title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum habens caritatem perfectam teneatur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum perfectam caritatem habentes teneantur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei quinto[^4]: *Estote perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est*; hoc dicitur Apostolis et apostolicis viris: ergo videtur, quod omnes viri perfecti teneantur ad ea quae sunt perfectionis.

2. Item, Gregorius in quadam homilia[^5]: « Cum augentur dona, rationes crescunt donorum »; unde et auctoritas dicit, quod « cui plus committitur, plus ab eo exigitur »: ergo cui committitur perfecta caritas; cum Deus exigat actum convenientem habitui, videtur, quod ille teneatur ad opera perfectionis.

3. Item, sicut se habet caritas imperfecta ad opera simplicis iustitiae, sic se habet caritas perfecta ad opera iustitiae consummatae; sed habens caritatem imperfectam tenetur ad ea quae sunt simplicis iustitiae: ergo videtur, quod habens caritatem perfectam obligetur ad opera perfectionis.

4. Item, caritas aut proficit, aut deficit; sed habens caritatem tenetur non deficere: ergo tenetur proficere, cum non sit medium inter haec[^6]. Qui autem habet perfectam caritatem non potest proficere nisi in operibus perfectis: ergo videtur, quod omnis, in quo est perfectio caritatis, obligetur ad opera perfectionis.

**Sed contra:**
1. Matthaei decimo nono[^7]: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*: igitur ex sola observantia mandatorum videtur quod homo possit pervenire ad salutem: ergo non videtur, quod ad ea obligetur, quae sunt caritatis perfectae.

2. Item, Iacobi tertio[^8]: *Qui non offendit in verbo, hic perfectus est vir*; sed nullus tenetur ad hoc, quod non offendat in verbo, quantumcumque sit perfectus: ergo propter perfectionem caritatis non obligatur quis ad ea quae sunt perfectionis.

3. Item, quanto aliquis est in maiori caritate constitutus, tanto plus habet de libertate spiritus[^9]; et quanto plus habet de libertate spiritus, tanto paucioribus vinculis obligatur: ergo perfecti non tenentur ad plura, quam teneantur imperfecti, quantum est de ipsa perfectione caritatis. Si ergo imperfecti non astringuntur ad opera perfectionis, videtur a maiori[^10], quod nec illi debeant astringi, qui sunt in caritate perfecta constituti.

5. Item, status caritatis perfectae non excedit caritatem imperfectam in infinitum: cum ergo mortale excedat veniale in infinitum[^11], quod est veniale imperfecto non est mortale perfecto, quantum est de ipso genere status: ergo non videtur, quod perfectio caritatis obliget hominem ad opera perfectionis. Si enim obligaret, iam videretur, quod perfectus vir esset peioris conditionis.

> ### Conclusio.
> Status caritatis perfectae, quantum est de se, non obligat nisi ad eam perfectionem, quae consistit in impletione mandatorum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est *genus perfectionis*, et multiplex est etiam *ratio obligandi*. — <!-- page 662 -->Quinque enim perfectionis genera consueverunt distingui. Una est perfectio *sufficientiae*, quae consistit in adimpletione mandatorum; et de hac Matthaei quinto[^1a]: *Estote perfecti, sicut Pater vester caelestis perfectus est.* — Secunda est perfectio *religionis*, quae consistit in observantia consiliorum; et de hac dicitur Matthaei decimo nono[^2a]: *Si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes* etc. — Tertia est perfectio *praelationis*, quae consistit in regimine subditorum; et de hac dicitur Lucae sexto[^3a]: *Perfectus omnis erit, si sit sicut magister eius.* — Quarta est perfectio *comparationis*, quae consistit in ostensione exemplorum; et de hac dicitur Genesis sexto[^4a]: *Noe vir iustus atque perfectus in generationibus suis.* — Quinta est perfectio *tranquillitatis*, quae consistit in consummatione difficillimorum et optimorum; primae Ioannis quarto[^5a]: *Perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem*; et Philosophus dicit, quod « perfecta virtus optimorum est operativa ».

Similiter intelligendum est, quod quinque modis obligatur aliquis ad aliquid. Primum genus obligationis est propter *mandatum divinum*. Secundum est propter *votum emissum*. Tertium est propter *officium susceptum*. Quartum est propter *vitandum scandalum*. Quintum est propter *conscientiae iudicium*.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum homo in perfecta caritate existens teneatur ad opera perfectionis; dicendum, quod si perfectio accipiatur primo modo, videlicet pro perfectione iustitiae, quae consistit in impletione mandatorum; sic obligatur ad illam perfectionem, sicut et alii; et eo magis de bono et aequo, quo magis percepit donum, per quod possit implere divinum mandatum. — Si autem loquamur de aliis generibus perfectionis, dicendum, quod non obligatur homo existens in perfecta caritate ad illa, quantum est ex obligatione divini mandati; nec aliter obligatur, nisi interveniat aliquod vinculum sequentium, videlicet votum, per quod obligetur ad perfectionem religionis; vel officium susceptum, per quod obligetur ad perfectionem praelationis; vel scandalum, ratione cuius obligetur ad perfectionem comparationis; vel conscientiae dictamen, per quod obligetur ad perfectionem tranquillitatis. His enim[^6a] intervenientibus, superinducitur nova obligatio ad huiusmodi genera perfectionum praedictarum. Sed status caritatis, quantum est de se, necessariam obligationem non adducit, sicut rationes, quae ad hanc partem sunt inductae, ostendunt. Et ideo concedi possunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Domini in Matthaeo, iam patet responsio: quia illud intelligitur de perfectione iustitiae et sufficientiae, ad quam obligantur omnes, tam perfecti quam imperfecti.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod sicut crescunt dona, sic crescunt rationes donorum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est[^7a] quantum ad ea quae sunt necessitatis. Praeterea, quod dicitur, quod rationes donorum crescunt; hoc non est, quia Deus semper exigat necessario ab homine totum, quod potest; sed quia exigit de bono et aequo, ita quod illa exigentia non inducit tentionem necessitatis, sed congruitatis; et eius omissio non inducit culpam mortalem, sed venialem. Dominus autem non solum exigit rationem de mortalibus, sed etiam de venialibus, secundum illud quod dicitur Matthaei duodecimo[^8a], quod homines reddent rationem de omni verbo otioso.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet caritas imperfecta ad opera simplicis iustitiae etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia caritas imperfecta ordinatur ad opera simplicis iustitiae non propter ipsius caritatis statum, sed propter divinum mandatum; sed non sic est de operibus perfectionis, quia non cadunt sic sub praecepto, sed magis sub admonitione et consilio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habens caritatem semper tenetur proficere; dicendum, quod caritas dicitur dupliciter proficere: uno modo propter multiplicationem bonorum operum; alio modo propter ipsius caritatis augmentum et progressum ad ultimum statum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod homo tenetur proficere in caritate, et quod caritas aut proficit, aut deficit; si intelligatur de profectu, qui consistit in ipsius caritatis augmento et incremento, sic non habet veritatem, quia caritas non augetur in homine continue[^9a]. Si vero intelligatur de profectu, qui consistit in bonorum operum multiplica<!-- page 663 -->tione et iustitiae exercitatione, sic veritatem habet; sed iste profectus caritatis non tantum attenditur in impletione consiliorum et operum perfectorum, sed etiam in observantia mandatorum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod homo in perfecta caritate existens ad opera perfectionis necesse habeat obligari[^18].

english:
### Article unique. *On charity with respect to the perfection of merit.*
### Question III. *Whether one having perfect charity is bound to fulfill the things which are of perfection.*

Thirdly it is asked whether those having perfect charity are bound to fulfill the things which are of perfection. And that they are, seems [to follow].

1. Matthew 5[^4]: *Be perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect*; this is said to the Apostles and to apostolic men: therefore it seems that all perfect men are bound to the things which are of perfection.

2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily[^5]: « When gifts are increased, the reckonings of the gifts grow »; whence also an authority says that « to whom more is committed, more is required of him »: therefore to him to whom perfect charity is committed — since God requires an act befitting the habit — it seems that he is bound to the works of perfection.

3. Likewise, as imperfect charity stands to the works of simple righteousness, so perfect charity stands to the works of consummate righteousness; but one having imperfect charity is bound to the things which are of simple righteousness: therefore it seems that one having perfect charity is obliged to the works of perfection.

4. Likewise, charity either advances or falls away; but one having charity is bound not to fall away: therefore he is bound to advance, since there is no middle between these[^6]. But he who has perfect charity cannot advance except in perfect works: therefore it seems that everyone in whom there is perfection of charity is obliged to the works of perfection.

**On the contrary:**
1. Matthew 19[^7]: *If you will enter into life, keep the commandments*: therefore from the observance of the commandments alone it seems that a man can attain to salvation: therefore it does not seem that he is obliged to those things which are of perfect charity.

2. Likewise, James 3[^8]: *He who offends not in word, he is a perfect man*; but no one is bound to this, that he offend not in word, however perfect he may be: therefore on account of the perfection of charity one is not obliged to the things which are of perfection.

3. Likewise, the more anyone is constituted in greater charity, so much the more he has of freedom of spirit[^9]; and the more he has of freedom of spirit, the fewer the bonds by which he is obliged: therefore the perfect are not bound to more than the imperfect are bound, as regards the perfection of charity itself. If therefore the imperfect are not constrained to the works of perfection, it seems from the greater[^10] that neither ought those to be constrained who are constituted in perfect charity.

5. Likewise, the state of perfect charity does not exceed imperfect charity infinitely: since therefore the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely[^11], what is venial to the imperfect is not mortal to the perfect, as regards the very kind of state: therefore it does not seem that the perfection of charity obliges a man to the works of perfection. For if it did oblige, it would now seem that the perfect man were of worse condition.

> ### Conclusion.
> The state of perfect charity, as regards itself, obliges only to that perfection which consists in the fulfillment of the commandments.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the *kind of perfection* is manifold, and the *ground of obliging* is also manifold. — <!-- page 662 -->For five kinds of perfection are customarily distinguished. One is the perfection of *sufficiency*, which consists in the fulfillment of the commandments; and of this [Matthew 5][^1a]: *Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.* — The second is the perfection of *religion*, which consists in the observance of the counsels; and of this it is said in Matthew 19[^2a]: *If you will be perfect, go and sell all that you have* etc. — The third is the perfection of *prelacy*, which consists in the governance of subjects; and of this it is said in Luke 6[^3a]: *Everyone shall be perfect, if he be as his master.* — The fourth is the perfection of *comparison*, which consists in the showing of examples; and of this it is said in Genesis 6[^4a]: *Noah, a man just and perfect in his generations.* — The fifth is the perfection of *tranquillity*, which consists in the consummation of the most difficult and best things; 1 John 4[^5a]: *Perfect charity casts out fear*; and the Philosopher says that « perfect virtue is operative of the best things ».

Likewise it must be understood that one is obliged to something in five ways. The first kind of obligation is on account of a *divine commandment*. The second is on account of a *vow undertaken*. The third is on account of an *office received*. The fourth is on account of the *avoidance of scandal*. The fifth is on account of the *judgment of conscience*.

When therefore it is asked whether a man existing in perfect charity is bound to the works of perfection; it must be said that if perfection be taken in the first way, namely for the perfection of righteousness, which consists in the fulfillment of the commandments; thus he is obliged to that perfection, just as also others; and so much the more, of what is good and equitable, the more he has received the gift by which he can fulfill the divine commandment. — But if we speak of the other kinds of perfection, it must be said that a man existing in perfect charity is not obliged to those, as regards the obligation of the divine commandment; nor is he otherwise obliged, unless some bond of the following [things] intervene, namely a vow, by which he is obliged to the perfection of religion; or an office received, by which he is obliged to the perfection of prelacy; or scandal, by reason of which he is obliged to the perfection of comparison; or the dictate of conscience, by which he is obliged to the perfection of tranquillity. For when these[^6a] intervene, a new obligation is superinduced to the aforesaid kinds of perfection. But the state of charity, as regards itself, brings no necessary obligation, as the arguments which are adduced to this part show. And therefore they can be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning the authority of the Lord in Matthew, the response is already plain: because that is understood of the perfection of righteousness and sufficiency, to which all are obliged, both perfect and imperfect.

2. To that which is objected concerning the authority of Gregory, that as the gifts grow, so the reckonings of the gifts grow; it must be said that this is true[^7a] as regards the things which are of necessity. Moreover, as to what is said, that the reckonings of the gifts grow; this is not because God always necessarily requires of a man all that he can [do]; but because he requires of what is good and equitable, so that that requirement does not bring on a holding of necessity, but of fittingness; and its omission does not bring on mortal fault, but venial. But the Lord requires a reckoning not only of mortal [sins], but also of venial ones, according to that which is said in Matthew 12[^8a], that men shall render a reckoning of every idle word.

3. To that which is objected, that as imperfect charity stands to the works of simple righteousness etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because imperfect charity is ordered to the works of simple righteousness not on account of the state of charity itself, but on account of the divine commandment; but it is not so concerning the works of perfection, because they do not fall thus under precept, but rather under admonition and counsel.

4. To that which is objected, that one having charity is always bound to advance; it must be said that charity is said to advance in two ways: in one way on account of the multiplication of good works; in another way on account of the increase of charity itself and its progress toward the ultimate state. When therefore it is said that a man is bound to advance in charity, and that charity either advances or falls away; if it be understood of the advance which consists in the increase and growth of charity itself, thus it is not true, because charity is not increased in a man continuously[^9a]. But if it be understood of the advance which consists in the multiplication of good works<!-- page 663 -->and the exercise of righteousness, thus it is true; but this advance of charity is attended not only in the fulfillment of the counsels and of perfect works, but also in the observance of the commandments. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that a man existing in perfect charity must of necessity be obliged to the works of perfection[^18].

la: Vers. 48.

en: Verse 48.

la: Libr. 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 9. n. 1. — Ad verba quae sequuntur: *auctoritas* [Vat. *auctoritas divina*] *dicit*, supple: in Glossa ordinaria (apud Strabum et Lyranum) in Luc. 12, 48: *Cui multum datum est, multum quaeretur ab eo.*

en: Book 1, Homilies on the Gospel, homily 9, n. 1. — To the words that follow, *an authority* [the Vatican edition: *a divine authority*] *says*, supply: in the *Glossa ordinaria* (in Strabo and Lyra) on Luke 12:48: *To whom much is given, much shall be required of him.*

la: Bernard., Epist. 254. n. 5. ait, inter profectum et defectum in hoc statu mortalis vitae nihil medium inveniri. Cfr. Epist. 91. n. 3; Serm. 35. de Diversis, n. 2. et Serm. 124. n. 1.

en: Bernard, Epistle 254, n. 5, says that between advance and falling-away in this state of mortal life no middle is found. Cf. Epistle 91, n. 3; Sermon 35 *on Diverse Subjects*, n. 2, and Sermon 124, n. 1.

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: Vers. 2. — *Minor* fulcitur illo Bedae dicto (in vers. laudat.): « Quotidiana est huiusmodi et inevitabilis offensio », nec non et illo (ibid. in n. n.): *Nullus loquentium est qui non aliquando delinquit in lingua sua.*

en: Verse 2. — The *minor* [premise] is supported by that saying of Bede (on the verse cited): « Of this kind is the daily and unavoidable offense », and also by that one (ibid., on the same): *There is no one of those who speak who does not sometimes fall short with his tongue.*

la: *Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas* [II. Cor. 3, 17.]. De seq. dicto vide supra pag. 31, nota 8. verba Augustini, quod aliud est esse *in lege*, aliud *sub lege.*

en: *Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty* [2 Cor. 3:17]. On the following saying see above, p. 31, note 8, the words of Augustine, that it is one thing to be *in the law*, another to be *under the law.*

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.

en: Cf. vol. I, p. 835, note 5.

la: Vide IV. Sent. d. 16. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — In fine arg. codd. K R W Y addunt *quam imperfectus.*

en: See IV Sent., d. 16, p. II, a. 3, q. 1. — At the end of the argument codices K R W Y add *quam imperfectus* ("than the imperfect [man]").

la: Vers. 48. — Paulo superius pro *Una est* edd. *Prima est.*

en: Verse 48. — A little above, for *Una est* the editions [read] *Prima est.*

la: Vers. 21.

en: Verse 21.

la: Vers. 40.

en: Verse 40.

la: Vers. 9. — Pro *perfectio comparationis* edd. cum nonnullis codd. hic et inferius *perfectio operationis*, refragantibus multis aliis codd. nec non Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 72. a. 3. Nostram lectionem tuentur etiam Petr. Pictaviensis († 1205), III. Sent. c. 25, et Guliel. Antissiodor., Sum. p. III. tr. 6. c. 5. q. 2. Hic, versum allatum exponens ait: « Erat Noe vir iustus et perfectus in generatione sua, id est in generatione humana, quoniam in comparatione hominum iustus apparebat, licet non in comparatione Angelorum ». Ille similiter locum laudatum explicat. Insuper perfectionem *religionis* vocat perfectionem *quietis*, perfectionem *praelationis* autem perfectionem *actionis*, et perfectionem *tranquillitatis* perfectionem *certitudinis* (Guliel. Antissiod. perfectionem *securitatis*). Utrique addunt quoque his quinque perfectionibus sextam, *perfectionem sacri ordinis* (e. gr. sacerdotii).

en: Verse 9. — For *perfectio comparationis* the editions with some codices, here and below, [read] *perfectio operationis*, against many other codices and also the Supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 72, a. 3. Our reading is upheld also by Peter of Poitiers († 1205), III Sent. c. 25, and by William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. III, tr. 6, c. 5, q. 2. The latter, expounding the verse cited, says: « Noah was a man just and perfect in his generation, that is, in the human generation, since in comparison with men he appeared just, though not in comparison with the Angels ». The former likewise explains the passage cited. Moreover he calls the perfection of *religion* the perfection of *rest*, the perfection of *prelacy* the perfection of *action*, and the perfection of *tranquillity* the perfection of *certitude* (William of Auxerre, the perfection of *security*). Both also add to these five perfections a sixth, the *perfection of sacred order* (e.g., of the priesthood).

la: Vers. 18. — Philosophi sententia habetur II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. II. Moral. Eudem. c. 3. et 6. (c. 1. et 5.) nec non supra pag. 472, nota 2.

en: Verse 18. — The Philosopher's statement is in *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 3. Cf. *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 3 and 6 (c. 1 and 5), and also above, p. 472, note 2.

la: Pro *enim*, quod cod. A omittit, cod. bb *igitur.*

en: For *enim*, which codex A omits, codex bb [reads] *igitur.*

la: Cod. A interserit *quia Deus semper exigit ab homine.* Mox pro *necessitatis* cod. F *necessaria.* Inferius pro *tentionem necessitatis* cod. V et edd. 1, 2 *tunc rationem necessitatis.*

en: Codex A inserts *quia Deus semper exigit ab homine* ("because God always requires of a man"). Soon, for *necessitatis* codex F [reads] *necessaria.* Below, for *tentionem necessitatis* codex V and editions 1, 2 [read] *tunc rationem necessitatis.*

la: Vers. 36.

en: Verse 36.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 4, et II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Post pauca pro *multiplicatione* edd. cum aliquot codd. *multitudine* et circa finem solut. *consistens* pro *existens.*

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 4, and II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — After a little, for *multiplicatione* the editions with some codices [read] *multitudine*, and near the end of the solution *consistens* for *existens.*

la: Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli.

en: See the scholion to question 1 of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`raw/vision/vol3/p-{661,662,663}.png` → `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{661,662,663}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw 45950–46084) as the base for clean running prose and exact footnote-marker spacing. PDF authoritative in the two-column cascade-shattered five-genera passage, Respondeo/Ad-replies, and every page footer (Vol III PDF-priority inversion; offset pdf = printed + 22; running-head OCR digit-mangled — trusted via the +22 offset and the running-head TEXT *DIST. XXX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III/IV* + the clean printed page numbers `662`/`663` read off the band tops).

**Alignment: PASS.** QUAESTIO III header raw 45950; opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum perfectam caritatem habentes teneantur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere. Et quod sic, videtur.* (raw 45952) confirmed against the p.661 L-column band — matches `title_la` and the divisio's TRACTATIO Tertium (*utrum habens caritatem perfectam teneatur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere*). Upper boundary: QUAESTIO IV at raw 46085 (*Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum*), confirmed via grep + the p.663 R-band (QUAESTIO IV opens immediately below q3's closing *…obligari¹*). No q-swap.

**Argument numbering (printed, preserved verbatim).** The *Sed contra* run is numbered **1, 2, 3, 5** in the print — there is **no contra-4**. This is an editorial numbering gap in the Quaracchi text (the four *videtur* objections are 1–4; the contra args skip from 3 to 5), preserved as printed, not an extraction dropout.

**Page span / page-split map.** q3 spans **printed pp.661–663** (PDF 683–685). **p.661** (PDF 683, lower portion, below q2's tail + scholion-redirect): QUAESTIO III header + full-width title, then *videtur* objections 1–4 (L-col), the *Sed contra* opener (1, L-col foot) + contra 2, 3, 5 (R-col), CONCLUSIO + the start of *Respondeo* (*Ad praedictorum… Quin-*, R-col foot). **p.662** (PDF 684, full page of q3): the five *genera perfectionis* (L-col), the five *modi obligandi* + the *Cum ergo quaeritur* determination (Conclusio 1 & 2) (L-col), then *His enim intervenientibus…* + Ad-replies 1, 2, 3, 4-start (R-col). **p.663** (PDF 685, top L+R only): Ad 4 conclusion (*…multiplicatione et iustitiae exercitatione… Et ideo ex hoc*, L-col) closing on the R-col with *non potest concludi… obligari¹*, immediately before QUAESTIO IV opens (mid-p.663).

**Apparatus: 18 entries, per-page restart (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM).**
- **p.661 nn.4–11 → `[^4]`–`[^11]`** (nn.1–3 are q2's): n.4 = `[^4]` Matt 5:48 (obj.1); n.5 = `[^5]` Gregory *Homil. in Evang.* 9 / Gloss on Luke 12:48 (obj.2); n.6 = `[^6]` Bernard *Epist.* 254 (obj.4 *medium inter haec*); n.7 = `[^7]` Matt 19:17 (contra 1); n.8 = `[^8]` James 3:2 / Bede (contra 2); n.9 = `[^9]` 2 Cor 3:17 / Augustine *in lege / sub lege* (contra 3 *libertas spiritus*); n.10 = `[^10]` tom. I p.835 (contra 3 *a maiori*); n.11 = `[^11]` IV Sent. d.16 / codd. K R W Y *quam imperfectus* (contra 5).
- **p.662 nn.1–9 → `[^1a]`–`[^9a]`** (suffixed `a` to avoid collision with p.661's nn.1–3 which belong to q2): n.1a Matt 5:48 / *Una est→Prima est*; n.2a Matt 19:21; n.3a Luke 6:40; n.4a Gen 6:9 (the long *perfectio comparationis/operationis* + Noe note); n.5a 1 John 4:18 / Aristotle *Ethic.* II.3; n.6a cod. A *enim*/*igitur*; n.7a cod. A *quia Deus semper exigit*; n.8a Matt 12:36; n.9a I Sent. d.17 / II Sent. d.27 cross-refs.
- **p.663 n.1 → `[^18]`** = *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli* (the scholion redirect, anchored at the closing *obligari*). Markers paired in both Latin and English bodies.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q2:* **p.661 nn.4–6** (n.4 Matt 5:48; n.5 Gregory *Homil.* 9; n.6 Bernard *Epist.* 254) — forwarded by q2's report and confirmed here against the p.661 L-band footer; they are this chunk's leading apparatus entries `[^4]`–`[^6]`. q2 retained its own p.661 nn.1–3.
- *Forwarded to q4 (d30-a1-q4):* on the shared **p.663**, q3 owns only **n.1** (the scholion redirect). **p.663 nn.2–7 belong to q4** — n.2 *Vers. 18.* (Lev 19:18, q4 obj.1 *Diliges amicum tuum sicut te ipsum* + Augustine Enarrat. in Ps. 25); n.3 *Vers. 46.* (Glossa interlinearis, Matt 5:46, q4 obj.2); n.4 *Vers. 27.* (Glossa Strabo/Lyra, Matt 5:44, q4 *Sed contra*); n.5 *Cap. 6, 15. et 18, 35.*; n.6 *Respicit Rom. 7, 23, et Gal. 5, 17.*; n.7 *Vide supra d. 28. q. 3.* q4 begins its NOTAE pickup at p.663 n.2 and continues on p.664+.

**Scholion: ABSENT — REDIRECT to q1 article-master scholion §IV.** q3 has no own scholion. q1's article-master scholion §IV explicitly forward-treats *this* third question: « *Tertiam quaestionem* sic proponit B. Albert… Praeter hunc tractat eandem quaestionem solus S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 8. quaestiunc. 3. — De quinque perfectionis generibus vide pag. 662, nota 4… » — and q3's closing apparatus note `[^18]` reads « Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli ». `has_scholion: false`. (Mirrors the established sibling-redirect convention, as q2 → q1 §III.)

**`[?]` flags: none.** All readings confirmed against the column-band crops; the editorial margin glosses (*Ad opposit.*, *Fundamenta*, *Genera 5 perfectionis* / *Prima–Quinta*, *Modi 5 obligandi*, *Conclusio 1–3*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Caritas dupliciter proficit*) trimmed per the OCR-cleanup rule — not Bonaventure's text.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Levitici decimo nono[^2]: *Diliges amicum tuum sicut te ipsum*; super quo dicit Augustinus, quod « nomine proximi et amici intelligitur omnis homo », secundum etiam quod ipse Dominus innuit Lucae decimo: ergo si illud praeceptum datum est omnibus; cum omnes teneantur affectu diligere se, videtur, quod omnes teneantur affectu diligere inimicos.

2. Item, Matthaei quinto[^3]: *Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis?* Glossa: « Nullam in caelo »: ergo qui tantum habet dilectionem respectu diligentium se non habet caritatem, cum caritas non possit esse sine mercede: igitur ad hoc, quod aliquis habeat caritatem, necesse est, quod ipsius caritas ad eos qui ipsum odiunt, se extendat.

3. Item, super illud Lucae sexto[^4]: *Diligite inimicos vestros*; Glossa interlinearis: « Non sufficit non odisse »; sed omnes tenentur ad illud quod sufficit ad salutem: ergo omnes tenentur non solum ad non odiendum inimicos, sed etiam ad amandum.

4. Item, nulli Deus dimittit peccatum, nisi ipse dimittat proximo, secundum quod dicitur Matthaei sexto et decimo octavo[^5]; sed nemo dimittit proximo ex corde, nisi ipsum diligat affectu: ergo nemo potest apud Deum veniam mereri, nisi offendentes se diligat ex corde.

5. Item, plus diligendus est proximus quam corpus proprium, nec aliquid adversatur magis et inimicatur spiritui quam ipsa caro[^6]: cum ergo quilibet teneatur naturam carnis suae diligere, videtur, quod teneatur inimicum suum affectu amare.

6. Item, sicut culpa est detestabilis, sic imago Dei est diligibilis; sed quantumcumque homo diligatur, semper tenetur homo detestari eius culpam[^7]: ergo quantumcumque per culpam adversetur, semper tenetur diligere naturam.

**Sed contra:**
1. Matthaei quinto[^8]: *Audistis, quia dictum est antiquis: Diliges amicum tuum et odio habebis inimicum tuum*; sed ad nihil morale obligamur nunc, ad quod non obligarentur antiqui in Lege: ergo si tunc non tenebantur ad diligendum inimicum, sed potius ad odiendum; videtur, quod non omnes tenentur nunc inimicos diligere. Minor probatur: quia super illud Matthaei decimo quarto[^9] de quinque panibus etc. Glossa: « Non alia, quam quae scripta erant, praedicavit; sed Legem et Prophetas mysteriis gravida esse demonstrat ». Et iterum, tertii Regum septimo[^10]: *Fecit Hiram mare fusile decem cubitorum*; ibi Glossa: « Decem praeceptis in Lege omnia quae facere debemus, Dominus expressit ». Si ergo in nullo decem praeceptorum continetur dilectio inimici, nec ad aliud obligantur moderni, ad quod non obligarentur antiqui; videtur etc.

2. Item, Lucae sexto[^11]: *Diligite inimicos vestros*; ibi Glossa: « Hoc perfectorum est »; et iterum alia Glossa, ibi: « Ecclesia hic non lacte nutritur, quod est simplicium et imperfectorum, sed validiori cibo caritatis roboratur »; sed ad ea quae perfectionis sunt, non omnes tenentur: igitur non omnes tenentur diligere inimicos.

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3. Item, super illud Psalmi[^12a]: *Revela oculos meos, et considerabo mirabilia de Lege tua*; Glossa: « Nihil mirabilius est in mandatis quam diligere inimicos »; sed non omnes tenentur ad faciendum mirabilia, « quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, virtutes et mirabilia facere non omnibus datum est »: ergo etc.

4. Item, Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in distinctione praecedenti[^13a], ubi actum est de ordine caritatis: « Sufficit, quod inimicos odio non habemus »: ergo videtur, quod non omnes tenentur diligere inimicos ex corde.

### Conclusio.

> Affectu a caritate elicito tenemur etiam inimicos diligere, optando eis bona aeterna; affectu vero imperato, quo quis optat alii prosperitatem temporalem, eos diligere est perfectionis, unde sufficit non odisse.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex est respondendi modus. Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod dupliciter est loqui de inimicis: aut secundum statum, in quo exercent inimicitias; aut secundum statum, in quo poenitent et petunt veniam. Si secundum statum, in quo veniam petunt; sic omnes tenentur ad diligendum inimicos propter illam conditionem, quam Dominus ponit in oratione dominica[^14a]: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos etc.* Si enim homo homini servat iram, frustra a Deo quaerit medelam, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastici vigesimo octavo. — Si autem loquamur de inimicis, prout sunt in statu et in actu laedendi et inimicitias exercendi; sic dicere voluerunt, quod affectu diligere inimicos non est necessitatis, sed magis perfectionis; nec hoc Dominus praecipit, sed magis consulit. Et istam opinionem quorundam Magister ponit in littera[^15a].

Sed si interius consideretur haec positio, minus sufficienter dicit, pro eo quod, secundum quod auctoritates Sanctorum expresse dicunt, et ipsa ratio aperte convincit, non est caritas vera, nisi diligat omne diligibile; diligibile autem a caritate est omne illud, quod est possibile ad beatitudinem pervenire: ideo non habet aliquis caritatem, nisi diligat omnes illos, qui sunt in statu viae, sive sint amici sive inimici. Unde in Psalmo[^16a] dicitur: *Latum mandatum tuum nimis*, quia mandatum caritatis ad omnes se extendit. Et sicut longitudo mandati se extendit ad omnem differentiam temporis, sic latitudo ad omnem personam hominis viatoris. Unde sicut aliquis non haberet caritatem, si proponeret etiam in uno solo die peccare et in aliis bene facere, quia deficit sibi longitudo mandati; sic, esto quod aliquis omnes homines diligat praeter unum solum, quem a dilectione excludit, caritatem non habet, quia deficit sibi latitudo illius mandati[^17a].

Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod diligere affectu est dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est affectus amoris: quidam a caritate elicitus, et quidam a caritate imperatus. Ille est affectus amoris a caritate elicitus, quo quis optat alii summum Bonum sive beatitudinem aeternam. Ille vero est affectus imperatus, quo quis optat alii bonum temporale et prosperitatem transitoriam. Amor enim caritatis facit, quod homo velit alii omne bonum, nedum summum Bonum, sed etiam temporale, nisi illud sit impediens ad salutem[^18a].

Si ergo loquamur de primo affectu a caritate elicito, dico, quod omnes tenentur inimicos, etiam actu inimicantes, diligere et eis vitam aeternam optare. — Si autem loquamur de affectu imperato, quo quis optat alii prosperitatem temporalem; sic non omnes tenentur diligere, sed sufficit non odisse. Et hoc est quod dicit Ambrosius[^19a]: « Sufficit, quod inimicos diligimus et non odio habemus », in quo innuit, quod cum duplex sit caritatis affectus, uno tenemur diligere, altero vero sufficit non odisse. Unde ad non odiendum inimicos et non gaudendum de malis eorum omnes tenentur, sicut dicitur Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto[^20a]: *Cum ceciderit inimicus tuus, ne gaudeas*; et Ecclesiastici octavo: *Noli de inimico tuo mortuo gaudere.* Diligere vero omnino quantum ad affectum elicitum et imperatum optando ei bona aeterna et temporalia, hoc perfectionis est et supererogationis. Diligere vero ad bona aeterna hoc necessitatis est et praeceptionis; et ad hoc omnes generaliter sunt obligati, tam perfecti quam imperfecti, sicut rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, ostendunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Matthaei quinto: *Diliges amicum tuum et odio habebis inimicum tuum*; responderi potest dupliciter.

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Primo, quod haec Lex nunquam praecipit, odio haberi inimicum, sed ipsi Iudaei hoc arguebant a contrario sensu: quia tantum praecipiebatur eis diligere amicos[^1], arguebant ex hoc, quod debebant odire inimicos. — Aliter responderi potest, quod est odium affectus et odium effectus; et iterum, est inimicus Ecclesiae sive fidei et inimicus personalis. Cum ergo Lex innuebat, inimicum odio esse habendum; hoc intelligitur de odio effectus et de inimico Ecclesiae et cultus divini. Odio vero affectus neminem praecipiebat odire, nec inimicum personalem nec inimicum Ecclesiae. Inimicum autem personalem non praecipiebat odiri nec odio affectus nec odio effectus, immo potius obligabat ad diligendum ipsum, licet non esset tunc ita expressum: unde et Dominus explicuit in Matthaei quinto[^2b]. Et propterea non potest ex hoc argui, quod non omnes teneantur diligere inimicos.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod hoc perfectorum est[^3b]; respondent aliqui, quod illud intelligitur de dilectione affectus et effectus, non de dilectione affectus tantum. Sed utrum hoc sit verum, in sequenti problemate declarabitur. Nunc autem dicamus, quod si intelligatur de affectu elicito et imperato, perfectionis est; si vero de affectu elicito tantum, est generalis necessitatis. Glossa vero loquitur ibi de dilectione quantum ad utrumque modum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diligere inimicos est mirabile; dicendum, quod mirabile dicitur illud quod est supra facultatem naturae; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter, secundum quod est operatio naturae simpliciter, et naturae rationalis. Facere autem mirabilia supra posse naturae simpliciter, hoc est per gratiam gratis datam, quam vocat Apostolus[^4b] operationem virtutum; et hoc non omnibus est datum. Facere vero mirabilia supra posse naturae rationalis, hoc est per gratiam gratum facientem, utpote per fidem et caritatem. Per fidem enim credimus multa, quae non possemus credere sine ea, et quae videntur infidelibus nimis incredibilia[^5b]; et per caritatem amamus ea quae videntur caritatem non habentibus odibilia. Et haec mirabilia continentur in Lege divina, et datum est illa omnibus facere, qui volunt in se suscipere gratiam gratum facientem. Et pro tanto non potest argui, quod non teneamur ad dilectionem inimici; hoc enim[^6b] est aliud genus mirabilis quam illud, de quo loquitur Augustinus.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Ambrosii, quod sufficit, si odio non habemus; dicendum, quod auctoritas illa truncate inducitur; dicit enim haec duo simul[^7b]: « Sufficit, si simpliciter diligimus et non odio habemus ». Quae duo valde rationabiliter dicit et duplicem affectum dilectionis innuit; et ad confirmationem facit praehabitae responsionis, per quam auctoritas illa satis clare potest intelligi.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether all are bound to love their enemies as to affection.*

Fourthly it is asked whether all are bound to love their enemies as to affection. And that they are, it seems.

1. Leviticus 19[^2]: *You shall love your friend as yourself*; on which Augustine says that « by the name of neighbor and friend every man is understood », according also to what the Lord himself indicates in Luke 10: therefore if that precept was given to all; since all are bound to love themselves as to affection, it seems that all are bound to love their enemies as to affection.

2. Likewise, Matthew 5[^3]: *If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have?* The Gloss: « None in heaven »: therefore he who has love only with respect to those who love him does not have charity, since charity cannot be without reward: therefore, in order that someone may have charity, it is necessary that his charity extend to those who hate him.

3. Likewise, on that of Luke 6[^4]: *Love your enemies*; the interlinear Gloss: « It does not suffice not to hate »; but all are bound to that which suffices for salvation: therefore all are bound not only to not hating their enemies, but also to loving them.

4. Likewise, God forgives sin to no one unless he himself forgives his neighbor, according to what is said in Matthew 6 and 18[^5]; but no one forgives his neighbor from the heart unless he loves him as to affection: therefore no one can merit pardon before God unless he loves from the heart those who offend him.

5. Likewise, the neighbor is to be loved more than one's own body, nor does anything oppose and act as an enemy to the spirit more than the flesh itself[^6]: since therefore anyone is bound to love the nature of his own flesh, it seems that he is bound to love his enemy as to affection.

6. Likewise, just as the fault is detestable, so the image of God is lovable; but however much a man is loved, a man is always bound to detest his fault[^7]: therefore however much he is opposed through his fault, one is always bound to love the nature.

**On the contrary:**
1. Matthew 5[^8]: *You have heard that it was said to the ancients: You shall love your friend and hate your enemy*; but we are now obligated to nothing moral to which the ancients in the Law would not have been obligated: therefore if then they were not bound to loving the enemy, but rather to hating; it seems that not all are now bound to love their enemies. The minor is proved: because on that of Matthew 14[^9] concerning the five loaves etc. the Gloss: « He preached nothing other than what was written; but he shows the Law and the Prophets to be pregnant with mysteries ». And again, 3 Kings 7[^10]: *Hiram made a molten sea of ten cubits*; there the Gloss: « By the ten precepts in the Law the Lord expressed all the things which we ought to do ». If therefore the love of the enemy is contained in none of the ten precepts, neither are the moderns obligated to anything else to which the ancients would not have been obligated; it seems etc.

2. Likewise, Luke 6[^11]: *Love your enemies*; there the Gloss: « This belongs to the perfect »; and again another Gloss, there: « The Church here is not nourished with milk, which belongs to the simple and imperfect, but is strengthened with the stronger food of charity »; but not all are bound to those things which are of perfection: therefore not all are bound to love their enemies.

3. Likewise, on that of the Psalm[^12a]: *Reveal my eyes, and I shall consider the wonders of your Law*; the Gloss: « Nothing is more wonderful among the commandments than to love one's enemies »; but not all are bound to do wonders, « because, as Augustine says, to do virtues and wonders is not given to all »: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Ambrose says, and it is found in the preceding distinction[^13a], where the order of charity was treated: « It suffices that we do not hold our enemies in hatred »: therefore it seems that not all are bound to love their enemies from the heart.

### Conclusion.

> By an affection elicited from charity we are bound to love even our enemies, by wishing them eternal goods; but by a commanded affection, by which one wishes another temporal prosperity, to love them belongs to perfection, whence it suffices not to hate.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of responding. For some wished to say that there is a twofold way of speaking of enemies: either according to the state in which they exercise their enmities; or according to the state in which they repent and seek pardon. If according to the state in which they seek pardon; thus all are bound to loving their enemies on account of that condition which the Lord places in the Lord's Prayer[^14a]: *Forgive us our debts, as we also etc.* For if a man keeps anger toward a man, in vain does he seek healing from God, according to what is said in Ecclesiasticus 28. — But if we speak of enemies as they are in the state and act of harming and exercising enmities; thus they wished to say that to love enemies as to affection is not of necessity, but rather of perfection; nor does the Lord command this, but rather counsels it. And the Master sets down this opinion of certain men in the text[^15a].

But if this position be considered inwardly, it speaks less sufficiently, for the reason that, according to what the authorities of the Saints expressly say, and reason itself openly convinces, there is no true charity unless it love every lovable thing; but lovable by charity is everything which is able to attain to beatitude: therefore no one has charity unless he love all those who are in the state of the way, whether they be friends or enemies. Whence in the Psalm[^16a] it is said: *Your commandment is exceedingly broad*, because the commandment of charity extends itself to all. And just as the length of the commandment extends to every difference of time, so its breadth to every person of a man who is a wayfarer. Whence just as someone would not have charity if he proposed to sin even on one single day and to do well on the others, because the length of the commandment is lacking to him; so, granted that someone love all men except one only, whom he excludes from love, he does not have charity, because the breadth of that commandment is lacking to him[^17a].

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that to love as to affection is in a twofold way, according as the affection of love is twofold: one elicited from charity, and one commanded by charity. That affection of love is elicited from charity, by which one wishes for another the highest Good or eternal beatitude. But that is the commanded affection, by which one wishes for another a temporal good and transitory prosperity. For the love of charity brings it about that a man wills for another every good, not only the highest Good, but also the temporal, unless it be an impediment to salvation[^18a].

If therefore we speak of the first affection, elicited from charity, I say that all are bound to love their enemies, even those actually showing enmity, and to wish them eternal life. — But if we speak of the commanded affection, by which one wishes another temporal prosperity; thus not all are bound to love, but it suffices not to hate. And this is what Ambrose says[^19a]: « It suffices that we love our enemies and do not hold them in hatred », in which he indicates that, since the affection of charity is twofold, by one we are bound to love, but for the other it suffices not to hate. Whence all are bound to not hating their enemies and to not rejoicing over their evils, as is said in Proverbs 24[^20a]: *When your enemy has fallen, do not rejoice*; and Ecclesiasticus 8: *Do not rejoice over your dead enemy.* But to love wholly as to elicited and commanded affection, by wishing him eternal and temporal goods, this belongs to perfection and supererogation. But to love unto eternal goods, this is of necessity and of precept; and to this all are generally obligated, both the perfect and the imperfect, as the reasons which are brought forward for the first part show, and therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary from Matthew 5: *You shall love your friend and hate your enemy*; it can be answered in two ways.

First, that this Law never commands that the enemy be held in hatred, but the Jews themselves argued this from the contrary sense: because it was only commanded them to love friends[^1], they argued from this that they ought to hate enemies. — Otherwise it can be answered that there is a hatred of affection and a hatred of effect; and again, there is the enemy of the Church or of the faith and the personal enemy. When therefore the Law indicated that the enemy was to be held in hatred; this is understood of the hatred of effect and of the enemy of the Church and of divine worship. But by hatred of affection it commanded no one to hate, neither the personal enemy nor the enemy of the Church. The personal enemy, however, it did not command to be hated either by hatred of affection or by hatred of effect, but rather it obligated to loving him, although it was not then so expressed: whence the Lord also made it explicit in Matthew 5[^2b]. And therefore it cannot be argued from this that not all are bound to love their enemies.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that this belongs to the perfect[^3b]; some respond that it is understood of the love of affection and of effect, not of the love of affection alone. But whether this is true will be declared in the following problem. But now let us say that if it be understood of the elicited and commanded affection, it belongs to perfection; but if of the elicited affection alone, it is of general necessity. But the Gloss speaks there of love as to both ways.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that to love enemies is wonderful; it must be said that that is called wonderful which is above the faculty of nature; but this can be in a twofold way, according as it is an operation of nature simply, and of rational nature. But to do wonders above the power of nature simply, this is through grace freely given, which the Apostle[^4b] calls the operation of powers; and this is not given to all. But to do wonders above the power of rational nature, this is through sanctifying grace, namely through faith and charity. For through faith we believe many things which we could not believe without it, and which seem to unbelievers too incredible[^5b]; and through charity we love those things which seem hateful to those not having charity. And these wonders are contained in the divine Law, and it is given to all to do them, who wish to receive in themselves sanctifying grace. And for that reason it cannot be argued that we are not bound to the love of the enemy; for this[^6b] is another kind of wonder than that of which Augustine speaks.

*To 4.* To that which is objected from the authority of Ambrose, that it suffices if we do not hold them in hatred; it must be said that that authority is brought forward in truncated form; for it says these two things together[^7b]: « It suffices if we simply love and do not hold in hatred ». Which two things it says very reasonably, and indicates a twofold affection of love; and it makes for the confirmation of the response already given, by which that authority can be understood clearly enough.

la: Vers. 18. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Luc. 10, 36. seq. — Dictum August. invenitur Enarrat. in Ps. 25. enarrat. 2. n. 2; de Disciplina christ. c. 3. n. 3, et Serm. 62. (in appendice) n. 1. (alias 59. de Tempore). — In fine arg. pro *videtur, quod... teneantur* codd. AFGHNTZ *videtur, quod... tenentur.*

en: Verse 18. — The following Scripture passage is Luke 10:36 ff. — The saying of Augustine is found in *Enarrationes in Ps.* 25, enarrat. 2, n. 2; *de Disciplina christiana* c. 3, n. 3, and Serm. 62 (in the appendix) n. 1 (alias 59, de Tempore). — At the end of the argument, for *videtur, quod... teneantur* codices AFGHNTZ read *videtur, quod... tenentur.*

la: Vers. 46. — Glossa est *interlinearis* et habetur apud Lyranum.

en: Verse 46. — The Gloss is the *interlinear* one and is found in Lyra.

la: Vers. 27. — Verba Glossae, quae apud Strabum et Lyranum habetur ut *ordinaria*, respiciunt Hieronymi exposit. in Matth. 5, 44: *Multi, praecepta Dei imbecillitate sua, non Sanctorum viribus aestimantes, putant, esse impossibilia quae praecepta sunt, et dicunt sufficere virtutibus non odisse inimicos* etc.

en: Verse 27. — The words of the Gloss, which is found in Strabo and Lyra as the *Ordinary* one, refer to Jerome's exposition on Matt. 5:44: *Many, esteeming the precepts of God by their own weakness, not by the strength of the Saints, think that the things which are commanded are impossible, and say that it suffices for the virtues not to hate one's enemies* etc.

la: Respicit Rom. 7, 23, et Gal. 5, 17. — Quoad maiorem cfr. verba August. supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 1. allata. — Quod corpus proprium diligendum sit, ostensum est supra d. 28. a. 4.

en: Refers to Rom. 7:23 and Gal. 5:17. — As to the major, cf. the words of Augustine adduced above in the text of the Master, d. XXIX, c. 1. — That one's own body is to be loved was shown above at d. 28, a. 4.

la: Vide supra d. 28. q. 3. — Subinde post *ergo quantumcumque* cod. K interiicit *homo*, quod vocabulum in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 72. a. 1. invenitur post *semper tenetur*. Tum pro *diligere naturam* edd. et nonnulli codd. *diligere eius naturam.*

en: See above d. 28, q. 3. — Thereupon, after *ergo quantumcumque*, codex K inserts *homo*, which word in the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collat. 72, a. 1, is found after *semper tenetur*. Then for *diligere naturam* the editions and some codices read *diligere eius naturam.*

la: Vers. 43. — In minori non pauci codd. omittunt *antiqui.*

en: Verse 43. — In the minor, not a few codices omit *antiqui.*

la: Vers. 19. — Glossa sumta est ex Comment. Rabani super hunc locum: *Turbis*, inquit Rabanus, *esurientibus Salvator non nova creat cibaria, sed acceptis eis quae habuerunt discipuli, benedicit, quia veniens in carnem non alia, quam praedicta sunt, praedicabat, sed Legis et Prophetarum scripta quam sint mysteriis gratiae gravida, demonstrat.* — Pro *praedicavit* edd. cum bene multis codd. *prophetat.*

en: Verse 19. — The Gloss is taken from Rabanus's Commentary on this passage: *To the crowds*, says Rabanus, *who hunger, the Savior does not create new foods, but, taking those which the disciples had, he blesses them, because, coming in the flesh, he preached nothing other than what was foretold, but he shows how pregnant with the mysteries of grace are the writings of the Law and the Prophets.* — For *praedicavit* the editions with very many codices read *prophetat.*

la: Vers. 23. — Glossa (Ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum) delibata est ex Beda, de Templo Salomonis, c. 19.

en: Verse 23. — The Gloss (Ordinary, in Strabo and Lyra) is drawn from Bede, *On the Temple of Solomon*, c. 19.

la: Vers. 27. — Prima Glossa, quae penes Lyranum habetur ut *interlinearis*, est secundum Augustinum, Enchirid. c. 73. n. 19. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri. Secunda Glossa est *ordinaria* et sumta ex Ambros., *In Luc.* n. 72; in ea pro *nutritur* Strabus cum textu originali substituit *imbuitur*, et omittit verba *quod est simplicium et imperfectorum.*

en: Verse 27. — The first Gloss, which is found in Lyra as the *interlinear* one, is according to Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 73, n. 19. Cf. here the text of the Master. The second Gloss is the *Ordinary* one and is taken from Ambrose, *In Luc.* n. 72; in it, for *nutritur*, Strabo, following the original text, substitutes *imbuitur*, and omits the words *quod est simplicium et imperfectorum.*

la: Psalm. 118, 18. — Glossa, quae hic allegatur, est *ordinaria* et transcripta ex August. Enarrat. in hunc Ps. serm. 7. n. 4. — Dictum August. habetur in eius Serm. 225. (alias 47. de Sanctis) n. 2. (in appendice Serm. August.).

en: Psalm 118:18. — The Gloss which is cited here is the *Ordinary* one and is transcribed from Augustine, *Enarratio* on this Psalm, serm. 7, n. 4. — The saying of Augustine is found in his Serm. 225 (alias 47, de Sanctis) n. 2 (in the appendix of Augustine's Sermons).

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 2; ceterum verba allata sunt Origenis, non Ambrosii. — Cod. Z post *et habetur in* subdit *littera.*

en: Text of the Master, c. 2; for the rest, the words adduced are Origen's, not Ambrose's. — Codex Z, after *et habetur in*, adds *littera.*

la: Matth. 6, 12. — Seq. locus est Eccli. 28, 3: *Homo homini reservat iram, et a Deo quaerit medelam?*

en: Matt. 6:12. — The following passage is Ecclus. 28:3: *Man keeps anger for man, and does he seek healing from God?*

la: Huius distinctionis.

en: Of this distinction.

la: Psalm. 118, 96. Cfr. supra pag. 627, nota 3, et August., Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 26. n. 63. et Serm. 165. (alias 7. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 4. n. 4, ubi exponitur illud Eph. 3, 18: *Quae sit latitudo et longitudo* etc.

en: Psalm 118:96. Cf. above p. 627, note 3, and Augustine, *Epist.* 140 (alias 120) c. 26, n. 63, and Serm. 165 (alias 7, de Verbis Apostoli) c. 4, n. 4, where that of Eph. 3:18 is expounded: *What is the breadth and length* etc.

la: Cod. K. adiicit *caritatis.*

en: Codex K adds *caritatis.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 6. in corp. — Paulo inferius pro *et eis* complures codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *et etiam eis.*

en: Cf. above d. 29, q. 6, in the body. — A little below, for *et eis*, several codices and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales read *et etiam eis.*

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 2. Pro *diligimus et habemus* nonnulli codd. et edd. *diligamus et habeamus.*

en: See above the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 2. For *diligimus et habemus* some codices and editions read *diligamus et habeamus.*

la: Vers. 17. — Locus Eccli. est 8, 8.

en: Verse 17. — The passage of Ecclus. is 8:8.

la: Levit. 19, 18: *Diliges amicum tuum sicut te ipsum.* — Superius pro *praecipi... odio haberi* edd. habent *Primo per hoc quod... odio haberi*, et deinde multi codd. omittunt *tantum* ante *praecipiebatur.*

en: Levit. 19:18: *You shall love your friend as yourself.* — Above, for *praecipi... odio haberi* the editions have *Primo per hoc quod... odio haberi*, and then many codices omit *tantum* before *praecipiebatur.*

la: Vers. 44. seqq. — Pro *explicuit* cod. A *explicavit.* Superius mallemus *odire* pro *odiri*, quod habent codd. et edd.

en: Verses 44 ff. — For *explicuit* codex A reads *explicavit.* Above we should prefer *odire* over *odiri*, which the codices and editions have.

la: Bd.: *minus diligere inimicos perfectorum est.* Paulo inferius pro *declarabitur* codd. PIL *determinabitur.*

en: *Bd.*: *to love enemies less belongs to the perfect.* A little below, for *declarabitur* codices PIL read *determinabitur.*

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 12, 10. — De *mirabili* vide II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Mox pro *et hoc non... datum* edd. et aliqui codd. *et haec non... data.*

en: 1 Epist. Cor. 12:10. — Concerning the *wonderful* see II. Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5. — Soon, for *et hoc non... datum* the editions and some codices read *et haec non... data.*

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.

en: See above d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4.

la: Codd. EFGHILNTU *aa igitur*, Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *hic igitur.* Subinde pro *mirabilis* (sic codd. 1, 2 et memorat. Supplement. cum plurimis codd.) Vat. *mirabilius.*

en: Codices EFGHILNTU read *aa igitur*, the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales *hic igitur.* Thereupon, for *mirabilis* (so codices 1, 2 and the cited Supplement with very many codices) the Vatican edition reads *mirabilius.*

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 2.

en: See above the text of the Master, d. XXIX, c. 2.

latin_scholion:
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**I.** Haec et seq. (5.) quaestio intime cohaerent et a pluribus Magistri commentatoribus una quaestione absolvuntur. De utraque quaestione antiquitus in scholis exortae sunt diversae illae, hic relatae opiniones, quibus ansam praebuisse videntur quaedam verba tum S. Augustini (q. 5. arg. 3. ad oppos.), tum Origenis, sed Ambrosio a Magistro attributa (hic arg. 4. ad oppos.), tum Glossae (q. 4. et 5. arg. 2. ad oppos.; et cfr. lit. Magistri). — Ex principio supra d. 28. q. 3. stabilito facile eruitur, quod inimici, in quantum sunt inimici i. e. secundum vitium inimicitiae, non sunt diligendi, quia « hoc est perversum et caritati repugnans, quia hoc est diligere malum alterius » (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 25. a. 8; cfr. etiam Bonav., d. 29. q. 6.).

De distinctione duplicis affectus, qua auctor noster in responsione utitur, haec habet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.): « Affectus duplex est: quia unus est principalis, quem caritas primo et per se elicit, ut optare dilecto bona spiritualia, scilicet gratiam et gloriam; alter secundarius, quem secundum quosdam [etiam S. Bonav.] imperat, non elicit, secundum alios elicit etiam, sed non primo et per se et principaliter, sed per accidens (ideo nec semper, quia non semper expedit dilecto), ut optare ei bona temporalia » (cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1, et scholion). — A S. Thoma (S. loc. cit.) opportune alia additur distinctio, nempe quod sit dilectio in *generali* et in *speciali*, « ut scilicet aliquis in speciali moveatur motu dilectionis ad inimicum; et istud non est de necessitate caritatis absolute, quia nec etiam moveri motu dilectionis in speciali ad quoslibet homines singulariter est de necessitate caritatis, quia hoc esset impossibile. Est tamen de necessitate caritatis secundum *praeparationem animi* » etc. — Notatu digna est doctrina in solut. ad 1. et 3.

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**II.** Quoad 5. quaestionem opinio primo loco recitata merito reprobatur, atque communiter docetur, quod inimicus in *casu necessitatis* (et per consequens semper *secundum praeparationem animi*) diligendus sit exhibitione operis. Praescindendo ab hoc casu necessitatis, B. Albert. (hic, a. 2.) docet: « Sine praeiudicio dico, quod mihi videtur grave, si omnes dicuntur teneri ad exhibendum signa dilectionis... sed tamen videtur mihi, si postulat veniam, non irridens, quod tunc non negandum est ei signum dilectionis ». — De ultima parte huius testimonii cfr. hic dub. 2; S. Thom., hic a. 2. ad 5. Quoad primam vero partem addenda videtur distinctio a S. Thoma, Petr. a Tar., Richardo a Med. adhibita et postea communiter recepta, videlicet inter signa et beneficia dilectionis *communia*, quae vulgo exhibentur proximis, et a quibus nec inimici debent excludi, et alia *specialia*, particulariter aliquibus personis conferenda, quae non nisi in casu necessitatis, vel particularium circumstantiarum etiam inimicis sub stricta obligatione sunt praestanda. Haec doctrina, licet hic in responsione explicite non ponatur, satis conformis est verbis auctoris, quae leguntur in fundam. et in refutatione 1. opinionis (cfr. eiusdem Comment. in Lucam, 17, 4.).

**III.** De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 59. m. 5. a. 2. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. 2; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 8. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This and the following (5th) question are intimately connected and are dispatched by many commentators on the Master in a single question. Concerning both questions there arose of old in the schools those diverse opinions related here, to which certain words seem to have given occasion: both of St. Augustine (q. 5, arg. 3 to the contrary), and of Origen, but attributed by the Master to Ambrose (here, arg. 4 to the contrary), and of the Gloss (q. 4 and 5, arg. 2 to the contrary; and cf. the text of the Master). — From the principle established above at d. 28, q. 3, it is easily drawn that enemies, insofar as they are enemies, that is, according to the vice of enmity, are not to be loved, because « this is perverse and repugnant to charity, since this is to love the evil of another » (St. Thomas, *Summa* II-II, q. 25, a. 8; cf. also Bonaventure, d. 29, q. 6).

Concerning the distinction of the twofold affection, which our author uses in the response, Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 1, a. 1) has this: « Affection is twofold: because one is principal, which charity elicits first and through itself, as to wish for the beloved spiritual goods, namely grace and glory; the other secondary, which according to some [including St. Bonaventure] it commands, does not elicit, according to others it also elicits, but not first and through itself and principally, but by accident (and therefore not always, because it is not always expedient for the beloved), as to wish him temporal goods » (cf. above d. 28, q. 1, and scholion). — By St. Thomas (loc. cit.) another distinction is opportunely added, namely that there is love in *general* and in *particular*, « so that someone be moved in particular by a motion of love toward the enemy; and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, since not even to be moved by a motion of love in particular toward any men singly is of the necessity of charity, because this would be impossible. It is, however, of the necessity of charity according to the *preparation of the mind* » etc. — Worthy of note is the doctrine in the solution to the 1st and 3rd.

**II.** As to the 5th question, the opinion recited in the first place is rightly rejected, and it is commonly taught that the enemy in a *case of necessity* (and consequently always *according to the preparation of the mind*) is to be loved by the showing of a work. Prescinding from this case of necessity, B. Albert (here, a. 2) teaches: « Without prejudice I say that it seems grave to me if all are said to be bound to showing signs of love... but nevertheless it seems to me that, if he asks pardon, not mockingly, then a sign of love is not to be denied him ». — Concerning the last part of this testimony cf. here dub. 2; St. Thomas, here a. 2 ad 5. As to the first part, however, the distinction seems to be added which was employed by St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and afterwards commonly received, namely between the *common* signs and benefits of love, which are usually shown to neighbors, and from which not even enemies ought to be excluded, and other *special* ones, to be conferred particularly on certain persons, which are to be rendered, even to enemies, under strict obligation, only in a case of necessity or of particular circumstances. This doctrine, although it is not here explicitly set down in the response, is sufficiently conformable to the words of the author which are read in the fundamenta and in the refutation of the 1st opinion (cf. the same author's *Commentary on Luke*, 17, 4).

**III.** Concerning both questions: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 59, m. 5, a. 2, 3. — Scotus, in both Writings here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 1, 2; *Summa* II-II, q. 25, a. 8, 9. — B. Albert, here a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Promoted in place from the 2026-06-02 auto-chunked skeleton (`line_start: 46085`, `line_end: 46299`). Backed up to `_backup-d30-a1-q4-pre-promote-20260611/`. Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p66{3,4,5,6}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 46087–46299) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The two-column OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo, scholion, and every page footer (Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion; offset pdf = printed + 22, running-head TEXT trusted over OCR'd digits). `type: quaestio`, **`has_scholion: true`** — q4 carries its OWN scholion §I–III (NOT a redirect; see below).

**Alignment check — PASS.** Opener *Quarto quaeritur, utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum. Et quod sic, videtur.* (raw 46087; QUAESTIO IV header raw 46085) matches `title_la` and the d30-divisio TRACTATIO Quartum (*utrum omnes, tam perfecti quam imperfecti, teneantur inimicos diligere quantum ad affectum*). Running heads on the bands read `…CUS QUAEST. IV.` (p.663 R, p.665 R) and `DIST. XXX. ART. UNICUS Q…` (p.665 L), confirming ARTICULUS UNICUS QUAEST. IV. No q-swap. Upper boundary = QUAESTIO V (raw 46300; *Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum*), confirmed eyes-on at mid-p.666 R.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.663** (PDF 685): q4 opens mid-page, lower R-col (header + title, below q3's tail *…obligari¹*). videtur obj.1–6 (L-col) and Sed contra 1 + 2 (R-col).
- **p.664** (PDF 686): videtur obj.3–4 (continuing), CONCLUSIO, Respondeo (full determination, two-opinion / *longitudo–latitudo* / *elicitus–imperatus* / Conclusio 1–2–3), Ad 1 opener.
- **p.665** (PDF 687): Ad 1 (close, *dupliciter* responses) → Ad 4; then `SCHOLION.` §I begins (foot of page).
- **p.666** (PDF 688): scholion §II (top L-col, continuing) + §III (R-col); ends before `QUAESTIO V.` (mid-page).

**Scholion disposition.** q4 has its OWN scholion (§I, §II, §III), printed pp.665–666 between the Ad-replies and QUAESTIO V — read eyes-on from the bands (`vol3-p665-L-1/-2`, `vol3-p666-L-0/R-0`). §I treats the connection of q4 with q5 and the twofold-affection distinction (Petr. a Tar., S. Thom.); §II treats q5's *casu necessitatis* / B. Albert; §III is the cross-author *De utraque quaestione* citation list. This is NOT a redirect — the q1 article-master scholion §IV closed its forward-treatment at q3, so q4 carries its own. `has_scholion: true`.

**Apparatus — 22 entries, per-page NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM restarts flattened.** Map:
- **p.663 nn.2–7** → `[^2]`–`[^7]` (PICKED UP from the q3→q4 hand-off; p.663 n.1 = q3's scholion-redirect, retained by q3).
- **p.664 nn.1–9** → `[^12a]`,`[^13a]`,`[^14a]`,`[^15a]`,`[^16a]`,`[^17a]`,`[^18a]`,`[^19a]`,`[^20a]` (suffixed `a` to avoid label collision with p.663 nn.2–7).
- **p.665 nn.1–7** → `[^1]`–`[^7]` (the Ad-replies' notes; n.3 = the *Bd.* variant, n.4 = 1 Cor 12:10 + II Sent. cross-ref, n.6 = codd. EFGHILNTU variant, n.7 = lit. Magistri d.XXIX c.2).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q3:* **p.663 nn.2–7** (q3 owned only p.663 n.1, its scholion redirect). Confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p663-L-2`.
- *Forwarded to q5:* **p.666 nn.1–5** — n.1 Prov. 25:21 (Vulgata *da ei aquam bibere*), n.2 Matt. 5:44 (Glossa ordinaria, Strabo *pugnatur*), n.3 Gregor. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30 n. 1 (*veraci* / *vera*), n.4 Vide supra lit. Magistri d. XXIX c. 1, n.5 Psalm 118 (Non quaeras ultionem) + Rom. 12:19. These cite q5's *quantum ad effectum* objections (Exodi 23, Levit. 19), not q4's; q5 starts its NOTAE pickup at p.666 n.1. Confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p666-L-2` + `vol3-p666-R-1`.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All six videtur arguments, both Sed contra, the full Respondeo, all four Ad-replies, scholion §I–III, and the 22 footers were read eyes-on from the 450 dpi bands. No ambiguity survives.

**OPEN (not this chunk):** d.27 q6 footer gap (p.615 nn.1–4 owed to `d27-a2-q6` tail) still pending for the d.21–d.30 polish gate.

**J4 Class A fix (2026-07-17).** Duplicate apparatus definitions: p.663's footer group (`[^2]`–`[^11]`, videtur/sed-contra) and p.665's footer group (`[^1]`–`[^7]`, Ad-replies) both restart Quaracchi numbering from low integers, so `[^2]`–`[^7]` were defined twice (6 collisions), silently dropping the p.665 set at render. Verified against the bands (`vol3-p665-L-1/-2`) that the p.665 body anchors run strictly in reading order 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 with no column/reading-order scramble (Trap 1 checked), and each def's content matches its anchor's lemma (e.g. `[^1]` cites Levit. 19:18 "diligere amicos" ↔ body "praecipiebatur eis diligere amicos"; `[^4]` cites 1 Cor. 12:10 ↔ body "quam vocat Apostolus"). `[^1]` had no collision (p.663 has no footer 1 — that belongs to q3's hand-off) so it was left as-is; the colliding six (`[^2]`–`[^7]`) in the p.665 group were relabeled `[^2b]`–`[^7b]`, following this file's own precedent of suffixing the p.664 group with `a`. Only marker labels changed — no Latin, English, or apparatus prose touched.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0