title: Coll. 4

source_text:
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### COLLATIO IV.
#### *De visione prima, quae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae, tractatio prima.*

### Summarium

*Introductio; de novem scientiis philosophorum; lux animae veritas, 1. — Tres radii primi huius lucis, scilicet veritas rerum, signorum, morum, 2. — Triplicis huius veritatis triplex consideratio confirmat hanc divisionem, 3-5. — Pars I. De primo radio intelligentiae per naturam inditae, qui versatur circa veritatem rerum. Mundus consideratur tripliciter: a philosopho quoad rerum essentiam, a mathematico quoad figuram, a naturali quoad naturam, 6. — Consideratio philosophi fit sex modis; unde sex lumina, 7. — De singulis in specie, 8-13. — Consideratio mathematici; ipsa dividitur secundum sex obiecta in sex scientias, 14. 15. — Hae disponunt ad theologiam, 16. — Consideratio naturalis; libri Aristotelis de scientia naturali, 17. — Pars II. De secundo radio eiusdem intelligentiae, qui versatur circa veritatem signorum seu vocum. Dividitur in grammaticam, logicam et rhetoricam, 18. — De obiecto et divisione grammaticae, 19. — De obiecto et divisione logicae, 20. — De obiecto et divisione rhetoricae, 21-25.*

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1. *Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris*[^p349-1] etc. In omnibus operibus sex dierum praeterquam secundae dictum est: *Vidit Deus, quod esset bonum*; et in fine[^p349-2] dicit: *Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona.* Videre dicitur Deus, quia videre nos facit. Prima visio animae est *intelligentiae per naturam inditae*. Unde dicit Psalmus[^p349-3]: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.* Et hic possent explicari omnes difficultates philosophiae. Philosophi dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem. Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magnis erroribus se immiscuerunt; *dicentes* enim, *se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt*[^p349-4]; superbientes de sua scientia, luciferiani facti. Apud Aegyptios *densissimae tenebrae* erant, sed *Sanctis tuis maxima erat lux*. Omnes, qui fuerunt in lege naturae, ut Patriarchae, Prophetae, philosophi, filii lucis fuerunt. — Lux animae veritas est; haec lux *nescit occasum*. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat: quia, si veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse: ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, verum est, veritatem esse: ergo si veritas non est, veritas est. *Super omnia* enim *praevalet veritas*, ut dicitur in Esdra[^p349-5].

2. Emittit autem haec lux tres radios primos; unde in Ecclesiastico[^p349-6]: *Tripliciter sol exurens montes.* Est enim *veritas rerum*, *veritas signorum* seu *vocum* et *veritas morum*. Veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, veritas sermonum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi. Et istae sunt tres partes philosophiae, quas philosophi non invenerunt, ut essent; sed quia iam secundum veritatem essent, in anima adverterunt, secundum Augustinum[^p349-7].

3. Haec triplex veritas consideratur ex parte *principii originantis*, ex parte *subiecti suscipientis* et ex parte *obiecti terminantis*. Respicit autem originans principium in ratione triplicis causae: *originantis*, *exemplantis* et *terminantis*; nam *ex ipso, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*[^p349-8]. Ergo veritas indicat, quod mens nostra fertur naturali inclinatione ad Veritatem, secundum quod est «causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi»: secundum *causam essendi*, veritas rerum; secundum *rationem intelligendi*, veritas vocum; secundum *ordinem vivendi*, veritas morum.

4. Ex parte autem animae omnis irradiatio veritatis super intelligentiam nostram fit tripliciter: aut fit super ipsam absolute, et sic pertinet ad notitiam rerum speculandarum; aut in comparatione ad *interpretativam*, et sic est veritas vocum; aut in comparatione ad *affectivam* et *motivam*, et sic est veritas operabilium.

5. Ex parte obiecti sic. Omne, quod est, aut est a *natura*, aut a *ratione*, aut a *voluntate*. Secundum primam est notitia, quae est de *rebus*, secundo modo de *sermonibus*, tertio modo de *moribus*. — Ergo secundum *principium*, *subiectum* et *obiectum* est triplex radius veritatis in anima, per quem anima possit elevari ad perpetua, et etiam ad causam omnium; sed si addatur condimentum *fidei*, tunc facilius; ut causa essendi attribuatur Patri, ratio intelligendi Filio, ordo vivendi Spiritui sancto.

6. Visio ergo intelligentiae per naturam inditae, ut convertitur ad *res*, est veritas. Vult autem anima totum mundum describi in se[^p349-9]. Mundus consideratur tripliciter: quantum ad *essentiam*, *figuram*

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et *naturam*. Iste autem radius dirigit ad *quidditatum differentias occultas* considerandas, ad *figurarum proportiones manifestas*, ad *naturarum proprietates ex utroque permixtas*. Naturalis permixta est consideratio, quia modo de causis, quae sunt occultae, ut quare ignis calidus, quare haec herba calida, quia hoc habent a specie sua, quae occulta est; modo de qualitate, item de quantitate et influentia corporum, quae aliquando patent, aliquando latent.

7. Secundum quidditatum differentias occultas fit divisio sex modis ad praesens: in *substantiam* et *accidens*, in *universale* et *particulare*, in *potentiam* et *actum*, in *unum* et *multa*, in *simplex* et *compositum*, in *causam* et in *causatum*. Haec sunt sex lumina, quae disponunt animam ad sciendum et bene sentiendum.

8. Divisio substantiae et accidentis patet[^p350-1]; sed quaedam sunt, quae reducuntur ad ista, et in his est maximus error. Dicit ille: creatio non est. Quare? Quia impossibile est, accidens praecedere substantiam; creatio autem accidens est: ergo etc. Dico, quod creatio, quae est passio, accidens non est, quia relatio creaturae ad Creatorem non est accidentalis, sed essentialis. Similiter, potentia materiae non est accidens materiae, sed essentialis, quia «hoc ipso, quod est, ad alterum est»[^p350-2]. Similiter differentiae ad genus reducuntur, ut merae privationes ad suos habitus.

9. Secunda divisio est in universale et particulare; et circa hoc est magnus error. Aliqui dicunt, quod universale nihil est nisi in anima; Plato posuit, quod esset solum in Deo; alii, quod solum in anima[^p350-3]. Isti nimis abstrahunt. — Dico ergo, quod est universale *unum ad multa*, *unum in multis*, *unum praeter multa*. Unum ad multa est in potentia materiae, quod non est completum; unum in multis, ut natura communis in suis particularibus; et unum praeter multa in anima. Unum autem ad multa et unum in multis et unum praeter multa in arte aeterna sunt; per illam enim artem et rationem consistit in re. Planum est enim, quod duo homines assimilantur, et non homo et asinus: ergo necesse est, ut illa similitudo fundetur et stabiliatur in aliqua forma stabili, non quae est in altero, quia illa est particularis: ergo in aliqua universali[^p350-4]. Ratio autem universalis non est tota in anima, sed in re secundum processum generis ad speciem, ut, communicamus primo in substantia ut in generalissimo, deinde in aliis usque ad formam hominis ultimatam.

10. Tertia divisio est potentiae et actus[^p350-5]; et hic sunt multi errores. Dicunt quidam, quod *actus* nihil addit super *potentiam* nisi modum essendi secundum completum et incompletum. Non loquimur hic de potentia pure passiva, sed de illa quae procedit ad actum. Necesse est enim, cum in omni creatura potentia activa sit coniuncta potentiae passivae, quod illae duae potentiae fundentur super diversa principia rei[^p350-6]. De potentia, quae est *ratio seminalis*, haec est vis: quia potentia talis super actum aliquando addit partem essendi, vel essentiae, ut, super rationem corporis addit *animatum* secundum rem, pro eo quod animatio aliquid est, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile; et super animatum addit *sen-*

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*sibile*, et sic usque ad hominem. Sic similiter de potentiis animae, quod sicut tetragonus addit unum angulum ad trigonum, et pentagonus ad tetragonum; sic *sensitivum* ad *vegetativum*, et *rationale* ad *sensitivum*[^p351-1]. — Aliquando autem addit solum modum essendi, ut, si de uno in potentia fiat unum in actu, addit solum modum essendi, quia unum non coniungitur materiae simpliciter, sed materiae habenti vitam in potentia radicali. — Unde insanum est dicere, quod ultima forma addatur materiae primae sine aliquo, quod sit dispositio vel in potentia ad illam, vel nulla forma interiecta.

11. Quarta divisio est in unum et multa, et de illa multi sunt errores. Quidam dixerunt, quod omnia sint unum; ut, sicut una est materia, ita una forma radicalis, et postmodum multiplicatur secundum *modum essendi* et variatur[^p351-2]. Et hoc nihil aliud est dicere, quam quod illa propositio: *homo est asinus*, sit vera per se, falsa per accidens. Unde intellige, quod *rationale* et *irrationale* non solum differunt per accidens, sed etiam essentialiter.

12. Quinta divisio est in simplex et compositum; et hic etiam sunt multi errores, ut dicere, quod aliqua creatura sit simplex; quia tunc esset purus actus, quod est solius Dei; et attribuere quod est Dei creaturae periculosum est. Minus ergo est periculosum dicere, quod Angelus sit *compositus*, etiam si verum non sit, quam quod sit *simplex*; quia hoc ego attribuo Angelo, nolens ei attribuere quod est Dei, propter pietatem, quam habeo ad reverentiam Dei. Sed secundum veritatem sic videtur, quia dicit Boethius[^p351-3]: «Forma subiectum esse non potest»: ergo Angelo nihil accideret tunc, nec laetitia nec tristitia.

13. Sexta divisio est in causam et causatum; et hic sunt multi errores. Quidam enim dicunt, mundum ab aeterno fuisse. In hoc conveniunt sapientes, quod non possit aliquid fieri de nihilo[^p351-4] et sic ab aeterno; quia necesse est, quod sicut, quando res cedit in nihilum, esse desinit; sic, quando fit de nihilo, incipit esse. Sed aliqui videntur posuisse materiam ingenitam; et sic sequitur, quod Deus nihil facit: quia materiam non facit, quia ingenita; nec formam, quia aut fit de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de materia, quia essentia formae non potest fieri de essentia materiae; nec de nihilo, ut supponunt, eo quod Deus nihil potest facere de nihilo. Sed absit, quod potentia Dei fulciatur fundamento materiae. — Haec igitur sunt fundamenta fidei, quae omnia examinat.

14. Secunda irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad considerandas *quantitatum proportiones manifestas*; et istae sunt valde manifestae, quia offerunt se sensui; et libenter homo negotiatur circa ista, quia cadunt in imaginatione; et imaginatio est fortis in nobis, et ratio obscuratur: et ideo homo multum in his detinetur. Ista scientia certissima est[^p351-5], quia ad oculum patet. Unde omnes aliae scientiae praeter istam quasi sunt occultae.

15. Haec consideratio mathematica est circa sex: aut circa numeros in sua puritate, et sic est *arithmetica*; aut circa numeros, ut considerantur in sonis, et sic *musica*; aut in quantitate continua et circa proportiones dimensivas generaliter, et sic *geometria*; aut per additionem de linea visuali, et sic *perspectiva*; aut secundum quantitatem utramque et secundum discretiones numerales et substantiales, vel continuas et discretas, et sic *astrologia*, et illa est duplex: una de corporibus regulatis per motum, et sic *astronomia*; alia de influentia, et haec partim est secura et partim periculosa, et haec est *astrologia*. Periculosa est propter iudicia, quae sequuntur; et ab hac fluit *geomantia*, vel *nigromantia* et ceterae species divinationis[^p351-6].

16. Hae scientiae disponunt ad intelligentiam Scripturae, ut patet de numeris *perfecto*, *diminuto*, *excrescente*; ut patet de perfectione senarii, qui de se perfectus est. «Non enim, ut dicit Augustinus[^p351-7], senarius ideo perfectus est, quia in eo numero Deus fecit mundum; sed ideo fecit mundum in illo numero, quia perfectus est». Similiter de duobus numeris cubicis primis, scilicet 8 et 27, quia bis duo bis sunt 8; ter tria ter sunt 27, qui ligari non

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possunt minus quam per duos numeros, scilicet 12 et 18. Sic enim se habent 12 ad 18, ut 18 ad 27, quia in *sexquialtera proportione*, quae tenet totum et eius medietatem. — Similiter patet de triangulo, quomodo ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis. Certum est enim, quod quantus est Filius, tantus est Pater; et quantus est Pater, tantus est Spiritus sanctus et Filius. Et inde triangulum considera, quod quilibet angulus totam superficiem includit. — Similiter in *perspectiva* de radio *directo*, qui fortior est, sicut, si tu proiicias lapidem directe deorsum, magnum sonum facit; si autem ex obliquo, non tantum. *Reflexus* radius est a corpore terso et polito virtute tersionis, et ibi accipit speciem; radius *fractus* est in introitu alterius perspicui[^p352-1].

17. Tertia irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad investigandum *naturarum permixtas proprietates*, scilicet partim occultas et partim manifestas. Philosophus enim considerat omnia per motum; considerat enim de motu, de principiis motus et causis, ut locus et tempus[^p352-2]; considerat autem naturas corporum caelestium, sive corpora aetheralia, meteoricalia; elementaria, vegetabilia, sensibilia, rationabilia. — Caelestia, in libro *de Caelo et mundo*, ubi reducit omnem motum ad motum perfectum, scilicet localem[^p352-3]; iste autem localis est triplex: aut circa medium, ubi non est contrarietas, et sic circularis; aut a medio, et sic est levium motus; aut ad medium, et sic motus gravium, sive motus rectus. Meteorica, ut in libro *Meteororum*, ubi dicit de impressionibus et mineralibus. — Si de elementaribus, sic in libro *de Generatione et corruptione*. Si de vegetabilibus, sic in libro *de Plantis*, ubi sunt mirabiles considerationes. — Si autem de sensibilibus, sic in libro *de Animalibus*, quem totum non habemus; aut de rationalibus, ut in libro *de Anima* cum suis appendicibus, scilicet *de Sensu et sensato*, et *de Memoria et reminiscentia*, *de Spiritu et anima*[^p352-4], *de Somno et vigilia*, *de Morte et vita*.

18. Secundus radius veritatis informat ad considerationem *locutionum*, *argumentationum*, *persuasionum* rationalium, ut homo habeat artem per eum ad *locutiones congrue indicantes mentis conceptus*, ad *argumentationes trahentes omnis mentis assensus*, ad *persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus*. Ratio enim cogitat facere quidquid in se est in alio, et quidquid est in alio facere in se; hoc autem non fit nisi per *sermonem*[^p352-5]. Quidquid ergo est in anima aut est per modum *conceptus*, aut per modum *assensus*, aut per modum *affectus*. Ad indicandum conceptum est *grammatica*; ad inducendum assensum est *logica*; ad inclinandum affectum *rhetorica*.

19. Secundum grammaticum omnis pars orationis significat mentis conceptum. Habet enim partem significantem substantiam et qualitatem, et sic est *nomen*; habet partem significantem modum, et sic est *verbum*, quod dicit inclinationes, scilicet *indicativus*, ut in rationali; *imperativus*, ut in irascibili; *optativus*, ut in concupiscibili; *subiunctivus*, partem utramque; *infinitivus*, quasi materialis. Et ad has differentias omnes reducuntur secundum Priscianum[^p352-6]. — Similiter determinat de *littera*, *syllaba*, *dictione*, *oratione*. Quia enim varii sunt modi significandi et terminandi secundum diversas linguas — ut terminatum in *a*, feminini generis ut in pluribus, in *us*, masculini generis, et sic de aliis — de littera determinat; sed ad hanc non potest descendere nisi per syllabam. — Ultimo considerat de connexione dictionum. Determinat similiter de *prosodia* et *dyasynthetica*. Exprimit autem omnia per octo partes orationis. Ad litteram ergo descendit per syllabam, sed postea de prosodia et metrica, et huiusmodi referuntur ad primum. Considerat similiter modos et accidentia, ut quod nominativus construatur cum verbo singularis numeri, ut non dicatur: *homo currunt*, quia ab una substantia non egreditur nisi actus unus; similiter, ut post verbum transitivum non ponatur nominativus, sed accusativus, qui dicit terminum, non principium actus, ut nominativus. — Unde grammatica a rebus naturam trahit, nec potest esse bonus grammaticus, nisi sciat res.

20. Alia directio est, quae illustrat ad *argumentationes inducentes mentis assensum*, quod fit per solidam argumentationem, ut, «quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, necessario inter se sunt eadem»[^p352-7]. Haec argumentatio habet formam generalem et specialem in materia necessaria, solida; et ideo est *prima analysis* et *secunda analysis* de syllogismo simpliciter. De syllogismo necessario, id est resolutorio in causam inferendi, ut in prima ana-

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lysi, id est resolutione, et in *secunda analysi*, id est resolutione in causam inferendi et essendi. — Et quia semper non potest esse inductio per necessariam argumentationem, ideo inveniuntur *loci* et habitudo localis, quae procedit per *probabilia*, ut *loci topici*; et quia in his cadit deceptio, adduntur *loci sophistici*, ut sciat homo dissolvere. Unde dissolvens non est sophisticus, sed verus respondens. Et quia isti modi trahunt originem a natura rerum — ut patet: *fumus est: ergo ignis fuit*; locus ab effectu[^p353-1] — ideo adduntur *decem praedicamenta*, adduntur etiam *enuntiationes*.

21. Tertia irradiatio est, qua mens illustratur ad persuadendum vel inclinandum animum; hoc fit per *rhetoricam*[^p353-2]. Unde rhetor oportet quod provideat civili utilitati, ubi potest esse periculum propter dissensionem animorum. Procedit autem secundum tria attributa et triplex genus causae, scilicet *demonstrativum* et *deliberativum* et *iudiciale*.

22. *Demonstrativum* personae, ut ad laudem, vel vituperium: ergo vel est laus quantum ad bona *animae*, quae sunt tria, scilicet virtus, scientia, veritas; vel est laus quantum ad *corpus*, scilicet pulcritudo, fortitudo etc.; vel de bonis *fortunae*, ut divitiae, parentela, patria.

23. *Deliberativum* est respectu rei faciendae, et tunc persuadetur, si adest *securitas*, *utilitas*, *honestas*; vel persuadetur non fieri, si sequitur *damnum*, *periculum*, *inhonestas*.

24. Genus *iudiciale* respondet rei factae, quae habet *constitutionem*, *coniecturam*, *dubitationem legitimam*. *Iuridicialis*[^p353-3] constitutio est: «Fecisti? Non feci»; quae apud alios *litis contestatio* vocatur. *Coniecturalis*, cum aliquid adducitur ad probandum. *Legitima dubitatio* iuridicialis est descriptio iuridicialis, quando factum conceditur; sed defendit se, quod non sit reus, vel quia potuit facere de mandato domini, vel quia debuit.

25. Ad hoc autem, quod sit potens orator, necesse est, ut habeat *exordium* ad captandam benevolentiam non nimis prolixum, non obscurum, non exquisitum; quod habeat *narrationem*, ut factum narret; postea, ut negotium *dividat*; et caveat multitudinem partium. Postea partem suam *confirmet* per rationes; postea adversarium *confutet* et rationes eius ostendat frivolas; postea *concludat*. Item, necesse est, ut habeat *inventionem*, *dispositionem*, *elocutionem*, *memoriam* et *pronuntiationem*.

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### COLLATION IV.
#### *On the first vision, which is that of the understanding implanted by nature: the first treatment.*

### Summarium

*Introduction; on the nine sciences of the philosophers; the light of the soul is truth, 1. — The three first rays of this light, namely the truth of things, of signs, of morals, 2. — A threefold consideration of this threefold truth confirms this division, 3–5. — Part I. On the first ray of the understanding implanted by nature, which is occupied about the truth of things. The world is considered in three ways: by the philosopher as to the essence of things, by the mathematician as to figure, by the natural philosopher as to nature, 6. — The philosopher's consideration proceeds in six modes; hence six lights, 7. — On each in particular, 8–13. — The mathematician's consideration; it is divided according to six objects into six sciences, 14, 15. — These dispose to theology, 16. — The natural philosopher's consideration; the books of Aristotle on natural science, 17. — Part II. On the second ray of the same understanding, which is occupied about the truth of signs or words. It is divided into grammar, logic and rhetoric, 18. — On the object and division of grammar, 19. — On the object and division of logic, 20. — On the object and division of rhetoric, 21–25.*

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1. *God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness*[^p349-1], etc. In all the works of the six days, except the second, it is said: *God saw that it was good*; and at the end[^p349-2] he says: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.* God is said to see, because he makes us see. The first vision of the soul is that *of the understanding implanted by nature*. Whence the Psalm says[^p349-3]: *The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.* And here all the difficulties of philosophy could be explained. The philosophers gave nine sciences and promised to give a tenth, namely contemplation. But many philosophers, while they wished to separate themselves from the darkness of error, entangled themselves in great errors; for *saying that they were wise, they became fools*[^p349-4]; growing proud of their knowledge, they became luciferian. Among the Egyptians there was *thickest darkness*, but *thy saints had very great light*. All who lived under the law of nature — Patriarchs, Prophets, philosophers — were sons of light. — The light of the soul is truth; this light *knows no setting*. For it shines upon the soul so strongly that it cannot even be thought not to be, nor be so expressed without a man contradicting himself: because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth: therefore something is true; and if something is true, it is true that truth is: therefore if there is no truth, there is truth. For *truth prevaileth above all things*, as is said in Esdras[^p349-5].

2. Now this light sends forth three first rays; whence in Ecclesiasticus[^p349-6]: *Threefold the sun burning the mountains.* For there is the *truth of things*, the *truth of signs* or *of words*, and the *truth of morals*. The truth of things is the indivision of the being and its to-be; the truth of speech is the adequation of the word and the understanding; the truth of morals is rectitude of living. And these are the three parts of philosophy, which the philosophers did not invent so that they should be, but which, since they already were according to truth, they observed in the soul, according to Augustine[^p349-7].

3. This threefold truth is considered on the side of the *originating principle*, on the side of the *receiving subject*, and on the side of the *terminating object*. Now the originating principle is regarded under the account of a threefold cause: *originating*, *exemplating* and *terminating*; for *of him, and by him, and in him are all things*[^p349-8]. Therefore truth shows that our mind is borne by a natural inclination toward Truth, according as it is «the cause of being, the ground of understanding and the order of living»: according to the *cause of being*, the truth of things; according to the *ground of understanding*, the truth of words; according to the *order of living*, the truth of morals.

4. But on the side of the soul, every irradiation of truth upon our understanding comes about in three ways: either it falls upon it absolutely, and so pertains to the knowledge of things to be speculated; or in comparison to the *interpretative* power, and so it is the truth of words; or in comparison to the *affective* and *motive* power, and so it is the truth of things to be done.

5. On the side of the object, thus. Everything that is, is either from *nature*, or from *reason*, or from *will*. According to the first there is the knowledge which is of *things*; in the second mode, of *discourse*; in the third mode, of *morals*. — Therefore according to *principle*, *subject* and *object* there is a threefold ray of truth in the soul, by which the soul may be lifted up to things everlasting, and even to the cause of all; but if the seasoning of *faith* be added, then more easily; so that the cause of being is attributed to the Father, the ground of understanding to the Son, the order of living to the Holy Spirit.

6. The vision, then, of the understanding implanted by nature, as it is turned to *things*, is truth. And the soul wills that the whole world be described in it[^p349-9]. The world is considered in three ways: as to *essence*, *figure*

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and *nature*. And this ray directs one to considering the *hidden differences of quiddities*, the *manifest proportions of figures*, the *properties of natures mixed of both*. The natural philosopher's consideration is mixed, because now it is of causes, which are hidden — as why fire is hot, why this herb is hot, because they have this from their own species, which is hidden; now of quality, and likewise of quantity and of the influence of bodies, which sometimes lie open and sometimes lie hidden.

7. According to the hidden differences of quiddities the division is made, for the present, in six modes: into *substance* and *accident*, into *universal* and *particular*, into *potency* and *act*, into *one* and *many*, into *simple* and *composite*, into *cause* and *caused*. These are the six lights which dispose the soul to knowing and to right judgement.

8. The division of substance and accident is clear[^p350-1]; but there are certain things which are reduced to these, and in them is the greatest error. That man says: creation is not. Why? Because it is impossible that an accident precede substance; but creation is an accident: therefore, etc. I say that creation, which is a being-acted-upon, is not an accident, because the relation of the creature to the Creator is not accidental but essential. Likewise the potency of matter is not an accident of matter but essential, because «by the very fact that it is, it is toward another»[^p350-2]. Likewise the differences are reduced to the genus, as mere privations to their habits.

9. The second division is into universal and particular; and about this there is a great error. Some say that the universal is nothing except in the soul; Plato held that it was only in God; others, that it is only in the soul[^p350-3]. These abstract too much. — I say therefore that there is a universal *one toward many*, *one in many*, *one beside many*. The one toward many is in the potency of matter, which is not complete; the one in many, as a common nature in its particulars; and the one beside many, in the soul. But the one toward many and the one in many and the one beside many are in the eternal art; for it is through that art and ground that it subsists in the thing. For it is plain that two men are alike, and not a man and an ass: therefore it is necessary that that likeness be founded and made stable in some stable form, not one which is in the other, since that is particular: therefore in some universal[^p350-4]. But the account of the universal is not wholly in the soul, but in the thing according to the procession of the genus to the species, as: we share first in substance as in the most general, then in the rest, down to the last form of man.

10. The third division is of potency and act[^p350-5]; and here are many errors. Some say that *act* adds nothing over *potency* except a mode of being according to complete and incomplete. We are not speaking here of a purely passive potency, but of that which proceeds to act. For it is necessary, since in every creature an active potency is joined to a passive one, that those two potencies be founded upon different principles of the thing[^p350-6]. Of the potency which is the *seminal ground*, this is the force: that such a potency sometimes adds to act a part of being, or of the essence — as, over the account of body it adds *the ensouled* really, in that ensouling is something, ordered however to the sensitive; and over the ensouled it adds *the sen-*

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*sitive*, and so on up to man. So likewise of the powers of the soul: that as the tetragon adds one angle to the trigon, and the pentagon to the tetragon, so the *sensitive* to the *vegetative*, and the *rational* to the *sensitive*[^p351-1]. — But sometimes it adds only a mode of being: as, if from one in potency there comes to be one in act, it adds only a mode of being, because the one is not joined to matter simply, but to matter having life in a radical potency. — Whence it is madness to say that the last form is added to prime matter without anything that is a disposition or a potency toward it, or with no form interposed.

11. The fourth division is into one and many, and about it there are many errors. Some have said that all things are one; that as there is one matter, so there is one radical form, and afterwards it is multiplied according to the *mode of being* and varied[^p351-2]. And this is nothing else than to say that the proposition *a man is an ass* is true of itself and false by accident. Whence understand that *rational* and *irrational* differ not only by accident but also essentially.

12. The fifth division is into simple and composite; and here too there are many errors, as to say that some creature is simple — because then it would be pure act, which belongs to God alone; and to attribute to a creature what is God's is dangerous. It is therefore less dangerous to say that an Angel is *composite*, even if it be not true, than that it is *simple*; because I attribute this to the Angel unwilling to attribute to it what is God's, out of the piety I have toward the reverence of God. But according to truth it seems thus, because Boethius says[^p351-3]: «A form cannot be a subject»: therefore nothing would then happen to an Angel, neither gladness nor sorrow.

13. The sixth division is into cause and caused; and here are many errors. For some say that the world was from eternity. In this the wise agree, that nothing can come to be from nothing[^p351-4] and thus from eternity; because it is necessary that, just as when a thing passes into nothing it ceases to be, so when it comes to be from nothing it begins to be. But some seem to have held matter to be unbegotten; and so it follows that God makes nothing: because he does not make matter, since it is unbegotten; nor form, since it comes to be either from something or from nothing; not from matter, because the essence of the form cannot come to be from the essence of matter; nor from nothing, as they suppose, since God can make nothing from nothing. But far be it that the power of God should be propped on the foundation of matter. — These, then, are the foundations of faith, which examines them all.

14. The second irradiation of the understanding implanted by nature is toward considering the *manifest proportions of quantities*; and these are very manifest, because they offer themselves to sense; and a man gladly busies himself about them, because they fall under imagination; and imagination is strong in us, and reason is darkened: and therefore a man is much detained in them. This science is most certain[^p351-5], because it is clear to the eye. Whence all the other sciences besides this are as it were hidden.

15. This mathematical consideration is about six things: either about numbers in their purity, and so it is *arithmetic*; or about numbers as they are considered in sounds, and so *music*; or in continuous quantity and about dimensive proportions generally, and so *geometry*; or by an addition concerning the visual line, and so *perspective*; or according to both quantities and according to numerical and substantial distinctions, or continuous and discrete, and so *astrology* — and that is twofold: one about bodies regulated by motion, and so *astronomy*; the other about influence, and this is partly safe and partly dangerous, and this is *astrology*. It is dangerous on account of the judgements which follow; and from it flows *geomancy*, or *necromancy* and the other kinds of divination[^p351-6].

16. These sciences dispose one to the understanding of Scripture, as is clear from the *perfect*, *deficient* and *excessive* numbers; as is clear from the perfection of the number six, which is of itself perfect. «For not», as Augustine says[^p351-7], «is the number six perfect because in that number God made the world; but he therefore made the world in that number, because it is perfect». Likewise of the two first cubic numbers, namely 8 and 27, because twice two twice is 8; three times three three times is 27, which cannot be

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bound by fewer than two numbers, namely 12 and 18. For 12 is to 18 as 18 is to 27, being in the *sesquialter proportion*, which holds the whole and its half. — Likewise it is clear from the triangle how it leads into the knowledge of the Trinity. For it is certain that as great as the Son is, so great is the Father; and as great as the Father is, so great is the Holy Spirit and the Son. And thence consider the triangle, that any angle includes the whole surface. — Likewise in *perspective*, of the *direct* ray, which is stronger: as, if thou cast a stone straight downward, it makes a great sound; but if obliquely, not so much. The *reflected* ray is from a body wiped and polished by the power of the wiping, and there it takes on the species; the *refracted* ray is at the entry into another transparent body[^p352-1].

17. The third irradiation of the understanding implanted by nature is toward investigating the *mixed properties of natures*, that is, partly hidden and partly manifest. For the philosopher considers all things through motion; he considers motion, the principles and causes of motion, such as place and time[^p352-2]; and he considers the natures of the heavenly bodies, that is, ethereal, meteoric bodies; elemental, vegetable, sensible, rational. — Heavenly things, in the book *On the Heavens and the World*, where he reduces all motion to the perfect motion, namely local[^p352-3]; and that local motion is threefold: either about the middle, where there is no contrariety, and so circular; or from the middle, and so it is the motion of light things; or to the middle, and so the motion of heavy things, that is, straight motion. Meteoric things, as in the book of the *Meteorology*, where he speaks of impressions and minerals. — If of elemental things, so in the book *On Generation and Corruption*. If of vegetable things, so in the book *On Plants*, where there are wonderful considerations. — But if of sensible things, so in the book *On Animals*, which we do not have entire; or of rational things, as in the book *On the Soul* with its appendices, namely *On Sense and the Sensed*, and *On Memory and Recollection*, *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^p352-4], *On Sleep and Waking*, *On Death and Life*.

18. The second ray of truth forms one toward the consideration of *utterances*, *argumentations*, *persuasions* of reason, so that a man may have through it an art toward *utterances congruously indicating the mind's conceptions*, toward *argumentations drawing all the mind's assents*, toward *persuasions inclining the mind's affections*. For reason thinks to make in another whatever is in itself, and to make in itself whatever is in another; and this comes about only through *speech*[^p352-5]. Whatever therefore is in the soul is either by way of *conception*, or by way of *assent*, or by way of *affection*. For indicating the conception there is *grammar*; for inducing assent there is *logic*; for inclining the affection, *rhetoric*.

19. According to the grammarian every part of speech signifies a conception of the mind. For it has a part signifying substance and quality, and so it is the *noun*; it has a part signifying mode, and so it is the *verb*, which states inclinations, namely the *indicative*, as in the rational power; the *imperative*, as in the irascible; the *optative*, as in the concupiscible; the *subjunctive*, as in both; the *infinitive*, as it were material. And to these differences all are reduced, according to Priscian[^p352-6]. — Likewise he determines about the *letter*, the *syllable*, the *word*, the *sentence*. For since the modes of signifying and of terminating are various according to the various languages — as a word ending in *a* is of the feminine gender for the most part, in *us* of the masculine, and so of the rest — he determines about the letter; but to this he cannot descend except through the syllable. — Last he considers the connexion of words. He determines likewise about *prosody* and *syntax*. And he expresses everything through the eight parts of speech. To the letter, then, he descends through the syllable; but afterwards what concerns prosody and metre and the like is referred back to the first. He considers likewise the moods and accidents: as that the nominative be construed with a verb of singular number, so that one does not say *a man run*, because from one substance there goes forth but one act; likewise, that after a transitive verb the nominative be not put, but the accusative, which states the term and not the principle of the act, as the nominative does. — Whence grammar draws its nature from things, nor can a man be a good grammarian unless he knows things.

20. Another direction is that which enlightens toward *argumentations inducing the mind's assent*, which comes about through solid argumentation, as: «whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are necessarily the same as one another»[^p352-7]. This argumentation has a general and a special form in necessary, solid matter; and therefore there is the *first analysis* and the *second analysis* concerning the syllogism simply. Of the necessary syllogism, that is, the one resolving into the cause of inferring, as in the first ana-

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lysis, that is, resolution; and in the *second analysis*, that is, resolution into the cause of inferring and of being. — And because there cannot always be an induction by necessary argumentation, therefore *topics* and topical relation are found, which proceeds by *probabilities*, as the *topical places*; and because deception falls in these, the *sophistical places* are added, so that a man may know how to unravel them. Whence he who unravels is not a sophist, but a true respondent. And because these modes draw their origin from the nature of things — as is clear: *there is smoke: therefore there has been fire*; the topic from effect[^p353-1] — therefore the *ten categories* are added, and the *enunciations* also.

21. The third irradiation is that by which the mind is enlightened toward persuading or inclining the mind; this is done through *rhetoric*[^p353-2]. Whence the rhetorician must provide for civil usefulness, where there can be danger through dissension of minds. And it proceeds according to three attributes and a threefold kind of cause, namely the *demonstrative*, the *deliberative* and the *judicial*.

22. The *demonstrative* is of a person, as toward praise or blame: therefore either the praise is as to the goods of the *soul*, which are three, namely virtue, knowledge, truth; or the praise is as to the *body*, namely beauty, strength, etc.; or of the goods of *fortune*, as riches, kindred, country.

23. The *deliberative* is in respect of a thing to be done, and then persuasion is used if there is *safety*, *usefulness*, *honourableness*; or one is persuaded that it not be done, if *loss*, *danger*, *dishonour* follow.

24. The *judicial* kind answers to a thing done, which has its *constitution*, its *conjecture*, its *lawful doubt*. The *juridical*[^p353-3] constitution is: «Didst thou do it? I did not»; which by others is called the *joining of issue*. The *conjectural* is when something is brought forward for proof. The *lawful doubt* of the juridical kind is the juridical description, when the deed is granted, but he defends himself as not guilty, either because he could do it by his master's command, or because he ought.

25. But for a man to be a powerful orator it is necessary that he have an *exordium* for winning goodwill, not too long, not obscure, not far-fetched; that he have a *narration*, so that he may narrate the deed; then that he *divide* the matter, and let him beware of a multitude of parts. Then let him *confirm* his own side by reasons; then let him *confute* the adversary and show his reasons frivolous; then let him *conclude*. Likewise it is necessary that he have *invention*, *disposition*, *elocution*, *memory* and *delivery*.

---

la: Gen. 1, 31. — August., XVI. de Civ. Dei, c. 5: Nec [Deus] *videndo* discit ad tempus, qui nunquam potest aliquid ignorare; sed ad tempus *videre* et cognoscere dicitur, quod videri et cognosci facit. Cfr. ibid. XXII. c. 2. et I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34, ubi similes locutiones S. Scripturae eodem modo exponit ac addit: Talibus locutionibus etiam abundat nostra consuetudo, cum dicimus *laetum diem*, quia nos laetos facit etc. Vide tom. III. pag. 528, nota 5.

en: Gen. 1:31. — Augustine, XVI *On the City of God*, c. 5: God does not *by seeing* learn in time, who can never be ignorant of anything; but he is said to *see* and to know in time, because he makes a thing to be seen and known. Cf. ibid. XXII, c. 2, and I *On Genesis against the Manichees*, c. 22, n. 34, where he expounds like locutions of Holy Scripture in the same way and adds: Our own usage too abounds in such locutions, as when we say *a glad day*, because it makes us glad, etc. See tom. III, p. 528, note 5.

la: Psalm. 4, 7. — *Novem* scientiae philosophorum, quae resultant ex subdivisione trium principalium (rationalis, naturalis et moralis) in collat. 5. planius exhibentur; cfr. etiam opusc. de Reductione artium ad theologiam, n. 4.

en: Ps. 4:7. — The *nine* sciences of the philosophers, which result from the subdivision of the three principal ones (rational, natural and moral), are set out more plainly in collation 5; cf. also the opusculum *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, n. 4.

la: Rom. 1, 22. — Subinde respicitur Exod. 10, 22. seq. — Inferius respicitur quod in Praeconio paschali *Exsultet* (cfr. Missale Roman. pro die Sabbati sancti) de Christo, vero lucifero, dicitur: Qui nescit occasum.

en: Rom. 1:22. — Thereupon reference is made to Exod. 10:22 f. — Below, reference is made to what is said of Christ, the true morning star, in the paschal proclamation *Exsultet* (cf. the Roman Missal for Holy Saturday): *Who knows no setting.*

la: Libr. III. c. 4, 41: Magna est veritas et praevalet. — Praecedens argumentatio (si veritas non est, veritas est) est secundum August. et Anselm.; cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 11.

en: Book III [of Esdras], c. 4:41: *Great is truth, and it prevaileth.* — The preceding argument (if there is no truth, there is truth) follows Augustine and Anselm; cf. above, p. 47, note 11.

la: Cap. 43, 4. — Prima veritatis definitio inferius posita, secundum quam ens est verum, si est id quod ex suo conceptu esse debet, et respectu cuius Aristot. (in fine II. Periherm.) docet, eam propositionem esse veriorem, quae enuntiat de re illud quod ipsa secundum se est, v. g. *bonum est bonum*, ab Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 8. c. 6. his verbis tangitur: Veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui *esse*, quod stabilitum est ei. Vide IV. Sent. d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. De secunda cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.

en: Ch. 43:4. — The first definition of truth set down below — by which a being is true if it is what by its own concept it ought to be, and in respect of which Aristotle (at the end of II *On Interpretation*) teaches that the proposition is truer which states of a thing what it is in itself, e.g. *the good is good* — is touched on by Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, tr. 8, c. 6, in these words: The truth of each thing is the property of its *being*, which is established for it. See IV *Sentences*, d. 14, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. On the second cf. tom. I, p. 707, note 5.

la: Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 25: Quantum intelligi datur, hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt, immo tripartitam esse animadvertere potuerunt: neque enim ipsi instituerunt, ut ita esset, sed ita esse potius invenerunt; cuius una pars appellaretur physica, altera logica, tertia ethica.

en: Book XI *On the City of God*, c. 25: So far as it is given us to understand, it is from this that the philosophers held the discipline of wisdom to be threefold — rather, were able to observe that it is threefold; for they did not appoint that it should be so, but rather found that it is so — of which one part should be called physics, another logic, the third ethics.

la: Rom. 11, 36. — De seq. sententia Platonis secundum August. cfr. supra pag. 19, nota 7.

en: Rom. 11:36. — On the following opinion of Plato according to Augustine cf. above, p. 19, note 7.

la: Sub quo respectu Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.), ait: Anima entia quodam modo est omnia.

en: In which respect Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 37 (c. 8), says: The soul is in a manner all things that are.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 2. et VII. text. 1. seqq. (III. c. 2. et VI. c. 1.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *Metaphysics*, text 2, and VII, text 1 ff. (III, c. 2, and VI, c. 1).

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 453, nota 6. B: *hoc ipsum quod est* etc. — De praecedente obiectione (creationis) vide II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6. — De reductione differentiarum ad genus notandum, quod differentiae secundum Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et differentiae*, in genere non contineantur *actu*, sed *potestate* sive indeterminate, et quod genus prius sit differentiis. De privatione et habitu cfr. supra pag. 304, nota 3.

en: According to Aristotle, II *Physics*, text 26 (c. 2). Cf. tom. I, p. 453, note 6. B: *hoc ipsum quod est* etc. — On the preceding objection (about creation) see II *Sentences*, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6. — On the reduction of differences to the genus it is to be noted that, according to Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On the community and the differences of genus and difference*, the differences are not contained in the genus *actually* but *potentially*, that is, indeterminately, and that the genus is prior to the differences. On privation and habit cf. above, p. 304, note 3.

la: Primus error est Nominalium (Epicuri et Roscelini) vel potius Conceptualistarum (Abaelardi); secundus Platonicorum (cfr. supra pag. 321, nota 4.), et tertius eorum qui contendebant, universale formari per abstractionem a rebus, et existere solum in anima, sed non in Deo. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 8. (c. 1.): Animal autem universale aut nihil est, aut posterius [re, de qua praedicatur]. Cfr. infra coll. 6. n. 2. — Duobus membris posterioribus in propos. paulo inferius posita, scil. *unum in multis* et *unum praeter multa*, utitur Aristot., II. Poster. c. 18. (c. 15.) et VII. Metaph. text. 45. (VI. c. 13.). Aliis verbis eandem rem B. Albert., de Sex Principiis, c. 2, explicat: Est enim universale, quod est *ante rem*, et hoc est causa rei per se, vel per accidens; et est universale, quod est *in re*, et hoc est substantia rei vel accidentis inclinati ad substantiam; et est universale, quod est *post rem*, et hoc est universale a re ipsa per intellectum separatum etc. Cfr. ipsius Comment. in V. Metaph. tr. 6. c. 5, ubi eandem distinctionem adhibet, primum tamen membrum (*ante rem*) sub duplici respectu considerans: Ante rem autem dicitur universale dupliciter: cum enim omnia... sint in intellectu primae causae, sicut in formali et primo lumine, et ipsa sit hoc modo forma omnium, quae tamen sunt in ipsa vita et lux, eo quod haec est vita quaedam existentibus omnibus et est lumen omnis notitiae et rationis omnium... Alio autem modo dicunt universale ante rem, non tempore, sed substantia et ratione; et haec est forma aut causa formalis accepta, constituens *esse* rei; actus enim talis formae et proprius effectus est esse in omni eo, quod est; hoc autem cum indifferens sit in omnibus, quae sunt eiusdem speciei vel formae, et quantum est de se sic indivisum, habet unam ad omnia vel multa relationem, et sic accipit universalitatis quandam naturam et rationem. Universale autem, quod dicunt esse *in re*, est eadem forma participata a multis actu vel potentia etc. — De potentia materiae cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3.

en: The first error is that of the Nominalists (Epicurus and Roscelin), or rather of the Conceptualists (Abelard); the second that of the Platonists (cf. above, p. 321, note 4); and the third that of those who contended that the universal is formed by abstraction from things and exists only in the soul, but not in God. Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 8 (c. 1): But the universal animal is either nothing or posterior [to the thing of which it is predicated]. Cf. below, collation 6, n. 2. — The two latter members in the proposition set down a little below, namely *one in many* and *one beside many*, Aristotle uses at II *Posterior Analytics*, c. 18 (c. 15), and VII *Metaphysics*, text 45 (VI, c. 13). Blessed Albert explains the same thing in other words, *On the Six Principles*, c. 2: For there is a universal which is *before the thing*, and this is the cause of the thing, whether of itself or accidentally; and there is a universal which is *in the thing*, and this is the substance of the thing, or of an accident inclined to substance; and there is a universal which is *after the thing*, and this is the universal separated from the thing itself by the understanding, etc. Cf. his *Commentary* on V *Metaphysics*, tr. 6, c. 5, where he uses the same distinction, but considers the first member (*before the thing*) under a twofold respect: Now the universal is said to be before the thing in two ways: for since all things… are in the understanding of the first cause as in a formal and first light, and it is in this way the form of all things, which nevertheless are in it life and light, because this is a certain life to all existing things and is the light of all knowledge and of the ground of all things… In another way they call the universal *before the thing*, not in time but in substance and in ground; and this is the form, or formal cause taken as such, constituting the *being* of the thing; for the act of such a form and its proper effect is to be in everything that is; and since this is undifferentiated in all things that are of the same species or form, and so far as it is of itself thus undivided, it has one relation to all or to many, and so takes on a certain nature and ground of universality. But the universal which they call *in the thing* is the same form participated by many actually or potentially, etc. — On the potency of matter cf. II *Sentences*, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 10, nota 8. et pag. 11, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 10, note 8, and p. 11, note 1.

la: Vide Aristot., IX. (VIII.) Metaph. per totum.

en: See Aristotle, IX (VIII) *Metaphysics* throughout.

la: Cfr. infra n. 12; supra collat. 2. n. 24. et II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2. — De ratione seminali vide II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, ubi ostenditur, quod ratio seminalis sit forma partis essentiae indifferens ad multa sive «forma existens secundum *esse* incompletum in materia et indifferens et possibilis ad multa producenda». Ibid. in prima opinione videtur etiam error superius positus tangi. — In seq. propositione codd. corruptas exhibent lectiones; sic A D E legunt: *pro eo quod animatio non est aliquid, ordinatum tamen ad id, ut super animatum addit sensibile, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile, et sic* etc. Pro *ordinatum tamen ad sensibile* B et Vat. *organizatum tamen addit*.

en: Cf. below, n. 12; above, collation 2, n. 24, and II *Sentences*, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, foundation 2. — On the seminal ground see II *Sentences*, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, where it is shown that the seminal ground is a form of part of the essence, undifferentiated toward many things, or «a form existing according to an incomplete *being* in matter, undifferentiated and capable of producing many things». There too, in the first opinion, the error set down above seems to be touched on. — In the following sentence the codices give corrupt readings; thus A D E read: *pro eo quod animatio non est aliquid, ordinatum tamen ad id, ut super animatum addit sensibile, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile, et sic* etc. For *ordinatum tamen ad sensibile* B and the Vatican edition have *organizatum tamen addit*.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.): Similiter autem se habent ei quod est de figuris et quae circa animam sunt; semper enim in eo quod est consequenter, est potentia quod prius est, et in figuris et in animatis; ut in quadrato quidem triangulus est, in sensitivo autem vegetativum.

en: Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 31 (c. 3): The case of figures and of the things concerning the soul is alike; for always in that which comes after, that which is prior is present potentially, both in figures and in ensouled things; as in the square the triangle is, and in the sensitive the vegetative.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 13. seqq. (c. 2. seqq.). — Est error pantheistarum, si Deus confundatur aut cum hac forma, aut cum materia; primum fecit in medio aevo Almaricus de Bene, docens, Deum esse principium formale omnium rerum, alterum praestitit David de Dinando, contendens, Deum esse materiam primam. Cfr. S. Thom., Sum. p. I. q. 3. a. 8.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I *Physics*, text 13 ff. (c. 2 ff.). — It is the error of the pantheists, if God is confounded either with this form or with matter; the first was done in the Middle Ages by Amalric of Bène, teaching that God is the formal principle of all things; the second by David of Dinant, contending that God is prime matter. Cf. St Thomas, *Summa*, p. I, q. 3, a. 8.

la: Libr. de Trin. c. 2: Formae vero subiectae [accidentibus] esse non possunt... Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum. Cfr. supra n. 10. — Post *forma* Vat. addit *simplex*, B *nullius*.

en: *On the Trinity*, c. 2: Forms cannot be subjects [of accidents]… But a form which is without matter will not be able to be a subject. Cf. above, n. 10. — After *forma* the Vatican edition adds *simplex*, B *nullius*.

la: Sufficiat adduxisse verba Averrois in III. de Caelo et mundo, text. 25: Omnes antiqui conveniunt in hoc, quoniam impossibile est, ut ponatur factus [mundus] ex rebus non entibus, nisi esset possibile, ut *non-esse* ipsius transmutaretur in *esse*, quod est impossibile. Cfr. Destruct. destruct. disput. 1. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 33. seq. (c. 4.) refert, communem naturalium opinionem fuisse, quod ex nihilo nihil possit fieri (ipse huic opinioni in tantum non consentit, quod contendit *formam* fieri ex *nihilo sui*, sed non ex *nihilo subiecti*, quia potentia continetur in materia). — De duplici errore, cuius hic mentio fit, cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et 2. et d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Let it suffice to have adduced the words of Averroes on III *On the Heavens and the World*, text 25: All the ancients agree in this, that it is impossible that the world be held to have been made out of things that are not, unless it were possible that its *not-being* should be changed into *being*, which is impossible. Cf. the *Destruction of the Destruction*, disputation 1. Aristotle, I *Physics*, text 33 f. (c. 4), reports that it was the common opinion of the natural philosophers that from nothing nothing can come to be (he himself so far dissents from this opinion that he contends that a *form* comes to be out of *nothing of itself*, but not out of *nothing of a subject*, since the potency is contained in matter). — On the twofold error mentioned here cf. II *Sentences*, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2, and d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 16. (I. brevior, c. 3.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Metaphysics*, text 16 (I, the shorter, c. 3).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Physic. text. 20. (c. 2.), et Hug. de S. Vict., II. Erudit. didascal. c. 7. seqq. et VI. c. 15.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Physics*, text 20 (c. 2), and Hugh of St Victor, II *Didascalicon*, c. 7 ff., and VI, c. 15.

la: Libr. IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 7. n. 14. Ibid. c. 2. n. 2. seqq. plura de numeris perfectis etc. proponuntur; cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4. scholion. Boeth., I. de Arithmet. c. 24: Superparticularis vero [numerus] est numerus ad alterum comparatus, quoties habet in se *totum* minorem et partem eius aliquam; qui si minoris habeat *medietatem*, vocatur *sexquialter* etc.

en: Book IV *On Genesis to the Letter*, c. 7, n. 14. Ibid., c. 2, n. 2 ff., much is set out about perfect numbers and so forth; cf. also I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 4, scholion. Boethius, I *On Arithmetic*, c. 24: A superparticular number is a number compared to another as often as it contains in itself the *whole* of the lesser and some part of it; and if it has *half* of the lesser, it is called *sesquialter*, etc.

la: Triplici radio respondet triplex amor: *divinus, utilis, socialis* (cfr. Ioan. a S. Geminiano, Sum. de exemplis, I. c. 4.).

en: To the threefold ray there answers a threefold love: *divine, useful, social* (cf. John of San Gimignano, *Summa de exemplis*, I, c. 4).

la: Et hoc facit Aristot. in libr. Phys. (cfr. III. text. 1. seqq.).

en: And this Aristotle does in the books of the *Physics* (cf. III, text 1 ff.).

la: Libr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 5. seq. et 17. (c. 2. et 3.).

en: Book I *On the Heavens and the World*, text 5 f. and 17 (cc. 2 and 3).

la: Sub hoc titulo nullus inter opera Aristot. exstat liber; nam post librum de Memoria et reminiscentia recensentur seqq.: de Somno et vigilia; de Somniis; de Divinatione per somnum; de Longitudine et brevitate vitae; de Iuventute et senectute, vita et morte, et respiratione (forsitan ultima pars huius libri, quae est de *respiratione* respicitur verbis *de Spiritu et anima*).

en: Under this title no book exists among the works of Aristotle; for after the book *On Memory and Recollection* the following are listed: *On Sleep and Waking*; *On Dreams*; *On Divination in Sleep*; *On Length and Shortness of Life*; *On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration* (perhaps the last part of this book, which is *On respiration*, is what is meant by the words *On the Spirit and the soul*).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 333, nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 333, note 7.

la: Grammat. libr. II. c. 5, ubi *nomen* describit: Nomen quasi notamen, quod hoc nomine notamus uniuscuiusque substantiae qualitatem (cfr. tom. I. pag. 390, nota 6.). Libr. VIII. c. 12. proponit quinque praedictas inclinationes verbi: Modi [verbi] sunt diversae inclinationes animi, varios eius affectus demonstrantes. Sunt autem quinque: indicativus sive definitivus, imperativus, optativus, subiunctivus, infinitivus etc. — In seqq. datur summa librorum Prisciani. Nomine *dyasyntheticae* (syntaxis) significatur pars grammaticae docens componere dictiones ad invicem congrue et evitare orationes incongruas.

en: *Grammar*, book II, c. 5, where he describes the *noun*: A noun (*nomen*) is as it were a mark (*notamen*), because by this name we mark the quality of each substance (cf. tom. I, p. 390, note 6). Book VIII, c. 12, sets out the five aforesaid inclinations of the verb: The moods [of the verb] are the various inclinations of the mind, showing its various affections. And there are five: indicative or definitive, imperative, optative, subjunctive, infinitive, etc. — In what follows a summary of Priscian's books is given. By the name *dyasynthetic* (syntax) is meant the part of grammar which teaches how to compose words with one another congruously and to avoid incongruous constructions.

la: Aristot., I. Elench. c. 5. (c. 6.). — Subinde respiciuntur opera Aristot., quae de *logica* tractant, scil. duo opera *Analyticorum*, in quibus continentur duo libri Analyticorum sive resolutoriorum *priorum*, et duo libri Analyticorum *posteriorum*; libri octo *Topicorum*; libri duo *Elenchorum* (sophisticorum); liber de *decem Praedicamentis* et libri duo de *Interpretatione* (enuntiatione, Perihermeneias).

en: Aristotle, I *Sophistical Refutations*, c. 5 (c. 6). — Thereupon reference is made to the works of Aristotle which treat of *logic*, namely the two works of the *Analytics*, in which are contained the two books of the *Prior* Analytics or Resolutions, and the two books of the *Posterior* Analytics; the eight books of the *Topics*; the two books of the *Refutations* (sophistical); the book *On the ten Categories* and the two books *On Interpretation* (on enunciation, the *Perihermeneias*).

la: August., II. de Doctr. christiana, c. 1. n. 1: Fumo viso, ignem subesse cognoscimus. Cfr. Boeth., III. de Differentiis topic.

en: Augustine, II *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 1, n. 1: When smoke is seen, we know that fire lies beneath. Cf. Boethius, III *On Topical Differences*.

la: De seqq. cfr. Aristot., de Rhetorica ad Alexandrum; Cicero, I. et II. Rhetor.; Boeth., IV. de Differentiis topic.

en: On what follows cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric to Alexander*; Cicero, I and II *Rhetoric*; Boethius, IV *On Topical Differences*.

la: Hoc termino utitur Cicero, I. Rhetor. c. 14. (ibid. c. 8: Fecisti? Non feci) et Topic. c. 24.

en: Cicero uses this term, I *Rhetoric*, c. 14 (ibid., c. 8: *Didst thou do it? I did not*), and *Topics*, c. 24. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin set from the IA djvu OCR of Tomus V (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`,
raw L60214–L60965) and checked page by page against the 450 dpi bands; **the whole apparatus is read
off the footer bands.** English translated literally and in parallel. Printed pp. 348–353, PDF
424–429 (offset +76). Plate scouting banked ahead of writing at
`manual-review/hex-c4-plate-scouting.md`.

**Span.** Collatio IV opens at the FOOT of p. 348, below Collatio III, with a full-width display
heading, a one-line subtitle and the head of its Summarium; **no two-column body of it stands on
that leaf**, and the Summarium runs across the page break into the head of p. 349, closing at *De
obiecto et divisione rhetoricae, 21-25.* It closes part-way down p. 353 at *…memoriam et
pronuntiationem.* ⚠ p. 353's running head already reads `IN HEXAËMERON COLLATIO V.` — the fourth
attestation in this work.

**✅ `COLLATIO IV.` CARRIES NO APPARATUS ANCHOR** — checked at magnification on the full-width crop.
Of the four collatio openings read so far only `COLLATIO I.` carries one.

**★★ THE CLOSING LEAF IS SHARED IN EVERY WAY, AND ITS REGISTER SPLITS BETWEEN THE TWO COLLATIONES.**
p. 353 carries, in order: Collatio IV's ¶¶ 20–25 in two columns, then Collatio V's full-width
heading and Summarium, then **Collatio V's own two-column body**, then one register of **four**
notes — of which **nn. 1–3 answer to Collatio IV's anchors and n. 4 to Collatio V's first**. This is
the ordinary per-page footer split, but here it falls across a *work-unit* boundary, exactly as
p. 313 did at the Itinerarium's scholion. `bon-hex-c4` owns three of the four and forwards n. 4.
⚠ It also explains why the leaf has no gutter in the default window and yet has columns at top and
bottom: **profile the region you are transcribing, not the page.**

**Page-break map.** 348 | 349 inside the Summarium · 349 | 350 at ¶ 6 (*…quantum ad essentiam,
figuram* | *et naturam*) · 350 | 351 at ¶ 10, mid-word (*…addit sen-* | *sibile*) · 351 | 352 at
¶ 16 (*…qui ligari non* | *possunt minus quam per duos numeros*) · 352 | 353 at ¶ 20, mid-word
(*…ut in prima ana-* | *lysi*). All five joints checked against the bands in both languages.

**Gutters (measured; the tool's default REJECTED on one of five).** p. 348 needs none for this
chunk. 349 = 1211 · 350 = 1348 · 351 = 1188 · 352 = **1349** (default 1353 on a 54 px run) ·
353 = **1180** (default 1181 on a **1 px** run — the narrowest reading the tool has returned in this
volume; it was right by one pixel and by luck, and the sound value came from a 59 px band profiled
over rows 8–40 %, above Collatio V's heading).

**Apparatus, page by page (32 entries owned).** Block split against anchor split:

| page | notes on page | owned | anchors L/R | block L/R | relation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 349 | 9 | 9 | 6 / 3 | 5 / 4 | block underruns by one |
| 350 | 6 | 6 | 3 / 3 | 3 / 3 | coincide |
| 351 | 7 | 7 | 4 / 3 | 4 / 3 | coincide |
| 352 | 7 | 7 | 4 / 3 | 6 / 1 | block overruns by two |
| 353 | 4 | **3** | 2 / 1 | 2 / 1 | coincide; n. 4 is Collatio V's |

**Runovers.** Gutter-crossing: p. 350 n. 3 · p. 351 n. 4 · p. 352 n. 6 (three). **Page-crossing:
NONE — checked leaf by leaf**, pp. 349, 350, 351, 352 and 353 each opening their left footer block
numbered ¹.

**Readings settled on the plate.**
- p. 352 ¶ 19: the plate reads *terminatum in* **a** *…, in* **us** *masculini generis* — the raw
  gave `m`, which would have made the grammatical example wrong.
- p. 349 n. 2's cross-reference is **tom. III. pag. 528** (raw `328`, the 3/5 class) and n. 3 sends
  the reader to **collat. 5** (raw `6`); p. 350 n. 2 is **tom. I. pag. 453** (raw `153`); p. 351
  n. 6 is **VI. c. 15** (raw `13`); p. 351 n. 3's variant is B ***nullius*** (raw *indlius*).
- ★ **p. 353 n. 1 is the note that proves the register's division:** *Fumo viso, ignem subesse
  cognoscimus* answers ¶ 20's *fumus est: ergo ignis fuit*, which stands in Collatio IV's own text.
  Without reading it, the whole leaf's register would have been handed to Collatio V.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention; body order, page by page).
p. 349: Introductio. · De 1. visione. · Novem scientiae philosophorum, decima promissa. · Simile. ·
Veritas lux animae. · Tres radii, triplex veritas, tres partes philosophiae. · Divisio haec
confirmatur tripliciter. · Ex parte principii tripliciter. · Ex parte subiecti tripliciter. · Ex
parte obiecti tripliciter. · Conclusio. · Notandum. · Pars I. De 1. radio.
p. 350: Est circa tria. · Sex differentiae quidditatum. · Sex lumina. · De prima divisione. · Error. ·
De secunda et errore. · Triplex universale. · De tertia et errore. · Duo diversa principia in
creatura. · Potentia rationis seminalis duo efficit. · Primo.
p. 351: Secundo. · Contra unitatem formae. · De quarta et errore. · De quinta et errore. · Solus Deus
simplex. · De sexta et errore. · Contra aeternitatem mundi. · Epilogus. · Consideratio mathematici
circa figuram. · Est circa sex. · Astrologia duplex. · Utilitas earum. · De numeris.
p. 352: Consideratio naturalis circa naturas. · Pars II. De secundo radio i. e. de veritate vocum. ·
Est triplex. · Primo, de grammatica. · Secundo, de logica.
p. 353: Tertio, de rhetorica. · Triplex genus causae. · De demonstrativo. · De deliberativo. · De
iudiciali. · Alia praestanda ab oratore.

**Register (additions; the c1–c3 freezes stand).**
- The three rays and their sciences keep their cognates: *veritas rerum · signorum seu vocum · morum*
  → "the truth of things · of signs or words · of morals"; *grammatica · logica · rhetorica* →
  grammar · logic · rhetoric.
- *irradiatio* → "irradiation" · *radius* → "ray" (both kept, since ¶ 2's *radii* and ¶ 4's
  *irradiatio* are distinct terms in the argument).
- *quidditas* → "quiddity" · *ratio seminalis* → **"seminal ground"**, following the frozen
  `de-reductione` rule that *ratio* in this technical use takes "ground".
- *unum ad multa · unum in multis · unum praeter multa* → "one toward many · one in many · one beside
  many", the scholastic triad, kept word for word because the apparatus quotes Albert's parallel.
- *indivisio entis et esse* → "the indivision of the being and its to-be" — *esse* keeps the corpus's
  "to-be" here, where the phrase turns on the pair.
- *prima analysis / secunda analysis* → "first analysis / second analysis" (Bonaventure's names for
  the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*; the note supplies the modern titles, and they are not
  substituted into the text).
- *dyasynthetica* → "syntax" in the English body, the apparatus glossing it; *litis contestatio* →
  "the joining of issue"; *pronuntiatio* → "delivery", the rhetorical term.
- *aeviterna* → "aeviternal" (as at c3) · *luciferiani* → "luciferian" · *condimentum fidei* → "the
  seasoning of faith".

**Census/ledger.** One line appended to `manual-review/vol5-runover-ledger.tsv` for `bon-hex-c4`:
three gutter-crossing runovers, **zero page-crossing** (a checked negative).

**Hand-off to `bon-hex-c5`.** Collatio V opens on **p. 353**, below Collatio IV, and **its body
already runs in two columns on that leaf**. ⚠⚠ **p. 353's footer register is SHARED: n. 4
(*Gen. 1, 4. — Quae immediate post afferuntur exposita sunt in collat. 4.*) is Collatio V's and is
forwarded**; nn. 1–3 are this chunk's and are not to be re-claimed. ⚠ Whether `COLLATIO V.` carries
an anchor is c5's first band question. ▶ **The shakedown gate for this work fires at the close of
this collatio — before c5 is written.**