title: Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum homo per talia opera aliquid mereatur.*

Quinto supposito, quod per opera facta extra caritatem non fiat satisfactio, nec vivificentur; quaeritur, utrum homo per ea aliquid mereatur. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut dicit auctoritas communis[^1] «nullum malum impunitum, et nullum bonum irremuneratum»; sed divina iustitia nunquam malum quantulumcumque dimittit, quin puniat: ergo nec quantulumcumque bonum, quin remuneret.

2. Item, si non remunerantur, ergo aequaliter se habet iudex ad eum qui nullum bonum fecit, et ad eum qui fecit multa bona: ergo stultum est alicui peccatori consulere, quod faciat aliquod bonum opus.

3. Item, Exodi vigesimo[^2]: *Honora patrem tuum, ut sis longaevus;* aut hoc dicitur habenti caritatem aut non habenti. Si habenti tantum, haec est parva remuneratio, quia ipse non amat istam vitam, sed aliam. Ergo dicitur non habenti: ergo meretur aliquid, si honorat, et sic etc.

4. Item, Dominus dicit de hypocrita Matthaei sexto[^3], qui facit opus bonum propter gloriam, quod recepit mercedem suam; esto ergo, quod aliquis faciat opus bonum propter Deum, non propter gloriam; cum non sit peius, quam illud quod fuit ad gloriam, immo melius: ergo dignum est mercede aliqua.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus[^4]: «Peccator non est dignus pane, quo vescitur»: ergo si peccator non est dignus vivere, multo minus est dignus remunerari.

2. Item, qui nihil est in conspectu alicuius apud illum nihil meretur; sed peccator nihil est in conspectu Dei; Psalmus[^5]: *Ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu eius malignus:* ergo etc.

3. Item, Sapientiae decimo quarto[^6]: *Similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas eius;* sed impietas omnino displicet Deo: ergo et impius. Sed qui omnino displicet alii nihil meretur apud ipsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, nihil meretur organum nisi vivum in operatione servili[^7] — unde ligo nihil meretur, dum operatur homo in vinea — sed peccator organum est non vivum: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Peccator potest apud Deum aliquid mereri, sed tantum de congruo.

**Respondeo:** Aliqui dicunt, quod peccator nihil omnino meretur apud Deum, neque ex congruo, neque ex condigno; sed tamen Deus ratione abundantissimae largitatis bona eius opera non dimittit irremunerata, immo remunerat; et est bonum peccatori bene operari, quamvis non sit iustum, eum remunerari, sed magis benignum.

Alii dicunt et probabilius, quod est mereri *de congruo* et *de condigno;* peccator autem apud Deum nihil meretur *de condigno,* sed tamen mereri potest *de congruo.* Peccator enim aliquando facit bonum opus in genere ad gloriam suam, ut cum dat eleemosynam propter gloriam; et ex hoc opere non meretur mercedem, sed poenam, quia procedit ex contumelia. Aliquando facit ad *Dei gloriam* et propter amorem Dei, quem habet, et hoc non potest esse sine aliqua gratia gratis data, quae disponit *de congruo* ad gratiam gratum facientem[^8], quam Deus aliquo modo acceptat; et ex hoc meretur *de congruo.* Illud autem meritum comparatum merito caritatis est improportionale, sicut linea latitudini et superficiei[^9]. Unde sicut linea nihil est in comparatione ad superficiem, aliquid tamen est in se; sic est de peccatore ad iustum, et de eius amore ad amorem caritatis, et de merito ad meritum.

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**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ex his patent obiecta; et primo ad illud Augustini: *Non est dignus* etc., dico bene, quod non meretur *ex condigno.* Similiter ad duo sequentia, quod nihil est in comparatione caritatis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud de Sapientia: *Similiter est odio impius;* dicendum, quod illud intelligitur per se secundum quod impius, non secundum quod habens naturam bonam et aliqua *dona gratis data*[^10]; et cum facit opus secundum quod impius, nihil meretur; sed quando secundum *gratiam gratis datam,* aliquid saltem meretur de congruo.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum de instrumento dicendum, quod non vivum dicitur dupliciter: negative, quod nec vivit nec natum est vivere; et privative, quod non vivit, sed tamen natum est vivere[^11]. Per primum nec *de congruo* nec *de condigno,* per secundum autem est meritum *de congruo,* eo quod non privatur simpliciter vita; vivit enim in morte et voluntarie operatur bonum et est quodam modo *Dei adiutor*[^12].

---

english:
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### Question V. *Whether by such works a man merits anything.*

Fifthly, it being supposed that by works done outside charity satisfaction is not made, nor are they vivified, it is asked whether a man merits anything by them. And that he does, it seems:

1. Because, as the common authority[^1] says, «no evil is unpunished, and no good unrewarded»; but the divine justice never dismisses any evil, however small, without punishing it: therefore neither any good, however small, without rewarding it.

2. Likewise, if they are not rewarded, then the judge stands equally toward him who did no good and toward him who did many good works: therefore it is foolish to counsel any sinner to do some good work.

3. Likewise, Exodus twenty[^2]: *Honor your father, that you may be long-lived;* either this is said to one having charity or to one not having it. If only to one having it, this is a small reward, because he himself does not love this life, but another. Therefore it is said to one not having it: therefore he merits something, if he honors, and so on.

4. Likewise, the Lord says of the hypocrite, Matthew six[^3], who does a good work for the sake of glory, that he has received his reward; let it be granted, then, that someone does a good work for God's sake, not for the sake of glory; since it is not worse than that which was for glory, but rather better: therefore it is worthy of some reward.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine[^4]: «The sinner is not worthy of the bread on which he feeds»: therefore if the sinner is not worthy to live, much less is he worthy to be rewarded.

2. Likewise, he who is nothing in someone's sight merits nothing with him; but the sinner is nothing in the sight of God; Psalm[^5]: *The malicious one is brought to nothing in his sight:* therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Wisdom fourteen[^6]: *Alike are hateful to God the impious one and his impiety;* but impiety is wholly displeasing to God: therefore also the impious one. But he who is wholly displeasing to another merits nothing with him: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, an instrument merits nothing unless it is alive in a servile operation[^7] — whence the mattock merits nothing while a man works in the vineyard — but the sinner is an instrument that is not alive: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** The sinner can merit something with God, but only congruently.

**I respond:** Some say that the sinner merits nothing whatsoever with God, neither congruently nor condignly; but nevertheless God, by reason of his most abundant generosity, does not leave his good works unrewarded, but rather rewards them; and it is good for the sinner to act well, although it is not just that he be rewarded, but rather benign.

Others say, and more probably, that there is meriting *congruently* and *condignly;* but the sinner merits nothing *condignly* with God, yet he can merit *congruently.* For the sinner sometimes does a good work in its kind for his own glory, as when he gives alms for the sake of glory; and from this work he does not merit a reward, but punishment, because it proceeds from contumely. Sometimes he acts for *God's glory* and out of the love of God which he has, and this cannot be without some grace freely given, which disposes him *congruently* toward the grace that makes one pleasing[^8], which God in some way accepts; and from this he merits *congruently.* But that merit, compared to the merit of charity, is disproportionate, as a line to breadth and to a surface[^9]. Whence just as a line is nothing in comparison to a surface, yet is something in itself; so it is with the sinner relative to the just man, and with his love relative to the love of charity, and with merit relative to merit.

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**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* From these the objections are clear; and first, to that of Augustine: *He is not worthy,* etc., I say well, that he does not merit *condignly.* Likewise to the two following, that he is nothing in comparison to charity.

*To 3.* To that from Wisdom: *Alike is the impious one hateful;* it must be said that this is understood of him in himself insofar as he is impious, not insofar as he has a good nature and certain *gifts freely given*[^10]; and when he does a work insofar as he is impious, he merits nothing; but when according to *grace freely given,* he merits at least something congruently.

*To 4.* To the last, concerning the instrument, it must be said that "not alive" is said in two ways: negatively, of that which neither lives nor is born to live; and privatively, of that which does not live, but nevertheless is born to live[^11]. By the first, neither *congruently* nor *condignly;* but by the second there is merit *congruently,* because he is not deprived of life simply; for he lives in death and works good voluntarily and is in some way *God's helper*[^12].

---

la: Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3. et 4. — Codd. M O supplent *satisfactoria.* Omnes codd. et ed. (4.) solutionem praeponunt huic (3.). Cum nulla appareat ratio huius transpositionis, retinuimus rectum ordinem Vaticanae.

en: See above, d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3 and 4. — Codices M O supply *satisfactoria.* All codices and the edition place solution (4.) before this (3.). Since no reason for this transposition appears, we have retained the correct order of the Vatican edition.

la: Retinuimus lectionem edd.; codd. I K (E a secunda manu) quod impunitas est causa impossibilitatis satisfaciendi; alii, hanc obiectionem cum ultimo fundamento confundentes, quod improportionalitas est causa impossibilitatis [vel impotentiae] satisfaciendi.

en: We have retained the reading of the editions; codices I K (E in a second hand) [read] that impunity is the cause of the impossibility of making satisfaction; others, conflating this objection with the last fundamentum, [read] that disproportion is the cause of the impossibility [or incapacity] of making satisfaction.

la: Scilicet fundamento 4. — Pro *sed Deus* ed. I *ergo,* Vat. *quia.* Post pauca pro sumitur non pauci codd. *sumuntur,* cod. V *fuit.* Subinde edd. omittunt *sincera,* et pro *commutabat* ed. I substituit *computat,* Vat. *commutat,* codd. F G *commutabit.*

en: Namely, fundamentum 4. — For *sed Deus* edition I [reads] *ergo,* the Vatican [edition] *quia.* Shortly after, for *sumitur* not a few codices [read] *sumuntur,* codex V *fuit.* Then the editions omit *sincera,* and for *commutabat* edition I substitutes *computat,* the Vatican [edition] *commutat,* codices F G *commutabit.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: De hac auctoritate, quam August. (*Enarrat. in Ps.* 118. serm. 23. n. 3.) sic proponit: *Nec recte factum infructuosum,* nec peccatum creditur impunitum, cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. Vide etiam Gregor., XXI. *Moral.* c. 5. n. 10, et Hugo a S. Vict., II. *de Sacram.* p. XIV. c. 9. circa finem.

en: Concerning this authority, which Augustine (*Expositions on the Psalms,* 118, sermon 23, n. 3) proposes thus: *Neither is a right deed unfruitful,* nor is sin believed to be unpunished, cf. vol. I, p. 713, note 2. See also Gregory, XXI *Morals,* c. 5, n. 10, and Hugh of St. Victor, II *On the Sacraments,* p. XIV, c. 9, near the end.

la: Vers. 12.

en: Verse 12.

la: Vers. 2. et 5: *Amen dico vobis, receperunt [hypocritae] mercedem suam.* — Inferius post *gloriam* cod. X bis addit *suam.*

en: Verses 2 and 5: *Amen I say to you, [the hypocrites] have received their reward.* — Below, after *gloriam,* codex X adds *suam* twice.

la: Hanc sententiam in operibus August. non invenimus. I. Nicolai in ed. *Pantheologiae* Raynerii de Pisis (Lugd. 1655), tom. III. tit. *de Satisfactione,* c. 3. § 3, ubi ex S. Thoma haec sententia adducitur, ait: «Citat sine indice S. Thomas, nec occurrit in Augustino, ut nec eius loquelam sapit». Cfr. Comment. in *Epist. ad Tit.* (inter opera Ambros.) 1, 15, ubi de peccatoribus: *Indigni habiti sunt tota uti Dei creatura.*

en: We have not found this sentence in the works of Augustine. I. Nicolai, in the edition of the *Pantheologia* of Rainerius of Pisa (Lyons, 1655), vol. III, title *On Satisfaction,* c. 3, § 3, where this sentence is adduced from St. Thomas, says: «St. Thomas cites it without reference, nor does it occur in Augustine, nor does it savor of his manner of speech». Cf. the Commentary on the *Epistle to Titus* (among the works of Ambrose) 1, 15, where, concerning sinners: *They were held unworthy to use the whole creation of God.*

en: Psalm 14, 4.

la: Vers. 9.

en: Verse 9.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. *Ethic.* c. 11.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VIII *Ethics,* c. 11.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — De merito *congrui* et *condigni* cfr. ibid. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Superius pro *contumelia* cod. V *concupiscentia.* — *(p. 357, n. 1)* Cfr. supra pag. 355, nota 5. *(n. 2)* Vide III. Sent. d. 28. q. 3. ad 2. — Inferius pro *saltem* edd. *ad salutem.* *(n. 3)* De differentia negationis et privationis cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis,* et IV. *Metaph.* text. 4. (III. c. 2.). *(n. 4)* Epist. I. Cor. 3, 9: *Dei enim sumus adiutores.* — Pro *in morte* [I. Tim. 5, 6: *Vivens mortua est*], et edd. *in merito, si.* — Vide scholion ad 3. quaest.

en: See II Sentences, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1. — On the merit of *congruity* and *condignity* cf. ibid., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2. — Above, for *contumelia* codex V [reads] *concupiscentia.* — *(p. 357, n. 1)* Cf. above p. 355, note 5. *(n. 2)* See III Sentences, d. 28, q. 3, ad 2. — Below, for *saltem* the editions [read] *ad salutem.* *(n. 3)* On the difference of negation and privation cf. Aristotle, *On the Categories,* chapter *On Opposites,* and IV *Metaphysics,* text 4 (III, c. 2). *(n. 4)* Epistle I Corinthians 3, 9: *For we are God's helpers.* — For *in morte* [I Timothy 5, 6: *Living, she is dead*], the editions also [read] *in merito, si.* — See the scholion to question 3. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p356-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p357-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (offset pdf = printed + 20, so PDF pp. 376–377). The IA djvu OCR for this range (raw lines 40628–40775) is cascade-shattered with severe two-column bleed (the *Contra* args and footers are diagonally fragmented one token per line), so per the VOL II OVERRIDE the column-band PDF read is authoritative for the body, Respondeo, Solutio, and all footers. Opener verified: "Quinto supposito… quaeritur, utrum homo per ea aliquid mereatur." Chunk ends just before QUAESTIO VI ("Sexto et ultimo quaeritur…") on p.357 L-column. Running head verified: "DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI." / page number 357 — correct distinction.

**Title.** The printed running title reads "Utrum *homo* per talia opera aliquid mereatur"; the dispatch title_la ("Utrum per talia opera…") omitted *homo*. Retained the printed reading with *homo*.

**Scholion.** NONE in this range. The only "scholion" tokens are inside footnotes — [^4] ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") and [^12]'s tail ("Vide scholion ad 3. quaest.") — i.e. the article's scholia live in the earlier questions (per the d.15-a1 q1/q2 scholion convention, where the article's scholion is parked in QUAESTIO I). No standalone SCHOLION block to render here.

**Page-split / footer map.** Body opens on p.356 (carried over from q4's tail). p.356 footers run 1–12 (notes 5–12 are the source/scripture refs for the Fundamenta and Contra args); all 12 captured as [^1]–[^12] markers in body order. The Respondeo + Solutio carry onto p.357. p.357 footer notes 1–5 belong to this q5 (Solutio refs) and have been **folded into the body's [^N] sequence and consolidated under [^12]** to keep marker pairing clean (each p.357 sub-note labeled `(p. 357, n. N)`). p.357 footer note 6 (Enchirid. Cap. 110, n. 29) belongs to q6 and is **handed off to q6**.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved from the clean PDF bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 6

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum bona opera extra caritatem facta valeant ad tolerabiliorem poenam.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum bona opera valeant ad tolerabiliorem poenam extra caritatem[^1]. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus dicit de talibus operibus in Enchiridio[^6], quod « ad hoc eis prosunt, ut tolerabilior sit damnatio ».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia probatum est supra[^7], quod aliquid meretur illo opere: ergo esto, quod statim moriatur post illud; ergo cum non sit irremuneratum et non praemietur in collatione boni[^8]: ergo saltem in diminutione mali.

3. Item, « declinare a malo semper vitat poenam, quamvis non semper consequatur palmam[^9] »; sed melius est bonum facere: ergo multo fortius vitabit poenam.

4. Item, peccatum aggravatur ex sequenti eventu et gravius punitur, ut patet in peccato otii: ergo peccatum, quod reddit hominem magis otiosum ad bonum, magis punitur: ergo illud, post[^10] quod fiunt bona opera, minus, et ita etc.

**Contra:**
1. Augustinus in Enchiridio[^11] dicit, *Pro pane* damnatis non prodesse suffragia Ecclesiae; sed ista sunt potentiora, cum sint ex caritate, quam opera extra caritatem facta: ergo illa multo minus prosunt.

2. Item, si merentur remissionem poenae, aut intensione, aut duratione. Non duratione, quia poena est infinita. Si intensione; sed quantum ad hoc est finita: ergo tantum possunt multiplicari bona opera, quod nulla erit poena.

3. Item, tantae culpae debetur tanta poena; sed opera bona extra caritatem facta non immutant nec minuunt culpam: ergo nec poenam[^12].

Quaeritur igitur, ad quid valeant huiusmodi bona.

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> **Conclusio.** Opera facta extra caritatem ad multa valent et etiam ad tolerabiliorem poenam, sed tantum ex consequenti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod huiusmodi opera bona extra caritatem facta, quando bona fiunt intentione, valent ad multa: ad temporalium multiplicationem, Isaiae primo[^1-2]: *Si volueritis et audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis.* Ad temporalis poenae diminutionem, tertii Regum vigesimo primo: *Nonne vidisti Achab coram me humiliatum? Idcirco non inducam* etc. Ad gratiae impetrationem, sicut Rahab, Iosue sexto, invenit gratiam propter opera, quae fecit nuntiis. Ad bonae vitae assuefactionem, Threnorum tertio: *Bonum est viro, cum portaverit iugum* etc. Ad peccati resistentiam, quia peccatum trahit suo pondere ad aliud, Ecclesiastici tertio: *Ignem ardentem exstinguit aqua, et eleemosyna resistit peccatis.* Ad tolerabiliorem poenam aeternam, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod valet, « ut tolerabilior sit damnatio ».

Sed illud diversimode intelligitur a diversis. Quidam enim dicunt, quod facit poenam tolerabiliorem non mutando poenam, sed fortificando subiectum. — Sed hoc non est congruum dicere, quod virtus aliqua detur damnato propter opera illa, quae facit mitius sustinere: quia aut daretur ad semper, aut ad tempus; et utrumque est inconveniens. Illa enim virtus aut est naturalis, aut gratuita, quorum neutrum facile est intelligibiliter assignare[^2].

Aliqui dicunt, quod valent ad remissionem poenae vermis, quia non tantum habebunt remorsum conscientiae, quantum si nulla opera bona fecissent. — Sed illud non valet, quia remorsus conscientiae erit secundum quantitatem culpae, sicut et ignis: ergo si non valet ad ignem, nec ad vermem[^3].

Ideo tertio modo dicendum, quod valent ad tolerabiliorem damnationem ex consequenti[^4], quia impediunt, culpam factam aggravari, et etiam retrahunt hominem a peccati frequentia et ab intensione libidinis et contemptus; quia non ex tanta libidine peccat qui aliquando opera bona facit, sicut qui Dei obliviscitur. Et ad vermem: quia minus cruciabitur et minorem habebit remorsum, quam si opera illa non fecisset, non de illa culpa, quam commisit, sed de malis, quae commisisset, et de bonis, quae omisisset, si illa opera bona non fecisset. — Et ita intelligendum est de eo qui statim moritur; et de eo qui magis moritur, quam neget Christum; et de consimilibus[^5].

His visis, patet responsio ad utramque partem. Rationes enim ad primam partem procedunt de poena, quam posset incurrere, si illa opera negligeret. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de poena, quae debetur culpae iam factae. Et sic patet totum circa hoc.

---

english:
### Question VI. *Whether good works done apart from charity avail toward a more tolerable punishment.*

Sixth and last it is asked, whether good works avail toward a more tolerable punishment apart from charity.[^1] And that they do seems to be the case.

1. Augustine says of such works in the *Enchiridion*[^6], that "they avail to this, that the damnation may be more tolerable."

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: for it was proved above[^7] that something is merited by such a work; therefore, granted that a man dies immediately after it; then, since it is not unrewarded and is not rewarded in the bestowal of a good[^8], it is therefore rewarded at least in the diminution of an evil.

3. Likewise, "to turn aside from evil always avoids punishment, although it does not always attain the palm[^9]"; but it is better to do good: therefore it will all the more strongly avoid punishment.

4. Likewise, sin is aggravated by its consequent outcome and is more gravely punished, as is plain in the sin of idleness: therefore the sin which renders a man more idle toward the good is more gravely punished; therefore that after[^10] which good works are done is punished less, and so on.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^11] says that, *In the matter of bread*, the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned; but those are more powerful, since they are from charity, than works done apart from charity: therefore those latter profit much less.

2. Likewise, if they merit a remission of punishment, it is either by intensity or by duration. Not by duration, because the punishment is infinite. If by intensity—but in this respect it is finite: therefore good works can be so multiplied that there would be no punishment.

3. Likewise, to so great a fault so great a punishment is owed; but good works done apart from charity neither change nor diminish the fault: therefore neither the punishment.[^12]

It is asked therefore toward what such good works avail.

> **Conclusion.** Works done apart from charity avail toward many things, and even toward a more tolerable punishment, but only as a consequence.

**I respond:** It must be said that such good works done apart from charity, when they are done with a good intention, avail toward many things: toward the multiplication of temporal goods, Isaiah one[^1-2]: *If you are willing and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land.* Toward the diminution of temporal punishment, Third Kings twenty-one: *Have you not seen Ahab humbled before me? Therefore I will not bring* etc. Toward the obtaining of grace, just as Rahab, Joshua six, found grace because of the works which she did for the messengers. Toward habituation to a good life, Lamentations three: *It is good for a man, when he has borne the yoke* etc. Toward resistance to sin, because sin draws by its own weight toward another, Ecclesiasticus three: *Water quenches a flaming fire, and alms resists sins.* Toward a more tolerable eternal punishment, as Augustine says, that it avails "that the damnation may be more tolerable."

But this is understood in diverse ways by diverse persons. For some say that it makes the punishment more tolerable not by changing the punishment, but by strengthening the subject. — But it is not fitting to say this, that some power is given to the damned on account of those works which makes him bear it more mildly: because it would be given either forever or for a time; and each is unacceptable. For that power is either natural or gratuitous, neither of which is easy to assign intelligibly.[^2]

Some say that they avail toward a remission of the punishment of the worm, because they will not have as much remorse of conscience as if they had done no good works. — But this does not hold, because the remorse of conscience will be according to the quantity of the fault, as also the fire is: therefore if it does not avail against the fire, neither against the worm.[^3]

Therefore it must be said in a third way, that they avail toward a more tolerable damnation as a consequence[^4], because they prevent the fault committed from being aggravated, and they also draw a man back from the frequency of sin and from the intensity of lust and contempt; for he does not sin out of so great a lust who sometimes does good works, as one who forgets God. And against the worm: because he will be tormented less and will have less remorse than if he had not done those works—not concerning the fault which he committed, but concerning the evils which he would have committed, and the goods which he would have omitted, had he not done those good works. — And so it is to be understood of him who dies immediately; and of him who rather dies than denies Christ; and of like cases.[^5]

These things seen, the answer to each side is plain. For the reasons for the first side proceed from the punishment which he could incur, if he were to neglect those works. But the reasons for the opposite proceed from the punishment which is owed to the fault already committed. And thus the whole matter concerning this is plain.

---

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — De merito *congrui* et *condigni* cfr. ibid. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Superius pro *contumelia* cod. Y *concupiscentia*.

en: See II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — On merit *of congruity* and *of condignity* cf. ibid. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Above, for *contumelia* ("contempt") cod. Y reads *concupiscentia*.

la: Vers. 19. — Seq. textus est III. Reg. 21, 29, ubi pro *Idcirco* Vulgata *quia igitur humiliatus est mei causa*, quae verba cod. H particulae *idcirco* praemittit. — Tertius est Ios. 6, 25: *Rahab vero... fecit Iosue vivere... eo quod absconderit nuntios* etc. — Quartus est Thren. 3, 27, et quintus Eccli. 3, 33.

en: For the Respondeo: Verse 19. — The following text is III. Kings 21:29, where for *Idcirco* the Vulgate reads *quia igitur humiliatus est mei causa* ["because therefore he is humbled for my sake"], which words cod. H prefixes to the particle *idcirco*. — The third [citation] is Jos. 6:25: *And Rahab... Joshua saved alive... because she had hid the messengers* etc. — The fourth is Lam. 3:27, and the fifth Sir. 3:33.

la: Cfr. infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. — Superius post *quae facit* cod. K (I a secunda manu) addit *ut poenam possit.* Subinde pro *aut est* codd. H bb *aut esset.*

en: Cf. below d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. — Above, after *quae facit* cod. K (and I by a second hand) adds *ut poenam possit.* Then for *aut est* codd. H bb read *aut esset.*

la: Vide infra d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — Pro *ergo si* codd. I K *ergo sicut*, et verbis *nec ad* in cod. I secunda manus praemisit *ita.*

en: See below d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — For *ergo si* codd. I K read *ergo sicut*, and before the words *nec ad* in cod. I a second hand prefixed *ita.*

la: Codd. S T Y addunt: *et ad hoc per consequens valent ad tolerabiliorem damnationem et ad ignem et ad vermem* [cod. Y omittit *et ad vermem*].

en: Codd. S T Y add: *and to this as a consequence they avail toward a more tolerable damnation and against the fire and against the worm* [cod. Y omits *and against the worm*].

la: Vide scholion ad 3. quaest.

en: See the scholion at question 3 [of this article].

la: Cap. 110. n. 29: *Quibus autem prosunt aut ad hoc prosunt, ut sit plena remissio, aut certe, ut tolerabilior fiat ipsa* damnatio. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XLV. c. 2. — Sola Vat. huic arg. subnectit alterum ex August. sumtum, ad quod in fine quaest. respicere videtur S. Bonav.: « Item Augustinus, libro de Patientia [c. 26. n. 23.]: *Haereticus et schismaticus tolerando supplicia, ne Christum neget, tolerabilius hic in inferno habebit* ». Sed locum integrum exhibet Magister in lit. c. 7.

en: Chapter 110, n. 29: *But to those whom they profit, they either profit toward this, that there may be full remission, or at least that the* damnation *itself may become more tolerable.* Cf. below the Master's text, d. XLV, c. 2. — The Vatican edition alone appends to this argument another [text] taken from Augustine, to which St. Bonaventure seems to look at the end of the question: "Likewise Augustine, in the book *On Patience* [c. 26, n. 23]: *The heretic and schismatic, by enduring torments lest he deny Christ, will here in hell have a more tolerable [lot].*" But the Master gives the passage in full in the text, c. 7.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Mox pro *aliquid* codd. G R *aliquis.*

en: The preceding question. — Just below, for *aliquid* codd. G R read *aliquis.*

la: Secundum Glossam in Ps. 33, 16. Vide tom. III. pag. 815, nota 7.

en: According to the Gloss on Ps. 33:16. See vol. III, p. 815, note 7.

la: Edd. *propter.*

en: The editions read *propter* ("on account of").

la: Cap. 110. n. 29. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XLV. c. 2, et Comment. d. 46. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Chapter 110, n. 29. Cf. below the Master's text, d. XLV, c. 2, and the Commentary, d. 46, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Codd. I K addunt *quantum ad hoc*, edd. *in.*

en: Codd. I K add *quantum ad hoc* ("in this respect"); the editions read *in.*

la: Vide supra q. 3.

en: See above, question 3.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 40776–40951), which is cascade-shattered in this two-column region (diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation + L/R column bleed). Reflowed column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p357-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p358-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, which are authoritative here per the VOL II OVERRIDE. Running heads verified: p.357 = "DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI." with page number "357"; p.358 head/number "358" (the raw OCR rendered it "3o8", a digit-mangle). Offset pdf = printed + 20.

**Page span correction.** The dispatch brief listed printed pages ~358–360, but the quaestio in fact occupies the BOTTOM of p.357 (title, opener, args 1–4, Contra 1–3) through the upper-left of p.358 (Conclusio + Respondeo, ending at "totum circa hoc"). The TOP-left of p.357 still belongs to QUAESTIO V (the *meritum de congruo/de condigno* discussion). Printed pages 359–360 belong entirely to the DUBIA, not this quaestio. `printed_pages` set to [357, 358] accordingly.

**Title correction (flagged).** The dispatch brief gave title_la "Quid sit illud quod meretur" / "What that is which is merited." The printed source title (p.357, immediately under "QUAESTIO VI.") is *Utrum bona opera extra caritatem facta valeant ad tolerabiliorem poenam*; that is the title used here. The brief's title appears to be a mis-label (possibly carried over from a different question).

**Scholion finding: NONE.** No SCHOLION header falls in the raw range. The article's scholion is held at QUAESTIO III of this same article (ARTICULUS UNICUS) — cross-referenced twice in the apparatus ("Vide scholion ad 3. quaest.", notes [^5] and the body of p.357 note 5). This matches the standard convention (a sibling quaestio carries the article scholion).

**Apparatus split / hand-off to p1-dubia.** Printed page 358's footer has 8 numbered notes. Notes 1–5 belong to this quaestio's Respondeo (Achab/Rahab citations; the *fortificando subiectum* rebuttal; the *vermis* rebuttal; the cod. S T Y addition; the scholion cross-ref) and are rendered here. **Notes 6–8 of p.358 belong to the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (Dub. I), not to this quaestio** — they gloss the *Induantur sicut diploide* / *duplex tribulatio* discussion (Ps. 108:29 diploide; *duplicari* vs *quadrupliciter* var.; "omnia peccata oriuntur"). They must be picked up by the `bon-sent-IV-d15-p1-dubia` chunk, whose body begins at the bottom-right of p.358 ("...modis duplicatur. Aut duplicatur quantum ad subiectum...") and continues onto pp.359–360.

**[?] flags:** none. The two-column reflow resolved cleanly against the PDF bands.

**Apparatus repair — CORRECTED 2026-07-17 (J4 Class D/E repair, per `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §4).** Prior state: `defs=12 la=13 en=13` — both languages equally elevated, a genuine defect (not the §2 backtick-blockquote false positive; checked and ruled out). Diagnosed via the §7 duplicate-label finder plus PDF verification (`colcrop.py vol4 357/358 1880`, footer bands read for both printed pages): the body legitimately anchors `[^1]` **twice** — once on p.357 (opening sentence, "extra caritatem[^1]") and once on p.358 (Respondeo, "Isaiae primo[^1]") — because Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each page (per this chunk's own intro blockquote). The prior single `[^1]` def **bundled both printed footnotes into one entry**: its first sentence ("Vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — De merito congrui...") is p.357's real printed note 1, verbatim-confirmed against the p.357 footer band; the parenthetical "(Resp.: Vers. 19. — Seq. textus est III. Reg. 21, 29...)" is p.358's real printed note 1 (confirmed verbatim against the p.358 footer band, which opens "¹ Vers. 19. — Seq. textus est III. Reg. 21, 29, ubi pro Idcirco..."). These are two distinct Quaracchi footnotes that happened to share the printed numeral 1 across the page-restart boundary. **Fix:** split the bundled def into `[^1]` (p.357 content only) and a new `[^1-2]` (p.358 content, following the corpus's locked page-restart-collision convention — see `vol2/bon-sent-II-d42-a1-q1.md`'s `[^4-2]`/`[^6-2]`/`[^7-2]`); relabeled the second body anchor (both Latin and English, Respondeo "Isaiae primo") from `[^1]` to `[^1-2]`. Defs `[^2]`–`[^5]` (p.358 footer notes 2–5) were independently verified against the same footer bands and found already correct — no changes needed there. Result: 13 defs, 13 anchors each in Latin and English, all content-verified against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for pp.357–358 (both columns, both footers). No wording changed — only the marker split and the new def entry (transcribed verbatim from the printed footer, not previously rendered as a standalone entry).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Quid sit satisfactio
What satisfaction is

source_text:
<!-- page 361 -->

### Articulus I. *De modo satisfaciendi in generali.*
### Quaestio I. *Quid sit satisfactio.*

Circa primum sic proceditur.

Augustinus definit, et habetur in littera[^1]: « Satisfacere est peccatorum causas excidere et earum suggestionibus aditum non indulgere ».

1. Videtur primo ista definitio sive notificatio *superflua*, quia idem est prorsus peccatorum causas excidere et non consentire suggestionibus.

2. Item, videtur *diminuta*, quia hoc totum vere dicitur de eo qui a peccato cessat: ergo secundum hoc cessare a peccato habet completam rationem satisfactionis: ergo non oportet amplius facere[^2].

3. Item, videtur *falsa*, cum dicit: « peccatorum causas excidere », quia hoc est solius Dei; ipse enim est qui delet peccata[^3].

4. Item, videtur *falsi implicativa*, cum dicit peccatorum causas; « peccatum enim nihil est[^4] »: ergo non habet causas, quia « causa est cuius esse

<!-- page 362 -->

sequitur aliud ». Si dicas, quod non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem[^5]; sed tunc, cum talis non sit nisi nostra voluntas, videtur, quod oportet excidere voluntatem; sed non voluntatem-potentiam, quia hoc est impossibile; non voluntatem-affectionem, quia hoc est per Dei gratiam; non voluntatem-actum, quia illa est ipsum peccatum. Si dicas, quod causas idem est quod occasiones; contra: non est in nostra potestate vitare occasiones; et iterum, esto quod eas non vitet, dum tamen non peccet, satisfacit.

Item, Anselmus[^6] definit: « Satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo impendere ». — Quaeritur ergo, quomodo differant hae definitiones.

> **Conclusio.** Augustini definitio explicatur eo sensu, quod tangat emendam praesentem pro culpa praeterita et propositum vitandi futuram.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum evidentiam notandum, quod haec notificatio tripliciter exponitur:

uno modo, ut sequens pars sit expositio praecedentis, ut sit sensus: satisfacere est peccatorum causas excidere, id est *motiva et occasiones*; et hoc quidem est earum suggestionibus aditum non indulgere; tunc enim exciduntur, quando nullo modo admittuntur. — Aliter exponitur, quod motiva ad peccatum sunt duplicia: quaedam *intra* nos, et illa sunt excidenda, sicut pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum, vel etiam radices peccatorum; quaedam *extra*, et illa *non sunt introducenda*; et quantum ad haec duo genera duas ponit differentias.

Sed tamen primae expositioni repugnat nugatio; secundae[^7] repugnat relatio eius quod est *earum*. — Et ideo tertio modo dicitur, quod ad satisfactionem completam duo requiruntur, scilicet emenda praesens pro culpa praeterita et propositum firmum in vitando futuram; et ista duo tangit in hac notificatione. Quantum ad emendam pro culpa perpetrata dicit: peccatorum causas excidere. Non enim potest pro culpa melius emenda fieri, quam ea a se cum dolore et poena praecidendo removere, quae cum amore sequendo peccavit. Quantum ad firmum propositum de futuro dicit: et suggestionibus aditum non indulgere.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiectum primo, quia non est *nugatio*; et ulterius, quae sit differentia definitionum: quia haec definitio tangit recessum a malo, illa Anselmi accessum ad bonum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod hoc totum convenit *a peccato cessare*; dicendum, quod peccatorum causas excidere dupliciter est: uno modo per *declinationem* solam, alio modo per *pugnam et violentiam*. Primo modo opponit[^8], secundo modo accipit hic excidere causas peccatorum per poenalitates assumtas illis contrarias, per quas violenter illae exciduntur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus solus excidit; dicendum, quod est excisio quaedam per *cautelam et praeventionem*, et est excisio per *ablationem causae* in effectu. Prima potest fieri ab homine, secunda non nisi a Deo[^9].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum non habet causam etc.; dicendum, quod causas hic vocat *occasiones*. Occasiones autem duplices sunt: quaedam *proximae*, ut coena splendida est occasio edacitatis; quaedam *remotae*, ut invitatio ad bonam coenam. Et qui bene vult satisfacere necesse habet occasiones propinquas excidere; et tales sunt in nostra potestate, remotae autem non.

english:
### Article I. *On the manner of satisfying in general.*
### Question I. *What satisfaction is.*

Concerning the first [matter] one proceeds thus.

Augustine defines [it], and it is had in the text[^1]: "To satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins and not to grant entry to their suggestions."

1. First, this definition or description seems *superfluous*, because to cut away the causes of sins and not to consent to the suggestions are absolutely the same.

2. Likewise, it seems *deficient*, because this whole is truly said of one who ceases from sin: therefore according to this, ceasing from sin has the complete account of satisfaction: therefore it is not necessary to do anything further[^2].

3. Likewise, it seems *false*, when it says: "to cut away the causes of sins," because this belongs to God alone; for he it is who blots out sins[^3].

4. Likewise, it seems *implicative of falsehood*, when it says "the causes of sins"; for "sin is nothing[^4]": therefore it has no causes, because "a cause is that whose being

<!-- page 362 -->

another follows." If you say that it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one[^5]; but then, since such a [cause] is nothing but our will, it seems that the will must be cut away; but not the will-as-power, because this is impossible; not the will-as-affection, because this is by the grace of God; not the will-as-act, because that is the very sin. If you say that the causes are the same as the occasions; on the contrary: it is not in our power to avoid the occasions; and again, granted that one does not avoid them, yet so long as one does not sin, one satisfies.

Likewise, Anselm[^6] defines [it]: "To satisfy is to render to God the honor due." — It is asked, therefore, how these definitions differ.

> **Conclusion.** Augustine's definition is explained in this sense, that it touches present amendment for past fault and the purpose of avoiding future [fault].

**I respond:** For the clarity of the aforesaid it must be noted that this description is expounded in a threefold way:

in one way, so that the following part be an exposition of the preceding, so that the sense be: to satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins, that is *the motives and occasions*; and this indeed is not to grant entry to their suggestions; for then they are cut away, when they are in no way admitted. — In another way it is expounded, that the motives to sin are twofold: some *within* us, and these are to be cut away, such as proneness to evil and difficulty toward good, or also the roots of sins; some *without*, and these *are not to be introduced*; and as to these two kinds he sets down two differences.

But nevertheless the first exposition is opposed by [the charge of] triviality; the second[^7] is opposed by the reference of [the word] *their*. — And therefore in a third way it is said that for complete satisfaction two things are required, namely present amendment for past fault and a firm purpose in avoiding future [fault]; and these two he touches in this description. As to amendment for the fault perpetrated he says: to cut away the causes of sins. For amendment cannot better be made for a fault than by cutting away from oneself with sorrow and pain those things by which one sinned in following [them] with love. As to the firm purpose concerning the future he says: and not to grant entry to the suggestions.

1. And by this the response to the first objection is clear, [namely] that it is not *triviality*; and further, what the difference of the definitions is: because this definition touches withdrawal from evil, that of Anselm approach toward good.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that this whole agrees [with] *ceasing from sin*; it must be said that to cut away the causes of sins is in two ways: in one way by *declination* alone, in another way by *struggle and violence*. In the first way he opposes [it][^8], in the second way he here takes cutting away the causes of sins through penalties assumed contrary to them, by which they are violently cut away.

3. To that which is objected, that God alone cuts away; it must be said that there is a certain cutting away by *caution and prevention*, and there is a cutting away by *removal of the cause* in [its] effect. The first can be done by man, the second only by God[^9].

4. To that which is objected, that sin does not have a cause etc.; it must be said that he here calls the causes *occasions*. Now the occasions are twofold: some *proximate*, as a splendid supper is the occasion of gluttony; some *remote*, as the invitation to a good supper. And whoever wishes to satisfy well must needs cut away the proximate occasions; and such are in our power, but the remote ones are not.

la: Hic c. 3. circa finem. Plurimi codd., contradicente textu originali, *eorum* pro *earum*. Idem recurrit infra in principio corp. quaest. — De proprietatibus definitionis cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. seqq.

en: Here c. 3, near the end. Very many codices, against the original text, [read] *eorum* (of them) for *earum* (of these). The same recurs below at the beginning of the body of the question. — On the properties of a definition cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VI. c. 1 ff.

la: Edd. *satisfacere*.

en: The editions [read] *satisfacere* (to satisfy).

la: Isai. 43, 25: *Ego sum, ego sum ipse, qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me et peccatorum tuorum non recordabor.*

en: Isaiah 43, 25: *I am, I am he myself, who blots out your iniquities for my own sake, and I will not remember your sins.*

la: Secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 1. n. 13. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 640, nota 8. — De seq. definitione causae vide Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.); Boeth., III. de Differentiis topic., et Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 1. c. 1. Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 120, nota 7.

en: According to Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John* tr. 1. n. 13. Cf. tom. II. p. 640, note 8. — On the following definition of cause see Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* II. c. 17 (c. 14); Boethius, *On Topical Differences* III, and Avicenna, *Metaphysics* tr. 1. c. 1. Cf. also tom. I. p. 120, note 7.

la: Ut docet August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, de quo vide tom. II. pag. 805, nota 5. Ibid. pag. 601, nota 6. insinuatur ab Anselmo triplex modus accipiendi voluntatem. — In fine arg. pro *ipsum peccatum*, quod habent codd. E H L aa, alii codd. et edd. *per ipsum peccatum*, quibus verbis codd. I K subiungunt: *ergo non videtur aliquid esse dictum.*

en: As Augustine teaches, *On Free Will* II. c. 20. n. 54, and *City of God* XII. c. 7, on which see tom. II. p. 805, note 5. Ibid. p. 601, note 6, a threefold manner of taking *will* is intimated by Anselm. — At the end of the argument, for *ipsum peccatum* (the very sin), which codices E H L aa have, other codices and the editions [read] *per ipsum peccatum* (through the very sin), to which words codices I K subjoin: *therefore nothing seems to have been said.*

la: Vide supra pag. 356, nota 1.

en: See above p. 356, note 1.

la: Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 *similiter*, Vat. *similiter secundae*. Circa finem corp. pro *peccavit* edd. *perpetravit*.

en: Not a few codices and ed. 1 [read] *similiter* (likewise), the Vatican [edition] *similiter secundae* (likewise of the second). Toward the end of the body, for *peccavit* (sinned) the editions [read] *perpetravit* (perpetrated).

la: Pro *opponit* codd. H P Q *convenit ei quod a peccato cessat*, ceteri codd. *exponit*, scil. opponens. Mox post *accipit* supple: *Augustinus*, vel substituendum *accipitur*. In principio solut. pro *quod hoc totum convenit a peccato cessare* edd. *quod totum habet rationem satisfactionis, quae potest a peccato cessare.*

en: For *opponit* (he opposes) codices H P Q [read] *convenit ei quod a peccato cessat* (it agrees with him who ceases from sin), the other codices *exponit* (he expounds), namely opposing. Soon after *accipit* (he takes) supply: *Augustinus*, or *accipitur* (it is taken) is to be substituted. At the beginning of the solution, for *quod hoc totum convenit a peccato cessare* the editions [read] *quod totum habet rationem satisfactionis, quae potest a peccato cessare* (that the whole has the account of satisfaction, which can [be said] of ceasing from sin).

la: In codd. et ed. 1 desideratur haec solutio, quam Vat. (male substituens in ipsa *absolutionem* pro *ablationem*) sumsit ex Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; hinc et codd. et ed. 1 in seq. solut. post *obiicitur* perperam addunt *tertio*.

en: In the codices and ed. 1 this solution is wanting, which the Vatican [edition] (wrongly substituting in it *absolutionem* for *ablationem*) took from Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; hence both the codices and ed. 1 in the following solution after *obiicitur* (is objected) wrongly add *tertio* (thirdly).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Vocabulum *satisfactionis*, novatoribus saeculi XVI. quam maxime odiosum, in genere ad mentem nostri Doctoris sic definiri potest: est redditio voluntaria aequivalentis alius indebiti ad compensandam iniuriam. Prout autem specialiter sumitur ut satisfactio *sacramentalis*, est actio aliqua poenalis, consistens in bonis operibus, a sacerdote in Sacramento poenitentiae impositis, ad compensandam aliquatenus solutione poenae temporalis iniuriam Deo per peccatum illatam. Hinc Concil. Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 8.) monet confessarios, « ut satisfactio, quam imponunt, non sit tantum ad novae vitae custodiam et infirmitatis medicamentum, sed etiam ad praeteritorum peccatorum vindictam et castigationem; nam claves sacerdotum non ad solvendum duntaxat, sed et ad ligandum concessas, etiam antiqui et credunt et docent ». — Scholastici communiter descriptionem *satisfactionis* non ita strictam, quae legitur apud S. Augustinum vel potius Gennadium, alteramque Anselmi praedicto sensu interpretari nituntur. Diffuse de utraque definitione disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; cfr. etiam Scot., in <!-- page 363 --> utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 12. a. 3. — B. Albert, hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. n. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**II.** In seq. (2.) quaestione magis explicatur conclusio quaestionis I. in p. I. Haec autem explicatio magni momenti est pro stabilienda orthodoxa de indulgentiis doctrina (cfr. infra d. 20. p. II.) Alex. Hal. rem tractat loc. cit. ante finem, ubi discutit praedictam descriptionem Anselmi. Alii commentatores Lombardi hanc quaestionem omittunt, vel potius coniungunt cum quaestione I. partis I.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The word *satisfaction*, most hateful to the innovators of the sixteenth century, can in general be defined according to the mind of our Doctor thus: it is the voluntary rendering of an equivalent of another thing owed, to compensate for an injury. But insofar as it is taken specially as *sacramental* satisfaction, it is some penal action, consisting in good works imposed by the priest in the Sacrament of penance, to compensate in some measure, by the payment of temporal punishment, for the injury inflicted upon God through sin. Hence the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV. c. 8) admonishes confessors, "that the satisfaction which they impose be not only for the safeguarding of the new life and a medicine of infirmity, but also for the avenging and chastising of past sins; for the keys of the priests were granted not for loosing only, but also for binding, as even the ancients both believe and teach." — The Scholastics commonly strive to interpret the description of *satisfaction*, not so strict, which is read in St. Augustine, or rather Gennadius, and the other [description] of Anselm in the aforesaid sense. Alexander of Hales disputes diffusely concerning both definitions, *Summa* p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; cf. also Scotus, in <!-- page 363 --> each *Scriptum* here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1. subq. 3; Suppl. q. 12. a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. subq. 3. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. n. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**II.** In the following (2nd) question the conclusion of question I of part I is more fully explained. Now this explanation is of great moment for establishing the orthodox doctrine on indulgences (cf. below d. 20. p. II). Alexander of Hales treats the matter in the place cited, before the end, where he discusses the aforesaid description of Anselm. Other commentators on Lombard omit this question, or rather join it with question I of part I.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from Vol IV PDF column bands (printed pp. 361–363; pdf pp. 381–383 at the verified +20 offset; `colcrop.py vol4` split_x=1880) per the Vol II/IV PDF-priority override, with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 41349–41553) as base for the clean running prose (fundamenta, sed contra-style objections) and footnote-marker spacing. The Respondeo (three expositions), the Solutio replies (1–4), the Conclusio, all footers, and the scholion were cascade-shattered / two-column-bled in OCR and taken from the PDF bands. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Alignment.** The article+question opener ("Circa primum sic proceditur. Augustinus definit... « Satisfacere est peccatorum causas excidere... »") matches PARS II / ARTICULUS I (*De modo satisfaciendi in generali*) / QUAESTIO I (*Quid sit satisfactio*), confirmed against the PDF (p.361 L foot: ARTICULUS I, *De modo satisfaciendi in generali*, then QUAESTIO I, *Quid sit satisfactio*). Aligned. The TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM list (p.361-R) confirms the four-question article: "Primo quaeritur, quid sit satisfactio; Secundo, cui sit satisfaciendum; Tertio, per qualia opera; Quarto, per quae." Per the locked chunking convention, the short ARTICULUS I opener is folded into this q1; there is no standalone divisio chunk for this article.

**Pars-level material NOT in this chunk.** Printed p.361-L/R also carries the PARS II opener material — COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XV, PARS II ("Respondetur rationibus pro praedicto errore..."), the DIVISIO TEXTUS ("Supra respondit Magister rationi sumtae ex sacra Scriptura..."), and the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM ("Ad intelligentiam huius partis... Primo quaeritur de modo in generali. Secundo... in speciali"). Per the chunking convention this pars-level DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO belongs in a separate `bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-divisio` chunk, NOT here. This chunk begins at the ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I body ("Circa primum sic proceditur"). Flagged for the d15-p2 divisio dispatch.

**Page span / page-verify.** Running heads: p.361 recto = "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 361"; p.362 verso top = "362 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."; p.363 recto = "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 363" (the QUAESTIO II running head already, because QUAESTIO II opens on p.363 — but the scholion tail of THIS q1 still occupies the top-of-page small print on p.363 before the QUAESTIO II header). Page-verify PASSES for q1 (p.361 head reads ART. I QUAEST. I). The chunk body spans printed pp. 361–362 (body ends "...remotae autem non." at the foot of p.362-R col.1); the scholion runs from the foot of p.362-R into the top of p.363 (small print), ending "...coniungunt cum quaestione I. partis I." immediately before QUAESTIO II ("Cui sit satisfaciendum"). printed_pages = [361, 362, 363]; pdf_pages = [381, 382, 383] at +20.

**Apparatus / footer-ownership.** 9 footnotes, all paired in both bodies. Each printed page restarts footer numbering; this chunk takes only the footers whose anchors fall in this question's body, renumbered [^1]–[^9] in body order:
- p.361 footer block nn.1–6: n1 (Edd. cum pluribus codd. *falsam et gravem*...probabilem) anchors in the pars-DIVISIO/error-text on p.361 → belongs to the d15-p2-divisio chunk, NOT here; n2 (Partis I. q. 1. seqq.) likewise belongs to the divisio material; n3 (Hic c. 3. circa finem...)→[^1] at the Augustine definition; n4 (Edd. *satisfacere*)→[^2]; n5 (Isai. 43, 25...)→[^3]; n6 (Secundum August., in Ioan. Evang...)→[^4].
- p.362 footers nn.1–6: n1 (Ut docet August., II. de Lib. Arb. ... *ipsum peccatum* variant)→[^5] at *deficientem*; n2 (Vide supra pag. 356, nota 1)→[^6] at Anselm's definition; n3 (Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. dub. 4) — back-ref keyed to *peccatum nihil est* / cause material; rendered inline-adjacent — see [?] flag; n4 (Non pauci codd. ... *similiter* / *peccavit→perpetravit*)→[^7] at *secundae*; n5 (Pro *opponit* codd. H P Q...)→[^8] at *opponit*; n6 (In codd. et ed. 1 desideratur haec solutio...)→[^9] at the 3rd reply (Deus solus excidit).
- p.363 footers: none own anchors in this q1's body (the q1 scholion tail is small-print continuation, not a numbered footer; p.363's numbered footers nn.1–8 belong to QUAESTIO II).

**Footer disposition note (n3 on p.362 = "Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. dub. 4").** This Quaracchi footer is a bare cross-reference attached to the *peccatum nihil est* / cause-of-sin discussion (fundamentum 4 tail). Its body anchor falls in the run of text "« peccatum enim nihil est »: ergo non habet causas..." which is already carried by [^4] (the *in Ioan. Evang.* note covering *peccatum nihil est*). To avoid a duplicate anchor at the same word, this bare "Cfr. II Sent. d. 42. dub. 4" cross-ref was folded conceptually under the same discussion and is NOT rendered as a separate numbered footer; the substantive note at that locus is [^4]. Flagged below.

**Scholion disposition (★ ownership).** This chunk OWNS the Articulus I scholion in full (printed from the foot of p.362-R into the small-print top of p.363, ending immediately before QUAESTIO II). It has two sections: **I.** = a general definition of *satisfactio* (Trent Sess. XIV c.8; the Augustine/Gennadius vs. Anselm descriptions) with a long roster of cross-references to the commentators on Lombard at THIS distinction (Alex. Hal., Scotus, S. Thomas, Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard., Durand., Dionys. Carth.) — directly grounding THIS q1 (what satisfaction is) and pointing forward to the article's later questions; **II.** = a brief note that the following (2nd) question more fully explains the conclusion of q.I of part I, and its weight for the doctrine of indulgences (cf. d. 20. p. II). Rendered in full (both languages), body-first / scholion-last per the parser gotcha. **Coverage: this single scholion block is the whole article's scholion**, covering article q1–q4 (it is keyed to the article-level question roster, not split per-question). Sibling questions a1-q2, a1-q3, a1-q4 should render `has_scholion: false` and point here. No second distinct scholion block exists for q2/q3/q4 within this article — this block ends just before QUAESTIO II.

**`[?]` flags.**
- [^4] / p.362 n3 ("Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. dub. 4"): the bare cross-reference footer on p.362 was read in the inner-gutter small print; its anchor coincides with [^4]'s discussion (*peccatum nihil est*), so it was folded under [^4] rather than given a separate marker. The *content* of the cross-ref ("Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. dub. 4") is legible and certain; the decision to fold it (vs. emit a 10th footer) is editorial — flagged for the d.20 decade-polish review to confirm whether Quaracchi's printed numbering treats it as a standalone footer entry.
- All other readings resolved against the PDF bands. OCR garbles silently corrected per CLAUDE.md (e.g. `procedilur`→`proceditur`, `definilio`→`definitio`, `consenlire suggeslionibus`→`consentire suggestionibus`, `diminula`→`diminuta`, `inconTeniens`-style→`inconveniens` n/a here, `Yohintas`→`voluntas`, `vohintatem`→`voluntatem`, `vohinta-tem-actnm`→`voluntatem-actum`, `Anselmns`→`Anselmus`, `nolan-dura`→`notandum`, `notificalio`→`notificatio`, `praecidendo reinovere`→`praecidendo removere`, `Prirao modo opponit`→`Primo modo opponit`, `assumtas`→`assumtas` (Quaracchi spelling kept), `coena spiendida`→`coena splendida`, `edacilalis`→`edacitatis`, `salisfaclio`→`satisfactio`, `excidcre`→`excidere`).
</parameter>
</invoke>


title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Cui sit satisfaciendum
To whom satisfaction is to be made

source_text:
<!-- page 363 -->

### Quaestio II. *Cui sit satisfaciendum.*

Secundo quaeritur, cui sit facienda satisfactio. Et quod Deo, videtur:

1. Anselmus[^1] ita definit: «Satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo impendere»; sed ei satisfit impendendo honorem, cui honorem impendimus: cum ergo honorem impendamus Deo, satisfaciendum est Deo.

2. Item, illi fit satisfactio, qui exigit poenam et emendam; sed ille qui exigit poenam a peccatore, Deus est; Gregorius[^2]: «Aut homo punit, aut Deus»; ergo satisfactio fit Deo.

3. Item, ei fit satisfactio, cui iniuriatum est per culpam; sed hic est Deus, quia «peccatum est, spreto incommutabili bono, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere»[^3]: ergo satisfactio proprie fit ipsi Deo.

4. Item, Christi satisfactio fuit exemplar nostrae satisfactionis, et inde non tantum exemplum trahitur, sed etiam fundamentum nostrae satisfactionis; sed Christus satisfecit Patri, quia semetipsum obtulit oblationem et hostiam Deo[^4]: ergo nostra satisfactio similiter est Deo facienda.

5. Item, si satisfactio non fieret nisi Ecclesiae, videtur, quod cum peccator exiret forum Ecclesiae, non teneretur ad poenam aliquam: ergo omnes evolarent: ergo frustra fiunt suffragia Ecclesiae, et errant qui ponunt poenam purgatoriam. Sed hoc est contra fidem[^5]: ergo etc.

6. Item, si Deus peccatori, quotiescumque iustificatur, totum condonaret, malum remaneret inultum, et daretur unicuique libertas transgrediendi contra Deum suum; sed hoc est inconveniens, quia universum sic remaneret inordinatum[^6]: ergo etc.

**Contra:** Augustinus dicit, et Magister ponit in littera[^7]: «Infidelitatis impietas est ab eo qui iustus est, dimidiam sperare veniam»; sed si hoc est erroneum, dicere, quod dimidiam veniam donet; ergo si dimittit, totum condonat: ergo culpam et poenam: ergo ipse amplius non exigit, ergo nec ei oportet satisfacere, ergo soli Ecclesiae.

2. Item, Deus in contritione dimittit culpam et poenam aeternam, quae excedit omnem poenam temporalem improportionaliter[^8]: ergo cum contritio non excedat confessionem improportionaliter, nec quantum ad poenam nec quantum ad meritum; multo fortius in confessione absolvitur peccator ab omni poena temporali quantum ad Deum: ergo Deus non exigit ampliorem satisfactionem.

3. Item, tanta potest esse contritio, quod delet omnem culpam et poenam, et tunc constat, quod Deus nihil exigeret satisfactionis; sed si talis veniat ad poenitentiam, poena satisfactoria est imponenda: ergo videtur, quod satisfactio non fiat Deo, sed Ecclesiae, quae est eius sponsa.

4. Item, confessio ultra contritionem est solum necessaria propter reconciliationem faciendam Ecclesiae, et ideo fit homini: ergo multo fortius de satisfactione, quae consequitur confessionem.

5. Item, videmus, quod Ecclesia absolvit a maiori parte poenae satisfactoriae in huiusmodi relaxationibus; sed nullus potest alicui relaxare nisi quod sibi debetur: ergo videtur, quod ista debeatur Ecclesiae: ergo videtur, quod satisfactio non fiat Deo, sed magis Ecclesiae.

> **Conclusio.** Satisfactio de peccato proprie fit ipsi Deo, tamen per Ecclesiam et in Ecclesia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum peccator peccat, se ad poenam aeternam obligat. Cum autem

<!-- page 364 -->

divina misericordia iustificat, remittit omnem culpam et reatum poenae aeternae, qui inseparabiliter[^9] adhaeret culpae. Sed quia misericordia non potest praeiudicare iustitiae, cuius est mala punire; ideo sic solvit a culpa et poena, ut tamen remaneat obligatus ad aliquantulam poenam temporalem. Sed quoniam peccator ipsum offenderat et etiam damnificaverat eius Ecclesiam; commisit Dominus iudiciariam potestatem super peccatores rectoribus Ecclesiae et in eos compromisit tanquam in arbitros, ut sic innotescat voluntas Dei poenitentibus per sacerdotes, et per illos imponatur poena peccatoribus, et Domino satisfiat *principaliter* et Ecclesiae *per consequens*. Unde satisfactio proprie de peccato fit ipsi Deo, tamen per Ecclesiam et in Ecclesia[^10]. — Et concedo rationes ad hoc inductas.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non est speranda dimidia venia; dicendum, quod tunc venia dimidiatur, quando unum mortale dimittitur, et reliquum tenetur; et hoc est inconveniens, ponere, quod Deus, qui iustus est, posset confoederari et reconciliari homini in sua iniustitia permanenti; alioquin simul esset amicus et inimicus! Non sic autem est de aliquantula poena temporali, quia obligatio ad poenam non facit iniustitiam in eo qui vult solvere.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in contritione dimittit poenam aeternam; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia ibi principaliter operatur misericordia relaxans, sed in satisfactione iustitia, in confessione vero utraque, unde quasi medium tenet; in cuius signum fit ibi ligatio et solutio. Et ideo non est simile.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanta potest esse contritio, quod totum remittitur; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quia Ecclesiae non constat, ideo debet a sacerdote imponi. Si autem sacerdoti constaret, reputaret omnino sibi satisfactum, et tunc poenam non imponeret, sed absolutum absolveret. Nunc autem in aliquibus decipitur, sed deceptio est fructuosa — quia semper merita cumulantur — et Ecclesiae imponenti et ulterius satisfacienti; quia enim Dominus non vult ultra sortem, reliquum in thesauris Ecclesiae habetur repositum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod confessio est propter reconciliationem; dicendum, quod non est solum propter hoc, sed ad arbitrandum poenam inter hominem et Deum; qua soluta, tunc fit reconciliatio perfecta.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Ecclesia absolvit a maiori parte; dicendum, quod hoc non est remittendo, sed pro eo solvendo de thesauris suis; vel quia Deus plenarie compromisit in eos quibus plenitudinem tradidit potestatis. Quod autem horum verum magis sit, infra videbitur, cum de relaxationibus agetur.

english:
### Question II. *To whom satisfaction is to be made.*

Secondly it is asked to whom satisfaction is to be made. And that it is to God, seems to be the case:

1. Anselm[^1] defines it thus: «To make satisfaction is to render to God the honor owed»; but satisfaction is made to him to whom we render the honor we render: since therefore we render honor to God, satisfaction is to be made to God.

2. Likewise, satisfaction is made to him who exacts the penalty and the amends; but he who exacts the penalty from the sinner is God; Gregory[^2]: «Either man punishes, or God [does]»; therefore satisfaction is made to God.

3. Likewise, satisfaction is made to him to whom injury has been done through fault; but this is God, because «to sin is, with the unchangeable good spurned, to cling to changeable things»[^3]: therefore satisfaction is properly made to God himself.

4. Likewise, Christ's satisfaction was the exemplar of our satisfaction, and from it not only an example is drawn, but also the foundation of our satisfaction; but Christ made satisfaction to the Father, because he offered himself as an offering and victim to God[^4]: therefore our satisfaction likewise is to be made to God.

5. Likewise, if satisfaction were made only to the Church, it would seem that when the sinner left the forum of the Church, he would not be bound to any penalty: therefore all would fly away: therefore the suffrages of the Church are made in vain, and those err who posit a penalty of purgatory. But this is against the faith[^5]: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if God should forgive the sinner the whole, as often as he is justified, evil would remain unavenged, and to each one would be given the liberty of transgressing against his God; but this is unfitting, because the universe would thus remain disordered[^6]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** Augustine says, and the Master sets down in the text[^7]: «It is the impiety of unbelief, for one who is just, to hope for half a pardon»; but if this is erroneous, to say that he grants half a pardon; therefore if he remits, he forgives the whole: therefore both the fault and the penalty: therefore he himself exacts nothing further, therefore neither is it needful to make satisfaction to him, therefore [satisfaction is made] to the Church alone.

2. Likewise, in contrition God remits the fault and the eternal penalty, which exceeds every temporal penalty disproportionately[^8]: therefore since contrition does not exceed confession disproportionately, neither as to penalty nor as to merit; much more strongly is the sinner absolved in confession from all temporal penalty as regards God: therefore God does not exact further satisfaction.

3. Likewise, contrition can be so great that it blots out the whole fault and penalty, and then it is established that God would exact no satisfaction; but if such a one come to penance, a satisfactory penalty is to be imposed: therefore it seems that satisfaction is made not to God, but to the Church, which is his spouse.

4. Likewise, confession beyond contrition is necessary only for the reconciliation to be made to the Church, and therefore is made to man: therefore much more strongly [is this so] concerning satisfaction, which follows upon confession.

5. Likewise, we see that the Church absolves from the greater part of the satisfactory penalty in relaxations of this kind; but no one can relax for anyone except what is owed to himself: therefore it seems that this is owed to the Church: therefore it seems that satisfaction is made not to God, but rather to the Church.

> **Conclusion.** Satisfaction for sin is properly made to God himself, yet through the Church and in the Church.

**I respond:** It must be said that when a sinner sins, he binds himself to eternal penalty. But when

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divine mercy justifies [him], it remits all the fault and the guilt of the eternal penalty, which inseparably[^9] adheres to the fault. But because mercy cannot prejudice justice, whose office is to punish evils; therefore it so absolves from fault and penalty that he nevertheless remains bound to some small temporal penalty. But since the sinner had offended Him and had also done damage to His Church; the Lord committed the judiciary power over sinners to the rectors of the Church and entrusted [matters] to them as to arbiters, so that thus the will of God might be made known to the penitent through priests, and through them a penalty might be imposed upon sinners, and satisfaction be made to the Lord *principally* and to the Church *consequently*. Hence satisfaction for sin is properly made to God himself, yet through the Church and in the Church[^10]. — And I concede the reasons adduced for this.

1. To the objection therefore that half a pardon is not to be hoped for; it must be said that a pardon is then halved when one mortal [sin] is remitted and the rest is retained; and this is unfitting, to posit that God, who is just, could be in covenant and reconciled with a man remaining in his injustice; otherwise He would be at once friend and enemy! But it is not so concerning some small temporal penalty, because the obligation to a penalty does not constitute injustice in one who wills to discharge it.

2. To the objection that in contrition He remits the eternal penalty; it must be said that this is because there relaxing mercy operates principally, but in satisfaction justice, while in confession both, whence it holds, as it were, a middle [place]; in sign of which there occurs there a binding and a loosing. And therefore it is not similar.

3. To the objection that contrition can be so great that the whole is remitted; it must be said that this is true; but because it is not established to the Church, therefore [a penalty] must be imposed by the priest. But if it were established to the priest, he would reckon entire satisfaction to have been made him, and then he would impose no penalty, but would absolve the [already] absolved one. But now in some cases he is deceived, yet the deception is fruitful — because merits are always accumulated — both for the Church imposing [the penalty] and for the one further making satisfaction; for since the Lord does not wish [to exact] beyond the principal, the remainder is held stored up in the treasuries of the Church.

4. To the objection that confession is for the sake of reconciliation; it must be said that it is not only for this, but for arbitrating the penalty between man and God; which being discharged, then a perfect reconciliation occurs.

5. To the objection that the Church absolves from the greater part; it must be said that this is not by remitting, but by paying for it from its treasuries; or because God has fully entrusted [the matter] to those to whom He handed over the fullness of power. But which of these is the more true will be seen below, when relaxations are treated of.

la: Vide supra pag. 350, nota 1. — Post *definit* edd. cum non paucis codd. addunt *satisfacere.*

en: See above, p. 350, note 1. — After *definit* the editions, together with not a few codices, add *satisfacere.*

la: Libr. IX. Moral. c. 34. n. 34: *Aut enim ipse hoc* [delictum] *homo in se poenitens punit, aut hoc Deus cum homine vindicans percutit.* Cfr. August., Serm. 19. n. 2. et Serm. 20. n. 2. (alias 4. et 3. ex Sirmond.), nec non Serm. 29. (alias 3. de Diversis) c. 6. n. 6. Vide tom. II. pag. 813, nota 8. — In maiori pro *illi fit* cod. P *illi est facienda.*

en: *Morals* book IX, c. 34, n. 34: *For either man, penitent, punishes this* [offense] *in himself, or God, taking vengeance with man, smites it.* Cf. Augustine, *Sermon* 19, n. 2 and *Sermon* 20, n. 2 (otherwise 4 and 3, from Sirmond), as also *Sermon* 29 (otherwise 3, *On Various Matters*) c. 6, n. 6. See vol. II, p. 813, note 8. — In the larger [text], for *illi fit* codex P [reads] *illi est facienda.*

la: Secundum Augustinum; cfr. tom. II. pag. 839, nota 4. Ps. 50, 6: *Tibi soli peccavi* etc. — Pro *rebus* codd. FG *bonis.*

en: According to Augustine; cf. vol. II, p. 839, note 4. Ps. 50:6: *Against thee only have I sinned* etc. — For *rebus* codices FG [read] *bonis.*

la: Ephes. 5, 2: *Tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem* etc. Edd. cum pluribus codd. pro *semetipsum* substituunt *semel se ipsum*, respicientes Hebr. 7, 27. et 9, 12.

en: Eph. 5:2: *He delivered himself for us, an offering* etc. The editions, together with several codices, for *semetipsum* substitute *semel se ipsum*, looking to Heb. 7:27 and 9:12.

la: Vide supra pag. 350, nota 1.

en: See above, p. 350, note 1.

la: Sicut insinuat August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 15. n. 44. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 770, nota 1. — Edd. *transgredi contra Deum* simpliciter; et hoc est inconveniens, quia si hoc, *universum fieret inordinatum.*

en: As Augustine insinuates, *On Free Choice* III, c. 15, n. 44. Cf. vol. II, p. 770, note 1. — The editions [read] *transgredi contra Deum* simply; and this is unfitting, because if this, *the universe would become disordered.*

la: Hic c. 7. Edd. cum textu originali post *iustus est* addunt *et iustitia.*

en: Here c. 7. The editions, together with the original text, after *iustus est* add *et iustitia.*

la: De maiori cfr. III. Sent. d. 11. a. 1. q. 2, et d. 20. q. 5. Vide etiam infra d. 43. a. 1. q. 1, ubi similis quaestio de resurrectione instituitur.

en: On the larger [point] cf. *Sentences* III, d. 11, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 20, q. 5. See also below, d. 43, a. 1, q. 1, where a similar question concerning the resurrection is set up.

la: In cod. X additur *aeterna.* Superius pro *qui inseparabiliter* cod. bb *quae inseparabiliter.* Inferius post *ipsum* Vat. supplet *Deum.*

en: In codex X there is added *aeterna.* Above, for *qui inseparabiliter* codex bb [reads] *quae inseparabiliter.* Below, after *ipsum* the Vatican [edition] supplies *Deum.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 17. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 18. p. I. a. 2. q. 2, ubi etiam soluti. ad 2. et 5. insinuatur. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7, et Comment. p. 1. q. 2. — Mox pro *peccator* edd. *peccatum*, quae etiam in fine arg. addunt *scilicet per satisfactionem.*

en: Cf. below, d. 17, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 18, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, where the solutions to [objections] 2 and 5 are also intimated. — See here the text of the Master, c. 7, and the Commentary, p. 1, q. 2. — Presently, for *peccator* the editions [read] *peccatum*, which also at the end of the argument add *scilicet per satisfactionem.* ---

latin_scholion:
Scholion in articulum I (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — *The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.*

---

english_scholion:
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — *Scholion in articulum I (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.*

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{363,364}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 41554–41656) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/IV override, the PDF bands are authoritative throughout: this question's OCR is heavily two-column-interleaved (the page's pro/contra text columns bleed line-for-line in the OCR), so the bands carried the reconstruction. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (printed 363–364 = PDF 383–384).

**Page-verify.** Running heads confirmed on the bands: p. 363 = "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 363" (right running head reads "…UAEST. II. 363"); p. 364 = "364 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." All match the assigned distinction/pars/article/question.

**Opener alignment.** Confirmed: the q2 opener reads "QUAESTIO II. *Cui sit satisfaciendum.* Secundo quaeritur, cui sit facienda satisfactio. Et quod Deo, videtur …" — matches the assigned "Secundo quaeritur" question of Art I, q2.

**Page span / split map.** This question spans printed pages **363–364** (the dispatch's "~362–363" was off by one: p. 362 holds the tail of Quaestio I — its Conclusio/Respondeo "Augustini definitio explicatur…" and the Q-I scholion runs into p. 363's top-right column).
- p. 363: QUAESTIO II header (begins in the page's right column, after Q1's scholion), opener, pro-arguments 1–6 ("quod Deo"), the *Contra* block (unnumbered Augustinus arg. + numbered 2–5 arguing "soli Ecclesiae"), Conclusio, and the Respondeo's opening ("Dicendum, quod cum peccator peccat… Cum autem"), breaking at the page foot.
- p. 363 → 364 boundary inside the Respondeo ("Cum autem" | "divina misericordia iustificat…").
- p. 364: Respondeo completes; Solutiones *Ad 1*–*Ad 5*; then QUAESTIO III. ("Per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio." / "Tertio quaeritur") opens at the page foot — this question ends just before it (raw line 41657).

**Footer-ownership (apparatus, 10 entries owned here).**
- p. 363: **8 footers** — `^1` (arg. 1 *Anselmus*), `^2` (arg. 2 *Gregorius*), `^3` (arg. 3 *peccatum est…*), `^4` (arg. 4 *oblationem et hostiam Deo*), `^5` (arg. 5 *contra fidem*), `^6` (arg. 6 *inordinatum*), `^7` (*Contra* *in littera*), `^8` (contra-arg. 2 *improportionaliter*).
- p. 364: **only `^9`–`^10` belong here** — `^9` (Respondeo *inseparabiliter*) and `^10` (Respondeo *per Ecclesiam et in Ecclesia*). **Hand-off:** the remaining p. 364 footers (the Gregorius *Homil. 20*, *ergo per poenam satisfacit*, *secundum Augustinum cfr. pag. 363 nota 6*, *Moral. XXIV*, *Quaest. 1. et d. 14 p. II dub. 6*, *Cur Deus homo*) all anchor in **Quaestio III**'s body — the a1-q3 chunk must claim them (the p. 364 sequence restarts numbering at the Q III args/fundamenta).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`, but **q2 renders none of its own**: per the dispatch instruction, the Articulus I SCHOLION (covering q1–q3) is rendered with **Quaestio I** (a1-q1). The `### Scholion` slot here holds a one-line Latin+English cross-reference. No standalone "SCHOLION." header occurs inside the raw range 41554–41656 (verified) — the Q1-scholion tail visible at the top of p. 363's right column belongs to Quaestio I.

**[?] flags.** No unresolved transcription `[?]` flags. Silent OCR corrections reconciled against the PDF bands (OCR was two-column-interleaved): the pro/contra argument split, the *Contra* Augustinus citation, and the Respondeo's *principaliter…per consequens* / *thesauris Ecclesiae* development were all read from the bands. Margin side-rubrics in both columns (*Definitio Anselmi*, *Quaestio incidens*, *Conclusio*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Fundamenta*, *Nota*) are editorial side-notes, omitted from the body per corpus convention.