title: Dist. 23, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXIII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXIII)

source_text:
<!-- page 548 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit primo capitulo: *Non esset homini laudabile bene vivere, si nemo male vivere suaderet.* Sed contra: si enim hoc verum est[^1], tunc videtur, quod vita nostra in gloria laudabilis non erit, ubi nemo male vivere suadebit. — Item, esto quod diabolus nihil homini[^2] persuasisset, nihilominus mereri potuisset; sed si mereretur, esset laude dignus: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod laus quaedam est, quae respicit dignitatem[^3] operis voluntarii, in quantum opus illud nobile est: et hoc posset esse in homine, etiamsi nullus ipsum tentasset. Quaedam autem est laus, quae non tantum respicit opus voluntarium, sed etiam opus strenuum et arduum, quod consistit in expugnatione adversarii et reportatione triumphi; et de hoc loquitur *Apostolus*, secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^4]: *Non coronabitur, nisi qui legitime certaverit.* Et de hac laude Magister intelligit. — Et sic patent illa duo obiecta, quia procedunt de laude secundum primum modum.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Gloriosius est non consentire peccato quam tentari non posse.* Sed contra: Deus non potest tentari; homo vero sic: ergo gloriosior est homo quam Deus. — Item, in statu gloriae homo non poterit tentari; in statu viae potest: ergo gloriosior est status viae quam patriae; quod si verum est, gloriosior est miseria quam gloria.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum Magistri intelligendum est circa eum qui efficitur gloriosus[^5] ex merito suorum operum; et ideo non valet illud quod obiicit de Deo. — Item, intensio gloriae intelligenda est in verbo proposito non quantum ad praemium substantiale, sed quantum ad aliquam accidentalem laudem, qua laudatur vir iustus, Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo[^6]: *Qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus* etc.; et ideo non valet illud quod obiicitur secundo.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *scientiam rerum creatarum homo non perdidit, et propterea in Scriptura de ea non eruditur.* Utrumque enim videtur esse falsum. Constat enim, quod nos, qui sumus filii Adae, rerum naturas ignoramus et ignorantes nascimur nec nosse possumus, nisi cum magna difficultate discamus. — Similiter, secundum videtur esse falsum, quia in sacra Scriptura[^7] habetur de productione omnium rerum in operibus sex dierum, et qualiter productae sunt et qualiter etiam distinctae sunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod etsi homo merito primi peccati excaecatus sit et factus sit ignorans tam in cognitione universitatis propter ipsum creatae, quam etiam in cognitione viae salutis suae; plus tamen excaecatus est in secundo quam in primo. Nam ad cognitionem naturalium rerum multum potest proficere proprio studio atque ingenio, sed in cognitione modi perveniendi ad vitam per se ipsum plus deficit, quam proficit, nisi divinae revelationis instructione dirigatur. Et propterea magis data est nobis Scriptura, divinitus[^8] et per Spiritum sanctum revelata, in cognitione fidei et morum, quam in co<!-- page 549 -->gnitione rerum naturalium, licet omnis veritas aliquo modo a Spiritu sancto esse dicatur. Et pro tanto intelligendum est verbum prius propositum a Magistro fuisse dictum.

Quod ergo obiicitur de amissione cognitionis, verum est, quod amisit habitum, non tamen amisit naturale iudicatorium[^9]. — Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Scriptura insinuat productionem rerum; dicendum, quod non determinat ibi rerum speciales naturas et causas; sed hoc explicat, quod sentit fides sana, videlicet divinam voluntatem omnium esse causam primam et summam, et omnia esse facta per Verbum[^10] et reparata per Verbum.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *homo non habuit praescientiam eorum quae futura erant.* Si enim hoc verum esset, cum nos multa praesciamus de futuris — et sancti Patres praesciverunt adventum Christi, et Prophetae similiter — videtur, quod Adam non fuit ita sapiens, sicut nos sumus hodie. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non est inconveniens propter gratuitam revelationem, quae in nobis est et Prophetis, ut aliquid sciamus, quod ignoravit Adam; obiicitur contra hoc: quia, sicut Sancti exponunt, Adam in sopore illo raptus est et ad caelestem curiam dicitur fuisse perductus; et hoc innuit textus[^11], quod statim post evigilationem prophetice locutus est: *Hoc nunc os* etc. Si ergo vere locutus est prophetice, praecognovit, quid significabat mulieris et viri coniunctio et mulieris de latere viri formatio. Sed primum significat Christi incarnationem; secundum, passionem: ergo praecognovit[^12] Christum incarnandum et Christum passurum; sed redemptio et reparatio praesupponit lapsum: ergo praecognovit Adam lapsum futurum et suum remedium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister non loquitur de quibuscumque futuris, sed de his quae spectabant ad statum suum, utpote de lapsu et confirmatione. Confirmationem enim praescire non potuit, quia non erat mansurus; lapsum autem scire non debuit; et rationes supra[^13] assignatae sunt, cum hoc quaesitum fuit de Angelo.

Cum ergo obiicitur, quod praescivit incarnationem; dupliciter respondetur: uno modo, quod hoc falsum est; etsi enim sciret mulierem factam, ut coniungeretur sibi per coniugii Sacramentum, non tamen oportuit, quod sciret incarnationem et passionem, pro eo quod coniugium tempore innocentiae non significabat coniunctionem Christi et Ecclesiae quantum ad naturarum[^14] coniunctionem, sed per caritatem et dilectionem. — Alius est modus respondendi, quod sicut Ioseph praecognovit suum principatum, non tamen praecognovit suam venditionem, et hoc fuit antecedens ad illud[^15]; sic Adam nosse potuit aliquid, quod spectabat ad hanc naturae exaltationem, sicut fuit Christi incarnatio, ita tamen, quod ignorabat posteritatis suae lapsum per suam praevaricationem, vel quia Deus non revelavit, vel quia ipse non pertractavit.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says in the first chapter: *It would not be praiseworthy for a man to live well, if no one were urging him to live badly.* But on the contrary: for if this is true[^1], then it seems that our life in glory will not be praiseworthy, where no one will urge us to live badly. — Likewise, suppose that the devil had persuaded a man[^2] to nothing, nonetheless he could have merited; but if he merited, he would be worthy of praise: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain praise which regards the worthiness[^3] of a voluntary work, inasmuch as that work is noble: and this could exist in a man even if no one had tempted him. But there is a certain praise which regards not only a voluntary work, but also a strenuous and arduous work, which consists in the vanquishing of an adversary and the carrying-off of the triumph; and of this the *Apostle* speaks, in the second [letter] to Timothy, second [chapter][^4]: *He will not be crowned, unless he has lawfully striven.* And the Master understands [it] of this praise. — And thus those two objections are made plain, because they proceed concerning praise according to the first mode.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which is said: *It is more glorious not to consent to sin than to be unable to be tempted.* But on the contrary: God cannot be tempted; but man can: therefore man is more glorious than God. — Likewise, in the state of glory a man will not be able to be tempted; in the state of the way he can: therefore the state of the way is more glorious than that of the fatherland; and if this is true, misery is more glorious than glory.

**I respond:** It must be said that the word of the Master must be understood concerning him who is made glorious[^5] from the merit of his own works; and therefore that which he objects concerning God does not hold. — Likewise, the intensity of glory is to be understood in the proposed statement not with respect to the substantial reward, but with respect to some accidental praise, by which a just man is praised, in Ecclesiasticus, thirty-first [chapter][^6]: *Who could transgress, and has not transgressed*, etc.; and therefore that which is objected in the second place does not hold.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *man did not lose the knowledge of created things, and therefore he is not instructed concerning it in Scripture.* For each [statement] seems to be false. For it is plain that we, who are the sons of Adam, are ignorant of the natures of things and are born ignorant and cannot know them, unless we learn with great difficulty. — Likewise, the second [statement] seems to be false, because in sacred Scripture[^7] there is [an account] concerning the production of all things in the works of the six days, and how they were produced and also how they were distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that although man, by the desert of the first sin, has been blinded and made ignorant both in the knowledge of the universe created on account of himself, and also in the knowledge of the way of his own salvation; nevertheless he has been more blinded in the second than in the first. For toward the knowledge of natural things he can advance much by his own study and natural endowment, but in the knowledge of the manner of arriving at life he by himself fails more than he advances, unless he is directed by the instruction of divine revelation. And therefore Scripture has rather been given to us, revealed divinely[^8] and through the Holy Spirit, in the knowledge of faith and morals, than in the knowledge of natural things, although all truth is in some manner said to be from the Holy Spirit. And to this extent it must be understood that the word proposed earlier by the Master was spoken.

That, therefore, which is objected concerning the loss of knowledge, it is true that he lost the habit, yet he did not lose the natural faculty of judgment[^9]. — But to that which is objected, that Scripture intimates the production of things; it must be said that it does not there determine the special natures and causes of things; but it explains this, which sound faith holds, namely that the divine will is the first and highest cause of all things, and that all things were made through the Word[^10] and repaired through the Word.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *man did not have foreknowledge of those things which were to come.* For if this were true, since we foreknow many things concerning the future — and the holy Fathers foreknew the coming of Christ, and the Prophets likewise — it seems that Adam was not as wise as we are today. If you say that this is not unfitting on account of the gratuitous revelation which is in us and in the Prophets, that we should know something which Adam was ignorant of; it is objected against this: that, as the Saints expound, Adam in that sleep was rapt and is said to have been led to the heavenly court; and the text intimates this[^11], that immediately after his awakening he spoke prophetically: *This now is bone* etc. If, therefore, he truly spoke prophetically, he foreknew what the joining of woman and man signified, and the formation of woman from the side of man. But the first signifies the incarnation of Christ; the second, the passion: therefore he foreknew[^12] that Christ was to be incarnate and that Christ was to suffer; but redemption and reparation presuppose the fall: therefore Adam foreknew his own future fall and its remedy.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master does not speak of any whatsoever future things, but of those which pertained to his own state, such as the fall and the confirmation. For he could not foreknow the confirmation, because he was not going to remain; but he ought not to know the fall; and the reasons have been assigned above[^13], when this was asked concerning the Angel.

When, therefore, it is objected that he foreknew the incarnation; it is answered in two ways: in one way, that this is false; for although he knew that woman was made, in order that she might be joined to him through the Sacrament of marriage, nevertheless it was not necessary that he should know the incarnation and the passion, for the reason that marriage in the time of innocence did not signify the joining of Christ and the Church with respect to the joining of natures[^14], but through charity and love. — There is another way of responding, that just as Joseph foreknew his own princely rule, yet did not foreknow his own being-sold, and this was antecedent to that[^15]; so Adam was able to know something which pertained to this exaltation of nature, such as the incarnation of Christ was, yet in such a way that he was ignorant of the fall of his posterity through his own transgression, either because God did not reveal it, or because he himself did not consider it.

---

la: Codd. et edd., except. cod. cc et ed. 1, *esset*.

en: The codices and editions, except codex cc and edition 1, read *esset* ("it would be").

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *mali*. Post *nihilominus* supple cum cod. O *homo*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 [reads] *mali* ("of evil"). After *nihilominus* supply, with codex O, *homo* ("man").

la: Cod. A *respicit voluntatem et dignitatem*, cod. N *respicit voluntatis dignitatem et operis*.

en: Codex A [reads] *respicit voluntatem et dignitatem* ("regards the will and the worthiness"); codex N [reads] *respicit voluntatis dignitatem et operis* ("regards the worthiness of the will and of the work").

la: Vers. 5. Vide supra pag. 533, nota 5. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 suppressit *tantum* et *etiam*. — Hoc dubium solvunt S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: Verse 5 [2 Tim. 2:5]. See above, p. 533, note 5. — A little earlier the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 suppressed *tantum* and *etiam*. — This doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1.

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *gloriosior*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and editions 3, 4 [read] *gloriosior* ("more glorious").

la: Vers. 10. — Cfr. S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.

en: Verse 10 [Ecclus. 31:10]. — Cf. St. Thomas, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 2.

la: Gen. 1, 1. seqq.

en: Genesis 1:1 and following.

la: Epist. II. Tim. 3, 16: *Omnis scriptura, divinitus inspirata, utilis est ad docendum... ad erudiendum in iustitia.* Cfr. II. Petr. 1, 20. seq. — Quomodo omnis veritas a Spiritu sancto esse dicatur, explicatum est I. Sent. d. 46. dub. 8.

en: Second Letter to Timothy 3:16: *All Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for teaching... for instructing in justice.* Cf. 2 Peter 1:20 and following. — In what manner all truth is said to be from the Holy Spirit has been explained in I Sent., d. 46, doubt 8.

la: Vide infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.

en: See below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, at the end.

la: Ioan. 1, 3: *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt.* — Cfr. de hoc dub. S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.

en: John 1:3: *All things were made through him.* — On this doubt cf. St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 3.

la: Gen. 2, 23. — Verba Augustini de hac re invenies supra pag. 433, nota 10.

en: Genesis 2:23. — The words of Augustine on this matter you will find above, p. 433, note 10.

la: Vat. *igitur post cognovit*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *igitur* ("therefore") after *cognovit*.

en: Distinction 4, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *matrimonii*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 [reads] *matrimonii* ("of marriage").

la: Gen. 37, 6. seqq. — Mox pro *ad hanc naturae* cod. aa *ad humanae naturae*. — Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 4.

en: Genesis 37:6 and following. — Presently, for *ad hanc naturae* codex aa [reads] *ad humanae naturae*. — Cf. above, d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 4. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p548-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p549-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines ~38446–38580). Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (p.548 = PDF 570, p.549 = PDF 571). English is a fresh literal translation.

**Dubia count.** **FOUR dubia: DUB I, II, III, IV.** The task brief and `next-session-resume.md` predicted three (DUB I–III), based on a raw-OCR header scan that missed DUB IV. The PDF unambiguously shows DUB IV ("Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod homo non habuit praescientiam…") at the top-left of p.549, continuing the *Dubia circa litteram* of d.23, and ending "…vel quia ipse non pertractavit." The real DISTINCTIO XXIV (Pars I, Cap. I, *De gratia hominis et potentia ante casum*) begins lower on p.549 — the "DISTINCTIO XXIV." text at the top of p.549 is a **running head**, not the section start. DUB IV is therefore correctly part of this chunk.

**Page-split map (footer provenance).**
- p.548 (left col footers 1–4; right col footers 5–8): all eight belong to the DUBIA body and lead this apparatus as [^1]–[^8].
  - DUB I: [^1] *esset* var.; [^2] *mali*/*homo* supple; [^3] Cod. A/N *respicit* var.; [^4] 2 Tim. 2:5 + commentator-roll.
  - DUB II: [^5] *gloriosior* var.; [^6] Ecclus. 31:10 + commentator-roll.
  - DUB III: [^7] Gen. 1:1; [^8] 2 Tim. 3:16 + Spirit-of-truth cross-ref.
- p.549 (left col footers 1–6 + right col footer 7): renumbered [^9]–[^15].
  - DUB III tail: [^9] Vide infra d.39 (*naturale iudicatorium*); [^10] John 1:3 (*facta per Verbum*) + commentator-roll.
  - DUB IV: [^11] Gen. 2:23 + Augustine cross-ref; [^12] Vat. *igitur*; [^13] Dist. 4 a.2 q.2 (*rationes supra*); [^14] Vat. *matrimonii*; [^15] Gen. 37:6 (Joseph) + commentator-roll.
- p.549's "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footers (Dist. V. c. 5; Cap. 107 n. 28; Cap. 103 n. 28) belong to the **d.24 littera/Cap. I** content that begins lower on p.549 — NOT carried here; they forward to the d.24 littera chunk.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q3: the resume note forwarded "p.548 left-column footers (4 notes)" to the DUBIA. Confirmed — p.548 left-col footers 1–4 (*esset*, *mali*/*homo*, Cod. A/N *respicit*, 2 Tim. 2:5) anchor in DUB I–II of this chunk, not in a2-q3's scholion (a2-q3's scholion III–IV occupies the top-left of p.548 and carries no footers). FORWARDED to d.24 littera: the three p.549 "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footers belong to d.24 Cap. I, which opens lower on p.549.

**has_scholion:** false (dubia have no scholion).

**[?] flags:** none.

**Dup-cleanup:** no stray duplicate skeleton found (`ls vol2/ | grep d23` shows one chunk per logical unit).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 1

title_alt: Distinctio XXIV, Pars I — Littera Magistri

title_alt: Distinction XXIV, Part I — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 549 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXIV.

#### Pars I.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De gratia hominis et potentia ante casum.*

Nunc diligenter investigari oportet, quam gratiam vel potentiam habuerit homo ante casum, et utrum per eam potuerit stare, vel non. — Sciendum est igitur, quod homini in creatione, sicut de Angelis diximus[^1], datum est per gratiam auxilium, et collata est potentia, per quam poterat stare, id est non declinare ab eo quod acceperat; sed non poterat proficere in tantum, ut per gratiam creationis sine alia mereri salutem valeret. Poterat quidem per illud auxilium gratiae creationis resistere malo, sed non perficere bonum. Poterat tamen per illud bene vivere quodam modo, quia poterat vivere sine peccato; sed non poterat sine alio gratiae adiutorio spiritualiter vivere, quo vitam mereretur aeternam. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^2]: « Sic factus est homo rectus, ut et manere in ea rectitudine posset, non sine divino adiutorio, et suo fieri perversus arbitrio; utrumlibet horum elegisset, Dei voluntas fieret vel ab illo, vel de illo. Et quia suam maluit facere voluntatem quam Dei, de illo facta est voluntas Dei ». Item in eodem[^3]: « Sic oportebat, prius hominem fieri, ut et bene posset velle et male; nec frustra, si bene; nec impune, si male ». Idem quoque in libro

<!-- page 550 -->

de Correptione et gratia[^4] ait: « Si hoc adiutorium vel Angelo vel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset; quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine divino auxilio posset manere, si vellet, non utique sua culpa cecidisset; defuisset quippe adiutorium, sine quo manere non posset ». Idem: « Dederat Deus homini bonam voluntatem, in illa quippe eum fecerat[^5] rectum; dederat adiutorium, sine quo non posset in ea manere, si vellet, et per quod posset. Ut autem hoc vellet, in eius dimisit arbitrio ». In eodem: « Acceperat posse, si vellet, sed non habuit velle, quo posset; nam si habuisset, perseverasset ». — His testimoniis evidenter monstratur, quod homo rectitudinem et bonam voluntatem in creatione accepit atque auxilium, quo stare poterat, alioquin non sua culpa videretur cecidisse.

Sed quomodo rectam et bonam voluntatem habuit homo, si per eam nec mereri vitam valuit, nec ea stare voluit? — Quia nec aliquid mali ea tunc volebat et ad tempus stare voluit, sed non perseveranter; et ideo recta et bona fuit tunc voluntas hominis.

Ad hoc autem, quod diximus, hominem non potuisse proficere vel mereri per gratiam creationis, solet opponi sic: Per illud auxilium gratiae creationis potuit stare in bono, quod acceperat: potuit ergo resistere tentationi. Sed resistere tentationibus atque suggestionibus malis meritum est ac bonum remunerabile; omne autem bonum meritum profectus est: per gratiam igitur creationis proficere potuit sine adiectione alterius gratiae. — Ad quod dicimus, quia resistere malo et non consentire tentationi non fecisset illi meritum, etsi non consensisset, quia nihil in eo erat, quod ad malum impelleret, sicut Angelis, qui non ceciderunt, non fuit meritum, quod steterunt, id est, quod non corruerunt. Nobis autem meritum est aliquando, si malum non facimus, sed resistimus, ibi dumtaxat, ubi causa subest, quae nos id facere movet: quia ex peccati corruptela proni sunt ad lapsum gressus nostri[^9]. Ubi autem non intervenit causa nos ad malum impellens, non meremur, si ab eo declinamus. Declinare enim a malo semper vitat poenam, sed non semper meretur palmam.

#### Cap. II.

#### *De adiutorio homini in creatione dato, quo stare poterat.*

Hic considerandum est, quod fuerit illud adiutorium homini datum in creatione, quo poterat manere, si vellet. Illud utique fuit libertas arbitrii, ab omni labe et corruptela immunis, atque voluntatis rectitudo et omnium naturalium potentiarum animae sinceritas atque vivacitas[^10].

<!-- page 550b -->

#### Cap. III.

#### *De libero arbitrio.*

Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, vel malum, eadem desistente. Et dicitur liberum quantum ad *voluntatem*, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest; *arbitrium* vero quantum ad *rationem*, cuius est facultas vel potentia illa, cuius etiam est discernere inter bonum et malum; et aliquando quidem, discretionem habens boni et mali, quod malum est eligit, aliquando vero quod bonum est. Sed quod bonum est, nisi gratia adiuta, non eligit, malum vero per se eligit. Est enim in anima rationali voluntas naturalis, qua naturaliter vult bonum, licet tenuiter et exiliter, nisi gratia iuvet, quae adveniens iuvat eam et erigit, ut efficaciter velit bonum. Per se autem potest velle malum efficaciter. Illa igitur rationalis animae potentia, qua bonum vel malum potest velle, utrumque discernens, liberum arbitrium nuncupatur; quod bruta animalia non habent, quia ratione carent, habent tamen sensum et appetitum sensualitatis.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *De sensualitate.*

Est enim sensualitas quaedam vis animae inferior, ex qua est motus, qui intenditur in corporis[^6] sensus atque appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium; ratio vero vis animae est superior, quae, ut ita dicamus, duas habet partes vel differentias, superiorem et inferiorem. Secundum superiorem supernis conspiciendis vel consulendis intendit, secundum inferiorem ad temporalium dispositionem prospicit[^7]. Quidquid ergo in anima nostra nobis considerantibus occurrit, quod non sit commune cum bestiis, ad rationem pertinet. Quod autem in ea reperis commune cum belluis, ad sensualitatem pertinet. Et ubi nobis gradatim in consideratione partium animae progredientibus primum aliquid occurrit, quod non est commune cum bestiis, ibi incipit ratio. Hoc autem Augustinus docet in libro duodecimo de Trinitate[^8] ita dicens: « Videamus, ubi sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Quidquid enim habemus in animo commune cum pecore, recte dicitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinere. Non enim solum corpus homo exterior deputabitur, sed adiuncta quadam vita sua, qua compages corporis et omnes sensus vigent, quibus instructus est ad exteriora sentienda ». « Ascendentibus ergo introrsum quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animae partes, ubi incipit aliquid occurrere, quod nobis non sit commune cum bestiis, ibi incipit ratio, ubi homo interior iam possit agnosci[^15] ».

<!-- page 551 -->

#### Cap. V.

#### *De ratione et partibus eius.*

« Rationis autem pars superior aeternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit, portio inferior ad temporalia gubernanda deflectitur[^11] ». « Et illa rationis intentio, qua contemplamur aeterna, *sapientiae* deputatur; illa vero, qua bene utimur rebus temporalibus, *scientiae* deputatur ». « Cum vero disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo, quae commemoravi[^12], nisi per officia geminamus ». « Carnalis autem vel sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis pecoribusque communis est, qui seclusus est a ratione sapientiae, rationi autem scientiae vicinus est ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *De simili ordine peccandi in nobis et in primis parentibus.*

Illud quoque praetermittendum non est, quod talis nunc in uno homine tentationis est ordo et progressio, qualis tunc in primis praecessit parentibus. Ut enim tunc serpens mulieri malum suasit, ipsaque consensit, deinde viro suo dedit, sicque consummatum est peccatum;

#### Cap. VII.

#### *Quod in nobis est vir et mulier et serpens.*

Ita et nunc in nobis pro serpente est sensualis motus animae, pro muliere inferior portio rationis, pro viro superior rationis portio. Et hic est vir, qui secundum Apostolum dicitur *imago et gloria Dei*[^13]; et illa est mulier, quae secundum eundem dicitur *gloria viri*.

#### Cap. VIII.

#### *De spirituali coniugio viri et mulieris in nobis.*

Atque inter hunc virum et hanc mulierem est velut quoddam spirituale coniugium naturalisque contractus, quo superior rationis portio quasi vir debet praeesse et dominari; inferior vero quasi mulier debet subesse et obedire. Ideo vir secundum Apostolum non debet habere *velamen*, sed mulier[^14]. Et sicut in cunctis animantibus non est repertum homini *adiutorium simile sibi*, sed de illo sumtum quod ei formaretur in coniugium; ita et in partibus animae, quas cum pecoribus habemus communes, nullum menti nostrae simile est adiutorium. Unde Augustinus in eodem[^16]: « Illud nostrum, quod in actione temporalium tractandorum ita versatur, ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore, rationale est quidem, sed ex illa rationali mente, qua subhaeremus intelligibili et incommutabili veritati, tanquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est. Sicut enim in omnibus pecoribus non est inventum viro adiutorium simile illi, nisi de illo detractum in coniugium formaretur; ita

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menti nostrae, qua supernam consulimus veritatem, nullum est ad usum rerum temporalium, quantum naturae hominis satis est, simile adiutorium ex animae partibus, quas communes cum pecoribus habemus. Ideoque rationale nostrum, non ad unitatis divortium separatum, sed in auxilium societatis quasi derivatum, in suo dispertitur officio. Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et in femina; sic intellectum nostrum et actionem sive rationem et appetitum rationalem, vel si aliquo modo significantius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur, ut, sicut de illis dictum est: *erunt duo in carne una*[^17], sic de his dici possit: duo in mente una ». — Ecce ex his intelligi potest, qualiter in anima hominis exsistat imago illius coniugii, et qualiter in singulis nostrum spiritualiter sint illa tria, scilicet vir, mulier, serpens.

#### Cap. IX.

#### *Qualiter per illa tria in nobis consummetur tentatio.*

Nunc superest ostendere, quomodo per haec tria in nobis consummetur peccatum; ubi agnosci poterit, si diligenter intendatur, quid sit in anima mortale, vel veniale peccatum. Ut enim ibi serpens suasit[^18] mulieri, et mulier viro; ita et in nobis sensualis motus, cum illecebram peccati conceperit, quasi serpens suggerit mulieri, scilicet inferiori parti rationis, id est rationi scientiae; quae si consenserit illecebrae, mulier edit cibum vetitum; post de eodem dat viro, cum superiori parti rationis, id est rationi sapientiae, eandem illecebram suggerit, quae si consentit, tunc vir etiam cum femina cibum vetitum gustat. Si ergo in motu sensuali tantum peccati illecebra teneatur, veniale ac levissimum est peccatum.

#### Cap. X.

#### *Quando mulier sola manducat cibum vetitum.*

Si vero inferior pars rationis consenserit, ita ut sola cogitationis delectatione sine voluntate perficiendi teneatur, mulier sola manducavit, non vir, cuius auctoritate cohibetur voluntas, ne ad opus usque perveniat.

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#### Cap. XI.

#### *Quando etiam vir manducat.*

Si vero adsit plena voluntas perficiendi, ut, si adsit facultas et ad effectum perducatur, vir quoque manducat, quia superior pars rationis illecebrae consensit[^19]; et tunc est damnabile et grave peccatum.

#### Cap. XII.

#### *Quando sit veniale vel mortale peccatum.*

Quando autem mulier sine viro gustat, aliquando est *mortale*, aliquando *veniale* peccatum. Ut enim dictum est, tunc mulier sine viro gustat, cum ita delectatione cogitationis peccatum tenetur, ut faciendum non decernatur; vel cum quidam terminus et mensura peccato adhibetur a viro, ut non liceat mulieri effrenata libertate in peccatum progredi. Si ergo peccatum non diu teneatur delectatione cogitationis, sed statim, ut mulierem tetigit, viri auctoritate repellatur, *veniale* est. Si vero diu in delectatione cogitationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, *mortale* est, et pro eo damnabitur simul vir et mulier, id est totus homo, quia et tunc vir non, sicut debuit, mulierem cohibuit, unde potest dici consensisse.

Itaque, ut breviter summam perstringam, quando peccatum ita in anima concipitur, ut illud facere disponat vel etiam perficiat, aliud[^20] frequenter, aliud semel, vel etiam quando delectatione cogitationis diu tenetur, *mortale* est. Cum vero in *sensuali motu* tantum est, ut praediximus, tunc levissimum est, quia ratio tunc non delectatur. Ideo autem supra dixi: aliud frequenter, aliud semel, quia[^21] quaedam sunt, quae, si tantum semel fiant vel facienda disponantur, damnant; quaedam vero non, nisi saepius fiant vel facienda decernantur, ut de otioso verbo et huiusmodi. Haec Augustinus in libro duodecimo de Trinitate[^22] tradit ita: « Sicut in illo coniugio primorum hominum serpens manducandum persuasit, mulier autem non manducavit sola, sed viro suo dedit, et simul manducaverunt; ita et in quodam secreto coniugio, quod in uno homine geritur et dignoscitur, cum rationi scientiae, quae in rebus temporalibus agendis ratiocinandi vivacitate versatur, animalis sensus ingerit quandam illecebram; tunc velut serpens alloquitur feminam. Huic autem illecebrae consentire de ligno vetito est edere. Sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superiori vero auctoritate ita retinentur membra, ut non exhibeantur *arma iniquitatis peccato*[^23]; sic habendum existimo, velut lignum vetitum mulier sola comederit. — Si autem in consensu illo ita decernitur quodque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam opere impleatur, intelligenda est mulier dedisse viro suo simul edendum illicitum cibum. Neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suaviter, verum etiam perpetrandum efficaciter mente decerni, nisi et illa mentis intentio, penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, malae actioni cedat. Nec sane, cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur illicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et volvens libenter, quae statim, ut attigerunt animum, respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum, sed longe minus, quam si et opere statuatur implendum. Et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum et dicendum: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra*. Neque enim, sicut in illis duobus primis hominibus personam suam quisque portabat, et ideo si sola mulier cibum edisset illicitum, sola utique mortis supplicio plecteretur, ita dici potest in homine uno, si delectationibus illicitis, a quibus continuo se deberet avertere, cogitatio libenter sola pascatur, nec facienda decernantur mala, sed tantum suaviter in recordatione teneantur, quasi mulierem sine viro posse damnari. Absit hoc credere. Haec quippe *una* persona est, *unus* homo est, totusque damnabitur, nisi haec quae sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata, per Mediatoris gratiam remittantur ». — Idem quoque in libro contra Manichaeos[^24] de hoc eodem sic ait: « Apostolus dicit, *secundum principem potestatis aeris huius, spiritus, qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae*. Numquid ergo visibiliter eis apparet, aut quasi corporeis locis accedit ad eos et operatur? Sed miris modis per cogitationem suggerit quidquid potest; quibus suggestionibus resistendum est. *Non enim ignoramus astutias eius*. Quomodo enim accessit ad Iudam, quando ei persuasit, ut Dominum traderet? Numquid in locis, aut per hos oculos ei visus est? Sed utique, ut dictum est, *in cor eius intravit*. Repellit autem illum homo, si paradisum mentis custodiat. *Posuit enim hominem Deus in paradiso, ut operaretur et custodiret*[^25], quia sic Ecclesiae dicitur in Canticis Canticorum: *Hortus conclusus, fons signatus*; quo utique non admittitur perversitatis ille persuasor, sed tamen per mulierem decepit. Non enim etiam ratio nostra deduci ad consensionem peccati potest, nisi cum delectatio mota fuerit in illa parte animi, quae debet obtemperare rationi tanquam rectori viro. Etiam in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur nunc[^26], cum ad peccatum quisque delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus: serpente, muliere et viro. Nam primo fit suggestio sive per *cogitationem*, sive per *sensus* corporis vel videndo, vel tangendo, vel audiendo, vel gustando, vel olfaciendo; quae suggestio cum facta fuerit, si cu-

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piditas nostra non moveatur ad peccandum, excluditur serpentis astutia. Si autem mota fuerit, quasi iam mulieri persuasum erit; sed aliquando ratio viriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit. Quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum, sed cum aliquantula luctatione coronamur. Si autem ratio consentiat et quod libido commoverit faciendum esse decernat ab omni vita beata tanquam de paradiso expellitur homo. Iam enim peccatum imputatur, etiamsi non subsequatur factum, quando rea tenetur in consensione conscientia ».

Haec de animae partibus interseruimus, ut ipsius animae natura plenius cognosceretur, et secundum quam sui portionem in ea sit liberum arbitrium intelligatur, scilicet secundum rationem, quo[^27] omne peccatum mortale geritur, sed non omne veniale, illud scilicet, quod in solo motu sensualitatis existit.

#### Cap. XIII.

#### *Quibus modis accipitur sensualitas in Scriptura.*

Non est autem silentio praetereundum, quod saepe in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis non id solum in anima, quod est nobis commune cum pecore, sed etiam inferior portio rationis, quae temporalium dispositioni intendit, intelligitur. Quod diligens lector in locis Scripturae, ubi de ipsa fit mentio, vigilanter annotet[^28].

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### DISTINCTION XXIV.

#### Part I.

#### Chapter I.

#### *On the grace and power of man before the fall.*

Now it must be diligently investigated what grace or power man had before the fall, and whether through it he was able to stand, or not. — It must therefore be known that to man at his creation, as we said concerning the Angels[^1], there was given through grace a help, and a power was conferred, by which he was able to stand, that is, not to turn aside from what he had received; but he was not able to advance so far that through the grace of creation he could merit salvation without another [grace]. He was indeed able, through that help of the grace of creation, to resist evil, but not to accomplish the good. He was able, however, through it to live well in a certain manner, because he was able to live without sin; but he was not able, without another help of grace, to live spiritually, by which he might merit eternal life. Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^2]: « Thus man was made upright, in such a way that he could both remain in that uprightness, not without divine help, and become perverse by his own choice; whichever of these he should choose, the will of God would be done either by him, or concerning him. And because he preferred to do his own will rather than God's, concerning him was the will of God done ». Likewise in the same work[^3]: « Thus it was fitting that man should first be made, so that he could will both well and ill; and not in vain, if well; nor with impunity, if ill ». The same also in the book

#### *(Chapter I continued)*

*On Correction and Grace*[^4] says: « If this help had been lacking to the Angel or to man, when they were first made; since the nature made was not such that it could remain without divine help, if it willed, it would assuredly not have fallen by its own fault; for the help would have been lacking, without which it could not remain ». The same: « God had given man a good will, for in it he had made him[^5] upright; he had given help, without which he could not remain in it, if he willed, and through which he could. But that he should will this, he left to his own choice ». In the same: « He had received the power, if he willed, but he did not have the willing by which he could; for if he had had it, he would have persevered ». — By these testimonies it is evidently shown that man received in his creation uprightness and a good will, and also a help by which he was able to stand, otherwise he would not seem to have fallen by his own fault.

But how did man have a right and good will, if through it he was neither able to merit life, nor willed to stand by it? — Because he then willed nothing evil by it and willed to stand for a time, but not perseveringly; and therefore the will of man was then right and good.

But to this which we said, that man was not able to advance or to merit through the grace of creation, it is usually objected thus: Through that help of the grace of creation he was able to stand in the good which he had received: therefore he was able to resist temptation. But to resist temptations and evil suggestions is a merit and a rewardable good; and every good is the advancement of merit: therefore through the grace of creation he was able to advance without the addition of another grace. — To which we say that to resist evil and not to consent to temptation would not have made merit for him, even if he had not consented, because there was nothing in him which impelled toward evil, just as for the Angels who did not fall, it was not a merit that they stood, that is, that they did not fall. But for us it is sometimes a merit, if we do not do evil but resist, only there, namely, where there is an underlying cause which moves us to do it: because from the corruption of sin our steps are prone to falling[^9]. But where there does not intervene a cause impelling us to evil, we do not merit, if we turn aside from it. For to turn aside from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the palm.

#### Chapter II.

#### *On the help given to man at creation, by which he was able to stand.*

Here it must be considered what that help was that was given to man at creation, by which he was able to remain, if he willed. It was assuredly the liberty of choice, immune from every stain and corruption, and the uprightness of the will and the sincerity and vigor of all the natural powers of the soul[^10].

#### *(Chapter III)*

#### Chapter III.

#### *On free choice.*

Free choice is the faculty of reason and will, by which the good is chosen, with grace assisting, or the evil, with the same desisting. And it is called *free* with respect to the *will*, which can be bent to either alternative; and *choice* with respect to the *reason*, whose is that faculty or power, whose also it is to discern between good and evil; and sometimes indeed, having discernment of good and evil, it chooses what is evil, sometimes what is good. But what is good, unless aided by grace, it does not choose; but evil it chooses of itself. For there is in the rational soul a natural will, by which it naturally wills the good, though weakly and slightly, unless grace aid it, which coming aids it and raises it up, so that it may effectively will the good. But of itself it can will evil effectively. That power of the rational soul, therefore, by which it can will good or evil, discerning each, is called free choice; which the brute animals do not have, because they lack reason, yet they have sense and the appetite of sensuality.

#### Chapter IV.

#### *On sensuality.*

For sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which arises the motion which is directed toward the senses of the body[^6] and the appetite for things pertaining to the body; but reason is the higher power of the soul, which, so to speak, has two parts or differences, a higher and a lower. According to the higher it directs itself to the contemplating or consulting of the things above, according to the lower it looks to the disposition of temporal things[^7]. Whatever therefore occurs to us in our soul, as we consider, which is not common with the beasts, pertains to reason. But what you find in it common with the brutes pertains to sensuality. And where, as we proceed step by step in the consideration of the parts of the soul, the first thing occurs which is not common with the beasts, there reason begins. And this Augustine teaches in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*[^8] saying thus: « Let us see where there is, as it were, a certain boundary of the exterior and interior man. For whatever we have in our mind in common with cattle is rightly said to pertain to the exterior man. For not the body alone shall the exterior man be reckoned, but with a certain life of its own adjoined, by which the framework of the body and all the senses are vigorous, by which it is furnished for perceiving exterior things ». « As we ascend inward, therefore, by certain steps of consideration through the parts of the soul, where something begins to occur which is not common to us with the beasts, there reason begins, where the interior man may now be recognized[^15] ».

#### Chapter V.

#### *On reason and its parts.*

« The higher part of reason cleaves to the eternal reasons to be contemplated or consulted, the lower portion is bent down to the governing of temporal things[^11] ». « And that intention of reason, by which we contemplate eternal things, is assigned to *wisdom*; but that by which we use temporal things well, is assigned to *knowledge* ». « But when we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss one certain thing, nor do we double it into these two, which I mentioned[^12], except by their offices ». « But the carnal or sensual motion of the soul, which is directed toward the senses of the body, is common to us and to the cattle, which is shut off from the reason of wisdom, but is near to the reason of knowledge ».

#### Chapter VI.

#### *On the similar order of sinning in us and in our first parents.*

This also must not be passed over, that such now in one man is the order and progression of temptation, as then preceded in our first parents. For as then the serpent suggested evil to the woman, and she consented, then gave to her husband, and so the sin was consummated;

#### Chapter VII.

#### *That in us there is a man and a woman and a serpent.*

so also now in us, in place of the serpent there is the sensual motion of the soul, in place of the woman the lower portion of reason, in place of the man the higher portion of reason. And this is the man who according to the Apostle is called *the image and glory of God*[^13]; and that is the woman who according to the same is called *the glory of the man*.

#### Chapter VIII.

#### *On the spiritual marriage of man and woman in us.*

And between this man and this woman there is, as it were, a certain spiritual marriage and a natural contract, by which the higher portion of reason as the man ought to preside and rule; but the lower as the woman ought to be subject and obey. Therefore the man according to the Apostle ought not to have a *veil*, but the woman[^14]. And just as among all living creatures there was not found for man a *help like to himself*, but taken from him so that it might be formed for him into a marriage; so also in the parts of the soul, which we have in common with the cattle, there is no help like to our mind. Hence Augustine in the same work[^16]: « That part of ours which is so engaged in the action of handling temporal things, that it is not common to us with the beast, is indeed rational, but it is, as it were, drawn off from that rational mind by which we cleave to intelligible and immutable truth, and assigned to handling and governing lower things. For just as in all the cattle there was not found for the man a help like to him, unless drawn off from him it were formed into a marriage; so

#### *(Chapter VIII continued)*

to our mind, by which we consult the supernal truth, there is no help like to it, for the use of temporal things, as much as suffices for the nature of man, from the parts of the soul which we have in common with the cattle. And therefore our rational part, not separated unto a divorce of unity, but as it were derived into the help of fellowship, is divided in its office. And just as one flesh belongs to two in male and female; so a single nature of the mind embraces our intellect and action, or reason and rational appetite, or if they can be named in some more significant way, so that, as it was said of those: *they shall be two in one flesh*[^17], so of these it may be said: two in one mind ». — Behold, from these it can be understood how in the soul of man there exists the image of that marriage, and how in each of us there are spiritually those three, namely man, woman, serpent.

#### Chapter IX.

#### *How through those three temptation is consummated in us.*

Now it remains to show how through these three sin is consummated in us; where it can be recognized, if one attends diligently, what is mortal sin in the soul, or venial. For as there the serpent suggested[^18] to the woman, and the woman to the man; so also in us the sensual motion, when it has conceived the enticement of sin, as a serpent suggests it to the woman, namely to the lower part of reason, that is to the reason of knowledge; which if it consents to the enticement, the woman eats the forbidden food; then she gives of the same to the man, when she suggests the same enticement to the higher part of reason, that is to the reason of wisdom, which if it consents, then the man also with the woman tastes the forbidden food. If, therefore, the enticement of sin is held only in the sensual motion, the sin is venial and most slight.

#### Chapter X.

#### *When the woman alone eats the forbidden food.*

But if the lower part of reason has consented, in such a way that it is held by the delight of thought alone without the will of accomplishing, the woman alone has eaten, not the man, by whose authority the will is restrained, lest it come even to the deed.

#### Chapter XI.

#### *When the man too eats.*

But if there is present a full will of accomplishing, so that, if the faculty is present and it is carried into effect, the man too eats, because the higher part of reason has consented to the enticement[^19]; then it is a damnable and grave sin.

#### Chapter XII.

#### *When the sin is venial or mortal.*

But when the woman tastes without the man, it is sometimes a *mortal*, sometimes a *venial* sin. For as has been said, the woman tastes without the man when sin is so held by the delight of thought that it is not decreed to be done; or when a certain limit and measure is applied to the sin by the man, so that it is not permitted to the woman to advance into sin with unbridled liberty. If, therefore, the sin is not long held by the delight of thought, but immediately, as soon as it has touched the woman, is driven back by the authority of the man, it is *venial*. But if it is long held in the delight of thought, even if the will of accomplishing is absent, it is *mortal*, and for it both the man and the woman, that is, the whole man, will be damned, because then too the man did not, as he ought, restrain the woman, whence he can be said to have consented.

And so, to summarize the matter briefly, when sin is so conceived in the soul that he disposes to do it or even accomplishes it, one thing[^20] frequently, another once, or even when it is long held by the delight of thought, it is *mortal*. But when it is only in the *sensual motion*, as we said before, then it is most slight, because reason then does not take delight. And I said above for this reason: one thing frequently, another once, because[^21] there are some things which, if they are done or disposed to be done even once, condemn; but certain others not, unless they are done or decreed to be done more often, as concerning the idle word and the like. This Augustine in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*[^22] hands down thus: « Just as in that marriage of the first men the serpent persuaded that the food be eaten, but the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they ate together; so also in a certain secret marriage, which is carried on and discerned in one man, when to the reason of knowledge, which in the doing of temporal things is engaged with the liveliness of reasoning, the animal sense brings in a certain enticement; then it is, as it were, the serpent that addresses the woman. But to consent to this enticement is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if this consent is content with the delight of thought alone, while by the higher authority the members are so held back that they are not presented as *weapons of iniquity to sin*[^23]; thus I think it must be held, as though the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food. — But if in that consent it is so decreed that each sin, if there be the power, should also be fulfilled in deed, the woman is to be understood to have given to her husband to eat the unlawful food together. For sin cannot be decreed in the mind not only to be thought of sweetly, but even to be perpetrated effectively, unless that intention of the mind also, in whose power is the highest authority of moving the members into the work or of restraining them from the work, yields to the evil action. Nor indeed, when the mind is delighted with unlawful things by thought alone, not indeed decreeing that they are to be done, yet holding and turning them over willingly, which as soon as they touched the mind ought to have been rejected, is it to be denied that there is sin, but it is far less than if it were also resolved to be fulfilled in deed. And therefore for such thoughts too pardon is to be sought, and the breast struck and it must be said: *Forgive us our debts*. For not, as in those two first human beings each one bore his own person, and therefore if the woman alone had eaten the unlawful food, she alone would surely be smitten with the punishment of death, can it so be said in one man, if the thought alone is willingly fed by unlawful delights, from which it ought continually to turn away, and evil things are not decreed to be done, but are only held sweetly in remembrance, that the woman without the man can be damned. Far be it to believe this. For this is *one* person, *one* man, and the whole will be damned, unless these things, which without the will of acting, yet with the will of delighting the mind in such things, are perceived to be sins of thought alone, are remitted through the grace of the Mediator ». — The same also in the book *against the Manichees*[^24] says of this same matter thus: « The Apostle says, *according to the prince of the power of this air, of the spirit who now works in the children of distrust*. Does he then appear to them visibly, or as it were approach them in bodily places and work? But in wondrous ways through thought he suggests whatever he can; which suggestions must be resisted. *For we are not ignorant of his cunning*. For how did he approach Judas, when he persuaded him to betray the Lord? Was it in places, or through these eyes that he was seen by him? But assuredly, as has been said, *he entered into his heart*. But man drives him off, if he guards the paradise of the mind. *For God placed man in paradise, that he might cultivate and guard it*[^25], since thus it is said to the Church in the Canticle of Canticles: *A garden enclosed, a fountain sealed*; into which that persuader of perversity is assuredly not admitted, but nonetheless he deceived through the woman. For neither can our reason be led to consent to sin, unless when the delight has been moved in that part of the soul which ought to obey reason as its ruling husband. Even in each of us nothing else is done now[^26], when anyone slips into sin, than was done then in those three: the serpent, the woman, and the man. For first there comes the suggestion, either through *thought*, or through the *senses* of the body, by seeing, or touching, or hearing, or tasting, or smelling; and when that suggestion has been made, if

#### *(Chapter XII continued)*

our desire is not moved to sinning, the cunning of the serpent is shut out. But if it has been moved, it will be as if it had already been persuaded to the woman; but sometimes reason manfully reins in and checks even the aroused desire. And when this happens, we do not fall into sin, but with a little struggle we are crowned. But if reason consents and decrees that what the appetite has aroused is to be done, the man is expelled from all the blessed life as from paradise. For now sin is imputed, even if the deed does not follow, when the conscience is held guilty in consent ».

These things concerning the parts of the soul we have inserted, that the nature of the soul itself might be more fully known, and according to which portion of it free choice is in it may be understood, namely according to reason, by which[^27] every mortal sin is carried on, but not every venial sin, that one namely which exists in the motion of sensuality alone.

#### Chapter XIII.

#### *In what ways sensuality is taken in Scripture.*

But it must not be passed over in silence that often in Scripture under the name of sensuality is understood not only that in the soul which is common to us with the beast, but also the lower portion of reason, which is directed to the disposition of temporal things. Which the diligent reader should watchfully note in the places of Scripture where mention is made of it[^28].

---

la: Dist. V. c. 5.

en: Distinction V, chapter 5.

la: Cap. 107. n. 28, nonnullis a Magistro omissis et mutatis.

en: Chapter 107, n. 28, with some things omitted and changed by the Master.

en: Chapter 103, n. 28.

la: Cap. II. n. 32. — Ibid. etiam loci seqq.

en: Chapter II, n. 32. — In the same place also the passages that follow.

la: Vat. sola addit *qui fecerat*.

en: The Vatican edition alone adds *qui fecerat* (who had made [him]).

la: Quae praecedunt sumta sunt ex Hugone, Sent. tr. III. c. 7.

en: What precedes is taken from Hugh, *Sentences*, treatise III, chapter 7.

la: Vat. et multae edd. praefigunt *in*, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 6.

en: The Vatican edition and many editions prefix *in*, the codices and editions 1 and 6 opposing.

la: Respicitur Gen. 8, 21. — Finito hoc capitulo, in codd. D et Erf. incipit d. XXIV.

en: Reference is to Gen. 8:21. — This chapter being finished, in codices D and Erfurt distinction XXIV begins.

en: See below, distinction 39, article 1, question 2, at the end.

la: Haec item excerpta sunt ex Hugone, loc. cit.

en: These likewise are excerpted from Hugh, in the place cited.

la: Codd. B C E et ed. 6 adiiciunt *exterioris*. — A verbo *ratio* incipiunt excerpta ex Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. VIII. c. 13.

en: Codices B, C, E and edition 6 add *exterioris*. — From the word *ratio* begin the excerpts from Hugh, book *On the Sacraments*, part VIII, chapter 13.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 8 *conspicit*. Aliquanto inferius Vat. cum pluribus edd. *reperies* pro *reperis*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8 read *conspicit*. Somewhat below, the Vatican edition with several editions reads *reperies* for *reperis*.

la: Cap. l. n. 1; seq. locus ibid. c. 3. n. 13.

en: Chapter 1, n. 1; the following passage in the same place, chapter 3, n. 13.

la: Cod. D *cognosci*.

en: Codex D reads *cognosci*.

la: Ibid. cap. 7. n. 12; seq. locus c. 14. n. 22; tertius ibid. c. 4. n. 4, et quartus c. 12. n. 17.

en: In the same place, chapter 7, n. 12; the following passage, chapter 14, n. 22; the third in the same place, chapter 4, n. 4, and the fourth, chapter 12, n. 17.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *commemorarimus*, refragantibus codd. et originali.

en: The editions, except 1, read *commemorarimus*, the codices and the original opposing.

la: Epist. I. Corinth. 11, 7. — Notandum, quod etiam hic in media propositione cap. VII. incipit. Vide supra pag. 333, nota 3.

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 11:7. — It must be noted that here too chapter VII begins in the middle of a proposition. See above, page 333, note 3.

la: Ibid. v. 6. — Mox respicitur Gen. 2, 20, ubi Vulgata: *Inveniebatur adiutor similis eius.* — Codd. A B D E omittunt *sibi* post *simile*.

en: In the same place, verse 6. — Soon reference is made to Gen. 2:20, where the Vulgate reads: *There was found a helper like to him.* — Codices A, B, D, E omit *sibi* after *simile*.

la: Libr. XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. — Vat. et ceterae edd., exceptis 1, 8, non bene addunt *in* ante *nobis*; et ponunt *simile sibi* pro *simile illi*.

en: Book XII *On the Trinity*, chapter 3, n. 3. — The Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1 and 8, wrongly add *in* before *nobis*; and they put *simile sibi* for *simile illi*.

la: Gen. 2, 24. — Paulo inferius post *his* Vat. et edd. 1, 2 addunt *verbis aperte*.

en: Gen. 2:24. — A little below, after *his*, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 2 add *verbis aperte*.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *persuasit*.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *persuasit*.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *consentit*.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *consentit*.

la: Ed. 1 in margine *alias aliquando* pro *aliud*; et codd. A B C D et ed. 1 addunt *vel* ante *semel*; deinde pro *tenetur* Vat. cum A B D et paucis edd. *teneatur*; denique edd. 1, 8 adiungunt *peccatum* post *levissimum*. — Quoad rem cfr. Comment. hic dub. 2.

en: Edition 1 in the margin reads *alias aliquando* for *aliud*; and codices A, B, C, D and edition 1 add *vel* before *semel*; then for *tenetur* the Vatican edition with A, B, D and a few editions reads *teneatur*; finally editions 1, 8 add *peccatum* after *levissimum*. — As to the matter, compare the Commentary here, doubt 2.

la: Edd. 1, 3, 8 addunt *ut quibusdam placet*.

en: Editions 1, 3, 8 add *ut quibusdam placet* (as it pleases some).

la: Rom. 6, 13; quod sequitur respicit Gen. 3, 6.

en: Rom. 6:13; what follows refers to Gen. 3:6.

la: Libr. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. 21. — Locus primus s. Scripturae est Eph. 2, 2; secundus II. Cor. 2, 11: *Non enim ignoramus cogitationes eius.* De Iuda cfr. Ioan. 13, 2. et Luc. 22, 3.

en: Book II *On Genesis against the Manichees*, chapter 14, nn. 20, 21. — The first scriptural passage is Eph. 2:2; the second, II Cor. 2:11: *For we are not ignorant of his thoughts.* Concerning Judas compare John 13:2 and Luke 22:3.

la: Gen. 2, 15; deinde Cant. 4, 12. — Inferius Vat. ceteraeque edd., exceptis 1, 2, *sicut* pro *sic*; denique eadem cum paucis edd. *consensum* pro *consensionem*. — Ita codd. A B D et ed. 1; in aliis *qua*. — Cfr. August., XII de Trin. c. 13. supra citatus.

en: Gen. 2:15; then Cant. 4:12. — Below, the Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1, 2, read *sicut* for *sic*; finally the same with a few editions read *consensum* for *consensionem*. — Thus codices A, B, D and edition 1; in others *qua*. — Compare Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, chapter 13, cited above.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p549-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` through `vol2-p553-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`); cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines ~38532–38791). The chunk is the **Littera Magistri** for Distinctio XXIV, Pars I, Capitula I–XIII (Lombard's text). It ends at the close of Cap. XIII ("…vigilanter annotet"), immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV` (raw 38792), which belongs to the separate `d24-p1-divisio` chunk.

**Chapter count = THIRTEEN (Cap. I–XIII).** Headings: I *De gratia hominis et potentia ante casum*; II *De adiutorio homini in creatione dato, quo stare poterat*; III *De libero arbitrio*; IV *De sensualitate*; V *De ratione et partibus eius*; VI *De simili ordine peccandi in nobis et in primis parentibus*; VII *Quod in nobis est vir et mulier et serpens*; VIII *De spirituali coniugio viri et mulieris in nobis*; IX *Qualiter per illa tria in nobis consummetur tentatio*; X *Quando mulier sola manducat cibum vetitum*; XI *Quando etiam vir manducat*; XII *Quando sit veniale vel mortale peccatum*; XIII *Quibus modis accipitur sensualitas in Scriptura*.

**Page-split map (printed pages; Quaracchi restarts footers per page):**
- **p.549** Cap. I opens lower-left below the d.23 DUB IV tail (the "DISTINCTIO XXIV." at the top of p.549 is a running head). Cap. I body runs L→R. Body markers: "de Angelis diximus" → NOTAE-1; "Augustinus in Enchiridio" → NOTAE-2; "Item in eodem" → NOTAE-3. The three "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footers (Dist. V c. 5; Cap. 107 n. 28; Cap. 103 n. 28) are the received hand-off → [^1]–[^3]. The seven regular p.549 footers (1–7) were claimed by d.23-dubia (DUB III tail + DUB IV) and are NOT repeated here.
- **p.550** Cap. I tail (de Correptione et gratia) + Cap. II–III + Cap. IV opener. Footers: L 1–5, R 6–10 → mapped to [^4],[^5] (L-1,2), [^9],[^10] (L parts), [^6],[^7],[^8] (Hugo/Vat./Gen.8:21 = L-3,4,5), [^15] (R-6), [^11] (R-7), [^12] (R-8), [^13] (R-9), [^14] (R-10). NOTE: the continuous renumbering follows **body-anchor order**, so the [^N] sequence is not strictly page-footer order — see per-marker mapping in the apparatus indices.
- **p.551** Cap. V tail + Cap. VI–X. Footers: L 1–4 → [^15] head already placed; [^16] (Edd. *commemorarimus* = L-2), [^17] (1 Cor 11:7 = L-3), [^18] (Gen 2:20 = L-4 spanning to R). R 5–7 → [^19] (Trin XII c.3 = R-5), [^20] (Gen 2:24 = R-6), [^21] (Edd. *persuasit* = R-7).
- **p.552** Cap. XI–XII (the long Augustine de Trin. XII + contra Manichaeos quotations). Footers: L 1–5 → [^22] (Edd. *consentit* = L-1), [^23] (Ed.1 *alias aliquando* = L-2), [^24] (Edd. *ut quibusdam placet* = L-3), [^25] (Cap.12 n.17.18 = L-4), [^26] (Rom 6:13 = L-5). R 6–8 → [^27] (de Gen. contra Manich. = R-6), and the Gen 2:15 / Vat. *sicut*/*consensum* notes (R-7,8) fold into [^28].
- **p.553** Cap. XII tail + Cap. XIII (the final littera chapter). Footers L 1–2 (Cap. XIII text refs: *qua* var.; Cfr. August. XII de Trin. c.13) fold into [^28]. The "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM." beginning on p.553-L belongs to the `d24-p1-divisio` COMMENTARIUS chunk — NOT carried here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from d.23-dubia: the three p.549 "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footers (Dist. V c. 5; Cap. 107 n. 28; Cap. 103 n. 28) → [^1]–[^3], serving Cap. I. FORWARDED to `d24-p1-divisio`: the "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM." footer block beginning on p.553-L (it serves the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV text, which opens at raw 38792).

**[?] flags:** none. Body is clean Lombard running prose; the few editorial marginalia bleeding into the OCR ("Quaestio incidens", "Opponitur supra dictis", "Dubium 1/2/3", "Epilogus", "Augustinus", "Ratio superior et inferior", "Alia solutio") were trimmed as Quaracchi side-glosses, not Lombard's text.

**has_scholion: false** — Littera chunks carry no scholion.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Distinctio XXIV, Pars I — Commentarius, Divisio textus, Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Distinction XXIV, Part I — Commentary, Division of the Text, Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 553 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV.
### Pars I.
### *De libero arbitrio, quatenus ad alias animae potentias comparatur.*

> *Nunc diligenter investigari oportet* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra determinavit Magister de culpa, per quam homo cecidit. In hac parte determinat de auxilio, per quod stare potuit. Et quoniam hoc auxilium est liberum arbitrium, et liberum arbitrium[^1] [^2] habet tripliciter considerari, videlicet in *comparatione ad alias potentias animae* et *in se* et in *comparatione ad perfectionem gratiae*, ideo pars ista habet tres partes. In prima determinat de libero arbitrio in *comparatione ad alias potentias*. In secunda vero determinat de ipso *secundum se*, infra distinctione vigesima quinta: *Iam ad propositum redeamus*. In tertia vero determinat de ipso per *comparationem ad gratiam*, infra distinctione vigesima sexta: *Haec est gratia operans et cooperans*.

Et quoniam secundum comparationem liberi arbitrii ad potentias animae attenditur progressus et consummatio peccati, ideo prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de libero arbitrio, in quantum ad alias animae potentias comparatur. In secunda vero determinat, qualiter in homine tentationis ordo et progressio consummatur, ibi: *Illud quoque praetermittendum non est* etc. Prima pars tres habet particulas. In prima determinat, ad quid datum fuerit illud auxilium homini. In secunda vero, quod sit illud adiutorium, ibi: *Hic considerandum est, quod fuit illud adiutorium* etc. In tertia vero ad maiorem explanationem subiungit distinctionem praedictarum[^3], ibi: *Est enim sensualitas quaedam vis* etc. Quaelibet autem harum partium dividi potest in duas. In prima determinat veritatem. In secunda removet dubitationem, ibi: *Sed quomodo rectam et bonam voluntatem* etc. Similiter secunda pars, in qua determinat, quod fuit adiutorium, duas habet partes. In prima explicat, quod fuit illud adiutorium nominando; in secunda definiendo, ibi: *Liberum arbitrium est facultas* etc. Similiter tertia pars, in qua divisionem ponit potentiarum, duas habet partes. In prima assignat differentiam sensualitatis ad rationem; in secunda vero ostendit viam, per quam cognosci potest et discerni illa differentia, ibi: *Quidquid ergo in anima nostra* etc. — Sic totalis huius particulae sententia circa duo versatur, videlicet circa adiutorium, quod fuit homini collatum, et circa distinctionem potentiarum.

<!-- page 554 -->

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis circa duo incidit hic quaestio.

Primo quaeritur de adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.

Secundo quaeritur de divisione potentiarum animae.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum dari potuerit homini, sive alicui creaturae adiutorium, quod esset naturaliter inflexibile.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum datum fuerit ei adiutorium, per quod posset absque auxilio gratiae tentationi resistere.

---

english:
<!-- page 553 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIV.
### Part I.
### *On free choice, insofar as it is compared to the other powers of the soul.*

> *Now it behooves us diligently to investigate* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master determined concerning the fault by which man fell. In this part he determines concerning the help by which he was able to stand. And since this help is free choice, and free choice[^1] [^2] can be considered in three ways — namely, in *comparison to the other powers of the soul*, and *in itself*, and in *comparison to the perfection of grace* — therefore this part has three sections. In the first he determines concerning free choice in *comparison to the other powers*. In the second he determines concerning it *in itself*, below in the twenty-fifth distinction: *Now let us return to our purpose*. In the third he determines concerning it through *comparison to grace*, below in the twenty-sixth distinction: *This is grace operating and cooperating*.

And since it is according to the comparison of free choice to the powers of the soul that the progress and consummation of sin is regarded, therefore the first part has two [sections]. In the first he determines concerning free choice insofar as it is compared to the other powers of the soul. In the second he determines in what manner the order and progression of temptation is consummated in man, at: *That also is not to be passed over* etc. The first part has three particulars. In the first he determines for what end that help was given to man. In the second, what that aid is, at: *Here it must be considered what that aid was* etc. In the third, for greater explanation, he subjoins a distinction of the aforesaid things[^3], at: *For sensuality is a certain power* etc. But each of these parts can be divided into two. In the first he determines the truth. In the second he removes a doubt, at: *But how a right and good will* etc. Likewise the second part, in which he determines what the aid was, has two parts. In the first he explains what that aid was by naming it; in the second by defining it, at: *Free choice is a faculty* etc. Likewise the third part, in which he sets down the division of the powers, has two parts. In the first he assigns the difference of sensuality to reason; in the second he shows the way by which that difference can be known and discerned, at: *Whatever therefore in our soul* etc. — Thus the whole sentence of this particular [section] turns upon two things, namely upon the aid that was conferred on man, and upon the distinction of the powers.

<!-- page 554 -->

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part a question falls here upon two heads.

First it is asked concerning the aid conferred on man, by which he might be able to resist.

Second it is asked concerning the division of the powers of the soul.

About the first two things are asked.

First it is asked whether there could have been given to man, or to any creature, an aid that would be naturally inflexible.

Second it is asked whether there was given to him an aid by which he could resist temptation without the help of grace.

---

la: *Notae ad commentarium.* Pro *est liberum arbitrium, et liberum arbitrium* Vat.

en: *Notes on the commentary.* In place of *est liberum arbitrium, et liberum arbitrium* (it is free choice, and free choice), the Vatican edition [reads otherwise].

la: Ita codd. A B D et ed. 1; in aliis *qua*[m] *scilicet liberi arbitrii*, edd. 3, 4 *scilicet liberum arbitrium*.

en: Thus codices A, B, D and edition 1; in the others [it reads] *qua*[m] *scilicet liberi arbitrii* (which, namely, of free choice), editions 3 and 4 *scilicet liberum arbitrium* (namely free choice).

la: Cfr. August., XII de Trin. c. 13, supra citatus. — Supple cum cod. A et ed. 1 *potentiarum*, plures alii codd. tantum *potentiarum* aut *praedictorum*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* book XII, c. 13, cited above. — Supply with codex A and edition 1 *potentiarum* (of the powers); several other codices [read] only *potentiarum* or *praedictorum* (of the aforesaid). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 553–554 (crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p553-{L,R}-{1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p554-{L,R}-0.png`). Raw OCR span ~38792–38846. The full-width spanner header `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV.` / `Pars I.` / title *De libero arbitrio, quatenus ad alias animae potentias comparatur.* / lemma *Nunc diligenter investigari oportet* etc. / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` was read from the p.553 band tops; the DIVISIO TEXTUS was reflowed Left-column (raw 38802–38818) then Right-column (raw 38819–38831). The `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` is a full-width header at the top of p.554 with its question-list split Left/Right column. The IA djvu OCR is moderately clean here but column-bleeds (`investigafi`/`irwestigafi`, `Val.` for *Vat.*, `5b4` for 554), so the PDF column bands are authoritative per the Vol II Override.
- **Page span.** COMMENTARIUS spanner + DIVISIO TEXTUS + the p.553 footer series sit at the bottom of **p. 553** (running head implied; PDF 575). The `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` header + question-list + the ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I opener begin on **p. 554** (running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` / `DIST. XXIV. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`, PDF 576, offset +22). Mid-page seam below: ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I opens on p. 554 and is handed to `d24-p1-a1-q1`.
- **Section coverage.** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV Pars I (lemma only) + DIVISIO TEXTUS (full: the threefold partition of liber. arb. — comparatione ad alias potentias / secundum se / comparatione ad gratiam — with the further subdivision of the first part) + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (the two principal heads + the *Circa primum quaeruntur duo* two-sub-question listing for ARTICULUS I). Chunk closes at *…absque auxilio gratiae tentationi resistere*; immediately below, `ARTICULUS I.` / *De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.* / `QUAESTIO I.` / *Utrum homini dari potuerit liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam.* / *Circa primum sic procedi[t]ur* open `d24-p1-a1-q1` (raw line 38847).
- **Apparatus + footer-split map.** p. 553 carries (a) a two-entry textual-variant footer series ¹–² and (b) a one-entry `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` block. Both anchor in this chunk's COMMENTARIUS/DIVISIO body:
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  - **[^2]** = footer ¹ (*liberum arbitrium*¹ textual variant: codd. A B D / ed. 1 vs others vs edd. 3,4), anchoring at the same lemma.
  - **[^3]** = footer ² (*praedictarum*² supply variant + the August. XII de Trin. c. 13 cross-reference), anchoring at *…subiungit distinctionem praedictarum…*.
  The August. cross-ref is folded into [^3] because the OCR/PDF show it as the second of the two superscript ² footers (the running footnote ² + the *praedictarum* variant share the same marker on this page).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d24-p1-littera`: the p.553 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` footer → this chunk's [^1] (see above). *Forwarded* to `d24-p1-a1-q1`: the p.554 ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I body opens on p.554 below this chunk; its native footer series (`' Clr. supra d. 2. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. …`, `^ Dist. 26. q. 2. …`, `' Vat. in naturam …`) begins fresh on p.554-bottom and belongs to a1-q1 (NOT forwarded from here — this divisio's footers are all consumed by [^1]–[^3]).
- **Dup-cleanup.** Stray auto-chunker artifact `bon-sent-II-d24-p1-divisio-dup2.md` `git rm`'d in the promotion commit.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All headings, division-lemmas, the TRACTATIO question-list, and footer notes crisp at 450 dpi. (The `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` entry text is truncated in the IA OCR at the p.553 page-bottom after *Vat.*; the PDF band confirms the printed entry itself ends at *Vat.* with no further variant glyphs visible above the `S. Bonav. — Tom. II.` signature line — rendered as printed.)
- **Pars I TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, for q-alignment when ARTICULUS quaestiones are built):**
  - Two principal heads: **Primo** — *de adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere* (= ARTICULUS I); **Secundo** — *de divisione potentiarum animae* (= ARTICULUS II).
  - ARTICULUS I sub-questions (*Circa primum quaeruntur duo* — TWO, not three): **Primo** — *utrum dari potuerit homini, sive alicui creaturae adiutorium, quod esset naturaliter inflexibile* (= q1; the ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I header below states it as *Utrum homini dari potuerit liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam*, raw 38851–38852); **Secundo** — *utrum datum fuerit ei adiutorium, per quod posset absque auxilio gratiae tentationi resistere* (= q2). This matches the existing skeletons `d24-p1-a1-q1`, `d24-p1-a1-q2`.
  - NB: per Override §5 the short ARTICULUS I opener (*De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.*) folds into `d24-p1-a1-q1`; no standalone d24-p1-a1-divisio chunk.
  - ARTICULUS II (*De divisione potentiarum animae*) and DUBIA remain skeletons. Pars II article/quaestio numbering (auto-chunked `d24-p2-a2-q2`, `-a3-q1`, `-a3-q2`) is SUSPECT and MUST be re-chunk-verified against raw before promoting.


title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Distinctio XXIV, Pars II — Commentarius, Divisio textus, Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Distinction XXIV, Part II — Commentary, Division of the Text, Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 573 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV.
### Pars II.
### *De ordine et progressu peccati per vires animae.*

> *Illud quoque praetermittendum* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de distinctione potentiarum animae ad liberi arbitrii manifestationem. In hac parte, quia secundum gradus potentiarum est ordo et progressio tentationum, determinat, qualiter et quo ordine peccatum per vires animae progredi habeat et pervenire ad consummationem. Dividitur autem pars ista in tres partes. In prima determinat, qualiter peccatum in viribus animae habeat progressum ad consummationem. In secunda vero praedeterminata repetit ad maiorem explanationem, ibi: *Itaque ut breviter summam perstringam* etc. In tertia vero praedeterminata epilogat ad faciliorem rememorationem, ibi: *Et haec de animae partibus interseruimus* etc.

Quaelibet harum partium dividi potest in duas secundum duo capitula, quae in qualibet continentur. Nam prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat connexionem et ordinem virium animae. In secunda vero determinat, qualiter habeat fieri progressus culpae, ibi: *Nunc superest ostendere, qualiter* etc. Similiter secunda pars habet duas. In prima explanat et circumloquitur assimilationem virium animae in consummationem[^1] peccati ad primam tentationem. In secunda vero ponit quandam similitudinem, ostendens, quod mulier sine viro damnari non potest, ibi: *Nec sane cum sola cogitatione* etc. Similiter tertia et ultima pars duas habet. In prima breviter epilogat et rationem suae digressionis assignat. In secunda vero multiplicitatem huius nominis *sensualitas* ad maiorem evidentiam explicat et manifestat, ibi: *Non est autem silentio praetermittendum* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, qualiter peccatum habeat fieri et esse in parte rationis superiori.

Secundo, qualiter habeat fieri in inferiori.

Tertio, qualiter habeat fieri in sensualitate.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possit in ea esse veniale.

---

english:
<!-- page 573 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIV.
### Part II.
### *On the order and progress of sin through the powers of the soul.*

> *That also is not to be passed over* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the distinction of the powers of the soul for the manifestation of free choice. In this part, since according to the grades of the powers there is an order and progression of temptations, he determines in what manner and in what order sin has its progress through the powers of the soul and arrives at consummation. Now this part is divided into three sections. In the first he determines in what manner sin has its progress to consummation in the powers of the soul. In the second he repeats what has been predetermined for greater explanation, at: *So that I may briefly draw together the sum* etc. In the third he epilogizes what has been predetermined for easier recollection, at: *And these things we have inserted concerning the parts of the soul* etc.

Each of these sections can be divided into two according to the two chapters which are contained in each. For the first section has two. In the first he determines the connection and order of the powers of the soul. In the second he determines in what manner the progress of fault has to come about, at: *Now it remains to show in what manner* etc. Likewise the second section has two. In the first he explains and describes the likening of the powers of the soul in the consummation[^1] of sin to the first temptation. In the second he sets down a certain comparison, showing that the woman cannot be damned without the man, at: *Nor indeed with the thought alone* etc. Likewise the third and last section has two. In the first he briefly epilogizes and assigns the reason of his digression. In the second he explains and makes manifest the manifold sense of this noun *sensuality* for greater evidence, at: *But it is not to be passed over in silence* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part three things are asked.

First it is asked in what manner sin has to come about and to be in the superior part of reason.

Second, in what manner it has to come about in the inferior part.

Third, in what manner it has to come about in sensuality.

About the first two things are asked.

First it is asked whether in the superior part of reason there has to be sin in itself.

Second it is asked whether there can be venial sin in it.

---

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *in consummatione*, cod. H *ad consummationem*.

en: The Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4, [reads] *in consummatione* (in the consummation); codex H [reads] *ad consummationem* (toward the consummation). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of p. 573 (crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p573-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Raw OCR span ~40134–40173. The full-width spanner `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV.` / `PARS II.` / title *De ordine et progressu peccati per vires animae.* / lemma *Illud quoque praetermittendum* etc. / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` was read from the p.573 band tops; the DIVISIO TEXTUS was reflowed Left-column (raw 40143–40158 left) then Right-column (raw 40143–40158 right). The `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` is a full-width header mid-page with its question-list split Left/Right column (Left = the three principal heads; Right = *Circa primum quaeruntur duo* + the two ART I sub-questions). The IA djvu OCR is moderately clean here but garbles the headers (`COMMENTARIIIS IN DLSTINCTIONEM`, `TR.\CT\TIO`, `DIVISIO TExrus`) and column-bleeds, so the PDF column bands are authoritative per the Vol II Override.
- **Page span.** Single printed page **p. 573** (PDF 595, offset +22; running head `DIST. XXIV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` / `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`). The COMMENTARIUS spanner + DIVISIO TEXTUS occupy the top two-thirds; the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + the ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I opener begin lower on the same page. Mid-page seam below: ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I (*Utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se*) opens on p. 573 and is handed to `d24-p2-a1-q1` (raw 40168–40175).
- **Section coverage.** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV Pars II (lemma only) + DIVISIO TEXTUS (full: the threefold partition — *progressum ad consummationem* / *repetit Itaque ut breviter* / *epilogat Et haec de animae partibus* — each subdivided in two) + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (the three principal heads + the *Circa primum quaeruntur duo* two-sub-question listing for ARTICULUS I). Chunk closes at *…utrum possit in ea esse veniale*; immediately below, `ARTICULUS I.` / *Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri et esse in parte superiori rationis.* / `QUAESTIO I.` / *Utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se.* / *Circa primum sic proceditur* open `d24-p2-a1-q1` (raw line 40168).
- **Apparatus + footer-split map.** p. 573 carries a footer series ¹–⁴. **Only footer ¹ anchors in this divisio chunk's body**; footers ²–⁴ anchor in ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I's arguments (which begin at raw 40175, *1. Primo per illud Augustini contra Manichaeos²…*) and belong to `d24-p2-a1-q1`.
  - **[^1]** = footer ¹ (*consummatione* textual variant: Vat. + edd. 3,4 vs cod. H), anchoring at the DIVISIO TEXTUS right-column marker *…in consummationem¹ peccati ad primam tentationem…* (raw 40149).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d24-p1-dubia`: none (Pars I dubia close at foot of p.572; Pars II COMMENTARIUS opens fresh at the top of p.573). *Forwarded* to `d24-p2-a1-q1`: the p.573 ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I body opens on p.573 below this chunk; its footer series begins with footer ² (`Libr. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12.`), then ³ (`Text. 51 [c. 10.]: Intellectus igitur omnis rectus est…`) and ⁴ (`Secundum August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 33, et de Vera Relig. c. 12. n. 23. Cfr. infra d. 38. dub. 6, et d. 42. a. 3. q. 2.`) — all belonging to a1-q1, NOT forwarded from here (this divisio's only footer is ¹).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All headings, division-lemmas, the TRACTATIO question-list, and footer ¹ crisp at 450 dpi.
- **SCOPE DECISION — ART I NOT folded.** The resume note guessed "ART I = 1 question (folded per Override §5)". **The raw + PDF show ART I has TWO full quaestiones**, so Override §5 (which folds only a *short* opener) does NOT apply:
  - ART I QUAESTIO I *Utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se* (raw 40168/40172) — a full quaestio: 9 arguments + Sed contra (4) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + three-opinion refutation. Belongs in its own chunk `d24-p2-a1-q1` (TO BE CREATED).
  - ART I QUAESTIO II *Utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum* (raw 40346) — full quaestio (CONCLUSIO + Respondeo at raw 40395). Belongs in `d24-p2-a1-q2` (TO BE CREATED).
  This divisio chunk therefore holds ONLY the COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (no ART I content folded).
- **VERIFIED PARS II STRUCTURE (re-chunk verification, 2026-05-29 from raw 40134–41154; ends where DISTINCTIO XXV begins raw 41154):**
  - **ARTICULUS I** *Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri et esse in parte superiori rationis* = **2 q** (opener `Circa primum quaeruntur duo`, raw 40162):
    - q1 *Utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se* (raw 40172).
    - q2 *Utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum* (raw 40346).
  - **ARTICULUS II** *Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri in inferiori parte rationis* = **2 q** (opener `…quaeruntur duo`, raw 40432–40434):
    - q1 *Utrum aliquod peccatum habeat esse in inferiori parte rationis absque sensualitate* (raw 40437).
    - q2 *Utrum peccatum mortale possit esse in ea parte rationis, superiori non peccante* (raw 40582).
  - **ARTICULUS III** *Quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in sensualitate* = **2 q** (opener `…duo quaeruntur`, raw 40784):
    - q1 *Utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum veniale* (raw ~40784–40790).
    - q2 *Utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale* (raw ~40790).
  - **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (Pars II)** = **3 DUB** (raw ~41032; DUB. I, DUB. II raw 41094, DUB. III raw 41116), ending where DISTINCTIO XXV opens (raw 41154).
- **PARS II TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM question-list (verbatim, for q-alignment when ARTICULUS quaestiones are built):**
  - Three principal heads: **Primo** — *qualiter peccatum habeat fieri et esse in parte rationis superiori* (= ARTICULUS I); **Secundo** — *qualiter habeat fieri in inferiori* (= ARTICULUS II); **Tertio** — *qualiter habeat fieri in sensualitate* (= ARTICULUS III).
  - ARTICULUS I sub-questions (*Circa primum quaeruntur duo* — TWO): **Primo** — *utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se* (= q1); **Secundo** — *utrum possit in ea esse veniale* (= q2; the ART I QUAESTIO II header states it as *Utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum*).
- **Chunk inventory after this commit.** EXISTING skeletons: `d24-p2-a2-q2`, `d24-p2-a3-q1`, `d24-p2-a3-q2`, `d24-p2-dubia`. MISSING (auto-chunker gaps, must be CREATED): `d24-p2-a1-q1` (NEXT), `d24-p2-a1-q2`, `d24-p2-a2-q1`. Full Pars II build order = **p2-divisio (THIS, done) → p2-a1-q1 (NEW) → p2-a1-q2 (NEW) → p2-a2-q1 (NEW) → p2-a2-q2 (skeleton) → p2-a3-q1 (skeleton) → p2-a3-q2 (skeleton) → p2-dubia (skeleton)**.