title: Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 2

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### Articulus II. *De comparatione peccati venialis ad mortale.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum veniale conveniat cum mortali in reatu poenae aeternae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum veniale conveniat cum mortali in reatu poenae aeternae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Poena assumta pro mortali est proportionabilis[^1] poenae assumtae pro veniali, et quantum ad acerbitatem et quantum ad durationem: ergo si poenae arbitrariae pensantur secundum magnitudinem reatus peccati, videtur, quod reatus venialis et mortalis sint utroque modo proportionabiles. Sed poena aeterna non est proportionabilis nisi aeternae: si ergo unum obligat ad poenam aeternam, videtur, quod et reliquum. Si tu dicas, quod per gratiam mortale fit veniale, et commutatur poena aeterna in temporalem; obiicitur tunc: quia, cum veniale similiter remittatur per gratiam, si misericordia Dei est ordinata, sicut aeternam commutat in temporalem, ita temporalem deberet commutare in instantaneam[^2]! Quod si non facit, videtur, quod illa responsio nulla sit.

2. Item, esto quod aliquis decedat cum mortali et veniali, et quod de neutro fuerit in hac vita punitus: si ergo peccatum non remanet impunitum[^3], ergo pro utroque punitur iste, sed non nisi in inferno, et in inferno punitur in aeternum. Sed non punitur ultra, quam meruit: ergo pro peccato veniali merebatur puniri aeternaliter. Si tu dicas, quod punitur aeternaliter ratione mortalis adiuncti; obiicitur, quod non. Esto quod mortale illud puniatur, quantum meruit[^4] puniri; tunc ergo pro veniali aut punietur aeternaliter ratione sui, aut ratione mortalis adiuncti. Non ratione mortalis adiuncti, quia illud sufficienter punitur per se. Si ergo punitur aeternaliter, hoc est ratione sui; sed Deus nullum punit supra condignum: ergo dignum erat, propter veniale peccatum aliquem aeternaliter puniri.

3. Item, veniale stat cum gratia et stat cum mortali, et utrobique salvatur ratio venialis; et constat, quod magis salvatur cum mortali quam cum gratia, quia gratia delet ipsum, mortale[^5] nunquam: ergo si abstrahatur ab utroque, magis tenebit proprietatem, quam habet cum mortali, quam cum gratia. Sed quando est cum gratia, debetur ei poena temporalis; quando cum mortali, debetur ei poena aeterna: ergo veniali de se et secundum se debetur poena aeterna. Si tu dicas, quod obiectio teneret, si poena temporalis deberetur ei ratione gratiae; sed hoc non est verum, quia debetur ei ratione sui; contra: impossibile est, sufficienter puniri peccatum, nisi remittatur, quia, quamdiu durat culpa, debet durare poena — non enim debet esse « dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae[^6] » — sed nec mortale nec veniale dimittitur nisi per gratiam: ergo tam mortali quam veniali debetur poena aeterna, quantum est de se.

4. Item, esto quod aliquis tantum habeat peccatum veniale, nec tamen habeat gratiam; aut esset dignus poena aeterna, aut temporali. Si temporali: ergo illa persoluta, esset omnino absolutus a culpa; sed potest per se ipsum poenam illam solvere: ergo per se posset ad innocentiam resurgere. Quodsi non potest per se ipsum ad innocentiam redire, nunquam potest, quantum est de se, poenam sufficientem pro illa culpa sustinere: ergo nisi auxilium gratiae superveniat[^7], veniali peccato debetur poena aeterna.

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Si tu dicas, quod solvendo poenam disponeret se ad gratiam, quae culpam deleret; hoc non solvit, quia, si se similiter puniret pro peccato mortali, Deus gratiam infunderet, quae illam culpam mortalem deleret.

5. Item, delectatio mortalis peccati non excedit delectationem venialis in infinitum: ergo si reatus respondet delectationi, nec reatus excedit reatum in infinitum, sed aeternum excedit temporale in infinitum; si ergo mortale obligat ad poenam aeternam, ergo et veniale. Si tu dicas, quod quamvis non excedat *simpliciter,* excedit tamen *secundum reputationem,* quia mortale diligit[^8] supra Deum, qui est bonum infinitum, veniale vero minime; contra hoc est, quia, cum veniale peccatum a Deo puniatur et Deo displiceat, aliquo modo offensivum est Dei. Ergo si tanta est offensa, quantus is qui offenditur; cum per veniale peccatum offendatur Deus, qui est infinitus; videtur, quod reatus peccati venialis debeat reputari infinitus, sicut et mortalis: ergo sicut per mortale peccatum meretur homo puniri infinite, ita et per veniale.

**Sed contra:** 1. Hugo de sancto Victore[^9]: « Veniale peccatum est illud, cui secundum se debetur poena transitoria »: ergo reatus peccati venialis solummodo est poenae temporalis.

2. Item, poena aeterna est mors secunda; sed nulli debetur mors secunda nisi propter primam, quae est per separationem animae a Deo: si igitur veniale a Deo non separat, sicut supra[^10] ostensum fuit, ergo non obligat ad poenam aeternam.

3. Item, si veniale facit hominem dignum poena aeterna, laedit hominem usque ad mortem; sed quod est huiusmodi debet dici mortale: ergo veniale peccatum est mortale.

4. Item, si veniale obligat ad poenam aeternam; cum omne aeternum careat fine, et quod caret fine caret remissione et venia, peccatum veniale dicit oppositionem ad remissionem et veniam; sed quod est huiusmodi, non est veniale: ergo peccatum veniale non est veniale[^11].

5. Item, si veniale facit dignum poena aeterna, et gratia facit hominem dignum vita aeterna; cum veniale peccatum et gratia simul sint in eodem[^12], simul est homo dignus vita aeterna et poena aeterna: ergo si fit ei retributio, secundum quod meruit, simul posset esse in aeterna beatitudine et in aeterna poena, quo nihil magis[^13] est impossibile.

### Conclusio.

> Veniali peccato non debetur poena aeterna per se, sed tantum ratione coniunctionis cum mortali.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut fides nostra dicit, peccato mortali debetur poena aeterna.

Quare autem peccato mortali debeatur poena aeterna, multiplex consuevit assignari ratio; ad praesens autem sufficiat una, quia ista quaestio alibi habet locum, scilicet in quarto[^14], ubi quaeritur de aeternitate poenae infernalis. Praecipua enim inter rationes, quare debetur peccato mortali poena aeterna, est, quia, dum homo peccat mortaliter, separat se a vita gratiae et subiicit se perpetuae impotentiae exeundi de culpa, quantum est de se. Nemo enim potest a culpa mortali resurgere nisi per creationem[^15] et infusionem novae gratiae et novae vitae; et propterea ratione istius impotentiae peccato mortali annexa est obligatio ad aeternitatem poenae. — Haec autem poena aeterna, etsi omni peccato mortali debeatur, non tamen omni persolvitur; quia, quamvis mortale peccatum reddat hominem impotentem ad resurgendum per se ipsum, contingit tamen, hominem relevari per divinum auxilium. Debetur igitur peccato mortali poena aeterna, quia separat hominem a vita; persolvitur autem poena aeterna in eo, quod tenet hominem in aeternum separatum a vita. — Quoniam igitur veniale peccatum nec separat hominem a vita, quia non excludit gratiam, nec tenet hominem in perpetuum separatum a vita; hinc est, quod peccatum veniale nec de se obligat ad poenam aeternam, nec ei secundum se redditur poena aeterna.

Quia vero peccatum veniale coniungi habet ei quod separat a vita, et etiam ei quod tenet separatum a vita; hinc est, quod ratione adiuncti poena aeterna debetur, et poena aeterna persolvitur. Unde si aliquis decedat cum mortali simul et cum veniali, aeternaliter pro utroque[^16] punietur.

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Et ratio huius est, quia nullum peccatum deleri potest absque gratia; et quamdiu durat culpa, debet durare et poena. Et ideo, cum venialis culpa duret cum mortali in infinitum, ratione coniunctionis cum illa in infinitum punitur. Nihilominus tamen ei, quantum est *de se,* debetur poena temporalis, cum simul possit stare cum gratia; et propterea *veniale* nominatur, ut in hoc distinguatur a genere peccati mortalis; quia *mortale* aufert principium vitae et veniae, videlicet ipsam gratiam, *veniale* autem, quantum est *de se,* non aufert, immo simul cum illa manet[^17]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod veniali peccato non debetur poena aeterna secundum se.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena satisfactoria pro veniali et mortali est proportionabilis; dici potest, quod ratio illa non concludit[^18], quod debeatur veniali poena aeterna, nisi prout est coniunctum mortali. Praeterea, ratio illa non cogit, quia, sicut in opponendo dictum est, in infusione[^19] gratiae poena mortalis peccati commutatur in *temporalem;* poena vero venialis peccati non commutatur in *non-temporalem.* — Et si tu quaeras, unde hoc, cum misericordia Dei debeat esse ordinata; dicendum, quod quia obligatio ad poenam aeternam non potest simul stare cum gratia, necessario per infusionem gratiae fit absolutio a reatu poenae aeternae. Sed gratia bene stat cum poena temporali; et ideo non oportet, per infusionem gratiae poenam temporalem in momentaneam commutari.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui decedit cum veniali et mortali; dicendum, quod talis tam pro veniali quam mortali aeternaliter punitur; sed hoc non est ratione venialis *principaliter,* sed ratione *mortalis* adiuncti. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod mortale punitur in se, quantum meruit; quia, sicut bonum vigoratur ex bono, ita malum vigoratur ex malo eo modo, quo dicitur malum vigorari. Ideo quamvis veniali, quantum est de se, non debeatur poena aeterna, nihilominus tamen potest ei deberi, in quantum est *coniunctum mortali;* et ideo, cum Deus punit tam veniale quam mortale in eodem[^20] poena aeterna, neutrum punit supra condignum, sed utrumque punit, prout puniri meretur, non solum *in se,* sed etiam, prout est *alteri coniunctum.*

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis salvatur ratio venialis cum mortali quam cum gratia; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de gratia quantum ad *actum,* verum est; nam actus gratiae sive motus gratiae delet veniale peccatum. Si autem intelligatur quantum ad *habitum,* falsum est; quia veniale cum gratia magis salvatur in propria ratione quam cum mortali; tunc enim nec reatus eius augetur nec minuitur nec mutatur. Sed cum veniale iunctum est mortali, tunc reatus eius augetur et quodam modo mutatur, quia iunctum malo vigoratur. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod veniali non debetur poena temporalis nisi ratione gratiae, quia semper duraret, nisi esset gratia. Dicendum enim, quod verum est, quod semper duraret, nisi esset gratia; quia tamen ipsum de se gratiam non excludit, sicut mortale, simul stat cum principio suae remissionis et deletionis: ideo, quamvis non possit deleri sine gratia, nihilominus tamen, quantum est de sua[^21] natura, delebile est et terminabile. Non sic est de mortali, quod omnino excludit donum gratiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliquis esset in solo veniali et moreretur, in aeternum cruciaretur; dicendum, quod haec[^22] positio est impossibilis. Primum, quia nunquam fuit nec est nec erit, quod aliquis in solo peccato veniali fuerit, ita quod non habeat gratiam. Nihil enim est medium nunc, quin homo habeat gratiam, aut sit in mortali peccato. Et in primo statu nihil fuit medium inter innocentiam et mortalem culpam, quia puritas innocentiae non potuit perdi nisi per mortalem culpam, sicut supra[^23] ostensum est; et ideo positio illa vana est. — Esto tamen, quod aliquis puer esset in veniali, dico, quod Deus nunquam educeret eum de statu meriti, quin vel ipse peccaret mortaliter, vel ipse daret ei gratiam. — Et si quaerat, utrum isti veniali debeatur poena aeterna, vel temporalis; dico, quod debetur poena temporalis. Et si procedat ulterius: ergo illa persoluta, erit omnino immunis a culpa;

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dicendum, quod verum est; sed quia nunquam potest eam Deo persolvere, ita quod Deus eam[^24] acceptet sine gratia; hinc est, quod Deus, ne cogeretur istum supra condignum punire, gratiam sibi infunderet, per quam solutionem poenae acceptaret. Et ideo non sequitur, quod illi peccato debeatur poena aeterna[^25] secundum se; nec sequitur, quod homo per se possit resurgere a culpa ad innocentiam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod delectatio non excedit delectationem in infinitum; dicendum, quod non excedit in infinitum secundum *veram intensionem delectationis,* sed secundum *reputationem peccantis.* — Exemplum autem huius ponitur in caritate, quae diligit aliquod bonum creatum et diligit increatum; et adeo bonum increatum reputat bonum, quod si bonum creatum infinities multiplicaretur[^26], adhuc non aequaret illi in amore; sed plus amaret Deum quam bonum creatum infinities multiplicatum, licet utrumque finite diligat. Sic etiam in proposito est intelligendum in amore concupiscentiae, quae caritatem perimit, et quae cum caritate salvatur. Nam *una,* scilicet quae caritatem perimit, praefert creaturam Deo, qui erat praeferendus infinitis bonis creatis; *altera* vero, quae cum caritate manet, non praefert creaturam Deo: et ideo secundum reputationem et peccantis et Dei punientis mortale excedit veniale improportionabiliter.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per veniale offenditur Deus; dicendum, quod falsum est; non enim dicitur Deus offendi, nisi cum contemnitur. Sed verum est, quod cum veniali peccato minus Deus *amatur,* secundum quod Augustinus dicit in libro Confessionum[^27]: « Minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat ». Ideo veniale vitam aeternam non aufert, sed retardat, quia a Deo non separat, sed elongat; nec obligat ad poenam aeternaliter cruciantem, quantum est de se, sed temporaliter affligentem.

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### Article II. *On the comparison of venial sin to mortal sin.*
### Question II. *Whether the venial sin agrees with the mortal in the liability to eternal punishment.*

Secondly it is asked whether the venial sin agrees with the mortal in the liability to eternal punishment. And that it does so, seems to follow.

1. The punishment assigned for the mortal sin is proportionable[^1] to the punishment assigned for the venial, both as to severity and as to duration: therefore if arbitrary punishments are weighed according to the magnitude of the guilt of the sin, it seems that the guilt of the venial and of the mortal are proportionable in both ways. But an eternal punishment is not proportionable except to what is eternal: if therefore the one binds to eternal punishment, it seems that the other does too. If you say that through grace the mortal sin becomes venial, and the eternal punishment is commuted into a temporal one; the objection then arises: since the venial is likewise remitted through grace, if the mercy of God is ordered, then just as it commutes the eternal into the temporal, so it ought to commute the temporal into the instantaneous[^2]! And if it does not do this, it seems that that reply is null.

2. Likewise, suppose that someone dies in mortal and venial sin, and that he was punished in this life for neither: if then a sin does not remain unpunished[^3], then he is punished for both, but only in hell, and in hell he is punished eternally. But he is not punished beyond what he deserved: therefore for the venial sin he deserved to be punished eternally. If you say that he is punished eternally by reason of the adjoined mortal sin; the objection is raised that this is not so. Suppose that that mortal sin be punished as much as it deserved[^4] to be punished; then therefore for the venial sin he will be punished either eternally by reason of itself, or by reason of the adjoined mortal sin. Not by reason of the adjoined mortal sin, because that is sufficiently punished by itself. If therefore he is punished eternally, this is by reason of itself; but God punishes no one beyond what is condign: therefore it was fitting that someone be punished eternally on account of venial sin.

3. Likewise, the venial sin stands with grace and stands with the mortal, and in both cases the character of the venial is preserved; and it is agreed that it is more preserved with the mortal than with grace, because grace blots it out, the mortal sin never[^5]: therefore if it be abstracted from both, it will hold its property more such as it has with the mortal than with grace. But when it is with grace, a temporal punishment is owed to it; when with the mortal, an eternal punishment is owed to it: therefore to the venial of itself and according to itself an eternal punishment is owed. If you say that the objection would hold if a temporal punishment were owed to it by reason of grace; but this is not true, because it is owed to it by reason of itself; on the contrary: it is impossible that a sin be sufficiently punished unless it be remitted, because, as long as the fault lasts, the punishment ought to last — for there ought not to be « the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of justice[^6] » — but neither the mortal nor the venial is remitted except through grace: therefore to the mortal as much as to the venial an eternal punishment is owed, so far as concerns itself.

4. Likewise, suppose that someone has only venial sin, yet does not have grace; he would be worthy either of eternal punishment or of temporal. If of temporal: then once that is paid, he would be entirely absolved from the fault; but he can pay that punishment by himself: therefore by himself he could rise again to innocence. But if he cannot by himself return to innocence, he can never, so far as concerns himself, sustain a punishment sufficient for that fault: therefore unless the help of grace supervenes[^7], an eternal punishment is owed to the venial sin.

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If you say that by paying the punishment he would dispose himself to grace, which would blot out the fault; this does not solve it, because, if he were likewise to punish himself for a mortal sin, God would infuse grace, which would blot out that mortal fault.

5. Likewise, the delight of mortal sin does not exceed the delight of the venial infinitely: therefore if the guilt corresponds to the delight, neither does the guilt exceed the guilt infinitely, whereas the eternal exceeds the temporal infinitely; if therefore the mortal binds to eternal punishment, then so does the venial. If you say that although it does not exceed *simply,* it nonetheless exceeds *according to reckoning,* because the mortal loves [the creature][^8] above God, who is the infinite good, whereas the venial does so least of all; against this is the fact that, since the venial sin is punished by God and is displeasing to God, it is in some way offensive to God. Therefore if the offense is as great as he who is offended; since by venial sin God is offended, who is infinite; it seems that the guilt of venial sin ought to be reckoned infinite, just as the mortal also is: therefore just as by mortal sin a man deserves to be punished infinitely, so also by the venial.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hugh of Saint Victor[^9]: « A venial sin is that to which, according to itself, a transitory punishment is owed »: therefore the guilt of venial sin is only of temporal punishment.

2. Likewise, eternal punishment is the second death; but the second death is owed to no one except on account of the first, which is by the separation of the soul from God: if therefore the venial does not separate from God, as was shown above[^10], then it does not bind to eternal punishment.

3. Likewise, if the venial makes a man worthy of eternal punishment, it harms a man unto death; but what is of this kind ought to be called mortal: therefore the venial sin is mortal.

4. Likewise, if the venial binds to eternal punishment; since everything eternal lacks an end, and what lacks an end lacks remission and pardon, the venial sin states an opposition to remission and pardon; but what is of this kind is not venial: therefore the venial sin is not venial[^11].

5. Likewise, if the venial makes one worthy of eternal punishment, and grace makes a man worthy of eternal life; since the venial sin and grace are simultaneously in the same [subject][^12], a man is simultaneously worthy of eternal life and eternal punishment: therefore if a recompense be made to him according to what he deserved, he could be simultaneously in eternal beatitude and in eternal punishment, than which nothing[^13] is more impossible.

### Conclusion.

> To venial sin an eternal punishment is not owed of itself, but only by reason of its conjunction with the mortal.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as our faith says, an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin.

Now as to why an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin, many reasons are wont to be assigned; but for the present let one suffice, since this question has its place elsewhere, namely in the fourth [book][^14], where it is asked concerning the eternity of infernal punishment. For the chief among the reasons why an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin is this: that, while a man sins mortally, he separates himself from the life of grace and subjects himself to a perpetual impotence of coming out of the fault, so far as concerns himself. For no one can rise again from a mortal fault except through the creation[^15] and infusion of a new grace and a new life; and therefore by reason of that impotence an obligation to the eternity of punishment is annexed to mortal sin. — But this eternal punishment, although it be owed to every mortal sin, is nevertheless not paid by every one; because, although a mortal sin renders a man impotent to rise again by himself, it nonetheless happens that a man is relieved through divine help. Therefore an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin, because it separates a man from life; but the eternal punishment is paid in this, that it holds a man eternally separated from life. — Since therefore the venial sin neither separates a man from life, because it does not exclude grace, nor holds a man perpetually separated from life; hence it is that the venial sin neither of itself binds to eternal punishment, nor is an eternal punishment rendered to it according to itself.

But since the venial sin is apt to be conjoined to that which separates from life, and also to that which holds [one] separated from life; hence it is that by reason of the adjoined [sin] an eternal punishment is owed, and an eternal punishment is paid. Whence if someone dies in mortal sin together with the venial, he will be punished eternally for both[^16].

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And the reason of this is that no sin can be blotted out without grace; and as long as the fault lasts, the punishment too ought to last. And therefore, since the venial fault lasts with the mortal infinitely, by reason of its conjunction with it, it is punished infinitely. Nevertheless to it, so far as concerns *itself,* a temporal punishment is owed, since it can stand together with grace; and therefore it is named *venial,* that in this it be distinguished from the genus of mortal sin; for the *mortal* takes away the principle of life and pardon, namely grace itself, whereas the *venial,* so far as concerns *itself,* does not take it away, but rather remains together with it[^17]. — Therefore the reasons showing that an eternal punishment is not owed to venial sin according to itself are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that a satisfactory punishment for the venial and the mortal is proportionable; it can be said that that reasoning does not conclude[^18] that an eternal punishment is owed to the venial, except insofar as it is conjoined to the mortal. Furthermore, that reasoning does not compel, because, as was said in the objecting, in the infusion[^19] of grace the punishment of mortal sin is commuted into a *temporal* one; but the punishment of venial sin is not commuted into a *non-temporal* one. — And if you ask whence this is, since the mercy of God ought to be ordered; it must be said that, because the obligation to eternal punishment cannot stand together with grace, necessarily through the infusion of grace there comes about an absolution from the liability to eternal punishment. But grace stands well with temporal punishment; and therefore it is not necessary that through the infusion of grace the temporal punishment be commuted into an instantaneous one.

2. To that which is objected concerning him who dies with the venial and the mortal; it must be said that such a one is punished eternally both for the venial and for the mortal; but this is not by reason of the venial *principally,* but by reason of the adjoined *mortal.* — Nor does it avail that he objects that the mortal is punished in itself as much as it deserved; because, just as the good is invigorated from the good, so evil is invigorated from evil, in that mode in which evil is said to be invigorated. Therefore although to the venial, so far as concerns itself, an eternal punishment is not owed, it can nonetheless be owed to it, insofar as it is *conjoined to the mortal;* and therefore, when God punishes both the venial and the mortal in the same[^20] eternal punishment, He punishes neither beyond what is condign, but punishes both, as each deserves to be punished, not only *in itself,* but also as it is *conjoined to another.*

3. To that which is objected, that the character of the venial is more preserved with the mortal than with grace; it must be said that if it be understood of grace as to its *act,* it is true; for the act of grace or the motion of grace blots out venial sin. But if it be understood as to its *habit,* it is false; because the venial with grace is more preserved in its proper character than with the mortal; for then its guilt is neither increased nor diminished nor changed. But when the venial is joined to the mortal, then its guilt is increased and in a certain way changed, because what is joined to evil is invigorated. — Nor does it avail that he objects that a temporal punishment is not owed to the venial except by reason of grace, because it would always last unless there were grace. For it must be said that it is true that it would always last unless there were grace; yet because it of itself does not exclude grace, as the mortal does, it stands together with the principle of its remission and blotting-out: therefore, although it cannot be blotted out without grace, nonetheless, so far as concerns its own[^21] nature, it is blottable-out and terminable. It is not so with the mortal, which altogether excludes the gift of grace.

4. To that which is objected, that if someone were in venial sin alone and were to die, he would be tormented eternally; it must be said that this[^22] supposition is impossible. First, because it never was nor is nor will be that anyone was in venial sin alone, in such a way that he does not have grace. For there is no middle state now, but that a man either has grace or is in mortal sin. And in the first state there was no middle between innocence and mortal fault, because the purity of innocence could not be lost except through mortal fault, as was shown above[^23]; and therefore that supposition is vain. — Yet granted that some child were in venial sin, I say that God would never lead him out of the state of merit, but that either he himself would sin mortally, or He Himself would give him grace. — And if it be asked whether to this venial [sinner] an eternal punishment is owed, or a temporal one; I say that a temporal one is owed. And if one proceed further: then once that is paid, he will be entirely free from fault;

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it must be said that this is true; but because he can never pay it to God, in such a way that God may accept it[^24] without grace; hence it is that God, lest He be compelled to punish this man beyond what is condign, would infuse grace upon him, through which He would accept the payment of the punishment. And therefore it does not follow that an eternal punishment is owed to that sin[^25] according to itself; nor does it follow that a man can by himself rise again from fault to innocence.

5. To that which is objected, that the delight does not exceed the delight infinitely; it must be said that it does not exceed infinitely according to the *true intensity of the delight,* but according to the *reckoning of the sinner.* — An example of this is set in charity, which loves some created good and loves the uncreated; and it so reckons the uncreated good as good that, if the created good were multiplied infinitely[^26], it still would not equal it in love; but it would love God more than the created good multiplied infinitely, although it loves each finitely. So also in the matter at hand it is to be understood concerning the love of concupiscence, which destroys charity, and that which is preserved with charity. For *the one,* namely that which destroys charity, prefers the creature to God, who was to be preferred to infinite created goods; but *the other,* which remains with charity, does not prefer the creature to God: and therefore according to the reckoning both of the sinner and of God who punishes, the mortal exceeds the venial disproportionably.

6. To that which is objected, that by the venial God is offended; it must be said that this is false; for God is not said to be offended except when He is contemned. But it is true that with venial sin God is *loved* less, according to what Augustine says in the book of the Confessions[^27]: « He loves Thee less who loves anything together with Thee, which he does not love on account of Thee ». Therefore the venial does not take away eternal life, but delays it, because it does not separate from God, but estranges; nor does it bind to a punishment eternally tormenting, so far as concerns itself, but to one temporally afflicting.

---

la: Pro *proportionabilis* codd. F T bb ee et alii in hoc arg. constanter exhibent *proportionalis.*

en: For *proportionabilis* codices F T bb ee and others in this argument consistently give *proportionalis.*

la: Edd., excepta I, *momentaneam.*

en: The editions, except the first, [read] *momentaneam* (instantaneous).

la: August., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 118. serm. 23. n. 3: Nec recte factum infructuosum, nec peccatum creditur impunitum. Cfr. *Serm. ad fratres in eremo* (inter opera August.), serm. 41. et 44., nec non supra pag. 843, nota 8.

en: Augustine, *Exposition of Psalm* 118, sermon 23, n. 3: "Neither is a rightly-done deed believed to be fruitless, nor a sin to go unpunished." Cf. *Sermons to the Brothers in the Hermitage* (among the works of Augustine), sermons 41 and 44, and also above, p. 843, note 8.

la: Codd. C K L O S Y et alii cum ed. 1 *meruit.* Circa finem arg. pro *Deus nullum punit* cod. O *Deus malum non punit.*

en: Codices C K L O S Y and others, with the first edition, [read] *meruit.* Near the end of the argument, for *Deus nullum punit* (God punishes no one) codex O [reads] *Deus malum non punit* (God does not punish evil).

la: Cod. bb sic: *delet ipsum mortale, veniale nunquam.*

en: Codex bb thus: *the mortal blots it out, the venial never.*

la: Ut ait August., cuius verba integra vide supra pag. 770, nota 1.

en: As Augustine says, whose words in full see above, p. 770, note 1.

la: Cod. T *subveniat.*

en: Codex T [reads] *subveniat* (come to aid).

la: Simul audi: *creaturam.*

en: Supply at the same time: *the creature.*

la: *Richard.* a S. Vict. in opusculo, quod inscribitur *de Differentia peccati mortalis et venialis,* quaestionem, de qua hic agitur, tangit et obiicienti, quodsi in peccatore decedenti cum mortali simul et cum veniali utrumque peccatum aeternaliter puniretur, quod tunc differentia inter peccata mortalia et venialia tolleretur, respondet: Miror, cur non aeque ex alia consideratione attendis et simili ratione contendis, utrumque [peccatum] esse veniale. Nam sicut in quibusdam utrumque aeterna poena punitur, sic in quibusdam utrumque temporali poena purgatur... utrumque mundatur poena transitoria. Quid ergo? Eritne utrumque veniale et non veniale, mortale et non mortale? Sed si vis inter utrumque recte discernere, attendere debes, quid utrumque faciat per se sine alterius adiectione... Videtur mihi veniale peccatum, quod in Christo renatis per se solum nunquam inducit aeternum supplicium, etiamsi defuerit poenitentiae remedium; mortale vero peccatum, etiamsi fuerit solum, si poenitentiae remedium defuerit, aeternam mortem inducit etc.

en: *Richard* of St. Victor, in the opuscule entitled *On the Difference of Mortal and Venial Sin,* touches on the question here treated, and to one objecting that, if in a sinner dying with mortal sin together with venial both sins were punished eternally, then the difference between mortal and venial sins would be removed, he replies: "I wonder why you do not equally attend from another consideration and contend with like reasoning that both [sins] are venial. For just as in some men both are punished with eternal punishment, so in some both are purged with temporal punishment... both are cleansed with transitory punishment. What then? Will both be venial and not venial, mortal and not mortal? But if you wish to discern rightly between the two, you ought to attend to what each does by itself without the addition of the other... It seems to me that a venial sin, which in those reborn in Christ never by itself alone induces eternal torment, even if the remedy of penance be lacking; but a mortal sin, even if it be alone, if the remedy of penance be lacking, induces eternal death," etc.

la: *Quaest. praeced.* — De maiori cfr. Apoc. 21, 8.

en: The preceding question. — On the major [premise] cf. Revelation 21:8.

la: Richard. a S. Vict. loc. supra cit. ait: Veniale itaque peccatum in Christo renatis, quantum in se solo est, semper pertinet ad veniam; mortale vero, quantum in se solo est, semper pertinet ad mortem aeternam.

en: Richard of St. Victor, in the place cited above, says: "And so a venial sin, in those reborn in Christ, so far as it is in itself alone, always pertains to pardon; but a mortal sin, so far as it is in itself alone, always pertains to eternal death."

la: Plerique codd. et ed. 2 *maius.*

en: Most codices and the second edition [read] *maius* (greater).

en: Distinction 44, part II, article I, question 1.

la: Cod. cc et ed. I *recreationem.* Subinde pro *infusionem* cod. T *reinfusionem.*

en: Codex cc and the first edition [read] *recreationem* (re-creation). Then for *infusionem* (infusion) codex T [reads] *reinfusionem* (re-infusion).

la: In Vat. deest *pro utroque.*

en: In the Vatican edition *pro utroque* (for both) is lacking.

la: Plures alias de hac re opiniones Praepositivus affert in sua Summa, p. II, dicens: Sunt quidam, qui ad hoc respondent, quod in morte omnia venialia peccata delentur, et ita non transit quis nisi cum mortalibus peccatis, pro quibus aeternaliter punitur. Sed si in malo homine venialia peccata delentur in morte, multo magis in bono: ergo bonus non portat secum aliquod veniale; quod est contra auctoritates. Alii sunt qui dicunt, quod venialia in morte ex contemptu fiunt mortalia in eo qui transit cum veniali et mortali... Alii sunt qui dicunt, quod veniale peccatum punitur in isto aeternaliter, ipse tamen non meruit puniri illa poena pro illo peccato... Alii dicunt, quod non est aliqua poena determinata, qua quis puniatur pro isto peccato vel pro illo, sed pro omnibus una poena est, sicut in eo qui suspenditur pro multis peccatis, una est poena suspensionis pro omnibus illis, non autem potest dici, quod illam poenam meruit hoc peccato vel illo, sed pro illis simul dignus est ea... Nobis autem magis placet via magistri nostri dicentis, quod pro veniali punitur iste aeternaliter; sed pro veniali peccato meretur quis poenam temporalem directe et absolute, aeternam sub conditione, sicut e converso mortali peccato meretur quis poenam aeternam directe, temporalem indirecte... sub conditione, scil. si poenituerit etc. — Verbis *non aufert* cod. O praemittit *eam.*

en: Praepositivus brings forward several other opinions on this matter in his *Summa,* part II, saying: "There are some who answer to this that in death all venial sins are blotted out, and so one passes only with mortal sins, for which he is punished eternally. But if in an evil man venial sins are blotted out in death, much more in a good man: therefore the good man does not carry any venial sin with him; which is against the authorities. There are others who say that venial sins in death become mortal through contempt in him who passes with the venial and the mortal... There are others who say that the venial sin is punished in him eternally, yet he himself did not deserve to be punished with that punishment for that sin... Others say that there is no determinate punishment by which one is punished for this sin or for that, but for all there is one punishment, just as in him who is hanged for many sins there is one punishment of hanging for all of them, and it cannot be said that he deserved that punishment by this sin or by that, but for them together he is worthy of it... But the way of our master pleases us more, who says that for the venial this man is punished eternally; but for a venial sin one deserves a temporal punishment directly and absolutely, an eternal one under a condition, just as conversely for a mortal sin one deserves an eternal punishment directly, a temporal one indirectly... under a condition, namely if he shall have repented," etc. — Before the words *non aufert* codex O prefixes *eam.*

la: Supra in obiectione prima, ubi etiam videre est, quod poena *non-temporalis,* quae hic memoratur, idem significat ac poena *instantanea.* — Paulo superius pro *non concludit* codd. C H L R S (K et T a prima manu) ee perperam *non excludit.* Paulo inferius pro *in infusione* codd. F T ee *infusione* tantum.

en: Above in the first objection, where it can also be seen that the *non-temporal* punishment here mentioned signifies the same as an *instantaneous* punishment. — A little above, for *non concludit* (does not conclude) codices C H L R S (K and T by the first hand) ee wrongly [read] *non excludit* (does not exclude). A little below, for *in infusione* codices F T ee [read] *infusione* only.

la: Non pauci codd., inter quos F K T (bb a prima manu) cc ee, atque edd. 1, 2 *venialis.*

en: Not a few codices, among them F K T (bb by the first hand) cc ee, and editions 1 and 2, [read] *venialis.*

la: Codd. H bb *eadem.* In fine arg. pro *alteri coniunctum* codd. F K T et nonnulli alii *alterius coniunctum.*

en: Codices H bb [read] *eadem.* At the end of the argument, for *alteri coniunctum* (conjoined to another) codices F K T and some others [read] *alterius coniunctum* (conjunction of another).

la: Codd. I V Y Z *sui.*

en: Codices I V Y Z [read] *sui* (its own).

la: Codd. T W bb omittunt *haec.*

en: Codices T W bb omit *haec* (this).

la: Dist. 21. a. 3. q. I. — Enuntiatio, quae antecedit, scil. *quia puritas... mortalem culpam,* desideratur in codd. T bb.

en: Distinction 21, article 3, question 1. — The statement which precedes, namely *quia puritas... mortalem culpam* ("because the purity... mortal fault"), is wanting in codices T bb.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *animam.*

en: Codex cc and the first edition [read] *animam* (the soul).

la: Fere omnes codd. et primae edd. omittunt *aeterna.* Paulo ante pro *poenae* cod. T substituit *bene.*

en: Nearly all the codices and the first editions omit *aeterna.* A little before, for *poenae* codex T substitutes *bene.*

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. *multiplicetur.*

en: The editions, with a few codices, [read] *multiplicetur.*

en: [Augustine, *Confessions,*] Book X, c. 29, n. 40.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (`raw/vision/vol2/p-967..970.png`, colcropped to `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p9{67-70}-{L,R}-{0-2}.png`), reading Left column top→bottom then Right column on each page; cross-checked against IA djvu OCR `raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 67196–67402. English is a fresh literal translation. PDF-priority inversion applied to the Conclusio/Respondeo/Solutio and all footer notes (cascade-fragmented in the OCR).

**Printed pages confirmed.** Low-dpi running-head render: p.967 head `DIST. XLII. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`; pp.968–970 verified by page-number markers in the column bands. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` → PDF pp.989–992.

**Page-split / apparatus map (per-page footnote restart):**
- p.967 (7 footers): [^1] *proportionalis* variant, [^2] *momentaneam*, [^3] Augustine *Enarrat. in Ps. 118*, [^4] *meruit* / *Deus malum non punit*, [^5] cod. bb *delet ipsum mortale*, [^6] Augustine ref. p.770 n.1, [^7] cod. T *subveniat*.
- p.968 (8 footers): [^8] *creaturam*, [^9] Richard of St. Victor *de Diff. pecc.* (long quote), [^10] *Quaest. praeced.* / Apoc. 21:8, [^11] Richard loc. cit. (second quote), [^12] *maius*, [^13] Dist. 44 p.II a.I q.1, [^14] *recreationem* / *reinfusionem*, [^15] *pro utroque* deest in Vat.
- p.969 (7 footers): [^16] Praepositivus *Summa* (long quote), [^17] non-temporalis = instantanea + *non excludit* variant, [^18] *venialis* variant, [^19] *eadem* / *alterius coniunctum*, [^20] *sui*, [^21] omit *haec*, [^22] Dist. 21 a.3 q.1.
- p.970 (5 footers): [^23] *animam*, [^24] omit *aeterna* / *bene*, [^25] *multiplicetur*, [^26] Augustine *Confessions* X.29.40, [^27] *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*

**Scholion.** None for this question (`has_scholion: false`). The preceding question's Scholion II ("Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest.") covers it; it is held in `bon-sent-II-d42-a2-q1`.

**Hand-off received (from a2-q1).** a2-q2 opened fresh on p.967 with its own footer sequence; no q1 footer migrated in. The a2-q1 Scholion II tail and its footer references occupy the top of p.967 L/R columns (above the `QUAESTIO II.` body) and stay with a2-q1.

**Hand-off forwarded (to a3-q1).** ARTICULUS III (`De modis dividendi peccata.`, short opener `Consequenter quaeritur tertio loco de modis dividendi peccata... in generali quaeruntur hic duo`, raw 67404) folds into a3-q1 per the Vol II chunking convention. a3-q1 (`Utrum peccatum habeat dividi per differentias materiales tantum, an etiam per formales`, `Circa primum sic proceditur`, raw ~67416) opens on the bottom half of printed **p.970** (PDF 992). **p.970's footnotes 6–10 belong to a3-q1** (6 = Vat. addit *et specificas*; 7 = Porphyry *de Praedicab. de Specie et de Differentia*; 8 = Aristotle *de Praedicam. de Oppositis*; 9 = Vide supra d.XXXIII lit. Magistri c.2; 10 = Aristot. pag.89 n.7 / *de Specie*). a3-q1's first five footers (1–5: *animam*, *aeterna*/*bene*, *multiplicetur* — wait, those 1–5 are q2's; a3-q1's begin at footer 6). **a3-q1's fresh footer sequence begins at p.970 footer 6.** No q2 footer migrates forward.

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 42, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 970 -->

### Articulus III. *De modis dividendi peccata.*

Consequenter quaeritur tertio loco de modis dividendi peccata. Et cum multi sint modi dividendi, de quibus valde prolixum esset hic disputare, his omissis, in generali quaeruntur hic duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum habeat dividi per differentias materiales tantum, an per differentias formales et specificas[^1].

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum dividi habeat per conversionem et aversionem tanquam per diversas peccatorum differentias.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum peccatum habeat dividi per differentias materiales tantum, an etiam per formales.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum dividi habeat per differentias materiales tantum, an etiam per formales. Et quod non tantum per materiales, sed etiam per formales dividi habeat, ostenditur sic.

1. Sicut se habet castitas ad virtutem, ita se habet luxuria ad vitium: ergo sicut castitas est species virtutis, ita luxuria est species vitii; sed una species distinguitur ab altera per differentias formales[^2]: ergo etc.

2. Item, bonum opponitur malo non tantum materialiter, sed etiam formaliter, et diversis bonis diversa opponuntur mala[^3]; sed bona, quibus mala opponuntur, formaliter distinguuntur: ergo pari ratione et mala, quae eis formaliter opposita sunt, formaliter differunt.

3. Item, circa unum actum peccati assignantur diversae differentiae peccatorum, sicut patet in peccato Adae, in quo dicitur fuisse gula et superbia et inobedientia[^4]; sed peccata, quae consistunt circa unum actum, non habent differentiam materialem: ergo si aliquo modo differunt, necesse est, quod habeant differentiam formalem.

4. Item, multiplicatio secundum materiam est multiplicatio secundum numerum[^5], et multiplicatio secundum numerum non habet statum: ergo si peccata solummodo distinguerentur per differentias materialiter differentes, nunquam peccatum posset dividi sufficienti divisione. Si igitur in Scriptura peccatum dividitur differentiis, ipsum sufficienter dividentibus et omne peccatum complectentibus; videtur, quod peccata ad invicem distinguantur non solum differentiis materialibus, verum etiam formalibus.

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**Sed contra:** 1. Formale in genere peccati mortalis est *aversio*; sed peccata a parte aversionis non distinguuntur, immo conveniunt — omnia enim dicunt aversionem a Deo — si ergo distinguuntur, hoc est solum a parte *conversionis*, quae est in peccato materialis: ergo tantum dividitur peccatum per differentias materiales, non per formales.

2. Item, peccatum, formaliter loquendo, nihil est; sed quod nihil est non habet differentias dividentes[^6]: ergo si peccatum dividitur, nullo modo dividitur, in quantum formaliter consideratur: restat igitur, quod solum dividatur per illud quod est materiale in ipso, et ita redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, omne illud, quod habet differentias formales et specificas, aliquo modo, formaliter loquendo, habet speciem; sed peccatum sive malum, formaliter loquendo, est privatio speciei[^7]; et privatio speciei non habet speciem; et quod caret specie caret differentia formali et specifica: ergo etc.

4. Item, si peccatum haberet differentias ipsum formaliter dividentes, ergo haberet veras species; sed omne tale habet ordinari in genere directe[^8]; illud autem, quod est in genere, a Deo est: ergo peccatum, formaliter loquendo, a Deo esset; quod est contra fidem.

5. Item, prima divisio peccati est in originale et actuale; sed originale et actuale peccatum non distinguuntur formaliter, quia quod est originale uni fuit alteri actuale, sicut patet, quia quod est originale nobis fuit actuale Adae. Si igitur prima membra maxime differunt[^9], et originale et actuale non sunt differentiae peccati formaliter differentes; multo fortius nec aliae.

6. Item, prima divisio actualis peccati est per mortale et veniale; sed mortale et veniale non dicunt diversas differentias secundum formam et speciem: ergo multo minus nec aliae differentiae secundum speciem et formam faciunt differre. Maior propositio manifesta est. Minor probatur per hoc, quod veniale peccatum efficitur mortale sola intensione libidinis circa idem genus delectabilis[^10]. Ergo si magis et minus non faciunt diversitatem secundum speciem et formam, videtur, quod peccatum veniale et mortale non addant formalem differentiam: ergo nec alia.

### Conclusio

> Peccatum abstracte sumtum habet differentias formales tantum per accidens, concrete sumtum etiam per se.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit loqui de peccato: aut in *concretione*, aut in *abstractione*[^11]. Si in *abstractione*; sic dicendum est, quod quemadmodum peccatum, cum sit privatio, non habet ordinari nisi per accidens, scilicet per comparationem ad suum oppositum, sic etiam non habet formaliter distingui nisi ratione sui oppositi; privationes enim distinguuntur per habitus. Unde sicut castitas et fortitudo sunt virtutes formaliter differentes in genere virtutis, sic etiam luxuria et pusillanimitas, quae sunt opposita istarum duarum virtutum, formaliter dicuntur differre in genere vitiorum, non tamen secundum formam *suam*, sed secundum formam *sui oppositi*[^12]. — Si autem loquamur de peccato in *concretione*, sic non tantum dicit privationem, sed etiam actum, vel habitum substratum; et quoniam actus, vel habitus substratus peccato non tantummodo diversificatur[^13] *materialiter*, immo etiam *formali* differentia — alia est enim pronitas ad luxuriam, alia pronitas ad superbiam, et alius actus, quo superbit aliquis, et alius quo luxuriatur, non tantummodo secundum *materiam*, sed etiam secundum *formam* propter formalem differentiam obiectorum[^14] — hinc est, quod peccatum, secundum quod *concretive* accipitur, dividi habet per differentias non tantum *materiales*, verum etiam *formales*, formales dico, non respectu *deformitatis*, sed respectu *habitus*, vel *actus* substrati.

Et sic patet, quod sive peccatum accipiatur abstracte, sive concrete, differentias habet formales; sed uno modo *per se*, alio modo *per accidens*, quia uno modo dicit ens in genere secundum rectam coordinationem, alio modo dicit ens in genere solum per *reductionem*.

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— Et quia hoc modo rationes ad primam partem procedunt, ideo concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod formale in peccato est aversio; dicendum, quod verum est, quod aversio est formale respectu *conversionis*; proprie tamen loquendo, peccatum magis debet dici formaliter privatio boni sibi oppositi quam aversio a Deo, aut saltem aeque proprie. Et quamvis peccatum ratione aversionis a Deo non multiplicetur, quia unum est, a quo fit aversio; tamen ratione privationis boni, cui opponitur, multiplicari habet; et ita ratione eius quod est in ipso *formale*, habet diversas differentias. Praeterea, ad *esse* peccati non tantummodo concurrit aversio, sed etiam conversio[^15]; et quoniam conversio respicit obiecta creata, quae non tantum distinguuntur *materialiter*, sed etiam *formaliter* differunt; hinc est, quod ex illa parte peccatum habet plurificari per *formales* differentias. Item, nec dicitur conversio esse *materiale* in peccato, *simpliciter* loquendo, sed solum *ratione aversionis*; nec omnino est materialis respectu aversionis; nam etsi aversio dat conversioni, quod sit *peccatum*, conversio tamen dat aversioni, quod sit *tale peccatum*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum, formaliter loquendo, nihil est; dicendum, quod verum est. Quamvis autem *nihil* sit, tamen *alicuius* est, non solum ut *subiecti*, verum etiam ut *oppositi*; et ea ratione, qua alicuius est, cui formaliter opponitur, formaliter habet distingui, non secundum formam, quae est in ipso, sed secundum formam, quae est in suo opposito[^16].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est privatio speciei, ergo non habet speciem; iam patet responsio. Verum est enim, quod non habet speciem proprie, secundum quod privatio; nec dicitur habere differentias formales et specificas isto modo, scilicet quod in se diversas habeat species; sed quia opponitur diversis bonis secundum speciem, in quantum illa privat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si haberet species, esset in genere[^17]; dicendum, quod verum est, si haberet species *in se* et *per se*; peccatum autem, secundum quod accipitur *abstracte* et *formaliter*, sicut non est in genere *per se* nisi *per reductionem*, sic non habet dividi per differentias formales differentes *per se*, sed solum *per accidens*. Quamvis autem peccatum, secundum quod nihil est et accipitur *abstracte*, non sit in genere; tamen secundum quod accipitur *concrete*, scilicet ratione actus substrati et habitus, in genere est; actio enim peccato substrata a Deo est[^18].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de originali et actuali, dicendum, quod originale et actuale non solummodo differunt, quod hoc sit ab actu, et illud a natura, sed etiam differunt penes bonum, quod privant; unde et actuale privat iustitiam gratuitam sive personalem; originale vero tollit iustitiam originalem, sive quae respicit hominem, secundum quod est natura[^19]. Praeterea, aliter dicitur in *nobis* originale, et aliter in *Adam*. In *nobis* dicitur originale, quia est ab origine tractum; in *Adam* vero, quia fuit origo aliorum peccatorum. Et quamvis originale secundo modo dictum possit esse idem quod actuale; prout tamen primo modo dicitur, non potest originale concurrere in idem peccati genus cum actuali; et hoc modo ponitur differentia inter ea.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de veniali et mortali, quod non differunt formaliter, quia magis et minus non variant speciem; dicendum, quod prima propositio falsa est. — Ad hoc autem quod dicitur, quod differentia secundum minus et magis non variat speciem; respondetur tripliciter. Primo, quod hoc est verum in genere *naturae*, sed non est verum in genere *moris*, sicut patet: quia vitia diversificantur formaliter secundum speciem penes *superabundantiam* et *defectum*, non solum a se invicem, sed etiam a virtute[^20]. — Secundo modo respondetur, quod hoc intelligitur de magis et minus *accidentali*; delectari autem sub Deo est essentiale veniali, et delectari supra Deum est essentiale mortali. — Tertio modo respondetur, quod hoc est verum de magis et minus *citra terminum*, sed non de magis et minus *ultra terminum*; unde calidum in quarto gradu est alterius speciei quam calidum in tertio. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod amare aliquid *citra* Deum est terminus venialis peccati; et quantumcumque intendatur amor, dum tamen *citra* Deum est, veniale peccatum est; si autem *praeponit* aliquid Deo, tunc exit suum terminum; et sic cadit in aliud peccati genus, scilicet in peccatum mortale.

english:
### Article III. *On the modes of dividing sins.*

There follows, in the third place, the question concerning the modes of dividing sins. And since there are many modes of dividing, about which it would be very lengthy to dispute here, leaving those aside, two are asked here in general.

First it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or by formal and specific differences[^1].

Second it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins.

### Question I. *Whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or also by formal ones.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or also by formal ones. And that it is to be divided not only by material differences, but also by formal ones, is shown thus.

1. As chastity stands to virtue, so lust stands to vice: therefore, as chastity is a species of virtue, so lust is a species of vice; but one species is distinguished from another by formal differences[^2]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, good is opposed to evil not only materially, but also formally, and to diverse goods diverse evils are opposed[^3]; but the goods to which the evils are opposed are formally distinguished: therefore by parity of reasoning the evils too, which are formally opposed to them, formally differ.

3. Likewise, concerning a single act of sin diverse differences of sins are assigned, as is plain in the sin of Adam, in which there is said to have been gluttony and pride and disobedience[^4]; but sins that consist in a single act do not have a material difference: therefore if they differ in any way, it is necessary that they have a formal difference.

4. Likewise, multiplication according to matter is multiplication according to number[^5], and multiplication according to number has no limit: therefore if sins were distinguished only by materially differing differences, sin could never be divided by a sufficient division. If therefore in Scripture sin is divided by differences that divide it sufficiently and embrace every sin; it seems that sins are distinguished from one another not only by material differences, but also by formal ones.

**On the contrary:** 1. The formal element in the genus of mortal sin is *aversion*; but sins are not distinguished on the side of aversion, indeed they agree — for all of them imply aversion from God — if therefore they are distinguished, this is only on the side of *conversion*, which is the material element in sin: therefore sin is divided only by material differences, not by formal ones.

2. Likewise, sin, formally speaking, is nothing; but what is nothing has no dividing differences[^6]: therefore if sin is divided, in no way is it divided insofar as it is considered formally: it remains, therefore, that it is divided only by that which is material in it, and thus the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, everything that has formal and specific differences in some way, formally speaking, has a species; but sin or evil, formally speaking, is a privation of species[^7]; and a privation of species has no species; and what lacks species lacks formal and specific difference: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if sin had differences formally dividing it, then it would have true species; but everything of this sort is ordered in a genus directly[^8]; but that which is in a genus is from God: therefore sin, formally speaking, would be from God; which is against the faith.

5. Likewise, the first division of sin is into original and actual; but original and actual sin are not formally distinguished, because what is original to one was actual to another, as is plain, since what is original to us was actual to Adam. If therefore the first members differ most[^9], and original and actual are not formally differing differences of sin; much more neither are the others.

6. Likewise, the first division of actual sin is by mortal and venial; but mortal and venial do not state diverse differences according to form and species: therefore much less do the other differences according to species and form make [things] differ. The major proposition is manifest. The minor is proved by this, that a venial sin is made mortal by the sole intensity of desire concerning the same genus of the pleasurable[^10]. Therefore if more and less do not make diversity according to species and form, it seems that venial and mortal sin do not add a formal difference: therefore neither do the others.

### Conclusion

> Sin taken abstractly has formal differences only by accident; taken concretely, also per se.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking about sin: either in its *concretion*, or in its *abstraction*[^11]. If [it is taken] in *abstraction*; then it must be said that, just as sin, since it is a privation, cannot be ordered except by accident, namely by comparison to its opposite, so likewise it cannot be formally distinguished except by reason of its opposite; for privations are distinguished by [their] habits. Hence, just as chastity and fortitude are virtues formally differing in the genus of virtue, so likewise lust and pusillanimity, which are the opposites of those two virtues, are said to differ formally in the genus of vices, yet not according to *their own* form, but according to the form *of their opposite*[^12]. — But if we speak of sin in its *concretion*, then it states not only a privation, but also an act, or an underlying habit; and since the act, or habit, underlying the sin is diversified[^13] not only *materially*, but indeed also by a *formal* difference — for one thing is the proneness to lust, another the proneness to pride, and one is the act by which someone is proud, and another that by which he is lustful, not only according to *matter*, but also according to *form* on account of the formal difference of the objects[^14] — hence it is that sin, according as it is taken *concretively*, is to be divided by differences not only *material*, but also *formal*; formal, I say, not with respect to the *deformity*, but with respect to the *habit*, or *act*, underlying [it].

And thus it is plain that whether sin be taken abstractly or concretely, it has formal differences; but in one way *per se*, in the other way *by accident*, because in one way it states a being in a genus according to right co-ordination, in the other way it states a being in a genus only by *reduction*.

— And because in this way the arguments proceed to the first part, therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the formal element in sin is aversion; it must be said that it is true that aversion is the formal element with respect to *conversion*; yet, properly speaking, sin ought rather to be called formally a privation of the good opposed to it than aversion from God, or at least equally properly. And although sin is not multiplied by reason of aversion from God, because that from which the aversion takes place is one; yet by reason of the privation of the good to which it is opposed, it is to be multiplied; and thus by reason of that which is the *formal* element in it, it has diverse differences. Moreover, to the *being* of sin there concurs not only aversion, but also conversion[^15]; and since conversion regards created objects, which are not only distinguished *materially*, but also differ *formally*; hence it is that on that side sin can be multiplied by *formal* differences. Likewise, conversion is not said to be the *material* element in sin, *absolutely* speaking, but only *by reason of the aversion*; nor is it altogether material with respect to the aversion; for although aversion gives to conversion that it be *sin*, conversion nonetheless gives to aversion that it be *such a sin*.

2. To that which is objected, that sin, formally speaking, is nothing; it must be said that it is true. But although it be *nothing*, nevertheless it is *of something*, not only as of a *subject*, but also as of an *opposite*; and by that ground by which it is of something to which it is formally opposed, it has to be formally distinguished, not according to the form which is in it, but according to the form which is in its opposite[^16].

3. To that which is objected, that sin is a privation of species, therefore it does not have a species; the response is already plain. For it is true that it does not have a species properly, according as it is a privation; nor is it said to have formal and specific differences in this way, namely that it have in itself diverse species; but because it is opposed to diverse goods according to species, insofar as it deprives those.

4. To that which is objected, that if it had species, it would be in a genus[^17]; it must be said that it is true, if it had species *in itself* and *per se*; but sin, according as it is taken *abstractly* and *formally*, just as it is not in a genus *per se* except *by reduction*, so it is not to be divided by formal differences differing *per se*, but only *by accident*. But although sin, according as it is nothing and is taken *abstractly*, is not in a genus; nevertheless according as it is taken *concretely*, namely by reason of the underlying act and habit, it is in a genus; for the action underlying the sin is from God[^18].

5. To that which is objected concerning the original and the actual, it must be said that the original and the actual not only differ in that the one is from an act, and the other from nature, but also differ as regards the good which they deprive; whence the actual deprives the gratuitous or personal justice; but the original takes away the original justice, that is, that which regards man according as he is nature[^19]. Moreover, the original is spoken of in one way in *us*, and in another way in *Adam*. In *us* it is called original because it is drawn from [our] origin; but in *Adam*, because he was the origin of the other sins. And although the original spoken of in the second way can be the same as the actual; yet as it is spoken of in the first way, the original cannot concur in the same genus of sin with the actual; and in this way a difference is set between them.

6. To that which is objected concerning the venial and the mortal, that they do not differ formally, because more and less do not vary the species; it must be said that the first proposition is false. — But to this which is said, that a difference according to less and more does not vary the species; it is answered in three ways. First, that this is true in the genus of *nature*, but is not true in the genus of *morals*, as is plain: for vices are formally diversified according to species by *superabundance* and *defect*, not only from one another, but also from virtue[^20]. — In the second way it is answered, that this is understood of more and less that is *accidental*; but to take delight under God is essential to the venial, and to take delight above God is essential to the mortal. — In the third way it is answered, that this is true of more and less *short of the limit*, but not of more and less *beyond the limit*; whence the hot in the fourth degree is of another species than the hot in the third. So too in the matter at hand it is to be understood that to love something *short of* God is the limit of venial sin; and however much the love be intensified, so long as it is *short of* God, it is a venial sin; but if it *prefers* something to God, then it goes beyond its limit; and thus it falls into another genus of sin, namely into mortal sin.

la: Vat. addit *et specificas*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *et specificas* ("and specific").

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie et c. de Differentia.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter on Species and the chapter on Difference.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis: *Contrarium autem bono quidem ex necessitate malum est; hoc autem per singulorum inductionem palam est, ut sanitati languor et iustitiae iniustitia et fortitudini timiditas; similiter autem et in aliis.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter on Opposites: "But the contrary of a good is necessarily an evil; and this is plain by the induction of particular cases, as languor is contrary to health and injustice to justice and timidity to fortitude; and likewise also in the rest."

la: Vide supra d. XXXIII. lit. Magistri, c. 2. et ibid. Comment. dub. 1.

en: See above, d. XXXIII, the text of the Master, c. 2, and there in the Commentary, dubium 1.

la: Cfr. locc. ex Aristot. supra pag. 89, nota 7. citt. — Seq. propos. illustratur istis verbis Porphyrii, de Praedicab. c. de Specie: *Individua autem... infinita sunt. Quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis [generibus] descendentes iubebat Plato quiescere... infinita vero, inquit, relinquenda sunt, neque enim eorum scientiam posse fieri.* — De distinctione peccati, qualiter in Script. habetur, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq. — Mox pro *ergo si peccata solummodo distinguerentur* cod. T *ergo si peccatum solummodo distingueretur*. Circa finem arg. pro *ad invicem* codd. l⁰ K T Y ee et alii *ab invicem*.

en: Cf. the passages from Aristotle cited above on p. 89, note 7. — The following proposition is illustrated by these words of Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter on Species: "But individuals... are infinite. Wherefore Plato bade us, descending from the most general [genera] down to the most special, to rest there... but the infinite, he says, must be left aside, for there can be no knowledge of them." — On the distinction of sin, as it is found in Scripture, see here the text of the Master, c. 4 f. — Shortly after, for *ergo si peccata solummodo distinguerentur* cod. T reads *ergo si peccatum solummodo distingueretur*. Near the end of the argument, for *ad invicem* codd. l⁰ K T Y ee and others read *ab invicem*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *animam*.

en: Cod. cc and the first edition read *animam*.

la: Fere omnes codd. et primae edd. omittunt *aeterna*. Paulo ante pro *poenae* cod. T substituit *bene*.

en: Almost all the codices and the first editions omit *aeterna*. Shortly before, for *poenae* cod. T substitutes *bene*.

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. *multiplicetur*.

en: The editions, with a few codices, read *multiplicetur*.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3. — De maiori vide supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cf. above p. 111, note 3. — On the major, see above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Ut probatum est supra d. 33. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As was proved above, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 48, nota 1. Enuntiatio seq. fundatur in eo, quod illud quod est in genere, dicit quid positivum, ut iam supra pag. 814, nota 8. in fine dictum est. In conclusione huius arg. pro *a Deo esset* cod. T *a Deo est*. De conclusione ipsa cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.

en: See above p. 48, note 1. The following statement is grounded in this, that what is in a genus states something positive, as was already said above on p. 814, note 8, at the end. In the conclusion of this argument, for *a Deo esset* cod. T reads *a Deo est*. On the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. locc. ex Aristot. supra pag. 937, nota 1. citt.

en: Cf. the passages from Aristotle cited above on p. 937, note 1.

la: In Iure can. 3. d. 25. *Unum orarium*: *Nullum peccatum est adeo veniale, quod non fiat criminale, dum placet.* Cfr. supra pag. 576, nota 6. — Quod *magis et minus* non variant speciem, vide supra pag. 639, nota 7. — Paulo superius omnes edd. perperam *intentione* pro *intensione*. In fine arg. pro *alia* [scil. differentia sive divisio peccati], quam lectionem codd. L O exhibent, in aliis codd. et edd. exhibetur perperam *aliam*; in cod. bb, qui nunc cum Vat. concordat, primitus legebatur *ergo nec alia aliam*.

en: In Canon Law, dist. 25, *Unum orarium*: "No sin is so venial that it does not become criminal while it pleases." Cf. above p. 576, note 6. — That *more and less* do not vary the species, see above p. 639, note 7. — A little above, all the editions wrongly read *intentione* for *intensione*. At the end of the argument, for *alia* [namely, difference or division of sin], which reading codices L and O exhibit, in other codices and editions it is wrongly given as *aliam*; in cod. bb, which now agrees with the Vatican edition, it was originally read *ergo nec alia aliam*.

la: De quo vide supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius post *ordinari* Vat. addit *in genere*.

en: On which see above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — A little below, after *ordinari* the Vatican edition adds *in genere*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* V, c. 1.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *diversificat*. Proxime post pro *materialiter* codd. C H R S T V Y Z ee *formaliter*, falso.

en: The editions, except the first, read *diversificat*. Immediately after, for *materialiter* codd. C H R S T V Y Z ee read *formaliter*, falsely.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 361, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro *dividi habet* cod. T *dividi potest*. Procedente quaestione, edd. et nonnulli codd. sibi constantes pro *abstracte* et *concrete* habent *abstractive* et *concretive*.

en: Cf. above p. 361, note 3. — A little below, for *dividi habet* cod. T reads *dividi potest*. As the question proceeds, the editions and several codices, consistent with themselves, have for *abstracte* and *concrete* the forms *abstractive* and *concretive*.

la: Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq., et supra d. 30. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. — Aliquanto superius pro *non variat* cod. T *non diversificat*.

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6 ff., and above d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — Somewhat above, for *non variat* cod. T reads *non diversificat*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De multis divisionibus peccatorum cfr. hic dub. 2, et de septem vitiis capitalibus dub. 3. et 4. De his dubiis S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1–4.) aliique antiqui distinctis quaestionibus tractant, et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 107. m. 2. — Primam huius articuli quaestionem Petrus a Tar. (et similiter Richard. a Med.) sic inscribit: « An diversa peccata specie distinguantur », qui cum S. Bonav., S. Thoma aliisque utitur distinctione inter peccatum ratione *deformitatis* et peccatum ratione *actus substrati*. Primo modo, cum sic non sit in genere per se, sed per accidens, id est per habitum oppositum sive per reductionem, non potest proprie per species distingui per se, sed tantum per species habituum oppositorum. Secundo autem modo, sicut est in genere per se, sic potest distingui per differentias formales, scilicet per comparationem ad obiecta, secundum quae actus formaliter distinguuntur. Scotus autem (II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 9.) vult, quod peccata distinguantur formaliter non pro specifica diversitate obiectorum, sed magis pro specifica diversitate rectitudinum, quae actibus inesse deberent.

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**II.** De seq. (2.) quaestione pauci antiqui explicite tractant. Hi cum S. Bonav. utuntur distinctione inter motum aversionis specialem, qui speciale peccatum odii constituit, et motum aversionis, qui generaliter in omni malo actu conversionis ad creaturam implicatur et cum ipso unum peccatum constituit. — S. Thom. rem tangit S. 1. II. q. 87. a. 4. et passim. Specialiter de ea disputant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the many divisions of sins, see here dubium 2, and concerning the seven capital vices, dubia 3 and 4. On these dubia St. Thomas (here q. 2, aa. 1–4) and the other ancients treat in distinct questions, and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 107, m. 2. — The first question of this article Peter of Tarentaise (and likewise Richard of Mediavilla) entitles thus: "Whether diverse sins are distinguished in species," who, with St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and others, makes use of the distinction between sin by reason of *deformity* and sin by reason of the *underlying act*. In the first way, since it is thus not in a genus per se, but by accident, that is, by an opposite habit or by reduction, it cannot properly be distinguished per se by species, but only by the species of opposite habits. But in the second way, just as it is in a genus per se, so it can be distinguished by formal differences, namely by comparison to the objects, according to which acts are formally distinguished. But Scotus (II *Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, n. 9) holds that sins are distinguished formally not by the specific diversity of the objects, but rather by the specific diversity of the rectitudes which ought to inhere in the acts.

**II.** Concerning the following (2nd) question few of the ancients treat explicitly. These, with St. Bonaventure, make use of the distinction between a special motion of aversion, which constitutes the special sin of hatred, and a motion of aversion which is generally implied in every evil act of conversion to a creature and constitutes one sin with it. — St. Thomas touches the matter, *S.* 1.II, q. 87, a. 4, and elsewhere. Specially do they dispute about it: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 970–973 (PDF pp. 992–995; offset `pdf = printed + 22`), read Left column then Right, body bands then footer bands, per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. Cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 67403–67586). Running heads confirm the page numbers (the OCR digits in this band are garbled): p.971 R-head "971"; p.972 R-head "972"; p.972 verso head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. II."; p.973 R-head "973"; running heads `DIST. XLII. ART. III. QUAEST. I.` (pp.970–972) and `QUAEST. II.` (p.973).

**Chunking.** The short ARTICULUS III opener (`De modis dividendi peccata.` / `Consequenter quaeritur tertio loco… in generali quaeruntur hic duo`, raw 67403) folds into this a3-q1 per the Vol II convention. The article lists q1 (`per differentias materiales tantum, an per differentias formales et specificas`) and q2 (`per conversionem et aversionem`).

**Page-split / apparatus map (per-page footer restart; rendered as running slugs `[^1]`–`[^20]`):**
- **p.970** — q1 occupies the bottom half of the page (the top half / R-column tail through `…temporaliter affligentem⁵` is a2-q2's Ad 6). **Footers 1–5 were consumed by a2-q2; this question picks up footers 6–10** = slugs `[^1]`–`[^5]` (6 Vat. *et specificas*; 7 Porphyry de Specie/Differentia; 8 Aristotle de Oppositis; 9 d.XXXIII Magistri; 10 Aristot. p.89 + Porphyry quote).
- **p.971** — full fresh sequence, footers 1–9 = slugs `[^6]`–`[^14]` (1 cc/ed.1 *animam*; 2 *aeterna* omission; 3 *multiplicetur*; 4 Libr. X; 5 *Vide scholion*; 6 *De quo* d.34; 7 Aristot. V Ethic.; 8 *diversificat*; 9 p.361/*dividi habet*). NOTE the OCR mis-paginated these footers — they print under p.971 (L-col 1–5, R-col 6–9) though the OCR clustered them; verified by eye against the L-2/R-2 PDF bands.
- **p.972** — full fresh sequence, footers 1–6 = slugs `[^15]`–`[^20]` (1 *Unum orarium* / canon law; 2 d.34; 3 Edd. *per se*; 4 d.37 a.1 q.1; 5 cod. T *a natura*; 6 Aristot. II Ethic. / *non diversificat*).
- **p.973** — body is entirely the Scholion + the opening of q2; **no body-footer sequence belongs to q1 on p.973.**

**Scholion.** This question carries the **Article-III Scholion (parts I–II)**. The SCHOLION header opens at the foot of p.972 L-column and the block runs across pp.972–973. **Scholion II ("De seq. (2.) quaestione…") explicitly covers the following question (a3-q2)**, so a3-q2 has no scholion of its own (`has_scholion: false` there).

**Hand-off forwarded to a3-q2** (`Utrum peccatum habeat dividi per aversionem et conversionem tanquam per diversas peccatorum differentias`, `Secundo quaeritur`, raw 67587): q2 opens in the **R-column of printed p.973** (PDF 995), continues onto p.974+. **q2 has NO scholion** — Scholion II (held here) covers it; set `has_scholion: false`. **q2's first body-footer is the fresh p.973 footer sequence** (the `Ieremiae secundo¹: Duo mala fecit populus meus…` and `Ecclesiastici decimo…` references) — no q1 footer migrates forward. q2 fund. 1 (Jeremiah 2: *Duo mala fecit populus meus*), fund. 2 (aversio = *contemptus*, conversio); Sed contra opens on the Glossa to Ecclesiasticus 10 (*Initium omnis peccati superbia*). After a3-q2 comes d42-dubia.

**Editorial marginalia trimmed** (not Bonaventure's text): the side-glosses `Fundamenta.`, `Ad opposita`, `Notandum.`, `Solutio oppositorum.`, `Distinctio.`, `Conclusio 1.`, `Conclusio 2.`, `Epilogus.` that bleed into the OCR were removed from the body.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 42, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De modis dividendi peccata.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum peccatum habeat dividi per aversionem et conversionem tanquam per diversas peccatorum differentias.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum habeat dividi per aversionem et conversionem tanquam per diversas peccatorum differentias sive diversa peccata.

Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ieremiae secundo[^1]: *Duo mala fecit populus meus: me dereliquerunt, fontem aquae vitae* etc.: ergo derelinquere Deum et adhaerere creaturae sunt duo mala, ergo sunt duo peccata.

2. Item, aversio est per *contemptum*, conversio autem per *cupiditatem*: si ergo cupiditas et contemptus sunt diversa[^2] peccatorum genera, videtur, quod aversio et conversio faciat peccata diversa.

3. Item, in bonis sic est, quod alius est *habitus*, quo quis declinat a malo, et alius, quo facit bonum; similiter et alius *actus*, sicut patet in timore et amore: ergo si multo maior est diversificatio ex parte malorum quam ex parte bonorum; multo fortius videtur, quod aliud sit peccatum, quo quis avertitur a Deo, et aliud, quo convertitur ad commutabile bonum.

4. Item, aliud est praeceptum, quo praecipitur facere bonum, et aliud[^3], quo praecipitur declinare a malo; sed aversio est contra illud praeceptum, quo quis praecipitur facere bonum, utpote Deo adhaerere et ad ipsum converti; conversio vero est contra illud praeceptum, quo praecipitur declinare a malo: ergo si diversa sunt praecepta, quibus opponuntur conversio et aversio, ergo sunt diversa peccata.

5. Item, plus convenit aversio cum alia aversione, quam aversio cum conversione; sed aversio cum alia aversione facit[^4] diversa peccata: ergo multo fortius conversio cum aversione diversa faciet peccata.

**Sed contra:**
1. Super illud Ecclesiastici decimo[^5]: *Initium omnis peccati superbia*; Glossa: « Caveamus superbiam et cupiditatem, non tanquam duo mala, sed unum, a quo omnia oriuntur »: ergo si superbia facit averti, et cupiditas converti; videtur, quod penes aversionem et conversionem non attendantur duo peccata, sed unum.

2. Item, Augustinus contra Pelagium[^6]: « Peccatum non est appetitus rerum malarum, sed desertio meliorum »: ergo nunquam conversio facit peccatum completum, nisi adsit aversio. Si ergo aversio concurrit ad omne peccatum, videtur, quod penes illam non sumatur differentia peccati.

3. Item, omne peccatum mortale est voluntarium; sed non est voluntarium nisi ratione conversionis ad commutabile bonum[^7]: ergo conversio concurrit ad omne peccatum: ergo conversio non potest esse peccati differentia.

4. Item, recessus a termino *a quo* et accessus ad terminum *ad quem* non facit diversos motus nec diversos actus[^8]; sed aversio dicit recessum a termino *a quo*, conversio accessum ad terminum *ad quem*: ergo non faciunt diversum actum vel motum. Sed ab unitate actus est peccatum unum: ergo non faciunt diversa peccata.

5. Item, in peccato aversio est *formalis* respectu conversionis; sed *formale* non ponit in numerum cum suo materiali[^9]: ergo nec aversio ponit in numerum cum conversione: ergo conversio et aversio non faciunt diversa peccata.

<!-- page 974 -->

### Conclusio
> Aversio et conversio non faciunt duo peccata, nisi prout aversio dicit actum distinctum a conversione.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *aversio* dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, prout dicit *deordinationem circa actum conversionis*; alio modo, prout dicit *actum a conversione distinctum*. Primo modo conversio non ponit in numerum cum aversione nec facit[^10] diversa peccata, immo illa duo essentialiter clauduntur in omni peccato mortali. Nam conversio non est culpa, nisi quia inordinata; non est autem inordinata, nisi quia avertitur homo a Deo, cui deberet inhaerere tanquam fini ultimo; et haec aversio est in peccato, in cuius perpetratione peccator nihil cogitat de Deo. — Secundo modo, scilicet prout aversio dicit *actum distinctum contra conversionem*[^11], sic constituit diversum peccati genus. Hoc enim modo « averti est odio habere vel invidere », sicut supra dixit Magister distinctione quinta; et constat, quod aliud genus peccati est odire Deum, et aliud amare commutabile bonum. Et quoniam ut plurimum *aversio* in peccato accipitur[^12], prout dicit deordinationem a Deo tanquam a fine, quam prout dicit motum inordinatum contra Deum; hinc est, quod conversio et aversio potius comparantur ad peccatum sicut differentiae constituentes quam sicut differentiae dividentes. — Et ideo concedendum, quod hoc modo aversio et conversio non faciunt diversa peccata; et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt, quia ista via procedunt.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de Ieremia; *Duo mala fecit populus meus* etc.; responderi potest, quod derelictio non tantum dicitur ibi pro deordinatione, quae est coniuncta conversioni, sed etiam pro omissione mandatorum Dei; et tunc distinguuntur illa duo mala non sicut aversio et conversio, sed sicut omissio et commissio. — Vel dicendum, quod duo mala dicuntur, non quia sint duo peccata, sed quia sunt duae diversae malae radices, concurrentes ad completionem unius peccati, sicut dicit Glossa praehabita super decimum Ecclesiastici.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aversio est per contemptum, et conversio per cupiditatem; iam patet responsio; loquitur enim de conversione et aversione pro diverso actu et motu. Quod si aliter intelligat, ut accipiatur contemptus et cupiditas *large*, prout concurrit[^13] ad unum peccatum; sic non sunt duo mala, sed unum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alius est habitus[^14], quo quis declinat a malo, et quo quis facit bonum; dicendum, quod declinare a malo dicitur dupliciter, sicut dictum est de aversione. Prout enim declinare a malo dicit actum detestationis et fugae respectu mali, dicit diversum actum et motum ab eo quod est facere bonum. Prout autem dicit recessum a malo, sic non dicit diversum actum et habitum, quia eodem motu et habitu, quo quis accedit ad bonum, elongatur a malo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alii praecepto opponitur conversio, et alii aversio; dicendum, quod falsum est; nam aversio et conversio non sunt contra diversa praecepta, sed concurrunt ad idem peccatum, quod est tam contra praeceptum affirmativum quam contra praeceptum negativum; nisi forte accipiatur aversio, prout nominat actum vel motum contra Deum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus convenit aversio cum aversione etc.; dicendum, quod verum est convenientia[^15] formali, quae est in hoc, quod assignatur in aliquo tanquam in uno communi; sed non est verum de convenientia ordinis, quae concurrit ad constitutionem unius tertii. Non enim unum peccatum constituitur ex pluribus aversionibus, sicut ex aversione et conversione simul concurrentibus.

---

english:
### Article III. *On the modes of dividing sins.*
### Question II. *Whether sin must be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins.*

Secondly it is asked whether sin must be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins, that is, diverse sins.

And that it must, seems [to be the case].

1. Jeremiah 2[^1]: *My people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water*, etc.: therefore to forsake God and to cleave to a creature are two evils, therefore they are two sins.

2. Likewise, aversion is through *contempt*, but conversion through *desire*: if therefore desire and contempt are diverse[^2] genera of sins, it seems that aversion and conversion make diverse sins.

3. Likewise, among good things it is so, that one *habit* is that by which someone turns away from evil, and another that by which he does good; and likewise there is another *act*, as is evident in fear and love: therefore if the diversification on the side of evils is much greater than on the side of goods; much more does it seem that the sin by which one turns away from God is one thing, and the sin by which he turns toward a changeable good another.

4. Likewise, the precept by which one is commanded to do good is one thing, and another[^3] is that by which one is commanded to turn away from evil; but aversion is against that precept by which one is commanded to do good, namely to cleave to God and to turn toward him; whereas conversion is against that precept by which one is commanded to turn away from evil: therefore if the precepts to which conversion and aversion are opposed are diverse, then they are diverse sins.

5. Likewise, aversion agrees more with another aversion than aversion with conversion; but aversion together with another aversion makes[^4] diverse sins: therefore much more will conversion together with aversion make diverse sins.

**On the contrary:**
1. Upon that text of Ecclesiasticus 10[^5]: *The beginning of all sin is pride*; the Gloss: « Let us beware of pride and covetousness, not as two evils, but as one, from which all things arise »: therefore if pride makes one be turned away, and covetousness makes one be turned toward; it seems that with respect to aversion and conversion two sins are not reckoned, but one.

2. Likewise, Augustine against Pelagius[^6]: « Sin is not the appetite for evil things, but the desertion of better things »: therefore conversion never makes a complete sin, unless aversion be present. If therefore aversion concurs in every sin, it seems that with respect to it the difference of sin is not taken.

3. Likewise, every mortal sin is voluntary; but it is not voluntary except by reason of conversion to a changeable good[^7]: therefore conversion concurs in every sin: therefore conversion cannot be a difference of sin.

4. Likewise, withdrawal from the terminus *from which* and approach to the terminus *to which* do not make diverse motions nor diverse acts[^8]; but aversion signifies withdrawal from the terminus *from which*, conversion the approach to the terminus *to which*: therefore they do not make a diverse act or motion. But from the unity of act the sin is one: therefore they do not make diverse sins.

5. Likewise, in sin aversion is *formal* with respect to conversion; but the *formal* does not enter into number with its material[^9]: therefore neither does aversion enter into number with conversion: therefore conversion and aversion do not make diverse sins.

### Conclusion
> Aversion and conversion do not make two sins, except insofar as aversion signifies an act distinct from conversion.

**I respond:** It must be said that *aversion* is taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it signifies a *disorder concerning the act of conversion*; in another way, insofar as it signifies an *act distinct from conversion*. In the first way conversion does not enter into number with aversion nor make[^10] diverse sins; rather those two are essentially included in every mortal sin. For conversion is not a fault except because it is disordered; and it is not disordered except because man is turned away from God, to whom he ought to cleave as to his ultimate end; and this aversion is in the sin, in the perpetration of which the sinner thinks nothing of God. — In the second way, namely insofar as aversion signifies an *act distinct over against conversion*[^11], it constitutes a diverse genus of sin. For in this way « to be turned away is to hate or to envy », as the Master said above in distinction five; and it is established that to hate God is one genus of sin, and to love a changeable good another. And since for the most part *aversion* is taken in sin[^12] as signifying disorder away from God as from an end, rather than as signifying a disordered motion against God; hence it is that conversion and aversion are compared to sin rather as constituting differences than as dividing differences. — And therefore it must be conceded that in this way aversion and conversion do not make diverse sins; and the reasons that show this are to be conceded, since they proceed by this way.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that which is first objected concerning Jeremiah; *My people have done two evils*, etc.; it can be answered that forsaking is there said not only for the disorder that is joined to conversion, but also for the omission of the commandments of God; and then those two evils are distinguished not as aversion and conversion, but as omission and commission. — Or it must be said that they are called two evils, not because they are two sins, but because they are two diverse evil roots, concurring in the completion of one sin, as the Gloss already cited upon the tenth chapter of Ecclesiasticus says.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that aversion is through contempt, and conversion through desire; the response is already evident; for it speaks of conversion and aversion as a diverse act and motion. But if it understands otherwise, so that contempt and desire be taken *broadly*, insofar as they concur[^13] in one sin; thus they are not two evils, but one.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that one habit[^14] is that by which someone turns away from evil, and [another] that by which one does good; it must be said that to turn away from evil is said in two ways, as was said of aversion. For insofar as turning away from evil signifies an act of detestation and flight with respect to evil, it signifies an act and motion diverse from that which is to do good. But insofar as it signifies withdrawal from evil, thus it does not signify a diverse act and habit, because by the same motion and habit by which one approaches the good, he is removed far from evil.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that conversion is opposed to one precept, and aversion to another; it must be said that this is false; for aversion and conversion are not against diverse precepts, but concur in the same sin, which is both against the affirmative precept and against the negative precept; unless perhaps aversion be taken insofar as it names an act or motion against God.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that aversion agrees more with aversion, etc.; it must be said that it is true of formal agreement[^15], which consists in this, that it is assigned in something as in one common [thing]; but it is not true of agreement of order, which concurs in the constitution of one third [thing]. For one sin is not constituted out of several aversions, as out of aversion and conversion concurring together.

---

la: Vers. 13. — Mox primo *ergo* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 praeligunt *si*.

en: [Jeremiah 2:]13. — Soon afterward, before the first *ergo*, the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 prefix *si*.

la: Cod. K *duo diversa*. Deinde pro *faciat* Vat. contra codd. et primas edd. *faciant*.

en: Codex K reads *duo diversa*. Then for *faciat* the Vatican edition, against the codices and the first editions, reads *faciant*.

la: Cod. T hic repetit *est praeceptum*.

en: Codex T here repeats *est praeceptum*.

la: Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *faciunt*, et mox pro *faciet* codd. X Z bb *facient*.

en: Many codices, together with editions 1, 2, and 3, read *faciunt*, and soon after, for *faciet*, codices X, Z, and bb read *facient*.

la: Vers. 15. — Glossa est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum.

en: [Ecclesiasticus 10:]15. — The Gloss is the Ordinary Gloss and is found in Strabo and in Lyra.

la: De hac definitione cfr. supra pag. 838, nota 8. Potest etiam ad eam referri quae s. Doctor in libr. I. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 8. n. 37. malam voluntatem describens dicit, nimirum quod mala voluntas « non miscetur naturae, quae aliquod malum est, quia nulla natura, in quantum natura est, malum est; sed cum deficit a natura, quae summum atque incommutabile est bonum ». — Post pauca Vat. omittit *completum*.

en: On this definition cf. above, p. 838, note 8. To it may also be referred what the holy Doctor says in Book I *Against Julian the Pelagian*, c. 8, n. 37, in describing the evil will, namely that the evil will « is not mixed with the nature, which is some evil thing, since no nature, insofar as it is a nature, is evil; but [it errs] when it falls away from the nature, which is the highest and unchangeable good ». — A little after, the Vatican edition omits *completum*.

la: De his duabus proposs. cfr. supra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. et hic a. 2. q. 1.

en: On these two propositions cf. above, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1, and here, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 3. seq., ubi docet, omnem motum esse a termino *ex quo* in terminum *ad quem* et denominari magis a termino *ad quem*. Ibid. text. 31. seqq. (c. 4.) tractat de iis quae ad unitatem motus requiruntur. Ultimum arg. verbum *peccata* abest a multis codd. et etiam a primis edd.

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 3 ff., where he teaches that every motion is from a terminus *from which* to a terminus *to which* and is named rather from the terminus *to which*. Ibid., text 31 ff. (c. 4) he treats of those things which are required for the unity of motion. The last word of the argument, *peccata*, is absent from many codices and also from the first editions.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 445, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, p. 445, note 5.

la: Edd. praeter 1 *faciunt*.

en: The editions except the first read *faciunt*.

la: Cap. 1. — Paulo superius pro *contra conversionem* in codd. L O legitur *a conversione*, et subinde pro *sic constituit* in cod. B *sic dicit aliquod*.

en: Chapter 1. — A little above, for *contra conversionem*, codices L and O read *a conversione*, and immediately after, for *sic constituit*, codex B reads *sic dicit aliquod*.

la: Post *accipitur* supple *vel* cum cod. Q (a secunda manu) *magis*, vel *potius*, quae vocula in cod. W secundis curis paulo inferius adiecta est post *a fine*; Vat. minus recte supplevit *tam* post *accipitur*.

en: After *accipitur* supply *vel*, with codex Q (by a second hand) *magis*, or *potius*, which little word in codex W was, by a second revision, added a little lower down after *a fine*; the Vatican edition less correctly supplied *tam* after *accipitur*.

la: Cod. F *concurrunt*.

en: Codex F reads *concurrunt*.

la: Codd. W Y subiiciunt *scilicet*.

en: Codices W and Y add *scilicet*.

la: Codd. K V ee *de convenientia*. Mox pro *assignatur* cod. T *assignantur*.

en: Codices K, V, and ee read *de convenientia*. Soon after, for *assignatur*, codex T reads *assignantur*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 973–974 (PDF 995–996, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 67587–67680. Running heads confirmed via PDF render: p.973 head reads `[ARTICULUS I]I. QUAEST. II. — 973`; p.974 head `974 — SENTENTIARUM LIB. II`.

**Page-split map (footnote markers):**
- **p.973** (R-col q2 opener + fundamenta L-col / Sed contra R-col): footers 1–9 → markers `[^1]`–`[^9]`. (1 = Ier. 2:13; 2 = Cod. K *duo diversa*; 3 = Cod. T repeats; 4 = *faciunt/facient*; 5 = Eccli. 10:15 Glossa ordinaria; 6 = Augustine def. cf. p.838 n.8; 7 = cf. d.41 a.2 q.1; 8 = Aristot. *Phys.* V; 9 = cf. p.445 n.5.)
- **p.974** (Conclusio + Respondeo + Solutio): footers 1–6 → markers `[^10]`–`[^15]`. (1 = Edd. *faciunt*; 2 = Cap.1 *a conversione*; 3 = *accipitur* supply *vel/magis*; 4 = Cod. F *concurrunt*; 5 = Codd. W Y *scilicet*; 6 = Codd. K V ee *de convenientia*.)

**Scholion:** none. This quaestio has no scholion of its own — Article-III Scholion II ("De seq. (2.) quaestione…", held in `d42-a3-q1`) covers it. `has_scholion: false`.

**Hand-off FORWARDED to `d42-dubia`:** The DUBIA block (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` / `DUB. I.`) begins at raw **67682**, opening on the bottom of printed **p.974** (PDF 996) and continuing onto p.975+. **p.974 footers 7 and 8 belong to the dubia, NOT to this quaestio** — do NOT re-claim p.974 footers 1–6 (consumed here as `[^10]`–`[^15]`). The dubia's first two body-footers are: footer 7 = `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` (anchored on the DUB. I opener `…postquam transit actu`), and footer 8 = `Quod insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Omnes edd. et Magistri et Comment. cum codd. habent postquam transit pro postquam transiit. Unde nihil immutavimus.` The dubia then continues with its own fresh p.975 footer sequence.

**[?] flags:** none. All readings resolved against the 450 dpi PDF column bands.