title: Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Quid sit beatitudo
What beatitude is

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De beatitudine.*
### Quaestio I. *Quid sit beatitudo.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: notes 1–9 of page 1000, then notes 1–6 of page 1001. Page 1002 carries a footer register of its own, but it anchors wholly in the following question and is rendered there.

Quantum ergo ad primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod beatitudo sit bonum creatum:

1. Quia beatitudo est perfectio Beati[^p1000-1]; sed omnis perfectio creaturae est creata, quia Deus nullius est forma perfectiva: ergo beatitudo est bonum creatum.

2. Item, omne creatum, quod non est transcendens, ut *ens* et *unum*, est alicuius generis determinati; sed beatitudo est bonum creatum, ut probatum est[^p1000-2], et non est transcendens, eo quod in paucissimis reperitur: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod est generis determinati et est in aliquo, ita quod sine eo res potest esse, est in genere accidentis[^p1000-3]; sed beatitudo est huiusmodi: ergo est in genere accidentis.

4. Item, omne bonum generis determinati, secundum quod homo denominatur qualis, et quod est perfectio ipsius animae, est in prima specie qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio; sed beatitudo est bonum creatum et generis determinati, ut probatum est[^p1000-4], et perficit naturam; hoc constat: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Quod non sit bonum creatum, videtur: quia beatitudo satiat nostrum appetitum; sed nihil satiat animae humanae appetitum nisi sola Trinitas, quia, cum sit nata capere Deum[^p1000-5], nihil minus Deo ipsam implet: ergo etc.

2. Item, beatitudo est finis ultimus, ultra quem non est finis alius[^p1000-6]; sed finis universalis est solum bonum increatum, sicut principium primum: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod non sit generis determinati, videtur: quia, ut dicit Boethius[^p1000-7], « Beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus »: ergo complectitur omne bonum; sed omne bonum in pluribus generibus determinatur, non in uno: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod non sit in genere accidentis, videtur: quia beatitudo est nobilissima omnium perfectionum; sed accidentalis forma minus habet de nobilitate quam substantialis: ergo impossibile est, quod beatitudo sit in genere accidentis[^p1000-8].

5. Item, quod non sit in qualitate, videtur: quia Philosophus[^p1000-9] definit felicitatem dicens, quod est « actus secundum virtutem perfectus »; et quod ita sit, patet: quia habitus perficitur per actum: si ergo beatitudo est ultima perfectio, est actus; sed actus est in genere actionis: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Beatitudo sumta pro obiecto beatificante est bonum increatum, sumta vero pro forma animam informante est bonum creatum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod beatitudo est finis satians nostrum appetitum. Satians autem nostrum appetitum est dupliciter: vel sicut *obiectum*, vel sicut *informans*. Satians nostrum appetitum sicut *obiectum* solus Deus est, ad quem capiendum humana anima ordinatur[^p1001-1]. Satians autem sicut *informans* est ipsa influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformitas et satietas.

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Secundum hoc nomen *beatitudinis* commune est secundum prius et posterius ad beatitudinem increatam, quae est finis satians ut obiectum, et ad creatam, quae est satians ut informans; et per prius dicitur de beatitudine increata, per posterius de creata, quia non satiat influentia obiecti nisi propter obiectum.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Et ex hoc patet primum, quia Beda[^p1001-2] et Augustinus loquuntur de obiecto satiante; similiter de fine, qui terminat intentionem, et non de fine, qui informat.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est generis determinati; dico, quod immo. Quod obiicit, quod est status continens omnia bona; dico, quod complecti omnia bona, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum *veritatem*, vel secundum *aequivalentiam*. Secundum *veritatem* non oportet, quod omnis generis bonum contineat; continet tamen secundum *aequivalentiam*, quia continet tantum bonum, quod sufficit et aequivalet, immo praeponderat omni bono; et tale non potest esse generis determinati[^p1001-3].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est perfectio substantialis; dicendum, quod istud est verum quantum ad *primum esse*, non tamen quantum ad *esse secundum* sive *bene esse*, immo accidentalis forma est perfectio ipsius compositi quantum ad bene esse, sicut patet de colore et odore in rosa[^p1001-4]. — Aliter potest dici, quod accidens est duplex. Quoddam namque est, quod causatur ex principiis subiecti, et tale ignobilius est substantiali forma, pro eo quod ab ipsa habet originem; quoddam, quod causatur a superiori, et tale potest esse nobilius, pro eo quod dirigit et coniungit. Et quia beatitudo iungit animam summo Deo, ubi est terminatio omnis appetitus; et ortum habet a Deo, non ab anima: ideo patet illud.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, cuius generis sit; dicendum, quod beatitudo creata non dicit actum pure, quia constat, quod actus gloriosus ab aliquo in habitu[^p1001-5] procedit; nec dicit habitum pure, quia dicit perfectionem summam, quae est in actu continuo: ideo necesse est, quod dicat *habitum ut actum* sive in actu, sicut si diceret scientiam, quae semper est in considerando. Quia vero principalius dicit *habitum* et *deiformitatem*; ideo, etsi dicat rem duplicis generis, tamen principalius generis *qualitatis*. Et est exemplum, quia *figura* dicit dispositionem qualitatis in quantitate, principalius tamen dispositionem; unde dicit qualitatem in quantitate et est in genere qualitatis[^p1001-6]. Similiter intelligendum est in proposito.

english:
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### Sole Article. *On beatitude.*
### Question I. *What beatitude is.*

As to the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that beatitude is a created good:

1. Because beatitude is the perfection of the Blessed[^p1000-1]; but every perfection of a creature is created, since God is the perfective form of nothing: therefore beatitude is a created good.

2. Likewise, everything created which is not transcendent, as *being* and *one* are, belongs to some determinate genus; but beatitude is a created good, as has been proved[^p1000-2], and is not transcendent, seeing that it is found in very few: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that which is of a determinate genus and is in something in such a way that the thing can be without it, is in the genus of accident[^p1000-3]; but beatitude is of this sort: therefore it is in the genus of accident.

4. Likewise, every good of a determinate genus, according to which a man is denominated as being of such a quality, and which is a perfection of the soul itself, is in the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; but beatitude is a created good and of a determinate genus, as has been proved[^p1000-4], and it perfects nature; this is agreed: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it is not a created good seems so: because beatitude satisfies our appetite; but nothing satisfies the appetite of the human soul except the Trinity alone, since, as the soul is born to receive God[^p1000-5], nothing less than God fills it: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, beatitude is the ultimate end, beyond which there is no other end[^p1000-6]; but the universal end is only the uncreated good, just as it is the first principle: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that it is not of a determinate genus seems so: because, as Boethius says[^p1000-7], « Beatitude is a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods »: therefore it embraces every good; but every good is determined within several genera, not within one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it is not in the genus of accident seems so: because beatitude is the noblest of all perfections; but an accidental form has less of nobility than a substantial one: therefore it is impossible that beatitude should be in the genus of accident[^p1000-8].

5. Likewise, that it is not in quality seems so: because the Philosopher[^p1000-9] defines happiness by saying that it is « an act perfect according to virtue »; and that it is so is clear: because a habit is perfected through act: if therefore beatitude is the ultimate perfection, it is an act; but act is in the genus of action: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Beatitude, taken for the beatifying object, is an uncreated good; but taken for the form informing the soul, it is a created good.

**I respond:** It must be said that beatitude is the end satisfying our appetite. Now what satisfies our appetite does so in two ways: either as an *object*, or as *informing*. What satisfies our appetite as an *object* is God alone, to the receiving of whom the human soul is ordered[^p1001-1]. But what satisfies as *informing* is the very inflowing of God into the soul, which is deiformity itself and satiety itself.

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According to this, the name *beatitude* is common, by priority and posteriority, to uncreated beatitude, which is the end satisfying as object, and to created beatitude, which is what satisfies as informing; and it is said by priority of uncreated beatitude, by posteriority of created, since the inflowing of the object does not satisfy except on account of the object.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* And from this the first is clear, because Bede[^p1001-2] and Augustine are speaking of the satisfying object; and likewise of the end which terminates the intention, and not of the end which informs.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is not of a determinate genus: I say that on the contrary it is. As to the objection that it is a state containing all goods, I say that to embrace all goods can be so in two ways: either according to *truth*, or according to *equivalence*. According to *truth* it is not necessary that it contain the good of every genus; it does, however, contain it according to *equivalence*, because it contains so great a good as suffices and is equivalent, indeed outweighs every good; and such a good cannot be of a determinate genus[^p1001-3].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that a substantial perfection is nobler: it must be said that this is true with respect to *first being*, but not with respect to *second being* or *well-being*; on the contrary, an accidental form is the perfection of the composite itself with respect to well-being, as is clear of colour and scent in a rose[^p1001-4]. — It can also be said otherwise, that accident is twofold. For there is one kind which is caused from the principles of the subject, and such is more ignoble than the substantial form, in that it has its origin from it; and another which is caused by something higher, and such can be nobler, in that it directs and joins. And because beatitude joins the soul to the most high God, where there is the terminus of every appetite, and has its rise from God, not from the soul: therefore that point is clear.

*To 5.* To that which is asked, of what genus it is: it must be said that created beatitude does not name act purely, since it is agreed that a glorious act proceeds from something in habit[^p1001-5]; nor does it name habit purely, since it names the highest perfection, which is in continuous act: therefore it is necessary that it name *habit as act* or in act, as if one were to say knowledge, which is always in considering. But because it names *habit* and *deiformity* more principally, therefore, even though it names a thing of a twofold genus, nevertheless it is more principally of the genus of *quality*. And there is an example: because *figure* names a disposition of quality in quantity, yet more principally the disposition; hence it names quality in quantity and is in the genus of quality[^p1001-6]. The same is to be understood in the case at hand.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7. et X. c. 7, beatitudo est *operatio et actio* hominis secundum rationem sive potentiam perfectam et optimam virtutem in vita perfecta.

en: According to Aristotle, I. *Ethics* c. 7 and X. c. 7, beatitude is the *operation and action* of man according to reason or a perfect power and the best virtue in a perfect life.

la: Arg. praeced. — Aristot. X. Ethic. c. 8. probat, quod beatitudo tantum Deo et hominibus convenit; « at ceterorum animalium nullum est felix ». Cfr. ibid. I. c. 9.

en: The preceding argument. — Aristotle, X. *Ethics* c. 8, proves that beatitude belongs only to God and to men; « but of the other animals none is happy ». Cfr. ibid. I. c. 9.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4, et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Accidente*.

en: See Aristotle, I. *Topics* c. 4, and Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Accident*.

la: In praeced. argg. — De *prima* specie qualitatis cfr. supra pag. 136, nota 3. — Mox pro *naturam* Vat. cum cod. E a secunda manu *animam*.

en: In the preceding arguments. — On the *first* species of quality cfr. above p. 136, note 3. — Shortly after, for *naturam* the Vatican edition, with codex E by a second hand, reads *animam*.

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11: Eo quippe ipso imago eius [Dei] est, quo eius capax est eiusque particeps esse potest. — Voci *nata* cod. G praefigit *anima*. In fine arg. post *implet* cod. aa addit *Augustinus et Beda*, qui etiam a Bonav., infra in solut. ad 1, et II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. fundam. 2, pro eadem sententia allegati sunt (cfr. ibid. nota addita).

en: Augustine, XIV. *On the Trinity* c. 8. n. 11: For it is his [God's] image by that very thing whereby it is capable of him and can be a partaker of him. — Before the word *nata* codex G prefixes *anima*. At the end of the argument, after *implet*, codex aa adds *Augustinus et Beda*, who are also alleged by Bonaventure for the same opinion below in the solution ad 1, and II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. fundam. 2 (cfr. the note added there).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2. — Subinde pro *universalis* codd. E K M S aa (I P a secunda manu) *ultimus*, cod. G *ultimus et universalis*.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, I. *Ethics* c. 2. — Thereafter, for *universalis* codices E K M S aa (I P by a second hand) read *ultimus*, codex G *ultimus et universalis*.

la: Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2.

en: Book III of *The Consolation [of Philosophy]*, prose 2.

la: Cfr. de hoc arg. tom. III. pag. 297, nota 1.

en: Cfr. on this argument vol. III, p. 297, note 1.

la: Vide supra nota 1. — Inferius pro *ultima perfectio* plures codd. *ultimata perfectio*.

en: See above, note 1. — Lower down, for *ultima perfectio* several codices read *ultimata perfectio*.

la: Psalm. 102, 5: Qui replet [alias: satiat] in bonis desiderium tuum. Cfr. August., in hunc loc.; Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. et 10.

en: Psalm 102, 5: Who fills [otherwise: satisfies] your desire with good things. Cfr. Augustine, on this passage; Boethius, III. *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]*, prose 2 and 10.

la: Edd. *Boethius*. Inferius ex codd. G L Y (I a secunda manu) supplevimus *non*.

en: The editions read *Boethius*. Lower down we have supplied *non* from codices G L Y (I by a second hand).

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. ad 4. — Pro *non potest* Vat. cum cod. E a secunda manu *bene potest*.

en: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. ad 4. — For *non potest* the Vatican edition, with codex E by a second hand, reads *bene potest*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. ad 1. Ibid. in corp. explicatur seq. solut. — Aliquanto inferius pro *et coniungit*, quod praebent codd. M O bb, cod. U *et quia iungit*, alii codd. *et cui* [codd. I K *ei cui*, edd. *ad eum, cui*] *iungit*. Subinde pro *summo Deo* codd. I K *summo bono*.

en: See II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. ad 1. In the body of the same passage the following solution is explained. — Somewhat lower down, for *et coniungit*, which codices M O bb give, codex U reads *et quia iungit*, other codices *et cui* [codices I K *ei cui*, the editions *ad eum, cui*] *iungit*. Thereafter, for *summo Deo* codices I K read *summo bono*.

la: Vat. perperam *actu*.

en: The Vatican edition wrongly reads *actu*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 136, nota 3.

en: Cfr. above, p. 136, note 3. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Doctrina de beatitudine magni momenti est et late patet in quaestionibus theologicis. De ea plura habent S. Thom., hic q. 1-3; S. I. II. q. 2-5. et q. 9-12; Scot., I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1-5. (de beatitudine *obiectiva*) et hic q. 1-12 (de beatitudine *formali*).

Quoad 1. quaestionem communis est distinctio beatitudinis in *obiectivam*, quae est ipsum bonum appetitum rationalem adaequate satians, et in *formalem*, quae est subiecti beati coniunctio immediata cum obiecto beatificante, vel potius (secundum communem sententiam) illa *operatio* animae, qua illud obiectum attingitur, habetur et fruitur. — De *formali* beatitudine agitur etiam infra q. 4; de qua exortae sunt plures opiniones. *Prima*, quae est falsa et attribuitur quibusdam antiquis, praesertim Ioan. a Ripa, posuit, eam esse *increatam* ipsius Dei visionem, intellectui creato unitam; quam bene refutat S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. — *Secunda* fuit Henrici Gand. (Quodl. 13. q. 12.), qui primo dicit, veram beatitudinem humanam et angelicam consistere non solum in actu voluntatis et intellectus, in quibus non est nisi beatitudo creata ratione ipsorum actuum; deinde prosequitur: « Principalius consistit in ipso obiecto, quod est ipsa beatitudo *increata*... in qua per actum beatitudinis voluntatis creatae ipsa anima humana mediante voluntate se transformat, ut convertatur in illud, prout possibile est secundum naturam » etc. Denique concludit, quod beatitudo « principalius perficit *essentiam* animae [per quandam « circuminsessionem sive illapsum »] quam potentias, quia in illa principalius habetur Deus, qui est finis et beatitudo, quam in potentiis, quia illam perficit quodam modo per suam essentiam ». Contra hanc opinionem diffuse disputat Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 25. seqq.). — *Tertia* opinio est Scoti (hic q. 2.), S. Thomae (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 25. seqq.) et fere communis, quae ponit beatitudinem formaliter in *actu secundo* sive in *operatione*. — *Quarta* est S. Bonav., quae eandem ponit in « influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformitas et satietas » (hic in corp.); porro hoc explicat (ad 5.), ut sit etiam *actus*, sed simul *habitus* in actu continuo, et quidem principalius *habitus*; deinde (q. 4.) docet, quod prius sit in *potentiis* quam in *essentia* (contra Henricum Gand.). De hac sententia dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.), quod vera continet, si *beatitudinis* nomen *largiore* sensu sumatur, dum *proprie* beatitudo sit *actus* nobilissimus. Ipse S. Bonav. hoc insinuat alibi (I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2.), ubi loquitur de fruitione per actum amoris. Sumitur igitur hic *beatitudo*, quatenus importat *dotes* animae. Nam, ut idem Richard. (hic a. 3. q. 7.) dicit, visio et fruitio proprie non sunt *dotes*, « sed *actus dotium*; dotes enim *qualitates* sunt. Unde *dos visionis* est quidam *habitus luminosus* in intellectu, quo elevatur ad

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clare Deum videndum... Unde proprie loquendo, in dotibus animae non consistit beatitudinis essentia, sed in actibus eorum, ad quos ordinantur, sicut habitus ad actum ». — Ideo autem auctor noster hic urget *influentiam divinam*, ut ostendat, quod ipsa operatio illa beatificans est a Deo ut causa principali simul et obiecto. Quod autem habitus et actus beatificus principalius sit a Deo, ita ut Beati in illo actu magis *pati* quam *agere* dici possint; iam inde manifestum est, quod theologia mystica communiter de sublimioribus orationis supernaturalis gradibus viatorum docet, animas in tali statu magis *agi* sive *pati* quam *agere*, licet actus vitales eliciant. Eo fortius hoc valet de Beatis in patria (cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.).

De 1. quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 1.

**II.** Quaestionis 2. conclusio, quam S. August. (vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. ante med.) mirifice probat, praeeuntibus Aristotele et Cicerone, est communiter recepta, sicut etiam distinctio triplicis appetitus, scil. *naturalis*, *sensibilis*, *rationalis* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.). Naturalis appetitus est quaedam inclinatio seu pondus, quo unaquaeque res tendit ad bonum sibi conveniens sive in proprium finem (ibid. a. 1. q. 1.) sive commodum (hic ad 4.). — Ipse appetitus rationalis (voluntas) communiter dividitur in *naturalem* et *deliberativum* (liberum), de quo vide II. Sent. d. 22. dub. 3; d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. Hic appetitus naturalis dirigitur quadam cognitione naturali (hic ad 1. 2. 3; II. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; d. 38. dub. 1.); in quo consentit S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1, ubi ait: « Quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem »). — Voluntas naturalis semper fertur in bonum; immo etiam quidquid libere vult homo, non vult nisi sub ratione boni, vel *simpliciter* (finis ultimi), vel *boni sibi* (II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25. p. II. q. 3; d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 2; d. 39. a. 2. per totum); quod confirmat S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 1. a. 6; hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 4.). — Voluntas naturalis, licet habeat actus elicitos, tamen non est semper in actu, sed interdum tantum in habitu (II. Sent. d. 39. dub. 2, et S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. ad 2. — Notandum est, quod S. Bonav. in fine 1. solutionis triplici modo explicat cognitionem naturalem.

**III.** Observamus etiam, quod in quaestionibus specialioribus de beatitudine variae sunt magistrorum opiniones. Breviter haec tantum notamus.

1. Quoad ipsum beatitudinis *appetitum naturalem* docet Scotus (hic q. 10. n. 11.), appetitum hunc non addere aliquam perfectionem super naturam absolutam, sed importare solam inclinationem ipsius naturae ad suam perfectionem; ideo voluntatem, quatenus sit natura, nullum habere actum *elicitum*, per consequens nec cognitionem aliquam requiri ad appetitum naturalem, sed tantum ad actum *elicitum*. Aliter docent Ss. Bonav. et Thom. (locis citt.).

2. Idem non approbat doctrinam Ss. Thomae, Bonav. et multorum, quod voluntas naturaliter determinetur ad beatitudinem tantum *in generali*, non vero *in particulari*; sed putat, quod voluntas appetitu naturali appetat beatitudinem etiam *in particulari*; sed appetitu elicito velit « ut in pluribus beatitudinem in universali vel particulari maiori inclinatione naturali quam ulla habituali »; denique, quod sub neutra determinatione ipsa velit eam necessario, sed contingenter (ibid. n. 3-6.).

3. Attamen cum S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 2.) aliisque communiter Scot. admittit quoad actum *deliberativum* distinctionem inter motum voluntatis *quoad exercitium* et *quoad specificationem* actus, et quod beatitudo non est obiectum *nolendi*, nec miseria est obiectum *volendi*, unde voluntas non est libera secundum specificationem [quoad haec obiecta], tamen potest actum suspendere, quia libera est quoad exercitium. Aliud enim est, ut dicit, *non posse velle miseriam* aut *nolle beatitudinem*, aliud est *non posse non nolle* aut *non velle*. — Nominales autem admittunt libertatem in appetendo beatitudinem etiam quoad specificationem, econtra Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 11.) hoc vult esse necessarium etiam quoad exercitium.

4. Denique quoad verba in fine corporis, quod anima veram beatitudinem appetat *naturaliter*, controvertitur inter scholam S. Thomae et Scoti. Illa tenet, claram visionem Dei, utpote finem supernaturalem, non posse appeti naturaliter, cum ad hoc anima non habeat inclinationem, ne inchoatam quidem. Altera autem distinguit inter *exigentiam* et *capacitatem passivam* naturae et docet, beatitudinem in Deo quoad exigentiam et exsecutionem esse finem supernaturalem, quoad inclinationem vero finem naturalem. — Trigosus aliique volunt, S. Bonaventuram stare pro prima opinione; sed Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. 1. disp. 4. q. 2.) rectius tenet, eum consentire Scoto, hoc excepto, quod ipse velit, hanc inclinationem habere aliquem *actum imperfectum*, tendentem ad beatitudinem in generali, quod negat Scotus, ut diximus. Loci principales auctoris nostri de hac re sunt II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. in corp. et ad 4, d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3, d. 22. dub. 3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 5, d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8, d. 42. q. 1.

De 2. quaestione praeter locos citt.: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 8.

**IV.** De 3. quaestione cfr. infra p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. Alii commentatores Lombardi plerumque hanc quaestionem ita praecise positam non tractant, sed in quaestionibus de dotibus corporis eadem principia adhibere solent. S. Thom. eandem solutionem habet hic q. 2. a. 2. ad 6; d. 44. q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The doctrine concerning beatitude is of great moment and extends widely in theological questions. On it more is to be found in St. Thomas, here q. 1-3; S. I. II. q. 2-5 and q. 9-12; Scotus, I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1-5 (on *objective* beatitude) and here q. 1-12 (on *formal* beatitude).

As to the 1st question, the common distinction of beatitude is into the *objective*, which is the good itself adequately satisfying rational appetite, and the *formal*, which is the immediate conjunction of the blessed subject with the beatifying object, or rather (according to the common opinion) that *operation* of the soul by which that object is attained, possessed, and enjoyed. — Of *formal* beatitude there is also treatment below in q. 4; concerning which several opinions have arisen. The *first*, which is false and is attributed to certain of the ancients, especially John of Ripa, held it to be the *uncreated* vision of God himself, united to the created intellect; which St. Bonaventure well refutes, III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. — The *second* was that of Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 13. q. 12.), who first says that true human and angelic beatitude consists not only in the act of the will and of the intellect, in which there is only created beatitude by reason of those acts; then he continues: « It consists more principally in the object itself, which is *uncreated* beatitude itself... in which, through the act of beatitude of the created will, the human soul itself, by means of the will, transforms itself, so that it is converted into that object, so far as is possible according to nature » etc. Finally he concludes that beatitude « more principally perfects the *essence* of the soul [through a certain « circuminsession or indwelling »] than the powers, because in the essence God, who is the end and beatitude, is more principally possessed than in the powers, since it perfects the essence in a certain way through its own essence ». Against this opinion Scotus disputes at length (here q. 2. n. 25. seqq.). — The *third* opinion is that of Scotus (here q. 2.), of St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 25. seqq.) and is nearly the common one, which places beatitude formally in *second act* or in *operation*. — The *fourth* is St. Bonaventure's, which places it in the « inflowing of God into the soul, which is deiformity itself and satiety » (here in the body); and further he explains this (ad 5.) so that it is also *act*, but at the same time *habit* in continuous act, and indeed more principally *habit*; then (q. 4.) he teaches that it is prior in the *powers* than in the *essence* (against Henry of Ghent). Of this opinion Richard of Middleton (here a. 1. q. 4.) says that it contains what is true, if the name *beatitude* be taken in a *broader* sense, whereas *properly* beatitude is the noblest *act*. St. Bonaventure himself intimates this elsewhere (I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2.), where he speaks of enjoyment through the act of love. *Beatitude* is therefore taken here inasmuch as it implies the *dowries* of the soul. For, as the same Richard (here a. 3. q. 7.) says, vision and enjoyment are not properly *dowries*, « but *acts of the dowries*; for the dowries are *qualities*. Hence the *dowry of vision* is a certain *luminous habit* in the intellect, by which it is elevated to

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seeing God clearly... Hence, properly speaking, the essence of beatitude does not consist in the dowries of the soul, but in the acts to which they are ordered, as habit to act ». — And for this reason our author here presses the *divine inflowing*, in order to show that that beatifying operation itself is from God as principal cause and at the same time as object. But that the beatific habit and act are more principally from God, so that the Blessed in that act can be said rather to *undergo* than to *act*, is manifest from this, that mystical theology commonly teaches, concerning the higher grades of supernatural prayer in wayfarers, that souls in such a state are rather *acted upon* or *undergo* than *act*, although they elicit vital acts. This holds all the more strongly of the Blessed in the fatherland (cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.).

On the 1st question, besides those praised: Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. 1.

**II.** The conclusion of the 2nd question, which St. Augustine (see here the text of the Master, c. 1. before the middle) proves admirably, with Aristotle and Cicero going before him, is commonly received, as is also the distinction of the threefold appetite, namely *natural*, *sensible*, *rational* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.). The natural appetite is a certain inclination or weight by which each thing tends to the good suited to it, whether to its proper end (ibid. a. 1. q. 1.) or to its advantage (here ad 4.). — The rational appetite itself (the will) is commonly divided into the *natural* and the *deliberative* (the free), on which see II. Sent. d. 22. dub. 3; d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. This natural appetite is directed by a certain natural cognition (here ad 1. 2. 3; II. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; d. 38. dub. 1.); in which St. Thomas agrees (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1, where he says: « What is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him »). — The natural will is always borne towards the good; indeed even whatever a man wills freely, he wills only under the aspect of good, either *simply* (of the ultimate end), or of *the good for himself* (II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25. p. II. q. 3; d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. in the body and ad 2; d. 39. a. 2. throughout); which St. Thomas confirms (S. I. II. q. 1. a. 6; here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 4.). — The natural will, although it has elicited acts, is nevertheless not always in act, but sometimes only in habit (II. Sent. d. 39. dub. 2, and St. Thomas, S. I. II. q. 10. a. 1. ad 2. — It is to be noted that St. Bonaventure at the end of the 1st solution explains natural cognition in a threefold way.

**III.** We observe also that in the more special questions on beatitude the opinions of the masters vary. We note only these briefly.

1. As to the *natural appetite* of beatitude itself, Scotus teaches (here q. 10. n. 11.) that this appetite adds no perfection over absolute nature, but implies only an inclination of nature itself to its own perfection; and therefore that the will, inasmuch as it is nature, has no *elicited* act, and consequently that no cognition is required for the natural appetite, but only for the *elicited* act. Ss. Bonaventure and Thomas teach otherwise (in the places cited).

2. The same author does not approve the doctrine of Ss. Thomas and Bonaventure and of many, that the will is naturally determined to beatitude only *in general*, but not *in particular*; rather he holds that the will by natural appetite desires beatitude even *in particular*; but that by elicited appetite it wills « for the most part beatitude in the universal or in the particular with a greater natural inclination than any habitual one »; and finally that under neither determination does it will it necessarily, but contingently (ibid. n. 3-6.).

3. Nevertheless, with St. Thomas (S. I. II. q. 10. a. 2.) and others commonly, Scotus admits, as regards the *deliberative* act, the distinction between the motion of the will *as to exercise* and *as to specification* of the act, and that beatitude is not an object of *not-willing*, nor is misery an object of *willing*, whence the will is not free according to specification [as regards these objects], yet it can suspend the act, because it is free as to exercise. For it is one thing, as he says, *not to be able to will misery* or *to not-will beatitude*, and another *not to be able not to not-will* or *not to will*. — The Nominalists, however, admit liberty in desiring beatitude even as to specification; contrariwise Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4. q. 11.) holds this to be necessary even as to exercise.

4. Finally, as to the words at the end of the body, that the soul desires true beatitude *naturally*, there is controversy between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus. The former holds that the clear vision of God, being a supernatural end, cannot be desired naturally, since for this the soul has no inclination, not even an inchoate one. The latter, however, distinguishes between the *exigency* and the *passive capacity* of nature, and teaches that beatitude in God, as to exigency and execution, is a supernatural end, but as to inclination a natural end. — Trigosus and others would have St. Bonaventure stand for the first opinion; but Bartholomew de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. 1. disp. 4. q. 2.) more rightly holds that he agrees with Scotus, with this exception, that he himself would have this inclination possess some *imperfect act*, tending to beatitude in general, which Scotus denies, as we have said. The principal passages of our author on this matter are II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. in the body and ad 4, d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3, d. 22. dub. 3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 5, d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8, d. 42. q. 1.

On the 2nd question, besides the places cited: St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 3. a. 8. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 8.

**IV.** On the 3rd question cfr. below p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. The other commentators on Lombard for the most part do not treat this question posed so precisely, but are wont to apply the same principles in the questions on the dowries of the body. St. Thomas has the same solution here q. 2. a. 2. ad 6; d. 44. q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L106437–106712, verified throughout against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1000,1001,1002}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands used as given at the pre-measured gutters 1000:2098, 1001:1620, 1002:2090; **no bands were regenerated**). Per the Vol II/IV override, the band read was taken as authoritative in the Respondeo/solutio/scholion/footer regions where the OCR cascade-shatters. Marginal glosses bleeding inline in the OCR (`Fundamenta.`, `Ad oppositum`, `Distinctio`, `Notandum.`, `Beatitudo … in actu continuo`, `Aliqua quaestio … cuiuslibet`) were trimmed as editorial marginalia.

**Printed pages — unchanged.** The skeleton's `printed_pages: [1000, 1001, 1002]` is correct as given. The chunk opens at the head of p.1000's second half (below the divisio's TRACTATIO), runs all of p.1001, and its scholion carries over onto the top of p.1002, ending immediately before the centred `QUAESTIO II.` header.

**ARTICULUS UNICUS is genuinely printed — the `a1` is not purely an artifact.** The brief anticipated that Pars I prints no ARTICULUS heading. The page in fact prints, centred full-width between the TRACTATIO and the QUAESTIO I header, `ARTICULUS UNICUS. / De beatitudine.` (OCR `ARTIGULUS UNIGUS. / De beatitiidine.`, raw L106437 ff.). This is confirmed independently by p.1001's running head, `DIST. XLIX. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I.` It is therefore rendered here, folded into q1 as the article opener per the frozen convention, rather than dropped at the divisio↔q1 seam. Pars I still has six questions and only this one (unicus) article.

**Question title verified.** The line after the `QUAESTIO I.` header reads *Quid sit beatitudo* — matching both `title_la` and the TRACTATIO's listing (*Primo quaeritur, quid sit beatitudo*). The ordinal opener aligns: the body begins *Quantum ergo ad primum proceditur sic*. No q-swap.

**Apparatus — 15 entries.**

| Printed page | Notes on the page | Claimed here | Forwarded |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1000 | 9 (single continuous register) | 1–9 (all) | — |
| 1001 | 6 (single continuous register) | 1–6 (all) | — |
| 1002 | 1 (at least; see below) | none | all → `d49-p1-a1-q2` |

**Marker binding order, determined per page from the bands.**
- **p.1000** — one continuous register in **straight reading order**, with an **overflow**: notes 1–5 begin in the left footer column (note 5, the long Augustine *de Trin.* entry, breaks mid-sentence at `Eo quippe ipso imago`) and **note 5 completes in the right footer column**, where notes 6–9 then follow. Anchors fall in reading order: 1–2 in the left body column (fundamenta 1–2), 3–4 in the left body column (fundamenta 3–4), 5–6 in the left body column (contra 1–2), 7–9 in the right body column (contra 3–5). No inversion, no document-order anomaly.
- **p.1001** — one continuous register, **straight reading order**: notes 1–3 in the left footer column, 4–6 in the right. Anchors: 1 in the left body column (Respondeo, at *anima ordinatur*), 2–3 in the left body column (ad 1-2, ad 3), 4–6 in the right body column (ad 4, ad 5). The left footer column also carries the signature line `S. Bonav. — Tom. IV.` and the right the sheet signature `126`; both are page furniture, not notes.

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
- **p.1000 → `d49-p1-divisio`:** I claim **all nine** of p.1000's notes. Derived independently: the divisio's share of p.1000 is the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` block at the head of the page (both columns), which carries **no footnote markers at all** on the bands. If p1-divisio reports claiming any p.1000 note, that is a genuine conflict and needs reconciling — from this side the register is 9 notes and all nine anchor in this chunk's body.
- **p.1002 → `d49-p1-a1-q2`:** I claim **none** of p.1002's footer register. My share of p.1002 is the tail of the scholion only (both columns, above the centred `QUAESTIO II.` header), and it carries no markers. The p.1002 footer note visible on the bands (`1 Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2: Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas`) anchors at *Boethius¹* in q2's first fundamentum; the raw also shows a note 2 (`Libr. I. Ethic. c. 1. — Inferius permulti codd. omittunt …`) anchoring at *Philosophus¹* in q2's second fundamentum. **The whole p.1002 register belongs to q2.** q2's writer should read that footer off the p.1002 bands itself and not rely on this count — I only inspected far enough to establish that none of it is mine.

**Seam continuity.** Opening: `Quantum ergo ad primum proceditur sic` resumes the divisio's TRACTATIO (`Primo quaeritur, quid sit beatitudo`) grammatically and by ordinal. Closing: the scholion's last sentence (`— Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.`) is a complete bibliographic close, immediately followed in the raw by the centred `QUAESTIO II.` header at L106713. No cascade-merge signature at either end.

**Dubia.** None in this range, and none expected — this chunk is at the head of the distinction, not its foot. The dubia check for d.49 falls to whoever holds the foot of pp.1032–1033.

**`[?]` flags: none.** Two OCR readings disagreed with the page and were **resolved at band time**, not flagged: (a) the OCR's `tamen principalius generis guaijtofe` in *ad 5* reads `tamen principalius generis qualitatis` on `vol4-p1001-R-1.png`; (b) the OCR's `principalius tamen disposi-tionem` and `in genere qnalitatis` likewise resolve cleanly on the same band. The scholion's `SCHOLION` header prints centred full-width across the gutter and OCRs as `SCHOLIOK` — noted as an instance of the lost-question signature typography, but here it hid nothing.

**Nothing unmapped.** Every printed line of this chunk's share of pp.1000–1002 is accounted for in the body or the scholion, and every numbered footer entry on pp.1000–1001 is rendered.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis
In what way beatitude is desirable

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis.*

Secundo quaeritur, qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis; et quaeritur, utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem *veram*. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Boethius[^p1002-1]: « Inserta est mentibus hominum veri boni cupiditas »; sed verum bonum est quod nos beatos vere efficit: ergo omnes appetunt beatitudinem veram.

2. Item, Philosophus[^p1002-2] dicit, quod « omnia bonum exoptant »; aut ergo exoptant bonum *quodcumque*, aut bonum, quod *sufficit*. Non *quodcumque*,

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quia, si *quodcumque*, tunc processus est in infinitum: constat ergo, quod bonum, quod *sufficit*. Sed nullum bonum est sufficiens implere animam humanam nisi beatitudo vera: ergo omnes homines appetunt beatitudinem veram.

3. Item, quod homo appetat beatitudinem, aut hoc est *naturale*, aut *deliberationis*. Si *deliberationis*: ergo potest appetere contrarium, scilicet miseriam, cuius contrarium dicit Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio[^p1003-1]: ergo appetit appetitu *naturali*. Sed *naturalis* appetitus est communis omnibus et perpetuus: ergo si talis est appetitus beatitudinis, patet etc.

4. Item, unumquodque perfectibile naturaliter appetit suam perfectionem; sed anima humana nata est perfici beatitudine vera[^p1003-2]: ergo omnis anima appetit beatitudinem veram.

**Contra:**

1. « Invisa possumus diligere, incognita nequaquam », ut dicit Augustinus[^p1003-3]; sed multi sunt qui ignorant, quid sit et ubi sit beatitudo vera; quod patet, quia ponunt beatitudinem in divitiis et honoribus: ergo et beatitudinem veram non appetunt.

2. Item, « peccatum est, spreto Bono incommutabili, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere[^p1003-4] »; sed beatitudo est Bonum incommutabile: ergo omnis peccator beatitudinem veram spernit, ergo nullus appetit. — *Si dicas*, quod *spernit* appetitu *deliberativo*, sed *appetit naturali*; hoc nihil est: quia « quod naturale est non assuescit in contrarium »: ergo nunquam per assuefactionem spernere poterit.

3. Item, beatitudo aut appetitur *propter se*, aut *propter aliud*. Si *propter aliud*: ergo non appetitur ut *beatitudo*, quia illud facit beatum, in quo finis constituitur: appetitur ergo ab omni, a quo appetitur, *propter se*[^p1003-5]. Sed multi sunt qui fruuntur utendis et utuntur fruendis: ergo multi sunt qui veram beatitudinem non appetunt propter se: ergo nec appetunt.

4. Item, si appetitur, aut in ratione *commodi*, aut in ratione *honesti*. Si in ratione *commodi*; cum appetitus commodi sit in animalibus brutis: ergo et beatitudinis[^p1003-6]. Si in ratione *honesti*; cum amor honesti non sit in malis: ergo non appetitur ab ipsis malis.

### Conclusio.

> *Omnes homines beatitudinem veram appetunt naturaliter.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duo sunt, quae faciunt appetitum, scilicet *convenientia* et *indigentia*. Quoniam igitur anima rationalis creata est ad *Dei imaginem et similitudinem*[^p1003-7] et facta est capax boni sufficientissimi; et ipsa sibi non sufficit, cum sit vana et deficiens: ideo dico, quod veram beatitudinem appetit naturaliter.

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod multi ignorant veram beatitudinem; respondent aliqui, quod ante appetitum *deliberativum* oportet cognitionem praecedere, sed non appetitum *naturalem*. — Sed hoc nihil est: quia, sicut in nobis est duplex amor, *naturalis* et *deliberativus*[^p1003-8]; sic similiter et duplex *cognitio*: ergo sicut *deliberativa* cognitio deliberativum amorem praecedit, sic *naturalis* naturalem.

Et propterea dicendum, quod sicut duplex est *instinctus* ad bonum, scilicet in *generali* et in *speciali*; sic et duplex *appetitus*. Et *dictamen boni* in *generali* venit a cognitione *naturali*, et quantum ad hoc non est error; sed dictamen in *speciali* illius vel illius non est omnino ab habitu naturali, sed *per assumtionem* factam a ratione deliberante, et circa hoc est error. — Similiter et de *appetitu* intelligendum[^p1003-9]. Omnes ergo habent *appetitum* beatitudinis verae in *generali* et habent *cognitionem* in *generali*. Omnes enim credunt, quod beatitudo sit bonum, quod sufficit, et omnes istud appetunt. In *speciali* vero, quando *assumit*: hoc sufficit, scilicet honor, vel pecunia, errat cognitio, et declinat affectio. Et est simile de eo qui vult emere aurum et credit, hoc frustum aurichalci esse aurum, et frustum auri credit esse aurichalcum. *Si quaeras* ab eo in generali, quid velit emere; respondet: aurum. *Si quaeras*, quod frustum vult emere; respondebit, quod hoc, demonstrato aurichalco. — Similiter, si ab avaro quaeras, utrum appetat beatitudinem veram et velit habere; respondebit, quod sic. *Si quaeras*, quid velit, utrum paradisum, vel

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denarium; respondebit: denarium. Et huius ratio est, quia hic credit sufficientiam, ibi non.

*Si quaeras:* quomodo *cognovit* in generali? dico, quod innata est illa cognitio[^p1004-1]. *Si quaeras:* per quid? dico, quod sufficientiam cognoscit per indigentiam. — *Si opponas*, quod privatio non est via cognoscendi habitum[^p1004-2]; dicendum, quod est quaedam indigentia *omnino privans*, quaedam *disponens et inclinans*; et haec est ratio cognoscendi. Unde si materia necessario haberet potentiam cognoscendi, cognosceret utique formam, ad quam inclinatur et disponitur; sic anima sufficientiam per suam indigentiam[^p1004-3]. — Posset tamen dici, quod cognitio beatitudinis et multarum rerum naturalium, ut puta iuris naturalis, nobis innata est. Et si anima dicatur creata esse « ut tabula rasa[^p1004-4] »; hoc intelligitur solum quantum ad species et similitudines, quas acquirit per sensus. — Vel dicatur tertio modo, sicut in primo libro[^p1004-5] dictum est de caritate, quomodo cognoverit eam, qui non habet, et tamen sine receptione speciei a sensibus. — Quilibet istorum modorum multum est probabilis. — Alia duo patent.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum dicendum, quod beatitudo appetitur sub ratione *commodi*; sed illud commodum est proprium naturae *rationalis*, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem. Unde etsi animalia appetant commodum, *illud* appetunt, ad quod sunt[^p1004-6].

> The numbered footnotes in the Apparatus below follow Quaracchi's own numbering, which restarts on every printed page; the labels are therefore page-qualified: notes 1–2 of page 1002, notes 1–9 of page 1003, notes 1–6 of page 1004. The same markers appear at the same positions in the Latin body above and in the English translation.

---

english:
### Question II. *In what way beatitude is desirable.*

Secondly it is asked, in what way beatitude is desirable; and it is asked whether all men desire *true* beatitude. And that they do, it seems.

1. Boethius[^p1002-1]: "Implanted in the minds of men is a longing for the true good"; but the true good is that which truly makes us blessed: therefore all desire true beatitude.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher[^p1002-2] says that "all things long for the good"; therefore they either long for *any whatever* good, or for the good which *suffices*. Not for *any whatever*,

for if for *any whatever*, then there is a process to infinity: it stands, therefore, that it is the good which *suffices*. But no good is sufficient to fill the human soul except true beatitude: therefore all men desire true beatitude.

3. Likewise, that a man should desire beatitude is either *natural* or *of deliberation*. If *of deliberation*: then he can desire the contrary, namely misery, the contrary of which Augustine says in the third book of *On Free Choice*[^p1003-1]: therefore he desires it with a *natural* desire. But *natural* desire is common to all and perpetual: therefore if the desire of beatitude is such, the conclusion is plain, etc.

4. Likewise, everything perfectible naturally desires its own perfection; but the human soul is born to be perfected by true beatitude[^p1003-2]: therefore every soul desires true beatitude.

**On the contrary:**

1. "Things unseen we can love, things unknown by no means," as Augustine says[^p1003-3]; but there are many who do not know what true beatitude is and where it is; which is plain, because they place beatitude in riches and honours: therefore they do not desire true beatitude either.

2. Likewise, "sin is, having despised the unchangeable Good, to cleave to changeable things[^p1003-4]"; but beatitude is the unchangeable Good: therefore every sinner despises true beatitude, therefore none desires it. — *If you say* that he *despises* it with the *deliberative* desire, but *desires* it with the *natural* one; this is nothing: because "what is natural does not grow accustomed to its contrary": therefore he will never be able by habituation to despise it.

3. Likewise, beatitude is desired either *for its own sake* or *for the sake of something else*. If *for the sake of something else*: then it is not desired as *beatitude*, because that makes blessed in which the end is constituted: it is therefore desired *for its own sake* by everyone by whom it is desired[^p1003-5]. But there are many who enjoy things to be used and use things to be enjoyed: therefore there are many who do not desire true beatitude for its own sake: therefore neither do they desire it at all.

4. Likewise, if it is desired, it is either under the aspect of the *advantageous* or under the aspect of the *honourable*. If under the aspect of the *advantageous*; since the desire of the advantageous is in brute animals: then the desire of beatitude is too[^p1003-6]. If under the aspect of the *honourable*; since the love of the honourable is not in the wicked: then it is not desired by the wicked themselves.

### Conclusion.

> *All men naturally desire true beatitude.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two things which produce desire, namely *suitability* and *neediness*. Since therefore the rational soul has been created to *the image and likeness of God*[^p1003-7] and has been made capable of the most sufficient good; and it does not suffice for itself, since it is empty and deficient: therefore I say that it naturally desires true beatitude.

*To 1, 2, 3.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that many are ignorant of true beatitude; some answer that knowledge must precede the *deliberative* desire, but not the *natural* desire. — But this is nothing: because, just as in us there is a twofold love, *natural* and *deliberative*[^p1003-8]; so likewise there is also a twofold *knowledge*: therefore just as *deliberative* knowledge precedes deliberative love, so *natural* knowledge precedes natural love.

And therefore it must be said that just as there is a twofold *instinct* toward the good, namely in *general* and in *particular*; so also there is a twofold *desire*. And the *judgment of the good* in *general* comes from *natural* knowledge, and as regards this there is no error; but the judgment in *particular*, of this or that, is not wholly from a natural habit, but *by an assumption* made by deliberating reason, and about this there is error. — And the like is to be understood of *desire*[^p1003-9]. All men therefore have the *desire* of true beatitude in *general* and have *knowledge* of it in *general*. For all believe that beatitude is the good which suffices, and all desire that. But in *particular*, when one *assumes*: this suffices, namely honour or money, knowledge errs and affection turns aside. And it is like the case of one who wishes to buy gold and believes this piece of brass to be gold, and believes the piece of gold to be brass. *If you ask* him in general what he wishes to buy, he answers: gold. *If you ask* which piece he wishes to buy, he will answer: this one, pointing to the brass. — Likewise, if you ask a miser whether he desires true beatitude and wishes to have it, he will answer that he does. *If you ask* what he wishes, whether paradise or

a penny; he will answer: the penny. And the reason of this is that here he believes there is sufficiency, there he does not.

*If you ask:* how did he *know* it in general? I say that that knowledge is innate[^p1004-1]. *If you ask:* by what? I say that he knows sufficiency through neediness. — *If you object* that privation is not a way of knowing a habit[^p1004-2]; it must be said that there is a certain neediness *wholly privative*, and a certain one *disposing and inclining*; and this latter is the ground of knowing. Hence if matter necessarily had the power of knowing, it would surely know the form to which it is inclined and disposed; so the soul knows sufficiency through its own neediness[^p1004-3]. — It could nevertheless be said that the knowledge of beatitude and of many natural things, such as the natural law, is innate in us. And if the soul is said to be created "as a blank tablet[^p1004-4]"; this is understood only as regards the species and likenesses which it acquires through the senses. — Or let it be said in a third way, as was said in the first book[^p1004-5] concerning charity, how one who does not have it has come to know it, and yet without the reception of a species from the senses. — Any one of these ways is highly probable. — The other two are plain.

*To 4.* To the last it must be said that beatitude is desired under the aspect of the *advantageous*; but that advantage is proper to *rational* nature, because it alone is capable of God through knowledge and love. Hence even if animals desire the advantageous, they desire *that* to which they are ordered[^p1004-6].

---

la: Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2: Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas.

en: *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]*, Book III, prose 2: For there is naturally implanted in the minds of men a longing for the true good.

la: Libr. I. Ethic. c. 1. — Inferius permulti codd. omittunt *Non quodcumque.*

en: *Ethics*, Book I, c. 1. — Below, very many codices omit *Not any whatever.*

la: Cap. 6. n. 18. seqq.; cfr. ibid. l. c. 14. n. 30, et Enarrat. 3. in Ps. 32. n. 15.

en: Chapter 6, n. 18 and following; cf. ibid., the same book, c. 14, n. 30, and *Exposition* 3 *on Psalm* 32, n. 15.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 1000, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, page 1000, note 5.

la: Libr. X. de Trin. c. 2. n. 4. Cfr. ibid. VIII. c. 4. n. 6.

en: *On the Trinity*, Book X, c. 2, n. 4. Cf. ibid., Book VIII, c. 4, n. 6.

la: Secundum August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53. Vide tom. II. pag. 839, nota 4. in fine. — Axioma: *Naturale non assuescit in contrarium*, est ex Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. — In fine arg. post *poterit* cod. Y addit: *si naturaliter appetit.*

en: According to Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 19, n. 53. See volume II, page 839, note 4, at the end. — The axiom *What is natural does not grow accustomed to its contrary* is from Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, after *poterit* codex Y adds: *if he desires it naturally.*

la: August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3: Finis autem boni appellatur, quo quisque, cum pervenerit, beatus est. Ibid. XIX. c. 1. n. 1: Illud enim est finis boni nostri, propter quod appetenda sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum (cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2.). Cfr. Epist. 118. (alias 56.) c. 3. n. 13. — In lib. 83 Qq. q. 30. August. ait: Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui. Cfr. X. de Trin. c. 10. n. 13.

en: Augustine, *On the City of God* VIII, c. 3: But that is called the end of the good, at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. Ibid. XIX, c. 1, n. 1: For that is the end of our good, for the sake of which the rest are to be desired, but itself for its own sake (cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 2). Cf. *Letter* 118 (elsewhere 56), c. 3, n. 13. — In the *Book of 83 Questions*, q. 30, Augustine says: And so all human perversity, which is also called vice, is to wish to use what is to be enjoyed and to enjoy what is to be used. Cf. *On the Trinity* X, c. 10, n. 13.

la: Vide supra pag. 1000, nota 2. — De divisione appetitionis ratione *commodi* et *honesti* cfr. supra pag. 717, nota 1; Anselm., libr. de Voluntate, et lib. de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. seqq.

en: See above, page 1000, note 2. — On the division of desire by the aspect of the *advantageous* and of the *honourable* cf. above, page 717, note 1; Anselm, the book *On the Will*, and the book *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 11 and following.

la: Gen. 1, 26. seq. — De hac respons. cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.

en: Genesis 1:26 f. — On this reply cf. *I Sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Motu animal. c. 3. in fine et c. 4. (c. 6. et 7.), ubi progressum ad operationem comparat syllogizationi, in qua habetur *maior* (principium), *minor* (assumtio) et *conclusio.* — Pro *a ratione deliberante* cod. K (I a secunda manu) *ab anima deliberante.* Aliquanto inferius post *assumit* cod. S addit *et dicit.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Movement of Animals*, c. 3 at the end and c. 4 (cc. 6 and 7), where he compares the progress toward action to syllogizing, in which there is a *major* (the principle), a *minor* (the assumption) and a *conclusion.* — For *by deliberating reason* codex K (I, by a second hand) reads *by the deliberating soul.* Somewhat further down, after *assumit* codex S adds *and says.*

la: August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26, ubi dicit, quod « antequam beati simus, mentibus tamen nostris *impressa* est notio beatitatis; per hanc enim scimus fidenterque et sine ulla dubitatione dicimus, beatos nos esse velle ». Ibid. etiam quae praecedunt insinuantur, scil. quod omnes appetant beatitudinem, sed propterea diversa sectentur, quod aliud alii videtur bonum et via ad beatitudinem. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 1. n. 1.

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 9, n. 26, where he says that "before we are blessed, the notion of blessedness is nevertheless *impressed* upon our minds; for through it we know and confidently and without any doubt declare that we wish to be blessed." In the same place the things that precede are also intimated, namely that all desire beatitude, but pursue different things for this reason, that one thing seems good to one and another to another as the way to beatitude. Cf. *Exposition on Psalm* 118, sermon 1, n. 1.

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 802, nota 8. — De exemplo ex *materia* sumto cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), ubi docet, ipsam appetere et desiderare ex natura sua formam.

en: See volume III, page 802, note 8. — On the example taken from *matter* cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 (c. 9), where he teaches that matter of its own nature desires and longs for form.

la: Respiciuntur infra verba Anselmi nota 9.

en: The words of Anselm in note 9 below are here referred to.

la: Secundum Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, ubi hoc dictum Philosophi exponitur, et afferuntur exempla cognitionum innatarum respectu *iuris* [ita codd. P Q aa, cod. G *luminis*, alii codd. et ed. 1 *numerus*, Vat. *numeri*, cod. E legit *numeri, naturaliter nobis* etc. quo respicitur August., XII. de Trin. c. 15. n. 24; cfr. Itiner. mentis in Deum, c. 2. 3.] *naturalis*, v. g. Dei diligendi, parentum honorandorum etc.

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 14 (c. 4). Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, where this saying of the Philosopher is expounded, and examples are adduced of innate knowledge with respect to *natural law* [so codices P Q aa; codex G reads *of light*; other codices and edition 1, *number*; the Vatican edition, *of number*; codex E reads *of numbers, naturally to us* etc., whereby reference is made to Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 15, n. 24; cf. *The Journey of the Mind into God*, cc. 2 and 3] — for example, that God is to be loved, that parents are to be honoured, etc.

la: Dist. 17. p. I. q. 4. Cfr. ibid. scholion n. III. 4. et 5.

en: Distinction 17, part I, q. 4. Cf. the scholion there, n. III, 4 and 5.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR, raw lines 106713–106833 of `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, verified column-by-column against the 450 dpi bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p100{2,3,4}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (gutters as measured in the d.49 brief; **no bands were regenerated**). English translated literally, paragraph for paragraph.

**Page span corrected.** The skeleton declared `printed_pages: [1002, 1003]`. The raw range runs past the `1004 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.` running head at L106803 and continues to L106833; `QUAESTIO III.` opens at L106834, on p.1004. Corrected to **[1002, 1003, 1004]** (pdf 1022–1024).

**Apparatus split map (17 entries claimed).**
- **p.1002** — 2 printed notes; **both mine** (Boethius, Aristotle). q1 holds the top of p.1002 (its scholion, I–IV) but anchors nothing in p.1002's numbered footer register, which restarts at 1 with my Boethius marker.
- **p.1003** — 9 printed notes; **all 9 mine** (p.1003 lies wholly inside this chunk). Notes 1–5 print in the left footer column, with note 5 **overflowing into the top of the right footer column** (the `Omnis itaque humana perversio…` sentence); notes 6–9 print in the right footer column. Binding is straight reading order.
- **p.1004** — 14 printed notes; **notes 1–6 mine** (all in the left footer column), **notes 7–14 belong to `p1-a1-q3`** (right footer column, anchoring in q3's body from `Augustinus, decimo nono de Civitate Dei` onward). Straight reading order; the register splits exactly at the footer column boundary.

**Raw-vs-band divergence.** The raw OCR carries p.1002's two footer entries but **omits the entire footer register of pp.1003 and 1004** — 23 notes invisible in the raw, recovered wholly from the bands. This is the d.47/d.48 missing-footer failure recurring in d.49.

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
- → `p1-a1-q1`: p.1002's numbered footer register contains only my two notes; nothing on that page is yours to claim.
- → `p1-a1-q3`: your chunk begins at L106834 **on p.1004, not p.1003**. p.1003 is entirely mine. On p.1004 take footer notes **7–14** (right column, beginning `7 Cap. 3. n. 1, ubi refert opinionem Varronis…`); notes 1–6 are mine.

**Verifications.** Ordinal opener aligns (*Secundo quaeritur, qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis*) — no q-swap. The title on the line after `QUAESTIO II.` reads *Qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis*, matching the frontmatter. Latin `[^` anchors = English `[^` anchors = 17. No scholion: p.1004 note 6 reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, so this question is expressly covered by q1's scholion — `has_scholion: false` is correct, not a dropout. Editorial marginalia (*Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Conclusio.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Solutio 1.*, *Improbatur.*, *Solutio auctoris.*, *Duplex instinctus…*, *Notandum.*, *De cognitionis innatae ratione.*, *Resp. 1./2./3.*) trimmed per the OCR-cleanup rule.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All three pages' bands read cleanly with no clipping.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
In quo subiecto sit beatitudo
In what subject beatitude resides

source_text:
<!-- page 1004 -->

### Quaestio III. *In quo subiecto sit beatitudo.*

> Le note numerate qui sotto seguono la numerazione a piè di pagina dell'edizione di Quaracchi, che ricomincia da 1 su ogni pagina stampata. Le sigle indicano la pagina: notes 7–14 of page 1004, notes 1–9 of page 1005, notes 1–2 of page 1006. Notes 1–6 of page 1004 belong to the preceding question (q. 2), and notes 3–6 of page 1006 to the following question (q. 4).

Tertio quaeritur de beatitudinis subiecto; et quaeritur, utrum homo sit subiectum beatitudinis secundum animam, an totum coniunctum. Et quod *totum coniunctum*, videtur.

1. Augustinus, decimo nono de Civitate Dei[^p1004-7]: « Summum bonum, a quo homo beatus efficitur, ex utriusque rei bonis constat, animae scilicet et corporis ».

2. Item, *de Spiritu et anima*[^p1004-8] dicit, quod « Deus factus est homo, ut totum hominem beatificaret, exterius per humanitatem, interius per Divinitatem ».

3. Item, Anselmus[^p1004-9], definiens beatitudinem, dicit, quod « est sufficientia omnium bonorum »; et bona illa dividit in bona animae et corporis.

4. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia praemium respondet merito; sed meritum est totius coniuncti, quia anima exuta non meretur: ergo beatitudo sive praemium[^p1004-10].

5. Item, beatitudo opponitur miseriae; sed miseria est non tantum animae, sed etiam est totius coniuncti, maxime ratione corporis: ergo etc.

6. Item, si beatitudo omnino respiceret animam ut subiectum, ergo non necesse esset, corpus resurgere; sed necesse est resurgere[^p1004-11]: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Super illud Psalmi[^p1004-12]: *Beata gens, cuius Dominus Deus* etc.; Glossa: « Beatitudo hominis tantum in animo est, quia animus hominis tantum capax est, valens frui illa ».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia beatitudo consistit in Deo, quia ipse est finis ultimus, in quo standum est[^p1004-13]; sed solus spiritus ad Deum videndum et amandum convertitur: ergo beatitudo est in solo spiritu.

3. Item, beatitudo gloriae respondet gratiae; sed gratia, cum sit qualitas spiritualis, est in homine ratione solius animae: ergo et beatitudo, quia, quantum se extendit dispositio ad formam, tantum se extendit forma[^p1004-14].

<!-- page 1005 -->

4. Item, si aliqua passio inest aliquibus subiectis, inest secundum aliquod commune[^p1005-1]; sed beatitudo inest Angelo et homini: ergo inest secundum aliquod commune Angelo et homini. Sed non est aliquod commune Angelo et homini nisi spiritus et potentiae spirituales: ergo beatitudo est tantum in potentia spirituali.

5. Item, si aliqua duo communicant in aliqua natura et non possunt convenire in eo quod superadditum est naturae, illud superadditum non inest secundum naturam, in qua communicant; sed homo communicat cum brutis in corpore et in potentiis sentiendi et non potest communicare in beatitudine[^p1005-2]: ergo non inest secundum corpus.

### Conclusio

> *Beatitudo est in sola anima ut in subiecto primo per inhaerentiam, in corpore vero propter coniunctionem per quandam redundantiam.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod beatitudo dicitur dupliciter: *proprie* et *communiter*. *Proprie* est gaudium de participatione Dei perfecta per cognitionem et amorem; *communiter* vero dicitur omnis remuneratio excludens omnem miseriam. Primo modo comprehendit praemium *substantiale* tantum, secundo modo *accidentale*; primo modo est tantum in *anima*, secundo modo est in *anima et corpore* et toto coniuncto. — Et per hoc solvunt rationes ad partes oppositas.

Sed ista solutio non videtur conveniens, quoniam, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p1005-3], « beate vivere est bonis veris certisque gaudere »; sed gaudium et « dolor, sicut dicit decimo quarto de Trinitate, est ipsius animae »: ergo et gaudium beatitudinis est in anima sicut in subiecto, sive sit de bono increato, quod est Deus, sive de bonis corporis.

Et ideo dicunt alii aliter, quod *gaudium* etiam *accidentale* et beatitudo accidentalis est in anima sicut in subiecto, sed huius *gaudii materia* est in corpore, quia gaudet anima de bonis corporis; et ideo beatitudo non est in corpore sicut in *subiecto*, sed sicut in *materia* et *obiecto*, non principali tamen. — Sed istud non sufficit dicere, quia similiter *materia gaudii* est in omnibus creaturis remanentibus post iudicium: ergo non magis diceretur secundum hoc, corpus nostrum beatificari quam aliae creaturae; quod non est conveniens dicere. — *Si tu dicas*, quod magis propter hoc, quod habet conditiones nobiliores; hoc non valet, quia similiter corpus solis easdem conditiones, quas corpus nostrum, habebit.

Et ideo dicendum aliter, quod beatitudo, cum sit gaudium de bonis, est in aliquo sicut in *subiecto primo per inhaerentiam*, et sic dico, quod est in sola anima; et est in aliquo sicut in *coniuncto per quandam redundantiam*, et sic, quia corpus est coniunctum animae, gaudium redundat in corpus[^p1005-4].

Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, quod beatitudo non sit in corpore tanquam in subiecto primo, sed tamen est ibi propter coniunctionem per quandam redundantiam et comparticipationem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ex utriusque bonis constat beatitudo; dicendum, quod Augustinus dicit illud secundum opinionem Tullii[^p1005-5].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, ut totum hominem beatificaret; dicendum, quod ibi est quaedam congruentia, quia etiam, etsi non esset incarnatus, homo esset beatus, dum tamen esset redemptus et ad visionem Dei perductus[^p1005-6].

3. Ad illud quod dicit Anselmus, dicendum, quod bene continet bona corporis; sed beatitudo non[^p1005-7] dicitur esse illa bona, sed gaudium de illis bonis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de merito, dicendum, quod anima non potest mereri extra corpus, non propter defectum virtutis, sed propter defectum status et temporis[^p1005-8] merendi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod miseria est ex parte corporis; dicendum, quod miseria *subiective* et *proprie* est in natura rationali; sed *materialiter* potest esse ratione corporis, sicut dicit Augustinus octavo de Civitate Dei[^p1005-9].

<!-- page 1006 -->

6. Ad aliud patet responsio, quod corpus necesse est resurgere, ut fiat beatum per quandam comparticipationem et redundantiam. Et est simile in gratia: quia, si gratia existens in anima secundum potentiam rationalem redundat in sensibilem, quando abundans est, et ipsam tranquillat, et quando delectatio magna est, similiter, sicut dicitur in Psalmo[^p1006-1]: *Sitivit in te anima mea*; cum in gloria sit perfecta abundantia et delectatio, non est mirum, si redundat in corpus; et hoc nemo dubitat nisi inexpertus[^p1006-2].

---

english:
### Question III. *In what subject beatitude resides.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the subject of beatitude; and it is asked whether man is the subject of beatitude according to the soul, or the whole composite. And that it is *the whole composite*, seems [to follow].

1. Augustine, in the nineteenth book of the City of God[^p1004-7]: « The highest good, by which man is made blessed, consists of the goods of each thing, namely of soul and of body ».

2. Likewise, *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^p1004-8] says that « God became man, that he might beatify the whole man, exteriorly through his humanity, interiorly through his Divinity ».

3. Likewise, Anselm[^p1004-9], in defining beatitude, says that « it is the sufficiency of all goods »; and he divides those goods into goods of the soul and of the body.

4. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because the reward corresponds to the merit; but merit belongs to the whole composite, since the soul stripped [of the body] does not merit: therefore [so also] beatitude, that is, the reward[^p1004-10].

5. Likewise, beatitude is opposed to misery; but misery belongs not only to the soul, but is also of the whole composite, chiefly by reason of the body: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if beatitude regarded the soul altogether as its subject, then it would not be necessary that the body rise again; but it is necessary that it rise again[^p1004-11]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that verse of the Psalm[^p1004-12]: *Blessed is the nation whose Lord is God* etc.; the Gloss: « Man's beatitude is only in his mind, because only the mind of man is capable of it, being able to enjoy it ».

2. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because beatitude consists in God, since he is the ultimate end, in which one must come to rest[^p1004-13]; but only the spirit is turned to seeing and loving God: therefore beatitude is in the spirit alone.

3. Likewise, the beatitude of glory corresponds to grace; but grace, since it is a spiritual quality, is in man by reason of the soul alone: therefore beatitude also, because, as far as the disposition to the form extends, so far does the form extend[^p1004-14].

4. Likewise, if some attribute is in certain subjects, it is in them according to something common[^p1005-1]; but beatitude is in an Angel and in a man: therefore it is in them according to something common to Angel and to man. But there is nothing common to Angel and to man except spirit and the spiritual powers: therefore beatitude is only in a spiritual power.

5. Likewise, if any two things share in some nature and cannot agree in that which is superadded to the nature, that superadded thing is not in them according to the nature in which they share; but man shares with the brutes in body and in the powers of sensing, and cannot share [with them] in beatitude[^p1005-2]: therefore it is not in [him] according to the body.

### Conclusion

> *Beatitude is in the soul alone as in its first subject by inherence, but in the body on account of the conjunction, by a certain redundance.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to this some have said that beatitude is spoken of in two ways: *properly* and *commonly*. *Properly* it is the joy arising from a perfect participation in God through knowledge and love; *commonly*, however, every remuneration excluding all misery is so called. In the first way it comprehends only the *substantial* reward, in the second way the *accidental* one; in the first way it is only in the *soul*, in the second way it is in the *soul and the body* and in the whole composite. — And by this they solve the arguments for the opposite sides.

But that solution does not seem fitting, since, as Augustine says[^p1005-3], « to live blessedly is to rejoice in goods true and certain »; but joy and « sorrow, as he says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, belong to the soul itself »: therefore the joy of beatitude also is in the soul as in a subject, whether it be concerning the uncreated Good, which is God, or concerning the goods of the body.

And therefore others say otherwise, that *accidental joy* also and accidental beatitude is in the soul as in a subject, but the *matter of this joy* is in the body, because the soul rejoices over the goods of the body; and therefore beatitude is not in the body as in a *subject*, but as in *matter* and *object*, yet not a principal one. — But it does not suffice to say this, because likewise the *matter of joy* is in all the creatures remaining after the judgment: therefore it would no more be said on this ground that our body is beatified than the other creatures; which it is not fitting to say. — *If you say* that it is rather on this ground, that it has nobler conditions; this does not hold, because likewise the body of the sun will have the same conditions as our body.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that beatitude, since it is joy over goods, is in something as in a *first subject by inherence*, and thus I say that it is in the soul alone; and it is in something as in *a composite by a certain redundance*, and thus, because the body is conjoined to the soul, the joy redounds into the body[^p1005-4].

Therefore the arguments proving that beatitude is not in the body as in a first subject are to be conceded, but nevertheless it is there on account of the conjunction, by a certain redundance and comparticipation.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that beatitude consists of the goods of each; it must be said that Augustine says that according to the opinion of Tullius[^p1005-5].

2. To that which is objected, that he might beatify the whole man; it must be said that there is a certain fittingness there, because even if he had not been incarnate, man would have been blessed, provided nevertheless that he had been redeemed and led through to the vision of God[^p1005-6].

3. To that which Anselm says, it must be said that it does indeed contain the goods of the body; but beatitude is not[^p1005-7] said to be those goods, but the joy over those goods.

4. To that which is objected concerning merit, it must be said that the soul cannot merit outside the body, not on account of a defect of power, but on account of a defect of the state and of the time of meriting[^p1005-8].

5. To that which is objected, that misery is on the part of the body; it must be said that misery *subjectively* and *properly* is in the rational nature; but *materially* it can be by reason of the body, as Augustine says in the eighth book of the City of God[^p1005-9].

6. To the other the answer is plain, that the body must rise again, so that it may be made blessed by a certain comparticipation and redundance. And there is a like case in grace: because, if grace existing in the soul according to the rational power redounds into the sensitive power, when it is abundant, and calms it, and when the delight is great, likewise, as is said in the Psalm[^p1006-1]: *My soul has thirsted for thee*; since in glory there is perfect abundance and delight, it is no wonder if it redounds into the body; and no one doubts this except one who is inexperienced[^p1006-2].

---

la: Cap. 3. n. 1, ubi refert opinionem Varronis (qui etiam ad Tullium Ciceronem recurrit) de summo hominis bono. — Textus originalis substituit *constare dicit* pro *constat*. Codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *rei*.

en: Chapter 3, n. 1, where he reports the opinion of Varro (who also has recourse to Tullius Cicero) concerning man's highest good. — The original text substitutes *constare dicit* for *constat*. The codices and edition 1 omit *rei*.

la: Cap. 9. (inter opera August.). Cfr. tom. III. pag. 19, nota 5, et August., X. de Civ. Dei, c. 27.

en: Chapter 9 (among the works of Augustine). Compare vol. III, p. 19, note 5, and Augustine, City of God X, c. 27.

la: Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 24: *Beatitudo est sufficientia, in qua nulla est indigentia.* Lib. de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 13: *In beatitudine… est sufficientia competentium commodorum sine omni indigentia.* Idem habetur in lib. de Similitudinibus (inter opera Anselmi), c. 47. seqq., ubi etiam 14 bona beatitudinis animae et corporis exponuntur.

en: Book I, *Why God Became Man*, c. 24: *Beatitude is a sufficiency in which there is no want.* The book *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 13: *In beatitude… there is a sufficiency of befitting advantages without any want.* The same is found in the book *On Likenesses* (among the works of Anselm), c. 47 ff., where also the fourteen goods of the beatitude of soul and of body are set out.

la: Cod. N (P a secunda manu) supplet *est totius coniuncti*; edd. legunt: *ergo non beatitudine sive praemium*.

en: Codex N (P by a second hand) supplies *est totius coniuncti*; the editions read: *ergo non beatitudine sive praemium*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 1. — Vat. *corpus resurgere*.

en: Compare above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 1. — The Vatican edition reads *corpus resurgere*.

la: Psalm. 32, 12. Post *cuius* Vulgata addit *est*. Glossam exhibet Petr. Lombard. (in hunc loc.): *Beatitudo omnis in animo tuo est, quia animus naturaliter est capax beatitudinis, valens ea frui.* Cfr. August., Enarrat. 2. in Ps. 32. serm. 2. n. 16.

en: Psalm 32, 12. After *cuius* the Vulgate adds *est*. Peter Lombard sets out the Gloss (on this passage): *All beatitude is in your mind, because the mind is naturally capable of beatitude, being able to enjoy it.* Compare Augustine, *Second Exposition on Psalm 32*, sermon 2, n. 16.

la: Vide supra q. 1.

en: See above, q. 1.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3.

en: Compare III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 26, nota 5. — Pro *passio* cod. O *forma* (per *passionem* secundum Aristot. intelligitur proprietas vel attributum).

en: See vol. II, p. 26, note 5. — For *passio* codex O has *forma* (by *passio*, according to Aristotle, a property or attribute is understood).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 1000, nota 2. — Mox post *ergo non inest* cod. L et Vat. supplent *beatitudo*.

en: Compare above, p. 1000, note 2. — Shortly after, following *ergo non inest*, codex L and the Vatican edition supply *beatitudo*.

la: Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 13. n. 29. — Seq. locus est XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 346, nota 7, ubi etiam alii loci allegati sunt. — Mox post *sed* ex codd. E L W Y supplevimus *gaudium*. Subinde post *beatitudinis est* codd. E L subnectunt *tantum*.

en: Book I, *On Free Choice*, c. 13, n. 29. — The following passage is City of God XIV, c. 15, n. 2. Compare vol. III, p. 346, note 7, where other passages too are cited. — Shortly after, following *sed*, we have supplied *gaudium* from codices E L W Y. Then, after *beatitudinis est*, codices E L append *tantum*.

la: August., Epist. 118. (alias 56.) c. 3. n. 14: *Tam potenti enim natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine… redundet etiam in inferiorem naturam, quod est corpus, non beatitudo, quae fruentis et intelligentis est propria, sed plenitudo sanitatis, id est incorruptionis vigor.* — Cod. Y *magnum gaudium animae redundat in corpus*. Inferius pro *comparticipationem* plures codd. *participationem*.

en: Augustine, Letter 118 (elsewhere 56), c. 3, n. 14: *For God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its most full beatitude… there redounds even into the lower nature, which is the body, not beatitude, which is proper to one enjoying and understanding, but a fullness of health, that is, the vigour of incorruption.* — Codex Y reads *magnum gaudium animae redundat in corpus*. Lower down, for *comparticipationem* several codices have *participationem*.

la: Vide supra pag. 1004, nota 7. — Pro *utriusque* multi codd. et ed. 1 *utrisque*.

en: See above, p. 1004, note 7. — For *utriusque* many codices and edition 1 have *utrisque*.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. — Ita codd. P S Y (E a secunda manu), alii codd. *perfectus*, edd. *perfecte*, cod. K (I a secunda manu) *dum esset admissus ad visionem Dei perfectam*. Pro *tamen*, quod praebent codd. E L P S, cod. aa *modo*, alii *enim*; post *redemptus* ex codd. G S supplevimus *et*.

en: Compare III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. — So codices P S Y (E by a second hand); other codices have *perfectus*, the editions *perfecte*, codex K (I by a second hand) *dum esset admissus ad visionem Dei perfectam*. For *tamen*, which codices E L P S offer, codex aa has *modo*, others *enim*; after *redemptus* we have supplied *et* from codices G S.

la: Cod. A *non est* vel *non*. Supra pro *bene* Vat. *beatitudo*.

en: Codex A reads *non est* or *non*. Above, for *bene*, the Vatican edition has *beatitudo*.

la: Cum codd. M O S substituimus *temporis* pro *tempus*.

en: With codices M O S we have substituted *temporis* for *tempus*.

la: Cap. 16, ubi ex proprietatibus, quae Plato daemonibus attribuit, deducit: *Ad hoc rationalia, ut misera esse possint; ad hoc passiva, ut misera sint; ad hoc aeterna, ut miseriam finire non possint.* Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 15. n. 2.

en: Chapter 16, where from the properties which Plato attributes to the demons he deduces: *They are rational for this, that they may be able to be miserable; passible for this, that they may be miserable; eternal for this, that they may not be able to end their misery.* Compare ibid., XIV, c. 15, n. 2.

la: Psalm. 41, 3. — Superius pro *sensibilem* plures codd. vel *sentientem* vel *sensualitatem*.

en: Psalm 41, 3. — Above, for *sensibilem*, several codices have either *sentientem* or *sensualitatem*.

en: See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L106834–107077, verified throughout against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1004,1005,1006}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands as supplied; **none regenerated**). No `[?]` flags.

**Page-span correction (reported).** The skeleton declared `printed_pages: [1003, 1004, 1005, 1006]`. **p.1003 is wrong and has been dropped.** The p.1003 running head reads `DIST. XLIX. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II.` on both columns, and both columns carry q. 2 body (the *appetitus beatitudinis* arguments, the CONCLUSIO *Omnes homines beatitudinem veram appetunt naturaliter*, and the Respondeo). Nothing of q. 3 stands on p.1003. Span is now **1004–1006** (pdf 1024–1026).

**`QUAESTIO III` prints centred full-width across the gutter** on p.1004, between the two column blocks — the same typographic signature that hid lost questions in d.48 and in d.49 P.II. Here it is *not* lost: it is this chunk's own header, and the raw OCR does carry it (`QUAESTIO III.` / `In quo suhieclo sit heatitudo.`). **Checked the whole 1004–1006 range for any further hidden QUAESTIO header: none.** The only other full-width centred header in range is `QUAESTIO IV.` / *Secundum quid beatitudo insit in anima* on p.1006, which opens the next chunk (`p1-a1-q4`) and is correctly excluded here.

**Ordinal opener verified.** The line after the header reads *Tertio quaeritur de beatitudinis subiecto* — correctly aligned to q. 3; no chunker q-swap. The printed title `In quo subiecto sit beatitudo` matches `title_la`; no correction needed.

**Reconciliation with `p1-a1-q2`'s hand-off.** Independently derived, then compared. Agreement on the front seam (p.1003 is wholly q2's; this chunk opens on p.1004) and on the p.1004 register split at the column boundary (1–6 q2, 7–14 here). **One correction to q2's report:** q2 states the raw omits the entire footer register of *both* p.1003 and p.1004. That is true of p.1003 but **not of p.1004** — the raw does carry p.1004's footer register, cascade-fragmented and column-interleaved, at L106901–106945 (`Augusl., dB Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26 …` for note 1 through `Cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3.` for note 14). It was read off the bands regardless, and the band read and the raw agree.

**Marker binding.** Straight reading order on every page of this chunk (left column then right column, notes numbered continuously across the two footer columns). No overflow and no inversion. Verified anchor-by-anchor against footer content.

**Page → apparatus split map (19 entries in this chunk):**

| Printed page | Notes on the page | Claimed here | Claimed by neighbour |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1004 | 14 (1–6 left footer col., 7–14 right footer col.) | **7–14** (8) | 1–6 → `p1-a1-q2` |
| 1005 | 9 (1–4 left footer col., 4 cont.–9 right footer col.) | **1–9** (9) | — (page wholly mine) |
| 1006 | 6 (all in left footer col.) | **1–2** (2) | 3–6 → `p1-a1-q4` |

Latin `[^` anchors: 19. English `[^` anchors: 19. Matched.

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
- **To `p1-a1-q2`:** p.1003 is *entirely* yours — both columns of body plus the whole p.1003 footer register (**9 notes**, 1–5 in the left footer column, 6–9 in the right; note 9 is the long Aristotle *de Motu animalium* entry ending *addit et dicit*). Additionally, **p.1004 notes 1–6 are yours** (1 = August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26; 2 = Vide tom. III. pag. 802, nota 8 + Aristot. I. Phys.; 3 = Respiciuntur infra verba Anselmi nota 9; 4 = Secundum Aristot., III. de Anima + II Sent. d. 39; 5 = Dist. 17. p. I. q. 1; 6 = Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.), anchored in p.1004's left column (*innata est illa cognitio*¹ … *habitum*² … *per suam indigentiam*³) and right column (*ut tabula rasa*⁴ … *in primo libro*⁵ … *ad quod sunt*⁶). Your body ends at *illud appetunt, ad quod sunt*⁶ in p.1004's right column, immediately before the full-width `QUAESTIO III` header.
- **To `p1-a1-q4`:** p.1006 notes **3–6** are yours (3 = August., Epist. 130. (alias 121.) c. 7. n. 14; 4 = Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1; 5 = Vide tom. II. pag. 226, nota 7; 6 = Secundum August.; vide supra pag. 1000, nota 5). All six p.1006 notes print in the **left** footer column. Your body begins at the full-width `QUAESTIO IV.` / *Secundum quid beatitudo insit in anima* header on p.1006, with *Quarto quaeritur, secundum quid insit beatitudo…*.

**Seam continuity.** Opening sentence (*Tertio quaeritur de beatitudinis subiecto…*) begins a fresh question after a printed header — continuity with q. 2 is by header, not by clause. Closing sentence (*…et hoc nemo dubitat nisi inexpertus*) parses complete; no cascade-merge signature.

**Page-break placement.** The 1005→1006 break falls mid-sentence inside solution 6 (*…Et est simile in | gratia: quia, si gratia existens…*). The `<!-- page 1006 -->` comment is therefore set at the nearest preceding paragraph boundary, before solution 6.

**No scholion.** Normal here: p.1006 note 2 explicitly redirects — *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* — so this question's scholion lives with `p1-a1-q1`. `has_scholion: false`.

**Raw-vs-band divergences resolved at band time (no `[?]`):** the raw's running-head line `DIST. XLIX. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III. … 1003` is a digit-mangle of p.**1005**'s running head (band reads `UNICUS QUAEST. III.` / `1005`); OCR *soria*→*miseria*, *suhieclo*→*subiecto*, *heatitudo*→*beatitudo*, *esuta*→*exuta*, *bealitudo*→*beatitudo*, *raereri*→*mereri*, *virtnlis*→*virtutis*, *slalus*→*status*, *rcsurgere*→*resurgere*, *coniunctipnem*→*coniunctionem*, *gralia*→*gratia*, *delectlatio*→*delectatio*, *inexpertus* confirmed. Editorial marginalia (*Ad oppositum.*, *Opinio 1./2./3.*, *Improbatur.*, *Non sufficit.*, *Notandum.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Fundamenta.*) trimmed per the corpus convention.