title: Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: iste homo incepit esse, Christo demonstrato.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: iste homo incepit esse, Christo demonstrato. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus *super Ioannem* 4[^1]: « Antequam mundus fieret, nec nos eramus, nec mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus »: si ergo non erat ante mundi constitutionem, ergo incepit esse.

2. Item, nasci et generari est mutari secundum substantiam et produci de non-esse in esse[^2]; sed idem est omnino produci in esse et incipere esse: cum ergo haec sit vera: iste homo nascitur, et haec: iste homo in esse producitur; haec erit vera: iste homo incipit esse.

3. Item, ante mundi constitutionem haec est vera: nullus homo est, et haec est falsa: aliquis homo est: ergo et haec falsa: iste homo est, demonstrato Christo; et haec modo est vera[^3]: ergo praedicatum modo convenit subiecto; et prius non conveniebat: ergo incipit convenire: ergo haec est vera: iste homo incipit esse.

4. Item, bene sequitur: iste homo est, ergo iste est homo, pro eo quod ex propositione, in qua clauditur implicatio, licet ipsam implicationem inferre — sequitur enim: homo albus currit, ergo homo est albus[^4] — ergo sequitur: iste homo est vel fuit ab aeterno, ergo iste fuit ab aeterno homo. Sed haec est falsa: iste, demonstrato Christo, ab aeterno fuit homo: ergo et haec: iste homo est vel fuit ab aeterno; et modo est vera: restat igitur, quod incipiat esse vera: ergo haec est vera: iste homo incipit esse.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ioannis octavo[^5]: *Antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum*, pari ratione et, antequam caelum fieret: ergo si idem demonstratur per hoc pronomen *ego* et per hoc pronomen *iste*, videtur,

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quod haec sit vera: iste homo fuit ante mundi constitutionem: ergo haec est falsa: iste homo incepit esse.

2. Item, Magister[^6] concedit hanc: « Iste puer creavit stellas »; sed cui vere attribuitur creare caelum, vere attribuitur semper esse: ergo iste puer semper fuit: ergo haec est falsa: iste puer incepit esse. Consimiliter haec negatur a Magistro: « Iste homo sive Christus est creatura »; sed hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia per nomen *creaturae* importatur exitus de non-esse in esse: ergo pari ratione, vel multo fortiori haec est falsa: iste homo incepit esse.

3. Item, proprium est pronominis pro proprio nomine poni et certam designare personam[^7]: ergo cum dicitur: iste homo, hoc pronomen *iste* demonstrat personam. Sed persona Christi semper fuit et nunquam incepit esse: ergo haec est falsa: iste homo incepit esse. Si tu dicas, quod persona ibi large accipitur; adhuc obiicitur, quia quidquid demonstrat, sive suppositum, sive personam proprie; videtur, quod adhuc falsa est locutio: quia expositio huius verbi *incipit* est haec: hoc incipit esse, ergo hoc modo est, sed prius non fuit[^8]. Si ergo haec est vera: iste homo incipit esse, haec est vera: iste homo modo est et prius non fuit. Sed quocumque modo accipiatur, falsa est haec locutio: iste homo prius non fuit. Si enim pro persona, eius opposita est vera: iste homo prius fuit. Similiter si pro supposito, vera est: iste homo prius fuit, propter communicationem idiomatum. Sed non licet negare de aliquo quod vere affirmatur sive per proprietatem naturae, sive per unionem. Haec enim simpliciter est falsa: homo non est Deus, quia eius opposita est vera per unionem[^9]. Cum ergo omni modo ista sit vera: iste homo semper fuit, haec omni modo est falsa: iste homo incepit esse.

4. Item, sicut supra[^10] habitum fuit, iste terminus *homo*, dictus de Christo, quodam modo habet naturam termini *accidentalis*, quia in termino accidentali suppositum praeexistere potest formae; sic et in proposito est reperire. Sed regula datur, quod terminus accidentalis, supponens verbo de praeterito[^11], potest supponere pro praesentibus, vel pro praeteritis, ita quod indifferenter potest reddere locutionem veram pro his, vel illis. Nec propter hoc distinguitur locutio multiplex, quia non comparatur ad illa tanquam ad significata, sed tanquam ad supposita; sed talis locutio dicitur habere plures causas veritatis[^12]. Cum ergo dicitur: iste homo fuit, sensus est: iste qui est homo, fuit, vel: iste qui fuit homo, fuit. Sed haec simpliciter est vera: iste qui est homo, ab aeterno fuit, ergo et haec: iste homo ab aeterno fuit, ergo haec est falsa simpliciter: iste homo incipit esse, et nullatenus distinguenda.

> ### Conclusio
> *Locutio: iste homo, Christo demonstrato, incepit esse, potest cum distinctione admitti, scilicet quatenus iste demonstrat singulare hominis, non personam Verbi.*

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam huius locutionis consideranda est responsio Magistri[^13]. Magister enim respondet dicens, quod ad hanc locutionem « non est ferenda responsio sine distinctione »; ipse tamen non distinguit, sed determinat, quod incepit esse quantum ad naturam, licet non quantum ad personam; incepit esse secundum naturam humanam, sed non incepit esse in quantum Verbum. — Sed certe iste modus dicendi non sufficit opponenti importuno[^14].

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Quaereret enim rationem multiplicitatis, et quem sensum faciat dicta locutio, quantum est de vi verborum; et hoc non potest haberi ex verbis Magistri ad liquidum. — Et propterea tentandum est distinguere, si quo modo possimus aptare[^15] praedictae locutioni convenientem distinguendi modum.

Videtur autem praedicta locutio posse distingui ex eo, quod verbum incipiendi potest notare inceptionem respectu *veritatis totius dicti*, vel potest importare inceptionem rei praedicatae respectu *subiecti*. Si primo modo, tunc est sensus: iste homo incepit esse, hoc est, locutio ista, scilicet iste homo est, incepit esse vera; et hoc absque dubio verum est. Si autem dicat, inceptionem esse respectu eius quod demonstratur per hoc pronomen *iste*, cum illud habeat esse aeternum vel per propriam naturam, vel idiomatum communicationem; videtur tunc locutio falsa. — Sed hic modus dicendi calumniabilis est, tum quia non videtur, quod verbum incipiendi habeat ferri super totum, cum nihil sit, quod reddat sibi suppositum; tum etiam, quia non est quaestio, utrum oratio illa incipiat esse vera; sed est quaestio, utrum res importata per hoc quod dicitur: iste homo incepit esse. Et sic iste modus dicendi non videtur in se valere nec etiam quaestionem terminare.

Et propterea alius potest esse modus distinguendi, et hoc semper supposito, quod *incipit* dicat inceptionem rei attributae sive actus in praedicato respectu subiecti. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel quia potest notare inceptionem respectu rei importatae per pronomen secundum se, vel sub ratione implicationis. Implicatur enim forma humanitatis, cum dicitur: iste homo, id est, iste qui est homo. Et si dicat inceptionem respectu subiecti sive personae importatae per pronomen; falsus est sermo, quia persona illa non habet esse post non-esse. Si vero respectu implicationis, vera est locutio; est enim sensus, quod iste inceperit esse, non quia iste, sed quia homo sive secundum naturam humanam. Et potest poni exemplum. Si scutum prius fuerit et postmodum dealbetur, haec est duplex: scutum album incipit esse, iuxta praedictum modum distinguendi. — Sed adhuc iste modus dicendi non minus est calumniabilis quam praecedens, pro eo quod haec locutio: scutum album incipit esse, habet exponi per has duas: scutum album est, et haec non est duplex; et aliam, quae est: scutum album prius non fuit; et haec est falsa, quia eius opposita est vera: scutum album fuit. *Album* enim, cum sit terminus accidentalis, potest supponere pro praesentibus, vel praeteritis per *indifferentiam*, non per *multiplicitatem*. *Praeterea*, si dicatur: homo albus incipit currere, *incipit* non ponit, quantum est de vi vocabuli, inceptionem circa albedinem, sed circa cursum. Et ideo adhuc iste modus dicendi est calumniabilis non modicum.

Est etiam[^16] tertius modus dicendi, quod hoc pronomen *iste* potest demonstrare personam Verbi, vel singulare hominis. Et si demonstret singulare hominis, sic oportet concedere hanc: iste homo incipit esse; et hanc: iste homo est ab aeterno: sicut conceditur, quod iste homo est mortuus et immortalis; sed unum dicitur per communicationem idiomatum, alterum vero per proprietatem naturae. Si enim, cum Christus nascitur, aliquis homo mutatur de non-esse in esse; necesse est, quod aliquis homo incipiat esse; sed non est verum pro alio homine quam pro isto homine. Iste ergo incipit esse per proprietatem naturae; sed tamen ab aeterno dicitur esse, quia est Deus, qui est ab aeterno[^17]. Si ergo iste homo demonstret singulare hominis, absque dubio vera est praedicta locutio. — Si autem demonstret personam Verbi, falsa est, falsa, inquam, quantum ad proprietatem naturae, quia persona Verbi de sui natura est aeterna. Quantum etiam ad communicationem idiomatum non admittitur, quia tale idioma non communicatur, propter hoc quod claudit repugnantiam intellectuum[^18]. — Et hic modus dicendi rationabilis est et minus calumniabilis quam praedicti et plus facit ad propositum et magis consonat verbis Magistri, qui dat *sensum* praedictae distinctionis, quamvis *verba* non ponat, ne desereret modum theologicum. Moderniores vero oportet amplius explicare propter importunitatem quaerentium. Determinat enim Magister, quod iste homo incepit esse, *secundum quod homo*, non autem *secundum quod Verbum*. Quid autem est aliud dicere, nisi quod per illud pronomen potest demonstrari *singulare hominis*[^19], vel *persona Filii Dei*? — Secundum hanc igitur distinctionem non omnino concedenda est praedicta locutio nec omnino neganda; concedi enim potest secundum unum sensum et negari secundum alium. — Et ideo rationes, quae probant, praedictam locutionem in aliquo sensu esse veram, et aliae, quae probant, in aliquo sensu esse falsam, pertransiri possunt, quia per istam distinctionem solvuntur. Secundum enim diversa membra utraeque verum concludunt, sicut sunt duae primae rationes ad primam partem et primae duae ad partem secundam. Ad illas vero quae ostendunt, locutionem esse veram *simpliciter*, vel falsam *simpliciter*, respondendum est.

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3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod ante mundi constitutionem haec est vera: nullus homo est; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen non oportet, quod ista nunc[^1b] sit vera: nullus homo fuit. Et ratio huius est propter variationem *suppositionis* termini; nam, sicut tactum est, iste terminus *homo* in Christo habet modum supponendi termini accidentalis. Sed illud argumentum non valet: haec fuit falsa: album disputat, ergo haec est falsa: album disputavit[^2b]; variatur enim *modus supponendi* ipsius termini. In prima enim habebat unicam suppositionem, in secunda duplicem. Unde quamvis ista sit falsa: iste homo est ante mundi constitutionem, nunc tamen est vera: iste homo fuit; quia sensus potest esse talis: iste qui nunc est homo, ante mundi constitutionem fuit; ideo non valet ratio illa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod implicatio sequitur ad propositionem, in qua implicatur; dicendum, quod verum est secundum eam differentiam temporis, secundum quam implicatur. Unde bene sequitur: si homo albus currit, homo est albus. Sed cum haec implicatio est respectu verbi de praeterito, tunc habet duplicem suppositionem, quia supponit pro praesentibus et pro praeteritis. Et ideo non sequitur: iste homo ab aeterno fuit, ergo ab aeterno fuit homo; sicut non sequitur: hoc album fuit, ergo hoc fuit album; quia regula est, quod terminus apponens verbo restringitur secundum consignificatum verbi, cuiuslibet temporis verbo apponat[^3b]; non autem sic est de termino ex parte subiecti. Et propterea ratio illa peccat ex *mutatione suppositionis*.

Ad duas autem rationes ad oppositum non oportet respondere, quia procedunt secundum alterum sensum, scilicet prout *iste* demonstrat personam. *Praeterea*, non concludunt, quod praedicta locutio sit falsa; quia possunt hae simul stare, quod semper fuerit et quod inceperit esse secundum diversas naturas.

3. Sed ad illud quod obiicit tertio, quod pronomen demonstrat personam; dicendum, quod *persona* accipitur *large* pro omni quod reddit determinatum suppositum verbo — potest enim dici: haec albedo — et sic potest bene demonstrare singulare suppositum hominis, id est atomum naturae humanae, quod assumtum est a Verbo, vel ipsam hypostasim, facta demonstratione non ad sensum, sed ad intellectum[^4b]. — Et si obiiciat, quod in utroque sensu est falsa, quia haec in utroque sensu est vera: iste homo semper fuit; dicendum, quod in talibus plus tollit negatio, quam ponat affirmatio opposita. Haec enim simul stant, scilicet Christum esse mortalem et immortalem; sed istae duae locutiones non simul stant: Christus est mortalis, Christus non est mortalis; quia negatio magis negat et removet significationem eius quod est *mortale*[^5b], quam *immortale* sibi oppositum. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum, quod amplius negatur in hac: iste homo non fuit, quam in hac: iste homo incipit esse, quae est affirmativa, licet claudat negationem. Hae enim simul possunt esse verae: iste homo est aeternus, et: iste homo incipit esse; sed istae duae nunquam: iste homo est aeternus, iste homo non est aeternus, ea ratione, qua dictum est. Et ideo non potest concludi, quod locutio praedicta sit falsa *simpliciter*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *homo* in Christo habet modum supponendi termini accidentalis; dicendum, quod hoc potest concedi in comparatione ad *personam* Christi, quae est suppositum humanitatis, in infinitum praecedens formam humanitatis; sed in comparatione ad *singulare hominis* veritatem non habet[^6b]. Unde quando *iste homo* demonstrat singulare hominis, necessario ad idem tempus refertur suppositum importatum per pronomen et forma importata per nomen. Et ideo haec est falsa: iste homo fuit ab aeterno, nisi intelligatur per idiomatum communicationem. Nam per proprietatem naturae verum est dicere, quod iste homo exivit de non-esse in esse per generationem. — Et sic patet responsio ad totum.

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Huius igitur responsionis tota summa in his tribus consistit, ut intelligatur, qualiter pronomen *iste* demonstrare potest dupliciter, scilicet *personam Verbi*, vel *singulare hominis*. — Intelligatur nihilominus, quomodo differentem *supponendi modum* habet terminus *accidentalis* et *substantialis* respectu verbi de praeterito, quamvis ex parte praedicati non sit differentia. — Intelligatur etiam, quod possibile est, duo opposita *affirmari* de eodem in Christo, ita quod unum dicitur per *unionem*, alterum per *proprietatem naturae*, sive de Deo, sive de homine; neutrum tamen istorum vere potest *negari*. Plus enim tollit negatio, quam ponat affirmatio, sicut dicitur alibi et faciliter posset ostendi.

english:
### Question II. *Whether this is to be conceded: this man began to be, Christ being pointed out.*

Second it is asked whether this is to be conceded: this man began to be, Christ being pointed out. And that it is so seems [the case].

1. Augustine *on John*, [Tractate] 4[^1]: "Before the world was made, neither were we, nor the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus": if therefore he was not before the foundation of the world, therefore he began to be.

2. Likewise, to be born and to be begotten is to be changed according to substance and to be produced from non-being into being[^2]; but to be produced into being and to begin to be are wholly the same: since therefore this is true: this man is born, and this: this man is produced into being; this will be true: this man begins to be.

3. Likewise, before the foundation of the world this is true: no man is, and this is false: some man is: therefore this also is false: this man is, Christ being pointed out; and this is now true[^3]: therefore the predicate now belongs to the subject; and before it did not belong: therefore it begins to belong: therefore this is true: this man begins to be.

4. Likewise, it follows well: this man is, therefore this is a man, on the ground that from a proposition in which an implication is enclosed it is permitted to infer that very implication — for it follows: a white man runs, therefore a man is white[^4] — therefore it follows: this man is or was from eternity, therefore this was a man from eternity. But this is false: this one, Christ being pointed out, was a man from eternity: therefore this also: this man is or was from eternity; and [yet] now it is true: it remains therefore that it begins to be true: therefore this is true: this man begins to be.

**On the contrary:** 1. In John, chapter eight[^5]: *Before Abraham was made, I am*, and by parity of reason also, before heaven was made: therefore if the same thing is pointed out by this pronoun *I* and by this pronoun *this*, it seems

that this is true: this man was before the foundation of the world: therefore this is false: this man began to be.

2. Likewise, the Master[^6] concedes this: "This boy created the stars"; but to him to whom it is truly attributed to create heaven, it is truly attributed always to be: therefore this boy always was: therefore this is false: this boy began to be. In like manner this is denied by the Master: "This man, or Christ, is a creature"; but this is for no other reason than that by the name *creature* a going-forth from non-being into being is imported: therefore by parity of reason, or by a much stronger one, this is false: this man began to be.

3. Likewise, it is proper to a pronoun to be put in place of a proper noun and to designate a determinate person[^7]: therefore when it is said: this man, this pronoun *this* points out a person. But the person of Christ always was and never began to be: therefore this is false: this man began to be. If you say that *person* is there taken broadly; it is still objected, that whatever it points out, whether a supposit or a person properly; it seems that the locution is still false: because the exposition of this verb *begins* is this: this begins to be, therefore this now is, but before was not[^8]. If therefore this is true: this man begins to be, this is true: this man now is and before was not. But in whatever way it be taken, this locution is false: this man before was not. For if [it be taken] for the person, its opposite is true: this man before was. Likewise if for the supposit, it is true: this man before was, on account of the communication of idioms. But it is not permitted to deny of anything that which is truly affirmed either through the propriety of nature, or through the union. For this is simply false: man is not God, because its opposite is true through the union[^9]. Since therefore in every way this is true: this man always was, this in every way is false: this man began to be.

4. Likewise, as was held above[^10], this term *man*, said of Christ, in a certain manner has the nature of an *accidental* term, because in an accidental term the supposit can pre-exist the form; and so it is to be found in the matter proposed. But a rule is given, that an accidental term, standing for a verb in the past tense[^11], can stand for present things, or for past, so that indifferently it can render the locution true for these or for those. Nor on this account is the locution distinguished as manifold, because it is not compared to those as to things signified, but as to supposits; but such a locution is said to have several causes of truth[^12]. Since therefore it is said: this man was, the sense is: this one who is a man, was, or: this one who was a man, was. But this is simply true: this one who is a man, was from eternity, therefore this also: this man was from eternity, therefore this is simply false: this man begins to be, and in no way to be distinguished.

> ### Conclusion
> *The locution "this man, Christ being pointed out, began to be" can be admitted with a distinction, namely insofar as "this" points out the singular of the man, not the person of the Word.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of this locution the response of the Master[^13] is to be considered. For the Master responds, saying that to this locution "no response is to be given without a distinction"; he himself, however, does not distinguish, but determines that it began to be as to the nature, although not as to the person; it began to be according to the human nature, but it did not begin to be insofar as Word. — But certainly this manner of speaking does not suffice against an importunate objector[^14].

For he would seek the ground of the manifoldness, and what sense the said locution makes, so far as concerns the force of the words; and this cannot be had clearly from the words of the Master. — And therefore one must attempt to distinguish, [to see] whether in some way we can fit[^15] to the aforesaid locution a fitting mode of distinguishing.

Now the aforesaid locution seems able to be distinguished from this, that the verb of beginning can note a beginning in respect of the *truth of the whole statement*, or can import a beginning of the thing predicated in respect of the *subject*. If in the first way, then the sense is: this man began to be, that is, that locution, namely "this man is," began to be true; and this without doubt is true. But if he should say that the beginning is in respect of that which is pointed out by this pronoun *this*, since that has eternal being either through its proper nature, or through the communication of idioms; then the locution seems false. — But this manner of speaking is open to caviling, both because it does not seem that the verb of beginning should be borne upon the whole, since there is nothing that renders a supposit to it; and also because the question is not whether that statement begins to be true; but the question is whether the thing imported by what is said: this man began to be. And so this manner of speaking does not seem to be valid in itself nor even to settle the question.

And therefore there can be another mode of distinguishing, and this always on the supposition that *begins* expresses the beginning of the thing attributed or of the act in the predicate in respect of the subject. But this can be in two ways: either because it can note a beginning in respect of the thing imported by the pronoun in itself, or under the account of an implication. For the form of humanity is implied when it is said: this man, that is, this one who is a man. And if it expresses a beginning in respect of the subject or person imported by the pronoun; the speech is false, because that person does not have being after non-being. But if [it expresses a beginning] in respect of the implication, the locution is true; for the sense is that this one began to be, not because this one, but because [he is] a man, or according to the human nature. And an example can be given. If a shield first existed and afterward is whitened, this is twofold: a white shield begins to be, according to the aforesaid mode of distinguishing. — But this manner of speaking is still no less open to caviling than the preceding, on the ground that this locution: a white shield begins to be, must be expounded by these two: a white shield is, and this is not twofold; and another, which is: a white shield before was not; and this is false, because its opposite is true: a white shield was. For *white*, since it is an accidental term, can stand for present or past things by *indifference*, not by *manifoldness*. *Moreover*, if it be said: a white man begins to run, *begins* does not posit, so far as concerns the force of the word, a beginning concerning the whiteness, but concerning the running. And therefore this manner of speaking too is open to caviling not a little.

There is also[^16] a third manner of speaking, that this pronoun *this* can point out the person of the Word, or the singular of the man. And if it points out the singular of the man, then one must concede this: this man begins to be; and this: this man is from eternity: just as it is conceded that this man is dead and immortal; but the one is said through the communication of idioms, the other through the propriety of nature. For if, when Christ is born, some man is changed from non-being into being; it is necessary that some man begin to be; but it is not true of any other man than of this man. This one therefore begins to be through the propriety of nature; but yet he is said to be from eternity, because he is God, who is from eternity[^17]. If therefore this man points out the singular of the man, without doubt the aforesaid locution is true. — But if it points out the person of the Word, it is false, false, I say, as to the propriety of nature, because the person of the Word is of its nature eternal. As to the communication of idioms also it is not admitted, because such an idiom is not communicated, on account of this, that it encloses a repugnance of the [two] understandings[^18]. — And this manner of speaking is reasonable and less open to caviling than the aforesaid, and contributes more to the matter proposed and is more consonant with the words of the Master, who gives the *sense* of the aforesaid distinction, although he does not posit the *words*, lest he should desert the theological manner. But the more modern [doctors] must explain it more fully, on account of the importunity of those who inquire. For the Master determines that this man began to be, *insofar as he is man*, but not *insofar as he is Word*. But what else is this to say, except that by that pronoun there can be pointed out the *singular of the man*[^19], or the *person of the Son of God*? — According to this distinction, therefore, the aforesaid locution is neither wholly to be conceded nor wholly to be denied; for it can be conceded according to one sense and denied according to another. — And therefore the arguments which prove that the aforesaid locution is true in some sense, and the others which prove that it is false in some sense, can be passed over, because they are resolved by this distinction. For according to the diverse members both conclude what is true, as are the first two arguments for the first part and the first two for the second part. But to those which show that the locution is true *simply*, or false *simply*, a response must be made.

3. To that which is objected, that before the foundation of the world this is true: no man is; it must be said that it is true; but nevertheless it is not necessary that this now[^1b] be true: no man was. And the reason for this is on account of the variation of the *supposition* of the term; for, as was touched on, this term *man* in Christ has the mode of standing of an accidental term. But that argument is not valid: this was false: "white disputes," therefore this is false: "white disputed"[^2b]; for the *mode of standing* of the term itself is varied. For in the first it had a single supposition, in the second a twofold one. Hence although this be false: this man is before the foundation of the world, nevertheless it is now true: this man was; because the sense can be such: this one who now is a man, was before the foundation of the world; therefore that argument is not valid.

4. To that which is objected, that the implication follows upon the proposition in which it is implied; it must be said that it is true according to that difference of time according to which it is implied. Hence it follows well: if a white man runs, a man is white. But when this implication is in respect of a verb in the past tense, then it has a twofold supposition, because it stands for present and for past things. And therefore it does not follow: this man was from eternity, therefore from eternity there was a man; just as it does not follow: this white thing was, therefore this was white; because the rule is, that a term added to a verb is restricted according to the consignificate of the verb, to whatever time it be added to the verb[^3b]; but it is not so with a term on the side of the subject. And therefore that argument errs from a *change of supposition*.

But to the two arguments to the contrary there is no need to respond, because they proceed according to the other sense, namely as *this* points out the person. *Moreover*, they do not conclude that the aforesaid locution is false; because these can stand together, that he always was and that he began to be according to diverse natures.

3. But to that which objects in the third place, that the pronoun points out the person; it must be said that *person* is taken *broadly* for everything that renders a determinate supposit to the verb — for one can say: this whiteness — and so it can well point out the singular supposit of the man, that is, the atom of human nature, which is assumed by the Word, or the hypostasis itself, the pointing-out being made not to the sense, but to the understanding[^4b]. — And if he should object that in either sense it is false, because in either sense this is true: this man always was; it must be said that in such cases negation removes more than the opposite affirmation posits. For these stand together, namely that Christ is mortal and immortal; but these two locutions do not stand together: Christ is mortal, Christ is not mortal; because negation negates and removes the signification of that which is *mortal*[^5b] more than [it does that of] *immortal* opposed to it. By this mode also it is to be understood, that more is denied in this: this man was not, than in this: this man begins to be, which is affirmative, although it encloses a negation. For these can be true together: this man is eternal, and: this man begins to be; but these two never: this man is eternal, this man is not eternal, for the reason that has been stated. And therefore it cannot be concluded that the aforesaid locution is false *simply*.

4. To that which is objected, that *man* in Christ has the mode of standing of an accidental term; it must be said that this can be conceded in comparison to the *person* of Christ, which is the supposit of the humanity, infinitely preceding the form of the humanity; but in comparison to the *singular of the man* it has no truth[^6b]. Hence when *this man* points out the singular of the man, the supposit imported by the pronoun and the form imported by the noun are necessarily referred to the same time. And therefore this is false: this man was from eternity, unless it be understood through the communication of idioms. For through the propriety of nature it is true to say that this man went forth from non-being into being through generation. — And so the response to the whole is clear.

The whole sum of this response, therefore, consists in these three things: that it be understood how the pronoun *this* can point out in two ways, namely the *person of the Word*, or the *singular of the man*. — Let it nonetheless be understood how an *accidental* and a *substantial* term have a different *mode of standing* in respect of a verb in the past tense, although on the side of the predicate there is no difference. — Let it also be understood that it is possible for two opposites to be *affirmed* of the same [subject] in Christ, in such a way that the one is said through the *union*, the other through the *propriety of nature*, whether of God or of the man; yet neither of these can truly be *denied*. For negation removes more than affirmation posits, as is said elsewhere, and could easily be shown.

la: Tract. 105. n. 7: *Priusquam mundus esset, nec nos* etc.

en: Tractate 105, n. 7: *Before the world was, neither were we*, etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 11. — In minori Vat. post *produci in esse* addit *post non-esse.* In fine arg. eadem Vat. cum edd. 1, 2 ante *erit vera* inserit *etiam* (cod. K *ergo*) et dein cum compluribus codd. pro *incipit esse* substituit *incepit esse.* Etiam in seqq. Vat., faventibus compluribus codd., pluries exhibet *incepit esse* pro *incipit esse*, sed nostra lectio in praesidium habet maiorem partem codd.

en: Cf. above, page 111, note 11. — In the lesser Vatican [edition], after *to be produced into being* it adds *after non-being.* At the end of the argument the same Vatican [edition], with editions 1, 2, before *will be true* inserts *also* (codex K *therefore*), and then, with several codices, substitutes for *begins to be* the reading *began to be.* Also in what follows the Vatican [edition], with several codices favoring, several times exhibits *began to be* for *begins to be*; but our reading has in its support the greater part of the codices.

la: Cod. K sic: *Item, ante mundi... nullus homo est; ergo haec est falsa: aliquis homo est; et si haec est falsa: aliquis homo est, demonstrato Christo, et haec modo est vera* etc. Deinde addit: *Item nullo homine existente, haec est falsa: iste homo est, demonstrato Christo, et modo est vera*, quibus verbis adiectis prosequitur: *ergo praedicatum* etc.

en: Codex K thus: *Likewise, before [the foundation of] the world... no man is; therefore this is false: some man is; and if this is false: some man is, Christ being pointed out, and this is now true*, etc. Then it adds: *Likewise, no man existing, this is false: this man is, Christ being pointed out, and now it is true*, to which words being added it continues: *therefore the predicate*, etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 1. et II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11.). Cfr. etiam Petr. Hispan., Summul. (tr. de locis topic. loc. de Toto in modo).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 1, and *On Interpretation* II, c. 2 (c. 11). Cf. also Peter of Spain, *Summulae* (the tract on the topical places, the place "On the Whole in the manner").

la: Vers. 58. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — In fine huius et duorum seqq. argg. codd. A F V bb, refragantibus plerisque aliis codd., pro *incepit esse* habent *incipit esse.*

en: Verse 58. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — At the end of this and the two following arguments, codices A, F, V, bb, most other codices opposing, read *begins to be* for *began to be.*

la: Hic c. 3. — Ibid. c. 1. habetur etiam altera sententia, paulo inferius allata. — Pro *creare caelum* edd. *creare stellas.*

en: Here c. 3. — In the same place, c. 1, there is also another statement, adduced a little below. — For *to create heaven*, the editions [read] *to create the stars.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 227, nota 2.

en: Cf. above, page 227, note 2.

la: In Tract. de exponibilibus propositionibus (inter opera Petri Hispani) capitulum invenitur, quod inscriptum est *de incipit et desinit*; in quo cap., exposito prius, quomodo res esse suum acquirant, vel in instanti et simul, vel successive et non simul, quatuor ponuntur regulae, quarum duae respiciunt rerum *incipit*, duae rerum *desinit*. « Prima est, quod propositiones de *incipit* rerum, quarum esse totum simul acquiritur, exponuntur per unam copulativam [propositionem], cuius prima pars est affirmativa de praesenti, secunda negativa de praeterito, ut *homo incipit esse* i. e. homo nunc est et immediate ante hoc non fuit. Secunda regula est, quod propositiones de *incipit* rerum, quarum esse acquiritur successive, exponuntur per unam copulativam, cuius prima pars est negativa de praesenti et secunda affirmativa de futuro, ut hic: *Socrates incipit esse albus* i. e. Socrates nunc non est albus et immediate post hoc erit albus » etc. — Paulo ante edd. *quidquid demonstrat, demonstrat sive suppositum... proprie: ergo videtur* etc., et pro *hoc incipit esse: ergo hoc modo est* codd. T bb *incipit esse hoc, id est modo est.*

en: In the Tract on exponible propositions (among the works of Peter of Spain) there is found a chapter entitled *On "begins" and "ceases"*; in which chapter, having first set forth how things acquire their being, either in an instant and all at once, or successively and not all at once, four rules are laid down, of which two regard the *begins* of things, two the *ceases.* "The first is, that propositions about the *begins* of things whose being is acquired all at once are expounded by one copulative [proposition], of which the first part is affirmative of the present, the second negative of the past, as *man begins to be*, i.e., man now is and immediately before this was not. The second rule is, that propositions about the *begins* of things whose being is acquired successively are expounded by one copulative, of which the first part is negative of the present and the second affirmative of the future, as here: *Socrates begins to be white*, i.e., Socrates now is not white and immediately after this will be white," etc. — A little before, the editions [read] *whatever it points out, it points out either a supposit... properly: therefore it seems*, etc., and for *this begins to be: therefore this now is*, codices T, bb [read] *this begins to be, that is, now is.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. — Mox pro *omni modo est falsa* codd. A G U *omnino est falsa.*

en: Cf. above d. 7, a. 1, q. 1. — Soon, for *in every way is false*, codices A, G, U [read] *is altogether false.*

en: Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Verbi gr. illud: *scutum fuit album*, verificari potest tam de scuto, quod existere desiit, quam de scuto, quod adhuc existit.

en: For example, that [statement]: *the shield was white*, can be verified both of a shield that has ceased to exist and of a shield that still exists.

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2: « Rursum, quaecumque non secundum aequivocationem dicuntur multipliciter, sed alio modo, ut disciplina una plurium, ut finis, aut ut eius quod ad finem, ut medicina eius quod sanitatem facit, ut quod cibat... aut ut eius quod per se est, et eius quod per accidens » etc. Quae verba B. Albert., II. Topic. tr. 1. c. 5. commentans ait: Exemplum propositionis propositae, proprie loquendo, non est multiplex [aequivoca], sed, nomine multiplicis extenso, multiplex dicitur propositio, quae plures causas habet veritatis, cuius veritas non destruitur, nisi omnibus modis et causis veritatis destructis; con struitur autem veritas, causa una constructa veritatis eiusdem.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 2: "Again, whatever things are said manifoldly not according to equivocation, but in another way, as one discipline of several things, as an end, or as that which is toward an end, as the medicine of that which makes health, as that which feeds... or as that which is per se and that which is per accidens," etc. Commenting on which words, Blessed Albert, *Topics* II, tr. 1, c. 5, says: The example of the proposition proposed, properly speaking, is not manifold [equivocal]; but, the name of "manifold" being extended, that proposition is called manifold which has several causes of truth, whose truth is not destroyed unless all the modes and causes of truth be destroyed; but the truth is constructed when one cause of the truth of the same is constructed.

la: Hic c. 3. — Paulo superius pro *distinguitur* edd. *dicitur.*

en: Here c. 3. — A little above, for *is distinguished*, the editions [read] *is said.*

la: B. Albert., hic d. 12. a. 1: Dicendum meo iudicio, quod nulla solutio modernorum hic tantum valet, sicut auctoris [Magistri] solutio, quam ponit hic, quia cautissima est, quod sine distinctione intellecta vel posita in sermone non reddatur responsio... sunt tamen qui subtilitates hic rimati sunt, minus tamen cautas simplicibus, licet verum dicant. Et auctor istarum solutionum est magister Wilhelmus Antissiodorensis » (cfr. eius Sum. p. III. tr. 1. c. 1. et 2.). Deinde, memorato duplici modo distinguendi locutionem *incipit*, de quo hic inferius pluribus verbis agitur, B. Albert. dicit: Ecce, in quantum potui investigare, haec est sententia Antissiodorensis. — Pro *modus dicendi* edd. cum nonnullis codd. hic et pluries infra *modus distinguendi.* Mox pro *sensum faciat* bene multi codd. minus accurate *sensum faciet.*

en: Blessed Albert, here d. 12, a. 1: "It must be said, in my judgment, that no solution of the moderns avails here as much as the author's [the Master's] solution, which he puts here, because it is most cautious, namely that without a distinction understood or posited in the speech no response should be given... there are nevertheless those who have here searched out subtleties, less safe, however, for the simple, although they speak the truth. And the author of these solutions is master William of Auxerre" (cf. his Summa p. III, tr. 1, c. 1 and 2). Then, having mentioned the twofold mode of distinguishing the locution *begins*, of which there is treatment here below at greater length, Blessed Albert says: Behold, so far as I have been able to investigate, this is the opinion of [William of] Auxerre. — For *manner of speaking*, the editions, with some codices, here and several times below [read] *manner of distinguishing.* Soon, for *makes [its] sense*, very many codices less accurately [read] *will make [its] sense.*

la: Cod. Z *adaptare.*

en: Codex Z [reads] *to adapt.*

la: Pro *etiam* codd. A H I K L T Z aa bb *etiam adhuc*, edd. *adhuc*, cod. G *autem.*

en: For *also*, codices A, H, I, K, L, T, Z, aa, bb [read] *also still*, the editions *still*, codex G *however.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 10. a. 1. q. 3. — In princip. huius enuntiati pro *Iste ergo* edd. *Ille ergo homo.*

en: Cf. above d. 10, a. 1, q. 3. — At the beginning of this statement, for *This one therefore*, the editions [read] *That man therefore.*

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. 1. — Inferius pro *ne desereret* non pauci codd. *nec deseret*, cod. U *vel deserat.* Post pauca pro *oportet amplius explicare* cod. O *magis explicare conati sunt.*

en: As was shown above, q. 1. — Below, for *lest he should desert*, not a few codices [read] *nor will he desert*, codex U *or let him desert.* A little after, for *must explain more fully*, codex O [reads] *they have endeavored to explain more.*

la: Cod. O hic (ex solut. ad 3.) addit *id est atomum naturae humanae assumtum a Verbo.* Cfr. supra pag. 18, nota 1.

en: Codex O here (from the solution to argument 3) adds *that is, the atom of human nature assumed by the Word.* Cf. above, page 18, note 1.

la: Pro *nunc* plurimi codd. *non*; sed lectionem *nunc* non solum tuentur edd. cum pluribus codd., sed etiam subnexa nec non responsum illud, quod S. Thom. dat, hic d. 12. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3: Dicendum, quod ab aeterno verum fuisset dicere: Nullus homo est, quia suppositum aeternum nondum erat suppositum humanae naturae; unde non poterat sumi sub dicta distributione, sicut nunc potest propter unionem. Unde quamvis ab aeterno non erat verum dicere: Aliquis homo est aeternus, modo tamen est verum dicere: Aliquis vel iste homo est ab aeterno.

en: For *now*, very many codices [read] *not*; but the reading *now* is upheld not only by the editions with many codices, but also by what is subjoined, and likewise by that response which St. Thomas gives, here d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: It must be said that from eternity it would have been true to say: No man is, because the eternal supposit was not yet the supposit of human nature; whence it could not be taken under the said distribution, as it can now on account of the union. Hence although from eternity it was not true to say: Some man is eternal, now nevertheless it is true to say: Some, or this, man is from eternity.

la: Similia exempla, ut *album currit*, *album est musicum*, *album aedificat* etc., frequentantur a Scholasticis, agentibus de propositionibus accidentalibus; vide e. gr. eorum exposit. in II. Periherm. c. 2. Etiam Aristot., II. Phys. text. 33. (c. 3.), dicit, quod « albus et musicus causa [accidentaliter] dicantur statuae », id est, si artifex etiam albus est et musicus. Propositionis: *album disputavit*, modus supponendi duplex est, quia, ut in ultimo arg. et in corp. quaest. habetur, propositio illa verificari potest tam de praesenti quam de praeterito. Cfr. infra solut. seq. — Pro *album disputat... disputavit* edd. *album disgregat... disgregavit* [scil. visum]. Deinde inferius post *iste homo fuit* Vat. repetit *ante mundi constitutionem.*

en: Similar examples, as *white runs*, *white is musical*, *white builds*, etc., are frequent among the Scholastics in treating of accidental propositions; see, e.g., their exposition on *On Interpretation* II, c. 2. Aristotle too, *Physics* II, text 33 (c. 3), says that "the white and the musical are said [accidentally] to be the cause of the statue," that is, if the craftsman is also white and musical. Of the proposition *white disputed*, the mode of standing is twofold, because, as is held in the last argument and in the body of the question, that proposition can be verified both of the present and of the past. Cf. below, the following solution. — For *white disputes... disputed*, the editions [read] *white separates... separated* [namely, the sight]. Then below, after *this man was*, the Vatican [edition] repeats *before the foundation of the world.*

la: Huius dictionis sententia est: terminus, qui verbo appositus est (praedicatum), restringitur ad illam temporis differentiam, quam verbum exprimit, scil. vel ad praeteritum, si est verbo praeteritum significanti appositus, vel ad praesens etc. Ratio est, quia, cum nemo dare possit quod non habeat, verbum, quod cum subiecto copulat praedicatum, in ipsum praedicatum transit idque non copulare potest nisi sub ea temporis differentia, quam in se continet. Cfr. Scot., super I. Periherm. q. 9. seqq. — Mox pro *Et propterea* edd. et complures codd. contra contextum *Et praeterea.* Subinde pro *ex mutatione* cod. U *ex commutatione.*

en: The meaning of this saying is: a term which is added to a verb (the predicate) is restricted to that difference of time which the verb expresses, namely either to the past, if it is added to a verb signifying the past, or to the present, etc. The reason is that, since no one can give what he does not have, the verb which couples the predicate with the subject passes into that very predicate, and can couple it only under that difference of time which it contains in itself. Cf. Scotus, on *On Interpretation* I, q. 9 ff. — Soon, for *And therefore*, the editions and several codices, against the context, [read] *And moreover.* Thereupon, for *from a change*, codex U [reads] *from an exchange.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 137, nota 6. et d. 10. a. 1. q. 3.

en: Cf. above, page 137, note 6, and d. 10, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Siquidem in propositione negativa negatio explicite habetur, et afficiendo ipsam propositionis copulam, propositionem negativam reddit contradictoriam alteri propositioni. Cfr. etiam q. seq. in fine. — Paulo superius pro *Haec enim* codd. G T et alii *Hae enim.*

en: Since in a negative proposition the negation is had explicitly, and by affecting the very copula of the proposition, it renders the negative proposition contradictory to the other proposition. Cf. also the following question, at the end. — A little above, for *For this* (sing.), codices G, T and others [read] *For these* (plur.).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec et sequens (3.) quaestio est de usu et significatione verborum. Hinc dissensus doctorum non consistit in ipsa re, cum omnes confiteantur, personam Christi esse aeternam, at naturam humanam eius in tempore creatam; omnesque cum S. Fulgentio (Epist. 17. c. 10. n. 18.) fateantur, quod Verbum incepit esse Christus. Verbum tamen mansit aeternum, et caro in ipso sumsit initium. De origine subtilium harum disceptationum cfr. supra pag. 252, nota 9. Tres exortae sunt de proprietate huius locutionis sententiae. S. Thom. enim cum Petro a Tar., Richardo a Med. et plurimis aliis docet, eam simpliciter esse falsam; Scotus autem, eam in rigore verborum esse veram; S. Bonaventura cum Alexandro Hal. et B. Alberto distinctionem adhibet et respondet, quod vera sit, si *iste homo* demonstret singulare hominis, ast falsa, si demonstret personam Verbi. Ipse autem supponit, quod pronomen *iste* praedicto duplici modo demonstrare possit (cfr. supra d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.). Sed S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 12. q. 1. a. 1. in corp.) hanc distinctionem reprobat asserens, quod quamvis in Christo sit « aliquid singulare praeter personam Verbi; tamen illud singulare non supponitur per hoc nomen *homo*, nec praedicatur de Christo... Et ideo patet, quod ista distinctio est secundum primam [cfr. supra d. 6. post divisionem textus] opinionem bona ». — Durand. etiam vult, distinctionem hic esse adhibendam, cum locutio sit aequivoca.

**II.** Notamus hic, quod commentarius Aegidii R. in Sententias Lombardi in media hac distinctione explicit. A Fulgentio Gallucio, cuius editione (Romae 1623) in tertio libro sententiarum usi sumus, additum est quoddam supplementum ad nonnullas sequentes quaestiones, collectum ex aliis Aegidii libris. Cum autem hoc supplementum non magni sit momenti, deinceps Aegidius inter auctores citatos omittitur. — Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. III. q. 6. m. 1. § 1. 2. — Scot., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., loc. cit.; S. III. q. 16. a. 9. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 12. q. unica a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 12. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 12. q. 1.

**III.** Etiam seq. (3.) quaestio versatur circa locutionem ambiguam et fere coincidit cum quaestione (supra d. 7. a. 1. q. 3.), quae est de locutione: homo factus est Deus; quae non admitti potest nisi cum quadam distinctione et tantum in uno sensu. Si conceditur assertio supra memorata, quod homo possit supponere pro singulari hominis per se; tunc haec locutio in uno sensu est simpliciter vera, in altero vero simpliciter falsa. Attamen a S. Thoma (S. III. q. 16. a. 7.) vix toleratur. De simili dictione: homo assumtus est Deus, quam insignis magister Gualterus de Mauritania defenderat, circa an. 1140 Parisiis in utramque partem disputatum est; eandem Richardus a S. Victore defendit. Hoc refert D'Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum t. 1. pag. 29. — S. Thom., Comment. loc. cit. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This and the following (3rd) question are about the use and signification of words. Hence the disagreement of the doctors does not consist in the matter itself, since all confess that the person of Christ is eternal, but that his human nature was created in time; and all confess, with St. Fulgentius (Letter 17, c. 10, n. 18), that the Word began to be Christ. The Word, however, remained eternal, and the flesh in him took a beginning. On the origin of these subtle disputations, cf. above, page 252, note 9. Three opinions have arisen concerning the propriety of this locution. For St. Thomas, with Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and very many others, teaches that it is simply false; Scotus, however, [teaches] that it is true in the rigor of the words; St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales and Blessed Albert, employs a distinction and responds that it is true, if *this man* points out the singular of the man, but false, if it points out the person of the Word. He himself, moreover, supposes that the pronoun *this* can point out in the aforesaid twofold way (cf. above d. 10, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1). But St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, in the body) rejects this distinction, asserting that, although in Christ there be "something singular besides the person of the Word; nevertheless that singular is not stood for by this noun *man*, nor predicated of Christ... And therefore it is clear that this distinction is, according to the first [cf. above d. 6, after the division of the text] opinion, a good one." — Durandus also holds that a distinction is here to be employed, since the locution is equivocal.

**II.** We note here that the commentary of Giles of Rome on the Sentences of Lombard breaks off in the middle of this distinction. By Fulgentius Gallucius, whose edition (Rome, 1623) in the third book of the Sentences we have used, there was added a certain supplement to some of the following questions, collected from other books of Giles. But since this supplement is of no great moment, henceforth Giles is omitted among the authors cited. — Alexander of Hales, on this and the following q., Summa p. III, q. 6, m. 1, § 1, 2. — Scotus, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, loc. cit.; Summa III, q. 16, a. 9. — Blessed Albert, on this and the following q., here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, III Sent. d. 12, the single q., a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Durandus, III Sent. d. 12, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III Sent. d. 12, q. 1.

**III.** The following (3rd) question also turns upon an ambiguous locution and nearly coincides with the question (above d. 7, a. 1, q. 3) which is about the locution: man was made God; which cannot be admitted except with a certain distinction and only in one sense. If the assertion mentioned above be conceded, that *man* can stand for the singular of the man per se; then this locution in one sense is simply true, in the other simply false. Nevertheless by St. Thomas (Summa III, q. 16, a. 7) it is scarcely tolerated. Concerning the similar saying: the assumed man is God, which the distinguished master Walter of Mortagne had defended, around the year 1140 it was disputed at Paris on both sides; Richard of Saint Victor defended the same. D'Argentré reports this, Collection of Judgments, vol. 1, page 29. — St. Thomas, Commentary, loc. cit., a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit., q. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.251–255 (PDF pp.273–277; raw OCR lines 17785–18073), reading each page left column top→bottom then right column, body bands then footer bands (Vol III PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II/III Override). Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Alignment.** Verified: this is the SECOND of Article II's three *vocabula* questions. The incipit reads *Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: iste homo incepit esse, Christo demonstrato* — matching the a2 TRACTATIO's second listed question (*Secundo, utrum concedendum sit, quod ille homo coeperit esse*) and the a2-q2 skeleton title. q1 = *Christus est creatura*; q3 = *homo incipit esse Deus*. No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.251** (right column, lower): QUAESTIO II header + title + opener (*Secundo quaeritur…*) + args 1–4 *pro*; *Sed contra* 1 down through *…videtur,*. Footer: q2's share of p.251 = **nn.4–8** (n.4 *Tract. 105* = arg 1; n.5 *Cfr. supra pag. 111* = arg 2; n.6 *Cod. K sic* = arg 3; n.7 *Cfr. Aristot. II. Topic.* = arg 4; n.8 *Vers. 58* = *Sed contra* 1). → `[^1]`…`[^5]`. (p.251 nn.1–3 belong to q1, already rendered as q1's `[^20]`–`[^22]`.)
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 255 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo incipit esse Deus.*

Tertio quaeritur de hac: homo incipit esse Deus, utrum sit concedenda. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ista est vera: Deus coepit esse homo: ergo a simplici conversa[^1]: homo coepit esse Deus.

2. Item, haec est vera: Deus incipit esse homo, propter unionem; sed unio est reciproca et mutua, quia, sicut homo unitur Deo, et Deus homini[^2]: ergo si unio reciprocatur, et inceptio, quae super unionem fundatur: ergo sicut haec est vera: Deus coepit esse homo, ita et haec: homo coepit esse Deus.

3. Item, simus in instanti, in quo Filius Dei incarnatus est, haec est vera: homo est Deus, et ante hoc: homo non fuit Deus: ergo homo coepit esse Deus[^3]. Praemissae sunt verae: ergo conclusio, quoniam praemissae exponunt conclusionem[^4].

4. Item, antequam homo esset, nec homo erat homo nec aliud; sed homo coepit esse homo, et homo non potuit ante esse Deus, quam esset homo: ergo si homo coepit esse homo, homo coepit esse Deus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Haec est vera: iste homo fuit ab aeterno Deus[^5]; et ad istum hominem sequitur homo: ergo homo fuit Deus ab aeterno: ergo haec est falsa: homo coepit esse Deus.

2. Item, si homo coepit esse Deus, aut ergo iste, aut ille, et sic de aliis; sed non est dare nisi

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de isto, et iste homo semper fuit Deus: ergo non coepit esse Deus: ergo haec est falsa: homo coepit esse Deus.

3. Item, communicatio est in idiomatibus: ergo si homo incepit esse Deus, videtur, quod haec sit concedenda: Dei Filius incepit esse Deus. Sed haec est falsa simpliciter: ergo et prima.

4. Item, esto quod Filius Dei deponeret hominem, quem assumsit, per impossibile; tunc quaero de hac: iste homo desinit esse Deus; haec est falsa, ergo pari ratione et haec est falsa: homo coepit esse Deus, cum assumsit. Probatio minoris: nunc est unio: ergo communicatio est in idiomatibus: ergo si Filius Dei semper erit Filius Dei, et homo semper erit Deus; sequitur necessario, quod haec sit vera: iste homo erit semper Deus, et haec similiter: Filius Dei semper erit homo: ergo et haec est falsa: homo desinit esse Deus, et haec: Deus desinit esse homo; pari ratione[^6] et hae sunt falsae: iste homo incepit esse Deus, et Deus incepit esse homo.

> ### Conclusio
> *Locutio: homo incepit esse Deus, bene intellecta, recipi potest tanquam simpliciter vera.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio haec conceditur: Deus coepit esse homo; sed de hac: homo coepit esse Deus, dubium est, utrum simpliciter sit concedenda.

Quidam namque voluerunt eam distinguere ex eo, quod hoc verbum incipit potest attribui huic termino homo ratione suppositi, vel ratione formae. Si attribuatur ratione formae, tunc iste terminus homo habet suppositionem simplicem[^7], et tunc est sensus, quod Deus incipit praedicari de homine, quia modo praedicatur et prius non praedicabatur; et sic locutio habet veritatem. Si vero respiciat ipsum ratione suppositi, sic dixerunt, quod haec est falsa locutio, quia supposito[^8] semper convenit esse Deum. — Huius autem simile assignant, sicut si dicatur: album incipit esse scutum, eo quod scutum primum fuit, et post dealbetur. Si enim inceptio attribuatur huic termino album ratione formae, vera est locutio; si ratione suppositi, falsa est, quia quod est album prius fuit scutum. — Si autem quaeratur ratio huius multiplicitatis, dicunt, eam ex hoc provenire, quia verbum incipiendi claudit in se negationem[^9], et illa potest intelligi praecedere terminum, et sic faciet ipsum habere simplicem suppositionem; vel sequi, et sic respicit ipsum gratia suppositi. Unde quamvis respectu aliquorum actuum vel verborum terminus subiectus determinare[^10] habeat suppositionem simplicem, aut personalem; tamen respectu huius verbi incipit utroque modo potest supponere; et hoc non ponit multiplicitatem in termino supponente, sed in tota locutione ex varia negationis comparatione.

Haec autem distinctio satis est rationabilis, si sane intelligatur simplex suppositio, ut dicatur terminus habere simplicem suppositionem, sub quo non licet descendere[^11], sicut cum dicitur: solus homo currit; vel simplicem suppositionem habere, quando praedicatum, vel aliquid in praedicato respicit ipsum[^12] gratia formae. Licet autem non sit praedicta distinctio reprobanda, attamen non dissolvit plene ambiguitatem locutionis propositae, quoniam, si respicit ipsum ratione suppositi, adhuc habet locutio veritatem. Si enim haec est vera: iste homo incipit esse, in aliquo sensu, ut prius[^13] probatum est, absque dubio verum est, quod incipit esse Deus.

Et propter hoc intelligendum, quod adhuc praedicta locutio habet veritatem, secundum quod verbum incipiendi respicit tantum subiectum gratia suppositi. Unde attendendum est, quod iste terminus homo respectu Christi partim habet naturam termini accidentalis, partim naturam termini substantialis: naturam, inquam, termini accidentalis respectu personae, quae praeexistit; naturam termini substantialis respectu singularis hominis, quod simul cum ipso incipit; per quod iste terminus homo habet supponere pro singulari hominis per se, pro persona Verbi non nisi gratia unionis[^14]. Et quoniam pro supposito singularis hominis, quod quidem est Iesus, habet locutio veritatem, quamvis non habeat pro supposito, quod est persona Christi; hinc est, quod praedicta locutio recipi potest tanquam simpliciter vera. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est vera: iste homo ab aeterno fuit Deus; dicendum, quod si iste demonstret personam, vera est; et in illo sensu falsa est: iste homo incepit esse Deus; si vero suppositum hominis respiciat, adhuc potest esse vera per unionem sive idiomatum communicationem. Sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod ista sit falsa: iste homo incepit esse Deus, per proprietatem suae naturae. Contingit enim, sicut prius[^15] dictum fuit, hunc hominem dicere mortalem et immortalem sine contradictione.

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2. Et per hoc patet sequens obiectum, quod si homo incipit esse Deus, aut iste, aut ille. Dici potest, quod iste; sed iste ibi non demonstrat personam, sed singulare hominis, sicut prius[^16] dictum fuit. Unde non est simile, si dicatur: album incipit esse scutum, quia album non habet nisi naturam termini accidentalis nec habet suppositum, pro quo possit reddere locutionem veram nisi ipsum scutum; non sic autem est in homine respectu Christi.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de communicatione idiomatum, dicendum, quod in idiomatum communicatione haec regula est attendenda, quia omnia communicantur, his dumtaxat exceptis, quae exprimunt ipsam unionem, vel quae claudunt intellectuum repugnantiam, ratione cuius errori appropinquant[^17]. — Ratio autem huius est, quia communicatio idiomatum fundatur super ipsam unionem et ordinatur ad fidei catholicam expressionem. Et ideo non communicantur illa quae important unionem; unde quamvis haec sit vera: Filius Dei est incarnatus, haec est falsa: homo est incarnatus. Similiter intelligendum est de his quae repugnantiam intellectuum important, sicut sunt esse creaturam et esse praedestinatum et similia. Et quoniam, cum dicitur: homo incepit esse Deus, importatur unio; ideo talis idiomatis non est communicatio.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, si per impossibile homo dimitteretur a Deo, utrum haec esset vera: homo desinit esse Deus; dicendum, quod sic; nec valet: homo semper erit Deus, ergo non desinit esse Deus. Sicut enim prius[^18] tactum fuit, istae duae simul sunt verae: homo desinit esse Deus, et homo semper erit Deus, quia per idiomatum communicationem haec est vera: homo semper erit Deus; et tamdiu erit vera, quamdiu durabit unio. Si vero cras solvatur unio, tunc nec per idiomatum communicationem nec alio modo est verum dicere, quod homo sit Deus. Et si tu obiicias, quod desinere implicat non esse; et istae non possunt concedi simul de Christo erit et non erit; dicendum, quod sicut dictum fuit[^19], plus negat negatio explicita quam implicita; propter hoc ista conceditur tanquam vera: iste homo est immortalis, demonstrato Christo in statu possibilitatis, quamvis non concedatur: iste homo non est mortalis. — Et sic patent ea quae in hac parte quaeruntur, et qualiter idiomata communicantur[^20].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether this is to be conceded: a man begins to be God.*

Third, it is asked concerning this proposition: a man begins to be God, whether it is to be conceded. And that it is so, it seems.

1. This is true: God began to be man: therefore, by simple conversion[^1]: man began to be God.

2. Likewise, this is true: God begins to be man, on account of the union; but the union is reciprocal and mutual, because, just as man is united to God, so also God to man[^2]: therefore, if the union is reciprocal, the inception too, which is founded upon the union [is reciprocal]: therefore, just as this is true: God began to be man, so also this: man began to be God.

3. Likewise, let us be at the instant in which the Son of God was incarnate: this is true: man is God, and before this: man was not God: therefore man began to be God[^3]. The premises are true: therefore the conclusion [is true], since the premises set forth the conclusion[^4].

4. Likewise, before man existed, man was neither man nor anything else; but man began to be man, and man could not be God before he was man: therefore, if man began to be man, man began to be God.

**On the contrary:** 1. This is true: this man was from eternity God[^5]; and from this man "man" follows: therefore man was God from eternity: therefore this is false: man began to be God.

2. Likewise, if man began to be God, then either this one, or that one, and so on of the others; but there is none to be given except concerning this one, and this man was always God: therefore he did not begin to be God: therefore this is false: man began to be God.

3. Likewise, there is a communication in the idioms: therefore, if man began to be God, it seems that this is to be conceded: the Son of God began to be God. But this is false absolutely: therefore the first [proposition] also [is false].

4. Likewise, suppose that the Son of God were to lay aside the man whom he assumed, per impossibile; then I ask concerning this: this man ceases to be God; this is false, therefore by parity of reasoning this also is false: man began to be God, when he assumed [the man]. Proof of the minor: now there is a union: therefore there is a communication in the idioms: therefore, if the Son of God will always be the Son of God, the man too will always be God; it follows necessarily that this is true: this man will always be God, and this likewise: the Son of God will always be man: therefore this also is false: man ceases to be God, and this: God ceases to be man; by parity of reasoning[^6] these too are false: this man began to be God, and God began to be man.

> ### Conclusion
> *The expression "man began to be God," well understood, can be received as absolutely true.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt this is conceded: God began to be man; but concerning this: man began to be God, it is doubtful whether it is to be conceded absolutely.

For some have wished to distinguish it on the ground that this verb "begins" can be attributed to this term "man" by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. If it is attributed by reason of the form, then this term "man" has simple supposition[^7], and then the sense is that God begins to be predicated of man, because now it is predicated and before it was not predicated; and thus the expression has truth. But if it regards [the man] by reason of the supposit, then they said that this is a false expression, because to the supposit[^8] it always belongs to be God. — And they assign a similar case to this, as if it were said: a white thing begins to be a shield, because the shield existed first, and afterward is whitened. For if the inception is attributed to this term "white" by reason of the form, the expression is true; if by reason of the supposit, it is false, because that which is white was previously a shield. — And if the ground of this manifold sense be asked, they say that it arises from this, that the verb of beginning includes within itself a negation[^9], and that [negation] can be understood to precede the term, and thus it will make it have simple supposition; or to follow [it], and thus it regards it by reason of the supposit. Hence, although with respect to certain acts or words the subject term may have[^10] simple or personal supposition; nevertheless with respect to this verb "begins" it can supposit in either way; and this does not place a manifold sense in the suppositing term, but in the whole expression, by reason of the varied relation of the negation.

Now this distinction is reasonable enough, provided that simple supposition be soundly understood, namely, so that a term is said to have simple supposition under which one may not descend[^11], as when it is said: only man runs; or to have simple supposition when the predicate, or something in the predicate, regards it[^12] by reason of the form. But although the aforesaid distinction is not to be rejected, nevertheless it does not fully dissolve the ambiguity of the proposed expression, since, if it regards [the man] by reason of the supposit, the expression still has truth. For if this is true: this man begins to be, in some sense, as was proved before[^13], without doubt it is true that he begins to be God.

And on account of this it is to be understood that the aforesaid expression still has truth insofar as the verb of beginning regards only the subject by reason of the supposit. Hence it is to be attended to that this term "man," with respect to Christ, partly has the nature of an accidental term, partly the nature of a substantial term: the nature, I say, of an accidental term with respect to the person, which preexists; the nature of a substantial term with respect to the singular of the man, which begins together with him; whereby this term "man" supposits for the singular of the man by itself, but for the person of the Word only by reason of the union[^14]. And since the expression has truth for the supposit of the singular man, which indeed is Jesus, although it does not have [truth] for the supposit which is the person of Christ; hence it is that the aforesaid expression can be received as absolutely true. — And the reasons in favor of this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that this is true: this man was from eternity God; it must be said that if "this one" points out the person, it is true; and in that sense it is false: this man began to be God; but if it regards the supposit of the man, it can still be true through the union or the communication of idioms. But nevertheless from this it does not follow that this is false: this man began to be God, by the property of his nature. For it happens, as was said before[^15], that one may call this man mortal and immortal without contradiction.

2. And through this the following objection is made clear, that if man begins to be God, [it is] either this one, or that one. It can be said: this one; but "this one" there does not point out the person, but the singular of the man, as was said before[^16]. Hence it is not similar, if it be said: a white thing begins to be a shield, because "white" has only the nature of an accidental term and has no supposit for which it could render the expression true except the shield itself; but it is not so in man with respect to Christ.

3. To that which is objected concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that in the communication of idioms this rule is to be attended to, namely, that all things are communicated, with these alone excepted, which express the union itself, or which include a repugnance of understandings, by reason of which they approach error[^17]. — And the ground of this is that the communication of idioms is founded upon the union itself and is ordered to the expression of the catholic faith. And therefore those things are not communicated which imply the union; whence, although this is true: the Son of God is incarnate, this is false: man is incarnate. Similarly it is to be understood concerning those things which imply a repugnance of understandings, such as to be a creature and to be predestined and the like. And since, when it is said: man began to be God, the union is implied; therefore there is no communication of such an idiom.

4. To that which is asked, if per impossibile man were released by God, whether this would be true: man ceases to be God; it must be said that yes; nor does this hold: man will always be God, therefore he does not cease to be God. For just as was touched on before[^18], these two are simultaneously true: man ceases to be God, and man will always be God, because through the communication of idioms this is true: man will always be God; and it will be true as long as the union will last. But if tomorrow the union be dissolved, then neither through the communication of idioms nor in any other way is it true to say that man is God. And if you object that to cease implies not-being, and these cannot be conceded together concerning Christ — that he will be and will not be — it must be said that, as was said[^19], an explicit negation negates more than an implicit one; on account of this the following is conceded as true: this man is immortal, Christ being pointed out in the state of possibility, although it not be conceded: this man is not mortal. — And thus those things which are asked in this part are made clear, and how the idioms are communicated[^20].

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 175, nota 10. — De maiori cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. VII. c. I. seqq. et Comment. a. I. q. 2. nec non a. 2. q. 2. — Hic et per totam hanc quaest. edd. constanter exhibent *incepit* pro *coepit.*

en: Cf. above, page 175, note 10. — On the major [premise] cf. above, the Master's text, d. VII, c. I and following, and the Commentary, a. I, q. 2, as also a. 2, q. 2. — Here and throughout this whole question the editions constantly exhibit *began* (*incepit*) for *began* (*coepit*).

la: Scil. in Logica. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.) quaestionem tractat, quaenam propositiones magis contrariae sibi invicem dicantur, e. gr. utrum Kallias sit iustus, et Kallias non sit iustus; an Kallias sit iustus, et Kallias sit iniustus. Probat autem multis rationibus, duas priores propositiones magis esse sibi contrarias quam sequentes.

en: That is, in Logic. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 4 (c. 14), treats the question, which propositions are said to be more contrary to one another, e.g. whether [the propositions] "Callias is just" and "Callias is not just," or "Callias is just" and "Callias is unjust." And he proves by many arguments that the two former propositions are more contrary to one another than the latter ones.

la: Syllogismum Aristot., I. Prior. c. I, definit sic: Est oratio, in qua, quibusdam positis [i. e. praemissis], aliud quiddam ab his quae posita sunt, ex necessitate accidit [i. e. concluditur], eo quod haec sunt.

en: Aristotle defines the syllogism, *Prior Analytics* I, c. I, thus: It is a discourse in which, certain things being posited [i.e. the premises], something else besides those which are posited follows of necessity [i.e. is concluded], on the ground that these are so.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Vide supra d. 5. a. I. q. I. — In maiori non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 pro *Deus incipit* falso *homo incipit.*

en: See above, d. 5, a. I, q. I. — In the major [premise] not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, [read] for *God begins* falsely *man begins.*

la: Cod. F ante *pari ratione* interserit *ergo.*

en: Codex F before *by parity of reasoning* inserts *therefore.*

la: Id est, terminus *homo* accipitur hic pro re universali per ipsum significata, sive pro natura speciei, scil. pro natura humana, et non pro quolibet inferiori sive supposito sub ipsa contento. *Simplici* suppositioni opponitur *personalis*, in qua terminus sumitur pro suis inferioribus sive suppositis e. gr. *homo currit.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. scholion.

en: That is, the term *man* is here taken for the universal thing signified by it, or for the nature of the species, namely for human nature, and not for any inferior or supposit contained under it. To *simple* supposition is opposed *personal* [supposition], in which the term is taken for its inferiors or supposits, e.g. *man runs.* Cf. *I Sent.* d. 4, q. 1, scholion.

la: Scil. humanae naturae in Christo, quod est Verbum. — De exemplo mox adducto cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: That is, of the human nature in Christ, which is the Word. — On the example soon adduced cf. the preceding question.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 252, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, page 252, note 3.

la: Vat. *determinate.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *determinately.*

la: Sive applicare ad inferiora (supposita); sic in exemplo allato non licet inferre: ergo solus hic homo v. gr. Petrus currit.

en: That is, to apply to the inferiors (supposits); thus in the example adduced it is not permitted to infer: therefore only this man, e.g. Peter, runs.

la: Intellige: terminum.

en: Understand: the term.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius pro *si respicit* cod. bb *etsi respiciat.*

en: The preceding question. — A little above, for *if it regards* codex bb [reads] *even if it should regard.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 10. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo ante pro *per quod* codd. A (K. a secunda manu) M O bb *propter quod.*

en: Cf. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 10, a. 1, q. 3. — A little before, for *whereby* codices A (K by a second hand) M O bb [read] *on account of which.*

la: Quaest. praeced. ad 3. pro parte negativa.

en: The preceding question, [reply] to the 3rd [argument] on the negative side.

la: Quaest. praeced. in corp.

en: The preceding question, in the body [of the article].

la: Vide hic q. 1. et supra d. 7. a. 1. q. 3. in fine, a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. — Mox pro *catholicam* cod. A *catholicae*, sed cfr. supra pag. 250, nota 2. Deinde pro *haec est falsa* edd. *haec tamen est falsa.*

en: See here q. 1 and above, d. 7, a. 1, q. 3, at the end, [and] a. 2, q. 1, [reply] to 2. — Soon, for *catholic* codex A [reads] *of the catholic [faith]*, but cf. above, page 250, note 2. Then for *this is false* the editions [read] *this nevertheless is false.*

la: Hic in hac obiect. et ad 1. et q. praeced. ad 3. seq. — Paulo superius pro *semper erit Deus* edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. *semper erat Deus*, quam lectionem dictae edd. (non codd.) etiam paulo inferius bis exhibent.

en: Here in this objection, and at [reply] to 1, and the preceding question [reply] to 3 and following. — A little above, for *will always be God* editions 1, 2 with not a few codices [read] *was always God*, which reading the said editions (not the codices) also exhibit twice a little below.

la: Quaest. praeced. ad 3. — Cfr. Gul. Antissiodor. S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 1. q. 7. — Mox pro *passibilitatis* cod. N perperam *impassibilitatis.*

en: The preceding question, [reply] to 3. — Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa* part III, tr. 1, c. 1, q. 7. — Soon, for *of passibility* codex N erroneously [reads] *of impassibility.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.255–257 (PDF pp.277–279; raw OCR lines 18074–18196), reading each page left column top→bottom then right column, body bands then footer bands (Vol III PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II/III Override). Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Alignment.** Verified: this is the THIRD and last of Article II's three *vocabula* questions. The incipit reads *Tertio quaeritur de hac: homo incipit esse Deus, utrum sit concedenda* — matching the a2 TRACTATIO's third listed question and the a2-q3 skeleton title (*Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo incipit esse Deus*). q1 = *Christus est creatura*; q2 = *iste homo incepit esse, Christo demonstrato*. No q-swap.

**Page-split map.** (Quaracchi superscripts traced eyes-on at 450 dpi; each `[^N]` is placed at its OCR superscript position, renumbered sequentially in body order.)
- **p.255** (left column below q2's scholion band + right column): QUAESTIO III header + title + opener (*Tertio quaeritur…*) + args 1–4 *pro*; *Sed contra* 1 down through *…sed non est dare nisi.* Footer block carries nn.1–6; q3's body anchors **nn.2–6**: n.3 *Cfr. supra pag. 175* (arg 1, *conversa*) → `[^1]`; n.2 *Scil. in Logica* (arg 2, *Deus homini*) → `[^2]`; n.5 *Syllogismum Aristot.* (arg 3, *coepit esse Deus*) → `[^3]`; n.6 *Cfr. quaest. praeced.* (arg 3, *conclusionem*) → `[^4]`; n.4 *Vide supra d. 5* (*Sed contra* 1, *ab aeterno Deus*) → `[^5]`. **p.255 n.1** (*Cod. G quando, cod. K quomodo vel quando*) has no lemma in q3 — it glosses a *quando* reading on q2's part of p.255; left with q2.
- **p.256**: *Sed contra* 2 (cont.)–4; CONCLUSIO; *Respondeo* — the *Quidam* distinction (opinio i.), its *album/scutum* simile, the ground of the manifold sense, and Bonaventure's own *intelligendum* exposition (accidental/substantial term) down through reply 1 (*…sine contradictione.*). Footer: **all 10 entries** anchored — n.1 (*pari ratione*) → `[^6]`; n.2 (*suppositionem simplicem*) → `[^7]`; n.3 (*supposito*) → `[^8]`; n.4 (*negationem*) → `[^9]`; n.5 (*determinare*) → `[^10]`; n.6 (*descendere*) → `[^11]`; n.7 (*ipsum*, *gratia formae*) → `[^12]`; n.8 (*ut prius*) → `[^13]`; n.9 (*gratia unionis*) → `[^14]`; n.10 (*sicut prius*, reply 1) → `[^15]`.
- **p.257**: replies 2, 3, 4; ends *…et qualiter idiomata communicantur.* Footer block carries nn.1–11; q3's body anchors **nn.1–5**: n.1 (*sicut prius dictum fuit*, reply 2) → `[^16]`; n.2 (*errori appropinquant*, reply 3) → `[^17]`; n.3 (*sicut prius tactum fuit*, reply 4) → `[^18]`; n.4 (*sicut dictum fuit*, reply 4) → `[^19]`; n.5 (*idiomata communicantur*, reply 4 end) → `[^20]`. **p.257 nn.6–11** belong to the DUBIA chunk that follows (see Hand-offs).

**Apparatus count.** 20 entries = 5 (p.255 nn.2–6) + 10 (p.256 nn.1–10) + 5 (p.257 nn.1–5). Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the chunk renumbers sequentially in body order. Every rendered `[^N]` def has a matching superscript anchor in both the Latin and English bodies. (p.255 n.1 stays with q2; p.257 nn.6–11 forward to the dubia.)

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. q3 prints **no SCHOLION header** of its own; its raw range instead carries *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* (rendered here as `[^20]`). The governing scholion is the three-section SCHOLION (I–III) printed on p.255 within **d11-a2-q2** (commit 2f6fc53), which forward-covers q3: q2's scholion section I opens *Haec et sequens (3.) quaestio…* and section III is explicitly *Etiam seq. (3.) quaestio versatur…* Confirmed eyes-on at 450 dpi.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Inbound (consumed):* NONE. q2 (2f6fc53) forwarded no footers; per q2's eyes-on read no q2 footer spills onto q3's pages. q3 begins on p.255 left column below q2's scholion band (raw line 18074).
- *Forwarded to d11-dubia:* the *DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI* block begins at **raw line 18197 / p.257 right column** (*Dub. I. In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram…*). Printed **p.257 footer nn.6–11** belong to the dubia, not to q3: n.6 (*Rom. 11, 36…*), n.7 (*Edd. et non pauci codd. vitiose non loquitur…*), n.8 (*Cfr. infra d. 14. a. 3. q. 3.*), n.9 (*Vide I. Sent. d. 7. q. 4. et dub. 2.*), n.10 (*Supple (ex obiectione): factum vel creaturam esse…*), n.11 (*Hic c. I. seq. — Paulo inferius pro determinatione cod. distinctione.*). q3 retained only p.257 n.5.

**[?] flags.** None. Body, all 17 rendered footers, and the *Vide scholion* cross-reference read cleanly at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0