title: Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 728 -->

### Articulus I.
#### *De causalitate divinae praedestinationis.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum praedestinatio vel reprobatio habeant in nobis causam meritoriam.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Quod autem habeant in nobis causam meritoriam, ostenditur sic.

1. *Primo de reprobatione.* Ad Romanos nono[^1] super illud: *Esau odio habui*, Glossa: «*Esau, subtracta gratia, per iustitiam est reprobatus*»; sed iustitia respicit merita: ergo reprobatio est ex meritis.

2. Item, per reprobationem non dicuntur nisi ista tria, scilicet odium aeternum, obduratio temporalis et damnatio finalis; sed omnia ista habent in nobis meritum, quia Deus neminem odit nisi propter demerita nec obdurat nec damnat: ergo etc.

3. Item, voluntate antecedente vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri[^2]: si ergo aliquem reprobat, hoc est voluntate consequente, neminem enim de se creat ad supplicium; sed voluntas consequens est concessio ex nostra causa; sed non est ex alia causa quam meriti: ergo etc.

4. Item, *de praedestinatione* similiter ostenditur. Gregorius[^3] dicit et Augustinus, quod praedestinatio iuvatur Sanctorum orationibus; sed plus valet unicuique fides sua quam fides aliena: ergo merito suo et alieno potest quis impetrare, quod sit praedestinatus.

5. Item, nullus est praedestinatus nisi finaliter in gratia perseverans, et[^4] e converso: sunt ergo convertibilia; sed aliquis potest mereri finalem perseverantiam: ergo potest mereri, quod sit praedestinatus.

6. Item, quod potest in maius potest in minus vel aequale pari ratione; sed homo potest mereri habere Deum, quod est maximum inter omnia; potest <!-- page 729 -->etiam mereri salutem, quod est aequale ei quod est esse praedestinatum: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Omne meritum antecedit illud cuius est meritum, quia disponit ad illud; sed praedestinatio et reprobatio praecedunt nostrum esse: ergo non cadunt sub nostro merito[^5].

2. Item, omne meritum aliquo modo est causa eius quod meretur; sed praedestinatio et reprobatio sunt aeterna, merita vero sunt temporalia: ergo temporale est causa aeterni; quod est impossibile.

3. Item, specialiter de praedestinatione videtur ad Titum tertio[^6]: *Non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit*.

4. Item, gratia est effectus praedestinationis; sed prima gratia antecedit omne meritum et est causa omnis meriti: ergo non cadit sub merito, et eo ipso gratia est, quia sine meritis datur: ergo nec praedestinatio.

### Conclusio.

> *Nec praedestinatio nec reprobatio quoad propositum aeternum cadunt sub merito, sed quoad connotatum reprobatio cadit sub merito simpliciter, praedestinatio vero secundum quid.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc intelligendum notandum, quod in praedestinatione tria intelliguntur: primum est propositum aeternum; secundum est temporalis gratificatio; tertium vero aeterna glorificatio. Similiter in reprobatione intelliguntur tria, scilicet aeternum propositum[^7], et temporalis obduratio, et aeterna damnatio. — Quantum ad primum et ultimum simpliciter est iudicandum: nam ultima, scilicet poena et gloria simpliciter cadunt sub merito; primum vero, scilicet propositum aeternum, eo ipso quod aeternum est, meritum habere non potest. Quantum vero ad medium, quod est gratificatio et obduratio, differenter iudicandum. Nam obduratio simpliciter cadit sub demerito sive sub malo merito; gratificatio vero nec simpliciter sub merito nec simpliciter extra. — Est enim meritum *congrui*, *digni* et *condigni*. Meritum *congrui* est, quando peccator facit quod in se est et pro se. Meritum *digni*, quando iustus facit pro alio. Meritum *condigni*, quando iustus operatur pro se ipso, quia ad hoc ordinatur gratia ex condigno; ad gratiam autem alteri promerendam non omnino ex condigno[^8], quia peccator omni bono est indignus, nec solum ex congruo, quia iustus dignus est exaudiri. — Gratificatio ergo sub merito *congrui* potest cadere quoad ipsum gratificandum, sub merito *digni* quantum ad alium virum sanctum, sub merito *condigni* quantum ad neutrum, et hoc proprie loquendo est meritum.

Respondendum ergo ad quaestionem, cum quaeritur, utrum praedestinatio et reprobatio cadant sub merito, quod[^9] simpliciter loquendo, quantum ad principale significatum, neutra cadit sub merito; quantum vero ad connotatum, reprobatio cadit sub merito simpliciter, praedestinatio vero secundum quid.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod praedestinatio non cadit sub merito; similiter, quod nec reprobatio.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Glossa, quod Esau per iustitiam est reprobatus; dicendum, quod ibi accipitur reprobatio pro connotato[^10], quod est obduratio.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod odium aeternum cadit sub merito; dicendum, quod odium aeternum duo dicit: et principale significatum et connotatum, quia neminem odit Deus quantum ad affectum, sed solum quantum ad effectum. Et primum non est ex meritis, sed secundum; quod patet, si resolvatur, quia odium est propositum puniendi; propositum autem nullus meretur, sed poenam.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod neminem reprobat nisi[^11] voluntate consequente; dicendum, quod voluntas consequens non dicitur, quia consequatur merita nostra ratione voluntatis, sed solum ratione voliti — vult enim aliquid Deus quod nos meruimus — ideo quia volitum est et connotatum, patet etc.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de praedestinatione, quod iuvatur orationibus Sanctorum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur ratione connotati, quod est gratia, quam sancti viri possunt aliis suis orationibus impetrare; nec tamen sequitur, quod homo possit impetrare sibi, quia ad hoc quod impetret <!-- page 730 -->necesse est, quod sit dignus mereri, et hoc non est nisi per gratiam.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est esse praedestinatum et in gratia finaliter perseverare; dicendum, quod non est idem, sed *convertibile*. Sed illud non sequitur, quod si aliquis possit mereri unum convertibilium, quod possit et reliquum[^12]; sicut non sequitur, si aliquid est causa unius convertibilium, quod sit causa alterius; istud manifestum est.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod potest in maius, potest in minus: dicendum, quod hoc verum est, si aequaliter ordinatur ad utrumque. Nam si habet ordinationem ad maius, et non habet ordinationem ad minus, quamvis possit in maius, non tamen sequitur, quod in minus; similiter in proposito. Gratia enim ordinatur ad merendum Deum ut glorificantem, non ut praedestinantem, similiter ad gloriam, non ad primam gratiam.

english:
<!-- page 728 -->

### Article I.
#### *On the causality of divine predestination.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether predestination or reprobation have in us a meritorious cause.*

That they have in us a meritorious cause, is shown thus.

1. *First, concerning reprobation.* In *Romans* 9[^1], on the text: *"Esau have I hated"*, the Gloss [reads]: "*Esau, with grace withdrawn, has been reprobated by justice*"; but justice regards merits: therefore reprobation is from merits.

2. Likewise, by reprobation are denoted nothing except these three, namely eternal hatred, temporal hardening, and final damnation; but all of these have their meritorious cause in us, since God hates no one except on account of demerits, and neither hardens nor damns [except so]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by an antecedent will God wills all men to be saved[^2]: if therefore he reprobates someone, this is by a consequent will, for he creates no one of himself for punishment; but the consequent will is a concession [arising] from our cause; but it is not from any cause other than [that of] merit: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, concerning predestination it is shown similarly. Gregory[^3] says, and Augustine [also], that predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints; but to each one his own faith is worth more than another's faith: therefore by his own and by another's merit one can obtain that he be predestined.

5. Likewise, no one is predestined except [the one] finally persevering in grace, and[^4] conversely: therefore they are convertible [terms]; but someone can merit final perseverance: therefore he can merit that he be predestined.

6. Likewise, [he] who can [reach] the greater, can [reach] the lesser or the equal by parity of reason; but a man can merit to have God, which is the greatest of all things; he can <!-- page 729 -->also merit salvation, which is equal to that which is to-be-predestined: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every merit precedes that of which it is the merit, because it disposes to it; but predestination and reprobation precede our being: therefore they do not fall under our merit[^5].

2. Likewise, every merit is in some way a cause of that which is merited; but predestination and reprobation are eternal, but merits are temporal: therefore the temporal is the cause of the eternal; which is impossible.

3. Likewise, especially concerning predestination it seems [so] from *Titus* 3[^6]: *"Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he has saved us."*

4. Likewise, grace is the effect of predestination; but the first grace precedes every merit and is the cause of every merit: therefore it does not fall under merit, and by this very fact is grace, that it is given without merits: therefore neither [does] predestination [fall under merit].

### Conclusion.

> *Neither predestination nor reprobation, as regards the eternal purpose, fall under merit; but as regards the connotatum, reprobation falls under merit simpliciter, but predestination secundum quid.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that in predestination three [things] are understood: the first is the eternal purpose; the second is temporal justification-by-grace (*gratificatio*); the third is eternal glorification. Likewise in reprobation three [things] are understood, namely the eternal purpose[^7], and temporal hardening, and eternal damnation. — As to the first and the last [it must be] judged simpliciter: for the last [things], namely punishment and glory, simpliciter fall under merit; but the first, namely the eternal purpose, by the very fact that it is eternal, cannot have a merit. As to the middle [things], which are justification-by-grace and hardening, it is to be judged differently. For hardening simpliciter falls under demerit, that is, under evil merit; but justification-by-grace falls neither simpliciter under merit nor simpliciter outside [merit]. — For there is the merit *of congruity* (*congrui*), *of worthiness* (*digni*), and *of full-condignity* (*condigni*). The merit *of congruity* is when the sinner does what is in him and for himself. The merit *of worthiness*, when the just [man] acts for another. The merit *of full-condignity*, when the just [man] works for himself, since grace is ordered to this from condignity; but to a grace to be merited for another, not entirely from condignity[^8], since the sinner is unworthy of every good, nor [is it] only from congruity, since the just [man] is worthy to be heard. — Justification-by-grace, therefore, can fall under the merit *of congruity* as regards the one to be justified, under the merit *of worthiness* as regards another holy man, under the merit *of full-condignity* as regards neither; and this, properly speaking, is merit.

It must therefore be responded to the question — when it is asked, whether predestination and reprobation fall under merit — that[^9], simpliciter speaking, as to the principal significate, neither falls under merit; but as to the connotatum, reprobation falls under merit simpliciter, but predestination secundum quid.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

The reasonings proving that predestination does not fall under merit are therefore to be granted; likewise, that neither does reprobation.

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, from the Gloss, that Esau was reprobated by justice; it must be said that there *reprobation* is taken for the connotatum[^10], which is hardening.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the eternal hatred falls under merit; it must be said that the eternal hatred says two [things]: both the principal significate and the connotatum, since God hates no one as regards [his] affect, but only as regards [his] effect. And the first [is] not from merits, but the second [is]; which is plain, if it be resolved [thus]: hatred is the purpose of punishing; but no one merits a purpose, but rather a punishment.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he reprobates no one except[^11] by a consequent will; it must be said that it is called *consequent will* not because it follows our merits by reason of the will, but only by reason of the [thing] willed — for God wills something which we have merited — therefore, since it is [a thing] willed and connotatum, it is clear etc.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning predestination, that it is aided by the prayers of the saints; it must be said that this is understood by reason of the connotatum, which is grace, which holy men can obtain for others by their prayers; nor however does it follow, that a man can obtain [it] for himself, since for the obtaining of it <!-- page 730 -->it is necessary that he be worthy to merit, and this is not [so] except through grace.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that to-be-predestined and to-finally-persevere-in-grace are the same; it must be said that they are not the same, but *convertible*. But it does not follow, that if someone can merit one of two convertible [terms], that he can [merit] the other[^12]; just as it does not follow, if something is the cause of one of two convertible [terms], that it is the cause of the other; this is manifest.

*To 6.* To that which is objected: that he who can [reach] the greater can [reach] the lesser; it must be said that this is true, if [the agent] is equally ordered to both. For if it has ordination to the greater, and does not have ordination to the lesser — although it can [reach] the greater, it does not however follow that [it can reach] the lesser; likewise in the [present] case. For grace is ordered to meriting God as glorifying, not as predestining; likewise to glory, not to the first grace.

la: Vers. 13. — Verba Glossae apud Lyranum haec sunt: *Iacob gratia electus, non merito, Esau subtracta gratia* (Glossa interlin.; et Glossa ordinar. adiungit: *per iustitiam reprobavit*).

en: Verse 13. — The words of the Gloss as found in [Nicholas of] Lyra are these: *"Jacob [was] chosen by grace, not by merit; Esau, with grace withdrawn"* (the interlinear Gloss; and the ordinary Gloss adds: *"reprobated him by justice"*).

la: Epist. I. Tim. 2,4. — Argumentum ipsum ex Damasceno, II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 29. sumtum est, ubi dicitur: *Hoc itidem nosse oportet, Deum (primaria et) antecedente voluntate velle omnes salvos esse et regni sui compotes fieri. Non enim nos, ut puniret, condidit, sed quia bonus est, ad hoc ut bonitatis suae participes essemus. Peccantes porro puniri vult, quia iustus est. Itaque prima illa voluntas antecedens dicitur et beneplacitum, cuius ipse causa sit; secunda autem, consequens, permissio ex nostra causa ortum habens* (τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἑπόμενον θέλημα καὶ παραχώρησις, ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας). Cfr. infra d. 46. q. I. — Mox post *hoc est* ed. I interiicit *solum*; post pauca sola Vat. *est consequens* pro *est concessio*.

en: *Epistle* I [to] Tim. 2:4. — The argument itself is taken from [John] Damascene, II *de Fide orthodoxa* c. 29, where it is said: *"This likewise it is needful to know, that God by a (primary and) antecedent will wills all to be saved and to become partakers of his kingdom. For he did not establish us to punish [us], but because he is good, that we might be partakers of his goodness. Sinners however he wills to be punished, since he is just. Therefore that first will, the antecedent, is called also good-pleasure, of which he himself is the cause; but the second, the consequent, [is] a permission having its origin from our cause"* (Greek: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἑπόμενον θέλημα καὶ παραχώρησις, ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας). Cf. below d. 46, q. I. — Soon after *hoc est*, edition I interpolates *solum*; a little later, the Vatican alone [reads] *est consequens* in place of *est concessio*.

la: Libr. I. *Dialog.* c. 8: «*Ea quae sancti viri orando efficiunt, ita praedestinata sunt, ut precibus obtineantur*». August., *de Dono persever.* c. 22. n. 60: *Cur enim non potius ita dicitur: et si qui sunt nondum vocati, pro eis ut vocentur oremus? Fortassis enim sic praedestinati sunt, ut nostris orationibus concedantur et accipiant eandem gratiam, qua velint atque efficiantur electi.* Cfr. etiam *Enarrat. in Ps.* 108, 23, ibi sub n. 21.

en: Book I *Dialogues* c. 8: "*Those things which holy men effect by prayer, are so predestined that they are obtained by prayers*". Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* c. 22, n. 60: *"For why is it not rather said thus: even if there are some not yet called, let us pray for them, that they may be called? For perhaps they have been so predestined, that they should be granted [to us] by our prayers and receive the same grace by which they may will and become the elect."* Cf. also *Enarration on Psalm* 108:23, there at n. 21.

la: Pro *et* plurimi codd. cum ed. I *nec*; mendose.

en: In place of *et* ("and"), most codices with edition I [read] *nec* ("nor"); erroneously.

la: De hoc et de seqq. argumentis cfr. August., l. *de Diversis Qq. ad Simplician.* q. 2, et *de Dono persever.* Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — In propositione minori cod. post verba *cuius est meritum* prosequitur sic: *antecedunt omne meritum, quia praecedunt nostrum esse*; cod. T (in marg.) sic: *praecedunt omne meritum nostrum et etiam nostrum esse*.

en: On this and the following arguments cf. Augustine, *On Various Questions to Simplicianus* q. 2, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 2. — In the minor proposition, [a] codex, after the words *cuius est meritum*, continues thus: *"they precede every merit, because they precede our being"*; codex T (in the margin) thus: *"they precede every merit of ours and also our being."*

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Pro *propositum* Vat. cum cod. cc *odium*, forte quia et in arg. 2. ad opposit. sic legitur; sed cum in subnexis et etiam in respons. ad. 2. exhibeatur, lectionem codd. in textum recipiendam duximus. Subinde pro *temporalis obduratio* complures codd. *temporalis ordinatio*, cui lectioni subnexa repugnant.

en: In place of *propositum* ("purpose") the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *odium* ("hatred"), perhaps because in argument 2 against [the opposite] it is also read so; but since in what follows and also in the response to [arg.] 2 it is exhibited [as *propositum*], we have decided to receive the reading of the codices into the text. Soon after, for *temporalis obduratio* ("temporal hardening") several codices [read] *temporalis ordinatio* ("temporal ordering"), to which reading what follows is repugnant.

la: Hanc secundam propositionis partem: *ad gratiam autem etc.* Vat., mutata interpunctione, in novam propositionem principalem sic transformavit: *Gratia autem alteri promerenda non est omnino etc.*

en: This second part of the proposition: *ad gratiam autem etc.* ("but to grace etc."), the Vatican [edition], having changed the punctuation, transformed thus into a new principal proposition: *"But a grace to be merited for another is not entirely etc."*

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. I minus congrue *quia*.

en: Most codices with edition I [read], less aptly, *quia* ("because") [in place of *quod*].

la: Codd. L. O. *effectu* sive *connotato*.

en: Codices L, O [read] *effectu* ("effect") or *connotato* ("connotatum").

la: Vat. et cod. cc praetermittunt *nisi*; mendose. — De voluntate consequente, quae semper connotat effectus eventum, cfr. infra d. 46. q. 1. in corp. — In fine respons. post *patet* codd. L addunt: *quod meritum non est respectu voluntatis, sed respectu voliti*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc omit *nisi* ("except"); erroneously. — On the *consequent will*, which always connotes the [actual] event of the effect, cf. below d. 46, q. 1, in the body. — At the end of the response, after *patet*, codices L add: *"that the merit is not with respect to the will, but with respect to the [thing] willed."*

la: Cod. I hic interserit: *nam unum convertibilium est causa alterius frequenter, non tamen sui ipsius, ut veritas rei est causa veritatis propositionis, et homo est causa risibilis* (risibilitatis); et similiter cod. T (in marg.): *nam unum convertibilium saepe est causa alterius, non tamen est causa sui ipsius, ut homo est causa risibilis*.

en: Codex I here interpolates: *"for one of two convertibles is frequently the cause of the other, but not however of itself, as the truth of a thing is the cause of the truth of a proposition, and the human being is the cause of the risible"* (*risibilitatis* ["of risibility"]); and similarly codex T (in the margin): *"for one of two convertibles is often the cause of the other, but is not however the cause of itself, as the human being is the cause of the risible."*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro hac et sequenti quaestione facilius intelligenda iuvat haec praenotare.

*1.* Distinguendum est inter rationem volendi et rationem voliti. «Deus enim unico actu vult finem et ea omnia quae sunt ad finem; unde *velle finem* non est Deo causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem; sed tamen vult, ea quae sunt ad finem ordinari in finem. Vult ergo, *hoc esse propter hoc*, sed non *propter hoc vult hoc*» (S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 19. a. 3; cfr. commentarius Caietani; et *S. c. Gent.* l. c. 86.). — Eandem distinctionem inter rationem volendi et rationem voliti adhibet S. Bonav., infra d. 45. dub. 3, et differentiam inter voluntatem nostram et divinam ita explicat, quod voluntas nostra cum excitetur a volito, et causam et rationem ab eo habet et quantum ad se et quantum ad volitum, maxime cum vult aliquid, quod est propter finem; sed voluntas Dei, «alius actus est ipse, quia non excitatur aliqua ratione alia a se, causam quantum ad se habere non potest. Volitum autem aliquando habet aliam causam quam voluntatem, aliquando solum voluntatem, ut in mundi creatione. Voluntas habet rationem, sed non causam, quia non est irrationalis». Unde etc. — Eadem utitur distinctione Scotus (*Report.* hic q. *unica*, n. 3-7.), ut suam sententiam persuadeat, quod ex parte Dei nec in praedestinando nec in reprobando sit aliqua alia ratio praeter essentiam divinam; et quod ex parte effectus sit ratio reprobationis, non autem praedestinationis.

*2.* Differt *causa efficiens*, *causa meritoria*, *ratio motiva*. Deus solus est causa efficiens gratiae et gloriae; causa meritoria, quae vel ad dispositionem vel aliquo modo ad causam efficientem reducitur, non potest esse nisi in creatura, sed est praevisa a Deo. Ratio motiva differt a causa meritoria. Nam ratio latius patet quam causa, quae concipitur ut influens in effectum; unde unum divinum attributum a nobis concipi potest ut ratio alterius, minime autem ut causa. Item terminus *motiva* latius patet quam *meritoria*, ut manifestum est. Hinc est, quod ratio motiva potest concipi tum ex parte Dei, v. g. ostensio suae misericordiae, tum ex parte praedestinati; et ex hac parte iterum dupliciter: vel quatenus haec ratio fundatur in aliquo merito (et tunc coincidit cum causa meritoria), vel ut supponit tantum aliquod motivum congruitatis.

*3.* Distinguitur a S. Doctore in praedestinatione *principale significatum* et *connotatum*. Illud est aeterna praeordinatio sive propositum divinae voluntatis vel miserendi vel puniendi (cfr. hic ad 2, et q. 2. in corp.); *connotatum* autem comprehendit *effectus* divinae praedestinationis, qui ut *volita* ordinantur ad divinam voluntatem per relationem realem; et per consequens voluntas Dei per relationem rationis terminatur ad ista volita quae eiusdem voluntatis sunt obiectum secundarium. Effectus praedestinationis principales sunt *vocatio*, quae in adultis implicat seriem gratiarum actualium; *iustificatio* per infusionem gratiae habitualis; *glorificatio*, quae implicat gratiam perseverantiae finalis.

*4.* Hos *effectus* sive haec *volita* ad se invicem ordinari secundum rationem alicuius causalitatis, communis sententia est: «scil. effectum posteriorem quidem (causam et rationem esse) prioris secundum rationem causae finalis; priorem vero posterioris secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad dispositionem materiae» (S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 23. a. 5.). Certum est etiam, vocationem quoad primam gratiam et etiam quoad seriem gratiarum actualium non cadere sub merito; nec iustificationem sub merito de condigno, licet adulti «gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando disponantur» ad iustificationem (Trid. Sess. 6. c. 5.). Item certum est, iustificatum auxilio gratiae «vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam, et ipsius vitae aeternae, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem» (ibid. can. 32.). Denique certum est, exsecutionem huius conditionis: *si tamen in gratia decesserit*, sive «magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae donum» (ibid. can. 16.) «sine speciali auxilio Dei» (ibid. can. 22.) a iustificatis nec obtineri nec de condigno mereri posse. Cum autem nec primus nec ultimus temporalium effectuum praedestinationis, scil. vocatio et perseverantia finalis, cadunt sub merito, tota series effectuum praedestinationis gratuita censeri debet, licet in ipsa multipliciter implicetur cooperatio et causalitas liberi arbitrii.

*5.* In actibus meritoriis «non est distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio et ex praedestinatione» (S. Thom., loc. cit.), quia «totus effectus est a causa creata, et totus a voluntate infinita increata» (S. Bonav., infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.), tamen *non totaliter*. Unde sequitur, quod idem actus meritorius totus est effectus praedestinationis et donum Dei, licet sub alio respectu possit esse etiam totus a libero arbitrio; sequitur etiam, quod eadem possint esse nostra merita, quae sunt Dei dona (Caelestin. I, epist. 21. c. 12.).

*6.* Effectus praedestinationis, et singuli et omnes collective, sicut habent ordinem ad se invicem, ita etiam realem a parte sua habent relationem ad Deum, qui est prima causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis et uniuscuiusque effectus et omnium simul; unde recte a theologis Deus dicitur causa salutis prima et principalis; non tamen sola, cum minime excludat actiones causarum secundarum, immo potius eas implicet et ordinet ad effectus suos. Secus non esset nec meritum nec demeritum<!-- page 731 -->, nec vera esset antiqua sententia (Epist. Synod. Episcop. in Sardinia exulum): «*Deus gratis salvat iusteque damnat*».

**II.** In respons. triplex distinguitur meritum, scil. praeter meritum de condigno et de congruo etiam meritum digni (quod nunc communiter subsumitur sub merito de congruo), quo iustus per sua suffragia aliis a Deo gratias obtinet. De hac triplici divisione et aliis subdivisionibus cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. 3, et III. *Sent.* d. 4. a. 2. q. 2, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2.

Verba in corp.: «*Meritum congrui est, quando peccator facit quod est in se*», quibusdam, ut Vasquez, occasionem dederunt, vituperandi S. Doctorem, quasi doceat, per opera naturalis ordinis fieri posse dispositionem ad iustificationem. Hanc interpretationem omnino a mente S. Doctoris alienam esse, iam ex verbis mox sequentibus colligi potest: «*peccator omni bono est indignus*», et clarius ex dub. 3. huius dist. In aliis locis Sanctus manifeste docet, dispositionem ad iustificationem requirere «*gratiam praevenientem et adiuvantem voluntatem*»; cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 2. q. 1, d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. 2, IV. *Sent.* d. 15. p. I. q. 5; et S. Thom., I. II. q. 109. a. 6, q. 112. a. 2. De celebri axiomate: *Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam*, agitur II. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4. — Quia autem illa verba hic in corp. posita non praecise de dispositione ad iustificationem dicta sunt, P. Trigosus ea putat exponi posse etiam de vocatione in genere, accipiendo meritum congrui in sensu largiore, quatenus minus indignus gratia videatur, qui potius naturaliter bene vivit, quam impius, qui continuis peccatis magis quotidie provocat iram Dei.

**III.** Quod *principale significatum* in praedestinatione, scil. *propositum aeternum* divinae voluntatis, sit *gratuitum*, licet ratione *voliti* glorificatio et reprobatio consequantur merita et demerita nostra, hic in corp. et in solut. ad 3. et ultimis verbis ad 6. manifeste docetur; omnino consentiunt S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 3.), Scotus aliique antiqui doctores. — In solut. ad 4. cum sententia communi docetur, quod praedestinatio quoad effectum gratiae iuvetur precibus Sanctorum (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; *S.* I. q. 23. a. 8; *de Verit.* q. 6. a. 6.). — In solut. ad 5. supponitur, quod non omnia convertibilia sunt formaliter idem, ut patet in exemplo: *risibile est rationale*. Hinc sequitur, quod falso sic inferatur: perseverantiam finalem aliquis potest mereri, ergo et praedestinationem. Sed nec ipsam perseverantiam finalem homo potest proprie mereri, tamen, quando ipse non deest gratiae, potest eam suppliciter a Deo impetrare (cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 3. a. 1. ad 1, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. ad 3.).

**IV.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 3. a. 1. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. *unica*. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; *S.* I. q. 23. a. 5; *de Verit.* q. 6. a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 163. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; *S.* p. I. tr. 16. m. 3. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1, q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 2. a. 1, et d. 40. princ. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durand. de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. *unica*.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the easier understanding of this and the following question, it helps to set forth these [points] beforehand.

*1.* A distinction must be drawn between the *ratio of willing* and the *ratio of the [thing] willed*. "For God by a single act wills the end and all those things which are toward the end; whence *to will the end* is not for God the cause of willing the things which are toward the end; but yet he wills that the things which are toward the end be ordered to the end. He wills therefore *this to be on account of that*, but not *on account of this he wills that*" (St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 19, a. 3; cf. the commentary of Cajetan; and *S. c. Gent.* l. [I], c. 86). — The same distinction between *ratio of willing* and *ratio of the [thing] willed* is employed by St. Bonaventure, below at d. 45, dub. 3, and he explains the difference between our will and the divine [will] thus: that our will, since it is excited by the [thing] willed, has both its cause and its *ratio* from it [the willed object] both as regards itself and as regards the [thing] willed, especially when it wills something which is on account of the end; but the divine will, "is another act itself, since it is not excited by any *ratio* other than itself, [and so] cannot have a cause as regards itself. But the [thing] willed sometimes has another cause than the will, sometimes only the will, as in the creation of the world. The will has a *ratio*, but not a cause, since it is not irrational." Hence etc. — The same distinction is employed by Scotus (*Report.* here q. *unica*, n. 3–7), to persuade his view that on God's side, neither in predestining nor in reprobating, is there any other *ratio* beside the divine essence; and that on the side of the effect there is a *ratio* of reprobation, but not of predestination.

*2.* The *efficient cause*, the *meritorious cause*, [and] the *motive ground* differ. God alone is the efficient cause of grace and of glory; the meritorious cause, which is reduced either to disposition or in some way to the efficient cause, cannot be except in a creature, but is foreseen by God. The *motive ground* differs from the *meritorious cause*. For *ratio* extends more widely than cause, which is conceived as flowing into the effect; hence one divine attribute can be conceived by us as the *ratio* of another, but in no way as the cause. Likewise the term *motiva* extends more widely than *meritoria*, as is manifest. Hence it is that the *motive ground* can be conceived both on the side of God — e.g. the showing-forth of his mercy — and on the side of the predestined; and on this side again in two ways: either insofar as this *ratio* is founded on some merit (and then it coincides with the *meritorious cause*), or insofar as it supposes only some motive of congruity.

*3.* The Holy Doctor distinguishes in predestination the *principal significate* and the *connotatum*. The former is the eternal preordination, that is, the purpose of the divine will either of having mercy or of punishing (cf. here at [ad] 2, and q. 2 in the body); but the *connotatum* comprises the *effects* of divine predestination, which as [things] *willed* are ordered to the divine will by a real relation; and consequently the will of God by a relation of reason is terminated to these willed [things], which are the secondary object of the same will. The principal effects of predestination are *vocation*, which in adults implies a series of actual graces; *justification* through the infusion of habitual grace; *glorification*, which implies the grace of final perseverance.

*4.* That these *effects* or these [things] *willed* are ordered to one another according to the *ratio* of some causality is the common opinion: namely, "that the posterior effect is (the cause and *ratio*) of the prior according to the *ratio* of the final cause; but the prior, of the posterior, according to the *ratio* of the meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of matter" (St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 23, a. 5). It is also certain that vocation, as to the first grace and also as to the series of actual graces, does not fall under merit; nor [does] justification under merit of condignity, although adults "by freely assenting to and cooperating with grace are disposed" to justification (Trent, sess. 6, c. 5). Likewise it is certain that the justified, with the help of grace, "truly merits an increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself, if however he has departed in grace" (ibid. can. 32). Finally it is certain that the execution of this condition: *if however he has departed in grace*, that is, "that great gift of perseverance unto the end" (ibid. can. 16), "without a special help of God" (ibid. can. 22), can neither be obtained nor merited of condignity by the justified. But since neither the first nor the last of the temporal effects of predestination — namely vocation and final perseverance — falls under merit, the whole series of effects of predestination must be deemed gratuitous, although in it the cooperation and causality of free choice is in many ways involved.

*5.* In meritorious acts "what is from free choice and what is from predestination are not distinct" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.), since "the whole effect is from a created cause, and the whole from the uncreated infinite will" (St. Bonaventure, below d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1), yet *not totally*. Whence it follows that the same meritorious act is wholly an effect of predestination and a gift of God, although under another respect it can also be wholly from free choice; it follows also, that the same [things] can be our merits which are God's gifts (Celestine I, *epist.* 21, c. 12).

*6.* The effects of predestination, both singly and all collectively, just as they have an order to one another, so also have on their side a real relation to God, who is the first efficient, exemplary, and final cause both of each effect and of all together; whence rightly God is called by theologians the first and principal cause of salvation; not however the sole [cause], since he in no way excludes the actions of secondary causes, but rather involves and orders them to their effects. Otherwise there would be neither merit nor demerit<!-- page 731 -->, nor would the ancient saying be true (Letter of the bishops exiled in Sardinia in synod): "*God saves gratuitously and damns justly*."

**II.** In the response a threefold merit is distinguished: namely, besides merit *of condignity* and *of congruity*, also merit *of worthiness* (which is now commonly subsumed under merit *of congruity*), by which the just man, through his own intercessions, obtains graces from God for others. On this threefold division and other subdivisions cf. *II Sent.* d. 27, a. 2, q. 2. 3, and *III Sent.* d. 4, a. 2, q. 2; d. 18, a. 1, q. 2.

The words in the body: "*The merit of congruity is when the sinner does what is in him*", gave occasion to some — such as Vasquez — to disparage the Holy Doctor, as if he taught that through works of the natural order a disposition to justification could come about. That this interpretation is entirely foreign to the mind of the Holy Doctor can be gathered already from the words immediately following: "*the sinner is unworthy of every good*", and more clearly from dub. 3 of this distinction. In other places the Saint manifestly teaches that the disposition to justification requires "*prevenient and helping grace [working upon] the will*"; cf. *II Sent.* d. 28, a. 2, q. 1; d. 27, a. 2, q. 1. 2; *IV Sent.* d. 15, p. I, q. 5; and St. Thomas, *I-II*, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 2. On the celebrated axiom: *Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam*, see *II Sent.* d. 28, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4. — But since those words placed here in the body are not said precisely about the disposition to justification, P. Trigosus thinks they can be expounded also of *vocation* in general, taking the merit of congruity in a broader sense, insofar as he seems less unworthy of grace, who rather lives naturally well, than the impious [man], who by continuous sins daily provokes the wrath of God more.

**III.** That the *principal significate* in predestination, namely the *eternal purpose* of the divine will, is *gratuitous*, although by reason of the [thing] *willed* glorification and reprobation follow our merits and demerits, is manifestly taught here in the body and in the solution to [arg.] 3 and in the last words [of the reply] to [arg.] 6; St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 3, ad 3), Scotus, and other ancient doctors entirely consent. — In the solution to [arg.] 4, with the common opinion, it is taught that predestination, as regards the effect of grace, is aided by the prayers of the saints (cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *S.* I, q. 23, a. 8; *de Verit.* q. 6, a. 6). — In the solution to [arg.] 5 it is supposed that not all convertibles are formally the same, as is plain in the example: *the risible is rational*. Hence it follows that this would falsely be inferred: someone can merit final perseverance, therefore [also] predestination [can be merited]. But neither can a man properly merit final perseverance itself, but, when he himself is not deficient from grace, he can suppliantly obtain it from God (cf. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 3, a. 1, ad 1, and Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1, ad 3).

**IV.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 3, a. 1. — Scot., on this and the following question in both Writings, here q. *unica*. — St. Thom., here a. 3; *S.* I, q. 23, a. 5; *de Verit.* q. 6, a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* III, c. 163. — B. Albert., here a. 2; *S.* p. I, tr. 16, m. 3, a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1; q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1; a. 3, q. 1. — Aegid. R., on this and the following question, here 1, *princ.* q. 2, a. 1, and d. 40, *princ.* 2, q. 1. 2. — Durand., on this and the following question, here q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. *unica*.

---