title: Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum fuisset congruum assumere ipsum Adam

title_alt: Whether it would have been fitting to assume Adam himself

source_text:
<!-- page 264 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum fuisset congruum assumere Adam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum congruum fuisset, ipsum Adam assumi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Christus debuit esse de genere Adae, ut satisfaceret pro peccato totius generis, quod processit de lumbis Adae[^p264-1]: ergo pari ratione debuit Dei Filius ipsum Adam assumere, ut pro peccato ipsius Adae congruentissime satisfaceret.

2. Item, nullum magis decet sustinere poenam pro culpa, quam eum qui culpam commisit: si ergo homo assumtus puniri debuit pro peccato Adae, sicut et factum est; videtur, quod nullum alium hominem adeo decuit assumere[^p264-2], sicut primum hominem.

3. Item, efficacius curat morbum qui curat ipsum in sua origine[^p264-3], quam qui in ramo; sed morbus corruptionis humani generis ortum habuit in Adam, et curatus fuit in Christo: ergo perfectius curatus fuisset, si Filius Dei assumsisset primum hominem, quam assumendo aliquem de eius genere. Sed decet summum medicum facere omne quod attestatur perfectioni medicinae: ergo etc.

4. Item, ad hoc, quod anima curetur per adventum Spiritus sancti, necesse est, quod Spiritus sanctus in eandem animam descendat, in qua prius habitavit culpa: ergo pari ratione, si per adventum Filii Dei debuit peccatum primi parentis curari, videtur, quod ipsum debuerit assumere magis quam alium. Quodsi dicas, quod non decuit propter culpam praeambulam; sed contra: Spiritus sanctus sic[^p264-4] purificat animam, quod nulla est indecentia, ut habitet in anima, in qua prius fuit culpa; sic etiam sanctificavit carnem Verbi, ut in nullo derogaretur Christo, quod fuit de nostra massa: ergo videtur, quod sic anima Adae potuit purificari et caro, quod in ipsius assumtione in nullo derogaretur excellentiae ipsius Filii Dei.

**Sed contra:** 1. Non decuit Deum facere, ut aliquis de malitia sua reportaret commodum; sed si Adam propter reparationem faciendam de culpa commissa assumeretur a Verbo, reportaret ineffabile commodum: ergo hoc esset contra divinam iustitiam[^p264-5]. Sed hoc non decet Deum: ergo etc.

2. Item, talis debuit satisfacere, qui nullius esset debitor poenae, sicut dicit Anselmus[^p264-6], quia satisfactio est, cum fit opus alias indebitum, sicut dicitur in libro de Regulis fidei; sed Adam fuit poenae debitor propter culpam, quam commisit: ergo nullatenus decuit, ipsum ad satisfaciendum assumi.

3. Item, quidquid sit de aliis, tamen esse vel dici peccatorem vere nullo modo decet Deum; sed illa unio facit idiomatum communicationem: ergo si Adam assumtus fuisset a Dei Filio, Filius Dei esset et diceretur vere peccator. Si ergo hoc nullo modo decet[^p264-7], videtur etc.

4. Item, si Adam assumsisset, cum Deus decrevisset genus humanum ex Adam propagare, iuncta sibi Eva, ergo aut decretum suum[^p264-8] sive dispositio non mansisset, aut Christus ex commixtione cum femina generasset; sed utrumque est omnino indecens: ergo omnino indecens fuit, Dei Filium assumere hominem primum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Non decuit Dei Filium assumere ipsum Adam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio non sic decuit Dei Filium assumere ipsum Adam, sicut aliquam aliam substantiam eiusdem generis, sicut patet ex ipso opere divino.

Et ratio huius est, quia non conveniebat omnium[^p264-9] Creatori, nec conveniebat primo homini, nec expediebat humano generi. Creatori omnium non competebat, ut persona Dei hominem assumeret peccatorem, cum ipse in forma assumta deberet peccatores ceteros iudicare[^p264-10], et tamen nullatenus de peccato argui posse, sive secundum naturam assumentem, sive secundum naturam assumtam, secundum quarum utramque competebat ei potestas iudiciaria. — Primo homini non conveniebat, ut ille qui tantum se deiecerat per culpam, tantum exaltaretur, ut Deus esset. Sufficiebat namque sibi et excedebat, ut saltem ei Deus reconciliaretur, nedum quod ille Deus efficeretur. — Generi etiam humano non expediebat, quia, cum ille homo esset poenae debitor, utpote ille qui reus erat omnium animarum nostrarum[^p265-1], non esset eius passio adeo Deo grata, sicut si omnino esset innocens, et vix etiam sufficeret ad satisfaciendum pro se, nedum quod aliis satisfactionem suam posset communicare. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod non decuit Filium Dei assumere primum hominem.

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1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod de genere humano debuit satisfacere; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia potuit aliquis esse de genere hominum, qui communicaret cum hominibus in natura et non communicaret in culpa. Non sic autem est de Adam, quia, ex quo peccavit, necessarium fuit, ipsum peccasse; et si Filius Dei ipsum assumsisset, eum qui poenae debitor erat, assumeret[^p265-2]; ideo non est simile.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum magis decet puniri, quam eum qui peccavit; dicendum, quod verum est de poena divinae ultionis; sed non est verum de poena divinae placationis. Magis enim Deus placari potuit per poenam innocentis quam per poenam rei et iniusti; et taliter punitus est Christus pro peccatis nostris. Nullius enim alterius poena poterat esse sufficiens meritum satisfactionis, quamvis esset aequum instrumentum divinae ultionis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de curatione morbi in radice, dicendum, quod verum est, quod perfectior est curatio, ubi radix ita potest purificari, sicut ramus; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam etsi Adam adeo purificari posset, ut nullam culpam actu haberet, nunquam tamen sic purificari potuit, ut nullam culpam habuisset. Et hoc quidem decebat habere Dei et hominum mediatorem, ut sua oblatione sufficienter placaret severitatem divinae iustitiae. — Aliae etiam rationes sunt, quare morbus in sua origine curari non debuit; sed illae assignatae sunt in secundo libro in tractatu de peccato originali[^p265-3], et aliquae in quarto, in tractatu de Sacramento baptismi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non purificantur per Spiritum sanctum nisi animae, quibus unitur per amorem; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia aliter purificantur per Christum, aliter per Spiritum sanctum. Per Spiritum sanctum namque purificantur sicut per causam effectivam, sed per Christum tanquam per causam meritoriam[^p265-4]. Et quia aliquis potest mereri alii diverso a se; hinc est, quod non oportet, mediatorem Dei et hominum sic cuilibet uniri, sicut Spiritus sanctus. — Est etiam differentia in unione, quia Spiritus sanctus illabitur nobis, ita tamen, quod non unitur nobis unione personali, quae facit, idiomata communicari; unde non est peccator, quamvis illabatur peccatori. Sed Filius unitur unione personali, in qua est idiomatum communicatio; et ideo non sic decuit ipsum uniri animae peccatrici, sicut decet Spiritum sanctum mitti in eam animam, quae prius fuit peccatrix. Et sic patet totum[^p265-5].

---

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether it would have been fitting to assume Adam.*

Secondly it is asked whether it would have been fitting that Adam himself be assumed. And that it would, it seems:

1. Because Christ had to be of the race of Adam, in order to satisfy for the sin of the whole race, which proceeded from the loins of Adam[^p264-1]: therefore by parity of reasoning the Son of God ought to have assumed Adam himself, so as most fittingly to satisfy for the sin of Adam himself.

2. Likewise, none is more fitting to undergo punishment for a fault than he who committed the fault: if therefore the assumed man had to be punished for the sin of Adam, as indeed was done, it seems that it was fitting to assume no other man so much[^p264-2] as the first man.

3. Likewise, he cures a disease more effectively who cures it in its origin[^p264-3] than he who [cures it] in the branch; but the disease of the corruption of the human race took its origin in Adam, and was cured in Christ: therefore the cure would have been more perfect, if the Son of God had assumed the first man, than by assuming someone of his race. But it befits the highest physician to do everything that attests to the perfection of the cure: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in order that the soul be healed through the coming of the Holy Spirit, it is necessary that the Holy Spirit descend into the same soul in which fault previously dwelt: therefore by parity of reasoning, if through the coming of the Son of God the sin of the first parent had to be cured, it seems that he ought to have assumed him rather than another. But if you say that it was not fitting on account of antecedent fault; on the contrary: the Holy Spirit so[^p264-4] purifies the soul that there is no unfittingness in his dwelling in a soul in which fault previously was; so too he sanctified the flesh of the Word, so that in nothing was it derogatory to Christ that it was of our mass: therefore it seems that thus the soul of Adam could be purified, and the flesh, so that in his being assumed nothing would be derogatory to the excellence of the Son of God himself.

**On the contrary:** 1. It was not fitting for God to bring it about that anyone should derive benefit from his own malice; but if Adam, for the sake of making the reparation, were assumed by the Word for the fault he had committed, he would derive an unspeakable benefit: therefore this would be against the divine justice[^p264-5]. But this does not befit God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, such a one had to make satisfaction as would be a debtor of punishment to no one, as Anselm says[^p264-6], because satisfaction occurs when a work is done that is otherwise not owed, as is said in the book *On the Rules of Faith*; but Adam was a debtor of punishment on account of the fault which he committed: therefore in no way was it fitting that he be assumed for making satisfaction.

3. Likewise, whatever may be the case concerning others, yet to be or to be truly called a sinner in no way befits God; but that union brings about a communication of idioms: therefore if Adam had been assumed by the Son of God, the Son of God would be and would truly be called a sinner. If therefore this in no way befits[^p264-7], it seems etc.

4. Likewise, if he had assumed Adam, since God had decreed to propagate the human race from Adam, Eve being joined to him, then either his decree[^p264-8] or arrangement would not have stood, or Christ would have generated by intercourse with a woman; but each is wholly unbecoming: therefore it was wholly unbecoming for the Son of God to assume the first man.

### CONCLUSION.

> It was not fitting for the Son of God to assume Adam himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume Adam himself in the way [he assumed] some other substance of the same race, as is plain from the divine work itself.

And the reason for this is that it was not suitable for the Creator of all[^p264-9], nor was it suitable for the first man, nor was it expedient for the human race. It was not fitting for the Creator of all that the person of God should assume a sinful man, since he himself in the assumed form would have to judge the rest of the sinners[^p264-10], and yet could in no way be arraigned for sin, neither according to the assuming nature nor according to the assumed nature, according to each of which judiciary power belonged to him. — It was not suitable for the first man that he who had cast himself down so far through fault should be exalted so far as to be God. For it was enough for him and beyond his due that God should at least be reconciled to him, far less that he should be made God. — Nor was it expedient for the human race, because, since that man was a debtor of punishment, inasmuch as he was guilty of all our souls[^p265-1], his passion would not be so pleasing to God as if he were wholly innocent, and would scarcely even suffice to make satisfaction for himself, far less be able to communicate his satisfaction to others. — Therefore the reasons proving that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume the first man are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that he ought to make satisfaction from the human race; it must be said that there is no parallel, because someone could be of the race of men who would share with men in nature and not share in fault. But it is not so with Adam, because, from the moment he sinned, it was necessary that he had sinned; and if the Son of God had assumed him, he would assume one who was a debtor of punishment[^p265-2]; therefore there is no parallel.

2. To that which is objected, that none is more fitting to be punished than he who sinned; it must be said that this is true of the punishment of divine vengeance; but it is not true of the punishment of divine appeasement. For God could be more appeased through the punishment of an innocent one than through the punishment of one guilty and unjust; and in this manner was Christ punished for our sins. For the punishment of no other could be a sufficient merit of satisfaction, although it would be a just instrument of divine vengeance.

3. To that which is objected concerning the curing of the disease in the root, it must be said that it is true that the cure is more perfect where the root can be purified just as the branch; but it is not so in the case at hand. For even if Adam could be so purified as to have no fault in act, yet he could never be so purified as not to have had any fault. And this indeed it befitted the Mediator of God and men to have, so that by his offering he might sufficiently appease the severity of the divine justice. — There are also other reasons why the disease ought not to be cured in its origin; but those have been set down in the second book in the treatise on original sin[^p265-3], and some in the fourth, in the treatise on the Sacrament of baptism.

4. To that which is objected, that none are purified through the Holy Spirit except souls to which he is united through love; it must be said that there is no parallel, because [souls] are purified in one way through Christ, in another through the Holy Spirit. For through the Holy Spirit they are purified as by an effective cause, but through Christ as by a meritorious cause[^p265-4]. And because someone can merit for another different from himself; hence it is that the Mediator of God and men need not be united to each one in the way the Holy Spirit [is]. — There is also a difference in the union, because the Holy Spirit glides into us, yet in such a way that he is not united to us by a personal union, which causes idioms to be communicated; whence he is not a sinner, although he glides into a sinner. But the Son is united by a personal union, in which there is a communication of idioms; and therefore it was not fitting for him to be united to a sinful soul, as it befits the Holy Spirit to be sent into that soul which previously was sinful. And thus the whole is clear[^p265-5].

---

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Vat. *assumi.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *assumi* [to be assumed].

la: Pro *origine* edd. hic, sicut et infra in solut. recurrit, *radice.* Subinde post *quam qui* edd. repetunt *curat* et cod. I pro *in ramo* substituit *in fine,* cod. Z *in ultimo.*

en: For *origine* [origin] the editions here, as it recurs also below in the solution, [read] *radice* [root]. Then after *quam qui* the editions repeat *curat,* and codex I substitutes for *in ramo* [in the branch] *in fine,* codex Z *in ultimo.*

la: Edd. *sicut* et dein pro *sanctificavit* exhibent *purificavit.* Mox pro *Christo, quod* Vat. *Christo, qui.*

en: The editions [read] *sicut,* and then for *sanctificavit* [sanctified] they present *purificavit* [purified]. Presently for *Christo, quod* the Vatican edition [reads] *Christo, qui.*

la: Cod. D *divinam naturam et iustitiam.*

en: Codex D [reads] *divinam naturam et iustitiam* [the divine nature and justice].

la: Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20. et II. c. 11. — Definitio satisfactionis hic memorata habetur in Alani ab Insul. libro de Articul. cathol. fidei, II. in princip., et sonat ibi sic: Satisfactio peccati est [ad] honorem eius contra quem peccatum est, aliquid sufficienter factum, alias indebitum. — Pro *qui nullius* esset debitor poenae cod. S *qui immunis esset debito poenae.* In fine arg. pro *satisfaciendum* cod. K *satisfactionem.*

en: Book I, *Cur Deus homo,* c. 20, and II, c. 11. — The definition of satisfaction mentioned here is found in Alan of Lille's book *On the Articles of the Catholic Faith,* II, at the beginning, and it runs there thus: Satisfaction for sin is something done sufficiently [to] the honor of him against whom the sin is, [something] otherwise not owed. — For *qui nullius esset debitor poenae* [who would be a debtor of punishment to none] codex S [reads] *qui immunis esset debito poenae* [who would be exempt from the debt of punishment]. At the end of the argument, for *satisfaciendum* codex K [reads] *satisfactionem.*

la: Pro confirmatione dicitur Hebr. 7, 26: Talis enim decebat, ut nobis esset pontifex sanctus, innocens, impollutus, segregatus a peccatoribus etc.

en: In confirmation it is said in Hebrews 7, 26: For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, etc.

la: Codd. G R S et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *suum,* pro quo codd. A P *Dei.* In princip. arg. post *Item, si* edd. supplent *Deus.*

en: Codices G R S and editions 1, 2 omit *suum* [his], in place of which codices A P [read] *Dei* [of God]. At the beginning of the argument, after *Item, si* the editions supply *Deus* [God].

la: Pro *omnium* cod. A hic et paulo inferius *hominum.*

en: For *omnium* [of all] codex A here and a little below [reads] *hominum* [of men].

la: Respicitur illud Ioan. 5, 22. seqq.: Omne iudicium dedit [Pater] Filio... et potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia filius hominis est — nec non illud Ioan. 5, 46: Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato? Cfr. ibid. 9, 39. et 12, 31. — Pro *et tamen* Vat. *et ita.*

en: Reference is made to that passage of John 5, 22 ff.: [The Father] has given all judgment to the Son... and has given him power to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man — and also that of John 5, 46: Which of you shall convict me of sin? Cf. ibid. 9, 39 and 12, 31. — For *et tamen* the Vatican edition [reads] *et ita.*

la: Respicitur illud I. Reg. 22, 22: Ego sum reus omnium animarum patris tui. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 23, ubi docet, per redemptorem iustificari debere *omnes homines,* ait: «Sed hoc facere nullatenus potest homo peccator, quia peccator peccatorem iustificare nequit». — Paulo inferius pro *nedum quod... posset* Vat. *nec tunc... posset,* edd. 1, 2 *non.. potuit.*

en: Reference is made to that passage of 1 Kings [1 Samuel] 22, 22: I am guilty of all the souls of thy father. Anselm, I, *Cur Deus homo,* c. 23, where he teaches that all men must be justified through the Redeemer, says: «But this a sinful man can in no way do, because a sinner cannot justify a sinner». — A little below, for *nedum quod... posset* the Vatican edition [reads] *nec tunc... posset,* editions 1, 2 *non.. potuit.*

la: Edd. *assumsisset.*

en: The editions [read] *assumsisset* [he would have assumed].

la: Dist. 32. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et dub. 1, nec non IV. Sent. d. 4. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Distinction 32, art. 1, q. 2, in the body and dubium 1, and also IV Sent., d. 4, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cod. bb *patet primum.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Codex bb [reads] *patet primum.* — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.264–265 (PDF 286–287; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 18653–18758) for the clean *videtur* / *sed contra* prose and footnote-marker spacing. The cascade-fragmented Respondeo (the threefold *non conveniebat Creatori / primo homini / humano generi* reasoning) and the Solutio (Ad 1–4) plus all footers were re-set from the PDF per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion. `type: quaestio`.

**Opener alignment — PASS.** Raw 18653 opens `QUAESTIO II. / Utrum fuisset congruum assumere Adam. / Secundo quaeritur, utrum congruum fuisset, ipsum Adam assumi.` This is ART. I q2 (*ipsum Adam* — whether it would have been fitting to assume Adam himself), NOT q1 (*massa perditionis* / *de genere Adam*) and NOT an ART. II question (ART. II q1 = *Utrum Christus potuerit peccare*, which begins at raw 18759, immediately after this q2's *Et sic patet totum* on p.265). Running heads confirmed via low-dpi render: p.264 top-left `264 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` (even/verso page); p.265 top-center `DIST. XII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` with top-right `265` (the p.265 running head already reflects ART. II, which opens lower on the same page).

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum ille homo, scilicet Christus, peccare potuerit

title_alt: Whether that man, namely Christ, could sin

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 265 -->

### Articulus II. *De conditione naturae assumtae quoad liberum arbitrium.*

Consequenter quaeritur de conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad liberum arbitrium. Et circa hoc incidunt duo dubitabilia.

Primo quaeritur, utrum ille homo peccare potuerit.

Secundo, utrum potentiam peccandi habuerit vel assumserit.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus potuerit peccare.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus potuerit peccare. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo[^p265-6] dicitur in laudem viri iusti: *Qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus*; sed omnis laus competit Christo, quae competit alicui eius membro: ergo videtur, quod illud potuit dici in laudem Christi: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus[^p265-7]: « Meliores iudicavit Deus
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homines, si ei liberaliter deservirent », et vocat *liberaliter deservire*, si, cum possent eum offendere, nollent: ergo si Christum optimum fecit et optimum iudicavit, videtur, quod Christus peccare potuerit.

3. Item, Bernardus[^p266-1]: « Tantum descendit, quantum descendere potuit »; sed inferioris gradus est qui potest peccare, quam qui non potest: ergo videtur, quod Christus in illo statu fuerit. *Si dicas*, quod hoc intelligitur ex parte carnis; *contra*: dispositio carnis correspondet dispositioni liberi arbitrii, sicut patet in Adam et in nobis: ergo sicut Christus assumsit carnis passibilitatem, ita videtur, quod liberi arbitrii vertibilitatem.

4. Item, Christus erat in statu viatoris: ergo cum ad statum viatoris pertineat posse peccare, sicut ad statum comprehensoris peccare non posse[^p266-2]; videtur, quod Christus peccare potuerit.

5. Item, nullus laudatur in his quae facit de necessitate[^p266-3]; sed Christus erat laudabilis in operibus suis: ergo non faciebat ea necessario: ergo poterat a bonis et debitis operibus cessare; et hoc est omittere: ergo potuit peccare.

6. Item, Christus potuit dicere aliquam orationem negativam et veram; sed qui potest dicere locutionem negativam, potest dicere affirmativam sibi oppositam; sed illa est falsa: ergo Christus potuit dicere locutionem falsam. Sed hoc est mentiri in eo qui novit, locutionem *esse falsam*: ergo videtur, quod Christus mentiri potuerit: ergo potuit peccare, cum mentiri nullo modo possit bene fieri[^p266-4].

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Hebraeos secundo[^p266-5]: *Eum qui paulo minoratus est* etc.; Glossa: « Natura humanae mentis, quam Deus assumsit, et quae nullo peccato depravari potuit, solus Deus maior est »: ergo nullo modo anima Christi potuit infici aliqua macula peccati.

2. Item, Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit comprehensor et beatus; sed de essentia beatitudinis est, quod sit bonum inamissibile[^p266-6]: ergo Christus nunquam illam beatitudinem potuit perdere: ergo nec anima ipsius peccare.

3. Item, Christus ab instanti conceptionis tantam gratiam suscepit, quod maiorem illa habere non potuit[^p266-7], ergo ab instanti conceptionis habuit gratiam confirmationis; sed nullus potest peccare, qui illam gratiam habet: ergo etc.

4. Item, si Christus potuit peccare, ponatur — quia « possibili posito, nullum accidit impossibile[^p266-8] » — sed posito, quod Christus sive homo ille peccaverit, ponitur ex hoc, quod dignus fuit aeterna damnatione: ergo vel Deus damnaretur, vel homo a Verbo separaretur. Sed utrumque est omnino impossibile: ergo impossibile fuit, illum hominem peccare.

### Conclusio

> *Anima Christi nullatenus potuit peccare ob triplicem rationem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio anima Christi non potuit depravari[^p266-9] aliqua culpa. — Et ratio huius est triplex, scilicet *plenitudo gratiae*, *consummatio gloriae* et *unio divinae naturae et humanae*. Plenitudo gratiae facit, quod ipse Christus secundum humanam naturam habuit gratiam confirmationis; sed illa gratia adeo liberum arbitrium firmat, ut nullo modo possit infirmari per culpam. — Hoc ipsum facit *consummatio gloriae*, quae quidem fuit in Christo a suae conceptionis primordio; statim enim fuit beatus et comprehensor; et sicut beatus non potest damnari, sic etiam non potest praevaricari, ac per hoc in Christo nulla potuit esse secundum animam macula peccati. — Postremo, hoc efficacissime facit *unio divinae naturae et humanae* in unitatem personae, quae unio facit, ut idiomata communicentur, et ipsa non potest frangi[^p266-10]. Si igitur Deus non potest esse peccator et non potest non esse homo; planum est, quod illa unio nullatenus sustinet, Christum secundum humanam naturam peccare potuisse. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes sunt concedendae.

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**Ad argumenta** in oppositum:

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de laude viri iusti, dicendum, quod laus illa ratione[^p267-1] *unius* partis dicit perfectionem, in hoc scilicet, quod non est transgressus; ex *alia* parte dicit quandam defectibilitatem. Cum ergo dicitur, quod omnis laus attribuenda est Christo; dicendum, quod etsi illud aliquo modo habeat veritatem de laude perfecta, sive ratione eius conditionis, penes quam attenditur perfectio; non tamen oportet, quod ratione eius conditionis, secundum quam est imperfectio. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quia, sicut dicit Magister[^p267-2], ista laus est capitis in membris, ita quod perfectio competit ipsi capiti in se, sed quod est ibi defectibilitatis competit ratione membrorum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meliores iudicavit Deus homines etc.; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de toto genere humano secundum aliquam meliorationem, quae attenditur in ordine universitatis. Sic enim decebat, hominem in universitate constitui, ut in prima sui constitutione haberet vertibilitatem arbitrii secundum legem communem[^p267-3]. Sed Christus habuit aliquid supra hominem; ideo decuit, quod sibi fieret aliquod privilegium speciale, ut esset in eo liberalitas obsequii sine vertibilitate arbitrii, sicut et in divina voluntate videmus, quod liberaliter nobis bona impendit et facit, nullam tamen in eo est ponere vertibilitatem. Et propter hoc verbum illud Augustini, secundum quod *liberaliter* vocat vertibilitatem ad contrarium, non se extendit ad meliorationem, quae attenditur secundum privilegium speciale, sed secundum legem communem. — Si quis autem velit dicere, quod illi intelligitur *liberaliter*, id est *voluntarie*[^p267-4], obviat ei littera sequens et ratio proponendi verbum, quia Augustinus hoc verbum dicit, ut reddat rationem, quare Deus talem fecit hominem, ut posset male facere.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Bernardo, quod descendit, quantum descendere potuit; dicendum, quod intelligitur de potentia *ordinata*[^p267-5], quae supponit condecentiam. Decuit autem Deum condescendere ad *miseriam*, sed nullo modo decuit descendere ad *culpam*. Nam etsi *miseria* Filio Dei non competat in se, tamen competit, ut est *ordinata ad finem* nostrae redemptionis. *Culpa* autem vel ordinatio ad culpam in actu, vel in habitu nullo modorum competit sibi; et ideo decenter non potuit se humiliare adeo, ut ad statum peccati secundum actum, vel habitum se Deus inclinaret. — Nec valet quod obiicit de passibilitate, quod respondet vertibilitati animae; dicendum est enim, quod hoc verum est secundum iustitiam communem, sed Christus passibilitates carnis assumsit dispensative, sicut inferius[^p267-6] apparebit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus erat in statu viatoris; dicendum, quod etsi erat in statu viatoris, non tamen *omnino*; habuit enim aliquid de statu comprehensoris. Unde Boethius[^p267-7] dicit, « quod Christus de omni statu aliquid assumsit: de statu *ante* peccatum assumsit innocentiam, de statu *post* peccatum assumsit poenam, de statu *comprehensoris* impossibilitatem peccandi ». Quia ergo Christus purus viator non erat; ideo non sequitur, quod peccare potuerit, sicut possunt et alii viatores.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus laudatur in his quae necessario facit; dicendum, quod duplex est necessitas, quae *repugnat* voluntati, sicut necessitas *coactionis*, quae venit ab extrinseco; et est necessitas, quae *subest* voluntati, et ista est necessitas, quae venit ex voluntatis *immutabilitate*[^p267-8]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod laus non est in operibus necessitatis; dicendum, quod verum est de necessitate *primo* modo dicta, sed non *secundo*.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potuit scienter dicere locutionem falsam; dicendum, quod *dicere* est dupliciter: uno modo idem est quod *ore proferre*; et hoc modo absque dubio potuit proferre locutionem falsam, quia talis prolatio est perfectionis. Alio modo *dicere* idem est quod *asserere* sive *affirmare*; et hoc modo non potuit, quia veritas ad falsitatem declinare non potuit; et hoc quia non fuit impotentiae, immo magis potentiae[^p267-9].

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english:
### Article II. *On the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free choice.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free choice. And concerning this two matters of doubt arise.

First it is asked, whether that man could sin.

Second, whether he had or assumed a power of sinning.

### Question I. *Whether Christ could sin.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether Christ could sin. And that he could, it seems:

1. In Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-one[^p265-6], it is said in praise of the just man: *He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed*; but every praise befits Christ which befits any member of his: therefore it seems that this could be said in praise of Christ: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^p265-7]: « God judged
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men to be better, if they served him freely », and he calls it *to serve freely* if, though they could offend him, they were unwilling to: therefore if he made Christ the best and judged him the best, it seems that Christ could sin.

3. Likewise, Bernard[^p266-1]: « He descended as far as he was able to descend »; but he is of a lower grade who can sin than he who cannot: therefore it seems that Christ was in that state. *If you say* that this is understood with respect to the flesh; *on the contrary*: the disposition of the flesh corresponds to the disposition of free choice, as is evident in Adam and in us: therefore just as Christ assumed the passibility of the flesh, so it seems that he assumed the changeableness of free choice.

4. Likewise, Christ was in the state of a wayfarer: therefore since to be able to sin pertains to the state of a wayfarer, just as to be unable to sin pertains to the state of a comprehensor[^p266-2]; it seems that Christ could sin.

5. Likewise, no one is praised in those things which he does of necessity[^p266-3]; but Christ was praiseworthy in his works: therefore he did not do them necessarily: therefore he could cease from good and due works; and this is to omit: therefore he could sin.

6. Likewise, Christ could utter some negative and true statement; but he who can utter a negative locution can utter the affirmative opposed to it; but that one is false: therefore Christ could utter a false locution. But this is to lie, in one who knows the locution *to be false*: therefore it seems that Christ could lie: therefore he could sin, since to lie can in no way be done well[^p266-4].

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter two[^p266-5]: *Him who was made a little lower* etc.; the Gloss: « The nature of the human mind, which God assumed, and which could be depraved by no sin, God alone is greater »: therefore in no way could the soul of Christ be infected by any stain of sin.

2. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception was a comprehensor and blessed; but it belongs to the essence of beatitude that it be a good that cannot be lost[^p266-6]: therefore Christ could never lose that beatitude: therefore neither could his soul sin.

3. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception received so great a grace that he could not have a greater than it[^p266-7], therefore from the instant of his conception he had the grace of confirmation; but no one can sin who has that grace: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if Christ could sin, let it be posited — since « when a possible is posited, nothing impossible follows[^p266-8] » — but, supposing that Christ or that man had sinned, it is posited by this that he was worthy of eternal damnation: therefore either God would be damned, or the man would be separated from the Word. But both are altogether impossible: therefore it was impossible that that man should sin.

### Conclusion

> *The soul of Christ could in no way sin, for a threefold reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the soul of Christ could not be depraved[^p266-9] by any fault. — And the reason for this is threefold, namely *the fullness of grace*, *the consummation of glory*, and *the union of the divine and human nature*. The fullness of grace brings it about that Christ himself, according to his human nature, had the grace of confirmation; but that grace so confirms free choice that it can in no way be weakened by fault. — This same thing the *consummation of glory* brings about, which indeed was in Christ from the very beginning of his conception; for at once he was blessed and a comprehensor; and just as one who is blessed cannot be damned, so neither can he prevaricate, and through this there could be in Christ no stain of sin according to his soul. — Lastly, this the *union of the divine and human nature* into the unity of person brings about most efficaciously, which union brings it about that the idioms are communicated, and it itself cannot be broken[^p266-10]. If therefore God cannot be a sinner and cannot not be man; it is plain that that union in no way allows that Christ, according to his human nature, could have sinned. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

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**To the arguments** to the contrary:

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected concerning the praise of the just man, it must be said that that praise, by reason[^p267-1] of *one* part, expresses perfection, namely in this, that he did not transgress; from the *other* part it expresses a certain defectibility. When therefore it is said that every praise is to be attributed to Christ; it must be said that, although this has some truth concerning the perfect praise, that is, by reason of that condition with respect to which perfection is regarded; nevertheless it is not necessary that it be so by reason of that condition with respect to which there is imperfection. — It could also be said otherwise, that, as the Master says[^p267-2], this praise is of the head in the members, so that perfection befits the head itself in itself, but what is of defectibility there befits it by reason of the members.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that God judged men to be better etc.; it must be said that this is true of the whole human race according to a certain betterment, which is regarded in the order of the universe. For thus it was fitting that man be constituted in the universe, so that in his first constitution he should have changeableness of choice according to the common law[^p267-3]. But Christ had something above man; therefore it was fitting that some special privilege should be made for him, that there should be in him a generosity of compliance without changeableness of choice, just as also in the divine will we see that it generously bestows and does good things to us, yet there is no changeableness to be posited in it. And on account of this that word of Augustine, according to which *freely* names changeableness toward the contrary, does not extend to the betterment which is regarded according to a special privilege, but according to the common law. — But if anyone should wish to say that there *freely* is understood, that is, *voluntarily*[^p267-4], the following text and the reason for proposing the word stands against him, because Augustine utters this word in order to render the reason why God made such a man, that he could do evil.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning Bernard, that he descended as far as he was able to descend; it must be said that it is understood of *ordained* power[^p267-5], which presupposes fittingness. Now it was fitting for God to condescend to *misery*, but in no way was it fitting to descend to *fault*. For although *misery* does not befit the Son of God in itself, nevertheless it befits him as it is *ordained to the end* of our redemption. But *fault*, or an ordering to fault in act, or in habit, in no manner of ways befits him; and therefore he could not fittingly humble himself so far that God should incline himself to the state of sin according to act or habit. — Nor does what he objects concerning passibility hold, that it corresponds to the changeableness of the soul; for it must be said that this is true according to the common justice, but Christ assumed the passibilities of the flesh by dispensation, as will appear below[^p267-6].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that Christ was in the state of a wayfarer; it must be said that, although he was in the state of a wayfarer, not however *altogether*; for he had something of the state of a comprehensor. Whence Boethius[^p267-7] says, « that Christ assumed something of every state: from the state *before* sin he assumed innocence, from the state *after* sin he assumed punishment, from the state *of a comprehensor* the impossibility of sinning ». Since therefore Christ was not a pure wayfarer; therefore it does not follow that he could sin, as the other wayfarers can.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that no one is praised in those things which he does necessarily; it must be said that necessity is twofold: that which *repels* the will, such as the necessity *of coercion*, which comes from without; and there is a necessity which *underlies* the will, and this is the necessity which comes from the *immutability*[^p267-8] of the will. When therefore it is said that praise is not in works of necessity; it must be said that it is true of necessity spoken of in the *first* way, but not in the *second*.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that he could knowingly utter a false locution; it must be said that *to say* is twofold: in one way it is the same as *to utter aloud*; and in this way without doubt he could utter a false locution, because such an utterance is a matter of perfection. In another way *to say* is the same as *to assert* or *to affirm*; and in this way he could not, because truth could not decline to falsity; and this because it was not a matter of impotence, but rather of power[^p267-9].

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la: Vers. 10.

la: De Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27: *Voluntate ergo peccatur.*

en: *On True Religion*, c. 14, n. 27: « It is therefore by will that one sins. »

la: Serm. 60. de Diversis (alias 18. ex Parvis), n. 1: *Descendit siquidem, quo inferius non decuit.* — Post *descendit* Vat. supplet *Deus.*

en: Sermon 60, *On Diverse Subjects* (otherwise 18, *From the Lesser*), n. 1: « He descended, indeed, to where it was not fitting to go lower. » — After *descendit* the Vatican edition supplies *Deus.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 3. seqq.

en: Cf. II Sent., text of the Master, d. XXV, c. 3 ff.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8. — Paulo inferius verbo *cessare* edd. cum cod. cc praemittunt *necessario.*

en: According to Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 5. Cf. vol. II, p. 113, note 8. — A little below, before the word *cessare*, the editions with codex cc prefix *necessario.*

la: Etiam apud Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 10. haec obiectio habetur, his verbis proposita: Quippe, ut alia taceam, quomodo dicemus, eum non potuisse mentiri, quod semper peccatum est? Cum enim dicat Iudaeis de Patre: *Si dixero, quia non scio eum, ero similis vobis mendax* (Ioan. 8, 55.), et inter haec verba dicat: *non scio eum,* quis eum dicat easdem tres nequivisse proferre dictiones, sive aliis verbis, ut sic diceret: *non scio eum*? Quod si faceret, ut ipse ait, esset mendax, quod est esse peccatorem. Quare, quoniam hoc potuit, peccare potuit. — Paulo superius pro *in eo qui novit* edd. 1, 2 et complures codd. *in eo quod novit.*

en: This objection is also found in Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 10, proposed in these words: Indeed, to pass over other things, how shall we say that he could not lie, which is always sin? For since he says to the Jews concerning the Father: *If I should say that I know him not, I shall be like to you a liar* (John 8:55), and among these words he says: *I know him not,* who would say that he was unable to utter the same three words, or in other words, so as to say: *I know him not*? But if he did so, as Anselm himself says, he would be a liar, which is to be a sinner. Wherefore, since he was able to do this, he was able to sin. — A little above, for *in eo qui novit* editions 1, 2 and very many codices read *in eo quod novit.*

la: Vers. 9. — Glossa habetur ut *ordinaria* apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum in hunc loc.; sumta est ex August., II. contra Maximin. Arian. c. 25.

en: Verse 9. — The Gloss is found as the *ordinary* [gloss] in Peter Lombard and Lyranus on this passage; it is taken from Augustine, *Against Maximinus the Arian* II, c. 25.

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. et 13, XII. c. 20. n. 2, XIV. c. 25, XIII. c. 8. n. 11.

en: Cf. Augustine, *City of God* XI, cc. 11 and 13; XII, c. 20, n. 2; XIV, c. 25; XIII, c. 8, n. 11.

la: Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 3.

la: Aristot., I. Prior. c. 12. et VII. Phys. text. 9. (c. 1.), VIII. text. 36. (c. 5.). — De ipso arg. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Post *ponatur* Vat. addit *in esse.*

en: Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, c. 12, and *Physics* VII, text 9 (c. 1), VIII, text 36 (c. 5). — On this argument cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — After *ponatur* the Vatican edition adds *in esse.*

la: Codd. A H K Z aa *damnari.* Mox pro *consummatio gloriae* G (bb a secunda manu) et edd. 1, 2 *confirmatio gloriae,* quae mutatio scripturae in cod. bb a secunda manu paulo inferius iterum facta est.

en: Codices A H K Z aa read *damnari.* Presently, for *consummatio gloriae,* G (bb in a second hand) and editions 1, 2 read *confirmatio gloriae,* which alteration of the writing is made again a little below in codex bb by a second hand.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 138, nota 8. et pag. 162, nota 2. — Pro *frangi* cod. U *infringi.* Ante *non potest frangi* cod. F inserit *peccato.*

en: Cf. above, p. 138, note 8, and p. 162, note 2. — For *frangi* codex U reads *infringi.* Before *non potest frangi* codex F inserts *peccato.*

la: Vocem *ratione,* quae ab edd. abest, adiecimus fide codd. A K M O bb.

en: The word *ratione,* which is absent from the editions, we have added on the authority of codices A K M O bb.

la: Hic c. 2. Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Proxime ante pro *quia* codd. A H I L U aa *quod.* Paulo inferius pro *competat* edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. *competit,* et mox pro *defectibilitatis* codd. I L Z aa *defectus.*

en: Here, c. 2. Cf. also II Sent., d. 44, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. — Just before, for *quia* codices A H I L U aa read *quod.* A little below, for *competat* editions 1, 2 with not a few codices read *competit,* and presently, for *defectibilitatis* codices I L Z aa read *defectus.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1, ubi quaestio dissolvitur, utrum Deus debuerit facere hominem impeccabilem.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, where the question is resolved, whether God ought to have made man impeccable.

la: Sive, ut paulo superius de Deo dictum est, liberalitate sine vertibilitate arbitrii, sicut et in divina voluntate videmus etc. Contra quam instantiam ibid. n. 28. dicitur: « Liberaliter igitur Deo Angeli serviunt, neque hoc Deo, sed ipsis prodest. Deus enim bono alterius non indiget… Illa vero quae facta sunt eius bono indigent… Minus autem sunt quam erant, cum per animae peccatum minus ad illum moventur » etc. Integrum August. locum, quo continetur etiam « littera sequens », ad quam lector hic delegatur, supra allegavimus pag. 265, nota 7. Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12. seqq.

en: Or, as was said a little above concerning God, by generosity without changeableness of choice, just as also in the divine will we see, etc. Against which instance it is said in the same place, n. 28: « The Angels therefore serve God freely, nor does this profit God, but themselves. For God does not need the good of another… But those things which have been made need his good… They are less than they were, when through the soul's sin they are moved less toward him » etc. The whole passage of Augustine, which contains also the « following text » to which the reader is here referred, we have cited above, p. 265, note 7. Cf. *On Free Choice* III, c. 5, n. 12 ff.

la: Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12: Sic eas [libertatem, voluntatem et benignitatem Dei] debemus rationabiliter intelligere, ut dignitati illius non videamus repugnare. Libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc quod expedit, aut quod decet; nec benignitas dicenda est quae aliquid Deo indecens operatur. — Subinde pro *Decuit autem,* quemadmodum scriptum est in codd. A (K a secunda manu) M O bb, alii codd. tamen, edd. *enim.* Post pauca codd. A bb verbis *Filio Dei* praefigunt *ipsi.*

en: Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 12: We ought thus to understand these [the liberty, will, and benignity of God] reasonably, so that we may not see them to be repugnant to his dignity. For there is no liberty except for that which is expedient or which is fitting; nor is that to be called benignity which does anything unfitting to God. — Thereupon, for *Decuit autem,* as it is written in codices A (K in a second hand) M O bb, yet other codices and the editions read *enim.* After a few words, codices A bb prefix *ipsi* to the words *Filio Dei.*

la: Dist. 15. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Pro *carnis* codd. U *communes.*

en: Distinction 15, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — For *carnis* codices U read *communes.*

la: De Una persona et duabus naturis, c. 8. Boethii sententia ibi longior est, quam quae hic a Bonav. affertur.

en: *On the One Person and the Two Natures*, c. 8. The sentence of Boethius is there longer than that which is here adduced by Bonaventure.

la: De qua necessitate vide II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3, d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in corp. et q. 4. seq. Cfr. etiam Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17. seqq. — In fine solut. pro *secundo,* quod habent codd. A M bb, alii codd. et edd. minus congrue *de secundo.*

en: Concerning this necessity see II Sent., d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3; d. 25, p. II, q. 2, in the body and q. 4 following. Cf. also Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 17 ff. — At the end of the solution, for *secundo,* which codices A M bb have, other codices and the editions read, less fittingly, *de secundo.*

la: Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 10. respondet: Et hoc dicere potuit, et peccare non potuit… Omnis potestas sequitur voluntatem. Cum enim dico, quia possum loqui vel ambulare, subauditur: si volo; si enim non subintelligitur voluntas, non est potestas, sed necessitas etc.

en: Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 10, answers: And he could say this, and could not sin… All power follows the will. For when I say that I can speak or walk, it is understood: if I will; for if the will is not understood along with it, there is not power, but necessity, etc. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Nonnulli haeretici blasphemaverunt dicentes, Christum *actu* peccasse; quod manifeste est contra s. Scripturam. Insuper omnino tenendum est, Christum fuisse absolute *impeccabilem*. Hoc docent communiter theologi, Ss. Patres et Concil. VI. oecumen. (Constantinop. III. an. 680), ubi inter alia contra Monothelitas, in Christo esse « duas naturales voluntates, non contrarias, absit, iuxta quod impii asseruerunt haeretici, sed sequentem eius humanam voluntatem, et non resistentem vel reluctantem, sed potius et subiectam divinae eius atque omnipotenti voluntati ». Et inferius: « Sicut enim eius caro caro Dei Verbi dicitur, ita et naturalis carnis eius voluntas *propria* Dei Verbi dicitur et est » etc. Et infra dicitur, quod sicut sanctissima caro Christi *deificata* non est peremta, « ita et humana eius voluntas *deificata* (θέλημα θεωθέν) non est peremta ». — Tres autem rationes huius impeccabilitatis affert S. Bonav. approbatas a S. Thoma, qui dicit (hic q. 2. a. 1.), quod Christus nec ut *viator* (ob plenitudinem gratiae) nec ut *comprehensor*, nec ut *Deus* potuit peccare. Et revera, si divina persona in Christo non tantum est terminus et principium *existendi*, sed et principium *quod operandi*, ipsa unio hypostatica formaliter excludit peccabilitatem. Hinc male audit Durandus (hic q. 2.), qui putat, quod Christus, dato quod humanitas eius fuisset assumta sine gratia (quod censet esse possibile), posset peccare et etiam damnari (!). Sed haec, ut dicit Dionys. Carth., « videntur prorsus absurda ». Etiam Scotus et plurimi eius discipuli in hoc recedunt ab egregia doctrina antiquorum Ordinis Magistrorum, scilicet Alexandri, S. Bonaventurae et Richardi, quod impeccabilitatem Christi non vi unionis hypostaticae, sed visionis beatificae necessariam esse asserant. Nonnulli tamen, ut Hauzeur (Collatio etc. t. II. col. 355. seqq.), aliter mentem ipsius Scoti interpretantur.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 2. a. 2, q. 15. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit.; S. III. q. 15. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 5. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**III.** Cum in Christo sit vera voluntas humana, ut constat contra Monothelitas, et cum voluntas humana in se considerata, praescindendo ab unione hypostatica et gratia gloriaque, sit potentia defectibilis et peccati capax, in aliquo sensu concedi potest, in Christo esse potentiam peccandi, scilicet « potentiam, quae *in aliis* est potentia peccandi » (ita S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2.). — De hac 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 14. m. 1. — B. Albert., a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Some heretics blasphemed, saying that Christ had *actually* sinned; which is manifestly against Sacred Scripture. Moreover, it is altogether to be held that Christ was absolutely *impeccable*. This the theologians teach in common, the holy Fathers, and the VI. ecumenical Council (Constantinople III, A.D. 680), where, among other things against the Monothelites, [it is said] that in Christ there are « two natural wills, not contrary—far be it!—as the impious heretics asserted, but his human will following, and not resisting or struggling, but rather subject to his divine and omnipotent will ». And below: « For just as his flesh is called the flesh of God the Word, so also the natural will of his flesh is called and is the *proper* [will] of God the Word » etc. And further it is said that, just as the most holy *deified* flesh of Christ was not destroyed, « so also his human *deified* will (θέλημα θεωθέν) was not destroyed ». — Now St. Bonaventure brings forward three reasons for this impeccability, approved by St. Thomas, who says (here, q. 2, a. 1) that Christ could sin neither as a *wayfarer* (on account of the fullness of grace), nor as a *comprehensor*, nor as *God*. And indeed, if the divine person in Christ is not only the term and principle *of existing*, but also the principle *by which he operates*, the hypostatic union itself formally excludes peccability. Hence Durandus (here, q. 2) is ill spoken of, who thinks that Christ, granted that his humanity had been assumed without grace (which he holds to be possible), could sin and even be damned (!). But these things, as Dionysius the Carthusian says, « seem utterly absurd ». Scotus too and very many of his disciples in this depart from the excellent doctrine of the ancients of the Order of Masters, namely Alexander, St. Bonaventure, and Richard, in that they assert the impeccability of Christ to be necessary not by force of the hypostatic union, but of the beatific vision. Some, however, such as Hauzeur (Collatio etc., vol. II, col. 355 ff.), interpret Scotus's own mind otherwise.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, S. p. III, q. 5, m. 2, a. 2, q. 15, m. 2. — Scotus, in both Scripta here, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here, loc. cit.; S. III, q. 15, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here, aa. 4, 5, 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 2, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.

**III.** Since in Christ there is a true human will, as is established against the Monothelites, and since the human will considered in itself, prescinding from the hypostatic union and from grace and glory, is a defectible power and capable of sin, in some sense it can be conceded that in Christ there is a power of sinning, namely « a power which *in others* is a power of sinning » (so St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2). — Concerning this 2nd question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit., q. 14, m. 1. — Bl. Albert, a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit., q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{265,266,267,268}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`; PDF pp. 287–290, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 18759–18945) as the base for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/III override, the column-band PDF read is authoritative for the cascade-fragmented Respondeo and all footers.

**Page identity.** Running heads confirmed via the 450 dpi bands: p.265 (`QUAEST. I. 265`), p.266 (`266 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`), p.267 (`DIST. XII. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 267`), p.268 (`268 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`). OCR'd page-number digits in this band are mangled; the running-head text + offset are authoritative.

**ARTICULUS II opener folded in.** Per the locked Vol II chunking convention, the short ARTICULUS II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de conditione naturae assumtae… incidunt duo dubitabilia*) is folded into this q1 — no standalone divisio chunk. Raw: ARTICULUS II header at line 18759; QUAESTIO I opener at 18766.

**Opener alignment — PASS.** QUAESTIO I here = *Utrum Christus potuerit peccare* / *Primo quaeritur, utrum ille homo peccare potuerit* ("whether that man / Christ could sin"), NOT q2 (*utrum potentiam peccandi habuerit*). The article opener lists q1 first = the *posse peccare* question; the body proceeds *Circa primum… utrum Christus potuerit peccare*. Correctly assigned.

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**Apparatus — 21 entries, per-page restart:**
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**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: true`. The free-standing SCHOLION (p.268) has parts I–III. Scholion I is doctrinal (impeccability; Constantinople III; the triplex-ratio synopsis). Scholion II is the reference list **for this q1** (Alex. Hal., Scotus, S. Thom., Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard, Dionys. Carth.). Scholion III closes with **`De hac 2. quaestione:`** + a second reference list — i.e. the scholion **forward-covers q2** (a2-q2 carries no scholion of its own).

**Hand-offs:**
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**`[?]` flags:** none. OCR in this region was confirmable line-by-line against the 450 dpi bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 268 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Christus potentiam peccandi habuerit vel assumserit.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus potentiam peccandi habuit vel assumsit. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus[^p268-1]: «Omnia quae in natura nostra plantavit Deus, assumsit Dei Verbum»; si ergo potentiam, qua peccamus et bene facimus, Deus ab initio in nobis plantavit; videtur, quod eam ex tempore Dei Verbum assumsit.

2. Item, idem Damascenus[^p268-2]: «Totum me assumsit, ut me totum redimeret»; ergo omnem nostram substantiam et omnis nostrae substantiae potentiam; sed potentia peccandi est potentia rationalis animae, quae non potest reperiri nisi in creatura valde nobili: ergo videtur, quod Christus eam habuerit.

3. Item, potentia peccandi est potentia rationalis, et illa est ad opposita[^p268-3], ergo eadem est potentia bene faciendi: si ergo non est aliud quam liberum arbitrium, et Christus liberum arbitrium assumsit; ergo et potentiam peccandi.

4. Item, solum illud curatum est in nobis, quod punitum et afflictum fuit in Christo[^p268-4]; sed in nobis curari maxime indigebat potentia peccandi, quoniam illa est, quae aegrotat per culpam: ergo videtur, quod in Christo passa fuerit et afflicta; et si hoc: ergo a Christo fuit habita et assumta.

**Sed contra:**

1. Christus secundum humanam naturam habuit plenam libertatem, sicut et plenam gratiam; sed «potentia peccandi, addita libertati, eam diminuit»; sicut dicit Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^p268-5]: ergo potentia peccandi non fuit in Christo.

2. Item, omni potentia aliquis est potens, ergo si in aliquo est potentia peccandi, illa potest peccare; sed Christus non potuit peccare, sicut prius[^p268-6] ostensum est: ergo nec peccandi potentiam habere.

3. Item, potentia peccandi est principium culpae; sed in quocumque contingit reperire principium, possibile est reperire illud quod ex illo principio causatur: ergo si Christus habuit potentiam peccandi, habere potuit peccatum: ergo potuit esse <!-- page 269 -->damnatus et Dei inimicus. Quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat, quod et primum[^p269-1].

4. Item, Christus secundum animam fuit Deo simillimus inter creaturas ceteras, quoniam maxime fuit eius anima deiformis[^p269-2]; sed Deus non habet potentiam peccandi: ergo videtur, quod eam non habuerit nec assumserit Christus.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Christus assumsit potentiam peccandi, id est potentiam, qua peccatur, non tamen potentiam peccandi ordinatam ad actum peccandi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod potentia peccandi dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur potentia peccandi, id est potentia, qua peccatur; et sic potentia peccandi nominat ipsum liberum arbitrium creatum, quod quidem potest in bonum, adiutum gratia; et quia per sui naturam est defectivum[^p269-3], hinc est, quod illa potentia sive facultas dici potest potentia bene faciendi et potentia peccandi; nullus enim peccat nisi per illam. — Alio modo potentia peccandi dicitur potentia ordinata ad peccandum, ut potentia nominet aliquid medium inter substantiam et peccati actum, per quod substantia illa possit exire in peccati perpetrationem.

Si ergo primo modo dicatur potentia peccandi, sic absque dubio fuit in Christo. Et sic procedunt rationes ad primam partem, quae ostendunt, Christum habuisse potentiam peccandi, quia assumsit integre nostram naturam et eius quamlibet potentiam. Et ideo rationes illae concedi possunt, quia recta via procedunt et verum concludunt. — Si vero potentia peccandi dicatur potentia ut ordinata ad peccatum perpetrandum, sic non est concedendum, quod Christus habuit[^p269-4] potentiam peccandi, pro eo quod peccare non potuit; et talis ordinatio, immo deordinatio, diminuit de plenitudine libertatis.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum in contrarium.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omni potentia est aliquis potens; dicendum, quod verum est, si potentia dicat ordinationem ad actum; sed si dicat solum naturalem aptitudinem[^p269-5], non habet veritatem, quia potest impediri per oppositum eius, sicut gressibilis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad gradiendum, et caecus ad videndum; non tamen gressibilis truncatus potest gradi. Et sic damnati habent potentiam merendi, sed tamen mereri non possunt, quia praepeditur in eis ordinatio illius potentiae sive exitus in talem actum[^p269-6]. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia animam Christi exire in actum peccati est impossibile, quamvis illam eandem potentiam habeat, quam habet peccator, et hoc propter perfectionem gratiae non sustinentis talem egressum sive defectum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia peccandi est principium culpae; dicendum, quod verum est; sed hoc est in quantum deficiens, sive in quantum sibi relinquitur[^p269-7]. In Christo autem non potest sibi relinqui propter inseparabilem unionem cum divinitate: et ideo non potest culpam perpetrare, quoniam non est in Christo sub ea ratione, qua habet principiare. Et ideo non sequitur, quod culpa aliqua possit esse in Christo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus secundum animam fuit Deo simillimus: dicendum, quod etsi similior fuit anima Christi Deo[^p269-8] ceteris creaturis, tamen improportionabiliter distat a Deo; quoniam Deus, cum sit summe potens in se, per se et ex se, non potest deficere nec habere potentiam deficiendi, nec quantum ad ordinationem, nec quantum ad radicem. Sed anima Christi est creatura, sicut et aliae animae, et ex hoc ipso per naturam suam est vertibilis et defectibilis et potentiam habet deficiendi; sed quod non deficiat, hoc habet beneficio eius qui longe distat ab omni defectu. Et ideo non sequitur, quod anima Christi caruerit omni potentia peccandi, sed quod caruit ordinatione ad talem actum sive defectum per illud donum, quod faciebat, Christum esse Deo simillimum[^p269-9].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether Christ had or assumed the power of sinning.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ had or assumed the power of sinning. And that he did seems so.

1. Damascene[^p268-1]: «All the things that God planted in our nature, the Word of God assumed»; if therefore God from the beginning planted in us the power by which we sin and do well, it seems that the Word of God assumed it in time.

2. Likewise, the same Damascene[^p268-2]: «He assumed the whole of me, that he might redeem the whole of me»; therefore [he assumed] our whole substance and the whole potency of our substance; but the power of sinning is a rational potency of the soul, which cannot be found except in a very noble creature: therefore it seems that Christ had it.

3. Likewise, the power of sinning is a rational potency, and that is toward opposites[^p268-3]; therefore it is the same potency as the potency of doing well: if therefore it is nothing other than free choice, and Christ assumed free choice, then [he assumed] also the power of sinning.

4. Likewise, only that has been healed in us which was punished and afflicted in Christ[^p268-4]; but in us the power of sinning most needed to be healed, since it is that which is sick through fault: therefore it seems that in Christ it suffered and was afflicted; and if so: therefore it was had and assumed by Christ.

**On the contrary:**

1. Christ according to his human nature had full liberty, just as also full grace; but «the power of sinning, added to liberty, diminishes it»; as Anselm says in the book *On Free Choice*[^p268-5]: therefore the power of sinning was not in Christ.

2. Likewise, by every potency someone is able [to act]; therefore if in anyone there is a power of sinning, that one can sin; but Christ could not sin, as was shown before[^p268-6]: therefore neither [could he] have the power of sinning.

3. Likewise, the power of sinning is a principle of fault; but in whatever it happens to find a principle, it is possible to find that which is caused from that principle: therefore if Christ had the power of sinning, he could have had sin: therefore he could have been <!-- page 269 -->damned and an enemy of God. But if this is impossible, it remains that the first [is impossible] also[^p269-1].

4. Likewise, Christ according to his soul was most like to God among the other creatures, since his soul was supremely deiform[^p269-2]; but God does not have the power of sinning: therefore it seems that Christ neither had it nor assumed it.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Christ assumed the power of sinning, that is, the potency by which one sins, yet not the power of sinning ordered to the act of sinning.

**I respond:** It must be said that the power of sinning is spoken of in two ways. In one way it is called the power of sinning, that is, the potency by which one sins; and so the power of sinning names free choice itself as created, which indeed can [tend] toward the good when aided by grace; and because by its own nature it is defectible[^p269-3], hence it is that this potency or faculty can be called both the potency of doing well and the potency of sinning; for no one sins except through it. — In another way the power of sinning is called a potency ordered toward sinning, such that the potency names something intermediate between the substance and the act of sin, through which that substance can go out into the perpetration of sin.

If therefore the power of sinning is spoken of in the first way, then without doubt it was in Christ. And in this way proceed the arguments to the first part, which show that Christ had the power of sinning, because he assumed our nature integrally and every potency of it. And therefore those arguments can be conceded, because they proceed by the right way and conclude what is true. — But if the power of sinning is called a potency as ordered toward perpetrating sin, then it is not to be conceded that Christ had[^p269-4] the power of sinning, for the reason that he could not sin; and such an ordering, indeed disordering, diminishes the fullness of liberty.

**To the arguments for the negative part:**

*To 1.* And through this the response to the first objection to the contrary is plain.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that by every potency someone is able [to act]; it must be said that it is true, if the potency states an ordering to the act; but if it states only a natural aptitude[^p269-5], it does not hold true, because it can be impeded through its opposite, just as one able to walk has a natural aptitude for walking, and a blind man for seeing; yet one able to walk who is maimed cannot walk. And thus the damned have a potency for meriting, but nevertheless they cannot merit, because the ordering of that potency, or its going out into such an act[^p269-6], is impeded in them. And so it is to be understood in the matter at hand, because for the soul of Christ to go out into the act of sin is impossible, although it has the same potency that a sinner has, and this on account of the perfection of grace not allowing such a going-out or defect.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the power of sinning is a principle of fault; it must be said that it is true; but this is insofar as it is defective, or insofar as it is left to itself[^p269-7]. In Christ, however, it cannot be left to itself on account of the inseparable union with the divinity: and therefore it cannot perpetrate fault, since it is not in Christ under that account by which it has [the role] of being a principle. And therefore it does not follow that any fault could be in Christ.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that Christ according to his soul was most like to God: it must be said that although the soul of Christ was more like to God[^p269-8] than the other creatures, nevertheless it stands disproportionately distant from God; since God, being supremely powerful in himself, through himself and from himself, cannot fail nor have a potency of failing, neither as to ordering nor as to root. But the soul of Christ is a creature, just as the other souls are, and from this very fact by its own nature it is changeable and defectible and has a potency of failing; but that it does not fail, this it has by the benefit of him who stands far distant from all defect. And therefore it does not follow that the soul of Christ lacked all power of sinning, but that it lacked the ordering to such an act or defect through that gift which made Christ to be most like to God[^p269-9].

---

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I. — In conclus. respicitur illud Eccli. 15, 14: *Deus ab initio constituit hominem et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui.*

en: Bk. III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 6. See above, the text of the Master, d. II, c. I. — In the conclusion that text of Ecclus. 15:14 is regarded: *God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel.*

la: Loc. cit. et in lit. Magistri, loc. cit. — Quoad *minorem* vide tom. II. pag. 1000, nota 4.

en: In the place cited and in the text of the Master, in the place cited. — As to the *minor* premise, see vol. II, p. 1000, note 4.

la: Secundum Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.). — Subinde post *ergo eadem est* cod. A bene inserit *cum*, cod. H vero post *bene faciendi* subnectit *et male faciendi.* Post *si ergo*, quod proxime sequitur, subaudi: haec potentia. — Quod Christus liberum arbitrium assumsit, ostendit Damascen., III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. et 18.

en: According to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5). — Then after *ergo eadem est* codex A rightly inserts *cum*, while codex H after *bene faciendi* appends *et male faciendi.* After *si ergo*, which follows next, understand: this potency. — That Christ assumed free choice, Damascene shows, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 14 and 18.

la: Quod enim inassumtibile est, incurabile est, ut dicit Damascen., III. de Fide orthod. c. 6, et habetur in lit. Magistri, supra d. II. c. I. Idem s. Doctor in eodem libro, c. 18. ulterius dicit: *Quapropter totum hominem assumsit, illamque adeo ipsius partem* [scil. animam], *quae obnoxia morbo fuerat, ut toti salutem largiretur* (ed. Migne). Cfr. ibid. c. 14, ubi insinuat, quod voluntas, quae primo subiacuit peccato, a Christo assumta fuit et curata.

en: For what is unassumable is incurable, as Damascene says, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 6, and it is found in the text of the Master, above, d. II, c. I. The same holy Doctor in the same book, c. 18, says further: *Wherefore he assumed the whole man, and indeed that very part of him* [namely, the soul], *which had been subject to disease, that he might bestow salvation on the whole* (Migne edition). Compare ibid. c. 14, where he intimates that the will, which first lay subject to sin, was assumed and healed by Christ.

la: Cap. I. Verba integra vide tom. II. pag. 613, nota 9.

en: Chap. I. For the entire words, see vol. II, p. 613, note 9.

la: Quaest. praeced. — In principio huius arg. post *Item* edd. subdunt *si.*

en: The preceding question. — At the beginning of this argument, after *Item* the editions add *si.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. fundam. I. et d. 13. a. I. q. I. in corp. — Pro *simillimus* multi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 minus recte *similis.* In fine arg. codd. H K S V cc *non habuit nec assumsit Christus.*

en: Compare the preceding question, foundation I, and d. 13, a. I, q. I, in the body. — For *simillimus* many codices, as well as editions 1 and 2, less correctly [read] *similis.* At the end of the argument codices H K S V cc [read] *Christ neither had nor assumed [it].*

la: Edd. cum cod. cc attexunt *bene faciendi.*

en: The editions, with codex cc, append *bene faciendi.*

la: Codd. N T U V *habuerit.*

en: Codices N T U V [read] *habuerit.*

la: Pro *aptitudinem* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 *habitudinem*, codd. M O *habitudinem sive aptitudinem.* — Similiter S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. ait: «*Actus se habet ad potentiam dupliciter: quia actus egreditur a potentia, et iterum per actus specificatur potentia... Et primo modo non potest dici, quod ille qui habet visum impeditum, habeat potentiam videndi, sicut non potest dici, quod possit videre. Secundo modo potest dici, quod habeat potentiam visivam*». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 44. a. I. q. 2. — Post *gressibilis* supple: omnis, vel truncatus.

en: For *aptitudinem* not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *habitudinem*, codices M O *habitudinem sive aptitudinem* (a relation, or aptitude). — Similarly St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, says: «*An act is related to a potency in two ways: because the act goes out from the potency, and again the potency is specified by the act... And in the first way it cannot be said that he who has impaired sight has a potency of seeing, just as it cannot be said that he is able to see. In the second way it can be said that he has a power of sight*». Compare II *Sent.* d. 44, a. I, q. 2. — After *gressibilis* supply: every, or maimed.

la: Libr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3: *Damnatio vero aeterna reddit impossibilem* [hominem] *ad bonum, non quia ibi sit plenitudo omnis mali, nec etiam quia auferatur naturalis aptitudo ad bonum, sed quia aufertur merendi spatium, et Deus amplius non offert gratiam iuvantem ad bonum. Et ideo illa impossibilitas non dicitur per privationem habilitatis omnimodam, sed potius propter bene faciendi impedimenta.* Cfr. ibi d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. — Mox pro *quia* codd. I K L aa bb *quod*, et pro *actum peccati* cod. A *actum peccandi.*

en: Bk. II *Sent.* d. 33, a. 2, q. 3, to the 3rd: *Eternal damnation, however, renders* [man] *incapable of the good, not because there is there the fullness of all evil, nor even because the natural aptitude for good is taken away, but because the space for meriting is taken away, and God no longer offers grace assisting toward the good. And therefore that impossibility is not said by a privation of capacity in every mode, but rather on account of impediments to doing well.* Compare there d. 34, a. 2, q. 2. — Next for *quia* codices I K L aa bb [read] *quod*, and for *actum peccati* codex A [reads] *actum peccandi.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. I. q. 2. et d. 44. a. I. q. I. seqq.

en: Compare II *Sent.* d. 34, a. I, q. 2, and d. 44, a. I, q. I, and following.

la: Post *Deo* codd. A (K a secunda manu) P R S interiiciunt *et sic*, codd. F H I (K primitus) L N T U V X aa cc et edd. 1, 2 *et sic de.* Paulo inferius pro *ad ordinationem* codd. F U *ad ordinem*, et pariter circa finem solut. *ordine* pro *ordinatione.*

en: After *Deo* codices A (K by a second hand) P R S insert *et sic*, codices F H I (K originally) L N T U V X aa cc and editions 1, 2 [insert] *et sic de.* A little below, for *ad ordinationem* codices F U [read] *ad ordinem*, and likewise near the end of the solution *ordine* for *ordinatione.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed **pp.268–269** (PDF 290–291; offset `pdf = printed + 22`; raw lines 18946–19058). Running heads confirmed via the bands: p.268 verso top `268 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` (the page-top block is q1's free-standing SCHOLION; q2 opens lower in the left column); p.269 `DIST. XII. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 269`. Fresh literal English. The IA djvu OCR is cascade-fragmented for the two-column body and footers in this region, so the PDF bands are authoritative (Vol III = Vol II override).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.268** — top of the page carries q1's free-standing SCHOLION I–III (held in `d12-a2-q1`, NOT this chunk). q2 begins lower-left: QUAESTIO II title + opener + args 1, 2, 3, and the start of arg 4 (left col); arg 4 continuation + Sed contra 1, 2, and the start of Sed contra 3 (right col). Footers: 6 (nn.1–6).
- **p.269** — Sed contra 3 continuation + Sed contra 4; CONCLUSIO; Respondeo (twofold sense of *potentia peccandi*); replies *Ad 1, Ad 2, Ad 3, Ad 4* (Solutio closes with *…Christum esse Deo simillimum*). Footers: 9 (nn.1–9).

q2's body is complete on pp.268–269. **Printed p.270 is entirely ARTICULUS III** (*De conditione naturae quantum ad sexum*, raw 19059; its QUAESTIO I at raw 19067) — q2 does NOT extend onto p.270. (The hand-off note had anticipated a possible p.269/270 spill; eyes-on the 450 dpi p.270 band confirms ART. III opens at the top of p.270.)

**Apparatus.** 15 entries, per-page restart, page-suffixed markers `[^p268-1..6]`, `[^p269-1..9]`. q2 opens a **fresh p.268 footer sequence** (n.1 = Damascenus, *De Fide orthod.* III c.6) — per the hand-off from `d12-a2-q1`, NO numbered footer migrates forward (q1 ended with the free-standing scholion on p.268, which carries no numbered notes). The p.269 footer n.9 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) cross-refers back to q1's scholion, consistent with this q2 having no scholion of its own.

**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: false`. This q2 has no scholion of its own; the scholion to this question lives in **`d12-a2-q1`'s Scholion III**, which closes with `De hac 2. quaestione:` followed by a reference list (Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med.). Footer p.269 n.9 here also directs *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* the fresh p.268 footer sequence (nn.1–6) as q2's first body-footers; NO footer carried over from q1 (per `d12-a2-q1` hand-off, "NO numbered footer migrates forward").
- *Forwarded to `d12-a3-q1`:* ARTICULUS III (*De conditione naturae quantum ad sexum*) opens at raw **19059**, its QUAESTIO I (*Utrum decuerit Deum assumere sexum muliebrem*, `Consequenter quaeritur… quantum ad sexum… Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur…`) at raw **19067**, both at the top of printed **p.270** (PDF 292) with a fresh p.270 footer sequence. The ARTICULUS III opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad sexum… duo quaeruntur*) folds into a3-q1 per the locked convention. No q2 footer migrates forward to a3-q1 (q2 ended on p.269; p.270 begins its own footer sequence).

**`[?]` flags.** None. OCR running-head digits were ignored in favour of the band-confirmed running heads and the `pdf = printed + 22` offset; the Latin was re-set directly from the 450 dpi bands and parses cleanly throughout.