title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 6

title_alt:
Utrum ideae ordinem habeant
Whether the ideas have an order

source_text:
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### Quaestio VI.
#### *Utrum ideae ordinem habeant.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in ideis sit ponere numerum ordinatum. Et quod sic,

1. Videtur Augustinus[^1] dicere: «Alia ratione conditus est homo quam equus», quia alius est homo, alius equus: ergo cum homo sit nobilior equo, pari ratione nobiliori idea vel ratione est conditus homo quam equus. Sed ubi est magis nobile et minus, ibi est ordo: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut Deus per ideas cognoscit et producit res distinctas, ita[^2] cognoscit et producit res ordinatas: ergo sicut ponitur pluralitas in ideis ex pluralitate cognitorum et ideatorum, ita debet poni ordo ex ordine.

3. Item, ubi pluralitas sive distinctio, aut est ordo, aut inordinatio; sed in Deo non cadit inordinatio nec confusio: ergo in Deo habent ordinem.

**Contra:**

1. Ideae sunt plures, quia per eas Deus distincte cognoscit; sed[^3] Deus non cognoscit unum post aliud, sed omnia simul: ergo ideae habent in Deo simultatem.

2. Item, si est ordo, aut ergo[^4] prioritatis, aut dignitatis, aut originis[^5]: non prioritatis, quia tunc esset una idea altera posterior, quod est inconveniens dicere; non nobilitatis, quia quaelibet in Deo est summe nobilis; non originis, quia si una de altera oriretur, tunc esset ibi vera distinctio secundum rem[^6]: ergo nullo modo, ut videtur, est in eis ordo.

3. Item, omnis infinitas aut omnino privat ordinem, aut tollit perfectionem ab ordine, quia tollit statum et complementum; sed in ideis est infinitas, ut visum est in alio problemate[^7]: ergo aut nullus ordo, aut incompletus; sed non incompletus, ergo nullus.

### Conclusio.

> *In ideis non est ordo ad invicem, nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sed tantum ad ideata.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum[^8], sicut tactum est in opponendo, non est ordo in ideis sive rationibus cognoscendi ad invicem, nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem. Habent quippe ordinem ideae ad ideata, sed ad invicem non, quoniam nec una prior altera, nec posterior, nec est una ab alia, nec nobilior est; et ideo non ponitur ibi ordo. — Et ratio huius est, quia ideae dicunt respectum ad res cognitas de ratione sui nominis[^9]. Et quia illae sunt plures, ideo ideae ex primo respectu nominis plures sunt. Sed ordo dicit novum respectum et novam habitudinem, cum una idea comparatur ad aliam. Et quoniam, illo[^10] respectu circumscripto, qui est ad ideata, in Deo ideae simpliciter sunt unum nec habent ordinem ad invicem; ideo non est concedendum, quod ideae habeant pluralitatem cum ordine ad invicem.

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**Ad argumenta:**

1. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod alia est idea, quia homo alius: ergo nobilior, quia homo nobilior equo; dicendum, quod non est simile. Similitudo enim, eo quod ad alterum comparatur, habet distingui, sed non habet nobilitari ab illo, nisi aliquid recipiat ab illo ad quod comparatur. Et quoniam idea hominis nihil recipit ab homine, nec idea equi ab equo: ideo una non dicitur altera nobilior.

2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod Deus cognoscit res ordinatas; dicendum, quod quamvis ordinatas cognoscat, tamen simul et aeque nobiliter cognoscit; et ideo, sicut ponebatur distinctio in ideis, quia distincte per eas cognoscebat, ita debet poni simultas et aequalis nobilitas, quia simul et aeque nobiliter cognoscit; et ita non debet poni ordo. Sicut enim, quamvis Deus cognoscat res albas, non sunt ideae albae in Deo, sic quamvis cognoscat ordinatas, non oportet, quod sint in Deo ordinatae.

3. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod ubi est pluralitas sine ordine, est confusio et inordinatio; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia potest ibi esse simultas; et sic est in ideis. — Vel dicendum, quod illud habet locum, ubi est pluralitas realis; non talis est in ideis, quia omnes unum sunt; et ideo non potest esse inordinatio.

english:
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### Question VI.
#### *Whether the ideas have an order.*

Sixth and last, it is asked whether in the ideas an ordered number is to be posited. And that [it is], appears thus.

1. Augustine[^1] seems to say: "By another account was man created than horse," since man is one thing, horse another: therefore, since man is nobler than horse, by parity of reason man was created by a nobler idea or account than horse. But where there is a more noble and a less, there is order: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, just as God by ideas knows and produces distinct things, so[^2] he knows and produces ordered things: therefore, just as plurality is posited in the ideas from the plurality of things known and ideated, so order ought to be posited [in them] from order.

3. Likewise, where there is plurality or distinction, there is either order or disorder; but in God there falls no disorder nor confusion: therefore in God they have an order.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ideas are several, since by them God distinctly knows; but[^3] God does not know one [thing] after another, but all things at once: therefore the ideas have in God simultaneity.

2. Likewise, if there is order, then either of priority, or of dignity, or of origin[^4][^5]: not of priority, since then one idea would be posterior to another, which it is unfitting to say; not of nobility, since each in God is supremely noble; not of origin, since if one arose from another, there would then be a true distinction there according to the thing[^6]: therefore in no way, as it seems, is there order in them.

3. Likewise, every infinity either altogether takes away order, or removes perfection from order, since it takes away [its] state and completion; but in the ideas there is infinity, as has been seen in another problem[^7]: therefore either no order, or an incomplete one; but not incomplete, therefore none.

### Conclusion.

> *In the ideas there is no order among themselves, neither according to thing nor according to reason, but only [an order] toward the ideated.*

**I respond:** It must be said[^8], as was touched upon in [the arguments] on the opposite side, that there is no order in the ideas or accounts of knowing among themselves, neither according to thing nor according to reason. The ideas indeed have an order to the ideated, but not among themselves, since neither is one prior to another, nor posterior, nor is one from another, nor is [one] more noble; and therefore no order is posited there. — And the reason of this is that ideas, of the very account of their name, bespeak a respect to things known[^9]. And because those [things] are several, therefore the ideas, from the first respect of their name, are several. But order bespeaks a new respect and a new disposition, when one idea is compared to another. And since, when that[^10] respect is set aside which is toward the ideated, in God the ideas are simply one and have no order among themselves; therefore it is not to be conceded that the ideas have plurality with order among themselves.

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**To the arguments:**

1. *To that which is objected*, that the idea is other, since man is other: therefore nobler, since man is nobler than horse; it must be said that the case is not similar. For likeness, since it is compared to another, has [to be] distinguished, but is not [thereby] ennobled by it, unless it receive something from that to which it is compared. And since the idea of man receives nothing from man, nor the idea of horse from horse: therefore the one is not called more noble than the other.

2. *To that which is objected*, that God knows ordered things; it must be said that, although he knows ordered things, yet he knows them at once and equally nobly; and therefore, just as distinction was posited in the ideas, since by them he distinctly knew, so simultaneity and equal nobility ought to be posited, since he knows at once and equally nobly; and so order ought not to be posited. For just as, although God knows white things, the ideas are not white in God, so although he knows ordered things, it is not necessary that they be ordered in God.

3. *To that which is objected*, that where there is plurality without order, there is confusion and disorder; it must be said that this is false, since there can be simultaneity there; and so it is in the ideas. — Or it may be said that that [rule] holds where there is real plurality; such is not [the case] in the ideas, since all are one; and therefore there cannot be disorder.

en: *On 83 Diverse Questions*, q. 46, n. 2.

la: Cod. T *ita etiam*.

en: Codex T [reads] *ita etiam* ("so likewise").

la: Supple cum codd. F P Q W *ideae*.

en: Supply with codices F P Q W *ideae* ("ideas").

la: Multi codd. ut A C G H I L R S T Z etc. perperam *ergo*.

en: Many codices, such as A C G H I L R S T Z etc., wrongly [read] *ergo*.

la: Cod. *si ergo*.

en: A codex [reads] *si ergo*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. *in corp.*

en: Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, *in the body*.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: In *fundamentis*, praesertim in 2. — In initio respons. post *Dicendum* codd. A F I V inserunt *quod*. Mox pro *secundum rem*, quam lectionem restituimus ex codd. F T W, Vat. *secundum originem*; codd. A C L O R S et alii plures *secundum ordinem*. Subinde post *rationem* Vat. addit *prioritatis aut dignitatis*.

en: In the *fundamenta*, especially in [no.] 2. — At the beginning of the response, after *Dicendum*, codices A F I V insert *quod*. Soon, in place of *secundum rem*, which reading we have restored from codices F T W, the Vatican [reads] *secundum originem*; codices A C L O R S and several others [read] *secundum ordinem*. Thereafter, after *rationem*, the Vatican adds *prioritatis aut dignitatis*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 3. *in corp.*

en: Cf. above q. 3, *in the body*.

la: Pro *illa* plurimi codd. *uno*; perperam.

en: In place of *illa*, very many codices [read] *uno*; wrongly.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Responsio ad hanc quaestionem et solutio ad 1. et 2. elicitur ex hoc principio, quod ideae nec nobilitatem nec ordinem nec alias proprietates habeant ab ideatis, sed tantum distinctionem (cfr. hic q. 4. *ad* 3. 4.). Quod autem ideae accipiant distinctionem ab ideatis, inde provenit, quia ideae respectum important ad distincta ideata. Fundamentum autem illorum respectuum est ipsa infinita divinae essentiae perfectio, quae eminenter omnia continet et ut prima et summa veritas exprimit.

**II.** Haec quaestio invenitur tantum a paucis antiquis Scholasticis explicite tractata, scil. a Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2. a. 4. *ad* 9. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 4. post principium.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The response to this question, and the solution *ad* 1 and 2, is drawn from this principle: that the ideas have neither nobility nor order nor other properties from the ideated, but only distinction (cf. here q. 4, *ad* 3, 4). But that the ideas receive distinction from the ideated arises hence, that ideas import a respect to distinct ideated [things]. The foundation, however, of those respects is the infinite perfection of the divine essence itself, which eminently contains all things and expresses [them] as first and highest truth.

**II.** This question is found expressly treated only by a few of the old Scholastics, namely by Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2, a. 4, *ad* 9. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 4, after the *principium*.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 35, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit in primo capitulo Magister: *Eorum tamen quaedam efflagitant specialem tractatum.* Aut enim ista[^1] efflagitant specialem tractatum, quia sunt difficilia, aut quia sunt appropriata. Si, quia sunt difficilia; sed alia etiam sunt difficilia, sicut simplicitas, veritas et immutabilitas. Si quia sunt appropriata; sed similiter sunt unitas et aequalitas.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista efflagitant specialem tractatum triplici ex causa: tum quia sunt difficilia; tum quia multa de ipsis in Scriptura sunt determinata; tum etiam quia dicunt respectum ad creaturam[^2], et secundum has conditiones attenditur ratio causae in divina natura. Ideo, quia debebat facere transitum ad creaturas sive ad creationem, et ad hoc praeexigitur in causa posse, scire et velle, quae faciunt causam esse perfectam: ideo tractatum istum in medio collocavit inter tractatum de Trinitate et tractatum de rerum universitate. Sed quia huiusmodi plus se tenent cum Deo, et adeo se tenent[^3], quod sunt Deus; ideo tractatus iste in primo libro ponitur.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Amodo tractandum est de scientia et voluntate et potentia.* Videtur enim male ordinare, quia potentia praecedit scientiam et voluntatem[^4]: ergo male ordinat in proponendo et male in exsequendo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de istis: aut in sua generalitate, aut ut concurrunt ad unum effectum. Si in sua generalitate, sic cum scientia sit respectu bonorum et malorum faciendorum, prior est secundum rationem intelligendi quam potentia; et potentia, cum sit respectu faciendorum et non faciendorum, prior est voluntate, quae est respectu faciendorum bonorum tantum. Si autem loquamur de his, prout concurrunt ad unum effectum; sic potentia, in quantum potens, est prima, in quantum exsequens, est ultima: prius enim est posse, deinde scire, et post velle, et postremo est facere quod est ipsius potentiae[^5]. Et quantum ad hunc actum Magister ponit hic ultimo loco potentiam; sed in exsecutione considerat ordinem secundum maiorem generalitatem et minorem.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *divina scientia diversa sortitur nomina*, quae scilicet sunt scientia[^6], praescientia vel praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio, providentia. Quaeritur[^7], quomodo distinguuntur haec nomina; et videtur quod insufficienter enumeret, quia non solum est ponere in divinis praedestinationem, verum etiam reprobationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod huiusmodi nomina distinguuntur sic: divina cognitio potest considerari in se, aut in comparatione ad creaturas. Si in se: aut prout dicit pure cognitionem per modum speculationis, aut prout dicit speculationem iunctam affectioni. Primo modo est scientia, secundo modo est sapientia. Vel sic: aut[^8] dicit cognitionem simplicem, aut per rationem nobilissimam. Primo modo scientia, secundo modo sapientia[^9]. — Si autem consideretur in comparatione ad res, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut connotat eventum, et sic praescientia; aut effectum, et hoc dupliciter: aut in conservando sive gubernando, et sic providentia; aut in efficiendo, et hoc dupliciter: aut quantum ad bonum naturae et sic dispositio; aut quantum ad bonum superadditum, et sic praedestinatio, aut quantum ad eius privationem, et sic reprobatio. Sed quia privatio gratiae non est effectus, sed defectus, ideo reprobatio non hic numeratur, sed continetur sub praescientiae nomine, et ipsum sibi appropriat.

Unde divisio potest sic formari: cognitio Dei aut est in se, aut in comparatione: si in se, aut per rationem nobilissimam, et sic sapientia; aut per qualemcumque rationem, et sic est scientia. Si in comparatione: aut eventuum, et sic praescientia; aut eventuum et effectuum, et hoc vel in gubernando, et sic est providentia; vel in efficiendo, et sic, si respectu cuiuscumque naturae sit, est dispositio; si respectu rationalis, sic praedestinatio; aut eventuum et effectuum et defectuum, et sic reprobatio, quae est praescientia nominata.

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#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *creator ita dicitur relative, ut tamen essentiam non significet.* Videtur enim dicere falsum: nam creatio significat modum actionis, non relationis, ergo creator similiter; ergo non dicitur secundum relationem a parte modi, nec a parte rei; illud constat: ergo nullo modo. Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod essentiam non significat, quia creatio significat aliquid: aut ergo creatum, aut increatum. Si creatum: ergo non dicitur de Deo; si increatum: ergo cum non significet personam, significat essentiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod relative dici aliquid est dupliciter: aut quia significat relationem, sicut nomina, quae sunt in praedicamento relationis; aut quia habet respectum annexum: sic, cum omnis actio dicat respectum ad passum sive factum, et passum ad agentem, sic dicitur relative, et sic intelligit Magister de hoc nomine *creator*; et bene[^10]. Aliud etiam quod dicit, quod non significat essentiam; dicit propter hoc, quod quamvis imponatur divinae essentiae — et ideo de sola essentia dicitur, secundum omnes — tamen de eo, a quo imponitur, fuit controversia. Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod nomina sex generum[^11] non praedicant aliquid in Deo, sed compraedicant. Unde actio non videtur dicere aliquid in agente, sed ab agente. Et huic videtur consonare ratio, quia actio et passio videntur esse eadem. Et iterum huic videtur consonare verbum Boethii *de Trinitate*[^12], quod «alia genera rerum nec de Creatore, nec de creaturis praedicantur» — Ista opinio fuit satis probabilis, et huius fuit Magister[^13]; et ideo dicit, quod praescientia ratione scientiae importat essentiam, sed creator tantum relationem.

Verumtamen illud hodie communiter non tenetur. Dicimus enim, Deum esse suam actionem, ut puta creationem. Et quoniam essentia est divina actio, et hoc nomen *creator* imponitur ab actione; ideo non tantum impositum est essentiae, verum etiam ab essentia, sed illam significat in relatione. Nec Boethius intendit dicere, quod talia non praedicantur, sed non praedicantur absolute. — Si tamen velimus sustinere Magistrum secundum communem opinionem, dicemus, quod Magister non vult dicere, quod creatio non importet divinam essentiam, sed quod, quantum ex vi vocabuli, non dicit essentiam absolute, sed per modum relationis sive sub appellatione relativa. Sed praescientia duo dicit: et scientiam et praecessionem[^14]. Ratione scientiae dicit essentiam absolutam, unde manet scientia, re ipsa non manente. Non sic est de creatione; non enim est creatio, nisi etiam sit creatura. Et secundum hoc verbum Magistri non habet calumniam[^15].

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si nulla fuissent futura, esset tamen in Deo scientia eadem.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia scientia nostra ponit res, et quando non ponit, non est scientia, sed opinio vel alia acceptio minus nobilis[^16]: ergo cum de nobilitate scientiae sit ponere rem, videtur multo fortius, quod divina scientia ponat, quae est nobilissima.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc breviter dicendum, quod est scientia, qua habeo cognitionem de re, et est scientia, qua scio rem esse[^17]. Prima scientia nec in nobis, nec in Deo ponit existentiam rei in proprio genere, nec de praesenti, nec de futuro; quod patet, quia artifex habet cognitionem faciendi domum, quam nunquam faciet. Secunda vero scientia ponit rem tam in Deo quam in nobis; sed in nobis, quia dependet, in Deo, quia connotat[^18]. Et quantum ad primum modum loquitur Magister, quod eadem scientia esset, sed non respectu eiusdem, et respectu tot, respectu quot modo est quantum ad secundum modum.

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#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *omnia sunt Deo praesentia, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae praeterierunt.* Quomodo intelligitur illud? Aut enim intelligitur de praesentia secundum veritatem, aut de praesentia secundum cognitionem. Primo modo falsum est: constans est, quod antichristus non est in Deo secundum veritatem praesens. Si secundum cognitionem, quia habet cognitionem praeteritorum et futurorum; sed sic habet una anima[^19]: ergo similiter omnia sunt ei praesentia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non omnia dicuntur esse praesentia Deo secundum veritatem existentiae rerum, sed secundum cognitionem, quia actu cognoscit praesentia, praeterita et futura; et circa actum suae cognitionis semper est praesentialitas, ita quod nulla successio cognitionis Dei est in nunc, quod complectitur omnem successionem sine mutatione: et ideo omnia sunt ei praesentia ex hac duplici causa[^20]. Quamvis autem creatura habeat cognitionem de praeteritis, quia tamen cognitio eius transit in praeteritum et nova generatur cognitio ex rei existentia: ideo non dicitur, quod omnia sunt praesentia creaturae, sicut dicitur, quod omnia praesentia sunt Deo. Et ideo non ponitur memoria in Deo, quoniam memoria respicit praeteritum[^21], non tantum in re, sed ut etiam actus illius cognitionis transit in praeteritum; sed praescientia non dicit rationem sive actum scientiae ut futurum; et ideo in Deo convenienter ponitur.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says in the first chapter: *Of these, however, certain ones demand a special treatment.* For either these[^1] demand a special treatment because they are difficult, or because they are appropriated. If because they are difficult; but other things also are difficult, such as simplicity, truth, and immutability. If because they are appropriated; but similarly so are unity and equality.

**I respond:** It must be said that these demand a special treatment from a threefold cause: both because they are difficult; both because many things concerning them are determined in Scripture; and also because they say a respect to the creature[^2], and according to these conditions the account of cause in the divine nature is attended to. Therefore, because [the Master] had to make a transition to the creatures, that is, to creation, and for this there is required beforehand in the cause *to-be-able*, *to-know*, and *to-will*, which make a cause to be perfect: therefore he placed this treatment in the middle, between the treatment on the Trinity and the treatment on the universe of things. But because such things hold themselves more with God, and so hold themselves[^3] that they are God; therefore this treatment is placed in the first book.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Henceforth there must be treatment of knowledge and will and power.* For he seems to order [them] ill, because power precedes knowledge and will[^4]: therefore he orders ill in proposing and ill in carrying out.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of these: either in their generality, or as they concur unto one effect. If in their generality, so since knowledge is with respect to goods and evils to be done, it is prior in the account of understanding than power; and power, since it is with respect to things to-be-done and not-to-be-done, is prior to will, which is with respect only to goods to-be-done. But if we speak of these as they concur unto one effect; then power, insofar as it is *able*, is first, insofar as it is *executing*, is last: for first is *to-be-able*, then *to-know*, and after that *to-will*, and lastly is *to-do*, which is of power itself[^5]. And as regards this act the Master places power here in the last place; but in execution he considers the order according to greater and lesser generality.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the divine knowledge is allotted diverse names*, namely *knowledge*[^6], *foreknowledge* or *forevision*, *disposition*, *predestination*, *providence*. It is asked[^7] how these names are distinguished; and it seems that he enumerates insufficiently, because in divine matters it is to be posited not only predestination but also reprobation.

**I respond:** It must be said that names of this kind are distinguished thus: divine knowing can be considered in itself, or in comparison to creatures. If in itself: either insofar as it says purely a knowing in the manner of speculation, or insofar as it says speculation joined to affection. In the first way it is *knowledge*, in the second way it is *wisdom*. Or thus: either[^8] it says simple knowing, or [knowing] through the most noble account. In the first way knowledge, in the second way wisdom[^9]. — But if it be considered in comparison to things, this can be twofold: either it connotes the event, and so *foreknowledge*; or the effect, and this twofold: either in conserving or governing, and so *providence*; or in effecting, and this twofold: either as regards the good of nature and so *disposition*; or as regards the superadded good, and so *predestination*, or as regards its privation, and so *reprobation*. But because the privation of grace is not an effect but a defect, therefore reprobation is not numbered here, but is contained under the name of foreknowledge, and [the latter] appropriates it to itself.

Hence the division can be formed thus: the knowing of God either is in itself, or in comparison: if in itself, either through the most noble account, and so wisdom; or through whatever account, and so it is knowledge. If in comparison: either of events, and so foreknowledge; or of events and effects, and this either in governing, and so it is providence; or in effecting, and so, if it is with respect to any nature whatsoever, it is disposition; if with respect to the rational, so predestination; or of events and effects and defects, and so reprobation, which is named foreknowledge.

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#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *creator is so said relatively, that nevertheless it does not signify the essence.* For he seems to say a falsehood: for *creation* signifies the mode of an action, not of a relation, therefore *creator* similarly; therefore it is not said according to relation on the side of the mode, nor on the side of the thing; that is established: therefore in no way [is it relative]. Likewise, he seems to say a falsehood when he says that it does not signify the essence, because *creation* signifies something: either therefore the created or the uncreated. If the created: therefore it is not said of God; if the uncreated: therefore since it does not signify a person, it signifies the essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that for something to be said relatively is twofold: either because it signifies a relation, like the nouns which are in the predicament of relation; or because it has a respect annexed: thus, since every action says a respect to the patient or thing-done, and the patient to the agent, so it is said relatively, and so the Master understands [it] of this name *creator*; and rightly so[^10]. Now the other thing he says, that it does not signify the essence; he says on this account, that although it be imposed upon the divine essence — and therefore is said of the essence alone, according to all — yet concerning that from which it is imposed there was a controversy. For some wished to say that the names of the six [last] genera[^11] do not predicate something in God, but co-predicate. Hence action does not seem to say something in the agent, but from the agent. And to this seems to consort the reasoning that action and passion seem to be the same. And again to this seems to consort the word of Boethius *On the Trinity*[^12], that «the other genera of things are predicated neither of the Creator nor of creatures.» — That opinion was sufficiently probable, and of this opinion was the Master[^13]; and therefore he says that foreknowledge by reason of knowledge imports the essence, but creator only relation.

Yet today this is not commonly held. For we say that God is his action, as for instance creation. And since the essence is divine action, and this name *creator* is imposed from action; therefore it is imposed not only upon the essence but also from the essence, but signifies it in relation. Nor does Boethius intend to say that such things are not predicated, but that they are not predicated absolutely. — If however we wish to sustain the Master according to the common opinion, we shall say that the Master does not wish to say that creation does not import the divine essence, but that, as much as from the force of the word, it does not say the essence absolutely, but in the manner of relation, that is, under a relative appellation. But foreknowledge says two things: both knowledge and a precession[^14]. By reason of knowledge it says the absolute essence, whence the knowledge remains, the thing itself not remaining. It is not so concerning creation; for there is not creation unless there be also a creature. And according to this the word of the Master does not have any cavil[^15].

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *If no things were going to be, there would yet be in God the same knowledge.* For he seems to speak ill, because our knowledge posits the things, and when it does not posit, it is not knowledge but opinion or some other less-noble acceptation[^16]: therefore since it pertains to the nobility of knowledge to posit the thing, it seems much more strongly that the divine knowledge, which is most noble, would posit.

**I respond:** To this it must be said briefly that there is a knowledge by which I have a cognition of a thing, and there is a knowledge by which I know that the thing is[^17]. The first knowledge neither in us nor in God posits the existence of the thing in its proper genus, neither of the present nor of the future; which is plain, because the artisan has the cognition of building a house, which he will never build. But the second knowledge posits the thing both in God and in us; but in us, because it depends, in God, because it connotes[^18]. And as regards the first mode the Master speaks, [namely] that the same knowledge would be, but not with respect to the same, and with respect to as many, with respect to as many as it is now, as regards the second mode.

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#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *all things are present to God, not only those which are, but also those which have passed away.* How is this to be understood? For either it is understood of presence according to truth, or of presence according to cognition. In the first way it is false: it is established that antichrist is not present to God according to truth. If according to cognition, [it follows] because [God] has cognition of past and future things; but thus has one soul[^19]: therefore similarly all things are present to it.

**I respond:** It must be said that not all things are said to be present to God according to the truth of the existence of things, but according to cognition, because in act he knows the present, the past, and the future; and around the act of his cognition there is always presentiality, so that there is no succession of God's cognition in the *now*, which embraces every succession without change: and therefore all things are present to him from this twofold cause[^20]. But although the creature has cognition of past things, yet because its cognition passes into the past and a new cognition is generated from the existence of the thing: therefore it is not said that all things are present to the creature, as it is said that all present things are to God. And therefore memory is not posited in God, since memory looks to the past[^21], not only as regards the thing, but also insofar as the act itself of that cognition passes into the past; but foreknowledge does not say the account or act of knowledge as future; and therefore it is fittingly posited in God.

---

la: Scilicet *scientia*, *praescientia*, *providentia*, *dispositio* etc. — Mox post primum *Si* in codd. P Q additur *propter hoc*.

en: Namely *knowledge*, *foreknowledge*, *providence*, *disposition*, etc. — Soon after the first *Si*, codd. P Q add *propter hoc*.

la: Cod. X bene subiungit *de Creatore*. Subinde pro *ad creationem* fere omnes codd. *ad Creatorem*; non bene.

en: Cod. X rightly subjoins *de Creatore*. Subsequently, for *ad creationem*, almost all codices read *ad Creatorem*; not rightly.

la: Pro *et adeo se tenent, quod* Vat. *et a Deo, cum*. Post *quod* multi codd. addunt *quia*, sed superflue.

en: For *et adeo se tenent, quod*, the Vatican edition reads *et a Deo, cum*. After *quod*, many codices add *quia*, but superfluously.

la: De quo vide supra pag. 487, nota 5. — Mox lectionem Vat. *proposito* ex codd. D T aa bb correximus in *proponendo*.

en: On which see above p. 487, note 5. — Soon after, we have corrected the Vatican reading *proposito*, on the basis of codd. D T aa bb, to *proponendo*.

la: Pro *ipsius potentiae* cod. E *actus suae potentiae*.

en: For *ipsius potentiae*, cod. E reads *actus suae potentiae*.

la: Cod. V Y addit *sapientia*.

en: Cod. V Y adds *sapientia*.

la: Cod. bb addit *ergo*. Subinde pro *distinguuntur* codd. V Y *distinguantur*.

en: Cod. bb adds *ergo*. Subsequently, for *distinguuntur*, codd. V Y read *distinguantur*.

la: Cod. V subiicit *prout*, et paulo inferius post *nobilissimam* Vat. cum paucis codd. adiungit *sive per causas nobilissimas, quae ipse Deus sunt*.

en: Cod. V subjoins *prout*, and a little below, after *nobilissimam*, the Vatican edition with a few codices adjoins *sive per causas nobilissimas, quae ipse Deus sunt* ("or through the most noble causes, which are God himself").

la: Sola Vat. addit *per appropriationem*. — De diversis nominibus divinae scientiae attributis S. Doctor fusius tractat infra d. 38. seqq. Alex. quoque Hal. de eis loquitur S. p. I. q. 23. m. 1. circa finem, nec non B. Albert., hic a. 4.

en: Only the Vatican edition adds *per appropriationem*. — Concerning the diverse names attributed to the divine knowledge, the Holy Doctor treats more fully below, d. 38 seq. Alexander of Hales also speaks of them, *Summa* p. I, q. 23, m. 1, near the end; and likewise Bl. Albert, here a. 4.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq., et VI. Ethic. c. 6. 7.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, c. 1 seq., and *Ethics* VI, c. 6–7.

la: Intellige: generum supremorum sive praedicamentorum, quae sunt: actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs et habitus. Secundum illos, de quibus S. Doctor hic loquitur, haec nomina non dicuntur de aliqua re eodem modo, quo nomina quatuor primorum praedicamentorum, quae sunt: substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relatio. Nam ista quatuor dicuntur de re, quatenus quod his nominibus significatur intrinsece continetur in ipsa re, de qua praedicatur; illa sex vero, quatenus quod ipsis significatur est aliquid, quod rem, de qua praedicatur, extrinsecus afficit. Sive, ut ait Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 4: «Aliae (praedicationes) quidem quasi rem monstrant, aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei; quodque illa quidem ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa vero, ut non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant». Haec differentia breviter insinuatur verbis *praedicare* et *compraedicare*.

en: Understand: of the supreme genera or predicaments, which are: action, passion, where, when, situation, and habit. According to those of whom the Holy Doctor here speaks, these names are not predicated of any thing in the same way as the names of the first four predicaments, which are: substance, quantity, quality, relation. For these four are predicated of the thing inasmuch as what is signified by these names is intrinsically contained in the thing itself of which it is predicated; but those six [predicates apply] inasmuch as what is signified by them is something which extrinsically affects the thing of which it is predicated. Or, as Boethius says, *On the Trinity* c. 4: «Some [predications] show, as it were, the thing, others as it were the circumstances of the thing; and those are predicated in such a way that they show the thing to *be* something, but the others, [in such a way] not [to show] *to be* but rather to attach something extrinsically in a certain way.» This difference is briefly insinuated by the words *praedicare* and *compraedicare*.

la: Cap. 4: *Reliqua vero neque de Deo neque de ceteris praedicantur.*

en: Chapter 4: *But the rest are predicated neither of God nor of the others.*

la: Cap. 7. huius distinctionis.

en: Chapter 7 of this distinction.

la: Pro *praecessionem* fere omnes codd. cum primis edd. perperam *praedestinationem*, melius cod. *praeordinationem*.

en: For *praecessionem*, almost all codices, together with the first editions, wrongly read *praedestinationem*; better is the codex reading *praeordinationem*.

la: Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. 6, et a S. Thoma nec non a Richardo, hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is also resolved by Bl. Albert here, a. 6, and by St. Thomas, and likewise by Richard, here on the text.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2: *Quod non est (de non-ente) non est scire, ut quod diameter sit symeter*; et ibid. c. 26 (c. 33), ubi differentiae inter scientiam et opinionem examinantur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2: *Of what is not (of non-being) there is no knowing, as that the diagonal be commensurable*; and the same place, c. 26 (c. 33), where the differences between knowledge and opinion are examined.

la: Prima scientia vocatur communiter respectu Dei *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, altera *scientia visionis* (cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 3, et d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.).

en: The first knowledge is commonly called, with respect to God, *the knowledge of simple intelligence*; the second, *the knowledge of vision* (cf. below d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 41, a. 2, q. 2).

la: Cod. addit: *sicut effectus ponit causam; in Deo, sicut causa ponit effectum.* — Plura de hoc dubio inveniuntur infra d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. 2.

en: A codex adds: *as the effect posits the cause; in God, as the cause posits the effect.* — More on this doubt is found below, d. 38, a. 1, q. 1–2.

la: Vat. hic inserit vocem *praesentium*, nulla ratione, cum de praesentibus non instituatur quaestio. Mox pro *sed sic habet una anima* eadem Vat., omnibus codd. dissuadentibus, *sed si sic, cum hanc habeat etiam anima.*

en: The Vatican edition here inserts the word *praesentium*, with no reason, since there is no question raised concerning present things. Soon after, for *sed sic habet una anima*, the same Vatican edition, with all the codices dissuading, reads *sed si sic, cum hanc habeat etiam anima.*

la: Non pauci hunc locum ita interpretati sunt, quod S. Bonaventura sententiam Scoti doceat, quae oppugnat doctrinam S. Thomae de praesentia rerum in aeternitate; de quo vide infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. Sed haec interpretatio aliena videtur a mente Seraphici, qui duplicem rationem affert pro eo, quod omnia sint Deo praesentia, unam scilicet ex parte cognitionis divinae, alteram ex parte aeternitatis Dei; et in proferenda hac secunda ratione prorsus convenit cum S. Thoma, dicens: «quod (scil. *nunc* aeternitatis) complectitur omnem successionem sine mutatione», quae verba infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. in sensu S. Thomae longius explicantur (cfr. ibi Scholion). — Mox Vat. textum dilatat interserendo post *cognitionem* verbum *praesentibus*, post *praeteritis* verba *et futuris* et post *praeteritum* voces *et futurum*.

en: Not a few have so interpreted this passage that St. Bonaventure teaches the opinion of Scotus, which opposes the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the presence of things in eternity; on which see below d. 39, a. 2, q. 3. But this interpretation seems alien to the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor], who brings forward a twofold reason for [the claim] that all things are present to God: one, namely, on the side of the divine cognition; the other, on the side of God's eternity. And in setting forth this second reason he wholly agrees with St. Thomas, saying: «that (namely, the *now* of eternity) embraces every succession without change», which words below at d. 39, a. 2, q. 3 are more lengthily expounded in the sense of St. Thomas (cf. there the Scholion). — Soon, the Vatican edition expands the text by inserting after *cognitionem* the word *praesentibus*, after *praeteritis* the words *et futuris*, and after *praeteritum* the words *et futurum*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — Sola Vat. addit *ut praeteritum*.

en: Cf. above d. 3, pars II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. — Only the Vatican edition adds *ut praeteritum*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 36

title_alt: Quomodo res sint in Deo, et Deus in rebus — littera Magistri

title_alt: How things are in God, and God in things — text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

#### Cap. I.

*Utrum omnia debeant dici esse in Dei essentia, ut in Dei cognitione vel praescientia esse dicantur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (*Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum*, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 617–618; on each printed page the notes were renumbered from 1, but here they run consecutively 1–21) in Latin, followed by an English rendering.

Solet hic quaeri, cum omnia dicantur esse in Dei cognitione seu praescientia[^1] vel in Deo per cognitionem, et eius cognitio vel praescientia sit divina essentia, utrum concedendum sit, omnia esse in divina essentia vel in Deo per essentiam. — Ad quod dicimus, quia Dei cognitio eius utique essentia est, et eius praescientia, in qua sunt omnia, ipsius cognitio est, nec tamen omnia, quae sunt in eius praescientia vel cognitione, in eius essentia esse dici debent. Si enim hoc diceretur, intelligerentur esse eiusdem cum Deo[^2] essentiae. In Deo enim dicitur esse per essentiam, quod est divina essentia, quod est Deus. Habet ergo Deus apud se in praescientia sua quae non habet in sui natura. Unde Augustinus de verbis Apostoli[^3] ita ait: « Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem. Quis sufficit hoc explicare? Eliguntur qui non sunt, nec errat qui eligit, nec vane eligit; eligit tamen et habet electos quos creaturus est eligendos, quos habet apud semetipsum non in natura sua, sed in praescientia sua ». Nondum erant quibus promittebatur[^4], sed et ipsi promissi sunt, quibus promittebatur. — Ecce hic aperte dicit, Deum apud semetipsum habere electos ante mundum, non in natura sua, sed in praescientia sua, cum tamen eius praescientia non sit aliud quam eius natura, quia ipsius praescientia est eius notitia. Potest tamen ad electos referri, cum ait: *in natura sua*, id est illorum. Illos quippe habuit ab aeterno apud se, non in natura sua[^5], id est illorum qui nondum erant, sed in sua praescientia, quia eos ita novit, ac si essent.

#### Cap. II.

*Qua ratione bona dicantur esse in Deo, et non mala.*

Post praedicta quaeritur, cum omnia dicantur esse in Deo, non per essentiam naturae, sed per cognitionem scientiae, et Deus sciat bona et mala, utrum concedendum sit simpliciter, mala esse in Deo, sive esse in Deo per cognitionem. Scit enim Deus et scivit semper omnia, tam bona quam mala, etiam antequam fierent, et praescivit ab aeterno ea futura. Ideoque cum omnia bona dixerimus esse in Deo propter praescientiam cognitionis, eadem ratione videtur dicendum, omnia mala esse in eo, cum ea semper noverit, et per cognitionem ei praesentia fuerint. Praecognovit enim Deus ab aeterno quosdam futuros malos et eorum malitiam, ut ait Augustinus[^6], praescivit, sed non praeparavit. Cum ergo peccata omnium sciat, nunquid intelligendum est, ea includi in illa generalitate locutionis, qua dixit Apostolus[^7], omnia esse in Deo? *Ex ipso, inquit, et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*. — Sed quis, nisi insanus, dixerit mala esse in Deo? Illa enim esse in Deo intelliguntur, quae ex ipso et per ipsum sunt; ea vero per ipsum sunt et ex ipso, quorum auctor est; sed non est auctor nisi bonorum. Non ergo ex ipso et per ipsum sunt nisi bona; ita ergo non in ipso sunt nisi bona: non ergo mala in Deo sunt, quia, licet ea noscat, non tamen ita omnino noscit, ut bona. Mala quasi de longe cognoscit, ut ait Propheta[^8], et *alta a longe cognoscit*, id est superbiam. Et alibi ad Deum loquens de malis ait: *De absconditis tuis adimpletus est venter eorum*. Quod exponens Augustinus: « Abscondita, inquit, peccata sunt, quae a lumine tuae veritatis absconduntur ». Sed quomodo peccata a lumine veritatis divinae absconduntur, cum a Deo sciantur? Si enim non sciret, quomodo de illis iudicaret et pro illis malos damnaret? Alibi Propheta[^9]: *Quia neque ab Oriente, neque ab Occidente deest*. Quod exponens Cassiodorus inquit: « Neque a bonis, neque a malis deest Deus, sed omnibus praesens et cognitor est ». Cognoscit ergo Deus et bona et mala per scientiam, sed bona cognoscit etiam per approbationem et per beneplacitum, mala vero non. Unde Cassiodorus super Psalmum dicit: « Peccata abscondita Deo sunt, quia non novit, id est non approbat ». Et ex eo sensu Augustinus dixit ea abscondita a lumine Dei. Qui etiam in Epistola ad Evodium[^10] insinuat, cognitionem Dei variis modis accipiendam, inquiens: « Si ad scientiam

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referas, non ignorat Deus aliquos vel aliqua, qui tamen in iudicio quibusdam dicet: *Non novi vos*[^11], sed eorum improbatio hoc verbo insinuata est ». — Ecce non cognoscere dicitur Deus quae[^12] non approbat, quae ei non placent. Apparet itaque, verum esse quod diximus, scilicet quia quodam modo cognoscit Deus bona, quo non cognoscit mala. Pariter quidem utraque eodemque modo noscit quantum ad notitiam, sed bona etiam approbatione et beneplacito cognoscit.

Et inde est, quod bona tantum dicuntur esse in Deo, non mala, et illa *prope*, haec *longe*, quia licet in Deo aliqua dicantur esse propter cognitionis praesentiam, et Deus bona et mala cognoscat, mala tamen non cognoscit nisi per notitiam, bona vero non solum per scientiam, sed etiam per approbationem et beneplacitum. Et ob talem cognitionem aliqua dicuntur esse in Deo, scilicet quia ita ea scit, ut etiam approbet, et placeant, id est, ita scit, ut eorum sit auctor.

#### Cap. III.

*Utrum idem sit omnia esse ex Deo et per ipsum et in ipso.*

Proinde si diligenter inspiciamus, idem videtur esse ex Deo et per ipsum et in ipso. Unde Ambrosius in tertio libro de Spiritu sancto[^13]: « Haec tria, *ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso*, omnia *unum* esse, supra diximus. Cum dicit, *per ipsum esse omnia*, non negavit, *in ipso esse omnia*. Eandem vim habent omnia haec, scilicet *cum ipso et in ipso et per ipsum*, et unum in his atque consimile, non contrarium intelligitur ». — Ecce habes, quia ex eadem intelligentia Scriptura dicit, omnia esse in ipso et per ipsum et ex ipso vel cum ipso. Cum ergo ex ea[^14] ratione omnia dicantur esse ex Deo vel per ipsum, non solum quia scit, sed etiam quia auctor est eorum; consequitur, ut eadem ratione ea esse in Deo dicantur, scilicet quia scit[^15] et eorum auctor est: dicitur, quia *in illo vivimus et movemur et sumus*, quia eo auctore sumus, movemur et vivimus. Cum ergo non sit auctor nisi bonorum, merito sola bona in eo esse dicuntur, sicut ex ipso et per ipsum. Cum igitur in eius cognitione vel praescientia sint omnia, scilicet bona et mala, in eo tamen non dicuntur esse nisi bona, quorum auctor est. Unde Augustinus in libro de Natura boni[^16]: « Cum audimus, inquit, *ex Deo et per ipsum et in ipso esse omnia*, omnes utique naturas intelligere debemus, et omnia quae naturaliter sunt. Neque enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant, sed vitiant, quae ex voluntate peccantium nascuntur ». — Hic aperte dicitur, quod in illa generalitate locutionis bona tantum continentur.

#### Cap. IV.

*Quod sunt in quolibet trium et per ipsum et in ipso.*

Praeterea sciendum est, quod licet ibi indicetur distinctio personarum, cum dicitur: *ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso*, omnia tamen ex Patre et per Patrem et in Patre sunt; similiter de Filio et de Spiritu sancto accipiendum est. Unde Augustinus in libro de Trinitate[^17]: « Non confuse, inquit, accipiendum est quod ait Apostolus, *ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso*: ex ipso dicens propter Patrem, per ipsum propter Filium, in ipso propter Spiritum sanctum ». Vigilanter autem attende, ne, quia Patrem volens intelligi dixit *ex ipso*, sic intelligas, omnia esse ex Patre, ut neges, omnia esse ex Filio vel ex Spiritu sancto, cum ex Patre et per Patrem et in Patre omnia *esse* sane dici possit, similiter et de Filio et de Spiritu sancto dicendum est.

#### Cap. V.

*Quod non omnia quae ex Deo sunt, etiam de ipso sunt.*

Illud etiam hic annectendum[^18] est, quod non omnia quae dicuntur esse ex Deo, etiam de ipso esse dici debeant; « quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Natura boni[^19], non hoc significat penitus *ex ipso*, quod *de ipso*. Quod enim *de ipso* est, potest dici esse *ex ipso*, sed non omne quod *ex ipso* est, potest dici esse *de ipso*, quia non est de sua substantia. Ex ipso enim sunt caelum et terra, quia ipse fecit ea, non autem de ipso, quia non de substantia sua. Sicut aliquis homo si generat[^20] filium et facit domum, ex ipso est filius, ex ipso est et domus, sed filius de ipso, domus vero de terra et ligno », non de ipso.

In[^21] praemissis apertum est, quod in Dei cognitione sive praescientia sunt omnia, scilicet bona et mala, sed non omni modo sunt ibi mala, quo bona; et quod in Deo bona tantum sunt, sicut ex ipso et per ipsum, non mala; et ex quo sensu haec accipienda sint, assignatum est; et quod *de ipso* non dicitur esse proprie quod aliud est ab ipso; ex ipso autem esse dicuntur omnia quae eo auctore sunt.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXXVI.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether all things ought to be said to be in God's essence, in the way that they are said to be in God's cognition or foreknowledge.*

It is wont to be asked here — since all things are said to be in God's cognition or foreknowledge[^1], or in God by cognition, and His cognition or foreknowledge is the divine essence — whether it is to be conceded that all things are in the divine essence, or in God by essence. — To which we say that God's cognition is indeed His essence, and His foreknowledge, in which all things are, is His cognition; and yet not all things which are in His foreknowledge or cognition ought to be said to be in His essence. For if this were said, they would be understood to be of the same essence with God[^2]. For in God [a thing] is said to be by essence which is the divine essence, which is God. God therefore has with Himself in His foreknowledge what He does not have in His [own] nature. Whence Augustine, *On the words of the Apostle*[^3], thus says: « *He chose us before the foundation of the world*. Who is sufficient to expound this? Those are chosen who are not, nor does He err who chooses, nor does He choose in vain; He nevertheless chooses, and has the elect — those whom, as about-to-create, He is to choose — whom He has with Himself not in their nature, but in His foreknowledge ». They to whom [the kingdom] was promised[^4] were not yet, but they themselves were the promised ones, to whom it was promised. — Behold, here he openly says that God has the elect with Himself before the world, not in their nature, but in His foreknowledge — although His foreknowledge is nothing other than His nature, since His foreknowledge is His knowing. It can however be referred to the elect, when he says: *in their nature*, that is, of those [elect]. For He had them from eternity with Himself, not in their nature[^5], that is, of those who were not yet, but in His foreknowledge, because He so knew them as if they were.

#### Chapter II.

*By what reason good things are said to be in God, and not evil ones.*

After the foregoing it is asked — since all things are said to be in God, not by the essence of nature but by the cognition of [His] science, and God knows good and evil things — whether it is to be conceded simply that evils are in God, or are in God by cognition. For God knows, and has always known, all things, both good and evil, even before they were made, and from eternity foreknew them as future. And therefore, since we have said that all good things are in God on account of the foreknowledge of [His] cognition, by the same reason it seems to be said that all evil things are in Him, since He has always known them, and they have been present to Him by cognition. For God foreknew from eternity certain men [as] going to be evil and their malice, as Augustine says[^6] — He foreknew it, but did not prepare it. Since therefore He knows the sins of all, must it be understood that they are included in that generality of expression by which the Apostle said[^7] that all things are in God? *From Him*, he says, *and through Him and in Him are all things*. — But who, save a madman, would say that evils are in God? For those things are understood to be in God which are from Him and through Him; but those things are through Him and from Him of which He is the author; but He is not the author save of good things. Therefore there are not from Him and through Him save good things; thus therefore there are not in Him save good things: therefore evils are not in God, because, although He knows them, He does not nevertheless so altogether know them as good things. He knows evils as it were from afar, as the Prophet says[^8]: and *the lofty He knows from afar*, that is, pride. And elsewhere, speaking to God of evils, he says: *From Your hidden things their belly is filled*. Augustine, expounding [this], says: « Hidden, he says, are the sins which are hidden from the light of Your truth ». But how are sins hidden from the light of divine truth, since they are known by God? For if He did not know, how would He judge concerning them and damn the wicked for them? Elsewhere the Prophet[^9]: *For [help comes] neither from the East nor from the West*. Cassiodorus, expounding [this], says: « God is wanting neither to the good nor to the evil, but is present to all and a knower [of all] ». God therefore knows both good and evil things by [His] science, but the good He also knows by approval and by good pleasure, the evil ones not. Whence Cassiodorus on the Psalm says: « Sins are hidden from God, because He does not know [them], that is, does not approve [them] ». And in that sense Augustine said they were hidden from the light of God. Who also in the Epistle to Evodius[^10] suggests that God's cognition is to be taken in various ways, saying: « If you refer [it] to [His] science,

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God is not ignorant of any persons or any things, [persons] who nevertheless in the judgment He will say to certain ones: *I never knew you*[^11], but their reprobation has been suggested by this word ». — Behold, God is said not to know what[^12] He does not approve, [the things] which are not pleasing to Him. It appears therefore that what we have said is true, namely that in a certain way God knows good things in a way in which He does not know evils. Both indeed He knows equally and in the same manner so far as concerns notice, but the good He also knows by approval and good pleasure.

And thence it is that good things alone are said to be in God, not evils — and the former *near*, the latter *far* — because, although in God some things are said to be on account of the presence of cognition, and God knows good and evil things, the evils nevertheless He does not know save by notice, but the goods not only by [His] science but also by approval and good pleasure. And on account of such a cognition some things are said to be in God, namely because He so knows them as also to approve [them], and they please [Him] — that is, He so knows them, that He is the author of them.

#### Chapter III.

*Whether to be from God and through Him and in Him is the same.*

Therefore, if we look diligently, to be *from God* and *through Him* and *in Him* seems to be the same. Whence Ambrose in the third book *On the Holy Spirit*[^13]: « These three, *from Him and through Him and in Him*, [signify] all to be *one*, as we said above. When He says *all things to be through Him*, He has not denied *all things to be in Him*. All these have the same force, namely *with Him and in Him and through Him*; and one in these and consimilar, and not contrary, is understood ». — Behold, you have it, that out of the same understanding Scripture says all things to be in Him and through Him and from Him or with Him. Therefore, since by that[^14] reason all things are said to be from God or through Him — not only because He knows, but also because He is the author of them — it follows that by the same reason they are said to be in God, namely because He knows[^15] and is the author of them: it is said that *in Him we live and move and are*, because, with Him as author, we are, are moved, and live. Since therefore He is not the author save of good things, deservedly good things alone are said to be in Him, just as [they are] from Him and through Him. Since therefore in His cognition or foreknowledge there are all things, namely good and evil, in Him nevertheless they are not said to be save the good, of which He is the author. Whence Augustine in his book *On the Nature of the Good*[^16]: « When we hear, he says, *that from God and through Him and in Him are all things*, we ought certainly to understand all natures, and all things which are naturally. For the sins which do not preserve nature but vitiate [it] are not from Him, [the sins] which are born from the will of those who sin ». — Here it is openly said that in that generality of expression good things alone are contained.

#### Chapter IV.

*That [all things] are in [each one] of the three [Persons] and through Him and in Him.*

Furthermore it must be known that, although there a distinction of Persons is indicated when it is said *from Him and through Him and in Him*, all things are nevertheless from the Father and through the Father and in the Father; the same is to be received concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whence Augustine in his book *On the Trinity*[^17]: « What the Apostle says, *from Him and through Him and in Him*, is not, he says, to be received confusedly: he says *from Him* on account of the Father, *through Him* on account of the Son, *in Him* on account of the Holy Spirit ». But take vigilant heed, lest, because, wishing the Father to be understood, he said *from Him*, you so understand all things to be from the Father as to deny that all things are from the Son or from the Holy Spirit — since *from* the Father and *through* the Father and *in* the Father all things can soundly be said *to be*; the same is to be said also concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit.

#### Chapter V.

*That not all things which are from God are also of Him.*

This too[^18] must here be added, that not all things which are said to be *from* God ought also to be said to be *of* Him; « because, as Augustine says in his book *On the Nature of the Good*[^19], *from Him* does not signify altogether the same as *of Him*. For what is *of Him* can be said to be *from Him*, but not all that is *from Him* can be said to be *of Him*, because it is not of His substance. For from Him are heaven and earth, because He made them, but not of Him, because not of His substance. Just as if some man begets[^20] a son and makes a house — the son is from him, the house also is from him, but the son [is] of him, the house [is] of earth and wood », not of him.

In[^21] the foregoing it has been made plain that in the cognition or foreknowledge of God all things are, namely good and evil, but not in every manner are evils there in the way that goods are; and that in God there are good things alone, just as [they are] from Him and through Him, not evils; and out of what sense these are to be received has been assigned; and that *of Him* is not properly said to be that which is something other than Himself; but *from Him* are said to be all things which are by His authorship.

---

la: Hic et in toto hoc et sequenti capitulo omnes codd. nostri et edd., exceptis Vat. et edd. 2, 8, pro *praescientia* ponunt *praesentia*; quod quidem in se non est falsum, ut explicatur a Magistro, d. XXXV. c. 9, attamen minus congruum.

en: Here and throughout this and the following chapter all our codices and editions, with the exception of the Vatican and editions 2 and 8, put *praesentia* ("presence") for *praescientia* ("foreknowledge"); which is indeed in itself not false, as is explained by the Master at d. XXXV, c. 9, but nevertheless less fitting.

la: Codd. BDE cum pluribus edd. *eo*.

en: Codices BDE with most editions [read] *eo* ("Him") [in place of *Deo*].

la: Ephes. 1, 4; August., sermo 26. c. 4. n. 4. In quo textu Vat. cum paucis edd. et codd. ABE *eligit nec vane elegit*.

en: Ephesians 1:4; Augustine, sermon 26, c. 4, n. 4. In which text the Vatican with a few editions and codices ABE [reads] *eligit nec vane elegit* ("He chooses and has not chosen in vain").

la: Codd. B C D E (A in margine) addunt *regnum*. Paulo post solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *mundi constitutionem* pro *mundum*.

en: Codices B C D E (A in the margin) add *regnum* ("the kingdom"). A little after, only the Vatican and editions 4, 6 [read] *mundi constitutionem* ("the foundation of the world") in place of *mundum* ("the world").

la: Ita codd. ACD et edd. 2, 3, 5, 7; Vat. cum aliis *sui*. Immediate post edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 *quia* pro *qui*.

en: Thus codices ACD and editions 2, 3, 5, 7; the Vatican with the others [reads] *sui* ("of His own"). Immediately after, editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 [read] *quia* ("because") for *qui* ("who").

la: Libr. I. de Praedest. Sanctorum, c. 10, in sensu.

en: [Augustine,] book I *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 10, in sense.

en: Romans 11:36.

la: Psalm. 137, 6; secundus locus est ib. 4. Locus August. est Enarrat. in Psalm. 16. n. 13.

en: Psalm 137:6 [Vulgate]; the second passage is at the same place, v. 4. The passage from Augustine is from the *Enarratio in Psalmum* 16, n. 13.

la: Psalm. 74, 7; Cassiodorus, Expositio in Psalterium in hunc locum. Sequens locus eiusdem est in Psalm. 16, 14.

en: Psalm 74:7 [Vulgate]; Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalterium*, on this passage. The following passage from the same author is on Psalm 16:14.

la: Nostri codd. et edd. *libro ad Helvidium*, sed revera locus invenitur Epist. 169. n. 2. ad Evod., nonnullis tamen a Magistro omissis. Paulo ante codd. *abscondi a lumine* pro *abscondita a lumine*.

en: Our codices and editions [read] *libro ad Helvidium* ("the book to Helvidius"), but in fact the passage is found in Epistle 169, n. 2, to Evodius, with some [things] nevertheless omitted by the Master. A little before, the codices [read] *abscondi a lumine* ("to be hidden from the light") in place of *abscondita a lumine* ("hidden from the light").

la: Respicitur Matth. 7, 23: *Nunquam novi vos*, et Luc. 13, 27: *Nescio vos*.

en: This regards Matthew 7:23: *I never knew you*, and Luke 13:27: *I do not know you*.

la: Solummodo Vat. et ed. 2. satis bene *qui*. Lectio nostra explicatur ab ed. 8, quae habet *approbat vel quae*. Deinde infra fide codd. et ed. 1 restauravimus *eodemque* pro *eodem*.

en: Only the Vatican and edition 2 [read], well enough, *qui* ("whom"). Our reading is explained by edition 8, which has *approbat vel quae* ("approves, or which"). Then below, on the faith of the codices and edition 1, we have restored *eodemque* ("and in the same way") in place of *eodem* ("in the same").

la: Cap. II. n. 84, sed ordine propositionum immutato. Locus s. Scripturae est Rom. 11, 36.

en: [Ambrose, *On the Holy Spirit*, book III,] c. 2, n. 84, but with the order of the propositions altered. The Scripture passage is Romans 11:36.

la: Contra codd. et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis edd. *eadem*.

en: Against the codices and edition 1, the Vatican with the other editions [reads] *eadem* ("the same") [in place of *ea*].

la: Hic locus in omnibus edd. corruptus esse videtur; Vat. scilicet *quia ei eorum auctor esse dicitur, quia*; aliae edd. scilicet *quia scit et eorum auctor esse dicitur, quia*. Nostri codd. ponunt *est* loco *esse*. — Locus s. Scripturae est Act. 17, 28.

en: This passage seems in all editions to be corrupt: the Vatican, namely, [reads] *quia ei eorum auctor esse dicitur, quia* ("because to Him He is said to be the author of them, because"); the other editions [read] *quia scit et eorum auctor esse dicitur, quia* ("because He knows and is said to be the author of them, because"). Our codices put *est* ("is") in place of *esse* ("to be"). — The Scripture passage is Acts 17:28.

la: Cap. 28. In fine huius textus Vat. et plurimae edd. addunt *omnia* contra codd., ed. 1 et originale.

en: [Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*,] c. 28. At the end of this text the Vatican and most editions add *omnia* ("all things"), against the codices, edition 1, and the original.

la: Libr. VI. c. 10. n. 12, unde prima verba sumta sunt; alia sunt ex I. c. 6. n. 12. Originale: *Ex ipso, ex Patre; per ipsum, per Filium; in ipso, in Spiritu sancto.*

en: [Augustine, *On the Trinity*,] book VI, c. 10, n. 12, whence the first words are taken; the others are from book I, c. 6, n. 12. The original [reads]: *From Him, [that is,] from the Father; through Him, [that is,] through the Son; in Him, [that is,] in the Holy Spirit.*

la: Ita Vat. cum codd. B E et aliis edd. excepta 1, quae habet *advertendum*, codd. C D *attendendum*; in divisione textus S. Bonav. *animadvertendum*.

en: Thus the Vatican with codices B E and the other editions, except 1, which has *advertendum* ("to be noted"); codices C D *attendendum* ("to be attended to"); in the division of the text S. Bonaventure [reads] *animadvertendum* ("to be observed").

la: Cap. 27, nonnullis mutatis.

en: [Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*,] c. 27, with some [things] altered.

la: Originale *gignat — faciat*; edd. *generat, et deinde*, exceptis 3, 7, 8, incongrue *faciat*.

en: The original [reads] *gignat — faciat* ("should beget — should make"); the editions [read] *generat, et deinde* ("begets, and thereafter"), except 3, 7, 8, [which read] incongruously *faciat* ("should make").

la: Vat. cum cod. E *ex*.

en: The Vatican with codex E [reads] *ex* ("from") [in place of *In*]. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]


title: Dist. 36, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVI. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXVI. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVI.

#### *Quomodo res sint in Deo.*

> *Solet hic quaeri, cum omnia dicantur esse in Dei cognitione.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de cognitione Dei, qua cognoscit omnia creata. Et quoniam cognitum dicitur esse in cognoscente, ideo determinat hic secundo modum, quomodo res sunt in Deo. Et quoniam res creatae non tantum dicuntur esse in Deo, sed etiam ex Deo et per Deum, ideo primo agit de existentia rerum in Deo; secundo vero comparat ad alias habitudines, scilicet *ex ipso* et *per ipsum*, ibi: *Proinde, si diligenter inspiciamus.*

Prima pars habet duas. In prima ostendit qualiter res dicantur esse in Deo a parte eius in quo sunt, utrum scilicet sint in Dei essentia, sicut sunt in Dei praescientia. In secunda[^1], qualiter dicantur esse in Deo a parte ipsarum rerum, ibi: *Post praedicta quaeritur, cum omnia dicantur esse in Deo,* ubi quaerit, utrum mala sint in Deo, et solvit, quod non. Quaelibet harum partium posset dividi: quoniam primo quaerit et opponit, et postmodum determinat, et partes manifestae sunt in littera.

*Proinde, si diligenter inspiciamus.* Haec est secunda pars, in qua comparat hoc quod est *esse in Deo* ad alias habitudines, importatas per alias praepositiones, et haec pars habet quatuor partes secundum quatuor capitula. In prima ostendit horum trium convenientiam; in secunda, differentiam et appropriationem, ibi: *Praeterea sciendum est.* In tertia differentiam eius quod dicitur[^2] *de ipso* ad hoc quod dicitur *ex ipso* ostendit, ibi: *Illud etiam hic animadvertendum[^3] est.* In quarta breviter praedicta epilogat, ibi: *Ex praemissis apertum est;* et haec posset dividi contra totam praecedentem. Intellectus partium patet in littera.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeritur de existentia rerum in Deo, et circa hoc tria principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum creaturae fuerint in Deo aeternaliter.

Secundo quaeritur de modo existendi ipsarum rerum in Deo.

Tertio, quantum ad generalitatem[^4] rerum in Deo existentium, utrum scilicet omnia quae Deus cognoscit, fuerint et sint in Deo. — Ita quod primo de existentia, secundo de modo, et tertio de numero.

Quantum ergo ad primum articulum duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum res fuerint in Deo ab aeterno.

Secundo, utrum sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae.

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### Articulus II. *De modo, quo res existunt in Deo.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de modo existentiae rerum in Deo, et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum omnia quae sunt in Deo, sint in ipso vita.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum res verius sint in Deo quam in universo sive in proprio genere.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XXXVI.

#### *How things are in God.*

> *"It is wont here to be asked, since all things are said to be in God's cognition."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the cognition of God, by which he knows all created things. And since the thing known is said to be in the knower, he therefore here determines secondly the mode in which things are in God. And since created things are not only said to be in God, but also from God and through God, he therefore first treats of the existence of things in God; and secondly compares [that mode] to the other relations, namely *from him* and *through him*, there: *"Therefore, if we look diligently."*

The first part has two [divisions]. In the first he shows in what manner things are said to be in God on the side of him in whom they are, namely whether they are in God's essence as they are in God's foreknowledge. In the second[^1], in what manner they are said to be in God on the side of the things themselves, there: *"After what has been said, it is asked, since all things are said to be in God,"* where he asks whether evils are in God, and resolves that they are not. Either of these parts could be subdivided: for first he asks and raises objections, and afterwards determines, and the parts are evident in the letter [of the text].

*"Therefore, if we look diligently."* This is the second part, in which he compares this — *to be in God* — to the other relations conveyed by the other prepositions, and this part has four parts according to the four chapters. In the first he shows the agreement of these three; in the second, the difference and appropriation, there: *"Moreover, it must be known."* In the third he shows the difference of that which is said[^2] *of him* with respect to that which is said *from him*, there: *"This too must here be observed[^3]."* In the fourth he briefly recapitulates the preceding, there: *"From what has been laid down it is clear;"* and this could be divided over against the whole preceding part. The sense of the parts is evident in the letter.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part it is asked concerning the existence of things in God, and concerning this three principal questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether creatures were in God eternally.

Second, it is asked concerning the mode of the existing of the things themselves in God.

Third, with regard to the generality[^4] of the things existing in God, namely whether all things which God knows have been and are in God. — So that the first concerns existence, the second concerns mode, and the third concerns number.

With regard, therefore, to the first article, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether things were in God from eternity.

Second, whether they are in God by reason of the essence, or of the person.

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### Article II. *On the mode in which things exist in God.*

Consequently with regard to the second article it is asked concerning the mode of the existence of things in God, and concerning this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether all things which are in God are in him as life.

Second, it is asked, whether things are more truly in God than in the universe or in their own genus.

---

la: Pro *In secunda* plurimi codd. *Secundo.*

en: For *In secunda* ("In the second"), most codices [read] *Secundo* ("Secondly").

la: Pro *dicitur* codd. P Q V *est;* in non paucis codd. neque *dicitur* neque *est.*

en: For *dicitur* ("is said"), codices P, Q, V [read] *est* ("is"); in not a few codices, neither *dicitur* nor *est* [is found].

la: Cod. T *attendendum.*

en: Codex T [reads] *attendendum* ("must be attended to").

la: Cod. V *universalitatem.* Paulo post pro *cognoscit* Vat. cod. cc *praecognoscit.*

en: Codex V [reads] *universalitatem* ("universality") [for *generalitatem*]. A little later, for *cognoscit* ("knows"), the Vatican edition and codex cc [read] *praecognoscit* ("foreknows"). ---


title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 620 -->

### Articulus I.
#### *De existentia rerum in Deo.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum res fuerint in Deo ab aeterno.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem res fuerint in Deo ab aeterno, videtur:

1. Quia agens cognoscens agit per speciem rei, quam penes se habet[^1]; sed res est in anima, quia similitudo eius est in ea: ergo et in Deo similiter.

Si dicas, quod illud exemplar nihil est rei, ergo secundum illud non deberet dici, res esse in Deo; contra: plus facit ad esse rei exemplar, quod est cognitivum et productivum, quam quod est productum a re[^2]: si ergo ratione exemplaris producti a re res est in anima, multo fortius debet dici in Deo esse ratione exemplaris producentis; sed hoc ab aeterno: ergo etc.

2. Item, similitudo producta non est vere aliquid, sed alicuius[^3]; sed exemplar, per quod cognoscit Deus, vere est ipse Deus: ergo verius est exemplar rei in Deo quam in anima: ergo multo fortius res est in Deo quam in anima, et sic etc.

3. Item, quia res potest exire de materia, res est in materia, et tamen non totaliter est in potentia materiae, immo agentis[^4]: ergo si res, quae sunt in potentia Dei, totaliter ibi sunt, multo fortius debent dici esse in ipso, et sic etc.

**Contra:**

1. Quod exit per creationem omnino nihil est, antequam creetur; sed creaturae sic exeunt: ergo omnino nihil sunt, antequam producuntur. Sed quod non est nec est hic nec ibi[^5]: ergo non est in aliquo, et ita nec in Deo.

2. Item, quod est in aliquo est in illo vel secundum se, vel secundum aliquid sui; sed res non est in Deo secundum se, quia tunc essentia rei esset in Deo[^6]; nec secundum aliquid sui, quia nihil de ipsa est aeternum sed totum ex tempore: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod est in aliquo est in illo secundum esse actuale, vel[^7] potentiale; sed creatura non est in Deo secundum esse actuale, quia tunc actu esset: ergo si est in Deo, est secundum esse potentiale. Sed omne esse potentiale, secundum quod huiusmodi, est permutabile: si ergo creatura ab aeterno est in Deo secundum esse potentiale, ab aeterno est in Deo secundum esse mutabile. Sed hoc falsum: ergo et primum.

4. Item, si creatura dicitur esse in Deo, quia potest esse a Deo: ergo cum ab aeterno esse a Deo sit impossibile[^8], non erit creatura ab aeterno in Deo ratione potentiae.

### Conclusio.

> *Res sunt in Deo ab aeterno secundum similitudinis praesentiam atque secundum causativam potentiam, sed non secundum realem existentiam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo tripliciter: vel secundum actualem

<!-- page 621 -->

existentiam, vel secundum similitudinis praesentiam, vel secundum causativam potentiam. Primo modo sunt res in universo, secundo modo in cognitiva substantia, tertio modo in sua causa[^9]. His duobus modis ultimis res sunt in Deo, quia est cognoscens res, antequam fiant, et potens producere. Unde quia ab aeterno cognovit, et potentia, qua produxit ex tempore, in Deo fuit ab aeterno, ideo dicuntur res fuisse in Deo ab aeterno.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod nihil est non est in aliquo; dicendum, quod verum est secundum primum modum existendi[^10], sed falsum secundum secundum et secundum tertium, quia illud quod nihil est modo, Deus potest facere.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod est in aliquo[^11], est in illo secundum se etc.; dicendum, quod quantum ad secundum modum res sunt in Deo secundum aliquid sui, quia secundum exemplar. Sed aliquid rei potest dici tripliciter, scilicet essentialiter, effective et causative, sicut pars, effectus vel causa. Hoc tertio modo est illud exemplar aliquid rei. — Quantum ad tertium modum, scilicet potentiam causativam, est res secundum se non in actu, sed potentia, quia suum esse potest produci a Deo.

3. Similiter ad sequens, dicendum, quod ratione exemplaris[^12] res actualiter sunt in Deo; ratione creationis potentialiter, quia possunt produci.

Quod obiicitur: quod est in Deo est immutabile; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de eo quod est actu in Deo; sed quod potest produci a Deo est mutabile. Vel dicendum, quod possibile[^13] habet comparationem ad divinam potentiam, quae est immutabilis, et sic est immutabile; vel ad connotatum temporale extra, et sic habet esse mutabile.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de creatione, dicendum, quod quamvis actus creandi non potuerit esse ab aeterno, tamen potentia creandi fuit in Deo[^14] ab aeterno.

english:
<!-- page 620 -->

### Article I.
#### *On the existence of things in God.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether things were in God from eternity.*

That things, however, were in God from eternity, appears thus:

1. Because a knowing agent acts through the species of a thing which it has within itself[^1]; but a thing is in the soul, since its likeness is in it: therefore likewise also in God.

If you say that that exemplar is nothing of the thing, therefore according to it the thing ought not to be said to be in God; on the contrary: the exemplar which is cognitive and productive contributes more to the being of a thing than that which is produced by the thing[^2]: if therefore by reason of an exemplar produced by the thing the thing is in the soul, much more strongly ought it to be said to be in God by reason of the producing exemplar; but this from eternity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a produced likeness is not truly something, but [is] of something[^3]; but the exemplar through which God knows is truly God himself: therefore the exemplar of a thing is more truly in God than in the soul: therefore much more strongly is a thing in God than in the soul, and so etc.

3. Likewise, since a thing can come forth from matter, the thing is in matter, and yet it is not totally in the potency of matter, but rather of the agent[^4]: therefore if things which are in the potency of God are totally there, much more strongly ought they to be said to be in him, and so etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. What comes forth through creation is utterly nothing before it is created; but creatures so come forth: therefore they are utterly nothing before they are produced. But what is not is neither here nor there[^5]: therefore it is not in anything, and thus not in God either.

2. Likewise, what is in something is in it either according to itself, or according to something of itself; but a thing is not in God according to itself, since then the essence of the thing would be in God[^6]; nor according to something of itself, since nothing of it is eternal but the whole [is] from time: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, what is in something is in it according to actual being, or[^7] potential; but a creature is not in God according to actual being, since then it would actually be: therefore if it is in God, it is according to potential being. But every potential being, insofar as it is such, is changeable: if therefore a creature is in God from eternity according to potential being, from eternity it is in God according to changeable being. But this is false: therefore so is the first.

4. Likewise, if a creature is said to be in God because it can be from God: therefore since for anything to be from God from eternity is impossible[^8], a creature will not be in God from eternity by reason of potency.

### Conclusion.

> *Things are in God from eternity according to the presence of a likeness and according to causative potency, but not according to real existence.*

**I respond:** It must be said that something is said to be in something else in three ways: either according to actual

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existence, or according to the presence of a likeness, or according to causative potency. In the first way things are in the universe, in the second way in a knowing substance, in the third way in their cause[^9]. In these last two ways things are in God, since he is one knowing things before they come to be, and able to produce [them]. Hence because he knew from eternity, and the potency by which he produced [them] in time was in God from eternity, therefore things are said to have been in God from eternity.

1. To that which is objected: that what is nothing is not in anything; it must be said that this is true according to the first mode of existing[^10], but false according to the second and according to the third, since that which now is nothing, God can make.

2. To that which is objected, that what is in something[^11], is in it according to itself etc.; it must be said that as to the second mode things are in God according to something of themselves, since according to an exemplar. But "something of a thing" can be said in three ways, namely essentially, effectively, and causatively, as a part, an effect, or a cause. In this third way that exemplar is something of the thing. — As to the third mode, namely causative potency, the thing in itself is not in act, but in potency, since its being can be produced by God.

3. Likewise to the next [objection], it must be said that by reason of the exemplar[^12] things are actually in God; by reason of creation potentially, since they can be produced.

What is objected: that what is in God is unchangeable; it must be said that this is true of that which is actually in God; but what can be produced by God is changeable. Or it must be said that the possible[^13] has comparison to the divine potency, which is unchangeable, and thus is unchangeable; or to the connoted temporal [thing] outside, and thus has changeable being.

4. To that which is objected concerning creation, it must be said that although the act of creating could not have been from eternity, nevertheless the potency of creating was in God[^14] from eternity.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. — De minori huius argumenti vide Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 38. (c. 8.).

en: Cf. above d. 35, q. 1. — On the minor of this argument see Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 38 (c. 8).

la: In hac propositione idea in mente creata dicitur esse aliquid productum a re, quatenus species intelligibilis, ab obiecto in anima producta, concurrit ut principium *quo* cum actione animae ad productionem exemplaris sive ideae. Hoc non convenit divinis ideis. Cfr. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 8. § 8.

en: In this proposition the idea in the created mind is said to be something produced by the thing, inasmuch as the intelligible species, produced in the soul from the object, concurs as the principle *by which* together with the action of the soul for the production of the exemplar or idea. This does not apply to the divine ideas. Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 8, § 8.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 8. (VI. c. 3.) ait: καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ[?], quae verba in antiqua versione Veneta (1489) sic Latinis redduntur: «Etenim separabile et hoc aliquid inesse videtur maxime substantiae». Cfr. etiam lib. *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia*, ex quo plura citantur infra d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. I. fundam. 3. Hinc Scholastici substantiam vocant *hoc aliquid*. Similiter etiam Aristoteles eam vocat *quod vere est*, de quo vide supra pag. 407, nota 1. Accidens autem dicitur esse *alicuius*. Similiter et Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 2. (VI. c. 1.) docet, accidentia non tam esse *entia*, quam *quid entis*, scil. vel quantitatem vel qualitatem substantiae. Sensus verborum S. Doctoris est, similitudo (exemplar, idea) producta in anima non est substantia, sed accidens. — In fine argumenti pro *et sic* cod. V *et si sic*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3) says: καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ[?], which words in the old Venetian version (1489) are rendered into Latin thus: "For the separable and the *this something* seems most of all to be in substance." Cf. also the book *On the Categories*, c. *On Substance*, from which more is cited below at d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. I, *fundam.* 3. Hence the Scholastics call substance *hoc aliquid* ("this something"). Likewise Aristotle also calls it *what truly is*, on which see above p. 407, n. 1. An accident, however, is said to be *of something*. Likewise Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1) teaches that accidents are not so much *beings* as *something of being*, namely either a quantity or a quality of a substance. The sense of the words of the holy Doctor is that a likeness (exemplar, idea) produced in the soul is not a substance, but an accident. — At the end of the argument, in place of *et sic*, codex V [reads] *et si sic*.

la: Nam agens actione sua transmutando materiam educit sibi similem formam ex ipsa, quae per se est indifferens ad diversas formas.

en: For the agent, by its action transmuting the matter, draws forth from it a form similar to itself, [a matter] which in itself is indifferent to diverse forms.

la: Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. I. (c. 1.): *Etenim quae sunt omnes existimant alicubi esse, quod vero non est, nusquam esse.* — Mox pro *et ita* codd. T X *ergo*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text I (c. 1): "For all consider that what is, is somewhere, but what is not, is nowhere." — Soon, in place of *et ita*, codices T X [read] *ergo*.

la: Et per consequens essentia creaturae esset essentia Dei. — Pro *essentia rei*, quae lectio habetur in codd. C F K T et aliis, non pauci codd. falso *essentia Dei*, Vat. *essentialiter*. Paulo superius pro *in illo* multi codd. *ab illo*, cui lectioni contextus repugnat. — De maiori huius argumenti cfr. Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 24. (c. 3.).

en: And consequently the essence of the creature would be the essence of God. — In place of *essentia rei*, which reading is found in codices C F K T and others, not a few codices wrongly [read] *essentia Dei*; the Vatican [edition] [reads] *essentialiter*. A little earlier, in place of *in illo*, many codices [read] *ab illo*, a reading to which the context is repugnant. — On the major of this argument cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 24 (c. 3).

la: Pro *vel* codd. T Z *scilicet*. Iidem codd. cum pluribus aliis subinde *secundum* vel omittunt, et pro tertio *vel* substituunt *et*.

en: In place of *vel*, codices T Z [read] *scilicet*. The same codices with several others sometimes omit *secundum* or, and in place of the third *vel* substitute *et*.

la: Sive cum repugnet, res a Deo creari ab aeterno.

en: Or, since it is repugnant that things be created by God from eternity.

la: Vat. hic interserit *videlicet ut causa, scilicet*. Mox post *est res* cod. W addit *in Deo*, et subinde pro *secundum se* cod. V exhibet *secundum esse* ac post pauca verbis *suum esse*, cod. M praemittit *secundum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] here interjects *videlicet ut causa, scilicet*. Soon after *est res* codex W adds *in Deo*, and then in place of *secundum se* codex V exhibits *secundum esse*, and shortly thereafter, before the words *suum esse*, codex M prefixes *secundum*.

la: Codd. aa bb subiiciunt *omnino*.

en: Codices aa bb subjoin *omnino* ("utterly").

la: Verba *illud quod est in aliquo* in multis mss. desiderantur. Aliquanto inferius pro *potest dici* codd. L V cc *potest esse*.

en: The words *illud quod est in aliquo* are missing in many manuscripts. A little below, in place of *potest dici*, codices L V cc [read] *potest esse*.

la: Vat. *exemplaritatis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *exemplaritatis*.

la: Pro *possibile*, quod ex praestantioribus codd. revocavimus, alii codd. *potentiale*; Vat. autem, pro *possibile* substituta voce *potentia*, hunc locum sic transformavit: *quod potentia se habet per comparationem* etc.

en: In place of *possibile*, which we have restored from the more excellent codices, other codices [read] *potentiale*; but the Vatican [edition], with the word *potentia* substituted for *possibile*, transformed this passage thus: *quod potentia se habet per comparationem* etc.

la: Supple cum Vat. *ab aeterno*.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *ab aeterno* ("from eternity").

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac distinctione tota doctrina de existentia rerum in Deo a S. Bonaventura accuratissime tractatur. — Pro intelligentia primae quaestionis notandum est, quod tripliciter intelligi potest locutio *esse in Deo*, ut bene explicatur hic *dub.* I. — Deinde observandum est, in triplici sensu accipi posse vocem *esse*, scil. pro *esse essentiae* (sive *quidditativo*, ut dixerunt Scholastici), pro *esse existentiae*, et pro eo *esse*, quod significat veritatem propositionis sive connexionem subiecti et praedicati, quae connexio est in rebus fundamentaliter, in intellectu vero formaliter. In propositionibus, quae habent necessariam terminorum relationem — unde vocantur *perpetuae veritatis* — existentia actualis subiecti non requiritur ad veritatem propositionis. Nec tamen idealis illa et aeterna necessitas supponit, aliquid esse ab aeterno, nisi in Deo. Contraria doctrina, scil. «*quod multae sunt veritates ab aeterno, quae non sunt Deus*», est septimus articulus reprobatus ab Universitate Magistrorum Parisiensium, ut refert S. Bonav., II. *Sent.* d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in fine (cfr. S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 16. a. 7, et q. 10. a. 3. ad 3.). — De sententia Henrici Gand. aliorumque, quod Deus essentiis rerum aliquod *esse intelligibile* ab aeterno communicaverit, et de *esse diminuto* secundum doctrinam Scoti cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. *Scholion*.

**II.** Duobus modis, quibus res sunt in Deo, scil. ut in causa exemplari et efficiente, addendus est tertius («ut in fine conservante») ex a. 2. q. 1. huius dist. — Argumentum 4. *ad opposit.* false applicat principium, a Seraphico firmiter stabilitum, scil. creationem ab aeterno actu factam esse impossibilem. De hac sententia cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 1. p. I. a. I. q. 2, et I. *Sent.* d. 43. q. 3.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. I. § 5. 6. — Scot., hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 18. a. 4. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. I. 2; *S.* p. I. tr. 15. q. 60. m. 4. a. I. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. q. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3, et d. 35. q. 5. — Ægid. R., hic I. princ. q. unica. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this distinction the whole doctrine on the existence of things in God is most carefully treated by St. Bonaventure. — For the understanding of the first question it is to be noted that the locution *to be in God* can be understood in three ways, as is well explained here in *dubium* I. — Then it must be observed that the word *being* (*esse*) can be taken in a threefold sense, namely for the *being of essence* (or *quidditative*, as the Scholastics said), for the *being of existence*, and for that *being* which signifies the truth of a proposition or the connection of subject and predicate, which connection is fundamentally in things, but formally in the intellect. In propositions which have a necessary relation of terms — whence they are called *of perpetual truth* — the actual existence of the subject is not required for the truth of the proposition. Yet that ideal and eternal necessity does not suppose that anything be from eternity, except in God. The contrary doctrine, namely, "*that there are many truths from eternity which are not God*," is the seventh article reproved by the University of the Masters of Paris, as St. Bonav. reports, II *Sent.* d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, at the end (cf. St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 16, a. 7, and q. 10, a. 3, ad 3). — On the opinion of Henry of Ghent and others, that God communicated to the essences of things some *intelligible being* from eternity, and on *diminished being* according to the doctrine of Scotus, cf. above d. 35, q. 1, *Scholion*.

**II.** To the two modes by which things are in God, namely as in an exemplar and efficient cause, a third is to be added ("as in a conserving end") from a. 2, q. 1, of this distinction. — Argument 4 *ad oppositum* falsely applies a principle firmly established by the Seraphic [Doctor], namely that creation actually made from eternity is impossible. On this opinion cf. II *Sent.* d. 1, p. I, a. I, q. 2, and I *Sent.* d. 43, q. 3.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. I, § 5–6. — Scotus, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 3; *S.* I, q. 18, a. 4, ad 1. — B. Albert., here a. I, 2; *S.* p. I, tr. 15, q. 60, m. 4, a. I, partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here a. I, q. I. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 3, and d. 35, q. 5. — Ægid. R., here I, *princ.* q. unica. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 5. — Biel, here q. unica.

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