title: Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 699 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus omnes creaturas diligat generaliter.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus omnes diligat generaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Sapientiae* undecimo: *Diligis omnia, Domine, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.*[^1] Nihil hoc expressius dici potest.

2. Item, *Genesis* primo[^2]: *Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona;* sed summum Bonum non potest non diligere bona: ergo Deus diligit omnem creaturam.

3. Item, omne quod factum est, a Deo factum est, Deus autem nihil facit nisi volens; sed velle bonum, hoc est amare[^3]: ergo nihil procedit a Deo, quod non ametur ab ipso: si ergo omnia a Deo exeunt, videtur, quod omnia a Deo diligantur.

<!-- page 700 -->

4. Item, amor est donum, in quo omnia alia donantur[^4]; sed nullum creatum est, quod non suscipiat influentiam divinae liberalitatis: si igitur huiusmodi influentiae communicatio non est nisi mediante dilectione, videtur, quod dilectio Dei sit respectu omnis creaturae.

5. Item, omnia exoptant summum Bonum, secundum quod dicit Boethius, et Dionysius[^5]; sed tunc Deus dicitur diligere creaturam aliquam, quando illam ad se convertit per dilectionem — magis enim dicitur diligere *effectu* quam *affectu* — ergo videtur, quod dilectio Dei se extendat ad omne creatum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Cum Deus sit summa caritas, omne quod diligit ex caritate diligit; sed ex caritate non sunt diligenda nisi tria diligibilium genera, videlicet Deus et spiritus rationalis et corpus humanum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus[^6]: ergo non videtur, quod Deus diligat *omnem creaturam*.

2. Item, « amor, sicut dicit Hugo de sancto Victore[^7], transformat amantem in amatum »; et quanto perfectior est amor, tanto magis conformat unum alteri: cum igitur amor Dei sit perfectissimus, nihil diligit, nisi quod est ei conformabile per se; hoc autem non est nisi creatura rationalis, quae facta est ad imaginem suam: ergo videtur, quod Deus non diligat omnem creaturam, sed *solum rationalem*.

3. Item, videtur, quod *non omnem rationalem* diligat: quia quidam sunt reprobi et quidam electi, quidam boni et quidam mali; sed impios et reprobos non diligit, secundum quod scribitur *Malachiae* primo[^8][^15]: *Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui;* et *Sapientiae* decimo quarto: *Similiter abominabilis est Deo impius et impietas eius:* si ergo Deus non diligit impietatem, videtur, quod non diligat impios: non ergo diligit omnes et singulos.

4. Item, dilectio est ratio electionis[^9][^16], ergo illos solum Deus diligit, quos ab aeterno elegit; sed non elegit omnes indifferenter: ergo non dilexit omnes generaliter.

5. Item, diligere est velle bonum[^10][^17], ergo illos tantum diligit, quibus vult bonum; sed cuicumque vult bonum, facit bonum: ergo illos tantum diligit Deus, quibus bona facit. Sed damnatis facit multa mala: ergo videtur, quod potius eos odiat, quam diligat: non ergo diligit generaliter omnem creaturam.

### Conclusio.

> Dilectio Dei quoad effectum naturae est omnibus communis et generalis, sed quoad effectum gratiae est specialis.

**Respondeo:** Ad huius intelligentiam est notandum, quod Deus non dicitur creaturam diligere ratione affectionis animi, sed ratione communicationis alicuius boni, ita quod dilectio Dei potius dicitur esse dilectio *effectus* quam *affectus*[^11][^18]. Communicatio autem bonitatis divinae attenditur in duplici genere effectus, videlicet in effectibus naturae et effectibus gratiae; et effectus naturae omnibus est communis, effectus vero gratiae non. — Hinc est, quod dilectio Dei quantum ad effectum naturae est omnibus communis et generalis; et secundum hanc[^12][^19] dicitur diligere omnem creaturam. Quantum autem ad effectum gratiae est specialis; et quantum ad istum quosdam diligit, quosdam odit, quia quidam habent in se effectum gratiae, quidam defectum culpae et poenae. — Rationes ergo omnes, quae inducuntur ad primam partem et probant, Deum omnem creaturam diligere, quia probant de dilectione[^20] communi, quae attenditur quantum ad communicationem boni generalis, utpote bonitatis naturalis, verum concludunt; et ideo concedendae sunt.

**Ad obiecta:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod haec praepositio *ex*[^1][^21] dicat habitudinem principii motivi et productivi respectu effectus creati; et sic omnia quae diligit, ex caritate diligit — caritas enim Dei principium est omnium effectuum, quos producit — aut ita, quod non solum dicat habitudinem principii producentis, verum etiam exemplaris repraesentantis;

<!-- page 701 -->

et sic solum illos ex caritate diligit, quibus communicat caritatem creatam, cuius illa suprema caritas est exemplar. Nam caritas increata est exemplar caritatis creatae sub ratione caritatis; aliorum vero non est exemplar sub hac ratione. Cum ergo dicitur, quod solum tria sunt diligenda ex caritate; hoc non dicitur, secundum quod *ex* dicit solum habitudinem principii moventis et imperantis, sed prout dicit habitudinem formalis et elicientis; et sic non potest concludi, quod Deus non diligat omnem creaturam se ipso, qui est caritas summa, ex qua procedunt omnia bona creata.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor transformat amantem in amatum; dicendum, quod illud verum est de amore affectionis, qui facit in alterum tendere; sed amor divinus non est amor affectionis inclinans ad alterum, sed potius alia inclinans et trahens ad se ipsum. Unde amor divinus potius transformat et conformat amata ipsi amanti quam e converso. Secundum autem quod duplex est conformatio ipsarum rerum ad Deum, videlicet secundum similitudinem *vestigii* et secundum similitudinem *expressam*, quae est ratio *imaginis*[^1]; sic dilectio Dei potest dupliciter accipi, ut praedictum fuit, videlicet *generaliter*, et sic non connotat ibi nisi quandam generalem assimilationem; et *specialiter*, et sic connotat quandam expressam unitionem. Et ideo prima dilectio est respectu omnis creaturae; secunda vero non est nisi eius creaturae, cui Deus communicat caritatem, ita quod per caritatem illam adhaeret Deo unione permaxima, ut sic per caritatem in Deo maneat, et Deus in eo[^2].

3. 4. 5. Ad tria vero sequentia, quae opponuntur, quibus ostenditur, quod Deus non diligit malos; unica est responsio: quia procedunt de dilectione speciali, non de generali. Et quantum ad illam dilectionem specialem verum est, quod Deus non diligit malos et reprobos, immo potius odit, quia non habent in se gratiam, sed culpam; quantum vero ad naturam non odit, sed diligit, quia *solem suum super bonos et malos oriri facit.*[^3] Et per hoc potest ad tria ultima responderi.

english:
### Question II. *Whether God loves all creatures generally.*

Secondly it is asked whether God loves all things generally. And that he does so, it seems.

1. *Wisdom* eleven: *Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made.*[^1] Nothing can be said more expressly than this.

2. Likewise, *Genesis* one[^2]: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good;* but the highest Good cannot fail to love good things: therefore God loves every creature.

3. Likewise, everything that has been made has been made by God, and God makes nothing except willingly; but to will the good, this is to love[^3]: therefore nothing proceeds from God that is not loved by him: if therefore all things issue from God, it seems that all things are loved by God.

4. Likewise, love is the gift in which all other things are given[^4]; but there is no created thing that does not receive an inflowing of the divine generosity: if therefore the communication of an inflowing of this kind is only through love, it seems that the love of God is in respect of every creature.

5. Likewise, all things long for the highest Good, according to what Boethius and Dionysius say[^5]; but God is then said to love some creature when he turns it to himself through love — for he is rather said to love by *effect* than by *affect* — therefore it seems that the love of God extends to everything created.

**On the contrary:** 1. Since God is the highest charity, everything that he loves he loves out of charity; but out of charity only three kinds of lovable things are to be loved, namely God and the rational spirit and the human body, according to what Augustine says[^6]: therefore it does not seem that God loves *every creature*.

2. Likewise, « love, as Hugh of Saint Victor says[^7], transforms the lover into the beloved »; and the more perfect the love is, the more it conforms the one to the other: since therefore the love of God is most perfect, he loves nothing except what is in itself conformable to him; but this is only the rational creature, which is made to his image: therefore it seems that God does not love every creature, but *only the rational one*.

3. Likewise, it seems that he does *not love every rational one*: for some are reprobate and some elect, some good and some evil; but the impious and the reprobate he does not love, according to what is written in *Malachi* one[^8][^15]: *Jacob I loved, but Esau I held in hatred;* and *Wisdom* fourteen: *Alike are the impious man and his impiety abominable to God:* if therefore God does not love impiety, it seems that he does not love the impious: therefore he does not love all and each.

4. Likewise, love is the ground of election[^9][^16], therefore God loves only those whom he chose from eternity; but he did not choose all indifferently: therefore he did not love all generally.

5. Likewise, to love is to will the good[^10][^17], therefore he loves only those for whom he wills the good; but for whomever he wills the good, he does good: therefore God loves only those for whom he does good things. But to the damned he does many evil things: therefore it seems that he rather hates them than loves them: therefore he does not love every creature generally.

### Conclusion.

> The love of God as to the effect of nature is common and general to all, but as to the effect of grace it is special.

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that God is not said to love a creature by reason of an affection of the mind, but by reason of the communication of some good, so that the love of God is rather said to be a love of *effect* than of *affect*[^11][^18]. But the communication of the divine goodness is regarded in a twofold kind of effect, namely in the effects of nature and the effects of grace; and the effect of nature is common to all, but the effect of grace is not. — Hence it is that the love of God as to the effect of nature is common and general to all; and according to this[^12][^19] he is said to love every creature. But as to the effect of grace it is special; and as to this he loves some and hates some, because some have in themselves the effect of grace, some the defect of fault and of punishment. — Therefore all the reasons that are brought forward for the first part and prove that God loves every creature, since they prove concerning the common love[^20], which is regarded as to the communication of the general good, namely of natural goodness, conclude truly; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**Reply to the objections:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: either thus, that this preposition *out of*[^1][^21] expresses the relation of a moving and producing principle in respect of the created effect; and thus everything that he loves, he loves out of charity — for the charity of God is the principle of all the effects that he produces — or thus, that it expresses not only the relation of a producing principle, but also of a representing exemplar;

and thus he loves out of charity only those to whom he communicates created charity, of which that highest charity is the exemplar. For uncreated charity is the exemplar of created charity under the formal character of charity; but of other things it is not the exemplar under this formal character. When therefore it is said that only three things are to be loved out of charity; this is not said insofar as *out of* expresses only the relation of a moving and commanding principle, but inasmuch as it expresses the relation of a formal and eliciting [principle]; and thus it cannot be concluded that God does not love every creature by himself, who is the highest charity, from whom proceed all created goods.

2. To that which is objected, that love transforms the lover into the beloved; it must be said that this is true of the love of affection, which makes one tend toward another; but the divine love is not a love of affection inclining toward another, but rather inclining and drawing other things to itself. Hence the divine love rather transforms and conforms the beloved things to the lover himself than the reverse. But inasmuch as there is a twofold conformation of things themselves to God, namely according to the likeness of *vestige* and according to the *expressed* likeness, which is the formal character of *image*[^1]; so the love of God can be taken in two ways, as was said before, namely *generally*, and thus it connotes there only a certain general assimilation; and *specially*, and thus it connotes a certain expressed union. And therefore the first love is in respect of every creature; but the second is only of that creature to which God communicates charity, so that through that charity it adheres to God by a most great union, so that thus through charity it remains in God, and God in it[^2].

3. 4. 5. To the three following [objections] that are opposed, by which it is shown that God does not love the evil; there is one reply: because they proceed concerning the special love, not the general. And as to that special love it is true that God does not love the evil and the reprobate, indeed rather hates them, because they do not have in themselves grace, but fault; but as to nature he does not hate, but loves, because *he makes his sun to rise upon the good and the evil.*[^3] And by this it is possible to reply to the three last.

la: Hic c. 1. — In initio solut. pro *copula amantis et amati* codd. D *copula amantis cum amato.*

en: Here c. 1. — At the beginning of the solution, for *the bond of the lover and the loved* codices D [read] *the bond of the lover with the loved.*

la: Pro *potest esse* codd. a N *dicitur.* Mox pro *res est in habitu* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 *res est habitu.*

en: For *can be* codices a N [read] *is said.* Soon, for *the thing is in a habit* not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *the thing is by habit.*

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2.

la: August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 32. n. 33: Sed [Deus] neque sic utitur ut nos; nam nos res, quibus utimur, ad id referimus, ut Dei bonitate perfruamur; Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus est, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus... Ille igitur usus, qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem.

en: Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 32, n. 33: But [God] does not use [things] as we do; for we refer the things we use to this, that we may enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers our use to his own goodness. For because he is good, we are; and insofar as we are, we are good... That use, therefore, which is called God's, by which he uses us, is referred not to his utility but to ours, but to his goodness alone.

la: Vers. 25: Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil etc.

en: Verse 25: *For thou lovest all things that are, and [hatest] nothing* etc.

la: Vers. 31. — In minori pro *bona* cod. Z *ea quae sunt valde bona.*

en: Verse 31. — In the minor [premise], for *good* codex Z [reads] *the things that are very good.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Quoad minorem cfr. liber de Causis, propos. 1. 18. et 20. — Post *omnia alia* codd. AN PS bb subiiciunt *dona.*

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 18, q. 1. — As to the minor [premise], cf. the *Book of Causes*, propositions 1, 18, and 20. — After *all other things* codices AN PS bb add *gifts.*

la: Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11; Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 10, ubi etiam haec leguntur, quibus illustratur minor: Possumus autem fiducialiter et veraciter dicere, quod Deus, qui est omnium causa, propter suae bonitatis excessum amat omnia et perficit omnia et continet et ad se convertit; et est divinus amor bonus boni propter bonum etc. (Versio abbatis Vercellens.).

en: Boethius, *On Consolation* III, prose 11; Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 10, where also these things are read, by which the minor is illustrated: We can also confidently and truly say that God, who is the cause of all things, on account of the excess of his goodness loves all things and perfects all things and contains [them] and turns [them] to himself; and the divine love is good, [the love] of the good for the sake of the good, etc. (Version of the abbot of Vercelli.).

la: Colligitur ex 1. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22, de quo videsis supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVIII. c. 1, et ibid. Comment. q. 1. et 6.

en: It is gathered from *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 23, n. 22, concerning which see above, the Master's text, d. XXVIII, c. 1, and there the Commentary, q. 1 and 6.

la: De Arrha animae. Vide tom. II. pag. 4, nota 8.

en: *On the Pledge of the Soul.* See vol. II, page 4, note 8.

en: Boethius, *On Consolation* III, prose 11; Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 10, where also these things are read, by which the minor is illustrated: We can confidently and truly say that God, who is the cause of all things, on account of the excess of his goodness loves all things and perfects all and contains [them] and turns [them] to himself; and the divine love is good, [the love] of the good for the sake of the good, etc. (Version of the abbot of Vercelli.).

la: Vers. 2. seq. — Locus libri Sapientiae est 14, 9: Similiter autem odio sunt Deo impius etc. — Circa finem arg. pro *diligit* multi codd. *diligit.*

en: Verse 2 and following. — The passage of the book of Wisdom is 14:9: *Alike, moreover, are the impious and [his impiety] in hatred to God,* etc. — Toward the end of the argument, for *loves* many codices [read] *loves.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 4.

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 40, a. 3, q. 1, fundamentum 4.

la: Vide verba Aristot., supra pag. 574, nota 5. allata. — Subinde post *diligit* cod. Z supplet *Deum.*

en: See the words of Aristotle, adduced above, page 574, note 5. — Thereafter, after *loves* codex Z supplies *God.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo superius edd. omittunt *animi.*

en: See here the Master's text, c. 3. — A little above, the editions omit *of the mind.*

la: Cod. Z secundum hunc modum. Paulo inferius idem cod. etiam *et quantum ad istum modum.*

en: Codex Z [reads] *according to this way.* A little below, the same codex also [reads] *and as to this way.*

la: Cod. Z subiungit *Dei.*

en: Codex Z appends *of God.*

la: Priscian., XIV. Grammat. c. 3, de praepositione *ex* dicit, quod « pro causali coniunctione potest accipi, ut *ex insidiis illius hoc patior,* i. e. insidiarum illius causa ». — Aliquanto inferius pro *suprema* cod. Z *summa.*

en: Priscian, *Grammar* XIV, c. 3, says concerning the preposition *ex* that « it can be taken for a causal conjunction, as *out of his snares I suffer this,* i.e. by reason of his snares ». — Somewhat below, for *highest* codex Z [reads] *supreme.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi Vol III PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{699,700,701}-{L,R}-*.png`, offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 48587–48701) as base for clean running prose. Two-column PDF-priority inversion per the VOL II OVERRIDE. English freshly translated, literal.

**Title.** The TRACTATIO listing (q1's divisio) gives *Secundum est, utrum diligat omnes creaturas universaliter*, but the printed **QUAESTIO II header and body opener both read *generaliter*** (`Utrum Deus omnes creaturas diligat generaliter` / *Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus omnes diligat generaliter*). Per the trust-running-head-text rule, `title_la`/`title_en` use the printed header *generaliter*; the TRACTATIO *universaliter* is a near-synonymous variant. **Alignment verified: TRACTATIO Secundum = QUAESTIO II opener, no q-swap.**

**Page-split map.** Opens lower-L on **p.699** (below q1's article-master scholion §I–IV): QUAESTIO II header + opener + arg.1 (L), arg.2 + arg.3 start (R). **p.700**: arg.3 cont., args 4–5, Sed contra 1–4 (L); Sed contra 5, Conclusio, Respondeo, reply 1 start (R). **p.701**: reply 1 cont., reply 2, reply-3.4.5 (R-col top); QUAESTIO III begins lower in the L-col (not in this chunk). Page breaks marked at the arg.3 (699→700) and reply-1 (700→701) seams.

**Apparatus: 21 entries, per-page restart (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM), renumbered continuous.** **p.699 nn.1–6 → [^1]–[^6]** (the PICKED-UP hand-off from q1: n.1 *copula amantis* variant, anchored at the Respondeo reply-1 *ex*; n.2 *potest esse* / *res est in habitu* variants; n.3 *Vide I. Sent. d. 45*; n.4 Augustine *de Doctr. christ.* I c.32, arg.3 *velle bonum hoc est amare*; n.5 Wisdom v.25, arg.1; n.6 Genesis v.31 / cod. Z, arg.2). **p.700 nn.1–12 → [^7]–[^18]** (n.1=`[^7]` Aristotle ref., Sed-contra-2 *amatum*; n.2=`[^8]` I Sent. d.18 / *Book of Causes*, arg.4; n.3=`[^9]` Boethius/Dionysius, arg.5; n.4=`[^10]` *de Doctr. christ.* I c.23, Sed-contra-5 *velle bonum*; n.5=`[^11]` *de Arrha animae*, Sed-contra-2 Hugh; n.6=`[^12]` Wisd. 14:9 / *diligit* variant, Sed-contra-3; n.7=`[^13]` I Sent. d.40, Sed-contra-4 *electionis*; n.8=`[^14]` Boethius/Dionysius version, arg.5; n.9=`[^15]` Aristotle / cod. Z *Deum*, Sed-contra-5; n.10=`[^16]` Master's text c.3 / *animi* omit, Respondeo *affectus*; n.11=`[^17]` cod. Z *secundum hunc modum*, Respondeo *secundum hanc*; n.12=`[^18]` cod. Z *Dei*, the "Rationes ergo omnes… *de dilectione communi*"). NB: several p.700 notes repeat earlier citations (the Quaracchi editors re-cite per page); rendered as printed. **p.701 nn.1–3 → [^19]–[^21]** (n.1=`[^19]` cod. Z *et secundum hoc* / *imitationem*-*unionem*, reply 2 *imaginis*; n.2=`[^20]` 1 John 4:16 / cod. Z *Deum*, reply 2 *Deus in eo*; n.3=`[^21]` Priscian on *ex* + the **scholion redirect**, reply 1 *ex* — see scholion note). Markers paired in both Latin and English bodies.

> NB on 21: the printed p.701 n.3 footer reads *Matth. 5, 45. — Deinde edd. «et per hoc patet ad tria ultima responsio.» — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, splicing the Matt. 5:45 ref (reply-3.4.5 *solem suum*), an edition variant, and the scholion-redirect. The Matt. 5:45 / edition-variant portion is carried at 21's anchor on *oriri facit*; the explicit *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* redirect is recorded in the scholion note below (it has no separate body marker — it is the q2-as-a-whole scholion pointer, exactly as in d29/d30 q2).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked-up from q1 (d32-a1-q1):* **p.699 NOTAE nn.1–6** (q2's own fresh sequence opening on p.699 below q1's scholion; consumed as [^1]–[^6]). q1's last footer was p.698 n.10.
- *Forwarded to q3 (d32-a1-q3):* on the shared **p.701**, q2 owns L-band nn.1–3 only. **p.701 nn.4–5 (L-band) + nn.6–11 (R-band) belong to q3** — n.4 *Vers. 8. — Superius post omnes Vat. addit creaturas* (q3 obj./arg.1, Wisd. 8 *Pusillum et magnum ipse fecit*); n.5 *Auctor libri de Causis, propos. 24; ipsa verba vide pag. 702, nota 7* (q3 *secundum quod dicit Philosophus*); n.6 *Vide hic lit. Magistri c.1 / diligat variant*; n.7 *Quia ut supra d.31 a.3 q.2 fundam. 4 docetur…*; n.8 *Vide supra d.30 q.6 ad 2*; n.9 1 John / *diligit* variant; n.10 *Cfr. supra pag. 650 nota 8*; n.11 *Vide supra d.29 q.1.* q3 starts its NOTAE pickup at p.701 n.4 and continues on p.702+.

**Scholion: ABSENT — REDIRECT to q1 §III.** q2 has no own scholion. q1's article-master scholion (printed on p.699 under q1's body) §III explicitly forward-treats this q2 («III. In seq. (2.) quaestione solutio fit per distinctionem communiter receptam inter dilectionem *generalem*… et dilectionem *specialem*… De hac quaestione specialiter tractant: S. Thom., …»). q2's own apparatus footer (p.701 n.3) reads «Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.» `has_scholion: false`. Mirrors the established sibling-redirect convention (d29-a1-q2, d30-a1-q2 → q1 §III).

**`[?]` flags:** none.

**J4 Class B — orphaned apparatus definitions, resolved (2026-07-17).** Classifier found 9 of 21 defs ([^13]–[^21]) with no `[^N]` anchor in either body. Re-read p.700 at 450 dpi (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p700-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) column-by-column and traced every printed superscript numeral (page-local 1–12) against its footer note text, confirming by content per Trap 1. Findings:

- **The printed page-700 superscripts (1–12) do NOT match this file's continuous [^N] labels 1:1** — the existing body markers [^1]–[^12] were assigned by simple positional count, not by the true per-page-restart numbering, so the anchor labels already in the body are mismatched to their own def content (e.g. body's `[^9]` sits on *ratio electionis* but def [^9]'s text is the Boethius/Dionysius citation). That mismatch is pre-existing and **out of scope for this pass** (not orphaned — every one of [^1]–[^12] already has a body anchor); flagging it here for a future audit rather than silently fixing it, since fixing would mean changing existing markers, which J4 does not authorize.
- Cross-referencing footer text directly against the file's def prose showed **[^13] and [^14] are verbatim duplicates of [^8] and [^9] respectively** (identical La. text, word-for-word). The true printed page-700 footer (read in full, notes 1–12) contains no third occurrence of either citation — no distinct superscript exists for them anywhere in the body. These two are almost certainly a transcription/copy-paste artifact from when the continuous 1–21 apparatus list was built (they also explain why the file's [^15]–[^21] are shifted +3 past where a clean per-page continuation would put them: footer notes 6–12 land at [^15]–[^21] instead of [^12]–[^18]). **REFUSED: [^13] and [^14] — no anchor placed.** No textual evidence of a second distinct location for either; anchoring them anywhere would either duplicate [^8]/[^9]'s existing anchor pointlessly or fabricate a location not attested in print.
- **[^15]–[^21] placed**, each verified against its own printed footer text (page 700, footer notes 6–12) and the physical superscript position on the page:
  - `[^15]` (Sapientiae 14:9 clarification) → printed superscript 6, physically on *Malachiae primo* in Sed-contra-3 (added alongside the existing `[^8]`, since the numeral 6 sits there in print even though the note's content glosses the *Sapientiae decimo quarto* citation later in the same sentence).
  - `[^16]` (I Sent. d.40 a.3 q.1 fundam.4) → superscript 7, on *ratio electionis* in Sed-contra-4 (alongside existing `[^9]`).
  - `[^17]` (Aristotle ref. + cod. Z *supplet Deum*) → superscript 8, on *velle bonum* in Sed-contra-5 (alongside existing `[^10]`).
  - `[^18]` (Master's text c.3 / *omittunt animi*) → superscript 9, on *dilectio effectus quam affectus* in the Respondeo (alongside existing `[^11]`).
  - `[^19]` (cod. Z *secundum hunc modum*) → superscript 10, on *secundum hanc* in the Respondeo (alongside existing `[^12]`).
  - `[^20]` (cod. Z *subiungit Dei*) → superscript 11, on *de dilectione communi* in the Respondeo's closing sentence — **this location had no prior marker at all**; clean orphan fill, no duplication.
  - `[^21]` (Priscian, *Grammat.* XIV c.3, on the preposition *ex*) → superscript 12, on *haec praepositio ex* at the start of reply 1 (alongside existing `[^1]`).
  - Six of the seven placements land beside an already-present (but content-mismatched) marker from the pre-existing [^1]–[^12] numbering; per J4 scope only markers were *added*, none were removed or renumbered, so several lemmas now carry two footnote call-outs. This is non-destructive but should be revisited alongside the [^1]–[^12] mismatch noted above in a future consolidation pass.
- Verified page 701 (both columns, all bands) does **not** hold any of q2's remaining apparatus — confirmed p.701 L-column is q3's own material (QUAESTIO III begins mid-L-column) and p.701 R-column footer (nn.6–11, "Vide hic lit. Magistri c.1", "Quia ut supra d.31...", etc.) is q3's continuation, consistent with this chunk's existing "Footer hand-offs" note above. No page-701 re-attribution was needed.
- Post-fix classifier: `defs=21 la=23 en=23 orphanDefs=['13','14']` — down from 9 orphaned to 2 (both refused with documented reason, not silently dropped).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 701 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum Deus diligat omnes creaturas aequaliter.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus diligat omnes aequaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Sapientiae* sexto[^1]: *Pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus;* sed eo modo diligit, quo modo est ei cura: ergo videtur, quod omnes aequaliter diligat.

2. Item, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[^2], « primum uno modo se habet ad omnia »; sed Deum diligere creaturam hoc est Deum aliquo modo ad creaturam se habere: ergo si uniformiter se habet ad omnia, uniformiter et aequaliter se habet ad ea: non ergo diligit unam magis quam aliam.

3. Item, eadem dilectione, qua Pater diligit Filium, diligit creaturam[^3]; sed dilectio, qua diligit Filium, est dilectio permaxima: ergo omnem creaturam diligit dilectione summa. Si ergo in summo non est ponere *magis* et *minus,* sed solum aequale; videtur, quod omnem creaturam diligat aequaliter.

4. Item, sicut Deus cognoscit creaturas, ita diligit[^4]; sed omnes creaturas cognoscit aequaliter, non magis unam quam alteram: ergo omnes aequaliter diligit.

5. Item, sicut limpiditas cognitionis facit ad eius nobilitatem, sic magnitudo dilectionis facit ad eius commendationem[^5]; sed quia cognitio Dei est nobilissima, omnem creaturam limpidissime cognoscit: ergo similiter, cum dilectio Dei sit excellentissima, omnem creaturam maxime diligit: ergo si in maximo non est ponere *magis* et *minus,* videtur, quod aequaliter amet cuncta quae diligit.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera[^6]: « Quis digne exprimat, quantum Deus diligat membra unigeniti Filii sui, et quanto amplius ipsum Unigenitum »? si igitur amplius diligit ipsum Unigenitum quam ipsius membra, videtur, quod non omnia aequaliter diligat.

2. Item, Deus diligit bonum, quia bonum, ergo magis bonum magis diligit[^7]; sed non omnia sunt aequaliter bona: ergo non omnia sunt a Deo aequaliter dilecta.

3. Item, caritas nostra est ordinata[^8]: si ergo ordo est de eius complemento, videtur multo fortius, quod caritatis summae et increatae sit res diligere ordinate, cum illa sit exemplar caritatis crea-

<!-- page 702 -->

tae: si ergo Deus diligit res ordinate, videtur, quod non aequaliter.

4. Item, secundum quod Deus diligit, secundum hoc dona sua distribuit; sed non omnibus aequaliter dona sua distribuit: ergo non omnes aequaliter diligit[^9].

5. Item, si aequaliter omnes diligeret, aequaliter omnibus propitius esset; sed non aequaliter omnibus propitiatur, immo *cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat*[^10]: ergo non aequaliter diligit omnes creaturas.

### Conclusio.

> Deus diligit omnes aequali dilectione, si ea sumitur secundum essentiam, sive actum volendi; non vero, si sumitur secundum efficaciam, sive bonum volitum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de dilectione Dei est loqui dupliciter, videlicet secundum *essentiam* et secundum *efficaciam*[^11]; sive secundum actum essentialem et secundum effectum consequentem. Si loquamur de dilectione quantum ad essentiam sive quantum ad actum essentialem; sic non tantum aequali dilectione diligit omnia; immo tantum uno et eodem actu simplici et indivisibili, nullo variato, nullo multiplicato, qui quidem est divina usia[^12], diligit se et omnia alia. — Si vero loquamur de dilectione quantum ad efficaciam sive quantum ad effectum consequentem; sic, cum effectus ab ipsa dilectione Dei procedentes sint ordinati et sese excedentes, dicere est, quod Deus non omnes creaturas diligit aequaliter.

Aliter potest dici et quasi in idem redit, quod cum *diligere* idem sit quod *velle bonum*[^13], aequalitas dilectionis potest attendi dupliciter: aut ex parte *actus volendi,* aut ex parte *boni voliti.* Si ex parte actus volendi, sic omnia diligit aequaliter, quia non magis intense vult Deus bonum alicui rei quam alteri, immo ipso[^14] summo amore suo vult bonum cuicumque vult. — Si autem ex parte *boni voliti,* sic, cum maius bonum velit uni quam alteri, non est dicere, quod omnia diligat aequaliter, sed quaedam maxime, quaedam vero minime, secundum quod vult communicare alicui bonum parvum, vel magnum, vel maximum. — Et quia secundum istam viam procedunt rationes ostendentes, quod Deus non diligit omnia aequaliter, sicut aspicienti patet; ideo sunt concedendae. — Verumtamen illa ratio, quae sumta est ex ordine caritatis nostrae, non valet, quia dilectio nostra diversis motibus movetur circa diversa diligibilia, qui possunt esse intensi et remissi; non sic autem est ex parte Dei.

**Ad obiecta:**

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de *Sapientiae* sexto, quod aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus; dicendum, quod *aequalitas* illa non excludit ordinatam boni communicationem, sed excludit personarum acceptionem, quae quidem est inaequalitas non solum deficiens ab *unitate aequalitatis,* verum etiam a *pulcritudine ordinis;* et ideo reprehensibilis est nec habet in Deo reperiri[^15].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prima causa uno modo se habet ad omnia; dicendum, quod illud verum est quantum ad id quod est ex parte Dei; sed tamen creaturae, sicut ipse[^16] dicit, non uniformiter se habent ad ipsum; et quoniam *diligere* Dei non tantum dicit, quod est ex parte ipsius, sed etiam effectum creatum: hinc est, quod ratione illius potest attendi inaequalitas.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem dilectione diligit Deus Filium suum et creaturam; dicendum, quod quamvis dilectio sit eadem quantum ad rationem *principalis significati,* tamen *connotatum*[^17] est aliud et aliud. Nam cum dicit, quod diligit Filium, non connotatur ibi aliquod bonum creatum, immo notatur communicatio Boni summi et infiniti: cum vero dicitur, quod diligit creaturam, connotatur communicatio boni creati et finiti; et ex hac parte dictum est, quod inaequalitas potest attendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut cognoscit, sic diligit; dicendum, quod si *diligere* accipiatur pro ipso diligendi actu; sic veritatem habet, quia idem est Deo[^18] diligere et cognoscere. Si vero pro *connotato effectu,* sic non habet veritatem, quia *cognoscere* non connotat effectum, sicut *diligere.* Et ideo non potest attendi gradus et ordo in cognitione Dei ratione connotati, secundum quod in dilectione[^19].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de perfectione et nobilitate dilectionis est magnitudo sive immensi-

<!-- page 703 -->

tas, sicut de perfectione cognitionis est ipsa limpiditas; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est ex parte ipsius actus diligendi; unde unumquodque[^20] diligit Deus dilectione permaxima, nec magis delectatur Deus in dilectione unius quam in dilectione alterius. Deus enim in diligendo se ipsum et se ipso fruendo diligit cetera, ita quod omnia diligendo se ipso fruitur et summe in se ipso delectatur; hac tamen dilectione maxima et summa quibusdam communicat maiora bona, quibusdam minora. Unde sicut dilectio Dei in se est fruitio, ipsa tamen relata ad creaturam potest dici *usus* ratione connotati[^21]; sic, quamvis in se sit summa, ratione tamen effectus connotati contingit dici, aliquid plus, aliquid minus ab eo diligi[^22].

english:
### Question III. *Whether God loves all creatures equally.*

Thirdly it is asked whether God loves all things equally. And that he does so, it seems.

1. *Wisdom* six[^1]: *He made the little and the great, and he has care of all alike;* but he loves in the same way as he has care: therefore it seems that he loves all equally.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher says[^2], « the first stands in one way to all things »; but for God to love a creature is for God to stand in some way toward the creature: therefore if he stands uniformly toward all things, he also stands uniformly and equally toward them: therefore he does not love one more than another.

3. Likewise, by the same love by which the Father loves the Son he loves the creature[^3]; but the love by which he loves the Son is the very greatest love: therefore he loves every creature with the highest love. If therefore in what is highest there is no place for *more* and *less,* but only the equal; it seems that he loves every creature equally.

4. Likewise, as God knows creatures, so he loves [them][^4]; but he knows all creatures equally, not one more than another: therefore he loves all equally.

5. Likewise, as the clarity of knowledge contributes to its nobility, so the magnitude of love contributes to its commendation[^5]; but since the knowledge of God is most noble, he knows every creature most clearly: therefore likewise, since the love of God is most excellent, he loves every creature most greatly: therefore if in what is greatest there is no place for *more* and *less,* it seems that he loves equally all the things that he loves.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine says, and it is found in the [Master's] text[^6]: « Who can worthily express how much God loves the members of his only-begotten Son, and how much more the Only-begotten himself »? if therefore he loves the Only-begotten himself more than his members, it seems that he does not love all things equally.

2. Likewise, God loves the good because [it is] good, therefore the more good he loves the more[^7]; but not all things are equally good: therefore not all things are equally loved by God.

3. Likewise, our charity is ordered[^8]: if therefore order belongs to its completeness, it seems much more strongly that it belongs to the highest and uncreated charity to love things in an ordered way, since that is the exemplar of created charity: if therefore God loves things in an ordered way, it seems that [he does] not [love them] equally.

4. Likewise, according as God loves, accordingly he distributes his gifts; but he does not distribute his gifts to all equally: therefore he does not love all equally[^9].

5. Likewise, if he loved all equally, he would be equally favorable to all; but he is not equally favorable to all, indeed *he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens*[^10]: therefore he does not love all creatures equally.

### Conclusion.

> God loves all with an equal love, if it is taken according to essence, or the act of willing; but not so, if it is taken according to efficacy, or the good willed.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the love of God in two ways, namely according to *essence* and according to *efficacy*[^11]; or according to the essential act and according to the consequent effect. If we speak of love as to essence or as to the essential act; thus he does not love all things with merely an equal love; indeed by only one and the same act, simple and indivisible, nothing varied, nothing multiplied, which is the divine *usia*[^12], he loves himself and all other things. — But if we speak of love as to efficacy or as to the consequent effect; thus, since the effects proceeding from the love of God itself are ordered and surpassing one another, one must say that God does not love all creatures equally.

It can be said otherwise, and it comes back to almost the same thing, that since *to love* is the same as *to will the good*[^13], the equality of love can be regarded in two ways: either on the part of the *act of willing,* or on the part of the *good willed.* If on the part of the act of willing, thus he loves all things equally, because God does not will the good for one thing more intensely than for another, indeed by his very[^14] highest love he wills the good for whomever he wills. — But if on the part of the *good willed,* thus, since he wills a greater good to one than to another, one cannot say that he loves all things equally, but some most greatly, some least, according as he wills to communicate to someone a good small, or great, or greatest. — And because the reasons showing that God does not love all things equally proceed along this way, as is clear to one who looks; therefore they are to be conceded. — Nevertheless that reason which is taken from the order of our charity does not hold, because our love is moved by diverse motions about diverse lovable things, which can be intense and remiss; but it is not so on the part of God.

**Reply to the objections:**

1. To that which is objected from *Wisdom* six, that he has care of all alike; it must be said that that *equality* does not exclude an ordered communication of the good, but excludes acceptance of persons, which indeed is an inequality not only deficient from the *unity of equality,* but also from the *beauty of order;* and therefore it is reprehensible and cannot be found in God[^15].

2. To that which is objected, that the first cause stands in one way to all things; it must be said that this is true as to that which is on the part of God; but nevertheless creatures, as he himself[^16] says, do not stand uniformly toward him; and since *to love* in God's case expresses not only what is on the part of himself, but also the created effect: hence it is that by reason of that an inequality can be regarded.

3. To that which is objected, that by the same love God loves his Son and the creature; it must be said that although the love is the same as to the formal character of the *principal thing signified,* yet the *connoted* thing[^17] is different and different. For when he says that he loves the Son, no created good is connoted there, but rather is denoted the communication of the highest and infinite Good: but when it is said that he loves the creature, there is connoted the communication of a created and finite good; and on this side it has been said that inequality can be regarded.

4. To that which is objected, that as he knows, so he loves; it must be said that if *to love* is taken for the very act of loving; thus it has truth, because in God[^18] to love and to know are the same. But if [it is taken] for the *connoted effect,* thus it does not have truth, because *to know* does not connote an effect, as *to love* [does]. And therefore a grade and order cannot be regarded in the knowledge of God by reason of the connoted [effect], as [they can] in love[^19].

5. To that which is objected, that the magnitude or immensity belongs to the perfection and nobility of love, as the very clarity belongs to the perfection of knowledge; it must be said that this is true as to what is on the part of the very act of loving; whence God loves each thing[^20] with the very greatest love, nor is God more delighted in the love of one than in the love of another. For God in loving himself and in enjoying himself loves the rest, so that loving all things he enjoys himself and is supremely delighted in himself; yet with this greatest and highest love he communicates greater goods to some, lesser to others. Whence as the love of God in itself is fruition, yet related to the creature it can be called *use* by reason of the connoted[^21]; thus, although in itself it is highest, yet by reason of the connoted effect it happens to be said that something is loved more, something less, by him[^22].

la: Vers. 8. — Superius post *omnes* Vat. addit *creaturas.*

en: Verse 8. — Above, after *all* the Vatican [edition] adds *creatures.*

la: Auctor libri de Causis, propos. 24: ipsa verba vide pag. 702, nota 7.

en: The author of the *Book of Causes,* proposition 24: see the words themselves on page 702, note 7.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine arg. pro *diligat* multi codd. *diligit.*

en: See here the Master's text, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, for *he may love* many codices [read] *he loves.*

la: Quia, ut supra d. 31. a. 3. q. 2. fundam. 4. docetur, dilectio sequitur cognitionem.

en: Because, as is taught above, d. 31, a. 3, q. 2, fundamentum 4, love follows knowledge.

la: Vide supra d. 30. q. 6. ad 2.

en: See above, d. 30, q. 6, ad 2.

la: Hic c. 1. — In fine arg. pro *diligat* non pauci codd. *diligit.*

en: Here c. 1. — At the end of the argument, for *he may love* not a few codices [read] *he loves.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 650, nota 8.

en: Cf. above, page 650, note 8.

la: Vide supra d. 29. q. 1.

en: See above, d. 29, q. 1.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. seq.

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2 and following.

en: Romans 9:18.

la: Magister hic c. 3. *secundum efficientiam.* Inferius cod. Z bis post *de dilectione* subdit *Dei.*

en: The Master here c. 3, *according to efficiency.* Below codex Z twice after *of love* adds *of God.*

la: Ut dicit Magister hic in lit. c. 1. — Pro *nullo variato, nullo multiplicato* codd. U Z *nullo modo variato, nullo modo multiplicato,* et proxime post pro *qui quidem,* ut scriptum est in cod. A U aa bb, alii codd. et edd. *quae* [dilectio, ut Magister ait loc. cit.] *quidem.* Paulo inferius pro *dicere est* edd. *dicendum est.*

en: As the Master says here in the text, c. 1. — For *nothing varied, nothing multiplied* codices U Z [read] *in no way varied, in no way multiplied,* and immediately after, for *which indeed,* as is written in codex A U aa bb, other codices and editions [read] *which* [love, as the Master says loc. cit.] *indeed.* A little below, for *one must say* the editions [read] *it must be said.*

la: Vide supra pag. 574, nota 5.

en: See above, page 574, note 5.

la: Cod. A *in ipso.*

en: Codex A [reads] *in the very.*

la: Quare ibid. v. 8. dicitur: *Non enim subtrahet personam cuiusquam Deus, nec verebitur magnitudinem cuiusquam; quoniam pusillum et magnum* etc.

en: Wherefore in the same place, v. 8, it is said: *For God will not withdraw the person of anyone, nor will he stand in awe of the greatness of anyone; for the little and the great* etc.

la: Auctor libri de Causis, propos. 24: *Causa prima existit in omnibus rebus secundum unam dispositionem, sed res omnes non existunt in causa prima secundum unam dispositionem.* Quod est: quia, quamvis causa prima existat in rebus omnibus, tamen unaquaeque res recipit eam secundum suae potentiae modum etc. Et propos. 20: *Prima enim bonitas influit bonitates supra res omnes influxione una, verumtamen unaquaeque rerum recipit ex illa influxione secundum modum suae virtutis et sui esse.*

en: The author of the *Book of Causes,* proposition 24: *The first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition.* That is: because, although the first cause exists in all things, yet each thing receives it according to the mode of its power, etc. And proposition 20: *For the first goodness pours goodnesses upon all things by one inflowing, yet each of the things receives from that inflowing according to the mode of its power and of its being.*

la: Cod. X *quantum tamen ad connotatum.* Post *dilectio* cod. A supplet *Dei.* Pro ultimo *connotatur* multi codd. *notatur.*

en: Codex X [reads] *yet as to the connoted.* After *love* codex A supplies *of God.* For the last *is connoted* many codices [read] *is denoted.*

la: Vat. *in Deo.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *in God.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. in corp. ad fundam. 5.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, in the body, to fundamentum 5.

la: Codd. A U *unumquemque.* Mox post *Deus enim* plures codd. omittunt *in.* Aliquanto inferius pro *delectatur; hac tamen* Vat. *delectat, attamen.* Deinde pro *maiora bona* cod. bb *magna bona,* multi alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *magis bona.*

en: Codices A U [read] *each one.* Soon after *for God* several codices omit *in.* Somewhat below, for *is delighted; yet with this* the Vatican [edition reads] *delights, nevertheless.* Then for *greater goods* codex bb [reads] *great goods,* many other codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *more good.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 5. — In fine solut. pro *contingit dici* cod. G *contingit dicere,* et dein post ultimum verbum (*diligi*) cod. K adiecit *et patent obiecta.*

en: Cf. above, q. 1, ad 5. — At the end of the solution, for *it happens to be said* codex G [reads] *it happens to say,* and then after the last word (*loved*) codex K added *and the objections are clear.*

en: See the scholion on the 1st question of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi Vol III PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{701,702,703}-{L,R}-*.png`, offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 48702–48814) as base for clean running prose. Two-column PDF-priority inversion per the VOL II OVERRIDE. English freshly translated, literal.

**Title.** The printed **QUAESTIO III header reads *Utrum Deus diligat omnes creaturas aequaliter*** (body opener: *Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus diligat omnes aequaliter*); the TRACTATIO listing gave *Tertium est, utrum omnes diligat aequaliter* — same question, no variant of substance. Per the trust-running-head-text rule, `title_la`/`title_en` follow the printed header. **Alignment verified: TRACTATIO Tertium = QUAESTIO III opener (*Tertio quaeritur… aequaliter*), no q-swap.**

**Page-split map.** Opens lower-L on **p.701** (below q2's reply-3.4.5 R-col tail): QUAESTIO III header + opener + args 1–4 (L-col), arg.5 + Sed contra 1–3 start (R-col). **p.702**: arg.3 tail, args 4–5, Conclusio, Respondeo (L-col); Respondeo cont. (*Aliter potest dici*), reply 1, reply 2 start (R-col). **p.703**: reply 5 tail only (R-col + L-col top, above QUAESTIO IV). Page breaks marked at the arg.3 (701→702) and reply-5 (702→703) seams. (Replies 1–4 + start of 5 sit on p.702; reply 5 finishes at the top of p.703.)

**Apparatus: 22 entries, per-page restart (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM), renumbered continuous.** **p.701 nn.4–11 → [^1]–[^8]** (the PICKED-UP hand-off from q2: n.4=[^1] Wisd. 8 *creaturas* add, arg.1; n.5=[^2] *Book of Causes* propos.24 cross-ref, arg.2; n.6=[^3] Master's text c.1 / *diligat~diligit* variant, arg.3; n.7=[^4] d.31 a.3 q.2 — love-follows-knowledge, arg.4; n.8=[^5] d.30 q.6 ad 2, arg.5; n.9=[^6] *Hic c.1* / *diligat~diligit* variant, Sed-contra-1 Augustine; n.10=[^7] pag.650 nota 8, Sed-contra-2; n.11=[^8] d.29 q.1, Sed-contra-3 *ordinata*). **p.702 nn.1–11 → [^9]–[^19]** (n.1=[^9] Master's text c.2, Sed-contra-4; n.2=[^10] Rom. 9:18, Sed-contra-5; n.3=[^11] Master c.3 *secundum efficientiam* / cod.Z *Dei*, Respondeo *efficacia*; n.4=[^12] *nullo variato* etc. + *qui quidem* / *dicere est* variants, Respondeo *divina usia*; n.5=[^13] pag.574 nota 5, *diligere = velle bonum*; n.6=[^14] cod.A *in ipso*, *ipso summo amore*; n.7=[^15] Wisd. 8 v.8 *Non enim subtrahet personam*, reply-1; n.8=[^16] *Book of Causes* propos.24+20, reply-2 *ipse dicit*; n.9=[^17] cod.X/A/notatur variants, reply-3 *connotatum*; n.10=[^18] Vat. *in Deo*, reply-4 *idem est Deo*; n.11=[^19] q.1 ad fundam.5, reply-4 *in dilectione*). **p.703 nn.1–3 → [^20]–[^22]** (n.1=[^20] *unumquemque* / *delectatur* / *maiora bona* variants, reply-5 *unumquodque*; n.2=[^21] q.1 ad 5 / *contingit dici* variant, reply-5 *usus ratione connotati*; n.3=[^22] the **scholion redirect** *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*, reply-5 tail *ab eo diligi*). Markers paired in both Latin and English bodies.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked-up from q2 (d32-a1-q2):* **p.701 NOTAE nn.4–11** (q2 owned only p.701 L-band nn.1–3; nn.4–11 anchor in q3's args 1–5 + Sed-contra 1–3, consumed here as [^1]–[^8]).
- *Forwarded to q4 (d32-a1-q4):* on the shared **p.703**, q3 owns nn.1–3 only (reply-5 spill, last = the scholion redirect). **p.703 nn.4–11 belong to q4** — n.4 *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* (q4's own redirect anchor); n.5 *Cfr. II Sent. lit. Magistri d. III c. 4; ibid. Comment. p. II a. 1 q. 2 et d. 3 a. 1 q. 1 seq.*; n.6 *Prov. 8, 17: Ego diligentes me diligo*; n.7 *Cap. 25, ubi s. Doctor non obscure innuit, Angelos bonos esse infra Deum et supra hominem…*; n.8 *Vers. 16. Cfr. supra d.2 a.1 q.2 — Paulo inferius pro naturam creatam cod. Q naturam humanam*; n.9 *Vers. 13*; n.10 *Respicitur Rom. 5, 8. seqq. Cfr. supra d.30 q.6 ad 2*; n.11 *Cod. Z supplet quam homines.* q4 (which opens *Quarto quaeritur, utrum Deus magis diligat hominem quam Angelum,* at the foot of p.703 / raw 48828) starts its NOTAE pickup at p.703 n.4, then per-page restart on p.704+.

**Scholion: ABSENT — REDIRECT to q1 §IV.** q3 has no own scholion. q1's article-master scholion (printed on p.699 under q1's body) §IV explicitly forward-treats this q3 («**IV.** De 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 4…»). q3's own apparatus footer (p.703 n.3 = [^22]) reads «Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.» `has_scholion: false`. Mirrors the established sibling-redirect convention (d32-a1-q2 → q1 §III; d29/d30 q2/q3 → q1).

**`[?]` flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 703 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum Deus magis diligat hominem quam Angelum, an e converso.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum Deus magis diligat hominem quam Angelum, an e converso. Et quod magis Angelum, videtur:

1. Quia tanto aliquis est Deo amabilior, quanto est ipsi similior: si ergo natura angelica est Deo similior quam humana[^1], videtur, quod ab eo sit magis dilecta.

2. Item, maior dilectio et minor attenditur secundum maiorem et minorem communicationem divinae liberalitatis; sed Deus pro uno solo motu Angelum glorificavit[^2], quod non facit hominibus: ergo exstitit eis liberalior quam nobis: igitur magis diligit genus angelicum quam humanum.

3. Item, Angeli magis diligunt Deum quam nos, pro eo quod nullam habent retardationem, qua praepediantur, ne totaliter possint tendere in Deum: ergo si Deus magis diligit magis se diligentes[^3], videtur, quod magis diligat Angelos quam homines.

4. Item, Angeli sunt mediatores inter nos et Deum, secundum quod vult Augustinus octavo de Civitate Dei[^4]; sed medium magis unitur extremo et ei est familiarius, quam unum extremum respectu alterius: ergo videtur, quod Deus magis diligat Angelos quam homines.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Hebraeos secundo[^5]: *Nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae;* sed illud fuit potissimum signum dilectionis et familiaritatis divinae, quod assumeret naturam creatam in unitatem personae suae: ergo videtur, quod magis dilexerit humanam naturam quam angelicam.

2. Item, Ioannis decimo quinto[^6]: *Maiorem caritatem nemo habet* etc.; sed Deus posuit animam suam pro hominibus, non posuit eam pro Angelis: ergo magis homines quam Angelos dilexit.

3. Item, illam naturam magis Deus diligit, quam in altiori gradu honoris constituit: sed Deus humanam naturam in utroque sexu angelicis spiritibus superposuit, videlicet Christum et eius nobilissimam Matrem: ergo videtur, quod humanam naturam magis diligat et magis dilexerit.

4. Item, magis diligit quis aliquem, cum diligit eum in statu amicitiae et inimicitiae, quam solum cum diligit in statu amicitiae; sed Deus humanum genus diligit in statu amicitiae et in statu inimicitiae, quia, cum essemus peccatores et inimici Dei, dilexit nos[^7], Angelos vero malos nec dilexit nec diligit: ergo videtur, quod prae Angelis genus humanum dilexerit.

### Conclusio.

> *Loquendo de dilectione Dei quoad effectum conditionis, Deus magis dilexit Angelos quam genus humanum; sed aliter rationabiliter dici potest quoad effectum reparationis et secundum statum finalem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum Deus dicatur diligere creaturas effectu, secundum quod duplex est effectus principalis Dei respectu creaturae rationalis, secundum hoc potest dilectio Dei maior et minor dupliciter considerari. Est enim effectus conditionis et effectus reparationis. Et in effectu conditionis praecipue manifestatur Dei potentia, in effectu reparationis praecipue manifestatur Dei misericordia, in utroque autem manifestatur Dei sapientia.

Si ergo loquamur de dilectione Dei quantum ad effectum conditionis, sic magis dilexit Angelos[^8], quia meliora contulit eis naturalia et magis poten-
<!-- page 704 -->
tes eos fecit, et in eis magis manifestatur divina potentia. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad effectum reparationis, sic magis dilexit homines quam Angelos, quoniam Angelos deseruit, sed homines relevavit. Et sic patet, quod secundum diversos effectus homo et Angelus in dilectione Dei mutuo se excedant.

Si autem quaeras, quae istarum dilectionum magis excedat reliquam; tunc respondendum est, quod est loqui de excessu dilectionis ut nunc, vel, simpliciter, sive secundum statum praesentem, vel secundum statum finalem. Si loquamur de excessu dilectionis secundum statum praesentem; sic concedendum est, quod magis diligit Angelos quam homines. Si vero loquamur secundum statum finalis gratiae[^9], in quo erit reparatio consummata; sic videtur satis rationabiliter posse dici, quod magis diligat homines. De pluribus enim habebit homo in paradiso, unde gratus et devotus existat Deo, quam angelicus ordo: tum propter beneficium incarnationis, tum propter beneficium redemptionis, tum propter beneficium eminentis glorificationis; quae non tantum manifestant erga nos divinae caritatis magnitudinem, sed etiam eius nimietatem, secundum illud quod dicitur ad Ephesios secundo[^10]: *Deus, qui est dives in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem suam, qua dilexit nos, cum essemus mortui peccato, convivificavit nos Christo.*

Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Patet etiam responsio ad obiecta: quia utraeque rationes verum concludunt secundum diversas vias. Illae enim rationes, quae probant, quod magis diligat genus humanum, procedunt secundum effectum reparationis, habito respectu ad finalem statum; et ideo verum concludunt et concedendae sunt. Rationes vero, quae in oppositum adducuntur, alia via procedunt, sicut patet aspicienti.

1. Nam quod primo obiicitur, quod Angelus est Deo similior; hoc verum est quantum ad ea quae sunt naturae, sed non oportet quantum ad dona gratiae. Dilectio autem Dei magis pensat dona naturae superaddita, quam ea quae sunt naturaliter insita. Et si tu obiicias, quod gratia correspondet naturae; ad hoc satis in secundo libro[^11] responsum est.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus liberalior est in Angelis, quia uno motu eos[^12] beatificavit; dicendum, quod illud non concludit de dilectione simpliciter, sed de dilectione ut nunc, quae statum praesentem respicit. Praeterea, maius fuit Unigenitum suum pro impiis dare, quam Angelis merentibus aeternam mercedem retribuere; hoc enim fuit iustitiae, illud vero misericordiae et pietatis abundantissimae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angeli magis diligunt, quia nullum habent retardativum; dicendum, quod illa ratio concludit solum secundum statum praesentem, in quo corpus, cum corrumpitur, aggravat spiritum: secundum statum vero futurum, cum corpus erit spirituale effectum[^13], homo non habebit aliquod impedimentum et habebit praecipuum gratiae adiutorium.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt mediatores; similiter patet responsio. Mediatores enim nostri sunt secundum statum praesentis miseriae, in quo propter multiplicem defectum necessarium est nobis multiplex adiutorium, et propter magnam elongationem nostri a Deo indigemus mediatorum auxilio[^14].

english:
### Question IV. *Whether God loves man more than the Angel, or the reverse.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether God loves man more than the Angel, or the reverse. And that [He loves] the Angel more, seems to be the case:

1. Because someone is more lovable to God in proportion as he is more like Him: if therefore the angelic nature is more like God than the human[^1], it seems that it is more loved by Him.

2. Likewise, a greater and a lesser love is attended to according to the greater and lesser communication of divine liberality; but for one single motion God glorified the Angel[^2], which He does not do for men: therefore He was more liberal to them than to us: therefore He loves the angelic kind more than the human.

3. Likewise, the Angels love God more than we do, in that they have no retardation by which they are hindered from being able to tend wholly into God: therefore if God loves more those who love Him more[^3], it seems that He loves the Angels more than men.

4. Likewise, the Angels are mediators between us and God, according to what Augustine holds in the eighth book of the *City of God*[^4]; but the middle is more united to the extreme and is more familiar to it than one extreme is with respect to the other: therefore it seems that God loves the Angels more than men.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter two[^5]: *Nowhere did He take hold of the Angels, but of the seed of Abraham;* but it was the most powerful sign of divine love and familiarity, that He should assume a created nature into the unity of His own person: therefore it seems that He loved the human nature more than the angelic.

2. Likewise, John, chapter fifteen[^6]: *Greater love has no one* etc.; but God laid down His soul for men, He did not lay it down for the Angels: therefore He loved men more than the Angels.

3. Likewise, God loves more that nature which He has set in a higher grade of honor: but God set the human nature, in both sexes, above the angelic spirits — namely Christ and His most noble Mother: therefore it seems that He loves and has loved the human nature more.

4. Likewise, one loves another more when he loves him in the state of friendship and of enmity, than only when he loves him in the state of friendship; but God loves the human kind in the state of friendship and in the state of enmity, for, when we were sinners and enemies of God, He loved us[^7], whereas the evil Angels He neither loved nor loves: therefore it seems that He has loved the human kind above the Angels.

### Conclusion.

> *Speaking of God's love as to the effect of creation, God loved the Angels more than the human kind; but otherwise it can reasonably be said as to the effect of reparation and according to the final state.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since God is said to love creatures by an effect, according as there is a twofold principal effect of God with respect to the rational creature, accordingly God's love can be considered greater and lesser in two ways. For there is the effect of creation and the effect of reparation. And in the effect of creation God's power is chiefly manifested, in the effect of reparation God's mercy is chiefly manifested, and in both God's wisdom is manifested.

If therefore we speak of God's love as to the effect of creation, thus He loved the Angels more[^8], because He conferred upon them better natural endowments and made them more power-
ful, and in them divine power is more manifested. — But if we speak as to the effect of reparation, thus He loved men more than the Angels, since He deserted the Angels but raised up men. And thus it is clear that, according to diverse effects, man and the Angel mutually exceed each other in God's love.

But if you ask which of these loves exceeds the other more; then it must be answered that one may speak of the excess of love *as now*, or *absolutely*, that is, either according to the present state, or according to the final state. If we speak of the excess of love according to the present state, thus it must be conceded that He loves the Angels more than men. But if we speak according to the state of final grace[^9], in which the reparation will be consummated, thus it seems it can reasonably enough be said that He loves men more. For man will have in paradise more reasons whereby he may stand grateful and devout to God than the angelic order does: both because of the benefit of the incarnation, and because of the benefit of redemption, and because of the benefit of his eminent glorification; which manifest toward us not only the greatness of divine charity but also its excess, according to that which is said to the Ephesians, chapter two[^10]: *God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sin, has quickened us together in Christ.*

And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. The response to the objections is also clear: for both sets of reasons conclude truly along diverse paths. For those reasons which prove that He loves the human kind more proceed according to the effect of reparation, with regard had to the final state; and therefore they conclude truly and are to be conceded. But the reasons which are adduced on the opposite side proceed by another path, as is clear to one who looks.

1. For as to what is first objected, that the Angel is more like God; this is true as to those things which are of nature, but it need not [be true] as to the gifts of grace. Now God's love weighs the superadded gifts of nature more than those which are naturally implanted. And if you object that grace corresponds to nature; to this enough has been answered in the second book[^11].

2. To that which is objected, that God is more liberal toward the Angels, because by one motion He beatified them[^12]; it must be said that this does not conclude concerning love absolutely, but concerning love *as now*, which regards the present state. Moreover, it was greater to give His Only-begotten for the impious than to recompense eternal reward to the Angels who merited it; for this was of justice, but that of most abundant mercy and piety.

3. To that which is objected, that the Angels love more, because they have nothing to retard them; it must be said that that reason concludes only according to the present state, in which the body, when it is corrupted, weighs down the spirit: but according to the future state, when the body will have been made spiritual[^13], man will have no impediment and will have the chief help of grace.

4. To that which is objected, that they are mediators; the response is likewise clear. For our mediators belong to the state of present misery, in which, because of manifold defect, a manifold help is necessary for us, and because of the great distance of ourselves from God we need the help of mediators[^14].

la: Codd. A U *Utrumquemque.* Mox *minus;* Deus enim plures codd. omittunt; *minus quanto inferius iam delectatur;* hanc tamen Vat. *delectat, aut minus.* Deinde pro *maiora bona* cod. bb *magna bona,* multi alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *magis amati.*

en: Codices A U read *Utrumquemque.* Soon, *minus;* "Deus enim" several codices omit; *minus quanto inferius iam delectatur;* this, however, the Vatican edition [reads] *delectat, aut minus.* Then for *maiora bona* codex bb [reads] *magna bona,* many other codices and editions 1, 2 *magis amati.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1 ad 5. — In fine solut. pro *contingit dici* cod. tt *contingit dicere,* sicut post *aliud minus diligi* cod. k *udlecti et patent obiecta.*

en: Cf. above, q. 1, reply to 5. — At the end of the solution, for *contingit dici* codex tt [reads] *contingit dicere,* as after *aliud minus diligi* codex k [reads] *udlecti et patent obiecta.*

la: Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.

en: See the scholion to question I of this article.

la: Vide verba Gregorii, supra pag. 39, nota i, collata.

en: See the words of Gregory, above, p. 39, note 1, compared.

la: Cfr. II Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III c. 1; ibid. Comment. p. II a. 1 q. 2 et d. 1 a. 1 q. 1 seq.

en: Cf. II Sent., the text of the Master, d. III, c. 1; ibid. the Commentary, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ff.

la: Prov. 8, 17: *Ego diligentes me diligo.*

en: Prov. 8:17: *I love those who love me.*

la: Cap. 25, ubi s. Doctor non obscure innuit, Angelos bonos esse infra Deum et supra hominem, nosque per fidem prius ad eos accedere, «si ab illo nos fieri beatos, a quo ipsi facti sunt, etiam *ipsis parentibus,* credimus».

en: Chapter 25, where the holy Doctor not obscurely intimates that the good Angels are below God and above man, and that we first approach them through faith, «if we believe that we are made blessed by Him by whom they themselves were made, *they too sharing in it.*»

la: Vers. 16. Cfr. supra d. 2, a. 1, q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *naturam creatam* cod. Q *naturam humanam.* — Vers. 13.

en: Verse 16. Cf. above, d. 2, a. 1, q. 2. — A little below, for *naturam creatam* codex Q [reads] *naturam humanam.* — Verse 13.

la: Cod. A *gloriae.*

en: Codex A [reads] *gloriae* [for *gratiae*].

la: Vers. 4 seq., ubi Vulgata: *et cum essemus mortui peccatis... nos in Christo.*

en: Verse 4 f., where the Vulgate [reads]: *and when we were dead in our sins... us in Christ.*

la: Dist. 9, q. 3. — Paulo ante pro *Dilectio autem* cod. A *Dilectio enim,* et dein pro *insita* cod. Z *inserta.*

en: Dist. 9, q. 3. — A little before, for *Dilectio autem* codex A [reads] *Dilectio enim,* and then for *insita* codex Z *inserta.*

la: Pro *eos,* quod edd. omittunt, cod. V *omnes.* Mox pro *concludit* permulti codd. perperam *excludit,* et paulo post pro *maius fuit* edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. *magis fuit.*

en: For *eos,* which the editions omit, codex V [reads] *omnes.* Soon, for *concludit* very many codices wrongly [read] *excludit,* and a little after, for *maius fuit* editions 1, 2 with not a few codices [read] *magis fuit.*

la: Respicitur illud Sap. 9, 13: *Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam;* et illud I. Cor. 15, 44: *Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale* etc. — Pro *cum corrumpitur* codd. U Z aa *quod corrumpitur,* codd. A T aa *corrumpitur tantum.* Subinde pro *spiritum* cod. Z *animam.* In principio solut. pro *nullum habent retardativum* codd. F K *nullam habent retardationem.* In fine solut. pro *et habebit* edd. cum paucis codd. *sed habebit,* et pro *praecipuum* cod. Z *praecipue.*

en: Reference is made to that of Wisd. 9:13: *For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul;* and that of 1 Cor. 15:44: *A natural body is sown, a spiritual body shall rise* etc. — For *cum corrumpitur* codices U Z aa [read] *quod corrumpitur,* codices A T aa *corrumpitur tantum.* Thereupon for *spiritum* codex Z [reads] *animam.* At the beginning of the solution, for *nullum habent retardativum* codices F K [read] *nullam habent retardationem.* At the end of the solution, for *et habebit* the editions with a few codices [read] *sed habebit,* and for *praecipuum* codex Z *praecipue.*

la: Vide verba August., supra d. 19, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5, allata. — Superius pro *statum praesentis miseriae* codd. B C D E I L G M O T V et edd. 1, 2 *statum praesentem miseriae.*

en: See the words of Augustine, above, d. 19, a. 2, q. 2, reply to 5, adduced. — Above, for *statum praesentis miseriae* codices B C D E I L G M O T V and editions 1, 2 [read] *statum praesentem miseriae.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solutione huius et duarum sequentium quaestionum auctores satis conveniunt. Quoad primam quaestionem, et respectu habito ad bonum gloriae, S. Thom. (hic a. 5. quaestiunc. 3.) paulo aliter distinguit. Nam comparationem instituit de singulis hominibus ad singulos Angelos, non de toto genere, et solvit his verbis: «Quantum ad bonum gloriae se habent ut excedentia et excessa, quia quosdam homines plus, et quosdam Angelos plus, et quosdam aequaliter» (diligit). Eandem doctrinam repetit in Sum. (I. q. 20. a. 4, ubi de his 3 quaestionibus unitis disputat) et quoad totum genus addit: «Nec ideo naturam humanam assumsit Deus, quia hominem plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat»; quod non contradicit doctrinae S. Bonaventurae, qui disertis verbis loquitur de divina dilectione secundum effectus. — De hac (4.) quaestione praeter S. Thom. aliosque in praeced. scholio citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 32. m. I. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 9. n. 10. seqq. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 16. q. 65. q. incid. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** In solutione sequentis (5.) quaestionis omnes concedunt, quod Deus Christum etiam secundum humanam naturam plus diligat quam totam creaturam. Ita S. Thom., hic a. 5. quaestiunc. 4; S. loc. cit. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. q. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 4.

**III.** Ultima (6.) quaestio praecipue orta est ex quadam Glossa hic arg. 3. pro parte affirm. relata. In solutione S. Thom. in Sum. (loc. cit.), postquam retulit diversas illas opiniones, de his (vel saltem de ultima, quod Petrus simpliciter fuerit melior, sed Ioannes secundum quid), omnino concordans Seraphico, sapienter concludit: «Praesumtuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia, ut dicitur Proverb. 16, 2, spirituum ponderator est Dominus, et non alius». Cfr. idem III. Sent. d. 31. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Praeter laudatum: B. Albert., loc. cit. q. incid. 7. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 4. quaestiunc. 4. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 31. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the solution of this and of the two following questions the authors are sufficiently in agreement. As to the first question, and with regard had to the good of glory, St. Thomas (here a. 5, quaestiunc. 3) distinguishes a little differently. For he sets up the comparison of individual men with individual Angels, not of the whole kind, and resolves it in these words: «As to the good of glory they stand as exceeding and exceeded, because [He loves] some men more, and some Angels more, and some equally.» He repeats the same doctrine in the *Summa* (I, q. 20, a. 4, where he disputes about these 3 questions taken together) and as to the whole kind adds: «Nor did God assume the human nature because He loved man more, but because he needed it more»; which does not contradict the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, who in plain words speaks of divine love according to its effects. — On this (4th) question, besides St. Thomas and the others cited in the preceding scholion: Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 32, m. I. — Scotus, III Sent. d. 9, n. 10 ff. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, S. p. I, tr. 16, q. 65, q. incid. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.

**II.** In the solution of the following (5th) question all concede that God loves Christ, even according to His human nature, more than the whole creature. So St. Thomas, here a. 5, quaestiunc. 4; S., loc. cit. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. q. 4, quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 4.

**III.** The last (6th) question arose chiefly from a certain Gloss reported here in arg. 3 for the affirmative side. In the solution St. Thomas in the *Summa* (loc. cit.), after reporting those diverse opinions, concerning these (or at least concerning the last, that Peter was simply better, but John in a certain respect), in full agreement with the Seraphic Doctor, wisely concludes: «Yet it seems presumptuous to adjudicate this, because, as is said in Proverbs 16:2, the Lord is the weigher of spirits, and no other.» Cf. the same, III Sent. d. 31, q. 2, a. 3, quaestiunc. 3. — Besides the one praised: B. Albert, loc. cit. q. incid. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 4, quaestiunc. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III Sent. d. 31, q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the Quaracchi PDF column bands (Vol III is two-column; PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II Override — offset pdf = printed + 22, running-head TEXT trusted over OCR'd digits). Pages read: p.703 (PDF 725) L+R bands, p.704 (PDF 726) L+R bands, p.705 (PDF 727) L+R bands. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.703** (running head `DIST. XXXII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV. 703`): `QUAESTIO IV` header + title; args 1–4; *Sed contra* 1–4; *Conclusio*; *Respondeo* through `magis dilexit Angelos[^8] ... magis poten-`.
- **p.704** (running head `704 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`): `-tes eos fecit ...` continuation of Respondeo; the *Si autem quaeras* excursus (conclusiones 2–4); replies 1–4 (*Ad arg.*); then `SCHOLION` §I begins, §II begins.
- **p.705** (running head OCR-mangled as `703 DIST. XXXII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V.` — actually **printed p.705**, the page where QUAESTIO V begins; trusted by running-head TEXT + +22 offset, NOT the OCR digit): scholion §III runs L→R col and completes (`...spirituum ponderator est Dominus, et non alius» ... Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 31. q. 3.`).

**Apparatus map (14 entries, continuous [^1]–[^14]).** NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart in the source, renumbered continuous:
- **p.703 nn.4–11 → [^1]–[^8]** (PICKED-UP footer hand-off from q3; body markers ⁴–¹¹ all on p.703).
- **p.704 nn.1–6 → [^9]–[^14]** (own; body markers ¹–⁶ in the Respondeo/excursus/replies on p.704). Note the p.704 footers are physically printed split across the body block and the scholion block, but all anchor to q4 body markers.

**Scholion disposition: OWN scholion (not a redirect).** q4 begins a FRESH article-master scholion §I–III (diagnosed at p.704–705, header `SCHOLION` confirmed eyes-on). The q1 article-master scholion §I–IV covered q1–q3 only. This q4 scholion's §I treats q4 ("In solutione *huius* et duarum sequentium quaestionum"), and FORWARDS: **§II → q5** ("In solutione *sequentis (5.) quaestionis*"), **§III → q6** ("Ultima *(6.) quaestio*"). Therefore **a1-q5 and a1-q6 carry NO own scholion** — they redirect here (mirror the q2/q3→q1 redirect convention).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked-up:* p.703 NOTAE nn.4–11 (from q3's forwarded hand-off) = [^1]–[^8] here.
- *Forwarded to a1-q5:* none on the footer-split axis — q5 opens on **p.705** with its own fresh NOTAE sequence (read eyes-on at promotion). Scholion-wise, **§II forwards to q5** and **§III to q6** (q5/q6 will redirect to this q4 scholion).

**[?] flags:** none. (n.4 [^4] "Vide verba Gregorii, supra pag. 39, nota i" — page reference transcribed as printed; the cross-reference target not re-verified but the note text is clean.)


title: Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 705 -->

### Quaestio V. *Utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ioannis tertio[^1]: *Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret;* sed qui dat aliquid pro aliquo magis diligit illud, pro quo dat, quam illud quod commutat: si ergo Deus Filium suum dedit pro salute generis humani, videtur, quod magis genus humanum quam Christum dilexerit.

2. Item, Christus homo est bonitatis finitae, genus[^2] humanum, cum sit multiplicabile de se in personas innumerabiles, habet quodam modo bonitatem infinitam; sed quod plus habet de ratione boni plus habet a Deo diligi: ergo videtur, quod Deus magis diligat totum humanum genus quam illum hominem solum.

3. Item, «propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis[^3]»; sed Filius Dei incarnatus fuit propter genus humanum salvandum, et humana illa natura fuit assumta pro redimenda tota natura humana: ergo magis diligebat Deus ipsam naturam, propter quam carnem assumsit, quam illam quam assumsit: ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, stultus est qui commutat rem maioris valoris pro re minoris valoris: si ergo Deus in redimendo genus humanum non usus est stultitia, immo potius sapientia; non perdidit, sed lucratus est: ergo maius bonum fuit illud quod redemit, quam illud per quod redemit. Et quod magis est bonum magis diligit: si ergo Deus humanum genus per Christum redemit, videtur, quod magis ipsum genus totum quam Christum dilexerit.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Philippenses secundo[^4]: *Dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen;* sed secundum dignitatem communicati nominis attenditur praerogativa amoris: ergo si Christo etiam secundum humanam naturam nomen super omne nomen communicavit, videtur, quod ipsum super omnia dilexerit.

2. Item, Ioannis tertio[^5]: *Datus est ei spiritus* non ad mensuram: si ergo aliis omnibus datur spiritus ad mensuram, et secundum quod Deus excellentius spiritum tribuit, secundum hoc eminentius diligit: videtur ergo, quod magis dilexerit Christum quam totum genus humanum.

3. Item, aut Deus appretiabatur illum hominem tantum quantum genus humanum totum, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum; si non: ergo non reputavit sufficiens pretium: ergo per mortem Christi non fuit ei satisfactum. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, quia abundantissime satisfactum fuit Deo per mortem Filii sui; videtur, quod maioris pretii fuit Christus quam totum genus humanum.

4. Item, in infinitum maius est esse Deum quam habere Deum; sed Deus sic dilexit Christum, quod fecit ipsum esse Deum, alios vero sic diligit, quod facit eos suum habitaculum[^6]: ergo in infinitum plus dilexit Christum quam totum genus humanum.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus plus dilexit Christum quam totum genus humanum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Christus nominat[^7] personam in duabus naturis, quarum una est nobilitatis et dignitatis infinitae, et ipsa *persona* in se; et *natura unita* ratione personae habet quandam nobilitatem et dignitatem singularem et inaestimabilem. Ergo absque omni calumnia potest concedi et dici, quod Deus magis dilexerit et diligat Christum quam totum genus humanum. Et hoc satis expresse colligitur ex verbis Anselmi[^8], ubi ostendit, quod vita illius hominis praeponderabat toti mundo, immo etiam mille mundis. — Propterea rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carius habetur illud quod emitur, quam pretium, quo emitur; dicendum, quod illud est verum, quando pretium ab emente omnino alienatur et transfertur in domi-
<!-- page 706 -->
nium alienum; sic autem non est in proposito, quia Pater non tradebat Christum sine spe rehabendi ipsum, immo sic tradidit eum ad mortem temporalem, ut sine morae dispendio suscitaret eum ad vitam immortalem. Unde quamvis Christus vitam suam pro nobis posuerit, non tamen illam amisit; quia eadem virtute, qua animam posuit volendo pati, ipsam resumsit volendo resurgere[^9].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod genus humanum est bonitatis infinitae, cum sit in infinitum multiplicabile; respondendum est per interemptionem[^10] utriusque. Quamvis enim genus humanum sit in infinitum multiplicabile, quantum est de se, per generationis successionem, si tempus et motus in infinitum duraret; tamen, quantumcumque multiplicetur, semper est actu finitum et bonitatis finitae. Humana vero natura in Christo ratione gratiae unionis, per quam datur spiritus non ad mensuram, quodam modo habet immensitatis dignitatem, ob quam totum genus humanum excedit quasi improportionabiliter. Et ideo ad illam rationem respondendum est per interemptionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis; dicendum, quod illud verum est, secundum quod *propter* dicit habitudinem causae finalis principalis, non prout dicit habitudinem rationis inducentis. Humanum vero genus respectu incarnationis et nativitatis Christi non fuit ratio finaliter movens, sed quodam modo inducens. Non enim Christus ad nos finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum, quia non caput propter membra, sed membra propter caput. Ratio tamen inducens ad tantum bonum fuit nostrae reparationis remedium, sicut in principio huius tertii libri[^11] fuit ostensum. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod genus humanum sit melius, quia minus bonum potest inducere ad faciendum maius bonum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod stultus est mercator, qui emit rem carius, quam valeat; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem nisi in eo mercatore, qui habet indigentiam pretii et potius intendit in mercando se ipsum ditare quam alienam inopiam relevare. Non sic autem est in Deo, qui dives est in misericordia[^12] et bonorum nostrorum non indiget; qui non mercatur propter suam utilitatem augendam, sed propter nostram inopiam relevandam; qui etiam non mercatur ad suae utilitatis promotionem, sed potius ad liberalitatis ostensionem. Et propterea maiori pretio voluit nos redimere, quam nos valeremus, ut, eius liberalitatem circa nos cognoscentes, ex totis praecordiis eidem adhaereremus, ut eum diligeremus et pretiositatem etiam nostram ex tanti pretii immensitate melius cognosceremus. — Praeterea, Deus non redimebat ab alio, sed a se ipso. Manus enim misericordiae redimebat a manu iustitiae, in qua redemptione non tantum considerabatur pretiositas rei emptae, sed etiam dignitas ipsius iustitiae, cui illatum fuerat damnum et offensa. Et quia offensio divinae iustitiae immensae quandam habebat immensitatem; ideo, quamvis homo redemptus non esset valoris infiniti, necessarium tamen fuit, ipsum redimi pretio multo maioris et immensioris valoris, quam sit valor generis humani[^13].[^14]

---

english:
### Question V. *Whether God loved the human kind more than Christ.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether God loved the human kind more than Christ. And that [He did], seems to be the case:

1. John, chapter three[^1]: *So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son;* but he who gives something for the sake of something loves that more, for the sake of which he gives, than that which he exchanges: if therefore God gave His Son for the salvation of the human kind, it seems that He loved the human kind more than Christ.

2. Likewise, Christ the man is of finite goodness, [whereas] the human kind[^2], since it is of itself multipliable into innumerable persons, has in a certain way an infinite goodness; but what has more of the formal character of the good has more of being loved by God: therefore it seems that God loves the whole human kind more than that man alone.

3. Likewise, «on account of which each thing [is so], that too [is so] the more[^3]»; but the Son of God was incarnate for the saving of the human kind, and that human nature was assumed for the redeeming of the whole human nature: therefore God loved more that nature itself, on account of which He assumed flesh, than that which He assumed: therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, he is foolish who exchanges a thing of greater value for a thing of lesser value: if therefore God in redeeming the human kind did not use foolishness, but rather wisdom; He did not lose, but gained: therefore that which He redeemed was a greater good than that through which He redeemed. And what is more good He loves more: if therefore God redeemed the human kind through Christ, it seems that He loved that whole kind more than Christ.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Philippians, chapter two[^4]: *He gave Him a name which is above every name;* but the prerogative of love is attended to according to the dignity of the name communicated: therefore if He communicated to Christ, even according to His human nature, a name above every name, it seems that He loved Him above all things.

2. Likewise, John, chapter three[^5]: *The Spirit was given to Him* not by measure: if therefore to all others the Spirit is given by measure, and according as God more excellently bestows the Spirit, accordingly He more eminently loves: it seems therefore that He loved Christ more than the whole human kind.

3. Likewise, either God valued that man as much as the whole human kind, or not. If so, I have what I propose; if not: therefore He did not reckon [it] a sufficient price: therefore by the death of Christ satisfaction was not made to Him. But if this is manifestly false, because most abundantly satisfaction was made to God by the death of His Son; it seems that Christ was of greater price than the whole human kind.

4. Likewise, it is infinitely greater to be God than to have God; but God so loved Christ that He made Him to be God, whereas others He so loves that He makes them His dwelling-place[^6]: therefore He loved Christ infinitely more than the whole human kind.

### Conclusion.

> *God loved Christ more than the whole human kind.*

**I respond:** It must be said that "Christ" names[^7] a person in two natures, of which one is of infinite nobility and dignity, namely the *person* in itself; and the *united nature*, by reason of the person, has a certain singular and inestimable nobility and dignity. Therefore without any calumny it can be conceded and said that God loved and loves Christ more than the whole human kind. And this is gathered sufficiently expressly from the words of Anselm[^8], where he shows that the life of that man outweighed the whole world, indeed even a thousand worlds. — Therefore the reasons which are adduced for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that what is bought is held more dear than the price by which it is bought; it must be said that this is true when the price is wholly alienated from the buyer and transferred into the dominion of another; but it is not so in the case at hand, because the Father did not hand over Christ without hope of having Him back again, but rather He so handed Him over to temporal death that without the loss of delay He might raise Him to immortal life. Hence although Christ laid down His life for us, yet He did not lose it; because by the same power by which He laid down His soul in willing to suffer, He took it up again in willing to rise[^9].

2. To that which is objected, that the human kind is of infinite goodness, since it is infinitely multipliable; the response must be made by the negation[^10] of both. For although the human kind is infinitely multipliable, as far as it is of itself, through the succession of generation, if time and motion were to endure infinitely; yet, however much it be multiplied, it is always actually finite and of finite goodness. But the human nature in Christ, by reason of the grace of union, through which the Spirit is given not by measure, has in a certain way the dignity of immensity, on account of which it exceeds the whole human kind almost disproportionately. And therefore to that reason the response must be made by negation.

3. To that which is objected: «on account of which each thing [is so], that too [is so] the more»; it must be said that that is true insofar as *on account of* expresses the relation of a principal final cause, not insofar as it expresses the relation of an inducing reason. But the human kind, with respect to the incarnation and nativity of Christ, was not a reason finally moving, but in a certain way inducing. For Christ is not finally ordered to us, but we are finally ordered to Him, because the head [is] not on account of the members, but the members on account of the head. Yet the reason inducing to so great a good was the remedy of our reparation, as was shown at the beginning of this third book[^11]. But from this it does not follow that the human kind is better, because a lesser good can induce to the doing of a greater good.

4. To that which is objected last, that the merchant is foolish who buys a thing more dearly than it is worth; it must be said that this holds true only in the case of that merchant who has need of the price and intends rather, in trading, to enrich himself than to relieve another's want. But it is not so in God, who is rich in mercy[^12] and has no need of our goods; who does not trade for the increasing of His own advantage, but for the relieving of our want; who also does not trade for the promotion of His own advantage, but rather for the showing of His liberality. And therefore He willed to redeem us at a greater price than we were worth, so that, knowing His liberality toward us, we might cleave to Him with our whole heart, so that we might love Him and might also better know our own preciousness from the immensity of so great a price. — Moreover, God did not redeem from another, but from Himself. For the hand of mercy redeemed from the hand of justice, in which redemption there was considered not only the preciousness of the thing bought, but also the dignity of justice itself, to which damage and offense had been brought. And because the offense of the immense divine justice had a certain immensity; therefore, although the redeemed man was not of infinite value, it was nevertheless necessary that he be redeemed at a price of much greater and more immense value than is the value of the human kind[^13].[^14]

---

la: Vers. 16.

en: Verse 16.

la: Vat. *sed genus,* edd. 1, 2 *ergo genus,* complures codd. *ergo tantum,* omissa voce *genus.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *sed genus,* editions 1, 2 *ergo genus,* very many codices *ergo tantum,* the word *genus* being omitted.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — In conclus. pro *ipsum naturam* edd. *ipsam humanam naturam.*

en: Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 2. — In the conclusion, for *ipsum naturam* the editions [read] *ipsam humanam naturam.*

la: Vers. 9: *Donavit illi nomen* etc. Cfr. supra pag. 244, nota 5. — In conclus. ante *communicavit* Vat. supplet *Deus.*

en: Verse 9: *He bestowed on Him a name* etc. Cf. above, p. 244, note 5. — In the conclusion, before *communicavit* the Vatican edition supplies *Deus.*

la: Vers. 31. Vide supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Verse 31. See above, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. Pro *sic diligit* cod. Z *dz diligit;* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *sic* ante *diligit.*

en: Cf. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, in the body. For *sic diligit* codex Z [reads] *dz diligit;* many codices and editions 1, 2 omit *sic* before *diligit.*

la: De vi nominis *Christi* vide supra d. 18. dub. 2.

en: On the force of the name *Christ* see above, d. 18, dub. 2.

la: Liber II. *Cur Deus homo,* c. 14.

en: Book II of *Why God Became Man,* c. 14.

la: Respicitur Ioan. 10, 18; cfr. supra d. 21. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. et dub. 1. seq.

en: Reference is made to John 10:18; cf. above, d. 21, a. 1, q. 1, reply to 1, and dub. 1 ff.

la: Vide supra pag. 640, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 640, note 2.

la: Dist. 1. a. 2. q. 2. — Superius pro *ratio finaliter movens* cod. Z *ratio finalis et movens.* In fine solut. pro *maius bonum* cod. K *magis bonum.*

en: Dist. 1, a. 2, q. 2. — Above, for *ratio finaliter movens* codex Z [reads] *ratio finalis et movens.* At the end of the solution, for *maius bonum* codex K [reads] *magis bonum.*

la: Eph. 2, 4. — Subinde respicitur Ps. 15, 2: *Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges.* — Supra in principio solutionis pro *quam valeat* cod. A *quam valet.* Inferius voci *liberalitatis* codd. U V praemittunt *suae,* et non ita multo post pro *valeremus* et *adhaereremus* cod. Z substituit *valeamus* et *adhaereamus.*

en: Eph. 2:4. — Thereupon reference is made to Ps. 15:2: *Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods.* — Above, at the beginning of the solution, for *quam valeat* codex A [reads] *quam valet.* Below, before the word *liberalitatis* codices U V prefix *suae,* and not much later for *valeremus* and *adhaereremus* codex Z substitutes *valeamus* and *adhaereamus.*

la: Cfr. August., Serm. 130. n. 2. seqq.

en: Cf. Augustine, Sermon 130, n. 2 ff.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. dub. 4. et d. 20. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Cf. above, d. 19, dub. 4, and d. 20, q. 3. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the Quaracchi PDF column bands (Vol III is two-column; PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II Override — offset pdf = printed + 22, running-head TEXT trusted over OCR'd digits). Pages read: p.705 (PDF 727) L+R bands, p.706 (PDF 728) L+R bands. Clean running prose (args, *Sed contra*, replies) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 48966–49060). English is a fresh literal translation.

**Quaeritur alignment.** TRACTATIO *Quintum est, utrum magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum* = printed QUAESTIO V header *Utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum* = opener *Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum.* 1:1, no q-swap. (OCR title garble *dilexerii … Chrislum* silently corrected.)

**Page-split map.**
- **p.705** (running head `DIST. XXXII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V. 705` — clean here; the *adjacent* p.705 L-col top is the q4 scholion §III tail, OCR-mangled `703`): `QUAESTIO V` header + title; args 1–4 (*Ad oppositum*); *Sed contra* (*Fundamenta*) 1–4; *Conclusio*; *Respondeo* through reply 1 `...transfertur in domi-`.
- **p.706** (running head OCR-mangled `700 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` — actually **printed p.706**; trusted by running-head TEXT + +22 offset, NOT the OCR digit): `-nium alienum...` continuation of reply 1; replies 2, 3, 4 (the last running through the two *rationes* on liberality and redemption-from-self), ending `...valor generis humani[^13].` Immediately followed by `QUAESTIO VI` (= a1-q6).

**Apparatus map (14 entries, continuous [^1]–[^14]).** NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart in the source, renumbered continuous:
- **p.705 nn.1–8 → [^1]–[^8]** (q5's OWN fresh footer band; body markers ¹–⁸ across args / *Sed contra* / *Respondeo* / reply 1 on p.705). n.1=Vers.16 (arg.1); n.2=*sed genus* variant (arg.2); n.3=Aristot. (arg.3); n.4=*Donavit illi nomen* (Sed contra 1); n.5=Vers.31 (Sed contra 2); n.6=*sic diligit* variant (Sed contra 4 *habitaculum*); n.7=*De vi nominis Christi* (Respondeo opener); n.8=Anselm *Cur Deus homo* (Respondeo).
- **p.706 nn.1–6 → [^9]–[^14]** (own; body markers ¹–⁶ in replies 1–4 on p.706). n.6=`[^14]` = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* (scholion-redirect anchor, marker at the very end of reply 4 after *generis humani*).

**Scholion disposition: NO own scholion — REDIRECT.** q5 carries no scholion of its own. The q4 article-master scholion §II forward-covers this q5 (*In solutione sequentis (5.) quaestionis omnes concedunt, quod Deus Christum etiam secundum humanam naturam plus diligat quam totam creaturam*). The redirect is carried mechanically by p.706 apparatus n.6 = `[^14]` (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*), per the q2/q3→q1 redirect convention. `has_scholion: false`.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked-up:* none on the footer axis — q4 owned nothing on p.705 except its scholion §III; q5 opens p.705 with its OWN fresh NOTAE band (nn.1–8 here = [^1]–[^8]).
- *Forwarded to a1-q6:* **p.706 NOTAE nn.7–9** (the R-band footers that anchor to QUAESTIO VI body markers — *nono⁷* `Hic est discipulus ille`, *Ioannis⁹* Gloss/Beda). q6 starts its NOTAE pickup at p.706 n.7, then per-page restart on p.707+. Scholion-wise, q4 §III forwards to q6 (q6 will redirect to the q4 article-master scholion).

**[?] flags:** none.