title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Quaestio I. *Utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset sexuum commixtio.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod, si homo stetisset, facta esset sexuum commixtio:

**Ad oppositum:**

1. *Primo* per textum Genesis secundo[^1]: *Faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.* Sed vir non indigebat adiutorio mulieris nisi quantum ad actum generationis, nec poterant simul aliquem generare, nisi simul commiscerentur: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quarto *de Civitate Dei*[^2]: «Quisquis dicit, non coituros, non generaturos homines, nisi peccassent, quid aliud dicit, nisi propter numerositatem Sanctorum necessarium fuisse peccatum?» Ergo si hoc est inconveniens ponere, etiamsi homo non peccasset, vir et mulier per commixtionem sexuum generarent.

3. Item, distinctio sexuum non est nisi propter generationem; sed in primaria sui conditione distinctio fuit in humana specie, sicut in aliis: ergo si sexus distincti ad unum effectum non concurrunt, nisi commisceantur, videtur, quod si homo stetisset, vir et mulier commixti essent.

4. Item, vir habuit vim generativam; sed planum est, quod prolem intra se concipere non poterat, cum nec haberet locum, in quo fetus vegetaretur, nec viam, per quam egrederetur: ergo videtur, quod ad hoc, quod generaret, necessarium erat sibi cum muliere commisceri et convenire.

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**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus *de Bono coniugali*[^3]: «Nuptiae non nisi mortalium esse poterunt»; constat, hoc dictum esse quantum ad commixtionem sexuum: si ergo, manente statu innocentiae, homo non poterat mori, ergo nec mulieri poterat commisceri.

2. Item, Damascenus[^4]: «Poterat Deus genus hoc absque generatione multiplicare, si homo mandatum suum servasset usque in finem»: ergo videtur, quod si homo stetisset, quod vir mulieri commisceri non haberet nec filium procreare.

3. Item, ad hoc data est vis generativa, ut quae non possunt continuari in se, conserventur in suo simili[^5]; sed homine stante, in perpetuum continuari posset: ergo non videtur, quod homo generaret.

4. Item, commixtio sexuum est opus carnale; sed primi parentes, cum essent spirituales, non erant dediti operibus carnis nec impediebantur a quiete contemplationis: ergo non videtur, quod natura stante, haberent insimul commisceri.

### Conclusio

> *Statu innocentiae perdurante, fuisset generatio et sexuum commixtio.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in statu innocentiae absque dubio homo haberet generari ex homine; et hoc attestatur auctoritate *Scripturae* et iudicio *rationis rectae*. — Dicitur enim hominibus in statu innocentiae, sicut scribitur Genesis primo[^6]: *Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram.* Et alius textus dicit, mulierem *in adiutorium viri esse factam.* — Rationi etiam rectae hoc consonat, quae dicit, potentiam generandi spectare ad completionem naturae, usum vero generationis ad complementum et perfectionem civitatis supernae. Et quia in statu innocentiae natura perfectior erat quam in statu viae; et si homo stetisset, superna civitas suorum civium numerositate nequaquam fraudata esset[^7]: ponendum est, quod homo in statu innocentiae generare poterat et genuisset. Et quia nec vir per se, nec mulier per se suffecisset ad generandum; ideo per commixtionem fieret coniunctio unius ad alterum, et mutuum sibi praeberent auxilium in procreatione prolis ad multiplicandum genus humanum. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod si homo stetisset, et esset generatio et sexuum commixtio.

**Solutio oppositorum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de verbo Augustini in libro *de Bono coniugali*, dicendum, quod *mortale* non vocatur ibi quod habet necessitatem in moriendo, sed mortale dicitur generaliter pro vita animali, in qua sola potest fieri generatio, quia in ea solum potest fieri decisio et restauratio; et quia haec mortalitas esse poterat in statu innocentiae, quamvis non in statu gloriae: ideo patet illud.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Damasceni, dicendum, quod Damascenus non vult dicere, quod non esset generatio, si homo stetisset, sed quod non esset per eum modum, per quem est modo, scilicet cum libidine et foeditate. Praeterea, ipse non dicit, quid Deus faceret, sed quid facere posset.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ideo data est vis generativa, quod perpetuentur corruptibilia; dicendum, quod illa non est ratio *tota*; immo ratio praecipua et secundum fidem, quam ignoravit Philosophus, est propter multiplicationem numeri electorum, quam Deus sic disposuit facere successive propter congruentiam multiplicem, sicut supra[^8] tactum est: tum videlicet propter divinae gloriae manifestationem; tum etiam propter hominum maiorem coniunctionem, ut magis ad invicem se diligerent; tum etiam propter universi decorem et perfectionem, quae non solummodo attenditur secundum *esse* permanens, immo etiam secundum *esse* decurrens; decursus autem in rebus irrationalibus debet esse secundum ordinem et exigentiam ad res rationales, propter quas factae sunt.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obicitur, quod commixtio sexuum est opus carnale; dicendum, quod *caro* uno modo sonat in vitium, sicut illud ad Galatas quinto[^9]: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum*; alio modo *caro* dicit naturam, sicut illud ad Ephesios quinto: *Nemo carnem suam odio habuit.* Et sic *carnale* potest dici dupliciter: vel a carne, secundum quod dicit naturam, vel a carne, secundum quod dicit vitium. Et hoc ultimo modo in primo statu sexuum commixtio non esset carnale opus, eo quod non esset ibi vitiositas; esset tamen opus carnale, secundum quod *caro* sonat in naturam; et nihilominus esset spirituale opus, quia natura et opus naturae concordaret spiritui et gratiae.

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english:
### Question I. *Whether in the state of innocence there would have been intercourse of the sexes.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that, if man had stood, intercourse of the sexes would have taken place:

**For the opposite [view]:**

1. *First*, by the text of Genesis 2[^1]: *Let us make him a help similar to himself.* But man did not need the help of woman except as regards the act of generation, and they could not generate anyone together unless they were joined together: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV[^2]: «Whoever says that they would not have come together, would not have begotten human beings, unless they had sinned, what else is he saying but that sin was necessary for the great number of the saints?» Therefore, if this is unfitting to posit, then even if man had not sinned, the man and the woman would have begotten by intercourse of the sexes.

3. Likewise, the distinction of the sexes is for nothing except generation; but in its primary condition there was a distinction in the human species, just as in others: therefore, since the distinct sexes do not concur to one effect unless they are joined, it seems that, if man had stood, man and woman would have been joined.

4. Likewise, the man had generative power; but it is plain that he could not conceive offspring within himself, since he had neither a place in which the fetus could be nourished, nor a way through which it might emerge: therefore it seems that, in order for him to generate, it was necessary for him to be joined and come together with the woman.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the good of marriage*[^3]: «Marriages cannot be except of mortals»; it is clear that this was said as regards the intercourse of the sexes: if therefore, the state of innocence remaining, man could not die, then he could not be joined to the woman either.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^4]: «God could have multiplied this race even without generation, if man had kept his commandment to the end»: therefore it seems that, if man had stood, the man would not have to be joined to the woman nor to procreate a son.

3. Likewise, generative power was given for this, that those things which cannot be continued in themselves might be conserved in their like[^5]; but with man standing, he could be continued in perpetuity: therefore it does not seem that the man would generate.

4. Likewise, the intercourse of the sexes is a carnal work; but the first parents, since they were spiritual, were not given to the works of the flesh nor were they impeded from the quiet of contemplation: therefore it does not seem that, nature standing, they would have to be joined together.

### Conclusion

> *The state of innocence persisting, there would have been generation and intercourse of the sexes.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in the state of innocence without doubt man would have had [offspring] generated from man; and this is attested by the authority of *Scripture* and the judgment of *right reason*. — For it is said to human beings in the state of innocence, as is written in Genesis 1[^6]: *Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth.* And another text says that the woman *was made as a help for the man.* — This also accords with right reason, which says that the power of generating pertains to the completion of nature, but that the use of generation pertains to the completing and perfecting of the supernal city. And since in the state of innocence nature was more perfect than in the state of the wayfarer; and if man had stood, the supernal city would in no way have been cheated of the great number of its citizens[^7]: it must be posited that man in the state of innocence was able to generate and would have begotten. And since neither the man by himself nor the woman by herself would have sufficed for generating, therefore through joining there would come about a conjoining of one to the other, and they would furnish mutual help to one another in the procreation of offspring for multiplying the human race. — And therefore the arguments showing that, if man had stood, there would have been both generation and intercourse of the sexes are to be conceded.

**Reply to the [arguments] for the opposite [view]:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected on the contrary side from the word of Augustine in the book *On the good of marriage*, it must be said that *mortal* is not called there that which has necessity in dying, but mortal is said generally for animal life, in which alone generation can occur, because in it alone can decision [seminal] and restoration occur; and because this mortality could be in the state of innocence, although not in the state of glory: therefore that point is plain.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the word of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not wish to say that there would be no generation if man had stood, but that it would not be by that mode by which it is now, namely with libido and foulness. Moreover, he himself does not say what God would do, but what He could do.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that generative power was given for this, that corruptible things might be perpetuated; it must be said that this is not the *whole* ground; rather, the principal ground, and the one according to faith, which the Philosopher did not know, is for the multiplication of the number of the elect, which God thus disposed to do successively on account of a manifold fittingness, as was touched on above[^8]: namely, both for the manifestation of the divine glory; and also for the greater conjoining of human beings, that they might love each other more; and also for the beauty and perfection of the universe, which is attended to not only according to permanent *being* but also according to *being* in flux; and the flux in irrational things ought to be according to the order and requirement toward rational things, on account of which they have been made.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the intercourse of the sexes is a carnal work; it must be said that *flesh* in one way sounds as vice, as that to the Galatians 5[^9]: *The flesh lusts against the spirit*; in another way *flesh* signifies nature, as that to the Ephesians 5: *No one has hated his own flesh.* And thus *carnal* can be said in two ways: either from flesh insofar as it signifies nature, or from flesh insofar as it signifies vice. And in this last way, in the first state, the intercourse of the sexes would not have been a carnal work, since there would not have been viciousness there; it would, however, have been a carnal work according as *flesh* sounds for nature; and it would nonetheless have been a spiritual work, because nature and the work of nature would accord with spirit and grace.

la: Vers. 18. (Gen. 2, 18: *Faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.*)

en: Verse 18. (Gen. 2:18: *Let us make him a help similar to himself.*) — Migrated forward from p. 477 L-2 footer ³ per the d20-divisio hand-off; anchors at *Faciamus ei adiutorium* in argument 1.

la: Cap. 23. n. 1, ubi in textu orig. post *generaturos* omittitur vox *homines*, et dein post *necessarium* subiicitur *hominis*.

en: Augustine, *de Civ. Dei* XIV, c. 23, n. 1, where in the original text after *generaturos* the word *homines* is omitted, and then after *necessarium* the word *hominis* is added.

la: Cap. 2. n. 2: *Nec esse concubitus nisi mortalium corporum possit* etc.

en: *de Bono coniugali* c. 2, n. 2: *Nor can intercourse exist except of mortal bodies* etc.

la: Libr. IV. *de Fide orthod.* c. 24: *Poterat enim Deus alio quoque modo genus* etc.

en: Damascene, Book IV, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 24: *For God could also in another way [multiply] the race* etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 35. (c. 4). — Dein pro *sed homine stante* Vat. *sed homo, natura stante.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 35 (c. 4). — Then for *but with man standing* the Vatican edition has *but the man, with nature standing.*

la: Vers. 28. — Seq. textus est Gen. 2, 18: *Faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.* — Paulo ante cod. O: *attestatur auctoritas Scripturae in iudicio*, ceteri codd. cum edd. et Vat.: *attestatur auctoritati Scripturae et iudicio*, pro qua lectione mira substituimus: *attestatur auctoritate* etc., innixi auctoritate Forcellini, qui exempla affert pro usu verbi *attestari* in sensu passivo. Paulo inferius pro *completionem naturae* Vat. cum paucis codd. *complexionem naturae.*

en: Verse 28 [Gen. 1:28]. — The following text is Gen. 2:18: *Let us make him a help similar to himself.* — Slightly earlier, codex O reads: *the authority of Scripture attests in the judgment*; the remaining codices with the editions and the Vatican: *it attests to the authority of Scripture and to the judgment*; in place of which strange reading we have substituted: *it is attested by the authority* etc., relying on the authority of Forcellini, who adduces examples for the use of the verb *attestari* in the passive sense. A little further down, for *completion of nature* the Vatican with a few codices reads *complexion of nature.*

la: Cod. T *fuisset.*

en: Codex T reads *would have been.*

la: Cfr. August., XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 21–24.

en: Cf. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei* XIV, cc. 21–24.

la: Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; ibid. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 1; d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. — Mox pro *divinae gloriae* multi codd. cum edd. *divinae generationis*, codd. D aa *Dei gloriae.* — Subseq. (ad arg. 4): Vers. 17. — Seq. textus est Eph. 5, 29.

en: Dist. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3; ibid. a. 1, q. 1 and dub. 1; d. 19, a. 1, q. 2, in the body. — Soon after, for *of the divine glory* many codices with the editions read *of divine generation*, codices D aa *of God's glory.* — Subsequent (to argument 4): Verse 17 [Gal. 5:17]. — The following text is Eph. 5:29.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De nonnullis in hac distinctione quaesitis S. Doctor dicit, quod plus habent curiositatis quam utilitatis; simul rationem addit, quare a Magistro et ceteris Scholasticis tractentur (infra q. 4. in corp.).

**II.** De hac et sequente quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 1. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 89. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 89. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 84. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning many of the questions asked in this distinction, the Holy Doctor says that they have more of curiosity than of utility; he at the same time adds the reason why they are treated by the Master and the other Scholastics (below, q. 4 in the body).

**II.** On this and the following question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 89, m. 1. — Scotus, in Hier. of Montefortino, vol. II, p. I, q. 89, a. 1, 2. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 2; S. I, q. 89, a. 1, 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 14, q. 84. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. unica. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{477,478,479}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`. Raw OCR (lines 33597–33704 + SCHOLION at 33696) was used only for footnote-anchor spacing cross-check; the IA djvu cascade-shattered the Respondeo, the four-part Solutio oppositorum, and the cross-column footer banks on p. 478 (the *congruentiam multiplicem* clause and the *caro/carnale* twofold-modus block are both physically scrambled into per-line fragments in raw). Column-band PDF read is authoritative per Vol II Override step 1.

**Page-split map.**
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- **p. 478 L-1** continues arg 4 close + *Sed contra* args 1–4 + CONCLUSIO line + Respondeo opener (*tiae absque dubio…*).
- **p. 478 R-1** holds Respondeo close (*…sexuum commixtio*) + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–4 complete.
- **p. 479 L-0** (top) holds SCHOLION I (curiositatis-quam-utilitatis Augustinian aside + infra q. 4 cross-ref) + SCHOLION II (commentator catalog: Alex. Hal. / Scotus / S. Thom. / B. Albert / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Aegid. R. / Durand. / Dionys. Carth. / Biel). QUAESTIO II header + body on p. 479 L-0 mid-page onward belong to **d20-a1-q2** (raw 33705+).

**Apparatus split.**
- **p. 477 L-2 ³** (*Vers. 18.* on Gen 2,18 *Faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi*) migrates forward from the d20-divisio chunk per its forward hand-off — folded as **[^1]** here, anchored at *Faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi* in argument 1. (p. 477 L-2 ¹–² stay with d20-divisio at *primo determinata* / *manifestata.*)
- **p. 477 R-2 ⁴** = **[^2]** anchors at *de Civitate Dei* in argument 2.
- **p. 478 L-2 ¹–⁴** = **[^3]–[^6]** (Aug. *de Bono coniugali* c.2 n.2 + Damasc. IV *de Fide orth.* c.24 + Aristot. II *de Anima* text 35 *Vat.-sed-homo-natura-stante* variant + long Vers.28 / Forcellini *attestari*-passive-sense / *completionem* vs *complexionem* variant block).
- **p. 478 R-2 ⁵–⁸** = **[^7]–[^9]** + merged into [^9] tail (Cod. T *fuisset.* + Aug. XIV *de Civ. Dei* c.21–24 + Dist.18.a.2.q.1.ad 3 multi-cross-ref + *divinae gloriae* vs *divinae generationis* vs *Dei gloriae* variants + Vers.17 Gal 5,17 + Eph 5,29 follow-up). The p. 478 R-2 ⁸ (*Vers. 17. — Seq. textus est Eph. 5, 29.*) was absorbed into [^9] as the *Ad 4* anchor to keep the body's `[^9]` count clean at 9 entries; the variants block ⁷ and the *Vers. 17* footer ⁸ both anchor in the *Ad 3 / Ad 4* span continuously.

**Cross-chunk hand-offs.** Received: p. 477 L-2 footer ³ from d20-divisio (folded as [^1]). Forwarded to d20-a1-q2: **none** — p. 479 SCHOLION block is captured here; QUAESTIO II body opens its own fresh apparatus on p. 479 R-1 onward.

**Marginal labels preserved inline.** *Fundamenta.* (suppressed — the Ad oppositum / Sed contra split already carries the function in Vol II; Vat. marginalia *Ad opposi-tum*, *Conclusio 1.*, *Conclusio 2.*, *Notandum.*, *In statu innocentiae.* were absorbed silently). Section labels rendered: *Ad oppositum*, *Sed contra*, *Conclusio*, *Respondeo*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Scholion*.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All 9 apparatus anchors and the SCHOLION text crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 477–479.

**OCR cosmetics silently corrected.** *generari/generari ex homine*, *commixtio*, *commisceri*, *coniunctio*, *Faciamus*, *Concubitus*, *insolutio-op-positorum* (marginal Vat. label *Solutio oppositorum* re-set), *complementum*, *completionem* (per Vat. variant noted in [^6]), and the *congruentiam multiplicem* / *propter divinae gloriae manifestationem* clause re-flowed from the cascade-fragmented raw.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in statu innocentiae in commixtione fuisset seminum decisio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in illa commixtione esset seminum decisio. Et quod sic, videtur.

***Ad oppositum:***

1. *« Generare est de substantia sua aliquem producere*[^1] *»*; sed nemo producit aliquem de substantia sua, nisi det ei partem substantiae suae, cum totam dare non possit nisi solus Deus; partem autem substantiae non dat nisi decidendo a se: ergo etc.

2. Item, filius a patre et matre generatur non tantum effective, sed etiam materialiter; sed quandocumque aliqua duo sunt materia unius, necesse est ad invicem uniri et commisceri secundum se tota, vel secundum aliquid sui; illud autem, in quo uniuntur, non solum habet rationem materialis, sed etiam effectivi, et tale vocamus *semen*[^2]: ergo si homo stetisset, generatio nihilominus esset per commixtionem seminum.

3. Item, vir ex suo coitu mulierem fecundaret, sed hoc non esset, nisi aliquid impartiretur mulieri; sed constat, quod non impartiretur necessarium, quia natura illud sibi reservat: ergo impartiretur alimenti superfluum, et hoc est *semen*[^3]: ergo fieret seminum commixtio.

4. Item, a primaria conditione habuerunt vir et mulier vasa susceptibilia et idonea ad humoris seminarii generationem et decisionem et commixtionem; et illa sunt quae sunt organa virtutis generativae: ergo in generatione prolis naturale est semen decidere: ergo si homo generaret tunc, secundum quod competebat naturae, in statu innocentiae fuisset commixtio seminum.

***Sed contra:***

1. Semen est superfluum nutrimenti; ubicumque autem est superfluitas, ibi est vitiositas; sed in natura instituta non erat vitiositas; ergo nec superfluitas: ergo nec humor seminarius.

2. Item, semen est superfluitas tertiae digestionis; sed si homo stetisset, non esset in eo superfluitas secundae digestionis, utpote stercus et urina: ergo nec superfluitas tertiae. *Prima* patet per Philosophum[^4]; *secunda* manifesta est, quia illae superfluitates nunquam sunt sine foeditate et ignominia: ergo si foeditas et ignominia non sunt in homine nisi per culpam, nullo modo esset in eis talis superfluitas.

3. Item, si esset in eis semen: aut esset *conveniens* propriae complexioni, aut *non*. Si *non*: ergo non videtur, quod de eo deberet vel posset proles generari. Si *sic*; sed natura naturaliter tenet quod est sibi conveniens, et si expellit, hoc non est per naturam, sed per violentiam: si igitur in statu innocentiae homo hominem generaret non violenter, sed naturaliter; videtur, quod in generatione semen non emitteret.

4. Item, actualis decisio partis a parte est via ad corruptionem; sed homo in statu innocentiae ad corruptionem non tendebat: ergo generando semen non decidebat[^5].

> **Conclusio.** *In statu innocentiae et vir et mulier per seminis decisionem generassent.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum generatio prolis, quantum est de ordine et potestate naturae, habeat fieri per coniunctionem et commixtionem duorum sexuum in hominibus, qui respectu prolis se habent per modum *materialis* et *efficientis*, ita quod ratio *materialis* plus residet penes mulierem, *efficientis* sive *activi* plus residet penes virum; necesse est ad generationem, aliquas particulas tam a muliere quam a viro decidi, in quibus esset

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virtus et ratio seminalis respectu corporis propagandi. Quia igitur hic est ordo naturae, non solum modo lapsae, sed etiam institutae, ideo dicendum est, quod in statu innocentiae et vir et mulier per decisionem seminum generassent.

***Solutio oppositorum:***

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de seminis superfluitate, dicendum, quod est superfluitas *residuitatis*, et est superfluitas *impuritatis*. Superfluitas *residuitatis* est in semine, et haec superfluitas necessitatem non excludit, immo idem ipsum, quod est necessarium, est superfluum, sed necessarium speciei, superfluum individuo, necessarium virtuti generativae, sed superfluum nutritivae; et haec superfluitas non repugnat bonitati et completioni[^6] naturae, quia non sonat in vitium, sed in complementum. Est et alia superfluitas *impuritatis*, sicut stercus et urina, defluxus rheumatis et emissio sudoris et consimilia; et haec est in duplici differentia. Quaedam venit ex *debilitate virtutis contentivae et conversivae*, sicut rheuma et sudor; et talis non fuisset in Adam, propterea quia virtutes naturales in ipso erant in suis operationibus efficaces. Alia vero est, quae venit ex *nutrimenti qualitate* et *nutriti puritate*[^7]; et haec fuisset in Adam, qualis est superfluitas egestionis et urinae, quae sunt propter separationem puri ab impuro, ut illud quod purum et idoneum est, assumatur in alimentum, illud vero quod est minus idoneum, abiiciatur exterius, licet non cum tanto foetore et foeditate, sicut nunc. Et hoc satis indicant vasa et intestina et foramina, quae sunt homini a sua prima conditione naturaliter deputata.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio quasi ad omnia obiecta. Nam *primum* quod obiicit, quod ubi est superfluitas, ibi est vitiositas; non valet, quia non habet veritatem de superfluitate *residuitatis*, qualis est superfluitas seminis.

2. *Secundum* autem, quod obiicit, quod superfluitas secundae digestionis est cum foeditate, et ita cum poenalitate, similiter non valet; quia, quamvis illa separatio puri ab impuro sit in nobis cum foeditate, in istis esset sine aliqua foetoris corruptione, in attestationem virtutis potentiae conversivae et puritatis nutritivae.

3. Similiter *tertium* non multum cogit; quia semen, cum sit superfluum nutritivae, est necessarium generativae, non[^8] convenit cum natura, ut salvans ipsam in se, sed ut salvans eam in altero. Et ideo natura non appetit sibi illud retinere, sed in alterum transfundere; et quamvis non conveniat naturae *generantis* in se, ut sic est, convenit tamen naturae *generati*.

4. Similiter *ultimum* non cogit, quod dicit, quod decisio est via ad corruptionem. Hoc enim locum habet, ubi est decisio partis necessariae cum quadam violentia, et ubi est decisio sine restauratione. Hoc autem non est in seminis decisione, sicut ostensum est. — Et ita omnia obiecta possunt solvi per distinctionem prius factam et alia etiam plura media, quae ad hoc possunt adduci[^9].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether in the state of innocence in that intercourse there would have been a cutting-off of seed.*

Secondly it is asked whether in that intercourse there would have been a cutting-off of seed. And that there would be, seems to be the case.

***For the affirmative:***

1. *« To generate is to produce someone from one's own substance*[^1] *»*; but no one produces another from one's own substance unless one gives him a part of one's substance, since to give the whole is possible to God alone; but one does not give a part of one's substance except by cutting it off from oneself: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the son is generated from the father and the mother not only effectively, but also materially; but whenever any two things are matter of one thing, it is necessary that they be united to one another and commingled either according to their whole selves, or according to some part of themselves; but that in which they are united has the character not only of the material but also of the effective, and such a thing we call *seed*[^2]: therefore, if man had stood firm, generation would nonetheless have been by commingling of seed.

3. Likewise, the man by his intercourse would impregnate the woman, but this would not happen unless something were imparted to the woman; but it is clear that what is necessary would not be imparted, because nature reserves it to itself: therefore there would be imparted the superfluity of nourishment, and this is *seed*[^3]: therefore there would occur a commingling of seed.

4. Likewise, from the original constitution man and woman had vessels suited and apt for the generation, cutting-off, and commingling of the seminal humor; and these are the organs of the generative power: therefore in the generation of offspring it is natural for seed to be cut off: therefore if man had generated then, according to what was fitting to nature, in the state of innocence there would have been a commingling of seed.

***On the contrary:***

1. Seed is a superfluity of nourishment; but wherever there is superfluity, there is defect; but in instituted nature there was no defect; therefore neither superfluity: therefore neither seminal humor.

2. Likewise, seed is a superfluity of the third digestion; but if man had stood firm, there would not have been in him a superfluity of the second digestion, namely feces and urine: therefore neither a superfluity of the third. The *first* is shown through the Philosopher[^4]; the *second* is manifest, because those superfluities are never without foulness and shame: therefore if foulness and shame are not in man except through fault, in no way would there be such superfluity in them.

3. Likewise, if there were seed in them: either it would be *suitable* to one's own complexion, or *not*. If *not*: then it does not seem that offspring could or should be generated from it. If *yes*: but nature naturally retains what is suitable to itself, and if it expels something, this is not by nature but by violence: if therefore in the state of innocence man would generate man not violently but naturally, it seems that in generation he would not emit seed.

4. Likewise, the actual cutting-off of a part from a part is a path toward corruption; but man in the state of innocence was not tending toward corruption: therefore in generating he was not cutting off seed[^5].

> **Conclusion.** *In the state of innocence both the man and the woman would have generated by the cutting-off of seed.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the generation of offspring, so far as concerns the order and power of nature, takes place through the conjunction and commingling of the two sexes in human beings — who in regard to offspring stand as the *material* and the *efficient*, in such wise that the character of the *material* belongs more to the woman, and that of the *efficient* or *active* belongs more to the man — it is necessary for generation that certain particles be cut off both from the woman and from the man, in which there would be the seminal power and account in regard to the body to be propagated. Since therefore this is the order of nature, not only of fallen but also of instituted nature, it must therefore be said that in the state of innocence both the man and the woman would have generated by the cutting-off of seed.

***Solution of the opposites:***

To that, then, which is objected on the contrary about the superfluity of seed, it must be said that there is a superfluity of *residuity*, and a superfluity of *impurity*. The superfluity of *residuity* is in seed, and this superfluity does not exclude necessity; rather, that very same thing which is necessary is superfluous — but necessary to the species, superfluous to the individual; necessary to the generative power, but superfluous to the nutritive; and this superfluity is not repugnant to the goodness and completion[^6] of nature, because it does not sound of vice but of complement. There is also another superfluity of *impurity*, such as feces and urine, the flow of rheum and the emission of sweat and similar things; and this is of a twofold kind. One sort comes from the *weakness of the retentive and conversive power*, such as rheum and sweat; and such would not have been in Adam, because the natural powers in him were efficacious in their operations. Another sort comes from the *quality of the nourishment* and the *purity of the one nourished*[^7]; and this would have been in Adam — such as is the superfluity of excretion and urine, which are for the separation of the pure from the impure, so that what is pure and apt may be taken up as nourishment, and what is less apt may be cast out externally, though not with such great stench and foulness as now. And this is sufficiently shown by the vessels and intestines and openings, which have been naturally assigned to man from his first constitution.

1. And through this is plain the response to virtually all the objections. For the *first*, which objects that where there is superfluity, there is defect, does not hold, because it has no truth concerning the superfluity of *residuity*, such as is the superfluity of seed.

2. The *second*, which objects that the superfluity of the second digestion is with foulness, and so with penality, likewise does not hold; because, although that separation of the pure from the impure is in us with foulness, in them it would have been without any corruption of stench, in attestation of the power of the conversive faculty and of the purity of the nutritive.

3. Likewise the *third* is not very compelling; because seed, since it is a superfluity of the nutritive, is necessary to the generative; it does not[^8] agree with nature as something saving nature in itself, but as saving nature in another. And therefore nature does not seek to retain it for itself, but to transfuse it into another; and although it does not agree with the nature of the *generator* in itself, as it is, yet it does agree with the nature of the *generated*.

4. Likewise the *last* does not compel — that which says that cutting-off is a path to corruption. For this has place where there is a cutting-off of a necessary part with a certain violence, and where there is a cutting-off without restoration. But this is not the case in the cutting-off of seed, as has been shown. — And thus all the objections can be solved through the distinction made earlier and also through several other middle terms which can be brought to bear on the matter[^9].

---

la: Damasc., I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 8: « Nam generatio quidem est, ut ex generantis substantia producatur generatum simile secundum substantiam ». Idem dicit Aristoteles, de quo cfr. supra pag. 13, nota 11, et pag. 219, nota 7. Quoad hoc arg. cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 9. q. 1, ubi differentia inter creaturarum generationem et divinam exponitur.

en: Damascene, I. *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 8: "For generation is that from the substance of the generator there be produced a generated thing like according to substance." The same is said by Aristotle, on whom cf. above page 13, note 11, and page 219, note 7. On this argument cf. I *Sent.* d. 9 q. 1, where the difference between the generation of creatures and divine generation is set forth.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *de Generat. animal.* c. 18; supra d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. circa finem corp. et d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. seq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 18; above d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. near the end of the body, and d. 18. a. 1. q. 2 (the following question).

la: Secundum Aristot., I. *de Generat. animal.* c. 18.

en: According to Aristotle, I. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 18.

la: Plurimi codd. et ed. 1 hic et infra in corp. *descindere*.

en: Very many codices and the first edition read *descindere* ("to cut down/away") here and below in the body.

la: Libr. I. *de Generat. animal.* c. 18, ubi asseritur, semen esse superfluitatem sive residuum ultimi nutrimenti, et esse omnia membra in potentia. — Secundum Avicennam, III. *Canon.* Fen 20. tr. 1. c. 3, *sperma* est superfluitas digestionis quartae, quae fit, cum dispartitur cibus in membris resudando a membris, tertia digestione iam expleta.

en: Book I. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 18, where it is asserted that seed is the superfluity or residue of the last nourishment, and is all the members in potency. — According to Avicenna, III. *Canon.* Fen 20. tr. 1. c. 3, *sperma* is the superfluity of the fourth digestion, which occurs when food is distributed among the members by exuding from the members, the third digestion already having been completed.

la: Plurimi codd. scribunt *descindebat*, nonnulli cum ed. 1. *decindebat*.

en: Very many codices write *descindebat*, several with the first edition *decindebat*.

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *complexioni*.

en: The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, reads *complexioni* ("complexion") for *completioni* ("completion").

la: Primae edd. et nonnulli codd. perperam *nutrimenti puritate*; Vat. *nutrimenti impuritate*; nostra lectio confirmatur solutione ad 2, ubi legitur *puritatis nutritivae*. Aliquanto inferius post *sicut* Vat. omittit *nunc*, qua omissione sensus sententiae prorsus corrumpitur.

en: The first editions and several codices erroneously read *nutrimenti puritate*; the Vatican edition reads *nutrimenti impuritate*; our reading is confirmed by the solution to 2, where one reads *puritatis nutritivae*. Somewhat further below, after *sicut*, the Vatican edition omits *nunc*, by which omission the sense of the sentence is entirely corrupted.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *et non*.

en: The Vatican edition, with a few codices and editions 2, 3, 4, reads *et non* ("and not") [omitting the negation our text places elsewhere].

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p479-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` + `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p480-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`. IA djvu OCR raw 33705–33791 used for footnote-marker spacing only; OCR cascade-fragmented through the *Ad oppositum* arg-3 (*si esset in eis semen*), the *Sed contra* arg-2 (*tertiae digestionis*), the entire Respondeo (*materialis/efficientis* sex-role distinction), and the four-part *Solutio oppositorum* (*superfluitas residuitatis* vs *impuritatis* twofold distinction) — column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override step 1.
- **Page-split map.** p.479 R-1 (raw 33705, *QUAESTIO II.* + italic title + opener + Ad oppositum args 1–4) → p.480 L-1 (Sed contra args 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo opener + first half of *Solutio oppositorum* through *vasa et intestina et foramina*) → p.480 R-1 (Solutio ad 1–4 close at *quae ad hoc possunt adduci* immediately before `QUAESTIO III.` at raw 33792). p.479 L is the prior quaestio's territory (d20-a1-q1 SCHOLION); p.479 L-2 footers ¹–³ anchor in this Q2 body (not in d20-a1-q1, contrary to a naive page-bound reading) — Vat. consistently typesets early-Q footers in the left-column footer band even when the body opens on the right column.
- **Apparatus 9 entries.** p.479 L-2 ¹ (Damasc.) = [^1]; p.479 L-2 ² (Cfr. Aristot. + cross-refs) = [^2]; p.479 L-2 ³ (Secundum Aristot.) = [^3]; p.479 R-2 ⁴ (descindere variant) = [^4]; p.479 R-2 ⁵ (Avicenna fourth-digestion gloss) = [^5]; p.479 R-2 ⁶ (descindebat variant) = [^6]; p.480 L-2 ¹ (complexioni Vat.) = [^7]; p.480 L-2 ² (nutrimenti puritate variant) = [^8]; p.480 L-2 ³ (et non variant) = [^9]. p.480 R-2 footers ⁴+ migrate FORWARD to d20-a1-q3 (anchor in QUAESTIO III body opening *Tertio quaeritur*).
- **Hand-offs.** Received: NONE from d20-a1-q1 (per prior session's forward hand-off = "none"). Forwarded: p.480 R-2 footer ⁴ (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) + ⁵ (Avicenna VIII *Metaph.* c.7 *delectatio est ex coniunctione convenientis*) + ⁶ (Cfr. Aristot. X *Ethic.* c.4) + ⁷ (Alex. Hal. *S. p. II. q. 89. m. 2. addit rationem* on *maioris harmoniae et maioris vigoris*) to d20-a1-q3 — they anchor in Q3's *Ad oppositum* args 2–4 opening on p.480 R-1 mid-page.
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 9 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.479–480.
- **Marginal labels absorbed** silently per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta* (×2 on p.480 L for sub-distinction in Solutio), *Conclusio*, *Subdistinctio*, *Distinctio solvenda*, *Solutio oppositorum*. Section headings rendered as bold italic where they carry semantic weight (Ad oppositum, Sed contra, Solutio oppositorum).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 480 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum in emissione seminis in statu innocentiae fuisset delectationis intensio.*[^1]

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in illa seminis emissione esset delectationis intensio. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*
1. Natura bene disposita desiderat superfluum emittere: ergo melius disposita magis desiderat illud emittere; sed natura instituta multo melius erat disposita quam natura lapsa: ergo vis generativa multo magis desiderabat semen emittere, quod est superfluum. Sed ubi maius est desiderium, ibi in completione multo maior est delectatio; ergo in seminis decisione multo maior esset delectationis intensio, quam sit modo.

2. Item, « delectatio est ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti et sensu eiusdem[^2] »; et ideo dicunt naturales, delectationem esse in coitu propter transitum humoris per locum nervosum, in quo maxime viget sensus. Si ergo tanta erat tunc convenientia vel maior, quam sit modo, et sensus tunc magis vigebat quam modo; videtur, quod in seminis decisione maior tunc, quam nunc esset delectationis intensio.

3. Item, unaquaeque virtus cognoscitiva delectatur in facilitate et complemento suae operationis; hoc per se verum est[^3]: ergo quanto maior esset completio et facilitas, tanto maior esset delectatio. Sed vis generativa, in qua viget sensus tactus, facilius et completius exisset tunc in actum suum quam nunc: ergo maior esset ibi delectationis intensio.

4. Item, oculus Adae plus delectabatur in aspectu lucis, et auditus in auditu cantus sonori, quam aspectus vel auditus hominis lapsi[^4]: ergo pari ratione in gustu et tactu, apposito sibi convenienti, multo plus haberet delectari: ergo cum cognovisset uxorem, vel cum comedisset, maiorem delectationem habuisset.

<!-- page 481 -->

*Sed contra. — Fundamenta.*
1. Augustinus dicit *de Civitate Dei*[^5], quod si homo non peccasset, sic membra genitalia applicarentur ad invicem, sicut modo applicatur manus ori; sed in applicatione manus ad os aut nulla aut modica habetur delectatio: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod nec in contactu illorum membrorum.

2. Item, si tanta esset delectationis intensio tunc, quanta est nunc, cum modo sit deordinatio in actu generandi propter intensionem delectationis; tunc fuisset generativa deordinata: ergo non esset generativa instituta, sed destituta.

3. Item, si in actu illo, natura stante, esset delectationis intensio, cum, fortificata una virtute, minoretur usus alterius[^6], videtur, quod sicut nunc in illo opere absorbetur usus rationis, ita et tunc; sed hoc non potest esse sine hominis subversione: ergo non esset natura ordinata, sed inordinata et subversa.

4. Item, si tanta esset tunc delectatio in praesentia et coniunctione sexuum, quanta est nunc, ergo similiter tantus esset appetitus in absentia, quantus est nunc; sed vehementia desiderii et appetitus[^7] excitat pruritum, et pruritus vehementia facit membra illa inobedientia rationi et repugnantia: ergo in statu ante lapsum esset pugna et controversia; quod est contra omnes Sanctos et contra fidem sinceram. Restat ergo, quod tempore naturae institutae in sexuum commixtione non erat delectatio intensa.

### Conclusio.

> In statu innocentiae non fuisset tanta in actu generationis delectationis intensio, quanta nunc est.

**Respondeo:** Intelligendum est, hic duplicem modum esse dicendi.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod tanta vel maior erat delectatio tunc quam nunc; et tamen non erat *immoderata: tanta* erat propter naturalis virtutis perfectionem, *immoderata* non erat propter inferiorum virtutum subiectionem. Ratio enim dominabatur illi delectationi et eam deferebat in suum finem; et ideo non absorbebatur, nec erat ibi repugnantia. Et per hoc volunt solvere obiecta.

*Opinio 2.* Est et alius modus dicendi, qui magis concordat verbis Augustini et probabilitati rationis, scilicet *Conclusio.* quod in decisione seminum et commixtione sexuum tempore naturae institutae aliqua fuisset delectatio, moderata tamen et mensurata, secundum quod exigebat hominis rectitudo, et secundum quod eam volebat temperare hominis ratio; et ideo non erat tanta, quanta est modo. Nunc enim, quia virtus illa maxime exivit rationis imperium, dum ratio amisit originalis iustitiae vinculum et retinaculum, per quod imperabat viribus inferioribus; ideo, laxatis sibi habenis, toto impetu et conatu se praecipitat in delectabile sibi oblatum, non propter intensionem virtutis moventis, sed propter defectum virtutis retardantis. Unde sicut equus lascivus, rupto freno, velocius currit et impetuosius, quam cum infrenatur et detinetur a suo sessore, licet non habeat maiorem virtutem; sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^8]: « Nuptiae illae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent et pudendam libidinem non haberent ».

Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod non esset tunc tanta delectationis intensio, quanta est nunc, cum modo tanta sit, ut modum et ordinem debitum non observet.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod natura desiderat emittere superfluitatem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed illud desiderium habet terminum et limitem et in natura instituta illum terminum non exiret; nunc autem exit, et ratio prius tacta est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod delectatio venit ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti et sensu eiusdem; dicendum, quod non tantum venit ex coniunctione, sed etiam ex virtutis conversione super delectabile. In statu autem naturae institutae, etsi esset coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti et sensus, non tamen tanta esset virtutis incurvatio et inclinatio, quanta est modo: et ideo non esset tam improba et tam intensa delectatio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus delectatur in completione et facilitate sui actus; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen adhuc ista delectatio terminum praefixum debet habere, et haberet utique, si homo stetisset. Et quoniam illum merito peccati egreditur, hinc est, quod amplius delectatur, quamvis delectationis materia non sit maior.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amplius delectaretur homo in sensu visus et auditus; dicendum, quod verum est de delectatione naturali, sed non est verum de delectatione curiositatis. Nec est simile de delectatione, quae est in visu et quae est in tactu, quoniam visus delectatur in obiecto, quod est <!-- page 482 -->nobile et magis accedit ad naturam spiritualem, similiter et auditus; et ideo in Beatis delectatio visus potissime intenditur. Tactus vero delectatur in re magis grossa et materiali; et ideo intensio suae delectationis magis repugnat statui spirituali et magis reddit hominem carnalem et animalem, qualis est homo in statu miseriae. Et sic patet, quod illud non est simile.

english:
### Question III. *Whether in the emission of seed in the state of innocence there would have been intensity of delight.*[^1]

Thirdly it is asked whether in that emission of seed there would have been intensity of delight. And that it would, seems thus:

*To the contrary.*
1. A well-disposed nature desires to emit what is superfluous: therefore one better disposed desires more to emit it; but instituted nature was much better disposed than fallen nature: therefore the generative power much more desired to emit seed, which is superfluous. But where the desire is greater, there in completion the delight is much greater; therefore in the discharge of seed the intensity of delight would have been much greater than it now is.

2. Likewise, "delight arises from the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting and the sensation of the same"[^2]; and so the natural philosophers say that delight in coitus arises from the passage of fluid through the nervous place, in which sense most flourishes. If therefore there was then as great or greater fittingness than now, and sense was then more vigorous than now, it seems that in the discharge of seed the intensity of delight would have been greater then than it is now.

3. Likewise, every cognitive power delights in the ease and completion of its operation; this is self-evident[^3]: therefore the greater the completion and ease, the greater the delight. But the generative power, in which the sense of touch flourishes, would then have gone forth into its act more easily and more completely than now: therefore the intensity of delight would have been greater there.

4. Likewise, the eye of Adam delighted more in the sight of light, and the hearing in the hearing of sonorous song, than the sight or hearing of fallen man[^4]: therefore by parity of reasoning in taste and touch, with the fitting object set before it, one would have had to delight much more: therefore when he had known his wife, or when he had eaten, he would have had a greater delight.

*On the contrary. — Foundations.*
1. Augustine says in *On the City of God*[^5] that if man had not sinned, the genital members would have been applied to one another just as the hand is now applied to the mouth; but in the application of the hand to the mouth either no delight or only moderate delight is had: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that neither in the contact of those members.

2. Likewise, if the intensity of delight then were as great as it is now, since now there is disorder in the act of generating on account of the intensity of delight, then the generative power would have been disordered: therefore it would not have been an instituted generative power but a destituted one.

3. Likewise, if in that act, nature standing, there were intensity of delight, since, when one power is strengthened the use of another is diminished[^6], it seems that, as now in that work the use of reason is absorbed, so also then; but this cannot be without the overthrow of man: therefore nature would not have been ordered but disordered and subverted.

4. Likewise, if the delight in the presence and conjunction of the sexes were then as great as it is now, then similarly the appetite in absence would have been as great as it is now; but the vehemence of desire and appetite[^7] excites itching, and the vehemence of the itching makes those members disobedient to reason and resistant: therefore in the state before the fall there would have been struggle and controversy; which is against all the saints and against sincere faith. It remains, therefore, that in the time of instituted nature in the commingling of the sexes there was no intense delight.

### Conclusion.

> In the state of innocence there would not have been such an intensity of delight in the act of generation as there is now.

**I respond:** It must be understood that here there is a twofold mode of speaking.

*First opinion.* For some have wished to say that the delight was then as great as or greater than now; and yet it was not *immoderate*: it was *so great* on account of the perfection of the natural power, but it was not *immoderate* on account of the subjection of the lower powers. For reason dominated that delight and directed it to its end; and so it was not absorbed, nor was there resistance there. And by this they wish to resolve the objections.

*Second opinion.* There is also another mode of speaking, which more agrees with the words of Augustine and with the probability of reason, namely *Conclusion.* that in the discharge of seed and in the commingling of the sexes in the time of instituted nature there would have been some delight, moderate however and measured, according to what man's rectitude required, and according to what man's reason wished to temper it; and therefore it was not so great as it is now. For now, because that power has greatly gone forth from reason's command, since reason has lost the bond and check of original justice, by which it commanded the lower powers; therefore, the reins being slackened to it, with full impetus and effort it precipitates itself into the delightful thing offered to it, not on account of the intensity of the moving power, but on account of the defect of the restraining power. Hence as a wanton horse, the bridle broken, runs more swiftly and more impetuously than when it is bridled and held back by its rider, although it does not have greater strength; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood to be. And this is what Augustine says in *On the City of God*[^8]: "Those nuptials worthy of the felicity of paradise, had sin not been, would both beget offspring to be loved and not have a shameful lust."

And therefore the reasons showing that the intensity of delight would not then have been as great as it is now must be conceded, since now it is so great that it does not observe the due measure and order.

*Solution of the contrary arguments.*
1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that nature desires to emit what is superfluous; it must be said that it is true; but that desire has a term and a limit, and in instituted nature it would not have gone beyond that term; now however it does go beyond it, and the reason has been touched on above.

2. To that which is objected, that delight comes from the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting and the sensation of the same; it must be said that it comes not only from the conjunction, but also from the turning of the power upon the delightful thing. In the state of instituted nature, however, although there was a conjunction of the fitting with the fitting and of sense, nevertheless the bending and inclination of the power would not have been as great as it is now: and so the delight would not have been so wanton and so intense.

3. To that which is objected, that the power delights in the completion and ease of its act; it must be said that it is true; but yet this delight ought still to have a fixed term, and it would have, if man had stood. And because he goes beyond it by the merit of sin, hence it is that he delights more, although the matter of delight is not greater.

4. To that which is objected, that man would delight more in the sense of sight and hearing; it must be said that it is true of natural delight, but it is not true of the delight of curiosity. Nor is it similar regarding the delight which is in sight and that which is in touch, since sight delights in an object which is noble and more approaches spiritual nature, and likewise hearing; and so among the Blessed the delight of sight is most especially intensified. But touch delights in a thing more gross and material; and so the intensity of its delight more conflicts with the spiritual state and more renders man carnal and animal, such as man is in the state of misery. And so it is plain that it is not similar.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: De hac definitione, quae est Avicennae, VIII. *Metaph.* c. 7, vide tom. I. pag. 38, nota 4.

en: On this definition, which is from Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VIII c. 7, see tom. I p. 38, note 4.

la: Cfr. Aristot., X. *Ethic.* c. 4.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* X c. 4.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 2. addit rationem: et hoc, quia maioris harmoniae et maioris vigoris praediti erant sensus illius.

en: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 89 m. 2, adds the reason: and this, because the senses of that man were endowed with greater harmony and greater vigor.

la: Libr. XIV. c. 23, 24, secundum sensum. Verba huius dicti magis sumta videntur ex Magistro, hic c. 1, ubi allegatur August. IX. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 10. n. 18.

en: Book XIV cc. 23, 24, according to the sense. The words of this saying seem rather taken from the Master, here c. 1, where Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IX c. 10 n. 18, is alleged.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 260, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 260, note 1.

la: Cod. T *vehementia et desiderium. appetitus.*

en: Codex T reads *vehementia et desiderium. appetitus.*

la: Libr. cit. c. 23. n. 2.

en: The cited book c. 23 n. 2.

latin_scholion:
De hac et sequente quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. a. 3. et dub. lit. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
On this and the following question: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 89 m. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 2. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 3. 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. a. 3 and lit. dub. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2.

---

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title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 482 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum in coitu in statu innocentiae fuisset integritatis corruptio.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum in illo coitu esset integritatis corruptio. Et quod non, videtur:

**Ad oppositum:**

1. *Primo* per Augustinum, decimo quarto *de Civitate Dei*[^2]: « Sine ulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur maritus gremio mulieris »: ergo videtur, quod si homo stetisset, nulla esset integritatis corruptio.

2. *Item*, ubi est corruptio integritatis in re habente sensum, est passio vel dolor, quia « dolor est sensus divisionis partium », sicut dicit Philosophus[^3]. Si ergo in actu illo fuisset integritatis corruptio, cum esset in re habente sensum, esset nihilominus per consequens doloris passio; sed haec passio non poterat esse in natura stante: ergo nec integritatis corruptio.

3. *Item*, ubi est corruptio integritatis, est amissio virginalis dignitatis; sed si homo stetisset, in actu illo non fuisset alicuius dignitatis amissio: ergo nec integritatis violatio.

4. *Item*, corruptio integritatis est principium destructionis et disponens[^4] ad mortem; immortalitas enim integritatem dicit et privat corruptionem. Si ergo statu illo manente, tam vir quam mulier erant immortales: ergo integritatem per corruptionem aliquam non poterant perdere.

**Sed contra. — Fundamenta:**

1. Impossibile est, semen suscipi et emitti nisi per apertionem viarum; sed in actu generationis fuisset seminum commixtio: ergo fuisset et viarum apertio. Si igitur in apertione viarum est, integritatis virginalis violatio: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, quamvis naturalia sint deteriorata, non tamen sunt ablata: ergo sicut modo commiscetur maritus uxori, ita et tunc; sed nunc non potest commisceri sine corruptione integritatis: ergo nec tunc.

3. *Item*, quod aliqua virgo conceperit, hoc est miraculum et proprium solius Matris Christi; si ergo miraculum est supra naturam et contra naturam, videtur, quod natura stante, nulla mulier posset concipere, manente virginitate et corporis integritate.

4. *Item*, mulier non posset parere, salva claustrorum[^6] integritate, quia fetus non posset nisi per apertam portam exire; exire enim per ianuam clausam, hoc est solius Christi proprium et naturae impossibile: si ergo esset integritatis corruptio in partu, pari ratione et in conceptu.

> **Conclusio.** In statu innocentiae, si vir uxorem cognovisset, fuisset claustrorum apertio, tamen sine poena et foeditate.

**Respondeo:** *Notandum*, quod proposita quaestio plus habet curiositatis quam utilitatis: quia tamen habet ortum ex verbis Augustini[^7], ideo introducta est, maxime propter explanationem illius verbi, quod dicit, quod maritus commisceretur uxori sine ulla corruptione integritatis; quod quidem non videtur esse intelligibile[^1]. Si enim mulier permaneret integra, nunquam esset viri ad mulierem carnis commixtio. — *Propter quod intelligendum est*, quod integritatis corruptio tria dicit, scilicet claustrorum apertionem, poenalem passionem et foedam delectationem. Primum est naturae, secundum est poenae, tertium vero est corruptionis vitiosae, quae tenet medium inter culpam et poenam.

Si igitur vir uxorem cognovisset in tempore naturae institutae, fuisset ibi claustrorum apertio[^5],
<!-- page 483 -->
sicut ostendunt rationes secundo inductae; non tamen fuisset ibi poenalis passio ac foeda delectatio, quia vis generativa nec esset corrupta nec esset infecta; immo obedirent rationi illa membra, sicut dicit Augustinus[^8], sicut obediunt os, manus et lingua. Unde sicut manus aperitur et clauditur, et os aperitur et clauditur, nec est ibi passio vel poena nec delectatio foeda, sic fuisset in natura; nec turpius fuisset tunc loqui de istis membris, quam sit loqui de aliis. Nunc enim turpe est loqui propter hoc, quod natura horret et erubescit actum illum ratione foeditatis, quae in ipso consistit.

**Ad rationes in oppositum:** Et sic patet responsio ad rationes ad partem oppositam. Omnes enim procedunt secundum quod corruptio sonat in violentiam et poenalitatem, et in delectationem et foeditatem; et sic minuit dignitatem virginalem. Et hoc patet pertractanti singulas[^9].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether in the act of intercourse in the state of innocence there would have been a corruption of integrity.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether in that act of intercourse there would have been a corruption of integrity. And that there would not, it seems:

**To the opposite side:**

1. *First*, through Augustine, in the fourteenth book of *On the City of God*[^2]: "Without any corruption of integrity the husband would be poured forth into the lap of the wife." Therefore it seems that, if man had stood [in his original condition], there would have been no corruption of integrity.

2. *Likewise*, wherever there is a corruption of integrity in a thing having sense, there is suffering or pain, because "pain is the sense of the division of parts," as the Philosopher says[^3]. If therefore in that act there had been a corruption of integrity, since it would have been in a thing having sense, there would by consequence nonetheless have been a suffering of pain; but this suffering could not exist in nature standing [unfallen]: therefore neither a corruption of integrity.

3. *Likewise*, wherever there is a corruption of integrity, there is a loss of virginal dignity; but if man had stood, in that act there would have been no loss of any dignity: therefore neither a violation of integrity.

4. *Likewise*, the corruption of integrity is a principle of destruction and a disposing[^4] toward death; for immortality bespeaks integrity and excludes corruption. If therefore, that state remaining, both man and woman were immortal: therefore they could not lose integrity through any corruption.

**On the contrary. — Foundations:**

1. It is impossible that the seed be received and emitted except through an opening of the passages; but in the act of generation there would have been a commingling of seeds: therefore there would also have been an opening of the passages. If therefore in the opening of the passages there is a violation of virginal integrity: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, although natural things have been worsened, they have not been taken away: therefore just as now the husband is commingled with the wife, so also then; but now it cannot be commingled without corruption of integrity: therefore neither then.

3. *Likewise*, that any virgin has conceived is a miracle and proper to the Mother of Christ alone; if therefore a miracle is above nature and contrary to nature, it seems that, nature standing, no woman could conceive while virginity and bodily integrity remained.

4. *Likewise*, the woman could not give birth with the integrity of the enclosures[^6] preserved, because the fetus could not come forth except through an opened door; for to come forth through a closed door is proper to Christ alone and naturally impossible: if therefore there would be a corruption of integrity in birth, by parity of reasoning also in conception.

> **Conclusion.** In the state of innocence, if the husband had known his wife, there would have been an opening of the enclosures, yet without pain and foulness.

**I respond:** It must be noted that the proposed question has more curiosity than utility: because, however, it has its origin in the words of Augustine[^7], for that reason it has been introduced, chiefly for the sake of explaining that saying in which he says that the husband would be commingled with the wife without any corruption of integrity; which indeed does not seem to be intelligible[^1]. For if the woman remained intact, there would never be a carnal commingling of the man with the woman. — *On account of which it must be understood* that corruption of integrity says three things, namely the opening of the enclosures, painful suffering, and foul delight. The first belongs to nature, the second belongs to penalty, the third indeed belongs to vicious corruption, which holds the middle between fault and penalty.

If therefore the husband had known his wife in the time of nature as instituted, there would have been there an opening of the enclosures[^5],

sicut ostendunt rationes secundo inductae — as the reasons brought forward second show; yet there would not have been there a penal suffering and a foul delight, because the generative power would neither have been corrupted nor have been infected; rather those members would obey reason, as Augustine says[^8], just as the mouth, the hands, and the tongue obey. Hence just as the hand is opened and is closed, and the mouth is opened and is closed, and there is no suffering or pain there nor foul delight, so it would have been in nature; nor would it have been more shameful then to speak about these members than it is to speak about others. For now it is shameful to speak about it on this account, that nature shudders and blushes at that act by reason of the foulness which consists in it.

**To the reasons against:** And thus the response is plain to the reasons on the opposite side. For all proceed according to the sense in which corruption sounds of violence and penality, and of delight and foulness; and thus diminishes virginal dignity. And this is plain to one who works through them one by one[^9].

---

la: Non pauci codd. cum edd. 3, 4, 5 *intendetur* (pro *intelligibile*).

en: Not a few codices, with editions 3, 4, and 5, read *intendetur* (in place of *intelligibile*).

la: Cap. 26: *Sine ardoris illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis, nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris.* (Virgil. *Aeneid.* 8.).

en: Chap. 26: "Without the enticing goad of ardour, with tranquillity of soul and body, the husband would be poured into the lap of the wife with no corruption of integrity." (Virgil, *Aeneid* 8.).

la: Libr. VI. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 6.) reprobat hanc doloris definitionem: « Dolor [est] separatio naturalium partium cum violentia », tum quia, si vera esset, dolerent etiam inanimantia, dum partes eorum separarentur; tum quia haec separatio non est ipse dolor, sed effectivum doloris; quod et Damascenus docet II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22, ubi ait: *Nam passionem dolor sequitur, non autem ipsa passio dolor est. Insensibilia enim patiuntur, nec tamen dolent. Non igitur passio ipsa, sed passionis sensus est dolor.* — Cod. V paulo superius post *sensum* addit *ibi*.

en: Book VI of the *Topics*, c. 3 (c. 6) rejects this definition of pain: "Pain is the separation of natural parts with violence" — both because, if it were true, even inanimate things would feel pain, while their parts were being separated; and because this separation is not pain itself, but the cause of pain; which Damascene also teaches in book II of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22, where he says: "For pain follows upon suffering, but the suffering itself is not pain. For insensible things suffer, yet they do not feel pain. Therefore pain is not the suffering itself, but the sense of the suffering." — Codex V, a little earlier after *sensum*, adds *ibi*.

la: Codd. C T cum edd. 2, 3 *dispositionis*.

en: Codices C and T, with editions 2 and 3, read *dispositionis*.

la: Cod. O *fuit*. In fine arg. multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 falso *corruptionis* pro *corporis*.

en: Codex O reads *fuit*. At the end of the argument many codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly read *corruptionis* in place of *corporis*.

la: Non pauci codd. *corporis*, alii plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *uxoris*, cod. D *pudoris*, cod. I. *vulvae*; sed vide paulo inferius in corp. quaest.

en: Not a few codices read *corporis*, several other codices, with editions 2 and 3, *uxoris*, codex D *pudoris*, codex I *vulvae*; but see a little below in the body of the question.

la: Libr. XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 26.

en: Book XIV of *On the City of God*, c. 26.

la: Libr. XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 16, 23, 24. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Book XIV of *On the City of God*, cc. 16, 23, 24. See also here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p482-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` and `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p483-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`. Raw OCR cascade-fragmented through the *Respondeo* (tripartite *claustrorum apertionem / poenalem passionem / foedam delectationem* division and *naturae / poenae / corruptionis vitiosae* sub-mapping) and the *Ad rationes in oppositum* close on p.483 R; column-band PDF read authoritative per the Vol II Override.
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title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 483 -->

### Quaestio V. *Utrum quoties fuissent coniuncti, toties prolem genuissent.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum in qualibet coniunctione viri et mulieris esset prolis generatio. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*
1. Matrimonium pro tempore innocentiae erat solum in officium, non in remedium[^1]; sed officium consistit in procreando prolem: ergo solum ad hoc erat. Si ergo vir et mulier non coniungebantur matrimonialiter, nisi propter quod erat matrimonium; videtur, quod nunquam coniuncti essent, quin prolem generarent.

2. Item, qui debitum petit in statu naturae lapsae praeter necessitatem prolis procreandae, peccat saltem venialiter[^2]: ergo ibi vir nunquam peteret debitum praeter necessitatem prolis procreandae, aut si peteret, peccaret et caderet a statu innocentiae. Ergo, illo statu manente, nunquam cognosceret uxorem, quin ex ea susciperet prolem, cum ibi *actus* non esset privatus debita intentione, nec *intentio* debito fine; privatio enim intentionis rectae non est sine culpa, privatio vero utilitatis intentae non est sine poena; quorum neutrum erat in natura instituta.

3. Item, nunquam homo comedisset, quin ex illa comestione sumsisset refectionem, nec unquam nutritiva in suo actu privata fuisset proprio effectu: ergo pari ratione generativa in suo actu nunquam caruisset debito fructu; sed fructus eius est proles: ergo etc.

4. Item, nunquam homo seminasset terram, quin ex ea collegisset fructum temporaneum; sterilitas enim non fuit in terra nisi propter hominis culpam[^3]: ergo si venter mulieris ita erat alienus a sterilitate, sicut terra tempore naturae institutae; ergo nunquam mulierem cognovisset, quin ex ea debitum fructum sumsisset.

*Ad oppositum.*
1. **Sed contra:** Vis nutritiva semen administrat generativae: ergo cum homo continue nutriretur, humor seminarius generativae continue administrabatur[^4]: ergo vel oportebat hominem extraordinarie pollui, vel naturam gravari ex tentione seminis, vel aliquando mulierem cognoscere, quando non esset apta generare, utpote quando prolem haberet in ventre. Si ergo prima duo membra sunt inconvenientia, restat ergo tertium, scilicet quod uxorem aliquando cognovisset, quando prolem non generasset.

2. Item, sicut comedere est actus naturalis, ita et coire; sed homo naturaliter appetit comedere non solum in statu naturae lapsae, sed etiam institutae: ergo pari ratione naturaliter appetebat coire. Sed homo tempore naturae institutae debebat appetitui naturae satisfacere, cum natura esset ordinata et ordinate appeteret, alioquin poenam sentiret: ergo videtur, quod sive mulier posset concipere sive non, vir praeter necessitatem prolis generandae aliquando mulierem cognosceret.

3. Item, ponatur, quod Adam cognosceret uxorem suam praegnantem; quaero: aut peccaret, aut non? Si non: ergo non erat necesse, quod in omni coitu generaret. Si sic; contra: sanctius erat tunc matrimonium quam tempore naturae lapsae et aeque magnae vel maioris efficaciae; sed nunc propter bonum matrimonii excusatur coitus a culpa, etiam quando nulla est prolis generandae necessitas: ergo videtur, quod multo fortius tunc.

4. Item, non erat maior inordinatio in contactu illorum membrorum quam in admovendo manum ad os[^5]; sed manus admoveri potest ad os sine aliquo peccato, etiam praeter necessitatem: ergo videtur, quod Adam potuit cognoscere uxorem suam absque peccato praeter necessitatem prolis generandae.

<!-- page 484 -->

> **Conclusio.** In statu innocentiae et congruentia ordinis exigebat, et perfectio virtutis sufficiebat, ut ex quolibet actu, quo Adam cognovisset uxorem, proles susciperetur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod vir in quolibet actu, quo cognovisset uxorem, suscepisset ex ea prolem. — Et ratio huius est, quia congruentia ordinis exigebat, et perfectio virtutis ad hoc sufficiebat. *Ratio 1.* Exigebat namque hoc congruentia duplicis ordinis, scilicet virtutis generativae ad rationem, et utriusque ad suum finem. Vis enim generativa ordinem habebat ad rationem, ordinem, inquam, perfectae subiectionis; et ideo in actum non exibat, nisi secundum quod ratio dictabat. Ratio autem recta et ordinata dictat, nulla re esse utendum nisi ad id, propter quod est; et quia vis generativa data fuit homini ad prolis multiplicationem; ideo recta ratio nunquam dictaret, et vis generativa nunquam exiret in actum nisi propter prolis generationem; hoc enim *congruentia ordinis*[^6] exigebat. — *Ratio 2.* Perfectio etiam *virtutis* aderat, quae ad hoc sufficiebat. Quia enim vis generativa in viro ad generandum erat potens et sufficiens nec habebat impedimentum, similiter et in muliere pro suo loco et tempore; ideo, cum ordinate cognosceret vir uxorem, semper ex ea prolem susciperet propter exigentiam duplicis ordinis, et sufficientiam duplicis virtutis, scilicet generantis et concipientis, sicut praedictum est. Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nutritiva semper deserviret generativae; dicendum, quod ita esset natura Adae ordinata, ut nunquam de cibo sumeret, nisi adeo temperate, quod superfluitas tertiae digestionis, quae quidem dicitur *semen*[^7], non esset sufficienter coadunata, quousque veniret hora debita generandi. Adam enim in statu innocentiae *posse* naturae suae cognovisset et sufficientiam alimenti et tempus et horam, quando generare debuisset; et ita viveret modeste et sobrie, quod nec ad superabundantiam nec ad indigentiam declinaret.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod naturaliter appeteret coire, sicut comedere; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia actus comestionis est ordinatus[^8] ad salutem individui, in quo continue fit deperditio; actus vero generationis ad conservationem speciei et multiplicationem similis — quod non oportet continue fieri, sed temporibus determinatis — et ideo non sic esset appetitus naturalis ad coitum, sicut est ad cibum, nec ita continuus nec ita frequens. Si enim in viris castis etiam tempore naturae lapsae non sic est inclinatio ad coitum sicut ad cibum, multo minus nec in Adam erat. Quod autem ita intendatur[^9] appetitus vis generativae, hoc potius est corruptionis naturae quam institutionis primariae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si cognosceret praegnantem, non peccaret; dicendum, quod praegnans non potest cognosci sine deordinatione, vel quae sit, vel quae videtur. Et quia in statu innocentiae deordinationem timere non poterat, quia non erat ibi titillatio nec pruritus: ideo, si tunc cognovisset, si sciret, se inutiliter cognoscere, inordinatus fuisset, et ideo peccasset. Nec est simile, quod inducit de matrimonio in statu naturae lapsae, quia nunc non solum est in *officium* procreandae prolis, sed etiam in *remedium* vitandae fornicationis, sicut melius in quarto libro[^10] patebit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non esset ibi maior deordinatio quam in admovendo manum ad os; dicendum, quod *similitudo* illa attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod utrumque membrum rationi subiacebat, et utrumque concupiscentiae pruritu et ardore carebat. In hoc tamen *dissimilitudo* est, quia magis oportebat actum illum ad finem debitum ordinare quam qualemcumque motum manus vel pedis, propter determinationem usus illorum membrorum ad procreationem prolis. Usus autem manus vel pedis non est ita determinatus; et ideo non oportet cum tanta deliberatione exerceri.

english:
### Question V. *Whether as often as they were joined, they would each time have generated offspring.*

Fifth, it is asked whether in every union of man and woman there would be the generation of offspring. And that this is so, it seems.

*Fundamenta.*
1. Matrimony, for the time of innocence, was only for office, not for remedy[^1]; but the office consists in procreating offspring: therefore it was for this alone. If therefore man and woman were not joined matrimonially except on account of that for which matrimony existed, it seems that they would never be joined without generating offspring.

2. Likewise, one who in the state of fallen nature asks the conjugal debt apart from the necessity of procreating offspring sins at least venially[^2]: therefore there the man would never ask the debt apart from the necessity of procreating offspring, or if he did ask, he would sin and would fall from the state of innocence. Therefore, with that state remaining, he would never know his wife without receiving offspring from her, since there the *act* would not be deprived of due intention, nor the *intention* of its due end; for the deprivation of right intention is not without fault, and the deprivation of the intended utility is not without penalty — neither of which existed in nature as instituted.

3. Likewise, never would man have eaten without taking refreshment from that meal, nor would the nutritive power in its act ever have been deprived of its proper effect: therefore by parallel reasoning the generative power in its act would never have lacked its due fruit; but its fruit is offspring: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, never would man have sown the ground without gathering temporal fruit from it; for sterility was not in the earth except on account of man's fault[^3]: therefore if the womb of the woman was as alien to sterility as the earth in the time of nature instituted, then he would never have known the woman without taking due fruit from her.

*Ad oppositum.*
1. **On the contrary:** The nutritive power supplies seed to the generative; therefore since man would be continuously nourished, the seminal humor would continuously be administered to the generative power[^4]: therefore either it was necessary that man be extraordinarily polluted, or that nature be burdened by retention of seed, or that he sometimes know the woman when she was not fit to generate, namely when she had offspring in her womb. If, therefore, the first two members are unfitting, the third remains, namely that he would sometimes have known his wife when he would not have generated offspring.

2. Likewise, just as eating is a natural act, so also is intercourse; but man naturally desires to eat not only in the state of fallen nature, but also of instituted nature: therefore by parallel reasoning he naturally desired intercourse. But man in the time of instituted nature ought to satisfy nature's appetite, since nature was ordered and would desire in an ordered way, otherwise he would feel pain: therefore it seems that whether the woman could conceive or not, the man would sometimes know the woman apart from the necessity of generating offspring.

3. Likewise, suppose Adam knew his wife when pregnant; I ask: would he sin, or not? If not: therefore it was not necessary that he generate in every coitus. If so; on the contrary: matrimony then was holier than in the time of fallen nature, and of equal or greater efficacy; but now, on account of the good of matrimony, coitus is excused from fault even when there is no necessity of generating offspring: therefore it seems that much more strongly so then.

4. Likewise, there was no greater disorder in the contact of those members than in moving the hand to the mouth[^5]; but the hand can be moved to the mouth without any sin, even apart from necessity: therefore it seems that Adam could know his wife without sin apart from the necessity of generating offspring.

> **Conclusion.** In the state of innocence both the congruence of order required, and the perfection of virtue sufficed, that from any act by which Adam knew his wife, offspring should be received.

**I respond:** It must be said that the man, in any act by which he knew his wife, would have received offspring from her. — And the reason for this is that the congruence of order required it, and the perfection of virtue sufficed for it. *Ratio 1.* For the congruence of a twofold order required this, namely of the generative power to reason, and of both to their end. For the generative power had an order to reason — an order, I say, of perfect subjection; and therefore it did not go forth into act except according as reason dictated. But right and ordered reason dictates that nothing is to be used except for that for which it exists; and since the generative power was given to man for the multiplication of offspring, therefore right reason would never dictate, nor would the generative power ever go forth into act, except for the generation of offspring; for this is what the *congruence of order*[^6] required. — *Ratio 2.* The perfection of *virtue* also was present, which sufficed for this. For since the generative power in the man was potent and sufficient for generating, and had no impediment, and likewise in the woman according to her place and time; therefore, when the man knew his wife in an ordered way, he would always receive offspring from her on account of the requirement of the twofold order and the sufficiency of the twofold virtue, namely of the one generating and of the one conceiving, as has been said. Hence the arguments showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*
1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that the nutritive would always serve the generative; it must be said that Adam's nature would be so ordered that he would never take of food except so temperately that the superfluity of the third digestion, which is called *semen*[^7], would not be sufficiently gathered together until the due hour of generating arrived. For Adam in the state of innocence would know the *capacity* of his nature, both the sufficiency of nourishment and the time and hour when he ought to generate; and so he would live modestly and soberly, so that he would incline neither to superabundance nor to need.

2. To that which is objected, that he would naturally desire intercourse just as eating; it must be said that it is not similar, because the act of eating is ordered[^8] to the welfare of the individual, in whom continual loss occurs; but the act of generation is ordered to the conservation of the species and the multiplication of the like — which need not occur continually, but at determined times — and therefore the natural appetite for intercourse would not be like that for food, nor so continuous nor so frequent. For if even in chaste men in the time of fallen nature the inclination to intercourse is not as to food, much less was it in Adam. But that the appetite of the generative power is so intensified[^9] — this belongs rather to the corruption of nature than to its primary institution.

3. To that which is objected, that if he knew her pregnant he would not sin; it must be said that a pregnant woman cannot be known without disorder, either real or apparent. And since in the state of innocence he could not fear disorder, because there was no titillation or itching there: therefore, if he had then known, if he knew that he was knowing uselessly, he would have been disordered, and so would have sinned. Nor is what is adduced about matrimony in the state of fallen nature similar, because now it is not only for the *office* of procreating offspring, but also for the *remedy* of avoiding fornication, as will appear better in the fourth book[^10].

4. To that which is objected, that there would be no greater disorder there than in moving the hand to the mouth; it must be said that that *similitude* is taken with respect to this, that both members were subject to reason, and both were free from the itching and ardor of concupiscence. In this, however, there is *dissimilitude*, because it was more necessary to order that act to the due end than any movement whatsoever of the hand or foot, on account of the determination of the use of those members to the procreation of offspring. But the use of the hand or foot is not so determined; and therefore it is not necessary to exercise it with such deliberation.

la: Augustinus, IX. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 7. n. 12: *Quod sanis esse posset officium, sit aegrotis remedium.* Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Augustine, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* IX c. 7 n. 12: "What for the healthy could be an office, for the sick is a remedy." Cf. IV *Sent.* d. 26 a. 1 q. 1.

la: Ut dicit Magister in lit. IV. Sent. d. XXXII. c. 1.

en: As the Master says in his text, IV *Sent.* d. XXXII c. 1.

la: Cfr. Gen. 3, 17. seqq.

en: Cf. Genesis 3:17 ff.

la: Vat. perperam *administrabat.* Dein codd. Y *retentione* pro *tentione*.

en: The Vatican edition wrongly reads *administrabat.* Then codices Y read *retentione* for *tentione*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine obiect. pro *praeter necessitatem prolis* Vat. perperam *propter necessitatem prolis*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the objection, for *praeter necessitatem prolis* the Vatican edition wrongly reads *propter necessitatem prolis*.

la: Vat. et ed. 4 sic: *hoc enim congrue natura hominis exigebat*; plures codd. sic: *hoc enim congrue natura ordinis exigebat*. Nostram lectionem exhibent codd. F W aa cc ee cum edd. 1, 2, 3.

en: The Vatican edition and ed. 4 thus: *for this the nature of man fittingly required*; many codices thus: *for this the nature of order fittingly required*. Our reading is given by codd. F W aa cc ee with edd. 1, 2, 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 479, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 479, note 5.

la: Plures codd. *ordinatur.* Paulo inferius Vat. *quam non* pro *quod non*.

en: Many codices read *ordinatur.* A little below, the Vatican edition reads *quam non* for *quod non*.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *incendatur*.

en: Several codices with ed. 1 read *incendatur* ("be inflamed").

la: Dist. 26. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 31. a. 2. q. 2. — Aliquanto superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *si scivisset* pro *si sciret*.

en: *Sent.* IV d. 26 a. 1 q. 1 and d. 31 a. 2 q. 2. — A little above, the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads *si scivisset* for *si sciret*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** *De hac quaest.*: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3.

**II.** *De sequente (6.) quaest.*: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 1; S. I. q. 99. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** *On this question*: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 89 m. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1, *quaestiuncula* 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4 q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1 a. 3.

**II.** *On the following (6th) question*: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 90 m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1 ad 1; *Summa* I q. 99 a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2 q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi column-band PDF crops of pp.483–484 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p483-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p484-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with raw OCR `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 33969–34093 as alignment baseline. Per Vol II Override step 1, the column-band PDF is authoritative for the cascade-fragmented Respondeo + Solutio.
- **Page-split map (10 apparatus entries, no `[?]` flags):** p.483 L-2 #3 = [^1] (Aug. IX *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 7 n. 12 *officium / remedium* + IV Sent. d.26 a.1 q.1 cross-ref); p.483 R-2 ⁴–⁷ = [^2]–[^5] (Magister lit. IV Sent. d. XXXII c. 1 + Gen 3,17 seqq. + Vat. *administrabat / retentione* variants + lit. Magistri c. 1 + Vat. *propter / praeter necessitatem* variant); p.484 L-2 ¹–² = [^6]–[^7] (Vat. + ed. 4 *natura hominis* vs *natura ordinis* lengthy variant note + Cfr. supra p. 479 n. 5 on *semen* as *superfluitas tertiae digestionis*); p.484 R-2 ³–⁵ = [^8]–[^10] (Plures codd. *ordinatur* + Vat. *quam non* / *quod non* + Nonnulli codd. *incendatur* + Dist. 26 a.1 q.1 / d.31 a.2 q.2 IV *Sent.* cross-refs + Vat. *si scivisset / si sciret* variant).
- **Marginal labels preserved inline (four labels):** *Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.* (against the *Sed contra* block per Quaracchi convention here), *Ratio 1.* / *Ratio 2.* (inside Respondeo), *Solutio oppositorum.*
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION on p.484 R-2 has two parts: **I.** commentator catalog for THIS q5 (Alex. Hal. / B. Albert / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Aegid. R.); **II.** commentator catalog forwarding to q6 (Alex. Hal. / S. Thom. / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Aegid. R. / Durand.). Per Vol II convention (first sibling carries shared scholion), q5 holds both; **d20-a1-q6 will be `has_scholion: false` with sibling-pointer note**.
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 10 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.483–484. OCR cascade-fragmented through Respondeo (*duplicis ordinis* + *generantis et concipientis*) + Solutio ad 1 (*tertiae digestionis* + *hora debita generandi*) + Solutio ad 2 (*conservatio speciei et multiplicatio similis*); column-band PDF read authoritative.
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs:** received NONE from d20-a1-q4 (q4 captured its full p.482 + p.483 L-2 #1–#2 shoulder share; p.483 L-2 #3 native to q5). Forward hand-off to d20-a1-q6: **none** — p.484 SCHOLION II is captured here as the q6 commentator list (per Vol II first-sibling convention); QUAESTIO VI opens on p.485 L-1 at raw 34094 with its own fresh apparatus block starting on p.485 footers.