title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*

1. « Peccatum, sicut dicit Anselmus[^1], non est aliud quam absentia vel carentia iustitiae, ubi debet esse »; sed privatio iustitiae passiva non est aliud

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quam carentia debitae iustitiae: ergo, essentialiter loquendo, culpa est corruptio, prout est passio.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro primo Confessionum[^2]: « Iussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut omnis motus inordinatus poena sibi sit »; sed motus inordinatus est culpa; poena autem motus inordinati non est nisi ipsa corruptio passiva, quam homo incurrit ex illa inordinatione: ergo peccatum est ipsa privatio-passio, formaliter loquendo.

3. Item, « omnes actiones animae passiones sunt », sicut vult Philosophus[^3]: ergo omnis inordinata actio animae est inordinata passio; sed quod est inordinatum est culpa: ergo illa passio sive corruptio inordinata est culpa.

4. Item, cum anima deformat se ipsam, ipsa deformitas, qua anima deformatur, remanet in ea, et culpa similiter; aut ergo illa deformitas est culpa, aut aliquod aliud; et constat, quod culpa, quae remanet in anima, non est aliud quam ipsa deformitas, qua anima deformis facta est: ergo videtur, quod peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio.

5. Item, corruptio-passio, in qua est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, aut est culpa, aut est poena. Si poena: ergo videtur, quod talis privatio sit a Deo: ergo Deus animam reddit deformem et iustitia privatam; quod profanum est dicere. Restat ergo, quod sit culpa.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio[^4]: « Culpa est malum, quod *facimus*, et poena malum, quod *patimur* »: si ergo corruptio-passio est malum, quod patimur, videtur, quod non sit culpa, sed poena.

2. Item, Augustinus[^5]: « Malum culpae est affectio voluntaria, malum vero poenae est affectio involuntaria »; sed corruptio-passio non est voluntaria, sed involuntaria, quia nemo vult corrumpi nec deformari: ergo non videtur, quod sit culpa, sed poena.

3. Item, Magister in littera[^6]: « Peccatum dicitur privatio *active*, non *passive*; nam ideo malum vel peccatum dicitur corruptio, quia naturam qualicumque privat bono ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Omnis poena est iusta et laudabilis[^7]; sed omnis corruptio-passio est poena, cum damnificet et puniat eum qui corrumpitur: ergo omnis corruptio-passio est iusta et laudabilis. Sed nulla culpa est iusta et laudabilis: ergo nulla culpa est corruptio passive dicta.

5. Item, causa et effectus essentialiter distinguuntur; sed peccatum corrumpit et est principium corruptionis passivae, sicut prius ostensum est[^8]: ergo corruptio-passio et ipsa culpa distinguuntur essentialiter: non est igitur culpa corruptio boni passive dicta.

### Conclusio.

> Non tantum corruptio sive privatio boni *active* dicta, sed eadem etiam *passive* dicta habet rationem culpae.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, sicut praetactum est[^9]: peccatum est corruptio, consistens circa voluntatem et eius actum, cum sit obliquatio a rectitudine iustitiae. *(Praenotandum.)* Voluntas autem in actu suo est « instrumentum se ipsum movens[^10] »; unde, quando voluntas ad aliquid movetur libere, si moveatur vel afficiatur inordinate, illa inordinatio respicit voluntatem moventem et voluntatem motam, quia voluntas, dum inordinate afficitur, inordinate movet et inordinate movetur. Quoniam igitur culpa, prout consideratur in *actu*, nihil aliud est quam motus voluntatis inordinatus, et ad illum motum concurrit *actio* et *passio*, non tantum est corruptio-*actio*, immo etiam corruptio-*passio*. *(Conclusio 1.)* Nam et inordinatio, qua anima se deordinat, et inordinatio, qua anima deordinatur, utraque est culpa, differens comparatione, una tamen per essentiam. — Et quia quales sunt actus, tales sunt habitus, maxime cum habitus generantur ex actibus, sicut est in genere malorum habituum[^11]; hinc est, quod deformitas vel privatio in voluntate relicta et habet in se aliquid correspondens *actioni*, et aliquid correspondens etiam *passioni*. Nam voluntas, dum peccat actualiter, efficitur inhabilis, et in quantum habet rationem *moventis* et in quantum habet rationem *moti*. Et ita culpa, considerata ut in habitu, et in quantum remanet in anima post actum peccati, et est corruptio sive privatio correspondens *actioni*, et est corruptio sive privatio correspondens *passioni*. Et sic eadem culpa est corruptio sive privatio boni, non solum *active*, sed etiam *passive* dicta, secundum veritatem

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loquendo. *(Corollarium.)* Secundum *appropriationem* vero, corruptio illa, in quantum est *active* intellecta, tenet mere rationem culpae, in quantum vero *passive* dicta, tenet rationem poenae; quia, in quantum est *active* dicta, tenet rationem voluntarii[^12], in quantum vero *passive*, rationem involuntarii. *(Explicatur.)* — Nec ista sunt incompossibilia circa eandem actionem et motum. Nam expresse videmus, quod in eadem actione corporali una et eadem actio et delectat et laedit, et per consequens contristat; sicut, cum scabiosus scalpendo cutem suam dilaniat, et dilaniando delectatur et dilaniando etiam laeditur, et[^13] unum placet, et reliquum displicet. Similiter et in eadem actione spirituali est aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad commutabile bonum, et conversio placet, et aversio displicet. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod eadem culpa potest dici *active* et *passive*; prout tamen *active* dicitur, proprie tenet rationem culpae, in quantum vero *passive*, tenet rationem poenae. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod aliqua corruptio-passio, utpote illa quae est rectitudinis privatio, culpa est.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod culpa est malum, quod *facimus* etc.; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam cum idem motus possit esse *actio* et *passio*, in quo voluntas se ipsam movet; sic et eadem actio potest esse poenae et culpae, licet sub alia et alia ratione. — Similiter respondendum est ad sequens, quod obiicitur de *voluntario* et *involuntario*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de verbo Magistri, dicendum, quod illud dicitur per quandam appropriationem; magis enim proprie dicitur culpa corruptio-*actio* quam corruptio-*passio*. *(Notandum.)* Verum est etiam, quod aliquis, dum caret iustitia, quam debet habere, culpabilis est. Ratio tamen principalis, quare culpabilis est, est ex hoc, quod ipse fecit sibi illam carentiam; nam si involuntarie eam sustineret aliunde, tunc teneret potius rationem *poenae* quam *culpae*[^14].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena est iusta et laudabilis; dicendum, quod est poena *inflicta* et poena *acta* et poena *contracta*[^15]. *(Triplex poena.)* Et cum dicitur, quod omnis poena est iusta et laudabilis, hoc intelligitur de poena *inflicta*; de poena *acta* vel *contracta* non habet veritatem, nisi prout intelliguntur sub ratione poenae. Privatio autem boni passiva sive ipsius animae deformatio non est poena *inflicta*, sed est poena *acta*, quia anima hanc poenam in se facit, dum peccat.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est causa corruptionis passivae; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de peccato, quod est *in actu*, quod est causa corruptionis in voluntate per modum habitus; et utrobique[^16], sicut ostensum est prius, habet rationem actionis et passionis. — *(Alia solutio.)* Potest tamen dici, quod etsi peccatum dicatur corrumpere, non tamen est proprie causa corruptionis, sed potius ipse peccans. Et si dicatur peccatum esse causa corruptionis passivae, hoc dicitur ratione ipsius peccantis, sicut actio dicitur esse causa passionis ratione ipsius agentis; fortassis enim idem potest esse actio et passio, sola comparatione differens[^17].

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english:
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### QUESTION II.
### *Whether sin is the very corruption-as-passion, speaking essentially.*

Secondly it is asked, whether sin is the very corruption-as-passion, speaking essentially. And that it is, it seems.

*Fundamenta.*

1. « Sin, as Anselm says[^1], is nothing other than the absence or lack of justice where it ought to be »; but the passive privation of justice is nothing other

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than the lack of the justice that is due: therefore, speaking essentially, guilt is a corruption insofar as it is a passion.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the first book of the Confessions[^2]: « You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered motion should be a punishment to itself »; but a disordered motion is guilt; and the punishment of a disordered motion is nothing but the very passive corruption which the human incurs from that disorder: therefore sin is the very privation-as-passion, speaking formally.

3. Likewise, « all the actions of the soul are passions », as the Philosopher holds[^3]: therefore every disordered action of the soul is a disordered passion; but what is disordered is guilt: therefore that disordered passion or corruption is guilt.

4. Likewise, when the soul deforms itself, the deformity itself by which the soul is deformed remains in it, and likewise the guilt; therefore either that deformity is guilt, or [it is] something else; and it is evident that the guilt which remains in the soul is nothing other than the very deformity by which the soul has been made deformed: therefore it seems that sin is the very corruption-as-passion.

5. Likewise, corruption-as-passion, in which there is a privation of measure, species, and order, is either guilt or punishment. If punishment: then it seems that such a privation is from God: therefore God renders the soul deformed and deprived of justice; which it is profane to say. It remains therefore that it is guilt.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On Free Will*[^4]: « Guilt is the evil which we *do*, and punishment the evil which we *suffer* »: if therefore corruption-as-passion is an evil which we suffer, it seems that it is not guilt, but punishment.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^5]: « The evil of guilt is a voluntary affection, but the evil of punishment is an involuntary affection »; but corruption-as-passion is not voluntary, but involuntary, since no one wills to be corrupted or deformed: therefore it does not seem that it is guilt, but punishment.

3. Likewise, the Master in the text[^6]: « Sin is called a privation *actively*, not *passively*; for evil or sin is called a corruption precisely because it deprives the nature of some good ».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Every punishment is just and praiseworthy[^7]; but every corruption-as-passion is a punishment, since it harms and punishes him who is corrupted: therefore every corruption-as-passion is just and praiseworthy. But no guilt is just and praiseworthy: therefore no guilt is a corruption spoken of passively.

5. Likewise, cause and effect are essentially distinguished; but sin corrupts and is the principle of passive corruption, as was shown before[^8]: therefore corruption-as-passion and guilt itself are essentially distinguished: therefore guilt is not corruption of the good spoken of passively.

### Conclusion.

> Not only corruption or privation of the good spoken of *actively*, but the same also spoken of *passively*, has the character of guilt.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted, as was touched upon before[^9]: sin is a corruption, consisting around the will and its act, since it is a deviation from the rectitude of justice. *(To be premised.)* But the will in its act is « an instrument moving itself[^10] »; whence, when the will is moved freely toward something, if it be moved or affected in a disordered way, that disorder regards the will as moving and the will as moved, because the will, while it is disordered in its affection, moves in a disordered way and is moved in a disordered way. Since therefore guilt, insofar as it is considered *in the act*, is nothing other than a disordered motion of the will, and to that motion both *action* and *passion* concur, it is not only corruption-*action*, but also corruption-*passion*. *(Conclusion 1.)* For both the disorder by which the soul disorders itself, and the disorder by which the soul is disordered, each is guilt, differing in comparison, yet one in essence. — And because as the acts are, such are the habits, especially since habits are generated from acts, as is the case in the genus of evil habits[^11]; hence it is that the deformity or privation left in the will both has in itself something corresponding to *action*, and something corresponding also to *passion*. For the will, while it sins actually, is rendered unfit, both insofar as it has the character of *mover* and insofar as it has the character of *moved*. And thus the guilt, considered as in habit, and insofar as it remains in the soul after the act of sin, is both a corruption or privation corresponding to *action*, and a corruption or privation corresponding to *passion*. And thus the same guilt is a corruption or privation of the good, not only spoken of *actively*, but also *passively*, speaking according to truth

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[, essentially] speaking. *(Corollary.)* But according to *appropriation*, that corruption, insofar as it is understood *actively*, holds merely the character of guilt, but insofar as it is spoken of *passively*, holds the character of punishment; because, insofar as it is spoken of *actively*, it holds the character of the voluntary[^12], but insofar as [it is spoken of] *passively*, [it holds] the character of the involuntary. *(It is explained.)* — Nor are these incompossible regarding the same action and motion. For we expressly see that in the same bodily action one and the same action both delights and wounds, and consequently saddens; just as, when a scabby person, by scratching, lacerates his own skin, both by lacerating he is delighted and by lacerating he is also wounded, and[^13] the one pleases, and the other displeases. Likewise also in the same spiritual action there is an aversion from the unchangeable good and a conversion to a changeable good, and the conversion pleases, and the aversion displeases. So too in the matter proposed it is to be understood that the same guilt can be spoken of *actively* and *passively*; yet insofar as it is spoken of *actively*, it properly holds the character of guilt, but insofar as [it is spoken of] *passively*, it holds the character of punishment. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that some corruption-as-passion, namely that which is a privation of rectitude, is guilt.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. 2. To that therefore which is first objected, that guilt is the evil which we *do*, etc.; the response is now clear from the things which have been said. For since the same motion can be *action* and *passion*, in which the will moves itself; so too the same action can be of punishment and of guilt, although under one and another character. — Likewise it must be responded to what follows, which is objected concerning the *voluntary* and the *involuntary*.

3. To that which is objected thirdly concerning the word of the Master, it must be said that this is said by a certain appropriation; for corruption-*action* is more properly called guilt than corruption-*passion*. *(To be noted.)* It is also true that someone, while he lacks the justice which he ought to have, is culpable. Yet the principal reason why he is culpable is from this, that he made that lack for himself; for if he were to sustain it involuntarily from elsewhere, then it would hold rather the character of *punishment* than of *guilt*[^14].

4. To that which is objected, that every punishment is just and praiseworthy; it must be said that there is punishment *inflicted*, punishment *enacted*, and punishment *contracted*[^15]. *(Threefold punishment.)* And when it is said that every punishment is just and praiseworthy, this is understood of punishment *inflicted*; of punishment *enacted* or *contracted* it does not hold true, except insofar as they are understood under the character of punishment. But the passive privation of the good, or the deformation of the soul itself, is not a punishment *inflicted*, but is a punishment *enacted*, because the soul makes this punishment in itself while it sins.

5. To that which is objected, that sin is the cause of passive corruption; it must be said that this is understood of sin which is *in act*, which is the cause of corruption in the will by way of a habit; and in both ways[^16], as was shown before, it has the character of action and of passion. — *(Another solution.)* Yet it can be said that, even though sin is said to corrupt, it is nevertheless not properly the cause of corruption, but rather the sinner himself. And if sin be said to be the cause of passive corruption, this is said by reason of the sinner himself, just as action is said to be the cause of passion by reason of the agent himself; for perhaps the same thing can be action and passion, differing in comparison alone[^17].

---

la: De Casu diaboli, c. 9. et 16; de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et 6. Cfr. supra pag. 722, nota 3.

en: *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 9 and 16; *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 3 and 6. Cfr. above p. 722, note 3.

la: Cap. 12. n. 19, ubi textus origin. et Vat. pro *motus* exhibent *animus*, quod infra d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. etiam codd. et edd. ponunt. — De propos. seq. cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 18. n. 52.

en: Cap. 12. n. 19, where the original text and the Vatican [edition] for *motus* exhibit *animus*, which below at d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. the codices and editions also place. — On the following proposition cfr. Augustine, III. *On Free Will* c. 1. n. 1. seqq. and c. 18. n. 52.

la: Vide I. de Anima, text. 3. et 12. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi potentiae et operationes animae vocantur *passiones* (πάθη), et supra pag. 648, nota 3.

en: See I. *On the Soul*, text 3 and 12 seqq. (c. 1), where the powers and operations of the soul are called *passions* (πάθη), and above p. 648, note 3.

la: Libr. I. c. 1. n. 1: *Duobus enim modis appellare solemus malum: uno, cum male quemque fecisse dicimus; alio, cum mali aliquid esse perpessum.* Cfr. supra pag. 625, nota 9.

en: Book I. c. 1. n. 1: *For in two ways we are accustomed to call [something] evil: in one, when we say that someone has done ill; in another, when [we say] that he has suffered something of evil.* Cfr. above p. 625, note 9.

la: Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. Verba vide supra pag. 719, nota 1.

en: Book III. *On Free Will* c. 9. n. 26. For the words see above p. 719, note 1.

la: Hic c. 3. in fine.

en: Here c. 3, at the end.

la: Vide infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. — Inferius cod. bb *quem corrumpit* pro *eum qui corrumpitur*. In fine arg. Vat. cum ed. 1 et nonnullis codd. addit *sicut prius ostensum est*; in seq. arg. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 haec verba omittit.

en: See below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. — Further on, cod. bb [reads] *quem corrumpit* for *eum qui corrumpitur*. At the end of the argument the Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 and several codices adds *sicut prius ostensum est*; in the following argument the Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4 omits these words.

la: Quaest. praeced. — De *maiori* vide supra pag. 656, nota 7. in fine.

en: The preceding question. — On the *major* [premise] see above p. 656, note 7, at the end.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Codd. F K subiiciunt *quod*.

en: The preceding question. — Codd. F K subjoin *quod*.

la: Secundum Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 564, nota 9.

en: According to Anselm, *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will* q. 3. c. 11. Cfr. above p. 564, note 9.

la: Vide supra pag. 718, nota 9. et pag. 760, nota 6.

en: See above p. 718, note 9, and p. 760, note 6.

la: Aliquot codd., inter quos F K Q, hic repetunt *tenet*.

en: Several codices, among which F K Q, here repeat *tenet*.

la: Vat. *quod*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *quod*.

en: Cfr. below d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. and a. 3. q. 2, d. 41. a. 2. q. 1, in the body.

la: Vide supra pag. 767, nota 6, ubi verba Praepositivi huic spectantia attulimus. Verbis ibi allatis Praepositivus haec addit: *Illa quae est poena contracta, est vitium; illa nullo modo a Deo est, nec est dicendum, quod sit iusta poena, nisi forte dicatur iusta, quia iustum fuit, ut Deus desereret primum parentem, et eo deserto, illa secuta est. De ea [scil. contracta], quae non est vitium, concedimus, quod a Deo est... De poena acta concedimus, quod est iusta poena et iniuste facta, i. e. iniuste faciens. Veniale peccatum est iniusta poena, i. e. iniuste facta, licet non iniustum faciens. Poena vera illata pro peccato, illa iusta poena est et est a Deo.* Cfr. infra d. 42. dub. 1.

en: See above p. 767, note 6, where we adduced the words of Praepositivus pertaining to this. To the words there adduced Praepositivus adds these: *That which is contracted punishment is a vice; it is in no way from God, nor is it to be said that it is a just punishment, unless perhaps it be called just because it was just that God should forsake the first parent, and, he being forsaken, it followed. Concerning that [contracted] which is not a vice, we grant that it is from God... Concerning enacted punishment we grant that it is a just punishment and unjustly made, that is, unjustly making. Venial sin is an unjust punishment, that is, unjustly made, although not unjustly making. But the punishment truly inflicted for sin, that is a just punishment and is from God.* Cfr. below d. 42. dub. 1.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *utrumque*.

en: The editions, except 1, [read] *utrumque*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion of the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 57406–57524), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (Respondeo, corollarium, Solutio replies) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 824–826, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 846–848). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. ALIGNMENT CHECK PASSED: opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo` matches ART I topic (2) (`Circa primum quaeruntur tria`: (1) *utrum a peccato sit boni corruptio* [a1-q1]; (2) *utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio* [this q2]; (3) *utrum peccatum, in quantum corrumpit, contrarietur bono increato* [a1-q3]).

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**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 824–826.
- p.824 (verso, running head `824 SENTENTIARUM LIB. 11.`): the top is a1-q1's SCHOLION tail; q2 begins lower (full-width `QUAESTIO II.` + opener) with fundamentum 1 (`«Peccatum, sicut dicit Anselmus¹...`). Only one footer on p.824 → [^1] (De Casu diaboli, received from a1-q1).
- p.825 (running head `DIST. XXXV. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 825`): rest of fund 1 + fund 2–5 + Sed contra 1–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo (Conclusio 1 + start of corollarium, "secundum veritatem"). Footers 1–10 → continuous [^2]–[^11]; markers reflowed L-col (Confessionum¹, Philosophus², de Lib. Arb.³, Augustinus⁴, Magister⁵, iusta et laudabilis⁶) then R-col (ostensum est⁷, praetactum est⁸, instrumentum se movens⁹, malorum habituum¹⁰). [^2] Confessionum (Cap.12 n.19, *motus/animus* variant), [^3] Philosophus (de Anima), [^4] de Lib. Arb. (Duobus modis), [^5] Augustinus (Libr.III de Lib.Arb. c.9), [^6] Magister in littera (Hic c.3), [^7] iusta et laudabilis (Vide infra d.36 a.3 q.2 + bb/Vat variants), [^8] prius ostensum (Quaest. praeced., De maiori), [^9] praetactum est (Quaest. praeced., Codd FK quod), [^10] instrumentum se movens (Anselm de Concord. q.3 c.11), [^11] genere malorum habituum (Vide supra pag.718).
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum peccatum, in quantum corrumpit, contrarietur bono increato

title_alt: Whether sin, insofar as it corrupts, is contrary to the uncreated good

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum peccatum ex eo, quod corrumpit bonum, contrarietur bono increato.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum peccatum ex hoc, quod corrumpit bonum, contrarietur bono increato. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Argg. pro parte affirmativa.*

1. Primo per Augustinum, duodecimo de Civitate Dei[^1]: « Vitium contrarium est Deo, tanquam malum bono; naturae vero, quam vitiat, non tantum est contrarium, sed etiam noxium »: ergo videtur, malum in eo, quod corrumpit naturam, contrariari summo bono.

2. Item, quod facit hominem rebellem et contrarium Deo, illud potissime Deo contrariatur; sed peccatum facit hominem inimicum Dei, et pugnare adversus Deum et resistere, sicut ex diversis locis Scripturae[^2] accipi potest: ergo etc.

3. Item, contrarietas effectuum attestatur contrarietati causarum, maxime quando causa sic est in alterum contrariorum, quod non potest esse in reliquum[^3]; sed summi boni est iustitiam facere, peccati vero est iustitia privare, nec Deus potest privare iustitia, nec malum potest facere iustitiam: ergo videtur, quod malitia sit summo bono contraria in hoc, quod privat iustitiam.

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4. Item, quod contrariatur praecepto alicuius contrariatur ipsi praecipienti; sed malum contrariatur verbis et mandatis Dei in hoc, quod est corruptio, et corrumpit illud quod mandata Dei praecipiunt servari: ergo etc.

5. Item, caritas et cupiditas opponuntur, similiter gratia et culpa opponuntur; sed caritas et gratia Deo uniunt et assimilant, et in hoc maximam habent cum summo bono convenientiam[^4]: ergo econtra cupiditas et culpa reddunt animam Deo deformem et ab eo separant; et si hoc, ergo habent cum Deo contrarietatem et repugnantiam.

**Sed contra:**

*Pro parte negativa.*

1. Malum nulli contrariatur, nisi ei cui est malum, et nulli est malum, nisi ei cui nocet: si ergo nullum malum summo bono potest nocere, quia iam non esset summum; videtur, quod ratione privationis boni non contrarietur malum aliquod summo bono[^5].

2. Item, omnia « contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem[^6] »; sed malum nullo modo natum est fieri circa summum bonum: ergo nullo modo contrariatur summo bono.

3. Item, omnium contrariorum aliqua est proportio[^7]; sed mali ad bonum increatum nulla est proportio: ergo nulla contrarietas est istius mali ad illud summum bonum.

4. Item, omne contrarium aliquo modo resistit et repugnat suo contrario; sed divinae virtuti, cum sit omnipotentissima, nihil potest resistere[^8]: ergo impossibile est, malum contrariari Deo, nec in se nec in suo opere.

5. Item, nihil quod facit ad pulcritudinem operis, contrariatur sapientiae artificis; sed mala, quae perpetrantur, faciunt ad decorem universitatis[^9]: ergo nullo modo contrariantur nec bonitati nec sapientiae Conditoris.

Quaeritur ergo, pro quanto habeat illud intelligi, quod malum facit hominem Deo inimicum et Deo adversarium, cum Dei voluntas impleatur ex omnibus, et omnia subiaceant eius voluntati et nutui.

### Conclusio.

> Peccatum, bonum corrumpens, contrariatur bono increato tantum in effectu eiusdem, et quidem in parte, non simpliciter et universaliter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquod malum contrariari alicui bono dupliciter potest intelligi: aut in se et secundum formam, aut in suo *effectu* et in operatione. *(Conclusio 1.)* Primo modo malum non potest contrariari summo bono, cum illud sit bonum per essentiam, cui nihil omnino est contrarium. *(Conclusio 2.)* Secundo vero modo *quodam* modo potest contrariari, et *quodam* modo non. Nam dupliciter potest aliquis repugnare alicui in suo effectu: aut quia repugnat ex parte *virtutis ipsius agentis*, aut quia repugnat ex parte *idoneitatis ipsius suscipientis*. *(Conclusio 3.)* — Primo modo nihil potest repugnare Deo in suo opere, quoniam virtus Dei omnipotentissima est, et ideo nullum potest invenire obstaculum. Secundo modo subdistinguendum est, quia nocumentum inferre effectui, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut *simpliciter et universaliter*, aut *in parte*. *(Conclusio 4.)* — Primo modo nihil potest contrariari Deo in opere suo. Tantus enim est et talis ordo universitatis, quem ei Conditor dedit, ut a nullo possit malo perturbari, secundum quod in pluribus locis vult Augustinus[^10]. *(Conclusio 5.)* Ultimo vero modo aliquid potest repugnare Deo in effectu suo, quia per malum bene contingit aliquem Dei effectum reddi minus habilem ad susceptionem divinae influentiae ad obtentum perfectionis et beatitudinis, ad quam ordinatur ex sua primaria conditione. — Et sic patet, quod uno modo malum potest dici contrariari Deo in suo effectu, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt; aliis vero modis non, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur; et ita diversis viis verum concludunt et concedendae sunt.

*(Ad quaesitum incidens.)* Per hunc etiam modum solvendum est ad illud, quod ultimo quaerebatur, scilicet pro quanto quis dicatur Dei inimicus. Nam iuxta modum praedictum distinguenda est *voluntas beneplaciti* et *voluntas signi*. Voluntas beneplaciti est ipse Deus; voluntas vero signi dicit aliquem effectum creatum[^11]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod aliquis homo adversatur Deo, hoc non intelligitur, quod adversetur et inimicetur voluntati beneplaciti, cui nullus potest resistere, immo semper impletur vel *ab homine*, vel *de homine*[^12]; sed hoc dicitur quantum ad voluntatem *signi*, quia, cum Deus praecipiat unum, homo malus facit contrarium et ita Deo adversatur; et talem hominem, qui sic adversatur Deo, Deus odit, non *affectu* et repugnantia voluntatis, sed *effectu* punitionis[^13]; sic enim hominem affligit, sicut quis affligeret suum adversarium; et sic eum affligendo, ordinat eum ad honorem suum et reddit eum sibi subiectum. Et sic voluntati beneplaciti ceterae voluntates subserviunt

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et militant, quamvis aliquae contrariae videantur ratione eius, quod repugnat voluntati signi. Sic etiam omnia mala a Deo ordinantur, quamvis repugnare videantur divino ordini in aliquo effectu particulari. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, satis potest faciliter ad quaesita responderi.

english:
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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether sin, from the fact that it corrupts the good, is contrary to the uncreated good.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether sin, from the fact that it corrupts the good, is contrary to the uncreated good. And that it is, it seems:

*Arguments for the affirmative part.*

1. First, by Augustine, in the twelfth [book] *On the City of God*[^1]: « A vice is contrary to God as evil to good; but to the nature which it vitiates it is not only contrary, but also noxious »: therefore it seems that evil, in that it corrupts a nature, is contrary to the highest good.

2. Likewise, that which makes a human rebellious and contrary to God, that is especially contrary to God; but sin makes the human an enemy of God, and [makes him] fight against God and resist [him], as can be gathered from various places of Scripture[^2]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, contrariety of effects attests to a contrariety of causes, especially when the cause is so toward one of the contraries that it cannot be toward the other[^3]; but it belongs to the highest good to make justice, whereas it belongs to sin to deprive of justice, and God cannot deprive of justice, nor can evil make justice: therefore it seems that malice is contrary to the highest good in this, that it deprives of justice.

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4. Likewise, that which is contrary to someone's precept is contrary to the one commanding it; but evil is contrary to the words and commandments of God in this, that it is corruption, and corrupts that which the commandments of God enjoin to be kept: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, charity and cupidity are opposed, and similarly grace and guilt are opposed; but charity and grace unite [us] to God and make [us] like [him], and in this they have the greatest agreement with the highest good[^4]: therefore conversely cupidity and guilt render the soul deformed before God and separate [it] from him; and if so, then they have contrariety and repugnance toward God.

**On the contrary:**

*For the negative part.*

1. Evil is contrary to nothing except that to which it is an evil, and is an evil to nothing except that to which it does harm: if therefore no evil can harm the highest good, because then it would no longer be the highest; it seems that, by reason of the privation of the good, no evil is contrary to the highest good[^5].

2. Likewise, all « contraries are by nature apt to come to be about the same [subject][^6] »; but evil is in no way apt to come to be about the highest good: therefore it is in no way contrary to the highest good.

3. Likewise, of all contraries there is some proportion[^7]; but of evil to the uncreated good there is no proportion: therefore there is no contrariety of this evil to that highest good.

4. Likewise, every contrary in some way resists and is repugnant to its contrary; but nothing can resist the divine power, since it is most omnipotent[^8]: therefore it is impossible that evil be contrary to God, neither in itself nor in his work.

5. Likewise, nothing that contributes to the beauty of a work is contrary to the wisdom of the artificer; but the evils which are perpetrated contribute to the adornment of the universe[^9]: therefore in no way are they contrary either to the goodness or to the wisdom of the Creator.

It is asked therefore in what measure that is to be understood, [namely] that evil makes the human an enemy and adversary of God, since the will of God is fulfilled out of all things, and all things lie subject to his will and command.

### Conclusion.

> Sin, corrupting the good, is contrary to the uncreated good only in its effect, and indeed in part, not simply and universally.

**I respond:** It must be said that some evil being contrary to some good can be understood in two ways: either in itself and according to form, or in its *effect* and in operation. *(Conclusion 1.)* In the first way evil cannot be contrary to the highest good, since that is good by essence, to which nothing whatever is contrary. *(Conclusion 2.)* But in the second way it can be contrary in a *certain* manner, and in a *certain* manner not. For in two ways one can be repugnant to another in its effect: either because it is repugnant on the part of the *power of the agent itself*, or because it is repugnant on the part of the *fitness of the recipient itself*. *(Conclusion 3.)* — In the first way nothing can be repugnant to God in his work, since the power of God is most omnipotent, and therefore can find no obstacle. In the second way a subdistinction must be made, because to inflict harm on the effect can be twofold: either *simply and universally*, or *in part*. *(Conclusion 4.)* — In the first way nothing can be contrary to God in his work. For so great and such is the order of the universe, which the Creator gave to it, that it cannot be perturbed by any evil, according to what Augustine holds in many places[^10]. *(Conclusion 5.)* But in the last way something can be repugnant to God in his effect, because through evil it well happens that some effect of God is rendered less fit for the reception of the divine influence toward attaining the perfection and beatitude to which it is ordained by its primary condition. — And thus it is clear that in one way evil can be said to be contrary to God in his effect, as the reasons adduced for the first part show; but in the other ways not, as the reasons show which are adduced for the second part; and thus by diverse ways they conclude truly and are to be granted.

*(To the incidental question.)* By this same manner there must also be a solution to that which was last asked, namely in what measure someone is called an enemy of God. For according to the aforesaid manner the *will of good-pleasure* and the *will of sign* are to be distinguished. The will of good-pleasure is God himself; but the will of sign signifies some created effect[^11]. When therefore it is said that some human is adverse to God, this is not understood [to mean] that he is adverse and hostile to the will of good-pleasure, which no one can resist, but rather it is always fulfilled either *by the human* or *concerning the human*[^12]; but this is said as regards the will of *sign*, because, since God commands one thing, the evil human does the contrary and so is adverse to God; and such a human, who is thus adverse to God, God hates, not by *affection* and repugnance of will, but by the *effect* of punishment[^13]; for thus he afflicts the human, just as one would afflict his adversary; and thus by afflicting him, he orders him to his own honor and renders him subject to himself. And thus to the will of good-pleasure the other wills are subservient

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and do service, although some seem contrary by reason of that which is repugnant to the will of sign. So too all evils are ordered by God, although they seem to be repugnant to the divine order in some particular effect. And by these things which have been said, the things asked can readily enough be answered.

la: Cap. 3, in textu origin. post *bono* plura sunt addita, et dein pro *non tantum est contrarium* legitur *non tantum malum*.

en: Chapter 3; in the original text after *bono* several things are added, and then for *non tantum est contrarium* there is read *non tantum malum*.

en: Isaiah 50, 2; Romans 5, 10; James 4, 4. — Jeremiah 5, 23; Job 9, 4; Acts 7, 51; Romans 13, 2.

la: Communiter secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13, et VII. c. 1. dicitur: *Quorum effectus sunt contrarii, et ipsa sunt contraria.* Cfr. tom. I, pag. 51, nota 11.

en: It is commonly said, according to Aristotle, I. *Topics* c. 13, and VII. c. 1: *Those whose effects are contrary are themselves also contrary.* Cfr. tom. I, p. 51, note 11.

la: Vide supra d. 26. q. 2. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: See above d. 26. q. 2. and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1, in the body.

la: Hoc arg. insinuat August., II. de Morib. Manich. c. 3. n. 5; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. — Paulo superius pro *nulli est* edd., excepta 1, *nulli inest*.

en: This argument Augustine insinuates, II. *On the Morals of the Manichees* c. 3. n. 5; XII. *On the City of God*, c. 3. — A little above, for *nulli est* the editions, except 1, [read] *nulli inest*.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et 11. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Idem XII. Metaph. text. 36. (XI. c. 10.) ait: *Primo autem nihil contrarium est.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories*, chapter *On Opposites*, and 11. *Topics* c. 3. (c. 7.). The same [author], XII. *Metaphysics* text 36. (XI. c. 10.) says: *But to the First nothing is contrary.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 748, nota 2. et pag. 750, nota 1. — In fine arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt illud.

en: Cfr. above p. 748, note 2, and p. 750, note 1. — At the end of the argument cod. cc and ed. 1 omit *illud* ("that").

la: Rom. 9, 19: *Voluntati enim eius quis resistit?*

en: Romans 9, 19: *For who resists his will?*

la: Ut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6.

en: As was shown in I. *Sent.* d. 46. q. 6.

la: Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 33; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. et XIV. c. 27.

en: Book III. *On Free Will* c. 12. n. 33; XI. *On the City of God*, c. 18. and XIV. c. 27.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 3. q. 1. seq. et d. 47. q. 1. seq., nec non August., III. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9.

en: Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 45. a. 3. q. 1. seq. and d. 47. q. 1. seq., and also Augustine, III. *On the Trinity* c. 4. n. 9.

la: August., Enchirid. c. 107. n. 28. Verba vide supra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 107. n. 28. For the words see above d. XXIV. text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cfr. above d. 26. q. 1, in the body.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Aliis verbis, sed non alio sensu, quoad hanc quaestionem loquitur S. Thom. (S. I. q. 48. a. 6.): « Malum poenae privat bonum creaturae... Malum vero culpae opponitur proprie bono increato. Contrariatur enim *impletioni* divinae voluntatis et divino amori, quo bonum divinum *in se ipso amatur*, et non solum secundum quod participatur a creatura » (cfr. I. II. q. 79. a. 1. ad 4.). — De controversia, qua ratione peccatum propter oppositionem ad Deum infinita sit offensa, S. Bonav. tantum loquitur de infinitate *obiectiva* et *secundum quid* (cfr. supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. in fine corp., infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. 2; III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3; IV. Sent. d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 44. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.).

**II.** De hac quaestione, quae non est sine utilitate, alii antiqui Scholastici explicite non tractant nisi: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 8. a. 1; Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 2.), qui exhibet doctrinam S. Bonaventurae breviter contractam, et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 5.), qui transcribit tantum eiusdem responsionem.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In other words, but not in another sense, S. Thomas speaks regarding this question (S. I. q. 48. a. 6.): « The evil of punishment deprives [one] of the good of the creature... But the evil of guilt is opposed properly to the uncreated good. For it is contrary to the *fulfillment* of the divine will and to the divine love, by which the divine good *is loved in itself*, and not only insofar as it is participated by the creature » (cfr. I. II. q. 79. a. 1. ad 4.). — On the controversy by what reason sin, on account of its opposition to God, is an infinite offense, S. Bonaventure speaks only of *objective* infinity and [infinity] *in a certain respect* (cfr. above d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. at the end of the body, below d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. 2; III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3; IV. Sent. d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 44. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.).

**II.** Concerning this question, which is not without usefulness, the other ancient Scholastics do not treat explicitly except: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 94. m. 8. a. 1; Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 3. a. 2.), who sets forth the doctrine of S. Bonaventure briefly compressed, and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 5.), who transcribes only his response.

---

translators_notes:
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- p.826 (verso, running head `826 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): the top is a1-q2's Solutio replies; q3 begins lower (full-width `QUAESTIO III.` + opener) with fundamenta 1–3 (Augustinus de Civ. Dei, the Scripture-cluster argument, the contrarietas-causarum argument). The three p.826 footers serving q3's opening fundamenta → [^1]–[^3] (received from a1-q2: footers 7–9).
- p.827 (running head `DIST. XXXV. ART. I. QUAEST. III. 827`): fundamenta 4–5 + Sed contra 1–5 + the incidental-question opener + Conclusio + Respondeo (all five conclusiones) + the incidental-question resolution. Footers 1–10 → continuous [^4]–[^13]; markers reflowed L-col (convenientiam¹, summo bono²[=non contrarietur], circa idem³, proportio⁴, resistere⁵, universitatis⁶, inimicum⁷[quaesitum]) then R-col (Augustinus⁷[in corp.→Libr.III de Lib.Arb], de homine⁸, punitionis⁹, etc.) — assigned by Quaracchi footer order: [^4] convenientiam (d.26 q.2/d.29), [^5] privationis boni (de Morib. Manich.), [^6] circa idem (de Praedicam./Topic.), [^7] proportio (pag.748/750), [^8] resistere (Rom.9,19), [^9] universitatis (I.Sent. d.46 q.6), [^10] vult Augustinus (Libr.III de Lib.Arb c.12) = footer ⁷; [^11] de Trin. (d.45/d.47/de Trin.) = footer ⁸, anchored at "voluntas signi dicit aliquem effectum creatum" (the *created effect* / will-of-sign cross-ref); [^12] Enchirid. c.107 = footer ⁹, anchored at "vel *de homine*" (Augustine: God's will fulfilled by/concerning man); [^13] Cfr. supra d.26 q.1 in corp. = footer ¹⁰, anchored at "sed *effectu* punitionis" (was orphaned). NB the prior Notes mis-mapped [^11]→de homine and [^12]→effectu punitionis; corrected 2026-05-31 polish against 600dpi p.827 (printed body superscripts: effectum creatum⁸, de homine⁹, effectu punitionis¹⁰).
- p.828 (verso, running head `828 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): Respondeo tail (`et militant… ad quaesita responderi`) + SCHOLION (items I, II). The SCHOLION carries only parenthetical/reference content (S. Thom. citation, the obiectiva-infinitas cross-refs, the commentator roll Alex. Hal./Petr. a Tar./Dionys. Carth.) — NO numbered footers. ARTICULUS II opens immediately below on p.828, forwarded to d35-a2-q1. This q3 claims no footer on p.828.

**Hand-off received.** From d35-a1-q2: the p.826 footers 7–9 — footer 7 (`Cap. 3, in textu origin. post bono plura sunt addita…` = XII. de Civ. Dei, anchoring fundamentum 1) → [^1]; footer 8 (the Scripture cluster `Isai. 50,2; Rom. 5,10; Iac. 4,4. — Ier. 5,23; Iob 9,4; Act. 7,51; Rom. 13,2`, anchoring fundamentum 2's *ex diversis locis Scripturae*) → [^2]; footer 9 (`Communiter secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c.13. et VII. c.1. … Quorum effectus sunt contrarii…`, anchoring fundamentum 3's contrarietas-causarum argument) → [^3]. a1-q2 claimed footers 1–6 on p.826.

**Hand-off forwarded to d35-a2-q1.** The `ARTICULUS II.` header (raw 57641, *De modo, quo peccatum bonum corrumpit*) with its TRACTATIO opener `Consequenter quantum ad secundum principale quaeritur de modo corrumpendi bonum per peccatum…` opens at the bottom of p.828. Per Override §5 the short ART II opener folds into a2-q1. No p.828 footer is forwarded — q3's only p.828 content is the Respondeo tail + SCHOLION, both footnote-free; the ARTICULUS II / a2-q1 body footers begin fresh on p.828's lower portion / p.829.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q3 (p.828, raw ~57625–57640), items I, II. `has_scholion: true`. Item I aligns S. Bonaventure's conclusion with S. Thomas (S. I. q. 48. a. 6.) on the evil-of-guilt opposed to the uncreated good, and treats the *infinita offensa* controversy (objective/secundum-quid infinity). Item II is the commentator roll for this question (Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar. hic q. 3. a. 2., Dionys. Carth. hic q. 5.). This is q3's own scholion, distinct from the whole-article scholion at a1-q1.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 826–828 read top→bottom. The p.826/827 seam (inside fundamentum 3 → fundamentum 4 — the L-col `summo bono` arg.5/`fundamentum 4` boundary is clean: p.826 R-col ends `in hoc, quod privat iustitiam` [fund.3], p.827 L-col opens `4. Item, quod contrariatur praecepto`), and the p.827/828 seam (inside the incidental-question resolution, `ceterae voluntates subserviunt` → `et militant, quamvis aliquae contrariae videantur` — continuous), are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The p.826 footer block splits cleanly between q2 (footers 1–6) and q3 (footers 7–9, received as [^1]–[^3]); the p.827 footer block (10 notes) is fully accounted for here ([^4]–[^13]); p.828 carries no footers for q3.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II.
### *De modo, quo peccatum bonum corrumpit.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum principale quaeritur de modo corrumpendi bonum per peccatum. Et cum dicat Augustinus[^1], quod « malum sit corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis », circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum per quodlibet malum corrumpantur ista tria simul et inseparabiliter.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec tria per malum corrumpantur aequaliter sive aeque principaliter.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum possint corrumpi totaliter.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum modus, species et ordo per quodlibet malum corrumpantur simul et inseparabiliter.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum per quodlibet malum habeant ista tria, scilicet modus, species et ordo, corrumpi simul et inseparabiliter. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per definitionem mali, quam ponit Augustinus[^2]: « Malum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis ». Si enim haec ratio recta est, ergo debet convenire cuilibet malo: ergo quodlibet malum est privativum istorum trium.

2. Item, impossibile est, esse modum sine specie et ordine, et e converso[^3]; sed quae necessario se concomitantur in esse, necessario se concomitantur in privatione. Si ergo malum est privatio alicuius horum, necesse est, quod simul illa tria habeat corrumpere.

3. Item, maior est connexio in his tribus, videlicet modo, specie et ordine, quam sit in habitibus virtutum, qui sunt diversi formaliter secundum speciem[^4]; sed propter connexionem habituum, cum amittitur unus habitus, necessario et omnes perduntur: ergo multo fortius, cum per malum privatur ordo, privatur simul species et modus.

4. Item, per donum gratiae melioratur anima et eius habilitas quantum ad haec tria, scilicet modum, speciem et ordinem — nam gratia reddit animam meliorem et pulcriorem et rectiorem — ergo cum culpa directe opponatur gratiae et tollat ipsam gratiam, videtur, quod haec tria simul et inseparabiliter corrumpat et minuat.

**Sed contra:**

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Modus attenditur in creatura per comparationem ad Deum sub ratione *efficientis*, et species sub ratione *exemplaris*, et ordo sub ratione *finis*[^5]; sed quamvis creatura deordinetur a Deo secundum comparationem sub ratione *finis*, nihilominus tamen salvatur comparatio ipsius ad Deum sub ratione *efficientis* et *exemplaris*: ergo ad cor-

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ruptionem ordinis non sequitur necessario corruptio modi et speciei.

2. Item, in corporibus videmus, modum auferri sine specie, et speciem etiam auferri posse sine ordine per aliquod malum, quod nocet bono naturae — nam aliquis habens indebitam quantitatem habet pulcritudinem formae, et e converso, et similiter est in ordine — sed sic se habet malum culpae ad modum, speciem et ordinem in spiritualibus, sicut malum, quod nocet naturae, ad modum, speciem et ordinem in corporalibus[^6]: si ergo in corporalibus non privantur illa tria simul et inseparabiliter, videtur, quod nec in spiritualibus.

3. Item, nos videmus, quod alia bona naturalia sic se habent, quod unum potest auferri sine altero, sicut fortitudo sine eloquentia, et e converso: ergo si modus, species et ordo dicunt bona naturalia ipsius animae; videtur, quod unum sine altero privari habeat per malum culpae.

4. Item, « tantum unum uni opponitur »[^7]: ergo unum malum opponitur uni bono; aut igitur quodlibet peccatum claudit in se tria peccata sive mala, aut si unicum est peccatum sive malum, videtur, quod non tollat simul et semel ista tria. *Si tu dicas*, quod ista tria simul concurrant in unum bonum; quaero, qualiter possit intelligi, cum videantur differre formaliter. — Et iterum, cum in omnibus habeant reperiri, qualiter dicuntur per malum culpae privari, quod non reperitur nisi in sola creatura rationali?

### Conclusio.

> Omne peccatum corrumpit circa voluntatem haec tria, modum, speciem et ordinem, simul et inseparabiliter.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod triplex fuit modus distinguendi et assignandi modum, speciem et ordinem in rebus.

Nam aliqui acceperunt ista tria secundum diversas *proprietates* in eadem re consideratas, ita quod modus dicat aliquid pertinens ad genus quantitatis, et species aliquid pertinens ad genus qualitatis, et ordo aliquid pertinens ad genus relationis. — Sed iste modus assignandi non consonat verbis Augustini[^8]. Nam ipse vult, quod in quolibet quantumcumque parvo bono, non solum substantia, sed etiam proprietate substantiae sit reperire ista tria; unde haec tria se extendunt ad omnia entium et praedicamentorum genera.

Alius vero modus assignandi et distinguendi ista tria fuit per comparationem ad diversa. Quaelibet enim res tripliciter habet considerari, videlicet in se et per comparationem ad alias res universi et in comparatione ad finem. Ut autem in se consideratur, sic attenditur in ea modus; nam unaquaeque res in se ipsa finita est et modificata. Ut autem comparatur ad res alias, sic attenditur in ea species, sicut attenditur pulcritudo partium secundum situm, quem habent in toto. Ut autem comparatur in relatione ad finem, sic attenditur in ea ordo; unaquaeque enim res ordinata est, dum directe tendit ad finem, ad quem est. — Iste autem modus dicendi, etsi probabilior videatur elici ex verbis Augustini[^9], adhuc tamen perfecte veritatem non attingit. Omnibus enim aliis rebus circumscriptis, remanente una sola anima, adhuc potest peccare, et adhuc potest attendi in ea modus, species et ordo.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi praedictis rationabilior, quod modus, species et ordo considerantur in eadem re secundum diversas comparationes sive relationes ad idem. Attenduntur enim in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod ipsa est vestigium Creatoris; quod quidem vestigium consistit in comparatione creaturae ad Creatorem secundum triplex genus causae, sicut in primo libro[^10] dictum fuit, ita quod modus attenditur secundum comparationem creaturae ad Creatorem in ratione causae efficientis, species in ratione causae exemplaris, et ordo in ratione causae finalis. Et quia quodlibet ens, quantumcumque modicum, habet istam comparationem ad Deum, in quolibet ente creato reperiuntur haec tria.

Iuxta hunc igitur modum attendendum est, quod creatura rationalis et est natura quaedam, et est ulterius praeter alias creaturas operans per voluntatem. Et utroque modo habet comparari ad Deum; et utroque modo habet reperiri in ea modus, species et ordo; utroque etiam modo habet reperiri circa eam malum, quod est istorum trium corruptivum. Sed malum culpae proprie habet consistere circa ipsam, secundum quod est voluntarie operans; et ideo privare habet modum, speciem et ordinem, secundum quod consistunt circa ipsam voluntatem, ut est voluntarie operans. Voluntas autem, cum ha-

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bet modum, speciem et ordinem, sicut debet, bona est. Tunc autem voluntas nostra bona est, quando in movendo sive operando continuatur divinae virtuti[^11] ut principio moventi, et conformatur ei ut regulae dirigenti, et unitur ei ut fini quietanti; et in primo attenditur modus, in secundo species, in tertio ordo secundum comparationem in triplici genere causae. Quandocumque vero aliquis peccat, necessario discontinuatur a Deo tanquam a principio movente, quia Deus nunquam movet ad peccatum; discordat a Deo tanquam a regula dirigente; et elongat se et deordinat tanquam[^12] a fine quietante, ponens creaturam finem. Et in omni peccato necesse est ista tria concurrere. — Et sic patet, quod omne peccatum corrumpit circa voluntatem haec tria, scilicet modum, speciem et ordinem simul et inseparabiliter. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes. Ad rationes vero in oppositum adductas facile est respondere.

1. Ad primum enim quod obiicitur, quod semper manet salva comparatio ad efficiens et exemplar; dicendum, quod voluntas ut natura quaedam est, habet ad Deum comparari illo triplici genere causae; et secundum hoc habet quendam modum, speciem et ordinem, in quibus communicat cum omni genere creaturae; et malum culpae non habet hoc modo illa privare. Alio modo, sicut praedictum est, habet comparari ad Deum ut moventem et dirigentem et quietantem; et hoc modo non manet salva comparatio ad Deum sub ratione exemplaris sive regulae dirigentis, nec etiam sub ratione moventis, sicut non manet sub ratione finis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in corporibus unum potest adimi sine altero; dicendum, quod haec in corporibus dupliciter possunt accipi: uno modo, prout accipiuntur penes dispositiones diversas; et hoc modo unum potest adimi sine altero, sed hoc modo non attenditur in eis ratio vestigii. Alio modo, prout attenduntur penes idem secundum comparationes, videlicet prout eadem forma substantialis dat modum, speciem et ordinem secundum diversas comparationes in triplici genere causae; et hoc dico quantum ad primum esse; vel prout eadem forma accidentalis dat quantum ad bene esse[^13]; et hoc modo nunquam fallit, quin, si fiat corruptio in modo, per consequens etiam fiat in specie et ordine, et e converso.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in aliis bonis naturalibus non est ita; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia alia bona naturalia essentialiter differunt; et ideo unum potest corrumpi et tolli sine altero. Non sic autem est in modo, specie et ordine, immo circa idem fundantur, sicut ostensum est.

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum. Nam etsi modus, species et ordo videantur esse tria bona, non tamen sunt diversa per essentiam, sed dicunt tres comparationes eiusdem boni. — Patet etiam illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quare scilicet culpa non est in omnibus, in quibus reperitur modus[^14], species et ordo, quia non est privatio illorum trium, secundum quod in eis consistit generalis ratio vestigii, et consistunt circa omnem creaturam, sed prout consistunt circa voluntatem deliberativam.

english:
### ARTICLE II.
### *On the manner in which sin corrupts the good.*

Consequently, with respect to the second principal point, it is asked concerning the manner of corrupting the good through sin. And since Augustine says[^1] that « evil is the corruption of mode, species, and order », concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether by any evil these three are corrupted simultaneously and inseparably.

Secondly it is asked, whether these three are corrupted by evil equally or as-equally-principally.

Thirdly it is asked, whether they can be corrupted totally.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether mode, species, and order are corrupted by any evil simultaneously and inseparably.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether by any evil these three, namely mode, species, and order, must be corrupted simultaneously and inseparably. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, by the definition of evil which Augustine sets down[^2]: « Evil is the privation of mode, species, and order ». For if this account is correct, then it ought to apply to any evil: therefore any evil is privative of these three.

2. Likewise, it is impossible that there be mode without species and order, and conversely[^3]; but things which necessarily accompany one another in being, necessarily accompany one another in privation. If therefore evil is the privation of any of these, it is necessary that it corrupt those three together.

3. Likewise, there is a greater connection in these three, namely mode, species, and order, than there is in the habits of the virtues, which are formally diverse according to species[^4]; but on account of the connection of the habits, when one habit is lost, necessarily all of them too are lost: therefore much more strongly, when by evil order is taken away, species and mode are taken away together.

4. Likewise, by the gift of grace the soul and its capacity are bettered with respect to these three, namely mode, species, and order — for grace renders the soul better and more beautiful and more upright — therefore since guilt is directly opposed to grace and takes away grace itself, it seems that it corrupts and diminishes these three simultaneously and inseparably.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Mode is regarded in a creature by comparison to God under the character of *efficient* [cause], and species under the character of *exemplar*, and order under the character of *end*[^5]; but although a creature be disordered from God according to comparison under the character of *end*, nevertheless its comparison to God under the character of *efficient* and *exemplar* is preserved: therefore upon the cor-

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ruption of order there does not necessarily follow the corruption of mode and species.

2. Likewise, in bodies we see that mode is removed without species, and that species too can be removed without order by some evil which harms the good of nature — for someone having an undue quantity has [yet] the beauty of form, and conversely, and similarly it is in order — but the evil of guilt stands to mode, species, and order in spiritual things just as the evil which harms nature [stands] to mode, species, and order in corporeal things[^6]: if therefore in corporeal things those three are not deprived simultaneously and inseparably, it seems that neither [are they] in spiritual things.

3. Likewise, we see that other natural goods are so disposed that one can be removed without the other, as fortitude without eloquence, and conversely: therefore if mode, species, and order state natural goods of the soul itself; it seems that one ought to be deprived without the other by the evil of guilt.

4. Likewise, « only one is opposed to one »[^7]: therefore one evil is opposed to one good; either therefore any sin encloses within itself three sins or evils, or, if the sin or evil is single, it seems that it does not remove these three simultaneously and at once. *If you say* that these three concur together into one good; I ask how this can be understood, since they seem to differ formally. — And again, since they must be found in all things, how are they said to be deprived through the evil of guilt, which is not found except in the rational creature alone?

### Conclusion.

> Every sin corrupts, concerning the will, these three — mode, species, and order — simultaneously and inseparably.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that there was a threefold manner of distinguishing and assigning mode, species, and order in things.

For some took these three according to diverse *properties* considered in the same thing, such that mode states something pertaining to the genus of quantity, and species something pertaining to the genus of quality, and order something pertaining to the genus of relation. — But this manner of assigning does not accord with the words of Augustine[^8]. For he holds that in any good however small, not only in substance, but also in the property of substance, these three are to be found; whence these three extend to all the genera of beings and of the predicaments.

But another manner of assigning and distinguishing these three was by comparison to diverse [things]. For any thing can be considered in three ways, namely in itself and by comparison to other things of the universe and in comparison to an end. As it is considered in itself, so mode is regarded in it; for each thing is in itself finite and modified. As it is compared to other things, so species is regarded in it, just as the beauty of the parts is regarded according to the position which they have in the whole. As it is compared in relation to an end, so order is regarded in it; for each thing is ordered when it directly tends to the end for which it is. — But this manner of speaking, although it seem more probably to be elicited from the words of Augustine[^9], yet does not perfectly attain the truth. For with all other things set aside, one sole soul remaining, it can still sin, and there can still be regarded in it mode, species, and order.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, more reasonable than the aforesaid, that mode, species, and order are considered in the same thing according to diverse comparisons or relations to the same. For they are regarded in each creature, insofar as it is a vestige of the Creator; which vestige indeed consists in the comparison of the creature to the Creator according to the threefold genus of cause, as was said in the first book[^10], such that mode is regarded according to the comparison of the creature to the Creator in the character of efficient cause, species in the character of exemplar cause, and order in the character of final cause. And because any being, however small, has this comparison to God, in any created being these three are found.

According to this manner, therefore, it is to be considered that the rational creature both is a certain nature, and is further, beyond other creatures, operating through the will. And in each way it is to be compared to God; and in each way there are to be found in it mode, species, and order; in each way also there is to be found concerning it the evil which is corruptive of these three. But the evil of guilt properly consists concerning it, insofar as it is voluntarily operating; and therefore it deprives [it of] mode, species, and order, insofar as they consist concerning the will itself, as it is voluntarily operating. But the will, when it ha-

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s mode, species, and order, as it ought, is good. But our will is good when, in moving or operating, it is continued to the divine power[^11] as to the moving principle, and is conformed to it as to the directing rule, and is united to it as to the quieting end; and in the first mode is regarded, in the second species, in the third order, according to comparison in the threefold genus of cause. But whenever anyone sins, he is necessarily discontinued from God as from a moving principle, because God never moves to sin; he is discordant from God as from a directing rule; and he removes himself and is disordered as[^12] from a quieting end, setting up the creature as his end. And in every sin it is necessary that these three concur. — And thus it is clear that every sin corrupts, concerning the will, these three, namely mode, species, and order, simultaneously and inseparably. — And the reasons showing this are to be granted. But to the reasons adduced to the opposite it is easy to respond.

1. To the first then which is objected, that the comparison to the efficient and the exemplar always remains preserved; it must be said that the will, as it is a certain nature, has to be compared to God by that threefold genus of cause; and according to this it has a certain mode, species, and order, in which it communicates with every genus of creature; and the evil of guilt does not in this mode deprive [it of] those. In another mode, as was said before, it has to be compared to God as moving and directing and quieting; and in this mode the comparison to God under the character of exemplar or directing rule does not remain preserved, nor even under the character of mover, just as it does not remain under the character of end.

2. To that which is objected, that in bodies one can be taken away without the other; it must be said that these in bodies can be taken in two ways: in one way, as they are taken according to diverse dispositions; and in this way one can be taken away without the other, but in this way the character of vestige is not regarded in them. In another way, as they are regarded according to the same according to comparisons, namely as the same substantial form gives mode, species, and order according to diverse comparisons in the threefold genus of cause; and this I say as to first being; or as the same accidental form gives [them] as to well-being[^13]; and in this way it never fails but that, if corruption occurs in mode, consequently it also occurs in species and order, and conversely.

3. To that which is objected, that in other natural goods it is not so; it must be said that it is not similar, because the other natural goods differ essentially; and therefore one can be corrupted and removed without the other. But it is not so in mode, species, and order, rather they are founded concerning the same, as has been shown.

4. And through this the response to the last [objection] is clear. For although mode, species, and order seem to be three goods, yet they are not diverse by essence, but state three comparisons of the same good. — There is clear also that which was lastly asked, namely why guilt is not in all things in which mode[^14], species, and order are found, [the reason being] that it is not the privation of those three insofar as in them consists the general character of vestige, and they consist concerning every creature, but [it is the privation of them] insofar as they consist concerning the deliberative will.

la: De Natura boni, c. 4.

en: *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4.

la: De Natura boni, c. 4. — De propos. seq., in qua pro *haec ratio* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substituerunt *haec definitio*, cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 33. (VI. c. 10), ubi docetur, definitionem esse rationem (λόγον), et VI. Topic. c. 1, ubi inter alia habetur illud: Oportet enim hominis definitionem de omni homine verificari.

en: *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4. — On the following proposition, in which for *haec ratio* ("this account") the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 substituted *haec definitio* ("this definition"), cfr. Aristotle, VII. *Metaphysics* text 33. (VI. c. 10), where it is taught that a definition is an account (λόγον), and VI. *Topics* c. 1, where among other things this is held: For it is necessary that the definition of "man" be verified of every man.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 6: Omne igitur quod est, sine aliqua specie non est. Ubi autem aliqua species, necessario est aliquis modus, et modus aliquid boni est. — In fine arg. pro *habeat* edd. 1, 2 cum aliquot codd., ut B D E F K X Z bb, manifeste falso *habeant*.

en: Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 6: Therefore everything which is, is not without some species. But where there is some species, there is necessarily some mode, and mode is something of the good. — At the end of the argument, for *habeat* edd. 1, 2 with several codices, such as B D E F K X Z bb, [read] manifestly falsely *habeant*.

la: Libr. III. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. 2. agitur de formali diversitate virtutum, et ibid. d. 36. a. 1. q. I. et 3. de connexione ipsarum.

en: [In] book III. of the *Sentences* d. 33. a. I. q. 2. the formal diversity of the virtues is treated, and ibid. d. 36. a. 1. q. I. and 3. their connection.

la: August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 7. exponens illud Sap. II, 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti, dicit: Secundum id vero, quod mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit, ille primitus et veraciter et singulariter ista [scil. tria] est, qui terminat omnia et format omnia et ordinat omnia etc. — Mox ed. 1 omittit *secundum* comparationem, pro quo ceterae edd. substituunt *per* comparationem.

en: Augustine, IV. *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 3. n. 7. expounding that [text] Wisdom XI, 21: Thou hast disposed all things in measure and number and weight, says: According to that, however, whereby measure prefixes the mode to every thing, and number affords the species to every thing, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability, he is primarily and truly and singularly these [namely, the three], who terminates all things and forms all things and orders all things etc. — Shortly [after], ed. 1 omits *secundum* comparationem ("according to comparison"), for which the other editions substitute *per* comparationem ("by comparison").

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4.

en: See above the text of the Master, d. XXXIV. c. 4.

la: Secundum Aristotelem, de quo cfr. supra pag. 812, nota 8.

en: According to Aristotle, on whom cfr. above p. 812, note 8.

la: De Natura boni, c. 3. Cfr. de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq.

en: *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 3. Cfr. *On True Religion* c. 18. n. 35. seq.

la: De Vera Relig. c. 7. n. 13: « Omnis enim res vel substantia vel essentia vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo melius enuntiatur, simul haec tria habet: ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat ». Et 83 Qq. q. 18: Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit... Ideoque etiam cum veritas quaeritur, plus quam tria genera quaestionum esse non possunt, utrum omnino sit, utrum hoc an aliud sit, utrum approbandum improbandumve sit. Cfr. de Natura boni, c. 22. seqq.

en: *On True Religion* c. 7. n. 13: « For every thing, whether substance or essence or nature, or if it is better expressed by any other word, has these three together: that it be some one thing, and be distinguished by its proper species from the rest, and not exceed the order of things ». And *83 Questions* q. 18: Everything which is, is one thing by which it subsists, another by which it is distinguished, another by which it agrees... And therefore also when truth is sought, there cannot be more than three genera of questions: whether it is at all, whether it is this or another, whether it is to be approved or disapproved. Cfr. *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 22. seqq.

la: Dist. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine et dub. 3. — Praeter verba August., quae supra attulimus pag. 828, nota 5, considerentur hic et illa, quae 83 Qq. q. 18. habentur: Causam quoque eius [creaturae] trinam esse oportet: qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi amica sit. Creaturae autem causam, id est auctorem, Deum dicimus. Oportet ergo esse Trinitatem, qua nihil praestantius, intelligentius et beatius invenire perfecta ratio potest.

en: Dist. 3. p. I. q. 2. at the end and dub. 3. — Besides the words of Augustine which we adduced above p. 828, note 5, let those also be considered which are held in *83 Questions* q. 18: Its cause too [namely, the creature's] must be threefold: that by which it is, that by which it is this, that by which it is friendly to itself. But the cause of the creature, that is the author, we call God. Therefore there must be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent, and more blessed.

la: Vat. *voluntati.*

en: The Vatican [edition] reads *voluntati* ("to the will") [for *virtuti*].

la: Ita plures codd., ut F H W cc etc., cum ed. 1; alii non pauci, inter quos C K L O S Z bb ee, cum edd. 2, 3 *aliquid*, Vat. *se* pro *tanquam.*

en: Thus several codices, such as F H W cc etc., with ed. 1; not a few others, among which C K L O S Z bb ee, with edd. 2, 3 [read] *aliquid*, the Vatican [edition reads] *se* for *tanquam.*

la: Vat. addit *salvat in esse, vel bene et beate esse.* — Aliquanto superius pro *prout attenduntur* codd. K T V bb cc ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *prout attenditur.*

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *salvat in esse, vel bene et beate esse* ("preserves in being, or in well- and blessedly-being"). — Somewhat above, for *prout attenduntur* the codices K T V bb cc ee and others, with edd. 1, 2, 3, [read] *prout attenditur.*

la: Codd. C L R S W bb etc. *numerus.*

en: Codices C L R S W bb etc. [read] *numerus* ("number") [for *modus*].

latin_scholion:
**I.** De modo, specie et ordine cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. et d. 37. p. 1. a. 3. q. 2; item S. Thom., S. 1. q. 5. a. 5. — Supponitur hic, quod bonitas et perfectio creaturae consistit in Dei similitudine, quae attenditur secundum triplicem causalitatem divinam, scilicet in ratione efficientis, exemplaris et finalis. Ad hanc triplicem causalitatem S. Bonav. reducit illa tria, quae inseparabiliter Dei similitudinem et bonitatem in creaturis constituunt. Consentiunt in hac reductione Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aegid. R. — Hinc malum in corruptione huius similitudinis consistit (hic q. 2.). Et bene notandum, quod secundum diversos bonorum gradus, diversi etiam gradus sunt modi, speciei et ordinis. Aliter igitur haec tria sunt in bonis gratiae, aliter in bonis naturae, aliter in bono naturae per se, aliter in ipsis potentiis, aliter in aptitudine potentiarum ad finem, circa quam attenditur corruptio, de qua sermo est. — Magni momenti est quod dicitur in fine corp., scilicet quod voluntas, quatenus peccando deficit, deviat a Deo secundum potentiam movente, secundum sapientiam regulante, secundum bonitatem finiente et quietante.

**II.** De tribus quaest. huius art. diffuse tractat Alex. Hal., S. 1. q. 19, et p. II. q. 95. m. 3. a. 1-4. — Alii commentatores Petri Lombardi easdem (vel saltem 1. et 2.) unica quaest. absolvunt, vel omnino omittunt. — De I. et 2. quaest.: Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, S. l. III. q. 85. a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 85. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** On mode, species, and order cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. and d. 37. p. 1. a. 3. q. 2; likewise St. Thomas, *Summa* 1. q. 5. a. 5. — It is here supposed that the goodness and perfection of a creature consists in the likeness of God, which is regarded according to the threefold divine causality, namely in the character of efficient, exemplar, and final [cause]. To this threefold causality S. Bonaventure reduces those three which inseparably constitute the likeness and goodness of God in creatures. In this reduction Alexander of Hales, Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Middleton, and Aegidius Romanus agree. — Hence evil consists in the corruption of this likeness (here q. 2.). And it is well to be noted that according to the diverse grades of goods, there are also diverse grades of mode, species, and order. Therefore these three are otherwise in the goods of grace, otherwise in the goods of nature, otherwise in the good of nature itself, otherwise in the powers themselves, otherwise in the aptitude of the powers toward the end, concerning which the corruption is regarded of which there is discussion. — Of great moment is that which is said at the end of the body, namely that the will, insofar as in sinning it fails, deviates from God according to power as moving, according to wisdom as regulating, according to goodness as finalizing and quieting.

**II.** On the three questions of this article Alexander of Hales treats at length, *Summa* 1. q. 19, and p. II. q. 95. m. 3. a. 1-4. — Other commentators on Peter Lombard dispatch the same (or at least the 1st and 2nd) in a single question, or omit them altogether. — On the 1st and 2nd question: Scotus, in Hier. de Montefortino, *Summa* book III. q. 85. a. 4. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I. II. q. 85. a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 4. a. I. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 57641–57819), with the cascade-fragmented ARTICULUS II opener, Respondeo (three modes), Solutio ad obiecta 1–4, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 828–830, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 850–852). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Folded ART II opener (per Override §5).** This chunk folds in the short ARTICULUS II opener (`ARTICULUS II. / De modo, quo peccatum bonum corrumpit.` + `Consequenter quantum ad secundum principale… circa hoc quaeruntur tria.` + the 3-question listing, raw ~57641–57651, p. 828 L/R) as headings + opening paragraph — no standalone divisio chunk. The 3-question listing is: (1) *utrum per quodlibet malum corrumpantur ista tria simul et inseparabiliter* (this q1); (2) *utrum haec tria per malum corrumpantur aequaliter sive aeque principaliter* (q2, raw 57820); (3) *utrum possint corrumpi totaliter* (q3, raw 57930 — skeleton MISSING, must be created from scratch).

**Alignment check (coordinator-verified, held).** After the folded opener, q1's body opener (`Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum per quodlibet malum habeant ista tria… corrumpi simul et inseparabiliter`) matches topic (1). No q-swap.

**Boundary.** This chunk = ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO I only. ENDS at raw 57819, immediately before `QUAESTIO II.` (raw 57820, *Utrum modus, species et ordo corrumpantur per peccatum aequaliter*) — everything from 57820 onward is d35-a2-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 828–830, offset +22.
- p. 828 (running head over R col; ART II opener + QUAESTIO I opener + fund 1–4 + Sed contra arg 1): footers 1–5 (L-col 1–3, R-col 4–5) → continuous [^1]–[^5]. [^1] ART II opener *Augustinus* (De Nat. boni c.4); [^2] fund 1 *Augustinus* (definitio); [^3] fund 2 *e converso* (83 Qq q.6); [^4] fund 3 *secundum speciem* (III Sent d.33); [^5] Sed contra 1 *ratione finis* (IV de Gen ad lit).
- p. 829 (running head `DIST. XXXV. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 829`; Sed contra arg 2–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo modes 1–3): footers 1–5 → continuous [^6]–[^10]. [^6] arg 2 *corporalibus* (Vide supra lit. Magistri d.XXXIV c.4); [^7] arg 4 *unum uni opponitur* (Aristot., pag. 812 nota 8); [^8] Respondeo mode-1 *verbis Augustini* (De Nat. boni c.3); [^9] Respondeo mode-2 *verbis Augustini* (De Vera Relig. c.7 n.13); [^10] Respondeo mode-3 *primo libro* (Dist. 3 p.I q.2).
- p. 830 (running head `830 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; Respondeo tail + Solutio ad 1–4 + SCHOLION I–II + QUAESTIO II opener at col-bottom): footers 1–4 → continuous [^11]–[^14]. [^11] Respondeo *divinae virtuti* (Vat. voluntati); [^12] Respondeo *tanquam* (Vat. se); [^13] Solutio ad-2 *ad bene esse* (Vat. addit salvat in esse); [^14] Solutio ad-4 *modus* (Codd. numerus). p.830 footer 5 (*Cap. 3* etc., anchors at QUAESTIO II body *Cap. 3* / fund 1) is forwarded to d35-a2-q2.
**Hand-off received.** NONE — a2-q1 opens a fresh footer sequence (a1-q3 forwarded nothing). Confirmed: p.828 footer 1 starts the new page sequence.

**Hand-off forwarded to d35-a2-q2.** p.830 footer 5 (`Cap. 3. — Paulo inferius pro maius edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd., inter quos codd. K T, magis.`) anchors at QUAESTIO II's fundamentum 1 (*in libro de Natura boni — Cap. 3*) and is forwarded to a2-q2. Also forwarded: p.830 footers for q2 body (`Vat. voluntati` n.1 / `Ita plures codd.` n.2 belong to q1; `Abbas Vercellensis… Naturaliter bonum producit ad esse` n.3 anchors at q2 body) — re-verify on the q2 dispatch; the q2 fundamentum 1 + the QUAESTIO II opener sit at the bottom of p.830 R col.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 830 L-bottom + R-bottom, raw ~57795–57810), items I, II. `has_scholion: true`. Item I treats modus/species/ordo + triplex causalitas + grades of goods. Item II is the commentator roll for all three questions of the article (Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard., Aegid., Dionys.). No item III. q2/q3 may legitimately lack their own scholion per Override §5.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 828–830 read top→bottom; the p.828/829 seam (inside Sed contra arg 1, `ergo ad cor-/ruptionem ordinis`), p.829/830 seam (inside Respondeo, `cum ha-/bet modum`), are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The SCHOLION spans both columns of p.830 (item I L+R, item II R) and is fully captured.

**[?] flags.** None.