title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum res sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum res sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae. Et quod ratione essentiae, videtur[^1]:

1. Quia quod inest ratione personae est proprium, quod inest ratione essentiae est commune: si ergo hoc[^2] est commune tribus, patet etc.

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2. Praeterea, res in Deo sunt ratione exemplaritatis[^3]; sed exemplar creaturae in Deo est divina essentia, quia Deus se ipso cognoscit et producit: ergo etc.

3. Item, regula est, quod quidquid de Deo dicitur in relatione ad creaturam, est essentialiter dictum[^4]; sed res esse in Deo est taliter dictum: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Quod ratione personae videtur, quia res sunt in Deo, in quantum possunt ab ipso exire; sed producere, cum sit actus, est ipsius suppositi[^5]: ergo personae.

2. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus *libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^6]: «Verbum dicit operativam potentiam»: si ergo res sunt in Deo ratione potentiae operativae, sunt in eo ratione Verbi: ergo cum Verbum sit persona, sunt in Deo ratione personae.

3. Item, Augustinus *de Civitate Dei* undecimo, capitulo vigesimo quarto[^7] dicit, quod «cum dicitur: *Dixit, ut fiat*, intelligitur Pater: in verbo dicendi Filius, in visione Spiritus sanctus»: ergo cum eius sit producere, in quo sunt, patet ergo, quod sunt ratione personae.

### Conclusio.

> *Res sunt in Deo non ratione essentiae nec ratione personae, sed sunt in Deo ut in causa.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis est considerare essentiam, quae est communis ut communis et absoluta, est considerare proprietates, et est considerare commune ut in relatione ad propria. Primum dicitur in omnimoda absolutione; secundum, scilicet proprietas, dicit relationem ad personam; tertium dicit relationem ad res; et illa appropriata significant Deum ut causam. — Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum res sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae, dicendum, quod proprie loquendo nec sic nec sic, sed sunt in Deo ut in causa, et sic ratione appropriatorum, quae sunt essentialia considerata in personis.

Cum ergo obiicitur, quod[^8] sint in essentia: dicendum, quod illae rationes concludunt, quod sunt in essentia communiter dicta, secundum quod comprehendit appropriata, non secundum quod in omnimoda absolutione consideratur.

Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, non concludit de persona ratione propriorum, sed ratione appropriatorum[^9].

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether things are in God by reason of essence, or of person.*

Secondly it is asked, whether things are in God by reason of essence, or of person. And that [they are] by reason of essence, it appears thus[^1]:

1. Because that which is in [something] by reason of person is proper, [whereas] that which is in [something] by reason of essence is common: if therefore this[^2] is common to the three [persons], it is plain, etc.

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2. Furthermore, things are in God by reason of exemplarity[^3]; but the exemplar of the creature in God is the divine essence, since God knows and produces by his very self: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is a rule that whatever is said of God in relation to a creature is said essentially[^4]; but for things to be in God is so said: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. That [it is] by reason of person it appears, because things are in God insofar as they can come forth from him; but to produce, since it is an act, belongs to the supposit itself[^5]: therefore [by reason] of person.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says in *On Eighty-Three Questions*[^6]: "The Word states an operative power": if therefore things are in God by reason of operative power, they are in him by reason of the Word: therefore, since the Word is a person, they are in God by reason of person.

3. Likewise, Augustine, *On the City of God*, book eleven, chapter twenty-four[^7], says that "when it is said: *He said, that it might be made*, the Father is understood: in the word of saying [is understood] the Son, in the seeing the Holy Spirit": therefore, since to him in whom they are belongs producing, it is plain that they are by reason of person.

### Conclusion.

> *Things are in God not by reason of essence nor by reason of person, but they are in God as in a cause.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in the divine [things] there is to consider the essence, which is common as common and absolute, [and] to consider the properties, and to consider the common as in relation to the proper [things]. The first is said in every-mode absoluteness; the second, namely property, states a relation to person; the third states a relation to things; and those appropriated [terms] signify God as cause. — When therefore it is asked, whether things are in God by reason of essence, or of person, it must be said that, properly speaking, neither so nor so, but they are in God as in a cause, and thus by reason of the appropriated [terms], which are essential [things] considered in the persons.

When therefore it is objected[^8] that they are in the essence: it must be said that those reasons conclude that they are in the essence taken in the common sense, according as it comprehends the appropriated [terms], not according as it is considered in every-mode absoluteness.

What is objected to the contrary does not conclude concerning person by reason of the proper [terms], but by reason of the appropriated [ones][^9].

en: Codices aa bb subjoin *omnino* ("altogether").

en: The words *illud quod est in aliquo* are missing in many manuscripts. A little further down, in place of *potest dici*, codices L V cc [read] *potest esse*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *exemplaritatis*.

la: Vide supra d. 22. dub. 2, ubi inter quinque regulas, ex verbis Augustini derivatas, haec quartum tenet locum. — Mox pro *taliter* cod. T *essentialiter*.

en: See above d. 22, *dub.* 2, where among the five rules derived from the words of Augustine, this one holds the fourth place. — Soon, in place of *taliter*, codex T [reads] *essentialiter*.

la: Iuxta illud axioma: *actiones sunt suppositorum*.

en: According to that axiom: *actions belong to supposits*.

la: Quaest. 63. Integrum textum habes supra d. 27. p. II. q. 2. fundam. 2.

en: Question 63. You have the integral text above, d. 27, p. II, q. 2, *fundam.* 2.

la: Verba Augustini haec sunt: *Pater quippe intelligitur Verbi, qui dixit: Fiat. Quod autem illo dicente factum est, procul dubio per Verbum factum est. In eo vero quod dicitur: Vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate... sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est... Quae bonitas si Spiritus sanctus recte intelligitur, universa nobis Trinitas in suis operibus intimatur*. — In cod. F (et T in margine) textus sic incipit: *Dixit, vidit, fiat; per fiat intelligitur* etc. Mox verbo *producere* codd. P Q V praefigunt *res*. Dein post *quod sunt* cod. O non incongrue addit *in Deo*.

en: The words of Augustine are these: "*For the Father indeed is understood [as the Father] of the Word, who said: Let it be made. But what was made when he so spoke, was without doubt made through the Word. But in this, that it is said: God saw that it is good, it is sufficiently signified that God by no necessity... but by goodness alone made what was made... If this goodness is rightly understood as the Holy Spirit, the whole Trinity is intimated to us in its works.*" — In codex F (and T in the margin) the text begins thus: "*He said, he saw, let it be made; by 'let it be made' is understood* etc." Soon, before the verb *producere*, codices P Q V prefix *res*. Then after *quod sunt*, codex O not incongruously adds *in Deo*.

la: Pro *quod* multi codd. minus recte *utrum*, et in fine responsionis pro *consideratur* perperam *considerantur*.

en: In place of *quod*, many codices less correctly [read] *utrum*, and at the end of the response, in place of *consideratur*, [they] wrongly [read] *considerantur*.

la: In cod. V (W in margine) additur: *Quod dicit, quod producere est actus personae, verum est, secundum quod est proprium, scilicet respectu personae; sed secundum quod est communis, scilicet respectu creaturae, est essentiae, quia idem est essentia et habens essentiam*.

en: In codex V (W in the margin) is added: "*That it says that to produce is an act of the person, is true, according as it is proper, namely with respect to person; but according as it is common, namely with respect to creature, [it is] of the essence, since the essence and the one having the essence are the same*."

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum creaturae sint in Deo ratione triplicis causalitatis, scilicet efficientis, exemplantis, finientis, et cum actiones sint suppositorum (hic arg. 1. ad opposit.), dubium ortum est, utrum res esse in Deo attribuendum sit ipsi ratione essentiae, an personae, an utriusque, id est ratione appropriatorum. Hanc quaestionem, sic positam, non invenimus discussam, nisi a paucis, nempe a Scoto, *Collationes*, col. 31, et II. *Sent.* q. I; B. Albert., hic a. 11, et Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. Tota ratio responsionis fundatur in his duobus principiis, quod res sint in Deo ut causa, et quod appropriata significent Deum ut causam.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since creatures are in God by reason of a threefold causality, namely efficient, exemplar, and final, and since actions belong to supposits (here arg. 1 *ad opp.*), a doubt has arisen whether to be in God is to be attributed to him by reason of essence, or of person, or of both, that is, by reason of the appropriated [terms]. This question, so posed, we do not find discussed, except by a few, namely by Scotus, *Collationes*, col. 31, and II *Sent.* q. I; B. Albert here a. 11, and Ægidius Romanus here 2 *princ.* q. 2. The whole reason of the response is founded on these two principles, that things are in God as in a cause, and that the appropriated [terms] signify God as cause.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum omnia sint in Deo vita
Whether all things are in God as life

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum omnia sint in Deo vita.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem omnia sint in Deo vita, videtur.

1. Ioannis primo[^1]: *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*; sed omnis creatura est facta: ergo omnis creatura est in ipso vita.

2. Item, Augustinus quinto super Genesim ad litteram[^2]: «Omnia dicuntur in ipso fuisse vita, non in sua natura, quia omnia noverat, antequam fierent».

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia divina essentia est vita, ergo quod est divina essentia etiam vita est; sed creatura in Deo est divina essentia, quia quidquid est in Deo est Deus: ergo est vita. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in *Monologio*[^3]: «quod creatura in Deo creatrix essentia est».

4. Item, *intelligere* est una differentia eius quod est *vivere*, cum *vivere* dicatur quadrupliciter secundum Philosophum[^4]: si igitur *intelligere* est *vivere*, ergo omnis ratio intelligendi est ratio vivendi. Sed res sunt in Deo secundum suas rationes intelligendi, ergo sunt in Deo viventes; sed non per participationem: ergo sunt vita simpliciter.

**Contra:**

1. Actuum decimo septimo[^5]: *In ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus*. Ergo si quia vivimus, sumus in Deo vita, ergo et quia movemur, sumus in eo motus; sed hoc non dicitur: ergo nec illud debet dici.

2. Item, si res dicuntur in Deo vita, aut ergo ratione potentiae, aut notitiae, aut voluntatis. Non ratione potentiae, quia res ex hoc, quod potest produci per creationem, antequam producitur, nihil omnino est, quia secundum totum producitur; si nihil est, ergo nec vita. Nec ratione notitiae, quia tunc, cum mala sint a Deo cognita, tunc mala essent in Deo vita; quod absurdum est. Si ratione voluntatis; sed voluntas Dei non est nisi futurorum: ergo sola futura viverent in Deo. Sed alia quam futura sunt in Deo per ideam: ergo non omne quod est in Deo, est in ipso vita.

3. Item, hoc[^6] videtur, quia exemplar aeternum repraesentat res expressissime, secundum quod sunt et ab ipso exeunt: ergo cum quaedam vivant, quaedam non, quaedam repraesentat per modum viventium, quaedam per modum non viventium: ergo quaedam sunt in Deo vita, quaedam non.

4. Ratione huius quaeritur, quare magis dicuntur res esse in Deo vita, quam sapientia, vel essentia, vel intelligentia.

### Conclusio.

> *Omnia quae sunt in Deo tanquam in exemplari, in ipso vita sunt.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod non omnia quae dicuntur esse in Deo, sunt in illo vita, sed ea solum, quae sic sunt in Deo ut disposita fieri[^7]. Et ratio huius est, quoniam *verbum* et *vita* dicunt actum et dispositionem. Et ideo dicit Anselmus[^8], quoniam verbum non est nisi eorum quae sunt, vel futura sunt; et ideo ea solum sunt in Deo vita. Et ideo dicunt, quod ad rationem dicendi vitam concurrit necessario, quod res sint in Deo quantum ad potentiam, notitiam et voluntatem producendi.

— Sed hoc non potest stare secundum Augustinum. Filius enim, ut ipse dicit sexto *de Trinitate*[^9], «est ars plena omnium rationum viventium»; sed constat, quod non impletur nisi rationibus infinitis: ergo infinitae rationes rerum vivunt in Deo, ergo non solum entium vel futurorum, sed etiam omnium possibilium. Et iterum Augustinus libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^10] dicit, quod «ratio est, etiamsi nunquam aliquid per illam fiat»; sed constat, quod ratio in mente artificis vivit, non quia res extra producitur: vivit enim, etiamsi res corrumpatur, et exterius esse omnino nihil facit ad vitam. Et ideo patet, quod non solum praesentia vel futura vivunt in Deo.

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Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod res tripliciter sunt in Deo, videlicet ut in principio producente, et sic sunt in ratione potentiae; ut in exemplari exprimente, et sic sunt in ratione notitiae; et ut in fine conservante, in ratione[^11] voluntatis. Primo modo — quia in principio producente — cum totum ex nihilo producat Deus, nihil omnino sunt, nec vita nec aliquid. Quia vero sunt in Deo tanquam in fine conservante, cum conserventur secundum esse, quod habent, sic sunt quaedam vita, quaedam non. Unde quaedam tantum *sunt*, quaedam *sunt et moventur*, quaedam, ut homines, *et sunt et moventur et vivunt*. Quia vero sunt[^12] ut in exemplari exprimente, sic sunt in ipso vita. Et quia non solum in illo exemplari exprimuntur entia, sed etiam omnia cognoscibilia[^13] Deo, ideo omnia sunt in Deo vita, quae in ipso sunt. Et ideo dicit beatus Ioannes: *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*. Et sic patet, quod esse in Deo attenditur secundum triplex genus causae; et similiter patet, quomodo ratione potentiae et notitiae, et voluntatis; et[^14] solvitur illa quaestio, secundum quod genus causae, vel secundum quam trium conditionum dicuntur res esse in Deo. Patet etiam, quae in Deo dicuntur vita, scilicet omnia quae sunt in ipso tanquam in exemplari.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in Deo *movemur* etc.; intelligendum est quantum ad tertium modum essendi in Deo, scilicet per conservationem. Deus enim conservat in nobis vitam et operationem et essentiam; et quantum ad hoc intelligitur dictum illud verbum.

2. Ad illud quod dicitur: ratione cuius res dicuntur in Deo vita etc.; dicendum, quod ratione potentiae et notitiae simul, quia ista duo concurrunt ad rationem exemplaris; non enim est exemplar Deus nisi eorum quae cognoscit et potest.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod res in illo exemplari repraesentantur ut sunt; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen non oportet, quod ratio repraesentationis sit talis omnino, quale est repraesentatum, sicut supra ostensum est: et ideo sicut corporalium est idea spiritualis, ita non viventium vivens.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare magis dicuntur res esse in Deo vita quam alia[^15]; dicendum, quod quamvis praedictum verbum multas habeat expositiones, quo dicitur: *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*; tamen specialiter circa hoc verbum consideranda est veritas dicti, et ratio dicendi. Veritas dicti, ut dicit Augustinus[^16], est, quod omnes res, factae a Deo vel etiam possibiles fieri, habent rationes in Deo, per quas intelliguntur; quae quidem rationes vivere dicuntur, quia sunt in substantia vivente, secundum quod vivens, et sunt etiam ratio intelligendi, qui est actus vitae: et ideo in artifice creato dicuntur vivere, sed in Deo non tantum dicuntur vivere, sed etiam ipsa vita, quia ipsa ratio cognoscendi in Deo est ipsa intelligentia. — Ratio autem dicendi fuit haec. Cum enim res habeant esse in Deo et etiam in universo et diversimode, quia aliquas proprietates habent secundum existentias in mundo, quae non competunt eis, secundum quod sunt in Deo: ideo non solum dixit: *Quod factum est in ipso erat*, sed *vita*, ut omnes illae conditiones excluderentur. Creaturae enim in mundo habent esse corporale, variabile et corruptibile. Quoniam enim «vita est actus spiritualis et continuus, fluens ab ente quieto et sempiterno[^17]», perfecte dictum est, quod res sunt in Deo vita, ut per spiritualitatem excludatur corporeitas, per quietem variabilitas, per sempiternitatem corruptibilitas.

english:
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### Question I.
#### *Whether all things are in God as life.*

That all things are in God as life appears [thus]:

1. John, chapter one[^1]: *That which was made, in him was life*; but every creature is made: therefore every creature is in him as life.

2. Likewise, Augustine, on Genesis according to the letter, book five[^2]: "All things are said to have been in him as life, not in their own nature, since he knew all things before they came to be."

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], since the divine essence is life, therefore that which is the divine essence is also life; but the creature in God is the divine essence, since whatever is in God is God: therefore it is life. And this is what Anselm says in the *Monologion*[^3]: "that the creature in God is the creating essence."

4. Likewise, *to understand* is one differentia of *to live*, since *to live* is said in four ways according to the Philosopher[^4]: if therefore *to understand* is *to live*, then every ground of understanding is a ground of living. But things are in God according to their grounds of understanding, therefore they are living in God; but not by participation: therefore they are life simply.

**On the contrary:**

1. Acts, chapter seventeen[^5]: *In him we live, and move, and are*. Therefore if [from the fact] that we live, we are in God as life, then also [from the fact] that we move, we are in him as motion; but this is not said: therefore neither ought that to be said.

2. Likewise, if things are said to be in God as life, then it is either by reason of power, or of knowing, or of will. Not by reason of power, since a thing, by the fact that it can be produced through creation, before it is produced is altogether nothing, since it is produced according to the whole; if it is nothing, then neither is it life. Nor by reason of knowing, since then, since evils are known by God, evils would then be in God as life; which is absurd. If by reason of will: but the will of God is only of future things: therefore future things alone would live in God. But things other than future are in God by an idea: therefore not everything that is in God, is in him as life.

3. Likewise, this[^6] appears, since the eternal exemplar represents things most expressly, according as they are and proceed from him: therefore since some things live and some do not, [and] he represents some after the manner of living things, others after the manner of non-living things: therefore some things are in God as life, others not.

4. By reason of this it is asked, why things are said to be in God as life rather than as wisdom, or essence, or intelligence.

### Conclusion.

> *All things which are in God as in an exemplar, in him are life.*

**I respond:** To this some have wished to say that not all things which are said to be in God are in him as life, but only those which are so in God as disposed to come to be[^7]. And the reason of this is that *word* and *life* state act and disposition. And therefore Anselm says[^8] that the word is only of those things which are, or are to be; and therefore those alone are in God as life. And therefore they say that to the account of speaking *life* it necessarily concurs that things be in God as to the power, the knowing, and the will of producing.

— But this cannot stand according to Augustine. For the Son, as he himself says in *On the Trinity*, book six[^9], "is an art full of all the living accounts"; but it is established that it is not filled save with infinite accounts: therefore infinite accounts of things live in God, therefore not only of beings or of future things, but also of all possible things. And again Augustine, in the book *Eighty-three Questions*[^10], says that "an account [*ratio*] is, even if nothing is ever made through it"; but it is established that the account in the mind of the artificer lives, not because the thing is produced outside: for it lives even if the thing is corrupted, and the outward being makes nothing at all to [its] life. And therefore it is clear that not only present or future things live in God.

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And therefore it must be said otherwise, that things are in God in three ways, namely as in a producing principle, and thus they are in the account of power; as in an expressing exemplar, and thus they are in the account of knowing; and as in a conserving end, in the account[^11] of will. In the first mode — namely as in a producing principle — since God produces the whole from nothing, [things] are altogether nothing, neither life nor anything. But because they are in God as in a conserving end, since they are conserved according to the being which they have, in this way some are life, others not. Whence some merely *are*, some *are and are moved*, some, like men, *both are and are moved and live*. But because they are[^12] [in God] as in an expressing exemplar, in this way they are in him as life. And since not only beings are expressed in that exemplar, but also all things knowable[^13] to God, therefore all things which are in him are in God as life. And therefore the blessed John says: *That which was made, in him was life*. And thus it is clear that being-in-God is attended to according to a threefold kind of cause; and likewise it is clear how [it is so] by reason of power and of knowing, and of will; and[^14] that question is solved, according to which kind of cause, or according to which of the three conditions, things are said to be in God. It is also clear which [things] are called *life* in God, namely all those which are in him as in an exemplar.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that in God *we are moved* etc.; it must be understood as to the third mode of being-in-God, namely through conservation. For God conserves in us life and operation and essence; and as to this is that saying [of the Apostle] understood.

2. To that which is said: by reason of what are things called *life* in God etc.; it must be said, by reason of power and of knowing together, since these two concur to the account of an exemplar; for God is exemplar only of those things which he knows and is able [to make].

3. To that which is objected, that things are represented in that exemplar as they are; it must be said that this is true; yet it is not necessary that the account of representation be altogether such as that which is represented, as was shown above: and therefore, just as the idea of corporeal things is spiritual, so [the idea] of non-living things is living.

4. To that which is asked lastly, why things are said to be in God as life rather than as something else[^15]; it must be said that, although the aforesaid word [*Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*] has many expositions, by which it is said: *That which was made, in him was life*; yet specially around this word the truth of what is said and the reason of saying it must be considered. The truth of what is said, as Augustine says[^16], is that all things, made by God or even possible to be made, have grounds [*rationes*] in God, through which they are understood; which grounds indeed are said *to live*, since they are in a living substance, insofar as it is living, and they are also a ground of understanding, which [understanding] is an act of life: and therefore in the created artificer they are said to live, but in God they are said not only to live, but [to be] life itself, since the very ground of knowing in God is the very intelligence. — But the reason for the [manner of] saying was this. For since things have being in God and also in the universe and in different ways, since they have certain properties according to [their] existences in the world which do not belong to them as they are in God: therefore [the Evangelist] did not say only: *That which was made, in him was*, but *life*, that all those conditions might be excluded. For creatures in the world have a being corporeal, variable, and corruptible. For since "life is a spiritual and continuous act, flowing from a being at rest and everlasting[^17]", it has been perfectly said that things are in God as life, so that by *spirituality* corporeality may be excluded, by *rest* variability, by *everlastingness* corruptibility.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Cap. 5. n. 31: «Sic ergo distinguendum est, ut, cum dixerimus: *quod factum est*, deinde inferamus: *in illo vita est*; non in se scilicet, hoc est in sua natura, qua factum est, ut conditio creaturaque sit; sed in illo vita est, quia omnia quae per ipsum facta sunt, noverat, antequam fierent».

en: Chapter 5, n. 31: "Thus therefore the distinction is to be made, that, when we have said: *that which was made*, we may then infer: *in him is life*; not in itself, that is, in its own nature, by which it was made, that it might be a condition and creature; but in him is life, since all things which were made through him, he knew before they came to be."

la: Cap. 34: «Etenim in se ipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata, in ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia et prima existendi veritas». Haec prima essentia ibid. c. 36. seq. vocatur «essentia creatrix».

en: Chapter 34: "For in themselves they are a mutable essence created according to an immutable account, but in him they are the very first essence and first truth of existing." This first essence, ibid. c. 36 ff., is called "creating essence."

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 13. (c. 2.): «Multipliciter autem ipso vivere dicto, et si unum aliquod horum insit solum, vivere ipsum dicimus, ut intellectus, et sensus, et motus et status secundum locum, adhuc autem motus secundum alimentum et augmentum et decrementum».

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 13 (c. 2): "Now since *to live* is said in many ways, even if some one of these alone is present, we call that *to live* itself — as understanding, and sense, and motion and rest according to place, and again motion according to nourishment and increase and decrease."

la: Vers. 28.

en: Verse 28.

la: Codd. V X *hoc ipsum*.

en: Codices V X [read] *hoc ipsum*.

la: Id est, *volita a Deo, ut fiant*.

en: That is, *willed by God, that they should come to be*.

la: *Monolog.* c. 32: «Eius enim quod non fuit nec est nec futurum est, nullum verbum esse potest».

en: *Monologion* c. 32: "For of that which neither was nor is nor will be, there can be no word."

en: Chapter 10, n. 11.

la: Quaest. 63: «Ratio autem, etsi nihil per illam fiat, recte ratio dicitur».

en: Question 63: "But an account [*ratio*], even if nothing is made through it, is rightly called an account."

la: Pro *in ratione* Vat. hic et sic *sunt ibi ratione*, et paulo ante bis *ibi ratione*. Pro *in ratione notitiae* non pauci codd. tantum *ratione notitiae*. Mox post *Primo modo, quia*, Vat. adiungit *sunt in Deo sicut*; deinde post *omnino sunt* Vat. contra cod. T cum pluribus aliis et ed. 1 addit *in Deo*.

en: In place of *in ratione*, the Vatican [edition] [reads] here *et sic sunt ibi ratione*, and a little before, twice, *ibi ratione*. In place of *in ratione notitiae*, not a few codices [read] only *ratione notitiae*. Soon after *Primo modo, quia*, the Vatican [edition] adds *sunt in Deo sicut*; then after *omnino sunt*, the Vatican [edition], against codex T with many others and edition 1, adds *in Deo*.

la: Supple cum Vat. *in Deo*. Aliquanto inferius pro *cognoscibilia* codd. aa bb bene *possibilia*. Nostram lectionem intellige *quae sunt cognoscibilia per propriam ideam*. Mala enim, licet sint Deo cognoscibilia, non habent propriam ideam. Nomine *entium* notantur quae existunt sive actualiter sive in futuro.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *in Deo*. A little below, in place of *cognoscibilia*, codices aa bb [read] well *possibilia*. Understand our reading [as meaning] *those things which are knowable through a proper idea*. For evils, although they are knowable to God, do not have a proper idea. By the name *beings* are noted those things which exist either actually or in the future.

la: Sic cod. T et plures alii codd. nec non ed. 1, Vat. adiungit *sic*.

en: Thus codex T and several other codices, as well as edition 1; the Vatican [edition] adds *sic*.

la: In cod. C hic recte additur *dist. 33. q. 4. (ad 3. et 4.)*.

en: In codex C there is here rightly added *dist. 33, q. 4 (ad 3 and 4)*.

la: Cod. W subiicit *scilicet sapientia, essentia, intelligentia*.

en: Codex W subjoins *namely wisdom, essence, intelligence*.

la: Libr. 83 *Qq.* q. 40, et longius in *Tract. I. in Ioan.* n. 16. seq. Aliquanto inferius pro *qui est actus* cod. Y *quae est actus*.

en: Book of *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 40, and at greater length in *Tractate I on John*, n. 16 ff. A little below, in place of *qui est actus*, codex Y [reads] *quae est actus*.

la: *Libr. de Causis*, prop. 18: «Quia vita est processio procedens ex ente primo quieto sempiterno, et motus similiter primus». Quae propositio recurrit etiam in libro *de Motu cordis* (ab Alfredo Anglico circa a. 1220 scripto et ad Magistrum Alexandrum Neckam directo, quo libro Scholastici saepius utebantur) his verbis (c. 1.): *Prima ergo et aequalis et continua est vita, primus enim formae actus est. Est enim primus motus e quieto sempiterno fluens* (ed. Barach, Innsbruck 1878). — In fine solutionis pro *sempiternitatem* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *simplicitatem*; perperam.

en: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 18: "Since life is a procession proceeding from the first being which is at rest and everlasting, and likewise [it is] the first motion." This proposition recurs also in the book *On the Motion of the Heart* (written by Alfred the Englishman around the year 1220 and addressed to Master Alexander Neckam, a book the Scholastics rather often used), in these words (c. 1): *Therefore the first and equal and continuous [thing] is life, for it is the first act of form. For it is the first motion flowing from the [being] at rest and everlasting* (ed. Barach, Innsbruck 1878). — At the end of the solution, in place of *sempiternitatem* many codices with edition 1 [read] *simplicitatem*; wrongly.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec aliquatenus cohaeret cum verbis S. Ioannis (1, 3. 4.), quae in multis antiquis s. Scripturae exemplaribus et a multis Patribus, praesertim Latinis (ut a Tertulliano, S. Ambrosio, S. Augustino) sic distribuebantur, ut legeretur *quod factum est in ipso vita erat* (vide arg. 1. in fundam.). Vulgata nunc cum S. Irenaeo, S. Hieronymo aliisque Patribus habet: *quod factum est. In ipso vita erat*. — Notanda est differentia (in solut. ad 4. posita) inter *vivere* et *esse vita*. Illud dici potest etiam de rationibus in mente artificis creati; hoc autem non nisi de rationibus in exemplari divino. Consentit S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 4. a. 8. ad 2.

**II.** Primam opinionem in respons. positam cum Seraphico etiam Angelicus aliique doctores plurimi improbant. Communi opinioni conformis est etiam distinctio, quod res «uno modo sint in Deo ut in *principio producente*, ratione potentiae, alio modo sicut in cognoscente sive ut in *exemplari exprimente* (et hoc modo res sunt vita in Deo), tertio modo, ut in *fine conservante*, ratione voluntatis, quia dispositio voluntatis spectat ad causam finalem, ut docetur infra d. 40. dub. 7. — Notabilis est solutio ad 4. Quod rationes rerum in Deo «sunt etiam ratio intelligendi», S. Thom. (*de Verit.* loc. cit. ad 4.) sic explanat: «Similitudines rerum in Verbo, sicut sunt rebus causa existendi, ita sunt rebus causa cognoscendi, in quantum scilicet imprimuntur intellectualibus mentibus, ut sic res cognoscere possint; et ideo, sicut dicuntur vita, prout sunt principia existendi, ita dicuntur *lux*, prout sunt principia cognoscendi». — Definitio vitae hic posita invenitur etiam apud Alex. Hal. *S.* p. II. q. 87. m. 1. a. 1, et a. 2., § 3 (cfr. supra pag. 624, nota 7.).

Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1. § 4, et p. II. q. 3. m. 3. a. 2. q. collat. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica n. 20. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 18. a. 5; *de Verit.* q. 4. a. 8. — B. Albert., I. *Sent.* d. 35. a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is somewhat connected with the words of St. John (1:3-4), which in many ancient exemplars of holy Scripture, and by many Fathers, especially the Latin (as by Tertullian, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine), were so divided that there should be read *quod factum est in ipso vita erat* ("that which was made, in him was life") (see arg. 1 in the foundations). The Vulgate now, with St. Irenaeus, St. Jerome, and the other Fathers, has: *quod factum est. In ipso vita erat* ("that which was made. In him was life"). — The difference (set out in the solution to [argument] 4) between *to live* and *to be life* is to be noted. The former can be said also of the grounds in the mind of a created artificer; but the latter only of the grounds in the divine exemplar. St. Thomas, *de Verit.* q. 4, a. 8, ad 2, agrees.

**II.** The first opinion set forth in the response is rejected, with the Seraphic [Doctor], also by the Angelic [Doctor] and by very many other doctors. To the common opinion the distinction also conforms, that things "are in God in one way as in a *producing principle*, by reason of power; in another way as in [something] knowing or as in an *expressing exemplar* (and in this way things are life in God); in a third way, as in a *conserving end*, by reason of will, since the disposition of will pertains to the final cause, as is taught below at d. 40, dub. 7." — Notable is the solution to [argument] 4. That the grounds of things in God "are also a ground of understanding," St. Thomas (*de Verit.* loc. cit. ad 4) explains thus: "The likenesses of things in the Word, just as they are to things a cause of existing, so they are to things a cause of being known, insofar namely as they are impressed upon intellectual minds, that thus they may be able to know things; and therefore, just as they are called *life* inasmuch as they are principles of existing, so they are called *light* inasmuch as they are principles of knowing." — The definition of life here laid down is found also in Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II, q. 87, m. 1, a. 1, and a. 2, § 3 (cf. above p. 624, note 7).

Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, § 4, and p. II, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, q. collat. — Scot., on this and the following question here, q. unica, n. 20. — S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 3; *S.* I, q. 18, a. 5; *de Verit.* q. 4, a. 8. — B. Albert., I *Sent.* d. 35, a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 3. — Ægid. R., here 2. *princ.* q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum res verius esse habeant in Deo quam in proprio genere.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum res sint in Deo verius quam in universo sive in proprio genere. Et quod verius sint in Deo, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum quinto *super Genesim ad litteram*[^1]: «Omnia, priusquam fierent, erant in notitia facientis et utique ibi meliora, ubi aeterna, ubi veriora et incommutabilia».

2. Item, «unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad cognitionem»[^2]; sed creaturae verius cognoscuntur in Deo quam in proprio genere: ergo et verius sunt in Deo.

3. Item, «omne quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum eius in quo est»[^3]; sed Deus est in infinitum nobilior mundo: ergo in infinitum nobiliori et veriori modo sunt res in Deo quam in universo.

4. Item, nobilius et verius est esse vitae quam non viventis; sed omnia vivunt in Deo, ut supra monstratum est[^4], non autem in genere proprio: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Verius est res, ubi est simpliciter, quam ubi est solum secundum quid; sed in Deo solum dicitur esse secundum quid — quia non sequitur: *asinus est in Deo, ergo asinus est* — sed in proprio genere simpliciter: ergo ibi verius.

2. Item, verius est res, ubi est secundum principia intrinseca et proxima, quam ubi est[^5] in principio extrinseco et remoto; sed res in mundo sunt secundum principia intrinseca, in Deo autem ut in principio extrinseco: ergo etc.

3. Item, verius est res, ubi est secundum propriam entitatem, quam ubi solum secundum similitudinem; sed in Deo est homo et lapis et alia secundum similitudinem: ergo[^6] etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Res, si comparantur ad se ipsas secundum diversum modum existendi, habent verius esse in proprio genere quam in cognoscente; si vero comparantur cum sua similitudine, quae in Deo est, tunc similitudo verius habet esse quam ipsa res in mundo.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum quod triplex est existentia rerum, scilicet in exemplari aeterno, et in intellectu creato, et in ipso mundo[^7]. In exemplari aeterno et in intellectu creato sunt res secundum similitudinem; in ipso mundo secundum entitatem propriam. — Quando ergo quaeritur, in quo sint verius, hoc dupliciter potest quaeri: aut ita quod fiat comparatio eiusdem rei ad se secundum diversum modum existendi, ut sit sensus: ubi lapis verius habet esse, vel cum est in cognoscente vel[^8] producente, vel cum est in se; et hoc modo concedendum est, quod verius est unaquaeque res in proprio genere quam in Deo, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae. Alio modo potest fieri comparatio rei ad suam similitudinem, ut sit sensus quaestionis: quid habet esse verius et nobilius, utrum ipsa res, vel eius similitudo? Et hoc modo simpli-

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citer concedendum, quod similitudo rei verius et nobilius esse habet in Deo, quam ipsa res in mundo ratione eius quod est; quia est ipse Deus. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Adhuc similitudines rerum in intellectu creato verius et nobilius habent esse quam res in universo, ut dicit Augustinus *de Trinitate*[^9], non ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius in quo, quia sunt nobiliori et spirituali modo similitudines in intellectu cognoscente, quam sint ipsae res in mundo contentae. Et sic patent rationes ad utramque partem.

2. Tamen ad illud argumentum, quod fit de comparatione esse ad cognoscere; dicendum, quod illud generaliter intellectum, quod res ibi est verius, ubi verius cognoscitur, non habet veritatem. Contingit enim cognoscere quod non est: et ideo sicut ad cognosci non sequitur esse, ita nec ad vere cognosci vere esse, nec ad verius cognosci verius esse. Quando ergo dicitur, quod *unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad cognitionem*, hoc intelligitur, quia eadem principia, quae sunt principia essendi, sunt principia cognoscendi; sed tamen principia essendi conferunt esse per se ipsa, sed cognitionem non conferunt per se, sed per suas similitudines.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod res in illo exemplari repraesentantur ut sunt; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen non oportet, quod ratio repraesentationis sit talis omnino, quale est repraesentatum, sicut supra ostensum est: et ideo sicut corporalium est idea spiritualis, ita non viventium vivens.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare magis dicuntur res esse in Deo vita quam alia; dicendum, quod quamvis praedictum verbum multas habeat expositiones, quo dicitur: *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*; tamen specialiter circa hoc verbum consideranda est veritas dicti, et ratio dicendi. Veritas dicti, ut dicit Augustinus, est, quod omnes res, factae a Deo vel etiam possibiles fieri, habent rationes in Deo, per quas intelliguntur; quae quidem rationes vivere dicuntur, quia sunt in substantia vivente, secundum quod vivens, et sunt etiam ratio intelligendi, qui est actus vitae.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether things have truer being in God than in their proper genus.*

Secondly it is asked, whether things are in God more truly than in the universe, that is, in their proper genus. And that they are more truly in God, appears thus:

1. Through Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book five[^1]: "All things, before they came to be, were in the knowledge of the Maker, and surely there better, where eternal, where truer and unchangeable."

2. Likewise, "each thing as it stands toward being, so [it stands] toward knowing"[^2]; but creatures are known more truly in God than in their proper genus: therefore they also are more truly in God.

3. Likewise, "everything which is in something is in it after the manner of that in which it is"[^3]; but God is infinitely nobler than the world: therefore in an infinitely nobler and truer manner are things in God than in the universe.

4. Likewise, the being of a living thing is nobler and truer than [that] of a non-living thing; but all things live in God, as has been shown above[^4], yet not in their proper genus: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. A thing is more truly where it is simply, than where it is only in a certain respect; but in God it is said to be only in a certain respect — for it does not follow: *the ass is in God, therefore the ass is* — but in its proper genus simply: therefore there [it is] more truly.

2. Likewise, a thing is more truly where it is according to its intrinsic and proximate principles, than where it is[^5] in an extrinsic and remote principle; but things in the world are according to intrinsic principles, in God however as in an extrinsic principle: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a thing is more truly where it is according to its proper entity, than where [it is] only according to a likeness; but in God a man and a stone and other things are according to a likeness: therefore[^6] etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Things, if they are compared to themselves according to a diverse mode of existing, have truer being in their proper genus than in the knower; but if they are compared with their likeness, which is in God, then the likeness has truer being than the thing itself in the world.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a threefold existence of things, namely in the eternal exemplar, and in the created intellect, and in the world itself[^7]. In the eternal exemplar and in the created intellect things are according to a likeness; in the world itself, according to their proper entity. — When therefore it is asked in which they are more truly, this can be asked in two ways: either in such a way that a comparison is made of the same thing to itself according to a diverse mode of existing, that the sense be: where does a stone have truer being, whether when it is in the knower or[^8] producer, or when it is in itself; and in this mode it must be conceded that any thing is more truly in its proper genus than in God, as the reasons brought forward for this prove. In another mode the comparison can be made of a thing to its likeness, that the sense of the question be: which has truer and nobler being, whether the thing itself, or its likeness? And in this mode simply

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it must be conceded that the likeness of a thing has truer and nobler being in God than the thing itself in the world, by reason of that which it is; since it is God himself. And the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded.

Furthermore the likenesses of things in the created intellect have truer and nobler being than things in the universe, as Augustine says *On the Trinity*[^9], not by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that in which [they are], since the likenesses are in a nobler and spiritual manner in the knowing intellect, than are the things themselves contained in the world. And thus the reasons on each side stand.

2. Yet to that argument which is made about the comparison of being to knowing; it must be said that what is generally understood [in the dictum], that a thing is more truly there where it is more truly known, does not have [the] truth. For it happens that one knows what is not: and therefore just as upon being-known being does not follow, so neither upon being-known-truly being-truly, nor upon being-known-more-truly being-more-truly. When therefore it is said that *each thing as it stands toward being, so [it stands] toward knowing*, this is understood [thus], because the same principles which are principles of being are principles of knowing; yet however the principles of being confer being through themselves, but they do not confer knowing through themselves, but through their likenesses.

3. To that which is objected, that things are represented in that exemplar as they are; it must be said that this is true; yet it is not necessary that the account of representation be wholly such as that which is represented is, as has been shown above: and therefore just as the idea of bodily things is spiritual, so [the idea] of non-living things [is] living.

4. To that which is asked lastly, why things are said to be in God *life* more than [under] other [titles]; it must be said that, although the foresaid word — by which it is said: *That which was made, in him was life* — has many expositions, nevertheless specially concerning this word the truth of the saying and the ground of the saying must be considered. The truth of the saying, as Augustine says, is that all things made by God or even possible to be made have grounds in God through which they are understood; which grounds indeed are said to live, since they are in a living substance, according to that it is living, and they are also a ground of understanding, which is an act of life.

en: Chapter 15, n. 33.

la: Aristot., II. *Metaph.* text. 4. (I. *brevior* c. I.). In textu originali pro *cognitionem* exstat *veritatem*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, text 4 (I, *shorter* c. I). In the original text, in place of *cognitionem*, *veritatem* stands.

la: Pro quo communiter dicitur cum auctore libri *de Causis*, prop. 10. 12. 20. 24: *Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis, et non recepti.* Cfr. et Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 4. Mutatio verborum huius axiomatis facta esse videtur, quia in Deum nihil potest recipi. — Mox pro *mundo* codd. V W *creatura*.

en: For which it is commonly said with the author of the book *On Causes*, prop. 10, 12, 20, 24: "Everything which is received in something is in it after the manner of the receiver, and not of the received." Cf. also Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* V, prose 4. The change of the words of this axiom seems to have been made because nothing can be received into God. — Soon, in place of *mundo*, codices V W [read] *creatura*.

la: *Quaest. praeced.* — Paulo superius pro *vitae* cod. *viventis*.

en: The preceding question. — A little earlier, in place of *vitae*, [a] codex [reads] *viventis*.

la: Codd. aa bb post *est* interiiciunt *ut*.

en: Codices aa bb after *est* interject *ut*.

la: Hoc argumentum insinuatur ab Anselmo, *Monolog.* c. 36.

en: This argument is intimated by Anselm, *Monologion* c. 36.

la: Secundum August., II. *Genes. ad lit.* c. 8. n. 16.

en: According to Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* II, c. 8, n. 16.

la: Codd. PQZ cum ed. I melius *et*.

en: Codices PQZ with edition I [read] better *et*.

la: Libr. IX. c. 4. n. 4: «Maior est notitia corporis quam ipsum corpus, quod ea notitia notum est. Illa enim vita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis, corpus autem non est vita. Et vita quaelibet quolibet corpore maior est, non mole, sed vi». Et ibid. c. 11. n. 16: «Melior est tamen imaginatio corporis in animo quam illa species corporis, in quantum haec in meliore natura est, id est in substantia vitali, sicuti animus est». Cfr. etiam Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 36. — Aliquanto inferius pro *quam* sint codd. IX *quam sunt*, et dein pro *contentae* cod. O *continente*.

en: Book IX, c. 4, n. 4: "The knowledge of a body is greater than the body itself, which is known by that knowledge. For that is a kind of life in the reason of the knower; the body, however, is not life. And any life whatsoever is greater than any body whatsoever, not in mass, but in power." And likewise c. 11, n. 16: "Yet the imagination of a body in the mind is better than that species of the body, insofar as this is in a better nature, that is, in a living substance, as the soul is." Cf. also Anselm, *Monologion* c. 36. — A little further below, in place of *quam*, [some] codices [read] *sint*; IX [reads] *quam sunt*; and thereafter in place of *contentae*, codex O [reads] *continente*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione solvenda antiqui Scholastici non iisdem distinctionibus et loquendi modis utuntur; tamen in ipsa doctrina vix differunt, quidquid nonnulli dicunt. S. Bonav., supposita communi doctrina, quae triplicem esse rerum existentium affirmat, distinguit duplicem comparationem. In prima comparatur diversis modis essendi eiusdem rei, ita ut *to verius* referatur ad gradum essendi idealiter, vel realiter; et tunc res realiter existens «verius habet esse». In secunda comparatur veritas et nobilitas essendi rei realiter et similitudinis idealiter existentis, et tunc *to verius* refertur ad gradum perfectionis in essendo, et res idealiter existens «habet esse verius et nobilius». Hic modus dicendi facile concordat cum distinctione, quam S. Thom. *de Veritate*, q. 4, a. 6, adhibet dicens: «*ly* verius potest designare vel veritatem rei, vel veritatem praedicationis. Si designet veritatem rei, sic procul dubio maior est veritas rerum in Verbo, quam in se ipsis. Si autem designetur veritas praedicationis, sic est e converso». Paulo aliter, sed in eodem sensu, S. Thom. in *Sum.* I, q. 18, a. 4, *ad* 3, et hic q. 1, a. 3, *ad* 2, docet, quod res «verius esse habent simpliciter in mente divina»; sed esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura quam in mente divina». — In *solut. ad* 2 egregie explicatur dictum Aristotelis, a non paucis male applicatum, scil. quod unumquodque, sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad cognitionem.

**II.** S. Thom., locis citt. — B. Albert., I *Sent.* d. 35, a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1, a. 3, *ad* 4. — Durand., hic q. 2, n. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In solving this question the older Scholastics do not use the same distinctions and modes of speaking; nevertheless in the doctrine itself they scarcely differ, whatever some say. St. Bonaventure, supposing the common doctrine which affirms a threefold being of existing things, distinguishes a twofold comparison. In the first there is compared diverse modes of being of the same thing, so that *the* "more truly" is referred to the grade of being ideally or really; and then a really existing thing "has being more truly". In the second there is compared the truth and nobility of being of a thing existing really and of a likeness existing ideally, and then *the* "more truly" is referred to the grade of perfection in being, and the ideally existing thing "has being more truly and more nobly". This mode of speaking easily agrees with the distinction which St. Thomas, *On Truth*, q. 4, a. 6, employs, saying: "*the* 'more truly' can designate either the truth of the thing or the truth of predication. If it designates the truth of the thing, thus without doubt the truth of things is greater in the Word than in themselves. If however the truth of predication is designated, thus it is the converse." A little otherwise, but in the same sense, St. Thomas in the *Summa* I, q. 18, a. 4, *ad* 3, and here q. 1, a. 3, *ad* 2, teaches that things "have being more truly simply in the divine mind"; but this being, namely [as] man or horse, they have more truly in their proper nature than in the divine mind. — In the *solution to* [argument] 2 the saying of Aristotle is excellently explained, ill applied by not a few, namely that each thing, as it stands toward being, so [it stands] toward knowing.

**II.** St. Thomas, at the places cited. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 35, a. 12. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 3, *ad* 4. — Durandus, here q. 2, n. 7. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 — J4 Class D/E apparatus repair (real defect, not the §2 false positive).** Health-scan
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lemmas" case and NOT the backtick-blockquote false positive. It was a genuine missing-apparatus-
entry defect compounded by a frontmatter page-number error:

1. **Frontmatter `printed_pages`/`pdf_pages` were wrong.** The chunk was labeled pp. 623–624
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2. **The duplicate `[^1]`** was two different footnotes sharing one label because Quaracchi
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5. Post-fix corpus health check: this file now reports `defs=9 la=9 en=9`, label sets identical,
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   questions / 4 books.


title: Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum mala sint in Deo
Whether evils are in God

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De numero sive generalitate existentiae, quam res habent in Deo.*

Tertio loco est quaestio de tertio articulo, scilicet de generalitate existentiae rerum in Deo, et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum mala sint in Deo. Secundo, utrum in Deo sint imperfecta, secundum quod huiusmodi.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum mala sint [in Deo].*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem mala non sint in Deo, videtur.

1. Augustinus *de Libero Arbitrio*: «In tantum res recte vituperantur, in quantum earum vituperator artem, in qua factae sunt, videt, ut hoc in eis vituperet, quod in arte non videt». Si ergo vituperantur quantum ad malitiam sive in quantum mala; et hoc modo non videntur in Deo: ergo hoc modo non sunt in Deo.

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2. Item, «omne quod est in Deo, est ex ipso et per ipsum», ut dicit Augustinus, et Magister in littera[^1]; sed mala numquam sunt ex Deo nec per Deum: ergo nec in Deo.

3. Item, omne quod est in Deo, aut est sicut in principio producente, aut sicut in exemplari exprimente, aut sicut in fine[^2] conservante; sed constans est, quod Deus non est principium producens mala, nec etiam conservans. Item, non est exemplar exprimens, quia ratio exemplaris attenditur secundum assimilationem; sed Dei ad malum nulla est assimilatio: ergo mala nullo modo sunt in Deo.

4. Item, quanto aliquid melius est, tanto magis distat a malo; sed Deus est optimus, quo nihil melius potest cogitari: ergo tanta distantia differt[^3], quanta nulla maior potest cogitari. Sed magis distat a malo quod nec habet veritatem malitiae nec similitudinem, quam quod habet saltem similitudinem, et in quo nullo modo est malum, quam in quo aliquo modo est: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Omne quod cognoscitur ab aliquo, qui est sua cognitio, est in illo tanquam in cognoscente; sed Deus cognoscit mala, quia ea punit et reprobat, et Deus est sua cognitio: ergo mala sunt in Deo. Minor patet, maior similiter, quia omne cognitum est in cognitione[^4]: si ergo idem est cognitio et cognoscens, ergo si est in cognitione, et in cognoscente.

2. Item, omne quod cognoscitur in aliquo, est in illo in quo cognoscitur; sed mala cognoscuntur in Deo: ergo sunt in Deo. Probatio minoris: mala cognoscuntur a Deo — constat — aut intra se, aut extra: non extra, hoc constat, quia divinus aspectus non exit extra, tunc enim indigeret alio ad cognoscendum[^5]. Et iterum, Angeli cognoscunt mala in Deo. Unde Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^6]: Angeli vident in illo bona nostra, quae eis placent, et mala nostra, quae eis displicent.

3. Item, omne quod cognoscitur in aliquo, et non per accidens, est aliquo modo in illo sicut in exemplari; sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo, sed non per accidens, quia nihil per accidens cognoscit, sed omnia per se: ergo mala sunt in Deo.

4. Item, omne quod cognoscitur ab aliquo non per privationem, cognoscitur per similitudinem et ideam; sed in Deo non cadit cognitio per privationem, quia nulla potest in illo exemplari esse privatio, cum sit purus actus[^7]: ergo si cognoscit mala non cognoscit per privationem, sed per similitudinem. Sed similitudo est idea in Deo: ergo mala habent ideam in Deo.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus mala cognoscit, ipsa tamen non sunt in Deo nec habent ideam in eo, sed cognoscuntur per ideam bonorum, quorum sunt privationes.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mala a Deo cognoscuntur, non tamen in Deo existunt secundum quod mala, quia sic loquimur in proposito. — Ideo, inquam, cognoscuntur, quia sicut «rectum est iudex sui et obliqui[^8]», sic summa veritas et lux et actus est ratio cognoscendi non tantum veritatem et lucem et actum, sed etiam obliquitatem, tenebram, et privationem. Unde lux se ipsa tenebram cognoscit[^9].

Non sunt autem mala in Deo, quoniam illa dicuntur esse in Deo, ad quae cooperatur Deus secundum aliquod genus causae, et maxime secundum genus causae formalis et exemplaris; malum autem non habet Deum pro causa[^10], nec pro

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exemplari, quia malum ratione malitiae dicit solum *privationem*, exemplar autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, dicit *assimilationem*. Quoniam igitur privatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, nulli est assimilabilis, hinc est, quod nec malum nec falsitas habet ideam in Deo; suum autem oppositum est assimilabile. Unde cum uno et eodem cognoscat Deus bonum et malum sibi oppositum, bonum cognoscit secundum rationem assimilationis; et ideo bonum est in Deo ut in exemplari et ut cognitum per se et per modum positionis. Malum autem cum cognoscatur a Deo, non habet in ipso ideam, ideo non est in Deo, quamvis sit in Dei cognitione: quia, quamvis cognoscatur a Deo, non cognoscitur per ideam sui, sed boni, cuius est privatio. Et ideo dicitur cognosci per accidens et per privationem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malum est in Dei cognitione, et cognitio est Deus: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod hic est fallacia secundum accidens[^11]. Quamvis enim idem sit cognitio Dei quod Deus, tamen aliud connotat, sicut potentia et sapientia. Unde sicut non sequitur: *est in Dei notitia, ergo et in potentia*, immo est ibi accidens et consequens; sic et in proposito.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum cognoscitur in Deo, ergo est in Deo; dicendum, quod nec illud sequitur: plus enim dicit *esse in Deo* quam *cognosci a Deo* vel *in Deo*. Cum enim dicitur aliquid cognosci a Deo, per hoc intelligitur, quod Deus sit ratio cognoscendi illud; sed cum additur, quod hoc sit *in Deo*, significatur, quod Deus sit ratio cognoscendi ut exemplar et per assimilationem; et ideo est ibi consequens.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognoscit non per accidens mala etc.; dicendum, quod cognosci per accidens hoc est dupliciter[^12]: aut a parte cognoscentis, aut cogniti. In Deo nulla cadit cognitio per accidens a parte cognoscentis, quia omnia cognoscit se ipso; tamen cadit a parte cogniti, quoniam aliquid cognoscit per similitudinem suam, ut bonum, aliquid per similitudinem sui oppositi; et ita est ibi per accidens, non in decurrendo, sed in assimilando. Cum enim Deus cognoscit malum, non intelligitur assimilari ei, sed suo opposito.

4. Similiter solvendum est de privatione: quia cognoscere per privationem est dupliciter: aut ita, quod sit privatio in virtute cognoscente, sicut cognoscit aliquis silentium et tenebram per aurem et oculum[^13], et sic ponit imperfectionem; aut ita, quod sit privatio in cognito, non in cognoscente, sicut lux cognosceret tenebram, si haberet vim cognitivam, et sonus silentium: et sic cognoscit Deus, quoniam est actus purus et lux et veritas.

english:
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### Article III. *On the number, that is, the generality, of the existence which things have in God.*

In the third place there is the question concerning the third article, namely concerning the generality of the existence of things in God; and concerning this two [questions] are asked. First it is asked, whether evils are in God. Secondly, whether imperfect [things] are in God, insofar as they are such.

### Question I.
#### *Whether evils are [in God].*

That, however, evils are not in God, appears [thus].

1. Augustine, *On Free Choice [of the Will]*: "To the extent that things are rightly censured, the censurer of them sees the art in which they are made, so as to censure in them that which he does not see in the art." If therefore they are censured as to malice, that is, insofar as they are evil; and in this mode they are not seen in God: therefore in this mode they are not in God.

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2. Likewise, "everything which is in God is from him and through him," as Augustine and the Master in the *Lombard text* say[^1]; but evils never are from God, nor through God: therefore neither in God.

3. Likewise, everything which is in God is either as in a producing principle, or as in an expressing exemplar, or as in a conserving end[^2]; but it is settled that God is not a principle producing evils, nor even conserving [them]. Likewise, [he] is not an exemplar expressing [them], since the account of an exemplar is taken according to assimilation; but of God to evil there is no assimilation: therefore evils are in no way in God.

4. Likewise, by however much something is better, by so much the more does it stand at a distance from evil; but God is the best, than whom nothing better can be thought: therefore [God] differs by so great a distance[^3] as none greater can be thought. But that which has neither the truth of malice nor a likeness of it stands more distant from evil than that which has at least a likeness; and that in which evil is in no way [stands more distant] than that in which it is in some way: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Everything which is known by someone who is his own knowing is in him as in a knower; but God knows evils, since he punishes them and reprobates [them], and God is his own knowing: therefore evils are in God. The minor is clear; the major likewise, since everything known is in the knowing[^4]: if therefore the knowing and the knower are the same, therefore if [something] is in the knowing, [it is] also in the knower.

2. Likewise, everything which is known in something is in that in which it is known; but evils are known in God: therefore they are in God. Proof of the minor: evils are known by God — this is settled — either inside himself or outside: not outside, this is settled, since the divine glance does not go outside, for then he would need another for knowing[^5]. And again, the angels know evils in God. Hence Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^6]: The angels see in him our goods, which please them, and our evils, which displease them.

3. Likewise, everything which is known in something, and not by accident, is in some way in it as in an exemplar; but evils are known by God, and not by accident, since [God] knows nothing by accident, but all things by themselves: therefore evils are in God.

4. Likewise, everything which is known by someone not by privation is known by likeness and idea; but in God knowing through privation does not fall, since no privation can be in that exemplar, since it is pure act[^7]: therefore if he knows evils, he does not know [them] by privation, but by likeness. But likeness is the idea in God: therefore evils have an idea in God.

### Conclusion.

> *God knows evils; nevertheless they are not in God, nor have they an idea in him, but are known through the idea of the goods of which they are privations.*

**I respond:** It must be said that evils are known by God, yet they do not exist in God insofar as they are evils, since thus we are speaking in the proposition. — They are known, I say, because just as "a straight thing is the judge of itself and of what is oblique[^8]," so the supreme truth and light and act is the ground of knowing not only truth and light and act, but also obliquity, darkness, and privation. Hence light by itself knows darkness[^9].

Evils, however, are not in God, since those things are said to be in God toward which God cooperates according to some kind of cause, and most of all according to the kind of formal and exemplar cause; but evil does not have God as a cause[^10], nor as

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an exemplar, since evil by reason of malice states only *privation*, but an exemplar, insofar as such, states *assimilation*. Therefore since privation, insofar as such, is assimilable to nothing, hence it is that neither evil nor falsity has an idea in God; but its opposite is assimilable. Hence, since by one and the same [thing] God knows the good and the evil opposed to it, he knows the good according to the account of assimilation; and therefore the good is in God as in an exemplar and as known by itself and after the manner of position. But evil, since it is known by God, does not have in him an idea, and therefore is not in God, although it is in God's knowing: since, although it is known by God, it is not known through an idea of itself, but of the good of which it is the privation. And therefore it is said to be known *by accident* and *by privation*.

1. Therefore to that which is objected, that evil is in God's knowing, and the knowing is God: therefore etc.; it must be said that here there is a fallacy according to accident[^11]. For although the knowing of God is the same thing as God, yet it connotes something else, like power and wisdom. Hence just as it does not follow: *it is in God's notice, therefore also in [his] power*, but rather it is there as accidental and consequent; so also in the proposition.

2. To that which is objected, that evil is known in God, therefore it is in God; it must be said that this also does not follow: for *to be in God* states more than *to be known by God* or *in God*. For when something is said to be known by God, by this is understood that God is the ground of knowing it; but when it is added that this is *in God*, it is signified that God is the ground of knowing as exemplar and through assimilation; and therefore it is there as consequent.

3. To that which is objected, that he knows evils not by accident etc.; it must be said that to be known by accident is twofold[^12]: either on the part of the knower, or of the known. In God no knowing by accident falls on the part of the knower, since he knows all things by himself; nevertheless it does fall on the part of the known, since [he] knows something by its likeness, as the good, [and] something by the likeness of its opposite; and thus it is there by accident, not in running through, but in assimilating. For when God knows evil, he is not understood to be assimilated to it, but to its opposite.

4. Similarly the [reply] concerning privation must be solved: since to know by privation is twofold: either thus, that there be privation in the knowing power, as someone knows silence and darkness through the ear and the eye[^13], and thus it posits imperfection; or thus, that there be privation in the known, not in the knower, as light would know darkness, if it had a cognitive power, and sound silence: and thus God knows, since he is pure act and light and truth.

la: Cap. 2, ubi et verba Augustini habentur.

en: Chapter 2, where the words of Augustine are also found.

la: In Vat. deest *fine*, quam vocem restituimus auctoritate codd. K V W X aa bb nec non auctoritate textus supra habiti a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *fine* is missing, which word we have restored on the authority of codices K V W X aa bb, and also on the authority of the text given above at a. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Codd. P Q *distat*.

en: Codices P Q [read] *distat*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 68, nota 2, et Aristot., XII. *Metaph.* text. 31. (XI. c. 9.), ubi specialiter agitur de intellectione Dei.

en: Cf. above p. 68, note 2, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, text 31 (XI, c. 9), where the intellection of God is treated specially.

la: Cfr. August., V. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 13. n. 29: *Porro si noverat (omnia), ubi nisi apud ipsum, apud quem Verbum erat, per quod facta sunt omnia? Nam si extra se ipsum ea noverat, quis eum docuerat? Quis enim cognovit sensum Domini, aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?* (Rom. 11, 34.). Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, C hic addit: *Restat ergo, quod intra se*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* V, c. 13, n. 29: "Moreover, if he knew (all things), where except with himself, with whom was the Word through which all things were made? For if he knew them outside himself, who had taught him? 'For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?'" (Rom. 11:34). The Vatican [edition], with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, C, here adds: "*It remains, therefore, that [he knew them] within himself*."

la: Libr. II. c. 8. n. 17: *Neque enim sicut nos, ad percipiendam sapientiam proficiebant Angeli, ut invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicerent, qui, ex quo creati sunt, ipsa Verbi aeternitate sancta et pia contemplatione perfruuntur, atque inde ista despicientes, secundum id quod intus vident, vel recte facta approbant, vel peccata improbant.*

en: Book II, c. 8, n. 17: "For the angels did not, like us, advance to the perception of wisdom, so as to behold the invisible things of God through those that are made, having been understood; rather, from the time they were created they enjoy by holy and pious contemplation the very eternity of the Word, and from there, looking down on these things, according to what they see within, they either approve right deeds or disapprove sins."

la: Pro ratione, quae hic adducitur, Scholastici allegare solent quod Averroes dicit in illum textum Aristot. (III. *de Anima*, text. 23.): *Si vero alicui non inest contrarium, ipsum se ipsum cognoscit*. «*Dicit enim: id est, si fuerit aliquis intellectus, qui non invenitur quandoque intelligens in potentia et quandoque intelligens in actu, tunc ille intellectus non intelligeret privationem omnino, immo nihil intelligeret extra se*».

en: For the reason here adduced, the Scholastics are wont to allege what Averroes says on that text of Aristotle (*On the Soul* III, text 23): "*But if there is no contrary in something, it knows its own self*." "He says, that is: if there should be any intellect which is not found sometimes understanding in potency and sometimes understanding in act, then that intellect would not understand privation at all; rather, it would understand nothing outside itself."

la: Aristot., I. *de Anima*, text. 83. (c. 5.): *Sufficiens enim est altera pars contrarietatis se ipsam diiudicare et oppositam; recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus; iudex enim utrorumque regula; obliquum autem neque sui ipsius neque recti.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 83 (c. 5): "For one part of a contrariety suffices to discern itself and its opposite; for by the straight we know both itself and the oblique; for it is the judge [and] rule of both; but the oblique [is judge] neither of itself nor of the straight."

la: Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 7. § 2: *Non enim ex existentibus existentia discens novit divinus animus, sed ex se et in se... non secundum speciem singula contemplans, sed secundum unam causae circumstantiam omnia sciens et continens, sicut et lux secundum causam in se ipsa cognitionem tenebrarum praeambivit, non aliunde videns tenebras quam a lumine.*

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 7, § 2: "For not by learning existing things from existents does the divine mind know, but from itself and in itself... not contemplating singulars according to species, but knowing and containing all things according to the one circumstance of the cause; just as light too, according to the cause, in its very self pre-embraced the knowing of darkness, not seeing darkness from any other source than from light."

la: Nam cum Augustino, XII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 7, dici solet: «*Malum non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, qualis non est Deus*». — Minus sincera et reprobata a codicibus et ed. 1 est Vat. lectio: *pro causa formali et pro exemplari*. Paulo inferius eadem Vat. cum cod. cc temere suppressit verba: *Quoniam igitur privatio secundum quod huiusmodi nulli est assimilabilis*.

en: For with Augustine, *City of God* XII, c. 7, it is wont to be said: "*Evil does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, such as God is not*." — Less sincere and reproved by the codices and edition 1 is the Vatican reading: *pro causa formali et pro exemplari*. A little below, the same Vatican [edition], with codex *cc*, rashly suppressed the words: "*Quoniam igitur privatio secundum quod huiusmodi nulli est assimilabilis*."

la: De qua vide supra pag. 58, nota 5. — Verbo *consequens* in fine huius et sequentis solutionis significatur fallacia consequentis, quae secundum Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4. (c. 5.) «*ideo est, quod putent converti consequentiam*».

en: Concerning which see above p. 58, n. 5. — By the word *consequens* at the end of this and of the following solution is signified the fallacy of the consequent, which according to Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5), "*comes about because they think the consequence is convertible*."

la: Loco verborum *Ad illud quod obiicitur... usque ad cognoscentis*, in cod. O legitur: *Ad illud quod obiicitur: in Deo nulla cadit cognitio per accidens; dicendum, quod verum est de his quae nata sunt cognosci per se et per positionem; sed malum per se nec causam nec voluntatem nec cognitionem habet, sed per bonum, secundum Dionysium, capitulo quarto de Divinis Nominibus, quia* etc. Pro *nulla cadit* codd. V W *non cadit aliqua*. Aliquanto inferius post *sui oppositi* codd. aa bb inserunt *ut malum est*; et subinde pro *non in decurrendo* Vat. cum nonnullis codd. non minus recte *non in discurrendo*.

en: In place of the words *Ad illud quod obiicitur... usque ad cognoscentis*, in codex O is read: "*To that which is objected: in God no knowing by accident falls; it must be said, that it is true of those things which are by nature known by themselves and by position; but evil by itself has neither cause nor will nor knowing, but [is known] through the good, according to Dionysius, On the Divine Names chapter 4, because* etc." For *nulla cadit* codices V W [read] *non cadit aliqua*. A little later, after *sui oppositi*, codices aa bb insert *ut malum est*; and soon thereafter, in place of *non in decurrendo*, the Vatican [edition] with several codices, not less correctly, [reads] *non in discurrendo*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 103. (c. 10.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 103 (c. 10).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Agitur hic de malis *secundum quod mala*, id est secundum *formale* mali, quod est privatio, non secundum *materiale* sive substratum eius (cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 2. per totum, et d. 35. a. 2. per totum, d. 37. a. 2. q. I.). Tota solutio eruitur ex hoc principio, quod *aliud est cognosci a Deo, aliud esse in Deo*, quod explicatur in solut. ad 2, et hic dub. 1. 2. — Quod malum non habeat ideam in Deo, et quod cognoscatur per ideam sui oppositi, communiter ab antiquis docetur. De modo, quo Deus mala cognoscat, cfr. d. 39. a. I. q. 2, et *Scholion*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 3, et m. 4. a. 2. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. *Report.* hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 18. a. 3. ad 1; *de Verit.* q. 3. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 38. m. 2. a. 3. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. et 3. ad 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Here it is treated of evils *as evil*, that is, according to the *formal* [aspect] of evil, which is privation, not according to the *material* [aspect] or its substrate (cf. II *Sent.* d. 34, a. 2, throughout, and d. 35, a. 2, throughout, and d. 37, a. 2, q. I). The whole solution is drawn from this principle, that *it is one thing to be known by God, another to be in God*, which is explained in the solution to [argument] 2, and here in *dubium* 1, 2. — That evil does not have an idea in God, and that it is known through the idea of its opposite, is commonly taught by the ancients. On the manner in which God knows evils, see d. 39, a. I, q. 2, and *Scholion*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 3, and m. 4, a. 2. — Scotus, on this and the following question, *Report.* here q. 3. — S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 18, a. 3, *ad* 1; *de Verit.* q. 3, a. 4. — B. Albert., here a. 6; *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 38, m. 2, a. 3, q. *incid*. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1 and 3, *ad* 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 5.

---


title: Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum imperfecta sint in Deo
Whether imperfect things are in God

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum imperfecta sint in Deo.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum imperfecta, secundum quod huiusmodi, sint in Deo. Et videtur quod non:

1. Quia mala ut mala non possunt habere similitudinem cum summo bono: ergo pari ratione, cum imperfecta non habeant similitudinem cum perfectissimo, non erunt in Deo.

2. Item, illa sola sunt in Deo, quae possunt esse a Deo et per Deum; sed imperfecta a Deo

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non sunt, quia dicitur Deuteronomii trigesimo secundo[^1]: *Dei perfecta sunt opera*.

3. Item, specialiter obiicitur de materia et passione[^2], diversitate et compositione. Cum enim exemplar sub ratione exemplaris sit forma, sit actus purus, et ita omnino simplex, videtur quod rationes materiae et passionis et diversitatis et compositionis repugnent exemplari; et si hoc, cum nihil dicatur esse in Deo nisi ratione exemplaris, patet etc.

4. Item, sicut veritas et bonitas[^3] est generalis conditio entium, ita et unitas; sed oppositum veritatis non habet ideam in Deo, similiter et bonitatis: ergo pari ratione oppositum unitatis. Sed oppositum unitatis est multitudo: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus ad Nebridium[^4]: «Qui totum condidit non potuit et partium non habere rationes»: ergo cum partes sub ratione partium sint imperfectae, patet quod habet rationes imperfectorum.

2. Item, omnis cognitio divina est *a priori*: cum ergo in omni creatura prius cadat ratio imperfecti quam perfecti, ut materiae quam formae, principiorum quam principiati, partium quam totius, ergo per prius haec cognoscit Deus. Ergo si perfecta habent ideam in Deo, necesse est, quod habeant etiam imperfecta.

3. Item, divinum exemplar exprimit rem secundum totum, alioquin non perfecte cognosceret, ergo quidquid est de re, habet exemplar; sed materia est de rei constitutione, et imperfecta de constitutione perfecti: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis effectus assimilatur suae causae aliqua assimilatione; sed minima assimilatio sufficit ad rationem exemplaris: ergo omne quod est a Deo, habet ideam in Deo, per quam, priusquam fiat, est in Deo. Sed materia est a Deo et passio et compositio et diversitas, quia omnia dicunt ens: ergo omnia sunt in Deo.

### Conclusio[^5].

> *Imperfecta sunt in Deo, non ratione imperfectionis, quae privationem dicit, sed ratione illius quod imperfectioni subest.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod imperfecta non sunt in Deo, nec cognoscuntur a Deo per aliquam ideam propriam, sed per ideam suorum oppositorum, ut materia per ideam formae, passio per ideam actus, multitudo per ideam unitatis. — Sed illud stare non potest. Cum enim omnia dicant aliquam entitatem et ita veritatem, de necessitate aliquam assimilationem habent ad primam veritatem, et ita rationem exemplaritatis; et ideo necessario sunt in Deo.

Propterea intelligendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum imperfecta habeant ideam in Deo, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ratione ipsius quod subest, aut ratione imperfectionis. Si ratione imperfectionis, cum imperfectio sit privatio, et privatio non dicat ens nec aliquid a Deo nec assimilabile, sic non habet ideam. Si autem ratione eius quod subest, sicut materia dicitur quid imperfectum, et materia aliquam essentiam dicit, sic habet ideam, sed non imperfectam, sed perfectam[^6]; quoniam, sicut non viventium est idea vivens, et corporalium spiritualis, sic temporalium aeterna, et imperfectorum perfecta[^7].

Nec tamen malorum est idea bona. Unde notandum, quod idea, sicut supra dictum fuit in quaestione de ideis[^8], dicit assimilationem extra genus. Prima autem assimilatio est in ratione entitatis in Deo. Omne ergo quod de se dicit rationem entitatis, sive sit compositum, sive imperfectum, sive materiale, sive passibile, sive in actu, sive in potentia, potest Deo assimilari et produci; et ideo habet esse in Deo. Quod autem dicit privationem, hoc ipso amittit rationem veri effectus et rationem assimilationis; et ideo falsitas et malitia ideam non habent nec sunt in Deo nec a Deo. — Ex his patet, quod imperfecta sunt in Deo; patent etiam quaesita.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1.* Quod enim obiicitur de malo, patet responsio, quia malum dicit simpliciter privationem in eo quod malum, non sic imperfectum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imperfecta non sunt a Deo; dicendum, quod imperfecta, secundum id quod sunt, a Deo sunt, licet in eis non remaneat imperfectio, quia Deus perficit[^9].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non habent assimilationem; dicendum, quod quamvis non habeant in conditionibus specialibus, habent tamen in generalibus; et hoc sufficit. Omnia enim habent rationem boni et pulcri et entis[^10].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de opposito unitatis, dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam unitas salvatur in multitudine, non sic bonitas in malitia, nec veritas in falsitate, quia illae sunt privationes; non sic autem unitatis privatio est multitudo[^11]; et ideo patet totum.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether imperfect things are in God.*

Secondly it is asked whether imperfect things, as such, are in God. And it appears that they are not:

1. Because evils as evils cannot have a likeness with the highest good: therefore by parity of reasoning, since imperfect things do not have a likeness with the most perfect, they will not be in God.

2. Likewise, those alone are in God which can be from God and through God; but imperfect things from God

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are not, since it is said in Deuteronomy 32[^1]: *The works of God are perfect*.

3. Likewise, it is specially objected concerning matter and passion[^2], diversity and composition. For since the exemplar, under the account of exemplar, is form, is pure act, and so altogether simple, it appears that the accounts of matter and of passion and of diversity and of composition are repugnant to the exemplar; and if so, since nothing is said to be in God except by reason of the exemplar, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, just as truth and goodness[^3] is a general condition of beings, so also is unity; but the opposite of truth has no idea in God, and likewise [the opposite] of goodness: therefore by parity of reasoning [neither has] the opposite of unity. But the opposite of unity is multitude: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine to Nebridius[^4]: "He who founded the whole could not but have also the accounts of the parts": therefore since the parts under the account of parts are imperfect, it is clear that he has the accounts of imperfect things.

2. Likewise, every divine knowing is *a priori*: since therefore in every creature the account of the imperfect falls before that of the perfect — as of matter before form, of principles before what is principled, of parts before the whole — therefore God knows these prior. Therefore if perfect things have an idea in God, it is necessary that imperfect things have one as well.

3. Likewise, the divine exemplar expresses the thing according to the whole, otherwise it would not perfectly know it; therefore whatever is of the thing has an exemplar; but matter is of the thing's constitution, and the imperfect [is] of the constitution of the perfect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every effect is assimilated to its cause by some assimilation; but the least assimilation suffices for the account of an exemplar: therefore everything which is from God has an idea in God, through which, before it comes to be, it is in God. But matter is from God, and passion and composition and diversity, since all of them state being: therefore all are in God.

### Conclusion[^5].

> *Imperfect things are in God, not by reason of the imperfection (which states a privation), but by reason of that which underlies the imperfection.*

**I respond:** To this some have said that imperfect things are not in God, nor are they known by God through any proper idea, but through the idea of their opposites — as matter through the idea of form, passion through the idea of act, multitude through the idea of unity. — But this cannot stand. For since all things state some entity and so [some] truth, of necessity they have some assimilation to the first truth, and so [have] the account of exemplarity; and therefore they are necessarily in God.

For this reason it must be understood that when it is asked whether imperfect things have an idea in God, this can be understood in two ways: either by reason of that which underlies, or by reason of the imperfection. If by reason of the imperfection, since imperfection is a privation, and a privation states neither being nor anything from God nor anything assimilable, in this way it has no idea. But if by reason of that which underlies — as matter is called something imperfect, and matter states some essence — in this way it has an idea, yet not an imperfect one, but a perfect one[^6]; since, just as the idea of non-living things is a living [idea], and that of bodily things [is] a spiritual [idea], so [the idea] of temporal things [is] eternal, and [the idea] of imperfect things [is] perfect[^7].

Yet there is no good idea of evils. Whence it must be noted that *idea*, as was said above in the question on ideas[^8], states an assimilation outside [any] genus. The first assimilation, however, is in the account of entity in God. Therefore everything which of itself states the account of entity — whether it be composite, or imperfect, or material, or passible, or in act, or in potency — can be assimilated to God and produced; and therefore it has being in God. But what states a privation, by that very fact loses the account of a true effect and the account of assimilation; and therefore falsity and malice have no idea, nor are they in God nor from God. — From these things it is clear that imperfect things are in God; the things asked are also clear.

**To the arguments of the negative side:**

*To 1.* As to what is objected concerning evil, the reply is clear, since evil states simply a privation in that which it is evil — not so the imperfect.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that imperfect things are not from God; it must be said that imperfect things, according to that which they are, are from God, although the imperfection does not remain in them, since God perfects [them][^9].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that they have no assimilation; it must be said that although they do not have it in their special conditions, they nevertheless have it in their general [conditions]; and this suffices. For all things have the account of the good and the beautiful and of being[^10].

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the opposite of unity, it must be said that it is not similar. For unity is preserved in multitude — not so goodness in malice, nor truth in falsity, since those are privations; but the privation of unity is not multitude in this way[^11]; and so the whole is clear.

la: Vers. 4. — De propos. maiori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Verse 4. — On the major proposition cf. here the *littera* of the Master, c. 2.

la: Id est passibili sive potentia passiva. — Pro *passione* Vat. *potentia*.

en: That is, the passible or passive potency. — In place of *passione*, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *potentia*.

la: Verba *et bonitas*, a Vat. suppressa, restauravimus ex codd. L P Q V W Z et ed. I. Mox post *pari ratione* supple cum cod. *nec*.

en: The words *et bonitas*, suppressed by the Vatican [edition], we have restored from codices L P Q V W Z and edition I. Soon after *pari ratione*, supply with the codex *nec*.

la: *Epist.* 14. n. 4: *Si igitur pars huius universi est Nebridius, sicut est, et omne universum partibus confit, non potuit universi conditor Deus rationem partium non habere*.

en: *Letter* 14, n. 4: "If therefore Nebridius is a part of this universe, as he is, and the whole universe is composed of parts, the Founder of the universe, God, could not but have the account of the parts."

la: In Vat. et nonnullis mss. haec conclusio desideratur.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and several manuscripts this conclusion is missing.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* *est exemplar in Deo*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* [reads] *est exemplar in Deo*.

la: Vat. et cod. *cc* omittunt *sed perfectam*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex *cc* omit *sed perfectam*.

en: *Distinction* 35, q. 2, *ad* 2.

la: Sententia clarius exprimeretur sic: licet non inde, quia *Deus perficit*, sed aliunde remaneat imperfectio; creatura enim, quod sit imperfecta, hoc non habet proprie a Deo, sed ex se, quia ex nihilo. Quare August., II. *de Liber. Arb.* c. 20. n. 54. ait: «Omne autem bonum ex Deo... Omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est». Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 1. q. 2; Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 3.

en: The thought would be more clearly expressed thus: although the imperfection remains not from there — that is, not because *God perfects* — but from elsewhere; for that a creature is imperfect, this it does not have properly from God, but from itself, since [it is] from nothing. Whence Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 20, n. 54, says: "But every good is from God... and every defect is from nothing." Cf. II *Sent.* d. 34, a. 1, q. 2; Alexander of Hales, *S.* p. II, q. 94, m. 3, a. 3.

la: Cfr. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 7. seqq. In fine huius capituli longam invenies explicationem de natura et cognitione mali, qua quae hic dicta sunt confirmantur.

en: Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 7 ff. At the end of this chapter you will find a long explanation about the nature and knowledge of evil, by which what is said here is confirmed.

la: Vide supra d. 24. a. I. q. I.

en: See above d. 24, a. I, q. I.

latin_scholion:
Quod imperfecta, quatenus formaliter dicunt privationem, non habeant ideam propriam, constat apud omnes. Sed utrum imperfecta ratione rei positivae, quae substat privationi, non tantum cognoscantur per aliquam ideam, sed per ideam propriam, haec quaestio hic discutitur, et principaliter agitur de materia prima. Prima opinio cum Platone (qui etiam materiam a Deo non creatam esse falso putavit) hoc omnino negat. S. Thom. (*de Veritate* q. 3. a. 5.) dicit contra Platonem: «Nos autem ponimus, materiam causatam esse a Deo; unde necesse est ponere, quod aliquo modo sit eius idea in Deo, cum quidquid ab ipso causatur, similitudinem ipsius utcumque retineat». Deinde idem distinguit ideam proprie sumtam, quae «respicit rem, secundum quod est producibilis in esse», et sic nec materiae tantum, nec formae tantum, sed composito toti assignat ideam propriam; et ideam large acceptam pro similitudine vel ratione, «et sic nihil prohibet, materiae primae etiam secundum se ideam esse». Eodem modo idem resolvit I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2. a. 3. ad 2; quae doctrina satis convenit cum doctrina Seraphici. In *Summa* autem (1. q. 15. a. 3. ad 3.) Angelicus simpliciter dicit: «Habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea compositi: nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est». Non conveniunt interpretes S. Thomae, utrum ipse se hic retractaverit (ut putat Caietanus), an solummodo loquatur de idea in stricto sensu. S. Bonaventuram in modo loquendi sequuntur Scotus et Richardus a Med.

Praeter auctores laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 7, et d. 35. a. 10. — Ægid. R., hic 2. *princ.* q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. in fine.

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english_scholion:
That imperfect things, insofar as they formally state a privation, do not have a proper idea, is established with all. But whether imperfect things, by reason of the positive thing which underlies the privation, are not only known through some idea, but through a proper idea — this question is here discussed, and the matter principally treated is prime matter. The first opinion, with Plato (who falsely supposed that matter too was not created by God), denies this altogether. St. Thomas (*de Veritate* q. 3, a. 5) says against Plato: "But we hold that matter has been caused by God; whence it is necessary to posit that in some way there is an idea of it in God, since whatever is caused by him retains, in whatever way, his likeness." Then the same [author] distinguishes the idea taken properly, which "regards the thing insofar as it is producible into being," and thus assigns a proper idea neither to matter alone, nor to form alone, but to the whole composite; and the idea taken broadly for a likeness or account, "and thus nothing prevents there being an idea also of prime matter according to itself." In the same way the same [author] resolves [it] in I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2; which doctrine agrees sufficiently with the doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor]. But in the *Summa* (I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3) the Angelic [Doctor] says simply: "Matter does have an idea in God, yet not one different from the idea of the composite: for matter according to itself neither has being, nor is knowable." The interpreters of St. Thomas do not agree whether he himself has retracted [it] here (as Cajetan supposes), or only speaks of an idea in the strict sense. Scotus and Richard of Mediavilla follow St. Bonaventure in their manner of speaking.

Besides the authors named: B. Albert, here a. 7, and d. 35, a. 10. — Ægidius Romanus, here 2 *princ.* q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3, at the end.

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