title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De ordine eorum quae concurrunt ad iustificationem.*

Consequenter viso de his quae concurrunt ad iustificationem impii in se, quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de ordine ipsorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quatuor quaeruntur.

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Primo quaeritur, utrum infusio gratiae necessario praecedat expulsionem culpae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum expulsio culpae necessario praecedat contritionem.

Tertio, utrum ante contritionem necesse sit praecedere attritionem.

Quarto, utrum confessio necessario sequatur iustificationem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum infusio gratiae necessario praecedat peccati expulsionem.*

Circa primum, quod gratiae infusio necessario praecedat peccati expulsionem, videtur.

1. Ambrosius[^1] dicit: « Quemadmodum intrans animam sapientis disciplina imprudentiam tollit, ita perfecta virtus iniquitatem »: si ergo iniquitatem non tollit nisi perfecta virtus intrans, et haec est gratia: ergo etc.

2. Item, gratiam infundi non est aliud quam ipsam creari[^2]; sed creatio gratiae praecedit expulsionem culpae, quia culpa non expellitur nisi per gratiam: ergo et gratiae infusio.

3. Item, si prius naturaliter expellitur culpa, quam infundatur gratia; cum culpa non possit expelli nisi per habitationem Dei in anima, tunc prius inhabitaret Deus animam, quam infunderet gratiam; et hoc est impossibile[^3].

4. Item, cum ignis expellit frigus, prius naturaliter immittit virtutem in materiam, quam illud expellit: si ergo Deus expellit culpam immittendo gratiam, ergo prior est gratiae immissio per naturam quam culpae expulsio.

**Sed contra:**

1. In qualibet mutatione prius est terminus *a quo* quam terminus *ad quem* secundum naturam, vel secundum tempus[^4]; sed iustificatio incipit a malo et terminatur ad bonum: ergo si malum, a quo incipit, est peccatum, et bonum, ad quod tendit, est gratia; videtur, quod prior per naturam sit peccati expulsio quam gratiae infusio.

2. Item, « prius est natura a quo non convertitur secundum necessitatem consequentia[^5] »; sed necessario ad esse gratum sequitur esse mundum, et non e converso, ut patet in primo homine et Angelo, in quibus ante fuit status innocentiae quam gratiae: ergo naturaliter prius est esse mundum quam gratum. Sed esse mundum est per culpae expulsionem, esse gratum per infusionem gratiae: ergo culpae expulsio prior.

3. Item, medium est secundum naturam et secundum actualem existentiam, et licet inter culpam et gratiam non sit medium secundum actualem existentiam, est tamen medium secundum naturam, videlicet innocentia; sed medium secundum naturam in mutatione naturaliter praecedit extrema[^6]: ergo etc.

4. Item, culpa expellitur, aut quando est, aut quando non est. Non quando non est, quia tunc semper expelleretur. Si quando est; sed quando est culpa in anima, non est infusa gratia, quia tunc simul essent duo opposita in eodem[^7]: ergo ante expellitur culpa, quam infundatur gratia.

5. Item, si Deus successive operaretur, prius expelleret culpam, quam infunderet gratiam, prius, inquam, tempore; sed subita operatio, si[^8] tollat ordinem temporis, non tamen tollit ordinem naturae: ergo cum subito iustificet, prius naturaliter culpam expellit, quam det gratiam.

6. Item, non videtur, quod sit[^9] aliquis ordo, quoniam privare privationem nihil aliud est quam restituere habitum; sed culpa est privatio, gratia est habitus: ergo omnino est idem gratiam infundi et culpam expelli: ergo videtur, quod simul sint tempore et natura, cum eiusdem ad se non sit aliquis ordo.

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### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Gratiae infusio, ut egrediens a suo principio, in iustificatione naturaliter praecedit expulsionem peccati.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod Deus se ipso expellit culpam; nam ipse de se dicit Isaiae quadragesimo tertio[^10]: *Ego sum, qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me.* Unde secundum hos prius Deus mundat animam et postmodum dat gratiam simul tempore, tamen posterius natura.

Sed quia verum esse communiter ponitur, et credo, quod Deus expellit peccatum per gratiam, sicut sol per radios tenebras, sicut dicitur Actuum decimo quinto[^11]: *Fide purificans* etc., et hoc supra monstratum est; ideo, cum causa praecedat effectum, infusio gratiae naturaliter prior est expulsione peccati, sicut lux praeit effugationem tenebrarum.

Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod qualitas aliqua, quae agit in aliud, habet triplicem comparationem, scilicet ad *principium*, a quo exit, et ad contrarium vel[^12] *oppositum*, quod expellit, et ad *subiectum*, quod perficit. Et sunt istae comparationes ordinatae. Prius enim comparatur ad principium, a quo producitur; secundo ad oppositum, quod expellitur; tertio ad subiectum, quod perficitur. Subiectum enim informatum aliqua qualitate, vel deformatum vitio, non potest intelligi informari aliqua bona qualitate vel perfectione, nisi prius intelligatur expulsio contrariae. Et impossibile est, quod aliquid intelligatur expulsum ab aliquo, quin prius intelligatur illud egredi a suo principio. Quoniam igitur gratiae infusio non dicit perfectionem subiecti nisi per concomitantiam, sed potius ipsius gratiae productionem ab agente; ideo patet, quod prior est quam expulsio, sicut causa prior est suo causato[^13].

**Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Quod obiicitur primo, quod prius est terminus *a quo*; dicendum, quod terminus *ad quem* non est gratiae infusio, sed magis subiectum esse gratum et mundatum et gratia informatum. Unde bene concedo, quod gratia prius per naturam habet rationem agentis quam informantis; et secundum quod habet rationem agentis, sic est principium iustificationis; secundum quod habet rationem informantis, sic est terminus.

*Ad 2.* Ad quod obiicitur, quod prius est esse mundum quam gratum; dicendum, quod quamvis prior sit mundatio per naturam quam gratificatio, non tamen est prior quam ipse mundans; et quia gratia non tantum est gratificans, sed etiam mundans; ideo praecedit. Unde ratio illa bona esset, si mundatio non esset a gratia tanquam a principio immediato et creato[^14]; nunc autem ratio illa tantum valet, quod prius per naturam competit gratiae expellere culpam quam subiectum informare; et hoc verum est. Forma enim, quae inducitur in materiam aliquam, prius est ibi ut potentia sive ut agens, quam sit ut perficiens sive ut actus. Sive igitur expulsio culpae sit idem quod mundificatio, sive non; sequitur infusionem gratiae; gratia enim mundificat, et hoc per naturam prius habet facere quam subiectum denominare.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod munditia vel innocentia est medium inter gratiam et culpam; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non propter hoc est prius animae mundificatio quam gratiae infusio. Gratia enim creata in anima ipsam informat; et quia informare non potest, quamdiu obstaculum ibi est, scilicet quamdiu[^15] subiectum opposito habitu informatur; culpam expellit. Unde prius est culpae expulsio naturaliter quam animae informatio. Et ante haec duo prius est gratiae creatio quam aliquod horum; gratiae autem infusio non est aliud quam ipsius creatio. Unde cum dicit, quod gratiae infusio est ipsius subiecti habilitatio, hoc dictum est per concomitantiam.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur: quando culpa expellitur? aut quando est, aut quando non est; dicendum, quod quia expulsio est mutatio subita, et in mutatione subita simul est *fieri* et *factum esse*; ideo simul est expulsio et expulsum esse; unde expellitur, quando primo non est. Dicitur ergo pro tanto expelli, quia prius fuit et adhuc esset, nisi contrarium repugnaret; et non semper dicitur expelli, sed solum in primo instanti et in quo esse desinit, et tunc quidem non est.

Aliqui tamen volunt aliter dicere, quod quia culpa habet esse temporale, ideo non est in sui termino, sed gratia est in termino et in initio; et ideo dicunt, quod cum gratia infunditur, et incipit et est tunc; peccatum autem, cum desinit esse, non est. — Sed quidquid sit de verbo desinendi[^16], <!-- page 427 -->tamen credo, quod culpa bene habet esse in instanti, sicut et gratia, et est in sui termino, termino, inquam, intra; sed expulsio est terminus extra, quia simul est cum expulsum esse. — Et si tu obiicias, quod duo instantia sunt immediata; tunc respondendum est, sicut superius[^17] responsum fuit de transitione panis in corpus Christi, ubi positae sunt quinque responsiones, quas non oportet iterare propter brevitatem; et in ultima credo esse standum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, si Deus operaretur successive etc.; dicendum, quod aliud[^18] mundaret animam quam gratia, et tunc esset alius ordo naturae; nunc autem cum mundet[^19] per gratiam, necesse est, ordine naturae ipsam praecedere expulsionem culpae. Hoc autem posito, quod per gratiam mundet; impossibile est intelligere, quod successive, quia tunc simul esset gratia cum culpa; gratia autem talis proprietas est, quae culpae nullatenus possit permisceri.

*Ad 6.* Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod idem est removere privationem et dare habitum; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi est pura privatio; verum est etiam, ubi datur habitus praecise removens illam privationem. Nunc autem non est ita, sed peccatum, etsi dicat deformitatem, nihilominus tamen concernit aliquam materiam secundum quosdam[^20]. Quidquid tamen sit de hoc, gratia non tantum reparat habitum oppositum culpae, qui est innocentia, sed superaddit, ut visum est supra[^21]; et ideo non est omnino idem culpam expellere et gratiam dare. — Et illud tenet communis opinio, quae illa quatuor distinguit, quae concurrunt ad iustificationem impii, inter quae primum est gratiae infusio, ultimo vero ponitur culpae expulsio.

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### Article II. *On the order of the things that concur unto justification.*

Consequently, having considered the things that concur unto the justification of the sinner in itself, with respect to the second article inquiry is made about the order of these things to one another. And concerning this four things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the infusion of grace necessarily precedes the expulsion of sin.

Second it is asked, whether the expulsion of sin necessarily precedes contrition.

Third, whether before contrition it is necessary that attrition precede.

Fourth, whether confession necessarily follows justification.

### Question I. *Whether the infusion of grace necessarily precedes the expulsion of sin.*

Concerning the first: that the infusion of grace necessarily precedes the expulsion of sin, it seems so.

1. Ambrose[^1] says: « Just as the discipline of wisdom, entering the soul, takes away imprudence, so perfect virtue takes away iniquity »: if therefore iniquity is not taken away except by perfect virtue entering in, and this is grace: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, for grace to be infused is nothing other than for it to be created[^2]; but the creation of grace precedes the expulsion of sin, because sin is not expelled except through grace: therefore so too is the infusion of grace.

3. Likewise, if sin is naturally expelled first, before grace is infused; since sin cannot be expelled except through the indwelling of God in the soul, then God would dwell in the soul before He would infuse grace; and this is impossible[^3].

4. Likewise, when fire expels cold, it first naturally sends its power into the matter, before it expels the cold: if therefore God expels sin by sending in grace, then the sending-in of grace is prior by nature to the expulsion of sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. In any change the terminus *from which* is naturally prior to the terminus *to which*, whether according to nature or according to time[^4]; but justification begins from evil and terminates at good: therefore if the evil from which it begins is sin, and the good to which it tends is grace; it seems that the expulsion of sin is by nature prior to the infusion of grace.

2. Likewise, « that is prior in nature from which the consequence is not converted according to necessity[^5] »; but to being clean there necessarily follows being in grace, and not conversely, as is clear in the first man and the Angel, in whom there was the state of innocence before that of grace: therefore by nature being clean is prior to being in grace. But being clean is through the expulsion of sin, being in grace through the infusion of grace: therefore the expulsion of sin is prior.

3. Likewise, the mean is [a mean] according to nature and according to actual existence, and although between sin and grace there is no mean according to actual existence, there is nevertheless a mean according to nature, namely innocence; but a mean according to nature in a change naturally precedes the extremes[^6]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, sin is expelled either when it is, or when it is not. Not when it is not, because then it would always be being expelled. If when it is; but when sin is in the soul, grace is not infused, because then two opposites would be at once in the same thing[^7]: therefore sin is expelled before grace is infused.

5. Likewise, if God were to operate successively, He would first expel sin before He would infuse grace, first, I say, in time; but a sudden operation, even if[^8] it removes the order of time, nevertheless does not remove the order of nature: therefore since He justifies suddenly, He first naturally expels sin before He gives grace.

6. Likewise, it does not seem that there is any order, since to deprive a privation is nothing other than to restore the habit; but sin is a privation, grace is a habit[^9]: therefore it is altogether the same for grace to be infused and for sin to be expelled: therefore it seems that they are simultaneous in time and nature, since of the same thing in relation to itself there is no order.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The infusion of grace, as proceeding from its principle, in justification naturally precedes the expulsion of sin.

**I respond:** To this some have wished to say that God expels sin by Himself; for He says of Himself in Isaiah forty-three[^10]: *I am He who blots out your iniquities for My own sake.* Hence according to these, God first cleanses the soul and afterward gives grace, [the two] simultaneous in time, yet posterior in nature.

But because the true [view] is more commonly held, and I believe that God expels sin through grace, as the sun [expels] darkness through its rays, as is said in Acts fifteen[^11]: *Purifying by faith* etc., and this was shown above; therefore, since the cause precedes the effect, the infusion of grace is naturally prior to the expulsion of sin, just as light goes before the driving-away of darkness.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that some quality which acts upon another thing has a threefold relation, namely to the *principle* from which it issues, and to the contrary or[^12] *opposite* which it expels, and to the *subject* which it perfects. And these relations are ordered. For first it is related to the principle from which it is produced; second to the opposite which is expelled; third to the subject which is perfected. For a subject informed by some quality, or deformed by a vice, cannot be understood to be informed by some good quality or perfection, unless first the expulsion of the contrary is understood. And it is impossible that anything be understood as expelled from something, unless first that thing be understood to issue from its principle. Since therefore the infusion of grace does not signify the perfection of the subject except by concomitance, but rather the production of grace itself by the agent; therefore it is plain that it is prior to the expulsion, just as a cause is prior to its effect[^13].

**To that, then, which is objected on the contrary:**

*To 1.* To what is objected first, that the terminus *from which* is prior; it must be said that the terminus *to which* is not the infusion of grace, but rather the subject's being in grace and cleansed and informed by grace. Hence I readily grant that grace by nature has the character of an agent before that of an informing [form]; and insofar as it has the character of an agent, thus it is the principle of justification; insofar as it has the character of an informing [form], thus it is the terminus.

*To 2.* To what is objected, that being clean is prior to being in grace; it must be said that although cleansing is by nature prior to gracing, nevertheless it is not prior to the one cleansing itself; and because grace is not only that which graces, but also that which cleanses; therefore it precedes. Hence that argument would be good, if cleansing were not from grace as from an immediate and created principle[^14]; but as it is, that argument has only this force, that by nature it belongs to grace to expel sin before it informs the subject; and this is true. For a form which is introduced into some matter is first there as a potency or as an agent, before it is there as perfecting or as an act. Whether therefore the expulsion of sin be the same as cleansing, or not; it follows the infusion of grace; for grace cleanses, and this by nature it has to do before it denominates the subject.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that cleanness or innocence is a mean between grace and sin; it must be said that this is true; but not on account of this is the cleansing of the soul prior to the infusion of grace. For grace, created in the soul, informs it; and because it cannot inform so long as an obstacle is there, namely so long as[^15] the subject is informed by the opposite habit; it expels sin. Hence the expulsion of sin is naturally prior to the informing of the soul. And before these two, the creation of grace is prior to any of them; but the infusion of grace is nothing other than its creation. Hence when he says that the infusion of grace is the enabling of the subject itself, this is said by concomitance.

*To 4.* To that which is asked: when is sin expelled? either when it is, or when it is not; it must be said that, because expulsion is a sudden change, and in a sudden change the *coming-to-be* and the *having-come-to-be* are simultaneous; therefore the expulsion and the having-been-expelled are simultaneous; hence it is expelled when first it is not. It is therefore said to be expelled inasmuch as it was before and would still be, were the contrary not to oppose it; and it is not always said to be expelled, but only in the first instant and in the [instant] in which its being ceases, and then indeed it is not.

Some, however, wish to say otherwise, that because sin has temporal being, therefore it is not in its terminus, but grace is in the terminus and in the beginning; and therefore they say that when grace is infused, it both begins and is then; but sin, when it ceases to be, is not. — But whatever may be the case as to the word "ceasing"[^16], yet I believe that sin too has being in an instant, just as grace does, and is in its terminus, in the terminus, I say, within; but the expulsion is the terminus without, because it is simultaneous with the having-been-expelled. — And if you object that two instants are immediate; then it must be answered, just as was answered above[^17] concerning the transition of bread into the body of Christ, where five answers were set down, which need not be repeated for the sake of brevity; and in the last one I believe one must stand.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, if God were to operate successively etc.; it must be said that something other than grace would cleanse the soul[^18], and then there would be another order of nature; but as it is, since He cleanses[^19] through grace, it is necessary that, in the order of nature, it precede the expulsion of sin. But this being granted, that He cleanses through grace, it is impossible to understand that [it be] successive, because then grace would be simultaneous with sin; but grace is such a property that it can in no way be mingled with sin.

*To 6.* To what is objected lastly, that it is the same to remove a privation and to give a habit; it must be said that this is true where there is a pure privation; it is true also where a habit is given that precisely removes that privation. But as it is, it is not so, but sin, even though it bespeaks a deformity, nevertheless concerns some matter according to certain ones[^20]. Yet whatever may be the case about this, grace not only repairs the habit opposed to sin, which is innocence, but superadds [something], as was seen above[^21]; and therefore it is not altogether the same to expel sin and to give grace. — And this the common opinion holds, which distinguishes those four things that concur unto the justification of the sinner, among which the first is the infusion of grace, while the expulsion of sin is placed last.

la: In *Apologia prophetae David*, c. 13. n. 63. Post *tollit* textus originalis addit *et scientia ignorantiam*. Cfr. C. *Ille rex* (25.), § 4. de Poenitentia, d. 3.

en: In the *Apology of the Prophet David*, c. 13, n. 63. After *tollit* the original text adds *et scientia ignorantiam* [and knowledge ignorance]. Cf. C. *Ille rex* (25), § 4, On Penance, d. 3.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4. in corp.

en: See I Sent., d. 9, q. 4, in the corpus.

la: Cfr. Sap. 1, 4. — Verbis *cum culpa* plures codd. interserunt *omnis*, et subinde pro *tunc prius* plurimi codd. *tunc primum*, cod. H *tunc prius primum*.

en: Cf. Wisdom 1:4. — To the words *cum culpa* several codices insert *omnis*, and thereafter for *tunc prius* very many codices read *tunc primum*, codex H *tunc prius primum*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 40. seqq. (c. 5.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 40 ff. (c. 5).

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Priori*: Secundo autem [prius alterum altero dicitur], quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unum duobus prius est; duobus enim existentibus, mox unum esse consequens est; uno vero existente, duo esse non necessarium est; quare non convertitur ab uno consequentia, ut reliquum sit; prius autem illud esse videtur, a quo non convertitur eius quod est esse consequentia. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 574, nota 1. et pag. 573, nota 1. — De primo statu Angelorum et hominis vide II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 29. a. 2. q. 2. — Inferius post *quam gratiae* codd. RS addunt *infusio*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On the Prior*: In the second way [one thing is said to be prior to another], that which is not converted according to the consequence of subsisting, as one is prior to two; for two existing, that one exists is at once a consequence; but one existing, that two exist is not necessary; wherefore the consequence is not converted from the one, so that the other should remain; but that is seen to be prior from which the consequence of that which is, as to being, is not converted. Cf. tome III, p. 574, note 1, and p. 573, note 1. — On the first state of the Angels and of man see II Sent., d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 29, a. 2, q. 2. — Below, after *quam gratiae*, codices RS add *infusio*.

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 22. (IX. c. 7.): Media namque illa dicimus, in quae necesse est primo transmutari quod transmutetur, ut puta... si ex albo ad nigrum veniat, prius ad puniceum et fuscum, quam ad nigrum veniet. Cfr. V. Phys. text. 6. et 52. (c. 1. et 5.). — In hoc arg. ex codd. DFG (ea secunda manu) supplevimus *videlicet innocentia*, quae lectio confirmatur falsa lectione codd. R S bb *videlicet in essentia*. Pro *actualem existentiam* fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 perperam *actualem exigentiam* (cfr. supra a. I. q. I. in corp. et ad 3.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 22 (IX, c. 7): For we call those things means into which it is necessary that whatever is changed first be changed, for instance... if it passes from white to black, it will come first to crimson and dusky, before it comes to black. Cf. *Physics* V, text 6 and 52 (c. 1 and 5). — In this argument, from codices DFG (in a second hand) we have supplied *videlicet innocentia*, which reading is confirmed by the false reading of codices R S bb *videlicet in essentia*. For *actualem existentiam* nearly all codices and ed. 1 wrongly [read] *actualem exigentiam* (cf. above, a. I, q. I, in the corpus and ad 3).

la: Quod est impossibile secundum Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.).

en: Which is impossible according to Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 4 (c. 14).

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *etsi*. Cod. P huic arg. subnectit: De hoc est auctoritas VII. Levit. [scil. Glossa *ordinaria* in v. 33. sumta ex Origen. homil. 5. n. 12.]: *Cum ablatum fuerit a corde tuo omne crassum, et mundatum fuerit ab omni inquinamento* [Glossa: operimento], *quod igni tradendum est, restat, ut ei apponatur gratia Spiritus sancti*: ergo etc.

en: The editions, with several codices, [read] *etsi*. Codex P appends to this argument: On this there is the authority of Leviticus 7 [namely the Glossa *ordinaria* on v. 33, taken from Origen, homily 5, n. 12]: *When all that is gross has been taken away from your heart, and it has been cleansed from every defilement* [Gloss: covering], *which must be given over to the fire, it remains that the grace of the Holy Spirit be added to it*: therefore etc.

la: Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *quod sit*.

en: Not a few codices and ed. 1 omit *quod sit*.

la: Vers. 25. Vide supra pag. 419, nota 4.

en: Verse 25. See above, p. 419, note 4.

la: Vers. 9. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Verse 9. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Ex codd. FGHL adiecimus *vel*. Inferius post *istae* cod. bb subiungit *tres*, et pro *quod perficitur* codd. GRSbb *a quo expellitur*.

en: From codices FGHL we have added *vel*. Below, after *istae*, codex bb subjoins *tres*, and for *quod perficitur* codices GRSbb [read] *a quo expellitur*.

la: Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.): Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa. — Post *prior est* cod. X supplet *infusio gratiae et culpae post expulsio*.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, c. 17 (c. 14): For a cause is prior to that of which it is the cause. — After *prior est* codex X supplies *infusio gratiae et culpae post expulsio*.

la: Cod. aa *immediante et creante*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *immediante et creante* [as an immediate and creating (principle)].

la: Pro *scilicet quamdiu*, quod habet cod. A et quod non pauci codd. omittunt, codd. ELaa *et*, cod. K (1a secunda manu) *dum*, edd. legunt: ideo subiectum opposito habitu informat et culpam expellit. Codd. HPQ, omisso *scilicet quamdiu*, post *informatur* addunt *qui*. In fine solut. pro *habilitatio* plures codd. *habitatio*.

en: For *scilicet quamdiu*, which codex A has and which not a few codices omit, codices ELaa [read] *et*, codex K (in a second hand) *dum*, the editions read: thus it informs the subject with the opposite habit and expels sin. Codices HPQ, omitting *scilicet quamdiu*, after *informatur* add *qui*. At the end of the solution, for *habilitatio* several codices [read] *habitatio*.

la: Cfr. tom. III. pag. 252, nota 3. — Inferius pro *cum expulsum esse* cod. X *cum eo quod est expulsum esse*, cod. Z *expelli et expulsum esse*.

en: Cf. tome III, p. 252, note 3. — Below, for *cum expulsum esse* codex X [reads] *cum eo quod est expulsum esse*, codex Z *expelli et expulsum esse*.

la: Dist. 11. p. I. q. 5. ad 4. — Pro *transitione* codd. R S bb *transsubstantiatione*.

en: Distinction 11, p. I, q. 5, ad 4. — For *transitione* codices R S bb [read] *transsubstantiatione*.

la: Codd. A aa *cum non mundet nisi*.

en: Codices A aa [read] *cum non mundet nisi* [since He cleanses only].

en: See II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, scholion. — For *materiam* codices EL [read] *naturam*, several others *maculam*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. scholion. — Pro *materiam* codd. EL *naturam*, plures alii *maculam*. [Idem ac nota praecedens; vide supra.]

en: [This reference belongs with the variant noted above on *materiam*; the editors' note treats *secundum quosdam* with II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, scholion.] [?]

la: Art. 1. q. I. Ibid. q. 3. de quatuor, quae concurrunt ad iustificationem. — Superius pro *reparat* cod. aa *recuperat*; subinde post *culpae* ex eodem cod. aa cum cod. N substituimus *qui est* pro *quae est*.

en: Article 1, q. I. Ibidem, q. 3, on the four things that concur unto justification. — Above, for *reparat* codex aa [reads] *recuperat*; thereafter, after *culpae*, from the same codex aa together with codex N we have substituted *qui est* for *quae est*.

la: [Scholion, sect. III:] auctor distinguit actum contritionis (hic q. 2. ad 1. 2. 3.).

en: [Scholion, sect. III:] the author distinguishes the act of contrition (here, q. 2, ad 1, 2, 3).

la: [Scholion, in fine, p. 428:] De utraque quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 17. m. 4. a. 7. § 1-3. — Scot., supra d. 16. q. 2. praesertim n. 18. 19. — B. Albert., hic a. II. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-4. — De his et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 1; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

en: [Scholion, at the end, p. 428:] On both questions, besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 17, m. 4, a. 7, §§ 1-3. — Scotus, above d. 16, q. 2, especially nn. 18, 19. — Bl. Albert, here a. II. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunculae 1-4. — On these and the following question, Durandus, here q. 1; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In quaestionibus huius articuli Scholastici quoad principia conveniebant, sed quoad quasdam subtiles quaestiones dissidebant. Affirmabant communiter, iustificationem impii fieri in instanti, et in eodem instanti quatuor coniungi inter se distinguenda. Haec ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 4. a. 6. § 4.) sic exponuntur: « In iustificatione enim sunt duo termini, scilicet a malo et ad bonum; unde ex parte Dei requiritur aliquid ex parte termini a quo, et aliquid ex parte termini ad quem; similiter ex parte nostra... Ex parte quidem Dei respectu termini in quem est infusio gratiae, respectu termini a quo remissio peccati. Ex parte nostra respectu termini in quem est motus liberi arbitrii [per fidem in Deum], respectu termini a quo contritio, quae est detestatio peccati ». Concordant perfecte S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 113. a. 6.) et S. Bonav. cum ceteris antiquis (cfr. scholion supra a. I. q. I.). — Non autem ita omnes conveniebant in solvenda quaestione, quo ordine naturae quatuor praedicta, quae ordine temporis coincidunt, ad invicem se habeant. — Et observandum est, quod haec quaestio minime respicit praeparationem, quae tempore iustificationem adulti praecedere debet (de qua saeculo XVIII. quoad qualitatem attritionis fuerunt graves controversiae), ut bene observant Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 7. § 1.) et S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 28. a. 3. 8.). Nec ipsa respicit actum contritionis a iam iustificato factum et a caritate vel elicitum, vel imperatum (cfr. infra q. 2. ad 1. 2. 3.). Recolatur etiam differentia in definienda contritione, quae inter antiquos et recentiores theologos versatur et supra in scholio ad a. 1. q. 1. notata est.

**II.** Controversia igitur est 1. de ordine naturae, qui est inter expulsionem culpae et infusionem gratiae (hic q. I.); 2. de eodem ordine inter actum contritionis et expulsionem culpae et gratiae infusionem; quae quaestiones intime cohaerent, et simul implicatur alia quaestio, utrum iste actus contritionis procedat ab ipsa gratia gratum faciente (habituali), an a gratia gratis data (actuali). — Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.) refert de his quinque opiniones, quarum ultima (quam censet esse probabilem) tenet, non esse quaerendum de prioritate secundum ordinem naturae, sed tantum de quatuor illis secundum rationem. Primo autem loco ipse recenset sententiam S. Thomae (S. I. II. q. 113. a. 8.), quam improbat, quod scilicet ordine naturae primum sit gratiae infusio, secundum motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, tertium motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, quartum remissio culpae. In qua sententia simul supponit S. Thom. ultimam dispositionem istam (contritionis actum) procedere ab ipsa gratia gratum faciente, « quia secundum ordinem causae formalis, efficientis et finalis infusio gratiae natura prior est », licet « secundum ordinem causae materialis remissio culpae praecedat infusionem gratiae » (hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1.). Similiter, « motus liberi arbitrii praecedit naturaliter gratiae infusionem, sicut dispositio materialis formam [sive secundum rationem causae materialis]. Si autem attendatur secundum rationem causae formalis, est e converso » (de Verit. q. 28. a. 8.). Hinc discipuli S. Thomae communius docent, contritionem procedere ab ipsa gratia habituali et sequi eandem in genere causae efficientis, ipsam vero praecedere in genere causae materialis. Et re vera ipsa verba S. Doctoris hoc satis clare docere videntur. Nihilominus cum aliis Thomistis Gotti (Theol. scholast. II. tr. 7. q. 2. dub. 4. § 6.) dicit, hanc assertionem non paucis scatere difficultatibus, probabiliusque videri, ultimam dispositionem illam non esse efficienter ab ipsa gratia habituali, sed ab auxilio supernaturali, et per consequens praecedere iustificationem.

**III.** Sententia S. Bonav. (de qua cfr. etiam supra d. 14. p. I. q. 3.) et Alexandri Hal. facile intelligitur, si attenditur duplex distinctio, quam facit S. Doctor. Prima fit circa gratiam (q. I. in corp.), quam considerat sub triplici ratione simulque dicit, quod prius per naturam habeat rationem agentis quam informantis (ibid. ad 1.) et mundantis quam gratificantis. Simul est observandum, quod gratiae infusio ab ipso hic intelligitur productio eius a primo principio, non informatio et perfectio subiecti nisi per concomitantiam (in fine corp.). Unde patet, quod gratiae productio prior est expulsione peccati, haec vero natura prior quam eadem gratia, quatenus subiectum informat et gratificat, quod est ultimus terminus ad quem (ad 1. 2. 3.). De gratia ut movente cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6. — Similiter auctor distinguit[^22] actum contritionis (hic q. 2. ad 1. 2. 3.) sive potius formationem huius actus, ut sit scilicet vel a gratia eliciente et imperante, vel tantum adveniente; sive aliis verbis, in adulto <!-- page 428 -->peccatore iste actus in primo instanti naturae praeintelligitur informis, in secundo intelligitur formata; ut informis necessario praecedit et expulsionem peccati et gratiae informationem. Hoc docet etiam Scot. et communior opinio (cfr. infra q. 3.). In solut. ad 4. adhibentur eadem principia, quae explicata sunt supra d. 11. p. I. q. 5. et in scholio.[^23]

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the questions of this article the Scholastics agreed as to principles, but as to certain subtle questions they differed. They commonly affirmed that the justification of the sinner takes place in an instant, and that in the same instant four things to be distinguished from one another are conjoined. These are expounded by Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. IV, q. 17, m. 4, a. 6, § 4) thus: « For in justification there are two termini, namely from evil and to good; whence on the part of God something is required on the part of the terminus from which, and something on the part of the terminus to which; likewise on our part... On the part of God indeed, with respect to the terminus to which is the infusion of grace, with respect to the terminus from which the remission of sin. On our part, with respect to the terminus to which is the movement of free will [through faith into God], with respect to the terminus from which contrition, which is the detestation of sin ». St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 113, a. 6) and St. Bonaventure agree perfectly with the other ancients (cf. the scholion above on a. 1, q. 1). — But not all agreed in solving the question, in what order of nature the four aforesaid things, which coincide in the order of time, are related to one another. — And it must be observed that this question by no means concerns the preparation which in time must precede the justification of an adult (about which, in the eighteenth century, there were grave controversies as to the quality of attrition), as Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., a. 7, § 1) and St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 28, a. 3, 8) well observe. Nor does it concern the act of contrition made by one already justified and either elicited or commanded by charity (cf. below, q. 2, ad 1, 2, 3). Let there also be recalled the difference in defining contrition which obtains between the ancient and the more recent theologians, and which was noted above in the scholion on a. 1, q. 1.

**II.** The controversy therefore is 1. about the order of nature which is between the expulsion of sin and the infusion of grace (here, q. I); 2. about the same order between the act of contrition and the expulsion of sin and the infusion of grace; which questions are intimately connected, and at the same time another question is involved, whether this act of contrition proceeds from grace itself that makes acceptable (habitual), or from grace gratuitously given (actual). — Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 1, q. 4) reports five opinions concerning these, of which the last (which he judges to be probable) holds that there is no inquiry to be made about priority according to the order of nature, but only about those four according to reason. But in the first place he reviews the opinion of St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 113, a. 8), which he disapproves, namely that in the order of nature the first is the infusion of grace, the second the movement of free will into God, the third the movement of free will against sin, the fourth the remission of sin. In which opinion St. Thomas at the same time supposes that this last disposition (the act of contrition) proceeds from grace itself that makes acceptable, « because according to the order of formal, efficient, and final cause the infusion of grace is by nature prior », although « according to the order of material cause the remission of sin precedes the infusion of grace » (here, q. 1, a. 4, quaestiuncula 1). Likewise, « the movement of free will naturally precedes the infusion of grace, just as a material disposition [precedes] the form [or according to the account of material cause]. But if it be considered according to the account of formal cause, it is the reverse » (de Verit. q. 28, a. 8). Hence the disciples of St. Thomas more commonly teach that contrition proceeds from habitual grace itself and follows it in the genus of efficient cause, but precedes it in the genus of material cause. And in truth the very words of the holy Doctor seem to teach this clearly enough. Nevertheless, with other Thomists, Gotti (Theol. scholast. II, tr. 7, q. 2, dub. 4, § 6) says that this assertion teems with not a few difficulties, and that it seems more probable that that last disposition is not efficiently from habitual grace itself, but from a supernatural help, and consequently precedes justification.

**III.** The opinion of St. Bonaventure (about which cf. also above, d. 14, p. I, q. 3) and of Alexander of Hales is easily understood, if one attends to the twofold distinction which the holy Doctor makes. The first is made concerning grace (q. I, in corp.), which he considers under a threefold account, and at the same time says that by nature it has the character of an agent before that of an informing [form] (ibid., ad 1) and of that which cleanses before that which graces. At the same time it must be observed that the infusion of grace is here understood by him [as] its production from the first principle, not the informing and perfection of the subject except by concomitance (at the end of the corpus). Hence it is plain that the production of grace is prior to the expulsion of sin, but this is by nature prior to the same grace insofar as it informs and graces the subject, which is the ultimate terminus to which (ad 1, 2, 3). On grace as a moving [cause] cf. II Sent., d. 26, q. 6. — Likewise the author distinguishes[^22] the act of contrition (here, q. 2, ad 1, 2, 3), or rather the formation of this act, that it be namely either from grace eliciting and commanding, or only supervening; or in other words, in the adult sinner this act in the first instant of nature is pre-understood as unformed, in the second is understood as formed; so that as unformed it necessarily precedes both the expulsion of sin and the informing of grace. This Scotus also teaches, and the more common opinion (cf. below, q. 3). In the solution to argument 4 the same principles are employed which were explained above in d. 11, p. I, q. 5, and in the scholion.[^23]

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 428 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum expulsio culpae necessario praecedat contritionem.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum expulsio culpae necessario praecedat contritionem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia motus contritionis est motus formatus[^1]; sed gratia prius naturaliter informat subiectum quam actum: ergo prius naturaliter est homo gratus quam contritus. Sed esse gratificatum sequitur peccati expulsionem: ergo et contritio, quae provenit ab anima gratificata.

2. Item, contritio est motus meritorius; sed omnis motus meritorius procedit a radice mundata[^2]: ergo cum radix mundetur per peccati expulsionem, patet, quod expulsio peccati praecedit contritionem.

3. Item, contritio est opus bonum; sed opus bonum praecedit habitus bonus[^3]: ergo prius naturaliter anima habilitatur, quam conteratur. Sed impossibile est intelligere animam habilem ad bonum, nisi expulsa culpa: ergo etc.

4. Item, motus liberi arbitrii praecedit; sed impossibile est, animam simul moveri diversis motibus secundum partem superiorem[^4]; sed in eodem instanti est remissio culpae et motus liberi arbitrii: non ergo contritio.

**Contra:**
1. Si contritio sequeretur culpae remissionem; cum, remissa culpa, necessario sit homo iustus, ergo etiam si non sequeretur contritio, esset iustus; sed hoc est falsum: ergo non necessario praecedit[^5].

2. Item, si remissio culpae esset omnino a libero arbitrio, tunc constat, quod actus detestationis eam praecederet; sed sicut praecedit rem quod est tota causa, ita et quod est adiuvativum: ergo si contritio est motus a libero arbitrio, adiuvans gratiam et faciens viam ad culpam delendam[^6]; patet, quod est prior.

3. Item, si lumen non posset introduci in aerem, nisi aere ad hoc operante; non solum luminis inductio praecederet expulsionem tenebrae, sed etiam actus aeris; sed sic est in proposito[^7]: ergo cum iustificatio non introducatur, nisi adiuvante libero arbitrio; patet, quod non solum infusio gratiae, sed etiam actus liberi arbitrii praecedit ipsam naturaliter.

4. Item, cum anima non possit sanari nisi operans; si non posset operari nisi sanata, esset ei via praeclusa[^8]: ergo necesse est, quod illa operatio, per quam sanatur, praecedat sanationem, ergo peccati remissionem.

### Conclusio
> Contritio remissionem culpae praecedit secundum ordinem naturae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquorum opinio fuit, quod remissio culpae antecederet contritionem, secundum quod remissio culpae dicitur quantum ad maculae ablationem; sed quantum ad poenam, vel sequelam sequitur. — Sed sicut supra[^9] dictum est, contritio necessaria est in ipsius gratiae infusione; unde et praecedit peccati expulsionem natura.

Et hoc patet sic: quia anima per detestationem peccati se disponit ad gratiam dispositione, quanta potest; gratia vero adveniens in animam, quia illa detestatio erat quasi dispositio media ad introducendam gratiam, per naturam prius respicit illam et per illam culpam delendam; sed[^10] ex comparatione vel respectu gratiae ad illam detestationem est contritio, ex respectu ad culpam est remissio: ideo contritio praecedit remissionem per naturam. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

Exemplum autem huius videri potest sic. Intelligamus aerem obtenebratum per praesentiam nubium et nebularum, et quod nubes illae non possint expelli eatenus, qua obtenebrant, nisi per motum aeris et irradiationem luminis. Tunc ad hoc,
<!-- page 429 -->
quod aer reciperet primam illuminationem, oporteret, simul cum irradiatione solis concurrere ventum, et post ad perfectam restitutionem luminis oporteret adhuc ventum sequi, qui nebulas expelleret. Per hunc modum est intelligere de contritione et gratiae infusione, ipsi tamen causalitas activa attribuatur ut irradiationi, secundum illud Psalmi[^11]: *Prae fulgore in conspectu eius nubes transierunt* etc.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod[^12] est actus formatus et meritorius et bonus; dicendum, quod actus formari potest a gratia dupliciter: uno modo a gratia ipsum motum secundum suam substantiam eliciente et imperante, ut cum gratia movet liberum arbitrium ad bonum opus; et tunc verum est, quod animae gratificatio et mundatio et habilitatio ad bonum talem actum praecedit. Alio modo actus formatur a gratia non imperante nec eliciente, sed adveniente, ut quando liberum arbitrium est in actu consono gratiae; tunc etiam[^13] adveniens et inveniens liberum arbitrium in actu utrumque simul tempore format, scilicet potentiam et actum, prius tamen natura actum quam potentiam, sicut dispositionem intermediam. Et de tali non est verum, quod sequatur mundationem vel informationem, immo praecedit et ordinatur ad remissionem culpae; quod quidem non facit aliquis actus a gratia elicitus, prout dicitur gratum faciens. Nam etiam ille actus, quo anima se disponit, est a gratia, secundum quod gratia dicit aliquid gratis datum; quia, secundum quod habitum est in secundo, liberum arbitrium non se disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem sine aliquo gratis dato. Et sic patent tria obiecta. Contritio vero, quae est post iustificationem, est per modum illum, quem dicit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima non simul diversis motibus movetur; dicendum, quod verum est secundum eandem potentiam; sed secundum aliam et aliam potest esse et necesse est. Simul enim sunt cognitio rationis et appetitus voluntatis et delectatio, cum quis delectatur in videndo vel intelligendo aliquid. Sic in proposito: quia motus liberi arbitrii est fidei secundum actum rationis, sed contritio est potentiae voluntatis secundum irascibilem vim, et simul sunt tempore.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the expulsion of fault necessarily precedes contrition.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the expulsion of fault necessarily precedes contrition. And that it does, it seems:

1. Because the motion of contrition is an informed motion[^1]; but grace naturally informs the subject prior to the act: therefore a man is naturally graced before he is contrite. But to be made graced follows upon the expulsion of sin: therefore so also does contrition, which proceeds from a graced soul.

2. Likewise, contrition is a meritorious motion; but every meritorious motion proceeds from a purified root[^2]: therefore since the root is purified through the expulsion of sin, it is clear that the expulsion of sin precedes contrition.

3. Likewise, contrition is a good work; but a good habit precedes a good work[^3]: therefore the soul is naturally enabled before it is made contrite. But it is impossible to understand the soul as enabled for good unless fault has been expelled: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the motion of free will precedes; but it is impossible for the soul to be moved at the same time by diverse motions according to the superior part[^4]; but in the same instant there is the remission of fault and the motion of free will: therefore contrition is not [the same instant].

**On the contrary:**
1. If contrition followed upon the remission of fault, since, the fault being remitted, a man is necessarily just, then even if contrition did not follow, he would be just; but this is false: therefore it does not necessarily precede[^5].

2. Likewise, if the remission of fault were entirely from free will, then it is settled that the act of detestation would precede it; but as that which is the whole cause precedes the thing, so also does that which is auxiliary: therefore if contrition is a motion from free will, aiding grace and making the way for fault to be destroyed[^6]; it is clear that it is prior.

3. Likewise, if light could not be introduced into the air unless the air worked toward this; not only would the introduction of light precede the expulsion of darkness, but so also would the act of the air; but so it is in the case at hand[^7]: therefore since justification is not introduced except with free will aiding, it is clear that not only the infusion of grace, but also the act of free will, precedes it naturally.

4. Likewise, since the soul cannot be healed except by operating; if it could not operate unless healed, the way would be closed off to it[^8]: therefore it is necessary that the operation by which it is healed precede the healing, therefore the remission of sin.

### Conclusion
> Contrition precedes the remission of fault according to the order of nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that it was the opinion of some that the remission of fault antecedes contrition, insofar as the remission of fault is taken with respect to the removal of the stain; but with respect to the penalty, or the consequence, it follows. — But as was said above[^9], contrition is necessary in the very infusion of grace; whence it also precedes the expulsion of sin in nature.

And this is clear thus: because the soul, through the detestation of sin, disposes itself toward grace with as great a disposition as it can; but grace, coming into the soul, since that detestation was as it were a middle disposition for introducing grace, by nature first regards that detestation and through it the fault to be destroyed; but[^10] from the comparison or in respect of grace to that detestation there is contrition, while in respect of the fault there is remission: therefore contrition precedes remission by nature. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

An example of this can be seen thus. Let us understand the air darkened by the presence of clouds and mists, and that those clouds cannot be expelled insofar as they darken, except by the motion of the air and the irradiation of light. Then, in order
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that the air might receive the first illumination, it would be necessary that, together with the irradiation of the sun, a wind concur, and afterward, for the perfect restoration of the light, it would still be necessary that a wind follow which would expel the clouds. In this manner is contrition and the infusion of grace to be understood, though the active causality be attributed to the irradiation, according to that of the Psalm[^11]: *At the brightness in his sight the clouds passed away,* etc.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1, 2, 3.* To that which is objected to the contrary, that it[^12] is an informed and meritorious and good act; it must be said that an act can be informed by grace in two ways: in one way, by grace eliciting and commanding the motion itself according to its substance, as when grace moves free will to a good work; and then it is true that the soul's gratification and purification and enabling for good precedes such an act. In another way, an act is informed by grace not commanding nor eliciting, but coming, as when free will is in an act consonant with grace; then also[^13], coming and finding free will in act, it forms both at the same time in time, namely the potency and the act, yet the act prior in nature to the potency, as an intermediate disposition. And concerning such an act it is not true that it follows purification or information, rather it precedes and is ordered to the remission of fault; which indeed some act elicited by grace does not do, insofar as it is called grace-making [*gratum faciens*]. For even that act by which the soul disposes itself is from grace, insofar as grace signifies something freely given; because, as was held in the second [book], free will does not dispose itself toward grace-making grace without something freely given. And so the three objections are clear. But the contrition which is after justification is by that mode which it states.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the soul is not moved by diverse motions at the same time; it must be said that this is true according to the same potency; but according to one potency and another it can be, and is necessary. For there are simultaneously the cognition of reason and the appetite of the will and delight, when someone delights in seeing or understanding something. So in the case at hand: because the motion of free will is of faith according to the act of reason, but contrition is of the potency of the will according to the irascible power, and they are simultaneous in time.

---

la: Scil. a gratia.

en: That is, from grace.

la: August., *de Spiritu et lit.* c. 14. n. 26: *Non enim fructus est bonus, qui de caritatis radice non surgit.*

en: Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 14, n. 26: *For that fruit is not good which does not spring from the root of charity.*

la: Ut insinuat Aristot. supra pag. 352, nota 10. allegatus.

en: As Aristotle suggests, cited above on p. 352, note 10.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 13. — *Maior probata est supra a. 1. q. 2. et intelligitur de motu fidei.*

en: Cf. above, p. 342, note 13. — *The major was proved above in a. 1, q. 2, and is understood of the motion of faith.*

la: Scil. *remissio culpae.* Edd. cum pluribus codd. omittunt *non,* in qua lectione supplendum *contritio.*

en: That is, the remission of fault. The editions, with many codices, omit *non,* in which reading *contritio* must be supplied.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 3.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. — Pro *sic est* ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. *hoc est.* Inferius pro *infusio gratiae,* quod praebet cod. M, alii codd. et ed. 1 *expulsio culpae (sed de hac quaeritur),* Vat. *iustificatio sive infusio gratiae praecedit expulsionem culpae.*

en: As was shown above in a. 1, q. 2, ad 3. — For *sic est,* edition 1 with many codices reads *hoc est.* Below, for *infusio gratiae,* which codex M provides, the other codices and edition 1 read *expulsio culpae (but this is the very thing in question),* the Vatican edition: *justification or the infusion of grace precedes the expulsion of fault.*

la: Supple: *salutis vel sanationis.*

en: Supply: of salvation or of healing.

en: The preceding article, q. 3, and d. 16, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.

la: Ita codd. F G U X, in aliis et edd. *sic.*

en: Thus codices F, G, U, X; in the others and the editions, *sic.*

la: Psalm. 17, 13. — Superius pro *est intelligere* non pauci codd. *intellige.*

en: Psalm 17:13. — Above, for *est intelligere,* not a few codices read *intellige.*

la: Cod. X supplet *contritio.* Idem cod. inferius pro *substantiam* substituit *speciem.* Cfr. supra d. 14. p. 1. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.

en: Codex X supplies *contritio.* The same codex, below, substitutes *speciem* for *substantiam.* Cf. above, d. 14, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, in the body.

la: Cod. U *enim,* Vat. *gratia.* Cfr. supra d. 16. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.

en: Codex U reads *enim,* the Vatican edition *gratia.* Cf. above, d. 16, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p428-{L,R}` and `vol4-p429-{L,R}`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 48278–48393). Vol IV is two-column; the VOL II OVERRIDE applies (PDF authoritative in cascade-shattered regions).
- **Page alignment correction:** the prompt's "~427–428" estimate was off by one. The running head on the q2-opening page reads **428 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV**, and p. 427's running head reads **QUAEST. I.** — p. 427 holds only a2-**q1**'s tail + scholion. So q2's true span is **printed pp. 428–429** (pdf 448–449). The opener "Secundo quaeritur, utrum expulsio culpae…" verified aligned; chunk ends just before q3 ("Tertio quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, quod attritio praecedat…", raw 48394, which opens on p. 429's lower left column).
- **Running-head quirk:** p. 429's running head reads "QUAEST. III." even though its left column begins with q2's Respondeo replies (q3 starts only partway down the left column). The OCR'd "QUAEST. III" mid-range (raw line ~48381) is that running head, not a body boundary. q2's reply text on p. 429 (cols L→R) is correctly retained in this chunk.
- **Scholion disposition:** has_scholion = **false**. The Articulus II scholion (§I–III, headed `SCHOLION.` on p. 427 spanning both columns) covers all of Art II's questions and is rendered with **a2-q1** (`bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-a2-q1`) per the dispatch instruction. No scholion text belongs here.
- **Footer split across the q2 span:** p. 428 footers 1–10 are q2's (objection/contra section, L cols 1–5, R cols 6–10); p. 429-L footers 1–3 are q2's (Respondeo Psalm + textual variants), renumbered sequentially here as [^11]–[^13]. p. 429-L footers 4+ belong to q3. The p. 428-R source-citation block ("De utraque quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., …") is the **scholion's** apparatus and is carried with a2-q1, not here.
- **[?] flags:** none. All readings legible in the bands; OCR garbles (e.g. `raotus`→motus, `aclum`→actum, `conlritio`→contritio, `niotum`→motum) silently corrected per CLAUDE.md.
- **J2 2026-07-13:** `[^12]` and `[^13]` were missing from the English body; inserted after "it" (Ad 1,2,3 opener, mirroring Latin *quod[^12]*) and after "also" (mirroring Latin *etiam[^13]*), respectively.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum necesse sit quod attritio praecedat impii iustificationem

source_text:
<!-- page 429 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum necesse sit, quod attritio praecedat impii iustificationem sive contritionem.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, quod attritio praecedat impii iustificationem sive contritionem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quoniam, si Deus iustificaret sine praeparatione, tunc etiam sine motu liberi arbitrii iustificaret; quod quidem non facit, sicut dicit Augustinus[^6]: « Qui creavit te sine te non iustificat te sine te ». Tunc igitur quaero: per quid immediate se praeparat? Si per actum alium quam doloris; cum gratia non sit deletiva suae praeparationis, illum actum non expellet, sed formabit: ergo sine omni contritione poterit iustificari; sed hoc est falsum[^7]: ergo etc.

2. Item, gratia per se sufficiens est delere culpam, ex quo venit in animam: ergo si requiritur actus, videtur hoc esse magis ad introducendam gratiam quam ad iuvandum introductam; sed motus doloris ante infusionem gratiae est attritio[^8]: ergo etc.

3. Item, licet dolor sit motus instantaneus, non tamen elicitur a libero arbitrio nisi per praeparationem et collationem, quae fit in tempore; sed iustificatio fit in instanti[^9]: ergo necesse est, quod ante illud instans liberum arbitrium dolere incipiat.

**Contra:**
1. Videmus Paulum iustificatum, in quo nulla praecessit praeparatio nec attritio[^10].

2. Item, Ambrosius[^11]: « Nescit tarda molimina Spiritus sancti gratia »: ergo statim potest totum fieri: ergo etc.

3. Item, si requiritur dolor praecedens, aut ille dolor informatur adveniente gratia, aut non. Si sic: ergo attritio fit contritio, et opus mortuum fit vivum; quod est inconveniens[^12]. Si non informatur, ergo necesse est, dolorem novum elici; sed similiter posset elici, si ille non praecessisset: ergo etc.

Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum attritio fiat contritio. Et quod non, videtur: quia ortum habet a timore servili, qui expellitur[^13], non formatur. — Quod autem fiat, videtur: quia ortum habet a fide informi, quae non expellitur, sed formatur: ergo similiter et attritio.

<!-- page 430 -->

> **Conclusio.** *Attritio praecedit impii iustificationem secundum legem communem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum speciale privilegium potest Deus iustificare sine omni praeparatione; tamen secundum legem communem non iustificat nisi eos qui se praeparant, sicut dicitur in Zacharia[^1]: *Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos.* Et quia praeparatio debet esse secundum convenientiam qua est ad iustificationem, in motu liberi arbitrii et contritio; necesse est, quod homo se praeparet motu fidei et doloris, ita quod gratia inveniat liberum arbitrium in utroque istorum actuum, vel etiam summe paratum ad utrumque, ita quod in eodem instanti paratum sit moveri, in quo gratia advenit. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam; procedunt enim secundum legem communem, quae non praeiudicat privilegio speciali[^2].

*Ad 1, 2.* Et ideo patet de Paulo. Similiter, quod nescit tarda molimina; dicendum, quod verum est, quod gratia subito venit, sed tamen homo non subito praeparatur.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum ille dolor formetur, aut novus eliciatur; illi qui dicunt, quod post contritio sequitur culpae remissionem, dicunt, quod novus elicitur, et post infusionem gratiae omnes virtutes habent novos actus. Sed illi qui dicunt, quod contritio est in instanti iustificationis; necesse habent dicere, quod dolor ille formatur et motus fidei sive liberi arbitrii[^3].

Ad illud ergo quod quaeritur, utrum attritio fiat contritio; dicendum, quod istud tripliciter potest intelligi: aut quod habitus, quo quis atteritur, formetur et illo conteratur, sicut fides informis fit formata; et hoc credo verum, credo enim, quod habitus poenitentiae informis per adventum gratiae formatur. Nec[^4] simile est de timore servili, in quo vivit voluntas peccandi. — Secundo modo potest intelligi quantum ad actum substratum; et adhuc concedo, quod actus, qui in principio sui est attritio, antequam interrumpatur, fit contritio, sicut patet de motu, quo quis vadit ad ecclesiam, si infundatur ei gratia in via. — Tertio modo potest intelligi quantum ad conditionem superadditam, quia opus mortuum secundum partem illam, qua mortuum est, fiat vivum; et hoc impossibile est, quia pars illa motus transiit et fuit informis et numquam formatur, quia non resumitur idem, quod praeteriit[^5].

---

english:
<!-- page 429 -->

### Question III. *Whether it is necessary that attrition precede the justification of the wicked, or contrition.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it is necessary that attrition precede the justification of the wicked, or contrition. And that it is so seems [to be the case]:

1. Because, if God were to justify without preparation, then He would also justify without a motion of free will; which indeed He does not do, as Augustine says[^6]: "He who created you without you does not justify you without you." Then therefore I ask: by what does one immediately prepare oneself? If by some act other than that of sorrow; since grace is not destructive of one's preparation, it will not expel that act but will inform it: therefore one will be able to be justified without any contrition; but this is false[^7]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, grace is of itself sufficient to destroy guilt, from the moment it comes into the soul: therefore if an act is required, this seems to be rather for introducing grace than for assisting grace once introduced; but a motion of sorrow before the infusion of grace is attrition[^8]: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, although sorrow is an instantaneous motion, nevertheless it is not elicited by free will except through a preparation and a bringing-together, which happens in time; but justification happens in an instant[^9]: therefore it is necessary that before that instant free will begin to sorrow.

**On the contrary:**
1. We see Paul justified, in whom no preparation nor attrition preceded[^10].

2. Likewise, Ambrose[^11]: "The grace of the Holy Spirit knows no slow endeavors": therefore the whole thing can be done at once: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, if a preceding sorrow is required, either that sorrow is informed by the coming of grace, or not. If so: then attrition becomes contrition, and a dead work becomes living; which is unfitting[^12]. If it is not informed, then it is necessary that a new sorrow be elicited; but it could likewise be elicited if that one had not preceded: therefore, etc.

Likewise, in connection with this it is asked whether attrition becomes contrition. And that it does not, seems [to be the case]: because it takes its origin from servile fear, which is expelled[^13], not informed. — But that it does [become contrition] seems [to be the case]: because it takes its origin from unformed faith, which is not expelled but informed: therefore likewise also attrition.

<!-- page 430 -->

> **Conclusion.** *Attrition precedes the justification of the wicked according to the common law.*

**I respond:** It must be said that according to a special privilege God can justify without any preparation; nevertheless according to the common law He does not justify any but those who prepare themselves, as is said in Zechariah[^1]: *Turn to me, and I will turn to you.* And because the preparation ought to be according to the fittingness by which it is ordered to justification, [there must be] in the motion of free will both contrition; it is necessary that a person prepare himself by a motion of faith and of sorrow, so that grace may find free will in both of these acts, or even supremely prepared for both, so that in the same instant it be prepared to be moved in which grace arrives. — And the arguments for this position are to be granted; for they proceed according to the common law, which does not prejudice the special privilege[^2].

*To 1 and 2.* And so it is clear in the case of Paul. Likewise, as to its knowing no slow endeavors; it must be said that it is true that grace comes suddenly, but nevertheless a person is not suddenly prepared.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, whether that sorrow is informed, or a new one elicited; those who say that contrition follows after the remission of guilt say that a new one is elicited, and that after the infusion of grace all the virtues have new acts. But those who say that contrition is in the instant of justification must say that that sorrow is informed, as is the motion of faith or of free will[^3].

To that, then, which is asked, whether attrition becomes contrition; it must be said that this can be understood in three ways: either that the habit by which one is brought to attrition is informed and by it one is brought to contrition, just as unformed faith becomes formed; and this I believe to be true, for I believe that the unformed habit of penance is informed by the advent of grace. Nor[^4] is it similar in the case of servile fear, in which the will to sin lives. — In a second way it can be understood with respect to the underlying act; and here too I concede that the act which at its beginning is attrition, before it is interrupted, becomes contrition, as is clear in the case of the motion by which someone goes to church, if grace is infused into him on the way. — In a third way it can be understood with respect to a superadded condition, namely that the dead work, according to that part by which it is dead, should become living; and this is impossible, because that part of the motion passed away and was unformed and is never informed, because the same thing which has passed away is not taken up again[^5].

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 327, nota 2.

en: Cf. above, p. 327, note 2.

la: Ut dictum est supra a. 1. q. 3.

en: As was said above, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Eccli. 2, 20: *Qui timent Dominum praeparabunt corda sua.* Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. dub. 1. et d. 14. p. II. dub. 1. — Pro *requiritur* non pauci codd. et ed. 1 *relinquitur*.

en: Ecclus. 2:20: *Those who fear the Lord will prepare their hearts.* Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, dub. 1, and d. 14, p. II, dub. 1. — For *requiritur* (is required), not a few codices and the first edition read *relinquitur* (is left).

la: Vide infra dub. 4. — Maior ostensa est supra d. 16. p. I. a. 3. q. 1.

en: See below, dub. 4. — The major [premise] was shown above, d. 16, p. I, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Cfr. Act. 9, 3. seqq.

en: Cf. Acts 9:3ff.

la: Libr. II. in Evang. Luc. I, 39. n. 19.

en: Book II, on the Gospel of Luke 1:39, n. 19.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 2.

en: See above, the text of the Master [Lombard], d. XVII, c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 322, nota 1, et III. Sent. d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. Oppositum ostenditur ibid. d. 23. a. 2. q. 4. de fide informi.

en: Cf. above, p. 322, note 1, and III Sent., d. 34, p. II, a. 1, q. 3. The opposite is shown there, d. 23, a. 2, q. 4, concerning unformed faith.

la: Cap. 1, 3: *Convertimini ad me, ait Dominus exercituum, et convertar ad vos* etc.

en: Ch. 1:3: *Turn to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you,* etc.

la: Hieron. in Ionam 1, 7: *Privilegia singulorum non possunt legem facere communem.* Et in C. *Ideo permittente* (16.), C. 25. q. 1. § 3.

en: Jerome, on Jonah 1:7: *The privileges of individuals cannot make a common law.* And in the canon *Ideo permittente* (16), C. 25, q. 1, § 3.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Verbis *motus fidei* codd. F G praemittunt *fit*, cod. aa *est*, sed perperam. In principio solutionis post *eliciatur* cod. K (I a secunda manu) addit *dicendum, quod.*

en: Cf. the preceding question. — Before the words *motus fidei* (motion of faith) codices F and G prefix *fit* (becomes), codex aa *est* (is), but wrongly. At the beginning of the solution, after *eliciatur* (is elicited) codex K (and I by a second hand) adds *dicendum, quod* (it must be said that).

la: Plures codd. *Nec etiam.* Inferius pro *substratum* non pauci codd. *subiectum.*

en: Several codices [read] *Nec etiam* (Nor even). Below, for *substratum* (underlying), not a few codices [read] *subiectum* (subject).

la: Vide supra d. 15. p. I. q. 1. 4.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450-dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p429-{L,R}-{0,1,2}` and `vol4-p430-{L,R}-{0,1,2}` (VOL II/IV override — the IA djvu OCR for raw lines 48394–48596 is cascade-shattered with two-column bleed and one-token-per-line diagonal fragmentation, so the column-band PDF read is authoritative for the entire body here). Offset pdf = printed + 20.

**Page span.** The quaestio's *opener* and three video-arguments + contra-arguments + the incidental question all sit on **printed p.429** (the q3 head appears low on p.429-L after the tail of q2's solution, which itself carries from p.428 onto p.429). The CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, and all replies are on **printed p.430**. Hence `printed_pages: [429, 430]`. (The auto-chunk frontmatter's implied p.428 was q2's body bleeding into this raw range — q2 owns p.428 and p.429 footers 1–5.)

**Footnote numbering.** Quaracchi restarts per printed page. p.429 carries notes 1–13, but 1–5 belong to q2's solution-tail (Psalm 17:13 etc., on p.429-L/R bands 0); q3's body owns p.429 notes **6–13** and p.430 notes **1–5** — 13 entries total, all rendered above.

**Scholion disposition.** The `SCHOLION` block printed on p.430 (and continuing) is the **Articulus II scholion** (it opens "Communiter docent antiqui Scholastici, Deum speciali privilegio posse iustificare…" and runs sections I–II covering the whole article, incl. "De ipsa 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 2. — Scot., q. cit." citing q3). Per the build convention for this article it is rendered once, with **a2-q1** (`bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-a2-q1`), not here. `has_scholion: false`. La/En cross-ref: *Scholion ad totum articulum II vide apud quaest. I huius articuli* / "For the scholion to the whole of Article II (with the note 'De ipsa 3. quaestione') see Question I of this article."

**[?] flags.** None. All thirteen footers and the full body were legible in the 450-dpi bands; the few raw-OCR garbles (`atlritio`, `instificatum`, `Paulnm`, `inconveniens'^`, `viviim`) were silently corrected against the PDF where context is unambiguous.


title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 431 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum confessio necessario sequatur iustificationem.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum confessio necessario sequatur iustificationem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia iste peccator tenetur confiteri; sed constat, quod gratia non absolvit ipsum a praecepto confessionis: ergo post gratiam susceptam adhuc tenetur[^1].

2. Item, contritus et confessus tenetur satisfacere; sed confessio non absolvit a satisfactione, quae est posterior ipsa: ergo nec contritio a confessione. Sed contritus est iustificatus: ergo iustificatus tenetur confiteri.

3. Item, Dominus praecepit poenitentiam agere, Matthaei quarto[^2]; sed in perfectione poenitentiae sunt ista tria, « scilicet contritio, confessio et satisfactio », sicut dicit Magister in littera supra distinctione decima sexta in principio: ergo non implet homo praeceptum, nisi confiteatur: ergo tenetur homo confiteri quantumcumque iustificatus.

4. Item, iustificationi necessarium est propositum confitendi; sed propositum aut desinit esse efficax, aut exit in actum, cum se offerunt tempus et locus. Sed proposito confitendi desinente, desinit aliquis esse iustus, et necesse est, non[^3] esse propositum efficax, vel hominem confiteri: ergo vel necesse est, quod post iustificationem homo confiteatur, vel quod a iustitia cadat.

**Contra:**
1. Qui habet iustitiam habet omne quod ad salutem est necessarium: sed omnis iustificatus habet iustitiam: ergo habet omne quod ad salutem est necessarium. Si ergo confessio non est necessaria ad iustificationem, nec post iustificationem est necessaria ad salutem: ergo iustificatus ad confessionem non tenetur.

2. Item, si iustificatus tenetur ad confessionem, aut ergo propter deletionem culpae, aut propter deletionem poenae; non culpae, iam quia culpa deleta est; non poenae, quia tanta potest esse contritio, quod delet totam poenam[^4], et si aliquod residuum est, potest deleri per satisfactionem exteriorem: ergo nullo modo tenetur.

3. Item, duplex est forum, scilicet forum Dei et forum Ecclesiae; secundum forum Dei punitur quis in purgatorio multo gravius quam in hoc mundo[^5]; secundum forum Ecclesiae in hac vita; sed potest quis renuntiare iudicari in foro minori, ut transferat se ad forum maius: ergo aliquis licite post contritionem potest exspectare poenam purgatoriam: ergo non tenetur iudicari in foro Ecclesiae: ergo nec confiteri.

4. Item, ponatur, quod aliquis conteratur et nihil cogitet de confessione, constans est, quod iste habet gratiam, et non omittit[^6]: ergo non cadit a gratia, quia non intervenit contemptus: ergo quamdiu non cogitat, non peccat. Esto quod sic moriatur, constat, quod salvatur etiam sine confessione: ergo etc. — Et ad hoc sunt multae auctoritates, quas adducit Magister in littera[^7].

<!-- page 432 -->

> **Conclusio.** Confessio etiam post iustificationem est necessaria necessitate praecepti, a qua tamen impossibilitas excusat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod confessio est instituta sub praecepto, sicut melius patebit infra[^8]; et ideo, quia ab hoc praecepto peccans per susceptionem gratiae non absolvitur, adhuc confiteri tenetur; et ideo, si non confitetur, cadit a iustitia. — Sicut enim nullus potest iustificari, qui Sacramenta contemnat; sic nullus in iustitia perseverat, si post iustificationem ex contemptu negligat confiteri. Et ideo, si potest confiteri et non curat, cadit a iustitia, cum cadit a proposito confitendi, sine quo iustificari non poterat. — Concedendum ergo, quod confessio post iustificationem est necessaria necessitate praecepti, a qua tamen excusat impossibilitas. Unde et rationes ad hanc partem sunt concedendae.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur: qui habet iustitiam habet omne quod necessarium est ad salutem; dicendum quod verum est, si perseveret in illa; sed quamvis sine confessione possit quis iustitiam adipisci, tamen in illa non potest diu permanere sine confessione, quin omittat. Non solum autem sunt necessaria ad salutem illa quae necessario requiruntur ad iustitiae adeptionem, verum etiam illa quae requiruntur ad habitae conservationem.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut est necessaria propter deletionem culpae etc.; dicendum, quod ista non est ratio, sed institutio. Quia enim confessio instituta est sub praecepto, ideo nemo absolvitur, sed quilibet tenetur, quantumcumque poena et culpa deleatur. Valet tamen ad deletionem culpae quantum ad eos qui se non paraverunt sufficienter omnino, et etiam poenae quantum ad alios, et ad multas utilitates, sicut infra[^9] melius apparebit, propter quod eam Dominus instituit.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de duplici foro, dicendum, quod poenitens, quamdiu est in hac vita, subiectus est foro Ecclesiae, ita quod ab ipso non potest appellare. Praeterea, fecit iniuriam Ecclesiae, et ideo, si potest comparere, tenetur, nisi per impossibilitatem excusetur. Nemo enim ad forum purgatorii admittitur, qui forum Ecclesiae contempsit, cum in nullo fiat iniuria peccatori, sed in utroque iustitia.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de illo qui nihil cogitat, dicendum, quod hoc potest esse duplici ex causa: vel propter intensionem doloris, vel propter occupationem superfluae sollicitudinis. Quantum ad primum, quia Dominus cor eius occupavit, si non fuit mora superflua nec indiscretio aliqua; credo, quod Dominus absolvit et voluntatem pro opere computat; et computatur iste cum illis qui excusantur propter impossibilitatem, habentes devotionem in Sacramento. — Si autem non cogitat nec curat, aliis sollicitudinibus occupatus, maxime si locum et tempus habuit confitendi ore; tunc non excusatur, immo ob peccatum omissionis reputabitur reus mortis, maxime si non fuerit sic morte praeventus, quin bene posset et deberet recogitare et petere Sacramentum Ecclesiae[^10].

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english:
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### Question IV. *Whether confession necessarily follows justification.*

Fourthly it is asked whether confession necessarily follows justification. And that it does, seems [to be shown thus]:

1. Because this sinner is bound to confess; but it is established that grace does not absolve him from the precept of confession: therefore after grace has been received he is still bound[^1].

2. Likewise, one who is contrite and has confessed is bound to make satisfaction; but confession does not absolve from satisfaction, which is posterior to it: therefore neither does contrition [absolve] from confession. But the contrite person is justified: therefore the justified person is bound to confess.

3. Likewise, the Lord commanded that penance be done, in Matthew chapter four[^2]; but in the perfection of penance there are these three things, « namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction », as the Master says in the text above, in distinction sixteen at the beginning: therefore a man does not fulfill the precept unless he confess: therefore a man is bound to confess however much he is justified.

4. Likewise, for justification a purpose of confessing is necessary; but the purpose either ceases to be efficacious, or issues into act, when time and place present themselves. But when the purpose of confessing ceases, a person ceases to be just, and it is necessary either that the purpose not be efficacious, or that the man confess[^3]: therefore either it is necessary that after justification a man confess, or that he fall from justice.

**On the contrary:**
1. Whoever has justice has everything that is necessary for salvation: but every justified person has justice: therefore he has everything that is necessary for salvation. If, then, confession is not necessary for justification, neither is it necessary for salvation after justification: therefore the justified person is not bound to confession.

2. Likewise, if the justified person is bound to confession, then either on account of the blotting-out of guilt, or on account of the blotting-out of punishment; not of guilt, since the guilt is already blotted out; not of punishment, because the contrition can be so great that it blots out the whole punishment[^4], and if any remainder is left, it can be blotted out by exterior satisfaction: therefore in no way is he bound.

3. Likewise, there is a twofold court, namely the court of God and the court of the Church; according to the court of God one is punished in purgatory far more severely than in this world[^5]; according to the court of the Church, in this life; but one can renounce being judged in the lesser court, so as to transfer himself to the greater court: therefore someone may licitly, after contrition, await the punishment of purgatory: therefore he is not bound to be judged in the court of the Church: therefore neither to confess.

4. Likewise, suppose that someone is contrite and thinks nothing about confession; it is established that this person has grace, and does not omit [it][^6]: therefore he does not fall from grace, since no contempt intervenes: therefore as long as he does not think [of it], he does not sin. Suppose he die thus, it is established that he is saved even without confession: therefore etc. — And for this there are many authorities, which the Master adduces in the text[^7].

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> **Conclusion.** Confession even after justification is necessary by the necessity of precept, from which, however, impossibility excuses.

**I respond:** It must be said that confession is instituted under a precept, as will better appear below[^8]; and therefore, because one who sins against this precept is not absolved by the reception of grace, he is still bound to confess; and therefore, if he does not confess, he falls from justice. — For just as no one can be justified who despises the Sacraments, so no one perseveres in justice if, after justification, out of contempt he neglects to confess. And therefore, if he can confess and does not care to, he falls from justice, since he falls from the purpose of confessing, without which he could not be justified. — It must therefore be conceded that confession after justification is necessary by the necessity of precept, from which, however, impossibility excuses. Hence the reasons for this side too are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected: whoever has justice has everything that is necessary for salvation; it must be said that this is true, if he perseveres in it; but although someone can attain justice without confession, yet he cannot long remain in it without confession, without omitting [it]. For not only are those things necessary for salvation which are necessarily required for the attainment of justice, but also those which are required for the conservation of what has been attained.

*To 2.* To that which is objected: it is either necessary on account of the blotting-out of guilt etc.; it must be said that this is not the ground, but the institution. For because confession is instituted under a precept, therefore no one is absolved [from it], but everyone is bound, however much punishment and guilt be blotted out. Yet it avails for the blotting-out of guilt as regards those who have not prepared themselves altogether sufficiently, and also for [the blotting-out] of punishment as regards others, and for many useful ends, as will better appear below[^9], on account of which the Lord instituted it.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the twofold court, it must be said that the penitent, as long as he is in this life, is subject to the court of the Church, in such a way that he cannot appeal from it. Moreover, he has done an injury to the Church, and therefore, if he can appear, he is bound, unless he be excused through impossibility. For no one is admitted to the court of purgatory who has despised the court of the Church, since no injury is done to the sinner thereby, but in both [there is] justice.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the one who thinks nothing [of it], it must be said that this can be from a twofold cause: either on account of the intensity of sorrow, or on account of the occupation of superfluous anxiety. As regards the first, because the Lord has occupied his heart, if there was no superfluous delay nor any indiscretion; I believe that the Lord absolves [him] and reckons the will for the deed; and this person is reckoned among those who are excused on account of impossibility, having devotion toward the Sacrament. — But if he does not think [of it] nor care, occupied with other anxieties, especially if he had place and time of confessing by mouth; then he is not excused, but rather on account of the sin of omission he will be reckoned guilty of death, especially if he was not so prevented by death that he could not well [confess], whereas he could and ought to have reconsidered and sought the Sacrament of the Church[^10].

---

la: Codd. F G *adhuc tenetur.*

en: Codices F and G read *adhuc tenetur* ("is still bound").

la: Vers. 17: *Poenitentiam agite* etc. — Mox pro *in perfectione poenitentiae* cod. F *in perfecta poenitentia.*

en: Verse 17: *Do penance* etc. — Shortly after, for *in perfectione poenitentiae* ("in the perfection of penance") codex F reads *in perfecta poenitentia* ("in perfect penance").

la: Plures codd. perperam omittunt *non*, codd. R S legunt *necesse enim est, esse* etc.

en: Several codices wrongly omit *non*; codices R and S read *necesse enim est, esse* etc.

la: Cfr. Luc. 7, 47. seq., ubi de Maria Magdalena, et 23, 42. seq., ubi de bono latrone.

en: Cf. Luke 7:47ff., where [it speaks] of Mary Magdalene, and 23:42ff., where [it speaks] of the good thief.

la: Ut ostenditur infra d. 20. p. 1. q. 2.

en: As is shown below, dist. 20, p. 1, q. 2.

la: Sensus hic et ad 1 est: et non peccat omittendo. — Inferius post *Esto* codd. I K L V addunt *ergo.*

en: The sense here and at [reply] 1 is: and he does not sin by omitting. — Below, after *Esto*, codices I, K, L, V add *ergo.*

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, ch. 1.

la: Partis II. a. 2. q. 1.

en: [See] Part II, art. 2, q. 1.

la: Partis II. a. 1. q. 1. in fine et a. 2. q. 3. — Mox *propter quod* codd. R S T bb addunt *etiam.*

en: [See] Part II, art. 1, q. 1 at the end, and art. 2, q. 3. — Shortly after, for *propter quod* codices R, S, T, bb add *etiam.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 48597–48710), with the two-column PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p431-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p432-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (offset pdf = printed + 20) read as authoritative for the cascade-shattered Respondeo and footer regions per the VOL II OVERRIDE. The question opens on printed p. 431 (running head verified "DIST. XVII. P. I. ART. II. QUAES[T]. IV") and runs through the *Ad 4* reply at the foot of p. 432-R, immediately before "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI" (next chunk, `bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-dubia`).

**Scholion disposition.** This quaestio renders no scholion. The Articulus II scholion (a single block of Scholastic concordance) is printed with QUAESTIO I and is rendered in `bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-a2-q1` (`has_scholion: true`). The q3 scholion (printed at the foot of p. 430) closes with a section "II. Seq. (4.) quaestio refertur ad 4. quaestionem" that explicitly bridges into this question; that bridge text lives with q3, not here. See `bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-a2-q1` for the Art. II scholion. (`has_scholion: false`.)

**Page-split / footer map.** Printed p. 431 footer notes (1–7) all attach to args/Contra of this question and are captured here as [^1]–[^7]. Printed p. 432 footer holds six notes, but only notes 1, 3, 5 attach to this question's body (Respondeo + replies; captured here as [^8], [^9], [^10] respectively); notes 2, 4, 6 of p. 432 attach to the DUBIA section that begins on p. 432-R and belong to the following chunk (`bon-sent-IV-d17-p1-dubia`) — do NOT re-park them here.

**[?] flags.** None. All OCR garbles (e.g. `iuslificalionem`→*iustificationem*, `conlrilus`→*contritus*, `piT)posituni`→*propositum*, `Sacraraento`→*Sacramento*, `recogilare`→*recogitare*) resolved unambiguously against the PDF bands. The marginal gloss tags bleeding into the OCR (*Conclusio*, *Ratio*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*) are Quaracchi editorial side-notes, trimmed out of the body per the cleanup rules.