title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum actus doni fortitudinis consistat principaliter circa passiones tolerandas, an circa cupiditates reprimendas.*

Quinto quaeritur, quis sit actus proprius doni fortitudinis, et quod eius obiectum; et est quaestio, utrum actus doni fortitudinis principaliter consistat circa passiones tolerandas, an circa cupiditates reprimendas. Et quod principaliter sit circa passiones tolerandas, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Gregorium[^1], qui dicit super principium *Iob,* quod fortitudinis-doni est dare trepidanti confidentiam; sed trepidatio maxime est, quando imminet periculum passionum: ergo videtur, quod circa huiusmodi maxime consistat actus fortitudinis-doni.

2. Item, fortitudo, sive dicatur donum sive virtus, respicit potentiam irascibilem tanquam proprium subiectum[^2]; sed potentia irascibilis magis proprie respicit passionum sustinentiam quam cupiditatum repressionem et abstinentiam: videtur ergo, quod actus principalis doni fortitudinis consistat circa passionum tolerantiam.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad eius oppositum: quia, sicut largitas opponitur avaritiae et cupiditati, sic fortitudo opponitur pusillanimitati[^3]; sed pusillanimitas attenditur circa fugam passionum: ergo videtur econtra, quod fortitudo-donum consistat circa passionum sustinentiam.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad habitum fortitudinis-virtutis: quia fortitudo-donum actum et obiectum debet habere in maiori, vel saltem in tanta excellentia et arduitate, quantam est reperire circa fortitudinem-virtutem; sed maxima arduitas consistit circa passiones: ergo cum circa illas consistat fortitudo-virtus[^4], videtur multo fortius, quod actus doni fortitudinis attendatur, vel consistat in aggressione et tolerantia passionum.

5. Item, inter omnes actus meritorios maxima est difficultas circa passiones sustinendas, et magis ad hoc inepti et infirmi sumus: ergo si dona data sunt nobis ad expediendum et contra infirmitates

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retardantes nos ad bonum[^5], videtur, quod aliquod donum debeat nobis dari ad passionum sustinentiam. Sed non est aliud assignare quam donum fortitudinis: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in libro *de Anima et spiritu*[^6]: «Fortitudinis est non tantum terrenas cupiditates reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci»; sed hoc non est fortitudinis-virtutis: ergo est fortitudinis-doni: videtur ergo, quod actus doni fortitudinis consistat in repressione cupiditatum.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^7], ubi loquitur de donis, dicit, quod «fortitudinis est ab omni transeuntium mortifera iucunditate se ipsum sequestrare»: ergo videtur, quod actus doni fortitudinis principaliter consistat in delectationum repressione.

3. Item, Augustinus[^8] adaptat septem dona septem beatitudinibus, ita quod fortitudo et esuries et sitis iustitiae sibi correspondent; sed esuries et desiderium iustitiae non oritur in nobis nisi per mortificationem desideriorum et voluptatum: ergo videtur, quod circa huiusmodi principaliter consistat actus fortitudinis.

4. Item, fortitudo-donum respondet dono consilii, sicut exsequens regulanti[^9]; sed donum consilii maxime dirigit ad divinorum consiliorum impletionem; divina autem consilia praecipue consistunt circa repressionem desideriorum et occasionum ei adhaerentium, sicut patet in castitate, obedientia et paupertate: ergo videtur, quod circa talium desideriorum repressionem actus fortitudinis-doni principaliter consistat.

5. Item, fortitudo-donum aut habet actum alterius generis quam fortitudo-virtus, aut si in eodem genere habet, necesse est, quod habeat excellentiorem; sed in eodem genere non potest habere excellentiorem, cum fortitudo-virtus consistat circa terribilia, quae inducunt mortem, sicut dicit Philosophus[^10]: ergo necesse est, quod habeat actum alterius generis. Cum ergo actus fortitudinis-virtutis consistat circa passiones tolerandas, videtur, quod actus fortitudinis-doni non circa passiones, sed circa delectationes refrenandas consistat.

Est igitur quaestio, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni fortitudinis, et quare eodem nomine cum habitu virtutis nominatur, quod quidem in nullo aliorum donorum reperitur.

### Conclusio.

> Doni fortitudinis actus principalis consistit circa promptam tolerantiam passionum secundum libertatem consilii et imitationem Christi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod fortitudo, quantum est de sua prima ratione, attenditur respectu ardui. Arduum autem dicitur aliquid dupliciter: aut quia laboriosum et difficile, quodam modo excellens et aggravans facultatem ipsius potentiae; aut quia est ultra necessitatem et excedit statum communem. Et fortitudo habet attendi respectu utriusque, sed respectu primi attenditur et ordinatur secundum necessitatem praecepti, respectu secundi secundum libertatem consilii. Et primum spectat ad fortitudinem-virtutem, secundum vero ad fortitudinem-donum. — Quoniam autem arduitas maxime attenditur circa excellentiam passionum; hinc est, quod tam fortitudinis-doni quam fortitudinis-virtutis est habilitare secundum principalem sui ordinationem ad sufferentiam passionum, sed aliter et aliter: quia sustinere et aggredi passiones potest aliquis aut propter iustitiae et honestatis conservationem, aut propter perfectam Christi imitationem; ita quod primum spectat ad dictamen iuris naturalis et honestatis moralis, secundum vero spectat ad consilium Dei. Et quoniam imitatio Christi attenditur in crucifixione sui, secundum quod ipse dicit Matthaei decimo sexto[^11]: *Qui vult venire post me, abneget semetipsum* etc.; hinc est, quod actus fortitudinis-doni attenditur circa promptam et expeditam passionum tolerantiam, per hoc quod quodam modo nos mundo et mundum nobis crucifigit, iuxta illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Galatas ultimo[^12]: *Mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo.* Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro *de Doctrina christiana*: «Assurgant deinceps ad fortitudinem, ut mundus eis crucifigatur, et ipsi mundo, et ut in huius vitae perversitate et abundantia iniquitatis non refrigescat caritas». — Et sic patet, quod fortitudinis-doni actus consistit circa passionum tolerantiam secundum imitationem Christi; et hic est eius actus principalis, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, quae verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

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1. 2. 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod est circa delectationum repressionem, per auctoritates Augustini; dicendum quod Augustinus in illis auctoritatibus non assignat proprium et principalem actum ipsius fortitudinis-doni, sed quasi praeambulum. Nemo enim promptus est et expeditus ad passionum tolerantiam secundum imitationem Christi, nisi qui carnem suam cum vitiis et concupiscentiis crucifixit[^13].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fortitudo exsequitur ea, ad[^14] quae consilium dirigit; dicendum, quod etsi donum consilii dirigat ad divina consilia implenda, in quibus consistit perfectio religionis, principaliori tamen intentione dirigit ad ea, in quibus plus est de ratione arduitatis; maioris autem arduitatis est Christum imitari in passionibus quam in actionibus: et ideo circa huiusmodi tam consilium quam donum fortitudinis principaliter habet consistere.

5. Ad illud quod ulterius obiicitur, quod donum fortitudinis non potest esse excellentiori modo circa passiones quam virtus fortitudinis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia excellentiori modo sustinet passiones et excellentiori habitu qui sustinet secundum Christi imitationem, quam[^15] propter iustitiae conservationem, et qui sustinet secundum consilii supererogationem, quam secundum praecepti obligationem. In uno enim istorum rectificatur, scilicet in actu virtutis fortitudinis; in alio autem non solum rectificatur, sed etiam altius elevatur et expeditur, scilicet in actu fortitudinis-doni.

Et per hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, videlicet de differentia reali fortitudinis-doni et fortitudinis-virtutis, et de convenientia in nomine. Re enim differunt propter diversitatem modorum habilitandi et ordinandi ad tolerantiam passionum; nomine vero conveniunt, pro eo quod ad eadem passionum genera ordinant[^16]. Fortitudo enim virtus ordinat ad sustinenda qualiacumque et quantacumque tormenta, antequam bonum virtutis et honestatem derelinquat, non tamen ita excellenter et prompte sicut fortitudo-donum. Unde inter omnes virtutes propter excellentiam et arduitatem ex parte obiecti virtus fortitudinis appropinquat donis; et propterea habitus virtutis et doni magis quam alia dona eodem nomine habent censeri, licet differant differentia reali, quia minor est inter illos habitus differentia. — Ex his patet, quis sit actus fortitudinis-doni, et quod obiectum, et quae sit differentia eius respectu aliorum habituum.

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### Question V. *Whether the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in enduring passions, or in repressing desires.*

Fifthly there is inquiry as to what is the proper act of the gift of fortitude, and what its object; and the question is whether the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in enduring passions, or in repressing desires. And that it is principally about enduring passions, seems [thus]:

1. *First,* by Gregory[^1], who says, on the beginning of *Job,* that it belongs to the gift of fortitude to give confidence to the trembling; but trembling is greatest when the danger of passions threatens: therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists chiefly about such [dangers].

2. Likewise, fortitude, whether it be called a gift or a virtue, regards the irascible power as its proper subject[^2]; but the irascible power more properly regards the enduring of passions than the repression and abstinence from desires: it seems therefore that the principal act of the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to its opposite: for, as liberality is opposed to avarice and desire, so fortitude is opposed to pusillanimity[^3]; but pusillanimity is attended to about the flight from passions: therefore it seems conversely that the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the habit of fortitude-as-virtue: for the gift of fortitude ought to have its act and object in a greater, or at least in as great, excellence and difficulty as is to be found about fortitude-as-virtue; but the greatest difficulty consists about the passions: therefore since fortitude-as-virtue consists about them[^4], it seems much more strongly that the act of the gift of fortitude is attended to, or consists, in the attacking and endurance of passions.

5. Likewise, among all meritorious acts the greatest difficulty is about enduring passions, and toward this we are more unfit and infirm: therefore if gifts are given to us for our expediting and against the infirmities

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holding us back from the good[^5], it seems that some gift ought to be given to us for the endurance of passions. But there is no other to assign than the gift of fortitude: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *On the Soul and the Spirit*[^6]: "It belongs to fortitude not only to repress earthly desires, but to forget them utterly"; but this does not belong to fortitude-as-virtue: therefore it belongs to fortitude-as-gift: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of fortitude consists in the repression of desires.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^7], where he speaks of the gifts, says that "it belongs to fortitude to sequester oneself from all the deadly delight of transient things": therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in the repression of delights.

3. Likewise, Augustine[^8] adapts the seven gifts to the seven beatitudes, so that fortitude and the hunger and thirst for justice correspond to each other; but the hunger and desire for justice does not arise in us except through the mortification of desires and pleasures: therefore it seems that the act of fortitude consists principally about such [mortification].

4. Likewise, the gift of fortitude corresponds to the gift of counsel, as the one executing to the one regulating[^9]; but the gift of counsel directs chiefly to the fulfillment of the divine counsels; and the divine counsels consist principally about the repression of desires and of the occasions adhering to them, as is plain in chastity, obedience, and poverty: therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally about the repression of such desires.

5. Likewise, the gift of fortitude either has an act of another genus than fortitude-as-virtue, or, if it has [one] in the same genus, it is necessary that it have a more excellent one; but in the same genus it cannot have a more excellent one, since fortitude-as-virtue consists about terrible things which bring on death, as the Philosopher says[^10]: therefore it is necessary that it have an act of another genus. Since therefore the act of fortitude-as-virtue consists about enduring passions, it seems that the act of fortitude-as-gift consists not about passions, but about restraining delights.

There is therefore the question, what is the act, and what the object, of the gift of fortitude, and why it is named by the same name as the habit of virtue, which indeed is found in none of the other gifts.

### Conclusion.

> The principal act of the gift of fortitude consists about the prompt endurance of passions according to the liberty of counsel and the imitation of Christ.

**I respond:** It must be said that fortitude, as far as concerns its first ground, is attended to with respect to the difficult. But something is called difficult in two ways: either because it is laborious and difficult, in a certain manner exceeding and burdening the faculty of the power itself; or because it is beyond necessity and exceeds the common state. And fortitude has to be attended to with respect to each, but with respect to the first it is attended to and ordered according to the necessity of the precept, with respect to the second according to the liberty of counsel. And the first pertains to fortitude-as-virtue, but the second to fortitude-as-gift. — But since difficulty is most of all attended to about the excellence of the passions; hence it is that it belongs to the gift of fortitude as much as to fortitude-as-virtue to enable [the soul], according to its principal ordering, for the suffering of passions, but in one way and another: for someone can endure and attack passions either for the conservation of justice and honor, or for the perfect imitation of Christ; so that the first pertains to the dictate of natural law and of moral honor, but the second pertains to the counsel of God. And since the imitation of Christ is attended to in the crucifixion of oneself, according as he himself says in Matthew 16[^11]: *Whoever wishes to come after me, let him deny himself* etc.; hence it is that the act of the gift of fortitude is attended to about the prompt and expedited endurance of passions, through this, that in a certain manner it crucifies us to the world and the world to us, according to that which the Apostle says to the Galatians, in the last [chapter][^12]: *The world is crucified to me, and I to the world.* And this is what Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*: "Let them rise up thereafter to fortitude, so that the world may be crucified to them, and they to the world, and that in the perversity of this life and the abundance of iniquity charity may not grow cold." — And so it is plain that the act of the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ; and this is its principal act, as the reasons adduced for the first part show, which conclude the truth, and therefore are to be conceded.

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1. 2. 3. But to that which is objected, that it is about the repression of delights, by the authorities of Augustine; it must be said that Augustine, in those authorities, does not assign the proper and principal act of the gift of fortitude itself, but as it were a preamble. For no one is prompt and expedited for the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ, except him who has crucified his flesh with its vices and concupiscences[^13].

4. To that which is objected, that fortitude executes those things to which[^14] counsel directs; it must be said that, although the gift of counsel directs to the fulfilling of the divine counsels, in which the perfection of religion consists, yet with a more principal intention it directs to those things in which there is more of the character of difficulty; but it is of greater difficulty to imitate Christ in passions than in actions: and therefore about such [passions] both counsel and the gift of fortitude have principally to consist.

5. To that which is further objected, that the gift of fortitude cannot be in a more excellent mode about passions than the virtue of fortitude; it must be said that this is false, because he endures passions in a more excellent mode and by a more excellent habit who endures according to the imitation of Christ, than[^15] [he who endures] for the conservation of justice, and he who endures according to the supererogation of counsel, than [he who endures] according to the obligation of the precept. For in one of these he is set right, namely in the act of the virtue of fortitude; but in the other he is not only set right, but is also more highly elevated and expedited, namely in the act of the gift of fortitude.

And through this is made plain that which was lastly asked, namely concerning the real difference of the gift of fortitude and fortitude-as-virtue, and concerning their agreement in name. For in reality they differ on account of the diversity of the modes of enabling and ordering toward the endurance of passions; but in name they agree, for this reason, that they order toward the same kinds of passions[^16]. For the virtue of fortitude orders toward enduring whatever and however great torments, before it would abandon the good of virtue and honor, yet not so excellently and promptly as the gift of fortitude. Whence among all the virtues, on account of excellence and difficulty on the part of the object, the virtue of fortitude approaches the gifts; and therefore the habit of virtue and of gift, more than the other gifts, are reckoned under the same name, although they differ by a real difference, because there is less difference between those habits. — From these things it is plain what is the act of the gift of fortitude, and what its object, and what is its difference with respect to the other habits.

la: Libr. I. *Moral.* c. 32. n. 44, super *Iob* 1, 4, ait: *Fortitudo in die suo convivium facit, quia, dum adversa non metuit, trepidanti menti cibos confidentiae apponit.* — Pro *super principium Iob* codd. H K Z *super primum Iob.*

en: [Gregory,] *Morals* book I, c. 32, n. 44, on *Job* 1:4, says: "Fortitude makes a banquet on its day, because, while it does not fear adversities, it sets before the trembling mind the food of confidence." — For *super principium Iob* (on the beginning of Job) codices H K Z [read] *super primum Iob* (on the first [book of] Job).

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via quarta) et d. 33. q. 4. in corp. (primus modus) nec non d. 26. a. 2. q. 5, ubi et minor insinuatur. — In fine arg. pro *consistat* multi codd. *consistit.*

en: Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the fourth way) and d. 33, q. 4, in the body (the first mode), and also d. 26, a. 2, q. 5, where the minor [premise] too is intimated. — At the end of the argument, for *consistat* many codices [read] *consistit.*

la: Vide supra pag. 736, nota 8. — In fine arg. pro *sustinentiam* edd. *tolerantiam.*

en: See above p. 736, note 8. — At the end of the argument, for *sustinentiam* the editions [read] *tolerantiam.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 3. — Pro *sed maxima* edd. *sed maxime,* cod. M *sed magis,* et superius pro *quantam est* cod. A N *quanta est.*

en: Cf. above d. 33, dub. 3. — For *sed maxima* the editions [read] *sed maxime,* codex M *sed magis,* and above, for *quantam est* codices A N [read] *quanta est.*

la: Videsis supra d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

en: See above d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

en: [On the Soul and the Spirit,] c. 20.

la: Libr. II. c. 7. n. 10, ubi pro *se ipsum sequestrare* legitur *sese extrahit.* — Pro *ab omni,* quod et textus origin. exhibet, *non* ponunt codd. *ab omnium.*

en: [On Christian Doctrine,] book II, c. 7, n. 10, where for *se ipsum sequestrare* there is read *sese extrahit.* — For *ab omni,* which the original text also exhibits, the codices do not set down *ab omnium.*

la: Libr. I. *de Serm. Domini in monte,* c. 3. n. 10. et c. 4. n. 11, ubi et *minor* insinuatur. De numero septenario beatitudinum, quae hic ponitur pro octonario, cfr. scholion ad d. 36. q. 2. — Pro *correspondent* cod. A *correspondeant.*

en: [Augustine,] book I *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* c. 3, n. 10, and c. 4, n. 11, where the *minor* [premise] too is intimated. On the sevenfold number of the beatitudes, which here is set down for the eightfold, cf. the scholion to d. 36, q. 2. — For *correspondent* codex A [reads] *correspondeant.*

la: Vide supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia in fine). — Quoad minorem vide quaest. praeced.

en: See above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way, at the end). — As to the minor [premise], see the preceding question.

la: Libr. III. *Ethic.* c. 6. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 876, nota 1. — Inferius pro *refrenandas* edd. *rescindendas.* Deinde post *consistat* cod. S addit *immo cum nihil sit terribilius morte, et aggredi mortem est actus fortitudinis-virtutis, et ita im-* [possibile est, donum fortitudinis habere actum praecellentem actum virtutis ei correspondentis. Et si habeat].

en: [Aristotle,] *Ethics* book III, c. 6 f. Cf. above p. 876, note 1. — Below, for *refrenandas* the editions [read] *rescindendas.* Then after *consistat* codex S adds "nay, since nothing is more terrible than death, and to attack death is an act of fortitude-as-virtue, and so it is impossible for the gift of fortitude to have an act excelling the act of the virtue corresponding to it. And if it should have [one]."

la: Vers. 24. — Paulo superius pro *consilium Dei* edd. *consilii donum.*

en: Verse 24. — A little above, for *consilium Dei* (the counsel of God) the editions [read] *consilii donum* (the gift of counsel).

la: Vers. 14. — Augustini sententia (in qua respicitur Gal. 6, 14. et Matth. 24, 12.) non habetur in libro *de Doctrina christ.* (cfr. hic arg. 2. ad oppos.), sed in *Serm.* 347. (alias 17. *de Sanctis*), c. 3. n. 3. — Cod. A *Assurgat... ei crucifigatur.* Idem cod. A paulo inferius pro *passionum tolerantiam* substituit *passionem tolerandam.*

en: Verse 14. — The saying of Augustine (in which Gal. 6:14 and Matt. 24:12 are regarded) is not found in the book *On Christian Doctrine* (cf. here arg. 2 to the contrary), but in *Sermon* 347 (otherwise 17 *On the Saints*), c. 3, n. 3. — Codex A [reads] *Assurgat... ei crucifigatur.* The same codex A, a little below, for *passionum tolerantiam* substitutes *passionem tolerandam.*

la: Codd. A G U *crucifigit.*

en: Codices A G U [read] *crucifigit* (crucifies).

la: In codd. G N P Q V deest *ad.*

en: In codices G N P Q V *ad* (to) is lacking.

la: Cod. M bene supplet *qui sustinet;* edd. hic et paulo inferius post *quam* supplent *qui.* Proxime post, cod. A voci *iustitiae* praefigit *Christi.* Idem cod. A in principio solut. pro *ulterius* habet *ultimo.*

en: Codex M rightly supplies *qui sustinet* (who endures); the editions, here and a little below, after *quam* supply *qui* (who). Immediately after, codex A prefixes *Christi* to the word *iustitiae.* The same codex A, at the beginning of the solution, for *ulterius* has *ultimo.*

la: Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *ordinantur.* In fine solut. cod. B adiicit *et sic patent obiecta.*

en: Very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *ordinantur* (are ordered). At the end of the solution codex B adds *et sic patent obiecta* (and thus the objections are made clear).

latin_scholion:
**I.** «Sicut duplex est actus fortitudinis-virtutis, coordinatus tamen, unde [duplex actus] non diversificat habitum fortitudinis secundum speciem, id est aggredi ardua et sustinere terribilia; ita duplex est actus fortitudinis-doni. Sed fortitudo-virtus negotiatur in arduis et terribilibus, quae proportionantur humanae virtuti nec eam excedunt; fortitudo vero donum in iis quae supergredi videntur vires humanae naturae; praesumit enim de divina virtute, non de sua; sua quippe virtus determinata est ad aliquod genus arduorum et terribilium, sed divina virtus sufficiens est ad omne» (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.). — Ab hac communi doctrina recedit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1.) docens «secundum aliquos», quod «donum fortitudinis non est respectu ardui cuiuscumque, sed tantum respectu ardui mali poenae extremum tenentis in arduitate, cuiusmodi est mortem sustinere pro fidei vel morum veritate promovenda aut defendenda». — S. Bonav. communi doctrinae superaddit, quod actus huius doni principalis versetur circa passionum tolerantiam secundum imitationem Christi. De eadem quaestione praeter laudatos: S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 34. q. 3. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 139. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 11-13.

**II.** Actus pietatis varii communiter a Scholasticis assignantur secundum doctrinam Augustini hic in arg. 3. ad oppos. relatam. S. Thom. in Comment. (loc. cit. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) docet, quod donum pietatis «dirigat in communicationibus omnibus, quae ad alterum sunt»; sed in S. (II. II. q. 121. a. 1.) addit, quod proprie secundum ipsum exhibemus cultum et officium Deo ut patri. Similiter dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.), hoc donum esse «principaliter respectu Dei sub ratione summi patris», sub qua ratione cultus ei exhibeatur. S. Bonav. autem vult, quod principaliter et proprie idem donum attendatur in benevolentia respectu proximi, quatenus gerit imaginem Dei. Similiter dicit B. Albert. (hic a. 16.), quod actus principalis eiusdem sit «benevolenter et sine querela bonum optare et facere omnibus imagine Dei insignitis». Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 1.) dicit generaliter, hoc donum esse in iis «quae exhibentur Deo, vel homini ad promotionem fidei in se, vel in altero».

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english_scholion:
**I.** "Just as the act of fortitude-as-virtue is twofold, yet coordinate, whence [the twofold act] does not diversify the habit of fortitude according to species, namely to attack difficult things and to endure terrible things; so the act of fortitude-as-gift is twofold. But fortitude-as-virtue is occupied in difficult and terrible things which are proportioned to human virtue and do not exceed it; but fortitude-as-gift [is occupied] in those things which seem to surpass the powers of human nature; for it presumes upon divine power, not upon its own; for its own power is determined to some genus of difficult and terrible things, but divine power is sufficient for everything" (so Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, sub-question 2). — From this common doctrine Richard of Mediavilla departs (here a. 3, q. 1), teaching "according to some," that "the gift of fortitude is not with respect to any difficult thing whatever, but only with respect to the difficult evil of penalty holding the extreme in difficulty, of which kind is to endure death for the truth of faith or morals to be promoted or defended." — St. Bonaventure superadds to the common doctrine, that the principal act of this gift is occupied about the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ. On the same question, besides those praised [cited above]: St. Thomas, III Sent. d. 34, q. 3, a. 1; S. II.II q. 139, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 11-13.

**II.** The various acts of piety are commonly assigned by the Scholastics according to the doctrine of Augustine reported here in arg. 3 to the contrary. St. Thomas in his Commentary (loc. cit. a. 2, sub-question 2) teaches that the gift of piety "directs in all the communications which are toward another"; but in the *Summa* (II.II q. 121, a. 1) he adds that properly, according to it, we render worship and office to God as to a father. Similarly Richard of Mediavilla says (here a. 3, q. 2) that this gift is "principally with respect to God under the character of the highest father," under which character worship is rendered to him. But St. Bonaventure holds that principally and properly this same gift is attended to in benevolence with respect to one's neighbor, inasmuch as he bears the image of God. Similarly Bl. Albert says (here a. 16) that the principal act of the same is "benevolently and without complaint to wish and to do good to all those marked with the image of God." Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 3, a. 1) says generally that this gift is in those things "which are rendered to God, or to man for the promotion of faith in oneself, or in another."

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 6

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum actus principalis pietatis consistat in religione respectu Dei, vel in compassione respectu proximi.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de actu et obiecto ipsius doni pietatis, et est quaestio, utrum actus principalis pietatis consistat in religione respectu Dei, vel in compassione respectu proximi. Et quod praecipue consistat in religione respectu Dei, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* per illud Apostoli ad Titum secundo[^1]: *Abnegantes impietatem, sobrie et iuste et pie* etc.; ibi Glossa: «Abnegantes, id est fugientes impietatem vanae culturae, sobrie in nobis et iuste ad proximum et pie ad Deum vivamus»: ergo pietas proprie est ordinata respectu Dei.

2. Item, Augustinus[^2], tractans illud Iob vigesimo octavo: *Pietas ipsa est sapientia, abstinere vero a malis intelligentia:* «Pietatem hoc loco posuit Dei cultum, quae Graece theosebia dicitur»: ergo etc.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^3]: «Pietatis est honorare sancta et non contradicere sacrae Scripturae»: si ergo utrumque horum consistit in cultu Dei, videtur etc.

4. Item, distinguitur peccatum iniquitatis et impietatis, quia iniquitas est in proximum, impietas est in Deum[^4]: si ergo respectu illius est pietas donum, respectu cuius est impietas vitium et peccatum; videtur, quod actus pietatis-doni praecipue attendatur in cultu Dei.

**Sed contra:** 1. Primae ad Timotheum quarto[^5]: *Pietas ad omnia utilis est;* ibi dicit Glossa: «Pietas, quae operatur bona fratribus, valet ad promerendum Deum; omnis enim summa disciplinae christianae in misericordia et pietate est»: ergo secundum hanc Glossam pietas ordinat respectu proximi.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^6] dicit, quod donum pietatis correspondet beatitudini mititatis; «opus enim est pietate mitescere»; sed mititas sive mansuetudo attenditur respectu proximi: ergo donum pietatis ad proximum ordinat.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Gregorium[^7] super *Iob* in assignatione donorum, ubi dicit, quod pietatis est opera misericordiae exhibere: si igitur hoc attenditur respectu proximi, videtur etc.

4. Item, Tullius in prima *Rhetorica*[^8] dicit, quod «pietas est benevolentia in parentes»; aut hoc intelligitur de pietate-dono, aut de pietate-virtute; sed de quocumque horum intelligatur, cum in obiectis conformentur, videtur, quod actus doni pietatis attendatur in comparatione ad proximum.

5. Item, donum pietatis exsequitur ea, ad quae donum scientiae ordinat[^9]; sed donum scientiae ordinat ad bene conversandum respectu proximi: ergo videtur, quod respectu illius attendatur actus pietatis-doni.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quomodo distinguatur pietas a mansuetudine et misericordia in actu suo et obiecto.

### Conclusio.

> Donum pietatis principaliter attenditur in benevolentia respectu cuiuslibet proximi, quatenus gerit imaginem Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod vocabulum pietatis multipliciter habet accipi, secundum quod innuit Augustinus in principio decimi *de Civitate Dei*[^10]. Ait enim sic: «Pietas proprie Dei cultus intelligi solet, quam Graeci theosebiam vocant; haec tamen et erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur; more autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur».

Cum igitur pietas sic dicatur multipliciter, videlicet erga Deum et erga parentes et erga quemcumque hominem; secundum quod ordinat erga Deum, non est nomen doni, sed potius est idem quod *latria* et *theosebia* sive *eusebia,* de qua dicit Augustinus[^11], quod «est sapientia vera». — Secundum autem quod ordinat ad parentes, adhuc etiam non tenet rationem doni, sed potius est species iustitiae-virtutis, pro eo quod ad hoc ordinatur secundum regulam naturalis iuris et secundum obligationem necessitatis. — Secundum autem quod attenditur respectu cuiuscumque proximi, sic pietas est nomen doni.

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Aliter tamen attenditur erga proximum pietas-donum et misericordia-virtus: quia misericordia-virtus respicit conformitatem in natura et necessitatem in indigentia sive miseria[^12]; pietas vero attendit in proximo imaginem divinam. Unde dono pietatis est homo benevolus cuicumque homini, qui habet in se imaginem Dei; ita quod benevolentia illa pro loco et tempore aliquando progreditur in compassionis affectum, aliquando in operis beneficium.

Et sic patet, quis sit actus et obiectum pietatis-doni, quoniam ipsius est facere hominem benevolum respectu cuiuslibet proximi, in quantum gerit imaginem Dei. Et quoniam ad hoc habet dirigi per donum scientiae, quod quidem fundatur super principia fidei et dirigit in conversatione secundum exemplar Christi; hinc est, quod actus pietatis, etsi principaliter consistat erga proximum, nihilominus consistit respectu sacrae Scripturae, ut eam cum benevolentia audiat, et etiam respectu passionis[^13] Christi, ut eam cum benevolentia ad memoriam reducat. Unde usus doni pietatis attenditur in his tribus in exsequendo, secundum quod et usus doni scientiae, quod est eius directivum, in cognoscendo; principaliter tamen, secundum quod donum est, attenditur in benevolentia respectu proximi, sicut rationes ostendunt, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur.

1. 2. 3. 4. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa, quod pietas ordinat ad Deum; et quod pietas est cultus Dei, et ad alias auctoritates consequentes; breviter dicendum, quod omnes illae auctoritates currunt de pietate secundum alium accipiendi modum, qui secundum Augustinum principalior et magis proprius est modus accipiendi pietatem, sicut ipse dicit in decimo *de Civitate Dei*[^14]. Nam primo et principaliter debet homo benevolus esse ad *Deum,* offerendo ei cultum et obsequium principale et praecipuum tanquam ei, ad cuius similitudinem factus est, et quod suae creationis est et conditionis primum et principale principium. — Deinde vero, quia pater terrestris quodam modo imaginem gerit Patris caelestis, et filius genitus imaginem gerit patris et ab eo sumit originem; hinc est, quod est alius modus accipiendi pietatem ab illo descendens, qui quidem est benevolentia in parentes. — Postremo, quia omnis homo gerit imaginem Dei; hinc est, quod est tertius et ultimus modus accipiendi pietatem, secundum quod benevolum et beneficum reddit erga omnem hominem insignitum divina imagine. — Licet autem iste sit ultimus et postremus modus accipiendi pietatem, tamen, sicut explanatum est, quantum ad hunc modum pietas-donum accipitur proprie. — Unde in omnibus illis auctoritatibus et rationibus peccatum est quantum ad processum arguendi ex illius nominis multiplicitate; quae, etsi non sit multiplicitas aequivocationis proprie dictae, est tamen multiplicitas cuiusdam analogiae[^15].

Ad illud vero quod ultimo quaerebatur de differentia ipsius pietatis-doni ad misericordiam et mansuetudinem; dicendum, quod etsi conveniat cum utroque, quia cum mansuetudine convenit in affectu, cum misericordia convenit in effectu; differt tamen ab utroque[^16]. A mititate enim et a mansuetudine differt: quia mansuetudo est contra irritationem ex illatione alicuius iniuriae[^17]; sed pietas est contra indurationem, qua quis non habet affectionem nec benevolentiam ad eos qui gerunt divinae imaginis insigne. — Similiter a misericordia differt: quia misericordia in proximo considerat conformitatem in natura et similitudinem speciei; pietas vero attendit in homine imaginem Dei. Unde aliqui dixerunt, quod misericordia considerat miseriam in imagine, pietas vero considerat imaginem in misero. Differt etiam, quia misericordia conformatur dictamini iuris naturalis et secundum regulam prudentiae; pietas vero conformatur suasioni iuris divini, et hoc secundum regulam doni scientiae. — Ex his patet, quis sit actus doni pietatis, quod etiam eius obiectum, et qualiter differat ab aliis habitibus.

Et secundum haec tria possent tria problemata formari circa donum pietatis et circa quodlibet aliorum donorum praedictorum; simul etiam cum hoc posset de quolibet quaeri, quem actum habeat in patria. Sed hoc supra[^18] determinatum fuit in generalitate; alia vero tanguntur implicite causa prolixitatis vitandae; tamen ex his quae breviter tacta sunt, qualitercumque haberi potest veritas praedictorum[^19].

---

english:
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### Question VI. *Whether the principal act of piety consists in religion with respect to God, or in compassion with respect to neighbor.*

Sixthly and lastly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of piety itself, and the question is whether the principal act of piety consists in religion with respect to God, or in compassion with respect to neighbor. And that it consists principally in religion with respect to God, is shown:

1. *First,* by that [word] of the Apostle to Titus, chapter two[^1]: *Renouncing impiety, [let us live] soberly and justly and piously* etc.; there the Gloss [says]: "Renouncing, that is, fleeing the impiety of vain worship, let us live soberly in regard to ourselves, and justly toward neighbor, and piously toward God": therefore piety is properly ordered with respect to God.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^2], treating that [text] of Job, chapter twenty-eight: *Piety itself is wisdom, but to abstain from evils is understanding:* "By piety in this place he set down the worship of God, which in Greek is called *theosebia*": therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^3]: "It belongs to piety to honor holy things and not to contradict sacred Scripture": if therefore both of these consist in the worship of God, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, the sin of iniquity and of impiety are distinguished, because iniquity is against neighbor, impiety is against God[^4]: if therefore piety is a gift with respect to that [object] with respect to which impiety is a vice and sin; it seems that the act of piety-as-gift is principally attended to in the worship of God.

**On the contrary:** 1. First to Timothy, chapter four[^5]: *Piety is profitable to all things;* there the Gloss says: "Piety, which works good things for the brethren, avails to merit God; for the whole sum of Christian discipline is in mercy and piety": therefore according to this Gloss piety is ordered with respect to neighbor.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^6] says that the gift of piety corresponds to the beatitude of meekness; "for it is a work of piety to grow meek"; but meekness or gentleness is attended to with respect to neighbor: therefore the gift of piety is ordered to neighbor.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by Gregory[^7] on *Job* in the assignment of the gifts, where he says that it belongs to piety to show works of mercy: if therefore this is attended to with respect to neighbor, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, Tully in the first book of the *Rhetoric*[^8] says that "piety is benevolence toward parents"; either this is understood of piety-as-gift, or of piety-as-virtue; but of whichever of these it be understood, since they agree in their objects, it seems that the act of the gift of piety is attended to in comparison to neighbor.

5. Likewise, the gift of piety carries out those things to which the gift of knowledge orders[^9]; but the gift of knowledge orders toward conversing well with respect to neighbor: therefore it seems that the act of piety-as-gift is attended to with respect to that [neighbor].

Beside this it is asked how piety is distinguished from gentleness and mercy in its act and object.

### Conclusion.

> The gift of piety is principally attended to in benevolence with respect to every neighbor, inasmuch as he bears the image of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the word "piety" is to be taken in many ways, according as Augustine intimates at the beginning of the tenth book *On the City of God*[^10]. For he says thus: "Piety is properly wont to be understood as the worship of God, which the Greeks call *theosebia*; yet it is also said to be had dutifully toward parents; and by the custom of the common people this name is also frequently [used] in works of mercy."

Since therefore piety is so said in many ways, namely toward God and toward parents and toward any man whatsoever; according as it is ordered toward God, it is not a name of a gift, but rather it is the same as *latria* and *theosebia* or *eusebia,* of which Augustine says[^11] that "it is true wisdom." — But according as it is ordered toward parents, it still does not hold the character of a gift, but rather is a species of justice-as-virtue, for the reason that it is ordered to this according to the rule of natural law and according to the obligation of necessity. — But according as it is attended to with respect to any neighbor whatsoever, in this way piety is a name of a gift.

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Yet piety-as-gift and mercy-as-virtue are attended to toward neighbor in different ways: because mercy-as-virtue regards conformity in nature and need in indigence or misery[^12]; but piety attends in the neighbor to the divine image. Whence by the gift of piety a man is benevolent toward any man whatsoever who has in himself the image of God; in such a way that that benevolence, according to place and time, sometimes advances into the affection of compassion, sometimes into the benefit of a deed.

And thus it is clear what is the act and object of piety-as-gift, since it belongs to it to make a man benevolent with respect to every neighbor, inasmuch as he bears the image of God. And since for this it has [need] to be directed by the gift of knowledge, which indeed is founded upon the principles of faith and directs in conversation according to the exemplar of Christ; hence it is that the act of piety, even though it principally consists toward neighbor, nonetheless consists with respect to sacred Scripture, that it may hear it with benevolence, and also with respect to the passion[^13] of Christ, that it may recall it to memory with benevolence. Whence the use of the gift of piety is attended to in these three [things] in carrying out, just as the use of the gift of knowledge, which is its directive, [is attended to] in knowing; yet principally, according as it is a gift, it is attended to in benevolence with respect to neighbor, as the reasons show which are adduced for this part.

1. 2. 3. 4. But to that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the Gloss, that piety is ordered to God; and that piety is the worship of God, and to the other authorities that follow; it must be said briefly that all those authorities run concerning piety according to another mode of taking [it], which according to Augustine is the more principal and more proper mode of taking piety, as he himself says in the tenth book *On the City of God*[^14]. For first and principally a man ought to be benevolent toward *God,* offering him worship and homage as principal and chief, as to him to whose likeness he was made, and who is the first and principal principle of his creation and condition. — Then indeed, because the earthly father in a certain way bears the image of the heavenly Father, and the begotten son bears the image of the father and takes his origin from him; hence it is that there is another mode of taking piety descending from that [first], which indeed is benevolence toward parents. — Lastly, because every man bears the image of God; hence it is that there is a third and last mode of taking piety, according as it renders [a man] benevolent and beneficent toward every man marked with the divine image. — Now although this is the last and final mode of taking piety, yet, as has been explained, with respect to this mode piety-as-gift is taken properly. — Whence in all those authorities and reasons there is an error as to the process of arguing from the multiplicity of that name; which, even though it is not the multiplicity of equivocation properly so called, is yet a multiplicity of a certain analogy[^15].

But to that which was lastly asked concerning the difference of piety-as-gift itself from mercy and gentleness; it must be said that although it agrees with both — because with gentleness it agrees in affection, with mercy it agrees in effect — yet it differs from both[^16]. For it differs from mildness and from gentleness: because gentleness is against the irritation [arising] from the infliction of some injury[^17]; but piety is against the hardening by which one does not have affection nor benevolence toward those who bear the mark of the divine image. — Likewise it differs from mercy: because mercy considers in the neighbor conformity in nature and likeness of species; but piety attends in the man to the image of God. Whence some have said that mercy considers misery in the image, but piety considers the image in the miserable [man]. It differs also, because mercy is conformed to the dictate of natural law and according to the rule of prudence; but piety is conformed to the persuasion of divine law, and this according to the rule of the gift of knowledge. — From these things it is clear what is the act of the gift of piety, what also is its object, and how it differs from the other habits.

And according to these three [things] three problems could be formed concerning the gift of piety and concerning any of the other aforesaid gifts; together also with this it could be asked concerning any [of them] what act it has in the fatherland. But this was determined above[^18] in general; but the others are touched on implicitly for the sake of avoiding prolixity; yet from these things which have been briefly touched on, the truth of the aforesaid can in some way be had[^19].

---

la: Vers. 12. Vulgata post *impietatem* addit *et saecularia desideria.* — In Glossa, quae a Lyrano ut interlinearis exhibetur, apud Petr. Lombard. post *vanae culturae* additum est *et ignorantiam et desideria saecularium, quae a mundi huius principe suggeruntur.* Cfr. Bernard., Serm. 54. de Divers.

en: Verse 12. The Vulgate after *impietatem* adds *et saecularia desideria* (and worldly desires). — In the Gloss, which is presented by Lyra as interlinear, in Peter Lombard after *vanae culturae* there is added *et ignorantiam et desideria saecularium, quae a mundi huius principe suggeruntur* (and ignorance and the desires of worldly things, which are suggested by the prince of this world). Cf. Bernard, Sermon 54 on Diverse [Subjects].

la: *Enchirid.* c. 2. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 771, nota 1. Locus script. est Iob 28, 28.

en: [Augustine,] *Enchiridion* c. 2, n. 1. Cf. above p. 771, note 1. The passage [of] Scripture is Job 28:28.

la: Libr. II. c. 7. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 776, nota 3. et etiam l. *de Serm. Domini in monte,* c. 4. n. 11: *Pietas congruit mitibus; qui enim pie quaerit honorat sanctam Scripturam* [Glossa ordinaria in Matth. 5, 3: *honorat sancta*] *et non reprehendit, quod nondum intelligit.*

en: [Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*] book II, c. 7, n. 9. Cf. above p. 776, note 3, and also the book *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* c. 4, n. 11: "Piety befits the meek; for he who piously seeks honors holy Scripture [Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 5:3: *honors holy things*] and does not reproach what he does not yet understand."

la: Hieronym., I. *Dialog. adversus Pelagianos,* n. 28: *Omnis impius iniquus est et peccator, nec reciprocatur, ut possimus dicere: omnis peccator et iniquus etiam impius est. Impietas enim proprie ad eos pertinet, qui notitiam Dei non habent, vel cognitam transgressione mutarunt. Peccatum autem et iniquitas pro qualibet vitiorum post peccati et iniquitatis vulnera reripit sanitatem.* Cfr. Isidor., X. *Etymolog.* n. 133.

en: Jerome, *Dialogue against the Pelagians* book I, n. 28: "Every impious man is unjust and a sinner, and it is not convertible, that we could say: every sinner and unjust man is also impious. For impiety properly pertains to those who do not have the knowledge of God, or who have changed it, once known, by transgression. But sin and iniquity, for any of the vices, recovers health after the wounds of sin and iniquity." Cf. Isidore, *Etymologies* book X, n. 133.

la: Vers. 8. — Glossa habetur ut ordinaria apud Strab. et Lyranum quoad primam eius propositionem, integra autem apud Petr. Lombardum; delibata est ex Comment. Ambrosio tributo, ubi sic legitur: *Pietas, cuius opera multorum precibus adiuvatur ad Dominum promerendum... Omnis enim summa disciplinae nostrae in misericordia et pietate est.*

en: Verse 8. — The Gloss is found as the ordinary [gloss] in Strabo and Lyra as to its first proposition, but entire in Peter Lombard; it is drawn from the Commentary attributed to Ambrose, where it reads thus: "Piety, whose work is aided by the prayers of many toward meriting the Lord... For the whole sum of our discipline is in mercy and piety."

la: Libr. II. c. 7. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 776, nota 8. Pro *pietate* edd. cum aliquot codd. contra textum origin. *pietatis.*

en: [Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*] book II, c. 7, n. 9. Cf. above p. 776, note 8. For *pietate* the editions with some codices, against the original text, [read] *pietatis.*

la: Libr. I. *Moral.* c. 32. n. 44, ubi exponens Iob 1, 1. dicit: *Pietas illi die convivium exhibet, quia cordis viscera misericordiae operibus replet.*

en: [Gregory,] *Morals* book I, c. 32, n. 44, where, expounding Job 1:1, he says: "Piety furnishes him a daily banquet, because it fills the inward parts of the heart with works of mercy."

la: B. Albert., hic a. 15, distinctius ait: *Tullius ante finem primae Rhetoricae;* ex qua formula sequitur, duos Ciceronis de Rhetor. libros communi nomine *primae Rhetoricae* tunc appellatos fuisse, siquidem definitio pietatis, inde petita et hic allata, invenitur circa finem II. Rhetor., in c. 54, ubi sic legitur: *Pietas* [est], *per quam sanguine coniunctis patriaeque benevolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus.* Cfr. ibid. c. 22. — Edd. *in prima Rhetoricae.* Mox pro *aut hoc* codd. U V *aut ergo hoc.*

en: Bl. Albert, here a. 15, says more distinctly: "Tully, before the end of the first *Rhetoric*"; from which formula it follows that the two books of Cicero *On Rhetoric* were then called by the common name "the first *Rhetoric,*" since indeed the definition of piety, drawn thence and adduced here, is found near the end of *Rhetoric* II, in c. 54, where it reads thus: "Piety [is] that by which to those joined by blood and to those well-disposed to the fatherland duty and diligent regard is rendered." Cf. ibid. c. 22. — The editions [read] *in prima Rhetoricae.* Presently for *aut hoc* codices U V [read] *aut ergo hoc.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia). — *Minor* iam probata est supra q. 2. — Inferius post *respectu illius* cod. A addit *actus.*

en: Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way). — The *minor* [premise] has already been proved above in q. 2. — Below, after *respectu illius* codex A adds *actus.*

la: Cap. 1. n. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 213, nota 9. et pag. 214, nota 5.

en: [*On the City of God* book X,] c. 1, n. 3. Cf. above p. 213, note 9, and p. 214, note 5.

la: Libr. XIV. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 246, nota 4. et etiam XII. *de Trin.* c. 14. n. 22. — Inferius pro *ordinat* cod. M *ordinatur.*

en: [Augustine,] *On the Trinity* book XIV, c. 1, n. 1. Cf. above p. 246, note 4, and also *On the Trinity* book XII, c. 14, n. 22. — Below, for *ordinat* codex M [reads] *ordinatur.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 1. — Cod. K *necessitatem indigentiae sive miseriam.*

en: Cf. above d. 33, dub. 1. — Codex K [reads] *necessitatem indigentiae sive miseriam* (the need of indigence or misery).

la: In plurimis codd. deest *passionis* [humanitatis?]; subinde pro *ut eam* codd. I K L aa *ut eum.* Paulo superius pro *erga* cod. A *circa,* et post *nihilominus consistit* edd. addunt *etiam.*

en: In very many codices *passionis* [humanitatis?] is lacking; thereupon for *ut eam* codices I K L aa [read] *ut eum.* A little above, for *erga* codex A [reads] *circa,* and after *nihilominus consistit* the editions add *etiam.*

la: Cap. 1. n. 3. Verba habes hic in principio corp. — Post pauca pro *et quod* cod. N *et qui.* Paulo inferius verbis *Patris caelestis* cod. A praefigit *Dei.*

en: [*On the City of God* book X,] c. 1, n. 3. The words you have here at the beginning of the body. — After a little, for *et quod* codex N [reads] *et qui.* A little below, to the words *Patris caelestis* codex A prefixes *Dei.*

la: Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 31. (c. 4.): *Sunt autem aequivocationum aliae multum distantes, aliae autem habentes quandam similitudinem, aliae vero propinquae aut genere aut similitudine rationis.* Cfr. supra pag. 232, nota 7.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* book VII, text 31 (c. 4): "Now of equivocations some are very far apart, but others have a certain likeness, and others indeed are near either in genus or in likeness of account." Cf. above p. 232, note 7.

la: Vat. hic *utraque,* licet paulo ante exhibeat *utroque.* Subinde pro *enim* codd. *vero.*

en: The Vatican [edition] here [reads] *utraque,* although a little before it presents *utroque.* Thereupon for *enim* codices [read] *vero.*

la: Aristot., *de Virtut. et vitiis,* c. 2: *Mansuetudo vero est virtus animosae* [partis irascibilis], *qua qui praediti sunt, difficulter ira concitantur.* Cfr. II. *Ethic.* c. 7.

en: Aristotle, *On Virtues and Vices,* c. 2: "But gentleness is a virtue of the spirited [part, the irascible], by which those who are endowed with it are with difficulty roused to anger." Cf. *Ethics* book II, c. 7.

la: Dist. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. — Mox pro *in generalitate* cod. W *in generali,* edd. *generaliter.*

en: D. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. — Presently for *in generalitate* codex W [reads] *in generali,* the editions *generaliter.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 35, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Letter of the Master

source_text:
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# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia*; quoniam, sicut dicit Philosophus[^1], « scientiae secantur in res », hoc est, dividuntur secundum diversitatem subiectorum; sed res divinae et humanae, creatae et increatae summa diversitate differunt: ergo nulla scientia, nulla sapientia simul potest esse de utrisque. — Item, res humanae in comparatione rerum divinarum quasi nihil sunt, sicut nec finitum est aliquo modo comparabile infinito[^2]: ergo sicut punctus nihil addit supra lineam, sic cognitio rerum humanarum nihil addit supra cognitionem rerum divinarum: ergo videtur, quod cognitio rerum humanarum non sit de integritate ipsius sapientiae: non ergo debet poni in eius definitione.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sapientiae nomen, secundum quod accipitur pro cognitione, dupliciter consuevit accipi a philosophis, sicut et nomen iustitiae dupliciter accipitur. Est enim iustitia *specialis* et iustitia *generalis*; iustitia *specialis* est virtus cardinalis, distincta ab aliis; iustitia vero *generalis* complectitur generaliter omnes virtutes[^3]. Sic et sapientia proprie dicta dicitur « cognitio causarum altissimarum », sapientia vero communiter dicta comprehendit et includit cognitionem omnium. — Et hoc modo dicit Philosophus[^4], quod sapiens de qualibet re, sicut est, inquirit cognoscere rationem; et hoc modo sapientia includit in se diversas scientias et non solum illas, quae sunt de creaturis, verum etiam illas, quae sunt de Creatore et creaturis. Et quoniam « nomine hominis potest intelligi omnis creatura », cum ipse cum omnibus communicet, sicut dicit Gregorius[^5]; hinc est, quod definiens sapientiam dicit ipsam esse scientiam rerum divinarum et humanarum, id est ceterarum rerum creatarum, in quibus manifestatur summa sapientia Dei[^6]. — Et per hoc patet explicatio notificationis et dissolutio primae obiectionis.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod scientia rerum humanarum nihil addit supra cognitionem rerum divinarum; dicendum, quod licet res divinae excedant humanas in infinitum, quia illae sunt infinitae, et istae finitae; cognitio tamen non excedit cognitionem in infinitum, pro eo quod utraque cognitio est finita, sive qua cognoscimus divina, sive qua cognoscimus humana. Non enim cognoscimus divina secundum suam immensitatem; nec quamdiu sumus in via, attingimus ad conspiciendam ipsam Veritatem in se; et ideo necesse est, eam in suis effectibus cognoscere[^7]. Et propterea cognitio rerum humanarum magna pars est nostrae notitiae, quamdiu sumus in statu viae; et pro tanto ponitur in definitione sapientiae.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Huic scientiae illud tantum tribuo, quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur.* Videtur enim falsum dicere, quoniam, cum dicit, fidem generari ex scientia, aut intelligit quantum ad *habitum*, aut quantum ad *actum*. Quantum ad *habitum* non habet veritatem, quia habitus fidei non generatur ex habitu scientiae: quantum ad *actum* non, quia actus fidei praecedit actum scientiae[^8]: ergo nullo modo habet veritatem. — Item, scientia versatur circa temporalia[^9]; fides autem est de aeternis: ergo videtur, quod donum scientiae nihil faciat ad ipsam fidem.

Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur de diversitate illorum quatuor actuum, quos enumerat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod licet fides habeat ipsam summam Veritatem pro principali obiecto, cui credit et assentit; illud tamen, quod credit, videt per speculum creaturae[^10]; et propterea, etsi speculum creaturae non sit eius principale obiectum, cognitio tamen aeternorum in subiecta creatura et mundanae creaturae, et intelligentia Scripturae plurimum confert ad ipsius fidei promotionem sive in alio, sive

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in se: in se quidem quantum ad profectum; in aliis autem non solum quantum ad profectum, sed etiam quantum ad inchoationem; homo enim magnae scientiae et litteraturae facilius persuadet et melius instruit venientes ad fidem quam ignorans, sicut de beato Paulo manifestum est. — Unde quia scientia ista valet ad fidei *introductionem* et introductae *provectionem* et provectae *defensionem* et defensae *confirmationem*[^11]; hinc est, quod quatuor actus assignat ei Augustinus respectu ipsius fidei, dicens, quod per « donum scientiae fides saluberrima *gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur* »; ita quod primus actus respicit *incipientes*, duo intermedii *proficientes* secundum progressum in bono et pugnam contra malum, quartus et ultimus iam *perfectos*.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod scientia non generat fidem nec quantum ad habitum nec quantum ad actum; dicendum, quod immo; sed generari aliquem habitum ab alio potest intelligi dupliciter: vel respectu eiusdem subiecti, vel respectu alterius; et respectu alterius dupliciter: vel *effective*, vel *dispositive*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod scientia generat fidem; hoc non intelligitur respectu eiusdem subiecti, sed respectu alterius; nec intelligitur *effective*, sed tantum *dispositive*[^12].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est de aeternis, scientia de temporalibus; dicendum, quod illud non cogit, quia temporalia bene manuducunt ad aeterna, quamdiu sumus in via[^13].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Scientia est abstinere a malis.* Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia diversorum donorum diversi sunt actus: cum ergo hoc sit ipsius timoris[^14], non videtur, quod sit ipsius scientiae. — Item, abstinere a malis respicit affectum; sed scientia respicit intellectum: ergo abstinere a malis non est actus ipsius.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum scientia non solum sit ad declinandum a malo, sed etiam ad faciendum bonum[^15], propter quid magis describitur per actum declinandi a malis quam per actum exercendi in bonis?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, secundum quod Magister exponit infra[^16], *abstinere a malis* non solum intelligitur privative: non facere malum, sed *a malis abstinere*, hoc est « prudenter conversari in medio nationis pravae et perversae ». Unde aliter et aliter abstinere a malis est ipsius timoris et ipsius scientiae. Timor enim reprimit interiora incentiva, scientia vero docet praecavere exteriora pericula et occasiones et ea quae sunt ad malum inclinantia, in quibus magna est difficultas.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, quoniam *abstinere a malis*[^17] aliter est timoris; praeterea, non est scientiae ut exsequentis, sed tantum ut dirigentis[^18]; postremo, non est ipsius scientiae privative tantum, sed etiam positive, sicut supra fuit tactum. Ideo patent illa tria obiecta, quae procedunt secundum haec.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Aperte monstratum est, in quo differant spiritus sapientiae et spiritus scientiae, cum sapientia divinis, et scientia humanis attributa sit rebus.* Videtur enim, quod ista nulla sit differentia, pro eo quod eadem virtus, scilicet caritas, simul habet versari circa Deum et proximum; et similiter eadem fides[^19]: ergo nulla videtur per hoc assignari donorum differentia. — Item, intelligentia, quae est donum unum, sicut dicit infra[^20], simul est de aeternis et temporalibus: ergo videtur, quod Magister sibi ipsi contradicat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod negotiari circa temporalia et aeterna potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum rationes easdem, vel secundum rationes alias et alias. Quando est secundum rationes easdem; tunc non est nisi diversitas materialis, et unus formalis habitus potest esse respectu utrorumque[^21]. Quando vero est secundum rationes alias et alias; tunc non solummodo est diversitas materialis, immo etiam est diversitas formalis; et sic est in proposito reperire, sicut colligi potest ex his quae dicta sunt in praehabitarum quaestionum determinatione[^22]: et propterea Magister differentiam satis recte assignat. Et haec de donis dicta sufficiant.

---

english:
# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says, namely that *wisdom is the knowledge of human and divine things*; for, as the Philosopher says[^1], « the sciences are cut up according to things », that is, they are divided according to the diversity of their subjects; but divine and human things, created and uncreated, differ by the greatest diversity: therefore there can be no science, no wisdom, at once concerning both. — Likewise, human things in comparison to divine things are as it were nothing, just as the finite is in no way comparable to the infinite[^2]: therefore, just as a point adds nothing to a line, so the knowledge of human things adds nothing to the knowledge of divine things: therefore it seems that the knowledge of human things does not belong to the integrity of wisdom itself: therefore it ought not to be placed in its definition.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name of *wisdom*, insofar as it is taken for knowledge, has customarily been taken in two ways by the philosophers, just as the name of *justice* too is taken in two ways. For there is *special* justice and *general* justice; *special* justice is a cardinal virtue, distinct from the others; but *general* justice embraces generally all the virtues[^3]. So too wisdom, in its proper sense, is called « the knowledge of the highest causes », but wisdom in its common sense comprehends and includes the knowledge of all things. — And in this way the Philosopher says[^4] that the wise man seeks to know the account of any thing whatever, as it is; and in this way wisdom includes within itself the diverse sciences, and not only those which are concerning creatures, but also those which are concerning the Creator and creatures. And since « by the name of *man* every creature can be understood », since he shares in common with all things, as Gregory says[^5]; hence it is that, in defining wisdom, he says that it is the knowledge of divine and human things, that is, of the other created things, in which the supreme wisdom of God is manifested[^6]. — And by this the explanation of the description and the resolution of the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that the knowledge of human things adds nothing to the knowledge of divine things; it must be said that, although divine things exceed human things infinitely, because the former are infinite and the latter finite; yet the knowledge does not exceed the knowledge infinitely, for the reason that each knowledge is finite, both that by which we know divine things and that by which we know human things. For we do not know divine things according to their immensity; nor, so long as we are on the way, do we attain to beholding Truth itself in itself; and therefore it is necessary to know it in its effects[^7]. And therefore the knowledge of human things is a great part of our cognizance, so long as we are in the state of the way; and to that extent it is placed in the definition of wisdom.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *To this knowledge I attribute only that by which the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened.* For he seems to say something false, since, when he says that faith is generated from knowledge, he understands it either as to *habit* or as to *act*. As to *habit* it does not hold true, because the habit of faith is not generated from the habit of knowledge: as to *act* not either, because the act of faith precedes the act of knowledge[^8]: therefore in no way does it hold true. — Likewise, knowledge is occupied about temporal things[^9]; but faith is concerning eternal things: therefore it seems that the gift of knowledge does nothing toward faith itself.

Alongside this it is also asked about the diversity of those four acts which he enumerates.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although faith has supreme Truth itself for its principal object, to which it believes and assents; yet that which it believes, it sees through the mirror of the creature[^10]; and therefore, even though the mirror of the creature is not its principal object, nevertheless the knowledge of eternal things in the subject creature and of the worldly creature, and the understanding of Scripture, contributes very much to the promotion of faith itself, whether in another or

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in oneself: in oneself indeed as to progress; but in others not only as to progress, but also as to inception; for a man of great knowledge and learning more easily persuades and better instructs those coming to the faith than one who is ignorant, as is evident from blessed Paul. — Whence, because this knowledge avails for the *introduction* of faith, and for the *advancement* of faith once introduced, and for the *defense* of faith once advanced, and for the *confirmation* of faith once defended[^11]; hence it is that Augustine assigns to it four acts with respect to faith itself, saying that through the « gift of knowledge the most salutary faith is *begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened* »; so that the first act regards *beginners*, the two intermediate ones the *proficient* according to progress in good and the fight against evil, and the fourth and last the now *perfect*.

To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that knowledge does not generate faith, neither as to habit nor as to act; it must be said that on the contrary it does; but for some habit to be generated by another can be understood in two ways: either with respect to the same subject, or with respect to another; and with respect to another in two ways: either *effectively* or *dispositively*. When, therefore, it is said that knowledge generates faith; this is not understood with respect to the same subject, but with respect to another; nor is it understood *effectively*, but only *dispositively*[^12].

To that which is objected, that faith is concerning eternal things, knowledge concerning temporal things; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion], because temporal things lead well by the hand to eternal things, so long as we are on the way[^13].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Knowledge is to abstain from evils.* For he seems to say something false, because the acts of diverse gifts are diverse: since, then, this belongs to fear itself[^14], it does not seem that it belongs to knowledge itself. — Likewise, to abstain from evils regards the affection; but knowledge regards the intellect: therefore to abstain from evils is not its act.

Alongside this it is asked: since knowledge is not only for turning away from evil, but also for doing good[^15], why is it described rather by the act of turning away from evils than by the act of being engaged in good things?

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as the Master expounds below[^16], *to abstain from evils* is not understood only privatively: not to do evil, but *to abstain from evils*, that is, « to conduct oneself prudently in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation ». Whence to abstain from evils belongs in one way and another to fear itself and to knowledge itself. For fear represses the inner incitements, but knowledge teaches one to guard against outward dangers and occasions and those things which incline toward evil, in which [matters] there is great difficulty.

And by this the response to the objections is clear, since *to abstain from evils*[^17] belongs in one way to fear; moreover, it does not belong to knowledge as carrying out, but only as directing[^18]; lastly, it does not belong to knowledge itself only privatively, but also positively, as was touched on above. Thus those three objections are clear, which proceed according to these [points].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *It has been openly shown in what the spirit of wisdom and the spirit of knowledge differ, since wisdom is attributed to divine things, and knowledge to human things.* For it seems that there is no difference here, for the reason that the same virtue, namely charity, has at once to be occupied about God and neighbor; and likewise the same faith[^19]: therefore no difference of gifts seems to be assigned by this. — Likewise, understanding, which is one gift, as he says below[^20], is at once concerning eternal and temporal things: therefore it seems that the Master contradicts himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be engaged about temporal and eternal things can be in two ways: either according to the same accounts, or according to differing accounts. When it is according to the same accounts; then there is only material diversity, and one formal habit can be with respect to both[^21]. But when it is according to differing accounts; then there is not only material diversity, but rather also formal diversity; and so it is to be found in the matter at hand, as can be gathered from those things which were said in the determination of the questions previously treated[^22]: and therefore the Master assigns the difference quite rightly. And let these things said concerning the gifts suffice.

---

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.) Cfr. tom. I. pag. 6, nota 3. — Cod. Z *secantur scientiae quemadmodum et res.* Mox pro *subiectorum* Vat. *obiectorum.*

en: [Aristotle,] *On the Soul*, bk. 3, text 38 (ch. 8). Cf. vol. 1, p. 6, note 3. — Codex Z reads *the sciences are cut up just as things [are].* Soon, for *of the subjects* the Vatican [edition reads] *of the objects.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 9, nota 1. — De proportione lineae ad punctum cfr. supra pag. 280, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 9, note 1. — On the proportion of a line to a point cf. above, p. 280, note 3.

la: Vide supra d. 33. dub. 1. — De definitione sapientiae, quae hic sequitur, cfr. supra pag. 771, nota 3.

en: See above, d. 33, doubt 1. — On the definition of wisdom which follows here, cf. above, p. 771, note 3.

la: Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1. de *discrimine expertorum et sapientum* loquens dicit, quod experti « *sciunt quidem quod est, propter quid* autem *nesciunt*; illi [sapientes] vero *propter quid* et causas *cognoscunt* ». Et c. 2. dicit, quod « *opinamur sapientem maxime omnia*, ut possibile est, *scire* » (i. e. per causas cognoscere). Cfr. supra q. 1. — Mox pro *rationem* cod. A *rationes*, et deinde pro *diversas* cod. M *divinas*, edd. *duas.*

en: In bk. 1 of the *Metaphysics*, ch. 1, speaking of the *distinction between the experienced and the wise*, he says that the experienced « *do indeed know that [a thing] is, but they do not know the why*; whereas they [the wise] *know the why and the causes* ». And in ch. 2 he says that « *we hold that the wise man knows all things*, so far as is possible » (i.e. to know through causes). Cf. above, q. 1. — Soon, for *the account* codex A [reads] *the accounts*, and then for *diverse* codex M [reads] *divine*, the editions *two.*

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 29. n. 2. — Paulo inferius *ceterarum* accipiendum est pro *cunctarum*: cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 1.

en: [Gregory,] bk. 2 of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 29, n. 2. — A little below, *of the other things* is to be taken for *of all things*: cf. above, p. 680, note 1.

la: Cfr. Sap. 13, 1. seqq.; Rom. 1, 19. 20; supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. [quomodo differat Deum videre *per speciem* et *per speculum*].

en: Cf. Wisdom 13:1 ff.; Rom. 1:19–20; above, d. 31, art. 2, q. 1, reply to 3 [how it differs to see God *through species* and *through a mirror*].

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. seq. De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. et circa lit.

en: Cf. *Sentences* bk. 1, d. 3, pt. 1, q. 1 f. On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 1; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 1, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, art. 1, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here, art. 2, q. 1, and on the letter.

la: Vide supra pag. 530, nota 5.

en: See above, p. 530, note 5.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq.

en: Cf. here, the letter of the Master, ch. 1 f.

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 13, 12. Cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius post *aeternorum* cod. A interiicit *est*, ubi respicitur Rom. 1, 20.

en: Reference is made to 1 Cor. 13:12. Cf. above, d. 24, art. 1, q. 2. — A little below, after *of eternal things* codex A inserts *is*, where reference is made to Rom. 1:20.

la: Vide tom. I. Prooem. q. 2.

en: See vol. 1, Prologue, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. ad 1. et d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.

en: Cf. above, q. 2, reply to 1, and d. 34, pt. 1, art. 1, q. 2, reply to 1.

la: De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Rich. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 4; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the letter.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4, et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Edd. *sit doni timoris*, cod. E *ipsius doni timoris.*

en: Cf. above, the letter of the Master, d. 34, ch. 4, and in the same place the Commentary, pt. 2, art. 1, q. 1. — The editions read *belongs to the gift of fear*, codex E *to the gift of fear itself.*

la: Respicitur illud Ps. 36, 27: *Declina a malo et fac bonum.*

en: Reference is made to that of Ps. 36:27: *Turn away from evil and do good.*

la: Hic c. 1. — Pro *infra* edd. *in littera.*

en: Here, ch. 1. — For *below* the editions [read] *in the letter.*

la: Codd. K P R S hic interserunt *aliter est scientiae.*

en: Codices K, P, R, S here insert *in another way it belongs to knowledge.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4, et S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above, q. 2. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 4, and St. Thomas, here, on the letter.

la: Vide supra q. 3. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.

en: See above, q. 3, and d. 27, art. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — In edd. desiderantur verba *et unus formalis... utrorumque* (cod. K *utriusque*).

en: Cf. above, d. 23, art. 1, q. 3. — In the editions the words *and one formal... [with respect to] both* are wanting (codex K reads *of each*).

la: Supra q. 1-3. — Ultimum solut. enuntiatum *Et haec* etc. deest in edd. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 3.

en: Above, q. 1–3. — The last clause of the solution, *And let these things* etc., is lacking in the editions. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 3.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.787–788 (PDF 809–810; offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 54633–54765) as base for clean running prose. Bounded forward by `DISTINCTIO XXXVI.` (raw 54766, printed p.789). Running heads confirmed: `DIST. XXXV. DUBIA. 787` and `788 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`. **This is the LAST chunk of d.35 → d.35 is now FULLY Tier-2 complete.**

**Page-split map.** Opens p.787 (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI`): Dub. I (L-col objection + Respondeo on the *generalis/specialis* sense of *sapientia*; R-col Respondeo-tail on finite-vs-infinite cognition) and Dub. II opener through *...sive in alio, sive* (R-col foot). Page break at *sive* mid-Dub. II Respondeo. p.788: Dub. II Respondeo-tail (*in se...*) + replies; Dub. III (*Scientia est abstinere a malis*) L-col foot through Respondeo (R-col); Dub. IV (*Aperte monstratum est...*) closing with *Et haec de donis dicta sufficiant.*

**Dubia list (4).** Dub. I — whether the knowledge of *human* things belongs to the integrity/definition of wisdom (resolved via the *general/special* sense of *sapientia*, both cognitions finite). Dub. II — whether knowledge *begets* faith (the four acts: introduce/advance/defend/confirm; faith generated *dispositively* not *effectively*, in another not the same subject; temporals lead by hand to eternals). Dub. III — why *knowledge* is described as *abstaining from evils* (an act seemingly of fear/affect): fear represses inner incitements, knowledge guards outer dangers as *directing* not *executing*, positively not merely privatively. Dub. IV — whether the wisdom/knowledge (divine/human) distinction holds, given charity and faith span both (and *intelligentia* spans eternal+temporal): same *ratio* = only material diversity; differing *ratio* = formal diversity, which obtains here.

**Apparatus** = 22-entry NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart, renumbered continuous: **p.787 nn.1–10 → [^1]–[^10]** (OWN fresh band; [^1]=Aristot. III *de Anima* text 38 *scientiae secantur in res* Dub.I arg, [^4]=Aristot. I *Metaph.* c.1–2 *experti/sapientes* Respondeo, [^5]=Gregor. II *Homil. in Evang.* hom.29 *nomine hominis omnis creatura*, [^6]=Sap.13/Rom.1 *sapientia Dei*, [^7]=I Sent. d.3 + Albert/Thomas/Petr/Richard cross-ref, [^10]=I Cor.13,12 *per speculum creaturae* Dub.II Respondeo); **p.788 nn.1–12 → [^11]–[^22]** ([^11]=tom.I Prooem. q.2 the four acts, [^14]=lit. Magistri d.XXXIV c.4 *timoris* Dub.III arg, [^15]=Ps.36,27 *Declina a malo et fac bonum*, [^16]=hic c.1 *abstinere a malis* Respondeo, [^21]=d.23 a.1 q.3 + edd.-lacuna note *et unus formalis... utrorumque*, [^22]=supra q.1-3 + *Et haec* edd.-lacuna note). Marker pairing 22/22 clean.

**Hand-offs.** PICKED UP: nothing (fresh band on p.787; a1-q6's NOTAE closed on p.786). FORWARDED: nothing — Dub. IV closes *Et haec de donis dicta sufficiant* (end of d.35 commentary); p.789 opens DISTINCTIO XXXVI with a fresh footer band.

**`has_scholion: false`** — no `SCHOLION.` header anywhere in the range (grep-verified raw 54633–54765); dubia carry none. No scholion-redirect marker in the footer band either.

**`[?]` flags:** NONE. pp.787–788 fully legible at 450 dpi.