title: Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 1

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### Articulus III. *De obligatione iuramenti.*

Consequenter quaeritur de obligatione iuramenti; et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum obligatio contrahatur per iuramentum dolosum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum contrahatur per iuramentum coactum. Tertio quaeritur, utrum contrahatur per iuramentum incautum sive indiscretum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum obligatio per iuramentum dolosum contrahatur.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum obligatio contrahatur per iuramentum dolosum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per auctoritatem Isidori, quam Magister adducit in littera[^1]. Ait enim sic: « Quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus sic accipit, sicut ille cui iuratur, intelligit »; sed ille cui iuratur, intelligit simpliciter et credit, quod alius se velit per verbum obligare: ergo videtur, quod Deus reputet ipsum obligatum: igitur secundum veritatem obligatur quis per iuramentum dolosum.

2. Item, « fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari[^2] »; sed si ille qui dolose iurat, ab obligatione esset absolutus, patrocinaretur ei fraus et dolus proprius: si igitur hoc est inconveniens dicere, videtur, quod iuramentum dolosum obligationem introducat.

3. Item, verba sunt, in quibus consistunt contractus[^3]: ergo si forma verborum est obligatoria, necesse est, intervenire contractum obligatorium: ergo sive intendat, sive non intendat, dum tamen verba iuramenti obligationem praetendant, iurans obligatur: ergo ita obligatur homo per iuramentum dolosum, sicut per iuramentum simplex et verum.

4. Item, si solummodo verba fidelia et pura obligarent in iuramento; cum nemini constet de fidelitate aliena, nemini constaret, utrum aliquis esset obligatus per verba sua; sed homo redditur certus de obligatione per iuramentum exhibitum[^4]: videtur ergo, quod sive per verba fidelia, sive per fraudulenta iuramentum fiat, iurans aequaliter obligatur.

**Sed contra:** 1. Gregorius[^5]: « Verba deserviunt intentioni; et Deus talia verba iudicat, qualia ex intimis proferuntur »: ergo si homo se non intendit obligare, quantumcumque exterius loquatur; videtur, quod Deus non reputet eum obligatum.

2. Item, secundum illud quod dicitur primi Regum decimo sexto[^6]: *Homo iudicat ea quae parent, Deus autem intuetur cor*; unde quantumcumque sint opera exterius laudabilia, non sunt tamen Deo placita, nisi procedant ex mera intentione et pura: ergo Deus obligationem iuramenti pensat secundum intentionem cordis: ergo si homo non

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intendat se ipsum obligare, quidquid exterius loquatur, apud Deum non erit obligatus: ergo iuramentum dolosum secundum veritatem non est obligatorium.

3. Item, obligatio iuramenti non est a *lege naturali* tantum, sed etiam a lege naturali et *actu proprio*; sed nullus obligatur actu proprio, nisi velit et intendat se ipsum obligare: si ergo iurans iuramento doloso non intendat[^7] se ipsum obligare, sed alium deludere, non videtur obligari secundum veritatem.

4. Item, iuramentum non est obligatorium, nisi quando « habet suos comites, videlicet iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem[^8] »; sed dolosum iuramentum caret veritate: ergo non videtur, quod introducat obligationem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quando verba iuramenti sunt duplicia, et iurans intendit in uno sensu, et recipiens in alio, cuius intentioni sit standum. Et quod magis standum sit intentioni *recipientis*, videtur per auctoritatem Isidori prius habitam; quod vero magis intentioni *iurantis*, videtur per auctoritatem Gregorii prius habitam, qua dicit, quod « verba illi intentioni deserviunt, ex qua proferuntur ».

### Conclusio

> Satis probabile esse videtur, quod iuramentum dolosum in foro Dei non sit simpliciter obligatorium, licet in foro Ecclesiae obliget, et simul committatur crimen periurii.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod iuramentum dolosum simpliciter obligat, quoniam, etsi dolosus intendat alium decipere, intendit tamen dicere verba obligatoria; et dum illa voluntarie exterius profert, simpliciter se ipsum obligat. Nec aliquo modo excusatur per cordis fraudulentiam, quia non solummodo recipiens, sed etiam ipsa Veritas accipit verba secundum sensum, quem faciunt, et ita non solummodo in conspectu hominum, immo etiam secundum veritatem dicunt, quod iuramentum dolosum est obligatorium.

Sed quoniam obligatio iuramenti est obligatoria, sicut obligatio voti et matrimonii; ideo videtur aliis dicendum, quod sicut *matrimonium* non est verum, nisi intersit interior consensus, nec est *votum* obligatorium, nisi sit intentio obligandi[^11]: sic etiam nec ipsum *iuramentum dolosum* dicendum est esse *simpliciter* obligatorium, in quo quis sic iurat, ut tamen per illa verba se ipsum obligare non intendat. Et propterea secundum istos distinguitur duplex forum, videlicet forum Ecclesiae et forum conscientiae. Secundum forum Ecclesiae iuramentum tale est obligatorium; Ecclesia enim iudicat de his quae exterius obligare[^12] possunt; unde cum verba illa obligationem exprimant, iudicat, sic iurantem ad id quod verba insinuant obligari. In foro autem Dei, qui iudicat secundum secreta conscientiae et secundum veritatem, iste quidem non obligatur, quia non voluit obligare se ipsum. Quia tamen dolose iuravit et nomen Dei in vanum assumsit, statim in actu ipso commisit crimen periurii. Nec reportat commodum de malitia, quia apud Deum ex illo iuramento iudicatur[^9] dignus poena aeterna.

Et iste quidem modus dicendi satis probabilis esse videtur. Et secundum ipsum patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; etiam pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae probant, illud iuramentum non esse obligatorium, ostendunt hoc non simpliciter, sed in foro Dei, qui iudicat

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secundum intentionem, secundum quam dolose iurans non intendebat se ipsum obligare. Rationes autem, quae ad oppositum inducuntur, procedunt secundum forum ecclesiasticum, aliter non concludunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Unde ad auctoritatem Isidori, qua dicit, quod Deus accipit verba secundum intentionem recipientis[^10]; dicendum, quod hoc dicit, non quia ipse Deus ad hoc reputet hominem obligatum, sed quia ex hoc, quod ille non intendit iurare, sicut ille intendebat recipere, Deus, qui hoc requirebat ex veritate et iustitia, reputat ipsum obligatum ad poenam. — Vel potest ille sermo causaliter intelligi, ut dicatur, quod Deus sic accipit, quia sic vult accipi ab ipsa Ecclesia, et sic vult etiam iudicari.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fraus et dolus nemini debent patrocinari; patet responsio per iam dicta: quia fraus et dolus non patrocinantur isti in foro Ecclesiae, immo compellitur ab ipsa Ecclesia iuramentum tenere, ac si iurasset vere et fideliter; non patrocinantur etiam in foro Dei, quia ex hoc ipso obligatur et reus efficitur magna poena. Unde si veniat ad poenitentiam, est ei gravis poenitentia imponenda; et sanum consilium est et decens, ut merito culpae sibi imponatur, ut iuramentum compleat, in quo proximum decipere intendebat, licet non possit sibi probari in facie ipsius Ecclesiae.

*Ad 3, 4.* Ad duo sequentia similiter patet responsio: quia verborum obligatio et certificatio per iuramentum superadditum respiciunt forum ecclesiasticum; et ideo obligationem concludunt non simpliciter, sed quantum ad illud forum[^13]. Et hoc quidem est concedendum.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, quando sunt verba duplicia, ita quod dolus non intervenit, cuius[^14] intentioni standum sit; dicendum, quod verba illa multiplicia aut magis praetendunt unum illorum sensuum secundum usum communem, aut aequaliter praetendunt utrumque. Si magis praetendunt unum sensum, illi intentioni standum est, quae illum sensum intellexit. Si vero indifferenter se habent ad utrumque; cum neutrum probari possit, standum est iudicio bonorum virorum, qui, pensatis coniecturis et rationibus, condescendere debent saniori et puriori intentioni[^15]. — Illa tamen auctoritas Isidori non facit ad propositum, quia Isidorus vocat illum arte iurare, cuius iuratio est dolosa; non oportet autem, dolum vel artem intervenire semper, quando verba sunt multiplicia[^16].

english:
### Article III. *On the obligation of an oath.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the obligation of an oath; and concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath. Second it is asked whether it is contracted through a coerced oath. Third it is asked whether it is contracted through an incautious or indiscreet oath.

### Question I. *Whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. From the authority of Isidore, which the Master adduces in the text[^1]. For he speaks thus: « By whatever artifice of words one swears, God accepts it just as he to whom one swears understands it »; but he to whom one swears understands it simply and believes that the other wishes to bind himself by his word: therefore it seems that God reckons him bound: therefore in truth one is bound through a deceitful oath.

2. Likewise, « fraud and deceit ought to give patronage to no one[^2] »; but if he who swears deceitfully were absolved from the obligation, his own fraud and deceit would give him patronage: if therefore it is unfitting to say this, it seems that a deceitful oath introduces an obligation.

3. Likewise, words are those in which contracts consist[^3]: therefore if the form of words is obligatory, it is necessary that an obligatory contract intervene: therefore whether he intends or does not intend, provided only that the words of the oath put forward an obligation, the one swearing is bound: therefore a man is bound by a deceitful oath just as by a simple and true oath.

4. Likewise, if only faithful and pure words bound in an oath; since the fidelity of another is evident to no one, it would be evident to no one whether anyone was bound through his own words; but a man is rendered certain of the obligation through the oath presented[^4]: it seems therefore that whether the oath is made through faithful or through fraudulent words, the one swearing is equally bound.

**On the contrary:** 1. Gregory[^5]: « Words serve the intention; and God judges such words as are brought forth from the inmost parts »: therefore if a man does not intend to bind himself, however much he speaks outwardly; it seems that God does not reckon him bound.

2. Likewise, according to that which is said in the first book of Kings, chapter sixteen[^6]: *Man judges those things which appear, but God beholds the heart*; whence however much works may be outwardly praiseworthy, they are nonetheless not pleasing to God unless they proceed from a sincere and pure intention: therefore God weighs the obligation of an oath according to the intention of the heart: therefore if a man does not

intend to bind himself, whatever he speaks outwardly, before God he will not be bound: therefore a deceitful oath in truth is not obligatory.

3. Likewise, the obligation of an oath is not from *natural law* alone, but also from natural law and a *proper act*; but no one is bound by a proper act unless he wills and intends to bind himself: if therefore one swearing by a deceitful oath does not intend[^7] to bind himself, but to deceive another, he does not seem to be bound in truth.

4. Likewise, an oath is not obligatory except when it « has its companions, namely judgment and justice and truth[^8] »; but a deceitful oath lacks truth: therefore it does not seem that it introduces an obligation.

Alongside this it is asked, when the words of an oath are twofold, and the one swearing intends them in one sense and the one receiving in another, by whose intention one must stand. And that one must rather stand by the intention of the *receiver*, seems to be the case from the authority of Isidore held above; but that one must rather stand by the intention of the *swearer*, seems to be the case from the authority of Gregory held above, in which he says that « words serve that intention from which they are brought forth ».

### Conclusion

> It seems sufficiently probable that a deceitful oath in the forum of God is not simply obligatory, although in the forum of the Church it binds, and at the same time the crime of perjury is committed.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold way of speaking.

For some wished to say that a deceitful oath simply binds, since, even though the deceiver intends to deceive another, he nonetheless intends to speak obligatory words; and while he voluntarily brings them forth outwardly, he simply binds himself. Nor is he in any way excused by the fraudulence of his heart, because not only the receiver but even Truth itself accepts the words according to the sense which they make, and thus they say not only in the sight of men, but even in truth, that a deceitful oath is obligatory.

But since the obligation of an oath is obligatory, just like the obligation of a vow and of marriage; therefore it seems that it must be said by others that just as *marriage* is not true unless an interior consent be present, nor is a *vow* obligatory unless there be an intention of binding[^11]: so too neither must the *deceitful oath* itself be said to be *simply* obligatory, in which one swears in such a way that nonetheless he does not intend to bind himself through those words. And therefore according to these a twofold forum is distinguished, namely the forum of the Church and the forum of conscience. According to the forum of the Church such an oath is obligatory; for the Church judges concerning those things which can bind outwardly[^12]; whence since those words express an obligation, it judges the one swearing thus to be bound to that which the words convey. But in the forum of God, who judges according to the secrets of conscience and according to truth, this man indeed is not bound, because he did not will to bind himself. Yet because he swore deceitfully and took the name of God in vain, in that very act he straightway committed the crime of perjury. Nor does he reap any advantage from his malice, because before God by that oath he is judged[^9] worthy of eternal punishment.

And this way of speaking indeed seems sufficiently probable. And according to it the response to the question proposed is clear; the response to the objections is also for the most part clear. For the reasons which prove that that oath is not obligatory show this not simply, but in the forum of God, who judges

according to the intention, according to which the one swearing deceitfully did not intend to bind himself. But the reasons which are brought in for the opposite proceed according to the ecclesiastical forum; otherwise they do not conclude.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* Whence to the authority of Isidore, in which he says that God accepts the words according to the intention of the receiver[^10]; it must be said that he says this, not because God himself for this reckons the man bound, but because from the fact that this man does not intend to swear as the other intended to receive, God, who required this out of truth and justice, reckons him bound to punishment. — Or that statement can be understood causally, so that it be said that God so accepts because he so wills it to be accepted by the Church itself, and so wills it also to be judged.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that fraud and deceit ought to give patronage to no one; the response is clear from what has already been said: because fraud and deceit do not give patronage to this man in the forum of the Church—rather he is compelled by the Church itself to keep the oath, as if he had sworn truly and faithfully; nor do they give patronage even in the forum of God, because by this very fact he is bound and is made guilty of a great punishment. Whence if he comes to penance, a grave penance is to be imposed on him; and it is sound counsel and fitting that, by the merit of his fault, it be imposed on him to fulfill the oath in which he intended to deceive his neighbor, although it cannot be proved against him in the face of the Church itself.

*To 3, 4.* To the two following the response is likewise clear: because the obligation of words and the certification through a superadded oath regard the ecclesiastical forum; and therefore they conclude an obligation not simply, but with respect to that forum[^13]. And this indeed must be granted.

But to that which is asked, when the words are twofold, in such a way that no deceit intervenes, by whose[^14] intention one must stand; it must be said that those manifold words either rather put forward one of those senses according to common usage, or equally put forward both. If they rather put forward one sense, one must stand by that intention which understood that sense. But if they are held indifferently toward both; since neither can be proved, one must stand by the judgment of good men, who, the conjectures and reasons having been weighed, ought to condescend to the sounder and purer intention[^15]. — Yet that authority of Isidore does not bear on the matter, because Isidore calls him to swear by artifice whose swearing is deceitful; but it is not necessary that deceit or artifice always intervene when the words are manifold[^16].

la: Hic c. 11. Pro *Deus sic accipit* cod. F cum textu originali *Deus tamen, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit*.

en: Here ch. 11. For *God so accepts* codex F, with the original text, reads *yet God, who is the witness of conscience, so accepts this*.

la: Cap. *Ex tenore*, x. de Rescriptis. Cfr. supra pag. 413, nota 2. — Plures codd. *debent*.

en: The chapter *Ex tenore*, in the Decretals, on Rescripts. Cf. above, p. 413, note 2. — Several codices read *debent* (ought).

la: Regula 85. Iuris in VI: *Contractus ex conventione legem accipere dignoscuntur*. Cfr. Iustinian., II. Digest. tit. 14. Lex 1. — In fine arg. pro *simplex et verum* codd. N Q *simpliciter verum*.

en: Rule 85 of the Rules of Law in the Sixth Book: *Contracts are known to take their law from agreement*. Cf. Justinian, Digest book II, title 14, Law 1. — At the end of the argument, for *simple and true* codices N Q read *simply true*.

la: Vat. *publicum*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *publicum* (public).

la: Libr. XXVI. Moral. c. 10 n. 15. exponens illud Iob 34, 2: *Nunquid aequa tibi videtur tua cogitatio, ut diceres: Iustior sum Deo?* ait: *Humanae aures verba nostra talia iudicant, qualia foris sonant; divina vero iudicia talia ea audiunt, qualia ex intimis proferuntur. Apud homines cor ex verbis, apud Deum vero verba pensantur ex corde. Beatus ergo Iob, dum hoc ait exterius quod interius Dominus dixit, omne quod locutus est tanto iuste exterius intulit, quanto pie ab interna sententia non recessit* etc. Cfr. C. *Humanae*, c. 21. q. 5, ubi verba haec adducuntur; et paulo inferius a Gratiano additur: *Si intentio non debet servire verbis, sed verba intentioni* etc.

en: Gregory, *Morals*, book XXVI, ch. 10, n. 15, expounding that of Job 34:2: *Does your thought seem just to you, that you should say: I am more just than God?* he says: *Human ears judge our words such as they sound outwardly; but the divine judgments hear them such as they are brought forth from the inmost parts. Among men the heart is weighed from the words, but with God the words are weighed from the heart. Blessed Job therefore, while he said outwardly that which the Lord said inwardly, brought forth outwardly all that he spoke as justly as he piously did not depart from the inner sentence,* etc. Cf. the canon *Humanae*, c. 21. q. 5, where these words are adduced; and a little below it is added by Gratian: *If the intention ought not to serve the words, but the words the intention,* etc.

la: Vers. 7: *Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem* etc. — Pro *parent* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *patent*, et pro *Deus* cod. U *Dominus*. Inferius pro *secundum intentionem* cod. U *ex intentione*, et pro *non intendat* codd. F K *non intendit*.

en: Verse 7: *For man sees those things which appear, but the Lord* etc. — For *parent* (appear) not a few codices, with editions 1 and 2, read *patent* (lie open), and for *Deus* codex U reads *Dominus*. Below, for *according to the intention* codex U reads *from the intention*, and for *let him not intend* codices F K read *he does not intend*.

la: Codd. A N *intendit*.

en: Codices A N read *intendit* (intends).

la: Secundum Hieron. super illud Ierem. 4, 2: *Et iudicabis: Vivit Dominus in veritate et in iudicio et in iustitia*. Edit. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: According to Jerome on that of Jeremiah 4:2: *And you shall judge: The Lord lives, in truth and in judgment and in justice*. See the edition here at the text of the Master, ch. 1.

la: Cod. G *reputatur*, cod. U *est*. Inferius pro *etiam* codd. A N U *et etiam*.

en: Codex G reads *reputatur* (is reckoned), codex U reads *est* (is). Below, for *also* codices A N U read *and also*.

la: Permulti codd. *obligari*.

en: Very many codices read *obligari* (to be bound).

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2, ubi de matrimonio, et d. 38. a. 1. q. 1, ubi de voto. — Paulo ante pro *obligatoria* codd. A bb *voluntaria*. Aliquanto inferius pro *secundum istos* cod. A *secundum istum modum*.

en: Cf. Sentences IV, d. 27. a. 2. q. 2, where on marriage, and d. 38. a. 1. q. 1, where on a vow. — A little before, for *obligatory* codices A bb read *voluntary*. Somewhat below, for *according to these* codex A reads *according to this manner*.

la: Cod. A, pro *concludunt* posito *excludunt*, substituit *ad aliud forum*. — *(positio in textu)* Codd. A U *cui*. Aliquanto inferius pro *quae illum sensum* codd. A K L N Q V aa bb *qui illum sensum*.

en: Codex A, having put *excludunt* (they exclude) for *concludunt* (they conclude), substitutes *to another forum*. — Codices A U read *cui*. Somewhat below, for *which [understood] that sense* codices A K L N Q V aa bb read *who [understood] that sense*.

la: In cod. H additur: *Ceteris tamen paribus, magis condescendere est intentioni recipientis quam iurantis; quia minus praesumitur de dolo ex parte eius qui verba audit, quam ex parte eius qui verba proponit. Et ratio huius est, quia in foro Ecclesiae non solum aspicitur ad ipsam veritatem, sed etiam ad coniecturae probabilitatem*.

en: In codex H is added: *Yet other things being equal, it is rather to condescend to the intention of the receiver than of the swearer; because less deceit is presumed on the part of him who hears the words than on the part of him who proposes the words. And the reason of this is that in the forum of the Church regard is had not only to truth itself, but also to the probability of conjecture*.

la: Can. *Qui peierare*, c. 22. q. 5. Gratian. concludit: *Ex his omnibus colligitur, quod iuramenta secundum intentionem praestantis, non recipientis, a Deo iudicantur. Quomodo ergo, secundum Isidorum, quacumque arte verborum quis iurat, Deus sic accipit, sicut ille cui iuratur, intelligit? Sed sicut aliud est callida arte verborum iurare, aliud simpliciter intentionem suam iurando enuntiare, sic aliud est simplici intentione iuramentum factum recipere, aliud in recipiendo calliditate uti; quia sicut quisquam apud Deum non valet aliquem laedere, sic nec praeter eius intentionem valet quis alicui subvenire. Deus autem duplicitatis aspernator simplicem intentionem utriusque considerat, et tam ex parte recipientis quam ex parte praestantis verborum artem aspernatur et odit*.

en: The canon *Qui peierare*, c. 22. q. 5. Gratian concludes: *From all these it is gathered that oaths are judged by God according to the intention of the one who gives them, not of the one who receives them. How then, according to Isidore, by whatever artifice of words one swears, does God so accept it just as he to whom one swears understands it? But just as it is one thing to swear by the cunning artifice of words, another simply to declare one's intention in swearing, so it is one thing to receive with simple intention an oath that has been made, another to use cunning in receiving it; because just as no one before God is able to injure another, so neither is anyone able, apart from his intention, to assist another. But God, the spurner of duplicity, considers the simple intention of each, and both on the part of the receiver and on the part of the giver of the words he spurns and hates artifice*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec versatur circa iuramentum promissorium, quod a S. Bonav. aliisque antiquis « appropriate dicitur obligatorium » (Scot., hic q. unica n. 9.). Illud tunc est dolosum, quando iurans, aliquid [se] esse facturum, in ipso actu iurandi intendit oppositum, et non intendit se obligare ad illud quod iuratur; et talis in ipso actu iurandi peccat mortaliter, quia adducit Deum tanquam testem sui propositi de aliquo implendo, cum tamen intendat oppositum. Tamen post illud iuramentum non remanet [scil. per se loquendo] obligatus, quia in obligationibus privatis nullus obligatur non intendens se obligare » (ita definit et resolvit Scot., hic q. unica n. 10.). Iuramentum dolosum hoc sensu acceptum idem est quod iuramentum fictum, quod secundum recentiores in proferendis verbis iuratoriis duobus modis fieri potest, scilicet cum verba proferuntur cum intentione vel non iurandi, vel in promissione non se obligandi. Tale iuramentum non valet, est tamen illicitum, ut constat ex prop. 25. inter damnatas ab Innocentio XI: « Cum causa licitum est iurare sine animo iurandi, sive res sit levis, sive gravis ». Quod autem fictum iuramentum semper sit peccatum mortale, ut Scot. videtur sentire, a recentioribus negatur (cfr. S. Alphons., Homo apost. tr. 5. n. 17.). — Alio autem sensu iuramentum dolosum saepe intelligitur de vero iuramento facto verbis duplicem sensum habentibus, quando « iurans intendit in uno sensu, et recipiens in alio » (hic q. incidens). Hoc autem potest esse cum dolo, vel sine dolo iurantis. « Si autem iurans dolum non adhibeat, obligatur secundum intentionem iurantis » (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 89. a. 7. ad 4.); de quo non est dubium; et idem hic docet S. Bonav., sed quaedam addit. — Si vero iurans recipientem dolo fallit, S. Thom. resolvit, quod « debet iuramentum servari secundum sanum intellectum eius cui iuramentum praestatur ». Quoad ipsum iuramentum dolosum, de quo est hic quaestio principalis, S. Thom. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.) docet: « Quamvis ex ipsa ratione iuramenti, in quantum iuramentum, non obligetur ad servandum ipsum nisi secundum suam intentionem; tamen ex necessitate iuramenti, in quantum fuit dolosum, obligatur ad servandum taliter, quod ex dolo alius non laedatur; et hoc est, quando secundum intentionem recipientis implet iuramentum ». Circa ultima verba paulo mitius S. Bonav. cum multis recentioribus iudicat. — De obligatione, quam imponit forum Ecclesiae dolose iuranti, nullum est dubium.

**II.** De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 3.

**III.** In solutione sequentis (2.) quaest. sententia nunc communissima est, quod iuramentum promissorium coactum de re licita in foro interno est validum, quia iurans, licet iniuste cogenti non obligetur, tamen contraxit obligationem coram Deo. Illud tamen est strictissimae interpretationis et rescindibile, saltem in foro Ecclesiae. — Alex. Hal. inter utramque sententiam hic relatam rem reliquit indicatam. De eadem (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. §2. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

**IV.** Etiam seq. (3.) quaestio est de iuramento promissorio. Definitiones tres incauti iuramenti hic positae communes sunt apud antiquos doctores. In his tribus speciebus deficit illa conditio iuramenti liciti, quae vocatur iustitia. A recentioribus (cfr. Sporer, Theol. moral. tom. 1. tr. 3. sect. 4. § 1.) vocatur incautum illud iuramentum, « quo iuratur sine debita consideratione et examine, verumne sit, an falsum quod iuratur ». — Casus moralis, qui in quaestione incidenti proponitur, similiter solvitur a S. Thom. in Sum. (loc. cit. ad 2.), et etiam ab Alexandro Hal. (loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. § 1.), qui tamen refert aliorum opinionem, qui sine distinctione asserunt, illud iuramentum esse incautum et non obligatorium simpliciter; quorum opinioni aliquatenus favent verba S. Thom., in Comment. hic a. 3. quaestiunc. I. ad 3. De ipsa (3.) quaestione praeter S. Thomam: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. a. I. 2. — Scot., loc. cit. n. II. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question turns upon a promissory oath, which by St. Bonaventure and the other ancients « is appropriately called obligatory » (Scotus, here in the sole question, n. 9). It is then deceitful when one swearing—that he will do something—in the very act of swearing intends the opposite, and does not intend to bind himself to that which is sworn; and such a one in the very act of swearing sins mortally, because he brings forward God as it were a witness of his purpose to fulfill something, while nonetheless he intends the opposite. Yet after that oath he does not remain [namely, speaking per se] bound, because in private obligations no one is bound who does not intend to bind himself » (so Scotus defines and resolves it, here in the sole question, n. 10). A deceitful oath taken in this sense is the same as a feigned oath, which according to more recent authors, in the uttering of the oath's words, can come about in two ways, namely when the words are brought forth with the intention either of not swearing, or, in a promise, of not binding oneself. Such an oath is not valid, yet it is illicit, as is established from proposition 25 among those condemned by Innocent XI: « With cause it is licit to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter be slight or grave ». But that a feigned oath is always a mortal sin, as Scotus seems to hold, is denied by more recent authors (cf. St. Alphonsus, Homo apost. tr. 5. n. 17). — But in another sense a deceitful oath is often understood of a true oath made with words having a twofold sense, when « the one swearing intends one sense, and the receiver another » (the incidental question here). But this can be with deceit, or without deceit of the one swearing. « But if the one swearing does not employ deceit, he is bound according to the intention of the swearer » (St. Thomas, S. II–II. q. 89. a. 7. ad 4); concerning which there is no doubt; and the same St. Bonaventure here teaches, but adds certain things. — But if the one swearing deceives the receiver by deceit, St. Thomas resolves that « the oath must be kept according to the sound understanding of him to whom the oath is given ». As to the deceitful oath itself, concerning which is the principal question here, St. Thomas (here a. 3. quaestiuncula 3) teaches: « Although by the very nature of the oath, insofar as it is an oath, one is not bound to keep it except according to his own intention; nonetheless by the necessity of the oath, insofar as it was deceitful, one is bound to keep it in such a way that another not be injured by the deceit; and this is the case when one fulfills the oath according to the intention of the receiver ». Concerning the last words St. Bonaventure judges a little more mildly, with many more recent authors. — Concerning the obligation which the forum of the Church imposes on one who swears deceitfully, there is no doubt.

**II.** Concerning this question, besides those praised: Alex. of Hales, Sum. p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following questions, here q. 3.

**III.** In the solution of the following (2nd) question the now most common opinion is that a coerced promissory oath concerning a licit matter is valid in the internal forum, because the one swearing, although he is not bound to the one unjustly coercing, nonetheless contracted an obligation before God. Yet that is of the strictest interpretation and rescindable, at least in the forum of the Church. — Alex. of Hales, between the two opinions related here, left the matter undecided. On the same (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. §2. — St. Thomas, here a. 3. quaestiuncula 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. ad 3. — B. Albert, here a. 9. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

**IV.** Likewise the following (3rd) question is concerning a promissory oath. The three definitions of an incautious oath set down here are common among the ancient doctors. In these three species there is lacking that condition of a licit oath which is called justice. By more recent authors (cf. Sporer, Theol. moral. tom. 1. tr. 3. sect. 4. § 1) that oath is called incautious « by which one swears without due consideration and examination as to whether what is sworn is true or false ». — The moral case which is proposed in the incidental question is likewise solved by St. Thomas in the Summa (loc. cit. ad 2), and also by Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. § 1), who nonetheless reports the opinion of others, who without distinction assert that that oath is incautious and not obligatory simply; whose opinion is somewhat favored by the words of St. Thomas, in his Commentary here a. 3. quaestiuncula I. ad 3. Concerning the (3rd) question itself, besides St. Thomas: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. a. I. 2. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. II. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
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- **p.875 nn.1–6 → [^7]–[^12]**. n.1 = *Codd. A N intendit* (arg.3 *non intendat*); n.2 = *Secundum Hieron. super Ierem. 4,2* (arg.4 *iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem*); n.3 = *Cfr. IV. Sent. d.27/d.38* (op.2 *votum… intentio obligandi*); n.4 = *Permulti codd. obligari* (Solutio op.1 *recipientis*); n.5 = *Cod. G reputatur* (Respondeo *iudicatur*); n.6 = *Hugo a S. Vict., arte verborum* (Solutio op.1 *exterius obligare* / Ecclesia clause). The p.875 footers carry an overflow head (continuation of p.874 n.9 *Vers.7*, *…tem etc. — Pro parent…*) before n.1; that overflow is folded into [^6]'s Latin above and not separately numbered.
- **p.876 nn.1–4 → [^13]–[^16]**. n.1 = *Cod. A excludunt / ad aliud forum* (*Ad 3,4* — *illud forum*); n.2 = *Codd. A U cui* (incidens reply *cuius*); n.3 = *In cod. H additur: Ceteris tamen paribus…* (incidens reply *saniori et puriori intentioni*); n.4 = *Can. Qui peierare, Gratian.* (incidens reply tail *multiplicia*). NB the textual variants for p.875 op.2/op.1 (*reputatur/est*, *obligari*) and the marginal author-side notes (*Duplex forum*, *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Iudicium auctoris*, *Notandum*, *Aliter*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Ad quaestionem incidentem*, *Distinctio*) are Quaracchi editorial side-glosses, not numbered footers, and are not rendered as apparatus.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 877 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum omne iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium.*

Secundo quaeritur de iuramento coacto, et est quaestio, utrum omne iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Omne iuramentum, quod habet iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem, est obligatorium[^1]; sed iuramentum coactum potest haec tria habere: ergo videtur, quod sit obligatorium.

2. Item, « coacta voluntas, ut vult Augustinus[^2], vere voluntas est »; sed iuramentum dicitur *coactum*, quia fit a voluntate coacta: ergo iuramentum coactum a vera voluntate est. Sed cum quis voluntate aliquid iurat, nisi sit malum, se ipsum obligat: ergo etc.

3. Item, peccatum ex coactione perpetratum inducit obligationem ad poenam aeternam: si ergo iuramentum de sui natura obligat ad veritatem servandam, sicut peccatum obligat ad poenam perferendam; videtur per simile, quod iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Augustini[^3]. Quidam coactus iuravit cuidam concubinae, quod eam duceret in uxorem et ulterius non exhiberet parentes suos. Respondet beatus Augustinus ex consilio beati Ambrosii, quod matrimonium teneret et poeniteret de residuo: ergo videtur secundum sententiam beati Augustini, quod iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium.

**Sed contra:** 1. Vota coacta non obligant, quia votum est *promissio spontanea*[^4]; sed iuramenti obligatio similiter a voluntate nostra procedit: ergo non videtur, quod iuramenta coacta sint obligatoria.

2. Item, « praetor[^5] dicit — et Tullius etiam in Rhetoricis — quod vi vel metu factum est ratum non habeo »: si ergo lex habet ratam omnem obligationem iustam, videtur, quod iuramenta coacta non sint obligatoria.

3. Item, causa metus mortis cadit in virum constantem; sed metus, qui cadit in virum constantem, excusat *a toto*, secundum quod iurisperiti[^6] dicunt: ergo videtur, quod iuramentum, quod fit ex tali metu, non sit obligatorium.

4. Item, coactio excludit contractum matrimonialem[^7]; sed tanti roboris et obligationis est ipsum matrimonium, quanti et iuramentum: si ergo matrimonium ex coactione contractum non est obligatorium, eadem ratione videtur quod nec iuramentum.

### Conclusio

> Iuramentum coactum respectu rei licitae in foro Dei obligatorium esse videtur, nisi relaxetur.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dicunt, quod cum duplex sit iuramentum, videlicet promissorium et *assertorium*[^8], respectu iuramenti assertorii coactio non excusat *a toto*, sed *a tanto*. Si quis enim coactus iurat et asserit, falsum esse verum, incurrit crimen periurii. In iuramento vero obligatorio sive promissorio coactio, quae surgit ex metu, qui potest cadere in constantem virum, *a toto* excusat — tale enim iuramentum licitum est et non est contra Deum, quo quis promittit, aliquid alicui se daturum, vel facturum — et ideo respectu talis iuramenti potest intervenire coactio sufficiens ad inclinandum etiam constantem virum. Et quia coactio sufficiens intervenit, voluntas illa non est iudicanda voluntas; ac per[^9] hoc nec iuramentum illud est vere obligatorium, ut dicunt.

Sed quoniam verba Augustini et consilium etiam

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eius videtur esse in contrarium — videtur enim beatus Augustinus iudicare tale iuramentum obligatorium — ideo est alius modus dicendi, ut distinguatur duplex forum, videlicet *ecclesiasticum* et *divinum*, ita quod obligatio iuramenti *coacti* e contrario se habet obligationi iuramenti *dolosi* respectu huius duplicis fori[^10]. Nam in foro *Ecclesiae* iuramentum coactum non est obligatorium: tum quia Ecclesia praesumit, quia iste qui coacte iuravit, non iuravit voluntate implendi iuramentum, sed potius evadendi periculum; tum etiam, quia ille qui iurare compulit, cum malitiose et dolose processerit, nullum ius acquisivit nec de malitia commodum reportare debuit; unde nullum habet ius repetendi. — In foro autem *Dei* iuramentum coactum obligatorium est, quia, cum Deus aspiciat voluntatem interiorem, et voluntas non possit cogi coactione *sufficiente*, sed *inducente*[^11], et ita voluntas coacta voluntas sit, iudicat Deus, talem hominem obligari. Et ideo in foro conscientiae secundum theologos consulendum est ei qui sic iuravit, nisi relaxationem inveniat, iuramentum implere; et hoc dico, si iuramentum illud fuit respectu rei licitae. — Unde rationes concedi possunt, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de obligatione voti; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia votum respicit obligationem ad Deum, qui vult sacrificia non coacta, sed voluntaria[^12]. Si quis tamen coactione inducente cogatur, ut votum emittat, videlicet ut in periculo mortis existens a Domino liberetur, non videtur absurdum dicere, eum esse obligatum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praetore et lege, quod non reputat ratum iuramentum factum per metum; dicendum, quod lex loquitur in foro *iudiciali*, quia non intromittit se de foro *conscientiae*. Unde secundum illud forum verum est, quod iuramentum coactum non obligat. Ex hoc tamen non potest concludi, quod non obliget quantum ad Deum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod metus, qui potest cadere in constantem virum, excusat a toto; dicendum, quod licet respectu actuum humanorum possit cadere metus sufficiens in virum constantem; tamen quantum ad ea quae iustitiae sunt, non potest cadere metus sufficiens in virum constantem. Quantum enim ad illa dicit Dominus[^13]: *Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt*. Ideo apud Deum talis metus non reputatur causa sufficiens ad excusandum hominem a reatu peccati, vel ab obligatione iuramenti.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obligatione matrimonii, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia matrimonium hoc habet ex ratione significationis et institutionis, ut contrahatur ex mera et libera voluntate. Significat enim coniunctionem Christi et Ecclesiae Dei et animae, in qua nulla intervenit coactio, sed mera benignitatis dilectio[^14]. Non sic autem est ex parte iuramenti. — Et si tu quaeras de illo qui coactus iuravit contrahere matrimonium, utrum teneatur; dicendum, quod tenetur, nisi ex causa superveniente absolvatur. Si tamen contrahat cum alia, in contrahendo peccat mortaliter nec amplius obligatur, sed pro culpa periurii est ei poenitentia imponenda: et de hoc amplius habetur in quarto in tractatu de matrimonio[^15].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether every coerced oath is binding.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning a coerced oath, and the question is whether every coerced oath is binding. And that it is, seems to be the case.

1. Every oath which has judgment and justice and truth is binding[^1]; but a coerced oath can have these three: therefore it seems that it is binding.

2. Likewise, « a coerced will, as Augustine holds[^2], is truly a will »; but an oath is called *coerced* because it is made by a coerced will: therefore a coerced oath is from a true will. But when one swears something with the will, unless it be evil, he binds himself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a sin perpetrated through coercion induces an obligation to eternal punishment: if therefore an oath by its own nature binds to keeping the truth, just as a sin binds to bearing punishment; it seems by likeness that a coerced oath is binding.

4. Likewise, this very thing seems to be the case from the authority of Augustine[^3]. A certain man, coerced, swore to a certain concubine that he would take her as wife and would no longer maintain his parents. Blessed Augustine responds, from the counsel of blessed Ambrose, that he should keep the marriage and do penance for the rest: therefore it seems, according to the judgment of blessed Augustine, that a coerced oath is binding.

**On the contrary:** 1. Coerced vows do not bind, because a vow is a *spontaneous promise*[^4]; but the obligation of an oath likewise proceeds from our will: therefore it does not seem that coerced oaths are binding.

2. Likewise, « the praetor[^5] says — and Tully also in the Rhetoric — what has been done by force or fear I do not hold ratified »: if therefore the law holds ratified every just obligation, it seems that coerced oaths are not binding.

3. Likewise, the cause of the fear of death falls upon a steadfast man; but fear which falls upon a steadfast man excuses *wholly*, according to what the jurists[^6] say: therefore it seems that an oath which is made from such fear is not binding.

4. Likewise, coercion excludes the marriage contract[^7]; but marriage itself is of as much strength and obligation as an oath: if therefore a marriage contracted from coercion is not binding, by the same reasoning it seems that neither is an oath.

### Conclusion

> A coerced oath, with respect to a licit matter, seems to be binding in the forum of God, unless it be relaxed.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold way of speaking.

For some say that, since an oath is twofold, namely promissory and *assertory*[^8], with respect to an assertory oath coercion does not excuse *wholly*, but *in part*. For if anyone, coerced, swears and asserts that what is false is true, he incurs the crime of perjury. But in an obligatory or promissory oath, the coercion which arises from fear—fear that can fall upon a steadfast man—excuses *wholly*; for such an oath is licit and not against God, by which one promises that he will give or do something to someone—and therefore with respect to such an oath there can intervene a coercion sufficient to incline even a steadfast man. And because a sufficient coercion intervenes, that will is not to be judged a will; and consequently[^9] neither is that oath truly binding, as they say.

But since the words of Augustine and also his counsel

seem to be to the contrary—for blessed Augustine seems to judge such an oath binding—therefore there is another way of speaking, namely to distinguish a twofold forum, that is the *ecclesiastical* and the *divine*, in such a way that the obligation of a *coerced* oath is related contrariwise to the obligation of a *deceitful* oath with respect to this twofold forum[^10]. For in the forum of the *Church* a coerced oath is not binding: both because the Church presumes that this man who swore under coercion did not swear with the will of fulfilling the oath, but rather of escaping the danger; and also because he who compelled the swearing, since he proceeded maliciously and deceitfully, acquired no right nor ought to have reaped advantage from his malice; whence he has no right of reclaiming. — But in the forum of *God* a coerced oath is binding, because, since God beholds the interior will, and the will cannot be coerced by a *sufficient* coercion, but [only] by an *inducing*[^11] one, and thus the coerced will is a will, God judges such a man to be bound. And therefore in the forum of conscience, according to the theologians, it must be counseled to him who has so sworn, unless he find a relaxation, that he fulfill the oath; and this I say, if that oath was with respect to a licit matter. — Whence the reasons which are for this part can be granted.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning the obligation of a vow; it must be said that it is not alike; because a vow regards an obligation to God, who wills sacrifices not coerced, but voluntary[^12]. Yet if anyone be compelled by an inducing coercion to make a vow, namely that, being in danger of death, he be freed by the Lord, it does not seem absurd to say that he is bound.

2. To that which is objected concerning the praetor and the law, that it does not reckon ratified an oath made through fear; it must be said that the law speaks in the *judicial* forum, because it does not concern itself with the forum of *conscience*. Whence according to that forum it is true that a coerced oath does not bind. Yet from this it cannot be concluded that it does not bind with respect to God.

3. To that which is objected, that fear which can fall upon a steadfast man excuses wholly; it must be said that, although with respect to human acts a sufficient fear can fall upon a steadfast man; nonetheless with respect to those things which belong to justice, a sufficient fear cannot fall upon a steadfast man. For as to those things the Lord says[^13]: *Do not fear those who kill the body*. Therefore with God such fear is not reckoned a cause sufficient to excuse a man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath.

4. To that which is objected concerning the obligation of marriage, it must be said that it is not alike: because marriage has this from the account of its signification and institution, that it be contracted from a sincere and free will. For it signifies the conjunction of Christ and the Church of God and the soul, in which no coercion intervenes, but the sincere love of kindness[^14]. But it is not so on the part of an oath. — And if you ask concerning him who, coerced, swore to contract marriage, whether he is bound; it must be said that he is bound, unless he be absolved by a supervening cause. Yet if he contract with another, in contracting he sins mortally and is no longer bound, but for the fault of perjury a penance is to be imposed on him: and concerning this more is had in the fourth [book] in the treatise on marriage[^15].

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 875, nota 2.

en: Cf. above, p. 875, note 2.

la: Libr. de Spiritu et lit. c. 31. n. 53: *Si subtilius advertamus, etiam quod quisque invitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate facit; sed quia mallet aliud, ideo invitus, hoc est nolens facere dicitur*. Cfr. C. *Si vero*, x. de Iureiur., ubi dicitur, iuramentum per metum extortum, si servari potest sine interitu salutis aeternae, servandum esse. — Inferius pro *cum quis voluntate* cod. U *cum quis voluntarie* [edd. *ex voluntate*].

en: *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 31, n. 53: *If we observe more subtly, even what each one is unwillingly compelled to do, if he does it, he does it by the will; but because he would prefer otherwise, he is therefore said to do it unwillingly, that is, not willing.* Cf. the canon *Si vero*, in the Decretals, on Oaths, where it is said that an oath extorted through fear, if it can be kept without the loss of eternal salvation, must be kept. — Below, for *when one [swears] with the will* codex U reads *when one [swears] voluntarily* [editions read *from the will*].

la: Secundum Gratian., C. *Inter cetera* c. 22. q. I. Nam ipse illi canoni haec verba praemittit: *Unde Augustinus scribit Severo Milevetano episcopo, consulenti de quodam Hubaldo, qui a consanguineis cuiusdam pellicis coactus fuerat iurare, se illam ducturum in coniugem nec matri suae vel fratribus ulterius necessaria subministraturum*. Rescribit ergo B. Augustinus, ut diximus, Severo Milevetano episcopo, ita dicens: *Inter cetera, ut rogaveras, a patre nostro Ambrosio quaesivi* etc. In nota adiecta editores dicunt: *Nihil hunc canonem cum Augustino commune habere censemus* (ed. Migne). — Pro *exhiberet* (i. e. *alimentaret*, cfr. Forcellini *Lexicon* etc.) edd. *adverteret*. Eodem sensu utuntur verbo *exhibeo* Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 24. q. 2, et Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 4. § 2.

en: According to Gratian, the canon *Inter cetera*, c. 22. q. I. For he prefixes these words to that canon: *Whence Augustine writes to Severus, bishop of Mileve, who consulted concerning a certain Hubaldus, who had been coerced by the kinsmen of a certain concubine to swear that he would take her as wife and would no longer supply necessities to his mother or brothers.* Blessed Augustine therefore writes back, as we have said, to Severus, bishop of Mileve, saying thus: *Among other things, as you had asked, I inquired of our father Ambrose,* etc. In an added note the editors say: *We judge that this canon has nothing in common with Augustine* (Migne's edition). — For *exhiberet* (i.e. *should provide food*, cf. Forcellini's *Lexicon* etc.) the editions read *adverteret*. In the same sense William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. III. tr. 24. q. 2, and Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 4. § 2, use the word *exhibeo*.

la: Magister, IV. Sent. d. XXXVIII. p. I: *Votum est testificatio quaedam promissionis spontaneae, quae Deo, et de his quae Dei sunt, proprie fieri debet*. — Pro *promissio*, quod habent codd. B K M X Z plures codd. et edd. *coactio*, cod. H *contractio*, cod. bb *obligatio*.

en: The Master, Sentences IV, d. XXXVIII. p. I: *A vow is a certain testification of a spontaneous promise, which ought properly to be made to God and concerning those things which are of God.* — For *promissio* (promise), which codices B K M X Z and several codices and editions have, [some read] *coactio* (coercion), codex H *contractio* (contract), codex bb *obligatio* (obligation).

la: Iustinian. IV. Digest. lit. 2. Lex I: *Ait praetor: Quod metus causa gestum erit ratum non habebo*. Cfr. II. Codic., lit. 20. de iis quae vi metusve causa gesta sunt, Lex 7. et 8. — Cicero I. Rhetor. c. II, et II. c. 31. quoad sensum; sed si verba attendantur, vide III. offic. c. 30, ubi dicit: *Non debuit esse ratum quod erat actum per vim*. Cfr. ibid. c. 28.

en: Justinian, Digest book IV, title 2, Law I: *The praetor says: What shall have been done for the sake of fear I shall not hold ratified.* Cf. Code book II, title 20, on those things which have been done by force or for the sake of fear, Laws 7 and 8. — Cicero, Rhetoric book I, c. II, and book II, c. 31, as to the sense; but if the words be attended to, see *On Duties* book III, c. 30, where he says: *That ought not to have been ratified which was done through force.* Cf. ibid. c. 28.

la: Cfr. Lex: *Metum accipiendum*, et Lex: *Metus autem causa*. — Lege 6. (IV. Digest. tit. 2.) dicitur: *Metum autem non vani hominis, sed qui merito et in hominem constantissimum cadat, ad hoc edictum pertinere dicemus*.

en: Cf. the Law: *Fear is to be taken*, and the Law: *But for the sake of fear*. — In Law 6 (Digest book IV, title 2) it is said: *But we shall say that to this edict pertains the fear not of a vain man, but such as may with reason fall even upon a most steadfast man*.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 29. q. I.

en: Cf. Sentences IV, d. 29, q. I.

la: Vide supra pag. 862, nota 2. — Aliquanto inferius pro *qui potest* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 incongrue *quae potest*.

en: See above, p. 862, note 2. — Somewhat below, for *which can [fall]* not a few codices, with editions 1 and 2, read incongruously *quae potest*.

la: Cod. G *et propter*, codd. B C D F H L V bb *sic per*.

en: Codex G reads *et propter* (and on account of), codices B C D F H L V bb read *sic per* (thus through).

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: De quo vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. — Circa finem corp. pro *fuit* codd. G K *fuerit*.

en: Concerning which see Sentences II, d. 25. p. II. q. 4. — Near the end of the body, for *fuit* codices G K read *fuerit*.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 38. a. I. q. I. ad 4, ubi triplex differentia voti et iuramenti affertur.

en: Cf. Sentences IV, d. 38. a. I. q. I. ad 4, where a threefold difference of a vow and an oath is brought forward.

en: Matthew 10:28.

la: Vide Eph. 5, 25. seqq. — Paulo superius pro *Dei* cod. U *et Dei*.

en: See Ephesians 5:25 ff. — A little above, for *of God* codex U reads *and of God*.

la: Dist. 29. per totam. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Distinction 29, throughout. — See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p87{7,8}-{L,R}-*.png`), Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion; cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw 60824–60924. Fresh literal English. This is the SECOND of Article III's three questions (*Secundo quaeritur de iuramento coacto … utrum omne iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium*); alignment confirmed against a3-q1's article opener (1. dolosum, 2. coactum, 3. incautum). Bound forward at `QUAESTIO III.` (*Utrum iuramentum incautum sit obligatorium*, raw 60925, p.878 mid-page).

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- **p.878 nn.1–6 → [^10]–[^15]** (page 878 is SHARED with q3; nn.1–6 anchor in q2's body, nn.7–10 in q3's). n.1 = *Cfr. quaest. praec.* (Respondeo opinio 2 — *huius duplicis fori*, the dolosum/coactum forum-comparison); n.2 = *De quo vide II. Sent. d. 25 / pro fuit codd. G K fuerit* (Respondeo — *inducente*, the variant in corp.); n.3 = *Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 38 a.1 q.1 ad 4, triplex differentia voti et iuramenti* (Solutio *Ad 1* — *vult sacrificia … voluntaria*, the vow comparison); n.4 = *Matth. 10, 28* (Solutio *Ad 3* — *Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt*); n.5 = *Vide Eph. 5, 25 / pro Dei cod. U et Dei* (Solutio *Ad 4* — *benignitatis dilectio*); n.6 = *Dist. 29. per totam — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* (Solutio *Ad 4* tail — *in tractatu de matrimonio*). The opinio 2 / conclusio 1 / conclusio 2 / corollarium / solutio oppositorum / Notandum side-glosses on p.878 are Quaracchi editorial marginalia, not numbered footers, and are not rendered.

**q2/q3 footer split.** p.878's printed footer column runs nn.1–10. By body anchor: nn.1–6 belong to q2 (whose Respondeo + Solutio occupy p.878 above QUAESTIO III); nn.7,8,9,10 belong to q3 (the *incautum* question that opens lower on the same page) and are EXCLUDED here — they will be picked up when q3 is promoted (n.7 *Vide infra in fundam. 1. verba Bedae*; n.8 *Libr. III de Officiis* = Ambrose / Iosue; n.9 *Cfr. supra pag. 666, nota 6*; n.10 *De Bono coniugali* = Augustine / meretrix).

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**[?] flags.** NONE — pp.877–878 fully legible at 450 dpi; all OCR garbles (*quaerilur*→*quaeritur*, *ulrum*→*utrum*, *Ulrum*→*Utrum*, *inramentum/iuramenlum*→*iuramentum*, *constanlem/constantissimum*, *praelor*→*praetor*, *iurisperiti*, *reputat ratum*, *Godd.*→*Codd.*) resolved against the PDF bands with full context.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum iuramentum incautum sit obligatorium.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum iuramentum incautum sit obligatorium. Iuramentum autem *incautum* dico, quod vergit in exitum malum, vel in exitum minus bonum[^1]. Et quod iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum malum, sit obligatorium, probatur:

1. *Primo* per exemplum Iosue, de quo dicit Ambrosius in libro *de Officiis*[^2]: « Iosue pacem, quam dederat, revocandam non censuit, quia firmata erat sacramenti religione, ne dum alienam perfidiam redargueret, suam fidem solveret »: tenebatur ergo Iosue iuramentum, quod fecerat, observare; sed illud iuramentum fuit incautum et vergebat in exitum malum, quia contra Dei praeceptum, quo praeceperat Dominus, ne cum gentibus illis foedus iniret[^3]: ergo videtur, quod tale iuramentum sit obligatorium.

2. *Item*, Augustinus[^4] dicit, quod meretrix iurans, se servaturam fidem suo leccatori, peior est, si non servat fidem, quam si observaret; sed iuramentum illud habet malum exitum, et tamen obligat, alioquin non esset peior in non observando quam in observando: ergo iuramentum, quod simpliciter vergit in exitum malum, est obligatorium.

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3. *Item*, hoc ipsum videtur de iuramento, quod vergit in exitum minus bonum, utpote qui iurat, se non intraturum religionem[^5], quia aliquis per matrimonii vinculum potest se obligare, ut non intret religionem, ita quod matrimonium illud vere est obligatorium: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod et per ipsum iuramentum.

4. *Item*, licitum est alicui nolle intrare religionem, et quod licitum est nolle licitum est confirmare, et quod licitum est confirmare licitum est iurare; sed iuramentum licitum est iuramentum obligatorium: videtur ergo, quod cum aliquis iuret, se non intraturum religionem, quod per illud iuramentum obligatur. Sed tale est iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum minus bonum: ergo videtur, quod iuramentum illud sit obligatorium.

**Sed contra:** 1. Beda dicit, et Magister adducit in littera[^6]: « Si quid nos incautius iurare contigerit, quod observatum peiorem vergat in exitum, libere illud salubriori consilio mutandum noverimus »: ergo secundum hoc iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum malum, vel minus bonum, non est obligatorium.

2. *Item*, Isidorus[^7]: « Non est observandum sacramentum, quo malum incaute promittitur ». Si tu dicas, quod auctoritas ista intelligitur solum, quando quis iurat quod est malum et iniustum, sed non, quando quis iurat, se non facturum bonum perfectum, ad quod non tenetur; obiicitur contra hoc: quia nullum iuramentum est iustum, quod impugnat iustitiae perfectionem[^8]; sed iuramentum, quo quis iurat, se non intraturum religionem nec aggressurum perfectionem, est perfectae iustitiae impugnativum: ergo et iuramentum iniquum. Sed nullum tale est obligatorium: ergo videtur, quod nullus obligetur per iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum minus bonum.

3. *Item*, nullum iuramentum est discretum, quod est contra Spiritus sancti consilium; sed cum quis iurat, se non intraturum religionem, iuramentum illud est contra Spiritus sancti consilium; sed nullum tale iuramentum habet in comitatu iudicium, et nullum tale est obligatorium[^9]: ergo idem quod prius.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, si quis iurat, se nunquam recepturum praelationem, utrum per tale iuramentum obligetur. Et quod sic, videtur: quia licitum est praelationem fugere: ergo licitum est, quod quis iuret eam non recipere[^10]. In contrarium est, quod maioris perfectionis est, ut communiter dicitur, status praelationis quam religionis, et bono privato praeferenda est utilitas communis.

> **Conclusio.** Iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in salutis detrimentum, vel directe in perfectionis impedimentum, non est obligatorium.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multipliciter contingit iuramentum esse incautum: primo modo, quando iuratur aliquid, quod simpliciter vergit in salutis detrimentum, sicut cum aliquis iurat, se facturum aliquid, quod non potest sine peccato mortali consummari. Secundo modo dicitur iuramentum esse incautum, cum quis iurat aliquid, quod vergit in salutis suae dispendium et perfectionis impedimentum, ut puta cum iurat quis, se nunquam intraturum religionem. Tertio modo dicitur iuramentum incautum, cum quis iurat aliquid *in omnem eventum*, quod uno casu contingente, vergit in salutis dispendium, alio casu contingente, vergit in salutis profectum; sicut cum iurat aliquis, se nunquam recepturum praelationem, quod quidem est in salutis dispendium, si utilis sit et canonice eligatur et a maiori sibi iniungatur; tunc autem vergit in salutis profectum, si sit persona inutilis sibi et aliis ad statum illum promoveri.

Si ergo loquamur de iuramento[^11] *primo* modo, sic absque dubio non est licitum nec obligatorium, immo qui ipsum observat committit peccatum. — Si vero loquamur de iuramento incauto *secundo* modo, sic nec est licitum nec obligatorium, licet ipsum observare non sit peccatum, quia non est peccatum non intrare religionem; grave tamen peccatum est iurare, se nunquam ascensurum ad gradum perfectionis, quia in hoc quodam modo impugnat ipsius iustitiae perfectionem et Spiritus sancti inspirationem[^12]. — Si vero loquamur de iuramento *tertio* modo, sic, uno casu contingente, est observandum, videlicet quando vergit in salutis profectum; alio vero casu contingente, est illicitum et non observandum, videlicet cum vergit in salutis detrimentum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedendum est enim, quod iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in salutis detri-

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mentum, vel quod directe vergit in perfectionis impedimentum, non est obligatorium, sicut rationes ad hanc partem inductae ostendunt[^13].

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Iosue, dicendum, quod iuramentum illud observatum non vergebat in malum exitum, immo in bonum. Triplex enim ratio fuit, quare Gabaonitae fuerunt reservati et non interfecti. Una videlicet *litteralis*, quia melius erat, ut damnarentur perpetua servitute, quam punirentur morte, maxime cum prompti essent servire et mortem sustinere, sicut ex ipso textu[^14] apparet. — Alia vero ratio est *moralis*, quia in hoc significatur, quod quantumcumque Deus minetur alicui et indignetur in praesenti vita; si tamen ad ipsum revertatur toto corde, non claudit misericordiae viscera. — Tertia vero ratio est *figuralis*, quia in hoc significatur, quod semper in nobis duo sunt populi, secundum quod duo fuerunt in terra promissionis, videlicet Amorrhaeorum et filiorum Israel, hoc est motuum rationalium et brutalium; secundum quod dicit Bernardus[^15]: « Quantumcumque labores, necesse est, ut intra fines tuos habitet Iebusaeus ». — Unde multiplici ratione observatio iuramenti illius non vergebat in exitum malum, sed potius in bonum. — Et quod obiicitur de mandato Domini, quod Dominus praeceperat, quod cum eis foedus non iniret[^16]; dicendum, quod hoc intelligendum est quantum ad eos qui erant incorrigibiles.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de meretrice, quae iurat leccatori suo fideliter adhaerere; dicendum, quod in iuramento est duo considerare: unum, quod meretrix iurat, se consensuram in nefarium actum cum suo leccatore; aliud, quod iurat, se[^17] alteri non daturam. Et primum quidem est illicitum, et ad hoc non obligatur; secundum quidem licitum, et quantum ad hoc obligatur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, quod peior est non servando, quam si iuramentum servaret. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est, si aliquis latro iuraret alii, se praedam cum illo divisurum, et postea retineret totum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui iurat, se nunquam religionem intraturum, quod licite potest iurare, sicut licite potest contrahere matrimonium; dicendum, quod non est simile hinc et inde, duplici ex causa. Prima est, quia matrimonium non tantummodo dicit privationem boni, quin potius dicat[^18] boni positionem; sed iuramentum, quo quis iurat, se nunquam religionem intraturum, de sua principali intentione est boni perfecti privatorium et impeditivum; ideo non est iudicandum obligatorium, sed potius illicitum et iniquum. — Alia etiam ratio est, quia qui matrimonium contrahit, sive ex consensu uxoris, sive ex morte, potest aliquando aggredi perfectionem. Qui autem iurat, se nunquam religionem intraturum, quantum est de se, reddit se in sempiternum inhabilem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod licitum est nolle intrare religionem, ergo et iuramento firmare[^19]; dicendum, quod non sequitur: quia nolle intrare religionem est imperfectionis, sed hoc iuramento firmare est cuiusdam obstinationis et impugnationis gratiae Spiritus sancti, quae de tepidis et negligentibus facit fervidos et perfectos. Et ideo, quamvis illud sit licitum, istud tamen est illicitum.

*Ad quaestionem incidentem.* Ad illud quod quaeritur ulterius de eo qui iurat, se non recepturum praelationem; iam patet responsio per illud quod iam dictum est: quia iuramentum illud in casu obligat, videlicet cum vergit in damnum proprium et alienum: in casu vero non, videlicet cum non tantum est persona sibi utilis, verum etiam aliis. — Attamen si iuramentum praecesserit, non debet quis se auctoritate propria a vinculo eius absolvere, sed superioris voluntatem, mandatum et auctoritatem super hoc requirere[^20], cuius voluntati magis quam propriae debet in hoc casu obedire[^21].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether an incautious oath is binding.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether an incautious oath is binding. Now by an *incautious* oath I mean one that tends toward an evil outcome, or toward a less good outcome[^1]. And that an incautious oath which tends toward an evil outcome is binding, is proved:

1. *First*, by the example of Joshua, of whom Ambrose says in his book *On Duties*[^2]: « Joshua judged that the peace which he had given should not be revoked, because it had been confirmed by the religion of an oath, lest while he reproved another's treachery he should break his own faith »: therefore Joshua was bound to keep the oath which he had made; but that oath was incautious and tended toward an evil outcome, because it was against the precept of God, by which the Lord had commanded that he should not enter into a covenant with those nations[^3]: therefore it seems that such an oath is binding.

2. *Likewise*, Augustine[^4] says that a harlot who swears that she will keep faith with her seducer is worse if she does not keep faith than if she were to observe it; but that oath has an evil outcome, and yet it binds, otherwise she would not be worse in not observing than in observing: therefore an oath which simply tends toward an evil outcome is binding.

3. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to hold] concerning an oath that tends toward a less good outcome, as for one who swears that he will not enter religion[^5], because someone can bind himself by the bond of matrimony so that he does not enter religion, so that that matrimony is truly binding: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [to hold] also of the oath itself.

4. *Likewise*, it is lawful for someone to be unwilling to enter religion, and what is lawful to be unwilling [to do] it is lawful to confirm, and what is lawful to confirm it is lawful to swear; but a lawful oath is a binding oath: therefore it seems that when someone swears that he will not enter religion, he is bound by that oath. But such is an incautious oath, which tends toward a less good outcome: therefore it seems that that oath is binding.

**On the contrary:** 1. Bede says, and the Master adduces in the text[^6]: « If it should happen that we swear something rather incautiously, which when kept would tend toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is to be freely changed by a more wholesome counsel »: therefore according to this an incautious oath, which tends toward an evil outcome or a less good one, is not binding.

2. *Likewise*, Isidore[^7]: « A sacrament by which an evil is incautiously promised is not to be kept ». If you say that this authority is to be understood only when someone swears what is evil and unjust, but not when someone swears that he will not do a perfect good, to which he is not bound; against this it is objected: because no oath is just which assails the perfection of justice[^8]; but an oath by which someone swears that he will not enter religion nor undertake perfection is destructive of perfect justice: therefore [it is] also an iniquitous oath. But no such [oath] is binding: therefore it seems that no one is bound by an incautious oath which tends toward a less good outcome.

3. *Likewise*, no oath is discreet which is against the counsel of the Holy Spirit; but when someone swears that he will not enter religion, that oath is against the counsel of the Holy Spirit; but no such oath has judgment in its company, and no such [oath] is binding[^9]: therefore the same as before.

Connected with this it is asked, if someone swears that he will never accept a prelacy, whether he is bound by such an oath. And that he is, it seems: because it is lawful to flee a prelacy: therefore it is lawful that someone should swear not to accept it[^10]. On the contrary is the fact that the state of prelacy is of greater perfection than that of religion, as is commonly said, and the common usefulness is to be preferred to the private good.

> **Conclusion.** An incautious oath, which tends toward the detriment of salvation, or directly toward the impediment of perfection, is not binding.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that an oath happens to be incautious in many ways: in the first way, when something is sworn which simply tends toward the detriment of salvation, as when someone swears that he will do something which cannot be carried out without mortal sin. In the second way an oath is said to be incautious when someone swears something which tends toward the loss of his salvation and the impediment of perfection, as for instance when someone swears that he will never enter religion. In the third way an oath is said to be incautious when someone swears something *in every event*, which, in one contingency, tends toward the loss of salvation, and in another contingency, tends toward the advancement of salvation; as when someone swears that he will never accept a prelacy, which indeed is to the loss of salvation, if he is useful and is canonically elected and it is enjoined upon him by a superior; but then it tends toward the advancement of salvation, if he is a person useless to himself and to others for being promoted to that state.

If therefore we speak of an oath[^11] in the *first* way, then without doubt it is neither lawful nor binding, indeed whoever keeps it commits sin. — But if we speak of an incautious oath in the *second* way, then it is neither lawful nor binding, although to keep it is not a sin, because it is not a sin not to enter religion; yet it is a grave sin to swear that one will never ascend to a grade of perfection, because in this he in a certain way assails the perfection of justice itself and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit[^12]. — But if we speak of an oath in the *third* way, then, in one contingency, it is to be observed, namely when it tends toward the advancement of salvation; but in the other contingency, it is unlawful and not to be observed, namely when it tends toward the detriment of salvation. — And by this the response to the proposed question is clear. For it must be granted that an incautious oath, which tends toward the detriment of salvation,

or which directly tends toward the impediment of perfection, is not binding, as the reasons brought in for this side show[^13].

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected on the contrary concerning Joshua, it must be said that that oath, when kept, did not tend toward an evil outcome, but rather toward good. For there was a threefold reason why the Gibeonites were spared and not slain. One, namely, *literal*, because it was better that they should be condemned to perpetual servitude than punished with death, especially since they were ready to serve and to undergo death, as appears from the text itself[^14]. — But another reason is *moral*, because in this it is signified that however much God may threaten someone and be indignant in the present life, yet if he turns back to Him with his whole heart, He does not close the bowels of mercy. — But the third reason is *figural*, because in this it is signified that there are always two peoples in us, just as there were two in the land of promise, namely of the Amorites and of the children of Israel, that is, of rational and of brutish motions; according to what Bernard says[^15]: « However much you labor, it is necessary that the Jebusite dwell within your borders ». — Whence for many reasons the keeping of that oath did not tend toward an evil outcome, but rather toward good. — And as to what is objected concerning the command of the Lord, that the Lord had commanded that he should not enter into a covenant with them[^16]; it must be said that this is to be understood with respect to those who were incorrigible.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the harlot, who swears to cleave faithfully to her seducer; it must be said that in the oath there are two things to consider: one, that the harlot swears that she will consent to a wicked act with her seducer; the other, that she swears that she[^17] will not give herself to another. And the first indeed is unlawful, and to this she is not bound; but the second indeed is lawful, and as to this she is bound. And therefore Augustine says that she is worse by not keeping than if she kept the oath. In this same way it is to be understood, if some robber were to swear to another that he would divide the spoil with him, and afterward retained the whole.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning him who swears that he will never enter religion, that he can lawfully swear, just as he can lawfully contract matrimony; it must be said that the case is not alike on either side, for a twofold reason. The first is, because matrimony does not only state a privation of good, but rather states[^18] a positing of good; whereas an oath by which someone swears that he will never enter religion is, of its principal intention, depriving of and impeditive of the perfect good; therefore it is not to be judged binding, but rather unlawful and iniquitous. — There is also another reason, because he who contracts matrimony, whether by the consent of his wife, or by death, can sometimes undertake perfection. But he who swears that he will never enter religion, so far as is in him, renders himself perpetually unfit.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is lawful to be unwilling to enter religion, therefore also to confirm it by an oath[^19]; it must be said that it does not follow: because to be unwilling to enter religion is [a matter] of imperfection, but to confirm this by an oath is [a matter] of a certain obstinacy and of an assailing of the grace of the Holy Spirit, which makes the lukewarm and negligent fervent and perfect. And therefore, although that [former] is lawful, this [latter] nevertheless is unlawful.

*To the incidental question.* To that which is further asked concerning him who swears that he will not accept a prelacy; the response is now clear from what has already been said: because that oath binds in [one] case, namely when it tends toward one's own harm and another's: but in [another] case it does not, namely when the person is useful not only to himself, but also to others. — Nevertheless, if the oath has gone before, one ought not to absolve himself from its bond by his own authority, but to require for this the will, command, and authority of a superior[^20], to whose will rather than his own he ought in this case to be obedient[^21].

---

la: P. 878, not. 7. Vide infra in fundam. I. verba Bedae.

en: P. 878, note 7. See below, in fundamentum I, the words of Bede.

la: P. 878, not. 8. Libr. III. c. 10. n. 69: *Iesus tamen pacem* etc. Cfr. Iosue 9, 15. seqq.

en: P. 878, note 8. [Ambrose,] bk. III, c. 10, n. 69: *Jesus [= Joshua] nevertheless [judged] the peace* etc. Cf. Joshua 9, 15 ff.

la: P. 878, not. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 666, nota 6.

en: P. 878, note 9. Cf. above, p. 666, note 6.

la: P. 878, not. 10. *De Bono coniugali*, c. 4. n. 4, sententialiter. Allegatur etiam a Gratiano, C. *Mulier si*, c. 22. q. 4. — Inferius pro *leccatori* Vat. hic et in solutione *tocatori*. Immediate post codd. B D F G L O T V aa, verbis male transpositis, *peior est, si servat fidem, quam si non observaret*.

en: P. 878, note 10. *On the Good of Marriage*, c. 4, n. 4, in substance. It is cited also by Gratian, C. *Mulier si*, c. 22, q. 4. — Below, for *leccatori* (her seducer) the Vatican edition reads here and in the solution *tocatori*. Immediately after, codices B D F G L O T V aa, with the words badly transposed, [read] *she is worse if she keeps faith than if she did not observe it*.

la: P. 879, not. 1. Cfr. Gratian., C. *Innocens credit*, c. 22. q. 4. § 6.

en: P. 879, note 1. Cf. Gratian, C. *Innocens credit*, c. 22, q. 4, § 6.

la: P. 879, not. 3. Libr. II. Sent. c. 31. n. 9; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 9. — Cum textu originali et codd. A F H K L T V ac bb substituimus *sacramentum* pro *iuramentum*.

en: P. 879, note 3. [Isidore,] bk. II *Sentences*, c. 31, n. 9; cf. here the text of the Master, c. 9. — With the original text and codices A F H K L T V and bb, we have substituted *sacramentum* (sacrament) for *iuramentum* (oath).

la: P. 879, not. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 875, nota 2. — Codd. A H aa *perfectioni*. In fine arg. post *incautum* cod. Z addit *et indiscretum*.

en: P. 879, note 4. Cf. above, p. 875, note 2. — Codices A H aa [read] *perfectioni*. At the end of the argument, after *incautum* codex Z adds *et indiscretum*.

la: P. 879, not. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 875, nota 2. — Superius pro *discretum* cod. O *obligatorium*.

en: P. 879, note 5. Cf. above, p. 875, note 2. — Above, for *discretum* codex O reads *obligatorium*.

la: P. 879, not. 6. Cfr. C. *Archidiaconum Florentinum*, dist. 85, ubi Gregorius iubet inquiri, num ille qui episcopus fuerat electus, « tactis sacrosanctis Evangeliis (sicut nobis nuntiatum est), iusiurandum praebuerit, nunquam se ad episcopatum accedere ». — Inferius post *praeferenda est* (cfr. supra pag. 652, nota 4.) codd. F G L T V W aa addunt *tamen*.

en: P. 879, note 6. Cf. C. *Archidiaconum Florentinum*, dist. 85, where Gregory orders inquiry to be made whether that man who had been elected bishop « had given an oath, with the holy Gospels touched (as has been reported to us), that he would never come to the episcopate ». — Below, after *praeferenda est* (cf. above, p. 652, note 4) codices F G L T V W aa add *tamen*.

la: P. 879, not. 7. In edd. additur *incauto*.

en: P. 879, note 7. In the editions *incauto* (incautious) is added.

la: P. 879, not. 8. Cod. A *repugnat ipsius iustitiae perfectioni et Spiritus S. inspirationi*.

en: P. 879, note 8. Codex A [reads] *it is repugnant to the perfection of justice itself and to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit*.

la: P. 880, not. 1. Cfr. Gratian., C. *Innocens credit*, c. 22. q. 4. § 4. seqq. — Superius pro *Et per hoc* cod. K *Et sic*.

en: P. 880, note 1. Cf. Gratian, C. *Innocens credit*, c. 22, q. 4, § 4 ff. — Above, for *Et per hoc* codex K reads *Et sic*.

la: P. 880, not. 2. Iosue 9, 21. seqq. — Ambros., III. de Offic. c. 10. n. 69: *Mulctavit tamen eos viliori obsequio ministerii. Clementior sententia, sed diuturnior; manet etiam officiis poena veteris astutiae, hereditario in hunc diem ministerio deputata.* Cfr. Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum, quae continet expositionem Origenis, August. (q. 12. et 13.) et Isidor. (c. 11.) in hunc locum. Pro *servire et mortem sustinere* edd. *servire magis quam mortem sustinere*.

en: P. 880, note 2. Joshua 9, 21 ff. — Ambrose, III *On Duties*, c. 10, n. 69: *He punished them, however, with the baser service of ministry. A milder sentence, but more lasting; the penalty of the old cunning remains also in [their] offices, assigned by inheritance to this day as a ministry.* Cf. the *Glossa ordinaria* in Strabo and Lyra, which contains the exposition of Origen, Augustine (qq. 12 and 13), and Isidore (c. 11) on this passage. For *to serve and to undergo death* the editions read *to serve rather than to undergo death*.

la: P. 880, not. 3. Serm. in Cantic., serm. 58. n. 10: *Velis, nolis, intra fines tuos habitat Iebusaeus* (Iudic. 1, 21.); *subiugari potest, sed non exterminari.* — Aliquanto superius pro *significatur* codd. A U *figuratur*.

en: P. 880, note 3. *Sermons on the Song of Songs*, serm. 58, n. 10: *Like it or not, the Jebusite dwells within your borders* (Judg. 1, 21); *he can be subjugated, but not exterminated.* — Somewhat above, for *significatur* codices A U read *figuratur*.

la: P. 880, not. 4. Ita plures codd. cum edd., in aliis *inirent*, cod. A *iniretur*, cod. N *haberent*.

en: P. 880, note 4. So most codices with the editions; in others *inirent*, codex A *iniretur*, codex N *haberent*.

la: P. 880, not. 5. Edd. addunt *fidem*. In fine solut. pro *se praedam* cod. K *se praedandum et*, plures alii codd. incongrue *se praedandum*.

en: P. 880, note 5. The editions add *fidem* (faith). At the end of the solution, for *se praedam* codex K [reads] *se praedandum et*, several other codices incongruously *se praedandum*.

la: P. 880, not. 6. Permulti codd. et edd. 1, 2 *dicit*. Pro *quin* cod. K *quia*.

en: P. 880, note 6. Very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *dicit*. For *quin* codex K reads *quia*.

la: P. 880, not. 7. Cod. K *confirmare*.

en: P. 880, note 7. Codex K [reads] *confirmare*.

la: P. 880, not. 8. Cod. A *inquirere*.

en: P. 880, note 8. Codex A [reads] *inquirere*.

la: P. 880, not. 9. Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.

en: P. 880, note 9. See the scholion to question 1 of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands of printed pp.878–880 (PDF 900–902), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 60925–61079. Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied throughout (Respondeo three-modes division and the Solutio replies were cascade-fragmented in the OCR; the PDF bands are authoritative there).

**Alignment.** VERIFIED — body opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum iuramentum incautum sit obligatorium* = the THIRD of ARTICULUS III's three questions (1. dolosum / 2. coactum / 3. incautum). CLOSES ARTICULUS III *De obligatione iuramenti* and the question-body of d.39 (only the littera-dubia follow).

**Page span:** opens lower on **p.878** (QUAESTIO III beneath a3-q2's Solutio tail, raw 60925), runs full **p.879** (running head "879 — DIST. XXXIX. ART. III. QUAEST. III."), closes on **p.880** (running head "880 — SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.") at *…debet in hoc casu obedire⁹*, immediately before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Apparatus — 21 markers, continuous integer numbering. CORRECTED in the d.31–d.40 Pass-3b boundary sweep (2026-06-14, 450 dpi p.878/879 bands eyes-on):**
- **p.878 nn.7–10 → [^1]–[^4]** (QUAESTIO III's body sits on the LOWER half of p.878, L-col bottom + R-col, beneath a3-q2; p.878's footer column runs as a SINGLE continuous band nn.1–10, with nn.1–6 keyed to a3-q2's body (its Respondeo opinio-2 + Solutio Ad 1–4, higher on the page) and nn.7–10 keyed to q3's body — n.7 *Vide infra in fundam. I verba Bedae* (→ q3 *minus bonum*), n.8 Ambrose *de Officiis* libr. III (→ *de Officiis*), n.9 *Cfr. supra pag. 666 nota 6* (→ *foedus iniret*), n.10 *De Bono coniugali* (→ *Augustinus*/meretrix)).
- **p.879 nn.1–8 → [^5]–[^12]** (q3's *Sed contra* 1–3 + incidens + Respondeo): n.1 Gratian *Innocens credit*, n.2 *Hic c. 9* (Bede/Magister in littera), n.3 *Libr. II Sent. c.31* + *sacramentum pro iuramentum* (Isidore), n.4 / n.5 the *supra pag. 875 nota 2* variant pair (perfectionem / discretum), n.6 *Archidiaconum Florentinum* dist. 85 (Gregory, prelacy oath), n.7 *incauto* edition-variant, n.8 Cod. A *repugnat*.
- **p.880 nn.1–9 → [^13]–[^21]** (the full Solutio: ad-1 Iosue/Gabaonitae triplex-ratio, ad-2 meretrix, ad-3 matrimony, ad-4 religion, ad-quaestionem-incidentem; [^21] = *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* redirect).

Marker pairing: 21 defs / 21 body anchors in each language.

**★ Pass-3b CORRECTION (2026-06-14).** The previous apparatus had two seam defects, both now fixed: (1) **DOUBLE-COUNT** — defs [^1]–[^6] had wrongly held p.878 nn.1–6 (*Cfr. quaest. praec.*, II Sent. d.25, IV Sent. d.38, Matth 10,28, Eph 5, Dist.29-redirect), which are **a3-q2's** footers (already its [^10]–[^15]); q3's body markers on p.878 ([^1]–[^4]) had thus been mis-glossed with q2's notes. (2) **DROPPED FOOTERS** — p.879 nn.1–6 had been omitted ("folded" away in a prior note), although q3's p.879 body carries 8 markers keyed to all 8 of p.879's footers. The 450 dpi p.878 L-2/R-2 and p.879 L-2/R-2 bands confirm: p.878 footer column = continuous nn.1–10 (q2 owns 1–6, q3 owns 7–10); p.879 = nn.1–8, all q3's. Apparatus re-keyed so [^1]–[^4]=p.878 nn.7–10, [^5]–[^12]=p.879 nn.1–8, [^13]–[^21]=p.880 nn.1–9 (unchanged). 21/21 paired. The "renumbered 2026-06-14 from a per-page suffix scheme" claim in an earlier note version was incidental; the substantive fix is the q2/q3 footer-attribution split. See `manual-review/vol3-d31-d40-polish-resolution-log.md`.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- PICKED UP ← a3-q2: NOTHING. q3 opens its share of p.878's footer column at n.7 (its own *minus bonum*/Bede marker); a3-q2 correctly owns p.878 nn.1–6 ([^10]–[^15]). No footer is shared between the two chunks.
- d39-a3-q3 → d39-dubia: NOTHING forwarded. q3 closes at p.880 n.9 ([^21]). The DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI opens lower on p.880 and starts a fresh footer band (p.880 dubia footer = the Dub. I notes).

**Scholion:** `has_scholion: false`. Grep-verified NO SCHOLI/SOHOLI/SCHOLION/SCHOLIOK header inside raw 60926–61079, and none in the p.878–880 PDF bands. The incautum question was prospectively surveyed in a3-q1's article-master scholion (§IV); [^6] and [^21] both redirect there.

**[?] flags:** NONE — pp.878–880 fully legible at 450 dpi.