title: Dist. 50, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 1041 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum in damnatis erunt tenebrae spirituales quoad actum cognoscendi.*

> **On the footnote numbering.** Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The labels below are therefore page-qualified: this quaestio carries notes 8–9 of page 1041 (notes 1–7 of that page belong to the preceding quaestio, Article II q. 1) and notes 1–13 of page 1042. The same markers stand at the same places in the Latin and in the English.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum erunt ibi tenebrae spirituales quantum ad actum cognoscendi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia caeco, ubicumque est, est tenebra; sed mali et damnati sunt excaecati per malitiam, Sapientiae secundo[^p1041-8]: *Excaecavit eos malitia eorum*: ergo si ibi crescit malitia, ergo et caecitas.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit super Psalmum sextum[^p1041-9]: « Ibi tenebrae exteriores erunt, quia penitus extra Deum erunt. Quid enim est extra Deum esse, nisi in summa caecitate esse »? Ergo erunt in summa caecitate; et si hoc, nulla ergo erit ibi illuminatio spiritualis.

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3. Item, sicut intellectiva nata est illuminari ad verum, ita affectiva inflammari ad bonum; sed affectiva omnino privatur calore sive amore boni: ergo cognitiva lumine veri[^p1042-1].

4. Item, sicut affectiva delectatur in bonitate, sic cognitiva in veritate; sed a reprobis auferetur omnis delectatio: ergo omnis illuminatio et cognitio veritatis pari ratione[^p1042-2].

**Contra:**

1. Reprobi habent multorum cognitionem naturalem; sed nec poena nec culpa debet bona naturae destruere omnino: ergo aliqua in eis cognitio remanebit[^p1042-3].

2. Item, damnati habent remorsum conscientiae et vermem[^p1042-4]; sed conscientia non remordet nisi de peccatis, quae cognovit: ergo etc.

3. Item, videtur, quod amplius sit in damnatis de luce quam in viatoribus, etiam se ipsis; quod patet, quia multi interficiunt Martyres, arbitrantes, se bene facere, multi credunt impune peccare; sed tunc certi erunt, se fuisse deceptos[^p1042-5]: ergo lumen cognitionis eis accrescet; et si hoc, ergo videtur, quod Deus det novas illuminationes damnatis.

4. Item, videtur, quod saltem a parte speculationis tantum lumen sit in eis, quantum nunc: quia, si privatio luminis est per meritum peccati; sed meritum et demeritum est in potentia practica vel motiva, non in potentia speculativa[^p1042-6]: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Damnatis aliqua quidem manifesta sunt, sed ad cumulum dolorum; nihil autem lucis ipsi habent ad dirigendum et delectandum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut est triplex actus lucis corporalis, scilicet *manifestare*, *dirigere* et *delectare*; sic et in luce spirituali. Si loquamur quantum ad primum actum; sic dico, quod non omnino extra lucem erunt, quia aliqua erunt eis manifesta, sed illa solum, quae faciunt ad cumulum poenae, alia non; et ideo ista lux est ad manifestandum tenebras et ducens in tenebrositatem, non consistens in lumine[^p1042-7]. — Si loquamur quantum ad secundum actum, qui est *dirigere*; sic dico, quod omnino erunt extra lucem, quia non poterunt dirigi. Erunt enim extra omnem viam et tempus et locum bene agendi, sicut dicitur Ecclesiastis nono[^p1042-8]: *Quia nec opus nec ratio nec scientia est apud inferos.* — Si quantum ad tertium, qui est *delectare*; sic dico similiter, quod erunt extra lucem omnino, quia nihil cognoscent actu, in quo delectentur. Erunt enim omnino absorpti a magnitudine poenarum, ita ut non liceat eis cogitare aliqua delectabilia[^p1042-9].

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Quod ergo dicuntur omnino excaecati et extra Deum esse; hoc intelligitur quantum ad directionem et delectationem.

*Ad 3, 4.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod nullam habent cognitionem, quia nec affectus eorum habet boni amorem; dicendum, quod sicut non habebunt amorem boni honesti, sed commodi; sic nec cogitabunt de bono honesto, sed tantum commodo[^p1042-10]. — Vel dicendum, quod non est simile, quia plus corrumpitur per peccatum affectus quam intellectus.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod habent cognitionem naturalem et cognitionem peccatorum; dicendum, quod cognitio naturalis[^p1042-11] non abolebitur; sed tamen nulla in eis cognitio exibit in actum, quae ad ipsorum non faciat cruciatum vel per se, vel per accidens.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ampliorem habebunt illuminationem; dicendum, quod aliqua peccata cognoscent, quae modo non cognoscunt, non per novi luminis donationem, sed per poenae afflictionem, quia, ut dicit Gregorius[^p1042-12], « poena aperit oculos, quos culpa claudit ».

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum intellectum speculativum non est demeritum; dicendum, quod voluntas demeretur sibi et omnibus potentiis animae et membris corporis; ideo non tantum punitur in se ipsa, sed etiam in omnibus potentiis et membris, licet ipsa puniatur principalius[^p1042-13]. Et sic patet illud.

---

english:
### Article II. Question II. *Whether in the damned there will be spiritual darknesses as to the act of knowing.*

Secondly it is asked whether there will be there spiritual darknesses as regards the act of knowing. And that there will be, seems [to follow]:

1. Because for a blind man, wherever he is, there is darkness; but the wicked and the damned have been blinded by malice, Wisdom, chapter two[^p1041-8]: *Their own malice blinded them*: therefore, if malice grows there, then blindness too.

2. Likewise, Augustine says on the sixth Psalm[^p1041-9]: "There the exterior darknesses will be, because they will be utterly outside God. For what is it to be outside God, save to be in the highest blindness?" Therefore they will be in the highest blindness; and if so, then there will be no spiritual illumination there.

3. Likewise, just as the intellective [power] is born to be illumined toward the true, so the affective to be enkindled toward the good; but the affective is wholly deprived of the warmth or love of the good: therefore the cognitive [is wholly deprived] of the light of the true[^p1042-1].

4. Likewise, just as the affective is delighted in goodness, so the cognitive in truth; but from the reprobate every delight will be taken away: therefore, by parity of reasoning, every illumination and knowledge of truth [will be taken away][^p1042-2].

**On the contrary:**

1. The reprobate have a natural knowledge of many things; but neither punishment nor fault ought wholly to destroy the goods of nature: therefore some knowledge will remain in them[^p1042-3].

2. Likewise, the damned have remorse of conscience and the worm[^p1042-4]; but conscience does not gnaw except concerning sins which it has known: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that there is more of light in the damned than in wayfarers, even than in themselves [as they were]; which is plain, because many kill the Martyrs, thinking that they do well, and many believe that they sin with impunity; but then they will be certain that they had been deceived[^p1042-5]: therefore the light of knowledge will increase for them; and if so, then it seems that God gives new illuminations to the damned.

4. Likewise, it seems that at least on the side of speculation there is as much light in them as now: because, if the privation of light is through the merit of sin; but merit and demerit are in the practical or motive power, not in the speculative power[^p1042-6]: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *To the damned some things indeed are made manifest, but unto the heaping up of their sorrows; yet they have nothing of light for directing and for delighting.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as there is a threefold act of bodily light, namely *to make manifest*, *to direct* and *to delight*; so also in spiritual light. If we speak as regards the first act; thus I say that they will not be wholly outside light, because some things will be manifest to them, but only those which make for the heaping up of punishment, others not; and therefore that light is for making manifest the darknesses and is one leading into darkness, not consisting in light[^p1042-7]. — If we speak as regards the second act, which is *to direct*; thus I say that they will be wholly outside light, because they will not be able to be directed. For they will be outside every way and time and place of acting well, as is said in Ecclesiastes, chapter nine[^p1042-8]: *Because there is neither work, nor reason, nor knowledge among the dead.* — If [we speak] as regards the third, which is *to delight*; thus I say likewise that they will be outside light altogether, because they will know nothing in act in which they might be delighted. For they will be wholly absorbed by the magnitude of their punishments, so that it will not be permitted them to think of any delightful things[^p1042-9].

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1, 2.* That they are therefore said to be wholly blinded and to be outside God; this is understood as regards direction and delight.

*To 3, 4.* But to that which is objected, that they have no knowledge, because neither does their affection have the love of the good; it must be said that, just as they will not have the love of the honorable good, but of the advantageous; so neither will they think about the honorable good, but only about the advantageous[^p1042-10]. — Or it must be said that the case is not similar, because the affection is more corrupted by sin than the intellect.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected to the contrary, that they have natural knowledge and knowledge of their sins; it must be said that natural knowledge[^p1042-11] will not be abolished; but nevertheless no knowledge in them will issue into act which does not make for their torment either *per se* or *per accidens*.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that they will have a fuller illumination; it must be said that they will know some sins which they now do not know, not through the bestowal of a new light, but through the affliction of punishment, because, as Gregory says[^p1042-12], "punishment opens the eyes which fault closes."

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that as regards the speculative intellect there is no demerit; it must be said that the will earns demerit for itself and for all the powers of the soul and the members of the body; therefore it is punished not only in itself, but also in all the powers and members, although it is itself punished more principally[^p1042-13]. And thus that is plain.

---

la: Vers. 21: *Excaecavit enim illos malitia eorum.*

en: Verse 21: *For their own malice blinded them.*

la: Vers. 8. n. 8. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, ubi post *quia* additur *tunc peccatores.*

en: Verse 8, n. 8. See here the Master's text, c. 2, where after *quia* is added *tunc peccatores.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et lib. *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera August.), c. 12.

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1, and the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 12.

la: Vide quaest. praeced. 3. pro parte negativa.

en: See the preceding question, [argument] 3 for the negative side.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 122, nota 8. verba Dionysii respectu daemonum, et supra pag. 1038, nota 3.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 122, note 8, the words of Dionysius with respect to the demons, and above, p. 1038, note 3.

la: De quo infra p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Pro *cognovit* codd. E F L *cognoscit*.

en: On which see below, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — For *cognovit* codices E F L read *cognoscit*.

la: Cfr. Sap. 5, 1. seqq. — Superius pro *etiam se ipsis*, quod codd. K R S (I a secunda manu) et ed. I omittunt, cod. G *etiam in se ipsis*, cod. Y *in se ipsis*, plures codd. *et se ipsis*.

en: Cf. Wisdom 5:1 ff. — Above, for *etiam se ipsis*, which codices K R S (I by a second hand) and edition I omit, codex G [reads] *etiam in se ipsis*, codex Y *in se ipsis*, and several codices *et se ipsis*.

la: Vide supra pag. 990, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 990, note 2.

la: Simile docet, supra pag. 1041, nota 5., Isidor. de lumine corporali. — Edd. *ideo non consistent in lumine.*

en: Isidore teaches the like of bodily light, above, p. 1041, note 5. — The editions read *ideo non consistent in lumine.*

la: Vers. 10: *Quia nec opus nec ratio nec sapientia nec scientia erunt apud inferos.*

en: Verse 10: *Because there will be neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge among the dead.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See here the Master's text, c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 1038, nota 7. — De altera huius obiect. solutione vide II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. (in eadem quaest. cit. insinuatur etiam solut. ad seq. obiect.), et lit. Magistri, d. XXXIX. c. 2.

en: Cf. above, p. 1038, note 7. — On the other solution of this objection see II Sent., d. 7, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (in the same question cited, the solution to the following objection is also intimated), and the Master's text, d. XXXIX, c. 2.

la: Nonnulli codd. *peccatoris*, cod. X (E a secunda manu) *naturalis peccatoris*, edd. *peccatorum*.

en: Several codices read *peccatoris*, codex X (E by a second hand) *naturalis peccatoris*, the editions *peccatorum*.

la: Libr. XV. Moral. c. 51. n. 58: *Et quia impiorum oculos culpa claudit, sed in extremum poena aperit, recte subiungitur: Et cum reddiderit, tunc sciet* (Iob 21, 19.).

en: *Morals*, bk. XV, c. 51, n. 58: *And because fault closes the eyes of the impious, but punishment opens them at the last, it is rightly added: And when he shall have repaid, then shall he know* (Job 21:19).

la: De quo fusius II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: On which more fully II Sent., d. 41, a. 2, q. 3. — See the scholion on the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR, raw lines 110926–111161 of `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, with every column and every footer register verified against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p104{1,2}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (measured gutters 1041:1659, 1042:2095). Bands were **not** regenerated. Read left column top→bottom, then right; body bands then footer bands.

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**Scholion.** None in this chunk, and none expected: Article II's scholion prints on p.1041 under the `SCHOLION` header belonging to q. 1, and its part II expressly covers the following questions (*De cognitione damnatorum plura quaeruntur infra p. II. a. 1; ubi etiam ab aliis Lombardi commentatoribus duae seqq. quaestiones… implicite solvuntur*). p.1042's note 13 likewise points back: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* `has_scholion: false` is correct.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 50, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 1043 -->

> The numbered footnotes below are page-qualified: all eleven are notes 1–11 of printed page 1043.
> Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels carry the page number
> to keep them unique within this file. The markers stand at the same positions in the Latin body
> and in the English translation.

### Quaestio III. *Utrum in damnatis sint tenebrae spirituales quoad actum memorandi.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in damnatis sint tenebrae quantum ad actum memorandi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastici undecimo[^p1043-1]: *Malitia unius horae oblivionem facit luxuriae maximae*: ergo maiorem oblivionem facit aeterna poena, et sic patet etc.

2. Item, hoc videtur per illud quod dicitur in littera[^p1043-2]: « Exteriores tenebrae intelligi possunt quaedam malignitas odii et quaedam oblivio Dei, quae tunc excrescent ».

3. Item, hoc videtur *ratione*: quia recte oblitus est qui non habet copiam memorandi; sed damnati non habent copiam memorandi; unde dicit Augustinus in littera[^p1043-3], quod « quia nimio dolore premuntur, adeo stupescunt et terrentur, ut interim mentem in aliam cogitationem non ferant »: ergo etc.

4. Item, damnati erunt subiecti tempori, secundum illud Psalmi[^p1043-4]: *Erit tempus eorum in saecula*, et aliis infirmitatibus: ergo videtur, quod ex longitudine temporis possint omnium oblivisci, sicut nunc videmus in nobis.

**Contra:** 1. Imago non tolletur a damnatis; sed imago consistit in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate respectu Dei[^p1043-5]: ergo saltem Dei habebunt memoriam.

2. Item, constat, quod non habent remorsum nisi de peccatis praeteritis; sed de nullo habent remorsum, nisi de quo cogitant: ergo cogitant de peccatis praeteritis, ergo et eorum memorantur.

3. Item, hoc videtur per illud quod damnati dicent, Sapientiae quinto[^p1043-6]: *Dicent intra se, poenitentiam agentes: hi sunt quos aliquando habuimus in derisum*: ergo rememorabuntur praeteritorum.

4. Item, Abraham dixit diviti[^p1043-7]: *Recordare, quod recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala*; sed hoc non dixisset, si non potuisset recordari: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *In damnatis sunt tenebrae spirituales, ut non recordentur sive Dei sive aliorum ad consolationem et itineris directionem, sed tantum ad moerorem et confusionem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad hoc facile est respondere, si revocatur ad mentem distinctio praecedens[^p1043-8]: quoniam est recordatio aliquorum ad *moestitiam* et dolorem et confusionem, aliquorum ad *itineris directionem*, aliquorum ad *consolationem*. Secundam et tertiam non habebunt damnati, nec respectu Dei nec respectu aliorum, quia non erit eis memoria Dei, vel ut convertantur sive revertantur ad ipsum, aut ut delectentur in ipso. Vigebit tamen in eis actus memoriae quantum ad primum, scilicet *desolationem*, quia semper habebunt memoriam peccatorum, quae commiserunt, et Dei, quem offenderunt, ad suam confusionem. — Nec hoc repugnabit poenis: quia poenae exteriores ducent ad cogitandum interius suum demeritum[^p1043-9]; et ita recordatio illa non est eis via lucis, sed tenebrarum, nec ponet hominem in statu bono vel in Deo, sed potius elongabit a Deo et a vero lumine.

Et sic patent rationes ad utramque partem. — Verumtamen illud argumentum, quod facit de tempore et passibilitate damnatorum, non valet: quia, sicut corpora passibilia erunt immortalia, ita, etsi anima sit subiecta variationi passionum, adeo tamen erit actus memorandi conversus ad ea quae spectant ad poenam, et adeo sine intermissione, quod non poterit anima oblivisci. — Et illud magis patebit ultimo[^p1043-10], cum agetur de verme. Haec autem sufficiant ad praesens, quibus intellectis, satis patet littera[^p1043-11].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether in the damned there are spiritual darknesses as to the act of remembering.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether in the damned there are darknesses as to the act of remembering. And that there are, it seems:

1. From that which is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter eleven[^p1043-1]: *The malice of one hour makes forgetfulness of the greatest luxury*: therefore eternal punishment makes a greater forgetfulness, and so it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, this seems from that which is said in the text[^p1043-2]: « The exterior darknesses can be understood as a certain malignity of hatred and a certain forgetfulness of God, which shall then grow up ».

3. Likewise, this seems *by reason*: because he is rightly said to have forgotten who has not the resource of remembering; but the damned have not the resource of remembering; whence Augustine says in the text[^p1043-3], that « because they are pressed by excessive grief, they are so stupefied and terrified that meanwhile they do not bear their mind into any other thought »: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the damned will be subject to time, according to that of the Psalm[^p1043-4]: *Their time shall be for ever*, and to other infirmities: therefore it seems that from the length of time they can forget all things, as we now see in ourselves.

**On the contrary:** 1. The image will not be taken away from the damned; but the image consists in memory, intelligence and will with respect to God[^p1043-5]: therefore at least of God they will have memory.

2. Likewise, it is agreed that they have remorse only for past sins; but they have remorse for nothing except that of which they think: therefore they think of past sins, and therefore they also remember them.

3. Likewise, this seems from that which the damned shall say, Wisdom, chapter five[^p1043-6]: *They shall say within themselves, doing penance: these are they whom we once had in derision*: therefore they shall be reminded of things past.

4. Likewise, Abraham said to the rich man[^p1043-7]: *Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime, and Lazarus likewise evil things*; but he would not have said this, if he could not have remembered: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *In the damned there are spiritual darknesses, so that they remember neither God nor others unto consolation and the direction of the journey, but only unto sorrow and confusion.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to this it is easy to reply, if the preceding distinction is called back to mind[^p1043-8]: since there is a remembering of some things unto *sadness* and grief and confusion, of some unto *the direction of the journey*, of some unto *consolation*. The second and the third the damned will not have, neither with respect to God nor with respect to others, because there will not be for them a memory of God, either that they might be converted or turn back to him, or that they might take delight in him. Yet the act of memory will be vigorous in them as to the first, namely *desolation*, because they will always have the memory of the sins which they committed, and of God, whom they offended, unto their own confusion. — Nor will this be repugnant to the punishments: because the exterior punishments will lead to thinking inwardly upon their own demerit[^p1043-9]; and thus that remembering is for them not a way of light, but of darkness, nor will it set a man in a good state or in God, but rather will remove him far from God and from the true light.

And so the reasons on both sides are clear. — Nevertheless that argument which is made from the time and the passibility of the damned is not valid: because, just as passible bodies will be immortal, so, even if the soul is subject to the variation of the passions, yet the act of remembering will be so turned toward those things which pertain to punishment, and so without intermission, that the soul will not be able to forget. — And that will appear more fully at the last[^p1043-10], when the worm is treated of. But let these things suffice for the present; and these being understood, the text is sufficiently clear[^p1043-11].

---

la: Vers. 29: *Malitia horae oblivionem facit luxuriae magnae.*

en: Verse 29: *The malice of an hour makes forgetfulness of great luxury.*

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Hic c. 2. Pro *terrentur* codd. L aa (bb a secunda manu) *turbantur*, quod etiam exhibet textus originalis, sed in aliquibus aliis discrepat.

en: Here, c. 2. For *terrentur* ("they are terrified") codices L and aa (bb by a second hand) read *turbantur* ("they are troubled"), which the original text also exhibits, though in some other respects it differs.

la: Psalm. 80, 16: *Inimici Domini mentiti sunt ei, et erit tempus* etc.

en: Psalm 80:16: *The enemies of the Lord have lied to him, and their time shall be* etc.

la: Ut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: As was shown in I *Sentences*, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vers. 3: *Dicentes intra se, poenitentiam agentes et prae angustia spiritus gementes: hi sunt* etc.

en: Verse 3: *Saying within themselves, doing penance and groaning for anguish of spirit: these are they* etc.

la: Luc. 16, 25: *Recordare, quia* [ita etiam cod. H] *recepisti* etc.

en: Luke 16:25: *Remember that* [so also codex H] *thou didst receive* etc.

la: In praeced. quaest. posita.

en: Set down in the preceding question.

la: Vide supra pag. 1042, nota 12. — Inferius posuimus ex codd. G L R T X aa *vel in Deo*, cod. M (E a secunda manu) *prope Deum* (plures codd. *poni Deo*), cod. K (I a secunda manu) *nec appropinquabit Deo*, edd. *coram Deo*.

en: See above, p. 1042, note 12. — Below we have set, from codices G L R T X aa, *vel in Deo* ("or in God"); codex M (E by a second hand) *prope Deum* ("near God") — several codices *poni Deo* ("to be placed for God"); codex K (I by a second hand) *nec appropinquabit Deo* ("nor will he draw near to God"); the editions *coram Deo* ("before God").

la: Infra p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — Inferius pro *patet littera* codd. L Y *patent litteralia*.

en: Below, p. II, a. 2, q. 3. — Below, for *patet littera* ("the text is clear") codices L and Y read *patent litteralia* ("the literal matters are clear").

en: See the scholion on question 1 of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L111162–111261, with every line verified against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p1043-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (measured gutter 1043:1610). Footer registers read entirely off the bands, not the raw. No bands were regenerated.

**Page span corrected: [1043, 1044] → [1043].** The chunk is wholly contained on printed p. 1043. Raw L111257 is p. 1044's *running head* (`1044  SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.`), page furniture only; p. 1044's first body element is `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM L. / Pars II.` at L111262, verified on band `vol4-p1044-L-0.png`. `pdf_pages` narrowed to [1063] accordingly.

**Title verified.** The line immediately after the `QUAESTIO III.` header reads *Utrum in damnatis sint tenebrae spirituales quoad actum memorandi.* — matches the skeleton's `title_la` exactly. Note the header and the title line both print **centred full-width across the gutter** (the lost-question signature): the L band carries `QUAESTI` / `Utrum in damnatis sint tenebrae sp…` and the R band `…ESTIO III.` / `…e spirituales quoad actum memorandi.` The raw happened to recover it, but the header would not survive a naive `grep QUAESTIO`.

**Opening hand-off verified independently.** p. 1043's L band opens with the running head `DIST. L. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` (page number `1043` on the R band), then `QUAESTIO III.` immediately — no trailing text from `p1-a2-q2` on this page. The neighbour's report is confirmed rather than assumed. The chunk's own opener, *Tertio quaeritur…*, is the third of the three questions Article II promises, and the body opens grammatically clean.

**Closing boundary verified.** The chunk closes *…quibus intellectis, satis patet littera.* — a complete, parsing sentence, and the natural close of Pars I. Nothing is trapped between L111261 and L111262: the intervening lines are blank plus p. 1044's running head. Pars II's `COMMENTARIUS` / `Pars II.` / `DIVISIO TEXTUS` genuinely begins at L111262. No swallowed question at this seam.

**Apparatus split map (p. 1043, 11 notes, all this chunk's).**
- Left footer register: notes **1–6**.
- Right footer register: notes **7–11**.
- **Binding crossing:** note **7** (*Luc. 16, 25*, on Abraham's *Recordare*) anchors in the **left** body column — the last of the *Contra* arguments — but prints in the **right** footer. Bound by content, not by position. All other notes anchor in the column whose footer prints them (1–6 left body/left footer; 8–11 right body/right footer).
- No register is shared with a neighbouring chunk: the whole of p. 1043 is this quaestio.

**Head/tail runover check — p. 1043.** *Head:* the left footer opens directly with a numbered `1` (*Vers. 29…*); there is **no** unnumbered fragment carried over from p. 1042. The right footer likewise opens directly with numbered `7`. *Tail:* note 6 closes cleanly (*…hi sunt etc.*) and note 11 closes cleanly (*…huius articuli quaest.*); neither breaks off mid-sentence, so **nothing runs over onto p. 1044**. Both registers are self-contained.

**Scholion:** none, and correctly none. Note 11 says explicitly *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* — Article II's scholion lives in `p1-a2-q1`. `has_scholion: false` is right.

**Band readings preferred over the raw** (raw garble → band reading, all resolved at band time, no guesses):
- note 5: raw `1. Sent. d. 3. p. II. n. I. q. 2.` → band **`I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.`**
- note 10: raw `Infra p. II. n. 2. q. .'i.` → band **`Infra p. II. a. 2. q. 3.`**
- note 9: raw `pi-opeDeiim (plin^es codd. poni Deo) cod. IC` and `appropirniitdbit` → band **`prope Deum (plures codd. poni Deo), cod. K`** and **`appropinquabit`**
- body: raw `Vigehil`, `demeritum`, `passilMIitate`, `ct adeo`, `lemeraorabuntur` → band **`Vigebit`, `demeritum`, `passibilitate`, `et adeo`, `rememorabuntur`**.

**Marginal glosses trimmed** (editorial side-marginalia, not Bonaventure's text, per the OCR-cleanup rule): `Argg. pro parte affirmativa.` (beside arg. 1), `Argg. pro parte negativa.` (beside Contra 1), `Distinctio.` and `Conclusio.` (beside the Respondeo), `Ad arg. 4. pro parte affirm.` (beside the *Verumtamen* paragraph), and `Desunt dubia circa lit.` (beside the closing lines). The last is worth recording: it is the editors' marginal notice that **Pars I carries no dubia circa litteram**, which is consistent with there being no `p1-dubium` chunk.

**Ambiguity flags:** none. Every band read was legible.

**Anchor count:** Latin 11, English 11 — matched.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 50, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 1044 -->

### Articulus I. *De cognitione animae separatae.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum anima separata habeat usum potentiae sensitivae.*

> **De numeratione notarum.** Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The labels below are therefore page-qualified: notes 2–4 of page 1044, notes 1–12 of page 1045, notes 1–11 of page 1046, and notes 1–2 of page 1047. Note 1 of page 1044 anchors in the preceding *divisio* chunk; notes 3–4 of page 1047 anchor in the following quaestio.

Quantum ergo ad primum est quaestio, utrum anima separata habeat usum potentiae sensitivae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Evangelii, Lucae decimo sexto[^p1044-2]: *Elevans oculos vidit Lazarum* etc. Omnia illa, quae ibi tanguntur, dicunt cognitionem sensitivam et per modum sensus: ergo etc.

2. Item, Cassiodorus in libro suo de Anima[^p1044-3], loquens de anima separata, dicit: « Videt, audit, tangit ac reliquis sensibus efficacius valet ».

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia tanto substantia per potentiam melius et facilius operatur, quanto est liberior et ab errore immunior; sed substantia animae rationalis separata habet potentiam cognitivam, quia impossibile est, destrui potentiam, quae fundatur in substantia perpetua. Et *iterum*, est substantia[^p1044-4] liberior et spiritualior: ergo ad actum cognitionis liberior: ergo melius potest ea uti, tam interiori quam exteriori, quam nunc.

4. Item, constat, quod anima separata cognoscit res abstractas a conditionibus materialibus, cognoscit res sub conditionibus materialibus, absente materia,

<!-- page 1045 -->

et iterum, cognoscit sub conditionibus individualibus, praesente materia vel obiecto[^p1045-1]; hoc constat: ergo intelligit et imaginatur et sentit, ergo habet usum omnis potentiae.

*Si tu dicas*, quod hoc facit per unam et eandem vim; *contra:* 5. Isti actus sunt maioris abstractionis et minoris[^p1045-2]: si ergo abstractio maior fit secundum gradus spiritualitatis potentiarum, et una potentia non habet gradus spiritualitatis maioris et minoris: ergo necesse est, quod hoc faciat per tres potentias.

6. Item, si intellectus animae separatae potest haec omnia, tunc videtur, quod cum frustra fiat per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora[^p1045-3], quod frustra dedit Deus tres potentias animae.

7. Item, si potest totum intellectus quantum ad ista tria: ergo deficientibus sensibus, nihilominus poterit cognoscere sensibilia; quod est manifeste falsum et contra experientiam et contra Philosophum[^p1045-4], qui dicit, quod « deficiente sensu, necesse est, scientiam deficere, quae est secundum illum sensum ». — *Si tu dicas*, quod hoc habet anima separata; *ego quaero:* quare separata potest totum per intellectum, non autem coniuncta? — *Si tu dicas*, quod hoc est propter molem carnis[^p1045-5]; *obiicitur* de statu Adae, ubi anima non habebat carnem opprimentem, nec tamen hoc poterat solo intellectu, quia frustra haberet sensus.

**Contra:** 1. « Sentire, ut vult Philosophus[^p1045-6], est operatio *coniuncti* »: ergo cum, facta separatione, iam non sit animal, iam non erit operatio sensus.

2. Item, sensus, sive interior[^p1045-7] sive exterior, est potentia egens organo determinato: ergo est potentia alligata organo: ergo cessante organo, non habet operationem.

3. Item, hoc videtur experimento: quia caecus habet potentiam videndi, et amisso oculo, non potest videre, nec phreneticus recordari: ergo si perdit organum potentia sensitiva, quando omnino separatur, magis perdit operationem, quam quando organum solum laeditur: ergo cessat omnis eius operatio.

4. Item, in omni potentia cognitiva necesse est reperire *agentem* et *passibilem*, et hoc *per differentiam*[^p1045-8]. Si enim differunt in intellectu, qui est potentia simplicior et spiritualior, multo magis in potentia sensitiva; sed potentia sensitiva non dividitur in *agentem* et *passibilem* in se[^p1045-9]: ergo necesse est, quod praeter se habeat passibilem. Sed hoc non est nisi organum corporale, quod recipit ad hoc, quod homo cognoscat: ergo cum post separationem sit activa sine passiva, et sine his duabus impossibile est, potentiam cognitivam fieri in actu; ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Anima separata per potentiam intellectivam cognoscit ad modum Angelorum omnia quae cognoscebant etiam aliae potentiae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem triplex fuit doctorum opinio.

Quidam namque dixerunt, quod anima separata, cum trahat secum omnes potentias, *omnibus* utitur tanquam substantia liberior; nec dicunt[^p1045-10] esse credendum philosophis in hac parte: quia nec recte intellexerunt cognitionem post separationem animae nec ulterius unitatem, propter quam in una anima sunt tres potentiae, scilicet rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis, et in eadem substantia perpetuo radicantur, cum qua necessario separantur; quod philosophi non cognoverunt, sed Sancti. Et quoniam fides nostra dicit, animas cruciari ignibus[^p1045-11]; et Cassiodorus dicit, quod « aliis sensibus efficacius valet »: ideo posuerunt, animam usum omnium potentiarum habere.

Secunda positio est, quod anima habet potentias *sensitivas*, illa, inquam, quae rationalis est. Sed quoniam omnes sensitivae exteriores uniuntur in origine et[^p1045-12] in sensu communi et distinguuntur in organis; ideo necessario, cum separatur anima a corpore, recurrunt omnes potentiae ad *unam originem*, scilicet ad sensum communem, et per illum sensum potest anima libera, quod poterat per omnes alios exteriores ratione alligationis cum corpore, et

<!-- page 1046 -->

illo utitur ad actus omnium sensuum; et ita utitur sensu interiori, non solum intellectu; et iste sensus est qui trahit secum phantasmata. Et hanc positionem confirmant per Augustinum, qui dicit de Spiritu et anima, et duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram[^p1046-1], quod anima trahit secum imagines rerum corporalium et per illas imaginatur et cognoscit, cum utitur potentia sensitiva interiori.

Tertia positio est, quod anima rationalis separata nihil cognoscit nisi mediante potentia *intellectiva*; per illam autem potest cognoscere non solum quod cognoscebat in corpore, sed etiam omne[^p1046-2] quod cognoscebant aliae potentiae, propter sui libertatem, sicut unus Angelus. Per potentias *sensitivas* nihil potest operari, sicut nec per *vegetativas*, quoniam dependent ab organo corporali, sicut manifestum est intuenti. Ergo sicut corpore corrupto, nihil operatur per potentias, quae respiciunt *vegetabilem*: ita nihil operatur per potentias, quae respiciunt sensibilem. — Per *intellectum* autem cognoscit res sub conditionibus materialibus, *praesente materia*, et hoc est *sensus exterioris*; et res sub conditionibus materialibus, *absente materia*, et hoc est *imaginationis*; et illas etiam res cognoscit, abstractis omnibus materialibus, et hoc est *intellectus*[^p1046-3]; et haec omnia vere facit. Et ideo recte dicitur anima separata *sentire, imaginari* et *intelligere*, non per diversas potentias, sed per *unam*, quae potest omnibus his modis cognoscere, sicut ponere est in Angelo, ut patet ex secundo libro[^p1046-4].

Ad maiorem autem intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut « in omni natura est aliquid, quo est *fieri*, et aliquid, quo est *facere*[^p1046-5] »; sic et in omni cognitione; et cum haec sit prima divisio potentiae per *activum* et *passivum*, necesse est, ista *differre*; verumtamen secundum gradus maioris et minoris simplicitatis et spiritualitatis habent maiorem et minorem differentiam. *Intellectiva* namque, pro eo quod est spiritualior et abstractior, habet utramque potentiam, quae respicit substantiam spiritualem, ita quod *activa* est ratione ipsius *quo est*, et *passiva* ratione ipsius *quod est*, scilicet materiae et formae[^p1046-6]. — In potentia autem *sensitiva*, quae est minus spiritualis, *activa* potentia est ex parte animae, et *passiva* ex organo; et ideo, quia sensus non est sine actione et passione, ideo *sentire* dicitur esse operatio *coniuncti*. Et *iterum*, cum *activa* nihil agat sine *passiva*; et quando anima amittit corpus, amittit *passivam* respectu actus sentiendi: ideo impossibile est, quod aliquo sensu utatur, sive interiori sive exteriori, quamdiu est separata.

Haec autem opinio magis est rationi consona nec repugnat fidei nec Sanctorum auctoritati. Ponit enim, quod anima per potentiam intellectivam intelligat et cognoscat his tribus modis, quibus nunc, et Angelus similiter, his, inquam, tribus modis a parte *rei cognitae*; et illud[^p1046-7] dicitur *intelligere, imaginari* et *sentire*, secundum quod Sancti dicunt. Et ita intelligendae sunt auctoritates Sanctorum.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de illo divite; dicendum, quod lingua illa non erat nisi lingua *imaginativa*[^p1046-8]. Anima enim defert imagines non tantum in potentia inferiori; sed, cum separatur, habet in memoria intelligibili, quae non eget organo corporali.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Cassiodoro, dicendum, quod non loquitur de sensibus exterioribus, sed de interioribus, qui nihil aliud sunt quam ipse intellectus, prout habet modum apprehendendi ipsorum sensuum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima separata est liberior; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad potentiam *activam*; sed quando caret *passiva*, non potest operari, sicut nec[^p1046-9] ignis sine combustibili, non propter imperfectionem sui in se, sed propter hoc, quod necessario exigit ad exeundum in opus.

*Ad 4. 5. 6. 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognoscit tripliciter; dicendum, quod hoc facit separata per unam et eandem potentiam[^p1046-10]. — Quod obiicitur de abstractione, dicendum, quod hoc non facit diversitatem, quoniam una potentia est, secundum quam anima ordinat totam lineam praedicamentalem[^p1046-11], et *ascendit* abstrahendo sive resolvendo ab infimo usque ad supremum, et *descendit* componendo a generalissimo usque ad individuum. Solius enim

<!-- page 1047 -->

potentiae rationalis est comparare individuum ad speciem et eiusdem considerare genus generalissimum[^p1047-1]; et ideo abstractio in his tribus actibus non est sufficiens ratio ad diversificandum potentias, sed magis coniunctio peroptima et decentissima, secundum quam factum est, ut anima, quamdiu est in carne, habeat potentias, secundum quas alligetur et communicet corpori operationem suam et in *regendo* sive vivificando et in *cognoscendo*[^p1047-2]. — Et sic patet, quare intellectus non habet hoc *posse*, quamdiu est coniunctus, propter alligationem et ordinem et connexionem potentiarum animae ad se et ad corpus; non sic autem, cum est separatus. — Et sic patet totum.

english:
### Article I. *On the cognition of the separated soul.*
### Question I. *Whether the separated soul has the use of the sensitive power.*

As to the first, then, the question is whether the separated soul has the use of the sensitive power. And that it does, seems to be so:

1. First, by the authority of the Gospel, Luke sixteen[^p1044-2]: *Lifting up his eyes he saw Lazarus* etc. All those things which are touched upon there bespeak a sensitive cognition and one after the manner of sense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Cassiodorus in his book *On the Soul*[^p1044-3], speaking of the separated soul, says: « It sees, it hears, it touches, and with the remaining senses it is more efficaciously strong ».

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because a substance operates through a power the better and the more easily, the freer it is and the more immune from error; but the substance of the rational soul, once separated, has a cognitive power, because it is impossible that a power be destroyed which is founded in a perpetual substance. And *again*, it is a substance[^p1044-4] freer and more spiritual: therefore freer for the act of cognition: therefore it can use it better, both the interior and the exterior, than now.

4. Likewise, it is agreed that the separated soul knows things abstracted from material conditions; it knows things under material conditions, the matter being absent;

and again, it knows under individual conditions, the matter or the object being present[^p1045-1]; this is agreed: therefore it understands and imagines and senses, therefore it has the use of every power.

*If you say* that it does this by one and the same power; *on the contrary:* 5. These acts are of greater and lesser abstraction[^p1045-2]: if therefore the greater abstraction comes about according to the degrees of spirituality of the powers, and one power does not have degrees of greater and lesser spirituality: therefore it is necessary that it do this by three powers.

6. Likewise, if the intellect of the separated soul can do all these things, then it seems that, since it is in vain that a thing be done by more when it can be done by fewer[^p1045-3], God gave the three powers to the soul in vain.

7. Likewise, if the intellect can do the whole with respect to these three: therefore, the senses failing, it will nonetheless be able to know sensible things; which is manifestly false and against experience and against the Philosopher[^p1045-4], who says that « when the sense fails, the knowledge which is according to that sense must necessarily fail ». — *If you say* that the separated soul has this; *I ask:* why can the separated soul do the whole through the intellect, but not the conjoined soul? — *If you say* that this is on account of the mass of the flesh[^p1045-5]; *the objection is raised* concerning the state of Adam, where the soul did not have oppressing flesh, and yet it could not do this by intellect alone, since it would have the senses in vain.

**On the contrary:** 1. « To sense, as the Philosopher holds[^p1045-6], is the operation of the *composite* »: therefore, since after the separation is made it is no longer an animal, there will no longer be an operation of sense.

2. Likewise, sense, whether interior[^p1045-7] or exterior, is a power needing a determinate organ: therefore it is a power bound to an organ: therefore, the organ ceasing, it does not have its operation.

3. Likewise, this is seen by experiment: because a blind man has the power of seeing, and, the eye being lost, he cannot see, nor can a frenzied man remember: therefore, if the sensitive power loses its organ, when it is altogether separated it loses its operation more than when the organ is merely injured: therefore all its operation ceases.

4. Likewise, in every cognitive power it is necessary to find an *agent* and a *patient*, and this *by a difference*[^p1045-8]. For if they differ in the intellect, which is a simpler and more spiritual power, much more so in the sensitive power; but the sensitive power is not divided into *agent* and *patient* within itself[^p1045-9]: therefore it is necessary that it have the patient outside itself. But this is nothing other than a bodily organ, which receives unto this, that a man may know: therefore, since after the separation it is active without a passive, and without these two it is impossible that a cognitive power be brought into act; therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *The separated soul, through the intellective power, knows after the manner of the Angels all the things which the other powers also used to know.*

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this question there was a threefold opinion of the doctors.

For certain men said that the separated soul, since it draws all its powers with itself, uses *all of them* as a freer substance; nor do they say[^p1045-10] that the philosophers are to be believed in this matter: because they neither rightly understood cognition after the separation of the soul, nor further the unity on account of which in one soul there are three powers, namely the rational, the sensible and the vegetable, and they are perpetually rooted in the same substance, with which they are necessarily separated; which the philosophers did not know, but the Saints did. And since our faith says that souls are tormented by fire[^p1045-11]; and Cassiodorus says that « with the other senses it is more efficaciously strong »: therefore they posited that the soul has the use of all its powers.

The second position is that the soul has the *sensitive* powers — that soul, I mean, which is rational. But since all the exterior sensitive powers are united in their origin and[^p1045-12] in the common sense, and are distinguished in their organs; therefore necessarily, when the soul is separated from the body, all the powers run back to *one origin*, namely to the common sense, and through that sense the soul, once free, can do what it could do through all the other exterior senses by reason of its binding with the body, and

it uses it for the acts of all the senses; and thus it uses an interior sense, not the intellect alone; and this is the sense which draws the phantasms with itself. And they confirm this position through Augustine, who says in *On the Spirit and the Soul*, and in the twelfth book *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^p1046-1], that the soul draws with itself the images of bodily things and through them imagines and knows, when it uses the interior sensitive power.

The third position is that the separated rational soul knows nothing except by the mediation of the *intellective* power; and through it it can know not only what it knew in the body, but also everything[^p1046-2] which the other powers used to know, on account of its freedom, like a single Angel. Through the *sensitive* powers it can operate nothing, just as neither through the *vegetative* ones, since they depend on a bodily organ, as is manifest to one who considers. Therefore, just as, the body being corrupted, it operates nothing through the powers which regard the *vegetable*: so it operates nothing through the powers which regard the sensible. — But through the *intellect* it knows things under material conditions, *the matter being present*, and this belongs to *exterior sense*; and things under material conditions, *the matter being absent*, and this belongs to *imagination*; and it knows those same things also with all material conditions abstracted, and this belongs to *intellect*[^p1046-3]; and it truly does all these things. And therefore the separated soul is rightly said to *sense, to imagine* and *to understand*, not through diverse powers, but through *one*, which can know in all these modes, as is to be posited in an Angel, as is clear from the second book[^p1046-4].

But for a fuller understanding it is to be noted that, just as « in every nature there is something by which it is *to become*, and something by which it is *to make*[^p1046-5] »; so also in every cognition; and since this is the first division of power, through the *active* and the *passive*, it is necessary that these *differ*; yet according to the degrees of greater and lesser simplicity and spirituality they have a greater and a lesser difference. For the *intellective* power, in that it is more spiritual and more abstract, has both powers, which regard a spiritual substance, so that the *active* is by reason of the *by which it is*, and the *passive* by reason of the *that which it is*, namely of matter and form[^p1046-6]. — But in the *sensitive* power, which is less spiritual, the *active* power is on the part of the soul, and the *passive* on the part of the organ; and therefore, because sense does not exist without action and passion, therefore *to sense* is said to be the operation of the *composite*. And *again*, since the *active* does nothing without the *passive*; and when the soul loses the body, it loses the *passive* with respect to the act of sensing: therefore it is impossible that it use any sense, whether interior or exterior, as long as it is separated.

Now this opinion is more consonant with reason, nor does it conflict with the faith nor with the authority of the Saints. For it posits that the soul, through the intellective power, understands and knows in these three modes, in which it does now, and the Angel likewise, in these three modes, I say, on the part of *the thing known*; and that[^p1046-7] is called *to understand, to imagine* and *to sense*, according to what the Saints say. And in this way the authorities of the Saints are to be understood.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected first concerning that rich man; it must be said that that tongue was only an *imaginative* tongue[^p1046-8]. For the soul carries images not only in the lower power; but, when it is separated, it has them in the intelligible memory, which does not need a bodily organ.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning Cassiodorus, it must be said that he does not speak of the exterior senses, but of the interior ones, which are nothing other than the intellect itself, insofar as it has the mode of apprehending of those very senses.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the separated soul is freer; it must be said that this is true as regards the *active* power; but when it lacks the *passive*, it cannot operate, just as neither[^p1046-9] can fire without something combustible — not on account of an imperfection of itself in itself, but on account of this, that it necessarily requires something for going forth into work.

*To 4. 5. 6. 7.* To that which is objected, that it knows in three ways; it must be said that the separated soul does this through one and the same power[^p1046-10]. — As to what is objected concerning abstraction, it must be said that this does not make a diversity, since it is one power according to which the soul orders the whole predicamental line[^p1046-11], and *ascends* by abstracting or resolving from the lowest up to the highest, and *descends* by composing from the most general down to the individual. For it belongs to the rational power alone

to compare the individual to the species and to consider the most general genus of that same species[^p1047-1]; and therefore abstraction in these three acts is not a sufficient ground for diversifying the powers, but rather a most excellent and most fitting conjunction, according to which it has been brought about that the soul, as long as it is in the flesh, should have powers by which it is bound and communicates its operation to the body, both in *governing* or vivifying and in *knowing*[^p1047-2]. — And thus it is clear why the intellect does not have this *capacity* as long as it is conjoined, on account of the binding and the order and the connexion of the soul's powers to itself and to the body; but not so, when it is separated. — And thus the whole is clear.

la: Vers. 23: *Elevans autem oculos suos, cum esset in tormentis, vidit Abraham a longe et Lazarum* etc.

en: Verse 23: *But lifting up his eyes, when he was in torments, he saw Abraham afar off, and Lazarus* etc.

la: Cap. 2: *Vivit [anima] in se post huius saeculi amissionem... pura, subtilis, cita, aeterna, videt, audit, tangit ac reliquis sensibus efficacius valet.* Cfr. lib. *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera August.), c. 30. — Pro *valet* cod. G *viget*, Vat. *utitur* vel *viget*.

en: Ch. 2: *The soul lives in itself after the loss of this world... pure, subtle, swift, eternal; it sees, it hears, it touches, and with the remaining senses it is more efficaciously strong.* Cf. the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 30. — For *valet* codex G has *viget*, the Vatican edition *utitur* or *viget*.

la: Cod. M addit *superior*. Post *liberior* Vat. adnectit *quod*.

en: Codex M adds *superior*. After *liberior* the Vatican edition attaches *quod*.

la: Non pauci codd. *obiecta*, cod. M *ut obiecta*.

en: Not a few codices read *obiecta*, codex M *ut obiecta*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 121; III. text. 1-17. et text. 37. seq. (II. c. 12; III. c. 4. et 8.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 121; III text 1-17 and text 37 f. (II c. 12; III c. 4 and 8).

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 277, nota 1. De seq. propos. cfr. supra pag. 1040, nota 7.

en: See vol. III p. 277, note 1. On the following proposition cf. above p. 1040, note 7.

la: Libr. 1. *Poster.* c. 14. (c. 18.). — Superius vocibus *deficientibus sensibus* plures codd. interserunt vel cum Vat. *in nobis*, vel cum ed. 1 *nobis*.

en: Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics* c. 14 (c. 18). — Above, into the words *deficientibus sensibus* several codices insert either, with the Vatican edition, *in nobis*, or, with edition 1, *nobis*.

la: Sap. 9, 15: *Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam* etc.

en: Wisdom 9, 15: *For the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul* etc.

la: Libr. *de Somno et vigilia*, c. 1: *Quoniam autem non animae proprium est sentire neque corporis; cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus; qui vero dicitur sensus, ut actio, motus quidam per corpus animae est;* manifestum est, quod neque animae passio propria neque inanimatum corpus possibile est sentire. Idem insinuatur I. *de Anima*, text. 12-14. (c. 1.).

en: The book *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 1: *Since, however, sensing is proper neither to the soul nor to the body; for whose the power is, his also is the act; but what is called sense, as an action, is a certain motion of the soul through the body;* it is manifest that neither is it possible for a passion proper to the soul, nor for an inanimate body, to sense. The same is intimated in I *On the Soul*, text 12-14 (c. 1).

la: Ut sensus communis, imaginatio etc. Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2.).

en: Such as the common sense, the imagination, etc. Cf. Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 136 ff. (III c. 2).

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 17. (c. 5.): *Quoniam autem in omni natura est aliquid hoc quidem materia... alterum autem causa et factivum... necesse et in anima has existere differentias. Et est quidam intellectus, quia omnia fit, quidam vero, quia omnia facit* etc.

en: Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 17 (c. 5): *Since, however, in every nature there is something which is matter... and another which is cause and productive... it is necessary that these differences exist in the soul also. And there is a certain intellect, in that it becomes all things, and another, in that it makes all things* etc.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 567, nota 7. — Nonnulli codd. pro *passibilem* substituunt in hoc arg. *possibilem*.

en: See vol. II p. 567, note 7. — Some codices substitute *possibilem* for *passibilem* in this argument.

la: Vat. *et dicunt non*. Inferius pro *unitatem* cod. S *veritatem*, et pro *scilicet* cod. E *id est*, edd. cum pluribus codd. *item*; incongrue, nisi subinde, sicut edd. faciunt, ante *in eadem* omittatur *et*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *et dicunt non*. Below, for *unitatem* codex S has *veritatem*, and for *scilicet* codex E has *id est*, the editions with several codices *item*; incongruously, unless subsequently, as the editions do, the *et* before *in eadem* is omitted.

la: Vide supra d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — In verbo Cassiodori pro *valet* cod. G *viget*, edd. *valent*. Subinde post *potentiarum* codd. L Y addunt *cognitivarum*.

en: See above d. 44 p. II a. 3 q. 2. — In the words of Cassiodorus, for *valet* codex G has *viget*, the editions *valent*. Subsequently, after *potentiarum* codices L and Y add *cognitivarum*.

la: Pro *et* cod. aa *scilicet*.

en: For *et* codex aa has *scilicet*.

la: Cap. 32. n. 60. et c. 33. n. 62. (cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XLIV. c. 7.); verba ex his locis refert etiam auctor libri *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera August.), c. 30. Cfr. ibid. c. 4. et c. 13, ubi docetur, quod potentiae et vires animae idem sint quod ipsa anima. — Inferius pro *cum utitur*, quod habent codd. R T U X, codd. I K *dum utitur*, alii codd. *item utitur* vel cum Vat. *ergo utitur*.

en: Ch. 32 n. 60 and c. 33 n. 62 (cf. above, the Master's text, d. XLIV c. 7); the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 30, also reports the words from these places. Cf. ibid. c. 4 and c. 13, where it is taught that the powers and forces of the soul are the same as the soul itself. — Below, in place of *cum utitur*, which codices R T U X have, codices I and K read *dum utitur*, other codices *item utitur*, or, with the Vatican edition, *ergo utitur*.

la: Ita codd. E G L P Q R S Y, alii codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *quod cognoscebat in corpore, sed etiam omne*, pro quo Vat. *intelligibilia, vel ea quorum habet species, sed etiam omne illud*; cod. K (I a secunda manu), qui praedicta verba omittit, inferius post *libertatem* addit *sed multa alia*.

en: So codices E G L P Q R S Y; other codices and edition 1 omit *quod cognoscebat in corpore, sed etiam omne*, for which the Vatican edition has *intelligibilia, vel ea quorum habet species, sed etiam omne illud*; codex K (I by a second hand), which omits the aforesaid words, adds below, after *libertatem*, *sed multa alia*.

la: Ex codd. F H (V bb a secunda manu) supplevimus *et hoc est intellectus*, cod. K (I a secunda manu) *quod est proprium intellectus*.

en: From codices F and H (V and bb by a second hand) we have supplied *et hoc est intellectus*; codex K (I by a second hand) has *quod est proprium intellectus*.

en: Distinction 3 p. II a. 2 q. 1.

la: Ut ait Aristot. supra pag. 1045, nota 8, qui etiam V. *Metaph.* text. 17. (IV. c. 12.) et IX. text. 2. (VIII. c. 1.) docet, divisionem potentiae per *activam* et *passivam* esse primam.

en: As Aristotle says above, p. 1045, note 8, who also in V *Metaphysics* text 17 (IV c. 12) and IX text 2 (VIII c. 1) teaches that the division of power through the *active* and the *passive* is the first.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4, ubi de distinctione intellectus *agentis et possibilis*.

en: See II *Sent.* d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 4, where the distinction of the *agent and possible* intellect is treated.

la: Codd. L Y addunt *ideo*, quod cod. aa substituit pro *illud*.

en: Codices L and Y add *ideo*, which codex aa substitutes for *illud*.

la: Cfr. August., XXI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 10. n. 2, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Codd. G L *imaginaria*. Inferius post *defert* codd. L R Y (X bb a secunda manu) supplent *secum*.

en: Cf. Augustine, XXI *On the City of God*, c. 10 n. 2, and here the Master's text, c. 4. — Codices G and L read *imaginaria*. Below, after *defert*, codices L R Y (X and bb by a second hand) supply *secum*.

la: A cod. F additur *potest*.

en: By codex F *potest* is added.

la: Multi codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *potentiam*, econtra Vat. addit *scilicet intellectivam*.

en: Many codices and edition 1 omit *potentiam*; on the contrary, the Vatican edition adds *scilicet intellectivam*.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 48, nota 4, et Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Specie*. — Multi codd. et ed. 1 *praedicabilem*. Superius pro *abstractione* permulti codd. et ed. 1 *alligatione*. Inferius post *componendo* edd. addunt *seu comparando*.

en: Cf. vol. II p. 48, note 4, and Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species*. — Many codices and edition 1 read *praedicabilem*. Above, for *abstractione* very many codices and edition 1 have *alligatione*. Below, after *componendo* the editions add *seu comparando*.

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 375, nota 1.

en: See vol. III p. 375, note 1.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 8. — Inferius pro *coniunctus* permulti codd. *coniunctio*.

en: Cf. II *Sent.* d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 1 ad 8. — Below, for *coniunctus* very many codices read *coniunctio*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hic incidit controversia inter antiquos agitata de cognitione animarum separatarum, de quibus diffusius disputant S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1-3; S. 1. q. 89. a. 1-8; de Verit. q. 19, a. 1-2; et Scotus, qui opinionem S. Bonaventurae suo modo magis explicavit, supra d. 44. q. 1-3, et II. Sent. d. 3. q. 10. Conveniunt autem hi tres doctores primo in eo, quod, reiectis primis duabus opinionibus in 1. quaestione relatis, docent, animam separatam nullo uti posse *sensu*, sive interiore sive exteriore. — Secundo iidem dicunt, quod species intelligibiles in vita acquisitae remaneant in intellectu, quod cum Avicenna negat Henr. Gandav. (Quodl. 5. q. 14.), unde idem etiam penitus negat (Quodl. 6, q. 8.), dari memoriam intellectivam. Ast S. Thom., cum contra Scotum doceat, *intellectum* non posse cognoscere *singularia* per *species a sensibus acceptas* « nisi indirecte et per quandam reflexionem » (hic q. 1. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 4; De Verit. loc. cit. a. 2.), sibi constans asserit, illas animas cognitionem singularium (saltem per se loquendo) non habere nisi per species ipsis a Deo infusas; hinc *proprie* dictam *memoriam* in parte *intellectiva* non ponit (S. 1. q. 79. a. 6; q. 89. a. 8.). — Tertio asserunt, quod animae separatae cognoscunt simili modo, ut Angeli; de quorum cognitione, ut dictum est II. Sent. d. 3. a. 2. q. 1. in scholio, S. Thomas aliter docet ac auctores nostri antiqui. Unde de praedictis animabus dicit (hic q. 1. a. 1.), quod cum non habeant *species concreatas*, post separationem erunt paratissimae « ad recipiendum influentiam a substantiis superioribus, scilicet Deo vel Angelis ». Praemittit etiam, quod « in hac vita, quanto anima a corpore magis abstrahitur, tanto magis a substantiis spiritualibus influxum cognitionis recipit. Et inde est, quod quaedam occulta cognoscuntur in dormiendo et in excessu mentis, quando anima a corporis sensibus abstrahitur » (cfr. Bonav., hic q. 2. arg. 2. pro parte affirm. et solut.). Breviter idem concludit in Sum. (I. q. 89. a. 1. ad 1.), quod « anima separata non intelligit per species innatas nec per species, quas *tunc* abstrahit, nec *solum* per species conservatas... sed per species ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima fit particeps, sicut et aliae substantiae separatae, quamvis inferiori modo ». — Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.) cum nostro auctore tenet, quod talis anima possit « per intellectum (non per potentiam sensitivam) sensibilia et sensibiles eorum modos cognoscere ». Scot. vero (supra d. 44. q. 2. n. 12. et q. 4.) putat, animas separatas *posse* acquirere notitiam abstractivam et intuitivam omnium sensibilium et spiritualium finitorum, scilicet *abstrahendo* speciem, si obiectum est materiale, vel *recipiendo* speciem, si illud est spirituale.

De 1. quaestione praeter laudatos: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de toto articulo hic q. 2. 3.

**II.** De 2. quaestione S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 89. a. 8.) cum nostro auctore resolvit, quod « secundum *naturalem* cognitionem... animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur » (cfr. hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 98. a. 5.).

De eadem quaestione: Scot., locis ultimo citt. et hic q. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. 8. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. 8.

**III.** In 3. quaestione solvenda auctores satis conveniunt. Cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. et a. 4; Suppl. q. 98. a. 9, q. 94. a. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Here falls the controversy debated among the ancients concerning the cognition of separated souls, about which St. Thomas disputes more at length, here q. 1. a. 1-3; *Summa* 1. q. 89. a. 1-8; *de Veritate* q. 19, a. 1-2; and Scotus, who set forth St. Bonaventure's opinion more fully in his own manner, above d. 44. q. 1-3, and II *Sent.* d. 3. q. 10. Now these three doctors agree, first, in this, that, the first two opinions reported in the first question being rejected, they teach that the separated soul can use no *sense*, whether interior or exterior. — Secondly, the same men say that the intelligible species acquired in life remain in the intellect, which, along with Avicenna, Henry of Ghent denies (Quodl. 5. q. 14.), whence the same man also utterly denies (Quodl. 6, q. 8.) that there is an intellective memory. But St. Thomas, since against Scotus he teaches that the *intellect* cannot know *singulars* through *species received from the senses* « except indirectly and by a certain reflexion » (here q. 1. a. 3; *Summa* loc. cit. a. 4; *De Veritate* loc. cit. a. 2.), consistent with himself asserts that those souls do not have cognition of singulars (at least, speaking per se) except through species infused into them by God; hence he does not posit *memory* properly so called in the *intellective* part (*Summa* 1. q. 79. a. 6; q. 89. a. 8.). — Thirdly, they assert that separated souls know in a manner similar to the Angels; concerning whose cognition, as was said in II *Sent.* d. 3. a. 2. q. 1. in the scholion, St. Thomas teaches otherwise than our ancient authors. Whence concerning the aforesaid souls he says (here q. 1. a. 1.) that, since they do not have *concreated species*, after the separation they will be most ready « to receive an influence from higher substances, namely from God or the Angels ». He also premises that « in this life, the more the soul is abstracted from the body, the more it receives an influx of cognition from spiritual substances. And hence it is that certain hidden things are known in sleep and in an ecstasy of mind, when the soul is abstracted from the senses of the body » (cf. Bonaventure, here q. 2. arg. 2. for the affirmative side, and the solution). He briefly concludes the same in the *Summa* (I. q. 89. a. 1. ad 1.), that « the separated soul does not understand through innate species, nor through species which it *then* abstracts, nor *only* through preserved species... but through species participated from the influence of the divine light, of which the soul is made a partaker, as are also the other separated substances, although in an inferior mode ». — Richard of Middleton (here a. 1. q. 1.), with our author, holds that such a soul is able « through the intellect (not through the sensitive power) to know sensible things and their sensible modes ». But Scotus (above d. 44. q. 2. n. 12. and q. 4.) thinks that separated souls *are able* to acquire abstractive and intuitive knowledge of all finite sensible and spiritual things, namely by *abstracting* the species, if the object is material, or by *receiving* the species, if it is spiritual.

On question 1, besides those praised: Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 1. a. 1. 2. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, on the whole article, here q. 2. 3.

**II.** On question 2 St. Thomas (*Summa* 1. q. 89. a. 8.), with our author, resolves that « according to *natural* cognition... the souls of the dead do not know the things which are done here » (cf. here q. 2. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1; *Suppl.* q. 98. a. 5.).

On the same question: Scotus, in the places last cited and here q. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 7. 8. — Peter of Tarantaise, on this and the following question, here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 2. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 2. 8.

**III.** In solving question 3 the authors sufficiently agree. Cf. St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2. quaestiuncula 3. and a. 4; *Suppl.* q. 98. a. 9, q. 94. a. 1-3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 10. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L111302–111641, with every damaged region (Respondeo, solutiones, scholion and *all four* footer registers) re-read from the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p10{44,45,46,47}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` at the pre-measured gutters (1044:2101, 1045:1640, 1046:2041, 1047:1683). **No bands were regenerated.** No band appeared clipped, including the two narrow-run pages 1044 and 1047. Left column read top→bottom, then right; body bands then footer bands.

**Page span.** `printed_pages: [1044, 1045, 1046, 1047]` **confirmed correct** against the bands (running heads: p.1045 `DIST. L. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 1045`; p.1046 `1046 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.`; p.1047 `DIST. L. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 1047`). The raw OCR digit-mangles p.1045's running-head number to `1043` — ignored, the band is legible. p.1047's running head reads `QUAEST. II.` while the page opens with the tail of q.1 plus its scholion; the head is anticipating the quaestio that begins lower on the page, so it is not stale in the d.49 p.1017 sense, but it must not be used as a boundary marker.

**Title.** Verified from the line *after* the `QUAESTIO I.` header on p.1044 (band `vol4-p1044-L-1.png`): *Utrum anima separata habeat usum potentiae sensitivae.* It agrees with the frontmatter and with the TRACTATIO's paraphrase. No change.

**Article opener / question count.** `ARTICULUS I. — De cognitione animae separatae.` has **no separate praenotata**: the header is followed directly by `QUAESTIO I.` and its title, and the first body sentence (*Quantum ergo ad primum est quaestio…*) is q1's own opener. Nothing exists at the header↔QUAESTIO seam to be lost, and the header + subtitle are carried in this chunk. The **question count Article I promises is three** — the pars-level TRACTATIO (held by `p2-divisio`) says *Circa primum quaeruntur* **tria**, and lists the ordinals *Primo… per comparationem ad virtutem cognoscentem* / *Secundo, per comparationem ad statum viatorum* / *Tertio, per comparationem ad statum Beatorum*. All three exist and are correctly aligned: q.1 (this chunk) = *ad virtutem cognoscentem*; `QUAESTIO II.` at L111642 = *Utrum anima separata cognoscat ea quae circa nos geruntur* (= *ad statum viatorum*); `QUAESTIO III.` at L111798; `ARTICULUS II.` at L111914. **No hidden question.** (Boundaries derived from the ordinal openers and the printed page, not from a `QUAESTIO` grep.)

**Seam with `p2-divisio` (p.1044), derived independently off the bands.** Band `vol4-p1044-L-1.png` shows, in printed order: `…Circa primum quaeruntur tria.` → `ARTICULUS I.` → `De cognitione animae separatae.` → `QUAESTIO I.` → title → *Quantum ergo ad primum est quaestio…*. The seam is therefore exactly at the `ARTICULUS I.` header (L111302), with `p2-divisio` closing on *Circa primum quaeruntur tria.* This chunk's opening is grammatically continuous with that close, and its closing sentence (*Et sic patet totum.*) parses.

**Page → apparatus split map** (28 entries in this file):

| Page | Register as printed | Total on page | Claimed here | Forwarded |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1044 | L footer: 1, 2 · R footer: 3, 4 | **4** | 2, 3, 4 | note 1 → `p2-divisio` |
| 1045 | L footer: 1–6 · R footer: 7–12 | **12** | 1–12 | — |
| 1046 | L footer: 1–4 · R footer: 5–11 | **11** | 1–11 | — |
| 1047 | L footer: 1–4 · R footer: unnumbered continuation of 4, then 5, 6 | **6** | 1, 2 | notes 3, 4 (+ 4's continuation), 5, 6 → `p2-a1-q2` |

**Binding order — bound by content, page by page, never by position.** Three cross-gutter cases occur in this span and are recorded so the neighbours do not re-derive them wrongly:
- **p.1044 note 1** prints in the **left** footer but anchors in the **right** body column (*poenae damnatorum¹*, inside the divisio's DIVISIO TEXTUS). It is **not** this chunk's.
- **p.1046 notes 5 and 6** print in the **right** footer but anchor in the **left** body column (*quo est facere⁵*, *materiae et formae⁶*). Both are claimed here.
- **p.1046** the register does **not** split at the body-column boundary: the left footer runs 1–4, while note 4 (*Dist. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.*) anchors at *ex secundo libro⁴*, still in the left column — so the split is by count, not by column.

**Head/tail runover check, per page (all read off the bands):**
- **p.1044** — head: register opens with a numbered `1`, no unnumbered fragment from p.1043. Tail: note 4 (*Cod. M addit superior…*) ends complete. **Clean both ends.**
- **p.1045** — head: opens with numbered `1`. Tail: note 12 (*Pro et cod. aa scilicet.*) ends complete. **Clean both ends.**
- **p.1046** — head: opens with numbered `1`. Tail: note 11 ends complete (*…edd. addunt seu comparando.*). **Clean both ends.**
- **p.1047** — head: opens with numbered `1`, no fragment from p.1046. Tail of the **left** footer: note 4 breaks off mid-sentence on *…curis saecularibus obligatum lucrisque* and is completed by an **unnumbered continuation opening the right footer** (*terrenis inhiantem fuisse noverimus…*), before notes 5 and 6. That is an intra-page, cross-gutter continuation; both halves belong to note 4, which anchors in q.2, so the whole of it is **forwarded to `p2-a1-q2`** and must be rendered joined. Nothing runs onto p.1048.

**Raw-vs-band divergences resolved at band time** (band authoritative, no `[?]` raised): p.1045 running-head number (`1043` in raw → **1045**); `SCHOLIOK` at L111582 → **`SCHOLION`**; `QU.ESTIO`/`QUAEST. 11.` garbles; p.1046 note 6 raw reads `d. 2i. p. I. a. 2. q. I` → band reads **`d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4`**; p.1045 note 4 raw `c. li. (c. IS.)` → band **`c. 14. (c. 18.)`**; scattered `l`/`i`/`c` substitutions (*polentia*, *inlellectus*, *irapossibile*, *spirituaHor*, *deslrui*, *laciat*, *eauti*, *libeiw*, *ci'edendum*, *alIig:ilionis*, *appi^ehendendi*, *praedicaraentalem*, *phum*/*Philosophum*) silently corrected.

**Editorial marginalia trimmed** (page furniture, not Bonaventure's text): *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Opinio 1./2./3.*, *Conclusio 1./2.*, *Modus triplex cognoscendi.*, *Explicatur.*, *Conclusio*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *De memoria intellectiva.*, *Notandum.* (×2), *De cognitione singularium.*, *Argg. pro parte affirmativa.*

**Scholion placement.** The source prints the `SCHOLION` centred full-width **above** the start of `QUAESTIO II.` on p.1047; per the corpus convention it is rendered here as the **last** subsection of both the `## Latin` and the `## English` blocks. Its three registers are the printed `1.`/`II.`/`III.`, normalised to `I.`/`II.`/`III.`

**Anchor parity.** Latin body anchors: 28. English body anchors: 28. Apparatus definitions: 28. Counted, matching.

**Ambiguity flags:** none. Nothing in this span was illegible on the bands.

**Unmapped material:** none found. No ordinal opener, dubium, scholion or section in L111302–111641 lacks a chunk.