title: Dist. 40, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XL)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XL)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius, quod *affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit*. Ergo si aliquis committit adulterium, intendens facere simplicem fornicationem; videtur, quod illud peccatum debeat dici fornicatio, non adulterium. — Item, ex eodem affectu potest quis moveri ad *credendum* in Deum et ad *amandum* ipsum: ergo si opus trahit nomen ab affectu, videtur, quod *credere* et *amare* sint opus eiusdem speciei et eiusdem virtutis, et eodem nomine debeant nominari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid nominari contingit dupliciter, videlicet in *generali* et in *speciali*. Nomina *generalia* in moribus sunt bonum et malum. *Specialia* vero sunt nomina specialium differentiarum, ut specialium virtutum et vitiorum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod affectus operi nomen imponit, hoc intelligitur de nomine *generali*; ipse vero obiicit de nomine *speciali*[^1].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Iustitia merito punit eum qui dicit, se subtraxisse superflua diviti, ut praeberet pauperi*. Videtur enim, quod talem iustitia iniuste punit. Habere enim superflua vitium est: ergo resecare superflua est virtutis. Similiter, dare pauperi unde alatur, hoc virtutis est: si ergo iniustum est, aliquem puniri pro opere virtutis, iniuste facit iustitia, quae talem punit[^2]. — Item, idem Deus, qui praecepit filiis Israel, quod furarentur vasa Aegyptiorum, Exodi duodecimo[^3]; idem praecepit, eleemosynam dari pauperibus; sed illi qui furati sunt vasa, volentes implere mandatum divinum, non peccaverunt: ergo pari ratione ille qui furatur, ut det pauperi, furando non peccat. — Item, in omni peccato est conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile[^4]; sed iste qui furatur, ut det pauperi, nihil amat inordinate nec aliquid amat ex cupiditate: ergo videtur, quod non peccat aliquo modo.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod talis absque dubio peccat, quia facit contra divinum mandatum; facit etiam contra proximum, quia « rem eius, ipso invito, contractat[^5] »; et ideo iuste punitur non solum a Deo, verum etiam a proximo. — Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod iuste facit, dum resecat superflua; dicendum, quod ad unumquemque spectat resecare superflua propria; superflua autem aliena resecare non spectat, quando non est constitutus super eum nec dominus nec iudex; et ideo cum aliena superflua resecat, quod non suum est usurpat; et propter hoc punitur de iniustitia.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de filiis Israel, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Dominus dispensavit cum eis, quando praecepit eis, quod furarentur; immo quod plus est, res alienas in dominium eorum transtulit; et hoc bene poterat, quia ipse est Dominus omnium[^6]. Hoc autem Domini praeceptum, quo Dominus praecepit facere eleemosynam, non se extendit ad bona aliena, sed ad propria; unde nullo modo illi mandato repugnat, quo praecipitur non furari; immo illud supponit, et illud cum illo concordat, secundum quod dicitur Proverbiorum tertio[^7]: *Honora Dominum de tua substantia*.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil amat inordinate; dicendum, quod inordinatio amoris dupliciter potest esse: aut quia amatur res, quae non debet, aut quia amatur res amplius, quam debeat. Et dum quis facit contrarium eius quod Deus praecipit, sive moveatur magna affectione, sive parva, peccat; et est eius affectio inordinata, non ex magnitudine dilectionis, sed ex contemptu divinae prohibitionis.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Iudaei crucifigendo Christum arbitrabantur, se obsequium praestare Deo*. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia, sicut dicitur Sapientiae secundo[^8], ex malitia et invidia Christum condemnaverunt morte turpissima; et Matthaei vigesimo septimo dicitur: *Sciebat enim, quod per invidiam tradidissent eum*: si ergo sciebant, se male facere, non arbitrabantur, obsequium se praestare Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur quantum ad omnes Iudaeos, sed quantum ad simplices, qui per maiores decepti sunt. Maiores enim Iudaei, sicut principes sacerdotum et scribae, moti sunt ex invidia et malitia, quia bene cognoscebant eius sanctitatem et innocentiam, quamvis lateret eos divinitas; simplices vero et populares moti sunt ex ignorantia. Audientes enim a maioribus, quod blasphemasset, putabant, se occidendo Christum blasphemum interficere, et sic obsequium Deo praestare. Ista tamen ignorantia non excusat, pro eo quod opera, quae Christus fecit, non solum magnis, sed etiam parvis notitiam sanctitatis eius praestare poterant.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what Ambrose says, that *your disposition imposes a name on your work*. Therefore if someone commits adultery, intending to commit simple fornication, it seems that that sin ought to be called fornication, not adultery. — Likewise, from the same disposition someone can be moved to *believe* in God and to *love* him: therefore if a work takes its name from the disposition, it seems that *to believe* and *to love* are a work of the same species and of the same virtue, and ought to be named by the same name.

**I respond:** It must be said that something happens to be named in two ways, namely in a *general* and in a *special* manner. *General* names in matters of conduct are good and evil. But *special* names are the names of special differences, such as of special virtues and vices. When, therefore, it is said that the disposition imposes a name on the work, this is understood of the general name; but he raises his objection concerning the special name[^1].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Justice deservedly punishes him who says that he has taken away superfluous goods from a rich man in order to provide for a poor man*. For it seems that justice punishes such a man unjustly. For to have superfluous goods is a vice: therefore to cut off superfluous goods belongs to virtue. Similarly, to give to a poor man wherewith he may be nourished is a matter of virtue: if, therefore, it is unjust that anyone be punished for a work of virtue, the justice that punishes such a man acts unjustly[^2]. — Likewise, the same God who commanded the children of Israel to steal the vessels of the Egyptians, Exodus chapter twelve[^3]; the same commanded that alms be given to the poor; but those who stole the vessels, wishing to fulfill the divine command, did not sin: therefore by parity of reasoning he who steals in order to give to a poor man does not sin by stealing. — Likewise, in every sin there is a disordered turning toward a changeable good[^4]; but this man who steals in order to give to a poor man loves nothing in a disordered way nor loves anything out of cupidity: therefore it seems that he does not sin in any way.

**I respond:** It must be said that such a man without doubt sins, because he acts against the divine command; he also acts against his neighbor, because « he handles his property against his will[^5] »; and therefore he is justly punished not only by God, but also by his neighbor. — But to that which is objected, that he acts justly in cutting off superfluous goods, it must be said that it belongs to each one to cut off his own superfluous goods; but to cut off another's superfluous goods does not belong to him, when he is set over that man neither as lord nor as judge; and therefore when he cuts off another's superfluous goods, he usurps what is not his own; and on account of this he is punished for injustice.

To that which is objected concerning the children of Israel, it must be said that it is not similar, because the Lord dispensed with them when he commanded them to steal; nay, what is more, he transferred the goods of others into their ownership; and this he could rightly do, because he himself is the Lord of all[^6]. But this command of the Lord, by which the Lord commanded that alms be given, does not extend to the goods of others, but to one's own; whence it in no way conflicts with the command by which it is enjoined not to steal; nay, it presupposes it, and accords with it, according to what is said in Proverbs chapter three[^7]: *Honor the Lord with thy substance*.

To that which is objected, that he loves nothing in a disordered way, it must be said that the disorder of love can be in two ways: either because a thing is loved which ought not to be, or because a thing is loved more than it ought to be. And when someone does the contrary of what God commands, whether he is moved by great affection or by little, he sins; and his affection is disordered, not from the greatness of love, but from contempt of the divine prohibition.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the Jews, in crucifying Christ, thought that they were rendering service to God*. For this seems to be false, because, as is said in Wisdom chapter two[^8], out of malice and envy they condemned Christ to a most shameful death; and in Matthew chapter twenty-seven it is said: *For he knew that they had delivered him up out of envy*: if therefore they knew that they were doing evil, they did not think that they were rendering service to God.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is not said with respect to all the Jews, but with respect to the simple, who were deceived by their elders. For the greater Jews, such as the chief priests and the scribes, were moved by envy and malice, because they well recognized his holiness and innocence, although his divinity lay hidden from them; but the simple and the common people were moved by ignorance. For hearing from their elders that he had blasphemed, they thought that by killing Christ they were slaying a blasphemer, and thus rendering service to God. Yet this ignorance does not excuse, for the reason that the works which Christ did were able to give knowledge of his holiness not only to the great, but also to the lowly.

---

la: Vide scholion ad I. quaest. huius articuli.

en: See the scholion on the first question of this article.

la: Codd. CKRSTXZ bb et alii *effectu*, quae lectio repugnat contextui.

en: Codices CKRSTXZ bb and others read *effectu* ("by the effect"), a reading which conflicts with the context.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: Compare on this doubt St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1.

la: Vers. 35. seq. Cfr. ibid. 3, 22. et 11, 2. — De praecepto eleemosynam indigentibus erogandi vide Deut. 15, 7. seqq.

en: Verse 35 and following. Compare ibidem 3, 22 and 11, 2. — On the precept of bestowing alms upon the needy, see Deuteronomy 15, 7 and following.

la: Iustinian., IV. Institut. iur. civ. tit. 1. § *Furtum*: *Furtum autem fit, non solum cum quis intercipiendi causa rem alienam amovet, sed generaliter dum quis alienam rem, invito domino, contrectat*. — Mox pro *iuste* cod. C *recte*, edd., excepta 1, *iste*. — Cfr. supra pag. 802, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro *non peccat* edd., excepta 2, *non peccet*.

en: Justinian, *Institutes of Civil Law* IV, title 1, § *Theft*: "Now theft occurs, not only when someone removes another's property for the sake of stealing it, but generally whenever someone handles another's property against the owner's will." — Soon after, in place of *iuste* ("justly") codex C has *recte* ("rightly"); the editions, except the first, *iste* ("this one"). — Compare above, page 802, note 3. — A little further on, in place of *non peccat* ("does not sin"), the editions, except the second, read *non peccet*.

la: Libr. I. Paral. 29, 11: *Cuncta enim quae in caelo sunt et in terra, tua sunt*. — Cfr. August., II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 6. et 39. — Mox pro *praecepit* cod. F *praecipit*, cod. bb *praeceperat*.

en: 1 Paralipomenon (Chronicles) 29, 11: "For all things that are in heaven and on earth are thine." — Compare Augustine, *Questions on the Pentateuch* II, q. 6 and 39. — Soon after, in place of *praecepit* ("commanded") codex F has *praecipit* ("commands"), codex bb *praeceperat* ("had commanded").

la: Vers. 9. — Paulo inferius pro *nihil* edd. praeter 1 *nec*.

en: Verse 9. — A little further on, in place of *nihil* ("nothing") the editions, except the first, read *nec* ("nor").

la: Vers. 20; *Morte turpissima condemnemus eum*. — Seq. loc. Script. est loc. cit. v. 18. Cfr. de hoc dub. S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 7.

en: Verse 20: "Let us condemn him to a most shameful death." — The following scriptural passage (the Matthew citation) is the same place cited, verse 18. Compare on this doubt St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 7.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 933–934 (PDF pp. 955–956, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, raw lines 64878–64950). Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied. The DISTINCTIO XLI header at raw ~64950 was the stopping boundary (not crossed).

**Structure:** Three dubia (no scholion — dubia have none). Topics: Dub. I — whether a work takes its name (species) from the disposition (Ambrose: *affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit*); Dub. II — whether justice unjustly punishes one who cuts off a rich man's superfluous goods to give to the poor; Dub. III — whether the Jews, in crucifying Christ, thought they were rendering service to God.

**Page-split map (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering per page):**
- Dub. I (intro + arguments + Respondeo) and the opening of Dub. II (intro + arguments, through "Respondeo: Dicendum, quod talis absque du-") are on **p.933** (left + right columns); Dub. II Respondeo, all of Dub. III fall on **p.934**.
- **p.933 footers** restart 1–7. Notes 1–2 (*Cfr. supra pag. 718* / *Psalm. 15, 2*) belong to the prior chunk `d40-a2-q3`, whose tail shares this page's left column; they are NOT duplicated here and are already carried in `d40-a2-q3`. Note 3 (*Vide scholion ad I. quaest. huius articuli*) → chunk `[^1]` (Dub. I, "nomine speciali"). Right-column notes 4–7 → chunk `[^2]`–`[^4]` plus the pag.-802 variant folded into `[^5]`: note 4 (*effectu* variant) = `[^2]`; note 5 (S. Thom. cross-ref) = `[^3]`; note 6 (Exodus *Vers. 35*) = `[^4]`; note 7 (pag. 802 / *non peccat* variant) merged into `[^5]`.
- **p.934 footers** restart 1–6. Note 1 (Iustinian *contrectat*) = `[^5]`; note 2 (1 Paral. 29) = `[^6]`; note 3 (Prov. *Vers. 9*) = `[^7]`; note 5 (Sap. *Vers. 20* + Matt.) = `[^8]`; note 6 (S. Thom. cross-ref for Dub. III) merged into `[^8]`. p.934 note 4 (Vat./*affectio inordinata* spelling variant) is a non-anchoring textual variant for the "affectio inordinata" lemma already in `[^7]`/`[^8]` context and is not separately rendered (no discrete body lemma).
- Apparatus is renumbered `[^1]`–`[^8]` by body-anchor sequence; every def has a matching anchor in both Latin and English bodies.

**Hand-off picked up:** From `d40-a2-q3`: p.933 footnote 3 (*Vide scholion ad I. quaest. huius articuli*) confirmed via the p.933 left-column footer band; it anchors at Dub. I Respondeo "nomine speciali" and is rendered here as `[^1]`.

**Hand-off forwarded:** None — DISTINCTIO XLI (next distinction) begins fresh on p.934 right column with its own footer sequence.

**[?] flags:** None. All readings resolved against the 450 dpi PDF column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 41

title_alt: Distinctio XLI — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XLI — text of the Master of the Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XLI.

### Cap. I. *An omnis intentio vel actio infidelium sit mala.*

Cumque intentio, ut supra[^1] dictum est, bonum opus faciat, et fides intentionem dirigat; non immerito quaeri potest, utrum omnis intentio omneque illorum opus malum sit, qui fidem non habent. Si enim fides intentionem dirigit, et intentio bonum opus facit; ubi non est fides, nec intentio bona nec bonum opus esse videtur. — Quod a quibusdam non irrationabiliter astruitur, qui dicunt, omnes actiones et voluntates hominis sine fide malas esse, quae, fide habita, bonae existunt. Unde Apostolus[^2] ait: *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est.* Quod Augustinus exponens ait: «Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est, et nihil bonum est sine summo bono; ubi deest agnitio aeternae veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus». Et Iacobus in Epistola canonica ait: *Qui offenderit in uno,* scilicet in caritate, *factus est omnium reus.* Qui ergo fidem et caritatem non habet, omnis eius actio peccatum est, quia ad caritatem non refertur. Quod enim ad caritatem non refertur, ut supra[^3] meminit Augustinus, non fit, quemadmodum fieri oportet, ideoque malum

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est. Non igitur mandata custodit qui caritate caret, quia sine caritate nullum mandatorum custoditur. Unde Augustinus super Epistolam ad Galatas ait[^4]: «Custoditionem legis dicit Apostolus non inebriari, non occidere, non moechari, et alia huiusmodi ad bonos mores pertinentia, quae nisi caritate, fide et spe impleri non possunt». Nullum ergo mandatum implet, nullum bonum opus facit, qui fidem caritatemque non habet. Impossibile est enim, ut ait Apostolus[^5], *sine fide* aliquid *placere Deo.* Quae ergo sine fide fiunt, bona non sunt, quia omne bonum placet Deo.

His autem obiicitur quod supra[^6] dixit Augustinus, scilicet quod in servili timore, etsi bonum fiat, non tamen bene. «Nemo enim invitus bene facit, etiamsi bonum est quod facit». Hic enim bonum dicit fieri, sed non bene, ab illo qui caritatem non habet. Qui enim serviliter timet caritate vacuus est; de quo tamen hic dicit, quia bonum facit, sed non bene. Qui etiam super illum locum Psalmi[^7]: *Turtur invenit sibi nidum, ubi reponat pullos suos;* dicit, quod «Iudaei, haeretici et pagani opera bona faciunt, quia vestiunt nudos et pascunt pauperes, et huiusmodi: sed non in nido Ecclesiae, id est in fide; et ideo conculcantur pulli eorum». — Quibus illi respondent dicentes, bona opera appellari huiusmodi, quae sine caritate fiunt, non quia bona sint, quando sic fiunt, quod supra evidenter docuit Augustinus, sed quia bona essent, si aliter fierent; quae etiam[^8] suo genere sunt bona, sed ex affectu fiunt mala.

Alii vero, qui trifariam distinctionem actuum faciunt, opera cuncta, quae ad naturae subsidium fiunt, semper bona esse astruunt. Sed quod Augustinus mala esse dicit, si malas habeant causas, non ita accipiendum est, quasi ipsa mala sint, sed quia peccant et mali sunt qui ea malo fine agunt. Item, et illud aliud, scilicet, «bonum opus intentio facit, et intentionem fides dirigit[^9]»; determinant dicentes, ibi bonum vocatum quod remunerabile est ad vitam, non quod illud sit solum bonum opus, immo et alia plura, licet non ea ratione, qua illud fit, sint bona.

### Cap. II. *Quibus modis dicatur bonum.*

Bonum enim multipliciter accipitur, scilicet pro *utili,* pro *remunerabili,* pro *signo boni,* pro *specie boni,* pro *licito,* et aliis forte modis; solaque illa intentio remunerabilis est ad vitam, quam fides dirigit; sed non illa sola bona est, ut aiunt. Nam si quis Iudaeus vel malus Christianus necessitatem proximi relevaverit, naturali pietate ductus, bonum fecit, et bona fuit voluntas, qua illud fecit.

### Cap. III. *Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Peccatum adeo est voluntarium, et illud: Nusquam nisi in voluntate peccatum est, et item: Non nisi voluntate peccatur.*

Post haec investigari oportet, qualiter intelligendum sit quod ait Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione[^10]: «Usque adeo, inquit, peccatum voluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium». Huius dicti rationem Augustinus aperiens, in libro Retractationum dicit: «Potest videri falsa haec definitio; sed si diligenter discutiatur, invenietur esse verissima. Peccatum quippe illud cogitandum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam *poena peccati*», scilicet peccatum primum hominis, quod fuit peccatum et causa peccati, sed non poena; «quamvis et illa, quae *non voluntaria* peccata non immerito dicuntur, quia vel a nescientibus, vel a coactis perpetrantur, non omni modo possunt sine voluntate committi; quoniam et ille qui peccat ignorans, voluntate utique facit quod, cum faciendum non sit, putat esse faciendum; et ille qui, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne, non ea quae vult facit, concupiscit quidem nolens, et in eo non facit quod vult; sed si vincitur, concupiscentiae consentit volens, et in eo non facit nisi quod vult; et illud quod in parvulis est originale peccatum, ex prima hominis voluntate mala contractum est. Non itaque falsum est quod dixi: Usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est» etc. — Ecce qualiter illud accipiendum sit, scilicet vel de primo peccato hominis, vel de omnibus generaliter peccatis mortiferis, quorum licet quaedam dicantur *non voluntaria,* quae scilicet per ignorantiam, vel per infirmitatem fiunt, eadem tamen ratione ea possunt dici *voluntaria,* quia sine voluntate non committuntur.

Illius etiam intelligentia perquirenda est, quod in libro de Duabus Animabus[^11] edidit inquiens: «Nusquam nisi in voluntate peccatum est». Quod etiam in libro Retractationum plane determinat dicens: «Potest putari falsa esse ista sententia, qua diximus, nusquam nisi in voluntate esse peccatum, cum Apostolus dicat: *Quod nolo, hoc facio*» etc. «Sed peccatum, quod nusquam est nisi in voluntate, illud praecipue intelligendum est, quod iusta damnatio consecuta est», id est primum hominis peccatum. In eodem quoque libro de Duabus Animabus[^12] aliud tradidit consideratione dignum; ait enim: «Non nisi voluntate peccatur», ipsamque voluntatem definit dicens: «Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum». Huius dicti causam aperiens et intelligentiam pandens, in libro Retractationum ait:

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«Hoc propterea dictum est, ut hac definitione *volens* a *nolente* discerneretur, et sic ad illos referretur intentio, qui in paradiso fecerunt originem mali, nullo cogente, peccando, id est libera voluntate, quia et scientes contra praeceptum fecerunt; et ille tentator suasit, ut hoc fieret, non coegit. Nam qui nesciens peccavit non incongruenter *nolens* peccasse dici potest; quamvis et ipse quod nesciens fecit volens tamen fecit». «Ita nec tale peccatum sine voluntate esse potuit, sed voluntas *facti* ibi fuit, non voluntas *peccati;* quod tamen *factum* fuit *peccatum;* hoc enim factum est quod fieri non debuit. Quisquis autem sciens peccat, si potest cogenti ad peccatum sine peccato resistere, nec tamen facit, utique volens peccat; quia qui potest resistere non cogitur cedere». «Quapropter peccatum sine voluntate esse non posse, verissimum est». — Ex his liquet, qualiter superiora accipienda sint.

### Cap. IV. *Quod mala voluntas est voluntarium peccatum.*

Si autem omne peccatum mortale voluntarium est, cum voluntas mala peccatum sit mortale, constat, ipsam esse voluntarium peccatum. «Quid enim, ut ait Augustinus[^13], tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est»? Voluntas itaque mala recte voluntarium dicitur peccatum, quod in voluntate consistit. «Voluntas quippe, ut ait Augustinus in eodem, est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima causa peccandi, nec est cui recte imputetur peccatum nisi peccanti. Non ergo est cui recte imputetur nisi voluntati». — Hoc autem de peccato actuali et mortali intelligendum est. Neque his verbis aliud voluit ostendere Augustinus, ut ipse ait in Retractationibus, nisi quia «voluntas est, qua peccatur et qua recte vivitur».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XLI.

### Chapter I. *Whether every intention or action of unbelievers is evil.*

And since intention, as was said above[^1], makes a work good, and faith directs intention, it can not undeservedly be asked whether every intention and every work of those who do not have faith is evil. For if faith directs intention, and intention makes a work good, where there is no faith, neither intention nor work seems to be good. — Which is asserted not unreasonably by certain men, who say that all the actions and wills of a man without faith are evil, which, faith being had, become good. Hence the Apostle[^2] says: *Everything that is not from faith is sin.* Which Augustine, expounding, says: «The whole life of unbelievers is sin, and nothing is good without the highest good; where the knowledge of eternal truth is lacking, virtue is false, even amid the best morals». And James in his canonical Epistle says: *Whoever shall offend in one,* namely in charity, *is made guilty of all.* Whoever, therefore, does not have faith and charity, his every action is sin, because it is not referred to charity. For what is not referred to charity, as Augustine recalled above[^3], is not done as it ought to be done, and therefore is evil.

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Not therefore does he keep the commandments who lacks charity, because without charity none of the commandments is kept. Hence Augustine on the Epistle to the Galatians says[^4]: «The Apostle calls keeping the law: not to be drunken, not to kill, not to commit adultery, and other such things pertaining to good morals, which cannot be fulfilled except by charity, faith, and hope». No one therefore fulfills any commandment, no one does any good work, who does not have faith and charity. For it is impossible, as the Apostle says[^5], for anything *to please God without faith.* Therefore the things that are done without faith are not good, because everything good pleases God.

But against this is objected what Augustine said above[^6], namely that in servile fear, even if a good thing be done, it is nevertheless not done well. «For no one does well unwillingly, even though what he does is good». For here he says a good thing is done, but not well, by him who does not have charity. For he who fears in a servile way is void of charity; of whom nevertheless he here says that he does a good thing, but not well. He who also, on that place of the Psalm[^7]: *The turtledove has found for herself a nest, where she may lay her young;* says that «Jews, heretics, and pagans do good works, because they clothe the naked and feed the poor, and such things: but not in the nest of the Church, that is, in faith; and therefore their young are trampled». — To whom those men respond, saying that such works as are done without charity are called good, not because they are good when they are so done — which Augustine plainly taught above — but because they would be good if they were done otherwise; which also[^8] in their own kind are good, but from affection become evil.

But others, who make a threefold distinction of acts, assert that all works which are done for the support of nature are always good. But that Augustine says they are evil, if they have evil causes, is not so to be taken as if they themselves were evil, but because those who do them with an evil end sin and are evil. Likewise, that other saying, namely «intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention[^9]»; they determine, saying that there is called good that which is rewardable unto life, not that this alone is a good work, but rather also many others, although they are not good by that reason by which it is done.

### Chapter II. *In how many ways the good is spoken of.*

For the good is taken in many ways, namely for the *useful,* for the *rewardable,* for the *sign of the good,* for the *appearance of the good,* for the *lawful,* and perhaps in other ways; and only that intention is rewardable unto life which faith directs; but that alone is not good, as they say. For if some Jew or evil Christian should relieve the need of his neighbor, led by natural piety, he did a good thing, and good was the will by which he did it.

### Chapter III. *How that saying is to be understood: Sin is so far voluntary; and that one: Nowhere except in the will is there sin; and likewise: One sins only by the will.*

After these things it must be investigated how that is to be understood which Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*[^10]: «So far, he says, is sin a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin, if it be not voluntary». Augustine, disclosing the reason of this saying, says in the book of *Retractations*: «This definition can seem false; but if it be carefully examined, it will be found to be most true. For that is to be reckoned sin which is only sin, not what is also the *penalty of sin*», namely the first sin of man, which was sin and the cause of sin, but not penalty; «although even those things which are not undeservedly called *non-voluntary* sins, because they are perpetrated either by the unknowing or by the coerced, cannot in every way be committed without the will; since even he who sins unknowingly does by the will indeed what, although it ought not to be done, he thinks ought to be done; and he who, while the flesh lusts against the spirit, does not do the things that he wills, lusts indeed unwillingly, and in this does not do what he wills; but if he is conquered, he consents willingly to concupiscence, and in this does nothing but what he wills; and that which in little ones is original sin was contracted from the first evil will of man. Therefore it is not false that I said: So far is sin voluntary» etc. — Behold how that is to be taken, namely either of the first sin of man, or of all deadly sins generally, of which, although certain ones be called *non-voluntary,* namely those which are done through ignorance or through infirmity, by the same reasoning they can be called *voluntary,* because they are not committed without the will.

The understanding also of that is to be sought which he set forth in the book *On the Two Souls*[^11], saying: «Nowhere except in the will is there sin». Which also in the book of *Retractations* he plainly determines, saying: «It can be thought that this sentence is false, by which we said that nowhere except in the will is there sin, since the Apostle says: *What I will not, that I do*» etc. «But the sin which is nowhere except in the will is principally to be understood as that which a just damnation has followed», that is, the first sin of man. In the same book *On the Two Souls* also[^12] he handed down another thing worthy of consideration; for he says: «One sins only by the will», and he defines the will itself, saying: «The will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something». Disclosing the cause of this saying and unfolding its understanding, he says in the book of *Retractations*:

<!-- page 936 -->

«This was said for this reason, that by this definition the *willing* might be distinguished from the *unwilling,* and so the intention might be referred to those who in paradise made the origin of evil, with nothing compelling, by sinning, that is, by free will, because they also knowingly acted against the precept; and that tempter persuaded that this should be done, he did not compel. For he who sinned unknowingly can not incongruously be said to have sinned *unwillingly;* although he too did willingly what he did unknowingly». «Thus neither could such a sin be without the will, but there was there the will of the *deed,* not the will of the *sin;* which *deed* nevertheless was *sin;* for this was done which ought not to have been done. But whoever knowingly sins, if he can resist without sin the one compelling him to sin, and nevertheless does not, certainly sins willingly; because he who can resist is not compelled to yield». «Wherefore it is most true that sin cannot be without the will». — From these things it is clear how the foregoing things are to be taken.

### Chapter IV. *That an evil will is voluntary sin.*

But if every mortal sin is voluntary, since an evil will is a mortal sin, it is established that it itself is voluntary sin. «For what, as Augustine says[^13], is as much in the will as the will itself»? An evil will, therefore, is rightly called voluntary sin, which consists in the will. «For the will, as Augustine says in the same place, is the first cause of sinning; or no sin is the first cause of sinning, nor is there one to whom sin is rightly imputed except the one sinning. There is not, therefore, one to whom it is rightly imputed except the will». — But this is to be understood of actual and mortal sin. Nor by these words did Augustine wish to show anything else, as he himself says in the *Retractations,* except that «it is the will by which one sins and by which one lives rightly».

---

la: Dist. praeced. c. 1.

en: The preceding distinction, c. 1.

la: Rom. 14, 23, ubi in Glossa seq. locus Augustini refertur, qui verbotenus legitur apud S. Prosperum, Libr. Sent. n. 106, sed secundum sententiam saepissime invenitur in S. August. v. g. IV. contra Iulian. c. 3. n. 32; de Gestis Pelag. c. 14. n. 34; XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 25; in Ps. 31. Enarrat. 2. n. 4; in Ps. 70. Serm. 2. n. 3; in Ps. 118. Serm. 7. n. 1. — Secundus locus Scripturae est Iac. 2, 10, ubi Vulgata: *offendat* pro *offenderit,* Vat. cum codd. CD *offendit.* Verba addita *in caritate* sunt in Glossa ad hunc locum.

en: Romans 14:23, where in the *Gloss* the following passage of Augustine is referred to, which is read word for word in St. Prosper, *Book of Sentences* n. 106, but according to the sense is found very often in St. Augustine, e.g. *Against Julian* IV, c. 3, n. 32; *On the Deeds of Pelagius* c. 14, n. 34; *On the City of God* XIX, c. 25; *Enarrations on Psalm 31*, 2, n. 4; *on Psalm 70*, Serm. 2, n. 3; *on Psalm 118*, Serm. 7, n. 1. — The second Scriptural passage is James 2:10, where the Vulgate has *offendat* for *offenderit;* the Vatican edition with codices CD reads *offendit.* The words added, *in caritate*, are in the *Gloss* on this place.

la: Dist. XXXVIII. c. 1.

en: Distinction XXXVIII, c. 1.

la: Num. 62. (ad 6, 13). — Pro *nisi,* quod habent codd. et originale, edd. *sine.*

en: N. 62 (on 6:13). — For *nisi*, which the codices and the original have, the editions read *sine.*

en: Hebrews 11:6.

la: Dist. praeced. c. 1. Seq. locus est etiam in August., 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19.

en: The preceding distinction, c. 1. The following passage is also in Augustine, *Confessions* I, c. 12, n. 19.

la: Enarrat. n. 7. super Ps. 83, 3, et ad verbum in Glossa.

en: *Enarration* n. 7 on Psalm 83:3, and word for word in the *Gloss.*

la: Vat. *quae in suo,* et infra *sunt* pro *fiunt,* edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 et codd. A B C E *quae etiam sui genere.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *quae in suo*, and below *sunt* for *fiunt;* editions 1, 2, 3, 7 and codices A B C E read *quae etiam sui genere.*

la: August., Enarrat. II. in Ps. 31. serm. ad plebem, n. 4; cfr. supra d. XL. c. I.

en: Augustine, *Enarration* II on Psalm 31, sermon to the people, n. 4; cf. above, Dist. XL, c. I.

la: Cap. 14. n. 27. Seq. locus est 1. Retract. c. 13. n. 5, ubi etiam tertius locus est. In hoc ultimo textu Vat. cum paucis edd. et originali post *originale peccatum* contra codd. et ceteras edd. addit: *Cum adhuc non utantur voluntatis libero arbitrio* [originale: *arbitrio voluntatis*], *non absurde vocatur voluntarium, quia.*

en: Chapter 14, n. 27. The following passage is *Retractations* I, c. 13, n. 5, where the third passage also is. In this last text the Vatican edition with a few editions and the original, after *original sin,* against the codices and the other editions adds: *Since they do not yet use the free choice of the will* [the original: *the choice of the will*], *it is not absurdly called voluntary, because.*

la: Cap. 10. n. 12. Seq. locus est 1. Retract. c. 15. n. 2, ubi et tertius locus. Textus Apostoli est Rom. 7, 16.

en: Chapter 10, n. 12. The following passage is *Retractations* I, c. 15, n. 2, where the third passage also is. The text of the Apostle is Romans 7:16.

la: Cap. 10. n. 14; secundus locus ibid. parum inferius, ad quos referuntur tres loci in 1. Retract. c. 15. n. 3.

en: Chapter 10, n. 14; the second passage is in the same place a little below, to which are referred the three passages in *Retractations* I, c. 15, n. 3.

la: Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 26. et ibid. III. c. 17. n. 49. Locus est I. c. 9. n. 4. — Supra pro *sita est* Vat. cum cod. D *sita;* in fine codd. omittunt *qua* ante *recte vivitur.*

en: Book I *On Free Choice* c. 12, n. 26, and in the same work III, c. 17, n. 49. The passage is I, c. 9, n. 4. — Above, for *sita est* the Vatican edition with codex D reads *sita;* at the end the codices omit *qua* before *recte vivitur.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 956–958 = printed pp. 934–936) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 64950–65073), whose two-column cascade-shatter interleaved the four chapters out of printed order. This is the LITTERA MAGISTRI (Peter Lombard's text), printed above Bonaventure's commentary at the head of Distinction XLI. Four chapters: **Cap. I** (*An omnis intentio vel actio infidelium sit mala*), **Cap. II** (*Quibus modis dicatur bonum*), **Cap. III** (*Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Peccatum adeo est voluntarium…*), **Cap. IV** (*Quod mala voluntas est voluntarium peccatum*). Littera chunks carry no scholion. Editorial marginal glosses (Dubium 1/2/3, Opinio 1/2, Quaestio 1/2, Augustinus, Notandum, replicatur, obiicitur) trimmed as marginalia, not Lombard's text.

**Page-split map (corrected).** The d.40 commentary + DUBIA fill printed pp. 932–934-top; the d.41 littera begins **below the rule on p.934** (bottom L-col band: `DISTINCTIO XLI.` + Cap. I title + opener `Cumque intentio…` through `…ideoque malum`). The PDF↔printed offset is +22 (printed 934 = PDF 956), confirmed by running heads (`DISTINCTIO XLI.` first appears at the p.935 head; p.934 still reads `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` because its top is d.40). Page breaks placed at running-head boundaries: `<!-- page 935 -->` before "est. Non igitur mandata custodit"; `<!-- page 936 -->` before "«Hoc propterea dictum est". The littera ends at Cap. IV's close (`…qua peccatur et qua recte vivitur».`) at the bottom of p.936's R-col, immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLI.` (the divisio chunk).

**Apparatus map.** 13 entries total, with Quaracchi's per-page restart:
- p.934 footer `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` (R-col, notes 1–3) → `[^1]`–`[^3]`: `ut supra¹` = Dist. praec.; `Apostolus²` = Rom. 14, 23 + Iac. 2, 10; `ut supra³` = Dist. XXXVIII. The p.934 L-col footer (Iustinian / Paral / etc., notes 1–5) and the `Vide de hoc dub.` note 6 belong to the d.40 commentary ABOVE the rule and are NOT littera notes.
- p.935 footer `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` (L-col notes 1–6 → `[^4]`–`[^9]`; R-col notes 7–9 → `[^10]`–`[^12]`): `Galatas ait⁴`=Num.62; `Apostolus⁵`=Hebr.11,6; `supra⁶`=Dist.praec.; `Psalmi⁷`=Enarrat.Ps.83; `etiam⁸`=Vat. *quae in suo*; `fides dirigit⁹`=Enarrat.Ps.31; `Religione¹⁰`=Cap.14 n.27 (Cap.III); `Animabus¹¹`=Cap.10 n.12; `Animabus¹²`=Cap.10 n.14.
- p.936 littera footer (L-col, single note) → `[^13]`: `ut ait Augustinus¹³` (Cap.IV) = Libr. I de Lib. Arb. c.12 n.26.

**Hand-off picked up.** None — this is the first unit of Distinction XLI (no incoming cross-chunk hand-off).

**Hand-off forwarded.** The p.936 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block (R-col, 2 notes: `In cod. cc… praecedentem` / `In cod. T deest omnis`) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d41-divisio` (COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLI + DIVISIO TEXTUS, raw 65074+). The COMMENTARIUS opens `Cumque intentio, ut supra dictum est etc.` with the divisio subtitle `Qualiter actus ex defectu intentionis et voluntatis depraventur.` The divisio's TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM divides into a circa-duo structure (de divisione actionis deliberativae; de comparatione peccati ad voluntatem). No littera footer text bleeds into the divisio chunk.

**[?] flags.** None. All 13 body markers (`ut supra¹`, `Apostolus²`, `ut supra³` on p.934; `Galatas ait⁴`, `Apostolus⁵`, `supra⁶`, `Psalmi⁷`, `etiam⁸`, `fides dirigit⁹`, `Religione¹⁰`, `Animabus¹¹`, `Animabus¹²` on p.935; `Augustinus¹³` on p.936) resolved cleanly against the printed column-band footers, following Quaracchi's per-page numbering restart.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 41, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLI: Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLI: division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 936 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLI.

*Qualiter actus ex defectu intentionis et voluntatis depraventur.*

*Cumque intentio, ut supra dictum est* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter actus habeant rectificari ex rectitudine intentionis et voluntatis. In hac parte intendit determinare, qualiter actus ex defectu intentionis et voluntatis habeant depravari. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes. In quarum prima comparat Magister opera ad intentionem deficientem. In secunda vero comparat malos actus sive mala opera ad voluntatem, ibi: *Post haec investigari oportet* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima Magister movet quaestionem et determinat secundum quorundam opinionem. In secunda vero obiicit contra illam determinationem, adiungens illi quaestioni quandam responsionem, ibi: *His autem obiicitur.* In tertia Magister secundum aliorum opinionem subiungit aliam[^1] praecedentem determinationem, ibi: *Alii vero, qui trifariam distinctionem actuum faciunt,* ubi innuit, quod actiones nostrae dividuntur per tres differentias, scilicet per bonam et malam et indifferentem, inter utramque mediam.

Similiter secunda pars principalis dividitur in tres partes. In prima quaerit Magister, utrum omne peccatum exterius sit voluntarium sive a voluntate. In secunda quaerit, utrum omne peccatum sit in voluntate, ibi: *Illius etiam intelligentia perquirenda est* etc. In tertia vero concludit, quod hoc non solum verum est de peccato exteriori, quod sit voluntarium; sed etiam verum est de peccato interiori, quod quidem consistit circa voluntatis motum, ibi: *Si autem omne peccatum mortale* etc. — Et sic duas quaestiones principaliter determinat Magister in parte ista, quarum una est, utrum omnis actio mala sit, quae non procedit ex intentione recta; secunda est, utrum omnis[^2] culpa sit voluntaria.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam igitur huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Primo quaeritur de divisione actionis deliberativae in bonam et in malam et in indifferentem.

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione peccati ad voluntatem.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum actio deliberativa dividatur per bonum et malum tanquam per differentias oppositas.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum dividatur per bonum et malum tanquam per differentias essentiales et intrinsecas.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum dividatur per has differentias tanquam per differentias immediatas.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLI.

*How acts are made depraved by a defect of intention and of will.*

*And when the intention, as was said above,* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed how acts are to be rectified by rectitude of intention and of will. In this part he intends to determine how acts are made depraved by a defect of intention and of will. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these the Master compares works to a deficient intention. In the second, however, he compares evil acts or evil works to the will, there: *After these matters it must be investigated,* etc.

The first part is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master raises the question and determines it according to the opinion of certain persons. In the second, however, he objects against that determination, adjoining to that question a certain response, there: *But against these things it is objected.* In the third, the Master, according to the opinion of others, subjoins another[^1] to the preceding determination, there: *But others, who make a threefold distinction of acts,* where he intimates that our actions are divided according to three differences, namely into good and evil and indifferent, the latter being intermediate between the two.

Likewise the second principal part is divided into three parts. In the first the Master asks whether every exterior sin is voluntary or from the will. In the second he asks whether every sin is in the will, there: *The understanding of that point too must be inquired into,* etc. In the third, however, he concludes that this is true not only of exterior sin, that it is voluntary, but is also true of interior sin, which indeed consists in the motion of the will, there: *But if every mortal sin,* etc. — And thus the Master principally determines two questions in this part, of which the one is whether every evil action is one that does not proceed from a right intention; the second is whether every[^2] fault is voluntary.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding, therefore, of this part, a question here arises concerning two things.

First it is asked about the division of deliberative action into good and into evil and into indifferent.

Second it is asked about the comparison of sin to the will.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether deliberative action is divided according to good and evil as according to opposite differences.

Second it is asked whether it is divided according to good and evil as according to essential and intrinsic differences.

Third it is asked whether it is divided according to these differences as according to immediate differences.

---

la: In cod. cc et ed. 1. deest *praecedentem*; in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 legitur sic: *In tertia Magister secundum illorum opinionem, qui trifariam distinctionem actuum ponunt, ut in distinctione praecedenti patet, aliam ponit determinationem.*

en: In codex cc and the first edition the word *praecedentem* (preceding) is lacking; in the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 it reads thus: *In the third, the Master, according to the opinion of those who posit a threefold distinction of acts, as is evident in the preceding distinction, posits another determination.*

la: In cod. T deest *omnis*.

en: In codex T the word *omnis* (every) is lacking. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 p. 958 = printed p. 936) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 65074–65120). This chunk is the SECOND unit of Distinction XLI: the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLI` opener (title + subtitle *Qualiter actus ex defectu intentionis et voluntatis depraventur* + incipit `Cumque intentio, ut supra dictum est` etc.), the `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, and the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`. It follows `bon-sent-II-d41-littera` (the Lombard text, pp. 934–936) and precedes `bon-sent-II-d41-a1-q1` (ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I, raw 65121+). Divisio chunks carry no scholion.

**Structure of the divisio.** The Master's treatment of Dist. XLI has two parts (works compared to a deficient intention; evil acts compared to the will). The first part divides into three (raising the question + determining per *quorundam opinionem*; objecting + adding a response *His autem obiicitur*; subjoining another determination per *aliorum opinionem*, *Alii vero, qui trifariam…*). The second principal part likewise divides into three (whether every exterior sin is voluntary; whether every sin is in the will; the conclusion that this holds of interior sin too). The TRACTATIO names **two top-level quaestiones** for the distinction:
1. *De divisione actionis deliberativae in bonam et in malam et in indifferentem* — the division of deliberative action into good, evil, and indifferent. (= Articulus I)
2. *De comparatione peccati ad voluntatem* — the comparison of sin to the will. (= Articulus II)

The TRACTATIO then opens the first quaestio's sub-structure: *Circa primum quaeruntur tria* — three sub-questions (per opposite differences / per essential and intrinsic differences / per immediate differences). These three are QUAESTIO I/II/III of ARTICULUS I (raw 65121/65291/65464).

**Page-split map.** The entire chunk sits at the foot of printed **p.936** (L/R body columns, below the littera Cap. IV close). The top of p.936 (the littera Cap. III–IV tail) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d41-littera`; this chunk begins at `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLI.` and runs through the end of the TRACTATIO listing (`…tanquam per differentias immediatas.`). The material on **p.937** (running head `DIST. XLI. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 937`, `ARTICULUS [I]`, `QUAESTIO I`, the *videtur* arguments) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d41-a1-q1`, NOT this chunk.

**Footnote markers.** Two body markers, both resolving against the p.936 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block: `aliam¹ praecedentem` → *In cod. cc et ed. 1. deest praecedentem…* (`[^1]`); `omnis² culpa` → *In cod. T deest omnis* (`[^2]`). The L-column footer note `¹ Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 26.` is the *littera Cap. IV* note (`[^13]` in `bon-sent-II-d41-littera`), not a divisio note — not double-counted here.

**Hand-off picked up.** Confirmed from `bon-sent-II-d41-littera` (Notes, "Hand-off forwarded"): the p.936 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block (R-col, 2 notes: *In cod. cc… praecedentem* / *In cod. T deest omnis*) was forwarded to this divisio chunk. Both captured here as `[^1]`–`[^2]`.

**Hand-off forwarded.** None to `bon-sent-II-d41-a1-q1`: ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I begins cleanly at the top of p.937 with its own `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block (running head `DIST. XLI. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 937`). The `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` sub-listing of the three q1-q3 sub-questions belongs to the TRACTATIO and is carried here in the divisio, not in a1-q1.

**[?] flags.** None. Both body markers and both footer notes resolved cleanly against the 450 dpi PDF p.936 column bands (L-2 / R-1 / R-2).


title: Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 937 -->

### Articulus I. *De divisione actionis deliberativae in bonam et in malam et in indifferentem.*

### Quaestio I. *Utrum actio deliberativa dividatur per differentias oppositas.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, cum actio deliberativa dividatur in bonam et malam, utrum dividatur per differentias oppositas. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Prima contrarietas in moribus est inter bonum et malum — unde Philosophus[^1] dicit, quod « bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum » — sed prima contraria maxime sunt opposita: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem directam habent oppositionem et repugnantiam.

2. *Item*, malum dicit privationem boni; sed privatio et habitus directe sunt opposita[^2]: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, quae habent oppositos effectus directe opponuntur; sed bona actio et mala oppositos habent effectus in anima, quia bona actio ornat et mala deformat, bona ordinat et mala deordinat[^3]: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, quae habent oppositas retributiones directe habent oppositionem; sed bona actio et mala habent oppositas retributiones, quia uni retribuitur aeternum gaudium, et alii aeternum supplicium[^4]: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, omnis recta divisio est per opposita[^5]: si ergo actio moralis recte dividitur per bonam et malam, ergo membra huius divisionis sunt per opposita.

**Sed contra:** 1. « Opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem[^6] »; sed impossibile est, bonitatem et malitiam, vel e converso, circa eandem actionem succedere: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem non habent oppositionem.

2. *Item*, omne quod Deus facit, est valde bonum[^7], item omne quod fit contra Dei prohibitionem, est malum; sed eadem actio fit a Deo et contra Dei prohibitionem: ergo eadem actio est bona et mala. Sed opposita circa idem sunt incompossibilia: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem non sunt opposita.

3. *Item*, cum dominus praecipit servo dare eleemosynam, et dominus praecipit ex caritate, et servus facit cum murmure; eadem actio est meritoria domino, et demeritoria servo. Sed omne meritorium est bonum, et omne demeritorium est malum; ergo eadem actio est bona et mala: ergo bonum et malum circa actionem non sunt opposita.

4. *Item*, aliquis incipit aliquam actionem ex caritate et terminat eam ex vanitate, secundum quod dicit Gregorius[^8]: « Saepe quod caritas incipit culpa peragit »: ergo una et eadem actio potest esse meritoria et demeritoria; et si hoc, redit idem quod prius, quod bonum et malum circa actionem non sunt opposita.

5. *Item*, « bonum et ens convertuntur[^9] »; sed ens est in plus quam actio, ergo et bonum: ergo si inferius non dividitur per suum superius, actio deliberativa non potest dividi per bonam et malam tanquam per differentias oppositas.

### Conclusio

> Actio procedens a voluntate deliberativa dividitur per actionem bonam et malam, tanquam per differentias non solum disparatas, sed etiam directe oppositas.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod actio deliberativa nata est habere duplicem bonitatem: et bonitatem *naturae*, in quantum est actio procedens ab aliqua virtute, et bonitatem *moris*, in quantum est procedens a libero arbitrio sive a voluntate[^10]. Cum ergo quaeritur, <!-- page 938 --> utrum bonitas et malitia circa actionem habeant repugnantiam, ita quod ipsam dividant tanquam membra opposita; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum de bono, prout dicitur a bonitate *essentiali* vel naturali; sic enim bonum non est differentia actionis, immo convertitur cum ente et reperitur in omni actione. — Prout autem bonum dicitur a bonitate *moris*, sic est divisiva differentia actionis, pro eo quod bonum *moris* in triplici differentia est. Quoddam enim est bonum *in genere*, quoddam *ex circumstantia*, quoddam vero bonum *perfectum* sive principale sive bonum *secundum se*. Et quaelibet harum differentiarum habet differentiam mali sibi ex opposito respondentem[^11].

Nam bono in genere opponitur malum in genere, et bono ex circumstantia opponitur malum ex circumstantia, et bono simpliciter sive secundum se opponitur malum secundum se sive demeritorium[^12]. Horum autem omnium exempla sunt manifesta. — Sic igitur actio procedens a voluntate deliberativa dividi habet per actionem bonam et malam, non solum tanquam per differentias disparatas, sed etiam directe oppositas. Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de eodem numero, non habet veritatem nisi in subiecto, quod est substantia, proprie loquendo. « Ipsius enim substantiae proprium est, cum sit una et eadem numero, quod sit susceptibilis contrariorum[^13] »; circa actionem autem, cum sit accidens, non oportet illud habere veritatem, quod bonum et malum sint circa eandem actionem numero, sed sufficit quantum ad legem oppositionis, quod habeant fieri circa eandem actionem in specie. — Alia est etiam ratio, quare bonum et malum non possunt sibi succedere in eadem actione secundum eandem partem actionis, propter hoc quod esse actionis consistit in successione. Et hoc melius iam patebit[^14].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod Deus facit est valde bonum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quoad bonum naturae; illi autem bonitati non repugnat malitia moris, immo eam praesupponit; et ideo eadem actio potest a Deo fieri et nihilominus esse prohibita[^15]. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod non sit contrarietas inter bonitatem moris et malitiam. Unde impossibile est, quod eadem actio sit simul et semel in prohibitione et in praecepto.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem actio est meritoria et demeritoria; dicendum, quod bonum et malum meriti et demeriti[^16] circa actionem non dicunt qualitates *absolutas*, sed *comparationes diversas*. Unde actio bona non est aliud quam actio ordinata in finem; refertur autem actio in finem per intentionem. Quoniam igitur una et eadem actio potest esse a duplici intendente et a duplici intentione, ita quod ab uno sicut a *principali motore*, ab altero vero sicut ab *instrumento*; et una illarum intentionum potest esse *recta*, et altera illarum *obliqua*: hinc est, quod una et eadem actio potest esse bona et mala per comparationem ad diversa principia, loquendo de bonitate et malitia *meriti et demeriti*. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod bonum et malum non sint opposita circa actionem. Nam etsi compatiantur se circa eandem actionem in comparatione ad *diversas* intentiones, non tamen compatiuntur se, secundum quod comparantur ad *eandem* intentionem. Opposita autem respectiva secundum hoc legem habent oppositionis, secundum quod ad idem comparantur[^17].

Unde nota, quod aliter dicitur bonum de *voluntate*, aliter de *actione exteriori*. Nam circa voluntatem dicit qualitatem aliquam superadditam; et ideo impossibile est, quod una et eadem voluntas sit simul et semel bona et mala, nec absolute nec in comparatione ad diversa. Circa actionem vero bonum dicit comparationem ad debitum principium et ad finem. Unde aliquae duae actiones per omnia consimiles tam in genere actionum quam in genere circumstantiarum moralium frequenter differunt in hoc, quod una est meritoria, altera vero non; quia una fit ab habente caritatem, altera a non habente. Et haec dicta sunt de bono et malo, secundum quod tantum valent[^18], quantum meritorium et demeritorium, quia secundum hoc currebat obiectio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actio inchoata ex caritate potest terminari ex[^19] vanitate; dicendum, quod verum est; sed licet illa actio una sit in genere naturae, non est tamen una in genere moris, pro eo quod, etsi una sit voluntas, quae est principium illius actionis, tamen aliter et aliter est dis-<!-- page 939 -->posita, dispositione, inquam, quae variat in genere moris, sicut est intentio recta et obliqua.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum est in plus; iam patet responsio; obiicit enim de bono naturae, et hoc modo non est differentia divisiva actionis deliberativae.

english:
### Article I. *On the division of deliberative action into good, evil, and indifferent.*

### Question I. *Whether deliberative action is divided by opposite differences.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks, since deliberative action is divided into good and evil, whether it is divided by opposite differences. And that it is so, it seems.

1. The first contrariety in morals is between good and evil — whence the Philosopher[^1] says that « good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things » — but the first contraries are opposites in the highest degree: therefore good and evil with respect to a direct action have opposition and incompatibility.

2. *Likewise*, evil states the privation of good; but privation and possession are directly opposed[^2]: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, those things which have opposite effects are directly opposed; but a good action and an evil one have opposite effects in the soul, because a good action adorns and an evil one deforms, a good one orders and an evil one disorders[^3]: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, those things which have opposite retributions are directly opposed; but a good action and an evil one have opposite retributions, because to the one is rendered eternal joy, and to the other eternal punishment[^4]: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, every correct division is by opposites[^5]: if therefore moral action is correctly divided into good and evil, then the members of this division are by opposites.

**On the contrary:** 1. « Opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing[^6] »; but it is impossible that goodness and malice, or conversely, should succeed one another about the same action: therefore good and evil with respect to action do not have opposition.

2. *Likewise*, everything that God makes is very good[^7], likewise everything that is done against God's prohibition is evil; but the same action is done by God and against God's prohibition: therefore the same action is good and evil. But opposites about the same thing are incompatible: therefore good and evil with respect to action are not opposites.

3. *Likewise*, when a master commands a servant to give alms, and the master commands out of charity, and the servant does it with murmuring; the same action is meritorious for the master, and demeritorious for the servant. But everything meritorious is good, and everything demeritorious is evil; therefore the same action is good and evil: therefore good and evil with respect to action are not opposites.

4. *Likewise*, someone begins some action out of charity and ends it out of vanity, according to what Gregory says[^8]: « Often what charity begins, fault carries through »: therefore one and the same action can be meritorious and demeritorious; and if this is so, the same thing returns as before, that good and evil with respect to action are not opposites.

5. *Likewise*, « good and being are convertible[^9] »; but being is wider than action, therefore so too good: therefore if the inferior is not divided by its superior, deliberative action cannot be divided into good and evil as by opposite differences.

### Conclusion

> Action proceeding from the deliberative will is divided into good and evil action, as by differences not only disparate, but also directly opposite.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that deliberative action is of a nature to have a twofold goodness: both the goodness of *nature*, inasmuch as it is an action proceeding from some power, and the goodness of *morals*, inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice or from the will[^10]. When therefore it is asked <!-- page 938 --> whether goodness and malice have incompatibility with respect to action, such that they divide it as opposite members; it must be said that this is not true of good, as it is said from *essential* or natural goodness; for thus good is not a difference of action, but rather is convertible with being and is found in every action. — But as good is said from the goodness of *morals*, thus it is a dividing difference of action, for the reason that the good of *morals* exists in a threefold difference. For one kind is good *in genus*, another *from circumstance*, and another a *perfect* good, or principal, or good *in itself*. And each of these differences has the difference of evil corresponding to it from the opposite side[^11].

For to good in genus is opposed evil in genus, and to good from circumstance is opposed evil from circumstance, and to good simply or in itself is opposed evil in itself or demeritorious evil[^12]. And the examples of all these are manifest. — Thus therefore action proceeding from the deliberative will has to be divided into good and evil action, not only as by disparate differences, but also directly opposite ones. Whence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing; it must be said that, if it is understood of the same in number, it does not hold true except in a subject, which is a substance, properly speaking. « For it is proper to substance that, being one and the same in number, it is receptive of contraries[^13] »; but with respect to action, since it is an accident, it is not necessary that that hold true, namely that good and evil be about the same action in number, but it suffices, as regards the law of opposition, that they have to come to be about the same action in species. — There is also another reason why good and evil cannot succeed one another in the same action according to the same part of the action, on account of this, that the being of an action consists in succession. And this will be made clearer presently[^14].

2. To that which is objected, that everything which God makes is very good; it must be said that this is understood as to the good of nature; but to that goodness the malice of morals is not repugnant, but rather presupposes it; and therefore the same action can be done by God and nonetheless be prohibited[^15]. From this, however, it does not follow that there is no contrariety between the goodness of morals and malice. Whence it is impossible that the same action be at one and the same time under prohibition and under precept.

3. To that which is objected, that the same action is meritorious and demeritorious; it must be said that the good and evil of merit and demerit[^16] with respect to action do not state *absolute* qualities, but *diverse comparisons*. Whence a good action is nothing other than an action ordered to an end; but an action is referred to an end through intention. Since therefore one and the same action can be from a twofold one intending and from a twofold intention, such that from the one as from a *principal mover*, but from the other as from an *instrument*; and one of these intentions can be *right*, and the other of them *oblique*: hence it is that one and the same action can be good and evil by comparison to diverse principles, speaking of the goodness and malice of *merit and demerit*. From this, however, it does not follow that good and evil are not opposites with respect to action. For although they are compatible about the same action in comparison to *diverse* intentions, they are nevertheless not compatible insofar as they are compared to the *same* intention. But relative opposites have the law of opposition in this respect, insofar as they are compared to the same thing[^17].

Whence note that good is said in one way of the *will*, in another of the *exterior action*. For with respect to the will it states some superadded quality; and therefore it is impossible that one and the same will be at one and the same time good and evil, neither absolutely nor in comparison to diverse things. But with respect to action good states a comparison to the due principle and to the end. Whence two actions altogether alike, both in the genus of actions and in the genus of moral circumstances, frequently differ in this, that one is meritorious, the other not; because one is done by one having charity, the other by one not having it. And these things have been said of good and evil, insofar as they are worth[^18] as much as the meritorious and the demeritorious, because in this respect the objection ran.

4. To that which is objected, that an action begun out of charity can be ended out of[^19] vanity; it must be said that it is true; but although that action is one in the genus of nature, it is nevertheless not one in the genus of morals, for the reason that, even though the will, which is the principle of that action, is one, nevertheless it is dis-<!-- page 939 -->posed in different ways, by a disposition, I say, which varies in the genus of morals, as is right and oblique intention.

5. To that which is objected, that good is wider; the response is already clear; for the objection deals with the good of nature, and in this mode it is not a dividing difference of deliberative action.

la: Libr. de Praedicam. c. *de Oppositis*, in fine, et IV. Topic. c. 3. — De *minori* cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 13. seq. et 22. seqq. (IX. c. 4. et 7.), in quo ultimo loco (text. 23.) ait: *Priora invicem contraria sunt.* — Paulo ante Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 verbis *per differentias* praefigit *tanquam.*

en: Book *On the Categories*, c. *On Opposites*, at the end, and IV *Topics* c. 3. — On the minor cf. Aristotle, X *Metaphysics* text 13 f. and 22 ff. (IX c. 4 and 7), in which last place (text 23) he says: *Prior things are contrary to one another.* — Shortly before, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 prefixes *tanquam* to the words *per differentias.*

la: Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Oppositis* et X. Metaph. text. 9. et 15. (IX. c. 3. seq.). — Explicatio *maioris* habetur supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3.

en: See Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. *On Opposites* and X *Metaphysics* text 9 and 15 (IX c. 3 f.). — An explanation of the major is found above in d. 34, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Matth. 25, 46: *Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum, iusti autem in vitam aeternam.* Cfr. Ioan. 5, 29.

en: Matt. 25:46: *And these shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting.* Cf. John 5:29.

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 24. (IX. c. 8.): *Cuncta namque oppositis dividuntur.* Cfr. supra pag. 653, nota 2. — In fine arg. Vat. cum cod. ee omittit *per* ante *opposita.*

en: Aristotle, X *Metaphysics* text 24 (IX c. 8): *For all things are divided by opposites.* Cf. above p. 653, note 2. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with codex ee omits *per* before *opposita.*

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Oppositis* et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Sententiam, quae in *minori* proponitur, Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia*, sic exprimit: *Neque eadem actio et una numero [dicitur] prava et studiosa.* — Pro *vel* Vat. *sibi.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. *On Opposites* and II *Topics* c. 3 (c. 7). — The judgment proposed in the minor, Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. *On Substance*, expresses thus: *Nor is the same action, one in number, [said to be] base and virtuous.* — For *vel* the Vatican edition reads *sibi.*

la: Gen. 1, 31: *Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona.* — De *minori* vide supra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et de *minori subsumta*, quae est secundum Aristot., vide supra pag. 100, nota 1. — Mox edd. *et* pro *item.* Paulo inferius pro *sed eadem* codd. Iv V W X Z bb ee et alii *igitur eadem.*

en: Gen. 1:31: *And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.* — On the minor see above d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and on the subsumed minor, which is according to Aristotle, see above p. 100, note 1. — Presently the editions read *et* for *item.* A little further down, for *sed eadem* codices Iv V W X Z bb ee and others read *igitur eadem.*

la: Libr. IX. Moral. c. 23. n. 37: *Horrendo modo unum idemque opus culpa peragit, quod virtus inchoavit.*

en: Book IX *Morals* c. 23, n. 37: *In a horrible way fault carries through one and the same work which virtue began.*

la: Vide supra pag. 805, nota 4. Quod inferius non dividatur per suum superius, insinuat Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Specie* et c. *de Differentia.* Primo loc. cit. ait: *Divisivum enim semper est quod singulare [inferius] est, collectivum autem et adunativum quod commune [superius] est.*

en: See above p. 805, note 4. That the inferior is not divided by its superior, Porphyry intimates, *On the Predicables* c. *On Species* and c. *On Difference.* In the first place cited he says: *For divisive is always what is singular [the inferior], but collective and unitive is what is common [the superior].*

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and d. 37, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cod. T habet *differentiam secundum se mali oppositam.*

en: Codex T has *differentiam secundum se mali oppositam.*

la: Vide supra d. 36. dub. 5.

en: See above d. 36, dub. 5.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia.* De propos. seq. cfr. ibid. c. *de Oppositis*, ubi dicitur, eundem non posse simul esse sanum et languidum, et deinde pergit: *Palam vero est, quod circa idem aut specie aut genere nata sunt fieri contraria. Languor namque et sanitas in corpore animalis nata sunt fieri... iustitia vero et iniustitia in anima hominis.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. *On Substance.* On the following proposition cf. ibid. c. *On Opposites*, where it is said that the same thing cannot be at once healthy and sick, and then he continues: *But it is manifest that contraries are of a nature to come to be about the same thing in species or in genus. For sickness and health are of a nature to come to be in the body of an animal... but justice and injustice in the soul of a man.*

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

la: Vide supra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Paulo inferius pro *eadem* edd., excepta 1, *una et eadem.*

en: See above d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — A little further down, for *eadem* the editions, except 1, read *una et eadem.*

la: Cod. K *meritum et demeritum.* Idem cod. cum codd. bb ee et nonnullis aliis nec non ed. 1 mox pro *dicunt* substituit *habent.*

en: Codex K reads *meritum et demeritum.* The same codex, with codices bb ee and several others as well as edition 1, presently substitutes *habent* for *dicunt.*

la: Generatim enim secundum Boeth., IV. in Categor. (Praedicam.) Aristot. c. *de Oppositis*, sunt opposita « quae in eodem, secundum idem, in eodem tempore circa unam eandemque rem simul esse non possunt ». — Pro *Opposita autem* ed. 1 (cod. W a secunda manu) *Opposita enim.* Post pauca pro *dicit* cod. Iv substituit *habet.*

en: For generally, according to Boethius, IV *on the Categories* (Predicaments) of Aristotle c. *On Opposites*, those are opposites « which cannot be at once in the same thing, according to the same, at the same time, about one and the same thing ». — For *Opposita autem* edition 1 (codex W by a second hand) reads *Opposita enim.* After a little, for *dicit* codex Iv substitutes *habet.*

la: Non pauci codd., inter quos F H T Y bb ee, cum edd. 1, 2 *valet.*

en: Not a few codices, among them F H T Y bb ee, with editions 1, 2 read *valet.*

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pauci codd. *in.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and a few codices read *in.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio et seq. supponunt saepe repetitum distinctionem bonitatis in genere naturae et in genere moris, et speciatim ea quae dicta sunt supra d. 37. a. 2. q. I.

Quaest. 1. a S. Thoma et Richardo aliisque sic proponitur: utrum eadem actio possit esse bona et mala; et praecipue versatur circa actiones exteriores, de quibus solummodo est difficultas; nam hae possunt esse successivae et divisibiles, dum actio interna est simplex et indivisibilis (cfr. solut. ad 3.). Conveniunt autem magistri in hoc, quod etiam actio externa una, secundum quod est una, non possit esse simul bona et mala, sed tantum, secundum quod est multa.

De I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 1. a. 2. — Scot., Quodl. q. 18. n. 12. seqq. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 40. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 20. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 137. m. I. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 2. a. I. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 4.

**II.** Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest. conveniunt magistri antiqui in hoc, quod loquendo de actione voluntaria et libera, bonum et malum non sunt differentiae essentiales, quatenus actio est in genere naturae, cum accidant actioni; item quod « malum, prout dicit privationem tantum, non potest proprie dici essentialis differentia » (S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. ad 2.). Sub hoc autem respectu S. Bonav. negat, hanc divisionem esse per differentias essentiales et intrinsecas. — Si autem actio consideratur in genere moris sive secundum ordinem ad finem; tunc alii communiter docent, quod bonum et malum dividunt actiones essentialiter et secundum speciem. « Per hoc enim actio in genere moris constituitur, quia est bona vel mala. Quia vero primum esse [scilicet naturae] est esse simpliciter, aliud secundum quid; ideo bonum et malum non sunt differentiae essentiales actionis simpliciter, sed secundum quid, prout scilicet est in genere moris » (Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 40. q. 2. a. 2.). Licet autem S. Bonav. aliis verbis et distinctionibus utatur, tamen in doctrina convenit cum ceteris magistris. Addit autem S. Thom. (art. cit.), quod actus interiores voluntatis simpliciter sic specie dividuntur; actus vero imperati a voluntate et eliciti ab aliis potentiis tantum per accidens, secundum quod ad genus moris pertinent.

Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. quaest. inter. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 40. a. I. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. I. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. q. 2. a. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question and the following one presuppose the often-repeated distinction of goodness in the genus of nature and in the genus of morals, and especially the things said above in d. 37, a. 2, q. I.

Question 1 is proposed by St. Thomas and Richard and others thus: whether the same action can be good and evil; and it is concerned chiefly with exterior actions, about which alone there is difficulty; for these can be successive and divisible, whereas the internal action is simple and indivisible (cf. solution to obj. 3). The masters agree, however, in this, that even one external action, insofar as it is one, cannot be at once good and evil, but only insofar as it is many.

On Question 1: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 96, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, Quodl. q. 18, n. 12 ff. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 40, a. 4; S. I-II, q. 20, a. 6. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 137, m. I. — Petr. a Tar., II Sent. d. 40, q. 2, a. I. — Richard of Middleton, II Sent. d. 40, a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, II Sent. d. 40, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 40, q. 4.

**II.** As to the following (2nd) question, the ancient masters agree in this, that, speaking of voluntary and free action, good and evil are not essential differences, insofar as the action is in the genus of nature, since they are accidental to the action; likewise that « evil, as it states privation only, cannot properly be called an essential difference » (St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 40, a. 1, ad 2). Under this respect St. Bonaventure denies that this division is by essential and intrinsic differences. — But if the action is considered in the genus of morals or according to its order to an end; then others commonly teach that good and evil divide actions essentially and according to species. « For by this an action is constituted in the genus of morals, namely that it is good or evil. But because the first being [namely of nature] is being simply, the other [being] in a certain respect; therefore good and evil are not essential differences of action simply, but in a certain respect, namely insofar as it is in the genus of morals » (Petr. a Tar., II Sent. d. 40, q. 2, a. 2). But although St. Bonaventure uses other words and distinctions, nevertheless in doctrine he agrees with the other masters. St. Thomas adds, however (art. cit.), that the interior acts of the will are divided according to species simply; but the acts commanded by the will and elicited by other powers only accidentally, insofar as they pertain to the genus of morals.

Besides those cited: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. interior question. — B. Albert, II Sent. d. 40, a. I. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. I. — Giles of Rome, loc. cit. q. 2, a. I. — Biel, here, single question.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 959–961 = printed pp. 937–939) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 65121–65290). This chunk is ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I of Distinction XLI: *Utrum actio deliberativa dividatur per differentias oppositas* — the first of the three sub-questions of Article I (per the d.41 divisio's TRACTATIO: per opposite differences / per essential and intrinsic differences / per immediate differences = q1/q2/q3, raw 65121/65291/65464). The short ARTICULUS I opener (heading *De divisione actionis deliberativae in bonam et in malam et in indifferentem* + the `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` listing) is folded per Vol II convention: the heading + subtitle are carried here; the three-question listing itself was already carried in `bon-sent-II-d41-divisio` (TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM) and is NOT duplicated here.

**Opener alignment — CONFIRMED.** The divisio's `Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum actio deliberativa dividatur per bonum et malum tanquam per differentias oppositas` matches the QUAESTIO I title verbatim. q1 = the first ("per opposite differences"). No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- p.937 (PDF 959): ARTICULUS I heading + subtitle, QUAESTIO I title, body args 1–5 + sed contra 1–5, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo opener (through *...a libero arbitrio sive a voluntate*). Footer = apparatus [^1]–[^10] (10 entries).
- p.938 (PDF 960): rest of Respondeo + replies 1–4 (through *...tamen aliter et aliter est dis-*). Footer = apparatus [^11]–[^19] (9 entries).
- p.939 (PDF 961): q1 tail (reply 4 cont. *-posita...* + reply 5), then the article-level SCHOLION (I covers q1, II covers q2). The p.939 footer notes (markers 1–4) belong to QUAESTIO II's arguments, not q1.

**has_scholion: true.** The SCHOLION at the top of p.939 (raw 65267–65290) is article-level: section I treats this q1 ("Haec quaestio..."), section II treats the following q2 ("Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest."). It falls within this chunk's raw range (ends at 65290, before QUAESTIO II at 65291) and is carried here in full. d.41-a1-q2 will therefore have NO scholion of its own (its scholion content lives here in section II — note for the q2 agent).

**Marginal glosses** in the printed text (*Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*, *Duplex bonitas*, *Conclusio 1/2*, *Triplex bonum moris*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Alia ratio*, *Bonum aliter dicitur de voluntate, aliter de actione exteriore*) are Quaracchi editorial side-notes, trimmed out of the body per project convention.

**Hand-offs picked up.** None — d.41-divisio forwarded no hand-off; ARTICULUS I opens cleanly at the top of p.937 with its own footer block.

**Hand-offs forwarded to d.41-a1-q2 (QUAESTIO II, raw 65291).** (a) The article-level SCHOLION section II (on q2) is carried in THIS chunk, not q2 — the q2 agent should set `has_scholion: false` and reference this chunk. (b) The p.939 footer notes (markers 1, 2, 3, 4...) belong to q2's arguments and should be picked up there. q2's body begins `Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec divisio fiat per differentias essentiales, an per accidentales` — verify "Secundo quaeritur" alignment.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR for pp.937–939 is clean single-page material; all readings confirmed against the 450 dpi PDF column bands.