title: Dist. 16, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et incidit quaestio circa verba Hilarii, quae videntur esse falsa et dubia et erronea; quae si dicamus esse retractata, iuxta quod prius[^p359-4] tactum fuit, semota erit omnis calumnia; quia tamen scriptura huius retractationis non est propalata, ideo sunt verba Hilarii, secundum quod possumus, verificanda.

Primo enim est dubium de illo verbo, quod dicit: *Passus quidem Christus dum caeditur, dum suspenditur, dum moritur* etc. Videtur enim dicere duo contraria, quod in corpore Christi fuerit vera passio, et tamen non fuerit verus dolor, quod non videtur esse intelligibile, quod corpus animatum vere patiebatur, et tamen vere non dolebat. — Et si tu velis dicere, quod hoc intelligat quantum ad personam Verbi; hoc nihil est, quia, sicut dolor est alienus a persona Verbi, ita et passio; et Hilarius[^p359-5] dicit, quod «passus fuit, licet non doluerit». — Similiter si tu dicere velis, quod non doluit, id est, non habuit causam et meritum doloris; similiter potes dicere, quod non habuit meritum passionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista verba Hilarii, etsi videantur esse contra fidem, tamen pro fide sunt; et hoc patet, si attendatur causa dicendi[^p359-6]. Contra enim illos loquitur Hilarius, qui dicebant, Christum omnino succubuisse passioni et a passione esse superatum; contra quos dicit Hilarius, quod etsi Christus vere passus fuerit, non tamen doluit, hoc est, passionibus non succubuit. Non enim vult negare *sensum* et *experimentum* passionis, sed *vim* et *dominium* passionis. Et quod iste sit intellectus, patet ex *modo loquendi* et ex *serie verborum* et ex *proprietate verborum*: quia *dolor* dicit comparationem ad voluntatem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus decimo quarto[^p359-7] de Civitate Dei, quod «dolor est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt». Quoniam ergo nec voluntas Christi divina nec voluntas creata passionibus succubuit; ideo non concedit Hilarius, Christum doluisse, hoc est, ipsum nolentem passionibus subiacuisse. Unde cum dicit[^p359-8]: «Virtus corporis sine sensu poenae vim poenae in se desaevientis excepit» etc.; *virtus corporis* dicitur voluntas rationalis, regitiva illius corporis; haec excepit vim poenae sine sensu poenae, hoc est sine dissensu a poena, quia voluit pati. — Et hoc ostendit *series litterae* sequentis. Probat enim, quod corpus illud non potuit dolere, quia «potuit undis superferri». Constat enim, quod corpus Christi non superferebatur undis per naturam ipsius corporis, quod[^p359-9] ponderosum erat, sed per imperium voluntatis. — Hoc ipsum patet per aliam rationem, quam subdit: quia «caro Christi concepta fuit de Spiritu sancto, ideo ille homo fuit habens *corpus ad patiendum*, sed *naturam non habens ad dolendum*». Ex cuius rationis et litterae intellectu manifestatur, esse verum quod prius dictum est. Quia enim caro illa concepta fuit de Spiritu sancto, ideo passibilitatem habuit, non *contra* voluntatem, sed *ex* voluntate; et hoc est quod dicit: «habens *corpus ad patiendum*, passus est», scilicet ex voluntate; «sed *naturam* non habens ad dolendum», id est ad patiendum contra dissensum voluntatis[^p359-10].

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedicta littera exponi potest triplici modo secundum triplicem modum exponendi praecedentia[^p360-7]: uno modo, ut illud referatur ad Verbum increatum, de quo concedit Hilarius, quod potuit pati, sed non esse passibile, quia, «licet passionibus se subdiderit, non tamen est demutatum patiendo[^p360-8]». — Alio modo potest exponi, sicut exponit Magister, ut per hoc quod est *passibile*, notetur dispositio consurgens ex *culpae merito*, quam removet Hilarius a Christo, quamvis in eo vere fuerit passio. — Tertio modo potest exponi, ut per hoc quod est *passibile*, notetur plena subiectio patientis[^p360-9] respectu passionis; et huiusmodi in Christo non fuit, cuius mens, ratio et voluntas passionibus superferebatur. Et quod iste sit intellectus, patet per litteram sequentem. Ait enim sic[^p360-10]: «Pati potuit, *passibilis* esse non potuit, quia passibilitas naturae infirmae est significatio, passio autem est eorum quae sunt illata perpessio». Et sic vult Christo attribuere passionis sufferentiam et removere subiacentiam.

#### Dub. II.

Item dubitabile est de hoc quod dicit: *Nec fieri potest, ut eius timor significetur in verbis, cuius fiducia continetur in factis.* Videtur enim contradicere ei quod dicitur Marci decimo quarto[^p360-1]: *Coepit Iesus pavere et taedere.* Videtur etiam contradicere aliis Sanctis, qui dicunt, eum vere timuisse. Videtur etiam contradicere sibi ipsi, quia dicit[^p360-2], quod «Christus pro Apostolis tristatus fuit usque ad mortem». Si tristis fuit, quare non similiter timuit?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Hilarius non intendit removere timorem a Christo, secundum quod timorem ei attribuit *Scriptura*, et *Sancti*, sed secundum quod attribuebant *haeretici*, qui dicebant, eum timuisse ex defectu securitatis; et talis est timor pusillanimitatis, de quo indubitanter verum est, quod non fuit in Christo. Unde valde attendendum est, quod Hilarius[^p360-3] a Christo non removet *tristitiam*, removet tamen *timorem*, quia *timor* consuevit consurgere ex defectu virtutis et pusillanimitate, *tristitia* vero surgit frequenter ex virtute et pietate. — Et quod iste sit intellectus, patet ex probatione sequenti. Probat enim, quod in Christo non fuit *infirmitas*, nec fuit *pusillanimitas*. *Pusillanimitas* non fuit, quia «armatis obvius prodiit»; *infirmitas* non fuit, quia «ad eius occursum consternata persequentium agmina, supinatis corporibus, conciderunt». Unde non excludit a Christo *timorem*[^p360-4], sed *timorem obviantem voluntati*; sic etiam *dolorem*, sicut patet aspicienti seriem litterae.

#### Dub. III.

Item dubitabile est tertio de hoc quod dicit in illa notula tracta de Synodis: *Pati potuit et passibilis esse non potuit.* Videtur enim verbum illud implicare contradictionem in semetipso, quia «cuius est potentia, eius est actus[^p360-5]»: ergo si fuit passibilis, potuit pati; et si potuit pati, fuit passibilis. — Praeterea, *passibile* nihil aliud est quam *potens pati*: ergo videtur, quod in praedicta locutione idem removetur a se[^p360-6].

#### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod ultimo dicit, *Christum de omni statu hominis aliquid accepisse*; quia secundum hoc videtur, quod Christus fuit in quadruplici statu. Nos autem non ponimus, Christum fuisse nisi in statu viatoris et comprehensoris. — Item, falsum videtur dicere, cum dicit, quod Christus de tertio statu assumsit plenitudinem gratiae: quia gratia non perficitur nisi per gloriam, iuxta illud quod dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p360-11]: *Cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est:* ergo plenitudo gratiae non fuit assumta secundum statum viae, sed secundum statum patriae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ille quadruplex status reduci habet ad duplicem. Sub statu enim *viae* comprehenduntur tres status, scilicet *innocentiae*, *naturae lapsae* et status *sub lege gratiae*. Illos autem quatuor status enumerat Magister ad maiorem declarationem conditionum ipsius naturae assumtae.

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Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plenitudo gratiae non habetur nisi secundum statum gloriae; dicendum, quod est plenitudo gratiae vel *simpliciter*, vel *respectu operis meritorii*: plenitudo gratiae simpliciter spectat ad statum gloriae, sicut obiicit; plenitudo vero respectu operis meritorii spectat ad statum viae. Et de hac intelligit Magister in littera, sicut patet aperte[^p361-1].

---

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and a question arises concerning the words of Hilary, which seem to be false and doubtful and erroneous; and if we should say that they were retracted, according to what was touched on before[^p359-4], all calumny will be removed; but because the writing of this retraction has not been published, therefore the words of Hilary are to be verified, in so far as we are able.

For first there is a doubt about that statement which he makes: *Christ indeed suffered while he was struck, while he was hung up, while he died,* etc. For he seems to say two contraries: that in the body of Christ there was true suffering, and yet that there was not true pain — which does not seem to be intelligible, that an ensouled body was truly suffering, and yet was truly not in pain. — And if you wish to say that he understands this with respect to the person of the Word, this is nothing, because, just as pain is foreign to the person of the Word, so too is suffering; and Hilary[^p359-5] says that «he suffered, although he did not feel pain». — Likewise, if you wish to say that he did not feel pain, that is, did not have the cause and merit of pain, you can likewise say that he did not have the merit of suffering.

**I respond:** It must be said that these words of Hilary, even though they seem to be against the faith, are nevertheless in favor of the faith; and this is clear if the cause of his saying it[^p359-6] is attended to. For Hilary speaks against those who said that Christ wholly succumbed to suffering and was overcome by suffering; against whom Hilary says that, even though Christ truly suffered, nevertheless he did not feel pain, that is, he did not succumb to the sufferings. For he does not wish to deny the *sensation* and the *experience* of suffering, but the *force* and the *dominion* of suffering. And that this is the meaning is clear from the *manner of speaking* and from the *sequence of the words* and from the *property of the words*: for *pain* states a relation to the will, according to what Augustine says in the fourteenth book[^p359-7] of *On the City of God*, that «pain is a dissent from those things which happen to us against our will». Since therefore neither the divine will of Christ nor his created will succumbed to the sufferings, therefore Hilary does not concede that Christ felt pain, that is, that he, being unwilling, lay under the sufferings. Hence when he says[^p359-8]: «The power of the body received in itself the force of the punishment raging against it without the sensation of the punishment», etc.; the *power of the body* is called the rational will, ruling over that body; this received the force of the punishment without the sensation of the punishment, that is, without dissent from the punishment, because it willed to suffer. — And this is shown by the *sequence of the following text*. For he proves that that body could not feel pain, because «it could be borne up over the waves». For it is established that the body of Christ was not borne up over the waves by the nature of the body itself, which[^p359-9] was heavy, but by the command of the will. — This same thing is clear by another reason, which he adds: because «the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit, therefore that man had a *body for suffering*, but *did not have a nature for feeling pain*». From the understanding of this reasoning and of the text it is made manifest that what was said before is true. For because that flesh was conceived of the Holy Spirit, therefore it had passibility, not *against* the will, but *from* the will; and this is what he says: «having a *body for suffering*, he suffered», namely from the will; «but *not having a nature* for feeling pain», that is, for suffering against the dissent of the will[^p359-10].

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid text can be expounded in a threefold way, according to the threefold manner of expounding the preceding things[^p360-7]: in one way, so that it is referred to the uncreated Word, of whom Hilary concedes that he could suffer, but not be passible, because, «although he subjected himself to the sufferings, nevertheless he was not changed by suffering[^p360-8]». — In another way it can be expounded, as the Master expounds it, so that by the fact that it is *passible* there is denoted a disposition arising from the *merit of fault*, which Hilary removes from Christ, although in him there was truly suffering. — In a third way it can be expounded, so that by the fact that it is *passible* there is denoted the full subjection of the one suffering[^p360-9] with respect to the suffering; and such was not in Christ, whose mind, reason, and will were borne up above the sufferings. And that this is the meaning is clear through the following text. For he says thus[^p360-10]: «He could suffer, he could not be *passible*, because passibility is the signification of an infirm nature, but suffering is the undergoing of those things which are inflicted». And thus he wishes to attribute to Christ the bearing of suffering and to remove the subjection.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is doubtful concerning this which he says: *Nor can it be that the fear of him should be signified in words, whose confidence is contained in deeds.* For it seems to contradict that which is said in Mark, the fourteenth chapter[^p360-1]: *Jesus began to be afraid and to be weary.* It seems also to contradict the other Saints, who say that he truly feared. It seems also to contradict himself, because he says[^p360-2] that «Christ was sorrowful for the Apostles unto death». If he was sorrowful, why did he not likewise fear?

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary does not intend to remove fear from Christ in so far as *Scripture* and the *Saints* attribute fear to him, but in so far as the *heretics* attributed it, who said that he feared from a defect of security; and such is the fear of faint-heartedness, of which it is undoubtedly true that it was not in Christ. Hence it must be very much attended to that Hilary[^p360-3] does not remove *sorrow* from Christ, but does remove *fear*, because *fear* is wont to arise from a defect of virtue and from faint-heartedness, whereas *sorrow* frequently arises from virtue and piety. — And that this is the meaning is clear from the following proof. For he proves that in Christ there was no *infirmity*, nor was there *faint-heartedness*. There was no *faint-heartedness*, because «he went forth to meet those who were armed»; there was no *infirmity*, because «at his approach the bands of his pursuers, thrown into confusion, fell back with their bodies overturned». Hence he does not exclude *fear*[^p360-4] from Christ, but *fear opposing the will*; and so too *pain*, as is clear to one who looks at the sequence of the text.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is doubtful, thirdly, concerning this which he says in that little note drawn from *On the Synods*: *He could suffer and could not be passible.* For that statement seems to imply a contradiction within itself, because «of that whose is the potency, of it is the act[^p360-5]»: therefore if he was passible, he could suffer; and if he could suffer, he was passible. — Besides, *passible* is nothing other than *able to suffer*: therefore it seems that in the aforesaid statement the same thing is removed from itself[^p360-6].

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says lastly, that *Christ received something from every state of man*; because according to this it seems that Christ was in a fourfold state. But we do not posit that Christ was except in the state of wayfarer and of comprehensor. — Likewise, he seems to say something false when he says that Christ assumed the fullness of grace from the third state: because grace is not perfected except through glory, according to that which the Apostle says in the first epistle to the Corinthians, the thirteenth chapter[^p360-11]: *When that which is perfect shall have come, that which is in part shall be done away:* therefore the fullness of grace was not assumed according to the state of the way, but according to the state of the homeland.

**I respond:** It must be said that that fourfold state is to be reduced to a twofold one. For under the state of the *way* are comprehended three states, namely of *innocence*, of *fallen nature*, and the state *under the law of grace*. But those four states the Master enumerates for the greater explanation of the conditions of the assumed nature itself.

To that which is objected, that the fullness of grace is not had except according to the state of glory, it must be said that there is a fullness of grace either *simply*, or *with respect to meritorious work*: the fullness of grace simply pertains to the state of glory, as the objection has it; but the fullness with respect to meritorious work pertains to the state of the way. And it is of this that the Master understands in his text, as is clearly evident[^p361-1].

---

la: Supra a. I. q. I. ad I. — Mox pro *semota* codd. I L N T U Z aa *remota*.

en: Above, art. I, q. I, reply to 1. — Soon, for *semota* (removed) codices I L N T U Z aa read *remota* (removed).

la: Libr. X. de Trin. n. 23. — Duplex explicatio verbi Hilarii, quae hic affertur, habetur hic in lit. Magistri, c. I. seq., nec non in Comment. a. I. q. I. ad I, vide ibi scholion. — Paulo superius pro *non dolebat*, quod habent codd. U Z bb (N a secunda manu) edd. *non doleat*, codd. H K *patiatur* pro *patiebatur*.

en: Book X of *On the Trinity*, n. 23. — The twofold explanation of Hilary's statement, which is here brought forward, is found here in the text of the Master, c. I and following, as also in the Commentary, art. I, q. I, reply to 1; see the scholion there. — A little above, for *non dolebat* (he was not in pain), which codices U Z bb (N by a second hand) have, the editions read *non doleat* (let him not be in pain); codices H K read *patiatur* (let him suffer) for *patiebatur* (he was suffering).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 347, nota I.

en: Cf. above, p. 347, note 1.

la: Cap. 6. et c. 15. n. 2. — Vide supra pag. 354, nota I.

en: Chapter 6 and chapter 15, n. 2. — See above, p. 354, note 1.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I, ubi etiam Hilarii verba invenies, quibus probationes subnexae innituntur.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. I, where you will also find Hilary's words, on which the proofs subjoined rest.

la: Codd. N U *quia*.

en: Codices N U read *quia* (because).

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 1; B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 10. seq.; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard., III. Sent. d. 15. hic circa lit. — Locis citatis solvuntur etiam duo dubia seqq.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, pt. III, q. 18, member 1; Bl. Albert, *Sentences* III, d. 15, a. 10 and following; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard, *Sentences* III, d. 15, here concerning the text. — At the places cited the two following doubts are also resolved.

la: Vers. 33. — Testimonia Sanctorum de timore Christi habentur supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. I.

en: Verse 33. — The testimonies of the Saints concerning Christ's fear are found above in the text of the Master, d. XV, c. I.

la: Libr. X. de Trin. n. 36. seqq. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro *Videtur etiam* non pauci codd. incongrue *Videtur enim*. Subinde post *sibi ipsi* cod. O subiungit *in fine distinctionis* (scil. d. 15.). Vide supra pag. 345, nota I. Pro *quia dicit* codd. A K bb *qui dicit*, alii codd. *quod dicit*.

en: Book X of *On the Trinity*, n. 36 and following. See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For *Videtur etiam* (it seems also) not a few codices incongruously read *Videtur enim* (for it seems). Then after *sibi ipsi* codex O subjoins *in fine distinctionis* (namely d. 15). See above, p. 345, note 1. For *quia dicit* (because he says) codices A K bb read *qui dicit* (who says), other codices *quod dicit* (which he says).

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I. et 2, ubi et subnexa tanguntur. — Mox pro *pusillanimitate* Vat. perperam *pusillanimitatis*.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. I and 2, where the subjoined matters are also touched on. — Soon, for *pusillanimitate* (faint-heartedness, ablative) the Vatican edition wrongly reads *pusillanimitatis* (of faint-heartedness).

la: Cod. bb *quemcumque [a] Christo timorem*, edd. cum paucis codd. *omnem timorem*. Inferius post *sic etiam* codd. E G I L N T U V X Z aa interserunt *ad*, codd. K H bb *et*.

en: Codex bb reads *quemcumque [a] Christo timorem* (whatever fear from Christ); the editions with a few codices read *omnem timorem* (all fear). Below, after *sic etiam* (so too), codices E G I L N T U V X Z aa insert *ad*, codices K H bb *et*.

la: Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. I.

en: Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, c. I.

la: Edd. *a se ipso*.

en: The editions read *a se ipso* (from its very self).

la: In I. dubio adhibitum. — Edd. cum multis codd. incongrue *exponentium praecedentium*. Nostram lectionem tuentur codd. H (K primitus) M O bb; in cod. A scriptum est *expositivum praecedentia*.

en: Employed in the first doubt. — The editions with many codices incongruously read *exponentium praecedentium*. Our reading is upheld by codices H (K originally) M O bb; in codex A it is written *expositivum praecedentia*.

la: Verba Hilarii sumta sunt ex eius lib. de Synodis, n. 49. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — De expositione seq. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. I. — Paulo inferius et etiam in tertia expositione post *ut per hoc quod* cod. N supplet *dicit*.

en: Hilary's words are taken from his book *On the Synods*, n. 49. See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — On the following exposition cf. here the text of the Master, c. I. — A little below, and also in the third exposition, after *ut per hoc quod* codex N supplies *dicit*.

la: Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. *passibilitatis*.

en: The editions, with one or another codex, read *passibilitatis* (of passibility).

la: Libr. de Synodis, n. 49. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro *infirmae* edd. vitiose *infimae*.

en: The book *On the Synods*, n. 49. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For *infirmae* (infirm) the editions faultily read *infimae* (lowest).

la: Vers. 10.

en: Verse 10.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert, here a. 5; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here concerning the text. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{359,360,361}-{L,R}-*.png`), per the Vol II/III override (PDF authoritative). Raw OCR span 25082→25203. Printed pages **359–361** (PDF 381–383, offset +22); confirmed via running-head TEXT (`DIST. XVI. DUBIA.` p.359; `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` / `360`; `DISTINCTIO XVII.` / `361`).

**Dubia count: 4** — Dub. I, II, III, IV. (Apparatus-count audit's "21 raw footers" estimate over-counted by lumping the d.17 `NOTAE AD SENTENTIARUM` footnotes that begin lower on p.361 — those belong to d.17-littera, not the dubia.)

**Column-flow note.** On the two-column pages the dubia do not read in raw-line order. p.359: left col = end of a2-q3 (skipped) + DUBIA header + Dub. I opener; right col = Dub. I body continues. p.360: **left col = Dub. II (continuing into Dub. III at column foot); right col top = Dub. I's Respondeo tail (the threefold-exposition passage), then Dub. IV.** Reflowed by dubium: Dub. I (full, p.359 R → p.360 R top), Dub. II (p.360 L), Dub. III (p.360 L foot), Dub. IV (p.360 R → p.361 L).

**Page-split / apparatus map (19 entries, per-page restart):**
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**Hand-offs.**
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**No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`) — dubia carry none; the literature is covered by a1-q1's scholion (p.359 ftr 3, held by a2-q3, reads *Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.*).

**[?] flags:** none — 450 dpi bands fully legible.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 17

title_alt: Distinctio XVII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XVII — text of the Master of the Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 361 -->

### DISTINCTIO XVII.

### Cap. I. *Si omnis Christi oratio, vel voluntas impleta sit.*

Post praedicta considerari oportet, utrum Christus aliquid voluerit vel oraverit, quod factum non sit. Hoc enim aestimari potest per id quod ipse ait[^p361-1]: *Pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste. Verumtamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis.* Hic namque voluntatem suam a Patris voluntate discernere videtur.

### Cap. II. *De voluntatibus Christi secundum duas naturas.*

Quocirca ambigendum non est, diversas in Christo fuisse voluntates iuxta duas naturas, divinam scilicet voluntatem et humanam. Et humana voluntas est affectus rationis, vel affectus sensualitatis, et alius est affectus animae secundum rationem, alius secundum sensualitatem; uterque tamen dicitur humana voluntas. Affectu autem rationis id volebat, quod voluntate divina, scilicet pati et mori, sed affectu sensualitatis non volebat, immo refugiebat. Nec tamen in eo caro contra spiritum, vel contra Deum concupiscebat, quia, ut ait Augustinus[^p361-2], «nonnullum est vitium, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum». «Caro autem dicta est concupiscere, quia hoc secundum ipsam agit anima, sicut anima per aurem audit et per oculum videt. Caro enim nihil nisi per animam concupiscit; sed concupiscere dicitur, cum anima carnali concupiscentia spiritui reluctatur, habens carnalem delectationem de carne et a carne adversus delectationem, quam spiritus habet. Ipsius autem carnalis concupiscentiae causa non est in anima sola nec in carne sola; ex utroque enim fit, quia sine utroque delectatio talis non sentitur». Talis igitur rixa talisque concertatio in anima Christi nullatenus esse potuit, quia carnalis concupiscentia ibi esse nequivit. Dei etiam voluntas erat et rationi placebat, ut id secundum carnem vellet, quatenus veritas humanitatis in eo probaretur. Nam qui hominis naturam suscepit quae ipsius sunt subire debuit. Ideoque sicut in nobis duplex est affectus, mentis scilicet et sensualitatis, ita et in eo debuit esse geminus affectus, ut mentis affectu vellet mori, et sensualitatis affectu nollet, sicut in viris sanctis fit. Petro enim ipsa Veritas dicit[^p361-3]: *Cum senueris, extendes manus tuas, et alius cinget te et ducet, quo non tu vis,* scilicet ad mortem. Quod exponens Augustinus dicit, quod Petrus «ad illam molestiam nolens est ductus, nolens ad eam venit, sed volens eam vicit; et reliquit affectum infirmitatis, quo nemo vult mori, qui adeo est naturalis, ut eum Petro nec senectus abstulerit. Unde etiam Dominus ait: *Transeat a me calix iste*; sed vicit eum vis amoris». Ergo et in Christo secundum humanitatem et in membris eius geminus est affectus: unus rationis, caritate informatus, quo propter Deum quis mori vult; alter sensualitatis, carnis infirmitati propinquus et ei[^p361-4] coniunctus, quo mors refugitur. Ut enim ait Augustinus[^p361-5]: «Pius mentis ratione cupit dissolvi et esse cum Christo, sensu autem carnis refugit et recusat. Hoc habet humanus affectus, quoniam diligit vitam, odit mortem». Secundum istum affectum Christus mori noluit, nec obtinuit quod secundum istum affectum petiit.

Ex affectu igitur humano, quem de Virgine traxit, volebat non mori et calicem transire orabat. Unde Beda[^p361-6]: «Orat, transire calicem, quia homo erat, dicens: *Pater, si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste.* Ecce, habes voluntatem humanam expressam. Vide iam rectum cor: *Sed non quod ego volo, sed quod tu vis.* Unde alibi: *Non veni facere voluntatem meam,* quam, scilicet temporaliter, sumsi de Virgine, *sed voluntatem eius qui misit me,* quam scilicet aeternus habui cum Patre». — Hic aperte dicit, duas in Christo fuisse voluntates, secundum quas diversa voluit. Hieronymus[^p361-7] quoque super illum locum: *Spiritus promptus est, caro autem infirma,* dans intelligi, hic duas voluntates exprimi, ait ita: «Hoc contra Eutychianos, qui dicunt in Christo unam tantum voluntatem. Hic autem ostendit humanam, quae propter infirmitatem carnis recusat passionem, et divinam, quae prompta est perficere

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dispensationem». Augustinus[^p362-1] etiam duas in Christo asserit voluntates, dicens: «Quantum distat Deus ab homine, tantum voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis. Unde hominem gerens Christus ostendit privatam quandam hominis voluntatem, in qua et suam et nostram figuravit, qui caput nostrum est, et ad eum sicut membra pertinemus. *Pater,* inquit, *si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste.* Haec humana voluntas erat, proprium aliquid et tanquam privatum volens. Sed quia rectum vult esse hominem et ad Deum dirigi, subdit: *Non quod ego volo, sed quod tu* vis; ac si diceret: Vide te in me, quia potes aliquid proprium velle, ut Deus aliud velit. Conceditur hoc humanae fragilitati». Idem alibi[^p362-2]: Christus in passione duas expressit voluntates in se secundum duas naturas; ait enim: *Pater, si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste.* Ecce, habes hominis voluntatem, quam ad divinam continuo dirigens, ait: *Verumtamen, non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu.* Ambrosius etiam in libro secundo de Fide[^p362-3]: «Scriptum est: *Pater, si fieri potest, transfer a me calicem hunc.* Verba Christi sunt, sed quo modo et in qua forma dicantur, adverte: hominis substantiam gerit, hominis assumsit affectum. Non ergo quasi Deus, sed quasi homo loquitur». «Suscepit quidem voluntatem meam. *Mea* est voluntas, quam suam dixit, cum ait: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu* vis». «Cum autem dixit: *Omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt,* quia nihil excipitur, sine dubio, quam Pater habet, eandem et Filius habet voluntatem[^p362-4]». «Eadem est Christi voluntas, quae paterna». «Una ergo voluntas est Patris et Filii». «Sed alia voluntas hominis, alia Dei, ut scias, vitam in voluntate hominis esse, passionem autem Christi in voluntate divina, ut pateretur pro nobis». — His testimoniis evidenter docetur, in Christo duas fuisse voluntates; quod quia negavit Macarius archiepiscopus, in Metropolitana[^p362-5] Synodo condemnatus est. Et ex affectu humano sensualitatis quidem, non rationis, illud voluit et petiit, quod non impetravit. Nec ideo petiit, ut impetraret, quia sciebat, Deum non esse facturum illud; nec illud fieri volebat affectu rationis, vel voluntate Divinitatis. Ad quid ergo petiit? Ut membris formam praeberet, imminente turbatione, clamandi ad Dominum et subiiciendi voluntatem suam divinae voluntati, ut, si pulsante molestia tristantur[^p362-6], pro eiusdem amotione orent; sed si nequeunt vitare, dicant quod ipse Christus. Non ergo ad insipientiam fuit, quod Christus clamans non auditur ad salutem corporalem. Bonum quidem petiit, scilicet ut non moreretur, sed melius erat, ut moreretur; quod et factum est.

### Cap. III. *De capitulis quibusdam Ambrosii et Hilarii, ubi de dubitatione et timore Christi agitur.*

Ceterum non parum nos movent verba Ambrosii, quibus significare videtur, Christum secundum humanum affectum de potentia Patris dubitasse, sic dicens in libro secundo de Fide[^p362-7]: «De quo dubitat? de se, an de Patre? De eo utique, cui dicit: *Transfer,* dubitat hominis affectu. Nam Deus de Patre non dubitat nec de morte formidat. Propheta etiam non dubitat, qui nihil Deo esse impossibile asserit. Num infra homines constitues Deum? Propheta non dubitat, et Filium dubitare tu credis? Ut homo ergo dubitat, ut homo locutus est». — His verbis innui videtur, quod Christus, non in quantum Deus est vel Dei Filius, sed in quantum homo, dubitaverit affectu humano. Quod ea ratione dictum accipi potest, non quia ipse dubitaverit, sed quia modum gessit dubitantis et hominibus dubitare videbatur.

Illud etiam ignorandum non est, quod Hilarius asserere videtur, Christum non sibi, sed suis orasse, cum dixit: *Transfer a me calicem hunc,* sicut nec sibi, sed suis timuit; nec eum voluisse, ut sibi non esset passio, sed ut a suis transiret calix passionis, ita inquiens[^p362-8]: «Si passio honorificatura eum erat, sicut, Iuda exeunte, ait: *Nunc honorificatus est Filius hominis;* quomodo tristem eum metus passionis effecerat? Nisi forte tam irrationabilis fuerit, ut pati mortem timuerit, quae patientem se glorificatura esset? Sed forte timuisse usque eo existimabitur, ut transferri a se calicem deprecatus sit dicens: *Pater, transfer calicem hunc a me.* Quomodo enim per patiendi metum transferri deprecaretur a se quod per dispensationis studium festinaret implere? Non enim convenit, ut pati nolit quod pati velit; et cum pati eum velle cognosceres, religiosius fuerat hoc confiteri, quam ad id impiae stultitiae prorumpere, ut cum assereres, ne pateretur, orasse, quem pati velle cognosceres». «Non ergo sibi tristis, neque sibi orat transire calicem, sed discipulis, ne in eos calix passionis incumbat, quem

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a se transire orat, ne in his scilicet maneat[^p363-1]». «Non enim rogat, ne secum sit, sed ut a se transeat. Deinde ait: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis.* Humanae in se sollicitudinis significans consortium, sed non discernens sententiam sibi communis cum Patre voluntatis». «Pro hominibus ergo vult transire calicem, per quem omnes tentandi discipuli erant; et ideo pro Petro rogatur, ne deficiat fides eius». «Sciens igitur, haec omnia post mortem suam desitura, usque ad mortem tristis est, et scit, hunc calicem non posse transire, nisi biberit; ideo ait: *Pater mi, si non potest transire calix iste, nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua,* sciens, consummata in se passione, metum calicis transiturum, qui, nisi eum bibisset, transire non posset, nec finis terroris, nisi consummata passione, terrori succederet, quia post mortem eius per virtutum gloriam apostolicae infirmitatis scandalum pelleretur». — Intende, lector, his verbis pia diligentia, ne sint tibi vasa mortis.

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### DISTINCTION XVII.

### Chap. I. *Whether every prayer or will of Christ was fulfilled.*

After the foregoing it must be considered whether Christ willed or prayed for anything which was not done. For this can be estimated from what he himself says[^p361-1]: *Father, if it is possible, let this chalice pass from me. Yet not as I will, but as thou wilt.* For here he seems to distinguish his own will from the will of the Father.

### Chap. II. *On the wills of Christ according to the two natures.*

Wherefore it must not be doubted that there were diverse wills in Christ according to the two natures, namely the divine will and the human. And the human will is an affect of reason, or an affect of sensuality, and one is an affect of the soul according to reason, another according to sensuality; yet each is called the human will. Now by the affect of reason he willed that which [he willed] by the divine will, namely to suffer and to die, but by the affect of sensuality he did not will it, nay he shrank from it. Yet there was not in him flesh against spirit, or [lust] against God, because, as Augustine says[^p361-2], «there is some vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit». «But the flesh is said to lust, because according to it the soul does this, just as the soul hears through the ear and sees through the eye. For the flesh lusts nothing except through the soul; but it is said to lust, when the soul by carnal concupiscence struggles against the spirit, having a carnal delight from the flesh and from the flesh against the delight which the spirit has. But the cause of this carnal concupiscence is not in the soul alone nor in the flesh alone; for it arises from both, since without both such delight is not felt». Such strife, therefore, and such conflict could in no way be in the soul of Christ, because carnal concupiscence could not be there. The will of God also it was, and it was pleasing to reason, that he should will this according to the flesh, so that the truth of [his] humanity might be proved in him. For he who took up the nature of man had to undergo what belongs to it. And therefore, just as in us there is a twofold affect, namely of the mind and of sensuality, so also in him there had to be a twin affect, that by the affect of the mind he should will to die, and by the affect of sensuality should not will it, as happens in holy men. For to Peter the Truth itself says[^p361-3]: *When thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee and lead thee whither thou wilt not,* namely to death. Expounding which, Augustine says, that Peter «was led to that trouble unwilling, came to it unwilling, but willing he overcame it; and he left behind the affect of weakness, by which no one wishes to die, which is so natural that not even old age took it away from Peter. Whence the Lord also says: *Let this chalice pass from me*; but the force of love overcame it». Therefore also in Christ according to [his] humanity and in his members there is a twin affect: one of reason, informed by charity, by which one wishes to die for the sake of God; the other of sensuality, near to[^p361-4] and conjoined with the weakness of the flesh, by which death is shunned. For as Augustine says[^p361-5]: «The pious man by the reason of the mind desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ, but by the sense of the flesh shrinks back and refuses. This the human affect has, because it loves life, hates death». According to this affect Christ did not will to die, nor did he obtain what according to this affect he sought.

Therefore from the human affect, which he drew from the Virgin, he willed not to die and prayed that the chalice might pass. Whence Bede[^p361-6]: «He prays that the chalice pass, because he was man, saying: *Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me.* Behold, you have the human will expressed. See now the upright heart: *But not what I will, but what thou wilt.* Whence elsewhere: *I came not to do my own will,* which, namely temporally, I took from the Virgin, *but the will of him who sent me,* which namely as eternal I had with the Father». — Here he plainly says that there were two wills in Christ, according to which he willed diverse things. Jerome[^p361-7] also, on that passage: *The spirit is willing, but the flesh weak,* giving to understand that here two wills are expressed, says thus: «This is against the Eutychians, who say that in Christ there is only one will. But here he shows the human [will], which on account of the weakness of the flesh refuses the passion, and the divine, which is ready to fulfill

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the dispensation». Augustine[^p362-1] also asserts that there were two wills in Christ, saying: «As far as God is distant from man, so far is the will of God from the will of man. Whence bearing [the person of] man, Christ showed a certain private will of man, in which he figured both his own and ours, who is our head, and to whom we belong as members. *Father,* he says, *if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me.* This was the human will, willing something proper and as it were private. But because he wills man to be upright and to be directed toward God, he adds: *Not what I will, but what thou* wilt; as if he were to say: See yourself in me, for you can will something proper, while God wills another thing. This is conceded to human frailty». The same elsewhere[^p362-2]: Christ in the passion expressed two wills in himself according to the two natures; for he says: *Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me.* Behold, you have the will of the man, which, directing it at once to the divine, he says: *Yet, not as I will, but as thou.* Ambrose also in the second book On Faith[^p362-3]: «It is written: *Father, if it be possible, transfer this chalice from me.* They are the words of Christ, but in what manner and in what form they are said, attend: he bears the substance of man, he took up the affect of man. Therefore he speaks not as God, but as man». «He took up indeed my will. *Mine* is the will, which he called his own, when he said: *Not as I will, but as thou* wilt». «But when he said: *All things that the Father has are mine,* since nothing is excepted, without doubt, the same will which the Father has the Son also has[^p362-4]». «The will of Christ is the same as the Father's». «There is therefore one will of the Father and of the Son». «But one will is the man's, another God's, that you may know that life is in the will of the man, but the passion of Christ in the divine will, that he might suffer for us». — By these testimonies it is evidently taught that there were two wills in Christ; and because Macarius the archbishop denied this, he was condemned in the Metropolitan[^p362-5] Synod. And from the human affect of sensuality indeed, not of reason, he willed and sought that which he did not obtain. Nor did he seek it in order to obtain it, because he knew that God would not do it; nor did he will it to be done by the affect of reason, or by the will of the Divinity. For what, then, did he seek it? That he might offer a form to [his] members, that, with trouble pressing on, of crying to the Lord and of subjecting their will to the divine will, so that, if when trouble strikes they are saddened[^p362-6], they may pray for its removal; but if they cannot avoid it, they may say what Christ himself [said]. It was not, therefore, for foolishness that Christ crying out is not heard unto bodily safety. He sought indeed a good thing, namely that he might not die, but it was better that he should die; which also was done.

### Chap. III. *On certain chapters of Ambrose and Hilary, where there is treatment of the doubting and fear of Christ.*

But the words of Ambrose move us not a little, by which he seems to signify that Christ according to the human affect doubted of the power of the Father, saying thus in the second book On Faith[^p362-7]: «Of whom does he doubt? of himself, or of the Father? Of him surely, to whom he says: *Transfer,* he doubts by the affect of man. For God does not doubt of the Father nor fear death. The Prophet also does not doubt, who asserts that nothing is impossible to God. Will you set God below men? The Prophet does not doubt, and do you believe the Son to doubt? As man therefore he doubts, as man he spoke». — By these words it seems to be intimated that Christ, not insofar as he is God or the Son of God, but insofar as he is man, doubted by a human affect. Which can be understood as said for this reason, not because he himself doubted, but because he bore the manner of one doubting and seemed to men to doubt.

This too must not be ignored, that Hilary seems to assert that Christ prayed not for himself, but for his own, when he said: *Transfer this chalice from me,* just as neither for himself, but for his own did he fear; nor did he wish that for himself there should be no passion, but that the chalice of passion might pass from his own, saying thus[^p362-8]: «If the passion was going to honor him, as, when Judas went out, he says: *Now is the Son of man glorified;* how had the fear of the passion made him sad? Unless perhaps he was so irrational as to fear to suffer death, which was going to glorify him who suffered? But perhaps it will be supposed that he so far feared, that he prayed that the chalice might be transferred from him, saying: *Father, transfer this chalice from me.* For how through fear of suffering would he pray that there be transferred from him what through zeal for the dispensation he was hastening to fulfill? For it is not fitting that he should be unwilling to suffer what he wills to suffer; and when you knew that he willed to suffer, it had been more religious to confess this than to break out into that impious folly, so that, when you would assert that he prayed not to suffer, [you assert it of him] whom you knew to will to suffer». «Not for himself therefore is he sad, nor for himself does he pray that the chalice pass, but for the disciples, that the chalice of passion may not fall upon them, which

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he prays may pass from him, that is, that it may not remain in these[^p363-1]». «For he does not pray that it be not with him, but that it pass from him. Then he says: *Not as I will, but as thou wilt.* Signifying a fellowship of human solicitude in himself, but not distinguishing a judgment of the will common to himself with the Father». «For men, therefore, he wills the chalice to pass, by which all the disciples were to be tempted; and therefore for Peter he is prayed for, that his faith may not fail». «Knowing, therefore, that all these things were to cease after his death, he is sad even unto death, and knows that this chalice cannot pass unless he drink it; therefore he says: *My Father, if this chalice cannot pass unless I drink it, thy will be done,* knowing that, the passion being consummated in himself, the fear of the chalice would pass, which, unless he had drunk it, could not pass, nor would the end of terror succeed the terror, unless the passion were consummated, because after his death, through the glory of [his] virtues, the scandal of the apostolic weakness would be driven away». — Attend, reader, to these words with pious diligence, lest they be to you vessels of death.

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la: Matth. 26, 39. — Cfr. de hac dist. Hugo de S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. I. c. 17. — Pro *aestimari* solummodo Vat. et ed. 8 bene *existimari*.

en: Matthew 26:39. — Compare on this distinction Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. I, c. 17. — For *aestimari* only the Vatican edition and edition 8 [read], well, *existimari*.

la: Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 3, ubi locus Scripturae est Gal. 5, 17. Seq. locus ex locis eiusdem, X. de Genesi ad lit. c. 12. n. 20. 21, et de Continentia, c. 8. n. 19, collectus, legitur sic in Glossa *ordinaria* ad Gal. 5, 17. — Immediate ante cod. D post *contra spiritum* addit *vel spiritus contra carnem*.

en: Book XIX *On the City of God*, c. 4, n. 3, where the Scripture passage is Galatians 5:17. The following passage, collected from passages of the same [author], *On Genesis according to the Letter* X, c. 12, nn. 20, 21, and *On Continence*, c. 8, n. 19, is read thus in the *ordinary* Gloss on Galatians 5:17. — Immediately before, codex D after *contra spiritum* adds *vel spiritus contra carnem*.

la: Ioan. 21, 18, quem locum continuo exponit S. August., tr. 123. n. 5, et est etiam in Glossa ibid. Locus Scripturae est Matth. 26, 39.

en: John 21:18, which passage Saint Augustine expounds at length, *Tractate* 123, n. 5, and it is also in the Gloss there. The Scripture passage is Matthew 26:39.

la: Codd. DG et edd. 1, 8 *ideo ei*.

en: Codices DG and editions 1, 8 [read] *ideo ei*.

la: Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 6. n. 16. Locus Scripturae est Phil. 1, 23. Pro *Pius*, quod habent codd. BCD et ed. 1 cum originali (*homo pius*), in aliis *Paulus*. Deinde post *quoniam* Vat. cum codd. AE addit *qui*.

en: Letter 140 (alias 120), c. 6, n. 16. The Scripture passage is Philippians 1:23. For *Pius*, which codices BCD and edition 1 have with the original (*homo pius*), in others *Paulus*. Then after *quoniam* the Vatican edition with codices AE adds *qui*.

la: Comment. in Marc. 14, 36, et in Glossa ibid. Locus alter Scripturae est Ioan. 6, 38. — Pro *homo erat, dicens* edd. 1, 6 *homo est, dicens*, ed. 8 *homo est Deus*.

en: *Commentary on Mark* 14, 36, and in the Gloss there. The other Scripture passage is John 6:38. — For *homo erat, dicens* editions 1, 6 [read] *homo est, dicens*, edition 8 *homo est Deus*.

la: Apud Hieronymum non invenitur, sed haec verba sunt ex Beda, ad hunc locum (Marc. 14, 38.), collecta et praecise inveniuntur in Glossa ibid.

en: It is not found in Jerome, but these words are from Bede, on this passage (Mark 14:38), collected, and are found precisely in the Gloss there.

la: Enarrat. II. serm. 1. in Ps. 32. (v. 1.) n. 2, in quo textu pro *qui caput* cod. E et ed. 8 cum originali *quia caput*. — Locus Scripturae est Matth. 26, 39. Cfr. I. Sent. d. XLVIII. c. 1, et ibi Comment. S. Bonaventurae.

en: *Enarration* II, sermon 1, on Psalm 32 (v. 1), n. 2, in which text for *qui caput* codex E and edition 8 with the original [read] *quia caput*. — The Scripture passage is Matthew 26:39. Compare I Sent., d. XLVIII, c. 1, and there the Commentary of St. Bonaventure.

la: Verbotenus apud Petrum Lomb. in Glossa ad Ps. 93, 15, excerpta ex August. Enarrat. in illum locum n. 19. — In fine loci Scripturae iam citati post *sicut tu* codd. AD et edd. 1, 8 addunt *vis*.

en: Word for word in Peter Lombard in the Gloss on Psalm 93:15, excerpted from Augustine's *Enarration* on that passage, n. 19. — At the end of the Scripture passage already cited, after *sicut tu* codices AD and editions 1, 8 add *vis*.

la: Cap. 5. n. 41. 42. Seq. locus est ibid. c. 7. n. 53 cum locis Scripturae iam citatis.

en: Chapter 5, nn. 41, 42. The following passage is there, c. 7, n. 53, with the Scripture passages already cited.

la: Ibid. c. 6. n. 51. Locus Scripturae est Ioan. 16, 15. Seq. locus ibid. parum superius; tertius ibid. n. 50; ultimus ibid. c. 7. n. 52.

en: Ibid., c. 6, n. 51. The Scripture passage is John 16:15. The following passage is there a little above; the third there, n. 50; the last there, c. 7, n. 52.

la: Ita codd. et edd. 1, 3, 7; in Vat. et aliis *Archiepiscopus Antiochiae in Constantinopolitana Synodo*. Lectio codd. confirmatur ab Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. I., c. 17. De Macario, patriarcha Antiocheno, cfr. Anastasius Biblioth., de Vitis Roman. Pontif. n. 81 (S. Agathonis). Quod sequitur convenit cum Comment. Petri Lombardi in Ps. 21, 6.

en: So the codices and editions 1, 3, 7; in the Vatican edition and others *Archbishop of Antioch in the Synod of Constantinople*. The reading of the codices is confirmed by Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. I, c. 17. On Macarius, patriarch of Antioch, compare Anastasius the Librarian, *On the Lives of the Roman Pontiffs* n. 81 (of St. Agatho). What follows agrees with the Commentary of Peter Lombard on Psalm 21:6.

la: Cod. E et edd. 1, 8 *turbantur*, cod. C *contristantur*.

en: Codex E and editions 1, 8 [read] *turbantur*, codex C *contristantur*.

la: Cap. 5. n. 43. 42. Codd. et ed. 1 citant III. libr. de Trinitate. Post *asserit* Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 2, 3, 7, addit *Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit* [Ps. 113, 3.]. Sed falso; nam Ambrosius respicit ad Iob 22, 17, qui locus apud ipsum legitur: *Impossibile enim tibi nihil est.* Vulgata: *Quasi nihil posset facere Omnipotens, aestimabant eum*.

en: Chapter 5, nn. 43, 42. The codices and edition 1 cite the third book *On the Trinity*. After *asserit* the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 2, 3, 7, adds *All things whatsoever he willed, he did* [Ps. 113:3]. But falsely; for Ambrose refers to Job 22:17, which passage in him is read: *For nothing is impossible to thee.* The Vulgate: *They esteemed him as though the Almighty could do nothing*.

la: Libr. X. de Trin. n. 29. 30, ubi respicitur Ioan. 13, 31. In quo textu post *ut pati* originale et codd., exceptis B E et Erf., omittunt *mortem*, insuper edd. 1, 8 omittunt *pati*, refragante etiam originali. Infra pro *ut pati nolit quod pati velit* originale in ed. Maurina: *ut pati nollet qui pati vellet*; sed ibi additur: «In prius vulgatis: *ut pati nolit quod pati velit*, quod immutamus potiorum mss. auctoritate». Nos autem secuti sumus nostros codd. Vat. cum pluribus edd. *nolit qui pati venit*.

en: Book X *On the Trinity* nn. 29, 30, where John 13:31 is referred to. In which text after *ut pati* the original and the codices, except B, E, and Erfurt, omit *mortem*, moreover editions 1, 8 omit *pati*, the original also resisting. Below, for *ut pati nolit quod pati velit* the original in the Maurine edition [reads]: *ut pati nollet qui pati vellet*; but there is added: «In the earlier vulgate [editions]: *ut pati nolit quod pati velit*, which we change on the authority of the better manuscripts». But we have followed our codices [and] the Vatican edition with several editions [reading] *nolit qui pati venit*.

la: Ibid. n. 37. Seq. locus ibid. paulo superius; tertius ibid. n. 38; ultimus ibid. n. 39. — Pro *ideo pro Petro rogatur,* cod. E cum pluribus edd. *rogat*, refragante etiam originali; respicitur ibi Luc. 22, 32. In fine pro *vasa mortis* edd. 1, 8 *causa mortis*.

en: Ibid., n. 37. The following passage is there a little above; the third there, n. 38; the last there, n. 39. — For *ideo pro Petro rogatur,* codex E with several editions [reads] *rogat*, the original also resisting; Luke 22:32 is referred to there. At the end, for *vasa mortis* editions 1, 8 [read] *causa mortis*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{361,362,363}-{L,R}-*.png`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 25210–25361). This is the *littera Magistri* — Peter Lombard's text for Distinction XVII (Cap. I–III), the opening of which is printed at the head of the distinction; it is a distinct Tier-2 unit from Bonaventure's commentary (the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII / DIVISIO TEXTUS chunk, `bon-sent-III-d17-divisio`, which begins at raw 25362 on printed p.363).

**Caps.** Cap. I (*Si omnis Christi oratio…*) → Cap. II (*De voluntatibus Christi secundum duas naturas*) → Cap. III (*De capitulis quibusdam Ambrosii et Hilarii…*). The marginal references in the printed text (`Determinatio…`, `Augustinus`, `Ambrosius`, `Macarius`, `Beda`, `Hieronymus`, `Confirmatur Sanctorum verbis`, `Specialis explanatio quaestionis sec. Hilarium`, and the `Dubium 1–4` keys that signpost the dubia Bonaventure raises in his commentary) are editorial running marginalia and have been trimmed from the body per project convention.

**Page-split map.** Cap. I + Cap. II open on **p.361 L** (below the d.16 dubia tail and the `DISTINCTIO XVII.` header) and run through both columns; Cap. II concludes and Cap. III opens on **p.362 R**; Cap. III concludes on **p.363** top (L + R) immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.`. Page breaks placed at the running-head transitions. Apparatus per-page restart: **p.361 → [^p361-1..7]** (the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` sequence, notes 1–3 in the L footer, 3-continuation + 4–7 in the R footer); **p.362 → [^p362-1..8]** (notes 1–5 in the L footer, 5-continuation + 6–8 in the R footer); **p.363 → [^p363-1]** (the single `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` note 1 in the L footer, above the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block which belongs to the divisio chunk).

**Hand-offs picked up: NONE.** The d.16→d.17 seam is clean — the d.16 dubia owned its share of the p.361 footer (`Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 5…`, under `NOTAE AD SENTENTIARUM`); this littera's apparatus starts fresh under the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` header on the same page. No forwarded footer was carried in.

**Hand-off forwarded to `bon-sent-III-d17-divisio`:** the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII (DIVISIO TEXTUS → TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM → ART. I QUAEST. I) begins at **raw line 25362** on printed **p.363** (running head `DIST. XVII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`). The COMMENTARIUS apparatus is keyed under `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` in the p.363 footer (note 1: `Codd. Z bb (K a secunda manu) et edd. 1, 2 adiungunt dist. 18…`) — that block is the divisio chunk's, not the littera's. The seam is clean: the littera ends at `…ne sint tibi vasa mortis.` (Cap. III) and `[^p363-1]` is the littera's last footer; everything from `COMMENTARIUS` onward migrates to the divisio.

**[?] flags: NONE.** The 450 dpi column bands were fully legible across all three pages.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XVII — De voluntate et oratione Christi

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XVII — On the will and prayer of Christ

source_text:
<!-- page 363 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.
### *De voluntate et oratione Christi.*

*Post praedicta considerari oportet etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de natura assumta quantum ad conditiones naturae et quantum ad plenitudinem gratiae et quantum ad defectum passibilitatis. Hic incipit quarta pars, in qua agit quantum ad usum virtutis. Et quoniam usus virtutis comparationem habet ad voluntatem, a qua egreditur, et ad praemium, quod meretur; ideo pars ista habet duas partes. In prima determinat de voluntate Christi. In secunda determinat de merito, ibi[^p363-c1]: *De merito etiam praetermittendum non est.* Et quoniam affectus voluntatis dignoscitur per petitionem orationis; ideo Magister simul determinat de voluntate Christi et de oratione Christi.

Dividitur autem pars ista in partes tres. In quarum prima movet dubitationem. In secunda eam determinat iuxta viam Sanctorum communem, ibi: *Quocirca ambigendum non est, diversas in Christo* etc. In tertia vero adhuc diligentius quaestionem propositam[^p363-2] explanat iuxta expositionem Hilarii specialem, ibi: *Illud etiam ignorandum non est, quod Hilarius* etc. Prima et ultima parte remanentibus indivisis, media dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima quaestionem praepositam determinat. In secunda vero determinationem suam auctoritatibus Sanctorum confirmat, ibi: *Ex affectu igitur[^p363-3] humano, quem de Virgine traxit.* In tertia vero quandam auctoritatem dubiam Ambrosii manifestat, ibi: *Ceterum non parum nos movent verba ipsius Ambrosii* etc. Subdivisiones autem partium manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Et primo quaeritur de voluntate Christi.

Secundo vero quaeritur de oratione Christi.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerint plures voluntates.

Secundo vero quaeritur de earum numero et sufficientia.

Tertio quaeritur de illarum voluntatum concordia vel controversia.

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII.
### *On the will and prayer of Christ.*

*After the foregoing, it must be considered etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the assumed nature with respect to the conditions of [its] nature, and with respect to the fullness of grace, and with respect to the defect of passibility. Here begins the fourth part, in which he treats with respect to the use of virtue. And because the use of virtue has a relation to the will, from which it proceeds, and to the reward, which it merits; therefore this part has two parts. In the first he determines concerning the will of Christ. In the second he determines concerning merit, there[^p363-c1]: *Of merit also it must not be passed over.* And because the affection of the will is discerned through the petition of prayer; therefore the Master at the same time determines concerning the will of Christ and the prayer of Christ.

Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he raises a doubt. In the second he determines it according to the common way of the Saints, there: *Wherefore it is not to be doubted that the diverse [wills] in Christ* etc. In the third, however, he explains the proposed question[^p363-2] still more diligently according to the special exposition of Hilary, there: *This also must not be left unknown, that Hilary* etc. The first and last parts remaining undivided, the middle one is divided into three parts. In the first of these he determines the proposed question. In the second he confirms his determination by the authorities of the Saints, there: *From human affection, therefore,[^p363-3] which he drew from the Virgin.* In the third, however, he clears up a certain doubtful authority of Ambrose, there: *But the words of Ambrose himself move us not a little* etc. The subdivisions of the parts, moreover, are manifest in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part there falls in here a question concerning two things.

And first it is asked concerning the will of Christ.

Second, however, it is asked concerning the prayer of Christ.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether in Christ there were several wills.

Second, however, it is asked concerning their number and sufficiency.

Third it is asked concerning the concord or controversy of those wills.

la: Codd. Z bb (K a secunda manu) et edd. 1, 2 adiungunt dist. 18. Paulo inferius pro *simul,* quod edd. omittunt, cod. A similiter.

en: Codices Z, bb (K by a second hand) and editions 1, 2 add "dist. 18." A little below, for *simul* ("at the same time"), which the editions omit, codex A likewise [omits].

la: Edd. *dubitationem motam.* Paulo inferius pro *parte* edd. exhibent *partibus* et deinde vocem *quaestionem* mutaverunt in *dubitationem.*

en: The editions [read] *dubitationem motam* ("the doubt raised"). A little below, for *parte* the editions present *partibus,* and then they changed the word *quaestionem* ("question") to *dubitationem* ("doubt").

la: Pro *igitur* codd. *Christi,* et pro *traxit* non pauci codd. *attraxit*; sed vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: For *igitur* ("therefore") the codices [read] *Christi,* and for *traxit* ("he drew") not a few codices [read] *attraxit* ("he drew to himself"); but see here the text of the Master, c. 2.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p363-{L,R}-*.png` (read L top→bottom then R, body then footers). Printed **p.363**, pdf **385** (offset pdf = printed + 22). Raw OCR span **25362→25392** (COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII header → end of TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM listing); the ARTICULUS I opener at raw 25393 and the QUAESTIO I body fold into `bon-sent-III-d17-a1-q1` per the Vol II/III chunking convention. The running head on p.363 is `DIST. XVII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` `has_scholion: false` (divisio carries none).

**Page-split map.** The entire divisio (COMMENTARIUS lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM) sits on a single printed page, **p.363** (both columns, below the d.17 littera Cap. III tail at top of L/R). Printed p.364 begins at raw 25412 with the QUAESTIO I (a1-q1) body, which is the next chunk. Apparatus per-page restart: this chunk owns p.363 **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note 1** (`[^p363-c1]`) and **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM notes 2–3** (`[^p363-2]`, `[^p363-3]`); LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note 1 (`[^p363-1]`, *Ibid. n. 37…*) belongs to the preceding littera (already captured there); LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note 4 (`Vers. 38: Quia descendi de caelo…`) annotates the QUAESTIO I opening fundamentum and migrates forward to a1-q1.

**Footer-block disambiguation.** p.363 carries two distinct footer sequences. The DIVISIO TEXTUS body markers map across both: `ibi¹` (on *De merito*) → COMMENTARIUM note 1 (`Codd. Z bb… dist. 18`, whose *"Paulo inferius pro simul"* tracks `Magister simul determinat`); `propositam²` → LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note 2 (whose *parte/partibus/quaestionem→dubitationem* variants track the *partes tres / quaestionem praepositam* clause); `igitur³` (on *Ex affectu igitur humano, quem de Virgine traxit*) → LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note 3 (whose *igitur→Christi, traxit→attraxit* variants track that exact phrase). Verified eyes-on against the 450 dpi L-2/R-2 footer bands.

**Question counts (verified for next dispatches).** TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM lists exactly two articles, three questions each — matching the d.17 skeleton set (a1-q1/q2/q3, a2-q1/q2/q3), no missing/extra skeleton. **ART. I — De voluntate Christi** (raw 25393 *ARTICULUS I.*; per-article listing "Circa primum quaeruntur tria"): q1 *Utrum in Christo fuerint plures voluntates* (raw 25396); q2 *De numero et sufficientia voluntatum in Christo* (raw 25538); q3 *De illarum voluntatum concordia vel controversia* (raw 25660). **ART. II — De oratione Christi** (raw 25867 *ARTICULUS II.*; per-article listing "circa hoc quaeruntur tria"): q1 *Utrum decuerit Christum orare* (raw 25879); q2 *Utrum Christus in omni oratione sua fuerit exauditus* (raw 26041); q3 *Utrum illa oratio, qua oravit in passione, fuerit sensualitatis, aut rationis* (raw 26129).

**Hand-offs picked up.** From d17-littera: the p.363 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note 1 block (`Codd. Z bb… dist. 18`), now `[^p363-c1]`. The littera's `[^p363-1]` (LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note 1) stays with the littera; no footer migrated INTO the divisio from the littera body.

**Hand-off forwarded to `bon-sent-III-d17-a1-q1`:** ART. I QUAESTIO I begins at **raw line 25396** (`QUAESTIO I.` / *Utrum in Christo fuerint plures voluntates*). Per the chunking convention the short ARTICULUS I opener (raw 25393 `ARTICULUS I. — De voluntate Christi.`, with no per-article preamble beyond the *Circa primum quaeruntur tria* line already held in this divisio's TRACTATIO) folds into a1-q1. The QUAESTIO I body opens `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas. Et quod sic, videtur.` (raw 25399, printed p.363 R column bottom — the question STARTS on p.363 and continues onto p.364 at raw 25412). **Migrating footers into a1-q1:** p.363 **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note 4** (`Vers. 38: Quia descendi de caelo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam etc. — Plurimi codd. allegant Matth. 5, ubi v. 17 legitur: Nolite putare, quoniam veni solvere Legem etc. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.`) annotates the QUAESTIO I fundamentum `1. Ioannis sexto: Non veni facere voluntatem meam…` and is a1-q1's; then p.364's footer sequence (COMMENTARIUM-style body apparatus `1 De Fide orthod. c. 13`, etc.) is a1-q1's own page apparatus. Seam is clean: this divisio ends at the TRACTATIO listing; nothing of the QUAESTIO I body is held here.

**[?] flags.** None — p.363 bands fully legible at 450 dpi.


title: Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 363 -->

### Articulus I. *De voluntate Christi.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum in Christo fuerint plures voluntates.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ioannis sexto[^p363-4]: *Non veni facere voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me*, ergo alia est voluntas ipsius Christi, alia voluntas mit-
<!-- page 364 -->
tentis; sed voluntas Christi secundum Divinitatem eadem est cum voluntate mittentis: ergo necesse est, quod Christus habuerit voluntatem secundum humanitatem et secundum Divinitatem: ergo habuit plures voluntates.

2. Item, Damascenus, tertio libro[^p364-1]: « Habere eum dicimus in duabus naturis duplicia ea quae sunt duarum naturarum naturalia, duas voluntates naturales, et divinam et humanam ».

3. Item, cuilibet naturae intellectuali respondet voluntas; sed in Christo fuerunt plures naturae intellectuales, sicut in praecedentibus[^p364-2] monstratum est: ergo plures voluntates.

4. Item, Christus meruit[^p364-3], sed meritum non est nisi secundum voluntatem creatam; Christus etiam omnia creavit, sed creatio non est nisi a voluntate increata: ergo Christus habuit voluntatem increatam et creatam: ergo habuit plures voluntates.

**Contra:** 1. Damascenus, in libro tertio[^p364-4]: « Quorum substantia est eadem, horum et voluntas est eadem; et quorum diversa voluntas, horum diversa substantia »; sed divina natura et humana uniuntur in Christo in unitate hypostasis, quae est substantia individua, ita quod in Christo non sunt plures hypostases, sed una: ergo si in Christo non est reperire plures hypostases, nec plures voluntates.

2. Item, voluntas facit volentem, ergo plures voluntates faciunt plures volentes; sed Christus est unicus volens: ergo unicam tantum habuit voluntatem[^p364-5].

3. Item, voluntas est illud in homine, penes quod residet regimen et dominium omnium eorum quae aguntur in ipso et per ipsum; hoc autem in Christo non potest esse nisi unum solum, quia non possunt esse plura dominantia in uno et eodem absque controversia[^p364-6]: ergo necesse est, in Christo esse voluntatem unam solam.

4. Item, in Christo est tantum una personalitas, quia personalitas dicit nobilissimam conditionem, quae reperitur in substantia rationali[^p364-7]; sed voluntas est nobilissimum et supremum substantiae rationalis: ergo sicut in Christo est una tantum personalitas, ita videtur, quod sit tantum una voluntas.

### Conclusio

> In Christo plures sunt voluntates.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum in Christo sint plures naturae intellectuales, videlicet divina et humana, necesse est, in Christo plures esse voluntates. — Sicut enim in una natura corporali nobili ista duo se concomitantur, videlicet lux et calor; sic et in natura spirituali perfecta necesse est duo reperiri his duobus correspondentia, videlicet cognitionem et affectionem; sed cognitio est actus rationis, et affectio[^p364-8] voluntatis. Cum ergo in Christo sint plures naturae spirituales, necessarium est in Christo ponere plures intellectus et plures voluntates; et hoc manifestat Magister in littera[^p364-9] per multimodas Sanctorum auctoritates. — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod quorum substantia est eadem, et voluntas est eadem; dicendum, quod *substantia* dicitur multipliciter: uno modo dicitur substantia idem quod *essentia* vel *natura*; alio modo dicitur substantia idem quod *suppositum*[^p364-10]. Damascenus autem in praedicta auctoritate accipit substantiam pro *essentia* vel *natura*. Argumentum vero in contrarium adductum procedit de *substantia-supposito* sive substantia, quae est individua; et hoc patet per ipsum Damascenum[^p364-11]. Ipse enim dicit sic: « Naturales, et non hypostaticas, id est personales, aimus voluntates »; et hoc probat ipse, quia in tribus personis una est voluntas, non propter unitatem in personis, sed propter unitatem in natura.
<!-- page 365 -->

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas facit volentem; dicendum, quod hoc, per se loquendo, intelligitur de natura, per consequens autem intelligitur de persona; et quoniam plures naturae possunt esse in una persona: hinc est, quod ad pluralitatem voluntatum, etsi consequatur pluralitas naturarum, non tamen consequitur personarum pluralitas. Ideo non sequitur: sunt plures voluntates, ergo plures, qui volunt; sed bene sequitur: sunt plures naturae, secundum quas insunt. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus[^p365-1]: « Quia duas naturas Christi duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus. Quoniam autem una duarum naturarum est hypostasis, unum aimus et volentem et agentem naturaliter secundum ambas ».

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas dicit illud, penes quod residet regimen et imperium eorum quae sunt in ipso volente; dicendum, quod imperans et dominans est per privationem coactionis, et est imperans et dominans per privationem subiectionis. Primo modo accipiendo imperans convenit ipsi voluntati generaliter[^p365-2]; et hoc modo possibile est, plura imperantia reperiri in eodem, in quo reperiuntur plura a coactione libera, sicut in Christo est reperire liberum arbitrium secundum divinam naturam et humanam. Si autem dicatur imperans et dominans per privationem omnis subiectionis; sic bene concedendum est, quod necesse est esse unum solum. Sed tale imperium non competit omni voluntati; non enim competit voluntati humanae, quae debet esse subiecta divinae, sed illi voluntati competit, quae nihil habet superius se. Ideo ex hoc non potest argui, quod in Christo non sint plures voluntates, sed quod non sint plures voluntates divinae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas est proprietas spectans ad dignitatem, sicut et personalitas; dicendum, quod aliter et aliter dicitur haec proprietas et illa ad dignitatem spectare, secundum quod aliquid per superabundantiam dicitur dupliciter: vel *absolute*, sicut dicitur albissimus, id est valde albus; vel *in comparatione*, sicut dicitur albissimus omnium. Et quod dicitur per superabundantiam *absolute* potest pluribus convenire; quod autem dicitur per superabundantiam *in comparatione* convenit uni soli. Dico ergo, quod personalitas accipitur penes dignitatem excellentiae respectu omnium, quae sunt in ipsa persona, et ideo in uno non potest esse nisi una personalitas; voluntas autem non sic, quia dicit potentiam substantiae rationalis nobilem et perfectam. Et ideo sicut plures naturae nobiles possunt se compati in una persona in Christo, sic et plures voluntates.

english:
### Article I. *On the will of Christ.*
### Question I. *Whether in Christ there were several wills.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether in Christ there was a plurality of wills. And that there was, it seems.

1. John, chapter six[^p363-4]: *I came not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me*; therefore the will of Christ himself is one thing, and the will of the one sending is another; but the will of Christ according to Divinity is the same as the will of the one sending: therefore it is necessary that Christ had a will according to humanity and according to Divinity: therefore he had several wills.

2. Likewise, Damascene, in the third book[^p364-1]: « We say that he has in two natures, in twofold manner, those things which are the natural properties of the two natures: two natural wills, both divine and human ».

3. Likewise, to every intellectual nature a will corresponds; but in Christ there were several intellectual natures, as was shown in what precedes[^p364-2]: therefore several wills.

4. Likewise, Christ merited[^p364-3], but merit is only according to a created will; Christ also created all things, but creation is only from an uncreated will: therefore Christ had an uncreated and a created will: therefore he had several wills.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene, in the third book[^p364-4]: « Of those whose substance is the same, the will also is the same; and of those whose will is diverse, the substance is diverse »; but the divine nature and the human are united in Christ in the unity of the hypostasis, which is an individual substance, so that in Christ there are not several hypostases, but one: therefore if several hypostases are not to be found in Christ, neither are several wills.

2. Likewise, the will makes the one willing; therefore several wills make several willing ones; but Christ is a single one willing: therefore he had only a single will[^p364-5].

3. Likewise, the will is that in a man in which resides the governance and dominion of all the things which are done in him and through him; but this in Christ can only be one alone, because there cannot be several ruling things in one and the same without conflict[^p364-6]: therefore it is necessary that in Christ there is one will alone.

4. Likewise, in Christ there is only one personality, because personality denotes the noblest condition, which is found in a rational substance[^p364-7]; but the will is the noblest and supreme [part] of a rational substance: therefore just as in Christ there is only one personality, so it seems that there is only one will.

### Conclusio

> In Christ there are several wills.

**I respond:** It must be said that since in Christ there are several intellectual natures, namely the divine and the human, it is necessary that in Christ there are several wills. — For just as in one noble corporeal nature these two accompany each other, namely light and heat; so also in a perfect spiritual nature it is necessary that two things be found corresponding to these two, namely cognition and affection; but cognition is an act of reason, and affection[^p364-8] of the will. Since therefore in Christ there are several spiritual natures, it is necessary to posit in Christ several intellects and several wills; and the Master makes this manifest in the text[^p364-9] through the manifold authorities of the Saints. — Hence the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that of those whose substance is the same the will also is the same; it must be said that *substance* is said in many ways: in one way substance is said as the same as *essence* or *nature*; in another way substance is said as the same as *supposit*[^p364-10]. But Damascene in the aforesaid authority takes substance for *essence* or *nature*. The argument adduced to the contrary, however, proceeds concerning *substance-supposit* or substance which is individual; and this is clear through Damascene himself[^p364-11]. For he says thus: « We affirm wills that are natural, and not hypostatic, that is, personal »; and he proves this, because in the three persons the will is one, not on account of the unity in the persons, but on account of the unity in nature.

2. To that which is objected, that the will makes the one willing; it must be said that this, speaking per se, is understood of nature, but consequently is understood of person; and since several natures can be in one person: hence it is that to a plurality of wills, even if a plurality of natures follows, nevertheless a plurality of persons does not follow. Therefore it does not follow: there are several wills, therefore several who will; but it does well follow: there are several natures, according to which they are present. And this is what Damascene says[^p365-1]: « Because we affirm the two natures of Christ to be his two natural wills and natural acts. But since the one [hypostasis] of the two natures is the hypostasis, we affirm one who both wills and acts naturally according to both ».

3. To that which is objected, that the will denotes that in which resides the governance and command of the things which are in the one willing; it must be said that there is a commanding and dominating through the privation of coercion, and there is a commanding and dominating through the privation of subjection. Taking commanding in the first way, it belongs to the will generally[^p365-2]; and in this way it is possible that several commanding things be found in the same [subject], in which several things free from coercion are found, just as in Christ there is to be found free choice according to the divine nature and the human. But if commanding and dominating be understood through the privation of all subjection; then it is well to be conceded that it is necessary for it to be one alone. But such command does not belong to every will; for it does not belong to the human will, which ought to be subject to the divine, but it belongs to that will which has nothing above itself. Therefore from this it cannot be argued that in Christ there are not several wills, but [only] that there are not several divine wills.

4. To that which is objected, that the will is a property pertaining to dignity, just as personality also; it must be said that this property and that are said to pertain to dignity in different ways, according as something is said by superabundance in two ways: either *absolutely*, as one is said to be whitest, that is, very white; or *in comparison*, as one is said to be whitest of all. And what is said by superabundance *absolutely* can belong to several; but what is said by superabundance *in comparison* belongs to one alone. I say therefore that personality is taken according to the dignity of excellence with respect to all the things which are in that person, and therefore in one [person] there can only be one personality; the will, however, is not so, because it denotes a noble and perfect power of a rational substance. And therefore just as several noble natures can be compatible in one person in Christ, so also several wills.

la: Vers. 38: *Quia descendi de caelo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam* etc. — Plurimi codd. allegant Matth. 5, ubi v. 17. legitur: *Nolite putare, quoniam veni solvere Legem* etc. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Verse 38: *Because I came down from heaven, not to do my own will* etc. — Very many codices cite Matthew 5, where v. 17 reads: *Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law* etc. — See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 13.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13.

la: Dist. 2. a. 2. q. 2; d. 14. a. 3. q. I. seq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Quod in *maiori* enuntiatur, ab Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5, nec non III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.) sic exprimitur: *In ratiocinativa enim voluntas fit.* Cfr. ibid. text. 50. (c. 10.). — Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho, hoc arg. in hunc modum profert: *Siquidem igitur natura inest intelligentibus motus liberae potestatis; igitur omne intelligens etiam facultate voluntatis praeditum est... Quodsi omne intelligens etiam natura voluntatis facultate praeditum est, Deusque Verbum vere caro ratione utentium ac intelligentium more animata factus est; plane fit, ut, et qua homo erat, idem substantialiter voluntatis facultate praeditus esset.* Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. et 18. nec non eiusdem opusc. de Duabus in Christo voluntatibus. Cfr. etiam Martini I, Epist. 3. et 4.

en: Dist. 2, a. 2, q. 2; d. 14, a. 3, q. I and following. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — What is stated in the *major* [premise] is expressed by Aristotle, IV *Topics* c. 5, and also III *On the Soul*, text 42 (c. 9), thus: *For in the ratiocinative [part] the will arises.* Cf. ibid. text 50 (c. 10). — Maximus, *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, brings forward this argument in this manner: *If therefore there is by nature in intelligent beings a movement of free power; then everything intelligent is also endowed with the faculty of will... But if everything intelligent is also by nature endowed with the faculty of will, and the Word of God truly became flesh, animated after the manner of those using reason and understanding; it plainly follows that, even insofar as he was man, he was substantially endowed with the faculty of will.* Cf. Damascene, III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14 and 18, and also his work *On the Two Wills in Christ*. Cf. also Martin I, Letters 3 and 4.

la: Cfr. infra d. 18. per totam. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 350, nota 9.

en: Cf. below d. 18 throughout. — On the minor [premise] cf. above page 350, note 9.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 14, pluribus interiectis post *voluntas est eadem.* Cfr. Basil., Epist. 189. (alias 80.) n. 6. et 8.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14, with several things interposed after *the will is the same.* Cf. Basil, Letter 189 (otherwise 80) n. 6 and 8.

la: Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho: « Si igitur unus Christus, tanquam unus omnino etiam volebat. Quodsi tanquam unus volebat, una prorsus est et eius voluntas, non duae... Non potest fieri, quin una cum voluntatibus etiam volentes inducantur ». Huius obiectionis fundamentum est illud axioma: Actiones sunt suppositorum.

en: Maximus, *Disputation with Pyrrhus*: « If therefore there is one Christ, then as one he also willed entirely. But if he willed as one, his will too is altogether one, not two... It cannot happen that along with the wills the willing ones too are not introduced ». The foundation of this objection is that axiom: Actions belong to supposits.

la: Pyrrhus in memorata Disputatione ait: Fieri non potest, ut in una persona duae sint, alia alii compositae, voluntates absque contrarietate (ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως).

en: Pyrrhus in the cited Disputation says: It cannot happen that in one person there be two wills, composed one with another, without contrariety (ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως).

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, d. 6. a. 2. q. I, d. 10. a. I. q. 2. — De minori cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6, scholion. — Paulo superius pro *una personalitas* codd. F T *una sola personalitas*.

en: Cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2; d. 6, a. 2, q. I; d. 10, a. I, q. 2. — On the minor [premise] cf. II Sent. d. 25, p. I, q. 6, scholion. — A little above, for *one personality* codices F T [read] *one sole personality*.

la: Edd. hic repetunt *actus*.

en: The editions here repeat *act*.

la: Hic c. 2. — Pro *multimodas* cod. Z *multas*.

en: Here c. 2. — For *manifold* codex Z [reads] *many*.

la: Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, et VII. Metaph. text. 7. et 53. (VI. c. 3. et 18.).

en: See Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on Substance, and VII *Metaphysics* text 7 and 53 (VI c. 3 and 18).

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. Probatio, de qua fit mentio, est ibidem: *Si enim personales esse concesserimus, tres sanctae Trinitatis personas diversae inter se voluntatis atque actionis necessario dicemus* (ed. Migne). — Voci *individua* Vat. adiicit *natura*. In cod. A scriptum est *sive quae est substantia individua*.

en: Book III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14. The proof which is mentioned is in the same place: *For if we concede [them] to be personal, we shall necessarily say that the three persons of the holy Trinity are of a will and action diverse among themselves* (Migne edition). — To the word *individual* the Vatican [edition] adds *nature*. In codex A it is written *or which is an individual substance*.

la: Quia duas naturas Christi duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus. *(Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.)*

en: Because we affirm the two natures of Christ to be his two natural wills and natural acts. *(See here the text of the Master, c. 2.)*

la: *(Cfr. supra de imperio voluntatis, II. Sent. d. 25.)*

en: *(Cf. above on the command of the will, II Sent. d. 25.)*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Error Monothelitarum, reprobatus iam a Concilio Chalcedonensi (an. 451), magis explicite a Concilio Constantinopolitano III. (an. 680) damnatur his verbis: « Duas naturales voluntates in eo (Christo) et duas naturales operationes indivise, inconvertibiliter, inseparabiliter, inconfuse secundum Ss. Patrum doctrinam praedicamus; et duas naturales voluntates non contrarias » etc. (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 2. q. I, scholion).

**II.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. III. q. 13. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic n. I. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 18. a. I. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. I. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. I. q. I. — Durand., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.

**III.** Quoad 2. quaestionem conveniunt magistri in hoc, quod appetitus « sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 18. a. 2.), cum pertineat ad perfectionem naturae humanae, fuerit in Christo, et quod hic appetitus vocari possit voluntas in sensu largiore et quasi per participationem, quia in homine natus est obedire rationi. — Quadruplicis divisionis voluntatis, hic ex Hugone allatae, alii auctores non faciunt mentionem. Et notandum, quod haec voluntas pietatis hic in penultima solutione argg. recte dicitur esse conditionata. — Duo actus voluntatis rationalis, qui a Ioanne Damasceno vocantur thelesis et bulesis (hic arg. 3. ad oppos.) et a Magistro voluntas ut natura et voluntas ut ratio, ab aliis autem voluntas naturalis et deliberativa, diffuse explicantur a S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. De eisdem respectu Christi S. Thom. (hic a. I. quaestiunc. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3.) cum Petr. a Tar. speciali quaestione tractat (cfr. etiam Scotus, loc. cit. n. 3-5). Communiter docetur, hanc divisionem tantum respicere actus, non ipsam potentiam. — De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The error of the Monothelites, already reproved by the Council of Chalcedon (year 451), is more explicitly condemned by the Third Council of Constantinople (year 680) in these words: « We preach two natural wills in him (Christ) and two natural operations, indivisibly, unchangeably, inseparably, unconfusedly, according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers; and two natural wills not contrary [to one another] » etc. (cf. above d. 12. a. 2. q. I, scholion).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, P. III, q. 13, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following question, in both Writings here, q. unic. — St. Thomas, here n. I, quaestiuncula 1; S. III, q. 18, a. I. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following question, here a. I, q. I. — Durandus, on this and the following 2 questions, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following 2 questions, here q. I. — Biel, here q. unica.

**III.** As to the second question, the masters agree in this, that the « sensitive appetite, which is called sensuality » (St. Thomas, S. III, q. 18, a. 2), since it pertains to the perfection of human nature, was in Christ, and that this appetite can be called a will in a broader sense and as it were by participation, because in man it is born to obey reason. — Of the fourfold division of the will, here brought in from Hugh, the other authors make no mention. And it is to be noted that this will of piety, here in the penultimate reply to the arguments, is rightly said to be conditioned. — The two acts of the rational will, which are called by John Damascene *thelesis* and *bulesis* (here arg. 3 to the contrary) and by the Master will as nature and will as reason, but by others natural and deliberative will, are explained at length by St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. Concerning these same things with respect to Christ, St. Thomas (here a. I, quaestiuncula 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3) together with Peter of Tarentaise treats in a special question (cf. also Scotus, loc. cit. n. 3-5). It is commonly taught that this division regards only acts, not the power itself. — On the second question: St. Thomas, here a. I, quaestiuncula 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 2, 3.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p363-{R}-*.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p364-{L,R}-*.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p365-{L,R}-*.png` (Vol III PDF-priority inversion). Printed pp.363–365 (PDF 385–387; offset pdf = printed + 22). Raw OCR span 25396–25537.

**Alignment.** Confirmed q1 = *Utrum in Christo fuerint plures voluntates* (whether in Christ there were several wills). Matches the divisio TRACTATIO listing for ART. I q1. Not q2 (*numero et sufficientia*, raw 25538) and not q3 (*concordia vel controversia*, raw 25660).

**Page-split map.** Question opens on **p.363 R-column bottom** (ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I headers, fundamentum 1). Body crosses to **p.364** at the foot of fund. 1 (`...alia voluntas mit-` | `tentis`), runs through funds 2–4, Contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo, Solutio 1. Crosses to **p.365** mid-Solutio 1 (`...accipit substantiam pro essentia vel natura` | end of Sol.1; then Sol.2 opens). p.365 carries Solutio 2–4 and the full SCHOLION (I–III). q2 (`QUAESTIO II.`) begins at the bottom of p.365 — the seam to the next chunk.

**Hand-offs picked up.** p.363 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM **note 4** (`Vers. 38: Quia descendi de caelo…`), forwarded by the d17-divisio agent, is here rendered as `[^p363-4]` on fundamentum 1's *Ioannis sexto*. (The divisio retained p.363 notes 1–3 and the COMMENTARIUM note; LIBR. SENT. note 1 stayed with the littera.)

**Hand-offs forwarded → d17-a1-q2.** q2 (`De numero et sufficientia voluntatum in Christo`) begins at **raw line 25538** / printed **p.365 R-column bottom**. The **p.365 footer block (notes 1–5)** — `¹ Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 14… (ed. Migne) — Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho, argumentum retorquens…`; `² Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 1…`; `³ Maximus, loc. cit., eandem obiectionem paulo aliter solvit`; `⁴ Sicut docet Priscian., de quo vide tom. II. pag. 399, nota 4…`; `⁵ Hic in lit. c. 2.` — annotates the **q2 body** (which starts on p.365), so these migrate to d17-a1-q2's apparatus, NOT here. The seam is grammatically clean: q1 ends at the scholion's section III; q2 opens `Secundo quaeritur de voluntatum numero et sufficientia…`.

**Scholion status.** `has_scholion: true`. The scholion **forward-covers q2** (section II reads `de hac et seq. q.` throughout; section III explicitly opens `Quoad 2. quaestionem…` and closes `De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 2…`). It does **not** separately cover q3. Per the Vol II/III convention, the sibling q2 will legitimately have **no scholion of its own** (`pro quaest. seq.` pattern).

**Apparatus count.** 12 entries: `[^p363-4]` (picked-up) + `[^p364-1..11]` (p.364's own 11-note footer block). `[^p365-1]` and `[^p365-2]` are short cross-reference notes attached to the Damascene quotation and the *imperium voluntatis* point in Solutio 2–3 (bracketed as editorial cross-refs — the p.365 numbered footer block proper belongs to q2 and is forwarded).

**[?] flags.** None — all three pages legible at 450 dpi. The Greek `ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως` in `[^p364-6]` is transcribed as printed.