title: Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 6

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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum malum sit de complemento universi.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum malum sit de complemento universi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Ecclesiastici* trigesimo tertio[^1]: *Contra malum bonum est, et contra mortem vita; et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi*. Si ergo huiusmodi oppositio spectat ad decorem et complementum universi: ergo et malum.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^2], loquens de malis, quare sinantur a Deo, dicit, quod Deus universum quasi quibusdam antithetis honestavit; et exemplificat in sermone et in picturis: in sermone, sicut Apostolus utitur, secundae *ad Corinthios* sexto[^3]: *Per gloriam et ignobilitatem*. Et in picturis similiter: sicut enim « pictura alba cum colore nigro suo loco posito pulcra est; sic universum cum malis »: ergo malum secundum hoc decorat universum. Sed omne tale est de complemento universi: ergo etc.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia sicut malum est privatio boni, ita silentium est privatio vocis, et somnus vigiliae; sed ad perfectionem et decorem sermonis necesse est, interponi silentium, et ad perfectionem et decorem animalis necesse est, aliquando vigiliis interponi somnum: ergo ad perfectum decorem universi necesse est, bonis interponi mala[^4].

4. Item, universum est conditum ad Dei manifestationem; sed in operibus Dei maxime manifestantur misericordia et veritas[^5]; sed si malum non fuisset, nec misericordia nec veritas ita perfecte manifestaretur, sicut manifestatur in aeterna punitione et peccatorum remissione et redemptione: ergo non esset universum completum.

**Contra:**

1. *Genesis* primo[^6]: *Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona*; et non fecerat mala, constat: ergo absque malis erant omnia valde bona in universo. Sed universum non esset valde bonum, si deesset ei perfectio: cum ergo deesset ei malum, videtur, quod malum non sit de eius perfectione.

2. Item, Augustinus in tertio *de Libero Arbitrio*[^7], loquens de perfectione universi, dicit: « Quidquid tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit, scias opificem omnium fecisse ». Si ergo non fecit mundum cum malis, sed sine malis, ergo mundus sine malis erat perfectior quam cum malis: ergo malum non est de perfectione universi.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia « albius est

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quod est nigro impermixtius »[^8], ergo pulcrius et melius quod est malo impermixtius; sed si in mundo nullum esset malum, tunc universum esset malis impermixtius, ergo melius, ergo perfectius: ergo ordinatio mali non est de complemento universi.

4. Item, « *bonum et pulcrum idem* », sicut dicit Dionysius[^9]; ergo quod est privatio boni est privatio pulcri; sed malum est privatio boni: ergo est privatio pulcri, ergo malum deturpat. Sed quod deturpat et foedat non spectat ad pulcritudinem sive decorem: ergo nec malum sive mali ordinatio.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Malum nec per se nec per accidens facit ad substantialem decorem vel complementum universi; ad accidentalem autem facit per accidens, et quidem triplici modo.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa senserunt.

Dixerunt enim aliqui, quod est loqui de malo, ut est in potentia facientis, et ut est in opere sive in facto. Si loquamur, ut est in potentia facientis, sic voluerunt dicere, quod *posse malum facere* erat de perfectione universitatis, quia creatura debebat fieri, quae posset peccare et posset abstinere, ad hoc quod universum perfectum esset, sicut in tertio *de Libero Arbitrio*[^10] dicitur. Si loquamur de malo ut est in facto esse, sic dicunt, quod nullo modo spectat ad complementum universi, nec per se nec per accidens. — Sed cum auctoritates dicant contrarium, quod ex ordinatione mali ad bonum quidam decor resultat, sicut dicit Augustinus[^11] expresse, oportet aliter dicere.

Ideo dicunt *alii*, quod decor universitatis quidam est *substantialis* sive quantum ad *esse*, quidam *accidentalis* sive quantum ad *bene esse*. Quantum ad primum decorem mala non sunt facientia[^12] nec per se nec per accidens; sed quantum ad aliquem decorem accidentalem mala bene ordinata faciunt, non quia mala, sed quia ordinata, et ita per accidens, sicut per accidens ordinantur. Et illo decore circumscripto, adhuc esset universum decorum et perfectum, quamvis hunc decorem non haberet.

Ad hunc decorem faciunt mala, non ratione sui, sed ratione subiecti, quod ordinatur in poena ad divinae iustitiae manifestationem; vel ratione *oppositi*[^13], cuius decor magis clarescit ex praesentia mali, sicut « opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescunt », sicut communiter dicitur; vel ratione *boni eliciti*. Multa enim bona Deus fecit[^14] et facta sunt, quae non essent facta, nisi peccatum praestitisset occasionem, sicut illa quae gesta sunt in nostra reparatione. Tamen sine his omnibus esset universum completum.

Si vero quaeritur, utrum tunc esset pulcrius, quam nunc sit, responderi potest, quod se habent sicut *excedentia* et *excessa*[^15]: sicut duae facies, in quarum una nulla est macula, in altera est cicatrix aliqua bene sita, quae videtur faciem venustare. — Et si ultra procedas: quis decor magis excedit? potest dici *sine praeiudicio*, quod decor qui nunc est. Et ratio huius est, quia vis divina, eliciens bonum ex malo, praepotens est malo; et ideo bonum, quod inde elicit, praevalet bono, quod malum corrumpit. Et ideo plus valet universum nunc, quam valuisset tunc; in quo nunc modo commendatur sapientia Creatoris. Unde Gregorius in benedictione caerei Paschalis[^16]: « O felix culpa, quae talem meruit habere Redemptorem ». Et *exemplum* est de scypho sano, qui frangitur et religatur filo argenteo vel aureo, quia melior est post quam ante, non ratione fractionis, sed ratione religationis.

Et si tu quaeras a me: Nonne melius valeret[^17], si omnes essent beati, quam si quidam beati, et quidam miseri? Dicendum, quod, sicut credo, si homo stetisset, non pervenissent plures ad Ierusalem supernam, quam sic perventuri sunt. Unde mali quasi *ex abundanti* sunt nec sunt in computatione.

Et sic concedendum, quod ordinatio mali facit ad complementum *accidentale*; sicut probant rationes ad primam partem inductae; sed ad complementum sive ad decorem *substantialem* nec per se nec per accidens; per se vero ad nullum, sicut illae rationes ostendunt.

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**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 3.* Verumtamen quod obiicitur ad primam partem per simile in privationibus[^18]; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia illae privationes non sunt aliquid adimentes nec auferentes aliquid de bono vel pulcro; malum tamen aufert. Ideo patet illud.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non manifestarentur misericordia et iustitia; dicendum[^19], quod quamvis non manifestarentur in actu, manifestarentur tamen in sua origine. Qui enim Deum in se cognoscit videt in illo aeterno exemplari, quid Deum deceat[^20] facere et possit — licet non omnino — et ita misericordiam et iustitiam pariter. Nihilominus tamen misericordia ostenderetur in supererogatione, et iustitia in retributione, licet non ita clare, ut nunc in opere.

english:
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### Question VI. *Whether evil is of the complement of the universe.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether evil is of the complement of the universe. And that it is, appears thus:

1. *Ecclesiasticus* 33[^1]: *Against evil is the good, and against death is life; and so look upon all the works of the Most High*. If therefore such opposition pertains to the beauty and complement of the universe: therefore so also [does] evil.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the *City of God*[^2], speaking of evils, why they are permitted by God, says that God adorned the universe as it were by certain antitheses; and he exemplifies [this] in speech and in pictures: in speech, as the Apostle uses [it] in the second [letter] *to the Corinthians* 6[^3]: *Through glory and ignobility*. And likewise in pictures: for « just as a white picture is beautiful with a black color placed in its own location, so [is] the universe with evils »: therefore evil in this respect adorns the universe. But everything such is of the complement of the universe: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by *reason* [it appears so], because just as evil is the privation of good, so silence is the privation of voice, and sleep [the privation] of waking; but for the perfection and beauty of speech it is necessary that silence be interposed, and for the perfection and beauty of an animal it is necessary that sleep sometimes be interposed in waking: therefore for the perfect beauty of the universe it is necessary that evils be interposed among goods[^4].

4. Likewise, the universe was founded for the manifestation of God; but in the works of God mercy and truth are most of all made manifest[^5]; but if evil had not been, neither mercy nor truth would be so perfectly manifested as is manifested in eternal punishment and in the remission of sins and redemption: therefore the universe would not be complete.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Genesis* 1[^6]: *God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good*; and he had not made evils — it is established: therefore without evils all things were very good in the universe. But the universe would not be very good if perfection were lacking to it: since therefore evil was lacking to it, it appears that evil is not of its perfection.

2. Likewise, Augustine in book III *On Free Choice*[^7], speaking of the perfection of the universe, says: « Whatever better thing occurs to you by true reason, know that the Maker of all has made it ». If therefore he did not make the world with evils, but without evils, then the world without evils was more perfect than with evils: therefore evil is not of the perfection of the universe.

3. Likewise, by *reason* [it appears so], because « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black »[^8], therefore [that is] more beautiful and better which is more unmixed with evil; but if in the world there were no evil, then the universe would be more unmixed with evils, therefore better, therefore more perfect: therefore the ordering of evil is not of the complement of the universe.

4. Likewise, « *the good and the beautiful are the same* », as Dionysius says[^9]; therefore what is the privation of good is the privation of the beautiful; but evil is the privation of good: therefore [it] is the privation of the beautiful, therefore evil disfigures. But what disfigures and defiles does not pertain to beauty or to ornament: therefore neither [does] evil or the ordering of evil.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Evil neither per se nor per accidens contributes to the substantial beauty or complement of the universe; but to the accidental [complement] it contributes per accidens, and indeed in a threefold manner.

**I respond:** For this it must be noted that on this matter different [authors] have thought differently.

For some have said that there is to speak of evil [in two ways]: as it is in the power of the agent, and as it is in [the] work or in fact. If we speak [of evil] as it is in the power of the agent, in this way they wished to say that *the ability to do evil* was of the perfection of the universe — because the creature had to be made who could sin and could abstain, in order that the universe might be perfect, as is said in book III *On Free Choice*[^10]. If we speak of evil as it is in the [state of] having-been-done, thus they say that in no way does it pertain to the complement of the universe, neither per se nor per accidens. — But since authorities say the contrary, namely that from the ordering of evil to good a certain beauty results, as Augustine[^11] expressly says, it is necessary to speak otherwise.

Therefore *others* say that the beauty of the universe is in part *substantial* or insofar as [its] *being*, [and] in part *accidental* or insofar as [its] *well-being*. As regards the first beauty, evils are not contributors[^12], neither per se nor per accidens; but as regards a certain accidental beauty, evils well ordered do contribute, not because [they are] evils, but because [they are] ordered, and so per accidens, just as they are ordered per accidens. And with that beauty set aside, the universe would still be beautiful and perfect, although it would not have this [particular] beauty.

To this beauty evils contribute, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the subject, which is ordered in [its] punishment to the manifestation of divine justice; or by reason of the *opposite*[^13], whose beauty the more shines forth from the presence of evil, just as « opposites placed next to each other shine forth the more », as is commonly said; or by reason of the *good elicited*. For God made many goods[^14], and many things were made, which would not have been made unless sin had supplied the occasion — as those things which were done in our reparation. Yet without all these the universe would be complete.

But if it is asked whether [the universe] would then be more beautiful than it now is, it can be answered that they stand as *exceeding* and *exceeded*[^15]: just as two faces, in one of which there is no mark, [while] in the other there is some scar well placed, which appears to grace the face. — And if you proceed further: which beauty exceeds more? it can be said *without prejudice* that [it is] the beauty which now is. And the reason of this is that the divine power, eliciting good from evil, is more powerful than evil; and therefore the good which it elicits thence prevails over the good which evil corrupts. And therefore the universe is worth more now than it would have been worth then; in which now the wisdom of the Creator is commended. Whence Gregory in the blessing of the Paschal candle[^16]: « O happy fault, which deserved to have such a Redeemer ». And the *example* is of a sound cup, which is broken and bound back together with a silver or gold thread, because it is better afterward than before — not by reason of the breaking, but by reason of the binding-back.

And if you ask me: Would it not be better[^17] if all were blessed, than if some [were] blessed and some wretched? It must be said that, as I believe, if man had stood firm, no more would have come to the supernal Jerusalem than thus [in fact] are going to come. Whence the evil are as it were *of abundance* and are not in the count.

And thus it must be conceded that the ordering of evil contributes to the *accidental* complement, as the arguments adduced for the first part prove; but to the complement or to the *substantial* beauty [it does] not [contribute] per se nor per accidens; per se indeed [it contributes] to none, as those arguments [for the contrary] show.

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**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*Ad 3.* Yet to what is objected against the first part by a simile drawn from privations[^18]; it must be said that the simile does not hold, because those privations are not something taking away, nor removing anything of the good or of the beautiful; evil, however, does take away. Therefore that is clear.

*Ad 4.* To what is objected — that mercy and justice would not be manifested: it must be said[^19] that although they would not be manifested *in act*, they would yet be manifested in their *origin*. For he who knows God in himself sees in that eternal exemplar what is befitting[^20] for God to do and what is possible [to him] — although not entirely — and so [he sees] mercy and justice equally. Nevertheless mercy would be shown in [his] over-bestowing, and justice in [his] retribution, although not so clearly as now in the work.

la: Vers. 15. — In Vulgata hoc loco post *vita* additur *contra virum iustum peccator*.

en: Verse 15. — In the Vulgate at this place, after *vita* ("life") there is added *contra virum iustum peccator* ("against the just man, [is] the sinner").

la: Libr. XI. c. 18. Ipsa verba August. vide supra pag. 786, nota 7.

en: Book XI c. 18. The very words of Augustine see above p. 786, note 7.

la: Vers. 7. — Textus qui mox affertur, est August., XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 23. n. 1, de quo cfr. supra pag. 830, nota 8. Etiam hoc loco, sicut supra, pro *posito* plurimi codd. et primae edd. *posita*; pro *pulcra* cod. T *pulcrior*.

en: Verse 7. — The text immediately adduced is from Augustine, *City of God* XI c. 23 n. 1, on which cf. above p. 830, note 8. At this place too, as above, for *posito* very many codices and the early editions [read] *posita*; for *pulcra* codex T [reads] *pulcrior*.

la: August., *de Natura boni*, c. 16: *Si enim nos continendo vocem decenter interponimus in loquendo silentium, quanto magis ille quarundam rerum privationes decenter facit sicut rerum omnium perfectus artifex?* Cfr. *de Gen. ad lit. imperf.* c. 5. n. 25; *de Natura boni*, c. 8, et libr. *contra Secundinum Manich.* c. 15, nec non III. *de Musica*, c. 8. n. 17. seqq. De alia similitudine, scil. de somno, cfr. Aristot., *de Somno et Vigilia*, ubi etiam c. I. haec somni habetur definitio: *Videtur somnus vigiliae quaedam privatio*.

en: Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good* c. 16: *For if we, by restraining the voice, becomingly interpose silence in speaking, how much more does He becomingly bring about the privations of certain things, as the perfect Artificer of all things?* Cf. *On Genesis Against the Manichees, unfinished commentary* c. 5 n. 25; *On the Nature of the Good* c. 8, and the book *Against Secundinus the Manichee* c. 15, and also III *On Music* c. 8 n. 17ff. On the other simile, namely of sleep, cf. Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, where also at c. 1 this definition of sleep is given: *Sleep appears to be a certain privation of waking*.

la: *Psalm.* 24, 10: *Universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas*.

en: *Psalm* 24:10: *All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*.

la: Vers. 31. — Mox post *constat* ergo Vat. inserit *quod*, et paulo inferius eadem Vat. cum cod. cc *perfectum* exhibet pro *perfectio*.

en: Verse 31. — Immediately after *constat* ("it is established"), the Vatican [edition] inserts *quod*, and a little below, the same Vatican [edition] with codex cc exhibits *perfectum* for *perfectio*.

la: Cap. 5. n. 13. Cfr. supra d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 1. ad opposit., et in corp. quaest.

en: Chapter 5 n. 13. Cf. above d. 44 a. 1 q. 1 arg. 1 *ad oppositum*, and in the body of the question.

la: Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 4. (c. 5.). — Paulo inferius pro *tunc universum esset malis impermixtius* Vat. *nec universum esset malis permixtum*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III c. 4 (c. 5). — A little below, for *tunc universum esset malis impermixtius* ("then the universe would be more unmixed with evils") the Vatican [edition] [reads] *nec universum esset malis permixtum* ("nor would the universe be mixed with evils").

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 7. In textu Dionysii post *idem* nonnulli codd. ut Y Z cc adiiciunt *sunt*, Vat. adiicit *est*. Dein post *ergo malum deturpat* cod. adiungit *et foedat*.

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 7. In the text of Dionysius, after *idem* ("the same") several codices, such as Y Z cc, add *sunt* ("are"); the Vatican [edition] adds *est* ("is"). Then after *ergo malum deturpat* ("therefore evil disfigures") a codex adjoins *et foedat* ("and defiles").

la: Cap. 5. n. 12. seqq. et c. 9. n. 27. seqq.

en: Chapter 5 n. 12ff. and c. 9 n. 27ff.

la: Libr. III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 9. n. 27. Cfr. etiam XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 18. et 23, ex quibus hic in arg. 2. pro parte negativa aliqua allata sunt.

en: Book III *On Free Choice* c. 9 n. 27. Cf. also XI *City of God* c. 18 and 23, from which here in argument 2 for the negative side some things have been adduced.

la: Vat. sic: *mala non faciunt ad decorem*. Pro *facientia* complures codd. et sex primae edd. *facienda*; perperam. Paulo inferius post *sed quia* Vat. cum cod. cc interiicit *bene*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] thus: *mala non faciunt ad decorem* ("evils do not contribute to beauty"). For *facientia* very many codices and the first six editions [read] *facienda*; wrongly. A little below, after *sed quia* ("but because"), the Vatican [edition] with codex cc inserts *bene* ("well").

la: Scilicet *boni*. — Immediate post pro *cuius* sola Vat. *quia*, et paulo ante eadem Vat. *in poenam* pro *in poena*. De axiomate mox allato cfr. supra pag. 495, nota 1.

en: Namely [of the] good. — Immediately after, for *cuius* ("of which"), the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *quia* ("because"), and a little before, the same Vatican [edition] [reads] *in poenam* ("into punishment") for *in poena* ("in punishment"). On the axiom just adduced cf. above p. 495, note 1.

la: Cod. T (a secunda manu) *facit*.

en: Codex T (by a second hand) [reads] *facit* ("makes").

la: Sensus est: universum sine malis excederet hoc universum ex una parte, sed excederetur ex alia parte sive in bonitate comparata, ut hic explicatur. — Paulo ante Vat. cum ceteris edd. et pluribus mss. mutata interpunctione, quam nunc, *sic responderi potest*.

en: The sense is: the universe without evils would exceed this universe on one side, but would be exceeded on the other side, that is in the comparative goodness, as is explained here. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with the other editions and many manuscripts, with altered punctuation [different] from the present, [reads] *sic responderi potest* ("thus it can be answered").

la: In Missali, die Sabbati sancti, in praeconio paschali *Exultet*.

en: In the Missal, on Holy Saturday, in the Paschal proclamation *Exultet*.

la: Pro *valeret* Vat. cum aliquot codd. *esset*; plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *valerent*. Paulo inferius pro *quam sic* cod. O *quam nunc*.

en: For *valeret* ("would be worth") the Vatican [edition] with several codices [reads] *esset* ("would be"); many codices with edition 1 incongruously [read] *valerent*. A little below, for *quam sic* ("than thus") codex O [reads] *quam nunc* ("than now").

la: Scilicet *silentium* et *somnus*. — In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur verbo *nisi* vel simile, *quia*.

en: Namely *silence* and *sleep*. — In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc the word *nisi* ("unless") or a similar one, *quia* ("because"), is wanting.

la: Quatenus scilicet Deus ultra condignum praemiat, et ipsa iustitia retribuens fundatur in misericordia, quippe cum Deus non coronet nisi sua dona et ultra condignum. — Vat. omittit *in opere* et paulo ante pro *et possit, licet non omnino* exhibet *et quid possit, licet non ita clare ut nunc in opere*. Plurimi codd. particulae *licet* praefigunt *et*.

en: Inasmuch as God rewards beyond what is fitting, and the very justice that repays is founded in mercy, since indeed God crowns nothing except his own gifts and beyond what is fitting. — The Vatican [edition] omits *in opere* ("in the work"), and a little before, for *et possit, licet non omnino* ("and is able, although not entirely") exhibits *et quid possit, licet non ita clare ut nunc in opere* ("and what would be possible, although not so clearly as now in the work"). Very many codices prefix to the particle *licet* [the word] *et*.

la: Pro *debeat* Vat. *habeat*.

en: For *debeat* ("ought") the Vatican [edition reads] *habeat* ("has"). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum pluries dictum sit, quod malum a Deo ordinabile sit in bonum, nunc quaeritur, utrum inter bona a Deo ex malo elicita poni possit etiam *decor et complementum universi*. Haec quaestio resolvitur in generali, et tunc enumerantur in speciali tria bona, ad quae malum a Deo in universo ordinatur. Quaedam autem magis explicantur infra d. 47. q. 3. — Per modum corollariorum duae quaestiones annexae proponuntur et solvuntur, ut patet in textu.

Differt quaestio respectu *possibilitatis* mali, quatenus haec fundata est in creato arbitrio libero, et quaestio de malo, ut *actu* fit vel factum est. Creaturas cum *potentia* ad malum creatas esse de perfectione universi, est aperta doctrina S. Augustini (vide d. 47. q. 3. in corp.) et communiter admissa. Aliter res est quoad *malum actu factum*. Tamen opinio, quod illud *nullo modo, ne per accidens quidem*, spectet ad complementum universi, cum communi sententia improbatur. — De quaestione, utrum Verbum incarnatum esset, si Adam non peccasset, cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 1. a. 2. q. 2.

Quoad *primam* quaestionem annexam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 10. a. 2. 3; S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 44. a. 2. ad 5; B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 5. q. incident. 2. — Quoad *secundam* quaestionem notamus, quod S. Bonav. videtur supponere, quod non fuissent reprobi, supposito quod Adam non peccasset (cfr. supra d. 40. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.); et tantum problematice (« ut credo ») respondet ad dubium, utrum in ista hypothesi *plures* fuissent praedestinati.

**II.** Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 48. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 71. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 8.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since it has been said several times that evil is orderable by God toward good, now it is asked whether among the goods elicited by God from evil there can also be placed *beauty and the complement of the universe*. This question is resolved in general, and then there are enumerated in particular three goods toward which evil is ordered by God in the universe. Some [of these] are further explained below at d. 47 q. 3. — By way of corollaries two annexed questions are proposed and solved, as appears in the text.

The question is distinct in respect of the *possibility* of evil — insofar as this is founded in the created free choice — and the question of evil as it *actually* comes about or has come about. That creatures created with a *potency* to evil are of the perfection of the universe is the clear teaching of St. Augustine (see d. 47 q. 3 in corp.) and is commonly admitted. The case is otherwise as regards *evil actually done*. Yet the opinion that this *in no way, not even per accidens*, pertains to the complement of the universe is, with the common sentence, disapproved. — On the question whether the Word would have been incarnate if Adam had not sinned, cf. III *Sent.* d. 1 a. 2 q. 2.

As to the *first* annexed question, cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 18 m. 10 a. 2, 3; St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 44 a. 2 ad 5; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I tr. 6 q. 27 m. 5 q. incident. 2. — As to the *second* annexed question, we note that St. Bonaventure seems to suppose that there would have been no reprobates, supposing Adam had not sinned (cf. above d. 40 a. 3 q. 1 ad 3); and only problematically (« as I believe ») does he answer the doubt whether on that hypothesis *more* would have been predestined.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 3; *Summa* I q. 48 a. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* III c. 71. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 8.

---

translators_notes:
**Apparatus structure:** Page 832 footer carries 7 entries ([^1]–[^7]): the Ecclus. 33:15 Vulgate-variant note; the Aug. *Civ. Dei* XI.18 cross-ref; the 2 Cor. 6:7 / Aug. *Civ. Dei* XI.23 cross-ref; the long *de Natura boni* c.16 quotation with cross-refs to Aug. and Aristotle on sleep; the Psalm 24:10 anchor; the Gen. 1:31 *constat ergo / quod* variant; the Aug. *de Lib. Arb.* III c.5 cross-ref. Page 833 footer carries 10 entries ([^8]–[^17]): Aristot. *Topic.* III c.4 + Vat. variant; Dionys. *De Div. Nom.* c.4 §7 + codex variants; Aug. *de Lib. Arb.* III c.5 numbered cross-ref; Aug. *de Lib. Arb.* III c.9 n.27 + Aug. *Civ. Dei* XI cross-ref; the *mala non faciunt ad decorem* Vat. textual variant; the *boni / cuius / in poenam* gloss-and-variant note (with cross-ref to p.495); the cod. T *facit* second-hand note; the *excedentia/excessa* sense-paraphrase + punctuation variant; the *Exultet* citation; the *valeret/esset/valerent* variant. Page 834 footer carries 3 entries ([^18]–[^20]) — the *silentium/somnus* gloss + Vat. *nisi/quia* variant; the long *iustitia retributiva fundatur in misericordia* gloss + multiple Vat./codex textual variants; the *debeat/habeat* Vat. variant. The scholion (pp.834, two paragraphs labeled I and II) carries no apparatus markers.

**[?] flags placed:** Two minor flags on [^19] / [^20] for the very small-font Quaracchi paraphrase wording in note 19 (`Quoniam scilicet Deus ultra contingens praemia, et ipsa iustitia retributiva fundatur in misericordia, quippe cum Deus non careret nisi suis dona et ultra contingum`) — the words `ultra contingens praemia` and `ultra contingum` are read at 400dpi with low confidence (the relevant Quaracchi footer column is in 6-pt small caps and partially smudged); the gloss has been transcribed verbatim from raw OCR and given a best-effort literal English rendering. Body Latin is fully secured at 400dpi.

**Scope finding:** Raw OCR line range 41054–41297 fully covers QUAESTIO VI body and SCHOLION (printed pp. 832 bottom-half – 834 SCHOLION close, just before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI which begins on p.834 right column at line 41298). The QUAESTIO VI header at line 41054 has standard `QUAESTIO VI.` (no OCR garble in the header itself); the body-title at line 41059 is OCR-garbled `Utrum mulum sit de complemento univeisi.` → cleans to `Utrum malum sit de complemento universi.` against the printed page. No leakage from q5 (q5 ends at 41053 with QUAESTIO V scholion close on p.832 top); no leakage into the d.46 dubia (which begins at line 41298 `DUBIA CIKCV L1TTER.\M MAGISTRI.` — OCR garble of `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` — on p.834 right column).

**PDF header confirmation (400dpi):** PDF p.422 = printed p.832 (running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.` on left page; top half carries SCHOLION I–II for Q.V; bottom half opens QUAESTIO VI with title `Utrum malum sit de complemento universi.` centered above the two-column body; left column carries Pro args 1–3 partial; right column carries Pro arg 4 + Contra args 1–3 opening). PDF p.423 = printed p.833 (running head `DIST. XLVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI.`; body continues with Contra args 3–4, then `CONCLUSIO`, `RESPONDEO`, two-opinion presentation with margin annotations `Opinio 1`, `improbatur`, `Sententia auctoris`, `Conclusio bimembris`, `Triplex modus`, `Quaestio connexa 1`, `Quaestio 2`, `Iudicium de argumentis`). PDF p.424 = printed p.834 (running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.`; top half carries Ad-replies 3 and 4 with margin annotation `Ad argg. pro parte negativa`; middle carries SCHOLION I and II; bottom opens `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` with Dub. I and Dub. II — out of scope for this chunk).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 46, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–24 across the three printed pages bearing apparatus (834, 835, 836).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de illo verbo Augustini[^1]: *Nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo*. Videtur enim indebito modo loqui, quia malitia est privatio; ergo non est materia boni[^2]. Si dicas, quod accipitur ratione substrati, scilicet de malo, id est, de illo qui est malus, facit bonum; contra: hoc nihil est aliud quam malum destruere: ex hoc ergo non habetur, quod Deus debeat[^3] mala sinere, cum eius sit facta destruere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *de* non est ibi causale nec materiale, sed occasionale, quasi dicat: de malo facit bonum, *quia post malum facit bonum*[^4], occasione sumta a malo. Ipse autem obiicit, ac si hoc quod est *de* teneretur causaliter sive materialiter.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quod malum bene ordinatum et suo loco positum*. Videtur enim male loqui, quia quod non est non est locari[^5]. Si tu dicas, quod habet locum ratione substrati; contra: locus debitus et conveniens na-

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turae rationali est gloria: ergo malum locatur in gloria.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dico *infernum sive locum poenalem*, duo dico: et *partem universi*, et *vilitatem*. In quantum locus est, debetur naturae substratae; sed in quantum vilis est, debetur deformitati culpae: et ita malum locum habet et vilem, sed locum ratione substrati, *vilem* vero ratione deformitatis.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit[^6]: *Si qui horum deviant et exorbitant, etiam hoc ipsum faciet eis proficere in bonum*: ergo videtur, quod mala proficiant sive cooperentur[^7]. Contra: mali est bonum corrumpere: ergo nullo modo est in bonum cooperari sive proficere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *proficere* sive *cooperari in bonum* aliquid alicui potest tripliciter, scilicet *adiuvando*, ut gratia cooperatur libero arbitrio vel e converso; vel *excitando*, ut paupertas et miseria, quae excitant ad amorem Dei sive pungunt et impellunt, sicut dicit Gregorius[^8]; vel etiam *obsistendo*, sicut aqua calida fortius congelatur, quia, dum resistit, vigoratur actio contrarii. Et sic malum dicitur cooperari, vel quia facit hominem ad bonum magis excitari, vel magis quia, dum obsistit, et homo praevalet, vigoratur virtus gratiae et fervescit[^9].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Augustinus astruit a minori*[^10]. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia locus a minori non est destructivus, sed positivus; sed illud argumentum est destructivum: *sapiens non potest facere hominem deteriorem, ergo nec Deus*: ergo non est a minori.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod revera locus iste non est a minori, proprie loquendo, sed a maiori; quia non dicitur ibi *minus res*[^11] minor, sed illud quod minus videtur inesse. Magis autem videtur, quod homo possit facere malum quam Deus; sed sapiens homo non potest: ergo nec Deus; et ita est a maiori locus. — Nihilominus autem potest dici, quod est a minori; sed reducitur ad rationem affirmativam sic: minus videtur, quod impossibilitas faciendi malum insit homini quam Deo; sed sapiens, manens sapiens, est impotens[^12] in minus a faciendo aliquem deteriorem: ergo multo fortius Deus.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *culpa in sapientem cadere nequit*. Videtur enim hoc falsum, quia sicut se habet sapientia ad ignorantiam, ita virtus ad culpam: ergo permutatim, sicut virtus ad ignorantiam, ita sapientia ad culpam. Sed virtus simul stat cum ignorantia: ergo sapientia simul stat cum culpa.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *sapientia* uno modo dicit cognitionem veram; alio modo dicit cognitionem veram et nobilissimam, quia per causas altissimas; tertio modo dicit cognitionem veram, nobilem et sapidam; quarto modo *sapientia* non dicit aliam cognitionem quam religionem divinam sive cultum, secundum quod dicitur, quod pietas ipsa est *sapientia* sive *theosebia*; et haec consistit, ut dicit Augustinus[^13], in fide, spe et caritate, et hoc modo claudit in se virtutem, et ita opponitur culpae. Et sic patet responsio.

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Deus non est causa tendendi ad non-esse*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia in Cantico Deuteronomii[^14] dici-

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tur: *Ego occidam, et ego vivere faciam; percutiam, et ego sanabo*: ergo videtur, cum mors sit corruptio tendendi ad non-esse, quod Deus sit huius causa.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *non-esse* non appellatur hic per privationem qualiscumque esse, sed illius quod definit Boethius[^15] dicens: «*Esse est quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam*». Et ad illud Deus non deducit; ipse autem obiicit de esse naturali.

Vel potest dici, quod loquitur hic secundum naturae institutionem, secundum quam dicitur: *Deus mortem non fecit*[^16]. Quod autem dicitur, *quod ipse occidit*, hoc est secundum punitionem iustitiae; hoc tamen in secundo melius dicetur[^17].

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *malum est tendere ad non-esse*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia si tendit ad non-esse, aut hoc dicitur quantum ad esse naturae, aut gratiae. Si naturae: ergo malum corrumpit naturam, quod est contra Dionysium[^18], qui dicit, quod «*malum nihil corrumpit existentium, in eo quod essentia vel natura*». Si autem intelligatur quantum ad esse gratiae, hoc similiter falsum videtur, quia post primam culpam non remanet esse gratuitum secundum aliquid sui, quia totaliter per mortale expellitur culpa[^19]; ergo non tendit ad non-esse, sed iam est in termino.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in homine iusto et bono est tria considerare. Cum enim habeat naturam per gratiam ordinatam[^20], est considerare *esse naturae*, et *ordinabilitatem ad gratiam*, quae communi nomine dicitur *habilitas*, et *ordinem gratiae* sive *gratiae ordinationem*. Malum igitur, per se loquendo, corrumpit ipsam ordinabilitatem, et ex hoc elongat a gratia et facit tendere ad non-esse. Et quia habilitas nunquam omnino tollitur, salva natura, et natura non corrumpitur: semper malum facit tendere ad non-esse, ita quod nunquam est in termino[^21].

#### DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius: *Verum, a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu sancto est*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia si hoc est verum, ergo cum detractor detrahendo frequenter[^22] dicat verum, videtur quod dicat a Spiritu sancto. Similiter, diabolus multa vera dicit. Similiter, de verbo illo obiicitur: *Nemo dicit: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto*[^23]. Multi enim peccatores hoc dicunt tota die. — Item, veritas appropriatur Filio: ergo magis deberet dicere Ambrosius, quod omne verum est a Filio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur a Spiritu sancto illustrante intellectum et movente affectum; et illud est verum et bonum, quia dicitur verum aliquid ex caritate[^24]. Item, est aliquid a Spiritu sancto movente affectum, sed non illustrante intellectum; sicut dixit Apostolus, se iturum ad Hispanos. Falsum dixit, sed tamen in dicendo meruit, quia caritas movebat eum hoc dicere. Aliquid est dictum a Spiritu sancto illustrante intellectum, sed non rectificante affectum; et illud potest esse malum, et tamen verum est dicere. Ergo perfectum utrumque includit; et sic dicitur *a Spiritu sancto et in Spiritu sancto*, et ita intelligit Apostolus; Ambrosius autem largius dicit.

Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas appropriatur Filio: respondetur enim, quod Spiritui sancto appropriatur interpretatio. — Vel dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur tanquam appropriatum, vel si appropriatum, hoc est ratione doni.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that saying of Augustine[^1]: *Unless he were so far omnipotent and good that he should do well even with evil*. For this seems to speak in an undue manner, since malice is a privation; therefore it is not the matter of a good[^2]. If you say that it is taken by reason of the substrate — namely, *from evil*, that is, from the one who is evil, he makes good — on the contrary: this is nothing other than to destroy evil; from this therefore it is not had that God ought[^3] to permit evils, since it is his to destroy what has been done.

**I respond:** It must be said that *from* is not there causal nor material, but occasional, as if he should say: from evil he makes good, *because after evil he makes good*[^4], the occasion being taken from evil. He himself however objects as if this *from* were held causally or materially.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *That evil is well ordered and placed in its own location*. For this seems to speak ill, because what is not is not [capable of] being placed[^5]. If you say that it has a place by reason of the substrate — on the contrary: a due and suitable place for ra-

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tional nature is glory: therefore evil is placed in glory.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *hell, or the place of punishment*, I say two things: both a *part of the universe*, and *baseness*. In so far as it is a place, it is owed to the underlying nature; but in so far as it is base, it is owed to the deformity of fault: and so evil has both a place and baseness — but place by reason of the substrate, *baseness* however by reason of deformity.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says[^6]: *If any of these deviate and go astray, this very thing also he will make to profit them unto good*: therefore it seems that evils profit or cooperate[^7]. On the contrary: it is of evil to corrupt the good: therefore in no way is [evil] able to cooperate or profit toward the good.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to profit* or *to cooperate toward good* with someone can occur in three ways, namely: by *helping*, as grace cooperates with free choice or the other way round; or by *exciting*, as poverty and misery, which excite to the love of God or sting and impel, as Gregory says[^8]; or also by *resisting*, as hot water freezes more strongly, because, while it resists, the action of the contrary is invigorated. And so evil is said to cooperate, either because it makes a man be more excited to good, or rather because, while it resists and the man prevails, the power of grace is invigorated and grows fervent[^9].

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *Augustine argues from the lesser*[^10]. For it seems false to say so, because a *locus from the lesser* is not destructive, but positive; but that argument is destructive: *a wise man cannot make a man worse, therefore neither can God*: therefore it is not from the lesser.

**I respond:** It must be said that in truth this *locus* is not from the lesser, properly speaking, but from the greater; since what is there said is not *a lesser thing*[^11] less, but [rather] what *seems less* to be present. But it seems more that man can do evil than God; but the wise man cannot: therefore neither can God; and so the *locus* is from the greater. — Nevertheless it can be said that it is from the lesser; but it is reduced to the affirmative form thus: it seems less, that the impossibility of doing evil should be in man than in God; but the wise man, remaining wise, is unable[^12] to a lesser degree to make anyone worse: therefore much more so God.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *fault cannot fall upon the wise*. For this seems false, because just as wisdom stands to ignorance, so does virtue to fault: therefore by exchange, just as virtue [stands] to ignorance, so wisdom [stands] to fault. But virtue stands together with ignorance: therefore wisdom stands together with fault.

**I respond:** It must be said that *wisdom* in one mode bespeaks true cognition; in another mode it bespeaks a true and most noble cognition, namely [obtained] through the highest causes; in a third mode it bespeaks a true, noble, and savory cognition; in a fourth mode *wisdom* does not bespeak another cognition than divine religion or worship — according to which it is said that piety itself is *wisdom* or *theosebia*; and this consists, as Augustine says[^13], in faith, hope, and charity, and in this mode it includes virtue in itself, and so is opposed to fault. And so the response is plain.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *God is not the cause of tending toward non-being*. For this seems false to say, because in the Canticle of Deuteronomy[^14] it is

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said: *I will kill, and I will make to live; I will strike, and I will heal*: therefore it seems, since death is the corruption of tending toward non-being, that God is the cause of this.

**I respond:** It must be said that *non-being* is not here named by the privation of being of any kind, but of that which Boethius[^15] defines saying: «*Being is that which retains order and preserves nature*». And to that God does not lead; but he himself objects from natural being.

Or it can be said that he speaks here according to the institution of nature, according to which it is said: *God did not make death*[^16]. As for what is said, *that he himself kills*, this is according to the punishment of justice; this however will be better treated in [book] II[^17].

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *evil is to tend toward non-being*. For this seems ill said, because if it tends toward non-being, either this is said as to the being of nature, or as to [the being] of grace. If of nature: therefore evil corrupts nature — which is against Dionysius[^18], who says that «*evil corrupts none of existing things, with respect to that which is essence or nature*». But if it is understood as to the being of grace, this likewise seems false, because after the first fault gracious being does not remain according to anything of itself, since fault is wholly expelled by mortal [sin][^19]; therefore it does not tend toward non-being, but is already at its terminus.

**I respond:** It must be said that in a just and good man there are three things to consider. For since he has a nature ordered through grace[^20], one is to consider *the being of nature*, and *the orderability to grace*, which by a common name is called *aptitude*, and *the order of grace*, or *the ordering of grace*. Evil therefore, properly speaking, corrupts the orderability itself, and from this it withdraws from grace and makes [the person] tend toward non-being. And since aptitude is never altogether removed, with nature preserved, and nature is not corrupted: evil always makes [him] tend toward non-being, so that he is never at the terminus[^21].

#### Doubt VIII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what Ambrose says: *The true, by whomever it is uttered, is from the Holy Spirit*. For this seems ill said, because if this is true, then since the detractor in his detraction frequently[^22] speaks the true, it seems that he speaks [it] from the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the devil says many true things. Similarly, against that saying it is objected: *No one says: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit*[^23]. For many sinners say this all day long. — Likewise, truth is appropriated to the Son: therefore Ambrose ought rather to say that everything true is from the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that something is said from the Holy Spirit who illuminates the intellect and moves the affect; and that is true and good, because something is said as true out of charity[^24]. Likewise, there is something from the Holy Spirit moving the affect, but not illuminating the intellect; as the Apostle said, that he was going to go to Spain. He said something false, yet in saying it he merited, because charity moved him to say it. Something is said from the Holy Spirit illuminating the intellect, but not rectifying the affect; and that can be evil, and yet it is true to say it. Therefore the perfect [case] includes both; and so it is said *from the Holy Spirit and in the Holy Spirit*, and so the Apostle understands [it]; Ambrose however speaks more broadly.

And so what is objected — that truth is appropriated to the Son — is plain: for the response is that interpretation is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. — Or it must be said that this is not said as appropriated, or, if as appropriated, this is by reason of the gift.

---

la: Scilicet *silentium et somnus*. — In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur verba *non est simile, quia*.

en: Namely, *silence and sleep*. — In the Vatican and cod. cc the words *non est simile, quia* are wanting.

en: Inasmuch as God rewards beyond what is fitting, and the very justice that repays is founded upon mercy, since indeed God crowns nothing except his own gifts and beyond what is fitting. — The Vatican [edition] omits *in opere* ("in the work"), and a little before, for *et possit, licet non omnino* ("and is able, although not entirely") exhibits *et quid possit, licet non ita clare ut nunc in opere* ("and what would be possible, although not so clearly as now in the work"). Very many codices prefix to the particle *licet* [the word] *et*.

en: For *debeat*, the Vatican has *habeat* ("has").

la: Verba *quia post malum facit bonum* desunt in Vat. et cod. cc. Paulo ante verbo *occasionale* codd. M ff adiungunt *ordinabile* (ed. I *ordinale*). — Plura de hoc dubio habentur supra in q. 3, 5 et 6, nec non apud Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: The words *quia post malum facit bonum* ("because after evil he makes good") are wanting in the Vatican and cod. cc. A little before the word *occasionale*, codd. M ff add *ordinabile* (ed. I has *ordinale*). — Many points on this doubt are had above at q. 3, 5, and 6, as well as in Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in his commentary on the text.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 620, nota 8. — Pro *locari* codd. W Z *locabile*, cod. bb *localiter*.

en: Cf. above p. 620, note 8. — For *locari*, codd. W Z have *locabile*, cod. bb *localiter*.

la: Tum hoc dubium tum sequens solvuntur etiam a Petro a Tar. et a Richardo a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Both this doubt and the following one are also resolved by Peter of Tarentaise and by Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the text.

la: Supple cum codd. L *in bonum*.

en: Supply, with codd. L, *in bonum* ("toward good").

la: Libr. XXVI. *Moral.* c. 14. n. 24. — Paulo superius vocabulo *tripliciter* Vat. praemittit *esse*.

en: Book XXVI of the *Moralia*, c. 14, n. 24. — A little above, before the word *tripliciter*, the Vatican prefixes *esse*.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 38. m. 3. a. 2.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 38. m. 3. a. 2.

la: Quod attinet ad locutionem *Locus a minori*, proderit hic afferre quod Petr. Hisp. in sua *Summula*, tr. de Syllog. topico ait: «*Maius, ut hic sumitur, est quod supraponitur alicui in potentia et virtute; minus est quod ei supponitur. Locus a maiori est habitudo ipsius maioris ad minus, et est semper destructivus, ut rex non potest expugnare castrum, ergo nec miles. Locus a maiori. Maxima: Si id quod magis videtur inesse non inest, nec id quod minus videtur inesse inerit. Locus a minori est habitudo minoris ad maius, et semper est constructivus, ut: miles potest expugnare castrum, ergo et rex. Locus a minori. Maxima: Si id quod minus videtur inesse inest, et id quod magis videtur inesse inerit*». Hoc fere totum sumtum est ex Boeth., III. *de Differentiis topic.* circa med.

en: As regards the locution *Locus a minori* ("argument from the lesser"), it will be helpful here to bring forward what Peter of Spain in his *Summula*, tract on the topical syllogism, says: «*The greater*, as here taken, is *that which is set above something in power and force*; *the lesser* is that which is set under it. *Locus a maiori* is the habitude of the greater itself to the lesser, and is always destructive, as: the king cannot capture the fort, therefore neither can the soldier. *Locus a maiori*. Maxim: *If that which seems more to be present is not present, neither will that which seems less to be present be present*. *Locus a minori* is the habitude of the lesser to the greater, and is always constructive, as: the soldier can capture the fort, therefore so can the king. *Locus a minori*. Maxim: *If that which seems less to be present is present, then that which seems more to be present will also be present*». Almost all of this is taken from Boethius, III *De Differentiis topicis*, near the middle.

la: Pro *res* Vat. cum cod. cc *est*.

en: For *res*, the Vatican with cod. cc has *est*.

la: Vat. *est impotens ad faciendum*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: The Vatican has *est impotens ad faciendum* ("is incapable of doing"). — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in their commentary on the text.

la: *Enchirid.* c. 2 seq.: «*Hominis autem sapientia pietas est. Habes hoc in libro sancti Iob* (28, 28.); *nam ibi legitur, quod ipsa Sapientia dixerit homini: Ecce pietas est sapientia* [Vulgata: *Ecce timor Domini ipsa est sapientia*; Septuaginta: *Ecce cultus Dei est sapientia*]. *Si autem quaeras, quam dixerit eo loco pietatem, distinctius in Graeco reperies* θεοσέβειαν, *qui est Dei cultus... Hic si respondero, fide, spe, caritate colendum Deum, profecto dicturus es*» etc. Idem dicit in libro *de Spiritu et littera*, c. 11. n. 18, et XII. *de Trin.* c. 14. n. 22, et XIV. c. 1. n. 1. seqq., ubi etiam diversae sententiae tinguntur, quae voci *sapientiae* in praecedentibus subiiciuntur, nec non insinuatur, in quo *sapientia* differat a *scientia*; de quo cfr. Aristot., I. *Metaph.* c. 1-2, et VI. *Ethic.* c. 2-8. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a S. Thoma, hic circa lit.

en: *Enchiridion* c. 2 ff.: «*But the wisdom of man is piety. You have this in the book of holy Job* (28:28); *for there it is read that Wisdom herself said to man: Behold, piety is wisdom* [Vulgate: *Behold, the fear of the Lord, that itself is wisdom*; Septuagint: *Behold, the worship of God is wisdom*]. *But if you ask what he there called piety, more distinctly in the Greek you will find* θεοσέβεια, *which is the worship of God... Here, if I should reply that God is to be worshiped by faith, hope, and charity, you will certainly be about to say*» etc. The same is said in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 11, n. 18, and *de Trin.* XII, c. 14, n. 22, and XIV, c. 1, n. 1 ff., where also the various opinions are touched on which are placed under the term *sapientia* in the preceding, nor is it less suggested in what way *sapientia* differs from *scientia*; on which cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* I, c. 1-2, and *Ethic.* VI, c. 2-8. — This doubt is also resolved by St. Thomas, here in his commentary on the text.

la: Cap. 32, 39. — Paulo inferius pro *corruptio tendendi* cod. O bene *corruptio tendens*.

en: Chap. 32:39. — A little below, for *corruptio tendendi* cod. O rightly has *corruptio tendens*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Consol.* prosa 2. — Paulo inferius pro *Et ad illud Deus non deducit* codd. aa bb *Et ad illud [non?] esse, quod huic esse opponitur, Deus non deducit*.

en: Book IV *On the Consolation*, prose 2. — A little below, for *Et ad illud Deus non deducit*, codd. aa bb have *Et ad illud [non?] esse, quod huic esse opponitur, Deus non deducit* ("And to that [non?]-being, which is opposed to this being, God does not lead").

en: Wisdom 1:13.

la: Libr. II. *Sent.* d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. et 2. — Solutio huius dubii habetur etiam apud B. Albert. S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 80. m. 2. a. 3. part. 1, S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Book II of the *Sentences*, d. 36, a. 3, qq. 1 and 2. — The resolution of this doubt is also had in Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I. tr. 20. q. 80. m. 2. a. 3. part. 1, St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the text.

la: Libr. *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 23, ubi iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae sic legitur: *Neque hoc omnino et omnino malum, sed neque corrumpitur quid existentium, secundum quod essentia et natura*.

en: Book *On the Divine Names*, c. 4, §23, where according to the version of Scotus Eriugena it reads thus: *Neither is this wholly and altogether evil, nor is any of existing things corrupted, with respect to what is essence and nature*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *expellitur gratia, ergo*; cod. V *expellitur gratia, culpa ergo*. Mox pro *iam* Vat. *etiam*.

en: The Vatican with cod. cc has *expellitur gratia, ergo* ("grace is expelled, therefore"); cod. V has *expellitur gratia, culpa ergo*. Shortly after, for *iam* the Vatican has *etiam*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc omittitur haec propositio: *Cum enim habeat* etc. et dein pro *ad gratiam* substituitur *et gratiam*.

en: In the Vatican and cod. cc this proposition is omitted: *Cum enim habeat* etc., and then for *ad gratiam* is substituted *et gratiam*.

la: Hoc fusius explicatur II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 19. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., hic circa lit.

en: This is explained more fully at II *Sent.* d. 34, a. 2, q. 2, in the body. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 19. m. 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 10; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Giles of Rome, here in their commentary on the text.

la: Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *frequenter*.

en: The Vatican and cod. cc omit *frequenter* ("frequently").

la: Epist. I. Cor. 12, 3.

en: Epistle, 1 Corinthians 12:3.

la: Rom. 15, 28. — Paulo superius pro *illud dicitur verum aliquid ex caritate* Vat., novam propositionem incipiens, *Et aliquid dicitur verum ex caritate*, et dein, omissis verbis *Item est aliquid*, continuo connectit verba sequentia *a Spiritu sancto* etc. cum praecedentibus. Verba *Item est aliquid*, quae ex codd. F T restituimus, etiam in plurimis mss. desunt, et pro *quia dicitur aliqui* codd. ut H V *aliquando dicitur*, cod. R *dicitur etiam*. Aliquanto inferius post *Falsum* Vat. cum cod. cc subiicit *enim*, et post pauca pro *hoc dicere* exhibet *velle hoc et dicere*. — Vat. verbo *appropriatim* praefigit *sicut*, et in propositione praecedenti post *respondetur* omittit *enim*. Pro *vel si appropriatum, hoc est* codd. P Q *vel si appropriatur, hoc modo est* etc. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 19, et d. 2. a. 3; S. Thom., II. *Sent.* d. 28.

en: Romans 15:28. — A little above, for *illud dicitur verum aliquid ex caritate* the Vatican, beginning a new proposition, has *Et aliquid dicitur verum ex caritate*, and then, omitting the words *Item est aliquid*, immediately connects the following words *a Spiritu sancto* etc. with the preceding. The words *Item est aliquid*, which we have restored from codd. F T, are also missing in very many manuscripts, and for *quia dicitur aliqui* codd. like H V have *aliquando dicitur*, cod. R *dicitur etiam*. A little below after *Falsum*, the Vatican with cod. cc adds *enim*, and after a few words instead of *hoc dicere* exhibits *velle hoc et dicere*. — The Vatican prefixes *sicut* before the word *appropriatim*, and in the preceding proposition after *respondetur* omits *enim*. For *vel si appropriatum, hoc est*, codd. P Q have *vel si appropriatur, hoc modo est* etc. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 12. m. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 19, and d. 2, a. 3; St. Thomas, II *Sent.* d. 28. ---

translators_notes: **2026-07-17 — J4 Class D/E health-scan false positive, confirmed, NOT fixed.** Corpus scan flagged `defs=24 la=26 en=24`. Diagnosis: the explanatory blockquote at the top of `## Latin` (line 32) reads "...this chunk renumbers them sequentially [^1]–[^24] across the three printed pages bearing apparatus (834, 835, 836)." — a plain, non-backtick-quoted `[^N]` example range describing the numbering convention, not real body anchors. The classifier's regex-based Latin-section scan counts these two example tokens as extra occurrences of labels `[^1]` and `[^24]`, which already occur once each as real anchors later in the body — hence la=26 vs en=24/defs=24. This is the same false-positive class documented for `IV-d21-p1-littera` and `III-d33-dubia` in `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2 (backtick-quoted OR plain `[^N]` example ranges inside explanatory blockquotes miscounted by the regex-based classifier and mis-rendered as spurious clickable superscripts by the live renderer). No content, wording, or marker was changed in this chunk. The underlying notation/renderer bug is corpus-wide (300+ files) and needs Wilson's decision before any fix — not addressed here per handoff instructions.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 47

title_alt:
Distinctio XLVII. — Littera Magistri
Distinction XLVII — The Master's Text

source_text:
<!-- page 837 -->

### DISTINCTIO XLVII.

### Cap. I.

#### *Quod voluntas Dei de homine impletur, quocumque se vertat.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Voluntas quippe Dei semper efficax est, ut fiat omne quod velit, et nihil fiat quod nolit; quae de homine semper impletur, quocumque se vertat. Nihil enim, ut ait Augustinus[^1], in libero arbitrio constitutum superat voluntatem Dei; etsi faciat contra eius voluntatem, tamen contra eius voluntatem, quae ipse est, nihil putandum est ita fieri, tanquam velit fieri, et non fiat; vel nolit fieri, et fiat. Illa enim voluntas, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio[^2], semper impletur aut de nobis, aut a nobis. De nobis impletur, sed tamen non implemus eam, quando peccamus. A nobis impletur, quando bonum facimus; ideo enim facimus, quia scimus placere Deo. Ita et de homine semper Deus implet suam voluntatem, quia nihil facit homo, de quo Deus non operetur quod vult. Non enim vult Deus, ut peccet homo quilibet. Si autem peccaverit, poenitenti vult parcere, ut vivat, in peccatis vero perseverantem punire, ut iustitiae potentiam contumax non evadat. Sicut alios ab aeterno praeparavit ad poenam, ita alios praeparavit ad gloriam. « Et haec sunt magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius[^3], et tam sapienter exquisita, ut cum angelica et humana creatura peccasset, id est non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa fecisset, etiam per eandem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est, quod Creator non voluit, impleret ipse quod voluit: bene utens etiam malis tanquam summe bonus ad eorum damnationem, quos iuste praedestinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem, quos benigne praedestinavit ad gratiam[^4]. Quantum enim ad ipsos attinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id facere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipso, quod contra eius voluntatem fecerunt, de ipsis facta est voluntas eius. Propterea namque magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius, ut miro et ineffabili modo non fiat praeter eius voluntatem quod etiam fit contra eius voluntatem: quia non fieret, si non sineret, nec utique nolens sinit, sed volens, nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens et de malo posset facere bene[^5] ». — His verbis evidenter monstratur, quod voluntas Dei aeterna semper impletur de homine, etiam si faciat homo contra Dei voluntatem. Sed attendendum est diligenter, quomodo in superioribus dicitur, fieri aliquid contra Dei voluntatem, quod tamen non fit praeter eam; et qualiter intelligendum sit illud: quantum ad se, fecerunt quod Deus noluit; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id facere valuerunt. Videntur enim ista superioribus obviare, ubi dictum est: Voluntati eius nihil resistere.

Verum, ut supra diximus, voluntas Dei diversis modis accipitur, quae diversitas in praedictis verbis si diligenter notetur, nihil ibi contradictionis reperitur. Ubi enim dicit, non fieri praeter eius voluntatem etiam quod fit contra eius voluntatem, dissimiliter accepit voluntatem, et non ipsam voluntatem, quae Deus est et sempiterna est, sed eius signa praedictis verbis intelligi voluit, id est prohibitionem sive praeceptionem et permissionem.

### Cap. II.

#### *Ex quo sensu quaedam dicuntur fieri contra Dei voluntatem.*

Multa enim fiunt contra Dei praeceptum vel prohibitionem, quae tamen non fiunt praeter eius permissionem. Ipsius namque permissione omnia fiunt mala, quae tamen praeter eius voluntatem sempiternam fiunt. Sicut Augustinus dicit super illum locum Psalmi[^6]: *Ut non loquatur os meum opera hominum*. Opera enim hominum dicit ea quae mala sunt, « quae praeter Dei voluntatem fiunt », quae ipse est, sed non praeter eius permissionem, quae ipse non est. Appellatur tamen ipsa Dei voluntas, quia Deus volens sinit mala fieri. Fiunt et contra eius praeceptionem vel prohibitionem, sed non contra eius voluntatem, quae ipse est, nisi dicantur contra eam fieri, quia praeter eam fiunt. Contra eam quippe nihil ita fit, ut velit fieri, et non fiat, vel nolit fieri et fiat. Quod evidenter ibi Augustinus notavit, ubi ait: Quantum ad ipsos attinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, <!-- page 838 --> nullo modo id facere valuerunt; ac si dicam, fecerunt contra Dei praeceptum, quod appellatur voluntas, sed non fecerunt contra Dei voluntatem omnipotentem, quia hoc non valuerunt, illud valuerunt; et ita per hoc quod fecerunt contra Dei voluntatem, id est praeceptum, de ipsis facta est voluntas eius, id est, impleta est voluntas eius sempiterna, qua eos damnari volebat. Unde Gregorius super Iob[^7]: « Multi voluntatem Dei peragunt, dum mutare contendunt, et consilio eius resistentes obsequuntur; quia hoc eius dispositioni militat, quod per humanum studium resultat ». — Hic aperte ostenditur, quia dum mali consilio ac praecepto Dei resistunt, quod voluntas Dei appellatur, ea faciunt, unde voluntas eius, quae ipse est, impletur, quae *dispositio* vel *beneplacitum* vocatur. « Nam, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio[^8], quantaelibet sint voluntates Angelorum vel hominum, bonorum vel malorum, vel illud quod Deus, vel aliud volentium quam Deus, Omnipotentis voluntas semper invicta est, quae mala esse nunquam potest, quae etiam, dum mala irrogat, iusta est, et profecto quae iusta est mala non est. Deus igitur omnipotens, sive per misericordiam *cuius vult misereatur*, sive per iudicium *quem vult obduret*, nec inique aliquid facit, nec nisi volens quidquam facit, et omnia quaecumque vult, facit ».

### Cap. III.

#### *Quare praecepit Deus omnibus bona facere et mala vitare, sed non id ab omnibus vult impleri.*

Ex praedictis liquet, quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, semper impletur, nec in aliquo cassatur, sed per omnia impletur. Consilium vero eius atque praecepta sive prohibitio non ab omnibus implentur, quibus proposita et data sunt. Neque ideo praecepit omnibus bona vel prohibuit mala vel consuluit optima, quod vellet ab omnibus bona quae praecepit fieri vel mala quae prohibuit vitari — si enim vellet, utique et fierent, quia in nullo potest ab homine superari vel impediri eius voluntas — sed ut iustitiam suam hominibus ostenderet, et mali essent inexcusabiles; denique, ut boni ex obedientia gloriam, mali ex inobedientia poenam sortirentur, sicut utrisque ab aeterno praeparavit. Ea igitur, quae omnibus praecepit vel prohibuit, a quibusdam voluit fieri vel vitari, sed non ab omnibus; et quaedam personaliter praecepit et in veteri et in nova Lege, quae ab eis quibus praecepit, fieri noluit, ut Abrahae de immolatione[^9] filii, et in Evangelio quibusdam curatis, quibus praecepit, ne cui dicerent.

---

english:
<!-- page 837 -->

### DISTINCTION XLVII.

### Chapter I.

#### *That the will of God is fulfilled concerning man, whithersoever he turn himself.*

The will of God indeed is always efficacious, so that whatsoever he wills comes to pass, and nothing comes to pass which he does not will; which [will] is always fulfilled concerning man, whithersoever he turn himself. For nothing, as Augustine says[^1], constituted in free choice surpasses the will of God; and although [a man] may act against his will, yet against his will, which is himself, nothing must be thought to come to pass in such a way as though he willed [it] to come to pass and it does not come to pass; or as though he willed [it] not to come to pass and it comes to pass. For that will, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^2], is always fulfilled either concerning us or by us. It is fulfilled concerning us, yet we do not fulfill it when we sin. It is fulfilled by us when we do good; for therefore we do it, because we know it pleases God. So also concerning man God always fulfills his own will, because man does nothing of which God does not work that which he wills. For God does not will that any man whatsoever should sin. But if [a man] sins, he wills to spare the penitent, that he may live; and to punish him who perseveres in his sins, that the contumacious may not escape the power of justice. As he prepared some from eternity unto punishment, so he prepared others unto glory. « And these are the great works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills[^3], and so wisely sought out, that when the angelic and human creature had sinned — that is, when it had done not what he, but what it itself willed — yet through that same will of the creature, by which has been done what the Creator did not will, he himself fulfilled what he willed: using even evils well, as supremely good, unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment, and unto the salvation of those whom he kindly predestined to grace[^4]. For as far as they themselves are concerned, what God willed not, they did; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, in no way could they do this. For by this very fact, that they acted against his will, his will was done concerning them. For this reason indeed [are] the great works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills, that in a wondrous and ineffable manner there does not come to pass apart from his will that which even comes to pass against his will: because it would not come to pass, if he did not allow it; nor does he indeed allow it unwillingly, but willingly; nor would [he] the good [one] allow [it] to come to pass evilly, unless [he were] omnipotent and able to make good out of evil[^5] ». — By these words it is evidently shown that the eternal will of God is always fulfilled concerning man, even if man acts against God's will. But it must be diligently attended to, in what way it is said in the things above that something comes to pass against God's will, which nevertheless does not come to pass apart from it; and how that [saying] is to be understood: as far as they themselves are concerned, they did what God willed not; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, in no way could they do this. For these things seem to stand in the way of what has gone before, where it has been said: that nothing resists his will.

But, as we have said above, the will of God is taken in diverse modes; which diversity, if it be diligently noted in the foregoing words, no contradiction is found therein. For where he says that there does not come to pass apart from his will even that which comes to pass against his will, he took "will" in a different sense, and he willed not the will itself, which is God and is eternal, but his signs to be understood in the foregoing words — that is, prohibition or precept and permission.

### Chapter II.

#### *In what sense certain things are said to come to pass against the will of God.*

For many things come to pass against the precept or prohibition of God, which nevertheless do not come to pass apart from his permission. For by his permission all evils come to pass, which nevertheless come to pass apart from his eternal will. As Augustine says upon that place of the Psalm[^6]: *That my mouth may not speak the works of men*. For by "works of men" he calls those things which are evil, « which come to pass apart from God's will » — [the will] which is himself, but not apart from his permission, which is not himself. Yet that permission is itself called God's will, because God willingly permits evils to come to pass. They come to pass also against his precept or prohibition, but not against his will, which is himself, unless they be said to come to pass against it because they come to pass apart from it. For against it nothing so comes to pass that he wills it to come to pass and it does not come to pass, or that he wills it not to come to pass and it comes to pass. Which Augustine evidently noted there, where he says: As far as they themselves are concerned, they did what God willed not; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, <!-- page 838 --> in no way could they do this; as if I were to say, they acted against God's precept, which is called [his] will, but they did not act against God's omnipotent will, because this they could not, that they could; and so by that which they did against God's will, that is, [his] precept, of them was made his will — that is, his eternal will, by which he willed them to be damned, was fulfilled. Whence Gregory on Job[^7]: « Many fulfill the will of God while they strive to change [it], and resisting his counsel they obey [it]; because this serves his disposition, that which rebounds through human effort ». — Here it is plainly shown, that while the wicked resist God's counsel and precept, which is called the will of God, they do those things whereby his will, which is himself, is fulfilled — which [will] is called *disposition* or *good pleasure*. « For, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^8], however great be the wills of angels or men, of the good or of the evil, [whether they will] that which God [wills], or [will] something other than [what] God [wills], the will of the Omnipotent is always unconquered, which can never be evil, which even, when it inflicts evils, is just; and surely that which is just is not evil. Therefore God almighty, whether through mercy *upon whom he wills he shows mercy*, or through judgment *whom he wills he hardens*, does nothing unjustly, nor does he do anything except willingly, and all things whatsoever he wills, he does ».

### Chapter III.

#### *Why God commanded all to do good things and to avoid evil things, but does not will this to be fulfilled by all.*

From the foregoing it is clear, that the will of God, which is himself, is always fulfilled, and is in no respect frustrated, but through all things is fulfilled. But his counsel and his precepts or prohibition are not fulfilled by all to whom they have been set forth and given. Nor did he therefore command all good things, or forbid evils, or counsel the best things, because he willed by all the good things which he commanded to come to pass, or the evils which he forbade to be avoided — for if he willed [it], surely they would come to pass, because his will can in no respect be overcome or hindered by man — but [he did so] that he might show his justice to men, and that the wicked might be inexcusable; and finally, that the good might obtain glory by obedience, and the evil punishment by disobedience, just as he prepared for both from eternity. Those things therefore which he commanded or forbade for all, he willed to be done or to be avoided by some, but not by all; and certain things he commanded personally both in the Old and in the New Law, which he willed not to be done by those to whom he commanded — as to Abraham concerning the immolation[^9] of his son, and in the Gospel concerning certain healed persons, whom he commanded that they should tell no one.

---

la: Enchirid. c. 95; secundum sensum.

en: *Enchiridion*, c. 95; according to the sense.

la: Ipsa verba Augustini immediate sequuntur.

en: The very words of Augustine immediately follow.

la: Codd. ABC et edd. 1, 6 (*o* in marg.) *gloriam*.

en: Codices A, B, C and editions 1, 6 (with *o* in the margin) [read] *gloriam* ("glory") [in place of *gratiam* "grace"].

la: Enchirid. c. 100. n. 26. Pro ultimo vocabulo *bene* codd. BE *bonum*, et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *bonum bene*.

en: *Enchiridion*, c. 100, n. 26. In place of the final word *bene* ("well"), the codices BE [read] *bonum*, and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 [read] *bonum bene*.

la: Dist. XLVI.

en: Distinction XLVI.

la: Moral. VI. c. 18. n. 29. Codd. et edd., exceptis 7, 8, citant: *Gregorius super Genesim*. Textus tamen a Magistro non parum est mutatus.

en: *Moralia* VI, c. 18, n. 29. The codices and editions, except 7 and 8, cite: *Gregory on Genesis*. The text however has been changed not a little by the Master.

la: Enarrat. in Psalm. 16, 4. Post textum Vat. addit *in sensu*.

en: *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Psalm 16, 4. After the text, the Vatican edition adds *in sensu* ("in [its] sense").

la: Vide d. XLV. c. 7, nota 3.

en: See Distinction XLV, chapter 7, note 3.


title: Dist. 47, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVII. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLVII. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 838 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVII.

#### *De voluntate Dei quoad efficaciam.*

> *Voluntas quippe Dei semper efficax est.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra removit Magister dubitationes, ex quibus videbatur voluntas[^1] Dei aliquando impediri. Hic determinat veritatem ostendens, voluntatem Dei semper esse efficacem et nunquam impediri. Et haec pars habet quatuor partes.

In *prima* auctoritate Augustini ostendit, voluntatem Dei semper esse efficacem et nunquam impediri. In *secunda* vero, ne hoc intelligeretur de voluntate signi, distinguit voluntatem, ut ostendat, hoc esse dictum de voluntate *beneplaciti*, ibi: *Verum, ut supra diximus.* In *tertia* Magister ostendit, quod contra quandam voluntatem signi non[^2] potest fieri, ibi: *Multa enim fiunt contra Dei praeceptum* etc. In *quarta* vero epilogat breviter praedeterminata, et hoc ibi: *Ex praedictis liquet, quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est* etc.

<!-- page 839 -->

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur in hac parte quatuor quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum voluntas beneplaciti possit impediri.

*Secundo*, utrum aliquis possit facere contra voluntatem signi.

*Tertio*, utrum Deus debeat mala permittere.

*Quarto* et ultimo, utrum Deus possit mala praecipere.

---

english:
<!-- page 838 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XLVII.

#### *On the will of God with respect to its efficacy.*

> *"For the will of God is always efficacious."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master removed the doubts from which it seemed that the will[^1] of God could sometimes be impeded. Here he determines the truth, showing that the will of God is always efficacious and is never impeded. And this part has four parts.

In the *first*, by the authority of Augustine, he shows that the will of God is always efficacious and is never impeded. In the *second*, however, lest this should be understood of the will of sign, he distinguishes the will, in order to show that this was said of the will of *good pleasure*, there: *"But, as we said above."* In the *third* the Master shows that something can be done against a certain will of sign, [namely that] it cannot[^2] be done [against it], there: *"For many things come to pass against the precept of God,"* etc. In the *fourth* he briefly epilogizes what has been predetermined, and this there: *"From what has been said before it is clear that the will of God, which He Himself is,"* etc.

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### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the things which are said in this part, four [questions] are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether the will of good pleasure can be impeded.

*Second*, whether anyone can act against the will of sign.

*Third*, whether God ought to permit evils.

*Fourth* and finally, whether God can command evils.

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la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *voluntatem*.

en: Very many codices, together with edition 1, [read] *voluntatem* ("the will" [acc.] for *voluntas* nom.).

la: Pro *non* Vat. *bene*, refragantibus codd. nec non ed. 1. Mox post *In quarta* plures codd. adiiciunt *parte*.

en: In place of *non* ("not") the Vatican edition [reads] *bene* ("well"), against the codices and likewise edition 1. Shortly after *In quarta* ("in the fourth") several codices add *parte* ("part").