title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the Master's text (Part I)

source_text:
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### DUB. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo contingit dubitari de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Nunc de veritate sive proprietate divinae essentiae* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia omne, quod habet proprium, distinguitur; sed divina essentia non est distinguibilis: ergo non habet proprium.

**Respondeo:**[^1] Dicendum, quod divina essentia eo modo est distinguibilis, quo modo habet proprietates, et e converso; quia quamvis in se non sit distinguibilis per plurificationem sui nec a persona per diversitatem, est tamen distinguibilis respectu essentiae creatae, respectu cuius habet has proprietates.

### DUB. II

Item quaeritur de illis tribus proprietatibus, quas ponit, scilicet de *veritate*, *immutabilitate*, *simplicitate*, cum multae aliae conditiones sint divinae essentiae, quare solum de his tribus agit?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod per has tres proprietates sufficienter distinguitur esse increatum a creato. Nam creatum,[^2] eo ipso quod creatum, habet esse post non esse, et ita esse vanum et possibile: ideo habet esse permixtum cum possibilitate, et propter hoc deficit a veritate, a stabilitate et simplicitate. Increatum vero esse habet contrarias proprietates, et in his sufficienter distinguitur. Nam *veritas* respicit *quod est*, *immutabilitas* *quo est*,[^3] *simplicitas* utrumque. Ideo patet sufficientia et ordo.

### DUB. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *a sapere dicitur sapientia*, quia non videtur dicere verum. Sicut enim albedo se habet ad album, ita sapientia ad sapere; sed albedo non dicitur ab albo, immo magis e contra[^4]: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum intellectum componentem *sapere* dicitur *a sapientia*, quia intellectus componens procedit ab abstracto ad concretum; secundum vero intellectum resolventem est e converso; et quantum ad hunc loquitur Augustinus. — Vel posset dici, quod loquitur secundum considerationem grammatici, non logici.[^5]

### DUB. IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quis magis est quam ille, qui dixit famulo*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia esse non recipit magis et minus, et maxime in Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *magis* et *minus* dupliciter possunt considerari, scilicet in comparatione ad idem; et sic[^6] dicunt intensionem et remissionem;

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vel in comparatione ad diversas substantias et naturas; et sic dicunt gradum et excessum, et sic est bene[^7] ponere magis et minus in ente respectu Creatoris et creaturae, et respectu creaturarum ad invicem. Sed in comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improportionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proportionabilis.

### DUB. V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum*. Videtur enim esse ista proprietas et Angelorum, quia Augustinus de *Civitate Dei*[^8] dicit, quod «immortalitas Angelorum non est praeterita, quasi non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit», sed semper est praesens: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

**Respondeo:** Quidam dicunt, quod duratio aevi est simplex et tota simul, non habens praeteritum et futurum; nihilominus ipsum aeviternum[^9] habet praeteritum et futurum quantum ad affectiones; et ita[^10] proprium est solius Dei.

Alii dicunt, quod in omni duratione creata, quoniam differt a durante et[^11] habet esse possibile, est prius et posterius; sed distinguunt in priori et posteriori. Quoddam enim est quod dicit durationis successionem, quoddam successionis durationem cum variatione et innovatione. Primum est in aevo, secundum in tempore; et hoc vult Anselmus[^12] expresse, et hoc credo probabilius. Et patet responsio ad verbum Augustini; ipse enim loquitur de priori et posteriori, quod quidem dicit innovationem et variationem et corruptionem.

### DUB. VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod divinae essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est. Videtur enim falsum, quia quod inest alicui substantialiter non adimitur comparatione aliqua; sed esse est substantiale rei cuilibet: ergo etc. Item ex comparatione ad Deum creatura melioratur, ut dicit Augustinus[^13], ergo magis est, quam si non comparetur: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dupliciter est accipere talem comparationem. Uno modo secundum rationem influentiae et receptionis; et sic creatura ad Deum comparata est magis, quam si non comparetur. Alio modo comparatur secundum habitudinem aequiparantiae et proportionis; et hoc modo verum est, quod nulla[^14] est proportionabilis secundum conditionem veritatis et nobilitatis esse divini; et ideo quasi nihil est, non omnino in se, sed nihil ad proportionem, quia non potest inveniri aliqua proportio quantitativa.

### DUB. VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Dicatur ergo, quod semper fuit, est et erit*. Videntur enim haec verba non dici[^15] de Deo, quia dicunt diversa tempora; sed in Deo non cadit diversitas temporum.

**Respondeo:** Quidam voluerunt dicere, quod actus isti non praedicant de Deo diversa tempora secundum essentiam, sed secundum concomitantiam; quia divinum esse omnino invariatum omne tempus concomitatur. Sed haec positio non solvit plene. Dicitur enim vere, quod Deus fuit ante omne tempus; tunc[^16] ergo concomitantiam non potest dicere. — Ideo dicunt alii, quod tempus consignificatum non est dispositio rei acceptae sive intellectae, quando dicitur de Deo, sed solum modi intelligendi; quando vero de re mobili, utroque modo. Exemplum patet de masculinitate[^17] in lapide et in viro: quoniam in viro est ut dispositio rei acceptae, in lapide ut modus intelligendi solum. Sed haec positio non videtur sufficiens, quia intellectus non ponit praeteritum circa suum intelligere, quando intelligit Deum fuisse: ergo oportet, quod ponat circa rem.

Propter hoc notandum, quod verba diversorum temporum aliter dicuntur de aeterno, aliter de aeviterno, aliter de temporali. Nam respectu temporalis important mutabilitatem et successionem et durationem. Secundum vero quod de aeviternis dicuntur, duo tantum important, successionem et durationem, sicut vult Hieronymus,[^18] Augustinus et Anselmus. Secundum vero quod dicuntur de Deo, important solum durationem. Unde dicitur: *Deus fuit*, quia eius du-

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ratio non coepit; *est*, quia duratio eius non interrumpitur: *erit*, quia non desinit nec corrumpitur. Proprie ergo loquendo, non dicuntur de Deo, ut dicit Hieronymus: large autem loquendo, dicuntur, ut dicit Magister et Augustinus; et ad hoc vadit opinio Magistri.[^19]

### DUB. VIII

Item quaeritur de verbo Hilarii: *Esse non est Deo accidens* etc., quia nec creaturae est accidens — nulli enim omnino rei accidit esse — quomodo ergo per hoc notatur Deus differre a creatura?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod accidens dicit quid natum in alio esse, ab alio exire, et ab illo recedere. Accidens enim dicitur quod inest subiecto et ab illo trahit ortum, et propterea potest adesse et abesse. In his tribus proprietatibus communicat esse creatum, licet non eodem modo omnino. Nam esse nostrum pendet ab alio sustinente, oritur ab alio efficiente, creatura etiam nata est suum esse perdere: ideo esse eius est quasi accidens, non tamen vere accidens, quia cum pendeat a Deo, non pendet sicut a subiecto. E contrario est in Deo; et ideo dicit Hilarius, quod *esse non est accidens Deo*; et hoc propter contrarias proprietates: quia accidens natum est alii inesse, propter hoc dicit: *subsistens veritas*; quia natum est ab alio exire, contra hoc dicit: *manens causa*; quia natum est etiam ab alio recedere, contra hoc dicit: *naturalis generis proprietas, quae non dimittit esse*.

### DUB. IX

Item quaeritur, quomodo intelligitur immortalitas, cum dicitur: *Solus habet immortalitatem*, et dicit Augustinus, quod accipitur pro incommutabilitate; sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Mors enim non dicit omnem mutabilitatem, sed solum corruptibilitatem viventium: ergo non idem est dicere.

**Respondeo:** Sicut vita accipitur communiter et proprie, ita et mors, ita et immortalitas. Uno enim modo dicitur vita actus continuus et internus, qui est a forma spirituali; et sic dicitur proprie, et sic immortalitas dicit vitam talem cum impossibilitate ad eius privationem. Alio modo dicitur vita actus completus potentiae, quae est secundum rei naturam, sicut dicitur aqua viva, quae habet operationem aquae convenientem; et hoc modo importat repugnantiam ad corruptionem. Et ideo debet dici secundum hanc vitam immortale quod est ita in actu completo, quod nullo modo potest aliquam peiorationem recipere; et sic accipit Apostolus et exponit Augustinus.

### DUB. X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit beatus Iacobus et est in littera: *Nec vicissitudinis obumbratio*; quae differentia est inter vicissitudinem et obumbrationem, et quae convenientia, ratione cuius dicatur vicissitudo obumbrare?

Et dicendum, quod vicissitudo importat numerum vicis, et iste est numerus cum interruptione; sed obumbratio dicitur per privationem actus lucis. Quoniam igitur actus formae lux est, privatio eius recte dicitur obumbratio; et quia vicissitudo ratione numeri dicit interruptionem, et ratione interruptionis dicit privationem, et ratione privationis obumbrationem, hinc est, quod recte dicitur vicissitudinis obumbratio.

---

english:
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### DOUBT I

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there occurs a doubt about what the Master says: *Now concerning the truth or property of the divine essence* etc. For he seems to speak badly, because everything that has a property is distinguished; but the divine essence is not distinguishable: therefore it does not have a property.

**I respond:**[^1] It must be said that the divine essence is distinguishable in the same way as it has properties, and conversely; because although in itself it is not distinguishable by a multiplication of itself nor from a person by diversity, nevertheless it is distinguishable with respect to created essence, with respect to which it has these properties.

### DOUBT II

Likewise it is asked about those three properties which he lays down, namely about *truth*, *immutability*, *simplicity*, since there are many other conditions of the divine essence, why does he treat only of these three?

**I respond:** It must be said that through these three properties uncreated being is sufficiently distinguished from created. For the created,[^2] by the very fact that it is created, has being after non-being, and so an empty and possible being: therefore it has being mixed with possibility, and on this account it falls short of truth, of stability, and of simplicity. Uncreated being, on the contrary, has the contrary properties, and in these it is sufficiently distinguished. For *truth* regards *what it is*, *immutability* *that by which it is*,[^3] *simplicity* both. Therefore the sufficiency and order are clear.

### DOUBT III

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *wisdom is named from to-be-wise*, because he does not seem to speak truly. For just as whiteness stands to the white, so wisdom to to-be-wise; but whiteness is not named from white, but rather conversely[^4]: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the composing intellect *to-be-wise* is named *from wisdom*, because the composing intellect proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; but according to the resolving intellect it is conversely; and Augustine speaks with respect to this. — Or it could be said that he speaks according to the consideration of the grammarian, not of the logician.[^5]

### DOUBT IV

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Who is more than he who said to his servant*. For he seems to speak badly, because being does not admit of more and less, and most of all in God.

**I respond:** It must be said that *more* and *less* can be considered in two ways, namely in comparison to the same; and thus[^6] they signify intensification and remission;

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or in comparison to different substances and natures; and thus they signify degree and excess, and thus it is good[^7] to posit more and less in being with respect to Creator and creature, and with respect to creatures among themselves. But in the comparison of Creator to creature there is a disproportionate and infinite excess; with respect to creatures among themselves it is proportionate.

### DOUBT V

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Whose essence does not know past or future*. For this property seems to belong also to the Angels, since Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*[^8] says that «the immortality of the Angels is not past, as though it were not, nor future, as though it were not yet», but is always present: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

**I respond:** Some say that the duration of aeviternity is simple and all at once, not having past and future; nevertheless the aeviternal thing itself[^9] has past and future as to its affections; and so[^10] it is proper to God alone.

Others say that in every created duration, since it differs from the one enduring and[^11] has possible being, there is a before and after; but they distinguish in the before and after. For there is something which signifies the succession of duration, and something the duration of succession with variation and innovation. The first is in aeviternity, the second in time; and this Anselm[^12] expressly maintains, and this I believe more probable. And the response to the word of Augustine is clear; for he speaks of a before and after which indeed signifies innovation and variation and corruption.

### DOUBT VI

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that our being is nothing compared to the divine essence. For this seems false, because what belongs to something substantially is not taken away by any comparison; but being is substantial to each thing: therefore etc. Likewise from comparison to God a creature is improved, as Augustine says[^13], therefore it is more than if it were not compared: therefore etc.

**I respond:** Such a comparison can be taken in two ways. In one way according to the relation of influence and reception; and thus a creature compared to God is more than if it were not compared. In the other way it is compared according to the relation of equiparation and proportion; and in this way it is true that none[^14] is proportionable according to the condition of the truth and nobility of the divine being; and therefore it is as if nothing, not entirely in itself, but nothing as to proportion, because no quantitative proportion can be found.

### DOUBT VII

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Let it therefore be said that he always was, is, and will be*. For these words seem not to be said[^15] of God, because they signify different times; but in God no diversity of times falls.

**I respond:** Some have wished to say that these acts do not predicate of God different times according to essence, but according to concomitance; because the divine being, altogether unvaried, is accompanied by every time. But this position does not fully solve. For it is truly said that God was before every time; then[^16] therefore it cannot signify concomitance. — Therefore others say that time as cosignified is not a disposition of the thing received or understood, when it is said of God, but only of the mode of understanding; but when said of a mutable thing, in both ways. The example is plain from masculinity[^17] in a stone and in a man: for in a man it is as a disposition of the thing received, in a stone only as a mode of understanding. But this position does not seem sufficient, because the intellect does not posit a past about its own understanding when it understands that God was: therefore it is necessary that it posit it about the thing.

On account of this it must be noted that words of different times are said in one way of the eternal, in another of the aeviternal, in another of the temporal. For with respect to the temporal they import mutability and succession and duration. According to how they are said of aeviternal things, they import only two things, succession and duration, as Jerome,[^18] Augustine, and Anselm hold. But according to how they are said of God, they import only duration. Hence it is said: *God was*, because his du-

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ration did not begin; *is*, because his duration is not interrupted; *will be*, because it does not cease nor is it corrupted. Strictly speaking, therefore, they are not said of God, as Jerome says: but broadly speaking, they are said, as the Master and Augustine say; and to this the Master's opinion tends.[^19]

### DOUBT VIII

Likewise it is asked about the word of Hilary: *Being is not an accident to God* etc., because being is not an accident to a creature either — for being is in no way accidental to anything whatever — how then is it noted through this that God differs from a creature?

**I respond:** It must be said that an accident signifies something whose nature is to be in another, to come forth from another, and to depart from it. For an accident is what is in a subject and draws its origin from it, and on this account can be present and absent. In these three properties created being shares, though not in entirely the same way. For our being depends on another that sustains it, arises from another that effects it, and the creature is of a nature even to lose its being: therefore its being is as it were an accident, yet not truly an accident, because, although it depends on God, it does not depend as on a subject. The contrary is in God; and therefore Hilary says that *being is not an accident to God*; and this on account of the contrary properties: because an accident is of a nature to be in another, on this account he says: *subsisting truth*; because it is of a nature to come forth from another, against this he says: *abiding cause*; because it is of a nature also to depart from another, against this he says: *the property of the natural genus, which does not let go of being*.

### DOUBT IX

Likewise it is asked, how immortality is to be understood, when it is said: *He alone has immortality*, and Augustine says that it is taken for incommutability; but this does not seem fitting. For death does not signify every mutability, but only the corruptibility of living things: therefore it is not the same thing to say.

**I respond:** Just as life is taken commonly and properly, so also death, so also immortality. For in one way life is called a continuous and internal act which is from a spiritual form; and so it is called properly, and so immortality signifies such a life with an impossibility of its privation. In another way life is called the complete act of a potency that is according to the nature of the thing, as living water is so called which has the operation appropriate to water; and in this way it imports a repugnance to corruption. And therefore according to this life that must be called immortal which is so in complete act that it can in no way receive any worsening; and so the Apostle takes it and Augustine expounds it.

### DOUBT X

Likewise it is asked about what blessed James says and which is in the text: *Nor a shadow of vicissitude*; what is the difference between vicissitude and adumbration, and what the agreement, by reason of which vicissitude is said to overshadow?

And it must be said that vicissitude implies the number of a turn, and this is a number with interruption; but adumbration is so called by the privation of the act of light. Since therefore the act of form is light, its privation is rightly called adumbration; and because vicissitude by reason of number signifies interruption, and by reason of interruption signifies privation, and by reason of privation adumbration, hence it is that it is rightly called *a shadow of vicissitude*.

---

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, ceteris tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit *Ad quod*. Mox plerique codd. ut A F G K S V W X non bene *illo* pro *eo*, alii vero ut H T aa bb *illo*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, adds *Ad quod*. Shortly after, most codices such as A F G K S V W X (not well) [read] *illo* for *eo*, while others such as H T aa bb [read] *illo*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut F T dd repetunt hic *esse*. Mox ed. 1 post *creatum* addit *est*.

en: Some codices such as F T dd repeat *esse* here. Shortly after, ed. 1 adds *est* after *creatum*.

la: Plurimi codd. omittunt *est*.

en: Very many codices omit *est*.

la: Plures mss. cum ed. 1 *e converso*.

en: Several manuscripts with ed. 1 [read] *e converso*.

la: De intellectu resolvente sive analytico, et componente sive synthetico vide infra d. 28. dub. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Secunda solutio inde sumitur, quod grammatici formam verborum abstractam derivant a forma concreta, logici autem sive philosophi (Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. 1.) e contrario. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3.

en: On the resolving or analytic intellect, and the composing or synthetic, see below d. 28. dub. 1, and IV Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — The second solution is taken from this, that grammarians derive the abstract form of words from the concrete form, but logicians or philosophers (Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 1) [do] the contrary. Compare below d. 33. q. 3.

la: Vat. praeter fidem omnium mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit *non*, sed falso, quia iuxta omnes Scholasticos intensio et remissio est motus eiusdem v. g. caloris a statu imperfectiore ad perfectiorem et viceversa. Vide S. Thomam, qui hic circa litteram idem dubium solvit consimili distinctione, scilicet: *Magis et minus potest dici aliquid vel quantum ad ipsam naturam participatam, quae secundum se intenditur et remittitur secundum accessum ad terminum vel recessum; et hoc non est nisi in accidentibus; vel quantum ad modum participandi; et sic etiam in essentialibus dicitur magis et minus secundum diversum modum participandi, sicut Angelus dicitur magis intellectualis quam homo.*

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of all manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, adds *non*, but falsely, because according to all the Scholastics intensification and remission is a motion of the same thing, e.g. of heat, from a less perfect state to a more perfect and conversely. See St. Thomas, who here on the text resolves the same doubt with a similar distinction, namely: *More and less can be said of a thing either as regards the participated nature itself, which in itself is intensified and remitted according to its approach to or recession from the term; and this is only in accidents; or as regards the mode of participating; and thus also in essentials more and less is said according to the different mode of participating, as an Angel is said to be more intellectual than a man.*

la: Cod. T *vermi*, cod. W *ibi* pro *bene*.

en: Codex T [reads] *vermi*, codex W *ibi* in place of *bene*.

la: Libr. XII. c. 15. n. 2.

en: Book XII, ch. 15, n. 2.

la: Hoc est res aeviterna sive subiectum aevi v. g. Angelus. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 non bene addit *seu aeternum*, quia non est idem cum aeviterno.

en: That is, an aeviternal thing or the subject of aeviternity, e.g. an Angel. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, not well adds *or eternal*, because it is not the same as the aeviternal.

la: Supple: *non noscere sive non habere praeteritum vel futurum*.

en: Supply: *not to know, or not to have, past or future*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *etiam*, et paulo post cum *priori et posteriori* (nonnulli codd. habent quidem *cum* loco *est*, sed solus cod. cc cum *priori et posteriori*). Pro nostra lectione militant etiam ea quae S. Doctor II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. habet, ubi fusius hanc quaestionem pertractans, ex creaturae possibilitate sive ex eo, quod nulla creatura omnino est actus, deducit durationem successionis sive prius et posterius in aevo. — Mox Vat., omnibus mss. et sex primis edd. obnitentibus, *de loco in*. Paulo infra post *successionem* cod. I satis bene addit *sine variatione et innovatione*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *etiam*, and a little after with *before and after* (some codices indeed have *cum* in place of *est*, but only codex cc [has] with *before and after*). For our reading there also fight the things which the holy Doctor has in II Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp., where, treating this question more fully, from the possibility of the creature, or from the fact that no creature is wholly act, he deduces the duration of succession or the before and after in aeviternity. — Shortly after, the Vatican edition, against all the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *de loco in* [sic — Quaracchi prints the Vatican lemma as it stands]. A little below, after *successionem*, codex I quite well adds *without variation and innovation*.

la: Vide *Monolog.* c. 28. et *Proslog.* c. 20. et 22.

en: See *Monologion* ch. 28, and *Proslogion* ch. 20 and 22.

la: Libr. I. *de Genes. ad lit.* c. 3. n. 9–10, et libr. *contra Epist. Manichaei*, c. 40. n. 46.

en: Book I, *On Genesis according to the letter*, ch. 3, nn. 9–10, and the book *Against the Epistle of Manichaeus*, ch. 40, n. 46.

la: Subaudi: *creatura*. — Vat. autem cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit *ratio* et paulo infra loco *ad proportionem* habet *a proportione*.

en: Understand: *creature*. — The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, adds *ratio*, and a little below in place of *ad proportionem* has *a proportione*.

la: Plurimis codd. obnitentibus, Vat. praemittit *debere*.

en: Against very many codices, the Vatican edition prefixes *debere*.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus *tunc*.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied *tunc*.

la: Substituimus fide antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 *masculinitate* pro *masculino genere*.

en: On the authority of the ancient manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *masculinitate* for *masculino genere*.

la: De Hieronymo vide notam hic in lit. Magistri c. 1. — Augustini et Anselmi textus accipe ex dub. 5. — Cfr. Scot., I. Sent. d. 9. q. unica in fine. — Paulo ante post *important* aliqui codd. ut F aa bb cum ed. 1 addunt *scilicet*, aliqui ut G I n *et*.

en: On Jerome see the note here on the Master's text, ch. 1. — Take the texts of Augustine and Anselm from dub. 5. — Compare Scotus, I Sent. d. 9. q. unica at the end. — Shortly before, after *important*, some codices such as F aa bb with ed. 1 add *scilicet*, others such as G I n [add] *et*.

en: Compare Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 10, a. 5.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the Master's text (Part II)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 175 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri

### Dubium I

In parte ista circa litteram incidit hic[^1] quaestio *de ordine*. Cum enim compositio in creatura sit ratio et causa mutationis, simplicitas est causa immutabilitatis; quia *si affirmatio est causa affirmationis, et negatio causa negationis*[^4]: ergo cum causa sit ante effectum, debuit primo Magister ponere proprietatem *simplicitatis*.

**Respondeo:** *Prima solutio.* Dicendum, quod revera compositio secundum rationem intelligendi prior est quam mutatio; sed quoniam negationes se habent e contrario affirmationibus, hinc est quod immutabilitas est prior — ita volunt aliqui dicere.

*Alia solutio.* Potest tamen aliter dici et melius: quod est *prius et notius nobis*, et *prius simpliciter*[^2][^5]. Et quia *simplicitas* est maxime nobis occulta (propter hoc[^3], quod simplex inquantum simplex habet rationem principii, et nos venimus a cognitione posterioris in cognitionem prioris), ideo prius agit de immutabilitate quam de simplicitate.

### Dubium II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: *«Eademque proprie ac vere simplex, quia nec habet compositionem partium»* etc. Videtur enim superflua dicere, quia *simplex est cuius pars non est*, sicut *compositum dicitur quod habet partes*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister notificat hic *simplex secundum quod est Dei proprium*; et ita opponitur compositioni et multiplicitati. Quantum ergo ad *privationem compositionis*, dicit quod non habet *multitudinem partium*; quantum vero ad privationem *multiplicitatis extraneae*, dicit quod non habet *varietatem accidentium*; quantum vero ad privationem *multiplicitatis intrinsecae*, dicit quod non habet *varietatem formarum*, ut *generis, speciei et differentiae*; et hoc modo *simplex* est simplex *vere et proprie*, quod solius Dei est[^6].

### Dubium III

Item quaeritur de ista ratione Augustini: *«Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem»* etc. Probat enim animam esse compositam *propter multitudinem proprietatum*. Sed contra: nulla substantia componitur ex proprietatibus, neque per se neque cum alio: ergo ex hoc non probatur, quod anima sit composita.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus hoc non probat nisi *a posteriori*. Compositio enim accidentis ad subiectum et diversitas necessario praesupponit aliam compositionem — quia, ut dicit Boethius[^7]: *«Quod est pure forma subiectum esse non potest»*. Ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum accidentium plurium, oportet in illo praeexistere *compositionem intrinsecam*; sed anima capit in se multitudinem accidentium: et ideo necessario infertur *a posteriori*, quod ipsa sit composita — licet non ex accidentibus.

### Dubium IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *«Sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum»* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia *a quocumque removetur superius, et inferius*[^8]: ergo si non habet qualitatem, nec bonitatem. Si tu dicas quod bonitas illa non est species qualitatis, quaeritur: quare non similiter dicitur in divinis *qualitas divina* sicut *bonitas divina*?

**Respondeo:** *Solutio quorundam.* Quidam volunt dicere, quod *nomen generis* non transfertur ad divina — tum quia non dicit rei complementum, sicut *species*; tum quia significat *in concretione ad subiectum et in dependentia*[^9]. Nomina autem specialia connotant effectum in creatura; et ideo dicitur *sine qualitate bonus*.

*Non probata.* Sed si quis velit[^10] inspicere, invenit hoc non habere veritatem. Si ergo quaeratur: *quomodo differt in Deo magnitudo et bonitas?* — dicendum, quod magnitudo significat divinam essentiam *per modum quantitatis*, bonitas *per modum qualitatis*: ergo isti modi cadunt in Deo[^11]. Et iterum, si quaeratur *qualis est Deus?* — respondetur: *bonus et magnus*.

*Solutio auctoris.* Et ideo dicendum, quod nomina generum in divinis reperiuntur, sed non prout habent *rationem generis* — quia Deus in nullo genere est. Et ad hoc significandum removet Augustinus[^12] nomina *novem generum* in quantum sunt genera.

### Dubium V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *«Si tamen est dignum, ut Deus dicatur substare»*. Videtur enim satis dignum, quia *summa nobilitas est per se subsistere*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duplex est proprietas ipsius *substantiae* — scilicet *per se stare* et *alii subesse*. Primum est perfectionis, secundum imperfectionis; et ideo ratione primae dicitur *digne*[^13], non ratione secundae.

### Dubium VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: *«Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit»* etc. Quae differentia est inter illas differentias [sc. *compositis / infirmis / obscuris / disparibus*]? Quodsi[^14] nulla est, videtur facere *inculcationem verborum*.

**Respondeo:** *Solutio 1.* Dicendum, quod quidam volunt[^15], quod per illa quatuor excludantur *quatuor genera compositionum*.

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(a) *Prima* enim est *essentiae ex principiis essentialibus*, ratione cuius dicitur quod Deus *non est ex compositis*, id est *simul positis*.

(b) *Secunda* est *substantiae ex principiis naturalibus*, quae sunt *materia et forma*; ratione huius dicitur *neque ex infirmis* — quia materia subiecta est privationi, quae facit formam esse instabilem[^16] et infirmam, et similiter materiam (infirma enim dicuntur *instabilia*).

(c) *Tertia* est *compositio mixti ex miscibilibus*, ratione cuius dicit *neque ex obscuris* — quia ubi mixtio, ibi quaedam formarum confusio, et ita obscuratio.

(d) *Quarta* est *compositio animati ex partibus disparibus* — ex anima videlicet et corpore; ratione huius dicit *neque ex partibus disparibus* — quia ipse est *spiritus*.

*Alia solutio.* Aliter tamen potest dici, quod excludit eandem compositionem ratione diversarum conditionum. Ad hoc enim quod aliqua[^17] principia constituant aliquid, oportet quod principia sint *differentia*, sint *dependentia*, sint *imperfecta*, sint etiam *difformia*[^18]. Si enim essent omnino conformia et perfecta, non possent aliquid constituere — quia *ex duobus entibus actu nihil fit*[^19].

Quia ergo *differentia*, ideo sunt *composita*, quasi *cum aliis posita*; quia *dependentia*, ideo *infirma*; quia *imperfecta*, ideo *obscura*; quia *dissimilia*, ideo *disparia*.

Deus autem non potest esse *ex differentibus*[^20] *et diversis*, quia est *vita per essentiam*; non potest esse *ex dependentibus et infirmis*, quia *virtus per essentiam*; non potest esse *ex imperfectis et obscuris*, quia *lux est*; similiter non potest esse *ex disparibus et dissimilibus*, quia *spiritus per essentiam*.

*Summa ergo actualitas, summa potestas, summa claritas, summa spiritualitas* non permittunt in Deo esse aliquam compositionem. Unde ex his quatuor conditionibus quatuor rationes eliciuntur probantes Deum[^21] simplicissimum.

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the Master's text

### Doubt I

In this part, concerning the Master's text, a question arises here[^1] *about order*. Since composition in a creature is the ground and cause of change, *simplicity* is the cause of *unchangeableness*; for *"if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation"*[^4]: therefore since the cause is before the effect, the Master ought first to have placed the property of *simplicity*.

**I respond:** *First solution.* It must be said that indeed composition, according to the order of understanding, is prior to change; but since negations are contrary to affirmations, hence it is that unchangeableness is prior — so some would have it.

*Another solution.* It can, however, be said otherwise and better: that there is the *prior and more known to us*, and the *prior simpliciter*[^2][^5]. And since *simplicity* is especially hidden from us (because of this[^3], that the simple insofar as it is simple has the character of a *principle*, and we come from knowledge of the posterior to knowledge of the prior), therefore he treats unchangeableness before simplicity.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says in the text: *"And the same is properly and truly simple, because it has neither composition of parts"* etc. For it seems superfluous to say, since *the simple is that of which there is no part*, just as *the composite is said to have parts*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master notes here *the simple as it is proper to God*; and thus it is opposed both to composition and to multiplicity. As to *privation of composition*, he says [God] does not have *multitude of parts*; as to privation of *extraneous multiplicity*, he says not *variety of accidents*; as to privation of *intrinsic multiplicity*, he says not *variety of forms* — such as of *genus, species, and difference*. And in this way the *simple* is simple *truly and properly* — which belongs to God alone[^6].

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked concerning that reason of Augustine: *"For since to be artistic is one thing, to be dull another"* etc. For he proves the soul to be composite *on account of multitude of properties*. But against this: no substance is composed from properties, neither by itself nor with another: therefore from this it is not proved that the soul is composite.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine proves this only *a posteriori*. For the composition of accident to subject and the diversity [of accidents] necessarily presupposes another composition — since, as Boethius says[^7]: *"What is pure form cannot be a subject."* Therefore for something to be the subject of many accidents, there must pre-exist in it an *intrinsic composition*; but the soul receives in itself a multitude of accidents: and therefore it is necessarily inferred *a posteriori* that it is composite — though not from accidents.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *"Good without quality, great without quantity"* etc. For he seems to speak wrongly, since *"from that from which the superior is removed, the inferior is also"*[^8]: therefore if [God] does not have quality, neither does He have goodness. If you say that that goodness is not a species of quality, it is asked: why is *"divine quality"* not said in God just as *"divine goodness"*?

**I respond:** *A solution of some.* Some wish to say that *the name of the genus* is not transferred to divine things — both because it does not signify the thing's completion, as the *species* does; and because it signifies *in concretion to a subject and in dependence*[^9]. But special names connote an effect in the creature; and so God is called *good without quality*.

*Not proven.* But if one wishes[^10] to look, one finds this not to hold. If then it be asked: *how do magnitude and goodness differ in God?* — it must be said that magnitude signifies the divine essence *in the mode of quantity*, goodness *in the mode of quality*: therefore these modes do fall in God[^11]. And again, if it be asked *"what sort of being is God?"*, the answer is: *good and great*.

*The author's solution.* And therefore it must be said that the names of the genera are found in God, but not as they have the *character of genus* — since God is in no genus. And to signify this, Augustine[^12] removes the names of the *nine genera* insofar as they are genera.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: *"If it is worthy that God be said to subsist"*. For it seems sufficiently worthy, since *"the highest nobility is to subsist per se."*

**I respond:** It must be said that the property of *substance* is twofold — namely, *to stand per se* and *to underlie another*. The first is of perfection, the second of imperfection; and therefore by reason of the first it is said [of God] *worthily*[^13], not by reason of the second.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked concerning what Hilary says: *"Not from composite things does God, who is life, subsist"* etc. What is the difference among those differences [i.e., *composite / weak / obscure / disparate*]? If[^14] there is none, he seems to make a *heaping-up of words*.

**I respond:** *Solution 1.* It must be said that some hold[^15] that by those four [terms] *four kinds of composition* are excluded.

(a) The *first* is that of *essence from essential principles*, by reason of which it is said that God is *not from composite things* — that is, *things placed together*.

(b) The *second* is that of *substance from natural principles*, which are *matter and form*; by reason of this he says *neither from weak things* — since matter is subject to privation, which makes both form unstable[^16] and weak, and similarly matter; for *the weak* means *the unstable*.

(c) The *third* is the *composition of a mixture from mixables*, by reason of which he says *neither from obscure things* — since where there is mixture, there is some confusion of forms, and so obscuring.

(d) The *fourth* is the *composition of a living thing from disparate parts* — namely from soul and body; by reason of this he says *neither from disparate parts* — because He is *spirit*.

*Another solution.* It can, however, be said otherwise: that he excludes the same composition by reason of diverse conditions. For for some[^17] principles to constitute something, the principles must be *different*, must be *dependent*, must be *imperfect*, and must also be *dissimilar*[^18]. For if they were altogether conformed and perfect, they could not constitute anything — since *"from two beings in act nothing comes to be"*[^19].

Because, therefore, *different*, they are therefore *composite*, as if *placed with others*; because *dependent*, therefore *weak*; because *imperfect*, therefore *obscure*; because *dissimilar*, therefore *disparate*.

But God cannot be *from different*[^20] *and diverse*, since He is *life by essence*; cannot be *from dependent and weak*, since He is *power by essence*; cannot be *from imperfect and obscure*, since He is *light*; nor can He be *from disparate and dissimilar*, since He is *spirit by essence*.

*Supreme actuality, supreme power, supreme clarity, supreme spirituality* — these do not permit any composition to be in God. Hence from these four conditions four reasons are drawn which prove God[^21] to be most simple.

---

la: Codd. V X *secundum*, et paulo infra cod. T *uniformitatem* loco *unitatem*.

en: Codices V and X read *secundum*, and a little below codex T reads *uniformitatem* in place of *unitatem*.

la: Hoc est, per eminentiam seu eminenter.

en: That is, by eminence or eminently.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *haec*. Mox post *simplicitas* cod. V *erit* loco *est*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *haec*. Shortly after *simplicitas*, codex V reads *erit* in place of *est*.

la: Aristot., I *Poster.* c. 10 (c. 13): *Similiter autem et, si affirmatio est causa ipsius esse, et negatio ipsius non esse.* — Hic codd. inter se non conveniunt; alii ut H K V Y etc. cum ed. 1 habent *est*, quod alii ut A F G I T etc. omittunt et cuius loco Vat. non bene habet *sit*; cod. V voci *negationis* praemittit *erit*. Paulo infra post *simplicitatis* codd. H Y addunt *quam immutabilitatis*.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 10 (c. 13): *"Similarly also, if affirmation is the cause of its being, negation is the cause of its not-being."* — Here the codices do not agree among themselves; some such as H K V Y etc. with ed. 1 have *est*, which others such as A F G I T etc. omit and in whose place the Vatican edition wrongly has *sit*; codex V prefixes *erit* to the word *negationis*. Shortly below, after *simplicitatis*, codices H and Y add *quam immutabilitatis*.

la: Aristot., I *Poster.* c. 2; — in qua propositione fide mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus primum *et*, ac mox post *prius* expunximus repetitum *notius*.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2; — in which proposition, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added the first *et*, and shortly after *prius* we have expunged the repeated *notius*.

la: Vide hic, q. 2.

en: See here, q. 2.

la: Boeth., *Libr. de Trin.* c. 2: *Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum*.

en: Boethius, *On the Trinity* c. 2: *"Form, which is without matter, cannot be a subject."*

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV *Topic.* c. 2, et Petr. Hispan., *Summula*, tract. *de Syllog. topico*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 2, and Peter of Spain, *Summula*, tract *On the Topical Syllogism*.

la: Mendum Vat. *substantiam et indipendentiam* correximus auctoritate mss. et ed. 1; cod. dd *in concretione sicut ad subiectum et dependentiam*. — S. Thom., hic q. 4, a. 3 hoc explicat dicens: *Quantitas habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subiectum; est enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qualitas dispositio substantiae; unde eadem ratione removentur a divina praedicatione secundum rationem generis, sicut removebantur per rationem accidentis*.

en: We have corrected the Vatican error *substantiam et indipendentiam* on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1; codex dd reads *in concretione sicut ad subiectum et dependentiam*. — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 3, explains this by saying: *"Quantity has its own character in comparison to a subject; for quantity is the measure of substance, quality the disposition of substance; whence by the same reasoning they are removed from divine predication according to the character of genus, just as they were removed by reason of being accidents."*

la: Cod. V hic addit *haec*, et paulo post *illud* loco *hoc*. Mox cod. dd *differat* pro *differt*.

en: Codex V here adds *haec*, and a little after has *illud* in place of *hoc*. Shortly after, codex dd reads *differat* for *differt*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Deum*. Paulo infra post *bonus* aliqui codd. ut K. cc ee ff cum edd. 2, 3 *cum* loco *et*, quae lectio, etsi non sit falsa, tamen minus est ad rem, quia in praeposita quaestione terminus *qualis* sumitur sensu largo, quatenus comprehendit omnia Dei attributa.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *Deum*. A little below, after *bonus*, some codices such as K, cc, ee, ff with edd. 2, 3 read *cum* in place of *et* — a reading which, even if not false, is nevertheless less to the point, since in the question proposed the term *qualis* is taken in a broad sense, insofar as it embraces all of God's attributes.

la: Lib. V *de Trin.* c. 8, n. 9. — Pro intelligentia huius dubii notandum, quod hic non agitur de quaestione, utrum Deus sit in aliquo genere (de quo S. Doctor iam supra q. 4 egit), sed de translatione nominum genericorum ad divina sive etiam de modo significandi, quem haec nomina respectu Dei habent. Opinionis hic primo loco positae rationes ponunt S. Thom., hic q. 4, a. 3, et clarius *de Potentia* q. 7, a. 4, ad 2; — Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4, ad 2; — B. Albert., hic a. 31; — Petrus a Tar., hic q. 5; aliique. Secunda opinio est S. Doctoris, quae consistit in duobus, scil. 1.° in eo, quod nomina generum in quantum sunt genera non transferantur; et hoc probant rationes pro prima opinione adductae; 2.° in eo, quod praedicta nomina aliquo modo transferantur, si nempe accipiuntur communiter sive *improprie* (cfr. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2), et hoc non negant auctores pro prima sententia citati. Ex quo patet, S. Doctorem impugnare eos qui contendunt, dicta nomina nullo modo transferri posse.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, c. 8, n. 9. — For understanding of this doubt it is to be noted that the question here is not whether God is in any genus (which the holy Doctor has already treated above q. 4), but [the question is] of the transferring of generic names to divine things, or of the mode of signifying which these names have with respect to God. The reasons for the opinion placed here in the first position are given by St. Thomas (here q. 4, a. 3, and more clearly *On Power* q. 7, a. 4, ad 2); — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4, ad 2; — Bl. Albert, here a. 31; — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5; and others. The second opinion is the holy Doctor's, which consists in two things: namely (1) that the names of the genera, insofar as they are genera, are not transferred (and the reasons adduced for the first opinion prove this); (2) that the said names are transferred in some way, namely if they are taken commonly or *improperly* (cf. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2) — and this is not denied by the authors cited for the first opinion. From which it appears that the holy Doctor is opposing those who contend that the said names cannot be transferred in any way.

la: Ed. 1 addit *substantia*. — De duplici hac substantiae proprietate vide infra d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.

en: Ed. 1 adds *substantia*. — On this twofold property of substance see below d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. *Quia si*, et mox contra vetustiores mss. et ed. 1 omittit *verborum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices, reads *Quia si*, and shortly after, against the older manuscripts and ed. 1, omits *verborum*.

la: Postulantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *volunt* loco *voluerunt*. Dein cod. dd addit *dicere*.

en: At the urging of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *volunt* for *voluerunt*. Then codex dd adds *dicere*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *mutabilem* pro *esse instabilem*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc — though the other codices and ed. 1 resist — reads *mutabilem* in place of *esse instabilem*.

la: Supplevimus *aliqua* ex 1 ed. et omnibus mss., quorum multi tamen mox omittunt *aliquid*.

en: We have supplied *aliqua* from ed. 1 and all the manuscripts, though many of them shortly thereafter omit *aliquid*.

la: Multi codd. cum ed. 1 *informia*, sed falso.

en: Many codices with ed. 1 read *informia*, but wrongly.

la: Aristot., VII *Metaph.* text. 49 (VI, c. 13): *Duo namque sic actu, nunquam sunt unum actu… nam actus separat*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 49 (VI, c. 13): *"For two things thus in act are never one in act… for act separates."*

la: Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *differentibus et*, pro quo cod. cc et edd. 2, 3, 6 habent *dependentibus*. Paulo post Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem mss. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, omittit *dependentibus et*.

en: The older codices with ed. 1 omit *differentibus et*, in place of which codex cc and edd. 2, 3, 6 read *dependentibus*. A little after, the Vatican edition with codex cc — though the other manuscripts with ed. 1 resist — omits *dependentibus et*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut K, VV, ee addunt *esse*. — Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 33. — S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa litt.

en: Some codices such as K, VV, ee add *esse*. — Cf. Bl. Albert, here a. 33. — St. Thomas and Richard [of Mediavilla], here on the text.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 9

title_alt: Distinctio IX — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction IX — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
<!-- page 177 -->

### Distinctio IX.

*De distinctione trium personarum.*

Nunc ad distinctionem trium personarum accedamus. « Teneamus igitur, ut docet Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^1], Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum naturaliter, nec tamen ipsum Patrem esse qui Filius est, nec Filium esse ipsum qui Pater est, nec Spiritum sanctum esse ipsum qui Pater est aut Filius. Una enim est essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, in qua non est aliud Pater, aliud Filius, aliud Spiritus sanctus, quamvis personaliter alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus »[^2].

### Cap. I.

*De coaeternitate Patris et Filii.*

Genitus est enim a Patre Filius, et ideo alius, nec tamen ante fuit Pater quam Filius; coaeternae enim sibi sunt tres personae. Sed contra hoc inquit haereticus, ut refert Ambrosius in libro primo *de Trinitate*[^3]: « Omne quod natum est, principium habet; et ideo, quia Filius est, principium habet et esse coepit; quod haereticorum ore sic dictum est ». « Nam ipse Arius, ut meminit Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^4], dixisse fertur: Si Filius est, natus est; si natus est, erat, quando non erat Filius ».

Qui hoc dicit « non intelligit, etiam *natum* esse de Deo sempiternum esse, ut sit coaeternus Patri Filius, sicut splendor, qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur, coaevus est illi, et esset coaeternus, si ignis esset aeternus[^5] ».

Item: « Si Dei Filius, inquit Augustinus, virtus et sapientia Dei est, nec unquam fuit Deus sine virtute et sapientia, coaeternus est Deo Patri Filius. Dicit autem Apostolus[^6]: *Christum esse Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam*; aut ergo non fuit, quando non fuit Filius, aut aliquando Deus non habuit virtutem et sapientiam, quod dementis est dicere ». Constat enim, quia semper habuit sapientiam, semper ergo habuit Filium.

Eidem quoque Arianicae quaestioni Ambrosius[^7] in hunc modum respondet: « Ego, inquam, Filium esse natum confiteor; quod reliquum est impietatis hor-

<!-- page 178 -->

resco ». Scriptum est enim in veteri Testamento[^8], ut vel unum e pluribus dicam: *Ante me non fuit alius Deus, et post me non erit.* Quis ergo hoc dicit? Pater an Filius? Si Filius, *ante me*, inquit, *non fuit alius Deus*; si Pater, *post me*, inquit, *non erit*: hic priorem, ille posteriorem non habet. Invicem enim in se et Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre cognoscitur[^9]. Cum enim Patrem dixeris, eius etiam Filium designasti, quia nemo ipse sibi pater est; cum Filium nominas, etiam Patrem fateris, quia nemo ipse sibi filius est. Itaque nec Filius sine Patre, nec Pater potest esse sine Filio: semper igitur Pater, semper et Filius est ».

Item: « Dic, inquam, mihi haeretice, fuitne, quando omnipotens Deus Pater non erat, et Deus erat? Nam si Pater esse coepit, Deus ergo primo erat et postea Pater factus est. Quomodo ergo immutabilis Deus est? Si enim ante Deus, postea Pater fuit, utique generationis accessione mutatus est ». « Sed avertat Deus hanc amentiam[^10] ».

### Cap. III.

*De ineffabili et intelligibili generationis modo.*

« Sed quaeris a me, inquit Ambrosius[^11], quomodo, si Filius sit, non priorem habeat Patrem? Quaero item abs te, quando vel quomodo Filium putes esse generatum? Mihi enim impossibile est generationis scire secretum. Mens deficit, vox silet, non mea tantum, sed et Angelorum; supra potestates et supra Angelos et supra Cherubim et supra Seraphim et supra omnem sensum est, quia scriptum est[^12]: *Pax Christi supra omnem sensum est.* Et si pax Christi supra omnem sensum est, quomodo non est supra omnem sensum tanta generatio? » « Tu ergo ori manum admove; scrutari non licet superna mysteria. Licet scire, quod natus sit, non licet discutere, quomodo natus sit. Illud negare mihi non licet, hoc quaerere metus est ». Ineffabilis enim est illa generatio; unde Isaias[^13]: *Generationem eius quis enarrabit?*

Quidam tamen de ingenio suo praesumentes dicunt, illam generationem posse intelligi et alia huiusmodi, inhaerentes illi auctoritati Hieronymi super *Ecclesiasten*[^14]: « In sacris Scripturis *quis* saepissime non pro impossibili, sed pro difficili ponitur, ut ibi: *Generationem eius quis enarrabit*? » Sed hoc non dixit[^15] Hieronymus ideo, quod generatio Filii aeterna plene intelligi vel explicari possit a quoquam mortalium, sed quia de ea aliquid intelligi vel dici potest. Quidam tamen hoc accipiunt dictum de temporali Christi generatione.

*Utrum debeat dici: semper gignitur Deus, vel semper genitus est.*

Hic quaeri potest, cum generatio Filii a Patre nec principium habeat nec finem, quia aeterna est, utrum debeat dici: Filius semper gignitur, vel semper genitus est, vel semper gignetur. De hoc Gregorius super *Iob*[^16] ait: « Dominus Deus Iesus in eo, quod virtus et sapientia Dei est, de Patre ante tempora natus est, vel potius, quia nec coepit nasci nec desiit, dicamus verius semper natus; non autem possumus dicere semper nascitur, ne imperfectus esse videatur. At vero, ut aeternus designari valeat et perfectus, semper dicamus et *natus*, quatenus et *natus* ad perfectionem pertineat et *semper* ad aeternitatem; quamvis per hoc ipsum, quod perfectum dicimus, multum ab illius veritatis expressione deviamus, quia quod factum non est, non potest dici proprie perfectum »; sed balbutiendo, ut possumus, excelsa Dei resonamus. « Et Dominus, nostrae infirmitatis verbis condescendens, *Estote*, inquit, *perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est*[^17] ». Super illum locum etiam Psalmi: *Ego hodie genui te*, de hac generatione Filii ita loquitur Augustinus[^18]: « Quamquam per hoc, quod dicit *hodie*, possit etiam intelligi dies ille, quo Christus secundum hominem natus est; tamen quia *hodie* praesentiam significat, atque in aeternitate neque praeteritum quidquam est, quasi esse desierit, neque futurum, quasi nondum sit, sed praesens tantum, quia quidquid aeternum est, semper est; divinius tamen accipitur de sempiterna generatione sapientiae Dei[^19] ». Ecce, his verbis ostendit Augustinus, quod generatio Filii semper est nec praeterit nec futura est, quia aeterna est. Ideo enim[^20] dixit *genui*, ne novum putaretur, scilicet ne videretur incepisse; *hodie* dixit, ne praeterita generatio videretur. « Ex his ergo verbis Prophetae, ut ait Ioannes Chrysostomus[^21], nihil aliud manifestatur, nisi quia ex ipsa essentia Patris semper genitus est Filius ».

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Origenes vero super *Ieremiam*[^22] dicit, quod Filius semper generatur a Patre, his verbis: « Salvator noster est sapientia Dei; sapientia vero splendor est aeternae lucis: Salvator ergo noster est splendor claritatis. Splendor autem non semel nascitur et desinit, sed quoties ortum fuerit lumen, ex quo splendor oritur, toties oritur etiam splendor claritatis: sic ergo Salvator semper nascitur. Unde ait in libro *Sapientis*[^23]: *Ante omnes colles generat me Dominus*, non, ut quidam male legunt, *generavit* ». His verbis aperte ostendit Origenes sane dici posse et debere: *Filius semper nascitur*, quod videtur contrarium illi verbo Gregorii praemisso, scilicet, « non possumus dicere: semper nascitur ».

Sed ne tanti auctores sibi contradicere in re tanta videantur, illa[^24] verba Gregorii benigne interpretemur. « Dominus, inquit, Iesus ante tempora de Patre natus est, vel potius, quia nec coepit nasci nec desiit, dicamus verius: semper natus ». Sed quomodo verius dicitur hoc, scilicet, quod Filius semper natus est, quam illud, scilicet quod de Patre ante tempora natus est? Illud enim sincera et catholica fides tenet ac praedicat ut istud. Quare ergo ait: « Dicamus verius », cum utrumque pariter sit verum, nisi[^25] quia volebat intelligi, hoc ad maiorem evidentiam et expressionem veritatis dici quam illud? His etenim verbis omnis calumniandi versutiis haereticis obstruitur aditus, quibus Christi secundum deitatem generatio sine initio et sine fine esse ac perfecta monstratur. Non autem adeo aperte[^26] manifestatur veritas, cum dicitur: *Filius ante tempora genitus est de Patre*, vel *Filius semper nascitur de Patre*. Et ideo dicit Gregorius, quod « non possumus dicere, semper nascitur »; non, inquam, ita convenienter, non ita congrue ad explanationem veritatis; potest tamen dici, si sane intelligatur. « Semper enim nascitur Filius de Patre », ut ait Origenes; non quod quotidie iteretur illa generatio, sed quia semper est. Semper ergo nascitur, id est, nativitas eius sempiterna est.

Hilarius quoque dicit, Filium nasci ex Patre, in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^27] his verbis: « Vivens Deus et naturae aeternae viventis potestas est; et quod cum sacramento scientiae suae ex eo nascitur, non potuit aliud esse quam vivens. Nam cum ait: *Sicut misit me vivens Pater, et ego vivo propter Patrem*, docuit vitam in se per viventem Patrem inesse ». Ecce hic habes, quia[^28] Filius nascitur ex Patre. Item in eodem[^29]: « Cum dicit Christus: *Sicut Pater habet vitam in se, sic et Filio dedit vitam habere in semetipso*, omnia viva sua ex vivente testatus est. Quod autem ex vivo vivum natum est habet nativitatis perfectum sine novitate naturae. Non enim novum est quod ex vivo generatur in vivum, quia nec ex nihilo est; et vita, quae nativitatem sumit ex vita, necesse est per naturae unitatem et perfectae nativitatis sacramentum, ut et[^30] in vivente vivat et in se habeat vitam viventem ». Ecce et hic habes, quia generatur ex vivo vivens Filius. Item in eodem[^31]: « In Deo totum quod est vivit; Deus enim vita est, et ex vita non potest quidquam esse nisi vivum; neque ex derivatione, sed ex virtute nativitas est. Ac sic, dum totum quod est vivit, et dum totum quod ex eo nascitur virtus est, habet nativitatem Filius, non demutationem ». Et hic dicit, quia nascitur. Item in nono libro *de Trinitate*[^32]: « Donat Pater Filio tantum esse, quantum est ipse, cui innascibilitatis esse imaginem sacramento nativitatis impertit, quem ex se in forma sua generat ». Hic dicit, quia generat Pater Filium.

Dicamus ergo, Filium natum de Patre ante tempora et semper nasci de Patre, sed congruentius semper natum; et eundem fateamur ab aeterno esse et Patri coaeternum, id est auctori. Pater enim generatione auctor Filii est, ut in sequenti[^33] ostendetur. Ut ergo Pater est aeternus, ita et Filius aeternus est, sed Pater sine auctore, Filius vero non, quia Pater innascibilis, Filius natus. Et ut ait Hilarius in duodecimo libro *de Trinitate*[^34]: « Aliud est sine auctore semper esse aeternum, aliud Patri, id est auctori, esse coaeternum. Ubi autem Pater auctor est, ibi et nativitas est; quia sicut nativitas ab auctore est, ita et ab aeterno auctore aeterna nativitas est. Omne autem, quod semper est, etiam aeternum est; sed tamen non omne, quod aeternum est etiam innatum est; quia quod ab aeterno nascitur habet aeternum esse, quod natum est. Quod autem non natum est, id cum aeternitate non natum est; quod vero ex aeterno natum est, id, si non aeternum natum est, iam non erit et Pater auctor aeternus. Si quid ergo ei, qui ab aeterno Patre natus est, ex aeternitate defuerit, id ipsum auctori non est ambiguum defuisse, quia si gignenti est infinitum gignere, et nascenti etiam est infinitum nasci. Medium enim quid inter nativitatem Dei Filii et generationem Dei Patris nec ratio[^35] nec sensus admittit, quia et in generatione nativitas est, et in nativitate generatio est, quia sine utroque neutrum est: utrumque ergo sine intervallo sui est ».

### Cap. V.

*De obiectionibus haereticorum nitentium probare, Filium non esse coaeternum Patri.*

« Sed inquiet haereticus: omne quod natum est, non fuit semper, quia in id natum est, ut esset. Nemo ambigit, quin ea[^36] quae in rebus humanis nata sunt, aliquando non fuerint. Sed aliud est ex eo nasci, quod semper non fuit, aliud ex eo natum esse, quod semper est. Ibi nec semper fuit, qui pater est, nec semper pater est; et qui non semper pater est, non semper genuit. Ubi autem semper pater est, semper filius est. Quod si semper Deo Patri proprium est, quod semper est Pater, necesse est, semper Filio proprium esse, quod semper est Filius. Quomodo ergo cadet in intelligentiam nostram, ut non fuerit semper cui proprium est, semper esse quod natum est[^37]? Natum ergo unigenitum Deum confitemur, sed natum ante tempora, nec ante esse quam natum, nec ante natum quam esse; quia nasci quod erat, iam non nasci est, sed se ipsum demutare nascendo. Hoc autem humanum sensum et intelligentiam mundi excedit. Non hoc capit ratio humanae intelligentiae, sed prudentiae fidelis pro-

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### Distinction IX.

*On the distinction of the three persons.*

Now let us approach the distinction of the three persons. "Let us therefore hold, as Augustine teaches in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^1], that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are by nature one God, yet that the Father himself is not the one who is the Son, nor the Son the one who is the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the one who is the Father or the Son. For there is one essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, although personally the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another"[^2].

### Chap. I.

*On the coeternity of the Father and the Son.*

For the Son is begotten of the Father, and therefore another, yet the Father did not exist before the Son; for the three persons are coeternal to one another. But against this the heretic says, as Ambrose reports in the first book *On the Trinity*[^3]: "Everything that is born has a beginning; and therefore, because he is the Son, he has a beginning and began to be; which has been said in this way from the mouth of heretics." "For Arius himself, as Augustine recalls in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^4], is said to have said: If he is a Son, he has been born; if he has been born, there was [a time] when the Son was not."

He who says this "does not understand that even *to be born* is, with respect to God, to be eternal, so that the Son is coeternal with the Father, just as the splendor which is begotten from fire and is diffused is coeval with it, and would be coeternal if the fire were eternal[^5]."

Likewise: "If the Son of God, says Augustine, is the power and wisdom of God, and God never was without power and wisdom, then the Son is coeternal with God the Father. For the Apostle says[^6]: *that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God*; therefore either he did not exist when the Son did not exist, or at some time God did not have power and wisdom, which it is mad to say." For it is established that he always had wisdom; therefore he always had a Son.

To the same Arian question Ambrose[^7] responds in this manner: "I, I say, confess that the Son has been born; what remains of impiety I shud-

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der at." For it is written in the Old Testament[^8], that I may speak of one out of many: *Before me there was no other God, and after me there shall be none.* Who, then, says this? The Father or the Son? If the Son, *before me*, he says, *there was no other God*; if the Father, *after me*, he says, *there shall be none*: this one has no prior, that one no posterior. For mutually in themselves both the Father is known in the Son and the Son in the Father[^9]. For when you say "Father," you have also designated his Son, because no one is his own father; when you name the Son, you also confess the Father, because no one is his own son. Therefore neither can the Son be without the Father, nor the Father without the Son: therefore always the Father, and always the Son also is."

Likewise: "Tell me, I say, heretic, was there a time when omnipotent God was not Father and yet was God? For if he began to be Father, then God first existed and afterwards was made Father. How then is God unchangeable? For if he was first God and afterwards Father, he was certainly changed by the accession of generation." "But may God turn away this madness[^10]."

### Chap. III.

*On the ineffable and intelligible mode of generation.*

"But you ask of me, says Ambrose[^11], how, if he is a Son, he does not have a Father prior to him? I in turn ask of you, when or how do you think the Son was generated? For to me it is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent — not mine only, but the Angels' too; it is above the powers and above the Angels and above the Cherubim and above the Seraphim and above all sense, because it is written[^12]: *The peace of Christ is above all sense.* And if the peace of Christ is above all sense, how is so great a generation not above all sense?" "You therefore, put your hand to your mouth; it is not permitted to scrutinize heavenly mysteries. It is permitted to know that he was born; it is not permitted to discuss how he was born. To deny that is not permitted me; to inquire into this is fearful." For that generation is ineffable; whence Isaiah[^13]: *Who shall declare his generation?*

Yet some, presuming on their own wit, say that that generation can be understood, and other things of this sort, clinging to that authority of Jerome on *Ecclesiastes*[^14]: "In the sacred Scriptures *quis* ('who') is very often put not for the impossible but for the difficult, as there: *Who shall declare his generation*?" But Jerome did not say[^15] this on the ground that the eternal generation of the Son could be fully understood or explained by any mortal, but because something can be understood or said of it. Yet some take this as said of the temporal generation of Christ.

*Whether it ought to be said: God is always being begotten, or has always been begotten.*

Here it can be asked, since the generation of the Son from the Father has neither beginning nor end, because it is eternal, whether it ought to be said: the Son is always being begotten, or has always been begotten, or shall always be begotten. About this Gregory on *Job*[^16] says: "The Lord God Jesus, in that he is the power and wisdom of God, was born from the Father before time; or rather, because he neither began to be born nor ceased, let us say more truly *always born*; we cannot, however, say *always being born*, lest he seem to be imperfect. But indeed, so that he may be designated both eternal and perfect, let us say both *always* and *born*, in that *born* pertains to perfection and *always* to eternity; although by this very thing, that we say 'perfect,' we deviate much from the expression of that truth, because what has not been made cannot properly be called perfect"; but stammering, as we can, we re-echo the lofty things of God. "And the Lord, condescending to the words of our infirmity, says: *Be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect*[^17]." Upon that place also of the Psalm: *Today I have begotten thee*, Augustine[^18] speaks thus of this generation of the Son: "Although by this, that he says *today*, that day too can be understood on which Christ was born according to man; yet because *today* signifies presence, and in eternity nothing is past, as though it had ceased to be, nor future, as though it were not yet, but only present, because whatever is eternal always is; yet it is taken more divinely of the eternal generation of the wisdom of God[^19]." Behold, by these words Augustine shows that the generation of the Son always is, and neither passes away nor is to come, because it is eternal. For he said *I have begotten*[^20] lest it be thought new, that is, lest it should seem to have begun; he said *today* lest the generation should seem past. "From these words of the Prophet therefore, as John Chrysostom[^21] says, nothing else is manifested than that from the very essence of the Father the Son is always begotten."

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Origen, however, on *Jeremiah*[^22] says that the Son is always being generated from the Father, in these words: "Our Saviour is the wisdom of God; but wisdom is the splendor of the eternal light: therefore our Saviour is the splendor of brightness. The splendor, however, is not born once and ceases, but as often as the light has risen from which the splendor arises, so often does the splendor of brightness also arise: so therefore the Saviour is always being born. Whence he says in the book of the *Wise One*[^23]: *Before all the hills the Lord begets me*, not, as some badly read, *has begotten*." By these words Origen plainly shows that it can rightly be said and must be said: *The Son is always being born*, which seems contrary to that word of Gregory set forth above, namely: "We cannot say: he is always being born."

But lest such great authors should seem to contradict one another in so great a matter, let us interpret those[^24] words of Gregory benignly. "The Lord Jesus, he says, was born from the Father before time; or rather, because he neither began to be born nor ceased, let us say more truly: *always born*." But how is this said more truly, namely that the Son was always born, than that, namely that he was born of the Father before time? For the sincere and catholic faith holds and preaches the former as it does the latter. Why then does he say "Let us say more truly," since both are equally true, unless[^25] because he wished it to be understood that this is said for the greater evidence and expression of the truth than that? For by these words every approach of calumniating wiles is closed to the heretics, by which the generation of Christ according to his deity is shown to be without beginning and without end, and perfect. But the truth is not manifested so plainly[^26] when it is said: *The Son was generated of the Father before time*, or *The Son is always being born of the Father.* And therefore Gregory says, "we cannot say, he is always being born"; not, I say, so suitably, not so congruously to the explanation of the truth; yet it can be said, if rightly understood. "For the Son is always being born of the Father," as Origen says; not that that generation is daily repeated, but because it always is. He is always therefore being born, that is, his nativity is eternal.

Hilary also says that the Son is born from the Father, in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^27] in these words: "Living God is also the power of an eternal living nature; and what is born from him with the sacrament of his own knowledge cannot have been other than living. For when he says: *As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father*, he taught that life is in himself through the living Father." Behold here you have that[^28] the Son is born from the Father. Likewise in the same book[^29]: "When Christ says: *As the Father has life in himself, so also to the Son he has given to have life in himself*, he has testified that all his living things are from the Living One. But what is born living from a living one has the perfection of nativity without novelty of nature. For it is not new that what is generated from the living into the living, since it is not from nothing; and the life which takes its nativity from life must, through the unity of nature and the sacrament of perfect nativity, both[^30] live in the Living One and have living life in itself." Behold here also you have that a living Son is generated from a living one. Likewise in the same book[^31]: "In God whatever is, lives; for God is life, and from life nothing can be except living; and the nativity is not by derivation but by power. And so, while everything which is, lives, and while everything which is born from him is power, the Son has nativity, not transformation." And here he says that he is born. Likewise in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^32]: "The Father gives to the Son to be as much as he himself is, to whom by the sacrament of nativity he imparts the image of unbegotten being, whom he generates from himself in his own form." Here he says that the Father generates the Son.

Let us say therefore that the Son was born from the Father before time and is always being born from the Father, but more congruously *always born*; and let us confess that he is from eternity and coeternal with the Father, that is, with the author. For the Father by generation is the author of the Son, as shall be shown in what follows[^33]. As therefore the Father is eternal, so also the Son is eternal, but the Father is without author, the Son not so, because the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten. And as Hilary says in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*[^34]: "It is one thing to be eternal without author, another to be coeternal to the Father, that is, to the author. But where the Father is author, there nativity also is; because as nativity is from the author, so also from an eternal author nativity is eternal. But everything which always is, is also eternal; yet not everything which is eternal is also unbegotten; because what is born from eternity has eternal being, in that it has been born. But what has not been born, is unborn together with eternity; and what is born from eternity, if it is not eternally born, the Father will no longer be also the eternal author. If therefore anything is lacking from eternity to him who is born of the eternal Father, it is not doubtful that the same thing is lacking to the author, because if it is infinite for the begetter to beget, for the begotten also it is infinite to be born. For neither reason[^35] nor sense admits any middle between the nativity of God the Son and the generation of God the Father, because both in generation there is nativity, and in nativity there is generation, since without either neither exists: therefore each is without interval of itself."

### Chap. V.

*On the objections of the heretics striving to prove that the Son is not coeternal with the Father.*

"But the heretic will say: Everything which has been born was not always, because it was born in order that it might be. No one doubts that those things[^36] which in human affairs have been born at some time were not. But it is one thing to be born from that which always was not, another to have been born from that which always is. There neither was he always who is father, nor is he always father; and he who is not always father has not always begotten. But where he is always father, there always is the son. But if it is always proper to God the Father that he is always Father, it must also always be proper to the Son that he is always Son. How then will it fall under our understanding, that he was not always to whom it is proper always to be that which has been born[^37]? Therefore we confess God the only-begotten as begotten, but begotten before time, neither being before being born nor born before being; because to be born what one already was is no longer to be born, but to change oneself in being born. But this exceeds human sense and the understanding of the world. Reason of human intelligence does not grasp this, but [it does grasp] of faithful prudence pro-

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la: Cap. I. n. 5. — In principio distinctionis omnes codd. omittunt *trium*.

en: Chapter I, n. 5. — At the beginning of the distinction all the codices omit *trium*.

la: Vat. huic capitulo addit verba sequentis cap.: *Genitus est* usque *alius*.

en: The Vatican edition adds to this chapter the words of the following chapter: *Genitus est* through *alius*.

la: Cap. II. n. 73. — Solummodo Vat. et edd. 1, 6, 8 citant hunc librum sub nomine *de Fide ad Gratianum*; cfr. supra Dist. II. c. 4. In textu contra originale et codd. nostros, Vat. cum ceteris edd. post *Filius* addit *natus*.

en: Chapter II, n. 73. — Only the Vatican edition and editions 1, 6, 8 cite this book under the name *On Faith to Gratian*; cf. above, Dist. II, c. 4. In the text, against the original and our codices, the Vatican edition with the other editions adds *natus* after *Filius*.

la: Cap. I. n. 1, unde et duae auctoritates, quae sequuntur, sumtae sunt. In primo textu solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 cum originali Augustini ante *quando* addunt *tempus*. Sed notum adagium Arii est: *Erat quando non erat* (ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν).

en: Chapter I, n. 1, whence also the two authorities that follow are taken. In the first text only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6, with Augustine's original, add *tempus* before *quando*. But the well-known adage of Arius is: *There was [a time] when he was not* (ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν).

la: Sola Vat. perperam omittit *aeternus*.

en: The Vatican edition alone wrongly omits *aeternus*.

la: I. Cor. 1, 24; sed in Vulgata et Augustino deest *esse*. Paulo ante post *coaeternus* Vat. et edd. 4, 9 addunt *ergo*.

en: 1 Cor. 1, 24; but in the Vulgate and in Augustine *esse* is absent. A little before, after *coaeternus*, the Vatican edition and editions 4, 9 add *ergo*.

la: Loc. cit. — Ex eodem libro c. 8. n. 88 proximus huius capituli locus sumtus est, secundus et tertius ex c. 9. n. 58 et 59, quartus ex eodem cap. n. 60.

en: Loc. cit. — From the same book, c. 8, n. 88, the next passage of this chapter is taken; the second and third from c. 9, nn. 58 and 59; the fourth from the same chapter, n. 60.

en: Isaiah 43, 10.

la: Respicitur illud Ioan. 14, 9. et 10. — Paulo supra post *priorem* Vat. contra originale, codd. et edd. 1, 8 adiicit *et*.

en: This refers to John 14, 9 and 10. — A little above, after *priorem*, the Vatican edition, against the original, the codices, and editions 1, 8, adds *et*.

la: Codd. CE et A (in margine) cum edd. 1, 8 hic addunt: *quia semper habuit sapientiam, semper habuit Filium*, quae verba, quia non levi carent interpolationis suspicione, in textum non recepimus.

en: Codices CE and A (in the margin) with editions 1, 8 here add: *quia semper habuit sapientiam, semper habuit Filium* ("because he always had wisdom, he always had a Son"), which words, because they are not free from a not-light suspicion of interpolation, we have not received into the text.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide ad Gratian.* c. 10. n. 64. et 65. — In principio huius loci sola Vat. habet *habet* pro *habeat*. Mox in codd. BCDE et ed. 1 deest *quando vel*, quod tamen est in originali.

en: Book I *On Faith to Gratian*, c. 10, nn. 64 and 65. — At the beginning of this passage only the Vatican edition has *habet* for *habeat*. Soon after, in codices BCDE and edition 1, *quando vel* is missing, which is nevertheless in the original.

la: Philip. 4, 7. Verba, quae infra sequuntur: *ori manum admove* et *scrutari non licet*, respiciunt Eccli. 5, 14. et 3, 22.

en: Philippians 4, 7. The words which follow below, *ori manum admove* ("put your hand to your mouth") and *scrutari non licet* ("it is not permitted to scrutinize"), refer to Sirach 5, 14 and 3, 22.

en: Isaiah 53, 8.

la: Cap. 3.

en: Chapter 3.

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. *dicit*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few other editions [reads] *dicit*.

la: Libr. XXIX. *Moral.* c. 1. in principio. Etiam verba, quae sequuntur post *resonamus*, ibidem inveniuntur. In principio primi loci codd. ABDE et edd. 1, 8 omittunt *Iesus*.

en: Book XXIX of the *Moralia*, c. 1, at the beginning. Likewise the words which follow after *resonamus* are found in the same place. At the beginning of the first passage, codices ABDE and editions 1, 8 omit *Iesus*.

la: Matth. 5, 48. — Paulo ante Vat. et edd. 3, 4, 7, 9 *resonemus* pro *resonamus*.

en: Matthew 5, 48. — A little before, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, 7, 9 [read] *resonemus* for *resonamus*.

la: *Expos. in Psalm.* 2. v. 6. — Paulo ante Vat. perperam *Psalmista*. Eadem Vat. et ed. 4 omittunt *etiam* ante *intelligi*.

en: *Exposition on Psalm* 2, v. 6. — A little before, the Vatican edition wrongly [reads] *Psalmista*. The same Vatican edition and edition 4 omit *etiam* before *intelligi*.

la: Codd. ACE ad marginem et edd. 1, 5, 9 in textu haec adiiciunt: *Unde etiam Augustinus in libro LXXXIII quaest. de semper nato (q. 37.) disserens ait: melior est natus, quam qui semper nascitur, quia qui semper nascitur nondum natus et nunquam natus est aut natus erit, si semper nascitur. Aliud est enim nasci, aliud natum esse, ac per hoc nunquam Filius est, si nunquam natus est; Filius autem est, quia natus, et semper Filius, quia aeternus, semper ergo natus.*

en: Codices ACE in the margin and editions 1, 5, 9 in the text add the following: *Whence also Augustine in his book of the 83 Questions, treating of "always born" (q. 37), says: He who is born is better than he who is always being born, because he who is always being born is not yet born and never has been or will be born, if he is always being born. For it is one thing to be born, another to have been born, and through this he is never the Son if he never has been born; but he is the Son because he has been born, and always the Son because eternal, therefore always born.*

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittit *enim*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, omits *enim*.

la: *Homil.* 2. in *Epist. ad Hebr.* n. 3.

en: *Homily* 2 on the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, n. 3.

la: *Homil.* II. circa finem, sed non paucis mutatis.

en: *Homily* II, near the end, but with not a few alterations.

la: Prov. 8, 25 secundum Septuag.; Vulgata: *ante colles ego parturiebar*. — Aliquae edd. sic citant: *in libro Sapientiae* pro *Sapientis*, cui errori etiam codd. favent; ed. 9 inde ait *in Prov. 8. Sapientia*.

en: Proverbs 8, 25 according to the Septuagint; the Vulgate has: *before the hills I was being brought forth*. — Some editions cite thus: *in the book of Wisdom* (*Sapientiae*) instead of *of the Wise One* (*Sapientis*), an error which the codices also favor; edition 9 has *in Prov. 8. Sapientia*.

la: Sola Vat. omittit *illa*.

en: The Vatican edition alone omits *illa*.

la: Mss. BCE addunt *forte*.

en: Manuscripts BCE add *forte* ("perhaps").

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 9 superflue addunt *semper*; codd. BC omisso *aperte* legunt *semper*. Immediate post cod. D et edd. 1, 8 *monstratur* pro *manifestatur*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 9 superfluously add *semper*; codices BC, with *aperte* omitted, read *semper*. Immediately after, codex D and editions 1, 8 [read] *monstratur* for *manifestatur*.

la: Num. 27. — Textus Scripturae, ab Hilario citatus, est Ioan. 6, 58, ubi Hilarius ponit *per Patrem* loco *propter Patrem*, quod habet Vulgata.

en: Number 27. — The text of Scripture cited by Hilary is John 6, 58, where Hilary puts *per Patrem* ("through the Father") in place of *propter Patrem* ("on account of the Father"), which the Vulgate has.

la: Codd. *quod* loco *quia*. Postea cod. D et edd. 1, 8 *de Patre* loco *ex Patre*.

en: The codices [read] *quod* in place of *quia*. Afterward codex D and editions 1, 8 [read] *de Patre* in place of *ex Patre*.

la: Ibid. — Textus Scripturae est Ioan. 5, 26, ubi Vulgata et edd. 1, 2, 5, 9 *semetipso* pro *se*. Deinde post *ex vivente* cod. D addit glossema *Patre*, et cod. A omnino *vitam suam* pro *omnia viva sua*.

en: Ibid. — The text of Scripture is John 5, 26, where the Vulgate and editions 1, 2, 5, 9 [read] *semetipso* for *se*. Then after *ex vivente* codex D adds the gloss *Patre*, and codex A has altogether *vitam suam* for *omnia viva sua*.

la: Edd. 1, 8 omittunt *et*, quod ceterae auctoritates nostrae cum Hilario habent; mox eadem particula *et* post *Ecce* omittitur a cod. D et ed. 8.

en: Editions 1, 8 omit *et*, which our other authorities together with Hilary have; soon the same particle *et* after *Ecce* is omitted by codex D and edition 8.

la: Loc. cit. n. 28. — Codd. CDE addunt *Hilarius*, et CE prosequuntur: *Attende quod totum* pro *In Deo totum*. Deinde edd. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 contra originale et male legunt *ex virtute nativitatis* pro *ex virtute nativitas*. Immediate post Vat. cum pluribus edd. mendose legit *si* pro *sic*, quod habetur in originali et edd. 5, 6, 8, 9.

en: Loc. cit., n. 28. — Codices CDE add *Hilarius*, and CE continue: *Attend that the whole* (*Attende quod totum*) for *In God the whole* (*In Deo totum*). Then editions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 against the original wrongly read *ex virtute nativitatis* for *ex virtute nativitas*. Immediately after, the Vatican edition with several editions faultily reads *si* for *sic*, which is held in the original and in editions 5, 6, 8, 9.

la: Num. 54, ubi contra codd., edd. 5, 9 et originale ceterae edd. habent *impartit* pro *impertit*. Deinde ed. Maurin. Hilarii legit *in formam suam* pro *in forma sua*.

en: Number 54, where against the codices, editions 5 and 9, and the original, the other editions have *impartit* for *impertit*. Then the Maurinist edition of Hilary reads *in formam suam* for *in forma sua*.

la: Immediate post, et Dist. XV. circa finem.

en: Immediately after, and Dist. XV, near the end.

la: Num. 21. — In hoc textu circa medium pro *ex aeterno* edd. 1, 8 non bene *ab aeterno*, et paulo post codd. DE *qui Pater* pro *et Pater*.

en: Number 21. — In this text, about the middle, for *ex aeterno* editions 1, 8 not well [read] *ab aeterno*, and a little after, codices DE [read] *qui Pater* for *et Pater*.

la: Codd. et plurimae edd. contra originale et Vat. omittunt *nec ratio*; et deinde ante *in generatione* Vat. cum paucis edd. omittit *et*.

en: The codices and most editions, against the original and the Vatican edition, omit *nec ratio*; and then before *in generatione* the Vatican edition with a few editions omits *et*.

la: In codd. et Hilario deest *ea*. — Paulo post, ante *ex eo natum* Vat. cum paucis edd. *est*.

en: In the codices and in Hilary *ea* is absent. — A little after, before *ex eo natum*, the Vatican edition with a few editions has *est*.

la: Apud Hilar. (ed. Maurin.) *natus est*, ubi in calce dicitur, plures codd. lectionem *natum* exhibere, quam mss. nostri et edd. habent. — Mox codd. CDE post *iam non* addunt *tantum*.

en: In Hilary (Maurinist edition) [the reading is] *natus est*, where it is said in the footnote that several codices exhibit the reading *natum*, which our manuscripts and editions have. — Soon codices CDE after *iam non* add *tantum*.


title: Dist. 9, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem IX — Divisio textus

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction IX — Division of the text

source_text:
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### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IX.

*De proprietatibus, quae respiciunt personas, et quidem de emanatione generationis.*

**Nunc ad distinctionem personarum accedamus** etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de proprietatibus, quae respiciunt essentiam. Hic agit de his, quae respiciunt personas; et haec pars habet duas partes. Quia enim distinctio personarum attenditur secundum duplicem emanationem, scilicet generationis et processionis, ideo primo agit de generatione, secundo vero de processione, infra distinctione decima: **Nunc vero post Filii aeternitatem de Spiritu sancto** etc.

Item, prima pars habet duas partes: in prima ostendit, quid de generatione Filii est sentiendum, secundo ex incidenti, quo sermone est ipsa exprimenda, ibi: **Hic quaeri potest, cum generatio Filii a Patre** etc.

Prima iterum pars habet quatuor partes[^1]. Primo proponit veritatem, quae est a catholicis retinenda, scilicet quod generans et genitus sunt per generationem distincti et coaeterni, ita quod generatio est distinctiva et aeterna. In secunda contra hoc opponit per oppositionem haereticorum, ibi: **Sed contra hoc inquit haereticus.** In tertia determinat, contra arguendo per rationes catholicorum Doctorum Augustini et Ambrosii, ibi: **Qui hoc dicit non intelligit, etiam natum esse** etc. In quarta et ultima respondet, compescendo inquisitionem superfluam haereticorum et etiam catholicorum superborum, ibi: **Sed quaeris a me, inquit Ambrosius**, ubi ostendit quod imperscrutabile[^2] est sacramentum generationis.

**Hic quaeri potest, cum generatio Filii a Patre** etc. Haec est secunda pars huius distinctionis, in qua Magister determinat, quo sermone generationis aeternitas congruentius exprimatur; et haec pars habet quatuor partes. In prima ponit doctorum apparentem controversiam. Nam quidam dicunt, eam debere exprimi per verba[^3] praeteriti temporis, alii, per verba praesentis. In secunda praedictam controversiam reducit ad concordantiam, ibi: **Sed ne tanti auctores in re tanta sibi contradicere videantur.** In tertia per verba Hilarii confirmat responsionem suam, ne videatur dictis Origenis inniti, ibi: **Hilarius quoque dicit, Filium nasci ex Patre** etc. In quarta concludit summatim, quid dicendum sit[^4] sive quomodo loquendum et quomodo etiam de generatione aeterna sentiendum, ibi: **Dicamus ergo Filium natum de Patre**, ubi confirmat veritatem per auctoritatem Hilarii, per quam etiam solvit obiectionem haeretici.

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### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicit Magister de generatione aeterna, in praesenti distinctione quatuor principaliter quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponenda generatio.

*Secundo*, dato quod sic, utrum generatio in divinis sit[^5] personarum distinctiva.

*Tertio* quaeritur, utrum illa generatio sit aeterna.

*Quarto* et ultimo quaeritur, utrum illa generatio sit terminata.

---

english:
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### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IX.

*On the properties which regard the persons, and indeed on the emanation of generation.*

**Now let us approach the distinction of the persons** etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the properties which regard the essence. Here he treats of those which regard the persons; and this part has two parts. For since the distinction of the persons is considered according to a twofold emanation, namely that of generation and of procession, therefore he first treats of generation, and secondly of procession, below in the tenth distinction: **But now, after the eternity of the Son, [let us treat] of the Holy Spirit** etc.

Again, the first part has two parts: in the first he shows what is to be held concerning the generation of the Son, and secondly, by way of an incidental matter, by what manner of speech it is to be expressed, at the place: **Here it may be asked, since the generation of the Son from the Father** etc.

The first part again has four parts[^1]. First, he sets forth the truth which is to be held by Catholics, namely that the one generating and the one generated are by generation distinct and coeternal, so that generation is distinctive and eternal. In the second, he objects against this through the opposition of heretics, at the place: **But against this the heretic says.** In the third he determines [the matter], arguing against [them] by the reasons of the Catholic Doctors Augustine and Ambrose, at the place: **He who says this does not understand that to be born also is** etc. In the fourth and last he replies, restraining the superfluous inquiry both of heretics and also of proud Catholics, at the place: **But you ask of me, says Ambrose**, where he shows that the mystery of generation is inscrutable[^2].

**Here it may be asked, since the generation of the Son from the Father** etc. This is the second part of this distinction, in which the Master determines by what manner of speech the eternity of generation is more fittingly expressed; and this part has four parts. In the first he sets forth the apparent controversy of the doctors. For some say that it ought to be expressed through verbs[^3] of the past tense, others, through verbs of the present. In the second he reduces the aforesaid controversy to a concordance, at the place: **But lest such great authorities should seem to contradict one another in so great a matter.** In the third, through the words of Hilary, he confirms his response, lest he should seem to lean on the sayings of Origen, at the place: **Hilary also says, that the Son is born of the Father** etc. In the fourth he concludes summarily what must be said[^4], that is, how one ought to speak and also how one ought to think concerning eternal generation, at the place: **Let us therefore say that the Son was born of the Father**, where he confirms the truth by the authority of Hilary, through which also he resolves the objection of the heretic.

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### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For an understanding of what the Master says concerning eternal generation, in the present distinction four [matters] are principally inquired into.

*First*, it is asked whether generation is to be posited in divine things.

*Secondly*, given that it is, whether generation in divine things is[^5] distinctive of the persons.

*Thirdly*, it is asked whether that generation is eternal.

*Fourthly* and lastly, it is asked whether that generation is terminated.

---

la: Ed. 1 *particulas*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *particulas* ["little parts," for *partes*].

la: Postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *imperscrutabile* loco *inscrutabile*. Mox Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, verbis Magistri *Hic quaeri potest* etc. omissis, pro *Haec est* ponit *Similiter*, deinde propter constructionem mutatam omittit *et haec pars*.

en: At the request of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *imperscrutabile* in place of *inscrutabile*. Shortly afterward the Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, the Master's words *Hic quaeri potest* etc. having been omitted, places *Similiter* in place of *Haec est*, and then, on account of the changed construction, omits *et haec pars*.

la: Unus alterve cod. ut I cum ed. 1 hic *verbum*, sed paulo post plurimi codd. sibi non constantes *verbum praesentis*.

en: One or another codex, as I together with edition 1, [reads] here *verbum*, but shortly afterward most of the codices, not being consistent with themselves, [read] *verbum praesentis*.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 4 hic adiecimus *sit*, quod Vat. ponit infra post *sentiendum*.

en: On the authority of most manuscripts and edition 4, we have here added *sit*, which the Vatican [edition] places below after *sentiendum*.

la: Auctoritate plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *ponenda*.

en: On the authority of most manuscripts and edition 1, we have here expunged the added *ponenda*.