title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum eleemosyna sit facienda de rebus propriis, iuste acquisitis et necessariis

title_alt: Whether almsgiving must be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De modo satisfaciendi in speciali.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de modo satisfaciendi in speciali. Et circa hoc quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, de quibus debeat fieri eleemosyna.

Secundo, utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere.

Tertio, utrum contingat satisfacere oratione.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de restitutione.

### Quaestio I. *De quibus debeat fieri eleemosyna.*

Circa primum proceditur sic. Communiter dicitur, quod eleemosyna debet fieri de rebus propriis, iuste acquisitis et necessariis. Et quod solum de rebus propriis, videtur:

1. Quia dicit ius[^1], quod non potest alienari possessio nisi a proprio domino; sed cum eleemosyna datur, possessio alienatur, quia fit ipsius pauperis recipientis: ergo nullus potest dare eleemosynam, nisi qui habet proprium et super rem temporalem habet dominium.

2. Item, hoc probatur ex textu Bibliae, Proverbiorum tertio[^2]: *Honora Dominum de tua substantia, et de primitiis frugum tuarum da pauperibus.*

Quod autem solum de iuste acquisitis, ostenditur.

3. Ecclesiastici trigesimo quarto[^3]: *Immolantis ex iniquo oblatio est maculata;* et infra: *Dona iniquorum non probat Altissimus.*

4. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus[^4]: «Eleemosyna Redemptoris oculis placet, quae non ex illicitis, vel
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iniquitate congeritur, sed quae de rebus concessis et iuste acquisitis». Et iterum ipse dicit: «Non est computanda eleemosyna, si pauperibus dispensetur quod ex illicitis rebus acquiritur».

Item, quod de necessariis, videtur.

5. Illud enim non est satisfactorium, ad quod quis alias tenetur; sed quilibet tenetur ad dandum superflua pauperibus, quantumcumque sit sine peccato, Lucae undecimo[^5]: *Quod superest date eleemosynam:* ergo etc.

6. Item, Gregorius in homilia[^6] super illud: *Facite dignos fructus poenitentiae:* «Qui se novit nonnulla illicita commisisse debet a licitis abstinere»: ergo si abstinentia satisfactoria non est illa quae est ab illicitis, sed quae a licitis; videtur similiter, quod eleemosyna satisfactoria sit illa, non quae est de superfluis, sed quae de necessariis.

**Ad oppositum**, quod non debeat esse de necessariis, ut resolvendo sive destruendo incipiamus, videtur:

1. Quia unusquisque tenetur se magis quam alterum diligere[^7]: ergo tenetur sibi necessaria reservare.

2. Item, dare necessaria vitae humanae est supererogationis; sed nullus sacerdos potest imponere opera supererogationis: ergo nec talem eleemosynam. Si ergo eleemosyna illa, quae est imposita a sacerdote, est satisfactoria, non oportet, quod sit de necessariis.

Item, videtur, quod possit esse de iniuste acquisitis.

3. Quia Lucae decimo sexto[^8] dicitur: *Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis;* Glossa: «Iniquitas bene dispensata vertitur in iustitiam».

4. Item Augustinus, in Causa decima quarta, quaestione quinta[^9]: «Qui habetis aliquid de malo facite inde bonum».

Item, hic quaeritur, si meretrix, vel usurarius, vel aleator de lucro suo possint facere eleemosynam, cum omnes hi malo modo acquirant.

Item, videtur, quod non oporteat fieri ex propriis.

5. Quia filii Israel abstulerunt vasa Aegyptiorum, Exodi duodecimo[^10], et postea obtulerunt ea in usum tabernaculi, Exodi trigesimo quinto.

6. Item, si hoc esset verum, cum mulier et filius et monachus non habeant dominium; videtur, quod nullam eleemosynam possint facere; quod falsum est, cum magis teneantur esse hospitales, et frequenter mulieres plus dent[^11] quam viri.

> **Conclusio.** Eleemosyna, ut proprie sit satisfactoria, debet fieri de propriis, iuste acquisitis et necessariis secundum communem usum vivendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud est necessarium ad hoc, quod eleemosyna sit satisfactoria, scilicet quod ille qui tribuit, iusto eam titulo habeat et tenere et possidere possit; si enim aliter habeat, potius tenetur reddere quam dare.

Quod ergo quaeritur, utrum necesse sit eleemosynam dare de proprio; dicendum, quod aut dicitur proprium, quia habet principale dominium alienandi, aut quia ab alio habet sibi commissum officium administrandi. Primo modo simpliciter potest facere ille qui habet proprium; secundo modo non potest facere, superiore prohibente, ut monachus, qui administrat res et bona monasterii ex mandato abbatis, potest utique eleemosynam dare; si autem ille vetet, non potest nec debet. Unde Causa duodecima, quaestione prima[^12]: «Certum est, quod monachus nihil habere, vel dare, vel accipere sine superioris licentia debet», nisi forte ille qui indiget, sit in extrema necessitate; tunc enim non debet obedire abbati, quia manifeste faceret contra Deum. Similiter iudicandum est de muliere — si non habeat dotem, vel aliquid iuxta dotem — quod contra mandatum viri non potest eleemosynam facere, si conscientia dictat ei, quod nullo modo velit; sed non debet sibi formare conscientiam, quod vir prohibeat medium, sed superfluitatem, nisi manifeste viderit voluntatem viri ad oppositum.

5. Si ergo obiiciatur de filiis Israel, qui furati sunt; dicendum, quod Dominus transtulit dominium, et revera non fuit ibi furtum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt malae conditionis monachi; dicendum, quod non, quia unica temporalium dimissione, si vere dimiserunt temporalia, meruerunt tantum, quantum in multis; et praeterea, bona voluntas supplet quod deest ex manu.
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Ad illud quod quaeritur de male acquisitis, dicendum, quod quaedam sunt male acquisita, in quibus transfertur dominium, et non competit repetitio; et talia non est necesse restitui et possunt licite retineri, ut pretium prostibuli et lucrum histrionis. Et talia possunt dari in eleemosynam, sed tamen non debent recipi in oblationem, si sit publicum, propter reverentiam altaris et confusionem peccati, ut resipiscant. Et hoc est quod dicitur Deuteronomii vigesimo tertio[^13]: *Non offeres mercedem prostibuli.* — Quaedam autem sunt, in quibus non transfertur dominium, sed competit repetitio, ut in furto et rapina; et de talibus non potest fieri nec oblatio nec eleemosyna, sed debet fieri restitutio. — Ad huiusmodi autem genus reducuntur omnia, quae iniusto titulo et mala fide possidentur, quia iniustus titulus pro nullo habendus est. Malae autem fidei possessor dicitur qui contra legum interdicta mercatur[^14]; talia sunt quae habentur per simoniam et usuram; et ideo de talibus nullo modo nec potest nec debet fieri eleemosyna.

Si vero quaeratur de aleatore, dicendum est generaliter, quod malae fidei possessor est et iniusto possidet titulo; et ideo nullo modo potest nec debet sibi tenere quod lucratus est, cum talis ludus sit turpis et reprobatus et contra Deum et contra omnia iura[^15]. — Utrum tamen teneatur restituere, distinguunt aliqui; quia aut ille, penes quem lucratus est, est talis persona, quae rebus suis praeesse non potest, ut puta minor sive pupillus, surdus, mutus, perpetuo morbo languidus; et sic tenetur restituere[^16]. Si autem sit talis persona, quae potuit amittere; aut socius tractus est ab illo et inductus, aut non. Si tractus fuit ab illo, non tenetur illi restituere, quia illi non competit repetitio in vindictam peccati, sed potest inde facere eleemosynam. Si autem ipse traxit eum, non potest eleemosynam facere, sed tenetur restituere, saltem in foro conscientiae, quia, licet nullus velit amittere, tamen qui non vult amittere nec ludere, sed inducitur, minus culpabilis videtur, et alius, qui inducit, magis; et ideo iste non debet damnificari, nec auctor nec inductor in aliquo meliorari. Nulli tamen licet ex hoc aliquid lucri acquisiti in proprios usus convertere.

Similiter iudicandum de torneamentis et dicendum, quod in illis pactionibus, quas habent inter se, bona non transferuntur invicem, sed in usus pauperum convertuntur propter ludi inhonestatem et iuris interdictionem[^17].

Ex his patent obiecta. Quod enim dicitur, quod de iniquo non potest fieri eleemosyna; intelligitur de eo quod inique possidetur et iniusto titulo.

Quod obiicitur ad contrarium procedit secundum aliam viam.

Ad illud quod quaeritur[^18] de necessariis et superfluis, dicendum, quod necessarium dicitur dupliciter: vel secundum naturae arctitudinem vel secundum communem usum vivendi. Si secundum arctitudinem; non tenetur, nec oportet ei imponi, qui peccavit; quia hoc est perfectionis illorum qui totum victum exspectant a Christo, sicut sunt viri, qui sunt in statu perfecto; et ideo, si fiat eleemosyna, debet fieri de eo quod superest huic necessario, et bene est satisfactoria. — Alio modo dicitur necessarium, quod expedit homini secundum communem modum vivendi. De quo dicit Augustinus[^19], quod «multa superflua habere probabimur, si sola necessaria teneamus»; et de tali fit proprie eleemosyna satisfactoria; de superfluo vero non fit, quantum est de rigore iustitiae. — Tamen credo, quod divinae misericordiae benignitas tanta est, quod totum acceptat et quasi pro nihilo salvat nos[^20]. — Et sic patet responsio ad utramque partem.

english:
### Article II. *On the manner of making satisfaction in particular.*

Consequently, as to the second article, the question is asked concerning the manner of making satisfaction in particular. And concerning this four things are asked.

First it is asked, from what goods almsgiving ought to be done.

Second, whether one may make satisfaction by fasting.

Third, whether one may make satisfaction by prayer.

Fourth and last, the question is asked concerning restitution.

### Question I. *From what goods almsgiving ought to be done.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. It is commonly said that almsgiving ought to be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary. And that it must be only from one's own goods, seems [the case]:

1. Because the law says[^1] that a possession cannot be alienated except by its proper owner; but when alms are given, the possession is alienated, since it becomes the property of the poor man receiving it: therefore no one can give alms except the one who has property and has ownership over the temporal thing.

2. Likewise, this is proved from the text of the Bible, Proverbs the third chapter[^2]: *Honor the Lord with thy substance, and give to the poor of the firstfruits of thy crops.*

That it must be only from goods justly acquired is shown.

3. Ecclesiasticus the thirty-fourth chapter[^3]: *The offering of one who sacrifices from what is unjust is defiled;* and below: *The Most High does not approve the gifts of the unjust.*

4. Likewise, Gregory in the *Morals*[^4]: «That alms pleases the eyes of the Redeemer which is gathered not from unlawful things, or
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from iniquity, but which is from things granted and justly acquired». And again he says: «It is not to be reckoned as alms, if what is acquired from unlawful things is dispensed to the poor».

Likewise, that it must be from necessary goods, seems [the case].

5. For that is not satisfactory to which one is otherwise bound; but everyone is bound to give his superfluous goods to the poor, however much this is without sin, Luke the eleventh chapter[^5]: *That which remaineth, give alms:* therefore etc.

6. Likewise, Gregory in the homily[^6] upon that text: *Bring forth fruits worthy of penance:* «He who knows that he has committed certain unlawful things ought to abstain from things lawful»: therefore if the satisfactory abstinence is not that which is from unlawful things, but that which is from lawful things; it seems likewise that the satisfactory almsgiving is that, not which is from superfluous goods, but which is from necessary goods.

**On the contrary**, that it ought not to be from necessary goods — that we may begin by resolving or destroying — it seems:

1. Because each one is bound to love himself more than another[^7]: therefore he is bound to keep necessary goods for himself.

2. Likewise, to give the necessities of human life is a matter of supererogation; but no priest can impose works of supererogation: therefore neither such almsgiving. If, then, that almsgiving which is imposed by a priest is satisfactory, it is not required that it be from necessary goods.

Likewise, it seems that it can be from goods unjustly acquired.

3. Because in Luke the sixteenth chapter[^8] it is said: *Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity;* the Gloss: «Iniquity well dispensed is turned into justice».

4. Likewise Augustine, in Cause fourteen, question five[^9]: «You who have something from evil, make from it good».

Likewise, here it is asked, whether a harlot, or a usurer, or a gambler can make alms from his gain, since all these acquire by an evil manner.

Likewise, it seems that it need not be done from one's own goods.

5. Because the children of Israel took away the vessels of the Egyptians, Exodus the twelfth chapter[^10], and afterward offered them for the use of the tabernacle, Exodus the thirty-fifth chapter.

6. Likewise, if this were true, since a wife and a son and a monk have no ownership; it seems that they can make no alms; which is false, since they are the more bound to be hospitable, and wives frequently give[^11] more than husbands.

> **Conclusion.** Almsgiving, in order that it be properly satisfactory, ought to be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary according to the common manner of living.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is necessary for almsgiving to be satisfactory, namely that the one who bestows it should hold it by a just title and be able to keep and possess it; for if he has it otherwise, he is bound rather to restore it than to give it.

As to what is asked, then, whether it is necessary to give alms from one's own: it must be said that a thing is called one's own either because one has the principal ownership of alienating it, or because from another one has entrusted to oneself the office of administering it. In the first way the one who has property can simply do it; in the second way he cannot do it when his superior forbids, as a monk, who administers the goods and property of the monastery by the abbot's mandate, can indeed give alms; but if the abbot forbids it, he cannot and ought not. Hence Cause twelve, question one[^12]: «It is certain that a monk ought to have nothing, or give, or receive without the superior's leave», unless perhaps the one who is in need is in extreme necessity; for then he ought not to obey the abbot, since he would manifestly act against God. Similarly it must be judged concerning a wife — if she has no dowry, or anything in lieu of a dowry — that against her husband's mandate she cannot make alms, if her conscience dictates to her that he in no way wills it; but she ought not to form for herself the conscience that her husband forbids what is moderate, but [only] what is superfluous, unless she manifestly sees the husband's will to the contrary.

5. If, then, the objection is made concerning the children of Israel, who stole; it must be said that the Lord transferred the ownership, and in truth there was no theft there.

6. To the objection that monks are of an evil condition; it must be said that they are not, because by the single renunciation of temporal things, if they have truly renounced temporal goods, they have merited as much as in many things; and besides, good will supplies what is lacking from the hand.
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To what is asked concerning ill-gotten goods, it must be said that some things are ill-gotten in which ownership is transferred and there is no right of recovery; and such things need not be restored and can lawfully be retained, like the wage of prostitution and the gain of a stage-player. And such things can be given in alms, but nevertheless ought not to be received as an offering, if it is public, on account of reverence for the altar and the shame of the sin, that they may come to their senses. And this is what is said in Deuteronomy the twenty-third chapter[^13]: *Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet.* — But some things are such in which ownership is not transferred, but there is a right of recovery, as in theft and robbery; and from such things neither an offering nor an alms can be made, but restitution must be made. — And to this kind are reduced all things that are possessed by an unjust title and in bad faith, since an unjust title is to be held as nothing. But a possessor in bad faith is said to be one who trades contrary to the prohibitions of the laws[^14]; such are the things had through simony and usury; and therefore from such things in no way can or ought alms be made.

But if the question is raised concerning a gambler, it must be said generally that he is a possessor in bad faith and possesses by an unjust title; and therefore in no way can or ought he keep for himself what he has won, since such play is base and reprobated and against God and against all laws[^15]. — Yet whether he is bound to make restitution, some distinguish; because either the person with whom he won is such a person as cannot manage his own affairs, such as a minor or ward, deaf, dumb, perpetually wasted by sickness; and thus he is bound to restore[^16]. But if it is such a person as could have lost; then either the companion was drawn in and induced by him, or not. If he was drawn in by him, he is not bound to restore to him, since there is no right of recovery for him in punishment of his sin, but he can make alms from it. But if he himself drew him in, he cannot make alms, but is bound to restore, at least in the court of conscience, since, although no one wishes to lose, yet he who does not wish to lose nor to play but is induced seems less culpable, and the other, who induces, more so; and therefore the latter ought not to be harmed, nor the author nor the inducer in any respect bettered. To no one, however, is it lawful from this to convert any of the gain acquired to his own uses.

Similarly it must be judged concerning tournaments, and it must be said that in those agreements which they make among themselves, goods are not transferred to one another but are converted to the uses of the poor, on account of the dishonor of the play and the interdiction of the law[^17].

From these things the objections are clear. For what is said, that alms cannot be made from what is unjust, is understood of that which is possessed unjustly and by an unjust title.

What is objected to the contrary proceeds by another way.

To what is asked[^18] concerning necessary and superfluous goods, it must be said that the necessary is spoken of in two ways: either according to the strictness of nature, or according to the common manner of living. If according to strictness; one is not bound, nor ought it to be imposed on the one who has sinned; because this belongs to the perfection of those who await their whole sustenance from Christ, such as are men who are in the state of perfection; and therefore, if alms be made, it ought to be made from what is over and above this necessary, and it is indeed satisfactory. — In another way the necessary is spoken of, namely what is expedient for a man according to the common manner of living. Of which Augustine says[^19], that «we shall be shown to have much superfluous, if we keep only the necessary»; and from such goods properly satisfactory alms is made; but from the superfluous it is not made, so far as concerns the rigor of justice. — Yet I believe that the kindness of the divine mercy is so great that it accepts the whole and saves us as if for nothing[^20]. — And thus the reply to both parts is clear.

la: Respicitur Luc. 16, 9: *Facite vobis amicos* etc. — In fine solut. cod. B addit: *Secundum ergo [hoc] dicendum, quod considerando dignitatem eius quod est satisfactorium, magis est satisfactoria oratio quam eleemosyna vel ieiunium; sed respiciendo fructum eius quod est satisfactorium, magis satisfactoria est eleemosyna, quia fructuosior; et hoc patet. Per largitionem enim eleemosynae acquirit homo sibi multos debitores, quos obligat ad orandum pro se; ipsi vero, quia plures sunt et in caritate, possunt ei gratiam impetrare, si non habet, vel si habet, augmentum gratiae. Licet enim oratio existentis in mortali non sit Deo accepta pro se, tamen exauditur quandoque, quando plures orant pro ipso, qui in caritate sunt, et possunt ei gratiam impetrare ex merito congrui, non condigni [cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.]. Sicut enim eleemosyna corporalis attenditur in largitione istarum rerum materialium, sic oratio facta pro alio est eleemosyna spiritualis; et congruum est, quod sicut ille reficit eos corporaliter per largitionem eleemosynae corporalis, sic ille reficiatur spiritualiter pro orationibus eorum, et hoc vel ad impetrationem gratiae vel augmenti in gratia. In istis vero attenditur magnus fructus; et ideo fructuosior est eleemosyna quam ieiunium vel oratio; et hoc patet; quia ieiunium et oratio valent praecipue facienti ea, sed eleemosyna valet non solum facienti eam, sed etiam aliis. — S. Bonav. non respondet ad ultimam obiectionem, quia solutio eius colligitur ex solut. ad 4.*

en: Reference is to Luke 16:9: *Make to yourselves friends* etc. — At the end of the solution codex B adds: «Therefore, accordingly, it must be said that, considering the dignity of that which is satisfactory, prayer is more satisfactory than alms or fasting; but considering the fruit of that which is satisfactory, alms is more satisfactory, because more fruitful; and this is clear. For by the bestowal of alms a man acquires for himself many debtors, whom he obligates to pray for him; and they, since they are many and in charity, can obtain grace for him, if he has it not, or, if he has it, an increase of grace. For although the prayer of one existing in mortal sin is not accepted by God on his own behalf, yet it is sometimes heard, when many who are in charity pray for him and can obtain grace for him by the merit of congruity, not of condignity [cf. *II Sent.* d. 27, a. 2, q. 2]. For just as corporal almsgiving is regarded in the bestowal of those material things, so prayer made for another is a spiritual alms; and it is fitting that, as one refreshes them corporally by the bestowal of corporal alms, so he is refreshed spiritually by their prayers, and this either toward the obtaining of grace or of increase in grace. In these things indeed a great fruit is regarded; and therefore alms is more fruitful than fasting or prayer; and this is clear; because fasting and prayer avail chiefly the one doing them, but alms avails not only the one doing it but also others. — St. Bonaventure does not reply to the last objection, since its solution is gathered from the reply to [argument] 4.»

la: Vers. 9, ubi Vulgata finem textus exhibet sic: *et de primitiis omnium* [ita etiam cod. H] *frugum tuarum* ita ei.

en: Verse 9, where the Vulgate gives the end of the text thus: «and of the firstfruits of all [so also cod. H] thy crops» and so on.

la: Vers. 21. — Seq. textus ibid. v. 23.

en: Verse 21. — The following text [is] ibid. v. 23.

la: Potius in *Registro* epist. lib. IX. Indict. 2. epist. 106: *Eleemosyna Redemptoris nostri oculis illa placet, quae non de illicitis et iniquitate... et bene acquisitis impenditur* [cfr. Gratian. C. *Eleemosyna* (7.), C. 14. q. 5]. In secundo loco, qui habetur ibid. paulo superius et in Gratian. C. *Non est putanda* (27.), C. 1. q. 1, textus originalis substituit *reputanda* pro *computanda* et accipitur pro *acquiritur*.

en: Rather in the *Register* of letters, bk. IX, Indiction 2, epist. 106: «That alms pleases the eyes of our Redeemer which is bestowed not from unlawful things and iniquity... and from goods well acquired» [cf. Gratian, c. *Eleemosyna* (7.), C. 14 q. 5]. In the second place, which is found ibid. a little above and in Gratian, c. *Non est putanda* (27.), C. 1 q. 1, the original text substitutes *reputanda* for *computanda* and takes [it] for *acquiritur*.

la: Libr. 1. *Homil. in Evang.* homil. 20. (super Luc. 3, 8.) n. 8, non iisdem verbis, quae potius inveniuntur ibid. lib. 11. homil. 34. n. 16: *Quia enim se illicita perpetrasse meminerat, etiam a licitis abstinebat.*

en: Bk. 1 of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 20 (on Luke 3:8) n. 8, not in the same words, which are rather found ibid. bk. 11, homily 34, n. 16: «For because he remembered that he had perpetrated unlawful things, he abstained even from lawful ones.»

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 29. q. 3.

en: Cf. *III Sent.* d. 29, q. 3.

la: Vers. 9. — *Glossa,* quae *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex Hieron., Epist. 121. (alias 151.) c. 6. (sive q. 6.). Cfr. Beda, in hunc loc.

en: Verse 9. — The *Gloss,* which is the *ordinary* one in Strabo and Lyra, is taken from Jerome, Epist. 121 (otherwise 151) c. 6 (or q. 6). Cf. Bede, on this passage.

la: Can. *Qui habet* (M.), sumtus ex Serm. 113. (alias 35. de verbis Domini...), n. 3. — Codd. et edd. *Augustinus in* lib. *quaest.* L. q. 33. m. 2. a. 2: *Praeterea Augustinus,* habetur ibid. q. XIV; secuti sumus Alex. et Ital.

en: Canon *Qui habet* (M.), taken from Sermon 113 (otherwise 35, *On the words of the Lord*...), n. 3. — The codices and editions [read] *Augustine in* the book of *Questions* L., q. 33, m. 2, a. 2: «Moreover Augustine,» found ibid. q. XIV; we followed Alexander and the Italian [edition]. [?]

la: Vers. 35. seq. — Seq. locus ibid. 35, 22.

en: Verse 35 ff. — The following passage [is] ibid. 35, 22.

la: Edd. *debent.*

en: The editions [read] *debent* (ought).

la: Can. *Non dicatis* (M.), § 2; quod sumtum est ex S. August., *Regulae clericis traditae fragmentum* (inter opera). Cfr. C. *Quia tua* (8.). Subinde respicitur C. *Non satis est* (14.), d. 86, in quo de praecepto succurrendi alteri in extrema necessitate constituto, et C. *Quae contra mores* (2.), d. 8, ubi docetur, nulli licere contra ius naturale agere, et Dei praeceptum praevalere mandatis hominum.

en: Canon *Non dicatis* (M.), § 2; which is taken from St. Augustine, *Fragment of the Rule handed down to clerics* (among his works). Cf. c. *Quia tua* (8.). Thereupon reference is made to c. *Non satis est* (14.), d. 86, in which [it treats] of the precept of succoring another set in extreme necessity, and c. *Quae contra mores* (2.), d. 8, where it is taught that it is lawful to none to act against the natural law, and that God's precept prevails over the mandates of men.

la: Vers. 18. — Superius pro *peccati* cod. H *peccatoris.*

en: Verse 18. — Above, for *peccati* (of the sin) cod. H [reads] *peccatoris* (of the sinner).

la: Regula iuris 82. in VI: *Qui contra iura mercatur bonam fidem praesumitur non habere.*

en: Rule of law 82 in the [Liber] Sextus: «He who trades contrary to the laws is presumed not to have good faith».

la: Cfr. C. *Episcopus aut presbyter* (1.), d. 35; C. *Clerici officia* (13.), X. de Vita et honest. cleric. (lib. III. tit. 1.), et C. *Inter dilectos* (M.), X. de Excessibus praelat. (lib. V. tit. 31.). De lege civili cfr. Lex fi. de relig. et sumt. fun. lib. III. C. tit. 44. Vide etiam Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 1, ubi ait: *At aleator, fur seu spoliator et latro ex illiberalibus etiam ipsi sunt, cum turpi lucro dediti sint; utrique enim lucri causa negotiantur et opprobria sustinent; et hi quidem pericula maxima acceptionis causa subeunt, illi ab amicis, quibus dare deberent, lucrantur; utrique igitur, cum unde non oportet velint lucrum comparare, turpi lucro dediti sunt, atque omnes huiuscemodi acceptiones sunt illiberales.*

en: Cf. c. *Episcopus aut presbyter* (1.), d. 35; c. *Clerici officia* (13.), X. *On the life and honesty of clerics* (bk. III, tit. 1), and c. *Inter dilectos* (M.), X. *On the excesses of prelates* (bk. V, tit. 31). On civil law cf. the last Law *On religion and funeral expenses*, bk. III of the Code, tit. 44. See also Aristotle, *Ethics* IV, c. 1, where he says: «But the gambler, the thief or despoiler and the robber are also of the illiberal, since they are given to base gain; for both sorts trade for the sake of gain and endure reproaches; and the latter undergo the greatest dangers for the sake of their takings, while the former make gain from friends, to whom they ought rather to give; both therefore, since they wish to procure gain whence one ought not, are given to base gain, and all takings of this kind are illiberal.»

la: Hoc constat ex Paul. leg. P. de aleae lusu et aleat. lib. II. P. tit. 3. — Paulo inferius ex codd. B E H Y supplevimus *socius,* pro quo alii codd. *potius.*

en: This is established from Paul, Law P., *On the playing of dice and gamblers*, bk. II, P. tit. 3. — A little below, from codices B E H Y we supplied *socius* (companion), for which other codices [read] *potius* (rather).

la: Torneamenta (cfr. supra pag. 36, nota 8.) prohibentur a Concilio Lateran. sub Alexandro III.; vide C. *Felicis memoriae* Innocentii (1.), X. de Torneamentis (lib. V. tit. 13.), et C. *Porro si clericus* (1.), X. de Clericis pugnant. in duello (lib. V. tit. 14.).

en: Tournaments (cf. above p. 36, note 8) are forbidden by the Lateran Council under Alexander III; see c. *Felicis memoriae* of Innocent (1.), X. *On tournaments* (bk. V, tit. 13), and c. *Porro si clericus* (1.), X. *On clerics fighting in a duel* (bk. V, tit. 14).

la: Edd. *obiicitur.*

en: The editions [read] *obiicitur* (is objected).

la: *Enarrat. in Ps.* 147. n. 12: *Multa autem superflua habemus, si nonnisi necessaria teneamus; nam si inania quaeramus, nihil sufficit.*

en: *Exposition on Psalm* 147, n. 12: «But we have much superfluous, if we keep only the necessary; for if we seek empty things, nothing suffices.»

la: Psalm. 55, 8: *Pro nihilo salvos facies illos.*

en: Psalm 55:8: «Thou shalt save them for nothing.» [Vulg. 55:8 / Heb. 56:7]

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solutione quatuor quaestionum huius articuli antiqui Scholastici satis conveniunt, etiam quoad casus de restitutione in I. quaestione factos, si excipias ea quae paulo severius docet S. Bonav. de obligatione restituendi lucri in ludis et torneamentis facti. Nam Alex. Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 3. a. 3. § 6.) aliique antiqui et recentiores casuistae cum S. Alphonso (Theol. moral. III. tr. 5. dub. 13. n. 887. seqq.) communissime docent, contractus ludorum vetitorum ante sententiam iudicis non esse per se irritos, nec lucrum inde perceptum esse restituendum. De his annexisque quaestionibus diffuse disputat Alex. Hal. S. p. IV. qq. 24-35, aliique Scholastici de tribus operum bonorum speciebus plures quaestiones solvunt.

**II.** De I. quaestione sive de eleemosyna vide hic dub. 2-7; super: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 33. m. 2. a. 1-6; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1-6; S. II. II. q. 32. a. 1-10. — IB. Albert., hic a. 14-26. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic n. 2. q. 1-8; — Durand., hic q. 7. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — De eadem: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 26. m. 1-5, praesertim m. 3. a. 4. — Scot., Quodl. q. 20. n. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1-7; S. II. II. q. 33. a. 1-17. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1-8. — Durand., hic q. 12. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. — De 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 28. m. 1-5. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1-4; S. II. II. q. 147. a. 1-8. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1-8. — Durand., hic q. 9. 10. 11. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — In 3. quaestione solvenda Gulielm. Antissiod. (Sum. p. IV. tr. 6. q. 2.) a Ss. Bonav., Thoma aliisque dissentit, cum distinguat inter orationem doceatque: «Quaedam enim oratio totaliter delectabilis est, sicut oratio viri contemplativi, quae est immediate ad gaudia aeterna; et talis oratio non est poenalis, unde non est satisfactoria». Quoad 4. quaestionem etiam S. Thom. primum opinionem et praesertim rationem adiectam improbat, et similiter secundam; convenit autem cum S. Bonav., quod restitutio sit satisfactio improprie accepta et quoddam praeambulum ad eam. Sed Dionys. Carth. sustinet, actum restitutionis, dummodo fiat in caritate, semper habere vim satisfactoriam; quod, ut videtur, nec illi antiqui doctores penitus negare voluerunt. De 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 24. m. 3. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1; cfr. q. 2-8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. in principio.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the solution of the four questions of this article the ancient Scholastics agree well enough, even as to the cases of restitution treated in the first question, if you except those things which St. Bonaventure teaches somewhat more severely concerning the obligation of restoring gain made in games and tournaments. For Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. IV. q. 24. m. 3. a. 3. § 6.) and other ancient and more recent casuists, together with St. Alphonsus (*Theol. moral.* III. tr. 5. dub. 13. n. 887. ff.) most commonly teach that the contracts of forbidden games before the judge's sentence are not of themselves void, nor is the gain thence received to be restored. On these and connected questions Alexander of Hales disputes at length, *Summa* p. IV. qq. 24-35, and other Scholastics solve several questions concerning the three kinds of good works.

**II.** On the first question, that is, on almsgiving, see here dub. 2-7; above: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 33. m. 2. a. 1-6; St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1-6; *Summa* II-II q. 32. a. 1-10. — Likewise Albert, here a. 14-26. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the two following questions, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here n. 2. q. 1-8; — Durandus, here q. 7. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — On the same: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 26. m. 1-5, especially m. 3. a. 4. — Scotus, *Quodl.* q. 20. n. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 4. a. 1-7; *Summa* II-II q. 33. a. 1-17. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 1-8. — Durandus, here q. 12. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7. — On the second question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 28. m. 1-5. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1-4; *Summa* II-II q. 147. a. 1-8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 8. q. 1-8. — Durandus, here q. 9. 10. 11. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — In solving the third question William of Auxerre (*Summa* p. IV. tr. 6. q. 2.) dissents from Saints Bonaventure, Thomas, and others, since he distinguishes among kinds of prayer and teaches: «For some prayer is wholly delightful, such as the prayer of a contemplative man, which is directly toward eternal joys; and such prayer is not penal, hence it is not satisfactory». As to the fourth question, St. Thomas too disapproves first the opinion and especially the reason added to it, and likewise the second; but he agrees with St. Bonaventure that restitution is satisfaction improperly understood and a certain preamble to it. But Dionysius the Carthusian holds that the act of restitution, provided it be done in charity, always has satisfactory force; which, as it seems, not even those ancient doctors wished altogether to deny. On the fourth question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 24. m. 3. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4-3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5. q. 1; cfr. q. 2-8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. at the beginning.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol IV two-column PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p369-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol4-p370-*`, `vol4-p371-*` (VOL II OVERRIDE: the IA djvu OCR for raw lines 42216–42563 is cascade-shattered with heavy two-column bleed, so the PDF bands are authoritative; OCR used only to cross-check footnote-anchor spacing). Offset pdf = printed + 20.
- **Page span correction.** The brief estimated pp. 368–370, but **p. 368 is entirely the preceding question (Art. I, q. 4, *De oratione* — oratio/ieiunium/eleemosyna as *partes satisfactionis*).** The running head on p. 369 reads "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. I"; the ARTICULUS II opener + QUAESTIO I begin at the foot of p. 369-L. This chunk's true span is **pp. 369–371** (pdf 389–391). Nothing on p. 368 belongs here, so there is no cross-chunk footer hand-off backward.
- **Articulus II opener** folds into this q1 per the locked chunking convention (no standalone divisio chunk for the four-question listing).
- **Scholion ownership.** The SCHOLION on p. 371 is the **Articulus II scholion covering all four questions** (§I = general note on the four questions + the restitution cases; §II = the per-question literature survey "De I. quaestione… De 2. quaestione… In 3. quaestione… De 4. quaestione"). Rendered IN FULL here (body first, scholion last). **q2 (ieiunium), q3 (oratio), q4 (restitutio) have NO standalone scholion of their own — they should point back to this chunk's scholion.**
- **Footnote numbering.** Quaracchi restarts footers per printed page (p. 369: 1–9 + symbol notes folded; p. 370: notes 1–12 → here 5–12; p. 371: notes 1–8 → here 13–20). Renumbered sequentially 1–20 for unique markers; per-page origin noted above.
- **[?] flags:** [^9] — the Augustine canon attribution (*Qui habet* / book of *Questions* q. 33 vs q. XIV) is itself a Quaracchi editorial tangle reporting codex/edition divergence; rendered as printed, flagged as an editorially uncertain source citation, not an OCR ambiguity.
- **Hand-off to q2 (bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-a2-q2, *Utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere*):** begins raw line 42564 / printed p. 371 R-foot continuing onto p. 372. q2 has no own scholion — point to this chunk's Articulus II scholion §II ("De 2. quaestione…").


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 372 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere. Et quod sic, videtur: quia, si « satisfacere est causas peccatorum excidere » et « Deo honorem per poenam reddere »[^1]; cum in ieiunio carnis incentiva excidantur, et homo se ipsum puniat, patet etc.

**Contra:**

1. Ioel secundo[^2]: *Scindite corda vestra et non vestimenta vestra:* ergo non facit vim Deus in afflictione carnis, sed mentis.

2. Item, primae ad Timotheum quarto[^3]: *Corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est;* sed satisfactio multum: ergo etc.

3. Item, cum satisfacere sit causas excidere peccatorum, illud punire est satisfacere, quod est causa peccati: sed hoc est cor, non os vel caro, Matthaei decimo quinto[^4]: *Nihil quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem, sed de corde exeunt* etc.

4. Item, iudex iustus puniendo non animadvertit in instrumentum, sed in auctorem sceleris — unde non punitur gladius, sed homicida — ergo cum caro non sit nisi sicut instrumentum motum, patet[^5] etc.

5. Item, caro est inimicus nostri spiritus, ad Galatas quinto[^6]: *Haec sibi invicem adversantur;* sed dicitur Matthaei quinto: *Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite* etc.

6. Item, quod commune est apud omnes est naturale; sed dicitur ad Ephesios quinto[^7]: *Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit:* ergo naturale est carnem fovere: ergo affligere est contra naturam. Sed poenitentia est regressio ab eo quod est praeter naturam: ergo ieiunium non est ad satisfaciendum in poenitentia.

7. Item, qui carnem affligit amittit vitam et accelerat mortem, quia est in eo maior consumtio et minor restauratio; sed qui accelerat mortem est homicida, ita etiam, quod, si longo tempore, non refert. Unde Hieronymus[^8]: « Non refert, utrum parvo tempore vel magno te interimas »: ergo qui ieiunat est homicida.

8. Item, omne opus discretum et virtuosum consistit in medio[^9]; sed ieiunium non consistit in medio, immo declinat ad indigentiam: ergo nec poenitentiae est nec virtutis.

### Conclusio.

> *Ieiunium est opus satisfactorium.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ieiunium est opus satisfactorium, secundum quod ipse Dominus di-
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cit Matthaei decimo septimo[^10]: *Hoc genus daemoniorum non eiicitur nisi in oratione et ieiunio.* Hoc est, inquam, satisfactorium liberando a poena, cum sit poenale; et Deo est placitum, quia corporis et spiritus est reordinativum: ut corpus spiritui non repugnet contumaciter, Proverbiorum vigesimo nono: *Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, sentiet illum contumacem;* ut spiritui subiiciatur totaliter, primae ad Corinthios nono: *Castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo* etc.; ut non crucietur aeternaliter, Ecclesiastici vigesimo: *Est qui multa redimit modico pretio,* et Ezechielis quarto: *Diem pro anno dedi tibi;* ut glorificetur aeternaliter, secundae ad Corinthios quarto: *Id quod est in praesenti momentaneum et leve tribulationis nostrae* etc.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non placet Deo etc.; dicendum, quod Deo non placet afflictio carnis sive eius maceratio secundum se, sed in quantum in ea punitur spiritus — quia « dolor non est carnis, sed animae in carne », ut dicit Augustinus[^11] — et in quantum talis poena procedit a poena doloris spiritualis, vel non, sicut hypocrita, exterius tantum puniat; et contra hoc est illud Ioelis, quia non dolebant animo, sed signo.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad modicum valet; dicendum, quod hoc est, vel quia uni soli vel ad modicum comparatione pietatis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caro non est causa; dicendum, quod etsi non sit causa, est tamen occasio; occasiones autem sunt praecidendae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est instrumentum; dicendum, quod duplex est instrumentum, scilicet separatum, et hoc non est puniendum; et coniunctum, quale est caro, et hoc sic, quia, hoc punito, punitur spiritus.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fovendus est inimicus; dicendum, quod caro fovenda est et servanda, sed inimicitia carnis non est fovenda, immo ad concordiam spiritus revocanda; et quia hoc fit per ieiunium et flagella, ideo est punienda. — Et per hoc patet, quod naturale est carnem diligere et fovere, sed carnis lasciviam fovere est corruptionis et vitii.

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diminuit vitam; dicendum, quod diminuere vitam vel accelerare mortem, aut est ex intentione, aut praeter. Si ex intentione, peccatum est; et sic intelligit Hieronymus. Aut praeter intentionem, et tunc aut dando operam rei licitae, aut non dando licitae, vel utili, sed supervacaneae, vel malae. Primo modo non est peccatum, sed secundo — tamen dicunt aliqui, quod abstinentia non accelerat mortem; sed tamen non credo, immo gravis poenitentia bene accelerat.

*Ad 8.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est medium in ieiunio; dicendum, quod immo; sed hoc non est medium sobrietatis, sed medium iustitiae; quia ieiunio punit quis suam carnem; sed in hac punitione servandum est ita medium, ut nec nimis lente puniat, ita quod vitia carnis vivant, nec ita acerbe, ut natura deficiat. Unde Bernardus[^12]: « Oportet carnem reprimere, non exstinguere ». Nec istud impedit, quin sit medium, quia ad extremum declinat. Nam in patientia medium est fere omnia sustinere, in continentia etiam semper abstinere.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether one can make satisfaction by fasting.*

Secondly it is asked whether one can make satisfaction by fasting. And that one can, seems [the case]: because, if « to make satisfaction is to cut away the causes of sins » and « to render honor to God by punishment »[^1]; since in fasting the incentives of the flesh are cut away, and a person punishes himself, it is clear, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Joel chapter two[^2]: *Rend your hearts and not your garments:* therefore God does not lay weight upon the affliction of the flesh, but of the mind.

2. Likewise, First Timothy chapter four[^3]: *Bodily exercise is profitable to little;* but satisfaction much: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, since to make satisfaction is to cut away the causes of sins, then to punish that which is the cause of sin is to make satisfaction: but this is the heart, not the mouth or the flesh, Matthew chapter fifteen[^4]: *Not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man, but from the heart proceed* etc.

4. Likewise, a just judge in punishing does not look to the instrument, but to the author of the crime — whence the sword is not punished, but the murderer — therefore since the flesh is nothing but as a moved instrument, it is clear[^5] etc.

5. Likewise, the flesh is the enemy of our spirit, Galatians chapter five[^6]: *These are contrary to one another;* but it is said in Matthew chapter five: *Love your enemies, do good* etc.

6. Likewise, what is common among all is natural; but it is said in Ephesians chapter five[^7]: *No one ever hated his own flesh:* therefore it is natural to cherish the flesh: therefore to afflict it is against nature. But penance is a return from that which is beside nature: therefore fasting is not for making satisfaction in penance.

7. Likewise, whoever afflicts the flesh loses life and hastens death, because in him there is a greater consumption and a lesser restoration; but whoever hastens death is a homicide, and so too, that, if [done] over a long time, it makes no difference. Whence Jerome[^8]: « It makes no difference whether you destroy yourself over a little time or a great »: therefore whoever fasts is a homicide.

8. Likewise, every discreet and virtuous work consists in a mean[^9]; but fasting does not consist in a mean, indeed it inclines toward want: therefore it belongs neither to penance nor to virtue.

### Conclusion.

> *Fasting is a satisfactory work.*

**I respond:** It must be said that fasting is a satisfactory work, according as the Lord himself says, Matthew chapter seventeen[^10]: *This kind of demons is not cast out except by prayer and fasting.* This, I say, is satisfactory in freeing from punishment, since it is penal; and it is pleasing to God, because it reorders both body and spirit: that the body may not resist the spirit obstinately, Proverbs chapter twenty-nine: *He who from childhood nourishes his servant delicately, shall afterward find him stubborn;* that it may be wholly subjected to the spirit, First Corinthians chapter nine: *I chastise my body and bring it into subjection* etc.; that it may not be tormented eternally, Ecclesiasticus chapter twenty: *There is who redeems much for a small price,* and Ezekiel chapter four: *A day for a year I have given you;* that it may be glorified eternally, Second Corinthians chapter four: *That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation* etc.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that it does not please God etc.; it must be said that the affliction of the flesh or its mortification does not please God in itself, but insofar as in it the spirit is punished — because « pain is not of the flesh, but of the soul in the flesh », as Augustine says[^11] — and insofar as such punishment proceeds from the punishment of spiritual sorrow, or not, [where] like the hypocrite he punishes outwardly only; and against this is that saying of Joel, that they did not grieve in mind, but in sign.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it avails to little; it must be said that this is so, either because [it avails] to one alone or to little by comparison with piety.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the flesh is not the cause; it must be said that even if it is not the cause, it is nevertheless the occasion; and occasions are to be cut off.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is an instrument; it must be said that an instrument is twofold, namely separate, and this is not to be punished; and conjoined, such as the flesh is, and this thus [is to be punished], because, when this is punished, the spirit is punished.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the enemy is to be cherished; it must be said that the flesh is to be cherished and preserved, but the enmity of the flesh is not to be cherished, indeed it is to be recalled to the concord of the spirit; and because this is done through fasting and scourges, therefore it is to be punished. — And by this it is clear that it is natural to love and cherish the flesh, but to cherish the wantonness of the flesh is [a matter] of corruption and of vice.

*To 7.* To that which is objected, that it diminishes life; it must be said that to diminish life or to hasten death is either from intention, or beside [it]. If from intention, it is a sin; and thus Jerome understands [it]. Or beside intention, and then either in giving attention to a licit thing, or in not giving [attention] to a licit or useful [thing], but to a superfluous, or an evil one. In the first way it is not a sin, but in the second — yet some say that abstinence does not hasten death; but nevertheless I do not believe [this], indeed grave penance does well hasten [it].

*To 8.* To that which is objected, that there is no mean in fasting; it must be said that indeed [there is]; but this is not the mean of sobriety, but the mean of justice; because by fasting one punishes his own flesh; but in this punishment such a mean is to be kept, that he neither punish too slackly, so that the vices of the flesh live, nor so harshly, that nature fail. Whence Bernard[^12]: « It behooves [us] to repress the flesh, not to extinguish it ». Nor does this prevent its being a mean, because it inclines toward the extreme. For in patience the mean is to bear well-nigh all things, in continence also always to abstain.

---

la: Prima definitio est Augustini (cfr. supra a. I. q. I.), posterior secundum Anselmum (cfr. ibid. q. 2. fundam. I.). — De excisione incentivorum carnis cfr. Gregor., XXX. Moral. c. 18. n. 63. — Plures codd., superius omisso *si,* mox post *cum* addunt *ergo.*

en: The first definition is Augustine's (cf. above, a. I, q. I), the later one according to Anselm (cf. ibid., q. 2, foundation I). — On the cutting away of the incentives of the flesh cf. Gregory, *Morals* book XXX, c. 18, n. 63. — Several codices, the earlier *si* being omitted, shortly after *cum* add *ergo.*

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8.

la: Vers. 11. et 19: De corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae etc. — Edd. cum nonnullis codd. *sed quae de corde exeunt: ergo.*

en: Verses 11 and 19: « For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts » etc. — The editions, with some codices, [read] *but the things which proceed from the heart: therefore.*

la: Ambros., 1. de Poenitentia, c. 14. n. 73: Vides ergo, quia animus noster culpae est auctor? Itaque innocens caro.

en: Ambrose, *On Penance* book I, c. 14, n. 73: « You see then, that our mind is the author of the fault? And so the flesh [is] innocent. »

la: Vers. 17. Pro *invicem* non pauci codd. et edd. *ad invicem.* — Seq. textus est Matth. 5. 44. — In fine arg. cod. K (I a secunda manu) addit: *ergo non debemus eam punire, sed potius confovere.*

en: Verse 17. For *invicem* (one another) not a few codices and editions [read] *ad invicem.* — The following text is Matthew 5:44. — At the end of the argument codex K (in a second hand) adds: *therefore we ought not to punish it, but rather to cherish it.*

la: Vers. 29. — De maiori vide supra pag. 14, nota 3.

en: Verse 29. — On the major [premise] see above, p. 14, note 3.

la: Sum. II. II. q. 147. a. I. ad 2. S. Thom. ait: Ut Hieronymus dicit Non differt, utrum magno vel parvo tempore te interimas, quia de rapina holocaustum offert [Isai. 61, 8.] qui vel ciborum nimia egestate, vel manducandi, vel somni penuria immoderate corpus affligit. Ratio primae propos. addita habetur in C. *Non mediocriter* (24.), de Consecr. dist. 5. et Hieronymo attribuitur. Cfr. ipsius Epist. 107. (alias 7.) n. 10, 125. (alias 4.) n. 7. et 130. (alias 8.) n. 11.

en: *Summa* II–II, q. 147, a. I, ad 2, St. Thomas says: « As Jerome says, It makes no difference whether you destroy yourself over a great or a little time, because he offers a holocaust of rapine [Isaiah 61:8] who afflicts his body immoderately by excessive lack of food, or by want of eating, or of sleep. » The reason of the first proposition added is found in canon *Non mediocriter* (24), *de Consecratione* dist. 5, and is attributed to Jerome. Cf. his Epistles 107 (alias 7) n. 10, 125 (alias 4) n. 7, and 130 (alias 8) n. 11.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6.

en: According to Aristotle, *Ethics* book II, c. 6.

la: Vers. 20, ubi Vulgata *nisi per orationem et ieiunium.* Cfr. Marc. 9, 28. — De seq. propos. vide supra a. I. q. 3. seq. — Vers. 21: Vulgata: *Qui... servum suum postea sentiet eum contumacem.* — Seq. textus est I. Cor. 9, 27; tertius Eccli. 20, 12; quartus Ezech. 4, 6: *Diem pro anno, diem, inquam, pro anno dedi tibi.* — Quintus II. Cor. 4, 17.

en: Verse 20, where the Vulgate [reads] *except by prayer and fasting.* Cf. Mark 9:28. — On the following proposition see above, a. I, q. 3 and following. — Verse 21: Vulgate: *He who... [nourishes] his servant, shall afterward find him stubborn.* — The following text is 1 Corinthians 9:27; the third Ecclesiasticus 20:12; the fourth Ezekiel 4:6: *A day for a year, a day, I say, for a year I have given you.* — The fifth 2 Corinthians 4:17.

la: Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2: Dolores porro, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne et ex carne. Quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima vel dolet, vel concupiscit? Cfr. tom. III. pag. 346, nota 7. — Superius post *dicendum* codd. brevius *quod non afflictio carnis* etc.

en: *On the City of God* book XIV, c. 15, n. 2: « Moreover the pains which are called of the flesh, are of the soul in the flesh and from the flesh. For what does the flesh of itself, without the soul, either feel pain at, or desire? » Cf. vol. III, p. 346, note 7. — Above, after *dicendum,* the codices more briefly [read] *that not the affliction of the flesh* etc.

la: Epist. ad Fratres de Monte Dei (inter opera Bernardi), lib. I. c. 11. n. 32: Modus in omnibus habendus est; affligendum aliquando corpus est, sed non conterendum etc. Cfr. Serm. 3. in Circumcisione Domini, n. 11. et Serm. 40. de Diversis, n. 7. Verba ipsa magis respondent Gregor., XX. Moral. c. 41. n. 78: Per abstinentiam quippe carnis vitia sunt exstinguenda non caro. Cfr. ibid. XXX. c. 18. n. 63; I. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 10. et 11; homil. 7. n. 19. — Pro *vivant* cod. bb *virescant.*

en: *Letter to the Brethren of Mont Dieu* (among the works of Bernard), book I, c. 11, n. 32: « A measure is to be kept in all things; the body is sometimes to be afflicted, but not crushed » etc. Cf. *Sermon 3 on the Circumcision of the Lord,* n. 11, and *Sermon 40 on Sundry Matters,* n. 7. The words themselves correspond rather to Gregory, *Morals* book XX, c. 41, n. 78: « For by abstinence the vices of the flesh are to be extinguished, not the flesh. » Cf. ibid. book XXX, c. 18, n. 63; Homilies on Ezekiel, homily 7, n. 10 and 11; homily 7, n. 19. — For *vivant* (live) codex bb [reads] *virescant* (flourish). ---

translators_notes:
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**Hand-off to q3 (`bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-a2-q3`, Utrum contingat satisfacere oratione):** the p373 footer also carries q3's opening notes (Gregor. *Moral.*; Eccli. 37, 34; *Epist. ad Fratres de Monte Dei*) at raw ~42688–42710 — q3 should pick those up; q3's body opener "Tertio quaeritur, utrum contingat satisfacere oratione" begins at raw 42686.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles resolved cleanly against the PDF bands (`conliugat`→`contingat`, `Secando`→`Secundo`, `horaicida`→`homicida`; `consumtio` retained as Quaracchi spelling). The Ad-replies skip a reply *Ad 6*: the printed text answers obj. 5 and obj. 6 together (the "Et per hoc patet…" clause of *Ad 5* dispatches the "natural to cherish the flesh" of obj. 6), then resumes at *Ad 7*. Rendered as printed.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum contingat satisfacere oratione.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum contingat satisfacere oratione; et cum duplex sit oratio, scilicet mentalis et vocalis, quaeritur, quae magis sit satisfactoria. Et videtur, quod mentalis:

1. Quia veraciter orare est, ut dicit Gregorius[^1], «amaros in compunctione gemitus, non ornata verba resonare»: ergo videtur, quod vera oratio et satisfactoria non sit in verbo et cantu, sed in lacrymis et fletu.

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2. Item, Matthaei sexto[^2]: *Orantes nolite multum loqui, sicut ethnici faciunt*; sed si vocalis oratio adderet ad satisfactionem, non esset parum loquendum, sed multum: ergo etc.

3. Item, oratio facit hominem tendere sursum[^3]; sed ratio non potest ferri sursum, quamdiu sollicita est circa ea quae sunt deorsum; sed quando profert sermonem, intenta est circa quid creatum: ergo si oratio, quae magis fert sursum, est oratio mentalis, et ista est magis placita: haec est magis satisfactoria.

**Contra:**

1. Oratio est satisfactoria, quae est poenalis; sed haec non est oratio mentalis, sed vocalis; nam mentalis oratio est suavis, sicut dicitur Ecclesiastis decimo[^4]: *Muscae morientes perdunt suavitatem unguenti.*

2. Item, illa quae est praecipue satisfactoria praecipue debet imponi a sacerdote; sed sacerdos imponit orationem vocalem, non mentalem: ergo etc.

3. Item, oratio mentalis, si qua est satisfactoria, est illa qua oratur cum gemitibus; sed haec est contritionis, scilicet plangere peccatum, et contritio dividitur contra satisfactionem: ergo talis oratio non est[^5] pars satisfactionis.

4. Item, plus laborat qui laborat corde et lingua, quam qui corde tantum; sed laborare primo modo est in oratione vocali, corde vero tantum in mentali: ergo videtur, quod vocalis sit magis satisfactoria.

> **Conclusio.** Quaelibet oratio est satisfactoria, prae ceteris autem ea, in qua accenditur homo ad gemitum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod vocalis oratio ordinatur ad mentalem, et non e converso. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod quaedam oratio est pure mentalis, quaedam pure vocalis, quaedam media: pure mentalis, quando labia non moventur, sed cor ad Deum loquitur[^6]; pure vocalis, quando nihil cogitat in his quae dicit, nec in generali nec in speciali, ita quod referat intentionem ad sensum verborum, vel finem, sed cum orat, fabricat castra; et sic mentalis simpliciter excedit vocalem.

Alia est mixta, in qua scilicet orat mentaliter et vocaliter; et de ista distinguendum: quia aut verba illa impediunt affectum, quia sic inflammatus est, quod immediate fertur in Deum, et tali utilior est oratio mentalis; si autem iuvatur, utilior est vocalis; et multimaxime illi qui non sunt tales, et sunt viri spirituales, ad quorum affectus provocandos institutae sunt vocales orationes.

Si quaeratur, quae oratio sit satisfactoria; credo, quod omnis, quia nulla est, in qua non laborent virtutes animales; et quantum delectatur spiritus, tantum caro frequenter tabescit, et virtutes animales minus sunt intentae regimini corporis. Credo tamen, quod illa inter ceteras est satisfactoria magis, in qua accenditur homo ad gemitum, quia haec est, in qua Deus maxime delectatur. — Unde quia illud est gratiae specialis, ideo non imponitur a sacerdote, sed praeambulum ad illud, scilicet oratio vocalis. Et quia non est status in vocibus, sed ordinantur ad intellectum; hinc est, quod Dominus et Gregorius mittunt a vocali oratione ad mentalem.

**Ad illud quod obiicitur,** quod impedit, ne sursum feratur; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo excitat affectum tepidum, nec est homo divisus, immo vis inferior superiori cooperatur[^7].

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod vocalis magis est poenalis; dicendum, quod verum est, ceteris paribus.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod oratio gemebunda spectat ad contritionem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed super illam addit postulationem, sicut publicanus petebat a Domino in templo remissionem[^8]. Et sic patet illud.

Sit igitur haec summa dictorum, quod omnis oratio ex caritate facta, si recte fiat, poenalis est et satisfactoria potest esse, quia nunquam est ita delectabilis, quin sit poenalis antecedenter, vel consequenter, vel concomitanter. Illa tamen inter omnes praecipue satisfacit, quae est magis gemebunda, et in qua maior clamor cordis est ad Deum pro venia peccatorum; haec autem in aliquibus est mentalis, in aliquibus vocalis.

Unde notandum, quod triplex est ratio, quare vocalis oratio est instituta. Prima et potissima est ad affectus accensionem. Unde Beda super illud Matthaei sexto[^9]: *Pater noster* etc. «Non his solis verbis oratur, sed aliis contentis sub eodem sensu, intentione cordis, affectu simplici; quae enim dicimus non eum docemus, sed nos temporis orandi recordamur». — Secunda ratio est ad intellectus instructionem. Unde Beda ibidem: «Orationem brevibus verbis composuit, quibus nec opus esset loqui ad eum qui omnia novit, sed ut noster affectus, qui cum Deo agit, disceret res, quas oraret, non verba, quae diceret». — Tertia ratio est ad faciliorem recordationem. Unde Glossa super illud Matthaei sexto: *Nolite assimilari eis* «Non apud Deum agendum est verbis, sed rebus».

Et sic patet ratio institutionis orationis vocalis, quia propter mentalem est, quam Deus praecipue acceptat et illam magis ad remissionem et satisfactionem, in qua cor magis contra peccatum intenditur. Ideo perutile est peccatoribus orationes frequentare, in quibus fiat mentio de male commissis, sicut fuit oratio Manassae.

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether one can make satisfaction by prayer.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one can make satisfaction by prayer; and since prayer is twofold, namely mental and vocal, it is asked which is the more satisfactory. And it seems to be the mental:

1. For to pray truly is, as Gregory says[^1], «to sound forth bitter groans in compunction, not ornate words»: therefore it seems that true and satisfactory prayer consists not in word and song, but in tears and weeping.

2. Likewise, in Matthew chapter six[^2]: *When you pray, do not speak much, as the heathen do*; but if vocal prayer added to satisfaction, one ought not to speak little but much: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, prayer makes a man tend upward[^3]; but reason cannot be carried upward, so long as it is occupied about the things which are below; but when it utters speech, it is intent upon some created thing: therefore if the prayer which carries one more upward is mental prayer, and that one is more pleasing: this is the more satisfactory.

**On the contrary:**

1. That prayer is satisfactory which is penal; but this is not mental but vocal prayer; for mental prayer is sweet, as is said in Ecclesiastes chapter ten[^4]: *Dying flies spoil the sweetness of the ointment.*

2. Likewise, that which is chiefly satisfactory ought chiefly to be imposed by the priest; but the priest imposes vocal, not mental prayer: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, mental prayer, if any is satisfactory, is that by which one prays with groans; but this belongs to contrition, namely to bewail sin, and contrition is divided against satisfaction: therefore such prayer is not[^5] a part of satisfaction.

4. Likewise, he labors more who labors with heart and tongue than he who labors with the heart alone; but to labor in the first way is in vocal prayer, but with the heart alone in mental prayer: therefore it seems that the vocal is the more satisfactory.

> **Conclusion.** Every prayer is satisfactory, but beyond the rest that one in which a man is kindled to groaning.

**I respond:** It must be said that vocal prayer is ordered to mental prayer, and not the reverse. Accordingly it must be understood that a certain prayer is purely mental, a certain purely vocal, and a certain one intermediate: purely mental, when the lips are not moved, but the heart speaks to God[^6]; purely vocal, when one thinks nothing in the things he says, neither in general nor in particular, so as to refer his intention to the meaning of the words, or to the end, but while he prays, he builds castles; and thus the mental simply surpasses the vocal.

The other is mixed, namely in which one prays both mentally and vocally; and concerning this a distinction must be made: for either those words impede the affection, because it is so inflamed that it is borne immediately into God, and for such a one mental prayer is more useful; but if it is helped, the vocal is more useful; and most of all for those who are not such, and are spiritual men, for the stirring of whose affections vocal prayers were instituted.

If it be asked which prayer is satisfactory; I believe that every one is, because there is none in which the animal powers do not labor; and as much as the spirit is delighted, so much does the flesh frequently waste away, and the animal powers are less intent upon the governing of the body. I believe nevertheless that that one among the rest is the more satisfactory in which a man is kindled to groaning, because this is the one in which God is most delighted. — Whence, because that belongs to special grace, therefore it is not imposed by the priest, but the preamble to it, namely vocal prayer. And because there is no resting-place in the words, but they are ordered to the understanding; hence it is that the Lord and Gregory send one from vocal prayer to mental.

**To that which is objected,** that it impedes one from being borne upward; it must be said that this is false, rather it stirs up a lukewarm affection, nor is the man divided, rather the lower power cooperates with the higher[^7].

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected on the opposite side, that the vocal is more penal; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that groaning prayer pertains to contrition; it must be said that this is true; but upon it it adds petition, as the publican sought remission from the Lord in the temple[^8]. And thus that is clear.

Let this therefore be the sum of what has been said, that every prayer made out of charity, if it be rightly made, is penal and can be satisfactory, because it is never so delightful that it is not penal antecedently, or consequently, or concomitantly. That one nevertheless among all chiefly makes satisfaction which is the more groaning, and in which there is the greater cry of the heart to God for the pardon of sins; and this is in some men mental, in some vocal.

Whence it must be noted that there is a threefold reason why vocal prayer was instituted. The first and most powerful is for the kindling of the affection. Whence Beda on that text of Matthew chapter six[^9]: *Our Father* etc. «It is prayed not with these words alone, but with others contained under the same meaning, with intention of heart, with simple affection; for the things which we say we do not teach Him, but we put ourselves in mind of the time of praying». — The second reason is for the instruction of the understanding. Whence Beda in the same place: «He composed the prayer in brief words, with which there was no need to speak to Him who knows all things, but that our affection, which deals with God, might learn the things which it should pray for, not the words which it should say». — The third reason is for easier remembrance. Whence the Gloss on that text of Matthew chapter six: *Do not be made like to them* «It is not with God to be acted by words, but by deeds».

And thus the reason for the institution of vocal prayer is clear, because it is for the sake of mental prayer, which God chiefly accepts, and that prayer more for remission and satisfaction in which the heart is more bent against sin. Therefore it is most useful for sinners to frequent prayers in which mention is made of the evils committed, as was the prayer of Manasses.

---

la: Vide supra pag. 368, nota 3. Gregor., X. Moral. c. III. n. 27. ait, quod mentem levare est in Deo animum per studia orationis attollere.

en: See above, p. 368, note 3. Gregory, *Morals* bk. X, c. 3, n. 27, says that to lift up the mind is to raise the soul up to God through the pursuits of prayer.

la: Vers. 7. Vulgata omittit *faciunt*.

en: Verse 7. The Vulgate omits *faciunt* ("do").

la: De minori cfr. Luc. 10, 41. seq.

en: On the minor premise cf. Luke 10:41 ff.

la: Vers. 1. Sensus est: cogitationes peccatorum sibi succedentes (morientes) perdunt suavitatem internae devotionis [cfr. I. Ioan. 2, 20. et 27.], ut S. Bonav. in Comment. super hunc loc. explicat. Cfr. Bernard., Serm. 44. in Cantic. n. 5. seqq. — De maiori vide a. 1. q. 3. seq.

en: Verse 1. The sense is: the thoughts of sinners succeeding one another (dying) destroy the sweetness of inner devotion [cf. 1 John 2:20 and 27], as St. Bonaventure explains in his Commentary on this passage. Cf. Bernard, *Sermon* 44 on the Canticle, n. 5 ff. — On the major premise see a. 1, q. 3 ff.

la: Codd. F G addunt *satisfactoria sive*.

en: Codices F G add *satisfactoria sive* ("satisfactory, or").

la: Libr. I. Reg. 1, 13: *Porro Anna loquebatur in corde suo, tantumque labia illius movebantur, et vox penitus non audiebatur.* Cfr. Serm. 283. in appendice Sermon. August. n. 2.

en: 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 1:13: *Now Anna spoke in her heart, and only her lips moved, and her voice was not heard at all.* Cf. *Sermon* 283 in the appendix of Augustine's *Sermons*, n. 2.

la: Superius *ante feratur* ex cod. O supplevimus *sursum*.

en: Above, before *feratur* ("be borne"), we have supplied from codex O the word *sursum* ("upward").

la: Luc. 18, 13. — Inferius pro *delectationis* ex codd. O U X bb substituimus *delectabilis*.

en: Luke 18:13. — Below, for *delectationis*, we have substituted from codices O U X bb the reading *delectabilis*.

la: Vers. 9. — Glossa est ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum; attribuitur ab ipsis Bedae, qui tamen neque hoc loco neque in Luc. 11, 1. seqq. haec verba habet. Sententiam primae Glossae exhibet August., Epist. 130. (alias 121.) c. 12. n. 22; sententia secundae Glossae invenitur apud ipsum in lib. II. seqq., et Isidor., III. Sent. c. 7. n. 1. seqq. — Inferius verbis *fabricat castra* Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 3. a. 2. § 6, addit *in Hispaniis*.

en: Verse 9. — The Gloss is the Ordinary Gloss in Strabo and Lyra; it is attributed by them to Beda, who however has these words neither in this place nor on Luke 11:1 ff. The sense of the first Gloss is given by Augustine, *Letter* 130 (otherwise 121), c. 12, n. 22; the sense of the second Gloss is found in him in book II ff., and Isidore, *Sentences* bk. III, c. 7, n. 1 ff. — Below, at the words *fabricat castra* ("builds castles"), Alexander of Hales, *Summa* pt. IV, q. 26, m. 3, a. 2, § 6, adds *in Hispaniis* ("in Spain"). ---

translators_notes:
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**[?] flags.** None. All footnote anchors resolved against the column bands; Vulgate citations and the Alexander of Hales / Augustine / Isidore cross-references read cleanly in the PDF.


title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum restitutio sit pars satisfactionis.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum restitutio sit pars satisfactionis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia aliquo peccato peccamus in Deum tantum, aliquo in Deum et proximum, ut rapina; sed constat, quod satisfactio respondet iniuriae: ergo satisfieri debet in hoc Deo et proximo. Sed satisfit proximo per restitutionem: ergo etc.

2. Item, qui peccat per gulositatem nullo modo melius satisfacit quam per ieiunii sobrietatem: ergo qui peccat rem alienam auferendo non melius satisfacit quam restituendo: ergo etc.

3. Item, per signum ostenditur: quia, si duo sunt raptores, quorum alter est[^1] in restituendo, alter non, minorem poenitentiam imponit sacerdos ei qui potest restituere, maiorem ei qui non: ergo restitutio facit ad satisfactionem.

4. Item, « satisfacere est causas peccatorum excidere »[^2]; sed causa, quare raptor in peccato est, est, quia rem alienam abstulit et detinet: ergo satisfactio est per rei retentae redditionem, quia hic peccati causa exciditur.

**Contra:**
1. Peccatum eo ipso est peccatum, quia in Deum est, et quia Dei deformatur imago, non quia in alium similem — quia tunc leo peccaret, cum aliud animal comederet — unde et in Psalmo[^3]: *Tibi soli peccavi*: ergo satisfactio est facienda soli Deo; sed haec non est per restitutionem, quia restitutio respicit proximum directe: ergo etc.

2. Item, satisfactio est per poenam, ad quam homo non tenetur alias nisi per culpam et secundum iudicium sacerdotis; sed ad restitutionem rei alienae tenetur, eo ipso quod aliena, et iudicio[^4] Dei sine sacerdote: ergo etc.

3. Item, si est pars satisfactionis, cum satisfactio nulla sit sine caritate[^5], nec restitutio est sine caritate; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum sint tres partes satisfactionis, scilicet ieiunium, oratio et eleemosyna[^6]; quaeritur: sub qua illarum continetur? et cum sub nulla, patet etc.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Restitutio dici potest pars satisfactionis communiter, non vero proprie sumtae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex est opinio.

Quidam dicunt, quod restitutio non est pars satisfactionis, sed *fundamentum*. Quaedam enim requiruntur ad poenitentiam sive satisfactionem ut fundamenta, et talia sunt peccati dimissio et alienae rei restitutio; quaedam ut *expedientia*, ut vitare pravam societatem; quaedam ut *satisfactoria*, ut ieiunium, oratio et eleemosyna; quaedam ut *perficientia*, ut sunt opera supererogationis, Lucae decimo[^7]: *Quodcumque supererogaveris reddam tibi.* — Et ratio eorum est, quia culpa proprie est in Deum, et quia satisfactio est per poenam arbitrariam arbitrio sacerdotis.

Sed alia opinio est, quod restitutio est opus satisfactorium, si fiat in caritate; alioquin non, sicut[^8] nec alia opera.

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Posset tamen dici, quod satisfactio dicitur communiter et proprie: communiter, omne opus poenale voluntarie assumtum, sive ad quod tenetur iudicio Dei, sive iudicio sacerdotis; et sic restitutio est opus satisfactorium et eius pars. Si autem dicatur satisfactio proprie per poenam voluntarie assumtam, ad quam non tenebatur nisi ex culpa et iudicio sacerdotis; sic non est pars, quia restituere tenetur qui habet rem alienam secundum omne ius, etiam si sacerdos nunquam imponat. — Rationes igitur ad primam partem procedunt de satisfactione dicta communiter, aliter procedunt omnes ex insufficienti.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod peccatur in solum Deum etc.; dicendum, quod verum est *per se*; sed tamen, quia homo est imago Dei, et « honor et dehonoratio imaginis ad prototypum refertur »; ideo, sicut ex caritate diligi debet homo in quantum imago, sic etiam et in ipsum peccari potest. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod aut intelligitur de eo qui non habet superiorem ad puniendum; aut intelligitur *primo et principaliter*; aut de peccato, quod non est in *proximum extra*, sed per *superbiam intra*.

*Ad 2.* Ad aliud patet responsio, quia obiicit de satisfactione *proprie* dicta.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sine caritate; dicendum, quod satisfactio, quia Deo[^9], non potest esse nisi in caritate; restitutio, quia proximo, extra fieri potest; sed ad hoc, quod placeat Deo, oportet esse in caritate.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum dicendum, quod ad nullam illarum partium reducitur, quia sunt satisfactionis proprie dictae.

*Ad illud autem quod obiicitur ad contrarium*, quod peccatur in proximum; dicendum, quod non peccatur in proximum nisi *per accidens*, scilicet quia offenditur Deus in proximo; et ideo soli Deo satisfaciendum est. Nec illi qui dicunt, restitutionem esse satisfactoriam; *ideo* dicunt, quia per ipsam homo satisfaciat proximo, sed quia aliquo modo, dum reddit rem, quam diligit et posset de facto tenere, amore Dei et mandato sacerdotis restituit. Verumtamen non est restitutio proprie satisfactio, sed inchoatio. Sed cum de proprio aliquid dat, tunc recte dat honorem Deo et superaddit; ideo satisfacit[^10].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod maior poenitentia imponitur, dici potest, quod hoc est, quia rem proximi dissipavit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest melius curari; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo melius curatur quis, si dat de proprio[^11].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether restitution is a part of satisfaction.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether restitution is a part of satisfaction. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because by some sin we sin against God alone, by another against God and neighbor, as in robbery; but it is established that satisfaction answers to the injury: therefore satisfaction must be made in this case to God and to the neighbor. But satisfaction is made to the neighbor through restitution: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, he who sins through gluttony in no way makes better satisfaction than through the sobriety of fasting: therefore he who sins by carrying off another's property makes no better satisfaction than by restoring it: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown by a sign: because, if there are two robbers, one of whom is engaged[^1] in restoring and the other not, the priest imposes a lesser penance on him who is able to restore, a greater on him who is not: therefore restitution contributes to satisfaction.

4. Likewise, « to satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins »[^2]; but the cause why the robber is in sin is that he has carried off and retains another's property: therefore satisfaction is through the restoration of the retained thing, because here the cause of the sin is cut away.

**On the contrary:**
1. Sin is sin by the very fact that it is against God, and because the image of God is deformed, not because it is against another like himself — for then a lion would sin when it ate another animal — whence also in the Psalm[^3]: *Against thee only have I sinned*: therefore satisfaction is to be made to God alone; but this is not through restitution, because restitution regards the neighbor directly: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, satisfaction is through a penalty, to which a man is not otherwise bound except through fault and according to the judgment of the priest; but to the restitution of another's property he is bound, by the very fact that it is another's, and by the judgment[^4] of God without a priest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it is a part of satisfaction, since no satisfaction is without charity[^5], neither is restitution without charity; but this is false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, since there are three parts of satisfaction, namely fasting, prayer, and almsgiving[^6]; it is asked: under which of them is it contained? and since it is under none, the point is plain, etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> Restitution can be called a part of satisfaction taken broadly, but not properly.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion.

Some say that restitution is not a *part* of satisfaction, but a *foundation*. For certain things are required for penance or satisfaction as foundations, and such are the dismissal of sin and the restitution of another's property; certain things as *expedient*, such as avoiding evil company; certain things as *satisfactory*, such as fasting, prayer, and almsgiving; certain things as *perfecting*, such as the works of supererogation, in Luke ten[^7]: *Whatsoever thou shalt spend over and above, I will repay thee.* — And their reason is that fault is properly against God, and that satisfaction is through a penalty arbitrarily set at the priest's discretion.

But there is another opinion, that restitution is a satisfactory work, if it is done in charity; otherwise not, just as[^8] neither are the other works.

It could nevertheless be said that satisfaction is spoken of both broadly and properly: broadly, every penal work voluntarily undertaken, whether one to which a man is bound by the judgment of God or by the judgment of the priest; and thus restitution is a satisfactory work and a part of it. But if satisfaction be taken properly, as a penalty voluntarily undertaken, to which one was not bound except from fault and the judgment of the priest; thus it is not a part, because he who has another's property is bound to restore it by every right, even if the priest never imposes it. — The reasons, therefore, for the first part proceed concerning satisfaction taken broadly; otherwise they all proceed from an insufficient ground.

**To the arguments for the negative part:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the opposite side, that sin is against God alone etc.; it must be said that this is true *in itself*; but nevertheless, because man is the image of God, and « the honor and dishonor of an image is referred to its prototype »; therefore, just as out of charity man is to be loved insofar as he is an image, so also one can sin against him. — Or it must be said otherwise, that either it is understood of him who has no superior to punish; or it is understood *first and principally*; or of the sin which is not against the *neighbor outwardly*, but through *pride inwardly*.

*To 2.* To the other the response is plain, because it objects concerning satisfaction taken *properly*.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is not without charity; it must be said that satisfaction, because it is to God[^9], cannot be except in charity; restitution, because it is to the neighbor, can be done outwardly; but for it to please God, it must be in charity.

*To 4.* To the last it must be said that it is reduced to none of those parts, because they are of satisfaction properly so called.

*To that, however, which is objected to the contrary*, that one sins against the neighbor; it must be said that one does not sin against the neighbor except *by accident*, namely because God is offended in the neighbor; and therefore satisfaction is to be made to God alone. Nor do those who say that restitution is satisfactory; they say so *not* because through it a man satisfies the neighbor, but because in some way, while he restores the thing which he loves and could in fact retain, out of love of God and at the command of the priest he restores it. Nevertheless restitution is not properly satisfaction, but a beginning of it. But when he gives something of his own, then he rightly gives honor to God and adds something further; therefore he satisfies[^10].

*To 3.* To that which says that a greater penance is imposed, it can be said that this is because he has squandered the neighbor's property.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he cannot be better cured; it must be said that this is false; rather, one is better cured if he gives of his own[^11].

---

la: Codd. BHQ adiiciunt *potens*, Vat. omittit *in*, pro quo ed. I *de*. Inferius post *qui non* cod. F supplet *potest*.

en: Codices BHQ add *potens* (able), the Vatican edition omits *in*, in place of which edition I has *de*. Further on, after *qui non* (who is not), codex F supplies *potest* (is able).

la: Secundum Augustinum; cfr. supra a. I. q. 1, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. et 7. in fine. — Plurimi codd. et ed. I verbo *satisfacere* praemittunt *si*. In fine arg. pro *quia* hic cod. N *quia hoc* (ablativus).

en: According to Augustine; cf. above, art. I, q. 1, and here the text of the Master, ch. 5 and 7 at the end. — Very many codices and edition I prefix *si* to the word *satisfacere*. At the end of the argument, in place of *quia* this codex N has *quia hoc* (ablative).

la: Psalm. 50, 6. — Mox *non* pauci codd. omittunt *facienda*.

en: Psalm 50:6. — Presently not a few codices omit *facienda* (is to be made).

la: Edd. *ex iudicio*, cod. aa *ergo et iudicio*, cod. G *iudicio Dei, ergo sine*. Superius post *Item* non pauci codd. addunt *si*.

en: The editions read *ex iudicio* (from the judgment), codex aa *ergo et iudicio* (therefore and by the judgment), codex G *iudicio Dei, ergo sine* (by the judgment of God, therefore without). Above, after *Item*, not a few codices add *si*.

la: Ut ostensum est supra p. I. q. 3.

en: As was shown above, part I, q. 3.

la: Vide supra a. I. q. 1.

en: See above, art. I, q. 1.

la: Vers. 35, ubi Vulgata post *supererogaveris* habet *ego cum rediero*.

en: Verse 35, where the Vulgate after *supererogaveris* (thou shalt spend over and above) has *ego cum rediero* (when I return).

la: Vat. *sed sic*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *sed sic* (but thus).

la: Edd. supplent *eius*. Mox pro *qui* plures codd. *quia*; bene *caritatem*. Subinde ex codd. E L X adiunximus *fieri*, pro quo alii codd. et edd. *esse*.

en: The editions supply *eius* (its). Presently, in place of *qui*, several codices read *quia*; correctly *caritatem*. Then, from codices E L X, we have added *fieri* (to be done), in place of which other codices and editions have *esse* (to be).

la: Cfr. supra q. I. — Cod. G *ut Deo satisfaciat*.

en: Cf. above, q. I. — Codex G reads *ut Deo satisfaciat* (that he may satisfy God).

la: Vide August., Epist. 153. (alias 54.) c. 6. n. 20. seqq. — Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.

en: See Augustine, *Letter* 153 (formerly 54), ch. 6, n. 20 ff. — See the scholion to question I of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands for printed pp. 375–376 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p375-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol4-p376-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; pdf = printed + 20 → pdf pp. 395–396), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 42852–43058). Running head verified: p.375 "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. IV." Opener alignment confirmed: "Quarto quaeritur, utrum restitutio sit pars satisfactionis." The chunk ends just before "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI" (raw ~43059), which begins the Pars II dubia chunk.

**Printed-page span correction.** The dispatch brief listed pages ~374–376, but p.374 (and the top three lines of p.375 left column) belong to the PRIOR question (q.3, *utrum oratio sit pars satisfactionis*). QUAESTIO IV actually opens partway down the left column of p.375 and closes in the left/right columns of p.376. `printed_pages` is therefore set to [375, 376] / `pdf_pages` [395, 396].

**Apparatus / page-split map.** 11 footnotes total. Body markers renumbered continuously 1–11 in chunk order:
- Chunk [^1]–[^8] = printed-page-375 footers ²–⁹ (the page-375 footer ¹, "Libr. II. Paralip. c. 33, 12 … oratio Manassae," belongs to the q.3 tail and is owned by the q.3 chunk; the unnumbered "de Sermone Domini … Glossa ordinaria" left-column block is likewise q.3's Glossa apparatus).
- Chunk [^9]–[^11] = printed-page-376 footers ⁴, ⁵, ⁶ (the page-376 left-column footers ¹–³ and right-column footers ⁷–⁹ belong to the following DUB. I / DUB. II chunk, "Edd. supplent eius … Porphyr., de Praedicab.").

**Scholion disposition.** has_scholion: false. The Articulus II scholion is a single block covering q1–q4 and is rendered with QUAESTIO I (`bon-sent-IV-d15-p2-a2-q1`); there is no distinct scholion header within this q4 range. (The q4 apparatus itself twice cross-refers to it: [^2] "et hic lit. Magistri …" and [^11] "Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.")

**Hand-off to p2-dubia.** The chunk boundary falls inside printed p.376: this q4 ends mid-page (left col bottom: "Ad illud … si dat de proprio") and "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI / DUB. I." begins immediately after on the same page. The p.376 footers split by body anchor — q4 owns p.376 footers ⁴–⁶; the p2-dubia chunk must claim p.376 footers ¹–³ (left col: "Edd. supplent eius …"; "Secundum Basilium et Damasc. … August., Serm. 82 …"; "Alex. Hal. …") and ⁷–⁹ (right col: "Lit. Magistri, c. 3."; "Cod. K … et haec est gratia gratum faciens."; "De hac hominis definitione … Porphyr., de Praedicab. …"). Verify these are not double-counted when promoting the dubia chunk.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR was legible against the PDF bands throughout; all variant-codex sigla in the apparatus (BHQ, aa, G, N, E L X) read cleanly at 450 dpi.