site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De productione animae Evae aliorumque hominum.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de productione animae ipsius Evae et per consequens omnis alterius animae ab anima Adae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Prima quaestio est, utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia, vel diversae.

Secundo, dato quod diversae, quaeritur, utrum simul, vel successive sint in *esse* productae.

Tertio, dato quod successive, quaeritur, utrum anima sit ex traduce.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia, an diversae.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod animae omnium hominum sint una anima numero, non diversae.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Omne quod individuatur et multiplicatur ad alterius multiplicationem et individuationem, substantialiter dependet ab illo[^1]; sed anima intellectiva non dependet substantialiter a corpore, cum possit esse substantialiter sine illo: ergo non individuatur nec multiplicatur secundum individuationem corporis vel multiplicationem.

2. Item, plus assimilantur in complexione et natura duorum hominum corpora quam eiusdem corporis membra diversa, ut caro mea carni tuae, quam os meum carni meae: ergo si una anima potest esse vivificativa diversorum membrorum unius corporis, ita quod in illa membra diversas habet influentias secundum eorum dispositiones varias; videtur multo fortius, quod una anima possit esse perfectio duorum corporum sibi similium.

3. Item, multiplicatio in individuis eiusdem speciei attenditur propter conservationem, ut perpetuetur esse in pluribus quod non poterat perpetuari in uno; sed anima rationalis est incorruptibilis, sicut infra[^2] patebit: ergo videtur, quod in ea non sit multiplicatio secundum numerum: ergo in diversis hominibus non numeratur, sed est eadem numero.

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4. Item, si anima intellectiva individuaretur secundum corpus, per consequens quod reciperetur in illa, individuaretur secundum exigentiam corporis; sed anima intellectiva suscipit formam universalem, ut est universalis: ergo si forma existens in anima non individuatur, pari ratione nec anima, prout est in hoc corpore, individuari potest[^3].

5. Item, ad hoc quod anima rationalis aliquid intelligat, necesse est, quod ex se intelligente et intellecto fiat unum; sed contingit animas diversorum hominum omnino idem intelligere: ergo contingit unum et idem eis uniri. Sed quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem[^4]: ergo animae plurium hominum sunt una et eadem substantia numero.

6. Item, actus et officium substantiae spiritualis est regere et movere substantiam corporalem: ergo si nihil est otiosum in natura[^5], nunquam est ponere substantiam spiritualem, quae non moveat corporalem; sed si diversae essent substantiae in diversis hominibus, cum contingat, eas separari a corporibus propriis, contingeret, eas aliquando ab actu cessare, et ita otiosas esse: quod si hoc est inconveniens, inconveniens est, plures homines diversas animas rationales habere.

**Contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Sicut dicit Philosophus[^6], « prius actus habet fieri in propria materia »; sed anima rationalis est actus et entelechia corporis humani: ergo cum diversa sint corpora humana, diversae erunt animae rationales illorum corporum perfectivae.

2. Item, perfectionem et perfectibile necesse est ad invicem esse proportionabilia: ergo nec perfectibile excedit perfectionem, nec perfectio ipsum perfectibile. Si ergo anima rationalis est perfectio corporis humani, illa anima rationalis, quae est perfectio istius corporis, non est perfectio alterius corporis; et ita impossibile est, quod perficiat aliud corpus.

3. Item, ab eodem est esse, et esse unum sive esse distinctum[^7]; sed unumquodque habet esse a sua perfectione: ergo et distinctionem. Si igitur homo ab homine distinguitur, ergo et perfectio unius hominis a perfectione alterius; sed perfectio hominis, secundum quod est homo, est ipsa anima rationalis, non tantum sensibilis: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per deductionem ad impossibile multiplex. Quorum primum est, quia, si eadem anima est in multis hominibus, cum unus sit sciens, alter ignorans, unus bonus, alter malus, unus etiam odiat alterum; sequitur tunc, quod duo contraria erunt in eodem subiecto secundum numerum, et idem ipsum contrariabitur sibi ipsi. Quodsi hoc est impossibile[^8], restat, quod et illud ex quo sequitur, scilicet unam et eandem animam esse in pluribus hominibus.

5. Item, si una et eadem anima est in pluribus, post mortem nihil plus habet iustus quam impius: ergo bonum remanet irremuneratum et malum impunitum[^9]: ergo mundus est inordinatus, et Deus est iniustus, et stultus est qui facit aliquod bonum. Ergo si hoc est adeo impossibile, ut non tantum sit contra fidem, sed etiam contra rationem rectam, impossibile est, plures homines eandem animam rationalem habere.

6. Item, si una anima rationalis est in diversis hominibus, ergo post mortem non est magis beatus unus quam alter. Si igitur ad beatitudinem non pervenitur nisi per virtutem, et multi sunt, qui in hac vita non habent virtutes: ergo multi sunt, qui non perveniunt ad beatitudinem. Si igitur eadem est <!-- page 446 -->omnium anima, nulli beatificantur: ergo frustra factus est homo, frustra factus est etiam totus mundus. Et si hoc est omnino falsum et impium, falsum et impium est, unam animam esse in pluribus.

### Conclusio.

> Secundum fidem, rationem et experientiam constat, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in hac quaestione multi philosophantes multa dixerunt falsa et vana.

*Error 1.* Quidam enim philosophi crediderunt, non solum eandem esse animam in omnibus hominibus, sed etiam in omnibus animalibus. Crediderunt enim, animam non esse aliud quam Deum; et huius positionis fuit Pythagoras et Varro, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei de Varrone[^10]. Maxime autem hoc putaverunt de anima humana propter sui dignitatem et spiritualitatem quantum ad intellectum *agentem;* quantum vero ad intellectum *possibilem* crediderunt esse idem quod *hyle*[^11], quia anima potest recipere omnia, et ita denudata est a formis omnibus. — *Reprobatur.* Hoc autem ponere non est philosophia, sed manifesta insipientia. Cum enim anima sit variabilis et transmutabilis et bonitatis et malitiae susceptibilis, omnino *Deus* esse non potest[^12]. Cum iterum sit forma nobilissima inter naturales formas, dans actum et complementum corpori et distincta ab aliis formis naturalibus, *hyle* esse non potest.

*Error 2.* Alii autem aliter opinati sunt, quod anima humana sive intellectualis, secundum quod intellectualis est, una est in omnibus hominibus, non solum quantum ad intellectum *agentem*, sed etiam quantum ad intellectum *possibilem*. — *Rationes 2.* Et ratio, quae movit ad hoc ponendum, fuit ipsius animae immaterialitas et incorruptibilitas. Quia enim immaterialis est et a corpore non dependens, per corpus non potest individuari, cum nec sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut dicit Philosophus[^13]. Cum sit incorruptibilis, non indiget multiplicari, cum una numero conservari possit. — Et haec fuit positio Commentatoris super librum de Anima[^14], quam etiam vult imponere Aristoteli et trahere ex verbis suis, tum quia ponit mundum aeternum, et ita homines innumerabiles praecesserunt; tum etiam, quia ponit, quod nulla sit substantia spiritualis, quae non habeat corpus movere; quodsi diversae animae essent in diversis hominibus, aliquando cessarent ab actu movendi, cum separantur; essent etiam infinitae actu, cum motus caeli non habuerit principium, secundum Philosophum.

*Explicatur erro[r].* Ad vitandas autem obiectiones in contrarium adductas distinguit Commentator tres partes in humana anima. Cuius verba sunt haec super tertium de Anima[^15]: « Opinandum est, quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus *recipiens*, secunda autem *efficiens*, tertia autem *factum*; et duae istarum sunt aeternae, scilicet *agens* et *recipiens*, tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis ». Animam autem tertiam, quam dicit generabilem et corruptibilem, vocat intellectum *passivum*; et illud dicit quod nihil aliud est quam imaginatio. Unde postmodum subiungit[^16]: « Intellectus passivus est corruptibilis, et absque hoc nihil intelligitur. Per intellectum autem passivum intelligo virtutem imaginariam ». Unde vult dicere, quod sicut in visu est color, et est lux, et est oculus videns; sic in intellectu se habet, quod species imaginariae sunt sicut color, intellectus agens est sicut lux, intellectus possibilis est sicut oculus. Et sicut ex concursu illorum trium efficitur visus, ita ex concursu illorum trium efficitur intellectus; et sicut ex diversitate vel defectu coloris causatur diversitas vel defectus actus videndi, sic ex diversitate existente in similitudinibus imaginariis vel imaginatione causatur diversitas in intellectu plurium et defectus etiam actus intelligendi in eodem homine, quia nihil intelligimus nisi in phantasmate. Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus[^17] corrumpi intellectum, quodam interius corrupto; intellectum, inquam, non quemlibet, sed *adeptum*. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, nititur declinare inconvenientia, quae ad hanc opinionem sequuntur.

*Reprobatur triplici ratione.* Quantumcumque autem hanc opinionem coloret, pessima est et haeretica. Est enim contra chri-<!-- page 447 -->stianam religionem, dum aufert meritorum retributionem, quae non esset, si omnium anima una esset. — Est etiam contra *rectam rationem*. Planum est *Notandum.* enim, quod anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva est, est perfectio hominis, secundum quod homo. Si ergo homines non sunt diversi solum, secundum quod animalia, sed secundum quod homines, non solum habent diversas imaginationes et animas sensibiles, immo etiam diversos intellectus et animas rationales. — Est etiam contra *sensibilem experientiam*, quoniam diversi homines diversas habent et contrarias cogitationes et affectiones. Quodsi tu dicas, quod hoc venit ex diversitate specierum existentium in imaginatione; hoc nihil est, quia non solummodo diversificantur in his intelligibilibus, quae extrahuntur a sensu, immo etiam in his quae sunt supra omnem imaginationem, sicut sunt virtutes, quae intelliguntur per suam essentiam, non per speciem imaginariam, sicut etiam est ipse Deus[^18], quem quidam diligunt, quidam contemnunt.

*Conclusio.* Hanc igitur positionem repudiando tanquam haereticam et falsam, dicendum est secundum fidem et veritatem, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales, et concedendae sunt rationes hoc probantes.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod intellectus non dependet a corpore, ergo ab eo non potest individuari: dicendum, quod intellectus individuatur secundum corporis indigentiam; non tamen eius individuatio est a corpore, sed a propriis principiis, materia scilicet et forma sua, quas de se habet, sicut in se subsistit, sicut determinatum est supra[^19].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una anima potest perficere diversa membra; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod omnia membra continuantur et reducuntur ad unum principale membrum in corpore, mediante quo est defluxus, motus et sensus ad alia membra, ut patet in corde[^20]; diversorum autem hominum corpora non continuantur nec reducuntur ad unum membrum: et ideo non possunt habere unam perfectionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicatio numeralis fit propter conservationem speciei; dicendum, quod sicut in praecedentibus[^21] dictum est, haec non est tota causa nec praecipua, immo principalis ratio est ad manifestationem bonitatis divinae; *Notandum.* et haec praecipue est in animabus, quae multae sunt, ut eis distribuatur gratiarum Dei multiformitas, et compleatur illius supernae civitatis integritas et numerositas.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima recipit formam universalem, ut est universalis; dicendum, *Notandum.* quod etsi illa forma, quam anima recipit, sit universalis per indifferentiam ad multa singularia cognoscenda, tamen revera illa species, quae est in anima, est quoddam accidens singulare, quae qualificat et disponit ipsam animam et in diversis animabus diversificatur; sicut et scientia, quae in diversis cognoscentibus est alia et alia, quamvis sit de re unica[^22].

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens. *Notandum.* Quando enim dicitur, quod ad actum intelligendi requiritur, quod ex intellecto et intelligente fiat unum: hoc intelligitur quantum ad speciem, quae unitur intellectui, non quantum ad ipsum obiectum extrinsecum. Illa autem species, quae intellectui unitur, habet comparationem ad intellectum, in quo est, et ad obiectum, ad quod est et quod repraesentat; et quamvis in comparatione ad obiectum habeat unitatem quodam modo in diversis cognoscentibus, quia ad idem, in quantum est ratio et similitudo eiusdem; tamen in comparatione ad animam, in qua est, habet diversitatem. Et potest poni exemplum de speciebus receptis in duobus speculis, vel in duobus oculis.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantiae spiritualis officium est movere corpus; dicendum, *Dupliciter deficit.* quod illud argumentum dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia propter hoc non est substantia spiritualis principaliter facta. Cessabit enim omnis motus, quod ignoravit Philosophus; unde vana est ratio sua, quando assumsit numerum motorum secundum numerum mobilium et motuum[^23]; multo enim plures sunt Angeli, quam sint orbes, qui moventur; non enim facti sunt ad hoc, sed ad fruendum Deo. <!-- page 448 -->— *Notandum.* Deficit etiam in hoc, quod etsi anima separetur a corpore, resumet tamen aliquando corpus suum per resurrectionem; quod etiam Philosophus ignoravit; et ideo non est mirum, si in huiusmodi deficit. Necesse est enim, philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adiuvetur per radium fidei.

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### Article II. *On the production of the soul of Eve and of all other human beings.*

Next, inquiry is made concerning the second article, namely concerning the production of the soul of Eve herself and, consequently, of every other soul beyond the soul of Adam. And concerning this, three things are asked.

The first question is whether the souls of all human beings are one substance, or diverse.

Second, granted that they are diverse, it is asked whether they were brought into being simultaneously, or successively.

Third, granted that they were brought forth successively, it is asked whether the soul is by traduction.

### Question I. *Whether the souls of all human beings are one substance, or diverse.*

Concerning the first, the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the souls of all human beings are one soul in number, not diverse.

*On the contrary side.*

1. Everything that is individuated and multiplied to the multiplication and individuation of another, depends substantially upon that other[^1]; but the intellective soul does not depend substantially upon the body, since it can be substantially without it: therefore it is not individuated nor multiplied according to the individuation or multiplication of the body.

2. Likewise, the bodies of two human beings are more assimilated in complexion and nature than the diverse members of the same body — as my flesh to your flesh, more than my bone to my flesh: therefore if one soul can be vivifying of diverse members of one body, in such a way that in those members it has diverse influences according to their various dispositions, it seems much more strongly that one soul could be the perfection of two bodies similar to each other.

3. Likewise, multiplication in individuals of the same species is attended to for the sake of conservation, that being may be perpetuated in many what could not be perpetuated in one; but the rational soul is incorruptible, as will be shown below[^2]: therefore it seems that in it there is no multiplication according to number: therefore in diverse human beings it is not numbered, but is the same in number.

4. Likewise, if the intellective soul were individuated according to the body, consequently what was received in it would be individuated according to the exigency of the body; but the intellective soul receives the universal form, as it is universal: therefore if the form existing in the soul is not individuated, by equal reasoning neither can the soul, insofar as it is in this body, be individuated[^3].

5. Likewise, in order that the rational soul understand something, it is necessary that from itself as understanding and from the understood thing there should come to be one; but it happens that the souls of diverse human beings understand altogether the same thing: therefore it happens that one and the same thing is united to them. But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other[^4]: therefore the souls of many human beings are one and the same substance in number.

6. Likewise, the act and office of spiritual substance is to rule and to move corporeal substance: therefore, if nothing is idle in nature[^5], one is never to posit a spiritual substance that does not move a corporeal one; but if there were diverse substances in diverse human beings, since it happens that they are separated from their proper bodies, it would happen that at some time they ceased from act, and so were idle: but if this is incongruous, it is incongruous that many human beings have diverse rational souls.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. As the Philosopher says[^6], « act has to come to be first in its proper matter »; but the rational soul is the act and entelechy of the human body: therefore, since human bodies are diverse, diverse will be the rational souls perfective of those bodies.

2. Likewise, it is necessary that the perfection and the perfectible be proportionable to one another: therefore neither does the perfectible exceed the perfection, nor the perfection the perfectible itself. If, therefore, the rational soul is the perfection of the human body, that rational soul which is the perfection of this body is not the perfection of another body; and so it is impossible that it should perfect another body.

3. Likewise, from the same source comes being and being-one or being-distinct[^7]; but each thing has being from its perfection: therefore also distinction. If, therefore, one human being is distinguished from another, then also the perfection of one human being from the perfection of another; but the perfection of a human being, insofar as he is a human being, is the rational soul itself, not merely the sensitive: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this very thing is seen by a manifold reduction to the impossible. The first of these is, because if the same soul is in many human beings, since one is knowing, another ignorant, one good, another evil, one even hates another; it would then follow that two contraries would be in the same subject according to number, and the same thing would be contrary to itself. But if this is impossible[^8], it remains that also that from which it follows — namely, that one and the same soul is in many human beings — is impossible.

5. Likewise, if one and the same soul is in many, after death the just has nothing more than the impious: therefore good remains unrewarded and evil unpunished[^9]: therefore the world is disordered, and God is unjust, and foolish is he who does any good. Therefore, if this is so impossible that it is not only against faith but also against right reason, it is impossible that many human beings have the same rational soul.

6. Likewise, if one rational soul is in diverse human beings, then after death one is no more blessed than another. If therefore one does not come to beatitude except through virtue, and many there are who in this life do not have virtues: therefore many there are who do not come to beatitude. If therefore the soul of all is the same, none are beatified: therefore in vain was the human being made, in vain was the whole world made. And if this is altogether false and impious, it is false and impious that one soul be in many.

### Conclusio.

> According to faith, reason, and experience it stands firm that diverse human beings have diverse rational souls.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that in this question many philosophizing men said many false and vain things.

*Error 1.* For certain philosophers believed that not only is the soul the same in all human beings, but also in all animals. For they believed that the soul is nothing other than God; and of this position were Pythagoras and Varro, as Augustine says in the book *On the City of God* concerning Varro[^10]. But they especially supposed this of the human soul on account of its dignity and spirituality with respect to the *agent* intellect; with respect to the *possible* intellect, however, they believed it to be the same as *hyle*[^11], because the soul can receive all things, and so is denuded of all forms. — *It is reproved.* But to posit this is not philosophy, but manifest folly. For since the soul is variable and changeable and susceptible of goodness and malice, it altogether cannot be *God*[^12]. Since, again, it is the noblest form among natural forms, giving act and completion to the body and distinct from other natural forms, it cannot be *hyle*.

*Error 2.* Others, however, have opined otherwise, namely that the human or intellectual soul, insofar as it is intellectual, is one in all human beings — not only with respect to the *agent* intellect, but also with respect to the *possible* intellect. — *Two reasons.* And the reason that moved them to posit this was the immateriality and incorruptibility of the soul itself. For since it is immaterial and not depending on the body, it cannot be individuated through the body, since it is neither a body nor a power in a body, as the Philosopher says[^13]. Since it is incorruptible, it does not need to be multiplied, since it can be conserved as one in number. — And this was the position of the Commentator on the book *On the Soul*[^14], which he also wishes to impose on Aristotle and to draw from his words, both because he posits the world to be eternal, and so innumerable human beings have preceded; and also because he posits that no spiritual substance is such as not to have a body to move; but if diverse souls were in diverse human beings, when separated they would at some time cease from the act of moving; they would also be infinite in act, since the motion of the heavens has had no beginning, according to the Philosopher.

*The error is set out.* In order, however, to avoid the objections adduced to the contrary, the Commentator distinguishes three parts in the human soul. His words on the third book of *On the Soul* are these[^15]: « It is to be supposed that in the soul there are three parts of intellect, of which one is the *receiving* intellect, the second the *effecting*, the third the *made*; and two of these are eternal, namely the agent and the receiving, but the third is generable and corruptible ». Now the third soul, which he calls generable and corruptible, he names the *passive* intellect; and that he says is nothing other than imagination. Whence afterwards he adds[^16]: « The passive intellect is corruptible, and without it nothing is understood. By the passive intellect I mean the imaginative power ». Whence he wishes to say that, just as in vision there is color, and there is light, and there is the seeing eye, so it stands in the intellect that the imaginative species are like the color, the agent intellect is like the light, and the possible intellect is like the eye. And just as vision is effected from the concurrence of those three, so intellect is effected from the concurrence of those three; and just as from the diversity or defect of color is caused diversity or defect of the act of seeing, so from the diversity existing in imaginative likenesses or in imagination is caused diversity in the intellect of many and even defect of the act of understanding in the same human being, since we understand nothing except in a phantasm. And to this extent the Philosopher says[^17] that intellect is corrupted when something interior is corrupted — intellect, I say, not any whatsoever, but the *acquired*. And by these things which have been said, he strives to deflect the inconveniences which follow upon this opinion.

*It is reproved by a threefold reasoning.* But however much he may color this opinion, it is most wicked and heretical. For it is against the Christian <!-- page 447 -->religion, since it takes away the recompense of merits, which would not be if the soul of all were one. — It is also against *right reason*. *To be noted.* For it is plain that the intellective soul, insofar as it is intellective, is the perfection of the human being insofar as he is human. If, therefore, human beings are not diverse only insofar as they are animals, but insofar as they are human beings, they have not only diverse imaginations and sensitive souls, but also diverse intellects and rational souls. — It is also against *sensible experience*, since diverse human beings have diverse and contrary thoughts and affections. But if you should say that this comes from the diversity of species existing in the imagination, this amounts to nothing, because they are not only diversified in those intelligibles which are drawn out from sense, but also in those which are above all imagination — such as the virtues, which are understood through their essence, not through an imaginary species, just as is God himself[^18], whom some love, some despise.

*Conclusion.* Repudiating, therefore, this position as heretical and false, it must be said according to faith and truth that diverse human beings have diverse rational souls, and the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the contrary arguments.*

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary — that the intellect does not depend on the body, therefore cannot be individuated by it — it must be said that the intellect is individuated according to the indigence of the body; nevertheless its individuation is not from the body, but from its own principles, namely matter and its form, which it has of itself, as it subsists in itself, as has been determined above[^19].

2. To that which is objected — that one soul can perfect diverse members — it must be said that the cases are not alike, for the reason that all members are continuous and reduced to one principal member in the body, by the mediation of which there is influx, motion, and sense to the other members, as is evident in the heart[^20]; the bodies of diverse human beings, however, are not continuous nor reduced to one member: and therefore they cannot have one perfection.

3. To that which is objected — that numerical multiplication takes place for the conservation of the species — it must be said that, as in the preceding[^21] has been said, this is not the whole nor the chief cause; rather the principal reason is for the manifestation of divine goodness; *To be noted.* and this is chiefly in souls, which are many, that to them may be distributed the multiform graces of God, and that the integrity and number of that supernal city may be completed.

4. To that which is objected — that the soul receives a universal form, as it is universal — it must be said, *To be noted*, that although that form which the soul receives is universal by indifference to many singulars to be known, nevertheless in reality that species which is in the soul is a certain singular accident, which qualifies and disposes the soul itself and is diversified in diverse souls; just as science also, which in diverse knowers is one and another, although it be of one single thing[^22].

5. And by this is evident the response to the next. *To be noted.* For when it is said that for the act of understanding it is required that from the understood thing and the understanding there be made one: this is to be understood as regards the species, which is united to the intellect, not as regards the extrinsic object itself. But that species which is united to the intellect has a relation to the intellect in which it is and to the object to which it is and which it represents; and although in relation to the object it has a unity in a certain manner in diverse knowers, because it is directed to the same thing, inasmuch as it is the account and likeness of the same — nevertheless, in relation to the soul in which it is, it has diversity. And an example may be taken from species received in two mirrors, or in two eyes.

6. To that which is objected — that the office of spiritual substance is to move a body — it must be said, *It is deficient in two ways.* that that argument is deficient in two ways. First, because spiritual substance is not principally made for this. For all motion will cease, which the Philosopher was ignorant of; whence his reasoning is vain when he assumed the number of movers according to the number of moveables and motions[^23]; for there are many more Angels than there are orbs that are moved; nor are they made for this, but for enjoying God. <!-- page 448 -->— *To be noted.* It is also deficient in this, that although the soul be separated from the body, nevertheless it will resume its body at some time through the resurrection — which also the Philosopher was ignorant of; and therefore it is no wonder if in things of this kind he is deficient. For it is necessary that one philosophizing slip into some error, unless he be helped by the ray of faith.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 2.) et VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.). — Rationes pro hac opinione praecipue inveniuntur in Averrois Comment. super III. de Anima, text. 4-8; text. 18-20; Destruct. destruct. Disput. physica secunda, in qua, relatis 10 rationibus huius opinionis et Algazelis dubitationibus de ipsis, Averroes illas explicat et has solvit; Tract. de Animae beatitudine; Libell. seu epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine. — Plures codd. cum ed. 2 in hoc arg. bis substituunt *dividuationem* pro *individuationem*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 20 (c. 2) and *Metaphysics* VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8). — The reasons for this opinion are found especially in Averroes's *Commentary on On the Soul* III, texts 4–8; texts 18–20; *Destructio destructionum*, second physical disputation, in which, having reported 10 reasons for this opinion and Algazel's doubts about them, Averroes explains them and resolves these; *Treatise on the Beatitude of the Soul*; *Libellus seu epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine*. — Several codices with edition 2 in this argument twice substitute *dividuationem* for *individuationem*.

la: Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Maior est secundum Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.) et II. de Anima, text. 35. (c. 4.).

en: Dist. 19, a. 1, q. 1. — The major is according to Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 59 (c. 10), and *On the Soul* II, text 35 (c. 4).

la: Averroes, in III. de Anima, text. 5. causam diversitatis inter intellectum et materiam ita assignat: Causa propter quam ista natura [intellectus] est distinguens et cognoscens, prima autem materia neque cognoscens neque distinguens, est, quia prima materia recipit formas diversas, scilicet individuales et istas [singulares]; ista autem recipit formas universales. Et ex hoc apparet, quod ista natura non est aliquod hoc [hoc aliquid sive singulare] neque corpus neque virtus in corpore, quoniam si ita esset, tunc reciperet formas, secundum quod sunt diversa et ista [i. e. individuales et singulares], et si ita esset, tunc formae existentes in ipsa essent intellectae in potentia, et sic non distingueret naturam formarum, secundum quod sunt formae etc. — In maiori, quae fundatur in illo axiomate: *Omne quod recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis,* non *recepti*, cod. cc et ed. 1 *recipitur* pro *reciperetur*.

en: Averroes, on III. *de Anima*, text 5, assigns the cause of diversity between intellect and matter thus: The reason why this nature [the intellect] is distinguishing and knowing, while prime matter is neither knowing nor distinguishing, is that prime matter receives diverse forms, namely individual and these [singular] forms; whereas this [the intellect] receives universal forms. And from this it appears that this nature is not any *this* [individual or singular], nor a body, nor a power in a body — since if it were, it would then receive forms insofar as they are diverse and these [individual and singular], and if so, then the forms existing in it would be understood in potency, and so it would not distinguish the nature of forms insofar as they are forms, etc. — In the major, which is founded on this axiom *Whatever is received is received according to the manner of the receiver, not of the received*, codex cc and edition 1 read *recipitur* for *reciperetur*.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 25. (c. 32.): Eadem iisdem eadem erunt. Cfr. VII. Topic. c. 1. et I. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.). — Hoc et seq. arg. ponit Averroes in III. de Anima, text. 5.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 25 (c. 32): Things the same as the same are the same. Cf. *Topics* VII c. 1 and *Physics* I, text 17 (c. 2). — Averroes lays down this and the following argument in *On the Soul* III, text 5.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 48. (c. 9.) iuxta translationem Arabico-latinam: Si igitur natura nihil facit otiose etc. — Averroes, in XII. Metaph. text. 44. ait: Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod si aliquae substantiae essent non moventes, essent otiosae. — Paulo inferius post *essent* in cod. A additur *spirituales*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 48 (c. 9), according to the Arabic-Latin translation: If, therefore, nature does nothing idly, etc. — Averroes, on *Metaphysics* XII, text 44, says: And therefore Aristotle says that if there were certain substances that were not moving, they would be idle. — A little below, after *essent*, codex A adds *spirituales*.

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.), ubi etiam principia seq. arg. insinuantur. Cfr. ibid. I. text. 53. (c. 3.). — De entelechia vide supra pag. 33, nota 3.

en: Book II of *On the Soul*, text 26 (c. 2), where also the principles of the following argument are intimated. Cf. ibid. I, text 53 (c. 3). — On entelechy see above p. 33, note 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 3. (III. c. 2.). August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 6. n. 8; Boeth., de Unitate et uno: « Quidquid est, ideo est quod unum est; quod sic ostenditur. Omne enim esse ex forma est in rebus creatis; sed nullum esse ex forma est, nisi cum forma materiae unita est. Esse enim non est nisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia. Unde philosophi dicunt illud describentes: *Esse* est existentia formae in materia. Cum autem forma materiae unitur, ex coniunctione utriusque necessario aliquid *unum* constituitur » etc. Idem ostendit III. de Consol. prosa 11. — Averroes ipse haec argg., sicut et plura impossibilia, quae ex sua opinione sequuntur, sibi obiicit, et propter ipsa fatetur, hanc quaestionem esse valde difficilem (III. de Anima, text. 5.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 3 (III, c. 2). Augustine, *On the Manners of the Manichaeans* II, c. 6, n. 8; Boethius, *On Unity and the One*: « Whatever is, is for the reason that it is one; which is shown thus. For all being is from form in created things; but no being is from form except when the form is united to matter. For being is not except from the conjunction of form with matter. Whence the philosophers describing it say: *Being* is the existence of form in matter. But when form is united to matter, from the conjunction of the two there is necessarily constituted something *one* », etc. The same he shows in *On Consolation* III, prose 11. — Averroes himself raises these arguments to himself, as well as many other impossibilities which follow from his opinion, and on account of them he confesses that this question is very difficult (*On the Soul* III, text 5).

la: Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (14.): Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria. August., de Quantit. animae, c. 32. n. 69: Si enim dixero, unam esse animam, conturbaberis, quod in altero beata est, in altero misera; nec una res simul et beata et misera potest esse. — Paulo superius post *secundum numerum* Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, subiungit *et in eadem parte, cum non habeat diversas partes*. Dein post *restat* multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt *quod*; in fine huius propositionis supple: *impossibile est*.

en: Aristotle, *Perihermeneias* II, c. 4 (14): But it does not happen that contraries are simultaneously in the same thing. Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul* c. 32, n. 69: For if I say that the soul is one, you will be disturbed, since in the one it is blessed, in the other miserable; nor can one thing simultaneously be both blessed and miserable. — A little above, after *according to number*, the Vatican edition with the other editions, excepting 1, adds *and in the same part, since it does not have diverse parts*. Then after *restat* many codices with editions 1 and 2 omit *quod*; at the end of this proposition supply: *it is impossible*.

la: Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. nullum bonum irremuneratum et nullum malum impunitum. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 713, nota 2.

en: According to Boethius, *On Consolation* IV, prose 1 and 4, no good is unrewarded and no evil unpunished. Cf. tom. 1, p. 713, note 2.

la: Libr. IV. c. 31; VII. c. 6. et 23, ubi hanc opinionem tribuit Varroni. Isidor., VIII. Etymol. c. 6. n. 19. referens sententias philosophorum de Deo ait: « Quidam [Deum esse dicunt] animum in omnibus commeantem (alias: commanentem) et lucidum, ut Pythagoras ». Idem dicit Cicero, I. de Natura Deor. c. 11; Lactantius, I. Div. Inst. c. 5; Minucius Felix in Octavio, c. 19.

en: Book IV, c. 31; VII, cc. 6 and 23, where he attributes this opinion to Varro. Isidore, *Etymologies* VIII, c. 6, n. 19, reporting the opinions of philosophers concerning God, says: « Some [say that God is] a mind passing through all things (variant: remaining in all things) and luminous, as Pythagoras ». The same is said by Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* I, c. 11; Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* I, c. 5; Minucius Felix, in the *Octavius*, c. 19.

la: Graece ὕλη, i. e. materia prima, de qua vide supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1.

en: In Greek ὕλη, that is, prime matter, on which see above d. 12, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius nonnulli codd. *maxima* pro *manifesta*.

en: Cf. above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above, several codices read *maxima* for *manifesta*.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 4. (c. 4.), ubi dicit de intellectu, quod sit *immixtus* i. e. ut explicat Averroes, quod sit nec corpus nec virtus in corpore. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 445, nota 1.

en: Book III of *On the Soul*, text 4 (c. 4), where he says of the intellect that it is *unmixed* — that is, as Averroes explains, that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. Cf. also above p. 445, note 1.

la: Libr. III. text. 4-8. et text. 18. seqq.

en: Book III, texts 4–8 and texts 18 and following.

la: Vide supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam in fundam. 5. haec opinio tangitur. — Text. 5.

en: See above d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, where this opinion is also touched on in fundamentum 5. — Text 5.

la: Loco cit. — In his verbis edd. Venet. an. 1489 et 1560 legunt: *et absque hoc nihil intelligit* [intellectus recipiens sive materialis]; *et intendit* [Aristoteles] *per intellectum passivum virtutem imaginativam*. — Ibid. etiam comparatio visus cum intellectu habetur. — Paulo superius codd. M aa substituunt *Illam autem tertiam* pro *Animam autem tertiam*.

en: Loc. cit. — In these words the Venice editions of 1489 and 1560 read: *and without it [the receiving or material intellect] understands nothing; and [Aristotle] means by* passive intellect *the imaginative power*. — Ibid. also the comparison of vision with intellect is found. — A little above, codices M aa substitute *Illam autem tertiam* for *Animam autem tertiam*.

la: Libr. I. de Anima, text. 66. (c. 4.). — Quid sit intellectus *adeptus* declarat Averroes, loc. cit. Relata enim praedicta comparatione visus cum intellectu, ait: Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum de intellectu *materiali* [recipiente] et *agente*. Et cum intellectus *materialis* fuerit copulatus, secundum quod perficitur per intellectum *agentem*, tunc nos sumus copulati cum intellectu *agente*; et ista dispositio dicitur *adeptio*, et intellectus *adeptus*.

en: Book I of *On the Soul*, text 66 (c. 4). — What the *acquired* intellect is, Averroes declares loc. cit. For having reported the aforesaid comparison of vision with intellect, he says: According to this, then, it is to be understood concerning the *material* [receiving] and *agent* intellect. And when the *material* intellect has been conjoined, inasmuch as it is perfected through the *agent* intellect, then we are conjoined with the *agent* intellect; and this disposition is called *acquisition*, and the intellect *acquired*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. circa finem, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 4, ubi verba Augustini hac de re explicantur.

en: Cf. below d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, in the body near the end, and *I Sent.* d. 17, p. 1, q. 4, where Augustine's words on this matter are explained.

la: De quo cfr. Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 3. seq. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

en: Concerning which cf. Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals* III, c. 3 and following. See also *I Sent.* d. 8, p. II, q. 3.

la: Avicenna, V. Metaph. c. 2: Quod igitur in anima intelligitur de homine est id quod est universale; eius autem universalitas non est ex hoc, quod est in anima, sed ex hoc, quod consideratur ad multa signata habentia esse vel opinata; eorum enim iudicium quantum ad ipsum idem est. Ex hoc autem, quod haec forma est dispositio in anima aliqua, est unum de individuis scientiarum vel formationum; quia, sicut aliquid diversis respectibus est genus et species, similiter aliquid diversis respectibus est universale et singulare. Haec igitur forma, secundum hoc quod est in anima, est aliqua formarum animae et est singularis, et secundum hoc, quod in ea multa conveniunt secundum aliquem trium praedictorum modorum, est universalis. Inter haec autem duo non est contrarietas. Non enim est impossibile, haec simul esse, scil. ut sit una essentia, et accidat ei communio relatione multorum; communio enim multitudinis non potest esse nisi relatione tantum; nisi enim relatio fieret ad multa, non esset communio etc. — Paulo superius plures codd. *quod qualificat*, Vat. *quod vel quae qualificat* pro *quae qualificat*.

en: Avicenna, *Metaphysics* V, c. 2: What therefore is understood in the soul concerning the human being is that which is universal; but its universality is not from the fact that it is in the soul, but from the fact that it is considered with respect to many designated things having being or supposed to have being; for the judgement concerning them as to itself is the same. From the fact, however, that this form is a disposition in some soul, it is one of the individuals of the sciences or formations; for just as something in diverse respects is genus and species, similarly something in diverse respects is universal and singular. This form, therefore, insofar as it is in the soul, is one of the soul's forms and is singular; and insofar as in it many things come together according to one of the three aforesaid modes, it is universal. Between these two there is no contrariety. For it is not impossible that these be simultaneously, namely that there be one essence, and that to it accrue community by relation to many; for community of multitude cannot be except by relation only; for unless a relation were made to many, there would be no community, etc. — A little above, many codices read *quod qualificat*, Vatican *quod vel quae qualificat* for *quae qualificat*.

la: Sicut fecit in XII. Metaph. text. 42. seqq. (XI. c. 8.) et Averroes, Epitom. in Metaph. tract. 4. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *si in huiusmodi defecit* pro *si in huiusmodi deficit*.

en: As he did in *Metaphysics* XII, text 42 and following (XI, c. 8), and Averroes, *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, tract 4. — A little below, several codices with editions 2 and 3 read *si in huiusmodi defecit* for *si in huiusmodi deficit*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio militat contra pessimum errorem philosophorum Arabum, qui unitatem numericam animarum, vel saltem intellectus agentis docebant et in hoc sensu Aristotelem interpretabantur. Erroneae hae opiniones etiam scholas catholicas inficere minitabantur, ut satis apparet ex censura plurium thesium huc spectantium, facta ab Universitate Parisiensi (vide D'Argentré, *Collectio iudicior.* t. I. pag. 192, c. 8. *Errores de anima et intellectu*, praesertim thes. 20. 22. 27.). Et merito dicit Scotus (*IV. Sent.* d. 43. q. 2. n. 26.), quod hic error, « qui proprius est et solius Averrois, pessimus est, non tantum contra veritatem theologiae, sed etiam contra veritatem philosophiae. Destruit enim scientiam... et ita omnes virtutes » (cfr. ibid. n. 5.). Unde principales Scholastici tota vi contra hanc doctrinam insurrexerunt, praesertim B. Albert. (*S.* p. II. tr. 13. q. 77. m. 3.), qui 30 argg. Arabum, praesertim Averrois, recenset et refutat, et aliis pluribus argg. contrarium probat; et S. Thom. multis locis, ut in suo opusculo (15.): *De Unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*; II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 76. a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* II. c. 73-75; *de Spiritual. Creat.* a. 9. 10; *de Anima* a. 3. — Ipsum Aristotelem Scholastici communiter a dicto errore vindicabant, sed Henr. Gand. (*Quodl.* 9. q. 14.) dicit: « Mihi videtur, non esse mirum, quod homines dubitant, quid sensit Aristoteles super his duobus, scil. an intellectus sit forma et actus corporis, et an sit idem numero in diversis, an singuli in singulis. Immo ut arbitror, ipse semper super illis in dubio fuit » etc.

**II.** Scot., loc. cit.; *de Rerum princ.* q. 9. a. 2. n. 12; apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 76. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. et II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question militates against the worst error of the Arab philosophers, who taught the numerical unity of souls, or at least of the agent intellect, and in this sense interpreted Aristotle. These erroneous opinions threatened even to infect Catholic schools, as appears sufficiently from the censure of many theses pertaining to this matter, made by the University of Paris (see D'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* t. I. p. 192, c. 8. *Errors concerning the soul and intellect*, especially theses 20, 22, 27). And rightly does Scotus say (*IV. Sent.* d. 43. q. 2. n. 26) that this error, « which is proper to and unique to Averroes alone, is most wicked, not only against the truth of theology but also against the truth of philosophy. For it destroys science... and so all the virtues » (cf. ibid. n. 5). Whence the principal Scholastics rose with all their force against this doctrine, especially Bl. Albert (*S.* p. II. tr. 13. q. 77. m. 3), who recounts and refutes 30 arguments of the Arabs, especially of Averroes, and proves the contrary by many other arguments; and St. Thomas in many places, as in his opusculum (15): *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists*; II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 76. a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* II. cc. 73–75; *de Spiritualibus Creaturis* a. 9, 10; *de Anima* a. 3. — Aristotle himself the Scholastics commonly vindicated from the said error, but Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* 9. q. 14) says: « It seems to me not strange that people doubt what Aristotle thought concerning these two things, namely whether the intellect is the form and act of the body, and whether it is the same in number in diverse men, or single in single ones. Rather, as I judge, he was always in doubt over them » etc.

**II.** Scotus, loc. cit.; *de Rerum principio* q. 9. a. 2. n. 12; apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 76. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard a Med., here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3. and II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
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- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I substantial (locates the question against Averroist unicity-of-intellect thesis + Parisian condemnations + Scotus + Albert + Aquinas series; Henry of Ghent caveat on Aristotle's own undecidedness). II = q1 commentator list.
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum animae omnium fuerint simul productae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum animae omnium fuerint simul productae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Iob quadragesimo[^1]: *Ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum:* ergo Iob factus est simul cum lucifero; sed non est factum corpus: ergo est facta anima: ergo anima Iob facta est simul cum lucifero: ergo pari ratione et animae aliorum hominum productae sunt in primordio.

2. Item, Angeli simul producti sunt et corpora caelestia propter immortalitatem et incorruptibilitatem[^2]: si ergo animae rationales sunt huiusmodi, videtur etc.

3. Item, animae omnes aequalis sunt durationis cum Angelis ex parte post: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod debeant esse aequalis durationis ex parte ante: ergo omnes simul cum Angelis fuerunt creatae.

4. Item, non est anima propter corpus, sed corpus propter animam[^3]: ergo potius corpus deberet formari secundum exigentiam animae, quam anima produci secundum exigentiam corporis; sed illud, ad cuius exigentiam fit alterum, prius est: ergo videtur, quod omnes animae, antequam sua corpora sint, productae fuerint.

5. Item, reperimus spiritum, qui per naturam suam est omnino separatus, et spiritum, qui per naturam suam semper est coniunctus: ergo videtur, quod sit reperire spiritum, qui sit natus esse separatus et coniunctus[^4]; talis autem non est nisi anima humana. Ergo si anima humana de sua natura est separata, ergo videtur, quod animae separatim a suis corporibus debuerint produci, et ita simul.

**Ad oppositum arguitur sic.**

*Fundamenta.*

1. In Psalmo[^5]: *Qui finxit singillatim corda eorum;* Glossa exponit, id est animas: ergo animae factae sunt singillatim et successive, sicut et corpora.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*[^6]: *Tenendum est, quod animae non sunt simul creatae.*

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Si animae essent creatae ante corpus, aut haberent usum rationis, aut non. Si non; quaero, quid impediret? et cum non sit dare, restat, quod si simul conditae fuerunt, statim habuerunt usum rationis; et si hoc, ergo meruerunt, vel demeruerunt, quorum utrumque est contra Apostolum ad Romanos nono[^7]: *Antequam aliquid boni vel mali egissent etc.*

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4. Item, si animae fuerunt simul creatae, aut volunt venire ad corpus, aut non. Si volunt, cum corpora illa sint infecta et poenalia: ergo sunt impiae et stultae, cum veniant voluntarie ad contrahendam culpam et poenam. Si nolunt, et mittuntur in corpora: ergo cum sint innocentes, fit eis iniuria, dum ante infligitur poena, quam commisissent culpam[^8].

5. Item, anima quamdiu est in corpore, mole corporis gravatur[^9]: ergo melius est ei et perfectius est esse extra carnem quam in carne; sed non est ordo, sed perversio, procedere ad statum minus perfectum a statu magis perfecto. Si ergo Deus et natura ordinate facit quidquid facit, nec ordine naturae nec ordine divinae providentiae decet, animas simul creari et postmodum corporibus uniri. — Ad hoc etiam faciunt rationes, quae supra[^10] adductae sunt de anima Adae, ubi ostenditur, quod anima creata fuerit in corpore, et non ante.

> ### Conclusio.
> *Animae humanae non fuerunt simul creatae.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi: unus secundum aestimationem aliquorum philosophorum, alter secundum inventionem quorundam haereticorum, tertius secundum instructionem sanctorum Doctorum.

*Tres modi dicendi.*

*Primus.* Primus modus dicendi est, quod animae simul fuerunt creatae in stellis comparibus, et post, formatis corporibus sibi idoneis, ad haec corpora vivificanda descendunt per lacteum caelum et alios orbes planetarum, et postmodum, corruptis corporibus, illuc revertuntur, et postmodum suo loco et tempore iterum descendunt; et cum descendunt, obliviscuntur prius cognitorum, et cum ascendunt, obliviscuntur malorum, quae in corpore habuerunt. Haec autem positio Platonis[^11] fuit et suorum sequacium, et hanc multum nititur approbare Macrobius, exponens *somnium Scipionis*.

*Reprobatur dupliciter.* — Sed vere ista positio plus est somnium quam aliquod dictum authenticum. Primum quidem, quia talis creatio et descensus et ascensus nullam omnino potest habere certitudinem, cum nemo possit hoc convincere ratiocinando, nemo etiam sit, qui possit dicere, se talium recordari[^12]. Secundo vero, quia manifestam continet absurditatem: quia, dum ponit talem animarum circulationem, ponit, quod anima non sit vera corporis perfectio, cum «*proprius actus in propria materia habeat fieri*[^13]». Ponit etiam, quod nulla possit esse beatitudo, cum illa non sit, nisi ubi est perpetuitas et certitudo, sicut ostendit Augustinus *de Trinitate* decimo quarto[^14].

*Secundus.* Secundus modus dicendi est, quod animae humanae simul fuerunt creatae in caelo cum Angelis, utpote quia sunt eiusdem naturae, et postmodum ad suggestionem dei tenebrarum peccaverunt, et merito illius peccati in corpora sunt detrusae tanquam in carceres, ut ibi purgentur, et cum purgatae fuerint, ad caelestem patriam revocentur. — Haec autem positio est haereticorum, qui dicuntur Manichaei[^15], *Reprobatur* sed etiam non solum est contra fidem catholicam, sed etiam contra philosophiam et contra sensibilem experientiam.

Contra fidem Catholicam est, cum ponat, animas ante peccasse, quam corporibus essent unitae, cum dicat Apostolus de Iacob et Esau ad Romanos nono[^16]: *Antequam aliquid boni et mali egissent;* ponat etiam, nullam animam damnari finaliter, et ita timorem Dei auferat de corde. — Contra *philosophiam* est, dum ponit, animas circuire diversa corpora, cum «*propria forma in propria materia habeat fieri*[^17]»; dum etiam ponit, quod corpus comparatur ad animam non sicut *perfectibile,* sed sicut *carcer;* quod si verum est, homo non est vera species, cum ex anima et corpore non fiat unum. — Contra *rationem et sensibilem experientiam* est, quia videmus, animam, quantumcumque bonam, nolle a corpore separari, secundum quod dicit Apostolus[^18]: *Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri;* quod mirum esset, si ad corpus naturalem aptitudinem et inclinationem non haberet sicut ad suum sodalem, non sicut ad carcerem. Videmus etiam, quod nihil novimus, nisi ea quae, postquam nati sumus, didicimus; quod non esset, si animae nostrae a primordio creatae fuissent et in caelo peccassent; multa enim alia scirent. Quodsi tu dicas, quod mole corporis oppressae obliviscuntur; quaero tunc: quare processu temporis non recordantur aliqua?

*Tertius.* Tertius modus dicendi est, quod animae non simul sunt creatae, sed successive producuntur in suis corporibus; et in hoc consenserunt omnes catholici tractatores; et adeo certum est, quod non licet alicui dubitare de animabus aliorum hominum

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*De anima Adae dubitat Augustinus.* ab Adam. Nam de anima Adae dubitasse videtur Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^19], utrum fuerit *ante* corpus, vel *in* corpore creata. De istis autem non dubitat, immo improbat, quod ante corpus productae fuerint, duplici ratione movente circa animas aliorum hominum, quarum nulla reperitur in anima Adae. Prima est, quod animae, cum corporibus uniuntur, originalem culpam contrahunt et inficiuntur, ita quod nullam habent culpam *actualem:* ergo in eis nec meritum nec demeritum potuit praecedere nec liberi arbitrii usus nec deliberatio veniendi vel non veniendi ad corpus[^20]. — Alia vero ratio est, quia animae nostrae a sua prima origine sunt ignorantes nec noverunt ista quae per sensus addiscunt; non enim *addiscere* est *reminisci,* ut probant Sancti et philosophi[^21]. — Et ideo animae nostrae hac duplici de causa non possunt dici ante corpora productae, tum propter ignorantiam, tum propter originalem culpam, quarum neutra fuit in anima Adae, quando in corpus fuit infusa: et ideo magis de illa dubitavit quam de istis. Probabilius tamen est de illa dicere, sicut supra[^22] ostensum fuit, quod fuerit creata in corpore.

*Conclusio.* De istis autem non solum debemus opinari probabiliter, sed etiam cogimur credere fideliter, quod ante corpora creatae non fuerint; et hoc omnes catholici sentiunt tractatores. Et sic, quando invenitur eorum auctoritas, quae videatur aliud sonare, pie intelligenda est; quia vel loquuntur secundum aliorum opinionem, vel si secundum propriam loquuntur, intelligunt, quod anima, priusquam corpori uniatur, creata est, non ordine *temporis,* sed *naturae.* Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Gregorii Nazianzeni et verba Damasceni[^23] et verba etiam Augustini in libro *de Anima et spiritu,* qui dicit, quod concupiscibilitas et irascibilitas prius insunt animae, quam ipsa uniatur corpori. In omnibus enim istis magis notatur ordo *naturae* quam *temporis.* — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod animae non fuerunt simul creatae.

*Solutio obiectorum.*

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo de Iob, dicendum, quod *tecum* non dicit ibi associationem quantum ad simultatem durationis, sed dicit conformitatem in participatione rationis, quasi diceret: *Feci tecum,* id est tibi similem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angeli sunt simul creati, quia incorruptibiles; dicendum, quod ista non est ratio tota; sed quia sunt incorruptibiles, ita quod non habent inclinationem ad alicuius alterius rei perfectionem. Anima vero, cum sit perfectio corporis, naturalem habet inclinationem ad corpus; et ideo, quamvis sit incorruptibilis et a corpore separabilis, debet tamen tunc produci, quando facta est formatio corporis, secundum exigentiam inclinationis ad corpus, quam non est ponere in Angelis. Qui autem hanc inclinationem negat esse in animabus, indiget sensu.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis animae duratio a parte *post* est aequalis durationi Angeli, ergo et a parte *ante;* dicendum, quod non est simile, quia duratio aeviterni a parte *post* est infinita, et infinitum infinito non est maius; et ideo nulla substantia spiritualis incorruptibilis potest aliam excedere quantum ad durationem ex parte *post.* Quantum autem ad durationem ex parte *ante* est finitas, et ex illa parte potest esse excessus, et excedit duratio Angeli durationem animae propter naturam animae, per quam habet uniri proprio corpori ut perfectibili. Et quia corpora non decuit simul esse, sed successive produci; spiritus similiter humanos oportuit non simul produci, sed successive.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus est propter animam; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen non oportet propter hoc, quod anima praecedat secundum *rem,* sed solum secundum inten-

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tionem artificis; finis enim, etsi praecedat in intentione, tamen habet sequi in executione[^24].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deberet esse spiritus, qui modo sit separatus, modo coniunctus; dicendum, quod illa combinatio non est congrua, nec debet esse per naturam. Spiritus enim, qui naturaliter coniungitur corpori, nunquam natus est a corpore separari nisi propter poenam peccati. Cum enim sit incorruptibilis secundum naturalem institutionem, debet ei aptari corpus incorruptibile, cum non possit ab eo separari absque dolore[^25]; et ideo illa tertia differentia spiritus non debet naturaliter reperiri. — Posset tamen dici, quod competentius est, animam manere post corpus quam ante, quia incorruptibile necessario excedit corruptibile duratione ex parte *post;* sed commetiri se potest duratione ex parte *ante.* Et hoc quidem decebat esse in anima et corpore, cum proportio debeat esse perfectionis ad perfectibile, quanta potest esse.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the souls of all human beings were produced simultaneously.*

Secondly it is asked whether the souls of all were produced simultaneously. And that it is so, it seems:

1. Job, chapter forty[^1]: *Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee:* therefore Job was made simultaneously with Lucifer; but [his] body was not made [then]: therefore the soul was made: therefore Job's soul was made simultaneously with Lucifer: therefore by parity of reasoning the souls of other human beings also were produced in the beginning.

2. Likewise, the Angels were produced simultaneously, and the celestial bodies, on account of their immortality and incorruptibility[^2]: if therefore rational souls are of this kind, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, all souls are of equal duration with the Angels on the side of the future: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that they ought to be of equal duration on the side of the past: therefore all were created simultaneously with the Angels.

4. Likewise, the soul is not for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul[^3]: therefore the body ought rather to be formed according to the requirement of the soul, than the soul produced according to the requirement of the body; but that for whose requirement another thing comes to be is prior: therefore it seems that all souls were produced before their bodies existed.

5. Likewise, we find a spirit that by its nature is wholly separate, and a spirit that by its nature is always conjoined: therefore it seems that there must be found a spirit that is by nature suited to be [both] separate and conjoined[^4]; but such a one is none other than the human soul. Therefore if the human soul is by its nature separate, it seems that the souls ought to have been produced separately from their bodies, and so simultaneously.

**On the contrary it is argued thus.**

*Foundations.*

1. In the Psalm[^5]: *Who hath fashioned the hearts of them one by one;* the Gloss expounds, that is, *the souls:* therefore the souls were made one by one and successively, just as the bodies also.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^6]: *It must be held that the souls were not simultaneously created.*

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. If the souls were created before the body, either they would have the use of reason, or not. If not; I ask, what would have hindered? and since none can be assigned, it remains that if they were created simultaneously, they immediately had the use of reason; and if so, then they merited or demerited, both of which are against the Apostle to the Romans nine[^7]: *Before they had done anything good or evil etc.*

4. Likewise, if the souls were created simultaneously, either they wish to come to a body, or not. If they wish, since those bodies are infected and penal: therefore they are impious and foolish, since they come voluntarily to contracting guilt and punishment. If they do not wish, and are sent into bodies: therefore since they are innocent, an injury is done to them, when punishment is inflicted before they had committed guilt[^8].

5. Likewise, the soul as long as it is in the body is weighed down by the mass of the body[^9]: therefore it is better and more perfect for it to be outside the flesh than in the flesh; but it is not order, but perversion, to proceed to a less perfect state from a more perfect state. Therefore if God and nature do whatever they do in an orderly way, neither by the order of nature nor by the order of divine providence is it fitting that souls be created simultaneously and afterwards united to bodies. — To this also tend the reasons which were adduced above[^10] concerning the soul of Adam, where it is shown that the soul was created in the body, and not before.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Human souls were not created simultaneously.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking: one according to the opinion of certain philosophers, another according to the invention of certain heretics, the third according to the instruction of the holy Doctors.

*Three modes of speaking.*

*First.* The first mode of speaking is that the souls were created simultaneously in their corresponding stars, and afterwards, when bodies suitable for them have been formed, they descend through the milky heaven and the other orbs of the planets to vivify these bodies, and afterwards, when the bodies are corrupted, they return thither, and afterwards in their own place and time they descend again; and when they descend, they forget what was previously known, and when they ascend, they forget the evils which they had in the body. This indeed was the position of Plato[^11] and of his followers, and Macrobius greatly strives to approve it, expounding the *Dream of Scipio*.

*It is refuted in two ways.* — But truly this position is more a dream than any authentic statement. First indeed, because such a creation and descent and ascent can have absolutely no certitude, since no one can convict this by reasoning, nor is there anyone who could say that he remembers such things[^12]. Secondly, because it contains a manifest absurdity: because, while it posits such a circulation of souls, it posits that the soul is not the true perfection of the body, since «*the proper act has its coming-to-be in proper matter*[^13]». It also posits that there can be no beatitude, since that does not exist except where there is perpetuity and certitude, as Augustine shows in *On the Trinity* book fourteen[^14].

*Second.* The second mode of speaking is that human souls were created simultaneously in heaven with the Angels, since they are of the same nature, and afterwards at the suggestion of the prince of darkness they sinned, and by the merit of that sin they were thrust into bodies as into prisons, that they might be purged there, and when they have been purged, that they might be called back to the heavenly fatherland. — This indeed is the position of the heretics who are called Manichees[^15], *It is refuted,* and it is not only against the Catholic faith, but also against philosophy and against sensible experience.

It is against the Catholic faith, since it posits that the souls sinned before they were united to bodies, although the Apostle says of Jacob and Esau, to the Romans nine[^16]: *Before they had done anything good or evil;* it also posits that no soul is finally damned, and so takes away the fear of God from the heart. — It is against *philosophy,* while it posits that the souls go round through diverse bodies, since «*the proper form has its coming-to-be in proper matter*[^17]»; while it also posits that the body is compared to the soul not as a *perfectible,* but as a *prison;* and if this is true, man is not a true species, since one [thing] does not come to be from soul and body. — It is against *reason and sensible experience,* because we see that the soul, however good, is unwilling to be separated from the body, according to what the Apostle says[^18]: *We do not wish to be despoiled, but to be clothed over;* which would be amazing if it had no natural aptitude and inclination to the body as to its companion, not as to a prison. We see also that we know nothing except what, after we are born, we have learned; which would not be the case if our souls had been created from the beginning and had sinned in heaven; for they would know many other things. But if you say that they are forgetful, oppressed by the mass of the body; I then ask: why in the course of time do they not recall anything?

*Third.* The third mode of speaking is that the souls are not simultaneously created, but are successively produced in their bodies; and in this all Catholic theologians have agreed; and it is so certain that it is not lawful for anyone to doubt concerning the souls of other human beings besides Adam.

*Augustine doubts concerning Adam's soul.* For Augustine seems to have doubted concerning the soul of Adam, *on Genesis to the letter*[^19], whether it was created *before* the body, or *in* the body. But concerning these [other souls] he does not doubt; on the contrary, he disapproves [the view] that they were produced before the body, for a twofold reason that moves him with regard to the souls of other human beings, of which neither is found in the soul of Adam. The first is that the souls, when they are united to bodies, contract original sin and are infected, so that they have no *actual* sin: therefore in them neither merit nor demerit could have preceded, nor any use of free will, nor any deliberation of coming or not coming to the body[^20]. — The other reason is that our souls from their first origin are ignorant, nor have they known the things that they learn through the senses; for to *learn* is not to *recall,* as Saints and philosophers prove[^21]. — And therefore our souls, for this twofold cause, cannot be said to have been produced before the bodies, both on account of ignorance and on account of original sin, neither of which was in the soul of Adam when it was infused into the body: and therefore he doubted more concerning that one than concerning these. Yet it is more probable to say concerning it, as was shown above[^22], that it was created in the body.

*Conclusion.* Concerning these [souls of other men], however, we are not only to opine probably, but are even compelled to believe faithfully, that they were not created before the bodies; and this all Catholic theologians hold. And so, when their authority is found that seems to sound otherwise, it is to be piously understood; because either they are speaking according to the opinion of others, or if they are speaking according to their own [view], they understand that the soul, before it is united to the body, is created not by the order of *time,* but of *nature.* And thus are to be understood the words of Gregory Nazianzen and the words of Damascene[^23] and also the words of Augustine in the book *On the Soul and the Spirit,* who says that concupiscibility and irascibility are in the soul before it is united to the body. For in all these [statements] is noted rather the order of *nature* than of *time.* — Therefore the reasons that show that the souls were not simultaneously created are to be granted.

*Solution of the objections.*

1. To that which is objected first concerning Job, it must be said that *with thee* does not there express association in respect to simultaneity of duration, but it expresses conformity in participation of reason, as if he were saying: *I made thee with [me],* that is, similar to thee.

2. To that which is objected, that the Angels are simultaneously created because they are incorruptible; it must be said that this is not the whole reason; but because they are incorruptible, in such a way that they have no inclination to the perfection of any other thing. The soul, however, since it is the perfection of the body, has a natural inclination to the body; and therefore, although it is incorruptible and separable from the body, nevertheless it must be produced when the formation of the body has taken place, according to the requirement of its inclination to the body, which is not to be posited in the Angels. But whoever denies that this inclination is in souls is in need of sense.

3. To that which is objected, that the duration of every soul on the side of the future is equal to the duration of the Angel, therefore also on the side of the past; it must be said that the case is not similar, because the duration of the everlasting on the side of the future is infinite, and an infinite is not greater than an infinite; and therefore no incorruptible spiritual substance can exceed another in respect to duration on the side of the future. As to duration on the side of the past, however, there is finitude, and on that side there can be excess, and the duration of the Angel exceeds the duration of the soul on account of the nature of the soul, by which it must be united to a proper body as to a perfectible. And because it was not fitting that the bodies be simultaneously, but successively produced; the human spirits likewise had to be not simultaneously produced, but successively.

4. To that which is objected, that the body is for the sake of the soul; it must be said that this is true, yet on that account it is not necessary that the soul precede according to *the thing,* but only according to the intention of the maker; for the end, although it precede in intention, yet must follow in execution[^24].

5. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a spirit which is now separated, now conjoined; it must be said that that combination is not congruous, nor ought it to be by nature. For a spirit which is naturally conjoined to a body is never apt to be separated from the body except on account of the punishment of sin. For since it is incorruptible according to its natural institution, an incorruptible body must be fitted to it, since it cannot be separated from it without sorrow[^25]; and therefore that third difference of spirit ought not naturally to be found. — Yet it could be said that it is more fitting that the soul remain after the body than before, because the incorruptible necessarily exceeds the corruptible in duration on the side of the future; but it can be measured along with it in duration on the side of the past. And this indeed was fitting in soul and body, since the proportion ought to be of the perfection to the perfectible, [in the degree] which it can be.

la: Vers. 10. — Paulo superius post *omnium* in aliquibus codd. additur *hominum.* Subinde cod. N legit: *sed non quantum ad corpus, ergo quantum ad animam: ergo anima Iob etc.*

en: Verse 10. — A little above, after *omnium* in some codices *hominum* is added. Then codex N reads: *but not as to the body, therefore as to the soul: therefore the soul of Job etc.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cf. above d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.

la: Vide Aristot., II. *de Anima,* text. 36. seq. (c. 4.).

en: See Aristotle, II *On the Soul,* text 36 seq. (c. 4).

la: Simile invenitur supra pag. 210, nota 11.

en: A similar [reference] is found above on page 210, note 11.

la: Psalm. 32, 15. — Glossam ordinariam, quae est secundum *Breviarium in Psalmos* (inter opera Hieronymi) in hunc locum, vide apud Lyranum; idem dicit Glossa interlinearis.

en: Psalm 32, 15. — For the Ordinary Gloss, which is according to the *Breviarium in Psalmos* (among the works of Jerome) on this passage, see Lyra; the Interlinear Gloss says the same.

la: Cap. 14: *Animas hominum non esse ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales naturas, nec simul creatas, sicut Origenes fingit* etc. — Hic liber est Gennadii.

en: Chap. 14: *That the souls of human beings are not from the beginning among the other intellectual natures, nor created simultaneously, as Origen feigns* etc. — This book is by Gennadius.

la: Vers. 11.

en: Verse 11.

la: Vide supra pag. 417, nota 6.

en: See above page 417, note 6.

la: Sap. 9, 15: *Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.* — De minori vide supra pag. 330, nota 5.

en: Wisdom 9, 15: *For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul.* — For the minor [premise] see above page 330, note 5.

la: Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo superius ante *divinae providentiae* in non paucis codd. omittitur *ordine.*

en: Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 3. — A little above, before *divinae providentiae,* in not a few codices *ordine* is omitted.

la: *In Timaeo,* (ed. Serrani, tom. III. pag. 41. seqq.) et in *Phaedro* (ibid. pag. 246. seqq.), ubi triplicem animae describit statum, scil. cum est in caelo nondum cum corpore coniuncta, tum in corpore est, denique cum e corpore discessit. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 22, nota 1. — Macrobius, I. *in Somnium Scip.* c. 14. et 21. — Paulo inferius codd. I (Q a secunda manu) aa *quia talis circulatio* pro *quia talis creatio.*

en: *In the Timaeus* (ed. Serranus, tom. III. p. 41 ff.) and in *Phaedrus* (ibid. p. 246 ff.), where he describes a threefold state of the soul, namely when it is in heaven not yet joined to a body, then when it is in a body, finally when it has departed from the body. Cf. also above page 22, note 1. — Macrobius, I *On Scipio's Dream* c. 14 and 21. — A little below, codices I (Q from a second hand) aa [read] *because such a circulation* for *because such a creation.*

la: Cfr. August., XII. *de Trin.* c. 15. n. 24.

en: Cf. Augustine, XII *On the Trinity* c. 15. n. 24.

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima,* text. 26. (c. 2).

en: Aristotle, II *On the Soul,* text 26 (c. 2).

la: Cap. 14. n. 20. Melius allegaretur liber XIII. c. 7. n. 10. seq., sed secuti sumus codd. Cfr. X. *de Civ. Dei,* c. 30; XII. c. 20; XXII. c. 27.

en: Ch. 14. n. 20. It would be better to allege book XIII. c. 7. n. 10. seq., but we have followed the codices. Cf. X *On the City of God* c. 30; XII c. 20; XXII c. 27.

la: Idem docent secundum August., *de Haeresibus,* c. 70., Priscillianistae et Origenes, sicut ibid. c. 42. ac XI. *de Civ. Dei,* c. 23. dicitur. — Paulo inferius edd. cum aliquibus codd. *et etiam sensibilem* pro *et contra sensibilem.*

en: The same is taught, according to Augustine, *On Heresies,* c. 70, by the Priscillianists and Origen, as is said ibid. c. 42 and in XI *On the City of God* c. 23. — A little below, the editions with some codices [read] *and also sensible* for *and against sensible.*

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima,* text. 26. (c. 2.).

la: Epist. II. Cor. 5, 4. — Paulo inferius edd. 3, 4 cum Vat. *sed sicut* pro *non sicut.*

en: Epistle II Cor. 5, 4. — A little below, editions 3, 4 with the Vatican [edition read] *but as* for *not as.*

la: Libr. VII. c. 24. n. 35. seqq. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. *originaliter culpam* pro *originalem culpam.*

en: Book VII c. 24. n. 35 ff. — A little below, not a few codices [read] *originally guilt* for *original guilt.*

la: Hanc rationem insinuat Augustinus, VI. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 9. n. 15; X. c. 7. n. 12; c. 15. n. 27; c. 17. n. 30; I. *de Anima et eius origine,* c. 8. n. 8; c. 12. n. 15; II. c. 7. n. 11. seq.; III. c. 8. n. 11; Epist. 166. (alias 28.) ad Hieronymum c. 9. n. 27. et Epist. 190. (alias 157.) ad Optatum, c. 3. n. 22.

en: Augustine intimates this reason in VI *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 9. n. 15; X c. 7. n. 12; c. 15. n. 27; c. 17. n. 30; I *On the Soul and its Origin* c. 8. n. 8; c. 12. n. 15; II c. 7. n. 11 seq.; III c. 8. n. 11; Epistle 166 (alias 28) to Jerome c. 9. n. 27 and Epistle 190 (alias 157) to Optatus c. 3. n. 22.

la: Aristot., II. *Prior.* c. 21. (c. 23.); I. *Poster.* c. 1; August., XII. *de Trin.* c. 15. n. 24; VII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 11. n. 16. — Aliquanto inferius plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 substituunt *a corpore fuit infusa* pro *in corpus fuit infusa.*

en: Aristotle, II *Prior [Analytics]* c. 21 (c. 23); I *Posterior [Analytics]* c. 1; Augustine, XII *On the Trinity* c. 15. n. 24; VII *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 11. n. 16. — A little below, very many codices with editions 1, 2 substitute *was infused from the body* for *was infused into the body.*

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 12. aperte sententiam catholicam docet: «*Porro corpus et anima simul creata sunt, non autem, uti deliravit Origenes, haec prius, illud posterius.*» Eandem doctrinam profitetur Greg. Naz., Orat. 31. n. 9. Hoc non obstante, apud Scholasticos invenitur argumentum in contrarium, quod fundabatur in quadam propositione, quam hi duo doctores formaverant de creatione Angelorum. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 3, hoc arg. ita affert: *Adhuc in idem sentit Damascenus in secundo libro [de Fide orthod.] c. 3, ubi inducens Gregorium Nazianzenum, quem vocat theologum, dicit sic: «Ego autem consentio Gregorio theologo* [Orat. 12, n. 12.]; *dicebat* [ἔπρεπε i. e. *decebat*] *enim, primo intellectualem substantiam creari, et ita, hoc est consequenter, sensibilem*» [textus originalis addit: *atque ita demum hominem ex utraque constantem*]. *Cum ergo anima sit substantia intellectualis, et corpus substantia sensibilis, anima est ante corpus creata etc.* — Retinuimus cum Vat. *Gregorii Nazianzeni,* quamvis in multis codd. et edd. 1, 2 substituatur *Gregorii Nysseni,* tum quia lectio nostra in aliquibus codd. habetur, tum quia confirmatur ex verbis B. Alberti modo relatis. Immo idem in *Comment. super III. de Anima,* tr. 2. c. 10, censet, Gregorium Nyssenum sententiae Platonis de praeexistentia animae adhaesisse. Insuper in S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 3. quatuor rationes affert, quibus Gregorius utitur in suo libro *de Anima contra Eunomium,* qui animam definivit substantiam *incorpoream, in corpore conditam.* Cfr. tamen Gr. Nyss. liber *de Hominis opificio,* c. 28. seq. — Verba auctoris libri *de Spiritu et anima,* c. 13. sunt: *Nec aliud nec minus est irascibilitas vel concupiscibilitas, quam anima... Has potentias habet, antequam corpori misceatur.*

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 12 openly teaches the Catholic position: «*Moreover body and soul were created simultaneously, and not, as Origen raved, the one [body] before, the other [soul] after.*» Gregory Nazianzen professes the same doctrine, Oration 31. n. 9. Notwithstanding this, among the Scholastics an argument to the contrary is found, which was founded on a certain proposition that these two doctors had formed concerning the creation of the Angels. B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 3, brings forward this argument thus: *To the same effect Damascene in his second book [On the Orthodox Faith] c. 3, where, introducing Gregory Nazianzen whom he calls the theologian, he says thus: «But I myself agree with Gregory the theologian* [Oration 12, n. 12]; *for he was saying* [ἔπρεπε i. e. *it was fitting*] *that the intellectual substance was first created, and so, that is consequently, the sensible*» [the original text adds: *and so finally man composed of both*]. *Since therefore the soul is an intellectual substance, and the body a sensible substance, the soul is created before the body etc.* — We have retained, with the Vatican [edition], *Gregory Nazianzen,* although in many codices and in editions 1, 2 *Gregory of Nyssa* is substituted, both because our reading is found in some codices, and because it is confirmed by the words of B. Albert just reported. Indeed the same [Albert] in his *Commentary on III On the Soul,* tr. 2. c. 10, opines that Gregory of Nyssa adhered to Plato's view of the pre-existence of the soul. Moreover in S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 3 he brings forward four reasons that Gregory uses in his book *On the Soul against Eunomius,* who defined the soul as a substance *incorporeal, established in a body.* Yet cf. Gregory of Nyssa, book *On the Making of Man,* c. 28 seq. — The words of the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul,* c. 13, are: *Irascibility and concupiscibility are neither other nor less than the soul... It has these powers before it is mingled with the body.* **Note (this scholion footnote also incorporates the source-pointer marginal *Haec ex Gregorio sumta solutio iam supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. habetur* ["This solution drawn from Gregory is already found above d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3."] and the codd.-variant gloss *Codd. Y aa propter,* and the cross-reference *Cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 7.*)

la: Vide Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 89. (c. 9.); VII. *Metaph.* text. 23. (VI. c. 7.); III. *de Anima,* text. 49. (c. 10.).

en: See Aristotle, II *Physics* text 89 (c. 9); VII *Metaphysics* text 23 (VI c. 7); III *On the Soul* text 49 (c. 10).

la: Cfr. infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 1, ubi hoc explicatur.

en: Cf. below d. 19, a. 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 1, where this is explained. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio iam tacta est supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 3. respectu animae Adae. Errorem Platonis et Origenis refellunt omnes Scholastici: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, d. 17. q. 1. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 90. a. 4; 3. c. Gent. II. c. 83; *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 10. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1; II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. 1. — Durand., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 3. — Biel, II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1, in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question has already been touched on above d. 17. a. 1. q. 3. with regard to the soul of Adam. The error of Plato and of Origen is refuted by all the Scholastics: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scotus, in both *Scripta,* d. 17. q. 1. — S. Thom., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 90. a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles* II. c. 83; *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 10. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1; II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. 1. — Durand., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 3. — Biel, II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1, in fine.

---

translators_notes:
- Page span: pp. 448 R band 1 (QUAESTIO II opener at raw 31566) → 451 L band 1 (SCHOLION close immediately before QUAESTIO III opener at raw 31766).
- **Cross-chunk footer hand-off received from d18-a2-q1:** p.448 L-2 footers ¹–⁴ (Vers. 10 + supra d. 2 p. I a. 2 q. 3 + Aristot. II *de Anima* text 36 + *Simile invenitur supra pag. 210*) are folded here as [^1]–[^4], anchoring the Q2 opener (Job 40), arg 2 (incorruptibility), arg 4 (soul-for-body) and arg 5 (separate-and-conjoined spirit) respectively. No forward hand-off to d18-a2-q3 — p.451 L-2 footer ¹ (Phys 89 / Metaph 23 / de Anima 49) anchors at Q2 ad 4 close *executione* = [^24]; subsequent p.451 L-2 entries (Cfr. infra d. 19; Vers. 26 seq.) anchor in Q3 args and stay with d18-a2-q3.
- **`[?]` flags resolved in d.11–d.20 polish-blocker 2026-05-25 (600 dpi pass on p.451):**
  1. Q2 ad 5 body `²` on *absque dolore* — **CONFIRMED at 600 dpi** (/tmp/p451-R-top.png clearly shows `dolore²`). Reading (a) is correct: the `²` is a real body anchor, not OCR noise. The p.451 L-2 footer ² (*Cfr. infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 1, ubi hoc explicatur*) thus belongs in **this** chunk (Q2), not in d18-a2-q3 — folded in as new [^25], appended after [^24]. d18-a2-q3 apparatus did not actually hold this footer (it began at [^1] = Vers. 26 seq. = p.451 L-2 footer ³), so this is a recovery of a footer dropped during chunking, not a hand-off transfer.
  2. Conclusio body `Damasceni[^23] [?]` — **RESOLVED**: `[^23]` already covers Damascenus + Greg. Naz. + Augustini *de Spiritu et anima* c. 13 (the long composite footer continues onto p.450 R-bot and explicitly includes *Verba auctoris libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. sunt:…*); no second anchor needed. The stray `[?]` was an OCR spacing artifact from the column-band read. Removed.
- **Pass 3 follow-up CLOSED 2026-05-26:** p.450 R-2 footers ⁶ (*Haec ex Gregorio sumta solutio iam supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. habetur*), ⁷ (*Codd. Y aa propter* — Quaracchi prints *aa*, not *oa*), ⁸ (*Cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 7*) all anchor within the SCHOLION I body that runs p.450 R-mid → p.451 L-1 (the *Gregorius Nazianzeni/Nysseni* codd.-variant + *de Spiritu et anima* c. 13 textual-reception paragraph). Body verified verbatim against the column-band PDF read at 450 dpi: every Latin clause from *Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 12…* through *…antequam corpori misceatur* is fully absorbed into composite footer [^23]. No grammatical splice, no missing body words, no orphan apparatus. The three footers are consolidated into [^23] via the parenthetical note above (Quaracchi marginal-typography convention: source-pointers + variant-glosses sometimes printed as separately-numbered footers even when the scholion already cites the source inline). Atomic split-out as [^26]/[^27]/[^28] would be a cosmetic refinement, deferred. See `manual-review/d11-d20-polish-resolution-log.md` § Pass 3.
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Tres modi dicendi.*, *Primus.*, *Reprobatur dupliciter.*, *Secundus.*, *Reprobatur.* (with parenthetical *Conln* OCR-garble cleaned), *Tertius.*, *De anima Adae dubitat Augustinus.*, *Conclusio.*, *Solutio obiectorum.* (twelve labels).
- `has_scholion: true` — SCHOLION I doctrinal scholion (this question already touched at d.17 a.1 q.3 + canonical commentator-list refuting Plato/Origen). Quaracchi prints only one scholion section on p.451 L-1 bottom (no SCHOLION II separate); the commentator list runs continuously into p.451 R-0.
- OCR around raw 31566–31766 is two-column cascade-fragmented (CONCLUSIO splice, Reprobatur marginal bleed-through, *Manichaei cam, sed* nonsense fragment at raw 31626 = *Manichaei[^15], — et non solum est contra fidem catholicam, sed etiam contra*); column-band 450 dpi PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override.
- Build-script per-page footnote re-numbering normal across the four pages.