title: Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum in divinis sit differentia secundum numerum.

title_alt: Whether in divine things there is difference according to number

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO IV.

#### *Utrum in divinis differentia secundum numerum possit poni.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere differentiam secundum numerum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus in tertio libro[^1]: «Numero, non natura differunt hypostases»; et loquitur de divinis hypostasibus.

2. Item, omnia quae contingit vere numerari, necesse est differre numero; sed hypostases vere contingit numerari, ut dicantur duae et tres: ergo vere cadit in eis differentia secundum numerum.

3. Item, omnia quae differunt re, aut differunt genere, aut specie, aut numero, aut nullo modo differunt[^2]. Sed impium est dicere, quod hypostases nullo modo differant: ergo saltem numero differunt.

4. Item, unitas secundum[^3] numerum non respicit unitatem formae, sed suppositi — quod patet: hoc enim album et hic sedens, demonstrato Petro, est unum numero — ergo ab oppositis diversitas secundum numerum non respicit diversitatem naturae, sed suppositorum; sed in Deo est pluralitas suppositorum, quamvis non sit diversitas naturarum: ergo etc.

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5. Item, idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens[^4]: ergo omne quod est ad alterum comparatum, aut est idem specie, aut diversum; aut idem numero, aut diversum. Ergo Pater, comparatus Filio[^5], aut est idem numero, aut diversus. Si idem; sed quandocumque aliqua duo sunt eadem numero, unum vere praedicatur de altero: ergo possum dicere: Pater est Filius, quod est[^6] contra fidem. Si diversus numero: ergo in divinis cadit diversitas secundum numerum.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ambrosius super secundam Epistolam ad Corinthios, et Magister recitat in littera[^7]: «Ibi vere unitas, ubi nulla diversitas»: ergo non est ibi diversitas secundum numerum, cum sit aliqua diversitas, scilicet diversitas secundum numerum.

2. Item, Boethius in libro *de Trinitate* capitulo secundo: «Nulla est in Deo diversitas[^8], nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo»: ergo nec differentia secundum numerum.

3. Item, diversitas secundum numerum solum venit ex parte materiae; unde dicit Philosophus[^9], quod «omnino materia numerabiliter est»; sed in divinis non cadit materia aliqua: ergo nec diversitas secundum numerum.

4. Item, quaecumque differunt numero, numerant[^10] omnia quae sunt in se ipsis, saltem omnia quae sunt ibi ex parte formalis principii. Hoc patet, quia enim Petrus et Paulus sunt duo, ideo duo homines, duo animalia, duo alba, et sic de singulis: ergo si Pater et Filius[^11] sunt numero differentes, ergo habent duas naturas, et duas essentias: ergo sunt duo dii, quod est contra catholicam fidem.

5. Item, quaecumque differunt numero, sunt separabilia imaginatione vel intellectu[^12]; sed Pater et Filius nullo modo sunt separabiles, nec re nec intellectu, in divinis, quia una persona est in alia et e converso: ergo nec differunt numero.

6. Item, quod non est multiplicabile nec multiplicatum est unum numero; sed divina natura non est multiplicabilis nec multiplicata: ergo est unum numero[^13]; sed quaecumque sunt unum numero, non possunt differre numero: ergo si essentia vel natura divina ceteras complectitur personas, impossibile est, quod personae numero differant.

### CONCLUSIO.

> In divinis non est ponenda differentia secundum numerum, licet personae numerentur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis non est ponere differentiam secundum numerum. Et huius ratio sumi potest et a posteriori et a priori.

A posteriori: quoniam omnia quae differunt numero, consequitur ista passio, quae est numerus; numerus autem est aggregatio multitudinis, in qua plus est in toto quam in singulis partium[^14]. Haec autem aggregatio est ex his solum, quae habent unitatem limitatam, quae plus est cum alio quam per se ipsam. Limitatio autem venit per additionem. Additio autem perducit ad compositionem cum materia, quae facit esse hic et nunc, et tantum et non plus; et ita non est diversitas secundum numerum nisi in his, in quibus est distinctio per additionem et compositionem et materiam. Et[^15] haec distinctio non cadit in Deo, ideo nec diversitas secundum numerum.

Alia ratio est a priori: quia in quolibet, quod intelligimus ut completum, intelligimus sub ista duplici conditione, scilicet per modum quo est et quod est; et unitas quidem sive identitas secundum speciem vel genus venit[^16] a parte eius quod est quo, secundum diversos status sive completionem maiorem et minorem. Unitas vero, vel diversitas secundum numerum venit a parte ipsius quod est secundum esse, sive prout est in supposito[^17] individuo. Sic autem ista duo coniuncta sunt in omnibus, quod numerato ipso quod est, necesse est, numerari ipsum quo est. Cum ergo in omnibus, quae differunt numero, numeretur ipsum quod est, necesse est, quod multiplicetur in illis ipsum quo est.

Et[^18] quia ad diversitatem secundum numerum concurrit diversitas ipsius quo est et quod est et qui

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est, id est naturae et suppositi sive hypostasis, sed principaliter ipsius quod est; cum in divinis ipsum quod est sive essentia propter summam simplicitatem nullo modo sit multiplicabilis: ideo necesse est, quod ipsum quod est similiter remaneat indistinctum: et ideo impossibile est, quod cadat ibi diversitas secundum numerum. Nec tamen unum est numero: quia ipsum quod est unum numero[^19] in creaturis non est dicibile de pluribus: sed in divinis ipsum quod est, quamvis sit unum, tamen de pluribus est dicibile. Et ratio huius est, quia idem est ibi quo est et quod est, quantum[^20] ex parte rei. Et ideo, sicut quo est est communicabile pluribus, quamvis non multiplicabile, ita ipsum quod est. Unde possumus dicere, quod pluralitas personarum medium tenet inter idem numero et diversum. Quamvis enim ipsum quod est non numeretur, numeratur tamen ipse qui est; unde sunt ibi plures qui.

**Ad 1.** Et hoc vult dicere Damascenus, cum dicit: «Numero, non natura differunt hypostases». Per hanc enim additionem: *non natura*, ipse contraxit differentiam secundum numerum sive distraxit a propria ratione[^21]. Unde ipse dicit primo libro capitulo octavo: «Oportet scire, quod aliud est differre re, aliud ratione. In omnibus creaturis hypostasum divisio re consideratur, communitas vero ratione; in summa vero et supersubstantiali Trinitate est e converso». Unde cum diversitas secundum numerum faciat sive notet diversitatem in re et natura, proprie loquendo, nisi nomen diversitatis secundum numerum distrahatur ad distinctionem suppositorum, non est concedendum, quod sit ibi diversitas secundum numerum, sed secundum numerum[^22] personarum sive hypostasum. Et hoc vult dicere Damascenus, quando dicit, quod hypostases differunt numero, non, inquam, numero, qui dicat[^23] diversitatem in re et natura, sed qui dicat differentiam in proprietatibus et relationibus, natura semper manente unica et indivisa. Ex hoc patet illud Damasceni.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod numero differunt ea quae numerantur; dicendum, quod verum est, quod[^24] eo modo differunt, quo numerantur; sed non numerantur nisi quantum ad personas; et ita non differunt nisi numero hypostasum et proprietate.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae differunt re etc.; distinguendum est in hoc nomine *re*[^25], quia potest dicere naturam sive essentiam, et potest dicere personam. Si dicat essentiam et naturam, verum est; si personam, falsum est, et non habet locum illa divisio.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas numero respicit identitatem suppositi; dicendum, quod si suppositum dicatur ipsum quod est, tunc habet veritatem. Si autem dicatur ipse qui est sive persona, non habet veritatem nisi in his, in quibus differt quo est et quod est. Unde proprie loquendo, diversitas secundum numerum sequitur ipsum quod est; et ideo[^26] in divinis non habet locum.

**Ad 5.** Ad illud quod obiicitur[^27], quod idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens, ergo idem numero, vel diversum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in ente, quod natum est numerari, sicut ens creatum; sed in ente increato hoc deficit. Unde Hilarius *de Trinitate*[^28]: «Deum ex Deo natum nec eundem nativitas nec aliud esse permittit»: et ita, sicut praedictum est, tenet medium inter idem numero et diversum.

english:
### QUESTION IV.

#### *Whether in divine things difference according to number can be posited.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, whether in divine things a difference according to number is to be posited. And that there is, seems [to be the case].

1. The Damascene in the third book[^1]: «In number, not in nature, the hypostases differ»; and he speaks of the divine hypostases.

2. Likewise, all things which can truly be numbered must necessarily differ in number; but the hypostases can truly be numbered, so that they are called two and three: therefore difference according to number truly applies in them.

3. Likewise, all things which differ in reality differ either in genus, or species, or number, or do not differ in any way[^2]. But it is impious to say that the hypostases do not differ in any way: therefore at least they differ in number.

4. Likewise, unity according to[^3] number does not regard the unity of form, but of the supposit — which is plain: for this white thing and this seated one, with Peter pointed out, are one in number — therefore by [the rule of] opposites, diversity according to number does not regard diversity of nature, but of supposits; but in God there is a plurality of supposits, although there is no diversity of natures: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, *the same* and *the diverse* sufficiently divide being[^4]: therefore everything which is compared to another either is the same in species, or diverse; or the same in number, or diverse. Therefore the Father, compared with the Son[^5], is either the same in number, or diverse. If the same; but whenever any two things are the same in number, the one is truly predicated of the other: therefore I can say: the Father is the Son, which[^6] is contrary to the faith. If diverse in number: therefore in divine things diversity according to number applies.

**On the contrary:**
1. Ambrose on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, and the Master recites it in the *littera*[^7]: «There is true unity, where there is no diversity»: therefore there is no diversity there according to number, since [if there were] there would be some diversity, namely diversity according to number.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*, chapter two: «There is no diversity[^8] in God, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents»: therefore neither difference according to number.

3. Likewise, diversity according to number comes solely from the side of matter; whence the Philosopher says[^9] that «altogether matter is what is numerable»; but in divine things no matter applies: therefore neither diversity according to number.

4. Likewise, whatever things differ in number, number[^10] all the things which are in themselves, at least all the things which are there from the side of the formal principle. This is plain, for because Peter and Paul are two, therefore [they are] two men, two animals, two white things, and so for each: therefore if Father and Son[^11] are different in number, therefore they have two natures and two essences: therefore they are two gods, which is contrary to the catholic faith.

5. Likewise, whatever things differ in number are separable in imagination or in intellect[^12]; but the Father and the Son are in no way separable, neither in reality nor in intellect, in divine things, because one person is in the other and conversely: therefore neither do they differ in number.

6. Likewise, what is not multipliable nor multiplied is one in number; but the divine nature is not multipliable nor multiplied: therefore it is one in number[^13]; but whatever things are one in number cannot differ in number: therefore if the divine essence or nature embraces the other persons, it is impossible that the persons differ in number.

### CONCLUSION.

> In divine things difference according to number is not to be posited, although the persons are numbered.

**I respond:** It must be said that in divine things a difference according to number is not to be posited. And the reason for this can be taken both *a posteriori* and *a priori*.

*A posteriori*: because all things which differ in number are followed by that affection which is number; but number is the aggregation of a multitude, in which there is more in the whole than in any of the parts singly[^14]. But this aggregation comes from those alone which have a limited unity, which is more with another than through itself. But limitation comes through addition. But addition leads to composition with matter, which makes [a thing] to be here and now, and so much and not more; and so there is no diversity according to number except in those things in which there is distinction through addition and composition and matter. And[^15] this distinction does not apply in God, therefore neither diversity according to number.

The other reason is *a priori*: because in anything which we understand as complete, we understand it under this twofold condition, namely through the mode *by which it is* and *that which is*; and unity indeed or identity according to species or genus comes[^16] from the side of that which is the *quo*, according to the diverse states or greater and lesser completion. But unity, or diversity according to number, comes from the side of *that which is* itself according to being, or as it is in an individual supposit[^17]. But these two are joined in all things in such wise that, *that which is* being numbered, it is necessary that *that by which it is* be also numbered. Since therefore in all things which differ in number, *that which is* is numbered, it is necessary that *that by which it is* be also multiplied in them.

And[^18] because for diversity according to number there concur the diversity of *that by which it is* and *that which is* and *who*

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is, that is, of nature and of supposit or hypostasis, but principally of *that which is* itself; since in divine things *that which is* itself, that is, the essence, on account of the highest simplicity is in no way multipliable: therefore it is necessary that *that which is* itself likewise remain undistinguished: and therefore it is impossible that diversity according to number apply there. Nor however is it one in number: because *that which is* itself one in number[^19] in creatures cannot be predicated of many: but in divine things *that which is* itself, although it be one, is nevertheless predicable of many. And the reason for this is that *that by which it is* and *that which is* are the same there, in respect[^20] of the thing. And therefore, just as *that by which it is* is communicable to many, although not multipliable, so [also] *that which is* itself. Whence we can say that the plurality of persons holds the middle between the same in number and the diverse. For although *that which is* itself is not numbered, *he who is* is nevertheless numbered; whence there are there many *whos*.

**To 1.** And this is what the Damascene wishes to say, when he says: «In number, not in nature, the hypostases differ». For by this addition: *not in nature*, he himself contracted difference according to number, or rather drew it away from its proper account[^21]. Whence he himself says in the first book, chapter eight: «It must be known, that one thing is to differ in reality, another in reason. In all creatures the division of the hypostases is considered in reality, but the community in reason; in the highest and supersubstantial Trinity, however, it is the converse». Whence since diversity according to number makes or notes diversity in reality and in nature, properly speaking, unless the name of diversity according to number is drawn over to the distinction of supposits, it is not to be conceded that there is there diversity according to number, but [only] according to number[^22] of persons or hypostases. And this is what the Damascene wishes to say, when he says that the hypostases differ in number, not, I say, in a number which expresses[^23] diversity in reality and in nature, but [in one] which expresses difference in properties and relations, the nature always remaining one and undivided. From this that [saying] of the Damascene is plain.

**To 2.** To that which is objected secondly, that those things differ in number which are numbered; it must be said that it is true that[^24] they differ in that mode in which they are numbered; but they are not numbered except with respect to the persons; and so they do not differ except in number of hypostases and in property.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that those things which differ in reality etc.; a distinction must be made in this name *re* [in reality][^25], because it can express the nature or essence, and it can express the person. If it expresses the essence and the nature, it is true; if the person, it is false, and that division has no place.

**To 4.** To that which is objected, that unity in number regards the identity of the supposit; it must be said that if by *supposit* be meant *that which is*, then it has truth. But if there be meant *he who is* or the person, it does not have truth except in those things in which *that by which it is* and *that which is* differ. Whence properly speaking, diversity according to number follows *that which is*; and therefore[^26] in divine things it has no place.

**To 5.** To that which is objected[^27], that *the same* and *the diverse* sufficiently divide being, therefore [each thing is either] the same in number, or diverse; it must be said that this is true in a being which is born to be numbered, such as a created being; but in uncreated being this fails. Whence Hilary *On the Trinity*[^28]: «That God born from God, neither does birth permit to be the same nor [permit] to be other»: and so, as has been said before, [it] holds the middle between the same in number and the diverse.

la: *De Fide orthod.* c. 6: *Personae siquidem non natura, sed numero inter se distingui dicuntur.*

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6: *For the persons are said to be distinguished from one another not in nature, but in number.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 6. (c. 5.); V. *Metaph.* text. 16. (IV. c. 9.); et Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 6 (c. 5); *Metaphysics* V, text. 16 (IV, c. 9); and Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 1.

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungitur *materiam sive*, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. ponitur *et hoc patet* loco *quod patet*, pro quo cod. *Z* *hoc enim patet*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc*, against the testimony of the other manuscripts and edition 1, *materiam sive* ("matter or") is added, and a little below, against most codices, *et hoc patet* ("and this is plain") is put in place of *quod patet* ("which is plain"), for which codex *Z* [reads] *hoc enim patet* ("for this is plain").

la: Vide supra pag. 104 nota 5.

en: See above p. 104, note 5.

la: Praeferimus lectionem maioris partis codd. ut *AFGIHSTUWYZ* etc. et ed. 1 lectioni aliquorum codd. et Vat. *Si ergo Pater comparatur Filio*. Mox post *Si idem* ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus male omissum *sed*.

en: We prefer the reading of the greater part of the codices, such as *AFGIHSTUWYZ* etc. and edition 1, to the reading of some codices and the Vatican edition, *Si ergo Pater comparatur Filio* ("If therefore the Father is compared with the Son"). Next, after *Si idem*, from most of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have supplied the wrongly omitted *sed*.

la: Cod. *H* addit *falsum est*.

en: Codex *H* adds *falsum est* ("is false").

la: Hic, c. 1, circa finem. — Paulo infra lectionem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 restituimus addendo *cum sit aliqua diversitas, scil. diversitas secundum numerum*.

en: Here, c. 1, near the end. — A little below we have restored the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 by adding *cum sit aliqua diversitas, scil. diversitas secundum numerum* ("since [if there were] there would be some diversity, namely diversity according to number").

la: Cod. *V* *diversitas*.

en: Codex *V* [reads] *diversitas*.

en: Book I *Physics*, text. 66 (c. 7).

la: Plurimi mss. et ed. 1 *numerantur*; sed propter difficultatem grammaticalem hanc lectionem non recepimus.

en: Most manuscripts and edition 1 [read] *numerantur* ("are numbered"); but on account of the grammatical difficulty we have not accepted this reading.

la: In cod. *Y* additur *duo*.

en: In codex *Y* *duo* ("two") is added.

la: In aliquibus mss. et Vat. hic additur *nec modo*, sed minus ad rem et contradicente maiore parte mss. et ed. 1. In fine argumenti plures codd. cum ed. 1 *ergo non* loco *ergo nec*.

en: In some manuscripts and the Vatican edition there is here added *nec modo* ("nor in mode"), but less to the point and against the major part of the manuscripts and edition 1. At the end of the argument several codices with edition 1 [read] *ergo non* in place of *ergo nec*.

la: Vat. cum uno alterove codice perperam omittit *numero*, quod tamen exhibetur in ceteris codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with one or two codices wrongly omits *numero* ("in number"), which however is exhibited in the other codices and edition 1.

la: Communis definitio numeri, sumta ex Aristotele, IV. *Phys.* text. 133. (c. ult.); V. *Metaph.* text. 11. et 20., ac X. *Metaph.* text. 21. (IV. c. 6. et 13. ac IX. c. 6.), haec est: *Numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum.* Vel ex Boethio, I. *de Arithmetica*, c. 3: *Numerus est unitatum collectio, vel quantitatis acervus ex unitatibus profusus* (cfr. etiam *de Trin.* c. 3.). — Plures codd. ut *AIPQTV cc* *singula* pro *singulis*. Paulo ante cod. 1 *ratio* loco *passio*. Mox codd. *PQ* *in his* pro *ex his*.

en: The common definition of number, taken from Aristotle, IV *Physics*, text. 133 (last chapter); V *Metaphysics*, text. 11 and 20, and X *Metaphysics*, text. 21 (IV, cc. 6 and 13, and IX, c. 6), is this: *Number is a multitude measured by one.* Or from Boethius, I *On Arithmetic*, c. 3: *Number is a collection of unities, or a heap of quantity poured forth from unities* (cf. also *On the Trinity*, c. 3). — Several codices such as *AIPQTV cc* [read] *singula* in place of *singulis*. A little earlier codex 1 [reads] *ratio* in place of *passio*. Next codices *PQ* [read] *in his* in place of *ex his*.

la: Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 loco *Sed* substituimus *Et*, quod aliqui codd. ut *SY* omittunt.

en: From most of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *Et* in place of *Sed*, which some codices such as *SY* omit.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. *est veniens*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] *est veniens* ("is coming").

la: In cod. *Y* adiungitur *vel*. Mox aliqui codd. ut *ATXZ* cum ed. 1 *iuncta* pro *coniuncta*, quod aliqui ut *SW* omittunt.

en: In codex *Y* *vel* ("or") is added. Next some codices such as *ATXZ* with edition 1 [read] *iuncta* in place of *coniuncta*, which some such as *SW* omit.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, omissa particula *Et*, proxime sequentem propositionem cum praecedente coniungit novamque paulo infra incipit, addito *ergo*, a verbis *Cum ergo in divinis*, quae lectio et in se incongrua est et contra antiquiores codd. nec non ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, omitting the particle *Et*, joins the next proposition with the preceding and begins a new one a little below, with *ergo* added, from the words *Cum ergo in divinis* ("Since therefore in divine things"), a reading which is in itself incongruous and against the older codices as well as edition 1.

la: Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus *unum numero*. Immediate post in pluribus codd. ut *ADILORSTU* etc. desideratur *in creaturis*.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have added *unum numero* ("one in number"). Immediately after, in several codices such as *ADILORSTU* etc. *in creaturis* ("in creatures") is missing.

la: In paucis mss. ut *YZ* additur *est*, et a cod. *Z* paulo infra post *ita* adiungitur *et*.

en: In a few manuscripts such as *YZ* *est* is added, and by codex *Z* a little below after *ita* *et* is added.

la: Vat. quae ponit *ad differentiam* loco *a propria* castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. — Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. (excepta ed. 1.) *distinxit* pro *distraxit*. Mox Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *ut* loco *Unde*.

en: The Vatican edition, which puts *ad differentiam* in place of *a propria*, is corrected from the manuscripts and the first six editions. — Most codices with the first editions (except edition 1) [read] *distinxit* in place of *distraxit*. Next the Vatican edition, against the resistance of most manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *ut* in place of *Unde*.

la: Lectio Vat. mutila, in qua male omittitur *sed secundum numerum*, resarcitur ope fere omnium mss. et ed. 1.

en: The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which *sed secundum numerum* is wrongly omitted, is repaired by the help of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus hic et paulo infra *dicat* pro *dicit* et mox ope plurium mss. ut *FHIT bb* mutavimus *relatione* in *relationibus*. Dein pauci codd. ut *USU* *unitate indivisa* loco *unica et indivisa*.

en: On the testimony of most codices and edition 1 we have here and a little below substituted *dicat* in place of *dicit*, and next by the help of several manuscripts such as *FHIT bb* we have changed *relatione* into *relationibus*. Then a few codices such as *USU* [read] *unitate indivisa* in place of *unica et indivisa*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* *quia*, sed contradicentibus aliis codd. et ed. 1. Paulo ante pro *differunt* aliqui codd. ut *IKTV cc* *differant*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *quia*, but with the other codices and edition 1 contradicting. A little earlier in place of *differunt* some codices such as *IKTV cc* [read] *differant*.

la: Pauci codd. ut *A D T* *rei*, et paulo infra *dicit* loco *dicat*.

en: A few codices such as *A D T* [read] *rei*, and a little below *dicit* in place of *dicat*.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 6 supplevimus *ideo*.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 6 we have supplied *ideo*.

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* deest *quod obiicitur*. Ed. addit *est*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc* *quod obiicitur* ("which is objected") is missing. The edition adds *est*.

la: Libr. I. n. 17: *Quia Deo ex Deo nato neque eundem nativitas permittit esse, neque aliud.* — In quo textu, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. *nec aliam esse natura permittit*. Mox ex codd. cum ed. 1 *praedictum* loco *dictum* posuimus.

en: Book I, n. 17: *Because birth does not permit God born from God to be the same, nor [permit Him to be] other.* — In which text, with nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, the Vatican edition [reads] *nec aliam esse natura permittit* ("nor does nature permit [Him] to be other"). Next from the codices with edition 1 we have put *praedictum* in place of *dictum*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum fides applicet numeros *unum* et *tres* ad divina, et numerus videatur non convenire cum aequalitate, S. Doctor apte agit hic de numero praecise sub hoc respectu, sive quomodo numerus admitti possit in divinis, quin derogetur summae divinae aequalitati. Plura de ratione numeri in divinis dicentur infra d. 24. a. 2. Cum Magister in hac re opinionem sustinuerit communiter reprobatam, multum illa aetate de ratione numeri in divinis est disputatum. Unde Alex. Hal. integram de hac materia scripsit quaestionem, septem membra complectentem, in qua diffuse exponit quae S. Bonav. hic brevi compendio exhibet.

**II.** Duplici conclusione quaestio resolvitur. Primo respondetur cum Magistro, quod in divinis non est differentia secundum numerum. Haec solutio intelligitur de numero proprie et stricte sumto. Hanc assertionem omnibus doctoribus communem Seraphicus duplici ratione probat. Prima sumta est *a posteriori* i. e. ex consideratione earum rerum, quae proprie habent differentiam numeralem. Haec sic procedit: numerus supponit aggregationem multitudinis, haec vero unitatem limitatam, limitatio additionem, quia genus additione differentiae specificae, species additione principiorum individuantium, materia additione formae limitantur; additio autem implicat compositionem, quae minime est in Deo et consequenter nec differentia numeralis. Secunda ratio sumitur *a priori* sive ex intrinsecis conditionibus entium et praecipue entis infiniti. Haec procedit ex distinctione in omnibus entibus completis facienda inter *quo est* et *quod est*. *Quo est* significat naturam specificam vel genericam, *quod est* vero individuum seu suppositum: ex illo oritur unitas specifica vel generica, ex hoc vero identitas vel diversitas secundum numerum. In Deo autem *quo est* et *quod est* minime multiplicantur et distinguuntur; tamen *qui est* (hypostasis) habet distinctionem et numerum personalem. — His suppositis facile intelligitur secunda conclusio, quae incipit a verbis: «Nec tamen est unum numero» etc. Licet enim in Deo *quo est* et *quod est* sint unum, tamen numeratur pluralitas personarum. Unde in divinis non est simpliciter numerus, sed cum additione determinante, nempe pluralitas «secundum numerum personarum» (hic ad 1. et dub. 2.). Ideo S. Doctor non consentit Magistro, qui numerum omnino removet a divinis, sed dicit infra (d. 24. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.): «Numerus importat distinctionem et super hoc compositionem aggregationis; et quamvis in divinis non sit aggregatio, nihilominus est distinctio, ideo numerus non simpliciter removendus est a divinis, sed numerus talis. Et Magister omnino removet, ideo in positione sua defecit. Et in illo articulo communiter non tenetur a magistris Parisiensibus».

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 45. m. 1. 2. 3. 4. — Scot., in utroque scripto I. *Sent.* d. 24. q. unic. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 24. q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 30. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 17; S. p. 1. tr. 9. q. 42. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., I. *Sent.* d. 24, prima princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 14. n. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since faith applies the numbers *one* and *three* to divine things, and number does not seem to be in agreement with equality, the Holy Doctor here aptly treats of number precisely under this respect, that is, in what manner number can be admitted in divine things without derogating from the highest divine equality. More on the account of number in divine things will be said below in d. 24, a. 2. Since the Master in this matter held an opinion commonly disapproved, much was disputed in that age concerning the account of number in divine things. Whence Alexander of Hales wrote a whole question on this matter, embracing seven members, in which he sets out at length what St. Bonaventure here exhibits in a brief compendium.

**II.** The question is resolved by a twofold conclusion. First it is answered with the Master, that in divine things there is no difference according to number. This solution is to be understood of number properly and strictly taken. The Seraphic Doctor proves this assertion, common to all the doctors, by a twofold reason. The first is taken *a posteriori*, that is, from the consideration of those things which properly have numerical difference. It proceeds thus: number supposes an aggregation of a multitude, this in turn a limited unity, limitation an addition, because genus is limited by the addition of the specific difference, species by the addition of individuating principles, matter by the addition of form; but addition implies composition, which is by no means in God, and consequently neither numerical difference. The second reason is taken *a priori*, that is, from the intrinsic conditions of beings and especially of infinite being. It proceeds from the distinction to be made in all complete beings between *quo est* and *quod est*. *Quo est* signifies the specific or generic nature, but *quod est* the individual or supposit: from the former arises specific or generic unity, from the latter identity or diversity according to number. But in God *quo est* and *quod est* are by no means multiplied and distinguished; nevertheless *qui est* (the hypostasis) has distinction and personal number. — These things being supposed, the second conclusion is easily understood, which begins with the words: «Nor however is it one in number» etc. For although in God *quo est* and *quod est* are one, nevertheless the plurality of persons is numbered. Whence in divine things there is not number simply, but with a determining addition, namely plurality «according to number of persons» (here in [reply] to 1 and dub. 2). Therefore the Holy Doctor does not agree with the Master, who removes number altogether from divine things, but says below (d. 24, a. 2, q. 1, in the body): «Number imports distinction and over and above this composition of aggregation; and although in divine things there is no aggregation, nevertheless there is distinction, therefore number is not simply to be removed from divine things, but [only] number of such [a kind]. And the Master removes [it] altogether, therefore in his position he failed. And in that article he is not commonly held by the masters of Paris».

**III.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 45, m. 1, 2, 3, 4. — Scotus, in either writing on I *Sent.* d. 24, q. unic. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 30, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 17; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 9, q. 42, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, I *Sent.* d. 24, prima princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 43, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 14, n. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 19, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram; et primo dubitatur de situ huius partis. Cum enim unitas in *substantia* faciat *identitatem*, unitas in *quantitate* *aequalitatem*, unitas in *qualitate* *similitudinem*, pari ratione videtur, quod deberet determinare de identitate et similitudine; quia, si de his non determinat, videtur, quod nec de aequalitate deberet facere specialem tractatum.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ostensa perfecta aequalitate, ostenditur, quod omnimoda sit in natura identitas et similitudo; et ideo determinata aequalitate, non est opportunum de aliis determinare; sed magis de aequalitate determinat propter haereses extirpandas, Arianorum maxime, qui posuerunt inaequalitatem in divinis; et ideo difficilior[^1] et utilior circa hoc versatur disputatio.

### DUB. II.

Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicit, quod *aequalitas consistit in aeternitate*. Videtur enim male procedere, quia ipse dividit *coaeternitatem*[^2] contra *aequalitatem*: ergo si ab ea distinguitur, quantum ad aeternitatem non attenditur aequalitas.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aequalitas perfecta in his tribus consistit, et Magister condividit aequalitatem contra coaeternitatem quantum ad alia duo membra, scilicet magnitudinem et potentiam.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non alio Deus, alio magnus* etc., quia videtur pari ratione, cum alio sit Deus, alio Pater, quod alio sit Deus, alio magnus. Si dicas, quod quantitas transit in substantiam, relatio non; obiicitur, quod illud non solvit. Augustinus[^3] enim loquitur de formali praedicatione, et constat, quod formaliter loquendo ita est ista falsa: *Deus est magnus deitate*, vel *Deus magnitudine*, sicut et: *Pater magnitudine*[^4].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis secundum rationem loquendi vel intelligendi a parte nostra magnitudo in divinis dicatur per modum quantitatis, et deitas per modum substantiae, tamen a parte rei nulla est omnino differentia. Nihil enim de magnitudine dicitur, quod non dicatur de substantia. In relatione[^5] autem paternitatis non est ita. Aliquid enim praedicatur de paternitate, quod non potest dici de essentia, sicut distinguere et distingui.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In generatione generationum anni tui*[^6]. Videtur enim male dicere, quia in aeternitate nulla cadit variatio: ergo cum annus variationem habeat, non debet transferri ibi[^7]. Item, in illa aeternitate est omnimoda simplicitas et impartibilitas: ergo non deberet pluraliter dici annos.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod iuxta modum nostrae infirmitatis et intelligimus[^8] divinam aeternitatem[^9] et nominamus. Quoniam enim annus dicit completam temporis revolutionem secundum decursum solis in zodiaco et regressum ad idem punctum, et divina aeternitas est perfecta et durationes ceteras circumplectens: ideo ad ipsam transtulit Scriptura nomen anni.

Rursus, quia interminata[^10] et a parte ante et a parte post, ideo non *annum* dicit, quasi terminum habeat, nec generationem singulariter, sed pluraliter *annos*, et *generationes* similiter. Ratione ergo perfectionis et interminationis transfertur, non ratione variationis.

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *in generatione Sanctorum sunt anni Dei, aeternitas*. Videtur enim falsum, quia duratio Sanctorum est finita a parte ante; sed aeternitas Dei est infinita a parte ante et post: ergo Sancti non sunt in illa[^11]. Item, quo modo essendi *in*[^12] generatio Sanctorum est in illa? Sicut mensura, non, quia Dei aeternitas solius Dei est mensura; si sicut causa in effectu; sed hoc modo est in ceteris creaturis: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod[^13] illud verbum non est dictum per commensurationem neque per aequalitatem, sed per concomitantiam et conformitatem. Quia enim generatio Sanctorum a parte post durat in infinitum[^14], durat etiam sine variatione: ideo illam summam aeternitatem in aeternum comitatur et ei

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expresse conformatur; et ideo exponit illud Psalmi beatus Augustinus[^15]: *In generatione generationum anni tui*: sive in generatione interminata, quae generatio est Sancti, sive Sancti sunt illa generatio, et quia in perpetuum durat, et quia ex multis generationibus sunt collecti.

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre*; quia, si quidquid est in Deo Deus est propter summam simplicitatem, ergo quidquid est in Filio est Filius: ergo si Pater est in Filio, Pater est Filius.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, cum dicitur aliquid esse in Deo, haec praepositio *in* aut dicit distinctionem essentialem, et sic non quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, quia *in eo vivimus, movemur et sumus*[^16]; aut nullam dicit distinctionem nisi secundum modum intelligendi, et hoc ponit omnimodam identitatem; et ideo sequitur, quod sit Deus quod est in Deo. Sed cum dicitur de persona, haec praepositio *in* dicit distinctionem personalem, et una persona de alia non praedicatur; et ideo patet, quod non est simile[^17].

### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: *Nec exemplum rebus divinis comparatio humana praestabit*. Videtur enim falsum, quia imago est expressa similitudo, et vestigium est in omni creatura: ergo videtur, quod *exemplum* sit in omnibus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est exemplum exprimens perfecte et[^18] consimiliter omnino, et tale nullum est in creaturis, quia imago et ceterae creaturae plus habent dissimilitudinis quam similitudinis; et est exemplum aliquo modo manuducens, et sic multa sunt, et ex multis colligitur unum, nec tamen omnino perfectum.

### DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quod inintelligibile est homini, possibile est Deo*. Videtur falsum, «*quia anima nostra quodam modo est omnia*»[^19], et intellectus noster non tot intelligit, quin plura possit intelligere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de intellectu comprehendente, et sic non est verum, quod omnia intelligere possit, quia nec Deus nec aliquid Dei est comprehensibile nobis, quia omnino infinitus; et est loqui de intellectu apprehendente, et hoc dupliciter: aut in ratione possibilis[^20] et suscipientis, et utique omne quod potest fieri, potest intelligere, quia possibile est ad intelligendum; aut in ratione agentis, et quia non habet lumen tantae potentiae, quod possit super omnia, scilicet praesentia et futura, quia multa sunt contra[^21] eius iudicium, sic non est omnium.

### DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: *Nam si partem eiusdem, qui genuit, accepit, neuter perfectus est*. Videtur enim non sequi hoc, quia homo perfectus generat filium perfectum, et tamen non dat ei nisi partem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est perfectio simpliciter, et perfectio[^22] in genere. Perfectio in genere bene compatitur secum dationem et receptionem partis, quia in dante suppletur per restaurationem, in accipiente per augmentum et additionem; sed perfectio simpliciter non compatitur secum restaurationem nec additionem. Et quoniam in Deo perfectio est simpliciter, ideo si daret partem, in dante remaneret defectus, similiter et in accipiente; ideo non est simile de homine[^23].

### DUB. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non per duplicem convenientium generum coniunctionem* etc.;

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aut enim tangit modos essendi, aut generandi. Non essendi, quia multo plures sunt quam isti; non generandi; et ita[^24] utroque modo est insufficiens.

**Respondeo:** Aliqui dicunt, quod Hilarius tangit duos modos generationis, qui sunt in creaturis, ut excludat eos a Filio. Sed non assignat nisi duos[^25] modos, quia non loquitur nisi de generatione vivi; vivens autem generabile dividitur in vegetabile et sensibile; et secundum illud duplex genus duplex est modus generandi, quem tangit Hilarius. Nam animalia generantur per[^26] coniunctionem maris et feminae, et plantae per insertum. Primum tangit cum dicitur: «*Non per duplicem convenientium generum*», quia masculus et femina sunt duplicis generis quantum ad sexum, et tamen convenientes sunt quantum ad formam et naturam[^27]. Secundum modum tangit cum dicit: «*Nec per insitivam capacioris substantiae naturam*», sicut surculus inseritur arbori, «*sed per naturae unitam similitudinem*», id est similitudinem omnino in natura indifferentem[^28].

Aliter potest dici, quod Hilarius non loquitur de modo[^29] generandi, sed loquitur, quomodo Pater sit in Filio; et excludit modum essendi *in*, quo creatura dicitur esse in creatura secundum modum usitatum; ad quem modum concurrit duplex conditio creaturarum: prima est creaturarum[^30] quoad naturam diversitas; secunda est continentis capacitas. Et has excludit ab illo modo existendi, qui est in divinis, per illa duo, quae dicit: «*Quod Filius est in Patre non per coniunctionem duorum generum, neque per insitivam capacioris substantiae naturam*». Hoc patet per litteram Hilarii[^31], quam immediate subiungit in originali, et Magister omittit: «*Quia*, inquit Hilarius, *per corporalem necessitatem exteriora fieri his, quibus continentur, interiora non possunt*», et[^32] vult, quod illud est impossibile in creaturis corporalibus, quod mutuo sint in se ipsis, sicut Pater est in Filio; quia propter corporalem necessitatem et imperfectionem interiora non possunt fieri exteriora his quibus continentur, ut si aqua est intus[^33] in vase, dum est intus, non potest fieri extra, et ita non continetur vas, ut vas sit in aqua.

### DUB. XI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Dum naturam Dei non degenerat nativitas*, quia non tantum in Deo, sed in creaturis pluribus non degenerat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod degenerare est extra genus generantis exire. Exire autem extra genus generantis hoc est: aut quantum ad communem[^34] formam et naturam; et sic est degeneratio in aequivocis, sicut equus ex asina generat burdonem, et asinus ex equa mulum, unde mulus degenerat. Alio modo degenerare est proprietates generantis relinquere, retenta natura, sicut filius, qui generatur ex patre nobili et pulcro, est rusticanus[^35] et turpis. Tertio modo est degenerare naturam generantis relinquere, non per dissimilitudinem, sed per diversitatem; et hoc modo omnis nativitas creata degenerat, quia in omni creatura generans est aliud a generato[^36], et sola divina generatio est, quae non degenerat, quia nihil nascitur novum, nihil additur alienum, et ideo generans a generato in substantia non separatur; et ideo illa generatio sola est nobilissima[^37].

---

english:
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt about the placement of this part. For since unity in *substance* makes *identity*, unity in *quantity* [makes] *equality*, unity in *quality* [makes] *likeness*, by parity of reason it appears that he ought to determine [also] concerning identity and likeness; because, if he does not determine concerning these, it appears that neither concerning equality ought he to make a special treatment.

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**I respond:** It must be said that, equality having been shown perfectly, it is shown that there is in [the divine] nature in every way identity and likeness; and therefore, equality having been determined, it is not necessary to determine concerning the others; but he treats more of equality on account of heresies to be extirpated, especially of the Arians, who posited inequality in the divine [persons]; and therefore the disputation that concerns this is more difficult[^1] and more useful.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is doubted concerning what he says, that *equality consists in eternity*. For it appears to proceed wrongly, because he himself divides *coeternity*[^2] over against *equality*: therefore if [equality] is distinguished from [coeternity], with respect to eternity equality is not regarded.

**I respond:** It must be said that perfect equality consists in these three [eternity, magnitude, power], and the Master places equality in coordinate division against coeternity with respect to the other two members, namely magnitude and power.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Not by another [is God] God, by another great* etc., because by parity of reason it appears, since by another he is God, by another Father, that by another he is God, by another great. If you say that quantity passes over into substance, but relation does not; the objection is raised that this does not solve it. For Augustine[^3] is speaking of formal predication, and it is established that, formally speaking, this [proposition] is just as false: *God is great by deity*, or *God by magnitude*, as also: *Father by magnitude*[^4].

**I respond:** It must be said that although according to our manner of speaking or understanding on our part magnitude in divine matters is said in the manner of quantity, and deity in the manner of substance, yet on the side of the thing there is no difference whatsoever. For nothing is said of magnitude which is not said of substance. In the relation[^5], however, of paternity it is not so. For something is predicated of paternity which cannot be said of essence, as to distinguish and to be distinguished.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *In the generation of generations are thy years*[^6]. For it appears to say wrongly, because in eternity no variation falls: therefore since *year* has variation, it ought not to be transferred there[^7]. Likewise, in that eternity there is every kind of simplicity and impartibility: therefore *years* ought not to be said in the plural.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the measure of our weakness we both understand[^8] and name the divine eternity[^9]. For since *year* states the complete revolution of time according to the course of the sun in the zodiac and its return to the same point, and the divine eternity is perfect and embraces all other durations: therefore Scripture transferred to it the name of *year*.

Again, because [it is] unterminated[^10] both from the side before and the side after, therefore it does not say *year* [in the singular], as though it had a terminus, nor *generation* singularly, but plurally *years*, and likewise *generations*. By reason therefore of perfection and unterminatedness it is transferred, not by reason of variation.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *in the generation of the saints are the years of God, eternity*. For it appears to be false, because the duration of the saints is finite from the side before; but the eternity of God is infinite from the side before and after: therefore the saints are not in it[^11]. Likewise, by which mode of being *in*[^12] is the generation of the saints in it? As measure, no, because the eternity of God is measure of God alone; as cause in effect [and so be in it]; but in this mode he is in the other creatures: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that[^13] this saying is not said by way of commensuration nor by way of equality, but by way of concomitance and conformity. For since the generation of the saints from the side after endures into infinity[^14], it endures also without variation: therefore it accompanies that highest eternity in eternity and

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is expressly conformed to it; and thus blessed Augustine[^15] expounds that [verse] of the Psalm: *In the generation of generations are thy years*: either in the unterminated generation, which is the generation of the Saint, or [because] the saints are that generation, both because it endures forever and because they are gathered out of many generations.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father*; because, if whatever is in God is God on account of the highest simplicity, therefore whatever is in the Son is the Son: therefore if the Father is in the Son, the Father is the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is not similar, because, when something is said to be in God, this preposition *in* either states an essential distinction, and so not whatever is in God is God, since *in him we live, move, and have our being*[^16]; or it states no distinction except according to the mode of understanding, and this posits an utter identity; and therefore it follows that what is in God is God. But when it is said of a person, this preposition *in* states a personal distinction, and one person is not predicated of another; and therefore it is clear that it is not similar[^17].

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about what Hilary says: *Nor will human comparison furnish an example for divine matters*. For it appears to be false, because image is an express likeness, and a vestige is in every creature: therefore it appears that *example* is in all things.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is an example expressing perfectly and[^18] altogether in like manner, and no such [example] exists in creatures, because image and the other creatures have more dissimilitude than likeness; and there is an example in some way leading-by-the-hand, and so [examples] are many, and from many is gathered one, yet not altogether perfect.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *That which is unintelligible to man is possible to God*. It appears false, «*because our soul is in some way all things*»[^19], and our intellect does not understand so many things that it cannot understand more.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is one thing to speak of the comprehending intellect, and so it is not true that it can understand all things, because neither God nor anything of God is comprehensible to us, since [he is] altogether infinite; and it is another to speak of the apprehending intellect, and this in two ways: either in the manner of *possible* [intellect][^20] and receiving, and indeed everything that can come to be, [the intellect] can understand, because it is possible for understanding; or in the manner of *agent*, and because it does not have light of so great a power that it could [reach] over all things, namely things present and future, since many are against[^21] its judgment, so it is not [the intellect] of all things.

### Doubt IX.

Likewise it is asked about what Hilary says: *For if he received a part of the same one who begot, neither is perfect*. For it appears that this does not follow, because a perfect man begets a perfect son, and yet does not give him except a part.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is perfection simply, and perfection[^22] in a genus. Perfection in a genus well tolerates with itself the giving and receiving of a part, because in the giver it is supplied through restoration, in the receiver through increase and addition; but perfection simply does not tolerate with itself restoration nor addition. And since in God perfection is simply, therefore if he were to give a part, in the giver a defect would remain, likewise also in the receiver; therefore it is not similar in the case of man[^23].

### Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Not by a coupling-together of two corresponding genera* etc.;

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for either he touches modes of being, or [modes] of generating. Not [modes] of being, because they are far more than these; not [modes] of generating; and so[^24] in either way it is insufficient.

**I respond:** Some say that Hilary touches the two[^25] modes of generation which are in creatures, in order to exclude them from the Son. But he assigns only two modes, because he speaks only of the generation of a living thing; and a living thing capable of generation is divided into vegetable and sensible; and according to that twofold genus the mode of generating is twofold, which Hilary touches. For animals are generated through[^26] the coupling of male and female, and plants through grafting. He touches the first when it is said: «*Not by a coupling-together of two corresponding genera*», because male and female are of twofold genus with respect to sex, and yet are corresponding with respect to form and nature[^27]. He touches the second mode when he says: «*Nor by the engrafted nature of a more capacious substance*», as a shoot is grafted onto a tree, «*but by a likeness united to nature*», that is, a likeness altogether undifferentiated in nature[^28].

It can be said otherwise that Hilary does not speak about the mode[^29] of generating, but speaks about how the Father is in the Son; and he excludes the mode of being-*in* by which a creature is said to be in a creature according to the customary mode; to which mode there concurs a twofold condition of creatures[^30]: the first is the diversity of creatures with respect to nature; the second is the capacity of the container. And he excludes these from that mode of existing which is in the divine [persons], by those two things which he says: «*That the Son is in the Father not by the coupling of two genera, nor by the engrafted nature of a more capacious substance*». This is clear from the text of Hilary[^31] which he immediately subjoins in the original [text], and which the Master omits: «*Because*, says Hilary, *by corporeal necessity outer things cannot become inner to those by which they are contained*», and[^32] he means that this is impossible in corporeal creatures, that they should mutually be in themselves, as the Father is in the Son; because on account of corporeal necessity and imperfection inner things cannot become outer to those by which they are contained, as if water is within[^33] a vessel, while it is within, it cannot come to be outside, and so the vessel is not contained, in such a way that the vessel might be in the water.

### Doubt XI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *While nativity does not degenerate from the nature of God*, because not only in God, but in many creatures it does not degenerate.

**I respond:** It must be said that to degenerate is to go out beyond the genus of the begetter. To go out beyond the genus of the begetter is this: either with respect to the common[^34] form and nature; and so there is degeneration in equivocals, as a horse from a she-ass begets a hinny, and an ass from a mare a mule, whence the mule degenerates. In another way to degenerate is to leave behind the properties of the begetter, the nature being retained, as a son who is generated from a noble and beautiful father is rustic[^35] and ugly. In a third way to degenerate is to leave behind the nature of the begetter, not through dissimilitude, but through diversity; and in this mode every created nativity degenerates, because in every creature the begetter is something other than the begotten[^36], and the divine generation alone is the one which does not degenerate, because nothing new is born, nothing alien is added, and therefore the begetter is not separated in substance from the begotten; and therefore that generation alone is the most noble[^37].

---

la: Vide supra pag. 342. nota 6.

en: See above p. 342, note 6.

la: Cod. O *sufficientior*.

en: Codex O [reads] *sufficientior*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut IVYZ *aeternitatem*.

en: Some codices such as I, V, Y, Z [read] *aeternitatem*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Vat. perperam et praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 ordinem invertit ponendo *quod sicut* loco *ita et sic et ista: Pater est magnus* pro *sicut et: Pater magnitudine*, quae et post *vel* repetit *Deus est*.

en: The Vatican [edition] wrongly and against the faith of the manuscripts and edition 1 inverts the order, putting *quod sicut* in place of *ita et sic et ista: Pater est magnus* in place of *sicut et: Pater magnitudine*, which it also after *vel* repeats *Deus est*.

la: Mendum Vat. *resolutione* correximus ex mss. et edd. 1, 2.

en: We have corrected the error of the Vatican [edition] *resolutione* from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2.

la: Ita codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum ceteris edd. *In generatione et generationem anni tui*; ceterum vide supra textum Magistri, c. 1.

en: So the codices with edition 1, while the Vatican [edition] with the other editions [reads] *In generatione et generationem anni tui*; for the rest see above the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cod. dd *ad divina* pro *ibi*. Paulo infra Vat. falso *impartialitas* loco *impartibilitas*; obstant etiam plurimi mss. et ed. 1.

en: Codex dd [reads] *ad divina* in place of *ibi*. A little below the Vatican [edition reads] falsely *impartialitas* in place of *impartibilitas*; very many manuscripts and edition 1 stand against [it] also.

la: Multi codd. contra contextum *Trinitatem* pro *aeternitatem*; Vat. cum uno alterove codice *Trinitatem vel aeternitatem*; lectio in textum recepta exhibetur a pluribus mss. ut H ee ff et ed. 1. Mox ex antiquioribus mss. supplevimus *enim*.

en: Many codices, against the context, [read] *Trinitatem* in place of *aeternitatem*; the Vatican [edition] with one or another codex [reads] *Trinitatem vel aeternitatem*; the reading received into the text is exhibited by several manuscripts such as H, ee, ff, and edition 1. Soon, from the older manuscripts we have supplied *enim*.

la: Subintellige: *aeternitas*. — Pauci codd. ut HT adiiciunt *est*, cod. X *est duratio*.

en: Understand: *aeternitas* ("eternity"). — A few codices such as H, T add *est*, codex X [reads] *est duratio*.

la: Nempe: *aeternitate Dei*. — Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et sex primarum edd., sensu eodem manente, *ergo illa non est Sanctis*.

en: Namely: *the eternity of God*. — The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and of the first six editions, the same sense remaining, [reads] *ergo illa non est Sanctis*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 4. argum. 7. ad opp., ubi novem modi essendi *in* referuntur. Mox Vat. *est in illa generatione Sanctorum*, sed praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd., licet idem servetur sensus.

en: Cf. above q. 4, argument 7 *ad oppositum*, where the nine modes of being *in* are recounted. Soon, the Vatican [edition reads] *est in illa generatione Sanctorum*, but against the faith of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, although the same sense is preserved.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quod* et consequenter substituimus *est* loco *esse*.

en: On the faith of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *quod*, and consequently substituted *est* in place of *esse*.

la: Cod. I cum ed. 1 addit *et*. Mox aliqui codd. ut T X cum ed. 1 *concomitatur* pro *comitatur*.

en: Codex I with edition 1 adds *et*. Soon, some codices such as T, X, with edition 1, [read] *concomitatur* in place of *comitatur*.

la: *Enarratio in Psalm.* 101. Serm. 2. n. 11: *De tot generationibus colliges omnes sanctas proles omnium generationum, et facies inde unam generationem. In ista generatione generationum anni tui, id est, aeternitas illa in illa generatione erit, quae de omnibus generationibus colligitur et in unam redigitur; ipsa particeps erit aeternitatis tuae. Ceterae generationes implendis temporibus generantur, ex quibus illa in aeternum regeneratur; mutata vivificabitur, erit idonea portare te, vires accipiens a te. In generatione generationum anni tui*. — Vat. hic sicuti et supra in dub. 4. contra codd. et ed. 1 *In generatione et generationem anni tui*, quae et paulo ante addit *hic* post *ideo*, ac dein *Sanctorum sive* pro *Sancti sive* ponit contra mss. et ed. 1. Mox cod. I *durant* et cod. dd *durant beati* loco *durat*, qui et in fine responsionis adiungit *et hic est intellectus huius propositionis*. — Idem dubium solvitur a B. Albert., hic a. 6.

en: *Commentary on Psalm* 101, sermon 2, n. 11: *Of so many generations you will gather all the holy offspring of all the generations, and you will make from these one generation. In that generation of generations are thy years, that is, that eternity will be in that generation which is gathered from all the generations and is reduced into one; it will partake of thy eternity. The other generations are generated for the filling-out of time, from which that [one] is regenerated into eternity; changed, it will be vivified, it will be fit to carry thee, receiving strength from thee. In the generation of generations are thy years.* — The Vatican [edition] here just as also above in dub. 4, against the codices and edition 1, [reads] *In generatione et generationem anni tui*, which it also a little before adds *hic* after *ideo*, and then puts *Sanctorum sive* in place of *Sancti sive*, against the manuscripts and edition 1. Soon, codex I [reads] *durant* and codex dd *durant beati* in place of *durat*, which also at the end of the response adjoins *et hic est intellectus huius propositionis*. — The same doubt is resolved by B. Albert, here a. 6.

la: Act. 17, 28. — Paulo infra cod. T *quod sic Deus est in Deo* loco *quod sit Deus quod est in Deo*.

en: Acts 17:28. — A little below, codex T [reads] *quod sic Deus est in Deo* in place of *quod sit Deus quod est in Deo*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 4. ad 1. et Scholion.

en: Cf. above q. 4 ad 1 and the *Scholion*.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus *et*. Plures codd. ut CLORSUV *similiter* pro *consimiliter*. — Cfr. de hac divisione pag. 94. dub. 4.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we have supplied *et*. Several codices such as C, L, O, R, S, U, V [read] *similiter* in place of *consimiliter*. — Cf. concerning this division p. 94, dub. 4.

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 37. (c. 8.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 37 (c. 8).

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *possibilitatis*, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1. Paulo post fide plurium mss. ut ISTYZ bb et ed. 1 restituimus particulam *utique*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *possibilitatis*, but against the other codices and edition 1. A little later, on the faith of several manuscripts such as I, S, T, Y, Z, bb, and edition 1, we have restored the particle *utique*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, *supra*. In lectione codicum intelligas locutionem contra iudicium rationis de ratione inferiori et conversa ad sensibilia, ut ipse S. Doctor praeclare explicat III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Plura de intellectu comprehendente et apprehendente vide supra d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1; de intellectu possibili et agente II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4, et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 1–20 (c. 4. et 5). — In cod. O in fine responsionis additur *quia non habet tantum lumen intellectuale, quod possit omnia intellecta in potentia facere intellecta in actu*.

en: The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 contradicting [it], [reads] *supra*. In the reading of the codices, understand the locution as "against the judgment of reason of the lower reason and turned to sensible things," as the holy Doctor himself explains splendidly in III *Sent.* d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. — More on the comprehending and apprehending intellect see above d. 3, p. I, q. 1, ad 1; on the possible and agent intellect II *Sent.* d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4, and Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 1–20 (c. 4 and 5). — In codex O at the end of the response is added: *because it does not have so great an intellectual light that it could make all intellected things in potency intellected in act*.

la: In pluribus mss. ut AFGISTWY etc. et ed. 1 deest *perfectio*.

en: In several manuscripts such as A, F, G, I, S, T, W, Y etc., and edition 1, *perfectio* is missing.

la: Ex multis mss. ut AFGHIMNPQTUZ ee ff et ed. 1 adiecimus verba *ideo non est simile de homine*.

en: From many manuscripts such as A, F, G, H, I, M, N, P, Q, T, U, Z, ee, ff, and edition 1, we have added the words *ideo non est simile de homine* ("therefore it is not similar in the case of man").

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus additum *in*.

en: On the faith of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out the added *in*.

la: Unus alterve codex ut G cum ed. 1 *hic* loco *hos*.

en: One or another codex such as G with edition 1 [reads] *hic* in place of *hos*.

la: Pauci mss. ut GH et ed. 1 *ex coniunctione*. Mox Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 post *insertum* adiicit *Et*. Dein aliqui codd. ut FGH cum ed. 1 *dicit* loco *dicitur*.

en: A few manuscripts such as G, H, and edition 1 [read] *ex coniunctione*. Soon the Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1, after *insertum* adds *Et*. Then some codices such as F, G, H, with edition 1, [read] *dicit* in place of *dicitur*.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *naturam* loco *materiam*. Paulo post aliqui codd. ut aa bb *dicitur* pro *dicit*.

en: From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *naturam* in place of *materiam*. A little later, some codices such as aa, bb [read] *dicitur* in place of *dicit*.

la: Vat. *similitudinem non in natura differentem*; sed obstat auctoritas vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1. — Praedictam expositionem huius loci praebent B. Albert., hic art. 10; S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *similitudinem non in natura differentem*; but the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1 stands against [it]. — The aforesaid exposition of this passage is given by B. Albert, here art. 10; St. Thomas and Richard, here in the *expositio litterae*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut FG cum ed. 1 *modis*.

en: Some codices such as F, G with edition 1 [read] *modis* (in the plural).

la: In Vat. deest *creaturarum*, quod tamen exstat in mss.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *creaturarum* is missing, which yet stands in the manuscripts.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* n. 39. — Ed. 1 cum uno alterove codice *Et hoc* pro *Hoc*. Mox ex pluribus mss. ut AHKTYZ etc. et ed. 1 *quam* loco *quoniam* substituimus.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity* n. 39. — Edition 1 with one or another codex [reads] *Et hoc* in place of *Hoc*. Soon, from several manuscripts such as A, H, K, T, Y, Z etc., and edition 1, we have substituted *quam* in place of *quoniam*.

la: Plurimi mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent particulam *et*, quae[?] in Vat. deest.

en: Very many manuscripts with edition 1 exhibit the particle *et*, which[?] is missing in the Vatican [edition].

la: Sequimur antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 addendo *intus*, quorum tamen aliqui ut FGISVW aa omittunt *in*.

en: We follow the older codices with edition 1 in adding *intus*, of which yet some such as F, G, I, S, V, W, aa omit *in*.

la: In cod. T deest *communem*.

en: In codex T *communem* is missing.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, *rusticus*. Paulo ante cod. T *matre* pro *pulcro*. Mox post *Tertio* ex nonnullis mss. ut P Q dd supplevimus *modo*. Dein post *degenerare* cod. dd addit *id quod*, pro quo plures codd. ut AFGHPQTZ ee ff cum ed. 1 minus bene *id est*, aliqui autem ut S V *et*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, the other manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting [it], [reads] *rusticus*. A little before, codex T [reads] *matre* in place of *pulcro*. Soon after *Tertio*, from some manuscripts such as P, Q, dd we have supplied *modo*. Then after *degenerare* codex dd adds *id quod*, in place of which several codices such as A, F, G, H, P, Q, T, Z, ee, ff, with edition 1, less well [read] *id est*, but some such as S, V [read] *et*.

la: Mendum Vat. et cod. cc *generante* pro *generato* hic et paulo infra ex aliis mss. et ed. 1 castigavimus. Paulo ante cod. T cum ed. 1 *creato* loco *creatura* et cod. Y *alius* pro *aliud*. Mox pro lectione Vat. *et in sola divina generatione degeneratio non est* fide fere omnium antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *et sola divina generatio est, quae non degenerat*; in qua propositione codd. O Y ponunt *sed* loco *et*, ac cod. L *quae non degenerata est* pro *quae non degenerat*.

en: We have corrected the error of the Vatican [edition] and codex cc *generante* in place of *generato* here and a little below from the other manuscripts and edition 1. A little before, codex T with edition 1 [reads] *creato* in place of *creatura*, and codex Y *alius* in place of *aliud*. Soon, in place of the Vatican reading *et in sola divina generatione degeneratio non est*, on the faith of nearly all the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *et sola divina generatio est, quae non degenerat*; in which proposition codices O, Y put *sed* in place of *et*, and codex L *quae non degenerata est* in place of *quae non degenerat*.

la: Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 11.

en: Cf. B. Albert, here a. 11.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 19, Part 2, Dubia

source_text:
<!-- page 365 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Oret, ut quod credit intelligat*. Videtur enim improprie loqui, quia nullus orat quod non desiderat, nullus desiderat quod non considerat, nullus considerat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit: ergo a primo, si orat, ut intelligat, intelligit[^1]. Item, nullus assentit rei, quam mente non intuetur sive concipit: ergo nullus assentit rei, quam non intelligit, quia intelligere est mente intueri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod intelligere dupliciter dicitur: uno modo idem est quod cognoscere, *quid est*[^2] quod per nomen dicitur; alio modo idem est quod ratione comprehendere. Primo modo antecedit fidem, quae est ex auditu[^3]; secundo modo consequitur, quia nulla ratio humana sufficit ad manifestanda credibilia, nisi intellectus fide[^4] illustretur et captivetur.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hac solutione Magistri, qua dicit: *Aliqua differre numero, quae sibi in computatione non adiunguntur*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia illi computationi aut respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil. Si aliquid respondet: ergo non differt a praecedenti differentia; si nihil respondet: ergo distinctio sive computatio nostra super[^5] vanum fundata est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod computationi nostrae, cum dicimus *unus, duo, tres*, aliquid respondet. Sed illud non est diversitas numeralis, sed distinctio personalis; unde in divinis non dicitur esse numerus nec differentia secundum numerum, nisi addatur *secundum numerum personarum*, qui dicit distinctionem in hypostasibus, non in natura; ideo quamvis dicantur tres personae, non tamen est ibi ternarius, sed trinitas[^6].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod cum *Deus dicatur trinus, non debet dici triplex*. Videtur enim contra illud quod dicitur Sapientiae septimo[^7], quod *Spiritus sapientiae est multiplex*, ergo duplex vel quadruplex: ergo etc. Item, Isidorus[^8] dicit, quod «*Trinitas est multiplex et numerabilis*». Item, ratione videtur, quia pannus unus, in substantia duplicatus, dicitur duplex, triplicatus triplex:

<!-- page 366 -->

ergo si una est substantia in tribus hypostasibus, videtur triplicari in eis et ita[^9] triplex dici.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod distinctio personarum non potest significari per additionem termini numeralis[^10] ad hoc nomen *Deus* nisi huius nominis *trinus*, quod specialiter ad hoc inventum est, ut significet pluralitatem in suppositis cum unitate formae. Quia ergo hoc nomen *triplex* dicit distinctionem simpliciter in termino cui additur, vel quantum ad formam, vel quantum ad partium multiplicationem, et quia[^11] in Deo non cadit multiplicatio nec quantum ad formam, nec quantum ad partes: ideo nullo modo potest dici triplex.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod[^12] dicitur *multiplex*; dicendum, quod istud est dictum causaliter, quia multorum et variorum donorum effectivum est principium[^13], in quibus est vera diversitas; non sic in personis. — Quod dicit Isidorus, improprie dictum est et exponendum est. — Ad illud, quod idem pannus dicitur triplex[^14]; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen secundum alias et alias partes; et quia in Deo non est alietas partium nec formae, ideo non potest dici triplex[^15].

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *in rebus corporeis plus sunt duae quam una*. Videtur enim instantia esse, quia ignis cum ferro non est[^16] maius quam ferrum per se, sive lux cum aere. Si tu dicas, quod non sunt corpora; obiicitur, quod corpus glorificatum simul est cum non glorificato, et tantum locum occupat non glorificatum per se, quantum cum glorioso: ergo non sunt maius, quia corpus maius maiorem occupat locum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus[^17] loquitur de rebus corporeis, quarum quaelibet est corpus; sed ignis in ferro et lux in aere non est corpus, sed proprietas corporis. Praeterea notandum, quod Augustinus non accipit hic[^18] *maius* extensive, sed accipit *plus* quantum ad veritatem existentiae vel essentiae. Cum enim non sit summa veritas in qualibet re, plus est de veritate existentiae in duabus rebus quam in una, quamvis non sit ibi plus de latitudine distantiae sive de extensione[^19] magnitudinis vel capacitatis contentivae.

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first about what he says: *Let him pray, that what he believes he may understand*. For it appears to speak improperly, because no one prays for what he does not desire, no one desires what he does not consider, no one considers what he does not know or understand: therefore from the first, if he prays in order to understand, he [already] understands[^1]. Likewise, no one assents to a thing which he does not gaze upon or conceive in mind: therefore no one assents to a thing which he does not understand, because to understand is to gaze with the mind.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to understand* is said in two ways: in one way it is the same as to know *what it is*[^2] which is said by the name; in another way it is the same as to comprehend by reason. In the first way it precedes faith, which is from hearing[^3]; in the second way it follows, because no human reason suffices to manifest things to be believed, unless the intellect is illumined and made captive by faith[^4].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this solution of the Master, by which he says: *Some things differ in number, which are not joined to one another in counting*. For it appears to say wrongly, because either something in the thing corresponds to that counting, or nothing. If something corresponds: therefore it does not differ from the preceding difference; if nothing corresponds: therefore our distinction or counting is founded upon[^5] the void.

**I respond:** It must be said that to our counting, when we say *one, two, three*, something does correspond. But that is not numerical diversity, but personal distinction; whence in the divine [persons] it is not said that there is *number* nor *difference according to number*, unless one adds *according to the number of persons*, which states a distinction in the hypostases, not in the nature; therefore although three persons are spoken of, yet there is not there a *ternary*, but a *trinity*[^6].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that since *God is called trine, he ought not to be called triple*. For it appears [to be] against what is said in the seventh [chapter] of Wisdom[^7], that *the Spirit of wisdom is manifold* (*multiplex*), therefore double or quadruple: therefore etc. Likewise, Isidore[^8] says that «*Trinity is manifold and numerable*». Likewise, it appears by reason, because one cloth, doubled in substance, is called double, tripled, triple:

[therefore] if one substance is in three hypostases, it appears to be tripled in them and so[^9] to be called triple.

**I respond:** It must be said that the distinction of persons cannot be signified by the addition of a numerical term[^10] to this name *God*, except by this name *trine*, which has been invented specifically for this, that it should signify plurality in the supposits with unity of form. Since therefore this name *triple* states distinction simply in the term to which it is added, either with respect to form, or with respect to the multiplication of parts, and since[^11] in God multiplication does not fall, neither with respect to form, nor with respect to parts: therefore in no way can [God] be called *triple*.

To that which is objected, that[^12] [the Spirit] is called *manifold*; it must be said that this was said causally, because [the Holy Spirit] is the effective principle[^13] of many and varied gifts, in which there is true diversity; not so in the persons. — As to what Isidore says, it was said improperly and is to be expounded [accordingly]. — To that [objection], that the same cloth is called triple[^14]; it must be said that this is true, but yet according to other and other parts; and because in God there is no otherness of parts nor of form, therefore he cannot be called triple[^15].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *in corporeal things two are more than one*. For an instance appears to be [available], because fire with iron is not[^16] greater than iron by itself, or light with air. If you say that they are not bodies; the objection is raised that a glorified body is together with a non-glorified [body], and the non-glorified [body] occupies just as much place by itself as [it does] with the glorious [body]: therefore they are not greater, because a greater body occupies a greater place.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine[^17] is speaking of corporeal things, of which each one is a body; but fire in iron and light in air is not a body, but a property of a body. Furthermore, it must be noted that Augustine does not here[^18] take *greater* extensively, but takes *more* with respect to the truth of existence or of essence. For since the highest truth is not in just any thing, there is more of the truth of existence in two things than in one, although there is not there more of the breadth of distance or of the extension[^19] of magnitude or of containing capacity.

---

la: Ultimam partem huius argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, sic mutilam exhibet: *nullus desiderat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit. Item.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, the other codices with edition 1 nevertheless resisting, exhibits the last part of this argument thus mutilated: *no one desires what he does not know or understand. Likewise.*

la: Vat. et cod. cc *aliquid* loco *quid est*, sed contra communem Scholasticorum modum loquendi et contra mss. (quorum tamen aliqui ut K W ee minus apte *aliquid est*) et ed. 1. Mox auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *comprehendere* pro *apprehendere*. — Explicationem huius distinctionis accipe a S. Doctore, qui III. Sent. d. 24. dub. 3. eandem obiectionem resolvendo ait: *Uno modo intelligere dicitur large nosse, quid est quod dicitur per nomen; et illud intelligere semper praecedit assensum fidei, nec aliquid creditur, quin isto modo prius intelligatur. Alio modo intelligere hoc est ratione praevia cogitare, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus: Quod intelligimus, debemus rationi; quod credimus, auctoritati. Et de isto intelligit Augustinus, quod quaedam sunt quae prius creduntur, et postea intelliguntur, sicut sunt articuli fidei, qui sunt supra rationem* etc. — Paulo ante pauci codd. ut P Q *est dupliciter* pro *dupliciter dicitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc [read] *aliquid* in place of *quid est*, but against the common manner of speaking of the Scholastics and against the manuscripts (of which yet some such as K, W, ee less aptly [read] *aliquid est*) and edition 1. Soon, on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted *comprehendere* in place of *apprehendere*. — Receive the explanation of this distinction from the holy Doctor, who, in III *Sent.* d. 24, dub. 3, in resolving the same objection, says: *In one way "to understand" is said broadly to know what it is that is said by the name; and that understanding always precedes the assent of faith, nor is anything believed which is not first understood in that way. In another way "to understand" is to think with reason going before, according to what Augustine says: What we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority. And concerning this Augustine understands that there are certain things which are first believed, and afterwards understood, as are the articles of faith, which are above reason* etc. — A little before, a few codices such as P, Q [read] *est dupliciter* in place of *dupliciter dicitur*.

en: Romans 10:17.

la: Plures codd. ut G H P Q U cum ed. 1 *luce fidei* pro *fide*. — Plura de hoc dubio vide apud Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 6. a. 6.

en: Several codices such as G, H, P, Q, U, with edition 1, [read] *luce fidei* ("by the light of faith") in place of *fide*. — More on this doubt see in Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 6, a. 6.

la: Vat. addit *nihil et*, quod deest in fere omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *nihil et*, which is missing in nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Cfr. hic q. 4.

en: Cf. here q. 4.

la: Vers. 22, ubi Vulgata loco *sapientiae* legit *intelligentiae*.

en: Verse 22, where the Vulgate, in place of *sapientiae*, reads *intelligentiae*.

la: Cfr. infra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri in fine, ubi tota Isidori propositio habetur.

en: Cf. below d. XXIV, the text of the Master at the end, where the whole proposition of Isidore is found.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ita*. Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 *tripliciter* loco *triplex*. Paulo supra cod. Z *est duplex* pro *dicitur duplex*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *ita*. Soon several codices with edition 1 [read] *tripliciter* in place of *triplex*. A little above, codex Z [reads] *est duplex* in place of *dicitur duplex*.

la: Vat., quae habet *numerabilis* pro *numeralis*, emendatur ex mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. T cum ed. 1 *significaret* loco *significet*.

en: The Vatican [edition], which has *numerabilis* in place of *numeralis*, is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. A little below, codex T with edition 1 [reads] *significaret* in place of *significet*.

la: In pluribus mss. ut A S T W V etc. et ed. 1 omittitur *quia*, ac dein ponitur *nec* loco *non*.

en: In several manuscripts such as A, S, T, W, V etc., and edition 1, *quia* is omitted, and then *nec* is put in place of *non*.

la: Hic et paulo infra post *quia* supple: *Spiritus sapientiae*.

en: Here and a little below, after *quia* supply: *Spiritus sapientiae* ("the Spirit of wisdom").

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, in hac propositione post *quia* addit *est causa*, ac mox post *et* contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 repetit *quia*. Dein aliqui codd. ut A L S Z *divinorum effectuum* loco *donorum effectivum*, aliqui autem ut G H K O ee ff omisso *donorum* legunt *variorum effectuum est* etc. Mox post *non sic* cod. V adiungit *est*.

en: The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting [it], in this proposition after *quia* adds *est causa*, and soon after *et*, against very many codices and edition 1, repeats *quia*. Then some codices such as A, L, S, Z [read] *divinorum effectuum* in place of *donorum effectivum*, but some such as G, H, K, O, ee, ff, with *donorum* omitted, read *variorum effectuum est* etc. Soon after *non sic* codex V adjoins *est*.

la: Vat. et cod. cc *multiplex*, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc [read] *multiplex*, but against the other codices and edition 1.

la: Plura de hoc videsis infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 18.

en: More on this you may see below d. 24, a. 3, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 66, m. 1, a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 18.

la: Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. expunximus additum *quid*, et mox ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 post *Si* supplevimus *tu*.

en: On the faith of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have struck out the added *quid*, and soon, from very many manuscripts and edition 1, after *Si* we have supplied *tu*.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 12, ex quo sumtus est textus huius dubii. — Paulo infra auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 post *ferro* adiecimus *et*.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity* c. 10, n. 12, from which the text of this doubt is taken. — A little below, on the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1, after *ferro* we have added *et*.

la: Vat. *ibi*, obnitentibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *ibi*, very many manuscripts and edition 1 striving against [it].

la: Ita fere omnes codd., dum Vat. loco *de extensione* ponit *extensivae*, cum qua convenit ed. 1, quae post *magnitudinis* cum cod. M addit *dimensivae*.

en: So nearly all the codices, while the Vatican [edition], in place of *de extensione*, puts *extensivae*, with which edition 1 agrees, which after *magnitudinis*, with codex M, adds *dimensivae*.