title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum gratia gratum faciens et gloria essentialiter differant.*

Tertio quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad gloriam, et est quaestio, utrum differant per essentiam.

Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Gratia gratum faciens, etsi non sit fides, tamen nunquam est sine fide, quia *sine fide impossibile est placere Deo*[^1]; gloria autem nullo modo compatitur secum fidem: ergo necesse est, gratiam et gloriam per essentiam differre.

2. Item, gratia gratum faciens se habet ad gloriam, sicut via ad terminum, et sicut id quod est ad finem, ad finem[^2]. Si igitur terminus necessario distinguitur a via, et finis ab eo quod est ad finem, distinctione essentiali; pari ratione videtur, quod gratia et gloria.

3. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad supplicium, ita se habet gratia ad praemium; sed culpa et poena aeterna differunt essentialiter: ergo pari ratione gratia et gloria.

4. Item, corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt per essentiam; sed gratia est corruptibilis et amissibilis, sicut supra[^3] ostensum fuit, gloria vero omnino est incorruptibilis: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod est cognoscibile ab habente differt per essentiam ab eo quod non est cognoscibile; sed gloria ab omni eo qui habet eam, cognoscitur — nullus enim est gloriosus, qui nesciat, se esse gloriosum — gratia non[^4]: ergo differt per essentiam a gloria.

**Sed contra:**

1. Sicut se habet caritas viae ad caritatem patriae, sic se habet gratia ad gloriam; sed caritas viae non differt per essentiam a caritate patriae, sicut enim dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^5], *caritas nunquam excidit:* ergo pari ratione gratia a gloria.

2. Item, Christus ab instanti suae conceptionis habuit gloriam et habuit gratiam; sed gratia illa, quam habuit, fuit ad cognoscendum et amandum Deum — statim enim cum conceptus fuit, cognovit et amavit cognitione et dilectione[^6] comprehensionis — igitur in ipso gratia non differebat a gloria.

3. Item, perfectum et imperfectum non variant rem secundum essentiam[^7]; sed gratia dicit assimilationem animae ad Deum secundum statum imperfectionis, gloria vero secundum statum perfectionis: ergo etc.

4. Item, aut gloria reddit acceptum Deo, aut non. Si non: ergo non tantum placet Deo gloria, quantum gratia, ergo nec status patriae, quantum status viae; quod est inconveniens. Si sic: ergo cum iste sit proprius actus gratiae, necesse est, gloriam esse gratiam.

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5. Item, quando aliquis de gratia transit ad gloriam, aut perdit gratiam, aut non. Si perdit gratiam: ergo videtur, quod desinat esse gratus Deo, et quod gloria et gratia habeant ad invicem repugnantiam; quorum utrumque falsum est. Si non perdit, cum gratia sit vita animae, sicut ostensum est supra[^8], et in una anima tantum sit una vita; aut gloria non erit vita, aut gratia et gloria erunt idem per essentiam. Sed constat, quod gloria est vita: ergo etc.

Quaestio est igitur, qualiter se habeat gratia ad gloriam. Si enim sunt idem, qualiter transitur[^9] ab una ad aliam, et quare sortiuntur diversa nomina? Si vero sunt diversa, ut quid gloria appellatur gratia? Unde est etiam ista diversitas, cum divina gratia omni statui conveniat, sive statui viae sive statui patriae? Utrosque enim Deus acceptat.

> **Conclusio.** Gratia et gloria non secundum essentiam differunt, sed tum secundum status sibi succedentes, tum secundum diversam comparationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tam gratia gratum faciens quam gloria nominat divinam influentiam, per quam anima habet Deum, et Deus habitat in anima. Habere autem[^10] contingit dupliciter: vel perfecte, et sic habet homo Deum in ratione quiescentis; vel semiplene, et sic habet homo Deum in ratione tendentis. Primum, scilicet quies, competit statui patriae; secundum, scilicet tendentia, competit statui viae; et ideo primum est gloriae, secundum est gratiae. Et quia primum est praemii, secundum est meriti; ideo gratiae attribuitur actus merendi, gloriae vero actus regnandi[^11]. Quoniam igitur idem potest esse per essentiam magis perfectum et minus perfectum; hinc est, quod gratia et gloria, secundum quod distinguuntur secundum modum habendi Deum, differunt solum secundum statum. — Et quoniam *nos habere Deum* non est aliud, quam *Deum habitare in nobis;* ideo gratia et gloria non solummodo distinguuntur secundum modum habendi Deum, sed etiam secundum rationem habitandi Deum in nobis. Cum tamen dico, Deum habitare in homine, duo ex hoc dico, scilicet divinam dignationem, qua hominem acceptat et sibi confoederat, et per consequens humanam exaltationem, ex qua homo ea quae Dei sunt, excellenter participat. Et ideo illa influentia, per quam Deus in nobis habitat, dicitur esse gratia secundum primam comparationem, videlicet in quantum Deus homini condescendit; et dicitur esse gloria quantum[^12] ad secundam comparationem, secundum hoc videlicet, quod homo per illam inhabitationem sublimatur et ad magna conscendit. Secundum istam considerationem et secundum istum modum gratia et gloria non differunt nisi sola comparatione. Unde vita aeterna nominatur gloria, et nominatur etiam gratia, ad Romanos sexto[^13]: *Gratia autem Dei vita aeterna.*

Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedendum est enim, quod gratia gratum faciens et gloria non differunt per essentiam: sed si differunt aliquo modo, hoc est secundum comparationem aliam et aliam — et sic simul sunt in eodem, sicut in Beatis et in Christo, qui dicuntur habere gratiam et gloriam — vel secundum statum alium et alium, secundum quod successive eidem insunt, quia primo inest gratia in statu viae, et postmodum gloria in statu patriae. Primo enim gratia inchoatur, et postmodum consummatur[^14].

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod gratia simul est cum fide; dicendum, quod hoc est ratione status. Fides enim, quae dicit aenigmaticam visionem, simul potest stare cum gratia secundum statum imperfectionis; non autem potest stare cum gratia secundum statum plenitudinis, qui excludit omne *quod est ex parte*[^15]. Unde ex illa ratione non potest concludi, quod gratia et gloria differant per essentiam sive secundum habitum, sed solum secundum statum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia se habet ad gloriam, sicut via ad terminum; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur ratione status et additionis eius quod gloria superaddit gratiae, sicut perfectum additur imperfecto, cum ipsum perducit ad complementum; et quantum ad statum bene concedendum est[^16], quod diversitas esse potest inter gratiam et gloriam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet culpa ad supplicium etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia culpa principaliter inest ex parte animae, supplicium vero aliquod ex parte corporis; gratia autem et gloria insunt animae ab eodem et secundum idem et ad idem, videlicet in comparatione ad Deum. — Posset tamen dici, quod aliqua culpa poena est, sicut videbitur infra[^17], et ita aliqua poena non differt a culpa, et aliqua differt; sic etiam et in gloria. Illa enim, in qua consistit praemium substantiale, eadem est cum gratia; sed gloria, quae consistit in stola corporis, erit ab ea diversa.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile variant essentiam; dicendum, quod illud non habet locum, nisi ubi corruptibilitas et incorruptibilitas venit ex natura principiorum componentium. Hoc autem non est in proposito, quia immutabilitas gloriae venit desursum, corruptibilitas autem gratiae de deorsum, videlicet a liberi arbitrii vertibilitate[^18].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cognoscente[^19], dicendum, quod illud non concludit differentiam secundum essentiam. Sola enim differentia secundum statum potest facere, ut videatur quod prius videri non poterat; sicut aliquis non cognoscit affectionem suam, quando non est intensa, sed quando postmodum intenditur, tunc de facili deprehenditur et cognoscitur. Item, color in tenebris non est visibilis, et in lumine est visibilis, et tamen color non differt essentialiter; sic nec diversitas modi cognoscendi respectu gratiae et gloriae habet eas essentialiter diversificare. — Et sic patet responsio ad omnia quaesita.

english:
### Question III. *Whether grace that makes pleasing and glory differ essentially.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning grace in comparison to glory, and the question is whether they differ by essence.

And that they do so seems to be the case.

1. Grace that makes pleasing, though it is not faith, nevertheless is never without faith, because *without faith it is impossible to please God*[^1]; but glory in no way coexists with faith: therefore it is necessary that grace and glory differ by essence.

2. Likewise, grace that makes pleasing stands to glory as the way to the terminus, and as that which is ordered to the end to the end[^2]. If, then, the terminus is necessarily distinguished from the way, and the end from that which is ordered to the end, by an essential distinction; by parity of reasoning it seems that grace and glory [are too].

3. Likewise, as fault stands to punishment, so grace stands to reward; but fault and eternal punishment differ essentially: therefore by parity of reasoning grace and glory [do too].

4. Likewise, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ by essence; but grace is corruptible and losable, as was shown above[^3], whereas glory is altogether incorruptible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that which is knowable by the one who has it differs by essence from that which is not knowable; but glory is known by everyone who has it — for no one is glorious who does not know himself to be glorious — grace is not[^4]: therefore it differs by essence from glory.

**On the contrary:**

1. As the charity of the way stands to the charity of the homeland, so grace stands to glory; but the charity of the way does not differ by essence from the charity of the homeland, for as it is said in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen[^5], *charity never falls away:* therefore by parity of reasoning grace [does not differ] from glory.

2. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception had glory and had grace; but that grace which he had was for knowing and loving God — for as soon as he was conceived, he knew and loved with the knowledge and love[^6] of comprehension — therefore in him grace did not differ from glory.

3. Likewise, the perfect and the imperfect do not vary a thing according to essence[^7]; but grace bespeaks the assimilation of the soul to God according to the state of imperfection, whereas glory [bespeaks it] according to the state of perfection: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, either glory renders [the soul] acceptable to God, or it does not. If it does not: then glory does not please God as much as grace does, and so neither does the state of the homeland [please him] as much as the state of the way; which is unfitting. If it does: then, since this is the proper act of grace, it is necessary that glory be grace.

5. Likewise, when someone passes from grace to glory, either he loses grace, or he does not. If he loses grace: then it seems that he ceases to be pleasing to God, and that glory and grace have a mutual repugnance; both of which are false. If he does not lose it, since grace is the life of the soul, as was shown above[^8], and in one soul there is only one life; either glory will not be life, or grace and glory will be the same by essence. But it is established that glory is life: therefore etc.

The question therefore is how grace stands to glory. For if they are the same, how is the passage made[^9] from the one to the other, and why do they obtain different names? But if they are different, why is glory called grace? And whence too is this diversity, since the divine grace befits every state, whether the state of the way or the state of the homeland? For God accepts both.

> **Conclusion.** Grace and glory do not differ according to essence, but both according to the states that succeed one another, and according to a different comparison.

**I respond:** It must be said that both grace that makes pleasing and glory name the divine influence by which the soul has God, and God dwells in the soul. Now to have [God] happens in two ways[^10]: either perfectly, and thus a man has God under the character of one at rest; or half-fully, and thus a man has God under the character of one tending toward [him]. The first, namely rest, belongs to the state of the homeland; the second, namely tending, belongs to the state of the way; and therefore the first is of glory, the second is of grace. And because the first is of reward, the second is of merit; therefore to grace is attributed the act of meriting, but to glory the act of reigning[^11]. Since, then, the same thing can be by essence more perfect and less perfect; hence it is that grace and glory, insofar as they are distinguished according to the mode of having God, differ only according to state. — And since *our having God* is nothing other than *God's dwelling in us;* therefore grace and glory are distinguished not only according to the mode of having God, but also according to the account of God's dwelling in us. Yet when I say that God dwells in a man, I say two things by this, namely the divine condescension, by which he accepts the man and confederates him to himself, and consequently the human exaltation, by which the man excellently participates in those things which are God's. And therefore that influence by which God dwells in us is called grace according to the first comparison, namely insofar as God condescends to the man; and it is called glory as[^12] regards the second comparison, namely according to this, that the man is sublimated through that indwelling and ascends to great things. According to this consideration and according to this mode, grace and glory differ only by comparison. Hence eternal life is named glory, and is also named grace, in the letter to the Romans, chapter six[^13]: *But the grace of God is eternal life.*

And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. For it must be granted that grace that makes pleasing and glory do not differ by essence: but if they differ in any way, this is according to one comparison and another — and thus they are simultaneously in the same [subject], as in the Blessed and in Christ, who are said to have grace and glory — or according to one state and another, insofar as they are present successively in the same [subject], because first grace is present in the state of the way, and afterward glory in the state of the homeland. For first grace is begun, and afterward consummated[^14].

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that grace is simultaneous with faith; it must be said that this is by reason of state. For faith, which bespeaks an enigmatic vision, can stand simultaneously with grace according to the state of imperfection; but it cannot stand with grace according to the state of fullness, which excludes everything *that is in part*[^15]. Hence from that reasoning it cannot be concluded that grace and glory differ by essence or according to habit, but only according to state.

2. To that which is objected, that grace stands to glory as the way to the terminus; it must be said that this is said by reason of state and of the addition of that which glory superadds to grace, as the perfect is added to the imperfect, when it leads it to completion; and as regards state it is rightly to be granted[^16] that there can be a diversity between grace and glory.

3. To that which is objected, that as fault stands to punishment etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because fault is present principally on the part of the soul, whereas punishment [is present] in some part on the part of the body; but grace and glory are present in the soul from the same [source] and according to the same and toward the same, namely in comparison to God. — Yet it could be said that some fault is a punishment, as will be seen below[^17], and so some punishment does not differ from fault, and some does differ; so too in the case of glory. For that [glory] in which the substantial reward consists is the same as grace; but the glory which consists in the stole of the body will be diverse from it.

4. To that which is objected, that the corruptible and the incorruptible vary essence; it must be said that this does not hold except where corruptibility and incorruptibility come from the nature of the constituent principles. But this is not so in the case at hand, because the immutability of glory comes from above, whereas the corruptibility of grace [comes] from below, namely from the mutability of free choice[^18].

5. To that which is objected concerning the one who knows[^19], it must be said that this does not conclude to a difference according to essence. For a difference according to state alone can bring it about that what could not be seen before is seen; just as someone does not know his own affection when it is not intense, but when afterward it is intensified, then it is easily detected and known. Likewise, color in darkness is not visible, and in light it is visible, and yet color does not differ essentially; so neither does the diversity of the mode of knowing with respect to grace and glory have [the power] to make them essentially diverse. — And thus the response to all the points sought is clear.

la: Hebr. 11, 6. — De propos. seq. vide III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, quod fides in gloria evacuetur.

en: Hebrews 11:6. — On the following proposition see III Sent. d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, where it is shown that faith is done away with in glory.

la: Ex cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus *ad finem.*

en: From codex cc and ed. 1 we have supplied [the words] *ad finem* (to the end).

la: Dist. 26. q. 4. et q. praeced. in corp.

en: Distinction 26, q. 4 and the preceding q. in the body.

la: Sicut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 3.

en: As was shown in I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 3.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *delectatione.*

en: The editions, except the first, [read] *delectatione* (delight).

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 5. (c. 1.) et XI. Metaph. c. 8. (X. c. 9.), ubi dicit, unumquodque dupliciter secundum quantitatem [quae supponit rei essentiam illamque non mutat] posse inesse, perfecte et imperfecte. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 358, nota 2. in fine.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 5 (c. 1) and *Metaphysics* XI, c. 8 (X, c. 9), where he says that each thing can be present in two ways according to quantity [which presupposes the essence of the thing and does not change it], perfectly and imperfectly. Cf. also above, p. 358, note 2, at the end.

la: Quaest. 1. et d. 26. q. 2.

en: Question 1 and d. 26, q. 2.

la: Vat. *transit,* ed. 3 *transeunt;* in fine arg. pro *utrosque* cod. L *utrobique,* codd. F O *utrumque.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *transit,* ed. 3 *transeunt;* at the end of the argument, for *utrosque* codex L [reads] *utrobique,* codices F O *utrumque.*

la: *Habere* autem contingit dupliciter. — Codd. H X Y Z aa bb ee et nonnulli alii addunt *Deum.*

en: "Now to have happens in two ways." — Codices H X Y Z aa bb ee and some others add *Deum* (God).

la: Apoc. 22, 5: *Et regnabunt in saecula saeculorum.*

en: Revelation 22:5: *And they shall reign for ever and ever.*

la: Codd. C U R S (T a prima manu) adiiciunt *ad substantiam.*

en: Codices C U R S (T by the first hand) add *ad substantiam* (to the substance).

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 2, ubi idem demonstratur de immortalitate in statu innocentiae et gloriae.

en: Cf. above, d. 19, a. 3, q. 2, where the same is demonstrated concerning immortality in the state of innocence and of glory.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 10. seqq.: *Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est… Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.*

en: First letter to the Corinthians 13:10ff.: *But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away… We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.*

la: In codd. K ee et nonnullis aliis nec non in ed. 1, mutata interpunctione, sic legitur: *ad complementum et quantum ad statum; unde concedendum est.*

en: In codices K ee and some others, as well as in ed. 1, with the punctuation changed, it reads thus: *ad complementum et quantum ad statum; unde concedendum est* (…to completion, and as regards state; whence it must be granted).

la: Dist. 36. a. 1. q. 1. — De ratione praeced. cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 mox post *poena* omittunt *non* et etiam cum cod. bb *et aliqua differt,* quibus verbis omissis, textus evidenter mutilatur; Vat. verbis *et aliqua differt* addit *et est diversa a culpa.*

en: Distinction 36, a. 1, q. 1. — On the preceding reasoning cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2 and following. — Very many codices, together with editions 1, 2, 3, omit *non* immediately after *poena,* and also, with codex bb, omit *et aliqua differt* (and some differs); with these words omitted the text is evidently mutilated; the Vatican [edition] adds to the words *et aliqua differt* the words *et est diversa a culpa* (and is diverse from fault).

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 5.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, q. 5.

la: Cod. K *cognitione;* Vat. *cognoscibilitate.* Aliquanto inferius post *Item* cod. P interserit *sicut.*

en: Codex K [reads] *cognitione;* the Vatican [edition] *cognoscibilitate.* Somewhat below, after *Item,* codex P inserts *sicut.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Verbum *gloria* in vario sensu accipi potest, sed hoc loco, ut vult Richard. a Med. (II. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 2.), accipitur «pro habitu, cuius est actus ipsa actualis coniunctio creaturae rationalis, vel intellectualis cum Deo per claram visionem et perfectam dilectionem». Communiter docetur a magistris, excepto Durando, quod gratia ad gloriam se habeat, ut semen ad fructum. S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 3. ad 2.) dicit: «Gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis». — Qui tenent, gratiam non distingui realiter a caritate, dicunt, lumen gloriae a gratia essentialiter distingui, cum secundum ipsos alio modo se habeat gratia ad gloriam, quam caritas viae ad caritatem patriae. Gloria enim praeter perfectam caritatem comprehendit quoddam lumen habituale, quo intellectus elevatur ad Deum videndum, quod lumen differt a lumine fidei (ita Richard. a Med., loc. cit. ad 2.). Praeter Richardum explicite de hac quaestione tractat solus Dionys. Carth., referens verba tantum nostri Doctoris.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The word *glory* can be taken in various senses, but in this place, as Richard of Mediavilla holds (II Sent. d. 29, a. 1, q. 2), it is taken «for a habit whose act is the actual conjunction itself of the rational or intellectual creature with God through clear vision and perfect love». It is commonly taught by the masters, except Durandus, that grace stands to glory as seed to fruit. St. Thomas (S. II–II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2) says: «Grace and glory are referred to the same genus, because grace is nothing other than a certain inchoation of glory in us». — Those who hold that grace is not really distinguished from charity say that the light of glory is essentially distinguished from grace, since according to them grace stands to glory in a different way than the charity of the way stands to the charity of the homeland. For glory, besides perfect charity, comprehends a certain habitual light by which the intellect is elevated to seeing God, which light differs from the light of faith (so Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. ad 2). Besides Richard, only Dionysius the Carthusian treats explicitly of this question, reporting only the words of our Doctor.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column-band crops (Vol II PDF-priority inversion), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 46035–46162. QUAESTIO III is the LAST quaestio of ARTICULUS I (*De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum*). Title verified from p.659 PDF divider: *Utrum gratia gratum faciens et gloria essentialiter differant.*

**Page-split map** (offset pdf = printed + 22):
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- **p.660** (PDF 682): Sed contra 4–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo (full) + replies 1, 2, 3 (reply 3 breaks at *praemium substantiale* / *substan-* at foot of R-col).
- **p.661** (PDF 683): reply-3 tail + replies 4, 5 + SCHOLION I (full), ending at *referens verba tantum nostri Doctoris* immediately above the ARTICULUS II divider (raw ~46163).

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**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED p.659 L-col footers 1–5 from a1-q2 (q2's SCHOLION closed above the QUAEST III divider; clean body seam, no body received). FORWARDED to a2-q1: ARTICULUS II opener (*De gratia in comparatione ad meriti exercitium,* raw ~46163, p.661) + p.661 footers 3+ (ART II Q I footer run). ART II TRACTATIO 3-q list (verbatim, raw ~46165): *Primo quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum. / Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat mereri gratiae augmentum. / Tertio quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius gratiae complementum, videlicet gloriae praemium.*

**has_scholion: true** — SCHOLION I only (single paragraph), fully on p.661 top above the ART II divider. Carries no footnote anchors (all citations inline parenthetical), so all 19 [^N] are body/reply footnotes.

**Body seams** 659→660 (*…necesse est, gloriam esse gratiam* / *5. Item, quando aliquis de gratia transit*) and 660→661 (*…praemium substan-* / *-tiale, eadem est cum gratia*) verified grammatically continuous at 450 dpi.

No [?] flags.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 661 -->

### Articulus II. *De gratia in comparatione ad meriti exercitium.*

Consequenter quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad meriti exercitium. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat mereri gratiae augmentum[^1].

Tertio quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius gratiae complementum, videlicet gloriae praemium.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum iam habitum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum iam habitum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per simile in corporalibus. Bonus enim miles strenue[^2] militando meretur equum, a domino suo sibi gratis datum, per usum ipsius equi: ergo si tantae est efficaciae usus rei spiritualis in merendo rem spiritualem, sicut rei corporalis in merendo rem corporalem; videtur, quod per gratiae bonum usum mereatur quis donum gratiae iam acceptum.

2. Item, quod potest in maius potest in minus; sed per usum gratiae contingit mereri gloriam habendam: ergo multo fortius contingit mereri gratiam iam habitam.

3. Item, unusquisque magis est efficax ad merendum sibi quam alii; sed viri iusti, in quibus est gratia, orando merentur aliis primam gratiam, sicut dicit Augustinus *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*[^3]: ergo multo fortius homo bene utendo dono gratiae efficitur dignus habitu gratiae, quem accepit. — Quod autem unusquisque magis sit efficax ad merendum sibi quam alii, probatur per id quod dicitur super illud Matthaei nono[^4]: *Videns Iesus fidem illorum;* ibi Glossa: « Quantum valet unicuique fides propria, si tantum profuit aliena », quasi dicat: multo plus.

4. Item, quantum placet Deo petitio et oratio pro habendo, tantum placet ei gratiarum actio pro iam habito; sed aliquis ex caritate orans meretur

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obtinere quod petit, si petit pie et pro se, perseveranter et ad salutem[^5]: ergo pari ratione, qui gratias agit pie et perseveranter, ex caritate, dignus efficitur eo quod iam accepit.

5. Item, sicut se habet caritas ad amandum, sic se habet gratia ad merendum; sed per caritatem non solummodo contingit amare alia, sed etiam ipsam caritatem, sicut vult Augustinus, et in primo libro[^6] habitum est: ergo pari ratione per gratiam contingit mereri ipsum gratiae donum.

6. Item, tunc est perfectio in actibus et habilibus animae, quando agens reflectitur super se ipsum; tunc enim quis perfecte intelligit, quando intelligit se intelligere[^7]: ergo non videtur esse perfectum meritum, nisi quis mereatur etiam illud, per quod meretur.

**Sed contra:** 1. Meritum et praemium relative dicuntur, sicut pater dicitur relative ad filium: ergo sicut idem non potest esse pater sui ipsius, sic unum et idem non potest esse meritum sui ipsius: ergo per gratiam non contingit mereri ipsius gratiae donum habitum.

2. Item, meritum et praemium habent ordinem, sicut via et terminus, et sicut dispositio respectu eius, ad quod disponit: ergo necesse est, quod meritum praecedat praemium vel tempore vel natura: ergo impossibile est, per gratiam mereri ipsum gratiae donum.

3. Item, gratuitum et debitum opponuntur; sed quanto aliquid magis cadit sub merito, tanto magis habet rationem debiti: si igitur usus gratiae non aufert ipsi gratiae esse donum gratuitum, immo potius addit; videtur, quod per ipsum usum gratiae nullo modo contingat mereri gratiae donum.

4. Item, quantum unumquodque placet Deo, tantum est meritorium; sed usus gratiae non placet Deo nisi propter ipsam gratiam: ergo non plus meretur usus gratiae cum gratia, quam gratia per se ipsam. Sed donum gratiae, eo ipso quod habetur, non meretur se: ergo pari ratione nec usu gratiae contingit mereri iam habitum gratiae donum.

> **Conclusio.** Per usum gratiae consequentem non potest quis mereri habitum gratiae praecedentem, nec per meritum congrui nec per meritum condigni.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod per usum gratiae consequentem non contingit mereri habitum gratiae praecedentem, nec quantum ad meritum congrui nec quantum ad meritum condigni. — Quantum ad meritum congrui non, pro eo quod usus gratiae ad ipsum habitum non comparatur sicut meritum ad praemium[^8]; tum quia non ordinatur ad ipsum habitum promerendum, sed ad aliud; tum etiam, quia non habet ordinari ad illud, nisi sicut ad suum fundamentum et originem. Meritum autem omne, sive congrui sive condigni, ordinatur ad praemium tanquam quaedam via et dispositio praeambula. — Multo minus nec quantum ad meritum condigni per usum gratiae contingit mereri ipsum donum gratiae, quod est ipsius usus principium; tum, quia ipsa gratia, quantum est de sua prima ratione et primaria infusione, sic habet rationem gratuiti, ut nullo modo compatiatur rationem debiti — si enim esset ex meritis, iam non esset gratia[^9] — tum etiam, quia si usus gratiae ipsam gratiam mereretur, quanto magis[^10] ipsa bene uteretur, tanto minus pro ipsa teneretur Deo esse gratus. Quodsi hoc repugnat perfectioni meriti, planum est, quod gratiam non contingit mereri, nec merito condigni, quia tunc tolleretur perfectio gratiae et perfectio meriti; nec merito congrui, quia non salvatur ibi ordo, qui inter meritum et praemium debet attendi. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero, quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de similitudine meriti in corporalibus, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia equus, quantum est de sui ratione, non dicit rationem gratuiti; ideo salva sua ratione potest quis eum iam habitum mereri. Primum autem gratiae donum, eo ipso quod tale est, dicit quid simpliciter gratuitum; ideo quidquid homo faciat, nunquam illud meretur, non solum quia sit iam habitum, sed quia gratuitum. Unde etsi aliqui dixerint, quod contingat mereri gloriam iam habitam, sicut in Angelis[^11]; non tamen credo, aliquos recte intelligentes sensisse, quod contingat mereri gratiam iam habitam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliquid potest in maius, potest in minus; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando aliquid ordinatur ad maius et ad minus ordinatione consimili[^12]; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam usus gratiae ordinatur ad merendum gloriam, non ad merendum gratiam, pro eo quod ipsam praesupponit tanquam fundamentum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquis meretur alii primam gratiam; dicendum, quod non est simile;

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primum, quia gratia in viro iusto praecessit gratiam infundendam viro peccatori, usus autem gratiae in eodem homine sequi habet ipsum donum gratuitum. *Praeterea,* cum quis meretur alii gratiam, donum gratiae non perdit ex hoc rationem gratuiti, quoniam ratio gratuiti attenditur in habitu gratiae in comparatione ad eum cui datur. Quantumcumque autem vir iustus oret pro peccatore, quod peccatori detur habitus gratum faciens, non potest esse sine gratuita liberalitate divinae misericordiae. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si unus alii potest mereri gratiam habendam, quod ipse possit sibi mereri gratiam iam habitam. — Quod autem dicitur, quod plus valet unicuique fides propria quam fides aliena, hoc intelligitur respectu meriti propriae gratiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratiarum actio ita est efficax pro habito, sicut oratio pro habendo; dicendum, quod etsi gratiarum actio ita sit Deo acceptabilis pro praeterito, sicut oratio pro futuro; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod gratiarum actio sit ordinata ad merendum iam habitum, pro eo quod ipsa gratiarum actio et laus pro beneficiis acceptis plus tenet rationem praemii quam rationem meriti. Sed si tenet rationem meriti, ordinatur ex divina liberalitate potius ad donum[^13] promerendum quam ad promerendum iam habitum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione caritatis ad amorem, et gratiae ad meritum, dicendum, quod non est simile. Meritum enim de sua ratione importat ordinem et relationem, amor vero importat actum potentiae non alligatae materiae; et quia idem non habet ad se referri et ordinari, sed actus potentiae non alligatae materiae habet supra se reflecti; hinc est, quod amorem contingit amari, sed meritum non contingit mereri.

6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo obiiciebatur. Illud enim veritatem in eis actibus non habet, qui quidem important relationem et ordinem et simul cum hoc aliquam imperfectionem; actus autem merendi respectu actus gloriosi imperfectionem aliquam dicit et ordinem et relationem, sicut prius[^14] ostensum est; et ideo illud non valet.

english:
### Article II. *On grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting.*

Consequently inquiry is made concerning grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace.

Second it is asked, whether one may merit an increase of grace[^1].

Third it is asked, whether through grace one may merit the completion of grace itself, namely the reward of glory.

### Question I. *Whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace already possessed.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace already possessed. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, through a likeness in bodily things. For a good soldier, by serving valiantly[^2], merits a horse, freely given to him by his lord, through the use of that horse: therefore if the use of a spiritual thing is of such efficacy in meriting a spiritual thing as [the use] of a bodily thing in meriting a bodily thing; it seems that through the good use of grace one may merit the gift of grace already received.

2. Likewise, that which has power for the greater has power for the lesser; but through the use of grace it happens that one merits glory to be had: therefore much more strongly does it happen that one merits grace already had.

3. Likewise, each one is more effective at meriting for himself than for another; but the just, in whom there is grace, by praying merit for others their first grace, as Augustine says in *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^3]: therefore much more strongly is a man, by using well the gift of grace, made worthy of the habit of grace which he has received. — And that each one is more effective at meriting for himself than for another, is proved through what is said upon that text of Matthew the ninth[^4]: *Jesus, seeing their faith;* there the Gloss: « How much one's own faith avails for each, if another's availed so much », as if to say: much more.

4. Likewise, as much as petition and prayer for what is to be had pleases God, so much does thanksgiving for what is already had please him; but someone praying out of charity merits

to obtain what he asks, if he asks devoutly and for himself, perseveringly and unto salvation[^5]: therefore by parity of reasoning, one who gives thanks devoutly and perseveringly, out of charity, is made worthy of that which he has already received.

5. Likewise, as charity stands to loving, so grace stands to meriting; but through charity it happens not only to love other things, but also charity itself, as Augustine holds, and as was established in the first book[^6]: therefore by parity of reasoning, through grace it happens that one merits the very gift of grace.

6. Likewise, there is perfection in the acts and capacities of the soul when the agent is reflected upon itself; for then one understands perfectly, when he understands that he understands[^7]: therefore meriting does not seem to be perfect, unless one merits also that through which he merits.

**On the contrary:** 1. Merit and reward are spoken of relatively, as a father is spoken of relatively to a son: therefore just as the same [thing] cannot be the father of itself, so one and the same [thing] cannot be the merit of itself: therefore through grace it does not happen that one merits the gift of grace itself once had.

2. Likewise, merit and reward have an order, as a way and a terminus, and as a disposition with respect to that to which it disposes: therefore it is necessary that merit precede reward either in time or in nature: therefore it is impossible, through grace, to merit the very gift of grace.

3. Likewise, the gratuitous and the owed are opposed; but the more something falls under merit, the more it has the character of the owed: if therefore the use of grace does not take away from grace itself its being a gratuitous gift, but rather adds [to it]; it seems that through the use of grace itself it in no way happens that one merits the gift of grace.

4. Likewise, as much as each thing pleases God, so much is it meritorious; but the use of grace does not please God except on account of grace itself: therefore the use of grace with grace does not merit more than grace by itself. But the gift of grace, by the very fact that it is had, does not merit itself: therefore by parity of reasoning, neither through the use of grace does it happen that one merits the already-had gift of grace.

> **Conclusion.** Through the subsequent use of grace one cannot merit the preceding habit of grace, neither by the merit of congruity nor by the merit of condignity.

**I respond:** It must be said that through the subsequent use of grace it does not happen that one merits the preceding habit of grace, neither as to the merit of congruity nor as to the merit of condignity. — Not as to the merit of congruity, for the reason that the use of grace is not compared to the habit itself as merit to reward[^8]; both because it is not ordered to meriting the habit itself, but to something else; and also because it does not have to be ordered to it, except as to its foundation and origin. But every merit, whether of congruity or of condignity, is ordered to reward as a kind of way and preparatory disposition. — Much less does it happen, as to the merit of condignity, that through the use of grace one merits the very gift of grace, which is the principle of that very use; both because grace itself, as to its first character and primary infusion, has the character of the gratuitous in such a way that it in no way admits the character of the owed — for if it were from merits, it would no longer be grace[^9] — and also because, if the use of grace were to merit grace itself, the more one used it well[^10], the less he would be bound to be grateful to God for it. And if this is repugnant to the perfection of merit, it is plain that grace cannot be merited, neither by the merit of condignity, because then the perfection of grace and the perfection of merit would be taken away; nor by the merit of congruity, because the order which ought to be observed between merit and reward is not preserved there. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected first to the contrary, concerning the likeness of merit in bodily things, it must be said that it is not alike, because a horse, as to its own character, does not bespeak the character of the gratuitous; therefore, with its character preserved, one can merit it even when already had. But the first gift of grace, by the very fact that it is such, bespeaks something simply gratuitous; therefore whatever a man may do, he never merits it, not only because it is already had, but because it is gratuitous. Hence even if some have said that it happens that one merits glory already had, as in the Angels[^11]; nevertheless I do not believe that any who rightly understand have held that it happens that one merits grace already had.

2. To that which is objected, that if something has power for the greater, it has power for the lesser; it must be said that this does not hold true, except when something is ordered to the greater and to the lesser by a like ordering[^12]; but it is not so in the case at hand. For the use of grace is ordered to meriting glory, not to meriting grace, for the reason that it presupposes it as a foundation.

3. To that which is objected, that someone merits for another the first grace; it must be said that it is not alike;

first, because the grace in the just man preceded the grace to be infused into the sinner, whereas the use of grace in the same man has to follow the gratuitous gift itself. *Furthermore,* when someone merits grace for another, the gift of grace does not on this account lose the character of the gratuitous, since the character of the gratuitous is regarded in the habit of grace in comparison to him to whom it is given. But however much a just man may pray for a sinner, that the habit making [him] pleasing be given to the sinner, it cannot be without the gratuitous liberality of the divine mercy. And therefore it does not follow that, if one can merit for another grace to be had, that he can merit for himself grace already had. — And as to what is said, that one's own faith avails more for each than another's faith, this is understood with respect to the merit of one's own grace.

4. To that which is objected, that thanksgiving is as effective for what is had as prayer for what is to be had; it must be said that even if thanksgiving is as acceptable to God for the past as prayer for the future; nevertheless from this it does not follow that thanksgiving is ordered to meriting what is already had, for the reason that thanksgiving itself and praise for benefits received holds more the character of reward than the character of merit. But if it holds the character of merit, it is ordered, out of divine liberality, rather to meriting the gift[^13] than to meriting what is already had.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of charity to love, and of grace to merit, it must be said that it is not alike. For merit, of its own character, implies order and relation, but love implies the act of a power not bound to matter; and because the same [thing] does not have to be referred and ordered to itself, but the act of a power not bound to matter has [the power] to reflect upon itself; hence it is that love happens to be loved, but merit does not happen to be merited.

6. And through this the response to that which was objected last is clear. For that [argument] does not have truth in those acts which indeed imply relation and order and together with this some imperfection; but the act of meriting, with respect to the glorious act, bespeaks some imperfection and order and relation, as was shown before[^14]; and therefore that [argument] does not avail.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae augmentum.*

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads *whether through grace one may merit the very increase of grace.*

la: Cod. T *et strenuus,* ed. 1 *in strenue,* Vat. cum edd. 2, 4 et aliquibus codd. *et strenue.*

en: Codex T [reads] *et strenuus,* edition 1 *in strenue,* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 4 and some codices *et strenue.*

la: Cap. 8. n. 13. Cfr. *de Dono persev.* c. 22. n. 60. et *Enarrat. in Ps.* 105, 23. n. 21, de quo vide tom. I. pag. 728, nota 3. — Paulo superius pro *efficax* cod. F *sufficiens.*

en: Chapter 8, n. 13. Cf. *On the Gift of Perseverance* c. 22, n. 60, and *Commentary on Psalm* 105:23, n. 21, concerning which see vol. I, p. 728, note 3. — A little above, for *efficax* codex F [reads] *sufficiens.*

la: Vers. 2. — Glossa, quae a Beda facta est super Luc. 3, 20, apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: *Quantum valet apud Deum fides propria, apud quem sic valuit aliena, ut intra et extra sanaret hominem!*

en: Verse 2. — The Gloss, which was made by Bede on Luke 3:20, in Strabus and Lyranus runs thus: *How much one's own faith avails before God, before whom another's so availed that it healed a man within and without!*

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 5. a. 3, ubi hae quatuor conditiones probantur et explicantur.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 26. m. 5. a. 3, where these four conditions are proved and explained.

la: Dist. 17. p. I. q. 2. — August., VIII. *de Trin.* c. 7. n. 10. et c. 8. n. 12.

en: Distinction 17, p. I, q. 2. — Augustine, *On the Trinity* VIII, c. 7, n. 10, and c. 8, n. 12.

la: Vide supra d. 23. p. I. q. 3. in corp.

en: See above, d. 23, p. I, q. 3, in the corpus.

la: *Meritum* enim est prius praemio, *gratia* vero prior usu gratiae. *Usus gratiae* de se ordinatur ad quid sequens usum gratiae, cuiusmodi est *augmentum* gratiae et vita aeterna; cfr. infra solut. ad 2. et q. 2. seq. — Aliquanto inferius pro *Multo minus nec* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *Multo minus vero.*

en: For *merit* is prior to reward, but *grace* [is] prior to the use of grace. *The use of grace* of itself is ordered to something following the use of grace, of which kind is the *increase* of grace and eternal life; cf. below in the solution to 2 and the following q. 2. — Somewhat below, for *Multo minus nec* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] *Multo minus vero.*

la: Rom. 11, 6: *Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.*

en: Romans 11:6: *But if by grace, then [it is] no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.*

la: Supple cum cod. aa (a secunda manu) *aliquis.*

en: Supply, with codex aa (by a second hand), *aliquis* [someone].

la: Huius sententiae fuit Magister. Cfr. supra d. V. c. 6. et ibid. in Comment. a. 3. q. 2. Praepositivus, S. p. II. loquens de meritis Angelorum ait: *Sed quaeritur, utrum meruerint ante confirmationem, vel tunc i. e. in confirmatione, vel postea.* Magister Petrus Lombardus dicit, quod tantum *postea,* et supponit exemplum de laborante in vinea; prius enim datur pretium, quam laboret. — Codd. I N V X Z et aliqui alii subiungunt *contingit.*

en: Of this opinion was the Master. Cf. above d. V, c. 6, and ibid. in the Commentary a. 3, q. 2. Prepositinus, Summa p. II, speaking of the merits of the Angels, says: *But it is asked whether they merited before [their] confirmation, or then, i.e. in [their] confirmation, or afterward.* Master Peter Lombard says that [they merited] only *afterward,* and supposes the example of the laborer in the vineyard; for the wage is given before he labors. — Codices I N V X Z and some others append *contingit.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. I. ad 5.

en: Cf. above d. 21, a. 3, q. I, ad 5.

la: Codd. A F I Y aa voci *donum* bene praefigunt *novum.* Subinde post *promerendum* codd. L O adiungunt *habendum.*

en: Codices A F I Y aa rightly prefix *novum* [new] to the word *donum* [gift]. Then, after *promerendum,* codices L O add *habendum.*

la: Hic in corp. et a. 1. q. 3.

en: Here in the corpus and a. 1, q. 3. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio distinguenda est a sequente, quae agit de gratiae augmento, haec autem est de prima gratia, non quidem acquirenda (de quo vide infra d. 28. a. 2. q. I.), sed iam habita; et quaeritur, utrum per bonum usum eiusdem postea possit ipsa cadere sub merito. In hoc sensu quaestio ab aliis non tractatur explicite nisi ab Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 5. a. 2. § 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.). — Breviter et in eodem sensu cum nostro Doctore ad eam respondent S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 5. ad 3; S. I. II. q. 114. a. 8. in fine corp.) et B. Albert. (II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2.).

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question must be distinguished from the following one, which treats of the increase of grace, whereas this one is about the first grace, not indeed to be acquired (concerning which see below d. 28. a. 2. q. I.), but already had; and it is asked whether through the good use of the same it can afterward fall under merit. In this sense the question is not treated explicitly by others except by Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II. q. 61. m. 5. a. 2. § 2.) and Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2. a. 2. little-question 2.). — Briefly and in the same sense as our Doctor, St. Thomas (here q. unica a. 5. ad 3; Summa I.–II. q. 114. a. 8. at the end of the corpus) and Blessed Albert (II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2.) respond to it.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion; `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p66{1,2,3}-{L,R}-*`), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 46163–46296. Pages 661–663 (PDF 683–685, offset +22). ARTICULUS II opener (*De gratia in comparatione ad meriti exercitium*) + the three-question TRACTATIO list folded into this q1 per **Override §5** (no standalone divisio chunk).

**Page-split map.**
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- **p.663**: reply-3 tail + replies 4–6 + SCHOLION I, ending before QUAESTIO II (a2-q2) at raw 46297.
- Body seams 661→662 (arg.4 *...orans meretur ‖ obtinere quod petit*) and 662→663 (reply 3 *...non est simile; ‖ primum, quia gratia*) are grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**Apparatus split.**
- **p.661 footers 3–6 → [^1]–[^4].** Footer 3 (*augmentum* variant) anchors the TRACTATIO "mereri gratiae augmentum"; footer 4 (*strenue/strenuus*) on arg.1; footers 5–6 (Aug. de Praedest. / Matthaei-Glossa) on arg.3. **p.661 footers 1–2** (*Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 5.* / *Cod. K cognitione; Vat. cognoscibilitate ... post Item cod. P interserit sicut*) belong to **a1-q3** (variant on q3's reply-4 *vertibilitate* and reply-5 *cognoscente*) — already rendered there as a1-q3 [^18]–[^19]. Confirmed by eyes-on: q1's title/opener carry NO superscript on p.661.
- **p.662 footers 1–8 → [^5]–[^12]**, anchored: arg.4 *ad salutem*[^5]; arg.5 *in primo libro*[^6]; arg.6 *intelligere*[^7]; Respondeo *meritum ad praemium*[^8], *iam non est gratia*[^9], *quanto magis*[^10]; reply 1 *in Angelis*[^11]; reply 2 *ordinatione consimili*[^12].
- **p.663 footers 2–3 → [^13]–[^14]**, anchored: reply 4 *ad donum promerendum*[^13]; reply 6 *sicut prius ostensum est*[^14]. **p.663 footers 1, 4–8 forward to a2-q2** — they annotate QUAESTIO II's body (footer 1 *enim/attenditur* variant; footers 4–6 *Vide supra pag. 634 / Cfr. quaest. praeced. / Vide infra d. 36.*; footers 7–8 *Vide supra pag. 662, nota 1 / Scilicet a Deo*), which opens in the lower half of p.663.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Received from a1-q3:* the ARTICULUS II opener + p.661 footers 3+ (per a1-q3's forwarded note). NB the a1-q3 forward stated footers 1–2 stayed with q3, which is correct (they are variants on q3 wording) — this chunk leads its apparatus at footer 3.
- *Forwarded to a2-q2:* the QUAESTIO II opener (raw 46297, p.663 L-col lower) + **p.663 footers 1, 4–8** (QUAESTIO II's footnote run, including footer 7 "Vide supra pag. 662, nota 1").

**has_scholion = true** — SCHOLION I only (single paragraph, all on p.663), distinguishing this question (de prima gratia iam habita) from the next (de gratiae augmento). No footnote anchors in the scholion — all its citations are inline parenthetical.

**No [?] flags.** OCR was clean in the body; all 14 apparatus entries verified against the 450 dpi PDF column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri gratiae augmentum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri gratiae augmentum[^1]. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Augustinum *ad Bonifacium*: « Gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici ».

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Omnis habens gratiam, habet unde possit proficere in merito[^2]; sed profectus in merito non est nisi per augmentum gratiae: ergo gratia sui ipsius augmentum mereri potest.

3. Item, peccans uno genere peccati meretur incidere in aliud genus peccati, unde efficitur peior, sicut peccans peccato superbiae meretur incidere in peccatum luxuriae[^3]: ergo pari ratione, qui bene utitur gratia per bonorum operum exercitium videtur mereri, ut fiat sibi gratiae augmentum.

4. Item, laudabilior est qui se extendit ad opus perfectionis cum minori adiutorio, quam qui se extendit cum maiori: ergo si habens minorem gratiam se elevat ad opera aequalis perfectionis cum eo qui habet maiorem, videtur, quod tantundem vel amplius apud Deum mereri habeat: ergo si nulli fit retributio nisi secundum quantitatem gratiae, videtur, quod talis meretur augmentum in gratia.

5. Item, qui petit *pie*, *perseveranter*, *pro se* et *ad salutem*, meretur exaudiri[^4]; sed qui petit gratiae augmentum continue, hoc modo petit: ergo videtur gratiae augmentum mereri.

**Sed contra:** 1. Meritum non est respectu eius quod omnino est impossibile; sed gratiam, cum sit forma simplex, augeri est impossibile[^5]: ergo impossibile est mereri gratiae augmentum.

2. Item, meritum non est respectu eius quod est in nobis, sed quod est ab alio[^6]; sed habens gratiam
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per virtutem eius quod habet, potest in bonum proficere; non solum enim habet unde possit stare, sicut dicit Augustinus, sed etiam unde possit proficere. Si igitur profectus gratiae consistit in eius augmento; sicut profectus gratiae est in eius potestate, ita videtur, quod et augmentum: ergo non videtur ad hoc concurrere meritum.

3. Item, nihil augetur nisi per rem eiusdem generis et naturae; sed gratia, quae primo datur, quantum est de natura sui, est ita gratuita, quod non cadit sub merito, sicut supra[^7] ostensum est, et Augustinus dicit *de Trinitate* quarto: « Quod meritis redditur, non est gratia ». Si igitur non contingit mereri ipsum gratiae donum, non contingit mereri ipsius gratiae augmentum.

4. Item, Deus remunerat opus secundum quantitatem radicis: ergo tantum meretur quis per opus gratuitum, quanta est illa gratia, a qua exit opus[^8]; si igitur gratia augmentata excedit illam, videtur, quod minor gratia per suum opus non possit mereri sui ipsius augmentum.

5. Item, si aliquis meretur augmentum, tunc si Deus non augeret ei gratiam, esset iniustus; et cum auget, opus illud est remuneratum: ergo videtur, quod opus illud non esset dignum remuneratione gloriae. Si igitur hoc est falsum et impossibile, ut per augmentum gratiae auferatur efficacia merendi gloriam[^9]; impossibile est ponere, quod augmentum gratiae mereri contingat.

### Conclusio

> Homo gratiae augmentum potest mereri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, absque dubio tenendum est, quod gratia meretur augeri. — Quis autem sit modus augendi, et modus merendi, difficile est assignare. — Cum enim multi sint modi augendi, quis eorum competat gratiae, non est facile discernere. Contingit enim, aliquid augeri per *impermixtionem* cum contrario, sicut dicitur, quod « albius est, quod est nigro impermixtius[^10] ». Contingit nihilominus, aliquid augeri propter hoc, quod minori *succedit* maius, sicut dies augeri dicuntur. Contingit etiam, aliquid augeri propter *aggregationem* multorum, sicut lumen augetur in aere propter multitudinem candelarum, ex quarum concursu fit aggregatio luminum. Contingit etiam, aliquid augeri per *additionem*, sicut augetur corpus per alimentum. Contingit etiam, aliquid augeri per *magnificationem* rei in se ipsa, sicut augmentata fuit costa, cum de ea facta fuit Eva[^11], et sicut augmentati fuerunt quinque panes, cum de eis quinque millia hominum pasti sunt. Contingit etiam sexto modo, aliquid augeri per *accessum* ad suum summum, sicut aliquid dicitur magis pulcrum et magis luminosum, quod magis accedit ad perfectionem pulcritudinis et lucis.

Omnibus his sex modis dixerunt aliqui gratiam augeri. Sed primi tres modi improbari possunt de facili, et in primo libro, distinctione decima septima[^12] improbati sunt aliquo modo, cum agitur de caritatis augmento. Eodem enim modo tam caritas quam gratia habent augeri. — Tres autem modi sequentes satis convenientes sunt nec improbari de facili possunt. Primus tamen eorum famosior est, pro eo quod magis consonat Sanctorum auctoritatibus, quae videntur dicere, in augmento gratiae infundi novam gratiam, cum loquuntur de diversa Sacramentorum efficacia. Qualiter autem hic modus valeat sustineri, in primo libro distinctione decima septima[^13] dictum fuit. Ultimus autem modus non est minus intelligibilis quam aliquis praedictorum, immo secundum hunc modum dicendi obiectiones, quae fiunt contra gratiae augmentum, facilius declinari possunt. Quamvis enim augmentum per appositionem videatur repugnare simplicibus, maxime cum in spiritualibus quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto sit virtute maius[^14]; augmentum tamen per accessum ad summum valde videtur eis consonum. — Quocunque autem horum trium modorum sequentium dicatur, non est magna vis facienda, sed pro certo habentes, gratiam Dei in nobis augeri posse, laborare debemus, qualiter in nobis augeatur per bona opera. Per illa enim, ut dicit Augustinus, « meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici ».

Modum autem merendi gratiae augmentum sic videre possumus. Contingit enim, aliquid mereri ex *congruo*, et contingit, aliquid mereri ex *condigno*. Tunc est meritum ex condigno, quando ratio meriti reperitur ibi perfecte et plene; et tunc est quaedam commensuratio et adaequatio meriti ad praemium. Et quia hoc non potest esse, cum gratia augetur; hinc est, quod non potest quis mereri gratiae augmentum merito con-
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digni; si igitur contingit ipsum augmentum gratiae mereri, hoc est merito congrui. Meritum autem congrui dicitur in quo est aliqua dispositio congruitatis respectu eius, ad quod illa dispositio ordinatur, quae tamen deficit a ratione condignitatis. Et hoc potest esse tripliciter. Aut enim est congruitas sine dignitate; et sic peccator per bona opera in genere, facta extra caritatem, meretur de congruo primam gratiam; ibi enim est quaedam congruitas, quia facit quod in se est; non est tamen condignitas, quia inimicus Dei est et indignus pane, quo vescitur. Aut est ibi dignitas cum indignitate, sicut est, quando vir iustus meretur peccatori primam gratiam: dignitas enim ex parte viri iusti, qui est amicus Dei et dignus a Deo exaudiri, sed indignitas est ex parte peccatoris; et ideo non est ibi plena ratio meriti. Aut est ibi dignitas cum gradus inferioritate; et sic habens gratiam minorem meretur per bonum usum pervenire ad gratiae cumulum; et hic modus merendi, etsi deficiat a merito condigni et contineatur sub merito congrui, maxime tamen inter ceteros modos praedictos merendi accedit ad perfectionem meriti[^15], et ideo quasi medium tenet inter meritum congrui et meritum condigni. — Ex praedictis igitur haberi potest, qualiter gratia augetur, et etiam, qualiter augeri meretur. Unde auctoritates et rationes ostendentes, quod gratia meretur augeri, concedendae sunt.

1. *Ad illud* autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod cum sit simplex, non potest augeri; dicendum, vel quod gratia non est omnino simplex, sed solum per privationem partium quantitativarum quantitate molis, non autem per privationem partium quantitativarum quantitate virtutis; et quantum ad tale genus partium est ei[^16] augmentum, non quantum ad primum. Vel potest dici secundum ultimum modum dicendi, quod augmentum, quod attenditur per accessum ad summum, non ponit compositionem, sed quandam maioris simplicitatis et unitatis perfectionem; et ideo non repugnat gratiae ratione simplicitatis essentiae.

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod profectus est in potestate gratiae; dicendum, quod quidam est profectus accidentalis, utpote qui attenditur in fervoris intensione, vel habitus radicatione, vel operum multiplicatione; et hic profectus est in potestate gratiae; et secundum hunc profectum gratia non dicitur augeri proprie, quia non efficitur homo dignus maiori praemio substantiali per illum. Alius vero est profectus, qui respicit praemium substantiale, secundum quem dicitur homo dignus maiori praemio; et hic non est in potestate gratiae, sed in sola illius potestate, cuius est gratiam infundere; et ideo hunc gratia non facere, sed mereri dicitur: et penes hunc effectum attenditur gratiae augmentum.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod augmentum gratiae est eiusdem generis cum gratia primo data; dicendum, quod etsi sit eiusdem naturae quantum ad rationem *habitus*, differentia tamen est quantum ad *statum*, pro eo quod supponit gratiae initium. Et quia eiusdem generis est cum gratia primo data, ideo non potest mereri merito condigni, sed merito congrui. Quia vero gratiam praesupponit, maiori congruitate meretur quis gratiae augmentum quam gratiae initium, sicut supra[^17] dictum fuit.

4. 5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod remuneratio attenditur secundum quantitatem radicis; respondendum est, quod illud intelligitur in merito condigni; in merito autem congrui locum non habet[^18]. Et per hunc etiam modum respondendum est ad illud quod ultimo opponit.

english:
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### Question II. *Whether through grace it happens that an increase of grace is merited.*

Secondly it is asked, whether through grace it happens that an increase of grace is merited[^1]. And that it does, it seems:

1. *First*, through Augustine *to Boniface*: « Grace merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ».

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason. Everyone having grace has whence he can advance in merit[^2]; but advancement in merit is only through an increase of grace: therefore grace can merit its own increase.

3. Likewise, one sinning by one kind of sin merits to fall into another kind of sin, whence he becomes worse, just as one sinning by the sin of pride merits to fall into the sin of lust[^3]: therefore by parity of reasoning, one who uses grace well through the exercise of good works seems to merit that an increase of grace be made for him.

4. Likewise, more praiseworthy is he who extends himself to a work of perfection with less help than he who extends himself with more: therefore if one having lesser grace raises himself to works of equal perfection with one who has more, it seems that he has to merit as much or more with God: therefore if recompense is given to none except according to the quantity of grace, it seems that such a one merits an increase in grace.

5. Likewise, he who asks *piously*, *perseveringly*, *for himself*, and *unto salvation*, merits to be heard[^4]; but he who asks for an increase of grace continually asks in this way: therefore it seems that an increase of grace is merited.

**On the contrary:** 1. There is no merit with respect to that which is altogether impossible; but grace, since it is a simple form, to be increased is impossible[^5]: therefore it is impossible to merit an increase of grace.

2. Likewise, there is no merit with respect to that which is in us, but with respect to what is from another[^6]; but one having grace
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through the power of what he has, can advance into the good; for he not only has whence he can stand, as Augustine says, but also whence he can advance. If therefore the advancement of grace consists in its increase; just as the advancement of grace is in its own power, so it seems that its increase is too: therefore merit does not seem to concur to this.

3. Likewise, nothing is increased except by a thing of the same genus and nature; but grace, which is first given, as far as is of its own nature, is so gratuitous that it does not fall under merit, as was shown above[^7], and Augustine says in the fourth book *On the Trinity*: « What is rendered for merits is not grace ». If therefore it does not happen that the gift of grace itself is merited, it does not happen that the increase of grace itself is merited.

4. Likewise, God recompenses a work according to the quantity of its root: therefore one merits only as much through a gratuitous work as is that grace from which the work proceeds[^8]; if therefore the increased grace exceeds that, it seems that lesser grace cannot, through its own work, merit its own increase.

5. Likewise, if anyone merits an increase, then if God did not increase grace for him, He would be unjust; and when He increases it, that work is recompensed: therefore it seems that that work would not be worthy of the recompense of glory. If therefore this is false and impossible, that through an increase of grace the efficacy of meriting glory be taken away[^9]; it is impossible to hold that an increase of grace happens to be merited.

### Conclusion

> A man can merit an increase of grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine says, it is without doubt to be held that grace merits to be increased. — But what is the mode of increasing, and the mode of meriting, is difficult to assign. — For since there are many modes of increasing, which of them belongs to grace is not easy to discern. For it happens that something is increased by *unmixing* with its contrary, as it is said that « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black[^10] ». It happens nonetheless that something is increased on account of this, that a greater *succeeds* to a lesser, as the days are said to increase. It happens also that something is increased on account of the *aggregation* of many, as light is increased in the air on account of a multitude of candles, from whose concurrence there comes to be an aggregation of lights. It happens also that something is increased by *addition*, as a body is increased by nourishment. It happens also that something is increased by the *magnification* of the thing in itself, as the rib was increased when Eve was made from it[^11], and as the five loaves were increased when from them five thousand men were fed. It happens also in a sixth mode, that something is increased by *approach* to its highest, as something is said to be more beautiful and more luminous which approaches more to the perfection of beauty and of light.

By all these six modes some have said that grace is increased. But the first three modes can be disproved easily, and in the first book, distinction seventeen[^12], they were disproved in some manner, when grace was treated of the increase of charity. For in the same way both charity and grace have to be increased. — But the three following modes are sufficiently fitting and cannot be disproved easily. The first of them, however, is more famous, for the reason that it accords more with the authorities of the Saints, which seem to say that in the increase of grace a new grace is infused, when they speak of the diverse efficacy of the Sacraments. But in what manner this mode can be sustained was said in the first book, distinction seventeen[^13]. But the last mode is not less intelligible than any of the foregoing; nay, according to this mode of speaking the objections which are made against an increase of grace can more easily be set aside. For although increase by apposition seems to be repugnant to simple things, especially since in spiritual things the more simple a thing is, the greater it is in power[^14]; nevertheless increase by approach to the highest seems very consonant with them. — But by whichever of these three following modes it be said, no great force is to be put upon it, but, holding for certain that the grace of God can be increased in us, we ought to labor that it be increased in us through good works. For through them, as Augustine says, « it merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ».

But the mode of meriting an increase of grace we can see thus. For it happens that something is merited *congruously* (*ex congruo*), and it happens that something is merited *condignly* (*ex condigno*). Then there is merit from condignity, when the account of merit is found there perfectly and fully; and then there is a certain commensuration and adequation of the merit to the reward. And because this cannot be when grace is increased; hence it is that one cannot merit an increase of grace by the merit of con-
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dignity; if therefore it happens that the increase of grace itself is merited, this is by the merit of congruity. But the merit of congruity is said to be that in which there is some disposition of congruity with respect to that to which that disposition is ordered, which nevertheless falls short of the account of condignity. And this can be in a threefold manner. For either there is congruity without worthiness; and thus a sinner, through good works in their kind, done outside charity, merits congruously the first grace; for there is a certain congruity, because he does what is in him; there is not, however, condignity, because he is an enemy of God and unworthy of the bread on which he feeds. Or there is worthiness with unworthiness, as is the case when a just man merits the first grace for a sinner: for there is worthiness on the part of the just man, who is a friend of God and worthy to be heard by God, but there is unworthiness on the part of the sinner; and therefore the full account of merit is not there. Or there is worthiness with inferiority of degree; and thus one having lesser grace merits, through good use, to arrive at the fullness of grace; and this mode of meriting, even though it falls short of the merit of condignity and is contained under the merit of congruity, nevertheless, among the other aforesaid modes, approaches most to the perfection of merit[^15], and therefore holds, as it were, a middle between the merit of congruity and the merit of condignity. — From the foregoing, therefore, it can be had how grace is increased, and also how it merits to be increased. Hence the authorities and reasons showing that grace merits to be increased are to be granted.

1. *To that* which is objected on the contrary, that since it is simple, it cannot be increased; it must be said, either that grace is not altogether simple, but only by the privation of quantitative parts in respect of the quantity of bulk, not however by the privation of quantitative parts in respect of the quantity of power; and as regards such a genus of parts there is increase for it[^16], not as regards the first. Or it can be said, according to the last mode of speaking, that the increase which is attended to by approach to the highest does not posit composition, but a certain perfection of greater simplicity and unity; and therefore it is not repugnant to grace by reason of the simplicity of its essence.

2. *To that* which is objected, that the advancement is in the power of grace; it must be said that there is a certain accidental advancement, namely that which is attended to in the intensity of fervor, or in the rootedness of the habit, or in the multiplication of works; and this advancement is in the power of grace; and according to this advancement grace is not properly said to be increased, because a man is not made worthy of a greater substantial reward through it. But there is another advancement, which regards the substantial reward, according to which a man is said worthy of a greater reward; and this is not in the power of grace, but in the sole power of Him whose it is to infuse grace; and therefore grace is said not to make this, but to merit it: and it is in regard to this effect that the increase of grace is attended to.

3. *To that* which is objected, that the increase of grace is of the same genus as the grace first given; it must be said that, although it is of the same nature as regards the account of *habit*, there is nevertheless a difference as regards *state*, for the reason that it supposes the beginning of grace. And because it is of the same genus as the grace first given, therefore it cannot be merited by the merit of condignity, but by the merit of congruity. But because it presupposes grace, with greater congruity does one merit the increase of grace than the beginning of grace, as was said above[^17].

4. 5. *To that* which is objected, that recompense is attended to according to the quantity of the root; it must be answered that that is understood in the merit of condignity; in the merit of congruity, however, it has no place[^18]. And by this mode also it must be answered to that which it objects in the last place.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *enim*. Aliquanto inferius pro *attenditur* ed. 1 *non attenditur*; perperam.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 2, 3, 4, reads *enim*. Somewhat below, for *attenditur* edition 1 reads *non attenditur*; wrongly.

la: Vide supra pag. 634, nota 6.

en: See above, p. 634, note 6.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Vide infra d. 36. a. I. q. I.

en: See below, d. 36, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 662, nota 1.

en: See above, p. 662, note 1.

la: Scilicet a Deo, qui dat gratiae augmentum et praemium. — Sententia Augustini, quae paulo inferius memoratur, habetur *de Corrept. et gratia*, c. 11. n. 31. seqq. et *Enchirid.* c. 106. seq. n. 28. Vide lit. Magistri supra d. XXIV. c. 1. et infra d. XXIX. c. 1. — Pro *potest in bonum proficere* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *potest in maius bonum proficere*. Circa finem arg. Vat. voci *augmentum* addit *gratiae*.

en: Namely, from God, who gives the increase of grace and the reward. — The sentence of Augustine, which is recalled a little below, is found in *On Rebuke and Grace*, c. 11, n. 31 seqq., and in the *Enchiridion*, c. 106 seq., n. 28. See the text of the Master above, d. 24, c. 1, and below, d. 29, c. 1. — For *potest in bonum proficere* the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, reads *potest in maius bonum proficere*. Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds *gratiae* to the word *augmentum*.

la: *Quaest. praeced.* — Verba Augustini, hic ex IV. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 2. citata, integra haec sunt: *Pluviam quippe voluntariam* (Ps. 67, 10.) *non nisi gratiam vult intelligi, non meritis redditam, sed gratis datam, unde et gratia nominatur.* — De *maiori* cfr. Aristot., 1. *de Generat. et corrupt.* text. 25. seqq. (c. 5.).

en: *The preceding question.* — The words of Augustine, cited here from the fourth book *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 2, are in full as follows: *A voluntary rain* (Ps. 67:10) *He wishes to be understood as nothing but grace, not rendered for merits, but given gratuitously, whence also it is named grace.* — On *greater* cf. Aristotle, book 1 *On Generation and Corruption*, text 25 seqq. (c. 5).

la: Cfr. supra d. XXVI. lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. — Vat. *quantum ex illa gratia, ex qua exit opus.*

en: Cf. above, d. 26, the text of the Master, c. 1, at the end. — The Vatican edition reads *quantum ex illa gratia, ex qua exit opus.*

la: Plures codd., inter quos H li aa bb ce, cum edd. 2, 3, 4 perperam *gratiam*.

en: Several codices, among which H li aa bb ce, with editions 2, 3, 4, wrongly read *gratiam*.

la: Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 4. (c. 5.). Cfr. IV. *Phys.* text. 85. (c. 9.). — Pro *per impermixtionem* codd. H K T Y aa bb et alii cum ed. 1 *per immixtionem*.

en: Aristotle, III *Topics*, c. 4 (c. 5). Cf. IV *Physics*, text 85 (c. 9). — For *per impermixtionem* codices H K T Y aa bb and others, with edition 1, read *per immixtionem*.

la: Gen. 2, 21. — De augmentatis quinque panibus cfr. Ioan. 6, 11. seqq.

en: Gen. 2:21. — On the increased five loaves cf. John 6:11 seqq.

la: Part. II. q. 1. seq.

en: Part II, q. 1 seq.

la: Part. II. q. 2, ubi etiam ultimus augendi gratiam modus explicatur. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 7. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *quae fiunt contra* codd. H K T bb etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *quae fiunt circa*. Post pauca Vat. *per appositionem* transformavit in *per oppositionem*, et mox pro *repugnare* non pauci codd., ut C H K R S T aa bb ce etc., cum ed. 2 exhibent *impugnare*. Deinde pro *tanto sit* in edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur *tanto fit*.

en: Part II, q. 2, where also the last mode of increasing grace is explained. Cf. IV Sent., d. 7, a. 2, q. 2. — A little below, for *quae fiunt contra* codices H K T bb etc., with editions 1, 2, 3, read *quae fiunt circa*. After a little, the Vatican edition transformed *per appositionem* into *per oppositionem*, and presently, for *repugnare*, not a few codices, such as C H K R S T aa bb ce etc., with edition 2, give *impugnare*. Then, for *tanto sit*, in editions 2, 3, 4 there is read *tanto fit*.

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis prop. 17, unde supra pag. 655, nota 4. quaedam attulimus.

en: Cf. the Book of Causes, prop. 17, from which we adduced certain things above, p. 655, note 4.

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 *ad perfectam meriti rationem.*

en: Codex cc, with edition 1, reads *ad perfectam meriti rationem.*

la: Multi codd. cum primis edd. subiiciunt *enim*.

en: Many codices, with the first editions, subjoin *enim*.

la: Hic in corp. et quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius Vat. *S. Bonav.* — Tom. II.

en: Here in the body and in the preceding question. — A little above the Vatican edition reads *S. Bonav.* — Tome II.

la: Cod. L subiungit *possibile*. Pro *ei* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit *ibi*. — De hoc duplici modo respondendi cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2. ad 2. et 3. — Cfr. Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 3. c. 6. — Paulo superius codd. C I K L O R S T et alii cum ed. 2 omittunt *radicis*.

en: Codex L subjoins *possibile*. For *ei* the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, substitutes *ibi*. — On this twofold mode of answering cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 2, ad 2 and 3. — Cf. Anselm, *On the Concord of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 6. — A little above, codices C I K L O R S T and others, with edition 2, omit *radicis*.

latin_scholion:
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**I.** Constat ex Concilio Tridentino (Sess. VI. can. 32.), « ipsum iustificatum bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum, cuius vivum membrum est, fiunt... vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae aeternae, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem atque etiam gloriae augmentum ». Hinc nunc communiter cum S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 114. a. 8.) dicitur, quod « augmentum gratiae cadit sub merito condigni ». Licet autem S. Bonav. alio modo loquendi utatur, cum illud meritum nominet de *congruo*; tamen dissidium non est nisi de nomine. ipse enim rationem meriti de condigno restringit, rationem vero meriti de congruo extendit, ut patet ex textu, ubi dicit, dignitatem cum *gradus inferioritate* a merito de condigno deficere, sed ita, ut maxime accedat ad perfectionem meriti et quasi medium teneat inter meritum de congruo et condigno. — Communiter autem distinguebatur « duplex meritum boni operis: unum quasi *annexum* et concomitans, et hoc modo meretur quis augmentum gratiae, quia opus exiens ab habitu disponit ad eius augmentum; alterum quasi *consequens*, et hoc modo proprie non meretur quis gratiae augmentum, nisi forte de congruo » (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. n. 3.). Cfr. etiam S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 5.); insuper Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.), qui utrumque modum loquendi probabilem esse censet; Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 3.), qui iisdem ac S. Bonav. distinctionibus utitur et de augmento gratiae dicit: » Hic est plus de merito simpliciter, quam in duobus primis ». — Ratio autem, quare S. Bonav. modum merendi augmentum gratiae nomine distinguit a modo merendi gloriam, videtur fuisse difficultas explicandi, quomodo per minorem gratiam possit quis mereri maiorem, sive quomodo per imperfectum introducatur perfectum. Hanc difficultatem solvit S. Thom. (S. loc. cit. ad 2.) sic: « Augmentum gratiae non est supra virtutem praeexistentis gratiae, licet sit supra *quantitatem* ipsius; sicut arbor, etsi sit supra quantitatem seminis, non est tamen supra virtutem eius ». Hoc exemplum vide etiam infra q. 3. in fine solution., (cfr. Aegid. R., loc. cit. dub. lat.). De modo, quo gratia concipiatur augeri, variae erant sententiae, sicut de augmento caritatis, ut notatum est I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. 2. in scholiis.

**II.** Ad rem spectat etiam infra d. 29. a. f. q. 2. — Praeter laudatos auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 5. a. 1. ad 3. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 22. n. 9. seqq. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 102. m. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica. Alii commentatores rem tractant I. Sent. d. 17, ubi sermo est de augmento caritatis.

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english_scholion:
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**I.** It is established from the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 32), « that the one justified, by the good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member... truly merits an increase of grace, eternal life, and — if he has departed in grace — the attainment of that same eternal life, and also an increase of glory ». Hence it is now commonly said with St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 114, a. 8) that « an increase of grace falls under the merit of condignity ». But although St. Bonaventure uses another mode of speaking, since he names that merit one of *congruity*; nevertheless the dissension is only over the name. For he restricts the account of merit of condignity, but extends the account of merit of congruity, as is clear from the text, where he says that worthiness with *inferiority of degree* falls short of the merit of condignity, but in such a way that it approaches most to the perfection of merit and holds, as it were, a middle between the merit of condignity and of congruity. — But commonly there was distinguished « a twofold merit of a good work: one as it were *annexed* and concomitant, and in this mode one merits an increase of grace, because the work proceeding from the habit disposes to its increase; the other as it were *consequent*, and in this mode one does not properly merit an increase of grace, except perhaps congruously » (so Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, n. 3). Cf. also St. Thomas (here, the single q., a. 5); moreover Richard of Middleton (here a. 2, q. 2), who judges both modes of speaking to be probable; Giles of Rome (here q. 1, a. 3), who uses the same distinctions as St. Bonaventure and says of the increase of grace: » Here there is more of merit simply than in the two first ». — But the reason why St. Bonaventure distinguishes by name the mode of meriting an increase of grace from the mode of meriting glory seems to have been the difficulty of explaining how through lesser grace one can merit a greater, or how through the imperfect the perfect is introduced. St. Thomas solves this difficulty (S. loc. cit., ad 2) thus: « An increase of grace is not above the power of pre-existing grace, although it is above its *quantity*; just as a tree, even though it is above the quantity of the seed, is nevertheless not above its power ». See this example also below, q. 3, at the end of the solution (cf. Giles of Rome, loc. cit., the Latin dubium). On the mode in which grace is conceived to be increased, there were various opinions, as on the increase of charity, as was noted in I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, 2, in the scholia.

**II.** Relevant to the matter also is below, d. 29, a. f., q. 2. — Besides the authors cited: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 5, a. 1, ad 3. — Scotus, IV Sent., d. 22, n. 9 seqq. — Bl. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 16, q. 102, m. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, here the single q. Other commentators treat the matter in I Sent., d. 17, where there is discussion of the increase of charity.

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translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from raw IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 46297–46472). Per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion, the cascade-shattered Respondeo, the four replies, and the SCHOLION (I–II) were verified column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF (pp. 663–666 L/R column bands at `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p66{3,4,5,6}-{L,R}-*.png`). English is a fresh literal translation. 18 apparatus entries, contiguous [^1]–[^18].
- **Page span:** pp. 663–666 (PDF 685–688, offset +22). QUAESTIO II opens raw 46297 (p. 663 R-col); SCHOLION at raw 46441 (p. 665 foot → p. 666 top); chunk ends before QUAESTIO III at raw 46474 (p. 666).
- **Page-split map:**
  - p. 663 = QUAEST. II opener + args 1–5 + Sed contra 1 + arg.2 head of Sed contra (breaks at *sed habens gratiam ‖ per virtutem*).
  - p. 664 = Sed contra 2 tail + 3–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo (six modi augendi + congruo/condigno) breaking at *merito con-‖digni*.
  - p. 665 = Respondeo tail (triplex congruitas) + replies 1, 2, 3, 4–5 + SCHOLION I head.
  - p. 666 = SCHOLION I tail (*arbor/semen* example) + SCHOLION II (top L/R). (The p. 666 body L/R columns below the scholion belong to QUAESTIO III.)
- **Body seams (450 dpi, grammatically continuous):** 663→664 *sed habens gratiam ‖ per virtutem eius quod habet*; 664→665 *merito con-‖digni*.
- **Hand-offs RECEIVED (from a2-q1):** p. 663 footer run for QUAEST. II = printed footers **1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8** (footers 2, 3 = *Codd. AFIYaa donum/novum* and *Hic in corp. et a.1.q.3* stayed with a2-q1 as its [^13]–[^14]). These became this q's [^1]–[^6].
- **Hand-offs FORWARDED (to a2-q3):** QUAESTIO III opener (*Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius complementum, videlicet gloriae praemium*) at raw 46474, p. 666 L-col, with its own p. 666 footer run (Vers. 8 / Vers. 7 *exaequabit* / Vers. 18 / Vers. 23 *Glossa* — these are q3's, NOT taken here). No body forwarded.
- **has_scholion = TRUE** (SCHOLION I + II; both single paragraphs, citations inline parenthetical, so no footnote anchors in the scholion — all 18 markers are body/reply footnotes).
- **No `[?]` flags.** Apparatus markers: 18 La = 18 En = 18 defs (the per-page printed footers: p. 663 #1,4–8 → [^1]–[^6]; p. 664 #1–9 → [^7]–[^14]; p. 665 #1–5 → [^15]–[^18]; p. 666 footers belong to q3).