title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether the name 'person' is conveniently transferred to the divine

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS I. *De translatione nominum persona, substantia, essentia ad divina.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomen personae convenienter ad divina translatum sit.*

Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum debuerit ibi[^1] transferri nomen personae ad divina. Quod autem[^2] nomen personae non debeat dici in divinis, ostenditur sic:

1. Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate*, et habetur in opposito in littera[^3]: «Dictum est: tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur»: ergo videtur, quod solum ad fugam haereticorum et non secundum veritatem et proprietatem dicatur persona in divinis.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia persona nominat particulare[^4], et non quodcumque, sed rationalis naturae; sed a quocumque removetur superius, et inferius: ergo cum in divinis non sit dicere particulare, similiter nec erit dicere personam.

3. Item, particulare rationalis creaturae est compositissimum inter omnia creata. Nam compositum est ex substantia corporali et spirituali, et rursus corporalis inter omnes videtur maiorem compositionem habere: ergo cum persona sit nomen particularis, et hoc summe compositi, et in divinis est summa simplicitas, patet quod in divinis non debet[^5] dici nomen personae.

4. Item, vocabula nostra debent respondere Graecis, ut unitas fidei ostendatur; sed Graeci non utuntur vocabulo *prosopon* in divinis, quod est idem quod *persona*: ergo cum ipsi proprius habeant vocabula quam nos[^6], nec nos debemus uti.

**Contra:**

1. Persona dicitur quasi *per se sonans*, sive *per se unum*[^7]; sed *per se unum* propriissime recipitur in Deo: ergo et persona secundum suum nomen.

2. Item, persona dicitur habens suam naturam intellectualem ab aliis distinctam; sed in Deo est ponere habentem naturam intellectualem et ab aliis distinctam, sicut supra ostensum est de pluralitate personarum[^8]: ergo etc.

3. Item, persona nominat mihi ultimum in genere rationalis naturae; sed rationalis sive intellectualis natura est nobilior inter creata[^9], et rursus, ultimum in illa est completissimum, quia ei nulla potest fieri additio: ergo si quidquid completionis est, ponendum est in Deo propriissime, patet etc.

4. Item, persona dicit dignitatem. Unde in ecclesiasticis personae dicuntur habentes dignitatem aliquam notabilem[^10]: ergo cum dignitas propriissime sit in Deo, nomen personae propriissime in Deo ponendum est.

> **Conclusio.** *Nomen personae convenienter et proprie in divinis dicitur ad significandam distinctionem et proprietatem nobilissimam suppositorum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod persona de sui ratione dicit suppositum[^11] distinctum proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente. Et hoc patet in sua etymologia, et in aequipollenti suo.

In etymologia, quia persona dicitur quasi *per se unum*[^12]. Per se autem unum proprie dicitur unum, quod est omnino distinctum ab aliis et in se indistinctum[^13]. Rursum, persona dicitur a *personando*, quasi *a se resonando*; resonare autem dicitur quod in sono praeeminet aliis; et ideo persona dicitur suppositum distinctum habens dignitatem, et ratione huius dignitatis, cum deberet per naturam vocabuli dici *pérsona*, penultima correpta, dicitur *persóna*, penultima producta.

Similiter ratio huius significationis accipitur ab aequipollenti in lingua Graeca, quod est *prosopon*. Apud Graecos *prosopon* dicebatur, sicut narrat Boethius[^14], homo larvatus, qui quidem solebat fieri in tragoediis: et hoc fiebat propter duo: una ratio erat ad distincte repraesentandum eum, de quo fiebat

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sermo; alia ratio erat ad melius resonandum vel personandum. Et ista duo conveniunt dictis[^15] duabus proprietatibus: et ideo ab hoc nomine *prosopon* apud Graecos tractum est hoc nomen *persona* apud Latinos. Et quia in ecclesiasticis maxime attenditur distinctio dignitatum, tractum est primo ad significandum honorem in ecclesiasticis. Deinde, quia individuum rationalis naturae distinctum est ab aliis, et hoc proprietate dignitatis inter creaturas, hinc est, quod extensum est ad significandum suppositum rationalis naturae. Demum[^16], quia in Deo est reperire suppositum distinctum proprietate nobilissima, Spiritu sancto dictante, translatum est ad divina[^17], quia ibi res nominis propriissime invenitur, quamvis ipsum nomen prius aliis sit impositum. Concedendum est ergo, quod in divinis proprie et convenienter nomen personae accipitur.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *dictum est, non ut diceretur*; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur pro tempore illo, in quo nomen personae secundum usum aequivalebat substantiae; et ideo dictum est, *non ut diceretur* quod persona consueverat significare, sed dictum est quasi translatum, *ne taceretur*, id est, ne confessio fidei diminuta esse probaretur.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona nominat particulare: dicendum, quod particulare de ratione sui nominis importat partem et imperfectionem; sed persona de ratione sui nominis importat completionem; ideo ponitur in divinis, quamvis non particulare; et bene, quia in divinis nomen speciei proprie dicitur, et nomen generis improprie[^18].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona nominat compositissimum; dicendum, quod hoc accidit, quia individuum rationalis naturae creatae est in genere et ideo multis differentiis distat, cum distinguatur qualitate; sed in divinis est distinctio sola origine, et praeterea[^19] non est in genere; et ideo non oportet, quod sit ibi aggregatio differentiarum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud Graecos[^20] non utuntur aequipollenti, scilicet *prosopon*; dicendum, quod ratio utendi apud Latinos non tam fuit proprietas quam penuria, quia non habebant quid responderent. Et ratio huius fuit, quia substantia secundum communem usum idem sonat quod essentia; Graeci autem habebant proprium vocabulum, scilicet *hypostasis*, quo utuntur: et ideo non sunt coacti transferre, ut nos.

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the transferring of the names "person," "substance," "essence" to the divine.*

### Question I. *Whether the name "person" is conveniently transferred to the divine.*

First, then, it is asked whether the name "person" ought there[^1] to be transferred to the divine. That, however[^2], the name "person" ought not to be said in divine matters is shown thus:

1. Augustine in the fifth [book] *On the Trinity*, and it is had in the contrary [position] in the *littera*[^3]: «It was said: three persons, not in order that this might be said, but lest it be passed over in silence»: therefore it seems that "person" is said in divine matters only for the sake of fleeing heretics, and not according to truth and propriety.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, since "person" names a particular[^4], and not just any [particular], but [one] of rational nature; but from whatever the higher [genus] is removed, the lower also [is removed]: therefore, since in divine matters there is no saying of a particular, likewise there will be no saying of "person" either.

3. Likewise, the particular of rational creature is the most composite among all created things. For it is composed of bodily and spiritual substance, and again the bodily seems to have a greater composition than all [others]: therefore, since "person" is the name of a particular, and that of one supremely composite, and in divine matters there is supreme simplicity, it is plain that in divine matters the name "person" ought not[^5] to be said.

4. Likewise, our terms ought to correspond to the Greek [terms], so that the unity of faith may be shown; but the Greeks do not use the term *prosopon* in divine matters, which is the same as *persona*: therefore, since they themselves have terms more proper than we[^6], we also ought not to use [it].

**On the contrary:**

1. "Person" is said as if *per se sonans* ("sounding through itself"), or *per se unum* ("one through itself")[^7]; but *per se unum* is most properly received in God: therefore "person" too, according to its name.

2. Likewise, "person" is said [to be] one having its intellectual nature distinct from others; but in God [there is] to be posited [one] having an intellectual nature and distinct from others, as has been shown above concerning the plurality of persons[^8]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, "person" names to me the ultimate in the genus of rational nature; but rational or intellectual nature is the more noble among created things[^9], and again, the ultimate in it is the most complete, since to it no addition can be made: therefore, if whatever is of completion is to be posited in God most properly, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, "person" expresses dignity. Whence in ecclesiastical matters those having some notable dignity are called persons[^10]: therefore, since dignity is most properly in God, the name "person" is most properly to be posited in God.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "person" is said conveniently and properly in divine matters to signify the distinction and the most noble property of the supposits.*

**I respond:** It must be said that "person," from its own account, expresses a supposit[^11] distinct by a property pertaining to dignity. And this is plain in its etymology, and in its equivalent.

In its etymology, since "person" is said as if *per se unum* ("one through itself")[^12]. Now *per se unum* is properly called one which is altogether distinct from others and undivided in itself[^13]. Again, "person" is said from *personando* ("sounding through"), as if "resounding from itself"; and "to resound" is said of that which in sound stands out above others; and therefore "person" is called a distinct supposit having dignity, and by reason of this dignity, although by the nature of the word it ought to be said *pérsona*, with the penult shortened, it is said *persóna*, with the penult lengthened.

Likewise the account of this signification is taken from the equivalent in the Greek tongue, which is *prosopon*. Among the Greeks *prosopon* meant, as Boethius[^14] narrates, a masked man, [a thing] which used to be made in tragedies: and this was done on account of two [reasons]: one reason was for distinctly representing him about whom the speech was being made; the other reason was for better resounding or sounding through. And these two correspond to the said[^15] two properties: and therefore from this name *prosopon* among the Greeks was drawn this name *persona* among the Latins. And because in ecclesiastical matters the distinction of dignities is especially attended to, it was first drawn to signify honor in ecclesiastical [persons]. Then, since the individual of rational nature is distinct from others, and this by a property of dignity among creatures, hence it is that it was extended to signify the supposit of rational nature. Finally[^16], since in God there is to be found a supposit distinct by a most noble property, with the Holy Spirit dictating, it was transferred to the divine[^17], because there the reality of the name is most properly found, although the name itself was first imposed on others. It is to be conceded therefore, that in divine matters the name "person" is properly and conveniently received.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that *it was said, not in order that it might be said*; it must be said that Augustine speaks for that time in which the name "person" according to usage was equivalent to "substance"; and therefore it was said, *not in order that it might be said* [in the way that] "person" had been accustomed to signify, but it was said as if transferred, *lest it be passed over in silence*, that is, lest the confession of the faith should be proved to be diminished.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that "person" names a particular: it must be said that "particular," from the account of its name, imports a part and imperfection; but "person," from the account of its name, imports completion; therefore it is posited in divine matters, although not "particular"; and rightly, because in divine matters the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly[^18].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that "person" names what is most composite; it must be said that this happens because the individual of created rational nature is in a genus and therefore is distant by many differences, since it is distinguished by quality; but in divine matters the distinction is by origin alone, and besides[^19] [God] is not in a genus; and therefore it is not necessary that there should there be an aggregation of differences.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that among the Greeks[^20] they do not use the equivalent, namely *prosopon*; it must be said that the reason for using [it] among the Latins was not so much propriety as poverty, since they did not have what they might respond. And the reason for this was that "substance" according to common usage sounds the same as "essence"; the Greeks, however, had their own term, namely *hypostasis*, which they use: and therefore they were not compelled to transfer [it], as we [were].

la: Vat. *ad divina debeat* loco *debuit ibi*, sed contra codd., quorum tamen plures cum ed. 1 habent *debuit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *ad divina debeat* in place of *debuit ibi*, but against the codices, of which however the majority, with ed. 1, have *debuit*.

la: Licet particula *ibi* superabundare videatur, exigentibus tamen plurimis mss. et ed. I, eam inseruimus. Mox in plurimis mss. et ed. I omittitur minus congrue *nomen personae*. Dein Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Et quod* loco *Quod autem*.

en: Although the particle *ibi* ("there") seems superabundant, nevertheless, on the demand of very many manuscripts and ed. I, we have inserted it. Soon afterwards, in very many manuscripts and ed. I, *nomen personae* ("the name of person") is, less suitably, omitted. Then the Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *Et quod* in place of *Quod autem*.

la: Hic, c. I. in fine.

en: Here, c. I, at the end.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. — Mox lectionem, qua ponitur *simpliciter* loco *similiter*, quaeque in mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 communissima est, minus idoneam iudicamus, nisi verba *simpliciter nec* sumantur pro *omnino nec* seu *nullo modo*.

en: Cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 2. — Soon after, the reading by which *simpliciter* ("simply") is placed in place of *similiter* ("likewise"), and which is most common in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, we judge less suitable, unless the words *simpliciter nec* be taken for *omnino nec* ("not at all") or *nullo modo* ("in no way").

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *debet* pro *oportet*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *debet* ("ought") for *oportet* ("it is needed").

la: Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice hic repetit verba *et non utuntur*. Paulo ante cod. V post *utuntur* addit *hoc*, et cod. O ponit *per prius* loco *proprius*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with only one or another codex, here repeats the words *et non utuntur* ("and they do not use"). A little before, cod. V after *utuntur* adds *hoc* ("this"), and cod. O places *per prius* ("by what is prior") in place of *proprius* ("more properly").

la: Vat. et recentior cod. cc *una*. Dein ed. 1 post *sed* adiungit *esse per se sive*, dum e contra cod. T breviter hoc loco *per se unum* habet.

en: The Vatican [edition] and the more recent cod. cc [read] *una* ("one"). Then ed. 1 after *sed* adds *esse per se sive* ("to be through itself or"), while on the contrary cod. T in this place briefly has *per se unum*.

la: Dist. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante fide multorum mss. ut FGH I P Q S T V W X etc. et ed. I post *intellectualem* adiecimus particulam *et*, quam cod. S etiam eodem modo in maiori propositione exhibet. Dein nonnulli codd. ut T W in minori *distinctum* pro *distinctam*.

en: Distinction 2, q. 2. — A little before, on the authority of many manuscripts such as FGH I P Q S T V W X etc. and ed. I, after *intellectualem* we have added the particle *et* ("and"), which cod. S also exhibits in the same manner in the major proposition. Then several codices such as T W [read] in the minor *distinctum* in place of *distinctam*.

la: Cod. aa praemittit *omnia*. Paulo infra communior mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 lectio ponit *quod* pro *quidquid*.

en: Cod. aa prefixes *omnia* ("all"). A little below, the more common reading of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 places *quod* ("which") in place of *quidquid* ("whatever").

la: In *Comment. super Ioannem*, c. 1, 23, n. 50 (Supplem. Bonelli, tom. I) S. Bonav. ait: *Personae dignae et eminentes personae ecclesiasticae vocantur.* — Vat. aliaeque edd. in hoc argumento, sicut et infra in corp. quaest., legunt *ecclesiis* pro *ecclesiasticis*; plurimi codd. propter abbreviationem verbi sunt ambiguae lectionis; codd. H ee cum ed. 1 in corp. quaest. *ecclesiasticis* clare exhibent scriptum, quae lectio et contextu et definitione ex Commentario super Ioan. modo allata et iure canonico confirmatur.

en: In the *Commentary on John*, c. 1, 23, n. 50 (Bonelli's Supplement, tom. I) St. Bonaventure says: *Worthy and eminent persons are called ecclesiastical persons.* — The Vatican [edition] and other editions in this argument, as also below in the body of the question, read *ecclesiis* ("in churches") in place of *ecclesiasticis* ("ecclesiastical [persons]"); very many codices, on account of the abbreviation of the word, are of ambiguous reading; codices H ee with ed. 1 in the body of the question clearly exhibit *ecclesiasticis* in writing, which reading is confirmed both by the context and by the definition just adduced from the Commentary on John and by canon law.

la: In multis mss. deest *suppositum*, sed minus congrue; ed. 1 *quid* pro *suppositum*. Mox Vat., contra mss. et ed. 1, perperam *pertinens* pro *pertinente*. — Infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. allatis tribus definitionibus personae quartam adiungit S. Doctor his verbis: *A magistris definitur sic: persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente.*

en: In many manuscripts *suppositum* is missing, but less suitably; ed. 1 [reads] *quid* in place of *suppositum*. Soon after, the Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and ed. 1, wrongly [reads] *pertinens* in place of *pertinente*. — Below, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4, after three definitions of "person" have been adduced, the Holy Doctor adds a fourth in these words: *By the masters it is defined thus: a person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility.*

la: Ita S. Isidorus, si audias B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1, sed idem in Comment., I. *Sent.* d. 23. a. 2. hoc Simoni Tornacensi adscribit. — Vat., contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *una*, sed minus bene.

en: So St. Isidore, if you listen to Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1; but the same [Albert] in [his] *Commentary*, *I Sent.* d. 23, a. 2, ascribes this to Simon of Tournai. — The Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *una* ("one"), but less well.

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 11 (IV. c. 6.): *Universaliter namque quotcumque non habent divisionem, quatenus non habent, eatenus unum dicuntur.* Et X. text. 9 (V. c. 3.): *Quod vero indivisibile aut non divisum, unum.* Libr. III. *Phys.* text. 68 (c. 7.): *Quoniam unum est indivisibile, quodcumque unum sit.* — Paulo infra post *quasi* communiorem mss. et ed. I lectionem exhibemus substituendo *a se* loco *per se*; forte melius legeretur *a per se*. Dein aliqui codd. cum ed. I *eminet* loco *praeeminet*.

en: Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 11 (IV, c. 6): *For universally, whatever things do not have division, insofar as they do not have [it], to that extent they are called one.* And X, text 9 (V, c. 3): *But what is indivisible or undivided [is] one.* Book III *Physics*, text 68 (c. 7): *Since one is indivisible, whatever is one.* — A little below, after *quasi*, we exhibit the more common reading of the manuscripts and ed. I by substituting *a se* in place of *per se*; perhaps it would be better read *a per se*. Then some codices with ed. I [read] *eminet* ("stands out") in place of *praeeminet* ("stands out above").

la: Haec etymologia nominis *persona* invenitur in Boeth., *de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi*, c. 3, his verbis: *Persona vero dicta est a personando, circumflexa penultima. Quod si acuatur antepenultima, aperte a sono dicta videbitur.*

en: This etymology of the name *persona* is found in Boethius, *On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ*, c. 3, in these words: *"Persona" indeed has been said from "personando," with the penult circumflexed. But if it be accented on the antepenult, it will plainly seem to have been said from sound.*

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *praedictis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *praedictis* ("aforesaid").

la: Ex multis mss. ut FGT etc. et ed. I substituimus *Demum* pro *Deinde*.

en: From many manuscripts such as FGT etc. and ed. I we have substituted *Demum* ("finally") for *Deinde* ("then").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, sed aliis codd. et ed. I obnitentibus, *de*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc — but with other codices and ed. I resisting — [reads] *de* [in place of *ad*].

la: In codd. aa bb additur: *Propter quod dicit Augustinus, quod Deus sine quantitate est magnus, sine qualitate bonus*; in cod. H vero *nomen speciei, ut bonus et magnus, nomen generis, ut qualis et quantus*, qui et additionem, quam ex codd. aa bb notavimus, in margine exhibet.

en: In codices aa bb is added: *On account of which Augustine says that God is great without quantity, [and] good without quality*; but in cod. H [is added] *the name of a species, such as "good" and "great," the name of a genus, such as "what kind" and "how much,"* which [codex] also exhibits in the margin the addition which we have noted from codices aa bb.

la: Supple: *Deus*, vel: *divina persona*. — Pauci codd. ut Z bb ee *propterea* loco *praeterea*, lectio non spernenda; alii pauci ut K V *persona* pro *praeterea*. — De hac responsione vide plura apud Richard. de S. Vict., IV. *de Trin.* c. 13–16.

en: Supply: *God*, or: *the divine person*. — A few codices such as Z bb ee [read] *propterea* ("for that reason") in place of *praeterea* ("besides"), a reading not to be spurned; a few others such as K V [read] *persona* in place of *praeterea*. — On this response see more in Richard of St. Victor, IV *On the Trinity*, c. 13–16.

la: Ita fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. contra Vat., quae legit *Graeci*. Paulo infra fide mss. et ed. I post *habebant* substituimus *quid* pro *quod*.

en: So nearly all the codices with the first six editions, against the Vatican [edition], which reads *Graeci* ("the Greeks" [nominative]). A little below, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. I, after *habebant* we have substituted *quid* ("what") for *quod* ("which").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio affirmativa probatur per definitionem personae. Haec definitio eruitur tum ex etymologia vocabuli Latini, tum ex aequipollenti termino Graeco *prosopon* (προσωπον).

Circa verba in solut. ad 2: «In divinis nomen speciei proprie dicitur, et nomen generis improprie», cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 4; et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4; et quoad particulare et universale d. 19. p. II. q. 2.

De conceptu personae cfr. infra d. 25. per totam, et d. 34. a. I. q. 1.

**II.** De conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. I, et q. 67. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq.; Report. d. 25. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2; S. I. q. 29. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. I; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. I. et 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. I. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic. q. I.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The affirmative conclusion is proved through the definition of "person." This definition is drawn both from the etymology of the Latin word, and from the equivalent Greek term *prosopon* (προσωπον).

Concerning the words in the solution to [objection] 2: «In divine matters the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly», cf. above d. 8, p. II, dub. 4; and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4; and as to particular and universal, d. 19, p. II, q. 2.

On the concept of person cf. below d. 25 throughout, and d. 34, a. I, q. 1.

**II.** On the conclusion: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 66, m. I, and q. 67, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following [questions]; *Reportata* d. 25, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 29, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. I; *Summa* p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. I and 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. I, a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 53, q. I, 2. — Durandus, on this and the following, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. I.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum in divinis nomine substantiae et subsistentiae convenienter utendum sit.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomen substantiae dici debeat in divinis vel etiam subsistentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus libro quinto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Deus absque ulla dubitatione dicitur substantia, vel si melius appellatur, essentia».

2. Item, tam Boethius[^2] quam Augustinus *de Trinitate* dicunt, quod aliorum nominum genera, ut

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magnitudo, bonitas etc., transeunt in substantiam: si ergo substantia non transit in aliud, constat substantiae nomen proprie dici; nam si non proprie, aeque bene diceretur, quod substantia transit in alia, sicut e converso.

3. Item, ratio substantiae secundum Philosophum[^3] est quod est ens per se; sed solus Deus propriissime est ens per se: ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo.

4. Item, ratio substantiae secundum Augustinum[^4] est dici ad se et absolute; sed ibi est proprie dici ad se, ubi nulla est dependentia: ergo si hoc est in Deo, ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus septimo *de Trinitate*[^5]: «Inconveniens est dicere de Deo, quod substet bonitati suae»; sed si de bonitate, eadem ratione et de qualibet proprietate: ergo, simpliciter loquendo, inconveniens est dicere, ipsum esse substantiam.

2. Item, Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^6]: «Deus non est substantia, sed supra omnem substantiam»: ergo hoc nomen *substantia* proprie est in creaturis et non in Deo.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia[^7] omne quod substat, habet aliquid inhaerens; sed in Deo non est inhaerens neque inhaerentia: ergo nec substantia.

4. Item, omne quod substat alii[^8], componitur illi; ergo ubi non est compositio nec nomen compositionis, ibi nec nomen substantiae: ergo cum in divinis non sit compositio, patet etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Substantia, quatenus dicit stare per se, non per aliud, proprie dicitur in divinis; quatenus dicit substare accidenti inhaerenti, non admittitur; quatenus dicit substare sive alii distinguenti sive alii perficienti, recipitur, sed magis propter imperfectionem nostri intellectus quam secundum proprietatem divini esse.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomen substantiae a duplici proprietate potest dici, videlicet a per se stando, non per aliud; et[^9] sic proprie est in divinis, et magis etiam proprie quam in creaturis; vel a substando alii vel aliis, et hoc est[^10] tripliciter: vel alii inhaerenti, et sic falso et improprie dicitur in divinis, quia proprietates in divinis non sunt accidentes nec inhaerentes; vel alii distinguenti, et sic dicitur in divinis non omnino improprie nec omnino proprie, quia proprietas illa non inhaeret, sed distinguit[^11], et ideo non facit subsistere sive substare, quasi sub alio stare, sed existere, quasi ab alio esse — et hinc est, quod Richardus dicit in libro *de Trinitate*[^12], quod «melius dicitur existentia quam substantia» — vel quia substat alii ut perficienti, et sic dicitur res naturae substare respectu essentiae. Et iste modus magis est circa nostrum intelligere quam circa divinum esse, quia[^13], sicut patebit in sequenti problemate, ex nostro intellectu evenit talis modus dicendi, non ex proprietate divini esse.

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english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in divine matters the names substance and subsistence are to be fittingly used.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the name *substance* — or also *subsistence* — ought to be said in divine matters. And that [it] so [should be], it seems:

1. Augustine, in book five *On the Trinity*[^1]: «God is without any doubt called *substance*, or, if it be more rightly called, *essence*».

2. Likewise, both Boethius[^2] and Augustine *On the Trinity* say that the genera of the other names — such as

magnitude, goodness, etc. — pass over into substance: if therefore substance does not pass over into another, it is established that the name *substance* is properly said [of God]; for if [it were] not properly [said], it would equally well be said that substance passes over into the others, just as conversely.

3. Likewise, the account of substance according to the Philosopher[^3] is "that which is being-through-itself"; but God alone is most properly *being-through-itself*: therefore the name *substance* is most properly in God.

4. Likewise, the account of substance according to Augustine[^4] is "to be said in relation to itself and absolutely"; but it is properly said "in relation to itself" there, where there is no dependence: therefore if this is in God, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*[^5]: «It is unfitting to say of God, that he stands under (*substet*) his goodness»; but if [unfitting] of goodness, by the same reasoning [it is unfitting] also of any property whatever: therefore, simply speaking, it is unfitting to say that he himself is a substance.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*[^6]: «God is not a substance, but above every substance»: therefore this name *substance* is properly in creatures and not in God.

3. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason: since[^7] everything which substands has something inhering [in it]; but in God there is neither anything inhering nor inherence: therefore neither [is there] substance.

4. Likewise, everything which substands another[^8] is composed with it; therefore where there is neither composition nor the name of composition, there [is] neither the name of substance: therefore since in divine matters there is no composition, it is clear etc.

> **Conclusion.** *Substance, insofar as it signifies "to stand through itself, not through another", is properly said in divine matters; insofar as it signifies "to substand an inhering accident", it is not admitted; insofar as it signifies "to substand either another distinguishing [property] or another perfecting [nature]", it is received, but more on account of the imperfection of our intellect than according to a property of the divine being.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the name *substance* can be said from a twofold property, namely from "standing through itself, not through another"; and[^9] thus it is properly in divine matters, and even more properly than in creatures; or from "substanding another or others", and this[^10] in three ways: either [substanding] an inhering [accident], and so [the name] is falsely and improperly said in divine matters, since the properties in divine matters are neither accidents nor inhering; or [substanding] another distinguishing [property], and so it is said in divine matters not altogether improperly nor altogether properly, since that property does not inhere, but distinguishes[^11], and therefore it does not make [the divine] *subsist* or *substand*, as it were "to stand under another", but [rather to] *exist*, as it were "to be from another" — and hence it is that Richard says in the book *On the Trinity*[^12], that «*existentia* is better said than *substantia*» — or because [the supposit] substands another as a perfecting [nature], and so the *thing of nature* (*res naturae*) is said to substand with respect to the essence. And this mode is more about our understanding than about the divine being, since[^13], as will be clear in the following problem, this manner of speaking arises from our intellect, not from a property of the divine being.

en: [August., V. *de Trin.*] c. 2, n. 3.

la: Libr. *de Trin.* c. 4; et August., V. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 11. seq. — Mox aliqui codd. ut VX *transeant* pro *transeunt*. Dein fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 bis posuimus *transit* loco *transeat*. Codd. V *aa* post *nomen* satis bene addunt *ibi*.

en: [Boethius,] book *On the Trinity*, c. 4; and Augustine, V *On the Trinity*, c. 10, n. 11 ff. — Soon after, some codices such as VX [read] *transeant* in place of *transeunt*. Then, on the witness of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have twice set *transit* in place of *transeat*. Codices V, *aa*, after *nomen*, rightly add *ibi*.

la: Aristot. substantiam communiter *negative* definit, ut in libr. *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia*: «Neque de subiecto aliquo dicitur, neque in subiecto aliquo est»; et V. *Metaph.* text. 13 (IV. c. 8.): «Ultimum subiectum, quod non dicitur de alio»; *positive* autem libr. I. *Phys.* text. 27. seq. (c. 3.), ubi ipsam vocat: «illud quod vere est», et VII. *Metaph.* text. 1 (VI. c. 1.): «simpliciter ens». Ex his verbis vel etiam ad oppositionem accidentis, quod secundum Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 35. (IV. c. 30.) alteri inest, seu cuius esse est alteri inesse, haec vulgaris definitio substantiae formata esse videtur, quae occurrit et in Ioan. Damasc. *Dialectica* c. 4, et in Averrois Comment. VII. *Metaph.* text. 18: *Substantiae, quia sunt existentes per se*. — In fine argumenti ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus propositionem *ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo*, quae in Vat. et cod. recentiore *cc* perperam deest. Paulo ante auctoritate plurium mss. ut HLMNOYZ post *propriissime est* adiecimus *ens*.

en: Aristotle commonly defines substance *negatively*, as in the book *On the Categories*, ch. *On Substance*: «Neither is it said of any subject, nor is it in any subject»; and *Metaphysics* V, text 13 (IV, c. 8): «The ultimate subject, which is not said of another»; *positively*, however, [in] book I *Physics*, text 27 ff. (c. 3), where he calls it: «that which truly is»; and *Metaphysics* VII, text 1 (VI, c. 1): «being simply». From these words — or also from the opposition to *accident*, which according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 35 (IV, c. 30), is in another, or whose being is to be in another — this common definition of substance seems to have been formed, which occurs both in John of Damascus, *Dialectica* c. 4, and in Averroes, Commentary on *Metaphysics* VII, text 18: *Substances, because they are things existing per se*. — At the end of the argument, from the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the proposition *ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo* ("therefore the name substance is most properly in God"), which is wrongly absent from the Vatican edition and the more recent codex *cc*. A little before, on the authority of several manuscripts such as HLMNOYZ, we have added *ens* after *propriissime est*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 9: «Absurdum est autem, ut substantia relative dicatur: omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit: quanto magis Deus»? Et ibidem c. 5. n. 10: «Utrumque (essentia et substantia) ad se dicitur, non relative ad aliquid». — Mox codd. W Y *sed* loco *ergo si*, et codd. V X *differentia* pro *dependentia*.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 4, n. 9: «It is absurd that *substance* be said relatively: for every thing subsists in relation to itself: how much more God!»? And in the same place, c. 5, n. 10: «Each (essence and substance) is said in relation to itself, not relatively to something». — Soon after, codices W, Y [read] *sed* in place of *ergo si*, and codices V, X [read] *differentia* in place of *dependentia*.

la: Cap. 5. n. 10: *Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat et subsit Deus bonitati suae*.

en: [Augustine, VII *de Trin.*] c. 5, n. 10: *It is impious, however, to say that God should subsist and stand under (*subsit*) his own goodness*.

la: Cap. 4: *Nam substantia in illo non est vere substantia, sed ultra substantiam*.

en: [Boethius, *de Trin.*] c. 4: *For substance in him is not truly substance, but beyond substance*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* omittit *quia*. Paulo infra post *non est* in nonnullis mss. ut BSWY *aa* additur *aliquid*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* omits *quia* ("since"). A little below, after *non est*, in some manuscripts such as B, S, W, Y, *aa* is added *aliquid* ("anything").

la: Vat. contra auctoritatem mss. et ed. 1 minus distincte *aliquid* pro *alii*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, less distinctly [reads] *aliquid* ("something") in place of *alii* ("another").

la: Codd. inter se non conveniunt; maior pars eorum cum ed. 1 exhibet *et*, pro quo aliqui ut ATVX *sed*, aliqui cum Vat. *si*. Mox post *magis* in multis mss. ut AFGITVXYZ etc. et ed. 1 adiungitur *etiam*, quod Vat. omittit.

en: The codices do not agree among themselves; the greater part of them with edition 1 exhibits *et*, in place of which some such as ATVX [read] *sed*, some with the Vatican edition [read] *si*. Soon after, after *magis*, in many manuscripts such as AFGITVXYZ etc. and edition 1 is appended *etiam* ("also"), which the Vatican edition omits.

la: Aliqui codd. ut ATW cum ed. 1 omittunt *est*. Dein post *inhaerenti* cod. O addit *et haec est propria acceptio substantiae*.

en: Some codices such as ATW with edition 1 omit *est*. Then after *inhaerenti*, codex O adds *et haec est propria acceptio substantiae* ("and this is the proper acceptation of substance").

la: Plura de hoc vide infra d. 33. q. 2. — In Vat. et cod. *cc* desideratur *sed distinguit*, quae tamen verba exstant in aliis codd. et ed. 1. Mox verbis *ab alio esse* cod. O praemittit *sub alio sistere id est*, ubi et multi codd. ut ACFIKMSTUXY cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *quia* pro *quasi*.

en: See more on this below, d. 33, q. 2. — In the Vatican edition and codex *cc* the words *sed distinguit* are wanting, which words however stand in the other codices and in edition 1. Soon after, before the words *ab alio esse*, codex O places *sub alio sistere id est*, where also many codices such as ACFIKMSTUXY with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *quia* in place of *quasi*.

la: Libr. IV. c. 20: «Personae rectius dicuntur *existentiae*, quam *substantiae* vel *subsistentiae*». — Ex quibus ultimis verbis Vat. pro textu selegit *subsistentia*, dum codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibent *substantia*. Mox ex codd. W *bb* (*ee* a secunda manu) claritatis gratia adiecimus *alii* post *substat*.

en: [Richard of St. Victor,] book IV, c. 20: «Persons are more correctly called *existences* than *substances* or *subsistences*». — From these last words the Vatican edition selected *subsistentia* for the text, while the codices with the first six editions exhibit *substantia*. Soon after, from codices W, *bb* (*ee* by a second hand), for the sake of clarity, we have added *alii* after *substat*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, ceteris codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *et* pro *quia*. In fine responsionis codd. X Z *divinae essentiae* loco *divini esse*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, with the other codices and edition 1 resisting, [reads] *et* in place of *quia*. At the end of the response, codices X, Z [read] *divinae essentiae* ("of the divine essence") in place of *divini esse* ("of the divine being").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Secundum duplicem proprietatem, quae in substantia potest attendi, scilicet stare per se et substare aliis (cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 5. 6.), datur etiam responsio duplex ad quaestionem. Secundum primam proprietatem substantia recto transfertur ad divina; substantia in secundo sensu sive substare aliis iterum tripliciter potest intelligi, cui distinctioni respondet triplex responsio.

**II.** Quoad sententiam Richardi a S. Victore, quod in divinis melius dicatur *existentia* quam *subsistentia*, observandum est, quod ipse intelligit *subsistens* in sensu stricto pro eo quod per se distinctum est a proprietate, quae in ipso est ut in subiecto; *existens* vero pro eo quod per se est distinctum ex modo originis. «Sed alii doctores S. Scripturae *subsistentias* large accipiunt pro qualitercumque per se existentibus hypostasibus, et ideo personas divinas subsistentias vel substantias vocant». Ita B. Alber., hic a. I. ad. 2; cfr. etiam S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 3. ad 1.

**III.** Terminus *res naturae*, hic in corp. et alibi saepe occurrens, sumtus est ex S. Hilario (de Trinit. IX. n. 3.) et significat *suppositum*. Cfr. infra d. 34. q. I. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 2. in corp. dicit: «Substantia dicitur res naturae, secundum quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae».

**IV.** In conclusionibus omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 1. a. 3. § 1., et q. 57. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 3. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 13. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R., q. 2. collater. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 5. n. 31. seqq., a. 68. q. 1. n. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** According to the twofold property which can be considered in substance — namely, *to stand through itself* and *to substand others* (cfr. above, d. 8, p. II, dub. 5, 6) — a twofold response is also given to the question. According to the first property, *substance* is rightly transferred to divine matters; *substance* in the second sense, or "to substand others", can again be understood in three ways, to which distinction a threefold response corresponds.

**II.** As regards the opinion of Richard of St. Victor, that in divine matters *existentia* is better said than *subsistentia*, it is to be observed that he understands *subsistens* in a strict sense for that which is per se distinct from the property which is in it as in a subject; whereas *existens* [he takes] for that which is per se distinct by mode of origin. «But other doctors of Sacred Scripture take *subsistences* broadly for hypostases existing per se in any way whatever, and therefore they call the divine persons *subsistences* or *substances*». So Bl. Albert, here a. 1, ad 2; cfr. also St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1.

**III.** The term *res naturae* (thing of [a] nature), here in the body and elsewhere often occurring, is taken from St. Hilary (*On the Trinity* IX, n. 3) and signifies *supposit*. Cfr. below, d. 34, q. 1. — St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 29, a. 2, in the body, says: «*Substance* is called *res naturae*, insofar as it is supposited under some common nature, just as this man is the *res naturae* of human [nature]».

**IV.** In the conclusions all agree. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 1, a. 3, § 1, and q. 57, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 3. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following, here a. 1; *S.* p. I, tr. 10, q. 13, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), q. 2, collater. 1 and 2. — Henr. of Ghent, *S.* a. 32, q. 5, n. 31 ff., a. 68, q. 1, n. 4. — Dionys. the Carthusian, here q. 1, 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Whether the name essence is fittingly used in divine matters; and on the difference of the names essence, subsistence, substance, and person

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.

#### *Utrum nomen essentiae in divinis convenienter adhibeatur; insuper quaeritur de differentia nominum essentia, subsistentia, substantia et persona.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum nomen essentiae dici [debeat] in divinis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus septimo *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Essentia vere ac proprie dicitur in divinis, ita ut forte solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam».

2. Item, hoc nomen *qui est* est nomen, quod ipse Deus sibi imposuit[^2]; ergo si ipse proprie se nominat, Deus proprie dicitur *qui est*; sed de quocumque proprie dicitur *qui est*, proprie potest dici in ipso[^3] *essentia*: ergo et in divinis dicitur *essentia*.

3. Item, inter omnia nomina nomen *essentiae* est absolutissimum, unde essentia secundum Avicennam[^4] dicitur *rei quidditas nomine absoluto*; cum ergo in divinis sit omnimoda absolutio: ergo et nomen *essentiae*.

**Contra:** 1. Non intelligimus Deum nisi in creaturis et per[^5] creaturas; sed nominatio Dei est per nostrum intelligere: ergo nullum nomen absolutum omnino debet poni in Deo.

2. Item, quaero, in quo differant nomen *substantiae* et[^6] *essentiae*? Nam *substantia* aut dicit commune, aut suppositum. Si suppositum: ergo superfluit nomen *personae*; si commune: ergo superfluit

<!-- page 409 -->

nomen *essentiae*: ergo cum debeamus labia nostra circumcidere in loquendo de Deo, nequaquam debet hoc nomen poni in Deo[^7].

3. Item, quaeritur gratia huius de necessitate et sufficientia et differentia istorum quatuor nominum: *essentia*, *subsistentia*, *substantia* et *persona*.

> **Conclusio.** *Nomen essentiae convenienter adhibetur in divinis; ratio et sufficientia quatuor nominum explicantur.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ista quatuor nomina sive vocabula[^8] in genere respondent quatuor vocabulis in Graeco, quae sunt: *usia*, *usiosis*, *hypostasis* et *prosopon*, ut *usia* respondeat *essentiae*, *usiosis* *substantiae*, *hypostasis* *subsistentiae* et *prosopon* *personae*.

Ratio autem et sufficientia horum[^9] quatuor nominum ab aliquibus accipitur sic. In divinis est accipere *communicabile* et *incommunicabile*, et hoc ex veritate et necessitate fidei, quae dicit Deum trinum et unum.

Et cum nos[^10] debeamus intelligere in Deo, quod vere est, per id quod videmus in his inferioribus, maxime secundum nobiles et primas et praecipuas conditiones; cum in communi in inferioribus inveniatur *quod est* et *qui est*[^11], ratione cuius significatur in concretione et in abstractione, ut dicatur *homo* et *humanitas*: sic in divinis intelligimus, quamvis non intelligamus in differentia illa duo. Ideo et in abstractione significamus[^12] per hoc nomen *deitas*, et in concretione per hoc nomen *Deus*. Et ideo imposuimus ei nomen, quo significaretur ipsum *quo est*, et hoc est *essentia*; et ipsum *quod est*, et hoc est *substantia*; et ita haec duo nomina accipiuntur ex parte communis.

Est etiam in divinis accipere, quod est *incommunicabile*, et hoc est *quid distinctum*, sive *quis distinctus*. Et hoc quidem contingit dupliciter intelligi sive significari: vel in quantum *distinguibile*, et hoc per nomen *subsistentiae* sive *hypostasis*; vel in quantum *distinctum*, et hoc per nomen *personae*. Et licet in Deo nihil differant *distinguibile* et *distinctum*, quia potentia in eo semper actui est coniuncta, tamen contingit duplici nomine significari[^13].

Unde differunt ista quatuor nomina secundum modum intelligendi, sicut *quo est*, *quod est*, *qui est*, *quis est*[^14]. Et quoniam in Deo idem est *quo est* et *quod est* ex una parte, et *distinguibile* et *distinctum* ex alia secundum rem, Sancti accipiunt et *substantiam* et *essentiam* pro eodem; similiter et *hypostasis* nomine utuntur Graeci pro supposito actu distincto. Unde distinctio per *quo* et *quod est*, et per *distinguibile* et *distinctum* in nominibus[^15] divinis non facit diversitatem nisi secundum rationem intelligendi.

Fuerunt etiam[^16] alii volentes dicere, quod *substantia* et *essentia* accipiuntur ex parte communis, sed differenter, quia illud commune contingit intelligi sub duplici ratione: una est, quod omnia indigent[^17] eo, ut sint; alia est, quod ipsum non eget aliis. Primo modo dicitur *essentia*, a qua et per quam omnia sunt; secundo modo *substantia*, quoniam per se stat, omnibus[^18] aliis circumscriptis. *Subsistentia* vero sive *hypostasis* et *persona* accipiuntur ex parte incommunicabilis et differunt. Quamvis enim utrumque nomen dicat *quid distinctum*, tamen *hypostasis* dicit suppositum substantiae distinctum, sed *persona* dicit distinctum proprietate nobili.

Fuerunt alii, qui voluerunt dicere, quod ista quatuor nomina distinguuntur per *communicabile* et *incommunicabile*, secundum quod potest unumquodque dupliciter significari: vel in abstractione, vel in concretione. Nam *communicabile* potest significari[^19] in abstractione, et sic dicitur *essentia*; vel in concretione ad suppositum, et sic dicitur *substantia*. Similiter *incommunicabile* potest significari in abstractione, et sic dicitur *subsistentia* sive *hypostasis*; vel in concretione, et sic dicitur *persona*.

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Sed tamen omnes isti modi habent calumniam. *Primus quidem*, qui sumitur per *distinguibile* et *distinctum*, quia Graeci utuntur vocabulo *hypostasis*, ubi nos utimur *persona*, et ita pro supposito distincto. Et Damascenus[^20] dicit, quod «*hypostasis* est *substantia* cum *proprietatibus*»; et ita significat actu distinctum. *Secundus modus* similiter[^21] habet calumniam, quia *essentia* non videtur aliquo modo significari ut in ratione causae respectu aliorum, cum sit nomen absolutissimum. *Tertius modus* habet calumniam similiter, quia *substantia* significat in abstractione, sicut *essentia*; et praeterea dubium est, utrum sit intelligere *hypostases*, abstractis proprietatibus; et ideo si non est intelligere, quomodo contingit significare?

Et propterea *quartus modus dicendi* est, quod cum fides dicat, Deum esse trinum et unum[^22], in quantum dicit *unum*, non possumus intelligere unum, quin intelligamus *quod est* et *quo est unum*; et *quo est unum* est illud *quo est*, et *quod est unum* est illud *quod est*. Primum est *essentia*, secundum *substantia*. Si intelligimus *trinum*, necesse est, quod[^23] intelligamus eum *qui distinguitur*, et *quo distinguitur*. *Quo distinguitur* est proprietas: ille autem *qui distinguitur* semper significatur ut distinctus. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel ut distinctus proprietate quacumque, vel ut distinctus proprietate nobili sive notabili[^24]. Primum significatur nomine *subsistentiae*, quae dicitur *prima substantia*[^25], et convenit non tantum individuo hominis, sed etiam asini. Secundum significatur per hoc nomen *persona*, quod importat nobilem proprietatem et non convenit nisi supposito rationalis creaturae[^26]. Quia Graeci utuntur nomine *hypostasis*, sicut nos nomine *personae*, ideo dicit Boethius[^27], quod Graeci utuntur nomine *hypostasis* pro supposito rationalis naturae. His visis patent obiecta.

**Ad 1.** Quod autem obiicitur, quod non debemus Deum nominare absolute; dicendum, quod quamvis nominemus Deum per creaturas, tamen etiam per creaturas cognoscimus, eum habere esse absolutum. Alia patent.

english:
### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether the name "essence" is fittingly used in divine matters; and there is also asked the difference of the names essence, subsistence, substance, and person.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the name *essence* may [or: ought to] be said in divine matters. And that [it] so [should be], it seems:

1. Augustine, in book seven *On the Trinity*[^1]: «*Essence* is truly and properly said in divine matters, so much so that perhaps God alone ought to be called *essence*».

2. Likewise, this name *who is* (*qui est*) is the name which God himself imposed upon himself[^2]; therefore if he properly so names himself, God is properly called *who is*; but of whatever *who is* is properly said, *essence*[^3] can properly be said in him: therefore *essence* too is said in divine matters.

3. Likewise, among all names the name *essence* is the most absolute; whence essence according to Avicenna[^4] is called *the quiddity of a thing under an absolute name*; since therefore in divine matters there is every-way absoluteness: therefore [there is] also the name *essence*.

**On the contrary:** 1. We do not understand God except in creatures and through[^5] creatures; but the naming of God is through our understanding: therefore no absolute name at all ought to be put in God.

2. Likewise, I ask: in what do the name *substance* and[^6] *essence* differ? For *substance* signifies either the common, or the supposit. If the supposit: then the name *person* is superfluous; if the common: then the name *essence* is superfluous: therefore, since we ought to circumcise our lips in speaking of God, this name ought by no means to be put in God[^7].

3. Likewise, by reason of this it is asked concerning the necessity, sufficiency, and difference of these four names: *essence*, *subsistence*, *substance*, and *person*.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "essence" is fittingly used in divine matters; the rationale and sufficiency of the four names are explained.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that these four names or terms[^8] in their genus correspond to four terms in Greek, which are: *usia*, *usiosis*, *hypostasis*, and *prosopon* — so that *usia* corresponds to *essentia*, *usiosis* to *substantia*, *hypostasis* to *subsistentia*, and *prosopon* to *persona*.

Now the rationale and sufficiency of these[^9] four names is taken by some thus. In divine matters there is to be taken *the communicable* and *the incommunicable*, and this from the truth and necessity of the faith, which says God [is] threefold and one.

And since we[^10] ought to understand in God what truly is, through that which we see in these lower [things], chiefly according to the noble, primary, and principal conditions; since in the common in the lower [things] there is found *that which is* (*quod est*) and *who is* (*qui est*)[^11], by reason of which it is signified in concretion and in abstraction — so that one says *man* (*homo*) and *humanity* (*humanitas*) — so in divine matters we understand [the same], although we do not understand those two as in [actual] difference. Therefore also we signify[^12] in abstraction by this name *deity* (*deitas*), and in concretion by this name *God* (*Deus*). And therefore we have imposed on him a name by which the *that-by-which-it-is* itself (*ipsum quo est*) might be signified, and this is *essence*; and the *that-which-is* itself (*ipsum quod est*), and this is *substance*; and so these two names are taken on the side of the common.

There is also to be taken in divine matters that which is *incommunicable*, and this is a *distinct what* (*quid distinctum*) or a *distinct who* (*quis distinctus*). And this indeed it happens to be understood or signified in two ways: either insofar as *distinguishable*, and this through the name *subsistence* or *hypostasis*; or insofar as *distinct*, and this through the name *person*. And although in God the *distinguishable* and the *distinct* in no way differ — because in him potency is always conjoined to act — nevertheless it happens [that they are] signified by a twofold name[^13].

Whence these four names differ according to the mode of understanding, like *that-by-which-it-is*, *that-which-is*, *who is*, *which one is* (*quo est*, *quod est*, *qui est*, *quis est*)[^14]. And since in God the *quo est* and *quod est* on the one side, and the *distinguishable* and *distinct* on the other, are the same in reality, the Saints take both *substance* and *essence* for the same; likewise the Greeks too use the name *hypostasis* for an actually distinct supposit. Whence the distinction by *quo* and *quod est*, and by *distinguishable* and *distinct*, in the divine names[^15] does not make a diversity except according to the rationale of understanding.

There were also[^16] others who would say that *substance* and *essence* are taken on the side of the common, but differently, because that common can be understood under a twofold rationale: one is, that all things stand in need[^17] of it, in order to be; another is, that itself stands not in need of others. In the first way it is called *essence*, from which and through which all things are; in the second way *substance*, since it stands through itself, with all[^18] others set aside. *Subsistence*, however — or *hypostasis* — and *person* are taken on the side of the incommunicable and they differ. For although each name says *a distinct what*, nevertheless *hypostasis* signifies *the distinct supposit of substance*, but *person* signifies the distinct [supposit] *by a noble property*.

There were others who would say that these four names are distinguished through *communicable* and *incommunicable*, according as each can be twofold signified: either in abstraction, or in concretion. For the *communicable* can be signified[^19] in abstraction, and so it is called *essence*; or in concretion to a supposit, and so it is called *substance*. Likewise the *incommunicable* can be signified in abstraction, and so it is called *subsistence* or *hypostasis*; or in concretion, and so it is called *person*.

But yet all these modes have a fault [*habent calumniam* — i.e. are open to objection]. *The first*, indeed, which is taken by way of *distinguishable* and *distinct*, [has a fault] because the Greeks use the term *hypostasis* where we use *person*, and so for a distinct supposit. And John Damascene[^20] says that «*hypostasis* is *substance* with *properties*»; and so it signifies an actually distinct [thing]. *The second mode* likewise[^21] has a fault, because *essence* does not seem in any way to be signified as in the rationale of a cause with respect to others, since it is the most absolute name. *The third mode* has a fault similarly, because *substance* signifies in abstraction, just as *essence*; and besides, it is doubtful whether it is [possible] to understand *hypostases* with the properties abstracted; and therefore if it is not [possible] to understand [them so], how does it happen that one signifies [them]?

And therefore *the fourth mode of speaking* is that, since the faith says God to be threefold and one[^22], insofar as it says *one*, we cannot understand *one* without understanding *that which is* (*quod est*) and *that by which it is one* (*quo est unum*); and *the by-which it is one* is that *quo est*, and *that which is one* is that *quod est*. The first is *essence*, the second *substance*. If we understand *threefold*, it is necessary that[^23] we understand *him who is distinguished* and *that by which he is distinguished*. *That by which he is distinguished* is the property; but he *who is distinguished* is always signified as distinct. And this can be in two ways: either as distinct by any property whatever, or as distinct by a noble or notable property[^24]. The first is signified by the name *subsistence*, which is called *first substance*[^25], and belongs not only to the individual of [the species] man, but also of [the species] ass. The second is signified by this name *person*, which imports a noble property and belongs only to a supposit of a rational creature[^26]. Because the Greeks use the name *hypostasis* as we [use] the name *person*, therefore Boethius[^27] says that the Greeks use the name *hypostasis* for a supposit of rational nature. With these things seen, the objections are clear.

**To 1.** As for what is objected, that we ought not to name God absolutely; it must be said that, although we name God through creatures, yet through creatures also we know that he has absolute being. The others are clear.

la: Cap. 3. n. 10; in quo textu fide plurium mss. ut GHY *ee* et ed. 1 nec non originalis post *oporteat* expunximus *per*.

en: [Augustine, VII *de Trin.*] c. 3, n. 10; in which text, on the witness of several manuscripts such as GHY, *ee*, and edition 1, as well as the original, we have struck out *per* after *oporteat*.

en: Exodus 3:14.

la: Vat. *de ipso*. Paulo ante post *qui est* a nonnullis mss. ut ASTVXY et ed. 1 omittitur *proprie*. Circa finem argumenti post *dicitur* in cod. M repetitur *bene proprie*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *de ipso* ("of him"). A little before, after *qui est*, in some manuscripts such as ASTVXY and edition 1 *proprie* is omitted. Near the end of the argument, after *dicitur*, in codex M *bene proprie* is repeated.

la: Prae manibus habemus principaliora tantum Avicennae opera (ed. Venet. sine anno), scil. *Logicam*, librum *Sufficientiae*, *de Caelo et mundo*, *de Anima*, *de Animalibus*, *de Intelligentiis* et *Primam philosophiam* (metaphysicam). Licet sententia, quam S. Bonav. hic refert, in ceteris etiam Avicennae operibus quoad verbum non inveniretur, sicut in praedictis opusculis verbotenus non occurrit, colligi tamen ipsa posse videtur ex doctrina Avicennae de universalibus. Secundum ipsum enim essentiae rerum sub triplici respectu considerari possunt. «Unus respectus essentiae est, secundum quod ipsa est non relata ad aliquid tertium esse nec ad id quod sequitur eam, secundum quod ipsa est sic. Alius respectus est, secundum quod est in his singularibus; et alius, secundum quod est in intellectu» (*Log.* p. I. c. 1.). Essentiae in se consideratae, seu quatenus essentia est, Avicenna vindicat *esse absolutissimum* i. e. tale quod excludit quemlibet respectum. Sic in *Prima philosophia*, tract. 5. c. 1. agendo de esse universalium ait: «Ponamus ergo in hoc duas considerationes (de essentia humanitatis), unam considerationem de ipsa, secundum quod est ipsa, et aliam considerationem de consequentibus ipsam. Secundum autem primam considerationem non est nisi humanitas tantum; unde si quis interrogaverit, an humanitas, quae est in Platone, ex hoc quod est humanitas, sit alia ab illa, quae est in Socrate, et necessario dixerimus: non, non oportebit consentire ei, ut dicatur: ergo haec et illa sunt una numero; quoniam negatio illa absoluta fuit, et intelleximus in ea, quod illa humanitas, ex hoc quod est humanitas, est humanitas tantum… Dicemus ergo, quod hoc est quiddam sensibile, quod est animal vel homo cum materia et accidentibus, et hoc est homo naturalis; et hoc est quiddam, quod est animal vel homo consideratum in se ipso secundum hoc quod est ipsum, non accepto cum eo hoc quod est sibi admixtum, sine conditione communis aut proprii aut unius aut multi, nec in effectu nec in respectu etiam potentiae, secundum quod est aliquid in potentia; animal enim ex hoc quod est animal, et homo ex hoc quod est homo, scil. quantum ad definitionem suam et intellectum suum absque consideratione omnium aliorum, quae comitantur illum, non est nisi animal vel homo» etc. Cfr. S. Thomas, *de Ente et essentia*. — In conclusione argumenti fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *et*.

en: We have at hand only the principal works of Avicenna (Venice ed., undated), namely the *Logic*, the book *Sufficientia*, *On Heaven and the World*, *On the Soul*, *On Animals*, *On Intelligences*, and the *First Philosophy* (Metaphysics). Although the opinion which St. Bonaventure here reports is not found verbatim even in the other works of Avicenna — just as it does not occur word-for-word in the aforesaid little works — yet it seems that it can be gathered from Avicenna's doctrine on universals. For according to him the essences of things can be considered under a threefold respect. «One respect of essence is, according as it itself is not related to a third being, nor to that which follows upon it, according as it itself is thus. Another respect is, according as it is in these singulars; and another, according as it is in the intellect» (*Log.* p. I, c. 1). To essence considered in itself, or insofar as it is essence, Avicenna ascribes that it is *most absolute*, i.e. such as excludes every respect. So in the *First Philosophy*, tract. 5, c. 1, in treating of the being of universals, he says: «Let us therefore set down here two considerations (concerning the essence of humanity), one consideration about itself, according as it is itself, and another consideration about what follows upon it. Now according to the first consideration there is only humanity; whence if anyone should ask whether the humanity which is in Plato, by reason of being humanity, is other than that which is in Socrates, and we should necessarily say: no — it will not be necessary to assent to him, that it be said: therefore this and that are one in number; because that negation was absolute, and we understood in it that that humanity, by reason of being humanity, is humanity only… We shall say therefore that this is a certain sensible thing, which is animal or man with matter and accidents, and this is the natural man; and there is something which is animal or man considered in itself according to what it is itself, without taking with it that which is mixed in with it, without the condition of common or proper or one or many, neither in effect nor in respect even of potency, according as it is something in potency; for animal, by reason of being animal, and man, by reason of being man — namely as to its definition and its intellect, without consideration of all the other [things] which accompany it — is nothing but animal or man» etc. Cfr. St. Thomas, *On Being and Essence*. — At the conclusion of the argument, on the witness of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have added *et*.

la: Ita melius mss. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, dum Vat. cum ed. 1 habet *propter*. Paulo ante in aliquibus mss. ut AST etc. deest *et per creaturas*, sed minus bene et contra rationem ad hoc obiectum infra positam.

en: So [read] better the manuscripts with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, while the Vatican edition with edition 1 has *propter* ("on account of"). A little before, in some manuscripts such as AST etc. *et per creaturas* is missing, but less well and against the reason given against this objection below.

la: Vat. hic repetit *nomen*.

en: The Vatican edition here repeats *nomen* ("name").

la: Cod. X ultima haec verba activo modo: *nequaquam debemus hoc nomen ponere in Deo*.

en: Codex X [has] these last words in the active mode: *nequaquam debemus hoc nomen ponere in Deo* ("we ought by no means to put this name in God").

la: In multis mss. ut AFGHIKTVWXY et ed. 1 omittitur *nomina sive*, in cod. S autem *sive vocabula*.

en: In many manuscripts such as AFGHIKTVWXY and edition 1 *nomina sive* ("names or") is omitted; in codex S, however, *sive vocabula* ("or terms") [is omitted].

la: Aliqui codd. cum Vat. *istorum*, sed mox Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 minus distincte *aliquando* pro *ab aliquibus*.

en: Some codices with the Vatican edition [read] *istorum*, but soon after the Vatican edition, against the older manuscripts and edition 1, less distinctly [reads] *aliquando* in place of *ab aliquibus*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *nos*. Mox, plurimis codd. et ed. 1 exigentibus, substituimus *id* pro *illud*, ac dein ex fere omnibus mss. mutavimus *notabiles* in *nobiles*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, with the other codices and edition 1 resisting, omits *nos* ("we"). Soon after, since most of the codices and edition 1 require it, we have substituted *id* for *illud*, and then on the basis of nearly all the manuscripts we have changed *notabiles* to *nobiles*.

la: Fide plurium mss. ut HIKWX *ee* et ed. 1 adiunximus *est*, ut et communiter haec duo exhibentur. Paulo infra cod. H *cum differentia* loco *in differentia*.

en: On the witness of several manuscripts such as HIKWX, *ee*, and edition 1 we have added *est*, as these two are also commonly exhibited. A little below, codex H [reads] *cum differentia* ("with difference") in place of *in differentia* ("in difference").

la: Vat. cum paucis tantum codd. *significatur*, et paulo infra contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *significaremus* pro *significaretur*, ubi codd. LO *quod significaret* loco *quo significaretur*. In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 post *imposuimus* deest *ei*.

en: The Vatican edition with only a few codices [reads] *significatur*, and a little below, against nearly all the codices and edition 1, [reads] *significaremus* in place of *significaretur*, where codices LO [have] *quod significaret* in place of *quo significaretur*. In most of the manuscripts and in edition 1, *ei* is missing after *imposuimus*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *significare*, sed minus cohaerenter cum praecedentibus. Ed. 1 insuper *ratione* pro *nomine*.

en: Most codices with edition 1 [read] *significare*, but less coherently with what precedes. Edition 1 moreover [reads] *ratione* in place of *nomine*.

la: Fide maioris partis codd. et ed. 1 omisimus ter particulam *et*, qua Vat. dictiones *quo est*, *quod est* etc. coniungit; pauci codd. exhibent particulam *et* bis tantum, nempe inter primas duas dictiones ac inter duas ultimas.

en: On the witness of the greater part of the codices and edition 1 we have three times omitted the particle *et*, with which the Vatican edition joins the phrases *quo est*, *quod est*, etc.; a few codices exhibit the particle *et* only twice, namely between the first two phrases and between the last two.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. minus distincte *omnibus* pro *nominibus*.

en: The Vatican edition with some manuscripts less distinctly [reads] *omnibus* in place of *nominibus*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut AZ cum ed. 1 *et* pro *etiam*.

en: Some codices such as AZ with edition 1 [read] *et* in place of *etiam*.

la: Ed. 1 *egent*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *egent* (instead of *indigent*; both meaning "they need").

la: Vat. minus bene et contra antiquiores mss. cum ed. 1 omittit *omnibus*. Plures codd. ut FHIPQTZ *aa* et ed. 1 *per se est* loco *per se stat*, et aliqui codd. ut VWX post *secundo modo* repetunt *dicitur*. Paulo infra cod. L *distinguuntur* pro *differunt*.

en: The Vatican edition, less well and against the older manuscripts, with edition 1 omits *omnibus*. Several codices such as FHIPQTZ, *aa*, and edition 1 [read] *per se est* in place of *per se stat*, and some codices such as VWX repeat *dicitur* after *secundo modo*. A little below, codex L [reads] *distinguuntur* in place of *differunt*.

la: Lectionem Vat. castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *significari* pro *significare*. Dein post *concretione* plures codd. ut ACORSTWY non male omittunt *ad suppositum*. — Cod. Z cum ed. 1 hic addit *et*, ac mox codd. ASTY cum ed. 1 *secundum* loco *per*.

en: We have corrected the Vatican reading from the manuscripts and edition 1, putting *significari* for *significare*. Then after *concretione*, several codices such as ACORSTWY rightly omit *ad suppositum*. — Codex Z with edition 1 here adds *et*, and soon after codices ASTY with edition 1 [read] *secundum* in place of *per*.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 6: *Hypostasis enim definitur essentia cum accidentibus*.

en: [John Damascene,] book III *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6: *For hypostasis is defined as essence with accidents*.

la: Auctoritate plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 hic supplevimus *similiter*, et mox substituimus *significat* pro *significatur*. Paulo infra post *non est intelligere* cod. *aa* repetit *hypostases abstractis proprietatibus*.

en: On the authority of most of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have here supplied *similiter*, and soon after we have substituted *significat* for *significatur*. A little below, after *non est intelligere*, codex *aa* repeats *hypostases abstractis proprietatibus*.

la: In cod. T hic additur *unum*.

en: In codex T *unum* ("one") is here added.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *ut* (in place of *quod*).

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit *sive notabili*.

en: The Vatican edition, beyond the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *sive notabili* ("or notable").

la: Plura *de prima substantia* seu individua substantia videsis in Aristot., libr. *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia*.

en: More *on first substance*, or individual substance, may be seen in Aristotle, book *On the Categories*, ch. *On Substance*.

la: Ed. 1 *naturae*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut ATZ cum ed. 1 *notabilem* pro *nobilem*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *naturae* (in place of *creaturae*). A little before, several codices such as ATZ with edition 1 [read] *notabilem* in place of *nobilem*.

la: Libr. *de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi*, c. 3. — Vat. in principio huius propositionis contra mss. et sex primas edd. *Pro qua* loco *Quia*, ac dein praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 *ut dicit Boethius, qui ait* pro *ideo dicit Boethius*, nec non paulo post *creaturae* pro *naturae*.

en: [Boethius,] book *On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ*, c. 3. — The Vatican edition at the beginning of this proposition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *Pro qua* in place of *Quia*, and then beyond the witness of most of the manuscripts and edition 1 [reads] *ut dicit Boethius, qui ait* in place of *ideo dicit Boethius*; not to mention, a little later, *creaturae* in place of *naturae*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro faciliore intelligentia aliquorum terminorum, in hac et sequentibus distinctionibus saepe occurrentium, haec ex communi antiquorum doctrina notamus.

1. *Essentia*, *substantia*, *natura*, licet in Deo sint omnino idem et etiam respectu creaturarum ab auctoribus saepe confundantur, tamen in rigore significationis differunt. *Essentia* «sumitur ab *esse*, quod est communissimum» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. I. ad 4.), et simul maxime abstractum et «absolutissimum» (S. Bonav. hic in 3. fundam.) i. e. quod omnem dependentiam et respectum ad extra maxime excludit, et est «maxime intimum cuilibet» (S. Thom., S. q. 8. a. I.). *Essentia* est proprie id «quod significatur per definitionem» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 2. ad 3.). Unde dici potest de rebus omnium praedicamentorum. — *Substantia* est magis contractae significationis, cum de eo tantum dicatur, quod est in primo praedicamento, et distinguitur contra *accidens*, quia est illud quod est *per se* et *alterum sustinet*. — *Natura* significationem habet adhuc magis contractam. Dicit S. Bonav. (III. *Sent.* d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.): «In hoc differt *essentia* a *natura*, quod *essentia* nominat rei formam in quadam abstractione, *natura* eam nominat ut entem in motu et materia, ut naturalium operationum principium».

2. *Communicabilitas* et *incommunicabilitas* duplex est. Alia est *communicabilitas per identitatem*, qua aliquod superius suis inferioribus ita est communicabile, ut de ipsis in recto praedicetur. Ita *homo* est communicabile omnibus humanis individuis. Alia est *communicabilitas per informationem* sive «per unius constitutionem», qua aliquid ita communicatur, ut sit alicuius rei forma vel substantialis vel accidentalis, sicut anima communicatur corpori, et quodlibet accidens suo subiecto; cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. — Utroque modo essentia divina a nobis concipitur communicabilis et communicata personis, scil. ut *quo est* et ut *quod est*. Nam essentia divina praedicatur in recto de personis (Pater est essentia divina), et concipitur a nobis etiam ut ratio, qua ipsae personae sunt Deus (Pater essentia divina est Deus).

3. Differunt *particulare* et *singulare*, *individuum*, *suppositum*, *persona*. *Particulare* potest etiam *species* dici respectu generis, sed *singulare* seu *individuum* semper opponitur *speciei*. Duplex autem est *singulare*: vel in genere accidentis, et hoc est communicabile subiecto ut forma accidentalis; vel in genere substantiae, et sic *singulare* vel *individuum* est naturaliter incommunicabile utroque modo supra dicto. De ratione *individui* est, quod sit divisum ab aliis, quae sunt vel possunt esse in eadem specie, in se indivisum existens. Unde de facto *individuum* in genere substantiae (si praescindimus ab humana Christi natura) coincidit cum *supposito*, de cuius ratione est incommunicabilitas; secundum conceptum vero ambo distinguuntur. Quomodo vero *suppositum* et *subsistentia* distinguantur a natura singulari, sive quid eidem addant tum in creatis tum in divinis, est quaestio difficilis et controversa, de qua vide infra d. 23. Schol. ad q. 1, et quoad *suppositum* in divinis d. 34. q. 1. — Denique *persona* iterum magis contrahit significationem *suppositi*; nam *suppositum* etiam in rebus materialibus reperitur, *persona* vero addit nobilitatem naturae intellectualis et eo ipso altiorem gradum in se subsistendi.

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Minus enim res materiales in se subsistunt quam spirituales, per se loquendo. Unde naturae intellectivae dicuntur et sunt eminenti modo *formae subsistentes*. De *persona* cfr. infra d. 25. per totam.

**II.** Circa differentiam et sufficientiam quatuor nominum, de quibus agitur in corp., tres afferuntur opiniones, quae omnes ab eodem fundamento procedunt, scilicet ab illa distinctione inter *communicabile* (commune) et *incommunicabile* (proprium); sed in ulteriore explicatione vias aliquatenus diversas tenent, ut exponitur in textu. Omnes tres opiniones S. Doctor reputat ex aliqua parte deficientes («habent calumniam»). Contra primam opinionem ipse urget hanc rationem, quod theologi cum S. Ioan. Damasceno *hypostasim* et *personam* eodem sensu accipiunt; contra secundam, quod abutatur nomine *essentiae* et faciat referre ad creaturas, cum sit «absolutissimum»; quae ratio confirmatur a S. Thom. (S. I. q. 39. a. 2. in corp.); contra tertiam duas affert rationes, quarum prima habet aliquam difficultatem. Videtur enim S. Doctor negare, quod *substantia* accipi possit in concreto, quod tamen alibi (a. 2. q. 2.) cum S. Thoma clare docet dicendo, *personam* posse nominari *substantiam*. Fortasse solum usum loquendi pro argumento adduxit; unde etiam statim aliam addidit rationem. — Denique propriam suam opinionem egregie explanat, consentientibus Alexandro et S. Thoma.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 1; q. 57. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. I. q. 29. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. collater. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68. q. 3; n. 1. a. 33. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** For an easier understanding of certain terms which often occur in this and the following distinctions, we note these things from the common doctrine of the ancients.

1. *Essence*, *substance*, [and] *nature* — although in God they are altogether the same, and even with respect to creatures they are often confused by authors — nevertheless in strict signification they differ. *Essence* «is taken from *to-be* (*esse*), which is the most common» (St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4), and at the same time it is most abstract and «most absolute» (St. Bonaventure here in the 3rd fundamentum), i.e. that which most excludes every dependence and respect *ad extra*, and is «most intimate to anything whatsoever» (St. Thomas, *Summa* [I], q. 8, a. 1). *Essence* is properly that «which is signified by the definition» (St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3). Whence it can be said of things in all the categories. — *Substance* is of more contracted signification, since it is said only of that which is in the first category, and is distinguished against *accident*, because it is that which is *per se* and *sustains another*. — *Nature* has a still more contracted signification. St. Bonaventure says (III *Sent.* d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4): «In this *essence* differs from *nature*, that *essence* names the form of a thing in a certain abstraction, [whereas] *nature* names it as a being in motion and matter, as the principle of natural operations».

2. *Communicability* and *incommunicability* are twofold. One is *communicability by identity*, by which something superior is so communicable to its inferiors, that it is predicated of them in the direct case (*in recto*). Thus *man* is communicable to all human individuals. Another is *communicability by information* or «by the constitution of one [thing]», by which something is so communicated as to be the form — substantial or accidental — of some thing, just as the soul is communicated to the body, and any accident to its subject; cfr. III *Sent.* d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1. — In each mode the divine essence is conceived by us as communicable and communicated to the persons, namely as *that-by-which-it-is* and as *that-which-is*. For the divine essence is predicated *in recto* of the persons (the Father is the divine essence), and is also conceived by us as the rationale by which the persons themselves are God (the Father, [who is] the divine essence, is God).

3. *Particular*, *singular*, *individual*, *supposit*, [and] *person* differ. *Particular* can also be said of a *species* with respect to a genus, but *singular* or *individual* is always opposed to *species*. Now *singular* is twofold: either in the genus of accident, and this is communicable to a subject as an accidental form; or in the genus of substance, and so the *singular* or *individual* is naturally incommunicable in each mode said above. It belongs to the rationale of *individual* that it be divided from others which are or can be in the same species, existing in itself undivided. Whence in fact the *individual* in the genus of substance (if we set aside the human nature of Christ) coincides with the *supposit*, of whose rationale incommunicability is part; but according to concept the two are distinguished. How indeed *supposit* and *subsistence* are distinguished from a singular nature, or what they add to the same — both in created and in divine [things] — is a difficult and controverted question, on which see below d. 23, Schol. ad q. 1, and as to *supposit* in divine [things], d. 34, q. 1. — Finally, *person* again further contracts the signification of *supposit*; for *supposit* is found also in material things, but *person* adds the nobility of the intellectual nature and by that very fact a higher grade of subsisting in itself. For material things, properly speaking, subsist in themselves less than spiritual ones. Whence intellectual natures are called and are, in an eminent mode, *subsistent forms*. On *person* cfr. below, d. 25, throughout.

**II.** Concerning the difference and sufficiency of the four names treated in the body, three opinions are brought forward, all of which proceed from the same foundation — namely from that distinction between *communicable* (the common) and *incommunicable* (the proper); but in the further explication they hold somewhat diverse roads, as is set forth in the text. The Holy Doctor reckons all three opinions to be in some part deficient («they have a calumny» [i.e. are open to objection]). Against the first opinion he himself urges this reason: that the theologians, with St. John Damascene, take *hypostasis* and *person* in the same sense; against the second, that it abuses the name *essence* and makes it refer to creatures, since it is «the most absolute» — which reason is confirmed by St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 39, a. 2, in the body); against the third he brings two reasons, of which the first has some difficulty. For the Holy Doctor seems to deny that *substance* may be taken in the concrete, which however elsewhere (a. 2, q. 2) he clearly teaches, with St. Thomas, by saying that *person* can be named *substance*. Perhaps he adduced only common usage of speech as an argument; whence also straightway he added another reason. — Finally he excellently explains his own opinion, with Alexander and St. Thomas agreeing.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 49, m. 1; q. 57, m. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; *S.* I, q. 29, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), here q. 2, collater. 3. — Henr. of Ghent, *S.* a. 68, q. 3; n. 1, a. 33, q. 1. — Dionys. the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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