title: Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De passibilitate et dolore animae Christi specialiter.*

Consequenter quaeritur de passibilitate et dolore ipsius animae Christi specialiter[^p352-2]. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

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*Primo* quaeritur, utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an solum secundum sensualitatem. — *Secundo*, dato quod passus fuerit secundum rationem, quaeritur, utrum passus fuerit secundum partem inferiorem et superiorem. — *Tertio*, dato quod[^p353-1] secundum utramque, quaeritur, utrum poenalius passus fuerit secundum rationem quam secundum partem sensualem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an secundum sensualitatem.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an tantum secundum sensualitatem. Et quod secundum rationem passus fuerit, videtur.

1. Anima passa est, patiente corpore, quia unitur corpori sicut perfectio; sed anima rationalis est perfectio corporis non tantum secundum sensualitatem, sed etiam secundum rationem[^p353-2]: ergo utroque modo passa fuit, corpore patiente.

2. Item, maior est coniunctio virium animae ad invicem, quam sit animae ad corpus; sed patiente corpore, patitur anima: ergo patiente una potentia, patitur alia: ergo dolore existente in sensualitate, necesse est esse in ratione.

3. Item, maior est unio potentiarum animae in ipsa anima, quam sit membrorum corporis in ipso corpore; sed patiente uno membro, compatiuntur cetera[^p353-3]: ergo si patitur potentia sensualis, necesse est, quod compatiatur et rationalis.

4. Item, quod inest animae secundum substantiam suam et essentiam per consequens redundat in omnes potentias; sed anima Christi patiebatur, patiente corpore, propter essentialem unionem ipsius ad corpus: ergo necesse fuit, eam pati secundum se totam: ergo secundum partem sensualem et rationalem.

5. Item, Christus sua passione non tantum nos liberavit a passione, qua patitur coniunctum, sed etiam a passione, qua patitur anima separata; sed anima separata non tantum patitur secundum sensualitatem, sed etiam patitur secundum se totam, praecipue secundum partem intellectualem, cuius habet usum et operationem[^p353-4]. Si ergo Christus pro nostra liberatione in se suscepit huiusmodi passiones, videtur, quod non tantum passus fuerit secundum sensualitatem, verum etiam secundum rationem.

**Sed contra:** 1. Quod nullius partis corporis est actus non patitur, corpore patiente; « anima secundum partem rationis nullius partis corporis est actus », ut dicit Philosophus[^p353-5]: ergo nunquam patitur, corpore patiente: ergo anima in Christo, si passa fuit, non fuit passa nisi solum secundum sensualitatem.

2. Item, quod non corrumpitur ad corruptionem alterius non patitur ad passionem alterius, quia passio est via ad corruptionem[^p353-6]; sed anima Christi secundum rationem non potuit corrumpi ad corruptionem corporis: ergo nec pati, corpore patiente.

3. Item, quod nullo modo habet contrarium aliquid nec habet aliquid superius non potest pati ab aliquo agente vel laedi[^p353-7]; sed anima Christi secundum rationem nec habet aliquid contrarium nec habet aliquid creatum se ipsa superius: ergo nullo modo secundum rationem pati potuit vel affligi.

4. Item, nihil idem et secundum idem de eodem gaudet et tristatur de eodem[^p353-8]; sed anima Christi secundum rationem gaudebat de doloribus et passionibus, quas corpus perferebat, alioquin non mereretur: ergo patiente corpore, non patiebatur nec affligebatur.

5. Item, cum passio attingit usque ad rationem, non tantum est propassio, immo est completa et perfecta passio, quae non potest cadere in sapientem, iuxta quod probat Seneca[^p353-9] et Hieronymus dicit. Aut igitur Christus sapiens non fuit, aut si fuit, anima eius secundum rationem carni compassa non fuit.

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### Conclusio.

> Anima Christi passa est tum dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, tum eo qui ipsi inest ex carne, quatenus ratio consideratur ut natura.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^p354-1], duplex est dolor in anima: unus, qui inest animae secundum se; alius, qui inest animae ex carne. Et utrumque dolorem constans est in anima Christi fuisse; et de illo quidem dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, non est dubium, quin Christus fuerit passus secundum rationem. Compassus enim fuit et doluit pro peccatis nostris; et iste dolor in voluntate rationali erat procedens ex consideratione rationis, videlicet ex recognitione peccatorum nostrorum[^p354-2].

De alio autem dolore, qui inest animae ex carne, non est usquequaque evidens. Distinguunt tamen magistri nostri communiter, quod ratio dupliciter habet considerari, videlicet ut ratio et ut natura[^p354-3]. Si consideretur ut ratio, sic passiones, quae ei attribuuntur, sunt consequentes ipsam deliberationem; et hoc modo anima Christi corpori patienti non compatiebatur, immo multum gaudebat et gratulabatur; vehementer enim placebat ei pati pro salute generis humani. — Si autem consideretur ratio ut natura; sic, cum habeat naturalem appetitum et inclinationem ad corpus, utpote perfectio ad perfectibile, patiebatur, corpore patiente. Anima enim rationalis non tantum est perfectio corporis humani secundum potentias sensibiles[^p354-4], cum corpus humanum sit ordinatum ad nobiliorem perfectionem, quam sit corpus brutale; sed secundum se totam, hoc est, secundum complementum suae essentiae et suarum potentiarum universitatem, est corporis perfectio et habet ad ipsum naturalem appetitum et inclinationem et coniunctionem, ac per hoc delectationem[^p354-5] et compassionem. — Concedendum est igitur, quod anima Christi fuerit compassa corpori secundum rationem, secundum quod consideratur ratio ut natura, cum passio corporis fuerit acerbissima, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^p354-6].

— Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod anima secundum rationem nullius partis corporis est actus; dicendum, quod Philosophus in illo verbo non vult negare naturalem coniunctionem ipsius intellectus ad corpus, sed hoc vult dicere, quod intellectus non determinat sibi organum, in quantum egreditur in actum proprium[^p354-7]. Et ex hoc non potest inferri, quod corpori non compatiatur; compassio enim illa non habet ortum ex determinatione organi, sed potius ex coniunctione vel unione naturali.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil compatitur alii patienti, quod non corrumpatur cum illo; dicendum, quod Augustinus negat illud vigesimo primo *de Civitate Dei*[^p354-8] tanquam falsum; instantiam enim habet in spiritu rationali. Unde illud verbum non habet veritatem nisi de illa passione, quae « magis facta abiicit a substantia » patiente, vel compatiente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi secundum rationem nec habet contrarium nec habet superius; dicendum, quod habere contrarium vel superius est dupliciter, videlicet *per se*, vel *per accidens*. Quamvis autem nihil adversetur et contrarietur animae Christi secundum se, adversatur tamen et contrariatur ratione uniti corporis; quod enim laedit perfectibile laedit et per consequens ipsam perfectionem[^p354-9].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi secundum rationem gaudebat de passionibus corporis; dicendum, quod nihil impedit, quod ratio de aliquo gaudeat ut ratio, et contristetur[^p354-10] ut natura, pro eo quod aliquid potest repugnare voluntati secundum appetitum naturalem, et consonare voluntati secundum appetitum deliberativum. Frequenter enim voluntate liberi arbitrii refugimus quae natura appetit, et appetimus quae natura refugit; sic et in proposito habet intelligi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio, quae attingit rationem, non cadit in sapientem; dicendum, quod rationem attingi per modum rationis

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repugnat perfectioni sapientiae, non autem[^p355-1] attingi per modum naturae. Hoc enim est, quod facit hominem cadere a statu et perfectione sapientiae, videlicet quod eius ratio cedat et succumbat passionibus, non autem quod sentiat passiones; et ita pati per modum naturae non aufert rationem propassionis. Aliud enim est passionem experiri, aliud a passionibus perturbari. Perturbari enim est subiici, experiri autem potest aliquis passiones et eis superferri. Et sic fuit in anima Christi, quae secundum rationem ut naturam passiones corporis experiebatur dolore acutissimo, secundum rationem ut deliberativam passionibus corporis superferebatur gaudio virtuoso[^p355-2].

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### Article II. *On the passibility and pain of Christ's soul in particular.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the passibility and pain of Christ's soul itself in particular[^p352-2]. And concerning this three things are asked.

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*First* it is asked whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. — *Second*, granted that he suffered according to the reason, it is asked whether he suffered according to the inferior part and the superior. — *Third*, granted that[^p353-1] [he suffered] according to both, it is asked whether he suffered more penally according to the reason than according to the sensual part.

### Question I. *Whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or according to the sensuality.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. And that he suffered according to the reason, it seems.

1. The soul suffered while the body was suffering, because it is united to the body as a perfection; but the rational soul is the perfection of the body not only according to the sensuality, but also according to the reason[^p353-2]: therefore it suffered in both ways while the body was suffering.

2. Likewise, the conjunction of the powers of the soul to one another is greater than is that of the soul to the body; but when the body suffers, the soul suffers: therefore when one power suffers, another suffers: therefore, pain existing in the sensuality, it must be also in the reason.

3. Likewise, the union of the powers of the soul within the soul itself is greater than is that of the members of the body within the body itself; but when one member suffers, the rest suffer along with it[^p353-3]: therefore if the sensual power suffers, it is necessary that the rational also suffer along with it.

4. Likewise, what is in the soul according to its substance and essence consequently redounds into all the powers; but Christ's soul was suffering while the body was suffering, on account of the essential union of it to the body: therefore it was necessary that it suffer according to its whole self: therefore according to the sensual part and the rational.

5. Likewise, Christ by his passion freed us not only from the passion by which the conjoined [soul] suffers, but also from the passion by which the separated soul suffers; but the separated soul suffers not only according to the sensuality, but also suffers according to its whole self, especially according to the intellectual part, of which it has use and operation[^p353-4]. If therefore Christ for our liberation took upon himself such passions, it seems that he suffered not only according to the sensuality, but also according to the reason.

**On the contrary:** 1. That which is the act of no part of the body does not suffer while the body suffers; « the soul according to the part of reason is the act of no part of the body », as the Philosopher says[^p353-5]: therefore it never suffers while the body suffers: therefore the soul in Christ, if it suffered, did not suffer except only according to the sensuality.

2. Likewise, that which is not corrupted unto the corruption of another does not suffer unto the passion of another, because passion is the way to corruption[^p353-6]; but Christ's soul according to the reason could not be corrupted unto the corruption of the body: therefore neither could it suffer while the body suffered.

3. Likewise, that which in no way has anything contrary nor has anything superior cannot suffer from any agent nor be harmed[^p353-7]; but Christ's soul according to the reason has neither anything contrary nor anything created superior to itself: therefore in no way according to the reason could it suffer or be afflicted.

4. Likewise, nothing one and the same and according to the same rejoices and grieves over the same thing[^p353-8]; but Christ's soul according to the reason rejoiced over the pains and passions which the body bore, otherwise it would not merit: therefore while the body suffered, it did not suffer nor was it afflicted.

5. Likewise, when passion reaches all the way to the reason, it is not only a pre-passion, but rather it is a complete and perfect passion, which cannot fall upon a wise man, according to what Seneca proves[^p353-9] and Jerome says. Either therefore Christ was not wise, or, if he was, his soul according to the reason did not suffer along with the flesh.

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### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul suffered both with the pain which is in the soul according to itself, and with that which is in it from the flesh, insofar as the reason is considered as a nature.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as Augustine says *On the City of God*[^p354-1], there is a twofold pain in the soul: one which is in the soul according to itself; another which is in the soul from the flesh. And it is settled that both pains were in Christ's soul; and concerning that pain indeed which is in the soul according to itself, there is no doubt that Christ suffered according to the reason. For he suffered along with and grieved for our sins; and that pain in the rational will was proceeding from the consideration of reason, namely from the recognition of our sins[^p354-2].

But concerning the other pain, which is in the soul from the flesh, it is not altogether evident. Yet our masters commonly distinguish that the reason can be considered in two ways, namely as *reason* and as *nature*[^p354-3]. If it be considered as reason, then the passions which are attributed to it are consequent upon deliberation itself; and in this way Christ's soul did not suffer along with the suffering body, but rather rejoiced and was glad exceedingly; for it pleased him vehemently to suffer for the salvation of the human race. — But if the reason be considered as nature; then, since it has a natural appetite and inclination toward the body, as a perfection toward the perfectible, it was suffering while the body was suffering. For the rational soul is the perfection of the human body not only according to the sensible powers[^p354-4], since the human body is ordered to a nobler perfection than is the brute body; but according to its whole self, that is, according to the completeness of its essence and the totality of its powers, it is the perfection of the body and has toward it a natural appetite and inclination and conjunction, and through this delight[^p354-5] and compassion. — It must therefore be granted that Christ's soul suffered along with the body according to the reason, insofar as the reason is considered as nature, since the passion of the body was most bitter, as was shown above[^p354-6].

— Hence the reasons which are for this part are to be granted.

1. To that, indeed, which is objected first to the contrary, that the soul according to the reason is the act of no part of the body; it must be said that the Philosopher in that statement does not wish to deny the natural conjunction of the intellect itself to the body, but he wishes to say this, that the intellect does not determine an organ for itself, insofar as it goes forth into its proper act[^p354-7]. And from this it cannot be inferred that it does not suffer along with the body; for that compassion does not take its origin from the determination of an organ, but rather from the natural conjunction or union.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing suffers along with another suffering thing which is not corrupted together with it; it must be said that Augustine denies that in the twenty-first [book] *On the City of God*[^p354-8] as false; for he has an instance in the rational spirit. Hence that statement does not hold true except concerning that passion which « more, once made, casts [the thing] away from the substance » that suffers, or suffers along [with it].

3. To that which is objected, that Christ's soul according to the reason has neither anything contrary nor anything superior; it must be said that to have something contrary or superior is twofold, namely *in itself*, or *by accident*. But although nothing is opposed and contrary to Christ's soul according to itself, yet it is opposed and contrary by reason of the body united [to it]; for what harms the perfectible harms also, and consequently, the perfection itself[^p354-9].

4. To that which is objected, that Christ's soul according to the reason rejoiced over the passions of the body; it must be said that nothing hinders the reason from rejoicing over something as reason, and grieving[^p354-10] as nature, for the reason that something can be repugnant to the will according to the natural appetite, and consonant with the will according to the deliberative appetite. For frequently by the will of free choice we flee what nature seeks, and we seek what nature flees; so too it must be understood in the matter proposed.

5. To that which is objected, that the passion which reaches the reason does not fall upon a wise man; it must be said that the reason's being reached by the mode of reason

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is repugnant to the perfection of wisdom, but not[^p355-1] its being reached by the mode of nature. For this is what makes a man fall from the state and perfection of wisdom, namely that his reason yield and succumb to the passions, but not that he feel the passions; and thus to suffer by the mode of nature does not take away the character of a pre-passion. For it is one thing to experience a passion, another to be disturbed by the passions. For to be disturbed is to be subjected, but one can experience passions and be borne above them. And so it was in Christ's soul, which according to the reason as nature experienced the passions of the body with most acute pain, [and] according to the reason as deliberative was borne above the passions of the body with virtuous joy[^p355-2].

la: Libr. II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 17: *Quapropter cum dicimus, quod homo ille [Christus]... non potuit non mori, aut velle non mori... non significatur in illo ulla impotentia servandi aut volendi servare vitam suam immortalem, sed immutabilitas voluntatis eius, qua se sponte fecit hominem ad hoc, ut in eadem voluntate perseverans moreretur, et quia nulla res potuit illam voluntatem mutare... Et si... cum aliquis sponte se proposuit facturum bonum aliquod, et eadem voluntate postea perficit quod proposuit; quamvis cogi possit, si nolit promissum solvere, non tamen dicendus est necessitate facere quod fecit, sed ea qua proposuit libera voluntate; non enim necessitate aut impotentia fieri vel non fieri dici debet aliquid, ubi neque necessitas neque impotentia quidquam operantur, sed voluntas; si, inquam, ita est in homine, multo magis necessitas aut impotentia nequaquam nominandae sunt in Deo* etc. — In initio solut. edd. lectionem codd. sic mutarunt: *obiicitur, quod illud necessario inest alicui, quod inest ei* etc.

en: Bk. II of *Why God Became Man* (Cur Deus homo), c. 17: *Wherefore when we say that that man [Christ]... could not not die, or [could not] will not to die... there is signified in him no inability to preserve or to will to preserve his immortal life, but the immutability of his will, by which he of his own accord made himself man for this end, that, persevering in the same will, he might die, and because no thing could change that will... And if... when someone of his own accord has proposed to do some good, and by the same will afterward accomplishes what he proposed; although he can be compelled, if he be unwilling to pay what was promised, yet he is not to be said to do by necessity what he did, but by that free will by which he proposed it; for nothing ought to be said to be done or not done by necessity or inability, where neither necessity nor inability effects anything, but the will; if, I say, it is thus in man, much more are necessity and inability by no means to be named in God* etc. — At the beginning of the solution the editions altered the reading of the codices thus: *it is objected, that what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it* etc.

la: Codd. D M O hic repetunt *passus fuerit*. Deinde pro *partem sensualem* [cod. Z *sensibilem*] edd. *sensualitatem*.

en: Codices D M O here repeat *passus fuerit* ("he suffered"). Then for *partem sensualem* ("the sensual part") [cod. Z *sensibilem*] the editions read *sensualitatem* ("the sensuality").

la: De coniunctione animae cum corpore et de coniunctione potentiarum animae inter se cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. et d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

en: On the conjunction of the soul with the body and on the conjunction of the powers of the soul among themselves cf. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. and d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 12, 26: *Et si quid patitur unum membrum, compatiuntur omnia membra.*

en: Epistle 1 Cor. 12:26: *And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer along with it.*

en: Cf. IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2, d. 45. a. 1. q. 1 and following, and d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. text. 6. (c. 4.). — Mox pro *si passa fuit* cod. K *si passa fuerit*.

en: Bk. II of *On the Soul* (de Anima), text 11 (c. 1) and Bk. III, text 6 (c. 4). — Soon, for *si passa fuit* cod. K reads *si passa fuerit*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Longitud. et brevitate vitae, c. 2, ubi haec corruptio vocatur *corruptio secundum accidens* i. e. quae consequitur corruptionem alterius. — Quod passio sit via ad corruptionem, insinuat Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.), de quo vide tom. II. pag. 458, nota 1, et I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Length and Shortness of Life*, c. 2, where this corruption is called *corruption by accident*, i.e. that which follows upon the corruption of another. — That passion is the way to corruption Aristotle intimates, VI. *Topics* c. 3 (c. 6), on which see vol. II, p. 458, note 1, and I. *On Generation and Corruption* text 50 ff. (c. 7).

la: Aristot., de Longitud. et brevitate vitae, c. 2: *Cui non est contrarium, et ubi non est, impossibile utique corrumpi.* Cfr. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.) et supra pag. 346, nota 5. — De minori vide supra pag. 266, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro *se ipsa superius* cod. Z *super se*, sed *ipsa superius est*. In fine arg. pro *vel affligi* cod. W *nec affligi*.

en: Aristotle, *On Length and Shortness of Life*, c. 2: *That for which there is nothing contrary, and where it [the contrary] is not, [it is] impossible at all to be corrupted.* Cf. I. *On Generation and Corruption* text 50 ff. (c. 7) and above, p. 346, note 5. — On the minor [premise] see above, p. 266, note 5. — A little below, for *se ipsa superius* cod. Z reads *super se*, but [reads] *ipsa superius est*. At the end of the argument, for *vel affligi* cod. W reads *nec affligi*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 205, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, p. 205, note 5.

la: Vide supra pag. 338, nota 7. Hieron. in Comment. in Eccle. ad 7, 8. annotat: *Calumnia conturbat sapientem* etc. *Nunc sapientem in profectu positum accipe... Sapiens quippe perfectus... nulla calumnia conturbatur.* Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 2, ubi propassio et passio verbis Hieronymi describuntur.

en: See above, p. 338, note 7. Jerome in the Commentary on Ecclesiastes, on 7:8, annotates: *Calumny disturbs the wise man* etc. *Now take "the wise man" as one placed in progress... For the perfect wise man... is disturbed by no calumny.* Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XV. c. 2, where pre-passion and passion are described in the words of Jerome.

la: Libr. XIV. c. 15. n. 2: *Dolor carnis tantummodo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio; sicut animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt.*

en: Bk. XIV. c. 15. n. 2: *The pain of the flesh is only an offense of the soul from the flesh and a certain dissension from its passion; just as the pain of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissension from those things which befell us against our will.*

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1. — Pro *recognitione* cod. T *cognitione*, codd. H I K L aa bb *recogitatione*.

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. XV. c. 1. — For *recognitione* cod. T reads *cognitione*, codices H I K L aa bb *recogitatione*.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 1: « *Est enim cognitio naturae, scilicet rationis, ut est natura quaedam; et est cognitio rationis, ut est ratio, cogitando et pertractando* ». Ibid. p. III. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2: *Dicendum sine praeiudicio, quod est considerare rationem dupliciter... vel ut [est] ratio, vel ut natura. Secundum quod consideratur ut natura, appetit unionem cum suo corpore et refugit separationem.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3, ubi eodem duplici modo voluntas consideratur. — Paulo superius pro *tamen*, quod non pauci codd. omittunt, cod. W *autem*, edd. *enim*.

en: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 1. m. 1: « *For there is a cognition of nature, namely of the reason, as it is a certain nature; and there is a cognition of the reason, as it is reason, by thinking and discoursing* ». Ibid. p. III. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2: *It must be said without prejudice that the reason can be considered in two ways... either as [it is] reason, or as nature. According as it is considered as nature, it seeks union with its body and shuns separation.* Cf. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3, where the will is considered in the same twofold manner. — A little above, for *tamen*, which not a few codices omit, cod. W reads *autem*, the editions *enim*.

la: Multi codd. *sensuales*.

en: Many codices read *sensuales* ("sensual").

la: In compluribus codd. exstare videtur *dilectionem*. Deinde in conclus. edd. et multi codd. omittunt *corpori*, quod ex codd. A F H (K et secunda manu) P Q Z restauravimus.

en: In several codices *dilectionem* ("love") seems to stand. Then in the conclusion the editions and many codices omit *corpori* ("to the body"), which we have restored from codices A F H (K also by a second hand) P Q Z.

la: Hic a. 1. q. 2. — Subinde post *Unde* codd. A I L T V Z aa subnectunt *et*.

en: Here a. 1. q. 2. — Thereupon, after *Unde* ("Hence") codices A I L T V Z aa append *et* ("and").

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. ad 3. — Paulo superius Vat. omittit *naturalem*; paulo inferius pro *compatiatur* codd. A X exhibent *compatiebatur*.

en: Cf. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. ad 3. — A little above the Vatican [edition] omits *naturalem* ("natural"); a little below, for *compatiatur* codices A X present *compatiebatur*.

la: Cap. 3. n. 2. Codd. et edd. allegant *19. de Civ. Dei*. — Verba *magis facta abiicit a substantia* sumta sunt ex Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. et q. 2. ad 6, ubi eadem obiectio solvitur.

en: Ch. 3. n. 2. Codices and editions cite *19. On the City of God*. — The words *more, once made, casts away from the substance* are taken from Aristotle, VI. *Topics* c. 3 (c. 6). Cf. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, and IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. and q. 2. ad 6, where the same objection is resolved.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 62. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. *On the Soul* (de Anima), text 62 ff. (c. 4).

la: Cod. N, omisso *et*, subiicit *autem*.

en: Cod. N, omitting *et*, subjoins *autem*.

la: Cod. Z addit *sic*. Proxime post pro *attingi* multi codd. habent *attingit*, quorum complures etiam subinde omittunt *per*.

en: Cod. Z adds *sic*. Immediately after, for *attingi* many codices have *attingit*, of which several also thereupon omit *per*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *ut naturam* cod. C *ut natura est*, edd. 1, 2 *sensitivam*; in Vat. legitur *non tantum*, et deinde *sed secundum rationem deliberativam* etc.; in edd. 1, 2 et cod. X *secundum rationem vero deliberativam* etc.

en: Cf. above, d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. — A little above, for *ut naturam* cod. C reads *ut natura est*, the editions 1, 2 *sensitivam*; in the Vatican [edition] is read *non tantum*, and then *sed secundum rationem deliberativam* etc.; in editions 1, 2 and cod. X *secundum rationem vero deliberativam* etc.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Etiam posteriores Scholastici approbant distinctionem inter rationem ut *ratio* et rationem ut *natura* (ut S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.), et quod anima Christi, quia tota secundum essentiam erat unita corpori ut forma eius, tota secundum omnes potentias patiebatur.

Alex. Hal., S. p. III. de hac et seq. q. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2. — Scot., de hac et seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 15. q. unica. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.; S. III. q. 15. a. 4, q. 46. a. 7. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. 3.

**II.** Solutio affirmativa ad seq. (2.) quaestionem communiter approbatur contra opinionem Henrici Gand. (Quodl. 8. q. 7, cui favere videtur Caietanus) asserentis: « Gaudium non est in anima ut in *portione*, nisi ut est *superior*; similiter neque tristitia, nisi ut est portio *inferior* ». — Notandum autem est, S. Bonaventuram cum aliis propositionem, quod etiam secundum portionem superiorem anima Christi passa sit, intelligere in hoc sensu, quod ipsa « consideratur per modum *naturae* » (in fine corp., cfr. solut. ad 6.), non ut *ratio*, minime autem, quatenus ordinatur ad suum obiectum primarium, scilicet Deum. Sed Scotus in Oxon. (loc. cit. n. 21.) praeter hoc asserere videtur, tristitiam etiam secundum *actum*, qui importat *nolle*, conditionatum, in superiore portione fuisse. — Notabilia sunt hic tria supposita ad explicandum mysterium, quod in eadem superiore portione gaudium fruitionis potuerit simul esse cum tristitia.

De hac (2.) quaestione: S. Thom. in Comment. loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. a. 4. q. 2.

**III.** In solutione 3. quaestionis consentit S. Thom., S. III. q. 46. a. 6. ad 3. De eadem explicite tractat Richard. a Med., III. Sent. hic a. 4. q. 4; alii plerumque rem tangunt in praecedentibus quaest., praecipue ubi inquirunt, utrum Christus habuerit dolorem compassionis.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Even the later Scholastics approve the distinction between reason as *reason* and reason as *nature* (as St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 3. subquestion 2.), and that Christ's soul, because it was wholly united according to essence to the body as its form, was wholly suffering according to all its powers.

Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, on this and the following q., q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2. — Scotus, on this and the following qq. in both Writings on III. Sent. d. 15. q. unica. — St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 2.; Summa III. q. 15. a. 4, q. 46. a. 7. — Bl. Albert, III. Sent. d. 15. a. 3. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 2. subquestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, III. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following qq., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. 3.

**II.** The affirmative solution to the following (2nd) question is commonly approved against the opinion of Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8. q. 7, whom Cajetan seems to favor), who asserts: « Joy is not in the soul as in a *portion*, except as it is *superior*; likewise neither is sadness, except as it is the *inferior* portion ». — But it must be noted that St. Bonaventure, with others, understands the proposition that Christ's soul suffered even according to the superior portion in this sense, that it « is considered by the mode of *nature* » (at the end of the body [of the article], cf. the solution to the 6th), not as *reason*, and least of all insofar as it is ordered to its primary object, namely God. But Scotus in the Oxford [commentary] (loc. cit. n. 21.) seems besides this to assert that sadness was also in the superior portion according to an *act* which implies *not willing*, [taken] conditionally. — Three suppositions are notable here for explaining the mystery, that in the same superior portion the joy of fruition could be at once together with sadness.

On this (2nd) question: St. Thomas in the Commentary, loc. cit. a. 3. subquestion 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. q. 1. a. 1. subquestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. a. 4. q. 2.

**III.** In the solution of the 3rd question St. Thomas agrees, Summa III. q. 46. a. 6. ad 3. Concerning the same Richard of Mediavilla treats explicitly, III. Sent. here a. 4. q. 4; others mostly touch the matter in the preceding questions, especially where they inquire whether Christ had the pain of compassion.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{352,353,354,355}-{L,R}-*.png`), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF authoritative; the IA djvu OCR for this range is heavily cascade-fragmented). English is a fresh literal translation. Raw OCR span ≈ 24650→24837. Printed pp.352–355 = PDF 374–377 (offset pdf = printed + 22); page numbers verified by running-head TEXT (`DIST. XVI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` on pp.353–354, with `353`/`354`/`355` page-foot numerals).

**ARTICULUS II opener folded in.** Per the locked chunking convention, the short ART. II opener (`Consequenter quaeritur de passibilitate et dolore ipsius animae Christi specialiter. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.`) + subtitle (*De passibilitate et dolore animae Christi specialiter*) + the 3-question listing are folded into this q1 chunk — no standalone divisio chunk.

**ARTICULUS II question titles** (from the opener listing, pp.352 R bottom – 353):
- **q1**: *Utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an solum secundum sensualitatem* — Whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. **(THIS CHUNK; body opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur…`)**
- **q2**: *Utrum [Christus] passus fuerit secundum partem inferiorem et superiorem* — Whether he suffered according to the inferior part and the superior. (body opener `Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis`, raw 24838)
- **q3**: *Utrum poenalius passus fuerit secundum rationem quam secundum partem sensualem* — Whether he suffered more penally according to the reason than according to the sensual part.

Alignment confirmed: the opener's first listed sub-question (`Primo quaeritur, utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an solum secundum sensualitatem`) matches this chunk's body (`Circa primum… utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an tantum secundum sensualitatem`). Body is ART. II q1, not q2/q3.

**Page-split map (apparatus, 22 entries, per-page restart):**
- **p.352** → `[^p352-2]` only (footer 2, *Cur Deus homo* c. 17). Footers 1 and 3 of p.352 belong to the prior chunk **a1-q3** (its solutions ad 5/ad 6: `ponit Anselmus¹`, `necessarium vero minime³`).
- **p.353** → `[^p353-1..9]` (all in q1: the q3 listing-marker¹ `dato quod`, fundamenta 1–5, sed contra 1–5).
- **p.354** → `[^p354-1..10]` (all in q1: Respondeo, Conclusiones 1–3, replies ad 1–4 + into ad 5).
- **p.355** → `[^p355-1,2]` only (q1's tail of reply ad 5: `non autem¹ attingi`, `gaudio virtuoso²`). Footers 3–8 of p.355 anchor in **q2** (its fundamentum + sed contra: Damasc.³, *aversionem⁴*, *inferior⁵*, 1 Cor.⁶, Aristot.⁷, Aristot. Topic.⁸) → forwarded to a2-q2.

**Scholion:** PRESENT (items I–III), located on p.355 (L–R, after q1's body, before QUAESTIO II). Items I and III treat this 1st question (and the 3rd's solution); item II is principally a forward-reference cataloguing literature on the *following* (2nd) question — it does NOT forward-cover q2 as a substitute for q2's own scholion. **a2-q1's scholion does NOT forward-cover q2/q3; each has its own.**

**Hand-off PICKED UP (from a1-q3):** on shared p.352, **footer 2** (`Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17`) → captured here as `[^p352-2]`, attached to the ART. II opener (the necessity-of-passion theme the article opens on). Note: on the printed page the `²` marker physically sits at a1-q3's solution `ponit Anselmus² exemplum` (R column), but a1-q3 deliberately left footer 2 for this chunk per its forwarded hand-off; placement here at the opener follows that decision. Not flagged `[?]` — the editorial attribution is settled by the prior chunk; the footnote text (Anselm on the immutability of Christ's will, no impotence/necessity) reads as the apparatus for the article's overarching necessity question.

**Hand-off FORWARDED (to a2-q2):** QUAESTIO II opens at **raw line 24838** (`QUAESTIO II.`; title *Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis*), running head `DIST. XVI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` at raw 24807, printed p.355. On shared p.355, **footers 3–8 migrate to q2** (3 = Damasc. III de Fide orthod. c. 6; 4 = Vide II Sent. lit. Magistri d. XXII; 5 = Cod. F *inferior*; 6 = Epist. 1 Cor. 12, 2; 7 = Secundum Aristot.; 8 = Aristot. III Topic. c. 4). q2 also picks up its own SCHOLION. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**[?] flags:** none — 450 dpi bands fully legible across pp.352–355.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 355 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Christus «assumsit totum hominem, ut totum curaret[^p355-3]»; sed totos nos curavit, et quantum ad superiorem portionem rationis et quantum ad inferiorem, et hoc quidem per passionem: ergo passus est quantum ad omnem partem rationis.

2. Item, ubi est culpa, ibi debet esse poena; sed culpa Adae fuit in superiori parte rationis propter completam aversionem[^p355-4]: si ergo Christus poenam sustinuit pro culpa Adae, ergo poenam sensit in suprema parte rationis.

3. Item, plus iungitur ratio superior inferiori, quam iungatur inferior sensualitati; sed ratio inferior patitur, patiente sensualitate: ergo ratio superior patitur, patiente inferiori.

4. Item, ratio superior[^p355-5] unionem habet ad deitatem et unionem habet ad carnem; sed propter unionem sui ad deitatem, in qua est promptuarium delectationis, necesse est, eam delectari: ergo pari ratione propter unionem sui ad carnem patientem necesse fuit, eam pati.

**Sed contra:** 1. Paulus in raptu suo propter plenam conversionem rationis ad Deum abstractus fuit omnino a passionibus et delectationibus carnis, sicut ipse dicit[^p355-6]: *Nescio, utrum in corpore, an extra corpus*; sed superior portio rationis in Christo omnino fuit ad Deum conversa: ergo videtur, quod nihil de afflictione carnis sentiebat.

2. Item, «contraria non possunt esse in eodem et secundum idem[^p355-7]»; sed gaudium et dolor sunt affectiones contrariae: ergo si Christus secundum portionem rationis superiorem continue gaudebat, ergo videtur, quod secundum illam dolorem non experiebatur nec sentiebat.

3. Item, «albius est quod est nigro impermixtius[^p355-8]»; ergo ubi est summum gaudium, ibi nullus

<!-- page 356 -->

est dolor; sed in superiori portione rationis Christi summum gaudium erat, quia perfectissime Deum comprehendebat: ergo videtur, quod nihil de dolore secundum illam partem sentiebat.

4. Item, sicut culpa opponitur gratiae, ita beatitudo opponitur miseriae; sed culpa non potest stare in eodem et secundum idem simul cum gratia: ergo nec beatitudo et miseria secundum eandem animae portionem. Sed beatitudo erat in Christo secundum portionem animae superiorem: ergo impossibile fuit, secundum illam partem inesse Christo aliquem dolorem.

5. Item, potentia illa simplex erat, ergo ad quod se convertebat secundum eandem partem, totaliter ferebatur[^p356-1]: si ergo quantum ad superiorem portionem semper erat conversus ad Deum, a quo hauriebat gaudium; videtur, quod secundum illam portionem nullum sentiebat cruciatum.

6. Item, superior portio rationis distinguitur ab inferiori in hoc, quod ipsa aspicit ad superiora, haec ad inferiora: si ergo Christus nullam materiam doloris habebat a superiori, sed solum ab infimo; videtur, quod superior portio rationis nullo modo pateretur in ipso.

### Conclusio

> Christus passus est etiam secundum portionem superiorem rationis, quatenus portio illa consideratur per modum naturae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum communem sententiam magistrorum passio Christi non solum stetit in sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem portionem.[^p356-2] Sicut enim anima nostra ex coniunctione sui ad corpus infectum tota corrumpitur et tota inficitur secundum omnem sui vim et secundum omnem partem, scilicet tam superiorem quam inferiorem; sic anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflictum tota patiebatur et affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis. — Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundum eundem statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium, nec dolor superveniens discontinuaverit gaudium; immo fuerunt[^p356-3] simul; nec iterum, quod maius est, dolor intensus valde fecerat, gaudium esse minus perfectum.

Ad haec autem intelligenda tria oportet supponere, quae sunt vera et probabilia, videlicet quod gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis non sunt affectiones contrariae, quia non sunt respectu eiusdem nec omnino eodem modo insunt eidem, sed unum inest per se, alterum per accidens: quia gaudium inest propter coniunctionem gratuitam ipsius cum Deitate, sed dolor propter naturalem coniunctionem ipsius cum carne; et quia non sunt affectiones contrariae, possunt in anima esse secundum eandem partem.

Altera suppositio est, quod non tantum huiusmodi dolor et gaudium non sunt contraria, sed unum est materiale respectu alterius; et ideo simul eidem inesse poterant, sicut in viro[^p356-4] poenitente videmus, quod simul dolet et de dolore gaudet. Sic et anima Christi secundum naturam corpori patienti compatiebatur, tamen de illa passione et compassione laetabatur.

Tertia suppositio est, quod Christus simul erat viator et comprehensor, ita quod viatoris cognitio non impediebat comprehensoris cognitionem, nec affectio affectionem[^p356-5]; et illud fuit in Christo singulare propter officium mediatoris, quo debebat experiri et divina et humana. Unde sicut simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos, ita quod una illarum conversionum alteram non impediebat nec retardabat; sic potuit secundum eandem partem animae simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a gaudio, nec gaudium a dolore pateretur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem. — Concedendum est igitur, Christum secundum superiorem portionem doluisse in passione, in quantum tamen ratio illa consideratur per modum naturae[^p356-6]. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum facile est per ea quae dicta sunt, respondere.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de raptu Pauli, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Paulus non sic potuit habere usum viatoris et comprehensoris, secundum quod Christus, qui erat homo et Deus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contraria non possunt inesse eidem; dicendum, sicut dictum est, quod dolor et gaudium in Christo non habebant contrarietatem, immo unum erat materiale respectu alterius, quia ex hoc ipso Christus gaudebat in Domino[^p356-7], quo sentiebat, se pati et dolere pro Domino.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gaudium dolori impermixtum est magis intensum; dicendum,

<!-- page 357 -->

quod illud verum est de dolore opposito gaudio; sed de dolore, qui dat occasionem gaudendi[^p357-1], non oportet illud habere veritatem; et ideo in proposito non concludit illa ratio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod beatitudo opponitur miseriae, secundum quod[^p357-2] gratia culpae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod beatitudo miseriae opponitur secundum legem communem, et non reperitur in aliquo simul gloria cum miseria. Et ratio huius est, quia unusquisque est in uno statu, non in duplici; sed quoniam Christus in duplici statu erat, vel quasi rationem tenebat duplicis personae; sicut in Christo status est compossibilis statui sine repugnantia, sic beatitudo cum miseria. Nec est simile omnino de gratia et culpa, quia non respiciunt diversos status, sed directe habent oppositionem et incompossibilitatem; nisi forte quis intelligat de culpa veniali, quae in eodem simul potest reperiri cum gratia, quae non habet oppositionem directam; expelleretur autem omnino venialis culpa, cum perficeretur[^p357-3] gratia; sic et a Christo ablata fuit passionis miseria, quando consummata fuit eius gloria.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia illa simplex est; dicendum, quod quamvis per naturam potentia simplex non possit ad diversa converti, tamen per deiformitatem gloriae possibile est adeo ampliari, ut simul possit et ad diversa converti et circa diversa affici; et sic in patria erit aliquando, et intelligendum etiam est fuisse in Christo[^p357-4].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio superior non dicitur, nisi in quantum convertitur ad superiora; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, pro eo quod ad superiorem portionem rationis spectat regere inferiorem, et penes ipsam residet regimen et imperium respectu omnium potentiarum animae, quae sunt aliquo modo rationi obaudibiles[^p357-5]; et ita per modum naturae colligatur potentiis aliis et ipsi corpori humano tanquam perfectibili; et ideo pati habet, corpore patiente. Quod autem dicitur, quod ratio superior attenditur secundum aspectum ad superiora; hoc dicitur quantum ad eius principalem actum, non quod excludatur conversio et colligantia ipsius ad inferiora[^p357-6].

---

english:
<!-- page 355 -->

### Question II. *Whether the soul of Christ suffered according to the superior portion of reason.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the soul of Christ suffered according to the superior portion of reason. And that it did, it seems thus.

1. Christ "assumed the whole man, that he might heal the whole[^p355-3]"; but he healed all of us, both as to the superior portion of reason and as to the inferior, and this indeed through his passion: therefore he suffered as to every part of reason.

2. Likewise, where there is fault, there ought to be punishment; but the fault of Adam was in the superior part of reason on account of a complete aversion[^p355-4]: if therefore Christ sustained punishment for the fault of Adam, then he felt punishment in the supreme part of reason.

3. Likewise, the superior reason is more joined to the inferior than the inferior is joined to sensuality; but the inferior reason suffers when sensuality suffers: therefore the superior reason suffers when the inferior suffers.

4. Likewise, the superior reason[^p355-5] has a union with the deity and has a union with the flesh; but on account of its union with the deity, in which there is the storehouse of delight, it is necessary that it be delighted: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of its union with the suffering flesh it was necessary that it suffer.

**On the contrary:** 1. Paul in his rapture, on account of the full conversion of his reason to God, was withdrawn entirely from the passions and delights of the flesh, as he himself says[^p355-6]: *I know not, whether in the body or out of the body*; but the superior portion of reason in Christ was entirely turned to God: therefore it seems that he felt nothing of the affliction of the flesh.

2. Likewise, "contraries cannot be in the same thing and according to the same[^p355-7]"; but joy and sorrow are contrary affections: therefore if Christ continually rejoiced according to the superior portion of reason, then it seems that according to it he did not experience nor feel sorrow.

3. Likewise, "that is whiter which is more unmixed with black[^p355-8]"; therefore where there is the highest joy, there is no

<!-- page 356 -->

sorrow; but in the superior portion of Christ's reason there was the highest joy, because he comprehended God most perfectly: therefore it seems that he felt nothing of sorrow according to that part.

4. Likewise, just as fault is opposed to grace, so beatitude is opposed to misery; but fault cannot stand in the same thing and according to the same together with grace: therefore neither beatitude and misery according to the same portion of the soul. But beatitude was in Christ according to the superior portion of the soul: therefore it was impossible that according to that part any sorrow be in Christ.

5. Likewise, that power was simple, therefore to whatever it turned itself according to the same part, it was wholly borne[^p356-1]: if therefore as to the superior portion he was always turned to God, from whom he drew joy; it seems that according to that portion he felt no torment.

6. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is distinguished from the inferior in this, that the superior looks to higher things, the latter to lower: if therefore Christ had no matter of sorrow from the superior, but only from the lowest; it seems that the superior portion of reason in no way suffered in him.

### Conclusion

> Christ suffered also according to the superior portion of reason, insofar as that portion is considered after the manner of nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the common opinion of the masters, the passion of Christ did not stand only in sensuality, nor only reach the inferior reason, but extended itself even to the superior portion.[^p356-2] For just as our soul, from its conjunction to an infected body, is wholly corrupted and wholly infected according to all its power and according to every part, namely both superior and inferior; so the soul of Christ, from its conjunction to the suffering and afflicted body, wholly suffered and was afflicted, that through that passion and that sorrow the whole sinful soul might be healed. And thus sorrow and passion were in Christ according to the supreme part of reason, although in it there was the joy of fruition. — But although this is held as true, it is nonetheless difficult to understand how in the soul of Christ, according to the same power and according to the same state of the power, there could be sorrow and joy, and the supervening sorrow not interrupt the joy; rather they were[^p356-3] simultaneous; nor again, what is greater, the very intense sorrow had made the joy be less perfect.

But for these things to be understood, three things must be supposed, which are true and probable, namely that the joy of fruition and the sorrow of passion are not contrary affections, because they are not in respect of the same thing nor are altogether present in the same way in the same subject, but the one is present per se, the other per accidens: because joy is present on account of the gratuitous conjunction of [the soul] with the Deity, but sorrow on account of the natural conjunction of it with the flesh; and because they are not contrary affections, they can be in the soul according to the same part.

The second supposition is that not only are sorrow and joy of this kind not contrary, but the one is material in respect of the other; and therefore they could be present in the same thing at once, as we see in a penitent man[^p356-4], who at once grieves and rejoices over his grief. So too the soul of Christ, according to its nature, suffered-with the suffering body, yet rejoiced over that passion and compassion.

The third supposition is that Christ was at once wayfarer and comprehensor, in such a way that the cognition of the wayfarer did not impede the cognition of the comprehensor, nor affection [impede] affection[^p356-5]; and this was singular in Christ on account of the office of mediator, by which he had to experience both things divine and human. Hence just as he could at once and at the same time be turned perfectly to God and be turned to us, in such a way that one of those conversions did not impede nor retard the other; so he could, according to the same part of the soul, at once and at the same time rejoice in God and suffer-with his body, in such a way that neither did sorrow suffer any diminution or remission from joy, nor joy from sorrow. — It must therefore be granted that Christ grieved according to the superior portion in the passion, insofar however as that reason is considered after the manner of nature[^p356-6]. And the reasons adduced for this side are to be granted. But to the reasons for the opposite it is easy to reply through the things that have been said.

1. For to that which is first objected concerning the rapture of Paul, it must be said that it is not similar, because Paul could not have the use of wayfarer and comprehensor in the way that Christ could, who was man and God.

2. To that which is objected, that contraries cannot be present in the same subject; it must be said, as has been said, that sorrow and joy in Christ did not have contrariety, but rather the one was material in respect of the other, because by this very fact Christ rejoiced in the Lord[^p356-7], by which he perceived that he was suffering and grieving for the Lord.

3. To that which is objected, that joy unmixed with sorrow is more intense; it must be said

<!-- page 357 -->

that this is true of sorrow opposed to joy; but of sorrow which gives occasion for rejoicing[^p357-1], it is not necessary that this hold true; and therefore in the present case that argument does not conclude.

4. To that which is objected, that beatitude is opposed to misery, in the way that[^p357-2] grace [is opposed] to fault; it must be said that it is true that beatitude is opposed to misery according to the common law, and glory together with misery is not found in anyone at once. And the reason for this is that each one is in one state, not in two; but since Christ was in a twofold state, or held as it were the standing of a twofold person; just as in Christ a state is compossible with a state without repugnance, so beatitude with misery. Nor is it altogether similar in the case of grace and fault, because they do not regard different states, but directly have opposition and incompossibility; unless perhaps one understands it of venial fault, which can be found in the same thing at once with grace, since it does not have direct opposition; but venial fault would be entirely expelled when grace is perfected[^p357-3]; so too from Christ the misery of the passion was taken away, when his glory was consummated.

5. To that which is objected, that that power is simple; it must be said that, although by nature a simple power cannot be turned to diverse things, nevertheless through the deiformity of glory it is possible for it to be so enlarged that it can at once both be turned to diverse things and be affected about diverse things; and thus it will be sometime in the fatherland, and it is to be understood that it was so also in Christ[^p357-4].

6. To that which is objected, that the superior reason is not so called except insofar as it is turned to higher things; it must be said that this is not true, because to the superior portion of reason belongs the governing of the inferior, and within it resides the rule and command over all the powers of the soul, which are in some way obedient to reason[^p357-5]; and thus after the manner of nature it is bound together with the other powers and with the human body itself as with something perfectible; and therefore it has to suffer when the body suffers. But as to what is said, that the superior reason is attended to according to its regard for higher things; this is said as to its principal act, not that there be excluded its conversion and conjunction to lower things[^p357-6].

---

la: Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. et 18. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri d. II. c. 1.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 6 and 18. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. II, c. 1.

la: Vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXII. c. 3. seq., nec non Comment. ibid. a. 1. q. 2. seq. Cfr. etiam lit. Magistri, II. Sent. d. XXIV. c. 4-13, et Comment. ibid. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ac p. II. per totam. — In fine arg. pro *suprema* edd. *superiori*.

en: See II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXII, c. 3 ff., and also the Commentary there, a. 1, q. 2 ff. Cf. also the text of the Master, II Sent., d. XXIV, c. 4–13, and the Commentary there, p. I, a. 2, q. 2 and throughout p. II. — At the end of the argument, for *suprema* the editions read *superiori*.

la: Cod. F perperam *inferior*.

en: Codex F wrongly reads *inferior*.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 12, 2.

en: 2 Corinthians 12:2.

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 85, nota 10. — Pro *non possunt esse* edd. *non possunt simul esse*.

en: According to Aristotle, concerning which see above, p. 85, note 10. — For *non possunt esse* (cannot be) the editions read *non possunt simul esse* (cannot be at once).

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.).

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 4 (c. 5).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 311, nota 1. et pag. 299, nota 3. — Mox pro *superiorem portionem* edd. *superiorem partem rationis*.

en: Cf. above, p. 311, note 1, and p. 299, note 3. — Presently, for *superiorem portionem* (the superior portion) the editions read *superiorem partem rationis* (the superior part of reason).

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2.

en: See II Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Ita codd. E I L N T U V Z aa, cod. K *fuerint*, edd. *fuerit*.

en: Thus codices E I L N T U V Z aa; codex K reads *fuerint*, the editions *fuerit*.

la: Edd. *vero*. Paulo ante pro *poterant* cod. A *poterat*, codd. E K N V *poterunt*, edd. *potuerunt*.

en: The editions read *vero*. A little earlier, for *poterant* (they could) codex A reads *poterat*, codices E K N V *poterunt*, the editions *potuerunt*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Cod. K sic prosequitur: *et illud fuit in Christo propter singulare officium mediatoris.*

en: Cf. above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — Codex K continues thus: *and this was in Christ on account of the singular office of the mediator.*

la: Vide quaest. praeced. in corp.

en: See the preceding question in the body.

la: Respicitur illud Phil. 4, 4: *Gaudete in Domino* etc. — Paulo superius ante *sicut dictum est* codd. A H I L Z aa bb et edd. 1, 2 interiiciunt *quod*.

en: This refers to Philippians 4:4: *Rejoice in the Lord*, etc. — A little above, before *sicut dictum est*, codices A H I L Z aa bb and editions 1, 2 insert *quod*.

la: Codd. A K L aa bb *gaudii*.

en: Codices A K L aa bb read *gaudii*.

la: Pro *secundum quod* cod. O *sicut*. Aliquanto inferius pro *in uno statu* cod. U *in suo statu uno*, et post pauca pro *est compossibilis* idem cod. U *erat compossibilis*.

en: For *secundum quod* codex O reads *sicut*. Somewhat below, for *in uno statu* codex U reads *in suo statu uno*, and a little after, for *est compossibilis* the same codex U reads *erat compossibilis*.

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. *perficitur*; codd. K bb *perficietur*, qui et paulo ante pro *expelleretur* cum aliquot aliis codd. habent *expelletur*. Cod. A *quin non* pro *quae non*.

en: The editions, with some codices, read *perficitur*; codices K bb read *perficietur*, which also a little before, for *expelleretur*, together with some other codices have *expelletur*. Codex A reads *quin non* for *quae non*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. in fine corp.

en: Cf. above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, at the end of the body.

la: Cod. M. *obedibiles*.

en: Codex M reads *obedibiles*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{355,356,357}-{L,R}-*.png`), per the VOL II OVERRIDE applied to Vol III (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo, Solutio, and footers of two-column Vol III pages; the column-band PDF read is authoritative). English is a fresh literal translation. Raw OCR span 24838–24964 (q3 opens at raw 24965). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (PDF pp.377–379); printed page span confirmed via running-head TEXT (p.355 head `DIST. XVI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` raw 24807; p.356 head raw 24873; p.357 head `DIST. XVI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` with OCR-mangled digit `337`→357 raw 24940 — trust the +22 offset and running-head text, not the OCR digit).

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart).**
- p.355 — footers **3–8** belong to this quaestio (q1 held only p.355 footers 1, 2, which anchor in q1's RESPONDEO tail `attingi¹` / `gaudio virtuoso²`). q2 anchors: `curaret³` (arg.1), `aversionem⁴` (arg.2), `ratio superior⁵` (arg.4), `ipse dicit⁶` (sed contra 1), `secundum idem⁷` (sed contra 2), `impermixtius⁸` (sed contra 3). Rendered here as `[^p355-3]`…`[^p355-8]`.
- p.356 — footers **1–7** (all this quaestio): `ferebatur¹` (arg.5), Respondeo `portionem²`, `fuerunt³`, `fecerat⁴`, `viro⁵` (2nd suppositio), `naturae⁶` (Concedendum), `in Domino⁷` (Solutio 2).
- p.357 — footers **1–6** belong to this quaestio (Solutio 3–6): `gaudendi¹`, `secundum quod²`, `perficeretur³`, `in Christo⁴`, `obaudibiles⁵`, `ad inferiora⁶`. p.357 footers **7–13** belong to q3 (its args/sed contra) and migrate forward.

**Hand-offs picked up.** p.355 footers 3–8 (Damasc.; Vide II Sent. d.XXII; Cod. F *inferior*; 2 Cor. 12,2; Secundum Aristot.; Aristot. III Topic.) — these were forwarded from d16-a2-q1, which held only p.355 footers 1, 2.

**Hand-off forwarded → d16-a2-q3.** QUAESTIO III opens at **raw line 24965** (`QUAESTIO III.`; title *Utrum dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali an in parte sensuali*; body opener `Tertio quaeritur, in qua parte animae Christi fuerit dolor intensior, utrum in parte rationali, an in parte sensuali`), running head `DIST. XVI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` (OCR digit `337` = printed p.357), printed p.357. **Migrating footers:** on shared p.357, footers **7–13** belong to q3 — `[^p357-7]` Edd. et nonnulli codd. *sensibili* (anchors `ad praesentiam affligentis⁷`); `[^p357-8]` Ita cod. A; in aliis et edd. male *ergo erat*; `[^p357-9]` Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp. et ad 3 (`compatiendo⁹`); `[^p357-10]` Vide supra d.XV lit. Magistri c.1 (`passio timoris¹⁰`); `[^p357-11]` Cap. 14 De *maiori* cfr. Aristot. III de Anima (c.7) et tom. I pag. 38 nota 4; `[^p357-12]` Edd. contra codd. A F G H U V *affligitur* (`affligebatur¹²`); `[^p357-13]` Libr. XIX c.13 n.2 (Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*). q2 captured p.357 footers 1–6 only; q3 picks up 7–13 + p.358+. **Scholion:** q1's scholion (I–III) is a forward-reference catalogue covering the q2/q3 literature; q2 has **no own scholion** (`has_scholion: false`), and q3 should be checked likewise. **resume → d.16 a2-q3 (raw 24965).**

**[?] flags.** None — the 450 dpi bands are fully legible for this quaestio.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 357 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali animae Christi, an in parte sensuali.*

Tertio quaeritur, in qua parte animae Christi fuerit dolor intensior, utrum in parte rationali, an in parte sensuali[^p357-7]. Et quod in parte sensuali videtur.

1. Illud magis patitur ad praesentiam affligentis, quod magis est passibile; sed sensualitas in Christo erat magis passibilis quam ipsa ratio, erat enim[^p357-8] fragilior: ergo videtur, quod magis affligebatur anima Christi secundum sensualitatem, quam affligeretur secundum rationem.

2. Item, omne illud, quod magis in patiendo a consolatione elongatur, magis patitur et affligitur; sed sensualitas plus recedebat a gaudio in passione quam ipsa ratio, sicut manifestum est[^p357-9]: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubi magis viget passio timoris, ibidem magis intenditur passio doloris; sed Christus plus timebat secundum sensualitatem quam secundum rationem — secundum enim rationem securus erat, licet sensualitas formidaret[^p357-10] — ergo pari ratione plus dolebat ex parte sensualitatis quam rationis.

4. Item, sicut gaudium est in coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti, ita dolor est in separatione: ergo ibi est maior dolor, ubi est separatio magis convenientis; sed anima plus convenit cum carne secundum sensualitatem quam secundum rationem, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Spiritu et anima*[^p357-11]: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod magis alligatur alicui et plus indiget illo magis patitur et affligitur in illius corruptione et amissione; sed sensualitas magis alligatur carni et plus indiget carne ad suam operationem exercendam quam ratio: ergo carne patiente, plus affligebatur[^p357-12] anima in sensualitate quam in ratione.

**Sed contra:**
1. Sicut dicit Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^p357-13]: « Dolor est testimonium bonae naturae », ergo in meliori natura intensior est dolor; sed melior est natura animae secundum rationem quam secundum sensualitatem: ergo intensior est dolor ex parte rationis quam ex parte sensualitatis.

<!-- page 358 -->

2. Item, quod ex pluribus causis dolet intensius dolet, quam quod ex una tantum; sed dolor erat[^p358-1] in sensualitate tantum ex carne, ratio vero non tantum condolebat carni, sed etiam sensualitati et nobis: ergo videtur, quod intensior erat dolor in ratione quam in sensualitate.

3. Item, ubi est intensior amor, ibi est intensior dolor[^p358-2]; sed Christus magis diligebat in nobis vitam gratiae, quam in se diligeret vitam naturae: ergo magis dolebat de hoc, quod nos amiseramus vitam gratiae, quam de hoc, quod ipse amittebat vitam naturae. Sed primus dolor erat in ratione, secundus in sensualitate: ergo magis doluit secundum rationem quam secundum sensualitatem.

4. Item, in ea parte intensior est dolor, quae habet maiorem rationem dolendi; sed sensualitas non habebat rationem dolendi nisi propter afflictionem carnis suae, ratio vero habebat rationem dolendi propter dehonorationem maiestatis divinae; sed magis dolendum est de Dei inhonoratione quam de carnis afflictione; et Christus dolebat, secundum quod debebat: ergo intensior dolor erat in Christo quantum ad partem rationalem quam quantum ad partem sensualem.

5. Item, Christus diligebat alios sicut se ipsum, quia perfectam habebat caritatem[^p358-3]: ergo tantum dolebat de separatione aliorum a Deo, quantum si ipse separaretur ab ipso; sed constans est, quod omnis anima recta plus doleret de separatione a Deo quam de separatione a corpore proprio: ergo anima Christi plus compatiebatur aliis quam propriae carni. Si ergo compassio respectu aliorum erat in ratione, compassio respectu carnis erat in sensualitate; ergo intensior dolor erat secundum partem rationalem quam secundum sensualitatem.

> ### Conclusio.
> Quoad dolorem passionis Christus magis doluit in parte sensuali, quoad dolorem compassionis magis in parte rationali; ipse autem dolor compassionis fuit intensior quam dolor passionis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in Christo duplex dolor fuit, secundum quod dicunt Sancti[^p358-4], videlicet dolor passionis et dolor compassionis, et uterque dolor intensus fuit et acerbus. Multum enim in se doluit, et multum nobis condoluit; et uterque istorum dolorum et in sensualitate fuit et in ratione, sed ordine permutato. Nam dolor passionis et carnis primo attingebat animam secundum sensualitatem, et deinde secundum alias vires. Dolor vero compassionis primo erat in ratione, et ex ratione redundabat in sensualitatem. Sicut enim, ratione nostra dolente pro peccatis nostris, gemit sensualitas et lacrymatur; sic et Christus, quia multum pro peccatis nostris doluit, de peccatis nostris flevit[^p358-5].

Cum ergo comparamus dolorem sensualitatis ad dolorem rationis, hoc potest esse in duplici genere; et si quidem intelligatur de dolore passionis, cum ille primo sensualitatem attingeret; concedendum est, animam Christi secundum partem sensualem magis doluisse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem[^p358-6]. — Si vero intelligatur de dolore compassionis, quo interius afficiebatur propter scelera nostra; cum ille ortum et originem habeat a ratione, concedendum est, ipsum magis secundum rationem doluisse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad partem sequentem inductae. — Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Membra enim huius quaestionis habent se sicut excedentia et excessa, et obiecta verum concludunt secundum diversas vias.

Si quis autem ulterius quaerat, cum ratio et sensualitas secundum duo genera doloris[^p358-7] mutuo se excedant, quis eorum fuerit intensior in Christo, utrum videlicet dolor passionis, vel compassionis; responderi potest, quod dolor compassionis fuit intensior. — Et ratio huius est: quia, quamvis magna causa esset dolendi in sensualitate propter separationem ipsius a carne, magna etiam esset dispositio ad dolendum propter optimam complexionem[^p358-8]; in dolore tamen compassionis amplior erat ratio dolendi propter inhonorationem Dei et separationem nostram a Deo, maior etiam erat dispositio ad dolendum propter dilectionis nimietatem. Secundum enim quod dilectio maior est, secundum hoc sunt plagae compassionis maiores. Unde multo plus compassio Christi excessit aliorum compassiones quam passio passiones, sicut fuit in eo maior

<!-- page 359 -->

excellentia dilectionis quam passionis respectu aliorum, licet in utroque multum excederet. — Et quod ille dolor intensior fuerit, colligitur ex duplici signo. Unum est, quod maluit animam suam a corpore separari, quam quod nos essemus a Deo separati. Aliud vero signum est, quod flevit pro peccatis nostris, sed non flevit pro poenis corporis sui, sicut Bernardus[^p359-1] dicit; planctus autem signum est amaritudinis et doloris. Et ideo hoc eleganter exprimit cancellarius Philippus[^p359-2] in quadam prosula valde notabili et devota. Ait enim sic:

> Homo vide, quid pro te patior!
> Ad te clamo, qui pro te morior.
> Vide poenas, quibus afficior,
> Vide clavos, quibus confodior!
> Cum sit tantus dolor exterior,
> Interior tamen planctus est gravior,
> Tam ingratum dum te experior[^p359-3].

---

english:
<!-- page 357 -->

### Question III. *Whether the pain was more intense in the rational part of Christ's soul or in the sensual part.*

Thirdly it is asked, in which part of Christ's soul the pain was more intense, whether in the rational part or in the sensual part[^p357-7]. And that it was in the sensual part is shown.

1. That suffers more at the presence of the afflicting thing which is more passible; but the sensuality in Christ was more passible than the reason itself, for it was[^p357-8] more fragile: therefore it seems that Christ's soul was more afflicted according to sensuality than it would be afflicted according to reason.

2. Likewise, everything that in suffering is removed further from consolation suffers and is afflicted more; but sensuality withdrew further from joy in the passion than the reason itself, as is manifest[^p357-9]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, where the passion of fear is more vigorous, there the passion of pain is more intensified; but Christ feared more according to sensuality than according to reason — for according to reason he was secure, although sensuality dreaded[^p357-10] — therefore by parity of reasoning he grieved more on the part of sensuality than of reason.

4. Likewise, just as joy is in the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting, so pain is in separation: therefore there is greater pain where there is separation of what is more fitting; but the soul agrees more with the flesh according to sensuality than according to reason, as Augustine says in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^p357-11]: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that which is more bound to something and has more need of it suffers and is afflicted more in its corruption and loss; but sensuality is more bound to the flesh and has more need of the flesh for exercising its operation than reason does: therefore, the flesh suffering, the soul was afflicted[^p357-12] more in sensuality than in reason.

**On the contrary:**
1. As Augustine says *On the City of God*[^p357-13]: « Pain is the testimony of a good nature », therefore in a better nature pain is more intense; but the nature of the soul is better according to reason than according to sensuality: therefore pain is more intense on the part of reason than on the part of sensuality.

<!-- page 358 -->

2. Likewise, that which grieves from several causes grieves more intensely than that which grieves from one only; but the pain was[^p358-1] in sensuality only from the flesh, whereas reason not only suffered-with the flesh, but also with sensuality and with us: therefore it seems that the pain was more intense in reason than in sensuality.

3. Likewise, where love is more intense, there pain is more intense[^p358-2]; but Christ loved in us the life of grace more than he would love in himself the life of nature: therefore he grieved more over this, that we had lost the life of grace, than over this, that he himself was losing the life of nature. But the first pain was in reason, the second in sensuality: therefore he grieved more according to reason than according to sensuality.

4. Likewise, pain is more intense in that part which has the greater ground for grieving; but sensuality had no ground for grieving except on account of the affliction of its own flesh, whereas reason had a ground for grieving on account of the dishonoring of the divine majesty; but one ought to grieve more over the dishonoring of God than over the affliction of the flesh; and Christ grieved according as he ought: therefore the pain was more intense in Christ as regards the rational part than as regards the sensual part.

5. Likewise, Christ loved others as himself, because he had perfect charity[^p358-3]: therefore he grieved over the separation of others from God as much as if he himself were separated from him; but it is certain that every right soul would grieve more over separation from God than over separation from its own body: therefore Christ's soul had more compassion for others than for its own flesh. If therefore compassion with respect to others was in reason, compassion with respect to the flesh was in sensuality; therefore the pain was more intense according to the rational part than according to sensuality.

> ### Conclusion.
> As regards the pain of passion, Christ grieved more in the sensual part; as regards the pain of compassion, more in the rational part; but the pain of compassion itself was more intense than the pain of passion.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that in Christ there was a twofold pain, according to what the Saints say[^p358-4], namely the pain of passion and the pain of compassion, and each pain was intense and bitter. For he grieved much in himself, and grieved-with us much; and each of these pains was both in sensuality and in reason, but with the order interchanged. For the pain of passion and of the flesh first reached the soul according to sensuality, and then according to the other powers. But the pain of compassion was first in reason, and from reason redounded into sensuality. For just as, when our reason grieves for our sins, the sensuality groans and weeps; so also Christ, because he grieved much for our sins, wept over our sins[^p358-5].

When, therefore, we compare the pain of sensuality to the pain of reason, this can be in a twofold kind; and if indeed it be understood of the pain of passion, since that first reached the sensuality, it must be granted that Christ's soul grieved more according to the sensual part, as the arguments for the first part show[^p358-6]. — But if it be understood of the pain of compassion, by which he was inwardly affected on account of our crimes, since that takes its rise and origin from reason, it must be granted that he grieved more according to reason, as the arguments adduced for the following part show. — And thus the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also clear. For the members of this question stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded, and the objections conclude truly according to diverse ways.

But if anyone further asks, since reason and sensuality mutually exceed one another according to the two kinds of pain[^p358-7], which of them was more intense in Christ — namely whether the pain of passion or of compassion — it can be answered that the pain of compassion was more intense. — And the reason of this is: that, although there was a great cause for grieving in sensuality on account of its separation from the flesh, and there was also a great disposition for grieving on account of the excellent complexion[^p358-8]; nevertheless in the pain of compassion there was a fuller ground for grieving on account of the dishonoring of God and our separation from God, and there was also a greater disposition for grieving on account of the excess of love. For according as love is greater, accordingly the wounds of compassion are greater. Hence by much more did the compassion of Christ exceed the compassions of others than his passion exceeded their passions, just as there was in him a greater

<!-- page 359 -->

excellence of love than of passion with respect to others, although in each he greatly exceeded. — And that that pain was more intense is gathered from a twofold sign. One is, that he preferred his soul to be separated from the body rather than that we should be separated from God. But the other sign is, that he wept for our sins, but did not weep for the punishments of his own body, as Bernard[^p359-1] says; and lamentation is a sign of bitterness and pain. And therefore Chancellor Philip[^p359-2] elegantly expresses this in a certain very notable and devout sequence. For he speaks thus:

> O man, behold what I suffer for you!
> To you I cry, I who die for you.
> Behold the pains by which I am afflicted,
> Behold the nails by which I am pierced!
> Though the outward pain be so great,
> The inward lamentation is yet heavier,
> While I find you so ungrateful[^p359-3].

---

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. hic et mox *sensibili*. Subinde pro *ad praesentiam affligentis* Vat. *ad potentiam affligentis*.

en: The editions and several codices here and just below read *sensibili* ("sensible"). Subsequently, for *ad praesentiam affligentis* ("at the presence of the afflicting thing") the Vatican reads *ad potentiam affligentis* ("at the power of the afflicting thing").

la: Ita cod. A; in aliis et edd. male *ergo erat*.

en: So codex A; in the others and in the editions, wrongly, *ergo erat* ("therefore it was").

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp. et ad. 3. — In *maiori* pro *patiendo* cod. K *compatiendo*.

en: Cf. the preceding question in the body and the reply to the 3rd. — In *maiori* (the major edition) for *patiendo* ("in suffering") codex K reads *compatiendo* ("in suffering-with").

la: Vide supra d. XV. lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine, et ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 2. — In *maiori* pro *passio timoris* cod. K *ratio timoris*.

en: See above, dist. XV, the Master's text, ch. 1 at the end, and there the Commentary, art. 2, q. 2. — In *maiori* for *passio timoris* ("the passion of fear") codex K reads *ratio timoris* ("the ground of fear").

la: Cap. 14. — De *maiori* cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 29. (c. 7.), et tom. I. pag. 38, nota 4.

en: Ch. 14. — On *maiori* cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 29 (ch. 7), and vol. I, p. 38, note 4.

la: Edd. contra codd. A F G H U V *affligitur*.

en: The editions, against codices A F G H U V, read *affligitur* ("is afflicted," present tense).

la: Libr. XIX. c. 13, n. 2: Et ipse dolor testimonium est boni adempti et boni relicti. Nisi enim bonum relictum esset, bonum amissum dolere non posset... Sicut ergo laetitia deserti boni in peccato testis est voluntatis malae, ita dolor amissi boni in supplicio testis est naturae bonae.

en: Book XIX, ch. 13, n. 2: "And pain itself is the testimony of a good taken away and of a good left behind. For unless the good were left behind, one could not grieve over the good lost... As, therefore, the gladness over a good forsaken in sin is the witness of an evil will, so the pain over a good lost in punishment is the witness of a good nature."

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. incongrue *est*.

en: The editions, with some codices, incongruously read *est* ("is").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 338, note 3.

la: Matth. 22, 39; Ioan. 15, 12. — Paulo inferius pro *plus doleret* cod. N *plus dolet*.

en: Matthew 22:39; John 15:12. — A little further down, for *plus doleret* ("would grieve more") codex N reads *plus dolet* ("grieves more").

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1, et Bernard. Serm. 3. in Nativ. Domini, n. 3. seq. Vide etiam infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 3, ubi Hugonis sententia affertur, de qua consule I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Cf. above, the Master's text, dist. XV, ch. 1, and Bernard, Sermon 3 on the Lord's Nativity, n. 3 and following. See also below, dist. 17, art. 1, q. 3, where Hugh's opinion is brought forward, on which consult Book I of the Sentences, dist. 48, art. 2, q. 2.

la: Cfr. Luc. 19, 41. seqq. Codd. L aa verbis *de peccatis* praefigunt *et*.

en: Cf. Luke 19:41 and following. Codices L aa prefix *et* ("and") to the words *de peccatis* ("for our sins").

la: Edd. supplent *adductae*, et deinde pro *afficiebatur* cum nonnullis codd. substituunt *affligebatur* et pro *habeat a ratione* legunt *haberet in ratione*.

en: The editions supply *adductae* ("adduced"), and then for *afficiebatur* ("was affected") with some codices they substitute *affligebatur* ("was afflicted"), and for *habeat a ratione* ("takes from reason") they read *haberet in ratione* ("it would have in reason").

la: Cod. A *dolorum*.

en: Codex A reads *dolorum* ("of pains").

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Inferius pro *nimietatem* codd. K bb *immensitatem*.

en: Cf. above, art. 1, q. 2. — Further below, for *nimietatem* ("excess") codices K bb read *immensitatem* ("immensity").

la: Serm. 4. de Adventu Domini, n. 7. et Serm. 3. in Nativ. Domini n. 3. seq. — De seq. propos. idem dicit Serm. in Cantic. serm. 19. n. 7: Alia suspiria testantur tristitiam animorum. August., Serm. 351. (alias Homil. 50.) c. 1. n. 1: Lacrymae sunt testes doloris.

en: Sermon 4 on the Lord's Advent, n. 7, and Sermon 3 on the Lord's Nativity, n. 3 and following. — On what is set forth below, the same says in the Sermon on the Canticle, serm. 19, n. 7: "Other sighs bear witness to the sadness of souls." Augustine, Sermon 351 (alias Homily 50), ch. 1, n. 1: "Tears are the witnesses of pain."

la: Cod. N addit *Parisiensis*. Boulaeus, Hist. univers. Paris. tom. 3. pag. 154, loquitur de quodam cancellario Philippo, mortuo an. 1237, qui igitur probabiliter est auctor huius carminis. — Fr. Mone, Hymn. lat. etc. tom. 1. pag. 172, inter hymnos Bernardo tributos affert etiam fragmentum cuiusdam carminis, quod prorsus convenit cum versibus hic allatis.

en: Codex N adds *Parisiensis* ("of Paris"). Du Boulay, *History of the University of Paris*, vol. 3, p. 154, speaks of a certain chancellor Philip, who died in the year 1237, who therefore is probably the author of this poem. — Fr. Mone, *Latin Hymns* etc., vol. 1, p. 172, among the hymns attributed to Bernard, also brings forward a fragment of a certain poem, which agrees entirely with the verses here cited.

en: See the scholion on the 1st question of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{357,358,359}-{L,R}-*.png`), per the Vol II/III override (PDF authoritative in the cascade-shattered Respondeo/footer regions). The IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw 24965–25081) was used only for footnote-marker spacing and clean running prose. English is a fresh literal translation. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Alignment.** Opener reads *Tertio quaeritur, in qua parte animae Christi fuerit dolor intensior, utrum in parte rationali, an in parte sensuali* — the LAST quaestio of art. II (and of dist. XVI before the Dubia). This is the *dolor intensior in parte rationali an sensuali* question, NOT q1 (*secundum rationem an sensualitatem*) or q2 (*secundum superiorem portionem rationis*). NOTE: the dispatch label called this *poenalius… secundum rationem quam secundum partem sensualem*; that title does not appear anywhere in the Vol III raw (a stale q-list artifact from a pre-q2 session). The d16-a2-q2 hand-off correctly forwarded this as q3, and the raw + bands confirm: this is the right, last, distinct q3.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.357** (raw 24965–25003): title, opener, fundamenta 1–5, Sed contra 1. Footnote markers 7–13 (footers 1–6 belong to a2-q2 and were captured there).
- **p.358** (raw 25004–25066): Sed contra 2–5, CONCLUSIO, RESPONDEO (twofold pain; passion reaches sensuality first, compassion reaches reason first), the resolution to the proposed question + objections, the connected question (which pain is more intense → compassion), and the start of the Corollarium. Footers 1–8 (per-page restart).
- **p.359** (raw 25067–25081): end of the Corollarium (twofold sign; Bernard) and Chancellor Philip's prosula (*Homo vide, quid pro te patior*). Footers 1–3 (footer 4 onward belongs to the d.16 Dubia and is forwarded). q3 ends just before the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header at raw 25082.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. q3 has no scholion of its own; q1's scholion (I–III) forward-covers the q2/q3 literature, and this is confirmed in-text by p.359 footer 3 (`[^p359-3]`: *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*).

**Hand-offs picked up.** From a2-q2: p.357 footers **7–13** (sensibili / ergo erat / compatiendo / passio timoris / Aristot. de Anima / affligitur / Augustine de Civ. Dei) — all rendered as `[^p357-7..13]`.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d16-dubia).** The d.16 Dubia chunk (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI`) opens at **raw line 25082** (header), with `Dub. I.` body beginning ~raw 25087. It shares printed p.359: **footers 4 onward** of p.359 migrate to the Dubia. Footer 4 = *Supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Mox pro semota codd. I L N T U Z aa remota.* (anchors the Dub. I clause *semota erit omnis calumnia*). Expect the Dubia chunk to hold several `DUB.` members (Dub. I confirmed on p.359; count the full DUB. sequence from raw 25082 to the DISTINCTIO XVII boundary at raw 25203) — likely multiple dubia.

**[?] flags.** None. The 450 dpi bands were fully legible across all three pages; all OCR garbles (*clolor*, *semuali*, *palitur*, *affligenlis*, *Cbristi*, *conneia*, *fiiit*, *enira*, *afticior*, *ingrnlum*) were resolved unambiguously against the bands.