title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De caritate quantum ad actum et modum.*

Consequenter quaeritur de ipsa caritate quantum ad actum et modum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.

Primo quaeritur, utrum actus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum.

Secundo, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum idem possit esse motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum.

Quarto quaeritur, quis eorum praecedat alterum.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum motus caritatis in Deum habeat modum.

Sexto et ultimo, utrum teneamur ad illum modum implendum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos decimo tertio[^3]: *Plenitudo Legis est dilectio*; sed nullus plene adimplet ea quae sunt Legis, nisi qui meritorie eam observat: si ergo plenitudo Legis per Apostolum attribuitur ipsi caritati, videtur, quod efficacia merendi primo et principaliter circa actum eius consistit.

2. *Item*, super illud ad Galatas quinto[^4]: *Fructus autem Spiritus caritas* etc.; Glossa: « Attende, quod in enuntiatione fructuum caput virtutum praemisit caritatem. Quae enim alia inter fructus Spiritus primatum tenere meruit nisi caritas, sine qua ceterae virtutes non reputantur esse virtutes, et ex qua omnia bona nascuntur »? Si ergo ex caritate omnia bona nascuntur, et hoc non potest intelligi nisi de bonis meritoriis; quod primo nascitur ex caritate primo tenet rationem meritorii: ergo per prius est meritorius actus caritatis quam actus alicuius virtutis.

3. *Item*, Gregorius[^5]: « Non habet aliquid viriditatis ramus boni operis, nisi maneat in radice caritatis »: ergo radix caritatis omnibus operibus tribuit viriditatem; sed haec viriditas non est aliud quam efficacia in merendo: si ergo hanc tribuit caritas aliis virtutibus per suum actum et motum, videtur, quod actus caritatis primo et principaliter sit meritorius inter omnes actus virtutum.

4. *Item*, meritum inest omni virtuti ex recta ordinatione in finem; sed caritas est virtus, quae immediate ordinat in finem, et mediante qua ceterae aliae ordinari habent[^6]: videtur ergo, quod circa actum eius primo et principaliter contingit actum meriti reperire.

5. *Item*, nullum obsequium est meritorium apud Deum, nisi quod fit liberaliter[^7]; sed nihil fit liberaliter, nisi quod fit ex amore, quoniam amor est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur: si ergo efficacia merendi consistit in liberalitate, et liberalitas primo et principaliter reperitur in motu caritatis et amoris; videtur idem quod prius, videlicet quod motus caritatis primo et principaliter sit meritorius.

6. *Item*, actus fidei non est meritorius, nisi secundum quod fides credit *in Deum* — nam credere *Deo* et credere *Deum* commune est fidei informi et fidei formatae — sed quod fides credat *in Deum*, hoc habet ratione caritatis adiunctae — « credere enim in Deum, sicut dicit Augustinus[^8], est credendo amare » — ergo videtur, quod actus fidei non sit meritorius nisi mediante actu caritatis. Si ergo actus fidei est primus inter actus omnium virtutum, videtur, quod circa actum caritatis primo et principaliter consistat meritum.

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**Sed contra:**

1. Omnis actus procedens a virtute formata est Deo placitus et meritorius, quia quales sunt habitus, tales sunt actus[^1]; sed virtutibus existentibus formatis, per prius exit in actum fides quam aliqua alia virtus: ergo videtur, quod actus eius primo sit meritorius.

2. *Item*, in omni eo, in quo primo consistit ratio dirigendi, primo consistit ratio merendi; sed circa actum fidei primo consistit ratio dirigendi, cum ipsa sit directiva omnium virtutum[^2]: ergo et circa ipsam primo consistit ratio merendi, non ergo circa actum caritatis.

3. *Item*, gratia in merendo movet conformiter libero arbitrio, et e converso[^3b]; sed liberum arbitrium per prius iudicat, quam eligat; ergo gratia per prius videtur respicere actum cognitionis quam affectionis. Sed quod per prius respicit gratia primo habet rationem meritorii: ergo videtur, quod ratio merendi prius inveniatur in actu cognitionis quam affectionis, et ita prius in actu fidei quam caritatis.

4. *Item*, fides informis meretur operationem miraculorum de congruo in statu peccati[^4b]; sed multo maioris efficaciae est fides formata respectu praemii assequendi, quam fides informis respectu miraculi impetrandi: si ergo impetratio miraculi primo et principaliter attribuitur actui fidei informis, videtur, quod actui fidei formatae primo et principaliter meritum vitae aeternae debeat attribui.

5. *Item*, quod magis est difficile et magis contra naturam, illud tenet magis rationem meriti in via; sed motus fidei magis est naturae dissonus quam motus caritatis, quia Deum diligere non est contra dictamen naturae, sicut credere multos articulos[^5b]: ergo videtur, quod in actu ipsius fidei primo et principaliter consistat efficacia merendi.

6. *Item*, sicut se habet prudentia respectu cardinalium, ita se habet fides respectu virtutum theologicarum; sed recta ordinatio per prius reperitur in actu prudentiae quam in actu virtutum cardinalium[^6b]: ergo recta ordinatio per prius invenitur in actu fidei quam in actu aliarum theologicarum. Sed illud per prius est meritorium, in quo per prius reperitur ordinatio: ergo videtur, quod actus sive motus fidei per prius sit meritorius quam motus caritatis.

### Conclusio.

> Motus caritatis primo et principaliter est meritorius, non quidem prioritate originis, sed prioritate completionis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod meritum primo et principaliter consistit circa actum sive motum fidei, cum ipsa sit prima virtutum, et eius actus principium aliorum. — Alii vero econtra dicere voluerunt, quod actus caritatis primo et principaliter sit meritorius, cum ipsa secundum Gregorium[^7b] et Ambrosium sit caput et radix omnium bonorum. Et utramque harum positionum magni clerici sustinuerunt. Et si velimus sane intelligere, sibi invicem non contradicunt, immo utrique verum sentire poterunt.

Propter quod notandum, quod secundum quod vult Philosophus[^8b], dupliciter dicitur aliquid altero prius. Est enim prius alterum altero origine, et est prius complemento et definitione. Si loquamur de prioritate originis, ratio merendi per prius consistit in actu fidei, quoniam ipse est origo motuum aliarum virtutum; et cum procedit a virtute formata, dicere est, ipsum esse meritorium. Si ergo motus fidei formatae est meritorius et prior origine quam motus aliarum virtutum; loquendo de prioritate originis, efficacia merendi per prius attribuenda est

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motui sive actui ipsius fidei. — Si vero loquamur de prioritate completionis, sic efficacia merendi per prius attribuenda est actui caritatis, cum ipsa completissima sit omnium[^1b] virtutum, et in ipsius actu consummetur ipsum meritum.

Ratio autem, quare caritas excellentior est aliis, est, quia maxime nos efficit deiformes, tum ratione *liberalis exhibitionis*, tum ratione *conformis unitionis*, tum ratione *finalis quietationis*. Ratione *liberalis exhibitionis*: quia, sicut Deus ex amore tribuit omnia dona, sic caritas liberaliter exsequitur omnia obsequia et mandata. — Ratione *conformis unitionis*: quoniam, sicut Pater et Filius nectuntur nexu amoris et uniuntur, sic homo, per caritatem adhaerendo Deo, efficitur unus spiritus. Propter quod dicitur Ioannis decimo septimo[^2b]: *Ut sint consummati in unum, sicut et nos unum sumus*. — Ratione *finalis quietationis*: quia, cum amor sit pondus, facit in Deum tendere et in Deo quiescere, sicut corporalia per sua pondera in propriis locis situari habent et stabiliri[^3c].

His ergo de causis per caritatem efficitur homo maxime Deo conformis secundum triplex genus causae, secundum quod creatura habet ad Creatorem referri, videlicet secundum rationem *principii moventis*, *formae exemplantis* et *finis quietantis*; et ratione huius primatum tenet inter ceteras virtutes, secundum quod dicit Apostolus[^4c]. — Et propterea, si loquamur de prioritate completionis, motus eius primo et principaliter est meritorius, sicut ostendunt auctoritates, quae ad primam partem inducuntur; et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. 2. 3. *Ad illud* vero quod obiicitur in contrarium primo et secundo et tertio, patet responsio: quia omnes illae tres rationes primae, sicut intuenti apparet, procedunt de *originis* prioritate; et ita non obviant veritati nec rationibus, quae ad oppositum habent adduci. Verum enim est, quod motus fidei primo[^5c] exit a libero arbitrio gratia informato quam motus aliarum virtutum; sed tamen non habet plenam et perfectam tendentiam et ordinationem in finem, quousque adiungatur ei motus caritatis, qui det ei pondus et inclinationem; unde ex adminiculo caritatis inest ipsi fidei perfectio meriti. Et propterea magis mensurari dicitur quantitas meriti secundum quantitatem caritatis quam secundum quantitatem alterius virtutis[^6c].

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod fides meretur operationem miraculorum; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia in fide est prima elevatio hominis supra se; ideo videtur[^7c] impetrare a divina virtute, ut operetur aliquid supra vim naturae. Sed meritum praemii consummati non respicit principaliter primam elevationem, sed elevationem summam et completam; et hoc quidem non reperitur in actu fidei secundum se, sed magis in actu caritatis.

5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod actus fidei est maioris difficultatis et magis contra naturam quam actus caritatis; dicendum, quod etsi actus fidei sit magis contra naturam *iudicantem*, non tamen magis est contra, vel supra naturam[^8c] *exsequentem*, immo multo minus. Multo enim facilius est credere summae Veritati propter se et super omnia, quam ipsam propter se et super omnia diligere et ei soli adhaerere et omnia propter eam contemnere. Et quia hoc est maximum, quod homo possit Deo impendere; et hoc facit ipsa caritas: ideo primo et principaliter vindicat sibi merendi efficaciam.

6. *Ad illud* quod ultimo obiicitur, quod sicut se habet prudentia respectu virtutum cardinalium, sic fides respectu theologicarum; dicendum, quod non est omnino simile, pro eo quod virtutes theologicae, cum habeant obiectum increatum, tanto perfectiores sunt, quanto magis intime illi uniunt et coniungunt. Et propterea spirituale aedificium dicitur *fundari* in fide et *erigi* in spe et *consummari* in caritate, quia caritas inter virtutes theologicas est maxime unitiva, et ideo actus eius maxime facit homines deiformes[^9c]. Et hinc est, quod respectu obiecti increati nobilior est modus apprehendendi per modum tactus et amplexus, quam per modum visus et intuitus; econtra est circa corporalia et circa materialia; et ideo non cogit illa ratio.

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### Article II. *On charity as to act and mode.*

Consequently, charity itself is inquired into as to act and mode. And concerning this six things are asked.

First it is asked whether the act of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues.

Second, whether it is possible that the motion of charity be mercenary.

Third it is asked whether the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can be the same.

Fourth it is asked which of them precedes the other.

Fifth it is asked whether the motion of charity toward God has a mode.

Sixth and last, whether we are bound to fulfill that mode.

### Question I. *Whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, through that which the Apostle says to the Romans 13[^3]: *The fullness of the Law is love*; but no one fully fulfills the things that are of the Law except one who observes it meritoriously: if therefore the fullness of the Law is attributed by the Apostle to charity itself, it seems that the efficacy of meriting consists first and principally in its act.

2. *Likewise*, upon that passage to the Galatians 5[^4]: *But the fruit of the Spirit is charity* etc.; the Gloss: « Note that in the enumeration of the fruits he placed charity as the head of the virtues. For what other thing among the fruits of the Spirit deserved to hold the primacy except charity, without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues, and from which all good things are born »? If therefore from charity all good things are born, and this cannot be understood except of meritorious goods; that which is first born from charity first holds the account of the meritorious: therefore the act of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of any [other] virtue.

3. *Likewise*, Gregory[^5]: « The branch of a good work has nothing of greenness unless it remains in the root of charity »: therefore the root of charity gives greenness to all works; but this greenness is nothing other than efficacy in meriting: if therefore charity gives this to the other virtues through its act and motion, it seems that the act of charity is first and principally meritorious among all the acts of the virtues.

4. *Likewise*, merit is in every virtue from a right ordering to the end; but charity is the virtue which immediately orders to the end, and by the mediation of which the other [virtues] are to be ordered[^6]: it seems therefore that it is in its act first and principally that the act of merit happens to be found.

5. *Likewise*, no service is meritorious before God except what is done freely[^7]; but nothing is done freely except what is done from love, since love is the gift in which all the other gifts are given: if therefore the efficacy of meriting consists in liberality, and liberality is found first and principally in the motion of charity and of love; the same seems as before, namely that the motion of charity is first and principally meritorious.

6. *Likewise*, the act of faith is not meritorious except according as faith believes *in God* — for to believe *God* and to believe *that there is a God* is common to unformed faith and to formed faith — but that faith believes *in God*, this it has by reason of the charity joined to it — « for to believe in God, as Augustine says[^8], is by believing to love » — therefore it seems that the act of faith is not meritorious except by the mediation of the act of charity. If therefore the act of faith is the first among the acts of all the virtues, it seems that merit consists first and principally in the act of charity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every act proceeding from a formed virtue is pleasing to God and meritorious, because as the habits are, so are the acts[^1]; but, the virtues being formed, faith goes forth into act prior to any other virtue: therefore it seems that its act is first meritorious.

2. *Likewise*, in everything in which the account of directing first consists, the account of meriting first consists; but the account of directing first consists in the act of faith, since it is the director of all the virtues[^2]: therefore the account of meriting also first consists in it, and therefore not in the act of charity.

3. *Likewise*, grace in meriting moves conformably to free will, and conversely[^3b]; but free will judges prior to choosing; therefore grace seems to regard the act of cognition prior to that of affection. But that which grace regards prior first has the account of the meritorious: therefore it seems that the account of meriting is found prior in the act of cognition than of affection, and thus prior in the act of faith than of charity.

4. *Likewise*, unformed faith merits the working of miracles by congruity in the state of sin[^4b]; but formed faith is of much greater efficacy with respect to attaining the reward than unformed faith with respect to obtaining a miracle: if therefore the obtaining of a miracle is attributed first and principally to the act of unformed faith, it seems that to the act of formed faith the merit of eternal life ought first and principally to be attributed.

5. *Likewise*, that which is more difficult and more against nature holds more the account of merit in this life; but the motion of faith is more discordant with nature than the motion of charity, because to love God is not against the dictate of nature, as is to believe many articles[^5b]: therefore it seems that the efficacy of meriting consists first and principally in the act of faith itself.

6. *Likewise*, just as prudence is related to the cardinal [virtues], so faith is related to the theological virtues; but right ordering is found prior in the act of prudence than in the act of the cardinal virtues[^6b]: therefore right ordering is found prior in the act of faith than in the act of the other theological [virtues]. But that is prior in being meritorious in which ordering is found prior: therefore it seems that the act or motion of faith is prior in being meritorious than the motion of charity.

### Conclusion.

> The motion of charity is first and principally meritorious, not indeed by priority of origin, but by priority of completion.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that some wished to say that merit consists first and principally in the act or motion of faith, since it is the first of the virtues, and its act the principle of the others. — But others, on the contrary, wished to say that the act of charity is first and principally meritorious, since it, according to Gregory[^7b] and Ambrose, is the head and root of all goods. And great clerics have upheld each of these positions. And if we are willing to understand soundly, they do not contradict one another; indeed, both can hold what is true.

On account of which it must be noted that, according as the Philosopher holds[^8b], something is said to be prior to another in two ways. For one thing is prior to another in origin, and is prior in completion and definition. If we speak of priority of origin, the account of meriting consists prior in the act of faith, since it is the origin of the motions of the other virtues; and since it proceeds from a formed virtue, it is to be said that it is meritorious. If therefore the motion of formed faith is meritorious and prior in origin than the motion of the other virtues; speaking of priority of origin, the efficacy of meriting is to be attributed prior

to the motion or act of faith itself. — But if we speak of priority of completion, then the efficacy of meriting is to be attributed prior to the act of charity, since it is the most complete of all[^1b] the virtues, and in its act the merit itself is consummated.

But the reason why charity is more excellent than the others is that it most of all makes us deiform, both by reason of *liberal bestowing*, and by reason of *conforming union*, and by reason of *final repose*. By reason of *liberal bestowing*: because, just as God out of love bestowed all gifts, so charity liberally carries out all services and commands. — By reason of *conforming union*: since, just as the Father and the Son are bound and united by the bond of love, so man, by cleaving to God through charity, is made one spirit. On account of which it is said in John 17[^2b]: *That they may be consummated in one, as we also are one*. — By reason of *final repose*: because, since love is a weight, it makes [one] tend toward God and rest in God, just as bodily things by their weights are situated and made stable in their proper places[^3c].

For these reasons therefore man is made most conformed to God through charity according to the threefold kind of cause, according as a creature is to be referred to the Creator, namely according to the account of the *moving principle*, the *exemplifying form*, and the *quieting end*; and by reason of this it holds the primacy among the other virtues, according to what the Apostle says[^4c]. — And therefore, if we speak of priority of completion, its motion is first and principally meritorious, as the authorities show which are adduced for the first part; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. 2. 3. *To that* indeed which is objected to the contrary in the first and second and third [places], the response is clear: because all those three first reasons, as is apparent to one considering, proceed from priority of *origin*; and thus they do not stand against the truth nor against the reasons which can be adduced for the opposite. For it is true that the motion of faith goes forth prior[^5c] from free will informed by grace than the motion of the other virtues; but yet it does not have a full and perfect tendency and ordering to the end, until the motion of charity is joined to it, which gives it weight and inclination; whence from the support of charity the perfection of merit is in faith itself. And therefore the quantity of merit is said to be measured more according to the quantity of charity than according to the quantity of another virtue[^6c].

4. *To that* which is objected, that faith merits the working of miracles; it must be said that this is because in faith is the first elevation of man above himself; therefore it seems[^7c] to obtain from the divine power that it work something above the power of nature. But the merit of the consummated reward does not regard principally the first elevation, but the highest and complete elevation; and this indeed is not found in the act of faith in itself, but rather in the act of charity.

5. *To that* which is objected, that the act of faith is of greater difficulty and more against nature than the act of charity; it must be said that, although the act of faith be more against *judging* nature, yet it is not more against, or above, *executing* nature[^8c], indeed much less. For it is much easier to believe the highest Truth for its own sake and above all things, than to love it for its own sake and above all things and to cleave to it alone and to despise all things for its sake. And because this is the greatest [thing] which man can render to God; and this charity itself does: therefore it first and principally claims for itself the efficacy of meriting.

6. *To that* which is objected last, that just as prudence is related to the cardinal virtues, so faith [is related] to the theological [virtues]; it must be said that it is not altogether alike, for the reason that the theological virtues, since they have an uncreated object, are the more perfect the more intimately they unite and join [us] to it. And therefore the spiritual edifice is said to be *founded* in faith and *raised* in hope and *consummated* in charity, because charity among the theological virtues is most of all unitive, and therefore its act most of all makes men deiform[^9c]. And hence it is that with respect to the uncreated object the manner of apprehending by way of touch and embrace is nobler than by way of sight and gazing; the contrary is the case concerning bodily and material things; and therefore that reasoning does not compel.

la: Vers. 22. — Glossa, quae sumta est ex Comment. Hieronymi in hunc locum, habetur apud Petr. Lombardum et Lyranum. — In Glossa pro *praemisit* edd. substituerunt *praemittit.* Post pauca eaedem edd. pro *quod primo* exhibent *actus qui primo.* Deinde in fine arg. pro *alicuius virtutis* cod. O *alterius virtutis.* *(P. 602, n. 4.)*

en: Verse 22. — The Gloss, which is taken from the Commentary of Jerome on this passage, is found in Peter Lombard and in Lyra. — In the Gloss, for *praemisit* the editions substituted *praemittit.* After a few [words] the same editions for *quod primo* exhibit *actus qui primo.* Then at the end of the argument, for *alicuius virtutis* codex O [reads] *alterius virtutis.* *(P. 602, n. 4.)*

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 27. n. 1. *(P. 602, n. 5.)*

en: Book II of the *Homilies on the Gospel*, homily 27, n. 1. *(P. 602, n. 5.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 267, nota 1. et pag. 381, nota 1. — De propos. seq. vide I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1, ubi solvitur quaestio: Utrum Spiritus S. sit donum, in quo omnia dona donantur. *(P. 602, n. 7.)*

en: Cf. above, p. 267, note 1, and p. 381, note 1. — On the following proposition see I Sent. d. 18, q. 1, where the question is resolved: Whether the Holy Spirit is the gift in which all gifts are given. *(P. 602, n. 7.)*

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 29. n. 6. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 1, et Comment. dub. 3, ubi discrimen exponitur, quod est inter credere *in Deum*, credere *Deo* et credere *Deum*. *(P. 602, n. 8.)*

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tract 29, n. 6. Cf. above, the Master's text, d. XXIII, c. 1, and the Commentary, dub. 3, where is expounded the distinction which there is between to believe *in God*, to believe *God*, and to believe *that there is a God*. *(P. 602, n. 8.)* <!-- p. 603 -->

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 760, nota 6. — Quod actus fidei prior sit actibus aliarum virtutum, ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et dub. 6. *(P. 603, n. 1.)*

en: Cf. tom. II, p. 760, note 6. — That the act of faith is prior to the acts of the other virtues was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, in the body and dub. 6. *(P. 603, n. 1.)*

la: Vide supra pag. 471, nota 3 et s. — Subinde pro *circa ipsam* edd. *circa ipsum.* *(P. 603, n. 2.)*

en: See above, p. 471, note 3 and ff. — Thereupon for *circa ipsam* the editions [read] *circa ipsum.* *(P. 603, n. 2.)*

la: Libr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6. ad 5, ubi Doctor ait: Secundum quod Deus movet per gratiam, per eandem gratiam potest excitare ad diversa opera. Secundum vero quod liberum arbitrium se ipsum movet per gratiam ad diversa opera, est in ipso cognitionis et affectionis diversitas, secundum quas ordinari habet ad diversa operum genera; et ideo, quamvis gratia non varietur in se, movet liberum arbitrium ad diversa, ratione variationis in ipso, quia ipsum potest movere. Nunquam enim gratia elicit opus meritorium, nisi voluntas sibi cooperetur. — Quaedam codd. dubiae sint lectionis, plures tamen, ut N, GTV, clare exhibent *conformiter libero arbitrio* [i. e. secundum naturam liberi arbitrii], quam lectionem edd. et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., repugnante contextu, mutaverunt in *conformiter liberum arbitrium*, cod. I. in *actum liberi arbitrii.* *(P. 603, n. 3.)*

en: Book II of the *Sentences*, d. 26, q. 6, ad 5, where the Doctor says: According as God moves through grace, by the same grace he can rouse to diverse works. But according as free will moves itself through grace to diverse works, there is in it a diversity of cognition and affection, according to which it is to be ordered to diverse kinds of works; and therefore, although grace is not varied in itself, it moves free will to diverse things, by reason of the variation in it [free will], because it [free will] can move it. For grace never elicits a meritorious work unless the will cooperates with it. — Certain codices are of doubtful reading, but several, as N, GTV, clearly exhibit *conformiter libero arbitrio* [i.e. according to the nature of free will], which reading the editions and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, against the context, changed into *conformiter liberum arbitrium*, codex I into *actum liberi arbitrii.* *(P. 603, n. 3.)*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 2: Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum. Cfr. Matth. 17, 19; Luc. 17, 6, et supra pag. 170, nota 3. *(P. 603, n. 4.)*

en: Epistle I Cor. 13, 2: And if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing. Cf. Matthew 17, 19; Luke 17, 6, and above, p. 170, note 3. *(P. 603, n. 4.)*

la: Cum secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, [cfr. etiam ibid. VI. c. 13, et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 33. (c. 35.)] prudens praefiniat medium cuiuslibet virtutis. — Paulo inferius ante *theologicarum* codd. K U supplent *virtutum.* *(P. 603, n. 6.)*

en: Since according to Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6, [cf. also there VI, c. 13, and *Magna Moralia* I, c. 33 (c. 35)], the prudent man predefines the mean of any virtue. — A little below, before *theologicarum* codices K U supply *virtutum.* *(P. 603, n. 6.)*

la: Praeter eius verba in fundam. 3. allata cfr. etiam eius Regul. pastor. p. III. c. 9; II. Regist. epist. Ind. I. epist. 17; Expos. in septem Ps. poenit. Ps. 2. n. 13. — De Ambrosio vide supra pag. 508, nota 9. Inferius pro *poterunt* edd. *potuerunt.* *(P. 603, n. 7.)*

en: Besides his words adduced in fundamentum 3, cf. also his *Pastoral Rule* p. III, c. 9; the *Register of Letters*, indiction I, epistle 17; the *Exposition on the seven Penitential Psalms*, Ps. 2, n. 13. — On Ambrose see above, p. 508, note 9. Below, for *poterunt* the editions [read] *potuerunt.* *(P. 603, n. 7.)*

la: Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 88. (c. 7.); V. Metaph. text. 16. et IX. text. 18. (IV. c. 11. et VIII. c. 8.). Cfr. de Praedicam., de Priori, et supra pag. 186, nota 2. — Paulo inferius post *et definitione* cod. I. addit *sive dignitate*, quod cod. bb substituit pro *et definitione.* Post pauca pro *dicere est* cod. A *dicendum est.* *(P. 603, n. 8.)*

en: Book VIII of the *Physics*, text 88 (c. 7); *Metaphysics* V, text 16, and IX, text 18 (IV, c. 11, and VIII, c. 8). Cf. *On the Categories*, *On the Prior [Analytics]*, and above, p. 186, note 2. — A little below, after *et definitione* codex I adds *sive dignitate*, which codex bb substitutes for *et definitione.* After a few [words], for *dicere est* codex A [reads] *dicendum est.* *(P. 603, n. 8.)* <!-- p. 604 -->

la: In cod. A deest *omnium*, pro quo vocabulo non pauci codd. substituerunt *obiectum.* In edd. 1, 2 legitur: *completissime sit obiectum.* In seqq. pro *unitionis* edd. constanter exhibent *unionis.* *(P. 604, n. 1.)*

en: In codex A *omnium* is lacking, for which word not a few codices substituted *obiectum.* In editions 1, 2 is read: *completissime sit obiectum.* In what follows, for *unitionis* the editions constantly exhibit *unionis.* *(P. 604, n. 1.)*

la: Vers. 22. seq.: Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus. Ego in eis et tu in me, ut sint consummati in unum. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. (Utrum Spiritus S. sit nexus sive unitas Patris et Filii). — Aliquanto superius pro *omnia dona* codd. lv Z et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. *omnia bona.* *(P. 604, n. 2.)*

en: Verse 22 ff.: That they may be one, as we also are one. I in them and you in me, that they may be consummated in one. — Cf. I Sent. d. 10, a. 2, q. 2 (Whether the Holy Spirit is the bond or unity of the Father and the Son). — Somewhat above, for *omnia dona* codices lv Z and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] *omnia bona.* *(P. 604, n. 2.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 289, nota 5. et infra d. 36. q. 6. — Edd. *et in Deum tendere est in Deo quiescere* pro *et in Deo quiescere*, ut legit cod. N, in aliis codd. *in Deum quiescere.* Fortasse legendum *et in Deum tendendo quiescere.* *(P. 604, n. 3.)*

en: Cf. above, p. 289, note 5, and below, d. 36, q. 6. — The editions [read] *et in Deum tendere est in Deo quiescere* for *et in Deo quiescere*, as codex N reads, in other codices *in Deum quiescere.* Perhaps it should be read *et in Deum tendendo quiescere.* *(P. 604, n. 3.)*

la: Edd. *prius.* Paulo inferius substituimus ex multis codd. *ordinationem* pro *ordinem*, et deinde pro *det* edd. cum aliquot codd. *dat*, alii codd. falso *debet.* *(P. 604, n. 5.)*

en: The editions [read] *prius.* A little below we substituted from many codices *ordinationem* for *ordinem*, and then for *det* the editions with some codices [read] *dat*, other codices wrongly *debet.* *(P. 604, n. 5.)*

la: Cod. A *meretur.* Mox pro *et hoc quidem* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *et haec quidem.* *(P. 604, n. 7.)*

en: Codex A [reads] *meretur.* Presently for *et hoc quidem* the editions with several codices [read] *et haec quidem.* *(P. 604, n. 7.)*

la: Maior pars codd. exhibet solum *supra naturam*, omisso *contra vel*, dum econtra edd. 1, 2 cum cod. U solum habent *contra naturam*; codd. A lv bb habent *supra naturam vel contra naturam.* *(P. 604, n. 8.)*

en: The greater part of the codices exhibits only *supra naturam*, omitting *contra vel*, while on the contrary editions 1, 2 with codex U have only *contra naturam*; codices A lv bb have *supra naturam vel contra naturam.* *(P. 604, n. 8.)*

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 9. a. 3: Fides dicitur fundamentum secundum rationem spiritualis aedificii, secundum quod dicit Glossa Hebr. 1: « Fides est fundamentum omnium bonorum, quod nemo mutare potest, sine quo non est bona aedificatio ». Dicitur autem fundamentum in via, quia est primus habitus, quo homo super se ascendit; sequens vero est spes, quae est sicut paries, quo animus erigitur ad attingendum magnitudinem gloriae caelestis; caritas vero est sicut supremum sive tectum, quod elevatur usque ad sublimitatem gloriae, quia nunquam excidet (I. Cor. 13, 8.). *(P. 604, n. 9.)*

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 9, a. 3: Faith is called the foundation according to the account of the spiritual edifice, according as the Gloss on Hebrews 1 says: « Faith is the foundation of all goods, which no one can change, without which there is no good edification ». But it is called the foundation in this life, because it is the first habit by which man ascends above himself; the next is hope, which is like the wall by which the mind is raised to attain the magnitude of heavenly glory; but charity is like the highest [part] or roof, which is elevated up to the sublimity of glory, because it never falls away (I Cor. 13, 8). *(P. 604, n. 9.)*

latin_scholion:
**I.** De hac (1.) quaestione diffuse disputat Guliel. Antissiodorensis (Sum. III. tr. 16. q. 1.) et resolvit, quod « potius est meritum in fide quam in caritate ». Sed de hoc antiquo auctore, licet sit acutus et doctus, iure observat Dionysius Carth. (III. Sent. d. 30. q. 3.), quod est « in opinionibus suis frequenter singularis et extremus: nam et proprium corpus dicit esse plus diligendum quam proximum ». Commentatores autem Lombardi hanc quaestionem plerumque tractant infra in distinctione 30, et resolvunt, quod principalitas meriti est in caritate, in aliis virtutibus, secundum quod caritate informantur. Principia autem hic posita tanguntur in aliis quaestionibus, praesertim de conditione ad meritum requisita, quod scilicet ad plenum meritum actus virtutum aliarum saltem virtualiter debeant esse imperati a caritate, de quo cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 114. a. 4; Bonav., II. Sent. d. 29. a. 3. q. 2, d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3, d. 41. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6; III. Sent. d. 36. q. 6; IV. Sent. d. 20. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. — Quae hic dicuntur de *excellentia* caritatis approbant S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 23. a. 6, aliique commentatores Petri Lombardi infra d. 36. in quaestione de aequalitate virtutum. Concordant verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 10. m. 2. a. 1. § 3.): « Caritas in virtutibus est complementum, eo quod idem est, in quod transit *actus* et *finis*; quia idem est in unitate quod diligitur et propter quod, quia diligitur summum Bonum et propter summum Bonum. Nec sic est in aliis, ut in fide et iustitia; sed caritas est ratio in aliis. Diffusio enim sive communicatio boni sive finis est ratio in omnibus virtutibus ».

De ipsa quaestione in III. Sent. d. 30. agunt: S. Thom., ibi a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., ibi q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., ibi q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit.

**II.** Sequentem (2.) quaestionem S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. a. 1.) cum aliis magistris ita proponit: « Utrum in dilectione Dei possit haberi respectus ad aliquam mercedem »; sed Richard. a Med. (hic a. 7. q. 2.) ita: « Utrum principalior actus sit diligere amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae ». — Plura ad hanc quaestionem spectantia vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. Iam supra (d. 26. a. 1. q. 1.) in scholio notatum est, quod amor Dei etiam purissimus non excludit actus spei, immo « maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum », ut dicit Bonav. (ibid. ad 3.). Porro cum Deus sit non tantum summa bonitas in se sumta, sed etiam bonitas conveniens nobis; etiam sub hoc secundo respectu non potest excludi a motivo caritatis, licet caritas proprie et principaliter motivum sumat a summa bonitate in se sumta (cfr. hic ad 2. 3.). Hinc etiam S. Thom. (II. II. q. 23. a. 4. in corp. et ad 2.) docet, obiectum caritatis esse Deum ut *beatitudinis obiectum*. Licet autem amore concupiscentiae ametur bonum ad hoc, ut sit bonum ipsius amantis, tamen « respectu nobilissimi amati, quod est Deus, amor concupiscentiae ordinatur sicut ad finem ad amorem amicitiae. Qui enim ex caritate vult frui Deo, quod est ipsum amare amore concupiscentiae, hoc ideo vult, ut Deus honoretur et glorificetur in se, quod est ipsum amare amore amicitiae » (Richard. a Med., loc. cit.). Similiter docet S. Thom. (III. Sent. loc. cit.): « Habens caritatem non potest habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat aliquid quodcumque finem amati, scilicet Dei... nec iterum, ut ponat aliquod bonum temporale finem ipsius amoris... potest tamen habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat beatitudinem creatam finem amoris, non autem finem amati. Hoc enim neque est contra rationem amicitiae neque contra rationem virtutis, cum beatitudo virtutum sit finis ».

**III.** De hac (2.) quaestione praeter laudatos alii tractant III. Sent. d. 29: B. Albert., ibi a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., ibi a. 3. — Durand., ibi q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., ibi q. 1. in fine.

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning this (1st) question William of Auxerre (*Summa* III, tr. 16, q. 1) disputes at length and resolves that « there is rather merit in faith than in charity ». But of this ancient author, although he is acute and learned, Dionysius the Carthusian (III Sent. d. 30, q. 3) rightly observes that he is « in his opinions frequently singular and extreme: for he even says that one's own body is to be loved more than one's neighbor ». But the commentators on Lombard for the most part treat this question below in distinction 30, and resolve that the principality of merit is in charity, [and] in the other virtues according as they are informed by charity. But the principles here laid down are touched on in other questions, especially concerning the condition required for merit, namely that for full merit the acts of the other virtues ought at least virtually to be commanded by charity, concerning which cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I-II, q. 114, a. 4; Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, d. 38, a. 1, q. 1, 2, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3, d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6; III Sent. d. 36, q. 6; IV Sent. d. 20, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5. — What is here said concerning the *excellence* of charity St. Thomas approves, *Summa* II-II, q. 23, a. 6, and the other commentators on Peter Lombard below at d. 36 in the question on the equality of the virtues. The words of Alexander of Hales agree (*Summa* p. IV, q. 10, m. 2, a. 1, § 3): « Charity in the virtues is the complement, because it is the same into which the *act* and the *end* pass; for the same in unity is that which is loved and that on account of which, because the highest Good is loved and on account of the highest Good. Nor is it so in the others, as in faith and justice; but charity is the ground in the others. For the diffusion or communication of the good or of the end is the ground in all the virtues ».

Concerning this question in III Sent. d. 30 treat: St. Thomas, there a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, there q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, there q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit.

**II.** The following (2nd) question St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 29, q. 1, a. 1) with the other masters proposes thus: « Whether in the love of God there can be had regard to some reward »; but Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 7, q. 2) thus: « Whether the more principal act is to love with the love of friendship than with the love of concupiscence ». — More things pertaining to this question see II Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 3; I Sent. d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1. Already above (d. 26, a. 1, q. 1) it was noted in the scholion that the love of God, even the most pure, does not exclude the acts of hope, indeed « the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to have God », as Bonaventure says (ibid. ad 3). Furthermore, since God is not only the highest goodness taken in itself, but also a goodness befitting us; even under this second respect he cannot be excluded from the motive of charity, although charity properly and principally takes its motive from the highest goodness taken in itself (cf. here ad 2, 3). Hence also St. Thomas (II-II, q. 23, a. 4, in the body and ad 2) teaches that the object of charity is God as the *object of beatitude*. But although by the love of concupiscence a good is loved to this end, that it be the good of the lover himself, yet « with respect to the most noble beloved, which is God, the love of concupiscence is ordered as to an end to the love of friendship. For he who out of charity wishes to enjoy God, which is to love him with the love of concupiscence, wishes this for this reason, that God be honored and glorified in himself, which is to love him with the love of friendship » (Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit.). Similarly St. Thomas teaches (III Sent. loc. cit.): « He who has charity cannot have an eye to a reward, so as to set anything whatever as the end of the beloved, namely of God... nor again, so as to set some temporal good as the end of the love itself... yet he can have an eye to a reward, so as to set created beatitude as the end of the love, but not as the end of the beloved. For this is neither against the account of friendship nor against the account of virtue, since beatitude is the end of the virtues ».

**III.** Concerning this (2nd) question, besides those praised, others treat in III Sent. d. 29: Blessed Albert, there a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, there a. 3. — Durandus, there q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, there q. 1, at the end.

translators_notes:
**Page span.** ART. II opener + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (six questions listed) + QUAESTIO I heading + opener + objections 1–6 begin at the foot of p.602 **left** column (immediately below the close of d27-a1-q4's *Ad 5*); per the locked chunking convention, the ART. II opener + TRACTATIO **fold into q1** (no standalone divisio chunk). Body runs: p.602 (ART. II opener, TRACTATIO, q1 heading + opener + obj.1–6 begin), p.603 (obj.6 close + *Sed contra* 1–6 + Conclusio + Respondeo begins), p.604 (Respondeo close [prioritate completionis] + Ratio triplex [liberalis exhibitionis / conformis unitionis / finalis quietationis] + Corollarium + Solutio oppositorum Ad 1.2.3 + Ad 4–6), p.605 (Scholion I–III). pdf = printed + 22 (PDF 624–627). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion; clean running prose cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR.

**Alignment.** Confirmed against d27-a1-q4's hand-off and the raw: raw line 41846 = `ARTICULUS II.` (heading `De caritate quantum ad actum et modum`), opener line 41850 = `Consequenter quaeritur de ipsa caritate quantum ad actum et modum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex`. TRACTATIO lists six (Primo…per prius meritorius / Secundo…mercenarium / Tertio…idem motus dilectionis / Quarto…quis praecedat / Quinto…habeat modum / Sexto…ad modum implendum). q1 raw line 41858 = `QUAESTIO I.`, title line 41859 = *Utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum* (= frontmatter `title_la`), opener line 41861 = `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum`. **No q-swap.** End boundary: raw line 42082 = `QUAESTIO II.` (q2 *Utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium*; opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium`); everything from 42082 onward belongs to the next chunk (d27-a2-q2). The q1 scholion (I–III) sits on p.605 immediately above the QUAESTIO II heading.

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (23 entries).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page.
- **p.602 (q1 takes nn.3–8):** d27-a1-q4 took p.602 nn.1–2 (concupiscibilis; scholion-redirect). q1's share: n.3 *Apostolus ad Romanos decimo tertio³* (Vers. 10), n.4 *Galatas quinto⁴* (Gloss/Jerome), n.5 *Gregorius⁵* (Homil. in Evang. 27), n.6 *ordinari habent⁶* (infra d.36 q.6), n.7 *liberaliter⁷* (Cfr. supra p.267/381), n.8 *Augustinus⁸* (In Ioan. tr.29). *(The d27-a1-q4 hand-off named "nn.3–5" by distinctive opener; the actual q1 footer run on p.602 is nn.3–8, since obj.4–6 also carry markers — captured in full.)*
- **p.603 (nn.1–8):** Sed-contra markers *actus¹*, *virtutum²*, *converso³*, *peccati⁴*, *articulos⁵*, *cardinalium⁶*; Respondeo markers *Gregorium⁷*, *Philosophus⁸*. n.3 = the long *II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6. ad 5* Doctor-ait note (grace/free-will), spanning both columns' footer bands.
- **p.604 (nn.1–9):** Respondeo/Ratio markers *omnium¹*, *Ioannis decimo septimo²*, *stabiliri³*, *Apostolus⁴*; Solutio markers *primo⁵* (Ad 1.2.3), *alterius virtutis⁶* (Ad — measure of merit), *videtur⁷* (Ad 4), *naturam⁸* (Ad 5), *deiformes⁹* (Ad 6 — long Alex. Hal. *Summa* fundamentum note). All nine resolved from the L/R footer bands.
- **p.605:** the Scholion (I–III) is the only matter; it carries no numbered footers of its own.

**Scholion.** PRESENT, three sections (I–III), at the foot/full width of p.605, immediately above the QUAESTIO II heading. **§I** treats this (1st) question itself (William of Auxerre vs. Dionysius Carth.; Lombard commentators treat it at d.30; Alexander of Hales on the excellence of charity). **§II** and **§III** forward-point to the *next* (2nd) question (mercenary love) — this is normal: the q1 scholion carries the cross-references for q2, so d27-a2-q2 will correctly have **no scholion of its own** (sibling redirect, per the missing-scholion-is-normal convention). `has_scholion: true`.

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a2-q2** (second question of ART. II): raw start **42082** (`QUAESTIO II.` / title `Utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium` / opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium. Et quod sic, videtur`). q2 begins on p.605 (PDF 627), below this chunk's scholion, running p.606+. **Footer split:** p.605 carries this chunk's scholion (no numbered footers) at the foot of both columns; q2's own first footers begin where its body markers fall (p.605 R-col `Lucae decimo quinto¹` onward) — verify the p.605 footer band at promotion time. **⚠ q2/q3 SPLIT — CREATE A NEW CHUNK.** The existing `bon-sent-III-d27-a2-q2.md` skeleton currently **swallows q3**: when promoting a2-q2, split it at **raw 42214** (= q3 opener `Tertio quaeritur, utrum idem possit esse motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum`) and create a separate `bon-sent-III-d27-a2-q3.md` chunk (*Utrum idem possit esse motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum*). q2's exact title: *Utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium*.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body text, the 23 numbered footers, and the scholion (I–III) resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands (OCR garbles — heading OCR, the `±`/`o.`/`(i.` digit-mangles for obj.2/5/6 markers, footer-title shatter — are unambiguous against the bands).

**J4 apparatus repair (2026-07-17, Class A — duplicate apparatus definitions).** J1's automated relabel tool (`tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py`) skipped this chunk because its greedy body-partition proof failed on one group: the Latin/English bodies were missing the `[^1]` anchor belonging to p.604's first footer (n.1 — the codex-A variant note on *omnium*). Extracted p.604 at 450dpi (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol3 --pages 602-604 --dpi 450`, `tools/colcrop.py vol3 604 1660`) and confirmed on the L-0 band: the printed page reads `...completissima sit omnium ¹ virtutum...` — a raised `¹` sits directly on *omnium*, exactly matching the existing (correct, untouched) def text "In cod. A deest *omnium*...". Added `[^1]` after *omnium* in the Latin (p.604 Respondeo, "Si vero loquamur de prioritate completionis..." paragraph) and mirrored it after "all" in the parallel English clause ("...since it is the most complete of all[^1] the virtues..."). No other defect found — all other duplicate-numbered groups (p.602 nn.3–8, p.603 nn.1–8, remainder of p.604 nn.2–9) already had a content-matching body anchor; only this one page-604 n.1 anchor was missing. No Latin/English wording changed. After the fix, `tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py --apply` mechanically relabeled the 23 defs: the greedy body-partition found 3 groups against 4 `printed_pages` (602,603,604,605 — p.605 has no footer notes of its own, only the scholion), so the tool fell back to its page-agnostic suffix scheme (`[^N]`/`[^Nb]`/`[^Nc]` per group) rather than page-qualified labels; uniqueness is what fixes the render bug, and every anchor keeps the note it already had (mechanically verified by the tool's own post-relabel check).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 605 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Lucae* decimo quinto[^1] super illud: *Quanti mercenarii in domo patris mei abundant panibus*, dicit Ambrosius, quod multi sunt boni mercenarii, qui spe aeternorum Deo serviunt; sed nemo Deo bene servit, nisi qui servit ei ex caritate: ergo possibile est, motum mercenarii ex caritate habere ortum.

2. Item, Augustinus, super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Scrutans corda et renes Deus*: « Finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio, ad quam quisque nititur pervenire »: ergo habens caritatem finaliter quaerit delectari; sed qui quaerit suam delectationem quaerit proprium commodum, et omnis talis est mercenarius: ergo videtur, quod affectus caritatis mercenarius esse possit.

3. Item, qui vult implere mandata Dei propter retributionem mercenarius est; sed de viro sancto dicitur in Psalmo[^3]: *Inclinavi cor meum ad faciendas iustificationes tuas propter retributionem*; et ad Hebraeos undecimo dicitur de Moyse: *Aspiciebat in remunerationem*: si ergo tam iste quam ille iustus erat et ex caritate movebatur, videtur, quod motus caritatis possit esse mercenarius.

4. Item, homo sanctus desiderat *dissolvi et esse cum Christo*, ut fruatur eo, secundum quod Apostolus desiderabat, ad Philippenses primo[^4]; sed desiderium illud non potest esse nisi caritatis, cum nullus naturali affectu desideret mori: ergo si tale desiderium intuetur proprium commodum et delectationem, videtur, quod possibile sit, affectum caritatis esse mercenarium.

<!-- page 606 -->

**Sed contra:** 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^5]: *Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt*; sed omnis mercenarius quaerit quod suum est: ergo motus caritatis non potest esse mercenarius.

2. Item, Bernardus, *de Diligendo Deo*[^6]: « Etsi sine praemio non possit serviri, tamen sine intuitu praemii serviendum est »; et paulo post: « Serviamus Deo in caritate, quae timorem expellit, laborem non sentit, praemium non requirit, meritum non intuetur »: si ergo omnis mercenarius requirit praemium, et caritas non requirit praemium: ergo motus caritatis non potest esse mercenarius.

3. Item, amor caritatis est amor gratuitus; sed gratuitum et mercenarium ex opposito dividuntur[^7], quia quod fit gratis non fit ex mercimonia: si ergo caritati essentiale est esse gratuitum, videtur, quod motus eius et actus nullo modo possit esse mercenarius.

4. Item, timor, qui principaliter oculum habet ad poenam, est timor servilis, qui non est Deo acceptus: ergo et pari ratione amor, qui habet oculum ad praemium, non potest esse meritorius; sed talis est mercenarius; omnis autem affectus caritatis est meritorius: ergo nullus potest esse mercenarius.

> **Conclusio.** Motus aliquis caritatis non improbabiliter dici potest mercenarius, quatenus respicit ad Bonum increatum tanquam ad finale praemium.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod mercenarius dicitur ille qui principaliter habet oculum ad mercedem; nam si eam aspiceret non principaliter, non propter hoc mercenarius esset. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod duplex est merces, videlicet creata et increata, temporalis et aeterna. Et secundum hoc est duplex mercenarius, videlicet bonus et malus; et duplex mercimonia, una laudabilis et alia vituperabilis. Nam qui principaliter respicit ad mercedem creatam et temporalem, malus mercenarius est; et hunc vituperat Ioannis decimo[^8] Dominus dicens: *Mercenarius autem fugit, quia mercenarius est*. Ille vero, qui aspicit principaliter ad mercedem aeternam, de qua dicitur Genesis decimo quinto: *Merces tua magna nimis*, bonus mercenarius est; et hic mercenarius « panibus abundat fidei, spei et caritatis », sicut dicit Ambrosius super illud[^9]: *Quanti mercenarii* etc.

De prima mercimonia intelligendo, non est dubium, quod motus caritatis non potest esse mercenarius, quia illa nec est a caritate nec cum caritate, cum caritati repugnet.

De secunda mercimonia dubium est, pro eo quod illa potest esse cum caritate; non est tamen omnino certum, utrum sit a caritate. — Nam quidam voluerunt dicere, quod non est a caritate, sed potius ab affectu naturae caritatem concomitante. Amor enim caritatis, ut dicunt, cum sit amor gratuitus, non intuetur praemium; immo liberaliter omnino facit hominem servire Deo, sicut filium patri suo[^10]. — Aliis autem videtur, quod talis affectus mercenarius possit esse a caritate. Desiderium enim habendi aeternam mercedem et fruendi aeterno bono est desiderium gratiae, nec est amoris naturalis nec acquisiti, sed potius amoris gratuiti, praecipue illud desiderium, quo dicebat Apostolus[^11]: *Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo*. Ad affectum enim caritatis non tantum spectat amare Deum amore amicitiae, immo etiam amore concupiscentiae. « Frui enim est amore inhaerere[^12] », et constat, quod frui Deo est per caritatem. Et ideo voluerunt isti dicere, et satis probabiliter, ut videtur, quod motus caritatis secundum aliquod genus mercimoniae possit esse mercenarius, scilicet secundum quod constituit mercedem suam circa Bonum increatum, ad quod tendit sicut ad finale praemium et desiderat tanquam omne bonum[^13]. — Si igitur hanc positionem sustinere velimus tanquam probabilem, satis facili-

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ter dissolvuntur rationes, quae sunt ad oppositam partem[^14].

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; dicendum, quod *suum* ibi vocatur proprium bonum, ita quod excluditur bonum *commune*[^15]. Quod autem appetit Deum sicut mercedem suam non quaerit hoc modo quod suum est, quia illud bonum est omnibus commune. Quaerere enim et videre et amare Deum sicut suam mercedem et praemium non est quaerere bonum proprium, illo modo dicendi *proprium*, qui sonat in vitium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deo sine intuitu praemii est serviendum; dicendum, quod duplex est motus in caritate, videlicet motus *amicitiae* et motus *concupiscentiae*. Motus *amicitiae* est ille quo quis desiderat Deo placere et servire; motus concupiscentiae est quo desiderat Deum habere et videre. Cum ergo dicit Bernardus, quod Deo sine intuitu praemii est serviendum, intelligit de amore amicitiae. Si enim per affectum amicitiae homo servit amico et eum diligit sine intuitu praemii, sicut dicit Philosophus[^16], multo fortius amore caritatis homo vult bonum Deo sine intuitu alicuius retributionis; sed per hoc non excluditur, quin caritas amore concupiscentiae exoptet et desideret illam summam mercedem apprehendere, ad quam finaliter intendit pervenire.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis est simpliciter gratuitus, ergo non potest esse mercenarius; dicendum, quod illud argumentum bonum est de ea mercimonia, quae repugnat gratiae; sed mercimonia vitae aeternae non repugnat gratiae, immo illi consonat, quia ad eam specialiter ordinat. Unde sicut amor *concupiscentiae* non repugnat amori amicitiae in caritate, immo quanto magis quis Deum recte desiderat, tanto magis ad honorem[^17] eius anhelat; sic affectus huiusmodi mercimoniae non repugnat gratiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de timore, quod ille qui principaliter habet oculum ad poenam, non potest esse Deo acceptus etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam cum poena nec sit Deus nec sit aliquid Dei: qui principaliter aspicit[^18] poenam ad finem ultimum non est recte ordinatus, cum principaliorem intuitum habeat ad aliud quam ad Deum. Sed merces et beatitudo summa est ipse Deus: et ideo ipsam principaliter potest quis aspicere, et tamen in finem recte ordinatus esse. — Et sic patet, quod nullum est inconveniens dicere, quod motus caritatis possit esse mercenarius, si dicatur mercenarius ex intuitu mercedis aeternae et increatae. Et hoc modo currunt rationes ad primam partem. Si autem alio modo mercenarius dicatur, rationes illae non cogunt nos fateri, motum caritatis posse esse mercenarium[^19].

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### Question II. *Whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. On *Luke* fifteen[^1], upon that text: *How many hired servants in my father's house abound with bread*, Ambrose says that there are many good hired servants, who serve God in the hope of eternal goods; but no one serves God well except one who serves him out of charity: therefore it is possible for the motion of a hired servant to have its origin from charity.

2. Likewise, Augustine, upon that text of the Psalm[^2]: *God searching the hearts and reins*: « The end of care and of thought is delight, to which each one strives to come »: therefore one having charity finally seeks to be delighted; but he who seeks his own delight seeks his own advantage, and every such one is mercenary: therefore it seems that the affection of charity can be mercenary.

3. Likewise, he who wishes to fulfill the commandments of God for the sake of reward is mercenary; but of the holy man it is said in the Psalm[^3]: *I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications for the sake of reward*; and to the Hebrews eleven it is said of Moses: *He looked unto the reward*: if therefore both this one and that one was just and was moved out of charity, it seems that the motion of charity can be mercenary.

4. Likewise, the holy man desires *to be dissolved and to be with Christ*, that he may enjoy him, according as the Apostle desired, to the Philippians one[^4]; but that desire cannot be except of charity, since no one by natural affection desires to die: therefore if such a desire looks to its own advantage and delight, it seems that it is possible for the affection of charity to be mercenary.

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**On the contrary:** 1. First to the Corinthians thirteen[^5]: *Charity seeketh not the things that are her own*; but every mercenary seeks what is his own: therefore the motion of charity cannot be mercenary.

2. Likewise, Bernard, *On Loving God*[^6]: « Although one cannot be served without reward, nevertheless one must be served without regard to reward »; and a little after: « Let us serve God in charity, which expels fear, does not feel toil, does not require reward, does not look to merit »: if therefore every mercenary requires reward, and charity does not require reward: therefore the motion of charity cannot be mercenary.

3. Likewise, the love of charity is gratuitous love; but the gratuitous and the mercenary are divided by opposition[^7], because what is done gratis is not done out of hire: if therefore it is essential to charity to be gratuitous, it seems that its motion and act can in no way be mercenary.

4. Likewise, fear, which principally has its eye on punishment, is servile fear, which is not acceptable to God: therefore by parity of reasoning love also, which has its eye on reward, cannot be meritorious; but such love is mercenary; but every affection of charity is meritorious: therefore none can be mercenary.

> **Conclusion.** Some motion of charity can not improbably be called mercenary, insofar as it looks to the uncreated Good as to a final reward.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that he is called mercenary who principally has his eye on the wage; for if he looked to it not principally, he would not on this account be mercenary. According to this it is to be understood that there is a twofold wage, namely created and uncreated, temporal and eternal. And according to this there is a twofold mercenary, namely good and bad; and a twofold hire, one praiseworthy and the other blameworthy. For he who principally looks to the created and temporal wage is a bad mercenary; and the Lord censures him in John ten[^8], saying: *But the hireling flieth, because he is a hireling*. But he who looks principally to the eternal wage, of which it is said in Genesis fifteen: *Thy reward [is] exceeding great*, is a good mercenary; and this mercenary « abounds with the bread of faith, hope, and charity », as Ambrose says upon that text[^9]: *How many hired servants* etc.

Understanding it of the first hire, there is no doubt that the motion of charity cannot be mercenary, because that hire is neither from charity nor with charity, since it is repugnant to charity.

Concerning the second hire there is doubt, inasmuch as it can be with charity; it is not however altogether certain whether it is from charity. — For some have wished to say that it is not from charity, but rather from an affection of nature accompanying charity. For the love of charity, as they say, since it is gratuitous love, does not look to reward; nay, it makes a man serve God altogether liberally, as a son [serves] his father[^10]. — But to others it seems that such a mercenary affection can be from charity. For the desire of having the eternal wage and of enjoying the eternal good is a desire of grace, and is neither of natural nor of acquired love, but rather of gratuitous love, especially that desire by which the Apostle said[^11]: *I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ*. For to the affection of charity it belongs not only to love God with the love of friendship, but even with the love of concupiscence. « For to enjoy is to cleave by love[^12] », and it is established that to enjoy God is through charity. And therefore these wished to say, and quite probably, as it seems, that the motion of charity according to some kind of hire can be mercenary, namely insofar as it constitutes its wage about the uncreated Good, toward which it tends as to a final reward and desires as every good[^13]. — If therefore we wish to maintain this position as probable, the reasons which are to the opposite part are easily

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dissolved[^14].

1. For to that which is first objected, that charity seeketh not the things that are her own; it must be said that *her own* is there called one's proper good, in such a way that the *common* good is excluded[^15]. But he who desires God as his wage does not in this manner seek what is his own, because that good is common to all. For to seek and to see and to love God as one's wage and reward is not to seek one's proper good, in that manner of calling [a thing] *proper* which sounds toward vice.

2. To that which is objected, that God is to be served without regard to reward; it must be said that there is a twofold motion in charity, namely the motion of *friendship* and the motion of *concupiscence*. The motion of *friendship* is that by which one desires to please and to serve God; the motion of concupiscence is that by which one desires to have and to see God. When therefore Bernard says that God is to be served without regard to reward, he understands it of the love of friendship. For if by the affection of friendship a man serves a friend and loves him without regard to reward, as the Philosopher says[^16], much more by the love of charity does a man will good to God without regard to any retribution; but by this it is not excluded that charity by the love of concupiscence may long for and desire to attain that highest wage, to which it finally intends to come.

3. To that which is objected, that the love of charity is simply gratuitous, therefore it cannot be mercenary; it must be said that that argument is good concerning that hire which is repugnant to grace; but the hire of eternal life is not repugnant to grace, nay it is consonant with it, because it specially orders [one] to it. Hence just as the love of *concupiscence* is not repugnant to the love of friendship in charity, nay the more rightly one desires God, the more he pants toward his honor[^17]; so the affection of this kind of hire is not repugnant to grace.

4. To that which is objected concerning fear, that he who principally has his eye on punishment cannot be acceptable to God, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike. For since punishment is neither God nor anything of God: he who principally looks[^18] to punishment as the ultimate end is not rightly ordered, since he has a more principal regard to something other than to God. But the wage and the highest beatitude is God himself: and therefore one can principally look to it, and yet be rightly ordered to the end. — And so it is plain that there is nothing unfitting in saying that the motion of charity can be mercenary, if one is said mercenary from regard to the eternal and uncreated wage. And in this way the reasons run to the first part. But if mercenary be taken in another way, those reasons do not compel us to confess that the motion of charity can be mercenary[^19].

la: Vers. 17. Expositionem Ambrosii integram iam retulimus tom. I. pag. 34, nota 6. — Circa finem mg. pro *motum mercenarii* codd. A K W *motum mercenarium*. Deinde post *ex caritate* Vat. sola omittit *habere*.

en: Verse 17. We have already given the whole exposition of Ambrose in vol. I, p. 34, note 6. — Near the end, in the margin, for *motum mercenarii* codices A K W [read] *motum mercenarium*. Then after *ex caritate* the Vatican edition alone omits *habere*.

la: Psalm. 7, 10. in quem locum August., n. 9. dicit: « Finis enim curae delectatio est, quia eo quisque curis et cogitationibus nititur, ut ad suam delectationem perveniat ». Quae Augustini sententia a S. Bonaventura hic iisdem verbis affertur, quibus a Strabo affertur in Glossa ordinaria.

en: Psalm 7, 10, on which place Augustine, n. 9, says: « For the end of care is delight, because by his cares and thoughts each one strives toward this, that he may come to his own delight ». This saying of Augustine is here cited by St. Bonaventure in the same words in which it is cited by Strabo in the Glossa ordinaria.

la: Psalm. 118, 112. — Seq. testimonium est Hebr. 11, 26. — Paulo inferius voci *iustus* Vat. praefigit *vir*.

en: Psalm 118, 112. — The following testimony is Hebrews 11, 26. — A little below, to the word *iustus* the Vatican edition prefixes *vir*.

la: Vers. 23. — *De minori*, in qua pro *caritatis* codd. A T substituerunt *caritas*, cfr. infra dub. 3. in fine.

en: Verse 23. — *On the lesser [reading]*, in which for *caritatis* codices A T have substituted *caritas*; cf. below, dubium 3, at the end.

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Cap. 7. n. 17. Cfr. supra pag. 556, nota 4. In dicto Bernardi ante *serviri* cod. A supplet *Deo*, cod. V ante *Etsi*. — Seq. Bernardi testimonium invenitur in eius Epist. 143. n. 3: *Servite in caritate illa, quae timorem expellit, labores non sentit, meritum non intuetur, praemium non requirit*.

en: Ch. 7, n. 17. Cf. above, p. 556, note 4. In the saying of Bernard, before *serviri* codex A supplies *Deo*, codex V [does so] before *Etsi*. — The following testimony of Bernard is found in his Epistle 143, n. 3: *Serve in that charity which expels fear, does not feel labors, does not look to merit, does not require reward*.

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4, et Comment. p. II. a. 4. q. 4. seq. — Proxime post codd. A K U Z, verbis transpositis, *ergo pari ratione et amor*.

en: See below in the text of the Master, dist. XXXIV, ch. 4, and the Commentary, part II, art. 4, q. 4 and following. — Just after, codices A K U Z, with the words transposed, [read] *ergo pari ratione et amor*.

la: Vers. 13. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Gen. 13, 1.

en: Verse 13. — The following passage of Scripture is Genesis 13, 1. [i.e. Gen. 15, 1.]

la: Luc. 15, 17. Verba: « panibus abundat fidei, spei et caritatis », in Ambrosii expositione super hunc locum non inveniuntur, neque S. Bonav. in Comment. super hunc locum nomen Ambrosii commemorat. Ait ibi: « Alii sunt mercenarii... et isti sunt qui serviunt pro mercede aeterna; et tales abundant frequenter panibus fidei, spei et caritatis, de quibus supra (c. 11, 5.): Amice, commoda mihi tres panes ». In expositione autem horum verborum: *Amice, commoda* etc., Ambrosius (lib. VII. n. 87. seqq.) tangit tres virtutes theologales. — Paulo inferius pro *cum caritati repugnet* cod. N *immo caritati repugnat*.

en: Luke 15, 17. The words « abounds with the bread of faith, hope, and charity » are not found in Ambrose's exposition upon this place, nor does St. Bonaventure in the Commentary upon this place mention the name of Ambrose. He says there: « Some are hired servants... and these are they who serve for the eternal wage; and such frequently abound with the bread of faith, hope, and charity, concerning whom above (ch. 11, 5): Friend, lend me three loaves ». And in the exposition of these words: *Friend, lend* etc., Ambrose (book VII, n. 87 ff.) touches on the three theological virtues. — A little below, for *cum caritati repugnet* codex N [reads] *immo caritati repugnat*.

la: Hugo a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XIII. c. 8: « Sed forte mercenarius eris, si diligis Deum et servis ei, ut praemium ab illo accipias. Dicunt hoc stulti quidam, et tam stulti, ut se ipsos non intelligant. Diligimus Deum et servimus illi, sed non quaerimus praemium, ne mercenarii simus, etiam ipsum non quaerimus. Dabit, si voluerit, sed nos non quaerimus... Pura enim et gratuita et filiali dilectione diligimus, nihil quaerimus... Diligimus ipsum, sed non quaerimus aliquid, etiam ipsum non quaerimus, quem diligimus... Quomodo, inquiunt, mercenarii non sumus, si Deum propter hoc diligimus, ut praemium ab eo accipiamus? Non est gratis hoc amare, neque amor iste filialis, sed mercenarii et servi, qui pretium quaerit pro servitute sua. » — Paulo ante pro *ab affectu naturae* codd. A G (H N primitus) L V W aa *ab effectu naturae*.

en: Hugh of St. Victor, II. *On the Sacraments*, part XIII, ch. 8: « But perhaps you will be mercenary, if you love God and serve him in order to receive a reward from him. Certain fools say this, and so foolish that they do not understand themselves. We love God and serve him, but we do not seek a reward, lest we be mercenaries, nor do we even seek him. He will give, if he wills, but we do not seek... For with a pure and gratuitous and filial love we love, we seek nothing... We love him, but we do not seek anything, nor do we even seek him whom we love... How, they say, are we not mercenaries, if we love God for this, that we may receive a reward from him? This is not to love gratis, nor is that love filial, but of mercenaries and servants, [of one] who seeks a price for his service. » — A little before, for *ab affectu naturae* codices A G (H N originally) L V W aa [read] *ab effectu naturae*.

en: Philippians 1, 23.

la: August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 1. n. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 2. seq., et Comment. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, ch. 1, n. 1. Cf. Sentences I, text of the Master, dist. I, ch. 2 ff., and the Commentary, art. 2, q. 1.

la: Non alienum videtur hic afferre quae Hugo a S. Vict. loco paulo superius (in nota 6.) laudato (II. de Sacram. p. XIII. c. 8.) ulterius dicit: « Audite homines sapientes. Diligimus, inquiunt, ipsum, sed non quaerimus ipsum. Hoc est dicere; diligimus ipsum, sed non curamus de ipso. Ego homo sic diligi nollem a vobis. Si me diligeretis, ut de me non curaretis, ego de vestra dilectione non curarem. Vos videritis, si dignum est, ut Deo offeratis quod homo digne respueret ». Et etiam haec: « Qui hoc dicunt [scil. quod amor iste non sit filialis, sed mercenarius], virtutem dilectionis non intelligunt. Quid est enim diligere nisi ipsum velle habere? Non aliud ab ipso, sed ipsum, hoc est gratis; si aliud quaereres ab ipso, gratis non amares... Si te ipso aliquid amas, mercenarius; si tu ipse, amas et ipsum amas, filius es » etc. — Subinde pro *Si igitur* edd. *Si enim*.

en: It does not seem out of place here to add what Hugh of St. Victor, in the place cited a little above (in note 6) (II. *On the Sacraments*, part XIII, ch. 8), further says: « Hear, wise men. We love him, they say, but we do not seek him. This is to say: we love him, but we do not care about him. I, a man, would not wish to be so loved by you. If you loved me in such a way that you did not care about me, I would not care for your love. See whether it is worthy that you should offer to God what a man would worthily spurn ». And also this: « Those who say this [namely, that this love is not filial but mercenary] do not understand the power of love. For what is it to love except to wish to have him himself? Not something other than himself, but himself — this is [to love] gratis; if you were to seek something else from him, you would not love gratis... If you love something for your own sake, [you are] mercenary; if [you love] him for his own sake, and you love and love him, you are a son », etc. — Thereupon for *Si igitur* the editions [read] *Si enim*.

la: In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. ad conciliandas opiniones hic additur, « quod duplex est appetitus sive affectio, amicitiae scil. et commodi ». Illa, affectio scil. amicitiae, ut ibi exponitur, nunquam est mercenaria; haec autem, scil. affectio commodi, qua quis sibi bonum desiderat, si est absoluta, est mercenaria; si non absoluta, sed propter aliud mediante alio, v. gr. gratia et meritis, mercenaria quidem non erit, tamen non est a caritate effective, sed a spe, concomitante caritate.

en: In the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, to reconcile the opinions, there is added here that « appetite or affection is twofold, namely of friendship and of advantage ». That [affection], namely the affection of friendship, as it is there expounded, is never mercenary; but this one, namely the affection of advantage, by which one desires good for himself, if it is absolute, is mercenary; if not absolute, but on account of another by means of another, e.g. grace and merits, it will indeed not be mercenary, yet it is not from charity effectively, but from hope, charity accompanying.

la: August., Epist. 211. (alias 109.) n. 12: *Caritas enim, de qua scriptum est, quod non quaerit quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur, quia communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponit. Et ideo, quanto amplius rem communem quam propriam curaveritis, tanto amplius vos profecisse noveritis* etc. — Pro *vocatur*, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A P Q S, codd. B C D H L M O bb exhibent *vocat*, cod. Z *vocavit*, codd. R X *notant*, alii codd. vel *vocant* vel *notant*, edd. *notat*. Subinde pro *Quod autem* codd. Z bb *Qui autem*.

en: Augustine, Epistle 211 (otherwise 109), n. 12: *For charity, of which it is written that it seeketh not the things that are her own, is so understood, because it prefers common things to its own, not its own to common things. And therefore, the more you care for the common thing than for your own, the more you will know that you have advanced* etc. — For *vocatur*, which reading codices A P Q S defend, codices B C D H L M O bb give *vocat*, codex Z *vocavit*, codices R X *notant*, other codices either *vocant* or *notant*, the editions *notat*. Thereupon for *Quod autem* codices Z bb [read] *Qui autem*.

la: Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 5. (c. 4.); VIII. Ethic. c. 3. seqq.; II. Magnor. Moral. c. 12. (c. 11.); VII. Eudem. c. 3. seqq. Cfr. supra pag. 574, nota 5.

en: Book II of the *Rhetoric*, ch. 5 (ch. 4); VIII of the *Ethics*, ch. 3 ff.; II of the *Magna Moralia*, ch. 12 (ch. 11); VII of the *Eudemian [Ethics]*, ch. 3 ff. Cf. above, p. 574, note 5.

la: Codd. A H K aa et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *amorem*.

en: Codices A H K aa and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] *amorem* [in place of *honorem*].

la: Codd. A K *respicit*. Subinde edd., pro *ad finem* exhibentes *tanquam finem*, haec verba coniungunt cum praecedentibus et disiungunt post *ultimum*. Cod. bb *tanquam ad finem*.

en: Codices A K [read] *respicit*. Thereupon the editions, giving *tanquam finem* in place of *ad finem*, join these words with the preceding and separate [them] after *ultimum*. Codex bb [reads] *tanquam ad finem*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Page span.** q2 spans printed pp. 605–607 (PDF 627–629; pdf = printed + 22). It opens at the **foot of p.605 left column**, immediately below the close of d27-a2-q1's scholion (§III), with the `QUAESTIO II.` heading + title + opener + obj.1–2 (L-col), obj.3–4 + *Sed contra* 1 begin (R-col). Body continues: p.606 (*Sed contra* 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo + the two-opinion *dubium*), p.607 L-col + R-col top (Respondeo close + Solutio oppositorum Ad 1–4 + Epilogus). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion; clean running prose cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR.

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**Alignment.** Confirmed against d27-a2-q1's hand-off and the raw: raw line 42082 = `QUAESTIO II.`, title line 42083 = *Utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium*, opener line 42084 = `Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium. Et quod sic, videtur` (matches frontmatter `title_la` + the hand-off). **No q-swap.** The "Secundo quaeritur" ordinal aligns with this being the second question of ART. II.

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (18 entries).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page.
- **p.605 (q2 takes nn.1–4):** n.1 *Lucae decimo quinto¹* (Vers. 17 / Ambrose exposition, vol. I p.34 note 6); n.2 *Psalmi²* (Psalm 7,10 / Augustine, via Strabo's Glossa); n.3 *Psalmo³* (Psalm 118,112; Hebr. 11,26); n.4 *Philippenses primo⁴* (Vers. 23; *De minori* codd. A T variant). *(p.605 also bears d27-a2-q1's scholion I–III at the top; that scholion carries no numbered footers of its own — the q1 chunk noted this.)*
- **p.606 (nn.1–9, all q2):** contra/Respondeo markers *tertio¹* (1 Cor 13,5), *de Diligendo Deo²* (Bernard, c.7 n.17 + Epist. 143), *dividuntur³* (infra lit. Magistri d.XXXIV), *Ioannis decimo⁴* (Gen 13/15,1), *super illud⁵* (Luc 15,17 / Ambrose note), *filium patri suo⁶* (long Hugo a S. Vict. *de Sacram.* note), *Apostolus⁷* (Phil 1,23), *inhaerere⁸* (August. *de Doctr. christ.* I), *omne bonum⁹* (Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. on twofold appetite). n.6 and n.9 span both columns' footer bands.
- **p.607 (q2 takes nn.2–6; p.607 n.1 belongs to q3's opener):** *commune²* (August. Epist. 211 / communia propriis), *Philosophus³* (Aristot. Rhetor./Ethic./Magn. Moral./Eudem. on friendship), *honorem⁴* (codd. *amorem* variant), *aspicit⁵* (codd. A K *respicit*; edd. *tanquam finem* variant), *esse mercenarium⁶* (Epilogus: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*).

**Scholion.** **ABSENT — sibling redirect.** q2 carries **no scholion of its own**. Its Epilogus closes with note ⁶ « Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. » — the scholion for this question lives in d27-a2-q1 (§II–III of that chunk's scholion forward-point to the mercenary-love question). This is the normal missing-scholion-is-normal pattern; `has_scholion: false`.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body text and the 18 numbered footers resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands (OCR garbles — heading shatter `QDAKSTIO`, the `±`/`o.`/`!`/`?` digit-mangled obj. and footnote markers, two-column footer bleed — are unambiguous against the bands).

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a2-q3** (third question of ART. II, **CREATE NEW CHUNK** — file did not previously exist as a separate chunk): raw start **42214** (`QDAKSTIO III.` = `QUAESTIO III.`); exact title *Utrum idem motus dilectionis possit esse in Deum et in proximum*; opener `Tertio quaeritur, utrum idem motus dilectionis possit esse in Deum et in proximum. Et quod sic, videtur` (raw 42217). q3 begins **mid-p.607 R-col** (PDF 629), immediately below this chunk's Epilogus, running p.608+. **Footer split:** p.607 carries q2's nn.2–6 (above) and q3's n.1 (`In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal.`, attached to q3 opener *Idem est motus in finem¹*) + later p.607 notes (n.7 Aristot. V. Phys., the *respicit*/*extremi* notes); verify the p.607 footer band split at q3 promotion. q3's end boundary: raw line **42359** = `QUAESTIO IV.` (q4 opener `Quarto quaeritur, utrum quaelibet trium personarum...`, raw ~42362); everything from 42214 up to (not including) the QUAESTIO IV header at 42359 belongs to d27-a2-q3. (The old auto-chunked q2 file ran `line_end: 42358`, i.e. it had swallowed exactly q3 up to the q4 header — confirming the split point.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0