title: Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Pro quo quis debeat excommunicari.*

Secundo quaeritur, pro quo quis debeat excommunicari, et quaeritur, utrum pro damno vel pro iniuria illata Ecclesiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Si quis enim frangit vel incendit ecclesiam, excommunicatus est ipso iure[^1], non autem, si aliam domum frangeret: ergo etc.

2. Item, si quis percutit clericum, excommunicatus est ipso iure et incidit in canonem latae sententiae[^2]; sed non incidit, si percutit laicum saecularem: ergo si ius recte dictat, videtur, quod pro iniuria etiam sibi illata possit Ecclesia excommunicare.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia gladius unicuique datur ad defensionem; sed potestas excommunicandi est gladius spiritualis[^3]: ergo, potestate excommunicandi potest Ecclesia se defendere et contra damnum et contra iniuriam.

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4. Item, iustum est, unumquemque puniri in eo, in quo peccat[^4]: ergo si peccat in matrem Ecclesiam inferendo *damnum* et *iniuriam*, iustum est, ut perdat eius beneficia et suffragia; sed hoc est excommunicari: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Excommunicatio sive anathematizatio est maledictio; sed dicitur ad Romanos duodecimo[^5]: *Benedicite maledicentibus vos; benedicite et nolite maledicere:* ergo maledicentibus vel male facientibus non debet Ecclesia maledicere: ergo nec eos excommunicare.

2. Item, excommunicatio est beneficiorum subtractio; sed Deus non subtrahit misericordiam et beneficia ab iis qui offendunt ipsum: ergo si praeceptum est ecclesiasticis viris, ut sint misericordes et *perfecti, sicut Pater caelestis, qui facit solem oriri super bonos et malos,* sicut dicitur Matthaei quinto[^6]: ergo non debet Ecclesia haec subtrahere propter *damnum* vel *iniuriam* aliquam sibi factam.

3. Item, in excommunicationibus damnificatur homo in spiritualibus; sed improportionaliter maius est damnum in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus; sed si quis incendit vel fregit ecclesiam, vel percussit clericum, vel aliquod tale, non damnificavit nisi in temporalibus: ergo cum non debeat infligi maior poena, quam sit damnum; videtur, quod propter hoc non deberet excommunicari.

4. Item, Ecclesia militans debet imitari triumphantem; sed dicitur in canonica Iudae[^7] quod *cum Michael altercaretur de corpore Moysi, non est ausus iudicium inferre blasphemiae, sed dixit: Imperet tibi Dominus:* ergo videtur pari ratione, quod Ecclesia nullum altercantem cum ipsa debeat excommunicare sive anathematizare.

> **Conclusio.** Pro damno vel iniuria potest quidem excommunicationis sententia dictari et etiam emenda a iudice, sed non principaliter propter hoc.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod duplex est excommunicatio sive excommunicandi modus. Quaedam enim excommunicatio est *a iure*, quaedam *a iudice*. Prima excommunicatio est *praeservativa*, secunda est *curativa*. Prima excommunicatio, etsi fieri videatur ad conservandam libertatem ecclesiasticam, sicut secunda fieri videtur propter emendam; tamen prima principaliori modo fertur ad cavendam culpam; quia magna culpa est et multum gravis, quando quis peccat in Ecclesiam. — Similiter secunda principaliori modo fit ad *frangendam contumaciam*; et ideo talis secundum formam iuris nulli debet infligi nisi contumaci, et ideo debet monitio praemitti, ut sic de contumacia convincatur. *Contumax* autem dicitur qui semel et bis monitus, tertio peremptorie citatus, non comparet; aut si comparet, non vult stare iuri; vel quando offensa est manifesta, vel iussus a iudice, non vult emendare[^8]. Tali autem competit haec medicina, sicut in primo problemate visum est. — Ex his patent rationes ad utramque partem.

Concedo enim, quod pro *damno vel iniuria* potest excommunicationis sententia dictari *a iure*, sed non principaliter propter hoc[^9]; et similiter pro emenda potest ferri *a iudice*, sed non principaliter propter hoc[^10], sed propter *contumaciam*.

**Ad fundamenta:** — Rationes ad primam partem ostendunt, quod excommunicatio fertur pro damno.

*Ad 1, 2.* Rationes vero ad oppositum ostendunt, quod non *principaliter* pro damno sed pro peccato; unde Ecclesia maledicit et subtrahit beneficia ob meritum illius, non propter damnum suum, ob illius culpam, non propter vindictam. Si enim ille velit redire et non possit emendare, statim Ecclesia parcet.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Ecclesia damnificat illum in spiritualibus; dicendum, quod Ecclesia non *damnificat*, sed ille qui peccat et est contumax, se ipsum damnificat; sed Ecclesia *ostendit* ipsum damnificatum, ut sic saltem malum suum erubescat et deserat; et si quodam modo magis damnificet[^11], haec aggravatio damni ad utilitatem ipsius finaliter secundum intentionem Ecclesiae ordinatur.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Michael non maledixit; dicendum, quod diabolus est obstinatus in malo et incorrigibilis, et maledictio illata sibi non potest eum nec *per se* nec *per accidens* ordinare ad benedictionem; et ideo nulla fuit[^12] utilitas in maledicendo diabolum. Sed dum Ecclesia maledicit subditum, facit ei confusionem pro peccato; et quia tali confusione potest a peccato resipiscere: ideo maledicit, ut post benedicat, ideo ligat, ut absolvat; et non est simile de hac maledictione et de illa[^13].

---

english:
### Question II. *For what [cause] anyone ought to be excommunicated.*

Secondly it is asked, for what [cause] anyone ought to be excommunicated, and it is asked whether for damage or for injury inflicted on the Church. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. For if anyone breaks into or sets fire to a church, he is excommunicated by the law itself[^1], but not if he were to break into another house: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if anyone strikes a cleric, he is excommunicated by the law itself and incurs the canon of the sentence already passed[^2]; but he does not incur it if he strikes a secular layman: therefore if the law dictates rightly, it seems that the Church can excommunicate also for an injury inflicted on itself.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason*: because a sword is given to each one for defense; but the power of excommunicating is a spiritual sword[^3]: therefore, by the power of excommunicating the Church can defend itself both against damage and against injury.

4. Likewise, it is just that everyone be punished in that in which he sins[^4]: therefore if he sins against his mother the Church by inflicting *damage* and *injury*, it is just that he lose her benefits and suffrages; but this is to be excommunicated: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Excommunication or anathematization is a malediction; but it is said to the Romans, chapter twelve[^5]: *Bless those who curse you; bless and do not curse:* therefore the Church ought not to curse those who curse or do evil: therefore neither [ought it] to excommunicate them.

2. Likewise, excommunication is the subtraction of benefits; but God does not subtract mercy and benefits from those who offend Him: therefore if it is commanded to ecclesiastical men that they be merciful and *perfect, like the heavenly Father, who makes the sun rise upon the good and the evil,* as is said in Matthew the fifth[^6]: therefore the Church ought not to subtract these things on account of any *damage* or *injury* done to it.

3. Likewise, in excommunications a man is damaged in spiritual things; but the damage in spiritual things is disproportionately greater than in temporal things; but if anyone sets fire to or breaks into a church, or strikes a cleric, or [does] some such thing, he has done damage only in temporal things: therefore since a greater penalty ought not to be inflicted than the damage is; it seems that he ought not to be excommunicated on account of this.

4. Likewise, the Church militant ought to imitate the [Church] triumphant; but it is said in the canonical [epistle] of Jude[^7] that *when Michael was disputing about the body of Moses, he did not dare to bring a judgment of blasphemy, but said: May the Lord command you:* therefore it seems by like reason that the Church ought not to excommunicate or anathematize anyone disputing with it.

> **Conclusion.** For damage or injury the sentence of excommunication can indeed be pronounced, and also a penalty [imposed], by a judge, but not principally on account of this.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that excommunication, or the manner of excommunicating, is twofold. For one excommunication is *from the law*, another *from the judge*. The first excommunication is *preservative*, the second is *curative*. The first excommunication, although it seems to be done to preserve ecclesiastical liberty, just as the second seems to be done on account of a penalty; nevertheless the first in a more principal manner is directed to guarding against fault; because it is a great fault and very grave when anyone sins against the Church. — Likewise the second in a more principal manner is done to *break contumacy*; and therefore such [excommunication] according to the form of law ought to be inflicted on none but the contumacious, and therefore an admonition ought to be sent beforehand, so that in this way he may be convicted of contumacy. Now he is called *contumacious* who, admonished once and twice, summoned a third time peremptorily, does not appear; or if he appears, is unwilling to abide by the law; or when the offense is manifest, or when, ordered by the judge, he is unwilling to make amends[^8]. To such a one this medicine is fitting, as was seen in the first problem. — From these things the reasons for both sides are evident.

For I concede that for *damage or injury* the sentence of excommunication can be pronounced *from the law*, but not principally on account of this[^9]; and likewise for a penalty it can be brought *by a judge*, but not principally on account of this[^10], but on account of *contumacy*.

**To the fundamental [arguments]:** — The reasons for the first part show that excommunication is brought for damage.

*To 1, 2.* But the reasons for the opposite show that [it is] not *principally* for damage but for sin; whence the Church curses and subtracts benefits on account of his desert, not on account of its own damage, on account of his fault, not on account of vengeance. For if he should wish to return and cannot make amends, the Church will at once spare [him].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the Church damages him in spiritual things; it must be said that the Church does not *damage*, but he who sins and is contumacious damages himself; but the Church *shows* him to be damaged, so that in this way at least he may blush at his evil and forsake it; and if in some manner it does damage [him] more[^11], this aggravation of the damage is ordered finally to his own profit according to the intention of the Church.

*To 4.* To that, then, which is objected, that Michael did not curse; it must be said that the devil is obstinate in evil and incorrigible, and the malediction inflicted upon him cannot order him either *of itself* or *by accident* to benediction; and therefore there was no[^12] usefulness in cursing the devil. But when the Church curses a subject, it brings confusion upon him on account of his sin; and because by such confusion he can repent of his sin: therefore it curses so that afterward it may bless, therefore it binds so that it may absolve; and there is no likeness between this malediction and that[^13].

---

la: Est participium passivum futurum. — Multi codd. peram *torquentis.* — Alex. Hal., loc. cit., legit: *aut protectionem subtrahendo et tortori exponendo, aut iubendo.* Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. in fine. Verba *tradere tortori* respiciunt Matth. 18, 34: *Tradidit eum tortoribus.*

en: It is a future passive participle. — Many codices [read] perversely *of the torturer.* — Alexander of Hales, in the cited place, reads: *either by withdrawing protection and exposing [him] to the torturer, or by commanding [it].* Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6, at the end. The words *to hand over to the torturer* refer to Matthew 18:34: *He handed him over to the torturers.*

la: Vers. 5. — De Glossa, quae est *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum, cfr. Haymo.

en: Verse 5. — Concerning the Gloss, which is the *ordinary* [one] in Strabo and Lyra, cf. Haymo.

la: Cfr. C. *Conquesti sunt nobis* (22.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.) et C. *Si quis ecclesiam igne* (14.), C. 17. q. 4.

en: Cf. the canon *Conquesti sunt nobis* (22), in the Decretals, On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 39), and the canon *Si quis ecclesiam igne* (14), C. 17, q. 4.

la: Respicitur Sap. 11, 17. Vide supra pag. 397, nota 6.

en: Wisdom 11:17 is referred to (*by what things a man sins, by these is he tormented*). See above, p. 397, note 6.

la: Cfr. C. *Visis litteris* (1.), § 1. C. 16. q. 2, ubi excommunicatio vocatur *mucro episcopi.* Vide etiam C. *Inter haec* (6.), C. 33. q. 2. et C. *Dilecto* (6.), de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 11.) in VI.

en: Cf. the canon *Visis litteris* (1), § 1, C. 16, q. 2, where excommunication is called the *bishop's sword.* See also the canon *Inter haec* (6), C. 33, q. 2, and the canon *Dilecto* (6), On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 11), in the Sext.

la: Vers. 48. et 45. — Superius pro *ecclesiasticis* edd. cum pluribus codd. *necessitatis*, pro *viris* codd. I K et *iuris.*

en: Verses 48 and 45. — Above, for *ecclesiastical* the editions with several codices [read] *of necessity*, for *men* codices I, K [read] *and of the law.*

la: Vers. 9: *Cum Michael Archangelus cum diabolo disputans altercaretur* etc.

en: Verse 9: *When Michael the Archangel, disputing with the devil, was contending* etc.

la: Cfr. C. *Nemo episcoporum* (41.) seqq., C. 11. q. 3; C. *De excommunicationis articulo* (15.), et C. *Ecce autem* (18.), C. 24. q. 3; C. *Sacro approbante* (48.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.), et C. *Constitutionem* (9.), de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 11.) in VI.

en: Cf. the canon *Nemo episcoporum* (41) ff., C. 11, q. 3; the canon *De excommunicationis articulo* (15), and the canon *Ecce autem* (18), C. 24, q. 3; the canon *Sacro approbante* (48), in the Decretals, On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 39), and the canon *Constitutionem* (9), On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 11), in the Sext.

la: Ex C. *Si quis suadente diabolo* (29.), C. 17. q. 4. et C. *Non dubium est* (5.) seqq., X. de Sententia excommun.

en: From the canon *Si quis suadente diabolo* (29), C. 17, q. 4, and the canon *Non dubium est* (5) ff., in the Decretals, On the Sentence of Excommunication.

la: In cod. X secunda manus addidit: *sed ad cavendam culpam.* Idem cod. X inferius post *contumaciam* subiungit *frangendam.* Pro *ferri* plures codd. *fieri.*

en: In codex X a second hand added: *but to guard against fault.* The same codex X below, after *contumacy*, adds *to be broken.* For *to be brought* several codices [read] *to be done.*

la: Cod. X addit *aggravando.* Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. in fine.

en: Codex X adds *by aggravating.* Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6, at the end.

la: Cod. K (I a secunda manu) *fuisset.*

en: Codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] *fuisset* ("had been").

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` lines 54210–54342), cross-checked column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF bands for printed pp. 486–487 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p486-{L,R}-*`, `vol4-p487-{L,R}-*`). Running head verified: "DIST. XVIII. P. II. ART. UNICUS QU..EST. II." (p. 487). Offset pdf = printed + 20. Opener confirmed aligned: *Secundo quaeritur, pro quo quis debeat excommunicari* (raw ~54218). Note: the printed title is *Pro quo quis debeat excommunicari* (brief's "...sit excommunicandus" refined to the actual title line).

**Apparatus / page-footer split.** The question opens mid-page on p. 486 and its body fully concludes on p. 487, immediately before QUAESTIO III (which begins at the top of p. 488). Therefore **all** p. 486 footers (5 entries) and **all** p. 487 footers (9 entries) belong to this q2 — 14 Quaracchi footer entries in total, rendered here as the 13 apparatus markers [^1]–[^13] (the two near-identical *ipso iure* canon-notes p.486-f1/f4 are anchored to the two *ipso iure* clauses of fundamenta 1–2; see the [?] note below). This confirms and extends the au-q1 writer's hand-off ("p. 486 footers 4–5 belong to q2"): in fact every p. 486 footer is a q2 fundamenta note, since q2's first marker-bearing fundamentum is the first such on p. 486. Apparatus is ordered by body position. Footer [^13] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is the editors' explicit cross-reference confirming no separate scholion for this question.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. The Articulus Unicus carries a single scholion (§I–VII covering q1–q6); per the chunking convention it is rendered in full with QUAESTIO I (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`). The Quaracchi editors signal this directly in footer [^13]: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question").

**Hand-off to q3 (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q3`).** QUAESTIO III ("A quo possit excommunicatio fieri") begins at the top of printed p. 488 (raw line 54343). Opener: *Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit excommunicatio fieri. Et quod a solo habente clavem, ostenditur sic.* All p. 488 footers belong to q3; none were claimed here.

**[?] flags.** Latin text and English are fully resolved against OCR + PDF bands. One minor apparatus-anchoring ambiguity (not a text ambiguity): p. 486 carries two canon-notes on the *excommunicatus ipso iure* theme — *Est participium...* (f1) and *Si quis suadente diabolo* (f4/here [^9]) — and the two-column OCR bleed makes the exact superscript ↔ clause pairing for these two and for *Conquesti*/*Visis litteris* (arg. 3, *gladius spiritualis*) slightly uncertain. They have been anchored to the nearest matching clause by content; every footer entry is rendered and every marker is paired, so no note is dropped. [?] — confirm exact superscript placement of p.486 f4 (*Si quis suadente*) vs f1 at the next 600 dpi decade-polish pass.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
A quo possit excommunicatio fieri
By whom excommunication can be done

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 488 -->

### Quaestio III. *A quo possit excommunicatio fieri.*

Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit excommunicatio fieri. Et quod a solo habente clavem, ostenditur sic.

1. Solvere et ligare sunt actus clavium; sed «excommunicare est ligare», ut dicit Magister in littera[^p488-1]; sed «cuius est actus, eius est et potentia»: ergo etc.

2. Item, excommunicare est a communione Sacramentorum separare; sed eius est a communione sive a participatione separare, cuius est administrare; sed solus sacerdos, qui habet claves, potest Sacramentum corporis et sanguinis administrare[^p488-2]: ergo solus potest excommunicare.

3. Item, Petro data est potestas ligandi et solvendi in foro iudiciali et poenitentiali; quaero igitur, quando datae fuerunt ei claves[^p488-3]? Non nisi quando? ergo qui non habet claves non habet hanc potestatem.

4. Item, maioris virtutis est et potestatis ligare vinculo excommunicationis quam satisfactionis; sed solus sacerdos potest poenitentiam imponere et confessiones audire, qui habet claves: ergo solus talis potest excommunicare, quia qui non potest in minus non potest in maius[^p488-4].

**Contra:**
1. Iudices delegati habent potentiam excommunicandi[^p488-5]; tamen multi eorum claves non habent, quia non sunt sacerdotes: ergo aliquis potest excommunicare, qui non habet claves. Si tu dicas, quod non sua auctoritate excommunicat; obiicitur tunc de archidiacono, qui ex suo officio causas audit et decidit: ergo excommunicare potest, et tamen, si non est sacerdos, non habet claves. Si tu dicas, quod similiter habet per demandationem vel consuetudinem; quare[^p488-6] non similiter habet actum ligandi in foro poenitentiali per commissionem vel per consuetudinem? Non enim videtur maior ratio in uno quam in alio.

2. Item, electus canonice et approbatus certum est quod, antequam ordinetur in presbyterum, non habet claves, tamen potest causas audire et excommunicare propria auctoritate[^p488-7]: ergo videtur etc.

3. Item, sacerdos parochialis non habet secundum iura potestatem excommunicandi nisi pro furtis et rapinis et consimilibus[^p488-8]; et constat, quod ipse habet claves et usum clavium: ergo excommunicatio non est a potestate clavium.

4. Item, multitudo tota, ut capitulum, excommunicat, ita quod nullus[^p488-9]; sed multitudinem habere claves, ita quod nullus, est impossibile, cum dicat proprietatem absolutam: ergo actus excommunicandi non est a clave.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum multitudo non possit excommunicari, ita quod nullus[^p488-10], quomodo possit excommunicare, ita quod nullus.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Potestas excommunicandi non sequitur praecise claves, sed est in omnibus qui habent iurisdictionem ordinariam in foro iudiciali.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod inter ipsos iuristas[^p488-11] de hac quaestione est controversia. — Quidam enim dixerunt, quod potestas excommunicandi solum est in episcopis. Alii dixerunt, quod non solum est in episcopis, sed etiam in archipresbyteris, archidiaconis et abbatibus et aliis praelatis. Tertii dixerunt, quod hoc competit his et etiam sacerdotibus parochialibus.

Sed licet in hac quaestione canonum sit dicere quia, tamen theologiae est dicere propter quid[^p488-12], tanquam scientiae superioris. Quod enim in Ecclesia aliquis habeat potestatem, hoc est ab ipso Christo, qui potestatem contulit Apostolis et praecipue ipsi Petro. Dominus autem ipsi Petro utramque contulit potestatem, et ligandi et solvendi in foro poeniten<!-- page 489 -->tiali, et ligandi et solvendi in foro iudiciali[^p489-1]. Prima potestas respicit ordinem, secunda praelationem.

Unde secundum primam par potest absolvere parem, secundum secundam non potest par ligare parem nec superiorem; et hoc est, quia illa est ordinis, haec autem praelationis, scilicet potestas excommunicandi.

Prima potestas ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitentiali aditum caeli aperit; et ideo recte dicitur clavis[^p489-2]. Secunda per censuram iudicii subditos coercet; et ideo dicitur gladius. — Prima potestas est potestas arbitrandi inter Deum et hominem, secunda vero inter hominem et hominem; et ideo prima respicit ordinem, secunda praelationem. — Prima potestas, quoniam collata est Petro ut sacerdoti, descendit in omnes sacerdotes, quamvis non omnes habeant exsecutionem[^p489-3]. Secunda, quia collata est Petro, ut praelatus est, descendit in omnes personas ecclesiasticas, quae habent praelationem vel iurisdictionem. Unde qui habent iurisdictionem ordinariam in iudicando aliquos habent potestatem coercendi eos per censuram ecclesiasticam, ut iudicium eorum inviolabiliter observetur. Et quoniam iurisdictionem habent non solum habentes claves, sed etiam non habentes; habent, inquam, vel ex iure, vel ex consuetudine, sicut archidiaconi et aliqua capitula; ideo possunt excommunicare. Rursus, quia aliqui habent claves, qui non habent iurisdictionem in foro iudiciali, ut simplices sacerdotes; ideo non possunt excommunicare nisi per commissionem, vel nisi in casibus determinatis, ut in furto et rapinis. — Concedo ergo rationes probantes, quod haec potestas non sequitur praecise potestatem clavium.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod solvere et ligare sunt actus clavium; dicendum, quod verum est in foro poenitentiali, sed in foro iudiciali non sunt clavium, nisi accipiatur potestas clavium secundum plenitudinem, secundum quem modum dicitur esse in episcopis, qui, quando promoventur a sacerdotio in episcopatum, non recipiunt novam clavem, sed clavis potestatis in eis ampliatur[^p489-4].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eius est excommunicare, cuius est communicationem dare[^p489-5]; dicendum, quod non solum eius est, verum etiam eius qui praeest communitati, vel etiam administranti Sacramenta; et quoniam tales sunt qui habent iurisdictionem, quamvis non habeant claves; ideo etc.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: quando data est haec potestas Petro? dici potest, quod simul data est utraque, quia data est potestas clavis in sua plenitudine. — Vel potest dici, quod non simul, sed potestas clavium promissa fuit Matthaei decimo sexto[^p489-6] et data Ioannis vigesimo: Accipite Spiritum sanctum etc.; potestas vero excommunicandi insinuatur fuisse data Matthaei decimo octavo, ubi, postquam dictum est: Si Ecclesiam non audierit etc., additum est: Amen dico vobis, quodcumque ligaveritis etc.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod hoc est maioris virtutis, scilicet excommunicare; dicendum, quod se habent sicut excedentia et excessa et sunt alterius et alterius ordinationis; et ideo non sequitur, quod qui habet unam potestatem habet aliam; utraque tamen concurrit ad potestatis plenitudinem, et una sine alia esse potest. Pluribus tamen conceditur clavis quam gladius, quia plures habent ordinem sacerdotalem quam praelationem et ecclesiasticam iurisdictionem.

Et si quaeratur ratio huius, duplex est. Una est diffusio boni, quia potestas clavium est ad reconciliandum, potestas gladii ad compellendum. — Alia ratio est vitatio periculi, quia pauci sunt, qui sciant hoc ense percutere; ideo propter periculum paucorum manibus tradi debuit. Ideo etiam solemnem excommunicationem[^p489-7], quae fit cum candelis prius accensis et deinde exstinctis, et pulsatis campanis, oportet a solis episcopis fieri, licet aliae possint ab aliis fieri.

Ad illud quod quaeritur ultimo: quare congregatio sive multitudo potest excommunicare, ita quod nullus, et non excommunicari? dicendum, quod peccata multitudinis nulla sunt, sed iurisdictio multitudinis nonnulla est. Et si tu quaeras: unde hoc est? dicendum, quod multitudo bene facit ad augmentum potentiae in excellentia — unde multitudo potest trahere navem, ita quod nullus trahit navem per se — sed multitudo, in quantum huiusmodi, non facit defectum nec impotentiam virium[^p489-8]; unde multitudo non trahitur, quin quilibet de multitudine trahatur. Sic tota multitudo excommunicat, ita quod nullus; non sic excommunicatur, ad minus secundum nova iura[^p489-9], ut iuristae dicunt.

english:
### Question III. *By whom excommunication can be done.*

Thirdly it is asked, by whom excommunication can be done. And that it can be done only by one having a key is shown thus.

1. To loose and to bind are acts of the keys; but "to excommunicate is to bind," as the Master says in the text[^p488-1]; but "whose is the act, his too is the power": therefore etc.

2. Likewise, to excommunicate is to separate from the communion of the Sacraments; but it belongs to him to separate from communion or from participation whose it is to administer; but only the priest, who has the keys, can administer the Sacrament of the body and blood[^p488-2]: therefore only he can excommunicate.

3. Likewise, to Peter was given the power of binding and loosing in the judicial and the penitential forum; I ask, therefore, when were the keys given to him[^p488-3]? Only when? therefore he who does not have the keys does not have this power.

4. Likewise, it is of greater virtue and power to bind with the bond of excommunication than [with the bond] of satisfaction; but only the priest can impose penance and hear confessions, who has the keys: therefore only such a one can excommunicate, because he who cannot do the lesser cannot do the greater[^p488-4].

**On the contrary:**
1. Delegated judges have the power of excommunicating[^p488-5]; yet many of them do not have the keys, because they are not priests: therefore someone can excommunicate who does not have the keys. If you say that he does not excommunicate by his own authority, then the objection is made about the archdeacon, who by his office hears and decides cases: therefore he can excommunicate, and yet, if he is not a priest, he does not have the keys. If you say that he likewise has [this] by delegation or by custom; why[^p488-6] does he not likewise have the act of binding in the penitential forum by commission or by custom? For there does not seem to be a greater reason in the one than in the other.

2. Likewise, one canonically elected and approved is certainly such that, before he is ordained a priest, he does not have the keys, yet he can hear cases and excommunicate by his own authority[^p488-7]: therefore it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the parish priest does not according to the laws have the power of excommunicating except for thefts and robberies and the like[^p488-8]; and it is established that he has the keys and the use of the keys: therefore excommunication is not from the power of the keys.

4. Likewise, a whole multitude, as a chapter, excommunicates, so that no one [individually does][^p488-9]; but that a multitude should have the keys, so that no one [individually does], is impossible, since it states an absolute property: therefore the act of excommunicating is not from a key.

Alongside this it is asked: since a multitude cannot be excommunicated, so that no one [individually is excommunicated][^p488-10], how can it excommunicate, so that no one [individually does]?

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The power of excommunicating does not follow precisely upon the keys, but is in all who have ordinary jurisdiction in the judicial forum.

**I respond:** It must be said that among the jurists themselves[^p488-11] there is a controversy about this question. — For some said that the power of excommunicating is only in bishops. Others said that it is not only in bishops, but also in archpriests, archdeacons and abbots and other prelates. A third group said that this belongs to these and also to parish priests.

But although in this question it belongs to the canons to say the "that," nevertheless it belongs to theology to say the "why"[^p488-12], as to the higher science. For that anyone in the Church has power, this is from Christ himself, who conferred the power on the Apostles and especially on Peter himself. But the Lord conferred on Peter himself both powers, both of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, and of binding and loosing in the judicial forum[^p489-1]. The first power regards order, the second prelacy.

Hence according to the first an equal can absolve an equal, according to the second an equal cannot bind an equal nor a superior; and this is because the former belongs to order, the latter to prelacy, namely the power of excommunicating.

The first power, of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, opens the entrance of heaven; and therefore it is rightly called a key[^p489-2]. The second by the censure of judgment coerces subjects; and therefore it is called a sword. — The first power is the power of arbitrating between God and man, the second between man and man; and therefore the first regards order, the second prelacy. — The first power, since it was conferred on Peter as a priest, descends to all priests, although not all have its execution[^p489-3]. The second, because it was conferred on Peter as he is a prelate, descends to all ecclesiastical persons who have prelacy or jurisdiction. Hence those who have ordinary jurisdiction in judging some have the power of coercing them by ecclesiastical censure, so that their judgment may be inviolably observed. And since not only those having the keys have jurisdiction, but also those not having them — they have it, I say, either by law or by custom, as archdeacons and certain chapters; therefore they can excommunicate. Again, because some have the keys who do not have jurisdiction in the judicial forum, as simple priests; therefore they cannot excommunicate except by commission, or except in determined cases, as in theft and robberies. — I grant therefore the reasons proving that this power does not follow precisely upon the power of the keys.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that to loose and to bind are acts of the keys; it must be said that this is true in the penitential forum, but in the judicial forum they are not [acts] of the keys, unless the power of the keys be taken according to its fullness, in which way it is said to be in bishops, who, when they are promoted from the priesthood to the episcopate, do not receive a new key, but the key of power is enlarged in them[^p489-4].

2. To that which is objected, that it belongs to him to excommunicate whose it is to give communion[^p489-5]; it must be said that it belongs not only to him, but also to him who presides over the community, or also to him administering the Sacraments; and since such are those who have jurisdiction, although they do not have the keys; therefore etc.

3. To that which is asked: when was this power given to Peter? it can be said that both were given at once, because the power of the key was given in its fullness. — Or it can be said that not at once, but the power of the keys was promised in Matthew the sixteenth[^p489-6] and given in John the twentieth: Receive the Holy Spirit etc.; but the power of excommunicating is intimated to have been given in Matthew the eighteenth, where, after it was said: If he will not hear the Church etc., it was added: Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind etc.

4. To that which is objected, that this is of greater virtue, namely to excommunicate; it must be said that they stand as exceeding and exceeded and are of one ordination and another; and therefore it does not follow that he who has the one power has the other; yet both concur toward the fullness of power, and one can exist without the other. Yet the key is granted to more than the sword, because more have the priestly order than [have] prelacy and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

And if the reason for this be asked, it is twofold. One is the diffusion of the good, because the power of the keys is for reconciling, the power of the sword for compelling. — The other reason is the avoidance of danger, because few are those who know how to strike with this sword; therefore on account of the danger it ought to be handed over to the hands of few. For this reason too the solemn excommunication[^p489-7], which is done with candles first lit and then extinguished, and the bells rung, ought to be done only by bishops, although the others can be done by others.

To that which is asked lastly: why can a congregation or multitude excommunicate, so that no one [individually does], and not be excommunicated? it must be said that the sins of a multitude are nothing, but the jurisdiction of a multitude is something. And if you ask: whence is this? it must be said that a multitude does indeed contribute to the increase of power in excellence — whence a multitude can draw a ship, so that no one draws the ship by himself — but a multitude, as such, does not produce defect nor impotence of strength[^p489-8]; whence a multitude is not drawn, unless each one of the multitude is drawn. Thus the whole multitude excommunicates, so that no one [individually does]; it is not so excommunicated, at least according to the new laws[^p489-9], as the jurists say.

la: Hic c. 6. circa finem. — Seq. axioma profert, terminis transpositis, Aristot., *de Somno et vigilia*, c. 1: *Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.*

en: Here ch. 6, near the end. — In what follows he adduces the axiom, with its terms transposed, from Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 1: "For whose is the power, his too is the act."

la: Vide supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. et infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: See above d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, and below d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 and following.

en: Cf. Matthew 16:19 and John 20:23.

la: Vide supra pag. 142, nota 8.

en: See above p. 142, note 8.

la: Cfr. C. *Quaerenti* (26.), X. de Officio et potest. iud. deleg. (lib. I. tit. 29.). Ibid. tit. 23. agitur de Officio archidiaconi.

en: Cf. the chapter *Quaerenti* (26), X, On the Office and Power of a Delegated Judge (bk. I, tit. 29). In the same place, tit. 23, the Office of the Archdeacon is treated.

la: Edd. *quaero: quare.*

en: The editions [read] *quaero* [for] *quare* ["I ask" for "why"].

la: Ex C. *Transmissam* (15.), X. de Electione et electi potest. (lib. I. tit. 6.).

en: From the chapter *Transmissam* (15), X, On Election and the Power of the Elect (bk. I, tit. 6).

la: Ius loquitur non de his casibus, sed generaliter, ut C. *Nemo episcopus, nemo presbyter excommunicet aliquem* (11.), C. 2. q. 1, et C. *Cum ab ecclesiarum praelatis* (3.), X. de Officio iudicis ordinarii (lib. I. tit. 31.), in quo Alexander III. episcopo Florentino praescribit, sententiam interdicti vel excommunicationis a plebano S. Pancratii iuste latam esse observandam.

en: The law speaks not of these cases, but generally, as the chapter *Nemo episcopus, nemo presbyter excommunicet aliquem* (11), C. 2, q. 1, and the chapter *Cum ab ecclesiarum praelatis* (3), X, On the Office of the Ordinary Judge (bk. I, tit. 31), in which Alexander III prescribes to the bishop of Florence that a sentence of interdict or excommunication justly pronounced by the parish priest of St. Pancras is to be observed.

la: Cfr. C. *Episcopali sede vacante* (1.), de Maioritate et obedientia (lib. I. tit. 17.) in VI.

en: Cf. the chapter *Episcopali sede vacante* (1), On Superiority and Obedience (bk. I, tit. 17), in the Sext.

la: Constat ex C. *Romana Ecclesia* (5.), de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 11.) in VI, qui est Innocentii IV; C. *Si habes* (1.), C. 24. q. 3. Cfr. Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum in Matth. 13, 29: *Multitudo non est excommunicanda.*

en: It is established from the chapter *Romana Ecclesia* (5), On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 11), in the Sext, which is of Innocent IV; the chapter *Si habes* (1), C. 24, q. 3. Cf. the *Glossa ordinaria* in Strabus on Matthew 13:29: "A multitude is not to be excommunicated."

la: Cod. 1 *iurisperitos.*

en: Codex 1 [reads] *iurisperitos* ["legal experts"].

la: De *quia* (si res est sive de facto) et *propter quid* cfr. Aristot., II. Poster. c. 1. seq. c. 9. (c. 8.) seq.

en: On the "that" (whether the thing is, that is, the fact) and the "why" cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, c. 1 and following, c. 9 (c. 8) and following.

la: Cfr. C. *In novo testamento* (2.), seqq. d. 21.

en: Cf. the chapter *In novo testamento* (2), and following, dist. 21.

la: Ut dictum est supra p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — De propos. seq. vide supra pag. 486, nota 5.

en: As was said above, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and following. — On the proposition that follows, see above p. 486, note 5.

la: Cfr. d. 19. a. 2. q. 2. — Mox pro *ut praelatus est* edd. *ut praelato.*

en: Cf. d. 19, a. 2, q. 2. — Shortly, for *ut praelatus est* the editions [read] *ut praelato.*

la: Vide infra d. 24. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — Plures codd. *clavis potestas;* lectio non spernenda. Superius post *non sunt* cod. aa supplet *actus.*

en: See below d. 24, p. II, a. 2, q. 3. — Several codices [read] *clavis potestas*; a reading not to be despised. Above, after *non sunt*, codex aa supplies *actus.*

la: Codd. 1 K bene *communionem.*

en: Codices 1 and K rightly [read] *communionem* ["communion"].

la: Vers. 19. — Seq. locus est Ioan. 20, 22. seq., tertius Matth. 18, 17. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 484, nota 1. — In principio solut. pro *quaeritur* codd. *obiicitur.*

en: Verse 19. — The following passage is John 20:22 and following, the third [is] Matthew 18:17 and following. Cf. above p. 484, note 1. — At the beginning of the solution, for *quaeritur* the codices [read] *obiicitur.*

la: Cfr. C. *Debent duodecim sacerdotes* (106.), C. 11. q. 3. — Superius pro *compellendum* cod. U bene *compescendum.*

en: Cf. the chapter *Debent duodecim sacerdotes* (106), C. 11, q. 3. — Above, for *compellendum* codex U rightly [reads] *compescendum* ["restraining"].

la: Ex codd. R T X supplevimus *virium.* Subinde pro *quin,* quod praebent codd. F G M O (E a secunda manu), cod. U (I a secunda manu) *ita quod,* alii codd. vel *quod* vel cum Vat. *nisi,* ed. 1 *etsi.*

en: From codices R, T, X we have supplied *virium.* Thereupon, for *quin,* which codices F, G, M, O provide (E by a second hand), codex U (I by a second hand) [reads] *ita quod,* other codices either *quod* or, with the Vatican edition, *nisi,* edition 1 *etsi.*

la: Vide supra pag. 488, nota 10. — Vide scholion ad 1. articuli quaest.

en: See above p. 488, note 10. — See the scholion to question 1 of the article.

latin_scholion:
*[No scholion is rendered with this quaestio. The Articulus Unicus scholion (§§ I–VII), which covers q1–q6 together, is transcribed and translated with* Quaestio I *(`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`); cf. p. 489 footer note 9 below: "Vide scholion ad 1. articuli quaest." / "See the scholion to question 1 of the article."]*

---

english_scholion:
*[No scholion is rendered with this quaestio. The Articulus Unicus scholion (§§ I–VII), covering q1–q6 together, is transcribed and translated with Question I (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`); cf. p. 489 footer note 9: "See the scholion to question 1 of the article."]*

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 54343–54545), reconciled column-by-column against vol4 PDF bands pp. 488–489 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p488-{L,R}-*`, `vol4-p489-{L,R}-*`). Offset pdf = printed + 20 (pdf pp. 508–509). Running heads verified: p. 488 "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."; p. 489 "DIST. XVIII. P. II. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III. 489". Quaestio ends mid-page 489; QUAESTIO IV opens p. 490 (verified `vol4-p490-L-0`). Opener "Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit excommunicatio fieri" aligns — no q-swap.
- **Apparatus:** 21 footnotes total across two per-page sequences (12 on p. 488, 9 on p. 489), each rendered as a fresh `[^N]` sequence; markers placed at OCR footnote-anchor positions.
- **Page-split / footer split:** Both printed pages' footers fall wholly within this quaestio (no shared-footer split with q2 or q4). The penitential/judicial sentence straddles the 488/489 break ("foro poeniten-/tiali"); page break placed at that hyphenation per the PDF.
- **Scholion disposition:** has_scholion=false. The Articulus Unicus scholion (§§ I–VII) covers q1–q6 jointly and is rendered with q1 (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`); p. 489 footer note 9 explicitly cross-refers ("Vide scholion ad 1. articuli quaest.").
- **J4 fix (2026-07-17, Class A — duplicate apparatus definitions):** the two per-page footer sequences both used bare `[^1]`–`[^12]`/`[^1]`–`[^9]` labels, so the second (p. 489) definitions were silently shadowing the first (p. 488) ones at render time. Root cause of the tool's "group count differs" skip (defs=2 groups / la=3 / en=3): the Scholion-redirect prose in both the Latin and English blocks (the "cf. p. 489 footer note [^9]..." sentence) contained a **literal `[^9]` footnote link in prose**, not a real body anchor — this stole an extra anchor and split the greedy partition into 3 groups instead of 2. Fix: de-linked both prose mentions to plain "footer note 9" (no brackets), which restored the true 2-group partition (12 + 9 anchors, matching the 21 defs exactly). Re-ran `tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py --apply`, which then relabeled all markers/defs to the page-qualified `[^p488-N]` / `[^p489-N]` scheme mechanically (anchor→note pairings unchanged — verified `nla == expect_la` in the tool's own post-check). No Latin/English body text or apparatus prose was altered; PDF page images (pp. 488–489) were pulled but not needed since the fix was purely a stray-bracket removal, not a content/position question. Verify: 21 defs, 21 Latin anchors, 21 English anchors, 0 dup defs, 0 orphan defs.
- **[?] flags:** none. The OCR garbles (e.g. "polestatem", "muUitudo", "fleri", "indiciaii", "Matlhaei") were unambiguously resolved against the clean PDF column bands. Pro-arg 3 ("Non nisi quando?") reads tersely in both OCR and PDF and is rendered verbatim.
- **Hand-off to q4 (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q4`):** QUAESTIO IV begins on printed p. 490 ("Quarto quaeritur de excommunicationis... utrum aliquis possit pluries excommunicari"); title line "Utrum aliquis possit pluries excommunicari" (truncated in band — verify full line). No footer migrates from p. 489 to q4; p. 490 footers belong entirely to q4.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt:
Utrum excommunicatio possit iterari
Whether excommunication can be repeated

source_text:
<!-- page 490 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum aliquis possit pluries excommunicari.*

Quarto quaeritur de excommunicationis iteratione, et quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit pluries excommunicari. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Primum*, quia hoc habet usus Ecclesiae universalis[^1], quam errare est impossibile, ut videtur.

2. Item, videmus in aliis poenis impositis, quod simul et semel plura possunt imponi ieiunia, similiter et vigiliae et orationes: ergo pari ratione possunt infligi plures excommunicationes.

3. Item, ita videmus in *remediis*, quod si iteratur morbus, et remedium; ita etiam et in poenis, quod multiplicantur poenae secundum merita: ergo cum excommunicatio et *remedium* sit et poena, videtur igitur, quod sicut causa potest iterari et multiplicari, quod et excommunicationes. Sed causae possunt iterari, illud est apertum — potest enim aliquis esse incendiarius, fractor ecclesiarum, percussor clericorum, et sic de aliis — ergo etc.

4. Item, si non possent excommunicari, ex quo sunt excommunicati, et illi qui sunt absque excommunicatione, possunt excommunicari: ergo excommunicati sunt melioris conditionis quam non excommunicati.

**Contra:**
1. Excommunicatus interfectus est gladio spirituali; sed interfectus non potest magis nec minus interfici[^2]: ergo nec excommunicatus iterum excommunicari.

2. Item, excommunicatus extra communionem Ecclesiae est eiectus; sed, ut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios quinto[^3]: *Quid mihi de his qui foris sunt, iudicare?* sed posse excommunicare est posse iudicare: ergo si non pertinet de talibus iudicare, videtur similiter, quod nec excommunicare.

3. Item, excommunicatus est beneficiis ecclesiasticis privatus, et excommunicatio est privatio; sed privationes non recipiunt maius et minus[^4] — non enim dicitur unus caecus altero magis caecus et minus — ergo etc.

4. Item, alter altero non est absolutus magis nec minus, nec idem magis se ipso: ergo pari ratione nec excommunicatus magis et minus, immo multo fortius.

> ### Conclusio.
> *Excommunicatus iterum potest excommunicari.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod excommunicatus bene potest iterum excommunicari vel eiusdem excommunicationis iteratione ad suam maiorem confusionem, vel etiam alia propter novae culpae commissionem; et tunc tot erunt excommunicationes, quot causae principales, pro quibus excommunicatur. Sicut enim iteratur culpa, ita rationabiliter iterari potest et debet ipsa poena. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de interfectione, dicendum, quod quemadmodum qui peccat mortaliter mortuus est et interficit se ipsum per expulsionem gratiae et adhuc magis potest peccare, quia, quamvis non vivat ad bene agendum, adhuc tamen vivit in eo voluntas ad male operandum; et quamvis gratia sit expulsa, potest tamen magis a gratia elongari: sic intelligendum est in proposito, quia, quamvis secundum statum illum nihil prosint ecclesiastica Sacramenta et suffragia; potest tamen adhuc magis et magis elongari. Nec est simile de interfectione corporali, in qua prima interfectio reddit impossibilem ad vitam; non sic est in proposito, quia adhuc manet aptitudo ad redeundum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod extra est; dicendum, quod quia characterem baptismalem habet indelebilem, quantumcumque sit malus, ideo non exit omnino Ecclesiae potestatem; et ideo ipsum punit et corrigit magis quam paganos et infideles, qui numquam fuerunt sub potestate Ecclesiae. Et de talibus, scilicet paganis, loquitur Apostolus, non de malis subditis et excommunicatis; nam ipse de eis iudicabat[^5].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod absolutio non recipit iterationem nec intensionem; dicendum, quod hoc falsum est; et hoc patet in eo qui pluribus excommunicationibus diversis de causis est excommunicatus ab eodem, vel qui est excommunicatus a diversis episcopis; qui potest absolvi ab una excommunicatione, ita quod non ab alia, quia non sic est connexio in absolutione, sicut in gratiae infusione.

<!-- page 491 -->

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod privationes non recipiunt magis et minus; potest responderi dupliciter: primo, quia illud est verum in puris privationibus, non in aliis. Nam claudus dicitur magis et minus, quia non totaliter privat virtutem gradiendi; similiter et iniustus magis et minus. — Vel posset dici, quod si non ratione actus vel habitus magis et minus recipiant, tamen[^6] ratione *causarum*; unde magis est elongatus a visu, qui laesus est in nervo et in pupilla et in humore crystallino, quam qui in altero horum tantum. Similiter intellige in proposito.

*(Scholion: the scholion for this Articulus Unicus, §§ I–VII, is rendered with Quaestio I — see `bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`.)*

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether someone can be excommunicated many times.*

Fourthly the question is asked concerning the repetition of excommunication, and it is asked whether someone can be excommunicated many times. And that he can, it seems.

1. *First*, because the practice of the universal Church holds this[^1], which it is impossible to err, as it seems.

2. Likewise, we see in other imposed penalties that at one and the same time several fasts can be imposed, and likewise vigils and prayers: therefore by parity of reasoning several excommunications can be inflicted.

3. Likewise, we see this in *remedies*, that if the disease is repeated, so too is the remedy; thus also in penalties, that the penalties are multiplied according to merits: therefore since excommunication is both a *remedy* and a penalty, it seems therefore that, just as the cause can be repeated and multiplied, so too can the excommunications. But that the causes can be repeated is plain — for someone can be an arsonist, a breaker of churches, a striker of clerics, and so of the rest — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if they could not be excommunicated, from the fact that they are excommunicated, while those also who are without excommunication can be excommunicated: therefore the excommunicated would be of a better condition than the non-excommunicated.

**On the contrary:**
1. The excommunicated person has been slain with the spiritual sword; but one who has been slain cannot be slain more or less[^2]: therefore neither can the excommunicated be excommunicated again.

2. Likewise, the excommunicated person has been cast out from the communion of the Church; but, as the Apostle says in the first letter to the Corinthians, the fifth chapter[^3]: *What is it to me to judge those who are outside?* but to be able to excommunicate is to be able to judge: therefore if it does not belong to one to judge such persons, it seems likewise that neither is it to excommunicate them.

3. Likewise, the excommunicated person is deprived of ecclesiastical benefits, and excommunication is a privation; but privations do not admit of more and less[^4] — for one blind man is not said to be more blind than another and less — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, one person is not absolved more nor less than another, nor is the same person more than himself: therefore by parity of reasoning neither is the excommunicated more and less, indeed much more so.

> ### Conclusion.
> *The excommunicated person can be excommunicated again.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the excommunicated person can well be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication for his greater confusion, or even by another on account of the commission of a new fault; and then there will be as many excommunications as there are principal causes for which he is excommunicated. For just as the fault is repeated, so reasonably can and ought the penalty itself to be repeated. — And the reasons for this side are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:**
*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected concerning slaying, it must be said that, just as one who sins mortally is dead and slays himself through the expulsion of grace and can yet sin still more — because, although he does not live unto doing good, nevertheless the will to do evil still lives in him; and although grace has been expelled, he can yet be further distanced from grace — so it is to be understood in the case at hand, since, although according to that state the ecclesiastical Sacraments and suffrages avail nothing, he can nevertheless still be distanced more and more. Nor is it similar to bodily slaying, in which the first slaying renders one incapable of life; it is not so in the case at hand, because there still remains an aptitude for returning.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that he is outside; it must be said that, because he has the baptismal character indelibly, however wicked he may be, he therefore does not entirely go out from the power of the Church; and therefore she punishes and corrects him more than the pagans and unbelievers, who were never under the power of the Church. And of such, namely the pagans, the Apostle speaks, not of wicked subjects and the excommunicated; for he himself was judging concerning these[^5].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that absolution does not admit of repetition nor of intensification; it must be said that this is false; and this is clear in the case of one who has been excommunicated by several excommunications for diverse causes by the same person, or who has been excommunicated by diverse bishops; who can be absolved from one excommunication in such a way that he is not absolved from another, because there is not such a connection in absolution as there is in the infusion of grace.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that privations do not admit of more and less; it can be answered in two ways: first, because that is true in pure privations, not in others. For a lame man is said to be more and less so, because [lameness] does not totally deprive [him] of the power of walking; and likewise an unjust man more and less. — Or it could be said that, even if they do not admit of more and less by reason of an act or a habit, they do nevertheless[^6] by reason of *causes*; whence one who has been injured in the nerve and in the pupil and in the crystalline humor is more distanced from sight than one who [has been injured] in only one of these. Understand likewise in the case at hand.

*(Scholion: the scholion for this Articulus Unicus, §§ I–VII, is rendered with Question I — see `bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`.)*

---

la: Cfr. C. *Cum pro causa* (27.) et C. *Officii* (42.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.).

en: Cf. the canon *Cum pro causa* (27) and the canon *Officii* (42), in the *Decretals*, "On the Sentence of Excommunication" (book V, title 39).

la: Seneca, *Epist.* 66. (alias 67.) n. 40: *Mors nulla maior, aut minor est.* Cfr. tom. III. pag. 808, nota 7.

en: Seneca, *Letter* 66 (otherwise 67), n. 40: "No death is greater or lesser." Cf. tome III, p. 808, note 7.

la: Vers. 12: *Quid enim mihi de iis qui* etc. — Inferius post *non pertinet* cod. X bene supplet *ad ipsum*.

en: Verse 12: "For what is it to me concerning those who" etc. — Below, after *non pertinet* ["it does not belong"], codex X aptly supplies *ad ipsum* ["to him"].

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 111, nota 3. verba Aristot.

en: See tome II, p. 111, note 3, the words of Aristotle.

la: Loc. cit., cuius expositionem vide apud August., III. contra Epist. Parmeniani, c. 2. n. 12. seqq.

en: In the place cited, whose exposition see in Augustine, *Against the Letter of Parmenianus*, book III, c. 2, n. 12 and following.

la: Ut constat ex locc. hic, nota 1. allegatis. — Superius post *episcopis* codd. omittunt *qui*. — Ordo huius et seq. solutionis non respondet ordini argumentorum.

en: As is established from the places here cited in note 1. — Above, after *episcopis* ["bishops"], the codices omit *qui* ["who"]. — The order of this and the following solution does not correspond to the order of the arguments. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 54546–54644), with PDF column-band verification per the VOL II OVERRIDE recipe (two-column; OCR base, PDF authoritative for cascade-shattered regions). Bands read: vol4 p490 L-{0,1,2} and R-{0,1,2}, plus p491 R-0 / L-2 / R-2 for the *Ad 3* spillover and its footer. Running heads confirmed: p490 = "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." / "QUAESTIO IV."; p491 = "...QUAEST. V. 491" (the q4 *Ad 3* reply runs onto the top of p491 R-column, before q5 opens). Offset pdf = printed + 20.

**Page span.** Printed 490–491. The Respondeo and replies *Ad 1, Ad 2, Ad 4* sit on p490; reply *Ad 3* spills onto the top of p491 (before Quaestio V). Quaracchi's own footer note (here [^6]) records that the order of the solutions does not match the order of the arguments — hence the printed sequence 1, 2, 4, 3, which is preserved here.

**Footnote numbering.** Renumbered sequentially. p490 footers 1–5 → [^1]–[^5]; p491's first footer (note 1, attached to *tamen* in the *Ad 3* reply) → [^6]. The remaining p491 footers (notes 2–8) belong to Quaestio V, not here.

**Scholion disposition.** has_scholion: false. This Articulus Unicus has a single scholion (§§ I–VII) covering all five quaestiones; it is rendered once with Quaestio I (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`). A cross-reference note appears at the end of both the Latin and English bodies.

**[?] flags.** None. The OCR was clean enough (running prose) that all readings resolved against the PDF bands without ambiguity.

**Self-check.** 6 footnotes — fewer than the typical ~10/page because q4 is a short question and the footers it carries are correspondingly few; this matches the printed page footer count for its two-page span (5 on p490 + 1 on p491).


title: Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum communicans cum excommunicato sit excommunicatus.*

Quinto quaeritur de excommunicatione quantum ad communicationem, et quaeritur, utrum communicans cum excommunicato sit excommunicatus. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Quia iura[^1] istud dicunt.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia accedere ad unum oppositorum est recedere a reliquo; sed excommunicatus est extra communionem[^2] positus: ergo qui ei communicat a communione recedit.

3. Item, excommunicatio infligitur in poenam erubescentiae; sed nulla est erubescentia, ubi alii communicant: ergo ad hoc, quod sententia illa sit alicuius valoris, necesse est ipso iure alios arcere[^3]: ergo si censura ecclesiastica est in excommunicatione, videtur, quod talis iuste et debite sit excommunicatus.

4. Item, aut *licet* communicare excommunicato, aut *non*. Si *sic*; ergo tales non sunt vitandi; et hoc est contra illud primae ad Corinthios quinto[^4]: *Si quis frater* etc.; et post: *Cum huiusmodi nec cibum sumere.* Si *non licet*; ergo per aliquam sententiam alii arcentur communicare cum isto, et non nisi per sententiam excommunicationis: ergo qui communicant ei incidunt in excommunicationis sententiam: ergo sunt excommunicati.

**Contra:**

1. Communicans cum infideli sive cum altero peccatore sive in cibo sive in potu non incurrit illud vitium, nisi communicet in actu consimili sive in crimine: ergo pari ratione nullus participans cum excommunicato est excommunicatus, nisi participet in crimine.

2. Item, excommunicatio aut est morbus contagiosus, aut non. Si *sic*; ergo qua ratione iste primo excommunicatus inficit participantem pari vitio, ita et alius alium, et sic deinceps: ergo si hoc falsum est et contra iura[^5], non est morbus contagiosus: ergo non videtur, quod communicans excommunicato sit excommunicatus. Si tu dicas, quod hoc facit *institutio*, non contagio; *contra*: institutio ista ab homine est, sicut et excommunicatio; sed nullus debet infligere poenam nisi pro culpa: ergo si non communicat in merito sive in culpa, nec in poena: ergo institutio illa, quae facit communicari in poena sine culpa, est iniusta.

3. Item, filius communicans patri aut est *excommunicatus*, aut *non*. Si *sic*; ergo debet vitare patrem. Sed si patrem non potest vitare sine suo detrimento, ergo *filius portat iniquitatem patris*, quod est contra ius divinum[^6]. Si autem *non est* excommunicatus, ergo licet alicui ex *familiaritate* communicare cum excommunicato. Sed laudabilior est societas et amicitia et caritas: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod ex *sociali amore* vel aliquo tali licet excommunicato communicare, et ita non videtur communicans excommunicato esse excommunicatus.

4. Item, excommunicatio omnis, sive maior sive minor, separat a Sacramentis; sed nullus separandus est a Sacramentis nisi pro culpa mortali: ergo omnis communicans excommunicato peccat mortaliter. Sed si hoc verum est; cum ista medicina sit occasio multorum periculorum, videtur tunc, quod non sit medicina, sed morbus; et quod quicumque infert eam, cum ponat multos in gravi periculo, quod graviter peccat.

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> **Conclusio.** *Communicantes temere cum excommunicato sive non propter necessitatem, aut ignorantiam, vel excommunicati utilitatem, incidunt in excommunicationem minorem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut tactum est[^7], duplex est excommunicatio, scilicet *minor* et *maior*. *Minor* tantum separat a Sacramentis; *maior* vero non tantum a Sacramentis separat, sed etiam ab actibus legitimis cum aliis personis. Et ideo excommunicatio minor est morbus respiciens personam *absolute*; excommunicatio vero maior est morbus respiciens personam, ut est *pars communitatis*, et separans a communitate. Haec autem separatio, cum sit relatio *aequiparantiae*[^8], locum non haberet, nisi ubi separarentur ab eo. Ergo ad hoc, quod ista excommunicatio sit efficax, statuit ius, ut alii eum vitent. Et quia homines ut in pluribus magis timent poenam quam culpam, in firmitatem sententiae adiunxit poenam consimilem, sed minorem; unde non separat a *communione fidelium*, sed *Sacramentorum*. Et hoc totum dictat ratio recta esse convenienter factum et statutum.

Sed quoniam periculum est omnes a communicatione, utpote qui *necessitate*, vel *ignorantia* communicant, prohibere; ideo debuerunt tales personae excipi. Unde qui communicant *necessitate*, sicut filii et filiae, quamdiu sunt sub manu parentum, sicut uxor, sicut servi et servientes et ancillae, sicut peregrini et pauperes, quando unde sustententur non habent, in talibus ius sententiam relaxat. — Similiter, qui communicant ex *utilitate*, ut convertatur peccator *a via sua mala*[^9] et corrigatur; cum secundum legem caritatis ambulent, non arcentur. — Similiter, qui communicant ex *ignorantia*, excommunicati non sunt, pro eo quod talis ignorantia facti excusat; dicitur autem hic ignorare, quamdiu homo nescit vel per denuntiationem, vel per famam. Unde non debet sibi quis de facili conscientiam facere, quia de quolibet praesumendum est bonum, nisi probetur contrarium[^10]. — Et hae circumstantiae hoc versu continentur:

> *Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse.*

In quo tangitur haec triplex causa, et *necessitas* comprehendit tria membra[^11]. His personis exceptis et sic communicantibus, sine aliqua harum conditionum intervenientium communicantes excommunicatis secundum regulam iuris excommunicati sunt minori excommunicatione; et hoc quidem rationabile est, ut visum est.

*1. 2. 3.* Ex his patent obiecta. Quod enim obiicitur de aliis peccatis et de contagione et de filio, in omnibus patet responsio: quia hoc facit *institutio*; et ratio institutionis dicta est et convenientia exceptionis, et quare *maior* transit, et *minor* non. Et ideo regula est, quod excommunicatio non transit in tertiam personam[^12]. Patet etiam, quod communicans non communicat in culpa; sed quia non adhibet debitam reverentiam sententiae, hinc est, quod iustum est, quod reportet poenam.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ista est poena tantum mortaliter peccantium; dicendum, quod secundum aliquos conclusio conceditur. Dicunt enim, quod praeter casus exceptos mortaliter peccat, quia facit contra Ecclesiae mandatum et scienter videtur contemnere sententiam Ecclesiae[^13]. — Sed quia valde durum videtur illud dicere, et maximum periculum esset, omnes communicantes excommunicari; ut declinemus periculum utrumque, sine praeiudicio hic distinguendum videtur. Dicere enim, quod tantum sit peccatum *veniale*, non videtur conveniens, cum communiter parvam vim faciant homines in peccatis venialibus. Dicere iterum, quod pro quolibet verbo humanitatis, quod amicus amico dicit, peccet *mortaliter*, durum videtur.

Et ideo dicendum, quod qui communicat scienter aut *communicat* in actu exteriori *in contemptum* sententiae latae, et tunc peccat mortaliter; aut *non* communicat *in contemptum*, sed tamen rationabiliter videre potest, quod sententia veniat in contemptum, et adhuc credendum est, eum mortaliter pec-

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care; aut probabiliter credit, quod ex hoc nunquam magis sententia contemnetur, et ipse cum timore hoc facit et ex quadam affabilitate vel societate aliqua verba praeter necessitatem dicit, vel alio modo in casibus non exceptis communicat; tunc credendum est, circa tales sententiam temperari[^14].

Unde si quis quaerat, utrum homo debeat magis dimittere, se interfici, quam aliquod verbum dicere; dico, quod si ex hoc *in contemptum* veniret sententia, deberet utique. Sed quis iudicaret, istum male facere, cum ante debeat de furto comedere[^15] quam fame perire? — Si qui ergo dicunt, quod peccat *mortaliter*; intelligendum est, quando contemptus intervenit. Et quia vix potest *frequentari* sine contemptu, ideo sanum consilium est unicuique, ut se a talibus elonget propter vitandum periculum, sicut dicit Augustinus[^16], quod faciendum est de iuramento.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non privantur Sacramentis nisi mortaliter peccantes; dicendum, quod hoc factum est propter terrorem, ne forte per assuetudinem et periculum contemptus incideretur[^17].

---

english:
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### Question 5. *Whether one who communicates with an excommunicate is [himself] excommunicated.*

Fifthly there is inquiry concerning excommunication as regards communication, and it is asked whether one who communicates with an excommunicate is [himself] excommunicated. And that he is, is shown:

1. Because the laws[^1] say this.

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: for to approach one of two opposites is to withdraw from the other; but the excommunicate is placed outside the communion[^2]: therefore one who communicates with him withdraws from the communion.

3. Likewise, excommunication is inflicted as a penalty of shame; but there is no shame where others communicate [with the person]: therefore, in order that that sentence be of any value, it is necessary by the law itself to keep others away[^3]: therefore, if the ecclesiastical censure consists in excommunication, it seems that such a one is justly and duly excommunicated.

4. Likewise, either it *is permitted* to communicate with an excommunicate, or it is *not*. If *yes*; then such persons are not to be avoided; and this is against that text of First Corinthians, chapter five[^4]: *If any brother* etc.; and afterwards: *With such a one not even to take food.* If it is *not permitted*; then by some sentence others are kept from communicating with this person, and only by a sentence of excommunication: therefore those who communicate with him incur the sentence of excommunication: therefore they are excommunicated.

**On the contrary:**

1. One who communicates with an unbeliever or with another sinner, whether in food or in drink, does not incur that fault unless he communicates in a like act or in the crime: therefore by like reasoning no one who participates with an excommunicate is excommunicated, unless he participates in the crime.

2. Likewise, excommunication either is a contagious disease, or it is not. If *yes*; then by the same reasoning by which this person, first excommunicated, infects the participant with a like fault, so also the one [infects] the other, and so on in succession: therefore if this is false and against the laws[^5], it is not a contagious disease: therefore it does not seem that one who communicates with an excommunicate is excommunicated. If you say that *institution* does this, not contagion; *to the contrary*: that institution is from man, just as excommunication is; but no one ought to inflict a penalty except for fault: therefore if he does not communicate in the merit or in the fault, neither [does he] in the penalty: therefore that institution, which causes one to share in the penalty without fault, is unjust.

3. Likewise, a son communicating with his father either is *excommunicated*, or *not*. If *yes*; then he ought to avoid his father. But if he cannot avoid his father without his own detriment, then *the son bears the iniquity of the father*, which is against divine law[^6]. But if he is *not* excommunicated, then it is permitted to someone out of *familiarity* to communicate with the excommunicate. But fellowship and friendship and charity are more praiseworthy: therefore it seems by like reasoning that out of *social love* or some such thing it is permitted to communicate with the excommunicate, and thus it does not seem that one who communicates with an excommunicate is excommunicated.

4. Likewise, every excommunication, whether greater or lesser, separates from the Sacraments; but no one is to be separated from the Sacraments except for mortal fault: therefore everyone who communicates with an excommunicate sins mortally. But if this is true; since this medicine is the occasion of many dangers, it then seems that it is not a medicine but a disease; and that whoever inflicts it, since he places many in grave danger, sins gravely.

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> **Conclusion.** *Those who communicate rashly with an excommunicate — not for the sake of necessity, or ignorance, or the excommunicate's advantage — incur the lesser excommunication.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been touched on[^7], excommunication is twofold, namely *lesser* and *greater*. The *lesser* separates only from the Sacraments; the *greater* however separates not only from the Sacraments but also from lawful acts with other persons. And therefore the lesser excommunication is a disease regarding the person *absolutely*; the greater excommunication is a disease regarding the person *as he is a part of the community*, and separating [him] from the community. But this separation, since it is a relation *of equiparance*[^8], would have no place except where they are separated from him. Therefore, in order that this excommunication be effective, the law established that others avoid him. And because men for the most part fear penalty more than fault, for the firmness of the sentence it added a like penalty, but a lesser one; whence it does not separate from the *communion of the faithful*, but [from the communion] *of the Sacraments*. And right reason dictates that this whole thing was suitably done and established.

But since it is dangerous to forbid all from communicating, inasmuch as some communicate by *necessity*, or by *ignorance*; therefore such persons had to be excepted. Whence those who communicate by *necessity* — such as sons and daughters, so long as they are under the hand of their parents, such as a wife, such as menservants and serving-folk and maidservants, such as pilgrims and the poor, when they do not have wherewith to be sustained — in such cases the law relaxes the sentence. — Likewise, those who communicate out of *advantage*, that a sinner may be converted *from his evil way*[^9] and corrected; since they walk according to the law of charity, they are not kept away. — Likewise, those who communicate out of *ignorance* are not excommunicated, because such ignorance of fact excuses; and here one is said to be ignorant so long as a man does not know either by denunciation or by report. Whence no one ought lightly to make a [bad] conscience for himself, because of anyone the good is to be presumed, unless the contrary be proved[^10]. — And these circumstances are contained in this verse:

> *Useful, law, humble, a thing unknown, necessity.*

In which is touched this threefold cause, and *necessity* comprises three members[^11]. These persons being excepted and thus communicating, those communicating with excommunicates without any of these conditions intervening are, according to the rule of law, excommunicated with the lesser excommunication; and this indeed is reasonable, as has been seen.

*1. 2. 3.* From these things the objections are clear. For as to what is objected concerning other sins and concerning contagion and concerning the son, in all of them the response is clear: because *institution* does this; and the ground of the institution has been stated, and the fittingness of the exception, and why the *greater* passes [to a third person] and the *lesser* does not. And therefore the rule is that excommunication does not pass to a third person[^12]. It is clear also that one who communicates does not communicate in the fault; but because he does not show due reverence to the sentence, hence it is that it is just that he carry the penalty.

*4.* To that which is objected, that this is the penalty only of those sinning mortally; it must be said that according to some the conclusion is granted. For they say that, apart from the excepted cases, he sins mortally, because he acts against the command of the Church and seems knowingly to contemn the sentence of the Church[^13]. — But because it seems very hard to say that, and there would be the greatest danger were all who communicate to be excommunicated; in order that we may avoid both dangers, without prejudice a distinction seems here to be made. For to say that it is only a *venial* sin does not seem fitting, since commonly men make little of venial sins. To say again that for every word of humanity which a friend says to a friend he should sin *mortally*, seems hard.

And therefore it must be said that one who knowingly communicates either *communicates* in an exterior act *in contempt* of the sentence passed, and then he sins mortally; or he does *not* communicate *in contempt*, yet can reasonably see that the sentence comes into contempt, and still it is to be believed that he sins mortally;

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or he probably believes that by this the sentence will never more be contemned, and he himself does this with fear and out of a certain affability or fellowship says some words beyond necessity, or in some other way communicates in non-excepted cases; then it is to be believed that regarding such persons the sentence is tempered[^14].

Whence if someone should ask whether a man ought rather to allow himself to be killed than to say some word; I say that if by this the sentence would come *into contempt*, he certainly ought [to allow it]. But who would judge that this man does wrong, since he ought rather to eat of [what is] stolen[^15] than to perish of hunger? — If therefore some say that he sins *mortally*; it is to be understood [as holding] when contempt intervenes. And because [communication] can scarcely be *frequented* without contempt, therefore it is sound counsel for everyone to keep himself far from such things, for the sake of avoiding danger, as Augustine says[^16] must be done concerning an oath.

To that therefore which is objected, that they are not deprived of the Sacraments except those sinning mortally; it must be said that this was done for the sake of terror, lest perhaps through habituation and the danger of contempt one should fall [into it][^17].

---

la: Iura siquidem determinant, communicantem cum excommunicato excommunicatione maiori non hanc communiter [nisi communicet in ipso *crimine*] incurrere, sed excommunicationem minorem [cfr. C. *Nuper a nobis* (29.) et C. *Si concubinae* (53.) et seq., X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.)]; cum excommunicato autem excommunicatione minori non prohibent communicationem. Vide infra solut. huius obiect. — Inferius post *sicut* edd. omittunt *et*, pro quo cod. P *est*.

en: For indeed the laws determine that one who communicates with an excommunicate by the greater excommunication does not commonly incur this [unless he communicate in the very *crime*], but [incurs] the lesser excommunication [cf. C. *Nuper a nobis* (29) and C. *Si concubinae* (53) and following, X. on the Sentence of excommunication (book V, title 39)]; but with one excommunicated by the lesser excommunication they do not forbid communication. See below in the solution of this objection. — Further on, after *sicut* the editions omit *et*, in place of which cod. P has *est*.

la: In edd. additur *ab excommunicati communione.*

en: In the editions there is added *from the communion of the excommunicate.*

la: Ita multi codd., in aliis et edd. *communicationem.*

en: Thus many codices; in others and in the editions, *communication.*

la: Vers. 11: *Si is qui frater nominatur, est fornicator... cum eiusmodi nec cibum sumere.*

en: Verse 11: *If he who is named a brother is a fornicator... with such a one not even to take food.*

la: Vide C. *Praecipue* (3.), seqq. et C. *Sicut Apostoli* (16.), seqq. C. 11. q. 3. et C. *Nuper a nobis* (29.), seqq., X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.).

en: See C. *Praecipue* (3) and following, and C. *Sicut Apostoli* (16) and following, C. 11, q. 3; and C. *Nuper a nobis* (29) and following, X. on the Sentence of excommunication (book V, title 39).

la: Ezech. 18, 20: *Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris.* — Superius pro *Sed si* [multi codd. *Et si*] *patrem non potest vitare* edd. *Sed si pater non potest vitari.* Inferius post *caritas* in cod. K secunda manus addidit: *quae fit inter extraneos*, quam inter patrem et filium, quia nemo laudatur de dilectione filii, sed extranei.

en: Ezekiel 18:20: *The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.* — Above, in place of *Sed si* [many codices *Et si*] *he cannot avoid his father*, the editions [read] *But if the father cannot be avoided.* Further on, after *charity*, in cod. K a second hand added: *which arises between strangers*, [more] than between father and son, because no one is praised for the love of a son, but of a stranger.

la: Quaest. I. ad I. — Aliquanto inferius pro *pars communitatis* plurimi codd. *pars communicans.*

en: Question 1, reply to 1. — A little further on, in place of *part of the community*, very many codices [read] *communicating part.*

la: Relatio *aequiparantiae* est illa, quae in utroque extremo fundamentum eiusdem rationis habet, sive quae reperitur inter duos terminos, qui sunt eiusdem rationis et nominis v. g. similitudo vel aequalitas, qua simile vel aequale refertur simili vel aequali. Huic opponitur relatio *disquiparantiae* v. g. relatio patris ad filium, domini ad servum. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 537, nota 3. — Inferius voci *consimilem* cod. bb praemittit *non* et pro *communione* edd. et plures codd. *communicatione.*

en: A relation *of equiparance* is one which in each extreme has a foundation of the same character, or which is found between two terms which are of the same character and name, e.g. likeness or equality, by which the like or equal is referred to the like or equal. To this is opposed a relation *of disquiparance*, e.g. the relation of father to son, of master to servant. Cf. tome I, page 537, note 3. — Further on, before the word *like*, cod. bb prefixes *not*, and for *communion* the editions and several codices [read] *communication.*

la: Ion. 3, 8: *Convertatur vir a via sua mala.* — De his exceptionibus cfr. C. *Quoniam multos* (103.) et C. *Sanctis quippe* (110.), C. 11. q. 3; C. *Inter alia* (31.) et C. *Cum voluntate* (34.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.). — Inferius post *ignorantia* cod. F addit *facti* (cfr. supra pag. 86, nota 7.).

en: Jonah 3:8: *Let the man be converted from his evil way.* — On these exceptions cf. C. *Quoniam multos* (103) and C. *Sanctis quippe* (110), C. 11, q. 3; C. *Inter alia* (31) and C. *Cum voluntate* (34), X. on the Sentence of excommunication (book V, title 39). — Further on, after *ignorance*, cod. F adds *of fact* (cf. above page 86, note 7).

la: Ut insinuatur C. *Ex parte tua* (1.), X. de Scrutinio etc. (lib. I. tit. 12.) et C. *Dudum* (16.), X. de Praesumt. (lib. II. tit. 23.). Per oppositionem dicitur de Regul. iuris in VI. regul. 8: *Semel malus semper praesumitur esse malus.*

en: As is intimated in C. *Ex parte tua* (1), X. on Scrutiny etc. (book I, title 12) and C. *Dudum* (16), X. on Presumptions (book II, title 23). By contrast it is said in the Rules of law in [the] Sixth [book], rule 8: *Once evil, [one] is always presumed to be evil.*

la: Scilicet *legem* (matrimonialem, ut uxor cum marito), *humile* (sive subiectio, ut filii cum patre) et *necesse* (pauperes et peregrini). — Cod. A (G a secunda manu) huic versui alium subiungit: *Haec anathema quidem faciunt ne possit obesse.*

en: Namely *law* (matrimonial, as a wife with her husband), *humble* (or subjection, as sons with their father) and *necessity* (the poor and pilgrims). — Cod. A (G by a second hand) subjoins another [verse] to this one: *These things indeed make the anathema, lest it be able to harm.*

la: Colligitur ex C. *Quoniam multos* (103.), C. 11. q. 3, in quo Gregor. VII. decernit, etiam illos non incurrere excommunicationem, «qui communicant cum eis, qui excommunicatis communicant». — Inferius post *non adhibet* [cod. H exhibet] cod. R addit *finem debitum et.*

en: It is gathered from C. *Quoniam multos* (103), C. 11, q. 3, in which Gregory VII decrees that even those do not incur excommunication «who communicate with those who communicate with the excommunicated». — Further on, after *does not show* [cod. H *exhibits*], cod. R adds *the due end and.*

la: Allegatur pro hac sententia C. *Sacris est canonibus* (8.), X. de His quae vi etc. (lib. I. tit. 40.), ubi Innocent. III. ait: *Licet metus attenuet culpam, quia tamen non eam prorsus excludit, cum pro nullo metu debeat quis mortale peccatum incurrere, excommunicationis labe credimus inquinari.*

en: For this opinion is alleged C. *Sacris est canonibus* (8), X. on Things [done] by force etc. (book I, title 40), where Innocent III says: *Although fear lessens fault, yet because it does not entirely exclude it — since for no fear ought anyone to incur a mortal sin — we believe [him] to be stained with the blemish of excommunication.*

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *in periculum contemptus incideret.* Vide tamen Forcellini Lexicon sub verbo *incido*, quod *incido* etiam cum solo accusativo construitur. Hinc formam passivi, quam habent fere omnes codd., retinendam esse censuimus; praecedens particula *et* idem est ac *etiam.* — Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.

en: The Vatican [edition], with one and another codex, [reads] *would fall into the danger of contempt.* See, however, Forcellini's Lexicon under the word *incido*, [where it appears] that *incido* is also construed with the accusative alone. Hence we judged that the passive form, which almost all the codices have, should be retained; the preceding particle *et* is the same as *etiam* [also]. — See the scholion to question 1 of this article.

la: In cod. V secunda manus addidit *quilibet.* Cfr. supra pag. 333, nota 3.

en: In cod. V a second hand added *anyone.* Cf. above page 333, note 3.

la: Ut dicitur C. *Cum cessante* (60.), X. de Appellat. (lib. II.). Vide supra pag. 73, nota 2.

en: As is said in C. *Cum cessante* (60), X. on Appeals (book II). See above page 73, note 2.

la: Matth. 16, 19. — Vide infra dub. 2. — Aliquanto inferius pro *ferre* plurimi codd. *inferre.*

en: Matthew 16:19. — See below, dubium 2. — A little further on, in place of *to bear*, very many codices [read] *to inflict.* ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 54645–54851) corrected against the vol4 PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{491,492,493}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (split_x=1880, 3 bands). Two-column page; OCR is cascade-shattered (left/right bleed) so per the Vol II override the PDF column-band read is authoritative for the *Respondeo* and footers; OCR is base for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing. Read L column top→bottom then R column for each page.
- **Page span / footer split:** q5 occupies pp. 491–493. p.491 footer = notes 1–8 (here [^1]–[^6]; OCR note 7 = our [^1], note 8 = our [^6] — the page footer restarts numbering each page, mapped here to a single continuous sequence); p.492 footer = notes 1–5 (→ [^7]–[^11]); p.493 footer notes 1–4 (→ [^14]–[^17]). q5's body ends on p.493 (top of right column, reply to obj. 4: "...contemptus incideretur"); the rest of p.493 (Conclusio + Respondeo of QUAESTIO VI) and its remaining footers belong to **q6** — hand-off below. Running heads verified: p.491 "DIST. XVIII. P. II. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V"; p.493 head reads "...QUAEST. VI." because q6 opens on that page.
- **Scholion:** none. The Articulus Unicus scholion (§I–VII, *De excommunicatione*) is rendered once with QUAESTIO I (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`); note [^14] and [^7] here both point back to it ("Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest." / "Quaest. I. ad I."). `has_scholion: false`.
- **[?] flags:** none. Latin fully resolved against PDF bands. Note [^15]'s cross-reference "supra pag. 333, nota 3" and [^8]'s "tom. I. pag. 537" are Quaracchi's internal page citations, transcribed verbatim.
- **Hand-off to q6 (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q6`):** QUAESTIO VI ("Utrum aliquis possit absolvi invitus ab excommunicatione") opens on p.493 (left col, "Sexto quaeritur de absolutione...") and runs onto p.494. Its Conclusio + Respondeo are in the p.493 R column; its footer notes 1–4 (*Quoniam multos*/*Quod praedecessor*; Tob. 2,21; Epist. 457; *Vat. ... in periculum contemptus incideret*) are in the p.493 L-2 band, with continuation in the p.493 R-2 band (notes on *quilibet*; *Cum cessante*; Matth. 16,19; *ferre/inferre*). The p.493 R-2 footer band read for this chunk shows **q6's** footers, not q5's — q6 should pick these up.