title: Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum enuntiabilia, quae semel Deus cognoscit, semper cognoscat.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Footnote numbering in the printed Quaracchi text restarts on every page; this chunk re-numbers continuously 1–28 across the four printed pages (738–741), in the order they are anchored in the body.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum enuntiabilia sive complexa[^1] quae Deus semel cognoscit, semper cognoscat vel sciat. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Deus non cognoscit enuntiabile nisi ratione veritatis[^5]; sed veritas enuntiabilis, quae semel fuit, semper fuit et est et erit: ergo enuntiabile, quod semel cognoscit, semper cognoscit. Probatio mediae: omnis veritas complexi fundatur supra rem incomplexam; sed eadem res primo est futura, postea praesens, deinde praeterita, et una et eadem:

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ergo una et eadem veritas est in ea secundum omnes hos modos. Sed necesse est, quod sit semper sub aliquo horum modorum: ergo etc.[^4]

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur alia ratione: quia quaecumque scit Deus scit immutabiliter[^2] — alioquin, cum scire Dei sit suum esse, si mutaretur suum scire, et esse[^6], quod est impossibile — sed omne quod habet immutabilitatem, habet sempiternitatem, quia, si desinit, mutatur: ergo quod Deus semel cognoscit semper cognoscit.

3. Item, quod scriptum est in illo libro deleri non potest; sed Deus cognoscit non aspiciendo extra, sed legendo in libro suae praescientiae: ergo quod semel cognoscit semper cognoscit. Prima patet, quia super illud Exodi trigesimo secundo[^7]: *Dele me de libro tuo* etc., Glossa: «*Securus hoc dicit, quia non delebitur*». Et idem dicit super Psalmum.

4. Item, quod desinit vel perditur aliquo desinente, de necessitate pendet ex illo; sed divina cognitio non pendet ex veritate creanda[^8]: ergo quamvis enuntiabile desinat esse verum, tamen Deus non desinit illud scire; et si hoc: ergo quod semel scit, et semper.

**Sed contra:**

1. Sicut praescire se habet respectu futuri, ut futurum est, sic scire respectu veri — si enim actu scitur, actu est verum — sed, sicut dicit Magister[^9], Deus desinit praescire rem, cum res de futuro fit praesens: ergo similiter desinit scire, cum de vero fit falsum.

2. Item, sicut divina acceptio respicit bonitatem, ita visio veritatem; sed Deus desinit hominem acceptare, cum perdit bonitatem: ergo desinit rem cognoscere[^3] sive enuntiabile, cum perdit veritatem.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile, quia, si quodcumque enuntiabile scivit, modo scit, et scivit, Christum esse moriturum, ergo et modo scit; sed quidquid scitur est verum[^10]: ergo Christum esse moriturum est verum, quod est contra fidem.

4. Item, si quidquid scivit, modo scit; sed aliquando scivit te non esse, cum non eras: ergo scit te non esse, et scit te esse, quia verum est: ergo scit simul duo contradictorie opposita, ergo duo contradictorie opposita sunt simul vera, quod falsum est et impossibile.

### Conclusio.

> *In quantum scire dicit nudum intelligere, quaecumque Deus semel scit semper scit; in quantum vero scire connotat veritatem in obiecto, ratione connotati, quod est variabile, Deus non quaecumque semel scit semper scit.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *scire* dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout reflectitur in se[^11]; et sic sensus est: iste scit hoc, id est, habet cognitionem de hoc; et hoc modo dicendum, quod *scire* nihil connotat a parte sciti actuale, nec veritatem nec praesentiam. Deus enim de omni enuntiatione habet perfectam cognitionem, utrum sit enuntiatio perfecta et congrua, utrum vera, et cetera similia. Alio modo *scire* dicitur, secundum quod est verbum *prohaereticum*[^12] et transit in actum extra, et sic connotat veritatem in obiecto; tunc ergo *scire* aliquod enuntiabile idem est quod scire, ipsum esse verum. Unde *scio te sedere*, hoc est dicere: non tantum habeo cognitionem de hoc, sed etiam cognosco, ipsum esse verum. — Primo modo *scire* importat *nudum*[^13] intelligere; secundo modo intelligere cum assensu.

Si ergo *scire* accipiatur primo modo, sic dico, quod quidquid est, et omne enuntiabile, et omne quod adhuc scivit, scit et habet cognitionem de illo, quia de omni eo quod est et quod potest esse, habet cognitionem. Nec sequitur: scit hoc, ergo est verum; immo est ibi consequens[^14]. — Si autem accipiatur *scire* secundo modo, prout connotat veritatem

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circa enuntiabile, sic fuerunt qui dicerent, quod desinit aliquod enuntiabile scire; quia[^15] quod enuntiabile, quod est verum, potest esse falsum.

Alii dixerunt contrarium, quia posuerunt, quod enuntiabile, quod semel est verum, semper est verum, et ita semper scitur. Et ut melius pateat, videnda est eorum positio[^16] et ratio positionis. Fuerunt qui dixerunt, quod *albus, alba, album*, cum sint tres voces et tres habeant modos significandi, tamen, quia eandem significationem important, sunt unum nomen. Per hunc modum dixerunt, quod unitas enuntiabilis[^17] accipienda est non ex parte vocis vel modi significandi, sed rei significatae; sed res est, quae primo est futura, deinde praesens, tertio praeterita: ergo enuntiare, rem hanc primo esse futuram, deinde praesentem, tertio praeteritam, non faciet diversitatem enuntiabilium, sed vocum. — Rursus, cum idem tempus sit primo futurum, deinde praesens, tertio praeteritum, tempus scilicet quod est mensura rei, quod *significatur* per orationem; quamvis *esse* vel *fuisse* vel *fore* consignificent tria tempora, ratione consignificati[^18] non diversificant enuntiabile, sed variatur solum a parte temporis significati. Unde si dicam semel: *Socrates currit hodie*, et cras dicam: *cucurrit*; cum hoc verbum det intelligere aliud tempus, et ita aliam actionem; enuntiabile non est idem, quantumcumque mutata significatione[^19]. Et quia, retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semper est verum, et non est idem, nisi cum eadem significatio retinetur, ideo dixerunt, quod illud quod semel est verum, semper est verum. Et ideo, cum Deus nihil obliviscatur, dicunt, quod omne enuntiabile, quod Deus scivit, scit. — Et respondent illi rationi: omne enuntiabile, quod scivit, scit; sed scivit te nasciturum[^20], vel te esse: ergo etc.; non debet inferri sic: ergo potest esse scit, te esse, sed sic: ergo scit, te fuisse. Aliter est ibi figura dictionis, quia procedit ab identitate in modo significandi ad identitatem rei. — Et hoc modo solvit Magister[^21]. Et ista fuit opinio Nominalium, qui sunt dicti Nominales, quia fundabant positionem suam super nominis unitatem.

Sed ista fuit positio contra Philosophum, qui improbam dicit in *Praedicamentis*[^22], quod eadem oratio primo est vera, postea falsa. Fuit etiam contra communem positionem. Fuit etiam contra veritatem. Et ratio huius est, quia nec bonum fundamentum habet, nec bonam adaptationem.

Primo enim, si quaeratur, utrum *albus, alba, no, i haie album* sint tria nomina, respondendum est: aut loqueris grammatice aut logice. Si grammatice, cum grammaticus consideret impositionem nominis, et modum principalem significandi substantiam cum qualitate[^23], sic dicet, unum nomen esse. Si logice, cum logicus consideret nomen, in quantum est vox expressiva, unde definit nomen, verbum et orationem per vocem tanquam per genus; et multiplicato superiori, necesse est, multiplicari inferius: si sunt multae voces significativae, sunt de necessitate multa nomina. Et ideo patet, quod male accipiebant nominis unitatem, secundum quod congruit ad propositum.

Mala etiam fuit adaptatio, quia enuntiabile non significat *rem*, sed *modum se habendi*[^24]; et cum per verbum praesentis, praeteriti et futuri significetur, res alio modo se habere: patet de necessitate, quod aliud enuntiabile est, te esse nasciturum, et te esse natum. — Rursus, deficiebant in ultimo[^25][^26], quia, sicut *homo* non significat istum ho-

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minem vel illum, sic *verbum praesentis temporis* non significat illud vel illud praesens, sed praesens in communi, sive copulat vel consignificat. Et inde est, quod, sicut *homo* non habet aliam significationem nec est aliud nomen nec aequivocum, si modo supponat pro Petro, modo pro Paulo; sic nec *verbum praesentis temporis*, sive pronuntietur hodie sive cras, non habet aliam significationem, et ideo non facit aliud enuntiabile. Et propterea[^27] patet, quod quocumque tempore proferatur, te esse nasciturum, quod idem est enuntiabile, quod prius fuit verum, modo falsum. Secundum igitur quod *scire* connotat veritatem circa enuntiabile, scitum illud, quod scivit, modo non scit, nulla facta mutatione in Dei scientia, sed solum in connotato. — Concedendum igitur, quod in secunda acceptione non omne quod scit, semper scit.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *veritas* est una in praesenti, praeterito et futuro; dicendum, quod quamvis sit reducibilis ad unam rei veritatem, sicut accidens ad subiectum[^28], et modus essendi ad entitatem, tamen, cum modus essendi habeat suam veritatem, et tres sunt modi essendi, ideo tres sunt veritates.

2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de indelebilitate et immutabilitate et independentia, dicendum, quod iam solutum est, quia nulla fit transmutatio in Dei cognitione, nec desinit scire enuntiabile propter mutationem in se, sed in connotato.

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### Question II.
#### *Whether the enuntiabilia which God once knows, he always knows.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the *enuntiabilia* or *complexa*[^1] which God once knows, he always knows or has knowledge of. And that [he does] so, it seems:

1. Because God does not know an *enuntiabile* except by reason of [its] truth[^5]; but the truth of an *enuntiabile* which once was, always was and is and will be: therefore the *enuntiabile* which he once knows, he always knows. The proof of the minor: every truth of a complex thing is founded upon a non-complex thing; but the same thing is first future,

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then present, then past, [and is] one and the same: therefore one and the same truth is in it according to all these modes. But it is necessary that it always be under some [one] of these modes: therefore etc.[^4]

2. Likewise, this same point seems [evident] from another reason: because whatever God knows, he knows immutably[^2] — otherwise, since the knowing of God is his being, if his knowing were changed, [his] being [would be changed][^6], which is impossible — but everything which has immutability has eternity, because, if it ceases, it is changed: therefore what God once knows, he always knows.

3. Likewise, what is written in that book cannot be deleted; but God knows not by looking outside, but by reading in the book of his foreknowledge: therefore what he once knows, he always knows. The major is plain, because upon that [verse] of *Exodus* 32[^7]: *"Blot me out of thy book"* etc., the Gloss [says]: «*He says this securely, because it will not be blotted out*». And the same [Gloss] says [the like] upon the Psalm.

4. Likewise, what ceases or is lost upon something [else] ceasing, depends of necessity upon that [other thing]; but divine cognition does not depend upon the truth to-be-created[^8]: therefore although an *enuntiabile* should cease to be true, yet God does not cease to know it; and if this: therefore what he once knows, he also [knows] always.

**On the contrary:**

1. Just as *praescire* (foreknowing) stands with respect to a future thing, insofar as it is future, so *scire* (knowing) [stands] with respect to a true thing — for if it is known in act, it is true in act — but, as the Master[^9] says, God ceases to foreknow a thing when the thing of-the-future becomes present: therefore likewise he ceases to know [it], when from a true [thing] it becomes false.

2. Likewise, just as divine acceptation regards goodness, so vision [regards] truth; but God ceases to accept a man, when he loses [his] goodness: therefore he ceases to know[^3] the thing or *enuntiabile*, when it loses [its] truth.

3. Likewise, this same point is shown by [arguing to the] impossible, because, if whatever *enuntiabile* he knew, he now knows, and he knew Christ to-be-about-to-die, therefore he also now knows [it]; but whatever is known is true[^10]: therefore Christ-to-be-about-to-die is true, which is against the faith.

4. Likewise, if whatever he knew, he now knows; but at some time he knew that you were not [yet], when you were not: therefore he knows you not-to-be, and [also] he knows you to-be, because [each] is true: therefore he knows at the same time two contradictorily opposed [things]; therefore two contradictorily opposed [things] are simultaneously true, which is false and impossible.

### Conclusion.

> *Insofar as* scire *says bare understanding, whatever God once knows, he always knows; but insofar as* scire *connotes truth in an object, by reason of the connotatum (which is variable), God does not [in this sense] always know whatever he once knew.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *scire* is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is reflected upon itself[^11]; and in this sense [the meaning] is: this one *knows* this, that is, has cognition of this; and in this mode it must be said that *scire* connotes nothing in the actual side of the known-thing — neither truth nor presence. For God has perfect cognition of every enunciation [as to] whether it is a complete and congruous enunciation, whether it is true, and other like [questions]. In another way *scire* is said insofar as it is a *prohaeretic*[^12] word (i.e. one importing election or assent) and passes outward into act, and thus connotes truth in the object; then therefore *to know* some *enuntiabile* is the same as to know that it is itself true. Whence «*I know you to sit*» is to say: I not only have cognition of this, but I also know that it itself is true. — In the first mode *scire* imports *bare*[^13] understanding; in the second mode, understanding with assent.

If therefore *scire* is taken in the first mode, then I say that whatever is, and every *enuntiabile*, and everything which he heretofore knew, [this] he [still] knows and has cognition of, because of everything which is and which can be, he has cognition. Nor does it follow: he knows this, therefore it is true; on the contrary, there is here a consequent [fallacy][^14]. — If however *scire* is taken in the second mode, insofar as it connotes truth

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concerning an *enuntiabile*, thus there have been some who would say that he ceases to know some *enuntiabile*; because[^15] [some] *enuntiabile* which is true can be false.

Others said the contrary, since they laid down that an *enuntiabile* which is once true, is always true, and so is always known. And that it may be more clearly evident, their position[^16] and the reason of [their] position must be seen. There have been some who said that *albus, alba, album* ("white" [in masc., fem., neut.]), although they are three utterances and have three modes of signifying, nevertheless, because they convey the same signification, are one name. By this same mode they said that the unity of an *enuntiabile*[^17] is to be taken not from the side of the utterance or of the mode of signifying, but [from the side] of the thing signified; but it is the [same] thing which is first future, then present, third past: therefore to enunciate that this thing is first future, then present, third past, will not make a diversity of *enuntiabilia*, but [only] of utterances. — Again, since the same time is first future, then present, third past — time, namely, which is the measure of the thing, which is *signified* by the utterance —, although *esse* or *fuisse* or *fore* ("to-be, to-have-been, to-be-about-to-be") consignify three times, by reason of the consignified[^18] they do not diversify the *enuntiabile*, but [the *enuntiabile*] is varied only on the side of the time signified. Hence if I once say: *Socrates is running today*, and tomorrow I shall say: *he ran*; although this verb gives [us] to understand another time, and so another action, the *enuntiabile* is not [therefore] different, however much the signification has been changed[^19]. And because, the same signification being retained, the *enuntiabile* is always true, and is not the same, except when the same signification is retained, therefore they said that what is once true, is always true. And therefore, since God forgets nothing, they say that every *enuntiabile* which God knew, he [still] knows. — And they reply to that reasoning [thus]: every *enuntiabile* which he knew, he knows; but he knew you-to-be-about-to-be-born[^20], or you-to-be: therefore etc.; it ought not to be inferred thus: therefore he can be [said to] know, you-to-be, but thus: therefore he knows, you-to-have-been. Otherwise there is in that [argument] a *fallacy of speech* (*figura dictionis*), because it proceeds from identity in the mode of signifying to identity of the thing. — And in this way the Master[^21] solves [it]. And this was the opinion of the Nominales, who were called Nominales, because they founded their position upon the unity of the name.

But this position was against the Philosopher, who plainly says in the *Categories*[^22] that the same sentence is first true, then false. It was also against the common position. It was also against the truth. And the reason for this is that it has neither a good foundation, nor a good adaptation.

For first, if one asks whether *albus, alba, album* are three names, the answer is: either you are speaking grammatically or logically. If grammatically, since the grammarian considers the imposition of the name and the principal mode of signifying substance with quality[^23], thus he will say [it] is one name. If logically, since the logician considers the name insofar as it is a *signifying utterance* — whence he defines name, verb, and sentence by *utterance* as by genus —; and when the superior [genus] is multiplied, the inferior [species] must of necessity be multiplied: if there are many signifying utterances, there are of necessity many names. And therefore it is plain that they wrongly took the unity of the name, according to what is congruent to the matter at issue.

The adaptation was also bad, because an *enuntiabile* does not signify a *thing*, but a *mode of being*[^24]; and since by the verb of the present, past, and future is signified that the thing is in another mode of being: it is plain of necessity that *te esse nasciturum* ("you to-be-about-to-be-born") and *te esse natum* ("you to-have-been-born") are different *enuntiabilia*. — Again, they were deficient in the last point[^25][^26], because, just as *homo* ("man") does not signify this man

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or that one, so *verbum praesentis temporis* ("verb of the present tense") does not signify this or that present, but the present in general — whether it couples [the predicate to the subject] or consignifies. And hence it is that, just as *homo* does not have another signification, nor is it another name, nor equivocal, if it supposits now for Peter, now for Paul; so neither does *verbum praesentis temporis*, whether it is pronounced today or tomorrow, have another signification, and therefore [it] does not make a different *enuntiabile*. And therefore[^27] it is plain that, at whatever time it is pronounced, *te esse nasciturum* — which is the same *enuntiabile* which was previously true — is now false. Therefore according as *scire* connotes truth concerning an *enuntiabile*, that known [object] which he knew, he now does not know — with no change made in the divine knowledge, but only in the connotatum. — It must be granted therefore that in the second acceptation [of *scire*] not everything which he knows, he always knows.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that *truth* is one in present, past, and future; it must be said that, although it is reducible to one truth of the thing — as accident to subject[^28], and mode of being to entity — yet, since the mode of being has its own truth, and there are three modes of being, therefore there are three truths.

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected concerning indelibility and immutability and independence, it must be said that it has already been solved, because no transmutation comes about in God's cognition, nor does he cease to know the *enuntiabile* on account of a change in itself, but in the connotatum.

la: Cod. K *compositio.*

en: Codex K [reads] *compositio* ("composition").

la: Cod. T (V in marg.) *mutabilem.* Proxime ante Vat. omittit *sicut est.* Aliquanto inferius pro *modum simplicitatis* ed. 1 *modum simplicis.*

en: Codex T (V in the margin) [reads] *mutabilem* ("changeable"). Just before, the Vatican [edition] omits *sicut est* ("as it is"). Somewhat below, in place of *modum simplicitatis* ("the mode of simplicity"), edition 1 [reads] *modum simplicis* ("the mode of the simple").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *praeterea;* incongrue.

en: The Vatican [edition] together with codex cc [reads] *praeterea* ("moreover"); incongruously.

la: Codd. A T *patet, quod sic intelligendum.*

en: Codices A T [read] *patet, quod sic intelligendum* ("it is plain, that it is to-be-so-understood").

la: Codd. L O hic interiiciunt: *signatae vel ratione enuntiabilis in se; si ratione enuntiabilis in se, cum ipsum sit aliqua res etc.; si ratione veritatis: sed cur.* Paulo inferius pro falsa lectione Vaticanae *super rem complexam* substituimus auctoritate potiorum codd. et ed. 1 *supra rem incomplexam.* In fine argumenti pro *horum* cod. T *istorum.*

en: Codices L O here interject: *signatae vel ratione enuntiabilis in se; si ratione enuntiabilis in se, cum ipsum sit aliqua res etc.; si ratione veritatis: sed cur* ("[truth] signed, either by reason of the *enuntiabile* in itself — if by reason of the *enuntiabile* in itself, since it is some thing etc.; if by reason of the truth: but why"). A little below, in place of the false reading of the Vatican *super rem complexam* ("upon a complex thing"), we substitute on the authority of the better codices and edition 1 *supra rem incomplexam* ("upon a non-complex thing"). At the end of the argument, in place of *horum* ("of these"), codex T [reads] *istorum* ("of those").

la: Intellige: etiam suum *esse* mutaretur.

en: Understand: his *esse* (being) too would be changed.

la: Vers. 32. — Psalmus, qui mox memoratur, est Ps. 105, et versus, qui respicitur, v. 23. — Glossa, in qua verba inveniuntur: *Securus hoc dicit* etc., est Glossa interlinearis, et Glossa, quae «*idem dicit super Psalmum*», est Glossa ordinaria et sumta est ex August., *Qq. in Exod.* q. 117, et *Enarrat. in Ps.* 105. n. 21. — De propos. minori argumenti cfr. August., XX. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 15. — Pro *Prima patet* Vat. cum pluribus codd. perperam *Praeterea patet.*

en: Verse 32. — The Psalm which is shortly remembered is Ps. 105, and the verse referred to is v. 23. — The Gloss, in which the words *Securus hoc dicit* etc. are found, is the Interlinear Gloss; and the Gloss which "*says the same upon the Psalm*" is the Ordinary Gloss and is taken from Augustine, *Questions on Exodus* q. 117, and *Enarrations on Psalm* 105, n. 21. — On the minor proposition of the argument cf. Augustine, *City of God* XX, c. 15. — In place of *Prima patet* ("the first is plain"), the Vatican with several codices wrongly [reads] *Praeterea patet* ("moreover it is plain").

la: Ed. 1 *creata.*

en: Edition 1 [reads] *creata* ("created").

la: Hic cap. 3. Expositio huius dicti Magistri dabitur infra, dub. 4. — Magister loc. cit. distinguit inter praescientiam et scientiam Dei, et praescientiam affirmat posse desinere; scientiam autem non. At S. Bonav. etiam hoc posterius affirmat, scil. scientiam Dei posse desinere, hoc derivans de eodem principio, quo Magister nisus docuit, praescientiam Dei posse desinere.

en: Here, c. 3. The exposition of this saying of the Master will be given below, dub. 4. — The Master at the cited place distinguishes between God's foreknowledge and his knowledge, and affirms that foreknowledge can cease, but not knowledge. But St. Bonaventure affirms this latter [point] also, namely that God's knowledge can cease — deriving this from the same principle by which the Master attempted to teach that God's foreknowledge can cease.

la: Ed. 1 *cogitare.*

en: Edition 1 [reads] *cogitare* ("to think").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 690, nota 2. — Pro *scitur* Vat. *scit.*

en: Cf. above p. 690, note 2. — In place of *scitur* ("is known"), the Vatican [reads] *scit* ("knows").

la: Id est, prout sistit in se, sive, ut paulo inferius dicitur, prout *importat nudum intelligere*, meram scil. apprehensionem absque iudicio de veritate obiectiva cognitionis. Hoc modo Deus omnia cognoscit quae cognosci possunt, etiam omnia falsa et impossibilia. — Paulo inferius pro *praescientiam* non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 *praescientiam.*

en: That is, insofar as it stands in itself, or — as is said a little below — insofar as it *imports bare understanding*, that is, a mere apprehension without judgment about the objective truth of the cognition. In this mode God knows all things which can be known, even all false and impossible things. — A little below, in place of *praescientiam* ("foreknowledge"), not a few codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 [read] *praescientiam* (Quaracchi prints the same word at both positions; the variant evidently lies in accentuation or in an underlying word-form not captured by spelling).

la: Graece προαιρετικόν (a προαιρείσθαι, de quo supra pag. 714, nota 3.) i. e. *electivum vel adhaesivum.* Verbum igitur *scire*, acceptum ut verbum *prohaereticum*, significat cognitionem cum electione sive adhaesione (assensu) relate ad rem cognitam, quatenus scil. simul iudicatur, rem cognitam esse veram, et *scire transit in actum extra* connotando *cogniti existentiam extra intellectum*. Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 5, et d. XXXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. M verbo *prohaereticum* adiungit: *id est voluntarium, unde prohaeresis id est voluntas.*

en: In Greek προαιρετικόν (from προαιρείσθαι, on which see above p. 714, note 3), i.e. *electivum vel adhaesivum* ("of choice or of cleaving-to"). The verb *scire*, then, taken as a *prohaeretic* word, signifies cognition with election or cleaving-to (assent) relative to the thing known — namely insofar as it is at the same time judged that the thing known is true, and *scire passes into act outside [the knower]* by connoting *the existence of the known outside the intellect*. Cf. above d. 33, dub. 5; and d. XXXVIII, *littera Magistri*, c. 1. — Codex M adds to the word *prohaereticum*: *id est voluntarium, unde prohaeresis id est voluntas* ("that is, voluntary, whence *prohaeresis* is the will").

la: Cum Vat. retinuimus *nudum*, quamquam codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibent *divinum*, quod sensum nimis arctare videtur.

en: With the Vatican [edition] we have retained *nudum* ("bare"), although the codices with the first six editions exhibit *divinum* ("divine"), which seems to constrict the sense too much.

la: Scilicet fallacia consequentis, in quantum enim *scire* in antecedente accipitur in primo sensu hic exposito, et in consequente in secundo. Cfr. Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4. (c. 5.).

en: Namely the fallacy of consequent, inasmuch as *scire* in the antecedent is taken in the first sense here expounded, and in the consequent in the second. Cf. Aristotle, I *Sophistical Refutations* c. 4 (c. 5).

la: Omnes ferme codd. cum ed. 1 minus concinne *suunt* pro *enum.*

en: Almost all the codices with edition 1, less elegantly, [read] *suunt* for *enum* [?] (an OCR-garbled variant — apparent intent is a variant on the local Latin reading).

la: Cod. U *enuntiationis.*

en: Codex U [reads] *enuntiationis* ("of enunciation").

la: Scilicet temporis. — Pro *consignificati* Vat. tamen *significati.* Eadem Vat. paulo ante pro *quod significatur* substituit *quae significatur*, quam lectionem castigavimus ex multis codd. et ex sex primis edd.

en: Namely, of time. — In place of *consignificati* ("of the consignified"), the Vatican however [reads] *significati* ("of the signified"). The same Vatican, a little before, in place of *quod significatur* ("what is signified") substitutes *quae significatur* ("which is signified") — which reading we have corrected from many codices and from the first six editions.

la: Haec propositio interpretatur verba praecedentia: sed *curatur unitas a parte temporis significati*; nam posita v. g. quantumcumque diversa actione in diversis temporibus, compatibile diversificatur necesse est. Sola Vat. hanc propositionem refert ad illa verba: *ratione consignificati non diversificant enuntiabile*, quare et ipsam transformaverit hoc modo: *Socrates currit hodie, et cras dicam cucurrit, cum hoc verbum non det intelligere aliud tempus (?) et ita nec aliam actionem enuntiabile non est mutatum quantumcumque mutata consignificatione.* Codd. conveniunt cum nostra lectione, excepto quod nonnulli pro *non est idem* exhibent *non est mutatum*, repugnante contra Vat. Pro *non est idem* ed. 1 *tamen est idem*, et paulo superius pro *cras dicam; currit* eadem ed. *cras dicam, cucurrit.* Paulo inferius in segmenti propositione *quo semper est verum* Vat. *semper est idem*, et in fine alterius propositionis pro *quod Deus scivit, scit* cod. Z paulo perfectius *quod Deus semel scivit, scit.* — Locutio *tempus significatum et tempus consignificantis* sumta est ex Aristot., I. Periherm., ubi c. 2,

en: This proposition interprets the preceding words: *but the unity is preserved on the side of the time signified*; for if, e.g., one posits however much different action in different times, the *compatible* [item] is necessarily diversified. The Vatican alone refers this proposition to those words *ratione consignificati non diversificant enuntiabile* ("by reason of the consignified they do not diversify the *enuntiabile*"), whence it has also transformed [the wording] thus: *Socrates currit hodie, et cras dicam cucurrit, cum hoc verbum non det intelligere aliud tempus (?), et ita nec aliam actionem enuntiabile non est mutatum quantumcumque mutata consignificatione.* The codices agree with our reading, except that some, in place of *non est idem* ("is not the same") exhibit *non est mutatum* ("is not changed") — against the Vatican. In place of *non est idem* edition 1 [reads] *tamen est idem* ("yet it is the same"); and a little earlier, in place of *cras dicam; currit*, the same edition [reads] *cras dicam, cucurrit.* A little below, in a fragmentary proposition, in place of *quo semper est verum* ("by which it is always true"), the Vatican [reads] *semper est idem* ("is always the same"); and at the end of another proposition, in place of *quod Deus scivit, scit* ("what God knew, he knows"), codex Z more perfectly [reads] *quod Deus semel scivit, scit* ("what God once knew, he knows"). — The expression *tempus significatum et tempus consignificantis* is taken from Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 2,

la: de *nomine* dicitur: *Nomen igitur est vox significativa* etc., et c. 3, de *verbo* dicitur: *Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus.*

en: where it is said of *nomen* (name): *Nomen igitur est vox significativa* etc. ("A name, then, is a signifying utterance," etc.), and c. 3, where it is said of *verbum* (verb): *Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus* ("A verb, however, is that which consignifies time").

la: Sola Vat. hic et paulo inferius post *te esse* ac *te fuisse* bene repetit *nasciturum;* cod. L hic et paulo post verbo *esse* et dein verbo *fuisse* praefigit *non.*

en: Only the Vatican here and a little below, after *te esse* and *te fuisse*, rightly repeats *nasciturum;* codex L here and a little after prefixes *non* to the verb *esse* and then to the verb *fuisse.*

la: Hic c. 3. — De fallacia figurae dictionis cfr. Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 5. (c. 4.), quae fundatur «in *similitudine* dictionis in parte cum alia dictione non idem significante» (Petr. Hisp.) v. g. *esse nasciturum, fuisse nasciturum.* — Pro *procedit* cod. V et ed. 1 *proceditur.*

en: Here, c. 3. — On the *fallacy of speech* (*figura dictionis*) cf. Aristotle, I *Sophistical Refutations* c. 5 (c. 4), which is founded «on the *likeness* of speech in part with another speech not signifying the same» (Peter of Spain), e.g. *esse nasciturum, fuisse nasciturum.* — In place of *procedit*, codex V and edition 1 [read] *proceditur.*

la: Cap. de *Substantia*: Eadem enim oratio vera et falsa videtur esse, veluti si vera sit oratio, sedere quempiam, eo surgente, ipsa eadem falsa erit. — Infra multi codd. *habet* pro *habent.*

en: Chapter *On Substance:* "For the same sentence seems to be true and [then] false — as, if it is a true sentence that someone is sitting, when he stands up, the very same [sentence] will be false." — Below, many codices [read] *habet* for *habent.*

la: De grammaticali definitione *nominis* cfr. supra pag. 390, nota 6; de logica definitione *nominis, verbi et orationis* cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. seqq.

en: On the grammatical definition of *nomen* (name) cf. above p. 390, note 6; on the logical definition of *nomen, verbum,* and *oratio* (name, verb, sentence) cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 1 seqq.

la: Scilicet *connexum praedicati cum subiecto.*

en: Namely, *the connection of predicate with subject.*

la: Scilicet quoad *consignificationem* temporis, de qua S. Doctor paulo superius locutus est in propositione, quae incipit: *Rursus, cum idem tempus sit etc.* Ratio, qua S. Doctor hic profert ad refutandum Nominales, fundatur in eo, quod conceptus nostri et propositiones ex eis formatae propter abstractionem, quae ipsis competit, non designant obiecta singularia; et quae his applicantur servant eandem significationem, ita ut [continuation on p. 741 footer:] aliqua propositio, in se spectata, sit eadem, quocumque tempore proferatur; sic v. g. haec propositio: *Socrates currit*, in se spectata eadem est, sive hodie sive cras pronuntietur. Sed aliter res se habet, si propositio non *in se* consideratur, sed relate ad *rem*, sive in quantum est *vera*. Tunc enim eadem propositio, quae primo fuit vera, falsa fieri potest, prout res ipsa mutatur. Falsum est igitur quod dicunt adversarii, *retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semper esse verum* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *sive copulat*, quam lectionem cum Vat. (*copulet*) et codd. A C L S T U W Y retinuimus, non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *sive non copulat.*

en: Namely, as regards the *consignification* of time, on which the holy Doctor spoke a little earlier in the proposition beginning *Rursus, cum idem tempus sit* etc. The reason which the holy Doctor here brings forward to refute the Nominales is founded on this: that our concepts and the propositions formed from them, on account of the abstraction which belongs to them, do not designate singular objects; and [those things] which are applied to them preserve the same signification, so that some proposition, considered in itself, is the same at whatever time it is uttered — thus e.g. this proposition *Socrates currit* ("Socrates is running"), considered in itself, is the same whether it is pronounced today or tomorrow. But the matter stands otherwise if the proposition is not considered *in itself*, but in relation to *the thing*, that is, insofar as it is *true*. For then the same proposition, which was at first true, can become false, as the thing itself changes. Therefore what the adversaries say is false: *retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semper esse verum* ("with the same signification retained, the *enuntiabile* is always true") etc. — A little below, in place of *sive copulat* — which reading we have retained with the Vatican (*copulet*) and codices A C L S T U W Y — not a few codices with edition 1 [read] *sive non copulat.*

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *praeterea.* Paulo inferius pro *scitum illud quod scivit, modo non scit*, quam lectionem cum Vat. etiam exhibet cod. T, plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *scitum illud quidem scivit et modo non scit.*

en: The Vatican with codex cc [reads] *praeterea* ("moreover"). A little below, in place of *scitum illud quod scivit, modo non scit* ("that known [thing] which he knew, he now does not know") — which reading the Vatican together with codex T also exhibits — the majority of codices with edition 1 [read] *scitum illud quidem scivit et modo non scit* ("indeed he knew that known [thing] and now does not know [it]").

la: Ed. 1 *substantiam.*

en: Edition 1 [reads] *substantiam* ("substance").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem posuit Magister hic c. 3. tum quoad *praescire* tum quoad *scire*, et de eadem re loquitur etiam infra d. XLIV. c. 2. Solutio Lombardi quoad *praescientiam* est recta, sed quoad secundum membrum est ex parte falsa. Nam S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 15. m. 7. ad obiect.), S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 5; *S.* I. q. 14. a. 15. ad 3.), Richardo a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 1.) ad hoc respondet cum distinctione. Concedit quidem, quod si scientia Dei referatur ad *res*, Deus sciat omnem rem, quam scivit; si autem refertur ad *enuntiabilia*, tunc docet, sententiam Magistri, quae est Nominalium, deficere et falso niti fundamento. Putabant enim Nominales, idem esse enuntiabile, quando *eadem* res vel actio tribus propositionibus diversi temporis enuntiatur, ut si de eodem cursu dicitur hodie: *Petrus currit*, et heri: *currit*, et cras: *cucurrit*, unde dixerunt «*idem esse enuntiabile, Christum nasci et esse nasciturum et esse natum*» (S. Thom., *S.* loc. cit.). E contrario, eadem propositione, dicta diversis temporibus, recte significari possunt diversae actiones, ut de tribus cursibus Petri, quos fecit heri et hodie et cras, in unoquoque die recte dicitur: *Petrus currit*. — Verum est, hanc quaestionem spectare potius ad dialecticam; tamen non inutilis est ad vitandos errores. Nam si vera esset sententia Nominalium, sequeretur, quod differentiae temporis nullius momenti essent in enuntianda veritate alicuius propositionis, et quod sicut non est successio *ex parte Dei*, qui omnes res sibi habet praesentes, ita etiam ipsae res et differentiae temporum non realiter sibi succederent. Nam si differentiae temporum ex parte rerum veritatem habent, etiam enuntiatio sive significatio huius differentiae veritatem debet habere, et hanc veritatem Deus scit. Non est ergo idem enuntiabile, Christum nasci vel cum esse natum vel esse nasciturum. Unde recte Richard. a Med. (loc. cit.) concludit: «*Scientia simplicis intelligentiae, quidquid scivit Deus, modo scit tam quoad res quam quoad enuntiabilia. Si autem* scire *significat cognoscere verum, sic non omne enuntiabile, quod Deus scivit esse verum, scit modo esse verum*». Cfr. etiam S. Bonav., supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2, d. 39. a. 1. q. 3.

**II.** Praeter citatos auctores: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 7, et m. 4. a. 6. — S. Thom. praeter locos cit. *Quodl.* 4. a. 17. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., *I. Sent.* d. 39. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Master proposed this question here in c. 3, both with regard to *praescire* (foreknowing) and with regard to *scire* (knowing), and he speaks on the same matter also below in d. XLIV. c. 2. Lombard's solution as regards *praescientia* is correct, but as regards the second member it is in part false. For St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales (*S.* p. I, q. 15, m. 7, ad obiect.), St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 5; *S.* I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3), [and] Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 1) responds to this with a distinction. He grants indeed that if the knowledge of God is referred to *things*, God knows every thing which he knew; but if it is referred to *enuntiabilia*, then he teaches that the opinion of the Master, which is that of the Nominales, fails and rests on a false foundation. For the Nominales supposed that the *enuntiabile* is the same, when *the same* thing or action is enunciated by three propositions of different time — as if of the same running it is said today: *Peter is running*, and yesterday: *he runs*, and tomorrow: *he ran*, whence they said «*it is the same* enuntiabile *that Christ-is-being-born and is-to-be-born and has-been-born*» (St. Thomas, *S.* loc. cit.). On the contrary, by the same proposition, said at different times, diverse actions can rightly be signified — as concerning three runnings of Peter which he performed yesterday and today and tomorrow, on each day it is rightly said: *Peter is running*. — It is true that this question pertains rather to dialectic; yet [it is] not useless for avoiding errors. For if the opinion of the Nominales were true, it would follow that the differences of time would be of no moment in enunciating the truth of any proposition; and that, just as there is no succession *on the side of God*, who holds all things present to himself, so also the things themselves and the differences of times would not really succeed one another. For if the differences of times have truth on the side of the things, the enunciation or signification of this difference too must have truth, and this truth God knows. Therefore it is not the same *enuntiabile* — Christ-being-born or [Christ] having-been-born or being-about-to-be-born. Whence Richard of Mediavilla (loc. cit.) rightly concludes: «*The knowledge of simple intelligence — whatever God knew, he now knows, both as regards things and as regards* enuntiabilia. *If however* scire *signifies to know-the-true, in this way not every* enuntiabile *which God knew to-be-true, he now knows to-be-true*». Cf. also St. Bonaventure, above, d. 38, a. 2, q. 2; d. 39, a. 1, q. 3.

**II.** Besides the authors already cited: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 7, and m. 4, a. 6. — St. Thomas besides the places already cited, *Quodl.* 4, a. 17. — B. Albert, here a. 6. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Durand., *I Sent.* d. 39, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**J4 Class D/E investigation (2026-07-17) — FALSE POSITIVE, confirmed, nothing changed.** Health scan flagged `defs=28 la=30 en=28` (Latin 2 anchors over). Root cause: the explanatory intro blockquote at the top of `## Latin` (line ~36) reads "...this chunk re-numbers continuously [^1]–[^28] across the four printed pages (738–741)..." — a **plain-text**, non-backtick-quoted mention of the label range, matching the corpus convention documented in `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2. A naive regex health-check (and, per §2, the live site's actual renderer, which is also regex-based and does not respect code spans even where backticks ARE used) double-counts the `[^1]` and `[^28]` inside this prose sentence as real body anchors, inflating `la` from 28 to 30. Confirmed by re-running the anchor count with the intro blockquote line stripped: `la=28, en=28, defs=28`, all three label sets identical, no dupes — the 28 real apparatus markers in the body (p.738=5, p.739=10, p.740=11, p.741=2, matching the frontmatter's `transcription_status` breakdown) are fully healthy. **No `[^N]` markers or apparatus defs were touched.**

**⚠ Live-render note for Wilson (worse than the backtick cases in `III-d33-dubia`/`IV-d21-p1-littera`):** because this instance uses **no backticks at all**, the `[^1]` and `[^28]` tokens in this blockquote will render as live, clickable footnote superscripts on the deployed site inside what's meant to be plain explanatory prose — this is not just a classifier false positive but an actual site-rendering defect, of the same family as the already-known "literal `[^N]` in prose steals the binding" bug. Sibling chunk `vol1/bon-sent-I-d41-a2-q1.md` has the identical unbracketed convention ("...re-numbers continuously [^1]–[^12] across the two printed pages (736–737)..."). Per the handoff, this corpus-wide notation issue (300+ files) needs a single deliberate fix (de-fence the wording or teach the renderer to skip code-spans/detect this prose pattern) — not a per-chunk patch — and needs Wilson's decision before anyone touches it.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 41, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 741 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). The nine footnotes in this chunk all come from the printed-page-742 footer; the three footnotes on the printed-page-741 footer anchor in the preceding part-2 quaestio body and scholion (rendered in `bon-sent-I-d41-p2-a1-q2.md`), not here.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Opinati tamen sunt quidam, Deum ideo elegisse Iacob, quia talem esse praescivit* etc. Videtur quod ista positio non sit opinio, sed haeresis manifesta, quia qui hoc ponit, ponit, gratiam homini non gratis, sed ex meritis dari a Deo: et iste est error pessimus, scilicet error Pelagii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ideo potest dicere causam meritoriam vel *rationem congruitatis*. Si <!-- page 742 -->dicat causam meritoriam, sic, quamvis prima fronte non dicat errorem, tamen ad ipsam sequitur error. Si vero dicat rationem *congruitatis*, sic non dicit errorem; sed tamen temeritatem quandam habet, quia de occulto Dei profundo nititur reddere rationem; et ideo utroque modo erat digna retractatione[^1].

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Apostoli, quod dicit Augustinus: *Reliquiae per electionem gratiae salvae fient*; in qua habitudine construatur ille genitivus; quia gratia nec videtur *eligens* nec *electa*; et iterum gratia est solum ex tempore: ergo et electio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si intelligatur de electione *temporali*, tunc *electio gratiae* dicitur, quia fit per gratiam: si autem de *aeterna*, sic dicitur *electio gratiae*[^2], non ut gratia dicat habitum, sed ut construatur sicut genitivus ex *vi declarationis essentiae*; unde dicitur *electio gratiae*, id est gratuita, quae merita non considerat. Et si obiicitur, quod unus genitivus non construitur ex illa vi[^3]; dicendum, quod verum est, nisi habeat virtutem duorum. Unde bene dicitur *vir sanguinis*, et *homo auctoritatis*, similiter *electio gratiae* dicitur, id est *gratuitae bonitatis*.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Praecedit aliquid in peccatoribus, quo digni efficiantur iustificatione*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia peccator ante iustificationem manet in peccato, et quamdiu est in peccato, est indignus pane, quo vescitur, sicut dicit auctoritas[^4], et etiam ipsa vita, ut puta Dei inimicus: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aut verbum illud Augustini retractatum est, et retractatum intelligitur in praefata retractatione, quae ponitur in praecedenti capitulo[^5]; aut dignitas ibi tantum valet quantum *congruitas* solum: et multae possunt esse congruitates in peccatoribus ad gratiam gratum facientem per multiplicem gratiam gratis datam.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *Deus praescire futura desinit, cum futura esse desinunt*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia praescientia dicit quid aeternum; sed nullum aeternum desinit esse: ergo nec praesciens desinit praescire. — Item, Richardus[^6] dicit, quod cum quatuor sint combinationes, *quod quoddam est quod habet principium et finem, quoddam quod caret principio et fine, quoddam quod habet principium et non finem, ut anima, quartum, scilicet quod habet finem et non principium, est impossibile*. Quod enim caret principio non habet esse aliunde: quod autem tale est, se ipso est: ergo est omnino immutabile, ergo non potest desinere. Si ergo praescire caret principio, necesse est, quod careat fine.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio Magister bene dicit, quod Deus desinit aliqua praescire, cum fiunt praesentia. Si enim praesciebantur, quia futura, et iam desinunt esse futura, constans est, quod desinunt *praesciri*, non ratione eius quod est *scire*, sed ratione *praepositionis*.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de aeterno, dicendum, quod aliquod nomen pure aeternum importat, aliquod vero nomen importat aeternum connotando temporale. Hoc nomen *Deus* pure aeternum importat, sed hoc vocabulum *praescire* dicit aeternum connotando temporale. — Secundum hoc notandum, quod quaedam connotant temporale ut ens in actu. Et quia tale temporale esse potest et desinere potest, ideo tales actus circa Deum dicuntur habere initium et terminum: ut puta si dicatur: *Deus conservat hanc rem*, conservare dicit essentiam[^7] connotando effectum; ideo incipit et desinit conservare. Quaedam connotant temporale, ut non-ens actu, ens tamen in potentia sive futurum. Et quoniam temporale non potest *incipere* esse non-ens sive esse futurum, antequam sit, sed potest *desinere* esse non-ens, cum incipit esse ens, *desinere* esse futurum, cum incipit esse praesens: hinc est, quod praescientia Dei respectu creati dicitur *desinere*, sed numquam *incipere*; et desinit ratione temporalis non desinentis, sed incipientis[^8].

Et ex hoc patet illud Richardi, quia cum[^9] Deus desinit praescire, non significatur, quod aliquod *ens* desinat, sed solum quod aliquid *incipiat*; et sic patet illud.

---

english:
<!-- page 741 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: *"Some however have held that God chose Jacob for the reason that he foreknew him to be such,"* etc. It seems that this position is not [merely] an opinion, but a manifest heresy, because whoever lays this down lays down that grace is given to man by God not gratis, but from merits: and this is the worst error, namely the error of Pelagius.

**I respond:** It must be said that for that reason one can call [it] either a meritorious cause or a *ground of congruity*. If <!-- page 742 -->he calls [it] a meritorious cause, then, although at first glance he does not state an error, yet an error follows upon it. If, however, he calls [it] a ground of *congruity*, then he does not state an error; yet he has a certain temerity, because he strives to render a reason from the hidden depth of God; and therefore in either mode it was worthy of retraction[^1].

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of the Apostle, which Augustine quotes: *"The remnant by the election of grace shall be saved"*; in what relation that genitive is to be construed, because grace seems neither to *choose* nor to be *chosen*; and again, grace is only in time: therefore [so is] the election.

**I respond:** It must be said that if it is understood of *temporal* election, then it is called *election of grace*, because it comes about through grace; if however [it is understood] of *eternal* [election], it is in this way called *election of grace*[^2], not so that grace state a habit, but so that it be construed like a genitive [taken] from the *force of declaration of essence*; whence it is called *election of grace*, that is *gratuitous*, [an election] which does not consider merits. And if it is objected that one genitive is not construed [taken] from that force[^3]; it must be said that this is true, unless it has the power of two [genitives]. Hence it is well said *vir sanguinis* ("man of blood") and *homo auctoritatis* ("man of authority"); similarly *election of grace* is said, that is *of gratuitous goodness*.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *"Something precedes in sinners by which they are made worthy of justification."* For it seems false to say [this], because a sinner before justification remains in sin, and as long as he is in sin, he is unworthy of the bread by which he is fed, as the authority says[^4], and even of life itself, as for example, [being] God's enemy: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that either that saying of Augustine has been retracted, and is understood to have been retracted in the aforesaid retraction, which is set down in the preceding chapter[^5]; or [else] *dignity* there has only as much force as *congruity* alone: and there can be many congruities in sinners towards gratum-making grace through manifold grace freely given.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *"God ceases to foreknow future things when the future things cease to be."* For it seems false to say [this], because foreknowledge states something eternal; but nothing eternal ceases to be: therefore neither does the one foreknowing cease to foreknow. — Likewise, Richard[^6] says that, since there are four combinations — namely *that [there is] something which has beginning and end, something which lacks beginning and end, something which has beginning and not end (as the soul); the fourth, namely [something] which has end and not beginning, is impossible* — [for] that which lacks a beginning does not have its being from elsewhere: but what is such, is by itself: therefore it is altogether immutable, therefore it cannot cease. If therefore foreknowing lacks a beginning, it is necessary that it lack an end.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the Master speaks well in saying that God ceases to foreknow certain things when they become present. For if they were foreknown because they were future, and now cease to be future, it is clear that they cease to be *foreknown*, not by reason of that which is *knowing*, but by reason of the *prefix*.

To that which is objected concerning the eternal, it must be said that one [kind of] name imports the purely eternal, and another [kind of] name imports the eternal with the connotation of the temporal. This name *God* imports the purely eternal, but this word *to-foreknow* states the eternal with the connotation of the temporal. — According to this it must be noted that certain things connote the temporal as a being-in-act. And because such a temporal [thing] can both be and cease to be, therefore such acts about God are said to have a beginning and a term: as for example, if it is said: *"God preserves this thing,"* "to preserve" states the essence[^7] with the connotation of the effect; therefore it begins and ceases to preserve. Certain things connote the temporal as a non-being in act, [yet] a being in potency or future. And since the temporal cannot *begin* to be non-being or to be future, before it is, but can *cease* to be non-being when it begins to be a being, [and] *cease* to be future when it begins to be present: hence it is that the foreknowledge of God with respect to the created is said *to cease*, but never *to begin*; and it ceases by reason of the temporal not ceasing, but [rather] beginning[^8].

And from this is clear that [point] of Richard, because when[^9] God ceases to foreknow, it is not signified that some *being* ceases, but only that something *begins*; and so it is clear.

---

la: Quod S. Doctor hic docet de electione ad gratiam, valet etiam de tota praedestinatione et continet ea quae supra a. 1. q. 2. fusius dicta sunt.

en: What the holy Doctor here teaches concerning election to grace holds also for the whole of predestination, and contains what was said more fully above, art. 1, q. 2.

la: Ex codd. L Y restituimus *gratiae*, quod in Vat. desideratur.

en: From codd. L, Y we have restored *gratiae* ("of grace"), which is lacking in the Vatican edition.

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. dub. 3, ubi S. Doctor idem dicit his verbis: *Convenienter dicitur: « mulier egregiae formae »*, sed nihil est dictum: *« mulier formae »*.

en: Cf. above, d. 34, dub. 3, where the holy Doctor says the same in these words: *"It is fittingly said: 'a woman of outstanding form'"*; but nothing is said [by saying]: *"a woman of form."*

la: Secundum B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 29. a. 2. haec auctoritas est Augustini.

en: According to Bl. Albert, *II Sent.* d. 29, a. 2, this authority is from Augustine.

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 2. — De hoc et seq. dubio cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Text of the Master, c. 2. — On this and the following doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard [of Mediavilla], here at the text.

la: Quod hic ut Richardi dictum affertur, in eius scriptis verbotenus non invenitur, sed colligi potest ex iis, quae Richardus de diversis modis essendi docet I. *de Trin.* c. 4. et 6. seqq.

en: What is here adduced as Richard's saying is not found verbatim in his writings, but can be gathered from those things which Richard teaches concerning the diverse modes of being in *On the Trinity* I, c. 4 and 6 and following.

la: Supple cum ed. 1 *divinam*, et subinde post *connotando* cum Vat. et cod. cc *actu*.

en: Supply with ed. 1 *divinam* ("divine"), and then after *connotando* supply with the Vatican edition and cod. cc *actu* ("in act").

la: Solummodo Vat. et edd. 1. 5. addunt *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1 and 5 alone add *dicitur* ("is said").

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 42

title_alt: Distinction XLII — The Master's Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XLII.

### Cap. I. *De omnipotentia Dei, quare dicatur omnipotens, cum nos multa possimus, quae ipse non potest.*

Nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est, ubi prima consideratio occurrit, quomodo vere Deus dicatur omnipotens: an quia omnia possit, an tantum, quia ea possit quae vult. Quod enim Deus omnia possit, pluribus auctoritatibus comprobatur. Ait enim Augustinus in libro *Quaestionum veteris ac novae Legis*[^1]: « Omnia quidem potest Deus, sed non facit nisi quod convenit veritati eius et iustitiae ». Idem in eodem: « Potuit Deus cuncta simul facere, sed ratio prohibuit », id est voluntas. Rationem nempe ibi voluntatem appellavit, quia Dei voluntas rationabilis est et aequissima. Fatendum est ergo, Deum omnia posse.

### Cap. II. *Quomodo dicatur Deus omnia posse.*

Sed quaeritur, quomodo omnia posse dicatur, cum nos quaedam possimus[^2], quae ipse non potest. Non potest enim ambulare, loqui et huiusmodi, quae a natura divinitatis penitus sunt aliena, cum horum instrumenta nullatenus habere queat incorporea et simplex substantia. — Quibus id respondendum arbitror, quod huiusmodi actiones, ambulatio scilicet et locutio et huiusmodi, a Dei potentia alienae non sunt, sed ad ipsam pertinent. Licet enim huiusmodi actiones in se Deus habere non possit; non enim potest ambulare vel loqui et huiusmodi, eas tamen in creaturis potest operari. Facit enim, ut homo ambulet et loquatur, et huiusmodi. Non ergo per istas actiones divinae potentiae detrahitur aliquid, quia et hoc potest facere Deus[^3] omnipotens.

Sed sunt alia quaedam, quae Deus nullatenus facere potest, ut peccata; non enim potest mentiri, non potest peccare. Sed non ideo omnipotentia[^4] Dei in aliquo detrahitur vel derogatur, si peccare non posse dicitur, quia non esset hoc potentiae, sed infirmitatis. Si enim hoc posset, omnipotens non esset. Non igitur impotentiae, sed potentiae imputandum est, quod ista non potest. Unde Augustinus in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^5]: « Magna, inquit, Dei potentia est non posse mentiri ». Sunt enim quaedam, quae in aliis rebus potentiae deputanda sunt, in aliis vero minime; et quae in aliis laudabilia sunt, in aliis vero reprehensibilia sunt. Non ergo Deus ideo minus potens est, quia peccare non potest, cum omnipotens nullatenus sit qui hoc potest.

Sunt etiam et alia quaedam, quae Deus non potest; unde videtur non omnia posse. Non enim potest mori vel falli. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Symbolo*[^6]: « Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest falli, non potest miser fieri, non potest vinci. Haec utique et huiusmodi absit, ut possit omnipotens. Si enim huiusmodi passionibus atque defectibus subiici posset, omnipotens minime foret ». Et inde monstratur omnipotens, quia ei haec propinquare non valent; potest tamen haec in aliis operari.

### Cap. III. *Quod omnipotentia Dei secundum duo consideratur.*

Sic igitur[^7] diligenter considerantibus omnipotentia eius secundum duo apparet, scilicet quod omnia facit quae vult, et nihil omnino patitur. Secundum utrumque Deus omnipotens verissime praedicatur, quia nec aliquid est, quod ei ad patiendum corruptionem inferre valeat, nec aliquid ad faciendum impedimentum afferre. Manifestum est itaque, Deum omnino nihil posse pati et omnia facere posse praeter ea sola, quibus eius dignitas laederetur eiusque excellentiae derogaretur; in quo tamen non est minus omnipotens. Hoc[^8] enim posse non esset posse, sed non posse. Nemo ergo Deum impotentem in aliquo dicere praesumat, qui omnia potest, quae posse potentiae est; et inde vere dicitur omnipotens.

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Ex quibusdam tamen auctoritatibus traditur, ideo vere dici omnipotens, quia quidquid vult, potest. Unde Augustinus in *Enchiridio*[^9]: « Non ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens, nisi quoniam quidquid vult, potest, nec voluntate cuiuspiam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus ». Idem in libro *de Spiritu et Littera*[^10]: « Non potest Deus facere iniusta, quia ipse summa iustitia et bonitas est. Omnipotens vero est, non quod possit omnia facere, sed quia potest efficere, quidquid vult, ita ut nihil valeat eius voluntati resistere, quin compleatur, aut aliquo modo impedire eandem ». Ioannes Chrysostomus in Homilia quadam de expositione *Symboli*[^11] ait: « Omnipotens dicitur Deus, quia *posse* illius non potest invenire non posse, dicente Propheta[^12]: *Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit*. Ipse est ergo omnipotens, ut totum, quod vult, possit. Unde Apostolus: *Eius*, inquit, *voluntati quis resistit?* » His auctoritatibus videtur ostendi, quod Deus ex eo tantum dicatur omnipotens, quod omnia potest, quae vult, non quia omnia possit.

Sed ad hoc potest dici, quod Augustinus, ubi dicit: *Omnipotens non dicitur, quod omnia possit* etc., tam ample et generaliter accepit *omnia*, ut etiam mala includeret, quae Deus nec vult nec potest. Non ergo negavit, eum posse omnia quae convenit ei posse. Similiter, cum dicit: *Non ob aliud veraciter dicitur: omnipotens, nisi quoniam quidquid vult, potest*, non negat, eum posse etiam ea quae non vult; sed adversus illos qui dicebant, Deum multa velle, quae non poterat, affirmat, eum posse quidquid vult, et ex eo vere dici omnipotentem, non ob aliud, nisi[^13] quia potest quidquid vult. Sed cave, quomodo intelligas *potest quidquid vult*, an quidquid vult se posse, an quidquid vult facere, an quidquid vult fieri. Si enim dicas, ideo omnipotentem vocari, quia potest quidquid vult se posse, ergo et Petrus[^14] similiter omnipotens dici potest, vel quilibet sanctorum Beatorum, quia potest quidquid vult se posse, et potest facere quidquid vult facere. Non enim vult facere, nisi quod facit, nec posse, nisi quod veraciter potest; sed non potest facere quidquid vult fieri. Vult enim, salvos fieri qui salvandi sunt; verumtamen eos salvare non valet. Deus autem quidquid vult fieri, potest facere. Si enim vult aliquid fieri per se, potest illud per se facere, et per se facit, sicut caelum et terram per se fecit, quia voluit. Si autem vult fieri per creaturam et per eam operatur — sicut per homines facit domos et huiusmodi artificialia[^15] et Deus — quidem ex se et per se potest; homo autem vel Angelus, quantumcumque beatus est, non est potens ex se vel per se.

Sed forte dices, nec Dei Filius potest a se, nec Spiritus sanctus, sed solus Pater. Ille enim potest a se, qui est a se; Filius autem, quia non est a se, sed a Patre, non potest a se, sed a Patre; et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet Filius non possit a se nec operetur a se, potest tamen et operatur per se; sicut Spiritus sanctus. Unde Hilarius in libro nono *de Trinitate*[^16]: « Naturae, inquit, cui contradicis, haeretice, haec unitas est, ut ita per se agat Filius, ne a se agat, et ita non a se agat ut per se agat ». Per se autem dicitur agere et potens esse, quia naturalem habet potentiam eandem, quam et Pater, qua[^17] potens est et operatur; sed quia illam habet a Patre, non a se, ideo a Patre, non a se dicitur posse et agere. Homo autem vel Angelus gratuitam habet potentiam, qua potens est. Ideo igitur vere ac proprie Deus Trinitas omnipotens dicitur, quia per se, id est naturali potentia, potest quidquid vult fieri, et quidquid vult se posse. Nihil enim vult fieri, quod non possit facere per se vel per creaturas[^18]; et nihil vult se posse, quod non possit; et omne quod vult fieri, vult se posse; sed non omne quod vult se posse, vult et fieri. Si enim vellet, et fieret, quia voluntati eius nihil resistere potest[^19].

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XLII.

### Chap. I. *On the omnipotence of God, why he is called omnipotent, although we can do many things which he himself cannot.*

Now we must treat of the omnipotence of God, where the first consideration occurs, in what way God is truly called omnipotent: whether because he can do all things, or only because he can do those things which he wills. For that God can do all things is proved by many authorities. For Augustine says in the book of *Questions on the Old and New Law*[^1]: « God indeed can do all things, but he does not do [anything] except what befits his truth and his justice ». The same in the same [book]: « God could have made all things at once, but reason forbade [it] », that is, [his] will. For he there called the will *reason*, because God's will is reasonable and most equitable. It must therefore be admitted that God can do all things.

### Chap. II. *In what manner God is said to be able to do all things.*

But it is asked, in what manner he is said to be able to do all things, since we can do certain things[^2] which he himself cannot. For he cannot walk, speak, and the like, [things] which are utterly foreign to the nature of divinity, since an incorporeal and simple substance can in no way possess the instruments of these. — To these I think it must be answered, that actions of this kind, namely walking and speech and the like, are not foreign to God's power, but pertain to it. For although God cannot have such actions in himself — for he cannot walk or speak and the like — yet he can work them in creatures. For he brings it about that a man walks and speaks, and the like. Therefore through these actions nothing is taken away from the divine power, because this too the omnipotent God[^3] can do.

But there are certain other things which God can in no way do, such as sins; for he cannot lie, he cannot sin. But on this account nothing is taken away or derogated from the omnipotence[^4] of God in any respect, if he is said not to be able to sin, because this would not be [a matter] of power, but of weakness. For if he could [do] this, he would not be omnipotent. Therefore this — that he cannot [do] those things — is to be imputed not to impotence but to power. Whence Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^5]: « It is great power of God, he says, not to be able to lie ». For there are some things which in some matters are to be reckoned [matters] of power, but in others by no means; and which in some are praiseworthy, but in others reprehensible. Therefore God is not for this reason less powerful, because he cannot sin, since he is in no way omnipotent who can [do] this.

There are still other things which God cannot [do]; whence it seems that he cannot [do] all things. For he cannot die or be deceived. Whence Augustine in the book *On the Symbol*[^6]: « God omnipotent cannot die, cannot be deceived, cannot become wretched, cannot be overcome. Far be it, surely, that the omnipotent should be able [to do] these things and the like. For if he could be subjected to passions and defects of this sort, he would by no means be omnipotent ». And from this he is shown to be omnipotent, because these things cannot approach him; yet he can work these things in others.

### Chap. III. *That God's omnipotence is considered according to two [aspects].*

Thus therefore[^7] to those carefully considering, his omnipotence appears according to two [aspects], namely that he does all things which he wills, and suffers nothing at all. According to each [aspect] God is most truly proclaimed omnipotent, because there is neither anything which can bring corruption upon him to suffer, nor anything to bring an impediment to his action. It is manifest therefore that God can suffer absolutely nothing and can do all things, except those alone by which his dignity would be injured and his excellence diminished; in which [exception], nevertheless, he is no less omnipotent. For this[^8] *being able* would not be being able, but being unable. Therefore let no one presume to call God impotent in anything, who can do all things which it belongs to *being able* [to be able to do]; and from this he is truly called omnipotent.

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From certain authorities, however, it is handed down that he is therefore truly said to be omnipotent because whatever he wills, he can [do]. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^9]: « He is called omnipotent for no other reason in truth, except because whatever he wills, he can [do], nor is the effect of the omnipotent will impeded by the will of any creature ». The same in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*[^10]: « God cannot do unjust things, because he himself is the highest justice and goodness. But he is omnipotent, not because he can do all things, but because he can effect whatever he wills, in such a way that nothing can resist his will, [preventing it] from being fulfilled, or in any way impede it ». John Chrysostom in a certain Homily on the exposition of the *Symbol*[^11] says: « God is called omnipotent, because his *being able* cannot find *not being able*, the Prophet[^12] saying: *He has done all things whatsoever he willed*. He is therefore omnipotent, in such a way that he can [do] the whole of what he wills. Whence the Apostle: *Who*, he says, *resists his will?* » By these authorities it seems to be shown that God is said to be omnipotent only from this — that he can do all things which he wills, not because he can do all things.

But to this it can be said that Augustine, where he says: *He is not called omnipotent because he can do all things*, etc., took *all things* so amply and generally that he included even evils, which God neither wills nor can [do]. He therefore did not deny that he can do all things which it is fitting for him to be able [to do]. Likewise, when he says: *He is called omnipotent in truth for no other reason, except because whatever he wills he can [do]*, he does not deny that he can [do] even those things which he does not will; but against those who said that God wills many things which he was not able [to do], he affirms that he can [do] whatever he wills, and that from this he is truly called omnipotent, for no other reason, except[^13] because he can [do] whatever he wills. But beware how you understand *he can [do] whatever he wills*, whether [it means] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do], or whatever he wills to do, or whatever he wills to come to be. For if you say that he is called omnipotent because he can [do] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do], then also Peter[^14] can likewise be called omnipotent, or any one of the holy Blessed, because he can [do] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do], and he can do whatever he wills to do. For he does not will to do, except what he does, nor to be able, except what he truly can; but he cannot do whatever he wills to come to be. For he wills that those who are to be saved be saved; yet he is not able to save them. But God can do whatever he wills to come to be. For if he wills something to come to be through himself, he can do it through himself, and he does [it] through himself, just as he made heaven and earth through himself, because he willed [it]. But if he wills it to come to be through a creature and works through it — just as through men he makes houses and other artificial things[^15] of this kind, as does God — [he] indeed can [do it] from himself and through himself; but a man or Angel, however blessed, is not able from himself or through himself.

But perhaps you will say: neither the Son of God can [act] from himself, nor the Holy Spirit, but only the Father. For he is able [to act] from himself, who is from himself; but the Son, because he is not from himself, but from the Father, is not able [to act] from himself, but from the Father; and the Holy Spirit from both. — To which we say, that although the Son is not able [to act] from himself, nor work from himself, yet he can and does work through himself; just like the Holy Spirit. Whence Hilary in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^16]: « The unity of [that] nature, he says, which you contradict, heretic, is this — that the Son so acts through himself, that he does not act from himself, and so does not act from himself, that he acts through himself ». But he is said to act and to be powerful *through himself*, because he has the same natural power which the Father also has, by which[^17] he is powerful and works; but because he has it from the Father, not from himself, therefore from the Father, not from himself, he is said to be able and to act. But a man or Angel has a gratuitous power, by which he is powerful. Therefore truly and properly God the Trinity is called omnipotent, because through himself, that is, by natural power, he can [bring about] whatever he wills to come to be, and [can do] whatever he wills himself to be able [to do]. For he wills nothing to come to be which he cannot do through himself or through creatures[^18]; and he wills himself to be able to do nothing which he cannot [do]; and everything which he wills to come to be, he wills himself to be able [to do]; but not everything which he wills himself to be able [to do], he also wills to come to be. For if he willed [it], it would also come to be, because nothing can resist his will[^19].

---

la: *Quaest. ex novo Test.* q. 97; sequens locus ibid. c. utroque mixtim q. 106.

en: *Questions from the New Testament*, q. 97; the following passage [is from] the same [work], cap. mixed from both, q. 106.

la: Codd. A C D E *possumus*. — Hoc et alia plura, quae in hac dist. sequuntur sumta sunt ex Abaelardo, *Introd. ad theol.* III. n. 4.

en: Codices A C D E [read] *possumus*. — This and many other things which follow in this distinction are taken from Abelard, *Introduction to Theology* III, n. 4.

la: Omittitur *Deus* a cod. D et edd., exceptis 1, 5.

en: *Deus* is omitted by codex D and the editions, except 1, 5.

la: Edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *omnipotentiae*.

en: Editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *omnipotentiae*.

la: Cap. 14. n. 24. — Infra Vat. et aliae edd. *nullatenus possit esse* pro *nullatenus sit*, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 6 (5 in marg.).

en: Chapter 14, n. 24. — Below, the Vatican edition and the other editions [read] *nullatenus possit esse* in place of *nullatenus sit*, against the codices and editions 1, 6 (5 in the margin).

la: Ad Catech. c. 1. n. 2; secundum sensum. — Paulo inferius pro *inde* Vat. et edd. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 cum cod. D *ideo*.

en: *To the Catechumens*, c. 1, n. 2; according to the sense. — A little below, for *inde*, the Vatican edition and editions 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 with codex D [read] *ideo*.

la: Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, et cod. B minus congrue *Hic ergo*.

en: The Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, and codex B, less fittingly [read] *Hic ergo*.

la: Codd. C D E *Haec*. Deinde solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *quia omnia* pro *qui omnia*.

en: Codices C D E [read] *Haec*. Then only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 [read] *quia omnia* in place of *qui omnia*.

en: Chapter 96, n. 24.

la: Cap. 3. n. 31. et ultimo, secundum sensum.

en: Chapter 3, n. 31, and the last [chapter], according to the sense.

la: Non invenitur in nova ed. Chrysost., sed in ed. antiqua (cfr. supra pag. 208, nota 8.), ubi est in hom. 2.

en: It is not found in the new edition of Chrysostom, but in the old edition (cf. above p. 208, note 8), where it is in Homily 2.

la: Psalm. 113, 11; sequens locus est ad Rom. 9, 19.

en: Psalm 113:11; the following passage is from Romans 9:19.

la: Ita codd. et ed. 1; aliae edd. vel omittunt *nisi* vel ponunt *quam*.

en: Thus the codices and edition 1; the other editions either omit *nisi* or put *quam*.

la: Codd. adiiciunt *nunc*, ed. 1 *tunc*.

en: The codices add *nunc*, edition 1 [adds] *tunc*.

la: Solummodo Vat. *artificia*; ed. 1 *aedificia artificialia*. Deinde codd. omittunt *est* post *beatus*.

en: Only the Vatican edition [reads] *artificia*; edition 1 [reads] *aedificia artificialia*. Then the codices omit *est* after *beatus*.

la: *Num.* 18; in quo textu Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 cum codd. *a se agit, ut* pro *a se agat, ut*.

en: *Number* 18; in which text the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 with the codices [read] *a se agit, ut* in place of *a se agat, ut*.

la: Vat. et ed. 8 cum cod. E *qui*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 8 with codex E [read] *qui*.

la: Codd. et Vat. *creaturam*. Deinde fide codd. et ed. 1 adiunximus *et* ante *fieri* et ante *fieret*.

en: The codices and the Vatican edition [read] *creaturam*. Then on the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have added *et* before *fieri* and before *fieret*.

la: In hac dist. et dd. 43. 44. Magister plura ad verbum vel ad sensum sumsit ex Hugone a S. Vict., *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. I. c. 14; et *de Sacram.* I. p. II. c. 22. Ex his duobus operibus Magister etiam in aliis praecedentibus dist. interdum aliqua transcripsit.

en: In this distinction and in dd. 43, 44, the Master took many things, either verbatim or according to the sense, from Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. I, c. 14; and *On the Sacraments* I, pars II, c. 22. From these two works the Master also at times transcribed some things in other preceding distinctions.


title: Dist. 42, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLII. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLII. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLII.

#### *De potentia Dei in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.*

> *Nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de scientia divina, hic agit de potentia. Et quia potentiam tripliciter contingit considerari, scilicet quantum ad quidditatem possibilium, et quantum ad quantitatem, et quantum ad modum operandi; ideo haec pars continet tres partes sive tres distinctiones. In prima determinat Magister de potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest. In secunda determinat de potentia quantum ad quantitatem, ostendens eius immensitatem, infra distinctione quadragesima tertia: *Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes.* In tertia determinat de ipsa quantum ad modum, ibi distinctione quadragesima quarta: *Nunc illud restat discutiendum, utrum melius* etc.

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet quatuor partes. In *prima* Magister ostendit, quod Dei potentia est omnipotentia, quia est respectu omnium possibilium, *quae posse potentiae est*[^1]. In *secunda* removet illa possibilia, quae posse non est potentiae, ibi secundo capitulo[^2]: *Sed quaeritur, quomodo omnia posse dicatur.* In tertia ponit signa[^3], quae attestantur divinae potentiae, ibi: *Sic diligenter considerantibus omnipotentia eius* etc. In quarta Magister alias rationes omnipotentiae docet ad praedictam[^4] reducere, ibi: *Ex quibusdam tamen auctoritatibus traditur, ideo* etc. Et ibi primo ponit auctoritates, deinde docet eas exponere, et hoc ibi: *Sed ad hoc potest dici, quod Augustinus* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius distinctionis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit aliquid aliud a se.

Secundo, dato quod possit, quaeritur, utrum possit in omne, quod alii agenti est possibile.

Tertio, utrum divina potentia se extendat ad omne illud, quod alii agenti est impossibile.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum possibile dicatur aliquid simpliciter secundum causas superiores sive potentiam divinam, vel secundum inferiores sive potentiam creatam.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XLII.

#### *On the power of God in relation to the possibles which he can [effect].*

> *"Now we must treat of the omnipotence of God."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the divine knowledge; here he treats of [the divine] power. And since power can be considered in three ways — namely, as to the quiddity of the possibles, as to the quantity, and as to the mode of operating — therefore this part contains three sub-parts or three distinctions. In the first the Master determines concerning the power in relation to the possibles which it can [effect]. In the second he determines concerning the power as to its quantity, showing its immensity, below in distinction forty-three: *"Some, however, glorying in their own [private] judgement."* In the third he determines concerning the same as to [its] mode, there in distinction forty-four: *"Now it remains to be discussed whether [it would have been] better,"* etc.

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has four parts. In the *first* the Master shows that the power of God is omnipotence, because it is in respect of all possibles, *which [their being able] is [a function] of the power*[^1]. In the *second* he removes those possibles which to-be-able is not [a function] of the power, there in the second chapter[^2]: *"But it is asked how all things are said to be possible."* In the third he sets forth signs[^3] which attest the divine power, there: *"Thus, to those who consider diligently, his omnipotence,"* etc. In the fourth the Master teaches to reduce the other accounts of omnipotence to the aforesaid[^4] [one], there: *"Yet from certain authorities it is handed down, therefore,"* etc. And there he first sets forth the authorities, then teaches to expound them, and this there: *"But to this it can be said that Augustine,"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this distinction, four [matters] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God can [effect] something other than himself.

Second, granted that he can, it is asked whether he can [effect] every [thing] which is possible to any other agent.

Third, whether the divine power extends to every [thing] which is impossible to any other agent.

Fourth it is asked, whether something is said to be possible without qualification according to the higher causes — i.e., the divine power — or according to the lower [causes] — i.e., the created power.

---

la: Pro *posse potentiae est,* quam lectionem ex cod. I et ed. 1 restituimus, plurimi codd. *quae possibile est,* alii pauci cum Vat. *quae possibile est esse.* Lectio a nobis restituta non solum eo commendatur, quod in se spectata melior est, sed etiam quia locutio *posse potentiae est* et in subnexis recurrit et in ipso textu Magistri habetur.

en: In place of *"posse potentiae est"* ("to-be-able is [a function] of the power"), which reading we have restored from codex I and edition 1, the majority of the codices [read] *"quae possibile est"* ("which is possible"), a few others, with the Vatican [edition], *"quae possibile est esse"* ("which is possible to be"). The reading restored by us is commended not only because, considered in itself, it is better, but also because the locution *posse potentiae est* recurs in what follows and is found in the very text of the Master.

la: Vat. omittit *secundo capitulo.*

en: The Vatican [edition] omits *"in the second chapter."*

la: Vat. *rationes.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *"rationes"* ("accounts").

la: Intellige: *rationem, quam Magister statuerit.* — Pro *praedictam* Vat. *praedictas duas.*

en: Understand: *"the account which the Master has established."* — In place of *"praedictam"* ("the aforesaid"), the Vatican [edition reads] *"praedictas duas"* ("the two aforesaid"). ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]