title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 808 -->

### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter intentionem.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter. Et quod praeter intentionem, videtur:

1. Primo per Dionysium in quarto de Divinis Nominibus[^1]: « Malum est praeter intentionem, naturam, et causam »; si *praeter intentionem*, habeo propositum.

2. Item, Dionysius[^2]: « Nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens »; sed qui operatur aliquid per intentionem, ad illud aspicit, quod intendit — nam intentio est quidam mentis intuitus — si ergo nullus operans ad malum aspicit, videtur, quod nullus malum intendit.

3. Item, *malum* dicit deordinationem ad finem[^3]; sed *intentio* dicit voluntatem ad finem directam: ergo malum non cadit sub intentione: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne malum, quod est in natura, est praeter intentionem naturae[^4]: ergo pari ratione omne malum, quod est in moribus, est praeter intentionem voluntatis rationalis.

5. Item, « bonum et finis idem »[^5]; sed intentio est respectu finis: ergo respectu boni: ergo non videtur, quod sit respectu mali: ergo nullo modo malum ab operante per voluntatem intenditur; redit igitur idem, quod prius.

**Sed contra:**

1. Voluntas rationalis est agens per intentionem et deliberationem: ergo si omne malum culpae actualis est voluntarium, omne est per intentionem factum.

2. Item, nullus peccat nisi habens usum rationis; et omnis talis est operans per intentionem: ergo peccatum, ut peccatum est, habet esse per intentionem.

3. Item, quod fit ab agente voluntario praeter intentionem, fit a casu et fortuna[^6]; sed malum culpae non est a casu et fortuna: ergo non est ab agente praeter intentionem.

4. Item, nullus iudicatur malus a facto, sed ab intentione — haec enim est quae « nomen imponit operi »[^7] — sed ab eo res proprie et principaliter procedit, a quo recipit complementum et denominationem: ergo etc.

5. Item, qui peccat ex malitia peccat ex certa scientia, et nullus agens aliquid ex certa scientia et

<!-- page 809 -->

malitia agit illud praeter intentionem: ergo si contingit sic malum facere, utpote cum peccatur peccato in Spiritum sanctum; videtur etc.

### Conclusio.

> Malum, sumtum pro eo quod est malum, potest intendi simpliciter; malum vero sub ratione mali non potest intendi, nisi quis id intendat saltem ut simul bonum sibi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de malo est loqui dupliciter: aut de eo quod est malum, aut de malo sub ratione mali. — Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum fiat per intentionem, vel praeter: dicendum, quod si intentio comparetur ad id quod est malum, sic bene contingit malum intendere, et tanquam *finem* et tanquam *id quod est ad finem*: tanquam *finem*, sicut aliquis intendit finaliter luxuriari, vel vane gloriari; tanquam *id quod est ad finem*, sicut facere furtum intendit, ut inde possit vivere voluptuose, et intendit mentiri, ut possit falso laudari.

Si vero intentio comparetur ad malum sub ratione mali, potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod intendat hoc facere tanquam malum simpliciter et malum sibi; et hoc modo nullus intendit, quia nihil appetitur a voluntate nisi sub ratione boni simpliciter vel boni sibi. Aut ita, quod intendat hoc tanquam malum simpliciter, verumtamen ut bonum sibi; et sic malum potest fieri per intentionem et fit aliquando, licet non ab omnibus, sed a malitiosis, quibus propter corruptionem palati interioris, mala sapiunt ut bona. — Quoniam igitur id quod est malum, cadit sub intentione, et aliqua sunt, quae habent malitiam coniunctam inseparabiliter; et qui intendit aliquid, per consequens iudicatur intendere quod est illi unitum inseparabiliter: hinc est, quod malum iudicatur et punitur ut factum per intentionem.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem, ad quam respondendum est non simpliciter, sed *distinguendo*. Patet etiam responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas. — Nam primae rationes procedunt de malo sub *ratione mali*. Nam intentio, quidquid principaliter considerat, induit ipsum ratione boni et appetibilis. — Illa tamen ratio de simili in natura non valet, quia natura est agens determinatum, unde « semper *intendit* quod melius est », *operatur* autem secundum leges sibi inditas a Deo. Unde si quid fit ibi malum, hoc est praeter intentionem; non sic autem est de voluntate deliberativa; ipsa enim non semper desiderat quod melius est.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Ad rationes ad oppositum patet responsio. Loquuntur enim de malo secundum *id quod est*; et sic bene intenditur ab agente per voluntatem, verumtamen vel in quantum consideratur ut habens intentionem boni *simpliciter*, vel boni *ut nunc* sive boni ipsi facienti, sicut est in illis, qui *laetantur, cum malefecerint*. Et sic procedunt omnes illae rationes.

---

english:
### QUESTION III.
### *Whether evil is from the good according to intention, or beside intention.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether evil is from the good according to intention, or beside it. And that it is beside intention, it seems:

1. First, through Dionysius in the fourth [chapter] *On the Divine Names*[^1]: « Evil is beside intention, nature, and cause »; if [it is] *beside intention*, I have my proposition.

2. Likewise, Dionysius[^2]: « No one works while looking toward evil »; but he who works something through intention looks toward that which he intends — for intention is a certain gaze of the mind — if therefore no one working toward evil looks [at it], it seems that no one intends evil.

3. Likewise, *evil* states a disordering with respect to the end[^3]; but *intention* states the will directed toward the end: therefore evil does not fall under intention: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every evil which is in nature is beside the intention of nature[^4]: therefore by parity of reasoning every evil which is in morals is beside the intention of the rational will.

5. Likewise, « the good and the end are the same »[^5]; but intention is with respect to the end: therefore with respect to the good: therefore it does not seem [to be] with respect to evil: therefore in no way is evil intended by the one operating through the will; therefore the same returns as before.

**On the contrary:**

1. The rational will is an agent through intention and deliberation: therefore if every evil of actual guilt is voluntary, every [such evil] is done through intention.

2. Likewise, no one sins unless having the use of reason; and everyone of this sort is one operating through intention: therefore sin, as it is sin, has being through intention.

3. Likewise, that which is done by a voluntary agent beside intention is done by chance and fortune[^6]; but the evil of guilt is not from chance and fortune: therefore it is not from the agent beside intention.

4. Likewise, no one is judged evil from the deed, but from the intention — for this is what « imposes the name on the work »[^7] — but a thing properly and principally proceeds from that from which it receives its completion and denomination: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, he who sins from malice sins from certain knowledge, and no one doing something from certain knowledge and

<!-- page 809 -->

malice does it beside intention: therefore if it happens that evil is so done, as when one sins by the sin against the Holy Spirit; it seems etc.

### Conclusion.

> Evil, taken for that which is evil, can be intended absolutely; but evil under the character of evil cannot be intended, unless one intend it at least as at the same time a good for oneself.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of evil: either of that which is evil, or of evil under the character of evil. — When therefore it is asked whether it comes about through intention, or beside it: it must be said that if intention is compared to that which is evil, then it can well happen that evil is intended, both as an *end* and as *that which is toward the end*: as an *end*, as someone intends finally to be lustful, or vainly to glory; as *that which is toward the end*, as he intends to commit theft, so that thereby he may live voluptuously, and he intends to lie, so that he may be falsely praised.

But if intention is compared to evil under the character of evil, it can be in two ways: either so that he intend to do this as evil absolutely and evil for himself; and in this manner no one intends [it], because nothing is desired by the will except under the character of good absolutely or good for oneself. Or so that he intend this as evil absolutely, yet as a good for himself; and thus evil can be done through intention, and is done sometimes, though not by all, but by the malicious, to whom, on account of the corruption of the interior palate, evils taste like goods. — Since therefore that which is evil falls under intention, and there are some [evils] which have malice joined inseparably [to them]; and he who intends something is consequently judged to intend that which is united inseparably to it: hence it is that evil is judged and punished as something done through intention.

From these things the response to the question is plain, to which one must respond not absolutely, but by *distinguishing*. The response to the reasons adduced on both sides is also plain. — For the first reasons proceed of evil under the *character of evil*. For intention, whatever it principally considers, clothes it with the character of good and of the appetible. — Yet that reason about the likeness in nature does not hold, because nature is a determinate agent, whence it « always *intends* what is better », but it *operates* according to the laws implanted in it by God. Whence if any evil comes about there, this is beside intention; but it is not so with the deliberative will; for it does not always desire what is better.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. To the reasons to the opposite the response is plain. For they speak of evil according to *that which it is*; and thus it is well intended by the agent through the will, yet either insofar as it is considered as having the intention of good *absolutely*, or of good *as of now* or of good for the one doing it, as is the case in those who *rejoice when they have done evil*. And thus all those reasons proceed.

---

la: Paragr. 32. Vide supra pag. 806, nota 1.

en: Paragraph 32. See above p. 806, note 1.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. et 31. Cfr. Aristot., II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7. (c. 6.). — Quae quaestione praecedente proferuntur de intentione, accurate exponuntur infra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 19. and 31. Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Magna Moralia* c. 7. (c. 6.). — The things which are brought forward in the preceding question concerning intention are accurately expounded below d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 6.

la: Vide Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 4, ubi dicitur: *Monstrosum est enim res praeter naturam.* Cfr. II. Phys. text. 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).

en: See Aristotle, IV. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 4, where it is said: *For a monstrous thing is a thing beside nature.* Cfr. II. *Physics* text 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).

la: Aristot., II. Phys. text. 31. (c. 3.); III. et V. Metaph. text. 3. (II. et IV. c. 2.); I. Ethic. c. 1; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. seq. (c. 1. seq.).

en: Aristotle, II. *Physics* text 31. (c. 3.); III. and V. *Metaphysics* text 3. (II. and IV. c. 2.); I. *Ethics* c. 1; I. *Magna Moralia* c. 2. seq. (c. 1. seq.).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Physics* text 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).

la: Haec sententia est Ambrosii, I. de Offic. minist. c. 30. n. 147.

en: This opinion is from Ambrose, I. *On the Duties of Ministers* c. 30. n. 147.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 56274–56357), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, conclusion-block, Ad-argumenta replies, and the p.808 footer block verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 808–809, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 830–831). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Alignment check (coordinator-verified, held).** q3 opener `Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter` matches topic (3) `secundum intentionem, vel praeter intentionem` exactly — no auto-chunker q-swap. This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO III only. It ENDS at raw 56357, immediately before the `ARTICULUS II.` header (raw 56358, *De malo in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo est.*) — everything from 56358 onward (the ARTICULUS II opener + QUAESTIO I at raw 56368) is d34-a2-q1.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 808–809.
- p. 808 (right column): QUAESTIO III header + opener + *Fundamenta* 1–5 (left column) and *Sed contra* 1–5 begin. The whole p.808 footer block (notes 1–7) physically sits under a1-q2's text but anchors in this q3's args; received as a hand-off from a1-q2. Markers per OCR position: [^1] *Nominibus* (Div. Nom. / Paragr. 32 → p.806 n.1), [^2] *Dionysius* (Div. Nom. c.4 §19, 31), [^3] *deordinationem ad finem* (Ethic. c.6), [^4] *praeter intentionem naturae* (de Generat. animal. — *Monstrosum est*), [^5] *bonum et finis idem* (Phys. text.31 etc.), [^6] *a casu et fortuna* (Phys. text.49), [^7] *nomen imponit operi* (Ambrosius, de Offic. minist.).
- p. 809 (running head OCR-garbled `DIST. XXXIV. ART. II. QUAEST. 1.` — trust content + offset, not the digit; the page is still a1-q3): *Sed contra* 5 tail + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (both modes + corollarium) + the *Ad rationes* replies. **No footers belong to this q3 on p.809** — the p.809 footer block (notes 1–5: *Vide infra d.43 per totam*; *Supple cum cod. bb aliquis*; *Codd. F aa bb...hoc...malum*; *Vide Aristot. III. Ethic. c.4 et VIII. c.2*; *Secundum Aristot.*) all anchor in QUAESTIO I of ARTICULUS II and are forwarded to d34-a2-q1.

**Hand-off received.** From d34-a1-q2: the seven p.808 footers (Dionysius de Div. Nom.; malum praeter intentionem; deordinatio ad finem / Ethic. c.6; monstrosum est res praeter naturam; bonum et finis idem; a casu et fortuna; nomen imponit operi = Ambrosius), anchored in this q3's *Fundamenta* 1–5 and *Sed contra* 3–4, rendered as continuous [^1]–[^7].

**Hand-off forwarded to d34-a2-q1.** The `ARTICULUS II.` header (raw 56358, *De malo in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo est.*), its short opener (`Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali... Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.` with the three-question listing — folded into a2-q1 per Override §5), the `QUAESTIO I.` header (raw 56368, *Utrum aliquid sit ita malum, quod nihil habeat de bono*, body `Circa primum sic proceditur... Et quod sic, videtur`), and the entire p.809 footer block (notes 1–5) are forwarded to a2-q1. This q3 claims no footer on p.809.

**Scholion disposition.** NONE here. `has_scholion: false`. q3 has no standalone scholion in the raw range (after the Respondeo it goes directly to ARTICULUS II). Per Override §5 this is expected and legitimate — q3's matter is covered by a1-q1 schol. I/II + a1-q2 schol. II.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of pp. 808–809 read top→bottom. The p.808/809 seam falls inside *Sed contra* 5 (`...ex certa scientia et` | `malitia agit illud praeter intentionem`) — grammatically continuous. The Respondeo first/second-mode transition and the corollarium → *Ex his patet* transition each parse cleanly. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.808 footer block is fully accounted for in this q3 (1–7); the p.809 footer block belongs wholly to a2-q1.

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 809 -->

### ARTICULUS II.
### *De malo in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo est.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, scilicet de malo in comparatione ad illud, in quo est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est, utrum contingat reperire malum sequestratum ab omni bono.

Secundum est, utrum malum habeat esse in bono sibi opposito.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit in eo, in quo est, tanquam aliquis habitus, aut pura privatio.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum aliquid sit ita malum, quod nihil habeat de bono.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum aliquod malum sit ab omni bono sequestratum[^1][^2][^3], et hoc est quaerere, utrum aliquid sit ita malum[^4], quod nihil habeat de bono[^5], sed sit malum in summo. Et quod sic, videtur[^6].

1. « In his quae per se dicuntur, si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad magis, et maxime ad maxime » per considerationem Philosophi[^7]; sed haec est vera per se: bono opponitur malum: ergo magis bono magis malum, et maxime bono maxime

<!-- page 810 -->

malum: si ergo contingit reperire summe bonum, ergo et summe malum. Nam « si unum oppositorum ponitur in natura, per consequens ponitur et reliquum ».

2. Item, magis et minus dicitur per accessum ad terminum: ergo ubi est reperire *magis* et *minus*, contingit reperire *summum*[^8]; sed in malo contingit reperire *magis* et *minus*: ergo etc.

3. Item, aut est status in malis, aut non — constat, quod necesse est statum ponere; nam ille ponitur in omni eo quod actu est[^9] — sed status non est citra summum: ergo necesse est ponere summe malum. Sed hoc est quod nihil habet de bono: ergo etc.

4. Item, « omne *per accidens* reducitur ad *per se*[^10] »: ergo si est ponere malum *per accidens*, est ponere malum *per se*; sed illud *per se* inest alicui, quod habet ortum ex propriis principiis illius: si ergo aliquid est malum *per se*, videtur, quod eius principia sint mala; et si principia eius sunt mala, totum est malum; et si totum est malum, nihil est ibi de bono: ergo a primo, si est ponere malum *per accidens*, est ponere aliquid, quod sit *simpliciter* et *totaliter* malum. Constat autem, quod primum est ponere: ergo et alterum.

5. Item, omne dictum *per participationem* reducibile est ad dictum *per essentiam*: cum ergo dicitur aliquid esse malum, aut dicitur *per participationem*, aut *per essentiam*. Si *per essentiam*; sed bonum *per essentiam* est summe bonum, quod nihil habet de malo: ergo similiter erit aliquid ita malum, quod nihil habebit de bono. Si dicitur *per participationem*; et[^11] omne tale reducitur ad dictum *per essentiam*: ergo redit necessario, quod aliquid sit malum essentialiter: et ita idem quod prius.

6. Item, « in quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, quo mensurantur omnia, quae sunt illius generis ». Hoc planum est et patet per Philosophum, qui hanc proponit in decimo primae Philosophiae[^12]; hoc etiam patet *inducendo*. Ergo in genere malorum est reperire aliquod unum, quod sit mensura omnium malorum; sed illud non potest esse nisi summum inter omnia mala: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Si est ponere summum malum, quod nihil habeat de bono; et esse aliquod bonum est: tunc est ponere, summe malum esse, et tamen non habere esse. Sed haec sunt duo incompossibilia[^13]: ergo etc.

2. Item, « omnis potentia, ut dicit Philosophus, est de genere bonorum », ergo si aliquid est summe malum, illud omnino nihil potest; sed summum in omni genere plus potest, quam illud quod est citra summum: si ergo illud quod non est summe malum, aliquid potest, illud quod est summe malum, multa potest: ergo eo ipso, quod est summum, *multa* potest et *nihil* potest. Sed haec duo sunt incompossibilia: ergo etc.

3. Item, « omnis scientia de genere bonorum est », non tantum scientia boni, verum etiam scientia mali; scire enim malum bonum est. Si ergo aliquid est summe malum, caret notitia boni et mali: ergo nec scit facere malum nec laedere; sed hoc ipso, quod malum est, scit laedere bonum: ergo hoc ipso, quod summe malum est, scit et nescit bona et mala. Sed ista sunt incompossibilia: ergo etc.

4. Item, si aliquid est summe malum, est malum *per essentiam* et necessario[^14]; sed si malum est *per essentiam* et naturam, naturale est ei facere malum. Sed unumquodque, dum facit quod est sibi naturale, *bene* facit; et quod bene facit est bonum: ergo si aliquid est summe malum, ipsum est bonum, et dum male facit, bene facit. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

5. Item, si aliquid est summe malum, illud est vilissimum; quanto enim aliquid magis malum est, tanto vilius est[^15]; et si vilissimum inter mala, ergo inter illa est infimum. Sed quod est infimum inter mala non est summum caput malorum: ergo quod est summe malum non est summe malum. Si dicas, quod non sequitur: est vilissimum, ergo non est summe malum, quia hoc est esse summe malum, quod infimum est respectu bonorum; obiicitur, quia si aliquid ponitur summe malum, non debet poni *super* alia, sed *infra* secundum rectum ordinem: ergo non est *deus* tenebrarum, sed *servus*; quod est contra errorem istum[^16].

6. Item, si est summe malum, ergo illud erit ita omnipotens in malo, sicut summe bonum in bono: ergo omne malum subiacet eius potentiae; sed cuiuscumque boni corruptio est malum: ergo cuiuslibet boni corruptio subiacet potentiae summe mali: ergo si summe malum est, potest corrumpere omne

<!-- page 811 -->

bonum. Sed bonum, quod potest corrumpi, non est summum: ergo si est ponere summe malum, nihil est summe bonum; et si non est summe bonum, nihil est bonum[^17]: ergo a primo, si est ponere summe malum, nihil est bonum. Quodsi hoc est omnino falsum et impium, patet etc.

### Conclusio.

> Et fides et ratio dictat, nihil esse ita malum, quin habeat aliquid de bono.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ponere, malum aliquod esse, quod nihil habeat de bono, non solum est perversitatis haereticae, sed etiam manifestae caecitatis et stultitiae. Sicut enim in opponendo monstratum est, ipsa positio implicat in se opposita. Implicat enim, quod illud, scilicet summe malum, *sit* et *non sit*; quod idem *possit* et *non possit*; et quod idem *sciat* et *nesciat*. Et dum implicat in se opposita, destruit se ipsam. Nam in ponendo, summe malum esse, quod nihil de bono habeat, ponit, quod illud non sit summum; ponit, quod non sit malum; ponit etiam, quod nullum bonum habeat oppositum. Et haec omnia in opponendo monstrata sunt, quae manifeste convincunt, errorem istum esse fatuum et caecum; et auctorem sive inventorem suum ostendunt fuisse excaecatum et impium. Nunquam enim in tantam tenebrositatem detrusus esset impius Manichaeus, nisi longe ante fuisset servus dei tenebrarum, qui excaecavit mentem eius, ut non fulgeret in eo *illuminatio veritatis*, quae super omnem irradiat intellectum[^18]. Et usque hodie viget hic error pessimus, quamvis sit irrationabilissimus. Et huius ratio est potissima ipsa mater caecitatis *superbia*, quae regnat in quibusdam laicis quantum ad ea quae sunt fidei et morum. Cum enim sint idiotae, praesumunt sacram Scripturam exponere, quae est profundissima omnium scripturarum; cum iterum habeant quandam honestatem exteriorem, contemnunt vitam omnium aliorum; et merito huius duplicis superbiae excaecantur, ut incidant in errorem istum pessimum, per quem excaecantur adeo, ut nesciant discernere, quid bonum et quid malum, dum multa genera bonorum ponunt esse a deo malo. Quos Isaias praemonstrat quinto capitulo[^19]: *Vae! qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum, ponentes lucem tenebras et tenebras lucem.* Et propter nimiam excaecationem, in qua sunt, amisso quasi rationis usu, nullam habent in eis efficaciam argumenta ad persuadendum, nec tormenta ad retrahendum, nec orationum suffragia ad relevandum, nisi hoc fiat de gratia specialissima. — Hanc positionem haereticam, immo stultissimam et blasphemam, repudiando dicamus, sicut dicit fides catholica et ratio recta, nihil esse ita malum, quin habeat aliquid de bono.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod *summum* in aliquo genere dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo dicitur *summum*, quo nihil potest esse *maius*; et hoc modo non contingit reperire neque ponere summe malum; nihil enim est adeo malum, quin posset esse peius, pro eo quod aliquid habet de bono, quo posset magis privari, et ita adhuc peius esset. Et pro tanto dicit Dionysius[^20], quod « malum est infinitum ». Alio modo dicitur *summum*, quo nihil est *maius secundum actum*, sed ipsum excedit inter omnia alia; et sic contingit reperire summum in malis. Nam lucifer, qui est *rex super omnes filios superbiae*[^21], pessimus est super omnes. — His visis, facile est respondere ad obiecta.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de oppositione mali, dicendum, quod consideratio intelligitur ita, quod terminus eodem modo accipiatur, cum dicitur *simpliciter*, et cum dicitur *cum excessu*; non sic autem est in proposito. Nam cum dicitur, quod bonum opponitur malo, accipitur hic bonum *per participationem*; cum vero infertur de summo bono, accipitur ibi bonum pro bono *per essentiam*, quod solum est summe bonum, et illi nihil opponitur[^22].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis et minus accipitur secundum maiorem et minorem accessum ad terminum; dicendum, quod verum est in his quae dicunt *positionem*; non autem est verum in his quae dicunt *privationem*, immo accipiuntur *per recessum*. Unde magis malum dicitur quod magis recedit a bono; et quia nunquam tantum recedit, quin adhuc possit magis; hinc est, quod nunquam est ibi ponere summum[^23].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de statu, dicendum, quod status est secundum *actum*; sed non oportet, quod sit status secundum *potentiam*, ut non possit esse ultra progressus. Nam etsi in rebus creatis non contingat invenire *actu infinitum*, contingit tamen reperire *infinitum in potentia*, sicut patet in numero per appositionem et in continuo per divisionem. Sic et in proposito intelligendum; et hoc infra[^24] manifestabitur, cum agetur de corruptione mali.

<!-- page 812 -->

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *per accidens* reducitur ad *per se*, et similiter dictum *per participationem* ad dictum *per essentiam* et similiter, quod in quolibet genere est reperire unum primum etc.; dicendum, quod haec habent locum in his quae dicunt positionem et naturam, quae possit causari ex principiis subiecti, et quae possit essentialiter dici, et secundum quam possint alia mensurari secundum eius participationem maiorem et minorem. Malum autem privationem dicit, in quantum malum; et ideo illae tres rationes non habent hic locum. — Et hoc fuit, quod decepit Manichaeum, ut dicit Augustinus[^25], quia nescivit, quid esset malum. Et quia voluit de malo disputare nesciens, quid hoc esset, ideo se et multos praecipitavit in errorem. Superbia enim sua fecit ipsum ignorare modum addiscendi. In omni enim inquisitione prius oportet intelligere, « quid est quod per nomen dicitur », et hoc tanquam praecognitionem afferre secum ad rei proprietates posterius cognoscendas[^26].

english:
### ARTICLE II.
### *On evil in comparison to the subject in which it is.*

Consequently it is asked about the second principal point, namely about evil in comparison to that in which it is. And concerning this three things are asked.

The first is, whether it happens that there is found an evil sequestered from every good.

The second is, whether evil has being in the good opposed to it.

Thirdly it is asked, whether evil is in that in which it is, as a certain habit, or [as] pure privation.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether anything is so evil that it has nothing of good.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether some evil is sequestered from every good[^1][^2][^3], and this is to ask, whether anything is so evil[^4] that it has nothing of good[^5], but is evil in the highest degree. And that it is so, it seems[^6]:

1. « In things which are said per se, if simply [is referred] to simply, and more to more, and most to most », by the consideration of the Philosopher[^7]; but this is true per se: to good evil is opposed: therefore to a greater good a greater evil, and to the greatest good the greatest

<!-- page 810 -->

evil: if therefore it happens that there is found a highest good, therefore also a highest evil. For « if one of opposites is posited in nature, consequently the other also is posited ».

2. Likewise, more and less is said by approach to a terminus: therefore where there is found *more* and *less*, it happens that there is found a *highest*[^8]; but in evil there is found *more* and *less*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, either there is a stopping-point among evils, or not — it is agreed that it is necessary to posit a stopping-point; for it is posited in everything that is in act[^9] — but the stopping-point is not short of the highest: therefore it is necessary to posit a highest evil. But this is what has nothing of good: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, « everything *per accidens* is reduced to *per se*[^10] »: therefore if there is to be posited an evil *per accidens*, there is to be posited an evil *per se*; but that *per se* is present in something which has its origin from the proper principles of it: if therefore something is evil *per se*, it seems that its principles are evil; and if its principles are evil, the whole is evil; and if the whole is evil, there is nothing there of good: therefore from the first, if there is to be posited an evil *per accidens*, there is to be posited something which is *simply* and *totally* evil. But it is agreed that the first is to be posited: therefore also the other.

5. Likewise, everything said *by participation* is reducible to what is said *by essence*: when therefore something is said to be evil, either it is said *by participation*, or *by essence*. If *by essence*; but the good *by essence* is the highest good, which has nothing of evil: therefore likewise there will be something so evil that it will have nothing of good. If it is said *by participation*; and[^11] every such thing is reduced to what is said *by essence*: therefore it returns necessarily that something is evil essentially: and so the same as before.

6. Likewise, « in any genus there is found one first thing, by which are measured all the things which are of that genus ». This is plain and is manifest through the Philosopher, who proposes this in the tenth [book] of First Philosophy[^12]; this also is manifest *by induction*. Therefore in the genus of evils there is found some one thing which is the measure of all evils; but that can be nothing except the highest among all evils: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. If there is to be posited a highest evil, which has nothing of good; and to be some good is [good]: then there is to be posited, that the highest evil is, and yet has not being. But these are two incompossibles[^13]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « every power, as the Philosopher says, is of the genus of goods », therefore if something is the highest evil, it can do nothing at all; but the highest in every genus can do more than that which is short of the highest: if therefore that which is not the highest evil can do something, that which is the highest evil can do many things: therefore by the very fact that it is the highest, it can do *many* things and can do *nothing*. But these two are incompossibles: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « every science is of the genus of goods », not only the science of good, but also the science of evil; for to know evil is good. If therefore something is the highest evil, it lacks the knowledge of good and evil: therefore it neither knows how to do evil nor to harm; but by the very fact that it is evil, it knows how to harm good: therefore by the very fact that it is the highest evil, it knows and does not know good and evil things. But these are incompossibles: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if something is the highest evil, it is evil *by essence* and necessarily[^14]; but if it is evil *by essence* and nature, it is natural to it to do evil. But everything, while it does what is natural to it, *does well*; and what does well is good: therefore if something is the highest evil, it itself is good, and while it does evil, it does well. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if something is the highest evil, it is the vilest; for the more evil something is, the viler it is[^15]; and if it is the vilest among evils, therefore among them it is the lowest. But what is the lowest among evils is not the highest head of evils: therefore what is the highest evil is not the highest evil. If you say that it does not follow: it is the vilest, therefore it is not the highest evil, because this is to be the highest evil, which is the lowest in respect of goods; it is objected, because if something is posited as the highest evil, it ought not to be posited *above* others, but *below*, according to the right order: therefore it is not the *god* of darkness, but the *servant*; which is against that error[^16].

6. Likewise, if there is a highest evil, then it will be as omnipotent in evil as the highest good is in good: therefore every evil is subject to its power; but the corruption of any good whatever is evil: therefore the corruption of any good whatever is subject to the power of the highest evil: therefore if there is a highest evil, it can corrupt every

<!-- page 811 -->

good. But a good which can be corrupted is not the highest: therefore if there is to be posited a highest evil, there is no highest good; and if there is no highest good, there is no good[^17]: therefore from the first, if there is to be posited a highest evil, there is no good. But if this is altogether false and impious, it is manifest etc.

### Conclusion.

> Both faith and reason dictate that nothing is so evil that it does not have something of good.

**I respond:** It must be said that to posit that there is some evil which has nothing of good is not only [a mark] of heretical perversity, but also of manifest blindness and stupidity. For as was shown in objecting, the very position implies opposites within itself. For it implies that that thing, namely the highest evil, *is* and *is not*; that the same thing *can* and *cannot*; and that the same thing *knows* and *does not know*. And while it implies opposites within itself, it destroys itself. For in positing that the highest evil is, which has nothing of good, it posits that that thing is not the highest; it posits that it is not evil; it posits also that it has no good opposed [to it]. And all these things were shown in objecting, which manifestly convince that this error is foolish and blind; and they show its author or inventor to have been blinded and impious. For never would the impious Manichee have been thrust into such great darkness, had he not long before been a servant of the god of darkness, who blinded his mind, so that the *illumination of truth* which irradiates over every intellect[^18] did not shine in him. And to this day this worst error flourishes, although it is most irrational. And the chief cause of this is *pride* itself, the mother of blindness, which reigns in certain laymen as to the things which are of faith and morals. For since they are uneducated, they presume to expound sacred Scripture, which is the most profound of all writings; since again they have a certain exterior respectability, they despise the life of all others; and by the merit of this twofold pride they are blinded, so as to fall into that worst error, by which they are so blinded that they do not know how to discern what is good and what is evil, while they posit that many kinds of goods are from an evil god. These Isaiah foreshows in the fifth chapter[^19]: *Woe! you who call evil good, and good evil, putting light [for] darkness and darkness [for] light.* And on account of the excessive blindness in which they are, having as it were lost the use of reason, arguments have no efficacy in them for persuading, nor torments for drawing them back, nor the suffrages of prayers for relieving them, unless this be done by a most special grace. — Repudiating this heretical, nay most foolish and blasphemous position, let us say, as the catholic faith and right reason say, that nothing is so evil that it does not have something of good.

But for the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that *highest* in some genus can be said in two ways. In one way is said *highest*, than which nothing can be *greater*; and in this way it does not happen that there is found nor posited a highest evil; for nothing is so evil that it could not be worse, for the reason that it has something of good, of which it could be more deprived, and so it would be still worse. And for this reason Dionysius says[^20] that « evil is infinite ». In another way is said *highest*, than which nothing is *greater according to act*, but it itself exceeds among all others; and in this way it happens that there is found a highest among evils. For Lucifer, who is *king over all the sons of pride*[^21], is the worst over all. — These things having been seen, it is easy to respond to the objections.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning the opposition of evil, it must be said that the consideration is understood thus, that the term be taken in the same way, when it is said *simply*, and when it is said *with excess*; but it is not so in the matter at hand. For when it is said that good is opposed to evil, here good is taken *by participation*; but when it is inferred concerning the highest good, there good is taken for the good *by essence*, which alone is the highest good, and to it nothing is opposed[^22].

2. To that which is objected, that more and less is taken according to the greater and lesser approach to a terminus; it must be said that it is true in those things which state a *position*; but it is not true in those things which state a *privation*, rather they are taken *by recession*. Whence a greater evil is said [to be] that which recedes more from good; and because it never recedes so much that it cannot still [recede] more; hence it is that there is never a highest to be posited there[^23].

3. To that which is objected concerning the stopping-point, it must be said that the stopping-point is according to *act*; but it is not necessary that there be a stopping-point according to *potency*, so that there could not be progress further. For although in created things it does not happen that one finds an *actual infinite*, it does happen that one finds an *infinite in potency*, as is plain in number by addition and in the continuum by division. So also it is to be understood in the matter at hand; and this will be manifested below[^24], when corruption of evil is treated.

<!-- page 812 -->

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that *per accidens* is reduced to *per se*, and likewise what is said *by participation* to what is said *by essence*, and likewise that in any genus there is found one first thing etc.; it must be said that these have a place in those things which state a position and a nature, which can be caused from the principles of the subject, and which can be said essentially, and according to which other things can be measured according to their greater and lesser participation of it. But evil states a privation, insofar as it is evil; and therefore those three reasons have no place here. — And this is what deceived the Manichee, as Augustine says[^25], because he did not know what evil was. And because he wished to dispute about evil, not knowing what this was, therefore he cast himself and many into error. For his pride made him ignorant of the manner of learning. For in every inquiry it is necessary first to understand « what it is that is said by the name », and to bring this as it were as a foreknowledge with oneself to the properties of the thing to be known afterward[^26].

la: Vide infra d. 43. per totam. — Edd., excepta 1, omittunt *peccato*.

en: See below d. 43, throughout. — The editions, except 1, omit *peccato*.

la: Supple cum cod. bb (in marg.) *aliquis*.

en: Supply with cod. bb (in the margin) *aliquis*.

la: Codd. F aa bb et alii hic interserunt *hoc*. — Paulo inferius post *et hoc modo nullus* cod. aa interiicit *malum*.

en: Codd. F aa bb and others here insert *hoc*. — A little below, after *et hoc modo nullus* cod. aa inserts *malum*.

la: Vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 4. et VIII. c. 2.

en: See Aristotle, III. *Ethics* c. 4. and VIII. c. 2.

la: Secundum Aristot., cuius sententiam de hoc vide supra pag. 183, nota 5. De testimonio seq. cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 1. — Paulo superius pro *et appetibilis* edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. ut *appetibilis*, cod. O *appetibilis* tantum. Paulo inferius pro *si quid fit bene* multi codd., ut F T aa bb ee etc., cum edd. 1, 2 *si quid sit*, cod. K *si quid fuerit*.

en: According to Aristotle, whose opinion on this see above p. 183, note 5. On the following testimony cfr. above p. 341, note 1. — A little above, for *et appetibilis* the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] *ut appetibilis*, cod. O *appetibilis* only. A little below, for *si quid fit bene* many codices, such as F T aa bb ee etc., with edd. 1, 2 [read] *si quid sit*, cod. K *si quid fuerit*.

la: Prov. 2, 14. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Proverbs 2, 14. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Libr. V. Topic. c. 5. (c. 8.), ubi haec regula explicatur, in quantum respicit proprium. Cfr. II. c. 4. (c. 10.). Quod ad propos. seq. attinet, ait Aristot. de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis: *Contrarium autem bono quidem ex necessitate malum est.* — De testimonio in fine arg. allato cfr. supra pag. 42, nota 2. — Circa finem arg. pro *ergo et summe malum* codd. K (T a secunda manu) X *contingit reperire et summe malum*.

en: Book V. *Topics* c. 5. (c. 8.), where this rule is explained, insofar as it regards the proper. Cfr. II. c. 4. (c. 10.). As to what pertains to the following proposition, Aristotle says in *On the Categories*, the chapter *On Opposites*: *But the contrary of a good is of necessity an evil.* — On the testimony adduced at the end of the argument cfr. above p. 42, note 2. — Near the end of the argument, for *ergo et summe malum* codd. K (T by a second hand) X [read] *contingit reperire et summe malum*.

la: Arislot., IV. Metaph. text. 18. (III. c. 4.) ait: *Si igitur quod magis est propinquius est, profecto erit aliquid verum, cui propinquius est quod magis verum est.* Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 1. et 4. — Vocabulo *summum* cod. F praemittit *et*.

en: Aristotle, IV. *Metaphysics* text 18. (III. c. 4.) says: *If therefore what is more is nearer, surely there will be something true, to which is nearer that which is more true.* Cfr. Anselm, *Monologion* c. 1. and 4. — Before the word *summum* cod. F prefixes *et*.

la: Sicut exponit Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.).

en: As Aristotle expounds, II. *Metaphysics* text 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.).

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.).

en: According to Aristotle, II. *Physics* text 66. (c. 6.).

la: Ed. 1 *sed*. In fine arg. cod. A addit *ergo similiter erit aliquid ita malum, quod nihil habebit de bono.*

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *sed*. At the end of the argument cod. A adds *therefore likewise there will be something so evil that it will have nothing of good.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 94, nota 4.

en: Cfr. above p. 94, note 4.

la: Vide Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19 seq., et Damasc., Dialog. contra Manichaeos, ubi fere eadem argg. occurrunt.

en: See Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 19 seq., and Damascene, *Dialogue against the Manichees*, where nearly the same arguments occur.

la: Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 3.), de quo vide supra pag. 372, nota 5. Idem dicit Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. de Bono et utili, et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. (c. 1.), idemque supponit III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 6.). Quibus locis etiam sententia habetur, quae format maiorem arg. seq., de quo cfr. etiam II. Magnor. Moral. c. 8. (c. 7.). — In testimonio allato textus Graecus pro *potentia* habet δύναμις, quae vox ab aliis Latine redditur voce *potestatis*, ab aliis voce *facultatis*.

en: Book VI. *Topics* c. 3. (c. 3.), on which see above p. 372, note 5. Aristotle says the same, I. *Rhetoric*, the chapter *On the Good and the Useful*, and I. *Magna Moralia* c. 2. (c. 1.), and he supposes the same III. *Topics* c. 4. (c. 6.). In which places also is found the opinion which forms the major of the following argument, on which cfr. also II. *Magna Moralia* c. 8. (c. 7.). — In the testimony adduced the Greek text for *potentia* has δύναμις, which word is rendered into Latin by some by the word *potestatis*, by others by the word *facultatis*.

la: Cod. F *naturam*.

en: Cod. F [reads] *naturam*.

la: Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 27, ubi malum dicitur *vile* propter defectum formae et privationem ordinis.

en: Cfr. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 27, where evil is called *vile* on account of the defect of form and the privation of order.

la: Vide supra pag. 25, nota 1.

en: See above p. 25, note 1.

la: Cfr. Boeth., de Hebdomad. sive *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint* etc. — Subinde post *a primo* Vat. adiungit *ad ultimum*.

en: Cfr. Boethius, *On the Hebdomads* or *How substances in that they are, are good* etc. — Then after *a primo* the Vatican [edition] adds *ad ultimum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 690, nota 1. et 2, et II. Cor. 4, 4.

en: Cfr. above p. 690, notes 1 and 2, and II. Corinthians 4, 4.

la: Vers. 20. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. omittit *quasi*, pro qua vocula codd. BP VZ etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 exhibent *suae*.

en: Verse 20. — Somewhat below the Vatican [edition] omits *quasi*, for which little word codd. BP VZ etc. with edd. 2, 3, 4 exhibit *suae*.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 32. Idem iam docebant Pythagorici, teste Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. Cfr. supra pag. 655, nota 3.

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 32. The Pythagoreans already taught the same, on the testimony of Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 6. Cfr. above p. 655, note 3.

la: Paulo superius verbis *summe malum* edd., excepta 1, praefigunt *aliquid*.

en: A little above, to the words *summe malum* the editions, except 1, prefix *aliquid*.

la: Iob. 41, 25. — Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. in corp.

en: Job 41, 25. — Cfr. above d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. in the body.

la: Cfr. infra d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. — Cod. F *quia hoc* pro *quod*.

en: Cfr. below d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. — Cod. F [reads] *quia hoc* for *quod*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — De duplici infinito cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 56. seqq. (c. 6.). — Paulo superius pro *actu infinitum* edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. *actum infinitum*.

en: Cfr. below d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — On the twofold infinite cfr. Aristotle, III. *Physics* text 56. seqq. (c. 6.). — A little above, for *actu infinitum* the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] *actum infinitum*.

la: Libr. II. de Morib. Manich. c. 2. n. 2. seqq.; de Duabus Animabus, c. 8. n. 10; Contra epist. Manichaei, c. 31. seqq.; de Natura boni, c. 4. — Paulo inferius voci *multos* cod. K addit *alios*. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 1, exponens, quod omnis doctrina disciplinaque intellectualis fit ex praeexistente cognitione, ait: *Dupliciter autem est necessarium praecognoscere: alia namque quia sunt praeopinari necesse est, alia vero quid est quod dicitur intelligere oportet, quaedam autem utraque.* Cfr. ibid. c. 10. (c. 9.).

en: Book II. *On the Morals of the Manichees* c. 2. n. 2. seqq.; *On the Two Souls*, c. 8. n. 10; *Against the Letter of Mani*, c. 31. seqq.; *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4. — A little below, to the word *multos* cod. K adds *alios*. Aristotle, I. *Posterior [Analytics]* c. 1, expounding that all intellectual teaching and learning comes from preexisting knowledge, says: *But it is necessary to have foreknowledge in two ways: for of some things it is necessary to presuppose that they are, but of others what it is that is said must be understood, and of certain things both.* Cfr. ibid. c. 10. (c. 9.).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec militat contra Manichaeos, qui ponebant, esse summum et purum malum, sicut est summum et purum bonum. — Corollarium quoddam conclusionis, quod respicit quaestionem, utrum peccatum totaliter bona creata corrumpere possit, tractatur infra d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — De hac re contra Manichaeos disputant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 2. — Scot., Report. II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. a. 1. ad 1; S. I. q. 49. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 15. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

**II.** Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem manifestum est, quod malum, cum sit *privatio*, debeat esse in aliquo ente ut subiecto, ergo in aliquo bono. Ad solvenda autem argg. 2. et 3. ad opposit. supponit S. Doctor, quod aliud est bonum, quod privatur per malum, aliud, cui inest malum; sive aliud est bonum *speciale*, cui *directe* et *specialiter* malum *opponitur*, aliud illud bonum, quod malo substernitur, sed eidem non opponitur nisi oppositione *generali*, quae est inter bonum et malum *generaliter sumtum*. Dum enim in aliis contrariis non sit nisi oppositio secundum *speciem* (v. g. album et nigrum), inter bonum et malum potest esse duplex oppositio, scil. in *generali*, et in *speciali*, quia « bonum et malum circueunt omne genus » (Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.) sive sunt conceptus transcendentes. Ita solutio illius difficultatis secundum communem sententiam habetur.

**III.** De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 4.; S. I. q. 48. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 11; de Malo, q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. et art. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question contends against the Manichees, who posited that there is a highest and pure evil, just as there is a highest and pure good. — A certain corollary of the conclusion, which regards the question whether sin can totally corrupt created goods, is treated below d. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — On this matter against the Manichees there dispute: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 1. m. 2. — Scotus, *Reportata* II. *Sent.* d. 37. q. 1. n. 12. — St. Thomas, II. *Sent.* d. 1. q. 1. a. 1. ad 1; *Summa* I. q. 49. a. 3; *Summa contra Gentiles* III. c. 15. — B. Albert, II. *Sent.* d. 1. a. 2; *Summa* p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. *Sent.* d. 1. q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

**II.** As to the following (2nd) question it is manifest that evil, since it is a *privation*, ought to be in some being as in a subject, therefore in some good. But for solving arguments 2 and 3 to the opposite, the holy Doctor supposes that one is the good which is deprived by evil, another that in which the evil is present; or one is a *special* good, to which evil is *directly* and *specially opposed*, another that good which is laid under the evil, but is not opposed to it except by a *general* opposition, which is between good and evil *taken generally*. For while in other contraries there is only an opposition according to *species* (e.g. white and black), between good and evil there can be a twofold opposition, namely in *general*, and in *special*, because « good and evil go around every genus » (Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.) or are transcendent concepts. Thus the solution of that difficulty is had according to the common opinion.

**III.** On this (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, in the cited place m. 5. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here a. 4.; *Summa* I. q. 48. a. 3; *Summa contra Gentiles* III. c. 11; *de Malo*, q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 5; *Summa* p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, in the cited place and article. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 56358–56574), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Conclusio, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 809–812, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 831–834). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**ARTICULUS II opener folded in (Override §5).** The short ART II opener (`ARTICULUS II. / De malo in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo est. / Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali… Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.` + the 3-question listing, raw 56358–56366, p. 809) is folded into this q1 as headings — no standalone `d34-a2-divisio` chunk.

**Alignment check (coordinator-mandated): CONFIRMED, no swap.** ART II 3-question list: (1) *utrum contingat reperire malum sequestratum ab omni bono*; (2) *utrum malum habeat esse in bono sibi opposito*; (3) *utrum malum sit in eo, in quo est, tanquam aliquis habitus, aut pura privatio.* q1 opener (`Circa primum… utrum aliquod malum sit ab omni bono sequestratum… utrum aliquid sit ita malum, quod nihil habeat de bono`) matches topic (1). a2-q2 opener (raw 56574, `QU.\ESTIO II. / Utrum malum sit in bono sibi opposito` — `Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sive malitia sit in bono sibi opposito`) matches topic (2). No q-swap.

**Boundary.** This chunk = ARTICULUS II opener + QUAESTIO I only. Begins raw 56358 (ART II header, p. 809 lower L-column). ENDS at raw 56574, immediately before the OCR-garbled `QU.\ESTIO II.` header — everything from 56574 onward is d34-a2-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 809–812. Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each page; footers split by *body anchor* across the shared chunk-boundary pages.
- p. 809 (running head `QUAESTIO I.` at top; chunk opens in lower L-column): all 7 footers anchor in this q1's opener + fundamentum 1 → [^1]–[^7]. (The a1-q3 hand-off briefed 5; the actual p.809 footer block is 7 — footers 6 [Prov. 2,14] and 7 [Libr. V. Topic.] were the undercount. All 7 belong here.) [^1]–[^6] cluster in the opener; [^7] at *Philosophi* in fundamentum 1.
- p. 810: fundamenta 1(end)–6 + Contra 1–6; footers 1–10 → continuous [^8]–[^17]. [^8] *summum* (Metaph.), [^9] *actu est* (Metaph.), [^10] *per se* (Phys.), [^11] *et* (Ed.1 sed), [^12] *decimo primae Philosophiae* (pag.94), [^13] *incompossibilia* Contra 1 (Dionys./Damasc.), [^14] *necessario* Contra 4 (Topic. VI), [^15] *vilius est* Contra 5 (Cod. F naturam), [^16] *errorem istum* Contra 5 (Dionys. §27), [^17] *nihil est bonum* Contra 6 (pag.25).
- p. 811: Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad obiecta 1–3; footers 1–7 → continuous [^18]–[^24]. [^18] *intellectum* (Boeth.), [^19] *capitulo* (pag.690 / II Cor 4,4), [^20] *Dionysius* (Vers.20), [^21] *filios superbiae* (Div. Nom. §32), [^22] *nihil opponitur* Ad 1 (summe malum aliquid), [^23] *ponere summum* Ad 2 (Iob 41,25 / d.21), [^24] *infra* Ad 3 (d.35 a.1 q.3).
- p. 812 (top, above QU.\ESTIO II.): tail of Ad obiecta 4.5.6 + SCHOLION (items I, II, III). The p.812 footer block has 4 notes; **footers 1 and 2 anchor in THIS q1's body** (footer 1 = de Morib. Manich., anchoring at *dicit Augustinus* + the *multos*-variant; footer 2 = Aristot. I. Poster., anchoring at *posterius cognoscendas*). These two were merged into [^26] (both fall on the closing clause). The remaining p.812 footers 3 (Cap. 14 Magistri) and 4 (Enchirid. c.14) anchor in a2-q2's body and are forwarded. The SCHOLION carries only parenthetical/reference content (commentator rolls, Richard. a Med. citation) — NO numbered footers.

**Hand-off received.** From d34-a1-q3: the p.809 footer block (briefed as 5; actually 7) — all anchored in this q1's opener + fundamentum 1, rendered [^1]–[^7].

**Hand-off forwarded to d34-a2-q2.** The QU.\ESTIO II. header (raw 56574, *Utrum malum sit in bono sibi opposito*) and everything below the SCHOLION belong to a2-q2. The p.812 footers 3 (`Cap. 14. n. 4. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.`) and 4 (`Enchirid. c. 14. n. 4, ubi textus originalis voci regulae adiungit illa et subinde voculae simul praemittit duo.`) anchor in a2-q2's fundamenta (Augustinus in Enchiridio etc.) and are forwarded. This q1 claims p.812 footers 1–2 only.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 812, raw ~56558–56574), items I, II, III. `has_scholion: true`. Item I treats the Manichee polemic + commentator roll for this q1. Items II and III treat the *following (2nd) question* (`Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem`) — they are advance scholia for a2-q2 physically printed under q1's SCHOLION header. a2-q2 may legitimately lack its own SCHOLION per Override §5 (covered by these items II/III).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 809–812 read top→bottom; the p.809/810 seam (inside fundamentum 1: `…et maxime bono maxime` | `malum: si ergo contingit reperire summe bonum`), p.810/811 seam (inside Contra 6: `…potest corrumpere omne` | `bonum. Sed bonum, quod potest corrumpi`), and p.811/812 seam (inside Ad obiecta 4.5.6: `…dictum per` | `participationem ad dictum per essentiam`) are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.809 footer block is fully claimed by this q1; the p.812 footer block splits 1–2 (this q1) / 3–4 (a2-q2).

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 812 -->

### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum malum sit in bono sibi opposito.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sive malitia sit in bono sibi opposito. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Augustinus in Enchiridio[^1]: « Cum mala et bona nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt ». Hic expresse habetur, quod mala sunt in bonis sibi oppositis.

2. Item, Augustinus[^2]: « In his contrariis, quae bona et mala vocantur, deficit regula dialecticorum, qua dicunt, nulli rei simul inesse contraria »; sed constat, quod non deficeret, nisi mala essent in bonis sibi oppositis: ergo etc.

3. Item, malum dicitur quod corrumpit[^3]; sed non corrumpit nisi illud, in quo est, et ei bono opponitur, quod corrumpit: ergo videtur, quod malum sit in bono sibi opposito.

4. Item, servitus opponitur libertati; sed peccatum, quod facit hominem servum, proprie inest homini secundum voluntatem et liberi arbitrii libertatem: ergo videtur, quod malum substantificari habeat in bono sibi opposito[^4].

**Contra:** *(Ad oppositum.)*

1. Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus[^5]: « Malum non est exsistens neque in exsistentibus »; sed omne bonum est de genere exsistentium: ergo malum non est in bono: ergo nec in bono sibi opposito.

2. Item, virtus et vitium opponuntur, et « tantum unum uni opponitur[^6] »: si ergo vitium non est in virtute, ergo nec est in bono sibi opposito, nec etiam cum illo.

<!-- page 813 -->

3. Item, regula dialecticorum est vera et necessaria, ergo non fallit in aliqua materia; nam si falleret in una sola materia, repudianda esset tanquam falsa. Si igitur ars dicit, quod « unum oppositum non est in altero nec cum altero circa idem[^7] », et bonum malo opponitur; ergo malum non est in bono sibi opposito.

4. Item, si malum potest esse in bono sibi opposito, ergo ab ipso non expellitur; et si non expellitur a suo opposito, videtur, quod non expellatur ab aliquo; et si a nullo expellitur, semper manet: ergo si aliquis semel est malus, semper est malus. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et[^8] primum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito, non tamen in eo quod directe et formaliter opponitur.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod bonum in creatura dicitur per ordinationem ad summum[^9]. Unde bonum dicitur quod est ordinatum in finem. Ordinatio autem tria respicit: aut ipsum ordinabile, aut illud secundum quod est ordinabile, aut illud per quod ordinatur. *(Distinctio.)* Et secundum hoc triplex reperitur in nobis bonum, scilicet bonum, quod est ordinabile, et hoc est naturale; et bonum, per quod ordinatur, et hoc est virtus vel gratia; et bonum, secundum quod natura ordinabilis est a gratia, et hoc est habilitas media.

Intelligendum est ergo, quod malum culpae ei bono, quod est ipsa natura vel substantia, non opponitur, quia ipsam substantiam non corrumpit, ut dicit Dionysius[^10]: « Nihil exsistentium corrumpitur in eo quod est essentia vel natura ». *(Malum tribus modis se habens ad oppositum.)* Ei autem bono, quod est virtus et gratia, simpliciter et directe opponitur. Unde mutuo se expellunt et simul esse non possunt. Ei autem bono, quod est habilitas media, quodam modo opponitur et quodam modo non. Nam illa habilitas media habet comparari ad naturam, cuius est, et ad gratiam, ad quam est. Secundum quod comparatur ad naturam, cuius est, sic non habet oppositionem ad malum, quoniam habilitas illa, ut erat[^11] talis naturae, indifferens erat ad bonum et ad malum; et sic est subiectum mali. Ut autem comparatur ad gratiam sive virtutem, vel etiam ad finem, ad quem est, sic habet oppositionem ad malum. Nam malum tollit ei rectam ordinationem ad illud ad quod est, et reddit minus et minus habilem.

Quoniam igitur malum culpae primo et principaliter circa *habilitatem* consistit, et *habilitas* potentiae opponitur ipsi malo, cum malum reddat ipsam potentiam inhabilem; *(Explicatur dictum Augustini.)* hinc est, quod Augustinus[^12] dicit, quod malum habet esse in bono sibi opposito; et quod in huiusmodi oppositis regula dialecticorum deficit, hoc est dicere, quod ad talia opposita non se extendit. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod regula dialecticorum falsificetur. Sed quoniam mos est Philosophi[^13], positis considerationibus, instantias subinferre, non quae falsificent ipsas, sed quae intellectum considerationum rectificent et manifestent; *(Notandum.)* sic beatus Augustinus, tanquam vir prudens ingenio, in hac instantia manifestat, illam maximam dialecticorum in his oppositis tenere, quae opponuntur oppositione formali, sicut opponitur virtus et vitium, gratia et culpa. In aliis autem oppositis, quae non opponuntur ratione eius quod *sunt*, sed ratione eius *ad quod sunt*, non est intelligenda illa regula; nam illa possunt simul stare, sicut stat gratia cum concupiscentia; et iterum, unum potest esse in altero, sicut culpa in habilitate.

Ex his, quae dicta sunt, manifesta est responsio ad quaestionem propositam. *(Conclusio.)* Dico enim, quod malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. In bono autem, quod *directe* et *formaliter* opponitur sibi, substantificari non habet, sicut duae ultimae rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur, ostendunt.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)*

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Dionysii, quod malum non est in exsistentibus etc.; dicendum, quod ipse loquitur per se, quod scilicet non est in exsistentibus, secundum quod exsistentia, sed potius secundum quod deficientia, cum sit privatio et defectus, ut iam[^14] patebit melius.

2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum unum uni opponitur; dicendum, quod illud intelligendum est de uno genere oppositionis, et intelligendo secundum idem, et per se loquendo. Habilitas autem potentiae non opponitur ipsi[^15] nisi ratione virtutis; virtus enim directe opponitur vitio; et quia naturalis habilitas quodam modo inclinat ad virtutem; hinc est, quod vitio opponitur quodam modo, licet non omnino ut virtus; et sic patet totum[^16].

---

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether evil is in the good opposed to it.*

Secondly it is asked, whether evil or malice is in the good opposed to it. And that it is, it seems.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^1]: « Since no one doubts that evils and goods are contraries, not only can they exist together, but evils altogether cannot exist apart from goods, nor except in goods ». Here it is expressly held that evils are in the goods opposed to them.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^2]: « In these contraries, which are called goods and evils, the rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that contraries cannot be present at once in any thing »; but it is established that it would not fail unless evils were in the goods opposed to them: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that is called evil which corrupts[^3]; but it does not corrupt except that in which it is, and it is opposed to the good which it corrupts: therefore it seems that evil is in the good opposed to it.

4. Likewise, servitude is opposed to liberty; but sin, which makes a human a slave, is properly present in a human according to the will and the liberty of free choice: therefore it seems that evil has to be substantified in the good opposed to it[^4].

**On the contrary:** *(To the opposite.)*

1. Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*[^5]: « Evil is not an existent thing nor among existing things »; but every good is of the genus of existing things: therefore evil is not in the good: therefore neither in the good opposed to it.

2. Likewise, virtue and vice are opposed, and « only one is opposed to one[^6] »: if therefore vice is not in virtue, then neither is it in the good opposed to it, nor even with it.

<!-- page 813 -->

3. Likewise, the rule of the dialecticians is true and necessary, therefore it does not fail in any matter; for if it failed in even one matter, it would have to be rejected as false. If therefore the art says that « one opposite is not in the other nor with the other concerning the same thing[^7] », and good is opposed to evil; therefore evil is not in the good opposed to it.

4. Likewise, if evil can be in the good opposed to it, then it is not expelled from it; and if it is not expelled by its opposite, it seems that it is not expelled by anything; and if it is expelled by nothing, it always remains: therefore if anyone is once evil, he is always evil. But if this is false, what remains is also[^8] the first [proposition].

### CONCLUSION.

> Evil is substantified in good, and not only in good, but even in a good in some manner opposed to it, yet not in that which is directly and formally opposed to it.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that good in a creature is so called by ordination to the highest[^9]. Whence that is called good which is ordained to an end. But ordination regards three things: either the orderable [thing] itself, or that according to which it is orderable, or that by which it is ordained. *(A distinction.)* And according to this a threefold good is found in us, namely the good which is orderable, and this is the natural; and the good by which it is ordained, and this is virtue or grace; and the good according to which the nature is orderable by grace, and this is the intermediate aptitude.

It must be understood, therefore, that the evil of guilt is not opposed to that good which is the nature or substance itself, because it does not corrupt the substance itself, as Dionysius says[^10]: « Nothing of existing things is corrupted in that which is its essence or nature ». *(Evil related to its opposite in three ways.)* But to that good which is virtue and grace, it is opposed simply and directly. Whence they mutually expel one another and cannot exist together. But to that good which is the intermediate aptitude, it is in some manner opposed and in some manner not. For that intermediate aptitude has to be compared to the nature, of which it is, and to the grace, to which it is. According as it is compared to the nature, of which it is, thus it has no opposition to evil, since that aptitude, as it was[^11] of such a nature, was indifferent to good and to evil; and thus it is the subject of evil. But as it is compared to grace or virtue, or even to the end, to which it is, thus it has opposition to evil. For evil takes away from it the right ordination to that to which it is, and renders it less and less apt.

Since therefore the evil of guilt consists first and principally about the *aptitude*, and the *aptitude* of the power is opposed to evil itself, since evil renders the power itself unapt; *(The saying of Augustine explained.)* hence it is that Augustine[^12] says that evil has being in the good opposed to it; and that in oppositions of this kind the rule of the dialecticians fails — this is to say that it does not extend to such opposites. Whence from this it does not follow that the rule of the dialecticians is falsified. But since it is the custom of the Philosopher[^13], when considerations have been set down, to subjoin instances, not such as falsify them, but such as rectify and make manifest the understanding of the considerations; *(To be noted.)* thus the blessed Augustine, as a man prudent in genius, in this instance makes manifest that that maxim of the dialecticians holds in those opposites which are opposed by formal opposition, as virtue and vice are opposed, [or] grace and guilt. But in other opposites, which are not opposed by reason of that which they *are*, but by reason of that *to which they are*, that rule is not to be understood; for those can stand together, as grace stands together with concupiscence; and again, one can be in the other, as guilt in the aptitude.

From the things which have been said, the response to the question proposed is manifest. *(Conclusion.)* For I say that evil is substantified in good, and not only in good, but even in a good in some manner opposed to it, as the reasons show which are adduced for the first part. But in the good which is *directly* and *formally* opposed to it, it has not to be substantified, as the two last reasons show which are adduced for the second part.

*(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)*

1. To that which is objected concerning the word of Dionysius, that evil is not among existing things etc.; it must be said that he speaks per se, namely that it is not among existing things, according as they are existing, but rather according as they are deficient, since it is a privation and a defect, as will now[^14] appear more clearly.

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected, that only one is opposed to one; it must be said that this is to be understood of one genus of opposition, and understanding it according to the same [respect], and speaking per se. But the aptitude of the power is not opposed to it[^15] except by reason of virtue; for virtue is directly opposed to vice; and because the natural aptitude in some manner inclines to virtue; hence it is that it is opposed to vice in some manner, although not altogether as virtue [is]; and thus the whole is clear[^16].

---

en: Chapter 14, n. 4. — Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Enchirid. c. 14. n. 4, ubi textus originalis voci *regulae* adiungit *illa* et subinde voculae *simul* praemittit *duo.*

en: *Enchiridion* c. 14. n. 4, where the original text adds *illa* to the word *regulae* and then prefixes *duo* to the little word *simul.*

la: Ut dicit Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20. Cfr. infra d. 35. per totam.

en: As Dionysius says, *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 20. Cfr. below d. 35. throughout.

la: Diony., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20: *Tenetur* [κρατεῖται] *autem et hoc* [malum] *boni participatione et substantificat* [οὐσιοῖ] *et suimet privationem bonum tota sui participatione.* [Translatio Scoti Erig.]. — De maiori vide supra d. 25. p. I. q. 1. In minori respicitur illud Ioan. 8, 34: *Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati.* Cfr. Rom. 6, 6. 20. — Pro *et liberi arbitrii* edd., excepta 1, *per liberi arbitrii.*

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 20: *But this too* [evil] *is held* [κρατεῖται] *by the participation of the good, and the good substantifies* [οὐσιοῖ] *even its own privation by the total participation of itself.* [Translation of Scotus Eriugena]. — Concerning the major [premise] see above d. 25. p. I. q. 1. In the minor there is regarded that of John 8, 34: *Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin.* Cfr. Rom. 6, 6. 20. — For *et liberi arbitrii* the editions, except 1, [read] *per liberi arbitrii.*

la: Cap. 4. § 20. in fine et in princ. § 21. et § 34.

en: Chapter 4. § 20. at the end and at the beginning [of] § 21. and § 34.

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 17. (IX. c. 5.) et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 10. (c. 2.).

en: Aristotle, X. *Metaphysics* text 17 (IX. c. 5.) and I. *On the Heavens and the Earth*, text 10 (c. 2.).

la: Verba Aristotelis vide supra pag. 100, nota 1. Paulo superius post *repudianda esset* multi codd., ut 1 K T ee, addunt *et.*

en: For the words of Aristotle see above p. 100, note 1. A little earlier after *repudianda esset* many codices, as 1 K T ee, add *et.*

la: In plurimis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur *et.*

en: In most codices and ed. 1 *et* is wanting.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *finem.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *finem.*

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Pro *corrumpitur* (φθείρεται) multi codd., inter quos F H K T aa, cum primis edd. perperam *corrumpit.* Lectionem *corrumpitur* rectam esse, evidenter apparet ex his verbis, quae loc. cit. verbis a S. Bonaventura allatis continuantur, nimirum: *sed defectu iuxta naturam ordinis, harmoniae et commensurationis ratio infirmatur, manere similiter habens.* [Scot. Erig.]. Infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. arg. ult. ad opposit. omnes codd. habent *corrumpitur.*

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 23. For *corrumpitur* (φθείρεται) many codices, among them F H K T aa, with the first editions wrongly [read] *corrumpit.* That the reading *corrumpitur* is the correct one evidently appears from these words, which in the place cited continue upon the words adduced by S. Bonaventure, namely: *but by a defect the account of the order, harmony, and commensuration according to nature is weakened, [the thing] retaining the like having.* [Scotus Eriugena]. Below d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. in the last argument to the opposite all the codices have *corrumpitur.*

la: Cod. aa hic et paulo post *est.*

en: Cod. aa here and a little after [reads] *est.*

la: Vide hic fundam. 1. et 2.

en: See here *fundamenta* 1 and 2.

la: Praesertim in Topic., ut videre est supra pag. 639, nota 2.

en: Especially in the *Topics*, as is to be seen above p. 639, note 2.

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

la: Simul audi: *malo*, vel *vitio*, quam vocem Vat. addit.

en: Hear together [with it]: *malo* ["to evil"], or *vitio* ["to vice"], which word the Vatican [edition] adds.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 56574–56682), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (Respondeo, the *triplex bonum* distinction, the Augustine-explication, the Solutio oppositorum) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 812–813, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 834–835). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Boundary (coordinator-verified, held).** This chunk = ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO II only. Opens at the OCR-garbled header `QU.\ESTIO II.` (raw 56574, p.812 bottom-center, full-width), body "Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sive malitia sit in bono sibi opposito." The ARTICULUS II header is NOT repeated — it is carried by sibling a2-q1 (Override §5). The chunk ENDS at raw ~56682, immediately before `QUAESTIO III.` (raw 56683, p.814, body "Utrum malum sit in bono tanquam aliquis habitus, an sit pura privatio") — everything from QUAESTIO III onward is d34-a2-q3.

**Alignment check.** PASSED. q2 opener "utrum malum sive malitia sit in bono sibi opposito" matches ART. II topic (2). q2 has **no own scholion** — this is normal and expected: the advance scholia for q2 are items **II** (`Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem manifestum est…`) and **III** (`De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal.…`) printed under a2-q1's SCHOLION header (raw 56569–56573); `has_scholion: false`. q2's own marginal `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` (body marker 10 → [^16]) confirms the back-reference.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 812–813 (running heads: p.812 `DIST. XXXIV. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` [a2-q1 occupies the top; q2 opens at the page bottom]; p.813 `DIST. XXXIV. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`).
- p.812 (bottom): QUAESTIO II opener + fundamenta 1–4 + Contra 1–2 (start). Page footer block has 8 notes; notes 1–2 belong to a2-q1 (its scholion/body markers), notes **3–8** are q2's. Renumbered continuous: [^1] = p.812 footer 3 (Cap. 14 n. 4, Augustinus in Enchiridio); [^2] = footer 4 (Enchirid. c. 14 n. 4); [^3] = footer 5 (Dionys. de Div. Nom. — *corrumpit* marker); [^4] = footer 6 (Diony. de Div. Nom. § 20 *Tenetur* — *substantificari habeat* marker); [^5] = footer 7 (Cap. 4 § 20 — *Nominibus* marker); [^6] = footer 8 (Aristot. X. Metaph. — *unum uni opponitur* marker).
- p.813: rest of Contra 3–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (*triplex bonum* distinctio, Augustine-explication) + Solutio oppositorum (replies 1, 2/3/4). Footer block has 10 notes → continuous [^7]–[^16]: [^7]=f1 (Verba Aristotelis, *circa idem*); [^8]=f2 (desideratur *et*, *quod et*); [^9]=f3 (Vat. *finem*, *ad summum*); [^10]=f4 (De Div. Nom. § 23 *corrumpitur*, *dicit Dionysius*); [^11]=f5 (Cod. aa *est*, *ut erat*); [^12]=f6 (Vide hic fundam. 1. et 2., *Augustinus dicit*); [^13]=f7 (Praesertim in Topic., *mos est Philosophi*); [^14]=f8 (Quaest. seq., *ut iam patebit*); [^15]=f9 (Simul audi malo/vitio, *non opponitur ipsi*); [^16]=f10 (Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest., *sic patet totum*).

**Hand-off received.** From a2-q1, per coordinator brief: p.812 footers 3 (`Cap. 14. n. 4. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.`) and 4 (`Enchirid. c. 14. n. 4, ubi textus originalis voci regulae adiungit illa…`) anchor here in q2's fundamenta 1 and 2 (Augustinus in Enchiridio). Carried as [^1] and [^2]. a2-q1 retained p.812 footers 1–2 for its own scholion/body.

**Hand-off forwarded to d34-a2-q3.** QUAESTIO III (`Utrum malum sit in bono tanquam aliquis habitus, an sit pura privatio`, raw 56683) begins on p.814; its page footers are entirely on p.814 and belong to a2-q3. No footer of q2's spilled past the p.813 block, so **no footer hand-off is forwarded** — a2-q3 starts clean on a fresh page.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of pp. 812 and 813 read top→bottom. The p.812/813 seam falls inside Contra 2/3 ("…nec etiam cum illo. / 3. Item, regula dialecticorum est vera…" — the OCR run "saria, ergo non fallit in aliqua materia; nam si falleret in una sola materia" continues directly into p.813 L "leret in una sola materia, repudianda esset…" — continuous). The L→R column seams on p.813 (Respondeo "…sic habet oppositionem / ad malum. Nam malum tollit…") are grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found.

**[?] flags.** None.