title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 653 -->

### ARTICULUS I. *De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum gratia gratum faciens dividi habeat per differentias essentialiter diversas.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum gratia gratum faciens dividi habeat per differentias diversas per essentiam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Magister in littera[^1] sumens auctoritatem Augustini, dividit gratiam in *praevenientem* et *subsequentem*. Si igitur recta divisio debet esse per opposita; et opposita non possunt fieri circa idem simul et semel: videtur igitur quod impossibile sit, unam et eandem gratiam esse praevenientem et subsequentem. Quodsi tu dicas, istam divisionem esse solummodo per differentias quantum ad *actum* et *effectum*, non quantum ad *habitum*; contra hoc est quod dicitur in Glossa super Exodi trigesimum tertium[^2]: *Si inveni gratiam* etc., ibi Glossa: «Non una gratia sufficit Sanctis. Una enim praecedit, ut Dominum diligant et cognoscant, altera subsequitur, ut se mundos custodiant»: ergo divisio gratiae in praevenientem et subsequentem non solum est per diversos usus, sed etiam per diversos habitus.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^3]: *Divisiones gratiarum* etc. Si igitur illae gratiae, quas ibi distinguit Apostolus, divisae sunt, et a Spiritu sancto dividuntur; videtur, quod essentialiter distinguantur. Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de gratiis *gratis datis*, non de gratia gratum faciente; *obiicitur* contra hoc, quia plura sunt necessaria ad hoc, quod quis habeat gratiam *gratum facientem* quam gratiam *gratis datam*: ergo si ad perfectionem usus gratiae gratis datae requiritur habituum multitudo, multo fortius ad perfectionem gratiae gratum facientis.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. «Si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum, quod illi opponitur[^4]»; sed culpa, eo ipso quod culpa est, opponitur gratiae gratum facienti, secundum quod gratia est: ergo cum multae sint differentiae culparum, quae formaliter distinguuntur; videtur, quod multae sint differentiae gratiae gratum facientis, quae essentialiter diversificentur.

4. Item, «habitus diversificantur per actus[^5]»; sed ad gratiam, secundum quod huiusmodi, pertinet animam curare, pertinet etiam a malo praeservare, pertinet etiam eam in bono fortificare. Si igitur isti sunt alii et alii actus, secundum quos etiam medicinae corporales ad invicem distinguuntur, quia alia
<!-- page 654 -->
est medicina praeservativa, alia curativa, alia restaurativa; pari ratione videtur hoc convenire gratiae.

5. Item, sicut se habet scientia respectu cognoscendorum, sic se habet gratia respectu meritorum; sed scientia respectu diversorum cognoscibilium est alia et alia[^6]: ergo videtur, quod gratia, quae est principium diversorum meritorum, sit alia et alia; haec autem est gratia gratum faciens: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Prima divisio gratiae gratum facientis est in praevenientem et subsequentem; sed ista membra, ut dicit Magister in littera[^7], non faciunt diversitatem habituum, sed effectuum: ergo nec aliqua alia membra gratiam dividentia.

2. Item, eadem est lucis influentia, quae fugat tenebras et illuminat aerem: ergo in spiritualibus eadem est influentia, quae culpam expellit et ad bonum disponit; sed prima est gratia *praeveniens*, secunda *subsequens*: ergo videtur, quod una tantum gratia sit in anima.

3. Item, unius acceptati una est acceptatio[^8]. Si igitur gratia gratum faciens non est aliud quam ipsa acceptatio sive ratio acceptandi, qua anima acceptatur a Deo; videtur, quod in uno homine unam tantum sit ponere gratiam gratum facientem.

4. Item, imago recreationis respondet imagini creationis; sed ad imaginem creationis non solum requiritur potentiarum pluralitas, sed etiam essentiae unitas, ad quam reducatur[^9] illa pluralitas: ergo et in imagine recreationis necesse est ponere aliquem habitum unum, in quo uniantur omnes habitus virtutum; hic autem non est nisi gratia gratum faciens: ergo etc.

5. Item, unus homo omnibus virtutibus idem et aequaliter meretur et in omnibus aequaliter acceptatur; hoc autem non esset, nisi una esset ratio acceptandi ipsum hominem secundum se et in omnibus actibus suis; haec[^10] autem non est nisi gratia gratum faciens: ergo etc.

### CONCLUSIO

> In una anima una tantum ponenda est gratia gratum faciens.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in una anima unam tantum est ponere gratiam gratum facientem.

Ratio autem huius sumitur et ex parte principii effectivi et ex parte subiecti et ex parte finis ultimi et ex parte finis primi et etiam intermedii[^11]. — Ex parte *principii effectivi*, quoniam gratia est influentia a Deo procedens in ipsam animam, secundum quam Deus totam animam sibi assimilat. Unde quia unius rei una est similitudo, in una anima una reperitur gratia procedens ab effectivo principio. — Ex parte *subiecti* similiter necesse est, gratiam gratum facientem esse unam, pro eo quod gratia comparatur ad animam sicut principium dans ei vitam in *esse secundo*. Et quoniam unius vivificabilis una est vita sive principium vivificans[^12]; hinc est, quod in una anima una tantum debet esse gratia. — Ex parte vero *finis* tam primi quam *ultimi* quam etiam *intermedii* ratio sumitur. Gratia enim est ad hoc, quod[^13] faciat hominem Deo acceptum; est etiam ad hoc, ut per ipsam perveniat homo ad unum et summum bonum; est etiam ad hoc, ut opus a libero arbitrio egrediens sit meritorium apud Deum. Quoniam igitur Deus non acceptat hominem secundum quid, sed si acceptat, totum acceptat; et opera eiusdem hominis secundum unum statum sunt aequaliter meritoria; et merces omnium meritorum est una: hinc est, quod necesse est ponere, in uno homine gratiam esse unam, exigente hoc comparatione ad principium effectivum et ad subiectum et ad finem immediatum[^14] et ultimum. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de divisione Magistri, quam ponit in littera[^15]; dicendum, quod illa divisio gratiae est penes *effectus*, quos habet in nobis, quorum unus accipitur respectu *mali*, a quo liberat, alter respectu *boni*, ad quod ordinat. Unde notandum est, quod nomen gratiae aequivocatur, ut aliquando accipiatur pro *habitu*, aliquando pro *effectu habitus*; et in proposita divisione non accipitur pro *habitu*, sed pro *effectu*. Per hunc etiam modum accipitur in illa Glossa, in qua dicitur, quod non una gratia necessaria est Sanctis etc., id est non unus *effectus* gratiae tantum. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod «habitus diversificantur per actus et effectus»; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in *actibus primis*, quorum unus ad alterum non habet ordinari. Sic autem non est in proposito, quia actus gratiae praevenientis ordinem habet ad actum gratiae subsequentis.
<!-- page 655 -->

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Apostoli, dicendum, quod sicut in opponendo[^16] praedictum est, hoc intelligitur de gratiis *gratis datis*. Illae enim multiplicantur propter hoc, quod ordinantur ad opera exteriora, ita quod secundum primam et immediatam rationem effectus diversos respiciunt; gratia autem gratum faciens, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet respicere opera exteriora, sicut[^17] interiora, nisi mediantibus habitibus virtutum et donorum; aut si illa respicit, hoc non est, nisi in quantum considerantur sub una ratione, videlicet sub ratione *meriti*. — Et ideo non tenet illud quod consequenter obiicit, quod maior est perfectio gratiae gratum facientis quam gratiae gratis datae; quod etsi verum sit *intensive*, non tamen oportet, quod *extensive*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod culpa multiplicatur[^18], ergo et gratia; responderi potest, quod illa ratio deficit dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia illud intelligitur de multiplicatione non secundum divisionem, quae est in partes *subiectivas*, sed secundum diversas *acceptiones* sive significationes. Cum enim *irrationale* dividatur contra *rationale*, non oportet, quod tot sint rationalia, quot irrationalia. Secundo etiam deficit, quia uni bono nata sunt opponi plura mala, cum «malum sit multifariam, et bonum uno modo[^19]».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus gratiae, secundum quod gratia est, diversificantur etc.; dicendum, quod etsi actus illi diversi sint tanta diversitate, quod in corporalibus diversis rebus attribuuntur, quia alterius medicinae est curare, et alterius praeservare; in spiritualibus tamen non sic diversificantur, ut inducant diversitatem habitus, tum propter ipsorum actuum et effectuum ordinem, tum etiam propter ipsius habitus perfectionem, ex qua habet, ut possit multo melius in plures effectus sine sui multiplicatione, quam natura corporalis hoc possit ex diversarum naturarum coniunctione[^20].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia, plana est responsio per iam dicta. Non enim est simile, tum quia scientia dicit habitum habentem respectum ad exteriora cognoscibilia secundum speciales et proprias conditiones et naturas; tum etiam, quia aliquo modo scientia creata causari dicitur ex rebus extra; tum etiam, quia ad ipsam scientiam maxime pertinet distinguere[^21]. Opposita autem harum proprietatum et conditionum reperiri habent in gratia, sicut haberi potest ex his quae praedicta sunt; et ideo non plurificatur, sed in una anima reperitur una.

english:
### Article I. *On grace in comparison with another habit.*
### Question I. *Whether sanctifying grace must be divided through essentially diverse differences.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether sanctifying grace must be divided through differences diverse by essence. And that it must, it seems.

1. The Master in the text[^1], taking up the authority of Augustine, divides grace into *prevenient* and *subsequent*. If, then, a right division must be through opposites, and opposites cannot come to be about the same thing at one and the same moment, it therefore seems that it is impossible for one and the same grace to be both prevenient and subsequent. But if you say that this division is only through differences as to *act* and *effect*, not as to *habit*; against this is what is said in the Gloss on the thirty-third chapter of Exodus[^2]: *If I have found grace* etc., where the Gloss says: «One grace does not suffice for the saints. For one precedes, that they may love and know the Lord; another follows, that they may keep themselves clean»: therefore the division of grace into prevenient and subsequent is not only through diverse uses, but also through diverse habits.

2. Likewise, in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter twelve[^3]: *Divisions of graces* etc. If, then, those graces which the Apostle there distinguishes are divided, and are divided by the Holy Spirit, it seems that they are essentially distinguished. If you say that he is speaking of *freely given* graces (*gratiae gratis datae*), not of sanctifying grace; it is *objected* against this that more is necessary for one to have *sanctifying* grace than *freely given* grace: therefore if a multitude of habits is required for the perfection of the use of freely given grace, much more so for the perfection of sanctifying grace.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by *reason*. «If one of two opposites is said in many ways, so too is the other which is opposed to it[^4]»; but fault (*culpa*), by the very fact that it is fault, is opposed to sanctifying grace insofar as it is grace: therefore, since there are many differences of faults which are formally distinguished, it seems that there are many differences of sanctifying grace which are essentially diversified.

4. Likewise, «habits are diversified through acts[^5]»; but to grace, as such, it belongs to heal the soul, it belongs also to preserve it from evil, it belongs also to strengthen it in good. If, then, these are different and different acts, according to which bodily medicines too are distinguished from one another — since one
<!-- page 654 -->
medicine is preservative, another curative, another restorative — by parity of reasoning this seems to belong to grace.

5. Likewise, as knowledge stands with respect to the things to be known, so grace stands with respect to merits; but knowledge with respect to diverse knowable things is different and different[^6]: therefore it seems that grace, which is the principle of diverse merits, is different and different; but this is sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. The first division of sanctifying grace is into prevenient and subsequent; but these members, as the Master says in the text[^7], do not make a diversity of habits, but of effects: therefore neither do any other members dividing grace.

2. Likewise, the same is the influx of light that drives away darkness and illumines the air: therefore in spiritual matters the same is the influx that expels fault and disposes to good; but the first is *prevenient* grace, the second *subsequent*: therefore it seems that there is only one grace in the soul.

3. Likewise, of one thing accepted there is one acceptance[^8]. If, then, sanctifying grace is nothing other than the acceptance itself, or the ground of accepting, by which the soul is accepted by God, it seems that in one man only one sanctifying grace is to be posited.

4. Likewise, the image of re-creation corresponds to the image of creation; but for the image of creation there is required not only a plurality of powers, but also a unity of essence to which that plurality may be reduced[^9]: therefore in the image of re-creation too it is necessary to posit some one habit in which all the habits of the virtues are united; but this is nothing other than sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, one man merits the same and equally by all the virtues and is accepted equally in all; but this would not be so unless there were one ground of accepting the man himself in himself and in all his acts; but this[^10] is nothing other than sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> In one soul only one sanctifying grace is to be posited.

**I respond:** It must be said that in one soul only one sanctifying grace is to be posited.

And the reason for this is taken both from the side of the *effective principle* and from the side of the *subject* and from the side of the *ultimate end* and from the side of the *first end* and also the *intermediate end*[^11]. — From the side of the *effective principle*, because grace is an influx proceeding from God into the soul itself, according to which God assimilates the whole soul to himself. Hence, since of one thing there is one likeness, in one soul there is found one grace proceeding from the effective principle. — From the side of the *subject* likewise it is necessary that sanctifying grace be one, since grace is compared to the soul as a principle giving it life in its *second being* (*esse secundo*). And since of one thing capable of being made alive there is one life or one vivifying principle[^12], hence it is that in one soul there ought to be only one grace. — But from the side of the *end*, both first and *ultimate* and also *intermediate*, the reason is taken. For grace exists for this, that[^13] it may make a man acceptable to God; it exists also for this, that through it a man may attain to the one and highest good; it exists also for this, that the work proceeding from free choice may be meritorious before God. Since, therefore, God does not accept a man in a qualified way, but if he accepts, he accepts the whole; and the works of the same man in one state are equally meritorious; and the reward of all merits is one: hence it is that it is necessary to posit in one man that grace is one, this being required by the comparison to the effective principle and to the subject and to the immediate[^14] and ultimate end. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the division of the Master, which he sets down in the text[^15]; it must be said that that division of grace is according to the *effects* which it has in us, of which one is taken with respect to *evil*, from which it frees, the other with respect to *good*, to which it orders. Hence it is to be noted that the name of grace is equivocal, so that it is taken sometimes for the *habit*, sometimes for the *effect of the habit*; and in the division proposed it is not taken for the *habit*, but for the *effect*. In this way too it is taken in that Gloss, in which it is said that not one grace is necessary for the saints etc., that is, not one *effect* of grace only. And *if you object* that «habits are diversified through acts and effects»; it must be said that this holds true of *first acts*, of which one is not ordered to another. But it is not so in the case at hand, because the act of prevenient grace has an ordering to the act of subsequent grace.
<!-- page 655 -->

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Apostle, it must be said that, as was said above in the objecting[^16], this is to be understood of *freely given* graces. For these are multiplied because they are ordered to external works, so that according to their first and immediate character they regard diverse effects; but sanctifying grace, as such, does not regard external works, as it does[^17] interior ones, except through the mediation of the habits of the virtues and gifts; or if it does regard them, this is only insofar as they are considered under one character, namely under the character of *merit*. — And therefore that which it consequently objects does not hold, that the perfection of sanctifying grace is greater than that of freely given grace; for although this is true *intensively*, it need not be so *extensively*.

3. To that which is objected, that fault is multiplied[^18], therefore grace too; it can be answered that that reasoning fails in two ways. First indeed, because that is to be understood of a multiplication not according to division into *subjective* parts, but according to diverse *acceptations* or significations. For since the *irrational* is divided against the *rational*, it need not be that there are as many rational things as irrational. Secondly it also fails, because to one good many evils are apt to be opposed, since «evil is manifold, and good is in one way[^19]».

4. To that which is objected, that the acts of grace, insofar as it is grace, are diversified etc.; it must be said that although those acts are diverse with so great a diversity that in bodily things they are attributed to diverse things — since it belongs to one medicine to cure and to another to preserve — yet in spiritual things they are not so diversified as to induce a diversity of habit, both because of the order of the acts and effects themselves, and also because of the perfection of the habit itself, by which it has that it can far better reach into many effects without its own multiplication than bodily nature can do this through the conjunction of diverse natures[^20].

5. To that which is objected concerning knowledge, the response is plain from what has already been said. For there is no parallel, both because knowledge denotes a habit having a respect to exterior knowable things according to their special and proper conditions and natures; and also because in some way created knowledge is said to be caused by things outside; and also because to knowledge itself it especially belongs to distinguish[^21]. But the opposites of these properties and conditions are found in grace, as can be had from what has been said before; and therefore it is not multiplied, but in one soul is found one.

la: Dist. praeced. c. 2. seqq. et hic c. 1. — Aristot., I. de Partib. animalium, c. 3. dicit: *Oppositis item dividendum est.* Cfr. II. Poster. c. 14. (c. 12.). — De sententia: *Opposita non possunt fieri circa idem simul et semel*, cfr. quod ex Aristot. attulimus supra pag. 100, nota 1. — Pro *debet esse* cod. aa *debet fieri*.

en: The preceding distinction, c. 2 ff., and here c. 1. — Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals* I. c. 3, says: *Division must likewise be made by opposites.* Cf. *Posterior Analytics* II. c. 14 (c. 12). — On the maxim *opposites cannot come to be about the same thing at one and the same moment*, cf. what we adduced from Aristotle above on p. 100, note 1. — For *debet esse* codex aa reads *debet fieri*.

la: Vers. 13. — Glossam referunt Strabus et Lyranus.

en: Verse 13. — Strabo and Lyranus report the Gloss.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13. et V. Ethic. c. 1.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I. c. 13, and *Ethics* V. c. 1.

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1: *Ut uno verbo dicam, ex similibus operationibus habitus fiunt; unde operationes qualitate quadam praeditas oportet reddere, quippe cum ex earum differentiis habitus quoque [differentes] consequantur.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* II. c. 1: *To say it in one word, habits arise from like operations; hence one must render the operations endowed with a certain quality, since from their differences differing habits too result.*

la: Ut insinuat Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.), et I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. Cfr. etiam I. Poster. c. 23. (c. 28.).

en: As Aristotle intimates, *On the Soul* III, text 38 (c. 8), and *Metaphysics* I. c. 1 ff. Cf. also *Posterior Analytics* I. c. 23 (c. 28).

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, c. 1.

la: Plures codd., inter quos F K bb, hic et paulo inferius *acceptio*.

en: Several codices, among them F K bb, here and a little below read *acceptio*.

la: Ita Vat. cum ed. 3 et pluribus codd., in aliis *hoc*.

en: So the Vatican edition with ed. 3 and several codices; in others *hoc*.

la: Verba *et etiam intermedii* desunt in multis codd., ut F H I L O T X Y Z aa bb, et in edd. 2, 3; in ed. 1 legitur *ex parte subiecti et ex parte finis primi, medii et ultimi*. Probabiliter haec verba, ex sequente explicatione sumta, a posterioribus manibus interpolata sunt.

en: The words *and also intermediate* are absent in many codices, such as F H I L O T X Y Z aa bb, and in eds. 2, 3; in ed. 1 it reads *from the side of the subject and from the side of the first, middle, and ultimate end*. Probably these words, taken from the explanation that follows, were interpolated by later hands.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 89. seqq. (c. 5.), et supra pag. 225, nota 6.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 89 ff. (c. 5), and above on p. 225, note 6.

la: Codd. V bb *ut*.

en: Codices V bb read *ut*.

la: Cod. aa *intermedium*; cod. cc et ed. 1 hic interiiciunt *medium*.

en: Codex aa reads *intermedium* (intermediate); codex cc and ed. 1 here insert *medium* (middle).

la: Cod. aa *de divisione Augustini, quam ponit Magister in littera*.

en: Codex aa reads *concerning the division of Augustine, which the Master sets down in the text*.

la: Supra in ipsa obiectione secunda.

en: Above, in the second objection itself.

la: Vat. cum cod. ee *sive*; ed. 1 omittit *sicut interiora*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex ee reads *sive* (or); ed. 1 omits *sicut interiora* (as interior ones).

la: Vat. *multipliciter dicitur*. — De partibus subiectivis cfr. supra pag. 598, nota 9.

en: The Vatican edition reads *is said in many ways*. — On subjective parts cf. above, p. 598, note 9.

la: Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 22. (c. 23.), ubi et haec exempla afferuntur: «quemadmodum sanitas quidem simplex (ἁπλοῦς), sed multiformis morbus; itidem virtus simplex, cum sit vitium tamen multiforme». Idem habetur VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 6. (c. 5.). Quia tamen tempore S. Bonav. libri Ethic. magis divulgati erant, S. Doctor verba respexisse videtur, quae habentur II. Ethic. c. 6, et quae iuxta antiquam versionem (in ed. oper. S. Thomae) sic sonant: *Boni enim quidem simpliciter (ἁπλῶς), multifarie autem mali.* Cfr. tom. I. pag. 810, nota 5. — Pro *multifariam* cod. T *multifarium*, cod. W *multiplex*.

en: Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* I. c. 22 (c. 23), where these examples too are brought forward: «just as health is simple (ἁπλοῦς), but disease manifold; likewise virtue is simple, while vice is nevertheless manifold». The same is found in *Eudemian Ethics* VII. c. 6 (c. 5). But since in the time of St. Bonaventure the books of the *Ethics* were more widely circulated, the holy Doctor seems to have had in view the words found in *Ethics* II. c. 6, which according to the old version (in the edition of the works of St. Thomas) run thus: *For the good is simple (ἁπλῶς), but the evil manifold.* Cf. vol. I, p. 810, note 5. — For *multifariam* codex T reads *multifarium*, codex W *multiplex*.

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 17, ubi inter alia haec: *Quod virtus, quanto plus approximat uni puro et vero, fit vehementior eius unitas, et quanto vehementior fit eius unitas, est infinitas in ea magis apparens* etc.

en: Cf. *Liber de Causis*, prop. 17, where among other things: *that the more a power approaches the one, pure and true, its unity becomes the more vehement, and the more vehement its unity becomes, the more does infinity appear in it* etc.

la: Vide de his Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et VI. text. 1. seqq. (V. c. 1.). — In fine solut. cod. aa addit *gratia*.

en: On these matters see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I. c. 1 ff. and VI, text 1 ff. (V. c. 1). — At the end of the solution codex aa adds *gratia*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Consentiunt theologi in hoc, quod *una tantum sit gratia*, quatenus ipsa est principium *vitae supernaturalis*; et rursus in hoc, quod «est differentia in gratia per differentes *effectus* et *status*, et non per differentes formas. Et secundum hoc dicendum, quod est divisibilis per differentias *accidentales*, et non per differentias *essentiales*, quae diversificant essentiam seu formam. *Virtus* autem divisibilis est utroque modo, scilicet per differentias essentiales et per differentias accidentales» etc. (ita Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 1.).

De multis distinctionibus gratiae, quae illa aetate in usu erant, vide hic dub. 1. Praecipue autem ibi notandum est, quod divisiones sumtae ex S. Augustino, scilicet in gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem, operantem et cooperantem, apud auctores et apud ipsum Augustinum in diversis sensibus sumuntur, ut observant S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 26. a. 5.) et S. Bonav. in dubio citato. Nam inveniuntur dictae modo de gratia increata, modo de creata, modo de habituali, modo de actuali; quod qui non attendit, in periculum incidit falsum sensum auctoribus attribuendi. S. Bonav. in praedicto dubio presse sequitur Alexandrum Hal. (loc. cit. a. 2.), qui diffuse de istis distinctionibus scribit et etiam differentiam gratiae *operantis* et *praevenientis* sic explicat: «Eadem est gratia *operans* et *praeveniens*, sed differenter: quia utraque comparatur respectu liberi arbitrii ut causa movens ipsum; sed *praeveniens* dicitur, in quantum semper praesto est ut causa bonae voluntatis, etsi in effectu non causet; *operans* vero efficit bonam voluntatem. Unde gratia *praeveniens* et *operans* dicuntur causa bonae voluntatis, sed *praeveniens* dicit causam secundum *habitum*, *operans* dicit causam secundum *actum*. — Similiter eadem est gratia *subsequens* et *cooperans*; sed *subsequens* dicitur respectu praevenientis, quae facit voluntatem bonam, eo quod adiuvet voluntatem iam existentem bonam ad faciendum bonum; *cooperans* vero dicitur respectu liberi arbitrii, in quantum ex gratia et libero arbitrio opus bonum procedit» (cfr. S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 5; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. 3.). De multiplici sensu istarum distinctionum late tractat etiam Aegid. R. (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 3. 4.).

Non inutilis esse nobis videtur observatio Estii (II. Sent. d. 26. § 7.), quod gratia, quae secundum Augustinum dicta est *cooperans*, interdum simplici vocabulo *operans* vocatur, et vicissim *operans* dicitur *cooperans*. Et addit rationem: «Si enim gratiae cooperatur liberum arbitrium producendo in se volendi actum, consequens est, etiam libero arbitrio in eodem actu cooperari gratiam, quia *cooperans* ad *cooperantem* relative dicitur» (cfr. Alex. Hal., citatus supra in schol. ad II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6.). Eo magis hoc notandum est, quia Scholastici antiqui effectum gratiae *operantis* minime restringunt ad solos primos actus *indeliberatos*, a gratia excitatos, sed potius docent, quod per eandem voluntas efficiatur *bona*, «quia Deus illam infundendo voluntatem hominis sanat et praeparat» (S. Bonav., supra d. 26. q. 6.). Constat autem, quod hic effectus in adultis sine cooperatione et motu liberi arbitrii non obtinetur; unde illud respectu talis gratiae operantis et moventis non est tantum *motum*, sed etiam se *ipsum movens*, «assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti» (Trid. Sess. VI. can. 4.). Nec dissentiunt Bonav. aliique Scholastici, quando gratiae operanti, ut eam distinguant a cooperante, attribuunt, quod *moveat* voluntatem; nec ipse S. Thom. dissentit, quando (S. loc. cit. a. 2.) addit, quod in effectu gratiae operantis «mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens». Nam haec ultima verba, adhibitis aliis locis, exponi debent et possunt (cfr. Caietan. in hunc locum, Estius, loc. cit. § 8, aliique commentatores Summae). — De hac cooperatione liberi arbitrii respectu gratiae operantis vide etiam verba Alexandri Hal. et Richardi a Med., supra d. 26. q. 6. in schol.

**II.** Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 6; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. ad 4; de Verit. q. 27. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 5. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 26. a. unicus q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Theologians agree in this, that *there is only one grace*, insofar as it is the principle of the *supernatural life*; and again in this, that «there is a difference in grace through differing *effects* and *states*, and not through differing forms. And according to this it must be said that it is divisible through *accidental* differences, and not through *essential* differences, which diversify the essence or form. But *virtue* is divisible in both ways, namely through essential differences and through accidental differences» etc. (so Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 1.).

Concerning the many distinctions of grace which were in use in that age, see here dub. 1. But it is especially to be noted there that the divisions taken from St. Augustine, namely into prevenient and subsequent grace, operating and cooperating, are taken among the authors and in Augustine himself in diverse senses, as St. Thomas (II. Sent. d. 26. a. 5.) and St. Bonaventure in the dubium cited observe. For they are found said now of uncreated grace, now of created, now of habitual, now of actual; and one who does not attend to this falls into the danger of attributing a false sense to the authors. St. Bonaventure in the aforesaid dubium closely follows Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. a. 2.), who writes at length about these distinctions and also explains the difference between *operating* and *prevenient* grace thus: «It is the same grace that *operates* and *prevenes*, but differently: because each is compared with respect to free choice as a cause moving it; but it is called *prevenient* insofar as it is always at hand as a cause of good will, even if it does not cause it in effect; but *operating* grace effects good will. Hence *prevenient* and *operating* grace are called the cause of good will, but the *prevenient* names the cause according to the *habit*, the *operating* names the cause according to the *act*. — Similarly the same grace is *subsequent* and *cooperating*; but it is called *subsequent* with respect to the prevenient, which makes the will good, in that it helps the will, already existing as good, to do good; but it is called *cooperating* with respect to free choice, insofar as from grace and free choice a good work proceeds» (cfr. St. Thomas, loc. cit. ad 5; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. 3.). On the manifold sense of these distinctions Aegidius Romanus also treats at length (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 3. 4.).

The observation of Estius (II. Sent. d. 26. § 7.) seems to us not useless, that the grace which according to Augustine is called *cooperating* is sometimes called by the simple word *operating*, and in turn *operating* is called *cooperating*. And he adds the reason: «For if free choice cooperates with grace by producing in itself the act of willing, it follows that grace too cooperates with free choice in the same act, since *cooperating* is said relatively to *the one cooperating*» (cfr. Alex. of Hales, cited above in the scholion on II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6.). This is the more to be noted, because the ancient Scholastics by no means restrict the effect of *operating* grace to the first *undeliberated* acts alone, aroused by grace, but rather teach that through the same grace the will is made *good*, «because God, by infusing it, heals and prepares the will of man» (St. Bonaventure, above d. 26. q. 6.). But it is established that this effect is not obtained in adults without the cooperation and motion of free choice; hence, with respect to such operating and moving grace, that is not only something *moved*, but also *moving itself*, «by assenting to God who arouses and calls» (Trid. Sess. VI. can. 4.). Nor do Bonaventure and the other Scholastics dissent, when, in order to distinguish operating grace from cooperating grace, they attribute to it that it *moves* the will; nor does St. Thomas himself dissent, when (S. loc. cit. a. 2.) he adds that in the effect of operating grace «our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone is moving». For these last words, with other passages adduced, must and can be explained (cfr. Cajetan on this passage, Estius, loc. cit. § 8, and the other commentators on the Summa). — On this cooperation of free choice with respect to operating grace see also the words of Alexander of Hales and Richard of Mediavilla, above d. 26. q. 6. in the scholion.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 6; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. ad 4; de Verit. q. 27. a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10; Summa p. II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, II. Sent. d. 26. a. unicus q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (PDF pp. 675–677, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 45619–45808. The short ARTICULUS I opener (*De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum*) is folded into this q1 per the Vol II chunking convention (Override §5) — no standalone a1-divisio chunk.
- **Page-split map:**
  - p. 653 (raw 45619–45656): ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I openers, arguments 1–4 (arg. 4 breaks mid-sentence at *quia alia ‖ est medicina*).
  - p. 654 (raw 45657–45728): arg. 5, Sed contra 1–5, Conclusio, Respondeo, reply 1 (breaks at *gratiae ‖ subsequentis*).
  - p. 655 (raw 45730–45795): replies 2–5, full Scholion I–II. Ends just before QUAESTIO II at raw 45809 (p. 656).
- **Apparatus split map (21 entries):**
  - p. 653 footers 2–6 → notes 1–5 (footer 1 *quae quaerit* belongs to d27-divisio, not here).
  - p. 654 footers 1–11 → notes 6–16.
  - p. 655 reply footers 1–5 → notes 17–21.
  - The Scholion carries no footnote anchors (its citations are inline parenthetical); it is fully on p. 655.
- **Hand-offs:** RECEIVED nothing (d27-divisio took only the NOTAE block + p.653 footer 1). FORWARDED nothing to a1-q2 — QUAESTIO II opens cleanly at the top of p.656 L-col (raw 45809) with its own footer run.
- **has_scholion:** true (SCHOLION I–II present, p. 655).
- **[?] flags:** none.
- **Body seams** 653→654 (*quia alia / est medicina*) and 654→655 (*actum gratiae / subsequentis*) are grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 656 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum gratia gratum faciens et virtus gratuita differant per essentiam.*

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione gratiae ad virtutem gratuitam, et est quaestio, utrum gratia gratum faciens et virtus gratuita differant per essentiam.

Et quod non, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod Magister[^1] dicit, et habitum est in lectione praecedenti, quod gratia gratum faciens est «fides cum dilectione»: si ergo fides et caritas virtutes sunt, videtur etc.

2. Item, «quorum definitiones sunt eaedem, ipsa sunt eadem[^2]»; sed gratia sic definitur ab Isidoro: «Gratia est divinae misericordiae donum, per quod bonae voluntatis est exitus»; sed haec definitio convenit virtuti gratuitae: ergo etc.

3. Item, eadem est per essentiam gratia operans et cooperans[^3]; sed gratia cooperans in libero arbitrio non est aliud quam virtus gratuita, cum ipsius sit voluntati cooperari: ergo idem est virtus et gratia.

4. Item, *quorum effectus et actus proximus et immediatus est idem, ipsa sunt eadem*[^4]; sed gratiae actus respectu subiecti est animam vivificare, respectu Dei est acceptam reddere, respectu operis est ipsum opus meritorium facere. Omnia haec virtuti competunt; nam dicitur ad Romanos primo[^5]: *Iustus ex fide vivit;* et ad Hebraeos undecimo: *Sine fide impossibile est Deo placere;* et primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio: *Si caritatem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest.* Ergo si primi effectus gratiae virtuti attribuuntur, gratia et virtus sunt unus et idem habitus.

5. Item, si habitus sunt diversi, unus non denominat alterum; sed gratia virtutem denominat, dicitur enim *virtus gratuita:* ergo gratia et virtus non differunt in essentia.

6. Item, circumscripto omni alio habitu, si quis habeat fidem et caritatem, habet unde Deo placeat et unde etiam ei serviat: si igitur illud quod facit Deo placere, est gratia gratum faciens; ergo omni[^6] habitu circumscripto, intellecto quod quis habeat fidem et caritatem, habet gratiam gratum facientem: ergo gratia gratum faciens non est aliquid per essentiam differens a virtute.

**Sed contra:**
1. Anselmus *de Concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii*[^7]: «Rectitudinem voluntatis nullus habet, nisi Dei gratia praeveniente»; sed virtus non est aliud quam rectitudo voluntatis: ergo virtus est a gratia praeveniente. Sed in creaturis differt effectus a causa per essentiam: ergo virtus gratuita essentialiter differt a gratia.

2. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est medium operandi respectu alterius, illa differunt per essentiam, quia nihil creatum agit se ipso[^8]; sed gratia in opus bonum et in actum determinatum movet mediante virtute: ergo gratia et virtus gratuita differunt per essentiam.

3. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum illorum habet actum continuum, et reliquum habet actum interpolatum, illa differunt per essentiam; sed gratia et virtus sunt huiusmodi, quia gratia est in actu continuo — continue enim vivificat et animam Deo reddit acceptam — virtus vero non est continue in ipso actu: ergo etc.

4. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod habent diversas differentias dividentes, illa differunt per essentiam[^9]; sed gratia dividitur per praevenientem et subsequentem, virtus vero per cardinalem et theologicam: ergo etc.

<!-- page 657 -->

5. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum remanet, reliquo recedente, illa sunt per essentiam diversa[^10]; sed virtus aliquo modo remanet post perpetrationem culpae, gratia vero gratum faciens nullo modo: ergo etc.

6. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum remanet indivisum, reliquum vero dividitur et multiplicatur, illa essentialiter differunt; sed gratia in una anima est una, sicut ostensum est supra[^11], virtutes vero multae, sicut ostendetur infra, et Apostolus dicit primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio: *Nunc autem manent fides, spes et caritas, tria haec* etc.: necesse est igitur, gratiam et virtutes gratuitas differre per essentiam.

### Conclusio

> Gratia gratum faciens diversa est a virtutum habitibus, qui una gratia fiunt gratuiti.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod circa hoc diversi diversimode senserunt.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod gratia nihil aliud est quam virtus. Intellexerunt enim, quod gratia non est aliud quam quaedam rectificatio[^12] potentiarum animae respectu eius, ad quod sunt. Hanc autem rectificationem, quia supra naturam est, non potest facere nisi Deus. Et quoniam talem rectitudinem faciendo in anima dat virtutes ipsis potentiis, ut rationali fidem, concupiscibili caritatem et irascibili spem; ideo dixerunt, gratiam creatam nihil aliud esse quam virtutem gratuitam, differre autem sola ratione dicendi, quia gratia dicitur, in quantum Deus per illam rectitudinem animam acceptat et approbat, virtus vero, in quantum anima, sic rectificata, habet exire in opera ardua et laudabilia.

Alii vero dixerunt, quod gratia et virtus gratuita essentialiter differunt sicut[^13] principium et principiatum, et sicut substantia et virtus. Sicut enim potentia animae non est ipsa animae essentia, sed potius emanat et procedit ab illa; sic virtus, quae perficit potentiam, non est ipsa gratia, quae perficit animae substantiam, sed potius aliquid egrediens ab ipsa, ut, sicut anima est quoddam totum potentiale, sic etiam gratia sit quoddam totum potentiale[^14]. Est enim una secundum se, et in quantum respicit ipsam animae substantiam; est tamen origo plurium, in quantum influit in ipsas potentias. Unde dicunt, illas virtutes non solum modo differre, in quantum sunt virtutes, sed etiam in quantum gratuitae, ut sit alia gratia specialis, a qua fides dicitur gratuita, alia, a qua spes, alia, a qua caritas gratuita nuncupatur.

Quaelibet autem harum positionum, etsi probabilitatem habeat, nihilominus tamen, si quis interius aspiciat, videbit, aliquo modo utramque a veritatis tramite declinare. — Nam prima, quae dicit, quod gratia nihil aliud est quam virtutis habitus, necesse habet dicere, aut quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus[^15], aut quod in uno homine sint multae gratiae gratum facientes. Quorum utrumque est improbabile, et unum est improbatum supra, et aliud est satis improbabile, videlicet quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus, et improbabitur suo loco. Necesse etiam habet dicere, aut quod gratia gratum faciens non totaliter tollitur per culpam, aut quod post peccatum nihil remanet de virtute aliqua. Et primum horum est contra communem doctorum sententiam, secundum vero est contra sensibilem experientiam. Ideo modus iste dicendi non modicam habet calumniam. — Alius etiam a veritate deviare videtur. Primum in eo, quod ponit, quod gratia primo existat in substantia et postmodum influat in potentias: hoc enim improbatum est supra[^16]. Secundo vero in eo, quod ponit, in uno et eodem homine esse diversas gratias gratum facientes; et hoc ipsum supra[^17] improbatum est. Unus enim est decor, qui datur faciei animae, ex quo non solum ipsa acceptatur, immo etiam habitus et opera.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum, cum dico *lumen* et *colorem illuminatum,* dico aliam et aliam formam, licet una sit ordinata ad aliam, et quodam modo altera compleatur ex alterius praesentia; similiter intelligendum est de gratia et virtute gratuita. Quemadmodum enim «color qualitas est corporis terminati[^18]», quae a praesentia luminis influxi venustatur et completur, ut possit movere visum; sic virtus, quae est habilitatio potentiae, absque gratia gratum faciente informis est, sicut color sine lumine; sed ea adveniente, ex qua tota anima in se et in suis potentiis decoratur, formari et vivificari dicuntur habitus virtutum et effici Deo accepti[^19]. Et quemadmodum ex lumine infuso et colore non fit unum per essentiam, sed per ordinem; et iterum, lumen, in quantum illuminat aerem coniunctum corpori terminato, et in quantum colorem reddit luminosum, non est aliud et aliud per essentiam, sed sola comparatione differens et secundum esse; et sicut

<!-- page 658 -->

unum lumen diversos potest colores ad actum reducere[^20] sine sui multiplicatione: sic in influentia gratiae et habitu virtutis intelligendum est esse, scilicet quod gratia superveniens cum habitu virtutis, quem *formare* dicitur, non facit *unum per essentiam,* sed ideo format, quia ad *finem suum ordinat.* Similiter gratia, a qua anima dicitur esse Deo grata, et a qua aliqua virtus dicitur esse gratuita, non differt nisi *sola comparatione,* sicut exemplum positum est in lumine[^21]. Similiter una est gratia, a qua omnes virtutes animae dicuntur esse gratuitae. — Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes plures ostendunt, quod habitus gratiae gratum facientis et virtutum habitus sunt diversi.

**Ad obiecta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Magistro, qui dicit, quod gratia est fides cum dilectione; dicendum, quod illa praedicatio non est per essentiam, sed per quandam *concomitantiam* et *significantiam.* Et aliquo modo posset etiam reduci ad praedicationem *per causam*[^22].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod definitio gratiae convenit virtuti; dicendum, quod illa notificatio vel non est propria, vel si est propria, non eo modo convenit virtuti, quo dicitur de gratia[^23]; gratia enim est sicut donum primum et excellentissimum inter dona creata, et sicut donum, quod complectitur totam bonitatem donantis. Sic autem intellecta hac notificatione, non competit virtuti.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia cooperans est virtus; dicendum, quod ille actus non assignatur gratiae secundum se, sed secundum quod est ordinativa virtutis; et sic dicitur libero arbitrio cooperari. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod idem sit quod virtus; immo si sic argueretur, esset *consequens*[^24], sicut si ita argueretur: color movet visum, et lux movet visum: ergo color non differt a luce. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quoniam vivificare et acceptum reddere et opus meritorium facere aliter competit virtuti, aliter gratiae. Gratiae enim competit primo, virtuti vero ex consequenti, videlicet quia ab influentia gratiae formatur et ordinatur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si habitus sunt diversi, unus non denominat alterum; dicendum, quod est denominatio per *inhaerentiam,* sicut albedo per album denominat corpus; et denominatio per *circumincessionem* quandam, in qua aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum habet ordinare alterum, secundum quod voluntas dicitur *deliberans* et iustitia *prudens*[^25]. Et per hunc modum virtus dicitur esse *gratuita.*

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circumscripto omni habitu etc.; dicendum, quod a caritate non potest circumscribi gratia, quia caritas semper nominat virtutem formatam[^26]. Si quis autem vocaret caritatem habitum amoris, quo natus est homo diligere Deum propter se et super omnia, sic, etsi modo non possit absque gratia reperiri, potest tamen intelligi, sicut in Adam et in primo Angelo ante lapsum fuit, ut supra distinctione tertia[^27] patuit. — Et sic patet, quod gratia est aliud quam virtus; patet etiam, quod est aliud quam potentiarum rectificatio. Nam in homine quantum ad statum innocentiae erat potentiarum rectitudo, antequam esset gratiae gratum facientis infusio; et hoc melius videbitur infra[^28], quando agetur de necessitate gratiae secundum statum innocentiae.

english:
### Question II. *Whether grace that makes pleasing and gratuitous virtue differ by essence.*

Secondly there is asked about the comparison of grace to gratuitous virtue, and the question is whether grace that makes pleasing and gratuitous virtue differ by essence.

And that they do not, it seems:

1. *First*, from that which the Master[^1] says, and which was set down in the preceding lesson, namely that grace that makes pleasing is «faith with love»: if therefore faith and love are virtues, it seems so, etc.

2. Likewise, «those whose definitions are the same are themselves the same[^2]»; but grace is thus defined by Isidore: «Grace is the gift of divine mercy, through which there is an issuing-forth of good will»; but this definition fits gratuitous virtue: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, operating grace and cooperating grace are by essence the same[^3]; but cooperating grace in free choice is nothing other than gratuitous virtue, since it belongs to it to cooperate with the will: therefore virtue and grace are the same.

4. Likewise, *those whose effect and proximate and immediate act is the same are themselves the same*[^4]; but the act of grace with respect to its subject is to vivify the soul, with respect to God is to render it accepted, with respect to the work is to make the work itself meritorious. All these belong to virtue; for it is said in Romans chapter one[^5]: *The just man lives by faith;* and in Hebrews chapter eleven: *Without faith it is impossible to please God;* and in First Corinthians chapter thirteen: *If I have not love, it profits me nothing.* Therefore if the first effects of grace are attributed to virtue, grace and virtue are one and the same habit.

5. Likewise, if habits are diverse, one does not denominate the other; but grace denominates virtue, for it is called *gratuitous virtue:* therefore grace and virtue do not differ in essence.

6. Likewise, with every other habit set aside, if anyone has faith and love, he has that whereby he may please God and also whereby he may serve Him: if therefore that which makes one please God is grace that makes pleasing; then with every[^6] habit set aside, granted that one has faith and love, he has grace that makes pleasing: therefore grace that makes pleasing is not something differing by essence from virtue.

**On the contrary:**
1. Anselm *On the Concord of Predestination and Free Choice*[^7]: «No one has rectitude of the will except by God's grace going before»; but virtue is nothing other than rectitude of the will: therefore virtue is from prevenient grace. But in creatures the effect differs from the cause by essence: therefore gratuitous virtue differs essentially from grace.

2. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one is the medium of operating with respect to the other, those differ by essence, because nothing created acts by itself[^8]; but grace moves into a good work and into a determinate act by means of virtue: therefore grace and gratuitous virtue differ by essence.

3. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one of them has a continuous act, and the other has an interrupted act, those differ by essence; but grace and virtue are of this kind, because grace is in a continuous act — for it continuously vivifies and renders the soul accepted to God — whereas virtue is not continuously in its act: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, whatever things are so related that they have diverse dividing differences, those differ by essence[^9]; but grace is divided into prevenient and subsequent, whereas virtue is divided into cardinal and theological: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one remains while the other withdraws, those are diverse by essence[^10]; but virtue in some way remains after the perpetration of a fault, whereas grace that makes pleasing in no way remains: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one remains undivided, while the other is divided and multiplied, those differ essentially; but grace in one soul is one, as was shown above[^11], whereas the virtues are many, as will be shown below, and the Apostle says in First Corinthians chapter thirteen: *But now there remain faith, hope, and love, these three* etc.: it is necessary therefore that grace and the gratuitous virtues differ by essence.

### Conclusion

> Grace that makes pleasing is diverse from the habits of the virtues, which are made gratuitous by the one grace.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that on this matter different men have thought in different ways.

For some wished to say that grace is nothing other than virtue. For they understood that grace is nothing other than a certain rectification[^12] of the soul's powers with respect to that for which they exist. But this rectification, since it is above nature, none but God can effect. And since, by making such rectitude in the soul, He gives virtues to the powers themselves — to the rational power faith, to the concupiscible love, and to the irascible hope — therefore they said that created grace is nothing other than gratuitous virtue, but that it differs only by the manner of speaking, because it is called grace insofar as God through that rectitude accepts and approves the soul, whereas it is called virtue insofar as the soul, thus rectified, has to go forth into arduous and praiseworthy works.

But others said that grace and gratuitous virtue differ essentially as[^13] principle and that which proceeds from a principle, and as substance and power. For just as the power of the soul is not the soul's essence itself, but rather emanates and proceeds from it; so virtue, which perfects the power, is not grace itself, which perfects the soul's substance, but rather something issuing forth from it, so that, just as the soul is a certain potential whole, so also grace is a certain potential whole[^14]. For it is one in itself, and insofar as it regards the soul's substance itself; yet it is the origin of many, insofar as it flows into the powers themselves. Hence they say that those virtues differ not only insofar as they are virtues, but also insofar as they are gratuitous, so that there is one special grace from which faith is called gratuitous, another from which hope, another from which love is named gratuitous.

But each of these positions, although it has probability, nonetheless, if one looks within, one will see that each in some way deviates from the path of truth. — For the first, which says that grace is nothing other than the habit of virtue, must say either that all the virtues are one virtue[^15], or that in one man there are many graces that make pleasing. Both of which are improbable, and the one has been disproved above, and the other is sufficiently improbable, namely that all the virtues are one virtue, and it will be disproved in its place. It must also say either that grace that makes pleasing is not wholly taken away by fault, or that after sin nothing of any virtue remains. And the first of these is against the common opinion of the doctors, the second against sensible experience. Therefore this manner of speaking has no small objection against it. — The other also seems to deviate from the truth. First in that it posits that grace first exists in the substance and afterwards flows into the powers: for this has been disproved above[^16]. Secondly in that it posits that in one and the same man there are diverse graces that make pleasing; and this very thing has been disproved above[^17]. For there is one comeliness which is given to the face of the soul, by which not only the soul itself is accepted, but even its habits and works.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, namely that just as, when I say *light* and *illuminated color,* I say one form and another, although the one is ordered to the other, and in a way the one is completed by the presence of the other; so it must be understood concerning grace and gratuitous virtue. For just as «color is a quality of a bounded body[^18]», which by the presence of infused light is adorned and completed, so that it can move sight; so virtue, which is the rendering-apt of a power, is without grace that makes pleasing formless, like color without light; but when that grace comes, by which the whole soul is adorned in itself and in its powers, the habits of the virtues are said to be formed and vivified and made accepted to God[^19]. And just as from infused light and color there comes about not one thing by essence, but by order; and again, light, insofar as it illuminates the air joined to a bounded body, and insofar as it renders color luminous, is not one thing and another by essence, but differing only by comparison and according to being; and just as

one light can reduce diverse colors to act[^20] without its own multiplication: so it must be understood to be in the influence of grace and the habit of virtue, namely that grace supervening upon the habit of virtue, which it is said to *form,* does not make *one thing by essence,* but it forms it for this reason, that it *orders it to its end.* Similarly grace, from which the soul is said to be pleasing to God, and from which any virtue is said to be gratuitous, does not differ except *by comparison alone,* as the example was set down concerning light[^21]. Similarly there is one grace, from which all the virtues of the soul are said to be gratuitous. — It must be conceded therefore, as several reasons show, that the habit of grace that makes pleasing and the habits of the virtues are diverse.

**To the objections:**

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected concerning the Master, who says that grace is faith with love; it must be said that that predication is not by essence, but by a certain *concomitance* and *signification.* And in some way it could also be reduced to predication *by cause*[^22].

2. To that which is objected, that the definition of grace fits virtue; it must be said that that notification either is not proper, or, if it is proper, does not fit virtue in the manner in which it is said of grace[^23]; for grace is like the first and most excellent gift among created gifts, and like a gift that embraces the whole goodness of the giver. But the notification thus understood does not belong to virtue.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that cooperating grace is virtue; it must be said that that act is not assigned to grace in itself, but according as it is directive of virtue; and so it is said to cooperate with free choice. Nor does it follow from this that it is the same as virtue; rather, if one argued thus, it would be the *consequent* [fallacy][^24], just as if one argued thus: color moves sight, and light moves sight: therefore color does not differ from light. — And by this the reply to the following is clear, since to vivify and to render accepted and to make a work meritorious belong in one way to virtue, in another way to grace. For they belong to grace first, but to virtue consequently, namely because it is formed and ordered by the influence of grace.

5. To that which is objected, that if habits are diverse, one does not denominate the other; it must be said that there is a denomination by *inherence,* as whiteness denominates a body by the white; and a denomination by a certain *mutual indwelling,* in which two things are so related that one has to order the other, according as the will is called *deliberating* and justice *prudent*[^25]. And in this manner virtue is said to be *gratuitous.*

6. To that which is objected, that with every habit set aside, etc.; it must be said that grace cannot be set aside from love, because love always names a formed virtue[^26]. But if one were to call love the habit of the love by which man is born to love God for His own sake and above all things, then, even though now it cannot be found without grace, it can nevertheless be understood, as it was in Adam and in the first Angel before the fall, as was clear above in the third distinction[^27]. — And thus it is clear that grace is other than virtue; it is clear also that it is other than the rectification of the powers. For in man, as regards the state of innocence, there was a rectitude of the powers before there was the infusion of grace that makes pleasing; and this will be seen better below[^28], when there will be a treatment of the necessity of grace according to the state of innocence.

la: Dist. XXVI. c. 3. et ibid. in Comment. dub. 2. et 3. — Pro *Et quod non* Vat. falso et contra contextum *Et quod sint idem,* refragantibus codd. L P Q W bb (K T a secunda manu), qui nobiscum conveniunt. Paulo post pro *lectione praecedenti* Vat. *distinctione praecedenti;* at multi codd., ut C K L O R S T aa bb cc ee, et edd. 1, 2, 3 confirmant nostram lectionem.

en: Distinction XXVI, c. 3, and in the same place in the Commentary, dub. 2 and 3. — For *And that they do not* the Vatican edition falsely and against the context [reads] *And that they are the same,* opposed by codices L P Q W bb (K T by a second hand), which agree with us. A little after, for *the preceding lesson* the Vatican edition has *the preceding distinction;* but many codices, such as C K L O R S T aa bb cc ee, and editions 1, 2, 3, confirm our reading.

la: Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Haec autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae. Cfr. supra pag. 648, nota 4. — Verba Isidori vide ibid. nota 7. — De diversis definitionibus virtutis, quae in hoc et seqq. argg. tanguntur, vide infra dub. 3.

en: According to Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4): But these are not the same, because the definitions are diverse. Cf. above p. 648, note 4. — See the words of Isidore in the same place, note 7. — On the diverse definitions of virtue, which are touched upon in this and the following arguments, see below, dub. 3.

la: Sicut ostensum est quaest. praeced.

en: As was shown in the preceding question.

la: Cfr. illud Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: Nam quaecumque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eaedem, et effectiva et corruptiva. Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 51, nota 11.

en: Cf. that passage of Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 1: For whatever things are simply the same, their generations too and corruptions are the same, and what produces and what corrupts. Cf. also vol. I, p. 51, note 11.

la: Vers. 17. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 6, tertius loc. cit. v. 3. — Paulo superius post *Omnia haec* Vat. adiicit *eadem per essentiam.*

en: Verse 17. — The following text is the cited place, v. 6; the third is the cited place, v. 3. — A little above, after *All these* the Vatican edition adds *the same by essence.*

la: Cod. aa subiungit *alio.* Circa finem arg. edd. cum pluribus codd. pro *aliquid* incongrue substituunt *aliud.*

en: Codex aa appends *another.* Near the end of the argument the editions, with several codices, incongruously substitute *other* for *something.*

la: Quaest. 3. c. 4: Sicut ergo illam [rectitudinem] nullus accipit, nisi gratia praeveniente, ita nullus eam servat, nisi eadem gratia subsequente. — Aristot., II. Magnor. Moral. c. 9. (c. 8.): Causa et cuius est causa, aliud est.

en: Question 3, c. 4: As therefore no one receives that [rectitude] except by prevenient grace, so no one preserves it except by the same grace following after. — Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* II, c. 9 (c. 8): The cause and that of which it is the cause are diverse.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 8, p. II, q. 2.

la: Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13: Eorundem eaedem differentiae.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 13: Of the same things the differences are the same.

la: Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: Si potest alterum sine altero esse, non enim erit idem ad idem [οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν i. e. non enim erit idem].

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 1: If one can be without the other, then it will not be the same as the same [οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν, i.e. for it will not be the same].

la: Quaest. praeced. — De diversitate virtutum vide III. Sent. d. 33. per totam. — Textus Apostoli est loc. cit. v. 13.

en: The preceding question. — On the diversity of the virtues see III Sent. d. 33 throughout. — The text of the Apostle is the cited place, v. 13.

la: Codd. U V cc et ed. 1 *rectitudo.*

en: Codices U V cc and edition 1 [read] *rectitude.*

la: Cod. aa subiungit *differunt.*

en: Codex aa appends *they differ.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 600, nota 1. — Mox post *secundum se* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et aliquibus codd. omittit *et.*

en: Cf. above p. 600, note 1. — Presently, after *in itself,* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and some codices omits *and.*

la: Quaest. 1. — Quod omnes virtutes non sint una virtus, ostenditur III. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. Ibid. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. probatur etiam, quod caritas semel habita possit amitti; idem probatur de gratia supra d. 26. q. 4.

en: Question 1. — That all the virtues are not one virtue is shown at III Sent. d. 33, q. 2. In the same place, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, it is also proved that love once had can be lost; the same is proved concerning grace above at d. 26, q. 4.

la: Dist. 26. q. 5. — Paulo superius pro *videtur* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *dicitur.*

en: Distinction 26, q. 5. — A little above, for *it seems* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] *it is said.*

la: Quaest. 1. — Mox post *habitus* Vat., cum edd. 3, 4 nec non aliqui codd. subiiciunt *eius.* Subinde post *dicendi* cod. aa addit *melior.*

en: Question 1. — Presently, after *habits* the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4 and also some codices, adds *of it.* Thereupon, after *of speaking* codex aa adds *better.*

la: Secundum Aristotelem; cfr. supra pag. 320, nota 5.

en: According to Aristotle; cf. above p. 320, note 5.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 5; d. 27. q. 1. et 4. nec non d. 36. q. 6. — Mox pro *aerem* non pauci codd., inter quos F K T cc ee, cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *aera;* forma Graeca.

en: Cf. III Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 5; d. 27, q. 1 and 4, and also d. 36, q. 6. — Presently for *aerem* (air) not a few codices, among which F K T cc ee, with editions 1, 2, 3 [read] *aera;* the Greek form.

la: Codd. I V Z *deducere.* In seqq. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *informare* et *informat* pro *formare* et *format.*

en: Codices I V Z [read] *to lead down.* In what follows the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] *to inform* and *informs* for *to form* and *forms.*

la: De lumine vide supra d. 13. a. 2. et 3. Loco verborum *sicut exemplum positum est,* quae ex codd. aa bb restituimus, in plurimis codd. nec non in Vat. et ceteris edd. legitur *sicut primum expositum est.*

en: On light see above d. 13, a. 2 and 3. In place of the words *as the example was set down,* which we have restored from codices aa bb, in very many codices and also in the Vatican edition and the other editions there is read *as was first explained.*

la: Libr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. ad similem obiectionem, nempe quod virtus non sit aliud quam caritas, S. Doctor respondet: Dicendum, quod praedicatio illa est praedicatio causalis. Ideo enim omnes virtutes definiri possunt per caritatem, quia amor caritatis dat eis rationem merendi, qua ablata, non est, proprie loquendo, dicenda virtus esse in anima. Cfr. supra d. 26. dub. 2.

en: In Book III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, to a similar objection — namely that virtue is nothing other than love — the holy Doctor replies: It must be said that that predication is a causal predication. For all the virtues can be defined by love for this reason, that the love of charity gives them the account of meriting, which being taken away, there is not, properly speaking, to be called a virtue in the soul. Cf. above d. 26, dub. 2.

la: Codd. I V Z bb verba sic transponunt: *non eo modo dicitur de gratia, quo convenit virtuti.*

en: Codices I V Z bb transpose the words thus: *it is not said of grace in the manner in which it fits virtue.*

la: Scilicet fallacia consequentis. Cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. — Ante *consequens* ed. 1 male interserit *etiam.*

en: Namely the fallacy of the consequent. Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3. — Before *consequent* edition 1 wrongly inserts *also.*

la: Nempe voluntas dicitur *deliberans* ex actu rationis praecedentis, et iustitia dicitur *prudens* ex prudentia, quam praesupponit. Cfr. supra d. 25. p. I. q. 6. in corp.

en: Namely the will is called *deliberating* from the act of preceding reason, and justice is called *prudent* from the prudence which it presupposes. Cf. above d. 25, p. I, q. 6, in the body.

la: Ratio huius est, quia, ut dicitur III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 4, secundum se totam opponitur culpae generaliter.

en: The reason for this is that, as is said at III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 4, it is according to its whole self opposed to fault generally.

la: Part. II. a. 3. q. 1, ubi de Angelis agitur. De Adamo vide infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. et a. 2. q. 2.

en: Part II, a. 3, q. 1, where the Angels are treated. On Adam see below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3, and a. 2, q. 2.

en: Distinction 29, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De quodam corollario huius quaestionis iam supra d. 26. q. 5. tractatum est. — Opinionem *primam* in resp. positam, sed respectu habitus *caritatis* tantum, sequuntur Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica), Durand. (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 1.), Nominales et etiam aliqui insignes theologi posteriores, ut Bellarminus et Estius. — *Secundam* opinionem, quae asserit, habitus gratiae et caritatis *essentialiter* distingui, tenet S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 110. a. 3; de Verit. q. 27. a. 2.) cum B. Alberto (II. Sent. d. 26. a. 11; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 4; licet quidam de eo falso dicant contrarium), Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), Aegid. R. (II. Sent. q. 2. a. 1.) et plurimis recentioribus. Observandum autem est, a S. Thoma hanc sententiam ita explicari, ut minime ex ea sequatur positio, contra quam argumentatur secundo loco S. Bonav., scilicet quod tunc in uno homine sint plures gratiae.

**II.** S. Bonav. media via incedendum esse putat, licet et primam et secundam opinionem habere probabilitatem non neget. *Convenit* autem ipse cum S. Thoma primo in hoc, quod gratia in ordine supernaturali respiciat *esse primum,* virtus autem *esse secundum.* Unde ait in Breviloquio (p. V. c. 4.): «Sicut principium productivum sua summa perfectione in dando vitam naturae non tantum dat *vivere* quantum ad actum *primum,* verum etiam quantum ad actum *secundum,* qui est operari; sic necesse est, quod principium reparativum vitam tribuat spiritui *in esse gratuito* et quantum ad *esse* et quantum ad *operari*» etc. — *Secundo* convenit in eo, quod gratiam ab habitibus virtutum, etiam caritatis, maiore distinctione differre asserit, quam distinctione *rationis* (cfr. III. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 3.).

<!-- page 659 -->

*Dissentit* vero Seraphicus a secunda opinione in tribus: primo quoad *naturam huius distinctionis:* dum enim S. Thomas vult, quod gratia a virtutibus, nempe infusis, differat *realiter* et *per essentiam,* S. Bonav. docet, quod non per essentiam differat, sed *sola comparatione* et *secundum esse.* — Secundo docet, quod gratia insit animae primo secundum *libertatem arbitrii* (supra d. 26. q. 5.); sed S. Thom. vult, quod primo insit secundum *essentiam.* Quomodo S. Bonav. illam assertionem intelligat, dictum est supra d. 26. q. 5, et perspicue declaratur IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 4. in corp., ubi duplex modus distinguitur, quo aliquid possit esse in potentia, et asseritur, quod anima non sit capax gratiae et gloriae nisi per *mentem,* quam vocare solet *faciem animae.* — Tertio, quod gratia, superveniens virtuti quasi causae materiali, eam formet, sicut lux colorem, non probatur a S. Thom. in Comment. (loc. cit.); qui tamen hoc intelligit in eo sensu, quod efficiatur ex gratia et virtute unum, sicut ex forma et eo cuius est forma. Et fortasse ita rem intellexisse videtur Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 2. a. 4.), qui concludit, quod «gratia et virtus sunt idem *substantialiter,* et non *formaliter,* sicut ferrum et cultellus substantialiter idem sunt, sed non formaliter; et sic gratia non est virtus omnino secundum *esse* et *rationem,* sed secundum *substantiam*». Sed S. Bonav. (hic in fine corp.) explicite dicit, quod gratia superveniens cum habitu virtutis, quem *formare* dicitur, *non facit unum per essentiam, sed ideo format, quia ad finem suum ordinat* (quare gratia magis *lux* dicatur quam calor, docetur IV. Sent. d. 18. p. II. dub. 3.). — Conferri etiam debet Breviloq. p. V. c. 4, ubi S. Bonav. fere eodem modo loquitur ac S. Thomas, ut iam observavit Dionys. Carth. (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. circa finem) his verbis: «Bonav. in Breviloquio suo super his multa conscribit perpulcre, et tamen pene omnia, quae affirmat de gratia, conveniunt caritati, nisi quod postea scribit de ramificatione gratiae [c. 4.] et habitus virtutum et donorum, et probat, gratiam esse *distinctam*». — De relatione, quam gratia habet ad omnes alias virtutes infusas, cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, ubi fundam. 4. in q. 1. positum sic exprimitur: «Consistit imago recreationis in tribus virtutibus theologicis et unitate gratiae, sicut imago creationis in tribus potentiis et unitate substantiae».

**III.** Auctoribus laudatis subiungimus Henricum Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 10.), qui, cum inter essentiam animae et potentias non distinguat nisi secundum *rationem,* sibi constans dicit: «Gratia et caritas non differunt re, immo id ipsum, quod in ipsa *essentia* est gratia, in quantum consideratur absolute vel sub ratione *essentiae,* id ipsum est *caritas* in ea, in quantum consideratur sub ratione *potentiae*». Iam hinc patet, Henrici sententiam in re principali differre a sententia Scoti.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning a certain corollary of this question, treatment has already been made above at d. 26, q. 5. — The *first* opinion set down in the response, but only with respect to the habit of *love,* is followed by Scotus (in both Commentaries, here in the single question), Durandus (II Sent. d. 26, q. 1), the Nominalists, and also some distinguished later theologians, such as Bellarmine and Estius. — The *second* opinion, which asserts that the habits of grace and of love are *essentially* distinguished, is held by St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 26, a. 1; Summa I-II, q. 110, a. 3; de Verit. q. 27, a. 2) together with Blessed Albert (II Sent. d. 26, a. 11; Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 4; although some falsely say the contrary about him), Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 1), Giles of Rome (II Sent. q. 2, a. 1), and very many recent writers. But it must be observed that this opinion is so explained by St. Thomas that the position against which St. Bonaventure argues in the second place — namely that then in one man there are several graces — by no means follows from it.

**II.** St. Bonaventure thinks that one must proceed by a middle way, although he does not deny that both the first and the second opinion have probability. He *agrees* with St. Thomas, first, in this: that grace in the supernatural order regards *first being,* while virtue regards *second being.* Hence he says in the Breviloquium (p. V, c. 4): «Just as a productive principle by its highest perfection in giving life to nature gives not only *to live* as regards the *first* act, but also as regards the *second* act, which is to operate; so it is necessary that the restorative principle should bestow life upon the spirit *in gratuitous being* both as regards *being* and as regards *operating*» etc. — *Secondly* he agrees in this, that he asserts grace to differ from the habits of the virtues, even of love, by a greater distinction than the distinction of *reason* (cf. III Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3).

The Seraphic Doctor *dissents* from the second opinion in three respects: first as to the *nature of this distinction:* for whereas St. Thomas holds that grace differs from the virtues, namely the infused ones, *really* and *by essence,* St. Bonaventure teaches that it differs not by essence, but *by comparison alone* and *according to being.* — Secondly he teaches that grace is in the soul first according to the *liberty of choice* (above d. 26, q. 5); but St. Thomas holds that it is in it first according to *essence.* How St. Bonaventure understands that assertion has been said above at d. 26, q. 5, and is clearly declared at IV Sent. d. 49, p. I, q. 4 in the body, where a twofold manner is distinguished by which something can be in potency, and it is asserted that the soul is not capable of grace and glory except through the *mind,* which he is wont to call the *face of the soul.* — Thirdly, that grace, supervening upon virtue as upon a quasi-material cause, forms it, as light forms color, is not proved by St. Thomas in the Commentary (loc. cit.); who nevertheless understands this in the sense that from grace and virtue one thing is brought about, as from form and that of which it is the form. And perhaps Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II, q. 61, m. 2, a. 4) seems to have understood the matter thus, who concludes that «grace and virtue are the same *substantially,* and not *formally,* as iron and a knife are substantially the same, but not formally; and so grace is not virtue altogether according to *being* and *account,* but according to *substance*». But St. Bonaventure (here at the end of the body) explicitly says that grace supervening upon the habit of virtue, which it is said to *form, does not make one thing by essence, but forms it for this reason, that it orders it to its end* (why grace should rather be called *light* than heat, is taught at IV Sent. d. 18, p. II, dub. 3). — There should also be compared Breviloquium p. V, c. 4, where St. Bonaventure speaks in almost the same manner as St. Thomas, as Dionysius the Carthusian has already observed (II Sent. d. 26, q. 1, near the end) in these words: «Bonaventure in his Breviloquium writes many things on these matters very beautifully, and yet almost everything that he affirms of grace agrees with love, except that afterwards he writes about the ramification of grace [c. 4] and the habit of virtues and gifts, and proves that grace is *distinct*». — Concerning the relation which grace has to all the other infused virtues, cf. III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, where the fourth fundamentum set down in q. 1 is thus expressed: «The image of recreation consists in the three theological virtues and the unity of grace, just as the image of creation consists in the three powers and the unity of substance».

**III.** To the authors cited we add Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4, q. 10), who, since he does not distinguish between the essence of the soul and the powers except according to *reason,* consistently with himself says: «Grace and love do not differ in reality; rather, that very thing which in the *essence* itself is grace, insofar as it is considered absolutely or under the account of *essence,* that same thing is *love* in it, insofar as it is considered under the account of *power*». And from this it is already clear that Henry's opinion differs in the principal matter from the opinion of Scotus.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 45809–46034. QUAESTIO II opens raw 45809 = top of p. 656 L-col ("Secundo quaeritur de comparatione gratiae ad virtutem gratuitam, et est quaestio, utrum gratia gratum faciens et virtus gratuita differant per essentiam"); ends raw 46034, immediately before QUAESTIO III (raw 46035, *Tertio quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad gloriam*).

**Page span:** printed pp. 656–659 (PDF 678–681, offset +22). The SCHOLION (I–III) begins at the foot of p. 658 R-col and continues across the top of both columns of p. 659, ending "…differre a sententia Scoti" immediately above the QUAESTIO III running head (`DIST. XXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. III.`).

**Page-split map of body:**
- p. 656: ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO II openers; args 1–6; Sed contra 1–4 (Sed contra 4 *differentias dividentes* breaks at page foot).
- p. 657: Sed contra 5–6; Conclusio; Respondeo (Opinio 1, Opinio 2, *iudicium de utraque*, Opinio 3 start; breaks at *et sicut ‖ unum lumen*).
- p. 658: Respondeo conclusio (conclusiones 2–4); replies 1, 2, 3+4 (joint), 5, 6; SCHOLION I + II start.
- p. 659: SCHOLION II tail + III (above the QUAESTIO III divider).

**Apparatus — 28 entries, per-page footer runs (Quaracchi restarts numbering each printed page):**
- p. 656 footers 1–9 → [^1]–[^9] (anchored in args 1–6 + Sed contra 1, 2, 4).
- p. 657 footers 1–10 → [^10]–[^19] (Sed contra 5–6, Opinio 1/2 markers, the *iudicium de utraque* "improbatum supra" anchors footers 6–8 = [^15]–[^17], Opinio 3 markers footers 9–10 = [^18]–[^19]).
- p. 658 footers 1–9 → [^20]–[^28] (Respondeo conclusio + replies 1, 2, 5, 6). The reply-3+4 paragraph carries [^24] (*consequens* = fallacia consequentis); reply 6 carries [^26]–[^28].

**Scholion footnotes:** The SCHOLION (I–III) carries NO `[^N]` body anchors — all its citations are inline parenthetical (cfr., supra d., III. Sent., Breviloq., etc.), exactly as in the sibling a1-q1 scholion. The p. 659 L-col footers 1–5 (Hebr. 11,6; Ex cod. cc; Dist. 26 q. 4; Sicut ostensum I Sent. d. 17; Vers. 8) belong to QUAESTIO III, not q2, and are NOT consumed here.

**Hand-offs:** RECEIVED nothing (clean seam — q1 closed on p. 655 with its own SCHOLION; q2 opens fresh at top of p. 656). FORWARDED nothing — QUAESTIO III (a1-q3, *de gratia in comparatione ad gloriam*) opens at raw 46035 / foot of p. 659 L-col and owns its own p. 659 L-col footers 1–5 + p. 660 run. Body seams 656→657 / 657→658 / 658→659 verified grammatically continuous at 450 dpi.

**[?] flags:** none.

**has_scholion:** TRUE (SCHOLION I, II, III).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0