title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Pars I)

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister, et est verbum Augustini, scilicet quod *mali non sunt cum illo, ut caeci in luce* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia mali sunt *in Deo*, quia in illo vivunt, moventur et sunt[^1]: ergo si non importatur maior convenientia per hoc quod est *esse cum aliquo* quam *in aliquo*, videtur, quod sicut mali dicuntur esse *in Deo*, ita debeant dici esse *cum Deo*.

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— Item, quae est magis impropria, *Deus est cum malis*, vel *mali cum Deo*? Videtur, quod haec: *mali sunt cum Deo*. Unde Augustinus in libro *Confessionum*[^2]: «Mecum eras, et tecum non eram»; loquitur pro statu peccati. Sed contra; cum dicit auctoritatem in casuali[^3], ergo videtur, quod melius dicitur: *homo cum Deo*, quam e converso.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec praepositio *cum* dicit associationem. In societate autem considerantur duo, scilicet mutuum auxilium et conformitas voluntatis. Quoniam igitur soli boni habent voluntatem conformem et sunt coadiutores Dei[^4], ideo de eis solis proprie dicitur, quod sint *cum Deo*, et e converso; quia tunc hoc quod est *cum* non dicit auctoritatem. Quia vero mali non conformantur nec auxiliantur Deo in sua salute, sed contradicunt, et tamen Deus adiuvat eos in multis; ideo dicit Augustinus: *Mecum eras* etc.[^5]

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Apud se habitat* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia praepositiones sunt distinctivae, quia transitivae[^6]: si ergo Deus a se non distinguitur, male dicitur, quod *apud se* erat. Si tu dicas, quod transitionem solum dicunt quantum ad modum; contra est Glossa super primum Ioannis[^7], quae dicit, quod *apud* notat distinctionem Patris ad Filium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus non solum est *in* creaturis, sed etiam *apud se*. Unde Augustinus in libro *Confessionum*[^8]: «Deus est in se ut alpha et omega, in mundo ut creator et rector, in Angelis ut sapor et decor, in electis ut liberator et adiutor, in reprobis ut terror et horror». — Quod obiicitur, quod praepositio dicit *transitionem* et *distinctionem*; dicendum, quod quantum est de virtute suae significationis, non dicit nisi *transitionem* quantum ad *modum*; quod autem dicat quantum ad *rem*, hoc est ratione materiae sive terminorum, quibus additur[^9].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Deus habitat in aliquo, cum ita est in eo, ut ab eo cognoscatur et diligatur*. Videtur non bene dicere, quia habitat in parvulis, qui eum non cognoscunt: ergo non videtur haec ratio conveniens.

**Respondeo:** Est cognoscere *actu*, et est cognoscere *habitu*; et quamvis parvuli non cognoscant *actu*, cognoscunt tamen *habitu*, eo quod gratiam habent et habitum virtutum, sicut dicitur in quarto libro[^10].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quomodo ubique Deus sit, intellectu non capimus*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia «quod intelligimus debetur rationi», sicut dicit Augustinus[^11]; sed habemus rationes, per quas scimus, Deum esse in rebus potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialiter. Si tu dicas, quod non comprehendimus[^12]; similiter nec alia comprehendimus, quae dicuntur de Deo: ergo magis de hoc quam de supradictis non deberet dicere Magister, quod sit ineffabile.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam sunt pure intelligibilia, et talibus non contradicit Imaginatio, sed deficit; quaedam sunt sensibilia, et in talibus sufficit; quaedam sunt quodam modo imaginabilia, et quodam modo intelligibilia, et in talibus frequenter intellectus deficit, et imaginatio contradicit et deficit: ut cum cogitamus, Deum esse ubique, Deum solo intellectu capimus, locum autem imaginamur. Et quoniam nostra imaginatio exemplum[^13] non capit, quod aliquod unum sit in pluribus locis, et intellectus in claritatem lucis non aspicit; hinc est, quod talia nobis non intelligibilia iudicantur magis quam alia.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Spiritus creatus sordibus polluti corporis non inquinatur*.

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Videtur enim contrarium esse ei quod dicitur Sapientiae nono[^14]: *Corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.* Et iterum, anima contrahit originale a carne et inficitur ab illa.

**Respondeo:** Sicut generatio univoca est, quae est similis ex simili, et aequivoca, quae est rei dissimilis, ita est infectio secundum rationem univocam, ut leprosus facit leprosum, et secundum rationem aequivocam, ut infectio generat infectionem[^15]. Primo modo loquitur Magister, quia anima leprosi non est leprosa; secundo modo obiicit.

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In Deo sunt omnia quae condidit, nec tamen inquinant eum* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia sordes corporales inquinant res corporales, ergo spirituales res spirituales. Item, si Deum non inquinant: ergo videtur quod posset dici, quod Deus est in diabolo; quod est contra omnem usum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut tangit Magister in littera[^16], sordes corporales non inquinant corpus, quod nec communicat in materia nec dependet, ut patet in radio, qui non inficitur faecibus, quia nec dependet nec communicat in transmutabili materia. Et quoniam Deus neutrum habet, ideo non valet illud. — Quod obiicitur, quod *Deus est in peccatoribus*; dicendum, quod nullum inconveniens esset dicere; tamen quia hoc videbatur sonare in contumeliam, ideo ponenda est determinatio, ratione cuius sermonis intellectus sanus appareat: ut si dicatur, *Deus est in diabolo vel in adultero quantum ad conservationem naturae*.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there occur doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says — and it is a word of Augustine — namely, that *the wicked are not with him, as the blind are in the light* etc. For he seems to speak ill, because the wicked are *in God*, since *in him they live and move and are*[^1]: therefore, if no greater conformity is imported by *to be with someone* than by *in someone*, it seems that just as the wicked are said to be *in God*, so they ought to be said to be *with God*.

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— Likewise, which is more improper: *God is with the wicked*, or *the wicked are with God*? It seems [that the latter is]: *the wicked are with God*. Whence Augustine in the book of *Confessions*[^2]: «You were with me, and I was not with you»; he is speaking on behalf of the state of sin. But on the contrary; since he expresses the authority in the oblique [case][^3], therefore it seems that it is better said: *the man with God*, than the converse.

**I respond:** It must be said that this preposition *with* says association. Now in society two things are considered, namely mutual help and conformity of will. Since therefore only the good have a will conformed [to God] and are coadjutors of God[^4], therefore of them alone is it properly said that they are *with God*, and conversely; because then this *with* does not say authoritativeness. But because the wicked do not conform nor help God in their own salvation, but contradict [him], and yet God helps them in many things; therefore Augustine says: *You were with me* etc.[^5]

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *He dwells with himself* etc. For he seems to speak ill, because prepositions are distinctive, since they are transitive[^6]: if therefore God is not distinguished from himself, it is wrongly said that he was *with himself*. If you say that they say transition only as to mode; on the contrary is the Gloss on First John[^7], which says that *with* (apud) notes a distinction of the Father with respect to the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that God is not only *in* creatures, but also *with himself*. Whence Augustine in the book of *Confessions*[^8]: «God is in himself as alpha and omega, in the world as creator and ruler, in the angels as savor and beauty, in the elect as liberator and helper, in the reprobate as terror and horror». — As to what is objected, that the preposition says *transition* and *distinction*; it must be said that, as far as the force of its signification is concerned, it says only *transition* as to *mode*; that it says [transition] as to *thing*, this is by reason of the matter or of the terms to which it is added[^9].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *God dwells in someone when he is in him in such a way that he is known and loved by him*. He seems not to speak well, because he dwells in little ones, who do not know him: therefore this account does not seem fitting.

**I respond:** There is to know *in act*, and there is to know *by habit*; and although little ones do not know in act, yet they know by habit, since they have grace and the habit of the virtues, as is said in the fourth book[^10].

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *How God is everywhere we do not grasp by the intellect*. For he seems to speak falsely, because «what we understand is owed to reason», as Augustine says[^11]; but we have reasons by which we know that God is in things potentially, presentially, and essentially. If you say that we do not comprehend [him][^12]; in like manner neither do we comprehend the other things which are said of God: therefore the Master ought not to say of this rather than of the aforesaid that it is ineffable.

**I respond:** It must be said that some things are purely intelligible, and to such Imagination does not contradict, but falls short; some things are sensible, and for such [imagination] suffices; some things are in some way imaginable and in some way intelligible, and in such cases the intellect frequently falls short, and imagination contradicts and falls short: as when we think that God is everywhere, we grasp God by intellect alone, but we imagine the place. And because our imagination does not grasp the example[^13] [of the case] that some one [thing] be in many places, and the intellect does not look upon the brightness of the light; hence it is that such things are judged by us [to be] not-intelligible more than other things.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *A created spirit is not defiled by the filths of a polluted body*.

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For it seems to be contrary to what is said in Wisdom 9[^14]: *The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul.* And again, the soul contracts the original [sin] from the flesh and is infected by it.

**I respond:** Just as generation is univocal, which is [the production] of like from like, and equivocal, which is of a thing dissimilar, so infection [occurs] according to a univocal account, as a leper makes [another] a leper, and according to an equivocal account, as infection generates infection[^15]. The Master speaks in the first mode, because the soul of the leper is not leprous; in the second mode the objector objects.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *In God are all the things which he founded, nor yet do they defile him* etc. For he seems to speak ill, because corporeal filths defile corporeal things, therefore spiritual [filths defile] spiritual things. Likewise, if they do not defile God: then it seems that one could say that God is in the devil; which is against all usage.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master touches in the text[^16], corporeal filths do not defile a body which neither communicates in matter nor depends [on it], as is plain in a ray [of light], which is not infected by dregs, because it neither depends on nor communicates in transmutable matter. And since God has neither, therefore that [argument] is not valid. — As to what is objected, that *God is in sinners*; it must be said that there would be no inconvenience in saying so; yet because this seemed to sound toward an outrage, therefore a determination must be added, by reason of which the wholesome sense of the discourse may appear: as if it be said, *God is in the devil or in the adulterer as regards the conservation of nature*.

---

la: Act. 17, 28: *In ipso enim vivimus et movemur et sumus*.

en: Acts 17:28: *For in him we live and move and are*.

en: [Augustine, *Confessions*,] Book X, c. 27, n. 38.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 3. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 3, in the body [of the question].

la: Epist. I. Cor. 3, 9: *Dei enim sumus adiutores*.

en: Epistle 1 Corinthians 3:9: *For we are God's coadjutors*.

la: Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. 11, et ab Aegid. R., hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is also resolved by Bl. Albert here, a. 11, and by Aegidius Romanus here, on the text.

la: Praepositiones vocantur *transitivae*, in quantum dicunt aliquid extra subiectum. Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et Scholion.

en: Prepositions are called *transitive* insofar as they say something outside the subject. Cf. above d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1, and the Scholion.

la: Vers. 1. Glossa exhibetur a Lyrano sic: *Erat apud Deum, ut alius apud alium*.

en: Verse 1. The Gloss is presented by [Nicholas of] Lyra thus: *He was with God, as one [person is] with another*.

la: Verba hic citata in libro *Confessionum* non inveniuntur, neque in Augustini Sermonibus super Matth. 6: *Pater noster* etc., ut ab aliis insinuatur. B. Albertus, S. I. tr. 18. q. 71, citato textui similem ex Bernardo (Serm. 6. de Dedicat. eccles.) affert, qui tamen non in omnibus cum eodem convenit. In textu citato Vat. cum cod. cc voci *electis* praemittit *liberatis vel*.

en: The words here cited are not found in the book of *Confessions*, nor in Augustine's Sermons on Matthew 6: *Our Father* etc., as is suggested by others. Bl. Albert, *Summa* I, tr. 18, q. 71, adduces a text similar to the one cited from Bernard (Serm. 6 *On the Dedication of the Church*), which however does not agree with it in all respects. In the cited text the Vatican edition with cod. cc prefixes to the word *electis* the [reading] *liberatis vel*.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 12. et 13; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; et Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3.

en: Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert here, a. 12 and 13; Peter of Tarentaise here, on the text; and Aegidius Romanus here, 1st principal question, q. 3.

la: Dist. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et ad 5; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 11. m. 5; B. Albert., hic a. 13; Petr. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: Dist. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also III *Sentences* d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, in the body and ad 5; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 11, m. 5; Bl. Albert here, a. 13; Peter [of Tarentaise] and Richard, here on the text.

la: Libr. *de Utilitate credendi*, c. 11. n. 25, ubi textus originalis *debemus* pro *debetur*. Cfr. etiam I. *Retract*. c. 14. n. 3.

en: Book *On the Utility of Believing*, c. 11, n. 25, where the original text has *debemus* (we ought) for *debetur* (is owed). Cf. also I *Retractations*, c. 14, n. 3.

la: Supple hic cum Vat. *obiicitur, quod*.

en: Supply here with the Vatican edition *it is objected, that*.

la: In Vat. desideratur *exemplum*. Mox pro *unum* multi codd. *tantum*; vitiose. — Solutio huius dubii magni momenti est.

en: In the Vatican edition *exemplum* is missing. Shortly afterward, for *unum*, many codices [read] *tantum*; faultily. — The solution of this doubt is of great moment.

la: Vers. 15.

en: Verse 15.

la: Id est, infectio carnis generat infectionem animae. De generatione aequivoca supra d. 13. dub. 8. dicitur: «quae est secundum putrefactionem». Communis opinio illius aetatis admittebat istam generationem quoad aliqua viventia imperfecta. — Paulo ante pro *univocam* multi codd. *univocatam*. Verba, quae mox sequuntur, *et secundum rationem aequivocam*, in pluribus codd. et ed. 1 male omittuntur.

en: That is, the infection of the flesh generates the infection of the soul. Concerning equivocal generation it is said above d. 13, dub. 8: «which is according to putrefaction». The common opinion of that age admitted this kind of generation as regards certain imperfect living things. — A little before, for *univocam* many codices [read] *univocatam*. The words which immediately follow, *et secundum rationem aequivocam*, in several codices and ed. 1 are wrongly omitted.

la: Cap. 4. — Verba proxime subiexa a Vat. sic in peius mutata sunt: *sordes corporales non coinquinant corpus spirituale, quia nec communicant in materia nec dependent*. Paulo inferius pro *quin nec* non pauci codd. minus congrue *qui nec*, et subinde pro *transmutabili* codd. L O *consimili*.

en: Chapter 4. — The words immediately appended have been changed for the worse by the Vatican edition thus: *corporeal filths do not defile a spiritual body, because they neither communicate in matter nor depend [on it]*. A little below, for *quin nec* not a few codices, less fittingly, [read] *qui nec*, and subsequently for *transmutabili* codd. L and O [read] *consimili*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Pars II)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 665 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Neque dimensionem habet, sicut corpus etc.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia dicitur ad Ephesios tertio[^1]: *Ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo etc.,* et Glossa exponit illud de Deo.

**Respondeo:** Magister loquitur proprie et ad litteram, sed Apostolus loquitur metaphorice. Unde multipliciter exponuntur illa verba. In Deo enim longitudo est longanimitatis, latitudo caritatis, sublimitas misericordiae, et profundum maiestatis sive sapientiae quantum ad Dei iudicia.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus in littera, quod *movet creaturam corporalem per tempus et locum.* Videtur enim mala ista divisio Augustini, primo, quia a Philosopho ponitur nulla mutatio secundum tempus. Et iterum, sua divisio non videtur sufficiens, quia Philosophus ponit sex species motus[^2].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum omnis species motus ad hunc duplicem motum reducitur, scilicet ad motum ad situm, et ad motum ad formam; Augustinus autem motum ad situm intelligit per motum secundum locum, qui est entis perfecti et completi, sine deperditione vel innovatione sive circa qualitatem sive proprietatem substantiae, eatenus qua ad situm est, nisi pariter sit ad formam. Motum autem ad formam, qui subdividitur per quinque species, comprehendit sub mutatione secundum tempus propter hoc, quod de se dicit mensuram variabilem et rei variabilis[^3]. Unde omnem mutationem, quae est secundum proprietates rei absolutas et intrinsecas, sive secundum qualitates corporales sive secundum spirituales, ut sunt affectiones in animabus, ipse vocat mutationem secundum tempus. Et ita patet ratio divisionis et sufficientia[^4].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *spiritualis creatura per tempus movetur.* Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia spiritualis creatura mensuratur aevo, cum sit perpetua: ergo si movetur, non per tempus movetur, sed per aevum. — Item, intellectus angelicus est deiformis, sicut vult Philosophus[^5], ergo intelligit in instanti; pari ratione et afficitur: non ergo in tempore. — Praeterea, tempus per prius est mensura motus primi mobilis: ergo illud solum mensuratur tempore, quod subiacet illi motui; sed tale non est Angelus nec eius motus: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Ad praesens notandum[^6], quod tempus uno modo dicitur proprie, et sic dicit mensuram rei mutabilis, in quantum mutabilis, tamen sub ratione continui; et quoniam motus primi mobilis est motus maxime evidens et continuus inter omnes: ideo tempus hoc modo dicitur proprie esse in primo mobili, sicut in subiecto, in quo primo est et in quo primo apparet. Alio modo dicitur tempus mensura cuiuslibet rei mutabilis, secundum quod mutabilis, sive moveatur instantanee sive continue; et sic non tantum est in motu primi mobilis, et in his quae ei subiacent, sed etiam in omni creato, circa quod accidit variatio; et sic est in Angelis. Et per hoc patent obiecta.

Quod enim obiicit de aevo, dicendum, quod aevum est mensura Angelorum quantum ad substantiale, quod est invariabile et incorruptibile, sed tempus quantum ad proprietates, quae variantur, et quaedam subito, quaedam successive, sicut patet[^7] in Angelis per naturam paulative intendi aliqua affectio. Et sic patent cetera.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *eadem sapientia est in duobus, neque maior neque minor.* Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia sapientia est accidens et qualitas sapientis, et accidens per substantiam numeratur[^8].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad hoc voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod eadem sapientia creata esset in duobus sapientibus, et hoc dant intelligere per duas suppositiones. Una est, quod species rei in anima non differant per essentiam a re extra. Alia suppositio est, quod eandem rem nosse possunt duo sapientes, scilicet unum enuntiabile, quod dictum est singulare. Et hoc ultimum non indiget persuasione; sed prius ostendunt, quod eadem sit, quia per eadem res cognoscitur, per quae res habet esse[^9]. Si ergo per formam suam habet esse, ergo et cognosci; et forma rei vere est in anima, et cum intellectus sit sciens per illam formam, et contingat aliquos duos omnino idem scire et cogitare, illa non est tantum vera forma, sed etiam una. Et quod hoc verum sit, persuadent per hoc, quod si forma potest secundum veritatem consimilem formam in materia producere et se ipsam facere in aliena materia, quare non est simile in anima, quae habilior est ad recipiendum? Unde et hoc dicunt sensisse Augustinum.

Unde dicunt, quod sapientia non est ad modum aliarum proprietatum. — Sed haec positio deviat ab Augustino, quia Augustinus[^10] vult, et alii Sancti, quod esse in pluribus omnino distinctis non convenit uni et eidem creaturae nisi per miraculum. Et iterum, positio ista super falsum[^11] fundata est: quia si veritas esse asini esset in anima, quare non diceretur anima esse asinus? Et iterum, si esset veritas, adhuc non esset eadem, quia nulla forma, cum generat se, generat se omnino eandem, sed de necessitate plurificatur essentia in generante et generato, praeterquam in Deo: et non valet ad propositum.

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Et ideo secundus modus dicendi est, quod Augustinus intelligit de sapientia increata, quae est in sapientibus et attingit ubique propter sui munditiam. — Sed cum Augustinus intendat ponere exemplum in creaturis, non videtur adhuc hoc esse secundum eius intellectum. Et iterum, ipse dicit quod illa sapientia est aequalis in duobus, qui sunt aequaliter sapientes, non autem in aliis: ergo videtur loqui de habitu.

Et ideo est tertius modus, quod ipse loquitur de unitate per conformitatem. — Sed illud adhuc non esset sufficienter dictum, quia tunc maior esset in duobus quam in uno, sicut patet in duobus divitibus, qui sunt in divitiis conformes et aequales.

Propter hoc dicendum, quod similitudo sive intentio in anima habet comparari ad animam, in qua est, et ad illud cuius est. Et quoniam ortum habet ab eo cuius est, et ad illud dicitur; ideo similitudines unius rei in animabus pluribus, quia in unam et eandem veritatem ducunt, et tantum una, quantum duae, hinc est, quod per comparationem ad illud cuius sunt, habent unitatem, nec maius sunt duae quam una, similiter nec sapientia; sed in comparatione ad animas, quae per illas cognoscunt, habent pluralitatem, et plus sunt duae quam una. Et ideo patet, quod non potest poni omnino simile, quia res differunt intentione sive similitudine; in Deo autem, in quo non differunt, patens est, quod unus potest esse in multis. Et sic patent cetera obiecta.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: *Nor does it have dimension as a body etc.* For he seems to speak ill, because it is said in Ephesians 3[^1]: *That you may be able to comprehend with all the saints, what is the length, the breadth, etc.,* and the Gloss expounds that of God.

**I respond:** The Master speaks properly and to the letter, but the Apostle speaks metaphorically. Hence those words are expounded in many ways. For in God *length* is of long-suffering, *breadth* of charity, *height* of mercy, and *depth* of majesty or of wisdom as regards God's judgments.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the text, that *he moves the bodily creature through time and place.* For this division of Augustine's seems faulty, first, because by the Philosopher no change according to time is posited. And again, his division does not seem sufficient, because the Philosopher posits six species of motion[^2].

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the Philosopher every species of motion is reduced to this twofold motion, namely to motion to position (*ad situm*) and to motion to form (*ad formam*); but Augustine understands motion to position by motion according to place, which is of a perfect and complete being, without loss or innovation either as regards quality or property of substance, in so far as it is to position, unless it be equally to form. But motion to form, which is subdivided through five species, he comprehends under change according to time, on account of this, that of itself it says a measure that is variable and of a variable thing[^3]. Hence every change which is according to the absolute and intrinsic properties of a thing, whether according to bodily qualities or according to spiritual ones, such as the affections in souls, he himself calls change according to time. And so the account of the division and its sufficiency is plain[^4].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the spiritual creature is moved through time.* For he seems to speak falsely, because the spiritual creature is measured by aevum (*aevum*), since it is perpetual: therefore if it is moved, it is not moved through time, but through aevum. — Likewise, the angelic intellect is deiform, as the Philosopher wishes[^5]; therefore it understands in an instant; by parity of reasoning it is also affected: therefore not in time. — Furthermore, time is by priority the measure of the motion of the first mobile: therefore that alone is measured by time which lies under that motion; but the Angel is not such, nor is his motion: therefore etc.

**I respond:** For the present it is to be noted[^6] that *time* is said in one way properly, and so it says the measure of a changeable thing in so far as changeable, yet under the account of the continuous; and since the motion of the first mobile is the most evident and continuous motion among all: therefore time in this way is properly said to be in the first mobile, as in a subject, in which it primarily is and in which it primarily appears. In another way time is said the measure of any changeable thing, in so far as changeable, whether it be moved instantaneously or continuously; and so it is not only in the motion of the first mobile and in those things which are subject to it, but also in every created thing about which variation occurs; and so it is in the Angels. And by this the objections are plain.

For as for what he objects concerning aevum, it must be said that aevum is the measure of the Angels as regards the substantial, which is invariable and incorruptible, but time as regards the properties, which vary, some suddenly, some successively, as is plain[^7] in the Angels by their nature, [namely] that some affection is intensified gradually (*paulative*). And so the rest are plain.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the same wisdom is in two persons, neither greater nor lesser.* For it seems false to say [this], because wisdom is an accident and a quality of the wise person, and an accident is numbered through substance[^8].

**I respond:** It must be said that for this some have wished to say that the same created wisdom would be in two wise persons, and they give this to be understood through two suppositions. One is that the species of a thing in the soul does not differ in essence from the thing outside. The other supposition is that two wise persons can know the same thing, namely one *enuntiabile*, which has been said to be singular. And this last [point] needs no persuasion; but they first show that it is the same, because a thing is known through the same things by which the thing has being[^9]. If therefore a thing has being through its form, therefore [it has it] also to be known; and the form of the thing is truly in the soul, and since the intellect knows through that form, and it happens that two persons know and think altogether the same, that [form] is not only a true form but also one. And that this is true they persuade through this, that if a form can according to truth produce a like form in matter and make itself in foreign matter, why is it not similar in the soul, which is more apt for receiving? Hence they also say that Augustine thought thus.

Hence they say that wisdom is not after the manner of the other properties. — But this position deviates from Augustine, because Augustine[^10] wishes, and the other Saints, that to be in plural altogether-distinct things does not befit one and the same creature except by miracle. And again, this position is founded upon a falsehood[^11]: because if the truth of being-an-ass were in the soul, why would the soul not be said to be an ass? And again, even if there were [such a] truth, still it would not be the same, because no form, when it generates itself, generates itself altogether the same, but of necessity the essence is multiplied in the generating and the generated, except in God: and it does not avail to the proposition.

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And therefore the second mode of speaking is that Augustine understands [this] of uncreated wisdom, which is in the wise and reaches everywhere on account of its purity. — But since Augustine intends to set an example in creatures, this still does not seem to be according to his understanding. And again, he himself says that that wisdom is equal in two persons who are equally wise, but not in others: therefore he seems to speak of a habit.

And therefore there is a third mode, that he speaks of unity by conformity. — But that still would not be sufficiently said, because then it would be greater in two than in one, as is plain in two rich men who are conformed and equal in riches.

On account of this it must be said that the likeness or intention in the soul has to be compared to the soul in which it is, and to that of which it is. And since it has its origin from that of which it is, and is said with respect to that; therefore the likenesses of one thing in plural souls, since they lead into one and the same truth, and two are as much [one] as one, hence it is that by comparison to that of which they are, they have unity, nor are two greater than one, nor likewise is the wisdom; but in comparison to the souls, which know through them, they have plurality, and two are more than one. And therefore it is plain that an altogether-similar [case] cannot be set down, because things differ in intention or likeness; but in God, in whom they do not differ, it is plain that one [wisdom] can be in many. And so the rest of the objections are plain.

---

la: Vers. 18. — Glossam, cuius mox fit mentio, invenies apud Lyranum in hunc textum.

en: Verse 18. — The Gloss of which mention is presently made you will find in Lyra on this text.

la: Libr. *de Praedicam.* c. *de Motu*: *Motus autem species sunt sex: generatio, corruptio, augmentum, diminutio, alteratio et secundum locum mutatio.* Cfr. supra pag. 663, nota 8, ubi etiam explanata invenies, quae mox in solutione huius dubii de Aristotelis doctrina afferuntur.

en: [Aristotle,] *Categories*, c. *On Motion*: *But the species of motion are six: generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and change according to place.* Cf. above p. 663, note 8, where you will find explained the points of Aristotle's doctrine which are presently brought forward in the solution of this doubt.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. *Phys.* text. 58–60. (c. 7.). — Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 98. seqq. (c. 11.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 58–60 (c. 7). — Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 98ff. (c. 11).

la: Supple cum codd. P Q W *est motus*, vel cum cod. D *transit*. — Pro *composito* Vat. cum cod. cc *posita*.

en: Supply with codd. P Q W *est motus*, or with cod. D *transit*. — For *composito* the Vatican edition with cod. cc reads *posita*.

la: Cfr. *Liber de Causis*, prop. 10, ubi docetur, quod intelligentiae primae, quae uni vero puro sunt propinquiores, maioris sint virtutis. — Melius tamen ista locutio reducenda videtur ad Dionysium, qui in diversis locis libr. *de Div. Nom.* v. g. c. 1. § 22, et c. 5. § 8, Angelos vocat *deiformes* (θεοειδεῖς). S. Bonaventura quoque II. *Sent.* d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opposit. auctorem huius locutionis citat Dionysium.

en: Cf. *Book of Causes*, prop. 10, where it is taught that the first intelligences, which are nearer to the one pure truth, are of greater power. — Better, however, this locution seems to be reducible to Dionysius, who in various places in *On the Divine Names*, e.g. c. 1, § 22, and c. 5, § 8, calls the Angels *deiform* (θεοειδεῖς). St. Bonaventure too in II *Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 1 *ad oppos.* cites Dionysius as the author of this expression.

la: Vide supra pag. 411, nota 6. Cfr. etiam Boeth., *de Unitate et uno.* — Pro *substantiam* Vat. et ed. 1 *subiecta*. — Plura de aevo et tempore II. *Sent.* d. 2. p. 1. per totam.

en: See above p. 411, note 6. Cf. also Boethius, *On Unity and the One.* — For *substantiam* the Vatican edition and ed. 1 read *subiecta*. — More on aevum and time in II *Sent.* d. 2, p. 1, throughout.

la: *Patet* pro *videtur*. — Mox Vat. *paulatim intendi aliquam affectionem*. Absque ratione et absque auctoritate codd. Vat. *paulative* mutavit in *paulatim*, cum constet, verbum *paulative* scriptoribus medii aevi familiare fuisse, ut videre est apud Du Cange, *Glossar. ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis.*

en: *Patet* in place of *videtur*. — Just below, the Vatican edition reads *paulatim intendi aliquam affectionem*. Without reason and without manuscript authority the Vatican edition changed *paulative* into *paulatim*, although it is established that the word *paulative* was familiar to writers of the Middle Ages, as can be seen in Du Cange, *Glossary on the writers of medieval and later Latin.*

la: *Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. 20, et a Petro a Tar., hic circa lit., ubi idem simul tractat de duobus seqq. dubiis.*

en: This doubt is also solved by Bl. Albert, here a. 20, and by Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text, where he treats simultaneously of the two following doubts.

la: B. Albert., hic a. 27., hanc sententiam exprimit his verbis: *Sicut dicit Aristoteles, VII. Primae philosophiae, text. 20. (VI. c. 6.), quodsi formae sunt absolutae a rebus, quarum sunt, ut dicebat Plato, quod tunc nihil per eas erit scitum; ergo si forma, quae est in anima, alia est a forma, quae est in re, non erit res scita per ipsam.* — Paulo superius pro *sed prius* cod. T *sed primum*. Paulo inferius verbo *contingat* fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 perperam praefigunt *non*; perperam inquimus, quia, interiecta particula *non*, vis argumentationis corrumpitur. Cod. L ante *contingat* repetit *cum*.

en: Bl. Albert, here a. 27, expresses this view in these words: *As Aristotle says in VII. First Philosophy, text 20 (VI, c. 6), that if forms are absolute from the things of which they are, as Plato used to say, then nothing will be known through them; therefore if the form which is in the soul is other than the form which is in the thing, the thing will not be known through it.* — A little above, for *sed prius*, cod. T reads *sed primum*. A little below, before the word *contingat*, almost all the codices and ed. 1 wrongly prefix *non*; we say *wrongly* because, when the particle *non* is interjected, the force of the argument is corrupted. Cod. L before *contingat* repeats *cum*.

la: *Epist.* 487. *ad Dardan.* n. 10, et libr. XXII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 29. n. 3. Cfr. etiam Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3, et opusculum, quod olim S. Anselmo tribuebatur, *Elucidarium*, libr. I. c. 3. — Post pauca pro *iterum* Vat. cum cod. cc *ideo*.

en: [Augustine,] *Letter* 487 *to Dardanus*, n. 10, and *On the City of God* XXII, c. 29, n. 3. Cf. also Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 3, and the little work formerly attributed to St. Anselm, *Elucidarium*, book I, c. 3. — A little after, for *iterum* the Vatican edition with cod. cc reads *ideo*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc addit *fundatur ei*. — Cod. Y addit *scilicet rei in causa*. Aliquanto inferius ante *non valet* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. interiicit *ideo*.

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc adds *fundatur ei*. — Cod. Y adds *scilicet rei in causa*. Somewhat lower, before *non valet*, the Vatican edition with some codices interjects *ideo*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38

title_alt: De praescientia divina — littera Magistri

title_alt: On divine foreknowledge — text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVIII.

#### Cap. I.

*An scientia vel praescientia Dei sit causa rerum vel e converso.*

Nunc ergo ad propositum revertentes, coepto insistamus. Supra[^1] dictum est, quod praescientia Dei futurorum tantum est, sed omnium tam bonorum quam malorum; scientia vero vel sapientia non modo de praeteritis[^2], sed etiam de praesentibus et futuris, nec tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis, quia se ipsum novit Deus. Hic oritur quaestio non dissimulanda, utrum scilicet scientia vel praescientia sit *causa* rerum, an res sint causa scientiae vel praescientiae Dei. Videtur enim praescientia Dei causa esse eorum quae ei subsunt, ac necessitatem eveniendi eis facere, quia nec aliqua futura fuissent, nisi ea Deus praescisset, nec possunt non evenire, cum Deus ea praesciverit. Si autem impossibile est, ea non evenire, quia praescita sunt, videtur igitur ipsa praescientia, qua praescita sunt, eis esse causa eveniendi. Impossibile est autem, ea non evenire, cum praescita sint, quia si non evenirent, cum praescita sint, falleretur Dei praescientia. At Dei praescientia falli non potest. Impossibile est ergo, ea non evenire, cum praescita sint. Sic igitur praescientia causa eorum esse videtur quae praescita sunt. Hoc idem et de scientia dicitur, scilicet quod, quia Deus aliqua novit, ideo sint. Cui sententiae Augustinus attestari videtur in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate[^3] sic dicens: « Non ista ex aliquo tempore cognovit Deus; sed futura omnia temporalia atque in eis etiam, quid et quando ab illo petituri fueramus, et quos et de quibus rebus vel exauditurus vel non exauditurus esset, sine initio ante praescivit. Universas autem creaturas, et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit, sed ideo sunt, quia novit. Non enim nescivit, quae fuerat creaturus: quia ergo scivit, creavit, non quia creavit, scivit; nec aliter scivit creata quam creanda. Non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, sed illis exsistentibus sicut oportebat et quando oportebat, illa mansit ut erat ». Unde in Ecclesiastico[^4]: *Antequam crearentur, omnia nota sunt illi, sic et postquam consummata sunt*. — Ecce his verbis videtur Augustinus innuere scientiam vel praescientiam Dei causam esse eorum quae fiunt, cum dicit, ideo ea esse, quia Deus novit. Idem quoque in sexto libro[^5] dicere videtur: « Cum, inquit, decedant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliquid vel succedit scientiae Dei,

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in qua novit omnia quae fecit per ipsam. Non enim haec quae creata sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo quia facta sunt, sed potius ideo facta sunt, quia immutabiliter ab eo sciuntur ». — Et hic etiam significare videtur Dei scientiam causam esse eorum quae fiunt, dicens, non ideo Deum ea novisse, quia facta sunt, sed ideo facta, quia novit ea Deus. Ideoque videtur Dei scientia vel praescientia causa esse eorum quae novit.

Quod si ita est, est igitur Causa omnium malorum, cum omnia mala sciantur et praesciantur a Deo; quod longe est a veritate. Si enim Dei scientia vel praescientia causa esset malorum, esset utique Deus auctor malorum, quod penitus falsum est. Non igitur scientia vel praescientia Dei causa est omnium quae ei subsunt.

Neque etiam res futurae causa sunt Dei praescientiae: licet enim non essent futurae, nisi praescirentur a Deo, non tamen ideo praesciuntur, quia futurae sunt. Si enim hoc esset, tunc eius quod aeternum est aliquid exsisteret causa ab eo alienum, ab eo diversum, et ex creaturis penderet[^6] praescientia Creatoris, et creatum causa esset increati. Origenes tamen super Epistolam ad Romanos[^7] ait: « Non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum, sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat ». Hoc videtur praemissis verbis Augustini obviare. Hic enim significari videtur, quod res futurae causa sint praescientiae; ibi vero, quod praescientia causa sit rerum futurarum.

Hanc igitur quae videtur repugnantiam de medio tollere cupientes, dicimus, res futuras nullatenus causam esse praescientiae vel scientiae Dei, nec ideo praesciri vel sciri, quia futurae vel factae sunt; ita exponentes quod ait Origenes, quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat, id est, quod futurum est, scitur a Deo antequam fiat, neque sciretur nisi futurum esset, ut non notetur ibi causa nisi *sine qua non* fieret[^8]. Ita etiam dicimus, scientiam vel praescientiam Dei non esse causam eorum quae fiunt, nisi talem, sine qua non fiunt, si tamen scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio, tunc recte potest dici causa eorum quae Deus facit. His enim duobus modis, ut superius praetaxatum est, accipitur cognitio vel scientia Dei, scilicet pro notitia sola, vel pro notitia simul et beneplacito. Hoc modo forte accepit Augustinus dicens: *Ideo sunt, quia novit*, id est, quia scienti placuit, et quia sciens disposuit. Et hic sensus ex eo adiuvatur, quia de bonis ibi tantum agit Augustinus, scilicet de creaturis, et de his quae Deus facit, quae omnia novit non solum scientia, sed etiam beneplacito ac dispositione. Sic ergo ibi accipitur Dei cognitio, ut non modo notitiam, sed etiam beneplacitum Dei significet.

Mala vero scit Deus et praescit, antequam fiant, sed sola notitia, non beneplacito. Praescit enim Deus et praedicit etiam quae non est ipse facturus, sicut praescivit et praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum, sed non fecit. Nec ideo, quia praescivit, ad peccatum infidelitatis eos coegit, nec praescisset vel praedixisset eorum mala, nisi essent ea habituri. Unde Augustinus super Ioannem: « Deus, inquit, futurorum praescius per Prophetam praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum, sed non fecit, neque praescisset mala eorum, nisi ea haberent. Non enim ideo quemquam ad peccandum cogit, quia futura hominum peccata praenovit; illorum enim praescivit peccata, non sua. Ideoque si ea quae ille praescivit ipsorum, non sunt ipsorum, non vere ille praescivit. Sed quia illius praescientia falli non potest, sine dubio non alius, sed ipsi peccant, quos Deus peccaturos esse praescivit. Et ideo si non malum, sed bonum facere voluissent, non malum facturi praeviderentur ab eo qui novit, quid sit quisque facturus ». — His verbis aperte ostenditur, si diligenter attendamus, praescientiam Dei non esse causam malorum, quae praescit, quia non ea praescit tanquam facturus nec tanquam sua, sed illorum qui sunt ea facturi vel habituri. Praescivit ergo illa sola notitia, non beneplacito auctoritatis. Unde datur intelligi, quod Deus e converso praescit bona tanquam sua, tanquam ea quae facturus est, ut in illa praesciendo simul fuerit ipsius notitia et auctoritatis beneplacitum.

#### Cap. II.

*Utrum praescientia Dei possit falli.*

Ad hoc autem, quod supra dictum est, scilicet praescientiam Dei falli non posse, solet a quibusdam sic opponi: Deus praescivit hunc lecturum vel aliquid huiusmodi; sed potest esse, ut iste non legat; ergo potest aliter esse, quam Deus praescivit; ergo potest falli Dei praescientia. — Quod omnino falsum est. Potest equidem non fieri aliquid, et illud tamen praescitum est fieri; non ideo tamen potest falli Dei praescientia, quia si illud non fieret, nec a Deo praescitum esset fieri.

Sed adhuc urgent quaestionem dicentes: aut aliter potest fieri, quam Deus praescivit, aut non aliter; si non aliter: ergo necessario cuncta eveniunt; si vero aliter: potest ergo Dei praescientia falli vel mutari. Sed potest aliter fieri, quia potest aliter fieri, quam fiat; ita autem fit, ut praescitum est: aliter ergo potest fieri, quam praescitum est. — Ad quod dicimus, illam locutionem multiplicem facere intelligentiam, scilicet: aliter potest fieri, quam Deus praescivit, et huiusmodi, ut: potest non esse quod Deus praescivit; et: impossibile est, non esse quod Deus praescivit; et: impossibile est, non esse praescita omnia quae fiunt, et huiusmodi. Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi, ut conditio sit implicita, et disiunctim. Si enim ita intelligas: non potest aliter fieri, quam Deus praescivit, id est, non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet quod Deus ita praesciverit fieri, et aliter fiat; verum intelligis. Si autem per disiunctionem intelligas, ut dicas, hoc aliter non posse evenire quam evenit, et quo modo futurum Deus praescivit; falsum est. Hoc enim aliter potest evenire, quam evenit, et tamen Deus hoc modo futurum praescivit. Similiter et alia determinatio, scilicet: impossibile est, illud non evenire, quod Deus praescivit, vel cum Deus praescierit; si coniunctim, intelligas, verum dicis; si disiunctim, falsum. Ita etiam et illud: impossibile est, non esse praescitum omne quod fit, id est, non potest esse utrumque simul, scilicet, ut fiat, et non sit praescitum: hic sensus verus est. Si vero dicis, Deum non potuisse non praescire omne quod fit, falsum est. Potuit enim facere, ut non fieret, et ita non esset praescitum.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether the science or foreknowledge of God is the cause of things, or conversely.*

Now therefore, returning to our subject, let us press on with what was begun. It has been said above[^1] that God's foreknowledge concerns only future things, but all of them — both good and evil; whereas [His] science or wisdom [concerns] not only past[^2], but also present and future things, and not only temporal but also eternal — since God knows Himself. Here arises a question not to be passed over, namely whether the science or foreknowledge [of God] is the *cause* of things, or whether things are the cause of God's science or foreknowledge. For God's foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which are subject to it, and to make a necessity for them of coming to pass — because no future things would have been, had God not foreknown them, nor can they fail to come to pass, since God has foreknown them. Now if it is impossible for them not to come to pass, because they have been foreknown, it seems then that the very foreknowledge by which they are foreknown is the cause of their coming to pass. But it is impossible for them not to come to pass, since they have been foreknown — because if they were not to come to pass, although they have been foreknown, God's foreknowledge would be deceived. But God's foreknowledge cannot be deceived. It is impossible therefore for them not to come to pass, since they have been foreknown. Thus then foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which have been foreknown. The same too is said of [God's] science: namely that, because God knows certain things, therefore they are. To which opinion Augustine seems to bear witness in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^3], saying thus: « These things God did not come to know from any [point in] time; but all future temporal things — and in them too what and when we were going to ask of Him, and whom and concerning what matters He would or would not hearken — He foreknew, without [any] beginning, beforehand. All creatures, however, both spiritual and corporeal, He knows not because they are, but they are because He knows; for He was not ignorant of what He was going to create: because therefore He knew, He created — not because He created, He knew; nor did He know things created otherwise than [He knew them as] to be created. For nothing has accrued to His wisdom from them, but, with them existing as it was fitting and when it was fitting, [His wisdom] remained as it was ». Whence in Ecclesiasticus[^4]: *Before they were created, all things are known to Him; so also after they are completed*. — Behold, by these words Augustine seems to suggest that God's science or foreknowledge is the cause of those things which are made, when he says they *are* because God *knows*. The same [Augustine] also in the sixth book[^5] seems to say: « When, he says, times pass away and follow, [yet] nothing passes away or follows for God's science,

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in which He knows all things which He has made through it. For these things which have been created are not known by God because they have been made, but rather they have been made because they are immutably known by Him ». — And here too he seems to signify that God's science is the cause of those things which are made, saying that God did not know them because they have been made, but they were made because God knows them. And therefore God's science or foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which He knows.

But if this is so, then [God's science] is the Cause of all evils too, since all evils are known and foreknown by God — which is far from the truth. For if God's science or foreknowledge were the cause of evils, surely God would be the author of evils, which is utterly false. Therefore God's science or foreknowledge is not the cause of all things which are subject to it.

Nor again are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge: for although they would not be future, were they not foreknown by God, yet they are not foreknown for the reason that they are future. For if this were so, then there would exist a cause of that which is eternal, [a cause] foreign to it and diverse from it; and the Creator's foreknowledge would depend[^6] on creatures, and the created would be the cause of the uncreated. Origen, however, on the Epistle to the Romans[^7] says: « Not for the reason that something will be, does God know it as future; but because it is future, therefore it is known by God, before it comes to be ». This seems to run contrary to the foregoing words of Augustine. For here it seems to be signified that future things are the cause of foreknowledge; but there, that foreknowledge is the cause of future things.

Wishing therefore to remove from our midst this apparent contradiction, we say that future things are by no means the cause of God's foreknowledge or science, nor are they foreknown or known *because* they are future or accomplished; thus expounding what Origen says — namely that *because it is future, therefore it is known by God before it comes to be* — that is, what is future is known by God before it comes to be, and would not be known if it were not future, so that nothing is here noted as cause except a *sine qua non* without which it would not happen[^8]. So too we say that the science or foreknowledge of God is not the cause of those things which are made, except such [a cause] without which they are not made — provided we refer *science* to bare cognition only. But if under the name of *science* there is included also good-pleasure and disposition, then [science] can rightly be called the cause of those things which God does. For in these two ways, as has been laid down above, is God's cognition or science taken: namely either for bare cognition, or for cognition together with good-pleasure. In this latter way perhaps Augustine took [it] when saying: *They are because He knows* — that is, because it pleased the One knowing, and because the One knowing has disposed [it]. And this sense is supported by [the fact] that there Augustine treats only of good things — namely of creatures and of those things which God does — all of which He knows not by science alone but also by good-pleasure and disposition. Thus then there God's cognition is taken so as to signify not only knowledge but also God's good-pleasure.

But evils God knows and foreknows before they come to be — yet by bare cognition only, not by good-pleasure. For God foreknows and even foretells things which He Himself is not going to do, just as He foreknew and foretold the unbelief of the Jews, but did not bring [it] about. Nor for the reason that He foreknew [it] did He compel them to the sin of unbelief; nor would He have foreknown or foretold their evils, had they not been about to have them. Whence Augustine on John: « God, he says, foreknowing future things, foretold through the Prophet the unbelief of the Jews, but did not make [them so]; nor would He have foreknown their evils, had they not [been going to] have them. For He does not for that reason compel anyone to sin, because He has foreknown the future sins of men: for He foreknew their sins, not His own. And therefore if those things which He foreknew of them are not theirs, then He did not truly foreknow [them]. But because His foreknowledge cannot be deceived, without doubt it is not someone else but they themselves who sin, whom God has foreknown to be sinners. And therefore if they had wished to do not evil but good, they would not be foreseen as about to do evil by Him who knows what each is going to do ». — By these words it is openly shown — if we attend diligently — that the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of the evils which He foreknows, since He does not foreknow them as one about to do [them], nor as His own, but as those of the men who are going to do or have them. He has therefore foreknown those [evils] by mere cognition only, not by good-pleasure of authority. Whence it is given to be understood that God conversely foreknows good things as His own, as things which He is going to do — so that in foreknowing them there is at the same time His cognition and the good-pleasure of [His] authority.

#### Chapter II.

*Whether the foreknowledge of God can be deceived.*

To that, however, which has been said above — namely that God's foreknowledge cannot be deceived — it is wont to be objected by certain [persons] thus: God foreknew that this man would read, or some such thing; but it can be that this [man] does not read; therefore it can be otherwise than God foreknew; therefore God's foreknowledge can be deceived. — Which [objection] is utterly false. Something can indeed *not* come to pass, and yet [the same thing] is foreknown to come to pass; nor for that reason however can God's foreknowledge be deceived — since if that [thing] were not to come to pass, neither would it have been foreknown by God to come to pass.

But still they press the question, saying: either it can be made otherwise than God has foreknown, or not otherwise; if not otherwise, then all things come to pass necessarily; if however otherwise, then God's foreknowledge can be deceived or changed. But [you say:] *it can be made otherwise* — because it can be made otherwise than [actually] is made; but it is so made as it has been foreknown; *therefore* it can be made otherwise than has been foreknown. — To which we say that this manner of speech makes the meaning manifold, namely: *it can be made otherwise than God has foreknown*, and the like — as: *it is possible for that not to be which God has foreknown*; and: *it is impossible for that not to be which God has foreknown*; and: *it is impossible that all things which are made should not have been foreknown*, and the like. For these can be understood conjunctively, so that the condition is implicit, and disjunctively. For if you understand thus — *it cannot be made otherwise than God has foreknown*, that is, both [things] cannot be at once, namely that God should have foreknown [it] to be made [in one way], and [yet] [that] it should be made otherwise — you understand truly. But if you understand by disjunction, so as to say *this cannot come to pass otherwise than it comes to pass, and in the way in which God has foreknown [it] as future*, [it is] false. For this can come to pass otherwise than it comes to pass, and yet God has foreknown [it] as future in this way. Similarly also the other determination, namely: *it is impossible for that not to come to pass which God has foreknown*, or: *since God has foreknown it* — if conjunctively, you understand [it], you say truly; if disjunctively, falsely. So too that: *it is impossible for everything that comes to pass not to have been foreknown*, that is, both [things] cannot be at once, namely that something should come to pass and not have been foreknown — this sense is true. But if you say *God could not not have foreknown everything that comes to pass*, [it is] false. For He could have brought it about that it should not come to pass, and so [it] would not have been foreknown.

---

la: Dist. XXXV. c. 1.

en: [Refers above to] distinction XXXV, c. 1.

la: Ita in codd. ABE et edd. 1, 6, in aliis non bene *futuris*. Deinde Vat. cum plurimis edd. *causae scientiae* pro *causa scientiae*, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.

en: Thus in codices ABE and editions 1 and 6; in the others, not well, *futuris* ("of future things"). Then the Vatican with most editions [reads] *causae scientiae* ("of-the-cause of the science") in place of *causa scientiae* ("the cause of the science"), the codices and edition 1 opposing.

la: Cap. 13. n. 22. — Paulo ante Vat. cum paucis edd. *noverit* loco *novit*.

en: [Augustine, *On the Trinity* book XV,] c. 13, n. 22. — A little before, the Vatican with a few editions [reads] *noverit* ("may have known") in place of *novit* ("knows").

la: Cap. 23, 29. Vulgata: *Domino enim Deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita: sic et post perfectum respicit omnia*.

en: [Ecclesiasticus,] c. 23, [v.] 29. The Vulgate [reads]: *For to the Lord God, before they were created, all things are known; so also after they are completed He looks upon all things*.

la: *De Trin.* c. 10. n. 11, sed verbis transpositis.

en: [Augustine,] *On the Trinity* [book VI,] c. 10, n. 11 — but with the words transposed.

la: Ita in codd. et ed. 1; in Vat. et aliis *scientia*. Immediate ante Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 *dependeret* pro *penderet*.

en: Thus in the codices and edition 1; in the Vatican and others [the reading is] *scientia* ("science"). Immediately before, the Vatican and editions 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 [read] *dependeret* ("would depend on") in place of *penderet* ("would hang upon").

en: [Origen, *On the Epistle to the Romans*,] book VII, n. 8 (on Romans 8:30).

la: Codd. ABC et ed. 1 (B in margine) *fis*, cod. E *fiat*. — Dist. XXXVI. c. 2. — *Tract.* 53. n. 4; sed tantum secundum sensum. — Illi codd. ACDE, edd. 1, 6 et originale Augustini, in aliis omittitur *ipsorum*. Deinde codd. ABCE et omnes edd., excepta Vat., *vera* pro *vere*, sed contra originale et cod. D. Deinde, praeter originale et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis *peccatores esse* pro *peccaturos esse*. — Codd. BCDE et ed. 1 *intendamus*, cod. A *inspiciamus*. — Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, omittunt *in*, refragantibus codd.

en: Codices ABC and edition 1 (B in the margin) [read] *fis*; codex E [reads] *fiat* ("let it be made"). — [Cf.] distinction XXXVI, c. 2. — *Tract.* 53, n. 4 — but only according to sense. — These codices: ACDE, editions 1 and 6, and the original of Augustine [retain *ipsorum*]; in the others *ipsorum* ("of them") is omitted. Then codices ABCE and all editions, except the Vatican, [read] *vera* ("true things") in place of *vere* ("truly") — but against the original and codex D. Then, besides the original and edition 1, the Vatican with others [reads] *peccatores esse* ("to be sinners") in place of *peccaturos esse* ("to be about to sin"). — Codices BCDE and edition 1 [read] *intendamus* ("let us attend"); codex A [reads] *inspiciamus* ("let us inspect"). — The Vatican and other editions, except 1, omit *in*, the codices opposing. (This is a composite footer entry: the OCR carries on the printed-p. 668 footer eight short notes referring to multiple anchors — codex variants for *fis/fiat*, the cross-reference to Dist. XXXVI c. 2, the Tract. 53 reference, the *ipsorum* / *vera-vere* / *peccatores-peccaturos esse* triple variant, plus the *intendamus / inspiciamus* and *in*-omission notes — all of which the chunk's body collapses under this single footnote anchor since the OCR-anchor-pegging in the body for those individual notes was lost to column-rule artifacts.) ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]


title: Dist. 38, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVIII. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXVIII. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 668 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVIII.

#### *De divinae praescientiae causalitate, infallibilitate et necessitate.*

> *Nunc ergo ad propositum revertentes, coepto insistamus etc.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Haec est secunda pars huius partis totalis, in qua agitur de divina scientia. Terminata enim prima parte, in qua agitur de ipsa quantum ad substantiam et in generali, hic agitur de ipsa quantum ad modum. Et quoniam duplex est modus nobilis cognitionis, scilicet certitudo et perfectio, sive infallibilitas et immutabilitas, ideo haec pars habet duas partes. In prima agit de praescientiae infallibilitate sive certitudine, in secunda vero de eius immutabilitate sive perfectione, ibi[^1]: *Praeterea solet quaeri, utrum scientia Dei etc.*

Prima pars spectat ad praesentem distinctionem, in qua Magister intendit quaerere et determinare, utrum divina praescientia infallibiliter ponat praescitum. Et habet haec distinctio duas partes. In prima[^2] parte, rediens ad propositum propter digressionem prius factam, breviter epilogat praedeterminata. In secunda prosequitur suum principale propositum, ibi: *Hic oritur quaestio non dissimulanda etc.* Et haec pars habet duas. In prima Magister inquirit, utrum praescientia ponat praescitum per modum causae, vel effectus: in secunda, utrum per modum necessitatis, vel contingentiae sive infallibilitatis, ultimo capitulo, ibi: *Ad hoc autem, quod supradictum est etc.* Prima pars duas habet. In prima opponit ad utramque partem, scilicet quod praescientia est causa praesciti et etiam effectus, pro et contra. In secunda solvit, ibi: *Hanc igitur quae videtur repugnantiam etc.* Similiter et secunda duas habet; in prima opponit, in secunda solvit, ibi: *Ad quod dicimus, illam locutionem.*

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo de praescientia divina quantum ad causalitatem.

Secundo quantum ad necessitatem.

Et de primo quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum praescientia divina sit causa rerum.

Secundo, utrum sit causata a rebus[^3].

---

english:
<!-- page 668 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXXVIII.

#### *On the causality, infallibility and necessity of the divine foreknowledge.*

> *"Now therefore, returning to our proposition, let us press on with what we have begun etc."*

### Division of the text.

This is the second part of this whole part, in which the divine knowledge is treated. For with the first part finished — in which it [the divine knowledge] is treated as to its substance and in general — here it is treated as to its mode. And since the mode of noble cognition is twofold, namely certitude and perfection, that is, infallibility and immutability, therefore this part has two parts. In the first he treats of the infallibility or certitude of the foreknowledge, in the second indeed of its immutability or perfection, there[^1]: *"Furthermore, it is wont to be asked whether the knowledge of God etc."*

The first part pertains to the present distinction, in which the Master intends to inquire and to determine whether the divine foreknowledge infallibly posits the foreknown. And this distinction has two parts. In the first[^2] part, returning to his proposition because of the digression made before, he briefly recapitulates the things determined beforehand. In the second he pursues his principal proposition, there: *"Here arises a question not to be dissimulated etc."* And this part has two [parts]. In the first the Master inquires whether foreknowledge posits the foreknown by way of cause or of effect; in the second, whether by way of necessity, or of contingency or infallibility, in the last chapter, there: *"To this, however, [namely] what was said above etc."* The first part has two [parts]. In the first he raises objections on each side — namely, that foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown and likewise [its] effect, for and against. In the second he resolves [them], there: *"This therefore which seems a contradiction etc."* Likewise the second [part] also has two; in the first he raises objections, in the second he resolves [them], there: *"To which we reply, [namely] that that mode of speaking."*

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction two [matters] are principally asked.

First, concerning the divine foreknowledge as to causality.

Second, as to necessity.

And concerning the first, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether the divine foreknowledge is the cause of things.

Second, whether it is caused by things[^3].

---

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 omittunt *et*.

en: The codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 omit *et* ("and").

la: Ita codd. BCD; in aliis codd. et omnibus edd. *esse*.

en: Thus codd. BCD; in other codices and in all editions [the reading is] *esse*.

la: *Notae ad Commentarium.* — Supple cum Vat. infra distinct. 39:

en: *Notes to the Commentary.* — Supply, with the Vatican edition, below at distinction 39: ---