title: Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum.*

Secundo quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad meriti usum, et est quaestio, utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos quinto[^1]: *Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem, probatio vero spem:* ergo si in ipsa probatione consistit meritum, videtur, quod spes ex meritis habeat ortum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per definitionem Magistri, quae ponitur in littera[^2]: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis, proveniens ex gratia et meritis ».

3. Item, nullus habet virtutem spei, nisi qui in sperando sequitur dictamen fidei; sed fides dicit, nullum adultum salvari posse absque meritis[^3]: ergo nullus recte sperat beatitudinem, nisi cui suppetunt merita: videtur ergo, quod spes ex meritis procedat.

4. Item, sicut se habet desperatio ad demerita, sic se habet spes ad bona merita; sed sic se habet desperatio ad demerita, quod nullus desperat nisi propter aliquam culpam commissam — mala enim conscientia est illa quae inducit in desperationem — ergo videtur, quod similiter spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum[^4].

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus[^5]: « Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur »: ergo si spes virtus est, sicut ostensum est in praecedentibus, Deus eam in nobis operatur sine nobis: ergo non habet ortum ex meritis nostris.

2. Item, nihil quod est principium meritorum, ortum habet ex meritis[^6]; sed spes est principium meritorum; nullus enim potest mereri apud Deum, nisi qui sperat: ergo spes ex meritis non habet ortum.

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3. Item, omnes virtutes simul infunduntur[^7]: ergo si aliqua virtus praecedat merita, necesse est, quod omnes praecedant; et si aliqua subsequitur, necesse est, quod omnes subsequantur: igitur aut spes non procedit ex meritis, aut ceterae virtutes procedunt ex meritis. Sed impossibile est, ceteras virtutes ex meritis oriri: ergo impossibile est, ipsam spem ex meritis oriri.

4. Item, quanto quis perfectior est, tanto est humilior, et quanto humilior est, tanto minus praesumit sive confidit de meritis propriis: ergo si spes perfecta iuncta est cum humilitate perfecta, videtur, quod nec spes nec eius usus oriatur ex intuitu meritorum[^8].

### Conclusio.

> Spes, quatenus est habitus, non oritur ex meritis; quatenus est terminus sive obiectum ipsius, ortum habet ex meritis praecedentibus; quatenus dicit actum, vel statum, oritur ex intuitu meritorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod spes aliquando nominat habitum virtutis, aliquando nominat actum, aliquando nominat statum, aliquando terminum sive obiectum[^9]. — Secundum autem quod spes nominat habitum virtutis, sic non habet ortum ex meritis, sed potius merita habent ortum ex ea. — Secundum autem quod nominat actum, sic oriri habet ex meritorum intuitu; nullus enim sperat recte aeternam beatitudinem, nisi qui Deo servivit, vel proponit Deo servire. — Secundum autem quod nominat statum, sic ortum habet ex meritis praecedentibus et concomitantibus; et hoc modo accipitur ad Romanos quinto[^10]: *Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia probationem, probatio spem;* Glossa, id est « certitudinem spei », ad quam scilicet certitudinem pervenitur per bona merita, et maxime per tolerantiam et sustinentiam tribulationum. — Secundum autem quod spes nominat ipsam rem speratam, sic ortum habet ex meritis praecedentibus.

Et sic patet, quod spes secundum primam acceptionem simpliciter praecedit merita tanquam meritorum principium; secundum ultimam acceptionem simpliciter sequitur tanquam meritorum praemium; secundum duas medias medio modo se habet, quia quodam modo praecedit, quodam modo sequitur. Nam spes, prout nominat motum spei, procedit ex meritorum intuitu et secundum veritatem est principium meritorum sequentium. Prout autem spes dicitur quaedam certitudo et status, sic secundum veritatem ex meritis habet ortum, et est nihilominus adminiculum ad perfectius merendum[^11]. Illa enim certitudo spei consurgit ex perpessione tribulationum et vehementer confirmat et confortat animam, ut a tribulationum sustinentia non recedat. — Et ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet nihilominus responsio ad obiecta, quia spes quodam modo accipiendi est ex meritis, et quodam modo principium meritorum; et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad oppositas partes, et utraeque secundum diversas vias probant et concludunt veritatem, exceptis duabus ultimis rationibus, adductis ad utramque partem.

Ad illud enim quod obiicitur de desperatione, potest responderi, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, cum desperatio dicat profunditatem peccati[^12], nullus illic demergitur, nisi per aliquam culpam praecedentem disponatur; non sic autem spes dicit meriti perfectionem secundum generalem sui acceptionem. Ideo non oportet, quod procedat ex meritis, prout nominat ipsam virtutem, vel eius actum, sicut desperatio, quae est vitium demergens in profundum, praeexigit aliud peccatum. — Praeterea, alia de causa non est simile, quia nos et ea quae sunt in nobis et a nobis, sunt principia vitiorum nostrorum; non sic autem est de bonis, quia *omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum de sursum est*[^13]; ideo non sic oportet, spem ex nostro oriri merito, sicut desperatio oritur ex vitio.

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Ad illud similiter quod ultimo obiicitur ex alia parte, quod vir humilis merita non intuetur; dicendum, quod merita intueri contingit dupliciter: vel attribuendo sibi, vel attribuendo gratiae divinae. Intueri autem merita attribuendo sibi, hoc est superbiae et vanitatis; et sic intuentur superbi, qui dicunt: *Manus nostra excelsa, et non Dominus fecit haec omnia*[^14]. Contra quos dicitur Deuteronomii nono: *Ne dicas in corde tuo: Propter iustitiam meam introduxit me Dominus, ut terram hanc possiderem.* Intueri autem merita referendo ad divinam gratiam, hoc est humilitatis et veritatis; et hoc modo motus spei ex intuitu meritorum habet oriri; per quem modum intuebatur Paulus merita sua, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^15]: *Abundantius omnibus laboravi; non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum.* — Alia vero, quae obiiciuntur, satis sunt manifesta[^16].

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english:
### Question II. *Whether hope takes its rise from good merits.*

Secondly it is asked about hope by comparison to the use of merit, and the question is whether hope takes its rise from good merits. And that it does, it seems.

1. To the Romans, chapter five[^1]: *Tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope:* therefore if merit consists in trial itself, it seems that hope takes its rise from merits.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the definition of the Master, which is set down in the text[^2]: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from grace and merits ».

3. Likewise, no one has the virtue of hope, except one who in hoping follows the dictate of faith; but faith says that no adult can be saved without merits[^3]: therefore no one rightly hopes for beatitude, except one for whom merits are at hand: therefore it seems that hope proceeds from merits.

4. Likewise, just as despair stands to demerits, so hope stands to good merits; but despair so stands to demerits that no one despairs except on account of some fault committed — for it is a bad conscience which leads into despair — therefore it seems that hope likewise takes its rise from good merits[^4].

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine[^5]: « Virtue is a good quality of the mind, which God works in us without us »: therefore if hope is a virtue, as was shown in what precedes, God works it in us without us: therefore it does not take its rise from our merits.

2. Likewise, nothing which is a principle of merits takes its rise from merits[^6]; but hope is a principle of merits; for no one can merit before God except one who hopes: therefore hope does not take its rise from merits.

3. Likewise, all the virtues are infused together[^7]: therefore if any virtue precedes merits, it is necessary that all precede; and if any follows after, it is necessary that all follow after: therefore either hope does not proceed from merits, or the rest of the virtues proceed from merits. But it is impossible that the rest of the virtues arise from merits: therefore it is impossible that hope itself arise from merits.

4. Likewise, the more perfect one is, the more humble he is, and the more humble he is, the less he presumes or trusts in his own merits: therefore if perfect hope is joined with perfect humility, it seems that neither hope nor its use arises from the regard of merits[^8].

### Conclusion.

> Hope, insofar as it is a habit, does not arise from merits; insofar as it is the terminus or object of itself, it takes its rise from preceding merits; insofar as it names an act, or a state, it arises from the regard of merits.

**I respond:** It must be said that hope sometimes names the habit of virtue, sometimes names an act, sometimes names a state, sometimes a terminus or object[^9]. — But according as hope names the habit of virtue, thus it does not take its rise from merits, but rather merits take their rise from it. — But according as it names an act, thus it has to arise from the regard of merits; for no one rightly hopes for eternal beatitude except one who has served God, or proposes to serve God. — But according as it names a state, thus it takes its rise from preceding and concomitant merits; and in this way is taken the text to the Romans, chapter five[^10]: *Tribulation works patience, patience trial, trial hope;* the Gloss, that is « the certitude of hope », to which certitude, namely, one arrives through good merits, and especially through the toleration and endurance of tribulations. — But according as hope names the very thing hoped for, thus it takes its rise from preceding merits.

And thus it is clear that hope, according to the first acceptation, simply precedes merits as a principle of merits; according to the last acceptation, it simply follows after as a reward of merits; according to the two middle ones, it stands in a middle way, because in a certain way it precedes, in a certain way it follows. For hope, as it names the motion of hope, proceeds from the regard of merits and according to truth is a principle of the merits that follow. But as hope is called a certain certitude and state, thus according to truth it takes its rise from merits, and is nonetheless a help toward meriting more perfectly[^11]. For that certitude of hope rises up from the suffering of tribulations and vehemently confirms and comforts the soul, so that it does not withdraw from the endurance of tribulations. — And from these things the answer to the proposed question is clear; the answer to the objections is no less clear, because hope is in a certain way of accepting it from merits, and in a certain way a principle of merits; and according to this the reasonings run to the opposite sides, and both by diverse ways prove and conclude the truth, except for the two last reasonings, adduced to either part.

For to that which is objected concerning despair, it can be answered that it is not alike, for the reason that, since despair names the depth of sin[^12], no one is plunged there except as he is disposed by some preceding fault; but hope does not so name the perfection of merit according to its general acceptation. Therefore it is not necessary that it proceed from merits, as it names the virtue itself, or its act, as despair does, which, being a vice plunging into the deep, presupposes another sin. — Moreover, for another reason it is not alike, because we, and those things which are in us and from us, are the principles of our vices; but it is not so concerning goods, because *every best gift and every perfect gift is from above*[^13]; therefore it is not so necessary that hope arise from our merit, as despair arises from vice.

To that likewise which is last objected from the other side, that the humble man does not regard merits; it must be said that to regard merits happens in two ways: either by attributing them to oneself, or by attributing them to the divine grace. But to regard merits by attributing them to oneself, this belongs to pride and vanity; and thus the proud regard them, who say: *Our hand is exalted, and not the Lord has done all these things*[^14]. Against whom it is said in Deuteronomy nine: *Say not in your heart: For my justice the Lord has brought me in, that I might possess this land.* But to regard merits by referring them to the divine grace, this belongs to humility and to truth; and in this way the motion of hope has to arise from the regard of merits; in which way Paul regarded his merits, in the first to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen[^15]: *I have labored more abundantly than all; yet not I, but the grace of God with me.* — But the other things which are objected are sufficiently manifest[^16].

---

la: Matth. 5, 20: *Nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra... non intrabitis in regnum caelorum.* Cfr. ibid. 16, 17. — (P. 571, n. 4.)

en: Matthew 5:20: *Unless your justice abound... you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.* Cf. ibid. 16, 17. — (P. 571, n. 4.)

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 31, enarrat. 2. n. 5: Spem enim gerit bona conscientia; quo modo mala conscientia tota in desperatione est, sic bona conscientia tota in spe. — (P. 571, n. 5.)

en: Augustine, *Enarration on Ps. 31*, second enarration, n. 5: For a good conscience bears hope; in the way that a bad conscience is wholly in despair, so a good conscience is wholly in hope. — (P. 571, n. 5.)

la: Vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5. — Spem esse virtutem, ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1. — (P. 571, n. 6.)

en: See II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5. — That hope is a virtue was shown above, a. 1, q. 1. — (P. 571, n. 6.)

la: Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 40. n. 62. seqq. ostendit, principium meriti, gratiam scilicet, non cadere sub merito; et n. 63. docet: Hominis quippe meritum superna gratia non, ut veniat, invenit, sed postquam venerit, facit etc. Quod etiam probat exemplo boni latronis, qui tres virtutes theologicas, « subita repletus gratia, et accepit et servavit in cruce ». — (P. 572, n. 1.)

en: Gregory, *Morals* XVIII, c. 40, n. 62 ff., shows that the principle of merit, namely grace, does not fall under merit; and n. 63 teaches: For the supernal grace does not find a man's merit, that it might come, but after it has come, it makes it, etc. Which he also proves by the example of the good thief, who, « suddenly filled with grace, both received and preserved on the cross » the three theological virtues. — (P. 572, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 1. — Pro *praecedat* nec non subinde pro *praecedant* Vat. *praecedit* (bis). — (P. 572, n. 2.)

en: Cf. below, d. 36, q. 1. — For *praecedat* and then for *praecedant* the Vatican edition reads *praecedit* (twice). — (P. 572, n. 2.)

la: Bernard., Serm. 1. in Ps. (90.) Qui habitat, n. 3: Periculosa habitatio eorum, qui in meritis suis sperant; periculosa, quia ruinosa. — (P. 572, n. 3.)

en: Bernard, *Sermon 1 on Ps. (90) Qui habitat*, n. 3: Perilous is the dwelling of those who hope in their own merits; perilous, because ruinous. — (P. 572, n. 3.)

la: Quae diversa acceptio spei insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — (P. 572, n. 4.)

en: Which diverse acceptation of hope is intimated here in the text of the Master, c. 1. — (P. 572, n. 4.)

la: Vers. 3. seq. — Verba Glossae invenis supra pag. 566, nota 8. — Non ita multo ante pro *servivit* cod. Z *servit*. — (P. 572, n. 5.)

en: Verse 3 ff. — The words of the Gloss you find above, p. 566, note 8. — Not much before, for *servivit* cod. Z reads *servit*. — (P. 572, n. 5.)

la: Codd. W Y *agendum* vel *merendum*. Aliquanto inferius pro *accipiendi*, quod habent codd. H I L T V aa (bb a prima manu) in aliis et edd. *accipienda*. — (P. 572, n. 6.)

en: Codd. W Y read *agendum* or *merendum*. Somewhat lower, for *accipiendi*, which codd. H I L T V aa (bb by the first hand) have, in others and in the editions *accipienda*. — (P. 572, n. 6.)

la: Gregor., VIII. Moral. c. 18. n. 34: Potest etiam inferni nomine peccatoris desperatio designari, de qua per Psalmistam dicitur: In inferno autem quis confitebitur tibi (Ps. 6, 6.)? Unde rursum scriptum est: Impius, cum in profundum venerit peccatorum, contemnit (Prov. 18, 3.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 43. a. 1. q. 2, ubi ostenditur, desperationem esse unam ex illis speciebus peccati in Spiritum S., quae nullo modo absque peccato praeambulo esse possunt. — Pro *illic* cod. V et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 48. *hic*. — (P. 572, n. 7.)

en: Gregory, *Morals* VIII, c. 18, n. 34: Despair can also be designated by the name of hell, of the sinner, of which it is said through the Psalmist: But in hell who shall confess to you (Ps. 6:6)? Whence again it is written: The impious, when he has come into the depth of sins, contemns (Prov. 18:3). Cf. II Sent. d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, where it is shown that despair is one of those species of sin against the Holy Spirit which can in no way exist without a preceding sin. — For *illic* cod. V and the *Supplement* of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 48, read *hic*. — (P. 572, n. 7.)

la: Dominus Deus tuus in conspectu tuo. — Mox pro *referendo* codd. A K *attribuendo*. — (P. 573, n. 1.)

en: The Lord your God in your sight. — Soon, for *referendo* codd. A K read *attribuendo*. — (P. 573, n. 1.)

la: Vers. 10. A re non alienum nobis videtur, ex Bernardi Serm. 68. in Cantic. n. 6. seq. afferre haec: Sufficit, ait S. Doctor, ad meritum scire, quod non sufficiant merita. Sed ut ad meritum satis est de meritis non praesumere, sic carere meritis satis ad iudicium est... Merita proinde *habere* cures; habita *data* noveris; fructum speraveris, Dei misericordiam; et omne periculum evasisti paupertatis, ingratitudinis, praesumtionis etc. — (P. 573, n. 2.)

en: Verse 10. It seems to us not foreign to the matter to bring forward these things from Bernard, *Sermon 68 on the Canticle*, n. 6 ff.: It suffices, says the holy Doctor, for merit to know that merits do not suffice. But as for merit it is enough not to presume upon merits, so to lack merits is enough for judgment... Therefore take care to *have* merits; once had, you will know them as *given*; you will have hoped for the fruit, the mercy of God; and you have escaped every peril of poverty, of ingratitude, of presumption, etc. — (P. 573, n. 2.)

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — (P. 573, n. 3.)

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. — (P. 573, n. 3.)

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 573 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum spes praecedat caritatem ordine naturae, an e converso.*

Tertio quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad habitum caritatis, et est quaestio, utrum spes praecedat caritatem ordine naturae, an e converso; et loquimur hic de habitibus in comparatione ad actus. Et quod spes praecedat, videtur.

1. Super illud Matthaei primo[^1]: *Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac genuit Iacob*; Glossa, id est, « fides generat spem, spes generat caritatem »: ergo si generans secundum ordinem naturae prius est generato, necesse est, quod spes praecedat caritatem.

2. Item, constructio aedificii spiritualis similis est aedificio materiali; sed in aedificio materiali non solum fundamentum praecedit aedificii complementum, sed etiam paries secundum rectum ordinem antecedit ipsum tectum: si ergo fides assimilatur ipsi fundamento sustentanti, et spes parieti erigenti, et caritas tecto consummanti[^2]; videtur, quod spes praecedat ipsam caritatem.

3. Item, secundum naturalem ordinem imperfectum antecedit perfectum, non e converso; sed caritas maior est et perfectior quam fides et spes, secundum quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^3]: *Maior autem horum est caritas*: ergo etc.

4. Item, nullus potest amare propter se et super omnia bonum, ad quod non sperat se posse pervenire[^4]: si ergo caritas diligit Deum propter se et super omnia, actus caritatis consequitur actum spei: ergo caritas ipsam spem.

**Sed contra** obiicitur: 1. Primo auctoritate Magistri in littera[^5]: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis, veniens ex meritis praecedentibus ipsam spem, quam natura praeit caritas »: ergo secundum naturalem ordinem caritas est ante spem.

2. Item, Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei[^6] dicit, quod omnis affectio oritur ex amore, ergo omnis affectio recta ex amore recto: cum ergo caritas dirigat ipsum amorem voluntatis, virtus autem spei dirigat unam de quatuor affectionibus; videtur, quod spes sit posterior caritate.

3. Item, nullus sperat nisi quod amat — quod enim non cupit aliquis nullo modo sperat — ergo rectitudo amoris praecedit rectitudinem exspectationis; sed caritas dirigit in amando, spes autem dirigit in exspectando: ergo caritas[^7] ante spem.

4. Item, timor et spes sunt duae affectiones quasi simul currentes — unde in Glossa, Deuteronomii vigesimo quarto[^8], dicuntur esse « duae molae »; sed omnis timor procedit ex amore: ergo et omnis

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spes: ergo spes gratuita procedit ex amore gratuito: igitur secundum naturalem ordinem caritas antecedit spem.

5. Item, « quanto aliquid est communius, tanto prius[^9] »; sed omne sperandum est amandum, et non convertitur: ergo communior est actus dilectionis quam actus spei: et si communior, ergo prior.

6. Item, is est ordo virtutis ad virtutem, qui est ordo dotis ad dotem; sed perfecta tentio, quae est dos correspondens spei, sequitur perfectam dilectionem, quae est dos correspondens caritati: ergo videtur, quod in via caritas praecedat spem secundum naturalem ordinem.

### Conclusio.

> *Actus spei secundum ordinem naturae antecedit actum caritatis; unde etiam habitus spei in comparatione ad talem actum prior est caritate, licet secundum se consideratus cum habitu caritatis habeat simultatem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est comparare habitum spei ad habitum caritatis, aut ratione habituum, *secundum se* consideratorum, aut ratione habituum comparatorum ad actus. Si loquamur de ipsis habitibus, *secundum se* consideratis, sic non habent ordinem, sed simultatem. Omnes enim virtutes gratuitae simul infunduntur, secundum quod infra[^10] manifestabitur. — Si autem loquamur de ipsis habitibus in comparatione *ad actus*, sic unus habet ordinem ad alterum, quia actus unius praeparat et disponit ad actum alterius, et praeparando et disponendo est eius quodam modo principium et origo; et ratione talis praeparationis et originis est ibi ordo. Quoniam igitur actus spei praeparat et disponit ad actum caritatis tanquam ad perfectionem et spiritualis aedificii complementum — nemo enim diligit aliquod bonum propter se et super omnia, nisi speret, se ad illud bonum perventurum — hinc est, quod secundum ordinem naturae actus spei antecedit actum caritatis; et hinc est, quod habitus spei in comparatione ad talem actum caritate prior est. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium ex auctoritate Magistri, quod spem natura praecedit caritas; dicendum, quod spes accipitur ibi vel pro re sperata, vel pro ipso statu spei, non autem pro primo eius actu, vel habitu[^11]. — Posset etiam dici, quod istud dicit Magister secundum suam opinionem, qua credidit, caritatem non esse habitum creatum, sed Spiritum sanctum, qui est principium omnium aliorum bonorum. Unde quia in hac opinione communiter Magister non sustinetur, et illud est verbum suum, auctoritas illa nullum habet robur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor est principium omnium affectionum; dicendum, quod verum est de amore secundum statum imperfectum; sed sicut amor secundum imperfectionem status est omnium affectionum principium, sic secundum suam perfectionem est omnium affectionum terminus finalis et complementum. Unde omnes affectiones animae ad id ordinantur, ut Deus ametur perfecte; caritas autem non nominat qualemcumque amorem, sed amorem praecipuum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod caritas secundum naturalem ordinem praecedat ipsam spem[^12].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus sperat nisi quod amat; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod spes caritatem sequatur, pro eo quod caritas addit talem circumstantiam super amorem, quae necessario subsequitur actum sperandi et eius rectitudinem, sicut prius tactum est. Cum enim duplex sit motus amoris caritatis, videlicet amor concupiscentiae et amor amicitiae; caritas amore concupiscentiae desiderat Deum super omnia, amore vero amicitiae similiter diligit Deum propter se et super omnia. Unde Deum concupiscit plus quam aliud bonum, Deo etiam bonum optat plus, quam habens caritatem optet sibi ipsi[^13]. Amor autem concupiscentiae adeo intensus esse non potest nisi praeambula exspectatione. Similiter nec amor amicitiae potest esse adeo elevatus, nisi praecedat confidentia. Nullus enim vult plus bonum alii quam sibi, nisi in illum totaliter confidat; nullus etiam aliquod bonum super omnia concupiscit, nisi qui se ad illud aliquando perventurum praesumit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor consequitur amorem, ergo et spes similiter; respondendum est, sicut dictum est, quod licet haec affectio

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praecedat illam, tamen *habitus* iste in comparatione ad actum non praecedit illum, propter praecipuam perfectionem, quam caritas ponit circa actum diligendi. — *Praeterea*, cum dicitur, quod timor sequitur ad amorem: hoc non intelligitur de *quolibet* amore, sed de *amore sui*. Ideo enim quis timet poenam, quia se ipsum amat; caritas autem non dicit principaliter amorem sui, sed amorem Dei. Et propterea non sequitur, quod actus caritatis praecedat actum timoris; nec ex hoc potest concludi, quod similiter praecedat actum spei.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod « prius est, a quo non convertitur consequentia[^14] »; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his quae *essentialiter* consequuntur ad se invicem; in his autem, quae se invicem *concomitantur*, non habet veritatem. Et hoc patet, quia sequitur, si est nix, quod sit album; sed non convertitur, tamen albedo nivis non praecedit ipsam nivis substantiam. Quoniam ergo *sperare* et *amare* sunt actus se invicem concomitantes; ideo, quamvis actus amandi se extendat ad diligibilia, non oportet, quod sit prius secundum ordinem naturae. — *Praeterea*, quamvis *caritas* generalior sit a parte *obiecti*, tamen *spes* generalior et in plus est a parte *subiecti*. Omnis enim viator, qui habet caritatem, habet spem; sed non convertitur, quia spes potest esse in peccatore[^15]; et ideo actus spei origine praecedit actum caritatis respectu *subiecti*, a quo uterque actus sumit originem. Et sic ratio non valet.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dotibus, quod perfecta tentio sequitur perfectam dilectionem; dicendum, quod illud non est usquequaque simile, propter hoc quod *dotes* in patria erunt aequalis perfectionis; in via autem *caritas* maioris perfectionis et dignitatis est, quantum est de ratione virtutis, quam sit ipsa spes[^16]; et ideo non oportet, quod si in via *exspectatio* praecedit dilectionem praecipuam, quod propter hoc in patria *tentio* praecedat dilectionem perfectam. Quamvis enim virtutes aequales sint quantum ad rationem merendi, perfectior tamen est actus dilectionis quam exspectationis: sed in gloria *perfecte diligere* non est maioris dignitatis quam *perfecte habere* et *perfecte tenere*. Unde quamvis in via actus irascibilis praecedat actum concupiscibilis, non tamen sic oportet esse in patria, ubi est reformatio perfecta, immo potest esse e contrario. — Sunt autem et hic alii modi respondendi, qui causa brevitatis omittuntur ad praesens propter hoc, quod trahunt extra materiam istam ad ordinem et distinctionem ipsarum dotum[^17].

english:
### Question III. *Whether hope precedes charity in the order of nature, or the reverse.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning hope by comparison to the habit of charity, and the question is whether hope precedes charity in the order of nature, or the reverse; and we speak here of the habits in comparison to acts. And that hope precedes, it seems.

1. Upon that text of Matthew, chapter one[^1]: *Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob*; the Gloss, that is, « faith generates hope, hope generates charity »: therefore if that which generates is, according to the order of nature, prior to what is generated, it is necessary that hope precede charity.

2. Likewise, the construction of the spiritual edifice is similar to a material building; but in a material building not only does the foundation precede the completion of the building, but also the wall, according to right order, precedes the roof itself: if therefore faith is likened to the sustaining foundation, and hope to the rising wall, and charity to the consummating roof[^2]; it seems that hope precedes charity itself.

3. Likewise, according to the natural order the imperfect precedes the perfect, not the reverse; but charity is greater and more perfect than faith and hope, according to what is said in the first to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen[^3]: *But the greater of these is charity*: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no one can love a good for its own sake and above all things, to which he does not hope that he is able to attain[^4]: if therefore charity loves God for his own sake and above all things, the act of charity follows the act of hope: therefore charity follows hope itself.

**On the contrary** it is objected: 1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text[^5]: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from merits preceding hope itself, which charity precedes by nature »: therefore according to the natural order charity is before hope.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fourteenth book of the *City of God*[^6] says that every affection arises from love, therefore every right affection from a right love: since therefore charity directs the very love of the will, while the virtue of hope directs one of the four affections; it seems that hope is posterior to charity.

3. Likewise, no one hopes except for what he loves — for what one does not desire he in no way hopes — therefore the rightness of love precedes the rightness of expectation; but charity directs in loving, while hope directs in expecting: therefore charity[^7] is before hope.

4. Likewise, fear and hope are two affections running as it were together — whence in the Gloss, on Deuteronomy chapter twenty-four[^8], they are said to be « two millstones »; but every fear proceeds from love: therefore also every

hope: therefore gratuitous hope proceeds from gratuitous love: therefore according to the natural order charity precedes hope.

5. Likewise, « by however much something is more common, by so much is it prior[^9] »; but everything to be hoped for is to be loved, and the converse does not hold: therefore the act of love is more common than the act of hope: and if more common, then prior.

6. Likewise, that is the order of one virtue to another which is the order of one dowry to another; but perfect holding, which is the dowry corresponding to hope, follows perfect love, which is the dowry corresponding to charity: therefore it seems that on the way charity precedes hope according to the natural order.

### Conclusion.

> *The act of hope, according to the order of nature, precedes the act of charity; whence also the habit of hope, in comparison to such an act, is prior to charity, although, considered in itself together with the habit of charity, it has simultaneity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of comparing the habit of hope to the habit of charity: either by reason of the habits considered *in themselves*, or by reason of the habits compared *to acts*. If we speak of the habits themselves, considered *in themselves*, then they have no order, but simultaneity. For all the gratuitous virtues are infused together, according to what will be shown below[^10]. — But if we speak of the habits themselves in comparison *to acts*, then one has an order to the other, because the act of one prepares and disposes to the act of the other, and by preparing and disposing it is in a certain way its principle and origin; and by reason of such preparation and origin there is order there. Since therefore the act of hope prepares and disposes to the act of charity as to a perfection and to the completion of the spiritual edifice — for no one loves any good for its own sake and above all things, unless he hopes that he will attain to that good — hence it is that according to the order of nature the act of hope precedes the act of charity; and hence it is that the habit of hope, in comparison to such an act, is prior to charity. — Whence the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of the Master, that charity precedes hope by nature; it must be said that hope is taken there either for the thing hoped for, or for the very state of hope, not however for its first act, or habit[^11]. — It could also be said that the Master says this according to his own opinion, by which he believed that charity is not a created habit, but the Holy Spirit, who is the principle of all other goods. Whence, because in this opinion the Master is commonly not upheld, and that is his own word, that authority has no force.

2. To that which is objected, that love is the principle of all the affections; it must be said that this is true of love according to the imperfect state; but just as love according to the imperfection of its state is the principle of all the affections, so according to its perfection it is the final term and completion of all the affections. Whence all the affections of the soul are ordered to this, that God be loved perfectly; charity, however, does not name just any love, but the chief love. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that charity, according to the natural order, precedes hope itself[^12].

3. To that which is objected, that no one hopes except for what he loves; it must be said that this is true; yet nevertheless from this it does not follow that hope follows charity, for the reason that charity adds such a circumstance upon love as necessarily follows upon the act of hoping and its rightness, as was touched on before. For since the motion of the love of charity is twofold, namely the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship; charity by the love of concupiscence desires God above all things, and by the love of friendship it likewise loves God for his own sake and above all things. Whence it desires God more than any other good, and wishes good to God more than one having charity would wish it for himself[^13]. But the love of concupiscence cannot be so intense except by a preceding expectation. Likewise neither can the love of friendship be so elevated, unless confidence precede it. For no one wills good to another more than to himself, unless he confide in him totally; nor does anyone desire any good above all things, except he who presumes that he will at some time attain to it.

4. To that which is objected, that fear follows love, therefore so does hope likewise; it must be answered, as has been said, that although this affection

precedes that one, yet this *habit* in comparison to its act does not precede it, on account of the chief perfection which charity sets about the act of loving. — *Moreover*, when it is said that fear follows upon love: this is not understood of *any* love, but of *self-love*. For one fears punishment because he loves himself; charity, however, does not principally name self-love, but the love of God. And therefore it does not follow that the act of charity precedes the act of fear; nor from this can it be concluded that it likewise precedes the act of hope.

5. To that which is objected, that « that is prior from which the consequence is not converted[^14] »; it must be said that this holds true in those things which *essentially* follow upon one another; but in those which *accompany* one another, it does not hold true. And this is plain, because it follows, if there is snow, that it is white; but it is not converted, yet the whiteness of snow does not precede the very substance of the snow. Since therefore *to hope* and *to love* are acts accompanying one another; therefore, although the act of loving extends to lovable things, it is not necessary that it be prior in the order of nature. — *Moreover*, although *charity* is more general on the side of the *object*, yet *hope* is more general and extends to more on the side of the *subject*. For every wayfarer who has charity has hope; but it is not converted, because hope can be in a sinner[^15]; and therefore the act of hope in its origin precedes the act of charity in respect of the *subject*, from which both acts take their origin. And so the argument has no force.

6. To that which is objected concerning the dowries, that perfect holding follows perfect love; it must be said that this is not alike in every respect, on account of this, that the *dowries* in the fatherland will be of equal perfection; but on the way *charity* is of greater perfection and dignity, as far as pertains to the nature of the virtue, than hope itself is[^16]; and therefore it is not necessary that, if on the way *expectation* precedes the chief love, on this account in the fatherland *holding* should precede perfect love. For although the virtues are equal as to the ground of meriting, yet the act of love is more perfect than that of expectation: but in glory *to love perfectly* is not of greater dignity than *to have perfectly* and *to hold perfectly*. Whence although on the way the act of the irascible precedes the act of the concupiscible, yet it is not necessary that it be so in the fatherland, where there is perfect reformation, nay it can be the reverse. — There are also here other ways of responding, which for the sake of brevity are omitted for the present, on account of this, that they draw beyond this matter to the order and distinction of the dowries themselves[^17].

---

la: Deut. 32, 27. — Seq. testimonium est ibid. 9, 4, ubi Vulgata post *Ne dicas in corde tuo* addit *cum deleverit eos Dominus Deus tuus in conspectu tuo*. — Mox pro *referendo* codd. A K *attribuendo*. (Hic vero) Vers. 2. Glossa in hunc loc. allegata ex Paschasii Radberti expositione in Matth. delibata esse videtur. Docet enim laudatus auctor ibi ad v. 17, per *Abraham*, *Isaac* et *Iacob* designari fidem, spem et caritatem: « Isaac [qui risus interpretatur], quippe, totus in spe; quod repromissus concipitur per fidem, quod nascitur per gratiam, gaudium parentibus generavit... Sed quia in Isaac spes vitae negotio figuratur, necesse est, ut Rebeccam, quae patientia interpretatur, in coniugium sumamus... De quibus profecto parentibus quid aliud quam caritas generatur »? Ibid. libr. V. exponens illud Matth. 8, 11: *Dico autem vobis, quod multi ab oriente* etc. ait: In *Abraham* fides, qua placuit Deo et reputatum est ei ad iustitiam; in *Isaac* vero spes, quasi sacramentum fidei et gratiae, generatur; porro per *Iacob* caritas designatur, quae per varia certamina, donec *Israel* Deum possit deorum in Sion videre, laboriose satis desudat. — (P. 573, n. 4.)

en: Deut. 32:27. — The following testimony is ibid. 9:4, where the Vulgate, after *Say not in your heart*, adds *when the Lord your God has destroyed them in your sight*. — Soon, for *referendo* codd. A K read *attribuendo*. (Here, verse 2.) The Gloss alleged on this passage seems to be drawn from the exposition of Paschasius Radbertus on Matthew. For that praised author there teaches, at v. 17, that by *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob* are designated faith, hope, and charity: « Isaac [who is interpreted "laughter"], indeed, wholly in hope; he who, promised, is conceived through faith, who is born through grace, generated joy for his parents... But because in Isaac the hope of life is figured by the affair, it is necessary that we take in marriage Rebecca, who is interpreted "patience"... Of which parents, indeed, what other thing is generated than charity »? Ibid., book V, expounding that text of Matthew 8:11: *But I say to you, that many shall come from the east* etc., he says: In *Abraham* is faith, by which he pleased God and it was reputed to him unto justice; in *Isaac* indeed hope is generated, as a kind of sacrament of faith and grace; further, by *Jacob* charity is designated, which through various contests, until *Israel* may see the God of gods in Sion, labors quite toilsomely. — (P. 573, n. 4.)

la: Cfr. infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6. — Superius pro *sustentanti* codd. A K *sustinenti*. — (P. 573, n. 5.)

en: Cf. below, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6. — Above, for *sustentanti* codd. A K read *sustinenti*. — (P. 573, n. 5.)

la: Vers. 13. — Sententiam *maioris* insinuat Aristot., de quo vide tom. II. pag. 330, nota 5. in fine. — (P. 573, n. 6.)

en: Verse 13. — The sense of the *major* is intimated by Aristotle, on whom see vol. II, p. 330, note 5, at the end. — (P. 573, n. 6.)

la: Cfr. August., I. Soliloq. c. 6. n. 12. seq. Vide etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 8. seq. — Edd. verbo *pervenire* praemittunt *unquam*. Mox post *diligit* ex codd. A K subiecimus *Deum*. — (P. 573, n. 7.)

en: Cf. Augustine, *Soliloquies* I, c. 6, n. 12 ff. See also above, the text of the Master, d. XXIII, c. 8 ff. — The editions prefix *unquam* to the word *pervenire*. Soon, after *diligit*, we have subjoined *Deum* from codd. A K. — (P. 573, n. 7.)

la: Hic c. 1. In sententia Magistri edd. pro *quam natura praeit* substituerunt *sed merita natura* [Vat. *naturaliter*] *praeit*. — (P. 573, n. 8.)

en: Here, c. 1. In the sentence of the Master the editions, for *quam natura praeit*, have substituted *sed merita natura* [Vat. *naturaliter*] *praeit*. — (P. 573, n. 8.)

la: Cap. 7. n. 2. De propos. seq. cfr. infra q. 5; d. 27. a. 1. praeit. — (P. 573, n. 9.)

en: Chapter 7, n. 2. On the following proposition cf. below, q. 5; d. 27, a. 1, it precedes. — (P. 573, n. 9.)

la: Cap. 7. n. 2. De propos. seq. cfr. infra q. 5; d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Mox pro *dirigat* non pauci codd. *dirigit*. — (P. 573, n. 9.)

en: Chapter 7, n. 2. On the following proposition, cf. below q. 5; d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and above, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — Soon, for *dirigat* not a few codd. read *dirigit*. — (P. 573, n. 9.)

la: Edd. supplent *est*. — (P. 573, n. 10.)

en: The editions supply *est*. — (P. 573, n. 10.)

la: Vers. 6. Glossa (ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum) sumta est ex Gregor., XXXIII. Moral. c. 12. n. 21, de quo vide tom. II. pag. 992, nota 7. — De minori, quae insinuatur ab August., vide supra pag. 338, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro *ordinem* cod. bb *ordinationem*. — (P. 573, n. 11.)

en: Verse 6. The Gloss (the *ordinaria* in Strabus and Lyranus) is taken from Gregory, *Morals* XXXIII, c. 12, n. 21, on which see vol. II, p. 992, note 7. — On the minor, which is intimated by Augustine, see above, p. 338, note 3. — A little lower, for *ordinem* cod. bb reads *ordinationem*. — (P. 573, n. 11.)

la: Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Simul, ubi legitur: Genera speciebus semper priora sunt; neque enim convertuntur secundum eius quod est esse consequentiam; ut cum quidem aquatile sit, animal est; cum vero sit animal, non necesse est, ut aquatile sit. Cfr. ibid. c. de Priori. Cfr. etiam XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.); Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis; lib. de Causis, propos. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *actus spei* codd. A K *actus sperationis*. — (P. 574, n. 1.)

en: According to Aristotle, *Categories*, c. On the Simultaneous, where it is read: Genera are always prior to species; for they are not converted according to the consequence of being; as, when something is aquatic, it is an animal; but when it is an animal, it is not necessary that it be aquatic. Cf. ibid., c. On the Prior. Cf. also *Metaphysics* XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1); Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. On the Communities and Differences of Genus; the book *On Causes*, prop. 1. — A little lower, for *actus spei* codd. A K read *actus sperationis*. — (P. 574, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp. — De opinione Magistri mox allata vide I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. — Pro *primo* edd. *proprio* et post pauca *credit* pro *credidit*. Post *dicit Magister* codd. A K subdunt *in littera*. — (P. 574, n. 3.)

en: Cf. the preceding question, in the body. — On the opinion of the Master just adduced see I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 1, and II Sent. d. 26, q. 2. — For *primo* the editions read *proprio*, and after a few words *credit* for *credidit*. After *the Master says* codd. A K add *in the text*. — (P. 574, n. 3.)

la: Vide infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. 3. nec non d. 36. q. 6. Quod autem amor in communi sit prima et nobilissima et radix omnium aliarum emanationum, docetur etiam I. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 2, et infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. — (P. 574, n. 4.)

en: See below, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 1, 3, as well as d. 36, q. 6. That love in general is the first and most noble thing and the root of all other emanations is taught also in I Sent. d. 10, a. 1, q. 2, and below, d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. — (P. 574, n. 4.)

la: Cfr. August., Serm. 385. (alias 38. inter 50 homilias) c. 3. n. 1. seqq. Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 5. (c. 4.): Est igitur *amare* velle alicui bona evenire, non sua, sed illius ipsius causa, quem diligit, et, quantum in eo est, efficere, ut illa veniant. — In fine solut. respicitur definitio spei, quae infra dub. 2. ex August. affertur. — Aliquanto superius pro *subsequitur* codd. G Z *subsequatur*, codd. A K *sequatur*; paulo inferius pro *Nullus enim vult plus* codd. A K ponunt *Nullus enim vult prius*. — (P. 574, n. 5.)

en: Cf. Augustine, *Sermon 385* (otherwise 38, among the 50 homilies) c. 3, n. 1 ff. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II, c. 5 (c. 4): *To love* is therefore to will that good things come to someone, not for one's own sake, but for the sake of that very one whom one loves, and, as far as is in one, to bring it about that those things come. — At the end of the solution there is regard to the definition of hope, which is brought forward below, dub. 2, from Augustine. — Somewhat above, for *subsequitur* codd. G Z read *subsequatur*, codd. A K *sequatur*; a little lower, for *Nullus enim vult plus* codd. A K put *Nullus enim vult prius*. — (P. 574, n. 5.)

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori: Secundum autem [prius alterum altero dicitur], quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unum duobus prius est; duobus enim existentibus, mox unum esse consequens est; uno vero existente, duo esse non necessarium est. Quare non convertitur ab uno consequentia, ut reliquum sit; prius autem illud esse videtur, a quo non convertitur eius quod est esse consequentia. — (P. 575, n. 1.)

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. On the Prior: In the second way [one thing is said to be prior to another], when it is not converted according to the consequence of existing, as one is prior to two; for two existing, it is at once a consequence that one is; but one existing, it is not necessary that two be. Wherefore the consequence is not converted from one, so that the other follow; but that seems to be prior, from which the consequence of being is not converted. — (P. 575, n. 1.)

la: Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem. — (P. 575, n. 4.)

en: See the scholion to the first question of this article. — (P. 575, n. 4.)

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the vol3 PDF column bands p.573–575 (pdf 595–597; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column then Right column, body bands then footer bands. The IA djvu OCR (raw lines 39816–39975) was used only as a base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing; the PDF is authoritative for the Respondeo, the Ad-replies, and every footer. Fresh literal English throughout.

**Page span.** Opens lower-left column of **p.573** (the QUAESTIO III header + *Utrum spes praecedat caritatem ordine naturae, an e converso* title, immediately after q2's `...satis sunt manifesta`); objections 1–4 and the four Sed contra objections run across p.573; objections 5–6, the Conclusio, the Respondeo, and Ad-replies 1–4 (Ad-4 begins) fill **p.574**; the Ad-4 tail and Ad-5, Ad-6 finish on **p.575**, ending at `...ad ordinem et distinctionem ipsarum dotum` immediately before the QUAESTIO IV header (which is in q4's region).

**Apparatus (17 entries, per-page restart).**
- **p.573 nn.4–11** (8): n.4 Deut./Paschasius Radbertus Glossa (the long Abraham–Isaac–Jacob = faith/hope/charity gloss) / n.5 *Cfr. infra d.27 a.2 q.1 ad 6* + *sustentanti/sustinenti* variant / n.6 *Vers. 13* + Aristot. on the *maior* / n.7 August. *Soliloq.* I + *unquam*/*Deum* readings / n.8 *Hic c.1* + Master's-text variant / n.9 *Cap. 7 n.2* (City of God) / n.10 *Edd. supplent est* / n.11 *Vers. 6* Glossa from Gregor. *Moral.* XXXIII.
- **p.574 nn.1–5** (5): n.1 Aristot. *Categories* c. de Simul + *actus sperationis* variant / n.2 *Dist. 36 q.1* / n.3 *Cfr. quaest. praeced.* + Master's-opinion cross-refs / n.4 *Vide infra d.27...* (love as root of emanations) / n.5 August. *Serm. 385* + Aristot. *Rhetor.* II definition of *amare*.
- **p.575 nn.1–4** (4): n.1 Aristot. *Categories* c. de Priori (the priority-by-consequence text) / n.2 *Cfr. supra a.1 q.4* / **n.3 not anchored in q3's body** (Epist. I Cor. 13:13 — its marker `³` belongs to q4's objection 2, which opens lower on the same printed page; left to q4) / n.4 *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem* (the article-scholion cross-reference).

**`[?]` flags.**
- **`[^7]` (P. 573, n. 9) — RESOLVED at 600 dpi (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11; `/tmp/hires/p573-foot-R.png`).** The p.573-R footer column prints a single contiguous numbered sequence; the *Mox pro dirigat … dirigit* clause is the **tail of a regular numbered note n.9** — `⁹ Cap. 7. n. 2. De propos. seq. cfr. infra q. 5; d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Mox pro dirigat non pauci codd. dirigit.` — NOT an unnumbered addendum, an "n. ad 9", or an n.9-bis. The prior `[^7]` def text wrongly duplicated n.7's Augustine *Soliloquia* Latin and tagged it `(P. 573, n. ad 9.)`; both are corrected. The body anchor stays on *caritas* in obj. 3 (the *dirigat/dirigit* variant lemma). Tag now `(P. 573, n. 9.)`.
- p.575 **n.3** (I Cor. 13:13) is intentionally NOT included here: its `³` marker falls on q4's objection 2 (*« bonum et finis idem sunt »*), not within q3. Confirmed by reading p.575-L: q4's QUAESTIO IV header sits above the n.3-bearing line.

**Scholion (ABSENT — sibling redirect).** No scholion for this quaestio: the QUAESTIO IV header follows immediately after Ad-6. q3's own footer **n.4** (`Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem`) cross-references the **article scholion**, which is printed in q1's physical region (top of p.571, before the QUAESTIO II header — see d26-a2-q2's Notes redirect and the open follow-up to add it to **q1**). `has_scholion: false`.

**Hand-off picked up from d26-a2-q2:** q2 owned p.573 footers nn.1–3; this q3 correctly opens its footer run at **p.573 n.4** (*Vers. 2. Glossa... Paschasii Radberti...*) and carries nn.4–11. Confirmed at the seam: q2 ends `...satis sunt manifesta` (top-R of p.573); q3 opens with the QUAESTIO III header (lower-L of p.573). Continuous.

**Hand-off forwarded to d26-a2-q4:** QUAESTIO IV (*Utrum spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni*; opener *Quarto quaeritur de ipsa spe per comparationem ad obiectum, et est quaestio, utrum spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni*) begins at **raw line 39976**. Page span: opens lower in the p.575 right/left columns (its header sits below q3's Ad-5 on p.575-L) and runs onto p.576+. **Footer split:** this q3 took p.575 footers nn.1–2 and n.4; **q4 owns p.575 footers n.3** (Epist. I Cor. 13:13 — anchored on q4's objection 2) **and nn.5–8** (n.5 *Cfr. supra pag. 470...*, n.6 Aristot. *Metaph.* III on *bonum et finis idem*, n.7 *Cfr. supra pag. 569 nota 4...*, n.8 *Enchirid. c.8 n.2*), then restarts on the next printed page. **Verify the q4 opener alignment** reads *utrum spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni*. Confirm whether q4 carries a scholion of its own.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0