title: Dist. 38, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
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### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII.

#### *De impedimentis ortis ex obligatione voti et matrimonii.*

*Nunc de voto inspiciamus* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de impedimento, quod venit[^1] ex ecclesiastica institutione. Hic agit de impedimento, quod venit ex nostra obligatione. Et quoniam dupliciter potest aliquis obligari alicui, scilicet voto et matrimonio; ideo primo agit de impedimento, quod venit ex obligatione voti; secundo vero de illo quod provenit ex obligatione matrimonii, et incipit illa secunda pars, ibi: *Cum vir et mulier legitime coniuncti sunt* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quid sit votum, breviter innuens, quid sit et de quo et quorum. In secunda determinat de obligatione in comparatione ad matrimonium, ostendens, quod quoddam impedit, sed non dirimit, ut votum simplex; quoddam et impedit et dirimit, ut solemne. Et incipit illa secunda pars ibi: *Sciendum vero est, quod votorum aliud est commune* etc.

Secundo modo: *Cum vir et mulier legitime* etc. Haec est secunda pars, in qua determinat Magister de impedimento ligaminis, et habet haec pars duas. In prima ostendit, quod legitime copulatus uni non potest, illa vivente, alii copulari, nec e converso; et si copuletur de facto, non est matrimonium. In secunda quaerit, utrum copulati de facto possint per ignorantiam ab adulterio excusari, ibi: *Hic quaeritur de illis feminis, quae putantes* etc.; ubi determinat, quod excusantur, quando dubitant, sed quando certificantur, non excusantur[^2].

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de voto. Et de hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de voto in se.

Secundo quaeritur de voto in comparatione ad obligationem.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur de voto, quid sit secundum essentiam. Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit. Tertio, in quo sit.

### ARTICULUS I.

#### *De voto in se.*

---

english:
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### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

#### *On the impediments arising from the obligation of vow and of matrimony.*

*Now let us examine concerning the vow* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the impediment which comes[^1] from ecclesiastical institution. Here he treats of the impediment which comes from our own obligation. And since a person can be obligated to another in two ways, namely by vow and by matrimony; therefore he first treats of the impediment which comes from the obligation of a vow; but second, of that which arises from the obligation of matrimony, and that second part begins there: *When a man and a woman are lawfully joined* etc.

The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he determines what a vow is, briefly intimating what it is and concerning what and of whom. In the second he determines concerning the obligation in comparison to matrimony, showing that a certain [vow] impedes but does not annul, as a simple vow; a certain [vow] both impedes and annuls, as a solemn one. And that second part begins there: *But it must be known that of vows one is common* etc.

In the second way: *When a man and a woman lawfully* etc. This is the second part, in which the Master determines concerning the impediment of the bond (*ligaminis*), and this part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he shows that one lawfully joined to one [spouse] cannot, while she is living, be joined to another, nor conversely; and if he be joined in fact, it is not matrimony. In the second he asks whether those joined in fact can through ignorance be excused from adultery, there: *Here it is asked concerning those women who, thinking* etc.; where he determines that they are excused when they are in doubt, but when they are made certain, they are not excused[^2].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of the present distinction it is asked concerning the vow. And concerning this, two [matters] are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning the vow in itself.

Second it is asked concerning the vow in comparison to obligation.

Concerning the first, three [things] are asked. First it is asked concerning the vow, what it is according to essence. Second it is asked, concerning what it is. Third, in whom it is.

### ARTICLE I.

#### *On the vow in itself.*

---

la: Codd. addunt *non tantum ex nostra obligatione, sed etiam.*

en: The codices add *not only from our own obligation, but also.*

la: In edd. desiderantur verba *quando dubitant... excusantur.*

en: In the editions the words *when they are in doubt... they are excused* are wanting. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the vol4 PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p814-{L,R}-*.png` (raw OCR L87112–87149 used only as a cascade-shattered reference). Two-column layout; each column read top→bottom, then reflowed as continuous prose. The DIVISIO TEXTUS first paragraph and its overflow (`...ut votum sim-` → `-plex; quoddam et impedit et dirimit...`) stitch the L-band tail to the R-band head. The full-width centered headers (COMMENTARIUS, the theme line, the *Nunc de voto* lemma, DIVISIO TEXTUS, TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, ARTICULUS I, *De voto in se*) were reconstructed by joining the L-band right edge to the R-band left edge, since each band truncates the centered text the other supplies. L column regenerated at split `2120`, R column at `1780` (the default clips vol4's wide left column).

**Single page.** All of this chunk prints on p. 814 (running head `814 | SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.` confirmed); no spill. `printed_pages: [814]` / `pdf_pages: [834]` (offset pdf = printed + 20) unchanged from the skeleton.

**Structure of the tractatio.** Two principals ("de voto... duo principaliter quaeruntur"): (1) de voto in se, (2) de voto in comparatione ad obligationem — Article I and Article II respectively. Article I ("Circa primum quaeruntur tria") then lists its three questions: what the vow is according to essence, concerning what it is, and in whom it is. Full listing rendered.

**Apparatus (2 entries, both divisio-anchored).** [^1] (`venit¹ ex ecclesiastica institutione`) and [^2] (`non excusantur²`) are the Quaracchi textual-variant notes on the DIVISIO TEXTUS prose, so this chunk claims both. Footnote ³ on p. 814 (`Per definitionem Hugonis³: Libr. II. de Sacram. p. XII. c. 3: Votum enim est...`) is anchored in the QUAESTIO I *Fundamenta*/videtur body and belongs to `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q1`; this chunk does not claim it. (The page-bottom footer column also carries the a1-q1 continuation; only the divisio-anchored ¹ ² are taken here.)

**Hand-offs.**
- *First page shared with the littera (p. 814):* the littera holds the Master's-caps lemma text at the very top of the distinction and owns any Master-caps footers; this chunk claims only the DIVISIO/TRACTATIO-anchored footers ¹ ².
- *Last page shared with `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q1` (p. 814):* QUAESTIO I (`Quid sit votum secundum essentiam`) and its `Quantum ad primum sic proceditur...` / *Fundamenta* body begin immediately below this chunk's ARTICULUS I opener and belong to a1-q1, together with footer ³ (and any higher-numbered p. 814 footers).

**[?] flags.** None. The divisio/tractatio prose and both textual-variant footers read cleanly from the bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Quid sit votum secundum essentiam
What a vow is according to its essence

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De voto in se.*

Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur de voto, quid sit secundum essentiam. Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit. Tertio, in quo sit.

### Quaestio I. *Quid sit votum secundum essentiam.*

Quantum ad primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod votum secundum substantiam sit *promissio*:

1. Per definitionem Hugonis[^p814-3]: « Votum est testificatio quaedam promissionis spontaneae, quae Deo, et de his quae Deo pertinent, proprie fieri debet ».

2. Item, voto se obligat homo ad id, ad quod prius non obligabatur; sed homo ad novum se non obligat nisi propter beneficium, vel propter peccatum, vel propter promissum; sed in voto non obligatur homo beneficio, vel peccato: ergo obligatur promissione: ergo promissio est de substantia voti.

Item, quod sit *obligandi intentio*[^p814-4], videtur:

3. Quia, sicut matrimonium est ab opere nostro, sic et votum; sed nullus contrahit matrimonium, quantumcumque promittat exterius, nisi intendat se obligare sive consentiat interius: ergo etc.

4. Item, votum est obligatio spontanea sive
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voluntaria; sed nullus obligatione voluntaria obligatur, nisi velit obligari; et nullus vult obligari verbo, nisi qui intendit se obligare: ergo etc.

**Contra:** Ostenditur quod *promissio* non sit de genere voti:

1. Per aliam definitionem voti[^p815-1]: « Votum est melioris boni conceptio cum deliberatione firmata » — haec definitio dicit voti substantiam — sed hoc totum potest esse sine promissione: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius super Ezechielem[^p815-2]: « Qui meliora agere deliberant et deliberata non faciunt, dum se elevant, cadunt »: ergo deliberatio melioris obligat ad faciendum, alioquin non esset casus; sed non est ibi alia obligatio quam voti: ergo sola deliberatio sine promissione est votum: non ergo promissio est de essentia voti.

Item, quod nec sit *obligandi intentio*, videtur:

3. Quia aliquis promotus ad sacros ordines, intendens ordines suscipere et nullo modo obligari ad castitatem, nihilominus obligatur, ac si intenderet: ergo videtur, quod de substantia[^p815-3] voti non sit obligandi intentio.

4. Item, si aliquis iurat alicui, non intendens se obligare ad id quod verba significant, iudicatur nihilominus ita obligatus, ac si intenderet: ergo pari ratione videtur in voto, quod fit sine intentione.

Item, cum ista duo similiter faciant ad esse iuramenti, scilicet promissio et obligandi intentio, quaeritur, quae sit differentia.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** *De essentia voti sunt promissio et obligandi intentio; et in voto simplici requiritur verbum interius, in solemni exterius.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista duo sunt de essentia voti, scilicet *promissio* et *obligandi intentio*. Cum votum sit *obligatio nova et voluntaria*, quia *de novo* est superaddita, *promissio* est necessaria; quia vero *voluntaria*, oportet, quod *velit obligari*, et ita[^p815-4], quod se obligare intendat. Sed contingit promittere alicui duplici verbo, scilicet *interiori et exteriori*. Promissio quantum ad verbum interius cogitationis et deliberationis est de necessitate voti *simplicis*, quod obligat quantum ad Deum, qui *intuetur cor*[^p815-5]. Sed promissio quantum ad verbum vel signum *exterius* est de necessitate voti *solemnis*, quod obligat quantum ad faciem Ecclesiae, quae iudicat secundum ea quae patent. Secundum hoc duplex datur definitio de voto; illa magistralis et communis est de voto simplici: « Conceptio melioris propositi[^p815-6] » etc.

1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur per definitionem voti et auctoritatem Gregorii, in sola deliberatione votum consistere; dicendum, quod non intelligunt[^p815-7] de qualibet deliberatione, sed de illa quae firmat propositum; et haec est quae consensui addit promissionem; aliter non firmat, unde licitum est dissentire.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obligandi intentio non est necessaria, sicut patet in ordine; dicendum, quod intentio respectu alicuius potest esse dupliciter: aut principaliter, quia de illo cogitat et illud placet, aut quia intendit aliquid antecedens[^p815-8] ad illud, vel simpliciter illi annexum; sicut si aliquis intendit vovere regulam monachorum, per consequens et ad continentiam obligari intendit et ad obedientiam; alioquin stulte appetit et vult. Similiter, quia ordini sacro annexum est votum, si intendit ordinem sacrum suscipere, per consequens et ad continentiam obligari principaliter, vel ex consequenti; quod si nullo modo intendat, non est votum; sic nec matrimonium.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui iurat in dolo tenetur; dicendum, quod duplex est forum, scilicet *iudiciale* et *poenitentiale*. In foro *iudiciali* iudicatur secundum exteriora, in foro *poenitentiali* secundum conscientiam. In foro *iudiciali*, quia « fraus nulli debet patrocinari[^p815-9] », accipiuntur verba secundum intellectum communem et sanum; et quia fraus non debet ei patrocinari, iudicatur teneri, sicut si secundum intentionem rectam verba dixisset. In foro *poenitentiali*, ubi est iudicium secundum veritatem, iudicatur, istum peccasse in dolo, sed nequaquam ex illa promissione esse obligatum[^p815-10]; unde
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sicut matrimonium contractum per verba exteriora sine consensu omni est matrimonium solum secundum interpretationem fori *iudicialis*, non secundum *veritatem*; sic de voto dicendum.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de differentia voti ad iuramentum obligatorium, dicendum, quod triplex est differentia, scilicet in *obiecto*, *medio* et *fine*. In *obiecto*, quia votum fit Deo, sed iuramentum homini; in *medio*, quia iuratur per Deum, sed vovetur per promissionem; in *fine*, quia iuramentum est ad astruendam veritatem, votum autem ad augendam honestatem et bonitatem.

english:
### Article I. *On the vow in itself.*

Concerning the first, three [questions] are asked. First it is asked about a vow, what it is according to its essence. Second it is asked, of what it is. Third, in whom it is.

### Question I. *What a vow is according to its essence.*

As to the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that a vow according to its substance is a *promise*:

1. By the definition of Hugh[^p814-3]: "A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which ought properly to be made to God and concerning the things that pertain to God."

2. Likewise, by a vow a man binds himself to that to which he was not previously bound; but a man does not bind himself to something new except on account of a benefit, or on account of a sin, or on account of a promise; but in a vow a man is not bound by a benefit or by a sin: therefore he is bound by a promise: therefore a promise is of the substance of a vow.

Likewise, that there is an *intention to bind*[^p814-4], seems [to be shown]:

3. Because, just as matrimony is from our own act, so also is a vow; but no one contracts matrimony, however much he may promise outwardly, unless he intends to bind himself or consents inwardly: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a vow is a spontaneous or
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voluntary obligation; but no one is bound by a voluntary obligation unless he wills to be bound; and no one wills to be bound by a word unless he intends to bind himself: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** It is shown that a *promise* is not of the genus of a vow:

1. By another definition of a vow[^p815-1]: "A vow is the conception of a better good confirmed by deliberation" — this definition states the substance of a vow — but this whole can exist without a promise: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory on Ezekiel[^p815-2]: "Those who deliberate to do better things and do not do the things deliberated, while they lift themselves up, fall": therefore the deliberation of a better [good] binds one to the doing [of it], otherwise there would be no fall; but there is there no other obligation than that of a vow: therefore deliberation alone without a promise is a vow: therefore a promise is not of the essence of a vow.

Likewise, that neither is there an *intention to bind*, seems [to be shown]:

3. Because someone promoted to sacred orders, intending to receive orders and in no way to be bound to chastity, is nonetheless bound, as if he had so intended: therefore it seems that the intention to bind is not of the substance[^p815-3] of a vow.

4. Likewise, if someone swears to another, not intending to bind himself to that which the words signify, he is nonetheless judged to be bound thereby, as if he had so intended: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] in a vow, that it comes to be without intention.

Likewise, since these two, namely a promise and the intention to bind, similarly make for the being of an oath, it is asked what the difference is.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** *Of the essence of a vow are a promise and the intention to bind; and in a simple vow an inward word is required, in a solemn one an outward word.*

**I respond:** It must be said that these two are of the essence of a vow, namely a *promise* and an *intention to bind*. Since a vow is a *new and voluntary obligation*, because it is *newly* superadded, a *promise* is necessary; but because it is *voluntary*, it is required that he *will to be bound*, and thus[^p815-4] that he intend to bind himself. But it happens that one promises to another by a twofold word, namely *inward and outward*. A promise as regards the inward word of thought and deliberation is of the necessity of a *simple* vow, which binds with respect to God, who *beholds the heart*[^p815-5]. But a promise as regards the outward word or sign, *outwardly*, is of the necessity of a *solemn* vow, which binds with respect to the face of the Church, which judges according to the things that are manifest. According to this a twofold definition of a vow is given; the magisterial and common one is of the simple vow: "The conception of a better resolve[^p815-6]," etc.

1 and 2. To that which is objected by the definition of a vow and the authority of Gregory, that a vow consists in deliberation alone; it must be said that they do not understand[^p815-7] [this] of any deliberation whatever, but of that which confirms the resolve; and this is what adds a promise to consent; otherwise it does not confirm, whence it is permitted to dissent.

3. To that which is objected, that the intention to bind is not necessary, as is clear in the case of [holy] orders; it must be said that intention with respect to something can be twofold: either principally, because one thinks of it and it pleases him, or because he intends something antecedent[^p815-8] to it, or simply annexed to it; just as, if someone intends to vow the rule of monks, consequently he intends also to be bound to continence and to obedience; otherwise he foolishly desires and wills. Likewise, because a vow is annexed to a sacred order, if he intends to receive a sacred order, consequently [he intends] also to be bound to continence, either principally or by consequence; but if he in no way intends it, it is not a vow; and so neither is it matrimony.

4. To that which is objected, that he who swears in deceit is held [bound]; it must be said that there is a twofold forum, namely the *judicial* and the *penitential*. In the *judicial* forum one is judged according to outward things, in the *penitential* according to conscience. In the *judicial* forum, because "deceit ought to profit no one[^p815-9]," the words are taken according to the common and sound understanding; and because deceit ought not to profit him, he is judged to be bound, just as if he had spoken the words according to a right intention. In the *penitential* forum, where there is judgment according to truth, he is judged to have sinned by deceit, but by no means to be bound by that promise[^p815-10]; whence,
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just as a matrimony contracted by outward words without any consent is a matrimony only according to the interpretation of the *judicial* forum, not according to *truth*; so must it be said of a vow.

To that which is finally asked concerning the difference of a vow from a binding oath, it must be said that there is a threefold difference, namely in *object*, in *medium*, and in *end*. In *object*, because a vow is made to God, but an oath to a man; in *medium*, because one swears by God, but one vows by a promise; in *end*, because an oath is for establishing truth, but a vow for increasing uprightness and goodness.

la: Libr. II. de Sacram. p. XII. c. 3: *Votum enim est...*

en: [Hugh of St. Victor,] *On the Sacraments*, Book II, part XII, c. 3: "For a vow is...".

la: Cod. aa supplet *de essentia voti.*

en: Codex aa supplies *de essentia voti* ("of the essence of a vow").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 156, nota 5. — Pro *melioris boni* in cod. E secunda manus substituit *melioris propositi* (cfr. infra in corp.), et pro *cum* edd. *animi.* Superius pro *de genere* codd. K V (I a secunda manu) *de substantia.*

en: Cf. above p. 156, note 5. — For *melioris boni* ("of a better good") a second hand in codex E substitutes *melioris propositi* ("of a better resolve") (cf. below in the body), and for *cum* the editions read *animi.* Above, for *de genere* ("of the genus") codices K V (the first by a second hand) read *de substantia.*

la: Libr. I. homil. 3. n. 18, ubi ostendit, verba (Ezech. 1, 9.): *Non revertebantur, cum incederent* etc., nec de peccatoribus bonum cognoscentibus et de ipso deliberantibus nec de imperfectis bonum quidem facientibus, sed meliora deliberata relinquentibus verificari, sed tantum de perfectis.

en: [Gregory the Great, *Homilies on Ezekiel*,] Book I, homily 3, n. 18, where he shows that the words (Ezek. 1:9): "They did not turn back as they went," etc., are verified neither of sinners who recognize the good and deliberate about it, nor of the imperfect who do indeed do good but abandon the better things they had deliberated on, but only of the perfect.

la: Ita cod. U, cod. V a secunda manu *essentia*, ceteri et edd. mendose *obligatione*, ut videtur, pro *ratione.*

en: Thus codex U; codex V by a second hand reads *essentia*; the rest and the editions read, by an error, *obligatione*, as it seems, in place of *ratione.*

la: Codd. P Q S *et etiam.*

en: Codices P Q S read *et etiam.*

la: Libr. I. Reg. 16, 7: *Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.*

en: 1 Kings [= 1 Samuel] 16:7: "For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart."

la: Praeter definitionem, quam Magister hic in lit. c. 1. proponit, B. Albert. (hic a. 1.) sequentes affert: Hugo de S. Vict. in libro de Sacramentis, parte XII, sic definit votum: *Votum est sponsio animi voluntaria.* Et quidam iurisperiti sic: *Votum est alicuius boni cum deliberatione facta promissio.* Antiqui autem doctores theologiae sic: *Votum est conceptio boni propositi cum deliberatione firmata, qua quis ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum se Deo obligat.* Alii autem sic: *Votum est promissio melioris boni ex deliberatione firmata.*

en: Besides the definition which the Master proposes here in the text, c. 1, Blessed Albert (here, a. 1) adduces the following: Hugh of St. Victor, in the book *On the Sacraments*, part XII, defines a vow thus: "A vow is a voluntary pledge of the soul." And certain jurists thus: "A vow is a promise, made with deliberation, of some good." But the ancient doctors of theology thus: "A vow is the conception of a good resolve confirmed by deliberation, by which one binds oneself to God to do or not to do something." And others thus: "A vow is the promise of a better good, confirmed by deliberation."

la: Codd. E F G *intelligitur.*

en: Codices E F G read *intelligitur* ("it is understood").

la: Edd. *aliud consequens.* Circa finem solut. pro *principaliter* cod. H *simpliciter*, et post *intendat* codd. F G repetunt *ad continentiam obligari.*

en: The editions read *aliud consequens.* Toward the end of the solution, for *principaliter* codex H reads *simpliciter*, and after *intendat* codices F G repeat *ad continentiam obligari.*

la: Vide supra pag. 680, nota 2. — Post pauca vocibus *quia fraus* ex cod. L praemisimus *et*, pro quo cod. V (a secunda manu) habet *sed quia.*

en: See above p. 680, note 2. — A little later, before the words *quia fraus* we have prefixed *et* from codex L, in place of which codex V (by a second hand) has *sed quia.*

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 39. a. 3. q. I.

en: Cf. [Bonaventure,] *Sentences* Book III, d. 39, a. 3, q. 1. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solvendis tribus huius articuli quaestionibus S. Thom. aliique doctores conveniunt. De 1. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. II. II. q. 88. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1-3. — De hac et 2 seqq. qq. Durand., hic q. 1; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**II.** De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. quaestiunc. 2. et a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1-3.

**III.** De 3. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. quaestiunc. 3. et a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1-3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the solving of the three questions of this article, St. Thomas and the other doctors are in agreement. On the first question: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1; *Summa* II-II, q. 88, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1, q. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, qq. 1-3. — On this and the two following questions: Durandus, here q. 1; Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**II.** On the second question: St. Thomas, at the places cited, quaestiuncula 2 and a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the place cited, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, qq. 1-3.

**III.** On the third question: St. Thomas, at the places cited, quaestiuncula 3 and a. 8. — Blessed Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the place cited, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, qq. 1-3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF bands for printed pp. 814–816 (pdf 834–836; offset +20), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (cascade-shattered two-column OCR; PDF authoritative). Raw OCR reference range L87150–87290. Running heads verified: p.814 verso *SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.*; p.815 *DIST. XXXVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.*; p.816 verso *SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.* — matches `printed_pages`.

**Reading order.** Each printed page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column, reflowed by sense. Body spans 814-L → 814-R → 815-L → 815-R → 816-L → 816-R. Page breaks fall mid-fundamentum: 814/815 within fund. 4 (*obligatio spontanea sive | voluntaria*); 815/816 within the reply to obj. 4 (*esse obligatum; unde | sicut matrimonium*).

**Chunk boundaries / hand-offs.**
- *Opening:* This chunk begins at **ARTICULUS I** (the article opener *Circa primum quaeruntur tria…* folded into q1 per the locked convention; cf. d37-a2-q1). The distinction-level DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (*Ad intelligentiam… Primo de voto in se, Secundo de voto in comparatione ad obligationem*) belong to the **divisio chunk**, which shares p.814.
- *Footer hand-off (p.814):* p.814 carries four numbered footers. Notes **1** (*Codd. addunt non tantum ex nostra obligatione, sed etiam*) and **2** (*In edd. desiderantur verba quando dubitant… excusantur*) are anchored in the divisio text (*venit¹*, *non excusantur²*) → they belong to the **divisio chunk**, not rendered here. Notes **3** and **4** are anchored in my body (*Hugonis³*, *obligandi intentio⁴*) → rendered as [^p814-3], [^p814-4].
- *Closing (p.816):* I share p.816 with **a1-q2**. My body ends at the differentia solutio (*…augendam honestatem et bonitatem*), followed by the Article-I SCHOLION (§I–III), which I own in full. **QUAESTIO II** (*De quo sive circa quam materiam sit votum* / *Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit votum…*) and every p.816 footer belong to **a1-q2** — none claimed here.

**Apparatus.** 12 entries total, split by page: **p.814 → 2** (notes 3, 4); **p.815 → 10** (notes 1–10, all anchored in my Contra/Respondeo body); **p.816 → 0** (scholion + differentia carry no markers). Labels use `[^pNNN-M]` where M is the printed footnote number, preserving Quaracchi's per-page restart.

**Editorial marginalia trimmed** (per CLAUDE.md rule): the printed side-labels *Fundamenta., Conclusio 2., Conclusio 3., Solutio oppositorum., Notandum., Distinctio., Forum duplex., Ad quaest. incid.* are Quaracchi editorial glosses, not Bonaventure's text — omitted from the body. The centered **CONCLUSIO** is a real structural heading and is retained.

**Scholion disposition.** Full Article-I scholion rendered here (both languages) in three numbered sections **§I–§III**, one per article-question (q1/q2/q3). Header OCR'd as *SCHOLIOK*; located and confirmed by content (doctor-lists keyed *De 1./2./3. quaestione*). Siblings a1-q2 and a1-q3 render no scholion.

**[?] flags.** None. One point of interest (not flagged): footer [^p815-3] is anchored at printed *de substantia voti* (obj. 3), yet its variant note discusses *essentia / obligatione / ratione*; the body is transcribed as printed and the note verbatim — the variant cluster is the editors' concern, and both readings are legible with confidence.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 816 -->

### Quaestio II. *De quo sive circa quam materiam sit votum.*

Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit votum, sive de materia, circa quam est votum; et videtur, quod sit circa omnia.

1. Et *primo* videtur, quod de *omni bono*: quia omne bonum potest homo promittere et spondere Deo et in tali sponsione obligatur; sed non est alia[^p816-1] quam votum: ergo etc. Unde et in baptismo promittit quod est necessitatis, scilicet abrenuntiare satanae.

2. Item, quod sit de *minori bono*, videtur: quia licitum est illud velle: ergo licite potest se homo ad illud obligare, ergo licite vovere; et istud videtur *per simile* in matrimonio, in quo quis obligat se ad statum imperfectionis[^p816-2].

3. Item, quod sit de *indifferenti*, videtur: quia cibus et potus, quantum est de se, dicunt actus indifferentes, quia naturales sunt; sed circa cibum et potum contingit esse votum, utpote votum abstinentiae: ergo et circa indifferentia.

4. Item, videtur, quod de *malis* possit esse votum: quia occidere innocentem est malum; sed Iephte[^p816-3] propter votum occidit filiam suam virginem et laudatur de voto. Unde Hieronymus dicit, quod «ideo ponitur in catalogo Sanctorum», quia «Deo placuit animus voventis»: ergo etc.

5. Item, conscientia non magis obligat quam votum; sed conscientia erronea ligat, quia *quod non est ex fide est peccatum*[^p816-4], id est contra conscientiam: ergo et votum erroneum; sed tunc errat homo in voto, quando vovet malum pro bono: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Quod non sit de *bono praecepti*, videtur: quia super illud[^p816-5]: *Vovete et reddite*, Glossa: «Vovere est voluntatis, sed reddere necessitatis»: ergo est de his solum, ad quae homo non aliunde, sed voluntarie obligatur; sed talia sunt supererogationis: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod non sit de *minori bono*, videtur per definitionem voti[^p816-6]: «Votum est conceptio melioris propositi cum deliberatione firmata»: ergo non videtur, quod sit de statu imperfectionis et minori bono. Et ideo videtur, quod votum debet esse ad promotionem salutis nostrae, non in dispendium; sed obligare ad statum minus bonum est in dispendium salutis, quia secundum Bernardum[^p816-7]: «Nemo bonus, qui non vult esse melior»: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod non sit de *indifferenti*, ostenditur per definitionem; dicitur[^p816-8] enim, quod «votum de his quae Deo pertinent, fieri debet»; sed talia non sunt indifferentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod non de *malis*, videtur: quia dicit Isidorus[^p816-9]: «In malis promissis rescinde fidem, in turpi voto muta decretum»; sed votum verum est immutabile voventi: ergo votum turpe vel de turpi non est votum verum.

5. Item, votum verum obligat ad id, de quo est; sed nullus obligari potest ad malum: ergo etc.

<!-- page 817 -->

*Probatio minoris*[^p817-1]: nullus faciens id, ad quod tenetur, facit malum; sed si homo obligatur ad malum et facit malum, facit id, ad quod tenetur: ergo faciens malum non facit malum.

### Conclusio.

> Votum, generaliter loquendo, est de his quae ad Deum pertinent et faciunt ad salutem; simpliciter vero et proprie est de his quae promovent ad salutem ultra statum communem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod votum generaliter loquendo est de his quae ad Deum pertinent et faciunt ad salutem; simpliciter vero et proprie est de his quae promovent ad salutem ultra statum communem. Unde quaecumque sunt talia, cadunt sub voto; quae autem his opposita sunt, ut quae ad dispendium salutis vergunt, sub voto cadere non possunt; quoniam votum debet habere comites, quos habet iuramentum, scilicet *veritatem, iudicium* et *iustitiam*[^p817-2].

Primo namque necesse est, ut in eo sit *iustitia*, scilicet ut illud quod vovetur, spectet ad salutem et sit bonum et honestum. — Secundo est *iudicium*, ut vovens deliberate voveat, non praecipitanter. — Tertio, quod sit in eo *veritas*, ut quod discrete et iuste vovit, hoc persolvat. Si ergo illud quod vovetur, ad detrimentum iustitiae faciat; non est ibi lex voti nec obligatio, sed ipsi voto fit iniuria; nec est obligatio ad servandum, sed potius ad poenitendum, sicut de conscientia erronea iudicatur. Secundum hanc regulam communem iudicandum est de his quae quaeruntur in speciali.

1. Quod enim quaeritur, utrum votum sit de *omni bono*, scilicet praecepti et consilii; dicendum, quod votum, proprie accipiendo, est de bono supererogationis, large tamen, si dicatur quaecumque testificatio, potest esse de bono praecepti. — Et per hoc patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Illud enim votum, quamvis non sit obligatio de novo, est tamen testificatio obligationis, qua homo non solum fatetur se obligatum, sed etiam complacet sibi in illa obligatione, et obligatio necessaria fit voluntaria[^p817-3]; et sic multi faciunt de necessitate virtutem.

2. Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, utrum sit de *minori bono*; dicendum, quod minus bonum est dupliciter considerare: uno modo, prout dicit statum quendam licitum; alio modo, prout dicit privationem maioris boni. Primo modo licitum est vovere illud respectu mali, quia respectu illius est quodam modo maius bonum. Secundo modo, prout privatorium maioris boni, licitum non est, nec obligatur quis ad servandum, sed ad poenitendum; ut si quis voveat, quod Deo serviet caste in statu saeculari, et nunquam ingredietur religionem: primum bonum est et licitum, sed in quantum privat statum altiorem, illicitum est, quia gratiam Dei duro corde repellit; et hoc est in praeiudicium salutis et in derogationem abundantis iustitiae. — Et *si tu obiicias*: licitum est sic esse, ergo et *vovere*; dicendum, quod sicut laudari non est malum, tamen appetere laudem est malum; sic in tali statu esse non est malum, sed obligare se, ut non possit ad melius pervenire, obligatione[^p817-4], quae fiat Deo, Deo iniuriam facit. Nec est simile de matrimonio, quia est obligatio facta alii personae, quae contenta est illa et non quaerit perfectiorem; Deus autem vult semper quod melius est.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur de *indifferenti*, dicendum, quod indifferens est dupliciter: unum, quod informabile est motu et circumstantia virtutis, sicut comedere et abstinere, et hoc potest voveri; aliud, quod nihil facit, quantum est de se, ut levare festucam vel ire ad prata, et de tali proprie non est votum; et si quis tale quid voveat, iudicio caret, quia nihil vovendum est, nisi quod creditur rationabiliter esse acceptum Deo. Unde si tale votum voveat quis, non est tenendum, sed commutandum. Et per hoc patet utrumque obiectum.

4. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de *malo*, dicendum, quod aliquid *simpliciter* est malum; et hoc nullo modo potest quis vovere, et si vovet, peccat, sed non obligatur. Aliud est, quod uno casu contingente, potest esse bonum, alio casu contingente, potest esse malum; et hoc potest voveri sub conditione eventus boni; quodsi vovetur *in omnem eventum* sine conditione, indiscretum est votum, et non tenetur ad illud[^p817-5]. — Quod ergo obiicitur de voto Iephte, dicendum, quod quia vovit *in omnem eventum*, votum fuit indiscretum; sed tamen, quia devotio et fides movit, sed indiscrete emisit, inde[^p817-6] duo fuerunt in voti *emissione*: unum laudabile, alterum vituperabile; similiter in voti *impletione* duo fuerunt, scilicet *figura* et *factum*, et factum fuit vituperabile, sed figura laudabilis. Quantum ergo ad diversa in voto Iephte, dicendum, quod laudatur ab Apostolo et Hieronymo[^p817-7], scilicet quantum ad fidem et

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devotionem; sed quantum ad indiscretionem et crudelitatem vituperatur ab Augustino; dicit enim, quod fuit in vovendo stultus et in reddendo fuit impius.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia erronea obligat; dicendum, quod conscientia dicitur erronea dupliciter: aut quia credit, se teneri ad id, ad quod non tenetur, tamen non tenetur ad eius oppositum; et talis error non est periculosus, et talis ligat. Est et alia erronea, quae credit bonum quod non est bonum, immo malum; et talis ligat non ad peccatum nec ad factum, sed ad se deponendum[^p818-1]. Sic votum erroneum, quod vergit in malum, est dimittendum, quia non obligat ad faciendum[^p818-2].

---

english:
### Question II. *On what, or the matter concerning which, a vow is.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning what a vow is about, or concerning the matter about which a vow is; and it seems that it is about everything.

1. And *first* it seems that it is about *every good*: because a man can promise and pledge every good to God, and by such a pledge he is bound; but this is nothing other[^p816-1] than a vow: therefore etc. Hence also in baptism he promises what is of necessity, namely to renounce Satan.

2. Likewise, that it is about a *lesser good* seems [to be the case]: because it is licit to will it: therefore a man can licitly bind himself to it, therefore [he can] licitly vow it; and this seems [to hold] *by a similar case* in marriage, in which one binds himself to a state of imperfection[^p816-2].

3. Likewise, that it is about the *indifferent* seems [to be the case]: because food and drink, so far as they are of themselves, are called indifferent acts, since they are natural; but concerning food and drink a vow can be made, as for instance a vow of abstinence: therefore also concerning indifferent things.

4. Likewise, it seems that a vow can be about *evils*: because to kill an innocent person is evil; but Jephthah[^p816-3] on account of a vow killed his virgin daughter and is praised for the vow. Hence Jerome says that "he is therefore placed in the catalogue of the Saints," because "the mind of the one vowing was pleasing to God": therefore etc.

5. Likewise, conscience does not bind more than a vow; but an erroneous conscience binds, because *what is not of faith is sin*[^p816-4], that is, contrary to conscience: therefore also an erroneous vow [binds]; but then a man errs in the vow when he vows evil for good: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. That it is not about the *good of precept* seems [to be the case]: because upon that text[^p816-5]: *Vow and render*, the Gloss [says]: "To vow belongs to the will, but to render belongs to necessity": therefore it is only about those things to which a man is bound not from elsewhere, but voluntarily; but such things are of supererogation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it is not about a *lesser good* seems [to be the case] from the definition of a vow[^p816-6]: "A vow is the conception of a better purpose, confirmed by deliberation": therefore it does not seem that it is about a state of imperfection and a lesser good. And therefore it seems that a vow ought to be for the promotion of our salvation, not to its detriment; but to bind oneself to a lesser good is to the detriment of salvation, because according to Bernard[^p816-7]: "No one is good who does not wish to be better": therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that it is not about the *indifferent* is shown from the definition; for it is said[^p816-8] that "a vow ought to be made concerning those things which pertain to God"; but such things are not indifferent: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it is not about *evils* seems [to be the case]: because Isidore says[^p816-9]: "In evil promises break faith, in a base vow change the decree"; but a true vow is unchangeable for the one vowing: therefore a base vow, or one about a base thing, is not a true vow.

5. Likewise, a true vow binds to that of which it is; but no one can be bound to evil: therefore etc.

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*Proof of the minor*[^p817-1]: no one doing that to which he is bound does evil; but if a man is bound to evil and does evil, he does that to which he is bound: therefore one doing evil does not do evil.

### Conclusion.

> A vow, generally speaking, is about those things which pertain to God and conduce to salvation; but simply and properly it is about those things which promote salvation beyond the common state.

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow, generally speaking, is about those things which pertain to God and conduce to salvation; but simply and properly it is about those things which promote salvation beyond the common state. Hence whatever things are such fall under a vow; but those things which are opposed to these, as those which tend to the detriment of salvation, cannot fall under a vow; since a vow ought to have the companions which an oath has, namely *truth, judgment*, and *justice*[^p817-2].

For first it is necessary that there be *justice* in it, namely that what is vowed pertain to salvation and be good and honorable. — Secondly there is *judgment*, that the one vowing vow deliberately, not precipitately. — Thirdly, that there be *truth* in it, so that what he vowed discreetly and justly, this he should pay. If therefore what is vowed should tend to the detriment of justice, there is there no law of the vow nor obligation, but injury is done to the vow itself; nor is there an obligation to keep it, but rather to repent, as is judged concerning an erroneous conscience. According to this common rule judgment must be made concerning those things which are inquired into in particular.

1. For as to what is inquired, whether a vow is about *every good*, namely of precept and of counsel; it must be said that a vow, taking it properly, is about the good of supererogation, yet broadly, if any testification whatever be so called, it can be about the good of precept. — And through this the objections on both sides are made evident. For that vow, although it is not an obligation anew, is nevertheless a testification of the obligation, by which a man not only confesses himself bound, but also takes pleasure in that obligation, and the necessary obligation becomes voluntary[^p817-3]; and thus many make a virtue of necessity.

2. But to that which is inquired, whether it is about a *lesser good*; it must be said that a lesser good can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it names a certain licit state; in another way, as it names a privation of a greater good. In the first way it is licit to vow it with respect to evil, because with respect to that [evil] it is in a certain way a greater good. In the second way, as depriving of a greater good, it is not licit, nor is anyone bound to keep it, but to repent; as if someone should vow that he will serve God chastely in the secular state, and will never enter religion: the first is good and licit, but insofar as it deprives of a higher state, it is illicit, because it repels the grace of God with a hard heart; and this is to the prejudice of salvation and to the derogation of abounding justice. — And *if you object*: it is licit so to be, therefore also to *vow* it; it must be said that, just as to be praised is not evil, yet to seek praise is evil; so to be in such a state is not evil, but to bind oneself, so that one cannot attain to something better, by an obligation[^p817-4] made to God, does injury to God. Nor is it similar with marriage, because it is an obligation made to another person, who is content with that [state] and does not seek a more perfect one; but God always wills what is better.

3. To that which is inquired concerning the *indifferent*, it must be said that the indifferent is twofold: one that is capable of being informed by the movement and circumstance of virtue, such as eating and abstaining, and this can be vowed; the other, which does nothing, so far as it is of itself, as to lift a straw or to go to the meadows, and about such a thing there is properly no vow; and if anyone should vow such a thing, he lacks judgment, because nothing is to be vowed except what is believed to be reasonably acceptable to God. Hence if anyone should vow such a vow, it is not to be kept, but to be commuted. And through this both objections are made evident.

4. But to that which is objected concerning *evil*, it must be said that something is *simply* evil; and this no one can in any way vow, and if he vows it, he sins, but is not bound. There is another thing, which by one contingent case can be good, by another contingent case can be evil; and this can be vowed under the condition of a good outcome; but if it is vowed *for every outcome* without condition, the vow is indiscreet, and one is not bound to it[^p817-5]. — As to what is therefore objected concerning the vow of Jephthah, it must be said that, because he vowed *for every outcome*, the vow was indiscreet; but nevertheless, because devotion and faith moved him, yet he uttered it indiscreetly, thence[^p817-6] there were two things in the *making* of the vow: one praiseworthy, the other blameworthy; likewise in the *fulfilling* of the vow there were two things, namely the *figure* and the *deed*, and the deed was blameworthy, but the figure praiseworthy. As therefore to the diverse things in the vow of Jephthah, it must be said that he is praised by the Apostle and by Jerome[^p817-7], namely as to faith and

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devotion; but as to the indiscretion and cruelty he is blamed by Augustine; for he says that he was foolish in vowing and impious in rendering.

5. To that which is objected, that an erroneous conscience binds; it must be said that a conscience is called erroneous in two ways: either because it believes itself bound to that to which it is not bound, yet it is not bound to the opposite of it; and such an error is not dangerous, and such [a conscience] binds. There is also another erroneous [conscience], which believes to be good what is not good, but rather evil; and such [a conscience] binds not to sin nor to the deed, but to laying itself aside[^p818-1]. Thus an erroneous vow, which tends toward evil, is to be dismissed, because it does not bind to the doing of it[^p818-2].

---

la: Cod. aa supplet *huiusmodi obligatio*.

en: Codex aa supplies *huiusmodi obligatio* [an obligation of this kind].

la: Ed. 1 cum multis codd. perperam *perfectionis*.

en: Ed. 1 with many codices wrongly [reads] *perfectionis* [of perfection].

la: Iud. 11, 30. seqq. — Sententia Hieron. habetur in Epist. 118. (alias 34.) n. 5: *Iephte obtulit virginem filiam, et idcirco in enumeratione Sanctorum ab Apostolo [Hebr. 11, 32.] ponitur.* Cfr. Epist. 60. (alias 3.) n. 8. In II. Comment. super Ierem. 7, 31. ait: *Quodsi Iephte obtulit filiam suam virginem Deo, non sacrificium placet, sed animus offerentis.* — In fine arg. codd. omittunt *Deo*.

en: Judges 11:30 ff. — Jerome's statement is found in Epistle 118 (alias 34), n. 5: "Jephthah offered his virgin daughter, and therefore he is placed in the enumeration of the Saints by the Apostle [Heb. 11:32]." Cf. Epistle 60 (alias 3), n. 8. In the second Commentary on Jeremiah 7:31 he says: "If Jephthah offered his virgin daughter to God, it is not the sacrifice that pleases, but the mind of the one offering." — At the end of the argument the codices omit *Deo* [to God].

en: Romans 14:23.

la: Psalm. 75, 12. — Glossam (cfr. August., Epist. 127. alias 45. n. 8.) exhibet Petr. Lombard. in hunc loc.: *Vovere enim consulitur voluntati, sed post voti promissionem necessario redditio exigitur.* Haym. super hunc loc. ait: *Vovere consilium est, solvere autem vota praeceptum.*

en: Psalm 75:12 [Vulgate]. — The Gloss (cf. Augustine, Epistle 127, alias 45, n. 8) is set forth by Peter Lombard on this passage: "For to vow is left to the will, but after the promise of the vow the payment is necessarily required." Haymo on this passage says: "To vow is a counsel, but to pay one's vows is a precept."

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Edd. in hac definitione pro *cum* exhibent *animi*.

en: Cf. the preceding question. — The editions in this definition, instead of *cum* [with], read *animi* [of the mind].

la: Epist. 91. n. 3: *Minime pro certo est bonus qui melior esse non vult.* — Superius pro *Et ideo* codd. *Et illud*.

en: Epistle 91, n. 3: "By no means is he certainly good who does not wish to be better." — Above, for *Et ideo* [And therefore] the codices [read] *Et illud* [And that].

la: Vide quaest. praeced. fundam. 1.

en: See the preceding question, fundamentum 1.

la: Libr. II. Synonym. n. 58. Cfr. supra pag. 697, nota 5.

en: *Synonyms*, Book II, n. 58. Cf. above, p. 697, note 5.

la: In permultis codd. desiderantur verba *nullus... minoris*.

en: In very many codices the words *nullus... minoris* are lacking.

la: Ierem. 4, 2: *Et iurabis: Vivit Dominus in veritate et in iudicio et in iustitia.* Cfr. III. Sent. d. 39. dub. 1. — Mox pro *in eo*, quod codd. communiter omittunt, cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *ibi*. Subinde post *salutem* edd. legunt: *et sic bonum est et honestum. Secundo necesse est, in eo esse iudicium*.

en: Jeremiah 4:2: "And you shall swear: The Lord lives, in truth and in judgment and in justice." Cf. III Sent., d. 39, dub. 1. — Presently, for *in eo* [in it], which the codices commonly omit, codex K (and 1 by a second hand) [reads] *ibi* [there]. Thereupon after *salutem* the editions read: "and thus it is good and honorable. Secondly it is necessary that there be judgment in it."

la: Edd. verbis male inversis *voluntaria fit necessaria*.

en: The editions, with the words wrongly inverted, [read] *voluntaria fit necessaria* [the voluntary becomes necessary].

la: Edd. *per obligationem*, cod. A *originali obligatione*.

en: The editions [read] *per obligationem* [through an obligation], codex A *originali obligatione* [by an original obligation].

la: Aliqui codd. omittunt *ad illud*, codd. W bb legunt: *tenetur. Ad illud quod obiicitur.*

en: Some codices omit *ad illud* [to that], codices W bb read: "he is bound. To that which is objected."

la: Codd. et edd. incongrue *unde*, nisi cum cod. V a recentiore manu correcto post *emisit* suppleatur *laudatur*.

en: The codices and editions incongruously [read] *unde* [whence], unless, with codex V (corrected by a more recent hand), after *emisit* one supplies *laudatur* [is praised].

la: Vide supra pag. 816, nota 3. — De Augustini sententia cfr. Qq. in Iudic. q. 49. n. 4. seqq. et 1. Qq. ex veteri Testam. (inter opera August.) q. 43. Hieron., 1. adversus Iovinian. n. 23: *A plerisque Hebraeorum reprehenditur pater [Iephte] voti temerarii etc.*

en: See above, p. 816, note 3. — Concerning Augustine's opinion, cf. *Questions on Judges*, q. 49, n. 4 ff., and the first book of *Questions on the Old Testament* (among the works of Augustine), q. 43. Jerome, *Against Jovinian*, Book 1, n. 23: "By most of the Hebrews the father [Jephthah] is reproved for a rash vow," etc.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro *peccatum* codd. FG *impletionem*, et pro *factum* cod. Q *effectum*.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 3. — For *peccatum* [sin] codices FG [read] *impletionem* [fulfillment], and for *factum* [deed] codex Q *effectum* [effect].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF page images / column bands for printed pp.816–818 (PDF pp.836–838; Vol IV offset `pdf = printed + 20`) under the VOL II OVERRIDE, with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 87291–87461) as reference for structure and marker spacing. The two-column IA OCR for this range is cascade-shattered (diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation + inter-column bleed) through the entire *Respondeo*, *Solutiones*, and every footer, so the PDF read is authoritative for those regions per the override.

**Opener alignment verified.** Raw L87291 `Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit votum, sive de ... materia, circa quam est votum; et videtur, quod sit circa omnia` follows `QUAESTIO II / De quo sive circa quam materiam sit votum` and matches the corrected `title_la`. No q-swap. Body ends at raw L87461 (`...quia non obligat ad faciendum`) immediately before `QUAESTIO III` (raw ~L87464).

**Page-span correction.** The chunk was scaffolded as pp.816–817, but the body (reply 5 on *conscientia erronea*) continues onto and ends on **printed p.818**; `printed_pages` corrected to [816, 817, 818] and `pdf_pages` to [836, 837, 838], `source` to pp.816–818.

**Page-split map (running heads verified eyes-on):**
- **p.816** (running head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 816"): my quaestio opens at the foot of the page below q1's body-tail and the Art. I SCHOLION (both q1's). It occupies the lower half of both columns: opener + *Fundamenta* args 1–5 (L-col into R-col) and *Contra* args 1–5 (R-col). Footer note-series **1–9** → [^p816-1]–[^p816-9], all anchored in my body.
- **p.817** (running head "DIST. XXXVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. II. — 817"): *Contra* 5's *Probatio minoris*, CONCLUSIO, *Respondeo*, and *Solutiones* 1–4 (reply 4 = the Jephthah discussion, carrying over to p.818). Footer note-series **1–7** → [^p817-1]–[^p817-7], all anchored in my body.
- **p.818** (running head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 818"): the tail of reply 4 (*devotionem...impius*) and reply 5 (*conscientia erronea*), ending my body at *...quia non obligat ad faciendum*. QUAESTIO III (*In quo subiecto possit esse votum*) then opens on this same page. My body carries only the first two footers, note-series **1–2** → [^p818-1]–[^p818-2].

**Apparatus count = 18** (p.816: 9; p.817: 7; p.818: 2), all keyed to body markers in both languages.

**Footer hand-offs:**
- *Picked up from `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q1`* (shared p.816): q1 holds the upper portion of p.816 (its body-tail *Ad quaest. incid.* on the *differentia voti ad iuramentum* and the whole Art. I SCHOLION), but that portion carries **no numbered page-footers** — the full p.816 series 1–9 is anchored in my body. I therefore claim all nine; q1 claims none of p.816's numbered footers.
- *Forwarded to `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q3`* (shared p.818): QUAESTIO III opens on p.818 after my body ends. **Printed p.818 footer note-series 3–9 belong to q3** (its args and *Respondeo*), not to me; I claim only p.818 notes 1–2. NB: q3's scaffold frontmatter lists `printed_pages: [817, 818, 819]`, but q3's body in fact begins on p.818 — flag for q3's promoter to verify/correct its first page.

**Scholion: ABSENT.** This quaestio renders no scholion of its own; the Art. I scholion lives in `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q1` (it explicitly covers all three Art. I questions — "In solvendis tribus huius articuli quaestionibus..."). Confirming this, my closing footer [^p818-2] is literally *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"). `has_scholion: false`.

**Editorial marginalia (trimmed from body per CLAUDE.md OCR-cleanup rule).** Quaracchi prints side-glosses that were not rendered inline: p.816 *Ad oppositum* (at arg. 1), *Fundamenta* (at *Contra* 1); p.817 *Notandum* (×2, at the two *Et si tu obiicias* / *respectu mali* notes), *Duplex indifferens* (at reply 3), *Duplex malum* (at reply 4), *De voto Iephte* (at the Jephthah reply); p.818 *Distinctio* (at reply 5). These are editorial structural captions, not Bonaventure's text.

**[?] flags:** none. All formulae, codex sigla (aa, K, A, W, bb, V, FG, Q), and scripture/authority citations (Judges 11; Heb. 11:32; Rom. 14:23; Ps. 75:12 Vulg.; Jer. 4:2; Jerome *Epist.* 118/60/91, *adv. Iovinian.*; Augustine *Epist.* 127, *Qq. in Iudic.*; Bernard; Isidore *Synon.* II; Peter Lombard; Haymo) resolved cleanly against the 450 dpi page images. The p.816 running-head digits and the OCR digit-mangles (`M8`=118, `'o`/`75`=Ps. 75, `o8`=58) were resolved by the clean PDF read and the +20 offset.


title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
De materia in qua est votum
On the matter in which a vow consists

source_text:
<!-- page 818 -->

### Quaestio III. *In quo subiecto possit esse votum.*

Tertio quaeritur de materia in qua, sive de subiecto, in quo est votum. Et videtur, quod sit in omni habente usum rationis:

1. Quia omnis talis habet usum liberi arbitrii; sed votum est a libertate arbitrii: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis discretionem habens rationis potest se voluntarie obligare diabolo per peccatum, nullo impediente: ergo multo fortius potest se obligare Deo per votum.

3. Item, omnibus patet via salutis, et aequalis est conditio omnium quantum ad hoc; sed votum est de his quae promovent salutem: ergo omnes sunt aequales in vovendo.

4. Item, hoc ostenditur per definitionem voti[^p818-3], quia est « conceptio boni animi deliberatione firmata »; sed omnes ratione utentes possunt bonum concipere: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Numerorum trigesimo[^p818-4] dicitur, quod si fuerit mulier in domo viri et voverit aliquid, et vir statim, ut audivit, contradixit, non erit promissionis rea: ergo mulier coniugata non potest auctoritate sua vovere; similiter videtur de viro, quia *non habet sui corporis potestatem*.

2. Item, puer et puella, quamdiu sunt impuberes, sunt omnino sub dispositione parentum et tutorum, sicut servus sub dispositione domini: ergo si omnino subsunt, nihil per se vovere possunt.

3. Item, religiosus abrenuntiavit[^p818-5] propriae voluntati; sed votum est obligatio procedens ex propria voluntate: ergo non potest vovere.

4. Item, servus subest imperio domini sui, unde si intret religionem, potest ipsum extrahere[^p818-6]: ergo non est suus; sed votum est a libertate: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.**
> *Simpliciter libere vovere potest qui nemini subest; qui autem subest, secundum id, in quo subest, non potest per se vovere.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod votum procedit a libera voluntate. Omnis ergo, qui libere potest facere quod vult, nullo impedimento in se existente, nullo homine de facto praepediente, nullo iure prohibente, potest simpliciter vovere; qui autem in omnibus subest nihil potest per se vovere; qui autem in aliquibus subest, secundum id, in quo subest, non potest vovere. — Quoniam igitur *uxor* subest viro, et *puer* patri in regimine vitae, nihil possunt circa hoc vovere, quod sit stabile, sine eorum auctoritate. *Vir* autem subest uxori in debito carnis; ideo contra hoc non potest vovere[^p818-7]. *Religiosus* subest in omnibus quae sunt infra religionem; et ideo nihil potest vovere sine sui praelati voluntate[^p818-8]. Sed *servus* subest quantum ad servitium corporale; ideo quod contra hoc sit vovere non potest nisi domini auctoritate; si quid autem est, quod libere possit facere, illud potest vovere.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes sunt liberae voluntatis; dicendum, quod verum est ad vovendum[^p818-9], sed non omnes sunt liberae voluntatis ad faciendum omne quod volunt; et haec voluntas requiritur in voto.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obligatione diaboli, dicendum, quod illa fit sola voluntatis libertate; sed non sic est de obligatione ad Deum
<!-- page 819 -->
quantum ad votum, quoniam votum respicit aliquod opus, respectu cuius frequenter liberum arbitrium non habet *posse*, vel de *facto*, vel etiam de *iure*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnibus patet via salutis; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad ea quae sunt *praecepti*, non quantum ad ea quae sunt *supererogationis*, quae respiciunt status diversos, quibus aliqui sunt apti, aliqui vero minime.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes possunt concipere et deliberatione firmare; dicendum, quod, sicut superius[^p819-1] dictum est, firmatio illa est per promissionem; non autem omnis promissio firmat nisi promissio obligatoria; nulla autem promissio est obligatoria, nisi quae fit ab eo qui potest se obligare; et talis est proprii iuris respectu illius quod vovere debet; et quia non omnes sunt tales, ideo non omnium est vovere, sed illorum tantummodo, qui hoc habent[^p819-2].

---

english:
<!-- page 818 -->

### Question III. *In what subject a vow can exist.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the matter in which, or the subject in which, a vow is. And it seems that it is in everyone having the use of reason:

1. For everyone such has the use of free choice; but a vow is from the freedom of choice: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everyone having discretion of reason can voluntarily bind himself to the devil through sin, with nothing hindering: therefore much more strongly can he bind himself to God through a vow.

3. Likewise, the way of salvation lies open to all, and the condition of all is equal as to this; but a vow is about those things which promote salvation: therefore all are equal in vowing.

4. Likewise, this is shown through the definition of a vow[^p818-3], for it is "a conception of a good mind, confirmed by deliberation"; but all who use reason can conceive a good: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Numbers, chapter thirty[^p818-4], it is said that if a woman be in her husband's house and vow anything, and the husband, as soon as he heard it, contradicted, she will not be guilty of the promise: therefore a married woman cannot vow by her own authority; and likewise it seems concerning the husband, because *he does not have power over his own body*.

2. Likewise, a boy and a girl, so long as they are underage, are entirely under the disposition of parents and guardians, as a slave is under the disposition of a master: therefore if they are entirely subject, they can vow nothing of themselves.

3. Likewise, a religious has renounced[^p818-5] his own will; but a vow is an obligation proceeding from one's own will: therefore he cannot vow.

4. Likewise, a slave is subject to the command of his master, whence if he enters religion, [the master] can draw him out[^p818-6]: therefore he is not his own; but a vow is from freedom: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.**
> *He who is subject to no one can simply and freely vow; but he who is subject, according to that in which he is subject, cannot vow of himself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow proceeds from a free will. Everyone, therefore, who can freely do what he wills, with no impediment existing in himself, no man hindering in fact, no law prohibiting, can simply vow; but he who is subject in all things can vow nothing of himself; while he who is subject in some things, according to that in which he is subject, cannot vow. — Since, therefore, a *wife* is subject to her husband, and a *child* to its father in the governance of life, they can vow nothing concerning this which is stable, without their authority. But a *husband* is subject to his wife in the debt of the flesh; therefore against this he cannot vow[^p818-7]. A *religious* is subject in all things which are within religion; and therefore he can vow nothing without the will of his prelate[^p818-8]. But a *slave* is subject as to bodily service; therefore, that he should vow against this he cannot do except by the master's authority; but if there is anything which he can freely do, that he can vow.

1. To that which is objected, that all are of free will; it must be said that this is true as to vowing[^p818-9], but not all are of free will as to doing everything they will; and this will is required in a vow.

2. To that which is objected concerning the obligation to the devil, it must be said that that comes about by the freedom of the will alone; but it is not so concerning the obligation to God as
<!-- page 819 -->
to a vow, since a vow regards some work, with respect to which free choice frequently does not have the power, either in fact, or even in law.

3. To that which is objected, that the way of salvation lies open to all; it must be said that this is true as to those things which are of precept, not as to those which are of supererogation, which regard diverse states, for which some are fit, but others not at all.

4. To that which is objected, that all can conceive [a good] and confirm it by deliberation; it must be said that, as was said above[^p819-1], that confirmation is through a promise; but not every promise confirms except an obligatory promise; and no promise is obligatory except one that is made by him who can bind himself; and such a one is of his own right with respect to that which he ought to vow; and because not all are such, therefore it does not belong to all to vow, but only to those who have this[^p819-2].

---

la: Vide supra quaest. 1.

en: See above, question 1.

la: Vers. 11. seqq. — In fine arg. allegatur I. Cor. 7, 4.

en: [Numbers 30,] verses 11ff. — At the end of the argument 1 Corinthians 7:4 is cited.

la: Cod. K *abrenuntiat*.

en: Codex K [reads] *abrenuntiat* [renounces, present tense].

la: Vide supra pag. 655, nota 4. — Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.), illum hominem vocat liberum, « qui sui ipsius et non alterius gratia est ». Cfr. I. Politic. c. 3. (c. 2.).

en: See above, page 655, note 4. — Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, c. 3 (c. 2), calls that man free "who is for his own sake and not for another's." Cf. *Politics* I, c. 3 (c. 2).

la: Cfr. supra d. 32. dub. 2. — Pro *ideo contra hoc* plurimi codd. et ed. 1 *ideo illud*.

en: Cf. above, distinction 32, dubium 2. — For *ideo contra hoc* [therefore against this] very many codices and edition 1 [read] *ideo illud* [therefore that].

la: Vide C. *Monacho non licet* votum vovere etc. (2.), C. 20. q. 4.

en: See the canon *Monacho non licet* [It is not permitted to a monk] to vow a vow, etc. (2), Causa 20, q. 4.

la: Quae sequuntur suadent, ut legatur *volendum*.

en: What follows suggests that *volendum* [for willing] should be read [in place of *vovendum*].

la: Quaest. 1. in corp. et ad 1. — Inferius pro *illa est* cod. bb *illa fit*.

en: Question 1, in the body and in reply 1. — Further below, for *illa est* [it is that], codex bb [reads] *illa fit* [that comes about].

en: See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF page images / column bands for printed pp.818–819 (PDF pp.838–839; Vol IV offset `pdf = printed + 20`) under the VOL II OVERRIDE, with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 87462–87593) as reference for structure and marker spacing. The two-column IA OCR for this range is cascade-shattered (diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation + inter-column bleed) through the *Respondeo*, *Solutiones*, and every footer, so the PDF read is authoritative for those regions per the override.

**Alignment verified.** The chunk opener "Tertio quaeritur de materia in qua…" is confirmed at raw L87462 (QUAESTIO III header just above); the question closes at "…qui hoc habent" immediately before `ARTICULUS 11.` (raw L87594). Raw range and question ordinal (Tertio = q3) align correctly — no q-swap.

**Page-span correction.** The chunk was scaffolded as pp.[817, 818, 819], but q3's body in fact opens in the lower half of **p.818** (below a1-q2's reply 5) and ends at the top of **p.819** (just before `ARTICULUS II`). It does not touch p.817. `printed_pages` corrected to [818, 819], `pdf_pages` to [838, 839], `source` to pp.818–819.

- **p.818** (running heads "818 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."): q3 opens at the foot of the left column and occupies the lower portion of both columns — opener + *Fundamenta* arguments 1–4 (pro) and *Contra* 1–4 (L-col), then CONCLUSIO, *Respondeo*, and *Solutiones* 1–2-start (R-col). Reply 2 straddles the page boundary. Footer note-series 3–9 → [^p818-3]–[^p818-9], all anchored in my body (7 notes). Notes 1–2 of p.818 belong to a1-q2.
- **p.819** (running head "DIST. XXXVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I. — 819"): the tail of reply 2 + replies 3–4 occupy a two-column block at the top of the page, above the centered `ARTICULUS II.` header. My body carries the first two footers, note-series 1–2 → [^p819-1]–[^p819-2] (markers at *superius* in reply 4 and at *qui hoc habent* closing reply 4). Notes 3–8 of p.819 belong to a2-q1 (its *rescindens*/*Rursus quidam*/*littera Magistri* material).

**Apparatus count = 9** (p.818: 7 [notes 3–9]; p.819: 2 [notes 1–2]), all keyed to body markers in both languages.

**Footer hand-offs:**
- *Picked up from `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q2`* (shared p.818): q2 forwarded p.818 footer note-series 3–9, which anchor in q3's arguments, *Respondeo*, and reply 1. I claim all seven; q2 kept only p.818 notes 1–2.
- *Forwarded to `bon-sent-IV-d38-a2-q1`* (shared p.819): `ARTICULUS II` opens on p.819 after my body ends. **Printed p.819 footer note-series 3–8 belong to a2-q1** (its arguments and *sed contra*), not to me; I claim only p.819 notes 1–2.

**Note on [^p819-1] compound entry.** Quaracchi's p.819 note 1 bundles a back-reference for q3's marker ("Quaest. 1. in corp. et ad 1.", keyed to *sicut superius dictum est* in reply 4) with an appended unmarked textual variant that occurs *inferius* — i.e. in a2-q1 below ("pro *illa est* cod. bb *illa fit*"). Because the numbered marker (1) is physically in q3's reply 4, the whole note is rendered here in q3's apparatus, per the mechanical marker-position rule.

**Scholion: ABSENT.** This quaestio renders no scholion of its own; the Art. I scholion lives in `bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q1` (it explicitly covers all three Art. I questions). Confirming this, my closing footer [^p819-2] is *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* ("See the scholion to question 1 of this article"). `has_scholion: false`.

**Editorial marginalia (trimmed from body per CLAUDE.md OCR-cleanup rule).** Quaracchi prints side-glosses that were not rendered inline: p.818 *Ad oppositum* (at arg. 1), *Fundamenta* (at *Contra* 1), *Conclusio*, *De puero*, *De religioso*, *De servo*, *Solutiones oppositorum* (down the *Respondeo* / reply column); p.819 *Notandum* (at reply 4's *firmatio illa est*). These are editorial structural captions, not Bonaventure's text.

**[?] flags:** none. The raw OCR's "pag. 635" in note 6 was corrected to **pag. 655** on the clean PDF read; all formulae, codex sigla (K, FG, Q, bb, ed. 1), scripture/authority citations (Numbers 30:11ff; 1 Cor. 7:4; Aristotle *Metaph.* I & *Polit.* I; Gratian C. 20 q. 4; d. 32 dub. 2), and the *vovendum/volendum* variant resolved cleanly against the 450 dpi page images. The p.819 running head reads "ART. II. QUAEST. I." because `ARTICULUS II` begins lower on the same page; q3's body above it is unaffected.