title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 6

source_text:
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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum aequalis fieret multiplicatio virorum et mulierum, si homo stetisset.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum aequalis fieret multiplicatio virorum et mulierum. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*
1. Natura sic procederet in generando, sicut Deus eam instituit; sed Deus, cum produxit naturam humanam, produxit masculum et feminam in pari numero[^1]: ergo similiter et natura in pari numero multiplicasset.

2. Item, generatio hominis non poterat continuari nisi per masculum et feminam, et ita necessaria est ad generationem mulier, sicut et masculus: ergo videtur, quod natura aequaliter intenderet utrumque sexum; sed sicut intendebat, ita[^2] multiplicabat: ergo etc.

3. Item, sicut vir intendit se salvare[^3] in simili, scilicet in viro, quem generat, sic et mulier in consimili, scilicet in muliere; sed natura aeque bene esset ordinata in muliere, sicut in viro: ergo si vir non frustraretur sua intentione, similiter nec mulier: ergo quot conciperet masculos ad conservationem sexus virilis, tot conciperet feminas ad conservationem sexus muliebris.

4. Item, in statu innocentiae sicut quilibet comederet, ita quilibet prolem multiplicaret, cum omnibus esset dictum: *Crescite et multiplicamini*[^4] etc.: ergo quilibet haberet uxorem. Si ergo matrimonium requirit, quod sint *duo in carne una*, tot essent viri, quot mulieres, nec plures nec pauciores.

*Ad oppositum.*
1. Sicut dicit Philosophus in libro *de Animalibus*[^5]: «femina est vir occasionatus»: ergo videtur esse praeter naturae intentionem; sed tempore naturae institutae, cum natura esset recta, nihil produceretur praeter intentionem ipsius: ergo videtur, quod nulla mulier generaretur, vel saltem paucae: ergo plures essent viri quam mulieres.

2. Item, sicut vult Philosophus[^6]: «Natura semper desiderat quod melius est»; sed sexus virilis perfectior est et melior quam sexus muliebris: ergo natura magis desiderat generare virum quam mulierem; si ergo sic produceret, secundum quod desideraret, plures produceret viros quam mulieres.

3. Item, generatio maris est propter vigorem virtutis generantis et seminis decisi, sicut dicunt naturales et medici[^7]; sed in statu naturae institutae virtus generativa et semen decisum completam et sufficientem haberet virtutem: ergo semper vel plures masculos generari contingeret.

4. Item, cum semen viri praedominatur semini mulieris, tunc ad propriam naturam trahit et convertit; sed secundum ordinem naturae masculus potentior est femina: ergo, natura stante, semper vel plures vinceret semen virile: ergo plures generaret natura masculos quam mulieres.

### Conclusio.

> Si homo mansisset in statu innocentiae, natura aequaliter multiplicasset viros et mulieres.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si homo stetisset, aequaliter natura multiplicaret viros et mulieres. — Rationem autem huius facile est accipere a parte finis ad quem, sed difficile est accipere a parte principii a quo.

*Ratio ex parte finis.* A parte namque *finis ad quem* ratio est in promptu. Cum enim distinctio sexuum esset propter multiplicationem generis humani et completionem numeri electorum; et illa multiplicatio ad omnes spectaret, et hoc solum secundum legem matrimonii, in qua tantum una erat unius: necesse est, si natura stetisset, tot fuisse mulieres, quot viros, cum nulla mulier careret viro, et nullus vir careret uxore, nec una esset plurium, nec plures unius[^8].

*Ratio ex parte principii.* Rationem autem a parte *principii effectivi* assignare est difficile; potest tamen sic investigari descendendo ad principia alterius scientiae, scilicet naturalis et medicinae, quarum utraque famulari habet theologiae. *Notandum.* Magna est enim quaestio apud naturales et medicos de distantia generationis maris et feminae; et cum quaeritur, quare modo mas, modo femina generatur, triplex ratio redditur a diversis[^9].

*Redditur triplex ratio.* Una a parte *vasis suscipientis*: si enim suscipitur in parte dextra, dicunt, quod ibi generatur vir propter fortem calorem, qui ibi viget; si in parte sinistra, sic generari habet mulier. — Secunda ratio redditur ex parte *commixtionis* utriusque sexus[^10], scilicet viri et mulieris. Si enim praedominatur semen viri, tunc trahitur ad naturam viri, et generatur masculus; si vero semen mulieris, tunc tra<!-- page 486 -->hitur ad suam naturam, et generatur sexus femineus. — Tertia ratio redditur ex parte *virtutis seminis virilis*. Si enim semen virile fuerit virtutis fortis ex concursu triplicis caloris et spiritus in ipso existentis[^11], tunc fit fortior coagulatio et complexio, et generatur sexus vigorosus, id est masculinus. Si autem fuerit virtutis debilis, tunc fit coagulatio mollior et fragilior, et generatur ex eo sexus infirmus, scilicet femineus. — *Notandum.* Haec autem ratio tertio dicta principalior est inter istas tres, nec aliae habent efficaciam nisi ab ista. Nam, sicut vult Philosophus[^12], principaliter movens in generatione sive maris sive feminae est semen virile; et ideo nec semen mulieris proprie habet semini viri praedominari, nisi hoc dicatur propter debilitatem seminis virilis, qua accedit ad conformitatem seminis mulieris; nec locus matricis facit sexuum diversitatem principaliter sicut principaliter movens, sed sicut cooperans principaliter moventi, quae quidem est fortitudo vel debilitas in virtute seminis virilis.

*Ratio 3. declaratur ex tribus rationibus.* Si autem quaeratur, quae sit ratio diversitatis in debilitate et virtute virilis seminis; triplex etiam ratio potest reddi[^13]. — Una est propter *caliditatem et bonam dispositionem membri*, a quo fit seminis generatio, et per quod fit seminis transfusio, ita quod nec excedit in caliditate nec declinat ad frigiditatem; tunc enim semen, quod ab illo membro transfunditur, est fortis virtutis et vigoris. Si autem membrum se habet in opposita dispositione, tunc semen est virtutis debilis. — Alia ratio potest sumi ex parte *exterioris adiutorii*, utpote alimenti et venti et temporis, quae multum faciunt ad vigorationem vel debilitationem virtutis. Boreas enim suo flatu virtutem vigorat, dum eam recludit interius; sed auster debilitat, dum eam exhalare facit; sic etiam facit cibus et tempus. Et quando exteriores dispositiones concurrunt, quae virtutem habent vigorare, tunc semen est fortis virtutis; quando vero sunt in contraria dispositione, tunc semen est virtutis debilis. — Tertia ratio sumitur ex parte *animae*. Vis enim generativa multum conformatur accidentibus animae et imaginationibus, secundum quod per experimentum patet. Nam ex memoria delectationis frequenter fit excitatio pruritus carnis; et ex imaginatione forti in somnis fit effusio seminis, sicut fit ad praesentiam mulieris; et vis formativa, quae est praecipua virtus in semine, multum adiuvatur ab imaginativa, secundum quod exempla ponuntur et sunt in sacra Scriptura et etiam in medicina, ut patet in ovibus Iacob, Genesis trigesimo[^14]. Et narratur pro exemplo, quod mulier, quae nanum aspiciebat, cum a viro cognoscebatur, omnes filios nanos concipiebat.

*Quoad statum naturae lapsae.* Inter has autem rationes cum omnes sint bonae et faciant ad seminis vigorationem, secundum statum naturae lapsae praecipua sumitur ratio ex parte complexionis membri; aliae duae sunt sicut adminiculares solum vel impedientes.

*Quoad statum naturae institutae.* Sed tempore naturae institutae, in qua corpus subiectum erat animae, principalis ratio sumitur generationis maris et feminae a parte virtutis animalis moventis et imaginantis. Cum enim vir intenderet et vellet generare virum, tunc vigoraretur virtus naturalis eius in agendo, et esset semen maioris virtutis, et generaretur sexus vigorosus sive masculus; quando vero vellet et imaginaretur generare sexum femineum, tunc minus forti impressione ageret in naturam inferiorem corporalem, et tunc semen esset minus forte, et generaretur sexus femineus: et ideo in tempore naturae institutae generatio maris et feminae subesset voluntati rationali. — Et quoniam ratio dictaret, omnia facienda esse ordinate, et tot producere mulieres quot viros, ut quilibet vir haberet *adiutorium simile sibi*[^15] secundum exigentiam legis matrimonii; ideo tunc viros et mulieres produceret in numero aequali. Nunc autem, quia generativa non omnino subest virtuti animali, id est imaginariae, nec etiam rationali, licet ei aliquo modo conformetur, sed magis variatur penes dispositionem membri et exterioris adiutorii; hinc est, quod non est certa determinatio numeri nec in viris nec in feminis generandis; immo modo[^16], quando credit generare masculum, generat feminam, et quando credit generare feminam, generat masculum; et aliqui plures habent feminas, aliqui plures masculos. — Sic ergo patet, quod si homo stetisset, in aequali numero fieret multiplicatio virorum et mulierum. Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur, quod femina dicitur vir occasionatus; dicendum, quod Philosophus non vult dicere, quod femina sit praeter naturae intentionem, sed quod virtus naturae aliquem defectum habet in productione mulieris respectu productionis viri; ille autem defectus non repugnat ordini naturae, sed potius salvat. Secundum enim ordinem naturae, sicut producuntur in eodem corpore quaedam membra magis fortia, quaedam minus: sic producuntur in eadem specie quaedam individua unius sexus, quaedam alterius. Et ideo, licet ille *defectus*, qui ordinem naturae corrumpit, utputa est ille, qui est causa defectus membri vel bonae complexionis[^17], sit *praeter* naturae<!-- page 487 -->intentionem; *generatio* tamen mulieris nec est *praeter* naturam nec *contra* naturam, sed *secundum* naturam.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura semper desiderat illud quod melius est; dicendum, quod non intelligitur, quod semper desiderat melius *simpliciter*, sed melius *in ordine*; licet autem sexus masculinus melior sit in se quam femineus, non tamen esset ita sufficienter salus naturae in solo virili sexu, sicut est in virili et muliebri: et ideo natura magis desiderat utrumque quam alterum solum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semen viri praedominatur[^18] semini mulieris; dicendum, quod illa ratio debet sane intelligi, ad hoc quod valeat. Proprie enim loquendo, nunquam semen mulieris praedominatur semini viri; sed ideo dicitur praedominari semen mulieris, quia semen viri adeo est debilis virtutis, quod magis est idoneum ad productionem sexus muliebris quam virilis; hoc autem modo potuit esse in statu primo, sicut praetactum est.

*Ad 3.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad aliud quod obiicitur de fortitudine caloris et virtutis. Gradus enim ibi fuissent secundum ordinem rationis et secundum exigentiam finis, ita quod vir aliquando operaretur actione magis fortificata in productione viri, aliquando minus fortificata in productione mulieris. — Si quis autem vellet dicere, sicut aliqui existimant, quod mulier semper gemellos conciperet, ita quod pars dextra attraheret quod est maioris virtutis de semine ad generationem sexus virilis, et pars sinistra quod est virtutis magis debilis ad generationem sexus feminei; tunc facile esset ad ea quae obiecta sunt respondere. Hoc autem nec de facili probatur, nec etiam reprobatur certitudine rationis: et ideo modus solvendi praehabitus videtur esse magis rationabilis[^19].

*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem* (q. 5 SCHOLION II) pro auctorum nominibus qui hanc quaestionem tractant.

---

english:
### Question VI. *Whether the multiplication of men and women would have been equal, if man had stood.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether the multiplication of men and women would have been equal. And that it would, seems thus.

*Fundamenta.*
1. Nature would so proceed in generating as God instituted it; but God, when he produced human nature, produced male and female in equal number[^1]: therefore similarly nature also would have multiplied in equal number.

2. Likewise, the generation of man could not be continued except through male and female, and so woman is as necessary for generation as is the male: therefore it seems that nature would equally intend each sex; but as it intended, so[^2] it multiplied: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, just as the man intends to preserve himself[^3] in the like, namely in the man whom he generates, so too the woman in what is co-like, namely in the woman; but nature is just as well ordered in the woman as in the man: therefore if the man were not frustrated in his intention, neither would the woman: therefore as many males as she would conceive for the preservation of the male sex, so many females would she conceive for the preservation of the female sex.

4. Likewise, in the state of innocence, just as everyone would eat, so everyone would multiply offspring, since to all it was said: *Increase and multiply*[^4] etc.: therefore everyone would have a spouse. If therefore matrimony requires that there be *two in one flesh*, there would be as many men as women, neither more nor fewer.

*On the contrary.*
1. As the Philosopher says in the book *On Animals*[^5]: «woman is a man by accident (vir occasionatus)»: therefore she seems to be beside the intention of nature; but in the time of nature as instituted, since nature was upright, nothing would be produced beside its intention: therefore it seems that no woman would be generated, or at any rate few: therefore there would be more men than women.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds[^6]: «Nature always desires what is better»; but the male sex is more perfect and better than the female sex: therefore nature more desires to generate a man than a woman; if therefore she should produce according to what she desires, she would produce more men than women.

3. Likewise, the generation of the male is on account of the vigor of the generating virtue and of the seed cut off, as the natural philosophers and physicians say[^7]; but in the state of nature as instituted the generative virtue and the seed cut off would have complete and sufficient strength: therefore it would always — or for the most part — happen that males be generated.

4. Likewise, since the seed of the man dominates the seed of the woman, it draws and converts it to its own nature; but according to the order of nature the male is more potent than the female: therefore, nature standing, the male seed would always — or for the most part — prevail: therefore nature would generate more males than females.

### Conclusion.

> If man had remained in the state of innocence, nature would equally have multiplied men and women.

**I respond:** It must be said that if man had stood, nature would equally have multiplied men and women. — The reason for this, however, is easy to grasp from the side of the end *to which*, but difficult to grasp from the side of the principle *from which*.

*Reason from the end.* For from the side of the *end to which*, the reason is at hand. Since the distinction of the sexes was for the multiplication of the human race and the completion of the number of the elect; and that multiplication would pertain to all, and this only according to the law of matrimony, in which one only belonged to one: it is necessary, if nature had stood, that there be as many women as men, since no woman would lack a man and no man would lack a wife, neither would one belong to many nor many to one[^8].

*Reason from the principle.* But to assign a reason from the side of the *effective principle* is difficult; it can however be investigated thus by descending to the principles of another science, namely natural philosophy and medicine, both of which are to serve theology. *Note.* For there is a great question among natural philosophers and physicians concerning the distinction of the generation of male and female; and when it is asked why now a male, now a female is generated, a threefold reason is given by different authors[^9].

*A threefold reason is given.* One is from the side of the *receiving vessel*: for if the seed is received in the right part, they say that a male is there generated on account of the strong heat which thrives there; if in the left part, then a woman has to be generated. — The second reason is given from the side of the *commixture* of the two sexes[^10], namely of man and woman. For if the seed of the man dominates, then it is drawn to the man's nature, and a male is generated; but if the woman's seed dominates, then it is drawn<!-- page 486 --> to her nature, and a female sex is generated. — The third reason is given from the side of the *virtue of the male seed*. For if the male seed has been of strong virtue from the concurrence of the threefold heat and spirit existing in it[^11], then a stronger coagulation and complexion takes place, and a vigorous sex is generated, that is, the masculine. But if it has been of weak virtue, then a softer and frailer coagulation takes place, and from it a weak sex is generated, namely the feminine. — *Note.* This reason, the one given third, is the principal among these three, nor do the others have efficacy except from it. For, as the Philosopher holds[^12], what principally moves in the generation of either male or female is the male seed; and therefore the seed of the woman does not properly have to dominate the seed of the man, unless this be said on account of the weakness of the male seed, by which it approaches the conformity of the woman's seed; nor does the place of the womb make the diversity of the sexes principally as principal mover, but rather as cooperating with the principal mover, which indeed is the strength or weakness in the virtue of the male seed.

*The third reason is declared from three reasons.* But if it be asked what the reason is of the diversity in weakness and strength of the male seed; a threefold reason also can be given[^13]. — One is on account of the *heat and good disposition of the member*, from which the generation of the seed takes place, and through which the transfusion of the seed takes place, such that it neither exceeds in heat nor inclines toward cold; for then the seed which is transfused from that member is of strong virtue and vigor. But if the member is in the opposite disposition, then the seed is of weak virtue. — Another reason can be taken from the side of *exterior aid*, namely of food and wind and time, which contribute much to the strengthening or weakening of virtue. For Boreas by its blast strengthens the virtue, while it encloses it within; but Auster weakens it, while it makes it exhale; so too does food and time. And when the exterior dispositions concur which have the power to strengthen, then the seed is of strong virtue; but when they are in the contrary disposition, then the seed is of weak virtue. — The third reason is taken from the side of the *soul*. For the generative power is much conformed to the accidents of the soul and to imaginations, as appears by experience. For from the memory of pleasure there often arises a stirring of the itching of the flesh; and from strong imagination in sleep there is an effusion of seed, as occurs at the presence of a woman; and the formative virtue, which is the principal virtue in the seed, is much aided by the imaginative, as is shown by the examples set down both in sacred Scripture and in medicine, as appears in Jacob's sheep, Genesis thirty[^14]. And it is told as an example that a woman who would gaze on a dwarf, when she was known by her man, would conceive all her sons as dwarfs.

*As regards the state of fallen nature.* Among these reasons, since all are good and contribute to the vigoration of the seed, according to the state of fallen nature the principal reason is taken from the side of the complexion of the member; the other two are as auxiliaries only, or as impediments.

*As regards the state of nature as instituted.* But in the time of nature as instituted, in which the body was subject to the soul, the principal reason for the generation of male and female is taken from the side of the moving and imagining animal virtue. For when the man would intend and will to generate a man, then his natural virtue would be strengthened in acting, and the seed would be of greater virtue, and a vigorous sex, namely a male, would be generated; but when he would will and imagine to generate a female sex, then by a less strong impression he would act upon the inferior bodily nature, and then the seed would be less strong, and a female sex would be generated: and therefore in the time of nature as instituted the generation of male and female would be subject to the rational will. — And since reason would dictate that all things ought to be done in order, and to produce as many women as men, that every man might have *an aid like to himself*[^15] according to the exigency of the law of matrimony; therefore he would then produce men and women in equal number. Now however, since the generative is not entirely subject to the animal virtue, that is the imaginative, nor even to the rational, although it is in some way conformed to it, but is rather varied according to the disposition of the member and of exterior aid; hence it is that there is no fixed determination of the number either of the men or of the women to be generated; indeed sometimes[^16], when one believes he is generating a male, he generates a female, and when he believes he is generating a female, he generates a male; and some have more females, others more males. — So therefore it is plain that, if man had stood, the multiplication of men and women would have taken place in equal number. Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*
1. To that which is first objected, that woman is called *a man by accident*; it must be said that the Philosopher does not mean that woman is beside the intention of nature, but that the virtue of nature has some defect in the production of the woman with respect to the production of the man; that defect, however, does not conflict with the order of nature, but rather preserves it. For according to the order of nature, just as in the same body certain members are produced as more strong, certain as less strong: so in the same species certain individuals of one sex are produced, certain of the other. And therefore, although that *defect* which corrupts the order of nature — namely that which is the cause of a defect of a member or of a good complexion[^17] — is *beside* the<!-- page 487 -->intention of nature; nevertheless the *generation* of a woman is neither *beside* nature nor *contrary to* nature, but *according to* nature.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that nature always desires what is better; it must be said that this is not to be understood as that she always desires what is better *simply*, but what is better *in order*; for although the masculine sex is better in itself than the feminine, yet the salvation of nature would not be sufficiently secured in the male sex alone, as it is in the male and the female together: and therefore nature more desires both than the one alone.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the seed of the man dominates[^18] the seed of the woman; it must be said that this argument must be soundly understood, that it may have force. For properly speaking, never does the seed of the woman dominate the seed of the man; but the woman's seed is said to dominate for this reason: that the seed of the man is so weak in virtue that it is more fitted for the production of the female sex than of the male; and this in fact could be the case in the first state, as has been touched on above.

*To 3.* And by this is plain the response to the other [objection] which is raised concerning the strength of the heat and of the virtue. For there the degrees would have been according to the order of reason and according to the exigency of the end, such that the man would sometimes operate with a more strengthened action in the production of a man, sometimes with a less strengthened action in the production of a woman. — But if anyone should wish to say, as some hold, that the woman would always conceive twins, such that the right part would draw what is of greater virtue of the seed to the generation of the male sex, and the left part what is of weaker virtue to the generation of the female sex; then it would be easy to respond to the objections. But this is neither easily proved nor refuted with the certitude of reason: and therefore the mode of solution previously set out seems to be the more reasonable[^19].

*See the scholion on the preceding question* (q. 5 SCHOLION II) for the names of the authors who treat this question.

---

la: Cfr. Gen. I, 27.

la: Cod. cc. et ed. 1 *ita et*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 read *ita et*.

la: Edd. et plures codd. *salvari*.

en: The editions and several codices read *salvari* ("to be saved" passive).

la: Gen. 1, 28. — Seq. textus est ibid. 2, 24.

en: Gen 1:28. — The following text [*duo in carne una*] is from ibid. 2:24.

la: Libr. XVI. sive libr. II. de Generat. animal. c. 3: *Femina enim quasi mas laesus est* (τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον). Cfr. ibid. IV. c. 6, ubi haec: *Sexum femineum quasi laesionem naturalem et detrimentum esse putandum est*.

en: Book XVI, or Book II, *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 3: "For the female is as it were a maimed male" (Greek as quoted). Cf. ibid. IV c. 6, where one reads: "the female sex must be regarded as a sort of natural maiming and detriment."

la: Libr. II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10). Vide supra pag. 341, nota 1. — Paulo inferius edd. 1, 2 et multi codd. *desideraret* pro *desiderat*.

en: Book II, *On Generation and Corruption*, text 59 (c. 10). See above p. 341 n. 1. — A little below, eds. 1 and 2 and many codices read *desideraret* (subjunctive) for *desiderat*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 1. 6, et Avicenna, III. Canon. Fen 21. tr. 1. c. 12.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* IV, c. 1, 6; and Avicenna, *Canon* III, Fen 21, tr. 1, c. 12.

la: Vide supra q. 1. in corp.

en: See above, q. 1 in the body.

la: Cfr. de his rationibus Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 1. seq., et Comment. Averrois, ibid., Avicenna, III. Canon. Fen 20. tr. 1. c. 3. et Fen 21. tr. 1. c. 12.

en: Cf. on these reasons Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* IV c. 1 ff., and the Commentary of Averroes, ibid.; Avicenna, *Canon* III, Fen 20, tr. 1, c. 3, and Fen 21, tr. 1, c. 12.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1. *seminis*.

en: Several codices with ed. 1 read *seminis* ("of seed") [in place of "of commixture"].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 219, nota 8, et pag. 421, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 219 n. 8 and p. 421 n. 2.

la: Libr. I. de Generat. animal. c. 20; II. c. 1; IV. c. 1. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. *quod quidem est* pro *quae quidem est*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* I c. 20; II c. 1; IV c. 1. — Somewhat below, the Vatican edition reads *quod quidem est* for *quae quidem est*.

la: Prima et secunda ratio affertur ab Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 2, et ab Averroe, ibid.

en: The first and second reasons are adduced by Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* IV c. 2, and by Averroes, ibid.

la: Vers. 37. seqq. — Quoad expositionem huius textus vide August., III. de Trin. c. 8. n. 13; XI. c. 2. n. 3; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 25; XVIII. c. 5. De hac ratione cfr. etiam Avicenna, I. Canon. Fen 2. Doctr. 2. c. 14.

en: Gen 30:37 ff. — On the exposition of this text see Augustine, *On the Trinity* III c. 8 n. 13; XI c. 2 n. 3; *On the City of God* XII c. 25; XVIII c. 5. On this argument cf. also Avicenna, *Canon* I, Fen 2, Doctr. 2, c. 14.

la: Gen. 2, 18. — Paulo inferius pro *generativa* cod. F *vis generativa*.

en: Gen 2:18. — A little below, for *generativa* codex F reads *vis generativa*.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *unde modo*; Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et edd. 3, 4 omittit *modo*.

en: Several codices with ed. 1 read *unde modo*; the Vatican edition with one or two codices and eds. 3, 4 omit *modo*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *dispositionis*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 read *dispositionis* [for *complexionis*].

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *praedominabatur*.

en: Not a few codices with ed. 1 read *praedominabatur* (imperfect).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question (q. 5 SCHOLION II — Quaracchi prints there the commentator-roll for q. 6: Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Durand.). ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops of pp. 485–487 (per Vol II PDF-priority inversion). OCR raw range 34094–34256 in `raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` (immediately following d20-a1-q5 SCHOLION II, terminates at `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` at line 34257). Opener "Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum aequalis fieret multiplicatio…" confirms q6 alignment.

**Page-split map for apparatus.**
- p. 485 L-2 footers ¹–⁶ → [^1]–[^6] (Gen 1:27 + *ita et* + *salvari* + Gen 1:28 / Gen 2:24 + Aristot. *de Gen. anim.* II/XVI c.3 Greek + Aristot. *de Gen. et corrupt.* II text 59 / Vat. *desideraret*).
- p. 485 R-2 footers ⁷–¹⁰ → [^7]–[^10] (Aristot. IV *Gen. anim.* + Avicenna / *vide supra q.1 in corp.* / multi-ref Aristot. IV + Averroes + Avicenna III Canon Fen 20/21 / Vat. *seminis*).
- p. 486 L-2 footers ¹–⁴ → [^11]–[^14] (supra pag. 219 + 421 / Aristot. I *de Gen. anim.* c. 20; II c. 1; IV c. 1 + Vat. *quod quidem est* / Aristot. IV c. 2 + Averroes / Gen 30:37 + Aug. *de Trin.* III/XI + *de Civ. Dei* XII/XVIII + Avicenna I Canon Fen 2).
- p. 486 R-2 footers ⁵–⁷ → [^15]–[^17] (Gen 2:18 + cod. F *vis generativa* / *unde modo* variant / Vat. *dispositionis*).
- p. 487 L-2 footers ¹–² → [^18]–[^19] (*praedominabatur* variant / *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* sibling-pointer). p. 487 L-2 footers ³+ all anchor in DUB. I / II body and migrate forward to d20-dubia.

**Sibling-pointer for scholion.** `has_scholion: false` per the Vol II first-sibling convention: q5's SCHOLION II on p. 484 R-2 already enumerates the commentators on q6 (Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Durand.). The same convention was used for d20-a1-q2 (sibling-pointer to q1's SCHOLION) and d20-a1-q4 (sibling-pointer to q3's SCHOLION).

**Cross-chunk hand-off.** Received none from d20-a1-q5 (q5 captured both SCHOLION I and SCHOLION II for p. 484 R-2). Forward hand-off to d20-dubia: p. 487 L-2 footers ³+ (*Aliqui codd.* *dubitationes* / Vat. *hic* / Dist. 31 cross-ref / Vers. 32) all anchor in DUB. I / II / III / IV body.

**OCR cascade-fragmentation regions.** The IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered (a) the Respondeo's tripartite *Ratio ex parte finis ad quem* / *principii effectivi* opening, (b) the entire *triplex ratio … redditur* block (vas suscipiens / commixtio / virtus seminis) crossing the p. 485 → p. 486 column boundary, (c) the long *Quoad statum naturae lapsae* / *institutae* dichotomy and the *adiutorium simile sibi* matrimonial-equality clause, and (d) the *Solutio oppositorum* ad-4 reordering (the printed page closes ad 1 → ad 2 → ad 4 → ad 3, not the Fundamenta order). Column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override step 1.

**No `[?]` flags.** All 19 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 485–487. The *triplex ratio* terminology is verified verbatim against the printed text (`vasis suscipientis` / `commixtionis` / `virtutis seminis virilis`).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 20, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XX)

title_alt: Doubts on the Letter of the Master (Dist. XX)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 487 -->

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *infirmitas prona ad ruinam turpitudinis excipitur honestate nuptiarum*. Ex hoc enim videtur dicere, quod non possit actus ille sine peccato et turpitudine exerceri. Sed contra hoc est, quia omnis actus, qui est in praecepto, potest fieri sine peccato, ergo et coitus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc[^1] non dicitur de turpitudine, quae sonat in *culpam*, sed quae magis sonat in *poenam*; vel si de illa intelligatur, tunc nuptiae ita excipiunt pronitatem carnis, quod actus ille absque omni peccato potest fieri. Unde quod dicit Magister, quod nuptiae ordinant actum illum, non est intelligendum ratione inordinationis, quae sit in actu illo, sed quae inesset, nisi esset matrimonium; de hoc autem diffusius agetur in quarto[^2] in tractatu de matrimonio.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *in paradiso essent nuptiae honorabiles*. Videtur enim, quod similiter sint honorabiles in statu Ecclesiae, cum sint *Sacramentum magnum*, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Ephesios quinto[^3], cum etiam approbentur a iure naturali. Si tu dicas, quod honorabilitas nuptiarum attenditur quantum ad actum illum; tunc quaeritur, quare magis actus ille honestus et castus sit cum pudore quam alius actus, in quo est culpae deordinatio; magis enim verecundatur quis de actu illo honeste et caste facto quam de alio actu inordinato, utpote cognoscere uxorem, quam percutere servum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de nuptiis quantum ad *significatum* et quantum ad *fructum* et quantum ad *actum*; et quantum ad haec tria honorabiles erant in paradiso. *Distinctio.* In statu vero miseriae, quamvis sint honorabiles quantum ad *significatum* et *fructum*, habent tamen pudorem annexum quantum ad *actum*, quia omnis homo utens ratione actum illum erubescit exercere coram aliis, etiam cum propria uxore. — *Ratio.* Rationem autem huius assignat Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei[^4]: quia, cum ratio deberet dominari corpori, magis erubescit, quod ipsa subiiciatur alicui parti corporis; et quod aliqua pars corporis dominetur ei, quam quod ipsa inordinate dominetur sibi; et ideo magis verecundatur de ardore libidinis, quae est in actu illo, quam de perturbatione furoris, quae est in convitiando servo.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Deus nondum iusserat, ut coirent*. Hoc enim videtur esse
<!-- page 488 -->
falsum, quia dicitur Genesis primo[^5]: *Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram*; constat, quod hoc dictum est quantum ad actum generativae: ergo etc. — *Quaestio incidens 1.* Iuxta hoc quaeritur, si mandatum illud omnes obligabat. Quodsi *sic*: ergo videtur, quod transgressi sunt, quia non coierunt in statu innocentiae; si *non*: ergo videtur, quod poterant continue servare virginitatem.

*Quaestio 2.* Item quaero, utrum illud mandatum maneat adhuc. Quodsi manet: ergo non licet alicui servare virginitatem, quod est contra Apostolum, qui dicit primae ad Corinthios septimo[^6]: *Volo, omnes vos esse, sicut ego sum*; loquitur de castitate. Si non obligat modo, quaero: quando revocatum est? Videtur etiam, quod modo sint melioris conditionis homines quam tunc, quia modo possunt servare virginitatem, tunc autem non poterant.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud mandatum *Ad quaest. 1.* datum fuit viro et mulieri in statu innocentiae; sed cum esset mandatum *affirmativum*, non obligabat ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. Determinatio autem temporis dependebat ex revelatione divinae voluntatis; quam[^7] quia Deus nondum eis revelaverat, ideo dicit Magister, quod nondum iusserat.

*Ad quaest. 2.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum illud mandatum fuerit revocatum; dicendum, quod aliter obligabat tempore naturae institutae, aliter nunc. Tunc enim omnes obligabat, quia omnibus erat in officium; nunc autem non obligat omnes, pro eo quod multi sunt, qui sufficiunt illud implere, aliis consilium virginitatis servantibus. Hoc autem consilium competit statui naturae *lapsae*, non autem naturae *institutae*, quia tunc, cum nulla esset pronitas, non esset maior virtus continere quam nubere, et omnes prolem ad cultum Dei generarent; nunc autem propter difficultatem et arduitatem omnino continere magnae est virtutis et dignitatis. — Et sic patent ea quae obiiciuntur[^8].

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Completo numero, sine morte corpora in aliam qualitatem transirent*. Videtur enim haec positio esse inconveniens. Primum, quia magnum dispendium esset parentibus, si tanto tempore gloria eorum differretur, quousque electorum numerus impleretur. — Et iterum, *si spes, quae differtur, affligit animam*[^9], videtur, quod in eis esset aliqua afflictio. Rursus, cum numerus electorum futurus sit in magna multitudine, quomodo possent omnes homines intra paradisi spatium contineri? Hoc non videtur esse probabile. Si tu dicas, quod propter hoc parentes transferrentur absque aliis[^10] et glorificarentur; hoc non videtur conveniens, quia ad magnificentiam Dei spectat, omnes simul glorificari, sicut faciet in die iudicii in generali resurrectione.

*Responsio.* Et dicendum est breviter, quod ista secunda opinio probabilior est, sicut dictae rationes ostendunt. Nec obstat illud de simultate glorificationis; hoc enim magis est propter iudicium et resurrectionem corporum, quam decet esse simul, quam propter beatitudinis collationem. Huius ratio expressius habetur in quarto[^11], in tractatu de resurrectione.

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *in parvulis exspectaretur aetas ad ambulandum et loquendum, sicut modo*. Hanc enim opinionem videtur Magister approbare. Sed contra hoc est verbum Augustini[^12] praecedens paulo ante hoc. Dicit enim sic: «Infirmitati mentis congruit haec infirmitas carnis». — Item, si natura humana potentior et nobilior est quam brutalis, et quorundam animalium fetus statim, cum nascuntur, possunt ambulare: multo fortius videtur, quod filii hominum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister nullam istarum opinionum intendit asserere; et dubium est, *Notandum.* utrum sic, vel sic esset; nihilominus tamen hanc opinionem approbat tanquam probabiliorem, quae dicit, parvulos paulative proficere et crescere ad usum membrorum. Nec hoc dicit sine ratione. Teneritudo enim membrorum debetur proli hominis propter bonitatem complexionis et congruentiam naturae, quae procedit a debiliori complexione ad fortiorem; unde parvuli habent teneriora membra quam adulti. Processus autem in incremento non
<!-- page 489 -->
esset miraculosus, sed naturalis, etiam tempore naturae institutae; et ideo rationabiliter Magister hunc modum dicendi magis approbat. Verbum autem Augustini praecedens intelligitur de infantia ratione incommodorum concomitantium eam, non ratione imperfectionis membrorum. — Aliud[^13] quod obiicitur de illis generibus animalium, non valet, quia alterius sunt complexionis et organizationis.

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Parvulos per intervallum temporis in sensu et cognitione proficere*. Cum enim anima rationalis non senescit in tempore[^14], non videtur secundum conditiones temporis alterari: ergo videtur, quod processu temporis non efficeretur magis sciens, cum non haberet in scientia per tempora alterari. — Item, Deus fecit animam Adae perfectam scientia[^15]: ergo pari ratione fecisset animam filiorum, si ipse stetisset.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum ad hoc, quod haec est probabilior positio, quod aliquo modo per intervalla temporum in sensu et cognitione profecissent. *Notandum.* Anima enim, dum est in corpore, complexionem corporis imitatur. Et quoniam in infantia[^16] est mollis et fluida complexio cerebri, ideo non potest ibi esse fortis impressio specierum nec fortis conversio super illas. Unde sicut facies non relucet in aqua mota, sic parvuli non essent idonei statim ad usum cognitionis.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod anima non alteratur in tempore; verum est, quantum est de se, sed ratione corporis[^17], cui coniungitur, quod crescit et in tempore fortificatur. — Ad aliud vero quod obiicit, quod haberet habitum; dicendum, quod si puer haberet scientiam quantum ad habitum, non tamen haberet quantum ad actualem considerationem propter organi ineptitudinem, sicut etiam non habent dormientes. Unde sicut parvuli baptizati dicuntur habere virtutes «in munere, non in usu[^18]» vel actu; sic intelligendum est, parvulos illos scientiam habuisse; et postmodum, complexione facta habili ad considerandum, statim essent in actu considerationis sine penuria et labore; et potissime verum esset in eis illud verbum Philosophi[^19], quod dicit, quod «in sedendo et in quiescendo fit anima prudens et sciens», cum sessio et quies dicatur contra motum et fluxibilitatem complexionis.

### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Praeceptum addidit obedientiae*; quare Dominus addidit praeceptum super praeceptum? Et quare tot fuerunt praecepta, quae homini dedit? Et iterum, quare praeceptum obedientiae sive disciplinae potius fuit *negativum* quam *affirmativum*?

*Responsio.* Respondendum est ad hoc breviter, quod tria Dominus fecit eis praecepta in principio, unum scilicet quod fuit: *Crescite et multiplicamini*[^20]. Aliud fuit: *De omni ligno paradisi comedite*. Tertium fuit: *De ligno autem scientiae boni et mali nolite comedere*. — Numerus autem et sufficientia istorum praeceptorum potest sumi dupliciter. *Congruentia 1.* Uno modo sic: quoddam enim est praeceptum, quod ordinat ad Deum; et istud fuit praeceptum obedientiae. Quoddam, quod ordinat ad *proximum*; et illud fuit praeceptum de multiplicando genere. Quoddam, quod ordinat ad *se ipsum*; et hoc fuit praeceptum de comestione. — *Congruentia 2.* Secundo modo sic, ut quoddam praeceptum respiciat *corpus*, et hoc est praeceptum de comedendo; quoddam respiciat *animam*, et hoc est praeceptum de abstinendo, quod est obedientiae meritum; quoddam *coniunctum*, et hoc est praeceptum de consimili multiplicando. — Praeceptum autem disciplinae fuit *negativum*, ut facilior esset eius observantia, et homo non posset de transgressione vel omissione habere excusationem. — Et in hoc terminatur totalis illa pars huius libri, quae est de hominis constitutione.

---

english:
### DUB. I.

In this part there are questions on the letter, and first it is asked concerning that which he says, that *the infirmity prone to the ruin of turpitude is taken up [excused] by the honor of marriage*. For from this he seems to say that this act cannot be performed without sin and turpitude. But to the contrary: every act which is in a precept can be done without sin; therefore so too can intercourse.

**I respond:** It must be said that this[^1] is not said of the turpitude which sounds [unto] *fault*, but rather of that which sounds [unto] *punishment*; or if it be understood of the former, then marriage so takes up the proneness of the flesh that the act can be performed without any sin. Hence what the Master says — that marriage orders that act — is not to be understood by reason of any disorder which is in that act, but of that which would be in it were there no marriage; on this however a fuller treatment will be given in the fourth [book][^2], in the tract on matrimony.

### DUB. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *in paradise the nuptials would be honorable*. For it seems that they are likewise honorable in the state of the Church, since they are *a great Sacrament*, as the Apostle says to the Ephesians, chapter five[^3], and since also they are approved by natural law. If you say that the honorability of marriage is to be considered with respect to the act itself, then it is asked why this honest and chaste act should be done with shame rather than another act in which there is the disorder of fault; for a man is more ashamed of that act honestly and chastely performed than of another disordered act, such as to know one's wife rather than to strike a servant.

**I respond:** It must be said that marriage may be spoken of with respect to *what is signified*, with respect to *fruit*, and with respect to *act*; and with respect to these three they were honorable in paradise. *Distinction.* But in the state of misery, although they are honorable as to *what is signified* and as to *fruit*, they nevertheless have shame attached as to the *act*, because every man who uses reason is ashamed to exercise that act before others, even with his own wife. — *Reason.* And Augustine assigns the reason for this in the fourteenth [book] of the *City of God*[^4]: because, since reason ought to dominate the body, it is more ashamed that it itself should be subjected to some part of the body, and that some part of the body should dominate it, than that it itself should disorderedly dominate itself; and therefore one is more ashamed of the ardor of lust which is in that act than of the perturbation of fury which is in upbraiding a servant.

### DUB. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *God had not yet commanded that they should come together*. For this seems to be false, because it is said in Genesis 1[^5]: *Increase and multiply and fill the earth*; and it is clear that this was said with respect to the act of the generative [power]: therefore etc. — *Incidental question 1.* In connection with this it is asked whether that command bound all. If *yes*: then it seems they transgressed, since they did not come together in the state of innocence; if *no*: then it seems they could continually preserve virginity.

*Question 2.* Likewise I ask whether that command still remains. If it remains: then it is not lawful for anyone to preserve virginity, which is against the Apostle, who says in 1 Corinthians 7[^6]: *I wish all of you to be as I am*; he is speaking of chastity. If it does not bind now, I ask: when was it revoked? And it would also seem that men are now in a better condition than then, because now they can preserve virginity, but then they could not.

**I respond:** It must be said that that command *To question 1.* was given to man and woman in the state of innocence; but since it was an *affirmative* command, it did not bind always, but for [a given] place and time. The determination of the time however depended on the revelation of the divine will; and because[^7] God had not yet revealed it to them, therefore the Master says that he had not yet commanded.

*To question 2.* To that which is asked, whether that command was revoked; it must be said that it bound differently in the time of nature instituted, differently now. For then it bound all, because for all it was a duty; but now it does not bind all, because there are many who suffice to fulfill it, while others observe the counsel of virginity. This counsel however befits the state of *fallen* nature, not the state of nature *instituted*, because then, when there was no proneness, it would not be a greater virtue to abstain than to marry, and all would generate offspring for the worship of God; but now, because of the difficulty and arduousness, to abstain altogether is of great virtue and dignity. — And thus the things objected[^8] are clear.

### DUB. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *When the number had been completed, bodies would pass without death into another quality*. For this position seems to be unsuitable. First, because it would be a great loss for the parents if their glory were deferred for so long, until the number of the elect should be filled. — And again, if *hope deferred afflicts the soul*[^9], it seems there would be some affliction in them. Again, since the number of the elect that was to be would be in a great multitude, how could all men be contained within the space of paradise? This does not seem probable. If you say that for this reason the parents would be translated apart from the others[^10] and glorified; this does not seem fitting, because it pertains to the magnificence of God that all be glorified together, as he will do on the day of judgment in the general resurrection.

*Response.* And it must be said briefly that this second opinion is more probable, as the stated reasons show. Nor does that consideration about the simultaneity of glorification stand in the way; for this is rather on account of the judgment and the resurrection of bodies — which it is fitting should be together — than on account of the bestowal of beatitude. The reason for this is more expressly given in the fourth [book][^11], in the tract on the resurrection.

### DUB. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *in little ones an age would be awaited for walking and speaking, just as now*. For this opinion the Master seems to approve. But against this is the word of Augustine[^12] preceding a little before this. For he says thus: «To the infirmity of the mind this infirmity of the flesh corresponds». — Likewise, if human nature is more powerful and nobler than the brute, and the offspring of certain animals, as soon as they are born, can walk: much more does it seem that the sons of men [could].

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master does not intend to assert any of these opinions; and it is in doubt, *Note.* whether it would be thus or thus; nevertheless he approves this opinion as more probable, which says that little ones gradually advance and grow to the use of [their] members. Nor does he say this without reason. For the tenderness of members is due to the offspring of man on account of the goodness of his complexion and the congruity of [his] nature, which proceeds from a weaker complexion to a stronger; whence little ones have more tender members than adults. The process however in growth would not have been miraculous, but natural, even in the time of nature instituted; and therefore the Master more reasonably approves this way of speaking. The preceding word of Augustine is to be understood of infancy by reason of the inconveniences accompanying it, not by reason of imperfection of the members. — The other thing[^13] which is objected concerning those kinds of animals does not hold, because they are of a different complexion and organization.

### DUB. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *That little ones advance over an interval of time in sense and cognition*. For since the rational soul does not grow old in time[^14], it does not seem to be altered according to the conditions of time: therefore it seems that with the passage of time it would not be made more knowing, since it would not have anything in knowledge to be altered through times. — Likewise, God made the soul of Adam perfect in knowledge[^15]: therefore by the same reason he would have made the soul of [his] sons [perfect in knowledge], had he himself stood.

**I respond:** It must be said to this, that this is the more probable position, that in some way they would have advanced through intervals of times in sense and cognition. *Note.* For the soul, while it is in the body, imitates the complexion of the body. And since in infancy[^16] the complexion of the brain is soft and fluid, therefore there cannot there be a strong impression of species nor a strong conversion upon them. Hence just as a face does not shine back in moved water, so little ones would not be apt straightway for the use of cognition.

To what is objected, that the soul is not altered in time; it is true so far as the soul is concerned in itself, but by reason of the body[^17] to which it is joined — which grows and is strengthened in time. — To the other [objection], that he would have a habit; it must be said that if a boy had knowledge as to *habit*, he would not nevertheless have it as to actual consideration, on account of the ineptitude of the organ, as also those who sleep do not. Hence just as baptized little ones are said to have the virtues «in endowment, not in use[^18]» or in act; so it is to be understood that those little ones had knowledge; and afterwards, when the complexion had been made apt for considering, they would straightway be in act of consideration without lack and labor; and most truly would that word of the Philosopher[^19] hold in them, which says that «in sitting and in being at rest the soul becomes prudent and knowing», since sitting and rest are said as against motion and the fluctuation of complexion.

### DUB. VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *He added a precept of obedience*; why did the Lord add precept upon precept? And why were there so many precepts which he gave to man? And again, why was the precept of obedience or discipline rather *negative* than *affirmative*?

*Response.* It must be answered to this briefly, that the Lord made for them three precepts at the beginning, namely, first, that which was: *Increase and multiply*[^20]. The other was: *Eat of every tree of paradise*. The third was: *But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil eat not*. — The number however and sufficiency of these precepts can be taken in two ways. *Congruity 1.* In one way thus: for there is a certain precept which orders toward God, and this was the precept of obedience. Another, which orders toward the *neighbor*; and this was the precept of multiplying the race. Another, which orders toward *oneself*; and this was the precept of eating. — *Congruity 2.* In a second way thus, that one precept regards the *body*, and this is the precept of eating; another regards the *soul*, and this is the precept of abstaining, which is the merit of obedience; another *conjoined*, and this is the precept of multiplying the like. — But the precept of discipline was *negative*, in order that the keeping of it might be easier, and that man might not have any excuse for transgression or omission. — And in this terminates that whole part of this book which is on the constitution of man.

---

la: Aliqui codd. et ed. 1 *dubitationes*.

en: Some codices and edition 1 read *dubitations*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *hic*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 reads *here*.

la: Dist. 31. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.

en: Distinction 31, article 1, question 1, and article 2, question 1. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here at article 6; St. Thomas, here in the comment on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 3.

la: Vers. 32. — Paulo inferius post *actus ille* nonnulli codd. et ed. 1 bene interiiciunt *cum est* (cod. Z *qui est*), ac subinde cum pluribus aliis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 pro *sit* substituunt *fit*. Dein cod. aa post *quam* subiungit *aliquis*.

en: Verse 32. — A little further on, after *actus ille*, several codices and edition 1 rightly insert *cum est* (cod. Z reads *qui est*), and then with several other codices and editions 2, 3, 4 substitute *fit* for *sit*. Then cod. aa after *quam* adds *aliquis*.

la: Cap. 16. 19. et 23. n. 2. seq. — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit., Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 4. — Paulo inferius pro *dominetur sibi; et ideo* Vat. *dominetur ei, ideo*. In fine dubii pro *convitiando* nonnulli codd. *comminando*.

en: Chapter 16, 19, and 23, no. 2 and following. — The same doubt is solved by St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the comment on the letter, [and] Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 4. — A little further on, for *dominetur sibi; et ideo* the Vatican reads *dominetur ei, ideo*. At the end of the doubt, for *convitiando* some codices read *comminando*.

la: Vers. 28.

en: Verse 28 [of Genesis 1].

la: Vers. 7, ubi Vulgata: *Volo enim, omnes vos esse sicut meipsum*.

en: Verse 7, where the Vulgate reads: *For I wish all of you to be as myself*.

la: Cod. T *quare*.

en: Codex T reads *quare* [why].

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 4; S. Thom., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, question 89, member 4; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the comment on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 5.

en: Proverbs 13:12.

la: Haud pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *filiis*. Paulo ante complures codd. et ed. 1, verbis transpositis, sic: *Si tu dicas propter hoc, quod parentes*. Cod. N *omnes electi* pro *omnes homines*.

en: Not a few codices with edition 1 read *filiis* [sons]. A little earlier several codices and edition 1, with the words transposed, read thus: *Si tu dicas propter hoc, quod parentes*. Cod. N reads *all the elect* for *all men*.

la: Dist. 43. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. Petr. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 6.

en: Distinction 43, article 1, question 3. Cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the comment on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 6.

la: Libr. I. de Peccatorum merit. et remiss. et bapt. parvul. c. 38. n. 69, qui locus allegatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4, ubi etiam sequens ratio exhibetur.

en: Book I *On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Little Ones*, c. 38, n. 69, which passage is cited here in the Master's letter, c. 4, where also the following reason is set out.

la: Vat. et aliae edd. non bene *Ad illud*. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, ubi etiam seq. dubium solvitur; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2.

en: The Vatican and other editions less well read *Ad illud*. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, question 90, member 3; Bl. Albert, here at article 7; [and] *Summa* part II, tract 14, question 83, where also the following doubt is solved; St. Thomas, here question 2, article 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here question 2, article 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here at article 2, question 2; Aegidius Romanus, here at question 2, article 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 459, nota 6. — Pro *non senescit* Vat. *senescit* tantum; perperam.

en: Cf. above page 459, note 6. — For *non senescit* the Vatican reads *senescit* only; wrongly.

la: Ut ostenditur infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As is shown below at distinction 23, article 2, question 1.

la: Ante *infantia* vocula *in* a nobis inserta est, licet in omnibus codd. et edd. desideretur. Constat, in codd. antiquis aliqua particula saepissime a librariis omitti, quando repetitur.

en: Before *infantia* the little word *in* has been inserted by us, although in all the codices and editions it is wanting. It is known that in ancient codices some particle is very often omitted by the scribes when it is repeated.

la: Supple: *alteratur*. — Deinde Vat. omittit *quod*, postea pro *habitum*, scil. scientiae, substituit *scientiam*, et, suppressa voce *puer*, prosequitur: *dicendum, quod etsi haberet*.

en: Supply: *alteratur* [is altered]. — Then the Vatican omits *quod*; afterwards for *habitum*, namely of knowledge, it substitutes *scientiam*; and, suppressing the word *puer*, it continues: *dicendum, quod etsi haberet*.

la: Ut dicit Magister, IV. Sent. d. IV. in fine.

en: As the Master says, *Sentences* IV, distinction 4, at the end.

la: Libr. VII. Phys. text. 20. (c. 3.), ubi et haec sententia: *Neque igitur pueri possunt quid discere neque iudicare similiter ac seniores; multa enim perturbatio circa ipsos fit et motus. Sedantur autem et desinunt perturbationes aliquando quidem a natura, aliquando vero ab aliis* etc. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Pro *quod dicit* nonnulli codd. *qui dicit*.

en: Book VII of the *Physics*, text 20 (c. 3), where also this sentence: *Therefore neither can boys learn anything nor judge in like manner as the elders; for there is much perturbation about them and motion. The perturbations are quieted however and cease, sometimes indeed from nature, but sometimes from other things*, etc. — This doubt is also solved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, question 90, member 2; St. Thomas, here question 2, article 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here question 2, article 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here question 2, article 3. — For *quod dicit* some codices read *qui dicit*. Note: Genesis 1:28 (*Crescite et multiplicamini*) is cited in the body of DUB. VII without a numbered footer anchor; the editors' note on it sits with the following NOTAE block tied to the d.21 *littera* on p. 489 R-2 and migrates forward. ---

translators_notes:
- **Page span**: pp. 487–489 (raw lines 34257–34401). Source: PDF column bands at 450 dpi (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p48{7,8,9}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`).
- **Dub count**: 7 dubia (DUB. I–VII). The OCR cascade printed DUB. IV physically before DUB. III in linear flow because of the L vs R column-height differential on p. 488; reordered semantically I → II → III → IV → V → VI → VII per Vol II column-band PDF discipline.
- **Apparatus count**: 20 entries [^1]–[^20]. Page-split map:
  - **p. 487 L-2 ³–⁶** → [^1]–[^4]: cross-chunk hand-off from d20-a1-q6 (q6's report flagged "L-2 footers 3+ migrate to this dubia body"). [^1] = Aliqui codd. *dubitationes*, anchored on the opener *quaestiones* (in `In parte ista sunt quaestiones`). [^2] = Vat. *hic*, on `in quarto`. [^3] = Dist. 31 multi-cross-ref + B. Albert. / S. Thom. / Aegid. R. commentator roll for DUB. I, anchored on Eph 5,32 `Ephesios quinto`. [^4] = long Vers. 32 note with *cum est*/*fit*/*aliquis* variant block, anchored on Aug. *de Civ. Dei* XIV cite `decimo quarto de Civitate Dei` opening the *Ratio* answer.
  - **p. 487 R-2 ⁷** → [^5]: Aug. *de Civ. Dei* XIV cc. 16, 19, 23 + S. Thom. / Petr. a Tar. / Aegid. R. roll + *dominetur sibi*/*comminando* variants, anchored on Gen 1 cite `Genesis primo` opening DUB. III.
  - **p. 488 L-2 ¹–⁶** → [^6]–[^11]: [^6] Vers. 28 on Gen 1:28 *Crescite et multiplicamini*; [^7] Vers. 7 Vulgate *Volo enim* on 1 Cor 7,7; [^8] Cod. T *quare* on *Et sic patent ea quae obiiciuntur*; [^9] Alex. Hal. + S. Thom. + Richard. + Aegid. roll on DUB. III/Quaestio 2; [^10] Prov. 13:12 on *si spes, quae differtur, affligit animam*; [^11] Haud pauci codd. *filiis* + *parentes* transposition + cod. N *omnes electi*, on *parentes transferrentur absque aliis*.
  - **p. 488 R-2 ⁷–⁹** → [^12]–[^14]: [^12] Dist. 43 a.1 q.3 + Petr. a Tar. / Richard. / Aegid. roll on DUB. V (*in quarto, in tractatu de resurrectione*); [^13] Aug. *de Peccat. merit.* I c.38 n.69 on Aug. *Infirmitati mentis* quote; [^14] Vat. *Ad illud* + Alex. Hal. + B. Albert. + S. Thom. + Petr. a Tar. + Richard. + Aegid. roll on DUB. V *Aliud quod obiicitur*.
  - **p. 489 L-2 ¹–⁶** → [^15]–[^20]: [^15] Cfr. supra pag. 459 + Vat. *senescit* perperam, on *anima rationalis non senescit in tempore*; [^16] infra d.23 a.2 q.1, on *Deus fecit animam Adae perfectam scientia*; [^17] *in* inserted before *infantia*, on `in infantia`; [^18] Supple *alteratur* + Vat. *scientiam*/omits *puer*, on `ratione corporis`; [^19] Magister IV Sent. d.IV in fine, on the *«in munere, non in usu»* tag; [^20] long Aristot. *Phys.* VII text 20 with full Greek-paraphrased *Neque igitur pueri* quote + Alex. Hal. / S. Thom. / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. roll + *quod dicit*/*qui dicit* variant, on the Philosopher cite `verbum Philosophi`.
- **NOT migrated**: p. 489 R-2 ⁷+ (NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block + Hugo / Sap. 17,10) belongs to **d.21-littera** Cap. I, not this dubia. p. 487 L-2 ¹–² (*praedominabatur* + *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) belong to **d20-a1-q6** and were already captured there.
- **`has_scholion: false`** — dubia chunks carry no SCHOLION by design (Vol II convention, verified across d.1–d.19 dubia).
- **Cross-chunk hand-off received** from d20-a1-q6: p. 487 L-2 ³+ folded as [^1]–[^4]. **Forward hand-off to d.21-littera**: NOTAE block on p. 489 R-2 (Hugo *Sum. Sent.* tr. 3 c. 4 + Sap. 17, 10) is native to d.21-littera Cap. I opener — d.21 subagent should pick it up directly from p. 489 R-2.
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 20 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 487–489.
- **d.20 final clean state**: this is the ninth and final d.20 chunk. **d.11–d.20 decade-polish-blocker triggers next** (see next-session-resume.md).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21

title_alt: Distinction XXI — The Text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 489 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXI.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De invidia diaboli, qua ad tentandum accessit.*

« Videns igitur diabolus, hominem per obedientiae humilitatem posse ascendere, unde ipse per superbiam corruerat, invidit ei; et qui prius per superbiam fuerat diabolus, id est deorsum lapsus, zelo invidiae factus est satan, id est adversarius. Unde et mulierem tentavit, in qua minus quam in viro rationem vigere novit[^1] ». « Eius enim malitia, ad tentandam virtutem timida[^2], humanam naturam in ea parte, ubi debilior videbatur, aggressa est, ut si forte illic aliquatenus praevaleret, postmodum fiducialius ad alteram, quae

<!-- page 490 -->

robustior fuit, pulsandam vel potius subvertendam accederet. Primum igitur solitariam feminam exploravit, ut in ea primum omnem suae tentationis vim experiretur ».

#### Cap. II.

#### *De forma, in qua venit.*

« Sed quia illi per violentiam nocere non poterat, ad fraudem se convertit, ut dolo hominem supplantaret, quem virtute superare nequiret. Ne autem fraus illius nimis manifestaretur, in sua specie non venit, ne aperte cognosceretur et ita repelleretur. Iterum, ne nimis occulta foret fraus eius, quae caveri non posset, et homo simul videretur iniuriam pati, si taliter circumveniri permitteret eum Deus, ut praecavere non posset; in aliena quidem forma venire permissus est diabolus, sed in tali, in qua eius malitia facile posset deprehendi. Ut igitur in propria forma non veniret, voluntate sua factum est; ut autem in forma suae malitiae congruenti veniret, divinitus factum est. Venit ergo ad hominem in serpente, qui forte, si permitteretur, in columbae specie venire maluisset. Sed non erat dignum, ut spiritus malignus illam formam homini odiosam faceret, in qua Spiritus sanctus appariturus erat ». « Non ergo nisi per serpentem tentare permissus fuit diabolus, ut per illud quod foris erat, astutiam tentantis animadvertere femina quiret ». Diabolus enim per serpentem tentabat, in quo loquebatur.

#### Cap. III.

#### *De calliditate serpentis.*

Ideoque serpens dictus est esse *callidior cunctis animantibus terrae*, quia, ut ait Augustinus[^3], « mali angeli, licet superbia deiecti, natura tamen sunt excellentiores omnibus bestiis propter eminentiam rationis »; « quamvis serpens non rationali anima, sed spiritu diabolico possit sapientissimus dici ». « Non ergo mirum, si diabolus, spiritu suo implens serpentem, sicut vates implebat, sapientissimum reddiderat omnium bestiarum; quem tamen ad tentandum non elegit diabolus, sed per quod animal permissus fuit tentavit ».

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Utrum elegerit serpentem, ut per eum tentaret diabolus.*

Unde Augustinus super Genesim: « Non est putandum, quod diabolus serpentem, per quem tentaret, elegerit, sed cum decipere cuperet, non potuit, nisi per quod animal posse permissus est. Nocendi enim voluntas inest cuique a se, sed potestas a Deo[^4] ». « Sic autem loquebatur diabolus per serpentem ignorantem, sicut per energumenos vel fanaticos loquitur. Serpente enim velut organo est usus, movens naturam eius ad exprimendos sonos verborum et signa, quibus suam monstraret voluntatem. Serpens ergo nec verba intelligebat nec rationalis est factus; callidissimus tamen dictus est propter astutiam diaboli ». « Locutus est autem sicut asina Balaam[^5]; sed hoc diabolicum, illud angelicum fuit; boni enim et mali angeli similiter operantur ».

« Hic quaeri solet: quare mulier non horruit serpentem? Quia, cum noverit creatum esse, etiam[^6] officium loquendi a Deo accepisse putavit.

#### Cap. V.

#### *De modo tentationis.*

« Tentatio autem hoc modo facta est ». « Stans coram femina hostis superbus non audet in verba persuasionis exire, metuens deprehendi; sed sub interrogatione eam aggreditur, ut ex responsione colligeret, qualiter in malitia procedere posset. *Cur*, inquit, *praecepit vobis Deus, ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi? Cui respondit mulier: De fructu lignorum, quae sunt in paradiso, vescimur; de fructu vero ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis Deus, ne comederemus et ne tangeremus, ne forte moriamur*[^7]. In quo verbo dedit locum tentanti, cum dixit, *ne forte moriamur*; unde mox diabolus *dixit ad mulierem: Nequaquam moriemini; scit enim Deus, quod in quocumque die comederitis ex eo, aperientur oculi vestri, et eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum, et malum*. Attende ordinem ac progressum humanae perditionis. Primo Deus dixerat: *Quocumque die comederitis ex eo, morte moriemini*. Deinde mulier dixit: *Ne forte moriamur*. Novissime serpens dixit: *Nequaquam moriemini*. Deus affirmavit, mulier quasi ambigendo illud dixit, diabolus negavit; quae igitur dubitavit, ab affirmante recessit et neganti appropinquavit ».

Qui ad suam persuasionem pleniter suffulciendam, id est, ut malum, quod intendebat, libere persuaderet, « et malum, quod mulier timuit, negando removit, et repromissionem addidit, et ut eius persuasio citius reciperetur, promissionem duplicavit. Unam nempe comestionem suadens, duo in praemio proposuit, similitudinem Dei scientiamque boni et mali spondens. Ubi tribus modis hominem tentavit, scilicet *gula* in persuasione cibi, cum dixit: *In quocumque die comederitis*; *inani gloria* in promissione deitatis, cum dixit: *Eritis sicut dii*; *avaritia* in promissione scientiae, cum dixit: *Scientes bonum et malum*. Gula est immoderata cibi aviditas, vana gloria amor propriae excellentiae, avaritia immoderata habendi cupiditas, quae non est tantum pecuniae, sed etiam altitudinis et scientiae, cum supra modum sublimitas ambitur[^8] ».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXI.

#### Chapter I.

#### *On the envy of the devil, by which he came to tempt.*

“Seeing therefore that man could ascend by the humility of obedience to that place from which he himself had fallen through pride, the devil envied him; and he who was first *diabolus* through pride, that is, *one fallen downward*, was made *satan*, that is, *adversary*, through the zeal of envy. Hence also he tempted the woman, in whom he knew reason to flourish less than in the man[^1].” “For his malice, being timid about tempting virtue[^2], assailed human nature in that part where it seemed weaker, so that if perchance he prevailed there in some measure, afterwards he might approach with greater confidence to assail and rather to overthrow the other,

which was more robust. First, therefore, he sounded out the solitary woman, that in her he might first try the whole force of his temptation.”

#### Chapter II.

#### *On the form in which he came.*

“But because he could not harm him by violence, he turned to fraud, that he might supplant man by guile, whom he could not overcome by strength. Now lest his fraud be too manifest, he did not come in his own form, lest he be openly recognized and so be repelled. Again, lest his fraud be too hidden — which then could not be guarded against, and man at the same time would seem to suffer injustice, if God permitted him to be deceived in such a way that he could not foresee it — the devil was permitted to come in an alien form, but in such a one in which his malice could easily be detected. Therefore that he should not come in his own form was done by his own will; that he should come in a form fitting his malice was done by divine arrangement. He came therefore to man in a serpent, who perhaps, if it had been permitted, would have preferred to come in the form of a dove. But it was not fitting that the malign spirit should make that form hateful to man in which the Holy Spirit was to appear.” “Therefore the devil was permitted to tempt only through the serpent, so that through that which was outward the woman might perceive the cunning of the tempter.” For the devil tempted through the serpent, in which he was speaking.

#### Chapter III.

#### *On the cunning of the serpent.*

Therefore the serpent is said to be *more cunning than all the animals of the earth*, because, as Augustine says[^3], “the evil angels, although cast down by pride, are nevertheless by nature more excellent than all beasts on account of the eminence of reason”; “although the serpent, not by a rational soul but by the diabolical spirit, can be called most wise.” “It is no wonder, then, if the devil, filling the serpent with his own spirit (as he filled the soothsayers), made him the wisest of all beasts; yet the devil did not choose him to tempt, but tempted through that animal which he was permitted to.”

#### Chapter IV.

#### *Whether the devil chose the serpent, that he might tempt through it.*

Hence Augustine, on Genesis: “It is not to be supposed that the devil chose the serpent through which he tempted; but since he desired to deceive, he could not, except through that animal through which he was permitted to be able. For the will to do harm is in each one from himself, but the power is from God[^4].” “Now the devil spoke through the unknowing serpent just as he speaks through the possessed or the frenzied. For he used the serpent as an organ, moving its nature to express the sounds of words and signs, by which he might make known his will. Therefore the serpent neither understood the words nor was made rational; yet he is called most cunning on account of the cunning of the devil.” “He spoke moreover as Balaam’s ass[^5]; but the latter was diabolical, the former angelic; for good and evil angels operate in like manner.”

“Here it is usually asked: why was the woman not horrified at the serpent? Because, since she knew it to be a creature, she supposed it had also[^6] received the office of speaking from God.”

#### Chapter V.

#### *On the manner of the temptation.*

“The temptation was carried out in this manner.” “The proud enemy, standing before the woman, does not dare to enter into words of persuasion, fearing to be detected; but he attacks her under the form of a question, that from the answer he might gather how he might proceed in his malice. *Why*, he said, *did God command you not to eat of every tree of paradise? To whom the woman replied: Of the fruit of the trees which are in paradise, we feed; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, God commanded us that we should not eat, and that we should not touch, lest perhaps we die*[^7]. In which word she gave place to the tempter, when she said, *lest perhaps we die*; whence presently the devil *said to the woman: You shall not die the death; for God doth know that in whatever day you shall eat thereof, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil*. Attend to the order and progress of human ruin. First God had said: *In whatever day you shall eat thereof, you shall die the death*. Then the woman said: *Lest perhaps we die*. Last the serpent said: *You shall not die the death*. God affirmed; the woman as it were doubting said the same; the devil denied. She therefore who had doubted withdrew from the one affirming and drew near to the one denying.”

He, in order to support his persuasion more fully — that is, in order freely to persuade the evil he intended — “both removed the evil which the woman feared by denying it, and added a counter-promise, and, that his persuasion might be received the more quickly, he doubled the promise. Persuading one act of eating, he set forth two things in reward: likeness to God and the knowledge of good and evil. Here he tempted man in three ways, namely by *gluttony* in the persuasion of food, when he said: *In whatever day you shall eat thereof*; by *vainglory* in the promise of deity, when he said: *You shall be as gods*; by *avarice* in the promise of knowledge, when he said: *Knowing good and evil*. Gluttony is the immoderate appetite for food, vainglory is the love of one’s own excellence, avarice is the immoderate desire for having — which is not only of money, but also of high status and of knowledge, when sublimity is sought beyond measure[^8].”

---

la: Hugo, *Sum. Sent.* tr. 3. c. 4. Ex hoc capitulo nec non ex seq. atque ex eiusdem libro I. *de Sacram.* p. VII. c. 4, 6, 9, 3, Magister sumsit quae sequuntur usque ad finem dist.

en: Hugh (of St. Victor), *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 3, c. 4. From this chapter as well as the following one, and from the same author’s book I *On the Sacraments* part VII, cc. 4, 6, 9, 3, the Master has taken what follows down to the end of the distinction.

la: Alluditur ad Sap. 17, 10: *Cum sit enim timida nequitia*.

en: Allusion to Wisdom 17:10: *For wickedness, being timid…*

la: Libr. XI. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 2. n. 4. Quae sequuntur usque in cap. V. excerpta sunt ex eodem loco, c. 2, 3, 27, 28, 29.

en: (Augustine), Book XI *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 2, n. 4. What follows down to chapter V is excerpted from the same place, cc. 2, 3, 27, 28, 29.

la: Cod. Erl. adnotat: *Illud in Glossa ad Gen.* 3, 1. *et non in Augustino* [scil. quoad verba]. — In eadem Glossa inveniuntur plura alia, quae a Magistro hic afferuntur.

en: Codex Erl. notes: *That is in the Gloss on Gen.* 3:1 *and not in Augustine* [namely as to the wording]. — In the same Gloss are found many other things which the Master here adduces.

en: Numbers 22:28.

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5 praemittit *etiam*, et paulo superius post *boni* omittit *enim*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, prefixes *etiam* (“also”), and a little above, after *boni*, omits *enim*.

la: Gen. 3, 1-3, et seq. locus ibid. 4. seqq.

en: Genesis 3:1–3, and the following passage at the same place, 4 ff.

la: Hunc locum sumsit Hugo (l. *de Sacram.* p. VII. c. 6.) ex Gregorio super Evang. *Hom.* 16. n. 1. 2.

en: Hugh (of St. Victor) took this passage (book *On the Sacraments* part VII, c. 6) from Gregory on the Gospels, *Homily* 16, nn. 1–2. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 489 R-bottom (DISTINCTIO XXI title block + Cap. I opener, after d.20 DUB. VII close) and p. 490 L+R (Cap. I continuation + Cap. II + Cap. III + Cap. IV + Cap. V to *ambitur*[^8]). Per Vol II Override the column-band PDF read is authoritative; the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 34402–34499) cascade-fragments the Cap. headings into the d.20 DUB. VI/VII column bleed (e.g. `Cap. V.` surfaces in the raw at line 34444, mid Cap. II text, due to two-column bleed).
- **Page-split map.** p. 489 R-1: DISTINCTIO XXI title + `Cap. I` heading + opener through *postmodum fiducialius ad alteram, quae*. p. 489 R-2 footers: NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM ¹ (Hugo *Sum. Sent.* tr. 3 c. 4) = [^1]; ² (Sap. 17, 10 *timida nequitia*) = [^2]. p. 490 L: Cap. I close (*robustior fuit … experiretur*) + Cap. II (full) + Cap. III (full) + Cap. IV opener (Aug. *Non est putandum* … *potestas a Deo*[^4]). p. 490 R: Cap. IV continuation (Sic autem loquebatur … *etiam*[^6] *officium*) + Cap. V (full, *Tentatio autem* through *ambitur*[^8]). p. 490 L-2 footers: ¹ (Lib. XI *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 2 n. 4) = [^3]; ² (Cod. Erl. on Gloss vs Augustinus) = [^4]. p. 490 R-2 footers: ³ (Num. 22, 28) = [^5]; ⁴ (Vat. *etiam* variant) = [^6]; ⁵ (Gen. 3, 1-3) = [^7]; ⁶ (Hugo *l. de Sacram.* p. VII c. 6 ex Greg. *Hom.* 16) = [^8].
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d20-dubia`: NOTAE block on p. 489 R-2 (footers ¹ Hugo + ² Sap. 17, 10) — native to this Cap. I opener per the d20-dubia forward note (resume note 2026-05-25); folded as [^1]–[^2]. *Forwarded* to `d21-divisio`: none — `Cap. VI. De duplici tentationis specie` opens at the top of p. 491 L-1 (raw line 34501) and carries its own apparatus block (e.g. the *Aug. in Enchiridio* and r.l.j 3 marginalia at p. 491 footers 3+).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 8 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 489–490. Cap. V's *moriamur*[^7] anchor on Gen 3:1–3 absorbs the chained scriptural quotation block (*ne forte moriamur* + *Nequaquam moriemini* + *Quocumque die comederitis ex eo morte moriemini*) — Quaracchi anchors only at the close of the first quotation per their convention.
- **Five Lombard capitula** preserved verbatim with Quaracchi's italic chapter titles: I *De invidia diaboli, qua ad tentandum accessit*; II *De forma, in qua venit*; III *De calliditate serpentis*; IV *Utrum elegerit serpentem, ut per eum tentaret diabolus*; V *De modo tentationis*. Cap. VI–onward belong to `d21-divisio` per the auto-chunker boundary on p. 491.
- **Lombard marginals** on p. 490 (`Augustinus.` at Cap. III; `Dubium 1.` at Cap. IV close; `Dubium 2.` at Cap. IV mid; `Quaestio incidens` at *Hic quaeri solet*; `Tres modi tentandi.` at Cap. V close) are preserved inline by Vol II convention only where they survived the column-band read; they appear here as section-internal italics rather than as separately rendered margin labels (the d.21 q-articles will pick up their own marginals downstream).