title: Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 320 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum poenitentia sit virtus generalis, an specialis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum poenitentia sit virtus generalis, an specialis. Et ostenditur, quod generalis:

1. Augustinus in libro *de Quinque Responsionibus*[^1]: « Poenitentia est quaedam res optima et perfecta, omnes defectus revocans ad perfectum »; sed alio habitu restauratur defectus concupiscibilis et irascibilis: ergo poenitentia respicit omnes habitus. Sed hoc non posset facere, si esset specialis virtus: ergo etc.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur; quia eiusdem virtutis, cuius est delectari in aliquo, est tristari et detestari oppositum; sed continentiae est delectari de actu castitatis[^2]: ergo eiusdem est detestari actum incontinentiae, et sic de aliis. Sed poenitens detestatur omne peccatum: ergo etc.

3. Item, « habitus cognoscuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta »[^3]; sed obiectum poenitentiae est peccatum in communi, quia ipsa omne peccatum detestatur et omne peccatum expellit: ergo poenitentia est virtus generalis et communis.

**Contra:** 1. Specialis virtutis est diligere bonum, quia bonum, scilicet caritatis[^4]: ergo a simili, specialis virtutis est odire sive detestari malum, quia malum; sed hoc est poenitentiae: ergo etc.

2. Item, specialis doni est refugere malum faciendum sive declinare a malo, ut timoris[^5]: ergo specialis virtutis est refugere malum iam factum; sed hoc est poenitentiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, poenitentia ordinatur ad unum actum tantum liberi arbitrii, non ad omnes, quia solum ad poenitere et dolere: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Poenitentia est virtus specialis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hic fuit multiplex positio. — Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod est virtus generalis, et est pars iustitiae generalis, cuius est facere bonum et declinare a malo[^6]. Unde sicut facere omne bonum est iustitiae generalis, sic declinare ab omni malo facto est iustitiae generalis; et hoc est poenitentiae: et ideo poenitentia est pars

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iustitiae generalis. Et quoniam iustitia generalis dicitur non per *praedicationem*, sed per quandam virtutum *aggregationem*, quia comprehendit multas virtutes — sicut una vinea multas vites, ut dicit Chrysostomus[^7], sic poenitentia comprehendit omnes virtutes — quando poenitet de malo luxuriae, tangit chordam continentiae; quando de malo superbiae, chordam humilitatis; ut sit venter conscientiae resonans in fletu quasi cithara, secundum illud Isaiae decimo sexto[^8]: *Venter meus ad Moab quasi cithara sonabit*; quia, si secundum omnes virtutes flenda sunt peccata aliena, multo magis propria.

Sed haec positio non debet stare: quia, etsi poenitentia respiciat malum in *communi*, tamen respicit sub *propria ratione* et habet *actum specialem*, qui indiget virtute non tantum praecipiente, sed eliciente; ut, sicut *ira per zelum*, quae detestatur omne peccatum in proximo, est specialis virtus, quia respicit illud sub ratione digni poenae; et *obedientia* specialis virtus, quia respicit exsequendum sub ratione mandati[^9]: sic etiam poenitentia specialis virtus, quia respicit sub ratione mali proprii a se contra Deum perpetrati, prout homo ex hoc dignus est puniri.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod effectum habet generalem; dicendum, quod illud est verum ratione *connexionis virtutum*, quia omnes defectus reparat; et magis est verum de ipsa quam de alia, quia aliorum actus est in *formando*[^10], actus poenitentiae in *reformando*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eiusdem virtutis est gaudere de aliquo et de opposito tristari; dicendum, quod verum est *imperative*, sed non *elicitive*. Et hoc patet, quia caritas dictat et imperat fugere peccatum: sed tamen timor elicit motum fugae. Alterius enim virtutis est imperare, et alterius elicere, ut obedientia dictat Deo obediendum in hoc praecepto[^11]: *Non moechaberis*, et continentia elicit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obiecto, dicendum, quod etsi non contrahatur ad speciale peccatum, tamen illud considerat sub *speciali et propria ratione*, hoc est, in quantum a se perpetratum et Dei offensivum, cui vult reconciliari et emendam facere; ideo est virtus specialis, quia virtus ponitur generalis vel specialis, non ratione obiecti, quod est *materiale*, sed secundum quod habet rationem *motivi*[^12].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether penance is a general or a special virtue.*

Secondly it is asked, whether penance is a general or a special virtue. And it is shown that it is general:

1. Augustine in the book *On the Five Responses*[^1]: "Penance is a certain most excellent and perfect thing, recalling all defects to perfection"; but it is by another habit that the defect of the concupiscible and the irascible [power] is restored: therefore penance regards all habits. But it could not do this, if it were a special virtue: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it appears *by reason*; for it belongs to the same virtue whose [property] it is to take delight in something, to be saddened by and to detest its opposite; but it belongs to continence to take delight in the act of chastity[^2]: therefore it belongs to the same [virtue] to detest the act of incontinence, and so of the others. But the penitent detests every sin: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, "habits are known through acts, and acts through objects"[^3]; but the object of penance is sin in general, because it itself detests every sin and expels every sin: therefore penance is a general and common virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. It belongs to a special virtue to love the good, because it is good, namely [to the virtue] of charity[^4]: therefore by similarity, it belongs to a special virtue to hate or detest evil, because it is evil; but this belongs to penance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it belongs to a special gift to flee from doing evil, or to turn away from evil, as [it belongs] to fear[^5]: therefore it belongs to a special virtue to flee from evil already done; but this belongs to penance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, penance is ordered to only one act of free choice, not to all, because [it is ordered] only to repenting and grieving: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Penance is a special virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said that here there was a manifold position. — For some wished to say that it is a general virtue, and is a part of general justice, whose [property] it is to do good and turn away from evil[^6]. Hence just as to do every good belongs to general justice, so to turn away from every evil deed belongs to general justice; and this belongs to penance: and therefore penance is a part

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of general justice. And since general justice is so called not by *predication*, but by a certain *aggregation* of virtues, because it comprehends many virtues — just as one vineyard [comprehends] many vines, as Chrysostom says[^7], so penance comprehends all virtues — when one repents of the evil of lust, it touches the chord of continence; when of the evil of pride, the chord of humility; so that the belly of conscience may resound in weeping like a lyre, according to that [word] of Isaiah, the sixteenth [chapter][^8]: *My belly shall sound like a lyre for Moab*; because, if according to all the virtues the sins of others are to be wept over, much more one's own.

But this position ought not to stand: because, although penance regards evil in *general*, nevertheless it regards [it] under its *proper account* and has a *special act*, which requires a virtue not only commanding but eliciting; so that, just as *anger through zeal*, which detests every sin in one's neighbor, is a special virtue, because it regards it under the account of [being] deserving of punishment; and *obedience* [is] a special virtue, because it regards the carrying out [of a command] under the account of a mandate[^9]: so too penance [is] a special virtue, because it regards [sin] under the account of an evil proper [to oneself], perpetrated by oneself against God, inasmuch as man is on this account deserving of punishment.

1. To the objection therefore which is raised on the contrary, that it has a general effect; it must be said that this is true by reason of the *connection of the virtues*, because it repairs all defects; and it is more true of it than of another [virtue], because the act of others is in *forming*[^10], but the act of penance in *reforming*.

2. To the objection which is raised, that it belongs to the same virtue to rejoice over something and to be saddened by its opposite; it must be said that this is true *commandingly*, but not *elicitively*. And this is clear, because charity dictates and commands the fleeing of sin: but nevertheless fear elicits the motion of flight. For it belongs to one virtue to command, and to another to elicit, as obedience dictates that God be obeyed in this precept[^11]: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, and continence elicits [the act].

3. To the objection which is raised concerning the object, it must be said that although it is not contracted to a special sin, nevertheless it considers it under a *special and proper account*, that is, inasmuch as [it is] perpetrated by oneself and offensive to God, with whom one wishes to be reconciled and to make amends; therefore it is a special virtue, because a virtue is reckoned general or special, not by reason of the object, which is *material*, but according as it has the account of a *motive*[^12].

---

la: Libr. III. (Hypognost. inter opera August.) c. 9, ubi textus originalis *quae defectus revocat* pro *omnes defectus revocans*. — In minori pro *restauratur* cod. I *revocatur*.

en: Book III ([Hypognosticon,] among the works of Augustine) c. 9, where the original text [reads] *which recalls the defect* for *recalling all defects*. — In the minor [premise], for *restauratur* codex I [reads] *revocatur*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3; VII. c. 3. seqq., et de Virtutibus, c. 3. — Finem arg. Vat. exhibet sic: sed poenitentia detestatur omne peccatum sive expellit: ergo poenitentia est virtus communis et generalis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 3; VII, c. 3 ff., and *On the Virtues*, c. 3. — The end of the argument the Vatican [edition] presents thus: but penance detests or expels every sin: therefore penance is a common and general virtue.

la: Secundum Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 2: Habitus operationibus definitur [definitio, per quam res cognoscitur, fit per priora et notiora, ut dicitur VI. Topic. c. 3.], et iis quorum habitus est. Cfr. ibid. II. c. I, et II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Vide tom. III. pag. 470, nota 8.

en: According to Aristotle, *Ethics* IV, c. 2: A habit is defined by its operations [a definition, by which a thing is known, is made through what is prior and more known, as is said in *Topics* VI, c. 3], and by those things of which it is the habit. Cf. ibid. II, c. 1, and *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4). See tom. III, p. 470, note 8.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. I. ad 5.

en: Cf. III Sent., d. 27, a. I, q. I, ad 5.

la: Vide III. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. seqq., et Comment. p. II. per totam. Respicitur Ps. 36, 27: Declina a malo et fac bonum. — Non pauci codd. *amoris*.

en: See III Sent., text of the Master, d. XXXIV, c. 4 ff., and the Commentary, p. II, throughout. Reference is made to Ps. 36:27: *Turn away from evil and do good.* — Not a few codices [read] *amoris* [of love].

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. dub. I. — Superius post *dicere, quod* cod. W supplet *poenitentia*.

en: Cf. III Sent., d. 33, dub. I. — Above, after *dicere, quod* codex W supplies *poenitentia*.

la: Homil. 34. in Matth. 20, I. seqq. (op. imperfect.): « Vinea enim iustitia est, in qua diversae species iustitiarum positae sunt quasi vites, ut puta mansuetudo, castitas, patientia, longanimitas, ceteraque innumerabilia bona, quae omnia generaliter iustitiae appellantur ». Bernard., Serm. 63. in Cantic. n. 3: Bona vinea iustus, cui virtus vitis, cui actio palmes etc. — Superius pro *iustitia generalis* multi codd. et ed. I *iustus generalis*, cod. F *virtus generalis*.

en: Homily 34 on Matthew 20:1 ff. (the *Opus imperfectum*): "For justice is a vineyard, in which the diverse species of justices are set like vines, as for instance gentleness, chastity, patience, longanimity, and the other innumerable goods, which are all in general called [the goods] of justice." Bernard, Sermon 63 *on Canticles*, n. 3: The just man is a good vineyard, whose virtue is the vine, whose action is the branch, etc. — Above, for *general justice* many codices and the first edition [read] *the general just man*, codex F *general virtue*.

la: Vers. 11. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. I. in corp., et III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1. verba Hieronymi in hunc locum.

en: Verse 11. Cf. below a. 2, q. I, in the body, and III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, fundam. 1, the words of Jerome on this passage.

la: Cfr. quaest. seq. et infra d. 16. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. ad 3. — Post *quia respicit* codd. et ed. I omittunt *exsequendum*. Superius post *sed* cod. F supplet *etiam*.

en: Cf. the following question and below d. 16, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3; III Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3. — After *quia respicit* the codices and the first edition omit *exsequendum*. Above, after *sed* codex F supplies *etiam*.

la: Cod. E (I L a secunda manu) *in informando*; cfr. infra a. 3, et I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. I. ad 4.

en: Codex E (I L by a second hand) [reads] *in informando*; cf. below a. 3, and I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. I, ad 4.

la: Exod. 20, 14. Cfr. quaest. seq.

en: Exod. 20:14. Cf. the following question.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Cf. III Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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**SCHOLION finding — this chunk (q2) renders NO scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. Per the dispatch brief and confirmed eyes-on: the Articulus I scholion (covering q1–q3) is printed with QUAESTIO I (`bon-sent-IV-d14-p1-a1-q1`) on the preceding pages. Its tail (§II, §III, §IV + the *De eadem/De ipsa* source lists) overflows onto the tops of p. 320 L and p. 320 R but is owned by q1. q2's own [^12] points back to it ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."). No distinct SCHOLION header falls inside q2's pages. **q2 therefore renders none and cross-refers to the q1 scholion** (La: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* / En: See the scholion to the preceding question).

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 321 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum poenitentia sit virtus theologica, an cardinalis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit virtus theologica, vel cardinalis. Et quod theologica, videtur:

1. Quia poenitentiae est reconciliare Deo et detestari peccatum, in quantum Dei offensivum: ergo respicit ipsum Deum non tantum ut *finem*, sed etiam in ratione *obiecti*; sed omnis talis virtus est theologica[^7]: ergo etc.

2. Item, videtur, quod sit *caritas*: quia poenitentiae est detestari peccatum, quia peccatum[^8] sive Dei offensivum; sed non detestatur aliquis separationem ab aliquo, nisi quia diligit coniungi cum eo; sed hoc est caritatis: ergo poenitentia est caritas.

3. Item, eadem vi naturali, qua homo refugit malum, ne fiat, aspernatur, cum factum est; sed caritate refugit homo separari a Deo[^9]: ergo eadem refugit separationem iam factam. Sed hoc est poenitentiae: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Quod sit virtus *cardinalis*, videtur: quia omnis virtus theologica secundum actum suum transit in Deum ut in *obiectum*; sed poenitentia non transit in Deum ut in *obiectum* quantum ad actum poenitendi: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod sit *iustitia*, videtur: super illud Psalmi[^10]: *Sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae*; Glossa: « Quid iustius, quam ut suis quisque peccatis potius quam alienis peccatis irascatur, seque puniens per poenitentiam et satisfactionem Deo offerat »?

3. Item, Isidorus[^11]: « Tunc iudicium homo de se sumit, quando per dignam poenitentiam sua prava

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facta damnat »; sed iudicium sumere est iustitiae: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Poenitentia non est virtus theologica, sed cardinalis, contenta sub iustitia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hic duplex fuit opinio.

Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod poenitentia non est aliud quam *caritas* secundum substantiam, differens secundum statum. Dicitur enim caritas, in quantum amat Deum, sed poenitentia, in quantum resurgens, et eius est detestari malum[^1d] in quantum Dei offensivum.

— Sed certe si *timor*, qui facit declinare a malo, differt a caritate; non video, quare poenitentia non differat. Sed quia « habitus cognoscuntur per actus[^2d] », non quoscumque, sed formales sive elicitos et primos; notandum, quod poenitentiae actus est detestari culpam sive peccatum, quia Dei offensivum, et hoc in reconciliationem sive emendam. Et quia haec ratio est ipsius *iustitiae*, dico, quod poenitentia est virtus cardinalis, contenta sub iustitia. Sicut enim *fortitudo* multos habet ramos ab una radice procedentes, ut patientiam, perseverantiam, fiduciam, quae induunt unam rationem[^3d]; sic etiam *iustitia*, ut puta largitatem, pietatem, humilitatem, obedientiam, poenitentiam, quae forte sunt partes *potentiales* ipsius virtutis iustitiae, sicut melius patebit infra[^4d].

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod virtutes invicem se *adiuvant* et invicem sibi *imperant*, sicut patet consideranti motus earum. Aliquis enim obedit ad hoc solum, quod praecipitur; et hoc est obedientiae purae. Aliquis obedit praecepto Domini, quia amat eum; et hoc est obedientiae imperatae a caritate. Aliquis obedit in hoc praecepto continentiae, quia diligit ipsam; et hoc est obedientiae imperatae a continentia. Unde obedire semper ab obedientia elicitur, aliquando per se, aliquando ab aliis imperata[^5d]. — Similiter patet in aliis; quia *continere* est actus elicitus a castitate. Si quis autem continet *amore castitatis*, talis actus est elicitus et imperatus a castitate; si quis *amore Dei*, sic est elicitus a castitate et imperatus a caritate; si propter *praeceptum Dei*, sic est imperatus ab obedientia[^6d]. — Similiter dicendum, quod poenitentia detestatur peccatum, aut quia *Dei offensivum*, ut ei reconcilietur et emendet, et hoc facit secundum se; aut quia *a Deo separativum*, et hoc facit imperata a caritate; aut quia *specialis virtutis corruptivum*, et hoc facit imperata et adiuta a qualibet speciali virtute. Et sic patet, quod proprie est iustitia, tamen contingit, aliarum virtutum motus sibi commisceri.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod est theologica, quia habet Deum pro obiecto; dicendum, quod falsum est; quia, sicut obedientia proprie respicit Dei mandatum, et *latria* honorem Deo debitum; sic poenitentia offensam Deo factam et emendam faciendam.

2. Ad aliud patet responsio: quia ille motus est a caritate per modum *imperantis*, sed a poenitentia per modum *elicientis*; unde quamvis caritas moveat ad detestandum quod separat a Deo, non tamen elicit, quia est ibi specialis difficultas, sicut in aliis actibus virtutum; unde sicut caritas movet ad omne bonum *imperando*, sed non *eliciendo*, immo speciales virtutes sunt necessariae; sic in actu poenitentiae intelligendum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de virtute naturali, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia virtus *naturalis* non dicit tantam approximationem ad actum[^7d], sicut virtus *infusa* vel *acquisita*; et ideo magis diversificatur quam naturalis. Et hoc patet, quia plures virtutes sunt in eadem potentia naturali; et ideo non sequitur, quod si naturalis eadem est, quod propter hoc sit eadem virtus *moralis*[^8d].

english:
### Question III. *Whether penance is a theological or a cardinal virtue.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it is a theological or a cardinal virtue. And that it is theological, it seems:

1. Because it belongs to penance to reconcile [one] to God and to detest sin, insofar as it is offensive to God: therefore it regards God himself not only as an *end*, but also under the account of an *object*; but every such virtue is theological[^7]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that it is *charity*: because it belongs to penance to detest sin, since sin is offensive to God; but no one detests separation from someone unless because he loves to be joined to him; but this belongs to charity: therefore penance is charity.[^8]

3. Likewise, by the same natural power by which a man shuns evil, that it not be done, he spurns it when it has been done; but by charity a man shuns being separated from God[^9]: therefore by the same [power] he shuns a separation already made. But this belongs to penance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. That it is a *cardinal* virtue, it seems: because every theological virtue according to its act passes over into God as into an *object*; but penance does not pass over into God as into an *object* as regards the act of repenting: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it is *justice*, it seems: upon that [text] of the Psalm[^10]: *Sacrifice the sacrifice of justice*; the Gloss: "What is more just than that each one should be angry at his own sins rather than at the sins of others, and, punishing himself through penance and satisfaction, should offer himself to God?"

3. Likewise, Isidore[^11]: "Then does a man pass judgment upon himself, when through worthy penance he condemns his own depraved

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deeds"; but to pass judgment belongs to justice: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Penance is not a theological virtue, but a cardinal one, contained under justice.

**I respond:** It must be said that here there were two opinions.

For some have wished to say that penance is nothing other than *charity* according to substance, differing according to state. For it is called charity insofar as it loves God, but penance insofar as [the soul] is rising again, and it belongs to it to detest evil[^1d] insofar as it is offensive to God.

— But surely, if *fear*, which makes [a man] turn away from evil, differs from charity, I do not see why penance should not differ. But because "habits are known through their acts[^2d]" — not just any acts, but the formal, that is, the elicited and primary ones — it must be noted that the act of penance is to detest fault, that is, sin, because it is offensive to God, and this for reconciliation, that is, amendment. And because this account belongs to *justice* itself, I say that penance is a cardinal virtue, contained under justice. For just as *fortitude* has many branches proceeding from one root, such as patience, perseverance, confidence, which put on one account[^3d]; so too *justice* [has many], such as liberality, piety, humility, obedience, penance, which are perhaps *potential* parts of the virtue of justice, as will better be made clear below[^4d].

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that the virtues *aid* one another and *command* one another, as is clear to one considering their motions. For one man obeys only because it is commanded; and this belongs to pure obedience. Another obeys the command of the Lord because he loves him; and this belongs to obedience commanded by charity. Another obeys in this precept of continence because he loves it; and this belongs to obedience commanded by continence. Whence to obey is always elicited from obedience, sometimes of itself, sometimes commanded by others[^5d]. — Likewise it is clear in other cases; for *to be continent* is an act elicited by chastity. But if someone is continent *from love of chastity*, such an act is elicited and commanded by chastity; if *from love of God*, then it is elicited by chastity and commanded by charity; if on account of the *precept of God*, then it is commanded by obedience[^6d]. — Likewise it must be said that penance detests sin either because it is *offensive to God*, that [the soul] may be reconciled to him and make amends, and this it does of itself; or because it is *separative from God*, and this it does as commanded by charity; or because it is *destructive of a particular virtue*, and this it does as commanded and aided by some particular virtue. And so it is clear that it is properly justice, yet it happens that the motions of the other virtues are mingled with it.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that it is theological because it has God for its object, it must be said that this is false; because, just as obedience properly regards the command of God, and *latria* the honor due to God, so penance [regards] the offense done to God and the amendment to be made.

2. To the other [objection] the response is clear: because that motion is from charity by way of *commanding*, but from penance by way of *eliciting*; whence, although charity moves [a man] to detest that which separates [him] from God, it nevertheless does not elicit [the act], because there is there a special difficulty, as in the other acts of the virtues; whence, just as charity moves to every good by *commanding*, but not by *eliciting* — nay, the special virtues are necessary — so it must be understood in the act of penance.

3. To that which is objected concerning natural virtue, it must be said that it is not similar: because a *natural* virtue does not bespeak so great an approximation to the act[^7d] as an *infused* or *acquired* virtue; and therefore it is more diversified than the natural one. And this is clear, because several virtues are in the same natural potency; and therefore it does not follow that, if the natural [virtue] is the same, on this account it should be the same *moral* virtue.[^8d]

la: Vers. 11. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. in corp., et III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1. verba Hieronymi in hunc locum.

en: Verse 11. Cf. below, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and III *Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, fundamentum 1, the words of Jerome on this place.

la: Codd. F H Q (bb a secunda manu) addunt: *a Deo est separatum.* Edd. substituunt *est* pro *sive.*

en: Codices F H Q (bb by a second hand) add: *is separated from God.* The editions substitute *est* for *sive.*

la: Cfr. Rom. 8, 35. seqq.

en: Cf. Romans 8:35 ff.

la: Psalm. 4, 6. — Glossam exhibet Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc., et sumta est ex August. (in Ps. 4. n. 7.), qui sic prosequitur: *seque ipsum puniens mactet Deo.*

en: Psalm 4:6. — Peter Lombard presents the Gloss on this place, and it is taken from Augustine (on Psalm 4, n. 7), who continues thus: *and, punishing himself, let him sacrifice himself to God.*

la: Libr. II. Sent. c. 13. n. 3.

en: *Sentences*, book II, c. 13, n. 3.

la: Edd. *in quantum refugit et detestatur malum.* — De differentia timoris et caritatis (1. Ioan. 4, 18: *Timor non est in caritate, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem*; quoniam timor poenam habet etc.) cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 34. p. II. per totam.

en: The editions [read] *insofar as it shuns and detests evil.* — On the difference between fear and charity (1 John 4:18: *Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casts out fear*; for fear has punishment, etc.) cf. III *Sent.*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 34, p. II, throughout.

la: Secundum Aristot.; cfr. supra pag. 320, nota 3.

en: According to Aristotle; cf. above, p. 320, note 3.

la: Quae virtutes enumerantur a Cicerone ut partes fortitudinis; cfr. tom. III. pag. 561, nota 7.

en: Which virtues are enumerated by Cicero as parts of fortitude; cf. tom. III, p. 561, note 7.

la: Art. seq. q. 1. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 2, ubi ex Cicerone, Macrobio etc. partes *potentiales* (i. e. virtutes annexas, in quibus *tota* ratio iustitiae non invenitur) iustitiae recensuimus.

en: The following article, q. 1. Cf. tom. III, p. 728, note 2, where, from Cicero, Macrobius, etc., we have reviewed the *potential* parts of justice (i.e. the annexed virtues, in which the *whole* account of justice is not found).

la: Cod. F *imperative*, quo explicatur lectio non paucorum codd. *imperate.* Mox pro primo *a castitate* codd. *a continentia.*

en: Codex F [reads] *imperative*, by which the reading of not a few codices, *imperate*, is explained. Presently, for the first *a castitate* the codices [read] *a continentia.*

la: Codd. H P Q addunt *et elicitus a castitate.*

en: Codices H P Q add *and elicited by chastity.*

la: Sive tantam determinationem ad specialem actum. — Cod. X *distantiam ad actum.*

en: That is, so great a determination toward a particular act. — Codex X [reads] *distance to the act.*

en: See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---

latin_scholion:
Scholion in articulum unicum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — *The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.*

---

english_scholion:
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — *Scholion in articulum unicum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.*

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{321,322}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 36949–37085) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/IV override, the PDF is authoritative in the cascade-shattered regions; the OCR for this q3 is severely two-column-interleaved (right-column text bled into left-column lines and the apparatus is spliced through the page), so the PDF bands carried the reconstruction. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (printed 321–322 = PDF 341–342).

**Page-verify.** Running heads confirmed on the bands: p. 321 = "DIST. XIV. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. III. 321"; p. 322 = "322 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." Distinction/pars/article all correct (corrects the assigned `pdf_pages` working note — bands matched at +20).

**Opener alignment.** Confirmed: the q3 opener at the bottom of p. 321 L column reads "QUAESTIO III. *Utrum poenitentia sit virtus theologica, an cardinalis.* Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit virtus theologica, vel cardinalis. Et quod theologica, videtur…" — matches the assigned title.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 321 (L col., lower): QUAESTIO III. header + opener + arg. 1 (continues to R).
- p. 321 (R col.): arg. 1 completes; args. 2–3; *Contra* 1–2; *Contra* 3 opens ("Item, Isidorus: « Tunc iudicium homo de se sumit, quando per dignam poenitentiam sua prava").
- p. 321 → 322 boundary inside *Contra* 3 ("sua prava" | "facta damnat »…").
- p. 322 (L col.): *Contra* 3 completes; CONCLUSIO; Respondeo (two opinions; opinio 1 = poenitentia est caritas; reproof; opinio 2 / conclusio = cardinalis sub iustitia; the *adiuvant/imperant* explanation, obedientia/continentia examples). The ARTICULUS II. opener ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum…") begins at the very bottom of p. 322 L and belongs to the a2 chunk.
- p. 322 (R col.): the obedientia/continentia/poenitentia explanation completes; Solutiones *Ad 1*–*Ad 3* complete (". . . eadem virtus *moralis*."), immediately before the ARTICULUS II. body. (Note: p. 322 prints in mixed column order — the L column's tail ART. II. opener sits below the R column's q3 close; q3's last word is *moralis* in the R column.)

**Footer-ownership (apparatus, 13 entries total, all anchored in this q3's body).**
- p. 321: the page's footer sequence is **11 notes**, but notes **1–6 anchor in the preceding q2's body and Solutio** (note 1 = Chrysostom "Vinea enim iustitia est"; note 2 = "Vers. 11… verba Hieronymi"; note 3 = "Cfr. quaest. seq. et infra d. 16… — Post *quia respicit*…"; note 4 = "Cod. E… *in informando*"; note 5 = "Exod. 20, 14"; note 6 = "Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") and are owned by the **a1-q2 chunk**. q3 owns **notes 7–11** (`^7` arg. 1 *theologica*; `^8` arg. 2 *peccatum sive*; `^9` arg. 3 *a Deo*; `^10` *Contra* 2 Psalm *iustitiae*; `^11` *Contra* 3 Isidore).
- p. 322: **8 footers**, all q3's — relabeled `^1d`–`^8d` (`^1d` opinio 1 *detestari malum*; `^2d` *habitus per actus*; `^3d` *unam rationem*; `^4d` *patebit infra*; `^5d` obedientia *imperata*; `^6d` *imperatus ab obedientia* / continentia; `^7d` *Ad 3* *approximationem ad actum*; `^8d` *Ad 3* *virtus moralis*). The p. 322 footer ends here; the ARTICULUS II. apparatus opens on p. 323 and is owned by the a2 chunk.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`, but **q3 renders none of its own**: the Articulus Unicus (a1) carries a single SCHOLION block (q1/q2/q3 bibliography) which the **a1-q1 chunk** owns and renders. The `### Scholion` slot here holds a one-line Latin+English cross-reference per the dispatch instruction. No "SCHOLION." header occurs inside the raw range 36949–37085. (Both note 6 on p. 321 — "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." — and note `^8d` on p. 322 — "Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest." — contain the textual cross-pointer.)

**[?] flags.** None unresolved. Silent OCR corrections from the PDF bands (OCR was cascade-interleaved): *theologica* / *obiecti* (arg. 1); *peccatum sive* (arg. 2); *separari a Deo* (arg. 3); *Sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae* (Contra 2); Respondeo *resurgens* / *elicitos et primos* / *fortitudo* / *potentiales*; the obedientia examples (*amore castitatis* / *amore Dei* / *praeceptum Dei*); Solutio *imperantis* / *elicientis*; *approximationem ad actum* / *virtus moralis* (Ad 3). Marginal rubrics in the bands (*Fundamenta*, *Conclusio*, *Non probatur*, *Opinio 1.* / *Opinio 2. et conclusio 1.*, *Explicatio*, *Obedientia multiplex*, *Notandum*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Item continentiae* / *Item poenitentiae*) are editorial side-notes and are omitted from the body per corpus convention.

**Hand-off to ARTICULUS II.** ARTICULUS II ("De poenitentia in comparatione") opens at the bottom of p. 322 L column ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de poenitentia in comparatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria: Primo… ad subiectum; Secundo… ad actum sive originem; Tertio… ad ordinem.") — raw line ~37086. Its TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (the three questions) and QUAESTIO I header begin there; p. 323's footer sequence (not in this range) is the a2-q1 apparatus, not q3's.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De poenitentia in comparatione.*
### Quaestio I. *Quae vis animae sit subiectum virtutis poenitentiae.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de poenitentia in comparatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur de ipsa per comparationem ad subiectum. Secundo, quantum ad actum sive originem. Tertio, quantum ad ordinem.

Primo quaeritur, quae vis animae sit subiectum virtutis poenitentiae; et ostenditur, quod sit in vi animae irascibili.

1. Augustinus in libro de Poenitentia[^1], poenitentiam definiens, dicit, quod est « quaedam dolentis vindicta »; constans autem est, quod vindicta est ipsius irascibilis et vindictam appetere: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Irascimini* etc.; Glossa: « Quid iustius, quam ut suis quisque irascatur peccatis potius quam alienis, seque puniens per poenitentiam Deo offerat »: ergo irasci peccatis est per poenitentiam; sed constat, quod irasci est ipsius irascibilis: ergo et poenitere.

3. Item, Ioannes Chrysostomus[^3]: « Perfecta poenitentia cogit poenitentem omnia libenter sufferre »; sed hoc est ipsius irascibilis: ergo poenitentia est in vi irascibili.

4. Item, poenitere, sicut patet ex ratione nominis, « est poenam tenere », et ipse Augustinus[^4] hanc etymologiam ponit; sed vis, quae respicit poenam et sustinet, est irascibilis: ergo etc.

5. Item, poenitentia virtus est, non solum secundum quod respicit culpam, sed secundum quod est in subiectum, scilicet in hominem, qui offendit, ut puniatur, et per poenam emenda fiat; et hoc patet per duo, quae Magister dicit in littera[^5]. Dicit enim, quod « poenitentia dicitur a puniendo »; dicit etiam, quod per poenitentiam « mala plangimus cum emendationis proposito ». Ergo cum virtus, qua volumus, proximum peccantem puniri, sit in irascibili, scilicet ira per zelum, pari ratione et poenitentia erit in irascibili.

**Sed contra:** 1. Videtur, quod poenitentia sit in synderesi: quia cuius est actus, eius est habitus; sed actus poenitentiae est gemere, et gemere est synderesis: ergo et poenitentia. Prima patet; secunda probatur, quia scribitur ad Romanos octavo[^6]: *Spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus*; sed Glossa dicit, quod spiritus est synderesis: ergo etc.

2. Item, videtur, quod in rationali: quia in ea vi est poenitentia, cuius est agere poenitentiam; sed agere poenitentiam est ipsius rationis: ergo et poenitentia. Prima patet; minor probatur, super illud Psalmi[^7]: *Spera in Deo* etc.; Glossa: « Id est, de peccatis poenitentiam agam »; et ut habetur in Glossa: *Quare tristis* etc.: « Ratio confortat animam sensibilem »: ergo ratio agit poenitentiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, videtur, quod in concupiscibili: quia « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem[^8] »; sed delectatio et tristitia sunt opposita, similiter dolor et gaudium, amor et odium; sed in poenitentia est dolor, tristitia et odium peccati: cum ergo horum opposita, scilicet amor, gaudium et delectatio, sint in concupiscibili; per praedictam regulam poenitentia est in concupiscibili: non ergo in irascibili.

4. Item, videtur, quod sit in qualibet vi animae: quia quae mutuo se expellunt habent esse circa idem susceptibile[^9]; sed poenitentia expellit omnia peccata: ergo cum diversa genera peccatorum sint in diversis viribus, poenitentia non est in una vi, sed in diversis.

> **Conclusio.** Probabilius est, poenitentiam esse in voluntate, et quidem in irascibili.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc varie opinati sunt diversi.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod poenitentia circuit omnes vires[^10], quia expellit omnia peccata et omnia deflet. Et quoniam pro omnibus deflet, et ad perfectum fletum concurrit motus omnium virtutum, et ad expulsionem vitiorum concurrunt habitus virtutum omnium; voluerunt, quod poenitentia in omnibus viribus esset tanquam iustitia generalis.

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Et hoc nituntur ostendere per Glossam super illud Isaiae decimo sexto[^11]: *Venter meus ad Moab quasi cithara sonabit* — interlinearis exponit: « Sonabit plangendo » — et Glossa dicit: « Sicut cithara compositum sonum non emittit, si una chorda rupta fuerit; sic spiritualis venter Prophetae, si una chorda virtutum rupta fuerit, dulces melodias non resonabit ». Et ex hoc volunt habere, quod similiter est in luctu poenitentiae, et ita quod poenitentia sit in omni vi. Et ideo dicunt, quod poenitentia definitur per actus diversarum virium; dicunt etiam, quod ei respondent[^12] actus virium diversarum. Satisfacit enim poenitens orando, et hoc est rationalis; ieiunando, et hoc est concupiscibilis; miserendo sive eleemosynam tribuendo, et hoc est similiter concupiscibilis; poenam sufferendo, et hoc est irascibilis.

— Sed ista positio partim supra[^13] improbata est. Si enim poenitentia est habitus specialis et unus, ut supra monstratum est; unus habitus in una est et potentia, cum unum accidens sit in uno subiecto[^14], et subiectum virtutis sit potentia: necesse est, quod poenitentia non in omni, sed in aliqua vi sit determinate. — Sed illud est quod decepit ponentes, quod in omnibus viribus esset, quia poenitentia ab omnibus imperatur; et hinc est, quod ad luctum poenitentiae omnes virtutes concurrunt ut annexae, et videtur, quod poenitentia sit in omnibus viribus et virtutes ceteras complectatur. — Istud etiam decepit eos, quia actum specialem et proprium poenitentiae non respexerunt, qui non est omnis, sed alicuius specialis vis. Et ideo haec positio non est multum probabilis.

Secunda positio est, quod poenitentia est in vi determinata, sed non est in aliqua trium virium praedictarum, sed in vi superiori ad illas tres; et hanc vocant liberum arbitrium, in quo coniugatae sunt vis cognitiva et motiva, eo quod imperat aliis viribus et ei non imperatur, et circa quod residet meritum ex parte nostra. Et quia virtus a nulla potentia imperatur, quia etiam virtus est ad merendum; posuerunt, omnes virtutes et poenitentiam esse in libero arbitrio tanquam in subiecto. Quia vero liberum arbitrium regit potentias inferiores; et per unam virtutem potest regere multas potentias, sicut per iustitiam et poenitentiam: hinc est, quod poenitentia videtur esse in inferioribus viribus, videtur etiam esse in pluribus, quamvis subiective sit in una sola. — Verumtamen, sicut alibi[^15] melius patet, liberum arbitrium non dicit aliam potentiam ab his, scilicet rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili, licet dicat per alium modum — quia dicit per modum moventis et imperantis: sed istae potentiae sunt ei obedientes, ita quod eadem potentia in quantum libera imperat sibi ut natura — et ideo, si ista positio velit dicere, quod liberum arbitrium dicat potentiam secundum rem et naturam distinctam ab his, rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili; tunc[^16] non intelligo nec credo, quod habeat veritatem. Si vero vult dicere, quod nominent eandem potentiam, sed tamen secundum alium modum se habendi; hoc ego non nego.

Sed adhuc remanet eadem dubitatio, si potentiae animae diversae sunt, in qua sit secundum rem; quia vel oportet ad hoc venire, quod illae tres potentiae sint in una potentia secundum rem; vel quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta ab illis; vel quod omnis virtus sit in aliqua istarum trium, scilicet vel in rationali, vel concupiscibili, vel irascibili, in quibus consueverunt communiter a doctoribus et patribus nostris tres virtutes theologicae poni, cum actus harum virium immediate tendant in Deum. Et certe, si theologicae ibi reponuntur, quare non et cardinales secundum aspectum earum ad inferius[^17]?

Tertia positio est, quod poenitentia est in rationali; et ratio huius positionis haec est, quia poenitentia est pars iustitiae cardinalis. Cum enim sit virtus et non sit theologica, necesse est, quod reducatur ad aliquam virtutem. Cum ergo virtus cardinalis sufficienter et secundum Sanctos et secundum philosophos dividatur in quatuor; et poenitentia non sit sub aliqua aliarum: constat, quod poenitentia, ut praemissum est[^18], sub iustitia continetur; iustitia autem, cum sit habitus unus, non potest esse in pluribus viribus: ergo necesse est, quod sit in una. — Rursus, cum actus iustitiae, qui est « reddere unicuique quod suum est[^19] », proprie sit rationis, quia iste est actus iudicialis, et ratio est iudex in regno animae; dicunt, quod iustitia est in ratione, ut est iudex, sicut prudentia est in ea, ut est dux sive consiliarius. Et quoniam

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ratio, ut est iudex, imperat toti animae; hinc est, quod iustitia cardinalis dicitur omnes vires animae circuire[^20]. Et hinc est, quod habitus continet, qui videntur ad affectionem pertinere, sicut obedientiam et poenitentiam; et hinc est, quod poenitentia in una vi est, tamen multas circuire videtur; et ideo in rationali est, ut est regitiva irascibilis et concupiscibilis, ut moveat concupiscibilem ad gemendum pro culpa, et irascibilem ad puniendum ipsam animam.

Sed nec illud est multum rationabile inspicienti, quod poenitentia, quae in affectu maxime sonat, et humilitas, quae est species iustitiae, sit in rationali. — Et ulterius, habitus virtutis non debet poni circa virtutem imperantem, sed elicientem. Nam in eliciendo est difficultas, et respectu illius sive ratione illius est habilitatio; unde motus virtutis non dicitur esse huius proprie vel illius nisi virtutis elicientis: sicut si caritas imperet continere vel iustitia pugnare; tamen continere semper est continentiae, et recte pugnare est fortitudinis. Sicut ergo poenitere non est nisi poenitentiae, sic habitus non est in virtute imperante, sed eliciente; haec autem non est vis rationalis, sed vis affectiva, et maxime irascibilis, sicut patet ex rationibus prius visis[^21]. Nam poenitentia non tantum respicit vitium, quod abominatur, quantum subiectum peccati, contra quod insurgit et quod insurgendo punit; et non tam respicit culpam sive offensam, quam etiam emendam; et ista emenda est in poenae sufferentia, et ideo recte dicitur vindicta.

Et ideo est alia opinio, quod poenitentia, ut est specialis virtus, est in irascibili. Hanc positionem credo probabiliorem. Non enim capio, quomodo poenitentia in omnibus viribus esse possit, cum sit habitus specialis. — Sic nec secundum capio, quomodo omnis virtus sit in una vi, supposito quod potentiae rationales sint plures, quae sunt proprie ipsius animae, ut rationalis est, sive sint plures in quantum[^22] potentiae, sive, ut dicunt alii, plures vires. — Nec tertium, quomodo poenitentia et humilitas sint in ratione, cum dicant, quod est affectionis, ut etiam ipsa spes vel caritas. — Et ideo dicendum, quod cum poenitentia de se dicat habitum affectionis, quod est in potentia affectiva. Cum autem dicat affectionem odii vel doloris ut vindictae et ut punientis, sicut patet ex multiplici auctoritate et ratione in opponendo[^23]: et illud odium, quod est cum insurrectione, sit in irascibili potentia: quod ipsa poenitentia est in irascibili.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sit in synderesi; dicendum, quod argumentum illud deficit, quia gemere non est synderesis ut elicientis nec ut perfecte imperantis, quia sic nihil potest imperare libero arbitrio; sed potius est ut remurmurantis malo et dictantis bonum, quia naturaliter remurmurat malo; et in hoc errare non potest[^24]. Et quoniam virtus est in potentia, penes quam residet facultas et imperium eliciendi actum: ideo non est in synderesi, sed in libero arbitrio. Libertas autem arbitrii non solum est in ratione, sed in concupiscibili et irascibili, quia complectitur rationem et voluntatem; et voluntas continet potentiam amandi et detestandi, scilicet concupiscibilem et irascibilem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sit in rationali; dicendum, quod ratio dicitur multipliciter; tamen quantum pertinet ad propositum, dicitur communiter et proprie[^25]. Communiter comprehendit totam portionem animae divisam contra sensualitatem, in qua ponuntur tres potentiae; et sic accipitur in Glossa praedicta. Proprie accipitur pro potentia divisa contra concupiscibilem et irascibilem; et sic obiicitur, et sic non valet obiectio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sit in concupiscibili propter hoc, quod odium est in eadem;

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dicendum, quod odium dicitur dupliciter: aut cum quadam displicentia, aut cum insurrectione, vindicta et ira; et primum est in concupiscibili, secundum in irascibili; et tale est in poenitentia. Sicut enim per iram et per zelum irascitur homo et indignatur peccatis proximi; sic per poenitentiam peccatis suis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sit in omnibus; dicendum, quod expellere omnia vitia est dupliciter; vel per modum detestantis, vel per modum informantis. Per poenitentiam expelluntur omnia vitia per modum detestantis et satisfacientis; sed per modum informantis unumquodque vitium expellitur per virtutem sibi oppositam. Quod primo modo expellit[^26] non necesse est esse in eadem potentia, sed quod secundo modo. Et sic patet illud.

english:
### Article II. *On penance in comparison.*
### Question I. *Which power of the soul is the subject of the virtue of penance.*

Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked concerning penance in comparison. And concerning this three matters are asked. First, it is asked concerning it by comparison to its subject. Second, as to its act or origin. Third, as to its order.

First, it is asked which power of the soul is the subject of the virtue of penance; and it is shown that it is in the irascible power of the soul.

1. Augustine in the book *On Penance*[^1], defining penance, says that it is "a certain vengeance of one grieving"; but it is agreed that vengeance and to desire vengeance belong to the irascible [power]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that [verse] of the Psalm[^2]: *Be angry* etc.; the Gloss: "What is more just than that each one be angry rather at his own sins than at another's, and, punishing himself by penance, offer himself to God": therefore to be angry at sins is by penance; but it is agreed that to be angry belongs to the irascible [power]: therefore also to do penance.

3. Likewise, John Chrysostom[^3]: "Perfect penance compels the penitent to bear all things willingly"; but this belongs to the irascible [power]: therefore penance is in the irascible power.

4. Likewise, to do penance, as is clear from the meaning of the name, "is to hold punishment," and Augustine himself[^4] sets down this etymology; but the power which regards and sustains punishment is the irascible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, penance is a virtue, not only according as it regards fault, but according as it is into [its] subject, namely into the man who offends, that he be punished, and through punishment amendment be made; and this is clear through two [things] which the Master says in the text[^5]. For he says that "penance is named from punishing"; he also says that through penance "we bewail evils with a purpose of amendment." Therefore, since the virtue by which we will that a sinning neighbor be punished is in the irascible [power], namely anger through zeal, by parity of reasoning penance too will be in the irascible [power].

**On the contrary:** 1. It seems that penance is in the synderesis: because to whatever the act belongs, to it belongs the habit; but the act of penance is to groan, and to groan belongs to the synderesis: therefore also penance. The first is clear; the second is proven, because it is written in Romans the eighth[^6]: *The Spirit asks on our behalf with unutterable groanings*; but the Gloss says that the spirit is the synderesis: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that [it is] in the rational [power]: because penance is in that power whose [office] it is to do penance; but to do penance belongs to reason itself: therefore also penance. The first is clear; the minor is proven, on that [verse] of the Psalm[^7]: *Hope in God* etc.; the Gloss: "That is, that I may do penance for my sins"; and as is had in the Gloss: *Why are you sad* etc.: "Reason strengthens the sensible soul": therefore reason does penance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that [it is] in the concupiscible [power]: because "opposites are apt to come about concerning the same thing[^8]"; but delight and sadness are opposites, likewise grief and joy, love and hatred; but in penance there is grief, sadness, and hatred of sin: since therefore the opposites of these, namely love, joy, and delight, are in the concupiscible [power]; by the aforesaid rule penance is in the concupiscible [power]: therefore not in the irascible.

4. Likewise, it seems that it is in any power whatever of the soul: because things that mutually expel one another have their being concerning the same susceptible [subject][^9]; but penance expels all sins: therefore, since the diverse kinds of sins are in diverse powers, penance is not in one power, but in diverse [powers].

> **Conclusion.** It is more probable that penance is in the will, and indeed in the irascible [part].

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this various [authors] have opined diversely.

For some have said that penance goes round all the powers[^10], because it expels all sins and bewails all things. And since it bewails on behalf of all, and to perfect weeping there concurs the motion of all the powers, and to the expulsion of vices there concur the habits of all the virtues; they held that penance is in all the powers as a general justice.

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And this they strive to show by the Gloss on that [verse] of Isaiah the sixteenth[^11]: *My belly shall sound to Moab like a harp* — the interlinear [Gloss] expounds it: "It shall sound by bewailing" — and the Gloss says: "Just as a harp does not emit a composed sound, if one string has been broken; so the spiritual belly of the Prophet, if one string of the virtues has been broken, will not resound sweet melodies." And from this they wish to hold that it is likewise in the mourning of penance, and thus that penance is in every power. And therefore they say that penance is defined by the acts of diverse powers; they also say that to it there correspond[^12] the acts of diverse powers. For the penitent makes satisfaction by praying, and this belongs to the rational [power]; by fasting, and this belongs to the concupiscible [power]; by showing mercy or by bestowing alms, and this likewise belongs to the concupiscible [power]; by bearing punishment, and this belongs to the irascible [power].

— But this position has been partly disproven above[^13]. For if penance is a special and single habit, as was shown above; one habit is also in one power, since one accident is in one subject[^14], and the subject of a virtue is a power: it is necessary that penance be determinately not in every, but in some [one] power. — But that is what deceived those positing that it was in all the powers, [namely] that penance is commanded by all [the powers]; and hence it is that to the mourning of penance all the virtues concur as annexed, and it seems that penance is in all the powers and embraces the other virtues. — This also deceived them, because they did not regard the special and proper act of penance, which is not of every, but of some special power. And therefore this position is not very probable.

The second position is that penance is in a determinate power, but is not in any of the three aforesaid powers, but in a power superior to those three; and this they call free choice, in which are conjoined the cognitive and motive power, because it commands the other powers and is not commanded, and concerning which the merit on our part resides. And because a virtue is commanded by no power, since also a virtue is for meriting; they posited that all the virtues and penance are in free choice as in [their] subject. But because free choice rules the lower powers; and through one virtue can rule many powers, as through justice and penance: hence it is that penance seems to be in the lower powers, and seems also to be in several, although subjectively it is in one alone. — Nevertheless, as is better clear elsewhere[^15], free choice does not name a power other than these, namely the rational, concupiscible, and irascible, although it names [them] in another manner — because it names [them] by way of mover and commander: but these powers are obedient to it, so that the same power insofar as it is free commands itself as nature — and therefore, if that position wishes to say that free choice names a power really and naturally distinct from these, the rational, concupiscible, and irascible; then[^16] I neither understand nor believe that it has truth. But if it wishes to say that they name the same power, but nevertheless according to another manner of holding itself; this I do not deny.

But still the same doubt remains, if the powers of the soul are diverse, in which one [penance] is really; because either it is necessary to come to this, that those three powers be in one power really; or that free choice be a power distinct from them; or that every virtue be in some one of those three, namely either in the rational, or concupiscible, or irascible, in which the three theological virtues are commonly wont to be placed by our doctors and fathers, since the acts of these powers tend immediately into God. And certainly, if the theological [virtues] are placed there, why not also the cardinal [virtues] according to their aspect toward the lower[^17]?

The third position is that penance is in the rational [power]; and the ground of this position is this, that penance is a part of cardinal justice. For since it is a virtue and is not theological, it is necessary that it be reduced to some [other] virtue. Since therefore the cardinal virtue is sufficiently divided into four both according to the Saints and according to the philosophers; and penance is not under any of the others: it is agreed that penance, as was premised[^18], is contained under justice; but justice, since it is one habit, cannot be in several powers: therefore it is necessary that it be in one. — Again, since the act of justice, which is "to render to each one what is his[^19]," properly belongs to reason, because this is a judicial act, and reason is the judge in the kingdom of the soul; they say that justice is in reason, as it is judge, just as prudence is in it, as it is leader or counselor. And since

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reason, as it is judge, commands the whole soul; hence it is that cardinal justice is said to go round all the powers of the soul[^20]. And hence it is that it contains habits which seem to pertain to affection, such as obedience and penance; and hence it is that penance is in one power, yet seems to go round many; and therefore it is in the rational [power], as it is the ruler of the irascible and concupiscible, so that it moves the concupiscible to groaning for fault, and the irascible to punishing the soul itself.

But neither is that very reasonable to one inspecting [it], that penance, which most resounds in affection, and humility, which is a species of justice, be in the rational [power]. — And further, the habit of a virtue ought not to be placed about the commanding virtue, but the eliciting [one]. For in eliciting is the difficulty, and with respect to it or by reason of it is the habituation; whence the motion of a virtue is not said to belong properly to this or that [power] except [to that] of the eliciting virtue: just as if charity should command continence or justice command fighting; nevertheless to be continent is always of continence, and to fight rightly is of fortitude. As therefore to do penance belongs to nothing but penance, so the habit is not in the commanding power, but in the eliciting [one]; but this is not the rational power, but the affective power, and most of all the irascible, as is clear from the reasons seen before[^21]. For penance regards not so much the vice, which it abominates, as the subject of sin, against which it rises up and which by rising up it punishes; and it regards not so much the fault or offense, as also the amendment; and this amendment is in the bearing of punishment, and therefore it is rightly called vengeance.

And therefore there is another opinion, that penance, as it is a special virtue, is in the irascible [power]. This position I believe more probable. For I do not grasp how penance could be in all the powers, since it is a special habit. — So neither do I grasp the second, how every virtue is in one power, supposing that the rational powers are several, which belong properly to the soul itself, as it is rational, whether they be several insofar as[^22] powers, or, as others say, several capacities. — Nor the third, how penance and humility are in reason, since they say that it is of affection, as even hope or charity itself is. — And therefore it must be said that, since penance of itself names a habit of affection, [it follows] that it is in the affective power. But since it names an affection of hatred or grief as of vengeance and as of one punishing, as is clear from manifold authority and reason in the objecting[^23]: and [since] that hatred which is with rising up is in the irascible power: [it follows] that penance itself is in the irascible [power].

1. To that therefore which is objected, that it is in the synderesis; it must be said that that argument fails, because to groan does not belong to the synderesis as eliciting nor as perfectly commanding, because thus it could command nothing to free choice; but rather as murmuring against evil and dictating good, because it naturally murmurs against evil; and in this it cannot err[^24]. And since a virtue is in the power in which resides the faculty and command of eliciting the act: therefore it is not in the synderesis, but in free choice. But the liberty of choice is not only in reason, but in the concupiscible and irascible, because it embraces reason and will; and the will contains the power of loving and of detesting, namely the concupiscible and the irascible.

2. To that which is objected, that it is in the rational [power]; it must be said that reason is named in many ways; yet as far as pertains to the proposal, it is named commonly and properly[^25]. Commonly it comprehends the whole portion of the soul divided against sensuality, in which three powers are placed; and so it is taken in the aforesaid Gloss. Properly it is taken for the power divided against the concupiscible and irascible; and thus it is objected, and thus the objection does not avail.

3. To that which is objected, that it is in the concupiscible [power] on account of this, that hatred is in the same;

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it must be said that hatred is named in two ways: either with a certain displeasure, or with rising up, vengeance, and anger; and the first is in the concupiscible, the second in the irascible; and such is [the hatred] in penance. For just as a man is angered by anger and by zeal and is indignant at the sins of his neighbor; so by penance [he is angered] at his own sins.

4. To that which is objected, that it is in all [the powers]; it must be said that to expel all vices is in two ways; either by way of detesting, or by way of informing. By penance all vices are expelled by way of detesting and making satisfaction; but by way of informing each single vice is expelled by the virtue opposed to it. [The penance] which expels in the first way[^26] need not be in the same power, but [that which expels] in the second way [must]. And so that is clear.

la: De Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 8. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — De minori huius et seqq. argg. cfr. tom. III. pag. 570, nota 9, et Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum in Matth. 13, 39: *Ut in ratione possideamus prudentiam, in ira odium vitiorum, in cupiditate desiderium virtutum.*

en: *On True and False Penance* (among the works of Augustine), c. 8. n. 22. See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — On the minor of this and the following arguments cf. vol. III. p. 570, note 9, and the ordinary Gloss according to Strabo on Matthew 13, 39: *That in reason we possess prudence, in anger hatred of vices, in desire the longing for virtues.*

la: Psalm. 4, 6. — De Glossa, in qua post poenitentiam edd. addunt et satisfactionem, vide supra pag. 321, nota 10.

en: Psalm 4, 6. — On the Gloss, in which after *penance* the editions add *and satisfaction*, see above p. 321, note 10.

la: Cap. Perfecta poenitentia (50.), de Poenitentia, d. 1. (et d. 3. c. 8.), quod inscribitur: « Item Joannes Os aureum in homilia de poenitentia, quae incipit: Provida mente ». Ad quae verba in ed. Migne (Patrolog. Lat. tom. 187. col. 1832) haec in nota subiiciuntur: « Omissa est tanquam supposititia in ed. Maurinan. Ed. Maurin. tantum prae manibus habemus. Pro poenitentem in praenotato cap. substituitur peccatorem ».

en: Chapter *Perfecta poenitentia* (50.), *de Poenitentia*, d. 1. (and d. 3. c. 8.), which is entitled: "Likewise John Golden-Mouth in a homily on penance, which begins: *Provida mente*." To which words in the Migne edition (*Patrologia Latina* vol. 187. col. 1832) these [things] are subjoined in a note: "It is omitted as spurious in the Maurinian edition. We have at hand only the Maurinian edition. For *poenitentem* in the aforenoted chapter is substituted *peccatorem*."

la: De Vera et falsa Poenitentia, c. 18. n. 35. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: *On True and False Penance* c. 18. n. 35. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cap. 1. et 2. — Inferius pro ira cod. X irascendo.

en: Chapters 1 and 2. — Below, for *ira* codex X [reads] *irascendo*.

la: Vers. 26. — Glossam, quae est Hieronymi in Ezech. 1, 7, vide II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. — Ratio exhibita in maiori insinuatur ab Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 1: Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.

en: Verse 26. — The Gloss, which is Jerome's on Ezekiel 1, 7, see II Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. — The ground set forth in the major is intimated by Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking* c. 1: For to whatever the potency belongs, to it also belongs the act.

la: Psalm. 41, 6. — Ibid. etiam est seq. textus. — Illae Glossae exhibentur a Strabo et Lyrano ut ordinariae. Prima sumta est ex Cassiodoro, in hunc locum: « Id est de peccatis meis poenitentiam gero ». Secunda iuxta Strabum est: Quare tristis? etc. De perturbationibus, contra quas ratio confirmat animam sensualem spe Dei. — Post in Glossa cod. H addit super illud.

en: Psalm 41, 6. — In the same place is also the following text. — Those Glosses are exhibited by Strabo and Lyranus as ordinary. The first is taken from Cassiodorus, on this passage: "That is, I do penance for my sins." The second, according to Strabo, is: *Why are you sad?* etc. On the perturbations, against which reason confirms the sensual soul by hope of God. — After *in the Gloss* codex H adds *on that [verse]*.

la: Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 19, nota 5.

en: According to Aristotle; see above p. 19, note 5.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 27. (III. c. 6.); V. text. 16. (IV. c. 10.), et X. text. 11. (IX. c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV. text 27 (III. c. 6.); V. text 16 (IV. c. 10.), and X. text 11 (IX. c. 4.).

la: Idem dicitur secundum August., de iustitia. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 11. — In seq. propos. pro concurrunt, quod alii codd. omittunt, codd. HL concurrit.

en: The same is said according to Augustine, on justice. Cf. vol. III. p. 720, note 11. — In the following proposition, for *concurrunt*, which other codices omit, codices HL [read] *concurrit*.

la: Vers. 11. — Glossa interlinearis, quam exhibet Lyranus, sumta est ex Haymone (in hunc locum): « Sicut cithara sonat, sic sonabit sensus et intellectus meus ad Moab plangendo ». Secunda, quae est ordinaria, praebetur ab Hieronymo (in hunc locum); cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1.

en: Verse 11. — The interlinear Gloss, which Lyranus exhibits, is taken from Haymo (on this passage): "Just as a harp sounds, so my sense and intellect shall sound to Moab by bewailing." The second, which is the ordinary [Gloss], is furnished by Jerome (on this passage); cf. III Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1.

la: Ita cod. H, alii codd. et edd. respondet. Mox pro virium codd. I K virtutum.

en: So codex H; other codices and the editions [read] *respondet*. Soon, for *virium* codices I K [read] *virtutum*.

la: Art. praeced. q. 2.

en: The preceding article, q. 2.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. — Inferius pro quod in omnibus viribus esset edd. poenitentiam in omnibus viribus esse, et subinde ergo videtur pro et videtur [cod. et ideo videtur, cod. X et ex hoc videtur], ac pro tudum codd. I K actum.

en: Cf. vol. II. p. 119, note 8. — Below, for *quod in omnibus viribus esset* the editions [read] *poenitentiam in omnibus viribus esse*, and thereupon *ergo videtur* for *et videtur* [codex *et ideo videtur*, codex X *et ex hoc videtur*], and for *tudum* codices I K [read] *actum*.

la: Libr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 25. n. 1. q. 2. seqq. (praecipue q. 6. ad 2.).

en: Book II Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. and d. 25. n. 1. q. 2 ff. (especially q. 6. ad 2).

la: Codd. KL (l a secunda manu) eam, Vat. tunc eam, ed. 1 cum non paucis codd. tamen.

en: Codices KL (l by a second hand) [read] *eam*, the Vatican [edition] *tunc eam*, edition 1 with not a few codices *tamen*.

la: Art. I. q. 3. — De numero virtutum cardinalium cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 4. — Cod. aa praevisum est.

en: Article I. q. 3. — On the number of the cardinal virtues cf. III Sent. d. 33. q. 4. — Codex aa [reads] *praevisum est*.

la: Ut dicit iam Plato; cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 1.

en: As Plato already says; cf. vol. III. p. 728, note 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 323, nota 10.

en: See above p. 323, note 10.

la: Cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 1. verba Aristot. — Inferius pro in affectu maxime sonat [cfr. opinio 1.] edd. est in affectu maxime (cod. N iam affectum maxime sonat).

en: Cf. vol. III. p. 720, note 1, the words of Aristotle. — Below, for *in affectu maxime sonat* [cf. opinion 1] the editions [read] *est in affectu maxime* (codex N *iam affectum maxime sonat*).

la: Pro in quantum, quod edd. omittunt, cod. X inquam.

en: For *in quantum*, which the editions omit, codex X [reads] *inquam*.

la: Scilicet in fundam.

en: Namely in the fundamenta.

la: Vers. 14. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria (sumta ex August., cuius verba vide tom. III. pag. 720, nota 11.), hoc elicit ex eo, quod de Euphrate non dicitur, ipsum circuire determinatam terram.

en: Verse 14. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary [Gloss] (taken from Augustine, whose words see in vol. III. p. 720, note 11), elicits this from the fact that of the Euphrates it is not said that it goes round a determinate land.

la: Cod. G unicuique quod suum est. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Aliquanto inferius post secundum sed edd. supplent etiam.

en: Codex G [reads] *to each one what is his*. — Cf. II Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1 ff. — Somewhat below, after *secundum*, [before] *sed* the editions supply *etiam*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. P. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 2, ubi 7 modi afferuntur, quibus ratio sumi potest.

en: See II Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, S. P. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 2, where 7 ways are brought forward, in which reason can be taken.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio nostri Doctoris supponit distinctionem duplicis irascibilis, quarum una est in parte animae sensibili, altera in parte rationali, et quidem in affectiva, de quibus III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. plura dicta sunt. In decursu quaestionis multa tanguntur, quae I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, et II. Sent. d. 24. 25. 33, de divisione potentiarum animae, nec non II. Sent. d. 39, de conscientia et synderesi, fuse exposita sunt. Posteriores Scholastici, cum non admittant irascibilem proprie dictam in parte rationali animae, poenitentiam ponunt simpliciter in voluntate; quod Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 9.) sic explicat, ut in re vix discedat a S. Bonav. Dicit enim: « Actus [poenitentiae] est actus voluntatis, cuius est imperare intellectui et voluntati, et hoc imperio pertinente ad irascibilem et potentiam aliquam habentem in se aliquid simile virtuti irascibili. Sicut enim irascibilis in sensitiva suo modo vindicat, ita et illa potentia, quae imperat vindictam in parte intellectiva, habet quoddam simile irascibili ». — Primam opinionem hic relatam sustinuit Guliel. Antissiod. (S. p. IV. tr. 6. q. 3.), secundam vero Alex. Hal.; sed S. Bonaventurae consentit B. Albertus.

De I. quaestione praeter Scotum: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

**II.** Quae in 2. quaestione de origine poenitentiae docentur, haec perfecte concordant iis quae contra novatores saeculi XVI. Concil. Trident. in Sess. VI. c. 6. decrevit de modo praeparationis ad iustificationem, et in Sess. XIV. c. 4. de contritione (cfr. infra d. 17. a. 2. q. 3.); cui doctrinae communiter Scholastici adhaerent. Nec dissentit Scot. quoad necessitatem gratiae (hic q. 2. n. 13.), ut ibi in adiecto scholio et commentario probatur.

De II. quaestione praeter Scotum: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

**III.** Circa 3. quaestionem et quoad habitum infusum poenitentiae (de quo cfr. supra a. 1. q. 3.) facile patet conclusio, quae respicit ordinem temporis. Tamen « secundum ordinem naturae simpliciter praecedunt ipsam virtutes theologicae » (S. Thom. S., III. q. 85. a. 6.). Cfr. S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. et 3, ubi in scholiis tangitur etiam sententia Scoti, qui virtutes cardinales per se infusas non admittit. Quoad ordinem vero consideratum in actibus cum S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) conceditur, quod « poenitentia est prior quibusdam, scilicet caritate et sequentibus ipsam, at posterior aliis, scilicet fide et spe », quatenus sunt informes. Addit S. Thom. (S. loc. cit.), quod « actus autem et habitus caritatis simul sunt tempore cum actu et habitu poenitentiae... horum tamen duorum actuum primus naturaliter praecedit secundum; nam actus virtutis [infusae] poenitentiae est contra peccatum ex amore Dei; unde primus actus est ratio et causa secundi »; de qua doctrina clarius agitur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1–3. — De secunda tabula post naufragium (secundum phrasim S. Hieronymi) agitur hic dub. 1. et infra d. 22. a. 3. q. 2. S. Thom. (hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4.) locutionem illam aliter exponit, quod scilicet prima tabula fuerit ante naufragium peccati originalis, secunda post illud. Concil. Trid. (Sess. XIV. can. 2.) vocat cum S. Bonav. poenitentiam secundam tabulam, ut distinctam a baptismo.

De 3. quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 2. n. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion of our Doctor supposes the distinction of a twofold irascible [power], of which one is in the sensible part of the soul, the other in the rational part, and indeed in the affective [part], concerning which much is said in III Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. In the course of the question many [points] are touched which were fully expounded in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, and II Sent. d. 24. 25. 33, on the division of the powers of the soul, and also II Sent. d. 39, on conscience and synderesis. The later Scholastics, since they do not admit an irascible [power] properly so called in the rational part of the soul, place penance simply in the will; which Scotus (here q. 2. n. 9.) so explains that in reality he scarcely departs from St. Bonaventure. For he says: "The act [of penance] is an act of the will, whose [office] it is to command the intellect and the will, and this by a command pertaining to the irascible and to some power having in itself something similar to the irascible virtue. For just as the irascible in the sensitive [part] takes vengeance in its own way, so also that power which commands vengeance in the intellective part has something similar to the irascible." — The first opinion here related was upheld by William of Auxerre (S. p. IV. tr. 6. q. 3.), but the second by Alexander of Hales; but B. Albert agrees with St. Bonaventure.

On the 1st question, besides Scotus: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. subq. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. subq. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. 2.

**II.** What is taught in the 2nd question on the origin of penance perfectly accords with what the Council of Trent, against the innovators of the 16th century, decreed in Session VI. c. 6. on the manner of preparation for justification, and in Session XIV. c. 4. on contrition (cf. below d. 17. a. 2. q. 3.); to which doctrine the Scholastics commonly adhere. Nor does Scotus dissent as to the necessity of grace (here q. 2. n. 13.), as is proven there in the appended scholion and commentary.

On the 2nd question, besides Scotus: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. subq. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. subq. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 2. — Durandus, IV Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

**III.** Concerning the 3rd question and as to the infused habit of penance (concerning which cf. above a. 1. q. 3.) the conclusion easily appears, which regards the order of time. Yet "according to the order of nature the theological virtues simply precede it" (St. Thomas, S. III. q. 85. a. 6.). Cf. St. Bonaventure, III Sent. d. 36. q. 1. and 3, where in the scholia there is touched also the opinion of Scotus, who does not admit the cardinal virtues to be per se infused. But as to the order considered in the acts, it is conceded with St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. subq. 2.) that "penance is prior to some [virtues], namely charity and those following it, but posterior to others, namely faith and hope," insofar as they are unformed. St. Thomas adds (S. loc. cit.) that "the act and habit of charity are simultaneous in time with the act and habit of penance... yet of these two acts the first naturally precedes the second; for the act of the [infused] virtue of penance is against sin out of love of God; whence the first act is the ground and cause of the second"; concerning which doctrine it is treated more clearly below d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1–3. — On the second plank after shipwreck (according to the phrase of St. Jerome) it is treated here in dub. 1. and below d. 22. a. 3. q. 2. St. Thomas (here loc. cit. subq. 4.) expounds that locution otherwise, namely that the first plank was before the shipwreck of original sin, the second after it. The Council of Trent (Session XIV. can. 2.) with St. Bonaventure calls penance a second plank, as distinct from baptism.

On the 3rd question, besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 3. a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 2. n. 9. 10. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. subq. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from Vol IV PDF column bands (printed pp. 323–326; pdf pp. 343–346 at the verified +20 offset; `colcrop.py vol4` split_x=1880) per the Vol II/IV PDF-priority override, with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 37086–37514) as base for the clean running prose (article opener, fundamenta, sed contra) and footnote-marker spacing. The Respondeo, the three opinions, the Solutio replies, and the scholion were cascade-shattered / two-column-bled in OCR and taken from the PDF bands. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Alignment (NOTE — dispatch brief mismatch, resolved).** The dispatch brief's prose (articulus title *De actione et transmutatione accidentium*, expected "Utrum…" question title) was carried over from the d.12 model file and does NOT describe this chunk. The actual raw range 37086–37514 and the PDF bands are d.14, p.1, ART. II, *De poenitentia in comparatione*, QUAESTIO I, *Quae vis animae sit subiectum virtutis poenitentiae*. The opener ("Primo quaeritur, quae vis animae sit subiectum virtutis poenitentiae; et ostenditur, quod sit in vi animae irascibili") confirms ART. II / QUAEST. I (not an *Utrum* title — title set from the actual heading line per brief instruction). Aligned. Per the locked chunking convention, the short ART. II opener ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum... quaeruntur tria. Primo... Secundo... Tertio...") is folded into this q1; there is no standalone divisio chunk for this article. Range ends just before QUAESTIO II ("Utrum poenitentia oriatur ex timore", raw 37515).

**Page span / page-verify.** Running heads verified on the bands: p.323-R = "QUAEST. I. 323"; p.325-R = "DIST. XIV. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 325"; verso tops p.324 = "324 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.", p.326 = "326 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." Body spans printed pp. **323–326**: fundamenta + Sed contra + Conclusio + Respondeo open p.323; opinions 1–3 run pp.323–325; opinion 4 + Solutio 1–3 on p.325; Solutio 4 + the full SCHOLION on p.326, ending at the foot of p.326-R immediately before QUAESTIO II. printed_pages = [323, 324, 325, 326]; pdf_pages = [343, 344, 345, 346] at +20.

**Apparatus / footer-ownership.** 26 footnotes, all paired in both bodies. Each printed page restarts footer numbering; all anchors of this question's body fall within pp.323–326, renumbered [^1]–[^26] in body order. This is a single-question chunk (no shared cross-chunk page boundary at the top: p.323 opens with QUAESTIO I; the prior chunk closed on p.322/earlier). p.323 footers → [^1]–[^10]; p.324 footers → [^11]–[^17]; p.325 footers → [^18]–[^25]; p.326 footers → [^26]. No footers spill into neighboring chunks within this q's body range; the p.326 SCHOLION's own back-references ("De I./II./3. quaestione...") are kept inline within the scholion text, not as numbered footers.

**Scholion disposition (★ ownership).** This chunk OWNS the Articulus II scholion in full (printed on p.326, ending at the foot of p.326-R immediately before QUAESTIO II). It is question-keyed across the article's three questions: **I** = "Conclusio nostri Doctoris..." — grounds THIS q1 (which power of the soul is the subject of penance; the twofold irascible; sources; opinion-history — William of Auxerre / Alexander of Hales / Albert; "De I. quaestione" author list); **II** = "Quae in 2. quaestione de origine poenitentiae docentur..." — the 2nd question (origin of penance; Trent Sess. VI/XIV concordance; "De II. quaestione" author list); **III** = "Circa 3. quaestionem..." — the 3rd question (order/infused habit; order of time vs. nature; second-plank-after-shipwreck; "De 3. quaestione" author list). Rendered in full (both languages), body-first / scholion-last per the parser gotcha. **Coverage: the scholion covers article q1–q3** (section I → q1, II → q2, III → q3). Sibling questions a2-q2 and a2-q3 should render `has_scholion: false` and point here. No second distinct scholion block exists for q2/q3 within this article — this single block on p.326 is the whole article's scholion, ending just before QUAESTIO II. (Unlike the d.12 a2 scholion which had four sections I–IV, this d.14 a2 scholion has three sections I–III.)

**`[?]` flags.** None outstanding. All readings resolved against the PDF bands. OCR garbles silently corrected per CLAUDE.md (e.g. `Prirao quaerilur`/`Priiiio qiiaerilur`→`Primo quaeritur`, `poenilentia`→`poenitentia`, `coniparaiione`→`comparatione`, `irascibili`, `coUimba`-type ligature noise, `Saci'amenti`-type apostrophe noise, `auclonlatera`/`auctoritatem`, `circuit`/`circuire`, `Iristitia`→`tristitia`, `concupiscibilem`, `synaeresi`→`synderesi`, `vustitia`→`iustitia`, `inenarrabilibus`, `obsequium`). The scholion's Migne column citation reads "col. 1832" on the band (OCR rendered "I.d32").