title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum necesse sit conteri de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis teneatur homo conteri, aut possit de talibus sine poenitentia salvari.

Et quod teneatur *conteri*, videtur:

1. Quia, si aliquis peccet et post cadat in furiam ante poenitentiam[^1], non potest postmodum iustificari[^2]; et huius ratio est, quia non potest de peccatis poenitere: ergo si furiosus non excusatur, nec obliviosus.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios quarto[^4][^7]: *Nihil mihi conscius sum* etc.; Glossa: « Quia potest latere quod nescio »: ergo latentia peccati impedit iustificationem; sed hoc non esset, nisi de illo teneretur poenitere: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod in generali tenetur; hoc non solvit, quia in generali non latet, immo quilibet debet reputare, se fuisse peccatorem.

3. Item, quod teneatur in speciali, videtur: quia si non esset oblitus, teneretur poenitere in speciali: ergo esto, quod ex culpa inciderit in oblivionem et ex negligentia, si non reportat commodum de malitia[^3], adhuc tenetur.

Item, quaero, quid sit conteri sive poenitere in generali. Si sub conditione, ut: doleo, si feci; similiter potest homo poenitere de his quae non fecit, sicut de his quae fecit.

**Contra:**

1. Aliquis ita oblitus est, quod non potest recordari, quia memoria non est in nostra potestate: ergo si non tenetur ad impossibile[^p408-2], non tenetur ad recordari; sed non potest poenitere nisi de malis, quae recordatur: ergo nec de his.

2. Item, si facit homo quod in se est, Deus facit quod in se est: sed possibile est, istum facere quod in se est sine recordatione: ergo possibile est facere quod in se est sine poenitentia: ergo possibile est iustificari sine poenitentia: ergo non tenetur poenitere.

3. Item, aliquis est paratus dolere de omnibus et non dolet vel poenitet de his, nisi quia non recordatur: ergo oblivio introducta est impedimentum: si ergo dolet de oblivione, removetur impedimentum: ergo iustificatur.

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4. Item, esto quod totum oblitus sit in generali et particulari, quia nunquam recordatur, se offendisse; talis non potest poenitere nec in generali nec in speciali, et tamen potest iustificari, quia est viator et potest demereri: ergo non oportet, quod de illis poeniteat.

> **Conclusio.** De peccatis commissis et oblitis necesse est conteri in generali, non autem in speciali.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod oblitus aut est oblitus omnino[^p408-4], ita quod non recordatur nec in generali nec in speciali, aut est oblitus in speciali, sed tamen in generali recordatur. Quando est oblitus in speciali, tamen recordatur in generali; dico, quod tenetur poenitere et conteri in generali de negligentia sua, propter quam venit in illam oblivionem; et tenetur facere quod in se est, ut recordetur in speciali vel per recogitationem, vel per orationem. — Si autem sit omnino oblitus, adhuc tenetur conteri in generali. — Et voco conteri in generali non sub conditione, sed sub existimatione probabili. Debet enim homo probabiliter credere, quod in multis offendit[^p408-3], quorum non recordatur; et si ex hac existimatione doleat, sicut si certus esset, contritus est et poenitens[^p408-1]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes monstrantes, quod non est necesse conteri in speciali sive poenitere. — Nec valet illud quod ultimo opponitur, quod nec in generali tenetur, quia totum est oblitus. Dico enim, quod totum, quod est oblitus certitudinaliter, potest cognoscere probabiliter.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod oportet specialiter, per simile de furioso; responsio est, quod[^p408-5] furiosus nec generaliter nec specialiter potest poenitere; et nullus iustificatur sine poenitentia vel in generali, vel in speciali.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum latens impedit iustificationem; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo certitudinem iustificationis, quia non est certus de iustitia, eo quod non est certus de culpa.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod reportat commodum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia debet dolere in generali de illis et praeterea de oblivione; et iterum, gravius punitur a Deo, quam si non fuisset oblitus, tamen via salutis non praecluditur.

Ultimum de generalitate patet: quia poenitere in generali non est per conditionem, sed per certitudinem de peccatis commissis, quia scit, se aliquando peccasse, sed tamen non recolit, quo peccato; aut per praesumtionem probabilem, quae aliquando tantum dolorem generat in homine, sicut certitudo peccati, et tantundem valet[^5].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether it is necessary to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterwards forgotten.*

Secondly it is asked whether a man is bound to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterwards forgotten, or whether he can be saved with respect to such sins without penitence.

And that he is bound to be *contrite* seems so:

1. Because, if someone sins and afterwards falls into madness before penitence[^1], he cannot afterwards be justified[^2]; and the reason for this is that he cannot repent of his sins: therefore if the madman is not excused, neither is the forgetful man.

2. Likewise, in the fourth chapter of First Corinthians[^4][^7]: *I am conscious to myself of nothing* etc.; the Gloss: « Because what I do not know can lie hidden »: therefore the latency of a sin impedes justification; but this would not be so unless one were bound to repent of it: therefore etc. If you say that one is bound in a general way, this does not resolve it, because in a general way it does not lie hidden — indeed everyone ought to reckon that he has been a sinner.

3. Likewise, that one is bound in particular seems so: because if he had not forgotten, he would be bound to repent in particular: therefore granted that he should have fallen into forgetfulness through fault and through negligence, if he does not derive an advantage from his malice[^3], he is still bound.

Likewise, I ask what it is to be contrite or to repent in a general way. If under a condition, as: I grieve, if I did it; then likewise a man can repent of those things which he has not done, just as of those which he has done.

**On the contrary:**

1. Someone has so forgotten that he cannot remember, because memory is not in our power: therefore if he is not bound to the impossible[^p408-2], he is not bound to remember; but he cannot repent except of the evils which he remembers: therefore neither of these.

2. Likewise, if a man does what is in him, God does what is in Him: but it is possible for this man to do what is in him without remembering: therefore it is possible to do what is in him without penitence: therefore it is possible to be justified without penitence: therefore he is not bound to repent.

3. Likewise, someone is prepared to grieve over all things, and he does not grieve or repent of these except because he does not remember: therefore the forgetfulness that has come in is an impediment: if therefore he grieves over the forgetfulness, the impediment is removed: therefore he is justified.

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4. Likewise, granted that he has wholly forgotten both in a general and in a particular way, because he never remembers that he has offended; such a one cannot repent either in a general or in a particular way, and yet he can be justified, because he is a wayfarer and can earn demerit: therefore it is not required that he repent of those things.

> **Conclusion.** Concerning sins committed and forgotten it is necessary to be contrite in a general way, but not in particular.

**I respond:** It must be said that the forgetful man is either wholly forgetful[^p408-4], so that he remembers neither in a general nor in a particular way, or he is forgetful in particular, but nevertheless remembers in a general way. When he is forgetful in particular, yet remembers in a general way; I say that he is bound to repent and to be contrite in a general way over his negligence, on account of which he came into that forgetfulness; and he is bound to do what is in him, that he may remember in particular, whether by recollection or by prayer. — But if he is wholly forgetful, he is still bound to be contrite in a general way. — And I call being contrite in a general way not under a condition, but under a probable estimation. For a man ought probably to believe that he has offended in many things[^p408-3] of which he does not remember; and if from this estimation he grieves, just as if he were certain, he is contrite and penitent[^p408-1]. — Therefore the arguments showing that it is not necessary to be contrite in particular, or to repent, are to be conceded. — Nor does that hold which is objected last, that he is not bound even in a general way because he has wholly forgotten. For I say that the whole which he has forgotten with certainty he can know probably.

1. To that which is objected to the opposite, that it is required specially, by the likeness of the madman; the response is that[^p408-5] the madman can repent neither generally nor specially; and no one is justified without penitence, either in a general or in a particular way.

2. To that which is objected, that a hidden sin impedes justification; it must be said that it is false — rather it impedes the certitude of justification, because he is not certain of his righteousness, in that he is not certain of his guilt.

3. To that which is objected, that he derives an advantage; it must be said that it is false, because he ought to grieve in a general way over those things and besides over the forgetfulness; and again, he is punished more gravely by God than if he had not forgotten, yet the way of salvation is not cut off.

The last point about generality is clear: because to repent in a general way is not by a condition, but by certainty concerning sins committed, because he knows that he has at some time sinned, yet does not recall by what sin; or by a probable presumption, which sometimes generates as much grief in a man as the certainty of sin, and is worth just as much[^5].

---

la: Vide infra d. 21. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: See below, d. 21, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Psalm. 24, 7. — Superius *verbis quam fecit* non pauci codd. interserunt *sibi*.

en: Psalm 24:7. — Above, after *the words which he did*, not a few codices insert *to himself*.

en: Distinction 22, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. *satis*.

en: Edition 1, with several codices, reads *enough*.

la: Respicitur Iac. 3, 2: *In multis enim offendimus omnes*.

en: Reference is to James 3:2: *For in many things we all offend*.

en: Psalm 18:13. — Above, in place of *also in an adult*, a second hand in codex X substitutes *also in adult age*.

en: Verse 4. — On the Gloss which is found in Lyranus as interlinear, see above, page 210, note 10.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 103, nota 11.

en: Cf. above, page 103, note 11.

la: Secundum regulam iuris supra pag. 234, nota 6. allegatam.

en: According to the rule of law cited above, page 234, note 6.

la: Vide supra pag. 407, nota 5. verba Iacobi. — Codd. E1 S T addunt *Deum*. Inferius post *contritus est* cod. L omittit *et*, pro quo cod. E *vel*.

en: See above, page 407, note 5, the words of James. — Codices E1, S, T add *God*. Below, after *he is contrite* codex L omits *and*, in place of which codex E reads *or*.

la: Scil. in fundam. — Inferius post *quod totum* codd. omittunt *quod est*.

en: Namely, in the fundament. — Below, after *that the whole* the codices omit *which is*.

la: In cod. X secunda manus addidit *non est simile, quia*. — Sive: *impedit solum*. — Cod. U *non est poenitere sub conditione*. Mox post *sed* Vat. addit *aut*. Inferius pro *probabilem* in codd. plurimis substituitur *probare*, in ed. 1 *potest probare*. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: In codex X a second hand added *it is not alike, because*. — Or: *it impedes only*. — Codex U reads *it is not to repent under a condition*. Soon after *but* the Vatican edition adds *or*. Below, in place of *probable* in most codices *to prove* is substituted, and in edition 1 *can prove*. — See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De poenitentia post baptismum de venialibus.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum veniale peccatum possit fieri mortale.*

Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum veniale peccatum possit fieri mortale. Et quod sic,

1. Per *complacentiam* specialiter, videtur: Augustinus[^1]: «Nihil adeo est veniale, quod non fiat mortale, dum placet». — Item, quod per *multitudinem*: Augustinus *de Poenitentia*[^2]: «Quamvis singula non letali vulnere ferire sentiantur; tamen omnia simul congregata, velut scabies, eo quod plura sunt, necant».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia complacentia est plenus consensus; sed delectatio, quae est venialis, adveniente consensu, fit mortalis: ergo veniale per complacentiam fit mortale. *Minor* patet, quia delectatio morosa, quae est venialis ante consensum, postea fit mortalis[^3].

3. Item, *placitum* est quietata voluntas; sed quiescens in creatura fruitur illa, et ita peccat mortaliter[^4]: ergo veniale fit per complacentiam mortale.

4. Item, quod per *multitudinem*, videtur: quia amor mortalis non excedit amorem venialis in infinitum; sed finitum aliquoties sumtum reddit esse *finitum*[^5]: ergo etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod excedit in infinitum, quia hoc est supra Deum, et illud infra; *contra*: ab eadem virtute non exit motus in infinitum maior et minor; sed mortalis amor et venialis sunt ab eadem potentia: ergo etc.

5. Item, veniale est alicuius quantitatis, quia est maius et minus; sed omne quantum est proportionale quanto: ergo mortale, cum sit quantum, non excedit veniale improportionaliter, et sic etc.

6. Item, unum veniale disponit aliquo modo, et aliud magis; sed per maiorem dispositionem fit *necessitas*[^6]: ergo necessario, ut videtur, veniale introducit mortale peccatum.

**Contra:** 1. Veniale et mortale specie differunt[^7]; sed complacentia, eo quod complacentia, non mutat speciem, sed conservat: ergo unum per complacentiam non fit alterum: ergo veniale non fit mortale.

2. Item, mortale excedit veniale in infinitum, quia poena excedit poenam in infinitum[^8]: ergo veniale infinities multiplicatum non fit mortale.

> ### Conclusio
> Peccata venialia per essentiam non fiunt mortalia, fiunt tamen interdum ratione vel pleni consensus, vel quietatae voluntatis, vel dispositionis sive pronitatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod triplex est genus venialis peccati. Quoddam enim est ex *subreptione*[^9]; et ideo veniale, quia vitari non potest tunc. Quoddam ex *cogitatione* sine voluntate sive consensu, et ideo veniale, quia non plene consentit homo, ut in cogitatione de muliere et delectatione citra consensum in delectationem. Quoddam est veniale cum *ratione et consensu*; sed tamen ideo est veniale, quia non est deordinatio contra praeceptum, ut ebrietas et mendacium iocosum.

Cum igitur quaeritur, utrum veniale fiat mortale; si intelligat[^10], quod haec culpa per essentiam fiat illa, nulla est quaestio, quia hoc est impossibile. — Si intelligat, quod illud quod alias erat veniale, possit esse mortale, ut mendacium iocosum et ebrietas; dico, quod quoddam non fit mortale, quoddam fit mortale per complacentiam. Primum igitur veniale, quod committitur praeter rationem, semper est veniale; sed secundo modo veniale per delectationem citra consensum fit mortale per consensum, et ita per complacentiam, secundum quod placitum dicitur consensus plenus. Tertium veniale quod est per delectationem citra Deum, potest fieri mortale per libidinem magnam, sicut mendacium iocosum; et hoc fit mortale secundum placitum, secundum quod placitum dicitur quietata voluntas. Et quia iteratio actus disponit ad libidinem et complacentiam; hinc est, quod Augustinus

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dicit in pluribus locis[^11], quod plura venialia obruunt, non *per se*, sed quia *disponunt* ad libidinem, non dispositione *necessitatis*, sed *pronitatis*.

**Ad fundamenta:** Ad illud ergo quod[^12] probatur, quod venialia non fiunt mortalia per *essentiam*; dicendum, quod verum est.

*Ad 1.* Sed quod obiicit in contrarium de Augustino, solutum est, quomodo intelligitur. Illud enim intelligitur sive per convenientiam in genere actus, sive per dispositionem, quia multa venialia disponunt ad libidinem et contemptum; ideo Augustinus[^13] comparat ea bestiis minutis, comparat guttis, comparat arenae, comparat scabiei, non quia ipsa in se faciunt naufragium, sed quia ad hoc perducunt per accidens.

*Ad 2. 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de consensu et quietata voluntate, dicendum, quod quando consensus venit, novum peccatum fit, nec fit veniale mortale, sed quod alias esset veniale, fit mortale.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per multitudinem; dicendum, quod est infinita proportio, non quia motus est infinitus intensione, sed reputatione, sicut patet in eo qui diligit ex caritate: plus diligit Deum quam denarium unum et quam in infinitum multiplicatum[^14]; unde amor infra Deum nunquam comparabilis est amori, qui est supra Deum, secundum istum modum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veniale est quantum; dicendum, quod quemadmodum linea est in se quanta, sed comparatione superficiei non habet quantitatem[^15]; sic veniale, etsi de se quantum sit, comparatione mortalis caret quantitate.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de dispositione, dicendum, quod voluntas semper libere movetur, et ideo non disponitur dispositione, quae sit necessitas, sed tantum dispositione, quae est pronitas; non sic natura, quae ad unam partem est determinata[^16]. — Et alia ratio est in habente caritatem, quia sustentatur a virtute infinita; et talis per nullum pondus compellitur cadere, salva sustentatione; voluntas enim semper libera est et, quamdiu est in via, vertibilis est; et ideo nunquam inevitabiliter, dum est in via, ad malum culpae disponitur. Et sic patet illud.

english:
### Article III. *On penance after baptism concerning venial sins.*
### Question I. *Whether a venial sin can become mortal.*

First, then, it is asked whether a venial sin can become mortal. And that it can, is shown thus:

1. By *complacency* specially, it seems so: Augustine[^1]: «Nothing is so venial that it does not become mortal, while it pleases». — Likewise, that it does so by *multitude*: Augustine, *On Penance*[^2]: «Although individually they are not felt to strike with a deadly wound; nevertheless all gathered together at once, like the itch, by the fact that they are many, kill».

2. Likewise, by *reason* it seems so: because complacency is full consent; but a pleasure that is venial, when consent comes, becomes mortal: therefore a venial sin becomes mortal through complacency. The *minor* is clear, because morose pleasure, which is venial before consent, afterward becomes mortal[^3].

3. Likewise, *taking-pleasure* is a will at rest; but one resting in a creature enjoys it, and so sins mortally[^4]: therefore a venial sin becomes mortal through complacency.

4. Likewise, that it does so by *multitude*, it seems: because mortal love does not exceed venial love infinitely; but a finite thing taken several times yields a *finite* being[^5]: therefore etc. *If you say* that it does exceed infinitely, because this is above God and that is below; *on the contrary*: from the same power there does not issue a motion infinitely greater and lesser; but mortal love and venial love are from the same potency: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, a venial sin is of some quantity, since it is greater and lesser; but every quantum is proportional to a quantum: therefore a mortal sin, since it is a quantum, does not exceed a venial sin disproportionately, and so etc.

6. Likewise, one venial sin disposes in some way, and another more; but by a greater disposition there arises *necessity*[^6]: therefore necessarily, as it seems, a venial sin introduces mortal sin.

**On the contrary:** 1. Venial and mortal differ in species[^7]; but complacency, in that it is complacency, does not change the species but preserves it: therefore one does not become the other through complacency: therefore a venial sin does not become mortal.

2. Likewise, a mortal sin exceeds a venial one infinitely, because its punishment exceeds the other's punishment infinitely[^8]: therefore a venial sin multiplied infinitely does not become mortal.

> ### Conclusion
> Venial sins do not become mortal by essence; yet they do become so sometimes by reason of either full consent, or a will at rest, or disposition and proneness.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are three kinds of venial sin. For one is from *surprise*[^9]; and it is therefore venial, because it cannot then be avoided. Another is from *thought* without will or consent, and it is therefore venial, because the man does not fully consent, as in a thought about a woman and a pleasure short of consent into the pleasure. Another is venial with *reason and consent*; but it is venial nonetheless, because there is no disorder against a precept, as drunkenness and a jesting lie.

When, therefore, it is asked whether a venial sin becomes mortal; if one means[^10] that this fault by its essence becomes that one, there is no question, because this is impossible. — If one means that what was otherwise venial can be mortal, as a jesting lie and drunkenness; I say that one kind does not become mortal, another kind becomes mortal through complacency. The first venial sin, then, which is committed apart from reason, is always venial; but the venial sin of the second mode, through pleasure short of consent, becomes mortal through consent, and thus through complacency, insofar as taking-pleasure is called full consent. The third venial sin, which is through pleasure short of God, can become mortal through great lust, like a jesting lie; and this becomes mortal according to taking-pleasure, insofar as taking-pleasure is called a will at rest. And because the repetition of the act disposes toward lust and complacency; hence it is that Augustine

says in many places[^11] that many venial sins overwhelm, not *of themselves*, but because they *dispose* toward lust, not by a disposition of *necessity*, but of *proneness*.

**To the foundations:** To that, then, which proves that venial sins do not become mortal by *essence*[^12]; it must be said that it is true.

*To 1.* But as to what is objected on the contrary from Augustine, it has been solved how it is to be understood. For that is understood either by a fittingness in the genus of the act, or by disposition, because many venial sins dispose toward lust and contempt; therefore Augustine[^13] compares them to little beasts, compares them to drops, compares them to sand, compares them to the itch, not because they of themselves cause shipwreck, but because they lead to this accidentally.

*To 2 and 3.* To that which is objected about consent and the will at rest, it must be said that when consent comes, a new sin is made, and the venial sin does not become mortal, but what was otherwise venial becomes mortal.

*To 4.* To that which is objected about multitude; it must be said that the proportion is infinite, not because the motion is infinite in intensity, but in reckoning, as is clear in one who loves out of charity: he loves God more than a single penny and more than it multiplied to infinity[^14]; whence a love below God is never comparable to the love that is above God, according to this manner.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a venial sin is a quantum; it must be said that just as a line is in itself something quantified, but in comparison with a surface it has no quantity[^15]; so a venial sin, though of itself it be a quantum, in comparison with a mortal sin lacks quantity.

*To 6.* To that which is objected about disposition, it must be said that the will is always moved freely, and therefore is not disposed by a disposition that is a necessity, but only by a disposition that is a proneness; not so nature, which is determined to one part[^16]. — And there is another reason in one who has charity, because he is sustained by an infinite power; and such a one is by no weight compelled to fall, his sustaining being preserved; for the will is always free and, as long as it is on the way, changeable; and therefore never, while it is on the way, is it inevitably disposed toward the evil of fault. And so that is clear.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 376, nota 6.

en: See vol. II, p. 376, note 6.

la: Serm. 351. (qui est 1. de Poenitentia) c. 3. n. 5. Textus originalis *quo plura* pro *eo quod plura*. — Pro *per multitudinem* cod. S *per multiplicationem*.

en: Sermon 351 (which is the 1st *On Penance*) c. 3, n. 5. The original text reads *quo plura* for *eo quod plura*. — For *per multitudinem* codex S reads *per multiplicationem*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. dub. 1. — Superius pro *complacentia* codd. R S T *per complacentiam*.

en: Cf. II *Sent.* d. 24, p. II, dub. 1. — Above, for *complacentia* codices R S T read *per complacentiam*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 2; II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. — Fide codd. A F G H V W aa substituimus *quietata* pro *quieta*, hic et infra in fine corp. et in solut. huius obiect., ubi etiam plures alii codd. legunt *quietata*.

en: See I *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, q. 2 and a. 3, q. 2; II *Sent.* d. 42, a. 2, q. 1. — On the faith of codices A F G H V W aa we have substituted *quietata* for *quieta*, here and below at the end of the body and in the solution of this objection, where likewise several other codices read *quietata*.

la: Sensus est: finitum, si aliquoties sumitur sive multiplicatur, non fit infinitum, sed alterum finitum. — Pro *esse finitum* ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. perperam *esse infinitum*, Vat. *esse non finitum*.

en: The sense is: a finite thing, if it is taken or multiplied several times, does not become infinite, but another finite thing. — For *esse finitum* edition 1, with several codices, wrongly *esse infinitum*; the Vatican edition *esse non finitum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 22, nota 9. — Superius pro *aliud magis* plures codd. et [codd. A W omittunt *ad aliud magis*]; edd. *ad mortale*, cod. R (1a secunda manu) *ad mortale, et aliud magis*.

en: Cf. above, p. 22, note 9. — Above, for *aliud magis* several codices and [codices A W omit *ad aliud magis*]; the editions *ad mortale*, codex R (1, by a second hand) *ad mortale, et aliud magis*.

la: Ut ostensum est II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. ad 6.

en: As was shown in II *Sent.* d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 1, ad 6.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 2. — Inferius post *non fit* codd. R S addunt *etiam*.

en: See II *Sent.* d. 42, a. 2, q. 2. — Below, after *non fit*, codices R S add *etiam*.

la: Hoc, ut asseritur II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 1. in corp., dicitur veniale a veniendo, quia venit ex subreptione et pronitate naturae corruptae. Ibid. tertium genus venialis inferius adductum vocatur «veniale ex genere actus». Cfr. infra q. 2. et d. 17. p. II. dub. 7. — Aliquanto inferius pro *citra consensum* edd. *circa consensum*.

en: This, as is asserted in II *Sent.* d. 21, a. 3, q. 1 in the body, is called venial from "coming" (*veniendo*), because it comes from surprise and the proneness of corrupted nature. There the third kind of venial, adduced below, is called «venial by the genus of the act». Cf. below q. 2 and d. 17, p. II, dub. 7. — Somewhat below, for *citra consensum* the editions read *circa consensum*.

la: Codd. H K aa hic et paulo inferius *intelligatur*.

en: Codices H K aa here and a little below read *intelligatur*.

la: Epist. 263. (alias 108.) n. 8, et de Cantico novo, c. 2. n. 2, ubi exemplum ponitur de naufragio, proveniente ex humore paulatim intrante per rimas; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 12. n. 14, et Enarrat. in Ps. 39. n. 22, ubi exemplum de granis arenae, quae licet sint minuta in se, hominem obruere et opprimere possunt multiplicata; Serm. 9. (alias 96. de Tempore) c. 11. n. 17, ubi venialia bestiis minutis hominem necantibus comparantur, et Serm. 56. (alias 48. de Diversis) c. 9. n. 12, ubi assimilantur guttis minutis, quae flumina implent. — Superius pro *secundum placitum* codd. R S *per placitum*.

en: *Epist.* 263 (alias 108) n. 8, and *On the New Canticle*, c. 2, n. 2, where the example is set of a shipwreck arising from moisture gradually entering through the cracks; on *John's Gospel* tr. 12, n. 14, and *Enarrat. on Ps.* 39, n. 22, where the example of grains of sand, which though small in themselves can, when multiplied, overwhelm and crush a man; *Serm.* 9 (alias 96 *de Tempore*) c. 11, n. 17, where venial sins are compared to little beasts killing a man, and *Serm.* 56 (alias 48 *de Diversis*) c. 9, n. 12, where they are likened to little drops that fill rivers. — Above, for *secundum placitum* codices R S read *per placitum*.

la: Forlasse legendum *quod*.

en: Perhaps to be read *quod*.

la: Vide notam penultimam et supra pag. 409, nota 2. — In fine solut. pro *istum modum* codd. R S T *iustum modum*.

en: See the penultimate note and above, p. 409, note 2. — At the end of the solution, for *istum modum* codices R S T read *iustum modum*.

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118, 72. serm. 17. n. 10: «Ut amplius diligat caritas legem Dei, quam diligit cupiditas aurum et argentum».

en: Augustine, *Enarrat. on Ps.* 118, [v.] 72, serm. 17, n. 10: «So that charity may love the law of God more than cupidity loves gold and silver».

la: Cfr. tom. III. pag. 280, nota o. — Inferius post *comparatione* edd. supplent *tamen*.

en: Cf. vol. III, p. 280, note o. — Below, after *comparatione*, the editions supply *tamen*.

la: Vide supra pag. 113, nota 10; Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 8.). — Aliquanto inferius voci *vertibilis* cod. aa praemittit *semper*.

en: See above, p. 113, note 10; Aristotle, *Metaph.* IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 8). — Somewhat below, to the word *vertibilis* codex aa prefixes *semper*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ad quaestionem, utrum veniale possit fieri mortale, respondetur communiter, quod nec idem numero actus potest fieri ex veniali mortale, nec plura venialia per se constituunt unum mortale, nisi dispositive vel ex parte consensus; sed aliter dicendum de circumstantiis graviter speciem mutantibus. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 15. m. 3. a. 1. § 1; Scot., IV. Sent. d. 21. n. 3. seqq.; III. Sent. d. 39. q. unica n. 3. seq. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 3. a. 7; S. 1. 11. q. 88. a. 4. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 13; Sum. p. 11. tr. 18. q. 117. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

**II.** Quaestio seq. (2.) intelligitur de necessitate absoluta poenitendi de venialibus, quam quidam aliquatenus sustinere voluerunt cum Alexandro Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3. a. 3. § 5, a. 4. § 2.), hoc duplici principio innixi, quod post vitam in purgatorio non remittatur culpa, sed tantum poena, et quod formalis actus poenitentiae requiratur ad deletionem peccati, etiam venialis. Sed de hac quaestione plerumque alii magistri tractant et diffuse disputant infra d. 21. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, ubi in scholio citantur ceteri auctores. Attamen hoc loco rem tractat B. Albert., a. 54. 55.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** To the question whether a venial sin can become mortal, the common answer is that neither can the numerically same act become mortal from venial, nor do many venial sins of themselves constitute one mortal sin, except dispositively or on the side of consent; but it must be said otherwise of circumstances that gravely change the species. Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. IV. q. 15. m. 3. a. 1. § 1; Scotus, IV *Sent.* d. 21. n. 3. ff.; III *Sent.* d. 39. q. unica n. 3. f. — St. Thomas, II *Sent.* d. 24. q. 3. a. 7; S. I–II. q. 88. a. 4. — B. Albert, II *Sent.* d. 24. a. 13; *Summa* p. II. tr. 18. q. 117. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tarantasia, here a. 6. quaestiuncula 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

**II.** The following question (2) is understood concerning the absolute necessity of doing penance for venial sins, which some wished to maintain to some degree with Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. m. 3. a. 3. § 5, a. 4. § 2.), relying on this twofold principle: that after this life the fault is not remitted in purgatory but only the punishment, and that a formal act of penance is required for the blotting-out of sin, even of venial sin. But on this question other masters for the most part treat and dispute at length below at d. 21. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, where in the scholion the other authorities are cited. Yet in this place B. Albert treats the matter, a. 54, 55.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 46290–46428) with PDF column-band reads of printed pp. 409–410 (pdf 429–430, offset +20) authoritative over the cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio and the page-410 footer/scholion blocks. Vol IV column split x≈1880. Running head verified on p409 R: "DIST. XVI. P. II. ART. III. QUAEST. I." Page-verify passed.

**Article opener.** The short ARTICULUS III opener folds into this q1 per the locked chunking convention; there is no standalone divisio chunk. The article title (*De poenitentia post baptismum de venialibus*) is carried in the q1 heading.

**Scholion ownership.** The Art III SCHOLION is present in this raw range (after q1's Ad-replies, straddling p410 L/R columns) and is rendered IN FULL here: §I (the common doctrine on venial→mortal + Alex/Scotus/Thomas/Albert/Petr/Richard/Dionysius citation list) and §II (which explicitly frames *the following question* — q2 — on the absolute necessity of penance for venial sins). q2 carries NO scholion of its own; it points here.

**Footer split (p410, shared with q2).** Printed p410's footer sequence serves both this q1's Ad-replies and q2's openers. q1 owns p410 footers for anchors *pluribus locis*, *quod* probatur, the Augustine-comparison, *multiplicatum*, *quantitatem*, *determinata* — rendered here as [^11]–[^16] in this chunk's continuous numbering. The remaining p410 footers (*Apoc. 21,27*; "Ut dictum est quaest. praeced.") belong to q2's body anchors and migrate to q2.

**Hand-off to q2 (bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a3-q2):** q2 ("Utrum quis teneatur poenitere de veniali") begins at raw line 46429 / printed p410 R-2 ("Secundo quaeritur de poenitentia veniali..."). q2 has NO scholion of its own (covered by §II above). q2 inherits the two p410 footers it anchors (Apoc. 21,27; "Ut dictum est quaest. praeced.") plus its own p411+ footers.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the PDF column bands; codex-siglum apparatus rendered as printed.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum quis teneatur poenitere de veniali.*

Secundo quaeritur de poenitentia venialium quantum ad necessitatem remedii. Et est quaestio, utrum teneatur quis poenitere de veniali. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia impossibile est intrare in gloriam, nisi veniale remittatur[^1]; sed veniale est actuale peccatum, et ab illo non iustificatur nisi per poenitentiam: ergo necesse est poenitere.

2. Item, aliquod est veniale, quod per consensum fit mortale[^2]: ergo aliqua sunt, in quae tenemur dissentire, ne fiant: ergo postquam talia sunt commissa, tenemur dissentire et de eis dolere: ergo et poenitere.

3. Item, multitudo venialium de proximo disponit ad mortale, licet non necessario: ergo qui dimittit venialia, in se multiplicari committit se discrimini; sed omnes tenentur non committere se discrimini: ergo etc.

<!-- page 411 -->

4. Item, quod poena exterior sit necessaria, videtur, quia dicit Magister in littera[^3], quod est pectus percutiendum, et quantulacumque poena est sustinenda.

5. Item, Augustinus[^4], loquens de periculo venialium: «Ieiunia, inquit, et orationes et eleemosynae invigilent».

**Sed contra:**
1. Quae non tenemur vitare, non tenemur de his poenitere — hoc certum est, quia, sicut virtus poenitentiae detestatur factum, ita cavet faciendum[^5] — sed talia sunt venialia: ergo etc.

2. Item, ad nihil tenemur, sine quo potest esse caritas; sed caritas potest esse sine deletione venialium, quia stat cum venialibus[^6]: ergo de venialibus non tenemur poenitere.

3. Item, non teneor[^7] poenitere de hoc veniali nec de illo, et sic de aliis: pari ratione ergo de nullo.

4. Item, quod non debeatur veniali poena exterior, videtur: quia veniale est minus mortali in infinitum; sed mortali debetur poena finita exterior[^8]: ergo veniali nulla.

> **Conclusio.** Poenitentia de peccato veniali secundum se non est necessaria, sed bene, prout praebet rationem periclitandi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de morbo peccati venialis: aut in se, aut in quantum praebet occasionem periclitandi, quam ponit Augustinus in littera[^9] sive per consensum, sive per contemptum. Si loquamur de veniali *in se*; sic dico, quod non est necesse poenitere de veniali, nec poenitentia interiori nec poenitentia exteriori; quoniam, sicut infra[^10] videbitur, veniale non solum in hac vita deletur, verum etiam post mortem. — Si autem loquamur ratione periculi, ad quod ducit; sic dico, quia ducunt ad periculum ipsum impoenitentem, quod tenetur homo de aliquibus poenitere, quando advertit periculum, sicut manifeste dicit Augustinus in littera[^11].

Et ideo notandum est, sicut tactum est[^12], quod tria sunt genera venialium: quaedam ex subreptione; et de his non tenemur poenitere nisi de congruo; quaedam ex cogitatione, cui si consentiatur, incidit homo in mortale; et de tali tenetur homo poenitere non simpliciter, sed in casu, sive pro loco et tempore, quando recogitat ea, ne, si consentiat, cadat. Quaedam autem sunt venialia, quae per sui multitudinem augent libidinem, sicut illa, in quae est consensus, sed deordinatio infra Deum; et de talibus dico, quod tenetur homo poenitere, ne multiplicentur, et homo periculo et discrimini se committat. Et ad talium poenitentiam hortatur Augustinus[^13] ostendens periculum, quod est in multitudine venialium, comparans arenae, comparans bestiis minutis, comparans guttis multiplicatis, comparans scabiei; et intelligenda est similitudo quantum ad haec omnia ratione periculi, non quod faciant ipsa venialia de se, sed quod ad hoc hominem praeparant[^14]. Et de his sanum consilium est etiam poenam sustinere, sicut Augustinus determinat. Utrum autem teneamur sacerdoti ea confiteri et ad eius arbitrium satisfacere, quaestio erit infra[^15], cum agetur de confessione.

Ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Nam rationes ad primam partem procedunt ratione periculi, ad quod disponunt, praeter primum, ad quod solvendum per interemptionem[^16], quia remitti possunt in alio saeculo. — Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt ratione morbi in se.

Ultimam tamen non valet. Quamvis enim mortale, quamdiu est mortale, sit improportionale; tamen in ipsa iustificatione remittitur poena aeterna, et mortale fit quodam modo veniale, et ita proportionale[^17].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether one is bound to repent of a venial sin.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning the penance for venial sins as regards the necessity of the remedy. And the question is whether one is bound to repent of a venial sin. And that he is, it seems:

1. Because it is impossible to enter into glory unless the venial sin be remitted[^1]; but a venial sin is an actual sin, and one is not justified from it except through penance: therefore it is necessary to repent.

2. Likewise, there is some venial sin which by consent becomes mortal[^2]: therefore there are things to which we are bound to dissent, lest they come to be: therefore, after such things have been committed, we are bound to dissent and to grieve over them: therefore also to repent.

3. Likewise, a multitude of venial sins disposes one nearly to mortal sin, though not necessarily: therefore he who lets venial sins be multiplied in himself commits himself to danger; but all are bound not to commit themselves to danger: therefore etc.

<!-- page 411 -->

4. Likewise, that exterior punishment is necessary seems so, because the Master says in the text[^3] that the breast is to be struck, and that however small a punishment is to be borne.

5. Likewise, Augustine[^4], speaking of the danger of venial sins: «Let fastings, he says, and prayers and almsdeeds keep watch».

**On the contrary:**
1. Those things which we are not bound to avoid, of these we are not bound to repent — this is certain, because, just as the virtue of penance detests the deed done, so it guards against the doing[^5] — but such are venial sins: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, we are bound to nothing without which charity can exist; but charity can exist without the deletion of venial sins, because it stands together with venial sins[^6]: therefore of venial sins we are not bound to repent.

3. Likewise, I am not bound[^7] to repent of this venial sin nor of that, and so of the others: by parity of reasoning, therefore, of none.

4. Likewise, that exterior punishment is not owed to a venial sin seems so: because a venial sin is less than a mortal one infinitely; but to a mortal sin a finite exterior punishment is owed[^8]: therefore to a venial sin none.

> **Conclusion.** Penance for a venial sin, taken in itself, is not necessary, but well [advised], inasmuch as it furnishes a ground of being endangered.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking about the disease of venial sin: either in itself, or insofar as it furnishes an occasion of being endangered, which Augustine sets down in the text[^9], whether through consent or through contempt. If we speak of a venial sin *in itself*; thus I say that it is not necessary to repent of a venial sin, neither with interior penance nor with exterior penance; since, as will be seen below[^10], a venial sin is deleted not only in this life, but also after death. — But if we speak by reason of the danger to which it leads; thus I say that, because they lead the impenitent man himself into danger, a man is bound to repent of certain things, when he perceives the danger, as Augustine manifestly says in the text[^11].

And therefore it must be noted, as was touched on[^12], that there are three kinds of venial sins: certain ones from sudden impulse; and of these we are not bound to repent except as fitting; certain ones from thought, to which if one consents the man falls into mortal sin; and of such a man is bound to repent not absolutely, but in a [particular] case, or according to place and time, when he reflects on them, lest, if he consent, he fall. But there are certain venial sins which by their multitude increase concupiscence, like those in which there is consent, but [only] a disorder below God; and of these I say that a man is bound to repent, lest they be multiplied, and the man commit himself to peril and danger. And to penance for such Augustine[^13] exhorts, showing the danger that is in the multitude of venial sins, comparing it to sand, comparing it to tiny beasts, comparing it to multiplied drops, comparing it to the itch; and the likeness is to be understood, as regards all these, by reason of the danger, not as though the venial sins themselves do it of themselves, but because they prepare a man for this[^14]. And concerning these it is sound counsel to bear punishment also, as Augustine determines. But whether we are bound to confess them to a priest and to make satisfaction at his judgment, will be a question below[^15], when confession is treated.

From these things the objections to either part are clear. For the reasonings to the first part proceed by reason of the danger to which they dispose, except the first, which is to be solved by [its] suppression[^16], because they can be remitted in the other age. — But the reasonings to the opposite proceed by reason of the disease in itself.

The last, however, does not hold. For although a mortal sin, so long as it is mortal, is disproportionate; nevertheless in the very justification the eternal punishment is remitted, and the mortal sin becomes in a certain way venial, and so proportionate[^17].

---

en: Cf. Revelation 21:27.

la: Ut dictum est quaest. praeced., ubi etiam *maior* seq. arg. insinuatur. — De dolore poenitentiae vide supra p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

en: As was said in the preceding question, where also the major [premise] of the following argument is intimated. — On the sorrow of penance see above, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Hic c. 4. et 6.

en: Here [in the Master's text], c. 4 and 6.

la: Epist. 265. (alias 108.) n. 8. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Letter 265 (formerly 108), n. 8. See here the Master's text, c. 5.

la: Vide supra d. 14. p. I. dub. 4.

en: See above, d. 14, p. I, dubium 4.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. fundam.

en: Cf. Book II of the Sentences, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, in the fundamenta.

la: Codd. R S *tenemur*.

en: Codices R and S read *tenemur* ["we are bound"].

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. in fine. Cfr. etiam supra d. 15. p. I. q. 1. et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.

en: See here the Master's text, c. 6, at the end. Cf. also above, d. 15, p. I, q. 1, and p. II, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here [in the Master's text], c. 5.

en: Distinction 21, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Hic c. 5. Cfr. ibid. c. 6. verba Magistri.

en: Here [in the Master's text], c. 5. Cf. there, c. 6, the words of the Master.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Inferius pro *quaedam ex cogitatione* non pauci codd. et ed. 1 perperam *quaedam ex voluntate*. Subinde, voci *quando* codd. A I K aa praemittunt *scilicet*.

en: The preceding question. — Below, for *quaedam ex cogitatione* ["certain ones from thought"] not a few codices and the first edition wrongly read *quaedam ex voluntate* ["certain ones from will"]. Thereupon, to the word *quando* ["when"] codices A, I, K, aa prefix *scilicet* ["namely"].

la: Vide supra pag. 410, nota 1. — Pro *et homo* edd. *et homo*. Superius pro *multitudinem* cod. aa *multiplicationem*.

en: See above, p. 410, note 1. — For *et homo* the editions [read] *et homo*. Above, for *multitudinem* ["multitude"] codex aa reads *multiplicationem* ["multiplication"].

la: Vide arg. 5. pro parte affirm., et hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. — Pro *sed quod ad hoc* plurimi codd. et ed. 1 *sed ad quod* (cod. L) — fortasse legendum *sed ad hoc* (similitudo est), *quod*. Dist. 17. p. III. a. 2. q. 1.

en: See argument 5 for the affirmative part, and here the Master's text, c. 5. — For *sed quod ad hoc* most codices and the first edition [read] *sed ad quod* (codex L) — perhaps to be read *sed ad hoc* (the likeness holds), *quod*. Distinction 17, p. III, a. 2, q. 1.

en: Distinction 17, p. II, dubium 7, and d. 21, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Sive negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Pro *praeter primum, ad quod* Vat. *praeter primam, quam*. Inferius pro *quod*, quod multi codd. et ed. 1 omittunt, codd. F G *Ultima*.

en: Or [its] negation. Cf. Tome I, p. 87, note 4. — For *praeter primum, ad quod* ["except the first, which"] the Vatican edition [reads] *praeter primam, quam* ["except the first {reason}, which"]. Below, for *quod* ["which"], which many codices and the first edition omit, codices F and G [read] *Ultima* ["The last"].

la: Vide infra d. 17. p. II. dub. 7. et d. 21. p. I. q. 2. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See below, d. 17, p. II, dubium 7, and d. 21, p. I, q. 2. — See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the PDF page bands for printed pp. 410–411 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p41{0,1}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 46429–46524) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Vol IV is two-column with cascade-shattered Respondeo/footers, so the PDF column bands are authoritative for the damaged regions (Vol II override). Offset pdf = printed + 20 → PDF pp. 430–431.
- **Opener alignment verified:** the chunk opens "Secundo quaeritur de poenitentia venialium quantum ad necessitatem remedii… utrum teneatur quis poenitere de veniali" = Art III q2. Correctly aligned.
- **Running head:** p410's head reads "SENT.", p411's reads "DIST. XVI. P. II. DUBIA." (the DUBIA section begins in the right column of p411). The q2 body occupies p410-L bottom (opener + args 1–3) and p411-L/R (args 4–5, sed contra, conclusio, respondeo). The page-verify target "ART. III. QUAEST. II" running head does not appear because q2 shares its closing page with the start of the dubia; pages confirmed correct by content, not by the head text.
- **Scholion disposition:** Article III's scholion (`I. Ad quaestionem… II. Quaestio seq. (2.) intelligitur de necessitate absoluta…`) is printed on p410 between q1 and q2 and is rendered with the sibling chunk **bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a3-q1** (`has_scholion: true` there). This chunk renders no scholion (`has_scholion: false`); its second clause ("II. Quaestio seq.") is the cross-reference to the present q2.
- **Apparatus split (per-page footer):** p410 footers 1–6 belong to q1/scholion text earlier on the page; only footers 7–8 (Apoc. 21,27; "Ut dictum est quaest. praeced.") attach to q2's opener args 1–2 and are rendered here as [^1]–[^2]. p411 footers 1–15 attach to q2's p411 body and are rendered as [^3]–[^17]. p411 footer 16 (Porphyr., de Praedicab.) belongs to the DUBIA and hands off to the p2-dubia chunk.
- **[?] flags:** none. All footnote markers and readings resolved cleanly against the PDF column bands.