title: Dist. 19, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Divisio textus distinctionis XIX partis secundae

title_alt: Division of the text of Distinction XIX, Part 2

source_text:
<!-- page 354 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

### Pars II.

#### *De aequalitate probata per exclusionem inaequalitatis.*

> *Sed nunc iam ad propositum redeamus.*

> HUIUS PARTIS TEXTUM VIDE SUPRA P. 337.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, divinas personas aequari quantum ad magnitudinem positive[^1] per hoc, quod una essentia est in singulis tota. Hic ostendit, quod est summa in eis aequalitas, et hoc facit excludendo ab eis omnem[^2] rationem inaequalitatis. Et dividitur haec pars in tres partes. In prima ostendit, quod non cadit ibi ratio totius[^3] integri. In secunda ostendit, quod non cadit ibi ratio generis et speciei[^4], ibi: *Hic adiiciendum est, quod tanta est aequalitas* etc. In tertia ostendit, quod non cadit ibi ratio numeri, ibi: *Quod autem Ioannes dicit* etc[^5].

Prima iterum pars habet[^6] duas. In prima, quia fecerat digressionem, continuat dicta dicendis. In secunda vero ostendit, quod ibi non cadit ratio totius et partis, ibi: *Nec est aliqua trium personarum.*

Item secunda pars, in qua ostendit, quod in divinis non cadit ratio universalis sive generis et speciei, habet duas partes. In prima ostendit, quod non est in divinis accipere genus nec speciem nec individuum. In secunda vero contra hoc opponit auctoritate Damasceni, ibi: *His autem videntur adversari quaedam.* Prima habet duas: primo ostendit, quod non est ibi ratio[^7] generis vel speciei vel individui; secundo, quod non est ibi ratio materialis principii, ibi: *Notandum etiam, quod essentia divina non est materia.* Similiter pars, in qua obiicit contra hoc, habet duas: in prima ostendit, quod cadit ibi ratio universalis et individui, ratione[^8] Damasceni; in secunda solvit. Primum facit ibi: *His autem videntur adversari* etc.; secundum, ibi: *Haec autem quae hic dicuntur, licet in singulis sermonibus.*

*Quod autem Ioannes dicit* etc. Haec est tertia particula in qua ostendit, quod in divinis non cadit ratio numeri, et haec pars habet quatuor partes. In prima, praemisso quod in aequalitate personarum non cadit ratio numeri, ostendit, quibus modis differre numero non conveniat personis, et quibus modis conveniat. In secunda ostendit, quod in divinis personis tanta est magnitudo in una persona, quanta in tribus, ibi: *Sciendum est ergo.* In tertia ostendit, quod Deus non potest dici triplex sive multiplex, ibi: *Praeterea, cum Deus dicatur trinus.* In quarta ostendit differentiam inter pluralitatem, quae est in Trinitate, et pluralitatem[^9] quae est in creaturis corporalibus, ultimo capitulo: *In rebus corporeis non tantum* etc.

Et notandum, quod tota summa et fundamentum totius distinctionis in hoc verbo consistit, quod divina essentia est magnitudo una non multiplicata, et tota non divisa est in qualibet personarum; ideo necesse est, quod personae sint omnino aequales in[^10] magnitudine. Nec potest ibi cadere ratio totius universalis, quia illud multiplicatur in partibus: nec totius integri, quia illud dividitur in partes nec est totum in qualibet parte; et ita nec ratio materialis principii, nec ratio numeri.

<!-- page 355 -->

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo, utrum in divinis sit ponere totum integrale.

Secundo, utrum sit ponere totum universale.

Tertio, utrum in divinis personis sit principium materiale.

Quarto, utrum in divinis sit differentia secundum numerum.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX.

### Part II.

#### *On equality proved by the exclusion of inequality.*

> *But now let us return to our proposition.*

> FOR THE TEXT OF THIS PART, SEE ABOVE P. 337.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master showed that the divine persons are made equal with respect to magnitude positively[^1] by the fact that one essence is whole in each of them. Here he shows that there is in them the highest equality, and this he does by excluding from them every[^2] account of inequality. And this part is divided into three parts. In the first he shows that the account of an integral whole[^3] does not apply there. In the second he shows that the account of genus and species[^4] does not apply there, at: *Here it must be added, that so great is the equality* etc. In the third he shows that the account of number does not apply there, at: *But what John says* etc[^5].

The first part again has[^6] two. In the first, because he had made a digression, he connects what has been said with what is to be said. In the second, however, he shows that the account of whole and part does not apply there, at: *Nor is any one of the three persons.*

Likewise the second part, in which he shows that in divine matters the account of a universal — that is, of genus and species — does not apply, has two parts. In the first he shows that in divine matters one cannot take a genus nor a species nor an individual. In the second, however, he objects against this by the authority of the Damascene, at: *But to these things certain things seem to be opposed.* The first has two: first he shows that the account[^7] of genus or species or individual does not apply there; secondly, that the account of a material principle does not apply there, at: *It must also be noted, that the divine essence is not matter.* Similarly the part in which he objects against this has two: in the first he shows that the account of universal and individual does apply there, by the reasoning[^8] of the Damascene; in the second he resolves it. He does the first at: *But to these things there seem to be opposed* etc.; the second, at: *But these things which are said here, although in particular discourses.*

*But what John says* etc. This is the third particle in which he shows that in divine matters the account of number does not apply, and this part has four parts. In the first, having premised that in the equality of the persons the account of number does not apply, he shows in which modes differing in number does not befit the persons, and in which modes it does befit them. In the second he shows that in the divine persons there is as much magnitude in one person as in three, at: *It must be known therefore.* In the third he shows that God cannot be called threefold or manifold, at: *Moreover, since God is called triune.* In the fourth he shows the difference between the plurality which is in the Trinity and the plurality[^9] which is in corporeal creatures, in the last chapter: *In corporeal things not only* etc.

And it must be noted that the whole sum and foundation of the entire distinction consists in this word, that the divine essence is one magnitude not multiplied, and whole undivided in each of the persons; therefore it is necessary that the persons be altogether equal in[^10] magnitude. Nor can the account of a universal whole apply there, because that is multiplied in its parts; nor of an integral whole, because that is divided into parts and is not whole in each part; and thus neither the account of a material principle, nor the account of number.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part four things are asked.

First, whether in divine matters an integral whole is to be posited.

Secondly, whether a universal whole is to be posited.

Thirdly, whether in the divine persons there is a material principle.

Fourthly, whether in divine matters there is difference according to number.

---

la: Sequimur maiorem partem codicum addendo *positive*, pro quo aliqui ut *BU aa cc* cum ed. 1 *potentiae*, cod. *D et potentiam* ponunt. In Vat., fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, post *ad* adiicitur *aeternitatem et*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut *A F G H T Z* cum ed. 1 *aequales* loco *aequari*.

en: We follow the greater part of the codices in adding *positive* ("positively"), in place of which some such as *BU aa cc*, with edition 1, put *potentiae*, codex *D* puts *et potentiam*. In the Vatican edition, against the resistance of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, after *ad* there is added *aeternitatem et* ("eternity and"). A little earlier several codices such as *A F G H T Z*, with edition 1, [read] *aequales* in place of *aequari*.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus tantum codicibus minus apte *communem* pro *omnem*.

en: The Vatican edition, with only some codices, less aptly [reads] *communem* in place of *omnem*.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus additum *et*.

en: On the authority of most manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the added *et*.

la: Vat. adiunxit *vel individui*, quod deest in mss.

en: The Vatican edition added *vel individui* ("or of an individual"), which is missing in the manuscripts.

la: Mss. *Sciendum igitur est tantam aequalitatem* loco *Quod autem Ioannes dicit* etc.; sed lectio mss. est falsa, quia omittitur capitulum illud, in quo Magister ostendit in divinis non cadere rationem numeri. Idem mendum mss. recurrit paulo infra, ubi huius partis subdivisio datur, et in qua consequenter mss. exhibent tantum tres partes, omissa prima parte, quae est in Vat.

en: The manuscripts [read] *Sciendum igitur est tantam aequalitatem* in place of *Quod autem Ioannes dicit* etc.; but the reading of the manuscripts is false, because that chapter is omitted in which the Master shows that the account of number does not apply in divine matters. The same error of the manuscripts recurs a little below, where the subdivision of this part is given, and in which consequently the manuscripts exhibit only three parts, the first part being omitted, which is in the Vatican edition.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *habet* loco *in*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *habet* in place of *in*.

la: Aliqui tantum mss. cum Vat. *natura*.

en: Only some manuscripts, with the Vatican edition, [read] *natura*.

la: Plures codd. ut *HPQZ cc* et ed. 1 *auctoritate*.

en: Several codices such as *HPQZ cc* and edition 1 [read] *auctoritate*.

la: Mutila lectio Vat., in qua omittuntur verba *quae est in Trinitate et pluralitatem*, resarcitur ex mss. et ed. 1, sicut et paulo post substituimus *ultimo capitulo* loco *ibi*.

en: The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which the words *quae est in Trinitate et pluralitatem* ("which is in the Trinity, and the plurality") are omitted, is repaired from the manuscripts and edition 1; just as a little after we substituted *ultimo capitulo* ("in the last chapter") in place of *ibi* ("there").

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* deest *in*. Paulo ante pauci mss. ut *VX indivisa* pro *non divisa*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc* the word *in* is missing. A little earlier a few manuscripts such as *VX* [read] *indivisa* in place of *non divisa*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum in divinis sit ponere aequalitatem.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 341 -->

### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De divinarum personarum aequalitate et eius proprietatibus.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum in divinis ponenda sit aequalitas.*

Circa primum, quod sit ibi aequalitas, ostenditur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo[^1]: «Totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales».

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione sic: omnis multitudo reducitur ad unitatem; ergo omnis inaequalitas ad aequalitatem; sed unitas, a qua est omnis multitudo, est unitas increata: ergo et aequalitas, ad quam reducitur omnis inaequalitas, est aequalitas increata[^2]: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod perfectionis est, transferendum est ad divina: sed aequalitas est perfectionis in creatura: ergo etc.

4. Item, unum in substantia facit identitatem, unum in quantitate aequalitatem, unum in qualitate facit similitudinem[^3]; sed in divinis non tantum est unitas in substantia, sed etiam in quantitate, alioquin non esset ibi perfecta unitas: ergo non tantum est ibi identitas substantiae, sed et[^4] aequalitas.

**Contra:** 1. Ubi aequalitas, ibi divisibilitas, quia simplex simplici non aequatur; sed in divinis non est ponere divisibilitatem: ergo nec aequalitatem.

2. Item, ubi aequalitas, ibi quantitas, quia «proprium est quantitatis, secundum eam aequale vel inaequale dici»[^5]; sed in divinis non est ponere quantitatem, quia secundum Augustinum[^6] «Deus est magnus sine quantitate»: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubi aequalitas, ibi finitas, quia ibi est commensuratio[^7], ergo mensura et finitas; sed in divinis est infinitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, ubi aequalitas, ibi diversitas, quoniam nihil est sibi aequale; sed in divinis est omnimoda unitas: ergo non est ibi aequalitas.

> **Conclusio.** Ponenda est in divinis aequalitas, quae consequitur quantitatem virtutis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aequalitas ponitur in divinis, secundum quod dicitur in Symbolo, et dicit Augustinus[^8].

<!-- page 342 -->

Et ad hoc intelligendum notandum[^9], quod aequale et inaequale est propria passio consequens quantitatem. Quantitas autem dicitur dupliciter: proprie, scilicet quantitas molis, et translative, quantitas virtutis. Et quia illa[^10] est propria passio quantitatis, consequitur utramque quantitatem: ubi ergo est ponere quantitatem virtutis, ibi est ponere aequalitatem vel inaequalitatem. Haec autem quantitas virtutis ponitur in spiritualibus et summe reperitur in divinis, quia haec quantitas non repugnat simplicitati, sed consonat; similiter nec aequalitas consequens istam quantitatem. Et quia altera pars contradictionis completior attribuenda est Deo, et aequalitas praeit inaequalitatem: ideo ponenda est aequalitas in divinis; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod, ubi aequalitas, ibi divisibilitas: dicendum, quod verum est de aequalitate, quae consequitur quantitatem molis.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur: ubi aequalitas, ibi quantitas; dicendum, quod verum est vel[^11] secundum genus, vel secundum speciem; et quamvis nomen quantitatis non transferatur, transfertur tamen nomen speciei, ut magnitudo[^12].

<!-- page 343 -->

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi aequalitas, ibi finitas; dicendum, quod aequalitas in creaturis duo importat, scilicet conterminationem[^13] et excessus privationem; primum est incompletionis ratione limitationis, secundum perfectionis: ideo transfertur ratione secundi, non primi.

Posset tamen dici, quod infinitum, quod est incomprehensibile, secundum veritatem est ab infinito comprehensibile, et ideo commensurabile infinito et est sibi finitum[^14]. Et ex hoc non sequitur: est commensurabile infinito, ergo finitum; immo magis infinitum: et[^15] est ibi quid et simpliciter.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi aequalitas, ibi diversitas: dicendum, quod est diversitas suppositorum et diversitas formae[^16]. Ad aequalitatem et similitudinem requiritur diversitas suppositorum, non autem formae diversitas, sed unitas. Quod autem consequitur in inferioribus ad diversitatem suppositorum numeratio formae vel quantitatis, hoc est imperfectionis; et ideo totum, quod est perfectionis, transfertur in Deum. Non tamen est in suppositis proprie loquendo diversitas, sed distinctio[^17].

english:
### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *On the equality of the divine persons and on its properties.*
### Question I. *Whether equality is to be posited in divine things.*

As to the first [question], that there is equality there, it is shown:

1. First, by what is said in the Creed[^1]: «All three persons are coeternal to one another and coequal».

2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason thus: every multitude is reduced to unity; therefore every inequality to equality; but the unity from which every multitude [arises] is uncreated unity: therefore also the equality to which every inequality is reduced is uncreated equality[^2]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is of perfection is to be transferred to divine things: but equality is of perfection in the creature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, oneness in substance makes identity, oneness in quantity equality, oneness in quality makes likeness[^3]; but in divine things there is not only unity in substance, but also in quantity — otherwise there would not be there a perfect unity: therefore there is there not only identity of substance, but also[^4] equality.

**On the contrary:** 1. Where there is equality, there is divisibility, since the simple is not made equal to the simple; but in divine things divisibility is not to be posited: therefore neither equality.

2. Likewise, where there is equality, there is quantity, since «it is the property of quantity that according to it [a thing] is called equal or unequal»[^5]; but in divine things quantity is not to be posited, since according to Augustine[^6] «God is great without quantity»: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, where there is equality, there is finitude, because there is commensuration[^7], therefore measure and finitude; but in divine things there is infinity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, where there is equality, there is diversity, since nothing is equal to itself; but in divine things there is unity in every mode: therefore there is no equality there.

> **Conclusion.** Equality is to be posited in divine things — [the equality] which follows upon the quantity of virtue [*quantitatem virtutis*].

**I respond:** It must be said that equality is posited in divine things, according to what is said in the Creed, and Augustine says[^8].

And for the understanding of this it must be noted[^9] that equal and unequal is a proper accident following upon quantity. But quantity is said in two ways: properly, namely the quantity of mass [*quantitas molis*], and by transference, the quantity of virtue [*quantitas virtutis*]. And because that[^10] is a proper accident of quantity, it follows upon both [kinds of] quantity: where therefore one is to posit quantity of virtue, there one is to posit equality or inequality. But this quantity of virtue is posited in spiritual things and is found supremely in divine things, because this quantity is not repugnant to simplicity, but is consonant with it; and likewise neither is the equality which follows upon this quantity. And because the more complete part of the contradiction is to be attributed to God, and equality precedes inequality: therefore equality is to be posited in divine things; and the reasons in favor of this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary, that where there is equality, there is divisibility: it must be said that this is true of the equality which follows upon the quantity of mass.

2. To that which is objected secondly: where there is equality, there is quantity; it must be said that it is true either[^11] according to genus, or according to species; and although the name of quantity is not transferred, nevertheless the name of the species is transferred, as *magnitude*[^12].

3. To that which is objected: where there is equality, there is finitude; it must be said that equality in creatures imports two things, namely conterminātion[^13] and the privation of excess; the first is of incompletion by reason of limitation, the second of perfection: therefore it is transferred by reason of the second, not of the first.

Yet it could be said that the infinite, which is incomprehensible, in truth is comprehensible by [another] infinite, and is therefore commensurable to [that] infinite and is finite to it[^14]. And from this it does not follow: it is commensurable to the infinite, therefore [it is] finite; rather, the more infinite: and[^15] there is there a "[finite] in some respect" and "[finite] simply".

4. To that which is objected: where there is equality, there is diversity: it must be said that there is a diversity of supposits and a diversity of form[^16]. For equality and likeness, diversity of supposits is required, but not diversity of form, but unity. But [the fact] that in inferior things there follows upon a diversity of supposits a numeration of form or of quantity — this is of imperfection; and therefore the whole, which is of perfection, is transferred into God. Yet there is not, in the supposits properly speaking, diversity, but distinction[^17].

la: Athanasiano.

en: [The Athanasian Creed.]

la: Vide Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 3. et 13; Boeth., *de Arithmetica*, ubi diversimode haec propositio occurrit. Boeth. loc. cit. praesertim II. c. 1. etiam ostendit, omnem numerorum inaequalitatem reduci ad aequalitatem.

en: See Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 3 and 13; Boethius, *On Arithmetic*, where this proposition occurs in various ways. Boethius, loc. cit. — especially II, c. 1 — also shows that every inequality of numbers is reduced to equality.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Quantitate et Qualitate, et V. *Metaph.* text. 15. (16.) et 20. (IV. c. 9. et 10.): *Eadem enim sunt quorum substantia una; similia vero quorum qualitas una; aequalia autem quorum quantitas una.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. on Quantity and on Quality, and *Metaphysics* V, text 15 (16) and 20 (IV, c. 9 and 10): *For those things are the same whose substance is one; like, those whose quality is one; equal, those whose quantity is one.*

la: Multi codd. ut AFGHKVWX etc. cum ed. 1 minus bene omittunt *et*.

en: Many codices such as A, F, G, H, K, V, W, X, etc., with ed. 1, less well omit *et*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Quantitate. — Paulo ante in pluribus antiquis mss. ut A C R S T V Y et ed. 1 perperam *sed* loco *quia*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. on Quantity. — A little before, in several ancient manuscripts such as A, C, R, S, T, V, Y, and ed. 1, *sed* is wrongly placed in place of *quia*.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 2, in quo textu fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.

en: *On the Trinity* V, c. 1, n. 2 — in which text, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have supplied *est*.

la: B. Albert. et Richard. a Med., hic a. 1, probant hoc per definitionem ex Geometria (Euclidis) sumtam et infra d. 31. p. I. q. 1. arg. 2. ad opp. citatam: *Aequale est, quod alteri suppositum non excedit nec exceditur.* — Mox Vat., fere omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 repugnantibus, *ergo ubi est mensura, ibi est finitas*, quo posito processus argumentationis tollitur.

en: Bl. Albert and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, prove this through the definition taken from the Geometry (of Euclid) and cited below at d. 31, p. I, q. 1, arg. 2 *ad oppositum*: *That is equal which, when set under another, neither exceeds nor is exceeded.* — Next, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] *therefore where there is measure, there is finitude*, which posited, the course of the argumentation is destroyed.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, in qua dicta Augustini allegantur.

en: See here the text of the Master, in which the sayings of Augustine are alleged.

la: Unus alterque codex praemittit *verum est*.

en: One or another codex prefixes *verum est* ("it is true").

la: Referas illa ad paulo supra posita *aequale et inaequale*, vel potius subintellige: *aequalitas vel inaequalitas*; cum quo concordat lectio cod. X, qui mox post *quantitatis* addit *scilicet aequalitas vel inaequalitas, ideo*; lectio autem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua verbo *consequitur* praefigitur *aequalitas*, incompleta est et contra antiquiores codd. nec non contra ed. 1.

en: Refer those [words] to *aequale et inaequale* set down a little above, or rather understand: *equality or inequality*; with which the reading of cod. X agrees, which soon after *quantitatis* adds *namely, equality or inequality, therefore*; but the reading of the Vatican and of cod. cc, in which *aequalitas* is prefixed to the verb *consequitur*, is incomplete and is against the older codices and also against ed. 1.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam *vel*.

en: From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied the particle *vel*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 8, p. II, dub. 1.

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *vel commensurationem*.

en: Codices *aa* and *bb* add *or commensuration*.

la: Exhibemus lectionem maioris partis codd. ut AGHILO TQSTVY etc. et ed. 1, dum ceteri codd. cum edd. 2, 3 loco *sibi* ponunt *ibi*, vel falso *infinitum* pro *finitum*; Vat. autem omittit *et est sibi finitum*.

en: We display the reading of the greater part of the codices such as A, G, H, I, L, O, T, Q, S, T, V, Y, etc., and ed. 1, while the other codices with editions 2, 3 in place of *sibi* put *ibi*, or falsely *infinitum* for *finitum*; the Vatican, moreover, omits *et est sibi finitum*.

la: Vat. male et praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit *et*. Mox cod. X loco *quid* habet magis distincte *secundum quid*; complete diceretur: *et est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter* (cfr. Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4. 5.); ut siquidem transitus a finito sub aliquo respectu ad finitum simpliciter. Nam licet infinitum obiectum ab infinito intellectu comprehendatur eique sit commensurabile, propter hoc tamen dici non potest, ipsum esse finitum simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid; quia potentiae in ratione intelligendi infinitae respondet solummodo obiectum infinitum in ratione intelligibilis.

en: The Vatican wrongly and against the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions omits *et*. Next, cod. X in place of *quid* has more distinctly *secundum quid*; fully it would read: *and there is there a fallacy of [the] secundum quid and simpliciter* (cf. Aristotle, I *Sophistical Refutations*, c. 4–5) — namely a transition from [what is] finite under some respect to [what is] finite simply. For although an infinite object is comprehended by an infinite intellect and is commensurable to it, nevertheless on account of this it cannot be said that it is finite simply, but only *secundum quid*; because to a power infinite in the account of understanding there corresponds only an object infinite in the account of intelligibility.

la: Praeter lectionem in textum receptam reperiuntur in mss. variae lectiones; cod. K post verba *dicendum quod* addit *verum est ubi*; dein plures codd. ut ACRSUW (alio): *ibi aequalitas suppositorum* loco *diversitas suppositorum*, cod. T vero primitus *dicendum, quod est ibi aequalitas suppositorum et unitas formae*, sed postea mutatum in *dicendum, quod est inaequalitas suppositorum et diversitas formae*. Lectio primitiva codicis T non est spernenda. Mox cod. K post *aequalitatem* addit *autem*, et post *similitudinem* adiungit *in divinis*.

en: Besides the reading received into the text, various readings are found in the manuscripts; cod. K after the words *dicendum quod* adds *verum est ubi*; then several codices such as A, C, R, S, U, W (otherwise): *ibi aequalitas suppositorum* in place of *diversitas suppositorum*; but cod. T originally *dicendum, quod est ibi aequalitas suppositorum et unitas formae*, but later changed into *dicendum, quod est inaequalitas suppositorum et diversitas formae*. The original reading of codex T is not to be despised. Next, cod. K after *aequalitatem* adds *autem*, and after *similitudinem* appends *in divinis*.

la: Vide supra d. 1. q. 2. et dubia circa litteram; item Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 1.

en: See above d. 1, q. 2, and the *dubia circa litteram*; likewise Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 65, m. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ex sententia communi hae tres communes relationes identitatis, aequalitatis et similitudinis correspondent his tribus generibus: substantiae, quantitati et qualitati. Hanc doctrinam explicat Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.): «In his inferioribus ex unitate in substantia causatur identitas, ex unitate in quantitate aequalitas, ex unitate in qualitate similitudo, unde identitas, aequalitas, similitudo dicunt relationes fundatas super tria praedicamenta. Iuxta istam similitudinem, quoniam est significare divinam substantiam ut essentiam et ut quantam et ut qualem, est ponere in divinis identitatem, aequalitatem et similitudinem. Sed quantitas in divinis transit in genus substantiae, et qualitas similiter, quia in divinis non est ponere nisi duo genera, scil. substantiae et ad aliquid. Aequalitas et similitudo dicunt relationes ut fundatas in substantia». Insuper, sicut est duplex quantitas, propria scilicet sive quantitas molis, et impropria sive quantitas virtutis vel perfectionis (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 1.), ita etiam duplex distinguitur aequalitas, «quatenus consequitur utramque quantitatem». Et sicut quantitas virtutis (quam S. Augustinus maluit nominare nomine magnitudinis, quam nomine quantitatis, ne insipientes accipiant occasionem errandi, existimando in Deo esse quantitatem molis orbem replentem) nobilior est quantitate molis, ita nobilior est aequalitas fundata super quantitatem virtutis, quam quae fundatur super quantitatem molis. Dici etiam potest, quod altera est aequalitas proprie dicta, altera vero improprie. Aequalitas proprie sumta est quaedam relatio praedicamentalis, fundata super unitate, quam res habent in genere quantitatis. Aequalitas vero large sumta est relatio extra genus quantitatis et potest fundari in quolibet ente, tam finito quam infinito, quatenus habet certum gradum in entibus. De Deo autem, qui est extra omne genus, relationes identitatis, aequalitatis et similitudinis praedicantur tantum in sensu transcendentali.

<!-- page 344 -->

**II.** Quoad solut. ad 2. et assertionem ibi positam, quod[?] «quamvis nomen quantitatis non transferatur, transfertur tamen nomen speciei», cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 1. — Quoad vero loquendi modum «non est in divinis suppositis proprie diversitas, sed distinctio», cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 1.[?] Magis autem explicat Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. ad 2.) his verbis: «Ad aequalitatem et similitudinem in suppositis requiritur diversitas suppositorum secundum essentiam in suppositis; non sic est in divinis, propter quam diversitatem suppositorum concomitatur identitas essentiae; et propter hanc unitionem non est ponere diversitatem, sed distinctionem, ut dicit Ambrosius. Unde aequalitas in divinis personis non dicit diversitatem, sed distinctionem; distinctio enim non tollit unitatem, sive identitatem; unde licet in divinis sit summa identitas, quia illam concomitatur distinctio, huiusmodi identitas non tollit aequalitatem».

**III.** Plura de aequalitate vide infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1, 2, 3. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 41, m. 1. — Scot., de hac et duabus seqq. in utroque scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1, et d. 24, q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 42, a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 70, q. 1. — Durand., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. 1. — Riel., hic q. 1, a. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** According to the common opinion, these three common relations of identity, equality, and likeness correspond to these three genera: substance, quantity, and quality. Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below) explains this doctrine: «In these inferior things, from unity in substance is caused identity, from unity in quantity equality, from unity in quality likeness — whence identity, equality, likeness express relations founded upon the three predicaments. According to this likeness, since [it is possible] to signify the divine substance as essence and as quantified and as qualified, equality is to be posited in divine things, [along with] identity and likeness. But quantity in divine things passes over into the genus of substance, and quality likewise, since in divine things only two genera are to be posited, namely substance and *ad aliquid* (relation). Equality and likeness express relations as founded in substance». Furthermore, just as there is a twofold quantity — proper, namely *quantitas molis* (quantity of mass), and improper, namely *quantitas virtutis* (quantity of virtue) or of perfection (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1) — so also a twofold equality is distinguished, «inasmuch as it follows upon both [kinds of] quantity». And just as the quantity of virtue (which St. Augustine preferred to name by the name of *magnitude* rather than by the name of *quantity*, lest the foolish take occasion of erring by supposing that there is in God a quantity of mass filling the universe) is more noble than the quantity of mass, so the equality founded upon the quantity of virtue is more noble than that which is founded upon the quantity of mass. It can also be said that one [equality] is equality properly so called, the other improperly. Equality properly taken is a certain predicamental relation, founded upon a unity which things have in the genus of quantity. But equality broadly taken is a relation outside the genus of quantity, and can be founded upon any being, both finite and infinite, inasmuch as it has a determinate grade in beings. But of God, who is outside every genus, the relations of identity, equality, and likeness are predicated only in the transcendental sense.

**II.** As to the solution to [objection] 2 and the assertion there set down, that[?] «although the name of quantity is not transferred, nevertheless the name of the species is transferred», cf. above d. 8, p. II, dub. 1. — As to the manner of speaking «in the divine supposits there is not, properly speaking, diversity, but distinction», cf. below d. 24, dub. 1.[?] Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. ad 2) explains it more fully in these words: «For equality and likeness in supposits, a diversity of supposits according to essence in the supposits is required; this is not so in divine things, on account of which diversity of supposits there accompanies an identity of essence; and on account of this union, one is not to posit diversity, but distinction, as Ambrose says. Hence equality in the divine persons does not express diversity, but distinction; for distinction does not destroy unity, or identity; whence, although in divine things there is the highest identity, since distinction accompanies it, an identity of this kind does not destroy equality».

**III.** For more on equality see below d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3. — Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 41, m. 1. — Scotus, on this and the two following [questions] in both writings here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, and d. 24, q. 2, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st *principium*, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 70, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the two following here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following here q. 1. — Ricl[Riellus / Gabriel Biel?], here q. 1, a. 1.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum sit ibi summa aequalitas.
Whether there is supreme equality there

source_text:
<!-- page 344 -->

### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum in divinis sit summa aequalitas.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit summa aequalitas. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Sicut dicitur ab Augustino in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^1], «non dicitur aliquis maior alio, nisi aut quia praecedit aetate, aut quia excedit magnitudine, aut quia superat potestate»: sed nihil horum est in divinis, ut probat Augustinus et Magister[^2]: ergo nihil est ibi inaequalitatis: ergo est ibi summa aequalitas.

2. Item, non potest maior aequalitas cogitari[^3] quam ubi unum aequatur uni et unum pluribus et unum omnibus; sed in divinis tantus est Filius, quantus est Pater, et tantus Filius, quantus Pater et Spiritus sanctus, et tantus etiam[^4], quantus omnes tres: ergo etc.

3. Item, unitas in quantitate, sicut dictum est[^5], facit aequalitatem: ergo ubi summa unitas, ibi summa aequalitas; sed hoc est in divinis: ergo etc.

4. Item, status non est nisi in summo; sed status est in illa aequalitate per reductionem omnium ad ipsam: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus in libro *octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^6]: «Si omnia essent aequalia, non essent omnia»: ergo omnimoda aequalitas tollit perfectionem[^7]. Si ergo nihil ponendum in Deo, quod repugnat perfectioni, in divinis personis non est omnimoda aequalitas.

2. Item, maior est aequalitas, quae attenditur secundum quantitatem continuam et discretam, quam[^8] secundum continuam tantum[^9]; sed in divinis non est aequalitas secundum quantitatem discretam, quia ibi est trinitas et ita imparilitas: ergo in divinis non est omnimoda aequalitas.

3. Item, maior est aequalitas, quae attenditur secundum potentiam et sapientiam et bonitatem, quam quae[^10] secundum sapientiam et potentiam tantum; sed in divinis non est aequalitas secundum bonitatem: ergo non est ibi summa aequalitas. Probatio minoris: bonum est diffusivum sui[^11]; sed magis diffundit se Filius quam Spiritus sanctus, quia producit sibi aequalem, et etiam Pater quam Filius: ergo etc.

Quaeritur ergo, quare Augustinus non ostendit aequalitatem in[^12] sapientia et bonitate? et iterum, quare non ex parte loci, sicut magnitudinis et etiam aliarum differentiarum quantitatis? Quod cum non faciat, non videtur assignare omnimodam aequalitatem, sed solum in parte[^13]; aut si omnimodam ostendit, insufficienter procedit.

> **Conclusio.** *Summa est divinarum personarum aequalitas in aeternitate quoad originem, in magnitudine quoad omnia quae habent in se, in potentia quoad effectus.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis est summa aequalitas, et summa etiam assignatur ab Augu-

<!-- page 345 -->

stino, quoniam[^14] sufficienter ostenditur remotio omnis inaequalitatis per illa tria, quae sunt aeternitas, magnitudo et potentia.

Horum trium distinctio et sufficientia ab aliquibus accipitur[^15] sic. Quia enim in divinis non est extensio molis nec aggregatio multitudinis, ideo non est ibi quantitas continua intrinseca[^16] nec discreta, sed loco eius est quantitas virtutis, quae tangitur per hoc membrum, quod est *potentia*. Quia vero Deus suo ambitu complectitur omnem durationem, ideo est ibi quantitas *aeternitatis* correspondens tempori. Quia vero ambitu suae immensitatis complectitur omnem locum et locatum, ideo est ibi quantitas *magnitudinis* correspondens loco. Et sic patet[^17], cum non sit aliam quantitatem accipere ibi, quod sufficienter in illis ostenditur aequalitas et consistit.

Sed haec distinctio non est conveniens, tum quia non est in Deo nisi[^18] quantitas virtutis; et ita non deberet ibi esse nisi unum membrum, nec debet illa distingui contra alias; tum etiam, quia magnitudo in divinis non tantum attenditur quantum ad ambitum localitatis, sed etiam quantum ad intensionem bonitatis. Unde dicitur in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^19], quod in «spiritualibus idem est maius et melius». Et propter hoc quantitas virtutis non tantum attenditur in operatione, sed etiam in re[^20] considerata in omnimoda absolutione.

Ideo possumus aliter horum trium distinctionem et sufficientiam assignare. In omni quod est, contingit hanc triplicem considerationem habere. Potest enim aliquid considerari in comparatione ad suam originem sive a parte ante; et sic unum maius est altero, quando origo eius est prior; et contra hoc est aequalitas *aeternitatis*. Potest iterum considerari in se; et sic dicitur unum altero maius, quia maioris extensionis, vel quia maioris valoris. Contra hanc[^21] est in Deo aequalitas *magnitudinis*, ut haec aequalitas non tantum dicatur per comparationem ad localitatem, sed etiam ad sapientiam et bonitatem et ad omne quod facit alterum altero dici maius, quia[^22] melius. Unde Augustinus et Magister in hac distinctione probant aequalitatem magnitudinis per aequalitatem virtutis sive in virtute. Potest etiam tertio considerari per comparationem ad effectum: et sic dicitur maius, quia potentius; et contra hoc est aequalitas *potentiae*. Quoniam igitur rem[^23] non contingit pluribus modis considerari, si est aequalitas in istis, summa est: et cum ostenditur in istis, summa ostenditur, et perfecta inductione proceditur. Et sic patet illud[^24] quod ultimo quaerebatur.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod aequalitas repugnat perfectioni: dicendum, quod verum est: perfectioni universi, quae aggregata est ex diversitate; non sic est in Deo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est aequalitas secundum utramque quantitatem etc.; dicendum, quod summa aequalitas non est in quantitate continua nec discreta, quia ibi unum non aequatur pluribus; sed hic[^25] est perfectissima aequalitas: ideo solum secundum quantitatem virtutis attenditur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bonitate, quia diffusivum etc.; dicendum, quod emanatio personae non attenditur secundum rationem bonitatis essentiae, sed magis fecunditatis personae vel in persona; et ideo non sequitur, quod si Spiritus sanctus non producit, quod propter hoc habeat minus de bonitate. Unde notandum, quod duplex est diffusio, scilicet intra vel[^26] extra. Diffusio intra est, quando persona procedit a persona in[^27] unitate naturae; et haec non est proprie diffusio, et haec non consequitur bonum, quia bonum, sed bonum in hypostasi, quae aliam producere nata est; et ideo secundum hanc diffusionem non dicitur una persona altera melior. Est[^28] alia diffusio extra, quae attenditur in productione effectus; et secundum hanc rationem attenditur diffusio proprie et ratio boni. Et quia in hac una persona alteram non excedit, quia indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis: ideo hac non est una melior alia[^29].

<!-- page 346 -->

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in the divine [persons] there is supreme equality.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] there is supreme equality. And that there is, is seen in this way.

1. As is said by Augustine in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^1], "no one is called greater than another, except either because he precedes in age, or because he exceeds in magnitude, or because he surpasses in power": but none of these is in the divine [persons], as Augustine and the Master prove[^2]: therefore there is nothing of inequality there: therefore there is supreme equality there.

2. Likewise, no greater equality can be thought[^3] than where one is equated to one and one to many and one to all; but in the divine [persons] the Son is as great as the Father is, and the Son is as great as the Father and the Holy Spirit are, and [each one] is also as great[^4] as all three: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, unity in quantity, as has been said[^5], makes equality: therefore where there is supreme unity, there is supreme equality; but this is in the divine [persons]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, rest is only in the highest; but rest is in that equality through the reduction of all [equalities] to it: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *of the Eighty-three Questions*[^6]: "If all things were equal, all things would not be": therefore equality of every kind takes away perfection[^7]. If therefore nothing is to be posited in God which is repugnant to perfection, in the divine persons there is not equality of every kind.

2. Likewise, greater is the equality which is regarded according to continuous and discrete quantity, than[^8] [the equality] according to continuous [quantity] only[^9]; but in the divine [persons] there is not equality according to discrete quantity, since there [there] is trinity and so unevenness: therefore in the divine [persons] there is not equality of every kind.

3. Likewise, greater is the equality which is regarded according to power and wisdom and goodness, than that which[^10] [is regarded] according to wisdom and power only; but in the divine [persons] there is not equality according to goodness: therefore there is not supreme equality there. The proof of the minor: the good is diffusive of itself[^11]; but the Son diffuses himself more than the Holy Spirit, since he produces [one] equal to himself, and likewise the Father [more] than the Son: therefore etc.

It is asked therefore, why does Augustine not show equality in[^12] wisdom and goodness? and again, why not on the side of place, as [he does] of magnitude and also of the other differences of quantity? Since he does not do this, he does not seem to assign equality of every kind, but only in part[^13]; or if he does show equality of every kind, he proceeds insufficiently.

> **Conclusion.** *Supreme is the equality of the divine persons in eternity as to origin, in magnitude as to all things which they have in themselves, in power as to effects.*

**I respond:** It must be said, that in the divine [persons] there is supreme equality, and supreme [equality] is also assigned by Augu-

stine, since[^14] sufficiently is shown the removal of all inequality through those three [things], which are *eternity*, *magnitude*, and *power*.

The distinction and sufficiency of these three is taken[^15] by some in this way. For since in the divine [persons] there is no extension of mass nor aggregation of multitude, therefore there is not there continuous intrinsic[^16] quantity nor discrete; but in place of it there is the quantity of power, which is touched by this member, which is *power*. But because God by his ambit embraces every duration, therefore there is there the quantity of *eternity* corresponding to time. But because by the ambit of his immensity he embraces every place and every located thing, therefore there is there the quantity of *magnitude* corresponding to place. And thus it is plain[^17], since there is no other quantity to be taken there, that sufficiently in those [three] equality is shown and consists.

But this distinction is not fitting, both because there is not in God except[^18] the quantity of power; and so there ought not to be there but one member, nor ought that to be distinguished against the others; and also because magnitude in the divine [persons] is not regarded only with respect to the ambit of locality, but also with respect to the intensity of goodness. Whence it is said in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^19], that in "spiritual things the same [thing] is greater and better." And on account of this the quantity of power is regarded not only in operation, but also in the thing[^20] considered in every kind of absoluteness.

Therefore we can in another way assign the distinction and sufficiency of these three. In everything that is, it happens that one can have this threefold consideration. For something can be considered in comparison to its origin or from the part-before; and thus one [thing] is greater than another, when its origin is prior; and against this is the equality of *eternity*. It can again be considered in itself; and thus one [thing] is called greater than another, either because of greater extension, or because of greater value. Against this[^21] is in God the equality of *magnitude*, so that this equality is not said only by comparison to locality, but also to wisdom and goodness and to everything which makes one [thing] be called greater than another, because[^22] better. Whence Augustine and the Master in this distinction prove the equality of magnitude through the equality of power, or in power. It can also thirdly be considered by comparison to effect: and thus it is called greater, because more powerful; and against this is the equality of *power*. Since therefore the thing[^23] cannot be considered in more ways, if there is equality in these, it is supreme: and when it is shown in these, supreme [equality] is shown, and one proceeds by perfect induction. And thus is plain that[^24] which was last asked.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that equality is repugnant to perfection: it must be said, that it is true: [repugnant] to the perfection of the universe, which is aggregated out of diversity; it is not so in God.

2. To that which is objected, that greater is the equality according to both quantities etc.; it must be said, that supreme equality is not in continuous nor in discrete quantity, since there one [thing] is not equated to many; but here[^25] is most perfect equality: therefore [it] is regarded only according to the quantity of power.

3. To that which is objected concerning goodness, that [it is] diffusive etc.; it must be said, that the emanation of a person is not regarded according to the account of the goodness of the essence, but rather of the fecundity of the person or in the person; and therefore it does not follow, that if the Holy Spirit does not produce, that on account of this he should have less of goodness. Whence it is to be noted, that diffusion is twofold, namely within or[^26] without. Diffusion within is, when a person proceeds from a person in[^27] the unity of nature; and this is not properly diffusion, and this does not follow upon the good, because [it is] the good, but [upon] the good in a hypostasis, which is born to produce another; and therefore according to this diffusion one person is not called better than another. There is[^28] another diffusion outside, which is regarded in the production of an effect; and according to this account is regarded diffusion properly and the account of the good. And since in this one person does not exceed another, since the works of the Trinity are undivided: therefore in this [respect] one is not better than another[^29].

la: Cap. 1. n. 4, ubi haec propositio ad Trinitatem applicata, non ut generalis, sicut hic exhibetur, invenitur. Vide lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Chapter 1, n. 4, where this proposition is found applied to the Trinity, not as general, as it is here presented. See the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Hic c. 1. seqq., in quibus etiam Augustini probationes reperies.

en: Here c. 1 ff., in which you will also find Augustine's proofs.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *excogitari*. Mox cod. W *si* loco *ubi*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *excogitari*. Soon after, codex W [reads] *si* in place of *ubi*.

la: Codd. non consentiunt inter se; maior eorum pars cum ed. 1 exhibet lectionem in textum receptam, alii ut V Z aa bb ff adiungunt *unus*, alii cum Vat. repetunt *Filius*. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 11.

en: The codices do not agree among themselves; the greater part of them with edition 1 exhibits the reading received into the text, others such as V, Z, aa, bb, ff add *unus*, others with the Vatican edition repeat *Filius*. See here the text of the Master, c. 11.

la: In quarto fundam. praeced. q. — Paulo infra cod. Y *haec* pro *hoc*.

en: In the fourth fundamentum of the preceding question. — A little below codex Y [reads] *haec* in place of *hoc*.

la: Quaest. 41: *Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia.*

en: Question 41: *Because all things would not be, if they were equal.*

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additum *in divinis*, sicut et paulo infra post *nihil* adiunctum *est*; deinde substituimus *repugnat* loco *repugnet*, nec non adiecimus *personis* ac consequenter delevimus *ut* superfluum ibi post *non est*.

en: On the authority of most manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here the badly added *in divinis*, as also a little below the *est* added after *nihil*; then we have substituted *repugnat* in place of *repugnet*, and likewise added *personis*, and consequently deleted *ut* as superfluous there after *non est*.

la: In cod. bb additur bene *quae*.

en: In codex bb *quae* is fittingly added.

la: Quantitas continua est cuius partes copulantur ad eundem terminum communem, seu cuius partes sunt unitae; discreta vero cuius partes sunt ab invicem disiunctae, v. g. numerus. Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Quantitate.

en: Continuous quantity is that whose parts are joined to the same common terminus, or whose parts are united; but discrete [quantity] is that whose parts are disjoined from one another, e.g. number. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on Quantity.

la: In multis mss. ut A F H I T W X Y Z ee ff et ed. 1 deest *quae*.

en: In many manuscripts such as A, F, H, I, T, W, X, Y, Z, ee, ff, and edition 1, *quae* is lacking.

la: Haec propositio colligitur ex Dionys. libr. *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 4. § 1. seq., et *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 1. seqq., ubi dicit, proprium esse divinae bonitati se aliis communicare.

en: This proposition is gathered from Dionysius's book *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 4, § 1 ff., and *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 1 ff., where he says it is proper to the divine goodness to communicate itself to others.

la: Codd. H M addunt *potentia*.

en: Codices H and M add *potentia*.

la: Auctoritate plurium mss. ut G H I L O Y Z ff substituimus *parte* pro *partem*.

en: On the authority of several manuscripts such as G, H, I, L, O, Y, Z, ff we have substituted *parte* for *partem*.

la: Codd. L O *quam* loco *quoniam*, qui et mox ponunt *ostendit remotione* pro *ostenditur remotio*.

en: Codices L and O [read] *quam* in place of *quoniam*, and they likewise place *ostendit remotione* for *ostenditur remotio*.

la: Cod. W *ostenditur*.

en: Codex W [reads] *ostenditur*.

la: Vat. *extensiva* pro *intrinseca*, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1. Explicationem accipe ex Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 47. m. 5, qui locus hic in Scholio legitur. Omnino idem dicit B. Albert. (*S.* p. I. tr. 11. q. 47. m. 2): *Dicendum, quod in veritate quantitas in creatis, penes quam attenditur aequalitas, duplex est, scil. magnitudinis et virtutis. Et ea quae est magnitudinis duplex est, scil. intus et extra mensurans: intus: longitudo, latitudo, profundum: extra: locus. Similiter esse rei, ut dicit Gilbertus, mora mensuratur; et haec mora est tempus. Quantitas autem virtutis proprie non mensuratur nisi obiecto circa quod est virtus. Et dicimus eos aequales virtute, qui et in aequalia possunt obiecta, sive illa virtus sit intellectualis sive operativa.* Cfr. etiam B. Albert., hic a. 3.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *extensiva* for *intrinseca*, but the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1 stands against it. Take the explanation from Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 47, m. 5, which passage is read here in the Scholion. B. Albert (*S.* p. I, tr. 11, q. 47, m. 2) says altogether the same: *It must be said, that in truth the quantity in created [things], with respect to which equality is regarded, is twofold, namely of magnitude and of power. And that which is of magnitude is twofold, namely measuring within and without: within: length, breadth, depth: without: place. Likewise the being of a thing, as Gilbert says, is measured by duration; and this duration is time. But the quantity of power properly is not measured except by the object about which the power is. And we call those equal in power, who can [act] upon equal objects, whether that power is intellectual or operative.* Cf. also B. Albert, here a. 3.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus additum *quod*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1 we have expunged the added *quod*.

la: Mendum Vat., in qua omittitur *nisi*, correximus ex mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. 1 *deberet* loco *debet*.

en: A defect of the Vatican edition, in which *nisi* is omitted, we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. A little below codex 1 [reads] *deberet* in place of *debet*.

en: Chapter 8, n. 9.

la: Vat. minus congrue et contra antiquiores codd. nec non ed. 1 *ut res* pro *in re*.

en: The Vatican edition, less fittingly and against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] *ut res* in place of *in re*.

la: Cod. X *hoc*.

en: Codex X [reads] *hoc*.

la: Cod. T *et* loco *quia*.

en: Codex T [reads] *et* in place of *quia*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, fundamentum argumentationis repetens, minus bene nec non contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 *ergo ratio aequalitatis* loco *igitur rem*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, repeating the foundation of the argumentation, less well and against the older codices with edition 1, [reads] *ergo ratio aequalitatis* in place of *igitur rem*.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *illud* in principio sequentis propositionis *ergo*.

en: From most manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *illud* at the beginning of the following proposition *ergo*.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. ut ed. 1 substituimus *hic* pro *haec*.

en: On the authority of most manuscripts as [also of] edition 1 we have substituted *hic* in place of *haec*.

la: Cod. Y *et* loco *vel*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *et* in place of *vel*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis mss. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, omittit male *in*. Mox post *diffusio*, multis codd. ut A C D E K R S T U X etc. cum edd. 2, 3 consentientibus, posuimus *et haec* pro *et hoc*. Dein nonnulli codd. ut A Y *sequitur* loco *consequitur*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other manuscripts together with edition 1, badly omits *in*. Soon after *diffusio*, with many manuscripts such as A, C, D, E, K, R, S, T, U, X etc., together with editions 2 and 3 consenting, we have placed *et haec* for *et hoc*. Then some manuscripts such as A and Y [read] *sequitur* in place of *consequitur*.

la: In cod. M additur *et*.

en: In codex M *et* is added.

la: Vat. cum uno alterove codice *altera*. Paulo ante cod. O post *ideo* adiungit *in*.

en: The Vatican edition with one or another codex [reads] *altera*. A little before, codex O after *ideo* adds *in*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In conclusione omnes conveniunt. Sed circa S. Augustini probationem et circa sufficientiam membrorum divisionis, quae ponit, duplex affertur expositio. Prima, quae est Alexandri et Alberti, S. Doctori non probatur; secundam et meliorem cum ipso approbat etiam S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 1. Ut fundamenta primae opinionis melius perspiciantur, haec ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.) referimus: «Aequalitas respicit quantitatem, sive quod per modum quantitatis signatur. Omnis autem quantitas aut est mensurans intra, aut extra: si intra, aut est virtutis, aut molis; quantitas vero molis non cadit in divinis, sed quantitas *virtutis*; et hoc dicitur per *potentiam*. Item quantitas mensurans extra est duplex, scil. tempus et locus; et quantitati, quae est *tempus* in inferioribus, respondet *aeternitas* in divinis; ei autem quantitati, quae est *locus*, respondet *magnitudo* in divinis, non qua Deus circumscribatur in loco, sed qua est inter omnia non inclusus, et qua ipse continet et locat omnia. Sic ergo quantitas in divinis est virtutis, quae est *potentia*; et durationis, quae est *aeternitas*; et locationis sive continentiae activae, qua ipse continet et locat omnia, et haec dicitur *magnitudo*. Quia ergo in Deo non est ponere pluribus modis quantitatem, ideo quantum ad haec tria solum in divinis assignatur aequalitas».

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 47. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; *S.* p. I. tr. 11. q. 47. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 70. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the conclusion all agree. But concerning St. Augustine's proof and the sufficiency of the members of the division which he posits, a twofold exposition is offered. The first, which is that of Alexander and Albert, is not approved by the Holy Doctor; he, together with him [the Master], approves the second and better [exposition], as also does St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1. That the foundations of the first opinion may be better perceived, we report these [words] from Alex. of Hales (place cited below): "Equality regards quantity, or what is signified by way of quantity. But every quantity is either measuring within, or without: if within, it is either of power, or of mass; but the quantity of mass does not fall in divine matters, but the quantity of *power*; and this is said through *power*. Likewise the quantity measuring without is twofold, namely time and place; and to the quantity which is *time* in lower things, *eternity* in divine matters corresponds; but to the quantity which is *place*, *magnitude* in divine matters corresponds, not [magnitude] by which God is circumscribed in place, but by which he is among all [things] not enclosed, and by which he himself contains and locates all [things]. Thus therefore the quantity in divine matters is of power, which is *power*; and of duration, which is *eternity*; and of location or active containment, by which he himself contains and locates all [things], and this is called *magnitude*. Since therefore in God quantity is not to be posited in many ways, therefore only with respect to these three is equality assigned in divine matters."

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 47, m. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 3; *S.* p. I, tr. 11, q. 47, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1, 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ., q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *S.* a. 70, q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum conversione.

title_alt: Whether in divine things there is equality with convertibility

source_text:
<!-- page 346 -->

### QUAESTIO III.

#### *Utrum aequalitas divinarum personarum sit reciproca.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum conversione. Et quod non, videtur hoc modo.

1. Chrysostomus[^1] super illud ad Hebraeos primo: *Qui cum sit splendor* etc.: «Filius est aequalis Patri, non Pater Filio».

2. Item, Hilarius[^2]: «Imago, si perfecte implet illud cuius est ipsa, coaequatur ei, non illud suae [imagini]».

3. Item, Augustinus in primo libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^3]: «In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas»: ergo videtur, quod Pater non sit aequalis Filio, ut Filius Patri.

4. Item, Dionysius[^4]: «In causalibus et causatis non recipimus reciprocationem»; sed Pater est principium Filii: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Omne relativum aequiparantiae denominat extrema secundum modum consimilem[^5]; sed aequalitas est relatio aequiparantiae: ergo similis reciprocatio.

2. Item, unum in quantitate facit aequalitatem; sed sicut Filius est unum cum Patre, ita Pater unum cum Filio quantum ad substantiam et quantitatem: ergo sicut Filius est aequalis Patri, ita Pater Filio: ergo est ibi reciprocatio.

3. Item, aequalitas mutua et reciprocata[^6] maior est quam non reciprocata: ergo si in divinis est summa aequalitas, patet etc.

4. Item, omne quantum comparatum quanto aut est maius, aut minus, aut aequale; sed Pater est quantus virtute, et similiter Filius: aut ergo Pater est maior virtute Filio, aut minor, aut aequalis; sed non maior aut minor: ergo aequalis[^7].

<!-- page 347 -->

### CONCLUSIO.

> Relatio aequalitatis in divinis est reciproca; sed actus coaequationis non dicitur de Patre respectu Filii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aequalitas est ibi cum conversione[^8], non tantum quia *divina*, sed etiam quia aequalitas de sui ratione dicit reciprocationem in quantum aequalitas. Et[^9] secundum hoc credendum est, quod Pater est aequalis Filio et Filius Patri.

Et ad intelligentiam obiectorum notandum[^10], quod dupliciter est loqui de aequalitate: aut prout dicit respectum aequiparantiae, aut prout ultra respectum concernit actum coaequationis[^11]. In quantum dicit respectum aequiparantiae, sicut ostendunt rationes, necesse est, quod sit ibi reciprocatio; sed in quantum ulterius concernit actum coaequationis, sic dicit rationem imitationis: et sic non convenit Patri respectu Filii, quia importaret subauctoritatem in Patre[^12]. Unde non dicitur Pater coaequari Filio, quia Filium non imitatur nec perfecte nec imperfecte. Et est simile, si dicatur: *hoc cum illo*. Potest enim dupliciter intelligi: aut[^13] prout dicit duorum coniunctionem; et sic de necessitate attenditur secundum conversionem; si enim iste vadit cum illo, necesse est etiam, quod verum sit e converso. Alio modo *hoc cum illo* dicit associationem, et ita quandam subauctoritatem in associante; et sic dicitur, quod miles vadit cum rege, non e converso, quia miles associat regem[^14], non e converso. Similiter intelligendum est in aequalitate.

**Ad 1, 2, 3, 4.** Et ex his patent auctoritates Sanctorum, quia[^15] loquuntur de aequalitate secundo modo, praeter illam Dionysii, ad quam respondendum, quod non habet locum in proposito, quia Dionysius loquitur proprie de causa, secundum quod causa dicitur illud cuius esse sequitur aliud[^16], et ita differt per essentiam ab effectu, et hoc modo non cadit in Deo respectu personae.

english:
### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether the equality of the divine persons is reciprocal.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether in divine matters there is equality with convertibility. And that there is not, seems [to be shown] in this manner.

1. Chrysostom[^1] on that text to the Hebrews 1: *Who, since he is the splendor* etc.: «The Son is equal to the Father, [but] not the Father to the Son».

2. Likewise, Hilary[^2]: «An image, if it perfectly fulfils that of which it is itself [the image], is coequated to it, not it to its [image]».

3. Likewise, Augustine in the first book *On Christian Doctrine*[^3]: «In the Father is unity, in the Son equality»: therefore it seems that the Father is not equal to the Son as the Son [is equal] to the Father.

4. Likewise, Dionysius[^4]: «In causes and things caused we do not admit reciprocation»; but the Father is the principle of the Son: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Every relative of equiparance denominates its extremes according to a like manner[^5]; but equality is a relation of equiparance: therefore there is a like reciprocation.

2. Likewise, oneness in quantity makes equality; but just as the Son is one with the Father, so the Father [is] one with the Son with respect to substance and quantity: therefore just as the Son is equal to the Father, so the Father [is equal] to the Son: therefore there is reciprocation there.

3. Likewise, mutual and reciprocated[^6] equality is greater than equality not reciprocated: therefore if in divine matters there is the highest equality, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, every quantum compared to a quantum either is greater, or less, or equal; but the Father is a quantum in power, and likewise the Son: therefore either the Father is greater in power than the Son, or less, or equal; but not greater or less: therefore equal[^7].

### CONCLUSION.

> The relation of equality in divine matters is reciprocal; but the act of coequation is not said of the Father with respect to the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that equality is there with convertibility[^8], not only because they are *divine*, but also because equality from its own account expresses reciprocation insofar as it is equality. And[^9] according to this it must be believed that the Father is equal to the Son and the Son to the Father.

And for the understanding of the objections it must be noted[^10] that there is a twofold way of speaking of equality: either as it expresses the regard of equiparance, or as beyond the regard it concerns the act of coequation[^11]. Insofar as it expresses the regard of equiparance, as the reasons show, it is necessary that there be reciprocation there; but insofar as it further concerns the act of coequation, it then expresses the account of imitation: and thus it does not belong to the Father with respect to the Son, because it would imply a sub-authority in the Father[^12]. Hence the Father is not said to be coequated to the Son, because he does not imitate the Son either perfectly or imperfectly. And it is similar, if it be said: *this [is] with that*. For it can be understood in two ways: either[^13] as it expresses a conjunction of two; and thus of necessity it is taken according to convertibility; for if this one goes with that one, it is necessary also that the converse be true. In another way *this with that* expresses association, and thus a certain sub-authority in the one associating; and thus it is said that the soldier goes with the king, not the converse, because the soldier associates the king[^14], not the converse. The like is to be understood concerning equality.

**To 1, 2, 3, 4.** And from these the authorities of the Saints are clear, because[^15] they speak of equality in the second way, except that of Dionysius, to which it must be responded that it has no place in our proposition, because Dionysius speaks properly of cause, according as that is called cause whose being some other follows[^16], and thus it differs by essence from its effect, and in this way it does not occur in God with respect to a person.

la: Homilia 2. ad Hebr. n. 2. ait: «Per *splendorem* vero aequalitatem ostendit et eius cum Patre propinquitatem... Deinde subiunxit: *Et character seu figura.* Figura enim seu character est alius ab exemplari prototypo; alius autem non omnino, sed in eo quod attinet ad hypostasin. Nam hic quoque character ostendit, nullam esse diversitatem, sed plane in omnibus perfectam similitudinem eius cuius est character et figura». In *Comment. super IV. libr. Sent. ad Hannibaldum Hannibaldensem Romanum*, quod inter opera S. Thomae habetur, hic q. 1. a. 2. idem textus occurrit et Glossae Chrysostomi adscribitur. Sed verbotenus in Glossa ordinaria non invenitur. In fine Glossae dicitur: «*Splendor* autem et *figura* sicut et *imago* proprie ad personam Filii referuntur et relative dicuntur». — Homil. 75. (al. 74.) n. 4. in Ioan. a Chrysostomo dicitur: «Si quis vero dixerit, maiorem esse Patrem, ut Filii principium, non huic contradicemus. At hoc non facit Filium alterius esse substantiae». Quae verba sicut et ea quae ex Glossa sunt allegata, eatenus hic attentione digna sunt, quia S. Bonav. in corp. quaest. conceptibus *imitationis* et *subauctoritatis* utitur ad stabiliendam secundam conclusionis partem, scil. sub aliquo respectu inter Patrem et Filium non esse aequalitatem mutuam.

en: *Homily* 2 on Hebrews, n. 2, says: «By *splendor* he shows the equality and his nearness to the Father... Then he added: *And character or figure.* For the figure or character is other than the prototypal exemplar; yet not wholly other, but in what pertains to hypostasis. For here too the character shows that there is no diversity, but plainly in all things a perfect likeness of that of which it is the character and figure». In the *Commentary on the Four Books of the Sentences to Hannibald the Hannibaldensian, of Rome*, which is held among the works of St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, the same text occurs and is ascribed to a Gloss of Chrysostom. But verbatim it is not found in the ordinary Gloss. At the end of the Gloss it is said: «*Splendor* and *figure*, as also *image*, are properly referred to the person of the Son and are said relatively». — *Homily* 75 (al. 74), n. 4, on John, by Chrysostom, it is said: «If anyone shall say that the Father is greater, as the principle of the Son, we will not contradict this. But this does not make the Son to be of another substance». Which words, like those alleged from the Gloss, are worthy of attention here insofar as St. Bonaventure in the body of the question uses the concepts of *imitation* and *sub-authority* to establish the second part of the conclusion, namely that under a certain respect there is not between the Father and the Son a mutual equality.

la: August., VI. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 11, sententiam Hilarii de his tribus nominibus, quae Trinitati appropriantur: *aeternitas*, *imago* et *munus*, referens proponit ista verba de imagine. Vide infra d. XXXI. p. II. in princ. lit. Magistri.

en: Augustine, VI *On the Trinity*, c. 10, n. 11, reporting the opinion of Hilary on these three names which are appropriated to the Trinity — *eternity*, *image*, and *gift* — sets forth these words concerning the image. See below, d. XXXI, p. II, at the beginning of the text of the Master.

en: Chapter 5, n. 5.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 9. § 6, ubi initium huius textus in Graeco sic exhibetur Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τῶν αἰτιατῶν, quod diverse a diversis transfertur; codd. cum ed. 1 praestant lectionem in textum receptam; Vat. loco *causalibus* ponit *causis*.

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 9, § 6, where the beginning of this text is given in Greek thus: Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τῶν αἰτιατῶν, which is variously translated by various [translators]; the manuscripts with edition 1 furnish the reading received into the text; the Vatican edition in place of *causalibus* puts *causis*.

la: Relatio aequiparantiae communiter definitur: est ea cuius extrema sunt eiusdem rationis seu eodem nomine nominantur, v. g. *amicus* (est enim amicus amici amicus), *similis*, *aequalis*; huic opponitur relatio disquiparantiae, i. e. cuius extrema sunt alterius rationis, ut relatio *patris* ad *filium*.

en: A relation of equiparance is commonly defined: it is that whose extremes are of the same account or are named by the same name, e.g. *friend* (for a friend is a friend of a friend), *like*, *equal*; opposed to it is the relation of disquiparance, i.e. one whose extremes are of another account, as the relation of *father* to *son*.

la: Postulantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *reciprocata* pro *reciproca*.

en: At the request of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *reciprocata* for *reciproca*.

la: Mutila lectio Vat. et cod. cc, in qua verba *sed non maior aut minor: ergo aequalis* omittuntur, resarcitur ope vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1.[?]

en: The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, in which the words *sed non maior aut minor: ergo aequalis* are omitted, is repaired by the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1.[?]

la: Sequimur codd. I Z addendo *cum conversione*, quia de hoc S. Doctor principaliter quaestionem instituit, quod tamen in aliis mss. et Vat. nec non ed. 1 perperam deest. Cod. H (primitus) et K *reciproca* pro *cum conversione*; cod. T (in marg. a posteriore manu) *reciproca sive cum conversione*. Mox post *quia aequalitas* fide mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 expunximus *et cum aequalitas*, quo addito subnexa perturbentur necesse est.

en: We follow codices I, Z by adding *cum conversione*, because the Holy Doctor principally institutes the question concerning this, which nevertheless in the other manuscripts and the Vatican edition and edition 1 is wrongly missing. Codex H (originally) and K [read] *reciproca* in place of *cum conversione*; codex T (in the margin by a later hand) *reciproca sive cum conversione*. Soon after *quia aequalitas*, on the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have struck out *et cum aequalitas*; if it were added the subsequent text would necessarily be disturbed.

la: Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *Et*, et paulo infra post *Pater* fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus *est*. Plures codd. ut F M T Z aa bb ee *concedendum* loco *credendum*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *Et*, and a little below, after *Pater*, on the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have added *est*. Several codices such as F, M, T, Z, aa, bb, ee [read] *concedendum* in place of *credendum*.

la: In cod. V additur *est*.

en: In codex V *est* is added.

la: Passivo modo sumtum.

en: Taken in a passive sense.

la: Lectio mss. et sex primarum edd. *quia importat auctoritatem in Patre* contextui repugnat. Mox plures codd. ut A B C O L O R S V Y Z *proprie* loco *perfecte*. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, incongrue addit *sic* post *Et*. Dein in cod. T a manu suppari in margine post *cum illo* adiungitur *vadit*, forsan propter subnexa; in qua lectione melius hic poneretur pro *hoc*.

en: The reading of the manuscripts and the first six editions, *quia importat auctoritatem in Patre* ("because it imports authority in the Father"), is repugnant to the context. Soon after, several codices such as A, B, C, O, L, O, R, S, V, Y, Z [read] *proprie* in place of *perfecte*. A little below, the Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices with edition 1, incongruously adds *sic* after *Et*. Then in codex T by a near-contemporary hand, in the margin after *cum illo*, *vadit* is appended, perhaps on account of what follows; in which reading it would better be put here in place of *hoc*.

la: Plures codd. ut A C F L O R S T W etc. omittunt *aut*, pro quo cod. U habet *scilicet*.

en: Several codices such as A, C, F, L, O, R, S, T, W, etc. omit *aut*, for which codex U has *scilicet*.

la: Id est, se socium adiungit regi. Cfr. Robertus, *Thesaurus linguae lat.*, voc. *associare*. — In Vat. et cod. cc male desunt verba *quia miles* usque *e converso*, quae tamen exstant in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Mox, mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 consentientibus, substituimus *in* loco *cum*.

en: That is, he joins himself as companion to the king. Cf. Robertus, *Thesaurus of the Latin language*, s.v. *associare*. — In the Vatican edition and codex cc the words *quia miles* through *e converso* are wrongly missing, which nevertheless are extant in the older manuscripts and edition 1. Soon after, with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 in agreement, we have substituted *in* in place of *cum*.

la: Codd. dissentiunt inter se; alii ut F G H ee cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptam; alii ut A I K S T W Y ff ponunt *qui*, Vat. *quae* loco *quia*.

en: The codices disagree among themselves; some like F, G, H, ee with edition 1 present the reading received into the text; others like A, I, K, S, T, W, Y, ff put *qui*; the Vatican edition [puts] *quae* in place of *quia*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 120. nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 120, note 7.

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Aequalitas conversim dicta* idem est ac mutua sive reciproca. — Distinctionem inter simplicem relationem aequalitatis et aequalitatem cum actu coaequationis Sanctus adhibet etiam infra d. 31. p. 1. q. 3. Eandem habet etiam S. Thom. et Alex. Hal. locis infr. citt. et etiam Richard., qui ad mentem S. Thom. quoad aequalitatem cum actu coaequationis addit: «Sed quia de virtute sermonis hoc nomen *aequale* non videtur importare nisi relationem aequiparantiae, quia quod importet coaequationem videtur magis ex modo loquendi, secundum quem non consuevimus proprie dicere veritatem: *rex est cum milite*, sed *miles est cum rege*; ideo de virtute sermonis, nisi essent auctoritates, quae videntur sonare ad contrarium, videretur posse concedi simpliciter, quod Pater est aequalis Filio».

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 54. m. 1. a. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** *Equality said convertibly* is the same as mutual or reciprocal. — The distinction between the simple relation of equality and equality with the act of coequation the Saint employs also below in d. 31, p. 1, q. 3. The same is held also by St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales in the places cited below, and also by Richard, who in line with the mind of St. Thomas, regarding equality with the act of coequation, adds: «But because by force of the expression this name *equal* does not seem to import anything but the relation of equiparance, because the fact that it should import coequation seems [to depend] rather on the manner of speaking, according to which we are not accustomed properly to say truly: *the king is with the soldier*, but *the soldier is with the king*; therefore by force of the expression, were there not authorities which seem to sound to the contrary, it would seem that one could simply concede that the Father is equal to the Son».

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 54, m. 1, aa. 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; *Summa* p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here, 1st principal, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 68, q. 2.

---