title: Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De quantitate peccati primorum parentum.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de quantitate peccati primorum parentum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum primum peccatum potuerit esse veniale. Secundo quaeritur, utrum fuerit remediabile sive remissibile. Tertio quaeritur, utrum inter cetera genera peccatorum fuerit magis grave.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum peccatum Adae potuerit esse veniale.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum primum peccatum hominis fuerit vel esse potuerit peccatum veniale. Et quod sic, videtur.

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1. In egressu a rectitudine prius curvatur aliquid parva obliquitate quam magna; sed magna obliquitas est culpa mortalis, et parva est culpa venialis: ergo cum cecidit a statu rectitudinis innocentiae[^1], per veniale transivit ad mortale: ergo prius peccavit venialiter quam mortaliter.

2. Item, consensum sive electionem praecedit appetitus, nihil enim eligimus, nisi prius illud appetamus[^2]: ergo ante consensum primi hominis fuit appetitus. Sed appetitus ille erat ad illicitum, ergo erat peccatum; sed non mortale, quia nihil est mortale citra consensum: ergo veniale: prius igitur peccavit peccato veniali quam peccato mortali.

3. Item, contingit aliquid diligere inordinate et supra Deum. Contingit etiam aliquid diligere ordinate et sub Deo; sed inter haec duo cadit medium, videlicet diligere aliquid sub Deo, sed inordinate: si igitur ab extremo in extremum pervenitur per medium[^3], prius dilexit homo aliquid inordinate sub Deo quam supra Deum. Sed primum est mortale, secundum veniale: ergo etc.

Si tu dicas, quod homo in primo statu existens non potuit peccare venialiter; ostenditur, quod sic:

4. Primum, quia verbum otiosum est peccatum veniale, quantum est de genere suo, cum non sit contra aliquod mandatum[^4]; sed Adam poterat verbum otiosum dicere et cum uxore sua iocari: ergo poterat in statu illo venialiter peccare.

5. Item, quod potest in maius potest in minus, quod est ordinatum ad illud[^5]; sed Adam poterat peccare mortaliter; sed peccatum mortale est maius quam veniale. Cum igitur Adam primo potuit peccare mortaliter, potuit primo peccare venialiter.

6. Item, est ponere statum, in quo non potest quis peccare venialiter nec mortaliter, utpote statum comprehensoris; et statum, in quo potest peccare venialiter et mortaliter, utpote statum viatoris; et statum, in quo contingit peccare mortaliter et non venialiter, sicut statum angeli lapsi: ergo erit ponere statum, in quo contingeret peccare venialiter et non mortaliter[^6]; sed hic non est status nisi hominis instituti: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Peccatum veniale ideo veniale est propter impulsionem et pronitatem, quam homo habet ad illud[^7]; sed primus homo nullum habuit impulsum: ergo non potuit primo committere veniale peccatum.

2. Item, in primo homine nullus erat motus brutalis, sed quilibet erat secundum deliberationem rationis; sed peccatum committere cum deliberatione rationis, ubi nulla est pronitas, non potest esse nisi mortale: ergo etc.

3. Item, regnum animae adeo ordinatum erat, sicut dicit Augustinus[^8], quod, si ipsa servaret ordinem sub Deo, nihil exiret eius imperium: ergo impossibile fuit, hominem peccare, nisi prius a Deo se averteret; sed hoc est per mortale: ergo etc.

4. Item, angelus propter dignitatem sui status non solum peccavit mortaliter, sed etiam irremediabiliter[^9]: ergo si status innocentiae excedebat statum miseriae in magna praecellentia, videtur, quod illud quod est in nobis modo modicum et leve, in statu illo esset magnum et grave: nulla igitur essent ibi levia et minuta peccata, sed omnia essent gravia et mortalia.

5. Item, omne peccatum aufert innocentiam; sed quod auferebat homini innocentiam auferebat immortalitatem[^10]; et quod auferebat immortalitatem inferebat mortem; et quod inferebat mortem erat mortale: ergo a primo, nullum peccatum poterat esse primo in homine, quod non esset mortale.

6. Item, si Adam primo commisisset veniale, quaero, utrum potuisset poenitere, an non. Si non: ergo fuisset irremediabile. Si sic: ergo propter veniale peccatum doluisset: ergo passibilis factus esset; et si passibilis, ergo et mortalis, cum eadem esset in eo ratio passibilitatis et mortis. Ergo necesse fuit, primum peccatum primi hominis vel esse mortale, vel esse irremediabile, vel quod aliquid esset veniale et inferret mortem; quae duo simul stare non poterant.

> **Conclusio.** Primum peccatum Adae fuit mortale, nec potuit esse veniale.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod Adam primo peccato peccavit mortaliter, potuisset tamen peccare venialiter, non tamen omni genere venialis. Quoddam enim est veniale, quod est veniale ex genere actus, sicut dicere verbum otiosum et mendacium iocosum, vel exire in risum dissolutum; et hoc est veniale, non solum, cum praevenit rationis iudicium, sed etiam, cum subsequitur; et hoc peccato

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dicunt Adam primo peccare potuisse. Est aliud genus venialis peccati, quod dicitur veniale a veniendo, quia venit ex surreptione et pronitate naturae corruptae[^11]; et hoc praevenit, non subsequitur iudicium rationis; et tali peccato dixerunt Adam peccare non potuisse propter ordinem originalis iustitiae, quo inferior potentia ita subdebatur superiori, quod nihil appeteret absque eius imperio et dictamine. — Et haec positio satis fuit probabilis.

Verumtamen communiter non approbant eam doctores theologiae; nam improbabilitatem habet, si quis attendat ad perfectionem status et regulam rectitudinis, in qua erat; a qua etiam, cum nullum haberet impellens, exire non poterat, nisi contemnendo divinam iustitiam et foedando suam innocentiam et corrumpendo naturam suam; quae omnia faciunt, primam culpam Adae non venialem, sed mortalem fuisse, nec potuisse aliter esse. Et ideo est communis opinio, quam hodie approbant doctores, quod Adam in statu innocentiae primo peccato peccavit mortaliter, nec primum eius peccatum veniale esse potuit. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod prius est pervenire ad parvam obliquitatem quam ad magnam; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi est curvitas paulativa et per successionem; ibi autem potius fuit fractio quam curvatio, vel si curvatio dici debet, primo incepit in consensu, qui fuit mortale peccatum, et ita inter rectitudinem et illam obliquitatem non intercidit medium. Et si tu quaeras: unde hoc? dico, quod hoc non fuit propter immediatam oppositionem rectitudinis ad peccatum mortale, sed quia in tali subiecto, quod quidem vel oportebat esse sanum[^12], vel mortuum.

2. Ad secundum quod obiicitur, quod appetitus praecedit consensum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed appetitus, qui praecessit consensum primorum parentum, non fuit libidinosus, sed naturalis; ex tunc autem incepit esse libidinosus, quando voluntas deliberativa consensit, et tunc etiam incepit esse mortalis; et ita non ante coepit esse peccatum, quam esset mortale.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod medium est inter diligere ordinate sub Deo, et inordinate supra Deum; dicendum, quod etsi sit medium, comparando statum ad statum simpliciter, comparando tamen ad hominem illum, non cadebat medium. Ratio autem huius erat propter magnam approximationem ad Deum, ob quam nihil poterat inordinate diligere, quin per hoc Deo iniuriam faceret, ac per hoc supra Deum diligeret.

4. Ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod poterat dicere verbum otiosum, quod est veniale; dicendum, quod verbum otiosum ei fuisset mortale propter status perfectionem. Unde quod dicitur, aliquod peccatum esse veniale generaliter sive de genere sui actus, hoc intelligendum est respectu naturae lapsae.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod potest in maius, potest in minus; dicendum, quod illud non est semper verum, quia non est hominis potestas aliquando ita ordinata ad minus, sicut ad maius. Unde maius est, hominem mori quam febricitare, facilius tamen potest aliquis alicui inferre mortem quam febrem[^13]; sic et homo primus citius potuit se occidere quam debilitare, id est, prius mortaliter quam venialiter peccare.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quartus status esse deberet, in quo posset tantum venialiter peccare; dicendum, quod illum statum nullo modo convenit esse. Quod enim aliquod peccatum sit veniale alicui, hoc est propter magnam pronitatem, quam habet ad peccandum, et difficultatem, quam habet ad benefaciendum; et ubi haec sunt, est facilitas ad mortale. Et ita nunquam est ponere statum, in quo peccetur venialiter, in quo non possit peccari mortaliter; est tamen ponere e converso statum, scilicet in quo contingit peccare mortaliter, et non venialiter, propter defectum poenitentiae; huiusmodi autem est status daemonum[^14].

english:
### Article III. *On the magnitude of the sin of the first parents.*

Consequently, with regard to the third article, the question is raised concerning the magnitude of the sin of the first parents. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the first sin could have been venial. Second it is asked, whether it was remediable or remissible. Third it is asked, whether among the other kinds of sins it was more grave.

### Question I. *Whether the sin of Adam could have been venial.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether the first sin of man was, or could have been, a venial sin. And that it could, it seems.

1. In departing from rectitude something is first bent by a small obliquity rather than a great one; but a great obliquity is a mortal fault, and a small one a venial fault: therefore when he fell from the state of the rectitude of innocence[^1], he passed through the venial to the mortal: therefore he sinned venially before mortally.

2. Likewise, appetite precedes consent or choice, for we choose nothing unless we first desire it[^2]: therefore before the consent of the first man there was appetite. But that appetite was toward something illicit, therefore it was a sin; but not mortal, for nothing is mortal short of consent: therefore venial: he therefore sinned by a venial sin before by a mortal sin.

3. Likewise, it happens that one loves something inordinately and above God. It also happens that one loves something ordinately and under God; but between these two there falls a mean, namely to love something under God, but inordinately: if therefore one passes from one extreme to the other through a mean[^3], man loved something inordinately under God before above God. But the first is mortal, the second venial: therefore etc.

If you should say that man, existing in the first state, could not sin venially; it is shown that he could:

4. First, because an idle word is a venial sin, so far as concerns its own genus, since it is not against any commandment[^4]; but Adam could speak an idle word and jest with his wife: therefore he could sin venially in that state.

5. Likewise, what can [do] the greater can [do] the lesser, which is ordered to it[^5]; but Adam could sin mortally; but a mortal sin is greater than a venial one. Since therefore Adam could first sin mortally, he could first sin venially.

6. Likewise, one must posit a state in which one can sin neither venially nor mortally, namely the state of the comprehensor; and a state in which one can sin venially and mortally, namely the state of the wayfarer; and a state in which it happens [that one can] sin mortally and not venially, like the state of the fallen angel: therefore one must posit a state in which it would happen [that one can] sin venially and not mortally[^6]; but this is none other than the state of man as instituted: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. A venial sin is venial precisely on account of the impulse and the proneness which a man has toward it[^7]; but the first man had no impulse: therefore he could not first commit a venial sin.

2. Likewise, in the first man there was no brute motion, but every [motion] was according to the deliberation of reason; but to commit a sin with the deliberation of reason, where there is no proneness, cannot be other than mortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the kingdom of the soul was so ordered, as Augustine says[^8], that, if it [the soul] kept the order under God, nothing would go forth from its rule: therefore it was impossible for man to sin unless he first turned himself away from God; but this is through a mortal [sin]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the angel, on account of the dignity of his state, sinned not only mortally, but even irremediably[^9]: therefore if the state of innocence exceeded the state of misery in great pre-eminence, it seems that what is in us now small and light would, in that state, be great and grave: therefore there would be no light and slight sins there, but all would be grave and mortal.

5. Likewise, every sin takes away innocence; but what took away innocence from man took away immortality[^10]; and what took away immortality brought in death; and what brought in death was mortal: therefore from the first, no sin could be in man at the beginning which was not mortal.

6. Likewise, if Adam had first committed a venial [sin], I ask whether he could have repented, or not. If not: then it would have been irremediable. If so: then on account of the venial sin he would have grieved: then he would have become passible; and if passible, then also mortal, since the ground of passibility and of death would be the same in him. Therefore it was necessary that the first sin of the first man either be mortal, or be irremediable, or that something be venial and bring in death; which two could not stand together.

> **Conclusion.** The first sin of Adam was mortal, nor could it have been venial.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this there was a twofold opinion. For some said that Adam by his first sin sinned mortally, but could nevertheless have sinned venially, yet not by every kind of venial [sin]. For one [kind] is venial which is venial by the genus of the act, like speaking an idle word and a jesting falsehood, or breaking out into dissolute laughter; and this is venial not only when it precedes the judgment of reason, but also when it follows it; and by this sin

they say Adam could first have sinned. There is another genus of venial sin, which is called venial from "coming" (*a veniendo*), because it comes from the surprise and proneness of corrupted nature[^11]; and this precedes, does not follow, the judgment of reason; and by such a sin they said Adam could not sin, on account of the order of original justice, by which the lower power was so subjected to the higher that it would desire nothing apart from its rule and dictate. — And this position was sufficiently probable.

Nevertheless the doctors of theology do not commonly approve it; for it has improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which he was; from which also, since he had nothing impelling him, he could not depart except by despising the divine justice and by defiling his innocence and by corrupting his nature; all of which make the first fault of Adam to have been not venial, but mortal, nor could it have been otherwise. And therefore it is the common opinion, which today the doctors approve, that Adam in the state of innocence by his first sin sinned mortally, nor could his first sin have been venial. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**
1. To that, then, which is objected, that one first arrives at a small obliquity rather than at a great one; it must be said that this is true where there is a gradual bending by succession; but there it was rather a breaking than a bending, or if it ought to be called a bending, it first began in the consent, which was a mortal sin, and so between rectitude and that obliquity no mean fell in. And if you ask: whence this? I say that this was not on account of the immediate opposition of rectitude to mortal sin, but because in such a subject, which indeed had either to be sound[^12], or dead.

2. To the second which is objected, that appetite precedes consent; it must be said that this is true; but the appetite which preceded the consent of the first parents was not lustful, but natural; from then on, however, it began to be lustful, when the deliberative will consented, and then also it began to be mortal; and so it did not begin to be a sin before it was mortal.

3. To that which is objected, that there is a mean between loving ordinately under God and inordinately above God; it must be said that, although there is a mean comparing the state to the state simply, yet comparing it to that man, no mean fell in. The reason for this was on account of the great nearness to God, on account of which he could love nothing inordinately without thereby doing injury to God, and thereby loving [it] above God.

4. To the other [argument] which is objected, that he could speak an idle word, which is venial; it must be said that an idle word would have been mortal for him on account of the perfection of his state. Hence, as to what is said, that some sin is venial generally or by the genus of its act, this is to be understood with respect to fallen nature.

5. To that which is objected: what can [do] the greater can [do] the lesser; it must be said that this is not always true, because the power of man is sometimes not so ordered toward the lesser as toward the greater. Hence it is greater for a man to die than to be sick with fever, yet one can more easily inflict death on another than fever[^13]; so too the first man could more readily kill himself than weaken himself, that is, [could] sin mortally before venially.

6. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a fourth state, in which one could sin only venially; it must be said that such a state in no way is fitting to be. For that some sin be venial to someone is on account of the great proneness which he has to sinning, and the difficulty which he has to doing good; and where these are, there is facility to the mortal. And so there is never to be posited a state in which one sins venially, in which one cannot sin mortally; there is nevertheless to be posited, conversely, a state, namely in which it happens [that one can] sin mortally and not venially, on account of a defect of repentance; and of this kind is the state of the demons[^14].

la: Eccle. 7, 30: *Solummodo hoc inveni, quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum.*

en: Eccles. 7:30 (Vulg.): *Only this have I found, that God made man upright.*

la: Hic ordo actuum voluntatis exponitur a Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. Cfr. etiam August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 25. n. 74. seq.

en: This order of the acts of the will is set out by John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 22. Cf. also Augustine, *On Free Will* III, c. 25, n. 74 ff.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.) ubi habetur, quod in mutatione non transitur statim ab uno extremo in alterum, sed per intermedia, »ut ex albo in fuscum, non in nigrum«.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 32 (c. 4), where it is held that in change one does not pass at once from one extreme to the other, but through intermediates, "as from white to dusky, not to black."

la: Cfr. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 210, nota 11.

en: See above, p. 210, note 11.

la: Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. in hac prop. omittit *ideo veniale*, nonnulli codd., inter quos ee, et edd. 3, 4 supprimunt tantum *ideo*.

en: Cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — The Vatican edition omits *ideo veniale* in this proposition; some codices, among them ee, and editions 3 and 4, suppress only *ideo*.

la: De quo agitur infra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.

en: Treated below, d. 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. et 29. — Pro *regnum animae* codd. F Z *regimen animae*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, c. 15 and 29. — For *regnum animae* (kingdom of the soul) codices F Z read *regimen animae* (governance of the soul).

la: Sicut probatum est supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

en: As was proved above, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. — In fine arg. pro *primo in homine* Vat. *in primo homine*. — Notandum autem quod Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 6. ait: *Aliud est dicere, quod homo potuit primo peccare venialiter, et quod homo potuit peccare venialiter primo. Concedendum est autem, quod homo primo potuit peccare venialiter, sicut hoc: Deus ab aeterno potuit creare mundum, sed non potuit creare ab aeterno.*

en: Cf. above, d. 19, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3. — At the end of the argument, for *primo in homine* the Vatican edition reads *in primo homine*. — It is to be noted, moreover, that Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 104, m. 6, says: "It is one thing to say that man could first sin venially, and [another] that man could sin venially first. It is to be granted, however, that man first could sin venially, as in this: God from eternity could create the world, but could not create from eternity."

la: Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Nonnulli codd., ut CH *unum*, ed. 1 *sanum seu vicum*.

en: Some codices, like CH, read *unum*; edition 1 reads *sanum seu vicum*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. et I. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6. — In fine solutionis plures codd., ut C F R aa *peccari* pro *peccare*.

en: Cf. above, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3, and I Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6. — At the end of the solution several codices, like C F R aa, read *peccari* for *peccare*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seq.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Scotus (in utroque scripto hic q. 1.) sustinet, quod primum peccatum potuisset esse veniale, cum inordinate transgredi potuisset vel consilium, vel tale praeceptum, cuius violatio non separat a fine. Hoc approbat etiam Biel (II. Sent. d. 22. q. 1.) tanquam probabilius. Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1.) tum hanc opinionem tum oppositam iudicat esse probabilem. Sed Alex. Hal., S. Thom. aliique antiqui doctores fere communiter cum nostro Doctore contrariam tenent sententiam.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 89. a. 3; de Malo q. 7. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 10; et de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Scotus (in both writings, here q. 1) maintains that the first sin could have been venial, since [Adam] could have inordinately transgressed either a counsel or such a precept whose violation does not separate from the end. Biel (II Sent., d. 22, q. 1) also approves this as more probable. Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 3, q. 1) judges both this opinion and the opposite to be probable. But Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, and the other ancient doctors hold, almost commonly with our Doctor, the contrary opinion.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 104, m. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; *Summa* I-II, q. 89, a. 3; *de Malo* q. 7, a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10; and on this and the following questions, *Summa* p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6.

---

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum peccatum primum hominis fuerit remissibile, vel irremissibile.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum, quod primo secutum est ex tentatione illa, fuerit remissibile, vel irremissibile. Et quod irremissibile, videtur.

**Ad oppositum:**
1. Augustinus *de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae*[^1], loquens de Angelo, dicit, quod resurgere non potuit, quia de sublimissimo statu cecidit; sed homo cecidit de nobilissimo gradu et statu, quem potuit habere in via: ergo si non potuit resurgere daemon, pari ratione nec homo.

2. Item, peccatum, ad quod nullam habet homo inclinationem, nullam habet excusationem, et quod omni caret excusatione, non est dignum remissione; sed peccatum, quod omnino ineptum est ad remissionem, est irremissibile: ergo peccatum illud est irremissibile, quod fit sine aliqua inclinatione. Sed tale fuit peccatum, quod consecutum est ex prima tentatione: ergo, etc.

3. Item, morbus, qui totam naturam inficit, est incurabilis, quia omnino sanitatem et principium sanitatis expellit; sed peccatum, quod ex primaria tentatione subsecutum est, totam naturam humanam infecit[^2]: videtur igitur, quod fuerit morbus incurabilis.

4. Item, Adam, antequam peccaret, non solum habuit naturalia, sed etiam gratuita, sicut ostendetur infra[^3] — et hoc innuit Glossa, Lucae decimo, ubi dicit, quod homo « vulneratus fuit in naturalibus et exspoliatus gratuitis » — Angelus vero non habuit gratuita, sed solum naturalia, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^4]: ergo maiorem corruptionem fecit peccatum hominis in homine quam peccatum angeli in angelo. Sed peccatum, quod magis corrumpit, minus est aptum sanari: ergo si peccatum angeli fuit irremediabile, multo fortius peccatum hominis.

**Sed contra:**
1. Poenitentia est via ad inveniendam veniam[^5]; sed primus parens, postquam peccavit, potuit poenitere quod patet, quia doluit et poenituit: ergo potuit veniam et misericordiam invenire: ergo peccatum eius fuit remissibile.

2. Item, dignum est, ut qui ab alio deiicitur ab alio adiuvetur; sed homo, cum peccavit, alio tentante deiectus est: ergo decuit, ipsum habere praesidium et adiutorium ad resurgendum[^6]; sed illo habito, peccatum hominis est remissibile: ergo, etc.

3. Item, peccatum primi hominis totam humanam naturam infecit: ergo si irremissibile fuisset, tota humana natura damnata fuisset: ergo divina providentia et dispositio, quae hominem fecerat propter beatitudinem, fuisset frustrata, et ita esset vana.

4. Item, non est maioris stabilitatis culpa quam gratia, nec demeritum quam meritum: ergo si culpa Adae fuisset irremissibilis, gratia praecedens fuisset inamissibilis: ergo si gratiam potuit amittere, pari ratione a culpa potuit resurgere.

Quaestio est igitur, propter quid remissibile fuerit peccatum humanum, non angelicum.

### Conclusio.

> Peccatum primum hominis remissibile fuit, quod triplici ratione congruum esse probatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod primum peccatum hominis, quod ex tentatione diaboli subsecutum est, remissibile fuit.

Et si quaeratur ratio huius, dicendum, quod ex tribus rationibus una potest ratio sufficiens colligi. Remissibile namque fuit peccatum primi hominis, quia erat *in carne mortalis*, quia *in voluntate vertibilis*, quia *in transgressione excusabilis*[^7]. — *Carnis mortalitas* faciebat remissibilitatem. Potuit enim divina iustitia severitatem et aequitatem sui iudicii in homine exercere praeter aeternam damnationem in hoc, quod hominem peccatorem morti tradidit et hominis innocentis mortem pro satisfactione suscepit, ut[^8] sic exerceretur in homine severitatis vindicta pro culpa perpetrata, ut, quemadmodum homo voluntarie peccando Deum deseruerat et se ipsum morte culpae occiderat, sic spiritus invitus desereret corpus, et mors exigatur in poena, sicut commissa fuerat in culpa. Angelus autem per naturam immortalis erat nec mori poterat, nisi
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morte aeterna; et ideo non erat[^9] alia via exercendi in ipsum iustitiae severitatem nisi per mortem damnationis aeternae. Et sic *carnis mortalitas* multum facit ad hoc, quod peccatum hominis esset remissibile.

*Voluntatis vertibilitas* ad hoc nihilominus faciebat. Quia enim homo conditus est in vertibilitate arbitrii, quae non tantum debebat esse in eo ad momentum, sed etiam ad tempus diuturnum, quia longo tempore debebat esse viator; hinc est, quod sicut gratia adveniens eius voluntati non abstulit vertibilitatem ad malum, sic culpa superveniens non abstulit potentiam revertendi ad bonum; et sicut potuit transgredi, ita potuit conteri; et sicut per culpam pervenit ad iram divinam, sic per poenitentiam rediit ad gratiam. Hoc autem angelus non habuit, sicut ostensum fuit supra distinctione septima[^10], propter brevitatem spatii merendi, post quod voluntas eius vertibilitatem habere non poterat, sicut ibidem ostensum est.

*Excusabilitas* etiam *in culpa* faciebat ad peccati hominis remissibilitatem. Quia enim alio suggerente cecidit, dignum fuit, per alium sublevari; et ideo competebat sibi mediatorem habere. Et quia lapsus non potest resurgere sine manu sublevante, et inimicus non potest reconciliari sine mediatore interveniente; hinc est, quod peccatum hominis remissibile fuit, non peccatum angeli: quia homo, qui per alium cecidit, alium debuit habere adiutorem et relevatorem; angelus vero non, quia cecidit per semetipsum. Et haec est ratio, quam Magister reddit in littera[^11].

**Epilogus.** Et sic patet, quod triplex est ratio, quare peccatum hominis remissibile fuit; et istae tres concurrentes reddunt unam rationem integram. Inter has tamen praecipua est ratio, quae medio loco posita est, scilicet *vertibilitas voluntatis* post lapsum, per quam homo susceptibilis erat poenitentiae, mediante qua ad veniam poterat pervenire. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, peccatum hominis, quod ex prima tentatione secutum est, fuisse remissibile.

**Solutio oppositorum:**
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod cecidit de nobilissimo statu; dicendum, quod quamvis homo esset in statu sublimi, non tamen sic dicitur de sublimissimo statu cecidisse, sicut angelus. Angelus enim proximus erat gloriae, adeo quod uno solo motu conversionis ad Deum poterat effici gloriosus; non sic fuit de homine[^12]; et ideo non est simile.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo nullam habuit inclinationem; dicendum, quod etsi non habuit inclinativum[^13] *interius*, habuit tamen impulsivum *exterius*, ratione cuius aliquo modo fuit peccatum eius excusabile. Esto tamen, quod excusabile non esset in se, nihilominus excusabile factum est, quando homo incepit de sua transgressione dolere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tota natura corrupta est; dicendum, quod etsi corrupta sit tota quantum ad totam posteritatem, quae seminaliter ex Adam procedit, nihilominus tamen remansit ipsi Adae semen, in quo benedictae sunt omnes gentes[^14], id est Christus, in quo nulla fuit corruptio, immo membrum sanissimum fuit; et ideo sua cauterizatione cetera membra a faece peccati curavit. Remansit etiam in homine aliqua naturalis rectitudo, utpote *synderesis*[^15], quae non fuit in eo extincta, qua movente et instigante, potuit peccatum detestari, et detestando ad Deum reverti et revertendo curari.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo habuit naturalia et gratuita, quando peccavit; dicendum, quod etsi aliquod donum amiserit in peccando, quod lucifer non perdidit, quia non habuit; naturae tamen rectitudo non est adeo obliquata in homine, sicut fuit in diabolo; et non tam improbe et pertinaciter adhaesit ei quod appetiit, sicut angelus, qui nullum habuit retardativum.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the first sin of man was remissible or irremissible.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the sin which first followed from that temptation was remissible or irremissible. And that it was irremissible seems [to be the case].

**On the opposite side:**
1. Augustine, in *On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture*[^1], speaking of the Angel, says that he could not rise again, because he fell from the most sublime state; but man fell from the noble grade and state which he was able to have in the wayfaring condition: therefore if the demon could not rise again, by parity of reasoning neither could man.

2. Likewise, a sin toward which a man has no inclination has no excuse, and that which lacks all excuse is not worthy of remission; but a sin which is wholly unfit for remission is irremissible: therefore that sin is irremissible which is done without any inclination. But such was the sin which followed from the first temptation: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, a disease which infects the whole nature is incurable, because it wholly expels health and the principle of health; but the sin which followed from the first temptation infected the whole human nature[^2]: it seems therefore that it was an incurable disease.

4. Likewise, Adam, before he sinned, had not only natural [gifts] but also gratuitous [gifts], as will be shown below[^3] — and the Gloss intimates this, on Luke chapter ten, where it says that man « was wounded in his natural [gifts] and despoiled of his gratuitous [gifts] » — but the Angel did not have gratuitous [gifts], but only natural ones, as was shown above[^4]: therefore the sin of man worked a greater corruption in man than the sin of the angel in the angel. But the sin which corrupts more is less apt to be healed: therefore if the sin of the angel was irremediable, much more so the sin of man.

**On the contrary:**
1. Penance is the way to finding pardon[^5]; but the first parent, after he sinned, was able to repent which is evident, because he grieved and repented: therefore he was able to find pardon and mercy: therefore his sin was remissible.

2. Likewise, it is fitting that he who is cast down by another should be helped by another; but man, when he sinned, was cast down by another tempting him: therefore it was fitting that he should have a safeguard and aid for rising again[^6]; but, this being had, the sin of man is remissible: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the sin of the first man infected the whole human nature: therefore if it had been irremissible, the whole human nature would have been damned: therefore the divine providence and disposition, which had made man for the sake of beatitude, would have been frustrated, and thus would be vain.

4. Likewise, fault is not of greater stability than grace, nor demerit than merit: therefore if the fault of Adam had been irremissible, the preceding grace would have been unlosable: therefore if he was able to lose grace, by parity of reasoning he was able to rise again from fault.

The question therefore is, on account of what the human sin was remissible, and not the angelic.

### Conclusion.

> The first sin of man was remissible, which is proved to be fitting by a threefold reasoning.

**I respond:** It must be said that the first sin of man, which followed from the temptation of the devil, was remissible.

And if the reason for this be asked, it must be said that from three grounds one sufficient reason can be gathered. For the sin of the first man was remissible because he was *mortal in flesh*, because *changeable in will*, because *excusable in his transgression*[^7]. — The *mortality of the flesh* made for remissibility. For the divine justice was able to exercise the severity and equity of its judgment upon man apart from eternal damnation in this, that it handed over the sinful man to death and took up the death of an innocent man for satisfaction, so that[^8] thus there should be exercised upon man the vengeance of severity for the fault perpetrated, so that, just as man by sinning voluntarily had forsaken God and had slain himself by the death of fault, so the spirit should unwillingly forsake the body, and death be exacted in punishment, just as it had been committed in fault. But the angel was by nature immortal and could not die, except
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by eternal death; and therefore there was no[^9] other way of exercising upon him the severity of justice except through the death of eternal damnation. And thus the *mortality of the flesh* contributes much to this, that the sin of man should be remissible.

The *changeableness of the will* made for this nonetheless. For since man was constituted in changeableness of free choice, which ought to be in him not only for a moment but also for a long time, because for a long time he was to be a wayfarer; hence it is that, just as the grace coming to his will did not take away its changeableness toward evil, so the fault supervening did not take away the power of returning to good; and just as he was able to transgress, so he was able to be contrite; and just as through fault he came to divine wrath, so through penance he returned to grace. But the angel did not have this, as was shown above in the seventh distinction[^10], on account of the brevity of the span for meriting, after which his will could not have changeableness, as was there shown.

The *excusableness in the fault* also made for the remissibility of the sin of man. For since he fell by another's suggestion, it was fitting that he should be raised up by another; and therefore it was suitable for him to have a mediator. And since the fallen cannot rise again without a hand to raise him, and the enemy cannot be reconciled without a mediator intervening; hence it is that the sin of man was remissible, not the sin of the angel: because man, who fell through another, ought to have another as helper and restorer; but not the angel, because he fell through himself. And this is the reason which the Master renders in the text[^11].

**Epilogue.** And thus it is evident that there is a threefold reason why the sin of man was remissible; and these three concurring render one integral reason. Among these, however, the principal one is the reason placed in the middle position, namely the *changeableness of the will* after the fall, through which man was capable of penance, by means of which he could come to pardon. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that the sin of man, which followed from the first temptation, was remissible.

**Solution of the opposing arguments:**
1. To that, then, which is objected, that he fell from the noblest state; it must be said that, although man was in a sublime state, nevertheless he is not said to have fallen from the most sublime state as the angel did. For the angel was next to glory, so much so that by one single motion of conversion to God he could be made glorious; it was not thus with man[^12]; and therefore it is not similar.

2. To that which is objected, that man had no inclination; it must be said that, although he did not have an inclining [cause][^13] *within*, he nevertheless had an impelling [cause] *without*, by reason of which his sin was in some way excusable. Yet granted that it was not excusable in itself, it was nevertheless made excusable when man began to grieve over his transgression.

3. To that which is objected, that the whole nature is corrupted; it must be said that, although it is corrupted as a whole with respect to the whole posterity which proceeds seminally from Adam, nevertheless there remained to Adam himself a seed in which all nations are blessed[^14], that is Christ, in whom there was no corruption, but rather he was a most healthy member; and therefore by his cauterization he healed the other members from the dregs of sin. There remained also in man some natural rectitude, namely *synderesis*[^15], which was not extinguished in him, by whose moving and instigating he was able to detest sin, and by detesting to return to God, and by returning to be healed.

4. To that which is objected, that man had natural and gratuitous [gifts] when he sinned; it must be said that, although he lost some gift in sinning which Lucifer did not lose, because he did not have it; nevertheless the rectitude of nature is not so bent in man as it was in the devil; and he did not cleave so wickedly and obstinately to what he desired as the angel, who had nothing to hold him back.

la: Libr. I. c. 2. Vide supra pag. 176, nota 5.

en: Book I, c. 2. See above, p. 176, note 5.

la: Cfr. infra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Cf. below, d. 30, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Dist. 29. a. 2. q. 1. — Glossa super Luc. 10, 30. seq. sumta est ex Beda in hunc locum, nonnullis verbis adiectis. Verba Glossae integra haec sunt: « Qui [latrones i. e. angeli mali] etiam indumenta gratiae spiritualis, immortalitatis scil. et innocentiae, offerunt [auferunt?], et sic vulnera inferunt i. e. peccati quibus humanae naturae integritas violatur, et mors quasi fossis visceribus inducitur... *Semivivo relicto*, quia immortalitatem exuere, sed rationis sensum abolere non possunt » etc. Beda haec scribens, verba S. Ambrosii super hunc locum et S. August., II. Quaest. Evang. q. 19. vidisse videtur.

en: Dist. 29, a. 2, q. 1. — The Gloss on Luke 10, 30 and following is taken from Bede on this place, with some words added. The words of the Gloss in full are these: « Who [the robbers, i.e. the evil angels] also offer [take away?] the garments of spiritual grace, namely of immortality and innocence, and thus inflict wounds, i.e. of sin, by which the integrity of human nature is violated, and death is brought on as if the entrails were pierced... *the man being left half-alive*, because they can strip [him] of immortality, but cannot abolish the sense of reason » etc. Bede, writing these things, seems to have seen the words of St. Ambrose on this place and of St. Augustine, II *Questions on the Gospels* q. 19.

la: Plures codd., ut O T W omittunt *inveniendam*, alii, ut C F P R S *veniam*; alii, ut I V X Z legunt: *via ad veniendum ad veniam*, cod. O *via ad veniam et misericordiam*, Vat. *ad veniam vel ad merendum*. — Cfr. de hoc arg. infra lit. Magistri d. XXXIII. c. 4.

en: Several codices, such as O T W, omit *inveniendam*; others, such as C F P R S, [read] *veniam*; others, such as I V X Z, read: *the way to coming to pardon*; cod. O, *the way to pardon and mercy*; the Vatican [edition], *to pardon or to meriting*. — Cf. on this argument below, in the text of the Master, d. XXXIII, c. 4.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7, ubi et seq. arg. insinuatur, nec non August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 10. n. 29. seq. et supra pag. 176, nota 1. — Pro *ergo decuit* non pauci codd., ut H I K P Q V Y Z ee cum edd. 2, 3 *ergo debuit*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7, where the following argument also is intimated, as well as Augustine, III *On Free Will* c. 10, n. 29 and following, and above, p. 176, note 1. — For *therefore it was fitting* not a few codices, such as H I K P Q V Y Z ee with editions 2, 3, [read] *therefore it ought*.

la: Nonnulli codd., inter quos Q cc cum ed. 1: *in carne mortali... vertibili... excusabili*.

en: Some codices, among them Q cc with edition 1: *in mortal flesh... changeable... excusable*.

la: Multi codd., inter quos F R T W aa cc ee, cum edd. 1, 2 *et*.

en: Many codices, among them F R T W aa cc ee, with editions 1, 2, [read] *and*.

la: Vat. *non enim erat*.

en: The Vatican [edition]: *for there was not*.

la: Part. I. a. I. q. 1.

en: Part I, a. I, q. 1.

la: Hic c. 7. — Paulo inferius post *Et istae tres* in cod. W subiicitur *rationes*.

en: Here, c. 7. — A little below, after *And these three*, in cod. W *rationes* is added.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *de primo homine*.

en: Cod. cc and edition 1: *of the first man*.

la: Ita Vat. cum aliis edd. et pluribus codd., sed codd. F K T aa ee *inclinationem*.

en: Thus the Vatican [edition] with the other editions and several codices, but codices F K T aa ee [read] *inclinationem*.

la: Gen. 22, 18; 26, 4. et Gal. 3, 8. Cfr. August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 35. seq.

en: Gen. 22, 18; 26, 4 and Gal. 3, 8. Cf. Augustine, X *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 20, n. 35 and following.

la: De qua fusius infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

en: On which more fully below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 and following.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De ipsa conclusione non potest esse controversia; sed de *ratione principali*, quare peccatum primorum parentum fuerit remissibile, non autem peccatum lapsorum angelorum, antiqui Scholastici non conveniunt, ut iam observatum est supra d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. 1. in schol. S. Bonav. (hic in fine corp.) secundum mentem S. Thomae docet, *praecipuam* rationem, per quam homo susceptibilis esset poenitentiae, esse *vertibilitatem voluntatis* post lapsum. Eadem quaestio a S. Doctore tangitur III. Sent. d. 20. q. 1.

**II.** Plures antiqui commentatores Lombardi cum S. Thoma hanc quaestionem hoc loco non tractant, sed eam tangunt in quaestione de obstinatione daemonum (supra d. 7.) et in altera de reparabilitate totius generis humani (III. Sent. d. 20.). De eadem specialim disputant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 11; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the conclusion itself there can be no controversy; but concerning the *principal reason* why the sin of the first parents was remissible, and not the sin of the fallen angels, the ancient Scholastics do not agree, as has already been observed above at d. 7, p. I, a. I, q. 1. In the scholion of St. Bonaventure (here at the end of the body), following the mind of St. Thomas, he teaches that the *principal* reason, by which man was capable of penance, is the *changeableness of the will* after the fall. The same question is touched by the holy Doctor at III Sent., d. 20, q. 1.

**II.** Several ancient commentators of Lombard, together with St. Thomas, do not treat this question in this place, but touch it in the question on the obstinacy of the demons (above, d. 7) and in the other on the reparability of the whole human race (III Sent., d. 20). On the same matter they dispute specially: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 104, m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 11; *Summa* p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 5.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF crops (vol2-p506/p507, split_x=1860 to clear the wide left column), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 35540–35673. QUAESTIO II of ARTICULUS III (*De quantitate peccati primorum parentum*), Distinctio XXI, Book II.

**Page-split map.**
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**Apparatus.** 15 entries total, renumbered continuously [^1]–[^15]. Walked the raw footer range directly (p.506 notes 1–8, p.507 notes 1–7); no garbled-opener undercount. ~8 + 7 per page is normal for two-column Vol II.

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**`has_scholion`: true.** Own SCHOLION I (on the *principal reason* dispute) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll: Alex. Hal., B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Dionys. Carth.), both at p.507 bottom spanning both columns.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All 15 anchors and both scholia crisp at 450 dpi. The OCR running-head digit `508`/`S08` (= 508 SENTENTIARUM footer at raw 151, marking the start of the next page) confirmed against PDF + offset.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum primum peccatum fuerit gravissimum omnium peccatorum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum peccatum, quod ex illa tentatione subsecutum est, fuerit gravissimum omnium peccatorum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus decimo quarto *de Civitate Dei*[^1]: « Magna fuit in peccando iniquitas, ubi tanta fuit in non peccando facilitas ». Ex quo verbo elicitur tale argumentum: ubi maior est facilitas ad obediendum, ibi maior est culpa in contemnendo; sed primo homini obedire fuit facillimum: ergo in transgressione illa fuit peccatum maximum.

2. Item, Augustinus ibidem[^2]: « Obedientia secundi hominis eo est praedicabilior, quo factus est *obediens usque ad mortem* ». Ex quo verbo potest elici tale argumentum: sicut qui est obediens usque ad mortem habet maximum meritum in obediendo et est maxime laudabilis, sicut fuit Filius Dei; sic qui sic est inobediens, ut etiam non desistat propter timorem mortis, maxime est culpabilis et vituperabilis; sed talis fuit inobedientia primorum parentum, qui comminatione mortis non timuerunt transgredi divinum mandatum: ergo videtur, quod illud peccatum fuerit maximum.

3. Item, tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto magis corrumpit, quia peccatum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis[^3]; sed peccatum primorum parentum fuit maxime corruptivum, quia non solum ipsos corrupit, sed etiam totum genus humanum: ergo fuit omnium peccatorum maximum.

4. Item, tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto maiori poena punitur per iustum Dei iudicium; sed peccatum primorum parentum punitum fuit poena mortis et exhaeredationis[^4] in se et in suis posteris, et haec est maxima omnium poenarum: ergo illud peccatum fuit maximum.

**Sed contra:**
1. Minus est peccatum remissibile quam irremissibile; sed peccatum illud fuit remissibile, ut supra[^5] probatum est; multa autem peccata sunt irremissibilia: ergo, etc.

2. Item, gravius est peccatum, quod nullo modo est excusabile, quam quod aliquam habet excusationem; sed peccatum primorum parentum aliquam habet excusationem in hoc, quod factum est ad alienam instigationem; peccatum autem in Spiritum sanctum colorem excusationis non habet[^6]: ergo peccatum illud non fuit peccatum gravissimum.

3. Item, tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto ex maiori libidine procedit; sed in primis parentibus minime regnavit libido et voluntatis improbitas, cum eorum natura esset munda et sana: ergo videtur, quod illa transgressio ex inobedientia non fuerit maxima.

4. Item, gravius est peccatum, quod est contra *rationem* et *naturam* et *institutionem divinam*, quam quod solum est contra *divinum mandatum*; sed peccatum primorum parentum, quod ex illa tentatione secutum est, nec fuit omnino contra *naturam* nec contra *rationem*, sed solum contra *divinam institutionem* — nam nec natura nec ratio per se dictabat, de illo ligno non esse edendum — multa autem sunt peccata, quae sunt contra *naturam* et *rationem* et *institutionem divinam*, quae nos appellamus *peccata contra naturam*: ergo non videtur, quod illa primorum parentum transgressio omnium peccatorum fuerit maxima.

> **Conclusio.** Peccatum Adae non fuit gravissimum propter maiorem libidinem vel ingratitudinem, fuit tamen aliqualiter, sive sub duplici respectu, gravissimum omnium humanorum peccatorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum multis modis possit dici peccatum unum gravius et maius altero, ad praesens tamen attendendum est, quod tribus modis dicitur unum peccatum esse gravius altero: aut propter maiorem libidinem, aut propter maiorem ingratitudinem, aut propter maiorem corruptionem. — Si primo modo loquamur, sic peccatum illud nec fuit maximum simpliciter nec maximum omnium peccatorum humanorum[^8]; ex maiori enim
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libidine diabolus peccavit, et etiam multi filii Adae ex maiori libidine peccant, quam peccaverit primus parens. — Si vero secundo modo dicatur[^7] peccatum maius, scilicet quantum ad ingratitudinem; sic peccatum Adae non fuit maximum simpliciter, maximum tamen fuit omnium humanorum. Maximum namque simpliciter non fuit, quia diabolus ex maiori ingratitudine peccavit, cum plura bona in sua creatione perceperit et de sublimiori statu lapsus fuerit. Fuit tamen maximum omnium humanorum, quia in nobiliori statu et altiori erat quam aliquis posterorum suorum, qui lapsus fuerit in peccatum; et ideo maxime iudicatur fuisse ingratus. — Si autem dicatur tertio modo peccatum maius altero, ratione maioris laesionis; sic quodam modo fuit maximum omnium, et quodam modo non. Maior enim laesio dupliciter potest intelligi et[^9] esse, scilicet intensive et extensive. Intensive loquendo peccatum Adae non fuit maximae laesionis, quia non adeo depravavit voluntatem suam, sicut multa peccata depravant. Extensive vero loquendo, peccatum illud maximae laesionis fuit, quia nullum peccatum est, quod tot personis nocuerit et in tot pertranseat, sicut illud peccatum, quod perpetratum fuit ex tentatione primaria; et ita quodam modo fuit gravissimum, quodam modo non.

Et ex hoc patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas: utraeque enim secundum diversas vias verum concludunt, sicut aspicienti satis est planum.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the first sin was the gravest of all sins.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the sin which followed from that temptation was the gravest of all sins. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. Augustine in the fourteenth book *On the City of God*[^1]: "Great was the iniquity in sinning, where there was such great ease in not sinning." From this saying such an argument is drawn: where there is greater ease in obeying, there is greater fault in despising; but for the first man to obey was most easy: therefore in that transgression there was the greatest sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the same place[^2]: "The obedience of the second man is the more praiseworthy, in that he was made *obedient unto death*." From this saying such an argument can be drawn: just as he who is obedient unto death has the greatest merit in obeying and is most praiseworthy, as was the Son of God; so he who is so disobedient that he does not even desist on account of the fear of death is most blameworthy and reprehensible; but such was the disobedience of the first parents, who under the threat of death did not fear to transgress the divine command: therefore it seems that that sin was the greatest.

3. Likewise, a sin is the graver the more it corrupts, for sin is a corruption of mode, species, and order[^3]; but the sin of the first parents was most corruptive, because it corrupted not only themselves but also the whole human race: therefore it was the greatest of all sins.

4. Likewise, a sin is the graver the greater the penalty by which it is punished through the just judgment of God; but the sin of the first parents was punished by the penalty of death and disinheritance[^4] in themselves and in their posterity, and this is the greatest of all penalties: therefore that sin was the greatest.

**On the contrary:**
1. A remissible sin is less than an irremissible one; but that sin was remissible, as was proved above[^5]; but many sins are irremissible: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a sin which is in no way excusable is graver than one which has some excuse; but the sin of the first parents has some excuse in this, that it was done at the instigation of another; the sin against the Holy Spirit, however, has no semblance of excuse[^6]: therefore that sin was not the gravest sin.

3. Likewise, a sin is the graver the more it proceeds from greater lust; but in the first parents lust and wickedness of will reigned least of all, since their nature was clean and sound: therefore it seems that that transgression by disobedience was not the greatest.

4. Likewise, a sin which is against *reason* and *nature* and *divine institution* is graver than one which is only against a *divine command*; but the sin of the first parents, which followed from that temptation, was neither wholly against *nature* nor against *reason*, but only against the *divine institution* — for neither nature nor reason of itself dictated that one ought not to eat of that tree — whereas there are many sins which are against *nature* and *reason* and *divine institution*, which we call *sins against nature*: therefore it does not seem that that transgression of the first parents was the greatest of all sins.

> **Conclusion.** The sin of Adam was not the gravest on account of greater lust or ingratitude, yet it was in a certain way, that is, under a twofold respect, the gravest of all human sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although in many ways one sin can be called graver and greater than another, for the present it must nevertheless be observed that in three ways one sin is said to be graver than another: either on account of greater lust, or on account of greater ingratitude, or on account of greater corruption. — If we speak in the first way, then that sin was neither the greatest absolutely nor the greatest of all human sins[^8]; for from greater
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lust the devil sinned, and also many of the children of Adam sin from greater lust than the first parent sinned. — But if a sin is said[^7] to be greater in the second way, namely as regards ingratitude; then the sin of Adam was not the greatest absolutely, yet it was the greatest of all human sins. For it was not the greatest absolutely, because the devil sinned from greater ingratitude, since he had received more goods in his creation and fell from a more sublime state. Yet it was the greatest of all human sins, because he was in a nobler and higher state than any of his descendants who fell into sin; and therefore he is judged to have been most ungrateful. — But if a sin is said to be greater than another in the third way, by reason of greater injury; then in a certain way it was the greatest of all, and in a certain way not. For a greater injury can be understood and[^9] exist in two ways, namely intensively and extensively. Speaking intensively, the sin of Adam was not of the greatest injury, because it did not so deprave his will as many sins deprave [it]. But speaking extensively, that sin was of the greatest injury, because there is no sin which has harmed so many persons and passes into so many, as that sin which was perpetrated from the original temptation; and so in a certain way it was the gravest, and in a certain way not.

And from this is clear the response to the reasons brought forward on both sides: for both sets conclude what is true according to different ways, as is sufficiently plain to one who looks.

la: Cap. 15. n. 1: *Quisquis huiusmodi damnationem vel nimiam vel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas.*

en: Ch. 15, n. 1: "Whoever thinks such a condemnation either excessive or unjust truly knows not how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning, where there was such ease in not sinning."

la: Loc. cit. Textus integer est hic: *Et sicut obedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est obediens usque ad mortem* (Philip. 2, 8.), *ita inobedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inobediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inobedientiae poena proposita, et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non obedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto terrenti supplicio?*

en: Loc. cit. The full text is here: "And just as the obedience of the second man is the more praiseworthy, in that he was made obedient unto death (Phil. 2:8), so the disobedience of the first man is the more detestable, in that he was made disobedient unto death. For where the penalty of disobedience set forth is great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter and under the command of so great a power and with so terrifying a punishment [threatened]?"

la: Secundum August., *de Natura boni*, c. 4. et 37. Cfr. infra d. 33. a. 2. per totum. — August. hoc et seq. arg. praecipue affert contra Iulianum (op. imperf.), libr. II. c. 94; III. c. 65; VI. c. 23. et 27. Cfr. etiam *Enchir.* c. 25. seqq. et 48, quod Magister, infra d. XXXIII. c. 3. pro hac re allegat, ubi etiam argg. pro parte contraria recitat.

en: According to Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4 and 37. Cf. below, d. 33, a. 2, throughout. — Augustine brings forward this and the following argument especially against Julian (*Opus imperfectum*), bk. II, c. 94; III, c. 65; VI, c. 23 and 27. Cf. also the *Enchiridion*, c. 25 ff. and 48, which the Master cites for this matter below, d. XXXIII, c. 3, where he also recites the arguments for the contrary part.

la: Nonnulli codd., ut F ee cum edd. 2, 3 *exhaereditationis*.

en: Some codices, such as F ee with editions 2, 3, [read] *exhaereditationis* ["disinheritance"].

la: Quaest. praeced. — De seq. prop. cfr. Matth. 12, 31. seq., ubi Dominus dicit, Spiritus blasphemiam et peccatum contra Spiritum sanctum non remitti neque in hoc saeculo neque in futuro. — In pluribus codd. ut F T W X cc et ed. 1 maior sic sonat: *Maius est peccatum irremissibile quam remissibile.*

en: The preceding question. — On the following proposition cf. Matt. 12:31 ff., where the Lord says that the blasphemy of the Spirit and the sin against the Holy Spirit are not forgiven, neither in this world nor in the next. — In several codices, such as F T W X cc and ed. 1, the major premise runs thus: "The irremissible sin is greater than the remissible."

la: Cfr. infra d. 43. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Permulti codd., ut F H I K T W X etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *dicebat*.

en: Very many codices, such as F H I K T W X etc. and editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *dicebat* [for *dicatur*].

la: Vat. bene adiunxit vocem *humanorum*, quae in codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 desideratur.

en: The Vatican edition rightly added the word *humanorum* ["human"], which is wanting in the codices and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt *et*. — Cfr. infra d. 33. dub. 2. ubi duodecim modi recensentur, quibus unum peccatum dicitur gravius esse altero.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 omit *et*. — Cf. below, d. 33, dub. 2, where twelve ways are listed by which one sin is said to be graver than another. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Thom. diserte docet (hic q. 2. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 163. a. 3.), peccatum illud primorum parentum non fuisse gravius omnibus aliis peccatis humanis, si attendatur *species* peccati, quae gravitas essentialis est peccato; sed fuisse gravissimum, si idem attendatur secundum *conditionem peccantium*. Haec sententia videtur esse communis, licet non eodem modo omnes loquantur de gravitate huius peccati absolute considerati. De hoc dicit Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 3.): « Multa peccata fiunt modo a multis, quae sunt graviora, ita quod, si Adam debuisset fuisse damnatus pro illo, multo minorem poenam sustinuisset ». Consentit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 3. partic. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** St. Thomas teaches expressly (here q. 2, a. 2; S. II-II, q. 163, a. 3) that that sin of the first parents was not graver than all other human sins, if the *species* of the sin is considered, which gravity is essential to sin; but that it was the gravest, if the same is considered according to the *condition of those sinning*. This opinion seems to be the common one, although not all speak in the same way about the gravity of this sin considered absolutely. Concerning this Scotus says (here q. 2, n. 3): "Many sins are committed in a manner by many, which are graver, so that, if Adam had had to be damned for it, he would have suffered a much lesser penalty." Richard of Mediavilla agrees (here a. 3, q. 2).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 104, m. 3. — B. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 3, partic. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here a. 2, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p508-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p509-{L,R}-{0,2}.png`), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 35674–35770. QUAESTIO III (the last quaestio of ARTICULUS III, *De quantitate peccati primorum parentum*). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`.
- **Page span:** pp. 508–509 (PDF 530–531). Page break placed in the conclusio: p.508 ends `...ex maiori enim`, p.509 resumes `libidine diabolus peccavit...`. The CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, *Ad argumenta* epilogue, and SCHOLION I+II all sit on p.509.
- **Apparatus page-split map (9 entries [^1]–[^9]):**
  - p.508 footers ¹–⁸ = [^1]–[^8]: Aug. *de Civ. Dei* XIV c.15 n.1 (*Magna fuit iniquitas...*); Aug. loc.cit. full text (*obediens usque ad mortem* Phil 2,8); Aug. *de Natura boni* c.4+37 / cross-refs d.33 a.2, *contra Iulianum*, *Enchir.*, Magister d.XXXIII c.3; codd. F ee *exhaereditationis*; Quaest. praeced. + Matth 12,31 (Spirit-blasphemy) + codd. *maior* variant; Cfr. infra d.43 a.2 q.1; codd. *dicebat* for *dicatur*; Vat. added *humanorum*.
  - p.509 footer ¹ = [^9] **received into q3's conclusio**: codd. cc/ed.1 omit *et* + Cfr. infra d.33 dub.2 (twelve modes of one sin graver than another). This footer anchors q3's conclusio word *intelligi et esse* (its content — "unum peccatum gravius esse altero" — confirms it belongs to q3, not to DUB I about locution).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs:** **received NONE** (a3-q2 closed clean on p.507). **Forwarded to `bon-sent-II-d21-dubia`:** the remaining p.509 footers ²–⁵ (² Boeth. *in librum de Interpretatione* on *vox/locutio*; ³ Num 22,28 *locutio asinae Balaam*; ⁴ Vat. *servatur*; ⁵ codd. omit *vim* / cod. cc ed.1 *virtutem*) all belong to DUB I (*de hoc quod diabolus loquebatur per serpentem*); its anchors begin at `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` (raw 35771).
- **`has_scholion: true`.** SCHOLION I = S. Thomas distinction (gravity by *species* essential to sin vs. by *condition of those sinning*) + Scotus dissent (Adam would have suffered lesser penalty) + Richard. a Med. consent. SCHOLION II = commentator-roll (Alex. Hal., B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., Durand., Biel).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 9 anchors + both scholia crisp at 450 dpi. The printed running title is *Utrum primum peccatum fuerit gravissimum omnium peccatorum*; the TRACTATIO listing folded into a3-q1 abbreviated it as *utrum inter cetera genera peccatorum fuerit magis grave* — title_la follows the printed title.
- **ARTICULUS III now closes.** Next work in d.21 is the DUBIA chunk (`bon-sent-II-d21-dubia`, DUB I–IV+, raw 35771 onward, pp. 509–512+), then any dup cleanup, before d.22.