title: Dist. 18, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de hoc quod dicit, quod relatio non apparet in hoc nomine *spiritus*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia spiritus dicitur, quia spiratur: ergo refertur ad spirantem; ergo apparet in eo relatio. Item, videtur quod magis appareat quam in[^1] hoc nomine *donum*, quia *«relativa dicuntur, quae hoc ipsum, quod sunt, aliorum sunt»*[^2]; sed spiritus eo quod spiritus, habet esse a spirante; donum vero non oportet quod habeat esse a donante; ergo non videtur in hoc tantum apparere relatio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tam donum quam spiritus dicitur relative; sed tamen relatio magis apparet in hoc nomine *donum* quam in hoc

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nomine *spiritus*, quia donum semper dicit respectum ad dantem, spiritus autem[^3] non, immo potest accipi absolute.

Vel aliter dicendum, quod Augustinus non dicit, quod relatio non appareat in hoc nomine *spiritus*, sed quod non appareat in hoc nomine *spiritus sanctus*. Quamvis enim dicatur esse spiritus spiratoris, non tamen dicitur esse spiritus sanctus spiratoris.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis spiritus dicit habitudinem respicientem esse[^4] quam donum; dicendum, quod verum est in his quibus accidit esse donum, sed in Spiritu sancto, qui ideo est, quia donum, non habet locum ista obiectio.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius nascendo accepit, ut sit ipsa substantia*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia in omni eo quod inest Filio per nativitatem, distinguitur Filius a Patre, quia nativitas est proprietas distinctiva: ergo si[^5] Filius nascendo accepit, ut sit essentia vel substantia: ergo Pater in substantia distinguitur a Filio. Item, quod Filius nascendo accepit sive quod Filius est nascendo est natum: ergo substantia est nata, si Filius nascendo est substantia. Omne enim, quod nascendo accipitur[^6], a nativitate habet ortum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui distinxerunt istam locutionem: *Filius nascendo est divina substantia* sive *Deus*, quia gerundium[^7] potest dicere *concomitantiam*, et sic simpliciter est vera; vel *causam*, et sic est[^8] multiplex, quia cum dico: *Filius est Deus* sive *divina substantia*, tria dico, scilicet subiectum, compositionem et praedicatum. Potest ergo hoc gerundium *nascendo* dicere causalitatem respectu subiecti, vel respectu compositionis, vel respectu praedicati. Si respectu subiecti, tunc est sensus: *Filius nascendo* etc., scilicet[^9] qui est Filius nascendo, vel qui nascendo habet, ut sit Filius, est Deus; et sic est vera. Si respectu compositionis, sic est sensus: *Filius est Deus nascendo*, id est, hoc praedicatum convenit subiecto per nativitatem; et sic adhuc locutio est vera. Si respectu praedicati, sic est sensus: *Filius est Deus* sive *substantia divina nascendo*, ita quod nasci sive nativitas sit principium sive origo Deitatis; et in hoc sensu est falsa.

Magister tamen istam locutionem non distinguit, sed simpliciter concedit, et satis probabiliter, quoniam praedicta distinctio non videtur habere radicem[^10]. Cum enim gerundium natum sit determinare compositionem — quia omnino nihil est dicere: *homo nascendo* et huiusmodi — et cum compositio praedicati, sive essentiae sive omnium quae attribuuntur Filio, conveniant subiecto per nativitatem, locutio[^11] habet veritatem. Nec valent obiectiones in contrarium adductae, quia nativitas non distinguit illud quod per nativitatem habetur sive quod est in nascente, sed eum solum, qui nascitur: et ideo non sequitur, quod substantia sit distincta, nec quod ipsa nascatur, quamvis per generationem habeatur[^12].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius nativitate non est essentia*. Videtur falsum dicere, quia cum nascendo sit essentia, pari ratione videtur, quod nativitate; et hoc videtur per auctoritatem Hilarii in littera.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio ista est distinguenda: *Filius nativitate est divina essentia*; quia ablativus potest construi in ratione formae, vel in ratione principii. Si in ratione formae, sic est falsa, quia nativitas non est causa formalis respectu praedicati essentialis. Si in ratione principii, sic habet veritatem, quia omnia quae conveniunt Filio, conveniunt ei per nativitatis originem. Sed Magister, quia accipit gerundium[^13] in ratione principii, ideo cum gerundio simpliciter concedit; et quia accipit ablativum in ratione formae, ideo cum ablativo simpliciter negat; magis enim iudicat secundum[^14] usum loquendi quam secundum virtutem sermonis.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Neque per defectionem, aut protensionem, aut derivationem*; quomodo[^15] differunt illa tria?

**Respondeo:** Quidam dicunt sic, quod per *defectionem* producitur aliquid de materia per formae praeex-

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istentis corruptionem, sicut ex grano frumenti herba; per *protensionem* producitur aliquid[^16] per praeexistentis formae permanentiam et inductionem formae artificialis, sicut vas fit de argento; per *derivationem*, quod producitur per praeexistentis formae permanentiam sola locali mutatione, ut rivus ex fonte et lacus ex rivo.

Aliter potest dici, quod materiale principium, ex quo res est, aut est materiale et transiens formaliter, et sic est *defectio*; aut est materiale et permanens, et sic est *protensio*; aut est materiale et permanens et agens, et sic est *derivatio*; et horum exempla sunt manifesta[^17].

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Aliud est quod accepimus, ut essemus, aliud, ut sancti essemus*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia sicut sine Spiritu Dei non possumus sancti esse, ita nec esse: ergo videtur, quod Spiritu sancto[^18] non tantum accepimus, ut essemus sancti, sed etiam ut essemus.

**Respondeo:** Potest ad hoc dici, quod hoc dictum est per appropriationem. Quamvis enim a Spiritu sancto habeamus esse et sanctum esse, appropriate tamen habemus sanctum esse: ideo non sic accipi[^19] dicitur in nostri esse productione, sicut in sanctificatione.

Aliter tamen potest dici, quod, sicut dare ordinatur ad habendum, ita et accipere; et quia nullus habet Spiritum sanctum, quantumcumque Spiritus sanctus operetur in eo, nisi qui potest eo frui, et omnis talis est sanctus: ideo Spiritus sanctus non dicitur, proprie loquendo, dari nec accipi nisi a Sanctis[^20].

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Tollam de spiritu tuo*, quia hoc non potest dici quantum ad substantiam, ergo quantum ad effectum sive gratiam: ergo videtur quod gratia transferatur ab uno in alium. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum per conformitatem; obiicitur, quod[^21] pari ratione posset dici, quod tolleret de spiritu aliorum et daret Moysi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de spiritu quantum ad effectum; et haec praepositio *de* importat conformitatem simul[^22] et partialitatem, sed non quantum ad partem constituentem secundum veritatem, sed secundum proportionem; quoniam effectus Spiritus sancti multo plus abundavit in Moyse quam in aliis, ut[^23] quasi alii partem gratiae suae viderentur habere. Et dicitur *tollam* quantum ad sollicitudinem, quia dum dona Spiritus sancti aliis sunt communicata, sollicitudo Moysi est diminuta, et pars illius sollicitudinis est[^24] aliis commissa.

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt about what he says, that the relation does not appear in this name *spirit*. For it appears to say falsely, because *spirit* is so called, because it is breathed-forth: therefore it is referred to the one breathing-forth; therefore relation appears in it. Likewise, it appears that [relation] appears more [in *spirit*] than in[^1] this name *gift*, because *«relatives are said to be those things which, this very thing which they are, are said to be of others»*[^2]; but *spirit* by the very fact that it is *spirit* has its being from the one breathing-forth; *gift*, however, need not have its being from the giver; therefore it appears that relation does not appear in this [name *gift*] more.

**I respond:** It must be said that both *gift* and *spirit* are said relatively; but yet relation appears more in this name *gift* than in this

name *spirit*, because *gift* always says a respect to the giver, but *spirit*[^3] does not, but rather can be taken absolutely.

Or it can be said otherwise, that Augustine does not say that the relation does not appear in this name *spirit*, but that it does not appear in this name *Holy Spirit*. For although [the Holy Spirit] is said to be the spirit of the breather-forth, yet *Holy Spirit* is not said to be of the breather-forth.

To that which is objected, that *spirit* states a relationship regarding being[^4] more than *gift*; it must be said that this is true in those things to which it is accidental to be a gift, but in the Holy Spirit, who is for this reason because [he is] gift, this objection has no place.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Son by being-born received that he might be the very substance*. For it appears to say wrongly, because in everything which is in the Son through nativity, the Son is distinguished from the Father, because nativity is a distinctive property: therefore if[^5] the Son by being-born received that he might be essence or substance: therefore the Father is distinguished from the Son in substance. Likewise, that which the Son received by being-born, or that which the Son is by being-born, is born: therefore substance is born, if the Son by being-born is substance. For everything that is received[^6] by being-born has its origin from the nativity.

**I respond:** It must be said that some have distinguished this locution: *The Son by being-born is the divine substance*, or *God*, because the gerund[^7] can state *concomitance*, and so simply it is true; or *cause*, and so it is[^8] multiple, because when I say *The Son is God* or *the divine substance*, I say three things, namely subject, composition, and predicate. Therefore this gerund *by being-born* can state causality with respect to the subject, or with respect to the composition, or with respect to the predicate. If with respect to the subject, then the sense is: *The Son by being-born* etc., namely[^9] he who is Son by being-born, or who by being-born has [it] that he is Son, is God; and so it is true. If with respect to the composition, then the sense is: *The Son is God by being-born*, that is, this predicate belongs to the subject through nativity; and so still the locution is true. If with respect to the predicate, then the sense is: *The Son is God* or *the divine substance by being-born*, in such a way that to be born or nativity is the principle or origin of the Deity; and in this sense it is false.

The Master, however, does not distinguish this locution, but simply concedes it, and quite probably, since the aforesaid distinction does not seem to have a root[^10]. For since the gerund is naturally apt to determine the composition — for it is altogether nothing to say *a man by being-born* and the like — and since the composition of the predicate, whether of the essence or of all those things which are attributed to the Son, belong to the subject through nativity, the locution[^11] has truth. Nor are the objections adduced to the contrary valid, because nativity does not distinguish that which is had through nativity, or that which is in the one being born, but only him who is born: and therefore it does not follow that the substance be distinct, nor that it itself be born, although it be had[^12] through generation.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Son by nativity is not essence*. It appears to say falsely, because since by being-born he is essence, by parity of reason it appears that [he is so] by nativity also; and this appears through the authority of Hilary in the text.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt this [locution] is to be distinguished: *The Son by nativity is the divine essence*; because the ablative can be construed in the manner of *form*, or in the manner of *principle*. If in the manner of form, so it is false, because nativity is not the formal cause with respect to the essential predicate. If in the manner of principle, so it has truth, because all things which belong to the Son, belong to him through the origin of nativity. But the Master, because he takes the gerund[^13] in the manner of principle, therefore with the gerund he simply concedes; and because he takes the ablative in the manner of form, therefore with the ablative he simply denies; for he judges more according to[^14] the usage of speaking than according to the strict force of the expression.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Neither by defection, or by protension, or by derivation*; how[^15] do those three differ?

**I respond:** Some say thus, that by *defection* something is produced from matter through the corruption of a pre-existing

form, as the blade [of grass] from a grain of wheat; by *protension* something is produced[^16] through the permanence of a pre-existing form and the introduction of an artificial form, as a vessel is made from silver; by *derivation*, that which is produced through the permanence of a pre-existing form by local change alone, as a stream from a fountain and a lake from a stream.

It can be said otherwise, that the material principle from which a thing is, is either material and transient formally, and so it is *defection*; or it is material and permanent, and so it is *protension*; or it is material and permanent and agent, and so it is *derivation*; and the examples of these are manifest[^17].

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what is said: *One thing is what we have received in order that we might be, another, that we might be holy*. For it appears to say wrongly, because just as without the Spirit of God we cannot be holy, so neither [can we] be: therefore it appears that by the Holy Spirit[^18] we have not only received that we might be holy, but also that we might be.

**I respond:** It can be said to this, that this was said by appropriation. For although from the Holy Spirit we have being and holy being, yet by appropriation we have holy being: therefore he is not so said to be received[^19] in the production of our being, as in [our] sanctification.

Yet it can be said otherwise, that, just as giving is ordered to having, so also receiving; and because no one has the Holy Spirit, no matter how much the Holy Spirit may operate in him, except him who is able to enjoy him, and every such one is holy: therefore the Holy Spirit is not said, properly speaking, to be given or received except by the Holy[^20].

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *I will take from your spirit*, because this cannot be said with respect to substance, therefore with respect to effect or grace: therefore it appears that grace is transferred from one into another. If you say that this was said by conformity; the objection is raised, that[^21] by parity of reason it could be said, that he would take from the spirit of others and give to Moses.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is to be understood of the spirit with respect to effect; and this preposition *from* imports conformity together with[^22] partiality, but not with respect to a part constituting [it] according to truth, but according to proportion; because the effect of the Holy Spirit abounded much more in Moses than in others, so that[^23] the others might seem to have, as it were, a part of his grace. And it is said *I will take* with respect to solicitude, because while the gifts of the Holy Spirit were communicated to others, the solicitude of Moses was diminished, and a part of that solicitude was[^24] committed to others.

---

la: Libr. 1. de Fide orthod. c. 9. Vide supra d. 2. dub. 3.

en: Book 1 *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 9. See above d. 2, dub. 3. [Reference to John Damascene.]

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relativis: *Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur, quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum esse dicuntur*. — Aliqui codd. ut V Y *aliorum dicuntur* loco *aliorum sunt*. Paulo ante in Vat. male deest *quem*[?], exstat autem in mss. et primis edd. Dein cod. dd post *apparet* adiungit verba certe supplenda *relatio in hoc nomine spiritus*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on Relatives: *But those things are said to be in-relation-to-something, whatsoever, this very thing which they are, are said to be of others*. — Some codices such as V, Y [read] *aliorum dicuntur* in place of *aliorum sunt*. A little before, in the Vatican [edition] *quem*[?] is wrongly absent, but it is found in the manuscripts and the first editions. Then codex dd after *apparet* adjoins the words, certainly to be supplied, *relatio in hoc nomine spiritus*.

la: Multi codd. ut A F H K S T V X Y etc. cum ed. 1 addunt *sanctus*.

en: Many codices such as A, F, H, K, S, T, V, X, Y etc., with edition 1, add *sanctus*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *esse*, quae et mox falso *sed Spiritus sanctus*, *quia* pro *sed in Spiritu sancto, qui*; lectionem in textum receptam exhibent antiquiores codd. (uno alterove legente *quia* loco *qui*) cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc omits *esse*, which also soon [reads] wrongly *sed Spiritus sanctus*, *quia* in place of *sed in Spiritu sancto, qui*; the reading received into the text is exhibited by the older codices (with one or another reading *quia* in place of *qui*) with edition 1.

la: In aliquibus mss. ut S X et ed. 1 minus apte omittitur *si*.

en: In some manuscripts such as S, X, and edition 1, *si* is less aptly omitted.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *accepit*, sed melior est lectio mss., quia generalior.

en: The Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and edition 1, [reads] *accepit*, but the reading of the manuscripts is better, because more general.

la: Aliqui codd. hic, sed plures codd. cum ed. 1 infra bis *gerundivum* loco *gerundium*.

en: Some codices [read so] here, but more codices with edition 1, twice below, [read] *gerundivum* in place of *gerundium*.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.

en: On the faith of most manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *est*.

la: Vat. *id est*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *id est*.

la: Cod. K *rationem*. Paulo ante cod. V *hanc* loco *istam*.

en: Codex K [reads] *rationem*. A little before, codex V [reads] *hanc* in place of *istam*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, *ideo* pro *locutio*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, the other codices and edition 1 contradicting, [reads] *ideo* in place of *locutio*.

la: Eandem difficultatem fere eodem modo solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Et breviter Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 42. m. 3. a. 1. ad 8.

en: B. Albert resolves the same difficulty in nearly the same way, here a. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. — And briefly Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, ad 8.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 hic et paulo infra *gerundivum*.

en: Many codices with edition 1, here and a little below, [read] *gerundivum*.

la: In cod. N additur *communem*. Cod. O *Magister tamen potius*, et cod. X *Magister enim plus* loco *magis enim*. Mox pauci codd. ut A dd *veritatem* pro *virtutem*. — In solutione huius dubii consentiunt B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic in expos. lit.

en: In codex N is added *communem*. Codex O [reads] *Magister tamen potius*, and codex X *Magister enim plus* in place of *magis enim*. Soon a few codices such as A, dd [read] *veritatem* in place of *virtutem*. — In the solution of this doubt B. Albert agrees, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the *expositio litterae*.

la: Multi codd. ut A S T V W X etc. *quo* pro *quomodo*.

en: Many codices such as A, S, T, V, W, X etc. [read] *quo* in place of *quomodo*.

la: In multis mss. et ed. 1 omittitur *aliquid*. Paulo infra cod. X *sicut nascitur de argento statua* loco *sicut vas fit de argento*.

en: In many manuscripts and edition 1 *aliquid* is omitted. A little below, codex X [reads] *sicut nascitur de argento statua* in place of *sicut vas fit de argento*.

la: Haec verba Hilarii simili modo explicantur a B. Alberto, hic a. 9, et a S. Thoma, Petro et Richardo, hic in expos. lit. S. Thomas tamen verba *per protensionem* intelligit sic: quando producitur ex re manente coniuncta sibi, sicut ramus ex arbore.

en: These words of Hilary are explained in a similar manner by B. Albert, here a. 9, and by St. Thomas, Peter, and Richard, here in the *expositio litterae*. St. Thomas, however, understands the words *per protensionem* thus: when something is produced from a thing remaining joined to itself, as a branch from a tree.

la: Ita codd. et ed. 1; cod. Y bene *a Spiritu sancto*; Vat. *Spiritum sanctum*.

en: So the codices and edition 1; codex Y rightly [reads] *a Spiritu sancto*; the Vatican [edition] *Spiritum sanctum*.

la: Cod. Y *accipit*, qui et paulo supra post *Aliter* omittit *tamen*. Mox cod. Z *habet* loco *potest*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *accipit*, which also a little above after *Aliter* omits *tamen*. Soon codex Z [reads] *habet* in place of *potest*.

la: Vat. *nisi Sanctis et a Sanctis*. — Plura de hoc vide supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. et 2.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *nisi Sanctis et a Sanctis*. — More on this see above d. 14, a. 2, q. 1 and 2.

la: Aliqui codd. ut F G H Z etc. cum ed. 1 *quia*.

en: Some codices such as F, G, H, Z etc., with edition 1, [read] *quia* [in place of *quod*].

la: Fide mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 substituimus *simul* loco *similiter*. Paulo ante cod. Z cum ed. 1 post *importat* satis bene addit *ibi*. Mox post *partem* ponendo *constituentem* sequimur lectionem plurium mss. ut G H I O ee ff et ed. 1, quae in se clarior est et confirmari videtur minus apta lectione multorum codd. *construentem*, cod. H *continentem*; Vat. habet *conferentem* et *continentem*. Explicationem sensus accipe ex Richardo, hic in expos. lit. dicente: *Haec praepositio* de *non dicit ibi partitionem substantiae Spiritus sancti vel gratiae, quae fuit in Moyse, sed quod aliis daretur gratia Spiritus sancti in minori abundantia, ita quod haberent quasi rationem partis respectu abundantiae gratiae, quae erat in Moyse. Vel loquitur de ablatione quoad usum sollicitudinis, non quoad habitum.* — Vide etiam S. Thomam et Petrum, hic in expos. lit.

en: On the faith of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have substituted *simul* in place of *similiter*. A little before, codex Z with edition 1, after *importat*, quite suitably adds *ibi*. Soon, after *partem*, by placing *constituentem* we follow the reading of many manuscripts such as G, H, I, O, ee, ff, and edition 1, which in itself is clearer and seems to be confirmed by the less apt reading of many codices *construentem*, codex H *continentem*; the Vatican [edition] has *conferentem* and *continentem*. Take the explanation of the sense from Richard, here in the *expositio litterae*, who says: *This preposition* "from" *does not state there a partition of the substance of the Holy Spirit, or of the grace which was in Moses, but that the grace of the Holy Spirit was given to others in lesser abundance, in such a way that they had as it were the relation of a part with respect to the abundance of grace which was in Moses. Or it speaks of removal as to the exercise of solicitude, not as to the habit.* — See also St. Thomas and Peter, here in the *expositio litterae*.

la: Vat. *ut quod alii quasi*, sed obstant fere omnes antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *ut quod alii quasi*, but nearly all the older codices stand against [it], with edition 1.

la: Ed. 1 omittit *est*.

en: Edition 1 omits *est*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 19

title_alt:
Distinctio XIX littera Magistri
Lombard's text on Distinction XIX

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XIX.

#### *De aequalitate trium personarum.*

#### Cap. I. *De aequalitate trium personarum.*

Nunc postquam coaeternitatem trium personarum pro modulo[^1] facultatis nostrae insinuavimus, iam de earundem aequalitate aliquid eloqui superest. Fides enim catholica sicut coaeternas, ita et coaequales tres personas asserit. Aequalis est enim in omnibus Patri Filius, et Patri et Filio Spiritus sanctus; quia, ut Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^2], breviter aperiens, quomodo intelligatur aequalitas, docet: «Nullus horum alium aut praecedit aeternitate aut excedit magnitudine aut superat potestate; quia nec Filio nec Spiritu sancto,

<!-- page 336 -->

quantum ad naturae divinae unitatem pertinet, anterior aut maior est Pater, nec Filius Spiritu sancto. Aeternum quippe et sine initio est, quod Filius de Patris natura existit; et aeternum ac sine initio est, quod Spiritus sanctus de natura Patris Filiique procedit. Ob hoc ergo tres unum recte credimus et dicimus Deum, quia una prorsus aeternitas, una immensitas, una naturaliter trium personarum est divinitas». Ecce breviter assumpsit Augustinus, in quo trium personarum consistit aequalitas, scilicet quia alia aliam non excedit aeternitate, magnitudine[?] aut potestate.

#### Cap. II. *Quod aeternitate et magnitudine et potentia in Deo unum est, etsi videantur esse diversa.*

Cumque enumerentur ista quasi diversa, in Deo tamen unum et idem sunt, scilicet essentia divina simplex et incommutabilis. Unde Augustinus in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Non alio magnus, alio Deus est, sed eo magnus, quo Deus; quia non aliud illi est magnum esse, aliud Deum esse. Eadem quippe eius magnitudo est, quae virtus, et eadem essentia, quae magnitudo». Pater ergo et Filius simul una essentia et una magnitudo. Ita etiam et potentia Dei essentia divina est. Unde Augustinus in septimo libro *Confessionum*[^4]: «Voluntas et potentia Dei Deus ipse est». Aeternitas quoque Dei essentia divina est. Quod Augustinus ostendit super illum locum Psalmi[^5] *In generationem et generationem anni tui*, dicens: «Est generatio generationum, quae iam transit, collecta de omnibus generationibus, id est sanctis. In illa erunt anni Dei, qui non transeunt, id est aeternitas Dei. Non enim sunt aliud anni Dei, aliud ipse, sed anni Dei aeternitas Dei est. Aeternitas vero ipsa Dei substantia est, nihil habens mutabile». Inconcusso igitur teneamus, quod unum et idem est, scilicet essentia divina, Dei aeternitas, potentia, magnitudo; et tamen consuevit Scriptura haec et his similia quasi distincta ponere. In his ergo verbis trium personarum aequalitatem breviter complexus est Augustinus. Quia alius alium nec aeternitate nec magnitudine nec potentia superat. Quod autem aeternitate aliqua trium personarum aliam non excedat, supra ostensum est[^6], ubi coaeternitas trium personarum insinuata est.

#### Cap. III. *Nunc superest ostendere, quod magnitudine vel potentia alius alium non excedat; et prius de magnitudine videamus.*

Sciendum est ergo, quia Pater non est maior Filio, nec Pater vel Filius maior Spiritu sancto, nec maius aliquid duae personae simul sunt quam una, nec tres simul maius aliquid quam duae, nec maior est essentia in tribus quam in duabus nec in duabus quam in una, quia tota est in singulis. Unde Ioannes Damascenus[^7] ait: «Confitemur Deitatis naturam omnem perfecte esse in singula suarum hypostaseon, id est personarum: omnem in Patre, omnem in Filio, omnem in Spiritu sancto. Ideoque perfectus Deus Pater, perfectus Deus Filius, perfectus Deus Spiritus sanctus».

#### Cap. IV. *Quomodo dicitur Pater esse in Filio et Filius in Patre et Spiritus sanctus in utroque.*

Et inde est, quod Pater dicitur esse in Filio et Filius in Patre et Spiritus sanctus in utroque et singulus in singulis. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^8]: «Propter unitatem naturalem totus Pater in Filio et Spiritu sancto est, totus quoque Spiritus sanctus in Patre et Filio est. Nullus horum extra quemlibet ipsorum est propter naturae divinae unitatem». Haec hic aperit aliqualenus — non enim potest plene tantum ab homine reserari arcanum — ex qua intelligentia dicatur singula personarum tota esse in aliis. Unde etiam Hilarius ista interius perquirens in libro tertio *de Trinitate*[^9] ait: «Affert plerisque obscuritatem sermo Domini, cum dicit: *Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est*; nec immerito. Natura enim intelligentiae humanae rationem dicti huius non capit, nec exemplum aliquod rebus divinis comparatio humana praestabit; sed quod inintelligibile[^10] est homini, Deo esse possibile est. Cognoscendum itaque atque intelligendum est, quid sit illud: *Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est*; si tamen comprehendere hoc ita ut est valebimus, ut quod

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natura rerum pati non posse aestimatur, ut divinae veritatis ratio consequatur». «Patrem igitur in Filio et Filium in Patre esse, plenitudo in utroque divinitatis perfecta est[^11]»; «quia plenitudo deitatis est in Filio. Quod in Patre est, hoc et in Filio est; quod in Ingenito est, hoc in Genito; alter ab altero et uterque unum»: «is scilicet qui est, nihil habens quod non sit etiam in eo, a quo est[^12]»; «non duo unus, sed alius in alio, quia non aliud in utroque»; «ut unum in fide nostra sint uterque, non unus: nec eundem utrumque, nec aliud confitemur; quia Deum ex Deo natum nec eundem nativitas, nec aliud esse permittit[^13]». «Eandem igitur in utroque et virtutis similitudinem et deitatis plenitudinem confitemur, quia Veritas dicit: *Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est*. Omnia enim Filius accepit a Patre[^14]». «Nam si partem eiusdem, qui genuit, accepit, neuter ergo perfectus est: deest enim et unde decessit, nec plenitudo in eo erit, qui ex portione constiterit. Neuter ergo perfectus est, si plenitudinem suam et qui genuit amittit, nec qui natus est consequitur[^15]». «Fateamur ergo, quod Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre, Deus in Deo», ut idem Hilarius ait in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^16], «non per duplicem convenientium generum coniunctionem, nec per insitivam capacioris substantiae naturam, sed per naturae unitam similitudinem, per nativitatem viventis naturae ex vivente natura; dum res non differt, dum naturam Dei non degenerat nativitas, dum non aliud aliquid ex Deo quam Deus nascitur, dum nihil in his novum est, nihil alienum, nihil separabile». Ecce his verbis, prout humana permittit infirmitas, intelligi potest[^17], ex quo sensu Christus dixerit, se esse in Patre et Patrem in se. Ex eodem etiam sensu intelligitur Spiritus sanctus esse in utroque et singula personarum in singulis; quia scilicet in singulis est eadem plenitudo divinitatis et unita similitudo naturae; quia non est maior divina natura in aliqua harum personarum, sed unius et indifferentis naturae sunt hae tres personae. Ideoque altera in altera esse dicitur, ut praedictum est. Unde Ambrosius[^18] praedictorum verborum sententiam nobis aperiens super Epistolam secundam ad Corinthios quinto ait: «Per hoc intelligitur Pater esse in Filio et Filius in Patre, quia una est eorum substantia. Ibi enim est unitas, ubi nulla est[^19] diversitas». Ecce tribus illustrium virorum testimoniis, scilicet Augustini, Hilarii atque Ambrosii, in idem concurrentibus revelatione Spiritus sancti in eis loquentis pie credere volentibus ostenditur — tamen quasi per speculum et in aenigmate[^20] — qualiter accipiendum sit, cum dicitur Pater in Filio esse vel Filius in Patre vel Spiritus sanctus in utroque.

### Pars II.

Sed iam nunc ad propositum redeamus coeptoque insistamus ostendentes, quod magnitudine nulla trium personarum aliam superat, quia nulla maior aliis, nec maius aliquid sunt duae quam una, nec tres quam duae, nec maior Deus quam singuli eorum; quia singulus illorum perfectus est, nec est quo crescat illa perfectio[^21].

#### Cap. V. *Quod nulla personarum pars est in Trinitate.*

Nec est aliqua trium personarum pars Dei vel divinae essentiae, quia singula harum verus et plenus Deus est et tota et plena divina essentia est; et ideo nulla istarum in Trinitate pars est. Unde Augustinus in libro secundo *contra Maximinum*[^22] haereticum sic ait: «Putas, Deum Patrem cum Filio et Spiritu sancto unum Deum esse non posse; times enim, ne Pater sit pars unius Dei, qui constet ex tribus. Noli hoc timere, nulla enim fit partium in deitatis unitate divisio. Unus est Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, id est ipsa Trinitas unus est Deus. Ergo, inquis, Deus Pater est pars Dei; absit».

#### Cap. VI. *Quare tres personae dicantur summe unum.*

«Tres enim personae sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et hi tres, quia unius substantiae sunt,

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unum sunt et summe unum sunt, ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est diversitas voluntatum. Si enim natura unum essent, et voluntate non essent, non summe unum essent: si vero natura dispares essent, unum non essent. Hi ergo tres, quia[^23] unum sunt propter ineffabilem coniunctionem Deitatis, qua ineffabiliter copulantur, unus Deus est». «Pars ergo Trinitatis esse non potest quicumque unus[^24] in tribus. In Trinitate igitur, quae Deus est, et Pater Deus est, et Filius Deus est, et Spiritus sanctus Deus est, et simul hi tres unus Deus; nec huius Trinitatis tertia pars est unus, nec maius aliquid duo quam unus est ibi, nec maius aliquid sunt omnes quam singuli, quia spiritualis, non corporalis est magnitudo. *Qui potest capere, capiat*[^25]; qui autem non potest, credat et oret, ut quod credit intelligat. Verum est enim quod dicitur per Prophetam: *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*[^26]». His verbis aperte ostendit indifferentem magnitudinem trium personarum. Item in eodem[^27]: «Tu nempe dixisti, unum Deum non ex partibus esse compositum; et hoc de Patre tantum vis intelligi. Ille, inquis, virtus est ingenita, simplex. Et tamen in hac simplici virtute multa videris commemorare, cum dicis: Deus Deum genuit, bonus bonum genuit, sapiens sapientem, clemens clementem, potens potentem. Nunquid ergo bonitas et sapientia et clementia et potentia partes sunt unius virtutis, quam simplicem esse dixisti? Si dixeris, partes sunt: simplex ergo virtus ex partibus constat. Et simplex ista virtus, te definiente, unus est Deus; ergo Deum ex partibus compositum esse dicis. Non dico, inquis, non sunt ergo[^28] partes. Si ergo in una persona Patris et illa invenis quae plura videntur, et partes non invenis, quia una virtus simplex est: quanto magis Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus et propter individuam deitatem unus Deus est et propter uniuscuiusque proprietatem tres personae sunt et propter singulorum perfectionem partes unius Dei non sunt! Virtus est Pater, virtus est Filius, virtus est Spiritus sanctus. Hoc verum dicis; sed quod virtutem de virtute genitam et virtutem de virtute procedentem non vis eandem habere naturam, hoc falsum dicis, hoc contra fidem rectam et catholicam dicis». His verbis aperte docetur, quod tres illae personae non sunt partes Dei vel divinae essentiae, nullaque illarum[^29] Trinitatis pars dicenda est nec una maior aliis.

#### Cap. VII. *Cum dicimus, tres personas esse unam essentiam, nec ut genus de speciebus nec ut speciem de individuis praedicamus, quia non est essentia genus et persona species, vel essentia species et personae individua.*

Hic adiiciendum est, quod tanta est aequalitas trium personarum atque indifferens magnitudo, quod cum dicamus, tres personas unam esse[^30] essentiam vel substantiam, neque ut genus de speciebus, neque ut speciem de individuis praedicamus. Non enim essentia divina genus est et tres personae species, vel essentia divina species et tres personae individua. Quod Augustinus rationibus probabilibus atque irrefragabilibus aperte demonstrat in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^31] ita dicens: «Si essentia genus est, species autem persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt, oportet appellari tres substantias, ut appellantur tres personae; sicut cum sit animal genus et equus species, appellantur tres equi, iidemque tria animalia. Non enim species ibi pluraliter dicitur et genus singulariter, ut si diceretur, tres equi sunt unum animal; sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine dicuntur». Cum ergo tres personas unam fateamur esse essentiam, non tres[^32] essentias, cum tres equi tria animalia dicantur, non unum: patet, nomine essentiae non significari genus nec nomine personae speciem.

«Si vero dicunt, nomine personae non speciem significari, sed aliquid singulare atque individuum, et nomine essentiae speciem intelligi, ut persona non dicatur sicut homo, sed quomodo dicitur hic homo, velut Abraham, Isaac et Iacob vel quis alius, qui etiam digito praesens demonstrari possit; sic quoque illos eadem ratio confutabit. Sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac et Iacob tria individua, ita tres homines et tria animalia. Cur ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, si secundum genus et speciem et individuum ista distinguantur[?], non ita dicuntur tres essentiae, ut tres personae[?]».

Alio quoque modo idem probat Augustinus, scilicet quod essentia divina non est genus, nec personae species, vel essentia non est species nec personae

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individua. «Una, inquit[^33], essentia non habet species, sicut unum animal non habet species unius essentiae. Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non sunt tres species unius essentiae: divina ergo essentia genus non est. Sed nec species est essentia divina et personae individua, sicut homo species est, individua autem Abraham, Isaac et Iacob. Si enim essentia species est, ut homo, sicut unus homo non dicitur esse Abraham, Isaac et Iacob, ita non dicetur[^34] una essentia esse tres personae. Non itaque secundum genus et species ista dicimus».

#### Cap. VIII. *Quod nec secundum materialem causam dicuntur tres personae una essentia.*

Notandum etiam, quod essentia divina non est materia trium personarum, ut Augustinus in eodem libro[^35] docet, «tanquam secundum communem eandemque materiam tres personae dicantur esse una essentia, sicut ex eodem auro si fierent tres statuae, diceremus tres statuas unum aurum. Non autem sic Trinitatem, id est tres personas, dicimus unam essentiam et unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant. In statuis enim aequalibus plus auri est tres simul quam singulae, et minus auri est una quam duae. In illa vero essentia Trinitatis nullo modo ita est». Non ergo secundum materialem causam tres personas unam dicimus esse[^36] essentiam, sicut tres statuae dicuntur unum aurum.

#### Cap. IX. *Nec ita dicuntur tres personae una essentia, ut tres homines una natura vel unius naturae.*

His quoque addendum est, quod tres personas non ita dicimus esse unam essentiam, ut Augustinus in eodem[^37] ait, vel unius essentiae, «sicut dicimus, aliquos tres homines eiusdem sexus et eiusdem temperationis corporis eiusdemque animi unam esse naturam vel unius naturae. Nam in his rebus non tantum est unus homo, quantum tres homines simul, et plus aliquid sunt homines duo quam unus homo, sicut et in statuis esse diximus; at in Deo non est ita. Non enim maior essentia est Pater et Filius simul quam solus Pater vel solus Filius, sed tres simul illae personae aequales sunt singulis». Ex praemissis patet, quod tres personae dicuntur divina essentia nec secundum materialem causam, ut tres statuae unum aurum, nec secundum complexionis similitudinem, ut tres homines unius naturae, nec ut genus praedicatur de speciebus, vel ut species de individuis, id est continens de contentis, maius de minoribus.

His autem videntur adversari quae quidam sacrae Scripturae tractatores catholici in suis scriptis tradiderunt, in quibus significare videntur, quod essentia divina sit quoddam[^38] commune et universale, velut species; tres vero personae sint tria particularia, tria individua numero differentia. Unde Ioannes Damascenus, inter Doctores Graecorum magnus, in libro, quem *de Trinitate* scripsit[^39], quem et papa Eugenius transferri fecit, ait: «Communia et universalia praedicantur de subiectis sibi ipsis particularibus. Commune ergo substantia est, particulare vero hypostasis, id est persona. Particulare autem dicitur, non quod partem naturae habet, sed particulare numero, ut atomus, id est individuum. Numero enim et[^40] non natura differre dicuntur hypostases». Item in eodem[^41]: «Substantia significat communem et circumplectivam speciem *homoideon*, id est similium specie *hypostaseon*, id est personarum, ut puta Deus, homo; hypostasis autem individuum demonstrat, id est Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum, Petrum, Paulum et huiusmodi». Ecce aperte dicit, substantiam esse universale, hypostasim vero particulare, et quod Deus est species, ut homo, et quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt individua, sicut Petrus et Paulus, eo quod numero differunt; quae[^42] praemissae sententiae Augustini penitus contradicere videntur. Quid ergo dicemus ad haec? Hoc utique dicere possumus atque debemus, quod ea quae Augustinus tradidit superius, sine omni haesitatione tenenda sunt.

Haec autem, quae hic dicuntur, licet in sermonis superficie aliquid a fide alienum resonare videantur, sane tamen intelligi queunt piumque lectorem atque

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intellectorem plurimum efflagitant. In quorum explanatione mallem silens alios audire, quam loquendo malevolis detrahendi occasionem praestare. Videtur[^43] tamen mihi ita posse accipi. Cum ait: *substantia est commune, et hypostasis est particulare*; non ita haec accepit, cum de Deo dicantur, ut accipiuntur in philosophica disciplina, sed per similitudinem eorum quae a philosophis dicuntur, locutus est; ut sicut ibi *commune* vel *universale* dicitur quod praedicatur de pluribus, *particulare* vero vel *individuum* quod de uno solo: ita hic[^44] essentia divina dicta est *universale*, quia de omnibus personis simul et de singulis separatim dicitur, *individuum* vero singula quaelibet personarum, quia nec de aliis communiter nec de aliqua aliarum singulariter praedicatur. Propter similitudinem ergo praedicationis substantiam Dei[^45] dixit *universale*, et personas *particularia* vel *individua*. Propter hoc idem etiam eandem divinam essentiam dixit esse «speciem communem et circumplectivam similium specie personarum», quia sicut haec species *homo* de suis praedicatur individuis, velut de Petro, Paulo et aliis, nec isti specie differunt, sed conveniunt[^46], ita Deus de tribus praedicatur personis, quae in divinitate non differunt, sed per omnia conveniunt. Hanc ergo similitudinem inter res sempiternas et res temporales perpendens Ioannes universalitatis et particularitatis nomina, quae rebus temporalibus proprie conveniunt, ad res aeternas transtulit; Augustinus vero, maiorem videns dissimilitudinem quam similitudinem inter res praedictas, ab excellentia Trinitatis praedicta nomina removit.

#### Cap. X. *Utrum tres personae differant numero quae proprietatibus distinctae sunt.*

Quod autem Ioannes dicit, hypostases differre numero, non natura, in eo quod non differre natura ait, verissime et sine scrupulo loquitur; quod vero dicit, differre numero, cavendum est, quomodo intelligatur; diversis enim modis dicuntur aliqua differre numero. Dicuntur enim aliqua differre numero, quando ita differunt, ut hoc non sit illud nec aliquid, quod illud est vel in ipso est: qualiter differunt Socrates et Plato et huiusmodi, quae apud philosophos dicuntur individua vel particularia: iuxta quem modum non possunt dici tres personae differre numero. Dicuntur quoque differre numero quae in enumeratione sive computatione non sibi adiunguntur, sed a se invicem discernuntur, ut cum de aliquibus rebus loquentes dicimus *una, duae, tres*; et secundum hunc modum forte dixit Ioannes hypostases, id est personas, differre numero. Possumus enim dicere: Pater est unus, et Pater et Filius sunt duo, et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres; et item: haec persona est una, et haec et illa sunt duae, et haec et illa et alia sunt tres. Convenientius tamen tres illae personae proprietatibus tantum distingui dicuntur, de quarum distinctione secundum proprietates in sequenti tractabitur[^47]. Nunc vero ad inceptum redeamus, quae dicta sunt repetentes, ut saepius versando familiarius innotescant.

#### Cap. XI. *Quare tres personae simul non sunt maius aliquid quam una.*

Sciendum est ergo, «tantam aequalitatem esse in Trinitate, ut ait Augustinus in octavo libro *de Trinitate*[^48], ut non solum Pater non sit maior quam Filius, sed nec Pater et Filius simul maius aliquid sint quam Spiritus sanctus, aut quaelibet persona minus aliquid sit quam ipsa Trinitas». Quod autem ita sit, aliquo modo, si fieri potest, demonstrandum est. «Quantum ergo ipse Creator adiuvat, attendamus, inquit Augustinus in eodem[^49], quomodo in hac Trinitate duae vel tres personae non sunt maius aliquid quam una earum».

«Quod ibi magnum dicitur, aliunde magnum non est quam eo, quo vere est; quia ibi magnitudo ipsa[^50] veritas est et veritas essentia; non ergo ibi maius est quod verius non est. Non autem verius est Pater et Filius simul quam Pater solus vel Filius. Non ergo maius[^51] aliquid uterque simul quam singulus eorum. Et quia aeque vere est etiam Spiritus sanctus, ideo Pater et Filius simul non sunt aliquid maius quam ipse, quia nec verius sunt. Item in essentia veritatis hoc est verum esse, quod est esse, et hoc est esse, quod est *magnum esse*: hoc est ergo magnum esse quod verum esse. Quod igitur ibi aeque verum est, et aeque magnum est. Quod ergo ibi plus veritatis non habet, non habet plus magnitudinis. Plus autem veritatis non habet quod verius non est. Non est autem verius una persona quam alia, vel duae quam una, vel tres simul quam singula. Non ergo plus veritatis habet una quam alia, vel duae quam una, vel tres simul quam singula. Sic ergo et ipsa Trinitas non est maius aliquid quam unaquaeque ibi persona, sed tam magnum quam singula. Non enim ibi maior est quae verior non est, ubi ipsa veritas est magnitudo[^52]». Ecce modo convenienti et ratione catholica ostensum

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est, quomodo indifferens sit magnitudo trium personarum, quia nec una maior est alia, nec duae maius aliquid quam una[^53], nec tres simul maius aliquid quam singula.

#### Cap. XII. *Quod Deus non est dicendus triplex, sed trinus.*

Praeterea cum Deus dicatur trinus, non tamen debet dici triplex. Ibi enim non est triplicitas, ubi summa est unitas et indifferens aequalitas. Unde Augustinus in libro sexto *de Trinitate*[^54] ait: «Non, quoniam Deus Trinitas est, ideo triplex putandus est: alioquin minor esset Pater solus, vel Filius solus, quam simul Pater et Filius». «Cum itaque tantus est Pater solus vel solus Filius, vel solus Spiritus sanctus, quantus est simul Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, nullo modo triplex dicendus est Deus. Non enim Pater cum Filio et Spiritu sancto maior Deus est quam singuli eorum, quia non est quo crescat illa perfectio. Perfectus autem est et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et perfectus dicitur Deus singulus eorum. Et ideo Trinitas potius quam triplex dici debet».

«In rebus corporeis non tantum est una, quantum tres simul, et plus sunt duae quam una res; in Trinitate vero summa tantum est una persona, quantum tres simul, et tantum sunt duae, quantum una, et in se infinitae sunt[^55]», quia non est finis magnitudinis earum. Ac per hoc aperitur quod supra diximus[^56], scilicet quomodo et singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis, et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum in omnibus est, et unum omnia. Ecce iam ostendimus sufficienter, qualiter in Trinitate aliqua persona aliam non superet magnitudine.

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### DISTINCTION XIX.

#### *On the equality of the three Persons.*

#### Cap. I. *On the equality of the three Persons.*

Now, after we have set forth the coeternity of the three Persons according to the small measure[^1] of our ability, it remains to say something about their equality. For the catholic faith asserts that the three Persons are not only coeternal but also coequal. For the Son is in all things equal to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son; since, as Augustine in his book *On Faith to Peter*[^2], briefly opening up how equality is to be understood, teaches: "None of these either precedes another in eternity or exceeds another in greatness or surpasses another in power; since neither to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit,

as far as the unity of the divine nature is concerned, is the Father prior or greater, nor is the Son so to the Holy Spirit. For it is eternal and without beginning that the Son exists from the Father's nature; and it is eternal and without beginning that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the nature of the Father and of the Son. For this reason, therefore, we rightly believe and call the three one God, since there is altogether one eternity, one immensity, one divinity by nature of the three Persons." Behold, Augustine has briefly summed up that in which the equality of the three Persons consists — namely, that one does not exceed another in eternity, in greatness[?], or in power.

#### Cap. II. *That eternity and greatness and power in God are one, even though they may seem to be diverse.*

And although these are enumerated as if diverse, in God they are nevertheless one and the same — namely, the simple and unchangeable divine essence. Whence Augustine in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^3]: "He is not great by one thing and God by another, but He is great by that whereby He is God; for it is not one thing for Him to be great, another to be God. For His greatness is the same as His power, and the same essence as His greatness." Therefore the Father and the Son together are one essence and one greatness. So also the power of God is the divine essence. Whence Augustine in the seventh book of the *Confessions*[^4]: "The will and the power of God are God Himself." The eternity of God is also the divine essence. Which Augustine shows on that place of the Psalm[^5] *Through generation and generation are Your years*, saying: "There is a generation of generations, which has now passed, gathered out of all generations — that is, of the saints. In that generation will be the years of God, which do not pass — that is, the eternity of God. For the years of God are not one thing and He Himself another, but the years of God are the eternity of God. And the eternity itself is the substance of God, having nothing changeable." Let us therefore hold unshaken that one and the same is the divine essence, the eternity of God, His power, His greatness; and yet Scripture is accustomed to set down these and similar things as if distinct. Therefore in these words Augustine has briefly comprised the equality of the three Persons. For one does not exceed another in eternity, in greatness, or in power. That, however, none of the three Persons exceeds another in eternity has been shown above[^6], where the coeternity of the three Persons was set forth.

#### Cap. III. *Now it remains to show that one does not exceed another in greatness or in power; and let us first see about greatness.*

It must be known, therefore, that the Father is not greater than the Son, nor is the Father or the Son greater than the Holy Spirit, nor are two Persons together anything greater than one, nor are three together anything greater than two, nor is the essence greater in three than in two, nor in two than in one, since it is whole in each. Whence John of Damascus[^7] says: "We confess the entire nature of the Deity to be perfectly in each of His hypostases — that is, of the Persons: the whole in the Father, the whole in the Son, the whole in the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Father is perfect God, the Son is perfect God, the Holy Spirit is perfect God."

#### Cap. IV. *How the Father is said to be in the Son and the Son in the Father and the Holy Spirit in both.*

And from this it is that the Father is said to be in the Son and the Son in the Father and the Holy Spirit in both, and each in each. Whence Augustine in his book *On Faith to Peter*[^8]: "On account of the natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and likewise the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and in the Son. None of these is outside any of them, on account of the unity of the divine nature." This he opens up here in some measure — for the mystery cannot be fully unsealed by man alone — from what understanding it is said that each of the Persons is wholly in the others. Whence also Hilary, searching into these matters more inwardly, in the third book *On the Trinity*[^9] says: "The word of the Lord brings obscurity to many when He says: *I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me*; and not without reason. For the nature of human understanding does not grasp the reasoning of this saying, nor will any human comparison furnish an example for divine things; but what is unintelligible[^10] to man is possible to God. It must therefore be known and understood, what that is: *I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me*; if, however, we will be able to comprehend it as it is — so that what

the nature of things is judged not to be able to bear, may yet follow the reasoning of divine truth." "Therefore that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, the perfect plenitude of divinity in both[^11] is"; "since the plenitude of the deity is in the Son. What is in the Father, this also is in the Son; what is in the Unbegotten, this is in the Begotten; one from the other, and each is one": "He, namely, who is, having nothing that is not also in Him from whom He is[^12]"; "not one [being] two, but one in another, since not anything other in either"; "so that in our faith both are one, not one [person]: nor do we confess each as the same, nor as something other; since the fact that God was born of God neither lets nativity be the same, nor anything else[^13]." "Therefore in both we confess the same likeness of power and the same plenitude of deity, since Truth says: *I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me*. For the Son has received all things from the Father[^14]." "For if He has received a part of the same one who begot Him, then neither is perfect: for there is lacking from Him who is decreased, nor will there be plenitude in Him who has come to subsist out of a portion. Neither, therefore, is perfect, if He who begot loses His own plenitude, nor does He who is born attain to it[^15]." "Let us therefore confess, that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, God in God," as the same Hilary says in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^16], "not by the twofold conjunction of agreeing genera, nor by the implanted nature of a more capacious substance, but by the unity of likeness of nature, by the nativity of a living nature from a living nature; while the thing does not differ, while the nativity does not degenerate the nature of God, while nothing other than God is born from God, while there is nothing new, nothing alien, nothing separable in these." Behold, by these words, insofar as human weakness permits, it can be understood[^17] in what sense Christ said that He is in the Father and the Father in Him. From the same sense too it is understood that the Holy Spirit is in both, and each of the Persons in each; namely because in each there is the same plenitude of divinity and the united likeness of nature; for the divine nature is not greater in any one of these Persons, but these three Persons are of one and undifferentiated nature. And therefore one is said to be in another, as has been said before. Whence Ambrose[^18], opening to us the meaning of the aforesaid words on the second Letter to the Corinthians, chapter five, says: "Through this it is understood that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, since their substance is one. For there is unity, where there is no[^19] diversity." Behold, by the testimonies of three illustrious men coming together to the same — namely, of Augustine, Hilary, and Ambrose — by the revelation of the Holy Spirit speaking in them, it is shown to those who wish to believe piously — though as if through a glass and in an enigma[^20] — how it is to be received when it is said that the Father is in the Son or the Son in the Father or the Holy Spirit in both.

### Part II.

But now let us return to our purpose, and pressing on with what we have begun, let us show that none of the three Persons surpasses another in greatness, since none is greater than the others, nor are two anything greater than one, nor three than two, nor God greater than each of them; for each of them is perfect, nor is there anything by which that perfection might grow[^21].

#### Cap. V. *That no Person is a part in the Trinity.*

Nor is any of the three Persons a part of God or of the divine essence, since each of them is true and full God, and is the whole and full divine essence; and therefore none of them is a part in the Trinity. Whence Augustine in the second book *Against Maximinus*[^22] the heretic thus says: "You think that God the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be one God; for you fear lest the Father be a part of the one God, who consists of three. Do not fear this, for there is no division of parts in the unity of the deity. The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one God — that is, the Trinity itself is one God. Therefore, you say, God the Father is a part of God; God forbid."

#### Cap. VI. *Why the three Persons are said to be supremely one.*

"For the three Persons are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these three, since they are of one substance,

are one and are supremely one, where there is no diversity of natures, no diversity of wills. For if they were one in nature, and were not so in will, they would not be supremely one: but if they were unlike in nature, they would not be one. Therefore these three, since[^23] they are one on account of the ineffable conjunction of the Deity, by which they are ineffably bound together, is one God." "Therefore no one[^24] of the three can be a part of the Trinity. In the Trinity, therefore, which is God, both the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and at the same time these three are one God; nor is any one of them a third part of this Trinity, nor is anything greater two there than one, nor are all anything greater than each, since the greatness is spiritual, not bodily. *He who is able to grasp it, let him grasp it*[^25]; but he who is not able, let him believe and pray that what he believes he may understand. For it is true what is said by the Prophet: *Unless you believe, you will not understand*[^26]." By these words he openly shows the undifferentiated greatness of the three Persons. Likewise in the same place[^27]: "You yourself indeed have said that one God is not composed of parts; and you wish this to be understood of the Father alone. He, you say, is unbegotten, simple power. And yet in this simple power you seem to commemorate many things, when you say: God begot God, the good begot the good, the wise the wise, the merciful the merciful, the powerful the powerful. Are then goodness and wisdom and mercy and power parts of the one power, which you have said is simple? If you say they are parts: then the simple power consists of parts. And this simple power, by your own definition, is one God; therefore you say that God is composed of parts. I do not say so, you reply; therefore[^28] they are not parts. If, then, in the one Person of the Father you find both those things which seem to be many, and you do not find parts, since the one power is simple: how much more are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit one God on account of the undivided deity, and three Persons on account of the property of each, and not parts of one God on account of the perfection of each! The Father is power, the Son is power, the Holy Spirit is power. This you say truly; but that you do not wish power begotten of power and power proceeding from power to have the same nature — this you say falsely, this you say against the right and catholic faith." By these words it is openly taught, that those three Persons are not parts of God or of the divine essence, and none of them[^29] is to be called a part of the Trinity, nor is one greater than the others.

#### Cap. VII. *That when we say three Persons are one essence, we predicate neither as a genus of species nor as a species of individuals, since the essence is not a genus and a Person a species, nor the essence a species and the Persons individuals.*

Here it must be added that there is so great an equality of the three Persons and an undifferentiated greatness, that when we say the three Persons to be[^30] one essence or substance, we predicate neither as a genus of species nor as a species of individuals. For the divine essence is not a genus and the three Persons species, nor the divine essence a species and the three Persons individuals. Which Augustine, by probable and irrefragable reasonings, openly demonstrates in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^31] saying thus: "If essence is a genus, and Person a species, as some think, three substances must be called, just as three Persons are called; just as, since *animal* is a genus and *horse* is a species, three horses are called, and the same three animals. For the species there is not said in the plural and the genus in the singular, as if it were said, three horses are one animal; but as the three horses are called by the specific name, so the three animals by the generic name." Since therefore we confess the three Persons to be one essence, not three[^32] essences, while three horses are called three animals, not one: it is clear that by the name *essence* a genus is not signified, nor by the name *Person* a species.

"But if they say that by the name *Person* not a species is signified, but something singular and individual, and that by the name *essence* a species is to be understood, so that *Person* may not be said as *man*, but as *this man* is said — like Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or any other who can be pointed out present with the finger — the same reasoning will refute them as well. For just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals, so they are called three men and three animals. Why then are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, if these are distinguished[?] according to genus and species and individual, not so called three essences, as three Persons[?]?"

In another way also Augustine proves the same — namely, that the divine essence is not a genus, nor the Persons species, or that the essence is not a species nor the Persons

individuals. "One essence," he says[^33], "does not have species, just as one animal does not have species of one essence. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not three species of one essence: therefore the divine essence is not a genus. But neither is the divine essence a species and the Persons individuals, just as *man* is a species, and the individuals are Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. For if the essence is a species, like *man*, just as one man is not said to be Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so it will not be said[^34] that one essence is three Persons. Therefore we do not say these things according to genus and species."

#### Cap. VIII. *That neither according to material cause are the three Persons called one essence.*

It must be noted also that the divine essence is not the matter of the three Persons, as Augustine in the same book[^35] teaches, "as if according to a common and the same matter the three Persons were said to be one essence — just as if from the same gold three statues were made, we should say that the three statues are one gold. But we do not so call the Trinity — that is, the three Persons — one essence and one God, as if from one matter three things subsist. For in equal statues there is more gold three together than one, and there is less gold in one than in two. But in that essence of the Trinity it is in no way so." Therefore we do not call the three Persons to be[^36] one essence according to material cause, as three statues are called one gold.

#### Cap. IX. *Nor are the three Persons so called one essence, as three men are one nature or of one nature.*

To these things also it must be added, that we do not so say the three Persons to be one essence, as Augustine in the same place[^37] says, or of one essence, "as we say that three men of the same sex and the same temperament of body and of the same soul are one nature, or of one nature. For in these things one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man, as we said also in the case of statues; but in God it is not so. For the Father and the Son together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone, but the three Persons together are equal to each." From the foregoing it is clear that the three Persons are called the divine essence neither according to material cause, as three statues are one gold, nor according to the likeness of complexion, as three men of one nature, nor as a genus is predicated of species, nor as a species of individuals — that is, the container of the contained, the greater of the lesser.

But to these things there seem to be opposed certain things which some catholic treatise-writers of sacred Scripture have handed down in their writings, in which they seem to signify that the divine essence is something[^38] common and universal, as a species; but that the three Persons are three particulars, three individuals differing in number. Whence John of Damascus, the great one among the Doctors of the Greeks, in the book which he wrote *On the Trinity*[^39], which Pope Eugenius caused to be translated, says: "The common and universal things are predicated of the particulars subject to themselves. The common, therefore, is the substance, and the particular is the *hypostasis*, that is, the Person. And it is called *particular*, not because it has part of the nature, but particular by number, as an *atom*, that is, an individual. For the *hypostases* are said to differ in number, and[^40] not in nature." Likewise in the same place[^41]: "Substance signifies the common and surrounding species *homoideon* — that is, of *hypostases* alike in species, that is, of Persons; as for example *God*, *man*; but *hypostasis* points to an individual — that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul, and the like." Behold, he openly says that the substance is the universal, the *hypostasis* the particular, and that *God* is a species like *man*, and that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are individuals, like Peter and Paul, in that they differ by number; which[^42] seem entirely to contradict the foregoing opinions of Augustine. What, then, shall we say to these things? This indeed we can and ought to say: that those things which Augustine has handed down above are to be held without any hesitation.

But these things which are said here, although on the surface of the discourse they seem to ring out something foreign to the faith, can yet be soundly understood, and earnestly demand a pious reader and

an understanding interpreter. In whose explanation I would rather, being silent, listen to others than, by speaking, give occasion to the malicious for detraction. Yet it seems[^43] to me that they may be received thus. When he says: *substance is the common, and hypostasis is the particular*; he did not so receive these things, since they are said of God, as they are received in philosophical discipline, but he spoke by likeness of those things which are said by the philosophers; so that just as there *common* or *universal* is called what is predicated of many, and *particular* or *individual* what is of one alone: so here[^44] the divine essence has been called *universal*, since it is said of all the Persons together and of each separately, and *individual* in turn each one of the Persons, since it is predicated neither in common of the others, nor singularly of any of the others. By the likeness of predication, therefore, he called the substance of God[^45] *universal*, and the Persons *particulars* or *individuals*. For this same reason also he called the divine essence "the common species and surrounding [species] of Persons alike in species," since just as this species *man* is predicated of its individuals, as of Peter, Paul, and others, and these do not differ in species, but agree[^46], so God is predicated of the three Persons, who do not differ in divinity, but agree in all things. Pondering this likeness, therefore, between eternal things and temporal things, John transferred the names of universality and particularity, which properly belong to temporal things, to eternal things; but Augustine, seeing greater dissimilarity than likeness between the said things, removed the said names from the excellence of the Trinity.

#### Cap. X. *Whether the three Persons differ in number, who are distinct by properties.*

But that John says the *hypostases* differ in number, not in nature — in that he says they do not differ in nature, he speaks most truly and without scruple; but in that he says they differ in number, one must beware how it is to be understood; for in different ways some things are said to differ in number. For some things are said to differ in number, when they so differ that one is not the other, nor anything that the other is, or is in the other: in which way Socrates and Plato and the like differ — those which are called by the philosophers individuals or particulars: by which mode the three Persons cannot be said to differ in number. Some things are also said to differ in number, which in enumeration or computation are not joined to each other, but are distinguished from each other, as when, speaking of certain things, we say *one, two, three*; and according to this mode perhaps John said that the *hypostases* — that is, the Persons — differ in number. For we can say: the Father is one, and the Father and the Son are two, and the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three; and likewise: this Person is one, and this and that are two, and this and that and another are three. Yet more fittingly the three Persons are said to be distinguished only by properties, of whose distinction according to properties it will be treated in what follows[^47]. Now, however, let us return to what we began, going over the things that have been said, so that, by being often turned over, they may become more familiar.

#### Cap. XI. *Why the three Persons together are not anything greater than one.*

It must therefore be known that "such is the equality in the Trinity, as Augustine says in the eighth book *On the Trinity*[^48], that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but neither are the Father and the Son together anything greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is any Person anything less than the Trinity itself." That this is so must, in some way, if it can be done, be demonstrated. "As far, then, as the Creator Himself helps, let us attend, says Augustine in the same place[^49], how in this Trinity two or three Persons are not anything greater than one of them."

"What is there called *great* is great from no other source than from that whereby it truly is; since there greatness itself[^50] is truth, and truth is essence; therefore there is not anything greater there which is not more true. But the Father and the Son together are not more truly than the Father alone or the Son. Therefore neither[^51] is anything greater both together than one of them. And since the Holy Spirit too is equally truly, therefore the Father and the Son together are not anything greater than He, since they are not more truly. Likewise in the essence of truth, this *to be true* is what *to be* is, and this *to be* is what *to be great* is: this therefore is *to be great* which is *to be true*. What therefore there is equally true, is also equally great. What therefore there does not have more truth, does not have more greatness. But that does not have more truth which is not more truly. But one Person is not more truly than another, nor two than one, nor three together than each. Therefore one does not have more truth than another, nor two than one, nor three together than each. Thus therefore the Trinity itself also is not anything greater than each Person there, but as great as each. For there is not greater what is not more true, where truth itself is greatness[^52]." Behold, in a fitting way and by catholic reasoning it has been shown

how the greatness of the three Persons is undifferentiated, since neither is one greater than another, nor two anything greater than one[^53], nor three together anything greater than each.

#### Cap. XII. *That God is not to be called threefold, but triune.*

Furthermore, although God is called triune, He must nevertheless not be called threefold. For there is no triplicity, where there is supreme unity and undifferentiated equality. Whence Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^54] says: "Not because God is Trinity is He therefore to be thought threefold: otherwise the Father alone, or the Son alone, would be less than the Father and the Son together." "Therefore, since the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as much as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together, in no way is God to be called threefold. For the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit is not a greater God than each of them, since there is nothing by which that perfection might grow. But both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are perfect, and each of them is called perfect God. And therefore Trinity rather than threefold ought He to be called."

"In bodily things one is not as much as three together, and two are more than one thing; but in the supreme Trinity one Person is as much as three together, and two are as much as one, and they are infinite in themselves[^55]"; since there is no end of their greatness. And by this is opened up what we said above[^56] — namely, how each is in each, and all are in each, and each is in all, and all are in all, and one is in all, and one is all. Behold, we have now shown sufficiently how in the Trinity any Person does not surpass another in greatness.

---

la: Ed. 1 *modico*.

en: Edition 1 reads *modico* ("by a small one") in place of *modulo* ("by a small measure").

la: Cap. 1. n. 1; cfr. August., libr. VI. *de Trinitate* c. 3. n. 7. — Paulo supra ante *Augustinus* solummodo Vat. et ed. 1 omittunt *ut*, cui codd. et edd., exceptis Vat. et edd. 1, 6, 8, male addunt *ait*.

en: Chapter 1, n. 1; cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* book VI, c. 3, n. 7. — A little earlier, before *Augustinus*, the Vatican edition alone and edition 1 omit *ut*, to which the manuscripts and editions, except the Vatican and editions 1, 6, 8, wrongly add *ait*.

la: August., *de Trin.* VII, c. 1, n. 2.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII, c. 1, n. 2.

la: Confessionum libr. VII vel potius August., *de Trin.*, locus quo*ad sensum.

en: Confessions Book VII, or rather Augustine, *On the Trinity*, the passage taken as to the sense. [^[?]: editorial reference partly damaged in the page footer; the text-citation as given in the body refers to *Confessionum* libr. VII.]

la: Dist. IX.

en: Distinction IX.

la: *De Fide orthodoxa*, locus quoad sensum ex libr. VI [?] *de Trinitate* — citatio Damasceni.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, the citation from John of Damascus; the apparatus footer reference is partly damaged. [The body cites Damascene; cf. the parallel citation at apparatus n. 39 below.]

la: Cap. 1. n. 1 (eiusdem libelli *de Fide ad Petrum*).

en: Chapter 1, n. 1 (of the same little book *On Faith to Peter*).

la: Hilar., *de Trin.* III, n. 1. — Locus est apud Hilarium libr. III.

en: Hilary, *On the Trinity* III, n. 1. — The passage is in Hilary, book III.

la: Lectio *inintelligibile* a codd. et editionibus tradita; vide Hilarium, libr. III. *de Trinitate*.

en: The reading *inintelligibile* is handed down by the manuscripts and editions; see Hilary, *On the Trinity* III.

la: Ibid. n. 23; et quod sequitur n. 1; in quo textu Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd. et originale legunt *divinitatis* pro *deitatis*.

en: Ibid., n. 23; and what follows, n. 1; in which text the Vatican edition and other editions, against the manuscripts and the original, read *divinitatis* in place of *deitatis*.

la: Ibid. n. 23, et deinde n. 1; in quo textu cod. C post *non duo* adiicit *sunt*.

en: Ibid., n. 23, and then n. 1; in which text codex C, after *non duo*, adds *sunt*.

la: Libr. I. n. 17.

en: Book I, n. 17.

la: Libr. III. n. 23. — Locus Scripturae est Ioan. 6, 11 [?].

en: Book III, n. 23. — The Scripture passage is John 6:11 [?] (the chapter/verse in the OCR is partly garbled; the citation is to John, ch. 6).

la: Libr. III. n. 8, in quo circa initium Vat. cum paucis edd. *deesset* pro *deest*, et paulo infra post *neuter ergo* edd. 1, 8 addunt *eorum*.

en: Book III, n. 8, in which near the beginning the Vatican edition with a few editions reads *deesset* in place of *deest*, and a little later after *neuter ergo*, editions 1, 8 add *eorum*.

la: Num. 39; sed verba: *per naturae unitam similitudinem*, sumta sunt ex n. 37. — In textu Vat. cum aliis edd. contra 1, 8 et codd. post *in Patre* addit *et*. Deinde Vat. et edd. 1, 6, 9 male legunt *insitam* pro *insitivam*. Denique post *viventis* auctoritate codd. ABB et edd. 1, 8 adiecimus *naturae*. Hilarius: *viventis ex vivente naturae*.

en: Number 39; but the words *per naturae unitam similitudinem* are taken from n. 37. — In the text the Vatican edition with other editions, against editions 1, 8 and the manuscripts, after *in Patre* adds *et*. Then the Vatican edition and editions 1, 6, 9 wrongly read *insitam* in place of *insitivam*. Finally after *viventis*, on the authority of codices ABB and editions 1, 8, we have added *naturae*. Hilary reads: *viventis ex vivente naturae*.

la: Vat. et aliae edd., exceptis 1, 8, *aperitur* pro *intelligi potest* contra omnes codd.

en: The Vatican edition and other editions, except 1, 8, read *aperitur* in place of *intelligi potest*, against all the manuscripts.

la: Vel potius Ambrosiaster, ut communiter citatur, qui, teste Augustino, est quidam Hilarius, non Pictaviensis, sed quidam diaconus Romanus, ut videtur, auctor Commentarii in XII Epistolas beati Pauli (in appendice Operum Ambrosii). Contra eundem S. Hieronymus in Dialogo seu altercatione contra Luciferianos n. 25. scripsisse fertur. — Locus Apostoli ab ipso explicatus est II. Cor. 3, 17 [?]. — Ante vocem *Ambrosius* edd. 1, 8 bene addunt *etiam*.

en: Or rather Ambrosiaster, as he is commonly cited — who, on Augustine's testimony, is a certain Hilary, not the one of Poitiers, but some Roman deacon, as it seems, the author of the Commentary on the twelve Letters of blessed Paul (in the appendix of the works of Ambrose). Against the same one St. Jerome is reported to have written in the *Dialogue* or *Altercation against the Luciferians*, n. 25. — The passage of the Apostle expounded by him is 2 Corinthians 3:17 [?]. — Before the word *Ambrosius*, editions 1, 8 well add *etiam*.

la: Vat. et aliae edd., excepta una[?], omittunt *est* contra omnes codd. et originale.

en: The Vatican edition and other editions, except one[?], omit *est*, against all the manuscripts and the original. [The numeral identifying the dissenting edition in the OCR footer is illegible.]

la: I. Cor. 13, 12. — Paulo supra ante *concurrentibus* sola Vat. male legit *in eodem* pro *in idem*.

en: 1 Corinthians 13:12. — A little earlier, before *concurrentibus*, the Vatican edition alone wrongly reads *in eodem* in place of *in idem*.

la: Praecedentia quoad sensum et aliqua verba sumta sunt ex August. libr. VI. *de Trinit.* c. 8. n. 9, et c. 10. n. 12. — Vat. cum pluribus edd. post *singuli* et *singulus* habet bis *horum* loco *eorum* et *illorum*.

en: What precedes is taken as to the sense, and some words verbatim, from Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI, c. 8, n. 9, and c. 10, n. 12. — The Vatican edition with several editions, after *singuli* and *singulus*, has twice *horum* in place of *eorum* and *illorum*.

la: Cap. 10. n. 1, et duo sequentes loci ibid. n. 2.

en: Chapter 10, n. 1, and the two following passages at the same place, n. 2.

la: Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 addunt *unum*, contradicentibus aliis edd., codd. et originali. Paulo post cum originali, codd. et ed. 1 expunximus *summe* ante *non essent*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 add *unum*, with the other editions, the manuscripts, and the original contradicting. A little later, with the original, the manuscripts, and edition 1, we have struck out *summe* before *non essent*.

la: Edd. 1, 6, 8 et originale *qui*.

en: Editions 1, 6, 8 and the original read *qui*.

en: Matthew 19:12.

la: Isai. 7, 9. iuxta lectionem Septuag. et Augustini. Vulg.: *Si non credideritis, non permanebitis*.

en: Isaiah 7:9, according to the reading of the Septuagint and of Augustine. The Vulgate reads: *If you will not believe, you will not abide*.

la: Ibid. n. 3.

en: Ibid., n. 3.

la: Vat. et plures edd. omittunt *ergo* contra originale, codd. et ed. 1, 6. Mox Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *non inveniunt* [?] (variantia partly garbled).

en: The Vatican edition and several editions omit *ergo* against the original, the manuscripts, and editions 1, 6. Then the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *non inveniunt* [?] (the OCR of the variant is partly garbled).

la: Codd. BCDE *eorum*, cod. A *harum*. Deinde in fine *aliis* solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 9 non bene addunt *est*.

en: Codices BCDE read *eorum*, codex A *harum*. Then at the end of *aliis*, the Vatican edition alone and editions 4, 9 not well add *est*.

la: Vat. et ed. 4 omittunt *esse*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 4 omit *esse*.

la: Cap. 6. n. 11. — Vat. contra edd. 1, 8 et codd. omittit *ita* ante *dicens*. Verba vero Augustini sic leguntur in originali: «Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt, omitto illud quod iam dixi, oportere appellari tres essentias, ut appellantur tres substantiae vel personae, sicut appellantur tres equi, eademque animalia tria, cum sit species *equus*, *animal* genus. Neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est et genus singulariter, tanquam diceretur tres equi, unum animal; sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine».

en: Chapter 6, n. 11. — The Vatican edition, against editions 1, 8 and the manuscripts, omits *ita* before *dicens*. But the words of Augustine are read in the original thus: "For if essence is a genus, but substance or person a species, as some think, I leave aside that which I have already said, that three essences must be called, just as three substances or persons are called — just as three horses are called, and the same three animals, since *horse* is a species, *animal* a genus. For neither is the species there said in the plural and the genus in the singular, as if it were said: three horses, one animal; but as the three horses by the specific name, so three animals by the generic name."

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 hic male adiiciunt *esse*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, 9 here wrongly add *esse*.

la: Loc. cit. parum infra; sed ultimas propositiones Magister contraxit ex diffusiore Augustini doctrina. — Mox auctoritate omnium codd. et ed. 1 inseruimus *unius essentiae* post *animal non habet species*. Deinde solummodo Vat. et ed. 8 post *Pater ergo* omittunt *et*.

en: Loc. cit., a little later; but the Master has compressed the last propositions out of Augustine's more diffuse teaching. — Then on the authority of all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted *unius essentiae* after *animal non habet species*. Then the Vatican edition alone and edition 8, after *Pater ergo*, omit *et*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus edd. contra edd. 1, 3, 7, 8 et codd. BCE *dicitur*; codd. AD bene *diceretur*. In fine codd. CD *dicuntur* pro *dicimus*.

en: The Vatican edition with several editions, against editions 1, 3, 7, 8 and codices BCE, reads *dicitur*; codices AD well read *diceretur*. At the end, codices CD read *dicuntur* in place of *dicimus*.

la: Loc. cit. immediate post.

en: Loc. cit. immediately after.

la: Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, contra omnes codd. adiiciunt *substantiam vel*.

en: The Vatican edition and other editions, except edition 1, against all the manuscripts add *substantiam vel*.

la: Cap. 6. n. 11. — Prima propositio iam paulo ante relata est. In textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. contra edd. 1, 6, 8, codd. et originale omittit *et* ante *in statuis*.

en: Chapter 6, n. 11. — The first proposition has just been quoted a little before. In the text the Vatican edition with several editions, against editions 1, 6, 8, the manuscripts, and the original, omits *et* before *in statuis*.

la: Cod. D cum Vat. et edd. 3, 4, 6, 8 *quiddam*. Paulo ante post *adversari* codd. AC non male addunt *ea*.

en: Codex D with the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, 6, 8 reads *quiddam*. A little earlier, after *adversari*, codices AC not badly add *ea*.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthodoxa* c. 6, secundum versionem a Burgundione Pisano iussu Eugenii III. factam et a Ioanne Conon valde impugnatam, qua tamen antiqui Scholastici saec. 13. post Lombardum utebantur. Teste Fabricio (*Biblioth. Graec.* tom. 9.) nunquam typis impressa est. Subiicimus Damasceni verba iuxta versionem Mich. Lequien Ord. Praed. (ed. Migne, Patrolog. Graec. tom. 94.): «Quae communia et universalia sunt de particularibus sibi subiectis praedicantur. Commune porro quoddam est essentia, ut species; particulare persona. Particulare, inquam, non quod naturae partem quandam sibi vindicet, sed quia numero particulare est, ut individuum. Personae siquidem non natura, sed numero inter se distingui dicuntur». — Vat. contra ed. 1 et codd. legit *Graecorum maximus* loco *Graecorum magnus*.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6, according to the version made by Burgundio of Pisa at the bidding of Eugenius III, and strongly impugned by John Conon, which nevertheless the ancient Scholastics of the thirteenth century after the Master used. According to Fabricius's testimony (*Biblioth. Graec.* tom. 9), it has never been printed. We subjoin the words of Damascene according to the version of Michel Lequien O.P. (ed. Migne, Patrolog. Graec. tom. 94): "The things which are common and universal are predicated of the particulars subject to themselves. The common, then, is something — namely, the essence as species; the particular, the Person. *Particular*, I say, not as claiming for itself some part of nature, but because it is particular by number, as an individual. For Persons are said to be distinguished from each other not by nature, but by number." — The Vatican edition, against edition 1 and the manuscripts, reads *Graecorum maximus* in place of *Graecorum magnus*.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 6 omittunt *et*, et immediate post contra originale, codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8, Vat. cum aliis edd. *videntur* loco *dicuntur*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 omit *et*; and immediately after, against the original, the manuscripts, and editions 1, 6, 8, the Vatican edition with other editions reads *videntur* in place of *dicuntur*.

la: Cap. 4. — Ed. Migne: «Quod porro aliud sit substantia et aliud hypostasis, multoties a nobis dictum est, quodque substantia sive essentia communem speciem eiusdemque speciei personas (ὁμοειδῶν ὑποστάσεων) complectentem significet, ut Deus, homo; persona autem ac hypostasis individuum denotet, puta Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum, Petrum, Paulum».

en: Chapter 4. — The Migne edition reads: "That moreover substance is one thing and *hypostasis* another, has been said by us many times; and that substance or essence signifies the common species and that which embraces the Persons of the same species (ὁμοειδῶν ὑποστάσεων), as *God*, *man*; but Person, that is *hypostasis*, denotes the individual — for example the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul."

la: Sola Vat. *videntur*; et paulo infra *accipit* pro *accepit* et *dicuntur* pro *dicantur*.

en: The Vatican edition alone reads *videntur*; and a little later *accipit* in place of *accepit*, and *dicuntur* in place of *dicantur*.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 8 contra alias edd. et codd. *haec*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, against the other editions and the manuscripts, read *haec*.

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt *Dei*, sed minus bene. Mox sola Vat. post *hoc idem* omittit *etiam*.

en: The manuscripts and editions 1, 8 omit *Dei*, but less well. Then the Vatican edition alone, after *hoc idem*, omits *etiam*. [Footnote-anchor positioning here approximate; the OCR ordering is partly conflated with [^45].]

la: Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 9 contra alias edd. et codd. addunt *per omnia*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 9, against the other editions and the manuscripts, add *per omnia*.

la: Lectionem *conveniunt* sequimur cum codd. et ed. 1; Vat. cum aliis edd. *convenire dicitur*[?].

en: We follow the reading *conveniunt* with the manuscripts and edition 1; the Vatican edition with other editions reads *convenire dicitur*[?] (variant partly garbled in the OCR).

la: Dist. XXVI.

en: Distinction XXVI.

la: Prooem. n. 1. — Mox post *aliquid* Vat. et plures edd. cum cod. D contra ceteros codd. et originale non bene *sunt* pro *sint*.

en: Proem, n. 1. — Then after *aliquid*, the Vatican edition and several editions with codex D, against the other manuscripts and the original, not well read *sunt* in place of *sint*.

la: Ibid. et in principio cap. 1. n. 2.

en: Ibid., and at the beginning of c. 1, n. 2.

la: Lectio *magnitudo ipsa* in textu Augustini.

en: The reading *magnitudo ipsa* is in Augustine's text.

la: Vat. cum plerisque edd. contra 1, 2 et originale addunt *est*, quod edd. 5, 7 melius transponunt *ingenito*: *Non est ergo maius*. Immediate post codd. BCE et edd. 2, 3, 7 cum originali habent *utrumque* loco *uterque*.

en: The Vatican edition with most editions, against 1, 2 and the original, add *est*, which editions 5, 7 better transpose to *ingenito*: *Non est ergo maius*. Immediately after, codices BCE and editions 2, 3, 7 with the original have *utrumque* in place of *uterque*.

la: Quae praecedunt, leguntur ibid. c. 1. n. 2, sed non paucis a Magistro omissis, transpositis et mutatis.

en: What precedes is read at the same place, c. 1, n. 2, but with not a few things omitted by the Master, transposed, and changed.

la: Codd. ACD et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 *nec duae quam una*; codd. BE *nec duae quam una* (variant readings of order).

en: Codices ACD and editions 1, 2, 3, 7 read *nec duae quam una*; codices BE the same, with variant ordering.

la: Cap. 7. n. 9. — Sequens locus est ibid. c. 8.

en: Chapter 7, n. 9. — The following passage is at the same place, c. 8.

la: Ibid. cap. 10. n. 12. — Locus Scripturae est: Psalm. 16, 3.

en: Ibid., chapter 10, n. 12. — The Scripture passage is: Psalm 16:3.

la: Cap. 3, 4 in fine et 11. — Vat. cum pluribus edd. contra codd. *superius dictum est* loco *supra diximus*; item Vat. cum cod. C et aliis edd., excepta 1., omittit *scilicet*; denique post *quomodo* omittit *et* contra codd. ACDE et edd. 1, 8.

en: Chapters 3, 4 at the end, and 11. — The Vatican edition with several editions, against the manuscripts, reads *superius dictum est* in place of *supra diximus*; likewise the Vatican edition with codex C and other editions, except edition 1, omits *scilicet*; finally after *quomodo* omits *et* against codices ACDE and editions 1, 8.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 19, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Divisio textus distinctionis XIX partis primae

title_alt: Division of the text of Distinction XIX, Part 1

source_text:
<!-- page 341 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

#### *De aequalitate trium personarum in Deo, in specie quoad magnitudinem.*

### Pars I.

#### *De aequalitate per essentiae unitatem probata.*

> *Nunc postquam coaeternitatem trium personarum* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Terminatis duabus partibus, in quibus Magister egit de his quae pertinent ad essentiae unitatem et personarum pluralitatem singillatim, hic incipit tertia pars, in qua determinat personarum aequalitatem, quae simul respicit[^1] pluralitatem et unitatem. Et haec pars habet tres partes. In prima proponit, in quibus consistat aequalitas. In secunda probat specialiter, ibi: *Nunc superest ostendere, quomodo* etc. In tertia, quia in probando propositiones dubias dixerat, in quibus dictio exclusiva generat ambiguitatem, ideo determinat, qualiter dictiones exclusivae accipiantur in divinis, infra distinctione vigesima prima: *Hic oritur quaestio ex praedictis trahens originem.*

Prima pars[^2], in qua proponit ea, in quibus aequalitas consistit, habet duas partes. In prima parte proponit, quod consistit in his tribus: aeternitate, magnitudine et potestate. In secunda, ne crederentur haec tria diversa, ostendit, quod haec sunt idem in Deo, secundo capitulo[^3]: *Cumque enumerantur ista quasi diversa* etc.

*Nunc superest ostendere, quod magnitudine.* Haec est[^4] secunda pars, in qua probat aequalitatem, et dividitur haec pars in duas. Supposito enim, quod in divinis sit aequalitas quantum ad aeternitatem, ostendit primo aequalitatem quantum ad magnitudinem; secundo quantum ad potestatem, infra distinctione vigesima: *Nunc ostendere restat, quomodo aliquae* etc.

<!-- page 342 -->

Prima istorum pars habet duas. In prima[^5] probat aequalitatem magnitudinis per essentiae unitatem. Secundo probat aequalitatem, excludendo omnem[^6] inaequalitatem, ibi: *Sed iam nunc ad propositum redeamus.* Prima pars, in qua probat personarum aequalitatem quantum ad magnitudinem, habet duas. In prima probat per essentiae indivisionem[^7]; in secunda per illam eandem ostendit, esse in personis circumincessionem, ibi: *Et inde est, quod Pater dicitur esse in Filio.*

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere aequalitatem.

Secundo, dato quod sic, utrum sit ibi summa aequalitas.

Tertio, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum conversione.

Quarto, utrum sit ibi aequalitas cum circumincessione.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX.

#### *On the equality of the three persons in God, specifically with respect to magnitude.*

### Part I.

#### *On equality proved through the unity of essence.*

> *Now after [he has treated of] the coeternity of the three persons* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

The two parts having been finished, in which the Master treated separately of the things which pertain to the unity of essence and to the plurality of persons, here begins the third part, in which he determines the equality of the persons, which simultaneously regards[^1] plurality and unity. And this part has three parts. In the first he proposes in what equality consists. In the second he proves it specifically, at: *Now it remains to show, how* etc. In the third, because in proving he had stated certain doubtful propositions in which an exclusive expression generates ambiguity, he therefore determines how exclusive expressions are to be taken in divine matters, below in the twenty-first distinction: *Here a question arises drawing its origin from the foregoing.*

The first part[^2], in which he proposes the things in which equality consists, has two parts. In the first part he proposes that it consists in these three: eternity, magnitude, and power. In the second, lest these three be believed to be diverse, he shows that these are the same in God, in the second chapter[^3]: *And since these are enumerated as though diverse* etc.

*Now it remains to show, that in magnitude.* This is[^4] the second part, in which he proves the equality, and this part is divided into two. For, supposing that in divine matters there is equality with respect to eternity, he first shows the equality with respect to magnitude; secondly with respect to power, below in the twentieth distinction: *Now it remains to show how some* etc.

The first of these parts has two. In the first[^5] he proves the equality of magnitude through the unity of essence. Secondly he proves equality by excluding every[^6] inequality, at: *But now let us return to our proposition.* The first part, in which he proves the equality of the persons with respect to magnitude, has two. In the first he proves it through the indivision of essence[^7]; in the second through that same [indivision] he shows that there is in the persons circumincession, at: *And hence it is that the Father is said to be in the Son.*

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part four things are asked.

First it is asked whether in divine matters equality is to be posited.

Secondly, granted that it is, whether there is there the highest equality.

Thirdly, whether in divine matters there is equality with conversion.

Fourthly, whether there is there equality with circumincession.

---

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *recipit*. Mox post *partes* Vat. addit *principales*.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, against the other codices and edition 1, reads *recipit*. Soon after, following *partes*, the Vatican adds *principales*.

la: In Vat. additur *principalis*.

en: In the Vatican edition *principalis* is added.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *secundo capitulo*. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut *aa bb* cum ed. 1 post *sunt* adiungunt *unum et*.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *secundo capitulo* ("in the second chapter"). A little earlier, some codices such as *aa* and *bb*, with edition 1, after *sunt* add *unum et*.

la: Vat., omissis verbis Magistri *Nunc superest* etc., loco *Haec est* ponit *Similiter*, deinde ob mutatam constructionem omittit particulam *et* ac *haec pars*.

en: The Vatican edition, omitting the Master's words *Nunc superest* etc., in place of *Haec est* puts *Similiter*; then, on account of the changed construction, it omits the particle *et* and the words *haec pars*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut *aa bb* adiiciunt satis bene *parte*.

en: Some codices such as *aa* and *bb* add, fittingly enough, *parte*.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *omnem*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *omnem* ("every").

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addit *sive unitatem*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, adds *sive unitatem* ("or unity").