title: Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Christus sit duo
Whether Christ is two

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De varietate harum opinionum, in qua videlicet sit maior probabilitas.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus sit duo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus sit duo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus ad Felicianum[^2]: « Aliud est Filius Dei, aliud filius hominis »; sed quod est aliud et aliud est duo: ergo etc. *(Ad oppositum.)*

2. Item, Hilarius in libro nono de Trinitate[^3]: « Christus, homo Iesus, quamvis sit aliud de Patre, aliud de Matre, non tamen alius »; sed quod est aliud et aliud est duo: ergo etc.

3. Item, Christus, secundum quod Deus, est unum unitate increata; secundum quod homo, est unum unitate creata: si ergo unitas creata et increata est alia et alia, ergo Christus est duo.

4. Item, differentia essentialis dat esse[^4], ergo diversae differentiae essentiales dant diversa esse; sed in Christo est differentia essentialis naturae humanae, scilicet rationale, quae essentialiter differt a natura divina: ergo necesse est, Christum habere diversa esse. Sed quae habent diversa esse sunt duo: ergo videtur, quod Christus sit duo.

5. Item, una natura in pluribus personis facit, illas personas esse unum, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus in Trinitate unum sunt: ergo pari ratione plures naturae in una persona facient, illam personam esse duo; sed Christus est una persona in duabus naturis: ergo Christus est duo.

6. Item, propter unionem est communicatio idiomatum[^5]; sed non est communicatio eiusdem ad se: ergo necesse est, inter ea quibus idiomata communicantur, esse differentiam. Sed non est communicatio idiomatum quantum ad naturas, sed quantum ad supposita naturarum, quae dicuntur de Christo, et quorum unum dicitur de altero: si ergo illud, de quo praedicantur duo diversa, est duo; videtur, quod Christus sit duo, cum in eo sit idiomatum communicatio.

7. Item, Christus, secundum quod Deus, est aliquid, quod est Pater, secundum quod homo, est aliquid, quod non est Pater: ergo est aliquid et aliquid[^6]: ergo videtur, quod necesse sit ponere, Christum esse duo.

**Sed contra:** 1. Damascenus in libro tertio[^7]: « Divina natura humanam sibi univit in unam suarum hypostasum »: ergo si hypostasis nominat ipsum suppositum, unum est suppositum in Christo; sed illud, in quo est unum suppositum, unum est, non duo: ergo etc. *(Fundamenta.)*

2. Item, Hilarius de Trinitate nono[^8]: « Cum non sit aliud Filius Dei, aliud filius hominis, requiro, quis sit clarificatus »: ergo Christus non est aliud et aliud; nec alius et alius, et hoc constat: ergo non est duo, sed unum.

3. Item, « omne quod est, ut dicit Boethius[^9], ideo est, quia unum est »; sed Christus est: ergo necesse est, Christum esse unum et unum simpliciter et in actu, igitur est indivisum; et quod est indivisum non est duo: ergo Christus non est duo.

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4. Item, sicut divisio dicit ordinem ad multitudinem, sic unio dicit ordinem ad unitatem[^1b]: si ergo in incarnatione non fuit divisio, sed magis unio; videtur, quod esse multa sive duo, nullatenus conveniat Christo.

5. Item, si Christus est duo, quaero: quid duo? aut duae naturae, aut duae personae; neutrum horum est dare: naturae duae non, quia natura humana non praedicatur de Christo; duae personae non, quia, sicut supra[^2b] ostensum fuit et inferius ostendetur, in Christo non est nisi una persona: ergo etc.

6. Item, si aliqua duo differunt essentialiter in suppositis, impossibile est, unum praedicari de altero; sed Deus et homo essentialiter differunt: ergo si in Christo habent differentiam suppositorum, ergo non praedicantur de se mutuo: ergo nec Deus est homo, nec homo Deus, quod est communiter contra omnes Sanctos[^3b].

7. Item, « individuum constat ex proprietatibus, quarum collectionem impossibile est in altero reperiri[^4b] »: sed quidquid dicitur de Filio Dei, dicitur de filio hominis, et e converso: ergo Filius Dei et filius hominis in Christo non differunt numero, sicut individua duo: ergo Christus non potest dici duo individua sive supposita, nec potest dici duae naturae: ergo nullatenus videtur, quod debeat dici duo.

### Conclusio

> Christus non debet dici duo, sed unum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Christus sit duo, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi: *(sensus triplex.)* uno modo, ut dicatur Christus esse duae naturae; et hoc modo nullus posuit nec intellexit, Christum esse duo, pro eo quod humana natura non praedicatur de Christo[^5b]. *(Conclusio 1.)* — Alio modo potest intelligi, quod Christus sit duo, videlicet duae personae; et hoc modo fuit haereticum et contra Symbolum. Dicit enim Athanasius[^6b]: « Non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus ». *(Conclusio 2.)* — Tertio modo potest intelligi, quod Christus sit duo medio modo, non quia Christus sit duae naturae, vel duae personae, sed quia sit duo supposita, vel duae res naturae, quae tenent[^7b] quasi medium inter dualitatem naturae et dualitatem personae. Et iste modus dicendi pertinuit ad primam opinionem, nec est haereticus, sed multam habuit probabilitatem. *(Notandum.)* Cum enim diversis naturis diversae respondeant res naturae, et diversis substantiis diversa respondeant supposita; ideo dicere voluerunt, Christum, qui est Deus ratione divinae naturae, et homo ratione humanae, esse duas res naturae, quarum tamen una praedicatur de altera propter unitatem personae.

Sed licet haec positio habeat aliquid probabilitatis, aliquid tamen dicit adeo improbabile, quod paucos aut nullos habet defensores. *(Non probatur.)* Planum enim est, quod illa, quorum unum de altero praedicatur, invicem non numerantur, quamvis formaliter distinguantur; utpote si dicatur: Petrus est musicus, musicus et Petrus non sunt duo, quamvis inter Petrum et musicam suam sit distinctio[^8b]. Si ergo haec opinio dicit, quod Deus est homo, et homo est Deus; non potest sustineri, quod sint duo in Christo, secundum quod dicuntur concretive ad suppositum. Et ideo concedendum est, istam opinionem esse falsam, et huius opinionis auctores deceptos fuisse. *(Conclusio 3.)*

Ratio autem huius deceptionis venit ex hoc, *(Origo deceptionis.)* quod non distinxerunt inter suppositum, secundum quod suppositum dicitur quod subiicitur generi[^9b], et suppositum, quod dicitur illud, in quo substantificatur totum esse rei; cum tamen magna sit differentia. *(Notandum.)* Si enim dicatur suppositum quod subiicitur generi; corpus et color diversa habent supposita, quia diversas habent differentias[^10b]. Si autem dicatur suppositum, secundum quod in eo substantificatur totum esse rei; sic corpus et color unum possunt habere suppositum, quia una est substantia et unum individuum, in quo salvatur natura[^11b] corporalitatis et natura coloris. Res autem non numeratur secundum supposita in subiiciendo et praedicando, sed secundum numerum suppositorum in essendo et substantificando. *(Notandum.)* — Quoniam igitur natura humana in Christo substantificatur in divina persona, hinc est, quod unum est ibi suppositum, secundum quod attenditur numeratio rei quantum ad

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esse in actu. Et ideo Christus non debet dici duo, sed unum. *(Conclusio.)* — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. 2. Ad illas ergo duas auctoritates ad contrarium, quae obiiciuntur, quod Christus est aliud et aliud; dicendum, quod illae praedicationes sunt impropriae et debent sic exponi: Christus est aliud et aliud, id est alterius et alterius naturae. *(Solutio oppositorum.)* *(Notandum.)* Et ex hoc non sequitur, quod Christus sit duo, sed solum, quod in Christo sint plura[^1c]. Locutio enim impropria non est extendenda.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus est unum, secundum quod est Deus, unitate increata, et unum, secundum quod homo, unitate[^2c] creata; dicendum, quod magis proprie dicitur unus, quam dicatur esse unum. In Christo enim est una sola persona, quamvis non sit una sola natura. Nihilominus tamen potest dici unum, secundum quod Deus, et unum, secundum quod homo. Illud tamen unum et illud[^3c], secundum quod dicuntur de Christo, non ponunt in numerum, quia Christus non dicitur unum, secundum quod homo abstractive, sed concretive. Quamvis autem unitas creata et increata possint dici duo; quia tamen in Christo, secundum quod dicitur, concretive dicitur, unitas creata ad suppositum increatum comparatur et de eodem praedicatur; ideo non ponit in numerum, ut Christus possit dici duo, sicut nec Petrus et hoc album, eodem demonstrato[^4c].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversae differentiae essentiales dant diversa esse; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando suppositum illud, ad quod comparantur illae differentiae, non praecedit naturaliter quantum ad esse actuale aliquam illarum differentiarum: sicut Petrus non est ante istam differentiam[^5c] rationale, et Brunellus ante istam differentiam, quae est irrationale. Non sic autem est in proposito. Nam Filius Dei, qui est hypostasis, est suppositum humanae naturae per unionem et naturaliter praecedit quantum ad esse actuale essentialem differentiam hominis. Et ideo illa differentia non dat ei esse simpliciter, sed tale esse; advenit enim *(Notandum.)* hypostasi iam completae in esse, et ideo non potest in eam plurificari.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una natura in pluribus personis facit esse unum etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia natura divina sic est in pluribus personis, quod de qualibet praedicatur, non solum in concretione, sed et in abstractione; et ideo, cum ipsa sit una, necesse est, illas tres hypostases esse unum quid. Duae autem naturae ita concurrunt in unam personam Christi, ut tamen humana natura praedicari non valeat in abstractione, sed magis in concretione ad idem suppositum; et quia hoc modo non numerantur, sed uniuntur, ideo non potest una persona dici plura, sicut plures personae in divinis dicuntur una natura.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propter unionem est communicatio idiomatum; dicendum, quod verum est. — Si autem quaeratur, quid ibi[^6c] communicet idiomata; respondendum est, quod non natura naturae, secundum quod considerantur in abstractione, sed hypostasis divinae naturae communicat sibi idiomata, secundum quod est hypostasis in humana natura; non quia ipsa in se sit diversa, sed quia diversis naturis est supposita. *(Quaestio incidens solvitur.)* — Vel certe ipsae naturae, secundum quod dicuntur in concretione, possunt sibi ipsis idiomata communicare, ut dicatur: Deus est homo, et homo est Deus; et quando intelliguntur sic accipi, dicitur[^7c] ut res naturae, quae quasi medium tenet inter naturam abstractive consideratam et ipsam hypostasim. *(Alio modo.)* *(Notandum.)* Et hoc modo est ibi recte communicatio idiomatum, quia est ibi diversitas inter res naturae, habito respectu ad ipsas naturas; et est ibi unitas, habito respectu ad ipsam personam[^8c].

Et si tu obiicias, quod Christus tunc non debet dici nec unum, nec duo, sed medium tenere inter dualitatem et unitatem; dicendum, quod quamvis res naturae habeant rationem medii, plus tamen quantum ad unitatem se tenent cum ipsa hypostasi. *(Obiectio et nota.)* — Et ratio huius est duplex, prima videlicet, quia res naturae praedicatur de ipsa hypostasi, sed non praedicatur de ipsa natura abstractive *(Ratio duplex.)*

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considerata, nec e converso. Alia ratio est, quia denominatio fit a termino[^1d], unio autem ordinatur tanquam ad terminum; et quia in Christo naturae in una hypostasi uniuntur, ideo res naturae in Christo non ponunt in numerum, ut propter ipsas Christus dicatur esse duo.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus est aliquid, quod est Pater; dicendum, quod cum dicitur Christus esse aliquid, secundum quod homo, aliquid non dicit ipsam naturam abstractam, sed naturae suppositum. Unde cum dicitur Christus esse homo, relatio implicatur intrinsecus[^2d]. Sicut igitur non valet: Christus est essentia, quae est Pater, et est persona, quae non est Pater, ergo est duo; quia essentia non ponit in numerum cum persona, nec dictum substantialiter cum eo quod dicitur secundum relationem: sic non habet vigorem aliquem illatio rationis praedictae. Unde peccatum illius illationis reduci potest ad locum sophisticum, qui est figura dictionis[^3d].

english:
### Article I. *On the variety of these opinions, namely, in which there is the greater probability.*
### Question I. *Whether Christ is two.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether Christ is two. And that he is, it seems.

1. Augustine, *to Felicianus*[^2]: "The Son of God is one thing, the son of man another"; but what is one thing and another is two: therefore etc. *(In the opposite direction.)*

2. Likewise, Hilary in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^3]: "Christ, the man Jesus, although he is one thing from the Father and another from the Mother, is nevertheless not another person"; but what is one thing and another is two: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he is God, is one by an uncreated unity; insofar as he is man, he is one by a created unity: if therefore the created and the uncreated unity are one thing and another, then Christ is two.

4. Likewise, an essential difference gives being[^4], therefore diverse essential differences give diverse beings; but in Christ there is an essential difference of the human nature, namely the rational, which differs essentially from the divine nature: therefore it is necessary that Christ have diverse beings. But things that have diverse beings are two: therefore it seems that Christ is two.

5. Likewise, one nature in several persons makes those persons to be one, as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in the Trinity are one: therefore by parity of reasoning several natures in one person will make that person to be two; but Christ is one person in two natures: therefore Christ is two.

6. Likewise, on account of the union there is a communication of idioms[^5]; but there is no communication of the same thing to itself: therefore it is necessary that there be a difference between the things whose idioms are communicated. But the communication of idioms is not with respect to the natures, but with respect to the supposits of the natures, which are said of Christ, and of which one is said of the other: if therefore that of which two diverse things are predicated is two; it seems that Christ is two, since in him there is a communication of idioms.

7. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he is God, is something that is the Father, insofar as he is man, is something that is not the Father: therefore he is something and something[^6]: therefore it seems that it is necessary to posit that Christ is two.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene in the third book[^7]: "The divine nature united the human nature to itself into one of its hypostases": therefore if "hypostasis" names the supposit itself, there is one supposit in Christ; but that in which there is one supposit is one, not two: therefore etc. *(Foundations.)*

2. Likewise, Hilary, *On the Trinity*, ninth book[^8]: "Since the Son of God is not one thing and the son of man another, I ask, who has been glorified?": therefore Christ is not one thing and another; nor one person and another, and this is established: therefore he is not two, but one.

3. Likewise, "everything that is, as Boethius says[^9], is for this reason, because it is one"; but Christ is: therefore it is necessary that Christ be one, and one simply and in act, therefore he is undivided; and what is undivided is not two: therefore Christ is not two.

4. Likewise, just as division states an order to multitude, so union states an order to unity[^1b]: if therefore in the Incarnation there was not division, but rather union; it seems that to be many or two in no way befits Christ.

5. Likewise, if Christ is two, I ask: which two? either two natures, or two persons; neither of these can be granted: not two natures, because the human nature is not predicated of Christ; not two persons, because, as was shown above[^2b] and will be shown below, in Christ there is but one person: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if any two things differ essentially in their supposits, it is impossible for one to be predicated of the other; but God and man differ essentially: therefore if in Christ they have a difference of supposits, then they are not predicated of each other: therefore neither is God man, nor man God, which is commonly against all the Saints[^3b].

7. Likewise, "an individual is constituted out of properties, the collection of which it is impossible to find in another[^4b]": but whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the son of man, and conversely: therefore the Son of God and the son of man in Christ do not differ in number, like two individuals: therefore Christ cannot be called two individuals or supposits, nor can he be called two natures: therefore it in no way seems that he ought to be called two.

### Conclusion

> Christ ought not to be called two, but one.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether Christ is two, this can be understood in three ways: *(threefold sense.)* in one way, so that Christ is said to be two natures; and in this way no one has posited nor understood Christ to be two, since the human nature is not predicated of Christ[^5b]. *(Conclusion 1.)* — In another way it can be understood that Christ is two, namely two persons; and in this way it was heretical and against the Creed. For Athanasius says[^6b]: "Yet not two, but one is Christ." *(Conclusion 2.)* — In a third way it can be understood that Christ is two in a middle way, not because Christ is two natures or two persons, but because he is two supposits, or two "things of nature" (*res naturae*), which hold[^7b] as it were a middle between the duality of nature and the duality of person. And this manner of speaking belonged to the first opinion, and is not heretical, but had much probability. *(Note.)* For since to diverse natures diverse "things of nature" correspond, and to diverse substances diverse supposits correspond; therefore they wished to say that Christ, who is God by reason of the divine nature and man by reason of the human, is two "things of nature," of which nevertheless one is predicated of the other on account of the unity of the person.

But although this position has something of probability, it nevertheless says something so improbable that it has few defenders or none. *(Not proven.)* For it is plain that those things of which one is predicated of the other are not numbered against each other, although they are formally distinguished; as for example if it be said: Peter is a musician, "musician" and "Peter" are not two, although between Peter and his music there is a distinction[^8b]. If therefore this opinion says that God is man, and man is God; it cannot be sustained that there are two in Christ, insofar as they are said concretely with respect to the supposit. And therefore it must be granted that this opinion is false, and that the authors of this opinion were deceived. *(Conclusion 3.)*

But the reason for this deception comes from this, *(The origin of the deception.)* that they did not distinguish between supposit, insofar as a supposit is said to be that which is subjected to a genus[^9b], and supposit, which is said to be that in which the whole being of a thing is substantified; whereas there is a great difference. *(Note.)* For if supposit be said to be that which is subjected to a genus; body and color have diverse supposits, because they have diverse differences[^10b]. But if supposit be said to be that according to which the whole being of a thing is substantified in it; then body and color can have one supposit, because there is one substance and one individual in which the nature[^11b] of corporeity and the nature of color are preserved. But a thing is not numbered according to supposits in being-subjected and being-predicated, but according to the number of supposits in being and substantifying. *(Note.)* — Since therefore the human nature in Christ is substantified in the divine person, hence it is that there is one supposit there, insofar as the numbering of the thing is attended to with respect to

being in act. And therefore Christ ought not to be called two, but one. *(Conclusion.)* — And the reasons that show this are to be granted.

1. 2. To those two authorities for the contrary, then, which are objected, that Christ is one thing and another; it must be said that those predications are improper and ought to be expounded thus: Christ is one thing and another, that is, of one nature and of another. *(Solution of the opposing arguments.)* *(Note.)* And from this it does not follow that Christ is two, but only that in Christ there are several things[^1c]. For an improper manner of speaking is not to be extended.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ is one, insofar as he is God, by an uncreated unity, and one, insofar as he is man, by a created unity[^2c]; it must be said that he is more properly called one [masc.] than he is said to be one [neut.]. For in Christ there is but one person, although there is not but one nature. Nevertheless he can be said to be one, insofar as he is God, and one, insofar as he is man. Yet that "one" and that "[one]"[^3c], insofar as they are said of Christ, do not constitute a number, because Christ is not called one insofar as he is man abstractly, but concretely. But although the created and the uncreated unity can be called two; nevertheless, because in Christ, insofar as he is spoken of, he is spoken of concretely, the created unity is compared to the uncreated supposit and predicated of the same; therefore it does not constitute a number, such that Christ could be called two, just as neither Peter and this white thing, when the same thing is pointed out[^4c].

4. To that which is objected, that diverse essential differences give diverse beings; it must be said that this is true when the supposit to which those differences are compared does not naturally precede, with respect to actual being, any of those differences: as Peter is not before this difference[^5c] "rational," and Brunellus before this difference which is "irrational." But it is not so in the matter at hand. For the Son of God, who is a hypostasis, is the supposit of the human nature through the union and naturally precedes, with respect to actual being, the essential difference of the man. And therefore that difference does not give him being simply, but such-being; for it comes *(Note.)* to a hypostasis already complete in being, and therefore cannot be multiplied into it.

5. To that which is objected, that one nature in several persons makes them to be one, etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because the divine nature is in several persons in such a way that it is predicated of each, not only in concretion, but also in abstraction; and therefore, since it is one, it is necessary that those three hypostases be one something. But the two natures so concur into the one person of Christ that nevertheless the human nature cannot be predicated in abstraction, but rather in concretion to the same supposit; and because in this way they are not numbered but united, therefore one person cannot be called several, just as several persons in the divine are said to be one nature.

6. To that which is objected, that on account of the union there is a communication of idioms; it must be said that this is true. — But if it be asked what communicates the idioms there[^6c]; it must be answered that it is not nature to nature, insofar as they are considered in abstraction, but the hypostasis of the divine nature communicates idioms to itself, insofar as it is a hypostasis in the human nature; not because it is in itself diverse, but because it is supposited to diverse natures. *(The incidental question is resolved.)* — Or certainly the natures themselves, insofar as they are said in concretion, can communicate idioms to each other, so that it is said: God is man, and man is God; and when they are understood to be taken thus, it is said[^7c] as a "thing of nature," which holds as it were a middle between the nature considered abstractly and the hypostasis itself. *(In another way.)* *(Note.)* And in this way there is rightly a communication of idioms there, because there is there a diversity between the things of nature, regard being had to the natures themselves; and there is there a unity, regard being had to the person itself[^8c].

And if you object that Christ then ought to be called neither one nor two, but to hold a middle between duality and unity; it must be said that although the things of nature have the character of a middle, nevertheless they incline more toward unity, holding with the hypostasis itself. *(Objection and note.)* — And the reason for this is twofold: the first, namely, that the thing of nature is predicated of the hypostasis itself, but is not predicated of the nature itself considered abstractly *(The reason is twofold.)*

considered, nor conversely. The other reason is, that denomination is made from a terminus[^1d], whereas the union is ordered as to a terminus; and because in Christ the natures are united in one hypostasis, therefore the things of nature in Christ do not constitute a number, such that on their account Christ should be called two.

7. To that which is objected, that Christ is something that is the Father; it must be said that when Christ is said to be something, insofar as he is man, "something" does not signify the abstract nature itself, but the supposit of the nature. Hence when Christ is said to be man, a relation is intrinsically implied[^2d]. Just as therefore this does not hold: "Christ is the essence, which is the Father, and is a person, which is not the Father, therefore he is two"; because the essence does not constitute a number with the person, nor what is said substantially with what is said according to relation: so the inference of the aforesaid reasoning has no force. Hence the fallacy of that inference can be reduced to the sophistical topic which is the figure of speech[^3d].

la: Sive contra Felician. Arian. de Unitate Trinitatis (habetur inter opera August., sed est Vigilii) c. 11.

en: Or *against the Arian Felicianus, On the Unity of the Trinity* (found among the works of Augustine, but it is Vigilius's), c. 11.

la: Num. 14, sed tantum quoad sententiam. Dicit enim ibi Hilarius: *Per sacramentum autem evangelicae dispensationis non alius est in forma servi, quam qui in forma Dei est, cum tamen servi formam accipere et in forma Dei manere non idem sit* etc. Cfr. ibid. n. 4. Cod. R allegat 5. de Trinitate. Ipsa verba testimonii allati potius inveniuntur apud Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 42. n. 85, et apud Isidor., I. Sent. c. 14. n. 5. Infra d. VII. c. 2. ista verba a Magistro tribuuntur Augustino.

en: Num. 14, but only as to the sense. For Hilary there says: *But through the sacrament of the evangelical dispensation he who is in the form of a servant is not another than he who is in the form of God, since nevertheless to take the form of a servant and to remain in the form of God is not the same thing*, etc. Cf. ibid. n. 4. Codex R cites *On the Trinity*, book 5. The very words of the cited testimony are rather found in Gregory, *Moralia* XVIII, c. 42, n. 85, and in Isidore, *Sentences* I, c. 14, n. 5. Below, d. VII, c. 2, these words are attributed by the Master to Augustine.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, in fine.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Difference*, at the end.

la: Vide supra pag. 14, nota 3.

en: See above, p. 14, note 3.

la: Vat. addit *et per consequens est aliud et aliud.*

en: The Vatican edition adds: *and consequently he is one thing and another.*

la: De Fide orthod. c. 6. — In auctoritate allegata codd. et edd. 1, 2, a textu origin. discrepantes, pro *in unam suarum hypostasum* minus praecise exhibent *in unam suam hypostasim.* Lectioni a Vat. et a nobis receptae primitus etiam codd. K Z assentiebantur (postea lectio eorum commutata est a secunda manu). Cfr. tamen infra lit. Magistri, d. IX. — Paulo inferius pro *unum est, non duo* edd. et codd., exceptis codd. K (a prima manu) et Z, quos sequimur, inepte *unum est in Christo, non duo.* In cod. M desunt verba *unum est suppositum in Christo; sed illud, in quo est unum suppositum.*

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6. — In the cited authority the codices and editions 1, 2, diverging from the original text, less precisely give for *into one of its hypostases* the reading *into one hypostasis of its own*. To the reading received by the Vatican edition and by us, codices K and Z at first also assented (afterwards their reading was altered by a second hand). Cf. however below, the Master's text, d. IX. — A little later, for *it is one, not two*, the editions and codices, except codices K (by a first hand) and Z, which we follow, ineptly read *it is one in Christ, not two*. In codex M the words *there is one supposit in Christ; but that in which there is one supposit* are lacking.

la: Num. 40. In testimonio allato Vat. bis pro *aliud* substituit *alius.* Nostra lectio sumta est e codd. K Z bb, et notamus, quod sunt plures alii codd., ut A F etc., qui semel saltem exhibent *aliud.* Magister quoque, d. VII. c. 2, stat pro nostra lectione, et editores Maurini in nota ad calcem operis cit. apposita asserunt, lectionem *aliud*, licet minus accurata sit, tamen in vetustissimis codd. inveniri. Demum nostram lectionem comprobat etiam sententia et processus ipsius argumenti.

en: Num. 40. In the cited testimony the Vatican edition twice substitutes *alius* (another person) for *aliud* (another thing). Our reading is taken from codices K Z bb, and we note that there are several other codices, such as A F, etc., which at least once exhibit *aliud*. The Master too, d. VII, c. 2, stands for our reading, and the Maurist editors, in a note appended at the foot of the cited work, assert that the reading *aliud*, although it is less accurate, is nevertheless found in the most ancient codices. Finally our reading is also confirmed by the sense and the course of the argument itself.

la: In libro de Unitate et uno. Cfr. lib. de Una Persona et duab. natur. c. 4, de quo vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 2.

en: In the book *On Unity and the One*. Cf. the book *On the One Person and the Two Natures*, c. 4, on which see above, d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, foundation 2.

la: Boeth., III. Comment. in Porphyr. c. de Specie: *Dividere enim est in multitudinem quod unum ante fuerat dissolvere; omnisque divisio e contrario compositionem coniunctionemque meditatur.*

en: Boethius, *Third Commentary on Porphyry*, the chapter *On Species*: *For to divide is to dissolve into a multitude what before was one; and every division by contrast looks to composition and conjunction.*

la: Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 2. et infra a. 2. huius dist. q. 1. — In maiori pro *quid duo* Vat. substituit *quae duo.* Subinde ante *neutrum* codd. N X Y interiiciunt *sed.*

en: Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 2, and below, a. 2 of this distinction, q. 1. — In the major premise, for *which two* the Vatican edition substitutes *what two things*. Then, before *neither*, codices N X Y insert *but*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 7. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, in fine. Cfr. de hoc arg. Anselm., de Fide Trin. c. 6.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species*, at the end. Cf. on this argument Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity*, c. 6.

la: Scil. in abstracto sive per essentiam, dicendo: Christus est humana natura. Cfr. infra ad 5. et 6.

en: Namely, in the abstract or by essence, by saying: Christ is the human nature. Cf. below, *ad 5* and *ad 6*.

la: In Symbolo.

en: In the Creed.

la: Pro *tenent* non pauci codd. *tenet*, perperam. Paulo inferius pro *multam habuit probabilitatem* codd. D O *multum habuit probabilitatis.* Deinde pro *voluerunt* codd. K Z *voluit.*

en: For *they hold* not a few codices read *it holds*, wrongly. A little later, for *had much probability* codices D O read *had much of probability*. Then for *they wished* codices K Z read *he wished*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 7. et 16. (IV. c. 6. et 9).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, texts 7 and 16 (IV. c. 6 and 9).

la: De his infra d. 10. a. 1, q. 3. dicitur: *Est suppositum in quo* et *suppositum de quo*, scilicet «de quo alterum praedicatur et quod subiicitur superiori», quod S. Thom. (hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2) vocat suppositum locutionis. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie. — *Suppositum, in quo* totum esse rei salvatur, est substantia in se subsistens (cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, scholion).

en: Concerning these things it is said below, d. 10. a. 1. q. 3: there is a *suppositum in which* and a *suppositum of which*, namely "of which the other is predicated and which is subjected to a superior," which St. Thomas (here a. 1. quaestiunc. 2) calls the supposit of speech. Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species*. — A *supposit in which* the whole being of a thing is preserved is a substance subsisting in itself (cf. above, d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, scholion).

la: Vel aliis verbis: *Corpus* et *color* diversa sunt supposita, quia sub diversis generibus (substantiae et qualitatis) ponuntur; atque secundum logicam et grammaticam eis tribuuntur diversa supposita, quia species, quae sub ipsis tanquam generibus ponuntur et in quas dividuntur, sunt diversae.

en: Or in other words: *body* and *color* are diverse supposits, because they are placed under diverse genera (of substance and of quality); and according to logic and grammar diverse supposits are attributed to them, because the species which are placed under them as genera, and into which they are divided, are diverse.

la: Vat. perperam addit *personalitatis sive suppositi et.* Subinde pro *corporalitatis* codd. K Z *corporeitatis.*

en: The Vatican edition wrongly adds *of personality or of supposit and*. Then for *of corporeity* (*corporalitatis*) codices K Z read *corporeitatis*.

la: Sicut non sequitur, ut Alex. Hal. ait S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 1, ex parte hominis, quod quamvis [ipse] sit corpus et anima coniuncta, et anima est unum et corpus unum: ergo homo est plura.

en: Just as it does not follow, as Alexander of Hales says, S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 1, on the side of man, that although [he] is body and soul conjoined, and the soul is one and the body is one: therefore man is several.

la: Codd. A F G H I L N T U Z aa *in unitate.*

en: Codices A F G H I L N T U Z aa read *in unity* (*in unitate*).

la: Intellige, cum cod. K *et unum.* Paulo inferius edd. verbis *homo, abstractive* praemittunt *dicitur.* Deinde pro *Quamvis autem* codd. K Z bb *Quamvis enim*, et versus finem solut. pro *non ponit in numerum* cod. G *non potest concedi.*

en: Understand, with codex K, *and one*. A little later the editions prefix *is said* to the words *man, abstractly*. Then for *But although* codices K Z bb read *For although*, and toward the end of the solution, for *does not constitute a number* codex G reads *cannot be conceded*.

la: Cfr. Rustic. Diacon. (circiter an. 550) contra Acephalos disputatio. Rationem habentes eorum quae infra q. 3. in corp. occurrunt, addimus hic solutionem Gulielmi Antissiodorensis, qui S. p. III. tr. 1. q. 3. dicit: «Dicimus, quod revera Christo inest binarius essentialis; sed quia una unitatum illius binarii est [!], licet sit essentialis, tamen degenerat in accidentalem, sicut et ipsa humanitas; ideo binarius ille non numerat supposita, sed naturas, sicut binarius accidentium non numerat subiecta, sed suas formas». In exemplum adducit Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 13. (IV. c. 7.), hominem iustum musicum. — In propositione non satis clara, supplendum videtur *unitas* post *secundum quod.*

en: Cf. the *Disputation against the Acephali* of Rusticus the Deacon (about the year 550). Taking account of the things that occur below, q. 3, in the body, we add here the solution of William of Auxerre, who in S. p. III. tr. 1. q. 3 says: "We say that there is really in Christ an essential pair; but because one of the unities of that pair is [!], although it be essential, nevertheless it degenerates into an accidental one, as does the humanity itself; therefore that pair does not number supposits, but natures, just as a pair of accidents does not number subjects, but their forms." As an example he adduces Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 13 (IV. c. 7), "the just musical man." — In the not sufficiently clear proposition, *unity* seems to be supplied after *insofar as*.

la: Cod. U subiicit *quae est.* Paulo inferius post *naturaliter praecedit* codd. A B D F I (K a prima manu) L N T U inserunt *et* (i. e. etiam). Deinde post *advenit* edd. omittunt *enim*, omissa etiam interpunctione ante *advenit.*

en: Codex U appends *which is*. A little later, after *naturally precedes*, codices A B D F I (K by a first hand) L N T U insert *et* (i.e. "also"). Then, after *comes*, the editions omit *for*, the punctuation before *comes* also being omitted.

la: Pro *ibi* cod. bb *sibi*, codd. G N T *tibi*, codd. A I K L aa *cui.* — Fuse agit de his Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 18.

en: For *there* codex bb reads *to itself*, codices G N T *to you*, codices A I K L aa *to which*. — Damascene treats of these things at length, IV. *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 18.

la: Vat. clarius *dicuntur*, et subinde pro *quae quasi medium* cum edd. 1, 2 et compluribus codd. *quia medium*, et immediate post *sola tenent* pro *tenet.*

en: The Vatican edition more clearly reads *they are said*, and then, for *which as it were a middle*, with editions 1, 2 and several codices, *because a middle*, and immediately after, *they alone hold* for *it holds*.

la: Codd. U Z bb *ad ipsas personas.* Verba *et est ibi unitas... personam* in plurimis codd. nec non in edd. 1, 2 desunt.

en: Codices U Z bb read *to the persons themselves*. The words *and there is there a unity... the person* are lacking in most codices and also in editions 1, 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 46, nota 5. — Mox post *ordinatur* Vat. supplet *ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam.* Subinde pro *et quia in Christo naturae* codd. W Y *et quia in Christo res naturae.*

en: Cf. above, p. 46, note 5. — Soon after *is ordered* the Vatican edition supplies *to the hypostasis or person itself*. Then for *and because in Christ the natures* codices W Y read *and because in Christ the things of nature*.

la: Scil. relatio humanae naturae ad Verbi personam, qua natura humana subsistit. — Paulo inferius, ubi legimus *ponit in numerum cum persona*, edd. 1, 2 ponit *numerum in persona.* Etiam multi codd. pro *cum persona* exhibent *in persona.*

en: Namely, the relation of the human nature to the person of the Word, by which the human nature subsists. — A little later, where we read *constitutes a number with the person*, editions 1, 2 read *constitutes a number in the person*. Many codices too, for *with the person*, exhibit *in the person*.

la: De qua vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.) et tom. I. pag. 740, nota 6. — Pro *illius illationis* codd. C H N X *illius locutionis.*

en: On which see Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 3 (c. 4), and vol. I, p. 740, note 6. — For *of that inference* codices C H N X read *of that manner of speech*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Magister in hac et seq. distinctione fuse refert famosas illas tres opiniones de Christo homine, de quibus a tempore Abaelardi in scholis per saecula est disputatum, licet paulo post Lombardum, qui rem iniudicatam reliquit, theologi in reiiciendis primae et tertiae opinionis positionibus communiter convenerint. Cum S. Bonav. in Commentario ad utramque dist. passim has opiniones tangat, nonnulla praelibanda videntur, ut intelligatur, tum quid ipsae doceant, tum quid de singulis sit iudicandum.

Primo igitur est notandum, de quo obiecto controvertebatur; deinde quae principia ab omnibus praesupponebantur; denique quas theses singulae sustinebant, et in quibus inter se differebant.

Obiectum, de quo controvertebatur, fuit, quid proprie constituat hominem Christum, ut homo est.

Praesupponebant autem omnes, ut fusius docet S. Thom. (hic post divisionem textus), et conveniebant in quatuor: 1. ex parte termini unionis confitebantur unam in Christo personam, contra Nestorium; 2. ex parte effectus fatebantur, duas naturas distinctas et inconfusas remansisse, contra Eutychen; 3. ex parte assumti concedebant, et perfectam animam et corpus assumta fuisse, contra Apollinaristas aliosque haereticos; 4. ex parte modi assumtionis docebant, formationem, unionem, assumtionem eodem temporis instanti evenisse, distinguentes tantum ordinem naturae, et hoc est contra quendam errorem a Damasceno (IV. de Fide orthod. c. 6.) relatum.

Theses principales singularum opinionum breviter, sed sufficienter a nostro auctore (hic post divisionem textus, cfr. etiam infra d. 7. post divisionem textus) enumerantur. Plura exhibent Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 6. per totam); nec non S. Thom. (loco cit. et brevius S. III. q. 2. a. 3. 6.), qui distincte proponit, in quibus singulae conveniant atque differant, insuper in plerisque harum distinctionum quaestionibus docet, quid ad eas secundum principia uniuscuiusque opinionis resolvendum sit; demum clarissime eas exponit Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. et dub. lat. Etiam posteriores Scholastici de iisdem agunt et inter priores Gulielm. Antissiodorensis, Summa aurea libr. III. tr. 1. q. 1. 8. — Fundamentum autem et radix primae opinionis, quae secundum Antissiodorensem (loc. cit. q. 8.) fuit archiepiscopi Senonensis et sequacium, est assertio, quod anima et corpus unita assumuntur, et quidem ita, ut ex ista unione, quae secundum intellectum praecedit assumtionem ad Verbum, constituatur non solum humanitas, sed etiam homo. — Secunda opinio vult, quod non ex sola unione corporis et animae, sed insuper ex unione cum persona Verbi oriatur, quod sit hic homo. — Tertiae opinionis fundamentum est duplex, scilicet, quod ex ista unione animae et corporis in Christo non resultet unum tertium, et quod haec duo adveniunt divinae personae accidentaliter. Haec fuit opinio Abaelardi.

Secundo. Ex praedictis satis patet, defensores istarum opinionum intentionem quidem habuisse defendendi veritatem catholicam, patronos tamen primae et tertiae opinionis pravo dialecticae usu se ipsos laqueis sophisticarum rationum irretisse et incidisse fere in errorem Nestorii. Communiter igitur posteriores Scholastici tertiam opinionem censurant ut haereticam (vide infra q. 3.), primam (de qua hic agitur) ut falsam; et approbant secundam ut omnino tenendam: tamen de 2. eiusdem articulo, quod persona Verbi incarnata aliquo modo facta sit composita, remanebat dubium, quod in seq. quaestione discutitur (de his opinionibus vide etiam infra a. 1. q. 3. in fine). — Observamus autem, S. Thomam in Sum. (III. q. 2. a. 6.) censurasse tum primam tum tertiam opinionem ut haereticam. Tamen in Comment. (hic q. 1.) mitiore censura reprobat primam opinionem, immo (ibid. a. 2.) de eadem dicit: « Non est haeretica ». Similiter etiam Alex. Hal. excusat eandem, « quantum valemus »; similiter B. Albert., Petrus a Tar., Scotus aliique, excepto Aegidio R., non ita gravi censura eam qualificant. — Mirum sane est, quod Petrus Lombardus non ausus sit suum iudicium de his opinionibus determinate ferre (cfr. d. VII. in fine). Hac de causa et ob quandam de Trinitate doctrinam (sed sanam) Magistrum acerrime insectatur Walterus, Prior S. Victoris (Parisiis) in quodam libro « contra manifestas et damnatas etiam in Conciliis haereses » etc., ipsumque in prologo numerat inter « quatuor labyrinthos Franciae », simul cum Abaelardo, Petro Pictaviensi et Gilberto Porretano, utpote « uno Aristotelico spiritu afflatos » (cfr. dissertatio P. Denifle in recenti periodico *Archiv für Litteratur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* von H. Denifle O. Pr. et Fr. Ehrle S. I, Heft 2. 3. pag. 406 seqq. et Heft 4. pag. 584).

**II.** In hac quaest. reprobatur primae opinionis articulus quartus, quo quidem falsitas principiorum, ex quibus legitime sequitur, manifestatur. Cum sententia communi suae aetatis S. Bonav. hanc positionem pluribus modis repetit esse falsam. Ne autem sibi ipsi contradicat, verba eius (in corp.): « Nec est haereticus, sed multam habuit probabilitatem », restringenda sunt ad solam et simplicem thesim, Christum esse duo (praescindendo a modo explicationis et ab aliis articulis) et ad praecedentia tempora, quando res nondum erat profundius discussa.

**III.** Distinctio inter suppositum et personam, quam prima opinio hic adhibet, scilicet ut tribuant Christo unam quidem personam, quae significet quid completissimum, sed duo supposita, quasi humana natura esset quid subsistens, certissime est falsa. Radicem huius erroris S. Bonav. in eo invenit, quod decepti non distinxerint suppositum in sensu aequivoco vel abusivo, et suppositum proprie dictum, ut ibi et clarius infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. circa med. explicatur. Minus proprie igitur loquitur eximius Suarez (Comment. in S. III. t. I. disp. 7. sect. 3.) dicens, S. Bonaventuram « ita explicare » illam sententiam, et quidem improbabiliter. Non enim ita eam explicat, sed potius hoc modo confutat. Etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.) commemorat duplicem sensum termini suppositum his verbis: « Unum (in Christo) est suppositum; nisi dicatur suppositum locutionis, quia sic, de quocumque potest fieri sermo, est suppositum ». Similem huic distinctionem habet S. Bonav. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3. ad 5, adiungens, talem considerationem esse grammatici, non theologi. — Licet S. Doctor reprobat hanc opinionem, quod sint in Christo duae res naturae, tamen in secunda solut. ad 6. concedit, quod terminus res naturae, quatenus medium teneat inter naturam et personam. Etiam alii antiqui Scholastici, ut Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 3, q. 7. m. 1. a. 3.), B. Albert. (hic a. 2.), S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), Aegid. R., (hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 4.) aliquam distinctionem inter praedicta faciunt. Sed cum terminus res naturae in scholis fere cessaverit, vel non distinguatur a supposito, non vacat in hac subtilitate immorari. — Solut. ad 4. ponit unum esse simpliciter in Christo, cum S. Thoma (hic q. 2. a. 2; S. III. q. 17. a. 2; de Unione etc. a. 4.).

**IV.** De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 17. a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 33; Quaest. de unione Verbi incarnati a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The Master in this and the following distinction recounts at length those three famous opinions on Christ as man, about which from the time of Abelard it was disputed in the schools for centuries, although shortly after Lombard, who left the matter undecided, the theologians commonly agreed in rejecting the positions of the first and third opinions. Since St. Bonaventure in his Commentary on both distinctions touches on these opinions throughout, some things seem worth premising, so that it may be understood both what they teach and what is to be judged of each.

First, therefore, it is to be noted concerning what object the controversy was; then what principles were presupposed by all; finally what theses each one held, and in what they differed among themselves.

The object about which the controversy was, was what properly constitutes Christ the man, as he is man.

Now all presupposed, as St. Thomas teaches more fully (here after the division of the text), and agreed in four points: 1. on the side of the terminus of the union they confessed one person in Christ, against Nestorius; 2. on the side of the effect they admitted that two distinct and unconfused natures remained, against Eutyches; 3. on the side of what was assumed they conceded that both a perfect soul and body were assumed, against the Apollinarists and other heretics; 4. on the side of the manner of assumption they taught that the formation, union, and assumption took place in the same instant of time, distinguishing only an order of nature, and this is against a certain error reported by Damascene (IV. *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6).

The principal theses of each opinion are enumerated briefly but sufficiently by our author (here after the division of the text; cf. also below, d. 7, after the division of the text). More are set forth by Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 6, throughout); and also by St. Thomas (in the cited place, and more briefly S. III. q. 2. a. 3. 6.), who distinctly proposes in what the several opinions agree and differ, and moreover in most of the questions of these distinctions teaches what is to be resolved concerning them according to the principles of each opinion; finally Aegidius Romanus most clearly expounds them, here q. 1. a. 3. and the *dub. lat.* Also the later Scholastics treat of them, and among the earlier, William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, book III. tr. 1. q. 1. 8. — Now the foundation and root of the first opinion, which according to the Auxerrian (loc. cit. q. 8.) was that of the Archbishop of Sens and his followers, is the assertion that soul and body, united, are assumed, and indeed in such a way that from this union, which according to the understanding precedes the assumption to the Word, there is constituted not only the humanity but also the man. — The second opinion holds that it is not from the union of body and soul alone, but in addition from the union with the person of the Word, that there arises that this man is. — The foundation of the third opinion is twofold, namely, that from this union of soul and body in Christ there does not result one third thing, and that these two come to the divine person accidentally. This was the opinion of Abelard.

Secondly. From the foregoing it is sufficiently clear that the defenders of these opinions indeed had the intention of defending the Catholic truth, but that the patrons of the first and third opinions, by a perverse use of dialectic, ensnared themselves in the toils of sophistical reasonings and fell almost into the error of Nestorius. Commonly therefore the later Scholastics censure the third opinion as heretical (see below, q. 3), the first (of which it is treated here) as false; and they approve the second as wholly to be held: yet concerning the second article of the same, that the person of the Word incarnate was in some way made composite, a doubt remained, which is discussed in the following question (on these opinions see also below, a. 1. q. 3, at the end). — But we observe that St. Thomas in the *Summa* (III. q. 2. a. 6) censured both the first and the third opinion as heretical. Yet in the Commentary (here q. 1) he reproves the first opinion with a milder censure, indeed (ibid. a. 2) he says of it: "It is not heretical." Likewise also Alexander of Hales excuses it, "as far as we are able"; likewise B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Scotus, and others, with the exception of Aegidius Romanus, qualify it with no such grave censure. — It is truly remarkable that Peter Lombard did not dare to render his judgment definitively concerning these opinions (cf. d. VII, at the end). For this cause, and on account of a certain doctrine on the Trinity (but a sound one), Walter, Prior of St. Victor (at Paris), assails the Master most bitterly in a certain book "against the manifest heresies, even those condemned in the Councils," etc., and in the prologue numbers him among the "four labyrinths of France," together with Abelard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert of Poitiers, as men "breathed upon by one Aristotelian spirit" (cf. the dissertation of P. Denifle in the recent periodical *Archiv für Litteratur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* by H. Denifle O. P. and Fr. Ehrle S. J., Heft 2. 3. p. 406 ff. and Heft 4. p. 584).

**II.** In this question the fourth article of the first opinion is reproved, by which indeed the falsity of the principles, from which it legitimately follows, is made manifest. With the common opinion of his age St. Bonaventure repeats in several ways that this position is false. But lest he contradict himself, his words (in the body): "It is not heretical, but had much probability," are to be restricted to the bare and simple thesis that Christ is two (prescinding from the manner of explanation and from the other articles), and to preceding times, when the matter had not yet been more deeply discussed.

**III.** The distinction between supposit and person, which the first opinion here adopts, namely so as to attribute to Christ one person indeed, which signifies something most complete, but two supposits, as though the human nature were something subsisting, is most certainly false. St. Bonaventure finds the root of this error in the fact that, deceived, they did not distinguish supposit in an equivocal or abusive sense, and supposit properly so called, as is explained there and more clearly below, d. 10. a. 1. q. 3, in the body, about the middle. Less properly therefore does the eminent Suarez speak (Comment. on S. III, t. I. disp. 7. sect. 3), saying that St. Bonaventure "so explains" that opinion, and indeed improbably. For he does not so explain it, but rather refutes it in this manner. Also St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2) mentions a twofold sense of the term "supposit" in these words: "There is one supposit (in Christ); unless 'supposit' be said of speech, because thus, of whatever a statement can be made, it is a supposit." St. Bonaventure has a distinction similar to this above, d. 5. a. 2. q. 3, *ad 5*, adding that such a consideration belongs to the grammarian, not the theologian. — Although the Holy Doctor reproves this opinion, that there are in Christ two "things of nature," nevertheless in the second solution *ad 6* he concedes that the term "thing of nature," inasmuch as it may hold a middle between nature and person. Also other ancient Scholastics, such as Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 3, q. 7. m. 1. a. 3), B. Albert (here a. 2), St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 1), Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2. a. 1), Aegidius Romanus (here q. 1. a. 1. and *dub. lat.* 4), make some distinction among the aforesaid. But since the term "thing of nature" has almost ceased in the schools, or is not distinguished from supposit, it is not worthwhile to dwell on this subtlety. — The solution *ad 4* posits that there is one [thing] simply in Christ, with St. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 2; S. III. q. 17. a. 2; *de Unione* etc. a. 4).

**IV.** On the question itself: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 1. — Scotus, in both Scripta here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 17. a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 33; *Quaest. de unione Verbi incarnati* a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 3. a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 10760–11042), cross-checked against the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{148–152}-{L,R}-*.png`, PDF pp.170–174, offset pdf = printed + 22) per the Vol II/III override (PDF authoritative in OCR-damaged regions; here the OCR body was clean and the PDF chiefly confirmed footers and the Respondeo/Solutio reflow). English freshly translated, literal, parallel paragraph-for-paragraph.

**Alignment confirmed.** q1 opener reads *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus sit duo* — *whether Christ is two*. Sibling check vs raw: q2 (raw 11044) = *Utrum persona Christi sit una unitate simplici, an composita*; q3 (raw 11166) = *Utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit substantia, an homo praedicetur de Christo secundum habitum*. No q-swap.

**Page-split map (footer apparatus, 31 entries; Quaracchi restarts per printed page).**
- p.148 — notes **2–9** (`[^2]`–`[^9]`; markers *Felicianum²/de Trinitate³/dat esse⁴/idiomatum⁵/aliquid⁶/tertio⁷/Trinitate nono⁸/Boethius⁹*). Note 1 (`dixit/dicebat`, marker *dicit¹* in the TRACTATIO) belongs to **d6-divisio**, not q1 — divisio owns only p.148 note 1.
- p.149 — notes **1–11** rendered as `[^1b]`–`[^11b]` (body markers run 1b–8b; notes 9b–11b are commentator/codex glosses to the Respondeo–Solutio text on this page; 9b = *generi*, 10b = *differentias*, 11b = *natura*).
- p.150 — notes **1–8** rendered as `[^1c]`–`[^8c]` (markers *plura¹ᶜ/unitate²ᶜ/illud³ᶜ/demonstrato⁴ᶜ/differentiam⁵ᶜ/ibi⁶ᶜ/dicitur⁷ᶜ/personam⁸ᶜ*).
- p.151 — notes **1–3** rendered as `[^1d]`–`[^3d]` (markers *termino¹ᵈ/intrinsecus²ᵈ/figura dictionis³ᵈ*).
- p.152 footer notes 1–4 (Athanasii / De Fide orthod. c.4 / Vide Boeth. de Una Persona / De quo vide tom.I p.835) belong to **QUAESTIO II** (its body markers print below the q1/q2 boundary) — NOT captured here.

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED (from d6-divisio):** p.148 footer notes — divisio kept only note 1; q1 took notes 2–9 (the divisio's forecast of "2–7" was conservative; notes 8 and 9 are the *Sed contra* arg-2/arg-3 markers, also on p.148, so q1 correctly owns 2–9).

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED (to d6-a1-q2):** NONE. q1's p.148–151 footer sequences are fully exhausted here; the p.152 footer notes 1–4 belong to QUAESTIO II, which opens at the bottom of p.152-R (raw 11044). No shared-page footer is parked.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (sections **I–IV**) prints at q1's tail, spanning p.151-R bottom → p.152-R, ending "Biel, hic q. 2." just before QUAESTIO II. It carries **NO footnote markers** (cross-references only). Section I surveys the three opinions + Lombard's non-judgment + the Walter of St-Victor "four labyrinths" note; II restricts Bonaventure's "non haereticus, sed multam habuit probabilitatem"; III treats the suppositum/persona distinction; IV is the parallel commentator source-list.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 152 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum persona Christi sit una unitate simplici, an composita.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum persona Christi sit una unitate simplici, aut composita, sicut dicebat secunda opinio. Et quod habeat in se unitatem compositam, videtur (*Fundamenta*):

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo[^1] (*Ad oppositum*): « Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus »; sed homo est compositus ex anima et carne: ergo Christi persona est composita ex divinitate et humanitate.

2. *Item*, Damascenus in tertio libro[^2]: « In Domino Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam hypostasim ex utrisque compositam »: si ergo secundum ipsum idem est hypostasis et persona, ergo etc.

3. *Item*, intellectus personae praesupponit intellectum naturae[^3]; sed si est compositio in eo quod praesupponitur, necessario est compositio in eo quod supponit: cum ergo natura humana in Christo sit composita, necessario sequi videtur, quod et persona composita dici debeat.

4. *Item*, si Christus esset solum ex anima rationali et carne, haberet hypostasim compositam: ergo cum habeat in se animam et carnem et divinitatem, per locum a minori[^4], multo magis videtur habere compositam hypostasim.

5. *Item*, Christus est homo aut simplex, aut compositus; constat, quod non simplex, quia hoc est contra naturam humanitatis: est ergo homo compositus. Sed homo non praedicatur de Christo nisi ratione suppositi et hypostasis[^5]: ergo videtur, quod persona in Christo debeat dici composita.

**Sed contra:**
1. Omne compositum compositione temporali est temporale: si ergo persona Christi est composita, et non nisi compositione temporali; ergo persona Christi est temporalis: non ergo aeterna. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, ubicumque est compositio de novo, ibi est mutatio: si ergo in incarnatione persona Christi fuit composita, necessario sequitur, quod fuerit mutata. Sed personam Verbi mutari est impossibile: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, ubicumque est compositio, ibi est imperfectio in utroque extremorum, quoniam « ex duobus entibus in actu non fit unum[^6] », et componibilia possibilia sunt respectu compositi; sed nec in natura Verbi nec in persona potest esse aliqua imperfectio: ergo nec compositio.

4. *Item*, ubi est compositio, compositum non praedicatur de aliquo extremorum, sicut patet, quia homo nec est anima nec est caro: ergo si persona Christi composita est ex divinitate et humanitate, ergo Christus nec est Deus nec est homo, nec Creator nec creatura. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod persona Christi non est composita.

5. *Item*, ubi est compositio, unum extremorum non praedicatur de altero — unde cum homo componatur[^7] ex anima et carne, nec anima est caro, nec e converso — ergo si persona Christi esset composita, nec homo esset Deus, nec Deus homo; quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc.

<!-- page 153 -->

### Conclusio
> Persona Christi non est composita, proprie loquendo, sed tantum in sensu largiore.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod compositio dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo *proprie* dicitur compositio unio aliquorum duorum habentium mutuam inclinationem ad constitutionem tertii (*Distinctio*). Et hoc modo, sicut rationes ostendunt, persona Christi non potest dici composita[^1b] (*Conclusio 1*). Multa enim sequerentur inconvenientia, videlicet quod persona illa esset *mutata*, et quod esset *imperfecta*, et quod esset *temporaliter in esse producta*, et quod etiam *non communicarentur idiomata*. Et ideo hoc modo dicere, personam Christi esse compositam, non tantum esset falsum, verum etiam esset haereticum.

Alio modo dicitur compositio *large* simul-cum-alio-positio; et sic personalis unio potest dici compositio[^2b] (*Secunda opinio*). Et per hunc modum dicebat secunda opinio, personam Christi esse compositam, non quia ipsa sit ex pluribus naturis constituta, sed quia persona illa ante incarnationem suppositum erat in una natura simplici; post incarnationem persona suppositum fuit divinae naturae et humanae, et hoc absque ulla mutatione facta in ipsa, sed solum ex parte humanae naturae, sicut ostensum fuit in prima distinctione huius libri[^3b]. Et ideo opinio ista, quae dicebat, personam Christi fuisse compositam, vera fuit et sanum habuit intellectum. — Quia tamen verbum calumniabile est, pro eo quod compositionis vocabulum consuevit accipi primo modo; ideo doctores praesentis temporis sensum huius opinionis retinent, declinantes compositionis vocabulum. In persona enim Christi non est compositio proprie dicta. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae inductae sunt ad istam partem.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Symboli, dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo inter animam et carnem, et divinitatem et humanitatem. Non enim est similitudo quantum ad extremorum compositionem, sed quantum ad hoc, quod[^4b] anima et caro concurrunt ad unitatem personae; sic etiam divinitas et humanitas in Christo in unitatem personae concurrunt, quamvis hoc fiat alio et alio modo.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, dicendum, quod Damascenus non accipit ibi proprie compositionem, sed large (*Notandum*). Unde et verbum suum oportet exponere, quia fortasse non ita improprie sonat in lingua Graeca, sicut in Latina. Unde dicitur hypostasis composita ex duabus naturis, non quia ex illis duabus sit constituta, sed quia in sacramento incarnationis factum est, ut hypostasis, quae erat sub una tantum natura, in duabus[^5b] et sub duabus fieret; unde magis proprie dicitur hypostasis esse *in* duabus naturis quam *ex* duabus naturis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus personae praesupponit[^6b] intellectum naturae; dicendum, quod verum est de natura, quae dat primum esse personae, et talis est divina natura respectu personae Christi. Et propterea, quamvis natura humana sit composita, non sequitur, quod propter hoc persona Christi compositionem habeat.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Christus esset solum ex anima et carne, haberet hypostasim compositam; dicendum, quod verum est, quia tunc haberet primum esse hypostasis eius ex humana natura, quae quidem composita est. Nunc autem non est simile, quia persona Christi suum esse primum habet ex divina natura, quae quidem est omnino simplicissima. Et ideo humana natura superadveniens, sicut non dat personae esse personale, sic non facit, eam esse compositam.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus est homo compositus; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quod subiungit, quod homo praedicatur ratione hypostasis; dicendum, quod si ita intelligatur, quod homo in praedicato ratione hypostasis praedicetur, veritatem non habet (*Notandum*); quia secundum regulam Philosophi[^7b], quamvis terminus subiiciatur ratione suppositi, praedicatur ratione formae; et ideo hoc adiectivum *compositus* circa istum terminum *homo* non nominat compositionem quantum ad suppositum, sed quantum ad formam. Et propterea non potest ex hoc inferri, quod persona Christi sit composita.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the person of Christ is one by a simple unity, or a composite one.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the person of Christ is one by a simple unity, or a composite one, as the second opinion was saying. And that it has in itself a composite unity seems to be the case (*Fundamenta*):

1. *First*, through that which is said in the Symbol[^1] (*On the contrary side*): « For just as the rational soul and the flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ »; but a man is composed of soul and flesh: therefore the person of Christ is composed of divinity and humanity.

2. *Likewise*, Damascene in the third book[^2]: « In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, one hypostasis composed of both »: if therefore according to him hypostasis and person are the same, therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, the understanding of the person presupposes the understanding of the nature[^3]; but if there is composition in that which is presupposed, there is necessarily composition in that which presupposes: since therefore the human nature in Christ is composite, it seems necessarily to follow that the person too ought to be called composite.

4. *Likewise*, if Christ were only of a rational soul and flesh, he would have a composite hypostasis: therefore since he has in himself soul and flesh and divinity, by an argument from the lesser[^4], it seems all the more that he has a composite hypostasis.

5. *Likewise*, Christ is a man either simple, or composite; it is established that he is not simple, because this is contrary to the nature of humanity: he is therefore a composite man. But "man" is not predicated of Christ except by reason of the supposit and hypostasis[^5]: therefore it seems that the person in Christ ought to be called composite.

**On the contrary:**
1. Everything composite by a temporal composition is temporal: if therefore the person of Christ is composite, and only by a temporal composition; therefore the person of Christ is temporal: therefore not eternal. But this is false: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, wherever there is a new composition, there is change: if therefore in the Incarnation the person of Christ was composed, it necessarily follows that it was changed. But for the person of the Word to be changed is impossible: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, wherever there is composition, there is imperfection in each of the extremes, since « out of two beings in act one thing is not made[^6] », and things capable of being composed are in potency with respect to the composite; but neither in the nature of the Word nor in the person can there be any imperfection: therefore neither composition.

4. *Likewise*, where there is composition, the composite is not predicated of any of the extremes, as is plain, because a man is neither the soul nor the flesh: therefore if the person of Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then Christ is neither God nor man, neither Creator nor creature. But if this is false, it remains that the person of Christ is not composite.

5. *Likewise*, where there is composition, one of the extremes is not predicated of the other — whence since a man is composed[^7] of soul and flesh, neither is the soul the flesh, nor conversely — therefore if the person of Christ were composite, neither would the man be God, nor God man; but if this is false, it remains etc.

### Conclusion
> The person of Christ is not composite, properly speaking, but only in a broader sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that composition can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, composition is *properly* called the union of some two things having a mutual inclination toward the constitution of a third (*Distinction*). And in this way, as the arguments show, the person of Christ cannot be called composite[^1b] (*First conclusion*). For many incongruities would follow, namely that that person would be *changed*, and that it would be *imperfect*, and that it would be *brought into being temporally*, and also that *the idioms would not be communicated*. And therefore to say in this way that the person of Christ is composite would not only be false, but even heretical.

In another way composition is called *broadly* a being-placed-together-with-another; and in this sense the personal union can be called composition[^2b] (*The second opinion*). And in this way the second opinion was saying that the person of Christ is composite, not because it is itself constituted out of several natures, but because that person before the Incarnation was a supposit in one simple nature; after the Incarnation the person was the supposit of the divine and the human nature, and this without any change made in it, but only on the part of the human nature, as was shown in the first distinction of this book[^3b]. And therefore that opinion, which said that the person of Christ had been composite, was true and had a sound meaning. — Yet because the word is liable to calumny, since the term "composition" is wont to be taken in the first way, therefore the doctors of the present time retain the sense of this opinion while declining the term "composition." For in the person of Christ there is no composition properly so called. — Whence the arguments which were brought for that side are to be conceded.

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary from the authority of the Symbol, it must be said that there is not a complete likeness between soul and flesh, and divinity and humanity. For the likeness is not as to the composition of the extremes, but as to this, that[^4b] soul and flesh concur toward the unity of the person; so too divinity and humanity in Christ concur into the unity of the person, although this comes about in one way and another.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the authority of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not there take "composition" properly, but broadly (*Note*). Whence his word too must be expounded, because perhaps it does not sound so improperly in the Greek tongue as in the Latin. Whence the hypostasis is said to be composed of two natures, not because it is constituted out of those two, but because in the sacrament of the Incarnation it came about that the hypostasis, which was under one nature only, came to be in two[^5b] and under two; whence the hypostasis is more properly said to be *in* two natures than *of* two natures.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the understanding of the person presupposes[^6b] the understanding of the nature; it must be said that this is true of the nature which gives the first being to the person, and such is the divine nature with respect to the person of Christ. And therefore, although the human nature is composite, it does not follow that on this account the person of Christ has composition.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that if Christ were only of soul and flesh, he would have a composite hypostasis; it must be said that this is true, because then he would have the first being of his hypostasis from the human nature, which indeed is composite. But now it is not similar, because the person of Christ has its first being from the divine nature, which indeed is altogether most simple. And therefore the human nature supervening, just as it does not give the person personal being, so it does not make it composite.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that Christ is a composite man; it must be said that this is true; but as to what is added, that "man" is predicated by reason of the hypostasis; it must be said that if it is so understood, that "man" is predicated in the predicate by reason of the hypostasis, it does not hold the truth (*Note*); because according to the rule of the Philosopher[^7b], although a term is made the subject by reason of the supposit, it is predicated by reason of the form; and therefore this adjective *composite* with respect to that term *man* does not name composition as to the supposit, but as to the form. And therefore it cannot be inferred from this that the person of Christ is composite.

la: Athanasii.

en: Of Athanasius [i.e. the Athanasian Creed].

la: De Fide orthod. c. 4; fusius de hac re agit ibid. c. 7. et IV. c. 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 4; he treats this matter more fully ibid. c. 7 and IV c. 5. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Vide Boeth., de Una Persona et duab. natur. c. 2. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 37, nota 1. — Inferius pro *sequi videtur* codd. K Z *sequitur*.

en: See Boethius, *On the One Person and the Two Natures* c. 2 ff. Cf. above p. 37, note 1. — Below, for *sequi videtur* codices K Z read *sequitur*.

la: De quo vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. De hoc ipso arg. vide verba Augustini, hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. allata, et Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 3. n. 11.

en: On which see vol. I p. 835, note 5. On this very argument see the words of Augustine adduced here in the text of the Master, c. 3, and Letter 137 (alias 3) c. 3 n. 11.

la: Ut explanatum est in quaest. praeced. ad 5. et 6.

en: As was explained in the preceding question, in the reply to 5 and 6.

la: Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). Cfr. III. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.), ubi *parti* tribuitur ratio imperfecti et materiae.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII text 49 (VI c. 13). Cf. *Physics* III text 66 (c. 6), where to the *part* is attributed the character of the imperfect and of matter.

la: Codd. G H K L T U Z aa bb *componitur*.

en: Codices G H K L T U Z aa bb read *componitur*.

la: Cod. F *dici esse composita*.

en: Codex F reads *dici esse composita* ["to be said to be composite"].

la: Cfr. Damasc., Dialectica, c. 65. seq. — Pro *simul* cod. U *scilicet*.

en: Cf. Damascene, *Dialectica* c. 65 ff. — For *simul* codex U reads *scilicet*.

la: Art. I. q. I.

en: Article I, question I.

la: Cod. U subiicit *sicut*. Mox pro *ad unitatem* cod. A *in unitatem*.

en: Codex U adds *sicut*. Shortly after, for *ad unitatem* codex A reads *in unitatem*.

la: Vat. adiicit *esset*. Subinde pro *et sub* cod. U *sive sub*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *esset*. Thereupon, for *et sub* codex U reads *sive sub*.

la: Codd. A F G H I L N T U aa *supponit*.

en: Codices A F G H I L N T U aa read *supponit*.

la: In libro de Praedicam., c. de Substantia, docet, de primis substantiis sive suppositis praedicatum dici secundum nomen et rationem. In I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.) reprehendit propositionem: *omnis homo est omne animal*. — Paulo inferius post *praedicatur* edd. subdunt *tamen*.

en: In the book *On the Categories*, in the chapter on Substance, he teaches that of first substances or supposits the predicate is said according to name and account. In *On Interpretation* I c. 5 (c. 7) he censures the proposition: *every man is every animal*. — A little below, after *praedicatur* the editions add *tamen*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio solvit dubium illud, utrum et quo sensu approbari possint verba secundi articuli secundae opinionis (cfr. supra *Praenotata post divisionem textus*), quod persona Verbi post incarnationem facta sit composita. Constat autem, quod compositio in illo ente, quod vocatur Christus, est prorsus singularis, et quod respectu personae divinae hic terminus purificandus est ab illis imperfectionibus, quae propriae et naturali compositioni inhaerent. Hinc antiqui magistri evitabant Christi personam nominare proprie compositam, nec compositionem admittebant nisi « in sensu largo », id est, ut sit compositio *ad* hoc sive *cum* hoc, non compositio *ex* his. Similiter praeferebant dicere, hypostasim Christi esse *in* duabus naturis, quam dicere, *ex* duabus naturis. In hoc etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 3.) concordat cum nostro Doctore dicens: « Persona Christi post incarnationem potest dici aliquo modo composita, in quantum ibi salvatur aliqua conditio compositi; non tamen est ibi vera ratio compositionis, quia deficit ibi altera conditio; unde etiam non est in usu modernorum » etc. Idem tamen in Sum. (III. q. 2. a. 4.) et praecipue Aegid. R. penitus approbare videntur sententiam multorum auctorum recentium, qui, innixi dictis Patrum Graecorum et Conciliorum, praesertim can. 8. et 4. Concilii V. oecumenici, determinate docent, terminum ex hac unione resultantem esse personam proprie compositam, sed eminentiore modo, quam res naturales compositae sint. — Sed in re ipsa vix dissentit S. Bonaventura.

**II.** Praeter laudatum S. Thomam: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. a. 2. m. 5. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question resolves that doubt, whether and in what sense the words of the second article of the second opinion (cfr. above, the *Praenotata after the division of the text*) can be approved, namely that the person of the Word after the Incarnation became composite. Now it is established that the composition in that being which is called Christ is altogether singular, and that with respect to the divine person this term must be purified from those imperfections which inhere in proper and natural composition. Hence the ancient masters avoided naming Christ's person properly composite, nor did they admit composition except « in a broad sense », that is, so that it be a composition *toward* this or *with* this, not a composition *out of* these. Likewise they preferred to say that the hypostasis of Christ is *in* two natures, rather than to say *out of* two natures. In this too S. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 3.) agrees with our Doctor, saying: « The person of Christ after the Incarnation can be called composite in some way, insofar as some condition of the composite is preserved there; yet there is not there the true account of composition, because the other condition is lacking there; whence it is also not in use among the moderns » etc. Yet the same in the Summa (III. q. 2. a. 4.) and especially Aegidius Romanus seem wholly to approve the opinion of many more recent authors who, relying on the sayings of the Greek Fathers and of the Councils, especially canons 8 and 4 of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, determinately teach that the term resulting from this union is a properly composite person, but in a more eminent mode than natural composite things are. — But in the reality itself S. Bonaventure scarcely dissents.

**II.** Besides the cited S. Thomas: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 6. a. 2. m. 5. — Scotus, in both Writings here q. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 3. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 8. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{152,153,154}-{L,R}-*.png`) read Left column top→bottom then Right, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 11044–11165). OCR here is comparatively clean; the PDF resolved running-head digits and footer lemmata. Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Page-split map (printed pp. 152–154):**
- **p.152** (PDF 174): top of L + top of R = the markerless TAIL of q1's scholion (sect. III–IV, *Radicem huius erroris… Biel, hic q. 2.*) — belongs to d6-a1-q1. QUAESTIO II header spans both columns. q2 body: Fundamenta args 1–5 (L) + Sed contra args 1–5 (R). Footer notes 1–7 (`[^1]`–`[^7]`).
- **p.153** (PDF 175): CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (two-modes-of-composition) + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–5; SCHOLION sect. I opens at column foot. Footer notes 1–7 (`[^1b]`–`[^7b]`).
- **p.154** (PDF 176): SCHOLION sect. I tail (*…ex duabus naturis. In hoc etiam S. Thom.… vix dissentit S. Bonaventura*) + sect. II (commentator source-list). No footer notes for q2. QUAESTIO III begins after the scholion.

**Footer hand-off.**
- *Received from d6-a1-q1:* NONE — q1's p.148–151 footers were fully exhausted in q1.
- *q2 owns p.152 footer notes 1–7,* keying its opening Fundamenta/Sed-contra markers (*Symbolo¹ / Damascenus in tertio libro² / naturae³ / locum a minori⁴ / ratione suppositi et hypostasis⁵ / ex duobus entibus⁶ / componatur⁷*). This matches the hand-off forecast in next-session-resume (notes 1–4 plus the Sed-contra markers 5–7, all on p.152).
- *Forwarded to d6-a1-q3:* NONE. q2's p.152 + p.153 footer sequences are fully exhausted here; p.154 carries no q2 footers (scholion is markerless). QUAESTIO III (raw 11166) opens its own footer sequence on p.154/155 — note q3's first marker (*Ad Philippenses secundo¹*) keys a p.154/155 footer that belongs to q3, not q2.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (sections I–II) prints at q2's tail, spanning p.153-R foot → p.154-R, ending "Biel, hic q. 1." just before QUAESTIO III. It carries NO footnote markers (cross-references only): I = the "broad sense" / *in* vs *ex* two-natures resolution + S. Thom. concord + the recentiores' "eminently composite" view (canons 8 & 4 of the Fifth Ecumenical Council); II = the parallel commentator source-list.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0