title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum summa simplicitas soli Deo conveniat.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum simplicitas sit Dei [proprium]. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Nulla creatura est actus purus, quia in omni creatura, ut dicit Boethius[^1], differt *quo est* et *quod est*; ergo in omni creatura est actus cum possibili; sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret simplicitate: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis creatura habet esse finitum et limitatum: ergo habet esse arctatum[^2]; sed ubicumque est esse limitatum, est ibi aliquid quod contrahit, et aliquid quod contrahitur, et in omni tali est compositio et differentia: ergo omnis creatura est composita: ergo nulla simplex.

3. Item, omnis creatura habet esse datum aliunde, ergo habet esse aliunde acceptum, ergo nulla creatura est suum esse, ergo in omni creatura est dependentia sive differentia; sed nullum tale simpliciter simplex: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne, quod est post primam unitatem, deficit ab illa, ergo statim cadit in dualitatem, sicut dicit Dionysius[^3], quod *post monadem dyas est*: sed omnis creatura est a prima unitate: ergo omnis creatura est ab illa deficiens: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. «Ab uno non procedit nisi unum»[^4] et a vero non procedit nisi verum; sed unitas et simplicitas eandem rationem habent in Deo: ergo sicut ab uno unum, ita a simplici simplex.

2. Item, videtur specialiter, quod simplicitas sit in creaturis, quia simplex est quod non habet partem; sed punctus non habet partem, quia ita definitur: *punctus est, cuius pars non est*[^5]: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud, ante quod non est aliud, est simplex; quia si compositum est, necessario habet ante se aliud; sed ens est primum, sicut dicit auctor *de Causis*[^6]: «Prima rerum creatarum est esse»: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne illud est simplex, in quo stat resolutio; sed resolutio stat in principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, quia materia ulterius non resolvitur, cum sit status in causis, alioquin esset ire in infinitum[^7]: ergo cum resolutio stet in creato, aliquid creatum est simplex. Si tu dicas, quod principia non habent omnimodam simplicitatem, quia quamvis non componantur ex aliis, tamen componuntur aliis; contra: hoc non videtur facere contra simplicitatem, quod componatur alii. Nam quod aliquid non sit componibile alii, non facit aliquam simplicitatem, cum ista proprietas[^8] sit in individuis completis, quae maxime sunt composita: ergo hoc quod dico componibile aliis, non tollit ab eis simplicitatem, et sic etc.

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> **Conclusio.** *Deum solum esse summe simplicem, duplici modo probatur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod simplicitas essentiae privat compositionem et privat essentialem differentiam sive multiplicitatem. Unde simplex est, quod non habet compositionem partium nec multiplicitatem actionum[^9] sive formarum. In solo autem Deo est privatio compositionis et differentiae sive multiplicitatis: ideo simplicitas in solo Deo est essentialiter.

Unde notandum, quod multiplex est compositio. Una compositio est ex partibus essentialibus; et haec est in omnibus *per se entibus*[^10]; alia est ex partibus integrantibus; et haec est in omnibus corporibus; tertia est ex partibus dissimilibus sive repugnantibus; et haec est in omnibus animatis et viventibus. Unde in omni substantia per se ente, quae proprie[^11] dicitur creatura, est compositio, quia omnis creatura aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis, aut composita ex utroque.

Similiter est considerare triplicem differentiam in creaturis. Prima est substantiae, virtutis et operationis[^12], sive substantiae et accidentis; secunda est differentia suppositi et essentiae; tertia est differentia entis et esse[^13]. Prima differentia est rei, prout est agens; secunda, prout est ens in genere; tertia, prout est ens in se. Prima differentia est in omni subiecto, quoniam omne[^14] subiectum habet esse mixtum; ideo non agit ex se toto, et ideo differt in eo *quo agit* et *quod agit*, et actio sive subiectum et proprietas[^15]. Secunda differentia est in omni individuo, quia omne individuum habet esse limitatum; et ideo in aliquo convenit, in aliquo differt cum alio, et ideo in omni individuo differt essentia et suppositum; multiplicatur enim essentia in suppositis. Tertia differentia est in omni creato et concreato[^16]: quia enim omne, quod est praeter Deum, accipit esse aliunde, sive principium sit, sive principiatum: ideo nihil est suum esse, sicut lux non est suum lucere.

Si ergo dicatur simplicitas per privationem compositionis, sic proprium est solius Dei in ratione substantiae, quia nulla alia substantia est, quae non habet compositionem ex possibili et actuali saltem.

Si autem simplicitas dicat privationem essentialis differentiae et dependentiae, ita quod in essentia nulla sit diversitas nec dependentia[^17], est proprium Dei in ratione entis, quia nullum aliud ens est, in quo non cadat aliqua diversitas vel dependentia.

Concedendum ergo est, quod simplicitas est Dei proprium, ut visum est. Creaturae autem compositae sunt nec vere simplices, quia habent esse mixtum ex actu et potentia, quia habent esse limitatum, et ita in genere et specie per additionem contractum, quia habent esse aliunde datum, quia habent esse post Deum unum, a quo deficiunt; et ita cadunt in compositionem.

Aliter potest dici[^18] et brevius[^20], quod simplex dicitur per privationem compositionis[^19]. Sed notandum, quod compositio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo alicuius ex aliquibus; alio modo, qua[^21] aliquid dicitur componi alii. Si ergo simplicitas privet compositionem ex aliis, sic convenit etiam creatis, utpote primis principiis[^22], quae non componuntur ex aliis. Si autem privet compositionem cum aliis et ex aliis, sic solius Dei est. Omnis enim creatura aut est ens per se et in se[^23], et ita composita ex aliis; aut est ens cum alio et in alio; et ita alii composita. Et iterum omne creatum aut est principium; et ita componibile alii; aut principiatum; et sic compositum ex aliis; et sic accipitur simplicitas, prout est rei proprietas, per privationem, videlicet utriusque compositionis.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa et opposita:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *ab uno non est nisi unum* etc.; dicendum, quod simplex non est conditio generalis entis sicut unum. Nam

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simplicitas dicit modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae; quia creatura non potest recipere, cum esse eius sit limitatum, sit[^24] mixtum, sit etiam esse dependens et aliunde datum.

*Ad 2, 3, 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate puncti et entis et principii, dicendum, quod ibi est simplicitas per privationem compositionis ex aliis, non autem prout simplicitas dicit indifferentiam omnimodam. In omnibus enim, ut dictum est, cadit aliqua differentia et dependentia: quamvis enim non sint composita, tamen eorum esse dependet a composito, sive compositione.

Unde bene concedendum est illud quod ultimo dicebatur, quod illud derogat simplicitati rei, quod sit alteri componibilis, in quantum simplicitas privat multiplicitatem et differentiam in re simplici, quamvis non deroget, in quantum privat[^25] compositionem ex aliis. Omnis enim dependentia facit ipsum quod dependet a summa simplicitate et indifferentia recedere. Solus autem Deus est independens. Omnia autem alia sunt dependentia, sive comparatione ad principia, ex quibus sunt, sive unum principium componens complicetur ad aliud, sive esse dependens[^26] comparatione ad Deum sive ab ipso Deo. Nihil autem, quod dependet, est sua dependentia: ideo nihil tale est summe simplex, quia omne simplicissimum est absolutissimum[^27].

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### Question II. *Whether supreme simplicity belongs to God alone.*

Secondly it is asked, whether simplicity is proper to God. And that it is so, is seen in this way.

1. No creature is pure act, because in every creature, as Boethius says[^1], *that by which it is* (*quo est*) differs from *that which is* (*quod est*); therefore in every creature there is act together with the possible; but everything of this sort has in itself multiformity and lacks simplicity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every creature has finite and limited being: therefore it has a constrained being[^2]; but wherever there is limited being, there is there something that contracts and something that is contracted, and in everything of this sort there is composition and difference: therefore every creature is composed: therefore none is simple.

3. Likewise, every creature has being given from elsewhere, therefore it has being received from elsewhere, therefore no creature is its own being, therefore in every creature there is dependence or difference; but nothing of this sort is simply simple: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is after the first unity falls short of it, therefore it falls forthwith into duality, as Dionysius says[^3], that *after the monad there is the dyad*: but every creature is from the first unity: therefore every creature falls short of it: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. «From one there proceeds only one»[^4] and from the true there proceeds only the true; but unity and simplicity have the same account in God: therefore just as from one [comes] one, so from the simple [comes] the simple.

2. Likewise, it seems especially that simplicity is in creatures, because the simple is that which has no part; but the point has no part, since it is so defined: *a point is that of which there is no part*[^5]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every thing before which there is no other is simple; for if it is composite, it necessarily has another before it; but being is first, as the author *of [the book] On Causes* says[^6]: «The first of created things is being»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything is simple in which resolution comes to a halt; but resolution halts in principles, which are matter and form, because matter is not further resolved, since it is the terminus among causes, otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity[^7]: therefore since resolution halts in the created, something created is simple. If you say that the principles do not have simplicity in every mode, because, although they are not composed from others, yet they are composed with others; on the contrary: this does not seem to militate against simplicity, that something is composed with another. For that something not be composable with another does not make for any simplicity, since this property[^8] belongs to complete individuals, which are most of all composite: therefore this which I call composable-with-others does not take simplicity away from them, and so on.

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> **Conclusion.** *That God alone is supremely simple is proved in a twofold way.*

**I respond:** It must be said that simplicity of essence negates composition and negates essential difference or multiplicity. Hence the simple is that which has neither composition of parts nor multiplicity of actions[^9] or of forms. But in God alone is there negation of composition and of difference or of multiplicity: therefore simplicity is essentially in God alone.

Hence it should be noted that composition is manifold. One composition is from essential parts; and this is in all *beings per se*[^10]; another is from integral parts; and this is in all bodies; the third is from dissimilar or contrary parts; and this is in all animate and living things. Hence in every substance that is a being per se, which properly[^11] is called a creature, there is composition, since every creature is either bodily, or spiritual, or composed of both.

Similarly, a threefold difference is to be considered in creatures. The first is of substance, power, and operation[^12], or of substance and accident; the second is the difference of supposit and essence; the third is the difference of being (*ens*) and to-be (*esse*)[^13]. The first difference belongs to a thing insofar as it is an agent; the second, insofar as it is a being in a genus; the third, insofar as it is a being in itself. The first difference is in every subject, since every[^14] subject has a mixed being; therefore it does not act by its whole self, and therefore there differ in it *that by which it acts* and *that which acts*, and the action or subject and property[^15]. The second difference is in every individual, because every individual has a limited being; and therefore it agrees with another in something and differs from another in something, and therefore in every individual essence and supposit differ; for essence is multiplied in supposits. The third difference is in everything created and con-created[^16]: for because everything that is besides God receives its being from elsewhere, whether it be a principle or be principled: therefore nothing is its own being, just as light is not its own act-of-shining.

If, therefore, simplicity be spoken of by way of negation of composition, then it is proper to God alone in the order of substance, because there is no other substance which does not have composition out of the possible and the actual at least.

If, however, simplicity speaks the negation of essential difference and of dependence, so that in the essence there be no diversity nor dependence[^17], it is proper to God in the order of being, because there is no other being in which some diversity or dependence does not fall.

It must therefore be conceded that simplicity is proper to God, as has been seen. Creatures, however, are composed and not truly simple, because they have a being mixed of act and potency, because they have a limited being, and so contracted by addition into genus and species, because they have a being given from elsewhere, because they have a being after the one God, from whom they fall short; and thus they fall into composition.

Otherwise it can be said[^18] and more briefly[^20], that the simple is so called by way of negation of composition[^19]. But it must be noted that composition is spoken of in two ways: in one way, of some thing out of certain [components]; in another way, by which[^21] some thing is said to be composed with another. If, therefore, simplicity negate composition out of others, then it pertains also to created things, namely to first principles[^22], which are not composed out of others. If, however, it negate composition both *with* others and *out of* others, then it belongs to God alone. For every creature either is a being per se and in itself[^23], and thus is composed out of others; or is a being with another and in another, and thus is composed *with* another. And again every created thing either is a principle, and thus composable with another; or is principled, and thus composed out of others; and so simplicity is taken, insofar as it is a property of a thing, by way of negation, namely of either kind of composition.

**Replies to the arguments and to the opposing arguments:**

*To 1.* To what is objected, that *from one there is only one* etc., it must be said that *simple* is not a general condition of being as *one* is. For

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simplicity bespeaks the most noble mode of unity, which God communicates to no creature; because the creature cannot receive [it], since its being is limited, is[^24] mixed, is also a being dependent and given from elsewhere.

*To 2, 3, 4.* To what is objected concerning the simplicity of the point, of being, and of a principle, it must be said that there is there simplicity by way of negation of composition out of others, but not insofar as simplicity bespeaks an utterly all-round indifference. For in all those, as has been said, some difference and dependence falls: for although they are not composed, yet their being depends on a composite, or on composition.

Hence what was said last must rightly be conceded, that what derogates from the simplicity of a thing is that it be composable with another, inasmuch as simplicity negates multiplicity and difference in the simple thing, although it does not derogate inasmuch as it negates[^25] composition out of others. For every dependence makes the very thing that depends to recede from supreme simplicity and indifference. But God alone is independent. All other things, however, are dependent — whether by comparison to the principles from which they are, or whether one composing principle be folded together with another, or whether [as] a dependent being[^26] by comparison to God or [as flowing] from God himself. But nothing that depends is its own dependence: therefore nothing of that sort is supremely simple, because everything most simple is most absolute[^27].

la: In libro *de Hebdomad.* et *de Trin.* c. 2. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 3.

en: Boethius, in the book *de Hebdomadibus* and *de Trinitate* c. 2. See above d. 3 p. II a. 1 q. 3 fundamentum 3.

la: Cod. X *contractum*.

en: Codex X reads *contractum* ("contracted").

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 1. et 13. — Mox lectio Vat. *ergo* pro *sed* corrigitur ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 1 and 13. — Just after, the Vatican reading *ergo* in place of *sed* is corrected from the manuscripts and the first edition.

la: Ita Avicenna, IX. *Metaph.* c. 2. seqq. Cfr. etiam Averroes, *Comment.* in XII. *Metaph.* text. 44. Allegatur etiam II. *de Gener. et corrupt.* text. 56. (c. 10.), ubi Aristot. ait: *Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere.*

en: Thus Avicenna, IX *Metaphysics* c. 2 sqq. Cf. also Averroes, *Commentary* on XII *Metaphysics* text 44. It is also cited as II *On Generation and Corruption* text 56 (c. 10), where Aristotle says: *For the same thing, holding itself in the same way, is by nature always apt to produce the same effect.*

la: Euclid., I. *Geometriae*, ubi iuxta translationem Boethii habetur: *Punctus est, cuius pars nulla est.*

en: Euclid, *Geometry* I, where according to Boethius's translation one reads: *A point is that of which there is no part.*

la: *Propos.* 4. — Mendum Vat., quae post *causis* habet *sed primum*, castigatur ope mss. et ed. 1.

en: *[Liber de Causis]* prop. 4. — The Vatican error, which after *causis* has *sed primum*, is corrected with the help of the manuscripts and the first edition.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Metaph.* per totum (I. brevior.), ubi processus in infinitum in genere causarum reprobatur. De materia et forma, quatenus sunt principia, vide Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 42. 82. (c. 5. 9.); et Gilbert. Porret., *de Sex Princip.* prop. I. — Cod. V *abire* loco *ire*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Metaphysics* throughout (the shorter [book] I), where the regress to infinity in the genus of causes is rejected. On matter and form, insofar as they are principles, see Aristotle, I *Physics* text 42, 82 (c. 5, 9); and Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles* prop. 1. — Codex V reads *abire* in place of *ire*.

la: Nempe: *quod aliquid non sit componibile.* — Paulo ante cod. cc *componaiitur* loco *componatur*, ubi supple: *aliquid*.

en: Namely: *that something not be composable.* — A little earlier codex cc has *componantur* in place of *componatur*, where one should supply: *aliquid*.

la: Ed. 1 *accidentium*, loco *actionum*, cum qua lectione concordant verba Magistri, hic c. 3. in initio, et explicatio ipsorum infra dub. 2. Pro lectione mss. allegari potest Alan. ab Insul. *Regul. theolog.*, reg. 1, ubi praeter pluralitatem partium et proprietatum affert pluralitatem effectuum, quae attenditur in proprietatibus; sic albedo facit album, facit coloratum, facit qualem. Deus autem non est diversus effectibus variis, quia non est causa formalis. Utraque tamen lectio in idem recidit, ut patet ex iis, quae paulo infra habentur.

en: The first edition reads *accidentium* in place of *actionum*, with which reading the words of the Master agree, here c. 3 at the beginning, and their explanation below at dub. 2. For the manuscript reading one may cite Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, reg. 1, where, besides the plurality of parts and of properties, he brings forward the plurality of effects, which is attended to in properties; thus whiteness makes white, makes colored, makes "such-and-so." God, however, is not diverse by various effects, since he is not a formal cause. Each reading, nevertheless, comes back to the same, as is clear from what is given just below.

la: Sive substantiis, supple creatis. — Mox cod. W *secunda* loco *alia*.

en: Or "in substances," supply: created. — Just after, codex W reads *secunda* in place of *alia*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus aliis mss. et ed. 1, male omittit *proprie*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other manuscripts and the first edition, wrongly omits *proprie*.

la: Dionys., *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 11. Cfr. supra p. 79. Nota 5.

en: Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 11. Cf. above p. 79, Note 5.

la: Vide Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 2. seqq. et *de Hebdomad.*

en: See Boethius, *On the Trinity* c. 2 sqq. and *On the Hebdomads*.

la: Vat. falso et contra mss. necnon ed. 1 *esse* pro *omne*. — Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 2, ostendit, quod nullum simplex esse possit subiectum accidentium; cuius propositionis explicationem vide apud Alan. ab Insul. *Regul. theolog.*, reg. 12.

en: The Vatican edition falsely, and against the manuscripts and the first edition, has *esse* for *omne*. — Boethius, *On the Trinity* c. 2, shows that no simple [thing] can be the subject of accidents; for the explanation of this proposition see Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, reg. 12.

la: Corrupta lectio Vat. *sive subiecti proprietas* resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1.

en: The corrupt Vatican reading *sive subiecti proprietas* is repaired with the help of the manuscripts and the first edition.

la: Substantiae sive supposita dicuntur creari; accidentia et annexa, inter quae est ipsa creatio passive sumta, dicuntur concreari. Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *enim*.

en: Substances or supposits are said to be created; accidents and what is annexed [to them] — among which is creation itself taken passively — are said to be con-created. Cf. II *Sent.* d. 1 p. I a. 3 q. 2. — Just after, on the faith of the older manuscripts and of the first edition, we have added *enim*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut H T cum edd. 1, 4, 5 *habeat*.

en: Some codices such as H, T, with editions 1, 4, 5, read *habeat*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut H I aa bb addunt *sic*.

en: Several codices such as H, I, aa, bb add *sic*.

la: Vide Boeth., *de Unitate et Uno.*

en: See Boethius, *On Unity and the One*.

la: Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *brevius* loco *verius*, et paulo infra *Sed* pro *Et*.

en: From the older manuscripts and from the first edition we have substituted *brevius* in place of *verius*, and a little below *Sed* for *Et*.

la: Ita plurimi codd. ut A C F H K R S T U cc ee cum edd. 1, 2, 3; Vat. *quo*. Refertur *qua* ad *compositio*.

en: Thus most codices, such as A C F H K R S T U cc ee, with editions 1, 2, 3; the Vatican reads *quo*. *Qua* refers back to *compositio*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum et ed. 1 omittit minus bene *principiis*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut E F H I K Q X Z *creaturis* pro *creatis*.

en: The Vatican with codex cc, against the trust of the others and the first edition, less well omits *principiis*. A little earlier several codices, such as E F H I K Q X Z, read *creaturis* in place of *creatis*.

la: Id est substantia completa, cui opponitur accidens. — Paulo infra fide plurium mss. ut H T aa bb ee et ed. 1 post *iterum* posuimus *omne* loco *esse*; codd. aa bb habent *omne*.

en: That is, a complete substance, to which accident is opposed. — A little below, on the faith of several manuscripts such as H, T, aa, bb, ee, and of the first edition, we have placed *omne* after *iterum* in place of *esse*; codices aa, bb read *omne*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et quinque primarum edd. *et* pro *sit*. Mox codd. A C G L O R S X aa bb habent *sicut etiam* pro *sit etiam*.

en: The Vatican, without the authority of the manuscripts and of the five earliest editions, reads *et* for *sit*. Just after, codices A C G L O R S X aa bb read *sicut etiam* in place of *sit etiam*.

la: Faventibus multis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *privat* loco *privet*.

en: With many manuscripts and the first edition in favor, we have substituted *privat* in place of *privet*.

la: Ita codd. H K cum Vat., in qua lectione verba *esse dependens* referas ad subiectum *omnia alia sunt*; ceteri codd. cum ed. 1 ponunt *omne dependens*, sed minus congrue, etiamsi suppleas verbum *est*, ob mutationem subiecti; utraque lectio non caret difficultate grammaticali.

en: Thus codices H, K with the Vatican, in which reading the words *esse dependens* are to be referred to the subject *omnia alia sunt*; the other codices with the first edition put *omne dependens*, but less congruously — even if you supply the verb *est* — because of the change of subject; each reading is not without grammatical difficulty.

la: Libr. II. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Seraphicus ait: *Omne dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem, quia differt quo est et quod est.* — Explicationem huius accipe a B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tract. 4. q. 20. m. 2: *In principiis etiam substantiae non potest esse simplicitas, quia licet ex aliis principiis substantiae non componantur, tamen aliud habent hoc quod sunt, et aliud quo principia substantiae sunt; hoc enim quod sunt, res quaedam et substantiae sunt, quia ex non substantiis non fit substantia, ut dicit Philosophus. Eo autem quo principia substantiae sunt, utrumque principiorum dependentiam habet ad alterum. Materia... ad formam ut ad actum, et forma ad materiam ut ad id in quo habet esse distinctum... Similiter dicendum est de componentibus.* — Libr. I. *Sent.* d. 8. a. 24. ad hanc obiectionem: *relatio creaturae ad Creatorem est quid extrinsecum, adeoque non facit creaturae compositionem*, respondet: *Dicendum, quod sola relatio ad causam efficientem non facit eis compositionem, sed hoc quod relinquitur in eis ex tali exitu in esse... ex hoc ipso, quod res exit in esse post nihil, remanet potentia tendendi in nihil, nisi contineatur ab alio.*

en: Book II *Sent.* d. 3 p. I a. 1 q. 1 in corp. The Seraphic [Doctor] says: *Everything dependent by that very fact falls into some composition, because that-by-which-it-is and that-which-it-is differ in it.* — For the explanation of this take B. Albert, *Summa* p. I tract. 4 q. 20 m. 2: *In the principles even of substance simplicity cannot be, because, although they are not composed out of other principles of substance, yet they have one [thing] in that which they are, and another by which they are principles of substance; for that which they are, they are a certain reality and substances, since substance is not made from non-substances, as the Philosopher says. But by that by which they are principles of substance, each of the principles has a dependence on the other. Matter... [stands] to form as to its act, and form to matter as to that in which it has its distinct being... The like is to be said of [other] composing things.* — Book I *Sent.* d. 8 a. 24, to this objection — *the creature's relation to the Creator is something extrinsic, and thus does not constitute composition in the creature* — he replies: *It must be said that the relation alone to the efficient cause does not produce composition in them, but that which is left in them from such a going-forth into being... by this very fact, that a thing goes forth into being after nothing, there remains in it a potency of tending toward nothing, unless it is held back by another.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In responsione dicitur, quod compositio ex partibus essentialibus, scil. materia et forma, est «in omnibus per se entibus». His verbis S. Bonav. tangit illam opinionem, quod etiam in Angelis sit aliquo modo spiritualis materia et forma. Hic modus loquendi et ante et post S. Thomam in scholis fuit receptus et approbatus; nunc vero est obsoletus, immo multis immerito est lapis offensionis. Quo sensu haec locutio ab ipso S. Bonav., Alex. Hal. et aliis multis intellecta sit, alibi dicetur; cfr. interim II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1., et d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 61. m. 1; ibid. q. 20. m. 2. § 1.

**II.** Duae exhibentur quaestionis solutiones. In prima enumerantur quinque genera compositionis; aliud sextum genus, quod est ex genere et differentia, infra (q. 4. huius dist.) specialiter explicatur. — Secundum modum dicendi S. Doctor declarat veriorem, cui consentit S. Thom., S. I. q. 3. a. 7. et 8.

**III.** Celebris est distinctio inter *quod est* et *quo est*, sive inter essentiam et existentiam. Sumta est haec distinctio ex Boethii libro *de Hebdomad.*, vel potius ex commentario, quem Gilbertus Porretanus in hoc opusculum scripsit. Deus quidem est et sua essentia et suum esse, ut dicit sententia communis, sed in creatura esse (existentia) non est id quod existit, sed quo essentia existit. Haec distinctio ab omnibus admittitur, sed de natura eiusdem fuit et est controversia. Nominales volunt, hanc distinctionem esse solius rationis; pluralitas Thomistarum, eam esse realem; Scot. vero (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. et d. 3. q. 3.) tenet hic suam distinctionem formalem. Seraphicus Doctor in his duabus quaestionibus naturam huius distinctionis explicite non determinat, tamen verba eius valde conveniunt cum verbis S. Thomae. Trigosus (S. q. 3. a. 2. dub. 4.) putat, S. Bonaventuram docere realem distinctionem inter esse et essentiam creaturae, sed non tanquam inter duas res, sed sicut inter rem et actum sive modum eiusdem; insuper ipsum S. Thomam et etiam Scotum in eandem fere sententiam convenire asserit. Cfr. circa hanc controversiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 12. m. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., Quodl. 1. q. 8. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Chart., hic q. 7, ubi retractat id quod prius pro distinctione reali in sensu multorum Thomistarum scripserat; Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2.

**IV.** Tangitur in hac et sequenti quaestione alia celebris controversia de distinctione, quae est in Deo inter essentiam et attributa et inter ipsa attributa, utrum scil. haec sit solummodo rationis ratiocinantis, ut dicunt Nominales, an sit formalis in sensu Scoti (hic q. 4.), an virtualis sive fundamentalis, ut vult S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 2. q. unic. a. 2. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 4.). Sententiae Angelici S. Bonav. quoad distinctionem inter essentiam divinam et attributa absoluta omnino consentit. Distinctionem enim virtualem in sensu S. Thom. ipse egregie explicat infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.; cfr. etiam d. 22. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et ad 3; d. 27. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; d. 34. q. 2. in corp.; d. 35. q. 2. in corp.; d. 7. q. 4, et in hac nostra dist. p. I. q. 1; p. II. q. 1. et. 2. — Etiam in illa quaestione connexa, utrum distinctio virtualis iam sufficiat ad verificanda contradictoria de eadem re, S. Bonav. videtur stare potius a parte scholae S. Thomae, quae hoc affirmat, quam Scoti, quae hoc negat. Dicit enim S. Bonav. (infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5.), quod «quantulacumque differentia rationis sufficit ad affirmationem et negationem», quod notandum pro doctrina de SS. Trinitate. Cfr. etiam d. 8. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; d. 19. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4; d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; d. 35. a. 1. q. 3; d. 43. q. 1. ad 3.

Alia vero quaestio est de distinctione inter relationes et essentiam divinam, quam S. Doctor expressis verbis affirmat esse maiorem quam illam, quae est inter attributa absoluta et essentiam, et inter attributa haec ad invicem, eamque tanquam tertium divisionis membrum et medium exhibet, dum agit de triplici divisione eorum, quae tantum ratione differant; vide infra d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. et 3, et d. 22. q. 4. Haec secunda species a Seraphico distincta, ut vult Bruliffer, dedit occasionem Scoto suam excogitandi distinctionem formalem. De sententia S. Bonaventurae cfr. d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion ad d. 26. q. 1.

Circa distinctionem virtualem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 52. m. 1, et q. 56. m. 7. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. d. 3. a. 4, et hic a. 3. i. 5. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. — Ægid. R., I. Sent. d. 2. 1. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 31; et Quodl. 5. q. 1. — Durand., d. 2. q. 2. et 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

**V.** In conclusione principali conveniunt omnes: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 5. m. 3; p. II. q. 12. per totam. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 5. a. 1. et 2.; S. 1. q. 3. a. 7. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. — Biel, hic q. 7. dub. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the response it is said that the composition out of essential parts, namely matter and form, is «in all beings per se». By these words St. Bonaventure touches on that opinion, that even in the Angels there is in some way spiritual matter and form. This way of speaking, both before and after St. Thomas, was received and approved in the schools; but now it is obsolete, indeed for many it is undeservedly a stone of offense. In what sense this expression was understood by St. Bonaventure himself, Alexander of Hales, and many others, will be said elsewhere; cf. meanwhile II *Sent.* d. 3 p. I a. I q. 1, and d. 17 a. 1 q. 2. — Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. II q. 61 m. 1; ibid. q. 20 m. 2 § 1.

**II.** Two solutions of the question are presented. In the first, five genera of composition are enumerated; another, sixth, genus — which is from genus and difference — is specially explained below (q. 4 of this distinction). — The second way of speaking the Holy Doctor declares more true, with which St. Thomas agrees, *Summa* I q. 3 a. 7 and 8.

**III.** Famous is the distinction between *quod est* and *quo est*, that is, between essence and existence. This distinction is taken from Boethius' book *de Hebdomad.*, or rather from the commentary which Gilbert of Poitiers wrote on that little work. God indeed is both his own essence and his own being, as the common sentence holds; but in the creature being (existence) is not that which exists, but that by which the essence exists. This distinction is admitted by all, but concerning its nature there has been and is controversy. The Nominalists hold this distinction to be one of reason only; the majority of the Thomists, that it is real; Scotus indeed (II *Sent.* d. 1 q. 2 and d. 3 q. 3) here holds his own formal distinction. The Seraphic Doctor in these two questions does not explicitly determine the nature of this distinction, yet his words agree very well with the words of St. Thomas. Trigosus (*Summa* q. 3 a. 2 dub. 4) thinks that St. Bonaventure teaches a real distinction between being and essence in the creature, but not as between two things, but as between a thing and an act or a mode of the same; further, he asserts that St. Thomas himself and also Scotus come to almost the same view. Cf. concerning this controversy Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. II q. 12 m. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, *Quodl.* 1 q. 8. — Aegidius Romanus, here princ. 1 q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7, where he retracts what he had earlier written for the real distinction in the sense of many Thomists; Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 28 q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 2.

**IV.** In this and in the following question another famous controversy is touched on, concerning the distinction which is in God between essence and the attributes and among the attributes themselves — whether, namely, this is only of reasoning reason (*rationis ratiocinantis*), as the Nominalists say; or whether it is formal in the sense of Scotus (here q. 4); or whether it is virtual or fundamental, as St. Thomas holds (I *Sent.* d. 2 q. unica a. 2, 3; *Summa* I q. 13 a. 4). St. Bonaventure consents entirely to the view of the Angelic Doctor concerning the distinction between the divine essence and the absolute attributes. For he excellently explains the virtual distinction in St. Thomas's sense below at d. 45 a. 2 q. 1 in corp.; cf. also d. 22 a. 1 q. 2 in corp. and ad 3; d. 27 p. I a. 1 q. 3; d. 34 q. 2 in corp.; d. 35 q. 2 in corp.; d. 7 q. 4, and in this our distinction p. I q. 1; p. II q. 1 and 2. — Also in that connected question, whether the virtual distinction by itself suffices to verify contradictories of the same thing, St. Bonaventure seems rather to stand on the side of the school of St. Thomas, which affirms this, than on Scotus's side, which denies it. For St. Bonaventure says (below d. 34 a. 1 q. 1 ad 5) that «however small a difference of reason suffices for affirmation and negation», which is to be noted for the doctrine on the Holy Trinity. Cf. also d. 8 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1; d. 19 p. II a. 1 q. 2 ad 4; d. 28 a. 1 q. 1 in corp.; d. 35 a. 1 q. 3; d. 43 q. 1 ad 3.

Another question, however, is concerning the distinction between the relations and the divine essence, which the Holy Doctor expressly affirms to be greater than that which is between the absolute attributes and the essence, and between the attributes among themselves; and he presents it as the third member and the middle of the division, while treating of the threefold division of those things which differ only by reason; see below d. 26 q. 1 ad 2 and 3, and d. 22 q. 4. This second species, distinguished by the Seraphic Doctor, as Bruliffer holds, gave occasion to Scotus to devise his formal distinction. On the view of St. Bonaventure cf. d. 13 q. 3 and the Scholion to d. 26 q. 1.

Concerning the virtual distinction cf. Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 52 m. 1, and q. 56 m. 7 a. 2. — B. Albert, *Summa* p. I d. 3 a. 4, and here a. 3 i. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I *Sent.* d. 2 q. 1 a. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 2 a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, I *Sent.* d. 2 princ. 1 q. 2, 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 31; and *Quodl.* 5 q. 1. — Durandus, d. 2 q. 2 and 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 2 q. 2.

**V.** In the principal conclusion all agree: Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 5 m. 3; p. II q. 12 throughout. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 5 a. 1 and 2; *Summa* 1 q. 3 a. 7, 8. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 6 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3 q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7. — Biel, here q. 7 dub. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum anima rationalis sit tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte ipsius.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus[^1] dicit, quod sicut Deus est in maiori mundo, sic anima in minori: sed Deus sic est in maiori, quod in qualibet parte totus: ergo anima sic est in minori, scilicet in corpore.

2. Item, quod dat esse toti et partibus unitur toti et partibus secundum essentiam, quia forma per sui essentiam dat esse, et hoc non nisi ei cui essentialiter unitur[^2]; sed anima dat esse toti corpori et omnibus partibus: ergo etc.

3. Item, in oculo est videre, est sentire, est vivere[^3]. Quaero ergo, utrum sint haec unus actus vel differentes. Non unus; hoc constat, quia, privato visu, adhuc sentit per tactum, privato sensu, adhuc vivit, sicut in paralytico; cum ergo vivere sit a substantia, videre a potentia, in oculo est anima secundum substantiam; eadem ratione potest probari, et in omnibus partibus esse[^4].

4. Item, anima operatur in toto corpore, ergo in toto corpore[^5] est per potentiam; sed potentia animae simplex est: ergo si potentia una est in manu et pede, idem est in diversis partibus; sed non est simplicior potentia quam substantia: ergo etc.

5. Item, anima est in corpore: aut ergo[^6] est in qualibet parte, aut est in una determinate, aut est in puncto. Si in qualibet parte, habeo propositum. Si in una, cum illa habeat plures partes, et anima sit simplex, erit in pluribus partibus: ergo non est inconveniens, animam esse in pluribus partibus. Sed qua ratione est[^7] in partibus partis, eadem ratione est in partibus totius. Si est in puncto corporis[^8], ergo cum punctus non habeat proportionem ad totum corpus, anima est improportionabilis toti corpori: ergo non potest esse perfectio, cum proportio sit perfectionis ad perfectibile[^9]. Similiter, « punctus est substantia posita » sive habens positionem, ergo anima habet situm in corpore; sed nulla forma situalis est motor sufficiens: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Forma, quae est in toto et in partibus una, denominat partes et totum ratione consimili[^10]. Unde quaelibet pars ignis est ignis: ergo si anima est in qualibet parte, tunc quaelibet pars animalis est animal sicut totum[^11], cum quaelibet pars sit substantia animata sensibilis.

2. Item, existentia animae rationalis non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis, cum sit fixa in se: ergo non est in qualibet[^12].

3. Item, operatio eius non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis nec alicui communicatur: ergo in nulla parte corporis est, nec in quantum perfectio, nec in quantum motor. Unde Philosophus[^13] dicit, quod « anima nullius corporis est actus », id est nullius partis corporis, sed in quo est, est sicut actus.

4. Item, corpus organicum[^14] est diversarum rationum in partibus et toto, ergo habet diversam perfectionem: ergo cum anima perficiat totum quantum ad essentiam, perficit partes quantum ad potentiam: ergo anima rationalis non est in partibus nisi solum

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quantum ad rationem potentiae; et hoc etiam dicit Philosophus[^15]: « Sicut anima ad corpus, sic partes animae ad partes corporis ».

5. Item, si anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ergo tota est in manu; sed quando aliquod totum est in aliquo, movetur illo moto[^16]: ergo mota manu, movetur anima, et similiter, manu quiescente, quiescit: ergo cum manus una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una et eadem numero simul quiescit et movetur secundum idem.

6. Item, si anima est in pluribus partibus[^17] tota, qua ratione in tribus, eadem ratione in pluribus, et ita in infinitis, et quantumcumque extendatur corpus: ergo anima nata est esse ubique, et ita videtur, quod anima non sit substantia limitata, sed infinita.

7. Item, si tota anima est in manu sicut in aliis partibus: ergo cum vita sit ab[^18] anima, non magis recipit motum et sensum manus a corde, quam e converso. Hoc autem est contra omnes philosophos[^19]; et sequitur ex hoc tale inconveniens, quod, sicut laeso corde perit vita, ita laesa manu.

> **Conclusio.** Anima rationalis est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod anima secundum essentiam est in aliqua parte determinate, secundum potentiam vero est et influit in toto corpore, sicut aranea est in tela[^20]. Unde dixerunt, quod est in corde, quia cor est domicilium vitae, et eius inhabitator est anima. Et ad hoc ponendum movit eos experimentum cum defectu rationis. Experimentum, quia visibiliter apparet, quod laeso corde separatur anima, et ab ipso fluit[^21] sensus et motus, et est membrum nobile existens in medio, sicut centrum corporis. Defectus rationis, quia non potuerunt intelligere, quomodo aliquid limitatum sit unum et idem totum in pluribus; et quia fides non cogit credere, et ratio non intelligit, ideo dicunt, non esse ponendum, quod sit in toto ratione cuiuslibet partis.

Sed aliorum opinio est, ut Augustini[^22], quod anima in qualibet parte corporis sit tota; et ad hoc ponendum movet experimentum, exemplum et rationabile argumentum. Experimentum, quia anima in partibus distantibus a corde ita cito sentit, sicut et in propinquis; item[^23] simul quasi in ictu oculi sentit laesionem in partibus distantibus, et cum anima separatur, dolor est in singulis partibus et resolutio. Exemplum similiter movet, sicut dicit Augustinus[^24]: « Videmus enim quod uno animali perfecte sano est una sanitas in singulis partibus, nec maior in maiori nec minor in minori ». Si ergo hoc est in forma corporali, quanto magis in spirituali? Rationis argumentum movet, quia anima est forma simplex et motor sufficiens. Quia forma totalis corporis, est in toto; quia vero simplex, non est secundum partem et partem sui; quia motor sufficiens, ideo non habet situm, et ideo nec est in puncto nec in parte determinata. Et quia magis rationalis est opinio, quae fundatur supra[^25] rationem, quam quae fundatur supra defectus rationis, et quia Augustinus hoc dicit, hanc approbo tanquam meliorem.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: *forma quae est in toto* etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est genus formae. Est enim quaedam, quae perficit et extenditur et dependet. Et haec, quia totum perficit, est in toto; quia vero extenditur, perfectionem totius communicat partibus; quia vero dependet nec agit per se, operationem totius communicat partibus, ut patet in forma ignis, quia quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaelibet calefacit. Est alia[^26] forma, quae perficit et dependet, sed non extenditur; et ta-

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lis forma, quia totum perficit, est in toto et qualibet parte: quia vero non extenditur, ideo actum[^27] totius non attribuit partibus: quia vero dependet, operationem totius communicat partibus; et talis est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, quia nulla pars animalis est animal, tamen quaelibet pars animalis vivit et sentit. Est iterum[^28] forma, quae totum perficit, tamen nec extenditur nec dependet quantum ad operationem; et talis, quia perfectio est, est in toto et partibus; quia vero non extenditur, perfectionem totius non communicat partibus: quia non dependet, ideo[^29] nec operationem communicat: et talis est anima rationalis, quia nulla pars hominis est homo, et nulla pars hominis intelligit. Tamen etsi non communicet[^30] actum totius ut toti, communicat ut partibus; quia quaelibet pars est pars hominis et vivificatur a perfectione hominis; et ideo perfectio hominis est in qualibet parte.

*Ad 3.* Et sic patet responsio ad illud, quod *nullius corporis est actus*; quia nulli parti corporis[^31] communicat propriam operationem nec perfectionem totius, tamen omnes partes perficit in toto. Similiter ad aliud de forma, quia forma, quae est in partibus, non denominat similiter[^32] totum et partes, nisi sit forma dependens et extensa; et loquor hic de forma substantiali tantum, non de accidentali.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sunt eiusdem rationis totum et partes; dicendum, quod in partibus est considerare organizationem et complexionem. Ratione complexionis sunt uniformes toti et sunt dispositae ad idem genus vitae et perficiuntur ab uno; ratione[^33] organizationis sunt diversae et perficiuntur a potentiis.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[^34] *movetur, mota manu* etc.; dicendum, quod perfectio potest super totum perfectibile et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad potentiam; et cum anima sit perfectio totius corporis, super totum potest, et ideo nullo minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia nec potentia; definitur autem corpore suo, quod perficit, et ideo corpore moto, movetur per consequens; partibus autem non definitur, quia sunt minores toto, et ita est in una, quod est extra illam[^35]. Et ideo, quia in nulla parte est definitive, non movetur ad motum alicuius partis, sicut nec Deus movetur ad motum alicuius creaturae.

*Ad 6.* Et per hoc patet sequens, quia totum corpus comparatur ipsi animae tanquam unus locus; et ideo in pluribus partibus non est nisi in quantum in uno loco; unde si separentur, non erit in illis. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod sit infinita, quia « omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti »[^36], et ita corporis humani. Unde potest cogitari tam magnum corpus, quod non posset vivificari ab anima.

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod tunc una pars non recipit ab alia; dicendum, quod sicut Deus in maiore mundo immediate est in omni creatura ipsam continens, tamen per[^37] ordinem universi influit aliquid una creatura in aliam; sic intelligendum, quod anima per sui praesentiam est in qualibet parte immediate, quam continet et conservat, non tamen omnino, sed influit in omnes partes per unam: et ideo cessante illa parte et eius influentia, perit ordo corporis essentialis, et ita anima separatur.

english:
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### Question III. *Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in every part of it.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the rational soul is in the whole body in such a way that it is in every part. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. Augustine[^1] says that as God is in the greater world, so the soul is in the lesser: but God is in the greater world in such a way that he is whole in every part: therefore the soul is so in the lesser, namely in the body.

2. Likewise, that which gives being to the whole and to the parts is united to the whole and to the parts according to essence, because a form by its essence gives being, and this only to that to which it is essentially united[^2]; but the soul gives being to the whole body and to all its parts: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, in the eye there is seeing, there is sensing, there is living[^3]. I ask therefore whether these are one act or different acts. Not one; this is clear, because, when sight is removed, it still senses by touch; when sense is removed, it still lives, as in a paralytic; since therefore living is from the substance, seeing from a power, in the eye the soul is according to substance; by the same reasoning it can be proved to be also in all the parts[^4].

4. Likewise, the soul operates in the whole body; therefore in the whole body[^5] it is through power; but the power of the soul is simple: therefore if one power is in the hand and the foot, the same [power] is in diverse parts; but a power is not simpler than a substance: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the soul is in the body: therefore either[^6] it is in every part, or it is determinately in one, or it is in a point. If in every part, I have the proposition. If in one, since that has several parts, and the soul is simple, it will be in several parts: therefore it is not unfitting that the soul be in several parts. But for whatever reason it is[^7] in the parts of a part, by the same reason it is in the parts of the whole. If it is in a point of the body[^8], then since a point has no proportion to the whole body, the soul is unproportionable to the whole body: therefore it cannot be the perfection [of the body], since proportion belongs to a perfection with respect to the perfectible[^9]. Likewise, « a point is a substance having position », or having a position, therefore the soul has a place in the body; but no situated form is a sufficient mover: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. A form which is one in the whole and in the parts denominates the parts and the whole by a like account[^10]. Whence every part of fire is fire: therefore if the soul is in every part, then every part of an animal is an animal as the whole is[^11], since every part is an ensouled sensible substance.

2. Likewise, the existence of the rational soul does not depend on any part of the body, since it is fixed in itself: therefore it is not in every [part][^12].

3. Likewise, its operation does not depend on any part of the body, nor is it communicated to any: therefore it is in no part of the body, neither as perfection, nor as mover. Whence the Philosopher[^13] says that « the soul is the act of no body », that is, of no part of the body, but it is in that in which it is, as an act.

4. Likewise, the organic body[^14] is of diverse accounts in its parts and in the whole; therefore it has diverse perfection: therefore since the soul perfects the whole as to essence, it perfects the parts as to power: therefore the rational soul is not in the parts except only

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as to the account of power; and this also the Philosopher[^15] says: « As the soul is to the body, so the parts of the soul are to the parts of the body ».

5. Likewise, if the soul is whole in every part of the body, then it is whole in the hand; but when some whole is in something, it is moved when that is moved[^16]: therefore when the hand is moved, the soul is moved, and likewise, when the hand is at rest, the soul is at rest: therefore since one hand can be moved, while the other is at rest, one and the same soul numerically is at once at rest and moved according to the same.

6. Likewise, if the soul is whole in many parts[^17], by whatever reason in three, by the same reason in more, and thus in infinite, and however much the body is extended: therefore the soul is by nature to be everywhere, and so it seems that the soul is not a limited substance, but infinite.

7. Likewise, if the whole soul is in the hand as in the other parts: then since life is from[^18] the soul, the hand does not receive motion and sense from the heart more than conversely. But this is against all philosophers[^19]; and there follows from this such an inconvenience, that, as when the heart is injured life perishes, so [it should perish] when the hand is injured.

> **Conclusion.** The rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in every part.

**I respond:** It must be said that some say that the soul according to essence is determinately in some part [of the body], but according to power it is and influences in the whole body, as a spider is in its web[^20]. Whence they said that it is in the heart, because the heart is the dwelling-place of life, and its inhabitant is the soul. And experience together with a defect of reason moved them to posit this. Experience, because it visibly appears that, when the heart is injured, the soul is separated, and from it flows[^21] sense and motion, and it is the noble member existing in the middle, as the center of the body. Defect of reason, because they could not understand how something limited could be one and the same whole in many; and because faith does not compel us to believe it, and reason does not understand it, therefore they say it must not be posited that it is in the whole by reason of every part.

But the opinion of others is, as of Augustine's[^22], that the soul is whole in every part of the body; and to posit this, experience, an example, and a reasonable argument move [them]. Experience, because the soul senses as quickly in parts distant from the heart as in parts near; likewise[^23] it senses, at once as it were in the twinkling of an eye, an injury in distant parts, and when the soul is separated, there is pain in each part and dissolution. Example likewise moves, as Augustine says[^24]: « For we see that in one perfectly healthy animal there is one health in each of the parts, neither greater in the greater nor lesser in the lesser ». If therefore this is so in a corporeal form, how much more in a spiritual one? The argument from reason moves, because the soul is a simple form and a sufficient mover. Because it is the total form of the body, it is in the whole; because it is simple, it is not according to part and part of itself; because a sufficient mover, therefore it has no place, and therefore it is neither in a point nor in a determinate part. And because the more rational opinion is that which is founded upon[^25] reason, than that which is founded upon defects of reason, and because Augustine says this, I approve this one as the better.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1, 2.* To that therefore which is objected to the contrary: *the form which is in the whole* etc.; it must be said that there are three kinds of form. For there is a certain one which perfects and is extended and depends. And this, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole; because it is extended, communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; because it depends and does not act per se, communicates the operation of the whole to the parts, as is evident in the form of fire, because every part of fire is fire and every [part] heats. There is another[^26] form, which perfects and depends, but is not extended; and such a

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form, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in every part: but because it is not extended, therefore it does not attribute the act[^27] of the whole to the parts: but because it depends, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; and such is the vegetable and sensible soul, because no part of an animal is an animal, yet every part of an animal lives and senses. There is again[^28] a form which perfects the whole, yet is neither extended nor depends as to operation; and such [a form], because it is a perfection, is in the whole and in the parts; because it is not extended, does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts: because it does not depend, therefore[^29] it does not communicate operation either: and such is the rational soul, because no part of a man is a man, and no part of a man understands. Yet even if it does not communicate[^30] the act of the whole to the whole [as such], it does communicate [it] to the parts; because every part is a part of a man and is vivified by the perfection of a man; and therefore the perfection of a man is in every part.

*To 3.* And thus the answer is evident to that [objection], that *it is the act of no body*; because to no part of the body[^31] does it communicate its proper operation nor the perfection of the whole, yet it perfects all the parts in the whole. Similarly to the other [objection] concerning form: because a form which is in the parts does not denominate the whole and the parts in like manner[^32], unless it be a dependent and extended form; and I speak here only of substantial form, not of accidental.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the whole and the parts are not of the same account; it must be said that in the parts there is to be considered organization and complexion. By reason of complexion they are uniform with the whole and are disposed to the same kind of life and are perfected by one [thing]; by reason[^33] of organization they are diverse and are perfected by powers.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that[^34] *it is moved, when the hand is moved* etc.; it must be said that a perfection has power over the whole perfectible both as to substance and as to power; and since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, it has power over the whole, and therefore its substance and power are bounded by nothing less than the whole body; it is bounded, however, by its own body, which it perfects, and therefore when the body is moved, it is moved consequently; but by the parts it is not bounded, because they are less than the whole, and so it is in one [part] in such a way that it is outside it[^35]. And therefore, because it is in no part definitively, it is not moved by the motion of any part, just as God is not moved by the motion of any creature.

*To 6.* And by this is evident what follows, because the whole body is compared to the soul itself as one place; and therefore it is not in many parts except inasmuch as in one place; whence if they are separated, it will not be in them. Nor does it follow from this that it is infinite, because « of all things constituted by nature there is a limit and account of magnitude and of growth »[^36], and so [also] of the human body. Whence so great a body can be conceived that it could not be vivified by the soul.

*To 7.* To that which is objected last, that then one part does not receive from another; it must be said that, just as God in the greater world is immediately in every creature containing it, yet through[^37] the order of the universe one creature influences another with something; so it is to be understood that the soul, by its presence, is immediately in every part, which it contains and preserves, yet not entirely, but it influences all the parts through one: and therefore when that part and its influence cease, the essential order of the body perishes, and so the soul is separated.

la: Libr. *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 13. in fine. — Mox in propos. minore post *maiori* Vat. repetit *mundo*.

en: Book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 13, near the end. — Soon, in the minor proposition, after *maiori* the Vatican edition repeats *mundo*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 15. et 16. (VII. c. 6.). — De proxime sequente propositione vide II. *de Anima*, text. 4. seqq. et 24. (c. 1. et 2.), ac I. *de Part. animal.* c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VIII *Metaphysics* text 15 and 16 (VII c. 6). — On the immediately following proposition see II *On the Soul*, text 4 ff. and 24 (c. 1 and 2), and I *On the Parts of Animals* c. 1.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis *est*.

en: From very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *est* twice.

la: Supple cum cod. V *patet*. — In fine argumenti post *partibus* cod. Y addit *corporis*.

en: Supply with codex V *patet*. — At the end of the argument, after *partibus*, codex Y adds *corporis*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 minus bene omittit *in toto corpore*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, less well omits *in toto corpore*.

la: Fide plurium mss. ut M T V W X Z etc. et ed. 1 adiecimus *ergo*, et dein post *ergo* *est*.

en: On the trust of many manuscripts such as M T V W X Z etc. and ed. 1 we have added *ergo*, and then after *ergo* [supplied] *est*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et paulo post minus apte omittunt *est*.

en: Very many codices with ed. 1, here and a little later, less aptly omit *est*.

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *ergo est punctus*.

en: Codices aa, bb add *ergo est punctus*.

la: Colligitur ex dicto Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 24 (c. 2.); *Videtur enim actus activorum inesse in patiente et disposito*. — Et text. 26. ait, quod non videatur quodlibet (subiectum) recipere quodlibet (quamlibet formam). — Sequens definitio puncti datur ab Aristot., I. *de Anima*, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.)

en: It is gathered from what Aristotle says, II *On the Soul*, text 24 (c. 2): *For the act of agents seems to inhere in what is acted upon and disposed*. — And at text 26 he says that not just anything (subject) appears to receive just anything (any form). — The following definition of a point is given by Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 68 (c. 4), and V *Metaphysics* text 12 (IV c. 6).

la: Aristot., I. *de Historia animal.* c. 1.

en: Aristotle, I *History of Animals* c. 1.

la: Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, licet plurimi eorum post *pars* omittant *animalis*; Vat. autem cum cod. cc, omissa particula *tunc*, pro *est animal sicut totum* ponit *dicitur animal*.

en: So the ancient codices with ed. 1, although very many of them omit *animalis* after *pars*; but the Vatican edition with codex cc, omitting the particle *tunc*, puts *dicitur animal* for *est animal sicut totum*.

la: Codd. W X addunt *parte*.

en: Codices W, X add *parte*.

la: Lib. II. *de Anima*, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. *de Anima*, text. 6. (c. 4.).

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 11 (c. 1) and III *On the Soul*, text 6 (c. 4).

la: Aliqui codd. ut A I W Y *organizatum*.

en: Some codices such as A, I, W, Y [read] *organizatum*.

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 9. (c. 1.).

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 9 (c. 1).

la: Vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. I. ad opp. 3.

en: See above, d. 8, a. 2, q. I, to the contrary 3.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, hic omittit *partibus* et in fine argumenti *substantia*, ac contra plures codd. ut F H T V Y etc. ponit *ea ratione* loco *eadem ratione*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc — the other codices and ed. 1 opposing — here omits *partibus*, and at the end of the argument *substantia*; and against many codices such as F, H, T, V, Y, etc., it puts *ea ratione* in place of *eadem ratione*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut A C G I R S omittunt *ab*. Cod. T *cum una sit anima*. Codd. L O *sit anima vel ab anima*.

en: Some codices such as A, C, G, I, R, S omit *ab*. Codex T [reads] *cum una sit anima*. Codices L, O [read] *sit anima vel ab anima*.

la: Vide Aristot., III. *de Partib. animal.* c. 3. et 4.

en: See Aristotle, III *On the Parts of Animals* c. 3 and 4.

la: Chalcidius, qui vixit sub initio IV. saec., in Platonis *Timaeum* (ed. Lipsiae, 1876, cura Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, pag. 296. n. CCXX.): *Sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacumque parte de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale positum in media sede cordis, sensuum exordia retinere, ut cum quid nuntiabunt, de proximo recognoscat.* — Vat. *fluit* pro *influit*. Mox post *quia* cod. K addit *sicut dicitur in libro de Motu cordis*. Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 1. (in aliis edd. q. 94.). — De hac opinione cfr. Greg. Nyssen., *de Hominis opificio*, c. 12.

en: Chalcidius, who lived at the beginning of the IV century, on Plato's *Timaeus* (Leipzig ed., 1876, by Dr. Joh. Wrobel, p. 296, n. CCXX): *Just as a spider in the middle of its net holds with its feet all the beginnings of its threads, so that whenever any of the little creatures runs into the snares from any part, it senses it from close at hand, so the soul's principal [part], placed in the middle seat of the heart, retains the beginnings of the senses, so that whenever they report anything, it recognizes it from close at hand.* — The Vatican edition reads *fluit* for *influit*. Then after *quia* codex K adds *sicut dicitur in libro de Motu cordis*. See Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 1 (in other editions q. 94). — On this opinion, cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, c. 12.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *fluit* loco *influit*. — De cordis principatu vide Aristot., III. *de Partib. animal.* c. 4.

en: From very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *fluit* for *influit*. — On the primacy of the heart, see Aristotle, III *On the Parts of Animals* c. 4.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 8; et *de Immort. animae* c. 16. n. 23; ac *de Origine animae* hom. (epist. 166.) n. 4; necnon contra *Epist. Manichaei* c. 16. n. 20. — Mox nonnulli codd. modo inverso *ad hoc movendum ponit*, codd. h O *ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum ponit*; sed cum subnexis haec lectio non cohaeret. Dein plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *rationale* pro *rationabile*. De differentia horum cfr. August., II. *de Ordine*, c. 11. n. 31. seq.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity* c. 6 n. 8; and *On the Immortality of the Soul* c. 16 n. 23; and *On the Origin of the Soul*, homily (epist. 166) n. 4; also against the *Epistle of Manichaeus* c. 16 n. 20. — Then some codices, in inverse manner, [read] *ad hoc movendum ponit*; codices h, O [read] *ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum ponit*; but with what follows this reading does not cohere. Then many codices such as A, F, G, I, K, T etc., with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *rationale* for *rationabile*. On the difference of these, cf. Augustine, II *On Order*, c. 11 n. 31 ff.

la: Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et edd. 1, 6, repetit hic *quia*. Cod. W *et ita*, cod. X *et* loco *item*, aliqui codd. vero ut F T particulam *et* addunt non male post *simul*.

en: The Vatican edition, the older manuscripts and editions 1, 6 opposing, here repeats *quia*. Codex W [reads] *et ita*, codex X [reads] *et* in place of *item*; some codices indeed, such as F, T, not badly add the particle *et* after *simul*.

la: Libr. *de Praesentia Dei* seu *Epistol.* 187. c. 4. n. 13: *Qualitas vero corporis, quae sanitas dicitur, cum sanum corpus est totum, tanta est in maioribus, quanta in minoribus partibus. Non enim quae minus magnae sunt, ideo minus sanae sunt, aut quae ampliores, ideo saniores.* — Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *uno*.

en: Book *On the Presence of God*, or *Letter* 187 c. 4 n. 13: *But the quality of the body which is called health, when the body is sound as a whole, is as great in the larger parts as in the smaller. For those parts which are less large are not for that reason less sound, nor those which are larger therefore more sound.* — From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *uno*.

la: Ed. 1 hic et paulo post *super*. Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 *defectum* loco *defectus*. Dein fide plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. post *rationis* addidimus *et*, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.

en: Ed. 1 here and a little later [reads] *super*. Some codices such as V, Y with ed. 1 [read] *defectum* in place of *defectus*. Then on the trust of very many manuscripts and the first six editions, we have added after *rationis* the word *et*, which the Vatican edition less well omits.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut A B D E G P T Y W *autem* pro *alia*; cod. I *autem alia*.

en: Some codices such as A, B, D, E, G, P, T, Y, W [read] *autem* for *alia*; codex I [reads] *autem alia*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut D G T ff addunt *sive perfectionem*.

en: Some codices such as D, G, T, ff add *sive perfectionem*.

la: Codd. P Q adiiciunt *tertia*.

en: Codices P, Q add *tertia*.

la: Multi codd. ut A C E G H I O R S T U V Y Z ff cum ed. 1 omittunt *ideo*.

en: Many codices such as A, C, E, G, H, I, O, R, S, T, U, V, Y, Z, ff, with ed. 1, omit *ideo*.

la: Subaudi: *parti* vel *partibus*. — Multi codd. ut A C E G L R S U V Y Z cc ff falso post *etsi* omittunt *non*; fere omnes tamen codd. contra Vat. habent *communicet* pro *communicat*. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *est pars* ac post *hominis* particulam *et*.

en: Understand: *parti* or *partibus*. — Many codices such as A, C, E, G, L, R, S, U, V, Y, Z, cc, ff falsely omit *non* after *etsi*; yet nearly all the codices against the Vatican edition have *communicet* for *communicat*. Then the Vatican edition with codex cc — the other codices with ed. 1 opposing — omits *est pars* and after *hominis* the particle *et*.

la: Ex codd. H Y supplevimus *parti corporis*, certe saltem subaudiendum. Ed. 1 vero paulo ante post *nullius* addit *parte*. Sensus responsionis redditur facilior, si ponatur: *quia, etsi nulli parti* etc. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *tamen* loco *cum* et *perficit* pro *perficiat*.

en: From codices H, Y we have supplied *parti corporis*, certainly at least to be understood. But ed. 1, a little before, after *nullius* adds *parte*. The sense of the response is rendered easier if one puts: *quia, etsi nulli parti* etc. — Then on the trust of older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *tamen* for *cum*, and *perficit* for *perficiat*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 *simul* pro *similiter*; cod. I *similiter et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the trust of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *simul* for *similiter*; codex I [reads] *similiter et*.

la: Cod. V addit *vero*.

en: Codex V adds *vero*.

la: Supple cum cod. E: *anima*.

en: Supply with codex E: *anima*.

la: Antiquam lectionem mss. et ed. 1 restituimus ponendo *quod est extra illam* loco *quod non est extra aliam*. Paulo ante cod. W particulae *ita* praefigit *ideo*. — De hac solutione cfr. Aristot., I. *de Anima*, text. 61. (c. 4.).

en: We have restored the ancient reading of the manuscripts and ed. 1 by putting *quod est extra illam* in place of *quod non est extra aliam*. A little before, codex W prefixes *ideo* to the particle *ita*. — On this solution, cf. Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 61 (c. 4).

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 41. (c. 4.). — Immediate post corrupta et falsa lectio Vat. et cod. cc *et ita corpus humanum non potest* resarcitur ex aliis mss. et ed. 1. Mox multorum codd. ut A F G H K T etc. et ed. 1 auctoritate substituimus *posset* loco *possit*.

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 41 (c. 4). — Immediately after, the corrupt and false reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, *et ita corpus humanum non potest*, is repaired from the other manuscripts and ed. 1. Then on the authority of many codices such as A, F, G, H, K, T, etc., and ed. 1 we have substituted *posset* for *possit*.

la: Unus alterve codex ut I cum ed. 1 non male *secundum* loco *per*. Mox codd. O Z *ab* pro *aliquid*.

en: One or two codices such as I, with ed. 1, not badly [read] *secundum* in place of *per*. Then codices O, Z [read] *ab* in place of *aliquid*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Propositio in arg. 1. ad opp., quod forma aliqua denominat partes et totum, vera est, quando agitur de rebus organizatione carentibus, quarum partes sunt proinde omnino homogeneae; sed falsissime applicatur ad corpora organizata, sicut fit in illo sophismate Buridani ad probandum digitum hominis esse hominem. Triplici illa distinctione formarum S. Doctor ad 1. istam difficultatem iam solvit.

**II.** Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 5. hoc notandum. Anima vocatur perfectio totius corporis et corpus perfectibile, quia secundum Aristotelem anima, ut forma substantialis, est actus corporis, unde « super totum potest », i. e. per substantiam suam potest totum corpus vivificare et per potentiam movere. Hoc tamen non excludit, quod magis influat in organa principaliora, uti explicatur in solut. ad 7. Verba: « Ideo nullo minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia », sensum habent, quod anima sit in toto corpore modo definitivo, ut nunc dicitur, non circumscriptivo. Esse in loco circumscriptive dicitur, quando totum locatum est in toto loco, et pars locati in parte loci; quando vero aliquid determinatur quidem ad aliquem locum, ut naturaliter non possit simul esse in alio, et insuper, ut sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte loci, tunc dicitur esse definitive in loco.

**III.** Circa conclusionem omnibus communem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 64. — Scot., De rer. princ. q. 12. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 5. a. 3; S. I. q. 76. a. 8; S. c. Gent. II. c. 72. — B. Albert., hic a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. post medium. — Biel, II Sent. d. 16. q. unic. dub. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The proposition in arg. 1 to the contrary, that some form denominates the parts and the whole, is true when it concerns things lacking organization, whose parts are accordingly altogether homogeneous; but it is most falsely applied to organized bodies, as occurs in that sophism of Buridan for proving that a man's finger is a man. By that threefold distinction of forms the Holy Doctor has already solved this difficulty in [the reply] to 1.

**II.** For the understanding of the solution to 5, this is to be noted. The soul is called the perfection of the whole body, and the body the perfectible, because according to Aristotle the soul, as substantial form, is the act of the body, whence « it has power over the whole », i.e. by its substance it can vivify the whole body and by its power move it. This, however, does not exclude that it influences more in the more principal organs, as is explained in the solution to 7. The words: « Therefore by nothing less than the whole body is its substance bounded » have the sense that the soul is in the whole body in a definitive mode, as it is now said, not circumscriptive. To be in a place circumscriptively is said when the whole located thing is in the whole place, and a part of the located in a part of the place; but when something is determined indeed to some place, such that it cannot naturally be at the same time in another, and moreover, so as to be whole in the whole and whole in every part of the place, then it is said to be definitively in the place.

**III.** Concerning the conclusion common to all, cf. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 64. — Scot., *De rer. princ.* q. 12. a. 3. — S. Thom., *hic* q. 5. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 76. a. 8; *S. c. Gent.* II. c. 72. — B. Albert., *hic* a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., *hic* q. 6. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., *hic* a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., *hic* 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., *hic* q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., *hic* q. 7. post medium. — Biel, *II Sent.* d. 16. q. unic. dub. 1.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere sive praedicamento.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quod distinguitur ab aliis entibus, est aliqua natura determinata; sed Deus est huiusmodi, quia distinguitur a creaturis omnibus, quia nullum creatum est Deus: ergo est natura determinata; sed quod est natura determinata est in genere determinato[^1]: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod habet superius univocum et essentiale, habet esse in genere determinato; sed Deus habet superius se[^2], ut substantiam, quae dicitur de Deo et creaturis et essentialiter et univoce, quia secundum istam rationem quae est, res per se existens: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod sit in quolibet genere, videtur. Quia omne, quod est completionis[^3] in creatura, attribuendum est Deo; sed omne praedicamentum habet aliquid completionis: ergo res omnium praedicamentorum sunt in Deo; sed quidquid est in Deo est Deus, et e converso[^4]: ergo Deus essentialiter subiicitur rei omnis praedicamenti: ergo est in quolibet.

4. Item, summo bono nihil deficit de bonitate: ergo summo enti nihil[^5] de entitate: ergo in Deo est omnis entitas et omnis differentia entitatis: ergo cum differentiae entium sint decem praedicamenta, omnia sunt in Deo.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus in libro quinto *de Trinitate*[^6]: «Deus est bonus sine qualitate, magnus sine quantitate»: ergo magnitudo Dei non est in genere quantitatis nec bonitas in genere qualitatis: ergo nec substantia in genere substantiae: ergo in nullo est[^7].

2. Item, videtur quod non est in genere determinato; quia omne, quod est in genere determinato, habet esse finitum et limitatum; Deus autem est infinitus: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod non in quolibet genere, videtur, quia quod habet in se res plurium generum est compositum; Deus autem est simplicissimus: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Deus nec est in aliquo determinato genere, nec in pluribus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non convenit Deo[^8] esse in uno genere determinato, quia omne tale habet esse limitatum et arctatum et compositum. In pluribus[^9] generibus non potest esse. Aut enim aliquid est in pluribus propter naturarum et proprietatum diversitatem, ut album, in quantum dicit subiectum aliquod sive rem albam, est in genere substantiae, sed in quantum dicit formam, quae est albedo, est in praedicamento qualitatis; aut propter generalitatem, sicut unum et ens.

Propter naturarum multiformitatem[^10] non potest Deus esse in pluribus, quia omne tale compositum est et multiforme, Deus autem simplex. Non propter generalitatem, quia ens tale nihil est habens[^11] distinctum a rebus creatis. Deus autem est habens in se ens distinctum a rebus, et habens esse simplex et infinitum; et ideo nec in uno genere nec in pluribus esse potest.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod distinguitur ab aliis, est natura distincta etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si distinguatur per aliquid, quod ipsum[^12] contrahat et arctet, sicut per differentiam cadentem in genere; Deus autem non sic distinguitur, sed se ipso.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus habet superius univocum; dicendum, quod Deo non est superius, quia[^13] non est simplicius; nec univocum,

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quia illa ratio non convenit uniformiter creaturae et Creatori. Deus enim est ens per se, quia nullo egens; creatura est ens per se, quia non est in alio ut in subiecto, eget tamen alio ad sui conservationem.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne, quod est perfectionis et bonitatis, ponendum est in Deo; dicendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel per[^14] diversitatem, et hoc facit esse in diversis generibus; vel secundum omnimodam unitatem, et hoc facit esse extra omne genus.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deo nihil deficit de bonitate; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur non deficiens a bonitate propter hoc, quod omnis differentia boni particularis sit in Deo per differentiam, sed quia est in eo per aequivalentiam[^15]. Quia enim est summum bonum, complectitur in se bonum omne; sic intelligendum est de entitate; et sic patet illud.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether God is in any determinate genus or predicament.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether God is in any determinate genus. And that he is, is shown thus.

1. That which is distinguished from other beings is some determinate nature; but God is of this sort, since he is distinguished from all creatures, because no creature is God: therefore he is a determinate nature; but what is a determinate nature is in a determinate genus[^1]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that which has something univocal and essential above itself has its being in a determinate genus; but God has above himself[^2] substance, which is said of God and of creatures both essentially and univocally, since according to that account it is a thing existing through itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that he is in every genus appears thus. Because everything that belongs to completion[^3] in a creature is to be attributed to God; but every predicament has something of completion: therefore the realities of all the predicaments are in God; but whatever is in God is God, and conversely[^4]: therefore God is essentially subject to the reality of every predicament: therefore he is in every one.

4. Likewise, to the highest good nothing of goodness is lacking: therefore to the highest being nothing[^5] of entity is lacking: therefore in God is every entity and every difference of entity: therefore, since the differences of beings are the ten predicaments, all are in God.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^6]: «God is good without quality, great without quantity»: therefore the greatness of God is not in the genus of quantity, nor his goodness in the genus of quality: therefore neither his substance in the genus of substance: therefore he is in none[^7].

2. Likewise, it appears that he is not in a determinate genus; because everything that is in a determinate genus has being that is finite and limited; but God is infinite: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that he is not in every genus appears, because that which has in itself the realities of several genera is composite; but God is most simple: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** God is neither in any determinate genus, nor in several.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is not fitting for God[^8] to be in one determinate genus, because every such thing has being that is limited and contracted and composite. In several[^9] genera he cannot be. For either something is in several on account of the diversity of natures and properties — as *white*, insofar as it signifies some subject or white thing, is in the genus of substance, but insofar as it signifies the form, which is whiteness, is in the predicament of quality — or on account of generality, as *one* and *being*.

On account of the multiformity of natures[^10] God cannot be in several, because everything such is composite and multiform, whereas God is simple. Nor on account of generality, because such a being is nothing having[^11] anything distinct from created things. But God is one having in himself a being distinct from things, and having simple and infinite being; and therefore he can be neither in one genus nor in several.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that what is distinguished from others is a distinct nature, etc.; it must be said that this is true, if it be distinguished by something which contracts and constricts it[^12], as by a difference falling within a genus; but God is not so distinguished, but by himself.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that God has something univocal above himself; it must be said that nothing is above God, because[^13] nothing is simpler; nor univocal,

because that account does not apply uniformly to creature and Creator. For God is a being through himself, because needing nothing; a creature is a being through itself, because it is not in another as in a subject, yet it needs another for its conservation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that everything that belongs to perfection and goodness is to be placed in God; it must be said that this can be in two ways: either by[^14] *diversity*, and this causes it to be in diverse genera; or according to entire *unity*, and this causes it to be outside every genus.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that to God nothing of goodness is lacking; it must be said that God is not called non-deficient in goodness on the ground that every difference of particular good is in God by way of difference, but because it is in him by equivalence[^15]. For since he is the highest good, he encompasses in himself every good; the same is to be understood of entity; and so that point is plain.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* in princ., ubi quinque a Scholasticis communiter receptae conditiones pro eo quod aliquid ponatur in genere determinato assignantur, scil. quod sit univocum, quod sit ens incomplexum seu ens per se unum, quod sit ens reale, quod sit universale vel particulare, quod sit ens finitum seu quid determinabile ad specialem modum entis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* at the beginning, where the five conditions commonly received by the Scholastics for something to be placed in a determinate genus are laid down, namely: that it be univocal, that it be an incomplex being or a being one through itself, that it be a real being, that it be universal or particular, that it be a finite being or something determinable to a special mode of being.

la: Plures codd. ut ABDFGKST etc. cum ed. 1 *re* loco *se*.

en: Several codices such as ABDFGKST etc., together with the first edition, read *re* in place of *se*.

la: Hoc est, *perfectionis*. — Cfr. Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 15.

en: That is, *of perfection*. — Cf. Anselm, *Monologion* c. 15.

la: Cfr. Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 4, et Alan. ab Insul., *Regul. theolog.*, reg. 9.

en: Cf. Boethius, *On the Trinity* c. 4, and Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 9.

la: Cod. V et ed. 1 repetunt hic *deficit*.

en: Codex V and the first edition here repeat *deficit*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 2: *Ut sic intelligamus Deum.... sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum*.

en: Chap. 1, n. 2: *That we may so understand God.... good without quality, great without quantity*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.

en: From the more ancient manuscripts and the first edition we have supplied *est*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. addit *etiam*.

en: The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and of the six earliest editions, adds *etiam*.

la: Quae, sicut et *res, aliquid, verum, bonum* propter maximam universalitatem, qua in omnibus generibus implicantur, vocantur *transcendentalia*.

en: Which, like *res, aliquid, verum, bonum*, on account of their highest universality — by which they are implicated in all the genera — are called *transcendentalia* (transcendentals).

la: Vat. *multiplicitatem*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition reads *multiplicitatem*, but against the manuscripts and the first edition.

la: Unus alterve codex ut E V omittit *habens*.

en: One or another codex such as E V omits *habens*.

la: Cod. V *rationem* loco *ipsum*.

en: Codex V reads *rationem* in place of *ipsum*.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *eo*, et paulo post substituimus *illa* pro *substantiae*.

en: On the testimony of the more ancient manuscripts and the first edition we have removed the added *eo* here, and a little after we have substituted *illa* for *substantiae*.

la: Codd. V X *secundum*, et paulo infra cod. T *uniformitatem* loco *unitatem*.

en: Codices V and X read *secundum*, and a little after codex T reads *uniformitatem* in place of *unitatem*.

la: Hoc est, per eminentiam seu eminenter.

en: That is, by way of eminence or eminently.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Genus determinatum, de quo est quaestio, est genus logicum seu praedicamentum, quod praedicatur de pluribus specie differentibus, v. g. substantia. — Aliqui Nominales, ut Gregorius Ariminensis, contra communem et veram sententiam affirmarunt, Deum esse in genere substantiae. Quaestionem S. Doctor duplici conclusione solvit docendo, Deum nec esse in uno determinato genere, nec esse in *pluribus* simul. Quod non sit in *pluribus*, probat per partes: cum enim duplici modo aliquid esse possit in pluribus praedicamentis, neuter modus Deo convenit. Primus modus patet ex littera; secundus modus est «propter generalitatem, sicut unum et ens». Quod ut intelligatur, sciendum, quod *ens, unum, verum, bonum* vocantur *transcendentia*, quia ita ponuntur in omnibus praedicamentis, ut praedicentur quidem de eis, sed non sint aliquod praedicamentum. Non enim haec transcendentia esse habent distinctum a praedicamentis, in quibus ponuntur, v. g. ens in praedicamento substantiae est substantia, in praedicamento quantitatis est quantitas. Unde hic modus minime convenit Deo, qui habet esse omnino determinatum et distinctum a rebus. Hac doctrina eliditur pantheismus.

**II.** Solutio ad 1. eruitur ex distinctione inter naturam determinatam per aliquam differentiam, et determinatam per se ipsam; in primo casu differentia contrahit genus ad aliquam speciem, quae est in aliquo praedicamento; tunc et ipsa natura, sic determinata, est in hoc praedicamento. Aliter dicendum de Deo, qui est actus purissimus, determinatus per se et ideo extra omne praedicamentum. Cfr. Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

**III.** Quoad rem principalem antiqui doctores consentiunt. De sententia S. Thomae, qui in *Commentar.* (hic q. 4. a. 2.), paulo aliter loquitur quam in *Summa* (I. q. 3. a. 5. 7.), cfr. Caietanus ad ult. locum. — Scot. (hic q. 3. n. 20.) non conclusionem, sed tantum eam rationem oppugnat, quae a S. Thom. ex hoc eruitur, quod Deus omnium generum perfectiones in se continet. Tamen Scot. (loc. cit. n. 16.) putat, rationem entis Deo et creaturis univoce convenire, quod quomodo cohaereat cum aliis doctrinis Scoti varie a Scotistis explicatur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 32; S. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 3. in fine. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 26. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 1. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The *determinate genus*, of which the question is, is the logical genus or predicament which is predicated of several things differing in species, e.g. substance. — Some Nominalists, such as Gregory of Rimini, against the common and true opinion affirmed that God is in the genus of substance. The holy Doctor resolves the question with a twofold conclusion, teaching that God is neither in one determinate genus, nor in *several* at once. That he is not in *several*, he proves by parts: for since something can be in several predicaments in a twofold way, neither way is fitting to God. The first way is plain from the text; the second way is "on account of generality, as *one* and *being*". That this may be understood, it must be known that *being, one, true, good* are called *transcendentals*, because they are so placed in all the predicaments that they are indeed predicated of them, but are not any predicament. For these transcendentals do not have being distinct from the predicaments in which they are placed, e.g. *being* in the predicament of substance is substance, in the predicament of quantity is quantity. Hence this mode least of all befits God, who has being altogether determinate and distinct from things. By this doctrine pantheism is refuted.

**II.** The solution to argument 1 is drawn from the distinction between a nature determined through some difference, and one determined through itself; in the first case the difference contracts the genus to some species, which is in some predicament; then that nature, so determined, is in this predicament. Otherwise it must be said of God, who is most pure act, determined through himself and therefore outside every predicament. Cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

**III.** As to the principal matter the ancient doctors agree. On the opinion of St. Thomas, who in the *Commentary* (here q. 4. a. 2.) speaks somewhat otherwise than in the *Summa* (I. q. 3. a. 5. 7.), cf. Cajetan on the latter place. — Scotus (here q. 3. n. 20.) opposes not the conclusion, but only that argument which is drawn by St. Thomas from this, that God contains in himself the perfections of all the genera. Yet Scotus (loc. cit. n. 16.) holds that the account of *being* belongs univocally to God and to creatures, which how it coheres with the other doctrines of Scotus is variously explained by the Scotists. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 2. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 32; S. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 3. at the end. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 26. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 1. 2.

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