title: Dist. 27, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part II)

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Secundum quod sapientia est essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod Verbum, non est hoc quod Pater*, quia aut hoc tenetur essentialiter, aut personaliter. Si essentialiter, non solum secundum quod sapientia, est unum per essentiam cum Patre, sed etiam in quantum Verbum. Si personaliter, tunc est falsum, quod secundum quod sapientia, sit hoc quod Pater personaliter. — Item, cum *hoc*, sit neutri[^1] generis, videtur quod stet pro essentia, et ita Verbum semper est hoc quod Pater, scilicet unum per essentiam vel substantiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *hoc* stat ibi pro significato termini, ut sit sensus: Verbum, secundum quod sapientia, hoc est quod Pater; quia secundum quod sapientia, aliquid ei attribuitur, quod etiam Patri, scilicet significatum huius nominis *sapientia*. Similiter altera est vera: Filius, secundum quod Verbum, non est hoc quod Pater, quia aliquid attribuitur Filio, secundum quod Verbum, quod non convenit Patri. Unde *secundum* dicit ibi habitudinem sub ratione formali, et pronomen *hoc* importat et demonstrat proprium significatum termini; et ideo, quia *sapientia* significat essentiale, tenetur in prima essentialiter; quia significatum *Verbi* est personale, tenetur in secunda personaliter.

Vel aliter potest dici, quod tenetur essentialiter, et secundum quod dicit habitudinem per modum formalis; unde sicut alio est Deus, alio est Pater — quia deitate est Deus, paternitate Pater —, ita quod nec paternitate Deus, nec deitate Pater — ita accipit Augustinus, cum dicit: *secundum quod Verbum, non est hoc quod Pater*[^2], ut non negetur unitas in natura, sed ut negetur habitudo eius quod est *secundum*; quia Verbum, in quantum verbum, non dicit unitatem essentiae, sed distinctionem personae, econtra *sapientia*.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Eadem proprietate sive notione dicitur verbum, imago et filius*; quia si hoc est verum, ergo ibi est synonymia vel inculcatio verborum, aut aliqua differentia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod differentia est; et una differentia potest accipi sic, ut *verbum* dicatur quod[^3] procedit ex interioribus, *imago* quod imitatur in exterioribus, et *filius* complectitur utrumque; et ideo magis et communius dicitur *filius* quam aliquod aliorum.

Vel aliter: omnia haec tria important similitudinem alterius; sed *filius* importat illam similitudinem naturaliter emanantem, *imago* ut expresse imitantem, *verbum* ut aliis exprimentem, quantum est de se sive natum exprimere; ideo *filius* frequentius nominatur illa persona propter hoc, quod ipsam emanationem et habitudinem illam nomine importat proprio.

Vel aliter: *imago* importat illam similitudinem ut conformem, *verbum* importat illam ut mentalem sive spiritualem, sed *filius* connaturalem. Et sic patet diversa ratio significandi eandem habitudinem, et ita eadem proprietas est, nec tamen synonymia. — Et in prima acceptione praeit intentio *verbi*, in secunda intentio *filii*, in tertia intentio *imaginis*; tamen inter omnes medius modus est convenientior.[^4]

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *solus Filius est Deus de Deo*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia «Spiritus sanctus est Deus de Deo»[^5]: non ergo solus Filius.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista exclusio arctatur ex modo loquendi. Quod patet, quia non dicit simpliciter hoc, sed loquens de Patre et Filio dicit[^6]: «non ambo Deus de Deo, sed solus Filius», ita

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quod ex ipso modo loquendi *solus* arctatur ad faciendam exclusionem pro Patre.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Secundum nomina substantiae dicitur: illud de illo*. Videtur enim falsum, quia bene dicitur Filius de Patre per nomina, quae non sunt nomina substantiae. Si tu dicas, quod intelligitur secundum idem nomen; obiicitur, quod bene dicitur procedens de procedente, et principium de principio, sive spirans de spirante, haec tamen nomina non dicuntur secundum substantiam.

Item quaeritur de hoc, quod statim addit ibi: *Licet illa nomina substantiam non significent*; quia si hoc, ergo significant relationem; ergo hoc nomen *Deus* significat relationem. Et iterum, si non significant substantiam, sed relationem, ergo possunt pro eis poni nomina relativa: ergo Pater de Patre.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *dici hoc de hoc* est dupliciter, scilicet secundum idem nomen, vel secundum aliud. Secundum idem non potest esse, nisi conveniat duobus; et quia nomina duabus personis convenientia fere omnia sunt essentialia, licet aliqua sint notionalia; ideo regula Magistri ut plurimum veritatem habet. Tamen quidam libri habent *maxime*[^7]; in quibus non est, potest poni pro glossa; et sic cessat obiectio, quia Magister non intendit excludere nisi nomina propria, quae dicuntur de uno solo. — Quod obiicitur, quod nomina non significant substantiam; dicendum, quod significationem accipit pro suppositione, et tantum valet *non significant* quantum *non supponunt*.

---

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what [the Master] says: *Insofar as [the Word] is wisdom, he is what the Father is; insofar as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is*, because either this is taken essentially or personally. If essentially, then not only insofar as wisdom is he one in essence with the Father, but also insofar as he is the Word. If personally, then it is false that, insofar as he is wisdom, he is personally what the Father is. — Likewise, since *hoc* ("this") is of neuter[^1] gender, it seems that it stands for the essence, and so the Word is always what the Father is, namely one in essence or substance.

**I respond:** It must be said that *hoc* there stands for the [thing] signified by the term, so that the sense is: the Word, insofar as he is wisdom, is what the Father is; because insofar as he is wisdom, something is attributed to him which is also [attributed] to the Father, namely the [thing] signified by this name *wisdom*. Likewise the other [proposition] is true: the Son, insofar as he is the Word, is not what the Father is, because something is attributed to the Son insofar as he is the Word, which does not belong to the Father. Hence *secundum* ("insofar as") states there a relation under a formal aspect, and the pronoun *hoc* imports and points out the proper [thing] signified by the term; and therefore, because *wisdom* signifies something essential, in the first [proposition] it is taken essentially; because the [thing] signified by *Word* is something personal, in the second [proposition] it is taken personally.

Or it can be said otherwise, that it is taken essentially, and insofar as it states a relation in the manner of a formal [aspect]; whence, just as it is by one [thing] that he is God, by another [thing] that he is Father — because by deity he is God, by paternity Father —, in such a way that he is neither God by paternity nor Father by deity — so does Augustine take it, when he says: *insofar as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is*[^2], in such a way that the unity in nature is not denied, but the relation expressed by *secundum* is denied; because the Word, insofar as he is word, does not state unity of essence but distinction of person — the contrary [holds] for *wisdom*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Word, image, and son are said by the same property or notion*; because if this is true, then either there is a synonymy or a piling-up of words there, or [there is] some difference.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a difference; and one difference can be taken thus: that *word* is said [of him] who[^3] proceeds from the interior [parts], *image* [of him] who imitates in the exterior [parts], and *son* embraces both; and therefore the [name] *son* is said more [emphatically] and more commonly than any of the others.

Or otherwise: all these three import a likeness to another; but *son* imports that likeness as naturally emanating, *image* as expressly imitating, *word* as expressing [the likeness] to others, insofar as it is of itself or born to express; therefore that person is more frequently named *son* on account of this, that he imports by [his] own name the very emanation and that relation.

Or otherwise: *image* imports that likeness as conformed, *word* imports it as mental or spiritual, but *son* [imports it] as connatural. And so it is plain that there is a different account of signifying the same relation, and so it is the same property, and yet not synonymy. — And in the first acceptation the meaning of *word* takes precedence, in the second the meaning of *son*, in the third the meaning of *image*; nevertheless among them all the middle way is the more fitting.[^4]

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Son alone is God from God*. For it seems false to say [this], because "the Holy Spirit is God from God"[^5]: therefore not the Son alone.

**I respond:** It must be said that this exclusion is restricted by the manner of speaking. Which is plain, because he does not say this simply, but speaking of the Father and the Son he says[^6]: "not both [are] God from God, but the Son alone", in such a way

that from the very manner of speaking *alone* is restricted to making an exclusion with regard to the Father.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *According to the names of substance it is said: this from that*. For it seems false, because the Son is rightly said [to be] from the Father by names which are not names of substance. If you say that it is understood with regard to the same name; it is objected that *proceeding* is rightly said [to be] from a *proceeding [one]*, and *principle* from *principle*, or *spirating* from *spirating*; yet these names are not said according to substance.

Likewise it is asked about what he immediately adds there: *Although those names do not signify substance*; for if this [is so], then they signify a relation; therefore this name *God* signifies a relation. And again, if they do not signify substance but relation, then relative names can be put in their place: therefore Father from Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that to say *this of that* is twofold, namely according to the same name, or according to another. According to the same [name] it cannot be, unless it belongs to two; and because the names belonging to two persons are nearly all essential, though some are notional; therefore the Master's rule for the most part holds true. However, certain books have *maxime* ("most of all")[^7]; in those in which it is not [present], it can be put as a gloss; and so the objection ceases, because the Master does not intend to exclude any [names] except proper [ones], which are said of one alone. — As to the objection that the names do not signify substance; it must be said that he takes "signification" for "supposition", and *non significant* ("they do not signify") amounts to *non supponunt* ("they do not supposit").

---

la: Forma antiquior pro *neutrius*; praesertim verba neutri generis apud antiquos grammaticos saepe saepius occurrunt.

en: An older form for *neutrius*; especially [forms with] words of neuter gender occur very often among the ancient grammarians.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 339, nota 5. — Cod. hic finem propositionis facit. Deinde adiungit: *Aliter videtur posse dici, quod stat semper ly hoc personaliter, et tantum valet hoc est Pater, ac si diceretur: est Pater. Sapientia enim, secundum quod essentia, est Pater; secundum quod est Verbum, non est Pater, ut non* etc.

en: Cf. above p. 339, note 5. — A codex here makes the end of the sentence. Then it adds: *It seems it can be said otherwise, that ly hoc always stands personally, and "hoc est Pater" amounts to as much as if it were said: "he is the Father". For wisdom, insofar as it is essence, is the Father; insofar as it is the Word, it is not the Father, so that not* etc.

la: Ed. 1 hic et rursum paulo inferius post *imago* substituit *quia* pro *quod*, quo secundo loco etiam permulti codd. cum ed. 1 conveniunt. Cod. Y subinde etiam post verba immediate subsequentia *et filius* coniunctionem *quia* repetit.

en: Edition 1 here, and again a little below after *imago*, substitutes *quia* for *quod*; in which second place very many codices also agree with edition 1. Codex Y thereafter also repeats the conjunction *quia* after the immediately following words *et filius*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 3. huius dist.

en: Cf. above q. 3 of this distinction.

la: Verba Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, d. X. c. 2.

en: For the words of Augustine see above in the *littera* of the Master, d. 10, c. 2.

la: Textus Augustini habetur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 5. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 9, et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: The text of Augustine is had here in the *littera* of the Master, c. 5. — This doubt is also resolved by B. Albert, here a. 9, and Richard [of Middleton], here near the *littera*.

la: [Vat.] nunc legitur tantum; vide lit. Magistri hic c. 5. — Paulo ante pro *ut plurimum* cod. cc *ut in pluribus*.

en: [The Vatican edition] now reads only [*maxime*]; see the *littera* of the Master here c. 5. — A little before, in place of *ut plurimum* ("for the most part") codex *cc* [reads] *ut in pluribus* ("as in many [books]").


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 28

title_alt: Distinctio XXVIII littera Magistri (capp. I — VII)

title_alt: Lombard's text on Distinction XXVIII (chapters I — VII)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 493 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXVIII.

#### Cap. I. *[Conclusio capituli praecedentis: ingenitus relative dicitur et de solo Patre.]*

...et ingenitus, non tamen indicat diversam substantiam, quia sicut filius ad patrem, et non-filius ad non-patrem refertur, ita genitus ad genitorem, et non-genitus ad non-genitorem referatur necesse est[^1]». Ecce evidenter ostendit, quod ingenitus relative dicitur et de solo Patre accipitur, aliaque notio est, qua dicitur ingenitus, alia, qua pater. Atque tantum valet, cum dicitur ingenitus, quantum non-genitus vel non-filius.

#### Cap. II. *An solus Pater debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius, sicut dicitur ingenitus.*

Ideo solet quaeri: utrum, sicut solus Pater dicitur ingenitus, ita ipse solus debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius, ut nec etiam Spiritus sanctus possit dici non-filius vel non-genitus. Quibusdam videtur, quod Pater solus debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius; Spiritus vero sanctus, sicut non dicitur ingenitus, ita, inquiunt, non est dicendus non-genitus vel non-filius. Debet quidem dici et credi Spiritus sanctus non esse genitus, vel non esse filius, sed non debet dici esse non-genitus vel non-filius. — Aliis autem videtur, quod cum Spiritus sanctus non possit dici ingenitus, potest tamen dici non-genitus vel non-filius. Quod vero Augustinus supra ait, tantum valere, cum dicitur ingenitus, quantum, cum dicitur non-genitus vel non-filius, etymologiam nominis ostendendo eum hoc dicunt, non ratione praedicationis.

#### Cap. III. *De proprietate, quam notat ingenitus.*

Si autem vis scire, quae sit proprietas, secundum quam Pater dicitur ingenitus, audi Hilarium ipsam vocantem innascibilitatem, in quarto libro *de Trinitate* ita aientem: «Est unus ab uno, scilicet ab Ingenito Genitus, proprietate videlicet in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis. Significata ergo in Scripturis personarum intelligentia, et distincto innascibilitatis nativitatisque sensu, solitarius Deus non est opinandus. Discretio ergo vel distinctio personarum in Scripturis posita est, in nullo autem naturae distinctio[^2]».

#### Cap. IV. *Responsio Ambrosii contra Arianos de Ingenito.*

Illud etiam taceri non oportet, quod Ariani ex eo probare nitebantur, alterius substantiae esse Patrem, alterius Filium, quia ille ingenitus, et iste genitus dicitur, cum diversum sit esse ingenitum, et esse genitum. Unde Ambrosius eorum quaestioni respondens dicit, se in divinis Scripturis hoc nomen, scilicet ingenitus, non legisse, ita inquiens in libro *de Incarnationis dominicae sacramento*[^3]: «Cum dudum audierint quidam, dicentibus nobis, Filium Dei, qui generatus est, Patri, qui generavit, inaequalem esse non posse, quamvis ille generatus sit, iste generaverit, quia generatio non potestatis, sed est naturae; adversus quidem illam quaestionem vocem sibi arbitrantur occlusam, sed tergiversatione damnabili in eodem loco vestigium vertunt, ut putent, mutationem fieri quaestionis mutatione sermonis, dicentes: Quomodo possunt ingenitus et genitus esse unius naturae atque substantiae? Ergo ut respondeam mihi propositae quaestioni, primo omnium in divinis Scripturis ingenitum nusquam invenio, non legi, non audivi. Cuius ergo mutabilitatis sunt homines huiusmodi, ut nos dicant ea usurpare, quae non sunt scripta, cum ea quae sunt scripta dicamus, et ipsi obiiciant quod scriptum non sit? Nonne ipsi sibi adversantur et auctoritatem calumniae suae derogant»? Attende, lector, quoniam hoc nomine ingenitus nolebat uti Ambrosius propter haereticos. Ita et nos subticere quaedam oportet propter calumniantium insidias, quae catholicis ac piis lectoribus secure credi possunt. Sunt etenim quaedam, quae non tantae sunt religionis et auctoritatis, ut eis nos oporteat semper confitendo ac recipiendo inservire, verum silentio praeteriri queunt aliquando; nec illius tamen sunt perversitatis, quin, cum opportunum fuerit, eis uti liberum habeamus[^4].

#### Cap. V. *An diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, cum supra[^5] dictum sit, quod aliud est dicere ingenitum, aliud patrem, et quod diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, utrum similiter diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium, an idem. *Responsio.* — Ad quod dicimus, quia ex eodem sensu, quo dicitur diversum genitus et ingenitus, et quo dicitur, non esse idem dicere genitum et ingenitum, potest dici, non esse idem, sed diversum esse patrem et esse filium, vel esse spiritum sanctum, quia non ea notione Pater est pater, qua Filius est filius, vel qua Spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus. Ideoque ex hoc sensu concedimus, quod aliud est esse patrem, et aliud est esse filium, quia alia notio est, qua Pater est pater, alia, qua Filius est filius. Sed si transponas, ut[^6] dicas, aliud est patrem esse, aliud filium esse, variatur intelligentia et ideo non conceditur. Est enim sensus talis, ac si dicatur, aliud est, quo Pater est, non quidem pater, sed est; aliud, quo Filius est, non quidem filius, sed est; quod penitus falsum est. Eo enim Pater est, quo

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Pater Deus est, id est per essentiam vel naturam; Filius eo Deus est, quo Pater est Deus: eo igitur Filius est, quo Pater est, et ita idem est Patrem esse et[^7] Filium esse; sed non est idem esse patrem et esse filium. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^8] ait: «Quamvis diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium, non est tamen diversa substantia, quia non hoc secundum substantiam dicitur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens, quia non est mutabile». Ecce diversum esse dicit esse patrem et esse filium; quod iuxta rationem praedictam accipi oportet, quia scilicet alia notio est, qua est pater, alia, qua est filius. Non enim secundum essentiam Pater dicitur pater, vel Filius filius, sed secundum relationem.

#### Cap. VI. *In sapientia genita dicitur secundum relationem, vel secundum substantiam.*

Sciendum quoque est, quod sicut solus Filius dicitur verbum vel imago, ita etiam ipse solus dicitur sapientia nata vel genita. Et ideo quaeritur, utrum hoc relative dicatur, et si relative dicitur, an secundum eandem relationem, qua dicitur verbum et imago. De hoc Augustinus in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^9] ita ait: «Id dici accipiamus, cum dicitur verbum, ac si diceretur nata sapientia, ut sit et Filius et Imago; et haec duo cum dicuntur, id est nata sapientia, in uno eorum, eo quod est nata, et Verbum et Imago et Filius intelligatur — et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia, quia relative dicuntur — at in altero, quod est sapientia, etiam essentia demonstretur, quoniam et ad se dicitur. Se ipsa enim sapiens est, et hoc est eius esse quod sapere; unde Pater et Filius simul una sapientia, quia una essentia». — Cave, lector, qualiter hoc intelligas, quod hic dicit Augustinus. Videtur enim dicere, quod cum dicitur nata sapientia, ibi sapientia essentiam significet, et nata relationem notet. Quod si ita est, cogimur dicere, essentiam divinam esse natam; quod superioribus repugnat. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quod *nata* in altero, id est in eo quod nata est, eadem notio intelligitur[^10], quae notatur cum dicitur verbum et imago. In altero vero, scilicet sapientia, demonstratur essentia, id est, demonstratur, quod Filius sit essentia, quia sapientia secundum essentiam dicitur. Et ideo cum dicitur nata sapientia, intelligitur, quod ipse, quia natus est, essentia est. Ibi tamen sapientia non pro essentia, sed pro hypostasi facit intelligentiam, ut, sicut quando dicitur verbum vel filius, intelligitur hypostasis cum sua proprietate, ita, cum dicitur nata sapientia, idem intelligatur[^11], id est genita hypostasis. Ideo vigilanter ait, idem esse intelligendum, cum dicitur verbum, et cum dicitur nata sapientia, id est eadem relatio eademque hypostasis, cui inest illa proprietas. Et ex hoc adiuvatur illud quod supra[^12] diximus, scilicet quod cum dicitur Pater vel Filius vel Spiritus sanctus, non tantum illae proprietates significantur, ut cum dicitur paternitas, filiatio, sed etiam hypostases cum suis proprietatibus.

#### Cap. VII. *De imagine.*

Illud etiam sciri oportet, quia cum supra[^13] dictum sit, imaginem relative dici de Filio, sicut verbum vel filius, interdum tamen reperitur secundum substantiam dici. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^14] dicit, quod una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas et imago, ad quam factus est homo. Hilarius etiam in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^15] sic ait: «Homo fit ad communem imaginem. Nomen non discrepat, natura non differt. Una est enim ad quam homo creatus est species». Ex his verbis ostenditur, quod imago aliquando essentiae intelligentiam facit, et tunc ad se dicitur et non relative.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXVIII.

#### Cap. I. *[Conclusion of the preceding chapter: "unbegotten" is said relatively and of the Father alone.]*

"...and *unbegotten*, yet it does not indicate a different substance, because just as *son* is referred to *father*, and *non-son* to *non-father*, so it is necessary that *begotten* be referred to *begetter*, and *non-begotten* to *non-begetter*[^1]." Behold, he plainly shows that *unbegotten* is said relatively and is taken of the Father alone, and that the notion by which He is called *unbegotten* is one thing, and the notion by which [He is called] *Father* is another. And it has the same force, when *unbegotten* is said, as *non-begotten* or *non-Son*.

#### Cap. II. *Whether the Father alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-Son, just as He is called unbegotten.*

Therefore it is wont to be asked: whether, just as the Father alone is called *unbegotten*, so He alone ought to be called *non-begotten* or *non-Son*, so that not even the Holy Spirit may be called *non-Son* or *non-begotten*. To some it seems that the Father alone ought to be called *non-begotten* or *non-Son*; but the Holy Spirit, just as He is not called *unbegotten*, so, they say, He is not to be called *non-begotten* or *non-Son*. The Holy Spirit must indeed be said and believed not to be begotten, or not to be Son, but He must not be said to be *non-begotten* or *non-Son*. — But to others it seems that, although the Holy Spirit cannot be called *unbegotten*, He can nevertheless be called *non-begotten* or *non-Son*. As to what Augustine says above, that it has the same force when *unbegotten* is said as when *non-begotten* or *non-Son* [is said], they say this by showing the etymology of the name, not on the ground of predication.

#### Cap. III. *On the property which "unbegotten" denotes.*

But if you wish to know what is the property according to which the Father is called *unbegotten*, hear Hilary calling it itself *innascibility*, in the fourth book *On the Trinity* speaking thus: "There is One from One, namely the Begotten from the Unbegotten, by a property, that is, in each one, both of innascibility and of origin. The understanding of the persons therefore having been signified in the Scriptures, and the sense of innascibility and of nativity having been distinguished, God is not to be thought of as solitary. The discretion therefore or distinction of the persons is set down in the Scriptures, but in no [way] a distinction of nature[^2]."

#### Cap. IV. *Ambrose's reply against the Arians concerning the Unbegotten.*

This too must not be passed over in silence: that the Arians strove to prove from this that the Father is of one substance and the Son of another, because the one is called *unbegotten* and the other *begotten*, since to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different. Whence Ambrose, replying to their question, says that he has not read this name, namely *unbegotten*, in the divine Scriptures, speaking thus in the book *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*[^3]: "When some had recently heard, when we said that the Son of God who has been begotten cannot be unequal to the Father who has begotten, although the one was begotten and the other has begotten, because generation is not of power but of nature; against that question they think their voice has been silenced, but by a damnable evasion they twist their footing in the same place, supposing that a change of question can be effected by a change of words, saying: How can *unbegotten* and *begotten* be of one nature and substance? Therefore that I may answer the question put to me, first of all in the divine Scriptures I nowhere find *unbegotten*; I have not read it, I have not heard it. Of what mutability then are men of this sort, that they should say that we usurp things which are not written, when we say things which are written, and they themselves object what is not written? Do they not contradict themselves and undermine the authority of their own calumny?" Mark, reader, that Ambrose did not wish to use this name *unbegotten* on account of the heretics. So we too ought to keep silence about certain things on account of the snares of slanderers, [things] which can be safely believed by Catholic and pious readers. For there are certain matters which are not of such [weight of] religion and authority that we are bound always to confess and accept and serve them, but they can sometimes be passed over in silence; nor are they of such perversity that, when occasion requires, we may not have liberty to use them[^4].

#### Cap. V. *Whether to be Father and to be Son differ.*

Furthermore, it is wont to be asked, since it has been said above[^5] that *to say "unbegotten"* is one thing and *[to say] "Father"* another, and that *begotten* and *unbegotten* differ, whether likewise *to be Father* and *to be Son* differ, or are the same. *Reply.* — To which we say that, from the same sense by which *begotten* and *unbegotten* are called different, and by which it is said that *to say "begotten"* and *"unbegotten"* is not the same, it can be said that *to be Father* and *to be Son*, or *to be Holy Spirit*, are not the same, but different, since the Father is not Father by the same notion by which the Son is Son, or by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit. And therefore in this sense we concede that *to be Father* is one thing and *to be Son* is another, because the notion by which the Father is Father is one, and that by which the Son is Son is another. But if you transpose, so that[^6] you say, *Father to be* is one thing, *Son to be* is another, the meaning is varied and therefore [this] is not conceded. For the sense is such, as if it were said, *one thing is that by which the Father is*, not indeed *Father*, but *is*; *another is that by which the Son is*, not indeed *Son*, but *is*; which is utterly false. For the Father is by that very [account] by which

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the Father is God, that is, through essence or nature; the Son is God by that [account] by which the Father is God: therefore the Son is by that [account] by which the Father is, and so *for the Father to be* and[^7] *for the Son to be* is the same; but *to be Father* and *to be Son* is not the same. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^8] says: "Although *to be Father* and *to be Son* differ, the substance is yet not different, because this is not said according to substance, but according to a relative; which relative, however, is not an accident, since it is not mutable." Behold, he says that *to be Father* and *to be Son* are different; which must be taken according to the aforesaid reasoning, namely because the notion by which He is Father is one, and that by which He is Son is another. For the Father is not called Father according to essence, nor the Son [Son], but according to relation.

#### Cap. VI. *That "begotten wisdom" is said either according to relation or according to substance.*

It must also be known that, just as the Son alone is called *Word* or *Image*, so He alone is called *born* or *begotten Wisdom*. And therefore it is asked whether this is said relatively, and if it is said relatively, whether [it is so] according to the same relation by which *Word* and *Image* are said. On this Augustine in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^9] speaks thus: "Let us take it that, when *Word* is said, what is signified is as if *born Wisdom* were said, so that He is also Son and Image; and when these two are said, that is, *born Wisdom*, in one of them, namely in *born*, both *Word* and *Image* and *Son* are understood — and in all these names essence is not shown, since they are said relatively — but in the other, which is *Wisdom*, essence too is shown, since [it] is said also with reference to self. For He is wise by Himself, and this is His being which is to be wise; whence Father and Son together are one Wisdom, since [they are] one essence." — Take care, reader, how you understand this which Augustine here says. For he seems to say that, when *born Wisdom* is said, *Wisdom* there signifies essence, and *born* notes the relation. Which if it is so, we are forced to say that the divine essence is born; which contradicts what was said above. — But to this we say, that *born*, in the one [term], that is, in the [word] *born*, is understood by the same notion by which it is noted when *Word* and *Image* are said[^10]. But in the other, namely *Wisdom*, essence is shown, that is, it is shown that the Son is essence, since *Wisdom* is said according to essence. And therefore, when *born Wisdom* is said, it is understood that He, since He is born, is essence. Yet there *Wisdom* effects an understanding not for essence but for hypostasis, so that, just as when *Word* or *Son* is said, the hypostasis with its property is understood, so, when *born Wisdom* is said, the same is to be understood[^11], that is, the begotten hypostasis. Hence with vigilance he says that the same must be understood when *Word* is said and when *born Wisdom* is said — that is, the same relation and the same hypostasis, in which that property is. And by this is supported what we said above[^12], namely that, when *Father* or *Son* or *Holy Spirit* is said, not only those properties are signified — as when paternity, filiation [are said] — but also the hypostases together with their properties.

#### Cap. VII. *On the Image.*

This too must be known: that although it has been said above[^13] that *image* is said relatively of the Son, just as *word* or *son*, it is sometimes nevertheless found to be said according to substance. Whence Augustine in the book *On the Faith to Peter*[^14] says that the divinity of the Holy Trinity essentially is one, and the Image to which man was made [is one]. Hilary too in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^15] thus says: "Man is made to a common image. The name does not differ, the nature does not differ. For one is the species to which man was created." From these words it is shown that *image* sometimes effects an understanding of essence, and is then said with reference to self and not relatively.

---

la: Omnia praecedentia a verbis *Hoc exemplis* sumta sunt ex V. *de Trin.* c. 7. n. 8, paucis mutatis. — Paulo post Vat. perperam *alia* pro *aliaque*, ed. 1 *alia quoque*.

en: All the foregoing, from the words *Hoc exemplis*, are taken from book V of *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 8, with a few changes. — A little later the Vatican edition wrongly [reads] *alia* in place of *aliaque*; edition 1 [reads] *alia quoque*.

la: *Num.* 33. Ultima propositio est ibi n. 35, et sic legitur: *Discretio tantum personae in te et tuis posita est, in nullo tamen naturae distincta confessione*.

en: *N.* 33. The last proposition is in the same place, n. 35, and reads thus: *Discretio tantum personae in te et tuis posita est, in nullo tamen naturae distincta confessione* ("a distinction only of person is set in Thee and Thine, with the confession in no way distinguished as to nature").

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8: IV. libro *de Spiritu sancto*, sed est liber *de Incarnatione Domini*, c. 8, n. 79. In quo textu post *Scripturis* Vat. cum ceteris edd. *ingenitus* pro *ingenitum*, refragantibus codd. et originali. Circa finem ante *adversantur* Vat. sola perperam omittit *sibi*.

en: Codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 [read]: book IV *On the Holy Spirit*; but it is the book *On the Incarnation of the Lord*, c. 8, n. 79. In which text, after *Scripturis*, the Vatican with the other editions [reads] *ingenitus* in place of *ingenitum*, against the codices and the original. Near the end, before *adversantur*, the Vatican alone wrongly omits *sibi*.

la: Codd. B C addunt *arbitrium*.

en: Codices B, C add *arbitrium*.

la: Cap. I.

en: Chapter I.

la: Codd. A D *fc.*

en: Codices A, D [read] *fc.* [i.e. *facias*].

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 *quod* contra codd. et alias edd.

en: The Vatican and editions 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 [read] *quod*, against the codices and the other editions.

en: Chapter 5, n. 6.

en: Chapter 2, n. 3.

la: Vat. cum aliis edd. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 *intelligatur*.

en: The Vatican with the other editions [reads], against the codices and editions 1, 8, *intelligatur*.

la: Vat. cum aliis edd. perperam *intelligitur*, refragantibus codd. et ed. 8.

en: The Vatican with the other editions wrongly [reads] *intelligitur*, against the codices and edition 8.

la: Dist. XXVII. pars II. in princip. — Vat. cum plurimis edd. *superius* pro *supra*, et post *scilicet* omittit *quod*.

en: Distinction XXVII, Part II, at the beginning. — The Vatican with most editions [reads] *superius* in place of *supra*, and after *scilicet* omits *quod*.

la: *Ibid.* pars II. c. 3, circa finem.

en: *Ibid.*, Part II, c. 3, near the end.

la: Cap. 1, n. 5. Hunc librum non esse S. Augustini, sed Fulgentii Ruspensis, supra in Prolegomenis pag. LXXXIV dictum est.

en: Chapter 1, n. 5. That this book is not by St. Augustine but by Fulgentius of Ruspe was stated above in the Prolegomena, p. LXXXIV.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 28, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVIII — De proprietate non personali, quae est innascibilitas. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXVIII — On the non-personal property, which is unbegottenness. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVIII.

#### *De proprietate non personali, quae est innascibilitas.*

> *Praeterea considerari oportet, quod non tantum etc.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de proprietatibus, quae sunt personarum et personales: hic incipit secunda pars, in qua agit de proprietatibus sive relationibus non personalibus. Et dividitur haec pars in duas, quia proprietas non personalis est duplex, scilicet innascibilitas et communis spiratio, quae significatur per hoc nomen *principium*. Ideo primo agit de innascibilitate, secundo de communi spiratione, infra distinctione vigesima nona: *Est praeterea aliud nomen etc.* Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de proprietate innascibilitatis; in secunda, quia opposita circa opposita clarius elucescunt[^1], tangit incidenter de proprietate nascibilitatis et nascibilis, infra distinctione eadem: *Sciendum quoque est, quod sicut Filius.*

Item prima pars habet quatuor partes. In prima ostendit, quid sit significatum huius nominis *ingenitus* in se, ostendens, quod sit proprium personae Patris et differens a paternitate et dictum secundum relationem. Secundo determinat eius significationem in aequipollenti, sicut in hoc nomine *non genitus*, et in hoc nomine *innascibilis*, ibi: *Ideo solet quaeri, utrum, sicut solus etc.* Tertio[^2] determinat huius nominis usum, ostendens, quod quamvis non habeat ortum ex Scriptura, quod tamen licet eo uti, quamvis Ambrosius videatur dicere contrarium — hoc enim facit ad reprehendendum haereticos — hoc et facit ibi: *Illud etiam tacere non oportet.* In quarta vero determinat[^3] quoddam dubium, quod ex praedeterminatis habet ortum, ibi: *Praeterea quaeri solet etc.*

*Sciendum quoque est, quod sicut solus Filius.* Haec est secunda pars huius partis[^4], in qua incidenter determinat de proprietate Filii sive Nati; et haec habet duas partes secundum duo, quae ibi tangit. Quia enim supra dictum fuerat, quod sapientia diceret commune, imago proprium, et ideo quia hoc posset generare dubium, quia invenimus e contrario aliquando, ideo primo ostendit, quod sapientia *nata* proprie dicitur de Filio. Secundo vero ostendit, quod imago aliquando accipitur essentialiter, ibi: *Illud etiam sciri oportet.*

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### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *ingenitus* sive *innascibilis* dicatur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem.

Secundo, supposito quod secundum relationem dicatur, quaeritur, utrum dicat eandem relationem quam hoc nomen *pater*.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum innascibilitas sit proprietas sive relatio personalis personae Patris.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum improcessibilitas dicat aliquam notionem in Patre.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XXVIII.

#### *On the non-personal property, which is unbegottenness.*

> *"Furthermore, it must be considered that not only etc."*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of the properties which are of the persons and personal: here begins the second part, in which he treats of the properties or relations which are non-personal. And this part is divided into two, because a non-personal property is twofold — namely, unbegottenness and common spiration, which is signified by this name *principle*. Therefore he treats first of unbegottenness, second of common spiration, below in the twenty-ninth distinction: *"There is, moreover, another name etc."* The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he determines concerning the property of unbegottenness; in the second, since opposites shine forth more clearly when set side by side with their opposites[^1], he touches incidentally on the property of begottenness and of the begotten, below in the same distinction: *"It must also be known, that just as the Son."*

Likewise the first part has four parts. In the first he shows what is the signification of this name *unbegotten* in itself, showing that it is proper to the person of the Father, distinct from paternity, and said according to relation. Second, he determines its signification in an equivalent expression, as in this name *not begotten*, and in this name *unbegettable*, there: *"Therefore it is wont to be asked whether, just as the only etc."* Third[^2], he determines the use of this name, showing that, although it does not arise from Scripture, it is nevertheless permitted to use it — although Ambrose seems to say the contrary, for he does this in order to refute heretics — and this he does there: *"This too must not be passed over in silence."* In the fourth, however, he determines[^3] a certain difficulty which arises from what has been previously determined, there: *"Furthermore, it is wont to be asked etc."*

*"It must also be known, that just as only the Son."* This is the second part of this part[^4], in which he incidentally determines concerning the property of the Son, or of the Begotten One; and this has two parts according to the two points which he touches there. For since it had been said above that *wisdom* expresses what is common, *image* what is proper, and therefore — because this could give rise to a difficulty, since we sometimes find the contrary — he therefore first shows that *born* wisdom is properly said of the Son. Second, however, he shows that *image* is sometimes taken essentially, there: *"This too must be known."*

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### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the things said in the present distinction, four [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether this name *unbegotten* or *unbegettable* is said according to substance or according to relation.

Second, supposing that it is said according to relation, it is asked whether it expresses the same relation which this name *father* expresses.

Third it is asked whether unbegottenness is a property or a personal relation of the person of the Father.

Fourth and lastly it is asked whether unprocessibility expresses any notion in the Father.

---

la: Sive, ut ait Aristot., 1. *Elench.* c. 14. (c. 15.): *Appositis iuxta se contrariis, minora et maiora apparent et peiora et meliora hominibus. Et* II. *de Caelo et mundo* text. 40. (c. 6.) *Sensibiliora enim sunt iuxta se invicem posita.* — Mox Vat. cum paucis codd. *innascibilitatis* pro *nascibilitatis*.

en: Or, as Aristotle says, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 14 (c. 15): *"When contraries are set side by side, lesser and greater things appear, and worse and better, to men."* And *On the Heavens and the World* II, text 40 (c. 6): *"For things are more sensible when placed side by side with one another."* — Soon afterwards the Vatican edition, with a few codices, reads *innascibilitatis* in place of *nascibilitatis*.

la: Sola Vat. hic addit: *Adiungens, quae sit proprietas secundum quam Pater dicitur ingenitus, ibi: Si autem vis scire.*

en: The Vatican edition alone here adds: *"Adding what the property is according to which the Father is called unbegotten, there: But if you wish to know."*

la: Codd. P Q W *solvit*.

en: Codices P, Q, W read *solvit* ("he resolves").

la: Verba *Sciendum quoque... usque ad huius partis* inclusive Vat. suppressit, eorum loco ponendo: *Similiter secunda pars.*

en: The Vatican edition has suppressed the words *Sciendum quoque...* up to and including *huius partis*, putting in their place: *"Likewise the second part."*


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum nomen ingenitus sive innascibilis secundum substantiam vel relationem dicatur

title_alt: Whether the name 'ingenerate' or 'unbegotten' is said according to substance or according to relation

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De proprietate innascibilitatis.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomen ingenitus sive innascibilis secundum substantiam, vel relationem dicatur.*

Quantum ergo ad primum, quod hoc nomen *ingenitus* dicatur secundum relationem, ostenditur:

1. Per Augustinum, qui dicit libro quinto *de Trinitate*[^1] et habetur in littera: « Non receditur a relativo praedicamento, cum ingenitus dicitur »: ergo dicitur secundum relationem.

2. Item eodem libro[^2]: « Sicut genitus ad genitorem, ita ingenitus ad non-genitorem »; sed quod dicitur ad aliud dicitur relative sive secundum relationem: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omne illud, in quo differt persona a persona, dicitur secundum relationem — hoc patet — sed secundum hoc quod est *ingenitus* differt Pater a Filio: ergo etc.

4. Item, nulla negatio privat modum significandi sive dicendi[^3]; sed *genitus* secundum relationem dicitur, ergo addita negatione, adhuc dicetur: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Omnis relatio in divinis aliquid ponit — illud certum est — sed *ingenitus* nihil ponit: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: si hoc nomen aliquid ponit, aut ergo secundum quod negative, aut secundum quod privative tenetur. Non secundum quod negative; hoc constat. Si ergo secundum quod privative tenetur; sed privatio tollit actum et ponit aptitudinem[^4]: ergo secundum hoc *ingenitus* idem erit quod *aptus generari, et non genitus*; sed hoc nulli convenit: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis relatio in divinis in concretione significata importat distinctionem, et ideo nulla dicitur de essentia secundum modum denominationis — haec enim est falsa: *essentia generat* — sed *ingenitus* dicitur de essentia, nam divina essentia est *non genita*[^5], cum eius oppositum de essentia non praedicetur, scilicet *genitus*: ergo etc.

3. Item, negationes se habent e contrario affirmationibus; sed *genitus* est in minus quam *relatus*, et *generatio* quam *relatio*: ergo *ingenitus* est in plus quam *non-relatus*, et *ingeneratio* quam *non-relatio*. Sed *non-relatus* vel *non-relatio* non dicitur secundum relationem, quia tunc opposita implicaret: ergo cum in plus sit hoc quod est *ingenitus*, non est in genere relationis: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis relatio in divinis aut est respectu principii, aut respectu principiati: ergo si hoc quod est *ingenitus* dicit relationem, aut[^6] respectu principii, aut respectu principiati. Sed non respectu principii, quia tunc Pater haberet principium, quod est inconveniens. Si respectu principiati, tunc ergo non eius est negatio, cuius fuit affirmatio — nam *genitus* dicitur respectu principii, quia ab aliquo — ergo si *ingenitus* non dicitur respectu principii, tunc ergo negatio non dicitur respectu eius, respectu cuius fuit affirmatio. Ergo nec dicit relationem ad principiatum, quia non permittit nomen, nec ad principium, quia non permittit res.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Nomen* ingenitus *in principali intellectu dicit relationem privative, sed ex consequenti intellectu positive, scilicet fontalem plenitudinem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum est, quod circa hoc diversae sunt positiones. Omnes enim posuerunt, quod hoc quod est *ingenitus* dicitur secundum relationem, sed differenter.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod *ingenitus* solum dicit *relationis privationem*; et illud solum sufficit ad hoc quod dicatur notionaliter, quoniam privatio potest esse principium distinguendi et innotescendi, sicut ovis non signata a signata. Et iterum, negatio dicit nobilitatem, sicut *non regi* in rege, *non causari* in causa, *non produci* in principio. — Sed ista positio non potest stare, quia pura negatio nec distinguit nec dicit nobilitatem[^7]: non distinguit, nam negatio relationis dicitur de essentia; non dicit nobilitatem, nam omnis nobilitas ponit aliquid per modum positionis.

Alii posuerunt, quod hoc quod est *ingenitus* dicitur secundum relationem et positive, quia privando unam ponit aliam: sicut *inaequale* privat aequalitatem et ponit relationem illi oppositam, similiter et hoc quod est *dissimile*, unde et relationem importat positive; sic hoc quod est *ingenitus* privando relationem ad genitorem ponit relationem oppositam ad non-genitorem. Et hoc dicunt sensisse Augustinum, qui dicit, quod « sicut genitus ad genitorem, ita non-genitus ad non-genitorem dicitur »[^8]. — Sed ista positio non potest stare, quia *non-genitus* aut dicitur ad principium, aut ad principiatum. Si ad principiatum, ergo respectu illius non potest dici hoc nomen *ingenitus*, cum *genitus* dicatur in respectu ad principium, et idem significatum sit in hoc nomine *genitus* et *ingenitus*, et *ingenitus* differat sola negatione: ergo necesse est, quod hoc nomen *ingenitus* dicatur respectu principii. Si autem hoc est verum: ergo secundum hoc poneretur[^9] Pater habere principium, respectu cuius dicatur. Et iterum, illud principium diceretur *non-genitor*; sed *non generare* non dicit principium, sed privationem illius.

Tertius modus dicendi est, quod hoc nomen *ingenitus*, secundum quod assignatur notio Patris, dicitur secundum relationem partim privative, partim positive. Propter hoc notandum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus[^10], « idem est ingenitus et non-genitus ». *Non-genitus* autem tripliciter potest accipi, sicut *non-album*, quia potest esse negatio in genere, vel extra genus, vel partim in genere et partim extra genus[^11]. Secundum quod est negatio extra genus, sic generaliter privat et non ponit aliquam qualitatem, sicut potest dici *non-album* quod non est in genere coloris nec qualitatis. Secundum quod est negatio in genere, sic privat albedinem et ponit qualitatem contrariam, ut *non-album*, quia caret albedine, sed tamen est nigrum. Secundum quod partim in genere, partim extra genus, in genere scilicet remoto[^12] et extra genus proximum; sic *non-album* dicitur quod caret tam albedine quam colore, habet tamen qualitatem nihilominus.

Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito. Nam hoc quod est *ingenitum*[^13] importat ordinem in ratione generis remoti, et ordinem ad principium in ratione proximi, et ordinem talem per modum naturae in ratione completivi. Si igitur *ingenitus* sit negatio extra genus, sic dicitur *ingenitus* quod non generatur nec etiam habet ordinem vel[^14] relationem; et hoc modo pure dicit privationem et dicitur de essentia, nec dicitur secundum substantiam nec secundum relationem, eo quod privatio solum est. — Alio modo potest esse negatio in genere; et tunc *ingenitus* dicitur quod non generatur, habet tamen ordinem ad principium, et hoc modo dicit relationem substratam; sed tamen ex hoc non dicit nobilitatem, et sic convenit Spiritui sancto, nec tamen est notio. — Tertio modo potest esse negatio quodam modo in genere, quodam modo extra genus; et sic dicitur *ingenitus* quod non generatur, habet tamen ordinem, sed non ad principium; et hoc modo dicit privationem relationis respectu principii. Si enim habet ordinem, et non ad principium, ergo ipsum est primum et principium; et hoc modo dicit nobilitatem, sicut et principium. Et decuit illam per negationem significari, quia prima cognoscuntur per negationem[^15], et hoc modo est notio.

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Sed quoniam *ingenitus* de ratione sui nominis non videtur dicere nisi privationem vel negationem generationis, propter hoc dicendum est quarto modo, quod hoc nomen *ingenitus*, secundum quod convenit Patri proprie, dicit relationem privative, sed ex hoc ipso dicit ex consequenti relationem positive.

Quod patet sic. *Non generari* enim dicitur qui simpliciter non generatur; et sic convenit non tantum Patri, sed essentiae et Spiritui sancto. Sed ultra hunc intellectum, prout proprie convenit Patri, addit, quia Pater non generatur, nec per generationem accipitur; et sic excluditur essentia, quae per generationem accipitur, sed adhuc convenit Spiritui sancto. Prout autem convenit soli Patri, sic dicitur *ingenitus*, quia non generatur, nec per generationem accipitur, nec generationem consequitur. Per primum membrum excluditur Filius, per secundum essentia, per tertium Spiritus sanctus, cuius processio praesupponit generationem secundum ordinem originalem, quia procedit ut nexus a Patre et Filio[^16]. Quamvis enim non sit in divinis prius et posterius, tamen secundum originem et rationem intelligendi prior est generatio Filii quam processio Spiritus sancti, ut supra ostensum fuit[^17], et tamen simul sunt natura.

Sic ergo large accepto verbo *consequendi*, cum ibi proprie non sit praecedere et sequi, tripliciter dicitur aliquis esse *ingenitus*: aut quia non producitur per generationem, aut quia non producitur per generationem nec per generationem habetur sive accipitur, aut quia nec producitur nec accipitur nec consequitur[^18]. Hoc igitur modo *ingenitus* importat nullo modo esse ab alio, et ita primitatem ac per hoc fontalem plenitudinem, sicut ostensum fuit in principio distinctionis praecedentis[^19], et sicut patet ex principio distinctionis sequentis, ubi dicitur, quod « Pater est principium totius deitatis, quia a nullo est »; et ita in principali intellectu dicit relationem privative, ex consequenti positive; et ita non dicit negationem, quae nihil ponit.

Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nihil ponit secundum quod negative; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia non est negatio *extra genus*, sicut si dicatur: *chimaera est ingenita*, immo est negatio cum constantia subiecti; et talis negatio in subiecto summam relinquit nobilitatem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicitur de essentia; dicendum, quod verum est, sed secundum quod solum dicitur privative, et sic non est proprietas Patris; secundum autem quod proprietas Patris, non dicitur de essentia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod negationes e contrario se habent affirmationibus; dicendum, quod illud non semper est verum de negatione in genere, sed extra genus. *Non-album* enim, prout est negatio in genere, non dicitur superius ad hoc quod est *non-quale*; similiter *ingenitum* ad hoc quod est *non-relatum* non est superius.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod[^20] dicit relationem; dicendum, quod secundum quod importat relationem privative, dicitur respectu principii; et ex hoc non sequitur, quod Pater habeat principium, immo quod non habeat, quia non dicitur secundum positionem, sed secundum remotionem. Unde bene dicit Augustinus, « quod dicitur ad non-genitorem », quia *ingenitus* significat remotionem genitoris. Secundum vero quod importat relationem positive et ex consequenti, sic[^21] respectu principiati; et sic non est inconveniens, quod aliquod nomen privativum aliquid ex consequenti importet, quod non importat affirmativum sibi oppositum. Et sic patent cetera.

english:
### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *On the property of unbegottenness.*

### QUESTION I. *Whether the name "ingenerate" or "unbegotten" is said according to substance or according to relation.*

As to the first [point], that this name *ingenerate* is said according to relation, is shown:

1. Through Augustine, who says in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^1] and as is found in the *littera*: "One does not depart from the relative predicament when one says *ingenerate*": therefore it is said according to relation.

2. Likewise in the same book[^2]: "Just as the begotten [is said] to the begetter, so the ingenerate [is said] to the non-begetter"; but what is said to another is said relatively or according to relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the same is seen by reason, since everything in which person differs from person is said according to relation — this is plain — but according to this [name], that is *ingenerate*, the Father differs from the Son: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no negation deprives the mode of signifying or saying[^3]; but *begotten* is said according to relation; therefore with negation added, it will still be said [according to relation]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every relation in divine [things] posits something — that is certain — but *ingenerate* posits nothing: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [premise]: if this name posits something, then either as it is taken negatively, or as it is taken privatively. Not as taken negatively; this is plain. If therefore as taken privatively; but privation removes the act and posits the aptitude[^4]: therefore according to this *ingenerate* will be the same as *apt to be begotten, and not begotten*; but this fits no one: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every relation in divine [things] signified in concretion imports distinction, and therefore none is said of the essence according to the mode of denomination — for this is false: *the essence begets* — but *ingenerate* is said of the essence, for the divine essence is *not begotten*[^5], since its opposite is not predicated of the essence, namely *begotten*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, negations stand opposite to affirmations; but *begotten* is in less than *related*, and *generation* than *relation*: therefore *ingenerate* is in more than *non-related*, and *ingeneration* than *non-relation*. But *non-related* or *non-relation* is not said according to relation, since then it would imply opposites: therefore since this [word] *ingenerate* is in more, it is not in the genus of relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every relation in divine [things] is either with respect to a principle, or with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle: therefore if this [word] *ingenerate* expresses relation, [it is] either[^6] with respect to a principle, or with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle. But not with respect to a principle, since then the Father would have a principle, which is unfitting. If with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle, then the negation is not of that of which the affirmation was — for *begotten* is said with respect to a principle, since [it is] from someone — therefore if *ingenerate* is not said with respect to a principle, then the negation is not said with respect to that with respect to which the affirmation was. Therefore neither does it express relation to that-which-is-from-the-principle, since the name does not permit [it], nor to a principle, since the thing does not permit [it].

> **CONCLUSION.** *The name* ingenerate *in its principal sense expresses relation privatively, but in its consequent sense positively, namely fontal fullness.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there are diverse positions on this. For all have held that this [name] *ingenerate* is said according to relation, but differently.

For some have said that *ingenerate* expresses only the *privation of relation*; and that alone suffices for it to be said notionally, since privation can be a principle of distinguishing and of making known, just as a sheep that is unmarked [is distinguished] from one that is marked. And again, negation expresses nobility, as *not being ruled* in a king, *not being caused* in a cause, *not being produced* in a principle. — But this position cannot stand, since pure negation neither distinguishes nor expresses nobility[^7]: it does not distinguish, for the negation of relation is said of the essence; it does not express nobility, for all nobility posits something through the mode of position.

Others have held that this [word] *ingenerate* is said according to relation and positively, since by privating the one it posits the other: just as *unequal* privates equality and posits the relation opposed to it, similarly also *dissimilar*, whence it imports relation positively; so this [word] *ingenerate*, by privating the relation to the begetter, posits the opposite relation to the non-begetter. And this they say Augustine held, who says that "just as the begotten [is said] to the begetter, so the non-begotten [is said] to the non-begetter"[^8]. — But this position cannot stand, since *non-begotten* is said either to a principle, or to that-which-is-from-the-principle. If to that-which-is-from-the-principle, then this name *ingenerate* cannot be said with respect to it, since *begotten* is said with respect to a principle, and the same is signified in this name *begotten* and *ingenerate*, and *ingenerate* differs only in the negation: therefore it is necessary that this name *ingenerate* be said with respect to a principle. But if this is true: then according to this the Father would be posited[^9] to have a principle with respect to which it is said. And again, that principle would be called *non-begetter*; but *not to beget* does not express a principle, but the privation of it.

The third manner of speaking is that this name *ingenerate*, insofar as it is assigned as the notion of the Father, is said according to relation partly privatively, partly positively. Concerning this it must be noted that, as Augustine says[^10], "*ingenerate* and *non-begotten* are the same". But *non-begotten* can be taken in three ways, like *non-white*, since it can be a negation in a genus, or outside a genus, or partly in a genus and partly outside a genus[^11]. Insofar as it is a negation outside a genus, thus it generally privates and does not posit any quality, just as one can call *non-white* that which is not in the genus of color nor of quality. Insofar as it is a negation in a genus, thus it privates whiteness and posits a contrary quality, as *non-white*, since it lacks whiteness, but yet is black. Insofar as [it is] partly in a genus, partly outside a genus, namely in a remote genus[^12] and outside the proximate genus; thus *non-white* is said [of that] which lacks both whiteness and color, yet has a quality nonetheless.

In this manner [it is] to be understood in the matter at hand. For this [word] *ingenerate*[^13] imports order in the account of remote genus, and order to a principle in the account of proximate [genus], and such an order through the mode of nature in the account of completive [genus]. If therefore *ingenerate* be a negation outside a genus, thus *ingenerate* is said [of him] who is not begotten and does not even have order or[^14] relation; and in this mode it expresses pure privation and is said of the essence, and is said neither according to substance nor according to relation, since it is privation only. — In another mode it can be a negation in a genus; and then *ingenerate* is said [of him] who is not begotten, yet has order to a principle, and in this mode it expresses an underlying relation; but yet from this it does not express nobility, and so it fits the Holy Spirit, yet is not a notion. — In a third mode it can be a negation in a certain manner in a genus, in a certain manner outside a genus; and thus *ingenerate* is said [of him] who is not begotten, yet has order, but not to a principle; and in this mode it expresses the privation of relation with respect to a principle. For if it has order, and not to a principle, therefore it itself is first and a principle; and in this mode it expresses nobility, just as also a principle [does]. And it was fitting that it be signified through negation, since first [things] are known through negation[^15], and in this mode it is a notion.

But since *ingenerate*, by the account of its name, does not seem to express anything but the privation or negation of generation, on this account it must be said in a fourth manner, that this name *ingenerate*, insofar as it fits the Father properly, expresses relation privatively, but by this very fact expresses consequently relation positively.

This is plain thus. *Not to be begotten* is said of him who simply is not begotten; and so [it] fits not only the Father, but the essence and the Holy Spirit. But beyond this sense, as it properly fits the Father, it adds, since the Father is not begotten, nor received through generation; and thus the essence is excluded, which is received through generation, but it still fits the Holy Spirit. As it fits the Father alone, thus he is called *ingenerate*, since he is not begotten, nor received through generation, nor follows upon generation. Through the first member the Son is excluded, through the second the essence, through the third the Holy Spirit, whose procession presupposes generation according to the original order, since he proceeds as the bond from the Father and the Son[^16]. For although in divine [things] there is no prior and posterior, yet according to origin and the account of understanding, the generation of the Son is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit, as was shown above[^17], and yet they are simultaneous in nature.

Thus therefore, with the verb *to follow* taken broadly, since there properly is no preceding and following there, in three ways someone is said to be *ingenerate*: either since he is not produced through generation, or since he is not produced through generation nor had or received through generation, or since he is neither produced nor received nor follows[^18]. In this mode therefore *ingenerate* imports being from another in no mode, and so primacy and through this fontal fullness, as was shown at the beginning of the preceding distinction[^19], and as is plain from the beginning of the following distinction, where it is said that "the Father is the principle of the whole deity, since he is from no one"; and so in its principal sense it expresses relation privatively, in its consequent sense positively; and so it does not express the negation that posits nothing.

Whence the reasons for this [conclusion] must be conceded.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that it posits nothing insofar as [taken] negatively; it must be said that this is false, since it is not a negation *outside a genus*, as if one said: *a chimaera is ingenerate*, but rather it is a negation with the constancy of the subject; and such a negation in the subject leaves the highest nobility.

2. To that which is objected, that it is said of the essence; it must be said that it is true, but according to as it is said only privatively, and so it is not a property of the Father; but according to as [it is] a property of the Father, it is not said of the essence.

3. To that which is objected, that negations stand opposite to affirmations; it must be said that this is not always true of negation in a genus, but [is true] outside a genus. For *non-white*, insofar as it is a negation in a genus, is not said as superior to this which is *non-qualitative*; similarly *ingenerate* is not superior to this which is *non-related*.

4. To that which is finally objected, that[^20] it expresses relation; it must be said that insofar as it imports relation privatively, it is said with respect to a principle; and from this it does not follow that the Father has a principle, but rather that he does not have [one], since it is not said according to position, but according to removal. Whence Augustine well says, "[it] is said to the non-begetter", since *ingenerate* signifies the removal of the begetter. But insofar as it imports relation positively and consequently, thus[^21] [it is said] with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle; and so it is not unfitting that some privative name should consequently import something which the affirmative opposed to it does not import. And thus the rest are plain.

la: Cap. 7, n. 8, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Chapter 7, n. 8, and here in the *littera* of the Master, c. 1.

la: Loc. cit. — Vat. sola post *Sicut* addit *dicitur*, pro quo in originali legitur *refertur*. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, circa finem.

en: At the place cited. — The Vatican [edition] alone after *Sicut* adds *dicitur* ("is said"), in place of which in the original one reads *refertur* ("is referred"). — See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1, near the end.

la: Hanc propositionem probat August., V. *de Trin.* c. 7, n. 8, exponendo exempla ex omnibus decem praedicamentorum generibus, quorum aliqua Magister, hic in lit., c. 1, adducit. S. Bonav., infra de verbis Augustini dubium movens (dub. 2), ea approbat munitque hac ratione: Quoniam terminus negatus trahit significationem ab affirmato, idem est modus dicendi quantum ad significationem in termino negato et affirmato. — Cfr. et Aristot., II. *Elench.* c. 6 (c. 31), ubi iste dicit, includi facere in non-facere et omnino in negatione affirmationem.

en: Augustine proves this proposition in V. *de Trin.* c. 7, n. 8, by setting out examples from all ten genera of predicaments, some of which the Master adduces here in the *littera*, c. 1. St. Bonaventure, raising a doubt below on the words of Augustine (dub. 2), approves them and supports them with this reason: Since a negated term draws its signification from the affirmed [term], the mode of saying with respect to signification is the same in the negated and the affirmed term. — Cf. also Aristotle, II. *Elench.* c. 6 (c. 31), where he says that doing is included in non-doing and altogether affirmation in negation.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis*, et V. *Metaph.* text. 27 (IV. c. 22), nec non IV. *Metaph.* text. 4 (III. c. 2), ubi differentia inter negationem et privationem ostenditur. — Mox Vat. absque auctoritate codd. nec suffragante ed. I sed *nondum genitus* pro *et non genitus*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Predicaments*, c. *On Opposites*, and V. *Metaph.* text. 27 (IV. c. 22), and also IV. *Metaph.* text. 4 (III. c. 2), where the difference between negation and privation is shown. — A little later the Vatican [edition], without the authority of any codex and without the support of ed. I, [reads] *nondum genitus* ("not yet begotten") for *et non genitus* ("and not begotten").

la: Cod. Y *ingenita*.

en: Cod. Y [reads] *ingenita* ("ingenerate" [feminine]).

la: Cod. V adiungit *hoc erit*. Paulo inferius post *haberet* codd. F T inserunt *aliquod*.

en: Cod. V adds *hoc erit* ("this will be"). A little below, after *haberet* ("would have"), codices F T insert *aliquod* ("some").

la: Vat. textum codd. nec non ed. I corrupit substituendo *distinguitur* pro *distinguit*, dein post *nobilitatem* addendo *nec distinguit*, et demum paulo inferius post *positionis* inserendo propositionem: *Non distinguit, quia non est relatio*.

en: The Vatican [edition] corrupted the text of the codices and also of ed. I by substituting *distinguitur* ("is distinguished") for *distinguit* ("distinguishes"), then after *nobilitatem* ("nobility") adding *nec distinguit* ("nor does it distinguish"), and finally a little below, after *positionis* ("of position"), inserting the proposition: *Non distinguit, quia non est relatio* ("It does not distinguish, since it is not a relation").

la: Vide supra, fundam. 2. — Explicationem huius dicti Augustini invenies infra, dub. 3. — Mox pro *non genitus* cod. R *ingenitus*.

en: See above, fundamentum 2. — The explanation of this saying of Augustine you will find below, dub. 3. — A little later, in place of *non genitus* ("not begotten") cod. R [reads] *ingenitus* ("ingenerate").

la: Plures codd. ut A T V Y cum ed. 1 *ponetur*.

en: Several codices, such as A T V Y, with ed. 1 [read] *ponetur* ("will be posited" [future]).

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 7, n. 8: *Ingenitus porro quid est, nisi non genitus?* — Paulo ante pro *assignatur* sola Vat. *assimilatur*; mendose.

en: Book V. *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 8: "Furthermore, what is *ingenerate* except *not begotten*?" — A little before, in place of *assignatur* ("is assigned") the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *assimilatur* ("is likened"); erroneously.

la: Haec divisio negationis insinuatur ab Aristot. I. *Poster.* c. 4: *Est enim contrarium aut privatio aut contradictio in eodem genere, ut par aut impar in numeris, secundum quod consequitur*. Et IV. *Metaph.* text. 4 (III. c. 2): *Negationem vero et privationem unius est speculari, propterea quod utroque modo unum speculatur id cuius est negatio aut privatio; aut enim simpliciter dicimus, non inesse illud, aut aliquod genus statuentes. In illo siquidem uni differentia est secundum illud quod in negatione, negatio namque absentia illius est; in privatione vero etiam subiecta quaedam natura fit, de qua privatio dicitur* (ed. Firmin-Didot). Et ibid. text. 27 (c. 6): *Est autem privatio, negatio a quodam determinato genere*. — Scotus, *Comment.* in IV. *Metaph.* text. 4 dicit: *Notandum etiam, quod duplex est negatio: quaedam est simpliciter et extra genus, per quam absolute dicitur, quod hoc non est illud; alia est negatio in genere, sive infinitans, per quam aliquid negatur non absolute, sed intra metas alicuius generis, sicut caecum dicitur, quod non habet visum; non tamen omne non habens visum est caecum, sed in genere animalium quod natum est habere visum. Unde negatio extra genus potest verificari tam de non ente, quod non est natum habere affirmationem, quam de ente, quod est natum habere et non habet. Unde tam chimaera, quam lapis, quam etiam homo potest dici non videns; non sic autem de privatione, quae est negatio infra genus, quia non omne non videns potest dici caecum, sed solum quod est aptum natum habere visum*. Cfr. etiam Scoti *Comment.* in I. *Sent.* d. 28, q. 2, n. 4. — Mox post *aliquam qualitatem* cod. K subiicit *contrariam*.

en: This division of negation is suggested by Aristotle, I. *Poster.* c. 4: "For the contrary is either a privation or a contradiction in the same genus, as even or odd in numbers, according as it follows." And IV. *Metaph.* text. 4 (III. c. 2): "It belongs to one [science] to consider negation and privation, because in either mode one considers the one whose [negation or privation] it is; for either we say simply that this does not inhere, or [we say so] establishing some genus. For in that one [the] difference is according to that which [is] in the negation — for negation is the absence of that [thing]; but in privation also a certain underlying nature occurs, of which the privation is said" (ed. Firmin-Didot). And in the same place, text. 27 (c. 6): "Privation, however, is negation from a certain determined genus." — Scotus, *Commentary* on IV. *Metaph.* text. 4 says: "It is to be noted also that negation is twofold: one is simply and outside a genus, through which absolutely it is said that this is not that; another is negation in a genus, or infinitating, through which something is denied not absolutely, but within the bounds of some genus, as one says *blind* of that which does not have sight; yet not everything not having sight is blind, but [only] in the genus of animals which are by nature [meant] to have sight. Whence negation outside a genus can be verified both of non-being, which is not by nature [meant] to have an affirmation, and of being, which is by nature [meant] to have it and does not have it. Whence chimaera as well as stone and even man can be called *not seeing*; but not so concerning privation, which is negation within a genus, since not everything not seeing can be called blind, but only that which is fit by nature to have sight." Cf. also Scotus' *Commentary* on I. *Sent.* d. 28, q. 2, n. 4. — A little later, after *aliquam qualitatem* ("any quality"), cod. K adds *contrariam* ("contrary").

la: Vat., suffragantibus solis edd. 4, 5, omittit *remoto*, et paulo inferius *nihilominus*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with only edd. 4, 5 supporting [it], omits *remoto* ("remote"), and a little below *nihilominus* ("nonetheless").

la: Codd. M Z *genitum*, cod. *genitus*.

en: Codices M Z [read] *genitum* ("begotten" [neuter]), [another] cod. *genitus* ("begotten" [masculine]).

la: Ed. I *nec*.

en: Ed. I [reads] *nec* ("nor").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 421, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 421, note 6.

la: Vide supra d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.

en: See above d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Supra d. 12, q. 4.

en: Above d. 12, q. 4.

la: Sic potiores codd. In Vat. et nonnullis mss. desideratur secundum membrum: *aut quia non producitur per generationem*. — In cod. F interpolatoris manus textum sic ampliavit: *ingenitus, aut quia non producitur per generationem, sed per generationem communicatur, ut essentia; aut quia non producitur per generationem nec per generationem habetur sive accipitur, sed generationem consequitur, ut Spiritus sanctus; aut quia non producitur nec accipitur nec consequitur, ut Pater*.

en: Thus the better codices. In the Vatican [edition] and in some manuscripts the second member is missing: "or because he is not produced through generation". — In cod. F the hand of an interpolator amplified the text thus: "*ingenerate*, either since he is not produced through generation, but is communicated through generation, as the essence; or since he is not produced through generation nor had or received through generation, but follows upon generation, as the Holy Spirit; or since he is neither produced nor received nor follows, as the Father."

la: Pars I, q. 2, ad 3. — Dictum Augustini, quod mox ex dist. seq. citatur, scil. quod *Pater est principium totius deitatis*, invenies ibi in lit. Magistri, c. 1, et eius explanationem ibi dub. 1.

en: Part I, q. 2, ad 3. — The saying of Augustine which is shortly cited from the following distinction, namely that *the Father is the principle of the whole deity*, you will find there in the *littera* of the Master, c. 1, and its explanation there in dub. 1.

la: Cod. T *respectu cuius* pro *quod*.

en: Cod. T [reads] *respectu cuius* ("with respect to which") for *quod* ("that").

la: Supple: *dicitur*.

en: Supply: *dicitur* ("is said").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Aliqua praenotanda videntur de multiplici sensu vocabuli *ingeniti* — de significatione huius notionis in Patre — et utrum sit proprietas constitutiva Patris.

**1.** Multiplex huius vocabuli sensus, ut recte observat Scotus (hic q. 2, n. 3, 4), ex duplici fonte manat, cum *genitus* in diverso sensu accipi, et particula *in* triplicem modum privationis significare possit (cfr. S. Thom., S. I, q. 34, a. 4, ad 2; Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 17, 27, ed. Paris. IV, c. 12, 22). Specialiter attendendi sunt quatuor sensus vocabuli *ingeniti*: a) cum privatione propria, quae ponit aptitudinem ad aliquam formam et ipsam formam negat — hic sensus omnino excluditur a Deo; b) cum simplici negatione formae, et sic dici potest de persona Patris et Spiritus S. et etiam de divina essentia, quatenus non generatur, licet per generationem communicetur; c) extenso nomine *generari* etiam ad *communicari*, divina essentia non est *ingenita*; d) negando omnino, quod persona sit ab alio ullo modo, vel, ut dicit Seraphicus, ponendo « quod non generatur, nec per generationem accipitur, nec generationem consequitur »; et sic convenit principio sine principio et est proprium solius Patris.

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— Hinc facile componi potest apparens contradictio inter verba SS. Patrum et doctorum (cfr. d. 13, q. 4).

**2.** De significatione notionis *ingeniti* in Patre non penitus conveniunt doctores. Nonnulli dixerunt, *innascibilitate* significari aliquid positivum, nempe positionem relationis, quae opposita sit relationi *genitoris*. S. Thomas et Scotus volunt, eam formaliter dicere puram negationem. Cum autem omnis negatio vel privatio fundata sit super aliquid positivum, hi duo doctores discrepant in assignando fundamento istius conceptus negativi. Scotus docet, fundamentum formale huius negationis esse paternitatem sub ratione paternitatis. S. Thomas a suis interpretibus non in eodem sensu exponitur. Videtur autem docere, hoc nomine importari negationem principii ab alio, fundatam in ratione principii ad alium. Vasquez putat eum convenire cum S. Bonaventura, qui iuxta morem suum media via incedit et docet, *innascibilitatem* primario et formaliter dicere negationem, sed secundario, consequenter et etiam fundamentaliter positionem, ut manifeste patet ex quaest. seq. in corp., et supra d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3. Hoc positivum, in ratione *ingeniti* connotatum, iuxta ipsum est *fontalis plenitudo* in Patre (cfr. loci citt., et d. 7, q. 2; d. 13, q. 3, et passim).

**3.** Proprietatem constitutivam Patris formaliter esse paternitatem, est sententia communis, et manifeste docetur a S. Doctore (hic q. 3). Addit tamen Seraphicus, sibi constans, quod etiam *innascibilitas* aliquo modo, id est ex consequenti intellectu, dicit relationem positive, et sic constituit Patrem, sed tantum radicaliter sive inchoative. Nam iuxta ipsum (d. 27, p. I, q. 2) *paternitas* supponit *generationem* tanquam radicem, *generatio* vero *fecunditatem*, quae importatur in *innascibilitate*, quatenus dicit fontalem plenitudinem in Patre. Haec concipitur ut radix communis duarum emanationum atque ut fecunda non in actu secundo, sed primo, sive, ut dicit Richard. a Med., *in habitu*. Firmum fundamentum haec doctrina habet in illa communi doctrina, quae a Concilio Florentino (Decret. unionis pro Iacobitis) consecrata est, quod « Pater quidquid est aut habet, non habet ab alio, sed ex se, et est principium sine principio. Filius quidquid est aut habet, habet a Patre et est principium de principio etc. » (cfr. infra d. 29, a. 1 et 2, et dub. 1 et 2).

**II.** His suppositis, et tres solutiones, quas S. Bonav. non approbat, et quarta ab ipso recepta et in fine responsionis posita facile intelliguntur. Haec sententia, quod *innascibilitas* fundamentaliter dicat fontalem plenitudinem in Patre, et ex consequenti relationem quasi communem ad duas personas emanantes, fuit antiqua positio magnorum doctorum (supra d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3), cui favent Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 69, m. 2 et 4), et Petrus a Tar. (hic q. 2, a. 3), et quam defendit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2, q. 1 et 2). Attamen a posterioribus Scholasticis solutio haec antiqua derelicta, immo a Scoto (hic q. 2, n. 6 seqq.) impugnata est tribus argumentis, quorum principale nihil concludit, cum contra mentem Seraphici supponat, in fontali illa plenitudine importari aliquam relationem realem, distinctam a generatione et spiratione activa. Etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; et S. I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1) obiicit: « Non videtur verum, quia sic *innascibilitas* non esset alia proprietas a paternitate et spiratione, sed includeret eas, sicut includitur proprium in communi ». Ad quod ex mente Seraphici responderi poterit cum distinctione: loquendo de principali et formali significatione *innascibilitatis*, quae dicit negationem principii, haec notio non est eadem cum paternitate et spiratione; loquendo de secundaria significatione, quae importat illam fontalem plenitudinem, « realiter est idem cum paternitate et spiratione activa... differt tamen secundum rationem » (Richard. a Med., hic a. 2, q. 2). Ita quoad sensum etiam S. Bonav., hic q. 2, et dub. 1, et q. 3, ad 2; cfr. etiam d. 29, dub. 1, circa finem.

**III.** Praeter auctores iam citatos cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 1, 2; d. 13, a. 9, 10; S. p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 1, particula 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. Med., hic a. 2, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 57, q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Some [things] seem to need noting beforehand concerning the manifold sense of the word *ingenerate* — concerning the signification of this notion in the Father — and whether it is the constitutive property of the Father.

**1.** The manifold sense of this word, as Scotus rightly observes (here q. 2, n. 3, 4), flows from a twofold source, since *begotten* can be taken in a different sense, and the particle *in* can signify a threefold mode of privation (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 34, a. 4, ad 2; Aristotle, V. *Metaph.* text. 17, 27, ed. Paris. IV, c. 12, 22). Specially to be attended to are four senses of the word *ingenerate*: a) with proper privation, which posits the aptitude for some form and denies that very form — this sense is altogether excluded from God; b) with simple negation of the form, and thus it can be said of the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, and even of the divine essence, insofar as it is not begotten, although it is communicated through generation; c) with the name *to be begotten* extended also to *to be communicated*, the divine essence is not *ingenerate*; d) by denying altogether that the person be from another in any way, or, as the Seraphic [Doctor] says, by positing "that he is not begotten, nor received through generation, nor follows upon generation"; and thus it fits a principle without principle and is proper to the Father alone. — Hence the apparent contradiction between the words of the Holy Fathers and the doctors can easily be reconciled (cf. d. 13, q. 4).

**2.** On the signification of the notion *ingenerate* in the Father the doctors do not entirely agree. Some have said that by *unbegottenness* something positive is signified, namely the position of a relation that is opposed to the relation of *begetter*. St. Thomas and Scotus hold that it formally expresses pure negation. But since every negation or privation is founded upon something positive, these two doctors disagree in assigning the foundation of this negative concept. Scotus teaches that the formal foundation of this negation is paternity under the account of paternity. St. Thomas is not expounded in the same sense by his interpreters. He seems, however, to teach that by this name is imported the negation of a principle from another, founded in the account of a principle to another. Vasquez thinks he agrees with St. Bonaventure, who according to his usual manner takes a middle way and teaches that *unbegottenness* primarily and formally expresses negation, but secondarily, consequently and even fundamentally [expresses] position, as is manifestly plain from the following question in the body, and above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3. This positive [reality], connoted in the account of *ingenerate*, according to him is *fontal fullness* in the Father (cf. the cited places, and d. 7, q. 2; d. 13, q. 3, and elsewhere).

**3.** That the constitutive property of the Father is formally paternity is the common opinion, and is manifestly taught by the holy Doctor (here q. 3). The Seraphic [Doctor] adds, however, consistent with himself, that *unbegottenness* also in some way, that is, in its consequent sense, expresses relation positively, and thus constitutes the Father, but only radically or inchoatively. For according to him (d. 27, p. I, q. 2) *paternity* presupposes *generation* as a root, but *generation* [presupposes] *fecundity*, which is imported in *unbegottenness* insofar as it expresses fontal fullness in the Father. This is conceived as the common root of the two emanations and as fecund not in second act, but in first, or, as Richard of Mediavilla says, *in habit*. This doctrine has a firm foundation in that common doctrine which was consecrated by the Council of Florence (Decree of Union for the Jacobites), that "the Father, whatever he is or has, has not from another, but from himself, and is the principle without principle. The Son, whatever he is or has, has from the Father, and is the principle from a principle, etc." (cf. below d. 29, a. 1 and 2, and dub. 1 and 2).

**II.** With these things presupposed, both the three solutions which St. Bonaventure does not approve, and the fourth received by him and placed at the end of the response, are easily understood. This view, that *unbegottenness* fundamentally expresses fontal fullness in the Father, and consequently relation as quasi-common to the two emanating persons, was the ancient position of great doctors (above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3), to which Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 69, m. 2 and 4), and Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 2, a. 3) lend support, and which Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1 and 2) defends. However, by later Scholastics this ancient solution has been left aside, indeed has been impugned by Scotus (here q. 2, n. 6 ff.) with three arguments, of which the principal concludes nothing, since it supposes against the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor] that in that fontal fullness some real relation, distinct from generation and active spiration, is imported. St. Thomas also (here q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; and *Summa* I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1) objects: "It does not seem true, since thus *unbegottenness* would not be a property other than paternity and spiration, but would include them, just as the proper is included in the common." To which from the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor] one will be able to respond with a distinction: speaking of the principal and formal signification of *unbegottenness*, which expresses the negation of a principle, this notion is not the same as paternity and spiration; speaking of the secondary signification, which imports that fontal fullness, "it is really the same as paternity and active spiration... yet it differs according to account" (Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2). So also, with respect to sense, St. Bonaventure, here q. 2 and dub. 1, and q. 3, ad 2; cf. also d. 29, dub. 1, near the end.

**III.** Besides the authors already cited, cf. Bl. Albert, here a. 1, 2; d. 13, a. 9, 10; *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 1, particula 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 57, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here unique question.

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