title: Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
#### *De modo divinae cognitionis.*

Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de modo divinae cognitionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat se et alia uniformiter.

Secundo, utrum cognoscat mutabilia immutabiliter.

Tertio, utrum cognoscat omnia praesenter.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus eodem modo cognoscat se et alia a se.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem cognoscat se et alia eodem modo sive uniformiter, ostenditur sic.

1. Scientia Dei est sua essentia, et suum scire est suum esse, ergo et modus cognoscendi est modus essendi; sed unus est modus essendi in Deo essentialis: ergo et unus modus cognoscendi.

2. Item, Deus se ipso et non alio cognoscit se, et se ipso et non alio cognoscit alia[^1], ergo una et eadem ratione cognoscit se et alia; sed modus cognoscendi attenditur penes rationem cognoscendi: ergo si est eadem ratio cognoscendi se et alia, et idem modus, et sic etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per impossibile, quia si alio modo cognoscit se, alio modo creaturas: ergo cum cognoscit se et creaturas, variatur in cognoscendo; ergo apud Deum est transmutatio et vicissitudinis obumbratio[^2].

4. Item, si alio modo, tunc ego quaero: aut modus ille est Creator, aut creatura. Non creatura, quia cognitio et modus cognoscendi est aeternus; si Creator, aut dicit quid personale, aut quid essentiale. Non personale, quia omnis cognitio est communis tribus, ergo dicit quid essentiale: ergo si alius et alius modus, ergo alia et alia essentia; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo et primum.

**Contra:**

1. Deus cognoscendo alia a se, cognoscit per ideam, se autem non cognoscit per ideam[^3]: ergo si cognoscere per ideam dicit modum cognitionis, et se non cognoscit per ideam, patet quod alio modo cognoscendi; et sic etc.

2. Item, in cognitione, qua Deus cognoscit se, idem est cognoscens et cognitum et ratio cognoscendi; sed in cognitione, qua cognoscit creaturam, non est idem ratio cognoscendi cum cognito: ergo non idem modus[^4].

3. Item, nihil commune est Creatori et creaturae secundum rationem essendi, ergo neque secundum rationem cognoscendi: cum ergo aliud sit esse creaturae quam Creatoris, et alius modus essendi: ergo alia cognitione et alio modo cognoscitur[^5] quam Creator. Si ergo alio modo cognoscitur a Deo, et idem est creaturam cognosci et Deum cognoscere, ergo Deus alio modo cognoscit se et alia.

4. Item, omnis cognitio, in qua cognitum est nobilius, praesentius et intelligibilius, est cognitio nobilior, scilicet quantum ad rem et modum. Quantum ad rem, quia de re magis nobili; quantum ad modum, quia de re praesentiori. Sed in cognitione, qua Deus cognoscit se, cognitum est nobilius, praesentius et intelligibilius quam in cognitione creaturae: ergo nobilior cognitio quantum ad rem et modum.

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### Conclusio.

> *Una cognitione et eodem modo cognoscit Deus se et alia a se.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est quaedam cognitio, quae causatur et ortum habet a cognoscibili: et haec, quoniam a cognoscibili causatur et dependet, variatur secundum exigentiam cognoscibilis quantum ad rem et modum. Est et alia cognitio, quae secundum rem idem est quod cognoscens et a cognoscibili non causatur nec dependet: et haec accipit identitatem quantum ad rem et modum a parte cognoscentis, non a parte cogniti.

Quoniam igitur divina cognitio a rebus non dependet nec causatur, sed est idem quod Deus, et Deus eadem essentia et eodem modo se habens: ideo una cognitione et eodem modo cognoscit Deus se et alia a se, quia per se ipsum nullo modo variatum nec diversificatum.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod per respectum ad cognoscentem cognitio eodem modo comparatur et eodem modo est, quia secundum illam comparationem habet esse[^6]; et sic procedunt primae rationes ostendentes, quod eodem modo cognoscit se et alia. Per respectum ad cognitum, licet sit eodem modo, tamen alio modo comparatur: nam ad Deum secundum rationem identitatis, ad creaturam secundum rationem diversitatis et causalitatis, et ideo ad creaturam secundum rationem ideandi, ad Deum vero minime; et hoc probant rationes inductae ad secundam partem, quod alio modo comparatur, et hoc modo concedendum est. Si ergo inferat quod alio modo sit, ratio non valet, quia cognitio Dei non recipit modum essendi nec nobilitatem a cognito.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Et sic patent duo obiecta de idea et diversitate.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, quod nihil est commune Creatori et creaturae; dicendum, quod verum est de communitate secundum eandem comparationem; sed secundum aliam et aliam nihil prohibet, quod aliquid sit veritas creaturae et similitudo Dei, similiter, quod aliquid sit veritas Dei et similitudo creaturae. Et quoniam ratio cognoscendi accipitur penes utrumque modum, ideo cognitio potest esse communis.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, dicendum, quod tenet, cum cognitio causatur a cognito; non autem tenet cum non causatur, sicut in proposito.

english:
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### Article II.
#### *On the mode of divine cognition.*

Consequently there is a question about the second article, namely, on the mode of divine cognition. And concerning this three things are asked.

First, it is asked whether God knows himself and other things uniformly.

Second, whether he knows mutable things immutably.

Third, whether he knows all things presentially.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God knows himself and other things in the same way.*

That he knows himself and other things in the same way, that is, uniformly, is shown thus.

1. The knowledge of God is his essence, and his to-know is his to-be; therefore the mode of knowing also is the mode of being; but there is one essential mode of being in God: therefore there is also one mode of knowing.

2. Likewise, God knows himself by himself and not by another, and he knows other things by himself and not by another[^1]; therefore he knows himself and other things by one and the same *ratio*; but the mode of knowing is taken according to the *ratio* of knowing: therefore if there is the same *ratio* of knowing himself and other things, [there is] also the same mode, and so on.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] *per impossibile*, because if he knows himself in another way [and] creatures in another way: therefore when he knows himself and creatures, he is varied in knowing; therefore in God there is transmutation and the shadow of vicissitude[^2].

4. Likewise, if [he knows] in another way, then I ask: either that mode is the Creator, or a creature. Not a creature, since the cognition and the mode of knowing is eternal; if [it is] the Creator, [it expresses] either something personal, or something essential. Not something personal, since every cognition is common to the three; therefore it expresses something essential: therefore if [there is] one mode and another, then [there is] one essence and another; but this is impossible: therefore also the first [is impossible].

**On the contrary:**

1. God, by knowing things other than himself, knows through an idea, but he does not know himself through an idea[^3]: therefore if to know through an idea expresses the mode of cognition, and he does not know himself through an idea, it is plain that [he knows himself] in another mode of knowing; and so on.

2. Likewise, in the cognition by which God knows himself, the knower and the known and the *ratio* of knowing are the same; but in the cognition by which he knows the creature, the *ratio* of knowing is not the same as the known: therefore not the same mode[^4].

3. Likewise, nothing is common to the Creator and the creature according to the *ratio* of being, therefore neither according to the *ratio* of knowing: since therefore the being of the creature is other than that of the Creator, and another mode of being [obtains]: therefore [the creature] is known by another cognition and in another mode[^5] than the Creator. If therefore [the creature] is known by God in another mode, and to know the creature and to know God are the same [act], then God knows himself and other things in another mode.

4. Likewise, every cognition in which the known is more noble, more present, and more intelligible is a more noble cognition, namely as regards the thing and the mode. As regards the thing, since [it is] of a more noble thing; as regards the mode, since [it is] of a more present thing. But in the cognition by which God knows himself, the known is more noble, more present, and more intelligible than in the cognition of the creature: therefore [it is] a more noble cognition as regards the thing and the mode.

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### Conclusion.

> *By one cognition and in the same way God knows himself and the things other than himself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain cognition which is caused and takes its origin from the knowable: and this one, since it is caused by and depends on the knowable, is varied according to the requirement of the knowable as regards thing and mode. There is also another cognition which according to the thing is the same as the knower and is neither caused nor depends on the knowable: and this one receives identity as regards thing and mode from the side of the knower, not from the side of the known.

Since therefore divine cognition does not depend on things and is not caused [by them], but is the same as God, and God is keeping himself in the same essence and in the same mode: therefore by one cognition and in the same way God knows himself and the things other than himself, since [he is] in no way varied or diversified through himself.

For the understanding of the objections, however, it must be noted that with respect to the knower the cognition is compared in the same way and is in the same way, since according to that comparison it has being[^6]; and so the first arguments proceed, showing that he knows himself and other things in the same way. With respect to the known, although it is in the same way, yet it is compared in another way: for to God [it is compared] according to the *ratio* of identity, to the creature according to the *ratio* of diversity and of causality, and therefore to the creature according to the *ratio* of being-an-idea-[for], but to God by no means; and this the arguments adduced for the second part prove, that it is compared in another way, and in this way it must be conceded. If therefore one infers that it is in another way, the argument is not valid, since the cognition of God does not receive its mode of being or nobility from the known.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1. 2.* And so the two objects [of the cognition] — concerning idea and diversity — are made plain.

*To 3.* To that which is objected in the third [argument], that nothing is common to the Creator and the creature; it must be said that [this] is true of community according to the same comparison; but according to one and another [comparison] nothing prohibits that something be a truth of the creature and a likeness of God, and likewise that something be a truth of God and a likeness of the creature. And since the *ratio* of knowing is taken according to either mode, the cognition can be common.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that [it] holds when the cognition is caused by the known; but it does not hold when it is not caused, as in [the present] case.

la: Cfr. Aristot., XII. *Metaph.* text. 39. et 51. (XI. c. 7. et 9.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, text 39 and 51 (XI, c. 7 and 9).

la: *Iacob.* 1, 17: *Apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio.*

en: *James* 1:17: "With whom there is no transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude."

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. et seqq.

en: Cf. above d. 35, q. 1, and following.

la: Supple cum cod. Z *cognoscendi*. Immediate ergo non cod. V *ergo nec*.

en: Supply with codex Z *cognoscendi* ["of knowing"]. Immediately following, in place of *ergo non*, codex V [reads] *ergo nec* ["therefore neither"].

la: Intellige cum cod. Q (in marg.) *creatura*.

en: Understand with codex Q (in margin) *creatura* ["the creature"].

la: In codd. L repetitur *a Deo*.

en: In codices L there is repeated *a Deo* ["from God"].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod ex parte *cognoscentis* uno eodemque modo et eadem ratione cognoscendi Deus omnia cognoscat, evincitur ex illo axiomate (in fine corp.), quod «*cognitio Dei non recipit modum essendi et nobilitatem a cognito*» (cfr. supra d. 38. q. 4. ad 4, q. 6. ad 2.). Hoc cohaeret cum alio principio: Quidquid recipitur per modum recipientis recipitur, licet *receptio* alicuius rei ab extra nullo modo dici possit de Deo, cuius intellectus est substantia et actus purissimus. — In solut. ad 3. dicitur, quod *veritas creaturae* potest esse similitudo Dei, quod explicatur supra d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1, q. 2. ad 3. 4; et quod *veritas Dei* est similitudo creaturae, de quo vide d. 35. q. 1. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 2. a. 1. 3, m. 4. a. 4. — Scot., I. *Report.* d. 36. q. 4; *de Primo principio*, c. 4. concl. 9; *Collat.* 21. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 1. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 14. a. 3. et in seqq. passim; *S. c. Gent.* I. c. 46. et passim; *de Verit.* q. 2. a. 13. — B. Albert., hic a. 2, d. 36. a. 3; tr. 15. q. 60. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 7. in solut. ad argg. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. d. 38. princ. 1. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 40. q. 45. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 1. — Biel, I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 2. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That on the part of *the knower* God knows all things by one and the same mode and the same *ratio* of knowing, is established from that axiom (at the end of the corpus), that "*the cognition of God does not receive its mode of being and nobility from the known*" (cf. above d. 38, q. 4, ad 4; q. 6, ad 2). This coheres with another principle: Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver, although the *reception* of any thing from outside cannot in any way be said of God, whose intellect is substance and most pure act. — In the solution to [obj.] 3 it is said that *the truth of the creature* can be a likeness of God, which is explained above at d. 3, p. I, q. 1, ad 1; q. 2, ad 3, 4; and that *the truth of God* is a likeness of the creature, on which see d. 35, q. 1, 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 2, a. 1, 3, m. 4, a. 4. — Scot., I *Report.* d. 36, q. 4; *On the First Principle*, c. 4, concl. 9; *Collat.* 21. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 38, q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 14, a. 3, and in the following [questions] passim; *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 46, and passim; *de Veritate* q. 2, a. 13. — B. Albert, here a. 2, d. 36, a. 3; tr. 15, q. 60, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 7, in solut. ad argg. — Aegid. R., on this and the following question, d. 38, princ. 1, q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 40, q. 45. — Durand., I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 1. — Biel, I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 2, 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum Deus mutabilia immutabiliter cognoscat.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat mutabilia immutabiliter. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Dionysii *de Divinis Nominibus*[^1]: «Cognoscit Deus omnia immaterialiter materialia, impartite partita, uniformiter multa, immutabiliter mutabilia».

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2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Eius scientia inamissibilis est et invariabilis»; sed omne tale immutabile: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *ratione*, quia quod nobilius est Deo attribuendum est; sed nobilior est cognitio, qua cognoscitur res immutabiliter, quam qua cognoscitur mutabiliter: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum eius, in quo est[^3], et hoc verum est maxime in Deo, in quo omne quod est, est ipsum sive Deus: ergo cum scientia rerum et ipsae res cognitae sint in Deo, et ipse sit omnino immutabilis: ergo in Deo immutabiliter.

5. Item, ad hoc est ratio Augustini[^4], *ducens ad impossibile*: «Dei enim scire est suum esse, et scientia sua est sua essentia»: si ergo sciret mutabiliter, esset mutabilis, quod omnino in ipso est impossibile.

6. Item, ubi est mutabilitas, ibi nulla est certitudo, si ergo Deus sciret res mutabiliter, sciret incerte; sed incertitudo est conditio dedecorans cognitionem: ergo non haberet Dei cognitio perfectam nobilitatem.

**Contra:** 1. Cum res est praesens, scit Deus, eam esse praesentem; et cum praeterita, scit eam esse praeteritam; et cum est futura, scit eam esse futuram, non praeteritam: ergo videtur, quod sicut nos cognoscimus res mutabiliter, ita et Deus cognoscat[^5].

2. Item, ad hoc quod scientia sit vera, necesse est, scibile et scientiam proportionari, alioquin non est vera scientia: cum igitur mutabilis ad immutabile non sit proportio, sed mutabilis ad mutabile, ergo Deus non cognoscit res mutabiles immutabiliter, sed mutabiliter; alioquin non vere cognosceret, ut videtur.

3. Item, «quidquid scitur, est verum»[^6], ergo quod immutabiliter scitur, immutabiliter est verum; sed res mutabiles non habent veritatem immutabilem: ergo non possunt sciri immutabiliter.

4. Item, quia res sunt contingentes, ideo Deum praescire futura contingentia est contingens, sicut in praecedentibus ostensum est[^7]; ergo quia res sunt mutabiles, Deum scire res mutabiles est mutabile: ergo mutabiliter cognoscit Deus mutabilia. Aut si non est hoc verum, quaero quare non? Et *iterum*, quomodo potest illud intelligi, quod rei mutabilis sit scientia immutabilis?

### Conclusio.

> *Deus mutabilia cognoscit immutabiliter secundum actum sciendi, licet res secundum actum essendi sint mutabiles.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus sciat res immutabiliter, hoc est dupliciter: quia haec dispositio[^8] *immutabiliter* potest determinare actum *sciendi Dei*, vel actum *essendi rerum*. Si actum *sciendi Dei*, sic omnino verum est, quod immutabiliter scit, quia circa eius actum et cognitionem non cadit *transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio*[^9]. Si autem determinet actum *essendi rerum*, sic falsum est de rebus mutabilibus, quia Deus scit eas mutabiles et novit ipsarum mutabilitatem, et scit, se habere nunc aliter[^10] quam prius; sed tamen *novit immutabiliter*.

Et ratio huius est, quoniam in eius cognitione non est *receptio*, non est *successio*, nec est *oblivio*; et ideo, quantumcumque res sint mutabiles, ipse[^11] non mutatur in cognoscendo mutabilitatem earum. Et quamvis nullum sit simile, potest tamen *cogitari*, si intelligatur vel cogitetur oculus fixus in pariete, qui se ipso videat transeuntes sine receptione et unico aspectu omnes videat et omnes motus ipsorum, quantumcumque res mutentur, tamen nec oculus mutatur nec eius cognitio; et sic est in Deo[^12]. *Exemplum* autem ad hoc intelligendum potest sumi a contrario sic. Quia enim *scientia causata* pendet a scibili, et non e converso, ideo potest esse mutatio circa *scientiam* per oblivionem et errorem et successivam considerationem, nulla facta mutatione in *scibili*. Sic contrario modo[^13], quia *scientia divina* non pendet ex re scita, potest esse mutatio circa *scibile*, nulla mutatione existente in divina *scientia*; et tamen illa scientia totum scit.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad primo obiectum de hoc quod scit fuisse, et esse. Dicendum enim, quod hoc dicit mutationem a parte *scibilis*, non *scientiae*.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de proportione, dicendum, quod in specialibus conditionibus non oportet proportionari etiam scientiam causatam, quia rei corporalis est scientia spiritualis; sed sufficit, quod sit proportio in veritate.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid scitur, est verum; ergo quod scitur immutabiliter, immutabiliter est verum; dicendum, quod hoc est *accidens*. Quamvis enim scientia respectu veritatis in scito de ratione suae intentionis generalis, maxime scientia respectu enuntiabilis; tamen scientia non dicit semper conformitatem in immutabilitate, maxime divina scientia, quae a scibili non dependet.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod futurum contingens non praescit Deus necessario; dicendum, quod non est simile tum ex parte *actus praesciendi*, tum ex parte *dispositionis*. Ex parte *actus* non est simile, quia *praescire* semper notat rei eventum; sed *scire* non semper connotat rei existentiam; scit enim Deus quae potest facere, et nunquam faciet. *Praeterea*, non est simile de *dispositione*, quia *modus* immutabilitatis respicit *actum*, sed *contingens* respicit non tantum *actum*, sed *ordinationem* ad futurum; et *actus* quidem divinae cognitionis est immutabilis et necessarius, sed comparatio ad futurum contingens est contingens.

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english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether God knows changeable things unchangeably.*

Secondly it is asked whether God knows changeable things unchangeably. And that this is so, is shown:

1. *First* by the authority of Dionysius *On the Divine Names*[^1]: "God knows all things — material things immaterially, partite things impartitely, many things uniformly, changeable things unchangeably."

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2. Likewise, Augustine in book XV *On the Trinity*[^2]: "His knowledge is unlosable and invariable"; but everything of this sort is unchangeable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same point is shown by *reason*, since what is more noble must be attributed to God; but more noble is the cognition by which a thing is known unchangeably than that by which it is known changeably: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, what is in something is in it according to the mode of that in which it is[^3], and this is true most of all in God, in whom everything that is, is himself or God: therefore, since the knowledge of things and the things known themselves are in God, and he is altogether unchangeable: therefore [they are] in God unchangeably.

5. Likewise, to this purpose is the argument of Augustine[^4], *leading to an impossible conclusion*: "For God's knowing is his being, and his knowledge is his essence": if therefore he were to know changeably, he would be changeable, which is altogether impossible in him.

6. Likewise, where there is changeability, there is no certitude; if therefore God were to know things changeably, he would know with uncertainty; but uncertainty is a condition disgracing cognition: therefore the cognition of God would not have perfect nobility.

**On the contrary:** 1. When the thing is present, God knows that it is present; and when past, he knows that it is past; and when it is future, he knows that it is future, not past: therefore it seems that, just as we know things changeably, so also does God know [them][^5].

2. Likewise, in order that knowledge be true, it is necessary that the knowable and the knowledge be proportioned, otherwise it is not true knowledge: since therefore there is no proportion between the changeable and the unchangeable, but between changeable and changeable, therefore God does not know changeable things unchangeably, but changeably; otherwise he would not know truly, as it seems.

3. Likewise, "whatever is known, is true"[^6], therefore what is known unchangeably is unchangeably true; but changeable things do not have unchangeable truth: therefore they cannot be known unchangeably.

4. Likewise, since things are contingent, therefore for God to foreknow contingent futures is contingent, as has been shown in the preceding [questions][^7]; therefore since things are changeable, for God to know changeable things is changeable: therefore God knows changeable things changeably. Or if this is not true, I ask why not? And *again*, how can this be understood, that of a changeable thing there is unchangeable knowledge?

### Conclusion.

> *God knows changeable things unchangeably according to the act of knowing, although things, according to the act of being, are changeable.*

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether God knows things unchangeably, this is twofold: because this disposition[^8] *unchangeably* can determine either the *act of God's knowing* or the *act of the things' being*. If [it determines] the *act of God's knowing*, then it is altogether true that he knows unchangeably, since concerning his act and cognition there falls no *transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude*[^9]. But if it determines the *act of the things' being*, then it is false in the case of changeable things, since God knows them as changeable and knows their changeability, and knows that he is now otherwise[^10] than before; yet nevertheless *he knows unchangeably*.

And the reason for this is that in his cognition there is no *reception*, no *succession*, nor any *forgetting*; and therefore, however much things are changeable, he himself[^11] is not changed in cognizing their changeability. And although there is no [perfect] likeness, it can yet be *thought*, if there be understood or imagined an eye fixed in a wall, which by itself would see those passing without reception and at one glance would see all things and all their motions: however much the things are changed, yet neither does the eye change nor its cognition; and so it is in God[^12]. An *example* for understanding this can be drawn from the contrary thus. For because *caused knowledge* depends on the knowable, and not vice versa, therefore there can be change concerning *knowledge* through forgetting and error and successive consideration, with no change made in the *knowable*. So in the contrary mode[^13], because *divine knowledge* does not depend on the thing known, there can be change concerning the *knowable*, with no change existing in the divine *knowledge*; and yet that knowledge knows the whole.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* And by this is plain the reply to what was first objected, concerning the fact that he knows it to have been and to be. For it must be said that this expresses change on the side of the *knowable*, not of the *knowledge*.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning proportion, it must be said that in special conditions it is not necessary that the caused knowledge also be proportioned, since of a corporeal thing there is spiritual knowledge; but it suffices that there be proportion in truth.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that whatever is known is true; therefore what is known unchangeably is unchangeably true; it must be said that this is *accidental*. For although knowledge has respect to the truth in the known by reason of its general intention, especially knowledge concerning the enunciable; yet knowledge does not always express conformity in unchangeability — most especially divine knowledge, which does not depend on the knowable.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that God does not foreknow the contingent future of necessity; it must be said that the case is not similar, both on the side of the *act of foreknowing* and on the side of the *disposition*. On the side of the *act* it is not similar, because *to foreknow* always notes the event of the thing; but *to know* does not always connote the existence of the thing; for God knows the things which he can do and which he will never do. *Moreover*, it is not similar concerning the *disposition*, because the *mode* of unchangeability respects the *act*, but the *contingent* respects not only the *act* but also the *ordering* toward the future; and the *act* indeed of divine cognition is unchangeable and necessary, but [its] comparison to a contingent future is contingent.

<!-- page 695 -->

la: Cap. 7. § 2: «Semel igitur divina sapientia cognoscens omnia, immaterialiter materialia, et non partite partitum, et multa universaliter (ἑνικῶς), ipso uno omnia et cognoscens et adducens».

en: Chapter 7, § 2: "Therefore at once the divine wisdom knowing all things — material things immaterially, partite [things] not-partitely, and many things universally (*henikōs*), by the one itself both knowing and bringing forth all."

la: Cap. 13. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Chapter 13, n. 22. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 625, nota 3. De ipso argumento cfr. August., XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 10. n. 2.

en: Cf. above page 625, note 3. On the argument itself cf. Augustine, *City of God* XI, c. 10, n. 2.

la: Libr. XV. *de Trin.* c. 13. n. 22, ubi principia huius argumenti habentur. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Book XV *On the Trinity* c. 13, n. 22, where the principles of this argument are had. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cod. V verbo *cognoscat* praemittit *eas*.

en: Codex V before the word *cognoscat* prefixes *eas* ["them"].

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2. Ipsa Philosophi verba habes supra pag. 690, nota 2.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2. The Philosopher's own words you have above on page 690, note 2.

en: Distinction 38, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Pro *dispositio* ed. 1 *dictio*, Vat. *determinatio*. Paulo ante pro *dupliciter eadem* Vat. *duplex*, cod. cc *haec est duplex*.

en: In place of *dispositio* edition 1 [reads] *dictio*, the Vatican *determinatio*. Shortly before, in place of *dupliciter eadem* the Vatican [reads] *duplex*, codex cc *haec est duplex*.

la: Pro *aliter* plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *cognitionem*; nonnulli codd. ut 1 (in marg.) et V retentae voci *aliter* praefigunt hanc vocem *cognitionem*, qua adiectione lectio redditur aequivoca.

en: In place of *aliter* very many codices with edition 1 incongruously [read] *cognitionem*; some codices, as 1 (in the margin) and V, retaining the word *aliter*, prefix to it this word *cognitionem*, by which addition the reading is rendered equivocal.

la: Codd. F S T cum ed. 1 *ipsa*. Mox post *nullum* ed. 1 inserit *exemplum*.

en: Codices F S T with edition 1 [read] *ipsa*. Soon after *nullum* edition 1 inserts *exemplum* ["example"].

la: Cfr. Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 6. Vide etiam S. Bonav., infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. 3.

en: Cf. Boethius, *Consolation [of Philosophy]* V, prose 6. See also St. Bonaventure, below d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, 2, 3.

la: Cod. O *Sic e contrario in Deo*.

en: Codex O [reads] *Sic e contrario in Deo* ["So conversely in God"].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius et sequentis quaestionis dependet a principio communiter recepto, quod Deus, cuius scientia non dependet a rebus, sicut nostra, res cognoscat non secundum modum earum, sed secundum modum suum; ergo mutabilia immutabiliter, contingentia infallibiliter, temporalia aeternaliter. — Inter antiquos Scholasticos hanc quaestionem specialiter tractant Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 6, qui rem aliis etiam exemplis a creaturis acceptis illustrat, et B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tr. 15. q. 60. m. 4. a. 1. partic. 5. De quibusdam difficultatibus a Scotistis obiectis supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in *Scholio* mentionem fecimus. — Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 4. notandum est, quod *praescientia futurorum* a *scientia mutabilium* duplici ex capite differt, scilicet ex parte *actus*, quia actus *praesciendi* connotat rei eventum, non actus *sciendi rei existentiam*; et ex parte *dispositionis*, quia in *praescientia* implicatur *ordinatio* eorum quae sunt contingentia, sed *scientia* per modum *immutabilitatis* tantum ipsum actum respicit.

Auctores: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 6. — S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 14. a. 15. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; *S.* p. I. tr. 15. q. 61. m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this and the following question depends on a principle commonly received: that God, whose knowledge does not depend on things as ours does, knows things not according to their mode, but according to his own mode; therefore he knows changeable things unchangeably, contingent things infallibly, temporal things eternally. — Among the older Scholastics, Alexander of Hales treats this question specifically, *S.* p. I. q. 23, m. 4, a. 6, who illustrates the matter with other examples drawn from creatures, and B. Albert, *S.* p. I, tr. 15, q. 60, m. 4, a. 1, particle 5. Concerning certain difficulties raised by the Scotists we have made mention above at d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, in the *Scholion*. — For understanding the solution to [argument] 4, it must be noted that *foreknowledge of futures* differs from *knowledge of changeable things* in a twofold respect, namely on the side of the *act*, since the act of *foreknowing* connotes the event of the thing, [and] not the act of *knowing* the existence of the thing; and on the side of the *disposition*, since in *foreknowledge* there is implicated the *ordering* of those things which are contingent, but *knowledge* through the mode of *unchangeability* respects only the act itself.

Authors: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 6. — St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 14, a. 15. — B. Albert, here a. 3; *S.* p. I, tr. 15, q. 61, m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. I, a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 38, q. 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 3

title_alt: Whether God knows all things simultaneously

source_text:
<!-- page 695 -->

### Articulus II.
#### *De cognitione divina ex parte cognitorum.*

### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum Deus cognoscat universa praesenter.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat omnia praesenter. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Secundae Petri* ultimo[^1] super illud: *Mille anni etc.*, Glossa: «In agnitione divinae veritatis praeterita et praesentia et futura aequaliter praesentia sunt».

2. Item, Augustinus *super Ioannem*[^2]: «In veritate, quae manet, praeteritum et futurum non invenio, sed solum praesens, et hoc incorruptum».

3. Item, quanto res est praesentior, tanto cognitio est nobilior, quia hoc facit ad nobilitatem cognitionis[^3]; sed Deus omnia cognoscit nobilissime: ergo omnia quae cognoscit, praesentissime cognoscit.

4. Item, si non cognoscit omnia praesenter, ergo non cognoscit omnia simul; quod si simul, tunc ergo in eodem nunc cognoscit omnia, et ita praesenter. Si autem non cognoscit simul, ergo unum post aliud; sed in omni tali cognitione est transmutatio: ergo in Dei cognitione caderet transmutatio, quod est omnino falsum et impossibile[^4].

**Contra:**

1. Praescientia non est nisi futuri, ut futurum est: ergo si Deus cognoscit omnia praesenter, ergo nihil omnino praescit; sed praescit, ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod improprie dicitur praescire; contra: in praescientia non sunt nisi duo, scilicet scientia et antecessio respectu cogniti; sed constat, quod in Deo proprie est scientia, constans est etiam, quod in ipso proprie est antecessio, quia proprie antecedit Deus omnia alia: ergo si cognoscit alia a se proprie, ergo Deus praescit alia[^5]: ergo responsio illa nulla est.

2. Item, omne praesens secundum statum suae praesentialitatis est necessarium: ergo si Deus omnia cognoscit praesenter et semper praesenter, ergo omnia cognoscit necessario. Sicut ergo quod praesens est non potest non esse, ita, si Deus aliquid praescit, necesse est praescivisse, et si praescivit, erit: ergo necesse est esse[^6].

3. Item, hoc ostenditur per impossibile, quia <!-- page 696 -->si omnia cognosceret praesenter, ergo plura simul; ergo simul se convertit ad multa; sed simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter se convertit: ergo cum unum intelligit, non potest in alterum.

4. Item, si cognoscit omnia praesenter: ergo simul scit duo contradictorie opposita; sed quidquid scitur est verum[^7]: ergo duo contradictorie opposita sunt simul vera.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus cognoscit omnia praesenter, tamen praesentialitas non accipienda est a parte cognitorum, sed cognoscentis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cognoscere omnia praesenter dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quod notetur praesentialitas a parte cognitorum, et sic est falsa, quia non cognoscit omnia esse vera praesenter et simul; aut ita, quod notetur praesentialitas a parte cognoscentis, et sic habet veritatem.

Et iterum, super omnes illas simul se convertit, et ita simul et praesenter cognoscit. Et iterum, praesens suae cognitionis est praesens simplicissimum, quod circumplectitur omnia tempora[^8].

Ex his tribus rationibus simul iunctis dicitur Deus omnia praesenter cognoscere. — Et rationes istae totum habent ex hoc, quod praesentialitas divinae cognitionis, quae quidem aeternitas est, est *simplex* et *infinita*. Quia simplex est, ideo semper praesens; quia infinita, ideo sunt ei omnia praesentia. Et exemplum huius ponitur in praesentialitate Dei quantum ad rerum existentiam, secundum quam Deus totus est in una[^9], et ita est in una, ut nihilominus sit et in alia; et hoc est, quia simplex et infinitus. — Ideo Deus iudicat, aliquid esse futurum, sed non futurum sibi; et omnia praesenter cognoscit, et tamen nihilominus *praescit*.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Et per hoc patet primum et secundum, quia procedunt, secundum quod praesentialitas est dispositio rei cognitae in sua natura, non in cognitione divina.

*Ad 3.* Patet etiam tertium, quia hoc[^10] est simplex et infinitum, et in uno multa cognoscit; ideo simul supra multa se convertit.

*Ad 4.* Quod obiicitur de oppositis, similiter patet, quia quamvis cognoscat opposita simul ex parte sua, tamen scit, unum alteri esse incompossibile, unum tamen alteri posse succedere.

english:
<!-- page 695 -->

### Article II.
#### *On the divine cognition from the side of the things known.*

### Question III.
#### *Whether God knows all things presentially.*

It is asked thirdly, whether God knows all things presentially. And that He does, is shown.

1. From *Second Peter*, last chapter[^1], on that text, *A thousand years etc.*, the Gloss: «In the recognition of divine truth, things past and present and future are equally present».

2. Likewise, Augustine *on John*[^2]: «In the truth which abides, I find no past or future, but only the present, and that incorrupt».

3. Likewise, the more present a thing is, the nobler the cognition, since this contributes to the nobility of cognition[^3]; but God knows all things in the noblest way: therefore, whatever He knows, He knows most presentially.

4. Likewise, if He does not know all things presentially, then He does not know them simultaneously; but if simultaneously, then in the same *now* He knows all things, and so presentially. If however He does not know them simultaneously, then one after another; but in every such cognition there is change: therefore in God's cognition there would fall change, which is altogether false and impossible[^4].

**On the contrary:**

1. Foreknowledge is only of the future as future: therefore if God knows all things presentially, He foreknows nothing at all; but He does foreknow, therefore etc. If you say that "to foreknow" is said improperly; against this: in foreknowledge there are only two things, namely knowledge and antecedence with respect to the thing known; but it is established that in God there is properly knowledge, and likewise established that in Him there is properly antecedence, since God properly precedes all other things: therefore if He properly knows things other than Himself, then God foreknows other things[^5]: therefore that response is null.

2. Likewise, every present thing, according to the state of its presentiality, is necessary: therefore if God knows all things presentially and always presentially, He knows all things necessarily. As, then, what is present cannot not be, so, if God foreknows something, it is necessary that He has foreknown it, and if He has foreknown it, it will be: therefore it is necessary that it be[^6].

3. Likewise, this is shown by impossibility, for <!-- page 696 -->if He knew all things presentially, then several at once; therefore He turns Himself simultaneously to many; but a simple [agent], to whatever it turns itself, turns itself wholly: therefore when He understands one thing, He cannot [turn] to another.

4. Likewise, if He knows all things presentially, then He knows simultaneously two contradictory opposites; but whatever is known is true[^7]: therefore two contradictory opposites are simultaneously true.

### Conclusion.

> *God knows all things presentially; nevertheless presentiality is not to be taken on the side of the things known, but of the knower.*

**I respond:** It must be said that "to know all things presentially" can be understood in two ways: either so that presentiality be noted on the side of the things known, and so it is false, since He does not know that all things are true presentially and simultaneously; or in such a way that presentiality be noted on the side of the knower, and thus it has truth.

And again, He turns Himself simultaneously over all those, and so simultaneously and presentially knows. And again, the present of His cognition is the most simple present, which embraces all times[^8].

From these three reasons, joined together, God is said to know all things presentially. — And these reasons all derive from this, that the presentiality of the divine cognition, which indeed is eternity, is *simple* and *infinite*. Because it is simple, therefore it is always present; because it is infinite, therefore all things are present to it. And the example of this is set forth in God's presentiality with respect to the existence of things, according to which God is wholly in one thing[^9], and is in one in such a way that nonetheless He is also in another; and this is because He is simple and infinite. — Therefore God judges that something is to be future, but not future to Him; and He knows all things presentially, and yet none the less He *foreknows*.

**Replies to the arguments on the negative side:**

*To 1, 2.* And by this the first and second are clear, since they proceed insofar as presentiality is the disposition of the thing known in its own nature, not in the divine cognition.

*To 3.* The third also is clear, since this[^10] is simple and infinite, and in one thing He knows many; therefore He turns Himself simultaneously upon many.

*To 4.* What is objected concerning opposites is likewise clear, since although He knows opposites simultaneously on His side, nevertheless He knows that one is incompossible with the other, yet that one can succeed to the other.

la: Vers. 8, ubi in Glossa Lyrani *virtutis* pro *veritatis*, et *constant* pro *sunt*.

en: Verse 8, where in the Gloss of Lyra *virtutis* stands for *veritatis*, and *constant* for *sunt*.

la: Tract. 38. n. 10, ubi in textu originali *incorruptibiliter* pro *incorruptum*.

en: Tractate 38, n. 10, where in the original text *incorruptibiliter* stands for *incorruptum*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3.

en: Cf. above d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3.

la: Vide de hoc argumento Boeth., V. *de Consolatione philosophiae*, prosa 6.

en: See on this argument Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, prose 6.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur conclusio: *ergo si cognoscit alia a se proprie, ergo Deus praescit alia.* Paulo ante pro *quia proprie* cod. W *qua proprie*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc the conclusion is lacking: *therefore if He properly knows things other than Himself, then God foreknows other things.* Shortly before, for *quia proprie*, codex W reads *qua proprie*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. I. c. 4.

en: Cf. Anselm, *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. I, c. 4.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 690, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 690, note 2.

la: Cfr. August., *83 Qq.* q. 17. et 19, nec non *in Ioan.* tract. 38. n. 10, et *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 101. n. 1, et in Psalm. 121. n. 6; Anselm., *Proslog.* c. 20, et *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. I. c. 6. — Paulo superius pro *quod* codd. A *quia*, et paulo inferius pro *totum* Vat. cum paucis mss. *ortum*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 17 and 19, and also *On John*, tractate 38, n. 10, and *Expositions on the Psalms* 101, n. 1, and on Psalm 121, n. 6; Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 20, and *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. I, c. 6. — A little above, for *quod* codices A read *quia*, and a little below, for *totum* the Vatican edition with a few manuscripts reads *ortum*.

la: Pro *una* cod. M *unaquaque re*.

en: For *una* codex M reads *unaquaque re*.

la: Scilicet illud simplex, quod totaliter se convertit super obiectum suae cognitionis; et loquitur de Deo.

en: Namely that simple [agent] which wholly turns itself upon the object of its cognition; and he is speaking of God.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Deum omnia cognoscere praesenter, ab omnibus theologis catholicis docetur; sed multum disputatum est de duabus quaestionibus connexis, quarum prima est, quomodo ista praesentia sit intelligenda; secunda vero, utrum eadem sit Deo ratio cognoscendi res creatas.

Quoad primam quaestionem S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 14. a. 13, q. 57. a. 3; *S. c. Gent.* I. c. 66. 67; *de Verit.* q. 2. a. 13; I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. unica, c. S.) docet: «Omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia non solum ea ratione, qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate» (*Sum.* I. q. 14. a. 13.). Haec secunda ratio multis displicuit, inter quos Petrus Ioan. Olivi Ord. Min. eo progressus est, ut illam sententiam tanquam *haereticam* censuraverit. At econtra censores ipsius Petri Ioannis hanc censuram reprobarunt ut *erroneam* (D'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* tom. I. pag. 229, ed. Paris. 1728). Etiam Scotus (hic. q. unica, n. 9.) non nisi primam illam rationem praesentialitatis admittit et docet, quod infinita aeternitatis duratio, quae omne tempus supergreditur, non nisi potentia, minime autem actu relationem coexistentiae ad res futuras habeat; quippe quia, quod non existit, nullatenus coexistere, vel fundamentum relationis coexistentiae esse possit. Scoto favet etiam Alex. Hal. (*S.* I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3.), eumque sequuntur non tantum Durandus et Nominales, sed etiam plurimi posteriores theologi ex omnibus fere scholis.

Nihilominus sententiam S. Thomae, recte intellectam, verissimam Deoque dignissimam reputamus et omnino confor<!-- page 697 -->mem doctrinae S. Augustini, S. Gregorii, S. Anselmi et S. Bonaventurae. Tota difficultas versatur circa rectam intelligentiam huius profundae positionis. Unde haec pauca praenotamus.

1. Aliud est *nunc* (sive instans praesens) temporis, aliud *nunc* aevi, aliud *nunc* aeternitatis, ut bene explicat Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. 1. q. 13. m. 9. a. 1. § 3.). Sufficit hic dicere, quod *nunc* temporis est instans indivisibile, raptim fugiens, quod copulat tempus prius cum posteriore; *nunc* aeternitatis est ipsa aeternitas, quae ratione infinitae simplicitatis est tota simul et indivisibilis, et hac ratione similis instanti indivisibili temporis, ratione vero immensitatis illimitatae omnes durationes temporis et aevi eminentissime in se complectitur et superexcedit.

2. Intellectio divina, cum sit substantia, eandem mensuram habet, quam ipsa divina substantia, unde etiam «praesentialitas divinae cognitionis, quae quidem aeternitas est, est *simplex* et *infinita*» (hic in corp.). Intellectio autem humana, quae est accidens, mensuratur tempore, substantia autem animae mensuratur aevo.

3. Alia est praesentia, qua res corporales, vel in genere res, quae tempore mensurantur, sibi coexistunt, alia, qua *Deus* rebus coexistit, alia, qua res temporales et differentiae temporis Deo coexistunt. Ut res corporales sibi sint praesentes, praeter indistantiam loci requiritur, ut simul sint in eodem instanti temporis, cuius mensura dilabitur per partes sibi succedentes sive per differentias praeteritorum et futurorum, et non est nisi in instanti. Unde in hac coexistentia pars durationis succedentis est extra aliam eius partem, et nullum instans potest coexistere nisi *uni soli* instanti durationis rei coexistentis. Si mensura utriusque durationis est aequalis et in eodem fluxu temporis, tunc tota duratio unius coexistit toti durationi alterius, sed ita, ut pars unius durationis tantum parti alterius coexistat. Si autem mensura utriusque est diversa, tunc non tantum secundum partes, sed etiam ex parte sibi coexistunt, vel nullatenus coexistunt. V. g. mensura horae coexistit quidem mensurae anni, cuius est pars, sed tamen nec toti anno, nec parti eius proportionatae indivisim, sed per successionem partium.

Aliter Deum coexistere omnibus rebus et mensuris temporum et locorum, manifestum est. Tota aeternitas existit per modum unius indivisibilis instantis, sine successione permanens et omnes successiones et mensuras temporis actu complectens et excedens. Sic est mensura divinae vitae et actionis ad intra; sic mensurat etiam omnes ad extra creatarum rerum mensuras; unde in eodem simplicissimo et immenso *nunc* aeternitatis coexistit omnibus rebus, non tantum iis quae in mensura temporis sunt praesentes temporali *nunc* vel cuidam parti aeternitatis quam nos imaginamur, sed etiam iis quae in mensura temporis et loci ab invicem distant secundum differentiam praeteritorum et futurorum. Immensa et indivisa aeternitas finitis rebus coexistit quidem *tota* propter indivisionem, sed non *totaliter* propter excessum, quia etiam aliis unquam existentibus rebus in actu coexistit, et aliis possibilibus in potentia.

Aliter denique ipsas res creatas et earum mensuram (tempus) aeternitati coexistere, tenendum est. Manifestum est, easdem pro mensura temporis, in qua sunt, et pro eo statu, in quo eorum duratio in omni instanti a differentia futuri fluit ad differentiam praeteriti, minime respondere toti aeternitati, nec eas virtute suae durationis posse coexistere eidem aeternitati. Sed quatenus haec finita mensura temporis circumplectitur et quasi includitur in altiore et supereminenti mensura aeternitatis, ad quam totum tempus non est nisi minimum instans, dici potest, quod etiam res temporales coexistant toti aeternitati, non autem *totaliter*. Sed τὸ *non totaliter*, dictum de coexistentia *rerum temporalium*, aliam rationem habet, ac dictum de coexistentia *Dei*. Deo enim convenit illa *coexistentia* per se, et τὸ *non totaliter* ratione excessus suae mensurae. Creaturae autem, cum non sint aeternae nec Deo coaeternae, illam coexistentiam non habent ex se et ratione suae durationis, sed ratione immensitatis et simplicitatis aeternitatis divinae, et τὸ *non totaliter* competit eis propter defectum, scil. propter finitam suae durationis mensuram.

**II.** Licet S. Bonav. a plurimis auctoribus ad sententiam Scoti trahatur, praesertim ob solutionem dubii 5. distinctionis 35. (quam partem etiam Barthol. de Barberiis, *Curs. theol.* tom. I. disp. 8. q. 7. mordicus tenet); tamen ipsa verba Seraphici (hic et infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4, et d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; *Itiner. mentis in Deum*, c. 5. circa finem) satis demonstrant, plene eum convenire cum Angelici sententia, sane intellecta. In *Itinerario* ita dicit: «Quia aeternum et praesentissimum, ideo omnes durationes ambit et intrat, quasi simul existens earum centrum et circumferentia. Quia simplicissimum et maximum, ideo totum intra omnia et totum extra omnia, ac per hoc est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam». Nihil autem dubii relinquit expositio huius doctrinae, quam S. Doctor facit in inedita quadam quaestione disputata, a nobis suo tempore publicanda, ex qua tantum unam propositionem transcribimus: «Sicut divina incircumscriptibilitas habet omnia loca sibi praesentia, et ipsa non distenditur per illa, licet illa vere sint distensa, sic divina aeternitas habet sibi omnia tempora praesentia, nec tamen ipsa succedit cum illis, licet illa vere succedant». — Plurimae obiectiones, quae contra hanc sententiam fieri solent, optime inter antiquos magistros solvit Richardus, hic a. 1. q. 1, et d. 41. a. 4. q. 2; qui tamen sententiam Scoti non omnino improbabilem censet. Circa utriusque positionis fundamenta possunt conferri Rada, *contr.* 30. a. 2, Macedo, *coll.* 9. *diff.* 4. et alii utriusque sententiae patroni.

**III.** Verba, quibus S. Doctor in principio responsionis duplicem sensum locutionis *praesenter cognoscere* distinguit, aliqua explicatione indigere videntur. Si *praesenter* ut adverbium determinat ipsum divinum actum sciendi, omnes concedunt eundem esse extra omnem mensuram temporis in simplicissimo *nunc* aeternitatis, ita ut nec praeteritum nec futurum nec praesens temporis ei convenire possint. Si autem *praesenter* trahitur ad omnia, tunc iterum duplex sensus distingui potest: vel ut notetur «praesentialitas cognitorum», ut est «dispositio rei cognitae in sua natura» (hic ad 1. 2.); quasi res futurae in mensura temporis non inter se realiter distent, sed sint simul et praesentes, quod manifeste est falsum — vel ipsa cognita comparari possunt non ad *nunc* temporale, sed ad praesentialitatem aeternitatis, quae simul est praesentialitas divinae cognitionis; et si in hoc sensu sumitur, subsistit duplex illa opinio scholarum. Ita fere Richard., d. 41. a. 4. q. 2.

**IV.** Quoad secundam quaestionem, utrum haec praesentialitas Deo sit ratio cognoscendi futura contingentia, non defuerunt, ut supra in *Scholio* (hic q. 1.) notavimus, qui nodum difficultatum, quae sunt circa praescientiam divinam, ita solvi posse putarent, inter quos numerantur etiam Salmanticenses. Ipse S. Thom. saepius istam rationem profert, quam Scotus (hic q. unica, n. 9.) nititur evertere. Communius autem S. Thomae sententia aliter explicatur, nempe quod ipse istam rationem non a priori tanquam unicum et proprium medium in quo statuere velit, sed quod potius a posteriori, supposita iam praescientia, inde sumat optima argumenta, ut manuducat ad intelligendum, praescientiam Dei esse intuitivam, infallibilem, immutabilem, nec ipsam contingentiae rerum derogare. Hoc inter alia insinuant ipsius verba (*S. c. Gent.* I. c. 67. in princ.) «Ex his autem iam aliqualiter patere potest, quod contingentium ab aeterno Deus infallibilem scientiam habuit, nec tamen contingentia esse desistunt». — Et revera, si scientia Dei non est, ut nostra, *a* rebus, sed potius *ad* res, ista praesentialitas rerum, saltem sola, non potest esse propria ratio divinae praescientiae.

**V.** Praeter iam citatos auctores: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. 1. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., *S.* p. 1. tr. 18. q. 60. m. 4. partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 4. a. 2. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 3. n. 11. seqq.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That God knows all things presentially is taught by all Catholic theologians; but there has been much dispute over two connected questions, of which the first is how this presence is to be understood; the second, whether this is the same as God's reason for knowing created things.

As to the first question, St. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 14. a. 13, q. 57. a. 3; *S. c. Gent.* I. c. 66. 67; *de Verit.* q. 2. a. 13; I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. unica, c. S.) teaches: «All things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only in that sense in which He has the *rationes* of things present with Himself, as some say, but because His gaze is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality» (*Sum.* I. q. 14. a. 13.). This second reason has displeased many, among whom Peter John Olivi O.F.M. went so far as to censure that opinion as *heretical*. But on the contrary, the censors of Peter John himself reproved this censure as *erroneous* (D'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* tom. I. p. 229, ed. Paris. 1728). Scotus too (here, q. unica, n. 9.) admits only that first reason of presentiality, and teaches that the infinite duration of eternity, which surpasses all time, has a relation of coexistence to future things only in potency, by no means in actuality; since indeed what does not exist can in no way coexist, nor can it be the foundation of a relation of coexistence. Alex. of Hales also favors Scotus (*S.* I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3.), and not only Durandus and the Nominalists follow him, but also very many later theologians from nearly all schools.

Nonetheless, we reckon St. Thomas's opinion, rightly understood, most true and most worthy of God, and altogether conformed <!-- page 697 -->to the doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Anselm, and St. Bonaventure. The whole difficulty turns on the right understanding of this profound position. Hence we set down these few notes.

1. The *now* (or present instant) of time is one thing, the *now* of aeviternity another, the *now* of eternity another, as Alex. of Hales well explains (*S.* p. 1. q. 13. m. 9. a. 1. § 3.). It suffices here to say that the *now* of time is an indivisible instant, fleeing swiftly, which couples earlier time with later; the *now* of eternity is eternity itself, which by reason of its infinite simplicity is wholly simultaneous and indivisible, and on this account similar to the indivisible instant of time, but by reason of its unlimited immensity it most eminently embraces in itself and surpasses all the durations of time and of aeviternity.

2. The divine intellection, since it is substance, has the same measure as the divine substance itself; whence also «the presentiality of the divine cognition, which indeed is eternity, is *simple* and *infinite*» (here in *corp.*). But human intellection, which is an accident, is measured by time, while the substance of the soul is measured by aeviternity.

3. There is one presence by which corporeal things, or things in general which are measured by time, coexist with one another; another, by which *God* coexists with things; another, by which temporal things and the differences of time coexist with God. For corporeal things to be present to one another, besides closeness of place it is required that they be simultaneously in the same instant of time, whose measure slips away through parts succeeding one another, that is, through the differences of past and future, and is only in an instant. Hence in this coexistence the part of the succeeding duration is outside another part of itself, and no instant can coexist with anything but the *one single* instant of the duration of the coexisting thing. If the measure of both durations is equal and in the same flow of time, then the whole duration of the one coexists with the whole duration of the other, but in such a way that a part of the one duration coexists only with a part of the other. If however the measure of each is different, then they coexist not only according to parts, but partially also, or not at all. For example, the measure of an hour does coexist with the measure of a year, of which it is a part, but not with the whole year, nor with a proportionate part of it indivisibly, but by succession of parts.

That God coexists otherwise with all things and with the measures of times and places is manifest. The whole eternity exists in the manner of one indivisible instant, abiding without succession and actually embracing and exceeding all successions and measures of time. Such is the measure of the divine life and of the action *ad intra*; thus too it measures all the measures of created things *ad extra*; whence in the same most simple and immense *now* of eternity He coexists with all things, not only with those which in the measure of time are present in the temporal *now*, or in some part of eternity which we imagine, but also with those which in the measure of time and place are distant from one another according to the difference of past and future. The immense and undivided eternity coexists with finite things *wholly* (*tota*) by reason of its indivision, but not *totally* (*totaliter*) by reason of its excess, since it also coexists in act with other things that ever exist, and in potency with other things possible.

Finally, that the created things themselves and their measure (time) coexist with eternity in another way must be held. It is manifest that those things, with respect to the measure of time in which they are, and with respect to that state in which their duration in every instant flows from the difference of future to the difference of past, by no means correspond to the whole of eternity, nor can they by virtue of their duration coexist with that eternity. But insofar as this finite measure of time is encompassed and as it were included in the higher and supereminent measure of eternity, to which all time is no more than a least instant, it can be said that even temporal things coexist with all eternity, but not *totally*. But the τὸ *not totally*, said of the coexistence of *temporal things*, has another character than what is said of the coexistence of *God*. For to God that *coexistence* belongs *per se*, and the τὸ *not totally* by reason of the excess of His measure. But to creatures, since they are not eternal nor coeternal with God, that coexistence does not belong from themselves and by reason of their duration, but by reason of the immensity and simplicity of the divine eternity, and the τὸ *not totally* befits them on account of defect, that is, on account of the finite measure of their duration.

**II.** Although St. Bonaventure is drawn by very many authors to the opinion of Scotus, especially on account of the solution of *dubium* 5 of distinction 35 (which part Barthol. de Barberiis, *Curs. theol.* tom. I. disp. 8. q. 7. tenaciously holds); nevertheless the very words of the Seraphic Doctor (here, and below d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4, and d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 5, near the end) sufficiently demonstrate that he fully agrees with the Angelic Doctor's view, sanely understood. In the *Itinerarium* he says: «Because [God] is eternal and most present, therefore He encompasses and enters all durations, as if simultaneously existing as their center and circumference. Because [He is] most simple and greatest, therefore He is wholly within all things and wholly outside all things, and through this is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere». Nor does the exposition of this doctrine which the Holy Doctor makes in a certain unedited disputed question — to be published by us in due time — leave any doubt; from which we transcribe but one proposition: «Just as divine uncircumscribability has all places present to itself, and itself is not extended through them, although they are truly extended, so divine eternity has all times present to itself, nor does it itself succeed with them, although they truly succeed». — Most of the objections that are wont to be brought against this opinion are best resolved among the ancient masters by Richard [of Mediavilla], here a. 1. q. 1, and d. 41. a. 4. q. 2; who however judges Scotus's opinion not entirely improbable. Concerning the foundations of each position, one may consult Rada, *contr.* 30. a. 2; Macedo, *coll.* 9. *diff.* 4; and other patrons of either opinion.

**III.** The words by which the Holy Doctor at the beginning of his response distinguishes a twofold sense of the expression *to know presentially* seem to need some explanation. If *presentially* as an adverb determines the divine act of knowing itself, all concede that this same act is outside every measure of time, in the most simple *now* of eternity, in such a way that neither past nor future nor present of time can apply to it. If however *presentially* is drawn to *all things*, then again a twofold sense can be distinguished: either it notes the «presentiality of the things known», as that is «the disposition of the thing known in its own nature» (here, ad 1, 2); as if future things in the measure of time did not really stand apart from one another, but were simultaneous and present, which is manifestly false — or the things known themselves can be compared not to the temporal *now*, but to the presentiality of eternity, which is at the same time the presentiality of the divine cognition; and if it is taken in this sense, that twofold opinion of the schools stands. Thus, more or less, Richard, d. 41. a. 4. q. 2.

**IV.** As to the second question, whether this presentiality is for God the reason of knowing future contingents, there have not been wanting (as we noted above in the *Scholion*, here q. 1) those who thought that the knot of difficulties surrounding the divine foreknowledge could thus be loosed; among whom even the Salmanticenses are reckoned. St. Thomas himself often advances this reason, which Scotus (here, q. unica, n. 9.) labors to overturn. But more commonly St. Thomas's view is otherwise explained: namely, that he does not wish to set up this reason *a priori* as the unique and proper *medium in quo*, but rather *a posteriori*, foreknowledge being already supposed, draws from it the best arguments to lead the mind to understand that God's foreknowledge is intuitive, infallible, immutable, and not derogating from the contingency of things. Among other things, his words intimate this (*S. c. Gent.* I. c. 67. *in princ.*): «From these things it can now in some way be made clear that God has had infallible knowledge of contingents from eternity, and yet contingents do not cease to be». — And indeed, if God's knowledge is not, like ours, *from* things, but rather *toward* things, that presentiality of things, at least taken alone, cannot be the proper reason of the divine foreknowledge.

**V.** Besides the authors already cited: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. 1. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., *S.* p. 1. tr. 18. q. 60. m. 4. partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 41. q. 4. a. 2. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 3. n. 11. seqq.

---


title: Dist. 39, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 698 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. X*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: *Sciunt se Pater et Filius invicem, sed iste nascendo, ille gignendo.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia *scire* est essentiale in divinis: ergo si scit nascendo, cum *nasci* dicat proprietatem personalem, proprietas personalis est ratio rei essentialis[^1], quod non est sane neque vere dictum.

**Respondeo:** Aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod scire Dei, relatum ad creaturas, vel ita quod una persona sciat se ipsam, est dictum *essentialiter*; sed secundum quod una persona scit aliam, dicit respectum personae ad personam et est dictum *notionaliter*. — Sed hoc non est convenienter dictum, quia, sicut in praecedentibus habitum est[^2], sapientia et sapere essentialiter tantum dicitur.

Et propterea dicendum, quod ablativus ille non tantum dicit causam sive rationem dicendi, sed rationem concomitantiae. Gerundia enim, sicut dicit Priscianus[^3], habent exponi per *si*, vel per *dum*, vel per *quia*; et primo modo dicunt convenientiam, secundo concomitantiam, et tertio causam.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Et omnia quae sunt in eorum sapientia et in eorum essentia, unusquisque eorum simul videt.* Sed supra, distinctione trigesima sexta[^4], dictum est, quod creaturae sunt in Dei notitia, sed non in Dei essentia: ergo est contradictio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum est, quod in divina scientia sunt scibilia, in divina vero essentia sunt attributa, sicut potentia, sapientia et bonitas. Et Augustinus vult dicere, quod Pater et Filius simul vident omnia cognoscibilia, creata et creanda, et omnia essentiae attributa. Unde littera legenda est divisim: *omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia*, ut puta creata, simul scit quilibet; similiter *omnia quae sunt in eorum essentia*, ut puta attributa, simul sciunt sive scit quilibet. Et ideo non vult dicere, quod creaturae sint in divina essentia[^5].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *scientia Dei non est nisi de his quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt.* Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia Deus scit omne quod potest facere; sed potest facere quod nunquam fuit nec est nec erit: ergo scientia Dei est de aliquo, quod nunquam fuit vel est vel erit. Et praeterea, est infinitorum, sicut vult Augustinus undecimo *de Civitate Dei*[^6], non tantum quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister loquitur de *scientia visionis*, quae est illorum tantum, quorum ab aeterno fuit praevisio; sed ipse obiicit de *scientia intelligentiae*, quae nullius connotat existentiam; quod patet. Intelligit enim Deus omne quod potest, et ita non recte currit obiectio[^7].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *non potest incipere scire vel praescire* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nihil scitur nisi verum[^8]: ergo antequam sit verum, non scitur: ergo si aliquid incipit esse verum, aliquid incipit a Deo sciri: ergo Deus potest incipere aliquid scire. — Item, creatio est divina essentia, et tamen ratione connotati Deus potest aliquid incipere creare: ergo similiter et aliquid scire.

**Respondeo:** Scire dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo *scire* hoc est quod habere cognitionem de aliquo; et sic non connotat actualem existentiam cogniti, et sic non potest Deus incipere aliquid scire, id est alicuius cognitionem incipere habere. Alio modo *scire* hoc est quod *nosse aliquid esse verum*, et hoc tunc primo scitur esse verum, quando incipit esse; et sic[^9] incipit Deus scire, sic et desinit praescire, non ratione principalis significati, quod est scientia, sed ratione connotati, quod quidem est veritas rei scitae.

<!-- page 699 -->

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nec potest noviter vel ex tempore velle aliquid, et tamen potest velle quod nunquam voluit.* Videtur enim hic[^10] dicere duo contradictorie opposita, quoniam illud est novum quod prius non fuit et modo est: ergo si posset velle quod prius non voluit, videtur quod incipiat velle.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dico, Deum velle hoc[^11], duo dico: et actum divinae voluntatis, et ulterius ordinationem[^12] ipsius effectus ad illum actum. Et primum quidem est necessarium et semper, nec potest incipere nec desinere. Voluntas enim divina est semper in actu suo, ita quod nec potest illo carere nec alium habere; sed ordinatio alicuius effectus ad illum actum est ordinatio rei futurae, quae nondum est, et ideo potest esse et non esse, et ordinari et non ordinari. Quando ergo dicitur: *Deus potest velle quod nunquam voluit, et tamen non ex tempore*; intellectus est, quod effectus ille potuit ordinari ad divinum velle; et quoniam ordinatio effectus est ordinatio rei futurae, et quod semel est futurum semper fuit futurum, et quod semel est[^13] ordinatum semper fuit ordinatum ad illam. Quando ergo dicitur, quod Deus potest velle aliquid, idem est dicere, quod aliquid potuit esse futurum sive habere ordinem ad divinam voluntatem, quod tamen non habet ordinem; sed si haberet, ab aeterno habuisset, et ideo non incipit ex tempore. Et ideo exemplum Magistri bonum est, si velle Dei importat ordinem ad volitum in ratione futuri; sed secundum quod importat concomitantiam in ratione praesentis, potest Deus ex tempore velle hoc esse, sive hoc approbare hodie, non quia[^14] incipiat actus, sed quia incipiat connotatum.

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *specialem curam habet de rationalibus*; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicitur Sapientiae sexto[^15]: *Aequalis est illi cura de omnibus.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *aequaliter* non privat ibi ordinem divinae distributionis, sed privat acceptionem personae. Et omnibus distribuit ibi tantum pro hominibus, tamen[^16] pro magnis et parvis, pauperibus et divitibus; et sic est ei aequaliter cura de omnibus, quia ita vult salutem pauperum, ut divitum.

---

english:
<!-- page 698 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what Augustine says: *The Father and the Son know each other, but this one by being born, that one by begetting.* For he seems to speak ill, because *to know* is something essential in divine things: therefore if [the Son] knows by being born, since *to be born* states a personal property, a personal property would be the account of an essential reality[^1], which is neither soundly nor truly said.

**I respond:** Some wished to say that the knowing of God, when referred to creatures, or [taken] thus that one person knows himself, is said *essentially*; but inasmuch as one person knows another, it states a respect of person to person and is said *notionally*. — But this is not fittingly said, because, as has been laid down in the preceding[^2], *wisdom* and *to be wise* are said only essentially.

And therefore it must be said that that ablative does not only state cause or the account of saying [it], but the account of *concomitance*. For *gerunds*, as Priscian says[^3], have to be expounded by *si* (if), or by *dum* (while), or by *quia* (because); and in the first mode they state agreement, in the second concomitance, and in the third cause.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *And all things which are in their wisdom and in their essence, each of them sees at once.* But above, in the thirty-sixth distinction[^4], it was said that creatures are in God's cognition, but not in God's essence: therefore there is a contradiction.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the divine knowledge there are *knowables*, but in the divine essence there are *attributes*, such as power, wisdom and goodness. And Augustine wishes to say that the Father and the Son together see all knowables, both created and to be created, and all the attributes of the essence. Hence the text must be read divisively: *all things which are in their knowledge*, namely created [things], each one knows at once; likewise *all things which are in their essence*, namely the attributes, they know at once or each one knows. And therefore he does not wish to say that creatures are in the divine essence[^5].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the knowledge of God is only of those things which are or have been or will be.* For this seems false, because God knows everything that he can do; but he can do what never was nor is nor will be: therefore the knowledge of God is of something which never was or is or will be. And furthermore, it is of infinites, as Augustine wills [in] *On the City of God* eleven[^6], not only of those things which are or have been or will be.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master is speaking of the *knowledge of vision* (*scientia visionis*), which is only of those things of which there was foresight from eternity; but he objects from the *knowledge of intelligence* (*scientia intelligentiae*), which connotes the existence of nothing; which is plain. For God understands everything which he can [understand], and so the objection does not run rightly[^7].

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he cannot begin to know or foreknow* etc. For he seems to speak ill, because nothing is known except [what is] true[^8]: therefore before it is true, it is not known: therefore if something begins to be true, something begins to be known by God: therefore God can begin to know something. — Likewise, creation is the divine essence, and yet by reason of the connoted [term] God can begin to create something: therefore likewise also to know something.

**I respond:** *To know* is said in two ways. In one way *to know* is the same as to have cognition of something; and thus it does not connote the actual existence of the known, and thus God cannot begin to know anything, that is, to begin to have cognition of something. In another way *to know* is the same as *to be acquainted that something is true*, and this is then first known to be true, when it begins to be; and thus[^9] God begins to know, and likewise ceases to foreknow, not by reason of the principal signified, which is *knowledge*, but by reason of the connoted [term], which is the truth of the thing known.

<!-- page 699 -->

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Nor can he newly or in time will anything, and yet he can will what he never willed.* For he seems here[^10] to say two contradictorily opposed things, since that is *new* which previously was not and now is: therefore if he could will what he previously did not will, it seems that he begins to will.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *God wills this*[^11], I say two things: both the act of the divine will, and further the ordering[^12] of the effect itself to that act. And the first is indeed necessary and ever-abiding, nor can it begin nor cease. For the divine will is always in its act, such that it can neither lack that act nor have another; but the ordering of some effect to that act is the ordering of a future thing, which is not yet, and therefore it can be and not be, can be ordered and not ordered. When therefore it is said: *God can will what he never willed, and yet not in time*; the sense is that that effect could be ordered to the divine willing; and since the ordering of the effect is the ordering of a future thing, and what is once future was always future, and what is once[^13] ordered was always ordered to it. When therefore it is said that God can will something, it is the same as to say that something could be future or have an order to the divine will, which yet does not have [such] order; but if it had, it would have had it from eternity, and therefore it does not begin from time. And so the Master's example is good, if God's willing imports an order to the willed in the character of *future*; but inasmuch as it imports concomitance in the character of *present*, God can in time will this to be, or to approve this today, not because[^14] the act begins, but because the connoted [term] begins.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he has special care for rational [creatures]*; since this seems to be against what is said in Wisdom 6[^15]: *His care is equal for all.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *equally* does not there exclude the order of the divine distribution, but excludes respect of persons. And he distributes [his care] to all there only as regards human beings, yet[^16] for great and small, poor and rich; and thus he has equally care for all, because he so wills the salvation of the poor as of the rich.

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la: Ed. 1 addit *vel quid essentiale*.

en: Ed. 1 adds *vel quid essentiale* (or [is] something essential).

en: Distinction 32, art. 1, q. 1, ad 2, and art. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Cfr. Libr. VIII. *Grammat.* c. 9. et 13. — Pro *Gerundia* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *Gerundiva*, et paulo inferius pro *dicunt* perperam *dicit*. — De hoc dubio cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 4. ad 2; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. Book VIII of [Priscian's] *Grammar*, c. 9 and 13. — For *Gerundia* many codices with ed. 1 [read] *Gerundiva*, and a little below, for *dicunt* [they read] erroneously *dicit*. — On this doubt cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 4, ad 2; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here at the text.

la: Cap. 1, et ibid. in Comment. dub. 1.

en: [Distinction 36,] c. 1, and there in the Commentary, doubt 1.

en: See Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 4, ad 3.

en: [*De Civitate Dei* XI,] c. 10, n. 3.

la: Huius dubii solutio invenitur etiam apud Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: The solution of this doubt is found also in Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here at the text.

en: Cf. above, p. 690, note 2.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. *sic*. Paulo ante pro *primo* cod. X *proprie*. — Plura de hoc dubio inveniuntur supra a. 1. q. 3, et a. 2. q. 2; apud B. Albert., hic a. 6; apud S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; apud Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with several codices [reads] *sic*. A little before, for *primo* cod. X reads *proprie*. — More on this doubt is found above, art. 1, q. 3, and art. 2, q. 2; in Bl. Albert, here a. 6; in St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; in Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

la: Vat., post *velle* posita virgula, pro *hoc* substituit *hic*, auctoritate quidem plurimorum codd., at perperam, ut ex subnexis clare intelligitur. Librarii mss. transcribentes, etiam hoc loco, ut saepe saepius accidit, *hic* pro *hoc* legisse, valde verisimile est.

en: The Vatican edition, with a comma placed after *velle*, substitutes *hic* for *hoc*, on the authority of very many codices, but mistakenly, as is plainly understood from what follows. It is highly probable that the scribes transcribing the manuscripts, here too — as often happens — read *hic* for *hoc*.

la: Vat. *fuit*. — Praecedens *et* intellige: *ergo etiam*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *fuit*. The preceding *et* understand as *ergo etiam* (therefore also).

la: Cod. Z hic et paulo ante *ordinationem*. Paulo inferius pro *exemplum* ed. 1 *dictum*. Nostram lectionem veram esse, patet ex integro textu Magistri, c. 2: *Non potest ergo noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid, sicut non potest noviter vel ex tempore velle aliquid* etc.

en: Cod. Z here and a little before [reads] *ordinationem*. A little below, for *exemplum* ed. 1 [reads] *dictum*. That our reading is the true one is plain from the entire text of the Master, c. 2: *He cannot therefore newly or in time know or foreknow anything, just as he cannot newly or in time will anything*, etc.

la: Vat. *fuit*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *fuit*.

la: Multi codd. cum Vat. post *non quia* alterum subiiciunt *non*, quod contextui repugnat, nec non codicibus D F M Y et ed. 1. — De hoc dubio lege Alex. Hal. S. I. q. 25; B. Albert., hic a. 7; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Many codices with the Vatican edition place a second *non* after *non quia*, which is repugnant to the context and [is] not [supported by] codices D F M Y and ed. 1. — On this doubt read Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I, q. 25; Bl. Albert, here a. 7; Peter of Tarentaise, here at the text.

la: Vers. 8, ubi Vulgata *Aequaliter* pro *Aequalis*. Paulo post pro *aequaliter* Vat. *aequalitas*.

en: Verse 8, where the Vulgate has *Aequaliter* (equally) for *Aequalis* (equal). A little after, for *aequaliter* the Vatican edition has *aequalitas* (equality).

la: Sive *accipitur*. Cfr. supra d. 1. q. 1. Scholion. — Mox pro *tamen* Vat. *tam*. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a Petr. a Tar. et a Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Or *accipitur* (is accepted). Cf. above, d. 1, q. 1, Scholion. — Soon after, for *tamen* the Vatican edition has *tam*. — This doubt is also resolved by Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here at the text.