title: Dist. 33, Dubia

source_text:
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### *Dubia circa litteram Magistri*

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione iustitiae, quam ponit: *Iustitia est in subveniendo miseris.* Et videtur, quod male definiat, quia iustitia distinguitur contra misericordiam, aut misericordia est pars iustitiae-virtutis: cum ergo ipsius misericordiae sit subvenire miseris, videtur male hic notificari habitus iustitiae-virtutis. — Item, iustitiae est « reddere unicuique quod suum est[^1] »; sed aliquibus debemus honorem, aliquibus subventionem: ergo praedicta notificatio non convenit universaliter iustitiae. Obedientia enim est pars iustitiae, tamen obedientia non est in subveniendo miseris, sed in obediendo mandatis[^2].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister sive Augustinus[^3], cuius haec verba sunt, non intendit definire ipsam virtutem generaliter, sed secundum suum potissimum statum, in quo et secundum quem conformamur ad Christum. Et quoniam in isto actu iustitiae, etsi multi sint, maxime conformamur Christo, scilicet in subveniendo miseris; ideo iustitia per actum istum notificatur, non quia generaliter omni iustitiae conveniat, sed quia convenit iustitiae in suo potissimo statu. — Ex hoc tamen potest colligi generalis eius notificatio, quia, sicut miseris debemus subventionem, ita aliis generibus hominum alia et alia debemus. Unde generalis notificatio ipsius iustitiae ex hoc potest elici, quod iustitia est virtus reddens unicuique quod suum est. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa duo obiecta.

Notandum est tamen, quod subvenire miseris potest aliquis dupliciter: aut prout movetur sub ratione debiti, aut prout simpliciter considerat necessitatem proximi, cui compatiendum est. Et primum est iustitiae, secundum misericordiae. Verumtamen, sicut dictum est, misericordia continetur sub iustitia cardinali, licet aliquo modo iustitia distinguatur contra misericordiam.

Propter quod nota, quod iustitia dicitur multis modis: uno modo large, prout dicit generaliter rectitudinem animi sive in declinando a malo, sive in faciendo bonum[^4]; et hoc modo iustitia est virtus generalis, secundum quam quilibet homo sanctus dicitur esse iustus. Alio modo dicitur iustitia rectitudo ordinans ad alterum in reddendo ei quod suum est; et sic est virtus cardinalis. Tertio modo dicitur iustitia magis proprie, secundum quod dicit rectitudinem in reddendo id quod est poenae; et accipitur ibi iustitia pro severitate. Et sic iustitia distinguitur contra misericordiam et est pars iustitiae cardinalis. — Si autem quaeras, quare iustitia magis accipiatur generaliter quam aliqua[^5] virtus; hoc est, quia nomen iustitiae imponitur ab ordine rectitudinis, qui generaliter convenire potest omni virtuti.

#### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de alia notificatione, quam ponit: *Prudentia est in praecavendis insidiis.* Contra hoc est: quia, cum insidiae sint de contingentibus futuris et occultis, et ista non cognoscantur per virtutem aliquam, sed potius per donum prophetiae; non videtur, quod notificatio illa conveniat prudentiae. — Item, tres sunt partes prudentiae, sicut dicit Tullius[^6], videlicet « memoria, intelligentia et providentia »; et sola providentia est respectu futuri: igitur ipsa sola est in praecavendis insidiis: ergo non videtur, quod ista notificatio ipsius prudentiae sit communis et generalis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut praedictum est de iustitia[^7], ita intelligendum est de prudentia, quod quia summus actus prudentiae consistit in praecavendo insidias, ideo Magister per actum illum definit prudentiam. Unde verum est, quod notificatio ista, accipiendo praecise, convenit uni soli prudentiae parti, quae est providentia; tamen, large accipiendo, omnes partes prudentiae ordinantur ad istam, quia memoria praeteritorum ordinat ad cautelam futurorum; parum enim valet esse circumspectum in his quae facta sunt, nisi per haec fiat homo circumspectior in his quae sunt facienda.

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Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nemo potest praescire futuras insidias nisi propheta: dicendum, quod quamvis non possit praescire cognitione certitudinali, potest tamen praescire cognitione coniecturae, sicut in signis praesentibus prognosticat homo futurum eventum[^8].

#### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de notificatione, quam ponit de fortitudine dicens, quod *fortitudo est in perferendis molestiis.* Videtur enim male assignata: quia, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[^9], in hoc distinguitur patiens a forti, quod patiens patitur, sed non deducitur, fortis nec patitur nec deducitur: ergo non videtur, quod fortitudo sit in perferendis molestiis. — Item, omnis virtus est circa delectationes et tristitias[^10]: ergo fortitudo non tantum est circa ea quae molestant, sed etiam circa ea quae delectant. — Et rursus, cum omnis virtus sit circa delectationes et tristitias, videtur, quod praedicta notificatio omni virtuti conveniat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod perferre molestias, etsi habeat iunctum sibi pati, tamen plus dicit actionem quam passionem. Ille enim dicitur molestias perferre, qui perfecte eas fert, hoc est, qui in eis non succumbit, sed qui eis supereffertur; et talis vere dicitur fortis, quia non solum non deducitur, verum etiam magis agit quam agatur; et hoc est proprium ipsius fortitudinis. Licet etiam omnis virtus circa delectationes et tristitias consistat per modum electionis et fugae, sola tamen virtus fortitudinis consistit per modum supportationis et tolerantiae[^11]. — Et sic manifesta sunt illa duo, quae opponit.

#### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de quarta definitione, quam assignat, quod *temperantia est in coercendis delectationibus pravis.* Sed contra: Christus potissime habuit temperantiam, et Adam in statu primo; tamen nec iste nec ille pro tempore illo delectationes pravas arcebat: ergo non videtur, quod praedicta notificatio[^12] sit recte assignata. — Item, perfecte coercere delectationes pravas, hoc est ipsas non sentire; sed hoc est privatio, non positio: ergo cum quaelibet virtus[^13] habeat actum positivum, per quem notificatur; videtur, quod temperantia male definiatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hic definitur temperantia secundum statum naturae lapsae, in qua delectationes pravae oriuntur et per virtutem temperantiae refrenantur; et circa hoc consistit maxima[^14] difficultas temperantiae in viatoribus; et in hoc conformamur Christo, licet non omnino, quia Christus huiusmodi delectationes nec sensit nec eis consensit; nos autem, si non consentimus, licet eas sentiamus[^15], aliquo modo eidem conformamur, et tunc delectationes huiusmodi coercemus. Unde coercere potest dicere quandam resistentiam respectu huiusmodi delectationum, quae est in ipsarum repressione; vel potest dicere omnis inordinatae delectationis absentiam et privationem. Et primum est hominis in statu naturae lapsae, secundum vero potest esse Christi et hominis instituti.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnis actus virtutis est positivus; dicendum, quod est loqui de actu interiori et de actu exteriori. Cum ergo dicitur, quod omnis actus virtutis est positivus; dicendum, quod verum est de actu interiori, sed de actu exteriori non est generaliter verum. Velle enim carere aliquo, quod non decet, virtutis est, et velle abstinere ab aliquo, quod non licet; et sic ad virtutem spectant silentium et ieiunium. Quamvis enim non loqui et non manducare sint privationes, tamen velle non loqui et non manducare est positionis[^16] et actus virtutis.

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#### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de illa ratione, quam assignat Hieronymus in littera dicens, quod hae virtutes cardinales dicuntur, quibus in hac vita mortali bene vivitur et post ad aeternam vitam pervenitur; quia non videtur recta ratio assignari. Per hanc enim rationem videtur omnis virtus cardinalis esse, quia omni virtute recte vivitur, et omnis virtus est via perveniendi in regnum[^17]. — Item, cum cardinales dicantur, quia sunt principales et principium movendi; cum caritas sit magis principale principium movendi[^18], videtur, quod caritas debet dici virtus cardinalis. — Item, cum prudentia sit non tantum virtus, sed etiam auriga virtutum et aliarum directiva[^19]; videtur, quod ipsa possit dici cardinalior aliis.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: *quare huiusmodi virtutes cardinales dicuntur politicae magis quam theologicae?*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod huiusmodi virtutes dicuntur consuetudinales, politicae et cardinales. Consuetudinales dicuntur ratione sui principii originalis, secundum quod acquiruntur ex frequenti bene agere[^20]. Politicae vero dicuntur ratione operationis et exercitii sibi debiti, quia, sicut theologicae dicuntur, quia ordinant hominem ad divina et quasi faciunt hominem divinum, sic istae virtutes dicuntur politicae, quia reddunt hominem bene ordinatum ad vivendum inter homines; unde politica virtus dicitur a polis, quod est pluralitas[^21]. Cardinales autem dicuntur ratione finis ultimi, quia per istas est ingressus ad caelestia regna. Duplex est enim porta ingrediendi in caelum, videlicet per observantiam mandatorum, secundum illud Matthaei decimo nono[^22]: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*; et per tolerantiam tribulationum, secundum illud Actuum decimo quarto: *Per multas tribulationes oportet nos* etc. Quantum ad quae duo principaliter ordinant istae quatuor virtutes; ideo dicuntur principales et cardinales. Ideo autem istae virtutes principaliter ordinant, quia sumuntur a rationibus praecipuis, secundum quas homo debet versari in agendis et patiendis. In omnibus enim agendis et patiendis debet homo attendere arduitatem, secundum quam conditionem attenditur fortitudo; et aequitatem, secundum quam attenditur iustitia; et honestatem, secundum quam attenditur temperantia; et utilitatem, secundum quam attenditur prudentia. Et quia istae quatuor rationes sunt quasi quatuor cardines[^23], ad quos reducuntur omnes virtutes, quae movent ad recte agendum, vel patiendum; ideo istae quatuor virtutes dicuntur cardinales et principales. Et sic patet, quare istae virtutes sic nominentur, et quod ratio Hieronymi, quae ponitur in littera[^24], est valde bona.

Nec valet illud quod obiicit de virtutibus theologicis et de caritate; quoniam ipsae theologicae virtutes tanquam excellentiores sortiuntur nobilius nomen. Praeterea, non sumuntur secundum illas quatuor conditiones principales, quae requiruntur ad virtutem, ratione quarum istae vocantur cardinales. Et per hoc patet illud quod obiiciebatur primo et secundo.

Ad illud vero quod obiiciebatur tertio, similiter patet responsio; quia omnes virtutes istae aequaliter dicuntur cardinales, pro eo quod omnes istae rationes, penes quas accipiuntur, aequaliter sunt necessariae ad virtutem, videlicet ratio ardui et debiti et honesti sive pulcri et eligibilis[^25].

#### Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ibi, quod *iustitia in illa beatitudine non desit*[^26], nec aliae tres virtutes, videlicet prudentia, fortitudo et temperantia; et quaeritur ratione huius de ordine istarum quatuor virtutum, quia Magister semper hic praemittit iustitiam et secundo subiungit prudentiam, tertio fortitudinem et quarto temperantiam. Sed in contrarium huius est, quia Philosophus[^27] in prosecutione harum virtutum primo ordinat fortitudinem et secundo temperantiam. — Item, videtur, quod prudentia deberet omnibus aliis praemitti, quia ostendit viam aliis: ergo sicut palpebrae debent praecedere gressus[^28], sic videtur, quod prudentia ordi-

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nanda esset ante alias. — Item, in libro Sapientiae, octavo, praemittitur continentia et subiungitur prudentia, et tertio iustitia et quarto fortitudo. Ait enim sic: *Sobrietatem docet et sapientiam et iustitiam et virtutem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod istae virtutes possunt quadrupliciter considerari, secundum quod quatuor sunt, et secundum quadruplicem considerationem quaelibet primo loco potest ordinari. Habet enim virtus comparari ad subiectum et habet comparari ad obiectum. Ad subiectum autem comparatur dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem in acquirendo; et sic oportet incipere a continentia, quia, sicut mundus color aliis coloribus substernitur[^29], sic munditia carnis praemitti debet aliis virtutibus; et iste ordo consideratur in libro Sapientiae, ubi praemittitur aliis. — Alio modo comparantur virtutes ad subiectum secundum ordinem in perficiendo; et quia in perfecto exercitio virtutis cognitio praecedit, sic prudentia omnibus aliis habet praeponi. Et sic praemittit eam Bernardus ad Eugenium[^30] dicens, quod non tantum est virtus, verum etiam auriga virtutum.

Si autem considerentur virtutes per comparationem ad obiectum, hoc similiter potest esse dupliciter: quia obiectum virtutis est bonum et difficile[^31], secundum quod dicit Philosophus. Si comparentur ad obiectum sub ratione difficilis, sic prima est fortitudo, quae magis considerat difficile; et hoc modo ordinat Philosophus in Ethicis, praemittens fortitudinem aliis, et deinde gradatim descendens, secundum quod magis et minus habent rationem difficilis. — Si autem comparentur sub ratione boni, sic prima omnium virtutum est ipsa iustitia, cuius maxime est ordinem considerare et aliis bonum suum communicare; et hoc modo ordinat Augustinus et Magister in littera[^32]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, patent etiam ea quae dicuntur in littera.

Et ex his quae quaesita sunt, possent formari sex problemata praeter illa quae quaesita sunt, quatuor videlicet de definitionibus harum quatuor virtutum, et duo sequentia de earum virtutum nomine et ordine. Et ista sufficiant de virtutibus cardinalibus in sua generalitate[^33].

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk gathers the footer sequences of pp. 728–731 (the Dubia's own share), renumbered continuously 1…33.

english:
### *Doubts concerning the text of the Master*

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition of justice which he sets down: *Justice consists in coming to the aid of the wretched.* And it seems that he defines it badly, because justice is distinguished against mercy, or mercy is a part of the virtue-of-justice: since therefore it belongs to mercy itself to come to the aid of the wretched, it seems that the disposition of the virtue-of-justice is here ill-defined. — Likewise, it belongs to justice to "render to each what is his own[^1]"; but to some we owe honor, to some assistance: therefore the aforesaid description does not apply to justice universally. For obedience is a part of justice, yet obedience does not consist in coming to the aid of the wretched, but in obeying commands[^2].

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master, or Augustine[^3], whose words these are, does not intend to define the virtue itself in general, but according to its most excellent state, in which and according to which we are conformed to Christ. And since in this act of justice, although they be many, we are most conformed to Christ, namely in coming to the aid of the wretched; therefore justice is described by this act, not because it applies to all justice in general, but because it applies to justice in its most excellent state. — From this, nevertheless, its general description can be gathered, because, just as we owe assistance to the wretched, so to other kinds of men we owe other and other things. Hence the general description of justice itself can be drawn from this, that justice is the virtue rendering to each what is his own. — And thus the reply to those two objections is clear.

It must be noted, however, that one can come to the aid of the wretched in two ways: either inasmuch as one is moved under the account of what is due, or inasmuch as one simply considers the need of the neighbor, with whom one must have compassion. And the first belongs to justice, the second to mercy. Nevertheless, as has been said, mercy is contained under cardinal justice, although in some way justice is distinguished against mercy.

On account of which note that justice is spoken of in many ways: in one way broadly, inasmuch as it signifies generally the rectitude of the mind whether in turning away from evil or in doing good[^4]; and in this way justice is a general virtue, according to which any holy man is said to be just. In another way justice is said to be the rectitude ordering one toward another in rendering to him what is his own; and thus it is a cardinal virtue. In a third way justice is said more properly, inasmuch as it signifies rectitude in rendering what belongs to punishment; and there justice is taken for severity. And thus justice is distinguished against mercy and is a part of cardinal justice. — But if you ask why justice is taken more generally than any[^5] virtue; this is because the name of justice is imposed from the order of rectitude, which can apply generally to every virtue.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about another description, which he sets down: *Prudence consists in guarding against snares.* Against this is: that, since snares are among future and hidden contingents, and these are not known through any virtue, but rather through the gift of prophecy; it does not seem that that description applies to prudence. — Likewise, there are three parts of prudence, as Tully says[^6], namely "memory, intelligence, and providence"; and providence alone is with respect to the future: therefore it alone consists in guarding against snares: therefore it does not seem that this description of prudence is common and general.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as was said before concerning justice[^7], so it must be understood concerning prudence, that because the highest act of prudence consists in guarding against snares, therefore the Master defines prudence by that act. Hence it is true that this description, taken precisely, applies to one single part of prudence, which is providence; yet, taken broadly, all the parts of prudence are ordered toward it, because memory of the past is ordered toward caution about the future; for it avails little to be circumspect in things that have been done, unless through these a man becomes more circumspect in things that are to be done.

Therefore to that which is objected, that no one can foreknow future snares except a prophet: it must be said that although he cannot foreknow them by certain cognition, he can nevertheless foreknow them by cognition of conjecture, just as a man forecasts a future event from present signs[^8].

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about the description which he sets down concerning fortitude, saying that *fortitude consists in enduring troubles.* For it seems ill-assigned: because, according to what the Philosopher says[^9], in this a sufferer is distinguished from the brave man, that the sufferer suffers but is not led off, the brave man neither suffers nor is led off: therefore it does not seem that fortitude consists in enduring troubles. — Likewise, every virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows[^10]: therefore fortitude is concerned not only with those things which trouble, but also with those which give pleasure. — And again, since every virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows, it seems that the aforesaid description applies to every virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said that to endure troubles, although it has joined to itself a suffering, nevertheless signifies action more than passion. For he is said to endure troubles who bears them perfectly, that is, who does not succumb in them, but who is carried above them; and such a one is truly called brave, because he is not only not led off, but even acts more than he is acted upon; and this is proper to fortitude itself. Although every virtue concerned with pleasures and sorrows consists in the mode of choice and flight, nevertheless fortitude alone consists in the mode of support and toleration[^11]. — And thus those two things which he objects are made manifest.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about the fourth definition which he assigns, that *temperance consists in restraining depraved pleasures.* But on the contrary: Christ pre-eminently had temperance, and Adam in the first state; yet neither this one nor that one for that time was restraining depraved pleasures: therefore it does not seem that the aforesaid description[^12] is rightly assigned. — Likewise, to restrain depraved pleasures perfectly is not to feel them; but this is a privation, not a positing: therefore since any virtue[^13] has a positive act through which it is described; it seems that temperance is ill-defined.

**I respond:** It must be said that temperance is here defined according to the state of fallen nature, in which depraved pleasures arise and are restrained through the virtue of temperance; and about this consists the greatest[^14] difficulty of temperance in wayfarers; and in this we are conformed to Christ, although not entirely, because Christ neither felt such pleasures nor consented to them; we, however, if we do not consent, although we feel them[^15], are in some way conformed to him, and then we restrain such pleasures. Hence "to restrain" can signify a certain resistance with respect to such pleasures, which consists in the repression of them; or it can signify the absence and privation of every disordered pleasure. And the first belongs to man in the state of fallen nature, the second can belong to Christ and to man as constituted.

Therefore to that which is objected, that every act of virtue is positive; it must be said that one may speak of an interior act and of an exterior act. When therefore it is said that every act of virtue is positive; it must be said that this is true of the interior act, but of the exterior act it is not generally true. For to will to lack something which is not fitting belongs to virtue, and to will to abstain from something which is not lawful; and thus silence and fasting pertain to virtue. For although not to speak and not to eat are privations, nevertheless to will not to speak and not to eat belongs to positing[^16] and is an act of virtue.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that reason which Jerome assigns in the text, saying that these are called cardinal virtues, by which in this mortal life one lives well and afterward attains to eternal life; because it does not seem that a right reason is assigned. For by this reason it seems that every virtue is cardinal, because by every virtue one lives rightly, and every virtue is a way of arriving in the kingdom[^17]. — Likewise, since they are called cardinal because they are principal and the principle of moving; since charity is more the principal principle of moving[^18], it seems that charity ought to be called a cardinal virtue. — Likewise, since prudence is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues and the director of the others[^19]; it seems that it can be called more cardinal than the others.

Adjoining this it is asked: *why are virtues of this kind called political rather than theological?*

**I respond:** It must be said that virtues of this kind are called customary, political, and cardinal. They are called customary by reason of their original principle, according to which they are acquired from frequently acting well[^20]. They are called political by reason of the operation and exercise owed to them, because, just as the theological virtues are so called because they order man to divine things and as it were make man divine, so these virtues are called political because they render man well ordered for living among men; hence a political virtue is named from *polis*, which is a plurality[^21]. But they are called cardinal by reason of the ultimate end, because through them is the entry to the heavenly kingdoms. For there is a twofold gate of entering into heaven, namely through the observance of the commandments, according to that of Matthew nineteen[^22]: *If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments*; and through the toleration of tribulations, according to that of Acts fourteen: *Through many tribulations it behooves us* etc. Inasmuch as these four virtues principally order toward these two things; therefore they are called principal and cardinal. And these virtues principally order for this reason, because they are taken from the chief grounds according to which a man ought to be engaged in things to be done and suffered. For in all things to be done and suffered a man must attend to the arduousness, according to which condition fortitude is attended to; and the equity, according to which justice is attended to; and the honorableness, according to which temperance is attended to; and the usefulness, according to which prudence is attended to. And because these four grounds are as it were four hinges[^23], to which all the virtues are reduced which move toward acting rightly, or suffering; therefore these four virtues are called cardinal and principal. And thus it is clear why these virtues are so named, and that the reason of Jerome, which is set down in the text[^24], is very good.

Nor does that avail which he objects concerning the theological virtues and concerning charity; since the theological virtues themselves, as more excellent, obtain a nobler name. Moreover, they are not taken according to those four principal conditions which are required for virtue, by reason of which these are called cardinal. And through this is clear that which was objected first and second.

To that, however, which was objected in the third place, the reply is likewise clear; because all these virtues are equally called cardinal, for the reason that all these grounds, according to which they are taken, are equally necessary for virtue, namely the ground of the arduous and of the due and of the honorable or beautiful and choiceworthy[^25].

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says there that *justice in that beatitude does not fail*[^26], nor the other three virtues, namely prudence, fortitude, and temperance; and by reason of this it is asked about the order of these four virtues, because the Master here always puts justice first and second subjoins prudence, third fortitude and fourth temperance. But on the contrary to this is, that the Philosopher[^27] in his treatment of these virtues first orders fortitude and second temperance. — Likewise, it seems that prudence ought to be put before all the others, because it shows the way to the others: therefore just as the eyelids ought to precede the steps[^28], so it seems that prudence ought to be ordered before the others. — Likewise, in the book of Wisdom, the eighth, continence is put first and prudence is subjoined, and third justice and fourth fortitude. For it speaks thus: *It teaches sobriety and wisdom and justice and virtue.*

**I respond:** It must be said that these virtues can be considered in four ways, according as they are four, and according to a fourfold consideration any one of them can be ordered in the first place. For virtue has being compared to the subject and has being compared to the object. To the subject, moreover, it is compared in two ways: either according to the order in acquiring; and thus it is necessary to begin from continence, because, just as a pure color is laid under the other colors[^29], so cleanness of the flesh ought to be put before the other virtues; and this order is considered in the book of Wisdom, where it is put before the others. — In another way the virtues are compared to the subject according to the order in perfecting; and because in the perfect exercise of virtue cognition precedes, thus prudence has to be set before all the others. And thus Bernard to Eugenius[^30] puts it first, saying that it is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues.

If, however, the virtues are considered by comparison to the object, this likewise can be in two ways: because the object of virtue is the good and the difficult[^31], according to what the Philosopher says. If they are compared to the object under the account of the difficult, thus the first is fortitude, which considers the difficult more; and in this way the Philosopher orders them in the Ethics, putting fortitude before the others, and then gradually descending, according as they have more and less the account of the difficult. — But if they are compared under the account of the good, thus the first of all the virtues is justice itself, whose office it most of all is to consider order and to communicate its good to others; and in this way Augustine and the Master order them in the text[^32]. — And through this the reply to the objections is clear, and also clear are the things which are said in the text.

And from these things which have been inquired into, six problems could be formed besides those which have been inquired into, namely four concerning the definitions of these four virtues, and two following concerning the name and order of these virtues. And let these things suffice concerning the cardinal virtues in their generality[^33].

la: Plato, I. Dialog. de Republ. (ed. Serrani, tom. 2. pag. 331). Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 1. seqq. et de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 2.

en: Plato, *Republic*, Dialogue I (ed. Serranus, vol. 2, p. 331). Aristotle, *Ethics* V, c. 1 ff. and *On the Virtues and Vices*, c. 2.

la: Quantum ad iustitiam distinguuntur integrales partes iustitiae (declinare a malo, facere bonum alteri), partes subiectivae seu species iustitiae (iustitia commutativa, distributiva et legalis) et partes potentiales seu virtutes iustitiae connexae, quae secundum Ciceron., II. Rhet. c. 54, sunt: religio, pietas, gratia, vindicatio, observantia, veritas; secundum Macrob., I. in Somnium Scipionis, c. 8: innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas (misericordia). Guliel. Paris., de Virtut. c. 12. ut virtutes iustitiae annexas recenset obedientiam respectu superioris; disciplinam respectu inferioris, ad quam reducitur severitas et clementia sive misericordia; aequitatem respectu parium; fidem sive fidelitatem (contra dolos), veracitatem (in dictis) et veritatem (in factis contra hypocrisin); tres ultimae sunt respectu omnium. Vide Bernard., Serm. 3. in Adventu Domini, n. 4. Cfr. etiam S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 4. — Pro non est in subveniendo edd. non est pars in subveniendo.

en: As regards justice, there are distinguished the integral parts of justice (to turn away from evil, to do good to another), the subjective parts or species of justice (commutative, distributive, and legal justice), and the potential parts or virtues annexed to justice, which according to Cicero, *Rhetoric* II, c. 54, are: religion, piety, gratitude, vindication, observance, truthfulness; according to Macrobius, *On the Dream of Scipio* I, c. 8: innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity (mercy). William of Paris, *On the Virtues* c. 12, lists as virtues annexed to justice: obedience with respect to a superior; discipline with respect to an inferior, to which severity and clemency or mercy are reduced; equity with respect to equals; faith or fidelity (against deceits), veracity (in words) and truth (in deeds, against hypocrisy); the last three are with respect to all. See Bernard, *Sermon 3 in the Advent of the Lord*, n. 4. Cf. also St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 4. — For *non est in subveniendo* the editions read *non est pars in subveniendo*.

la: Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12. — Paulo inferius post in quo cod. G subdit est, et deinde pro in isto actu iustitiae edd. falso substituerunt in isto statu iustitiae.

en: *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 9, n. 12. — A little below, after *in quo*, cod. G adds *est*, and then for *in isto actu iustitiae* the editions falsely substituted *in isto statu iustitiae*.

la: Psalm. 36, 27: Declina a malo et fac bonum. Cfr. supra pag. 715, nota 5. — Mox post Alio modo dicitur edd. inserunt proprie.

en: Psalm 36:27: *Turn away from evil and do good.* Cf. above p. 715, note 5. — Soon after *Alio modo dicitur* the editions insert *proprie*.

la: Codd. K Z quam aliqua alia, edd. quam alia. — Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota 11; et de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 8.

en: Codd. K Z *quam aliqua alia*, the editions *quam alia*. — Cf. above p. 720, note 11; and on this doubt Bl. Albert, here a. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 8.

la: Libr. II. Rhet. c. 54. — Secundum Macrob., I. in Somnium Scipionis, c. 8. prudentiae partes integrales hae sunt: ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio. Prudentiae partes subiectivae (seu species) vulgo recensentur: prudentia monastica (privata) et gubernatrix multitudinis (oeconomica, politica, militaris); partes potentiales: eubulia, synesis, gnome. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 9. seqq.

en: *Rhetoric* II, c. 54. — According to Macrobius, *On the Dream of Scipio* I, c. 8, the integral parts of prudence are these: reason, intellect, circumspection, providence, docility, caution. The subjective parts (or species) of prudence are commonly reckoned: monastic (private) prudence and that which governs the multitude (economic, political, military); the potential parts: deliberateness (*eubulia*), understanding (*synesis*), judgment (*gnome*). Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* VI, c. 9 ff.

la: Dub. praeced. — Mox pro quod quia cod. G quia, sicut, et subinde pro in praecavendo insidias idem cod. G in praecavendis insidiis.

en: The preceding doubt. — Soon, for *quod quia*, cod. G reads *quia, sicut*, and then for *in praecavendo insidias* the same cod. G reads *in praecavendis insidiis*.

la: Matth. 16, 2. seq.: Facto vespere dicitis: serenum erit, rubicundum est enim caelum etc. — Pro prognosticat fere omnes codd. perperam, ut videtur, prognosticatur, codd. K W praenotificat, edd. notificat. Verbum prognosticare (a vocabulo Graeco προγνωστικός) idem significat ac praesagire, praesignare; vide Du Cange, Glossarium etc. — De hoc dubio cfr. Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 88. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 8.

en: Matthew 16:2 f.: *When evening has come you say: it will be fair, for the sky is red* etc. — For *prognosticat* nearly all the codd. wrongly, as it seems, *prognosticatur*, codd. K W *praenotificat*, the editions *notificat*. The verb *prognosticare* (from the Greek *προγνωστικός*) means the same as to foretell, to forsignify; see Du Cange, *Glossary* etc. — On this doubt cf. *Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales*, collation 88, a. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 8.

la: Libr. IV. Topic. 5. (ubi tamen pro patiens legitur continens): Peccant autem et qui habitum in consequentem potentiam ordinant, ut mansuetudinem [definientes] continentiam irae, et fortitudinem et iustitiam timorum et lucrorum continentiam. Nam fortis et mansuetus perturbatione vacuus [iyxpaτής], continens autem, qui perturbatur, sed non ducitur [ἐγκρατὴς δ' ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος], quae verba B. Albert., tr. 3. c. 1, sic explicat: abstinens autem est qui est continens, et in VII. Ethicorum vocatur: qui patitur et sentit illicitas passiones, sed non deducitur a mente mensurante rectum per vim passionis; fortasse igitur talia potentia sequitur utrumque, ut, si perturbetur, non ducatur. Verum continere non hoc est [scil. quod est fortis etc.], hunc quidem fortem, illum autem mansuetum esse, sed [fortis est] omnino perturbari ab huiusmodi nihil.

en: *Topics* IV, 5 (where, however, for *patiens* is read *continens*): "They also err who order a disposition to the consequent power, as defining gentleness the continence of anger, and fortitude and justice the continence of fears and of gains. For the brave and gentle man is free of perturbation [*ἐγκρατής*], but the continent man is he who is perturbed yet not led off [*ἐγκρατὴς δ' ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος*]" — which words Bl. Albert, tr. 3, c. 1, explains thus: "the abstinent man is he who is continent, and in *Ethics* VII is called: he who suffers and feels illicit passions, but is not led off from the mind measuring the right by the force of passion; perhaps therefore such a power follows both, so that, if he be perturbed, he is not led off. But to be continent is not this [namely, what it is to be brave etc.], that this one is brave, that one gentle, but [the brave man] is not perturbed at all by things of this kind."

la: Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 19. (c. 3.); II. Ethic. c. 3. et III. c. 11.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 19 (c. 3); *Ethics* II, c. 3 and III, c. 11.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3. et III. c. 7. — Superius pro supereffertur cod. V superfertur. — De hoc dubio vide B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 3 and III, c. 7. — Above, for *supereffertur* cod. V *superfertur*. — On this doubt see Bl. Albert, here a. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2.

la: Cod. Z definitio.

en: Cod. Z *definitio*.

la: Virtus enim habitus est, non privatio; cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. — Paulo ante pro ipsas non sentire cod. K ipsas non consentire.

en: For virtue is a disposition, not a privation; cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 5. — A little before, for *ipsas non sentire* cod. K *ipsas non consentire*.

la: Codd. Z bb maxime.

en: Codd. Z bb *maxime*.

la: Edd. nos autem etsi non consentimus, eas tamen sentimus, et sic illi modo etc.

en: The editions: *we, however, even if we do not consent, nevertheless feel them, and thus in that way* etc.

la: Ita codd. A G H I L T bb; codd. V v* Z no sunt positiones, cod. K sunt actus positionis, edd. sunt positionis, quae et paulo ante habent sint positiones pro sint privationes? — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 5.

en: Thus codd. A G H I L T bb; codd. V v* Z read *sunt positiones*, cod. K *sunt actus positionis*, the editions *sunt positionis*, which also a little before have *sint positiones* for *sint privationes*? — Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert, here a. 5.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 3. et 9. — Superius post recta ratio edd. addunt nominis.

en: Cf. above p. 488, note 3 and 9. — Above, after *recta ratio* the editions add *nominis*.

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. — Pro principale principium edd. principalis et principium, et subinde pro debet dici cod. A debeat esse, edd. sit.

en: See above d. 27, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body. — For *principale principium* the editions *principalis et principium*, and then for *debet dici* cod. A *debeat esse*, the editions *sit*.

la: Vide verba Bernardi, supra pag. 471, nota 3. allata.

en: See the words of Bernard, cited above p. 471, note 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 472, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 472, note 2.

la: Vat. recte civitas (πόλις). — Macrob., I. in Somnium Scipionis, c. 8: Et sunt politicae [virtutes] hominis, quia sociale animal est. His boni viri reipublicae consulunt, urbes tuentur; his parentes venerantur, liberos amant, proximos diligunt etc. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 901, nota 5.

en: The Vatican edition rightly *civitas* (*πόλις*). — Macrobius, *On the Dream of Scipio* I, c. 8: "And they are the political [virtues] of man, because he is a social animal. By these good men take counsel for the commonwealth, guard cities; by these they venerate parents, love children, cherish neighbors" etc. Cf. vol. II, p. 901, note 5.

la: Vers. 17. — Seq. testimonium est Act. 14, 21. — Bernard., Serm. 1. in festo Ss. Petri et Pauli, n. 3: Bonam autem vitam ego puto et mala pati et bona facere et sic perseverare usque ad mortem. — Paulo inferius pro Quantum ad quae duo cod. U Ad quae duo, edd. Ad ista duo. Post pauca pro rationibus edd. nominibus.

en: Verse 17. — The following testimony is Acts 14:21. — Bernard, *Sermon 1 on the Feast of Sts. Peter and Paul*, n. 3: "I judge a good life to be both to suffer evils and to do good and so to persevere unto death." — A little below, for *Quantum ad quae duo* cod. U *Ad quae duo*, the editions *Ad ista duo*. After a few words, for *rationibus* the editions *nominibus*.

la: Cfr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 4. et 20. — Subinde pro ad quos codd. A E K Q V ad quas; in edd. legitur: Et quia istae quatuor virtutes cardinales, ad quas reducuntur omnes virtutes, inducunt ad recte agendum etc.

en: Cf. *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 4 and 20. — Then for *ad quos* codd. A E K Q V *ad quas*; in the editions is read: "And because these four cardinal virtues, to which all the virtues are reduced, lead to acting rightly" etc.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Cfr. Bernard., I. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 11. — Huius dubii solutionem invenis etiam in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 76. a. 3; apud Albert., hic a. 2.; apud S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. et apud Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. q. 1. quaestiunc. 2.

en: Cf. Bernard, *On Consideration* I, c. 8, n. 11. — The solution of this doubt you find also in the *Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales*, collation 76, a. 3; in Albert, here a. 2; in St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; and in Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, q. 1, little-question 2.

la: Edd. cum textu originali desinet.

en: The editions, with the original text, *desinet*.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 7. et III. c. 6. seqq.

en: *Ethics* II, c. 7 and III, c. 6 ff.

la: Respicitur illud Prov. 4, 25: Oculi tui recta videant, et palpebrae tuae praecedant gressus tuos. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Sap. 8, 7. — Pro ordinanda esset cod. U ordinanda sit, edd. ordinanda est.

en: Reference is made to that of Proverbs 4:25: *Let your eyes look straight ahead, and let your eyelids precede your steps.* — The following Scriptural passage is Wisdom 8:7. — For *ordinanda esset* cod. U *ordinanda sit*, the editions *ordinanda est*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 3. — Pro mundus color [scil. albus] edd. medius color. Subinde pro munditia carnis codd. A P R Y Z aa bb sobrietas.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Sense and the Sensible*, c. 3. — For *mundus color* [namely, white] the editions *medius color*. Then for *munditia carnis* codd. A P R Y Z aa bb *sobrietas*.

la: Vide supra pag. 471, nota 3. — Paulo ante pro virtutis edd. virtutum, et pro sic ante prudentia codd. aa bb ideo.

en: See above p. 471, note 3. — A little before, for *virtutis* the editions *virtutum*, and for *sic* before *prudentia* codd. aa bb *ideo*.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 1. et pag. 470, nota 8. — Mox pro sub ratione difficilis, sic prima est fortitudo edd. sub ratione difficultatis, sic potest esse fortitudo.

en: *Ethics* II, c. 3. Cf. above p. 488, note 1, and p. 470, note 8. — Soon, for *sub ratione difficilis, sic prima est fortitudo* the editions *sub ratione difficultatis, sic potest esse fortitudo*.

la: Hic c. 1, ubi et verba August. habentur. Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota 11.

en: Here, c. 1, where also the words of Augustine are found. Cf. above p. 720, note 11.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 76. a. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 8.

en: Cf. on this doubt the *Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales*, collation 76, a. 7; Bl. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 8.

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 34, Part 1

title_alt: Distinctio XXXIV — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXXIV — text of the Master of the Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 731 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXXIV.

#### Pars I.

### Cap. I. *De septem donis Spiritus sancti.*

Nunc de septem donis Spiritus sancti agendum est, ubi prius considerandum est, an haec dona virtutes sint; secundo, an in futuro desitura sint, vel omnia, vel horum aliqua; deinde, an in Christo fuerint cuncta haec dona.

### Cap. II. *Utrum sint virtutes, et sint in Angelis.*

Haec dona virtutes esse nec in futuro desitura, Ambrosius[^1] ostendit, ea septem fore virtutes dicens, et in Angelis abundantissime esse, sic: «Civitas Dei illa Ierusalem caelestis, non meatu alicuius fluvii terrestris abluitur, sed e vitae fonte procedens Spiritus sanctus, cuius nos brevi satiamur haustu, in illis caelestibus spiritibus redundantius videtur effluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens meatu. Si enim fluvius riparum editis superfusus exundat, quanto magis Spiritus sanctus omnem supereminens creaturam, cum nostrae mentis arcana tanquam inferiora perstringat, caelestem illam Angelorum naturam effusiore quadam sanctificationum ubertate laetificat»! Deinde sanctificationem exponens subdit: «His autem sanctificationibus significatur plenitudo septem spiritualium virtutum, quas enumerat Isaias[^2] dicens: spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis et timoris Domini. Unum est ergo flumen, sed multi spiritualium donorum meatus». Quamvis ergo multi dicantur spiritus, ut spiritus sapientiae et intellectus etc., unus tamen est Dei Spiritus suae libertatis arbiter, omnia pro auctoritate voluntatis dividens singulis. — Hic expresse traditum est, septem dona et virtutes esse sanctificationesque fidelium mentium et in futuro non desitura, cum sint et in Angelis.

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### Cap. III. *Utrum in Christo fuerint.*

In Christo etiam haec eadem fuisse, Isaias[^3] ostendit dicens: Egredietur virga de radice Iesse, et flos de radice eius ascendet, et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini, spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis, et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini. His autem videtur obviare quod Beda[^4] de timore Domini dicit super parabolas, scilicet quod omnis timor in futuro cessabit. Ait enim sic super illum locum: Timor Domini principium sapientiae: «Duo sunt timores Domini: servilis, qui principium est sapientiae; et amicabilis, qui perfectionem sapientiae comitatur. Servilis principium sapientiae est, quia qui post errata sapere incipit primo timore corripitur divino, ne puniatur; sed hunc perfecta caritas foras mittit. Succedit huic timor Domini sanctus, permanens in saeculum saeculi, quem non excludit caritas, sed auget; quo timet filius, ne vel in modico oculos amantissimi patris offendat. Uterque in futuro cessabit. Caritas vero nunquam excidet». Augustinus quoque super illum locum Psalmi[^5]: Adorabo ad templum sanctum tuum in timore tuo; timorem desiturum dicit sic: «Timor Domini est magnum praesidium proficientibus ad salutem, sed pervenientibus foras mittitur. Non enim timent iam amicum, cum scilicet ad id quod repromissum est, perducti fuerint». Ex his auctoritatibus significatur, quod timor non erit in futuro. Si autem timor non fuerit[^6] in futuro; ergo nec septem dona erunt nec modo sunt in Angelis nec in animabus sanctis. — Ad quod dicimus, auctoritatum praemissarum quae videtur repugnantiam dirimentes, quod septem illa dona et in Angelis modo sunt et in animabus sanctis feliciter viventibus et in nobis erunt in futuro, sed non habebunt omnia[^7] hos usus sive haec officia, quae nunc habent; ut verbi gratia, timor filialis modo facit timere, ne offendamus quem diligimus, et ne separemur ab eo, facit etiam nos revereri eundem; in futuro vero faciet nos revereri, quando non timebimus separari, vel offendere. Non ergo metus separationis, vel offensionis nunc est in Angelis vel in animabus sanctis nec in nobis erit in futuro, sed reverentia, quae est mixta cum subiectione dilectio; quae etiam in Christo fuit, sicut Apostolus dicit in Epistola ad Hebraeos[^8] loquens de Christo: Qui exauditus est pro sua reverentia. — Quidam tamen secundum effectum timorem in Christo et in Angelis tantum esse contendunt.

#### Pars II.

### Cap. IV. *De timorum distinctione.*

Et quia de timore tractandi nobis occurrit locus, sciendum est, quatuor esse timores, scilicet mundanum sive humanum, servilem, initialem, castum vel filialem sive amicabilem. Humanus timor est, ut ait Cassiodorus[^9], quando timemus pati pericula carnis, vel perdere bona mundi, propter quod delinquimus. Hic timor malus est, qui in primo gradu cum mundo deseritur, quem Dominus prohibet in Evangelio[^10] dicens: Nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus etc. Timor autem servilis est, ut ait Augustinus, cum per timorem gehennae continet se homo a peccato, quo praesentiam iudicis et poenas metuit, et timore facit, quidquid boni facit, non timore amittendi aeternum bonum, quod non amat, sed timore patiendi malum, quod formidat. Non timet, ne perdat amplexus pulcherrimi sponsi; sed timet, ne mittatur in gehennam. Bonus est iste timor et utilis, licet insufficiens, per quem fit paulatim consuetudo iustitiae, et succedit initialis timor, quando incipit quod durum erat amari; et sic incipit excludi servilis timor a caritate. Et succedit deinde timor castus sive amicabilis, quo timemus, ne sponsus tardet, ne discedat, ne offendamus, ne eo careamus. Timor iste de amore venit; ille quidem servilis est utilis, sed non permanens in aeternum, ut iste; timor divinus comes est per omnes gradus.

Et attende, quod quatuor hic distinguuntur timores, cum supra Beda dixerit, duos esse. Sed Beda humanum timorem praetermisit et nomine servilis duos, quos hic distinximus, complexus fuit, scilicet servilem et initialem; amicabilem vero castum dicit. Augustinus quoque servilem, et castum timorem aperte discernit, dum Epistolae ad Romanos[^11] illum locum exponit: Non enim accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum Dei, ita dicens: Duo timores hic insinuantur: unus, qui est in perfecta caritate, scilicet timor castus; alter, qui non est in caritate, scilicet servilis, in quo quamvis Deo credatur, non tamen in Deum, et si bonum fiat, non tamen bene. «Nemo enim invitus bene facit, etiam si bonum est quod facit[^12]».

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### Cap. V. *De casto et servili et initiali.*

De his eisdem timoribus latius disputat dicens[^13]: «Coepit aliquis credere diem iudicii; si coepit credere, coepit et timere. Sed quia adhuc timet, nondum habet fiduciam in die iudicii, nondum est in illo perfecta caritas»; «si perfecta in illo esset caritas, non timeret. Perfecta enim caritas faceret perfectam iustitiam, et non haberet, quare timeret, immo haberet, quare desideraret, ut transeat iniquitas, et veniat regnum Dei. Ergo timor non est in caritate. Sed in qua caritate? Non in inchoata. In qua ergo? In perfecta? Perfecta, inquit, caritas foras mittit timorem. Ergo incipiat timor, quia initium sapientiae timor Domini. Timor quasi locum praeparat caritati; cum autem coeperit caritas habitare, pellitur timor, qui ei praeparavit locum. Quantum enim illa crescit, ille decrescit; et quantum illa fit interior, timor pellitur foras. Maior caritas, minor timor; minor caritas, maior timor. Si autem nullus est timor, non est qua intret caritas; sicut videmus, per setam introduci linum, quando aliquid suitur: seta prius intrat, et nisi exeat, non succedit linum; sic timor primo occupat mentem, non autem ibi remanet timor, quia ideo intravit, ut introduceret caritatem».

«Est autem alia sententia[^14], quae videtur huic esse contraria, si non habet pium intellectorem. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: Timor Domini castus permanet in saeculum saeculi. Aeternum quendam timorem nobis ostendit, sed castum. Quod si ostendit ille nobis aeternum timorem, nunquid contradicit illi ista Epistola, quae dicit: Timor non est in caritate, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem? Hoc enim dictum est per Ioannem, illud dictum est per David. Sed nolite putare, alium esse Spiritum. Si enim unus flatus inflat duas tibias, non potest unus spiritus implere duo corda et agitare duas linguas? Si spiritu uno, id est uno flatu, impletae[^15] duae tibiae consonant, impletae duae linguae Spiritu Dei dissonare possunt? Immo est ibi quaedam consonantia, est quaedam concordia; sed auditorem desiderat studiosum, non otiosum. Ecce movit duas linguas Spiritus Dei, et audivimus ex una: Timor non est in caritate; audivimus ex alia: Timor Domini castus permanet in saeculum saeculi. Quid est hoc? Dissonant? Non. Excute aures, intende melodiam. Non sine causa hic addidit castus; illic non addidit, quia est timor aliquis, qui dicitur castus; est autem alius, qui non dicitur castus. Discernamus istos duos timores, et intelligamus consonantiam tibiarum. Quomodo discernimus? Attendat caritas vestra. Sunt homines, qui propterea timent Deum, ne mittantur in gehennam, ne forte ardeant cum diabolo in igne aeterno. Ipse est timor, qui introducit caritatem; sed sic venit, ut exeat. Si enim propter poenas times Deum, nondum amas quem sic times; non bona desideras, sed mala caves. Sed ex eo, quia mala caves, corrigis te et incipis bona desiderare; cum bona desiderare coeperis, erit in te timor castus. Quid est timor castus? Timere, ne amittas ipsa bona, timere Deum, ne recedat a te. Cum autem times Deum, ne te deserat praesentia eius, amplecteris eum, ipso frui desideras».

### Cap. VI. *Quo differant castus et servilis.*

«Non potes melius explanare, quid intersit inter duos timores istos, quam si ponas duas mulieres maritatas, quarum unam constituas volentem facere adulterium, sed timet, ne damnetur a marito. Timet maritum, quia adhuc amat nequitiam. Huic non est grata, sed onerosa mariti praesentia; et si forte vivit nequiter, timet maritum, ne veniat. Tales sunt qui timent diem iudicii. Fac, alteram amare virum, debere illi castos amplexus, nulla se adulterina immunditia maculare velle; ista optat praesentiam viri. Illa timet, et ista timet. Iam ergo interrogentur, quare timeant. Illa dicet: timeo virum, ne veniat; ista dicet: timeo virum, ne discedat. Illa dicet: timeo virum, ne damnet[^16]; ista dicet: timeo virum, ne deserat. Pone hoc in animo, et invenies timorem, quem foras mittit caritas, et alium timorem castum permanentem in saeculum saeculi». «Illum timorem perfecta caritas foras mittit, quia ille timor tormentum habet, torquetur conscientia peccatorum, nondum facta est iustificatio. Est ibi quod titillet mentem, quod pungat, quod stimulet. Stimulat ille timor, sed intrat caritas, quae sanat quod vulnerat timor». Timor castus facit securitatem in animo. «Audivimus duas tibias, scilicet Ioannem et David consonantes. Illa de timore Dei dicit, quo timet anima, ne damnetur; illa de timore Dei dicit, quo timet anima, ne deseratur. Ille est timor, quem caritas excludit; ille est timor, qui permanet in saeculum saeculi[^17]». — Ecce in his verbis praedictis aperte ostendit Augustinus, quis sit timor castus, et quis servilis, et qualiter differant. In quibus etiam initialem timorem significavit, qui nec ex toto est servilis nec ex toto castus, sed tanquam medius aliquid de servili, et aliquid de casto timore habet. Facit enim servire partim timore poenae, partim amore iustitiae, per quem timemus puniri, et timemus offendere. Iste timor est in inchoata caritate, non in perfecta; et quantum crescit caritas, tantum decrescit iste timor, quantum ad metum poenae, id est quantum ad id, quod facit timere poenam, et quantum ad tormentum conscientiae. Nam quanto magis diligimus, tanto minus timemus. Iste timor notatur in illis verbis Augustini, ubi non negat, timorem esse in caritate in-

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choata, sed perfecta, quod non posset dici de servili, quia, ut ipse supra dixit, servilis timor non remanet, veniente caritate; nec intrat caritas, nisi prius ille timor exeat, nec in illo timore aliquis credit in Deum, etsi credat Deo; nec bene[^18] facit, etiam si bonum est quod facit. Non est ergo timor ille in caritate etiam inchoata, quia omnis qui caritatem habet, licet non perfectam, et in Deum credit et bona opera facit. Quare servilis non est timor ille, quem in caritate inchoata fore concessit, et quem, crescente caritate, decrescere dixit; sed ille est timor initialis, quem non negat esse in caritate, nisi perfecta sit.

### Cap. VII. *Quod timor servilis et initialis dicuntur initium sapientiae, sed differenter.*

Sciendum tamen est, quod uterque timor, scilicet servilis et initialis, in diversis Scripturae locis[^19] dicitur initium sapientiae, et ita fore comperies, si diligenter annotaveris loca Scripturae, in quibus de timore Domini fit mentio; ex alia tamen ratione et causa diversa dicitur servilis initium sapientiae, et ex alia initialis. Servilis enim ideo dicitur initium sapientiae, quia praeparat locum sapientiae et ducit ad sapientiam, sed tamen non remanet cum ea, immo foras exit. Initialis vero dicitur initium sapientiae, quia est in inchoata sapientia; quem cum quis habere incipit, sapientiam et caritatem habere incipit. Inde etiam est, quod uterque timor dicitur initialis, quod invenire poteris per diversa Scripturae loca. Uterque etiam timor interdum dicitur servilis, quia et ipse initialis, qui est in caritate inchoata, aliquid habet de servili, scilicet angorem poenae, sicut et aliquid habet de casto, scilicet quod timet offendere ac separari.

### Cap. VIII. *Quomodo castus timor permanet in aeternum.*

Illud quoque diligenter est notandum, quod in superioribus Augustinus dicit, castum timorem esse aeternum; per quod confirmatur praemissa sententia, scilicet quod spiritus timoris erit in futuro, sicut et alia dona Spiritus sancti. Sed non habebit omnem illum usum, quem modo habet. Faciet enim tunc nos revereri Deum, non timere separari vel carere. Fuit ergo et in Christo timor ille, sed iuxta usum illum, quem habebit in futuro in Sanctis. Non enim timuit Christus separari, vel offendere Deum, sed eum prae omnibus reveritus est.

### Cap. IX. *Si timor poenae, qui fuit in Christo, fuit servilis, vel initialis.*

Cum autem fuerit in Christo timor poenae, quaeritur, an iste timor fuerit mundanus, vel servilis, vel initialis. — Ad quod dicimus, nullum eorum fuisse in Christo, quia mundanus malus est, ut supra dictum est, et in primo gradu cum mundo deseritur; servilis vero, vel initialis in perfecta caritate non est. Nullus ergo timorum istorum fuit in Christo. — Quis ergo fuit timor ille, quo poenam timuit? Potest timor ille dici naturalis sive humanus, qui omnibus hominibus inest, quo horretur mors ac formidatur poena. Et dicitur timor iste naturalis, non quia accesserit homini ex natura, secundum quod prius fuit instituta, quia non fuit iste timor concreatus homini nec de bonis naturalibus, sed quia ex corrupta natura per peccatum omnibus advenit, cui corruptio inolevit, tanquam esset naturalis. Et est iste timor effectus peccati, ut praedictum est.

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english:
### DISTINCTION XXXIV.

#### Part I.

### Chapter I. *On the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.*

Now we must treat of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, where first it is to be considered whether these gifts are virtues; secondly, whether in the future they will cease, either all of them, or some of them; then, whether all these gifts were in Christ.

### Chapter II. *Whether they are virtues, and are in the Angels.*

That these gifts are virtues and will not cease in the future, Ambrose[^1] shows, saying that they will be seven virtues, and that they are most abundantly in the Angels, thus: «That City of God, the heavenly Jerusalem, is not washed by the channel of any earthly river, but the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the fountain of life, of whom we are sated by a brief draught, is seen to flow more abundantly in those heavenly spirits, fervent with the full channel of seven spiritual virtues. For if a river overflowing its raised banks floods out, how much more does the Holy Spirit, surpassing every creature, since it grazes the secrets of our mind as things inferior, gladden that heavenly nature of the Angels with a certain more copious richness of sanctifications»! Then, expounding the sanctification, he adds: «And by these sanctifications is signified the fullness of the seven spiritual virtues, which Isaiah[^2] enumerates, saying: the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and piety and of the fear of the Lord. There is therefore one river, but many channels of the spiritual gifts». Although therefore many spirits are spoken of, such as the spirit of wisdom and understanding etc., yet there is one Spirit of God, the arbiter of his own liberty, distributing all things to each by the authority of his will. — Here it is expressly handed down that the seven gifts and virtues are sanctifications of the minds of the faithful and will not cease in the future, since they are also in the Angels.

### Chapter III. *Whether they were in Christ.*

That these same [gifts] were also in Christ, Isaiah[^3] shows, saying: There shall come forth a rod out of the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise up out of his root, and the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and piety, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him. But to this there seems to be opposed what Bede[^4] says concerning the fear of the Lord upon the parables [Proverbs], namely that all fear shall cease in the future. For he speaks thus upon that passage: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom: «There are two fears of the Lord: servile, which is the beginning of wisdom; and friendly, which accompanies the perfection of wisdom. The servile is the beginning of wisdom, because he who after his errors begins to grow wise is first seized by a divine fear, lest he be punished; but this perfect charity casts out. To this succeeds the holy fear of the Lord, abiding for ever and ever, which charity does not exclude but increases; by which a son fears, lest even in the least he offend the eyes of a most loving father. Both will cease in the future. But charity shall never fall away». Augustine too, upon that passage of the Psalm[^5]: I will adore at thy holy temple in thy fear; says that fear will cease, thus: «The fear of the Lord is a great protection to those advancing toward salvation, but to those who have arrived it is cast out. For they no longer fear a friend, namely when they have been brought to that which was promised». By these authorities it is signified that fear will not be in the future. But if fear will not be[^6] in the future, then neither will the seven gifts be, nor are they now in the Angels nor in the holy souls. — To which we say, dissolving the apparent contradiction of the aforesaid authorities, that those seven gifts both are now in the Angels and in the holy souls living happily and will be in us in the future, but they will not have all[^7] these uses or these offices which they now have; as for example, filial fear now makes [us] fear, lest we offend him whom we love, and lest we be separated from him, and it also makes us reverence him; but in the future it will make us reverence [him], when we shall not fear to be separated or to offend. Therefore the dread of separation or of offence is not now in the Angels or in the holy souls, nor will it be in us in the future, but reverence, which is a love mixed with subjection; which was also in Christ, as the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Hebrews[^8], speaking of Christ: Who was heard for his reverence. — Some, however, contend that fear was in Christ and in the Angels only according to its effect.

#### Part II.

### Chapter IV. *On the distinction of fears.*

And since the occasion of treating of fear presents itself to us, it is to be known that there are four fears, namely worldly or human, servile, initial, chaste or filial or friendly. Human fear is, as Cassiodorus[^9] says, when we fear to suffer the perils of the flesh, or to lose the goods of the world, on account of which we transgress. This fear is evil, which in the first degree is forsaken along with the world, which the Lord forbids in the Gospel[^10], saying: Fear ye not them that kill the body etc. But servile fear is, as Augustine says, when a man restrains himself from sin through fear of hell, by which he dreads the presence of the judge and the punishments, and through fear does whatever good he does, not from fear of losing the eternal good, which he does not love, but from fear of suffering the evil which he dreads. He does not fear lest he lose the embraces of the most beautiful bridegroom; but he fears lest he be sent into hell. This fear is good and useful, though insufficient, by which the habit of justice is gradually formed, and there succeeds initial fear, when that which was hard begins to be loved; and thus the servile fear begins to be excluded from charity. And then there succeeds chaste or friendly fear, by which we fear lest the bridegroom delay, lest he depart, lest we offend, lest we lose him. This fear comes from love; the servile indeed is useful, but not abiding for ever, as is this one; the divine fear is a companion through all the degrees.

And note that four fears are here distinguished, whereas above Bede had said there were two. But Bede passed over human fear, and under the name of servile he comprehended the two which we have here distinguished, namely servile and initial; and the friendly he calls chaste. Augustine too plainly distinguishes the servile and the chaste fear, when he expounds that passage of the Epistle to the Romans[^11]: For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of the sons of God, saying thus: Two fears are here intimated: one, which is in perfect charity, namely chaste fear; the other, which is not in charity, namely servile, in which, although [a man] believe God, yet [he does] not [believe] in God, and if good be done, yet [it is] not [done] well. «For no one does well unwillingly, even if what he does is good[^12]».

### Chapter V. *On the chaste and the servile and the initial.*

Concerning these same fears he disputes more at length, saying[^13]: «Someone has begun to believe the day of judgment; if he has begun to believe, he has also begun to fear. But because he still fears, he does not yet have confidence in the day of judgment, perfect charity is not yet in him»; «if perfect charity were in him, he would not fear. For perfect charity would make perfect justice, and he would not have why he should fear, nay rather he would have why he should desire that iniquity pass away and the kingdom of God come. Therefore fear is not in charity. But in what charity? Not in the inchoate. In what then? In the perfect? Perfect charity, he says, casts out fear. Let fear therefore begin, because the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord. Fear as it were prepares a place for charity; but when charity has begun to dwell, the fear is driven out, which had prepared a place for it. For as much as charity grows, so much does fear decrease; and as much as charity becomes interior, so much is fear driven outward. The greater the charity, the less the fear; the less the charity, the greater the fear. But if there is no fear at all, there is nothing by which charity may enter; just as we see flax introduced by means of a bristle, when something is sewn: the bristle enters first, and unless it goes out, the flax does not follow; thus fear first occupies the mind, but the fear does not remain there, because it entered for this purpose, that it might introduce charity».

«But there is another saying[^14], which seems to be contrary to this, if it does not have a devout interpreter. For it is said in the Psalm: The chaste fear of the Lord abideth for ever and ever. It shows us a certain eternal fear, but a chaste one. But if that [Psalm] shows us an eternal fear, does this Epistle contradict it, which says: Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casteth out fear? For this was said by John, that was said by David. But do not think that the Spirit is different. For if one breath inflates two pipes, can not one spirit fill two hearts and move two tongues? If, by one spirit, that is by one breath, two pipes when filled[^15] sound in concord, can two tongues, filled by the Spirit of God, sound in discord? Nay rather there is there a certain consonance, there is a certain concord; but it desires a zealous hearer, not an idle one. Behold the Spirit of God has moved two tongues, and we have heard from one: Fear is not in charity; we have heard from the other: The chaste fear of the Lord abideth for ever and ever. What is this? Do they sound discordant? No. Shake out your ears, attend to the melody. Not without cause did he here add chaste; there he did not add it, because there is some fear which is called chaste; but there is another which is not called chaste. Let us distinguish these two fears, and understand the consonance of the pipes. How do we distinguish? Let your charity attend. There are men who fear God for this reason, lest they be sent into hell, lest perchance they burn with the devil in eternal fire. This itself is the fear which introduces charity; but it comes so as to go out. For if you fear God on account of punishments, you do not yet love him whom you so fear; you do not desire goods, but guard against evils. But from this, that you guard against evils, you correct yourself and begin to desire goods; when you shall have begun to desire goods, there will be in you chaste fear. What is chaste fear? To fear lest you lose those very goods, to fear God, lest he depart from you. But when you fear God, lest his presence forsake you, you embrace him, you desire to enjoy him».

### Chapter VI. *In what the chaste and the servile differ.*

«You cannot better explain what difference there is between these two fears than if you set down two married women, of whom you make one willing to commit adultery, but she fears lest she be condemned by her husband. She fears her husband because she still loves wickedness. To her the presence of her husband is not pleasing, but burdensome; and if perchance she lives wickedly, she fears her husband, lest he come. Such are they who fear the day of judgment. Suppose the other loves her husband, [thinks] she owes him chaste embraces, [and] is willing to stain herself with no adulterous uncleanness; she longs for the presence of her husband. The one fears, and the other fears. Now then let them be asked why they fear. The one will say: I fear my husband, lest he come; the other will say: I fear my husband, lest he depart. The one will say: I fear my husband, lest he condemn[^16]; the other will say: I fear my husband, lest he forsake. Set this in your mind, and you will find the fear which charity casts out, and another, the chaste fear, abiding for ever and ever». «Perfect charity casts out that fear, because that fear has torment, the conscience of sins is tortured, justification has not yet been made. There is there something that tickles the mind, that pricks, that goads. That fear goads, but charity enters, which heals what fear wounds». Chaste fear makes security in the soul. «We have heard two pipes, namely John and David, sounding in concord. The one speaks of the fear of God, by which the soul fears lest it be condemned; the other speaks of the fear of God, by which the soul fears lest it be forsaken. The one is the fear which charity excludes; the other is the fear which abides for ever and ever[^17]». — Behold, in these foregoing words Augustine plainly shows what chaste fear is, and what servile, and how they differ. In which words he has also signified the initial fear, which is neither wholly servile nor wholly chaste, but as it were a middle [fear], having something of the servile and something of the chaste fear. For it makes one serve partly through fear of punishment, partly through love of justice, by which we fear to be punished, and fear to offend. This fear is in inchoate charity, not in perfect; and as much as charity grows, so much does this fear decrease, as regards the dread of punishment, that is, as regards that which makes one fear punishment, and as regards the torment of conscience. For the more we love, the less we fear. This fear is noted in those words of Augustine, where he does not deny that fear is in in-

choate charity, but [denies it of] perfect, which could not be said of the servile, because, as he himself said above, servile fear does not remain when charity comes; nor does charity enter unless that fear first goes out, nor does anyone in that fear believe in God, even if he believe God; nor does he do well[^18], even if what he does is good. That fear, therefore, is not in charity even inchoate, because everyone who has charity, though not perfect, both believes in God and does good works. Wherefore that fear is not servile which he conceded to be in inchoate charity, and which, as charity grows, he said decreases; but that is the initial fear, which he does not deny to be in charity, unless it be perfect.

### Chapter VII. *That servile and initial fear are called the beginning of wisdom, but differently.*

It is nevertheless to be known that both fears, namely the servile and the initial, are in diverse places of Scripture[^19] called the beginning of wisdom, and you will find it to be so, if you carefully note the places of Scripture in which mention is made of the fear of the Lord; yet for one reason and cause the servile is called the beginning of wisdom, and for another the initial. For the servile is called the beginning of wisdom because it prepares a place for wisdom and leads to wisdom, but yet does not remain with it, nay rather goes outward. But the initial is called the beginning of wisdom because it is in inchoate wisdom; and when one begins to have it, he begins to have wisdom and charity. Hence also it is that both fears are called initial, which you will be able to find through diverse places of Scripture. Both fears are also sometimes called servile, because the initial too, which is in inchoate charity, has something of the servile, namely the anguish of punishment, just as it also has something of the chaste, namely that it fears to offend and to be separated.

### Chapter VIII. *How chaste fear abides for ever.*

This too is to be diligently noted, that in the foregoing Augustine says that chaste fear is eternal; whereby the aforesaid opinion is confirmed, namely that the spirit of fear will be in the future, just as the other gifts of the Holy Spirit. But it will not have all that use which it now has. For it will then make us reverence God, not fear to be separated or to lose [him]. There was therefore that fear in Christ too, but according to that use which it will have in the future in the Saints. For Christ did not fear to be separated or to offend God, but reverenced him above all.

### Chapter IX. *Whether the fear of punishment which was in Christ was servile, or initial.*

But since there was in Christ a fear of punishment, it is asked whether this fear was worldly, or servile, or initial. — To which we say that none of them was in Christ, because the worldly is evil, as was said above, and in the first degree is forsaken along with the world; while the servile or initial is not in perfect charity. None therefore of those fears was in Christ. — What then was that fear by which he feared punishment? That fear can be called natural or human, which is in all men, by which death is dreaded and punishment is feared. And this fear is called natural, not because it accrued to man from nature, according as it was first instituted, because this fear was not concreated with man nor [is] of the natural goods, but because from nature corrupted through sin it comes upon all, in whom corruption has taken root, as though it were natural. And this fear is an effect of sin, as was said before.

---

la: Libr. I. de Spiritu s. c. 16. n. 178. — Seq. locus ibid. n. 179; cfr. II. c. 12. n. 140. — In primo textu sola ed. 8 pro *abluitur* ponit *alluitur,* refragante etiam originali; quam lectionem solam esse genuinam, sine causa asserit eiusdem editor Nicolai. Infra post *riparum* edd. addunt *crepidinibus,* refragantibus codd. et originali. Vocabulum *edita* usurpatur etiam pro locis elevatis. Deinde ante *supereminens* edd., exceptis 1, 3, 8, omittunt *omnem,* denique pro *arcana* edd. 6, 8 cum originali *arva.*

en: Book I, *On the Holy Spirit,* c. 16, n. 178. — The following passage is ibid. n. 179; cf. book II, c. 12, n. 140. — In the first text, edition 8 alone puts *alluitur* (washes against) for *abluitur* (washes off), the original also resisting; which reading the editor Nicolai asserts without cause to be the only genuine one. Below, after *riparum* (banks) the editions add *crepidinibus* (with embankments), the codices and the original resisting. The word *edita* (raised) is also used for elevated places. Then before *supereminens* (surpassing) the editions, except 1, 3, 8, omit *omnem* (every); finally for *arcana* (secrets) editions 6, 8 with the original [read] *arva* (fields).

la: Cap. II, 2. Inferius alluditur ad 1. Cor. 8, 8. — Verba *Quamvis ergo* etc. sententialiter leguntur ibid. n. 179, cfr. ibid. c. 12. n. 140.

en: [Isaiah] chapter 11, [verses] 2–3. Below allusion is made to 1 Corinthians 8:8. — The words *Quamvis ergo* (Although therefore) etc. are read substantially ibid. n. 179, cf. ibid. c. 12, n. 140.

en: [Isaiah] chapter 11, [verses] 1, 2, 3.

la: Super Prov. 1, 7. Ibi respicitur 1. Ioan. 4, 18; Ps. 18, 10; 1. Cor. 13, 8.

en: On Proverbs 1:7. There reference is made to 1 John 4:18; Psalm 18:10; 1 Corinthians 13:8.

la: Psalm. 5, 8; et ibi August. Enarrat. n. 9.

en: Psalm 5:8; and there Augustine, *Enarration* [on the Psalms], n. 9.

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. *erit.*

en: The Vatican edition with a few editions [reads] *erit* (will be).

la: Cod. A et edd. 1, 3 *omnino.*

en: Codex A and editions 1, 3 [read] *omnino* (altogether).

en: [Hebrews] chapter 5, [verse] 7.

la: In Prologo super Ps. 127, sententialiter; sed haec et quae sequuntur fere verbotenus apud Lyranum ibid. v. 1, et quoad sensum apud August. ibid. Enarrat. n. 7. — Supra pro *amicabilis* codd. et edd. *amicalis,* quod etiam infra, sed non constanter, repetunt. Utraque forma est usitata.

en: In the Prologue upon Psalm 127, substantially; but these things and what follows [are] almost verbatim in Lyra ibid. v. 1, and as to the sense in Augustine ibid. *Enarration,* n. 7. — Above, for *amicabilis* (friendly) the codices and editions [read] *amicalis,* which they also repeat below, but not consistently. Both forms are in use.

en: Matthew 10:28; Luke 12:4.

la: Cap. 8, 15, quem locum August. exponit in Evang. Ioan. tr. 85. n. 3.

en: [Romans] chapter 8, [verse] 15, which passage Augustine expounds in [his Tractates] on the Gospel of John, tract 85, n. 3.

la: August., de Spiritu et lit. c. 32. n. 56; 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19.

en: Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter,* c. 32, n. 56; *Confessions,* book I, c. 12, n. 19.

la: Plurimae edd. praefigunt *Augustinus,* scil. in 1. Ioan. tr. 9. n. 2. Seq. locus ibid. n. 4, ubi pro *quare timeret* edd., exceptis 1, 8, *unde timeret,* et infra Vat. cum paucis codd. *Perfecta ergo* pro *Perfecta, inquit.* — Loci Scripturae sunt 1. Ioan. 4, 18, et Eccli. 1, 16. Infra pro *qua intret* codd. A B et fere omnes edd. *quo intret,* refragante etiam originali.

en: Most editions prefix *Augustinus,* namely in [the Tractates] on 1 John, tract 9, n. 2. The following passage is ibid. n. 4, where for *quare timeret* (why he should fear) the editions, except 1, 8, [read] *unde timeret* (whence he should fear), and below the Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] *Perfecta ergo* (Perfect therefore) for *Perfecta, inquit* (Perfect, he says). — The scriptural passages are 1 John 4:18, and Ecclesiasticus 1:16. Below, for *qua intret* (by which it may enter) codices A B and almost all editions [read] *quo intret* (whither it may enter), the original also resisting.

la: Continuat August., ibid. n. 5, sed nonnullis a Magistro omissis. — Locus Psalmi est 18, 10. Vulgata *sanctus* pro *castus.*

en: Augustine continues, ibid. n. 5, but with some things omitted by the Master. — The passage of the Psalm is 18:10. The Vulgate [reads] *sanctus* (holy) for *castus* (chaste).

la: Plurimae edd. *implente,* refragante etiam originali.

en: Most editions [read] *implente,* the original also resisting.

la: Cod. E cum originali *damner... deserar* pro *damnet... deserat.*

en: Codex E with the original [reads] *damner... deserar* (lest I be condemned... lest I be forsaken) for *damnet... deserat* (lest he condemn... lest he forsake).

la: Ibid. n. 6. Cfr. in Evang. Ioan. tr. 43. n. 7; Enarrat. in Ps. 118, serm. 12. n. 3; Epist. 140 (alias 120.) c. 21. n. 52. — Seq. locus est in 1. Epist. Ioan. loc. cit. n. 4, sed multis a Magistro omissis. Tertius locus est ibid. n. 8, ubi pro *consonantes* Vat. *resonantes.*

en: Ibid. n. 6. Cf. [the Tractates] on the Gospel of John, tract 43, n. 7; *Enarration* on Psalm 118, sermon 12, n. 3; Epistle 140 (otherwise 120), c. 21, n. 52. — The following passage is in the first Epistle of John, the place cited, n. 4, but with many things omitted by the Master. The third passage is ibid. n. 8, where for *consonantes* (sounding in concord) the Vatican edition [reads] *resonantes* (resounding).

la: Codd. alii addunt *bona,* sed cod. C *bonum.*

en: Other codices add *bona* (good things), but codex C [reads] *bonum* (a good).

en: Psalm 110:10; Proverbs 1:7; 9:10; Ecclesiasticus 1:16. ---

translators_notes:
**Chapter subjects.** DISTINCTIO XXXIV is Lombard's treatment *de septem donis Spiritus sancti* — the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and (in Pars II) *de timorum distinctione* — the distinction of fears. The Magister's text is printed continuously across Lombard's **Pars I** (Capp. I–III) and **Pars II** (Capp. IV–IX), with the `Pars I.` / `Pars II.` bands appearing inside the littera and preserved here as printed subheads. **Nine chapters captured (Cap. I–IX):** **Cap. I** (*De septem donis Spiritus sancti*) is the prooemium naming the three questions (whether the gifts are virtues; whether they cease in the future; whether all were in Christ). **Cap. II** (*Utrum sint virtutes, et sint in Angelis*) adduces Ambrose (*de Spiritu s.* I) that the gifts are seven virtues abundant in the Angels — the Ambrose quotation runs from the p.731 L column into the R column. **Cap. III** (*Utrum in Christo fuerint*) adduces Isaiah 11 for Christ, then Bede (on Proverbs) and Augustine (on Psalm 5) that fear ceases, and resolves: the gifts remain but lose the *usus* of dread (separation/offence), retaining reverence — which was in Christ (Heb. 5:7). **Pars II** opens: **Cap. IV** (*De timorum distinctione*) distinguishes four fears (worldly/human, servile, initial, chaste/filial), reconciling Bede's two and adducing Augustine on Romans 8. **Cap. V** (*De casto et servili et iniliali*) is the long Augustine excursus (*in 1. Ioan.* tr. 9) on charity casting out fear, the bristle-and-flax simile, and the two-pipes (John/David) consonance — running from p.733 L into R. **Cap. VI** (*Quo differant castus et servilis*) is the two-married-women *exemplum* and the initial-fear definition — running from p.733 R into p.734 L. **Cap. VII** (*Quod timor servilis et initialis dicuntur initium sapientiae, sed differenter*). **Cap. VIII** (*Quomodo castus timor permanet in aeternum*) — chaste fear is eternal, was in Christ *iuxta usum futurum.* **Cap. IX** (*Si timor poenae, qui fuit in Christo, fuit servilis, vel initialis*) — none of the three; Christ's fear of punishment was *naturalis sive humanus,* an effect of corrupted nature.

**Provenance (PDF-priority inversion).** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{731,732,733,734}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (read L column top→bottom, then R column; body bands then footer bands). The IA djvu OCR for this band (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw 50773–50990) is a two-column cascade-shatter — the footer bands in particular are heavily fragmented — and was used only as the base for clean running prose and exact `[^N]` marker spacing; all footer NOTAE blocks were read eyes-on from the PDF. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (printed 731–734 = PDF 753–756). Running heads confirmed: `DISTINCTIO XXXIV.` heads p.731 (raw 50773) and p.733; p.732 foot shows `732`; p.733 R shows `733`; p.734 running head is OCR-mangled `r34` but the printed page reads **734** (`SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`).

**Page-split map ([^N] → printed page).**
- **p.731 (PDF 753):** `[^1]`–`[^2]`. The littera opens mid-L-column (after the d.33 commentary tail that finishes at the top of both columns: L-top + R-top `… in sua generalitate`). The `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footer band sits in the p.731 **R footer-column** (nn.1–2). The p.731 **L footer-column** (nn.1–6: *Aristot. de Sensu,* *de Trin.,* *Ethic. II,* *Supplement. Summae Alex.* …) is **NOT** this littera's — it is the d.33 *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footer, already captured by `d33-dubia` (nn. 29–33) and the d.33 questions.
- **p.732 (PDF 754):** `[^3]`–`[^12]`. Left footer-column nn.1–7, right footer-column continues n.7 tail + nn.8–10 → renumbered `[^3]`–`[^12]`. (Cap. III runs L→R; `Pars II.` band then Cap. IV runs L→R.)
- **p.733 (PDF 755):** `[^13]`–`[^17]`. Left footer-column nn.1–2, right footer-column nn.3–5 → `[^13]`–`[^17]`. (Cap. V runs L→R; Cap. VI begins p.733 R.)
- **p.734 (PDF 756):** `[^18]`–`[^19]`. Left footer-column carries the littera's `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` nn.1–4 (`[^18]`=n.1 *bene*; n.2 *Psalm.110…* = `[^19]`; n.3 *Edd.1,8 cum*; n.4 *Cfr. Hebr.5,7*) and the right footer-column carries n.5 (*Hic c.4 — Infra pro naturalis…*). **Markers in body:** `bene¹`=[^18], `locis²`=[^19], `in³` (Edd.1,8 *cum*) and `Christo⁴` (*Cfr. Hebr.5,7*) and `supra⁵` (*Hic c.4*) are p.734 NOTAE nn.3,4,5 whose textual-variant content is editorial-only (no fresh citation beyond the renumbered pair); they are folded into the apparatus span [^18]–[^19] without separate markers to avoid orphaning purely-variant notes. See "Apparatus completeness" below. **19 entries total** (`[^1]`–`[^19]`).

**Apparatus completeness.** The p.734 left/right footer carries five physical NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM notes (nn.1–5) but only two bear distinct body anchors needed in the running text (`bene¹` and `locis²`); nn.3–5 are pure orthographic/edition variants on `in³`/`Christo⁴`/`supra⁵`. To keep marker pairing clean (every `[^N]:` def has a body anchor in both languages) the variant content of nn.3–5 is noted in this Notes block rather than as orphan markers: **n.3** = Edd. 1, 8 add *cum* (`is in inchoata sapientia`); **n.4** = Cfr. Hebr. 5, 7 (the Christ-reverence locus, already cited at [^8]); **n.5** = *Hic c. 4* (cross-ref to Cap. IV); below n.5 *infra pro naturalis, non quia* edd. 1, 8 read *naturalis, non quod.* No body content was lost; only redundant variant markers were consolidated.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from `d33-dubia`:* the **p.731 R-column NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM band (nn.1–2) = [^1]–[^2]**, this littera's opening footers, CLAIMED here per the resume hand-off (d33-dubia forwarded nothing across the d.33/d.34 boundary; the dubia closed clean on p.731 R-col at `… in sua generalitate`, and its own footers are the p.731 *L* NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band).
- *Forwarded to `d34-p1-divisio`:* **NONE of the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM band.** The p.734 littera NOTAE (nn.1–5) are fully captured here. The separate **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** block that begins in the p.734 **right footer-column** immediately below the littera's n.5 (`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. ¹ Ita codd. AEUX; alii codd. et edd. dicta.`) cites the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS body (which begins at the foot of p.734) and is the **`d34-p1-divisio` chunk's own footer** — it is a different apparatus family, not a forward of a NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note. Nothing is parked here for the divisio.

**Boundary verification.** The littera body stops cleanly at Cap. IX's `… effectus peccati, ut praedictum est.` (p.734, end of R-column body), confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p734-R-1.png`. The **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV.** header (subtitle *De habitibus donorum,* then `Pars I.` and `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`) begins below it at **raw line 50991** — that block and everything after it belong to `d34-p1-divisio`. Nothing at/after raw 50991 is included here.

**Forward-planning aid for `d34-p1-divisio` (verbatim — do NOT rechunk here).** The p.I divisio's TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw ~51027): the pars divides into TWO principal questions (`circa haec duo principaliter possunt quaeri`): (1) comparison of gifts to virtues, (2) the gifts in themselves. `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` → ARTICULUS I has THREE questions (Primo: differentiam; Secundo: ordinem; Tertio: praecellentiam). ARTICULUS II (OCR 'U.') begins raw ~51600 for the second principal question. So p.I = a1(q1–q3) + a2(q1–q3); the `-dup2` chunks (raw 51610–52174) are a2-q1/q2/q3, NOT a1-q4/q5/q6.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body readings and all 19 NOTAE entries were confirmed against the 450 dpi PDF bands (the heavily OCR-shattered footer regions were re-set eyes-on from the PDF, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0