuch as man, because this is not proper to God[^p227-2].

la: Vers. 9. — Glossa hic allegata neque apud Strabum neque apud Petrum Lombardum neque apud Lyranum habetur. Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. similem affert Glossam, sumtam ex August., II. contra Maximin. Arian. c. 2, quae sic sonat: *Hoc [nomen] illi ergo donatum est ut homini, secundum quem Filius factus est obediens usque ad mortem crucis, quod iam habebat idem ipse Dei Filius, Deus de Deo natus aequalis.* Cfr. II. Qq. in nov. Testam. q. 64. (inter opera August.) et Comment. in Epist. ad Phil. 2, 9, olim Ambrosio adscriptum. — In fine arg. pro *vere Deus* codd. K bb exhibent *verus Deus*.

en: Verse 9. — The Gloss here cited is found neither in Strabo nor in Peter Lombard nor in Lyra. Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, cites a similar Gloss, taken from Augustine, *Against Maximinus the Arian* II, c. 2, which runs thus: *This [name] was therefore granted to him as to a man, according to which the Son was made obedient unto the death of the cross, which the same Son of God, God born of God, equal, already had.* Cf. *Questions on the New Testament* q. 64 (among the works of Augustine) and the *Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians* 2, 9, formerly ascribed to Ambrose. — At the end of the argument, for *vere Deus* (truly God) codices K bb give *verus Deus* (true God).

la: Vers. 4. Cfr. supra d. 7. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Verse 4. Cf. above, d. 7, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vox *homo* desideratur in non paucis codd. et edd. 1, 2, pro qua Vat. cum nonnullis codd. mox post *gratiam unionis* addit *est homo*. In cod. C legitur: *et secundum quod habet humanitatem, habet gratiam unionis*.

en: The word *homo* (man) is lacking in not a few codices and in editions 1, 2; in its place the Vatican edition, with some codices, adds soon after *gratiam unionis* (the grace of union) the words *est homo* (he is man). In codex C is read: *and insofar as he has humanity, he has the grace of union*.

la: Vers. 6.

en: Verse 6.

la: De qua agit Aristot. in libris Posteriorum. Ibid. I. c. 4–7. tractatur de ipsa sententia, quae proponitur hic in maiori. De locutione *secundum quod ipsum* (i. e. quatenus tale est) cfr. Aristot. V. Metaph. text. 23. (IV. c. 18.). Locutio *per se accidens*, cui opponitur *non per se accidens* sive accidens communiter acceptum (quod scil. et adesse et abesse potest, ac de quo non est demonstratio sive scientia), intelligit *proprietatem* sive *passionem*, quae resultat ex principiis speciei, ut est risibilitas respectu hominis. Ad rem est illud Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7: *Tertium autem genus [eorum quae ad demonstrationem requiruntur] subiectum, cuius passiones et per se accidentia [τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα] ostendit demonstratio.* — In maiori codd. M O S perperam *aut est per se, aut per accidens.* Deinde pro *sive pars* codd. M O *aut pars*.

en: Of which Aristotle treats in the books of the *Posterior [Analytics]*. There, I, c. 4–7, the very thesis is treated which is proposed here in the major. On the locution *secundum quod ipsum* (insofar as it is itself, i.e. inasmuch as it is such) cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 23 (IV, c. 18). The locution *per se accidens* (per se accident), to which is opposed *non per se accidens* (a non-per-se accident) or an accident taken commonly (which, namely, can both be present and be absent, and of which there is no demonstration or science), he understands as a *property* or *attribute* which results from the principles of the species, as risibility is with respect to man. To the point is that saying of Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 7: *The third class, however, [of those things which are required for a demonstration] is the subject, whose attributes and per se accidents [τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα] the demonstration shows.* — In the major, codices M O S wrongly *aut est per se, aut per accidens* (either is per se, or per accident). Then for *sive pars* (or part) codices M O *aut pars* (or part).

la: Boeth., I. de Syllogismo hypothet., ait: « Disparata autem ea voco, quae tantum a se diversa sunt, nulla contrarietate pugnantia, veluti terra, vestis, ignis » etc. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topic. c. de Locis extrinsecis, sic docet: *De quocumque dicitur unum disparatorum abstractive, ab illo eodem removetur reliquum.* Dicitur notanter *abstractive*, quia, si concretive sumeretur, tunc non sequeretur, quia non sequitur: *hoc est album, ergo non est quantum*; sed bene sequitur: *hoc est albedo, ergo non est quantitas*.

en: Boethius, *On the Hypothetical Syllogism* I, says: « I call disparate those things which are merely diverse from one another, conflicting by no contrariety, such as earth, garment, fire » etc. Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, treatise on Topical Loci, ch. on the Extrinsic Loci, teaches thus: *Of whatever one of disparate things is said abstractly, from that same thing the other is removed.* It is said pointedly *abstractly*, because, if it were taken concretely, then it would not follow, since it does not follow: *this is white, therefore it is not quantified*; but it does well follow: *this is whiteness, therefore it is not quantity*.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 36. (c. 10.) et IV. Meteor. text. 41. (c. 7.): *Contrariorum [ἐναντίων] enim contrariae causae.*

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 36 (c. 10) and *Meteorology* IV, text 41 (c. 7): *For of contraries [ἐναντίων] the causes are contrary.*

la: Cod. G *ergo Christus non fuit Deus nisi ex tempore.*

en: Codex G: *therefore Christ was not God except in time.*

la: Hic c. 1. Quod ad duplicem intelligentiam dictionis *secundum* attinet, de quo in seqq. disseritur, Logici vulgo docent, particulas reduplicativas *secundum quod, in quantum, quatenus* etc. sumi posse vel *reduplicative* (quod fit, quando terminus reduplicatus est praedicati propria causa formalis, aut efficiens), vel *specificative* (quod locum habet, quando terminus reduplicatus non est propria ratio praedicati, attamen aliquo modo eam includit, cum sit quaedam eius species aut proprium subiectum).

en: Here c. 1. As regards the twofold understanding of the word *secundum*, which is discussed in what follows, the Logicians commonly teach that the reduplicative particles *secundum quod, in quantum, quatenus* (insofar as, inasmuch as, to the extent that) etc. can be taken either *reduplicatively* (which occurs when the reduplicated term is the proper formal or efficient cause of the predicate), or *specificatively* (which has place when the reduplicated term is not the proper ground of the predicate, yet in some way includes it, since it is a certain species of it or its proper subject).

la: Cod. U *nec*.

en: Codex U: *nor*.

la: Codd. A F G N U bb *dicitur*. Mox pro *reduplicatio* cod. bb *implicatio*. Subinde idem cod. bb voci *nominis* praefigit *celsitudinis*, et pro *acquisitionis* codd. S U aa exhibent *acquisitionem*.

en: Codices A F G N U bb: *it is said*. Soon for *reduplicatio* (reduplication) codex bb *implicatio* (implication). Then the same codex bb prefixes to the word *nominis* (of the name) the word *celsitudinis* (of the loftiness), and for *acquisitionis* (of the acquisition) codices S U aa give *acquisitionem* (the acquisition).

la: De hac fallacia vide supra pag. 179, nota 1.

en: On this fallacy see above, page 179, note 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. a. 2. q. 3.

la: Codd. A G N V Z *tamen*, cod. E *autem*. Paulo inferius post *ex hoc* edd. subiiciunt *tamen*. In fine solut. pro *unitus* non pauci codd. substituunt *mutatus*.

en: Codices A G N V Z *tamen* (however), codex E *autem* (but). A little below, after *ex hoc* (from this) the editions subjoin *tamen* (nevertheless). At the end of the solution, for *unitus* (united) not a few codices substitute *mutatus* (changed).

la: In cod. K a secunda manu adiectum est *dicendum, quod*. Circa finem solut. pro *quantum ad meritum* in codd. G N U scriptum est *secundum meritum*. Cfr. infra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. Deinde pro *conveniret* cod. aa *convenit*.

en: In codex K, by a second hand, there has been added *it must be said, that*. Near the end of the solution, for *quantum ad meritum* (as regards merit) in codices G N U is written *secundum meritum* (according to merit). Cf. below, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1. Then for *conveniret* (it would belong) codex aa *convenit* (it belongs).

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. q. 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In tribus huius articuli quaestionibus continuantur subtiles inquisitiones, iam in dist. 7. inchoatae, de proprietate plurium de Christo homine propositionum, utrum scilicet secundum proprietatem verborum sane dicantur. Hae disceptationes dialecticae in scholas introductae esse videntur ab eo tempore, quo exortae sunt famosae illae tres opiniones, quae relatae sunt in dist. 6. 7. post divisionem textus, cum patroni harum opinionum nec in his propositionibus explicandis possint convenire. Insuper notandum cum Magistro et S. Bonaventura, quod terminus *secundum* intelligi potest dupliciter, ut explicatur in corp. Vel cum S. Thoma dici potest, quod aliud est dicere: *secundum quod homo* (quo significatur substantia rationalis naturae), et dicere: *secundum quod iste homo* (quo significatur suppositum humanae naturae; cfr. tamen infra q. 2. ad 1.) — Quoad I. quaestionem antiqui Scholastici propositionem cum sua reduplicatione distinguunt eamque intellectam uno modo concedunt, alio modo negant. Adiiciunt autem, quod prior sensus verus minus usui verborum respondeat; unde ista propositio magis sit neganda quam concedenda. At Richard. a Med. vult, eam simpliciter esse negandam. Agitur autem potius de nomine quam de re.

De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. — Scotus hanc et seq. quaest. tangit III. Sent. d. 11. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. III. q. 16. a. 9. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1–3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Ad seq. (2.) quaestionem S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal., B. Alberto, Richardo et Aegid. R. respondet negative, sed S. Thom. in Sum. (loc. cit. a. 12.) propositionem admittit intellectam in duplici sensu, in tertio vero sensu eam respuit. In ipsa re omnes consentiunt.

Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 1. — B. Albert., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the three questions of this article there are continued the subtle inquiries, already begun in distinction 7, concerning the propriety of several propositions about Christ as man, namely whether they are rightly said according to the propriety of the words. These dialectical disputations seem to have been introduced into the schools from the time at which those famous three opinions arose, which were related in distinctions 6 and 7 after the division of the text, since the patrons of these opinions could not agree even in explaining these propositions. It is moreover to be noted, with the Master and St. Bonaventure, that the term *secundum* can be understood in two ways, as is explained in the body of the question. Or, with St. Thomas, it can be said that it is one thing to say *as man* (by which is signified the rational substance of a nature), and another to say *as this man* (by which is signified the supposit of the human nature; cf. however below, q. 2, ad 1). — As regards the first question, the ancient Scholastics distinguish the proposition with its reduplication and, taken in one way, concede it, in another way deny it. They add, however, that the prior true sense corresponds less to the use of the words; whence this proposition is rather to be denied than conceded. But Richard of Middleton holds that it is to be denied simply. It is, however, a matter rather of the name than of the thing.

On this first question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 6, m. 2, a. 2. — Scotus touches this and the following question, III Sent., d. 11, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. III, q. 16, a. 9. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 1–3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here under a single question.

**II.** To the following (second) question St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales, B. Albert, Richard, and Giles of Rome, responds negatively, but St. Thomas in the *Summa* (loc. cit., a. 12) admits the proposition as understood in a twofold sense, while in a third sense he rejects it. In the matter itself all agree.

Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., a. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit., q. 1. — B. Albert, here q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.225–227 (PDF 247–249, offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 15997–16137 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). OCR was largely clean for the body prose; the PDF was authoritative in the Respondeo/solutio region and for footer-note text per the Vol III override. Fresh literal English translation. ARTICULUS I's short opener (*De comparatione Christi hominis ad conditionem personalitatis*) folds into this q1 chunk per the locked chunking convention; the article's three quaestiones (q1 *est Deus*, q2 *est persona*, q3 *est individuum*) were enumerated in d10-divisio's TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

**Page-split map.** q1 opens at the bottom of p.225 (ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I headings + arguments 1–4 + the first *Sed contra* foundation), continues across p.226 (contra args 2–4, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, solutions 1–3 begin), and closes on p.227 (solutions 3–4 finish) just before the shared article SCHOLION, after which QUAESTIO II opens on the same page. Apparatus is rendered per printed page with Quaracchi's per-page restart, marker IDs suffixed by page: **p.225 nn.1–5** (5), **p.226 nn.1–9** (9), **p.227 nn.1–2** (2 — the q1 portion only; p.227 nn.3+ belong to q2's body) = **16 entries total**.

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED (from d10-divisio).** The divisio consumed only the p.224 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note. The forecast forwarded "p.225 nn.1–3" to this chunk; on eyes-on the q1 body opens at the top of p.225 and in fact carries **all** of p.225's footer notes (nn.1–5), since the entire p.225 left+right footer block keys to q1's arguments. All five are captured here; nothing parked.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED (to d10-a1-q2).** p.227 footer notes **nn.3, 4, 5 and following** belong to QUAESTIO II's body (which opens on p.227 immediately after the SCHOLION: *Christus non est homo, nisi quia est iste…* and *Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, est res completa…*). q1 took only p.227 nn.1–2. q2 also picks up the SCHOLION's §II forward-coverage already supplied here.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. The SCHOLION printed after q1's replies is the **article-wide** scholion: §I dispositions q1 (the ancient Scholastics distinguish/concede/deny; Richard of Middleton denies simply), §II forward-covers q2 (Bonaventure et al. respond negatively; Thomas admits in a twofold sense). There is **no §III** for q3 in this scholion block. Each section closes with a bibliographic source list. The scholion carries **no footnote markers** (no apparatus anchors).

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the PDF column bands; OCR garbles (*admitlenda*, *deraonstralivam*, *concinsio*, *SCHOLIOK*, the misplaced inline `223`/`29` page-number noise) silently corrected.


title: Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum haec sit vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona.*

Secundo quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona; et accipiatur illa determinatio *secundum quod homo* proprie. Nam in aliis acceptionibus non est dubium quin habeat veritatem, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera[^p227-3]. Et quod sit vera, videtur.

1. Christus non est homo, nisi quia est iste; sed Christus, secundum quod est iste homo, est persona, quia proprium est pronominis pro proprio nomine poni et certam designare personam (*Ad oppositum*): ergo haec est vera et concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona.

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, est res completa omni completione, quae potest reperiri in rationali creatura; sed personalitas est dignitas et proprietas nobilitatis reperta in creatura rationali completa[^p227-4]: ergo reperitur in Christo, secundum quod Christus est homo.

3. Item, nobilior et perfectior est unio, secundum quam Verbum unitur naturae assumtae, quam unio, secundum quam tota Trinitas per gratiam unitur cuilibet animae iustae[^p227-5]; sed unio per gratiam inhabitantem nulli tollit personae dignitatem, immo quilibet homo iustus, secundum quod homo, est persona: ergo multo fortius Christus.

4. Item, unio divinae naturae ad humanam nihil tollit divinitati, quae tamen dicitur *humiliata*,

<!-- page 228 -->

et multo fortius nihil tollit *humanitati*, cum humanitas dicatur per illam unionem *exaltata*[^p228-1]; sed haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod Deus, est persona: ergo multo fortius haec erit vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, cum homo nihil perdat dignitatis, sed acquirat per unionem illam.

5. Item, esto per impossibile, quod Verbum dimitteret naturam humanam[^p228-2], tunc ille homo, qui dicitur Iesus, secundum quod homo, esset persona; sed constat, quod nihil sibi accresceret propter illam separationem: ergo verum est nunc, quod Iesus, secundum quod homo, est persona.

**Sed contra:** 1. Nihil convenit Christo, secundum quod homo (*Fundamenta*), quod non sit assumtum, vel coassumtum; sed Filium Dei assumsisse personam est falsum et haereticum, sicut supra distinctione quinta[^p228-3] dicit Magister, et Augustinus, et multipliciter fuit probatum: ergo falsum est, Christum esse personam, secundum quod homo.

2. Item, si Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona; et humanitas coepit in Christo: ergo et personalitas: igitur Christus incepit esse persona: ergo non est persona aeterna: igitur non est unigenitus Filius Patris, cum Filius sit coaeternus Patri. Sed hoc est impium: ergo restat, quod illud, ex quo hoc sequitur, est falsum[^p228-4].

3. Item, impossibile est, idem praedicatum inesse eidem secundum naturas differentes: cum ergo Christus sit persona, secundum quod *Deus*; aut non conveniret ei esse *personam*, secundum quod *homo*, aut *alia* persona erit, secundum quod homo; et si alia persona est, secundum quod *homo*, et alia, secundum quod *Deus*: ergo Christus est duae personae: ergo non est unus, et ita non est[^p228-5]. Sed hoc est falsum: restat igitur, quod aliud membrum est verum, scilicet quod Christo non convenit esse personam, secundum quod homo.

4. Item, personalitas cuilibet rei inest ratione eius quod est in ipsa dignissimum — pertinet enim nomen personae ad notabilem[^p228-6] dignitatem — sed constat, quod dignissimum in Christo non est humana natura, sed divina; ergo falsum est, Christum secundum hominem sive secundum humanam naturam esse personam.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per nominis etymologiam. Sic enim arguit Magister in littera[^p228-7]: Persona dicitur quasi *per se sonans*, vel *per se unum*; nihil autem tale est alii coniunctum, saltem digniori: ergo si humana natura in Christo unita est digniori, scilicet divinae, videtur etc.

> ### Conclusio.
> Locutio: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, neganda est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, si haec dictio *secundum* accipiatur, prout importat rationem *formae*, vel *causae*[^p228-8], neganda est simpliciter (*Conclusio 1*); pro eo quod personalitas Christo secundum humanam naturam convenire non potest. Ipsa enim *coniuncta* est rei digniori, et ideo non potest habere rationem personae, quae attenditur secundum excellentiam dignitatis in eo, de quo dicitur; nec tantum coniuncta est rei digniori quacumque coniunctione, sed coniunctione sive unione *personali*[^p228-9]. Et ideo necesse est, esse in Christo respectu duarum naturarum unam personam; sed illa non potest attendi penes naturam creatam et penes naturam assumtam: necesse est igitur, ipsam attendi (*Conclusio 2*) secundum naturam assumentem et increatam. Et propterea haec admittitur: Christus, secundum quod Deus, est persona; haec respuitur: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, sicut probant rationes ad secundam partem inductae; et ideo sunt concedendae.

**Ad obiecta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de hac: Christus, secundum quod iste homo, est persona (*Solutio oppositorum*): dicendum, quod haec est distinguenda, ergo etc.; quia *iste* (*Notanda distinctio*)

<!-- page 229 -->

potest demonstrare naturam humanam *in atomo*[^p228-10], scilicet compositum ex illa anima et illo corpore; et hoc modo falsum est, Christum, secundum quod est iste homo, esse personam. Nec valet quod obiicit, quod pronomen demonstrat certam personam; persona enim ibi tantum valet quantum *suppositum*, unde convenienter dicitur: ista albedo. Si autem hoc quod est *iste* demonstrat personam, tunc est vera, et est sensus: Christus, secundum quod est iste, qui est homo, est persona. Sed tunc non sequitur: ergo secundum quod homo, immo est sophisma *secundum accidens*[^p228-11]. — (*Aliter.*) Generaliter autem posset resisti illi modo arguendi. Non enim sequitur: Petrus est individuum, secundum quod hic homo: ergo est individuum, secundum quod homo.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est res completa omni completione; dicendum, quod verum est de completione *absoluta* (*Notandum*), de completione autem *respectiva*, quae est dignitas superexcellentiae, veritatem non habet; nam humana natura in Christo non est nobilissimum eius, sicut in aliis hominibus. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod minor sit dignitas in Christo, secundum quod homo, quam in aliis hominibus, propter hoc, quia illa dignitas recompensatur per dignitatem improportionabiliter nobiliorem. Multo enim nobilius est esse personam personalitate aeterna quam personalitate creata[^p229-1].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio per gratiam non tollit dignitatem personae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, quamvis anima per gratiam uniatur rei digniori, scilicet Deo, non tamen unitur unione *naturali*, sed magis *voluntaria*; nec unitur in *unitatem hypostasis*, sed in *conformitatem voluntatis*. Et ideo non est necesse, Spiritum esse unius personae cum anima, quam inhabitat, sed conformis voluntatis. Non sic autem est in Christo, in quo personalis unio est[^p229-2].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quamvis natura divina sit unita humanae, tamen Christus est persona, secundum quod Deus; dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ex causa: persona quidem duo dicit (*Persona dicit duo*), scilicet *hypostasim*, in qua est substantia[^p229-3] totius esse rei, et *proprietatem* supereminentis dignitatis; et in illa beata unione utrumque horum (*Notandum*) reperitur in Christo, secundum quod Deus. Nam hypostasis divina est illa, in qua substantificatur totum *esse* Christi, non humana; *proprietas* etiam *dignitatis* inest illi secundum illam naturam, quae non potest uniri digniori; utrumque autem horum deficit humanae naturae, quoniam ipsa substantificatur in hypostasi *alterius* naturae, propter quod quodam modo dicitur *vergere in accidens*[^p229-4]; unitur etiam *digniori* naturae. Et ideo ex ipsa sui unione et nobilitate caret proprietate personae *secundum se*, quamvis non careat, immo habeat in *assumente*.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Verbum dimitteret humanam naturam, quod Iesus, secundum quod homo, esset persona; dicendum, quod verum est, quia tunc illa natura haberet *alium modum existendi* (*Notandum*); non enim esset unita alii digniori nec haberet suppositum alterius naturae. Nunc autem est e contrario; et[^p229-5] in illo processu nulla est necessitas inferendi, quia non servatur convenientia similitudinis. Et si tu obiicias, quod nulla dignitas accrescit; dicendum, quod ille homo sit persona, secundum quod homo, hoc non est propter *dignitatis incrementum*, sed propter *minorationem* ex illa separatione, quia tunc natura illa prius haberet pro supposito personam aeternam, nunc autem post separationem habet[^p229-6] personam temporalem. Multo autem dignius est habere personam aeternam alterius naturae quam personam temporalem sibi omnino connaturalem. Nam primo modo persona faciebat, ipsum vere dici et esse Deum, secundo modo hominem purum[^p229-7].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether this is true: Christ, as man, is a person.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this: Christ, as man, is a person; and let that qualification *as man* be taken properly. For in its other acceptations there is no doubt that it has truth, as the Master says in the text[^p227-3]. And that it is true seems so.

1. Christ is not man except because he is this one; but Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person, because it is proper to a pronoun to be put in place of a proper name and to designate a definite person (*To the contrary*): therefore this is true and to be conceded: Christ, as man, is a person.

2. Likewise, Christ, as man, is a thing complete with every completion that can be found in a rational creature; but personality is the dignity and property of nobility found in a complete rational creature[^p227-4]: therefore it is found in Christ, insofar as Christ is man.

3. Likewise, more noble and more perfect is the union by which the Word is united to the assumed nature than the union by which the whole Trinity is united through grace to any just soul[^p227-5]; but the union through indwelling grace takes away from no one the dignity of person, indeed every just man, as man, is a person: therefore much more so Christ.

4. Likewise, the union of the divine nature to the human takes away nothing from the divinity, which nevertheless is said to be *humbled*,

and much more it takes away nothing from the *humanity*, since the humanity is said to be *exalted* through that union[^p228-1]; but this is true: Christ, as God, is a person: therefore much more will this be true: Christ, as man, is a person, since the man loses nothing of dignity, but acquires it through that union.

5. Likewise, suppose by the impossible that the Word should release the human nature[^p228-2], then that man who is called Jesus, as man, would be a person; but it is established that nothing would accrue to him on account of that separation: therefore it is true now that Jesus, as man, is a person.

**On the contrary:** 1. Nothing belongs to Christ, as man (*The foundations*), that is not assumed or co-assumed; but that the Son of God assumed a person is false and heretical, as the Master says above in the fifth distinction[^p228-3], and Augustine, and it has been proved in many ways: therefore it is false that Christ is a person, as man.

2. Likewise, if Christ, as man, is a person; and the humanity began in Christ: therefore also the personality: therefore Christ began to be a person: therefore he is not an eternal person: therefore he is not the only-begotten Son of the Father, since the Son is co-eternal with the Father. But this is impious: therefore it remains that that from which this follows is false[^p228-4].

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the same predicate be in the same thing according to differing natures: since therefore Christ is a person, as *God*; either it would not belong to him to be a *person*, as *man*, or *another* person will be, as man; and if there is another person, as *man*, and another, as *God*: therefore Christ is two persons: therefore he is not one, and so he is not[^p228-5]. But this is false: therefore it remains that the other member is true, namely that it does not belong to Christ to be a person, as man.

4. Likewise, personality is in any thing by reason of that which is most worthy in it — for the name of person pertains to a notable[^p228-6] dignity — but it is established that the most worthy thing in Christ is not the human nature, but the divine; therefore it is false that Christ, as man, or according to his human nature, is a person.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the etymology of the name. For thus the Master argues in the text[^p228-7]: *Persona* is so called as it were *per se sonans* (sounding by itself), or *per se unum* (one by itself); but nothing of this kind is joined to another, at least to something more worthy: therefore if the human nature in Christ is united to something more worthy, namely the divine, it seems etc.

> ### Conclusion.
> The locution: Christ, as man, is a person, is to be denied.

**I respond:** It must be said that, beyond doubt, if this word *secundum* (according to) is taken insofar as it imports the account of *form* or of *cause*[^p228-8], it is to be denied without qualification (*First conclusion*); because personality cannot belong to Christ according to the human nature. For it itself is *joined* to something more worthy, and therefore it cannot have the account of person, which is regarded according to the excellence of dignity in that of which it is said; nor is it merely joined to something more worthy by any kind of conjunction whatever, but by a conjunction or union that is *personal*[^p228-9]. And therefore it is necessary that in Christ, with respect to the two natures, there be one person; but that person cannot be regarded on the side of the created nature and of the assumed nature: it is necessary therefore that it be regarded (*Second conclusion*) according to the assuming and uncreated nature. And for that reason this is admitted: Christ, as God, is a person; this is rejected: Christ, as man, is a person, as the reasons adduced for the second part prove; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the objections for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning this: Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person (*Solution of the objections*): it must be said that this is to be distinguished, therefore etc.; because *this* (*A distinction to be noted*)

can demonstrate the human nature *in atomo* (in the individual)[^p228-10], namely the composite of that soul and that body; and in this way it is false that Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person. Nor is what he objects valid, that the pronoun demonstrates a definite person; for *persona* there has only as much force as *suppositum*, whence it is fittingly said: this whiteness. But if that which is *this* demonstrates a person, then it is true, and the sense is: Christ, insofar as he is this one who is man, is a person. But then it does not follow: therefore as man — rather it is a fallacy *secundum accidens* (of accident)[^p228-11]. — (*Otherwise.*) Generally, however, this manner of arguing could be resisted. For it does not follow: Peter is an individual, as this man: therefore he is an individual, as man.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that Christ, as man, is a thing complete with every completion; it must be said that it is true of *absolute* completion (*To be noted*), but of *relative* completion, which is the dignity of supereminence, it does not have truth; for the human nature in Christ is not the most noble thing in him, as it is in other men. Nor from this does it follow that the dignity in Christ, as man, is less than in other men, on this account, because that dignity is compensated by a dignity disproportionately more noble. For it is much more noble to be a person by an eternal personality than by a created personality[^p229-1].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the union through grace does not take away the dignity of person; it must be said that it is not similar, because, although the soul through grace is united to something more worthy, namely God, nevertheless it is not united by a *natural* union, but rather by a *voluntary* one; nor is it united into the *unity of hypostasis*, but into a *conformity of will*. And therefore it is not necessary that the Spirit be of one person with the soul which it inhabits, but of conformed will. It is not so, however, in Christ, in whom the union is personal[^p229-2].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that although the divine nature is united to the human, nevertheless Christ is a person, as God; it must be said that it is not similar, for a twofold cause: for person indeed says two things (*Person says two things*), namely the *hypostasis*, in which is the substance[^p229-3] of the whole being of the thing, and the *property* of supereminent dignity; and in that blessed union each of these (*To be noted*) is found in Christ, as God. For the divine hypostasis is that in which the whole *being* of Christ is substantiated, not the human; the *property* also of *dignity* is in him according to that nature which cannot be united to something more worthy; but each of these is lacking to the human nature, since it itself is substantiated in the hypostasis of *another* nature, on account of which it is in a certain way said to *verge into an accident*[^p229-4]; it is also united to a *more worthy* nature. And therefore from its very union and nobility it lacks the property of person *in itself*, although it does not lack it, indeed has it, in the *assuming* one.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that if the Word should release the human nature, then Jesus, as man, would be a person; it must be said that it is true, because then that nature would have *another mode of existing* (*To be noted*); for it would not be united to something else more worthy, nor would it have the suppositum of another nature. But now it is the contrary; and[^p229-5] in that process there is no necessity of inferring, because the fittingness of the likeness is not preserved. And if you object that no dignity accrues; it must be said that, that the man would be a person, as man, this is not on account of an *increment of dignity*, but on account of the *lessening* from that separation, because then that nature would previously have for its suppositum an eternal person, but now after the separation it has[^p229-6] a temporal person. But it is much more worthy to have an eternal person of another nature than a temporal person wholly connatural to oneself. For in the first way the person made him to be truly called and to be God, in the second way a mere man[^p229-7].

---

la: Hic c. 1. — Superius pro *et accipiatur* (codd. WX *accipitur*) Vat. *et hoc si accipiatur*, edd. 1, 2 *et si accipiatur*. Paulo inferius pro *nisi quia* cod. K *nisi secundum quod*, et subinde post *est iste* edd. repetunt *homo*. — Rationem *minori* additam Priscian., XI. Grammat. c. 2. sic exprimit: » Pronomen enim dicitur quod pro nomine ponitur «. Et ibid. XVII. c. 2. idem dicit: Substantiam enim significat loco nominis positum pronomen et personam verbo sibi adiuncto congruam indicat.

en: Here c. 1. — Above, for *et accipiatur* (codd. WX *accipitur*) the Vatican edition reads *et hoc si accipiatur*, edd. 1, 2 *et si accipiatur*. A little below, for *nisi quia* cod. K has *nisi secundum quod*, and thereupon after *est iste* the editions repeat *homo*. — The added ground for the minor Priscian, *Grammar* XI, c. 2, expresses thus: "For a pronoun is so called because it is put in place of a name." And ibid. XVII, c. 2, he says the same: For a pronoun put in place of a name signifies substance, and indicates the person congruent with the verb joined to it.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Pro *nobilitatis* cod. U *rationabilitatis*, cod. F voci *nobilitatis* addit *i. e. rationabilitatis*.

en: Cf. above d. 3, a. 2, q. 2 and following. — For *nobilitatis* cod. U has *rationabilitatis*, cod. F adds to the word *nobilitatis* "i.e. rationabilitatis."

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — In codd. III (K primitus) L T Z aa deest tota ante *Trinitas*.

en: See above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — In codd. III (K originally) L T Z aa the word *tota* before *Trinitas* is missing.

la: Cfr. August., Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 3. n. 9; Epist. 169. (alias 102.) c. 2. n. 7. seq., et, de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 15. n. 31.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Letter* 137 (otherwise 3) c. 3, n. 9; *Letter* 169 (otherwise 102) c. 2, n. 7 and following, and *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 15, n. 31.

la: In codd. AG (K a prima manu) LTUVZaa desideratur *humanam*, pro quo cod. bb substituit *illam*. Codd. N W X *naturam humanam* mutaverunt in *hominem*.

en: In codd. AG (K by the first hand) LTUVZaa *humanam* is lacking, for which cod. bb substitutes *illam*. Codd. N W X changed *naturam humanam* into *hominem*.

la: Cap. 1. et 3, nec non Comment. ibid. a. 2. q. 2, ubi et Augustini testimonia habentur, quae hic respiciuntur. — De *maiori* cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 5. ad 1. — Voci *Magister* cod. G annectit *in littera*.

en: Chapters 1 and 3, and also the Commentary on the same, a. 2, q. 2, where the testimonies of Augustine are also found, which are here regarded. — On the major, cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 5, to 1. — To the word *Magister* cod. G annexes *in littera*.

la: Cfr. infra d. XI. lit. Magistri, c. 3, et Comment. a. 2. q. 2. seq.

en: Cf. below d. XI, text of the Master, c. 3, and the Commentary, a. 2, q. 2 and following.

la: Sic argumentatur Boethius; vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 2. — In initio arg. codd. K N T vocabulo *eidem* adiungunt *subiecto*. Deinde pro *conveniret* Vat. substituit *conveniet*, et mox post *aut alia persona erit, secundum quod homo* cod. Q addit *et alia, secundum quod Deus*.

en: Thus Boethius argues; see above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, foundation 2. — At the beginning of the argument codd. K N T add to the word *eidem* the word *subiecto*. Then for *conveniret* the Vatican edition substitutes *conveniet*, and soon after *aut alia persona erit, secundum quod homo* cod. Q adds *et alia, secundum quod Deus*.

la: Codd. M O *rationabilem*.

en: Codd. M O read *rationabilem*.

la: Hic c. 1. Cfr. supra d. V. c. 3. — Mox pro *vel per se unum* cod. bb *vel per se una*. In fine arg. post *divinae* cod. U repetit *naturae*.

en: Here c. 1. Cf. above d. V, c. 3. — Soon, for *vel per se unum* cod. bb has *vel per se una*. At the end of the argument, after *divinae* cod. U repeats *naturae*.

la: Vide corp. quaest. praeced.

en: See the body of the preceding question.

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *et penes* cod. K *nec penes*, cod. U *vel*.

en: Cf. above d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, for *et penes* cod. K has *nec penes*, cod. U *vel*.

la: Respiciuntur verba illa Damasc., quae supra pag. 15, nota 4. allegavimus. De hac solut. cfr. quaest. seq.

en: Those words of Damascene are regarded which we cited above on page 15, note 4. On this solution cf. the following question.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 179, nota 1. et tom. II. pag. 870, nota 8. — Paulo superius post *demonstrat personam* cod. K subiicit *propriam*.

en: Cf. above page 179, note 1, and vol. II, page 870, note 8. — A little above, after *demonstrat personam* cod. K subjoins *propriam*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. et 2. — Aliquanto superius post *sicut* cod. A interserit *est*, et post pauca, scil. post *secundum quod*, cod. S subdit *ille*. Deinde pro *quia illa dignitas* codd. A G K N U bb exhibent *quod illa dignitas*, et demum pro *nobiliorem* in codd. GZ (bb a secunda manu) scriptum est *nobilitantem*, in codd. W X *digniorem*.

en: Cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, to 1 and 2. — Somewhat above, after *sicut* cod. A inserts *est*, and after a little, namely after *secundum quod*, cod. S subjoins *ille*. Then for *quia illa dignitas* codd. A G K N U bb give *quod illa dignitas*, and finally for *nobiliorem* in codd. GZ (bb by the second hand) is written *nobilitantem*, in codd. W X *digniorem*.

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *Spiritum* (scil. sanctum) edd. 1, 2 cum paucis codd. *ipsum*, Vat. *ipsum Deum*.

en: See above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — A little above, for *Spiritum* (namely the Holy Spirit) edd. 1, 2 with a few codices read *ipsum*, the Vatican edition *ipsum Deum*.

la: Cod. A bene *substantiatio* [substantificatio?], cod. bb *sustentatio*, Vat. *subsistentia*. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. scholion. Mox pro *beata* edd. *vera*. Deinde post *substantificatur* edd. cum cod. cc inepte addunt *in hypostasi alterius naturae*.

en: Cod. A well reads *substantiatio* [substantificatio?], cod. bb *sustentatio*, the Vatican edition *subsistentia*. Cf. above d. 6, a. 2, q. 2, scholion. Soon, for *beata* the editions read *vera*. Then after *substantificatur* the editions with cod. cc ineptly add *in hypostasi alterius naturae*.

la: Vide supra pag. 155, nota 6. — Paulo inferius post *caret* Vat. inserit *et*.

en: See above page 155, note 6. — A little below, after *caret* the Vatican edition inserts *et*.

la: Vat. *et ideo*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *et ideo*.

la: Vat. *haberet*. Eadem Vat. paulo superius ante *sit persona* (codd. I L N T Z aa *fit persona*) interiicit *cum*; in cod. U legitur *quod etsi homo ille* etc. Circa finem solut. Vat. voculam *sibi* mutavit in *sive*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *haberet*. The same Vatican edition, a little above, before *sit persona* (codd. I L N T Z aa *fit persona*) inserts *cum*; in cod. U is read *quod etsi homo ille* etc. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition changed the word *sibi* into *sive*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.227–229 (PDF 249–251; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against raw OCR `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 16138–16277. Per the VOL II OVERRIDE (applies to Vol III), the PDF column-band read is authoritative in the OCR-cascade-damaged Respondeo/Solutio/footer regions; OCR was the base for clean running prose only.

**Alignment.** VERIFIED. q2 opener (raw 16138, *Secundo quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona*) concerns whether Christ as man is a **person** — not q1 (*est Deus*, 16001) nor q3 (*est individuum*, 16278). Running heads confirm `DIST. X. ART. I. QUAEST. II.` on p.227.

**Page-split map.** p.227 (running head, after q1's article-wide SCHOLION): q2 opener + args 1, 2, 3, start of arg 4. p.228: arg 4 cont., arg 5, Sed contra 1–5, Conclusio, Respondeo, Solutio ad-1 (start). p.229: ad-1 cont., ad-2, ad-3, ad-4, ad-5 (ends *hominem purum*); QUAESTIO III begins at the foot of the left column (→ next chunk).

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED (from d10-a1-q1, commit 1d22365).** q1 forwarded "p.227 footer notes nn.3, 4, 5 and following." Confirmed eyes-on: p.227's footer sequence is 1–5; q1 consumed nn.1–2 (its ad-3/ad-4), q2 takes **nn.3, 4, 5** (here `[^p227-3]`–`[^p227-5]`). Nothing parked.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED (to d10-a1-q3).** Printed p.229 has a single per-page footer sequence nn.1–9. q2 takes **nn.1–7** (its ad-2 through ad-5). **nn.8 (Damascenus, Dist.6.a.1.q.3) and 9 (Porphyry, De Praedicab. c. de Specie) belong to q3's args 1–2 and are FORWARDED to d10-a1-q3.** q3 opens mid-p.229 (foot of left column) and runs into p.230.

**Apparatus count.** 21 entries: p.227 nn.3–5 (3), p.228 nn.1–11 (11), p.229 nn.1–7 (7). Markers page-suffixed to disambiguate the three per-page restarts.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. The d.10 a.1 scholion is article-wide and was captured in q1 (its §II expressly forward-covers q2: *Ad seq. (2.) quaestionem S. Bonav. … respondet negative, sed S. Thom. … propositionem admittit intellectam in duplici sensu*). No distinct q2 SCHOLION block prints between QUAESTIO II and QUAESTIO III.

**[?] flags.** None outstanding. The two consecutive markers in Solutio ad-1 (*in atomo* → `[^p228-10]`, Damasc. supra pag.15; *sophisma secundum accidens* → `[^p228-11]`, supra pag.179 + tom. II pag.870) are both distinct printed p.228 footers (nn.10 and 11), verified against the 450 dpi p.228 R-2 footer band. One latent OCR garble in n.3 — `substantiatio [substantificatio?]` — is the editor's own bracketed query reproduced verbatim, not a transcription doubt.