title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 6

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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum caritas sit forma virtutum.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit forma virtutum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicitur ad *Romanos* primo[^1]: *Iustitia revelatur ex fide in fidem*; ibi Glossa: « *Fides est daemonum et nominetenus Christianorum. Haec est informis qualitas mentis, quae ideo dicitur informis, quia sociam non habet caritatem, quae est forma omnium virtutum* ».

2. Item, hoc ostenditur per illud quod dicitur in Glossa ad *Galatas* quinto[^2]: *Fructus autem Spiritus est caritas* etc.; ibi Glossa: « *Attende, quod in enumeratione fructuum caput virtutum praemisit, id est caritatem. Quae enim alia inter fructus Spiritus debuit tenere primatum, nisi caritas, sine qua virtutes ceterae non reputantur esse virtutes* »: si ergo virtutes aliae sine caritate non reputantur esse virtutes, ergo quod sint verae virtutes, hoc habent a caritate: ergo ab ipsa caritate habent complementum et informationem.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: « *Affectus enim imponit nomen operi*[^3] »: ergo nullum opus potest esse rectum, nisi affectus primo rectificetur; affectus autem non potest esse rectus, nisi diligat Deum propter se et super omnia, et hoc est per caritatem: igitur omne opus, cuiuscumque virtutis sit, si rectum est et bonum, hoc habet a caritate. Cum ergo actus caritatis informet omnia opera recta, videtur, quod et ipsa caritas informet omnes alias virtutes, quia, sicut se habet actus ad actum, ita habitus ad habitum.

4. Item, in moralibus complementum et species[^4] attenditur in ordine ad finem; sed amor summi Boni est illud quod cetera facit in finem debitum tendere: igitur amor summi Boni dat omnibus habitibus gratuitis et eorum operibus formam et complementum. Cum igitur ille amor sit caritas, caritas est forma virtutum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Super illud ad *Colossenses* tertio[^5]: *Caritas est vinculum perfectionis*; ibi Glossa: « *Cetera dona perfectum faciunt; caritas omnia ligat, ne abeant* »: si ergo aliae virtutes a caritate reddunt habentem perfectum, videtur, quod perfectae sint in se: ergo non indigent perfici nec formari a caritate.

2. Item, diversorum secundum speciem diversae sunt perfectiones secundum speciem; sed habitus virtutum secundum speciem diversificantur, secundum quod in praecedentibus[^6] est ostensum et communiter tenetur: cum ergo caritas sit virtus una, videtur, quod ab ea aliae virtutes formari non possint.

3. Item, quando aliqua duo in diversis subiectis sunt, impossibile est, unum esse formam alterius; sed caritas cum aliis virtutibus omnibus non reperitur in una potentia, quia diversae virtutes diversas potentias respiciunt[^7]: ergo impossibile est, quod virtutes aliae a caritate informentur.

4. Item, quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod sunt species immediate unum genus dividentes et immediate fluentes ab uno principio, unum illorum non potest esse forma alterius, quia oppositum non potest esse forma oppositi, nec disparatum disparati; sed caritas dividitur ex opposito cum aliis virtutibus[^8]; et iterum, omnes virtutes immediate fluunt a gratia, quae est omnium origo et
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forma: ergo una virtus non potest informare alteram; et per hoc concluditur, quod aliae virtutes non formantur a caritate sibi coniuncta.

5. Item, formae non est forma, nec perfectionis perfectio, nec ultimi aliud ultimum reperire, quia iam esset abire in infinitum[^9]; sed quaelibet virtus forma est, quaelibet etiam perfectio potentiae est, quaelibet nihilominus « *est ultimum potentiae* »: ergo videtur, quod una virtus aliam formam a se ipsa non possit habere: videtur ergo falsum et non intelligibile, quod aliae virtutes formentur a caritate.

6. Item, si aliae virtutes a caritate formantur et habent esse virtutis: igitur esse virtutem soli caritati convenit per se, aliis vero per accidens. Quodsi hoc est falsum, immo aliae virtutes, per se loquendo, virtutes sunt, cum sint species virtutis[^10]: ergo videtur, quod hoc sit falsum, quod caritas sit forma virtutum.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Omnes virtutes informantur a caritate, quia per ipsam omnes tendunt in finem ultimum et complementum accipiunt.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod habitus cuiuslibet virtutis tripliciter habet considerari secundum triplicem comparationem, videlicet ad obiectum, ad subiectum et ad finem ultimum[^11]. Possumus igitur loqui de virtutibus secundum istum triplicem respectum. — Et si loquamur de eis in comparatione ad obiectum; sic sunt formae tantum se ipsis distinctae, et earum distinctio innotescit per actum et obiectum; et sic non sunt formabiles nec perfectibiles ab aliquo uno, cum ipsae sint formae et perfectiones distinctae. — Si autem loquamur de virtutibus in comparatione ad subiectum; sic formae sunt, et tamen nihilominus formabiles: formae quidem sunt informantes subiectum quantum ad bonitatem moralem; per se ipsas tamen non sufficiunt ad bonitatem gratuitam, per quam anima efficitur Deo placita et accepta: et ideo perfici possunt et formari per gratiam, quae simul gratificat animam et habitus existentes in illa[^12]. — Postremo, si loquamur de ipsis habitibus virtutum in comparatione ad finem ultimum; sic formae sunt et formabiles etiam: formae quidem sunt, quia dispositiones sunt ipsius animae ordinantes ad perveniendum in finem[^13]; formabiles tamen sunt, quia, etsi omnes disponant ad tendendum in finem ultimum, perfectio tamen tendentiae venit ex ipsa caritate. Sicut enim corpora gravia inclinantur ad centrum per pondus, sic spiritus tendunt ad summum Bonum per pondus dilectionis[^14]. — Et huiusmodi signum est, quod caritas habet idem et sub eadem ratione pro obiecto et fine, quod non est reperire in alia virtute. Finis enim est bonum sub ratione boni et Bonum summum; et hoc quidem Bonum sub ratione boni est caritatis obiectum. Et propterea ceterae virtutes quantum ad rationem tendentiae in finem ultimum ab ipsa caritate suscipiunt complementum; et ideo non immerito radici caritatis attribuitur perfectio meriti. — Et secundum hoc concedi potest, ceteras virtutes a caritate formari, sicut auctoritates dicunt, et rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt, quae concedendae sunt, quoniam verum concludunt[^15].

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod virtutes aliae faciunt animam perfectam; dicendum, quod est perfectio simpliciter, et est perfectio secundum quid[^16]. Quaelibet autem virtus perfectum facit, secundum quid tamen, quia respectu specialis actus et obiecti. Perfectionem autem simpliciter non habet anima nisi in universitate virtutum, in quantum ab una gratia informantur et ab una caritate imperantur, mediante cuius adminiculo perducunt ad finem ultimum. Unde licet aliae virtutes dicantur perficere, ex hoc non potest concludi, quin ipsae perficiantur a caritate; perfectioni enim secundum quid superaddi potest perfectio simpliciter.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversorum secundum speciem diversae sunt perfectiones secundum speciem; dicendum, quod est perfectio in esse primo, et est perfectio in esse secundo. Verbum autem propositum veritatem habet de perfectione quantum ad esse primum, non autem de perfectione
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quantum ad bene esse. Cum autem dicimus, ipsam caritatem esse formam et perfectivam[^17] virtutum; hoc non est quantum ad ipsarum primum esse, sed quantum ad bene esse, videlicet quantum ad perfectionem et complementum meriti. Unde sicut ceterae virtutes, licet formaliter distinguantur in genere virtutis, tamen a gratia formantur, secundum quod gratuitae; sic etiam ceterae virtutes, quamvis sint distinctae, a caritate formari possunt, secundum quod meritoriae; perfectionem enim meriti habent ex unica ratione, videlicet ex perfecta tendentia in summum finem[^18].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae sunt in diversis subiectis, unum non potest esse alterius forma et perfectio; dicendum, quod aliquid informari ab aliquo est dupliciter: vel sicut a principio constitutivo, vel sicut a principio regitivo et directivo[^19]; vel per alia verba: est forma, quae complet in essendo; et est forma, quae complet in movendo. Cum ergo dicimus, ceteras virtutes formari a caritate; hoc non est, quia caritas sit forma constitutiva ipsarum virtutum, dans eis complementum in essendo; sed quia est forma directiva, dans eis complementum in regendo et ordinando. Sicut enim gravitas lapidem cum omnibus quae in eo sunt, trahit deorsum et dirigit ad centrum; sic caritas animam elevat sursum et ceteras virtutes movet et dirigit ad finem suum. — Quod autem ipse obiicit, quod forma et formatum non possunt esse in diversis subiectis; hoc est verum de forma constitutiva, quae complet in essendo; de alia non habet veritatem. Sicut enim una potentia potest ab alia regi et moveri, sic habitus unius potentiae ab habitu alterius; unde sicut distinctio potentiarum non tollit ordinem in movendo, sic etiam nec impedit informationem virtutum, quae penes illum ordinem attenditur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtutes ex opposito dividuntur; dicendum, quod hoc est per comparationem ad sua obiecta, secundum quae distinguuntur; et sic una virtus non est forma alterius. In comparatione autem ad ipsam gratiam, in qua colligantur et uniuntur, et ad ipsum finem, ad quem ordinantur; sic non habent oppositionem, immo potius connexionem. Et ex hac parte una virtus potest alteram informare, pro eo quod immediatius tendit in ipsum finem. Unde licet omnes virtutes immediate comparentur ad gratiam, a qua formantur; hoc non impedit, quin per comparationem ad finem una virtus ab alia informetur[^20]. — Posset etiam dici, quod virtus caritatis non solum immediatius ordinat in finem, verum etiam immediatius se habet ad gratiam. Et huius signum est, quia non potest esse informis[^21], sicut ceterae virtutes. Unde tum ex maiori immediatione ad finem, tum ex maiori immediatione ad gratiam habet alias virtutes informare.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod formae non est forma, nec perfectionis perfectio; dicendum, quod illud intelligendum est, per se loquendo: quia forma non formatur, secundum quod forma, nec perfectio perficitur, secundum quod perfectio, sed secundum quod in se habet aliquam informitatem et aliquam imperfectionem. Et quia aliae virtutes, quantum est de se, informitatem aliquam habent et imperfectionem nec sunt omnino ipsius potentiae ultimativae[^22]; ideo perfici habent et ad maius complementum perduci per gratiam et caritatem. — Praeterea, sicut tactum est prius, caritas non est forma et perfectio aliarum virtutum per constitutionem, vel per compositionem, sed potius per ordinem in finem. Unde virtutes alio modo sunt perfectiones, et alio modo a caritate perficiuntur: perfectiones, inquam, sunt, in quantum subiectum suum qualificant habilitando ad actum sibi debitum; perficiuntur autem, in quantum a caritate imperantur et per eius imperium et adminiculum perfectius in finem ordinantur[^23].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si caritas est perfectio virtutum, tunc accidit aliis esse virtutes; dicendum, quod hoc esset verum, si virtutes aliae totam perfectionem virtutis traherent a caritate; hoc autem est falsum. Virtutes enim quandam perfectionem habent ex se, et quandam ex gratia superinfusa, et quandam etiam ex caritate superadiuncta, secundum quod tactum est supra. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod accidat aliis virtutibus esse virtutes; ex se enim ipsis habent, quod virtutes sint, licet non habeant in tanta completione ex se, in quanta habent esse ex adminiculo caritatis[^24].

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### Question VI. *Whether charity is the form of the virtues.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether charity is the form of the virtues. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, from that which is said in *Romans* one[^1]: *Justice is revealed from faith unto faith*; there the Gloss: « *Faith is [the faith] of demons and of Christians in name only. This is an unformed quality of the mind, which is therefore called unformed because it has not charity as its companion, which is the form of all the virtues* ».

2. Likewise, this is shown by that which is said in the Gloss on *Galatians* five[^2]: *But the fruit of the Spirit is charity* etc.; there the Gloss: « *Note that in the enumeration of the fruits he set before [them] the head of the virtues, that is, charity. For what else among the fruits of the Spirit ought to hold the primacy, except charity, without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues* »: if therefore the other virtues without charity are not reckoned to be virtues, therefore that they be true virtues, this they have from charity: therefore from charity itself they have completion and information.

3. Likewise, this very thing seems [so] by *reason*: « *For the affection imposes the name upon the work*[^3] »: therefore no work can be right unless the affection is first set right; but the affection cannot be right unless it love God for his own sake and above all things, and this is through charity: therefore every work, of whatever virtue it be, if it is right and good, this it has from charity. Since therefore the act of charity informs all right works, it seems that charity itself also informs all the other virtues, since, as act stands to act, so habit [stands] to habit.

4. Likewise, in moral matters completion and species[^4] is regarded in [its] ordering toward the end; but the love of the highest Good is that which makes the rest tend toward their due end: therefore the love of the highest Good gives to all the gratuitous habits and to their works form and completion. Since therefore that love is charity, charity is the form of the virtues.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that [text] of *Colossians* three[^5]: *Charity is the bond of perfection*; there the Gloss: « *The other gifts make [one] perfect; charity binds all things together, lest they slip away* »: if therefore the other virtues from charity render the one having [them] perfect, it seems that they are perfect in themselves: therefore they do not need to be perfected nor formed by charity.

2. Likewise, of things diverse according to species the perfections are diverse according to species; but the habits of the virtues are diversified according to species, according as in the preceding [questions][^6] has been shown and is commonly held: since therefore charity is one virtue, it seems that the other virtues cannot be formed by it.

3. Likewise, when any two things are in diverse subjects, it is impossible that one be the form of the other; but charity together with all the other virtues is not found in one power, because diverse virtues regard diverse powers[^7]: therefore it is impossible that the other virtues be informed by charity.

4. Likewise, whenever some things so stand that they are species immediately dividing one genus and immediately flowing from one principle, one of them cannot be the form of the other, because an opposite cannot be the form of [its] opposite, nor one disparate [thing the form] of [its] disparate; but charity is divided in opposition with the other virtues[^8]; and again, all the virtues immediately flow from grace, which is the origin and
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form of all: therefore one virtue cannot inform another; and through this it is concluded that the other virtues are not formed by charity joined to itself.

5. Likewise, of a form there is no form, nor of a perfection [is there] a perfection, nor of an ultimate is there found another ultimate, because then it would be to go off into infinity[^9]; but every virtue is a form, every [virtue] also is a perfection of the power, every [virtue] nonetheless is « *an ultimate of the power* »: therefore it seems that one virtue cannot have a form from another distinct from itself: therefore it seems false and unintelligible that the other virtues be formed by charity.

6. Likewise, if the other virtues are formed by charity and have the being of a virtue: therefore to be a virtue belongs to charity alone *per se*, but to the others by accident. But if this is false—nay, rather, the other virtues, speaking *per se*, are virtues, since they are species of virtue[^10]: therefore it seems that this is false, that charity is the form of the virtues.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** All the virtues are informed by charity, because through it they all tend toward the ultimate end and receive completion.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the habit of any virtue has to be considered in a threefold way according to a threefold relation, namely to the object, to the subject, and to the ultimate end[^11]. We can therefore speak of the virtues according to this threefold respect. — And if we speak of them in relation to the object; thus they are forms distinct only by themselves, and their distinction becomes known through act and object; and thus they are not formable nor perfectible by any one [thing], since they themselves are distinct forms and perfections. — But if we speak of the virtues in relation to the subject; thus they are forms, and yet nonetheless formable: forms indeed they are, informing the subject as to moral goodness; yet by themselves they do not suffice for the gratuitous goodness through which the soul is made pleasing and accepted to God: and therefore they can be perfected and formed through grace, which at once makes the soul pleasing [to God] and the habits existing in it[^12]. — Finally, if we speak of the very habits of the virtues in relation to the ultimate end; thus they are forms and also formable: forms indeed they are, because they are dispositions of the soul itself ordering [it] to arriving at the end[^13]; yet formable they are, because, although they all dispose toward tending to the ultimate end, nevertheless the perfection of the tending comes from charity itself. For as heavy bodies are inclined toward the center by [their] weight, so spirits tend toward the highest Good by the weight of love[^14]. — And a sign of this kind is that charity has the same [thing] and under the same account for object and end, which is not to be found in another virtue. For the end is the good under the account of good and the highest Good; and this Good under the account of good is the object of charity. And on that account the other virtues, as to the account of [their] tending toward the ultimate end, receive completion from charity itself; and therefore not without merit is the perfection of merit attributed to the root of charity. — And according to this it can be granted that the other virtues are formed by charity, as the authorities say, and as the reasons adduced for this show, which are to be granted, since they conclude truly[^15].

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that the other virtues make the soul perfect; it must be said that there is a perfection simply, and there is a perfection in a certain respect[^16]. But every virtue makes [the soul] perfect, yet in a certain respect, because in respect of a special act and object. But the soul does not have perfection simply except in the totality of the virtues, inasmuch as they are informed by one grace and commanded by one charity, by whose aid as a means they lead [the soul] to the ultimate end. Hence although the other virtues be said to perfect, from this it cannot be concluded that they themselves are not perfected by charity; for to a perfection in a certain respect a perfection simply can be superadded.

2. To that which is objected, that of things diverse according to species the perfections are diverse according to species; it must be said that there is a perfection in [the] first being, and there is a perfection in [the] second being. But the proposed word holds truth concerning perfection as to first being, but not concerning perfection
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as to well-being. But when we say that charity itself is the form and perfective[^17] of the virtues; this is not as to their first being, but as to [their] well-being, namely as to the perfection and completion of merit. Hence just as the other virtues, although they be formally distinguished in the genus of virtue, are nevertheless formed by grace, according as [they are] gratuitous; so also the other virtues, although they be distinct, can be formed by charity, according as [they are] meritorious; for they have the perfection of merit from a single account, namely from a perfect tending toward the highest end[^18].

3. To that which is objected, that of things which are in diverse subjects one cannot be the form and perfection of the other; it must be said that for something to be informed by something is in two ways: either as by a constitutive principle, or as by a ruling and directive principle[^19]; or, in other words: there is a form which completes in being; and there is a form which completes in moving. When therefore we say that the other virtues are formed by charity; this is not because charity is the constitutive form of those virtues, giving them completion in being; but because it is a directive form, giving them completion in ruling and ordering. For as gravity draws downward and directs toward the center the stone together with all that is in it; so charity raises the soul upward and moves and directs the other virtues toward their end. — But as for what he objects, that the form and the thing formed cannot be in diverse subjects; this is true of the constitutive form, which completes in being; of the other it does not hold truth. For as one power can be ruled and moved by another, so the habit of one power [can be ruled and moved] by the habit of another; hence as the distinction of the powers does not take away order in moving, so also it does not impede the information of the virtues, which is regarded according to that order.

4. To that which is objected, that the virtues are divided in opposition; it must be said that this is by comparison to their objects, according to which they are distinguished; and thus one virtue is not the form of another. But in comparison to grace itself, in which they are bound together and united, and to the end itself, to which they are ordered; thus they do not have opposition, but rather connection. And from this side one virtue can inform another, for the reason that it tends more immediately into the end itself. Hence although all the virtues be immediately compared to grace, by which they are formed; this does not impede that, through comparison to the end, one virtue be informed by another[^20]. — It could also be said that the virtue of charity not only more immediately orders [the soul] into the end, but also stands more immediately to grace. And a sign of this is that it cannot be unformed[^21], as the other virtues [can]. Hence both from a greater immediacy to the end, and from a greater immediacy to grace, it has [the power] to inform the other virtues.

5. To that which is objected, that of a form there is no form, nor of a perfection a perfection; it must be said that that is to be understood, speaking *per se*: because a form is not formed, according as [it is] a form, nor is a perfection perfected, according as [it is] a perfection, but according as in itself it has some unformedness and some imperfection. And because the other virtues, as far as is of themselves, have some unformedness and imperfection, nor are they wholly of the ultimative power itself[^22]; therefore they have to be perfected and led to a greater completion through grace and charity. — Moreover, as was touched on before, charity is not the form and perfection of the other virtues by constitution, or by composition, but rather by [their] ordering toward the end. Hence the virtues are perfections in one way, and in another way are perfected by charity: perfections, I say, they are, inasmuch as they qualify their subject by enabling [it] for the act due to it; but they are perfected inasmuch as they are commanded by charity and, through its command and aid, are more perfectly ordered toward the end[^23].

6. To that which is objected, that if charity is the perfection of the virtues, then it is accidental to the others to be virtues; it must be said that this would be true if the other virtues drew the whole perfection of a virtue from charity; but this is false. For the virtues have a certain perfection from themselves, and a certain [perfection] from superinfused grace, and a certain [perfection] also from superadded charity, according as was touched on above. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that it is accidental to the other virtues to be virtues; for from their very selves they have that they are virtues, although they do not have [it] in such completion from themselves as they have being from the aid of charity[^24].

> **Scholion.** This question has no scholion of its own. The closing doctrinal note (*caritas* as *motor*, *forma*, and *finis* of all the virtues; *forma directiva* rather than *constitutiva* — cf. this question's reply *Ad 3*; Petr. a Tar. on the threefold form of each virtue; the wider doxography on Petr. Lombardi III. Sent. d. 27) is supplied by the article-style **scholion §II of the preceding question** (`bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q5`), which expressly opens *« Quoad ultimam quaestionem… »* — "As to the last question…". The apparatus marker 24 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms this redirect. See **d36-a1-q5 scholion §II.**

la: Vers. 17. — De Glossa cfr. supra pag. 492, nota 7.

en: Verse 17. — On the Gloss cf. above, p. 492, note 7.

la: Vers. 22. — Quoad Glossam vide supra pag. 602, nota 4. — Pro *Item, hoc* codd. A F H I L N T U Z bb *Item, hoc ipsum*, cod. X *Item, hoc idem*.

en: Verse 22. — As to the Gloss see above, p. 602, note 4. — For *Item, hoc* ("Likewise, this") codices A F H I L N T U Z bb [read] *Item, hoc ipsum*, codex X *Item, hoc idem*.

la: Ambros., I. de Offic. c. 30. n. 147. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XL. — Circa finem arg. pro *caritas informet* edd. 1. 2 *caritas in se teneat*, Vat. *caritas informet et in se teneat*. Deinde post *ita* cod. K repetit *se habet*.

en: Ambrose, *On the Duties [of Ministers]* I, c. 30, n. 147. Cf. II Sent., text of the Master, d. XL. — Near the end of the argument, for *caritas informet* ("charity informs") editions 1 and 2 [read] *caritas in se teneat*, the Vatican [edition] *caritas informet et in se teneat*. Then after *ita* codex K repeats *se habet*.

la: Sive forma; nam εἶδος, quod in textibus Graecis legitur, significat et speciem et formam. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.), et V. Metaph. text. 2. seq. nec non VIII. text. 12. (IV. c. 2. et VII. c. 4.), ubi etiam docet, formam et finem plerumque coincidere sive idem esse. Vide supra pag. 617, nota 5. — De ipso arg. cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Pro *in moralibus* plures codd. *in moribus* habere videntur.

en: Or "form"; for εἶδος, which is read in the Greek texts, signifies both species and form. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 70 (c. 7), and *Metaphysics* V, text 2 ff., and also VIII, text 12 (IV c. 2 and VII c. 4), where he also teaches that form and end frequently coincide or are the same. See above, p. 617, note 5. — On the argument itself cf. II Sent., d. 38, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — For *in moralibus* ("in moral matters") several codices appear to have *in moribus*.

la: Vers. 14. — Glossa habetur penes Petr. Lombard, et ut interlinearis etiam apud Lyranum; est secundum Haym., qui in hunc locum dicit: *Vinculum enim perfectionis est caritas, quia per illam omnia bona ligantur, ne pereant*.

en: Verse 14. — The Gloss is had in Peter Lombard, and as the interlinear [gloss] also in Lyra; it is according to Haymo, who on this passage says: *For charity is the bond of perfection, because through it all good things are bound together, lest they perish*.

la: Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 33. q. 1. seq. — De *maiori* cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 25. (IX. c. 9.). — In fine arg. ex cod. K supplevimus *aliae virtutes*, quae verba in plurimis codd. desunt, et pro quibus edd. cum paucis codd. exhibent *aliae* tantum.

en: Dist. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 33, q. 1 ff. — On the *major* [premise] cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 25 (IX c. 9). — At the end of the argument from codex K we supplied *aliae virtutes* ("the other virtues"), which words are lacking in most codices, and in place of which the editions, with a few codices, exhibit *aliae* ("the others") only.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — De ratione subinde adducta cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. in corp. — *Maiorem* huius arg., in qua post *aliquo* codd. B T addunt *duo*, insinuant Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Simul.* et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Differentia*.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1. — On the reasoning thereupon adduced cf. above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 5, in the body. — The *major* [premise] of this argument—in which, after *aliquo*, codices B T add *duo* ("two")—Aristotle suggests, *Categories*, c. *On the Simultaneous*, and Porphyry, *Isagoge*, c. *On Difference*.

la: Similiter dicit Aristot., V. Phys. text. 13. (c. 2.): *Amplius autem in infinitum fiet abitio, si erit mutationis mutatio et generationis generatio*. — De *minori*, in qua respicitur definitio virtutis ab Aristot. exhibita, cfr. supra pag. 388, nota 2. et pag. 741, nota 7. — Pro *aliud ultimum* codd. G I L aa *quid ultimum*, edd. *aliquod ultimum*. Inferius post *habere* Vat. addit *vel informare*.

en: Aristotle says likewise, *Physics* V, text 13 (c. 2): *But further, the going-off would proceed to infinity, if there were a change of change and a generation of generation*. — On the *minor* [premise], in which the definition of virtue set forth by Aristotle is regarded, cf. above, p. 388, note 2, and p. 741, note 7. — For *aliud ultimum* ("another ultimate") codices G I L aa [read] *quid ultimum*, the editions *aliquod ultimum*. Below, after *habere*, the Vatican [edition] adds *vel informare*.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1. docet, species participare genera, vel aliis verbis, *rationem* generum suscipere. — Paulo superius pro *esse virtutis* codd. I L Z aa *esse virtutes*, et pro *esse virtutem* cod. F *esse virtutis*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 1, teaches that species participate in genera, or, in other words, take on the *account* of [their] genera. — A little above, for *esse virtutis* codices I L Z aa [read] *esse virtutes*, and for *esse virtutem* codex F *esse virtutis*.

la: Vide supra d. 23. dub. 1, d. 26. dub. 2, d. 27. dub. 1.

en: See above, d. 23, dubium 1; d. 26, dubium 2; d. 27, dubium 1.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. in fine corp.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, at the end of the body.

la: Vide supra pag. 488, nota 9. definitionem virtutis, quam August. perhibet. — Cod. Z *finem ultimum*.

en: See above, p. 488, note 9, the definition of virtue which Augustine furnishes. — Codex Z [reads] *finem ultimum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 639, nota 3. — De seqq. vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. et 5; a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. — Paulo ante edd. voci *pondus* adiungunt *molis*.

en: Cf. above, p. 639, note 3. — On what follows see above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3 and ad 5; a. 2, q. 1, and dubium 1. — A little before, the editions append to the word *pondus* ("weight") [the word] *molis* ("of mass").

la: Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regula 91: *Caritas inter virtutes est causa prior* [siquidem, ut ipse explicat, ipsa est causa, quare opus dicatur bonum], *diuturnitate maior* [ipsa enim non excidit], *mater informatione, forma apparitione* [per opera videlicet caritatis magis apparent ceterae virtutes], *finis remuneratione, universalior opere* [quia omne opus bonum significat, caritatem esse in operante et opus ipsum fieri ex caritate ac propter amorem Dei].

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 91: *Charity among the virtues is the prior cause* [since, as he himself explains, it is the cause why a work is called good], *greater in duration* [for it itself does not fail], *mother in [its] informing, form in [its] manifesting* [namely, through the works of charity the other virtues more appear], *end in [its] rewarding, more universal in operation* [because every good work signifies charity to be in the one operating and the work itself to come to be from charity and on account of the love of God].

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.). — Subinde pro *perfectum* Vat. *animam perfectam*. Inferius pro *perducunt* cod. A *perducuntur*, et proxime post pro *finem ultimum* codd. X Y *perfectionem termini*. Demum post *ex hoc* edd. subdunt *tamen*, et dein post *quin* cod. Z interiicit *et*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV c. 16). — Thereupon, for *perfectum* the Vatican [edition reads] *animam perfectam*. Below, for *perducunt* codex A [reads] *perducuntur*, and just after, for *finem ultimum* codices X Y [read] *perfectionem termini*. Finally, after *ex hoc* the editions add *tamen*, and then after *quin* codex Z inserts *et*.

la: Cod. K *perfectionem*. Paulo inferius pro *complementum* codd. A F *completionem*.

en: Codex K [reads] *perfectionem*. A little below, for *complementum* codices A F [read] *completionem*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius post *formari* edd. inserunt *tamen*.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, after *formari* the editions insert *tamen*.

la: Vide supra pag. 720, nota 1. — Post pauca pro *et est forma* codd. A F *et est alia*.

en: See above, p. 720, note 1. — After a few [words], for *et est forma* codices A F [read] *et est alia*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 4. — Superius pro *hoc non impedit* edd. *hoc tamen non impedit*.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 4. — Above, for *hoc non impedit* the editions [read] *hoc tamen non impedit*.

la: Vocem *perfectio* supplevimus ex cod. Z. Paulo inferius pro *Et quia aliae* edd. *Et quia aliquae*.

en: We supplied the word *perfectio* from codex Z. A little below, for *Et quia aliae* the editions [read] *Et quia aliquae*.

la: Cod. Z *nec sunt in ipsis potentiae ultimatae*.

en: Codex Z [reads] *nec sunt in ipsis potentiae ultimatae* ("nor are they in the very things of the ultimate power").

la: Cod. U *ordinationem*. Idem cod. cum cod. A circa finem solut. pro *perficiuntur autem* substituit *perficiuntur tum, in quantum a caritate perficiuntur, aut.*

en: Codex U [reads] *ordinationem*. The same codex, with codex A, near the end of the solution, for *perficiuntur autem* substitutes *perficiuntur tum, in quantum a caritate perficiuntur, aut.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`raw/vision/vol3/p-{805,806,807}.png` → `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p80{5,6,7}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 55863–56052). Vol III two-column; PDF-priority inversion applied to the footers. English freshly translated literal/parallel. Running heads confirmed: p.805 `QUAESTIO VI.` opener (beneath q5's scholion §II tail in the L-col); p.806 `806 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`; p.807 `DIST. XXXVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI. 807`; p.808 `808 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` then `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` (= d36-dubia, raw 56053). Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Alignment.** PASS 1:1. QUAESTIO VI opener *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit forma virtutum* = TRACTATIO **Sexto et ultimo** *utrum caritas sit forma virtutum*. q6 = **caritas forma virtutum**, the LAST question of d.36. No q-swap.

**Body.** args 1–4 (auctoritates: Rom. 1 Gloss / Gal. 5 Gloss / Ambrose *affectus imponit nomen operi* / amor-summi-Boni) + Sed contra 1–6 (Col. 3 *vinculum perfectionis* / diversae-perfectiones / diversa-subiecta / ex-opposito-divisa + omnes-fluunt-a-gratia / formae-non-est-forma regress / per-accidens-esse-virtutem) + CONCLUSIO (*omnes informantur a caritate*) + Respondeo (triplex comparatio: ad obiectum / ad subiectum / ad finem ultimum → Conclusio 1 / Conclusio 2 grace / Conclusio 3 finem; *pondus dilectionis*; *signum*; Conclusio 4 radici-caritatis) + Solutio oppositorum *Ad 1* (Duplex perfectio simpliciter/secundum-quid) – *Ad 6* (Notandum: triplex perfectio ex-se / ex-gratia / ex-caritate). Key distinction: caritas = **forma directiva** (in regendo/ordinando) NOT **forma constitutiva** (in essendo) — *Ad 3*.

**Page-split map.** p.805→806 break inside Sed contra arg 4 (`…quae est omnium origo et | forma:`). p.806→807 break inside *Ad 2* (`…non autem de perfectione | quantum ad bene esse`). 24-marker NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart, renumbered continuous:
- **p.805 nn.1–8 → [^1]–[^8]** (OWN fresh band — NOTHING picked up from q5; q5's footers all closed on p.804). L-col nn.1–5 = Rom.1 Gloss / Gal.5 Gloss / Ambrose de Offic. + var. / εἶδος=species+forma var. / Col.3 Gloss-Haymo; R-col nn.6–8 = d.27+d.33 + *aliae virtutes* suppl. / cross-refs / d.27 + Categ./Isagoge.
- **p.806 nn.1–8 → [^9]–[^16]** (L-col nn.1–6, R-col nn.7–8). incl. Aristot. Phys.V regress / Topic.IV / dubia cross-refs / q.1-fine-corp / pag.488 def.virtutis / pag.639 pondus + *molis* var. / **Alan ab Insulis Theolog. Regul. 91** (caritas causa-prior/maior/mater/forma/finis/universalior) / Metaph.V + vars.
- **p.807 nn.1–8 → [^17]–[^24]** (L-col nn.1–4, R-col nn.5–8). incl. cod-vars / d.27 cross-refs / pag.720 / d.27 / *perfectio* suppl. / cod.Z var. / cod.U var. / **[^24] = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*** (the scholion redirect). Marker pairing 24/24 clean.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. Grep over q6's full range (raw 55863–56052) for `SCHOLIO[N/K]` returns nothing (watched the OCR `SCHOLIOK` garble per CLAUDE.md) — q6 has NO own scholion header. The closing footer [^24] = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* explicitly redirects to **a1-q5's article-style scholion §II**, which opens *« Quoad ultimam quaestionem… »* and is the *caritas = motor/forma/finis* dossier (forma directiva not constitutiva [hic ad 3]; Petr. a Tar. III.Sent. d.27 q.5 a.2 threefold-form simile; S.Thom. + commentators on Petr. Lombardi III.Sent. d.27). A redirect `> **Scholion.**` note placed LAST in both bodies (body-then-scholion order preserved). REDIRECT: **see d36-a1-q5 scholion §II.**

**Footer hand-off.** PICKED UP from a1-q5: **NOTHING** (q5's NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band closed fully on p.804 at n.5 = q5's [^23]; q5's scholion §II tail spills onto p.805 L-top but its footnotes were all on p.804). q6 opens its own fresh band on p.805. FORWARDED to **d36-dubia**: **NOTHING** — q6's footer band closes fully on **p.807** (n.8 = [^24], the scholion-redirect marker). **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** (= d36-dubia) opens on **p.808** (raw 56053) with its own fresh per-page footer band. d36-dubia is the LAST chunk of d.36.

**`[?]` flags.** NONE — pp.805–807 fully legible at 450 dpi.

**J2 marker fix (2026-07-13).** The English body carried `[^24]` twice: once as the genuine translation anchor at "...ex adminiculo caritatis[^24]" (mirroring the Latin's sole `[^24]` at the same clause), and once inside the `> **Scholion.**` redirect note's prose ("The apparatus marker [^24] ... confirms this redirect"), which is editorial commentary citing the note by number rather than a translated anchor. Cause (a), stray duplicate: de-linked the prose mention to plain "apparatus marker 24" so only the true translation anchor remains.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 36, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Letter of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 808 -->

# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Ubi est caritas, quid est quod possit deesse?* Si enim hoc verum est, quicumque habet caritatem, habet omne quod sufficit ad salutem: ergo videtur, quod superfluant ceterae virtutes. *Si dicas,* quod hoc dicitur, quia caritas habet alias virtutes sibi annexas[^1]; tunc similiter potest dici de qualibet aliarum virtutum; omnes enim connectuntur cuilibet virtuti, sicut et caritati. — Item, gratiae gratis datae non necessario connexae sunt ipsi caritati: et tamen ipsae sunt valde utiles et opportunae ipsi Ecclesiae[^2]: videtur ergo, quod etiam ubi caritas reperitur, multa deesse possint.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicit[^3], quod *ubi est caritas, nihil deest*; hoc intelligit de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem — nam iste defectus proprie defectus est, aliorum vero defectus pro modico est habendus — hoc autem attribuit ipsi caritati ratione connexionis aliarum virtutum. Qui enim habet caritatem habet unde possit Legem implere[^4], habet etiam per consequens ceteras virtutes, quae habilitant ad Legis impletionem.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod similiter posset dici de qualibet alia virtute; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia caritas non tantum aliis *connectitur,* sed etiam est *principium connexionis,* cum sit *vinculum perfectionis* et quodam modo « mater omnis boni », sicut ipse Magister dicit[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, *non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi Veritati, omnia peccata esse paria.* Videtur enim hoc debere placere ipsi Veritati: quia, secundum quod dicit Anselmus[^6], « peccatum nihil est »; in his autem, quae nihil sunt, unum non est maius altero: ergo videtur, quod peccatum unum non possit alterum excellere, igitur habent paritatem. — Item, quodlibet peccatum mortale totaliter privat hominem gratia et inducit mortem; sed in privatione omnimoda non est ponere maius et minus — quia in his quae mortua sunt, non est dicere magis mortuum unum quam reliquum[^7] — ergo in genere peccatorum mortalium unum peccatum non excedit alterum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quia peccatum est *privatio ordinis* et *diminutio habilitatis,* et per unum genus peccati anima magis deordinatur et inhabilior efficitur quam per aliud, sicut manifeste apparet[^8]; indubitanter est verum, quod peccata aequalia non sunt; concupiscentia enim plus inclinat ad unum appetibile quam ad reliquum; et ideo magis facit Deum contemnere et ab ipso elongari et recedere in uno genere peccati quam in alio.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum nihil est; dicendum, quod etsi nihil sit, *essentialiter* loquendo; alicuius tamen est sicut *subiecti,* et alicuius sicut *oppositi;* unde ratione boni maioris vel minoris, quod privatur in diversis peccatis, peccatum unum habet excedere alterum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totaliter privat gratiam et inducit mortem; dicendum, quod licet omne peccatum totaliter privet *gratiam,* non tamen totaliter tollit *habilitatem* ad gratiam; licet omne peccatum *inducat mortem,* non tamen *tollit habilitatem ad vitam:* et ideo, licet aliquid non sit magis et minus mortuum et magis et minus gratia privatum per diversa peccata quantum ad ipsam gratiam et vitam gratiae in se; est tamen magis et minus quantum ad habilitatem naturae respectu gratiae; et ratione illius diversa peccata habent sese invicem excedere. Unde non est simile de corporali morte, in qua totaliter fit privatio et impossibilitas redeundi ad vitam[^9].

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### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Omnia ad duo mandata caritatis pertinent, quia per caritatem implentur et ad caritatem tanquam ad finem referri debent.* Videtur enim duo opposita in se implicare. Si enim per caritatem implentur, potius debent referri ad caritatem sicut ad *principium* quam sicut ad *finem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut tactum fuit supra, distinctione vigesima septima[^10], caritas simul ponitur ipsarum virtutum quantum ad opera meritoria *principium* sive caput, et *forma* sive vinculum, et *finis,* ad quem ordinantur; et hoc est, quia ipsa caritas, dum immediate coniungit ipsi summo Bono, quodam modo supereminet ceteris et ceteras virtutes movet et imperat; et ideo caput et principium est earum. Ulterius, quia movendo facit opera eorum meritoria; ideo dicitur esse *forma*[^11]. Postremo, quia ideo facimus opera meritoria, ut Deo fruamur et per caritatem in Deo quiescamus; hinc est, quod caritas ceterarum virtutum et praeceptorum est *finis.* — Et sic « tres causae incidunt in unum et idem[^12] »; nec mirum, cum caritas faciat Deo conformem, qui habet in se respectu creaturae intentionem triplicis causae. Unde nulla est contrarietas cum eo quod Magister dicit in littera[^13].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Inimicus enim iustitiae est qui poenae timore non peccat.* Nullus enim iustitiae effectus iustitiae inimicatur; sed poena est iustitiae effectus[^14]: cum ergo poena faciat se timeri, videtur, quod non faciat divinae iustitiae inimicari. — Item, nihil quod facit declinare a malo, facit inimicari iustitiae; sed timor poenae, quo quis cessat a peccato, facit declinare a malo[^15]: ergo talis non est inimicus iustitiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum illud intelligitur *praecise* et *per concomitantiam: praecise,* ut dicatur inimicus iustitiae, qui timore poenae non peccat, hoc est, qui a peccato recedit solo timore poenae, non amore iustitiae; talis, inquam, qui ex solo timore movetur, dicitur iustitiae inimicus, non per causam, sed per concomitantiam. Licet enim timor ille non causet inimicitiam, *concomitatur* tamen ipsam concupiscentiam malam, per quam sumus inimici Dei; nam *qui amicus est huius mundi, inimicus Dei constituitur*[^16]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa duo, quae obiicit; quoniam ipse opponit, ac si verbum illud intelligeretur dictum esse per causam[^17].

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod ultimo concludit, quod *omnium divinarum Scripturarum plenitudo est dilectio Dei et proximi.* Si enim « natura operatur, quanto brevius potest, et non facit per plura quod potest facere per pauciora[^18] »; videtur similiter, quod hoc modo operari debeat divina Sapientia. Si ergo in tota Scriptura nihil plus continetur quam verbum de mandato caritatis, videtur tunc, quod circa hoc solum sacra Scriptura deberet versari, et de nullo alio ibi tractari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod plenitudinem alicuius contineri in aliquo, hoc est dupliciter: vel *integraliter,* vel *causaliter.* Plenitudo autem divinorum Eloquiorum in caritate non continetur *integraliter,* quia multae aliae virtutes ibi docentur et praecipiuntur, quae sunt diversae et distinctae a caritate; sed quod[^19] dicitur contineri, hoc est *causaliter,* quia tota sacra Scriptura finaliter ordinatur ad hoc, ut diligamus Deum et proximum.

Et si tu obiicias, quod *qui diligit proximum Legem implevit*[^20]: ergo illud solum mandatum deberet in Lege contineri; dicendum, quod mandata et documenta in sacra Scriptura multiplicantur propter duo, videlicet propter *removendam caecitatem* ex parte intellectus, et propter *excludendum fastidium* ex parte ipsius affectus. Necesse est enim, quod sciamus modos, secundum quos debemus ordinari ad proximum et ad Deum; et quia illi varii sunt, et nos ignorantes sumus nec possumus simul illa capere: ideo oportuit divisim per diversa documenta distinguere. — Rursus, quia affectus noster fastidit unum et delectatur in varietate[^21]: ideo diversis modis Scriptura docet et insinuat unum et idem, ut affectus noster, dum in diversis et variis idem invenit, proficiat in unitate et delectetur in varietate, ut tanto profectus sit maior, quanto delectabilior. Et propterea modo in ipsa sacra Scriptura reperiuntur *mandata obligatoria,* modo *exempla*[^22] *attractiva,* modo *monita salutaria,* modo *documenta Prophetarum,* modo *Evangelistarum,* ut ex omnibus his excludatur *fastidium,* et homo perfectius dirigatur ad unum. Et ex hoc convinci potest, quod sacra Scriptura, etsi magna sit, tamen optime tradita est et nihil continet superfluum, nihil etiam diminutum[^23].

english:
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# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about this which is said: *Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking?* For if this is true, whoever has charity has everything that suffices for salvation: therefore it seems that the other virtues are superfluous. *If you say* that this is said because charity has the other virtues annexed to it[^1]; then likewise it can be said of any of the other virtues; for all are connected to any virtue whatever, just as to charity. — Likewise, the gratuitously given graces are not necessarily connected to charity itself: and yet they are very useful and opportune to the Church[^2]: it seems, therefore, that even where charity is found, many things can be lacking.

**I respond:** It must be said that when he says[^3] that *where charity is, nothing is lacking,* he understands this of those things which are necessary for salvation — for that lack is properly a lack, whereas the lack of the others is to be reckoned as of little account — and he attributes this to charity by reason of the connection of the other virtues. For he who has charity has whereby he can fulfill the Law[^4]; he has also, consequently, the other virtues, which enable [one] to fulfill the Law.

But to that which is objected, that the same could likewise be said of any other virtue; it must be said that it is not alike: because charity is not only *connected* to the others, but is also the *principle of the connection,* since it is the *bond of perfection* and in a certain manner « the mother of all good », as the Master himself says[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *it was not pleasing to our authorities, nay rather to Truth itself, that all sins are equal.* For it seems that this ought to please Truth itself: because, according to what Anselm says[^6], « sin is nothing »; but among those things which are nothing, one is not greater than another: therefore it seems that one sin cannot excel another, and so they have parity. — Likewise, any mortal sin whatever totally deprives a man of grace and brings on death; but in total privation there is no positing of greater and less — because among those things which are dead, one cannot be called more dead than another[^7] — therefore in the genus of mortal sins one sin does not exceed another.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since sin is a *privation of order* and a *diminution of capacity,* and through one genus of sin the soul is more disordered and rendered less capable than through another, as plainly appears[^8]; it is undoubtedly true that sins are not equal; for concupiscence inclines more to one desirable object than to another; and therefore it makes [one] despise God and be estranged and withdraw from him more in one genus of sin than in another.

To that which is objected, that sin is nothing; it must be said that even if it is nothing, *essentially* speaking; yet it belongs to something as to a *subject,* and to something as to an *opposite;* whence by reason of the greater or lesser good which is taken away in the diverse sins, one sin has [the property] of exceeding another.

To that which is objected, that it totally deprives [one] of grace and brings on death; it must be said that, although every sin totally deprives [one] of *grace,* yet it does not totally take away the *capacity* for grace; although every sin *brings on death,* yet it does not *take away the capacity for life:* and therefore, although a thing is not more and less dead and more and less deprived of grace through diverse sins as regards grace itself and the life of grace in itself; yet it is more and less as regards the capacity of nature with respect to grace; and by reason of this, diverse sins have [the property] of exceeding one another. Hence it is not like bodily death, in which the privation occurs totally, and the impossibility of returning to life[^9].

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### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *All things pertain to the two commandments of charity, because they are fulfilled through charity and ought to be referred to charity as to their end.* For it seems to imply two opposites in itself. For if they are fulfilled through charity, they ought rather to be referred to charity as to a *principle* than as to an *end.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched upon above, in the twenty-seventh distinction[^10], charity is at once posited as, with respect to meritorious works, the *principle* or head of the virtues themselves, and their *form* or bond, and their *end,* to which they are ordered; and this is because charity itself, while it immediately joins [the soul] to the highest Good, in a certain manner rises above the others and moves and commands the other virtues; and therefore it is their head and principle. Further, because by moving it makes their works meritorious; therefore it is said to be their *form*[^11]. Lastly, because we do meritorious works in order that we may enjoy God and through charity rest in God; hence it is that charity is the *end* of the other virtues and precepts. — And thus « three causes coincide in one and the same thing[^12] »; nor is it to be wondered at, since charity makes [one] conformed to God, who has in himself, with respect to the creature, the intention of the threefold cause. Hence there is no contrariety with that which the Master says in the letter[^13].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *For he is an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment.* For no effect of justice is opposed to justice; but punishment is an effect of justice[^14]: since therefore punishment makes itself feared, it seems that it does not make [one] opposed to divine justice. — Likewise, nothing that makes [one] turn away from evil makes [one] opposed to justice; but the fear of punishment, by which one ceases from sin, makes [one] turn away from evil[^15]: therefore such a one is not an enemy of justice.

**I respond:** It must be said that that statement is understood *precisely* and *by concomitance: precisely,* so that he is called an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment, that is, who withdraws from sin from fear of punishment alone, not from love of justice; such a one, I say, who is moved from fear alone, is called an enemy of justice, not by cause, but by concomitance. For although that fear does not cause enmity, yet it *accompanies* that evil concupiscence by which we are enemies of God; for *he who is a friend of this world is constituted an enemy of God*[^16]. — And by this is made clear the response to those two things which he objects; for he raises the objection as if that statement were understood to be said by way of cause[^17].

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he concludes last, that *the fullness of all the divine Scriptures is the love of God and of neighbor.* For if « nature operates as briefly as it can, and does not do through many things what it can do through fewer[^18] »; it seems likewise that divine Wisdom ought to operate in this manner. If, therefore, in all of Scripture nothing more is contained than the word about the commandment of charity, it seems then that sacred Scripture ought to be concerned with this alone, and that nothing else ought to be treated of in it.

**I respond:** It must be said that for the fullness of something to be contained in something is twofold: either *integrally,* or *causally.* Now the fullness of the divine Oracles is not contained in charity *integrally,* because many other virtues are taught and enjoined there, which are diverse and distinct from charity; but what[^19] is said to be contained, this is *causally,* because all of sacred Scripture is finally ordered to this, that we may love God and neighbor.

And if you object that *he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law*[^20]: therefore that commandment alone ought to be contained in the Law; it must be said that the commandments and instructions in sacred Scripture are multiplied for two reasons, namely for *removing blindness* on the part of the intellect, and for *excluding distaste* on the part of the affection itself. For it is necessary that we know the ways according to which we ought to be ordered toward neighbor and toward God; and because those are various, and we are ignorant and cannot grasp them all at once: therefore it was fitting to set them out separately through diverse instructions. — Again, because our affection becomes weary of one thing and delights in variety[^21]: therefore in diverse manners Scripture teaches and insinuates one and the same thing, so that our affection, while it finds the same thing in diverse and varied [forms], may advance in unity and delight in variety, so that its progress may be the greater the more delightful it is. And on this account, sometimes in sacred Scripture itself there are found *obligatory commandments,* sometimes *attractive examples*[^22], sometimes *salutary warnings,* sometimes the *teachings of the Prophets,* sometimes [those] of the *Evangelists,* so that from all these distaste may be excluded, and man may be more perfectly directed to the one. And from this it can be proved that sacred Scripture, although it is great, is yet excellently handed down and contains nothing superfluous, nothing also lacking[^23].

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. et 6. — Superius pro *ceterae virtutes* cod. U *aliae virtutes,* et dein pro *alias* (deest in edd.) cod. Z *ceteras.* Mox verbo *dici,* pro quo cod. bb *quaeri,* edd. praemittunt *hoc.*

en: Cf. above, q. 1 and 6. — Above, for *the other virtues* codex U [reads] *other virtues,* and then for *others* (which is absent in the editions) codex Z [reads] *the rest.* Soon, before the word *to be said,* in place of which codex bb [reads] *to be asked,* the editions prefix *this.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 742, nota 9.

en: Cf. above, p. 742, note 9.

la: Cod. A supplet *Augustinus* relate ad textum huius dubii; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Deinde pro *nihil deest* cod. Z *nihil deesse potest.*

en: Codex A supplies *Augustine* in relation to the text of this doubt; cf. here, the letter of the Master, ch. 1. Then for *nothing is lacking* codex Z [reads] *nothing can be lacking.*

la: Rom. 13, 8: *Qui enim diligit proximum Legem implevit;* et v. 10: *Plenitudo ergo Legis est dilectio.*

en: Rom. 13:8: *For he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law;* and v. 10: *Love therefore is the fullness of the Law.*

la: Supra d. XXV. c. 5. Cfr. etiam d. XXIII. c. 9. atque hic c. 1. et 3., nec non d. 33. q. 5, scholion — Quod caritas est *vinculum perfectionis,* dicitur Colos. 3, 14. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Above, d. 25, ch. 5. Cf. also d. 23, ch. 9, and here ch. 1 and 3, as well as d. 33, q. 5, scholion. — That charity is the *bond of perfection* is said in Col. 3:14. — On this doubt cf. St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the letter.

la: De Conceptu virgin. et orig. peccat. c. 5. — De proposit. seq. et de minori seq. arg. cfr. tom. II. pag. 111, nota 3.

en: [Anselm,] *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin,* ch. 5. — On the proposition that follows and on the minor [premise] of the following argument cf. vol. 2, p. 111, note 3.

la: Seneca, Epist. 66. (alias 67.) n. 40: *Mors quidem omnium par est. Per quae venit diversa sunt; id, in quod desinunt, unum est. Mors nulla maior aut minor est; habet enim eundem in omnibus modum: finisse vitam.*

en: Seneca, *Letter* 66 (otherwise 67), n. 40: *Death indeed is equal for all. The things through which it comes are diverse; that into which they end is one. No death is greater or less; for it has the same measure in all: to have finished life.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. et 3. (praecipue ad 4. et 6, ubi etiam obiectiones solvuntur, quae hic proponuntur) nec non d. 35. a. 1. et 2. — Subinde pro *peccata* edd. praedicta.

en: See *Sentences* bk. 2, d. 34, art. 2, q. 2 and 3 (especially the replies to 4 and 6, where also the objections are resolved which are here proposed), as well as d. 35, art. 1 and 2. — Thereafter, for *sins* [read] the aforesaid editions.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis: *Ex habitu enim in privationem mutatio fit, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est; neque enim caecus factus aliquis rursus vidit etc.* Cfr. supra pag. 802, nota 8.

en: Aristotle, *Categories,* the chapter *On Opposites:* *For change occurs from a possession into a privation, but from a privation into a possession it is impossible; for neither has anyone who has been made blind seen again,* etc. Cf. above, p. 802, note 8.

la: Art. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. — Mox pro *ponitur* cod. K *potest esse.*

en: Art. 2, q. 1, and doubt 1. — Soon, for *is posited* codex K [reads] *can be.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 6.

en: Cf. above, q. 6.

la: Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 617, nota 5. — Cod. K sic prosequitur: *et ideo nec mirum est, si caritas etc.* Hic c. 3.

en: According to Aristotle; see above, p. 617, note 5. — Codex K continues thus: *and therefore it is no wonder, if charity,* etc. Here, ch. 3.

la: Hic c. 3.

en: Here, ch. 3.

la: Vide supra d. 33. dub. 1. Pro *Nullus enim... sed* etc. edd. *Nulli poenae* [Vat. *bonae*] *iustitiae effectus inimicatur; sed* etc.

en: See above, d. 33, doubt 1. For *For no... but* etc. the editions [read] *To no punishment* [the Vatican: *to no good*] *is an effect of justice opposed; but* etc.

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Iac. 4, 4: *Quicumque ergo voluerit amicus esse saeculi huius, inimicus* etc.

en: James 4:4: *Whoever therefore wishes to be a friend of this world, an enemy* etc.

la: Vide supra d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: See above, d. 34, pt. 2, art. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 42, nota 6. et pag. 277, nota 1. — Pro *brevius* edd. *velocius.* Mox pro *hoc modo* cod. G *eodem modo,* et paulo post *nisi* pro *quam.*

en: Cf. above, p. 42, note 6, and p. 277, note 1. — For *more briefly* the editions [read] *more swiftly.* Soon, for *in this manner* codex G [reads] *in the same manner,* and a little after, *except* for *than.*

la: Pro *sed quod,* quae lectio est codd. M O U V, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *secundum quod,* Vat. *sed tantum,* et subinde, *in ipsa* pro *hoc est.*

en: For *but what,* which is the reading of codices M O U V, the other codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *according to which,* the Vatican *but only,* and thereupon *in it* for *this is.*

la: Quintilian., l. de Instit. oratoria, c. 12. dicit, quod « praesertim reficiat animos ac reparet varietas ipsa, contraque sit aliquanto difficilius in labore uno perseverare ».

en: Quintilian, in the book of the *Institutes of Oratory,* ch. 12, says that « especially does variety itself refresh and restore the spirits, and on the contrary it is somewhat more difficult to persevere in one labor ».

la: Edd. omittunt *exempla.* Proxime post pro *attractiva* cod. M *excitativa.* Paulo inferius pro *ad unum* edd. *ad bonum,* et dein pro *convinci* non pauci codd. *coniici.*

en: The editions omit *examples.* Immediately after, for *attractive* codex M [reads] *exciting.* A little below, for *to the one* the editions [read] *to the good,* and then for *to be proved* not a few codices [read] *to be conjectured.*

la: Cfr. S. Bonav., Breviloq. Prooem. §§ 1–6, et Princip. s. Scripturae (de s. Scripturae praestantia). — Quoad hoc dub. vide S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium,* Prologue, §§ 1–6, and the *Principium* on sacred Scripture (on the excellence of sacred Scripture). — As to this doubt, see St. Thomas, here, on the letter.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.808–809 (PDF 830–831; offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, lines 56053–56198) as the base for clean running prose. Running heads confirmed: p.808 `808 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` + `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI`; p.809 `DIST. XXXVI. DUBIA. 809`. Closes DISTINCTIO XXXVI **in full** (littera · divisio · a1-q1..q6 · dubia all Tier 2). The next page (p.810) opens DISTINCTIO XXXVII (Lombard's `Cap. I.`, raw 56199).

**Dubia list (5).** This dubia treats the *littera* of d.36:
- **Dub. I** (p.808) — *Ubi est caritas, quid est quod possit deesse?* Whether, since charity suffices for salvation, the other virtues are superfluous. Resolved: "nothing is lacking" = nothing necessary to salvation; charity = not merely connected but the *principle of connection,* the *vinculum perfectionis* and "mater omnis boni."
- **Dub. II** (p.808) — whether *all sins are equal* (against Anselm's "peccatum nihil est"). Resolved: sin = *privatio ordinis* + *diminutio habilitatis*; sins differ in the greater/lesser good removed and in the capacity-of-nature toward grace; unlike bodily death there is more-and-less.
- **Dub. III** (p.809) — whether referring all to the two commandments of charity *as to an end* conflicts with their being fulfilled *through* charity *as a principle.* Resolved: charity is at once *principle/caput, forma/vinculum,* and *finis* (the threefold cause coinciding in one) — cf. d.27.
- **Dub. IV** (p.809) — *Inimicus iustitiae est qui poenae timore non peccat:* how the fear of punishment makes one an enemy of justice. Resolved: *praecise* (he who recoils from fear alone, not love of justice) and *per concomitantiam* (the fear accompanies the evil concupiscence by which we are enemies of God), not *per causam.*
- **Dub. V** (p.809) — *omnium Scripturarum plenitudo est dilectio:* if so, why does Scripture treat of more than charity (nature operating "by fewer")? Resolved: charity contains the fullness *causaliter,* not *integraliter*; the multiplicity of commandments/examples/warnings removes *caecitas* (intellect) and *fastidium* (affection); Scripture contains nothing superfluous, nothing lacking. Closes the dubia.

**Page-split map.** Dub. I + Dub. II → p.808; Dub. III + Dub. IV + Dub. V → p.809 (Dub. III's objection-sentence runs from the foot of p.808 R-col onto p.809 L-col top — a grammatically continuous splice, verified: *…potius debent referri ad caritatem sicut ad principium quam sicut ad finem.*).

**Apparatus (23, per-page restart, continuous renumber).** p.808 footer nn.1–9 → [^1]–[^9] (5 in L-col band, 4 in R-col band: nn.6–9); p.809 footer nn.1–14 → [^10]–[^23] (nn.1–9 in L-col band, with n.9 anchored in the R-col Dub. V at *pauciora*; nn.10–14 in R-col band). Marker pairing 23/23, both bodies.

**Footer hand-offs.** NOTHING picked up (d36-a1-q6 closed its band fully on p.807; the dubia opens a fresh band on p.808). NOTHING forwarded — the dubia footer band closes on p.809 (n.14 = [^23], the *Breviloquium* note); p.810 opens DISTINCTIO XXXVII with its own fresh footer sequence.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false` — no `SCHOLION`/`SCHOLIOK` header in the dubia range (grep-verified over raw 56053–56198). The *d.33 q.5 scholion* mention at [^5] is a cross-reference inside a footnote, not an own scholion.

**`[?]` flags.** None — pp.808–809 are legible at 450 dpi and the OCR base is clean.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVII.

#### Cap. I. — *De decem mandatis, quomodo contineantur in duobus.*

Sed iam distributio Decalogi, qui[^1] in duobus mandatis completur, consideranda est. « Habet enim Decalogus decem praecepta, quae sunt decachordum Psalterium; quae sic sunt distributa, ut tria, quae sunt in prima tabula, pertineant ad Deum, scilicet ad cognitionem et dilectionem Trinitatis; septem, quae sunt in secunda tabula, ad dilectionem proximi[^2] ».

Primum in prima tabula est: *Non habebis deos alienos; non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem* etc. Haec Origenes[^3] dicit duo esse mandata, sed Augustinus unum. Hoc ipsum enim, quod dixerat: *non habebis deos alienos*, perfectius explicat, cum prohibet coli figmenta, scilicet *idolum*, vel *similitudinem alicuius rei*; quae duo Origenes[^4] ita dicit distare, « ut *idolum* sit quod nihil habet simile sui; *similitudo* vero, quod habet speciem alicuius rei; verbi gratia, si quis in auro vel ligno vel alia re faciat speciem serpentis vel avis vel alicuius rei et statuat ad adorandum, non *idolum*, sed *similitudinem* fecit. Qui vero facit speciem, quam non vidit oculus, sed animus sibi fingit, ut si quis humanis membris caput canis vel arietis formet, vel in uno habitu hominis duas facies; non *similitudinem*, sed *idolum* facit, quia facit quod non habet aliquid simile sui ».

#### Cap. II. — *Quare idolum nihil esse in mundo dicitur.*

« Ideo dicit Apostolus[^5], quia *idolum nihil est in mundo*. Non enim aliqua ex rebus constantibus assumitur species, sed quod mens otiosa et curiosa reperit. *Similitudo* vero est, cum aliquid ex his quae sunt vel in caelo vel in terra vel in aquis, formatur ». — Augustinus[^6] vero ita exponit illud: *idolum nihil est in mundo*, id est, inter creaturas mundi non est forma idoli. Materiam enim formavit Deus, sed stultitia hominum formam dedit. Quaecumque facta sunt naturaliter, facta sunt per Verbum; sed forma hominis in idolo non est facta per Verbum, sicut peccatum non est factum per Verbum, sed est nihil; et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant.

Sed quaeritur, quomodo hic dicatur forma idoli non esse facta per Verbum, cum alibi[^7] legatur: « *Omnis forma, omnis compago, omnis concordia partium facta est per Verbum* ». — Hoc autem a diversis varie solvitur. Quidam enim dicunt, omnem formam, et quidquid est, a Deo esse, in quantum est, et formam idoli, in quantum *est*, vel in quantum *forma est*, a Deo esse, sed non in quantum est *idoli*, id est, posita ad adorandum. In hoc enim non est creatura, sed perversio creaturae. Sicut illud quod peccatum est, in quantum peccatum est, nihil est[^8]; et homines, cum peccant, nihil fiunt, quia ab illo qui vere est, separantur. Unde Hieronymus[^9]: « Quod ex Deo non est, qui solus vere est, non esse dicitur ». Ideoque peccatum, quod nos a vero esse abducit, nihil esse vel non esse dicitur. — Alii vero dicunt, omnem formam, quae scilicet naturaliter est, et omne quod naturaliter est, esse a Deo; sed forma idoli non est naturaliter, quia naturae iustitiae non servit. Id enim naturaliter esse dicitur, quod simplici naturae iustitiae, quae Deus est, militat, non resultat et naturam creatam non vitiat.

Secundum praeceptum est: *Non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum*; quod est dicere secundum litteram: non iurabis pro nihilo nomen Dei; « allegorice vero praecipitur, ut non putes, creaturam esse Christum, Dei Filium, quia omnis creatura vanitati subiecta est, sed aequalem Patri[^10] ».

Tertium vero est: *Memento, ut diem Sabbati sanctifices*; ubi secundum litteram praecipitur Sabbati observantia; allegorice[^11] vero, ut requiem hic a vitiis et in futuro in Dei contemplatione exspectes ex Spiritu sancto, id est ex caritate et dono Dei, non quod Spiritus sanctus sine Patre et Filio hoc operetur.

#### Cap. III. — *Quare in Spiritu sancto proprie dicitur fieri remissio peccatorum.*

« Accepit utique Ecclesia hoc donum, ut in Spiritu sancto fiat remissio peccatorum; quam remissionem cum Trinitas faciat, proprie tamen ad Spiritum sanctum dicitur pertinere, quia ipse est Spiritus adoptionis filiorum, ipse est Patris et Filii Amor et Connexio vel Communitas[^12] »; ideoque iustificatio nostra et requies ei attribuitur saepius. — Haec sunt tria mandata primae tabulae ad Deum pertinentia; et primum

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quidem, quod est de uno Deo colendo, pertinet ad Patrem, in quo est unitas vel auctoritas; secundum ad Filium, in quo est aequalitas; tertium ad Spiritum sanctum, in quo est utriusque communitas.

In secunda vero tabula septem erant mandata ad dilectionem proximi pertinentia. « Quorum primum ad patrem carnalem refertur, sicut primum primae tabulae ad Patrem caelestem, quod est: *Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam, ut sis longaevus super terram*[^13] », scilicet viventium. Parentes vero sic sunt honorandi, ut eis debita reverentia exhibeatur, et necessaria ministrentur.

Secundum est: *Non occides*; ubi secundum litteram actus homicidii prohibetur, secundum spiritum vero etiam voluntas occidendi. Unde huic mandato secundum litteram fit superadditio in Evangelio[^14], quia littera Evangelii exprimitur, quod Legis littera non exprimebatur.

#### Cap. IV. — *De sensu spirituali et carnali Legis.*

Evangelii littera exprimit *intelligentiam spiritualem*, id est, quam spirituales habent, et secundum quam spiritualiter vivitur; littera Legis *sensum carnalem*, id est, quem carnales habent, et secundum quem carnaliter vivitur; cui facta est superadditio.

Tertium est: *Non moechaberis*, « id est, ne cuilibet miscearis, excepto foedere matrimonii. A parte enim totum intelligitur[^15] » : « Nomine igitur moechiae omnis concubitus illicitus illorumque membrorum non legitimus usus prohibitus debet intelligi ».

Quartum est: *Non furtum facies*; ubi *sacrilegium* et *rapina* omnis prohibetur. « Non enim rapinam permisit qui furtum prohibuit, sed furti nomine bene intelligi voluit omnem illicitam usurpationem rei alienae ». — « *Sacrilegium* tribus modis committitur, quando scilicet vel sacrum de sacro, vel non sacrum de sacro, vel sacrum de non sacro aufertur ». Sacrum vero dicitur quidquid mancipatum est cultui divino, ut Ecclesia vel res Ecclesiae. — Hic etiam usura prohibetur, quae sub rapina continetur. Unde Hieronymus[^16]: « Usuras quaerere, vel fraudare, vel rapere nihil interest. Commoda fratri tuo, et accipe quod dedisti, et nihil superfluum quaeras, quia superabundantia in usura computatur ». Est enim usura, ut ait Augustinus[^17], cum quis plus exigit in iniuria, vel qualibet re, quam acceperit. Item Hieronymus[^18]: « Putant aliqui, usuram tantum esse in pecunia; sed intelligant, usuram vocari superabundantiam, scilicet quidquid est, si ab eo quod dederit, plus est; ut si in hieme demus decem modios, et in messe quindecim recipiamus ».

#### Cap. V. — *De furto.*

Si vero quaeritur de filiis Israel, qui, Domino iubente, ab Aegyptiis mutuaverunt vasa aurea et argentea et vestes pretiosas et asportaverunt, utrum furtum commiserint; dicimus, eos qui, ut parerent Deo iubenti, illud fecerunt, non fecisse furtum nec omnino peccasse. Unde Augustinus[^19]: « Israelitae non furtum fecerunt, sed Deo iubenti ministerium praebuerunt. Hoc enim Deus iussit, qui Legem dedit; sicut minister iudicis sine peccato occidit quem lex praecipit; sed si id sponte faciet, homicida est, etiam si eum occidat, quem scit a iudice occidendum ». « Infirmi autem, qui ex cupiditate Aegyptios deceperunt, magis *permissi* sunt hoc facere illis qui talia iure passi sunt, quam *iussi* ». — Hic opponitur, quod etiam boni in illo opere peccaverunt, quia naturalem legem, cui concordat Evangelium et lex moralis praeceptionis, transgressi sunt, quae est: quod tibi non vis fieri alii ne feceris; quam Veritas scripsit in corde hominis, et quia non legebatur in corde, iteravit in tabulis, ut voce forinsecus admota rediret ad cor et ibi inveniret quod extra legeret. Hanc igitur illi praevaricati[^20] videntur in illo facto, aliis facientes quod nolebant sibi fieri. — Sed ibi subintelligendum est: *iniuste*, ut non alii, scilicet iniuste, facias quod tibi non vis fieri. Alioquin huius praevaricator est iudex, dum punit reum, nolens aliquid tale sibi fieri. Ita etiam illud Domini verbum[^21]: *Omnia quaecumque vultis, ut faciant vobis homines* etc.; de bonis accipiendum est, quae nobis invicem exhibere debemus.

Quintum praeceptum est: *Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium*; ubi crimen mendacii et periurii prohibetur.

#### Cap. VI. — *De mendacio.*

« Solet autem quaeri, utrum prohibitum sit omne mendacium. Quidam dicunt, illud tantum prohiberi, quod *obest* et non *prodest* ei cui dicitur. Tale enim non est *adversus proximum*; ut ideo videatur hoc addidisse Scriptura[^22] ». — Sed de mendacio magna quaestio est nec cito explicari potest.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXVII.

#### Ch. I. — *On the ten commandments, how they are contained in the two.*

But now the distribution of the Decalogue, which[^1] is completed in two commandments, must be considered. « For the Decalogue has ten precepts, which are the ten-stringed Psaltery; and they are so distributed that three, which are in the first table, pertain to God, namely to the knowledge and love of the Trinity; seven, which are in the second table, to the love of neighbor[^2] ».

The first in the first table is: *You shall not have strange gods; you shall not make for yourself a graven thing nor any likeness* etc. Origen[^3] says that these are two commandments, but Augustine that it is one. For this very thing, which he had said: *you shall not have strange gods*, he explains more fully when he forbids that fashioned things be worshiped, namely an *idol*, or a *likeness of some thing*; and these two Origen[^4] says differ thus, « that an *idol* is what has nothing similar to itself; but a *likeness* is what has the appearance of some thing; for example, if someone in gold or wood or some other material makes the appearance of a serpent or a bird or some thing and sets it up to be adored, he has made not an *idol* but a *likeness*. But he who makes an appearance which the eye has not seen, but which the mind fashions for itself, as if someone should form upon human limbs the head of a dog or of a ram, or in one figure of a man two faces; makes not a *likeness* but an *idol*, because he makes what has nothing similar to itself ».

#### Ch. II. — *Why an idol is said to be nothing in the world.*

« Therefore the Apostle[^5] says that *an idol is nothing in the world*. For no appearance is taken from existing things, but what an idle and curious mind devises. But there is a *likeness* when something is formed from those things which are either in heaven or on earth or in the waters ». — But Augustine[^6] expounds that text thus: *an idol is nothing in the world*, that is, among the creatures of the world there is no form of an idol. For God formed the matter, but the foolishness of men gave the form. Whatever things were made naturally were made through the Word; but the form of a man in an idol was not made through the Word, just as sin was not made through the Word, but is nothing; and men become nothing when they sin.

But it is asked how here the form of an idol is said not to have been made through the Word, when elsewhere[^7] it is read: « *Every form, every framing, every concord of parts was made through the Word* ». — But this is solved variously by various authors. For some say that every form, and whatever is, is from God, insofar as it is, and that the form of an idol, insofar as it *is*, or insofar as it *is a form*, is from God, but not insofar as it is *of an idol*, that is, set up to be adored. For in this there is not a creature, but a perversion of a creature. Just as that which is sin, insofar as it is sin, is nothing[^8]; and men, when they sin, become nothing, because they are separated from him who truly is. Hence Jerome[^9]: « What is not from God, who alone truly is, is said not to be ». And therefore sin, which leads us away from true being, is said to be nothing or not to be. — But others say that every form, namely which is naturally, and everything that is naturally, is from God; but the form of an idol is not naturally, because it does not serve the nature of righteousness. For that is said to be naturally which fights for the simple nature of righteousness, which is God, does not rebound against it, and does not vitiate the created nature.

The second precept is: *You shall not take the name of your God in vain*; which is to say according to the letter: you shall not swear the name of God for nothing; « but allegorically it is commanded that you not think a creature to be Christ, the Son of God, because every creature is subject to vanity, but equal to the Father[^10] ».

But the third is: *Remember to sanctify the Sabbath day*; where according to the letter the observance of the Sabbath is commanded; but allegorically[^11], that you await rest here from the vices and in the future in the contemplation of God, from the Holy Spirit, that is from charity and the gift of God — not that the Holy Spirit works this without the Father and the Son.

#### Ch. III. — *Why remission of sins is properly said to be made in the Holy Spirit.*

« The Church has indeed received this gift, that in the Holy Spirit remission of sins should be made; and although the Trinity makes this remission, nevertheless it is properly said to pertain to the Holy Spirit, because he is the Spirit of the adoption of sons, he is the Love and Connection or Communion of the Father and the Son[^12] »; and therefore our justification and rest is attributed to him more often. — These are the three commandments of the first table pertaining to God; and the first

indeed, which is about worshiping the one God, pertains to the Father, in whom is unity or authority; the second to the Son, in whom is equality; the third to the Holy Spirit, in whom is the communion of both.

But in the second table there were seven commandments pertaining to the love of neighbor. « Of which the first refers to the carnal father, just as the first of the first table refers to the heavenly Father, which is: *Honor your father and your mother, that you may be long-lived upon the land*[^13] », namely of the living. And parents are to be honored thus, that due reverence be shown to them, and necessities be supplied.

The second is: *You shall not kill*; where according to the letter the act of homicide is forbidden, but according to the spirit even the will to kill. Hence to this commandment, according to the letter, an addition is made in the Gospel[^14], because the letter of the Gospel expresses what the letter of the Law did not express.

#### Ch. IV. — *On the spiritual and carnal sense of the Law.*

The letter of the Gospel expresses the *spiritual understanding*, that is, which spiritual men have, and according to which one lives spiritually; the letter of the Law the *carnal sense*, that is, which carnal men have, and according to which one lives carnally; to which an addition has been made.

The third is: *You shall not commit adultery*, « that is, do not mingle with anyone, except in the covenant of matrimony. For by a part the whole is understood[^15] » : « Under the name of adultery, therefore, every illicit intercourse and the unlawful use of those members must be understood as forbidden ».

The fourth is: *You shall not steal*; where all *sacrilege* and *robbery* is forbidden. « For he who forbade theft did not permit robbery, but under the name of theft he willed every illicit usurpation of another's property to be well understood ». — « *Sacrilege* is committed in three ways, namely when either the sacred is taken from the sacred, or the non-sacred from the sacred, or the sacred from the non-sacred ». And whatever is dedicated to divine worship is called sacred, as the Church or the property of the Church. — Here also usury is forbidden, which is contained under robbery. Hence Jerome[^16]: « There is no difference whether one seeks usury, or defrauds, or robs. Lend to your brother, and receive what you gave, and seek nothing superfluous, because superabundance is reckoned as usury ». For usury is, as Augustine[^17] says, when someone exacts more, by injury or in any matter, than he had received. Likewise Jerome[^18]: « Some think that usury is only in money; but let them understand that superabundance is called usury, namely whatever there is, if from that which he gave there is more; as if in winter we should give ten measures, and at harvest receive fifteen ».

#### Ch. V. — *On theft.*

But if it is asked concerning the sons of Israel, who, at the Lord's command, borrowed from the Egyptians vessels of gold and silver and precious garments and carried them off, whether they committed theft; we say that those who did it in order to obey God's command did not commit theft nor sin at all. Hence Augustine[^19]: « The Israelites did not commit theft, but rendered a ministry to God who commanded it. For God commanded this, who gave the Law; just as the minister of a judge kills without sin the one whom the law prescribes; but if he does this of his own accord, he is a homicide, even if he kills the one whom he knows is to be killed by the judge ». « But the weak, who out of greed deceived the Egyptians, were rather *permitted* to do this to those who by right suffered such things, than *commanded* ». — Here it is objected that even the good sinned in that deed, because they transgressed the natural law, with which the Gospel and the moral law of precept agree, which is: do not do to another what you do not wish to be done to yourself; which Truth wrote in the heart of man, and because it was not read in the heart, he repeated it on the tablets, so that, the voice being applied from without, it might return to the heart and there find what it read outside. This, therefore, they seem to have transgressed[^20] in that deed, doing to others what they did not want to be done to themselves. — But there it must be understood: *unjustly*, namely that you not do unjustly to another what you do not wish to be done to yourself. Otherwise the judge is a transgressor of this, when he punishes a guilty man, not wishing anything such to be done to himself. So also that word of the Lord[^21]: *All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you* etc.; must be taken of the good things which we ought to render to one another.

The fifth precept is: *You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor*; where the crime of lying and of perjury is forbidden.

#### Ch. VI. — *On lying.*

« But it is usually asked whether every lie is forbidden. Some say that only that is forbidden which *harms* and does not *profit* the one to whom it is told. For such is not *against the neighbor*; so that on this account Scripture[^22] is thought to have added this ». — But concerning lying there is a great question and it cannot be quickly explained.

---

la: Ita codd. B C D E; in cod. A et in edd. *quae*; deinde pro *completur* cod. E et edd. 1, 8 *continetur*.

en: So codd. B C D E; in cod. A and in the editions, *quae*; then for *completur* cod. E and edd. 1, 8 read *continetur*.

la: August., Serm. 9. (alias 96. de Tempore) c. 5. n. 6. — Decalogus est Exod. 20, 3. seqq. et Deut. 5, 7. seqq.

en: Augustine, Sermon 9 (otherwise 96, On the Seasons) c. 5, n. 6. — The Decalogue is Exod. 20:3 ff. and Deut. 5:7 ff.

la: In Exod. hom. 8. n. 2; Augustini locus est ex Quaestion. super Exod. quaest. 71. n. 2.

en: On Exodus, hom. 8, n. 2; the passage of Augustine is from *Questions on Exodus*, q. 71, n. 2.

la: Loc. cit. n. 3; verbotenus apud Lyranum in Glossa ordinaria in locum cit. — Pro *alicuius rei* cod. B, Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *alterius*. Deinde pro *ad adorandum* edd. 1, 8 habent tantum *adorandum*, et pro *sibi fingit* codd. B D cum Vat. et pluribus edd. *sibi finxit*.

en: Loc. cit. n. 3; word for word in Lyra in the *Glossa ordinaria* at the cited place. — For *alicuius rei* cod. B, the Vatican edition, and edd. 4, 6 read *alterius*. Then for *ad adorandum* edd. 1, 8 have only *adorandum*, and for *sibi fingit* codd. B D with the Vatican edition and several editions read *sibi finxit*.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 8, 4. Hic continuatur locus Origenis. — Infra pro *cum aliquid* edd. 1, 8 *dum aliquid*.

en: Epistle, I Cor. 8:4. Here the passage of Origen is continued. — Below, for *cum aliquid* edd. 1, 8 read *dum aliquid*.

la: Super Evang. Ioan. tr. 1. n. 13; sententialiter usque ad verba: *Sed quaeritur* etc.

en: On the Gospel of John, tr. 1, n. 13; in substance up to the words *Sed quaeritur* (But it is asked) etc.

la: Ibid., parum inferius.

en: Ibid., a little further below.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. XXXVII. c. 2. — Paulo superius pro *perversio creaturae* edd. 1, 8 *perversio naturae*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 37, c. 2. — A little above, for *perversio creaturae* edd. 1, 8 read *perversio naturae*.

la: Epist. 15. (alias 57.) n. 1: et VIII. super Ezech. c. 26, 19.

en: Epistle 15 (otherwise 57), n. 1; and On Ezekiel, bk. VIII, c. 26, 19.

la: Isidor., Quaestiones in Exod. c. 29. n. 3. Locus Scripturae est Rom. 8, 20.

en: Isidore, *Questions on Exodus*, c. 29, n. 3. The Scripture passage is Rom. 8:20.

la: Isidor. loc. cit. n. 4.

en: Isidore, loc. cit., n. 4.

la: August., Serm. 71. (alias 11. de Verbis Dom.) c. 17. n. 28. 29. Cfr. II. Quaestion. in Exod. q. 71. n. 1. — Respicitur Rom. 8, 15. — De seqq. cfr. I. Sent. d. XXXI.

en: Augustine, Sermon 71 (otherwise 11, On the Words of the Lord) c. 17, nn. 28, 29. Cf. *Questions on Exodus* II, q. 71, n. 1. — Rom. 8:15 is in view. — On what follows, cf. *Sentences* I, d. 31.

la: Hugo a S. Vict., Summa Sent. tr. 4. c. 4, unde plurima sumsit Magister. — Locus Scripturae est Deut. 5, 16.

en: Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 4, c. 4, from which the Master took much. — The Scripture passage is Deut. 5:16.

la: Matth. 5, 21. De his praeceptis cfr. Hugo, loc. cit. c. 6.

en: Matt. 5:21. On these precepts cf. Hugh, loc. cit., c. 6.

la: August., Quaestion. in Exod. quaest. 71. n. 4. et Glossa interlinearis super Exod. 20, 14. — Seq. locus est in Glossa ordinaria ibid.; tertius, August., loc. cit., qui est etiam in Decret. Gratian. II. parte XXXII. q. 4. c. *Meretrices*.

en: Augustine, *Questions on Exodus*, q. 71, n. 4, and the interlinear Gloss on Exod. 20:14. — The following passage is in the *Glossa ordinaria* at the same place; the third, Augustine, loc. cit., which is also in Gratian's *Decretum* II, part 32, q. 4, c. *Meretrices*.

la: Libr. VI. in Ezech. 18, 8, ubi loquitur quidem de usura, sed ipsa verba apud Hieronymum nec ibi nec alibi inveniuntur, licet et Hugo a S. Vict. (loc. cit.) et Magister ipsi eadem tribuant.

en: Bk. VI On Ezekiel, 18:8, where indeed he speaks of usury, but these very words are found in Jerome neither there nor elsewhere, although both Hugh of St. Victor (loc. cit.) and the Master himself attribute them to him.

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 54. n. 14; sententialiter, sed verbotenus in Petr. Lomb. Commentar. in Ps. 54, 12.

en: *Enarration on Psalm 54*, n. 14; in substance, but word for word in Peter Lombard's *Commentary on Psalm 54:12*.

la: Loco in nota 4. cit. ad v. 6.

en: At the place cited in note 4, on v. 6.

la: Quaestion. in Exod. quaest. 39, ubi pro *Deo iubenti*, quod habent edd. 1, 8, in aliis est *Deo iubente*; deinde post *praecipit* edd., exceptis 1, 8, addunt, favente originali, *occidi*. — Seq. loc. est in eiusdem Enarrat. in Ps. 104. n. 28; XXII. contra Faustum c. 71.

en: *Questions on Exodus*, q. 39, where for *Deo iubenti*, which edd. 1, 8 have, in the others it is *Deo iubente*; then after *praecipit* the editions, except 1, 8, add, with the support of the original, *occidi*. — The following passage is in the same author's *Enarration on Psalm 104*, n. 28; *Against Faustus*, bk. 22, c. 71.

la: Cod. plurimi cum Vat. *praevaricari*. — Superius verba *rediret ad cor* respiciunt Isai. 46, 8.

en: Very many codices with the Vatican edition read *praevaricari*. — Above, the words *rediret ad cor* (return to the heart) refer to Isa. 46:8.

la: August., Quaestion. in Exod. quaest. 71. n. 6. — Edd., exceptis 1, 8, post *quaestio est* addunt *quae*.

en: Augustine, *Questions on Exodus*, q. 71, n. 6. — The editions, except 1, 8, after *quaestio est* add *quae*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Littera Magistri (Peter Lombard's text) for DISTINCTIO XXXVII, *De decem mandatis, quomodo contineantur in duobus* — the precepts of the Decalogue and how the ten are reduced to the two great commandments of charity. Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.810–811 (raw OCR 56199–56328), which on these two two-column pages carry Lombard's flowing text in reading order L-column top→bottom, then R-column. The body is bounded **forward** at the Bonaventure **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII / DIVISIO TEXTUS**, which opens on printed **p.812** (raw 56349/56354) → that is `bon-sent-III-d37-divisio`. The littera ends cleanly at the foot of p.811 R-column (*…nec cito explicari potest.*).

**Skeleton re-chunk.** The auto-chunk skeleton had `line_start: 56270` (a p.811 page-top running head) and `line_end: 56348` — it leaked, dropping the entire opening of the littera (Cap. I–III, all of p.810). Re-chunked forward from the true DISTINCTIO XXXVII opener at raw **56199** (Cap. I) and bounded at the DIVISIO TEXTUS at raw 56354.

**CAP. chapters covered (Cap. I–VI, complete Lombard littera):**
- Cap. I — *De decem mandatis, quomodo contineantur in duobus* (Decalogue distribution: 3 precepts of 1st table to God, 7 of 2nd to neighbor; 1st precept *Non habebis deos alienos* + idol/likeness per Origen).
- Cap. II — *Quare idolum nihil esse in mundo dicitur* (idol is nothing; Augustine; idol-form not through the Word; 2nd precept *Non assumes nomen*; 3rd *Memento ut diem Sabbati*).
- Cap. III — *Quare in Spiritu sancto proprie dicitur fieri remissio peccatorum* (remission appropriated to the Holy Spirit; Trinity-distribution of the 1st table: Father/unity, Son/equality, Spirit/communion).
- Cap. IV — *De sensu spirituali et carnali Legis* (2nd table: 4th *Honora patrem*, 5th *Non occides*, spiritual vs carnal sense of the Law, 6th *Non moechaberis*, 7th *Non furtum facies* incl. sacrilege/usury).
- Cap. V — *De furto* (Israelites despoiling the Egyptians — not theft because Deo iubente; the natural-law objection *quod tibi non vis fieri*; 8th precept *Non loqueris falsum testimonium*).
- Cap. VI — *De mendacio* (whether every lie is forbidden — *magna quaestio nec cito explicari potest*; the littera breaks off here, the Bonaventure commentary takes it up).

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