title: Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, sit a Deo.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Quandocumque aliqua duo fundantur super idem secundum rem, si unum est a Deo, et reliquum[^1]; sed falsitas alicuius propositionis et veritas suae oppositae fundantur super idem — hoc enim ipso, quod haec est vera: homo est animal, haec est falsa: homo non est animal — ergo cum omnis propositionis veritas sit a Deo, videtur, quod omnis propositionis falsitas sit a Deo.

2. Item, «veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus[^2] », et falsitas est inadaequatio rei et intellectus per oppositum; sed sicut se habet aequalitas et inaequalitas in rebus, ita se habet aequalitas et inaequalitas in propositionibus; sed aequalitas et inaequalitas in rebus sunt ab ipso Deo — sicut enim a Deo est, quod aliqua duo sint aequalia, sic a Deo est, quod aliqua duo sic se habeant, quod unum excedat reliquum; unde Augustinus[^3] dicit, quod «si essent aequalia, non essent omnia » — ergo pari ratione adaequatio et inadaequatio signi ad signatum est ab eodem Principio.

3. Item, ab eo est falsitas propositionis, qui solus potest facere, propositionem ipsam esse falsam; sed demonstrato aliquo peccatore, ista est vera: iste
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non est iustus; et nullus potest facere, hanc esse falsam, nisi solus Deus, qui potest ei dare iustitiam: ergo etc.

4. Item, maioris dignitatis et potestatis est falsificare hanc propositionem: iste est peccator, quam verificare eam; qui enim peccat, hoc ipso quod peccat, verificat eam, et hoc indignitatis est: ergo si omnis propositionis veritas a Deo est, videtur multo fortius, quod talis propositionis falsitas sit a Deo.

**Sed contra:** 1. Omne quod Deus potest facere, habet exemplar in Deo; sed enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, non habet exemplar in Deo, cum ipsa veritas sit ratio exemplandi: ergo enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, non est a Deo[^4].

2. Item, sicut se habet bonitas ad malitiam, sic se habet veritas ad falsitatem; sed a summa bonitate nullo modo potest esse malitia: ergo a summa veritate nullo modo potest esse[^5] falsitas.

3. Item, «verum et ens convertuntur[^6] »; sed a Deo non potest aliquid esse, quod non sit aliquo modo ens — si enim pure nihil esset, a Deo non esset — ergo a Deo non potest esse nisi verum. Sed enuntiatio falsa, in quantum huiusmodi, dicit privationem veri: ergo videtur, quod a Deo non debeat causari, secundum quod huiusmodi.

4. Item, omne quod Deus potest facere, potest dicere; sed falsum non potest dicere: ergo non potest facere. Probatio minoris: si dicit falsum, aut ergo scienter, aut ignoranter. Ignoranter non; hoc constat. Si scienter; sed quicumque dicit falsum scienter, mentitur: ergo Deus mentiretur; quod profanum et impium est dicere.

### Conclusio.

> Enuntiatio falsa sub ratione falsitatis non est a Deo, facit tamen Deus aliquid, quo facto aliqua oratio est falsa necessario.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod falsitas nihil aliud est quam defectus veritatis in re, quae nata est verificari; sicut malitia dicit privationem bonitatis et rectitudinis circa actionem, quae nata est rectificari; et ideo, sicut actio mala, in quantum actio, est a Deo, in quantum vero mala et iniusta, a Deo non est[^7]: sic et enuntiatio falsa, in quantum enuntiatio, a Deo est, in quantum vero falsa, non est a Deo. — Unde, quemadmodum in actione duplex consideratur bonitas: una naturae, et altera moris, et una est essentialis, et altera accidentalis; et ideo una privatur, altera relinquitur, et ratione illius bonitatis, quae relinquitur, actio illa est a Deo: sic in omni enuntiatione duplex est veritas: una essentialis, et haec est veritas, qua propositio repraesentat illud, ad quod repraesentandum instituta est; et haec nunquam privatur ab enuntiatione; omnis enim enuntiatio significat illud, ad quod instituta est, sive sit vera, sive falsa. Alia vero est veritas accidentalis, quae attenditur in propositione, in hoc quod repraesentat rem, secundum quod est — tunc enim dicitur adaequari signum signato; et veritas enuntiationis non est aliud quam quaedam adaequatio — et haec veritas privatur per falsitatem. Tunc enim est propositio vel enuntiatio falsa, quando signum non repraesentat rem, sicut est, vel res non est, sicut repraesentatur per signum. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus[^8]: « Ab eo quod res est, vel non est, dicitur oratio vera, vel falsa »; hoc est dicere, ab eo quod res est, sicut repraesentatur, dicitur oratio vera; ab eo quod res non est, sicut repraesentatur, dicitur oratio falsa. Sicut igitur iniustitia est privatio rectitudinis, sic falsitas est defectus adaequationis; et ideo, sicut Deo ut auctori non attribuitur iniustitia actionis, sic non debet ei[^9] attribui falsitas orationis. Utroque enim modo defectus est, et nullus defectus Deo attribuendus est.

Notandum est tamen, quod etsi nullus defectus sit a Deo, magis tamen aliquis defectus elongatur a causalitate Dei quam alius, secundum quod sunt diversi modi deficiendi. Est enim quidam defectus, qui dicit privationem alicuius positionis et ordinis, sicut est defectus culpabilis; et iste est defectus vituperabilis et vituperabilem reddit actorem[^10]; et talem defectum Deus non facit, nec etiam facit aliquid, quo facto creatura tali defectu deficiat necessario. Unde Deus nec facit peccatum, nec facit aliquem peccare, nec facit aliquid, quo facto necessario sequatur peccatum ratione illius quod Deus facit. Hoc dico propter animae infusionem, in qua necessario contrahitur culpa originalis; sed hoc non est ex actu Dei, sed ex praevaricatione primi parentis[^11]. — Est et alius defectus, qui est privatio alicuius positionis, non tamen est privatio ordinis; contingit enim, aliquos defectus ordinari. Et talis defectus, licet non possit Deo attribui secundum quod defectus, potest tamen ei attribui secundum quod ordinatus; et de tali defectu licet non possit dici, quod Deus eum faciat, quia defectum facere
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est deficere; potest tamen dici, quod facit aliquid, quo facto necessario consequitur ille defectus; et talis defectus est falsitas et ignorantia et caecitas et consimiles. Unde quamvis non possit concedi, quod Deus faciat falsitatem orationis sive orationem falsam, secundum quod falsa est; potest tamen concedi, quod Deus faciat aliquid, quo facto aliqua oratio est falsa necessario; sicut, cum iustificat impium, facit aliquid, quo facto haec enuntiatio est falsa: iste est impius. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, non sit a Deo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod veritas et falsitas fundantur super idem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen aliter et aliter, quia veritas fundatur per modum positionis, et falsitas per modum privationis; et ideo non sequitur, quod sint ab eodem. Cum autem dicitur, quod quae super idem fundantur ab eodem sunt, hoc intelligitur, quando super illud idem fundantur et eodem modo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aequalitas et inaequalitas in rebus sunt ab eodem principio; respondendum est, quod non est simile: quia in rebus uno modo inaequalitas dicit privationem aequalitatis, ubi debet esse; et tunc non est a Deo, cum sit defectus. Alio modo inaequalitas dicit gradum et ordinem, qui debet esse inter res; et hoc modo, etsi videatur dicere privationem, quia tamen dicit positionem, a Deo est. Sed inadaequatio signi ad signatum semper dicit defectum, pro eo quod signum institutum est, ut repraesentet signatum, secundum quod est[^12]; et ideo inadaequatio signi ad signatum est falsitas; inadaequatio vero in rebus non est falsitas. Et propterea non sequitur, quodsi inadaequatio rei ad rem est a Deo, quod inadaequatio signi ad signatum sit a Deo. — Posset tamen dici, quod inadaequatio, in quantum huiusmodi, cum dicat defectum aequalitatis, a Deo non est, quamvis illud quod subest, a Deo est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus potest falsificare enuntiationem; dicendum, quod haec est vera et propria: Deus facit aliquid[^13], quo facto aliqua propositio est falsa; haec autem minus propria: Deus facit aliquam propositionem falsam; sed haec est simpliciter impropria: Deus facit falsitatem in propositione; et hoc, quia falsitas nominat ipsum defectum praecise. Et ideo in illa ratione est sophisma secundum accidens[^14], qua sic arguit: facit aliquid, quo facto propositio est falsa: ergo facit propositionem falsam sive falsitatem in propositione.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris dignitatis est falsificare aliquam propositionem quam verificare; dicendum, quod veritatem ad falsitatem contingit comparari dupliciter: aut loquendo formaliter, aut causaliter sive ratione eius quod subest. Si loquendo formaliter; sic cum veritas dicat adaequationem, et falsitas inadaequationem, et ita falsitas privationem, veritas positionem; dignius est omnino aliquid verificare quam falsificare, quidquid illud sit, cum dignior sit veritas quam falsitas; si tamen contingat dicere dignius respectu eius, in quo nulla est dignitas. Si autem comparamus veritatem ad falsitatem ratione eius quod respondet ex parte rei; sic dico de plano, quod aliquando dignius est illud quod ex parte rei reddit illam propositionem falsam, quam illud quod reddit propositionem veram, sicut patet; dignius est enim, quod reddit istam propositionem falsam: iste non est bonus; quam quod reddit eam veram. — Et ratio huius est ista, quia, quamvis veritas de se dicat positionem, quia dicit adaequationem, illa adaequatio ex parte alterius extremi ita bene potest respicere privationem sicut positionem, et defectum sicut effectum. Sicut enim defectus est ordinabilis[^15], et tamen defectus est, sic est cognoscibilis, et sic est significabilis. Ideo cum quaeritur, super quid fundetur veritas enuntiationis; non oportet, quod ex parte rei respondeat aliqua veritas. Sicut enim verum ens contingit vere significari ipsum esse, sic etiam de illo quod nullo modo est, contingit vere significare quod ipsum non est[^16]. Sicut enim significatio dicit relationem, quae non requirit significatum esse in actu; sic etiam veritas signi, quae quidem dicit conditionem illius relationis, non exigit fundari super aliquam rem actualiter existentem. Nihilominus tamen, cum omnis relatio et ordo a Deo sit, talis significatio et talis veritas a Deo est; nec sequitur ad hoc, quod significatum sit a Deo, immo est ibi sophisma secundum accidens, sicut si argueretur: ordinatio culpae et poenae est a Deo, ergo culpa est a Deo. Sic non sequitur in proposito: vera significatio furti est a Deo, ergo furtum est a Deo[^17]. — Et sic patet, quod etsi veritati non semper correspondeat ex parte significati aliquid excellentius quam falsitati, tamen veritas nobilior est quam falsitas; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi verificatio propositionis sit a Deo, quod ab eodem sit propositionis falsificatio sive falsa enuntiatio, secundum quod falsa. — Et sic patent
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quaesita[^18].

---

english:
### Article II.
### Question III. *Whether a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is from God.*

Thirdly it is asked whether a false enunciation, insofar as it is such, is from God. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. Whenever any two things are founded upon the same thing in reality, if the one is from God, so also is the other[^1]; but the falsity of some proposition and the truth of its opposite are founded upon the same thing — for by this very fact, that "a man is an animal" is true, "a man is not an animal" is false — therefore, since the truth of every proposition is from God, it seems that the falsity of every proposition is from God.

2. Likewise, "truth is the adequation of thing and intellect[^2]," and falsity, by the opposite, is the inadequation of thing and intellect; but as equality and inequality stand in things, so do equality and inequality stand in propositions; but equality and inequality in things are from God himself — for just as it is from God that two things are equal, so it is from God that two things stand thus, that one exceeds the other; whence Augustine[^3] says that "if they were equal, they would not be all things" — therefore by parity of reasoning the adequation and inadequation of sign to thing-signified is from the same Principle.

3. Likewise, the falsity of a proposition is from him who alone can make the proposition itself to be false; but, a certain sinner having been pointed out, this is true: "he
is not just"; and no one can make this false except God alone, who can give him justice: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it is of greater dignity and power to falsify this proposition: "he is a sinner," than to verify it; for whoever sins, by the very fact that he sins, verifies it, and this belongs to indignity: therefore, if the truth of every proposition is from God, it seems much more strongly that the falsity of such a proposition is from God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Everything that God can make has its exemplar in God; but a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, does not have an exemplar in God, since truth itself is the ground of exemplifying: therefore a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is not from God[^4].

2. Likewise, as goodness stands to malice, so truth stands to falsity; but from the highest goodness malice can in no way arise: therefore from the highest truth falsity can in no way arise[^5].

3. Likewise, "the true and being are convertible[^6]"; but from God nothing can be which is not in some way being — for if it were pure nothing, it would not be from God — therefore from God there can be nothing but the true. But a false enunciation, insofar as it is such, asserts a privation of the true: therefore it seems that it ought not to be caused by God, insofar as it is such.

4. Likewise, everything that God can make, he can say; but he cannot say what is false: therefore he cannot make it. Proof of the minor: if he says what is false, then either knowingly or unknowingly. Not unknowingly; this is clear. If knowingly — but whoever says what is false knowingly, lies: therefore God would lie; which it is profane and impious to say.

### Conclusion.

> A false enunciation under the aspect of falsity is not from God; yet God does make something by which some discourse is necessarily false.

**I respond:** It must be said that falsity is nothing other than a defect of truth in a thing which is apt to be made true; just as malice asserts a privation of goodness and rectitude concerning an action which is apt to be made right; and therefore, just as an evil action, insofar as it is action, is from God, but insofar as it is evil and unjust, is not from God[^7]: so too a false enunciation, insofar as it is enunciation, is from God, but insofar as it is false, is not from God. — Whence, just as in an action a twofold goodness is considered: one of nature, and the other of morals, and the one is essential, and the other accidental; and therefore the one is taken away, the other remains, and by reason of that goodness which remains, that action is from God: so in every enunciation there is a twofold truth: one essential, and this is the truth by which a proposition represents that for the representing of which it was instituted; and this is never taken away from the enunciation; for every enunciation signifies that for which it was instituted, whether it be true or false. But the other is accidental truth, which is regarded in a proposition in this, that it represents a thing according as it is — for then the sign is said to be made adequate to the thing-signified; and the truth of an enunciation is nothing other than a certain adequation — and this truth is taken away by falsity. For a proposition or enunciation is then false, when the sign does not represent the thing as it is, or the thing is not as it is represented by the sign. And this is what the Philosopher[^8] says: "From the fact that a thing is, or is not, a statement is called true, or false"; that is to say, from the fact that the thing is, as it is represented, the statement is called true; from the fact that the thing is not, as it is represented, the statement is called false. Therefore, just as injustice is a privation of rectitude, so falsity is a defect of adequation; and therefore, just as injustice of action is not attributed to God as its author, so falsity of discourse ought not to be attributed to him[^9]. For in both ways it is a defect, and no defect is to be attributed to God.

It must be noted, however, that although no defect is from God, yet one defect is more removed from the causality of God than another, according as there are diverse modes of failing. For there is a certain defect which asserts a privation of some position and order, such as is a culpable defect; and this is a blameworthy defect and renders the agent blameworthy[^10]; and such a defect God does not make, nor even does he make anything by which a creature necessarily fails through such a defect. Whence God neither makes sin, nor makes anyone sin, nor makes anything by which sin necessarily follows by reason of that which God makes. I say this on account of the infusion of the soul, in which original guilt is necessarily contracted; but this is not from the act of God, but from the prevarication of the first parent[^11]. — And there is another defect, which is a privation of some position, yet is not a privation of order; for it happens that some defects are ordered. And such a defect, although it cannot be attributed to God insofar as it is a defect, can nevertheless be attributed to him insofar as it is ordered; and of such a defect, although it cannot be said that God makes it, because to make a defect
is to fail; nevertheless it can be said that he makes something by which that defect necessarily follows; and such a defect is falsity and ignorance and blindness and the like. Whence, although it cannot be conceded that God makes the falsity of a discourse or a false discourse, insofar as it is false; it can nevertheless be conceded that God makes something by which some discourse is necessarily false; just as, when he justifies the impious, he makes something by which this enunciation becomes false: "he is impious." — The arguments showing that a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is not from God are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that truth and falsity are founded upon the same thing; it must be said that this is true; but yet in one way and another, because truth is founded by mode of position, and falsity by mode of privation; and therefore it does not follow that they are from the same. But when it is said that those things which are founded upon the same thing are from the same, this is understood when they are founded upon that same thing and in the same way.

2. To that which is objected, that equality and inequality in things are from the same principle; it must be answered that it is not similar: because in things in one way inequality asserts a privation of equality, where it ought to be; and then it is not from God, since it is a defect. In another way inequality asserts a grade and order which ought to be among things; and in this way, even though it may seem to assert a privation, yet because it asserts a position, it is from God. But the inadequation of sign to thing-signified always asserts a defect, for the reason that the sign was instituted to represent the thing-signified, according as it is[^12]; and therefore the inadequation of sign to thing-signified is falsity; but inadequation in things is not falsity. And for this reason it does not follow that, if the inadequation of thing to thing is from God, the inadequation of sign to thing-signified is from God. — Yet it could be said that inadequation, insofar as it is such, since it asserts a defect of equality, is not from God, although that which underlies it is from God.

3. To that which is objected, that God can falsify an enunciation; it must be said that this is true and proper: God makes something[^13] by which some proposition is false; but this is less proper: God makes some proposition false; but this is simply improper: God makes falsity in a proposition; and this, because falsity names precisely the defect itself. And therefore in that argument there is a fallacy of accident[^14], by which it argues thus: he makes something by which the proposition is false: therefore he makes the proposition false or makes falsity in the proposition.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater dignity to falsify some proposition than to verify it; it must be said that truth can be compared to falsity in two ways: either by speaking formally, or causally, that is, by reason of that which underlies. If by speaking formally; then since truth asserts adequation, and falsity inadequation, and so falsity privation, truth position; it is altogether more worthy to verify something than to falsify it, whatever that be, since truth is more worthy than falsity; if indeed it can be said to be more worthy with respect to that in which there is no dignity. But if we compare truth to falsity by reason of that which corresponds on the part of the thing; then I say plainly that sometimes that which on the part of the thing renders that proposition false is more worthy than that which renders the proposition true, as is evident; for it is more worthy that which renders this proposition false: "he is not good"; than that which renders it true. — And the reason for this is this, that, although truth of itself asserts position, because it asserts adequation, that adequation on the part of the other extreme can just as well regard a privation as a position, and a defect as an effect. For just as a defect is orderable[^15], and yet is a defect, so it is knowable, and so it is signifiable. Therefore when it is asked upon what the truth of an enunciation is founded; it is not necessary that on the part of the thing some truth correspond. For just as it happens that a true being is truly signified to be, so also of that which in no way is, it happens that it is truly signified that it is not[^16]. For just as signification asserts a relation which does not require the thing-signified to be in act; so also the truth of a sign, which indeed asserts the condition of that relation, does not require to be founded upon some actually existing thing. Nevertheless, since every relation and order is from God, such signification and such truth is from God; nor does it follow from this that the thing-signified is from God, but rather there is here a fallacy of accident, just as if one were to argue: the ordering of guilt and punishment is from God, therefore guilt is from God. So it does not follow in the matter at hand: the true signification of theft is from God, therefore theft is from God[^17]. — And so it is evident that, although there does not always correspond to truth, on the part of the thing-signified, something more excellent than to falsity, yet truth is nobler than falsity; and therefore it does not follow that, if the verification of a proposition is from God, from the same is the falsification of the proposition or the false enunciation, insofar as it is false. — And so the things sought are evident[^18].

---

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. (p. 873, nota 1, pertinet ad quaest. praec.)

en: Cf. above d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1. (The marginal gloss reads *de oppositum*.)

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (p. 873, nota 5.)

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 46. q. 4. ad 3. — Omnis propositionis veritatem a Deo esse, docetur ibid. d. 46. dub. 8, d. 35. q. 1, d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. (p. 873, nota 6.)

en: See I Sent. d. 46, q. 4, ad 3. — That the truth of every proposition is from God is taught ibid. d. 46, dub. 8, d. 35, q. 1, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Principio, in quibus fundatur hoc arg., habentur I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. seqq. et d. 36. per totam. (p. 874, nota 1.)

en: The principles on which this argument is founded are had in I Sent. d. 35, q. 1 ff. and d. 36 throughout.

la: Pro *potest esse* codd. H I K T Y et alii cum ed. 1 *est.* (p. 874, nota 2.)

en: For *potest esse* codices H I K T Y and others, with ed. 1, read *est.*

la: Haec propositio innititur verbis Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 4. (l. brev. c. 1.): *Quare ut secundum esse unumquodque se habet, ita etiam secundum veritatem.* — Paulo inferius pro *Sed enuntiatio falsa* plures codd., ut V X Y bb (K Q T a secunda manu), *Si igitur falsum.* (p. 874, nota 3.)

en: This proposition rests on the words of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, text 4 (brief recension c. 1): "Wherefore, as each thing stands with respect to being, so also with respect to truth." — A little below, for *Sed enuntiatio falsa* several codices, such as V X Y bb (K Q T by a second hand), read *Si igitur falsum.*

la: Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. (p. 874, nota 4.)

en: As was shown above a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 1.

la: Libr. de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1. ad 3, et Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2. seqq., ubi de veritate significationis, de veritatibus enuntiationis etc. agit. (p. 874, nota 5.)

en: *Book of the Categories,* chapter *On Substance.* Cf. I Sent. d. 46, q. 1, ad 3, and Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth,* c. 2 ff., where he treats of the truth of signification, of the truths of enunciation, etc.

la: In multis codd., ut F H K T W bb, et ed. 1 deest *ei.* (p. 874, nota 6.)

en: In many codices, such as F H K T W bb, and in ed. 1, *ei* is lacking.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 803, nota 1, et August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 14. n. 40. seqq. (p. 874, nota 7.)

en: Cf. above p. 803, note 1, and Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 1, n. 1 ff. and c. 14, n. 40 ff.

la: De quo vide supra d. 32. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius post *potest tamen* plurimi codd. et ed. 1, perinde ac supra, omittunt *ei.* (p. 874, nota 8.)

en: On which see above d. 32, a. 3, q. 1 f. — A little below, after *potest tamen,* most codices and ed. 1, just as above, omit *ei.*

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5. (p. 873, nota 7.)

en: Cf. tom. I, p. 707, note 5.

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt *aliquid* sed tum supra tum infra ordinarie hoc vocabulum habent. Paulo inferius post *haec autem* cod. H supplet *dicitur,* Vat. *est.* (p. 875, nota 2.)

en: Most codices with edd. 2, 3, 4 omit *aliquid,* but both above and below they ordinarily have this word. A little below, after *haec autem,* codex H supplies *dicitur,* the Vatican edition *est.*

la: Vide supra pag. 870, nota 8. — Cod. F *sophisticatio* pro *sophisma.* Mox pro *qua sic* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit *quae sic.* (p. 875, nota 3.)

en: See above p. 870, note 8. — Codex F reads *sophisticatio* for *sophisma.* Shortly, for *qua sic* the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 substitutes *quae sic.*

la: Cfr. August., de Magistro, c. 2. n. 3. seqq., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 2. n. 2. et II. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. — Subinde pro *et ideo inadaequatio* Vat. *et ideo in inadaequatione.* (p. 875, nota 1.)

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Teacher,* c. 2, n. 3 ff.; *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 2, n. 2 and II, c. 1, n. 1 ff. — Subsequently, for *et ideo inadaequatio* the Vatican edition reads *et ideo in inadaequatione.*

la: Cod. T hanc proposit. sic exhibet: *Sicut... vere significari esse, sic etiam de illa re, quae nullo modo est, contingit significare ipsam non esse.* In initio proposit. post *contingit vere significari* Vat. addit *de ipso.* (p. 875, nota 5.)

en: Codex T presents this proposition thus: "Just as... it is truly signified to be, so also of that thing which in no way is, it happens that it is signified not to be itself." At the beginning of the proposition, after *contingit vere significari,* the Vatican edition adds *de ipso.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 5. — Aliquanto superius inter verba illa *adaequatio* codd. F W interiiciunt *tamen.* (p. 875, nota 4.)

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 46, q. 5. — Somewhat above, between the words of that *adaequatio,* codices F W insert *tamen.*

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 46. q. 4. ad 1. — Subinde (cfr. p. 875, nota 7): Vide scholion ad primam huius art. quaest. (p. 875, notae 6 et 7.)

en: See I Sent. d. 46, q. 4, ad 1. — And further: See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 37, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (d. XXXVII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (d. 37)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 876 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illo verbo Augustini, quod dicit: *Opera diaboli, quae vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res.* Sed contra: Fulgentius dicit, et habetur in Glossa super tertium ad Romanos[^1]: «Deus illius rei est ultor, cuius non est actor»: ergo si Deus est ultor peccati, peccatum est res. — Item, videtur, quod contraria implicentur in illo verbo: omne enim ens est aliqua res; sed vitium est actus, sicut ipse dicit[^2], et actus est quaedam differentia entis: ergo idem est dicere, vitia esse actus et non res, quod affirmare inferius et negare superius de eodem; quod est impossibile. — Item, ipse Augustinus videtur sibi contradicere, cum dicit in Enchiridio[^3] quod «aliquae sunt res, quibus homines mali sunt»; tales non sunt nisi vitia et peccata: ergo vitia sunt res.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *res* accipitur communiter et proprie et magis proprie. Res, secundum quod communiter dicitur, dicitur a *reor, reris*; et sic comprehendit omne illud, quod cadit in cognitione, sive sit res exterius, sive in sola opinione. Proprie vero dicitur res a *ratus, rata, ratum*, secundum quod ratum dicitur esse illud quod non tantummodo est in cognitione, immo est[^4] in rerum natura, sive sit ens in se, sive in alio; et hoc modo res convertitur cum ente. Tertio modo dicitur res magis proprie, secundum quod dicitur a *ratus, rata, ratum*, prout ratum dicitur illud quod est ens *per se* et fixum; et sic res dicitur solum de creaturis et substantiis per se entibus[^5]. — Si igitur res accipiatur primo modo, peccatum est res et quantum ad actionem substratam et quantum ad deformitatem; et sic accipit Fulgentius. Si vero res dicatur secundo modo, sic peccatum dicitur res non ratione deformitatis, sed ratione actus substrati; et sic accipit Augustinus in Enchiridio. Tertio modo accipiendo hoc nomen *res*, sic peccatum nec est res ratione deformitatis, nec ratione actus substrati; et sic accipit Augustinus in verbo proposito, cum dicit, quod opera diaboli vitia sunt, non res. Et per hoc patet responsio ad totum[^6].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quod natura non est Deus non fecit.* Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia multa sunt, quae fiunt praeter naturam, et tamen constat, quod a Deo sunt, sicut multa accidentia, quae inducuntur[^7] per acquisitionem et per violentiam, et etiam per gratiam et per miraculum. — Item, omne quod est natura aliqua, vel est substantia, vel proprietas ei naturaliter inhaerens; sed multa sunt, quae nec naturaliter insunt, nec per se sunt: ergo non videtur esse verum illud quod dicitur, quod Deus non fecit illud quod natura non est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut hoc nomen *res* tripliciter accipitur, ita hoc nomen *natura*. Uno enim modo dicitur natura res, quae naturaliter est, vel proprietas, quae naturaliter inest. Secundo modo dicitur natura largius, non solum res per se ens, vel proprietas naturaliter inhaerens, sed etiam omne quod conservat naturam, vel quod saltem aliquo bono non privat; et istos duos modos ponit Magister in littera[^8]. Tertio modo dicitur natura largissime omne ens, quod est in aliqua re naturali, sive sit naturaliter inhaerens, sive non; sive sit salvativum, sive non. — Cum ergo dicit Augustinus, quod natura est omne quod Deus fecit, potest natura accipi tribus modis, secundum quod facere Dei accipitur tripliciter. Uno enim modo *facere* dicitur Deus creando; secundo modo concreando; tertio modo cooperando; et ita, secundum quod extenditur verbum faciendi, extenditur nomen naturae; sicut *facere* dicitur Deus actionem substratam peccato cooperando libero arbitrio, sic etiam nomen naturae se extendit ad illam actionem; et sicut facere Dei nunquam se extendit ad *deformitatem*, sic nec *natura*. Et ideo ex hac auctoritate non potest haberi, quod *actio substrata* deformitati non sit a Deo, sed hoc tantum habetur, quod *deformitas* non sit a Deo[^9].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illa ratione, quam Magister in littera dimittit insolutam. Ait enim sic: *Quid mirum, si Deus non dicitur esse actor[^10] peccatorum, in quantum nihil sunt, cum nihili nullus actor existere queat.* Videtur enim efficaciter arguere. Cum enim peccatum aliquo modo habeat actorem, et non possit habere, secundum quod nihil est: habet ergo, secundum quod aliquid est. Si ergo nullo modo habet Deum actorem, videtur, quod peccatum, in quantum actus est, a Deo non sit.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum est ad hoc, quod illud argumentum deficit, quia aliter peccatum est nihil, aliter est nihil illud quod nullo modo est. Peccatum enim formaliter nihil est, nihilominus tamen circa aliquid est, et alicuius boni privatio est. Et quamvis illud quod *nullo modo* est, non possit habere actorem, tamen illud quod dicit defectum circa ens, potest habere actorem, non, inquam, actorem efficientem, sed deficientem. Et sic patet, quod ratio illa non recte procedit[^11].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Iniquitas ipsa non est substantia.* Aut enim substantia dicitur proprie, aut dicitur communiter. Si dicitur *proprie*; nec etiam iustitia est substantia. Si dicitur *communiter*; ergo omne quod habet aliquam essentiam, dicitur substantia. Sed habitus malus habet aliquam essentiam, in quantum habitus: ergo videtur, quod possit dici substantia[^12]: ergo videtur, quod malus habitus, ut luxuria, debeat laudare Deum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut nomen *natura* multipliciter accipitur, ita et nomen *substantiae*. Praeter enim illos quatuor modos, quos dicit Philosophus[^13], quod substantia dicitur *materia, forma, compositum* et *essentia* uniuscuiusque, potest aliter distingui substantia iuxta verba beati Augustini[^14]: uno modo, ut dicatur res permanens et per se stans; alio modo, ut dicatur res permanens, non tamen per se stans, sed alii inhaerens; tertio modo, ut dicatur substantia quaelibet essentia actu ens, sive per se stans, sive non; et hoc modo substantia se extendit ad omne ens. Et sic accipit Augustinus[^15], cum dicit: «Quod nulla substantia est nihil omnino est». Cum ergo dicitur, quod iniquitas substantia non est; dicendum, quod *iniquitas* accipitur abstracte pro ipsa deformitate, non pro habitu, circa quem deformitas consistit.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Poenarum Deus actor est.* Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia nullius est Deus actor, nisi quod habet exemplar in Deo[^16]; sed poena, secundum quod poena non habet exemplar in Deo: ergo videtur, quod Deus non sit actor poenae. — Item, «idem est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente[^17]». Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus, «Deus non plasmavit nos ad puniendum»: ergo si Deo non placent mala poenae, videtur, quod non sint ab ipso tanquam ab actore.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam sunt, quae habent exemplar in Deo secundum conformitatem, quae attenditur quantum ad esse eorum *speciale*; quaedam vero secundum conformitatem, quae attenditur quantum ad esse *generale*. Quamvis igitur poena sive passio non habeat correspondens in Deo passionem vel poenam, habet tamen correspondens in genere *entis* et in genere *ordinis*; et istud sufficit ad hoc, quod aliquid habeat in Deo exemplar.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod voluntas in Deo duplex est, videlicet antecedens et consequens; et quamvis poena non sit a voluntate antecedente, nihilominus tamen est a voluntate consequente.

Qualiter autem poena sit a Deo et quae, hoc determinatum est supra distinctione praecedenti[^18]. Licet enim Magister dicat, poenas a Deo esse, non tamen hoc intelligendum est universaliter. — Ideo ad hoc, quod ista verba, quae dicuntur in hac distinctione, intelligantur sane, necessario oportet istas quatuor propositiones tanquam regulas[^19] infallibiles supponere. Quarum prima est, quod omne illud quod dicit positionem aliquam, est a Deo. Secunda est, quod omne illud quod aliquem ordinem dicit, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo. Tertia est, quod nullus defectus, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a Deo, propter hoc quod hoc repugnat divinae potentiae. Quarta est haec, quod nullum inordinatum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a Deo, quia repugnat divinae sapientiae.

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His autem tanquam manifestis praesuppositis, oportet etiam scire distinguere. Primo circa poenam quantum ad rationem poenae, et quantum ad illud quod substernitur. Secundo oportet scire, quod aliqua poena est *acta*, aliqua *contracta*, aliqua *inflicta*. Tertio oportet intelligere distinctionem huius nominis *res*, quoniam dicitur tripliciter. Quarto oportet intelligere distinctionem huius nominis *natura* et *substantia*, secundum quod distincta sunt supra[^20]. Et his intellectis, manifestantur ea quae dicuntur in littera.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that saying of Augustine, who says: *The works of the devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things.* But on the contrary: Fulgentius says, and it is found in the Gloss on the third chapter of Romans[^1]: «God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author»: therefore if God is the avenger of sin, sin is a thing. — Likewise, it seems that contraries are involved in that saying: for every being is some thing; but a vice is an act, as he himself says[^2], and act is a certain difference of being: therefore it is the same thing to say that vices are acts and not things, which is to affirm below and to deny above concerning the same thing; which is impossible. — Likewise, Augustine himself seems to contradict himself, when he says in the Enchiridion[^3] that «there are certain things by which men are evil»; such things are nothing but vices and sins: therefore vices are things.

**I respond:** It must be said that *thing* is taken commonly, properly, and more properly. A thing, according as it is said commonly, is named from *reor, reris* [to reckon]; and thus it comprehends everything that falls under cognition, whether it be a thing externally or in opinion alone. But properly a thing is named from *ratus, rata, ratum* [reckoned, fixed], according as that is said to be fixed which is not only in cognition but rather is[^4] in the nature of things, whether it be a being in itself or in another; and in this mode thing is convertible with being. In the third mode a thing is said more properly, according as it is named from *ratus, rata, ratum*, inasmuch as that is called fixed which is a being *per se* and fixed; and thus thing is said only of creatures and of substances that are beings per se[^5]. — If, therefore, thing be taken in the first mode, sin is a thing both as regards the underlying action and as regards the deformity; and thus Fulgentius takes it. But if thing be said in the second mode, then sin is called a thing not by reason of the deformity, but by reason of the underlying act; and thus Augustine takes it in the Enchiridion. Taking this name *thing* in the third mode, sin is neither a thing by reason of the deformity nor by reason of the underlying act; and thus Augustine takes it in the saying proposed, when he says that the works of the devil are vices, not things. And by this the response to the whole is clear[^6].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *What is not a nature God did not make.* For this seems to be false, because there are many things which come about beyond nature, and yet it is established that they are from God, as many accidents which are induced[^7] through acquisition and through violence, and also through grace and through miracle. — Likewise, everything that is some nature is either a substance or a property naturally inhering in it; but there are many things which neither inhere naturally nor exist per se: therefore that which is said does not seem to be true, namely that God did not make that which is not a nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as this name *thing* is taken in three ways, so too this name *nature*. For in one mode a nature is called a thing which exists naturally, or a property which inheres naturally. In the second mode nature is said more broadly, not only a thing being per se, or a property naturally inhering, but also everything that conserves nature, or that at least does not deprive of some good; and these two modes the Master sets down in the text[^8]. In the third mode nature is said most broadly of every being which is in some natural thing, whether it inheres naturally or not; whether it be conserving or not. — When, therefore, Augustine says that nature is everything that God made, nature can be taken in three modes, according as God's making is taken in three ways. For in one mode God is said to *make* by creating; in the second mode by con-creating; in the third mode by cooperating; and so, according as the word of making is extended, the name of nature is extended; just as God is said to *make* by cooperating with free will in the action underlying sin, so too the name of nature extends itself to that action; and just as God's making never extends itself to *deformity*, so neither does *nature*. And therefore from this authority it cannot be held that the *underlying action* of the deformity is not from God, but only this is held, that the *deformity* is not from God[^9].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that argument which the Master in the text leaves unsolved. For he says thus: *What wonder is it, if God is not said to be the author[^10] of sins, inasmuch as they are nothing, since no author of what is nothing can exist.* For it seems to argue effectively. For since sin in some mode has an author, and cannot have one according as it is nothing: it has one, therefore, according as it is something. If therefore it in no way has God as author, it seems that sin, inasmuch as it is an act, is not from God.

**I respond:** It must be said to this that that argument fails, because in one way sin is nothing, in another way that is nothing which in no way exists. For sin is formally nothing, yet nonetheless it is about something, and is the privation of some good. And although that which *in no way* exists cannot have an author, nonetheless that which states a defect about a being can have an author — not, I say, an efficient author, but a deficient one. And thus it is clear that that argument does not rightly proceed[^11].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Iniquity itself is not a substance.* For either substance is said properly, or it is said commonly. If it is said *properly*, then neither is justice a substance. If it is said *commonly*, then everything that has some essence is called a substance. But an evil habit has some essence, inasmuch as it is a habit: therefore it seems that it can be called a substance[^12]: therefore it seems that an evil habit, such as lust, ought to praise God.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as the name *nature* is taken in many ways, so too the name *substance*. For besides those four modes which the Philosopher states[^13] — that substance is said to be *matter, form, the composite,* and the *essence* of each thing — substance can be otherwise distinguished according to the words of blessed Augustine[^14]: in one mode, so that it be called a thing permanent and standing per se; in another mode, so that it be called a thing permanent, yet not standing per se, but inhering in another; in the third mode, so that any essence actually a being be called a substance, whether standing per se or not; and in this mode substance extends itself to every being. And thus Augustine takes it[^15], when he says: «What is no substance is altogether nothing». When, therefore, it is said that iniquity is not a substance, it must be said that *iniquity* is taken abstractly for the deformity itself, not for the habit about which the deformity consists.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *God is the author of punishments.* For this seems to be false, because God is the author of nothing except what has an exemplar in God[^16]; but punishment, according as it is punishment, has no exemplar in God: therefore it seems that God is not the author of punishment. — Likewise, «it is the same thing to come about with God as author and with God as willing[^17]». But, as Damascene says, «God did not fashion us for punishing»: therefore if the evils of punishment do not please God, it seems that they are not from Him as from an author.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are certain things which have an exemplar in God according to a conformity which is regarded as to their *special* being; but certain others according to a conformity which is regarded as to their *general* being. Although, therefore, punishment or passion has no corresponding passion or punishment in God, it nonetheless has something corresponding in the genus of *being* and in the genus of *order*; and this suffices for something to have an exemplar in God.

To the other it must be said that the will in God is twofold, namely antecedent and consequent; and although punishment is not from the antecedent will, nonetheless it is from the consequent will.

But in what manner punishment is from God, and which [punishment], this was determined above in the preceding distinction[^18]. For although the Master says that punishments are from God, yet this is not to be understood universally. — Therefore, in order that these words, which are said in this distinction, may be understood soundly, it is necessary to presuppose these four propositions as infallible rules[^19]. Of these the first is, that everything that states some position is from God. The second is, that everything that states some order, inasmuch as it is such, is from God. The third is, that no defect, according as it is such, is from God, on account of the fact that this is repugnant to the divine power. The fourth is this, that nothing disordered, according as it is such, is from God, because it is repugnant to the divine wisdom.

These things being presupposed as manifest, it is also necessary to know how to distinguish. First, concerning punishment as to the formal account of punishment, and as to that which is subjected. Secondly, it must be known that some punishment is *done*, some *contracted*, some *inflicted*. Thirdly, one must understand the distinction of this name *thing*, since it is said in three ways. Fourthly, one must understand the distinction of this name *nature* and *substance*, according as they were distinguished above[^20]. And these things being understood, those things which are said in the text are made manifest.

---

la: Vers. 5: *Nunquid iniquus est Deus, qui infert iram?* — Glossa, quae sumta est ex Fulgentii libro I. ad Monimum, c. 19, habetur apud Petr. Lombardum loc. hic cit. Codd. et primae edd. hic signant *Rom. I.*

en: Verse 5: *Is God unjust, who inflicts wrath?* — The Gloss, which is taken from Fulgentius' book I to Monimus, c. 19, is found in Peter Lombard at the place here cited. The codices and the first editions here mark *Rom. I.*

la: Hic c. I. et supra d. XXXV. c. 2. seq., ubi etiam verba Augustini inveniuntur. — Quod *actus* sit differentia entis, vide Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 20, IX. text. I. et XII. text. 8. (III. c. 3, VIII. c. 1. et XI. c. 2.). — Paulo inferius pro *quod affirmare* codd. H K T V W X Y Z et alii cum edd. 1, 2 *quam affirmare.*

en: Here c. 1 and above d. 35, c. 2 and following, where the words of Augustine are also found. — That *act* is a difference of being, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 20, IX, text 1, and XII, text 8 (III, c. 3; VIII, c. 1; and XI, c. 2). — A little below, for *quod affirmare* the codices H K T V W X Y Z and others, with editions 1, 2, read *quam affirmare.*

la: Cap. 19. n. 6. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 5. circa finem.

en: Chapter 19, n. 6. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. 34, c. 5, near the end.

la: Cod. T *bene etiam.*

en: Codex T reads *bene etiam.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. dub. 3.

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 25, dub. 3.

la: Vide supra d. 34, a. 2. q. I seqq. Cfr. etiam B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa m.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.

en: See above d. 34, a. 2, q. 1 and following. Cf. also Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here near the middle; Giles of Rome, here in the doubt on the text, 3.

la: Codd. K W ee et ed. I *ducuntur*, cod. T *dicuntur.*

en: Codices K W ee and edition 1 read *ducuntur*; codex T reads *dicuntur.*

la: Hic c. I. — Paulo inferius pro *re naturali* edd. praeter I cum paucis codd. *re materiali.*

en: Here c. 1. — A little below, for *re naturali* the editions except 1, with a few codices, read *re materiali.*

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desunt haec ultima verba inde a *sed hoc tantum* usque ad finem. — Huius dubii solutionem exhibent etiam Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 these last words from *sed hoc tantum* to the end are lacking. — The solution of this doubt is also given by Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Ita edd. 1, 2, 3 et plurimi (fortasse omnes) codd. pro *auctor*, quod vocabulum hic habet Vat., sed paulo post eadem *nullus actor.* Idem dicendum de hoc verbo, quoties infra in hoc et 5. dubio occurrit. In edd. Magistri legitur semper *auctor.* Quod autem non incongrue in his locis secuti simus antiquos codd. et edd., sequitur ex contextu. De differentia inter vocabula *auctor* et *actor* vide Forcellini, Lexicon etc.

en: Thus editions 1, 2, 3 and most (perhaps all) codices read, instead of *auctor*, which word the Vatican edition has here, but shortly after the same reads *nullus actor.* The same is to be said of this word, as often as it occurs below in this and the fifth doubt. In the editions of the Master it is always read *auctor.* That we have not unfittingly followed the ancient codices and editions in these places follows from the context. On the difference between the words *auctor* and *actor* see Forcellini, *Lexicon*, etc.

la: Plura de hac re habentur supra d. 34. a. I. et 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.

en: More on this matter is found above d. 34, a. 1 and 2. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here in the doubt on the text, 3.

la: Edd., excepta I, omittunt hanc primam conclusionem: *ergo videtur... dici substantia.*

en: The editions, except 1, omit this first conclusion: *therefore it seems... to be called a substance.*

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 2. (c. I.); V. Metaph. text. 15, VII. text. 7. et 53, XII. text. 14. (IV. c. 8, VI. c. 3. et 15, XI. c. 3.); Averroes, Epitom. in libr. Metaph. tr. I. et 2.

en: *On the Soul* II, text 2 (c. 1); *Metaphysics* V, text 15, VII, text 7 and 53, XII, text 14 (IV, c. 8; VI, c. 3 and 15; XI, c. 3); Averroes, *Epitome on the Metaphysics*, tracts 1 and 2.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I. seq. — Mox pro *non tamen* non pauci codd., inter quos F K T cc, cum ed. I *non tantum.*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 1 and following. — Soon, for *non tamen* not a few codices, among them F K T cc, with edition 1 read *non tantum.*

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 68. serm. 1. n. 5. Verba integra huius loci vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Huius dubii solutionem videsis etiam apud S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 6.

en: *Enarration on Psalm 68*, sermon 1, n. 5. See the full words of this passage here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — You may also see the solution of this doubt in St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here in the doubt on the text, 6.

la: Ut monstratum est I. Sent. d. 36. per totam, praecipue a. 3. q. 1. — De minori cfr. supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq.

en: As was shown in I Sent., d. 36, throughout, especially a. 3, q. 1. — On the minor premise cf. above d. 36, a. 3, q. 1 and following.

la: Secundum August., 83 Qq. q. 3. — Textus integer verborum Damasceni, quae habentur II. de Fide orthod. c. 29, reperitur tom. I. pag. 728, nota 2. Loc. cit. Damascenus profert etiam distinctionem voluntatis in voluntatem antecedentem et consequentem, de qua paulo inferius sermo est et de qua videsis etiam I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.

en: According to Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 3. — The full text of the words of Damascene, which are found in *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 29, is found in tome I, page 728, note 2. At the cited place Damascene also sets forth the distinction of the will into antecedent and consequent will, of which there is mention a little below and on which you may also see I Sent., d. 46, q. 1.

la: Art. 3. q. 1. seq. — Subinde pro *Licet enim* edd., excepta 1, substituunt *Licet autem.* Paulo ante cod. W *et quare* pro *et quae.*

en: Art. 3, q. 1 and following. — Thereafter, for *Licet enim* the editions, except 1, substitute *Licet autem.* A little before, codex W reads *et quare* for *et quae.*

la: Codd. E F subiungunt *necessarias et*, codd. A B D K O P Q R S T W et alii *negativas*, cod. C adiicit *negativas et.*

en: Codices E F append *necessarias et*; codices A B D K O P Q R S T W and others read *negativas*; codex C adds *negativas et.*

la: Hic dub. 1. 2. 3. — Regulae et distinctiones in huius dubii solutione exhibitae quasi fundamentum efficiunt omnium, quae a d. 34. usque huc de malo prolata sunt. Vide de hoc dub. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2, dub. lat.

en: Here doubts 1, 2, 3. — The rules and distinctions set forth in the solution of this doubt constitute, as it were, the foundation of all that has been brought forward concerning evil from d. 34 up to this point. See on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2, in the doubt on the text. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (PDF pp. 898–900 = printed pp. 876–878; offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 60938–61083) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied: the cascade-shattered Respondeo blocks of Dub. II and Dub. IV (the marginal-gloss intrusions "Res dicitur tripliciter / Natura dicitur tripliciter / Substantia dicitur multipliciter / Distinctiones quatuor" that the OCR splices mid-sentence) were re-set from the column-band crops. No scholion (dubia unit) — `has_scholion: false`.

**Dubia found (5):**
- Dub. I — on Augustine's saying that the works of the devil (vices) are acts, not things (the threefold sense of *res*).
- Dub. II — on "what is not a nature God did not make" (the threefold sense of *natura*).
- Dub. III — on the argument the Master leaves unsolved (whether God is the author of sins, which are nothing).
- Dub. IV — on "iniquity itself is not a substance" (the senses of *substantia*).
- Dub. V — on "God is the author of punishments" (exemplar in God; antecedent/consequent will; the four regulae and four distinctions for reading d. 37).

**Page-split map (footers; Quaracchi restarts per page):**
- p. 876: notes 1–3 (Dub. I, left col) + 4–9 (Dub. II, right col) = 9 footers.
- p. 877: notes 1–2 (Dub. III) + 3–5 (Dub. IV) + 6–10 (Dub. V) = 10 footers.
- p. 878: 1 footer (Dub. V closing "...distincta sunt supra¹") = 1 footer.
- Renumbered consecutively here as `[^1]`–`[^20]` (9 + 10 + 1 = 20).
- The "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" notes on p. 878 belong to d. 38's Littera Magistri (Cap. I, II) and are NOT captured here.

**Hand-off picked up (from a2-q3):** the entire p. 876 footer block belongs to this dubia chunk — a2-q3 owned no p. 876 footer. Confirmed: all p. 876 footers (notes 1–9) are captured here as `[^1]`–`[^9]`.

**Hand-off forwarded:** none. This chunk closes d. 37; the body ends cleanly at "...manifestantur ea quae dicuntur in littera." (p. 878 right col) immediately before DISTINCTIO XXXVIII (raw line 61084).

**[?] flags:** none. All five dubia and all 20 footers were resolved against the 450 dpi column bands. The OCR variant note `[^10]` (auctor/actor) is the Quaracchi editors' own textual note, not an ambiguity.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38

title_alt: Distinctio XXXVIII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXXVIII — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVIII.

### Cap. I. *De voluntate et eius fine.*

Post praedicta de voluntate eiusque fine disserendum est. Sciendum igitur est, quod ex fine suo, ut ait Augustinus[^1], voluntas cognoscitur, utrum recta, an prava sit. Finis autem bonae voluntatis beatitudo est, vita aeterna, Deus ipse. Malae vero finis est aliud, scilicet mala delectatio, vel aliquid aliud, in quo non debet voluntas quiescere. Finem bonum insinuat Propheta dicens: *Omnis consummationis vidi finem* etc. Caritas ergo, cuius latum mandatum est, finis omnis consummationis est, id est omnis bonae voluntatis et actionis, ad quam omne praeceptum referendum est. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^2]: «Omnia praecepta divina referuntur ad caritatem, de qua dicit Apostolus: *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta*. Omnis itaque praecepti finis caritas est, id est, ad caritatem refertur omne praeceptum. Quod vero ita fit vel timore poenae, vel aliqua intentione carnali, ut non referatur ad caritatem, quae est dilectio Dei et proximi, nondum fit quemadmodum oportet fieri, quamvis fieri videatur». «Tunc enim recte fiunt quae mandat Deus et quae consilio monet, cum referuntur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi». — His verbis aperte insinuatur, quis sit rectus finis voluntatis, sive actionis, scilicet caritas, quae et Deus est, ut supra[^3] ostendimus.

### Cap. II. *Quis sit bonus finis, scilicet caritas.*

Qui ergo caritatem sibi ponit finem, Deum sibi ponit finem; unde et Christum *finem legis ad iustitiam* dicit Apostolus[^4] esse *omni credenti*. Et recte dicitur Christus *finis legis ad iustitiam*, quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro Sententiarum Prosperi, «in Christo lex iustitiae non consumitur, sed impletur. Omnis enim perfectio in ipso est, ultra quem non est quo spes se extendat». «Finis fidelium Christus est, ad quem cum pervenerit currentis intentio, non habet quo possit amplius venire, sed habet in quo debeat permanere». — Finis ergo rectus atque supremus Deus Pater est et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; neque hi tres sunt tres fines, sed unus finis, quia non tres Dii, sed unus Deus.

### Cap. III. *Quod omnes bonae voluntates unum habent finem, et tamen quaedam diversos fines sortiuntur.*

Sed quaeritur, utrum omnes bonae voluntates unum tantum habeant finem. De hoc Augustinus in libro undecimo *de Trinitate*[^5] ita ait: «Aliae atque aliae voluntates suos proprios fines habent, qui tamen referuntur ad finem illius voluntatis, qua volumus beate vivere et ad eam pervenire vitam, quae non referatur ad aliud, sed amanti per se ipsam sufficiat; quemadmodum voluntas videndi finem habet visionem, et voluntas videndi fenestram finem habet fenestrae visionem; altera vero est voluntas per fenestram videndi transeuntes, cuius item finis est visio transeuntium. Ad quod etiam praedictae referuntur voluntates». Item: «Rectae sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet religatae, si bona est illa, ad quam cunctae referuntur. Si autem prava est, pravae sunt omnes; et ideo rectarum voluntatum connexio iter quoddam est ascendentium ad beatitudinem, quod certis velut passibus agitur; pravarum autem et distortarum voluntatum implicatio vinculum est, quo alligabitur qui hoc agit, ut proiiciatur in tenebras exteriores». — His auctoritatum testimoniis evidenter monstratur, plures in fidelibus rectas esse voluntates, proprios ac diversos fines habentes, et tamen unum eundemque, quia omnes referuntur ad unum, qui est finis finium, de quo paulo ante diximus; ita e converso forte est et in malis.

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Verumtamen huic sententiae, qua dictum est, fideliam quasdam rectas voluntates diversos fines sortiri, et tamen ad unum referri; videtur obviare quod alibi Augustinus monet, ne scilicet nobis duos fines constituamus, ita inquiens in libro de Sermone Domini in monte[^6]: «Non debemus ideo evangelizare, ut manducemus, sed ideo manducare, ut evangelizemus: ut cibus non sit bonum, quod appetitur, sed necessarium, quod adiicitur, ut illud impleatur: *Quaerite primum regnum Dei, et haec omnia adiicientur vobis*». Non dixit: «*primum quaerite regnum Dei*, et deinde: *quaerite ista*, quamvis sint necessaria; sed ait: *haec omnia adiicientur vobis*, id est, haec consequentur, si illa quaeratis; ne, cum ista quaeritis, illinc avertamini, aut ne duos fines constituatis, ut et regnum propter se appetatis, et ista necessaria propter illud». «Ergo propter regnum Dei tantum debemus operari omnia, non solam, vel cum regno Dei mercedem temporalem meditari». — Ecce hic aperte dicit, ne duos fines nobis constituamus, sed unum tantum, id est *regnum Dei*, cum supra dixerit, bonas voluntates alias et alias proprios habere fines.

Haec autem sibi non repugnare, animadvertit qui verbis praemissis simplici oculo diligenter intendit. Qui enim dixit, ne duos fines nobis constituamus, sed omnia propter regnum Dei faciamus, ipse praemisit, quod debemus manducare, ut evangelizemus. Cum autem hoc ita facimus, actionis illius finem *Evangelium* constituimus, sed et hunc finem ad regnum Dei referimus. Manducamus enim propter Evangelium, et manducamus et evangelizamus propter regnum Dei. Duos igitur fines nobis in manducando constituimus; sed ista facientes, nunquid peccamus? Absit. Nam et ipse sic facere suadet, si diligenter eius verba inspiciamus. Cum ergo ait, ne duos fines nobis constituamus, fines in diversa tendentes intelligi voluit, scilicet, quorum alter ad alterum non referatur; ita et cum dicit, propter regnum Dei tantum omnia agenda, nec cum ipso mercedem temporalem meditandam; ita intelligendum est, ut non appetendo meditemur cum regno mercedem temporalem, ita quod non propter regnum, sed propter se, ut scilicet regnum propter se appetamus, et ista propter illud, sicut ipse docet. Si enim petimus vitam aeternam petimusque etiam temporalia a Deo; si ea petimus propter vitam aeternam, non offendimus, neque sinistra tunc scit, quid faciat dextera, quia mercedem temporalem non propter se meditamur, sed propter regnum Dei, ut sit *laeva sub capite* et *dextera in amplexu*. Alioquin si haec temporalia propter se quaerimus, sicut aeterna, miscetur dextrae sinistra. Ideoque cum Dominus dixerit: *Attendite, ne iustitiam vestram faciatis coram hominibus, ut videamini ab eis*; alibi ait: *Sic luceant opera vestra bona coram hominibus, ut glorificent Patrem vestrum qui in caelis est*. — Propter Deum ergo omnia facienda sunt, ut omnia quae facimus, omniumque fines ad eum referamus.

### Cap. IV. *De differentia voluntatis et intentionis et finis.*

Solet etiam quaeri, quid distet inter voluntatem et intentionem ac finem. — Ad quod dici potest, inter voluntatem et finem certo atque evidenti modo distingui, quia voluntas est, qua volumus aliquid; finis vero voluntatis est vel illud quod volumus, per quod impletur ipsa voluntas, vel potius aliud, propter quod illud volumus. *Intentio* vero interdum pro voluntate, interdum pro fine voluntatis accipitur, quae diligens ac pius lector in Scriptura, ubi haec occurrunt, discernere studeat. Finis autem voluntatis est delectatio bona vel mala, ad quam nititur quisque pervenire. Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi[^7]: *Scrutans corda et renes*, sic ait: «Deus solus scrutatur corda, id est, quid quisque cogitet, et renes, id est, quid quemque delectet; quia finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio, ad quam cura et cogitatione nititur quisque pervenire». Et paulo post: «Opera nostra, quae sunt in dictis et factis, possunt homines videre, sed quo animo fiant et quo venire cupiant, solus Deus videt; qui cum videt, cor esse in caelo, et non delectari nos in carne, sed in Domino, id est, cum bonae sunt cogitationes et earum fines, dirigit iustum». Idem super alterius Psalmi[^8] locum illum, scilicet: *In laqueo isto, quem absconderunt, comprehensus est pes eorum*, dicit: «Pes animae amor est, qui, si pravus est, dicitur cupiditas vel libido; si rectus, dicitur caritas. Eo movetur anima, quasi ad locum, quo tendit, id est ad delectationem bonam vel malam, quo se supervenisse per amorem laetatur». Finis ergo voluntatis, ut praemissum est, dicitur et illud quod volumus, et illud propter quod volumus, et intentio ad illud respicit propter quod volumus, et voluntas ad illud quod volumus, ut verbi gratia, si velim esurientem reficere, ut habeam vitam aeternam, voluntas est, qua volo reficere esurientem, cuius finis est refectio esurientis; intentio vero, qua sic ad vitam pervenire volo; *finis* autem supremus est ipsa vita, ad quam et alius finis refertur.

Sed quaeritur, utrum intentio talis sit voluntas, et si voluntas est, an in hoc opere sit una eademque voluntas, qua volo habere vitam aeternam, et qua volo reficere esurientem. Videtur nempe talis intentio esse voluntas, ut enim voluntas est, qua volo reficere pauperem, ita et voluntas est, qua per istud volo habere vitam. Et alia quidem videtur esse voluntas, qua volo habere vitam, et alia, qua pauperi subvenire volo. Sed ista ad illam refertur. «Nam etsi hoc ita placet, ut in eo cum aliqua delectatione voluntas acquiescat, nondum est tamen illud quo tenditur, sed hoc ad illud refertur, ut illud deputetur tanquam patria civis, istud vero tanquam refectio vel mansio viatoris[^9]». Et sunt istae voluntates affectus sive motus mentis, quibus quasi gressibus vel passibus tenditur ad patriam. Sicut

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ergo altera est voluntas videndi fenestras, ut supra, docente Augustino, didicimus, altera, quae ex ista nectitur, voluntas scilicet per fenestras videndi transeuntes; ita nonnullis alia videtur esse voluntas eleemosynas dandi pauperi, alia voluntas habendi vitam. Alii autem putant, quod una sit voluntas et hic et ibi, sed propter subiectorum multiplicitatem diversitas memoratur voluntatum. Ceterum quodlibet horum verum sit, illud nulli[^10] in ambiguum venit, quin voluntas ex suo fine pensetur, utrum recta sit, an prava, peccatum, an gratia, et quin nomine intentionis aliquando *finis*, aliquando *voluntas* intelligatur.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

### Chap. I. *On the will and its end.*

After the foregoing, we must treat of the will and its end. It must be known, therefore, that from its end, as Augustine says[^1], the will is recognized, whether it be right or perverse. And the end of a good will is beatitude, eternal life, God himself. But the end of an evil will is something else, namely an evil delight, or something else, in which the will ought not to rest. The Prophet intimates the good end, saying: *I have seen an end of all perfection* etc. Charity, therefore, whose commandment is broad, is the end of all perfection, that is, of every good will and action, to which every precept is to be referred. Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^2]: «All the divine precepts are referred to charity, of which the Apostle says: *The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned*. The end of every precept, therefore, is charity, that is, every precept is referred to charity. But what is done either from fear of punishment, or from some carnal intention, so that it is not referred to charity, which is the love of God and neighbor, is not yet done as it ought to be done, although it may seem to be done». «For then are rightly done the things which God commands and which he advises by counsel, when they are referred to the love of God and neighbor». — By these words it is openly intimated what is the right end of the will, or of the action, namely charity, which is also God, as we showed above[^3].

### Chap. II. *What the good end is, namely charity.*

He, therefore, who sets charity as his end, sets God as his end; whence the Apostle[^4] also calls Christ *the end of the law unto justice* *to everyone that believeth*. And rightly is Christ called *the end of the law unto justice*, because, as Augustine says in the book of the *Sentences of Prosper*, «in Christ the law of justice is not consumed, but fulfilled. For all perfection is in him, beyond whom there is nothing to which hope may extend itself». «The end of the faithful is Christ, to whom when the intention of one running has come, it has nowhere it can come further, but it has wherein it ought to remain». — The right and supreme end, therefore, is God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; nor are these three three ends, but one end, because they are not three Gods, but one God.

### Chap. III. *That all good wills have one end, and yet certain ones obtain diverse ends.*

But it is asked whether all good wills have one end only. Concerning this Augustine in the eleventh book *On the Trinity*[^5] thus says: «Various wills have their own proper ends, which nevertheless are referred to the end of that will by which we will to live blessedly and to attain that life which is not referred to anything else, but suffices of itself to the one loving it; just as the will of seeing has sight as its end, and the will of seeing a window has the seeing of the window as its end; but there is another will of seeing through the window those passing by, whose end likewise is the sight of those passing by. To which the aforesaid wills are also referred». Likewise: «The wills are right and all bound to one another, if that be good to which they are all referred. But if it be perverse, they are all perverse; and therefore the connection of right wills is a certain road of those ascending to beatitude, which is traversed as it were by fixed steps; but the entanglement of perverse and distorted wills is a chain, by which he who does this will be bound, that he may be cast into the exterior darkness». — By these testimonies of authorities it is evidently shown that there are in the faithful many right wills, having their own and diverse ends, and yet one and the same, because they are all referred to one, which is the end of ends, of which we spoke a little before; and so, conversely, perhaps it is also in evil things.

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Nevertheless, to this opinion, by which it has been said that certain faithful right wills obtain diverse ends, and yet are referred to one, there seems to be opposed what Augustine elsewhere advises, namely that we should not set up two ends for ourselves, thus saying in the book *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount*[^6]: «We ought not to evangelize for this reason, that we may eat, but to eat for this reason, that we may evangelize: so that food is not a good which is sought, but a necessity which is added, that it may be fulfilled: *Seek first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you*». He did not say: «*first seek the kingdom of God*, and then: *seek these things*, although they are necessary; but he said: *all these things shall be added unto you*, that is, these will follow, if you seek those; lest, when you seek these things, you be turned away from there, or set up two ends, so that you both seek the kingdom for its own sake, and these necessary things for its sake». «Therefore, for the kingdom of God alone we ought to work all things, not to meditate on temporal reward alone, or together with the kingdom of God». — Behold, here he plainly says that we should not set up two ends for ourselves, but one only, that is, the *kingdom of God*, since above he had said that good wills have various proper ends.

But that these do not contradict one another, he perceives who attends carefully with a simple eye to the foregoing words. For he who said that we should not set up two ends for ourselves, but do all things for the kingdom of God, himself premised that we ought to eat that we may evangelize. But when we do this thus, we set up the *Gospel* as the end of that action, but we also refer this end to the kingdom of God. For we eat for the sake of the Gospel, and we eat and evangelize for the sake of the kingdom of God. We therefore set up two ends for ourselves in eating; but doing these things, do we sin? By no means. For he himself advises us to do so, if we carefully examine his words. When therefore he says that we should not set up two ends for ourselves, he meant ends tending in diverse directions to be understood, namely, of which one is not referred to the other; so also when he says that all things are to be done for the kingdom of God alone, and that temporal reward is not to be meditated on together with it; it is thus to be understood, that we do not by seeking meditate on temporal reward together with the kingdom, so that not for the kingdom, but for itself, namely that we should seek the kingdom for its own sake, and these things for its sake, as he himself teaches. For if we ask for eternal life and also ask for temporal things from God; if we ask for them on account of eternal life, we do not offend, nor then does the left know what the right does, because we meditate on temporal reward not for its own sake, but for the kingdom of God, that the *left may be under the head* and the *right in the embrace*. Otherwise, if we seek these temporal things for their own sake, like the eternal, the left is mingled with the right. And therefore, since the Lord said: *Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them*; he says elsewhere: *So let your good works shine before men, that they may glorify your Father who is in heaven*. — For the sake of God, therefore, all things are to be done, that all the things we do, and the ends of all, we may refer to him.

### Chap. IV. *On the difference of will and intention and end.*

It is also wont to be asked what distinction there is between will and intention and end. — To which it can be said that between will and end there is a distinction in a certain and evident manner, because will is that by which we will something; but the end of the will is either that which we will, by which the will itself is fulfilled, or rather something else, on account of which we will that. But *intention* is sometimes taken for the will, sometimes for the end of the will, which the diligent and pious reader should strive to discern in Scripture, where these things occur. And the end of the will is a good or evil delight, to which each one strives to attain. Hence Augustine, on that passage of the Psalm[^7]: *Searching the hearts and reins*, thus says: «God alone searches the hearts, that is, what each one thinks, and the reins, that is, what delights each one; because the end of care and thought is delight, to which by care and thought each one strives to attain». And a little after: «Our works, which are in words and deeds, men can see, but with what mind they are done and whither they desire to come, God alone sees; who when he sees the heart to be in heaven, and that we delight not in the flesh, but in the Lord, that is, when the thoughts and their ends are good, directs the just man». The same author, on the passage of another Psalm[^8], namely: *In this snare which they have hidden, their foot has been caught*, says: «The foot of the soul is love, which, if it be depraved, is called cupidity or lust; if right, is called charity. By it the soul is moved, as it were to a place to which it tends, that is, to a good or evil delight, where it rejoices to have arrived through love». The end of the will, therefore, as has been premised, is said to be both that which we will, and that on account of which we will, and intention looks to that on account of which we will, and will to that which we will; as for example, if I will to refresh a hungry man, that I may have eternal life, the will is that by which I will to refresh the hungry man, whose end is the refreshment of the hungry man; but the intention is that by which I thus will to attain to life; and the supreme *end* is life itself, to which the other end also is referred.

But it is asked whether such an intention is a will, and if it is a will, whether in this work there is one and the same will, by which I will to have eternal life, and by which I will to refresh the hungry man. For such an intention seems indeed to be a will, for as it is a will by which I will to refresh the poor man, so also it is a will by which through this I will to have life. And there seems indeed to be one will, by which I will to have life, and another, by which I will to succor the poor man. But that is referred to this. «For although this so pleases, that in it the will rests with some delight, nevertheless it is not yet that to which it tends, but this is referred to that, so that that may be reckoned as the homeland of the citizen, but this as the refreshment or lodging of the wayfarer[^9]». And these wills are affections or motions of the mind, by which, as it were by gait or steps, one tends to the homeland. Just as

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therefore there is one will of seeing the windows, as above, with Augustine teaching, we have learned, and another, which is knit from this, namely the will of seeing through the windows those passing by; so to some it seems that there is one will of giving alms to the poor man, and another will of having life. But others think that the will is one both here and there, but on account of the multiplicity of the objects a diversity of wills is spoken of. But whichever of these be true, it comes into doubt for no one[^10] that the will is weighed from its end, whether it be right or perverse, sin or grace, and that by the name of intention sometimes the *end*, sometimes the *will* is understood.

---

la: Libr. XI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 10, sententialiter. — Locus Prophetae est Ps. 118, 96.

en: Book XI *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 10, given in substance. — The passage of the Prophet is Ps. 118:96.

la: Cap. 121. n. 32, ubi locus Scripturae est I. Tim. 1, 5. Seq. locus Augustini ibid. parum inferius.

en: Chapter 121, n. 32, where the scriptural passage is 1 Tim. 1:5. The following passage of Augustine is in the same place, a little lower down.

la: Libr. I. d. XVII. c. 3. — Paulo superius post *actionis* Vat. cum pluribus edd. addit *bonae*.

en: Book I, d. XVII, c. 3. — A little above, after *actionis* the Vatican edition with several editions adds *bonae*.

la: Rom. 10, 4. Verba Augustini in libro Sentent. Prosperi sunt sent. 190 (August. Enarrat. in Ps. 43. n. 1.); et quae sequuntur sent. 206 (in Ps. 56. n. 2.). In primo loco post *perfectio* Vat. addit *ex ipso et*, refragantibus codd. A B C D et edd. I, 8; in aliis tantum *ex ipso*. De originali recte annotat cod. Erf.: In originali *in ipso*, non *ex ipso*.

en: Rom. 10:4. The words of Augustine in the book of the *Sentences of Prosper* are sentence 190 (Augustine, *Enarrationes in Ps. 43*, n. 1); and what follows is sentence 206 (on Ps. 56, n. 2). In the first place, after *perfectio* the Vatican edition adds *ex ipso et*, against codices A B C D and editions 1, 8; in the others only *ex ipso*. Concerning the original codex Erfurt rightly notes: in the original *in ipso*, not *ex ipso*.

la: Cap. 6. n. 10. Seq. locus ibid. parum inferius, ubi in fine respicitur Matth. 22, 13.

en: Chapter 6, n. 10. The following passage is in the same place, a little lower down, where at the end Matt. 22:13 is alluded to.

la: Libr. II. c. 16. n. 54. Locus Scripturae est Matth. 6, 33. — Paulo superius pro *monet* Vat. cum pluribus edd. et cod. A *admonet*. — Seq. locus ibid. c. 17. n. 56; tertius ibid. infra, in quo pro *temporalem* edd., exceptis I, 8 et Vat., *corporalem*, sed originale *temporalium*.

en: Book II, c. 16, n. 54. The scriptural passage is Matt. 6:33. — A little above, for *monet* the Vatican edition with several editions and codex A reads *admonet*. — The following passage is in the same place, c. 17, n. 56; the third is in the same place below, in which for *temporalem* the editions, except 1, 8 and the Vatican, read *corporalem*, but the original has *temporalium*.

la: Psalm. 7, 10. Enarrat. ibi n. 9, multis mutatis, sed ad verbum in Glossa ibid. Ibid. est etiam seq. locus; et respicitur Ps. 36, 4.

en: Ps. 7:10. *Enarratio* there, n. 9, with many changes, but word for word in the Gloss on the same place. In the same place is also the following passage; and Ps. 36:4 is alluded to.

la: Psalm. 9, 16; Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 13.

en: Ps. 9:16; *Enarratio* on this Psalm, n. 13.

la: Augustinus, XI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 10, vide supra pag. 878, nota 3, ubi plura ex eodem loco afferuntur, ad quae mox respicitur.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XI, c. 6, n. 10; see above, p. 878, note 3, where more is adduced from the same passage, to which reference is presently made.

la: Codd. *nullis*.

en: The codices read *nullis*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latini re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 900–902 = printed pp. 878–880) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 61084–61216). This is the LITTERA MAGISTRI (Peter Lombard's text), printed above Bonaventure's commentary at the head of Distinction XXXVIII. Lombard's text has four chapters: Cap. I (*De voluntate et eius fine*), Cap. II (*Quis sit bonus finis, scilicet caritas*), Cap. III (*Quod omnes bonae voluntates unum habent finem...*), Cap. IV (*De differentia voluntatis et intentionis et finis*). Littera chunks carry no scholion.

**Page-split map.** The littera begins mid-page on printed p.878 (the upper part of p.878 is the tail of the d.37 commentary). Cap. I–III sit on p.878; Cap. III's closing paragraph and Cap. IV's body span p.879; Cap. IV concludes at the top of p.880, immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII` (the divisio chunk). Page breaks placed at the running-head boundaries: `<!-- page 879 -->` before "Verumtamen huic sententiae"; `<!-- page 880 -->` before "ergo altera est voluntas videndi fenestras".

**Apparatus map.** 11 entries total, with Quaracchi's per-page restart:
- p.878 footer (`NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM`): notes 1–5 → `[^1]`–`[^5]`. (The left-column note `Hic dub. 1.2.3.` above that subheader belongs to the d.37 commentary, not the littera, and is excluded.)
- p.879 footer: notes 1–5 → `[^6]`–`[^9]` (note 5 = the cross-reference to p.878 note 3 → `[^9]`).
- p.880 footer: the single editorial note `Codd. nullis` on the word *nulli* → `[^10]`. (The `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block on p.880 belongs to the divisio chunk.)

**Hand-off picked up.** The a2-q3/dubia agents flagged that the p.878 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footer block belongs to this littera (Lombard's-text footnotes). Confirmed and captured here as `[^1]`–`[^5]`.

**Hand-off forwarded.** The p.880 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer notes belong to `bon-sent-II-d38-divisio` (COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS, raw 61217–61269); only the `nulli`-note migrates here.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR-garbled "fideliam" on p.879 (`fi-/deliam`) is the printed word as set (a Quaracchi line-break artifact "fi-deliam" = *fideliam*); retained as printed.


title: Dist. 38, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVIII — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXVIII — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
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## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII.
### *Qualiter per peccatum depravatio fiat in ipsa voluntate.*

*Post praedicta de voluntate eiusque fine etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, quid sit malum sive peccatum in generali; in hac parte determinat, qualiter peccatum per actum voluntatis habeat introduci. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes tres. In quarum prima determinat Magister, qualiter peccatum a voluntate habeat ortum in generali. In secunda vero descendit ad speciales differentias peccati, infra distinctione quadragesima secunda: *Cum autem voluntas mala et operatio sint* etc. In tertia vero inquirit, unde[^1] ortum habeat in ipsa voluntate potestas peccandi, infra distinctione quadragesima quarta: *Post praedicta, consideratione dignum occurrit* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima inquirit Magister, qualiter ipsa voluntas habeat depravari. Secundo vero, qualiter ex pravitate voluntatis fiat depravatio in actu exteriori, infra distinctione quadragesima: *Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur.* Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, qualiter voluntas habeat depravari. In secunda vero inquirit, quare magis depravetur voluntas quam alia potentia[^2], infra distinctione trigesima nona: *Hic autem oritur quaestio satis necessaria.*

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet duas partes. Quoniam enim depravatio et rectificatio voluntatis attenditur penes finem, et voluntas habet comparari ad finem mediante intentione; ideo pars ista duas partes habet. In quarum prima determinat Magister de rectificatione et depravatione voluntatis ex parte finis. Secundo vero inquirit differentiam voluntatis et intentionis[^3], ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri, quid distet inter voluntatem et intentionem.* Prima pars habet quatuor partes. Quia enim obliquatio cognosci habet per rectitudinem — «nam rectum iudex est sui et obliqui[^4]» — ideo in prima parte ostendit Magister, quod ex parte finis venit rectitudo voluntatis. Secundo determinat, quis sit ille finis, ibi: *Qui ergo caritatem sibi ponit finem.* In tertia vero determinat de unitate finis respectu bonarum voluntatum, ibi: *Sed quaeritur, utrum omnes bonae voluntates* etc. Quarto vero movet quoddam dubium et determinat, ibi: *Verumtamen huic sententiae, qua dictum est* etc. Secunda vero pars, in qua determinat de differentia voluntatis et intentionis, habet duas. In quarum prima quaerit differentiam secundum rationem, ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri* etc. Secundo de differentia secundum rem, ibi: *Sed quaeritur, utrum intentio talis sit voluntas.* — Et secundum hoc duo determinantur in parte ista, scilicet de comparatione voluntatis ad finem, et de differentia intentionis et voluntatis.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam igitur huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Et primo quaeritur de comparatione voluntatis ad suum finem.

Secundo vero quaeritur de differentia intentionis ad voluntatem.

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo quaeritur, utrum voluntas ratione finis sit commendabilis.

Secundo quaeritur, quis sit ille finis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonae voluntates habeant unum finem, vel diversos.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum malae voluntates communicent in fine, an constituant sibi fines alios et alios.

---

english:
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## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII.
### *How through sin a depravation comes about in the will itself.*

*After the foregoing concerning the will and its end, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed what evil or sin is in general; in this part he determines how sin is introduced through an act of the will. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master determines how sin has its origin from the will in general. In the second he descends to the special differences of sin, below in the forty-second distinction: *But when the evil will and the operation, etc.* In the third he inquires whence[^1] the power of sinning has its origin in the will itself, below in the forty-fourth distinction: *After the foregoing, something worthy of consideration arises, etc.*

The first part has two. In the first the Master inquires how the will itself comes to be depraved. In the second, how from the pravity of the will a depravation comes about in the exterior act, below in the fortieth distinction: *After these things, something must be added concerning acts.* The first part has two. In the first he determines how the will comes to be depraved. In the second he inquires why the will is depraved more than another power[^2], below in the thirty-ninth distinction: *But here arises a question of considerable necessity.*

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has two parts. For since the depravation and the rectification of the will is regarded with respect to the end, and the will is to be compared to the end by the mediation of intention; therefore this part has two parts. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the rectification and depravation of the will on the side of the end. In the second he inquires into the difference between will and intention[^3], at the place: *It is also wont to be asked what distinguishes will from intention.* The first part has four parts. For since obliquity comes to be known through rectitude — «for the straight is the judge of itself and of the oblique[^4]» — therefore in the first part the Master shows that the rectitude of the will comes on the side of the end. Secondly he determines what that end is, at the place: *He, therefore, who sets charity as his end.* In the third he determines concerning the unity of the end in respect of good wills, at the place: *But it is asked whether all good wills, etc.* In the fourth he raises a certain doubt and determines it, at the place: *Nevertheless, against this opinion, by which it has been said, etc.* The second part, in which he determines concerning the difference between will and intention, has two. In the first of these he seeks the difference according to reason, at the place: *It is also wont to be asked, etc.* Secondly the difference according to the thing, at the place: *But it is asked whether such an intention is a will.* — And according to this two things are determined in this part, namely concerning the comparison of the will to the end, and concerning the difference between intention and will.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding, then, of this part, a question arises here concerning two matters.

And first it is asked concerning the comparison of the will to its end.

Secondly it is asked concerning the difference of intention from will.

Concerning the first, four things are asked.

First it is asked whether the will is commendable by reason of its end.

Secondly it is asked what that end is.

Thirdly it is asked whether good wills have one end, or diverse ones.

Fourthly it is asked whether evil wills share in a common end, or set up for themselves ends differing from one another.

---

en: The codices read *nullis*.

la: Edd., excepta I, *utrum*.

en: The editions, except the first, read *utrum*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4: *voluntas in suo actu, quam aliqua alia potentia.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads: *the will in its act, than any other power.*

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 hic adiungunt *et finis*, quae verba etiam infra, ubi divisio secundae partis habetur, verbis *de differentia voluntatis et intentionis* addunt. — Secundum Aristot., I. *de Anima*, text. 83. (c. 3.).

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 here add *and of the end*, which words they also add below, where the division of the second part is given, to the words *concerning the difference of will and intention*. — According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 83 (c. 3). ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 p.902 = printed p.880) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 61217–61269). This chunk is the COMMENTARIUS opener (`Post praedicta de voluntate eiusque fine etc.`), the DIVISIO TEXTUS (division of Lombard's text for d.38), and the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (listing of the questions) for Distinction XXXVIII. Divisio chunks carry no scholion.

**Page-split map.** The entire divisio sits on printed p.880. The upper part of p.880 holds the tail of the d.38 littera (Lombard's text, Cap. IV); `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII` begins mid-page after the littera. The next chunk (`d38-a1-q1`) begins on printed p.881 (running head `DIST. XXXVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`) immediately after this chunk's TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM. No internal page break.

**Apparatus map.** 4 entries, all from the p.880 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block:
- note 1 `Codd. nullis` (on *unde* in the divisio) → `[^1]`
- note 2 `Edd., excepta I, utrum` (on *quam alia potentia*) → `[^2]`
- note 3 `Vat. cum edd. 3, 4: voluntas in suo actu...` → `[^3]`
- note 4 = the two combined editorial notes printed as Quaracchi nn. 3 and 4 (the *et finis* variant on *voluntatis et intentionis*, plus the Aristotle *de Anima* source for the «rectum iudex» dictum) → `[^4]`. These two short notes are merged into one apparatus entry because the dictum and the *et finis* variant both attach to the same sentence cluster in the body.

**Hand-off picked up.** Confirmed from `d38-littera`: the p.880 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block belongs to this divisio chunk (captured here). The separate `Codd. nullis` editorial note sitting *above* the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` header on p.880 is the littera's `[^10]` (note on *nulli*) and stays with the littera; it is NOT duplicated here. (The identical-looking `Codd. nullis` here as `[^1]` is the distinct divisio note on *unde*, which the printed footer marks with `'` directly under the NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM header.)

**Hand-off forwarded.** None — `d38-a1-q1` begins cleanly on p.881 with its own footer block (`DIST. XXXVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`); no shared-page footer to split.

**[?] flags.** None. PDF (p.902) read confirms the OCR body and footer verbatim.