title: Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum beata Virgo Maria meruerit Christum concipere, an conceptio illa fuerit solum ex munere gratiae divinae.*

Secundo quaeritur de conceptione Christi in comparatione ad meritum beatae Virginis Mariae, et est quaestio, utrum meruerit beata Virgo Maria Christum concipere, an fuerit conceptio illa solum ex munere divinae gratiae. Et quod beata Virgo meruerit Christum concipere, ostenditur:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) Per illud quod dicitur Lucae primo[^1]: *Beata, quae credidisti; quoniam perficientur in te quae dicta sunt tibi a Domino;* sed annuntiata erat conceptio a Domino: ergo ideo concepit, quia credidit. Sed constat, quod fides sive credulitas non fuit causa efficiens conceptionis: ergo fuit causa meritoria.

2. Item, in collecta, quae dicitur communiter ab Ecclesia[^2]: « Omnipotens, sempiterne Deus, qui gloriosae Virginis Mariae corpus et animam, ut dignum Filii tui habitaculum effici mereretur, Spiritu sancto cooperante praeparasti » etc. Et ex hoc colligitur, quod beata Maria meruit et quod digna fuit: ergo meruit merito condigni concipere.

3. Item, Bernardus quinto de Consideratione ad Eugenium[^3], tractans illud Matthaei decimo tertio: *Simile est regnum caelorum fermento* etc., dicit, quod « mulier fuit Sapientia, quae fermento fidei beatae Virginis in incarnatione tria sata commiscuit, *novum, antiquum, aeternum:* novum in animae creatione de nihilo, antiquum in assumtione corporis de natura Adam, aeternum in unione divinitatis ». Ergo fides beatae Virginis aliquo modo cooperata est in ista commixtione; sed non quantum ad principium solum effectivum: ergo per modum meriti.

4. Item, beata Virgo aut habuit gratiam sufficientem[^4], praeparantem ipsam ad conceptionem Filii Dei, aut non. Si sic; sed gratia sufficienter praepa-
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rans facit mereri illud, ad quod praeparat, merito condigni: ergo videtur, quod beata Virgo ex illa gratia meruit conceptionem Filii Dei, cum ea bene usa fuerit. Si non; aut ergo caruit illa gratia sufficienter praeparante, quia ipsam non potuit recipere, aut quia eam noluit Deus, vel non potuit dare; sed non, quia non potuit Deus, vel noluit dare, cum sit omnipotens et vellet sine dubio sibi idoneum habitaculum praeparare. Si quia Virgo non potuit recipere: ergo multo minus potuit Filium Dei concipere, ad cuius conceptionem gratia illa praeparabat. Quodsi omnia ista sunt inconvenientia, relinquitur primum, videlicet quod beata Virgo meruit conceptionem Christi per gratiam sibi datam.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Augustinus in Enchiridio, et habetur in littera[^5]: « Modus, quo natus est Christus de Maria sicut filius, et de Spiritu sancto non sicut filius, insinuat nobis gratiam Dei, qua homo nullis praecedentibus meritis in ipso exordio naturae suae, quo coepit esse, Verbo Dei copularetur »: ergo videtur, quod nulla merita praecesserunt conceptionem Christi vel incarnationem.

2. Item, maius est meritum totius Ecclesiae quam singularis personae: ergo si incarnatio non cadit sub merito totius Ecclesiae[^6], nec sub merito Virginis Mariae.

3. Item, quod cadit sub merito non tenet plene rationem gratuiti — nam si gratia est ex meritis, iam non est gratia, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Romanos[^7] — sed Filii Dei incarnatio ad maximam pertinuit gratiam, secundum quod dicit Augustinus: ergo videtur, quod eius conceptionem non meruit beata Virgo Maria.

4. Item, hoc est inaestimabilis dignationis, quod Filius Dei aeterni efficiatur filius unius pauperculae mulieris: ergo non fuit ex aequitate vel iustitia retributionis, igitur nec ex merito Virginis.

> **Conclusio.** Maria non merito condigni, sed tantum merito congrui et post annuntiationem etiam dignitatis potuit mereri concipere Filium Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de merito (*Triplex meritum.*) secundum triplicem gradum et differentiam. Est enim meritum *congrui,* in quo[^8] peccator dicitur gratiam sibi mereri, cum ad gratiam se disponit: et est meritum *digni,* quo scilicet vir iustus orat pro alio et meretur exaudiri; et est meritum *condigni,* quo quis ex tanta caritate meretur tantam gloriam[^9].

Dico igitur, quod beata Virgo Maria concipere (*Conclusio 1.*) Filium Dei *ante incarnationem* meruit merito *congrui,* quoniam prae sua nimia puritate et humilitate et benignitate idonea erat, ut efficeretur Dei Mater. *Post annuntiationem* vero, (*Conclusio 2.*) postquam consensit, et Spiritus sanctus in copiositate gratiae in eam descendit, non solum habuit *congruitatem,* sed *dignitatem;* et ex tunc meruit non solum merito *congruitatis,* sed *dignitatis* obumbrari et impraegnari virtute Altissimi[^10]. Sed merito *condigni* non potuit (*Conclusio 3.*) mereri concipere Filium Dei, pro eo quod hoc excedit omne meritum, et etiam, quia erat ipsius meriti gloriosae Virginis *fundamentum.* Sive enim dicamus, Deum fieri hominem, sive dicamus, mulierem fieri matrem Dei, utrumque est supra statum, qui debetur creaturae; et ideo tam hoc quam illud fuit benignitatis et gratiae. Et propterea, sicut dixi, quod gratiam primam potest mereri iustus peccatori merito *dignitatis,* non merito *condigni,* ne gratia perderet[^11] rationem gratiae; sic potest concedi, quod beata Virgo non tantum merito *congrui,* sed merito *dignitatis* meruit conceptionem, quia per copiosam gratiam Spiritus sancti ad conceptionem illam non solum congrua, sed etiam *digna* fuit[^12].

Ex his patere possunt rationes et auctoritates, quae ad utramque partem adducuntur. (*Notandum.*) Nam rationes, quae ad primam partem adducuntur, currunt de merito secundum primam, vel secundam acceptionem. Rationes, quae ad secundam partem adducuntur, currunt de merito tertio[^13].

1. (*Solutio oppositorum.*) Ad illud tamen verbum, quod dicitur de littera[^14], dicendum, quod non privantur simpliciter merita, sed praecedentia merita, et hoc non in quocumque, sed in natura assumta, quia non habuit merita ad unionem praecedentia; quia simul concepta et assumta fuit et formata, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^15].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maius est meritum totius Ecclesiae quam Virginis Mariae; dici potest, quod ratio illa non cogit, quia maius est meritum Patrum[^16] quam Virginis extensive, nec tamen
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oportet quod intensive; quia beata Virgo, postquam, annuntiatione audita ab Angelo, sanctificata fuit a Spiritu sancto, tanto munere gratiae est impleta, ut aliquid digne posset mereri, quod non possent, si omnes alii Sancti essent congregati simul.

3. 4. Ad alia duo non oportet respondere, quoniam procedunt secundum tertiam viam, sicut apparet. Nam dignitas nihil aufert liberalitatis gratiae nec benignitatis misericordiae; immo simul cum illis manet, sicut intuenti apparet[^17].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether the Blessed Virgin Mary merited to conceive Christ, or whether that conception was solely from the gift of divine grace.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the conception of Christ in comparison to the merit of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the question is whether the Blessed Virgin Mary merited to conceive Christ, or whether that conception was solely from the gift of divine grace. And that the Blessed Virgin merited to conceive Christ is shown:

1. (*Arguments.*) Through that which is said in Luke 1[^1]: *Blessed art thou that hast believed, for the things shall be accomplished in thee that were spoken to thee by the Lord;* but the conception had been announced by the Lord: therefore she conceived for this reason, because she believed. But it is established that faith or belief was not the efficient cause of the conception: therefore it was the meritorious cause.

2. Likewise, in the collect which is commonly said by the Church[^2]: « Almighty, eternal God, who, the Holy Spirit cooperating, didst prepare the body and soul of the glorious Virgin Mary, that she might merit to be made a worthy dwelling-place for thy Son » etc. And from this it is gathered that blessed Mary merited and that she was worthy: therefore she merited by the merit of condignity to conceive.

3. Likewise, Bernard in the fifth book *On Consideration to Eugenius*[^3], treating that text of Matthew 13: *The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven* etc., says that « the woman was Wisdom, who by the leaven of the faith of the Blessed Virgin in the incarnation mingled three measures, *the new, the old, the eternal:* the new in the creation of the soul out of nothing, the old in the assumption of a body from the nature of Adam, the eternal in the union of the divinity ». Therefore the faith of the Blessed Virgin cooperated in some manner in that mingling; but not as regards the merely effective principle: therefore by way of merit.

4. Likewise, the Blessed Virgin either had sufficient grace[^4], preparing her for the conception of the Son of God, or not. If so; but grace sufficiently prepar-
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ing makes one merit that for which it prepares, by the merit of condignity: therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin from that grace merited the conception of the Son of God, since she used it well. If not; then either she lacked that sufficiently-preparing grace because she could not receive it, or because God did not will it, or could not give it; but not because God could not, or would not, give it, since he is omnipotent and would without doubt wish to prepare for himself a fitting dwelling-place. If because the Virgin could not receive it: then much less could she conceive the Son of God, for whose conception that grace was preparing. But if all these are unfitting, the first remains, namely that the Blessed Virgin merited the conception of Christ through the grace given to her.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*To the opposite.*) Augustine in the *Enchiridion,* and it is had in the text[^5]: « The manner in which Christ was born of Mary as a son, and of the Holy Spirit not as a son, suggests to us the grace of God, by which a man, with no preceding merits, in the very beginning of his nature, in which he began to be, was joined to the Word of God »: therefore it seems that no merits preceded the conception of Christ or the incarnation.

2. Likewise, the merit of the whole Church is greater than that of a single person: therefore if the incarnation does not fall under the merit of the whole Church[^6], neither does it fall under the merit of the Virgin Mary.

3. Likewise, that which falls under merit does not fully hold the character of the gratuitous — for if grace is from merits, then it is no longer grace, as the Apostle says to the Romans[^7] — but the incarnation of the Son of God pertained to the greatest grace, according to what Augustine says: therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin Mary did not merit his conception.

4. Likewise, this is of inestimable condescension, that the Son of the eternal God should be made the son of one poor little woman: therefore it was not from equity or the justice of retribution, and therefore not from the merit of the Virgin.

> **Conclusion.** Mary, not by the merit of condignity, but only by the merit of congruity, and after the annunciation also by the merit of worthiness, was able to merit to conceive the Son of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of merit (*The threefold merit.*) according to a threefold degree and difference. For there is the merit of *congruity,* by which[^8] a sinner is said to merit grace for himself, when he disposes himself toward grace: and there is the merit of *worthiness* (*digni*), by which, namely, a just man prays for another and merits to be heard; and there is the merit of *condignity,* by which one out of such great charity merits such great glory[^9].

I say therefore that the Blessed Virgin Mary, (*Conclusion 1.*) *before the incarnation,* merited to conceive the Son of God by the merit of *congruity,* since by her exceeding purity and humility and kindness she was fit to be made the Mother of God. But *after the annunciation,* (*Conclusion 2.*) after she had consented, and the Holy Spirit descended upon her in the abundance of grace, she had not only *congruity* but *worthiness;* and from then she merited, not only by the merit of *congruity* but of *worthiness,* to be overshadowed and made pregnant by the power of the Most High[^10]. But by the merit of *condignity* she could not (*Conclusion 3.*) merit to conceive the Son of God, for the reason that this exceeds all merit, and also because it was the *foundation* of the merit itself of the glorious Virgin. For whether we say that God is made man, or whether we say that a woman is made the Mother of God, each is above the state which is due to a creature; and therefore both this and that were of kindness and of grace. And therefore, as I said, that a just man can merit the first grace for a sinner by the merit of *worthiness,* not by the merit of *condignity,* lest grace should lose[^11] the character of grace; so it can be granted that the Blessed Virgin merited the conception not only by the merit of *congruity,* but by the merit of *worthiness,* because through the copious grace of the Holy Spirit she was, for that conception, not only congruous but also *worthy*[^12].

From these things can be made clear the reasons and authorities which are adduced for either side. (*Note.*) For the reasons which are adduced for the first side run upon merit according to the first or second acceptation. The reasons which are adduced for the second side run upon merit in the third sense[^13].

1. (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) To that word, however, which is said from the text[^14], it must be said that merits are not denied absolutely, but preceding merits, and this not in anyone whatever, but in the assumed nature, because it did not have merits preceding the union; for it was at the same time conceived and assumed and formed, as was shown above[^15].

2. To that which is objected, that the merit of the whole Church is greater than that of the Virgin Mary; it can be said that that reasoning is not conclusive, because the merit of the Fathers[^16] is greater than that of the Virgin extensively, yet it is not
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necessary that it be so intensively; because the Blessed Virgin, after, having heard the annunciation from the Angel, she was sanctified by the Holy Spirit, was filled with so great a gift of grace that she could worthily merit something which all the other Saints could not, if they were gathered together at once.

3. 4. To the other two there is no need to respond, since they proceed according to the third way, as is apparent. For worthiness takes away nothing of the liberality of grace nor of the kindness of mercy; rather it remains together with them, as is apparent to one who considers[^17].

---

la: Vers. 45. — Superius pro *solum ex* codd. K P Q Z bb *ex solo.*

en: Verse 45. — Above, for *solum ex* ("solely from") codices K P Q Z bb read *ex solo.*

la: In Completorio post antiphonam *Salve Regina.*

en: In Compline, after the antiphon *Salve Regina.*

la: Cap. 10. n. 22. seq., sed fusius ibi quam hic in arg. Cfr. Serm. 2. de Nativ. Domini, n. 4. Locus Script. est Matth. 13, 33. — Ante *in incarnatione* non pauci codd. erronee repetunt *quae.*

en: Chapter 10, n. 22 ff., but more fully there than here in the argument. Cf. Sermon 2 on the Nativity of the Lord, n. 4. The scriptural passage is Matthew 13:33. — Before *in incarnatione* not a few codices erroneously repeat *quae.*

la: Cod. K *sufficienter.*

en: Codex K reads *sufficienter* ("sufficiently").

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here chapter 2.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro *cadit* cod. N *cadebat.*

en: Cf. the preceding quaestion. — For *cadit* codex N reads *cadebat.*

la: Cap. 11, 6. — Dictum August., quod habetur in eius libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 19. n. 24, vide supra pag. 29, nota 1. Cfr. X. de Civ. Dei, c. 29. n. 1. — Pro *pertinuit* cod. Z *pertinet.*

en: Chapter 11:6. — The saying of Augustine, which is found in his book XIII *On the Trinity,* c. 19, n. 24, see above, p. 29, note 1. Cf. *On the City of God,* book X, c. 29, n. 1. — For *pertinuit* codex Z reads *pertinet.*

la: Pro *in quo* codd. G H L T aa et *quo,* codd. F K U V Z *quo.*

en: For *in quo* codices G H L T aa also read *quo,* and codices F K U V Z read *quo.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. et 3. — Pro *gloriam* cod. G *gratiam.* Mox pro *ante incarnationem* Vat. *ante annuntiationem.*

en: Cf. *II Sentences,* d. 27, a. 2, q. 2 and 3. — For *gloriam* codex G reads *gratiam.* Shortly after, for *ante incarnationem* the Vatican edition reads *ante annuntiationem.*

la: Respicitur Luc. 1, 35: *Virtus Altissimi obumbrabit tibi.* — Paulo ante pro *sed dignitatem* cod. bb *sed etiam* [edd. *et*] *dignitatem.*

en: Reference is made to Luke 1:35: *The power of the Most High shall overshadow thee.* — A little before, for *sed dignitatem* codex bb reads *sed etiam* [the editions: *et*] *dignitatem.*

la: Pro *perderet* Vat. substituit *perdat,* interiectis paulo ante inter *non* et *merito condigni* verbis *tantum merito congrui, licet iustus non possit ipsam primam gratiam mereri peccatori.* Pro *ne gratia* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 *ne igitur* vel *ne ergo,* cod. U *ne sic.*

en: For *perderet* the Vatican edition substitutes *perdat,* having inserted a little before, between *non* and *merito condigni,* the words *tantum merito congrui, licet iustus non possit ipsam primam gratiam mereri peccatori* ("only by the merit of congruity, although a just man cannot merit that first grace for a sinner"). For *ne gratia* not a few codices and editions 1, 2 read *ne igitur* or *ne ergo,* codex U *ne sic.*

la: Vat. sola, paulo superius vocibus *meruit conceptionem* adiectis verbis *Filii Dei,* hic superflue addit: *Quamvis eandem conceptionem Verbi divini numquam meruerit merito condigni, ne tantum beneficium incarnationis Filii Dei perderet rationem gratiae benignitatis et misericordiae.*

en: The Vatican edition alone, a little above having added to the words *meruit conceptionem* the words *Filii Dei,* here superfluously adds: *Although she never merited that same conception of the divine Word by the merit of condignity, lest so great a benefit of the incarnation of the Son of God should lose the character of the grace of kindness and of mercy.*

la: Edd. 1, 2 apponunt *modo,* Vat. adiungit *modo accepto.*

en: Editions 1, 2 add *modo,* the Vatican edition adds *modo accepto.*

la: Ita fere omnes codd., cod. bb *quod obiicitur de littera,* edd. *quod adducitur in littera.*

en: So nearly all the codices; codex bb reads *quod obiicitur de littera,* the editions read *quod adducitur in littera.*

en: Distinction 3, part II, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Cod. K *Ecclesiae.*

en: Codex K reads *Ecclesiae* ("of the Church").

en: See the scholion to the preceding quaestion. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.106–108 (PDF 128–130; offset pdf = printed + 22), reading each page Left column top→bottom then Right column, body bands then footer bands. The IA djvu OCR for this two-column quaestio is cascade-fragmented (body interleaved with footers, R-col bleed), so per the project's Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion the column-band read is authoritative for the body and footers. Raw OCR range: lines 7914–8019.

**Alignment.** PASS. The QUAESTIO II header *Utrum beata Virgo Maria meruerit Christum concipere, an conceptio illa fuerit solum ex munere gratiae divinae* matches the TRACTATIO's q2 (*meritum beatae Virginis Mariae*); opener *Secundo quaeritur de conceptione Christi in comparatione ad meritum beatae Virginis Mariae…* (raw 7917). This is NOT a2-q1 (*mera gratia / merita sanctorum Patrum*) and NOT a2-q3 (*dignitatem naturae assumtae,* raw 8020).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.106** — q2 occupies only the **Left column** (the page is shared: p.106 R-col top carries a2-q1's SCHOLION §I–III tail; QUAESTIO II prints at the foot of p.106). q2's L-col holds the opener + Fundamenta 1 (Lucae 1), 2 (collect *Omnipotens*), and the start of arg 4 (*habuit gratiam sufficientem*), continuing onto p.107. (Note: arg 3 — Bernard *de Consideratione* — physically prints at the top of p.106 R-col, immediately under the scholion; reflowed here into argument order.)
- **p.107** — both columns: end of arg 4, *Sed contra* args 1–4, CONCLUSIO, RESPONDEO (triple-merit distinction + Conclusiones 1–3), *Ex his patere possunt* (Notandum), and replies 1–2 (Solutio oppositorum).
- **p.108** — q2 occupies only the **Left column top + R-col top**: the tail of reply 2 (Left), and replies "3. 4." (Right top), ending at *…sicut intuenti apparet.* immediately before QUAESTIO III.

**Apparatus / footer hand-off (17 entries).**
- **RECEIVED from a2-q1:** p.106 footer note 1 (*Codd. et edd. 1, 2 ante meretur repetunt quod…*) belongs to a2-q1 (its `[^16]`); q2's per-page sequence therefore starts at **p.106 note 2** → `[^1]`. p.106 notes 2,3,4,5 → `[^1]`–`[^4]`.
- p.107 notes 1–12 → `[^5]`–`[^16]` (note 7 spans the L-col footer bottom → R-col footer top — a single note rendered as `[^11]`).
- p.108 note 1 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) → `[^17]`.
- **FORWARDED to a2-q3:** p.108 footer notes 2 ff. (note 2 *Hic c. 2. — In testimon. allegato pro illi homini…*; notes 3,4,5 Aristot./Boeth. references) are q3's, anchoring to q3's *in littera²* and following arguments.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. q2 carries NO scholion of its own. The SCHOLION printed after a2-q1 (raw ~7890) forward-covers q2: §I *Quoad hanc et seq. quaestionem…* and §II *Quoad B. V. Mariam, de qua agitur in seq. quaestione…* and §III *De utraque quaestione…* This is confirmed independently by q2's own footnote [^17] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) — "See the scholion to the preceding quaestion." This mirrors the Art. I q1→q2→q3 forward-coverage pattern.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses, not as anchors: Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Triplex meritum, Conclusio 1/2/3, Notandum, Solutio oppositorum.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum gratia in conceptione teneat rationem proprietatis naturalis, vel gratuitae.*

Tertio quaeritur de gratia illa, quae fuit in conceptione, in comparatione ad dignitatem naturae assumtae, et est quaestio, utrum gratia illa teneat rationem proprietatis naturalis, vel gratuitae. Et quod tenet rationem proprietatis naturalis, videtur:

1. (*Argg. pro 1. parte.*) *Primo* per auctoritatem Augustini, quae ponitur in littera[^1]: «In naturae humanae susceptione fiebat quodam modo illi homini gratia naturalis, ut nullum posset admittere peccatum».

2. Item, hoc *ratione* videtur. Quod inest rei a sua prima origine inest ei naturaliter[^2]; sed anima Christi ab instanti conceptionis habuit gratiam, nec potest nec potuit ab ea separari gratia illa: ergo videtur, quod illa gratia naturaliter fuerit innata.

3. Item, quod inest rei a principio intrinseco inest ei naturaliter[^3]; sed gratia Christi ortum habebat a persona Verbi, quae non est alia a persona Christi: ergo inerat ei a suo principio intrinseco; et si hoc, tunc inerat per modum proprietatis naturalis magis quam gratuitae.

4. Item, proprietas, per quam res ordinatur ad actum naturalem, est naturalis; sed per gratiam ille homo erat Filius Dei naturalis et est: ergo videtur, quod gratia sibi collata fuerit ei ad modum proprietatis naturalis.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Argg. pro 2. parte.*) Gratia et natura dividuntur ex opposito; sed quandocumque duo aliqua opponuntur, unum non denominat reliquum[^4]: ergo si naturale dicitur a natura, videtur, quod nulla gratia sit naturalis, aut si est naturalis, non est gratia.

2. Item, plus distat naturale a gratuito, in quantum huiusmodi, quam meritorium; sed perfecta gratia Christi non potuit esse ex meritis[^5]: ergo multo fortius videtur, quod non fuerit naturalis.

3. Item, «naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur[^6]»; sed Christus laudabilis erat per gratiam, quam habebat: ergo non videtur, quod gratia illa fuerit ei naturalis.

4. Item, excellentior est unio humanae naturae ad divinam in unitate personae quam per conformitatem gloriae[^7]; sed natura non elevatur ad gloriam, quantumcumque excellat, nisi mediante gratia, quae excedit terminum naturae, et quanto magis excedit, tanto magis tenet rationem gratiae: si ergo quod collatum est Christo multo magis excedebat terminos naturae, quam quod collatum est aliis hominibus; videtur, quod gratia eius plus habuit de ratione gratuiti et minus de ratione naturalis, quam gratia collata eius membris.

> ### Conclusio.
> Gratia unionis quodam modo fuit homini Christo naturalis, quodam modo non.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod gratia unionis (*Gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter.*), sicut in praecedentibus[^8] fuit tactum, tripliciter potest dici. Uno modo dicitur gratia unionis gratia disponens de congruo ad unionem; alio modo dicitur gratia unionis ipsa unio gratis facta; tertio modo dicitur gratia unionis ipsa gratia faciens unionem. — Et quocumque horum modorum dicatur gratia unionis, verum est, quod tenet rationem gratuiti (*Conclusio 1.*); verum est etiam, quod aliquo modo habet proprietatem rei naturalis. Et hoc insinuat ipsa littera Augustini, cum dicit, quod «quodam modo fieret illi homini gratia naturalis»: non dicit, simpliciter fieret, sed quodam modo.

Si enim dicatur gratia unionis, id est gratia disponens ad unionem, quodam modo est natu-<!-- page 109 -->ralis, quodam modo non (*Ratio.*). — Nam proprietas naturalis comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum, et sicut ad causam. Secundum comparationem, quam habet ad subiectum, naturaliter dicitur inesse quod inest a primordio ipsius rei et inseparabiliter et ab ea non recedit. Secundum comparationem, quam habet ad causam, dicitur naturaliter inesse proprietas[^9], quae causatur a principiis subiecti, et per quam ipsum subiectum efficit operationem naturalem. Primo modo dicitur gratia Christi fuisse naturalis, per quam ad unionem disponebatur, quia gratiam habuit a primordio suae nativitatis et gratiam perdere non potuit. Secundo vero modo non fuit naturalis, quia[^10] potius ordinabatur ad operationem supra naturam; non habebat etiam ortum a principiis naturae, sed potius a divina voluntate. Et propterea secundum istum modum accipiendi verum dicitur, quod gratia quodam modo fuit Christo naturalis, quodam modo non. Et ista possunt accipi ex his quae dicuntur in textu[^11].

Similiter, si gratia unionis dicatur ipsa unio gratis facta (*Conclusio 3.*), quodam modo fuit naturalis, quodam modo non: Naturalis, inquam, fuit propter inseparabilitatem, quia natura humana sic fuit unita divinae a sua prima formatione, quod ab ipsa separari non potuit. Quodam modo non fuit naturalis, sed gratuita, in hoc scilicet quod terminos naturae excedit et ex mera Dei voluntate processit.

Similiter, si tertio modo dicatur gratia[^12] ipsa virtus gratis faciens unionem, sicut ipse Spiritus sanctus (*Conclusio 4.*), sic quodam modo fuit illi homini naturalis, quodam modo non. Naturalis fuit per communicationem idiomatum ratione personae Verbi, cui Spiritus sanctus connaturalis est. Non enim habuit Filius Spiritum sanctum per influentiam, sed potius, quia habet in se a Patre vim spirativam. Et propterea dicitur in Ioanne[^13], quod non est ei datus Spiritus ad mensuram. Per comparationem autem ad naturam assumtam gratia illa non erat illi homini connaturalis, quia Spiritus sanctus non erat in eo per principia naturae creatae, sed per gratiam inhabitantem. — Et sic patet, quod omni modo intelligendi[^14] gratia illa quodam modo fuit illi homini connaturalis, alio modo non.

Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad utramque partem (*Ad argumenta.*), quae secundum diversas vias verum concludunt. Verum est enim, quod «gratia illa, sicut dicit Augustinus, quodam modo naturalis fuit illi homini»: non tamen simpliciter, sicut rationes ostendunt.

*Ad 4.* (*Ad arg. pro 1. parte.*) Illa tamen ratio, qua ostenditur, quod gratia illa est naturalis, quia ordinat ad actum naturalem, non valet, quia assumtio[^15] est falsa; quoniam, etsi per gratiam illam disponatur, ut sit filius naturalis, non tamen propter hoc ordinatur ad operationem naturalem. Hoc enim non dicitur propter hoc, quod illi naturae assumtae conveniat a Patre per gratiam illam aeternaliter et naturaliter generari; sed hoc est, quia per gratiam illam disponitur ad unionem, quae facit idiomatum communicationem, et unio illa supra naturam est. Et ideo non est mirum, si gratia, quae ad illam unionem reddit naturam congruam, est supra naturam.

*Ad 3.* Similiter alia ratio, quae dicit[^16], quod gratia illa a principio intrinseco est, non cogit; quoniam aliter accipitur intrinsecum in proposito, et aliter, cum dicitur, quod naturale est quod est a principio intrinseco. Nam intrinsecum, prout cadit in notificationem proprietatis naturalis, dicitur esse illud quod est de constitutione naturae; non sic autem persona Verbi est illi intrinseca.

*Ad 1, 2.* Aliae vero duae rationes sunt concedendae, quia non probant, quod gratia illa simpliciter fuerit naturalis, sed quod quodam modo conformitatem habuit ad proprietatem naturalem. Et hoc quidem veritatem habet, sicut iam ostensum est.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the grace in the conception holds the character of a natural property, or of a gratuitous one.*

Thirdly it is asked about that grace which was in the conception, in comparison to the dignity of the assumed nature, and the question is whether that grace holds the character of a natural property, or of a gratuitous one. And that it holds the character of a natural property is seen:

1. (*Arguments for the first side.*) *First*, by the authority of Augustine, which is set down in the text[^1]: "In the assumption of human nature there came to be in that man, in a certain manner, a natural grace, such that he could admit no sin."

2. Likewise, this is seen *by reason*. What is in a thing from its first origin is in it naturally[^2]; but the soul of Christ from the instant of conception had grace, and that grace neither can nor could be separated from it: therefore it seems that that grace was naturally inborn.

3. Likewise, what is in a thing from an intrinsic principle is in it naturally[^3]; but the grace of Christ took its rise from the person of the Word, which is not other than the person of Christ: therefore it was in him from his intrinsic principle; and if this, then it was in him by the mode of a natural property rather than of a gratuitous one.

4. Likewise, a property by which a thing is ordered to a natural act is natural; but by grace that man was and is the natural Son of God: therefore it seems that the grace conferred on him was in him after the manner of a natural property.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Arguments for the second side.*) Grace and nature are divided as opposites; but whenever two things are opposed, one does not denominate the other[^4]: therefore if "natural" is said from nature, it seems that no grace is natural, or if it is natural, it is not grace.

2. Likewise, the natural is more distant from the gratuitous, as such, than from the meritorious; but the perfect grace of Christ could not be from merits[^5]: therefore much more strongly it seems that it was not natural.

3. Likewise, "by natural things we are neither praised nor blamed[^6]"; but Christ was praiseworthy through the grace which he had: therefore it does not seem that that grace was natural to him.

4. Likewise, the union of human nature to the divine in the unity of person is more excellent than [conformity] through the conformity of glory[^7]; but nature is not elevated to glory, however much it may excel, except by the mediation of grace, which exceeds the limit of nature, and the more it exceeds, the more it holds the character of grace: if therefore what was conferred on Christ much more exceeded the limits of nature than what was conferred on other men; it seems that his grace had more of the character of the gratuitous and less of the character of the natural than the grace conferred on his members.

> ### Conclusion.
> The grace of union was in a certain manner natural to the man Christ, in a certain manner not.

**I respond:** It must be said that the grace of union (*The grace of union is spoken of in three ways.*), as was touched upon in the foregoing[^8], can be spoken of in three ways. In one way the grace of union is called the grace disposing congruously to the union; in another way the grace of union is called the union itself freely effected; in a third way the grace of union is called the grace itself effecting the union. — And in whichever of these ways the grace of union is spoken of, it is true that it holds the character of the gratuitous (*Conclusion 1.*); it is also true that in some manner it has the property of a natural thing. And this the very text of Augustine intimates, when he says that "in a certain manner there came to be in that man a natural grace": he does not say that it came to be simply, but in a certain manner.

For if the grace of union is called, that is, the grace disposing to the union, in a certain manner it is natu-ral, in a certain manner not (*Reason.*). — For a natural property is compared to something as to a subject, and as to a cause. According to the comparison which it has to the subject, that is said to be in it naturally which is in it from the very beginning of the thing and inseparably, and does not depart from it. According to the comparison which it has to the cause, a property is said to be in it naturally[^9] which is caused by the principles of the subject, and through which the subject itself effects a natural operation. In the first way the grace of Christ is said to have been natural, by which he was disposed to the union, because he had grace from the beginning of his nativity and could not lose grace. But in the second way it was not natural, because[^10] it was rather ordered to an operation above nature; nor did it have its rise from the principles of nature, but rather from the divine will. And therefore according to this mode of taking it it is truly said that grace was in a certain manner natural to Christ, in a certain manner not. And these things can be gathered from what is said in the text[^11].

Likewise, if the grace of union is called the union itself freely effected (*Conclusion 3.*), in a certain manner it was natural, in a certain manner not: Natural, I say, it was on account of inseparability, because human nature was so united to the divine from its first formation that it could not be separated from it. In a certain manner it was not natural, but gratuitous, namely in this, that it exceeds the limits of nature and proceeded from the mere will of God.

Likewise, if in the third way the grace[^12] is called the very power freely effecting the union, as the Holy Spirit himself (*Conclusion 4.*), thus in a certain manner it was natural to that man, in a certain manner not. It was natural through the communication of idioms by reason of the person of the Word, to whom the Holy Spirit is connatural. For the Son did not have the Holy Spirit through influence, but rather because he has in himself from the Father the power of spirating. And therefore it is said in John[^13] that the Spirit is not given to him by measure. But through the comparison to the assumed nature that grace was not connatural to that man, because the Holy Spirit was not in him through the principles of created nature, but through indwelling grace. — And thus it is clear that in every mode of understanding[^14] that grace was in a certain manner connatural to that man, in another way not.

And according to this the reasons run to both sides (*To the arguments.*), which according to diverse ways conclude truly. For it is true that "that grace, as Augustine says, was in a certain manner natural to that man": yet not simply, as the reasons show.

*To the 4th.* (*To the argument for the first side.*) That reason, however, by which it is shown that that grace is natural because it orders to a natural act, does not hold, because the assumption[^15] is false; for although by that grace he is disposed to be a natural son, yet not on this account is he ordered to a natural operation. For this is not said on account of this, that it belongs to that assumed nature to be eternally and naturally generated by the Father through that grace; but it is because by that grace he is disposed to the union, which effects the communication of idioms, and that union is above nature. And therefore it is no wonder if the grace which renders the nature congruous to that union is above nature.

*To the 3rd.* Likewise the other reason, which says[^16] that that grace is from an intrinsic principle, does not compel; for "intrinsic" is taken otherwise in the matter proposed, and otherwise when it is said that the natural is what is from an intrinsic principle. For "intrinsic," insofar as it falls under the notification of a natural property, is said to be that which is of the constitution of nature; but the person of the Word is not thus intrinsic to it.

*To the 1st and 2nd.* But the other two reasons are to be conceded, because they do not prove that that grace was simply natural, but that in a certain manner it had a conformity to a natural property. And this indeed holds the truth, as has already been shown.

la: Hic c. 2. — In testimon. allegato pro *illi homini* Vat. *in homine*.

en: Here, c. 2. — In the testimony alleged, in place of *to that man* the Vatican edition reads *in man*.

la: Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 9. (c. 8.) ait: Atque his fere duobus a natura quippiam inesse determinamus, eo scilicet quod a nativitate statim omnibus inest, et quod generatione existente facile consequimur, ut senectus, canities etc.

en: Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 9 (c. 8), says: And by these two marks especially we determine that something is in [a thing] by nature, namely by the fact that it is at once in all from birth, and that, generation having taken place, we easily acquire it, as old age, grey hair, etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 3. seqq., ubi definitio naturae datur (principium aliquod et causa movendi et quiescendi, in quo est primum et non secundum accidens) nec non plura alia definiuntur, quae ad naturam spectant.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 3 ff., where the definition of nature is given (some principle and cause of moving and resting, in which it is primarily and not according to accident), and likewise several other things are defined which pertain to nature.

la: Deficiunt enim in oppositis conditiones principales ad denominationem requisitae. «Tria sunt autem necessaria, inquit Boeth., I. in Praedicam. Aristot. c. de Denominativis, ut denominativa vocabula constituantur: prius ut re participent, post ut nomine, postremo ut sit quaedam nominis transfiguratio, ut cum aliquis dicitur a fortitudine fortis... Si quid vero sit quod re non participet, neque nomine participare potest. Quare quaecumque re non participant, denominativa esse non possunt».

en: For in opposites the principal conditions required for denomination are lacking. "Three things, however, are necessary," says Boethius, *On Aristotle's Categories* I, c. on Denominatives, "for denominative words to be constituted: first that they participate in the thing, then in the name, lastly that there be a certain transfiguration of the name, as when someone is called *brave* from *bravery*... But if there be anything that does not participate in the thing, it cannot participate in the name either. Wherefore whatever things do not participate in the thing cannot be denominatives."

la: Cfr. infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1.

la: De hac Aristot. propos. vide tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8. — Vat. et aliquot codd. verbo *naturalibus* praemittunt *in*.

en: On this Aristotelian proposition see vol. II, p. 113, note 8. — The Vatican edition and several codices prefix *in* to the word *naturalibus*.

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. et infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Pro *in unitate* edd. cum codd. A T V bb *in unitatem*. Paulo inferius pro *magis excedit* codd. G H L T V aa et edd. 1, 2 *magis accedit* [scil. ad gloriam].

en: See above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, and below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 2 f. — In place of *in unitate* the editions, with codices A T V bb, read *in unitatem*. A little below, in place of *magis excedit*, codices G H L T V aa and editions 1, 2 read *magis accedit* [namely, to glory].

la: Codd. M O *naturalis esse proprietas*. Paulo superius pro *ipsius rei* in cod. K a posteriore manu substitutum est *ipsi rei*. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3, ubi de hac re fusius agitur.

en: Codices M O read *naturalis esse proprietas*. A little above, in place of *ipsius rei*, in codex K a later hand has substituted *ipsi rei*. — Cf. II *Sent.* d. 26, q. 3, where this matter is treated more fully.

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. *sed*.

en: The editions and several codices read *sed*.

la: Cod. X *in littera*, et quidem c. 2.

en: Codex X reads *in littera*, and indeed c. 2.

la: Codd. F N bene supplent *unionis*. Cod. Z omittit *gratia*.

en: Codices F N rightly supply *unionis*. Codex Z omits *gratia*.

la: Cap. 3, 34: Non enim ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum. — In propos. praeced. codd. K Z *habuit* commutarunt in *habet*, et pro *in se* exhibent *in se ipso*; cod. U voci *Filius* praefigit *ipse*. De ista propos. cfr. I. Sent. d. 11. 12. et 29. a. 2.

en: Chapter 3:34: For God does not give the Spirit by measure. — In the preceding proposition codices K Z have changed *habuit* into *habet*, and in place of *in se* present *in se ipso*; codex U prefixes *ipse* to the word *Filius*. On this proposition cf. I *Sent.* d. 11, 12, and 29, a. 2.

la: Non pauci codd. *intelligendo*; minus bene. Paulo superius pro *principia* cod. Z *principium*.

en: Not a few codices read *intelligendo*; less well. A little above, in place of *principia*, codex Z reads *principium*.

la: Sive minor. — Paulo ante pro *qua ostenditur* cod. bb *quae ostendit*.

en: That is, the minor [premise]. — A little before, in place of *qua ostenditur*, codex bb reads *quae ostendit*.

la: Pro *quae dicit* cod. U *qua dicitur*, codd. A G L N T V aa bb *qua dicit*. Paulo superius pro *reddit* cod. Z *reddidit*.

en: In place of *quae dicit* codex U reads *qua dicitur*, codices A G L N T V aa bb *qua dicit*. A little above, in place of *reddit*, codex Z reads *reddidit*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solvenda hac quaestione omnes antiqui Scholastici consentiunt et etiam iisdem fere distinctionibus utuntur. Attamen posteriores doctores gratiam habitualem in Christo non vocant *gratiam unionis*, quem modum loquendi S. Bonav. accepit ab Alexandro Hal., ut iam supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in scholio innuimus, ubi etiam explicatum est, quo sensu gratia habitualis vocari possit «disponens de congruo ad unionem».

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 2. — Scotus quaestionem tangit in utroque Scripto, III. Sent. d. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. Magistri. — Ricard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In solving this question all the ancient Scholastics agree and even use nearly the same distinctions. Nevertheless the later doctors do not call the habitual grace in Christ the *grace of union*, a manner of speaking which St. Bonaventure took from Alexander of Hales, as we already intimated above at d. 2, a. 3, q. 2 in the scholion, where it was also explained in what sense habitual grace can be called "disposing congruously to the union."

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 7, m. 2, a. 2. — Scotus touches the question in both *Scripta*, III *Sent.* d. 10. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; *Summa* III, q. 2, a. 12. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 3, a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.108–109 (PDF 130–131; raw OCR lines 8020–8145), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF-priority in OCR-cascade regions). Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.108** is shared with **a2-q2** (a2-q2's tail — reply *Ad 3.4.* ending *…sicut intuenti apparet¹* — prints at the top of p.108 R-col). QUAESTIO III begins immediately after, mid-p.108 R-col. q3 occupies the whole of p.108 **L-col** (question header, opener, args 1–4 pro 1ª parte + Sed contra args 1–3 pro 2ª parte) and most of p.108 **R-col** (Sed contra arg 4, Conclusio, Respondeo through Conclusio 1–2).
- **p.109** holds the rest of the Respondeo (L-col: Conclusio 3, Conclusio 4 / R-col top), the replies (*Ad argumenta*, *Ad 4*, *Ad 3*, *Ad 1.2*), and the SCHOLION (§I L-col foot, §II R-col foot). q3 ends with the SCHOLION on p.109.
- **p.110** begins (running head `110 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`) with ARTICULUS III — it belongs entirely to the next chunk (d4-a3-q1); q3 does NOT extend onto p.110.

**Footer hand-off (received from a2-q2).** Per the VOL II Override per-page footer-split rule: p.108's footer note 1 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) was consumed by **a2-q2 as its `[^17]`** (it keys q2's final reply); confirmed by eyes-on the p.108 footer band. q3 therefore LEADS with p.108 **note 2** → its `[^1]`. p.108 notes 2–9 → `[^1]`–`[^8]`; p.109 notes 1–8 → `[^9]`–`[^16]`. Total 16 entries.

**Footer hand-off (forwarded to d4-a3-q1).** q3 ends on p.109; p.110 starts ARTICULUS III with a fresh per-page footer sequence. No footer is shared across the q3 → a3-q1 boundary (clean page break at p.109/p.110). a3-q1 begins its own footer numbering on p.110.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true` — q3 carries its **own** SCHOLION (§I + §II only), printed at the foot of p.109 after the replies. §I notes the ancient Scholastics' consensus and the *gratia unionis* terminology inherited from Alexander of Hales (cross-ref d.2, a.3, q.2); §II is the parallel-loci list (Alexander, Scotus, Thomas, Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard, Giles, Durandus, Dionysius). This differs from q2 (which had no own scholion, being forward-covered by a2-q1 §I–III).

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not as anchors: *Argg. pro 1. parte*, *Argg. pro 2. parte*, *Gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter*, *Conclusio 1*, *Ratio*, *Conclusio 3*, *Conclusio 4*, *Ad argumenta*, *Ad arg. pro 1. parte*.

**`[?]` flags:** none. OCR garbles (`teneal`→tenet, `naluralis`→naturalis, `assuintam`→assumtam, `iutrinseco`→intrinseco, `SCHOLIOK`→SCHOLION, `.Egid.`→Aegid., running head `ART. U.`→ART. II.) silently corrected against the PDF column bands; all readings unambiguous.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 4, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 110 -->

### Articulus III. *De conceptione Christi in comparatione ad Virginem concipientem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de conceptione Christi in comparatione ad Virginem concipientem, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in illa conceptione aliquid Virgo Maria fuerit Spiritui sancto in aliquo cooperata.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum illa operatio vel cooperatio fuerit naturalis, vel miraculosa.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ex illa cooperatione sit Virgo Maria Dei genitrix appellanda.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Virgo Maria in illa conceptione fuerit aliquid Spiritui sancto in aliquo cooperata.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in illa conceptione aliquid Virgo Maria fuerit Spiritui sancto cooperata in aliquo, mediante aliqua potentia. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Damasceni, quam ponit Magister in littera (*Fundamenta*)[^1]: « Praevenit Spiritus sanctus in ipsam secundum verbum, quod dixerat Angelus ei, purgans eam et potentiam deitatis Verbi receptivam praeparans, simul autem et generativam »: ergo si non solum habuit potentiam receptivam, sed etiam generativam, non solum se habuit Virgo Maria per modum recipientis, sed per modum agentis et cooperantis.

2. *Item*, vera mater cooperatur in filii generatione; sed beata Maria vere fuit Mater Christi[^2]: ergo vere fuit cooperata in eius conceptione virtuti Spiritus sancti.

3. *Item*, hoc conceditur et cantatur ab Ecclesia tanquam verus et catholicus sermo[^3]: « Genuit puerpera regem »; sed *generare* agere est et actio virtutis generativae: ergo videtur, quod in illa conceptione generativa vis Virginis cooperata fuit divinae virtuti.

4. *Item*, aut Virgo Maria *cooperata fuit*, aut *non*. Si *sic*, habeo propositum; si *non*: ergo habuit se solummodo sicut materia: ergo sicut nulla est affinitas[^4] hominis ad limum, unde formatus est, sic nec Mariae ad Christum. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, vir praebuit mulieri materiale principium, quando de eius costa formata est Eva; sed propter hoc ipsius mulieris non dicitur esse pater, aut mater, quia cooperatus non fuit in eius formatione; sed beata Virgo habitudinem matris habet ad Christum: ergo non solum praeparavit materiam, sed cooperata fuit ad inducendum formam.

6. *Item*, veritas debet respondere figurae; sed Virgo Maria figurata est per virgam Aaron, et virga Aaron fronduit et floruit et fructum fecit, sicut habetur Numerorum decimo septimo[^5]; de flore autem pervenitur ad fructum mediante virtute activa reperta in planta, quae floruit: fuit igitur in virga virtus activa ad fructificandum: ergo videtur multo fortius in Virgine Maria.

**Sed contra:** (*Ad oppositum*) 1. Ad Galatas quarto[^6]: *Misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere*; et ad Romanos primo: *Qui factus est ei ex semine David*; super quem locum dicit Glossa: « Apostolus dicit *factum*, sed non *natum*. Aliud enim est ex semine admixto sanguinis coagulo generare, aliud non commixtione, sed virtute procreare. Possunt enim homines filios *generare*, sed non *facere* ». Ergo videtur, quod Virgo Maria solum se habuit ut materiale principium, ex quo corpus Christi dicitur factum.

2. *Item*, Damascenus[^7]: « Copulavit sibi de purissimis et sanctissimis Virginis sanguinibus, non seminans, sed per Spiritum sanctum creans »: si ergo *creatio* est actio solius Dei, in qua non cooperatur creatura; videtur, quod in nullo fuerit Virgo cooperatrix.

3. *Item*, Christus eodem modo fuit in parentibus, quo fuit in Virgine; sed in parentibus fuit « secundum corpulentam substantiam tantum[^8] »: ergo nec in Virgine fuit nisi secundum corpulentam sub<!-- page 111 -->stantiam. Si ergo *generatio* dicit vim activam et cooperativam ad formam producendam, videtur, quod Virgo Maria in nullo fuerit Spiritui sancto cooperata.

4. *Item*, agens potentiae finitae non potest continuari nec cooperari in agendo cum agente potentiae infinitae in ea operatione, in qua operatur virtus illa per modum infiniti; sed conceptio Christi fuit in instanti, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^9]; producere autem rem in instanti, quae nata est produci successive, hoc est potentiae in infinitum excedentis potentiam naturae: ergo si Virgo Maria nullam habuit potentiam nisi finitam, videtur, quod Spiritui sancto non potuit cooperari in conceptione illa.

> ### Conclusio.
> Beata Virgo vere cooperata est Spiritui sancto in conceptione Filii sui, subministrando materiam, quae non solum habuit rationem materiae, sed etiam sufficientiam et virtutem ad prolis productionem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, cum Virgo Maria sit Mater Christi et vere ipsum concepisse dicatur, vere cooperata fuit Spiritui sancto in Filii sui conceptione (*Conclusio 1*). Et hoc[^10] communiter et generaliter tenent doctores theologiae. De modo autem cooperandi diversi sentiunt diversa (*De modo cooperationis 3 sententiae*). — Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod Virgo Maria solum cooperata fuit ministrando principium materiale. Alii vero[^11], quod cooperata fuit in ultimae formae inductione et in materiae praeparatione, quamvis non in tota operatione. Alii vero tenent medium inter utrumque.

Primi, qui dicunt, quod cooperata fuit solum in materialis principii ministratione (*Sententia 1*), moventur hac ratione: quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^12], mater in generatione prolis se habet sicut principium materiale, et semen viri sicut effectivum et operativum. Unde comparatur semen viri ad semen mulieris sicut artifex ad materiam, mulier vero non facit nisi materiam ministrare et exterius fovere. Et hoc totum fecit Virgo Maria; et ideo vere mater est appellanda, quia nihil ei defuit, quod spectat ad veram matrem in generatione prolis. Spiritus autem sanctus quod defuit ex parte viri supplevit. — Sed haec positio parum dicit (*Non probatur*): primum, quia mater in generatione non solum habet potentiam *passivam*, sed[^13] *activam*; unde quandoque proles magis assimilatur matri quam patri. Unde quod dicunt physici intelligendum est per *appropriationem*[^14]. Et iterum dicit Damascenus, quod Spiritus sanctus non solum dedit Virgini potentiam *receptivam*, sed etiam *generativam*; et sicut prius[^15] ostensum est, propter materiam solum non est appellanda mater, sicut patet in formatione mulieris de costa viri.

Et quoniam ista positio nimis parum dicit, ideo sunt alii (*Sententia 2*), qui superaddunt et dicunt, quod non solum cooperata fuit Spiritui sancto ministrando *principium materiale*, sed etiam in *ultimae formae inductione*. Nam in *tota* operatione cooperari non potuit, quoniam formatio corporis instantanea, prout formatio comprehendit totam transmutationem, fieri non potest nisi a virtute infinita. In ultimae autem formae[^16] inductione cooperari potuit, pro eo quod ultima forma in instanti potest induci a natura, vel a virtute creata; et ideo in hoc, in quo potuit, cooperata fuit Spiritui sancto potentia Virginis generativa, et pro tanto dicitur mater, quia operata fuit conceptionem et quantum ad *initium* et quantum ad *consummationem*. — Sed haec positio nimis dicit (*Non probatur ob 3 rationes*): primum, quia eiusdem est *factum esse*, cuius est *fieri*[^17]; quodsi conceptionem *efficere* non est virtutis creatae, sed increatae, similiter nec ipsum *conceptum esse*. — Rursus, inducens ultimam formam nobilius est quam *praeparans*. Non igitur videtur decens, quod Spiritus sanctus *praeparet* per se, et ultimam formam *inducat* cum Virgine. — Difficile est nihilominus assignare, quae sit illa forma ultima, in cuius inductione cooperatur Virginis potentia generativa. Illa enim[^18] non potest esse *anima*, quoniam a sola creatione habet originem; non *organizatio corporea*, ut videtur, quia illa non inducitur subito, sed per successionem a natura; inducitur enim per *motum*, non per *mutationem*; « *motus* enim est transmutatio successiva; *mutatio*, instantanea », ut dicit Philosophus[^19].
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Et quoniam prima opinio parum dicit, et secunda multum excedit (*Sententia 3 et media*), suis obliquitatibus dirigunt nos in veritatis viam. Et propterea melius sentire videntur qui dicunt *medium* (*Conclusio 2*), videlicet quod beata Virgo habuit virtutem sibi divinitus datam, per quam administraret materiam illi conceptui, materiam, inquam, quae non solum habuit rationem *materiae* sive potentiae passivae, sed etiam *sufficientiam et virtutem* ad prolis productionem. Illa tamen virtus per se non poterat prodire ad perfectum actum nisi per successionem in tempore; sed quoniam non decebat, carnem Christi formari successive, sicut in praecedentibus[^20] ostensum est; ideo Spiritus sanctus sua infinita virtute produxit illam materiam ad actum completum. Et per hoc in nullo Virgini derogatur, si Deus sua virtute acceleravit, quod in aliis mulieribus successive producit ad *esse*. — Non (*Corollarium*) enim fuit minor potentia in Virgine quam in alia muliere, immo multo maior, quia potentiam *naturalem* et *supranaturalem* habuit, per quam subministrare poterat materiam ipsa sola adeo, sicut mulier viro commixta; unde tota substantia Christi fuit de matre sua. Et ideo, si recte velimus sentire et loqui, veriori modo fuit Virgo mater Christi, quam sit aliqua mater filii sui[^21]. Unde et per illam virtutem ipsum in ventre per novem menses confovit.

Et sic patet, quod Virgo Maria aliquo modo fuit in conceptione Filii cooperata, videlicet subministrando sufficientem materiam virtute activa[^22], quae tamen supra posse suum accelerata fuit et ad complementum perducta per virtutem infinitam. — Et (*Confirmatur*) huic consonat sacra Scriptura[^23], quae modo dicit Christum *natum de Virgine*, modo dicit *factum*. Consonat etiam verbum Damasceni, qui dicit, quod virtutem habuit verbi *susceptivam* et *generativam*: *generativam*, quia potuit seminarium corpori ministrare per virtutem sibi collatam divino munere; *susceptivam* vero, quia solum Dei Verbum potuit carnem assumtam in instanti formare, quod quidem Verbum susceptum est a Virgine. — Rationes igitur ostendentes, in Filii Dei conceptione Virginem aliquo modo cooperatam[^24] fuisse, sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de Glossa super illud *factum* (*Solutio oppositorum*), iam patet responsio. Hoc enim non excludit veram potentiam generativam a Virgine, sed ponit, ibi aliquam vim esse supra vim naturae[^25]; unde removet viri seminis commixtionem, et ideo sic dicitur *factus*, quod nihilominus dicitur *natus*. Et est simile, si Deus uni virgae aridae daret vim germinandi, quam habet una viridis, et praeter hoc faceret ipsam in instanti fructificare; virga illa diceretur fructum fecisse et attulisse[^26], et nihilominus fructus ille diceretur esse factus ex illa virga, ita quod simul diceretur *factus* et *ortus*. Sic et in proposito est intelligendum, talis enim praecessit figura huius conceptionis in virga.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod carnem illam fecit *creans*, non *seminans*; dicendum, quod sicut per actum *creationis* non intendit dicere, quod caro illa facta fuerit ex *nihilo*, sed quod[^27] ad perfectionem deducta est per virtutem infinitam; sic etiam per hoc, quod dicit *non seminans*, non privat potentiam activam a Virgine, sed removet consuetum modum operandi naturae, qui est per seminis commixtionem maris et feminae. — Utrum autem Virgo excitata a Spiritu sancto seminaverit (*Ad quaestionem incidentem notabilis responsio*), hoc est[^28], ad locum matricis semen emiserit: quamvis aliqui dixerint, non est verbum illud frequenter in ore versandum, tum quia turpitudinem habet annexam, et homo habere debet munda labia in tali materia; tum etiam, quia certitudinem non habet ex se, nec verbis Sanctorum videtur multum consonare. Unde stultum est in talibus velle ita curiose singula pertractare. Hoc tamen sufficiat dixisse, videlicet quod Virgo ministravit materiam aptam generationi Filii Dei secundum carnem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non fuit in ea secundum rationem seminalem; dicendum, quod verum est, si seminalis ratio dicatur illa, secundum quam natura consuevit operari; sic enim accipit Augustinus ibi[^29] (*Notandum*). Ex hoc tamen non excluditur, quin aliqua potentia praeter morem solitum divinitus Virgini sit collata. Praeterea, ratione adhuc potentiae illius activae non debet dici fuisse ibi secundum rationem seminalem, pro eo quod ad actum perfectum perducta fuit per virtutem supra naturam; et respectu talis modi operandi fuit ibi solum potentia *obedientiae*. Et est simile (*Simile*): si Deus post[^30] commixtionem maris et feminae in instanti perducit foetum ad complementum organizationis<!-- page 113 -->perfectae, talis formatio non diceretur esse facta secundum *rationem seminalem*, quamvis esset ibi *vis activa* respectu talis organizationis educendae in *esse* per temporis successionem; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

4. Ad ultimam rationem dicendum, quod ratio illa non cogit, quod Virgo Maria non fuerit cooperata Spiritui sancto in Filii conceptione aliquo modo, sed solum, quod non fuerit cooperata in producendo[^31] illam materiam ad esse completum; et hoc est quod primum fuit concessum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

english:
### Article III. *On the conception of Christ in comparison with the Virgin conceiving.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the conception of Christ in comparison with the Virgin conceiving, and concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether in that conception the Virgin Mary in any way cooperated with the Holy Spirit.

Second it is asked, whether that operation or cooperation was natural or miraculous.

Third it is asked, whether from that cooperation the Virgin Mary is to be called the Mother of God.

### Question I. *Whether in that conception the Virgin Mary in any way cooperated with the Holy Spirit.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether in that conception the Virgin Mary in any way cooperated with the Holy Spirit, by means of some power. And that she did, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Damascene, which the Master sets down in the text (*Fundamenta*)[^1]: « The Holy Spirit came beforehand into her according to the word which the Angel had spoken to her, purifying her and preparing the power of her receptive of the deity of the Word, and at the same time also the generative power »: therefore if she had not only a receptive power, but also a generative one, the Virgin Mary held herself not only after the manner of one receiving, but after the manner of one acting and cooperating.

2. *Likewise*, a true mother cooperates in the generation of her son; but the blessed Mary was truly the Mother of Christ[^2]: therefore she truly cooperated in his conception with the power of the Holy Spirit.

3. *Likewise*, this is granted and sung by the Church as a true and catholic utterance[^3]: « The woman in childbed begot a king »; but *to beget* is to act and is the action of the generative power: therefore it seems that in that conception the generative power of the Virgin cooperated with the divine power.

4. *Likewise*, either the Virgin Mary *cooperated*, or *not*. If *yes*, I have what was proposed; if *no*: then she held herself only as matter: therefore just as there is no affinity[^4] of a man to the clay from which he was formed, so neither is there of Mary to Christ. But this is false: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, a man supplied a woman with the material principle, when Eve was formed from his rib; but on this account he is not said to be the father of that woman, nor her mother, because he did not cooperate in her formation; but the blessed Virgin has the relation of a mother to Christ: therefore she not only prepared the matter, but cooperated in inducing the form.

6. *Likewise*, the truth ought to correspond to the figure; but the Virgin Mary was prefigured by the rod of Aaron, and the rod of Aaron put forth leaves and blossomed and bore fruit, as is found in the seventeenth chapter of Numbers[^5]; but from the flower one arrives at the fruit by means of an active power found in the plant which blossomed: there was therefore in the rod an active power for fruit-bearing: therefore it seems much more so in the Virgin Mary.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite*) 1. To the Galatians, fourth chapter[^6]: *God sent his Son, made of a woman*; and to the Romans, first chapter: *Who was made to him of the seed of David*; on which passage the Gloss says: « The Apostle says *made*, but not *born*. For it is one thing to generate from seed mixed with a clot of blood, another not by commixture but by power to procreate. For men can *generate* sons, but not *make* them ». Therefore it seems that the Virgin Mary held herself only as a material principle, from which the body of Christ is said to have been made.

2. *Likewise*, the Damascene[^7]: « He joined to himself from the most pure and most holy bloods of the Virgin, not sowing seed, but creating through the Holy Spirit »: if therefore *creation* is the action of God alone, in which the creature does not cooperate; it seems that the Virgin was in no way a cooperator.

3. *Likewise*, Christ was in his parents in the same way in which he was in the Virgin; but in the parents he was « only according to corpulent substance[^8] »: therefore neither was he in the Virgin except according to corpulent sub<!-- page 111 -->stance. If therefore *generation* implies an active and cooperative power for producing the form, it seems that the Virgin Mary in no way cooperated with the Holy Spirit.

4. *Likewise*, an agent of finite power cannot be continued nor cooperate in acting with an agent of infinite power in that operation in which that power operates after the manner of the infinite; but the conception of Christ was in an instant, as was shown above[^9]; but to produce a thing in an instant which is of a nature to be produced successively belongs to a power infinitely exceeding the power of nature: therefore if the Virgin Mary had no power except a finite one, it seems that she could not cooperate with the Holy Spirit in that conception.

> ### Conclusion.
> The blessed Virgin truly cooperated with the Holy Spirit in the conception of her Son, by supplying the matter, which had not only the character of matter, but also the sufficiency and power for the production of the offspring.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, since the Virgin Mary is the Mother of Christ and is truly said to have conceived him, she truly cooperated with the Holy Spirit in the conception of her Son (*First conclusion*). And this[^10] the doctors of theology commonly and generally hold. But concerning the manner of cooperating, different men think differently (*On the manner of cooperation, three opinions*). — For some wished to say that the Virgin Mary cooperated only by furnishing the material principle. Others[^11], that she cooperated in the inducing of the ultimate form and in the preparation of the matter, although not in the whole operation. Others hold a middle position between the two.

The first, who say that she cooperated only in the furnishing of the material principle (*First opinion*), are moved by this reason: that, as the Philosopher says[^12], the mother in the generation of the offspring holds herself as the material principle, and the seed of the man as the effective and operative one. Hence the man's seed is compared to the woman's seed as the craftsman to the matter, while the woman does nothing but furnish the matter and foster it externally. And all this the Virgin Mary did; and therefore she is truly to be called mother, because nothing was lacking to her that pertains to a true mother in the generation of the offspring. And the Holy Spirit supplied what was lacking on the part of the man. — But this position says too little (*It is not proved*): first, because the mother in generation has not only a *passive* power, but[^13] an *active* one; hence sometimes the offspring resembles the mother more than the father. Hence what the natural philosophers say is to be understood by *appropriation*[^14]. And again the Damascene says that the Holy Spirit gave the Virgin not only a *receptive* power, but also a *generative* one; and as was shown before[^15], on account of matter alone one is not to be called a mother, as is plain in the formation of woman from the rib of the man.

And since this position says far too little, therefore there are others (*Second opinion*) who add to it and say that she cooperated with the Holy Spirit not only by furnishing the *material principle*, but also in the *inducing of the ultimate form*. For in the *whole* operation she could not cooperate, since the instantaneous formation of the body, inasmuch as formation comprehends the whole transmutation, cannot be brought about except by an infinite power. But in the inducing of the ultimate form[^16] she could cooperate, in that the ultimate form can be induced in an instant by nature, or by a created power; and therefore in this, in which she could, the generative power of the Virgin cooperated with the Holy Spirit, and to that extent she is called mother, because she operated the conception both as to its *beginning* and as to its *completion*. — But this position says too much (*It is not proved, for three reasons*): first, because to the same [thing] belongs *to have been made* whose it is *to be made*[^17]; but if to *effect* the conception is not within a created power, but an uncreated one, likewise neither is the *having been conceived* itself. — Again, that which induces the ultimate form is nobler than that which *prepares*. It does not therefore seem fitting that the Holy Spirit should *prepare* by himself, and *induce* the ultimate form together with the Virgin. — Nonetheless it is difficult to assign which is that ultimate form, in whose inducing the generative power of the Virgin cooperates. For that[^18] cannot be the *soul*, since it has its origin from creation alone; nor *bodily organization*, as it seems, because that is not induced suddenly, but through succession by nature; for it is induced through *motion*, not through *change*; « for *motion* is successive transmutation; *change*, instantaneous », as the Philosopher says[^19].
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And since the first opinion says too little, and the second exceeds too much (*Third and middle opinion*), by their deviations they direct us into the way of truth. And therefore those seem to think better who hold the *middle* (*Second conclusion*), namely that the blessed Virgin had a power divinely given to her, by which she administered matter to that conception, matter, I say, which had not only the character of *matter* or of passive power, but also *sufficiency and power* for the production of the offspring. That power, however, could not by itself proceed to the perfect act except through succession in time; but since it was not fitting that the flesh of Christ be formed successively, as was shown in the preceding[^20]; therefore the Holy Spirit by his infinite power produced that matter to the complete act. And by this nothing is detracted from the Virgin, if God by his power accelerated what in other women he produces successively into *being*. — For (*Corollary*) there was not less power in the Virgin than in another woman, indeed much greater, because she had a *natural* and a *supernatural* power, through which she could furnish the matter by herself alone as much as a woman joined to a man; hence the whole substance of Christ was from his mother. And therefore, if we wish to think and speak rightly, the Virgin was the mother of Christ in a truer manner than any mother is of her son[^21]. Hence also through that power she fostered him in her womb for nine months.

And so it is plain that the Virgin Mary in some way cooperated in the conception of the Son, namely by furnishing sufficient matter with an active power[^22], which power, however, was accelerated beyond its own capacity and brought to completion through the infinite power. — And (*It is confirmed*) sacred Scripture is in agreement with this[^23], which now says Christ to be *born of the Virgin*, now says him to be *made*. The word of the Damascene also agrees, who says that she had a power *receptive* of the Word and *generative*: *generative*, because she could administer the seed-bed to the body through the power conferred upon her by divine gift; but *receptive*, because the Word of God alone could form the assumed flesh in an instant, which Word indeed was received by the Virgin. — Therefore the reasons showing that the Virgin in some way cooperated[^24] in the conception of the Son of God are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected concerning the Gloss on that word *made* (*Solution of the contrary arguments*), the response is already plain. For this does not exclude a true generative power from the Virgin, but posits that there was in it some power above the power of nature[^25]; hence it removes the commixture of the man's seed, and therefore he is so called *made* that nonetheless he is called *born*. And it is similar, as if God should give to one dry rod the power of germinating which a green one has, and besides this should make it fructify in an instant; that rod would be said to have made and borne the fruit[^26], and nonetheless that fruit would be said to be made from that rod, so that at the same time it would be said *made* and *sprung forth*. And so it is to be understood in the matter at hand, for such a figure of this conception went before in the rod.

2. To that which is objected concerning the Damascene, that he made that flesh by *creating*, not by *sowing seed*; it must be said that just as by the act of *creation* he does not intend to say that that flesh was made from *nothing*, but that[^27] it was brought to perfection by an infinite power; so also by this, that he says *not sowing seed*, he does not deprive the Virgin of an active power, but removes the accustomed manner of nature's operating, which is through the commixture of the seed of male and female. — But whether the Virgin, stirred up by the Holy Spirit, emitted seed (*A noteworthy reply to an incidental question*), that is[^28], emitted seed to the place of the womb: although some have asserted [this], that word is not to be turned over frequently on the lips, both because it has a baseness attached to it, and a man ought to have clean lips in such a matter; and also because it does not have certainty of itself, nor does it seem much in harmony with the words of the Saints. Hence it is foolish in such matters to wish to treat each point so curiously. Let it suffice, however, to have said this, namely that the Virgin administered matter apt for the generation of the Son of God according to the flesh.

3. To that which is objected, that he was not in her according to a seminal account; it must be said that it is true, if that be called a seminal account according to which nature is accustomed to operate; for thus Augustine takes it there[^29] (*Note*). From this, however, it is not excluded that some power beyond the customary manner was divinely conferred upon the Virgin. Moreover, by reason still of that active power it ought not to be said to have been there according to a seminal account, in that it was brought to the perfect act through a power above nature; and with respect to such a manner of operating there was there only a power of *obedience*. And it is similar (*A similar case*): if God after[^30] the commixture of male and female in an instant brings the foetus to the completion of perfect organization<!-- page 113 -->, such a formation would not be said to be made according to a *seminal account*, although there were there an *active power* with respect to such organization to be brought into *being* through succession of time; so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

4. To the last reason it must be said that that reason does not compel [the conclusion] that the Virgin Mary did not cooperate with the Holy Spirit in some way in the conception of the Son, but only that she did not cooperate in producing[^31] that matter into complete being; and this is what was first granted. And by this the response to the objections is plain.

la: Supra d. III. c. 1. In fine arg. post *sed* edd. addunt *et*.

en: Above, d. III, c. 1. At the end of the argument, after *sed* the editions add *et*.

la: Cfr. Matth. I, 18, et infra q. 3.

en: Cf. Matthew 1:18, and below, q. 3.

la: Vide Breviar. Roman., fest. Nativ. Dom. 2. antiph. ad Laudes. Cfr. Coelius Sedul., II. Carm. Pasch. 63. — Quoad minorem nota, quod Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.) docet, *generare* esse « facere aliud quale ipsum », in conclusione plurimi codd. omittunt *vis*, pro quo cod. K (a secunda manu) exhibet *virtus*; cod. T omittit *vis Virginis*.

en: See the Roman Breviary, feast of the Nativity of the Lord, 2nd antiphon at Lauds. Cf. Caelius Sedulius, II Carmen Paschale 63. — As to the minor premise, note that Aristotle, II de Anima, text 34 (c. 4), teaches that *to generate* is « to make another like itself »; in the conclusion most codices omit *vis*, for which cod. K (in a second hand) gives *virtus*; cod. T omits *vis Virginis*.

la: Quae tamen oritur ex generatione. Cfr. verba Aristot. in praeced. nota allegata. — Post *habuit se* cod. U addit *ibi*.

en: Which nonetheless arises from generation. Cf. the words of Aristotle cited in the preceding note. — After *habuit se* cod. U adds *ibi*.

la: Vers. 8. De virga Aaron cfr. Serm. 245. (alias 3. de Tempore) in appendice Serm. August. n. 3; Bernard., Serm. infra Oct. assumt. B. M. V. n. 8. — Circa finem arg. pro *fuit igitur* edd. *fuit etiam*. Subinde post *ergo videtur* codd. K Z subdunt *quod*, quam voculam Vat. ponit post *multo fortius*. Cod. S post *multo fortius* inserit *in figurato, scilicet*.

en: Verse 8. On the rod of Aaron, cf. Sermon 245 (otherwise 3 de Tempore) in the appendix of Augustine's Sermons, n. 3; Bernard, Sermon within the Octave of the Assumption of the B. V. Mary, n. 8. — Near the end of the argument, for *fuit igitur* the editions [read] *fuit etiam*. Then after *ergo videtur* codd. K Z subjoin *quod*, which little word the Vatican edition places after *multo fortius*. Cod. S after *multo fortius* inserts *in figurato, scilicet*.

la: Vers. 4. — Locus e primo cap. ad Rom. cit. est v. 3. — Glossa quae est etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, sumta est ex Quaestion. ex nov. Test. p. II. q. 42. (inter opera August.).

en: Verse 4. — The passage cited from the first chapter to the Romans is v. 3. — The Gloss, which is also here in the text of the Master, c. 3, is taken from the Questions on the New Testament, p. II, q. 42 (among the works of Augustine).

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 2. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1. — In conclus. pro *in qua* codd. AKLTUVXZ aa bb *in quo*.

en: Book III de Fide orthodoxa c. 2. See above, the text of the Master, d. III, c. 1. — In the conclusion, for *in qua* codd. AKLTUVXZ aa bb [read] *in quo*.

la: Ut dicit August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 35. (*tantum* i. e. non secundum rationem seminalem). — In prima conclusione post *substantiam* cod. U adiicit *tantum*.

en: As Augustine says, X de Genesi ad litteram c. 20 n. 35 (*only*, i.e. not according to a seminal account). — In the first conclusion, after *substantiam* cod. U adds *tantum*.

la: Dist. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *produci* permulti codd. perperam *producere*.

en: Dist. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — Soon, for *produci* very many codices wrongly [read] *producere*.

la: Codd. FK (Z a prima manu) subiungunt *quidem*.

en: Codd. FK (Z in a first hand) subjoin *quidem*.

la: Cod. N *Alii dicunt*. Mox post *ultimae formae* codd. M O addunt *filii*.

en: Cod. N [reads] *Alii dicunt*. Soon, after *ultimae formae*, codd. M O add *filii*.

la: Libr. I. de Generat. animal. c. 2. et 20. — Paulo superius pro *ministratione* codd. K Z bb habent *subministratione*, et aliquanto inferius, in fine sententiae Aristot., Vat. pro *exterius fovere* substituit *ulterius fovere*.

en: Book I de Generatione animalium c. 2 and 20. — A little above, for *ministratione* codd. K Z bb have *subministratione*, and somewhat below, at the end of the sentence of Aristotle, the Vatican edition substitutes *ulterius fovere* for *exterius fovere*.

la: Cod. Z adiicit *etiam*, edd. *et*.

en: Cod. Z adds *etiam*, the editions *et*.

la: Sive non exclusive, sed principaliter tantum. Cfr. de his II. Sent. d. 20. q. 6. — Pro *physici* Vat. *philosophi*. Paulo ante pro *quandoque* codd. K Z bb *aliquando*.

en: Or not exclusively, but principally only. Cf. concerning these matters II Sent. d. 20. q. 6. — For *physici* the Vatican edition [reads] *philosophi*. A little before, for *quandoque* codd. K Z bb [read] *aliquando*.

la: In fundam. 1. et 5.

en: In the foundations [i.e. arguments] 1 and 5.

la: Pro *formae* plurimi codd. *formationis*; lectio corrupta.

en: For *formae* most codices [read] *formationis*; a corrupt reading.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 27. (VI. c. 8.), et VI. Phys. text. 59. (c. 6.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 27 (VI, c. 8), and VI Physics text 59 (c. 6).

la: Cod. H omittit *enim*, pro quo codd. Z bb *autem*, multi alii codd. *tamen*. Subinde codd. K bb *nec organizatio* pro *non organizatio*.

en: Cod. H omits *enim*, for which codd. Z bb [read] *autem*, many other codices *tamen*. Then codd. K bb [read] *nec organizatio* for *non organizatio*.

la: Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. seqq., tres quidem species transmutationis distinguit: motum (i. e. transmutationem ex subiecto in subiectum), generationem (i. e. transmutationem ex non-subiecto in subiectum) et corruptionem (i. e. transmutationem ex subiecto in non-subiectum); sed duas ulteriores species communi nomine *mutationis* complectitur, quare et duae tantum species transmutationis notantur, nempe motus et mutatio, quae secundum communem commentatorum explicationem ita inter se distinguuntur, quod motus significet transmutationem successivam, mutatio vero instantaneam. Ad motum pertinent alteratio, augmentatio, diminutio et loci mutatio. Cfr. Scot. in V. Phys. q. 1. — Vat. vocabulo *mutatio* praefigit *non*, sententiam Aristot. sic corrumpens.

en: Aristotle, V Physics text 7 ff., distinguishes indeed three species of transmutation: motion (i.e. transmutation from subject to subject), generation (i.e. transmutation from non-subject to subject), and corruption (i.e. transmutation from subject to non-subject); but he embraces the two latter species under the common name of *change*, whence only two species of transmutation are noted, namely motion and change, which according to the common explanation of the commentators are so distinguished from one another that motion signifies successive transmutation, but change instantaneous. To motion belong alteration, increase, diminution, and change of place. Cf. Scotus in V Physics q. 1. — The Vatican edition prefixes *non* to the word *change*, thus corrupting the opinion of Aristotle.

la: Dist. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — In seqq. Vat. cum edd. 1, 2 *perduxit* et *perducit* pro *produxit* et *producit*, refragantibus plurimis codd. Paulo ante cod. N *sic decebat* pro *decebat*.

en: Dist. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — In what follows, the Vatican edition with edd. 1, 2 [reads] *perduxit* and *perducit* for *produxit* and *producit*, against very many codices. A little before, cod. N [reads] *sic decebat* for *decebat*.

la: Codd. H K Z *quam mulier filii sui*.

en: Codd. H K Z [read] *quam mulier filii sui*.

la: Edd. perperam *virtuti activae*. Paulo ante cod. U voci *Filii* adiicit *sui*.

en: The editions wrongly [read] *virtuti activae*. A little before, cod. U adds *sui* to the word *Filii*.

la: Matth. I, 16; Gal. 4, 4. — Aliquanto inferius post *cor*[*pori*] Vat. supplet *Christi*. Subinde pro *a Virgine* cod. Z *de Virgine*.

en: Matthew 1:16; Galatians 4:4. — Somewhat below, after *cor*[*pori*] the Vatican edition supplies *Christi*. Then for *a Virgine* cod. Z [reads] *de Virgine*.

la: Codd. A G L T V aa et edd. 1, 2 *cooperantem*.

en: Codd. A G L T V aa and edd. 1, 2 [read] *cooperantem*.

la: Vat., in initio propos. pro *Hoc* substituto *Haec*, ante *vim naturae* ingerit *naturam seu supra*. Paulo inferius pro *nihilominus* edd. 1, 2 perperam *nullo modo*.

en: The Vatican edition, at the beginning of the proposition having substituted *Haec* for *Hoc*, inserts *naturam seu supra* before *vim naturae*. A little below, for *nihilominus* edd. 1, 2 wrongly [read] *nullo modo*.

la: Codd. M O *accelerasse*. In fine solut. Vat. voci *virga* annectit *Aaron*.

en: Codd. M O [read] *accelerasse*. At the end of the solution the Vatican edition attaches *Aaron* to the word *virga*.

la: In codd. A F G H L N T U V aa deest *quod*.

en: In codd. A F G H L N T U V aa *quod* is lacking.

la: Pro *hoc est* codd. A Z *et*, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *hoc, et*.

en: For *hoc est* codd. A Z [read] *et*, other codices and edd. 1, 2 [read] *hoc, et*.

la: Libr. X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 38. Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, praesertim ad 2, et II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Book X de Genesi ad litteram c. 20 n. 38. Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, especially in reply to the 2nd [objection], and II Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Vat. *per*, et mox *perduceret* pro *perducit*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *per*, and soon *perduceret* for *perducit*.

la: Vat. *perducendo*. Mox pro *et hoc est quod* codd. K Z *et hoc quidem*, alii codd. *et hoc quod*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *perducendo*. Soon, for *et hoc est quod* codd. K Z [read] *et hoc quidem*, other codices *et hoc quod*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum beata Virgo vere sit Mater Christi, communiter docent theologi, eandem ad generationem Christi, licet singularissimo miraculo factam, praestitisse saltem totum illum concursum, quem matres communiter praestant ad generationem filiorum. Quod hic concursus comprehendat ministrationem materiae ad formandum corpus aliaque quaedam, quae conceptionem sequuntur, exploratum est. Utrum autem mulier etiam *active* concurrat ad ipsam generationem, est quaestio ad physiologiam spectans, nec hoc loco ratione dignitatis sublimissimi mysterii a theologo distinctius discutienda, cum homo habere debeat in tali materia munda labia, ut bene dicitur hic in solut. ad 2. Sufficiat notasse, de illa generali quaestione physiologica iam inter antiquos fuisse dissidium, cum Aristoteles sustineat, matres in ipsa generatione humana non concurrere active, sed tantum passive, ministrando materiam, dum econtra Galenus vult, etiam active easdem concurrere. — In proposita quaestione S. Thom., qui hic in Comment. quatuor recenset opiniones, sequitur sententiam Aristotelis docens, in principali actione sive in ipsa conceptione nihil active B. Virginem operatam esse. Idem tenent B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R. et etiam Richard. a Med. Aliter sentit S. Bonav., Alex. Hal., Scot. (qui diffuse has opiniones discutit), Biel aliique non pauci, qui aliquem concursum etiam *activum*, sed subordinatum principali operationi Spiritus S., gloriosae Matri tribuendum esse putant. In modo autem hanc sententiam explicandi iidem non eandem ingrediuntur viam, cum etiam diversae opiniones de vi activa, materiae concreata in solutionem influant, de quo cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. Ceterum sententia media via incedens, quam tenet S. Bonav., videtur satis esse probabilis.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 8. m. 1. q. incid. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 32. a. 4. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 3. a. 11. et 22. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 3. a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

**III.** In seq. quaestione, supposita ista cooperatione activa, quaerit S. Bonav., utrum eadem sit naturalis, an miraculosa. Similem fere quaestionem habet etiam B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 3. a. 12. Sed S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 2.), cum talem cooperationem non admittat, non de cooperatione B. Virginis, sed de ipsa generatione Christi ex Virgine eandem instituit quaestionem, scilicet utrum haec sit naturalis, an miraculosa. Ad hanc idem respondet, quod generatio ista, simpliciter loquendo, sit miraculosa, at naturalis secundum quid. Eandem quaestionem et similem solutionem habent Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Since the blessed Virgin is truly the Mother of Christ, theologians commonly teach that she furnished to the generation of Christ — though brought about by a most singular miracle — at least all that concurrence which mothers commonly furnish to the generation of their sons. That this concurrence comprehends the furnishing of matter for forming the body and certain other things which follow upon conception, has been established. But whether the woman also concurs *actively* in the generation itself is a question pertaining to physiology, and not to be discussed here more distinctly by the theologian, by reason of the dignity of the most sublime mystery, since a man ought to have clean lips in such a matter, as is well said here in the solution to the second [objection]. Let it suffice to have noted that concerning that general physiological question there was already disagreement among the ancients, since Aristotle maintains that mothers do not concur actively in human generation itself, but only passively, by furnishing the matter, while on the contrary Galen holds that they concur also actively. — In the question proposed, S. Thom., who here in the Commentary reviews four opinions, follows the opinion of Aristotle, teaching that in the principal action, or in the conception itself, the B. Virgin did nothing actively. The same is held by B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., and also Richard a Med. Otherwise think S. Bonav., Alex. Hal., Scotus (who discusses these opinions at length), Biel, and not a few others, who hold that some concurrence, even *active*, but subordinated to the principal operation of the Holy Spirit, is to be attributed to the glorious Mother. But in the manner of explaining this opinion they do not enter upon the same way, since different opinions concerning the active power concreated in the matter also flow into the solution, on which cf. II Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. For the rest, the middle opinion proceeding by a middle way, which S. Bonav. holds, seems to be sufficiently probable.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 8. m. 1. q. incid. 2. — Scot., in either Writing here q. unica. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 32. a. 4. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 3. a. 11. and 22. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 3. a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

**III.** In the following question, supposing this active cooperation, S. Bonav. asks whether the same be natural or miraculous. B. Albert too has nearly a similar question, III. Sent. d. 3. a. 12. But S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 2.), since he does not admit such cooperation, sets up the same question not concerning the cooperation of the B. Virgin, but concerning the generation itself of Christ from the Virgin, namely whether this be natural or miraculous. To this he replies the same, that that generation, speaking simply, is miraculous, but natural in a certain respect. The same question and a similar solution are had by Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard a Med., loc. cit. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit. q. 3.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 110–113 (PDF 132–135; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 8146–8387 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). The short ARTICULUS III opener (`Consequenter quaeritur … circa hoc quaeruntur tria`, raw 8150) plus its 3-question TRACTATIO is folded into this q1 chunk per the locked chunking convention (no standalone divisio chunk). Alignment **PASS**: header + opener (`Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in illa conceptione aliquid Virgo Maria fuerit Spiritui sancto cooperata`) concern *whether the Virgin cooperated with the Holy Spirit* — q1, not q2 (*naturalis vel miraculosa*) and not q3 (*Dei genitrix appellanda*).

**Page-split map (apparatus, 31 entries).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page:
- **p.110** (running head `110 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): footer notes 1–8 → `[^1]`–`[^8]`. Holds ART. III opener + 3-q TRACTATIO, q1 header, args 1–6 (with marginal *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*), Sed contra 1–2, start of arg 3.
- **p.111** (`DIST. IV. ART. III. QUAEST. I.` / `QUAEST. I. 111`): footer notes 1–11 → `[^9]`–`[^19]`. Holds Sed contra 3 tail + arg 4, Conclusio blockquote, Respondeo opening, *Sententia 1* (with *Non probatur*), *Sententia 2* (with *Non probatur ob 3 rationes*). Note 11 (`Aristot., V. Phys. …`) physically spills its tail onto p.112's footer area but is keyed `[^19]` on p.111.
- **p.112** (`112 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): footer notes 1–11 → `[^20]`–`[^30]`. Holds *Sententia 3 et media* / *Conclusio 2*, *Corollarium*, *Confirmatur*, and Solutio oppositorum repl. 1–3 (with marginal *Solutio oppositorum*, *Ad quaestionem incidentem notabilis responsio*, *Notandum*, *Simile*).
- **p.113** (`DIST. IV. ART. III. QUAEST. II.` running head — the head jumps to QUAEST. II because q2 begins lower on the page, but the top of p.113 still belongs to q1): **footer note 1 only → `[^31]`** (keys q1's `in producendo¹`). p.113 footer notes 2–4 (Fulgentius / *Virginem* variant / Vat. *pro eo quod*) belong to **q2** and are NOT taken here. Holds Solutio repl. 3 tail + repl. 4, then the SCHOLION §I–III.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. q1 carries its own SCHOLION §I–III at the foot of p.113 (raw 8359). §I = doctrinal survey (Aristotle/Galen physiology dispute; opinion-tally of S. Thom./Albert/Petr. a Tar./Aegid./Richard against active cooperation vs S. Bonav./Alex. Hal./Scot./Biel for a subordinate active concurrence; S. Bonav.'s media via judged probable). §II = parallel-loci list. §III **forward-covers q2** (*In seq. quaestione, supposita ista cooperatione activa, quaerit S. Bonav., utrum eadem sit naturalis, an miraculosa*) — so expect q2 (`bon-sent-III-d4-a3-q2`) to have NO own scholion, forward-covered by this §III.

**Footer hand-off forwarded to d4-a3-q2.** No shared footer flows across the q1→q2 body boundary in the sense of carried notes: q1 consumes p.113 footer note 1 only; **p.113 footer notes 2–4 belong to q2** (note 2 = Fulgent., de Fide ad Petr. c. 2 n. 14, keys q2 arg 1 *filius naturalis*; note 3 = *Virginem* / *fortius* variant; note 4 = Vat. *pro eo quod, licet virtutes naturales omnes colla*[*tae*]…). q2 opens on p.113 R-col (`Secundo quaeritur, utrum illa cooperatio beatae Virginis fuerit naturalis, an miraculosa`) with marginal *Ad oppositum*; it begins its footer pickup at p.113 note 2.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses (not anchors), per convention: *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum* (×1 on p.110), *Conclusio 1*, *De modo cooperationis 3 sententiae*, *Sententia 1*, *Non probatur*, *Sententia 2*, *Non probatur ob 3 rationes*, *Sententia 3 et media*, *Conclusio 2*, *Corollarium*, *Confirmatur*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Ad quaestionem incidentem notabilis responsio*, *Notandum*, *Simile*.

**[?] flags:** none. The OCR-damaged Respondeo/Solutio regions and all four page footers were fully resolved from the 450 dpi column bands.