title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum praeter caritatem increatam poni debeat habitus caritatis creatus

title_alt: Whether besides uncreated charity a created habit of charity must be posited

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De dono creati habitus caritatis, utrum existat, et quomodo diligi et cognosci possit.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum praeter caritatem increatam poni debeat habitus caritatis creatus.*

Circa primum, quod non sit ponere aliam caritatem a caritate increata, supposita probatione per auctoritates multas, quas adducit Magister in littera, probatur rationibus, et primo rationibus sumtis ab essentia caritatis, quae est bonitas, hoc modo.

1. Nullum accidens est melius substantia rationali; sed caritas est melior anima rationali, quia eam facit meliorem: ergo non est accidens, ergo est substantia. Sed constat, quod non irrationalis, ergo rationalis, ergo anima vel Angelus vel Deus; sed non anima vel Angelus: ergo Deus[^1].

2. Item, nulla bonitas creata aequivalet beatitudini[^2]; sed caritas aequivalet beatitudini, quia per caritatem meretur homo, ut efficiatur dignus vita aeterna sive beatitudine: ergo caritas non est bonitas creata: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne bonum creatum est bonum per participationem; sed omne bonum alio bono bonum potest intelligi non bonum[^3], et sic caderet in ipso malum per diminutionem speciei, modi et ordinis: ergo si caritas est bona bonitate creata, caritas potest esse mala vel saltem intelligi mala vel etiam fieri informis; quod falsum est.

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus sumtis a virtute sic.

4. Quanto aliquid virtuosius, tanto paucioribus mediis indiget. Ergo si aliquid est potentissimum, nulla alia a se virtute indiget: ergo si Spiritus sanctus est potentiae infinitae et ipse est caritas, ergo se ipso, non alio, inflammat affectum ad amorem: non est ergo ponere caritatem creatam necessario, quae sit habitus.

5. Item, plus distat virtus naturalis a Deo quam voluntas; sed Deus dirigit virtutem naturalem non alio quam sit ipse[^4]: ergo si ibi non cadit medium, nec in voluntate cadet: ergo etc.

6. Item, ubi movet virtus motoris primi semper praesens et non potens errare, superfluit aliam virtutem superaddere, ut puta, si manus esset semper coniuncta temoni, non oporteret ibi esse aliam

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virtutem; sed Spiritus sanctus est dirigens et adiuvans ipsam voluntatem et est coniunctus semper et non potens errare: ergo superfluit aliam caritatem ponere; sed omne superfluum est resecandum: ergo etc.

Item, rationibus sumtis ab actu ostenditur illud idem.

7. Quia actus caritatis est animam recreare; sed non minoris virtutis est recreare, quam creare[^5], ergo si creare solum est ab increato, quod est infinitae potentiae, ergo et recreare; sed hoc proprium est caritatis: ergo est increata.

8. Item, aliquis actus caritatis est unire; sed nulla creatura per vanitatem unitur veritati, sed[^6] omnis creatura vanitas: ergo nulla creatura est medium uniendi Deo: si ergo caritas est medium uniendi, ergo non est vanitas nec creatura.

9. Item, actus caritatis est unumquodque ordinate diligere: ergo si ordinate diligere est diligere unumquodque, secundum quod sibi convenit, cum bonum increatum sit melius creato in infinitum, ergo ipsum magis in infinitum diligibile: ergo si caritas facit Deum diligere, ut diligendus est, caritas facit Deum in infinitum diligere; sed quod exit in actum infinitum est increatum[^7]: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Caritas est principium reformandi animam quantum ad potentiam voluntatis; sed anima quantum ad alias potentias, scilicet irascibilem et rationalem, reformatur per virtutes creatas: ergo pari ratione et concupiscibilis; sed eius reformatio[^8] est caritas: ergo etc.

2. Item, ubi est reformatio, ibi est conformatio et informatio, et ubi est informatio, ibi est aliquid informans, quod se habet per modum formae; sed omnis forma rei creatae est creata; Deus enim nullius est forma perficiens: ergo etc.

3. Item, caritas est principium vivendi; unde Hugo de sancto Victore[^9]: «Scio, anima mea, quod amor est vita tua»; sed omnis vita, existens per participationem in aliquo, est ab aliquo informante, ex quo et vivificabili fiat unum; sed ex Deo et anima non potest fieri unum: ergo necesse est ponere in anima aliquam caritatem creatam, quae vivificet.

4. Item, omne quod est in aliquo possibili ad mortem, est in[^10] illo per aliquod separabile; sed vita gratiae est in anima possibili ad moriendum morte culpae: ergo per aliquod separabile; hoc autem non est Deus, quia impossibile est Dei praesentiam separari ab aliquo: ergo est aliquid creatum.

5. Item, caritas est principium gratificandi; sed gratificatio est illud[^11], in quo distinguitur bonus a malo, iustus ab impio, non tantum in actu, sed etiam in quiete, ut parvulus vel adultus dormiens: ergo cum distinctio non sit boni a malo per bonitatem increatam, quia illa omnibus est communis, caritas dicit quid creatum[^12]. Et iterum, cum distinctio quiescentium non sit per actum vel usum, sed habitum, patet quod caritas dicit habitum creatum.

6. Item, caritas est principium merendi; sed non quia bona facimus, ideo boni sumus, sed magis e converso: ergo[^13] caritas prius facit bonum, quam eliciat actum; sed cum aliquis de non bono fit bonus, necesse est aliquid poni in ipso de novo, et hoc non potest esse actus: ergo habitus.

7. Item, Deus alio modo cooperatur in operatione meritoria quam naturali, quia si non alio modo, tunc redit error Pelagii, quod ex naturalibus posset homo mereri; si ergo alio modo, cum per virtutem increatam omni naturae cooperetur, necesse est, quod in operatione creata meritoria cooperetur mediante alia virtute; sed haec non potest esse nisi creata: ergo etc.

8. Item, videtur quod Magister erraverit, quia qui dividit opera Trinitatis haereticus est; sed Magister posuit, quod caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum, sit Spiritus sanctus proprie: ergo ponit, quod nostrum diligere, quod est effectus in creatura, sit solius Spiritus sancti; et ita dividit opera Trinitatis.

9. Item, qui dicit, quid creatum esse increatum, errat; sed caritas, qua diligimus Deum et proximum, ut communiter tenetur, est quid creatum: sed Magister dixit, hanc esse Spiritum sanctum: ergo erravit.

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> **Conclusio.** Praeter caritatem increatam poni debet caritas, quae est habitus creatus et animam informans.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est et fuit ab antiquo duplex opinio. Quorundam enim, ut Magistri et sequacium suorum, est opinio, quod Spiritus sanctus est essentialiter caritas, qua Pater et Filius diligunt nos, et etiam qua nos diligimus Deum.

Et quidam voluerunt dicere, quod intellectus huius positionis hic est[^14]: Dicunt enim, quod, sicut lux potest tripliciter considerari, scilicet in se et in transparenti et in extremitate perspicui terminati — primo modo est lux, secundo modo lumen, tertio modo hypostasis coloris[^15] — ita Spiritus sanctus potest considerari in se, et sic est amor Patris et Filii; potest rursum considerari ut in anima humana inhabitans, et sic Spiritus sanctus dicitur gratia; potest etiam considerari ut unitus voluntati, et sic est caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum. Unde dicunt, quod Spiritus sanctus est nostra caritas, non per appropriationem, sed per unionem. Quemadmodum enim solus Filius est homo vel est[^16] incarnatus; et tamen tota Trinitas est incarnationem operata, sed tamen solus Filius unitus: sic, quamvis tota Trinitas faciat unionem Spiritus sancti cum voluntate, solus tamen Spiritus sanctus unitur voluntati, et ideo solus est caritas.

Ratio autem movens ad ponendum hoc est auctoritas Apostoli, primae ad Corinthios sexto[^17]: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus Spiritus est*, et etiam similitudo. Dicunt enim, quod, sicut Filius procedit per modum naturae et ita naturae unitur[^18], sic Spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis, et ideo voluntati unibilis et unitus. Et quia voluntas vertibilis est, non sic natura, ideo Spiritus sanctus unitur separabiliter, sed Filius inseparabiliter, et ideo longe inferiori modo quam Filius; et quibus sic unitur, se ipso facit diligere.

Sed haec positio non potest stare, quia Spiritus sanctus non est unibilis; et praeterea, si esset unibilis, aut per naturam, aut per gratiam. Non per naturam, ergo per gratiam: ergo adhuc oporteret[^19] esse habitum gratiae disponentem animam ad susceptionem talis unionis; et ita redit contrarium. Ideo non credo, quod Magister hoc modo fuerit huius opinionis.

Et propter hoc aliter dicendum, quod illud: *quo diligimus Deum*, tripliciter est accipere: aut quod diligimus effective, et sic caritas sive amor est totius[^20] Trinitatis et Spiritus sancti appropriate; aut quo diligimus exemplariter, et sic Spiritus sanctus, qui est unio Patris et Filii et nexus amborum, est[^21] unitas, ad cuius imitationem caritas nos nectit, secundum quod dicit Dominus, Ioannis decimo septimo[^22]: *Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus*; aut quo diligimus formaliter, et sic secundum opinionem Magistri est animi affectio.

Et in his omnibus verum dixit nec erravit, sed defecit; quia praeter hoc est ponere caritatem secundum communem opinionem, quae sit[^23] habitus creatus animam informans. Et ratio huius sumitur a parte essentiae eius, virtutis et operationis.

A parte essentiae, quia caritas est bonitas creaturae rationalis, ipsam perficiens et distinguens et ordinans et disponens ad vitam aeternam: ergo necesse est, quod sit eius[^24] formalis perfectio.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod caritas est melior anima rationali; dicendum, quod non est ibi comparatio, quia ubi unum propter alterum,

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ibi tantum unum[^25]; unde habens caritatem bonus est propter caritatem. Vel non cadit ibi comparatio, quia non uniformiter dicitur bonum. Nam substantia rationalis dicitur bona, quia ordinabilis in finem, caritas bona, quia ordinans.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aequivalet beatitudini; dicendum, quod aequivalet secundum divinam aestimationem, quae[^26] opus caritatis aestimat dignum vita aeterna sive tanta remuneratione.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si est bonum per participationem, tunc eius bonitas est permutabilis in informitatem; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur bonum per participationem dupliciter: aut quia participans et ordinatum, aut quia participatio et ordinatio. Primo modo est bonum habens caritatem, secundo modo[^27] caritas: et ideo potest non esse, quia non est ipsa essentia bonitatis, sed participatio; tamen ens[^28] non potest non esse bona vel ordinata, quia est ipse ordo amoris. Unde solvendum ad[^29] illud per distinctionem; et in hoc patent rationes sumtae ab essentia.

A parte etiam virtutis necesse est ponere caritatem habitum creatum. Nam caritas, qua diligimus Deum, est virtus, non tantum quia[^30] Deus cooperatur nobis, sed etiam quia nostra voluntas cooperatur Deo: *Adiutores enim Dei sumus*[^31]; et quia, cum cooperamur Deo, necesse est nos sibi conformari, necesse est, quod ab illa summa caritate relinquatur in nobis aliquod exemplatum in nostro affectu, per quod moveatur[^32] illi conformiter. Voluntas enim libera est et nata moveri ad opposita: et ideo ponitur virtus caritatis creatae in nobis, non propter defectum a parte Dei nobiscum operantis, sed voluntatis nostrae sibi cooperantis.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus potentissima non indiget virtute media, verum est; sed caritas non est propter illius virtutis indigentiam, sed potius voluntatis suscipientis, quae indiget aliquo habitu disponente.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus cooperatur naturae sine virtute creata; dicendum, quod Deus regit naturam, sicut instituit, et natura uniformiter currit; et ideo non indiget aliquo[^33] regulante. Non sic est de voluntate, quae movetur difformiter; et ideo indiget aliquo habitu regulante et disponente ipsam. Vel dicendum, quod aliud est de natura et voluntate; quia natura non habet moveri nisi iuxta se, vel infra, sed voluntas supra: et ideo indiget aliquo elevante ipsam.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus primi motoris est praesens; dicendum, quod non sufficit praesentia, sed necesse est, quod recipiens influentiam habeat habilitatem et conformitatem; et hoc est per virtutem creatam.

A parte etiam operationis ponitur necessitas, quia reformatio sive[^34] recreatio, unio et dilectio non tantum sunt ab aliquo ut ab efficiente, sed etiam ut ab informante. Informans autem caritas creata est; et ex hoc patent obiecta ex parte actus sive operationis.

*Ad 7.* Nam quod obiicitur, quod recreatio[^35] est ab increato; verum est per modum efficientis, sicut et creatio; sed reformatio ulterius relinquit[^36] formam; et ideo necesse est ponere habitum informantem.

*Ad 8.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vanitas non unit[^37] veritati; dicendum, quod gratia potest considerari secundum quod ex nihilo, et sic est vanitas, et sic non unit; vel secundum quod est influentia secundum divinam praesentiam, et sic habet veritatis expressam similitudinem, et tali modo unit.

*Ad 9.* Ad illud quod obiicitur[^38], quod caritas facit diligere Deum quantum est diligendus etc.; dicendum, quod hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quantum Deus deberet diligi in se, et sic falsum est, quia cum sit bonum infinitum, deberet in infinitum diligi, et tali modo Deus solus se ipsum diligit; vel in quantum est diligendus ab hoc[^39], et sic verum est, et tunc diligit in infinitum, non simpliciter, sed secundum aestimationem habentis caritatem. Tantum enim diligit caritas Deum plus quam bonum creatum, quod, si bonum creatum in infinitum multiplicaretur, adhuc magis diligeret Deum.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:** Quod autem obiicitur in contrarium, concedendum est praeter duo ultima, quae ostendunt Magistrum errasse.

*Ad 8.* Quod ergo[^40] obiicitur, quia dividit opera Trinitatis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia quod Spiritus sanctus sit caritas, qua diligimus Deum, aut dictum est per appropriationem, aut per unionem, aut certe per exemplaritatem; et sic intelliguntur omnes auctoritates, quas Magister adducit pro se;

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formaliter autem loquendo non intelliguntur verae, nec credo, quod Magister sic intellexerit.

*Ad 9.* Et per hoc patet aliud[^41], quod Magister non dicit, quod creatum sit increatum, sed quod sufficiat donum increatum sine creato; et in hoc non fuit error, sed defectus tantum.

english:
### Article Unique. *On the gift of the created habit of charity, whether it exists, and how it can be loved and known.*
### Question I. *Whether besides uncreated charity a created habit of charity must be posited.*

Concerning the first point, that no charity other than uncreated charity is to be posited — supposing the proof through the many authorities which the Master adduces in the *littera* — is shown by reasons; and first, by reasons drawn from the essence of charity, which is goodness, in this manner.

1. No accident is better than a rational substance; but charity is better than the rational soul, since it makes it better: therefore it is not an accident, therefore it is a substance. But it is established that it is not irrational, therefore rational, therefore either soul or angel or God; but neither soul nor angel: therefore God[^1].

2. Likewise, no created goodness is equivalent to beatitude[^2]; but charity is equivalent to beatitude, because through charity a man merits, so as to be made worthy of eternal life or beatitude: therefore charity is not a created goodness: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every created good is good by participation; but every good which is good by another good can be understood as not good[^3], and thus evil would fall upon it through the diminution of species, mode and order: therefore if charity is good with a created goodness, charity can be evil, or at least be understood as evil, or even become unformed; which is false.

Likewise, the same is shown by reasons drawn from virtue, thus.

4. The more virtuous a thing is, the fewer means it needs. Therefore if anything is most powerful, it needs no virtue other than itself: therefore if the Holy Spirit is of infinite power and is himself charity, then by himself, not by another, he inflames the affection to love: therefore there is no need to posit a created charity which would be a habit.

5. Likewise, natural virtue is more distant from God than the will; but God directs natural virtue by no other than himself[^4]: therefore if no medium falls there, neither will it fall in the will: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, where the virtue of the first mover, ever present and unable to err, moves, it is superfluous to add another virtue — as, for instance, if a hand were always joined to the rudder, there would be no need for another

virtue there; but the Holy Spirit is directing and assisting the will itself, and is always conjoined and unable to err: therefore it is superfluous to posit another charity; but everything superfluous is to be cut away: therefore etc.

Likewise, by reasons drawn from the act, the same is shown.

7. Because the act of charity is to recreate the soul; but it is no less a work of virtue to recreate than to create[^5], therefore if to create is from the uncreated alone, which is of infinite power, then to recreate is also; but this is proper to charity: therefore charity is uncreated.

8. Likewise, an act of charity is to unite; but no creature is united to truth through vanity, but[^6] every creature is vanity: therefore no creature is the medium of uniting [us] to God: if therefore charity is the medium of uniting, then it is neither vanity nor a creature.

9. Likewise, the act of charity is to love each thing in due order: therefore if to love in due order is to love each thing according to what befits it, since the uncreated good is better than the created infinitely, then it is itself infinitely more lovable: therefore if charity makes one love God as he is to be loved, charity makes one love God infinitely; but what goes out into an infinite act is uncreated[^7]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Charity is the principle of reforming the soul as to the power of the will; but the soul, as to the other powers — namely the irascible and the rational — is reformed through created virtues: therefore by parity of reasoning so also is the concupiscible; but its reformation[^8] is charity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, where there is reformation, there is conformation and information; and where there is information, there is something informing, which has itself after the manner of a form; but every form of a created thing is created; for God is the perfecting form of nothing: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, charity is the principle of living; whence Hugh of St. Victor[^9]: «I know, my soul, that love is your life»; but every life, existing by participation in something, is from something informing, out of which and the vivifiable a unity is made; but out of God and the soul a unity cannot be made: therefore it is necessary to posit in the soul some created charity, which vivifies.

4. Likewise, everything that is in something capable of dying is in[^10] it through some separable thing; but the life of grace is in the soul which is capable of dying the death of fault: therefore through some separable thing; but this is not God, since it is impossible for God's presence to be separated from anything: therefore it is something created.

5. Likewise, charity is the principle of making pleasing; but making-pleasing is that[^11] in which the good is distinguished from the evil, the just from the impious, not only in act, but also in rest, as a child or an adult sleeping: therefore, since the distinction of good from evil is not through uncreated goodness, because that is common to all, charity bespeaks something created[^12]. And again, since the distinction of those at rest is not through act or use, but through habit, it is plain that charity bespeaks a created habit.

6. Likewise, charity is the principle of meriting; but it is not because we do good things that we are good, but rather conversely: therefore[^13] charity first makes [a man] good, before it elicits an act; but when someone from not-good becomes good, it is necessary that something be placed in him anew, and this cannot be the act: therefore a habit.

7. Likewise, God cooperates in a meritorious operation in another mode than in a natural one, because if not in another mode, then the error of Pelagius returns, that man could merit from his natural [powers]; if therefore in another mode — since by uncreated virtue he cooperates with every nature — it is necessary that in a created meritorious operation he cooperate by means of another virtue; but this can only be created: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, it seems that the Master erred, because he who divides the works of the Trinity is a heretic; but the Master held that the charity by which we love God is the Holy Spirit properly: therefore he holds that our loving — which is an effect in the creature — is of the Holy Spirit alone; and thus he divides the works of the Trinity.

9. Likewise, he who says that something created is uncreated errs; but the charity by which we love God and neighbor, as is commonly held, is something created: yet the Master said this to be the Holy Spirit: therefore he erred.

> **Conclusio.** Besides uncreated charity there must be posited a charity which is a created habit informing the soul.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that for the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that on this matter there is and from of old has been a twofold opinion. The opinion of certain ones — the Master and his followers — is that the Holy Spirit is essentially the charity by which the Father and the Son love us, and also by which we love God.

And some have wished to say that the meaning of this position is this[^14]: For they say that, just as light can be considered in three ways, namely in itself, and in the transparent, and at the boundary of a terminated translucent body — in the first mode it is *lux*, in the second *lumen*, in the third the hypostasis of color[^15] — so the Holy Spirit can be considered in himself, and thus he is the love of the Father and of the Son; he can again be considered as inhabiting the human soul, and thus the Holy Spirit is called grace; he can also be considered as united to the will, and thus he is the charity by which we love God. Whence they say that the Holy Spirit is our charity, not by appropriation, but by union. For just as the Son alone is man, or is[^16] incarnate, and yet the whole Trinity wrought the incarnation, but only the Son was united: so, although the whole Trinity makes the union of the Holy Spirit with the will, yet the Holy Spirit alone is united to the will, and therefore he alone is charity.

The reason moving them to posit this is the authority of the Apostle, in the first to the Corinthians, [chapter] six[^17]: *He who clings to God is one Spirit*; and also a likeness. For they say that, just as the Son proceeds by way of nature and so is united to nature[^18], so the Holy Spirit by way of will, and therefore is unitable and united to the will. And because the will is changeable, not so nature, therefore the Holy Spirit is united separably, but the Son inseparably, and thus in a far inferior mode than the Son; and to those to whom he is so united, he by himself makes [them] love.

But this position cannot stand, because the Holy Spirit is not unitable; and besides, if he were unitable, it would be either by nature or by grace. Not by nature, therefore by grace: therefore there would still need[^19] to be a habit of grace disposing the soul to the reception of such a union; and so the contrary returns. For this reason I do not believe that the Master held this opinion in this way.

And on this account it must rather be said that the [phrase] *that by which we love God* can be taken in three ways: either as that by which we love **effectively**, and thus charity or love is of the whole[^20] Trinity, and of the Holy Spirit by appropriation; or as that by which we love **exemplarily**, and thus the Holy Spirit, who is the union of the Father and the Son and the bond of both, is[^21] the unity to the imitation of which charity binds us, according to what the Lord says, John seventeen[^22]: *That they may be one, as we also are one*; or as that by which we love **formally**, and thus, according to the opinion of the Master, it is the affection of the soul.

And in all these things he spoke truly and did not err, but fell short; because besides this there is to be posited a charity according to the common opinion, which is[^23] a created habit informing the soul. And the reason for this is taken from the side of its essence, of its virtue, and of its operation.

From the side of essence, because charity is the goodness of the rational creature, perfecting and distinguishing it, ordering and disposing it to eternal life: therefore it is necessary that it be its[^24] formal perfection.

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected first, that charity is better than the rational soul; it must be said that there is no comparison there, because where one [thing exists] for the sake of another,

there is only one[^25]; whence the one having charity is good on account of charity. Or there is no comparison there, because "good" is not said uniformly. For the rational substance is called good because it is orderable to an end, and charity is called good because it orders.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that it is equivalent to beatitude; it must be said that it is equivalent according to divine estimation, which[^26] reckons the work of charity worthy of eternal life or of so great a reward.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that if it is good by participation, then its goodness is changeable into unformedness; it must be said that something is called good by participation in two ways: either because it is participating and ordered, or because it is the participation and the ordering. In the first way, the one having charity is good; in the second way[^27] charity itself: and therefore it can not-be, because it is not the very essence of goodness, but a participation; nevertheless, as a being[^28] it cannot fail to be good or ordered, because it is itself the order of love. Whence it is to be solved with regard to[^29] that point by a distinction; and thereby the reasons drawn from essence stand answered.

From the side of virtue also it is necessary to posit charity as a created habit. For the charity by which we love God is a virtue, not only because[^30] God cooperates with us, but also because our will cooperates with God: *for we are God's fellow-workers*[^31]; and because, when we cooperate with God, we must be conformed to him, it is necessary that from that supreme charity there be left in us some exemplate in our affection, by which it may be moved[^32] in conformity to it. For the will is free and naturally moved to opposites: and so the virtue of created charity is posited in us, not because of any defect on the side of God working with us, but on the side of our will cooperating with him.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that the most powerful virtue does not need a mediating virtue, this is true; but charity is not [posited] because of any need of that virtue, but rather of the receiving will, which needs some disposing habit.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected, that God cooperates with nature without created virtue; it must be said that God governs nature as he instituted it, and nature runs uniformly; and therefore it does not need anything[^33] to regulate it. It is not so with the will, which is moved unevenly; and therefore it needs some habit regulating and disposing it. Or it must be said that the case of nature and of will differs; because nature is moved only on its own level, or below, but the will above: and therefore it needs something elevating it.

*Ad 6.* To that which is objected, that the virtue of the first mover is present; it must be said that presence does not suffice, but it is necessary that the recipient of the influence have aptitude and conformity; and this is through created virtue.

From the side of operation also a necessity is posited, because reformation or[^34] recreation, union and love are not only from something as from an efficient [cause], but also as from an informing [cause]. But the informing charity is created; and from this the objections from the side of act or operation stand answered.

*Ad 7.* For as to what is objected, that recreation[^35] is from the uncreated; this is true by way of efficient [cause], as is creation also; but reformation furthermore leaves[^36] a form behind; and therefore it is necessary to posit an informing habit.

*Ad 8.* To that which is objected, that vanity does not unite[^37] to truth; it must be said that grace can be considered insofar as [it is] from nothing, and thus it is vanity, and thus does not unite; or insofar as it is an influence according to the divine presence, and thus it has an express likeness of truth, and in that mode unites.

*Ad 9.* To that which is objected[^38], that charity makes [one] love God as far as he is to be loved, etc.; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: either as far as God ought to be loved in himself, and thus it is false, since, since he is an infinite good, he ought to be loved infinitely, and in that mode God alone loves himself; or as far as he is to be loved by this [creature][^39], and thus it is true, and then [charity] loves infinitely, not simply, but according to the estimation of the one having charity. For charity loves God so much more than created good, that even if created good were multiplied to infinity, it would still love God more.

**To the arguments to the contrary:** What is objected to the contrary is to be conceded, except for the last two, which show that the Master erred.

*Ad 8.* As to what then[^40] is objected, that he divides the works of the Trinity; it must be said that this is false, because [the saying] that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God, was either said by appropriation, or by union, or certainly by exemplarity; and thus all the authorities which the Master adduces for himself are to be understood;

speaking *formally*, however, they are not to be understood as true, nor do I believe that the Master so understood them.

*Ad 9.* And by this the other point also stands clear[^41], namely that the Master does not say that the created is uncreated, but that the uncreated gift suffices without the created; and in this there was not error, but only a defect.

la: Sub hoc respectu ait August., libr. 83 *QQ.* q. 51: *Nec quidquam est melius rationali anima, nisi Deus.* — Paulo ante verbo *irrationalis* praefigitur in cod. V *est*. Praeferimus lectionem nonnullorum codd. ut M T Z (cod. H omittit particulam *et*), in qua additur *Deus et*, quae intentioni Magistri ad amussim correspondet.

en: Under this respect Augustine says, in the *Book of 83 Questions*, q. 51: *Nor is anything better than the rational soul, except God.* — A little before, in cod. V the word *est* is prefixed to *irrationalis*. We prefer the reading of certain codices (M T Z; cod. H omits the particle *et*), in which *Deus et* is added — a reading which exactly corresponds to the Master's intention.

la: Beatitudo enim secundum Boeth., III *de Consol.* Prosa 2, est *status bonorum omnium congregatione perfectus.* — Mox sequimur plures codd. ut B H K O T Z Π substituendo *ut efficiatur* loco *et efficitur*, quod Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliis codd. habet. — Vat. cum cod. cc *ostendit*, sed contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.

en: Beatitude, according to Boethius, *Consolation* III, prose 2, is *the state perfected by the gathering together of all goods.* — Next we follow several codices (B H K O T Z Π) in substituting *ut efficiatur* for *et efficitur*, which the Vatican edition with ed. 1 and other codices has. — The Vatican, with cod. cc, reads *ostendit*, but against the older codices with ed. 1.

la: Boeth., *de Hebdomad.* ait: *Si participatione (bona sunt), per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est, album non est, et de ceteris qualitatibus eodem modo.* — Mox post *creata* in Vat. et cod. cc deest *caritas*, quod tamen invenitur in ceteris mss. et ed. 1. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *ab aliquo*.

en: Boethius, *On the Hebdomads*, says: *If they are good by participation, of themselves they are in no way good; for what is white by participation is not, in respect of what it is in itself, white, and likewise for other qualities.* — Next, after *creata*, in the Vatican and cod. cc the word *caritas* is missing, though it is found in the other manuscripts and ed. 1. — The Vatican, against very many codices and ed. 1, reads *ab aliquo*.

la: Vat. cum ed. 1, sed contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *se ipso* pro *sit ipse*; ed. 1 insuper omittit *quum*. Paulo ante multi codd. cum ed. 1 perperam *diligit* loco *dirigit*. — Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 restituimus *caritate*. — Hic, c. 1–4 et c. 6.

en: The Vatican with ed. 1, but against nearly all the codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, reads *se ipso* for *sit ipse*; ed. 1 also omits *quum*. A little before, many codices with ed. 1 wrongly read *diligit* for *dirigit*. — On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we restored *caritate*. — [See] here, cap. 1–4 and cap. 6.

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 7. — Paulo ante codd. W Y post *virtutis est* repetunt *animam*.

en: Cf. above, d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, fundamentum 7. — A little before, codices W Y, after *virtutis est*, repeat *animam*.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 substituimus *sed* loco *et*. Mox post *omnis creatura* cod. X addit *est*.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we substituted *sed* for *et*. Next, after *omnis creatura*, cod. X adds *est*.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *infinitum et*, quod Vat. praemittit verbo *increatum*.

en: On the authority of very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we struck out *infinitum et*, which the Vatican prefixes to the word *increatum*.

la: Ed. 1 *reformativum*.

en: Ed. 1 reads *reformativum*.

la: *De Arrha animae*, in princ.: *Scio, quod vita tua dilectio est.* In quo textu Vat., multis codd. cum edd. 1, 6 refragantibus, *Scito*.

en: [Hugh of St. Victor,] *On the Arrha of the Soul*, at the beginning: *I know that your life is love.* In which text the Vatican reads *Scito*, with many codices and editions 1 and 6 disagreeing.

la: Ex fere omnibus codd. et sex primis edd. supplevimus male omissum *in*.

en: From nearly all the codices and the first six editions we supplied the wrongly omitted *in*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *id* loco *illud*, et paulo infra *et adultus* pro *vel adultus dormiens*.

en: The Vatican, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads *id* for *illud*, and a little below *et adultus* for *vel adultus dormiens*.

la: Codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures cum Vat. et ed. 1 *non falso caritas non dicit quid commune*; alii *falso caritas dicit quid commune*, ex quo tamen lectio codd. O U Z, quam in textum recepimus, quaeque distinctior est, confirmari videtur. Cod. T a manu secunda in margine *caritas enim increata dicit quid commune*, sed superflue, utpote repetitio propositionis praecedentis; lectio vero eiusdem primitiva, in qua verba, de quibus agitur, prorsus omittuntur, non est spernenda, immo magis placeret quam ceterae, si firmiore auctoritate fulciretur; quod si haec praeferatur, interpunctio esset mutanda ita, ut proxime sequens propositio coniungatur cum praecedenti.

en: The codices disagree among themselves: very many, with the Vatican and ed. 1, read *non falso caritas non dicit quid commune*; others *falso caritas dicit quid commune*, from which, however, the reading of codices O U Z — which we have received into the text, and which is the more distinct — seems to be confirmed. Cod. T, by a second hand in the margin, has *caritas enim increata dicit quid commune*, but superfluously, since it is a repetition of the preceding proposition; the primitive reading of the same codex, however, in which the words at issue are wholly omitted, is not to be despised — indeed it would please us more than the others, if it were supported by stronger authority; and if this be preferred, the punctuation would have to be changed so that the next-following proposition is joined with the preceding one.

la: In Vat. incongrue omittitur *ergo*, quod in mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 invenitur.

en: In the Vatican *ergo* is incongruously omitted, which is found in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *potest demonstrari per similitudinem* loco *hic est*. Paulo ante cod. O omittit *quidam*; cod. V autem ibi addit *etiam*.

en: The Vatican, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *potest demonstrari per similitudinem* for *hic est*. A little before, cod. O omits *quidam*; cod. V there adds *etiam*.

la: Hoc explicatur verbis S. Thomae, hic q. 1. a. 1: *Quia hypostasis coloris est lux, et color nihil aliud est quam lux incorporata.* — Plura de hoc habet S. Bonaventura, II. *Sent.* d. 13. a. 2. q. 2; et III. *Sent.* d. 23. dub. 1. Cfr. etiam I. *Sent.* d. 3. p. 1. dub. 7.

en: This is explained in the words of St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1: *Because the hypostasis of color is light, and color is nothing other than incorporated light.* — St. Bonaventure has more on this, II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, and III Sent., d. 23, dub. 1. Cf. also I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, dub. 7.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. supplevimus *est*.

en: From the older manuscripts we supplied *est*.

la: Vers. 17, ubi Vulgata: *Qui autem adhaeret Domino, unus* etc. — Mox post *etiam* Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 adiungit *movet eos*.

en: Verse 17, where the Vulgate has: *But he who clings to the Lord is one*, etc. — Next, after *etiam*, the Vatican, without any authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *movet eos*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut A 3 T aa cum ed. 1 *unitus*, cui cod. aa addit *est*.

en: Some codices (A 3 T aa) with ed. 1 read *unitus*, to which cod. aa adds *est*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, antiquioribus tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, *oportet*.

en: The Vatican, with cod. cc — though the older codices with ed. 1 disagree — reads *oportet*.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. restituimus non bene omissum *totius*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts we restored the wrongly omitted *totius*.

la: Corrupta lectio Vat. et cod. cc, in qua, paulo ante omisso *qui*, hic loco *est* ponitur *et*, deinde post *unitas* nova incipit propositio, resarcitur ope antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1. — Cod. Z *quoniam* loco *qui*, et plures codd. falso ponunt *aliorum* pro *amborum*.

en: The corrupt reading of the Vatican and cod. cc — in which, *qui* having been omitted a little before, *et* is here put in place of *est*, and then after *unitas* a new clause begins — is repaired by the help of the older codices and ed. 1. — Cod. Z reads *quoniam* for *qui*, and several codices wrongly place *aliorum* for *amborum*.

la: Vers. 21.

en: Verse 21.

la: Postulantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *sit* loco *est*.

en: At the demand of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted *sit* for *est*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *eius*, quod alii codd. cum ed. 1 bene exhibent.

en: In the Vatican and cod. cc *eius* is missing, which the other codices with ed. 1 rightly exhibit.

la: Aristot., III *Topic.* c. 2: *Si alicubi alterum alterius gratia; nihil enim eligibiliora utraque quam unum: ut sanum fieri et sanitas, quam sanitas* etc.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2: *If anywhere one [is] for the sake of the other; for the two together are nowise more choiceworthy than the one: as becoming-healthy and health, [are not more choiceworthy] than health*, etc.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut A 3 T W cc minus congrue *qui*, ed. 1 cum uno alteroque cod. ut 1 *quia*. Mox cod. bb *reputat* pro *aestimat*.

en: Some codices (A 3 T W cc) read, less fittingly, *qui*; ed. 1, with one or two codices (e.g. 1), reads *quia*. Next, cod. bb has *reputat* for *aestimat*.

la: In aliquibus mss. ut B bb adiungitur *est*.

en: In some manuscripts (B bb) *est* is added.

la: Fide multorum codd. ut A C G K L O S T U V X Z ee Π et ed. 1 supplevimus *ens*, cuius sensus explicatur lectione cod. R cum *est* loco *tamen ens*; plures codd. minus apte cum *ens*. Paulo ante codd. aa bb *essentialiter bonitas* pro *essentia bonitatis*; cod. 1 *et primo modo potest esse bonum* loco *et ideo potest non esse*, ac mox *secundo modo* pro *tamen ens*.

en: On the authority of many codices (A C G K L O S T U V X Z ee Π) and ed. 1 we supplied *ens*, whose sense is explained by the reading of cod. R with *est* in place of *tamen ens*; several codices, less aptly, [read] *cum ens*. A little before, codices aa bb read *essentialiter bonitas* for *essentia bonitatis*; cod. 1 reads *et primo modo potest esse bonum* for *et ideo potest non esse*, and next *secundo modo* for *tamen ens*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et quinque primas edd. *est* loco *ad*.

en: The Vatican, against the manuscripts and the first five editions, reads *est* for *ad*.

la: Vat. cum paucis mss. bis *qua* loco *quia*.

en: The Vatican, with a few manuscripts, twice reads *qua* for *quia*.

la: I. Cor. 3, 9. — Mox praeferimus lectionem paucorum mss. Q T et ec (a poster. manu) ponendo *sibi* loco *similiter*, utpote quae conclusionem plenius exhibet; error aliorum mss. explicatur ex eo, quod verbum *similiter*, si abbreviatur, formae verbi *sibi* appropinquet.

en: 1 Cor. 3:9. — Next we prefer the reading of a few manuscripts (Q T and ec, by a later hand) by putting *sibi* in place of *similiter*, since this exhibits the conclusion more fully; the error of the other manuscripts is explained by the fact that the word *similiter*, when abbreviated, approaches the form of the word *sibi*.

la: Codd. non conveniunt inter se; alii cum Vat. *moveat*, sed iam grammatice minus bene; ed. 1 *moverat*; alii codd. ut E H I O T Y Z ee exhibent lectionem a nobis receptam, quae contextui respondet.

en: The codices do not agree among themselves: some, with the Vatican, read *moveat*, but already grammatically less well; ed. 1 reads *moverat*; other codices (E H I O T Y Z ee) exhibit the reading we have received, which corresponds to the context.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *alio* pro *aliquo*. Paulo ante cod. X *movetur* loco *currit*. In sequenti propositione Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *movet* pro *movetur*.

en: Very many codices, with ed. 1, read *alio* for *aliquo*. A little before, cod. X reads *movetur* for *currit*. In the following clause the Vatican, against the witness of the manuscripts and the first six editions, reads *movet* for *movetur*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 restituimus *sive* loco *vel*, et paulo infra post *etiam* adiecimus *ut*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we restored *sive* in place of *vel*, and a little below after *etiam* we added *ut*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc hic *creatio* loco *recreatio* et paulo infra *recreatio* pro *creatio*, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1; pauci tamen codd. ut M aa bb cum ed. 2, formaliter loquendo, melius *reformatio* loco *recreatio*.

en: The Vatican, with cod. cc, here reads *creatio* for *recreatio*, and a little below *recreatio* for *creatio* — but the authority of the other manuscripts and of ed. 1 stands against this; a few codices, however (M aa bb), with ed. 2, read more correctly, formally speaking, *reformatio* for *recreatio*.

la: Ita plurimi et meliores codd.; Vat. *requirit*. Lectio a nobis recepta explicatur supra post solut. ad 3, ubi arguitur ex parte virtutis et dicitur: *Necesse est, quod ab illa summa caritate relinquatur in nobis aliquod exemplatum in nostro affectu, per quod moveatur illi conformiter.*

en: So very many and better codices; the Vatican reads *requirit*. The reading received by us is explained above, after the solution to the 3rd, where the argument is from the side of virtue, and it is said: *It is necessary that from that supreme charity there be left in us some exemplate in our affection, by which it may be moved in conformity to it.*

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. pro *unitur* substituimus *unit*, quod obiectioni magis respondet. Mox post *secundum quod* supple cum cod. bb *est*.

en: On the authority of very many manuscripts and the first six editions, in place of *unitur* we substituted *unit*, which answers more aptly to the objection. Next, after *secundum quod*, supply with cod. bb *est*.

la: Plurimis postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *obiicitur* pro *obiicit*. Dein in multis codd. et ed. 1 minus apte deest *caritas*.

en: At the demand of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted *obiicitur* for *obiicit*. Then in many codices and ed. 1 *caritas* is, less aptly, missing.

la: Plures codd. ut C S V W X falso *ad hoc*.

en: Several codices (C S V W X) wrongly read *ad hoc*.

la: Vat. cum nonnullis mss. *autem*; ed. 1 *enim*. Mox plures codd. ut G H I K T etc. post *obiicitur* ponunt *quod* loco *quia*.

en: The Vatican, with some manuscripts, reads *autem*; ed. 1 reads *enim*. Next, several codices (G H I K T, etc.) after *obiicitur* place *quod* in place of *quia*.

la: Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *illud* pro *aliud*.

en: The Vatican, against the resistance of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *illud* for *aliud*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Obsoleta et communiter reprobata est opinio Magistri, quod non sit in anima caritas creata secundum habitum, sed tantum secundum actum. Iuxta ipsum enim, ut communiter explicatur, Spiritus sanctus voluntatem creatam perficit per se ipsum, non tamen ut forma inhaerens, sed ut finis, exemplar et motor, ita ut actus caritatis ab anima elicitus nullum habitum creatum habeat. Scotus paulo mitius verba Magistri nititur explicare, scilicet quod Spiritus sanctus non formaliter, sed tantum exemplariter et causaliter sit nostra caritas, quod verissimum est. (Cfr. infra dub. 6).

**II.** Novem obiectiones Magistri ita sunt ordinatae, ut tres ex parte *essentiae*, tres ex parte *virtutis* et tres ex parte *actus* accipiantur. Unde etiam S. Bonav. sub eadem triplici respectu contrarias apponit rationes, quas, relicto solito ordine, statim applicat ad solvendas difficultates. Primo loco exhibet falsam quorundam explicationem Magistri, quod Spiritus sanctus solus sibi uniat voluntatem creatam, sicut Filius solus univit sibi naturam humanam. Hunc sensum reprobat merito ut falsissimum, cum unitas operationis non possit esse nisi ab unitate suppositi, immo naturae; talis autem hypostatica vel naturalis unio voluntatis creatae cum Spiritu sancto est ficta, immo haeretica.

**III.** In solut. ad 1. argumentatio fit ex axiomate Aristotelis: «Ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum»; inde sequitur, quod, si homo propter caritatem est Deo acceptus, una tantum est hic bonitas; ideo non potest fieri comparatio utriusque bonitatis separatae.

**IV.** In solut. ad 2. verba: «secundum divinam aestimationem» idem dicunt ac: «secundum acceptationem Dei», quae iuxta sententiam communem inter conditiones ad meritum de condigno requisitas numeratur. De hoc videsis II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, et Breviloq. p. V. c. 2.

**V.** De caritate creata: Breviloq. p. V. c. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., in utroque scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 23. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 3, et p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Obsolete and commonly rejected is the opinion of the Master, that there is in the soul no created charity according to habit, but only according to act. According to him, that is — as it is commonly explained — the Holy Spirit perfects the created will through himself, yet not as an inhering form, but as end, exemplar, and mover, in such a way that the act of charity elicited by the soul has no created habit. Scotus tries to explain the words of the Master a little more mildly, namely that the Holy Spirit is our charity not formally, but only exemplarily and causally — which is most true. (Cf. below, dub. 6).

**II.** The Master's nine objections are so ordered that three are taken on the side of *essence*, three on the side of *virtue*, and three on the side of *act*. Hence St. Bonaventure too, under the same threefold respect, sets out the contrary reasons; and, leaving the usual order, he immediately applies them to the solving of the difficulties. In the first place he sets forth a false explanation of the Master given by certain men — namely that the Holy Spirit alone unites to himself the created will, just as the Son alone united to himself the human nature. He rightly rejects this sense as most false, since unity of operation can only be from unity of *suppositum*, indeed of nature; and such a hypostatic or natural union of the created will with the Holy Spirit is feigned, indeed heretical.

**III.** In the solution to the 1st [objection] the argument is from the axiom of Aristotle: «Where one [is] for the sake of the other, there is only one»; whence it follows that, if a man is acceptable to God on account of charity, there is here only one goodness; and therefore no comparison can be made of the two goodnesses taken separately.

**IV.** In the solution to the 2nd [objection] the words: «according to divine estimation» say the same as: «according to the acceptation of God», which, according to the common opinion, is numbered among the conditions required for merit *de condigno*. On this see II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 3, and *Breviloquium* p. V, c. 2.

**V.** On created charity: *Breviloquium* p. V, c. 1. — Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Scotus, in both writings, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* II–II, q. 23, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. I, tr. 8, q. 36, m. 3, and p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 1. — Petrus a Tar[antasia], here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius R[omanus], here, 1st *principium*, q. 1 and 2. — Durandus, here q. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum caritas diligenda sit ex caritate.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit amabilis ex caritate; et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus octavo *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Nemo dicat: non novi, quid diligam: diligat fratrem et diligit ipsam dilectionem»: ergo dilectio est diligenda; ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia non est perfecta cognitio nisi illa, qua quis novit se nosse sive novit ipsam notitiam, ergo nec perfectus amor nisi ille, quo quis amat se amare sive amorem; sed caritas est perfectus amor: ergo etc.

3. Item, aliquis diligit proximum et recte, quia videt, eum habere caritatem; sed «propter quod unumquodque et illud[^2] magis[^3]»: ergo magis debet diligere caritatem sive dilectionem.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus in libro primo *de Doctrina christiana*[^4] dicit, tantum quatuor esse diligenda ex caritate, scilicet Deum, se ipsum, proximum et corpus proprium; sed caritas sive dilectio non est aliquod horum: ergo non est diligenda ex caritate.

2. Item, duplex est dilectio, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae; si ergo caritas sive dilectio diligitur, aut ergo dilectione concupiscentiae, aut amicitiae. Non amicitiae; constat, quia amicitia est inter similes et amor, quo aliquis optat alii bonum; caritati autem nemo optat bonum. Item, nec concupiscentiae; quia concupiscentia est rei non habitae: ergo cum ex caritate nemo diligat nisi[^5] habens caritatem, ergo ex caritate non potest quis concupiscere caritatem. — Si tu dicas, quod concupiscit augmentum caritatis, hoc non solvit, quia ego non quaero, nisi utrum caritas habita, secundum quod habita est, possit amari.

3. Item, sicut se habet fides ad credere, et spes ad actum sperandi, ita dilectio sive caritas ad actum diligendi; sed nullus habens fidem credit fidem vel in fidem; quia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^6]: «Credens scit,

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se credere, et videt, se credere»; credulitas autem est de non visis; similiter autem nullus sperat ipsam spem: ergo a simili nec diligit caritatem; vel si non est simile, quaeritur: quare non?

4. Item, si diligens diligit dilectionem, aut eadem, aut alia. Si alia, tunc pari ratione et aliam dilectionem diligit alia; et sic erit abire in infinitum. Si ergo stare est et non contingit abire in infinitum, si diligit, diligit[^7] eadem. Sed si hoc; contra: nulla forma specialis super se ipsam reflectitur nisi de primis intentionibus, sicut unitas, veritas, bonitas; unde nullo modo dicitur albedo alba: ergo nec dilectio dilecta. et sic etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Caritas creata non amore amicitiae diligenda est, sed amore tum concupiscentiae tum complacentiae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod accipiendo dilectionem, secundum quod Deus dilectio est, constat utique, quod ex caritate est diligenda. Sed accipiendo dilectionem, secundum quod est habitus gratuitus, sic utique[^8] diligenda est, sed non super omnia.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod triplex est amor, scilicet amicitiae, quo aliquis optat alicui bonum[^9]; concupiscentiae, quo aliquis sibi desiderat aliquid; et complacentiae, quo aliquis requiescit et delectatur in re desiderata, cum praesens est[^10].

Dico ergo, quod caritas amore amicitiae nullo modo est amabilis, quia non est beatificabilis; amore concupiscentiae est amabilis ex caritate, secundum quod diligens desiderat amplius diligere; amore vero[^11] complacentiae, scilicet quod diligens acceptat ipsam dilectionem, qua Deum diligit, hoc[^12] diligenda est caritas, secundum quod iam habetur, eo quod ipsa est bonum valde acceptabile.

*Ad 1.* His visis, patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam ratio illa ex auctoritate Augustini *de Doctrina christiana* currit solum quantum ad dilectionem amicitiae, quia Augustinus loquitur de amabili, cui aliquis optat bonum.

*Ad 2.* Quod secundo obiicitur[^13] similiter patet. Quamvis enim caritatis habitae, secundum quod habita, non sit concupiscentia, nihilominus tamen est complacentia. — Posset tamen dici, quod spiritualis dilectio[^14] et possessio excitat ad desiderandum, dum reficit, et reficit, dum excitat: ideo simul manent concupiscentia et complacentia.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de fide et spe, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia actus[^15] fidei de se dicit imperfectionem, similiter et spei; alter enim est rei non visae, alter rei non habitae; et ideo si talis actus reflecteretur, diminueret de ratione habitus; unde qui credit credulitatem, non habet eam[^16], et spem similiter; et ideo hae virtutes evacuantur in patria. Sed dilectio est actus completionis et perfectionis, sicut scientia; unde sicut perfecte scit qui scit, se scire, ita perfecte diligit qui amat dilectionem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, aut eadem, aut alia etc.; dicendum, quod eadem quantum ad habitum, sed alia quantum ad actum.

Et quod obiicitur, quod specialia[^17] non reflectuntur; dicendum, quod reflexio in forma aliquando venit ex natura[^18]; et sic est in generalibus; aliquando venit ratione eius, in quo est; et sic est in formis, quae sunt in potentiis natis supra se converti, et in quantum supra se convertuntur. Et quoniam potentia cognitiva se ipsam cognoscit, «et voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens[^19]», ideo per scientiam aliquis se et scientiam novit, et per caritatem se et ipsam diligit.

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Et si quaeratur[^20] ratio, quare potentia intellectiva nata est supra se redire et voluntas, alibi dicetur[^21]: sed modo tantum sufficiat, quia sunt simplices potentiae et in substantia simplici fundatae et organo non alligatae; et ideo patet, quod non est simile illud quod obiici consuevit: in sensibus alia est potentia, quae[^22] videt, et alia, quae videt, se videre: quod similiter debeat esse in intellectu.

english:
### Question II. *Whether charity is to be loved out of charity.*

Secondly it is asked, whether charity is lovable out of charity; and that it is, is shown in this manner.

1. Augustine, in book eight *On the Trinity*[^1]: «Let no one say: I do not know what I love: let him love his brother and he loves love itself»: therefore love is to be loved; therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same point seems to follow by reason, since there is no perfect knowledge except that by which one knows that he knows or knows knowledge itself; therefore neither is there perfect love except that by which one loves that he loves or love itself; but charity is the perfect love: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, someone loves his neighbor, and rightly, because he sees that he has charity; but «that on account of which a thing is so, that thing is so the more[^2][^3]»: therefore he ought the more to love charity or love.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in book one *On Christian Doctrine*[^4] says that there are only four things to be loved out of charity, namely God, oneself, one's neighbor, and one's own body; but charity or love is none of these: therefore it is not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, love is twofold, namely of concupiscence and of friendship; if therefore charity or love is loved, it is loved either with the love of concupiscence or with that of friendship. Not with that of friendship; for it is plain that friendship is between equals and is the love by which someone wishes another's good; but no one wishes a good for charity. Likewise, neither with that of concupiscence; for concupiscence is of a thing not possessed: therefore since out of charity no one loves except[^5] one having charity, therefore out of charity one cannot have concupiscence for charity. — If you say that one has concupiscence for the increase of charity, this does not solve it, because I am not asking anything except whether charity, when possessed, can, insofar as it is possessed, be loved.

3. Likewise, as faith is to believing, and hope to the act of hoping, so love or charity is to the act of loving; but no one having faith believes faith or believes in faith; for, as Augustine says[^6]: «The believer knows that he believes, and sees that he believes»; but credulity is of things not seen; likewise no one hopes for hope itself: therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither does anyone love charity; or, if it is not parallel, the question is asked: why not?

4. Likewise, if the lover loves love, either it is the same love or another. If another, then by parity of reasoning he loves that other love by yet another; and so it will be a regress to infinity. If, then, one must stop somewhere and it is impossible to go to infinity, if he loves, he loves with the same love[^7]. But if this is so; on the contrary: no special form is reflected upon itself except those of the first intentions, such as unity, truth, goodness; whence whiteness is in no way called white: therefore neither is love loved. And so on.

> **Conclusio.** *Created charity is to be loved not with the love of friendship, but with the love both of concupiscence and of complacency.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, taking love insofar as God is love, it is certain that it is to be loved out of charity. But taking love insofar as it is a gratuitous habit, in this way too[^8] it is to be loved, but not above all things.

For the understanding of the objections it must be noted that love is threefold, namely of friendship, by which someone wishes a good for another[^9]; of concupiscence, by which someone desires something for himself; and of complacency, by which someone rests and takes delight in a thing desired, when it is present[^10].

I say therefore that charity is in no way lovable with the love of friendship, because it is not capable of being beatified; with the love of concupiscence it is lovable out of charity, insofar as the lover desires to love more amply; but with the love[^11] of complacency, namely insofar as the lover accepts the very love by which he loves God, in this way[^12] charity is to be loved, insofar as it is already possessed, since it itself is a good highly to be welcomed.

*To 1.* With these things seen, the response to the first two is plain. For that argument from the authority of Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* runs only with respect to the love of friendship, since Augustine is speaking of a lovable object for which someone wishes a good.

*To 2.* What is objected in the second place[^13] is plain in like manner. For although there is no concupiscence of charity-already-possessed, considered as possessed, nevertheless there is complacency. — It might however also be said that spiritual love[^14] and possession excite to desiring, while they refresh, and refresh, while they excite: therefore concupiscence and complacency remain together.

*To 3.* To what is objected in the third place concerning faith and hope, it must be said that it is not parallel; because the act[^15] of faith of itself bespeaks an imperfection, and likewise the act of hope; for the one is of a thing not seen, the other of a thing not possessed; and therefore if such an act were reflected upon itself, it would diminish from the character of the habit; whence he who believes credulity does not have it[^16], and likewise hope; and therefore these virtues are emptied out in the homeland. But love is an act of completion and perfection, like knowledge; whence just as he knows perfectly who knows that he knows, so he loves perfectly who loves love.

*To 4.* To what is objected, "either the same or another etc.": it must be said, the same as to habit, but another as to act.

And to the objection that special[^17] forms are not reflected back: it must be said that reflection in a form sometimes comes from nature[^18]; and so it is in general [forms]; sometimes it comes by reason of that in which it is; and so it is in forms which are in potencies born to be turned back upon themselves, and insofar as they are turned back upon themselves. And since the cognitive power knows itself, «and the will is an instrument moving itself[^19]», therefore through knowledge one knows oneself and one's knowledge, and through charity one loves oneself and charity itself.

And if it be asked[^20] why the intellective power is born to return upon itself, and likewise the will, this will be said elsewhere[^21]; but for the present let it suffice that they are simple powers, founded in a simple substance, and not bound to an organ; and therefore it is plain that the case which is wont to be objected is not parallel: in the senses, one power[^22] sees, and another sees that it sees: [the objection being] that the like ought to obtain in the intellect.

la: August., *de Trin.* l. VIII. c. 8. n. 12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, bk. VIII, c. 8, n. 12. See here the Master's text, c. 1.

la: Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. I obnitentibus, *illud* pro *aliud*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most manuscripts and the first edition, reads *illud* in place of *aliud*.

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2; in quo textu Vat. cum aliquibus codd. post *unumquodque* addit *tale*. Cfr. supra d. 12. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 2; in which text the Vatican edition with some manuscripts adds *tale* after *unumquodque*. Cf. above d. 12, q. 2, arg. 1, *ad oppositum*.

la: Cap. 23. n. 22: *Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod iuxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est.* In quo textu, uti a S. Bonaventura refertur, Vat. post *proximum* addit *et corpus proximi*, quod et multi codd. habent, omissis tamen verbis *et corpus proprium*; aliqui tandem codd. ut F H V Z cc cum ed. I exhibent lectionem in textum receptam, quae confirmatur etiam ex d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp., ubi eadem sententia allegatur. Mox cod. V *aliqui* pro *aliquod*.

en: Ch. 23, n. 22: *Since therefore there are four things to be loved: one which is above us, another which we ourselves are, a third which is alongside us, a fourth which is below us.* In this text, as cited by St. Bonaventure, the Vatican edition adds *et corpus proximi* after *proximum*, which many manuscripts also have, the words *et corpus proprium* however being omitted; some manuscripts finally, such as F, H, V, Z, cc, with the first edition exhibit the reading received into the text, which is confirmed also from d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, *ad oppositum*, where the same opinion is alleged. Next codex V reads *aliqui* for *aliquod*.

la: Ed. I *non* loco *nisi*, eodem sensu.

en: The first edition reads *non* in place of *nisi*, with the same sense.

la: Libr. XIII. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 3., ubi agit de modo, quo fidem, quae in nobis est, cognoscimus et concludit: *Eam (fidem) tenet certissima scientia clamatque conscientia.* Et ibid. c. 2. n. 3: *Suam igitur quisque fidem apud se ipsum videt.* — Mox cod. K post *est* addit *de rebus*, et paulo infra post *spem* Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. I adiungit *sed habet*.

en: Bk. XIII *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 3., where he treats of the manner in which we know the faith that is in us, and concludes: *Most certain knowledge holds it (faith), and conscience proclaims it.* And in the same place, c. 2, n. 3: *Each one therefore sees his own faith within himself.* — Next codex K, after *est*, adds *de rebus*, and a little below, after *spem*, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, adds *sed habet*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut G H K T bb *diligei*. Paulo infra post *primis* cod. O adiicit *est*. De hac primarum intentionum reflexione vide supra d. 3. p. 1. dub. 3.

en: Some manuscripts, such as G, H, K, T, bb, read *diligei*. A little below, after *primis*, codex O adds *est*. On this reflection of the first intentions see above d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. I omittunt *utique*.

en: Several manuscripts with the first edition omit *utique*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut A T etc. et ed. I addunt *et*.

en: Some manuscripts, such as A, T, etc., and the first edition, add *et*.

la: De triplici hoc amore cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 29. dub. 4.

en: On this threefold love cf. III. *Sentences*, d. 29, dub. 4.

la: Mss. antiquiores cum ed. I exhibent particulam *vero* in Vat. omissam.

en: The older manuscripts with the first edition exhibit the particle *vero*, omitted in the Vatican edition.

la: Scil. amore complacentiae. — Multi codd. cum ed. I *haec* loco *hoc*, sed perperam, quia agitur de *idem*, caritate respectu triplicis amoris; cod. Y *sic* pro *hoc*; Vat. *hoc modo*.

en: Namely with the love of complacency. — Many manuscripts with the first edition read *haec* in place of *hoc*, but wrongly, since the discussion concerns *the same*, namely charity in respect of the threefold love; codex Y reads *sic* in place of *hoc*; the Vatican edition reads *hoc modo*.

la: Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc *quaeritur*.

en: The Vatican edition, with the more recent codex cc, reads *quaeritur*.

la: Nonnulli codd., ut B G T Y ff cum ed. I, minus congrue *delectatio* pro *dilectio*.

en: Some manuscripts, such as B, G, T, Y, ff, with the first edition, less aptly read *delectatio* in place of *dilectio*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. I *Actus enim* loco *quia actus*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition, reads *Actus enim* in place of *quia actus*.

la: Cod. O hic prosequitur: *ut fidem, similiter qui sperat spem, non habet eam ut spem; similiter ut videtur hae virtutes evacuantur etc.*

en: Codex O continues here: *as faith; likewise he who hopes for hope does not have it as hope; likewise, as it seems, these virtues are emptied out, etc.*

la: Cod. Y *formae speciales*.

en: Codex Y reads *formae speciales*.

la: In cod. O additur *formae in se*.

en: In codex O the words *formae in se* are added.

la: Anselmus, libr. *de Concord. praesc. et lib. arb.* q. 3. c. 11, in quibus verbis Vat. cum uno alteroque codice minus apte *se ipsam*, loco *se ipsum*. Mox sequimur cod. T post *aliquis* ponendo *se* loco *scit*, quae lectio ex immediate praecedentibus et sequentibus probatur ut unice admittenda; in aliorum codicum siquidem lectione cognitio reflexiva, de qua hic agitur, non attingitur. Dein cum Vat. pauci codd. post *et scientiam* addunt *suam*.

en: Anselm, book *On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Will*, q. 3, c. 11, in which words the Vatican edition with one or two codices less aptly reads *se ipsam* in place of *se ipsum*. Next we follow codex T, putting *se* in place of *scit* after *aliquis*, which reading is proved to be the only one to be admitted from what immediately precedes and follows; for in the reading of the other codices the reflexive cognition here at issue is not touched on. Then with the Vatican edition a few codices after *et scientiam* add *suam*.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. I substituimus *quaeratur* loco *quaeritur*.

en: On the testimony of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted *quaeratur* in place of *quaeritur*.

la: Libr. II. *Sent.* d. 23. p. 1. q. 1–3; vide etiam ibid. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 4, et III. *Sent.* d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Mox post *sed* in Vat. et cod. cc adiicitur *hoc*.

en: Bk. II *Sentences*, d. 23, p. 1, q. 1–3; see also in the same place d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 4, and III. *Sentences*, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — Next, after *sed*, the Vatican edition and codex cc add *hoc*.

la: Vat. et cod. cc non bene *qua* contra plurimos codd. ut A B D F G H N q T Z ee ff cum ed. I. Paulo ante ed. I post *sensibus* adiungit *quia ex quo*.

en: The Vatican edition and codex cc, not well, read *qua* against many manuscripts such as A, B, D, F, G, H, N, q, T, Z, ee, ff, with the first edition. A little before, the first edition after *sensibus* adds *quia ex quo*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primo in genere quaestio resolvitur affirmative et per duplicem conclusionem, scilicet respectu caritatis increatae et creatae. Deinde quoad habitum creatum accuratius determinatur, qua specie amoris triplicis sit diligendus.

**II.** Solut. ad 1. praesupponit, quod *obiectum caritatis in genere sumtae est duplex*. Vel enim ipsum est capax beatitudinis, vel solummodo est medium, per quod possit quis adiuvari, ut beatificetur. Ad primum genus pertinent illa tria a S. Augustino enumerata, unde haec amore amicitiae diligi possunt; ad secundum genus omnis creatura pertinet, et sic omnis creatura ut medium ad summum bonum diligi potest. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.

*Primae intentiones*, de quibus sermo est in solut. ad 4. sunt notiones transcendentales: *ens, unum, verum, bonum*; quae «super se ipsas reflectuntur», i. e. de se praedicantur, ut v. g. veritas est una, vera, bona. *Formae vero speciales* sunt, quae constant ex genere et differentia. Ipsae ex natura sua non possunt aliter de se praedicari; interdum tamen hoc fieri potest ratione subiecti, in quo sunt, si hoc habet actus reflexos super se ipsum, sicut est in duabus potentiis voluntatis et intellectus; cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. dub. 3.

**III.** Quoad ipsam quaestionem cfr. *Summa de Virtutibus*, sub nomine Alexandri de Hales Parisiis 1509 ap. Ioan. Petit impressa, coll. 64. a. 7. De hac Summa controversia exorta est occasione eorum, quae a Waddingo (*Annales* ad an. 1245) aliisque Ord. Min. auctoribus scripta sunt, scil. quod S. Thom. multa inde in suam Summam theolog., praesertim in secundam partem secundae acceperit. Ex adverso Natalis Alexander, Echardus, de Rubeis eo progressi sunt, ut hanc Summam existere sive manuscriptam sive impressam negarent, de quo videri potest de Rubeis, *Dissertat. criticae*, diss. 15, quae etiam in modernis Summae S. Thom. editionibus impressa est. Sed in hoc falluntur viri doctissimi, cum plura huius Summae exemplaria impressa adhuc supersint, ut in bibliotheca regali Monachii et Conventus nostri Trudonopolitano (St. Trond) in Belgio. Ex ipso autem initio huius operis apparet, quod non sit liber distinctus, sed pars alterius operis, scil. magnae Summae Alex. Hal., ut videtur. Attamen huius Summae auctor ipse Alex. Hal. esse non potest, quia multae quaestiones verbotenus sumtae sunt ex hoc Commentario S. Bonaventurae. Videtur potius esse Gulielmi de Melitona, qui 1236, iubente Summo Pontifice Alexandro IV., incompletam Alexandri Hal. Summam continuare incepit; sed et ipse post quatuor annos, morte correptus, opus incompletum reliquit. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; S. II. II. q. 26. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 3. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** First, in general, the question is resolved affirmatively and through a twofold conclusion, namely with respect to uncreated charity and to created [charity]. Then, as to the created habit, it is more accurately determined by which species of the threefold love it is to be loved.

**II.** The reply *To 1* presupposes that *the object of charity, taken in general, is twofold*. For either it is itself capable of beatitude, or it is only a means by which someone can be helped to be beatified. To the first kind belong those three enumerated by St. Augustine, whence these can be loved with the love of friendship; to the second kind every creature belongs, and so every creature can be loved as a means to the highest good. Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, *ad 1*.

*The first intentions*, of which there is mention in the reply *to 4*, are the transcendental notions: *being, one, true, good*; which «are reflected upon themselves», i.e. are predicated of themselves, as for example: truth is one, true, good. But *the special forms* are those which consist of genus and difference. They by their nature cannot otherwise be predicated of themselves; sometimes however this can occur by reason of the subject in which they are, if this has acts reflexive upon itself, as is the case in the two powers of will and intellect; cf. above d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3.

**III.** Concerning the question itself cf. the *Summa de Virtutibus*, printed under the name of Alexander of Hales at Paris in 1509 by Jean Petit, col. 64, a. 7. Concerning this *Summa* a controversy arose on the occasion of what was written by Wadding (*Annales*, at the year 1245) and other authors of the Order of Friars Minor, namely that St. Thomas took many things from it into his Summa theol., especially into the second part of the second. On the other side, Natalis Alexander, Echard, and de Rubeis went so far as to deny that this *Summa* existed either in manuscript or in print, on which one may consult de Rubeis, *Critical Dissertations*, diss. 15, which is also printed in modern editions of St. Thomas's Summa. But in this these very learned men are deceived, since several printed copies of this *Summa* still survive, as in the royal library of Munich and in our convent at Trudonopolis (St. Trond) in Belgium. From the very beginning of this work, however, it appears that it is not a separate book, but part of another work, namely of the great *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, as it seems. Yet the author of this *Summa* cannot himself be Alexander of Hales, since many questions are taken word-for-word from this Commentary of St. Bonaventure. Rather it seems to be by William of Melitona, who in 1236, at the bidding of the Supreme Pontiff Alexander IV, began to continue the unfinished *Summa* of Alexander of Hales; but he too, after four years, overtaken by death, left the work unfinished. — S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 5; S. II. II. q. 26, a. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 3; on this and the next question, S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 3. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 4. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R., here 3. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

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