title: Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De liberi arbitrii immutabilitate tam in confirmatis, quam in obstinatis.*

Consequenter secundo quaeritur de liberi arbitrii immutabilitate tam in confirmatis, quam in obstinatis. Supposito autem, quod Angeli in sua conditione habuerint liberum arbitrium, sicut homo, quaeruntur hic tria.

Primum est, utrum confirmatio mutaverit libertatis arbitrium.

Secundum est, utrum obstinatio auferat libertatis usum.

Tertium est, utrum haec, vel illa minuat libertatis dominium.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum confirmatio mutet libertatis arbitrium.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum confirmatio mutet libertatis arbitrium, ita quod sit aliud ante confirmationem, aliud post. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Vertibilitas inest libero arbitrio creato per naturam[^1], ergo quod aufert libero arbitrio vertibilitatem mutat eius naturam et variat; sed confirmatio hoc aufert libero arbitrio: ergo mutat et variat.

2. Item, nihil idem, manens idem, potest oppositas differentias participare[^2]; sed *mutabile* et *immutabile* sunt oppositae differentiae entis, sicut *mortale* et *immortale* viventis: si ergo liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem est mutabile, post confirmationem immutabile: ergo est aliud et aliud.

3. Item, « rationales potestates sunt ad opposita », sicut dicit Philosophus[^3]: ergo cum potentia desinit esse ad opposita, desinit esse rationalis; sed post confirmationem liberum arbitrium desinit esse ad opposita: ergo desinit esse rationalis potestas. Sed nulla potentia rationalis potest fieri non-rationalis, manens eadem: ergo etc.

4. Item, « potentiae distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta[^4] »; ubi ergo sunt diversa obiecta, necesse est, etiam potentias diversificari; sed liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem potest in malum,
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post confirmationem non potest: ergo est aliud et aliud.

**Contra:** 1. Anselmus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^5] dicit, quod « liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se »; sed haec potestas in confirmatione non tollitur, sed fortificatur: ergo liberum arbitrium non mutatur.

2. Item, gratia naturam perficit et confirmat; sed nihil quod alterum secundum naturam perficit et complet, mutat eius naturam: ergo gratia adveniens libero arbitrio ipsum non mutat[^6]. Sed confirmatio est per gratiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne confirmans alterum est conservans; et nihil conservans est corrumpens; et nihil mutat aliquid, nisi corrumpat aliquid, quia non est mutatio sine deperditione: ergo nihil confirmans mutat. Sed confirmatio ideo dicta est, quia liberum arbitrium Angeli confirmat: ergo ipsum non mutat.

4. Item, gratia confirmationis facit esse liberum a miseria in Angelis, sicut gratia gratum faciens facit liberum a culpa; sed libertas a culpa non mutat liberum arbitrium nec eius libertatem: ergo nec libertas a miseria: ergo nec confirmationis gratia[^7].

### Conclusio

> *Liberum arbitrium per confirmationem non mutatur quoad substantiam, sed tantum quoad statum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est mutatio alicuius dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad *substantiam* sive essentiam, alio modo quantum ad *statum*; vel per alia verba: est mutari quantum ad *primum esse,* et est mutari quantum ad *bene esse.* — Si loquamur de mutatione *primo* modo, sic sine dubio dicendum, quod confirmatio liberum arbitrium non mutat, cum perficiat et conservet; sicut ostendunt rationes secundo inductae. Si autem loquamur de mutatione *secundo* modo, scilicet quantum ad *statum* vel *bene esse*; sic etiam absque dubio planum est, quod liberum arbitrium alium habet *statum*[^8] et aliud complementum, quam haberet prius. — *Huic* autem mutationi non obviant rationes secundo inductae, sed solum *primae,* de qua erat quaestio in partem negativam terminata, scilicet quod liberum arbitrium per confirmationem, etsi alteretur, non tamen fit aliud.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod vertibilitas est libero arbitrio naturalis; dicendum, quod aliquid est naturale propter naturae *complementum,* utpote igni, quod tendat sursum; aliquid naturale propter naturae *defectum,* sicut igni posse extingui. Sic libero arbitrio est aliquid naturale propter naturae *complementum,* ut posse in bonum; aliquid propter naturae *defectum,* ut posse verti in malum. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquid mutatur secundum substantiam, quando perdit illud quod habet per naturam; dicendum, quod etsi hoc possit habere veritatem in eo naturali, quod consequitur *complementum,* non tamen est verum in eo quod consequitur *defectum;* et tale quid est vertibilitas. Sicut enim dicit Anselmus[^9], « *posse peccare* non est libertas nec pars libertatis ».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de oppositione differentiarum, dicendum, quod sicut *mortale* et *immortale* dupliciter possunt comparari ad substantiam viventem, sic *mutabile* et *immutabile* ad libertatem. Si enim mortale et immortale utrumque sit per *naturam,* sic dicunt differentias oppositas, essentialiter diversificantes supposita. Si autem mortale sit per naturam, immortale per gratiam auferentem defectum naturae; sic non sunt differentiae oppositae, sed sunt compossibiles; vel saltem, quod est sub una potest esse sub altera, sola alteritate[^10] quantum ad *bene esse* sive complementum gratiae. Per hunc modum mutabile et immutabile per *naturam* est impossibile esse circa idem, manens idem, nec simul nec successive; sed mutabile per *naturam,* immutabile per *gratiam* non sic opponuntur nec essentialiter distinguuntur; et ideo non variant secundum substantiam liberum arbitrium[^11].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationales potestates sunt ad opposita; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non ad *omnia* opposita, sed ad *aliqua,* utpote ad *facere* aliquid et *non facere,* ad *incidere* tunicam et *non incidere,* ut dicit ipse Philosophus[^12]. Et hoc modo liberum arbitrium confirmatum ad
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opposita potest esse, et ideo naturalis potestas est sicut et ante. — Quod ergo obiicitur: non est in malum et bonum, ergo non est ad opposita; manifestum est, quod ista ratio est peccans *secundum consequens.*

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de diversitate obiecti, quod liberum arbitrium confirmatum non est in malum; dicendum, quod hoc veritatem habet de obiecto *per se;* malum autem non est obiectum per se liberi arbitrii, in quantum *liberum,* sed solum in quantum *deficiens.* Et ideo non sequitur, si non potest in malum, quod non sit liberum vel quod sit aliud; sed sequitur, quod non est deficiens, confirmante influentia manus Omnipotentis, quae nullo modo sinit deficere, quamvis liberum habeat *posse* et *velle.*

english:
### Article II. *On the immutability of free choice both in the confirmed and in the obstinate.*

Consequently it is asked, secondly, concerning the immutability of free choice both in the confirmed and in the obstinate. And granted that the angels in their [original] condition had free choice, just as man [does], three things are asked here.

The first is whether confirmation has changed the freedom of choice.

The second is whether obstinacy takes away the use of freedom.

The third is whether the one or the other lessens the dominion of freedom.

### Question I. *Whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice*

Concerning the first it is thus proceeded and asked, whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice, such that it is one [thing] before confirmation and another after. And that it [does], it seems.

1. Vertibility [changeableness] is present in created free choice by nature[^1], therefore that which takes away vertibility from free choice changes and alters its nature; but confirmation takes this away from free choice: therefore it changes and alters [it].

2. Likewise, nothing one and the same, remaining the same, can participate in opposite differences[^2]; but *mutable* and *immutable* are opposite differences of being, as *mortal* and *immortal* [are differences] of the living thing: if therefore free choice before confirmation is mutable, after confirmation immutable: therefore it is one [thing] and another.

3. Likewise, "rational powers are toward opposites," as the Philosopher says[^3]: therefore when a power ceases to be toward opposites, it ceases to be rational; but after confirmation free choice ceases to be toward opposites: therefore it ceases to be a rational power. But no rational power can become non-rational while remaining the same: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, "powers are distinguished through acts, and acts through objects[^4]"; where therefore there are diverse objects, it is necessary that the powers too be diversified; but free choice before confirmation can [tend] toward evil,
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after confirmation it cannot: therefore it is one [thing] and another.

**On the contrary:** 1. Anselm, *On Free Choice*[^5], says that "free choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake"; but this power is not taken away in confirmation, but strengthened: therefore free choice is not changed.

2. Likewise, grace perfects and confirms nature; but nothing which perfects and completes another according to nature changes its nature: therefore grace, coming to free choice, does not change it[^6]. But confirmation is through grace: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that confirms another is preserving [it]; and nothing preserving is corrupting; and nothing changes anything unless it corrupts something, because there is no change without loss: therefore nothing confirming changes [anything]. But confirmation is so called because it confirms the free choice of the angel: therefore it does not change it.

4. Likewise, the grace of confirmation makes [one] to be free from misery in the angels, just as sanctifying grace makes [one] free from fault; but freedom from fault does not change free choice nor its freedom: therefore neither [does] freedom from misery: therefore neither [does] the grace of confirmation[^7].

### Conclusion

> *Free choice is not changed by confirmation as to substance, but only as to state.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the change of anything is twofold: in one way as to *substance* or essence, in another way as to *state*; or in other words: there is being-changed as to *first being,* and there is being-changed as to *well-being.* — If we speak of change in the *first* way, then without doubt it must be said that confirmation does not change free choice, since it perfects and preserves [it]; as the reasons adduced in the second place [the *Contra*] show. But if we speak of change in the *second* way, namely as to *state* or *well-being*; then likewise without doubt it is plain that free choice has another *state*[^8] and another completion than it would have had before. — But this change is not opposed by the reasons adduced in the second place, but only by the *first* [set], on which the question was determined toward the negative part, namely that free choice through confirmation, although it be altered, nevertheless does not become another [thing].

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that vertibility is natural to free choice; it must be said that something is natural on account of the *completion* of nature, as for fire, that it tend upward; something natural on account of the *defect* of nature, as for fire the being able to be extinguished. So in free choice there is something natural on account of the *completion* of nature, as the being able [to tend] toward good; something on account of the *defect* of nature, as the being able to be turned toward evil. — To that which is objected, that something is changed according to substance when it loses that which it has by nature; it must be said that, although this can have truth in that natural [feature] which follows upon *completion,* it is nevertheless not true in that which follows upon *defect*; and such a thing is vertibility. For as Anselm says[^9], "*to be able to sin* is not freedom nor a part of freedom."

2. To that which is objected concerning the opposition of differences, it must be said that, just as *mortal* and *immortal* can be compared to a living substance in two ways, so [can] *mutable* and *immutable* to freedom. For if mortal and immortal are each by *nature,* then they state opposite differences, essentially diversifying their supposits. But if mortal be by nature, [and] immortal by a grace taking away the defect of nature; then they are not opposite differences, but are compossible; or at least, that which is under the one can be under the other, by mere otherness[^10] as to *well-being* or the completion of grace. In this manner mutable and immutable by *nature* are impossible to be about the same [thing], remaining the same, neither simultaneously nor successively; but mutable by *nature,* [and] immutable by *grace,* are not so opposed nor essentially distinguished; and therefore they do not alter free choice according to substance[^11].

3. To that which is objected, that rational powers are toward opposites; it must be said that it is true; but not toward *all* opposites, but toward *some,* as toward *to do* something and *not to do,* toward *to cut* a tunic and *not to cut,* as the Philosopher himself says[^12]. And in this manner confirmed free choice can be toward
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opposites, and therefore [it] is a natural power as also before. — As for what is objected, then: it is not toward evil and good, therefore it is not toward opposites; it is manifest that this argument is fallacious *by [the fallacy of the] consequent.*

4. To that which is objected concerning the diversity of object, that confirmed free choice is not toward evil; it must be said that this has truth concerning the object *per se;* but evil is not the object per se of free choice, insofar as it is *free,* but only insofar as it is *deficient.* And therefore it does not follow, if it cannot [tend] toward evil, that it is not free or that it is another [thing]; but it follows that it is not deficient, the influence of the hand of the Omnipotent confirming [it], which in no way allows [it] to fail, although the free [will] has the *being-able* and the *willing.*

la: Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 27, ex quo etiam conceptus *vertibilitas* (τροπή) sumtus esse videtur. — Paulo inferius cod. bb *sed confirmatio aufert libero arbitrio vertibilitatem* pro *sed confirmatio hoc aufert libero arbitrio.*

en: Cf. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, ch. 27, from which also the concept *vertibilitas* (τροπή, "turning") seems to have been taken. — A little below codex bb [reads] *sed confirmatio aufert libero arbitrio vertibilitatem* for *sed confirmatio hoc aufert libero arbitrio.*

la: Nam ut ait Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia: *Universaliter omnis differentia addita alicui alteratum facit... quae vero propriissime, aliud.* Vide etiam Aristot., II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.), ubi dicit, quod « idem et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere », et quod « contrariorum contrariae causae »; I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 130. (c. 12.), ubi ait: *Dicere nihil prohibere, generatum quippiam esse incorruptibile... perimere est datorum aliquid.*

en: For as Porphyry says, *Isagoge* (On the Predicables), the chapter on Difference: "Universally every difference added to anything makes [it] altered... but those [differences which are] most properly [so called make it] another [thing]." See also Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 56 (ch. 10), where he says that "what is the same and behaves in the same way is by nature apt to do the same," and that "the causes of contraries are contrary"; *On the Heavens* I, text 130 (ch. 12), where he says: "To say that nothing prevents some generated thing from being incorruptible... is to do away with one of the things granted."

la: Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).

en: *Metaphysics* IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, ch. 2 and 5).

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (ch. 4).

la: Cap. 3. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. ut H aa bb *non totaliter tollitur* pro *non tollitur.*

en: Ch. 3. — A little below several manuscripts, such as H aa bb, [read] *non totaliter tollitur* for *non tollitur.*

la: Cod. aa *ergo gratia adveniens liberi arbitrii rationem non mutat.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *ergo gratia adveniens liberi arbitrii rationem non mutat.*

la: In hoc arg. supponitur ista a S. Bernardo, de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 3, allata distinctio libertatis a peccato, a miseria et a necessitate. — Cod. aa *nec libertatem tollit* pro *nec eius libertatem.*

en: In this argument is presupposed that distinction of freedom from sin, from misery, and from necessity, adduced by St. Bernard, *On Grace and Free Choice* ch. 3. — Codex aa [reads] *nec libertatem tollit* for *nec eius libertatem.*

la: In Vat. additur *nunc.*

en: In the Vatican edition *nunc* is added.

la: De Lib. Arb. c. 1, ubi textus originalis *potestas peccandi* pro *posse peccare.* — Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *Sic enim* pro *Sicut enim.*

en: *On Free Choice* ch. 1, where the original text [reads] *potestas peccandi* for *posse peccare.* — Not a few manuscripts with the first edition [read] *Sic enim* for *Sicut enim.*

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, ubi docet differentiam tripliciter accipi, scil. *communiter, proprie* et *propriissime. Communiter,* qua unum ab altero vel etiam a se ipso (ut Socrates a Platone et a se ipso, puero et sene facto) differt quocumque modo; *proprie,* quando unum ab altero differt inseparabili accidente, v. g. caecitate oculorum differt Socrates a Platone; *propriissime,* quando unum ab altero differt differentia specifica. Duae priores differentiae constituunt *alteritatem,* tertia vero *alietatem.*

en: Cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge* (On the Predicables), the chapter on Difference, where he teaches that difference is taken in three ways, namely *commonly, properly,* and *most properly. Commonly,* by which one [thing] differs from another or even from itself (as Socrates from Plato and from himself, made a boy and an old man) in any way whatever; *properly,* when one differs from another by an inseparable accident, e.g. by blindness of the eyes Socrates differs from Plato; *most properly,* when one differs from another by a specific difference. The two former differences constitute *otherness* (*alteritas*), but the third [constitutes] *otherhood* (*alietas*).

la: Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *variant substantiam liberi arbitrii.*

en: Some manuscripts with the first edition [read] *variant substantiam liberi arbitrii.*

la: Libr. I. Peri Herm. c. 7. (c. 9.), ubi tamen haec exempla in forma passiva *fieri, non fieri* etc. exprimuntur. — Cod. F post *non facere* addit *ad opposita, quae sunt in genere naturae, non in genere moris.* Paulo inferius Vat. *rationalis potestas* pro *naturalis potestas.*

en: *On Interpretation* (Peri Hermeneias) I, ch. 7 (ch. 9), where however these examples are expressed in the passive form *fieri, non fieri* (to be done, not to be done) etc. — Codex F after *non facere* adds *ad opposita, quae sunt in genere naturae, non in genere moris.* A little below the Vatican edition [reads] *rationalis potestas* for *naturalis potestas.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De libero arbitrio eiusque speciebus cfr. infra d. 25. per totam, praecipue dubia partis I. et II, d. 44. a. 3. q. 1; I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. 2; IV. Sent. d. 18. p. II. dub. 1; de novem gradibus voluntarii infra d. 41. dub. 3. — Notanda est etiam distinctio de usu liberi arbitrii quoad actum elicitum a potentia, et quoad actum elicitum a potentia et ordinatum ad *finem ultimum* (hic q. 2.), et altera de duplici immutabilitate (hic q. 2. ad 2.), nec non de dominio, quod opponitur servituti vel coactionis, vel subiectionis (hic q. 3.). De mala voluntate in omnibus damnatis agitur IV. Sent. d. 50. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** Supponit S. Doctor in hac quaestione, quod Angeli confirmati in gratia et adepti gloriam non possint peccare, de quo alii commentatores plerumque explicite tractant et simul hanc nostram et duas seqq. qq. absolvunt. Omnes in hoc conveniunt, quod potentia serviendi peccato (sive indifferentia contrarietatis, qua voluntas possit deficere a fine et ferri ad malum) non est essentialis libertati, sed est potius eius defectus; quo defectu sublato, non minuitur libertas, sed magis perficitur. De ratione autem intrinseca, quare sancti Angeli sint impeccabiles, aliter sentit S. Thomas, aliter Scotus et ex parte etiam Henr. Gand., de quo vide hic a. 1. q. 1.

**III.** Solut. ad 3. illustratur iis quae docentur III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1: « Determinatio potentiae ad unum potest esse dupliciter, videlicet per necessitatem naturae et per confirmationem gratiae. Si sit per necessitatem naturae, tunc tollit arbitrii libertatem, ac per hoc tollit dignitatem meriti. Si autem sit determinatio per confirmationem gratiae, cum talis confirmatio gratiae simul stet cum libera voluntate, sic non tollit ab ipso opere bonitatem moris, cum sit voluntarium, ac per hoc nec qualitatem meriti. In Christo autem fuit liberum arbitrium determinatum ad unum non per necessitatem naturae, sed per confirmationem gratiae ».

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 29. m. 1. a. 3; q. 72. m. 3. a. 3. 4. et m. 4. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 6. n. 9. seqq.; Report. ibid. q. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 62. a. 8. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand. rem tangit Quodl. I. q. 17. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning free choice and its species cf. below, d. 25, throughout, especially the dubia of parts I and II; d. 44, a. 3, q. 1; I Sent. d. 6, q. 1; III Sent. d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, 2; IV Sent. d. 18, p. II, dub. 1; on the nine grades of the voluntary, below, d. 41, dub. 3. — There is also to be noted the distinction concerning the use of free choice as to an act elicited by the power, and as to an act elicited by the power and ordered to the *ultimate end* (here q. 2), and another concerning the twofold immutability (here q. 2, ad 2), as well as [the one] concerning dominion, which is opposed to servitude either of coercion or of subjection (here q. 3). Of evil will in all the damned it is treated [in] IV Sent. d. 50, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

**II.** The Holy Doctor supposes in this question that the angels confirmed in grace and having attained glory cannot sin, concerning which the other commentators for the most part treat explicitly and at the same time resolve both this our [question] and the two following questions. All agree in this, that the power of serving sin (or the indifference of contrariety, by which the will can fail from the end and be borne toward evil) is not essential to freedom, but is rather its defect; with which defect taken away, freedom is not lessened, but rather perfected. But concerning the intrinsic ground why the holy angels are impeccable, S. Thomas thinks one way, Scotus another, and in part also Henry of Ghent, concerning which see here a. 1, q. 1.

**III.** The solution to [objection] 3 is illustrated by the things taught [in] III Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1: "The determination of a power to one [thing] can be twofold, namely by the necessity of nature and by the confirmation of grace. If it be by the necessity of nature, then it takes away the freedom of choice, and by this takes away the dignity of merit. But if the determination be by the confirmation of grace, since such confirmation of grace stands together with a free will, then it does not take away from the work itself the goodness of morals, since it is voluntary, and by this neither the quality of merit. But in Christ there was free choice determined to one [thing] not by the necessity of nature, but by the confirmation of grace."

**IV.** Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 3; q. 72, m. 3, a. 3, 4, and m. 4. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 49, q. 6, n. 9 ff.; *Reportata* ibid. q. 5. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 62, a. 8. — B. Albert, on this and the following q. here a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1. — Henry of Ghent touches the matter [in] Quodl. I, q. 17. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO I** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars I** — *Utrum confirmatio mutet libertatis arbitrium* (whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice, such that it is one thing before and another after). Per the locked Vol II chunking convention, the short **ARTICULUS II opener** (*De liberi arbitrii immutabilitate tam in confirmatis, quam in obstinatis*) + the *Supposito… quaeruntur hic tria* sub-divisio (Primum *confirmatio mutaverit* / Secundum *obstinatio auferat usum* / Tertium *haec vel illa minuat dominium* — matching the s39 structure re-derivation: ARTICULUS II = 3 q) + `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 13351–13360) are folded into this q1 chunk — there is no standalone `d7-p1-a2-divisio` chunk. Structure: 4 *videtur* (vertibilitas-natural / opposite-differences / rational-powers-ad-opposita / powers-distinguished-by-objects) + **Contra** in 4 membra (Anselm *potestas servandi rectitudinem* / grace-perfects-not-changes / confirmans-conservans-not-corrumpens / libertas-a-miseria parallel) + *Conclusio* (blockquote) + a **duplex-mutatio Respondeo** (change *quantum ad substantiam* vs *quantum ad statum / primum esse vs bene esse* — confirmation changes only the *status*, not the substance; the *Contra* reasons answer the substance-sense, the *videtur* the state-sense) + a 4-member **Solutio oppositorum** (the *duplex naturale propter complementum / defectum* answer w/ Anselm *posse peccare non est libertas*; the *mortale/immortale per naturam vs per gratiam* answer w/ the *Notandum*; the *rationales potestates ad aliqua non omnia opposita* answer = *peccans secundum consequens*; the object-*per se* vs *in quantum deficiens* answer) + editorial **Scholion I–IV**.
- **`has_scholion: true`.** The editorial SCHOLION I–IV (parallel loci for free choice; the impeccability-of-confirmed-angels supposition with the S. Thomas/Scotus/Henr. Gand. divergence; the III Sent. *determinatio per necessitatem naturae vs per confirmationem gratiae* quotation illustrating Solut. ad 3; the doctor survey Alex. Hal./Scot./S. Thom./B. Albert./Petr. a Tar./Richard. a Med./Aegid. R./Henr. Gand./Durand./Dionys. Carth./Biel) carries **no numbered apparatus** — only inline parenthetical cross-refs (infra d. 25; d. 44 a. 3 q. 1; I Sent. d. 6 q. 1; III Sent. d. 12/d. 18; IV Sent. d. 18/d. 50; infra d. 41 dub. 3; hic q. 2/q. 3). Consistent with the Vol II editorial-scholion pattern (d7-a1-q1's SCHOLION I–II; d4/d5-a1-q1).
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum obstinatio tollat a daemonibus libertatis usum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum obstinatio tollat daemonibus libertatis usum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. « Liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Anselmus[^1], est potestas servandi rectitudinem », ergo servatio rectitudinis est usus liberi arbitrii; sed hanc non habent nec possunt habere Angeli obstinati: ergo etc.

2. Item, Anselmus[^2]: « Potestas peccandi nec est libertas nec pars libertatis », ergo peccare nullo modo est uti libertate; sed daemones per liberum arbitrium nunquam faciunt actum, qui non sit peccatum, nec possunt facere propter obstinationem in malo: ergo perdiderunt libertatis usum.

3. Item, libere velle et necessario velle sunt opposita; sed daemones necessario habent malam voluntatem: ergo necessario volunt malum, non ergo libere. Sed libere velle est usus libertatis: ergo amiserunt libertatis usum.

4. Item, phrenetici et insani non habent libertatis usum, quoniam plus in eis regnat appetitus phantasticus quam rationalis; sed « in daemonibus est furor irrationalis, amens concupiscentia, phantasia proterva », sicut dicit Dionysius[^3]: ergo videtur, quod amiserunt usum liberi arbitrii.

5. Item, bestiae non habent usum liberi arbitrii, quia moventur secundum impetum[^4]: sed diabolus maiori impetu movetur ad malefaciendum, quam bestia: ergo non habet libertatis usum. Quod autem maiori impetu moveatur, videtur. In libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^5] dicit Augustinus: « Videmus ferocissimas bestias timore poenarum a maximis voluptatibus abstrahi »; sed diabolus timore poenae non dimittit superbire: ergo maiori impetu fertur in malum.

**Contra:** 1. In quocumque est usus rationis et appetitus, est usus liberi arbitrii; sed in daemonibus est usus rationis, quia conferunt et disponunt: ergo etc.

2. Item, ei qui non habet usum liberi arbitrii
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non imputatur aliquid quod faciat; sed daemonibus obstinatis mala, quae faciunt, imputantur: ergo habent usum.

3. Item, potentia incorruptibilis non alligata organo semper est in suo actu et usu; sed liberum arbitrium in daemonibus est huiusmodi: ergo nullo modo potest impediri a suo usu.

4. Item, nihil quod causatur ab usu liberi arbitrii et sine illo non potest causari, aufert liberi arbitrii usum; sed obstinatio est huiusmodi: ergo obstinatio non aufert liberi arbitrii usum. *Prima* patet per se, quia effectus proprius non destruit causam; *secunda* patet, quia obstinatio est a mala voluntate.

5. Item, *per quae quis peccat, debet puniri*[^6]; sed daemon libero arbitrio peccavit: ergo in ipso debet puniri; ergo daemon habet liberum arbitrium; et constat, quod ipsum non est otiosum: ergo habet aliquem usum.

### Conclusio

> *Obstinatio daemonibus non omnem usum liberi arbitrii aufert, sed tantum actum ordinatum in finem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod etsi multis modis dicatur usus, sicut habitum est in primo libro[^7], tamen quantum ad praesens sufficit, quod usus alicuius potentiae dicitur dupliciter: uno modo *actus elicitus a potentia,* alio modo *actus elicitus a potentia ad eum finem, ad quem est.* Primo modo dicendo, usus liberi arbitrii est libere velle sive eligere. Secundo modo, usus liberi arbitrii est rectitudinem servare, quoniam ad illam est. Dicendum est igitur, quod obstinatio daemonibus non aufert usum primo modo, quia libere volunt quod volunt; sed usum secundo modo sic, quia eorum potentia, etsi in actum exeat, non tamen in actum ordinatum in finem. Rationes autem probantes, quod daemones habent usum liberi arbitrii, procedunt de usu secundum primam viam; unde concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur ad oppositum de Anselmo, dicendum, quod Anselmus definit liberum arbitrium per actum ordinatum in finem, qui est servare rectitudinem, et ita quantum ad usum secundo modo dictum, et hunc amittunt daemones obstinati.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potestas peccandi non est libertas nec pars libertatis; dicendum, quod verum est; nunquam tamen est sine libertate, sicut nec peccare est sine usu libertatis sive liberae voluntatis. Omnis enim qui peccat, libere vult. Et ideo continuatio peccati usum liberi arbitrii non excludit, sed includit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libere velle et necessario velle opponuntur; dicendum, quod duplex est necessitas: quaedam a causa *extrinseca,* utpote necessitas coactionis, et haec opponitur ei quod est libere velle; quaedam vero est a dispositione *intrinseca,* et haec non opponitur, immo stat simul cum libertate[^8]; talis est in libero arbitrio daemonum, quod ita conglutinavit sibi malum, ut nullo modo velit ab eo separari.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de phreneticis, dicendum, quod phrenetici sic habent usum phantasiae, quod *absorbetur* usus rationis, et magis aguntur, quam agant[^9]; daemon autem sic habet phantasiam protervam, quod usus et actus rationis *non excluditur.* Illa enim protervitas potius est a libero arbitrio, quam sit ab infirmitate naturae, sicut ponimus in phrenetico.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bestiis, quod abstrahuntur, ergo minori impetu moventur; dicendum, quod illud impetu movetur, quod non habet retrahens. Habere autem retrahens est dupliciter, scilicet *intra* et *extra*; impetus autem, qui magis repugnat libero arbitrio, est illud quod excludit retinaculum *interius,* non quod excludit *exterius.* Quoniam igitur impetus bestiae excludit retinaculum *intra,* quamvis possit retrahi per illud quod est *extra*; ideo non habet liberum arbitrium. Daemon autem habet potentiam *interiorem,* per quam sine aliquo exteriori repellente potest retrahi, et quae a nullo extrinseco potest superari; et ideo impetus daemonum in malum libero arbitrio non repugnat, sed consonat; et sic patet illud.
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english:
### Question II. *Whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom*

Secondly it is asked whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom. And that it [does], it seems.

1. "Free choice, as Anselm says[^1], is the power of preserving rectitude," therefore the preserving of rectitude is the use of free choice; but this the obstinate angels do not have nor can have: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Anselm[^2]: "The power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom," therefore to sin is in no way to use freedom; but the demons through free choice never do an act which is not sin, nor can they do [otherwise] on account of obstinacy in evil: therefore they have lost the use of freedom.

3. Likewise, to will freely and to will necessarily are opposites; but the demons necessarily have an evil will: therefore they necessarily will evil, therefore not freely. But to will freely is the use of freedom: therefore they have lost the use of freedom.

4. Likewise, the frenzied and the insane do not have the use of freedom, since in them the phantastic appetite reigns more than the rational; but "in the demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, wanton phantasy," as Dionysius says[^3]: therefore it seems that they have lost the use of free choice.

5. Likewise, beasts do not have the use of free choice, because they are moved according to impulse[^4]: but the devil is moved by a greater impulse to do evil than a beast: therefore he does not have the use of freedom. And that he is moved by a greater impulse, [thus] it seems. In the book of *Eighty-three Questions*[^5] Augustine says: "We see most ferocious beasts drawn away from the greatest pleasures by fear of punishments"; but the devil by fear of punishment does not give up being proud: therefore he is borne into evil by a greater impulse.

**On the contrary:** 1. In whatever there is use of reason and of appetite, there is use of free choice; but in the demons there is use of reason, because they confer and dispose [things]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, to him who does not have the use of free choice
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nothing that he does is imputed; but to the obstinate demons the evils which they do are imputed: therefore they have the use [of it].

3. Likewise, an incorruptible power not bound to an organ is always in its act and use; but free choice in the demons is of this kind: therefore it can in no way be impeded from its use.

4. Likewise, nothing that is caused by the use of free choice and cannot be caused without it takes away the use of free choice; but obstinacy is of this kind: therefore obstinacy does not take away the use of free choice. The *first* [premise] is evident of itself, because a proper effect does not destroy its cause; the *second* is evident, because obstinacy is from an evil will.

5. Likewise, *by the things by which one sins, one ought to be punished*[^6]; but the demon sinned by free choice: therefore he ought to be punished in it; therefore the demon has free choice; and it is established that it is not idle: therefore it has some use.

### Conclusion

> *Obstinacy does not take from demons every use of free choice, but only the act ordered to the end.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, although "use" is said in many ways, as was treated in the first book[^7], nevertheless for the present it suffices that the use of any power is said in two ways: in one way, *an act elicited by the power,* in another way, *an act elicited by the power toward the end for which it is.* Speaking in the first way, the use of free choice is to will or choose freely. In the second way, the use of free choice is to preserve rectitude, since it is for that. It must therefore be said that obstinacy does not take from demons the use in the first way, because they freely will what they will; but the use in the second way, thus [it does], because their power, although it goes forth into act, nevertheless [does] not into an act ordered to the end. But the reasons proving that the demons have the use of free choice proceed concerning use according to the first way; whence they are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected on the opposite side concerning Anselm, it must be said that Anselm defines free choice through the act ordered to the end, which is to preserve rectitude, and so as to use in the second way said, and this the obstinate demons lose.

2. To that which is objected, that the power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom; it must be said that it is true; nevertheless it is never without freedom, just as neither is to sin without the use of freedom or of a free will. For everyone who sins, wills freely. And therefore the continuation of sin does not exclude the use of free choice, but includes [it].

3. To that which is objected, that to will freely and to will necessarily are opposed; it must be said that necessity is twofold: one [kind is] from an *extrinsic* cause, as the necessity of coercion, and this is opposed to that which is to will freely; but another is from an *intrinsic* disposition, and this is not opposed, but rather stands together with freedom[^8]; such [a necessity] is in the free choice of the demons, which has so glued evil to itself that it in no way wills to be separated from it.

4. To that which is objected concerning the frenzied, it must be said that the frenzied so have the use of phantasy that the use of reason is *absorbed,* and they are more acted-upon than they act[^9]; but the demon so has a wanton phantasy that the use and act of reason is *not excluded.* For that wantonness is rather from free choice than from an infirmity of nature, as we posit in the frenzied [man].

5. To that which is objected concerning beasts, that they are drawn away, therefore they are moved by a lesser impulse; it must be said that that is moved by impulse which has nothing drawing [it] back. But to have something drawing back is twofold, namely *within* and *without*; and the impulse which more opposes free choice is that which excludes the *interior* restraint, not that which excludes the *exterior.* Since therefore the impulse of a beast excludes the restraint *within,* although it can be drawn back by that which is *without*; therefore it does not have free choice. But the demon has an *interior* power, through which, without anything exterior repelling, it can be drawn back, and which can be overcome by nothing extrinsic; and therefore the impulse of the demons toward evil does not oppose free choice, but is consonant [with it]; and so that [point] is evident.
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la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3.

en: *Dialogue On Free Choice* ch. 3.

la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1.

en: *Dialogue On Free Choice* ch. 1.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23.

en: *On the Divine Names* ch. 4, § 23.

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. et 27, ostendens, quod in brutis non sit voluntas nec libertas, utitur his verbis ὁρμή et ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν i. e. impulsus sive impetus — impelluntur ad actionem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 785, nota 2.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, ch. 22 and 27, showing that in brutes there is no will nor freedom, uses these words ὁρμή and ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν, i.e. impulse or drive — they are impelled to action. Cf. tom. I, p. 785, note 2.

la: Quaest. 36. n. 1; Videmus etiam, immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum metu.

en: Question 36, n. 1: "We see also that the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pains."

la: Sap. 11, 17: Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur.

en: Wisdom 11, 17: "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also is he tormented."

la: Dist. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius post «uno modo» codd. L O prosequuntur: *est actus naturalis operatio debita cuique rei, et secundum hoc dicitur: cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum est. Alio modo* etc. Ed. 1 cum cod. cc legit: *uno modo dicitur usus operatio rei naturalis; alio modo... ad quem est vel in actum ordinatum in finem. Primo modo* etc.

en: Dist. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — A little below, after "uno modo" codices L O continue: *est actus naturalis operatio debita cuique rei, et secundum hoc dicitur: cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum est. Alio modo* etc. The first edition with codex cc reads: *uno modo dicitur usus operatio rei naturalis; alio modo... ad quem est vel in actum ordinatum in finem. Primo modo* etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. et I. Magn. Moral. c. 13. seq. (c. 14. seq.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 1, and *Magna Moralia* I, ch. 13 ff. (ch. 14 ff.).

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 27. ad insinuandam differentiam hominis, qui libertate praeditus est, et brutorum, utitur hac oppositione: "Ἄλογα ἄγονται μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἤπερ ἄγουσι... ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸς ὤν, ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται" i. e. Bruta aguntur magis a natura, quam agant... Homo vero, cum sit rationis particeps, ducit potius naturam, quam ab ea ducatur. Cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. et de Motu animal. c. 4. seq. (c. 7.).

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, ch. 27, to indicate the difference between man, who is endowed with freedom, and brutes, uses this opposition: "Ἄλογα ἄγονται μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἤπερ ἄγουσι... ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸς ὤν, ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται," i.e. Brutes are led by nature more than they lead... but man, since he is a participant of reason, leads nature rather than is led by it. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, and *On the Motion of Animals* ch. 4 ff. (ch. 7). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Alii plurimi commentatores hanc et seq. quaest. tantum breviter tangunt in praecedenti quaest., et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 5; explicite autem de hac nullus et de sequenti pauci tractant, scil. D. Albert., hic a. 2. 3; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. (tantum quoad confirmationem in bono).

**II.** Verba in quaest. 2. ad 3: « Quaedam (necessitas) vero est a dispositione intrinseca, et haec non opponitur, immo stat simul cum libertate », non sunt intelligenda in eo sensu, quod sola violentia, quae procedit ab extrinseco, opponatur libero arbitrio, quatenus ad merendum et demerendum requiritur. Contrarium iam ex solut. ad 5. sequitur; et alibi S. Doctor apertissime docet, ad actum liberum et moralem praeter libertatem a coactione requiri libertatem a necessitate sive libertatem indifferentiae. Ita infra d. 25. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. ait: « Non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus, quo vis motiva movet se ipsam », quam sententiam clarius in toto illo articulo, praesertim q. 3. explanat (cfr. etiam infra d. 24. p. I. dub. 3. et p. II. a. 1. q. 1, d. 26. q. 6, nec non schol. ad praeced. quaest. n. III.). Ille autem modus loquendi, quo utitur hic S. Bonav., apud antiquos Scholasticos passim occurrit, et apud ipsum S. Thomam, qui S. I. q. 82. a. 1. ad 1. dicit: « Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis »; quae verba apte explicantur a Gotti (Theol. scholast. t. II. tr. 2. q. 2. dub. 2. § 2.) ex ipsius S. Thomae doctrina (de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. ad 2.). Hoc enim loco distinguitur libertas *voluntatis,* quae significat *velle* respectu ordinis ad finem et non requirit nisi spontaneitatem et libentiam, a libertate *arbitrii,* quae convenit voluntati in ordine ad eligenda media et exigit nedum spontaneitatem, sed etiam *indifferentiam* ad volendum, vel non volendum. — Notae sunt propositiones Baii a S. Pio V. aliisque Sum. Pontificibus damnatae, quarum 39. est: « Quod voluntarie fit, etiamsi necessario fiat, libere tamen fit »; et 66. atque 67: « Sola violentia repugnat libertati hominis naturali ». « Homo peccat etiam damnabiliter in eo quod necessario facit ». Item damnata est ab Innocentio X. propositio 3. Iansenii: « Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione ».

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Very many other commentators touch this and the following question only briefly in the preceding question, and Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 72, m. 5; but no one [treats] of this explicitly, and few of the following, namely D. Albert, here a. 2, 3; S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 3, 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2 (only as to confirmation in good).

**II.** The words in question 2, ad 3: "But a certain (necessity) is from an intrinsic disposition, and this is not opposed, but rather stands together with freedom," are not to be understood in the sense that only violence, which proceeds from outside, is opposed to free choice, insofar as it is required for meriting and demeriting. The contrary already follows from the solution to [objection] 5; and elsewhere the Holy Doctor most plainly teaches that for a free and moral act, besides freedom from coercion, there is required freedom from necessity, or freedom of indifference. So below, d. 25, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, he says: "Not any motion from within makes a power free, but that motion by which the motive force moves itself," which opinion he explains more clearly in that whole article, especially q. 3 (cf. also below, d. 24, p. I, dub. 3, and p. II, a. 1, q. 1; d. 26, q. 6; as well as the scholion to the preceding question, n. III). But that manner of speaking which the Holy Doctor uses here occurs everywhere among the ancient Scholastics, and in St. Thomas himself, who, S. I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1, says: "But natural necessity does not take away the freedom of the will"; which words are aptly explained by Gotti (*Theologia scholastica* t. II, tr. 2, q. 2, dub. 2, § 2) from the doctrine of St. Thomas himself (*de Veritate* q. 24, a. 1, ad 2). For in this place is distinguished the freedom *of the will,* which signifies *to will* with respect to the order to the end and requires only spontaneity and willingness, from the freedom *of choice,* which belongs to the will in the order to choosing means and demands not only spontaneity but also *indifference* to willing or not willing. — Well known are the propositions of Baius condemned by St. Pius V and the other Supreme Pontiffs, of which the 39th is: "What is done voluntarily, even if it be done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely"; and the 66th and 67th: "Only violence is repugnant to the natural freedom of man." "Man sins even damnably in that which he does necessarily." Likewise there was condemned by Innocent X the 3rd proposition of Jansenius: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is not required in man freedom from necessity, but freedom from coercion suffices."

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO II** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars I** — *Utrum obstinatio tollat a daemonibus libertatis usum* (whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom). Structure: a *Secundo quaeritur* opener + 5 *videtur* (Anselm *potestas servandi rectitudinem* / Anselm *potestas peccandi non est libertas* / *libere velle vs necessario velle* opposed / the phrenetici-and-insani simile via Dionysius / the bestiae-moved-by-impetus simile via Damascene + Augustine *Octoginta trium Quaest.*) + **Contra** in 5 membra (usus rationis+appetitus / imputability / incorruptible-power-always-in-act / effect-does-not-destroy-cause / *per quae quis peccat debet puniri*) + *Conclusio* (blockquote) + a **duplex-usus Respondeo** (use = *actus elicitus a potentia* vs *actus elicitus a potentia ad finem*; obstinacy removes only the second — the *videtur* prove use in the first sense and are granted) + a 5-member **Solutio oppositorum** (Anselm defines per the second sense; *continuatio peccati* includes not excludes use; *duplex necessitas* a causa extrinseca/coactionis vs a dispositione intrinseca; the phrenetici *absorbetur usus rationis* vs daemon *non excluditur*; the *retinaculum intra/extra* answer on beasts) + editorial **Scholion I–II**.
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum confirmatio in bono, vel obstinatio in malo diminuat libertatis dominium.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum confirmatio, vel obstinatio diminuat libertatis dominium. Et quod confirmatio minuat, videtur.

1. Liberior est potentia et magis suorum actuum domina, quae omnino nulli subiacet necessitati, quam quae subest; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum necessitatem habet ad benefaciendum, non confirmatum vero minime: ergo confirmatio diminuit dominium.

2. Item, quanto potentia amplior, tanto liberior; sed confirmatio arctat liberum arbitrium ad bonum, ante vero erat indifferens ad bonum et ad malum: ergo videtur, quod liberius erat ante et magis dominans actuum.

3. Item, potentia, quae exit in actum ex se ipsa, magis est suorum actuum domina, quam quae exit mediante alieno beneficio sive gratia; sed liberum arbitrium non confirmatum ex se ipso faciebat quod volebat, confirmatum autem quod facit implet per gratiam; ergo liberius erat ante confirmationem quam post.

Item, hoc ipsum videtur de *obstinatione*:

1. Primo per Anselmum[^1], qui dicit, quod « potentia peccandi, addita libero arbitrio, ipsum diminuit », ergo multo magis actus peccandi, ergo maxime necessitas peccandi; sed hoc est in obstinatione: ergo etc.

2. Item, liberius est aliquid, quod nulli subiacet servituti, quam quod subiacet; sed liberum arbitrium in obstinatis subiacet servituti peccati, ante vero minime: ergo etc.

3. Item, liberior est potentia, quanto facilius exit in actum, ad quem est, et tanto minus libera, quanto difficilior est ad illud; sed difficillimum est Angelo obstinato velle bonum: ergo videtur, quod in eis[^2] liberum arbitrium maxime sit diminutum.

**Contra:** Quod obstinatio non diminuat, videtur.

4. Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*[^3]: « Data, inquit, ipsis Angelis dona nequaquam mutata dicimus, sed sunt integra et splendidissima »; ergo si liberum arbitrium fuit eis datum naturaliter, ergo non est diminutum.

5. Item, liberum arbitrium dicitur liberum, quia non potest cogi; ergo si libertas diminuitur, aliqua coactio introducitur; sed liberum arbitrium obstinati nullo modo potest cogi: ergo nullo modo potest diminui.

6. Item, si diminuitur per obstinationem et peccatum, ergo cum non sit infinitum, omnino poterit auferri: ergo videtur, quod aliquando perdant daemones liberum arbitrium, quod est supra improbatum[^4].

Quod autem confirmatio non diminuat, sed augeat, videtur:

4. Per Anselmum in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^5], qui sic dicit: « Quod habet quod decet et expedit nec potest illud perdere, liberius est, quam quod potest »; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum non potest perdere iustitiam et rectitudinem, quam expedit et decet habere, non confirmatum potest: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto magis aliquid assimilatur illi quod est liberum in fine libertatis[^6], tanto liberius est; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum magis as-
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similatur Deo et eius arbitrio quam non confirmatum: ergo est liberius.

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae habet dispositionem elevantem et reddentem facilem ad illud ad quod est, liberior est, quam illa quae caret[^7]; sed liberum arbitrium confirmatum sic se habet respectu non confirmati: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Dominium libertatis, quod opponitur servituti coactionis, nec confirmatione nec obstinatione minuitur; dominium autem, quod opponitur servituti subiectionis, confirmatione augetur, obstinatione minuitur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de diminutione dominii libertatis arbitrii, distinguendum est in dominio. Quoddam enim est dominium, quod opponitur *coactioni*; quoddam, quod opponitur *subiectioni.* Si autem loquamur de dominio libertatis, quod opponitur servituti *coactionis,* sic privat coactionem; et hoc dominium est essentiale libero arbitrio, et ideo non minuitur nec augetur. Rursus, quia omnem privat coactionem, aequaliter est in omnibus tam bonis quam malis, tam Creatore quam creaturis, sicut dicit Bernardus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^8], ubi dicit, quod « manet libertas voluntatis tam integra in malis quam in bonis, tam in Creatore quam in creaturis ». — Si autem dicatur dominium, quod opponitur servituti *subiectionis,* sic recipit magis et minus nec inest aequaliter omnibus. Nam in *miseris* est subiectum miseriae, in *beatis* liberum; in *malis* subiectum culpae, in *bonis* liberum, et tanto liberius, quanto magis distant a malo; in *creaturis* subiectum mandatis, in *Deo* vero supra omne mandatum. Et hoc modo accipiendo dominium, per confirmationem augetur, quae magis elongat a subiectione culpae et miseriae, et per obstinationem minuitur, quae cervicem submittit utrique[^9]. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quod obstinatio minuit, et confirmatio auget, quia hac via procedunt, et ideo verum concludunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod confirmatio diminuit propter necessitatem; dicendum, quod necessitas *immutabilitatis ad bonum* nullo modo repugnat libero arbitrio, nec in quantum liberum a *coactione,* quia coactio est ab extrinseco; nec in quantum liberum a *culpa,* vel *miseria,* et ideo non diminuit. Illa ergo propositio solum habet veritatem de necessitate *coactionis,* vel *pronitatis ad malum.*

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amplitudine, dicendum, quod potentiam ampliari est dupliciter: aut respectu eorum quae *posse est posse,* et de talibus verum est; aut respectu eorum quae *posse non est posse, sed deficere*; et respectu talium non est verum, et tale est malum. Unde divina potentia, quae est amplissima et liberrima, non est respectu mali[^10].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beneficio et gratia, dicendum, quod illud verum est, si aeque bene per se posset, sicut potest cum gratia; sed hoc non est verum, quia illud beneficium gratiae elevat potentiam ad ea, ad quae erat et per se[^11] attingere non poterat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obstinatio non minuit, quia integra manent data; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quantum ad *substantiam* naturalium, non quantum ad *habilitates,* ut infra[^12] melius videbitur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libertas est dominium propter privationem coactionis; dicendum, quod quantum ad illud non diminuitur, sicut praedictum est[^13].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totaliter posset tolli libertas; dicendum, quod verum est de ea quae diminuitur, qualis est libertas a *culpa* et *miseria*; de alia vero non est verum; et sic patet illud.

Patent etiam omnia litteralia per haec dicta[^14].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether confirmation in good, or obstinacy in evil, lessens the dominion of freedom*

Thirdly it is asked whether confirmation, or obstinacy, lessens the dominion of freedom. And that confirmation lessens [it], it seems.

1. A power is more free and more the mistress of its own acts which is subject to no necessity at all, than [one] which is subject [to it]; but confirmed free choice has a necessity to doing good, whereas the non-confirmed [has it] not at all: therefore confirmation lessens dominion.

2. Likewise, the ampler a power, the more free; but confirmation constricts free choice to good, whereas before it was indifferent to good and to evil: therefore it seems that it was more free before and more the master of [its] acts.

3. Likewise, a power which goes forth into act of itself is more the mistress of its own acts than [one] which goes forth by means of another's benefit or grace; but non-confirmed free choice of itself did what it willed, whereas confirmed [free choice] fulfils what it does through grace; therefore it was more free before confirmation than after.

Likewise, this same [thing] is seen concerning *obstinacy*:

1. First, through Anselm[^1], who says that "the power of sinning, added to free choice, lessens it," therefore much more the act of sinning, therefore most of all the necessity of sinning; but this is [present] in obstinacy: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a thing is more free which is subject to no servitude, than [one] which is subject; but free choice in the obstinate is subject to the servitude of sin, whereas before [it was] not at all: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, a power is more free the more easily it goes forth into the act for which it is, and so much the less free, the more difficult it is toward it; but it is most difficult for an obstinate angel to will good: therefore it seems that in them[^2] free choice is most of all lessened.

**On the contrary:** That obstinacy does not lessen [it], it seems.

4. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^3]: "The gifts given to the angels themselves," he says, "we say are by no means changed, but are entire and most splendid"; therefore if free choice was given to them naturally, then it is not lessened.

5. Likewise, free choice is called free because it cannot be coerced; therefore if freedom is lessened, some coercion is introduced; but the free choice of the obstinate can in no way be coerced: therefore it can in no way be lessened.

6. Likewise, if it is lessened through obstinacy and sin, then since it is not infinite, it could be wholly taken away: therefore it seems that the demons would at some time lose free choice, which was disproved above[^4].

But that confirmation does not lessen [it], but increases [it], it seems:

4. Through Anselm in the book *On Free Choice*[^5], who says thus: "That which has what is fitting and expedient and cannot lose it is more free than that which can [lose it]"; but confirmed free choice cannot lose the justice and rectitude which it is expedient and fitting to have, [whereas] non-confirmed [free choice] can: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the more a thing is assimilated to that which is free at the term of freedom[^6], the more free it is; but confirmed free choice is more as-
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similated to God and His choice than non-confirmed [free choice]: therefore it is more free.

6. Likewise, every power which has a disposition elevating [it] and rendering [it] easy toward that for which it is, is more free than [one] which lacks [it][^7]; but confirmed free choice is so disposed with respect to the non-confirmed: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *The dominion of freedom which is opposed to the servitude of coercion is lessened neither by confirmation nor by obstinacy; but the dominion which is opposed to the servitude of subjection is increased by confirmation, lessened by obstinacy.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked concerning the lessening of the dominion of the freedom of choice, a distinction must be made in "dominion." For one [kind] is the dominion which is opposed to *coercion*; another, [the one] which is opposed to *subjection.* Now if we speak of the dominion of freedom which is opposed to the servitude of *coercion,* thus it excludes coercion; and this dominion is essential to free choice, and therefore is neither lessened nor increased. Again, since it excludes all coercion, it is equally in all, both good and evil, both in the Creator and in creatures, as Bernard says in the book *On Free Choice*[^8], where he says that "the freedom of the will remains as entire in the evil as in the good, as [much] in the Creator as in creatures." — But if "dominion" be taken [as] that which is opposed to the servitude of *subjection,* thus it admits of more and less and is not equally present in all. For in the *miserable* it is subject to misery, in the *blessed* free; in the *evil* subject to fault, in the *good* free, and so much the more free, the more they are distant from evil; in *creatures* subject to commands, but in *God* above every command. And taking "dominion" in this manner, by confirmation it is increased, which more removes [one] from the subjection of fault and misery, and by obstinacy it is lessened, which submits the neck to both[^9]. — The reasons, therefore, that obstinacy lessens and confirmation increases [it] are to be granted, because they proceed by this way, and therefore conclude truly.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that confirmation lessens [it] on account of necessity; it must be said that the necessity *of immutability toward good* in no way is repugnant to free choice, neither insofar as it is free from *coercion,* because coercion is from outside; nor insofar as it is free from *fault* or *misery,* and therefore it does not lessen [it]. That proposition, then, has truth only concerning the necessity *of coercion,* or *of proneness to evil.*

2. To that which is objected concerning amplitude, it must be said that for a power to be made ampler is twofold: either with respect to those things of which *to be able is [really] to be able,* and concerning such it is true; or with respect to those things of which *to be able is not [really] to be able, but to fail*; and with respect to such it is not true, and such is evil. Whence the divine power, which is most ample and most free, is not [a power] with respect to evil[^10].

3. To that which is objected concerning benefit and grace, it must be said that this is true, if it could [do] equally well of itself as it can with grace; but this is not true, because that benefit of grace elevates the power to those things to which it was [ordered] and of itself[^11] could not attain.

4. To that which is objected, that obstinacy does not lessen [it], because the gifts remain entire; it must be said that that is to be understood as to the *substance* of the natural [endowments], not as to the *aptitudes,* as will be seen better below[^12].

5. To that which is objected, that freedom is dominion on account of the privation of coercion; it must be said that as to that it is not lessened, as was said before[^13].

6. To that which is objected, that freedom could be wholly taken away; it must be said that this is true of that [freedom] which is lessened, such as freedom from *fault* and *misery*; but of the other it is not true; and so that [point] is evident.

The literal points too are all evident through these things said[^14].

---

la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1: *Potestas ergo peccandi, quae addita voluntati minuit eius libertatem* etc. — Circa finem arg. plures codd. ut F P Q aa *sed haec est* pro *sed hoc est.*

en: *Dialogue On Free Choice* ch. 1: "The power of sinning, therefore, which added to the will lessens its freedom" etc. — Near the end of the argument several manuscripts, such as F P Q aa, [read] *sed haec est* for *sed hoc est.*

la: Vat. *in eo.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *in eo.*

la: Cap. 4. § 23. Cfr. supra pag. 122, nota 8. — Paulo inferius post *fuit eis datum* non pauci codd. cum tribus primis edd. interserunt *ergo*; cod. aa *bene ergo naturale est.*

en: Ch. 4, § 23. Cf. above, p. 122, note 8. — A little below, after *fuit eis datum* not a few manuscripts with the first three editions insert *ergo*; codex aa [reads] *bene ergo naturale est.*

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Cap. 1: *Qui sic habet quod decet et quod expedit, ut hoc amittere non queat, liberior est, quam ille qui sic habet hoc ipsum, ut possit perdere.*

en: Ch. 1: "He who so has what is fitting and what is expedient that he cannot lose it is more free than he who so has this very thing that he can lose [it]."

la: Haec dictio respondet aliis similibus in libro de Causis, prop. 21. *in fine simplicitatis* et in Averrois Comment. super XII. Metaph. text. 39. *in fine nobilitatis.* Cfr. tom. I. pag. 638, nota 1. et pag. 806, nota 6. — Vat. substituit *infinitae libertatis.* Plures codd. *est liberrimum* pro *est liberum.*

en: This expression corresponds to other similar ones in the book *On Causes,* prop. 21, *in fine simplicitatis* (at the term of simplicity), and in Averroes' Commentary on *Metaphysics* XII, text 39, *in fine nobilitatis* (at the term of nobility). Cf. tom. I, p. 638, note 1, and p. 806, note 6. — The Vatican edition substitutes *infinitae libertatis.* Several manuscripts [read] *est liberrimum* for *est liberum.*

la: Nonnulli codd. supplent *illa dispositione.* Vat. *hac dispositione.*

en: Several manuscripts supply *illa dispositione.* The Vatican edition [reads] *hac dispositione.*

la: Cap. 4. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6.

en: Ch. 4, n. 9. Cf. above, p. 115, note 6.

la: Fusius haec monstrantur infra d. 25. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: These things are shown more fully below, d. 25, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 ff.

la: Sicut probatum est I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2.

en: As was proved [in] I Sent. d. 42, q. 2.

la: Cod. F cum edd. 2, 3 *ad quae per se,* omissis *erat et.* Cod. T *exit* pro *erat.*

en: Codex F with the 2nd and 3rd editions [reads] *ad quae per se,* with *erat et* omitted. Codex T [reads] *exit* for *erat.*

la: In secunda parte huius dist. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: In the second part of this distinction, a. 1, q. 1 ff.

la: In corp. quaest.

en: In the body of the question.

en: See the scholion of the preceding question. — As is evident from the last words, the Holy Doctor judged that here the *dubia circa litteram Magistri* (doubts concerning the text of the Master), which he was accustomed to set down in other distinctions, were not to be solved. ---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO III** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars I** — *Utrum confirmatio in bono, vel obstinatio in malo diminuat libertatis dominium* (whether confirmation in good, or obstinacy in evil, lessens the dominion of freedom). **This question CLOSES d.7 Pars I.** Structure: a *Tertio quaeritur* opener + a 3-fold *quod confirmatio minuat* set + a parallel 3-fold *hoc ipsum… de obstinatione* set + **Contra** *Quod obstinatio non diminuat* (3 membra, numbered 4–6) + a further *Quod autem confirmatio non diminuat, sed augeat* set (numbered 4–6) + *Conclusio* (blockquote) + a **duplex-dominium Respondeo** (dominion opposed to *coactio* — essential, neither lessened nor increased, equal in all per Bernard; vs dominion opposed to *subiectio* — admits more/less, increased by confirmation, lessened by obstinacy; the *Notandum* miseris/beatis–malis/bonis–creaturis/Deo scale) + a 6-member **Solutio oppositorum** + the closing *Patent etiam omnia litteralia per haec dicta* clause.
- **NO own scholion (`has_scholion: false`) AND NO d7-p1-dubia.** Both confirmed by the **terminal editorial note** — p.188 footer note ⁸ (this chunk's [^14], anchoring the closing *Patent etiam omnia litteralia per haec dicta⁸*): `Vide scholion praecedentis quaest. — Ut patet ex ultimis verbis, S. Doctor hoc loco dubia circa litteram Magistri, quae in aliis distinctionibus ponere consuevit, non esse solvenda iudicavit.` So (a) this q's scholion is the *preceding* question's (sibling-scholion, the `d5-a2-q2` / `d7-p1-a1-q3` pattern); (b) **there is deliberately no Pars I dubia** — Bonaventure judged the Pars I *dubia circa litteram Magistri* not to be solved. Read on the p.188 R-2 crop, not assumed. This matches the s39 structure re-derivation (d.7 Pars I = NO p1-dubia, raw 13716–13718).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 13612–13723) over the 450 dpi pp.187–188 column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 188 --dpi 450`; p.187 image+colcrops cached from the a2-q2 build; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {187,188}`), read **Left column top→bottom, then Right column**, body bands then footer band, reflowed column-by-column (not raw-line order). The Respondeo + Solutio + every page-footer are the cascade-shattered regions where the column-band PDF read is authoritative (the *Solutio 2 non est respectu mali⁴* / *Solutio 3 per se⁵* clauses were the worst-fragmented and were rebuilt off the p.188-R crops); the videtur running prose is clean OCR base. Editorial marginal glosses bleeding inline (*Ad oppositum, Fundamenta, Duplex dominium, Conclusio 1/2, Notandum, Solutio oppositorum*) trimmed per CLAUDE.md.
- **Cross-chunk footer — INCOMING a2-q2→a2-q3 at p.187 (RECEIVED clean, no backfill).** The committed `bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a2-q2` Notes document the OUTGOING side: a2-q2's last numbered apparatus is p.186 [^9]; its editorial SCHOLION I–II tail spans p.187 carrying **no** numbered apparatus; QUAESTIO III opens on p.187. So **all of p.187's footer is this chunk's** — ¹ `Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1: Potestas ergo peccandi…` → [^1] (obstinatio-set 1 *per Anselmum*), ² `Vat. in eo` → [^2] (obstinatio-set 3 *in eis*), ³ `Cap. 4. § 23. Cfr. supra pag. 122, nota 8…` → [^3] (Contra 4 *Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus*), ⁴ `Quaest. praeced.` → [^4] (Contra 6 *supra improbatum*), ⁵ `Cap. 1: Qui sic habet quod decet…` → [^5] (augeat-set 4 *Per Anselmum de Libero Arbitrio*), ⁶ `Haec dictio respondet aliis similibus in libro de Causis…` → [^6] (augeat-set 5 *liberum in fine libertatis*). Verified by lemma on the cached p.187 crops; `bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a2-q2` not modified, no backfill.
- **Cross-chunk footer — OUTGOING a2-q3→p2-divisio at the p.188/p.189 cross-pars boundary (CLEAN).** This chunk's last numbered apparatus is **p.188 [^14]** (the editorial NO-DUBIA note). a2-q3 ends at the foot of p.188; **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII** Pars II opens fresh on p.189 (raw 13724 — next chunk `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-divisio`). p.188 footer ¹–⁸ are wholly this chunk's [^7]–[^14]; p.189's footer is the Pars II divisio's. No backfill, clean cross-pars boundary.
- **Apparatus crosswalk:** p.187 ¹–⁶ → [^1]–[^6] (Anselm-Dialog.c.1 / Vat.-in-eo / Dionys.-Div.Nom.c.4 / Quaest.praeced. / Anselm-de-Lib.Arb.c.1 / the libro-de-Causis+Averroes *in fine simplicitatis/nobilitatis* note); p.188 ¹–⁸ → [^7]–[^14] (codd.-illa-dispositione / Bernard-de-Lib.Arb.c.4-n.9 / infra-d.25-p.II / I-Sent.-d.42-q.2 / cod.F-ad-quae-per-se / infra-secunda-parte-huius-dist / in-corp.-quaest / the **Vide scholion praecedentis quaest. + NO-DUBIA editorial note**).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 14 body superscripts + the 2 page-footers (p.187 ¹–⁶; p.188 ¹–⁸) verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops. Raw-OCR garbles silently corrected against the crops: `obstincUio`/`obstinalio` = *obstinatio*; `dominiim`/`dominium` confirmed; `confirmaiio` = *confirmatio*; the p.188 footer ² `pag. Ilo` = *pag. 115*; ³ truncated `infra d. 25. p. II. a.` resolved on the L-2 crop to *infra d. 25. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq.* The cascade-shattered duplex-dominium Respondeo + 6-member Solutio (p.188-L–R) reflowed entirely from the column-band crops, not raw-line order.