title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether generation is to be posited in God

source_text:
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### Quaestio I. *Utrum in divinis generatio ponenda[^1] sit.*

Circa primum, quod generatio sit in divinis, ostenditur[^2]:

1. *Primo* a minori. Multo fortius debet esse generatio in eo qui generationem aliis tribuit, quam in his quae recipiunt; sed generatio est in creaturis: ergo et in Deo qui tribuit. Et hoc est quod dicitur Isaiae ultimo[^3]: *Si ego generationem aliis tribuo, sterilis ero? dicit Dominus,* quasi dicat, non.

2. *Item*, ostenditur illud idem a posteriori. Per prius enim est paternitas in Deo quam in creatura; sed paternitas et generatio vere est in creatura: ergo et in Deo. Quod prius sit ibi, dicit Apostolus ad Ephesios tertio[^4]: *Ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur.*

3. *Item*, ostenditur hoc ipsum a simili, quia omne quod perfectionis est, attribuendum est Deo, in quo est summa omnis perfectionis; sed generatio est perfectionis in creatura, ut vult Philosophus[^5], quia «perfectum est quod potest generare quale ipsum est»: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, illud idem ostenditur alia ratione sic[^6]: divina natura est summe bona et actualissima: ergo summe potest et vult se communicare; sed prima et summa ratio communicandi est in generatione: ergo necesse est in divinis ponere generationem.

**Contra:** 1. Generatio in creaturis aut est perfectionis, aut imperfectionis. Si perfectionis, tunc ergo, cum substantiae spirituales et incorporales sint nobilissimae, debet in eis generatio esse: ergo cum non sit in eis, non est nobilitatis; sed quod non est nobilitatis non est in Deo: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, ubi est generatio, ibi est variatio; generatio enim est species motus, et inter omnes species motus maior est variatio in motu secundum substantiam, quia est entis in potentia, minor in motu secundum locum[^7]: ergo cum in Deo non sit variatio nec aliqua species motus, etiam illa quae minima est, ut loci mutatio: ergo nec generatio.

3. *Item*, ubi est generatio, ibi est corruptio, unde Philosophus[^8] dicit, quod «propter longe stare a principio reliquo modo complevit esse Deus, continuam in his faciens generationem»; et huiusmodi signum est, quod sola corruptibilia generant et generantur in creaturis; sed in Deo nulla cadit corruptio: ergo nec generatio.

4. *Item*, ubi est generatio, ibi est nutritio; unde ad tot et plures se extendit vis nutritiva quam generativa; sed in Deo non est vis nutritiva: ergo nec generativa, ergo nec nutritio, nec generatio: ergo generatio non est in divinis.

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> **Conclusio.** *Generatio ponenda est in divinis, cuius congruitas et modus explicatur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod generatio ponenda est in divino esse[^9]. Et huius ratio potissima est, ut credo, quia omnis natura est communicabilis; et quia in Deo propter sui nobilitatem est aptitudo actui coniuncta, immo ipse actus, oportet quod natura sit pluribus communicata; sed non possunt esse plures ab una natura, quin unus sit ab alio, vel ambo a tertio: ergo cum ante divinas personas nihil sit, oportet quod una sit ab alia. Et quoniam sunt conformes in natura, et generatio est emanatio secundum conformitatem naturae: ideo credo, quod necesse est in divinis ponere generationem.

Ut autem intelligatur, per quem modum, notandum, quod generare de sui propria ratione est similem sibi in substantia et natura producere[^10]. Sibi vero similem contingit produci tripliciter[^11]: aut per impressionem suae similitudinis in alio; et sic generatur character a sigillo, lumen a luminoso, species ab obiecto; alio modo per eductionem speciei consimilis ab alio; et sic generatur elementum ab elemento; tertio modo per productionem similis de simili sive de se ipso; et sic generatur animatum ab animato; et iste tertius modus est perfectior, unde non reperitur nisi in substantiis habentibus formam nobilem, quae est vita[^12]. Et iste modus generationis est secundum nascentiam et est in Deo et[^13] in creaturis, sed differenter; quia producere alium ex se ipso potest esse dupliciter, vel ex se toto, vel ex parte sui.

Ex se toto non potest producere nisi ille, cuius essentia potest esse in pluribus una et tota. Nam si non potest esse in pluribus una et tota, si generans dat totam suam substantiam generato, tunc substantia tota transit in generatum[^14], et generans perdit substantiam totam generando, quod esse non potest. Ideo ad hoc necesse est, quod talem habeat substantiam, quae una et tota sit in pluribus. Talis autem substantia non est nisi substantia habens summam simplicitatem; haec autem est sola divina essentia[^15], in qua propter summam simplicitatem suppositum non addit ad essentiam, unde nec ipsam coarctat nec limitat nec formam multiplicat. Et ideo in ea[^16] potest esse generatio communicans eandem substantiam totam; et talis generatio est omnimodae perfectionis et in solo Deo reperitur, ratione iam dicta.

Alio modo contingit aliquem ex se producere quantum ad partem sui. Sic pater naturalis generat filium, partem substantiae transmittendo et decidendo[^17]. Et haec generatio necessario est cum transmutatione; quia enim pars decisa non habet actum totius, necesse est, quod per mutationem acquirat; sed quod acquirit quod non habet, variatur; ideo haec generatio est mutatio et habet variationem coniunctam. Est etiam cum corruptione annexa; quia enim aliqua pars generantis deperditur, generans est, a quo potest fieri ablatio et ita corruptio. Est etiam cum conservatione[^18] adiuncta; quia enim fit deperditio, necesse est quod per nutrimentum fiat restauratio. Et ideo generatio in creatura et perfectionis et imperfectionis est: perfectionis a parte virtutis producentis, imperfectionis a parte subiecti divisibilis. Et ideo est in solis animatis, quae habent formam perfectionis, ipsam scilicet[^19] animam, et corpus defectibile et restaurabile.

Generatio vero in divinis est omnimodae perfectionis. Quia[^20] enim non est ex parte, ideo est, quod habet actu speciem. Et ideo nec ibi est in natura imperfectio nec variatio, quia nihil novum acquiritur; nec corruptio, quia nihil adimitur; nec nutritio, quia nihil[^21] restituitur.

**Et ex hoc patet solutio obiectorum;** quia generatio[^22] de toto est tantae perfectionis, quod non potest esse in creatura aliqua; generatio vero ex parte tantam habet imperfectionem coniunctam[^23], ut non possit esse circa substantiam invariabilem et incorruptibilem et simplicem, non solum in natura increata, verum etiam in creata. Aliae rationes probant de generatione quae est ex parte.

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english:
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### Question I. *Whether generation is to be posited[^1] in God.*

Concerning the first, that generation is in God, is shown[^2]:

1. *First* from the lesser. Generation ought much more strongly to be in him who bestows generation upon others than in those which receive it; but generation is in creatures: therefore also in God who bestows it. And this is what is said in Isaiah, last chapter[^3]: *If I bestow generation upon others, shall I be sterile? saith the Lord,* as if to say, no.

2. *Likewise*, that same thing is shown from the posterior. For paternity is in God before it is in creatures; but paternity and generation truly is in creatures: therefore also in God. That it is there first, the Apostle says to the Ephesians chapter three[^4]: *From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.*

3. *Likewise*, this very thing is shown from likeness, because everything that is of perfection is to be attributed to God, in whom is the height of all perfection; but generation is of perfection in creatures, as the Philosopher holds[^5], because "that is perfect which can generate such as it is itself": therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, that same thing is shown by another reason thus[^6]: the divine nature is supremely good and most actual: therefore it supremely can and wills to communicate itself; but the first and highest ground of communicating is in generation: therefore it is necessary to posit generation in God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Generation in creatures is either of perfection or of imperfection. If of perfection, then since spiritual and incorporeal substances are most noble, generation ought to be in them: therefore since it is not in them, it is not of nobility; but what is not of nobility is not in God: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, where there is generation, there is variation; for generation is a species of motion, and among all species of motion the variation is greater in motion according to substance, because it is of a being in potency, less in motion according to place[^7]: therefore since in God there is neither variation nor any species of motion, even that which is least, such as change of place: therefore neither generation.

3. *Likewise*, where there is generation, there is corruption; whence the Philosopher[^8] says, that "on account of standing far from the principle, in the remaining mode God completed being, making continual generation in these things"; and a sign of this kind is, that only corruptible things generate and are generated in creatures; but no corruption falls in God: therefore neither generation.

4. *Likewise*, where there is generation, there is nutrition; whence the nutritive power extends itself to as many and more things than the generative; but in God there is no nutritive power: therefore neither generative, therefore neither nutrition, nor generation: therefore generation is not in God.

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> **Conclusion.** *Generation is to be posited in God; its fittingness and mode is explained.*

**I respond:** It must be said that generation is to be posited in the divine being[^9]. And the most potent ground of this is, as I believe, because every nature is communicable; and because in God, on account of his nobility, there is an aptitude joined to act, nay rather, act itself, it is necessary that the nature be communicated to many; but several cannot be from one nature, unless one is from the other, or both from a third: therefore since before the divine persons nothing is, it is necessary that one be from another. And since they are conformed in nature, and generation is an emanation according to conformity of nature: therefore I believe that it is necessary to posit generation in God.

But that it be understood by what mode, it must be noted that to generate, of its proper account, is to produce one like itself in substance and nature[^10]. But to produce one like itself happens to occur in three ways[^11]: either by the impression of its likeness in another; and thus a character is generated from a seal, light from a luminous body, a species from an object; in another mode by the eduction of a like species from another; and thus an element is generated from an element; in a third mode by the production of a like from a like or from itself; and thus a living thing is generated from a living thing; and this third mode is more perfect, whence it is found only in substances having a noble form, which is life[^12]. And this mode of generation is according to nativity and is in God and[^13] in creatures, but differently; because to produce another from oneself can be in two ways, either from oneself wholly, or from a part of oneself.

From oneself wholly only he can produce, whose essence can be in many [things] one and whole. For if it cannot be in many [things] one and whole, if the generator gives its whole substance to the generated, then the whole substance passes into the generated[^14], and the generator loses the whole substance by generating, which cannot be. Therefore for this it is necessary that he have such a substance as is one and whole in many. But such a substance is none other than a substance having supreme simplicity; and this is only the divine essence[^15], in which on account of supreme simplicity the supposit adds nothing to the essence, whence it neither constrains it nor limits it nor multiplies the form. And therefore in it[^16] there can be a generation communicating the same whole substance; and such generation is of every-mode perfection and is found only in God, by the reason already stated.

In another mode it happens that someone produces from himself with respect to a part of himself. Thus a natural father generates a son by transmitting and shedding a part of his substance[^17]. And this generation is necessarily with transmutation; for since the part shed does not have the act of the whole, it is necessary that through change it acquire [it]; but what acquires what it does not have, varies; therefore this generation is change and has variation joined to it. It is also with corruption annexed; for since some part of the generator is lost, the generator is one from whom removal can be made and so corruption. It is also with conservation[^18] adjoined; for since loss takes place, it is necessary that through nourishment restoration occur. And therefore generation in a creature is both of perfection and of imperfection: of perfection on the side of the power producing, of imperfection on the side of the divisible subject. And therefore it is in living things alone, which have a form of perfection, namely[^19] the soul, and a body capable of failing and being restored.

But generation in God is of every-mode perfection. For because[^20] it is not from a part, therefore it is the case that it has its species in act. And therefore there is in it neither imperfection of nature nor variation, because nothing new is acquired; nor corruption, because nothing is taken away; nor nutrition, because nothing[^21] is restored.

**And from this is clear the solution of the objections;** because generation[^22] of the whole is of such great perfection that it cannot be in any creature; but generation from a part has so great an imperfection joined[^23] to it that it cannot be about an invariable and incorruptible and simple substance, not only in uncreated nature, but even in created. The other reasons prove of the generation which is from a part.

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en: On the authority of many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here expunged the added word *ponenda*.

la: Cod. W addit *sic*.

en: Codex W adds *sic*.

la: Vers. 9, ubi Vulgata loco *aliis* ponit *ceteris* et pro *dicit* habet *ait*.

en: Verse 9, where the Vulgate in place of *aliis* puts *ceteris* and instead of *dicit* has *ait*.

la: Vers. 15, in quo textu Vulgata *caelis* loco *caelo*. — Paulo ante ed. 1 *per prius* pro *prius*.

en: Verse 15, in which text the Vulgate has *caelis* in place of *caelo*. — A little before, ed. 1 has *per prius* for *prius*.

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 34. (c. 4.) et IV. *Meteor*. text. 19. (c. 3.).

en: Book II of *On the Soul*, text 34 (c. 4) and IV *Meteorology* text 19 (c. 3).

la: Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *sic*, et pro *alia ratione* ponit *illa ratione*, sed obest auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc omits *sic*, and instead of *alia ratione* puts *illa ratione*, but the authority of the other manuscripts and of ed. 1 stands against this.

la: Vide Aristot., V. *Phys*. text. 7. seqq. et VIII. text. 53. seqq. (c. 7.).

en: See Aristotle, V *Physics* text 7 ff. and VIII text 53 ff. (c. 7).

la: Libr. II. *de Gener. et corrupt*. text. 59. secundum transl. arabico-latinam. In ed. vero Paris. c. 10. ita exhibetur: *Hoc vero (esse sive existere) in omnibus inesse impossibile sit, propterea quod longe ab ipso principio distent; reliquo modo Deus ipse universum complevit, continua facta generatione.* Vide etiam II. *de Anima*, text. 33. (c. 4.). — Vat. loco *Philosophus* ponit *Auctor de causis*, sed falso et contra omnes mss., quorum pauci ut H 10 indicant etiam locum addendo *in libro de Generat. et corruptione*, et plures *primo* ponunt pro *principio*. Mox nonnulli codd. ut H T ee ff cum ed. 1 *quia* loco *quod*.

en: Book II of *On Generation and Corruption* text 59 according to the Arabic-Latin translation. In the Paris edition c. 10 it is rendered thus: *That this (to be or to exist) be in all things is impossible, because they stand far from the principle itself; in the remaining mode God himself completed the universe, generation having been made continuous.* See also II *On the Soul* text 33 (c. 4). — The Vatican edition in place of *Philosophus* puts *Auctor de causis*, but falsely and against all the manuscripts, of which a few such as H 10 indicate also the place, adding *in the book On Generation and Corruption*, and several put *primo* for *principio*. Soon some codices such as H T ee ff with ed. 1 [have] *quia* in place of *quod*.

la: Ex codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *divino esse* pro *divinis*, deinde supplevimus particulam *Et*. Mox post *credo* codd. H I *quia in divinis* et ed. 1 *quia Dei* loco *quia omnis*.

en: From the codices and ed. 1 we have substituted *divino esse* for *divinis*, then we have supplied the particle *Et*. Soon after *credo* codices H I have *quia in divinis* and ed. 1 *quia Dei* in place of *quia omnis*.

la: Vide Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 34. (c. 4.); VII. *Metaph*. text. 22. et 28. (VI. c. 7. et 8.).

en: See Aristotle, II *On the Soul* text 34 (c. 4); VII *Metaphysics* text 22 and 28 (VI c. 7 and 8).

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, antiquioribus autem mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, *in natura producere tripliciter est* loco *contingit produci tripliciter*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc — the older manuscripts and ed. 1 contradicting — has *in natura producere tripliciter est* in place of *contingit produci tripliciter*.

la: Hinc et generatio sub hoc respectu communiter definitur: *origo viventis a vivente ut principio coniuncto in similitudinem naturae*.

en: Hence also generation under this respect is commonly defined: *the origin of a living thing from a living thing as from a conjoined principle in a likeness of nature*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut X Z repetunt hic *in*.

en: Some codices such as X Z repeat *in* here.

la: Cod. R *et est in generato* pro *in generatum*. Paulo post mendum Vat. *adhuc* loco *ad hoc* correximus ex mss.

en: Codex R has *et est in generato* for *in generatum*. A little after, we have corrected the error of the Vatican edition, *adhuc* in place of *ad hoc*, from the manuscripts.

la: Ed. 1 *substantia*. Mox post *suppositum* cod. R *nihil* loco *non*, et paulo infra cod. V *ipsam* praemittit verbo *limitat*.

en: Ed. 1 has *substantia*. Soon after *suppositum* codex R has *nihil* in place of *non*, and a little below codex V prefixes *ipsam* to the verb *limitat*.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ea* pro *eo*, quod ponitur in Vat.

en: On the trust of many manuscripts and of ed. 1 we have substituted *ea* for *eo*, which is given in the Vatican edition.

la: Ope plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 exhibemus *decidendo* loco *descindendo*, quod non ita bene subnexo verbo *decisa* corresponderet. Mox cod. T *causa transmutabilitatis* pro *cum transmutatione*.

en: By the help of many manuscripts and of ed. 1 we present *decidendo* in place of *descindendo*, which would not correspond so well to the verb *decisa* annexed below. Soon codex T has *causa transmutabilitatis* for *cum transmutatione*.

la: Nempe: *conservatione* passive sumta. — Antiquam lectionem plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. restituimus pro *conversione* ponendo *conservatione*; utriusque lectionis idem sensus. Pro lectione mss. stat Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 47. (c. 4.).

en: Namely: *conservatione* taken passively. — We have restored the ancient reading of many manuscripts and of the first six editions, putting *conservatione* in place of *conversione*; the sense of both readings is the same. Aristotle, II *On the Soul* text 47 (c. 4), stands for the manuscript reading.

la: Ita mss. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. hic *id est* pro *ipsam scilicet* habet et mox *ipsum scilicet* praemittit nomini *corpus*.

en: So the manuscripts with ed. 1, while the Vatican edition here has *id est* for *ipsam scilicet* and soon prefixes *ipsum scilicet* to the noun *corpus*.

la: Consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, commutavimus in hac propositione *Quod* in *Quia* et deinde *quia* in *quod*.

en: With the manuscripts and ed. 1 in agreement, we have changed in this proposition *Quod* into *Quia* and then *quia* into *quod*.

la: Ed. 1 addit *restauratur vel*.

en: Ed. 1 adds *restauratur vel*.

la: Cod. bb adiicit *quae est*.

en: Codex bb adds *quae est*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, *adiunctam*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [has] *adiunctam*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Obiectiones iam in corp. solutae sunt. Quoad Angelos patet, quod nullam habere possunt generationem: non generationem imperfectam, quae est ex parte, propter simplicitatem substantiae angelicae; non perfectam, quae est ex toto, quia eorum natura est finita. — Quoad argumenta congruentiae, quae supposito fidei dogmate hic afferuntur, cfr. supra d. 2. q. 2; d. 5. q. 2; dub. 3. 10. huius d.; Breviloq. p. 1. c. 3; Hexaem. Serm. II. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 1. 2. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 6. 7. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 27. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 10. 11. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 3; S. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., I. Sent. d. 4. l. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 58. q. 1. n. 8-24. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1; d. 10. q. 1. prop. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The objections have already been resolved in the body. As regards the Angels, it is clear that they can have no generation: not the imperfect generation, which is from a part, on account of the simplicity of angelic substance; not the perfect, which is from the whole, because their nature is finite. — As regards the arguments of fittingness, which on the supposition of the dogma of faith are here brought forward, cf. above d. 2. q. 2; d. 5. q. 2; dub. 3. 10. of this d.; *Breviloquium* p. 1. c. 3; *Hexaemeron* Sermon II. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 12. m. 1. 2. — Scotus, I *Sent.* d. 2. q. 6. 7. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 4. q. 1. a. 1; *S.[T.]* I. q. 27. a. 1. 2; *S. c. Gentiles* IV. c. 10. 11. — Blessed Albert, I *Sent.* d. 4. a. 3; *Summa* I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, I *Sent.* d. 4. q. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, I *Sent.* d. 4. l. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 58. q. 1. n. 8-24. — Durandus, I *Sent.* d. 4. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 4. q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1; d. 10. q. 1. prop. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in divinis generatio distinguat inter gignentem et genitum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum generatio in divinis sit personarum distinctiva. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus circa principium *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Nulla res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit»: si ergo gignit, aliam gignit; sed inter aliam et aliam est distinctio: ergo etc.

2. Item, generatio est emanatio; sed ubi est emanatio, ibi est multiplicatio sive plurificatio; ubi autem multiplicatio, ibi[^2] distinctio: ergo ubi generatio, ibi necessario est distinctio.

3. Item, generatio in divinis est relatio[^3]; sed relatio importat respectum et ordinem; sed ubi respectus et ordo, ibi suppositorum et relatorum sive ordinatorum distinctio: et sic etc.

4. Item, maior[^4] diversitas sustinetur a supposito vel in supposito composito et multiplici quam in subiecto simplici et uniformi; sed relative opposita non stant insimul in eodem individuo creato: ergo nec in simplici hypostasi. Probatio mediae. Bene sequitur: Socrates est pater Platonis: ergo non est filius eius, vel est distinctus ab eo: ergo multo fortius in divinis.

**Contra:**

1. Pater generando Filium dat ei totum quod habet; sed habet essentiam et personam: ergo dat ei essentiam et personam: ergo sicut Filius non distinguitur a Patre essentialiter, ita nec personaliter, ut videtur.

2. Item, Pater communicat Filio essentiam suam propter summam[^5] simplicitatem; sed aeque simplex est persona ut essentia: ergo qua ratione communicat essentiam, communicat et personam.

3. Item, in Patre idem est natura et persona: ergo impossibile est, quod communicet unum, quod non[^6] communicet aliud, ergo si dat naturam, et personam.

4. Item, videtur quod relatio non distinguat aliqua[^7] ratione, quia unus et idem punctus est principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum: ergo si istae relationes non sunt distinctivae, videtur similiter, quod nec paternitas et filiatio. Si dicas, quod non omnes relationes distinguunt, sed solum mutuae, ut principium et principiatum, finis et finitum; contra[^8]: Pater et Filius se habent, sicut intelligens et intellectum, ut dicit Anselmus[^9]; sed idem potest esse intelligens et intellectum: ergo etc.

5. Item, maior est repugnantia in contrariis quam in relativis[^10]; sed albedo et nigredo, quae sunt contraria, non faciunt distinctionem circa Petrum, quia idem potest modo esse albus, modo niger: ergo multo fortius unus in divinis modo erit Pater modo Filius.

6. Item, quaeritur, quare potius relationes faciunt distinctionem personae quam essentiae, cum aeque bene possint esse plures essentiae vel naturae in una persona, sicut e converso.

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> **Conclusio.** Contra Sabellium probatur, quod generatio in divinis facit realem distinctionem inter generantem et genitum; contra Arium vero, quod haec distinctio sit quantum ad personam, non quantum ad essentiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod generatio in divinis, sicut ostensum est[^11], facit realem distinctionem inter generantem et generatum, non rationalem vel intellectualem solum, sicut dixit Sabellius; et[^12] realem quantum ad personam, non quantum ad essentiam, sicut dixit Arius.

Quod sic patet. Generatio in creaturis dicit emanationem per modum actionis sive mutationis, in Deo[^13] emanationem per modum relationis.

In quantum emanatio, dicit aliquam distinctionem; in quantum talis emanatio, dicit distinctionem in persona[^14]. Ratione emanationis est distinctio; quia, sicut dicit Anselmus[^15], «nec intellectus capit, nec natura permittit, illum, qui est ab alio, esse illum, a quo est», secundum quod positive dicitur aliquis esse ab alio — nam Pater privative dicitur esse a se, id est non ab alio. In quantum talis emanatio, ponit distinctionem in persona. Generatio enim est productio convenientis in natura; ratione[^16] naturae non potest esse distinctio: ergo vel erit ratione suppositi, vel proprietatis. Si proprietatis, aut absolute, aut respective; non absolute, quia tunc esset distinctio in natura; nec[^17] respective, ut puta relationis, quia in relatione secundum se non est motus in creaturis[^18] nec origo in divinis; unde filiatio non generatur nisi in alio. Ergo necesse est, quod sit distinctio in supposito.

Similiter ratione relationis est distinctio, quia nihil ad se refertur nec ordinatur. Ratione vero talis relationis est distinctio personalis; quia generare et generari, cum dicant relationem per modum actionis et passionis[^19], dicunt eam in supposito et respectu suppositi. Et ideo, quia relatio inter extrema notat distinctionem, patet quod distinctio est ibi suppositorum. His visis[^20], facile est solvere ad obiecta.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Quod ergo obiicitur: Pater communicat Filio totum quod habet; verum est, praeter generationem et generationis distinctionem; ipsa enim ratio communicandi dat intelligere distinctionem, quia nullus communicat sibi, sed alii: et ideo[^21] id in quo distinguit, non communicat.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeque simplex est persona, ut essentia; dicendum, quod simplicitas essentiae est, quod sit in pluribus; sed simplicitas suppositi est, quod non sit in[^22] pluribus. Nam suppositum sive individuum, quantum est de se, dicitur quod est in uno solo; ideo non est simile.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem[^23] est essentia et persona; dicendum, quod quamvis sint idem, non tamen sunt ad idem: quia persona est ad alium, ideo generatur et refertur; essentia vero non, ideo essentia communicatur et persona distinguitur. Sicut ergo, quamvis idem sit in Patre essentia et persona, tamen persona generat, essentia non; sic e converso essentia communicatur et persona non.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de principio et fine in puncto, patet responsio, quia illae non sunt mutuae relationes, quod proprie requiritur ad distinctionem; unde non valet. Quod obiicit[^24] de intelligente et intellecto, dico quod non est ibi relatio secundum esse, sed secundum dici. Ad hoc autem quod relatio distinguat, oportet quod sint relationes mutuae, quia aliter non distinguunt; oportet etiam, quod dicant relationem secundum esse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de albedine et nigredine, dicendum, quod nulla est oppositio formarum, nisi considerentur[^25] respectu eiusdem temporis; et impossibile est, quod idem subiectum eodem tempore sit album et nigrum; relationes autem in divinis simul sunt.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare magis relationes faciunt[^26] distinctionem in personis quam in essentia; patet ex iam dictis responsio. Potest etiam alia ratio reddi, quia pluralitas naturarum impedit simplicitatem personae, sed non sic e converso. Quod patet sic: si[^27] plures naturae sunt in una persona, aut ergo per gratiam, aut per naturam. Si per gratiam unimus, sic — quia natura unita consequitur unitatem personae — non impedit[^28]; sed si naturaliter, ut in Petro, est pluralitas essentiarum sive naturarum, tunc — cum intellectus naturae praecedat personam, et non natura ex personis, sed persona ex naturis sit[^29] — necesse est, personam esse compositam; et inde est, quod in divinis magis est unitas naturae cum pluralitate personarum, quam e converso.

english:
### Question II. *Whether generation in God distinguishes between the one begetting and the one begotten.*

Secondly it is asked, whether generation in God is distinctive of the persons. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, near the beginning of *On the Trinity*[^1]: «There is no thing which begets itself, that it may exist»: if therefore it begets, it begets another; but between one and another there is distinction: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, generation is an emanation; but where there is emanation, there is multiplication or plurification; and where multiplication, there[^2] distinction: therefore where generation, there necessarily is distinction.

3. Likewise, generation in God is a relation[^3]; but relation imports respect and order; but where respect and order, there is distinction of the supposits and of the things related or ordered: and so etc.

4. Likewise, greater[^4] diversity is sustained by a supposit, or in a composite and manifold supposit, than in a simple and uniform subject; but relatively opposed things do not stand together in the same created individual: therefore neither in a simple hypostasis. Proof of the middle [premise]. It well follows: Socrates is the father of Plato: therefore he is not his son, or he is distinct from him: therefore much more strongly in God.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Father, in begetting the Son, gives him everything that he has; but he has the essence and the person: therefore he gives him the essence and the person: therefore just as the Son is not distinguished from the Father essentially, so neither personally, as it seems.

2. Likewise, the Father communicates his essence to the Son on account of [his] supreme[^5] simplicity; but the person is just as simple as the essence: therefore by the same reason by which he communicates the essence, he also communicates the person.

3. Likewise, in the Father the nature and the person are the same: therefore it is impossible that he should communicate the one and not[^6] communicate the other; therefore if he gives the nature, [he gives] also the person.

4. Likewise, it seems that relation does not distinguish by any[^7] account, because one and the same point is the beginning and the end with respect to diverse lines: therefore if these relations are not distinctive, it seems likewise that neither are paternity and filiation. If you say that not all relations distinguish, but only mutual ones, as principle and that which is from a principle, end and that which is ended; on the contrary[^8]: the Father and the Son are related as the one understanding and the thing understood, as Anselm says[^9]; but the same can be understanding and understood: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, there is greater repugnance in contraries than in relatives[^10]; but whiteness and blackness, which are contraries, do not make a distinction in Peter, because the same [subject] can now be white, now black: therefore much more strongly will one in God be now Father, now Son.

6. Likewise, it is asked, why rather do the relations make the distinction of the person than of the essence, since equally well there could be several essences or natures in one person, as conversely.

> **Conclusion.** Against Sabellius it is proved, that generation in God makes a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated; against Arius, however, [it is proved] that this distinction is with regard to the person, not with regard to the essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that generation in God, as has been shown[^11], makes a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated, not a rational or intellectual one only, as Sabellius said; and[^12] [makes] a real [distinction] with regard to the person, not with regard to the essence, as Arius said.

That it is so appears thus. Generation in creatures bespeaks an emanation by way of action or change; in God[^13], an emanation by way of relation.

Insofar as [it is] emanation, it bespeaks some distinction; insofar as [it is] such an emanation, it bespeaks distinction in the person[^14]. By reason of emanation there is distinction; because, as Anselm says[^15], «neither does the intellect grasp, nor does nature permit, that he who is from another should be the one from whom he is», according as one is said positively to be from another — for the Father is said privatively to be from himself, that is, not from another. Insofar as [it is] such an emanation, it places distinction in the person. For generation is the production of one agreeing in nature; by reason[^16] of nature there cannot be distinction: therefore either it will be by reason of the supposit, or of a property. If of a property, either absolutely or relatively; not absolutely, because then there would be distinction in nature; nor[^17] relatively, as for example of a relation, because in a relation taken in itself there is no motion in creatures[^18] nor origin in God; whence filiation is not generated except in another. Therefore it is necessary that there be distinction in the supposit.

Likewise by reason of the relation there is distinction, because nothing is referred to itself nor ordered [to itself]. But by reason of such a relation there is personal distinction; because to generate and to be generated, since they bespeak a relation by way of action and passion[^19], bespeak it in a supposit and with respect to a supposit. And therefore, since the relation between the extremes notes a distinction, it is clear that the distinction is there a distinction of supposits. These things being seen[^20], it is easy to answer the objections.

**To the arguments:**

1. To what is therefore objected: the Father communicates to the Son everything that he has; it is true, except for the generation and the distinction of generation; for the very account of communicating gives [us] to understand a distinction, because no one communicates to himself, but to another: and therefore[^21] that in which he distinguishes [himself], he does not communicate.

2. To that which is objected, that the person is just as simple as the essence; it must be said that the simplicity of the essence is that it be in many; but the simplicity of the supposit is that it not be in[^22] many. For a supposit or individual, insofar as it is in itself, is said [to be] that which is in one alone; therefore it is not the same.

3. To that which is objected, that the essence and the person are the same[^23]; it must be said that, although they are the same, yet they are not toward the same: because the person is toward another, therefore it is generated and is referred; but the essence is not, therefore the essence is communicated and the person is distinguished. As therefore, although in the Father the essence and the person are the same, yet the person generates, the essence does not; so conversely the essence is communicated, the person is not.

4. To that which is objected concerning beginning and end in a point, the answer is clear, because those are not mutual relations, which is properly required for distinction; whence it does not hold. As to what is objected[^24] concerning the one understanding and the thing understood, I say that there is not there a relation according to being, but according to predication. For the relation to distinguish, it is required that the relations be mutual, because otherwise they do not distinguish; it is required also that they bespeak a relation according to being.

5. To that which is objected concerning whiteness and blackness, it must be said that there is no opposition of forms unless they be considered[^25] with respect to the same time; and it is impossible that the same subject at the same time be white and black; but the relations in God are simultaneous.

6. To that which is finally asked, why rather do the relations make[^26] the distinction in persons than in essence; the answer is clear from what has already been said. Another reason can also be given, namely that the plurality of natures impedes the simplicity of the person, but not so conversely. Which appears thus: if[^27] several natures are in one person, then either through grace or through nature. If we are united through grace, in that case — because the united nature follows the unity of the person — it does not impede[^28]; but if naturally, as in Peter, there is a plurality of essences or natures, then — since the understanding of nature precedes the person, and the nature is not from the persons, but the person from the natures[^29] — it is necessary that the person be composite; and from this it is that in God there is rather a unity of nature with a plurality of persons than conversely.

la: Libr. I. c. I. n. 1. — Circa finem argumenti fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 post *inter aliam* expunximus *rem*.

en: Book I, c. 1, n. 1. — Near the end of the argument, on the authority of many manuscripts and the first edition, we have expunged *rem* after *inter aliam*.

la: Vat. adiungit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *et*.

la: Cod. Y addit *in creaturis vero actio vel mutatio*.

en: Codex Y adds *in creaturis vero actio vel mutatio* ("but in creatures [it is] action or change").

la: Multi codd. ut ACGKORSUVY etc. cum sex primis edd. *minor*, sed mendose. Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *subiecto* pro *substantia* et *relative* pro *relativa*. — Sensus argumenti est: Suppositum creatum et compositum est capax ad maiorem diversitatem sustinendam, quam increatum et simplex; sed in creato supposito non est capacitas ad simul sustinenda relative opposita; ergo multo minus in simplici supposito etc.

en: Many codices, such as ACGKORSUVY etc., with the first six editions [read] *minor*, but mistakenly. A little below, on the authority of older manuscripts and the first edition, we have substituted *subiecto* for *substantia* and *relative* for *relativa*. — The sense of the argument is: A created and composite supposit is capable of sustaining greater diversity than an uncreated and simple one; but in a created supposit there is no capacity for sustaining relatively opposed things simultaneously; therefore much less in a simple supposit, etc.

la: In mss. et ed. 1 deest *suam*, quod Vat. hic addit. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 *et* pro *ut*.

en: In the manuscripts and the first edition, *suam* is lacking, which the Vatican edition adds here. Shortly after, the Vatican edition, with codex cc against the other codices and the first edition, [reads] *et* in place of *ut*.

la: Sequimur vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 ponendo *quod non* loco *quin*. Cod. Z brevius *unum sine altero*.

en: We follow the older codices with the first edition in placing *quod non* in place of *quin*. Codex Z [reads] more briefly *unum sine altero*.

la: Multi codd. ut ACLOPQRSTUVY etc. cum ed. 1 *alia* loco *aliqua*, sed, ut videtur, minus bene, etiamsi sub *alia ratione* intelligas modum distinguendi relativis proprium, quia, uti ex subnexis patet, agitur de eo, quod relatio simpliciter non distinguat. Cod. Z *nisi* pro *aliqua*.

en: Many codices, such as ACLOPQRSTUVY etc., with the first edition [read] *alia* in place of *aliqua*, but, as it seems, less well, even if under *alia ratione* one should understand the mode of distinguishing proper to relatives, because, as appears from what follows, the discussion is about [the claim] that relation, simply speaking, does not distinguish. Codex Z [reads] *nisi* in place of *aliqua*.

la: Cod. Y addit *videtur quod nec mutuae quia*. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. renitentibus, *ut* pro *sicut*.

en: Codex Y adds *videtur quod nec mutuae quia* ("it seems that not even mutual [relations distinguish] because"). Shortly after, the Vatican edition, with codex cc, the other codices nonetheless resisting, [reads] *ut* in place of *sicut*.

la: *Monolog.* c. 32, ubi hoc quoad sensum invenitur.

en: *Monologion*, c. 32, where this is found as to the sense.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Oppositis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter on Opposites.

la: Hic in fundam.

en: Here in the fundamenta [of the question].

la: Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. *sed* loco *et*, ac paulo post *dicit* pro *dixit*. Cod. M *accidentalem* loco *intellectualem*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *sed* in place of *et*, and a little after *dicit* in place of *dixit*. Codex M [reads] *accidentalem* in place of *intellectualem*.

la: Cod. bb addit *autem*.

en: Codex bb adds *autem*.

la: Praeclaram hanc emendationem debemus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. verba *in quantum* usque *Ratione* omittit, mutata insuper interpunctione. Nonnulli codd. autem praemittunt voci *talis*.

en: This excellent emendation we owe to the older manuscripts and the first edition, while the Vatican edition omits the words from *in quantum* down to *Ratione*, with the punctuation moreover changed. Some codices, however, prefix [*autem*?] to the word *talis*.

la: *De Process. Spir. S.* c. 3: *Quippe nec natura permittit nec intellectus capit, existentem de aliquo esse de quo existit, aut de quo existit esse existentem de se.* — Cfr. etiam *Monolog.* c. 38.

en: *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, c. 3: "Indeed neither does nature permit, nor does the intellect grasp, that one who exists from something should be that from which he exists, or that from which he exists should be the one who exists from himself." — Cf. also *Monologion*, c. 38.

la: Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. addit *igitur*, pro quo codd. aa bb incongrue ponunt *enim*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, adds *igitur*, in place of which codices aa and bb incongruously place *enim*.

la: Ed. 1 *non*.

en: The first edition [reads] *non*.

la: Vide Aristot., V. *Phys.* text. 10. (c. 2.).

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 10 (c. 2).

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *et passionis*, qui et bis pro plurali ponunt singularem numerum *dicat* et *dicit*. — Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 20. (IV. c. 15.), ubi tres species relationis, inter quas est *actio et passio*, afferuntur.

en: Very many codices with the first edition omit *et passionis*, and twice place the singular *dicat* and *dicit* in place of the plural. — Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV, c. 15), where three species of relation are presented, among which is *action and passion*.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. incongrue et contra alios codd. et ed. 1 hic addit *patet*, moxque omittit *est*. Nonnulli codd. *respondere* pro *solvere*.

en: The Vatican edition, with a few codices, incongruously and against the other codices and the first edition, adds *patet* here, and shortly omits *est*. Some codices [read] *respondere* in place of *solvere*.

la: Supple: *Pater*. — Cod. R et ed. 1 clarius *distinguitur* loco *distinguit*. Paulo ante cod. N post *sibi* addit *ipsi*.

en: Supply: *Pater* ("the Father"). — Codex R and the first edition [read] more clearly *distinguitur* in place of *distinguit*. A little before, codex N adds *ipsi* after *sibi*.

la: Multi codd. ut BDESVXYZ aa bb cum ed. 1 *ex* loco *in*, sed falso, ut patet ex contextu. Mox post *dicitur* fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *esse*.

en: Many codices, such as BDESVXYZ aa bb, with the first edition [read] *ex* in place of *in*, but falsely, as is clear from the context. Shortly after *dicitur*, on the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition, we have expunged *esse*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. *generat*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *generat*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 *obiicitur*. Cod. V particulam *Et* praemittit relativo *quod*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, [reads] *obiicitur*. Codex V prefixes the particle *Et* to the relative *quod*.

la: Cod. R adiungit *secundum idem*.

en: Codex R adds *secundum idem*.

la: Cod. Y *faciant*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *faciant*.

la: Vat. omittit *si*, quod pauci codd. ut EXZ bene addunt, cum sermo sit ex suppositione. Mox cod. E *eadem* pro *una*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *si*, which a few codices, such as EXZ, rightly add, since the discourse is from a supposition. Shortly after, codex E [reads] *eadem* in place of *una*.

la: Cod. X addit *simplicitatem*.

en: Codex X adds *simplicitatem*.

la: Plurimi codd., mutata interpunctione, cum ed. 1 *sic* pro *sit*, cod. Y *est*; paulo supra plurimi codd. *praecedit* pro *praecedat*. Lectionem tamen cod. I et ed. 1 praeferimus propter congruitatem grammaticalis constructionis. Cod. I post *personis* addit *constet*. Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 perperam *natura* loco *naturis*.

en: Very many codices, with the punctuation changed, with the first edition [read] *sic* in place of *sit*; codex Y [reads] *est*; a little above, very many codices [read] *praecedit* in place of *praecedat*. We nevertheless prefer the reading of codex I and the first edition on account of the congruity of the grammatical construction. Codex I adds *constet* after *personis*. The Vatican edition, against the older codices and the first edition, wrongly [reads] *natura* in place of *naturis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Duae haereses Sabellii et Arii, Symbolo Nicaeno aliisque Ecclesiae decretis reprobatae, duplici conclusionis propositione refelluntur.

Quoad distinctiones relationis in solut. ad 4. notandum, quod relativa secundum dici ea sunt, quae in principali significato non important relationem, sed aliquid absolutum, quod tamen secundario involvit relationem ad aliud, ut scientia ad obiectum, i. e. scibile; ita Brulifer ad hunc locum. Vel clarius cum Goudin (Philos. Logica Maior. p. I. disp. 2. q. 4.): «Relatio secundum dici non est aliquid pure relativum, sed res quaedam absoluta, quam consequitur habitudo ad aliam, adeo ut exprimi non possit, quin et illa habitudo exprimatur... sic pars, etsi sit aliquid absolutum, includit tamen habitudinem ad totum, scientia ad obiectum». Quid sit relatio mutua, non eget explicatione. Plura vide infra d. 30. q. 3. Scholion.

**II.** Cfr. supra d. 5. per totam. — Scot., d. 11. q. 2; d. 26. q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 28. a. 1. 3; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 14. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 7; d. 9. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unic.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The two heresies of Sabellius and Arius, reproved by the Nicene Creed and other decrees of the Church, are refuted by the twofold proposition of the conclusion.

As to the distinctions of relation in the solution to argument 4, it should be noted that relatives "according to predication" (*secundum dici*) are those which in their principal signification do not import a relation, but something absolute, which however secondarily involves a relation to another, as knowledge to its object, i.e. the knowable; thus Brulifer at this place. Or more clearly with Goudin (*Philos. Logica Maior.* p. I. disp. 2. q. 4.): «A relation *secundum dici* is not something purely relative, but a certain absolute thing, upon which there follows a habitude to another, so that it cannot be expressed without that habitude also being expressed... thus a part, even if it is something absolute, yet includes a habitude to the whole, knowledge to the object». What a mutual relation is, needs no explanation. See further below at d. 30. q. 3. Scholion.

**II.** Cf. above d. 5. throughout. — Scotus, d. 11. q. 2; d. 26. q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; *S. I.* q. 28. a. 1. 3; *S. c. Gent.* IV. c. 14. — Bl. Albert, I. *Sent.* d. 26. a. 7; d. 9. a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. and 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. unic.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
Utrum in divinis generatio sit aeterna
Whether generation in God is eternal

source_text:
<!-- page 184 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum in divinis generatio sit aeterna.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum divina generatio sit aeterna. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. In creaturis operans naturaliter operatur quam citius potest, et de perfectione agentis est, quod citissime possit operari[^1]: ergo cum productio Filii a Patre sit per naturam et summam potentiam, quam cito fuit, Pater genuit; sed fuit ab aeterno: ergo etc.

2. Item, de perfectione generationis est, ut quod generatur aequetur generanti[^2]: ergo cum divina generatio sit perfectissima, Filius erit Patri per omnia aequalis; sed Pater est infinitus duratione: ergo et Filius.

3. Item, intelligere se coaeternum est menti divinae; nunquam enim est ponere, quod de non intelligente sit Deus factus intelligens; sed verbum est coaeternum menti intelligenti; ex hoc enim, quod mens se intelligit, verbum gignit. Si ergo propriissime Filius est verbum, est coaeternum Patri; et hoc est quod dicit beatus Ioannes[^3]: *In principio erat Verbum*.

4. Item, hoc[^4] idem ostenditur per impossibile. Omne quod coepit esse, est mutatum secundum substantiam; sed omne quod incipit generari, incipit esse: ergo omne quod incipit generari, est mutatum secundum substantiam; sed generatio[^5] est de substantia generantis: ergo ubi incipit esse generatio, substantia generantis mutatur; sed substantia Dei Patris secundum esse est immutabilis: ergo generatio non incipit in divinis.

**Contra:**

1. Sicut se habet corruptio ad non[^6] esse ex parte finis, sic generatio ex parte principii; sed omne quod corrumpitur, desinit esse: ergo omne quod generatur, incipit esse; sed nullum tale est aeternum: ergo etc.

2. Item, quidquid producit divina essentia est ipsa[^7] posterius tempore, sive duratione: ergo pari ratione quidquid producit divina persona, cum essentia et persona sint idem.

3. Item, in Deo idem est suum esse et sua duratio; sed Filius habet principium essendi: ergo habet principium durationis: sed quod habet principium durandi[^8] incipit esse: ergo etc.

<!-- page 185 -->

4. Item, Pater caret principio et caret initio: ergo qua ratione communicat Filio non habere initium, eadem ratione communicat ei non habere principium; aut si non hoc, nec illud.

> **Conclusio.** Generatio in divinis est aeterna propter summam generantis fecunditatem et summam geniti aequalitatem et utriusque summam actualitatem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod generatio Filii est aeterna tum ratione generantis, tum ratione geniti: ratione generantis propter summam et perfectam fecunditatem, ratione geniti propter summam et perfectam aequalitatem; quarum utraque conditio tollit, ne Filius sit posterius[^9] Patre, sicut visum est in opponendo. Alia ratio est propter summam in utroque actualitatem, in qua non distat actus a potentia, nec posse antecedit esse.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corruptio ponit terminum finalem; dicendum, quod corruptio semper dicit privationem, et mutationem[^10], et ita conversionem entis in non esse; et ideo ponit terminum finalem. Sed generatio aliquando dicit mutationem, ut in creaturis, et sic ponit terminum initialem; sed in divinis non dicit mutationem ex non ente, sed emanationem ab ente.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod essentia nihil producit nisi ex tempore; dicendum, quod sicut persona producit aliam personam, sic essentia aliam essentiam. Aliam autem essentiam[^11] ex se ipsa non producit, cum ipsa sit immultiplicabilis, nec ex alia, quia similiter esset quaerere, unde producit illam aliam; et sic necesse est in productione prima creaturae, quod producat ex nihilo; et omne sic productum habet esse post non esse, et ita initium. Persona autem non de nihilo producit personam; et ideo non facit de non ente ens, et ideo nullum ponit initium talis productio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius habet principium essendi; dicendum, quod principium dicitur dupliciter[^12], scilicet originale et initiale. Secundum quod principium dicitur originaliter, sic Filius tam quantum ad esse, quam quantum ad durationem habet principium, quia utrumque habet ab alio. Si autem principium dicatur initium[^13], sic dico, quod nec habet principium essendi nec durandi. Primum principium non aufert rationem aeterni, secundum vero sic.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur[^14] ultimo, quare Pater communicat Filio carentiam initii, non principii; patet iam responsio: quia temporale et aeternum de necessitate differunt per essentiam, principium et principiatum non sic; ideo non est simile de hoc et illo. Quia ergo quod[^15] habet initium est temporale, quod caret est aeternum; ideo cum Pater et Filius sint unius essentiae, patet etc. Rursum, cum habere principium et non habere dicant[^16] differentiam personae, et haec est inter Patrem et Filium; ideo sicut Pater non communicat Filio personam, sed tantum naturam sive essentiam, sic communicavit ei non habere initium, sed non communicavit non habere principium.

english:
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### Question III. *Whether generation in God is eternal.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the divine generation is eternal. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. In creatures, that which operates naturally operates as quickly as it can, and it pertains to the perfection of an agent that it be able to operate most swiftly[^1]: therefore since the production of the Son from the Father is through nature and supreme power, as soon as he was, the Father generated; but he was from eternity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it pertains to the perfection of generation that what is generated be equal to what generates[^2]: therefore since the divine generation is most perfect, the Son will be in all things equal to the Father; but the Father is infinite in duration: therefore so also the Son.

3. Likewise, to understand itself is coeternal with the divine mind; for it is never to be supposed that God became understanding from a non-understanding being; but the word is coeternal with the understanding mind; for from this, that the mind understands itself, it begets a word. If therefore the Son is most properly the word, he is coeternal with the Father; and this is what blessed John[^3] says: *In the beginning was the Word*.

4. Likewise, this[^4] same point is shown by [the argument from] impossibility. Everything which began to be has been changed according to substance; but everything which begins to be generated, begins to be: therefore everything which begins to be generated has been changed according to substance; but generation[^5] is of the substance of the generator: therefore where generation begins to be, the substance of the generator is changed; but the substance of God the Father, according to its being, is immutable: therefore generation does not begin in God.

**On the contrary:**

1. As corruption stands to non[^6]-being on the side of the end, so generation [stands] on the side of the beginning; but everything which is corrupted ceases to be: therefore everything which is generated begins to be; but no such thing is eternal: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, whatever the divine essence produces is posterior to it[^7] in time or in duration: therefore by parity of reasoning whatever the divine person produces [is posterior to it], since essence and person are the same.

3. Likewise, in God his being and his duration are the same; but the Son has a principle of being: therefore he has a principle of duration: but what has a principle of duration[^8] begins to be: therefore etc.

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4. Likewise, the Father lacks principle and lacks beginning: therefore by the same reasoning by which he communicates to the Son not to have a beginning, by the same reasoning he communicates to him not to have a principle; or if not the one, then not the other either.

> **Conclusion.** Generation in God is eternal because of the supreme fecundity of the one generating, and the supreme equality of the one generated, and the supreme actuality of both.

**I respond:** It must be said that the generation of the Son is eternal both by reason of the one generating and by reason of the one generated: by reason of the one generating because of [his] supreme and perfect fecundity, by reason of the one generated because of [his] supreme and perfect equality; each of these conditions removes [the possibility] that the Son be posterior[^9] to the Father, as has been seen in the opposing arguments. Another reason is on account of the supreme actuality in each, in which act is not distant from potency, nor does the capacity-to-be precede being.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected, that corruption posits a final term; it must be said that corruption always denotes privation, and change[^10], and thus a conversion of being into non-being; and therefore it posits a final term. But generation sometimes denotes change, as in creatures, and thus posits an initial term; but in God it does not denote change from non-being, but emanation from being.

2. To that which is objected, that the essence produces nothing except in time; it must be said that just as a person produces another person, so the essence [produces] another essence. But it does not produce another essence[^11] from itself, since it is unmultipliable, nor from another, because it would similarly be a matter of asking whence it produces that other; and thus it is necessary in the first production of a creature, that it produce from nothing; and everything thus produced has being after non-being, and thus a beginning. But the person does not produce a person from nothing; and therefore it does not make a being out of non-being, and therefore such a production posits no beginning.

3. To that which is objected, that the Son has a principle of being; it must be said that "principle" is said in two ways[^12], namely as originative and as initial. According to the way "principle" is said originatively, thus the Son has a principle both as to being and as to duration, because he has each from another. But if "principle" be called a beginning[^13], thus I say, that he has neither a principle of being nor of duration. The first sense of "principle" does not take away the character of the eternal; the second indeed does.

4. To that which is objected[^14] last, why the Father communicates to the Son lack of beginning but not of principle; the response is now clear: because the temporal and the eternal differ of necessity by essence, principle and principled do not so [differ]; therefore the case of the one is not like the case of the other. Because therefore that which[^15] has a beginning is temporal, [and] that which lacks one is eternal; therefore since the Father and the Son are of one essence, this is clear etc. Again, since to have a principle and not to have one express[^16] a difference of person, and this is between the Father and the Son; therefore just as the Father does not communicate to the Son [his] person, but only [his] nature or essence, so he has communicated to him not having a beginning, but he has not communicated [to him] not having a principle.

la: Vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 10. (VIII. c. 3.). — Paulo infra ed. 1 post *et* repetit *per* et cod. T post *genuit* addit *Filium*.

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 10 (VIII c. 3). — A little below, ed. 1 after *et* repeats *per*, and codex T after *genuit* adds *Filium*.

la: Aristot., IV. Meteor. text. 19. (c. 3.) ait: *Perfectum esse id quod tale producere potest, quale ipsum est.* Vide et II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *Meteorology* IV, text 19 (c. 3) says: *That is perfect which can produce such as itself is.* See also *On the Soul* II, text 34 (c. 4).

en: [John,] chapter 1, [verse] 1.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *hoc*. — Vide pro hoc et sequenti argumento Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7; I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 11-23. (c. 3.), et II. de Anima, text. 34. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *hoc*. — See on this and the following argument Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 7; *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 11-23 (c. 3), and *On the Soul* II, text 34 ff. (c. 4).

la: Cod. T *generatus* pro *generatio* et mox *si* loco *ubi*.

en: Codex T [reads] *generatus* for *generatio*, and shortly after *si* in place of *ubi*.

la: Cod. O omittit *non*, salvo eodem sensu, qui est in generationis et corruptionis contrarietate, de qua V. Phys. text. 14, et quae sub alio respectu exprimitur hac formula: *Corruptio unius est generatio alterius*.

en: Codex O omits *non*, with the same sense preserved, [a sense] which lies in the contrariety of generation and corruption, on which see *Physics* V, text 14, and which under another aspect is expressed by this formula: *The corruption of one [thing] is the generation of another*.

la: Fide plurium mss. ut HKY bb et ed. 1 posuimus ablativum *ipsa* pro *ipsi*.

en: On the authority of several manuscripts such as HKY bb and ed. 1 we have placed the ablative *ipsa* in place of *ipsi*.

la: Praeferimus lectionem nonnullorum mss. ut M P Q pro *essendi* ponentium *durandi*, quia in ipsa et processus et vis argumenti distinctior redditur. Cod. H et ed. 1 ponunt *durationis*; cod. O vero *essendi* et *durationis*.

en: We prefer the reading of certain manuscripts such as M, P, Q which place *durandi* in place of *essendi*, because in it both the progression and the force of the argument are rendered more distinct. Codex H and ed. 1 read *durationis*; codex O however [reads] *essendi* and *durationis*.

la: Ed. 1 *posterior*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *posterior*.

la: Cod. bb addit *ex non ente*, quod subnexis correspondet.

en: Codex bb adds *ex non ente*, which corresponds to what follows.

la: Praestamus lectionem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, quae concinnior est lectione Vat. *Aliam autem naturam essentia.* Vat. et paulo infra minus distincte exhibet *immutabilis* loco *immultiplicabilis*; cum Vat. consentit cod. cc, eo excepto, quod pro *naturam* ponat *creaturam*. Mox cod. R *producere* loco *producit*.

en: We prefer the reading of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, which is neater than the Vatican reading *Aliam autem naturam essentia.* Vat. and a little below less distinctly exhibits *immutabilis* in place of *immultiplicabilis*; codex cc agrees with Vat., with this exception, that for *naturam* it puts *creaturam*. Shortly after, codex R [reads] *producere* in place of *producit*.

la: Vat. minus bene et contra mss. et ed. 1 *duplex*. — Plura de notione principii vide infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. et 2.

en: Vat. less well and against the manuscripts and ed. 1 [reads] *duplex*. — More on the notion of "principle" see below d. 29. a. 1. q. 1 and 2.

la: Cod. bb *initialiter*.

en: Codex bb [reads] *initialiter*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut FHK cum ed. 1 *quaeritur*.

en: Several manuscripts such as FHK with ed. 1 [read] *quaeritur*.

la: Cod. Y addit *eo*.

en: Codex Y adds *eo*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et trium primarum edd. *dicat*.

en: Vat., against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first three editions, [reads] *dicat*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio est de fide, definita in Nicaeno contra Arianos. — Rationes pro conclusione in responsione breviter allatae explicantur argumento 1. et 2. in fundam. — Quoad aeternitatem cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. et IV. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1; I. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.

**II.** Quoad conclusionem: Scot., hic et Report. q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 2; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 11. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 38. q. 1. n. 22. 23. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. hic q. unic. — Biel, hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is of faith, defined at Nicaea against the Arians. — The reasons for the conclusion briefly adduced in the response are explained in arguments 1 and 2 of the *fundamenta*. — Concerning eternity see below d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. and IV Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1; I Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.

**II.** Concerning the conclusion: Scotus, here and *Reportata* q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; *S.* I q. 42 a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* IV c. 11. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. 6. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 2. *princ.* q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 38. q. 1. n. 22. 23. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, on this and the following [question] here q. unic. — Biel, here q. 3.

---


title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum generatio Filii terminata sit.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit terminata. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro octoginta trium Quaestionum[^1]: « Qui semper nascitur nunquam est natus, ac per hoc nunquam est filius ». Nullus ergo per generationem dicendus est filius, quousque generatio

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sit terminata; sed Verbum Patris recte dicitur perfectus Filius: ergo eius generatio est terminata.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: produci terminatur ad productum esse, ergo generari ad generatum esse; sed Filius Dei est generatus et natus: ergo eius productio sive generatio est terminata.

3. Item, nobilius est esse generatum quam generari, quia generari est via ad generatum esse, et non e converso; sed quod nobilius est Deo est attribuendum: ergo magis debet ei attribui generatum esse quam generari: ergo generatio Filii dicitur in terminatione.

4. Item, in[^2] generatione, quae semper est in generando, semper aliquid vel aliquis producitur; sed non producitur id quod productum est, secundum id quod est productum: ergo oportet, vel quod iteretur, vel quod succedat generatum in tali generatione; sed in Filio Dei nec est successio nec[^3] iteratio: ergo nec continua generatio: ergo Filii Dei generatio est terminata.

**Contra:**

1. Damascenus[^4]: « Deus, infinite et sine tempore ens, infinite et inquiescibiliter generat »: ergo generatio nunquam terminatur.

2. Item, ratione videtur hoc idem posse monstrari. Aeternum non habet se aliter nunc quam prius, sed semper omnino uniformiter: ergo si semper Pater a principio[^5] generat, adhuc generat; alioquin aliter se haberet nunc quam prius, et ita generatio aeterna mutaretur.

3. Item, simplex[^6] et infinitum caret omni termino; sed generatio Filii est simplex et infinita: ergo generatio Filii caret omni termino. Quod sit infinita, patet, quia Filius est infinitus, et iterum ipsa generatio est aeterna, et aeternum est duratione infinitum.

4. Item, perfectior est potentia semper actui coniuncta, quam quae non semper: ergo perfectior est fecunditas semper actui generationis coniuncta, maxime cum fecunditas generandi non perdatur, sed perficiatur[^7]: si ergo in Deo est fecunditas perfecta, semper ergo generat; sed non generat alium nisi Filium: ergo Filius semper generatur.

> **Conclusio.** Generatio divina dicenda est terminata, quatenus hoc vocabulum excludit imperfectionem, interminata vero, quatenus excludit durationem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod quaedam sunt, in quibus idem est esse et factum esse, differt tamen fieri et esse, ut sunt illa, quorum esse est permanens nec dependet omnino a principio producente[^8], immo habent rationem subsistendi aliquam intra se, sive per principia propria sive subiecti, ut substantiae et accidentia innata. Quaedam sunt, in quibus differt esse et factum esse, idem tamen est fieri et esse, ut sunt successiva, quorum esse dependet omnino a principio producente existente in sua actualitate, ut sunt motus et mutationes. Quaedam sunt, in quibus est idem fieri et esse et factum esse, ut sunt illa, quae habent esse permanens et totaliter dependent a principio producente, existente in sua actualitate per eundem modum, per quem in principio[^9], non tantum in se, sed etiam respectu producti, ita quod consimilis modus actualitatis attendatur quantum ad utrumque; et talia sunt influentiae sive corporales sive spirituales. Unde Augustinus octavo super Genesim ad litteram[^10] dicit, quod lumen semper nascitur et, dum nascitur, est, unde aer semper est illuminatus et semper illuminatur. Similiter omnino dicit[^11] de lumine spirituali, quod est gratia.

Si igitur Filius Dei habet esse permanentissimum

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et esse coniunctissimum principio productivo, ut in sui actualitate existenti, quia ipse Filius est purus[^12] actus; omnino idem est in ipso nasci et natum esse; et ideo semper nascitur et semper est natus et semper est, nec unquam desinit nec cessat generari, nec Pater generare.

Cum ergo quaeritur, an generatio Filii sit terminata, distinguendum est, quia terminatum aut excludit imperfectionem; et sic generatio Filii est terminata, quia perfecta, cum simul sint[^13], immo idem sit generari et generatum esse. Si vero excludat durationem, falsa est, quia semper durat.

Concedo ergo[^14], quod generatio Filii est interminata ratione desitionis, quia nunquam desinit generari, sicut probant rationes ad secundam partem adductae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod *Qui semper nascitur nunquam est natus*; dicendum, quod verum est in illa generatione, in qua differt nasci et natum esse; sed non talis est generatio divina. Attamen quia generatio divina intelligitur per generationem creatam, et in creaturis de perfecte nato non dicitur nasci, sed natum esse: ideo vult Augustinus[^15], quod melius dicitur Filius natus esse, quia intelligibilius est, non quia ei non conveniat nasci.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod produci terminatur ad productum esse, et similiter, nobilius est generatum esse quam generari; dicendum, quod omnia ista tantum ibi habent locum, ubi differt generari et generatum esse. In illa[^16] autem generatione locum non habent.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, in generatione, quae semper est in generando etc.; solvendum est per interemptionem; non enim est verum, quod generatio semper ens[^17] semper de novo aliquid producat, quia radius semper oritur a sole, nec tamen semper iteratur nec succedit, sed a sua origine continuatur in esse.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether the generation of the Son is terminated.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, whether the generation of the Son is terminated. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. Augustine in the *Book of Eighty-Three Questions*[^1]: "He who is always being born is never born, and accordingly is never a son." Therefore no one is to be called a son through generation, until the generation

is terminated; but the Word of the Father is rightly called a perfect Son: therefore his generation is terminated.

2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: to-be-produced is terminated at being-produced, therefore to-be-generated [is terminated] at being-generated; but the Son of God is generated and born: therefore his production or generation is terminated.

3. Likewise, it is more noble to be generated than to be generating, because to be generating is the way to being-generated, and not conversely; but what is more noble is to be attributed to God: therefore being-generated ought rather to be attributed to him than being-generating: therefore the generation of the Son is spoken of as in [its] termination.

4. Likewise, in[^2] generation, which is always in [the act of] generating, something or someone is always being produced; but that which has been produced is not produced [further], according to that by which it has been produced: therefore it must be either that there is repetition, or that one generated thing succeeds [another] in such a generation; but in the Son of God there is neither succession nor[^3] repetition: therefore neither continuous generation: therefore the generation of the Son of God is terminated.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Damascene[^4]: "God, being infinitely and without time, generates infinitely and unceasingly": therefore the generation never terminates.

2. Likewise, by reason this same thing seems able to be shown. The eternal does not have itself otherwise now than before, but always entirely uniformly: therefore if the Father from the beginning[^5] always generates, he still generates; otherwise he would have himself otherwise now than before, and so the eternal generation would be changed.

3. Likewise, the simple[^6] and the infinite lack every term; but the generation of the Son is simple and infinite: therefore the generation of the Son lacks every term. That it is infinite, is plain, because the Son is infinite, and again the generation itself is eternal, and the eternal is infinite in duration.

4. Likewise, more perfect is a power always conjoined to act than [one which is] not always [so]: therefore more perfect is the fecundity always conjoined to the act of generation, especially since the fecundity of generating is not lost, but rather perfected[^7]: if therefore in God there is perfect fecundity, he therefore always generates; but he does not generate any other than the Son: therefore the Son is always being generated.

> **Conclusion.** The divine generation must be called terminated, insofar as this word excludes imperfection, but unterminated, insofar as it excludes [the limit of] duration.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there are some things in which to-be and to-have-been-made are the same, but to-become and to-be differ — as are those whose being is permanent and does not depend wholly upon the producing principle[^8], but rather have some ground of subsisting within themselves, whether through their own principles or [those] of the subject, as substances and innate accidents. There are some in which to-be and to-have-been-made differ, but to-become and to-be are the same — as are successive things, whose being depends wholly upon the producing principle as existing in its actuality, as are motions and changes. There are some in which to-become and to-be and to-have-been-made are the same — as are those which have permanent being and depend totally upon the producing principle, as it exists in its actuality in the same mode by which [it existed] at the beginning[^9], not only in itself but also with respect to the produced thing, in such a way that a like mode of actuality is regarded with respect to both; and such are influences, whether bodily or spiritual. Hence Augustine in the eighth [book] *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^10] says that light is always being born and, while it is being born, it is, whence the air is always illumined and is always being illumined. He says[^11] entirely the same of the spiritual light, which is grace.

If therefore the Son of God has most-permanent being

and being most-conjoined to the productive principle, as [a being] existing in its actuality, because the Son himself is pure[^12] act; entirely the same is in him to-be-born and to-have-been-born; and therefore he is always being born and is always born and always is, nor does he ever cease nor leave off being generated, nor [does] the Father [leave off] generating.

When, therefore, it is asked whether the generation of the Son is terminated, a distinction must be made: because "terminated" either excludes imperfection — and thus the generation of the Son is terminated, because perfect, since they are simultaneously[^13], indeed the same is to-be-generated and to-have-been-generated. But if it should exclude duration, [then] it is false, because it always endures.

I therefore[^14] grant that the generation of the Son is unterminated by reason of ceasing, because it never ceases to be generated, as the reasons adduced for the second part prove.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that *He who is always being born is never born*; it must be said that this is true in that generation in which to-be-born and to-have-been-born differ; but the divine generation is not such. Nevertheless, because the divine generation is understood through created generation, and in creatures of one perfectly born one does not say "is being born" but "has been born": therefore Augustine[^15] holds that it is better said that the Son "has been born", because it is more intelligible, not because to be born does not befit him.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that to-be-produced is terminated at being-produced, and likewise, that being-generated is more noble than being-in-generation; it must be said that all these things have place only there, where to-be-generated and to-have-been-generated differ. In that[^16] generation, however, they have no place.

4. To that which is objected last, that in generation, which is always in [the act of] generating etc.; it is to be solved by way of refutation; for it is not true that a generation always being[^17] always produces something anew, because a ray always arises from the sun, and yet it is not always repeated nor does it succeed [itself], but from its origin it is continued in being.

la: Quaest. 37: *Qui semper nascitur nondum est natus; et nunquam natus est aut natus erit, si semper nascitur. Aliud est enim nasci, aliud natum esse. Ac per hoc nunquam Filius, si nunquam natus.* — Mox cod. 1 *Nunquam* pro *Nullus*, et cod. S *enim* pro *ergo*.

en: [Augustine, *De diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*,] q. 37: "He who is always being born is not yet born; and he is never born nor will be born, if he is always being born. For one thing is to be born, another to have been born. And accordingly, [there is] never a Son, if [he is] never born." — Just below, codex 1 reads *Nunquam* ("never") for *Nullus* ("no one"), and codex S reads *enim* for *ergo*.

la: Fide plurium codd. ut B F H P Q Y et ed. 1 supplevimus *in*; quae lectio comprobatur etiam inde, quod infra in solutione huius obiectionis omnes codd. cum Vat. exhibeant praepositionem *in*. Plures codd. ut AGKSTVYZ falso *generatio naturae* loco *generatione*; pauci ut FX cum ed. 1 *generatione naturae*.

en: On the faith of several codices such as B F H P Q Y and ed. 1 we have supplied *in*; which reading is corroborated also from the fact that, below in the solution to this objection, all the codices with the Vatican [edition] exhibit the preposition *in*. Several codices such as AGKSTVYZ falsely [give] *generatio naturae* in place of *generatione*; a few such as FX with ed. 1 [give] *generatione naturae*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit *ibi*, quod bene deest in aliis mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds *ibi* ("there"), which is rightly absent from the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 8: *Deus enim, ut qui tempori non subsit et principio, passione ac fluxione omni vacet sitque incorporeus ac solus ab interitu liber, ita citra tempus quoque et principium et passionem et fluxum et sine ullo congressu gignit, ac nec initium nec finem habet incomprehensibilis ipsius generatio.* — Vat. *per Damascenum* pro *Damascenus*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 8: "For God, as one who is not subject to time or to a beginning, and is empty of all passion and flux, and is incorporeal and alone free from destruction, so also begets beyond time and beginning and passion and flux and without any union, and his incomprehensible generation has neither beginning nor end." — The Vatican [edition reads] *per Damascenum* in place of *Damascenus*, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Cod. M addit *Filium*. Mox unus alterve cod. cum ed. 1 *generavit* loco *generat*.

en: Codex M adds *Filium*. Just below, one or another codex with ed. 1 [reads] *generavit* in place of *generat*.

la: Lectio plurium codd. ut H I P Q ee ff et ed. 1, in qua hic et paulo infra ponitur *simpliciter* pro *simplex et*, satis bona est.

en: The reading of several codices such as H I P Q ee ff and ed. 1, in which here and a little below *simpliciter* is put for *simplex et*, is sufficiently good.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, legit *perditur*, sed *perficitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with the manuscripts and ed. 1 resisting, reads *perditur* ("is lost"), but [the correct reading is] *perficitur* ("is perfected").

la: In Vat. et cod. cc hic additur *et hoc proximo producente in facto esse*, quod tamen abest ab aliis mss. et ed. 1 et superfluere videtur, quia hoc distinctionis membrum per duo alia satis superque explicatur. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 renitentibus, post *propria* habet *sui* loco *sive*, sed non bene. Mox ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *substantiae* loco *substantia*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc there is added here *et hoc proximo producente in facto esse* ("and this with the proximate producent in [the state of] having-been-made"), which however is absent from the other manuscripts and ed. 1 and seems superfluous, since this member of the distinction is more than sufficiently explained by the other two. A little below the Vatican [edition] with codex cc — the other codices with ed. 1 resisting — after *propria* has *sui* in place of *sive*, but not well. Next, from the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *substantiae* for *substantia*.

la: Intellige: in initio productionis. Sensus est: modus actualitatis principii taliter producentis idem est in principio seu initio et in continuatione productionis, tum in se tum quoad productum; sicut est v. g. actualitas solis illuminantis et luminis vel aeris illuminati. Vat. falso et contra antiquiores codd. ac ed. 1 post *per quem* addit *sunt*.

en: Understand: at the beginning of the production. The sense is: the mode of actuality of a principle so producing is the same at the principle or beginning and in the continuation of the production, both in itself and as regards the produced; as is, e.g., the actuality of the illuminating sun and of the light or of the illumined air. The Vatican [edition], falsely and against the older codices and ed. 1, after *per quem* adds *sunt*.

la: Cap. 12. n. 26: *Neque enim, ut dicebamus, sicut operatur homo terram… ita Deus operatur hominem iustum, id est iustificando eum, ut si abscesserit, maneat in abscedente quod fecit; sed potius sicut aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit, quia si factus esset, non autem fieret, etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret; sic homo Deo sibi praesente illuminatur, absente autem continuo tenebratur.*

en: [*De Genesi ad litteram* lib. VIII,] c. 12, n. 26: "For neither, as we were saying, [does it happen] as a man works the earth… [that] thus God works the just man, that is, by justifying him, that if [God] should depart, what he made should remain in the one departing; but rather, as the air, with light present, has not been made bright but is becoming [bright], because if it had been made [bright once for all], and were not [continually] becoming [bright], it would remain bright even with the light absent; so the man is illumined by God present to him, but with [him] absent he is at once darkened."

la: Vide textum modo citatum. — Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis vero cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, *dicendum* pro *dicit*.

en: See the text just cited. — The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, but with the others together with ed. 1 resisting, [reads] *dicendum* in place of *dicit*.

la: Ita vetustiores mss. et ed. I, dum Vat. cum cod. cc *ipse est Filius et purus*. Paulo ante unus alterve cod. ut PQ cum ed. 1 *sua* loco *sui*.

en: Thus the older manuscripts and ed. I, while the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *ipse est Filius et purus* ("the Son himself is also pure"). A little before, one or another codex such as PQ with ed. 1 [reads] *sua* in place of *sui*.

la: Lectio Vat. *simile* loco *simul sint* corrigitur ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: The reading of the Vatican [edition], *simile* in place of *simul sint*, is corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Ed. 1 addit *ergo*.

en: Ed. 1 adds *ergo*.

la: Verba Augustini vide supra in ipsa obiectione. — Mox ed. 1 *dicatur* loco *dicitur*. Paulo ante fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *perfecte* pro *perfecto*.

en: See the words of Augustine above in the objection itself. — Just below, ed. 1 [reads] *dicatur* in place of *dicitur*. A little before, on the faith of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *perfecte* for *perfecto*.

la: Vat. contra mss. *ista*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts, [reads] *ista*.

la: Hoc est, quae semper est. — Paulo infra post *nec tamen semper* Vat. explicando addit *eius productio*, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.

en: That is, [a generation] which always is. — A little below, after *nec tamen semper*, the Vatican [edition] by way of explanation adds *eius productio* ("its production"), which is absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In quaestione praecedenti probatum est, quod generatio Filii non habet initium; hic quaeritur, utrum habeat terminum, sive utrum sit terminata. Et cum vocabulum *terminata* habeat duplicem sensum, quatenus excludit aut imperfectionem aut durationem, quaestio haec etiam duplici conclusione resolvitur. — Triplex distinctio in principio responsionis satis notabilis est.

**II.** De ipsa quaestione cfr. hic dub. 8. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unic. ad 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 2. ad 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 19; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 4. particula 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2; a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 70. — Durand., hic q. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In the preceding question it was proved that the generation of the Son has no beginning; here it is asked whether it has a term, that is, whether it is terminated. And since the word *terminated* has a twofold sense, insofar as it excludes either imperfection or duration, this question also is resolved by a twofold conclusion. — The threefold distinction at the beginning of the response is sufficiently noteworthy.

**II.** On this question itself cf. here dub. 8. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unic. ad 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 2, ad 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 19; *Summa* p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 4, particle 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2; a. 3, q. 1. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2 *princ.*, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 54, q. 3, n. 70. — Durandus, here q. 4.

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