site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo Deum defigat aspectum in ipsum lumen aeternum, an in aliquid infra ipsum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo Deum defigat aspectum in ipsum lumen aeternum, an in aliquid infra ipsum. Et quod non videat ipsum fontem luminis, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum sexto[^p302-8]: *Lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quam nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest:* ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, nunquam Deum in sua luce vidit nec videre potest.

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2. Item, Ioannis primo[^p303-1]: *Deum nemo vidit unquam;* super illum locum dicit Chrysostomus: «Solus Filius eum vidit et Spiritus sanctus; qui autem creabilis est naturae, qualiter videre potest increabilem»? Si ergo anima Christi nec est Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, sed magis creatura; non videtur, quod illam lucem videat in se ipsa.

3. Item, quantum distat finitum ab infinito, tantum distat creatura a Creatore; sed propter infinitam distantiam nulla virtus finita potest cognoscere Deum ut *immensum*[^p303-2]: ergo pari ratione propter infinitam distantiam nulla virtus creata poterit cognoscere et videre *lumen increatum* per se ipsum.

4. Item, sicut ad cognitionem *comprehensionis* requiritur commensuratio quaedam, ita ad cognitionem a parte[^p303-3] *visionis* requiritur assimilatio congrua; sed quae in nullo conveniunt non possunt assimilari: ergo Creator non potest a creatura in se ipso videri, cum nihil habeant commune.

5. Item, multo plus excedit claritas divinae lucis oculum animae Christi, quam sol excedat claritatem oculi materialis; sed oculus noster materialis non potest intueri lumen corporale in *fonte* propter excellentiam: ergo nec intellectus Christi.

6. Item, fons aeterni luminis in se ipso est infinitus et immensus; sed finitum non potest super infinitum: ergo cum virtus animae Christi sit finita, non poterit actus eius se protendere usque ad ipsum: ergo non poterit ipsum cognoscere in se ipso: ergo videtur, quod nec anima Christi nec alia anima cognoscat Deum in claritate sua.

**Sed contra:**

1. Super illud secundae ad Corinthios tertio[^p303-4]: *Nos revelata facie;* Glossa: «Christus est imago Patris eadem cum illo, in quem tendimus, scilicet ut eum in essentia videamus»: si ergo Christi anima habet ad quod nitimur pervenire, ergo Deum videt in substantia et natura.

2. Item, plus est uniri alicui in unitatem personae quam in unionem facientem cognitionem; sed anima Christi Verbo aeterno immediate unita est in unitatem personae[^p303-5]: ergo multo fortius ipsi veritati et luci Verbi unitur per cognitionem ipsius in se: ergo sine aliquo medio Deum videt.

3. Item, in cognitione conclusionum non est quies, sed solum in cognitione principiorum — et ratio huius est, quia anima cognoscit conclusiones per medium, principia vero cognoscit sine medio[^p303-6] — si ergo anima Christi cognoscit Deum mediante aliquo, ergo non quiescit in cognitione Dei; et si non quiescit in Deo, cum Deus sit finis ultimus, non est beata. Si ergo beata est, necessario sequitur, quod cognoscat divinam lucem in se ipsa; pari ratione et omnis anima beata.

4. Item, intellectus comprehensoris tantum elevatur, quantum affectus, quamvis caecus sit in via propter caecitatem ignorantiae; sed Christus fuit perfectissimus comprehensor: cum ergo ipse diligeret summam Dei bonitatem in se ipsa, omni effectu circumscripto, pari ratione lucem et veritatem in se ipsa videbat absque medio.

5. Item, aut *immediate* videt, aut *per medium.* Si *immediate*, habeo propositum; si per *medium*, aut per medium *proportionabile*, aut *improportionabile*. Si per medium *improportionabile*, ergo potius impeditur, quam iuvetur; si per medium *proportionabile*, contra: aut est *creatum*, aut *increatum*; *increatum* non, quia illud est unum solum; si *creatum*: ergo creatura potest esse proportionabilis[^p303-7] Creatori; et si hoc, cum nihil aliud impediat, quin creatura possit videre Deum in sua substantia, restat, quod anima Christi sic eum videre poterat et videbat.

6. Item, si per medium, aut illud est *superius* anima Christi beata, aut *inferius.* Si *inferius;* ergo immediatior est anima Christi Deo, quam sit illud quod tu dicis medium: ergo illo circumscripto, melius videbit Deum. Si *superius;* ergo aliquid est excellentius natura humanae mentis in Christo. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia *omnia sunt subiecta pedibus eius*[^p303-8]. Restat igitur, quod anima eius immediate et in ipso fonte videbat et videt lumen aeternum. — His etiam rationibus idem ostendi potest de qualibet anima beata.

### Conclusio

> Anima Christi et aliae animae beatae vident ipsum luminis fontem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod Deus a nulla creatura videbitur nec videtur in sua *essen-*

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*-tia* vel *natura*, sed videbitur in *claritate* sua, cum tantus sit fulgor ipsius immensitatis luminis, quod ad contuitum illius substantiae nullus oculus creaturae possit pertingere. — Hunc errorem evacuat Gregorius in Moralibus, tractans illud Iob vigesimo octavo[^p304-1]: *Abscondita est ab oculis omnium viventium,* ubi ait sic: «Fuerunt qui dicerent, in illa regione beatitudinis in *claritate* sua Deum conspici et in *natura* non videri; sed non est aliud *claritas,* aliud *natura,* sed ipsa *natura* est claritas, et ipsa *claritas* est natura». Et ideo iste error non multum rationabilis est, quia male intelligit lumen aeternum, in quo non differt *essentia* luminis et ipse *actus* lucendi.

Et ideo fuerunt alii moderniores, qui dixerunt, a nulla creatura posse aspici lumen aeternum in *fonte* suae claritatis, sed in quibusdam *condescensionibus* et theophaniis, et hoc propter improportionabilitatem oculi ad illam summam lucem, quae potius sua immensitate opprimeret, quam delectaret oculum creaturae, quae se habet ad ipsam, sicut oculus noctuae[^p304-2]; et ideo oportuit, quod Deus se contemperaret ipsi animae, sicut sol contemperatur oculo mediante nube. — Sed hic modus dicendi non minus a veritate deviat quam praecedens. Unde etiam ipsum improbat magister Hugo, super Angelicam Hierarchiam[^p304-3]: «Quid est, inquit, theophaniis Deum videri et extra illas non videri, nisi nunquam vere videri? Si enim sola imago semper videtur, veritas nunquam videtur. Tollant ergo phantasias suas, quibus lumen mentium nostrarum obtenebrare nituntur, neque nobis Deum nostrum simulacris exterminationum suarum intersepiant; quia nos, sicut nec satiare potest aliquid praeter ipsum, sic nec sistere potest aliquid usque ad ipsum».

Et ideo, his duobus modis tanquam erroneis abiectis, dicendum est tertio modo vere et catholice, quod anima Christi beatissima et aliae beatae animae vident ipsum luminis fontem, in quo reficiuntur, quiescunt, delectantur et quodam modo a claritate illius luminis absorbentur, ut Deus ab eis undique conspiciatur et videatur etiam in ipsis[^p304-4]; et hoc potissime verum est in anima Christi. — Et ideo concedendae sunt auctoritates et rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

Ad intelligentiam autem auctoritatum adductarum in contrarium et consimilium notandum est, quod quinque modis habent exponi auctoritates Sanctorum, quae videntur dicere, Deum in sua substantia non posse videri. Primo modo sic: non potest videri, scilicet *viribus nostris,* potest tamen *munere Dei.* Unde super illud primae ad Timotheum sexto[^p304-5]: *Lucem habitat inaccessibilem;* Glossa: «Inaccessibilis est viribus nostris, accessibilis muneribus suis». — Secundo modo sic: non potest videri substantia, scilicet *in via.* Unde super illud primae ad Timotheum sexto[^p304-6]: *Quem nullus hominum videre potest;* Glossa: «Poterit autem aliquando». Et sic illud Exodi trigesimo tertio: *Non videbit me homo et vivet.* — Tertio modo sic: non potest substantia videri, id est *plene comprehendi.* Unde super illud Iob undecimo[^p304-7]: *Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes?* Glossa: «Eius essentia a nullo plene videbitur», *plene,* scilicet circumscribendo. — Quarto modo sic: non potest videri substantia, id est *ratio* substantiae. Unde ad Romanos primo[^p304-8]: *Quod notum est Dei;* Glossa: «Ratio substantiae eius latet omnem creaturam»; et hoc modo potest dici «Trinitas sibi soli nota esse». — Quinto modo sic: nemo Dei substantiam novit, vel aliquid tale, «quia non *facit nosse*». Matthaei vigesimo quarto[^p304-9]: *De die autem illa et hora nemo novit, neque Angelus* etc., sicut fovea *caeca*

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dicitur, quia non manifestat quod habet in se. Et sic dicit Chrysostomus, quod Angeli non vident, quid sit Deus.

**Ad opposita:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Et sic patent duae auctoritates, quia prima currit secundum primum modum, et secunda secundum quartum modum, vel quintum.

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum distat finitum ab infinito etc.; dicendum, quod *distantia* dicitur contra *convenientiam; convenientia* autem invenitur in triplici differentia, quantum ad praesens sufficit. Est enim convenientia *commensurationis* sive adaequationis, et convenientia *participationis* alicuius communis, et convenientia *ordinis.* Dico igitur, quod si *distantia* dicatur per privationem convenientiae *adaequationis* et *participationis,* infinita est distantia creati ad increatum, sicut infiniti ad finitum. Si vero dicatur *distantia* per privationem convenientiae *ordinis;* dicendum, quod falsum est, quia creaturae immediate ordinantur ad Deum sicut ad principium et sicut ad finem, maxime creatura rationalis[^p305-1]. Ad *simplicem* autem *contuitum* sufficit, quod sit convenientia *ordinis,* sed ad *cognitionem comprehensionis* requiritur convenientia secundum quandam *aequalitatem* sive adaequationem. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi anima creata non possit *comprehendere* infinitatem, quod non possit *intueri* luminis fontem. — Et per hoc patet sequens. Quod enim dicit, quod ad cognitionem requiritur assimilatio; dicendum, quod non oportet, quod *assimilatio in natura tertia,* sed sufficit, quod unum sit *similitudo alterius,* sicut in primo libro fuit determinatum, distinctione prima, tertia et trigesima quinta[^p305-2].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excedit oculum lumen illud; dicendum, quod est excellentia *conservans,* et est excellentia *corrumpens.* Excellentia *conservans* est in spiritualibus, sed *corrumpens* in obiectis corporalibus; et ratio huius in primo libro[^p305-3] est reddita et a parte *obiecti* et a parte *modi* comprehendendi: et ideo non est simile.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finitum non potest supra infinitum; dicendum, quod anima in cognoscendo Deum plus est in *suscipiendo* quam in *agendo,* immo omnis potentia animae respectu Dei se habet in ratione *passivi* — nedum potentia cognitiva *active,* quae de sua ratione dicit quodam modo passionem, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p305-4] et Priscianus. — Et ideo, cum intelligit Deum, non agit anima in Deum, sed Deus influit in animam, in qua influentia Deus condescendit per gratiam, et anima elevatur et efficitur deiformis. Et ipsa deiformitas est *dispositio* reddens oculum animae aptum ad videndum Deum, non quia facit proportionabilem *quantitatem,* quia semper illud lumen excedit in infinitum, sed quia facit proportionabilem *qualitatem,* quia datur ipsi animae aliquid, utpote similitudo, quod[^p305-5] ipsam animam et intellectum animae, cum Deo facit similem, reddit intelligentem. — Et si tu obiicias, quod licet visio et cognitio incipiat a *passione,* completur tamen in *actione,* cum ad visionem duo concurrant: *receptio* et *iudicium*[^p305-6]; illum autem fontem luminis nulla potest creatura *agere,* quoniam ipsum a nullo potest *pati;* similiter de illo fonte luminis et veritate summa nullus potest *iudicare,* sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione[^p305-7], et ipsa ratio dictat, cum iudicans aliquo modo praesideat indicato; nullo modo videtur sustineri posse, quod anima Christi, vel alia anima beata iudicaret ipsum superni luminis fontem: ad hoc respondendum est, quod etsi ad actionem cognitionis aliquo modo concurrat non solum *passio,* sed etiam *actio;* non tamen concurrit *actio,* quae quidem fit per aliquam *influentiam* vel impressionem ipsius cognoscentis in cognoscibile, sed solum per quandam *protensionem.* Sicut etiam latet in *dilectione,* cum amo aliquem, anima amando aliquo modo agit, nihil tamen influit in amatum, nec dilectum aliquid patitur vel recipit ab amante: sic intelligendum est in cognitione[^p305-8]. — Similiter, cum dicimus, visionem sive cognitionem perfici in *iudicio;* dicendum, quod verum est; sed ad hoc, quod videamus Deum, non oportet, quod de ipso iudicemus in se, sed sufficit ad claram visionem ab ipso lumine luminis illuminari et illuminatum oculum in ipsum *protendere* intuendo, et iudicare de ipso intuitu, cum non possit attingere ad hoc, ut de

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*ipsa summa veritate* iudicet, sed *secundum ipsam* iudicet anima de se ipsa et de sua cognitione. Nihil tamen impedit, aliquo modo accipiendo iudicium, secundum quod requiritur ad visionem, quin possit concedi, quod anima beata certissime iudicet, illud esse summum lumen, quod intuetur, sicut in primo libro[^p306-1] fuit habitum. Et huic non repugnat verbum Augustini. Quantumcumque enim sive *intuitus* sive *iudicium* videatur in se habere naturam actionis; tamen respectu Dei vel divini luminis, a quo causatur, est *passio* et *effectus.* Unde quod anima videat Deum in se, hoc non est, quia anima possit supra Deum, sed magis quod Deus possit supra ipsam, adeo ut anima per divinam potentiam et influentiam elevetur supra ipsam[^p306-2]. — Haec autem quae dicta sunt de anima Christi generaliter, valent ad quaestionem de visione Dei, similiter quae sequuntur.

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### Question III. *Whether Christ's soul, in knowing God, fixes its gaze on the eternal light itself, or on something below it.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ's soul, in knowing God, fixes its gaze on the eternal light itself, or on something below it. And that it does not see the fount of light itself appears as follows.

1. First to Timothy 6[^p302-8]: *He dwells in inaccessible light, which no man has seen, nor indeed can see:* therefore Christ, according as he is man, has never seen God in his light, nor can he see him.

2. Likewise, John 1[^p303-1]: *No one has ever seen God;* upon that passage Chrysostom says: «The Son alone has seen him, and the Holy Spirit; but he who is of a creatable nature, how can he see the uncreatable»? If therefore Christ's soul is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but rather a creature; it does not appear that it sees that light in itself.

3. Likewise, by as much as the finite is distant from the infinite, by so much is the creature distant from the Creator; but on account of the infinite distance no finite power can know God as *immense*[^p303-2]: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of the infinite distance, no created power will be able to know and see the *uncreated light* through itself.

4. Likewise, just as for the knowledge of *comprehension* a certain commensuration is required, so for the knowledge on the side of[^p303-3] *vision* a fitting assimilation is required; but things which agree in nothing cannot be assimilated: therefore the Creator cannot be seen in himself by a creature, since they have nothing in common.

5. Likewise, the brightness of the divine light exceeds the eye of Christ's soul much more than the sun exceeds the brightness of the material eye; but our material eye cannot behold corporeal light in its *fount* on account of [its] excellence: therefore neither can the intellect of Christ.

6. Likewise, the fount of eternal light is in itself infinite and immense; but the finite cannot [reach] above the infinite: therefore since the power of Christ's soul is finite, its act will not be able to extend itself all the way to it: therefore it will not be able to know it in itself: therefore it appears that neither Christ's soul nor any other soul knows God in his brightness.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that text of Second Corinthians 3[^p303-4]: *We, with unveiled face;* the Gloss: «Christ is the image of the Father, the same as him, toward whom we tend, namely that we may see him in [his] essence»: if therefore Christ's soul has [the thing] to which we strive to attain, therefore it sees God in substance and nature.

2. Likewise, it is more to be united to someone in unity of person than in a union producing knowledge; but Christ's soul is immediately united to the eternal Word in unity of person[^p303-5]: therefore much more strongly is it united to the truth and light of the Word through knowledge of it in itself: therefore it sees God without any medium.

3. Likewise, in the knowledge of conclusions there is no rest, but only in the knowledge of principles — and the reason for this is that the soul knows conclusions through a medium, but knows principles without a medium[^p303-6] — if therefore Christ's soul knows God through some medium, then it does not rest in the knowledge of God; and if it does not rest in God, since God is the ultimate end, it is not beatified. If therefore it is beatified, it necessarily follows that it knows the divine light in itself; and by parity of reasoning so does every beatified soul.

4. Likewise, the intellect of one who is a comprehensor is elevated as much as his affection, although it is blind in the way on account of the blindness of ignorance; but Christ was a most perfect comprehensor: since therefore he loved the supreme goodness of God in itself, every effect being set aside, by parity of reasoning he saw the light and truth in itself without a medium.

5. Likewise, either it sees *immediately,* or *through a medium.* If *immediately,* I have my proposition; if *through a medium,* either through a *proportionate* medium, or an *improportionate* one. If through an *improportionate* medium, then it is hindered rather than helped; if through a *proportionate* medium, on the contrary: either it is *created* or *uncreated;* not *uncreated,* because that is one alone; if *created:* then a creature can be proportionate[^p303-7] to the Creator; and if this [is so], since nothing else hinders the creature from being able to see God in his substance, it remains that Christ's soul could so see him and did see him.

6. Likewise, if [it sees] through a medium, either that [medium] is *superior* to the beatified soul of Christ, or *inferior.* If *inferior;* then Christ's soul is more immediate to God than that which you call a medium: therefore, that being set aside, it will see God better. If *superior;* then there is something more excellent than the nature of the human mind in Christ. But this is impossible, because *all things are subjected under his feet*[^p303-8]. It remains therefore that his soul saw and sees the eternal light immediately and in the fount itself. — By these reasonings too the same can be shown of any beatified soul.

### Conclusion

> Christ's soul and the other beatified souls see the fount of light itself.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that God will not be seen, nor is seen, by any creature in his *essence*

or *nature,* but will be seen in his *brightness,* since the splendor of the immensity of his light is so great that no creaturely eye can attain to the beholding of that substance. — Gregory in the Morals dispels this error, treating that text of Job 28[^p304-1]: *It is hidden from the eyes of all the living,* where he speaks thus: «There were those who said that in that region of beatitude God is beheld in his *brightness* and is not seen in his *nature;* but brightness is not one thing and nature another, but the very *nature* is brightness, and the very *brightness* is nature». And so this error is not very reasonable, because it understands the eternal light badly, in which the *essence* of light and the very *act* of shining do not differ.

And so there were others more modern who said that the eternal light cannot be beheld by any creature in the *fount* of its brightness, but [only] in certain *condescensions* and theophanies, and this on account of the disproportion of the eye to that supreme light, which would oppress rather than delight the creaturely eye, which is related to it as the eye of an owl[^p304-2]; and therefore it was necessary that God should temper himself to the soul, as the sun is tempered to the eye through the medium of a cloud. — But this manner of speaking deviates from the truth no less than the preceding. Hence master Hugo too refutes it, on the Angelic Hierarchy[^p304-3]: «What is it, he says, for God to be seen in theophanies and not to be seen outside them, except never to be truly seen? For if only the image is always seen, the truth is never seen. Let them therefore put away their phantasms, by which they strive to darken the light of our minds, and let them not fence God our own from us by the images of their exterminations; because for us, just as nothing besides him can satisfy, so nothing short of him can bring us to a stand».

And so, these two manners having been cast aside as erroneous, it must be said in a third manner, truly and catholically, that the most beatified soul of Christ and the other beatified souls see the fount of light itself, in which they are refreshed, rest, are delighted, and in a certain way are absorbed by the brightness of that light, so that God is beheld by them on every side and is seen even in [the souls] themselves[^p304-4]; and this is most especially true in the soul of Christ. — And therefore the authorities and reasons adduced for this side must be granted.

But for an understanding of the authorities adduced to the contrary, and of similar ones, it must be noted that in five ways the authorities of the Saints can be expounded, which seem to say that God cannot be seen in his substance. In the first way thus: he cannot be seen, namely *by our own powers,* yet he can [be seen] *by the gift of God.* Hence upon that text of First Timothy 6[^p304-5]: *He dwells in inaccessible light;* the Gloss: «It is inaccessible to our powers, accessible to his gifts». — In the second way thus: the substance cannot be seen, namely *in the way.* Hence upon that text of First Timothy 6[^p304-6]: *Whom no man can see;* the Gloss: «Yet he will be able [to be seen] at some time». And thus that text of Exodus 33: *Man shall not see me and live.* — In the third way thus: the substance cannot be seen, that is, *fully comprehended.* Hence upon that text of Job 11[^p304-7]: *Wilt thou perhaps comprehend the traces of God?* the Gloss: «His essence will be seen fully by none», *fully,* namely by circumscribing. — In the fourth way thus: the substance cannot be seen, that is, the *account* of the substance. Hence to the Romans 1[^p304-8]: *That which is known of God;* the Gloss: «The account of his substance lies hidden from every creature»; and in this way it can be said «that the Trinity is known to itself alone». — In the fifth way thus: no one knows the substance of God, or anything of the sort, «because he does not *make [it] known*». Matthew 24[^p304-9]: *But of that day and hour no one knows, not even an Angel* etc., just as a pit is called *blind*

because it does not manifest what it has in itself. And thus Chrysostom says that the Angels do not see what God is.

**To the opposing arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* And thus the two authorities are clear, because the first runs according to the first way, and the second according to the fourth way, or the fifth.

*To 3, 4.* To that which is objected, that the finite is so far distant from the infinite, etc.; it must be said that *distance* is spoken of as opposed to *agreement;* but *agreement* is found in a threefold difference, so far as suffices for the present. For there is the agreement of *commensuration* or adequation, the agreement of *participation* of something common, and the agreement of *order.* I say therefore that if *distance* be spoken of through the privation of the agreement of *adequation* and *participation,* the distance of the created to the uncreated is infinite, as of the infinite to the finite. But if *distance* be spoken of through the privation of the agreement of *order;* it must be said that this is false, because creatures are immediately ordered to God as to a principle and as to an end, most of all the rational creature[^p305-1]. But for a *simple beholding* it suffices that there be the agreement of *order,* whereas for the *knowledge of comprehension* the agreement according to a certain *equality* or adequation is required. And therefore it does not follow that, if the created soul cannot *comprehend* the infinity, it cannot *behold* the fount of light. — And through this the next [argument] is clear. For as to what it says, that for knowledge assimilation is required; it must be said that it is not necessary that [there be] *assimilation in a third nature,* but it suffices that the one be a *likeness of the other,* as was determined in the first book, distinction one, three, and thirty-five[^p305-2].

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that that light exceeds the eye; it must be said that there is an excellence that *preserves,* and an excellence that *corrupts.* The *preserving* excellence is in spiritual things, but the *corrupting* in corporeal objects; and the reason for this was given in the first book[^p305-3], both on the side of the *object* and on the side of the *mode* of comprehending: and therefore it is not the same case.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the finite cannot [reach] above the infinite; it must be said that the soul, in knowing God, is more in a state of *receiving* than of *acting,* indeed every power of the soul, with respect to God, is in the character of *passive* — not even the cognitive power [is] *actively* [so], which by its own nature implies in some manner a passion, as the Philosopher[^p305-4] and Priscian say. — And therefore, when it understands God, the soul does not act upon God, but God flows into the soul, in which influx God condescends through grace, and the soul is elevated and made deiform. And this very deiformity is the *disposition* rendering the eye of the soul apt for seeing God, not because it makes a proportionate *quantity,* since that light always exceeds [it] to infinity, but because it makes a proportionate *quality,* since something is given to the soul itself, namely a likeness, which[^p305-5], making the soul itself and the intellect of the soul like to God, renders it understanding. — And if you object that, although vision and knowledge begin from *passion,* they are nevertheless completed in *action,* since for vision two things concur: *reception* and *judgment*[^p305-6]; but no creature can *act upon* that fount of light, since it can *suffer* nothing from anyone; likewise concerning that fount of light and supreme truth no one can *judge,* as Augustine says in *On True Religion*[^p305-7], and reason itself dictates [it], since the one judging in some way presides over the thing judged; in no way does it seem able to be maintained that Christ's soul, or any other beatified soul, should judge the fount of the supernal light itself: to this it must be responded that, although for the action of knowledge there concurs in some manner not only *passion* but also *action;* nevertheless there does not concur an *action* which indeed is made through some *influx* or impression of the knower into the knowable, but only through a certain *protension.* Just as it lies hidden also in *love,* when I love someone, the soul in loving in some manner acts, yet flows nothing into the beloved, nor does the beloved suffer or receive anything from the lover: so it is to be understood in knowledge[^p305-8]. — Likewise, when we say that vision or knowledge is completed in *judgment;* it must be said that this is true; but in order that we may see God, it is not necessary that we judge concerning him in himself, but it suffices for clear vision to be illuminated by the light of light itself and for the illuminated eye to *extend* itself into him by beholding, and to judge concerning him by beholding, since it cannot attain to this, that

it should judge concerning *the supreme truth itself,* but *according to it* the soul judges concerning itself and concerning its own knowledge. Yet nothing prevents — taking judgment in some manner, according as it is required for vision — its being conceded that the beatified soul most certainly judges that that which it beholds is the supreme light, as was held in the first book[^p306-1]. And the word of Augustine does not contradict this. For however much *beholding* or *judgment* may seem in itself to have the nature of action; nevertheless with respect to God or the divine light, by which it is caused, it is a *passion* and an *effect.* Hence that the soul sees God in himself is not because the soul can [be] above God, but rather because God can [be] above it, so that the soul, through the divine power and influx, is elevated above itself[^p306-2]. — But these things which have been said of the soul of Christ generally hold good for the question concerning the vision of God, and likewise those which follow.

la: Vers. 16. — Paulo superius pro *infra ipsum* edd. *citra ipsum.*

en: Verse 16. — A little above, for *infra ipsum* (below it) the editions [read] *citra ipsum* (this side of it).

la: Vers. 18. Cfr. I. Ioan. 4, 12. — Verba Chrysostomi inveniuntur in eius homil. 15. (alias 14.) in Ioan. n. 1. Cfr. eius lib. de Incomprehens. Dei natura, homil. 5. n. 1, et ibid. homil. 4. n. 4. In hoc testimon. cod. U pro *qualiter* substituit *quomodo.*

en: Verse 18. Cfr. 1 John 4:12. — The words of Chrysostom are found in his homily 15 (otherwise 14) on John, n. 1. Cfr. his book *On the Incomprehensible Nature of God,* homily 5, n. 1, and ibid. homily 4, n. 4. In this testimony codex U substitutes *quomodo* (how) for *qualiter* (in what manner).

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cfr. the preceding question.

la: Lectio *a parte* in pluribus codd. dubia est propter abbreviationem factam; pro *a parte* etiam legi posset *apertae.*

en: The reading *a parte* (on the side of) is doubtful in several codices on account of the abbreviation made; in place of *a parte* one might also read *apertae* (of an open [vision]).

la: Vers. 18. — Glossa, apud Lyranum *interlinearis,* invenitur etiam apud Petr. Lombardum, in hunc loc.

en: Verse 18. — The Gloss, in Lyra the *interlinear* one, is found also in Peter Lombard, on this passage.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Pro *in unitatem personae* non pauci codd. hic et in initio huius arg. *in unitate personae.*

en: Cfr. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 1 seq. — In place of *in unitatem personae* (into unity of person) not a few codices read here and at the beginning of this argument *in unitate personae* (in unity of person).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — August., I. Confess. c. 1: *Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.*

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 2. — Augustine, *Confessions* I, c. 1: *For you have made us toward yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.*

la: Non *quantitative* i. e. ut sit tanta, quantus Deus est in virtute, sed *qualitative* sive quantum ad similitudinem expressam, quae datur mediante lumine gloriae. Sed hoc intelligitur de medio *disponente,* non de illo *medio quo,* quod vocatur *species impressa.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7. et hic q. 3. ad 6.

en: Not *quantitatively,* i.e. that it be as great as God is in power, but *qualitatively,* or as regards the expressed likeness, which is given by means of the light of glory. But this is understood of a *disposing* medium, not of that *medium-by-which* (*medium quo*) which is called the *impressed species.* Cfr. II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7, and here q. 3. ad 6.

la: Respicitur Ps. 8, 8; Eph. 1, 22; Hebr. 2, 8. Cfr. supra pag. 266, nota 5. — Paulo superius post *quod tu dicis* cod. U inserit *esse.* Circa finem arg. pro *His etiam* cod. K habet *His autem,* et deinde multi codd. male omittunt *idem.*

en: Reference is to Ps. 8:8; Eph. 1:22; Heb. 2:8. Cfr. above, p. 266, note 5. — A little above, after *quod tu dicis* codex U inserts *esse.* Toward the end of the argument, for *His etiam* codex K has *His autem,* and then many codices wrongly omit *idem.*

la: Vers. 21. — Fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 erronee allegant v. 17: *Non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum.* Verba Gregorii, quae habentur in eius XVIII. Moral. c. 54. n. 90, sic ibi sonant: *Fuere nonnulli, qui Deum dicerent etiam in illa regione beatitudinis in claritate quidem sua conspici, sed in natura minime videri. Quos nimirum minor inquisitionis subtilitas fefellit. Neque enim illi simplici et incommutabili essentiae aliud est claritas, et aliud natura, sed ipsa ei natura sua claritas, ipsa claritas natura est.*

en: Verse 21. — Almost all codices and editions 1, 2 erroneously cite v. 17: *Gold or glass shall not be made equal to it.* The words of Gregory, which are found in his *Morals* XVIII, c. 54, n. 90, run there thus: *There were some who said that God is beheld even in that region of beatitude in his brightness indeed, but is by no means seen in his nature. These, doubtless, a lesser subtlety of inquiry deceived. For to that simple and unchangeable essence brightness is not one thing and nature another, but for it its very nature is its brightness, its very brightness is its nature.*

la: Supple cum cod. M *ad lucem solis.* Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 1. (l. brevior, c. 1.): *Sicut enim nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima* (ed. Venet. 1489).

en: Supply, with codex M, *ad lucem solis* (to the light of the sun). Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, text 1 (in the shorter book, c. 1): *For just as the eyes of the night-raven are related to the light of day, so too the intellect of our soul to those things which are of all the most manifest in nature* (Venice ed. 1489).

la: Libr. II. c. 1. in fine. Textus origin. post *vere videri* addit *et verum nunquam videri,* et mox post *veritas nunquam videtur* subiungit *quoniam imago veritas non est, etiam cum de veritate est;* deinde pro *obtenebrare* exhibet *obumbrare* et pro *exterminationum* vocem *autumationum* [Vat. *aestimationum,* quae etiam in principio textus allati cum edd. 1, 2 ter *videre* substituit pro *videri*].

en: Book II, c. 1, at the end. The original text, after *vere videri* (truly to be seen), adds *et verum nunquam videri* (and the truth never to be seen), and shortly after *veritas nunquam videtur* (the truth is never seen) it subjoins *quoniam imago veritas non est, etiam cum de veritate est* (since the image is not the truth, even when it is from the truth); then for *obtenebrare* it gives *obumbrare,* and for *exterminationum* the word *autumationum* [the Vatican: *aestimationum,* which also at the beginning of the cited text, with editions 1, 2, three times substitutes *videre* for *videri*].

la: Id est, videatur Dei praesentia et influentia in ipsis. Sic etenim explicatur cognitio *in* creatura, quae distinguitur a cognitione *per* creaturam; cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. — Paulo superius ante *luminis fontem* cod. A interiicit *superni.*

en: That is, that the presence and influx of God be seen in [the souls] themselves. For thus is explained knowledge *in* the creature, which is distinguished from knowledge *through* the creature; cfr. I Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. — A little above, before *luminis fontem* codex A interposes *superni* (of the supernal [light]).

la: Vers. 16. — Glossa delibata est ex August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 6. n. 2.

en: Verse 16. — The Gloss is drawn from Augustine, *Enarration on Ps. 118,* sermon 6, n. 2.

la: Vers. 16. — Haec altera Glossa sumta est ex August., II. contra Maximin. Arian. c. 12. n. 2, et habetur apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Exod. 33, 20. — Pro *Unde super* codd. G I K N T U V Z *ut super.* Mox post *Et sic illud* cod. K supplet *intelligitur.*

en: Verse 16. — This other Gloss is taken from Augustine, II *Against Maximinus the Arian,* c. 12, n. 2, and is found in Peter Lombard and Lyra. — The following passage of Scripture is Exod. 33:20. — For *Unde super* codices G I K N T U V Z [read] *ut super.* Shortly after, following *Et sic illud,* codex K supplies *intelligitur.*

la: Vers. 7. — Glossa, quae est *ordinaria,* invenitur apud Strabum et Lyranum; sumta est ex Gregor., X. Moral. c. 8. n. 13, ubi sic legitur: *Etsi hunc* [Omnipotentem] *in claritate sua quandoque conspicimus, non tamen eius essentiam plene contuemur. Angelica etenim, vel humana mens, cum ad incircumscriptum lumen inhiat, eo ipso se, quo est creatura, coangustat etc.*

en: Verse 7. — The Gloss, which is the *ordinary* one, is found in Strabo and Lyra; it is taken from Gregory, X *Morals,* c. 8, n. 13, where it reads thus: *Even if we sometimes behold him* [the Omnipotent] *in his brightness, we nevertheless do not fully gaze upon his essence. For the angelic, or human, mind, when it gapes toward the uncircumscribed light, by that very thing whereby it is a creature, straitens itself,* etc.

la: Vers. 19. — Haec quoque Glossa *ordinaria* est et habetur apud Strabum, Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum; mutuata est ex Origen., I. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. n. 16. Verba *Trinitas sibi soli nota esse* [cod. N *est*] sunt Isidori; cfr. supra pag. 299, nota 2.

en: Verse 19. — This Gloss too is the *ordinary* one and is found in Strabo, Peter Lombard, and Lyra; it is borrowed from Origen, I *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,* n. 16. The words *Trinitas sibi soli nota esse* [codex N *est*] are Isidore's; cfr. above, p. 299, note 2.

la: Vers. 36. — Verba *quia non facit nosse* habentur in Glossa (*ordinaria*), quam vides apud Strabum et Lyranum, in hunc loc. Cfr. etiam August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34; 83 Qq. q. 60; I. de Trin. c. 12. n. 25. — Exemplum de *fovea* [vel *fossa*] *caeca* invenitur in August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34, nec non in Ioan. Evang. tr. 43. n. 6, ubi S. Doctor ait: *Fossa caeca dicitur, non quia ipsa oculos perdidit, sed quia latendo non videntes facit.*

en: Verse 36. — The words *quia non facit nosse* are found in the Gloss (*ordinary*), which you see in Strabo and Lyra, on this passage. Cfr. also Augustine, I *On Genesis against the Manichees* c. 22, n. 34; *83 Questions* q. 60; I *On the Trinity* c. 12, n. 25. — The example of the *blind pit* [or *ditch*] is found in Augustine, I *On Genesis against the Manichees* c. 22, n. 34, and also in his *Tractates on John's Gospel* tr. 43, n. 6, where the Holy Doctor says: *A ditch is called blind, not because it itself has lost eyes, but because by lying hidden it makes [men] not seeing.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et 5, II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *sicut infiniti ad finitum* codd. F G K L V (aa primitus) bb *sicut finiti ad infinitum.*

en: Cfr. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 and 5, II Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — A little above, for *sicut infiniti ad finitum* codices F G K L V (aa originally) bb [read] *sicut finiti ad infinitum.*

la: Dist. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. — Subinde ante *obiecti* cod. U interserit *subiecti;* et non vituperanda est haec interpositio, siquidem loc. cit. praeter rationem *a parte obiecti* et *modi* etiam ratio *a parte subiecti* proponitur.

en: Dist. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2. — Thereupon, before *obiecti* codex U inserts *subiecti;* and this interposition is not to be censured, since at the cited place, besides the reason *on the side of the object* and *of the mode,* a reason *on the side of the subject* too is proposed.

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 118. (c. 11.), et III. text. 2. et 12. seqq. (c. 4. seq.), quo loco dicit, sentire et intelligere esse *pati quoddam*». Cfr. tom. II. pag. 825, nota 2. Dictum Prisciani supra allatum est pag. 10, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro *nedum* [intellige: multo minus se habet], quod ex codd. A bb scribit *necdum*) restituimus, alii codd. *nec dicit,* edd. *nec dicitur.*

en: Book II *On the Soul,* text 118 (c. 11), and III text 2 and 12 seqq. (c. 4 seq.), in which place he says that to sense and to understand are *a certain suffering*». Cfr. tom. II, p. 825, note 2. The saying of Priscian was cited above, p. 10, note 6. — A little before, for *nedum* [understand: it stands much less so], which from codices A bb (which write *necdum*) we have restored, other codices [read] *nec dicit,* the editions *nec dicitur.*

la: Codd. A bb *quae.* Edd. post *quod* superflue subiiciunt *eum;* superflue, inquimus, quippe cum haec coniunctio (non in praeposito) postea habeatur ante *Deo.* Mox verbo *intelligentem* id. praefigunt *et;* cod. K exhibet *et* ante *reddit.* Aliquanto superius pro *quia semper illud* multi codd. *sed super illud.*

en: Codices A bb [read] *quae.* The editions, after *quod,* superfluously subjoin *eum;* superfluously, we say, since this conjunction (not in the antecedent) is afterward had before *Deo.* Shortly, before the word *intelligentem* the same [editions] prefix *et;* codex K exhibits *et* before *reddit.* Somewhat above, for *quia semper illud* many codices [read] *sed super illud.*

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 221, nota 4. — Post pauca pro *ipsum* id. *ipse.*

en: Cfr. tom. II, p. 221, note 4. — After a few [words], for *ipsum* the same [reads] *ipse.*

la: Cap. 29. n. 53. et c. 31. n. 57. seq. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 68, nota 3. et pag. 69, nota 12. Cfr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 2. n. 34. et c. 14. n. 38.

en: Chapter 29, n. 53, and c. 31, n. 57 seq. See the words in tom. I, p. 68, note 3, and p. 69, note 12. Cfr. II *On Free Choice* c. 2, n. 34, and c. 14, n. 38.

la: Cod. G *de cognitione.* Mox pro *in iudicio* edd. substituunt *in iudicio* et paulo inferius post *oculum* subdunt *etiam.*

en: Codex G [reads] *de cognitione.* Shortly, for *in iudicio* the editions substitute *in iudicio,* and a little below, after *oculum,* they add *etiam.*

la: Dist. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 4, ubi distinguitur inter iudicium, quod fit *discernendo,* utrum scil. res *sit,* an non (hoc modo iudicium convenit omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti); et iudicium, quod fit *approbando* vel reprobando, num ita *debeat esse;* et sic intellectus non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis. — Paulo inferius edd. cum pluribus codd. omittunt *Dei vel,* pro quo in codd. E I T scriptum est *Dei vi.*

en: Dist. 3, p. I, q. 1, ad 4, where a distinction is drawn between the judgment that is made *by discerning,* namely whether a thing *is* or not (in this way judgment belongs to every knowing intellect with respect to every object); and the judgment that is made *by approving* or reproving, whether it *ought thus to be;* and thus the intellect does not judge concerning the truth, but according to it [judges] concerning other things. — A little below, the editions with several codices omit *Dei vel,* in place of which in codices E I T is written *Dei vi.*

la: Ante *ipsam* supple cum cod. A *se.* In fine solut. ante *quae sequuntur* cod. W interserit *et.*

en: Before *ipsam* supply, with codex A, *se.* At the end of the solution, before *quae sequuntur* codex W inserts *et.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio confirmata est pluribus decretis Ecclesiae, praesertim Constitutione Benedicti XII. *Benedictus Deus* (an. 1336), ubi docetur, quod Beati in caelo «vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione obiecti visi se habente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente». — Alius error Beguardorum damnatus est an. 1311 a Clemente V. in Concilio Viennensi, scilicet «quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in se ipsa naturaliter est beata, quodque anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum» (cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.). — Prima et secunda opinio erronea (hic in corp.) tribuuntur quibusdam Armenis saeculi VII, Arnaldistis saec. XII. et posterius cuidam Graeco Gregorio Palamas. — Circa modum huius visionis multae exortae sunt disputationes et opiniones. Inter alia nonnulli iam illa aetate voluerunt, quod haec visio fiat per aliquam speciem seu similitudinem a Verbo impressam; quam opinionem Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1.) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 3.) censuerunt esse probabilem; sed Ss. Thom. et Bonav. cum communi sententia docent, ipsum Verbum, intellectui essentialiter praesens et unitum, supplere vicem speciei impressae. Consentit eis etiam Scotus, si agitur de facto, tamen possibile esse putat Deo etiam mediante specie impressa praedictam visionem efficere, quod discipuli S. Thomae communiter negant. De hac controversia S. Bonav. disertis verbis nihil determinat; tamen quaedam verba generalia in favorem Scotisticae sententiae cum De Barberiis exponi possent. Quod ipsa increata veritas sine specie impressa eminentissime informare possit intellectum, docetur variis locis v. g. hic solut. ad 3. 4. et 6, a. 2. q. 1-3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 5; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7.

**II.** Hoc loco pauci antiqui Commentatores hanc quaestionem explicite tractant, ut praeter S. Bonav. Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1, nec non Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. Ceteri rem hic tangunt in aliis quaestionibus, praesertim in illa, utrum Verbum cognoscatur mediante aliqua specie impressa (Durand., hic q. 2.), et diffusius, ubi disputant de visione beatifica in genere, ut Scot. IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 11. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2; S. I. q. 12. a. 1. seqq.; S. c. Gent. III. c. 51-54.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is confirmed by many decrees of the Church, especially the Constitution of Benedict XII, *Benedictus Deus* (a.d. 1336), where it is taught that the Blessed in heaven «see the divine essence by an intuitive and even facial vision, with no creature mediating in the character of an object seen, but the divine essence immediately showing itself to them, nakedly, clearly and openly». — Another error of the Beghards was condemned in 1311 by Clement V in the Council of Vienne, namely «that every intellectual nature is in itself naturally beatified, and that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to seeing God and beatifically enjoying him» (cfr. II Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.). — The first and second erroneous opinions (here in the body) are attributed to certain Armenians of the seventh century, to the Arnaldists of the twelfth century, and later to a certain Greek, Gregory Palamas. — Concerning the manner of this vision many disputations and opinions have arisen. Among other things, some even in that age wished that this vision should come about through some species or likeness impressed by the Word; which opinion Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 3. quaestiuncula 1.) and Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1. q. 3.) judged to be probable; but Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure, with the common opinion, teach that the Word itself, essentially present and united to the intellect, supplies the place of an impressed species. Scotus too agrees with them if it is a question of fact, yet he thinks it possible for God to effect the aforesaid vision even by means of an impressed species, which the disciples of St. Thomas commonly deny. Concerning this controversy St. Bonaventure determines nothing in express words; yet certain general words could be expounded in favor of the Scotist opinion, with De Barberiis. That the uncreated truth itself, without an impressed species, can in a most eminent way inform the intellect, is taught in various places, e.g. here in the solution to 3, 4, and 6, a. 2. q. 1-3; I Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 5; II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7.

**II.** In this place few of the ancient Commentators treat this question explicitly, as, besides St. Bonaventure, Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1, and also Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. The rest touch the matter here in other questions, especially in that one, whether the Word is known by means of some impressed species (Durandus, here q. 2.), and more at length where they dispute about the beatific vision in general, as Scotus IV Sent. d. 49. q. 11. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 49. q. 2; S. I. q. 12. a. 1. seqq.; S.c. Gent. III. c. 51-54.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `vol3-p302..306-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` (PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II/III override; the IA djvu OCR cascade-fragments the Respondeo, Solutio, and footers), reading Left column top→bottom then Right column, body bands then footer bands. English is a fresh literal paragraph-for-paragraph translation. Raw OCR span 21254–21524.

**Printed page span.** pp. 302–306 (PDF 324–328; offset `pdf = printed + 22`). Running heads confirmed eyes-on against the bands: p.302 (q3 title at foot of L-col), p.303 R `QUAEST. III. 303`, p.304 L `304 SENTENTIARUM` / R `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`, p.305 L `DIST. XIV. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` / R `QUAEST. III. 305`, p.306 L `306 SENTENTIARUM` — never trusting OCR'd digits.

**Page-split map.**
- p.302 (R-col foot): QUAESTIO III title + opening *videtur* arg. 1 only.
- p.303: *videtur* args 2–6 (L-col) + SED CONTRA args 1–6 (L→R) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo opening (R-col foot).
- p.304: Respondeo — opinio 1 (refuted by Gregory) + opinio 2 (refuted by Hugo) + the author's own catholic answer + the five *modi* of expounding the contrary authorities (modi 1–5).
- p.305: end of modus 5 (L-col top) + replies *Ad 1–6* (the *triplex convenientia,* *duplex excellentia,* and the long *passio/actio/protensio* reply *Ad 6*).
- p.306 (L-col top + R-col top): tail of reply *Ad 6* + the *intuitus/iudicium* coda; then SCHOLION I–II. ARTICULUS II QUAESTIO I begins immediately after on the L-col of p.306 — out of scope.

**Hand-offs.** *Picked up* from d14-a1-q2 — **p.302 footer 8** (`Vers. 16. — Paulo superius pro infra ipsum edd. citra ipsum.`), rendered `[^p302-8]`, anchoring q3's first fundamentum `Primae ad Timotheum sexto⁸`. q2 consumed p.302 footers 1–7 (its body + Scholion I–II); none of those are re-claimed here. *Forwarded to d14-a2-q1* — NONE: q3 consumes all of pp.303–305's footer sequences and the two p.306 body footers (1–2); ARTICULUS II QUAESTIO I begins a fresh p.306 footer sequence (the p.306 R-col footers 3, 4 — `voculae eodem` / `Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram` — belong to a2-q1, NOT re-claimed here). The seam is grammatically clean (q3 ends `…similiter quae sequuntur.` + SCHOLION; a2-q1 opens `Consequenter quaeritur de cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo…`).

**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: true`. A free-standing SCHOLION (I, II) prints at the top of p.306 after the body. It is q3-specific (§I = the doctrinal confirmation from *Benedictus Deus* + the condemned Beghard/Armenian/Palamite errors + the impressed-species controversy; §II = the thin medieval-commentator tradition on this question). It carries no numbered apparatus and does NOT forward-cover the next article's questions.

**Apparatus count = 28** (per-page restart): p.302 → 1 (`[^p302-8]`, picked-up hand-off); p.303 → 8 (`[^p303-1]`–`[^p303-8]`); p.304 → 9 (`[^p304-1]`–`[^p304-9]`); p.305 → 8 (`[^p305-1]`–`[^p305-8]`, footer 4 wraps L→R); p.306 → 2 (`[^p306-1]`, `[^p306-2]`, the two body footers; the Scholion carries none). Markers paired at matching positions in both bodies. (The raw apparatus-count heuristic reports 32 for this chunk — an overcount from the two-column cascade; ground truth from the printed footer bands is 28.)

**p.298 reconciliation (side-check).** Verified against the 450 dpi p.298 R-col footer band: p.298 has exactly **4 footers**. Footers 1–2 → d14-a1-q1 (`[^p298-1]`, `[^p298-2]`); footer 3 (`Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.` + *illi homini*/*detur* codex variants) anchors q1's *Ad 4* reply and was **orphaned** in q1's original promotion (q1 captured only 1–2; q2 correctly declined it as q1-territory but it was never backfilled). **Fixed in a separate earlier commit** (`fix: backfill orphaned p.298 footer 3 into d14-a1-q1`) — q1 now holds footers 1–3 (`[^p298-3]` added, 21 entries, marker pairing 21/21 clean). Footer 4 (`Vers. 9`) → q2. p.298 now fully reconciled, no orphan.

**`[?]` flags.** None. The whole chunk (body + apparatus + Scholion) was fully legible at 450 dpi, read column-by-column.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0