title: Dist. 44, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–17 across the two printed pages bearing apparatus (792, 793). The small tail of DUB. IV that spills onto p.794 carries no apparatus of its own — p.794's footer belongs to DISTINCTIO XLV.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de ista solutione Magistri, qua dicit, quod non valet huius similitudinis inductio, quia Filium genuit de sua substantia[^1]. Videtur enim responsio ista non esse sufficiens. Nam invidia potest[^2] attendi respectu diversi in substantia et natura, sicut Angelus invidit homini: ergo propter hoc non excluditur invidia a Deo respectu creaturae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad invidiam ista duo concurrunt, scilicet potestas[^3] ad aequalitatem et exigentia rei factae. Non enim invidet aliquis alicui, nisi quia parificatur ei aliquis vel excedit, vel quia timet, ne parificetur. Item, artifex non dicitur invidus, nisi quando non facit rem, secundum quod exigit, et ipse potest. Et propter hoc, quia ex parte rerum non erat exigentia, et iterum[^4] in nullo poterant parificari; ideo qualescumque faceret, non convincitur in Deo esse invidia, etiam si nullas res faceret. Sed in Filio Dei erat potentia ad aequalitatem et ulterius exigentia propter hoc, quod erat de substantia Patris[^5]. Hinc est, quod non est simile ut dicit Magister; et est responsio eius bona. Ponit enim antecedens pro consequente, non quia velit dicere, quod invidia sit solum vel possit esse respectu similis in natura; sed propter rationem praedictam exigentiae scilicet et aequalitatis, quae erant in generatione Filii, quia erat de substantia Patris.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod potuit Deus hominem talem fecisse, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet; et si talem fecisset, *quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse?* Videtur enim dici contrarium in Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo[^6]: *Potuit transgredi et non est transgressus*; hoc dicitur in laudem sancti viri. Et Augustinus ipse dicit *super Genesim ad litteram*[^7], quod *« meliores iudicavit Deus homines, si ei liberaliter deservirent »*. Et iterum, libro *de Civitate Dei* dicit, quod *« melior est substantia, quae peccare potest, quam quae non potest »*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *melius* dicitur dupliciter: aut simpliciter, aut in ordine ad finem. Si simpliciter loquamur, melior est homo confirma-

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tus in gratia, quam potens labi; si in ordinatione ad finem, quae quidem consistit in perveniendo; sic melius fuit facere hominem in libertate peccandi, sed tamen primum melius est simpliciter, hoc autem est melius secundum quid. Et ideo verbum Augustini, simpliciter loquendo, habet veritatem.

Quod autem dicitur de viro iusto, laus accidentalis est sive quantum ad gloriam accidentalem. Constat enim, Christum non potuisse peccare, et tamen erat gloriosissimus. Similiter intelligendum est verbum illud Augustini *super Genesim*. Sed quod dicitur, quod melior est natura, quae potest peccare, quam quae non potest; dicendum, quod non posse peccare est duplici de causa, aut quia caret voluntate, aut vertibilitate voluntatis; et primo modo intelligit Augustinus, non secundo.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister[^8], quod *potuit Deus meliora facere, quam fecit*. Videtur enim istud non habere veritatem in omnibus, et specialiter in Christo, quem videtur nullo modo posse facere meliorem, per illud quod dicitur ad Philippenses secundo[^9]: *Dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen*. Item, Ioannis tertio[^10]: *Datus est ei spiritus non ad mensuram*; ergo nullo modo potuit Deus dare Christo plus de spiritu: ergo non potuit eum facere meliorem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister loquitur de universo et eius partibus; et quoniam Christus nec est de universo nec eius pars, ideo non habet locum in ipso verbum[^11]. Tamen adhuc in Christo habet dubitationem. Si enim quidquid habet humanitas Christi, finitum est, ergo cum Deus possit supra omne finitum, potuit maius. Et iterum, Christus factus fuit passibilis et mortalis, et potuit fieri immortalis.

Et propter hoc dicendum, quod tripliciter est loqui de Christo, aut quantum ad unionem, aut quantum ad gratiam singularis personae, aut quantum ad proprietates naturae. Si quantum ad *unionem*, nec Deus potest plus dare, nec creatura recipere, quia unionis gratia ex parte alterius extremi est dignitatis infinitae, scilicet quod homo sit Deus, quamvis ex parte humanitatis quidquid est ibi sit finitum: et ita non ponitur limitatio ex parte Dei, nec ex parte creaturae capacitas infinita nisi per unionem, videlicet quia unitur homo bono infinito, ita quod homo est Deus, qui est bonitatis infinitae. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad gratiam singularis personae, sic concedo, quod Deus potuit plus[^12] dare, sed rationalis natura non potuit amplius recipere; non quia capacitas animae ad gratiam per collationem gratiae minuatur, quia nec minuitur nec augetur, sed consummatur[^13] et completur; et ideo non est possibilis ad amplius. Si autem loquamur *quantum ad proprietates naturae*, sic Deus et plus potuit de bonitate dare, et rationalis creatura recipere, quantum ad ea, scilicet, quae sunt corporis — quia nunc plura habet, quam quando factus est — sed non potuerunt nostrae[^14] saluti effici congruentiores. Nunquam enim salus nostra potuisset per substantiam incorruptibilem et immortalem ita reparari, sicut per mortem et passionem eius reparata est. Patet ergo, quomodo melior potuit esse Christus, et quomodo non[^15].

#### DUB. IV.

Item, obiicitur de beata Virgine. Videtur enim, quod non potuerit fieri melior, quia Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*[^16] dicit: *«Decebat, quod illius Hominis conceptio fieret de Matre purissima, qua puritate maior nequit sub Deo intelligi»*: ergo videtur, quod non potuit fieri melior, et tamen ipsa fuit pars universi. Item, super omnes choros Angelorum exaltata est in gloria: ergo facta est in summa gratia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de beata Virgine quantum ad tres conditiones, scilicet quantum ad gratiam conceptionis, quantum ad gratiam iustificationis, quantum ad naturam[^17]. Si quantum ad conceptionem prolis, sic quia fuit Mater Dei, quo nihil nobilius cogitari potest, et Mater nobilissimi Filii, sic tantam habuit bonitatis dignitatem,

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quod nulla mulier amplius capere potuit. Si enim omnes creaturae, quantumcumque ascenderent in gradibus nobilitatis, essent praesentes, omnes deberent reverentiam Matri Dei. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad gratiam *iustificationis*, tantam habuit, quantam pura creatura humana sive rationalis, quae facta est sic, recipere potuit. — Si quantum ad *naturalia*, optima habuit, secundum quod sibi competens fuit: simpliciter tamen meliora potuit recipere, et Deus dare. — Et ita patet, quod in nullo creato habet instantiam hoc verbum Magistri: *quod Deus ea quae fecit, potuit facere meliora*. Patet etiam, quod in aliquibus capacitatem gratiae complevit et implevit; sed in Christo per omnem modum, in Matre eius secundum quod capit pura creatura rationalis in sexu femineo quantum ad ea quae spectant ad corpus, et in anima humana, quantum ad ea quae sunt gratiae.

---

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that solution of the Master's, by which he says that the bringing-in of this similitude has no force, because he begot the Son from his own substance[^1]. For it seems that this response is not sufficient. For envy can[^2] be considered in regard to one diverse in substance and nature, as the Angel envied man: therefore on this account envy is not excluded from God in regard to a creature.

**I respond:** It must be said that two things concur for envy, namely, the power[^3] toward equality, and the exigence of the thing made. For no one envies another unless someone is made equal to him or exceeds him, or unless he fears lest he be equalled. Likewise, an artisan is not called envious except when he does not make a thing according as it exacts, and as he is himself able. And on account of this, since on the side of things there was no exigence, and again[^4] in nothing could they be equalled, therefore whatever sort of things he made, envy is not convicted to be in God, even if he made no things at all. But in the Son of God there was a power toward equality and, beyond that, an exigence, on account of this, that he was of the substance of the Father[^5]. Hence it is that it is not a like case, as the Master says; and his response is good. For he puts the antecedent for the consequent, not because he means to say that envy could be only or could be in regard to one similar in nature, but on account of the aforesaid ratio of exigence and equality, which were in the generation of the Son, because he was of the substance of the Father.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that God could have made such a man, who could neither sin nor wish to sin; and if he had made such a one, *who doubts that he would have been better?* For the contrary seems to be said in Ecclesiasticus thirty-one[^6]: *He was able to transgress, and did not transgress*; this is said in praise of a holy man. And Augustine himself says *on Genesis according to the letter*[^7], that *"God judged men to be better, if they served him freely"*. And again, in his book *On the City of God* he says, that *"that substance is better which can sin than the one which cannot"*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *"better"* is said in two ways: either absolutely, or in ordering to an end. If we speak absolutely, the man confirmed in grace is better

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than the one able to fall; if [we speak] in the ordering to the end, which indeed consists in attaining it, then it was better to make man in the liberty of being able to sin, but yet the first is better absolutely, while this is better in a qualified sense. And so the word of Augustine, speaking absolutely, has truth.

But what is said about the just man is accidental praise, that is, as regards accidental glory. For it is settled that Christ could not sin, and yet he was most glorious. Similarly is to be understood that word of Augustine *on Genesis*. But as to what is said, that a nature is better which can sin than one which cannot, it must be said that not-being-able-to-sin is from a twofold cause, either because it lacks the will, or [because it lacks] the changeability of the will; and Augustine understands it in the first mode, not the second.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what the Master[^8] says, that *God could have made things better than he did*. For this seems not to have truth in all cases, and specially in Christ, whom he seems in no way able to make better, through what is said to the Philippians, chapter two[^9]: *He gave him a name, which is above every name*. Likewise, John three[^10]: *The Spirit is given to him not by measure*; therefore in no way could God give to Christ more of the Spirit: therefore he could not make him better.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master speaks of the universe and its parts; and since Christ neither is of the universe nor a part of it, therefore the saying has no place in him[^11]. Yet still in Christ it has a doubt. For if whatever the humanity of Christ has is finite, then since God can do beyond every finite thing, he could have done a greater. And again, Christ was made passible and mortal, and could have been made immortal.

And on account of this it must be said that to speak of Christ is to do so in three ways: either as to *the union*, or as to *the grace of the singular person*, or as to *the properties of [his] nature*. If as to the *union*, neither can God give more, nor the creature receive more, because the grace of union on the side of one extreme is of infinite dignity, namely, that man should be God, although on the side of the humanity whatever is there is finite: and so no limitation is placed on the side of God, nor is there infinite capacity on the side of the creature except through the union, namely, because man is united to an infinite good, in such a way that man is God, who is of infinite goodness. — But if we speak as to the grace of the singular person, then I concede that God could give more[^12], but the rational nature could not receive more; not because the soul's capacity for grace is diminished by the conferring of grace, since it is neither diminished nor increased, but consummated[^13] and completed; and therefore it is not capable of more. But if we speak *as to the properties of the nature*, then God could both give more out of his goodness, and the rational creature receive [it], as to those things, namely, which are of the body — since he now has more than when he was made — but they could not have been made more fitting to our[^14] salvation. For our salvation could never have been so repaired through an incorruptible and immortal substance, as it was repaired through his death and passion. It is plain therefore in what way Christ could have been better, and in what way not[^15].

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, an objection is raised concerning the Blessed Virgin. For it seems that she could not have been made better, since Anselm *On the Conception of the Virgin*[^16] says: *"It was fitting that the conception of that Man should be from a most pure Mother, by a purity than which a greater cannot be understood under God"*: therefore it seems that she could not have been made better, and yet she was a part of the universe. Likewise, she is exalted in glory above all the choirs of Angels: therefore she was made in the highest grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the Blessed Virgin as to three conditions, namely, as to the grace of the conception, as to the grace of justification, and as to the nature[^17]. If as to the conception of the offspring, then since she was the Mother of God — than whom nothing more noble can be thought of — and Mother of a most noble Son, she had so great a dignity of goodness,

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that no woman could receive more. For if all creatures, however high they might rise in degrees of nobility, were present, all would owe reverence to the Mother of God. — But if we speak as to the grace of *justification*, she had as much as a pure human or rational creature, which was made as she was made, could receive. — If as to the *natural endowments*, she had the best, according to what was fitting for her: yet absolutely speaking she could have received better things, and God could have given them. — And so it is plain that in no created thing does this word of the Master fail to find application: *that the things which God made, he could have made better*. It is also plain that in some he filled and completed the capacity of grace; but in Christ in every way, in his Mother according as a pure rational creature in the female sex is capable, as to those things which pertain to the body, and in the human soul, as to those things which are of grace.

---

la: Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 3. — Mox post *quia* plures codd. ut F P Q V cum ed. I interiiciunt *aliquid*, et deinde pro *necessario* codd. A G W exhibent *ultimo*.

en: Cf. above d. 42, q. 3. — Shortly after *quia*, many codd. such as F P Q V with ed. I insert *aliquid*, and then for *necessario* codd. A G W exhibit *ultimo*.

la: Ed. I bene *potest*.

en: Ed. I rightly has *potest*.

la: Vat. et nonnulli codd. *possibilitas*, de quo cfr. supra pag. 756, nota 1.

en: The Vatican edition and some codd. read *possibilitas*, on which cf. above p. 756, note 1.

la: Pro *iterum* Vat. *quia*.

en: For *iterum* the Vatican has *quia*.

la: Cfr. supra d. XX. c. 2. et 3, et in Comment. dub. 4. Cfr. etiam de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1.

en: Cf. above d. XX, cc. 2 and 3, and in the Commentary, dub. 4. Cf. also on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1.

la: Vers. 10. — Mox pro *hoc dicitur* Vat. *hoc dicit*.

en: Verse 10. — Shortly after, for *hoc dicitur* the Vatican has *hoc dicit*.

la: Haec Augustini sententia ad verbum non invenitur in eius Comment. in Gen., sed tamen erui potest ex cit. oper. libr. VIII. c. 13. n. 30. seq., et XI. c. 7. n. 9. Plus convenit cum illo dicto in libr. *de Vera Relig.* c. 14. n. 27, quod iam supra pag. 784, nota 7. citavimus. De seq. textu, allato ex libro *de Civ. Dei*, cfr. supra pag. 748, nota 8.

en: This saying of Augustine is not found verbatim in his Commentary on Genesis, but it can nevertheless be drawn out from the cited work, book VIII, c. 13, nn. 30 ff., and XI, c. 7, n. 9. It accords better with that saying in the book *On True Religion*, c. 14, n. 27, which we have already cited above on p. 784, note 7. On the following text, brought forward from the book *On the City of God*, cf. above p. 748, note 8.

la: Plura de hoc dubio exposita sunt supra q. 1. seqq. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3, et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Many points on this doubt have been set out above at q. 1 and following. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 3; and Richard of Mediavilla, here in his commentary on the text.

la: Vers. 9. Vulgata: *Donavit*.

en: Verse 9. The Vulgate has *Donavit* ("he gave [as a gift]").

la: Vers. 34. — Subinde inter *ergo nullo* Vat. interiicit *quia*. Pro *ergo* cod. V *si ergo*.

en: Verse 34. — Shortly after, between *ergo nullo* the Vatican inserts *quia*. For *ergo*, cod. V has *si ergo*.

la: In Vat. legitur sic: *non habet locum in ipso*. Verum etiam adhuc etc. Pro *in Christo* cod. bb *in ipso*.

en: In the Vatican edition it is read thus: *non habet locum in ipso* ("it has no place in him"). But still further etc. For *in Christo*, cod. bb has *in ipso*.

la: Cod. V hic repetit *potest plus*.

en: Cod. V here repeats *potest plus* ("can [give] more").

la: Cfr. supra d. 17. p. II. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *natura* codd. T cc cum Vat. *creatura*, et dein pro *consummatur* cod. I *conservatur*.

en: Cf. above d. 17, p. II, q. 1. — A little above, for *natura* codd. T cc with the Vatican read *creatura*, and then for *consummatur* cod. I has *conservatur*.

la: Pro *nostrae* sola Vat. *naturae*.

en: For *nostrae* only the Vatican has *naturae*.

la: Eadem solutio huius dubii datur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 5. seq.; a B. Alberto, hic a. 3; a S. Thoma, hic q. 1, a. 3, et S. I. q. 25. a. 6. ad 1; a Petro a Tar., hic a. 3; ab Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3, nec non a Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

en: The same solution of this doubt is given by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 5 and following; by Bl. Albert, here a. 3; by St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, and *S.* I, q. 25, a. 6, ad 1; by Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3; by Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 3; as well as by Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

la: Cap. 18. ubi in ed. oper. Anselmi pro *qua puritate* legitur: *nempe decens erat, ut ea puritate qua*.

en: Chapter 18, where in the edition of Anselm's works, for *qua puritate*, is read: *nempe decens erat, ut ea puritate qua* ("namely it was fitting that with that purity by which...").

la: Plurimi codd. cum codd. 2, 3 perperam addunt *caritatis*; Vat. cum ed. I adiicit *corporis*, quo additamento notio vocis *natura* nimis restringitur. Nostrae lectioni, quae per se fert ad *naturam simpliciter*, suffragantur codd. P Q. Confirmatur etiam haec lectio verbis, quae paulo inferius adhibentur ad exponendas illas tres conditiones hic commemoratas; quae verba haec sunt: *Si quantum ad naturalia, optima* etc., et exstant in omnibus codd. nec non in edd. I, 2, 3. Paulo superius pro *quantum ad gratiam conceptionis* ed. I *quantum ad conceptionem prolis*.

en: Very many codd. with codd. 2, 3 wrongly add *caritatis*; the Vatican with ed. I adds *corporis*, by which addition the notion of the word *natura* is too narrowly restricted. Our reading, which by itself bears upon *naturam simpliciter* ("nature simply"), is supported by codd. P Q. This reading is also confirmed by the words which a little below are used to set out those three conditions here mentioned; which words are these: *Si quantum ad naturalia, optima* etc., and they are found in all the codd. as well as in edd. I, 2, 3. A little above, for *quantum ad gratiam conceptionis*, ed. I has *quantum ad conceptionem prolis*.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 45

title_alt:
Distinctio XLV. — Littera Magistri
Distinction XLV — The Master's Text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 794 -->

### DISTINCTIO XLV.

### Cap. I.

#### *De voluntate Dei, quae essentia Dei est, et de signis eius.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Iam de voluntate Dei aliquid pro sensus nostri imbecillitate dicendum est. Sciendum est igitur, quia *voluntas* sive *volens* de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur. Non est enim ei aliud *velle* et aliud *esse*, sed omnino idem. Et sicut idem est ei *esse bonum* quod *esse Deum*, ita idem est ei *esse volentem* quod *esse Deum*. Nam voluntas, qua semper volens est, non affectus vel motus est, qui in Deum cadere non valet, sed divina usia, qua volens est, Deus est[^1], et huiusmodi.

### Cap. II.

#### *Quod licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen potest dici Deus esse omnia quae vult.*

Et licet idem sit Deo *velle* quod *esse*, non tamen dicendum est Deum esse omnia quae vult. Quod quidam, de Dei voluntate non recte sentientes, nobis obiiciunt dicentes: Si idem est Deo velle quod esse, ergo cum dicimus, Deum velle omnia quae facit, dicimus, eum esse omnia quae facit; alioquin non ibi illo verbo[^2] idem significatur quod significatur hoc verbo *esse*, cum de Deo dicitur. Et si ita est, non semper dicitur de Deo *velle* secundum essentiam. Si vero secundum essentiam non dicitur aliquando, quomodo ergo dicitur de Deo? Relative enim numquam dicitur. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet idem penitus sit Deo *velle* quod *esse*, non tamen potest dici esse omnia quae vult; sicut idem est Deo *esse* quod *scire*, nec tamen sicut dicitur *scire omnia*, ita quoque potest dici *esse omnia*.

### Cap. III.

#### *De intelligentia harum locutionum: Deus scit, vel Deus vult, Deus scit omnia vel vult aliquid.*

Et ubicumque Deus dicitur *scire* vel *sciens*, et *velle* vel *volens*, haec de eo[^3] secundum essentiam dicuntur. Cum enim dicitur: Deus scit vel Deus vult, sive Deus est sciens vel volens, essentia divina praedicatur et Deus esse[^4] enuntiatur. Cum autem additur *omnia* vel *aliquid* vel *aliqua*, et dicitur: Deus scit omnia, vel vult aliquid vel aliqua: essentia quidem divina praedicatur, non simpliciter et absolute, sed ita ut scientiae, quae ipse est, omnia subiecta monstrentur, et voluntati, quae ipsa eadem est, aliquid vel aliqua subiecta esse dicantur, ut talis fiat sensus: Deus scit omnia, id est, Deus est, cuius scientiae, quae ipsius essentia est, omnia subiecta sunt. Similiter: Deus vult haec vel illa, id est, Deus est, cuius voluntati, quae ipse est[^5], haec sive illa subiecta sunt. *Volens* ergo sive *velle* dicitur Deus secundum essentiam, cuius voluntas essentia est sempiterna et immutabilis — licet ea varientur et transeant, quae ei subiecta sunt — quae non potest esse iniusta nec mala, quia Deus est.

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### Cap. IV.

#### *Quod Dei voluntas summe bona causa est omnium quae naturaliter sunt, cuius causa non est quaerenda, quia prima et summa causa est omnium.*

Haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naturaliter fiunt vel facta sive futura sunt, quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est. Ideoque causa ipsius quaerenda non est. Qui enim eius causam quaerit, aliquid maius ea quaerit, cum nihil ea maius sit. Unde Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^6]: « Qui quaerit, quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei. Omnis autem causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur. Nihil autem maius est voluntate Dei. Non ergo eius causa quaerenda est ». Idem in libro *de Genesi contra Manichaeos*[^7]: « Si qui dixerint: Quid placuit Deo facere caelum et terram? respondendum est eis: qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant, causas voluntatis[^8] Dei scire quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet causam voluntas, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas est credere. Qui ergo dicit: Quare fecit Deus caelum et terram? respondendum est illi: quia voluit[^9]. Voluntas enim Dei causa est caeli et terrae, et ideo maior est voluntas Dei quam caelum et terra. Qui autem dicit: Quare voluit facere caelum et terram? maius aliquid quaerit, quam est voluntas Dei; nihil autem maius inveniri potest. Compescat se ergo humana temeritas, et id quod non est, non quaerat, ne id quod est, non inveniat ». — Ecce his auctoritatibus aperte insinuatur, quod voluntatis Dei causa nulla est, et ideo quaerenda non est.

« Voluntas igitur Dei, ut ait Augustinus in tertio libro *de Trinitate*[^10], prima et summa causa est omnium specierum atque motionum. Nihil enim fit, quod non de interiori atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris egrediatur secundum ineffabilem iustitiam ». « Ubi enim non operatur quod vult Dei omnipotentis sapientia? quae *pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter*[^11] », « et non solum facit ea quae perseverantia consuetudinis admirationem non admittunt », « sed etiam ea quae propter raritatem et insolitum eventum mira videntur, ut sunt defectus luminarium et terrae motus et monstruosi animantium partus et his similia, quorum nihil fit sine[^12] voluntate Dei, sed plerisque non apparet. Ideoque placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam causis aliis ea tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, id est voluntatem Dei. Itaque non nisi Dei voluntas causa prima est sanitatis, aegritudinis, praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum et retributionum ». Haec igitur sola est, unde ortum est quidquid est, et ipsa non est orta, sed aeterna.

### Cap. V.

#### *Quibus modis accipitur Dei voluntas.*

Hic non est praetereundum nobis, quod sacra Scriptura de voluntate Dei variis modis loqui consuevit; et tamen non est Dei voluntas diversa, sed locutio diversa est de voluntate, quia nomine voluntatis diversa accipit. Nam *voluntas* Dei vere ac proprie dicitur quae in ipso est et ipsius essentia est; et haec una est nec multiplicitatem recipit nec mutabilitatem, quae inexpleta esse non potest, de qua Propheta ait[^13]: *Omnia quaecumque voluit, Dominus fecit*. Et Apostolus: *Voluntati eius quis resistit?* Et alibi: *Ut probetis, quae sit voluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta*. Et haec voluntas recte appellatur *beneplacitum Dei* sive *dispositio*.

### Cap. VI.

#### *Quod praeceptio, prohibitio, permissio, consilium, operatio nomine voluntatis interdum intelliguntur.*

Aliquando vero secundum quamdam dicendi figuram voluntas Dei vocatur quod secundum proprietatem non est voluntas eius, ut *praeceptio*, *prohibitio*, *consilium*, nec non *permissio* et *operatio*. Ideoque pluraliter aliquando Scriptura *voluntates* Dei pronuntiat. Unde Propheta[^14]: *Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius*. Cum non sit nisi una voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, pluraliter tamen dicit *voluntates*, quia voluntas Dei variis modis ac pro diversis accipitur, ut dictum est. Ita etiam idem Propheta propter multos effectus misericordiae et iustitiae pluraliter dicit[^15]: *Misericordias Domini in aeternum cantabo*. Et alibi: *Iustitiae Domini rectae, laetificantes corda*, cum tamen in Deo una sit misericordia, una iustitia, eademque[^16] sit misericordia quae iustitia, scilicet divina usia.

Ideo autem *praeceptio* et *prohibitio* atque *consilium*, cum sint tria, dicitur tamen unumquodque eorum Dei voluntas, quia ista *signa* sunt divinae voluntatis: quemadmodum et *signa* irae dicuntur ira, et dilectionis *signa* dilectio appellantur; et dicitur iratus <!-- page 796 --> Deus, et tamen non est ira in eo aliqua; sed *signa* tantum, quae foris fiunt, quibus iratus ostenditur, ira ipsius nominantur. Est figura dicendi, secundum quam non est falsum quod dicitur, sed verum, quod dicitur, sub tropi nubilo obumbratur. Et secundum hos tropos diversae voluntates Dei dicuntur, quia diversa sunt illa quae per tropum voluntas Dei dicuntur.

Pro praecepto Dei atque consilio potest accipi voluntas, ut ibi[^17]: *Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra*. Et alibi: *Qui fecit voluntatem Patris mei, qui in caelis est, ipse frater meus et soror et mater est*. Et contra hanc voluntatem multa fiunt. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Spiritu et littera*[^18]: « Infideles, inquit, contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Evangelio non credunt ».

### Cap. VII.

#### *Quod Deus velit ab omnibus fieri ea quae praecipit, vel non fieri quae prohibet.*

Et si illa tria dicuntur Dei voluntas, ideo quia *signa* sunt divinae voluntatis, non est tamen intelligendum, Deum omne illud fieri velle, quod cuicumque praecepit, vel non fieri quod prohibuit. Praecepit enim Abrahae immolare filium, nec tamen voluit; nec ideo praecepit, ut id fieret, sed ut Abrahae probaretur fides[^19]. Et in Evangelio praecepit sanato, ne cui diceret; ille autem praedicavit ubique, intelligens, Deum non ideo prohibuisse, quin vellet opus suum praedicari, sed ut daret formam homini laudem humanam declinandi.

Permissio quoque Dei et operatio voluntas Dei appellantur, qualiter accipit Augustinus in *Enchiridio*[^20] dicens: « Non fit aliquid, nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel *sinendo*, ut fiat, vel *ipse faciendo*. Nec dubitandum est, Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri, quaecumque fiunt male. Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est ». — Ecce manifeste hic habes[^21], Dei voluntatem appellari ipsius *operationem* vel *permissionem*, cum dicit, non fieri aliquid, nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, ubi includit et bona et mala omnia, quae fiunt. Ideoque aperte distinguit, quomodo Deum *velle* dixerit, ne eadem ratione intelligeretur velle bona et mala, subdens *vel sinendo, ut fiat* — hoc quantum ad mala — dicit *vel ipse faciendo* — hoc quantum ad bona. Mala enim sinit fieri, sed non facit; bona vero ipse facit. Ideoque dixit, eum *velle*, quia et volens[^22] mala sinit et volens bona operatur; et ob hoc *permissio* et *operatio* voluntas Dei dicuntur.

Quinque igitur supra posita sunt, quae dicuntur secundum tropum Dei *voluntas*, quia *signa* sunt divinae voluntatis, quae una est et immutabilis, scilicet Dei beneplacitum. Ideoque diligenter distinguat lector, ubi[^23] de voluntate Dei Scriptura commemorat, iuxta quem modum accipi oporteat, utrum scilicet pro beneplacito Dei, an pro aliquo signorum eius. Magna enim est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinae voluntatis, quia et beneplacitum Dei est voluntas eius, et signum beneplaciti eius dicitur voluntas eius. Sed beneplacitum eius aeternum est, signum vero beneplaciti eius non; et consonat rerum effectibus beneplacitum ipsius, et ipsi effectus rerum ab illo non discordant. Fit enim omne quod beneplacito vult fieri, et omne quod non vult fieri, nequaquam fit. Non ita autem est de *signis*, quia *praecepit* Deus multis ea quae non faciunt, et *prohibet* quae non cavent, et *consulit* quae non implent[^24].

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XLV.

### Chapter I.

#### *On the will of God, which is the essence of God, and on its signs.*

Now concerning the will of God something must be said, according to the feebleness of our understanding. It must be known therefore that *will* or *willing* is said of God according to essence. For *to will* and *to be* are not for him one thing and another, but altogether the same. And as for him *to be good* is the same as *to be God*, so for him *to be willing* is the same as *to be God*. For the will, by which he is always willing, is not an affect or motion — which cannot fall on God — but the divine substance, by which he is willing, is God[^1], and the like.

### Chapter II.

#### *That although for God to will is the same as to be, yet it cannot be said that God is all the things which he wills.*

And although for God *to will* is the same as *to be*, yet it must not be said that God is all the things which he wills. Which objection certain men, not rightly thinking concerning the will of God, raise against us, saying: If for God to will is the same as to be, then when we say that God wills all the things which he does, we are saying that he *is* all the things which he does; otherwise that word[^2] [used] there does not signify the same as is signified by this word *to be*, when it is said of God. And if this is so, then *willing* is not always said of God according to essence. But if at some time it is not said according to essence, how then is it said of God? For relatively it is never said. — To which we say that, although for God *to will* is altogether the same as *to be*, yet he cannot be said to *be* all the things which he wills; just as for God *to be* is the same as *to know*, and yet just as he is said *to know all things*, he cannot in like manner be said *to be all things*.

### Chapter III.

#### *On the understanding of these expressions: God knows, or God wills; God knows all things, or wills something.*

And wherever God is said *to know* or to be *knowing*, and *to will* or to be *willing*, these things are said of him[^3] according to essence. For when it is said: God knows or God wills, or God is knowing or willing, the divine essence is predicated and God is declared to be[^4]. But when there is added *all things* or *something* or *some things*, and it is said: God knows all things, or wills something or some things — the divine essence is indeed predicated, not simply and absolutely, but in such a way that all things are shown to be subject to his knowledge, which he himself is, and something or some things are said to be subject to his will, which is itself the same — so that this is the sense: God knows all things, that is, God is [he] to whose knowledge, which is his essence, all things are subject. Likewise: God wills these things or those, that is, God is [he] to whose will, which he himself is[^5], these or those are subject. Therefore *willing* or *to will* is said of God according to essence, whose will is essence — eternal and immutable — although those things may be varied and pass away which are subject to it; [the will] which cannot be unjust nor evil, because it is God.

<!-- page 795 -->

### Chapter IV.

#### *That God's supremely good will is the cause of all things which exist naturally, of which the cause is not to be sought, because it is the first and highest cause of all things.*

This therefore supremely good will is the cause of all things which naturally come into being, or have been done, or are to come, which no preceding cause has anticipated, because it is eternal. And therefore its cause is not to be sought. For he who seeks its cause seeks something greater than it, since nothing is greater than it. Whence Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions*[^6]: « He who asks why God willed to make the world, seeks the cause of the will of God. But every efficient cause is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause is not to be sought. » The same in the book *On Genesis Against the Manichees*[^7]: « If any shall have said: What pleased God to make the heaven and the earth? it must be answered to them: those who desire to know the will of God seek to know the causes of God's will[^8], although the will of God is itself the cause of all the things that are. For if the will has a cause, there is something which precedes the will of God, which it is impious to believe. He therefore who asks: Why did God make the heaven and the earth? must be answered: because he willed it[^9]. For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth, and therefore the will of God is greater than heaven and earth. But he who asks: Why did he will to make heaven and earth? seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found. Let human temerity therefore restrain itself, and let it not seek that which is not, lest it not find that which is. » — Behold, by these authorities it is openly intimated that the cause of God's will is nothing, and therefore is not to be sought.

« The will of God therefore, as Augustine says in the third book *On the Trinity*[^10], is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. For nothing comes to be, which does not go forth from the inner and intelligible hall of the supreme Emperor according to ineffable justice. » « For where does the wisdom of the omnipotent God not work that which it wills? — [that wisdom] which *reaches mightily from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly*[^11] », « and not only does those things which by the perseverance of custom admit no wonder », « but also those things which on account of rarity and unusual occurrence seem wonderful — such as defects of the luminaries and earthquakes and monstrous births of living things and the like, none of which comes to be without[^12] the will of God, although it does not appear so to most. And therefore the vanity of the philosophers chose to attribute these things to other causes also, since they were altogether unable to see the cause higher than all the rest — that is, the will of God. And so the will of God alone is the first cause of health, of sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions. » This [will] therefore alone is that from which whatever is has sprung, and itself has not sprung but is eternal.

### Chapter V.

#### *In what ways the will of God is taken.*

Here it must not be passed over by us, that sacred Scripture has been accustomed to speak of God's will in various ways; and yet the will of God is not diverse, but the manner of speaking concerning the will is diverse, because under the name of *will* it takes diverse things. For the *will* of God is truly and properly said [to be] that which is in him and is his essence; and this is one, and admits neither multiplicity nor mutability — [the will] which cannot be unfulfilled, of which the Prophet says[^13]: *All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he did*. And the Apostle: *Who resists his will?* And elsewhere: *That you may prove what is the good and well-pleasing and perfect will of God*. And this will is rightly called *the good pleasure of God* or *disposition*.

### Chapter VI.

#### *That precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, and operation are sometimes understood under the name of "will."*

But sometimes, according to a certain figure of speaking, that is called *the will of God* which according to propriety is not his will — such as *precept*, *prohibition*, *counsel*, and likewise *permission* and *operation*. And therefore Scripture sometimes pronounces *the wills* of God in the plural. Whence the Prophet[^14]: *Great are the works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills*. Although there is but one will of God, which he himself is, yet [the prophet] says *wills* in the plural, because the will of God is taken in various ways and for diverse things, as has been said. Likewise also the same Prophet, on account of the many effects of mercy and of justice, says in the plural[^15]: *The mercies of the Lord I will sing forever*. And elsewhere: *The justices of the Lord are right, gladdening hearts* — although in God there is one mercy, one justice, and the same[^16] is mercy as is justice, namely, the divine substance.

But *precept* and *prohibition* and *counsel*, since they are three, [yet] each one of them is called the will of God, because these are *signs* of the divine will: just as the *signs* of anger are called anger, and the *signs* of love are called love; and God is said to be angry — <!-- page 796 --> and yet there is no anger at all in him; but only *the signs*, which come to pass outwardly, by which he is shown to be angry, are named *his anger*. It is a figure of speech, according to which what is said is not false, but the truth which is said is overshadowed under the cloud of a trope. And according to these tropes the diverse wills of God are spoken of, because diverse are the things which through a trope are called the will of God.

For the precept and counsel of God, *will* can be taken, as in this place[^17]: *Thy will be done, as in heaven so on earth*. And elsewhere: *He who does the will of my Father, who is in heaven, he is my brother and sister and mother*. And against this will many things come to pass. Whence Augustine in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*[^18]: « Unbelievers, he says, act against the will of God, when they do not believe his Gospel. »

### Chapter VII.

#### *That God wills all to do those things which he commands, or not to do those which he forbids.*

And if those three are called the will of God on the ground that they are *signs* of the divine will, it must not however be thought that God wills everything to be done which he commands to anyone, or [wills] anything not to be done which he forbids. For he commanded Abraham to immolate his son, and yet did not will [it]; nor did he command for this reason, that it should be done, but that the faith of Abraham might be tested[^19]. And in the Gospel he commanded the healed [man] to tell no one; but he preached everywhere, understanding that God had not forbidden [it] for this reason — that he was unwilling that his work be preached — but that he might give to man a pattern of declining human praise.

The permission also of God and his operation are called the *will* of God, in the way Augustine takes it in the *Enchiridion*[^20], saying: « Nothing comes to be, unless the Omnipotent wills it to be — either by *allowing* [it] to come to be, or by *himself doing* [it]. Nor must it be doubted that God does well even by allowing the things to be done, whatsoever come to be evilly. For he does not [allow] this except by a just judgment, and surely good is all that is just. » — Behold, here you plainly have[^21] [it], that the will of God is called his *operation* or his *permission*, when he says: nothing comes to be unless the Omnipotent wills it to be — where he includes both all good things and all evil things which come to be. And therefore he plainly distinguishes how he said that God *wills*, lest by the same reckoning it should be understood that he wills both good things and evil things, adding *either by allowing it to come to be* — this in respect of evil things — and saying *or by himself doing* — this in respect of good things. For he allows evil things to come to be, but does not do them; whereas good things he himself does. And therefore he said that he *wills*, because as willing[^22] he allows evil things, and as willing he works good things; and on this account *permission* and *operation* are called the *will* of God.

Five things therefore have been set forth above, which are said according to a trope [to be] the *will* of God, because they are *signs* of the divine will, which is one and immutable — namely, the good pleasure of God. And therefore let the reader diligently distinguish, when[^23] Scripture makes mention of the will of God, in what way it must be taken — whether, namely, for the good pleasure of God, or for some sign of him. For great discretion must be employed in the knowledge of the divine will, because both the good pleasure of God is his will, and the sign of his good pleasure is called his will. But his good pleasure is eternal, but the sign of his good pleasure is not; and his good pleasure is in concord with the effects of things, and the effects of things do not disagree with it. For all that he wills by good pleasure to be done comes to be, and all that he does not will to be done in no way comes to be. But it is not so concerning the *signs*, because God has *commanded* to many [men] things which they do not do, and *forbids* what they do not avoid, and *counsels* what they do not fulfill[^24].

---

la: Ita codd. A C E et ed. 1; Vat. et aliae edd. omittunt *est*; cod. D *est, et Deus et*; cod. B *est, et Deus est, et*.

en: Thus codices A, C, E and ed. 1; the Vatican edition and other editions omit *est* ("is"); codex D [reads] *est, et Deus et* ("is, and God and"); codex B [reads] *est, et Deus est, et* ("is, and God is, and").

la: Cod. C addit *velle*.

en: Codex C adds *velle* ("to will").

la: Vat. cum pluribus edd. *vel*. Deinde codd. A D E et edd. 1, 4, 5 *de Deo* pro *de eo*.

en: The Vatican edition with most editions [reads] *vel* ("or"). Then codices A, D, E and editions 1, 4, 5 [read] *de Deo* ("of God") in place of *de eo* ("of him").

la: Supple: *velle*, sive cum edd. 2, 5: *voluntas*.

en: Supply: *velle* ("to will"), or with editions 2 and 5: *voluntas* ("will").

la: Codd. B C D addunt *esse*. Immediate ante ed. 1 *ipsa est* (scilicet essentia) pro *ipse est*.

en: Codices B, C, D add *esse* ("to be"). Immediately before, ed. 1 [reads] *ipsa est* (namely, *essentia* "the essence" [is]) in place of *ipse est* ("he himself is").

la: Quaest. 28.

en: Question 28.

en: Book I, c. 2, n. 4.

la: Codd. et edd., exceptis Vat. et ed. 8, *causas et voluntatem*, et immediate post *quod voluntas* pro *cum voluntas*.

en: The codices and editions, except the Vatican and ed. 8, [read] *causas et voluntatem* ("the causes and the will"), and immediately afterwards *quod voluntas* in place of *cum voluntas* ("when the will").

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 [read] *vult* ("he wills") [in place of *voluit* "he willed"].

la: Cap. 4. n. 9; sed originale habet: ... *omnium corporalium specierum atque motionum. Nihil enim fit visibiliter et sensibiliter, quod non de interiore, invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris aut iubeatur aut permittatur* (cod. D *Imperatoris vel eo permittente vel faciente egrediatur*) *secundum ineffabilem iustitiam.* — Sequens locus est ibid. c. 1. n. 6, tertius ibid. c. 2. n. 7, et quartus ibid. c. 3. n. 8, et c. 4. n. 9.

en: Chapter 4, n. 9; but the original has: ... *of all corporeal species and motions. For nothing comes to be visibly and sensibly which does not, from the inner, invisible and intelligible hall of the supreme Emperor, either be commanded or be permitted* (codex D [reads] *the Emperor, or by his permitting or doing, go forth*) *according to ineffable justice.* — The following passage is from the same place, c. 1, n. 6; the third [passage] from the same place, c. 2, n. 7; and the fourth from the same place, c. 3, n. 8, and c. 4, n. 9.

en: Wisdom 8, 1.

la: Codd. A B C E et ed. 1 *nisi*. Paulo inferius solummodo Vat. cum originali *licuit vanitati* pro *placuit vanitati*, denique codd. A D et omnes edd., excepta 1, *attribuere* pro *tribuere*, sed refragante originali.

en: Codices A, B, C, E and ed. 1 [read] *nisi* ("unless") [in place of *sine* "without"]. A little below, only the Vatican with the original [reads] *licuit vanitati* ("it was permitted to vanity") in place of *placuit vanitati* ("it pleased vanity"); finally codices A, D and all the editions, except 1, [read] *attribuere* in place of *tribuere* ("to attribute"), but against the original.

la: Psalm. 113, 11; loci sequentes sunt Rom. 9, 19, et 42, 2.

en: Psalm 113, 11; the following passages are Romans 9, 19, and [Romans] 12, 2.

la: Psalm. 88, 2; alius locus est Psalm. 18, 9.

en: Psalm 88, 2; the other passage is Psalm 18, 9.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd. praemittunt *et una*, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican and other editions prefix *et una* ("and one"), against the codices and ed. 1.

la: Matth. 6, 10; sequens locus est ibid. 12, 50. Vulgata: *Quicumque enim fecerit* etc.

en: Matthew 6, 10; the following passage is at the same place, 12, 50. The Vulgate [reads]: *For whosoever shall have done* etc.

en: Chapter 33, n. 38.

la: Respicitur Gen. 22, 2. seqq., et deinde Marc. 1, 44.

en: Reference is made to Genesis 22, 2 and following, and then to Mark 1, 44.

la: Cap. 95. 96. n. 24; in quo textu Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, *haec nisi* pro *hoc nisi*, contradicentibus codd. nec non originali.

en: Chapters 95 and 96, n. 24; in which text the Vatican with the other editions, except 1, [reads] *haec nisi* in place of *hoc nisi* ("this only"), against the codices and also the original.

la: Vat. cum plurimis edd. *habemus*.

en: The Vatican with most editions [reads] *habemus* ("we have") [in place of *habes* "you have"].

la: Solummodo Vat. *nolens*, sed perperam, et deinde cum ed. 1 et codd. A C omittit *et* post *sinit*.

en: Only the Vatican [reads] *nolens* ("unwilling"), but wrongly; and then with ed. 1 and codices A, C it omits *et* ("and") after *sinit* ("he allows").

la: Codd. B D *ubicumque*. Paulo post Vat. cum pluribus edd. omittit *scilicet*.

en: Codices B and D [read] *ubicumque* ("wherever"). A little later the Vatican with several editions omits *scilicet* ("namely").

la: In tractatu de voluntate divina Petrus Lombardus plures propositiones ad verbum expressas, alias vero secundum sensum deprompsit ex duobus opusculis Hugonis a S. Victore: *Summa Sententiarum* tr. I. c. 13, et l. *de Sacramentis* p. IV. c. 2, seqq. Iam pluries observavimus, Magistrum passim non pauca ex Hugone, Abaelardo et fortasse etiam ex aliis auctoribus, qui ante ipsum Sententias conscripserunt, in suos usus convertisse.

en: In his treatise on the divine will, Peter Lombard drew many propositions expressed word for word, and others according to the sense, from two opuscules of Hugh of St. Victor: *Summa Sententiarum* tract. I, c. 13, and the book *On the Sacraments*, part IV, c. 2 and following. We have already several times observed that the Master throughout took over not a few [passages] from Hugh, Abelard, and perhaps also from other authors who wrote *Sentences* before him, for his own use.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 45, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLV. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLV. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLV.

#### *De voluntate secundum suam quidditatem.*

> *Iam de voluntate Dei aliquid pro sensus nostri imbecillitate* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra[^1] egit Magister de scientia et potentia, hic iam tertio agit de voluntate. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In *prima* agit de voluntate secundum suam quidditatem. In *secunda* secundum eius impletionem respectu operis, qualiter scilicet impleatur, infra distinctione quadragesima sexta: *Hic oritur quaestio: dictum est enim*. In *tertia* determinat, qualiter voluntas nostra divinae conformetur, et hoc distinctione quadragesima octava: *Sciendum quoque est, quod aliquando mala est voluntas*.

*Prima* pars habet tres partes. In *prima* ostendit, quod voluntas Dei est ipsa divina essentia; in *secunda*, quod ipsa est omnium causa, ibi: *Haec itaque summa boni voluntas causa est*; in *tertia* ostendit, quod ipsa voluntas Dei est multipliciter dicta, ibi: *Hic non est praetermittendum nobis* etc.

*Prima* pars habet duas. In *prima* ostendit, quod *velle* est in Deo *esse*, et voluntas est essentia. In *secunda* solvit dubitationem, ibi: *Et licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse*.

*Secunda* pars similiter habet duas. In *prima* ostendit, quod divina voluntas est causa prima. In *secunda* ostendit, quod est causa generalissima, ibi: *Voluntas igitur Dei, ut ait Augustinus*.

*Hic non est praetermittendum* etc. Haec est *tertia* pars, in qua agit de istius nominis multiplicitate, et licet non sit multiplicitas aequivocationis, sed analogiae; et sunt in hac parte tres particulae. In *prima* ponit modum principalem accipiendi circa hoc nomen, quod est voluntas, quia scilicet accipiunt[^2] pro voluntate beneplaciti. In *secunda* ponit modos non principales, scilicet tropologicos, secundum quod accipitur pro signo voluntatis, et hoc facit ibi: *Hipponoia vero secundum quamdam dicendi figuram* etc. In *tertia* breviter epilogat praedeterminata, ibi: *Quinque ergo supra posita sunt, quae dicuntur* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis tria principaliter quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur de voluntate divina quantum ad quidditatem.

*Secundo* quantum ad causalitatem.

*Tertio* quantum ad rationem significandi.

Quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum sit in Deo ponere voluntatem.

*Secundo*, utrum ipsum sit dicere omnivolentem, sicut dicitur omnipotens.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XLV.

#### *On the will [of God] according to its quiddity.*

> *"Now concerning the will of God [let us say] something, according to the feebleness of our understanding,"* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above[^1] the Master treated of knowledge and power; here now, in the third place, he treats of [the divine] will. And this part has three parts. In the *first* he treats of the will according to its quiddity. In the *second* [he treats of it] according to its fulfillment with respect to its work — namely, how it is fulfilled — below in the forty-sixth distinction: *"Here a question arises: for it has been said,"* etc. In the *third* he determines how our will is conformed to the divine [will], and this in the forty-eighth distinction: *"It must also be known that sometimes the will is evil."*

The *first* part has three [parts]. In the *first* he shows that God's will is the divine essence itself; in the *second*, that it is the cause of all things, there: *"This will therefore of the highest good is the cause"*; in the *third* he shows that God's will itself is said in many ways, there: *"Here it must not be passed over by us,"* etc.

The *first* part has two [parts]. In the *first* he shows that *to will* in God is *to be*, and the will is the essence. In the *second* he resolves a doubt, there: *"And although for God it is the same to will as to be."*

The *second* part likewise has two [parts]. In the *first* he shows that the divine will is the first cause. In the *second* he shows that it is the most general cause, there: *"The will therefore of God, as Augustine says."*

*"Here it must not be passed over,"* etc. — this is the *third* part, in which he treats of the multiplicity of this name; and although it is not a multiplicity of equivocation but of analogy, there are in this part three particles. In the *first* he sets forth the principal mode of taking this name which is *will*, namely insofar as they take it[^2] for the will of [God's] good pleasure. In the *second* he sets forth the non-principal modes — namely, the tropological [modes] — according as it is taken for a sign of will; and this he does there: *"But hypponoia, according to a certain figure of speaking,"* etc. In the *third* he briefly epilogizes what has been predetermined, there: *"The five things therefore set forth above, which are called,"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, three [questions] are principally asked.

*First*, it is asked concerning the divine will as to its quiddity.

*Second*, as to its causality.

*Third*, as to its mode of signifying.

As to the first, two [questions] are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether the will is to be posited in God.

*Second*, whether it [is right] to call him "all-willing" [*omnivolens*], just as he is called "all-powerful" [*omnipotens*].

---

la: Dist. XXXV–XLI. de scientia, XLII. seqq. de potentia.

en: Distinctions XXXV–XLI [were] on knowledge, XLII and following on power.

la: Pro *accipiunt* Vat. cum ed. 1 et nonnullis mss. *sed*.

en: In place of *accipiunt* the Vatican edition, with ed. 1 and several manuscripts, [reads] *sed*. ---

translators_notes:
Page-foot apparatus on printed p. 797 contains exactly 2 numbered Quaracchi footnotes, both anchoring in this divisio body. [^1] anchors on *Supra* (paired with the OCR-attested superscript marker after *Siipra*, line 37397) and references the preceding span of distinctions on knowledge (XXXV–XLI) and power (XLII ff.). [^2] anchors on *accipiunt* in the third-particle discussion of voluntas-beneplaciti and records the Vat./ed.1/several-mss. variant *sed*. The OCR shows the footnote marker as `*` after `scilicet`, two-column garble making the exact word ambiguous; the printed footer lemma (`Pro accipiunt`) confirms the underlying word is *accipiunt*, anchoring at the verb governing *pro voluntate beneplaciti*. Body anchor placement verified eyes-on against 600 dpi render `raw/vision/vol1/d45-divisio-r600-387.png`.

**Scope finding (printed-page off-by-one in dispatch prompt)**: the task brief specified printed p. 798 / PDF p. 388, but PDF p. 388 is *ARTICULUS I. QUAESTIO I.* (the d.45-a1-q1 opening). The actual *DISTINCTIO XLV. DIVISIO TEXTUS.* page is printed **p. 797 / PDF p. 387**, confirmed by the running head `DIST. XLV. DIVISIO TEXTUS. — 797`. Frontmatter `printed_pages: [797]`, `pdf_pages: [387]` reflects the verified printed page. Raw OCR line bounds (37392–37448) cover the full divisio + tractatio quaestionum block ending immediately before the `ARTICULUS I.` heading at line 37449; bounds are correct as supplied.


title: Dist. 45, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De voluntate divina quantum ad quidditatem.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum in Deo sit ponere voluntatem.*

Quod autem in Deo non sit ponere voluntatem, ostenditur auctoritate et ratione.

1. *Primo* sic: Augustinus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^1]: « Voluntas est rationalis motus sensui praesidens et appetitui »; sed in Deo non est motus nec sensus nec appetitus: ergo neque voluntas.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Duabus Animabus*[^2]: « Voluntas est animi motus ad aliquid prosequendum, vel fugiendum »; sed in Deo non est ponere fugam nec prosecutionem: ergo nec voluntatem.

3. Item, ratione[^3]: quia voluntas est potentia in nobis maxime vertibilis, unde aliae potentiae non possunt in malum, sed sola voluntas est, a qua est peccatum; sed in Deo nulla est omnino vertibilitas ad malum: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas, eo ipso quod voluntas est, est ad opposita, eo quod ad opposita, est contingens et variabilis; in Deo autem nulla cadit contingentia nec varietas: ergo etc. *Probatio primae.* Voluntas, eo ipso quod voluntas, est potestas rationalis; sed « potestates rationales sunt ad opposita », sicut dicit Philosophus[^4]: ergo etc. Similiter, eo ipso quo est voluntas, est libera; et si hoc, non est determinata ad unum, quia tunc non haberet libertatem, sicut nec potentiae naturales: ergo est ad opposita, et ita variabilis.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ad Ephesios primo[^5] dicit Apostolus: *Secundum consilium voluntatis suae*. Et iterum ibidem: *Secundum propositum voluntatis suae*; et tota Scriptura est plena hoc nomine *voluntatis*, ut est in Deo: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus in duodecimo[^6] concludit, quod « voluntas est actio ipsius Dei ».

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia voluntas est illud, penes quod residet inter creata summa potentia[^7]: ergo si voluntas de se dicit potestatem, quia omnibus praesidet in regno animae, et nihil potest sibi imperare; sed Deus est potentissimus, et omne quod potentiae est, sibi attribuendum est: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas est, in qua consistit summa voluptas sive felicitas — beatus enim est qui habet « omne quod vult »[^8]; unde nihil delectatur nisi habens voluntatem vel aliquid simile voluntati — sed Deus est felicissimus, in quo est omnis felicitas et iucunditas: ergo etc.

5. Item, voluntas est illud, penes quod residet iustitia et aequitas — iustitia enim non est aliud quam rectitudo voluntatis[^9]; unde non habentia voluntatem non sunt capabilia iustitiae — sed Deus est iustissimus secundum omnem intellectum: ergo habet voluntatem.

6. Item, voluntas est vis, secundum quam attenditur summa liberalitas — omnis enim liberalitas

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venit ex amore, sed constat, quod amor est actus voluntatis — in Deo autem est ponere summam liberalitatem: ergo et amorem et voluntatem.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Voluntas est in Deo magis proprie et completiore modo quam in nobis, et sine ullis imperfectionibus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in Deo est ponere voluntatem, sicut ostendunt quatuor rationes praedictae, propter quatuor conditiones, scilicet *potestatis*, *voluptatis*, *aequitatis* et *liberalitatis*, quae sunt circa voluntatem; et magis proprie in Deo et completiori modo quam in nobis.

Voluntas enim in nobis est per differentiam a substantia et actu et per distantiam a fine[^10][^11]; in Deo autem per omnimodam indifferentiam horum, scilicet substantiae, virtutis, actus et finis. Et quia in nobis est per differentiam a substantia et ab actu, ideo aliis praesidens et secundum diversos actus *variabilis*. Propter[^12] differentiam enim a substantia, in qua possunt et aliae potentiae radicari, *praesidet* aliis potentiis, ut sensui et appetitui. Propter differentiam ab actu est *variabilitas secundum alternationem* affectionum. In Deo autem neutrum; ideo[^13] nec regit inferiores potentias, nec habet variari secundum affectiones varias. Et ideo quia in nobis est per distantiam a fine, inde est quod est indigens, et ideo in ea est fuga et appetitus, et cadit in ea etiam tristitia, cadit et malitia, quia potest a fine obliquari, cum non sit illi coniuncta. In Deo autem est omnino fini coniuncta, ideo nec fugam nec appetitum habet, nec tristitiam nec malitiam, sed omnimodam laetitiam et iustitiam.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Et sic patet responsio ad prima tria, quia quamvis istae conditiones: appetitus, fuga, malitia sive vertibilitas, conditiones sint voluntatis creatae, tamen omnino a voluntate divina semotae sunt.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est contingens et variabilis: dicendum, quod est contingentia vel in actu vel in effectu. Si loquamur de contingentia in effectu, non tantum est in effectu nostro, sed etiam in multis, quae a Deo sunt. Multa enim facit Deus, quae posset non facere, nullo repugnante. Si autem loquamur de contingentia in actu, quo voluntas aliquid modo desinit velle et incipit velle, modo vult aliquid, modo vult oppositum[^14]; haec cadit in voluntate humana, quia inter voluntatem humanam et actum est differentia; unde nec semper est in uno actu, nec in actu uniformi. Divina autem voluntas propter identitatem sui cum actu omnino variari non potest, nec habet in se aliquam contingentiam; et ideo patent omnia quaesita.

english:
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### Article I. *On the divine will according to its quiddity.*
### Question I. *Whether the will is to be posited in God.*

That, however, the will is not to be posited in God, is shown by authority and by reason.

1. *First*, thus: Augustine in the book *On Free Will*[^1]: « The will is a rational motion presiding over sense and appetite »; but in God there is no motion, nor sense, nor appetite: therefore neither will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Two Souls*[^2]: « The will is a motion of the soul toward pursuing something, or fleeing it »; but in God there is no flight nor pursuit to be posited: therefore neither will.

3. Likewise, by reason[^3]: because the will is the power in us most subject to turning — whence the other powers cannot [be turned] toward evil, but the will alone is that from which sin comes; but in God there is no turning whatsoever toward evil: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the will, by the very fact that it is will, is toward opposites; and because [it is] toward opposites, it is contingent and variable; but in God there falls no contingency nor variety: therefore, etc. *Proof of the first [proposition]:* The will, by the very fact that it is will, is a rational power; but « rational powers are toward opposites », as the Philosopher says[^4]: therefore, etc. Likewise, by the very fact that it is will, it is free; and if so, it is not determined to one thing — because then it would not have freedom, as neither do the natural powers [have it]: therefore it is toward opposites, and so variable.

**On the contrary:**

1. To the Ephesians, chapter 1[^5], the Apostle says: *According to the counsel of his will*. And again in the same place: *According to the purpose of his will*; and all of Scripture is full of this name *will* as [predicated] of God: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the twelfth [book][^6] concludes that « the will is an action of God himself ».

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [thus], because the will is that in which, among created things, supreme power resides[^7]: therefore if the will of itself bespeaks power — because it presides over all things in the kingdom of the soul, and nothing can command it; but God is most powerful, and whatever belongs to power must be attributed to him: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the will is that in which the highest pleasure or happiness consists — for « blessed is he who has all that he wills »[^8]; whence nothing takes delight unless it has a will or something similar to a will — but God is most happy, in whom is all happiness and gladness: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the will is that in which justice and equity reside — for justice is nothing other than the rectitude of the will[^9]; whence things not having a will are not capable of justice — but God is most just according to every understanding [of justice]: therefore he has a will.

6. Likewise, the will is the power by which supreme generosity is measured — for all generosity

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comes from love, but it is plain that love is an act of the will — in God, moreover, supreme generosity is to be posited: therefore also love and will.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The will is in God more properly and in a more complete mode than in us, and without any imperfections.

**I respond:** It must be said that the will is to be posited in God, as the four foregoing reasons show, on account of the four conditions — namely, of *power*, of *pleasure*, of *equity*, and of *generosity* — which pertain to the will; and [it is to be posited] more properly in God and in a more complete mode than in us.

For the will in us is [present] by [way of] difference from substance and act, and by distance from [its] end[^10][^11]; but in God [it is] by [way of] complete non-difference of these — namely, of substance, of virtue, of act, and of end. And because in us it is [there] by difference from substance and from act, therefore [it is] *presiding* over the others and *variable* according to diverse acts. For on account of[^12] [its] difference from substance, in which the other powers too can be rooted, [the will] *presides over* the other powers, such as sense and appetite. On account of [its] difference from act, there is *variability according to the alternation* of affections. But in God there is neither; therefore[^13] it neither rules inferior powers, nor undergoes variation according to varying affections. And so, because in us it is [there] by distance from [its] end, thence it is that [the soul] is needy, and therefore in [the will] there is flight and appetite, and there also falls in it sadness, and there falls also malice, because it can be turned aside from the end, since it is not joined to it. In God, however, [the will] is altogether joined to the end; therefore it has neither flight nor appetite, nor sadness nor malice, but altogether gladness and justice.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* And thus the reply to the first three is plain, because although these conditions — appetite, flight, malice or turnability — are conditions of the created will, yet they are altogether removed from the divine will.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that [the will] is contingent and variable: it must be said that contingency is either in act or in effect. If we speak of contingency in effect, [such contingency] is not only in our own effect, but also in many [things] which are from God. For God does many things which he could not do, with nothing opposing. But if we speak of contingency in act — by which the will at one moment ceases to will something and begins to will [it], at one moment wills something, at another wills the opposite[^14] — this [contingency] falls in the human will, because between the human will and [its] act there is a difference; whence it is not always in one act, nor in a uniform act. The divine will, however, on account of the identity of itself with [its] act, cannot vary at all, nor has it any contingency in itself; and therefore all the questions asked become clear.

la: Definitio hic proposita formata videtur ex iis quae S. August., l. de Lib. Arb. c. 8-11. n. 18-21, et III. c. 1. n. 1-4. de actibus rationis et voluntatis ceteros animi motus regentibus etc. profert. In cod. T a secunda manu loco libri de Libero Arbitrio citatur liber de Gratia et libero arbitrio, in quo tamen (c. 5. n. 3.) tantum docetur, hominis esse resistere concupiscentiae. In eodem cod. T (in marg.) paulo ante verbo *Primo* praemittitur *Auctoritate*.

en: The definition here proposed appears to be formed from those things which St. Augustine, in book I *On Free Will* c. 8-11 n. 18-21, and book III c. 1 n. 1-4, brings forward concerning the acts of reason and of will which govern the other motions of the soul, etc. In codex T, by a second hand, in place of the book *On Free Will*, the book *On Grace and Free Will* is cited — in which, however (c. 5 n. 3), only that it pertains to man to resist concupiscence is taught. In the same codex T (in the margin) a little before the word *Primo* is prefixed *Auctoritate* ("By authority").

la: Cap. 10. n. 14: Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum.

en: Chapter 10, n. 14: The will is a motion of the soul, with nothing compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something.

la: Vat. et nonnulli codd. subiiciunt *videtur*. — De ipso argumento cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virg. c. 3. seq.

en: The Vatican edition and some codices add *videtur* ("it appears"). — On the argument itself, cf. Anselm, *On the Conception of the Virgin*, c. 3 and following.

la: Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. seq, et text. 10. (VIII. c. 1. et 5.). Voluntatem esse potentiam rationalem, docet Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. et 50. (c. 9. et 10.). — In textu cit. pro *ad opposita* Vat. cum cod. cc *ad oppositum*. Mox pro *eo ipso quo* codd. H R X bb ee *eo ipso quod*. In fine arg. pro *et ita* Vat. *est igitur*.

en: Book IX *Metaph.*, text 3 and following, and text 10 (VIII c. 1 and 5). That the will is a rational power Aristotle teaches in book III *On the Soul*, text 42 and 50 (c. 9 and 10). — In the cited text, for *ad opposita* the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *ad oppositum*. Shortly afterward, for *eo ipso quo* codices H R X bb ee read *eo ipso quod*. At the end of the argument, for *et ita* the Vatican [reads] *est igitur*.

la: Vers. 11. — Textus sequens habetur ibid. v. 5.

en: Verse 11. — The following text is found in the same place, v. 5.

la: Id est: *Metaphys.* text. 39. (XI. c. 7): « Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονή » i. e. iuxta versionem Arabico-latinam: *Voluptas* [*delectatio*] *enim est actio ipsius*, scil. primi principii. S. Doctor hic pro *voluptas* substituit *voluntas*, quod non est falsum, quia voluptas non est sine voluntate. Cfr. etiam quae dicit in 4. argumento, et quae docet supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. de delectatione et fruitione.

en: That is: *Metaphysics* text 39 (XI c. 7): « Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονή » — i.e., according to the Arabic-Latin version: *For pleasure* [*delight*] *is an action of [the principle] itself*, namely of the first principle. The Holy Doctor here substitutes *voluntas* (will) for *voluptas* (pleasure), which is not false, since pleasure is not without will. Cf. also what he says in argument 4, and what he teaches above d. 1 a. 2 q. 1 on delight and enjoyment.

la: Cfr. August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 12. — Quod attinet ad rationem, quae mox adducitur: *quia omnibus praesidet* etc., Anselmus in libr. de Conceptu virg. c. 1. ait: Deus nos et potestatem, quae in nobis est, subiecit voluntati, ut ad imperium eius non possimus non movere nos et facere quod vult, immo illa movet nos velut instrumenta sua... Dominae, quam Deus nobis dedit, nec possumus nec debemus non obedire etc. — Circa finem argumenti pro *potentiae*, quam vocem ex codd. F H K T et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. *possibile*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* VIII c. 6 n. 12. — As regards the reasoning which is presently adduced: *because it presides over all things*, etc., Anselm in the book *On the Conception of the Virgin* c. 1 says: God has subjected to the will both us and the power which is in us, so that at its command we cannot but move ourselves and do what it wills — indeed, it moves us as its own instruments... To the mistress whom God has given us, we can neither nor ought we fail to obey, etc. — Near the end of the argument, for *potentiae* — a reading which we have restored from codices F H K T and edition 1 — the Vatican [edition] reads *possibile*.

la: August., XIII. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8: Beatus igitur non est, nisi qui et habet omnia quae vult et nihil vult male. Cfr. de Beata Vita, n. 10. seqq. — De seq. propos. cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 8.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIII c. 5 n. 8: Therefore he is not blessed except he who both has all that he wills and wills nothing evilly. Cf. *On the Blessed Life*, n. 10 and following. — On the following proposition, cf. above d. 1 dub. 8.

la: Anselm., *Dialog. de Veritate*, c. 12. iustitiam sic definit: Iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.

en: Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 12, defines justice thus: Justice, therefore, is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake.

la: Cfr. supra d. 10. p. I. q. 1. seq.

en: Cf. above, d. 10, p. I, q. 1 and following.

la: Sive differt a substantia animae et ab actu volendi et distat a fine. — De differentia voluntatis a substantia animae et ab actu volendi cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, et d. 8. p. II. q. 2; de distantia voluntatis a fine cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 1. et 2.

en: Or: it differs from the substance of the soul and from the act of willing, and is distant from [its] end. — On the difference of the will from the substance of the soul and from the act of willing, cf. above d. 3 p. II a. 1 q. 3, and d. 8 p. II q. 2; on the distance of the will from [its] end, cf. above d. 1 a. 3 q. 1 and 2.

la: Cod. V ante *Propter* repetit *praesidem*, novam propositionem sic incipiens: *Praesidens: propter*. Paulo inferius pro *variabilitas secundum alternationem* Vat. *variabilis secundum alterationem*.

en: Codex V before *Propter* repeats *praesidem*, beginning a new sentence thus: *Praesidens: propter*. A little below, for *variabilitas secundum alternationem* the Vatican [edition reads] *variabilis secundum alterationem*.

la: Vat. omittit *ideo*, pro quo cod. H *iterum*. Lectio a nobis recepta minus plana est, sed fere omnibus codd. confirmatur. Paulo inferius pro *quia potest* cod. M *qua potest*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *ideo*, for which codex H [reads] *iterum*. The reading we have adopted is less smooth, but is confirmed by nearly all the codices. A little below, for *quia potest* codex M [reads] *qua potest*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *sic in actu, quod voluntas modo vult aliquid modo desinit aliquid velle*, quam lectionem ex cod. T emendavimus, contextu hoc postulante. Alii codd. nostrae lectioni non nisi ex parte suffragantur; sic codd. H X etiam pro *quod voluntas* exhibent *quo voluntas*, et codd. K R cum ed. 1 omittunt *aliquid* ante *velle*. Non pauci codd. verbo *velle* falso praemittunt *esse*. Paulo inferius pro *quia inter* complures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam *quare inter*, et in fine solutionis ed. 1 *obiecta* pro *quaesita*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *sic in actu, quod voluntas modo vult aliquid modo desinit aliquid velle* ("thus in act, that the will at one moment wills something, at one moment ceases to will something") — which reading we have emended from codex T, the context requiring this. The other codices support our reading only in part; thus codices H X also, for *quod voluntas*, exhibit *quo voluntas*, and codices K R with ed. 1 omit *aliquid* before *velle*. Not a few codices falsely prefix *esse* to the verb *velle*. A little below, for *quia inter* several codices with editions 2 and 3 wrongly [read] *quare inter*, and at the end of the solution ed. 1 [reads] *obiecta* for *quaesita*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De voluntate in sensu proprio tractatur in art. 1. et 2; de *voluntate signi* in art. 3; de libertate, quae competit voluntati divinae in operibus ad extra, non pauca dicuntur in tractatu de libero arbitrio II. *Sent.* d. 25. praesertim p. I. q. 1. 2; p. II. q. 1. 2. — Quomodo libertas Dei cum eius immutabilitate possit componi, est difficilima quaestio, in qua enodanda plurimum laborant theologi; cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. 2; d. 35. q. 2. ad. 3; d. 13. dub. 4; d. 39. dub. 5; d. 47. q. 1. 2. Docti in conclusionibus convenirent; aliqui tamen sunt qui prosecutionem et fugam aliquo modo ad Deum transferri posse putant.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 34. m. 1. 2. — Scot., *Report.* hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 19. a. 1; S. c. Gent. l. c. 72. 73. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 45. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Of the will in the proper sense, [the matter] is treated in articles 1 and 2; of the *will of sign* in article 3; of the freedom which belongs to the divine will in its outward works, not a little is said in the treatise on free will, *Sent.* II d. 25, especially p. I q. 1. 2; p. II q. 1. 2. — How the freedom of God can be reconciled with his immutability is a most difficult question, in the unraveling of which theologians labor greatly; cf. above d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 1. 2; d. 35 q. 2 ad 3; d. 13 dub. 4; d. 39 dub. 5; d. 47 q. 1. 2. The learned agree in their conclusions; some, however, there are who think that pursuit and flight can in some way be transferred to God.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 34 m. 1. 2. — Scot., *Report.* here q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., here q. 1 a. 1; *Summa* I q. 19 a. 1; *Summa contra Gent.* l. [I] cc. 72. 73. — B. Albert, here a. 1. 2; *Summa* p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 45 q. 1. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 1.

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