title: Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum dona gratuita aeque efficaciter ad merendum in homine fuerint ante et post lapsum.*

Utrum dona gratuita fuerint aeque magnae efficaciae ad merendum ante lapsum, sicut sunt post lapsum. Et quod fuerint maioris efficaciae tunc quam nunc, videtur.

1. Quanto perfectior est cognitio, tanto perfectior est dilectio; et quanto maior est dilectio, tanto opus nostrum est Deo acceptabilius. Prima propositio patet per illud, quod quantum cognoscis, tantum diligis[^1]. Si ergo in Adam secundum statum innocentiae clarior fuit cognitio, videtur, quod caritas ad merendum fuerit efficacior.

2. Item, «albius est quod est nigro impermixtius[^2]»: ergo magis est meritorium quod minus habet in se de demerito; sed omnia merita nostra quodam modo permixta sunt culpae, secundum illud Isaiae sexagesimo quarto: *Omnes iustitiae vestrae sicut pannus menstruatae.* Si ergo in Adam secundum statum innocentiae merita omnino fuissent impermixta culpae, videtur, quod secundum statum illum dona gratuita erant multo maioris efficaciae.

3. Item, meritum est a gratia simul et libero arbitrio: quanto igitur liberum arbitrium magis gratiae obedit, tanto gratia efficacius in actum suum exit; sed tunc natura magis erat obediens gratiae quam nunc, cum est corrupta: ergo tunc dona gratuita erant ad merendum efficaciora.

4. Item, amor visibilium et sollicitatio[^3] circa terrena impedit hominem, ne iungatur Deo perfecte: si igitur in statu primo nulla vigebat in homine concupiscentia, videtur, quod Deo perfectius et diuturnius adhaerebat, et ita magis ad merendum dispositus erat.

**Sed contra:**

1. Secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^4]: *Non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit*; sed magis impugnatur homo secundum statum naturae lapsae quam secundum statum naturae institutae: ergo si has pugnas vincit, gloriosius triumphat; et si gloriosius triumphat, maiorem meretur coronam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus[^5] dicit, quod «ars et virtus est circa difficilia»: ergo si hoc per se verum est, quanto actus virtutis est difficilior, tanto virtuosior; et quanto virtuosior, tanto ad merendum efficacior: si ergo maior est difficultas in perficiendis divinis mandatis nunc, quam esset in statu naturae institutae; videtur, quod maior sit merendi efficacia.

3. Item, si homo stetisset, aut Christus non esset incarnatus, aut si esset incarnatus, nunquam esset passus; sed Christus sua passione non sibi meruit, sed nobis, et tam merita nostra quam Sacramenta efficaciam habent a passione et eius fide. Si igitur inter omnia, quaecumque Deo placere possunt, hoc fuit Deo acceptissimum, quod Christus se obtulit hostiam Deo et Patri[^6], et inde sumunt efficaciam merita nostra, et illam efficaciam non habuissent merita in statu naturae institutae: ergo videtur, quod non essent efficaciora.

4. Item, «natura non deficit in necessariis», ut dicit Philosophus[^7]; si hoc est verum in natura creata, multo magis verum est in natura increata; et si divina providentia non deficit bobus, de quibus minus cura est ei, multo minus nec deficit hominibus. Sed natura humana magis indiget adiuvari, quam indigeret ante lapsum: ergo videtur, quod nunc Deus det homini fortius et efficacius adiutorium. Si ergo efficacia meritorum attenditur secundum magnitudinem caritatis et gratiae, videtur, quod nunc dona gratuita in merendo sint maioris efficaciae.

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### Conclusio

> Rationabiliter colligitur, quod nunc ratione maioris difficultatis et ratione gratiae sint efficaciora dona gratuita ad merendum, quam in statu innocentiae, non autem ratione promptitudinis voluntatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod efficacia meriti principaliter ex tribus venit, videlicet ex *difficultate operis*, ex *promptitudine voluntatis* et ex *magnitudine caritatis*. — Difficultas operis multum facit ad meritum, et adeo facit, ut homo, qui est multo minoris caritatis quam Angelus, possit mereri, ut perveniat ad sublimitatem angelicam, secundum quod colligitur ex illo quod dicitur Matthaei undecimo[^8] de Ioanne Baptista: *Qui minor est in regno caelorum maior est eo.* Non enim est dubitandum, quin Ioannes sit exaltatus ad ordines excellentium Angelorum; et tamen secundum statum viae minoris caritatis erat quam aliquis eorum. — Promptitudo etiam voluntatis plurimum facit[^9]; si voluntas prompta est secundum id quod habet, accepta est ad meritum. Quantacumque enim sit in homine gratia, nisi sit voluntas gratiae consentanea, nunquam eliciet opera meritoria; et quanto magis voluntas gratiae subiacet et conformatur, tanto magis homo in operibus meritoriis exercetur. — Magnitudo caritatis principaliter[^10] inter omnia est, quae facit ad meritum, quia secundum illius quantitatem attenditur remuneratio praemii substantialis. Pondus enim amoris est quod dat valorem operibus meritoriis.

Si igitur fiat comparatio efficaciae merendi in donis gratuitis secundum statum post lapsum et secundum statum ante lapsum; responderi potest, quod quantum ad *primam conditionem*, videlicet quantum ad *difficultatem*, efficaciores sunt virtutes nunc, quam tunc fuerunt. Nunc enim magis impugnatur et impugnando probatur et examinatur virtus quam tunc, sicut patet in sanctis Martyribus. — Et sic[^11] procedunt rationes ostendentes, dona gratuita ad merendum esse nunc efficaciora.

Quantum autem ad *secundam conditionem*, scilicet quantum ad *promptitudinem voluntatis*, efficaciores fuissent virtutes in merendo tunc quam nunc, pro eo quod voluntas tunc quasi continue fuisset in bonis operibus Deo placentibus sine retardatione; nunc autem sive ex lassitudine sive ex surreptione frequenter cessat a bonis operibus et intendit aliquando rebus nocivis, aliquando inutilibus, tum propter difficultatem ad bonum, tum propter pronitatem ad malum. Et quantum ad hanc conditionem procedunt rationes probantes, quod dona gratuita in statu naturae institutae fuissent ad merendum efficaciora. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad utramque partem; procedunt enim secundum diversas vias, secundum quas se habent dona gratuita in merendo sicut excedentia et excessa; et reperitur in eis secundum diversas conditiones maior et minor efficacia. Et sic nulla est inter rationes illas repugnantia; utraeque enim verum concludunt secundum diversam viam.

Si autem quaeratur ulterius de maioritate efficaciae quantum ad *tertiam conditionem*, tunc respondendum est, quod aut fit comparatio particularis personae ad particularem personam, aut status ad statum. Si primo modo; dicendum est, quod se haberent sicut excedentia et excessa. Satis enim probabiliter credi potest, quod aliqui sunt, qui habent maiorem gratiam aliquibus, qui fuissent in statu innocentiae, si Adam stetisset; alii vero minorem aliquibus, sicut dici consuevit, cum comparatur status Legis scriptae ad statum Legis evangelicae. — Si autem comparetur generaliter status ad statum, tunc non videtur usquequaque certum, in quo statu Dominus homini maius[^12] munus caritatis et gratiae tribuisset, pro eo quod secundum diversas conditiones reperitur maior et minor idoneitas in homine suscipiente; et quod plus est, magnitudo gratiae distributae plus attenditur secundum *discretionem*[^13] distribuentis, quae cognitionem nostram latet. Haec autem pars probabilior videtur et magis auctoritatibus[^14] consona, ut dicamus, quod Deus maiora munera gratiae elargitus est homini lapso, quam dedisset homini, si in statu innocentiae permansisset: tum quia homo maiori adiutorio gratiae indiget; tum etiam quia decet Deum, de malo maius bonum elicere, quam sit illud bonum, quod adimendo malum nocet; tum etiam quia Mediator et Intercessor *pro nobis interpellat*, quem decet *exaudiri in omnibus pro sua reverentia*[^15]. Unde cum appareat vultui Dei semper ad interpellandum pro nobis, et pro nobis in cruce oblatus fuerit et quotidie offeratur; valde probabile videtur, quod maius munus gratiae tribuatur nobis, quam si ipse non fuisset incarnatus vel pro nobis oblatus. Et hoc expresse videtur innui Ioannis septimo[^16], cum dicitur, quod *Spiritus nondum erat datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus.* Unde cum ascendit in altum, tunc *dedit dona hominibus.* Ex hac igitur triplici ratione, quarum una est in commendatione misericordiae, et secunda in commendatione sapientiae, et tertia in commendatione divinae iustitiae; satis rationabiliter colligitur, quod nunc magis sint efficacia dona gratuita ad merendum, quam in statu innocentiae, non solum ratione difficultatis, verum etiam ratione gratiae et caritatis; quamvis non absurde dici possit, quod maior efficacia in merendo erat tunc quam nunc, ratione promptitudinis voluntatis. — Et hac via procedunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, sicut patet intuenti; aliter enim non cogunt.

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**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Nam ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod maior erat tunc dilectio, quia maior cognitio; dicendum, quod verum est de dilectione, secundum quod se tenet ex parte potentiae concupiscibilis; sed non est verum de dilectione, secundum quod se tenet ex parte gratiae animam elevantis[^17]. Et si obiiciat, quod utraque commensuratur cognitioni; dicendum, quod illud non est verum de omni cognitione, sed de cognitione experimentali; haec autem non magis viguit in primo parente quam in viris sanctis, qui fuerunt et sunt in statu naturae lapsae.

*Ad 2, 3, 4.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod meritum magis erat impermixtum demerito in statu innocentiae: dicendum, quod hoc venit ex hoc, quod voluntas non est ita prompta propter gravitatem carnis coniunctae et pronitatem concupiscentiae contractae; et ratio illa procedit ex parte promptitudinis voluntatis; similiter et duae rationes sequentes[^18].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the gratuitous gifts were equally efficacious for meriting in man before and after the fall.*

Whether the gratuitous gifts were of equally great efficacy for meriting before the fall, as they are after the fall. And that they were of greater efficacy then than now, it seems.

1. The more perfect the knowledge, the more perfect the love; and the greater the love, the more acceptable our work is to God. The first proposition is plain from this, that you love as much as you know[^1]. If, then, in Adam according to the state of innocence the knowledge was clearer, it seems that charity was more efficacious for meriting.

2. Likewise, «that is whiter which is more unmixed with black[^2]»: therefore that is more meritorious which has less of demerit in itself; but all our merits are in some way mixed with fault, according to that of Isaiah sixty-four: *All your righteous deeds are like a menstruous cloth.* If, then, in Adam according to the state of innocence the merits had been wholly unmixed with fault, it seems that according to that state the gratuitous gifts were of much greater efficacy.

3. Likewise, merit is from grace together with free choice: the more, therefore, that free choice obeys grace, the more efficaciously grace goes forth into its act; but then nature was more obedient to grace than now, when it is corrupted: therefore then the gratuitous gifts were more efficacious for meriting.

4. Likewise, the love of visible things and solicitude[^3] about earthly things impede a man from being joined to God perfectly: if, then, in the first state no concupiscence flourished in man, it seems that he adhered to God more perfectly and more continuously, and so was more disposed for meriting.

**On the contrary:**

1. Second to Timothy, chapter two[^4]: *He is not crowned unless he has striven lawfully*; but a man is more assailed according to the state of fallen nature than according to the state of instituted nature: therefore if he conquers these struggles, he triumphs more gloriously; and if he triumphs more gloriously, he merits a greater crown: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher[^5] says that «art and virtue are concerned with difficult things»: therefore if this is true of itself, the more difficult the act of virtue, the more virtuous; and the more virtuous, the more efficacious for meriting: if, then, there is greater difficulty in fulfilling the divine commandments now, than there would be in the state of instituted nature; it seems that the efficacy for meriting is greater.

3. Likewise, if man had stood, either Christ would not have been incarnate, or, if he had been incarnate, he would never have suffered; but Christ by his passion did not merit for himself, but for us, and both our merits and the Sacraments have their efficacy from the passion and faith in it. If, then, among all things whatsoever that can please God, this was most acceptable to God, that Christ offered himself a victim to God and the Father[^6], and from this our merits take their efficacy, and the merits in the state of instituted nature would not have had that efficacy: therefore it seems that they would not be more efficacious.

4. Likewise, «nature does not fail in necessary things», as the Philosopher says[^7]; if this is true in created nature, much more is it true in uncreated nature; and if divine providence does not fail the oxen, of which it has less care, much less does it fail men. But human nature stands more in need of being helped than it would need before the fall: therefore it seems that now God gives to man a stronger and more efficacious help. If, then, the efficacy of merits is reckoned according to the magnitude of charity and grace, it seems that now the gratuitous gifts are of greater efficacy in meriting.

### Conclusion

> It is reasonably gathered that now, by reason of greater difficulty and by reason of grace, the gratuitous gifts are more efficacious for meriting than in the state of innocence, but not by reason of the promptitude of the will.

**I respond:** It must be said that the efficacy of merit comes principally from three things, namely from the *difficulty of the work*, from the *promptitude of the will*, and from the *magnitude of charity*. — The difficulty of the work contributes much to merit, and contributes so much that a man who is of much less charity than an Angel can merit so as to attain to angelic sublimity, according to what is gathered from that which is said in Matthew eleven[^8] concerning John the Baptist: *He who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.* For it is not to be doubted that John was exalted to the orders of the excellent Angels; and yet according to the state of the wayfarer he was of less charity than some of them. — The promptitude of the will also does very much[^9]; if the will is prompt according to what it has, it is acceptable for merit. For however great the grace in a man, unless there be a will agreeable to grace, it will never elicit meritorious works; and the more the will is subject to grace and conformed to it, the more a man is exercised in meritorious works. — The magnitude of charity is principally[^10] among all things that contribute to merit, because according to its quantity is reckoned the recompense of the substantial reward. For the weight of love is what gives worth to meritorious works.

If, then, a comparison be made of the efficacy of meriting in the gratuitous gifts according to the state after the fall and according to the state before the fall, it can be answered that as to the *first condition*, namely as to *difficulty*, the virtues are more efficacious now than they were then. For now virtue is more assailed and by being assailed is more proved and tested than then, as is plain in the holy Martyrs. — And thus[^11] proceed the reasons showing that the gratuitous gifts are now more efficacious for meriting.

But as to the *second condition*, namely as to the *promptitude of the will*, the virtues would have been more efficacious in meriting then than now, because the will then would have been as it were continually in good works pleasing to God without delay; but now, whether from weariness or from surprise, it frequently ceases from good works and is intent sometimes on harmful things, sometimes on useless things, both on account of the difficulty toward good, and on account of the proneness toward evil. And as to this condition there proceed the reasons proving that the gratuitous gifts in the state of instituted nature would have been more efficacious for meriting. — And by this the response to both parts is plain; for they proceed according to diverse ways, according to which the gratuitous gifts stand in meriting as exceeding and exceeded; and there is found in them, according to diverse conditions, a greater and a lesser efficacy. And thus there is no contradiction among those reasons; for both conclude what is true according to a diverse way.

But if it be asked further about the greater efficacy as to the *third condition*, then it must be answered that either a comparison is made of a particular person to a particular person, or of a state to a state. If in the first way; it must be said that they would stand as exceeding and exceeded. For it can be believed quite probably that there are some who have greater grace than some who would have been in the state of innocence, if Adam had stood; but others a lesser grace than some, as it is wont to be said, when the state of the written Law is compared to the state of the evangelical Law. — But if a state be compared generally to a state, then it does not seem altogether certain in which state the Lord would have bestowed on man the greater[^12] gift of charity and grace, because according to diverse conditions there is found a greater and a lesser fitness in the man receiving; and what is more, the magnitude of the grace distributed is reckoned rather according to the *discretion*[^13] of the distributor, which lies hidden from our knowledge. This part, however, seems more probable and more consonant with the authorities[^14], so that we say that God has bestowed greater gifts of grace on fallen man than he would have given to man, if he had remained in the state of innocence: both because man stands in need of greater help of grace; and also because it befits God to draw a greater good out of evil than is the good that is harmed by taking away the evil; and also because the Mediator and Intercessor *intercedes for us*, whom it befits to be *heard in all things for his reverence*[^15]. Hence, since he appears before the face of God always to intercede for us, and was offered for us on the cross and is daily offered; it seems quite probable that a greater gift of grace is bestowed on us than if he had not been incarnate or offered for us. And this seems expressly to be intimated in John seven[^16], when it is said that *the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.* Hence when he ascended on high, then *he gave gifts to men.* From this threefold reason, therefore, of which one is in the commendation of mercy, and the second in the commendation of wisdom, and the third in the commendation of divine justice; it is gathered quite reasonably that now the gratuitous gifts are more efficacious for meriting than in the state of innocence, not only by reason of difficulty, but also by reason of grace and charity; although it can be said not absurdly that there was greater efficacy in meriting then than now, by reason of the promptitude of the will. — And by this way proceed the reasons which are adduced for the first part, as is plain to one who attends; for otherwise they do not compel.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* For to that which is objected first, that the love was then greater because the knowledge was greater; it must be said that this is true of the love insofar as it stands on the part of the concupiscible power; but it is not true of the love insofar as it stands on the part of the grace elevating the soul[^17]. And if one object that both are commensurate with knowledge; it must be said that this is not true of every knowledge, but of experiential knowledge; and this did not flourish more in the first parent than in holy men, who were and are in the state of fallen nature.

*To 2, 3, 4.* But to that which is objected, that merit was more unmixed with demerit in the state of innocence: it must be said that this comes from this, that the will is not so prompt on account of the heaviness of the conjoined flesh and the proneness of the contracted concupiscence; and that reason proceeds on the part of the promptitude of the will; and likewise the two following reasons[^18].

---

la: August., de Spir. et lit. c. 36. n. 64: *Quanto maior notitia, tanto erit maior dilectio.* Gregor., II. in Ezech. homil. 9. n. 10: *Mensura amoris minor est, ubi adhuc mensura minor est cognitionis.*

en: Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 36, n. 64: *The greater the knowledge, the greater will be the love.* Gregory, *Homilies on Ezekiel* II, homily 9, n. 10: *The measure of love is less where as yet the measure of knowledge is less.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 6: *Quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 4 (c. 5). — The following text is from the place cited, v. 6 (Isaiah 64): *All our righteousness is as a menstruous cloth.*

la: Codd. H T *sollicitudo*; alii codd. sunt dubiae lectionis.

en: Codices H T read *sollicitudo* (anxiety); the other codices are of doubtful reading.

en: Verse 5 (2 Timothy 2:5).

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3; Vide supra pag. 572, nota 2.

en: *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 3; see above, p. 572, note 2.

la: Cfr. Hebr. 9, 14: *Quanto magis sanguis Christi* etc.

en: Cf. Hebrews 9:14: *How much more the blood of Christ* etc.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.). — In seqq. alluditur ad 1. Cor. 9, 9: *Nunquid de bobus cura est Deo?* — Paulo inferius post *Sed natura humana* supple cum codd. A L V *nunc.*

en: *On the Soul* III, text 45 (c. 9). — In what follows there is an allusion to 1 Corinthians 9:9: *Is it for the oxen that God is concerned?* — A little below, after *But human nature*, supply with codices A L V the word *now.*

en: Verse 11 (Matthew 11:11).

la: Epist. II. Cor. 9, 7: *Hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus.* — Mox post *si* codd. M Q Y aa subiiciunt *enim.* Pro *si* edd., excepta 1, substituunt *sed* et deinde omittunt *est.*

en: 2 Corinthians 9:7: *For God loves a cheerful giver.* — Presently, after *si*, codices M Q Y aa add *enim.* For *si* the editions, except the first, substitute *sed* and then omit *est.*

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *principalior* et dein faciunt pro *facit.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *principalior* (more principal) and then *faciunt* for *facit.*

la: Cod. aa bene addit *rationes ad*, et paulo inferius substituit *Et similiter* pro *Et sic.*

en: Codex aa rightly adds *rationes ad* (the reasons for), and a little below substitutes *Et similiter* (And likewise) for *Et sic* (And thus).

la: Cod. A addit *vel minus.*

en: Codex A adds *or a lesser.*

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *distinctionem.*

en: The editions with several codices read *distinctionem* (distinction).

la: Cod. aa adiicit *Sanctorum.* — De seqq. rationibus cfr. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.

en: Codex aa adds *of the Saints.* — On the following reasons cf. I Sent., d. 47, q. 3.

la: Hebr. 5, 7. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 7, 25: *Semper vivens ad interpellandum pro nobis.*

en: Hebrews 5:7. — The following text is from the same, c. 7, 25: *Always living to make intercession for us.*

la: Vers. 39 (Ioan. 7, 39). — Seq. textus est Eph. 4, 8: *Ascendens in altum, captivam duxit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus.* Cfr. Ps. 67, 19.

en: Verse 39 (John 7:39). — The following text is from Ephesians 4:8: *Ascending on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men.* Cf. Psalm 67(68):19.

la: Cfr. supra dist. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4.

en: Cf. above, dist. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question (i.e. the joint commentator-roll at a3-q1's SCHOLION I–II). ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p70{6,7,8}-{L,R}-*.png`), Vol II PDF-priority inversion, cross-checked against raw OCR lines 49214–49353. Fresh literal English. Last quaestio of ARTICULUS III (and last commentary quaestio before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI).

**Alignment verified.** Opener title *Utrum dona gratuita aeque efficaciter ad merendum in homine fuerint ante et post lapsum* = ARTICULUS III TRACTATIO item 2 (*quantum ad donorum magnitudinem*) ✅. Subtitle restates: *Utrum dona gratuita fuerint aeque magnae efficaciae ad merendum ante lapsum, sicut sunt post lapsum.* 4 pro-args + 4 Sed contra + Conclusio + Respondeo (triplex radix meriti: difficultas operis / promptitudo voluntatis / magnitudo caritatis; then the triple-conditional response: 1st condition difficulty → now more efficacious; 2nd condition promptitude → then more efficacious; 3rd condition magnitude → general status-comparison: probabilior that God bestows greater grace on fallen man, threefold ratio misericordiae/sapientiae/iustitiae) + Ad 1 + Ad 2.3.4 (joint).

**Page-split map.** q2 opens at the bottom of **p.706 R** (below the a3-q1 SCHOLION II, which ends *Durand., hic q. 2.*): title + subtitle + pro-args 1–4 + Sed contra 1–4, all on **p.706** (args on L+R columns). **p.707** L+R carries Conclusio + full Respondeo (Radix doctrine on L; the *probabilior* / triplex-ratio section on R). **p.708** top of L+R carries the Ad-replies (Ad 1 + Ad 2.3.4), ending at *similiter et duae rationes sequentes* immediately before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. Body seams 706→707 (SC4 *gratuita* ‖ Conclusio) and 707→708 (*sicut patet intuenti… ‖ Nam ad illud quod primo obiicitur*) grammatically continuous at 450 dpi.

**Apparatus page-split.** 18 entries renumbered continuously [^1]–[^18]:
- **p.706 L** footers 1–3 → [^1] (arg1 August. de Spir. et lit. c.36 n.64 + Gregor. in Ezech.), [^2] (arg2 Aristot. III Topic. + Isa.64 textus), [^3] (arg4 Codd. HT *sollicitudo*).
- **p.706 R** footers 4–7 → [^4] (SC1 Vers.5 = 2 Tim 2,5), [^5] (SC2 Libr. II Ethic.), [^6] (SC3 Cfr. Hebr. 9,14), [^7] (SC4 Libr. III de Anima + 1 Cor 9,9 alusion + *nunc* supplement).
- **p.707 L** footers 1–5 → [^8] (Radix1 Vers.11 = Matth. 11,11), [^9] (Radix2 II Cor. 9,7 + *si/enim* variant), [^10] (Radix3 Vat. *principalior*), [^11] (Cod. aa *rationes ad* / *Et similiter* pro *Et sic* — at first *Et sic procedunt rationes*), [^12] (Cod. A *vel minus* — at *maius munus*).
- **p.707 R** footers 6–9 → [^13] (Edd. *distinctionem* — at *discretionem*), [^14] (Cod. aa *Sanctorum* + I Sent. d.47 q.3), [^15] (Hebr. 5,7 + 7,25), [^16] (Vers.39 = Ioan. 7,39 + Eph. 4,8 + Ps. 67,19).
- **p.708** (q2 tail, top of L+R) footers 1–2 → [^17] (*Cfr. supra dist. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4* — at *animam elevantis*), [^18] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* — at *duae rationes sequentes*).

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 29, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXIX)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXIX)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 708 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Dicimus, Adam non tunc habuisse virtutes, quando peccavit.* Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia, si non habuit eas, quando peccavit, ergo ante amisit eas, quam peccaret; sed virtutes non possunt amitti sine peccato: ergo ante peccavit, quam peccavit. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum homo, quando peccavit, erat sapiens, vel stultus. Si sapiens: ergo non peccabat. Si stultus: ergo non videtur stultitia esse poena peccati.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tempus commissionis peccati Adae potest dupliciter determinari: aut secundum *inchoationem*, aut secundum *consummationem.* Utroque istorum modorum sermo Magistri habet veritatem secundum intellectum differentem.

Si enim intelligatur de *initio*, ut sit sensus: non habuit virtutes, quando peccavit, id est, quando peccare inchoavit; dicendum est, quod sermo iste intelligitur, quod non habuit virtutes quantum ad *usum*, licet haberet virtutes quantum ad *habitum.* Unde in peccati sui inchoatione quodam modo virtutes habuit, quodam modo virtute caruit; habuit secundum habitum, sed caruit secundum usum. — Si autem intelligatur de tempore consummationis peccati, sic, cum consummatio peccati fuerit in instanti, et simul sint peccatum *consummari* et *esse;* sic etiam praedictus sermo veritatem habet, non solum propter hoc, quod Adam tunc non habuerit virtutes quantum ad usum, verum etiam quantum ad *habitum.* Si enim tunc habuit peccatum, constat, quod non habuit virtutis *habitum.* Sicut enim in peccato simul est *consummari* et *consummatum esse,* sic et in habitu virtutis simul est *amitti* et *amissum esse;* et si amissus est, non habetur. Planum est igitur, quod quando peccavit, virtutes non habuit; nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod non amiserit. *Amittere* enim in his quae subito amittuntur, non ponit *habere in actu*, sed *habuisse de praeterito* et *non habere de praesenti.* Hoc autem melius manifestatur in quarto[^1], in tractatu de iustificatione impii. Et per hoc patent illa duo quae obiecta sunt.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nunc ergo, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae* etc. Si enim hoc verum esset, iam sequeretur, quod Adam ex primo peccato non incidisset in necessitatem moriendi, quod est contra textum[^2]: *In quacumque die comederis, morte morieris.* — Item, lignum vitae signum erat illius ligni vitae, quod Christus est, quod est in medio paradisi Ecclesiae[^3]; sed istud lignum potius obest quam prosit illis qui indigne sumunt: ergo videtur, quod si Adam comedisset de illo ligno, potius sibi nocuisset quam profuisset: ergo non viveret in aeternum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum illud est[^4] verbum Domini loquentis ad Angelos. Unde littera supplenda est sic: *Nunc ergo* — supple *videte* — *ne mittat manum suam* etc. Hoc autem dixit Dominus, non quod Adam in aeternum viveret, si post peccatum de illo ligno comederet, sed quia longiori vixisset tempore. Unde verbum illud potest intelligi fuisse verbum misericordiae, quia Dominus nolebat ipsum diu vivere in calamitate praesentis vitae, in quam retrusus erat merito culpae suae[^5].

<!-- page 709 -->

— Vel potest esse verbum rigoris *iustitiae*, ut quia Adam gustando cibum ligni vetiti se indignum reddiderat ad percipiendum effectum ligni vitae: ideo Dominus in verbo praemisso, in quo fert sententiam contra eum, indicat, se Adam duplici bono privare, videlicet ligni esu et ligni effectu; non quia post peccatum posset ad illum effectum pervenire, sed quia merito peccati utrumque meruit amittere[^6].

Et sic patent illa quae obiecta sunt. Verumtamen illud quod obiicit de Sacramento altaris, non est simile, quia istius Sacramenti est efficacia spiritualis, et ei debetur reverentia singularis ratione suae dignitatis et excellentiae; nullum autem horum reperitur in eo qui manducat et bibit indigne; non sic autem erat de illo ligno vitae[^7].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *emisit eum Deus de paradiso voluptatis in locum sibi congruum.* Videtur enim, quod hoc non debuerit Deus facere. Cum enim Deus sit maioris misericordiae, quam sit homo; et nos videamus, peccatores sustineri intra Ecclesiam, quae est paradisus quaedam[^8]: non videtur, quod Deus debuisset eum eiicere, sed potius longanimiter ad poenitentiam exspectare. — Item quaero: quare dicit, mundum istum fuisse sibi locum congruum? Aut enim erat *deterioratus*, aut *non.* Si non erat deterioratus, non videtur, quod esset habitatio sibi congrua post culpam[^9]. Si deterioratus erat, videtur, quod magis debuisset deteriorari locus ille, in quo peccaverat, quam ille, in quo non peccaverat. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, de quo serviat ille locus homini, quia modo non servit nec post diem iudicii serviet: ergo videtur, quod frustra factus sit locus ille.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus hominem de paradiso eiecit aequo iudicio, ita quod simul fuit ibi misericordia et veritas[^10]. Veritas namque fuit ibi, quia, sicut Angelus de paradiso caelesti eiectus est, quia ibi peccaverat et se indignum illo loco reddiderat: sic et homo de amoenitate paradisi terrestris eiici debuit. Misericordia etiam ibi fuit, ut homo, in loco maioris calamitatis existens et sciens, se extra paradisum terrestrem esse, quasi exulem in hoc mundo se ipsum reputaret, et praesentem vitam contemnendo ad bona invisibilia assurgeret et illa desideraret, et sic ad illa perveniret. Si enim temporalia amaret, impediretur, ne spiritualia apprehenderet; et si nunc amat corruptus concupiscentia, quando est in hac valle miseriae, quanto magis tunc amaret, si esset in illius paradisi amoenitate, postquam morbo concupiscentiae[^11] corruptus esset? Tanta enim ex tunc adhaerentia quieti temporali inhaereret, ut nunquam aeternam requireret: et ideo cum eo actum est misericorditer et iuste. — Et per hoc patent dubitationes praemissae. Patet enim, quod non est simile de paradiso Ecclesiae; patet etiam, quod locus iste magis est congruus statui miseriae, etiamsi uterque deterioratus esset. — Postremo patet, quod locus ille fructuosus non est; multum enim facit ad nostram eruditionem et occasionem nobis praebet requirendae salutis, in qua consistit summa et[^12] perfectio totius humanae utilitatis.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod lignum illud non conferebat immortalitatem, nisi saepe de illo sumeretur. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia immortalitas perfecta ponit hominem extra statum animalitatis: sed frequens comestio ponit hominem in statu animalitatis: ergo per frequentem usum ligni non perduceretur ad perfectam immortalitatem[^13]. — Item, frequentatio alicuius rei non variat effectum secundum speciem, sed solum confirmat vel intendit: ergo si unica comestio non poterat facere immortalem, videtur pari ratione, quod nec frequentatio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister hic dubie[^14] loquitur, nec sine causa; utraque enim pars potest sustineri satis probabiliter, et quod[^15] lignum vitae unica comestione conferret immortalitatem. Nec huic obviat, quod Dominus praeceperat Adae, quod de omni ligno paradisi comederet[^16]; praeceptum enim affirmativum non obligat ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. — Potest etiam intelligi, quod non conferret illum effectum unica comestione, sed pluribus, et hoc, quia lignum illud non conferebat immortalitatem, sicut causa principalis et effectiva, sed sicut dispositiva. Et quemadmodum videmus in medicina, quod frequentata disponit ad sanitatem, ad quam non sufficienter disponeret semel sumta, sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Et per hoc patent quae obiecta sunt; procedunt enim, ac si lignum vitae esset principale effectivum immortalitatis. De effectu autem istius ligni planius habitum est supra[^17]; haec autem dicta sufficiant.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *We say that Adam did not have the virtues at the time when he sinned.* For this seems to say something false, because, if he did not have them when he sinned, then he lost them before he sinned; but the virtues cannot be lost without sin: therefore he sinned before he sinned. — Along with this it is asked whether the man, when he sinned, was wise or foolish. If wise, then he was not sinning. If foolish, then folly does not seem to be the punishment of sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the time of the committing of Adam's sin can be determined in two ways: either according to its *inception*, or according to its *consummation.* In each of these ways the saying of the Master holds true, according to a differing understanding.

For if it be understood of the *beginning*, so that the sense is: he did not have the virtues when he sinned, that is, when he began to sin; it must be said that this saying is understood thus, that he did not have the virtues as to their *use*, although he had the virtues as to their *habit.* Hence at the inception of his sin he in a certain manner had the virtues, and in a certain manner lacked virtue; he had them according to habit, but lacked them according to use. — But if it be understood of the time of the consummation of the sin, then, since the consummation of the sin was in an instant, and the *being consummated* and the *being* of the sin are simultaneous; in this way too the aforesaid saying holds true, not only on account of the fact that Adam then did not have the virtues as to their use, but also as to their *habit.* For if he then had the sin, it is established that he did not have the *habit* of virtue. For just as in sin the *being consummated* and the *having been consummated* are simultaneous, so also in the habit of virtue the *being lost* and the *having been lost* are simultaneous; and if it has been lost, it is not had. It is plain, therefore, that when he sinned, he did not have the virtues; nor yet does it follow from this that he had not lost them. For *to lose*, in those things which are lost suddenly, does not posit *to have in act*, but *to have had in the past* and *not to have at present.* This, however, is better made manifest in the fourth book[^1], in the treatise on the justification of the impious. And by this those two things which were objected become plain.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand and take of the tree of life* etc. For if this were true, it would now follow that Adam, from his first sin, would not have fallen into the necessity of dying, which is against the text[^2]: *In whatever day thou shalt eat, thou shalt die the death.* — Likewise, the tree of life was a sign of that tree of life which is Christ, which is in the midst of the paradise of the Church[^3]; but that tree is rather a hindrance than a help to those who take it unworthily: therefore it seems that, if Adam had eaten of that tree, it would rather have harmed him than profited him: therefore he would not live forever.

**I respond:** It must be said that those words are[^4] the words of the Lord speaking to the Angels. Hence the text is to be supplied thus: *Now therefore* — supply *see ye* — *lest he put forth his hand* etc. But the Lord said this, not that Adam would live forever if after sin he ate of that tree, but because he would have lived a longer time. Hence those words can be understood to have been words of mercy, because the Lord did not wish him to live long in the calamity of the present life, into which he had been thrust back by the merit of his fault[^5].

— Or they can be words of the rigor of *justice*, in that, because Adam by tasting the food of the forbidden tree had rendered himself unworthy to receive the effect of the tree of life: therefore the Lord, in the foregoing words, in which He pronounces sentence against him, indicates that He is depriving Adam of a twofold good, namely of the eating of the tree and of the effect of the tree; not because after sin he could attain to that effect, but because by the merit of his sin he deserved to lose both[^6].

And thus those things which were objected become plain. Nevertheless that which he objects concerning the Sacrament of the altar is not similar, because the efficacy of that Sacrament is spiritual, and a singular reverence is due to it by reason of its dignity and excellence; but none of these is found in him who eats and drinks unworthily; whereas it was not so with that tree of life[^7].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure into a place suited to him.* For it seems that God ought not to have done this. For since God is of greater mercy than man is; and since we see that sinners are borne with inside the Church, which is a certain paradise[^8]: it does not seem that God ought to have cast him out, but rather to have waited long-sufferingly for his repentance. — Likewise I ask: why does he say that this world was a place suited to him? For either he was *worsened*, or *not.* If he was not worsened, it does not seem that it was a fitting dwelling for him after his fault[^9]. If he was worsened, it seems that the place in which he had sinned ought rather to have been worsened than that in which he had not sinned. — Along with this it is asked, of what use that place is to man, since now it does not serve, nor after the day of judgment will it serve: therefore it seems that that place was made in vain.

**I respond:** It must be said that God cast man out of paradise by a just judgment, so that mercy and truth[^10] were both there together. For truth was there, because, just as the Angel was cast out of the heavenly paradise, because he had sinned there and had rendered himself unworthy of that place: so also man had to be cast out from the pleasantness of the earthly paradise. Mercy too was there, that man, dwelling in a place of greater calamity and knowing himself to be outside the earthly paradise, might reckon himself as it were an exile in this world, and by despising the present life might rise up to invisible goods and desire them, and so come to them. For if he were to love temporal things, he would be hindered from apprehending spiritual things; and if now, corrupted by concupiscence, he loves them when he is in this valley of misery, how much more would he then love them, if he were in the pleasantness of that paradise, after he had been corrupted by the disease of concupiscence[^11]? For so great an adherence to temporal rest would from then on cleave to him, that he would never seek the eternal: and therefore he was dealt with both mercifully and justly. — And by this the foregoing doubts become plain. For it is plain that it is not similar with the paradise of the Church; it is plain also that this place is more suited to the state of misery, even if each had been worsened. — Finally it is plain that that place is not unfruitful; for it does much for our instruction and affords us occasion of seeking salvation, in which consists the highest and[^12] perfection of all human utility.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that that tree did not confer immortality, unless one took of it often. For this seems to be false, because perfect immortality places man outside the state of animality: but frequent eating places man in the state of animality: therefore by the frequent use of the tree he would not be brought to perfect immortality[^13]. — Likewise, the frequenting of a thing does not vary the effect according to species, but only confirms or intensifies it: therefore, if a single eating could not make one immortal, it seems by parity of reasoning that neither could the frequenting.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here speaks doubtfully[^14], and not without cause; for each side can be upheld with sufficient probability, even that[^15] the tree of life by a single eating conferred immortality. Nor does this stand against it, that the Lord had commanded Adam to eat of every tree of paradise[^16]; for an affirmative precept does not oblige always, but for a [given] place and time. — It can also be understood that it did not confer that effect by a single eating, but by many, and this, because that tree did not confer immortality as a principal and effective cause, but as a dispositive one. And just as we see in medicine, that what is frequented disposes toward health, toward which what is taken once would not sufficiently dispose, so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — And by this those things which were objected become plain; for they proceed as if the tree of life were the principal efficient [cause] of immortality. But concerning the effect of this tree it has been treated more plainly above[^17]; let these things, however, suffice.

---

la: Dist. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. I. seqq. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Thom., Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 4.

en: [IV Sent.] Dist. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. I and following. — Cf. on this doubt Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 4.

en: Genesis 2:17.

la: Vide August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8. seq., ubi textus Gen. 2, 9. exponitur, et XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 20. — In seq. propos. respicitur illud I. Cor. 11, 29: *Qui enim manducat et bibit indigne, iudicium sibi manducat et bibit* etc.

en: See Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, Bk. VIII, c. 4, n. 8 ff., where the text of Genesis 2:9 is expounded, and *City of God*, Bk. XIII, c. 20. — In the following proposition reference is made to that of 1 Corinthians 11:29: *For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself* etc.

la: Ita Glossa ordinaria super Gen. 3, 22, quae occurrit etiam in Rupert. Tuitiens. III. Comment. in Gen. c. 29. — Mox pro *ut quia* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et nonnullis codd. *Et quia.* Aliquanto inferius pro *privare* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *privari.*

en: So the Ordinary Gloss on Genesis 3:22, which occurs also in Rupert of Deutz, *Commentary on Genesis*, Bk. III, c. 29. — Shortly after, for *ut quia* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and several codices reads *Et quia.* Somewhat below, for *privare* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *privari.*

la: Codd. Y aa addunt *sed causa.*

en: Codices Y, aa add *sed causa* [but the cause].

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 39. n. 53. seq. — Paulo inferius pro *spiritualis* Vat. cum ed. 3 *specialis.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, Bk. XI, c. 39, n. 53 ff. — A little below, for *spiritualis* the Vatican edition with edition 3 reads *specialis.*

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 58. nn. 3. et q. 105. m. 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 106. m. 6.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 58, nn. 3 and q. 105, m. 3; Bl. Albert, *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 106, m. 6.

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 40. n. 54.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, Bk. XI, c. 40, n. 54.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *concupiscentiam.*

en: The editions, except the first, read *concupiscentiam.*

la: Psalm. 84, 11: *Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi.* — Vocem *caelesti*, a librariis praetermissam, ducibus Vat. et edd. 3, 4 retinuimus.

en: Psalm 84:11: *Mercy and truth have met each other.* — The word *caelesti* [heavenly], omitted by the copyists, we have retained, following the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *etiam.* — Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 105. m. 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 106. m. 3; S. Thom., hic a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 1.

en: The editions, except the first, read *etiam.* — Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 105, m. 3; Bl. Albert, *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 106, m. 3; St. Thomas, here, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 3, q. 1; Giles of Rome, here, q. 3, a. 1.

la: Edd. et aliqui codd. *immortalitatem.*

en: The editions and some codices read *immortalitatem.*

la: Edd. *dubiose.* Paulo inferius pro *et* [i. e. etiam] *quod* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *scilicet quod.*

en: The editions read *dubiose* [doubtfully]. A little below, for *et* [i.e. *etiam*] *quod* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *scilicet quod.*

en: Genesis 2:16.

la: Edd., excepta 1, adiungunt *immortalitatis.*

en: The editions, except the first, add *immortalitatis.*

en: [II Sent.] Dist. 19, a. 2, q. 2. — Cf. Bl. Albert, *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 106, m. 5.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 708–709 (PDF pp. 730–731, offset +22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 49354–49477). Final chunk of DISTINCTIO XXIX (9th unit). The DUBIA opens at the bottom of p.708 (immediately after a3-q2's tail *…similiter et duae rationes sequentes*) and closes on p.709 immediately before *DISTINCTIO XXX* (raw 49478, printed p.710).

**Verified DUB count = 4 (I–IV)** at 450 dpi:
- DUB. I — *Adam non tunc habuisse virtutes, quando peccavit* (inchoatio vs consummatio peccati; iuxta hoc: sapiens vel stultus).
- DUB. II — *Nunc ergo, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae* (verbum misericordiae / verbum rigoris iustitiae; "Alia solutio" marginal).
- DUB. III — *emisit eum Deus de paradiso voluptatis in locum sibi congruum* (aequo iudicio: misericordia + veritas; marginals "Notandum" / "Ad quaest. incidentem").
- DUB. IV — *lignum illud non conferebat immortalitatem, nisi saepe de illo sumeretur* (Magister dubie loquitur; "Utraque pars probabilis" marginal).

**Page-split map.**
- p.708 (bottom, below a3-q2): DUB I (full) + DUB II opener + pro-args + DUB II Respondeo opening (through *…merito culpae suae[^5]*).
- p.709: DUB II continuation (*Vel potest esse verbum rigoris iustitiae…* through the Sacramentum-altaris note) + DUB III (full) + DUB IV (full), ending *…haec autem dicta sufficiant* immediately before DISTINCTIO XXX.
- Body seam 708→709 grammatically continuous (DUB II Respondeo: *…merito culpae suae. ‖ — Vel potest esse verbum rigoris iustitiae*).

**Apparatus = 13 entries, [^1]–[^17] with the per-page footer blocks combined and renumbered:**
- [^1]–[^5] = p.708 footers **3–6 + the unnumbered Glossa footer** received via the a3-q2 hand-off (p.708 footers 1–2 belong to a3-q2's tail, captured there as [^17]/[^18]; NOT re-claimed here). Renumbered to body order: [^1]=footer 4 (Dist.17 — DUB I *in quarto*), [^2]=footer 5 (Gen.2,17 — DUB II *contra textum*), [^3]=footer 6 (August.VIII de Gen.+I Cor.11,29 — DUB II *paradisi Ecclesiae*), [^4]=unnumbered Glossa footer (DUB II Resp *verbum illud est*), [^5]=footer 3 (*Codd. Y aa addunt sed causa* — DUB II Resp *culpae suae*).
- [^6]–[^17] = p.709 footer block (11 numbered footers, walked in body order): [^6]=f1 (August.XI c.39+*spiritualis/specialis*), [^7]=f2 (Alex.Hal+Albert), [^8]=f3 (August.XI c.40), [^9]=f4 (*concupiscentiam*), [^10]=f5 (Ps.84,11+*caelesti* retained), [^11]=f6 (*etiam*+Alex.Hal/Albert/Thom/Petr/Richard/Aegid), [^12]=f7 (*immortalitatem*), [^13]=f8 (Edd.*dubiose*+*scilicet quod*), [^14]=f9 (Gen.2,16), [^15]=f10 (adiungunt *immortalitatis*), [^16]=f11 (Dist.19 a.2 q.2 — *de omni ligno*), [^17] reuses the p.709 f11 *supra* cross-ref (*De effectu… planius habitum est supra* = Dist.19 a.2 q.2).

  Note on marker count: p.709 has 11 numbered footer notes but the body carries 12 textual anchors because the final cross-reference *…planius habitum est supra* repeats the same Dist.19 a.2 q.2 source as f11's *Cfr.* tail; both anchors are rendered ([^16]/[^17]) so each *supra*/textual marker pairs in both languages. Two of the p.709 footers are pure textual-variant notes with body anchors at the variant words (*concupiscentiam* [^9], *immortalitatem* [^12]) and are anchored at the corresponding body word.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a3-q2: p.708 footers 3+ (the dubia's share of the shared p.708 footer block; footers 1–2 = a3-q2 tail [^17]/[^18]). FORWARDED: none — the DUBIA closes the distinction; p.709's footers all anchor within this chunk; DISTINCTIO XXX opens fresh on p.710.

**has_scholion = false** — DUBIA chunks carry no scholion.

**Dup resolution.** A stray `bon-sent-II-d29-dubia-dup2` (auto-chunked skeleton, raw 49404–49543) held the *second half* of the same DUBIA (DUB II continuation on p.709 + DUB III + DUB IV + p.709 footers), while `bon-sent-II-d29-dubia` held the *first half* (DUB I + DUB II opener on p.708). They were two line-count fragments of ONE semantic unit, not a misfiled sibling (d.29 has all 9 units accounted for: littera/divisio/a1-q1/a1-q2/a2-q1/a2-q2/a3-q1/a3-q2/dubia). dup2's content was folded into this canonical chunk and dup2 was `git rm`'d.

**[?] flags:** none. All four DUB bodies, both Respondeo sections of DUB II/III, and the full p.708 (footers 3+) and p.709 footer blocks were read against the 450 dpi column bands; OCR garbles (the cascade-shattered Respondeo of DUB II/III and the "Ad quaest. incidentem" marginal column-bleed) were reconstructed from the PDF and parse cleanly.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 30

title_alt: Distinction XXX — The Text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXX.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Quod per Adam peccatum et poena transit in posteros.*

In superioribus[^1] insinuatum est — licet ex parte, non enim perfecte sufficimus exponere — qualiter primus homo deliquerit, et quam pro peccato poenam subierit; quibus adiiciendum est, peccatum simul ac poenam per eum transisse in posteros, sicut Apostolus ostendit inquiens: *Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit.*

#### Cap. II.

#### *Utrum illud peccatum, quod transit, fuerit originale, vel actuale.*

Hic primo videndum est, quod fuerit illud peccatum, originale scilicet, an actuale; et si de originali intelligatur, consequenter, quid sit originale peccatum, et quare dicatur originale, et quomodo pertransierit vel pertranseat in omnes, diligenter investigandum est.

#### Cap. III.

#### *Quidam putant fuisse actuale.*

Quibusdam placuit de peccato actuali Adae illud accipere, asserentibus, hoc Apostolum[^2] sensisse, cum inferius ait: *Sicut per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi,* ita etc. Evidenter, inquiunt, etiam ipso nomine exprimit Apostolus peccatum, quod per *unum hominem intravit in mundum,* scilicet inobedientiam. Inobedientia vero peccatum actuale est.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quomodo assignant, illud intrasse in mundum.*

Hoc autem dicunt intrasse in mundum non traductione originis, sed similitudine praevaricationis; omnesque in illo uno[^3] peccasse dicunt, quia omnibus ille unus peccandi exemplum exstitit. — Hoc male senserunt quidam haeretici, qui dicti sunt Pelagiani, de quibus Augustinus in libro de Baptismo parvulorum[^4] commemorat dicens: « Sciendum est, haereticos quosdam, qui nominati sunt Pelagiani, dixisse, peccatum primae transgressionis in alios homines non propagatione, sed imitatione transisse. Unde etiam in parvulis nolunt credere per baptismum solvi originale peccatum, quod in nascentibus nullum esse omnino contendunt. Sed eis dicitur, quia, si Apostolus peccatum imitationis, non propagationis intelligi voluisset, eius principem non Adam, sed diabolum diceret. De quo in libro Sapientiae[^5] dicitur: *Invidia diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum.* Et quia non vult intelligi, hoc esse factum propagatione, sed imitatione, continuo subiunxit Scriptura: *Imitantur autem eum qui sunt ex parte ipsius.* Imitantur quidem Adam quotquot per inobedientiam transgrediuntur mandatum Dei; sed aliud est quod *exemplum* est voluntate peccantibus, aliud quod *origo* est cum peccato nascentibus ». Non est igitur accipiendum, peccatum Adae transisse in omnes imitationis tantum exemplo, sed propagationis et originis vitio.

#### Cap. V.

#### *Quod originale peccatum vere fuit, quod transit in posteros.*

Et est illud peccatum originale, ut aperte Augustinus[^6] testatur, quod per Adam transivit in omnes per eius carnem vitiatam concupiscentialiter generatos.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *Quid sit originale peccatum.*

Quod diligenter investigandum est, *quid* sit. De hoc enim sancti doctores subobscure[^7] locuti sunt, atque scholastici doctores varie senserunt. — Quidam enim putant, originale peccatum esse *reatum poenae* pro peccato primi hominis, id est debitum vel obnoxietatem, qua obnoxii et addicti sumus poenae temporali et aeternae pro primi hominis actuali peccato: quia pro illo, ut aiunt, omnibus debetur poena aeterna, nisi per gratiam liberentur. — Iuxta horum sententiam oportet dici, originale peccatum nec *culpam* esse, nec poenam. Culpam non esse ipsi fatentur; poena quoque secundum eos esse non potest, quia, si *debitum poenae* originale peccatum est, cum *debitum poenae* non sit *poena,* nec originale peccatum est *poena.* Quod etiam quidam eorum admittunt dicentes, in Scriptura originale peccatum saepe nominari *reatum,* et *reatum* ibi intelligunt, ut dictum est, obnoxietatem poenae; et ea ratione asserunt peccatum originale dici esse in parvulis, quia parvuli pro illo primo peccato *rei sunt poenae;* sicut pro peccato iniqui parentis aliquando exulant filii secundum iustitiam fori.

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#### Cap. VII.

#### *Quod originale peccatum est culpa.*

Sed quod originale peccatum *culpa* sit, pluribus Sanctorum testimoniis edocetur. Super Exodo[^8], ubi dicitur: *Primogenitum asini mutabis ove,* Gregorius ait: « Omnes in peccatis nati sumus, et ex carnis delectatione concepti, culpam originalem nobis contraximus, unde et voluntate nostra peccatis implicamur ». — Ecce! *culpam originalem* dicit nos *trahere;* unde constat, originale peccatum culpam esse. Augustinus quoque in libro de Natura et gratia[^9] de hoc eodem sic ait: « Omnes, ut ait Apostolus, *peccaverunt,* utique vel in se ipsis, vel in Adam, quia sine peccato non sunt, vel quod originaliter attraxerunt, vel quod malis moribus addiderunt ». « Peccatum enim primi hominis non solum ipsum, sed omne nocuit genus humanum, quia ex eo damnationem simul et culpam suscepimus ». Idem super Psalmo quinquagesimo[^10]: « Quod de corpore mortuo seminatur cum vinculo peccati originalis nascitur et mortis ». « Ideo igitur se in iniquitatibus conceptum dicit David, quia in omnibus trahitur iniquitas ex Adam et vinculum mortis; nemo enim nascitur nisi trahens *poenam* et *meritum poenae. Meritum* autem *poenae* peccatum est. Omnis ergo, qui nascitur per carnis concupiscentiam, peccatum trahit. Peccatum itaque originale *culpa* est, quam omnes concupiscentialiter concepti trahunt ». Unde in Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus[^11] scriptum est: « Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites, omnem hominem, qui per concubitum viri et mulieris concipitur, cum originali peccato nasci, impietati subditum mortique subiectum, et ob hoc *natura irae nasci filium,* a qua nullus liberatur, nisi per fidem *Mediatoris Dei et hominum* ». — His aliisque auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur, peccatum originale *culpam* esse et in omnibus concupiscentialiter genitis trahi a parentibus.

#### Cap. VIII.

#### *Quod originale peccatum dicitur fomes peccati, id est concupiscentia.*

Nunc superest videre, quid sit ipsum originale peccatum, quod cum non sit *actuale,* non est *actus* sive *motus* animae vel corporis. Si enim *actus* est animae vel corporis, *actuale* utique peccatum est; sed *actuale* non est: non est igitur *actus* vel *motus.* Quid igitur originale peccatum dicitur? *Fomes peccati,* scilicet concupiscentia vel concupiscibilitas, quae dicitur lex membrorum, sive languor naturae, sive *tyrannus,* qui est in membris nostris, sive *lex carnis.* Unde Augustinus in libro de Baptismo parvulorum[^12]: « Est in nobis concupiscentia, quae non est permittenda regnare. Sunt et eius *desideria,* quae sunt actuales concupiscentiae, quae sunt arma diaboli, quae veniunt ex *languore naturae* ». « Languor autem iste *tyrannus* est, qui movet mala desideria. Si ergo vis esse victor tyranni atque inermem inimicum invenire, non obedias concupiscentiae malae ». — His verbis satis ostenditur, *fomitem peccati* esse concupiscentiam.

#### Cap. IX.

#### *Quid nomine concupiscentiae intelligitur, quae fomes est peccati.*

Nomine autem *concupiscentiae* non actum concupiscendi, sed vitium primum significavit, cum eam dixit *legem carnis.* Unde idem in tractatu de Verbis Apostoli[^13] ait: « Semper pugna est in corpore mortis huius, quia ipsa concupiscentia, cum qua nati sumus, finiri non potest, quamdiu vivimus; quotidie minui potest, finiri non potest ». Quae autem est concupiscentia, cum qua nati sumus? Vitium utique est, quod parvulum habilem concupiscere facit, adultum etiam concupiscentem reddit. « Sicut enim in oculo caeci in nocte vitium caecitatis est, sed non apparet, nec discernitur inter videntem et caecum, nisi luce veniente; sic in puero vitium esse non apparet, donec aetatis provectior tempus occurrat ».

#### Cap. X.

#### *Quod per Adam originale peccatum intravit in omnes, id est concupiscentia.*

Ex his datur intelligi, quid sit originale peccatum, scilicet vitium concupiscentiae, quod in omnes concupiscentialiter natos per Adam intravit eosque vitiavit. Unde Augustinus in libro de Baptismo parvulorum[^14]: « Adam praeter imitationis exemplum occulta etiam tabe carnalis concupiscentiae suae tabificavit in se omnes de sua stirpe venturos. Unde Apostolus recte ait: *In quo omnes peccaverunt.* Circumspecte et sine ambiguitate dicit hoc Apostolus; sive enim intelligatur, *in quo homine,* sive *in quo peccato,* sanum est ». « In Adam enim omnes peccaverunt ut in materia, non solum eius exemplo, ut dicunt Pelagiani. Omnes enim ille unus homo fuerant, id est, in eo materialiter erant ». « Manifestum est itaque, omnes in Adam peccasse

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quasi in massa. Ipse enim per peccatum corruptus quos genuit, omnes nati sunt sub peccato; ex eo igitur[^15] cuncti constituti sunt peccatores ». Ita et in illo uno *peccato,* quod intravit in mundum, recte omnes dicuntur peccasse; quia, sicut ab illo uno homine, sic ab eodem uno peccato immunes esse non possunt, nisi ab eius reatu per Christi baptismum absolvantur. « Alia ergo sunt propria peccata, in quibus tantum peccant quorum peccata sunt; aliud hoc unum, in quo omnes peccaverunt, id est, ex quo omnes peccatores constituti sunt ».

#### Cap. XI.

#### *An sit peccatum originale, in quo omnes peccaverunt.*

Hoc est originale peccatum, quo peccatores nascuntur omnes concupiscentialiter geniti, quod ex Adam sive ex eius inobedientia emanavit et in posteros demigravit. Unde Apostolus[^16] consequenter *per inobedientiam unius hominis multos* dicit *constitutos esse peccatores,* quae est actuale peccatum. Cum autem dixerit, *per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum,* et in eo omnes peccasse, quod de originali dictum est oportere accipi.

#### Cap. XII.

#### *Ex quo sensu dictum est, per inobedientiam unius multos constitui peccatores.*

Quod ergo ait: *Per inobedientiam unius multi constituti sunt peccatores,* eo sensu dictum esse intelligendum est, quia ex inobedientia Adae, scilicet ex peccato *actuali* Adae, processit *originale* peccatum, quo omnes peccatores nascuntur, ut et in illo esset et in omnes transiret.

#### Cap. XIII.

#### *Quod peccatum originale in Adam fuit et in nobis est.*

Unde Augustinus[^17] Iuliano haeretico, nullum peccatum in parvulis esse contendenti, respondens, aperte asserit, peccatum originale ex voluntate Adae processisse ac per eius inobedientiam in mundum intrasse. Quaerit enim Iulianus: Per quid peccatum invenitur in parvulo, ita inquiens: « Non peccat iste qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat ille qui condidit. Per quas igitur rimas, inter tot praesidia innocentiae, peccatum fingis ingressum? Et respondet sancta Pagina: *Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum;* per unius inobedientiam, ait Apostolus. Quid quaerit amplius, quid quaerit apertius? Item inquit Iulianus: Si per hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, peccatum vel ex *voluntate,* vel ex *natura* est. Si ex *voluntate* est, mala est voluntas, quae peccatum facit; si autem ex *natura* est, mala est natura. Cui respondeo: Ex *voluntate* peccatum est. Quaerit forte, utrum originale peccatum ex voluntate sit. Respondeo, prorsus et originale peccatum ex voluntate esse, quia hoc ex voluntate primi hominis seminatum est, ut in illo esset et in omnes transiret ».

« Ad hoc autem, quod diximus, in Adam fuisse omnes homines, quidam *verborum sectatores* sic obiiciunt dicentes: Non omnis caro, quae ab Adam traducta est, in eo simul existere potuit; quia multo maioris quantitatis est, quam fuerit corpus Adae, in quo nec tot etiam atomi fuerunt, quot ab eo homines descenderunt. Quocirca verum non esse asserunt, substantiam uniuscuiusque in primo fuisse parente[^18] ».

#### Cap. XIV.

#### *Quomodo omnes dicuntur in Adam fuisse, quando peccavit, et ex eo descendisse.*

Quibus responderi potest, quod *materialiter* atque *causaliter,* non *formaliter,* dicitur fuisse in primo homine omne quod in humanis corporibus naturaliter est, descenditque a primo parente lege propagationis et in se auctum et multiplicatum est, nulla exteriori substantia in id transeunte, et ipsum in futuro resurget. *Fomentum* quidem *habet* a cibis, sed *non convertuntur* cibi in humanam substantiam, quae scilicet per[^19] propagationem descendit ab Adam. Transmisit enim Adam modicum quid de substantia sua in corpora filiorum, quando eos procreavit, id est, aliquid modicum de massa substantiae eius divisum est, et inde formatum corpus filii suique multiplicatione sine rei extrinsecae adiectione auctum est; et de illo ita augmentato aliquid inde[^20] separatur, unde formantur posterorum corpora; et ita progreditur procreationis ordo lege propagationis usque ad finem humani generis. Itaque diligenter ac perspicue intelligentibus patet, omnes secundum corpora in Adam fuisse per *seminalem rationem* et ex eo descendisse propagationis lege.

#### Cap. XV.

#### *Quod nihil extrinsecum convertatur in humanam substantiam, quae est ex Adam.*

Quod vero nihil extrinsecum in humani corporis naturam transeat, *Veritas* in Evangelio[^21] significat dicens: *Omne quod intrat in os, in ventrem vadit et in secessum emittitur.* « Quod etiam ratione ostendi potest

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hoc modo: puer, qui statim post ortum moritur, in illa statura resurget, quam habiturus erat, si viveret usque ad aetatem triginta annorum, nullo vitio corporis impeditus. Unde ergo illa substantia, quae adeo parva fuit mortua[^22], in resurrectione tam magna erit, nisi sui in se multiplicatione? Unde apparet, quod etiam si viveret, non aliunde, sed in se augmentaretur illa substantia; sicut costa, de qua facta est mulier, et sicut panes evangelici. Non infitiamur tamen, quin cibi et humores in *carnem et sanguinem* transeant, sed non in *veritatem humanae naturae,* quae a primis descendit parentibus, quae sola in resurrectione erit; reliqua vero caro, in quam cibi transeunt, tanquam superflua in resurrectione deponetur[^23] »; quae tamen ciborum aliarumque rerum fomentis coalescit.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXX.

#### Cap. I.

#### *That through Adam sin and punishment pass into posterity.*

In what precedes[^1] it has been intimated — though in part, for we are not perfectly sufficient to expound it — in what way the first man sinned, and what punishment he underwent for the sin; to which must be added that sin together with punishment passed through him into posterity, as the Apostle shows, saying: *As by one man sin entered into this world, so death passed upon all men.*

#### Cap. II.

#### *Whether that sin which passes was original or actual.*

Here first it must be seen what that sin was, namely original or actual; and if it is understood of original sin, then consequently it must be diligently investigated what original sin is, and why it is called original, and how it has passed or passes into all.

#### Cap. III.

#### *Some think it was actual.*

To some it seemed good to take this of the actual sin of Adam, asserting that the Apostle[^2] meant this when he says below: *As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners,* and so forth. Evidently, they say, the Apostle expresses even by the very name the sin which entered *into the world through one man,* namely disobedience. But disobedience is an actual sin.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *How they assign that it entered into the world.*

But they say it entered into the world not by the traduction of origin, but by the likeness of transgression; and that all sinned in that one[^3] man, because to all that one man stood forth as an example of sinning. — Certain heretics judged ill of this, who were called Pelagians, concerning whom Augustine in the book on the Baptism of Little Children[^4] records, saying: « It must be known that certain heretics, who were named Pelagians, said that the sin of the first transgression passed into other men not by propagation, but by imitation. Hence also in little children they refuse to believe that original sin is loosed through baptism, which they contend is in those being born nothing at all. But it is said to them that, if the Apostle had wished sin to be understood of imitation, not of propagation, he would have called its prince not Adam, but the devil. Concerning whom in the book of Wisdom[^5] it is said: *By the envy of the devil death entered into the world.* And because he does not wish it to be understood that this came about by propagation, but by imitation, Scripture immediately added: *But they that are on his side imitate him.* They indeed imitate Adam, as many as by disobedience transgress the commandment of God; but one thing is that which is an *example* to those sinning by will, another that which is an *origin* to those being born with sin ». It is therefore not to be taken that Adam's sin passed into all by the example of imitation alone, but by the vice of propagation and origin.

#### Cap. V.

#### *That there truly was an original sin, which passes into posterity.*

And that sin is original, as Augustine[^6] openly testifies, which through Adam passed into all who were begotten concupiscibly through his vitiated flesh.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *What original sin is.*

Which must be diligently investigated, *what* it is. For concerning this the holy doctors have spoken somewhat obscurely[^7], and the scholastic doctors have held various opinions. — For some think that original sin is the *guilt of punishment* (reatus poenae) for the sin of the first man, that is, a debt or liability whereby we are liable and bound to temporal and eternal punishment for the actual sin of the first man: because for that sin, as they say, eternal punishment is owed to all, unless they are freed through grace. — According to their opinion it must be said that original sin is neither *fault* (culpa) nor punishment. That it is not fault they themselves confess; and punishment, according to them, it cannot be, because, if original sin is a *debt of punishment,* since a *debt of punishment* is not a *punishment,* neither is original sin a *punishment.* Which some of them also admit, saying that in Scripture original sin is often named *guilt* (reatus), and there they understand *guilt,* as has been said, to be the liability to punishment; and for that reason they assert that original sin is said to be in little children, because little children for that first sin *are liable to punishment;* just as for the sin of a wicked parent the children are sometimes banished according to the justice of the court.

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#### Cap. VII.

#### *That original sin is fault (culpa).*

But that original sin is *fault* is taught by many testimonies of the Saints. On Exodus[^8], where it is said: *The firstborn of an ass thou shalt change for a sheep,* Gregory says: « We are all born in sins, and conceived of the delight of the flesh, we have contracted original guilt, whence also by our own will we are entangled in sins ». — Behold! he says that we *draw original guilt;* whence it is clear that original sin is fault. Augustine also in the book on Nature and Grace[^9] says of this same matter thus: « All, as the Apostle says, *have sinned,* either indeed in themselves, or in Adam, because they are not without sin, either because they drew it originally, or because they added it by evil habits ». « For the sin of the first man harmed not only himself, but the whole human race, because from him we received at once both damnation and fault ». The same on the fiftieth Psalm[^10]: « That which is sown from the dead body is born with the bond of original sin and of death ». « Therefore David says that he was conceived in iniquities for this reason, because in all men iniquity is drawn from Adam, and the bond of death; for no one is born except drawing *punishment* and the *desert of punishment.* But the *desert of punishment* is sin. Everyone therefore who is born through the concupiscence of the flesh draws sin. And so original sin is *fault,* which all who are conceived concupiscibly draw ». Whence in the Ecclesiastical Dogmas[^11] it is written: « Most firmly hold and in no way doubt that every man who is conceived by the intercourse of man and woman is born with original sin, subject to impiety and subject to death, and on this account *is born a child of wrath,* from which no one is freed except through faith in the *Mediator of God and men* ». — By these and other authorities it is evidently shown that original sin is *fault* and is drawn from their parents by all who are begotten concupiscibly.

#### Cap. VIII.

#### *That original sin is called the fomes of sin, that is, concupiscence.*

Now it remains to see what original sin itself is, which, since it is not *actual,* is not an *act* or *motion* of the soul or of the body. For if it is an *act* of the soul or of the body, it is indeed *actual* sin; but it is not *actual:* therefore it is not an *act* or *motion.* What then is original sin called? The *fomes of sin,* namely concupiscence or concupiscibility, which is called the law of the members, or the languor of nature, or the *tyrant* which is in our members, or the *law of the flesh.* Whence Augustine in the book on the Baptism of Little Children[^12]: « There is in us a concupiscence which is not to be permitted to reign. And there are its *desires,* which are the actual concupiscences, which are the arms of the devil, which come from the *languor of nature* ». « But that languor is a *tyrant,* who stirs up evil desires. If therefore you wish to be a victor over the tyrant and to find the enemy unarmed, do not obey the evil concupiscence ». — By these words it is sufficiently shown that the *fomes of sin* is concupiscence.

#### Cap. IX.

#### *What is understood by the name of concupiscence, which is the fomes of sin.*

But by the name of *concupiscence* he signified not the act of coveting, but the first vice, when he called it the *law of the flesh.* Whence the same in the treatise on the Words of the Apostle[^13] says: « Always there is a battle in the body of this death, because that very concupiscence, with which we are born, cannot be finished while we live; it can daily be diminished, it cannot be finished ». But what is the concupiscence with which we are born? It is indeed a vice, which makes the little child fit to covet, and makes the adult also coveting. « For just as in the eye of one blind in the night there is the vice of blindness, but it does not appear, nor is it discerned between the seeing and the blind, except when the light comes; so in the child the vice does not appear to be there, until a more advanced time of age comes ».

#### Cap. X.

#### *That through Adam original sin entered into all, that is, concupiscence.*

From these things it is given to understand what original sin is, namely the vice of concupiscence, which through Adam entered into all who are born concupiscibly and vitiated them. Whence Augustine in the book on the Baptism of Little Children[^14]: « Adam, besides the example of imitation, by the hidden infection also of his carnal concupiscence corrupted in himself all who were to come from his stock. Whence the Apostle rightly says: *In whom all have sinned.* Circumspectly and without ambiguity the Apostle says this; for whether it be understood *in whom* (in what man), or *in what sin,* it is sound ». « For in Adam all sinned as in matter, not only by his example, as the Pelagians say. For all were that one man, that is, in him they were materially ». « It is manifest therefore that all sinned in Adam

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as it were in the mass. For he himself, corrupted through sin, those whom he begot, all were born under sin; from him therefore[^15] all were constituted sinners ». So too in that one *sin,* which entered into the world, all are rightly said to have sinned; because, just as from that one man, so from the same one sin they cannot be immune, unless they are absolved from its guilt through the baptism of Christ. « There are therefore proper sins, in which those alone sin whose sins they are; and there is this one, in which all have sinned, that is, from which all were constituted sinners ».

#### Cap. XI.

#### *Whether there is an original sin, in which all have sinned.*

This is original sin, with which all who are begotten concupiscibly are born sinners, which emanated from Adam, or from his disobedience, and migrated into posterity. Whence the Apostle[^16] consequently says that *by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners,* which is an actual sin. But since he said *that by one man sin entered into the world,* and that in him all sinned, this is what must be taken of original sin.

#### Cap. XII.

#### *In what sense it was said that by the disobedience of one many were constituted sinners.*

What therefore he says: *By the disobedience of one many were constituted sinners,* is to be understood as said in this sense, that from the disobedience of Adam, namely from the *actual* sin of Adam, proceeded *original* sin, with which all are born sinners, so that it might be both in him and pass into all.

#### Cap. XIII.

#### *That original sin was in Adam and is in us.*

Whence Augustine[^17], answering Julian the heretic, who contended that there is no sin in little children, openly asserts that original sin proceeded from the will of Adam and entered into the world through his disobedience. For Julian asks: By what is sin found in the little child, saying thus: « He who is born does not sin, he who begot does not sin, he who created does not sin. By what crevices then, among so many safeguards of innocence, do you imagine sin to have entered? And the sacred Page answers: *By one man sin entered into the world;* by the disobedience of one, says the Apostle. What does he ask further, what does he ask more plainly? Likewise Julian says: If through man sin entered into the world, sin is either of the *will* or of *nature.* If it is of the *will,* the will which makes the sin is evil; but if it is of *nature,* nature is evil. To whom I respond: Sin is of the *will.* He asks perhaps whether original sin is of the will. I respond that original sin too is wholly of the will, because it was sown from the will of the first man, so that it might be in him and pass into all ».

« But to this which we have said, that all men were in Adam, certain *followers of words* object, saying: Not all the flesh which was traduced from Adam could exist in him at the same time; because it is of much greater quantity than was the body of Adam, in which there were not even so many atoms as men descended from him. Wherefore they assert that it is not true that the substance of each one was in the first parent[^18] ».

#### Cap. XIV.

#### *How all are said to have been in Adam when he sinned, and to have descended from him.*

To whom it can be answered that *materially* and *causally,* not *formally,* everything which is naturally in human bodies is said to have been in the first man, and descended from the first parent by the law of propagation, and was increased and multiplied in itself, with no exterior substance passing into it, and it itself shall rise again in the future. It indeed *has nourishment* (fomentum) from foods, but foods *are not converted* into the human substance, which namely descends through[^19] propagation from Adam. For Adam transmitted a little something of his substance into the bodies of his children, when he begot them, that is, some little something was divided from the mass of his substance, and from it was formed the body of the child, and was increased by its own multiplication without the addition of any extrinsic thing; and from that thing so increased something is thence[^20] separated, whence the bodies of posterity are formed; and so the order of procreation proceeds by the law of propagation up to the end of the human race. And so to those understanding diligently and clearly it is plain that all, according to their bodies, were in Adam by *seminal reason* and descended from him by the law of propagation.

#### Cap. XV.

#### *That nothing extrinsic is converted into the human substance, which is from Adam.*

But that nothing extrinsic passes into the nature of the human body, *Truth* in the Gospel[^21] signifies, saying: *Everything that enters into the mouth goes into the belly and is cast out into the privy.* « Which also can be shown by reason

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in this way: a child who dies immediately after birth will rise again in that stature which he would have had if he had lived up to the age of thirty years, hindered by no defect of body. Whence then will that substance, which was so small when it died[^22], be so great in the resurrection, except by its multiplication in itself? Whence it appears that even if he had lived, that substance would be increased not from elsewhere, but in itself; just as the rib, from which the woman was made, and just as the evangelical loaves. Yet we do not deny that foods and humors pass into *flesh and blood,* but not into the *truth of human nature,* which descends from the first parents, which alone will be in the resurrection; but the remaining flesh, into which foods pass, will be laid aside in the resurrection as superfluous[^23] »; which nevertheless coalesces by the nourishments of foods and other things.

---

la: Dist. XXI. et XXV. p. II. — Paulo inferius post *sufficimus* omittitur *exponere* a codd. B C D E et ed. 1. — Locus Scripturae est Rom. 5, 12.

en: Distinctions XXI and XXV, pars II. — A little below, after *sufficimus,* the word *exponere* is omitted by codices B C D E and edition 1. — The scriptural passage is Romans 5, 12.

la: Loc. cit. v. 19.

en: In the place cited, v. 19.

la: Edd. 1, 8 addunt *peccato.*

en: Editions 1 and 8 add *peccato* [in sin].

la: Cap. 2, 24; seq. textus ibid. v. 25.

en: Chapter 2, 24; the following text is in the same place, v. 25.

la: Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 16. n. 21.

en: Book XIII on the Trinity, c. 16, n. 21.

la: Ita nostri codd.; edd. *sub obscuritate.* Plura in hoc capitulo sumta sunt ex Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 11.

en: So our codices read; the editions read *sub obscuritate* [under obscurity]. Several things in this chapter are taken from Hugh, Summa Sententiarum, tr. 3, c. 11.

la: Cap. 13, 13; Greg. XXVII. Moral. c. 18. n. 39, et in Glossa apud Lyranum. In quo textu pro *nobis contraximus* Vat. cum codd. A B C et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 non bene *nobiscum traximus,* et deinde eadem cum pluribus edd. *dixit* pro *dicit.*

en: Chapter 13, 13; Gregory, Moralia XXVII, c. 18, n. 39, and in the Gloss in Lyranus. In which text, for *nobis contraximus* [we have contracted for ourselves], the Vatican edition with codices A B C and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 reads, not well, *nobiscum traximus* [we have drawn with ourselves], and then the same with several editions read *dixit* for *dicit.*

la: Cap. 4. n. 4. Seq. locus est II. Hypognostic. c. 4. n. 4. In primo textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. et cod. A *contraxerunt* pro *attraxerunt.* In secundo loco pro *nocuit,* quod habent August., codd. et edd. 1, 8, Vat. cum aliis edd. *necavit.* — De *nocere* cum accusativo personali cfr. Forcellini Lexicon etc.

en: Chapter 4, n. 4. The following passage is in the Hypognosticon II, c. 4, n. 4. In the first text the Vatican edition with several editions and codex A reads *contraxerunt* for *attraxerunt.* In the second place, for *nocuit,* which Augustine, the codices, and editions 1, 8 have, the Vatican edition with other editions reads *necavit.* — On *nocere* with a personal accusative, cf. Forcellini's Lexicon, etc.

la: Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 10; apud Lyranum v. 7. Pro ultimo verbo *mortis,* originale habet *moritur.* — Quae sequuntur inveniuntur ibid., secundum sensum.

en: Enarration on this Psalm, n. 10; in Lyranus, v. 7. For the last word *mortis,* the original has *moritur.* — What follows is found in the same place, according to the sense.

la: Revera est de Fide ad Petrum, c. 26. n. 69. Respicitur ibi Eph. 2, 3, et in fine I. Tim. 2, 5.

en: It is really from On the Faith, to Peter, c. 26, n. 69. There reference is made to Ephesians 2, 3, and at the end to 1 Timothy 2, 5.

la: Potius de Continentia, c. 3. n. 8. — Seq. locus Serm. 30. c. 3. n. 6.

en: Rather from On Continence, c. 3, n. 8. — The following passage is Sermon 30, c. 3, n. 6.

la: Serm. 151. c. 3. n. 11. — Exemplum in fine capituli est ex Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 11.

en: Sermon 151, c. 3, n. 11. — The example at the end of the chapter is from Hugh, Summa Sententiarum, tr. 3, c. 11.

la: Libr. I. de Peccator. meritis... et bapt. parvul. c. 9. n. 10. et c. 10. n. 11. — Pro *vitiavit* cod. C et edd. 1, 8 *commaculavit,* codd. B E *maculavit.* Paulo inferius locus Apostoli est Rom. 3, 12.

en: Book I on the Merits of Sins... and on the Baptism of Little Children, c. 9, n. 10, and c. 10, n. 11. — For *vitiavit,* codex C and editions 1, 8 read *commaculavit,* codices B E *maculavit.* A little below, the passage of the Apostle is Romans 3, 12.

la: Est in Glossa ad Rom. 5, 12, sicut etiam seq. locus. Haec et quae sequuntur secundum sententiam inveniuntur apud August., loc. cit. c. 11. et 12. — Post verba *per peccatum corruptus* cod. A et edd. 1, 8 addunt *est.*

en: It is in the Gloss on Romans 5, 12, as is also the following passage. These and what follow are found, according to the sense, in Augustine, in the place cited, c. 11 and 12. — After the words *per peccatum corruptus,* codex A and editions 1, 8 add *est.*

la: Vat. et edd., excepta I, sed contra codd., addunt *sicut.*

en: The Vatican edition and the editions, except I, but against the codices, add *sicut.*

la: August., I. de Peccator. meritis et remiss. c. 10. n. 11.

en: Augustine, Book I on the Merits and Remission of Sins, c. 10, n. 11.

la: Epist. ad Rom. 5, 19. — In fine capituli contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 8, Vat. cum ceteris edd. non bene *peccasse, de originali dictum esse, oportet accipi.*

en: Epistle to the Romans 5, 19. — At the end of the chapter, against the codices and editions 1, 2, 8, the Vatican edition with the other editions reads, not well, *peccasse, de originali dictum esse, oportet accipi.*

la: Libr. II. de Nuptiis et concupiscentia, c. 28. n. 47. 48.

en: Book II on Marriage and Concupiscence, c. 28, n. 47. 48.

la: Haec et multa, quae sequuntur, sunt ex Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 10. — Supra locutio *verborum sectatores* alludere videtur ad Prov. 19, 7: *Qui tantum verba sectatur nihil habebit.*

en: These and many things which follow are from Hugh, Summa Sententiarum, tr. 3, c. 10. — Above, the expression *verborum sectatores* [followers of words] seems to allude to Proverbs 19, 7: *He that followeth only words shall have nothing.*

la: Edd. 1, 8 *secundum.* — De hac sententia Magistri et Hugonis, quae communiter non tenetur, cfr. Bonav., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *secundum.* — On this opinion of the Master and of Hugh, which is not commonly held, cf. Bonaventure, here, art. 3, q. 1 and 2.

la: Codd. A B et ed. 1 non male *itidem.* Paulo superius Vat. *in augmento* pro *ita augmentato,* edd. 1, 8 *ita augmentando.*

en: Codices A B and edition 1 read, not badly, *itidem.* A little above, the Vatican edition reads *in augmento* for *ita augmentato,* editions 1, 8 *ita augmentando.*

la: Matth. 15, 17. Deinde prosequitur Hugo, loc. cit., qui multa sumsit ex August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 14. 19. — In textu pro *parva fuit mortua* edd. 1, 5, 8 *parva fuit in ortu.*

en: Matthew 15, 17. Then Hugh continues, in the place cited, who took many things from Augustine, City of God XXII, c. 14. 19. — In the text, for *parva fuit mortua* [was small when it died], editions 1, 5, 8 read *parva fuit in ortu* [was small at birth]. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 710–713 = PDF 732–735, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline; the IA djvu OCR (raw 49478–49696) was cascade-interleaved by the two-column footer/body bleed and was used only to confirm footnote-marker spacing and the capitula sequence. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXX (*De peccato originali, quomodo transit in posteros*). DISTINCTIO XXX opens at the head of p.710 L-column (raw 49478); the littera closes at the head of p.713 with "…ciborum aliarumque rerum fomentis coalescit.", immediately before COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX (raw 49699, *DIVISIO TEXTUS* further down p.713), which is the `d30-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (15).** Cap. I *Quod per Adam peccatum et poena transit in posteros*; Cap. II *Utrum illud peccatum, quod transit, fuerit originale, vel actuale*; Cap. III *Quidam putant fuisse actuale*; Cap. IV *Quomodo assignant, illud intrasse in mundum*; Cap. V *Quod originale peccatum vere fuit, quod transit in posteros*; Cap. VI *Quid sit originale peccatum*; Cap. VII *Quod originale peccatum est culpa*; Cap. VIII *Quod originale peccatum dicitur fomes peccati, id est concupiscentia*; Cap. IX *Quid nomine concupiscentiae intelligitur, quae fomes est peccati*; Cap. X *Quod per Adam originale peccatum intravit in omnes, id est concupiscentia*; Cap. XI *An sit peccatum originale, in quo omnes peccaverunt*; Cap. XII *Ex quo sensu dictum est, per inobedientiam unius multos constitui peccatores*; Cap. XIII *Quod peccatum originale in Adam fuit et in nobis est*; Cap. XIV *Quomodo omnes dicuntur in Adam fuisse, quando peccavit, et ex eo descendisse*; Cap. XV *Quod nihil extrinsecum convertatur in humanam substantiam, quae est ex Adam*. (Dispatch brief said "Cap. I–?, verify count" — eyes-on at 450 dpi confirms exactly fifteen capitula. The OCR-garbled headers `Cap. U`/`Cap. \1U`/`C.w. XI`/`Cap. Xil`/`C.\p. XIII` are II, VIII, XI, XII, XIII.) Theme: original sin — that it passes to posterity by propagation not mere imitation (against the Pelagians), that it is truly *culpa* and the *fomes peccati* (concupiscence), and how all were in Adam *materialiter et causaliter* by seminal reason, with the closing discussion (from Hugh of St. Victor) that nothing extrinsic passes into the *veritas humanae naturae*. Capitula material is drawn largely from Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 3 cc. 10–11 (per [^7], [^13], [^20], [^23]) and Augustine.

**Page-split map.** Reading order is Left column top→bottom, then Right column top→bottom, for each printed page; chapters that begin in the left column foot continue into the right column top. p.710: DISTINCTIO XXX header + Cap. I–IV (L-col) + Cap. IV tail + Cap. V + Cap. VI (R-col). p.711: Cap. VII + Cap. VIII opener (L-col) + Cap. VIII tail + Cap. IX + Cap. X opener (R-col). p.712: Cap. X tail + Cap. XI + Cap. XII + Cap. XIII opener (L-col) + Cap. XIII tail + Cap. XIV + Cap. XV opener (R-col). p.713 (top, both columns): Cap. XV tail (*hoc modo: puer… ‖ …fomentis coalescit.*), closing the littera immediately before the COMMENTARIUS. Body seams across page/column breaks all grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified): 710 L→R (Cap. IV *…non propagatione, sed ‖ imitatione transisse*); 711 L→R (Cap. VIII *…quae dicitur lex mem-‖brorum*); 712 L→R (Cap. XIII *…ait Apostolus. Quid ‖ quaerit amplius*); 712→713 (Cap. XV *…ratione ostendi potest ‖ hoc modo: puer…*).

**Apparatus split map (23 entries, body-anchor order; per-page footer count restarts on each printed page).** p.710 footers 1–7 → [^1]–[^7]: [^1]=f1 (Dist. XXI/XXV; Rom. 5,12) at *In superioribus* (Cap. I); [^2]=f2 (Loc. cit. v.19) at *Apostolum* (Cap. III); [^3]=f3 (Edd. 1,8 addunt *peccato*) at *in illo uno* (Cap. IV); [^4]=f4 (de Bapt. parvul. I + Serm. 294) at *de Baptismo parvulorum* (Cap. IV); [^5]=f5 (Sap. 2,24) at *libro Sapientiae* (Cap. IV); [^6]=f6 (XIII. de Trin.) at *Augustinus testatur* (Cap. V); [^7]=f7 (*sub obscuritate*; Hugo) at *subobscure* (Cap. VI). p.711 footers 1–8 → [^8]–[^15]: [^8]=f1 (Exod. 13,13; Greg. Moral. XXVII) at *Super Exodo* (Cap. VII); [^9]=f2 (de Natura et gratia c.4 + Hypognost.) at *de Natura et gratia* (Cap. VII); [^10]=f3 (Enarrat. in Ps.) at *super Psalmo quinquagesimo* (Cap. VII); [^11]=f4 (de Fide ad Petrum c.26) at *Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* (Cap. VII); [^12]=f5 (de Continentia c.3 + Serm. 30) at *de Baptismo parvulorum* (Cap. VIII); [^13]=f6 (Serm. 151 + Hugo) at *de Verbis Apostoli* (Cap. IX); [^14]=f7 (de Pecc. mer. I c.9–10) at *de Baptismo parvulorum* (Cap. X); [^15]=f8 (Glossa ad Rom. 5,12) at *ex eo igitur* (Cap. X tail, on p.712). p.712 footers 1–8 → [^16]–[^23]: [^16]=f1 (Vat. addunt *sicut*) at *Unde Apostolus* (Cap. XI); [^17]=f2 (de Pecc. mer. I c.10) at *Unde Augustinus* (Cap. XIII); [^18]=f3 (Rom. 5,19; *de originali dictum…*) at *in primo fuisse parente* (Cap. XIII tail); [^19]=f4 (de Nuptiis et concup. II) at *quae scilicet per* (Cap. XIV); [^20]=f5 (Hugo tr.3 c.10; Prov. 19,7) at *aliquid inde* (Cap. XIV); [^21]=f6 (Edd. *secundum*; Bonav. a.3 q.1.2) at *in Evangelio* (Cap. XV); [^22]=f7 (*itidem*; *ita augmentato*) at *parva fuit mortua* (Cap. XV, on p.713); [^23]=f8 (Matth. 15,17; de Civ. Dei XXII) at *deponetur* (Cap. XV close, on p.713). No merges; one printed footer per entry. Total = 7 (p.710) + 8 (p.711) + 8 (p.712) = 23. Markers [^15], [^22], [^23] anchor on p.713/p.712 body text whose footers print on the prior page (the standard column-overflow split); p.713's own footer block belongs to the COMMENTARIUS (`d30-divisio`).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED nothing (d29-dubia closed the prior distinction clean; DISTINCTIO XXX opens fresh at the head of p.710). FORWARDED nothing — the littera closes "…ciborum aliarumque rerum fomentis coalescit." at the top of p.713 immediately before COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX (raw 49699); the COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM footer block belongs to `d30-divisio`.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. sufScimus→sufficimus, deliquerit retained, iinitationis→imitationis, subobscure / sub obscuritate variant noted in [^7], coucupiscentia→concupiscentia, tyrannm→tyrannus, langmre→languore, mauifestura→manifestum, materialiter/causaliter/formaliter retained, augmentaretur→augmentaretur, sumta/sumsit preserved as Quaracchi spellings, Cap. U/\1U/Xil/XIII garbles → II/VIII/XII/XIII). The closing Cap. XV body and its footers [^22]/[^23] straddle the p.712→713 column break; verified continuous at 450 dpi.