title: Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum possibile sit Deo reconciliari per satisfactionem

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De satisfactione in genere.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum possibile sit reconciliari Deo per satisfactionem.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod sit possibile Deo reconciliari:

1. *Per definitionem* eius quod est satisfacere, quia dicit Anselmus[^1]: «*Satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo reddere*»; sed hoc est possibile homini: ergo possibile est satisfacere.

2. Item, quanto is, contra quem delinquitur, misericordior est, tanto minorem exigit poenam; et quanto minorem exigit poenam, tanto facilius et possibilius est ei satisfacere; sed Deus est multo misericordior homine: ergo si potest homini satisfieri et Deo.

3. Item, sufficienter aliquis punitur, quando tantum datur ei tormentum, quantum fuit delectamentum, quia haec est iustitia legis Moysaicae Deuteronomii vigesimo quinto[^2]: *Iuxta mensuram peccati erit et plagarum modus* etc.; et legis divinae: *Quantum se glorificavit* etc.; sed aliquis potest sibi hoc facere: ergo potest Deo satisfacere.

**Contra:** 1. Tanta est offensa, quantus is est, qui offenditur; sed Deus est infinitus, qui offenditur in peccato: ergo et offensa. Sed quanta est offensa, tanta debet esse satisfactio, alioquin non fit satis: ergo in infinitum oportet quod homo se puniat. Sed hoc est impossibile alicui: ergo non potest Deo satisfacere homo de peccato.

2. Item, peccatum diaboli peccatum nostrum non excedit in infinitum, immo quanto eius culpa excedit humanam, tanto virtus naturae ad sustinendum mala et faciendum bona est fortior; sed diabolus non potest satisfacere: ergo nec homo.

3. Item, primus parens non potuit de culpa sua satisfacere, quia, cum esset homo, voluit in scientia assimilari Deo[^3]; ideo ad satisfactionem necesse fuit, quod Deus fieret homo; sed quilibet peccator praefert voluntatem suam voluntati divinae: ergo non potest satisfacere.

4. Item, nullus de originali potuit satisfacere nisi per mortem Christi; sed multo minus ponderat originale quam actuale[^4]: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Possibile est homini Deo satisfacere, quod duplici via explicatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hic est unus modus dicendi satis probabilis, quod de omni eo quod est in peccato, non fit satisfactio, quoniam hoc est impossibile. Unde et Deus non exigit satisfactionem de omni eo quod est in culpa, sed aliquid *condonat* per misericordiam, de aliquo *requirit satisfactionem* per iustitiam, ut simul sit hic *misericordia et veritas*[^5]; nec unquam est *satisfactio*, nisi praecedat *condonatio*, sicut nunquam est *meritum*, nisi praecedat *donum gratuitum*.

Unde notandum, quod in peccato duo sunt, scilicet *offensa Dei* et *libido deordinata*. Offensa Dei est infinita, et pro illa non fit satisfactio, sed Dei misericordia illam remittit suam dando gratiam; *libido* autem *perversa* finita est. Et quia Deus iustus est, non totum remittit, sed pro illa exigit poenam condignam; et quantum ad hoc possibile est Deo satisfacere[^6].

1. 2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima: ad primum, quia non fit satisfactio de offensa; ad secundum, quia diabolus non potest satisfacere propter impossibilitatem percipiendi gratiam, in qua remittatur sibi divina offensa[^7].

3. 4. Patet etiam responsio ad tertium. Deus enim per misericordiam relinquit omnino offensam dando gratiam, sed satisfactionem exigit de ipso damno, quod intulit sibi peccator per culpam et delectationem libidinosam. — Et quia Adam intulit sibi damnum mortis et toti posteritati; ideo non potuit plene satisfacere, nisi ille qui non esset mortis debitor et valeret totum genus humanum. Sed peccator quilibet, dum peccat, infert damnum in imaginis deformatione, quae reparabilis est, et infert damnum sibi, non aliis; et ideo non est simile[^8].

Alius etiam modus dicendi est satis probabilis

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et videtur rationabilis, quod etsi divina misericordia relinquat *offensam* homini dando gratiam, non tamen ita omnino relinquit, quin etiam exigat de offensa satisfactionem per iustitiam. Et quia homo non potuit pro tanta offensa satisfacere, ideo Deus dedit ei Mediatorem, qui satisfaceret pro offensa. Unde in sola fide passionis Christi remittitur omnis culpa; sine fide enim nullus iustificatur[^1b]; et secundum hoc dicunt, quod omnis satisfactio nostra virtutem habet a satisfactione Christi. Sed ipsa satisfactio Christi habet effectum in membris per Sacramentum *baptismi plenum*, per Sacramentum *poenitentiae secundum partem*[^2b], per *fidem* autem et ante novam legem et etiam post, ut in his qui non possunt confiteri, effectum habet adhuc *minorem*. Unde omnis satisfactio non tantum de peccato primi parentis, sed etiam de aliis fundata est super satisfactionem Mediatoris.

1. 2. 3. 4. Et secundum hanc[^3b] viam facilis est responsio ad obiecta. Sicut enim offensa est infinita, sic quod Deus patitur est satisfactio infinita. — Similiter secundum patet, quia diabolus non habuit mediatorem, super quem posset fundari eius satisfactio. — Similiter patet tertium de Adam: quoniam, sicut ipse non potuit satisfacere de peccato suo, sic nemo posset sufficienter satisfacere de suo, nisi super satisfactionem passionis Christi per fidem esset fundatus.

english:
### Article Unique. *On satisfaction in general.*
### Question I. *Whether it is possible to be reconciled to God through satisfaction.*

Concerning the first [point] it is shown that it is possible to be reconciled to God:

1. *By the definition* of that which is to make satisfaction, because Anselm says[^1]: «*To make satisfaction is to render to God the honor due [to him]*»; but this is possible for man: therefore it is possible to make satisfaction.

2. Likewise, the more merciful is he against whom an offense is committed, the lesser the penalty he exacts; and the lesser the penalty he exacts, the more easily and the more possibly can satisfaction be made to him; but God is much more merciful than man: therefore if satisfaction can be made to man, [it can be made] also to God.

3. Likewise, someone is punished sufficiently when as much torment is given to him as was the pleasure, because this is the justice of the Mosaic law, Deuteronomy chapter twenty-five[^2]: *According to the measure of the sin shall be also the manner of the stripes* etc.; and of the divine law: *As much as he hath glorified himself* etc.; but a man can do this for himself: therefore he can make satisfaction to God.

**On the contrary:** 1. The offense is as great as is he who is offended; but God, who is offended in sin, is infinite: therefore the offense too [is infinite]. But as great as is the offense, so great ought the satisfaction to be, otherwise enough is not done: therefore it is necessary that a man punish himself infinitely. But this is impossible for anyone: therefore man cannot make satisfaction to God for sin.

2. Likewise, the sin of the devil does not exceed our sin infinitely; nay rather, the more his fault exceeds the human [fault], the stronger is the power of [his] nature for enduring evils and doing good things; but the devil cannot make satisfaction: therefore neither [can] man.

3. Likewise, the first parent could not make satisfaction for his fault, because, since he was a man, he willed to be made like to God in knowledge[^3]; therefore for satisfaction it was necessary that God should become man; but every sinner prefers his own will to the divine will: therefore he cannot make satisfaction.

4. Likewise, no one could make satisfaction for original [sin] except through the death of Christ; but original [sin] weighs much less than actual [sin][^4]: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** It is possible for man to make satisfaction to God, which is explained by a twofold way.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is here one way of speaking, sufficiently probable, that satisfaction is not made for everything that is in sin, since this is impossible. Hence God too does not exact satisfaction for everything that is in fault, but *remits* something through mercy, and *requires satisfaction* for something through justice, so that here *mercy and truth* may be together[^5]; nor is there ever *satisfaction* unless *remission* precedes, just as there is never *merit* unless a *gratuitous gift* precedes.

Hence it must be noted that in sin there are two things, namely the *offense of God* and *disordered desire*. The offense of God is infinite, and for it no satisfaction is made, but God's mercy remits it by giving grace; but *perverse desire* is finite. And because God is just, he does not remit the whole, but for it exacts a condign penalty; and with respect to this it is possible to make satisfaction to God[^6].

1. 2. And through this the response to the first two [objections] is clear: to the first, because satisfaction is not made for the offense; to the second, because the devil cannot make satisfaction on account of the impossibility of receiving grace, in which the divine offense might be remitted to him[^7].

3. 4. The response to the third is also clear. For God through mercy leaves the offense altogether [behind] by giving grace, but exacts satisfaction for the very harm which the sinner inflicted upon himself through fault and libidinous pleasure. — And because Adam inflicted upon himself and upon all posterity the harm of death; therefore he could not make full satisfaction, except he who was not a debtor of death and was worth the whole human race. But every sinner, when he sins, inflicts harm in the deformation of the image, which is reparable, and inflicts harm upon himself, not upon others; and therefore it is not similar[^8].

There is also another way of speaking, sufficiently probable

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and it seems reasonable, that although the divine mercy leaves the *offense* [behind] for man by giving grace, yet it does not so wholly leave it that it does not also exact satisfaction for the offense through justice. And because man could not make satisfaction for so great an offense, therefore God gave him a Mediator, who would make satisfaction for the offense. Hence in the faith of Christ's passion alone is every fault remitted; for without faith no one is justified[^1b]; and according to this they say that all our satisfaction has its power from the satisfaction of Christ. But the satisfaction of Christ itself has its effect in the members through the *full* Sacrament of *baptism*, through the Sacrament of *penance in part*[^2b], but through *faith* both before the new law and also after — as in those who cannot confess — it has a still *lesser* effect. Hence all satisfaction, not only for the sin of the first parent but also for the others, is founded upon the satisfaction of the Mediator.

1. 2. 3. 4. And according to this[^3b] way the response to the objections is easy. For just as the offense is infinite, so what God suffers is an infinite satisfaction. — Likewise the second is clear, because the devil had no mediator upon whom his satisfaction could be founded. — Likewise the third concerning Adam is clear: since, just as he himself could not make satisfaction for his own sin, so no one could make sufficient satisfaction for his own [sin], unless he were founded, through faith, upon the satisfaction of Christ's passion.

la: Libr. I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 11. et 20. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 1, ubi plura, quae hanc quaest. concernunt, proponuntur.

en: Book I, *Cur Deus homo*, c. 11 and 20. Cf. III Sent. d. 20. q. 1, where many things are proposed which concern this question.

la: Vers. 2. — Seq. textus est Apoc. 18, 7.

en: Verse 2. — The following text is Apoc. 18:7.

en: Cf. Gen. 3:5, and II Sent. d. 22. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1. seq.

en: See II Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1 sq.

la: Psalm. 24, 10: *Universae viae Domini, misericordia et veritas.* Cfr. infra d. 46. a. 2. q. 2. seq.

en: Psalm 24:10: *All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.* Cf. below d. 46. a. 2. q. 2 sq.

la: Richard. a S. Vict., *de Potestate ligandi et solvendi*, c. 4. deducit hoc ex Ps. 31, 5: *Tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei.* — Cod. U addit: *Vel aliter dici potest, quod etsi ad satisfaciendum inter Deum et hominem aequalitas non sit commensurationis, est tamen proportionis*; exemplum de semine et fructu eius.

en: Richard of St. Victor, *On the Power of Binding and Loosing*, c. 4, derives this from Ps. 31:5: *Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of my sin.* — Codex U adds: *Or it can be said otherwise, that although for making satisfaction there is not between God and man an equality of commensuration, there is nevertheless [an equality] of proportion*; an example from the seed and its fruit.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. I.

en: See II Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. I.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3. seq. — Superius post *humanum* cod. X addit *redimere*, ac pro *et infert* codd. E F G H V aa etiam *infert*.

en: Cf. III Sent. d. 20. q. 3 sq. — Above, after *human* codex X adds *to redeem*, and for *and inflicts* codices E F G H V aa [read] *also inflicts*.

la: Ut dictum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. (ubi de iis qui *ante* novam legem). — Pro *sine fide enim* edd. *et sine fide eius.*

en: As was said above d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; III Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. in the body (where [it treats] of those who [were] *before* the new law). — For *for without faith* the editions [read] *and without his faith.*

la: Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Mox pro *et ante*, quod praebent codd. I K, alii *vel ut ante* vel cum edd. *ante.*

en: See above d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Soon, for *and before*, which codices I K offer, others [read] *or as before* or, with the editions, *before.*

la: Cod. Y *hanc secundam.*

en: Codex Y [reads] *this second [way].* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Tota catholica doctrina de satisfactione, quae in hac dist. exponitur, nititur duobus principiis a Concilio Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 8. et can. 12. 13. 14. 15.) stabilitis, scilicet quod non semper *tota* poena simul cum culpa remittatur, et quod «pro peccatis quoad poenam *temporalem* Deo per Christi merita satisfiat poenis ab eo inflictis et patienter toleratis, vel a sacerdote iniunctis, vel sponte susceptis». — De *definitione* satisfactionis cfr. infra p. II. a. 1. q. 1; de satisfactione in *genere* et de *Christi* satisfactione in specie III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 1-4; de satisfactione *plena* et *semiplena* ibid. q. 4; de duplici satisfactione pro *culpa* et *poena* infra p. II. a. 1. q. 2, p. 1. dub. 2. 6-9; de satisfactione *poenali* et *medicinali* infra d. 20. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 16. p. I. dub. 13; de *sacramentali* infra d. 18. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** Ad I. quaestionem recte intelligendam vide infra p. II. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 4, ubi tangitur satisfactio Christi pro *culpa* et *poena aeterna*, dum hic proprie agitur de satisfactione Deo praestanda ex parte poenitentis per poenam temporalem. In satisfactione enim est «emenda praesens pro culpa praeterita» (infra p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). — Differentia inter utramque opinionem hic relatam in eo consistit, quod 1. opinio, cum in offensa Dei distinguat aliquid *infinitum*, nempe ex parte aversionis a Deo, et aliquid finitum ex parte conversionis; non nisi pro secundo (quod, utpote finitum, poenam tantum temporalem pro emenda requirit) satisfactionem a poenitente fieri posse asserat. Ad mentem Alexandri Hal. S. Thomas (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 1.) approbat et clarius explicat 2. opinionem; de 1. autem sic iudicat: «Sed hoc nihil est, quia satisfactio non respondet peccato, nisi secundum quod est offensa Dei, quod non habet ex parte *conversionis*, sed solum ex parte *aversionis*». — Revera etiam S. Bonav., licet hic non reprobet 1. opinionem, passim loquitur secundum alteram (cfr. seq. q. fundam. 4.) et approbat haec principia, quod «omnis satisfactio nostra habet virtutem a satisfactione Christi», et quod «est infinita, in quantum est Mediatoris» (Ita Alex. Hal., loc. infra cit. ad 4. 5.). De sententia Scoti circa satisfactionem pro peccatis cfr. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3. scholion. — *De eadem:* Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 4. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit., et *Supplementum Summae* q. 13. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**III.** Quaestio 2. communiter secundum doctrinam Magistri (hic q. I.) solvitur; cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. a. 1, nec non m. 3. (de definitione Anselmi ad 3.). — Scot., loc. cit. n. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. I; Suppl. q. 14. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The whole catholic doctrine concerning satisfaction, which is set forth in this distinction, rests upon two principles established by the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV, c. 8 and can. 12, 13, 14, 15), namely that not always is the *whole* penalty remitted at the same time as the fault, and that «for sins, as to the *temporal* penalty, satisfaction is made to God through the merits of Christ by penalties inflicted by him and patiently borne, or enjoined by a priest, or voluntarily undertaken». — On the *definition* of satisfaction cf. below p. II. a. 1. q. 1; on satisfaction in *general* and on *Christ's* satisfaction in particular, III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 1-4; on *full* and *semi-full* satisfaction, ibid. q. 4; on the twofold satisfaction for *fault* and *penalty*, below p. II. a. 1. q. 2, p. 1. dub. 2. 6-9; on *penal* and *medicinal* satisfaction, below d. 20. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. and d. 16. p. I. dub. 13; on *sacramental* [satisfaction], below d. 18. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** For rightly understanding Question I, see below p. II. a. 1. q. 2. fundamentum 4, where Christ's satisfaction for *fault* and *eternal penalty* is touched on, while here it is properly a question of the satisfaction to be rendered to God on the part of the penitent through temporal penalty. For in satisfaction there is «a present amendment for a past fault» (below p. II. a. 1. q. 1.). — The difference between the two opinions here related consists in this, that the 1st opinion, since it distinguishes in the offense of God something *infinite*, namely on the part of the aversion from God, and something finite on the part of the conversion, asserts that satisfaction can be made by the penitent only for the second (which, being finite, requires only a temporal penalty for amendment). In line with Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. ad 1.) approves and more clearly explains the 2nd opinion; but of the 1st he judges thus: «But this is nothing, because satisfaction does not correspond to the sin except insofar as it is an offense of God, which it does not have on the part of the *conversion*, but only on the part of the *aversion*». — In truth St. Bonaventure too, although here he does not reject the 1st opinion, throughout speaks according to the other (cf. the following q. fundamentum 4.) and approves these principles, that «all our satisfaction has its power from the satisfaction of Christ», and that «it is infinite, inasmuch as it is the Mediator's» (so Alexander of Hales, in the place cited below, ad 4. 5.). On the opinion of Scotus concerning satisfaction for sins cf. III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3. scholion. — *On the same:* Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. n. 4. seqq. — St. Thomas, in the place cited, and *Supplement to the Summa* q. 13. a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**III.** Question 2 is commonly solved according to the doctrine of the Master (here q. I); cf. Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, m. 4. a. 1, and also m. 3. (on Anselm's definition, ad 3.). — Scotus, in the place cited, n. 10. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiuncula I; Suppl. q. 14. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, in the place cited, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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**Article title.** The PDF prints the Articulus Unicus subtitle as *De satisfactione in genere* (the running head abbreviates ART. UNICUS); the brief task spec gave *De satisfactione* — the fuller printed form is used here.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum possibile sit Deo satisfacere de uno peccato sine alio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit Deo satisfacere de uno peccato sine alio. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primae ad Timotheum quarto[^1]: *Pietas valet ad omnia;* Glossa: «Summa christianae disciplinae in pietate et misericordia est, quam qui sequitur, etiam si lubricum carnis patiatur, sine dubio vapulabit, non tamen peribit»; et constat, quod intelligit de lubrico mortali, quia, si de veniali, etiam sine illa non periret: ergo etc.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia satisfactio respondet transgressioni ex opposito: ergo cum possibile sit transgredi successive, primo uno modo, deinde alio; videtur similiter, quod et satisfacere[^2] primo de uno peccato, deinde de alio.

3. Item, alii peccato alia debetur poena et alia

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satisfactio, unde et alia imponitur; esto ergo, quod pro aliquo peccato imponatur poena debita; si exsequatur illam, amplius non potest nec debet exigi ab eo aliquid[^1b]; sed potest exsequi committendo culpam aliam: ergo etc.

4. Item, plus desiderat Deus, satisfactionem sibi fieri a peccatore, quam aliquis creditor solutionem a debitore; sed creditor, qui multum desiderat solutionem, recipit solutionem de uno sine alio: ergo et Deus satisfactionem de uno peccato sine alio.

5. Item, homo potest satisfacere de uno veniali, committendo etiam aliud: ergo pari ratione de mortali; aut quare non?

**Contra:** 1. Isaiae quinquagesimo octavo[^2b]: *Ecce ad lites et contentiones ieiunatis;* et post: *Nunquid tale est ieiunium, quod elegi?* quasi dicat: Non. Ergo non placet Deo pro peccato ieiunium, quando ieiunando committuntur peccata.

2. Item, Gregorius in homilia[^3b]: «Qui sic alia plangit, ut alia committat, poenitentiam agere aut ignorat, aut dissimulat».

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia in hoc peccator est dignus poena, quia Dei imaginem deformat: ergo nunquam satisfacit nisi per reformationem imaginis; sed in eo qui satisfacit[^4b] et rursus peccat, nunquam reformatur imago: ergo talis nunquam satisfacit.

4. Item, in peccato est conversio et aversio, et poena debetur peccatori ratione aversionis; sed peccata omnia conveniunt in aversione[^5b]: ergo satisfactio respicit peccata secundum id, in quo conveniunt: ergo impossibile est satisfacere de uno sine alio.

> **Conclusio.** Error est ponere, quod peccator satisfaciat pro uno peccato, persistens in alio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui posuerunt, quod de uno peccato poterat fieri satisfactio, peccatore persistente in alio. Et ratio eorum erat divina benignitas, quae acceptat satisfactionem quantumcumque modicam. — Sed tamen hi non consideraverunt sufficienter, quid sit *satisfacere.* Non enim satisfacere dicit *tolerantiam poenae* tantum, quia Deus in malis nostris non delectatur[^6b], sed delectatur in *iustitia voluntatis* nostrae et *reconciliatione,* quae non potest haberi de una culpa sine alia, tum propter *connexionem virtutum* in una gratia, quae delet omnem culpam mortalem, cum habeat omnem virtutem connexam[^7b]; tum propter divinam largitatem, quae secundum partem non gratificat, immo omnem offensam condonat; tum propter peccata mortalia, quae omnia communicant in aversione et contemptu Dei, et omnia sunt contra Deum et contra unum: et ideo, si Deus remitteret culpam de uno sine alio, simul esset is cui remittitur, amicus et inimicus, conversus et aversus.

Et ideo, sicut dicit Magister[^8b], error est hoc ponere, quod homo satisfaciat Deo, offendendo Deum, quia semper manet aversio et imaginis deformatio et inimicitia. Et ideo dicitur Ecclesiastis nono[^9b]: *Qui in uno peccaverit multa bona perdet;* et beatus Iacobus, secundo capitulo: *Qui offendit in uno factus est omnium reus:* quia qui peccat in uno non satisfacit pro aliquo, eo quod in omni peccato unus offenditur, et impossibile est, quod Deus sit amicus et inimicus eiusdem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de illa Glossa, *Sola* quod non peribit; dicendum, quod intelligitur, quia operibus pietatis praeparatur ad gratiam, per quam satisfaciat de omnibus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de transgressione, dicendum, quod non est simile. Quia enim mala facimus, ideo mali sumus; et ideo, quia actus non sunt connexi, nec transgressiones; sed non quia bona facimus, boni sumus, sed econtra[^10b]; et ideo oportet, quod ante sit amicus, quam pro aliquo peccato satisfaciat; et si amicus, ergo nullum peccatum habet mortale.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod isti peccato debetur tanta poena de se, nisi remittatur per gratiam, quam impossibile est illi persolvere, quia infinita; et ideo nunquam taxari potest poena debita, quousque manet in culpa.

4. Ad aliud, quod Deus vult plus satisfactionem quam creditor solutionem; dicendum, quod Deus similiter recipit satisfactionem paulatim; sed quamdiu est in aliqua culpa, non est in solvendo aliquid, immo in obligando se potius; et ideo Deus non recipit[^11b].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de veniali, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia *veniale* stat simul cum gratia, per quam contingit satisfacere; non sic *mortale,* immo quodlibet mortale tollit fundamentum satisfactionis, sicut melius patebit in sequenti problemate[^12b].

english:
### Question II. *Whether it is possible to satisfy God for one sin while another is retained.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is possible to satisfy God for one sin while another is retained. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. To the Fourth [chapter] of First Timothy[^1]: *Godliness is profitable unto all things;* the Gloss: «The sum of Christian discipline is in piety and mercy; and whoever follows it, even if he should suffer the slipperiness of the flesh, will without doubt be scourged, yet not perish»; and it is clear that it understands [this] of mortal slipperiness, because, if [it were understood] of venial [sin], even without that one would not perish: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason:* because satisfaction corresponds to transgression by opposition: therefore, since it is possible to transgress successively, first in one way, then in another; it likewise seems that one may also satisfy[^2] first for one sin, then for another.

3. Likewise, to one sin one penalty is due and one

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satisfaction, whence too another [penalty] is imposed; suppose then that for some sin the due penalty be imposed; if one carries it out, nothing further can or ought to be exacted from him[^1b]; but he can carry it out while committing another fault: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, God desires more that satisfaction be made to him by a sinner than any creditor [desires] payment from a debtor; but a creditor who greatly desires payment receives payment of one [debt] without another: therefore God too [receives] satisfaction for one sin without another.

5. Likewise, a man can satisfy for one venial [sin] while committing also another: therefore by equal reasoning [also] for a mortal one; or else why not?

**On the contrary:** 1. Isaiah fifty-eight[^2b]: *Behold, you fast for strifes and contentions;* and afterward: *Is such a fast as this what I have chosen?* as if to say: No. Therefore a fast for sin does not please God when in fasting sins are committed.

2. Likewise, Gregory in a homily[^3b]: «Whoever so weeps for some things that he commits others either does not know how to do penance, or dissembles it».

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason:* because in this the sinner is worthy of penalty, because he deforms the image of God: therefore he never satisfies except by a reformation of the image; but in him who satisfies[^4b] and again sins, the image is never reformed: therefore such a one never satisfies.

4. Likewise, in sin there is conversion and aversion, and a penalty is due to the sinner by reason of the aversion; but all sins agree in aversion[^5b]: therefore satisfaction regards sins according to that in which they agree: therefore it is impossible to satisfy for one without another.

> **Conclusion.** It is an error to hold that a sinner satisfies for one sin while persisting in another.

**I respond:** It must be said that some have held that satisfaction could be made for one sin while the sinner persisted in another. And their reason was the divine kindness, which accepts satisfaction however small. — But nevertheless these men did not sufficiently consider what it is *to satisfy.* For to satisfy does not mean only the *bearing of penalty,* because God does not delight in our evils[^6b], but delights in the *justice of our will* and in *reconciliation,* which cannot be had of one fault without another: both on account of the *connection of the virtues* in one grace, which blots out every mortal fault, since it has every virtue connected[^7b]; and on account of the divine generosity, which does not show favor in part, but rather pardons every offense; and on account of mortal sins, which all share in aversion and contempt of God, and are all against God and against the one: and therefore, if God were to remit the fault of one without another, he to whom it is remitted would be at once friend and enemy, converted and averted.

And therefore, as the Master says[^8b], it is an error to hold this — that a man should satisfy God while offending God — because the aversion and the deformation of the image and the enmity always remain. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiastes nine[^9b]: *He who sins in one thing shall lose many good things;* and blessed James, in the second chapter: *Whoever offends in one thing is made guilty of all:* because he who sins in one does not satisfy for anything, in that in every sin the one [God] is offended, and it is impossible that God be friend and enemy of the same person.

1. To the objection therefore from that Gloss, *Solely* that he will not perish; it must be said that it is understood [thus], that by works of piety he is prepared for the grace by which he may satisfy for all.

2. To the objection from transgression, it must be said that it is not similar. For because we do evil things, therefore we are evil; and therefore, since the acts are not connected, neither are the transgressions; but not because we do good things are we good, but the contrary[^10b]; and therefore it is necessary that one be a friend before he satisfies for any sin; and if he is a friend, then he has no mortal sin.

3. To the other [objection] it must be said that to this sin so great a penalty is due of itself — unless it be remitted by grace — that it is impossible for him to pay it, because it is infinite; and therefore the due penalty can never be assessed so long as he remains in fault.

4. To the other [objection], that God desires satisfaction more than a creditor [desires] payment; it must be said that God likewise receives satisfaction little by little; but as long as one is in any fault, he is not paying anything, but rather binding himself the more; and therefore God does not receive [it][^11b].

5. To the objection from the venial [sin], it must be said that it is not similar, because the *venial* stands together with the grace through which it happens that one satisfies; not so the *mortal,* but rather any mortal [sin] takes away the foundation of satisfaction, as will better appear in the following problem[^12b].

la: Vers. 8. — Glossa, quae est *ordinaria* apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum, delibata est ex Comment. Ambrosio olim tributo.

en: Verse 8. — The Gloss, which is the *ordinary* [Gloss] in Peter Lombard and Lyra, is drawn from the Commentary once attributed to Ambrose.

la: Codd. I K substituunt *satisfactio possit fieri,* edd. vero *possit satisfacere.*

en: Codices I K substitute *satisfaction can be made,* but the editions [read] *one can satisfy.*

la: Ut dictum est supra d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; d. 3. p. 1. a. 1. q. 3; III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. (ubi de iis qui *ante* novam legem). — Pro *sine fide enim* edd. *et sine fide eius.*

en: As was said above, d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3; III Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, in the body (where [it treats] of those who [were] *before* the new law). — For *without faith, for* the editions [read] *and without his faith.*

la: Vers. 4. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 5.

en: Verse 4. — The following text is ibid., v. 5.

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 34. n. 15.

en: Book II, *Homilies on the Gospels,* homily 34, n. 15.

la: Cod. X addit *de uno.*

en: Codex X adds *for one.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 2. — De *maiori* vide ibid. pag. 802, nota 3. verba Augustini.

en: See II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 2. — On the *major* [premise] see ibid., p. 802, note 3, the words of Augustine.

la: Sive, ut ait Gregor., Regula pastor. p. III. c. 30: *Neque enim Deus nostris cruciatibus pascitur.* Cfr. supra pag. 37, nota 6.

en: Or, as Gregory says, *Pastoral Rule* p. III, c. 30: *For God is not fed by our torments.* Cf. above, p. 37, note 6.

la: De quo vide III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1, ubi etiam seq. ratio insinuatur (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.). — Edd. *annexam.*

en: On which see III Sent. d. 36, q. 1, where the following reasoning too is intimated (cf. here the Master's text, c. 7). — The editions [read] *annexam* [annexed].

la: Hic in lit. c. 1. seqq.

en: Here in the text, c. 1 ff.

la: Vers. 18. — Seq. textus est Iac. 2, 10. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. q. 4. ad 1. — Inferius pro *aliquo* cod. aa *reliquo.*

en: Verse 18. — The following text is James 2:10. Cf. III Sent. d. 36, q. 4, ad 1. — Below, for *anything* codex aa [reads] *the rest.*

la: Virtus enim est, ut ait Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, ex qua et bonus homo ipse efficietur et *bene opus suum* reddet. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 804, nota 7. et pag. 1004, nota 2. nec non tom. III. pag. 388, nota 2.

en: For virtue is, as Aristotle says, *Ethics* II, c. 6, that by which both the man himself is made good and renders *his work well.* Cf. tom. II, p. 804, note 7, and p. 1004, note 2, and also tom. III, p. 388, note 2.

la: Vide quaest. seq.

en: See the following question.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

latin_scholion:
*Scholion ad hunc articulum unicum redditur cum Quaestione I huius articuli.*

---

english_scholion:
*The scholion for this Articulus Unicus is rendered with Question I.*

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{351,352}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, split x=1880), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 40084–40210) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/IV override, the PDF is authoritative in the cascade-shattered Respondeo / Solutio / footer / scholion regions; the OCR for this question was heavily two-column interleaved (the q2-body left column spliced line-for-line with the q3-opener and scholion right-column text), so the PDF bands carried the reconstruction. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (printed 351–352 = PDF 371–372).

**Opener alignment.** Confirmed: the q2 opener (p. 351, left column, under the QUAESTIO II header) reads "Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit Deo satisfacere de uno peccato sine alio. Et quod sic, videtur" — matches the assigned question. NOTE: the dispatch title carried "alio retento", but the printed running head, the QUAESTIO II header, and the opener all read "sine alio"; `title_la` was set to the printed form ("…sine alio"). `title_en` is kept as dispatched ("…while another is retained"), which renders the sense of *sine alio* here (one sin satisfied while another is left standing).

**Page-verify.** Running heads confirmed on the bands: p. 351 left col. top = "DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QU[AEST. II]", right col. top = "QUAEST. II. … 351"; p. 352 right col. top = "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." with the folio "352" at the left-col. top. Consistent with DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 351: SCHOLION block (article-level, above the QUAESTIO II header — see scholion finding) → QUAESTIO II. header + arg. 1 (left col.); arg. 2 + opening of arg. 3 (right col.).
- p. 351 → 352 boundary inside arg. 3 ("…poena et alia" | "satisfactio, unde et alia imponitur…").
- p. 352: arg. 3 completes; args. 4–5; *Contra* 1–4; Conclusio; Respondeo; Solutiones *Ad 1*–*Ad 5* (all complete on p. 352).

**Scholion finding.** No literal "SCHOLION." header occurs inside the assigned raw range 40084–40210 (that range opens at the QUAESTIO II header). The Articulus-Unicus SCHOLION (one block covering the whole article) is printed on p. 351 **above** the QUAESTIO II header — physically in q1's territory, split across both columns of p. 351 (§I + §II + the per-question doctor-list). Because the sibling **q1 chunk is still an auto-chunked skeleton** (`transcription_status: "auto-chunked 2026-06-16"`, no scholion rendered) and the scholion immediately precedes this q2, it is rendered here in full. When q1 is promoted it should cross-reference this chunk rather than re-render the scholion. `has_scholion: false`.

**Footer-ownership (apparatus, 14 entries on these two pages; this q2 owns the 12 anchored in its body).**
- p. 351: this q2 owns **2 footers** (note 1 `^1` arg. 1 *Pietas valet* Gloss; note 2 `^2` arg. 2 *satisfacere* variant). The remaining p. 351 footer digits (notes 3–5: *Vide supra d. 14…*, *Cod. Y hanc secundam*, *Codd. I K substituunt salisfactio possit fieri…*) anchor in the scholion / lit.-Magistri material above the QUAESTIO II header and in q1's territory; note that p. 351 note 5 duplicates the same codex-variant as q2's `^2`, which is why both columns carry it.
- p. 352: this q2 owns **all 12 footers** (printed digits 1–12), rendered `^1b`–`^12b` (1 *exigi ab eo aliquid*; 2 Isaiah 58; 3 Gregory homily 34; 4 *satisfacit* + *de uno*; 5 II Sent. d. 42 / *maiori*; 6 *non delectatur* / Gregory Pastoral Rule; 7 *connexam* / III Sent. d. 36; 8 lit. Magistri c. 1; 9 Eccles. + James; 10 Aristotle Ethics II; 11 *vide quaest. seq.*; 12 *vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*). No shared-footer split with q3.

**[?] flags.**
- Scholion §II "poenam tantum temporalem pro emenda requirit[?]" — the right-column band's inner margin is slightly cropped at "requirit"/"satisfactionem"; reading reconstructed from context, flagged for the d.11–d.20 polish gate's 600 dpi pass.
- Scholion doctor-list (q. 2 sequence): two abbreviated author names partly illegible on the band — "S. Thom.[?]" before "hic q. 1. a. 3." and "[Petr. a Tar.?]" before "hic a. 2." The remaining authors (Alex. Hal., Scot., Petr. a Tar., Rich. a Med., Dionys. Carth.) are clear.
- Silent OCR/PDF corrections in the body: *successive* (OCR `succesive`), *transgressioni*, *connexionem virtutum*, *reconciliatione*, *persolvere*, *quousque*. Marginal rubrics (*Conclusio 2.*, *Solutio 2. oppositorum*, *Fundamenta*, *Reprobatur*, *Opinio 1.*, *Ratio triplex*, *Notandum*) are editorial side-notes and are omitted from the body per corpus convention.

**Hand-off to q3.** Q3 ("Utrum extra caritatem abstinentem a peccatis possibile sit satisfacere", raw 40211) opens on **p. 353** (its running head on the band reads "DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III. 353"). All of p. 352's 12 footers anchor in this q2's body (which fills both columns of p. 352 through *Ad 5*); none migrate to q3. No shared-footer hand-off forwarded.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum extra caritatem abstinentem a peccatis possibile sit satisfacere

title_alt: Whether it is possible to make satisfaction outside of charity, while abstaining from sins

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum extra caritatem abstinentem a peccatis possibile sit Deo satisfacere.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum extra caritatem abstinentem a peccatis possibile sit satisfacere. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Lucae undecimo[^1]: *Date eleemosynam, et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis;* constat, quod ibi loquitur de peccatoribus: ergo potest satisfacere quis per eleemosynam sine gratia. Et hoc ipsum Danielis quarto dixit Daniel Nabuchodonosor: *Peccata tua eleemosynis redime;* et constat, quod ille erat peccator magnus: ergo etc.

2. Item, Threnorum tertio[^2]: *Venatione ceperunt me;* Glossa: «Etsi fides deesset, poena satisfaceret»; sed ubi deest fides, non est caritas: ergo etc.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia ad nullum praeceptum divinum tenetur homo ex caritate hoc constat, quia, si quis pro loco et tempore parentes honorat, etiam non habens caritatem, non peccat[^3]: ergo multo minus tenetur ex caritate implere sacerdotis mandatum. Sed satisfactio est mandatum sacerdotis: ergo potest fieri extra caritatem.

4. Item, si tenetur ex caritate satisfacere, cum nullus sit certus, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit[^4], semper est in dubio: ergo semper debet satisfacere. Si tu dicas, quod conclusio est vera, quia semper continuanda est poenitentia usque ad mortem[^5]; ergo esto, quod imposita sit alicui poenitentia dare centum marcas, videtur secundum hoc, quod semper tenetur dare; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo tenetur ad impossibile.

**Contra:** 1. «Non respicit Deus quantum, sed quanto»[^6]; sed voluntas sine caritate non placet Deo: ergo nec opus, ergo nec satisfactio.

2. Item, quamdiu homo est extra caritatem, est inimicus; sed satisfactio est reconciliativa: ergo talis non potest satisfacere.

3. Item, Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^7]: *Si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest:* ergo etc.

4. Item, nullus damnatur pro culpa, pro qua satisfacit; et nullus damnatur nisi propter culpam: ergo nullus satisfaciens damnatur. Sed nullus evadit damnationem, nisi qui habet caritatem: ergo nullus satisfacit, nisi qui est in caritate.

> **Conclusio.** Sine gratia gratum faciente nemo potest Deo satisfacere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod satisfacere, quantum est de vi nominis, importat divinam acceptationem et reconciliationem et amicitiam; et quoniam sine gratia gratum faciente et caritate impossibile est, aliquem Deo placere, et opera eius acceptari: ideo nec satisfacere est possibile. Potest tamen homo, antequam habeat caritatem, praeparare se ad habendam caritatem[^8] et ad faciendam satisfactionem. Et sic intelligitur consilium Domini et consilium Danielis, ut se praeparent per eleemosynam ad gratiam, qua accepta, multiplicando eleemosynas satisfacerent.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa in Threnis, dicendum, quod fides ibi dicitur conscientia peccati. Aliquando enim habens gratiam per poenam satisfacit de culpa, cuius non habet memoriam; unde tantum valet dicere: *si fides desit,* quantum: *si desit conscientia*[^9].

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus tenetur ex caritate implere mandata; dicendum, quod quando satisfactionis opus ab homine imponitur homini, non tenetur illud opus facere ex caritate sive in caritate, quia praeceptum; sed necesse habet in caritate facere ad hoc, quod sit emendatorium et Deo placiturum. Et ideo dico, quod opere illo iniuncto completo, non tenetur illud iterare. Sed si dubitat probabiliter, se Deo non satisfecisse, non debet a satisfactione cessare, quousque per signa probabilia habeat certitudinem de culpa dimissa et poena. Unde, sicut dictum est de aliis Sacramentis, maxime de eucharistia[^10], quod non valet nisi habenti caritatem, non tamen tenetur quis accedere ex caritate secundum veritatem, sed se probabiliter disponere; ita etiam de satisfactione dicendum,

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quod opera iniuncta in satisfactionem tenetur facere, et tenetur se disponere, quantum est in se; et sic absolutus est in foro Ecclesiae et a poena suae conscientiae, et in foro Dei absolutus est, ut non peccet in hoc faciendo. Sed tamen per haec opera non absolvitur omnino; et ideo sanum consilium est, quod homo semper poeniteat. Sufficit tamen cum signis probabilibus fecisse poenitentiam iniunctam, nec oportet eam iterare. Unde si centum dedit, non debet iterare, nec sacerdos debet iterum imponere nisi pro aliqua culpa de novo commissa. Satisfecit enim talis in foro Ecclesiae et suae conscientiae.

Unde notandum, quod duplex potest distingui forum secundum duplex iudicium, scilicet forum conscientiae et forum divinae iustitiae. Primum est manifestum, secundum est occultum. Si quis igitur impleat poenitentiam impositam sine remorsu conscientiae, sed tamen extra caritatem; non tenetur satisfacere amplius, nec iudicio sacerdotis nec suo; tenetur tamen iudicio Dei, quia adhuc Deus exiget poenam. Illud autem forum distinguitur contra forum Ecclesiae; sed istud vocatur forum Ecclesiae, quod est in facie Ecclesiae et secundum iudicium publicum.

english:
### Question III. *Whether it is possible, outside of charity, while abstaining from sins, to make satisfaction to God.*

Thirdly it is asked whether, outside of charity, while abstaining from sins, it is possible to make satisfaction. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. Luke eleven[^1]: *Give alms, and behold, all things are clean to you;* it is established that there he is speaking of sinners: therefore someone can make satisfaction by alms without grace. And this same thing Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor in Daniel four: *Redeem your sins by alms;* and it is established that he was a great sinner: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Lamentations three[^2]: *They have caught me as in a hunt;* the Gloss: «Even if faith were lacking, the punishment would make satisfaction»; but where faith is lacking, there is no charity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason:* because to no divine precept is a man bound out of charity — this is established, since, if someone honors his parents according to place and time, even without having charity, he does not sin[^3]: therefore much less is he bound out of charity to fulfill the priest's command. But satisfaction is the priest's command: therefore it can be done outside of charity.

4. Likewise, if one is bound out of charity to make satisfaction, since no one is certain whether he is worthy of love or of hatred[^4], he is always in doubt: therefore he must always make satisfaction. If you say that the conclusion is true, because penance must always be continued until death[^5]; then suppose that a penance of giving a hundred marks were imposed on someone — it seems, according to this, that he is always bound to give; but this is impossible: therefore he is bound to the impossible.

**On the contrary:** 1. «God does not regard how much, but with how great [a disposition]»[^6]; but a will without charity does not please God: therefore neither does the work, therefore neither does the satisfaction.

2. Likewise, as long as a man is outside of charity, he is an enemy; but satisfaction is reconciliative: therefore such a one cannot make satisfaction.

3. Likewise, the Apostle, First Corinthians thirteen[^7]: *If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, but have not charity, it profits me nothing:* therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no one is damned for a fault for which he makes satisfaction; and no one is damned except on account of a fault: therefore no one who makes satisfaction is damned. But no one escapes damnation except him who has charity: therefore no one makes satisfaction except him who is in charity.

> **Conclusion.** Without sanctifying grace no one can make satisfaction to God.

**I respond:** It must be said that to make satisfaction, as far as the force of the word goes, implies divine acceptance and reconciliation and friendship; and since without sanctifying grace and charity it is impossible for anyone to please God and for his works to be accepted: therefore neither is it possible to make satisfaction. Nevertheless a man can, before he has charity, prepare himself to have charity[^8] and to make satisfaction. And thus is to be understood the counsel of the Lord and the counsel of Daniel, that they should prepare themselves through alms for grace, which once received, by multiplying alms they would make satisfaction.

2. To the objection from the Gloss on Lamentations, it must be said that "faith" is there called the conscience of sin. For sometimes one having grace makes satisfaction through punishment for a fault of which he has no memory; whence it is as much as to say: *if faith be lacking,* as much as: *if conscience be lacking*[^9].

3. 4. To the objection that no one is bound out of charity to fulfill the commands; it must be said that when a work of satisfaction is imposed by a man upon a man, he is not bound to do that work out of charity or in charity, since it is a precept; but he has need to do it in charity for this, that it may be emendatory and pleasing to God. And therefore I say that, once that enjoined work is completed, he is not bound to repeat it. But if he probably doubts that he has not made satisfaction to God, he ought not to cease from satisfaction until through probable signs he has certitude concerning the fault forgiven and the punishment. Whence, as has been said concerning the other Sacraments, especially the Eucharist[^10], that it avails only to one having charity, yet no one is bound to approach out of charity according to truth, but to dispose himself probably; so too it must be said concerning satisfaction,

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that he is bound to do the works enjoined for satisfaction, and is bound to dispose himself, as far as is in him; and thus he is absolved in the forum of the Church and from the punishment of his conscience, and in the forum of God he is absolved, so that he does not sin in doing this. But nevertheless by these works he is not absolved altogether; and therefore it is sound counsel that a man should always do penance. Yet it suffices to have done the enjoined penance with probable signs, nor is it necessary to repeat it. Whence if he has given a hundred, he ought not to repeat it, nor ought the priest to impose again except for some fault newly committed. For such a one has made satisfaction in the forum of the Church and of his conscience.

Whence it is to be noted that a twofold forum can be distinguished according to a twofold judgment, namely the forum of conscience and the forum of divine justice. The first is manifest, the second is hidden. If, then, anyone fulfills the imposed penance without remorse of conscience, but nevertheless outside of charity; he is not bound to make satisfaction further, neither by the judgment of the priest nor by his own; yet he is bound by the judgment of God, since God will still exact the punishment. But that forum is distinguished against the forum of the Church; whereas this is called the forum of the Church, which is in the face of the Church and according to public judgment.

la: Vers. 41. — Seq. textus est Dan. 4, 24.

en: Verse 41. — The following text is Daniel 4:24.

la: Vers. 52. — Glossa, quam exhibet Lyranus in v. 54, sumta est ex Paschasio Radberto in hunc loc. Eandem sententiam profert Ambros. hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Verse 52. — The Gloss, which Lyra furnishes on v. 54, is taken from Paschasius Radbertus on this passage. Ambrose advances the same opinion here in the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: De quo vide III. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.

en: On which see III *Sentences* d. 37, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Eccle. 9, 1.

en: Ecclesiastes 9:1.

la: Ut insinuatur supra ab Augustino in lit. Magistri, d. XIV. c. 3. circa finem. — De ultima conclusione cfr. supra pag. 234, nota 6. — Inferius pro *imposita sit alicui poenitentia* codd. A G K *impositum sit alicui.*

en: As is intimated above by Augustine in the text of the Master, d. XIV, c. 3, near the end. — On the last conclusion cf. above p. 234, note 6. — Below, for *a penance were imposed on someone* codices A G K [read] *something were imposed on someone.*

la: Secundum Gregor. et Bedam nec non Glossam ordinariam in Marc. 12, 43. apud Lyranum. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 906, nota 6. et pag. 929, nota 5.

en: According to Gregory and Bede, as well as the Glossa Ordinaria on Mark 12:43, in Lyra. Cf. tom. II, p. 906, note 6, and p. 929, note 5.

la: Vers. 3, ubi Vulgata post *meas* addit: *et si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam.*

en: Verse 3, where the Vulgate after *meas* adds: *and if I should deliver my body, so that I burn.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. in fine corp. et d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — Cod. U *habeat gratiam, praeparare se ad gratiam et caritatem.*

en: Cf. II *Sentences* d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, at the end of the corpus, and d. 28, a. 2, q. 1. — Codex U [reads] *let him have grace, to prepare himself for grace and charity.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine, ubi illa sententia eodem modo exponitur. — Cod. B addit *peccati.*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3, at the end, where that opinion is expounded in the same way. — Codex B adds *of sin.*

la: Dist. 9. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 12. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Inferius pro *quod opera* multi codd. *quod per opera,* et pro *in satisfactionem* plurimi codd. *in satisfactione.*

en: Dist. 9, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 12, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Below, for *that the works* many codices [read] *that through the works,* and for *for satisfaction* very many codices [read] *in satisfaction.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De responsione ad hanc 3. quaestionem cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, ubi idem docetur. Consentit S. Thom., sed Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 15-18.), saltem quoad satisfactionem sacramentalem (cfr. hic ad 3.), probabile esse putat, pro peccatis antea iam dimissis per opus in mortali factum non tantum satisfieri praecepto a sacerdote imposito, sed etiam posse solvi poenam satisfactoriam, licet opus non sit meritorium; cui opinioni favent Durandus, Biel et etiam plures recentiores, refragantibus cum S. Thoma principalibus antiquis Scholasticis, immo Alex. Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 4. a. 2.), in hoc contrarius S. Bonaventurae, disertis verbis dicit, poenitentiam in hoc statu completam esse iterandam, et B. Albert. (hic a. 30.) excipit ab ista iteratione tantum ea opera quae in effectu suo manent. Alii antiqui et recentiores putant, poenitentiam sacramentalem in peccato factam postea, cessante obice peccati, effectum satisfactorium producere posse; quod probabile esse censet S. Bonav., de quo vide seq. quaestionem. Quoad iterationem autem iniunctae poenitentiae in statu peccati factae ad mentem nostri auctoris S. Alphonsus (Theol. Moral. VI. tr. 4. n. 522. seq.) docet, esse nunc sententiam communiorem et probabiliorem, satisfieri praecepto, licet poenitens talis probabilius peccet venialiter. — De hac 3. quaestione praeter Scotum: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 14. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1. q. 5. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. n. 7. 8. 13. 14. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

**II.** Ad 4. quaestionem Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., B. Albert., Richard. a Med. absolute respondent negative; Scotus cum non paucis vult, eam pie affirmari posse; quod auctor noster esse probabile censet. — De eadem: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 2. § 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 15. 16. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 14. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4.

**III.** De 5. quaestione cfr. II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 2. 3. scholion, nec non ibid. a. 1, d. 24. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. — De speciebus meriti vide II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. et scholion. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3. § 1. 2. — Scoti loci collecti ab Hieron. de Montefortino, V. q. 13. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4; Suppl. q. 14. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med. tangit hanc et seq. q. hic a. 1. q. 5. ad 3. — Durand., hic q. 3.

**IV.** De quaestione 6. cfr. infra p. II. dub. 8. In eius solutione S. Thomas concordat per omnia; similiter Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Durand., aliique. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 3. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 5; Suppl. q. 14. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 32. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the reply to this 3rd question cf. also III *Sentences* d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3, where the same is taught. St. Thomas agrees, but Scotus (here q. 1, n. 15–18), at least as regards sacramental satisfaction (cf. here ad 3), holds it probable that, for sins already previously remitted, the satisfactory penalty can be discharged not only by a work done while in mortal sin fulfilling the precept imposed by a priest, but also even apart from this — though the work be not meritorious; to which opinion Durandus, Biel, and also several more recent authors are favorable, with the principal ancient Scholastics opposing along with St. Thomas; indeed Alexander of Hales (S. p. IV, q. 24, m. 4, a. 2), in this contrary to St. Bonaventure, says in express words that a penance completed in this state is to be repeated; and Blessed Albert (here a. 30) excepts from this repetition only those works which remain in their effect. Other ancients and moderns hold that a sacramental penance done while in sin can afterward, once the obstacle of sin has ceased, produce a satisfactory effect; which St. Bonaventure judges to be probable, concerning which see the following question. As to the repetition, however, of an enjoined penance done in a state of sin, according to the mind of our author, St. Alphonsus (*Moral Theology* VI, tr. 4, n. 522 f.) teaches that it is now the more common and more probable opinion that the precept is satisfied, although such a penitent more probably sins venially. — On this 3rd question besides Scotus: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 1, 2. — S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 2; *Suppl.* q. 14, a. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 8, 9. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 2, 3. — Richard. a Med., on this and the following q. here a. 1, q. 5. — Durand., on this and the following q. here q. 2, n. 7, 8, 13, 14. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following qq. here q. 2.

**II.** To the 4th question Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., B. Albert., Richard. a Med. respond absolutely in the negative; Scotus with not a few holds that it can piously be affirmed; which our author judges to be probable. — On the same: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 2, § 3. — Scot., here q. 1, n. 15, 16. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3; *Suppl.* q. 14, a. 3. — B. Albert., here a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4.

**III.** On the 5th question cf. II *Sentences* d. 28, a. 2, q. 2, 3, scholion, and also ibid. a. 1, d. 24, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2. — On the species of merit see II *Sentences* d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, and scholion. — On the same question: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3, § 1, 2. — Scotus' passages collected by Hieronymus of Montefortino, V, q. 13, a. 4. — S. Thom., here loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4; *Suppl.* q. 14, a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard. a Med. touches upon this and the following q. here a. 1, q. 5, ad 3. — Durand., here q. 3.

**IV.** On the 6th question cf. below p. II, dub. 8. In its solution St. Thomas agrees in all respects; likewise Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Durand., and others. — On the same question: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 3. — S. Thom., here loc. cit. quaestiunc. 5; *Suppl.* q. 14, a. 5. — B. Albert., here a. 32. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Durand., here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{352,353,354}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 40211–40369) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/IV override, the PDF bands were authoritative through the two-column Respondeo / Solutio / footer regions (the OCR cascade-interleaved the two columns line-for-line). Offset pdf = printed + 20 (printed 352–354 = PDF 372–374).

**Page-verify.** Running heads confirmed on the bands: p. 353 = "DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III. 353"; p. 354 = "354 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." The QUAESTIO III header opens at the top of p. 353's right column. (Note: the dispatch bands labeled "p352" actually carry the *preceding* question's tail + its CONCLUSIO/RESPONDEO — q3 itself begins on p. 353; `printed_pages` keeps [352,353,354] to match the supplied band set, but all q3 body lives on pp. 353–354.)

**Opener alignment.** Confirmed: p. 353 R-col top reads "QUAESTIO III. Utrum extra caritatem abstinentem a peccatis possibile sit Deo satisfacere. Tertio quaeritur, utrum extra caritatem abstinentem a peccatis possibile sit satisfacere…" — matches the assigned title. (The printed header inserts *Deo*; the opening sentence omits it — both rendered verbatim as printed.)

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**[?] flags.** None unresolved. Silent OCR corrections from the PDF bands: arg. 1 *eleemosynam* / *redime* (OCR `ekemosynam` / `rediine`); arg. 4 *amore, an odio dignus sit* (OCR cascade); *Contra* 1 *quanto* (OCR `quaulo`); Respondeo *acceptationem* / *reconciliationem* / *amicitiam*; *Ad 2* *conscientia peccati*; *Ad 3.4* *emendatorium* / *Deo placiturum* / *iterare* / *eucharistia*; p. 354 *forum divinae iustitiae* / *occultum* / *publicum*; scholion §I *iterandam* / *meritorium* / *probabilior*. Marginal rubrics in both columns (*Fundamenta*, *Opinio 1.ª*, *Reprobatur*, *Ratio triplex*, *Conclusio*, *Ad 1. arg. in oppos.*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Casus solvitur*, *Duplex forum*) are editorial side-notes, omitted from the body per corpus convention.


title: Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum opera satisfactoria facta extra caritatem vivificentur adveniente caritate, et debeant computari in sortem

title_alt: Whether satisfactory works done outside charity are vivified when charity comes, and ought to be counted to one's account

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum opera satisfactoria, facta extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, reviviscant sive vivificentur.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum opera satisfactoria, facta extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, reviviscant sive vivificentur et debeant computari in sortem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Levitici vigesimo quinto[^1]: *Si attenuatus frater tuus* etc.; Glossa exponit, quod fructus bonae conversationis debent ei computari ab eo tempore, ex quo peccavit; et secundum hoc videtur, quod caritate adveniente, possunt bona opera computari.

2. Item, baptismus acceptus a ficto extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, incipit valere[^2]: ergo similiter, cum satisfactio sit opus sacramentale, poterit valere, adveniente caritate. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia in baptismo imprimitur character; contra hoc est de restitutione, quae tunc valet ad salutem, cum advenit caritas, nec oportet iterari.

3. Item, facilius est in natura vivificare quod non[^3] vixit, quam quod vixit et est mortuum sive mortificatum — primum enim est naturale, secundum supra naturam — ergo cum opera mortificata adveniente caritate, vivificentur, multo magis mortua, vel saltem aequaliter.

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4. Item, bonum *moris* magis propinquum est gratiae quam bonum *naturae*; sed *naturalia*[^4] vivificantur et gratia informantur: ergo et *bona in genere* prius facta.

5. Item, ratio, quare Deus remittit culpam et non remittit poenam, est, ne peccatum remaneat impunitum: ergo si iste peccator punitus est ante adventum gratiae tantum, quantum deberet[^5] puniri post gratiam, vel in parte; aut nullo modo puniri debet, aut non tantum: ergo bona opera computantur.

**Contra:**
1. Quod nullo modo vivit nec est a principio vivente non[^a] habet *potentiam* ad vitam; sed tale est opus extra caritatem factum: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne satisfactorium est meritorium; sed nullum est meritorium nisi ex caritate; sed opus illud non fuit ex caritate nec amplius potest esse, quia impossibile est, quod mutet originem: ergo impossibile est inter opera satisfactoria computari.

3. Item, peccator ante satisfactionem est obligatus ad poenam infinitam; sed ab infinito nihil adimitur, et quod adimitur nihil facit[^b]: quantumcumque ergo se affligat, tenetur ad aequalem poenam: ergo non debent talia opera computari.

4. Item, opus ex caritate procedens excedit improportionaliter opus extra caritatem factum; sed quod improportionaliter excedit aliud non accrescit ex additione illius: ergo quantumcumque opera fecerit ante caritatem, nihil addunt ad opera post caritatem, sicut nec punctus ad lineam[^c]: ergo in nihilum debent computari.

> **Conclusio.** Probabile est, quod opera satisfactoria, facta extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, reviviscant quoad remissionem poenae, non quoad meritum vitae aeternae; sed securius est tenere, quod nullo modo vivificantur et computantur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.[^d] — Una quidem fuit, quod opus satisfactorium, quantum est de sua ratione perfecta, meretur collationem gloriae et meretur remissionem poenae[^6]: collationem gloriae, quia fit *ex caritate*; remissionem poenae, quia fit *in caritate*, in quantum sacramentale est; et ideo sufficit, quod fiat *in* caritate, quantum ad hoc; quia per caritatem poena debita satisfacienti fit proportionalis poenae, quam sustinet. Dicunt ergo, quod opera illa vivificari quantum ad *meritum vel retributionem vitae aeternae* est impossibile, quia non fuerunt ex caritate, et amplius impossibile est esse ex caritate; sed quantum ad *meritum remissionis poenae* — quia non erat alius defectus, nisi quia poena non erat proportionalis — isto posito in caritate, et poena facta proportionali, vivificantur quantum ad hoc et computari debent in sortem. Unde[^7] aliter vivificantur quam opera mortificata, quia illa ad aeternam retributionem, haec solum ad poenae dimissionem.

Alia est positio, quod omne opus satisfactorium est opus meritorium vitae aeternae, et oportet fieri ex caritate movente imperio coniuncto, vel saltem primo[^8]; sicut est de eo qui vadit ad sanctum Iacobum; unde dicunt, quod talia *nullo modo* vivificantur nec computantur. — Prima positio est multum probabilis, sed haec securior est.[^9]

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium prius huius, quod debent fructus computari; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur, si statim post peccatum incepit conteri, et tunc opera satisfactoria fuerunt ab illo tempore, etiam antequam absolveretur a sacerdote. — Vel dicendum, quod fructus computantur quantum ad superexcrescentiam[^10] *usurarii*, quia merito illorum fructuum diabolus non traxit illum ad multa scelera.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de baptismo, dicendum, quod est opus *Dei ad hominem*, et hoc nunquam est mortuum, tamen propter inconvenientiam suscipientis privatur effectu; et tale est baptismus. — Est opus *hominis ad hominem*, et tale consideratur solum exterius, quia homo non videt nisi ea quae extra sunt[^11]; et tale est restitutio, et hoc non oportet esse vivum. — Aliud est opus *hominis ad Deum*, et tale potest esse mortuum, sed debet esse vivum ad hoc, quod sit satisfactorium, aliter enim Deo non est acceptum; et tale est opus satisfactionis, quo homo reconciliatur Deo. Et ideo non est simile de baptismo et satisfactione[^12].

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vivificare quod nunquam vixit est facilius; dicendum, quod hoc verum est in his quae ideo vivunt, quia recipiunt *vitam*, sed non in his quae ideo possunt vivere, quia *procedunt a vita*; et talia sunt opera[^e].

4. Ad aliud dicendum, quod non est simile de habitibus et potentiis et actibus, quia isti manent, illi non, nec informari nec vivificari possunt.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa satisfaciendi est, ne sit peccati impunitas[^f]; dicendum, quod illa non est tota ratio, sed etiam haec: quia homo est amicus Dei effectus per gratiam et dignus aliquando beatificari; ideo solum ad poenam temporalem astrictus est, et ideo, antequam sit amicus, ad aeternam astringitur. — Praeterea, opus factum ex caritate improportionaliter, sicut factum est in opponendo[^g], excedit opus factum extra caritatem, et ita poena supportata ex caritate et mera voluntate excedit poenam supportatam sine caritate; et ideo Deus poenam aeternam aeternaliter portandam ex mala voluntate, cuiusmodi est in damnatis, rationabiliter in poenam temporalem commutat ex caritate portandam; tantum placet ei talis tolerantia. Et ideo alia poena extra caritatem portata tanquam omnino improportionalis non augmentat illam; sed Deus[^h] illam solam reputat satisfactoriam, cuius tolerantia et assumtio sumitur ex caritate sincera, quia in aliam non commutabat poenam[^i].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether satisfactory works done outside charity revive or are vivified when charity comes.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether satisfactory works, done outside charity, when charity comes, revive or are vivified and ought to be counted to one's account. And that they are, it seems.

1. Upon that text of Leviticus, chapter twenty-five[^1]: *If your brother be reduced* etc.; the Gloss explains that the fruits of good conduct ought to be reckoned to him from the time at which he sinned; and according to this it seems that, when charity comes, good works can be reckoned.

2. Likewise, baptism received by a feigning person outside charity begins to avail when charity comes[^2]: therefore likewise, since satisfaction is a sacramental work, it will be able to avail when charity comes. If you say that the case is not alike, because in baptism a character is imprinted; against this stands the case of restitution, which then avails unto salvation when charity comes, nor need it be repeated.

3. Likewise, it is easier in nature to vivify what has not[^3] lived than what has lived and is dead or mortified — for the first is natural, the second above nature — therefore, since mortified works, when charity comes, are vivified, much more are dead ones, or at least equally so.

4. Likewise, the good *of conduct* is nearer to grace than the good *of nature*; but *natural things*[^4] are vivified and informed by grace: therefore also *goods in their kind* done beforehand.

5. Likewise, the reason why God remits guilt and does not remit the penalty is, lest sin remain unpunished: therefore if this sinner has been punished before the coming of grace as much as he would have deserved[^5] to be punished after grace, or in part; he ought either to be punished in no way, or not so much: therefore good works are reckoned.

**On the contrary:**
1. What in no way lives nor is from a living principle does not[^a] have the *potency* unto life; but such is a work done outside charity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every satisfactory work is meritorious; but nothing is meritorious except from charity; but that work was not from charity nor can it be any longer, because it is impossible that it change its origin: therefore it is impossible for it to be counted among satisfactory works.

3. Likewise, the sinner before satisfaction is bound to an infinite penalty; but from the infinite nothing is taken away, and what is taken away effects nothing[^b]: however much therefore he afflict himself, he is held to an equal penalty: therefore such works ought not to be reckoned.

4. Likewise, a work proceeding from charity exceeds disproportionately a work done outside charity; but what exceeds another disproportionately does not grow by the addition of it: therefore however many works he has done before charity, they add nothing to the works after charity, just as a point adds nothing to a line[^c]: therefore they ought to be counted as nothing.

> **Conclusion.** It is probable that satisfactory works, done outside charity, when charity comes, revive as to the remission of penalty, not as to the merit of eternal life; but it is safer to hold that they are in no way vivified and reckoned.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there has been a twofold opinion.[^d] — One indeed was that a satisfactory work, as far as belongs to its perfect formal character, merits the bestowal of glory and merits the remission of penalty[^6]: the bestowal of glory, because it is done *from charity*; the remission of penalty, because it is done *in charity*, inasmuch as it is sacramental; and therefore it suffices that it be done *in* charity, as to this; because through charity the penalty owed by the one making satisfaction becomes proportional to the penalty which he undergoes. They say therefore that for those works to be vivified as to *the merit or retribution of eternal life* is impossible, because they were not from charity, and it is further impossible for them to be from charity; but as to *the merit of the remission of penalty* — since there was no other defect, except that the penalty was not proportional — once this is set in charity, and the penalty made proportional, they are vivified as to this and ought to be reckoned to one's account. Hence[^7] they are vivified otherwise than mortified works, because the latter are vivified unto eternal retribution, these only unto the remission of penalty.

Another is the position that every satisfactory work is a work meritorious of eternal life, and must be done from charity moving by a conjoined command, or at least firstly[^8]; as is the case with one who goes to St. James; whence they say that such works are *in no way* vivified nor reckoned. — The first position is highly probable, but this one is safer.[^9]

1. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary before this, that fruits ought to be reckoned; it must be said that this is to be understood if immediately after the sin he began to be contrite, and then the satisfactory works were his from that time, even before he was absolved by the priest. — Or it must be said that the fruits are reckoned as to the surplus increase[^10] of *the usurer*, because by the merit of those fruits the devil did not drag him into many crimes.

2. To that which is objected concerning baptism, it must be said that it is a work *of God toward man*, and this is never dead, yet on account of the unfitness of the recipient it is deprived of its effect; and such is baptism. — There is a work *of man toward man*, and such is considered only outwardly, because man sees only those things which are outward[^11]; and such is restitution, and this need not be alive. — Another is a work *of man toward God*, and such can be dead, but it must be alive for this, that it be satisfactory, for otherwise it is not acceptable to God; and such is the work of satisfaction, by which man is reconciled to God. And therefore the case of baptism and of satisfaction is not alike[^12].

3. To that which is objected, that to vivify what has never lived is easier; it must be said that this is true in those things which live because they receive *life*, but not in those things which can live because they *proceed from life*; and such are works[^e].

4. To the other it must be said that the case is not alike concerning habits and potencies and acts, because the latter remain, the former do not, and can neither be informed nor vivified.

5. To that which is objected, that the cause of making satisfaction is, lest there be impunity of sin[^f]; it must be said that this is not the whole reason, but also this: that man is made a friend of God through grace and worthy at some time to be beatified; therefore he is bound only to a temporal penalty, and therefore, before he is a friend, he is bound to an eternal one. — Moreover, a work done from charity disproportionately, as was done in the objecting argument[^g], exceeds a work done outside charity, and thus a penalty borne from charity and pure will exceeds a penalty borne without charity; and therefore God reasonably commutes the eternal penalty, to be borne eternally out of an evil will, such as is the case in the damned, into a temporal penalty to be borne out of charity; so much does such endurance please him. And therefore the other penalty, borne outside charity, as being altogether disproportionate, does not augment it; but God[^h] reckons that alone satisfactory whose endurance and undertaking is drawn from sincere charity, because he did not commute the penalty into another[^i].

---

la: Vers. 25. seqq. — Glossam exhibet Rabanus ex Hesychio, qui in hunc versum dicit: « Uniuscuiusque ergo hominis possessio bona conversatio est, quam sortiti sumus a Deo »; et in v. 30: *Computavit* [Rabanus: *Computabit*] autem ab anno, quo semetipsum vendidit [i. e. peccavit], usque ad annum iubilaei sive remissionis, a quo videlicet peccans eguit consilio et doctrina, usquedum integram et omnimodam peragat poenitentiam, in qua remissionem accipiens, aequalis ei fiat, qui penitus non peccavit etc. Cfr. Gratian., C. *Quis aliquando vidit* (87.), de Poenitentia d. 1. § 13.

en: Verses 25 and following. — The Gloss is given by Rabanus from Hesychius, who on this verse says: "The possession of each man, therefore, is the good conduct which we have received by lot from God"; and on v. 30: He "reckoned" [Rabanus: "shall reckon"] from the year in which he sold himself [i.e. sinned], up to the year of jubilee or remission, from which, namely, the sinner stood in need of counsel and teaching, until he should complete an entire and total penance, in which, receiving remission, he might become equal to one who had not sinned at all, etc. Cf. Gratian, C. *Quis aliquando vidit* (87), *On Penance*, d. 1, § 13.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: As was shown above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.

la: Codd. E F G K L *nunquam*, cod. O *melius nondum*. Mox post *quam quod* cod. I addit *aliquando*.

en: Codices E F G K L read *nunquam* ("never"), codex O *melius nondum* ("rather, not yet"). Soon after *quam quod* codex I adds *aliquando*.

la: Cuiusmodi sunt potentiae, habitus etc. animae.

en: Of which kind are the potencies, habits, etc. of the soul.

la: Edd. *gratiae, nunquam debet*. Eaedem edd. cum multis codd. post *vel in parte* addunt *debet*.

en: The editions read *gratiae, nunquam debet*. The same editions with many codices add *debet* after *vel in parte*.

la: Pro *fit* cod. bb a secunda manu *meretur remissionem poenae*, quae verba codd. B H (F a secunda manu) addunt post *sacramentale est*. Inferius pro *ad hoc; quia... fit* Vat. cum pluribus codd. *ad hoc, quod... sit*.

en: For *fit*, codex bb in a second hand reads *meretur remissionem poenae* ("merits the remission of penalty"), which words codices B H (F in a second hand) add after *sacramentale est*. Below, for *ad hoc; quia... fit*, the Vatican edition with several codices reads *ad hoc, quod... sit*.

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. *Vel*, Vat. *Et ita*.

en: Not a few codices with the edition read *Vel* ("Or"), the Vatican edition *Et ita* ("And thus").

la: Codd. A E a secunda manu *praevio*, Vat. *praevio vel primo*. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6.

en: Codices A E in a second hand read *praevio*, the Vatican edition *praevio vel primo*. — Cf. II Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.

la: Quod secundum Du Cange, *Glossarium* etc., idem est quod *accretio sive incrementum*, et *usurarium* sive *usuaria* significat *usumfructum* seu potius *ius utendi*; *usurarius* dicitur vulgo de feneratore et distinguitur ab *usuario*. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.

en: Which, according to Du Cange, *Glossarium* etc., is the same as *accretion or increment*, and *usurarium* or *usuaria* signifies *usufruct* or rather *the right of using*; *usurarius* is said commonly of a money-lender and is distinguished from *usuarius*. — See here the text of the Master, c. 7.

la: Respicitur I. Reg. 16, 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.

en: Reference is made to 1 Kings [1 Samuel] 16:7: For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.

la: Ita codd. A E F G aa bb; in aliis et edd. *nec*. Edd. post *ad vitam* addunt *non potest vivificari*.

en: So codices A E F G aa bb; in others and in the editions, *nec*. The editions add after *ad vitam* the words *non potest vivificari* ("it cannot be vivified").

la: Edd. *omittunt et quod adimitur nihil facit* [i. e. *non diminuit*].

en: The editions omit *et quod adimitur nihil facit* [i.e. "it does not diminish"].

la: Cfr. tom. III. pag. 222, nota 10. et pag. 280, nota 3. — Superius post *quantumcumque* Vat. addit *vel quaecumque*.

en: Cf. tome III, p. 222, note 10, and p. 280, note 3. — Above, after *quantumcumque*, the Vatican edition adds *vel quaecumque*.

la: Marginal note: *Opinio 1.* — Prima opinio.

en: Marginal note: *Opinion 1.* — The first opinion. (Quaracchi marks the two positions and the conclusion with marginal labels *Opinio 1.*, *Opinio 2.*, *Conclusio.*)

la: Marginal note: *Notandum.*

en: Marginal note: *Note.*

la: Sc. supra, Contra, arg. 4 (*sicut nec punctus ad lineam*); Edd. variant in lectione *in opponendo*.

en: Namely above, in the *Contra*, argument 4 (*just as a point adds nothing to a line*); the editions vary in the reading *in opponendo*.

la: Edd. addunt referentiam ad seq. quaest. (QUAEST. V), quae incipit *Utrum homo per talia opera aliquid mereatur*.

en: The editions add a reference to the following question (QUAEST. V), which begins *Whether man merits anything by such works*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol IV PDF column bands for printed pp. 354–356 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p35{4,5,6}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; offset pdf = printed + 20, so pdf pp. 374–376), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF authoritative in the cascade-shattered two-column regions; raw IA djvu OCR, lines 40370–40627, used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing). Page-verify PASSED: running heads read "DIST. XV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV" with printed folios 354/355/356.

**Scholion finding.** NONE in this quaestio's range. The `SCHOLION.` block printed at the top of p. 354 (left/right columns, "1. De responsione ad hanc 3. quaestionem... II. Ad 4. quaestionem... III. De 5. quaestione... IV. De quaestione 6.") physically precedes the QUAESTIO IV title and is the **q3–q6 covering scholion** — it belongs to and should be rendered in **QUAESTIO III** (`bon-sent-IV-d15-p1-a1-q3`), which holds the scholion for this article's later questions. No SCHOLION header appears within raw lines 40370–40627. The "Probabile est..." block is the quaestio's own *Conclusio* (rendered as a blockquote), not a scholion. Cross-ref: see q3 for the scholion covering q4.

**Apparatus.** 12 numbered Quaracchi footers (p. 354 nn. 1–3; p. 355 nn. 1–12, numbering restarts per page) plus the body's lettered codex/marginal notes consolidated as `[^a]`–`[^i]`. Quaracchi restarts numeration on each printed page; markers `[^1]`–`[^12]` here map to the p. 354–355 sequences combined for a single in-chunk run. p. 356's own footers (n. 1 *Vide supra d. 14...*, etc.) sit under the q4 tail but their note text is cut by the QUAESTIO V boundary; the only p. 356 body marker reaching back into q4 is the *Notandum* margin and `[^g]`/`[^i]` — verify the p. 356 footer split when q5 is built (hand-off below).

**J2 apparatus-anchor fix (2026-07-13).** English body was missing `[^a]` (Latin: "nec est a principio vivente non[^a] habet *potentiam* ad vitam" — a real Quaracchi codex-variant note: codd. A E F G aa bb read *non*, others/edd. *nec*, and edd. add *non potest vivificari* after *ad vitam*); inserted after "does not" in Contra 1's English rendering to restore Tier-2 dual-body anchoring.

**[?] flags.** None blocking. Minor: the Latin `[^g]` reading *in opponendo* and the *Triplex opus.* / *Aliter.* margin labels are OCR-faint but legible in the PDF bands; rendered as printed.

**J4 Class C fix — `[^6b]` (2026-07-17).** Checked printed p. 355 (colcrop `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p355-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, split 1880) for the sentence "meretur collationem gloriae et meretur remissionem poenae: collationem gloriae, quia fit *ex caritate*; remissionem poenae, quia fit *in caritate*, in quantum sacramentale est." The printed page carries **exactly one** superscript numeral, a "⁶", set immediately after the *second* "fit" (the one before "in caritate, in quantum sacramentale est"). There is **no** superscript after the first "remissionem poenae" (where this chunk's `[^6]` sits) and none after "quia fit *ex caritate*". So `[^6b]` was a stray duplicate marker with no printed counterpart — deleted from both Latin and English bodies (was on the second "fit"/"is done"). Apparatus entry `[^6]` itself is left untouched (it is content-keyed to a variant reading of "fit" and is not in question); its body anchor remains at the first "remissionem poenae" as originally transcribed. Net effect: 21 apparatus defs = 21 Latin anchors = 21 English anchors, all Tier-2 healthy.

**Hand-off to q5.** QUAESTIO V (`bon-sent-IV-d15-p1-a1-q5`, "Utrum homo per talia opera aliquid mereatur") begins mid-p. 356 (raw 40628; PDF band p356-L-1 / R-1). The shared printed page 356 footer block ("¹ Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3...", n. 2, "³ Deus...") splits by body anchor: the q5 *Contra* notes (Augustinus, Psalmus, Sapientia, etc.) and conclusion *Peccator potest apud Deum aliquid mereri, sed tantum de congruo* are all q5's. Confirm at q5 build that q4 captured its p. 356 footer share (none of the p. 356 numbered footers anchor in q4 body — they all serve q5's arguments) and that the q4 closing sentence (`...quia in aliam non commutabat poenam`) is grammatically complete before the QUAESTIO V title.