title: Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 886 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum resurrectio sit omnium simul, an successive.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body and the English translation. They are qualified by printed page (p.886, p.887) because Quaracchi restarts the footnote numbering on each printed page.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum resurrectio sit omnium simul, an successive. Et quod simul, videtur.

1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^p886-6]: *In momento, in ictu oculi* etc.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia mors et incineratio debentur merito primi peccati, quo peccavimus in Adam[^p886-7]; et omnes simul peccavimus, quia simul fuimus in Adam: ergo et in Christo simul debemus resurgere.

3. Item, decens est, ut habitatio congruat habitatori: ergo sicut mundus peioratus est, homine facto mortali, ita debet meliorari, homine facto immortali[^p886-8]; sed non debet meliorari, quamdiu homo est mortalis: ergo quamdiu homines vivunt, non debet esse resurrectio: ergo erit omnium simul.

4. Item, post resurrectionem consummatur gloria; sed Angeli non habent omnino gloriam consummatam ante nostram glorificationem, nec similiter daemones poenam[^p886-9]: ergo si maior est colligatio hominum ad invicem quam ad Angelos, non debet unus sine altero resurgere: et sic etc.

**Contra:** 1. Resurrectio corporum sequitur resurrectionem animarum; sed resurrectio animarum est successiva et non simul: ergo et resurrectio corporum.

2. Item, Christus non exspectavit nostram resurrectionem[^p886-10], qui est caput nostrum, et qui magis fovet singula membra: ergo nec membrum exspectat resurrectionem membri, et sic etc.

3. Item, praemium respondet merito: ergo qui citius meruerunt citius debent remunerari: ergo meliores citius debent resurgere.

4. Item, maior est conformitas ex parte animarum quam corporum propter vinculum caritatis; sed glorificatio unius animae non exspectat glorificationem alterius: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Resurrectio corporum erit simul, non successiva.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod resurrectio corporum non erit successiva, sed simul; et huius possunt esse rationes congruentes sex.

Prima est *severitas divini iudicii*, quod inflixit poenam incinerationis corpori usque ad <!-- page 887 --> adventum secundum Filii Dei, sicut poena carentiae visionis[^p887-1] usque ad adventum primum. Et ratio huius est, quia omnes simul fuimus in uno principio peccati.

Secunda ratio est *meritum fidei*, quae multum meretur in credendo, nos remunerari, qui videmur similes bestiis in moriendo[^p887-2]; quod si illud experimento videret, non haberet meritum, quia humana ratio sibi praeberet experimentum.

Tertia ratio est *unitas corporis mystici*: quia enim omnes *unum corpus sumus in Christo*[^p887-3], ideo necesse est, quod quantum ad aliquam gloriam resurgamus simul; sed non quantum ad gloriam animae, quia ibi esset maximum damnum et quasi importabile: ergo quantum ad gloriam corporis.

Quarta ratio est *subsidium infirmitatis nostrae*: quia Sancti, dum sua desiderant corpora, vehementius etiam desiderant salutem nostram; unde Apostolus dicit ad Hebraeos undecimo[^p887-4]: *Deo pro nobis aliquid melius providente, ne sine nobis consummarentur.*

Quinta ratio est *manifestatio divinae iustitiae*: quia enim omnibus debet esse notum, quanta iustitia damnet malos et salvet bonos; ideo ultimam distributionem[^p887-5] distulit usque ad novissimum, ut omnes comparerent.

Sexta et ultima ratio est *consummatio gloriae*: quia enim Angeli adhuc sunt viatores quantum ad administrationem, quamdiu homines vivunt; et gaudium semper crescit secundum multitudinem electorum; non debuit perfecte gloria consummari in aliquo singulariter, donec consummaretur in omnibus simul.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**

1. Ex his patent obiecta. Nam resurrectio corporum non attenditur secundum resurrectionem animae. Animae enim resurrectio *prima*[^p887-6] respicit resurrectionem per gratiam, et haec est in via; et ideo *successive*. — Item, animae glorificatio substantiam importat praemii, quae si differretur, magnum damnum esset exspectanti; non sic de corpore, quia non multum gravat exspectare corpus, dum animae tenent Deum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de resurrectione Christi, patet responsio: quia nec concurrit ibi severitas iudicii, cum non esset super eum inducta maledictio; nec faceret ad meritum fidei, immo e contrario est in fidei adiutorium[^p887-7].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praemium respondet merito; dicendum, quod verum est pro loco et tempore; et praemium *essentiale* competit ut statim reddatur, sed *stola secunda*[^p887-8] debet exspectari, quousque cum solemnitate et magnificentia et gloria dantis conferatur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est unio et convenientia animarum; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo minor, pro eo quod omnia corpora in uno corpore fuerunt, sed non omnes animae in una anima[^p887-9].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether the resurrection of all will be simultaneous or successive.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the resurrection will be of all simultaneously, or successive. And it seems that it will be simultaneous.

1. First to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen[^p886-6]: *In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye,* etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because death and reduction-to-ashes are owed as the desert of the first sin, by which we sinned in Adam[^p886-7]; and we all sinned simultaneously, because we were simultaneously in Adam: therefore in Christ also we ought to rise simultaneously.

3. Likewise, it is fitting that the dwelling should be suited to the dweller: therefore just as the world was made worse when man was made mortal, so it ought to be made better when man is made immortal[^p886-8]; but it ought not to be made better so long as man is mortal: therefore so long as men are living, there ought not to be a resurrection: therefore it will be of all simultaneously.

4. Likewise, after the resurrection glory is consummated; but the Angels do not have their glory wholly consummated before our glorification, nor likewise the demons their punishment[^p886-9]: therefore if the bond of men with one another is greater than [their bond] with the Angels, one ought not to rise without another: and so on.

**On the contrary:** 1. The resurrection of bodies follows the resurrection of souls; but the resurrection of souls is successive and not simultaneous: therefore also the resurrection of bodies.

2. Likewise, Christ did not wait for our resurrection[^p886-10], he who is our head and who cherishes the individual members more [than any single member does]: therefore neither does one member wait for the resurrection of [another] member, and so on.

3. Likewise, reward corresponds to merit: therefore those who merited sooner ought to be rewarded sooner: therefore the better ought to rise sooner.

4. Likewise, there is a greater conformity on the part of souls than of bodies, on account of the bond of charity; but the glorification of one soul does not wait for the glorification of another: therefore, and so on.

### Conclusion

> *The resurrection of bodies will be simultaneous, not successive.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the resurrection of bodies will not be successive, but simultaneous; and of this there can be six fitting reasons.

The first is the *severity of the divine judgment,* which inflicted the punishment of reduction-to-ashes upon the body until the <!-- page 887 --> second coming of the Son of God, just as the punishment of the lack of the vision[^p887-1] [was inflicted] until the first coming. And the reason of this is that we were all simultaneously in one principle of sin.

The second reason is the *merit of faith,* which merits much in believing, that we be rewarded, who seem like the beasts in dying[^p887-2]; and if it saw that [glory] by experience, it would not have merit, because human reason would furnish itself with experimental proof.

The third reason is the *unity of the mystical body*: for because we are all *one body in Christ*[^p887-3], therefore it is necessary that as to some [degree of] glory we rise simultaneously; but not as to the glory of the soul, because there [i.e., in that case] there would be a very great loss and, as it were, unbearable: therefore [it is] as to the glory of the body.

The fourth reason is the *support of our infirmity*: because the Saints, while they desire their own bodies, more vehemently also desire our salvation; whence the Apostle says to the Hebrews, chapter eleven[^p887-4]: *God providing something better for us, that they should not be consummated without us.*

The fifth reason is the *manifestation of the divine justice*: because it must be known to all how great a justice condemns the wicked and saves the good; therefore he deferred the last distribution[^p887-5] until the very end, so that all might appear together.

The sixth and last reason is the *consummation of glory*: for because the Angels are still wayfarers as regards their administration, so long as men are living; and joy is always increasing according to the multitude of the elect; glory ought not to be perfectly consummated in anyone singly, until it should be consummated in all simultaneously.

**To the arguments of the opposed side:**

1. From these things the objections are clear. For the resurrection of bodies is not considered according to the resurrection of the soul. For the *first*[^p887-6] resurrection of the soul regards resurrection through grace, and this is on the way [in via]; and therefore [it is] successive. — Likewise, the glorification of the soul carries the substance of the reward, which, if it were deferred, there would be a great loss to the one waiting; not so concerning the body, because it does not much burden [one] to wait for the body, while the souls possess God.

2. To that which is objected concerning the resurrection of Christ, the response is clear: because neither does the severity of the judgment concur there, since the curse was not brought upon him; nor would it make for the merit of faith, but on the contrary it is an aid to faith[^p887-7].

3. To that which is objected, that reward corresponds to merit; it must be said that it is true with respect to place and time; and the *essential* reward is fitting to be rendered at once, but the *second stole*[^p887-8] must be waited for, until it be conferred with solemnity and magnificence and the glory of the giver.

4. To that which is objected, that there is a greater union and agreement of souls; it must be said that it is false, indeed [the union] is less, for the reason that all bodies were in one body, but not all souls in one soul[^p887-9].

---

la: Vers. 52.

la: Gen. 3, 19: *Quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris.* Cfr. Rom. 5, 12. seqq.

en: Gen. 3:19: "For dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Cf. Rom. 5:12 ff.

la: Cod. aa subiungit: *et hoc vult Glossa super Isai.* 30. [26.]: *Erit lux solis.* Vide Glossam *interlinearem* et *ordinariam* apud Strabum et Lyranum, quae est secundum Hieron. in hunc loc. — Pro *meliorari* codd. F G *remunerari* (cfr. infra d. 48. a. 2. q. I.).

en: Codex aa adds: "and this the Gloss on Isaiah 30 [26] intends: *There shall be the light of the sun.*" See the *interlinear* and *ordinary* Gloss in Strabo and Lyra, which follows Jerome on this passage. — For *meliorari* ["to be made better"] codices F G [read] *remunerari* ["to be rewarded"] (cf. below, d. 48, a. 2, q. 1).

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 11. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro *consummatam* plures codd. *confirmatam,* edd. *confirmatam vel consummatam.*

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 6, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 11, a. 2, q. 2. — For *consummatam* ["consummated"] many codices [read] *confirmatam* ["confirmed"], the editions *confirmatam vel consummatam.*

la: Supple: *quam quodlibet membrum.* Hoc arg. in codd. ponitur ultimo loco, sed solutio eius secundo.

en: Supply: "than any [single] member." This argument in the codices is placed last, but its solution second.

la: Codd. R S supplent *Dei* (cfr. III. Sent. d. 22. q. 6.). Inferius pro *peccati* edd. *peccante.*

en: Codices R S supply *Dei* ["of God"] (cf. III Sent., d. 22, q. 6). Below, for *peccati* ["of sin"] the editions [read] *peccante* ["sinning"].

la: Eccle. 3, 18. seqq.: *Dixi in corde meo de filiis hominum, ut probaret eos Deus et ostenderet similes esse bestiis. Idcirco unus interitus est hominis et iumentorum* etc. — Inferius respicitur verbum Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1: *Nec fides habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum.* — Pro *experimento* edd. *per experimentum homo.*

en: Eccles. 3:18 ff.: "I said in my heart concerning the sons of men, that God would prove them, and show them to be like beasts. Therefore the death of man and of beasts is one," etc. — Below, the word of Gregory is regarded, II Homilies on the Gospel, homily 26, n. 1: "Nor does faith have merit, for which human reason furnishes experimental proof." — For *experimento* the editions [read] *per experimentum homo.*

la: Rom. 12, 5. Cfr. I. Cor. 12, 12. seqq. — Inferius pro *importabile* Vat. *improportionabile.*

en: Rom. 12:5. Cf. 1 Cor. 12:12 ff. — Below, for *importabile* ["unbearable"] the Vatican [edition reads] *improportionabile* ["disproportionate"].

la: Vers. 40, ubi Vulgata *ut non* pro *ne.* Cfr. supra d. 21. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. ad 1. et 3.

en: Verse 40, where the Vulgate [reads] *ut non* ["that not"] for *ne* ["lest"]. Cf. above, d. 21, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 1 and 3.

la: Cod. G *retributionem,* Vat. *distributionem vel retributionem.*

en: Codex G [reads] *retributionem* ["recompense"], the Vatican [edition] *distributionem vel retributionem.*

la: Codd. F R S *primo* (glorificatio est resurrectio animae secunda). In fine solut. pro *tenent* edd. *timent.*

en: Codices F R S [read] *primo* ["first" adv.] (the glorification is the second resurrection of the soul). At the end of the solution, for *tenent* ["possess"] the editions [read] *timent* ["fear"].

la: De quo vide supra q. 1. in corp.

en: Concerning which, see above, q. 1, in the body [of the article].

la: Sive corporis, quae distinguitur a gloria animae sive stola prima. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 390, nota 4.

en: Or [the stole] of the body, which is distinguished from the glory of the soul, or the first stole. Cf. vol. III, p. 390, note 4.

la: Cod. aa addit: *quia non sunt ex traduce* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.). — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.

en: Codex aa adds: "because they are not by transmission [ex traduce]" (cf. II Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 31, a. 1, q. 1). — See the scholion to q. 1 of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the Internet Archive djvu OCR base (`bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, raw lines L94297–94416) and corrected against the 450 dpi column-band reads of printed pp. 886–887 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{886,887}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Left columns were re-cropped at split x=2120 and right columns at x=1620 because the default 1880 split clipped the outer edge of each column. Offset pdf = printed + 20. Two-column page, so the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF/band-priority in cascade-shattered regions) governs: the band reads are authoritative for the Respondeo, solutions, and every footer; the OCR base carried clean running prose and marker spacing.

**Page split.** Q3 opens mid-left-column of p.886 (immediately after the tail of the sibling a1-q2, whose replies 4–5 occupy the top of that column) at the centered heading QUAESTIO III. The four *fundamenta*, the four *Contra* arguments, the Conclusio, and the opening of the Respondeo (first *ratio*, down to "…usque ad adven-") sit on p.886. The page turns mid-sentence inside the first *ratio*; the `<!-- page 887 -->` break is placed at that point ("usque ad | adventum secundum Filii Dei"). Rationes 2–6 fill the p.887 left column; the four solutions (Ad 1–4) fill the upper p.887 right column, where Q3 ends at "…in una anima" — QUAESTIO IV begins immediately below on the same page (not part of this chunk). The running head on p.887 reads "DIST. XLIII. ART. I. QUAEST. IV." because Q4 opens on that page, but the top-of-page body is still Q3.

**p.886 footer hand-off (picked up).** The printed page 886 carries a two-column footer numbered 1–10 (Quaracchi restarts per printed page). Notes 1–5 anchor in the sibling a1-q2 body (its replies on the top of p.886) and were claimed by that chunk. Notes **6–10 anchor in this q3 body** and are claimed here as `[^p886-6]`–`[^p886-10]`: 6 = 1 Cor 15 v. 52 (*fundamentum* 1); 7 = Gen 3:19 / Rom 5:12 (*fund.* 2, "peccavimus in Adam"); 8 = the Isaiah 30/26 Gloss on the world made better (*fund.* 3, "homine facto immortali"); 9 = the II Sent. cross-refs on Angels' glory (*fund.* 4, "daemones poenam"); 10 = the "supple: quam quodlibet membrum" note on *Contra* 2 (Christus non exspectavit), with the editorial remark that this argument stands last in the codices but its solution second. Verified against the p.886 bottom bands.

**p.887 footers.** Page 887 restarts footer numbering. Notes **1–9 anchor in this q3 body** (the six rationes and four solutions) and are claimed as `[^p887-1]`–`[^p887-9]`. Notes 10 (Job 19:26 seq.) and 11 (Aristotle, *Topics* IV) anchor in QUAESTIO IV and are **not** claimed here.

**Editorial marginalia trimmed.** The p.887 right column prints the Quaracchi side-glosses "Solutio oppositorum." (at Ad 1) and "Notandum." (at Ad 3), and p.886 left prints "Fundamenta." and "Ad oppositum."; these are editorial marginal labels, not Bonaventure's text, and are omitted from the body per the corpus OCR-cleanup convention. The OCR line at the end of Ad 4 ("Jciog &\jf)Vvos((w") is bleed-through/hallucination noise from the smudged lower margin, not printed text, and is omitted.

**No scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. Article I's scholia are gathered elsewhere: the scholion covering the q1–q3 block lives in a1-q1, and the q4–q6 block in a1-q4 (cf. footer `[^p886-5]` "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." on the sibling, and `[^p887-9]` "Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.").

**No `[?]` flags** — all readings resolved against the bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum resurrectio sit eorundem secundum numerum

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers placed in both the Latin body above and the English translation. They are anchored page by page (page-qualified, in the form p-page-number followed by the note number), because the Quaracchi edition restarts its footer numbering on each printed page; in this question they run across pp. 887–891.

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### Articulus I.
### Quaestio IV. *Utrum resurrectio sit eorundem corporum secundum numerum.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum resurrectio sit eorundem secundum numerum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Iob decimo nono[^p887-10]: *In carne mea videbo Deum, Salvatorem meum, quem visurus sum ego ipse, et non alius*; constat, quod non dicit *alius* secundum speciem, sed secundum numerum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus[^p887-11]: «Si ex mortali fiat immortale, non dicimus, eum aliam vitam sumere»; ergo si non est alia vita, nec aliud vivens, ergo idem: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia identitas rei venit ab identitate principiorum substantialium; sed idem est principium materiale et idem formale: ergo idem homo qui prius.

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4. Item, «propria forma non est nata fieri nisi in propria materia[^p888-1]»: ergo cum anima sit propria forma corporis, quod perficit, non est nata uniri nisi illi: ergo si unitur in resurrectione, unitur eidem. Et si hoc; cum ipsa sit eadem, totum erit idem.

**Contra:**

1. «Omnis forma corrupta et iterum generata non est eadem numero, sed specie», sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo *de Generatione*[^p888-2]: cum ergo humanitas corrumpatur in isto in morte et iterum generetur in resurrectione, ergo alia numero. Si tu dicas, quod istud tenet in corruptione, quae est in contrarium, non in morte; contra: maior est corruptio in privationem quam in contrarium, quia ad hoc, quod fiat reparatio, necesse est fieri resolutionem usque ad ultima, et omnia rursus de novo generari[^p888-3]: ergo etc.

2. Item, quamvis artifex de eadem materia iterum faciat statuam, tamen alia est statua post quam ante: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod quamvis homo sit ex eisdem pulveribus, tamen est alius. Si dicas, quod Deus potest facere plus quam natura vel artifex; verum est, quod plus potest, tamen non facit, nisi quod congruit et congruum est; nec est intelligibile, quomodo aliquid corrumpatur et cedat in non-ens, et iterum fiat, quod sit idem[^p888-4]; aut si est congruum, quare non dat istam potentiam naturae?

3. Item, differentiae essentiales rem diversificant non tantum numero, sed etiam essentia[^p888-5]; sed *mortale* et *immortale* sunt essentiales differentiae: ergo cum resurgens sit immortalis et ante mortalis, patet etc.

4. Item, prima generatio et reformatio sunt operationes diversae: ergo si diversarum operationum diversi sunt termini secundum substantiam, aliud est corpus, quod primo generatur, aliud corpus, quod postmodum reformatur.

> **Conclusio.** Resurrectio est eiusdem secundum numerum corporis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa senserunt.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod triplex est diversitas secundum numerum: *una*, quae venit ex diversitate partis materiae et formae specificatae[^p888-6], sicut differt numero haec aqua et hic ignis; *quaedam*, quae venit ex diversitate partis materiae, sicut iste ignis ab illo differt; *tertia*, quae venit ex discontinuatione in duratione; et haec diversitas secundum numerum ortum habet, ut dicunt, ex tempore[^p888-7]; tempus enim durationem numerat, sicut et actionem. *Prima* diversitas secundum numerum est magna, *secunda* minor, *tertia* minima. *Prima* et *secunda* diversitate carebit corpus resurgens, sed *tertia* non carebit nec potest carere, quia propositio de praeterito non potest non esse vera[^p888-8]. Unde sicut virgo corrupta non potest fieri virgo — quia non potest non fuisse corrupta — nec a Deo nec a natura, nec hoc est intelligibile; sic corpus corruptum non potest omnimoda identitate reparari idem, quia non potest non fuisse corruptum. Tamen haec est ita modica diversitas, ut non mereatur aliquid propter hoc dici *diversum*, quoniam idem est secundum alium duplicem modum identitatis, scilicet propter identitatem *materiae* et *formae*, quia identitas materiae et principalis formae erit in resurgentibus. Hinc est, quod resurrectio est in eisdem[^p888-9]. Quod ergo dicit Philosophus, quod «forma corrupta et iterum generata est alia numero»; intelligit de ista diversitate.

Sed istud non videtur multum rationabile: primum quidem, quia stultum videtur dicere, quod Deus non possit omnino idem corpus reformare identitate secundum numerum. — *Amplius*, *identitas* secundum numerum in substantia non venit ex accidentibus, licet per illa innotescat[^p888-10], nec etiam *diversitas*. — Et *iterum*, quod discontinuatio in *esse* non inducat diversitatem in numero, videtur expresse in artificiatis, ut si arca dissolvatur et iterum ex eisdem tabulis et secundum eundem ordinem reparetur; non dicetur alia arca numero, sed eadem; et tamen desiit esse arca.

Et propter hoc dicunt alii aliter, quod duplex est corruptio: quaedam per *dissolutionem* sive separationem *principiorum componentium* sive partium; quaedam per *corruptionem formae*. In *prima*

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possibile est, idem numero reparari ei qui scit ad eundem modum et ad eadem loca reducere. In *secunda* — quia quod corruptum est non potest esse idem, quoniam nova est essentia formae, sicut[^p889-1] de novo generatur — dicunt quod necessario oportet esse aliud; et de hac intelligit Philosophus. Separatio et dissolutio corporis humani est quantum ad *primum* modum; ideo reparatur idem, sicut artificiatum, quia, salva anima et corpore, fit separatio unius ab alio, et post, salvis partibus materiae, fit incineratio; et Deus sicut bonus artifex cineres colligit et unit et reformat idem corpus: et quoniam illud corpus habet eandem perfectionem, ideo totum consummatum est idem.

Sed istud non solvit sufficienter. Certum est enim, quod forma carnis humanae *corrumpitur*, dum generatur inde vermis et serpens; et sicut potest corrumpi in carnem serpentis vel alterius animalis, sic resolvi potest, sicut et illud animal, etiam in quatuor elementa, et unumquodque elementorum corrumpi in aliud, et ita corrumpuntur formae mixti et elementi: ergo necesse est, elementa alia esse numero et aliam carnem. Et ita non potest stare ista responsio.

Et propterea notandum, quod est resurrectio eiusdem numero, quia aliter non esset resurrectio. — Si quaeras a me, quomodo hoc esse possit; dico, quod hoc potest esse per *virtutem divinam*, quamvis non possit esse *per naturam*; et istud intelligere possumus sic.

Supponamus nunc, quod natura aliquid agit, et illud non agit ex nihilo; et cum agat in materiam, oportet, quod producat formam; et cum materia non sit pars formae, nec forma fiat pars materiae, necesse est, aliquo modo formas naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et substantia materiae praegnans est omnibus: ergo rationes seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa. Sed ad illud *stat resolutio*, a quo *incipit generatio*: ergo nulla forma omnino corrumpitur, sed manet in materia, sicut antequam produceretur. Et sic dicit Augustinus[^p889-2]; unde formas in materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad *rationes seminales*. Dicit etiam, *resolvi ad materiam*, sicut ad occultissimos sinus naturae, idem utroque nomine secundum alteram et alteram rationem intelligi volens. Quid autem haec sint, alibi melius patet, scilicet *in secundo*[^p889-3]. Nunc autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod omnes formae, cum corrumpuntur, non omnino corrumpuntur, sed manent aliquo modo. Et huic concordat ratio et auctoritas philosophica et auctoritas beati Augustini[^p889-4], et quod maius est, auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae est auctoritas Spiritus sancti.

Hoc praesupposito, dicendum, quod quamvis forma ibi sit aliquo modo post corruptionem, tamen natura non potest producere ad idem esse, quod habuit prius. — Et ratio huius est: quia agens naturale agit influendo et impertiendo aliquid sui, quo mediante perficit illud quod erat in materia; et illud quod influitur a parte agentis, fit aliquid de completo esse ipsius producti: et ideo necesse est, quod natura det aliquid *novi* quantum ad *modum essendi substantialem*, qui est *esse*[^p889-5] in actu. Quamvis enim natura non det novam *essentiam*, dat tamen novum *modum essendi*, non tantum *accidentalem*, immo etiam *substantialem*, sicut *esse in actu*, secundum quem potest res substantialiter numerari et diversificari. Et propterea natura, cum reparat, non *idem*, sed *novum* producit; sed Deus, qui potest ipsas rationes seminales sine immissione alicuius novi ad perfectum esse deducere, potest facere, quod sit idem. Et sic facit in proposito, quia ex illis solis et per eundem ordinem in reformatione rem constituit, ex quibus erat ante. Unde si omnia elementa convertantur in ignem, Deus ex illo igne reformat eadem elementa, quae ibi erant in rationibus seminalibus, et ex illis formam carnis per eundem ordinem. Et sic patet, quod Deus potest reformare idem corpus secundum numerum; et sic potest dici ad praesens.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1 et 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo et secundo, iam patet responsio: quia, quamvis istud sit impossibile agenti *inferiori*, est tamen possibile agenti *superiori*, scilicet ipsi Deo. — Et quare istam potentiam non communicat Deus creaturae, patet: quia nulla creatura agit se ipsa[^p889-6], sed per aliquid sui, immittendo virtutem, sicut et color ad hoc, quod immutet visum, facit speciem sui in medio: unde agit aliquid extrinsecum in intrinseco; non sic Deus. Hoc autem dico de operatione naturali.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *mortali* et *immortali*, dicendum, quod quidquid sit de mortali, utrum sit differentia, an non — quia non est praesentis considerationis, cum rationes ad utramque partem sint, quia videtur dicere defectum et imperfectionem et non habet differentiam in eodem genere condividentem, et alia plura[^p889-7] — tamen hoc absque calumnia verum est, quod *mortale* tripliciter accipitur: uno modo dicit naturalem *aptitudinem* ad

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moriendum; alio modo, *possibilitatem* ad moriendum; tertio modo, *necessitatem*. Et primo quidem modo *mortale* inest homini ea ratione, qua compositum ex partibus heterogeneis. Unde Hilarius[^p890-1]: «Non ex compositis est Deus, quia vita est»: si ergo homo est ex *compositis heterogeneis* et *diversis naturis* et dispositionibus; impossibile est, quod vitam habeat nisi cum *aptitudine* ad moriendum; et sicut talis *compositio* est homini naturalis, ita et *mortale*. Et hoc modo accipiendo *mortale* contra *immortale*, nunquam concurrunt in idem; sic[^p890-2] nec spirituale aut simplex et compositum. Et si aliquo modo est differentia, isto modo est non dividens *animal*, sed *substantiam viventem*, cuius una differentia est *immortale*, et per oppositum *mortale*. — Secundo modo *mortale* inest eo modo, quo est quid compositum ex *partibus heterogeneis*, habentibus defectibilitatem, sicut in primo homine, qui habebat statum animalem; et hoc modo dicit statum *medium* inter miseriam et gloriam[^p890-3]. — Tertio modo *mortale* inest ea ratione, qua vivens est compositum ex *contrariis*, habentibus defectibilitatem et pugnam ad invicem; et sic inest homini lapso, et hoc modo dicit *statum miseriae*; et *immortale* huic[^p890-4] oppositum dicit *alium statum*. Et quoniam *status* mutari potest, unitate secundum numerum remanente; hinc est, quod ex *mortali* secundum hunc duplicem modum fit *immortale* sine diversitate substantiae. Et hoc modo fit in homine glorificato, qui est *mortalis* primo modo, scilicet secundum naturalem aptitudinem, sed *immortalis*, prout dicit privationem potentiae et necessitatis.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod diversae sunt operationes; dicendum, quod diversae operationes diversos effectus inducunt, quando dividuntur ex aequo; sed quando sic est, quod una ad alteram *ordinatur*, et una est *reparativa* effectus alterius; si secunda egrediatur ab agente omnino potente, potest omnino idem reparari. Et sic est in proposito.

Sed *obiicitur*: quomodo potest hoc intelligi? Cum istae operationes sint discontinuae, et *esse* rei sit discontinuum[^p890-5], et unius continui duo sint ultima tantum: si ergo *esse* discontinuatur, ergo est aliud et aliud. Cum ergo unum numero consequatur idem actuale; necessario videtur sequi, quod sit aliud et aliud. Et *iterum*, quomodo potest bis *incipere* aliquid et esse idem? Impossibile enim est esse et intelligere, quod aliquis currat bis eodem cursu. — Et potest ad hoc responderi, quod de *esse rei* est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad *defluxum et durationem*, aut *secundum se*. Si quantum ad *durationem et defluxum*; sic necessario oportet, quod duratio sit alia et alia, sicut mensura durationis. Si quantum ad ipsum *esse secundum se*; sic numeratur et plurificatur a *principiis permanentibus*; et quoniam principia permanentia sunt eadem, quamvis defluxus durationis et inceptio sit alia et alia: hinc est, quod res est una, et esse rei est unum. — Nec est simile de *actionibus successivis*, quia illae necessario[^p890-6] numerantur, et praeteritum et futurum respiciunt partes diversas actionis sive mutationis sive durationis successivae. Non sic oportet iudicare de *forma absoluta*, quae corrupta potest a Deo numerari eadem, quia aliquo modo manet in ratione seminali.

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### Article I.
### Question IV. *Whether the resurrection will be of the same bodies according to number.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether the resurrection will be of the same [bodies] according to number. And that it will, seems [to be shown].

1. Job, chapter nineteen[^p887-10]: *In my flesh I shall see God, my Saviour, whom I myself shall see, and not another*; it is clear that he does not say *another* according to species, but according to number: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher[^p887-11]: "If from a mortal thing an immortal one should come to be, we do not say that it takes on another life"; therefore if there is not another life, neither is there another living thing, therefore [it is] the same: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: because the identity of a thing comes from the identity of its substantial principles; but the material principle is the same and the formal principle is the same: therefore [it is] the same man as before.

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4. Likewise, "a proper form is not naturally apt to come to be except in its proper matter[^p888-1]": therefore, since the soul is the proper form of the body which it perfects, it is not naturally apt to be united except to that [body]: therefore if it is united in the resurrection, it is united to the same [body]. And if this is so; since it [the soul] is the same, the whole will be the same.

**On the contrary:**

1. "Every form that is corrupted and again generated is not the same according to number, but according to species," as the Philosopher says in the second book *On Generation*[^p888-2]: since therefore humanity is corrupted in this [man] in death and again generated in the resurrection, therefore [it is] another according to number. If you should say that this holds in the corruption which is into a contrary, not in death; on the contrary: corruption into privation is greater than into a contrary, because in order that reparation be made, it is necessary that a resolution be made down to the ultimate [elements], and that all things be again generated anew[^p888-3]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, although a craftsman may make a statue again from the same matter, still the statue is other after than before: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that, although a man be [made] from the same dust, still he is another. If you should say that God can do more than nature or a craftsman; it is true that He can do more, yet He does not do so, except what is fitting and is congruous; nor is it intelligible how something should be corrupted and pass into non-being, and again come to be, such that it is the same[^p888-4]; or if it is congruous, why does He not give this power to nature?

3. Likewise, essential differences diversify a thing not only according to number, but also according to essence[^p888-5]; but *mortal* and *immortal* are essential differences: therefore, since the one who rises is immortal and before was mortal, it is evident etc.

4. Likewise, the first generation and the reformation are diverse operations: therefore if the termini of diverse operations are diverse according to substance, the body which is first generated is one thing, and the body which is afterward reformed is another.

> **Conclusion.** The resurrection is of the same body according to number.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this diverse men have held diverse [views].

For some have said that there is a threefold diversity according to number: *one*, which comes from the diversity of a part of the matter and of the specified form[^p888-6], as this water and this fire differ in number; *another*, which comes from the diversity of a part of the matter, as this fire differs from that; a *third*, which comes from discontinuity in duration; and this diversity according to number has its origin, as they say, from time[^p888-7]; for time numbers duration, just as it does action. The *first* diversity according to number is great, the *second* less, the *third* least. Of the *first* and *second* diversity the rising body will be free, but of the *third* it will not be free nor can it be free, because a proposition about the past cannot fail to be true[^p888-8]. Hence, just as a corrupted virgin cannot become a virgin — because she cannot not have been corrupted — neither by God nor by nature, nor is this intelligible; so a corrupted body cannot be repaired as the same by an identity in every respect, because it cannot not have been corrupted. Yet this is so slight a diversity that it does not merit being called *diverse* on this account, since it is the same according to another twofold mode of identity, namely on account of the identity of *matter* and *form*, because the identity of the matter and of the principal form will be in those who rise. Hence it is that the resurrection is of the same [bodies][^p888-9]. What therefore the Philosopher says, that "a form corrupted and again generated is another according to number," he understands of this [third] diversity.

But this does not seem very reasonable: first indeed, because it seems foolish to say that God could not reform the entirely same body by an identity according to number. — *Further*, *identity* according to number in substance does not come from accidents, although it is made known through them[^p888-10], nor does *diversity* [either]. — And *again*, that discontinuity in *being* does not induce diversity in number is seen expressly in artificial things, as if a chest be dissolved and again be repaired from the same boards and according to the same order; it will not be called another chest according to number, but the same; and yet it ceased to be a chest.

And on account of this others say otherwise, that corruption is twofold: one by *dissolution* or separation of the *component principles* or parts; another by the *corruption of the form*. In the *first*

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it is possible that the same [thing] be repaired according to number by one who knows how to reduce [it] to the same mode and to the same places. In the *second* — because what is corrupted cannot be the same, since the essence of the form is new, as[^p889-1] it is generated anew — they say that of necessity it must be another; and of this the Philosopher understands. The separation and dissolution of the human body is according to the *first* mode; therefore it is repaired as the same, like an artifact, because, the soul and the body being preserved, there occurs a separation of the one from the other, and afterward, the parts of the matter being preserved, incineration occurs; and God, like a good craftsman, gathers and unites the ashes and reforms the same body: and since that body has the same perfection, therefore the whole consummated [body] is the same.

But this does not resolve [it] sufficiently. For it is certain that the form of human flesh *is corrupted* while a worm and a serpent are generated from it; and just as it can be corrupted into the flesh of a serpent or of another animal, so it can be resolved, like that animal too, even into the four elements, and each of the elements be corrupted into another, and thus the forms of the mixture and of the element are corrupted: therefore it is necessary that the elements be other according to number and [that there be] another flesh. And thus this response cannot stand.

And therefore it must be noted that the resurrection is of the same [body] according to number, because otherwise it would not be a resurrection. — If you should ask me how this can be; I say that this can be by *divine power*, although it cannot be *by nature*; and this we can understand thus.

Let us now suppose that nature does something, and does it not from nothing; and since it acts upon matter, it is necessary that it produce a form; and since matter is not a part of the form, nor does form become a part of matter, it is necessary that in some way natural forms be in the matter before they are produced; and the substance of matter is pregnant with all [forms]: therefore the seminal reasons of all forms are in it. But at that [point] *resolution stops*, from which *generation begins*: therefore no form is entirely corrupted, but remains in the matter, just as before it was produced. And thus says Augustine[^p889-2]; whence he says that the forms are in the matter before their production as regards their *seminal reasons*. He says also that they *are resolved into the matter*, as into the most hidden recesses of nature, meaning the same [thing] to be understood by each name according to one and another respect. But what these [seminal reasons] are is better shown elsewhere, namely *in the second book*[^p889-3]. Now let it suffice to have said this, that all forms, when they are corrupted, are not entirely corrupted, but remain in some way. And with this agrees reason and philosophical authority and the authority of blessed Augustine[^p889-4], and what is greater, the authority of sacred Scripture, which is the authority of the Holy Spirit.

This being presupposed, it must be said that although the form be there in some way after corruption, still nature cannot produce [it] to the same *being* which it had before. — And the reason for this is: because a natural agent acts by influencing and imparting something of itself, by the mediation of which it perfects that which was in the matter; and that which is influenced from the side of the agent becomes something belonging to the complete being of the product itself: and therefore it is necessary that nature give something *new* as regards the *substantial mode of being*, which is *being*[^p889-5] in act. For although nature does not give a new *essence*, it does give a new *mode of being*, not only *accidental*, but even *substantial*, like *being in act*, according to which a thing can be substantially numbered and diversified. And therefore nature, when it repairs, produces not the *same*, but a *new* [thing]; but God, who can bring the very seminal reasons to perfect being without the introduction of anything new, can make [it] to be the same. And so He does in the case at hand, because from those [elements] alone and by the same order He constitutes the thing in the reformation, from which it was before. Hence if all the elements be converted into fire, God from that fire reforms the same elements, which were there in the seminal reasons, and from them the form of flesh by the same order. And thus it is evident that God can reform the same body according to number; and so it can be said for the present.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* To that then which is objected first and second, the response is now evident: because, although this be impossible for a *lower* agent, still it is possible for a *higher* agent, namely God Himself. — And why God does not communicate this power to the creature is evident: because no creature acts by itself[^p889-6], but through something of itself, sending forth a power, as color too, in order to alter the sight, makes a likeness of itself in the medium: whence it acts as something extrinsic within something intrinsic; not so God. And this I say of natural operation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the *mortal* and the *immortal*, it must be said that whatever be [the case] concerning "mortal," whether it be a difference or not — because it is not of the present consideration, since there are reasons for either side, because it seems to signify a defect and imperfection and does not have a difference in the same genus co-dividing [it], and many other things[^p889-7] — nevertheless this is true without calumny, that *mortal* is taken in three ways: in one way it signifies a natural *aptitude* toward

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dying; in another way, the *possibility* of dying; in a third way, *necessity*. And in the first way indeed *mortal* is present in man by that reason by which [he is] composed of heterogeneous parts. Whence Hilary[^p890-1]: "God is not from composite things, since He is life": if therefore man is [composed] of *heterogeneous composites* and *diverse natures* and dispositions; it is impossible that he have life except with an *aptitude* toward dying; and just as such *composition* is natural to man, so also is *mortal[ity]*. And taking *mortal* in this way against *immortal*, they never coincide in the same [subject]; so[^p890-2] neither the spiritual nor the simple and the composite. And if in some way it is a difference, in this way it is not one dividing *animal*, but *the living substance*, of which one difference is *immortal*, and by opposite *mortal*. — In the second way *mortal* is present in the manner in which something is composite of *heterogeneous parts* having defectibility, as in the first man, who had the animal state; and in this way it signifies the state *midway* between misery and glory[^p890-3]. — In the third way *mortal* is present by that reason by which a living thing is composite of *contraries* having defectibility and a struggle against one another; and thus it is present in fallen man, and in this way it signifies the *state of misery*; and *immortal*, opposed to this[^p890-4], signifies *another state*. And since the *state* can be changed, the unity according to number remaining; hence it is that from *mortal*, according to this twofold mode, comes to be *immortal* without a diversity of substance. And in this way it comes about in the glorified man, who is *mortal* in the first way, namely according to natural aptitude, but *immortal*, inasmuch as it signifies the privation of the potency and the necessity [of dying].

*To 4.* To that which is objected lastly, that the operations are diverse; it must be said that diverse operations induce diverse effects when they are divided on an equal footing; but when it is so, that one is *ordered* to the other, and one is *reparative* of the effect of the other; if the second proceed from an agent entirely powerful, the entirely same [thing] can be repaired. And so it is in the case at hand.

But it is *objected*: how can this be understood? Since these operations are discontinuous, and the *being* of the thing is discontinuous[^p890-5], and of one continuum there are only two ultimate [points]: if therefore *being* is discontinuous, then it is one and another. Since therefore what is one in number follows the same actual [being]; it seems necessarily to follow that it is one and another. And *again*, how can something *begin* twice and be the same? For it is impossible to be and to understand that someone should run twice the same course. — And it can be responded to this that concerning the *being of a thing* one may speak in two ways: either as regards *its flowing-forth and duration*, or *in itself*. If as regards *duration and flowing-forth*; thus it necessarily follows that the duration be one and another, like the measure of duration. If as regards the *being in itself*; thus it is numbered and multiplied by the *permanent principles*; and since the permanent principles are the same, although the flowing-forth of duration and the beginning be one and another: hence it is that the thing is one, and the being of the thing is one. — Nor is it similar concerning *successive actions*, because those are necessarily[^p890-6] numbered, and the past and the future regard diverse parts of the action or change or successive duration. It is not so that one ought to judge concerning an *absolute form*, which, once corrupted, can be numbered as the same by God, because in some way it remains in the seminal reason.

la: Vers. 26. seq. Vulgata omittit *Salvatorem*, et post *ipse* addit: *et oculi mei conspecturi sunt.*

en: [Job 19,] vv. 26f. The Vulgate omits *Salvatorem* ("my Saviour"), and after *ipse* ("I myself") adds: *et oculi mei conspecturi sunt* ("and my eyes shall behold [him]").

la: Libr. IV. *Top.* c. 5: *Quandoque autem peccant, et passionem* [i. e. proprietatem] *in genere eius quod passum est, ponentes, ut immortalitatem vitam sempiternam dicentes esse; passio enim vitae et accidens immortalitas videtur esse. Quod autem verum sit quod dicitur, manifestum fit, si quis admittat, aliquem ex mortali fieri immortalem; nullus enim dicit, aliam vitam eum sumere, sed accidens aliquod vel passionem huic eidem advenire* etc. — Edd. omittunt *sumere... alia vita.*

en: *Topics* Book IV, c. 5: "But sometimes they err, placing the affection [i.e. the property] in the genus of that which is affected, as when, calling immortality an everlasting life, they say that immortality is a life; for immortality seems to be an affection or accident of life. That what is said is true becomes manifest if one grants that someone becomes immortal from being mortal; for no one says that he takes on another life, but that some accident or affection befalls this same [subject]," etc. The editions omit *sumere... alia vita* ("takes on... another life").

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 26. (c. 2.): *Uniuscuiusque enim actus in eo, quod potentia existit et in propria materia, aptus natura est fieri.* — Seq. propos. insinuatur ibid. text. 4. seqq. (c. 1.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 26 (c. 2): "For the actuality of each thing is naturally apt to come to be in that which exists in potency and in its proper matter." The following proposition is suggested ibid., text 4ff. (c. 1).

en: Text 70 (c. 11). Cf. *Physics* V, text 36 (c. 4).

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis.* Vide supra pag. 339, nota 1. — Pro *et omnia* cod. H *et omnino.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. *On Opposites.* See above, p. 339, note 1. For *et omnia* codex H reads *et omnino.*

la: Vide supra pag. 575, nota 1. verba Avicennae.

en: See above, p. 575, note 1, the words of Avicenna.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Differentia.* — Cod. F *specie.*

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, ch. *On Difference.* Codex F reads *specie.*

la: Vat. *specificae.* Inferius vocibus *in duratione* edd. interserunt *partium.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *specificae.* Below, into the words *in duratione* the editions insert *partium.*

la: Aristot., V. *Phys.* text. 34. seq. (c. 4.), ad unitatem numericam motus tria necesse esse docet, scilicet quod unum sit id quod movetur, quod unum sit in quo movetur et quod unum sit quando movetur, nempe tempus sit unum et non intermittatur. Ibid. IV. text. 108. seqq. (c. 12.) dicit, tempus esse numerum et mensuram motus rerum mobilium. — Mox pro *numerat*, quod codd. R S W bb (E P a secunda manu) habent, codd. O U aa *mensurat*, edd. *habet*; in pluribus codd. omittitur.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 34f. (c. 4), teaches that three things are necessary for the numerical unity of a motion, namely that there be one thing which is moved, one [medium] in which it is moved, and one [time] when it is moved, that is, that the time be one and not interrupted. Ibid., Book IV, text 108ff. (c. 12), he says that time is the number and measure of the motion of movable things. Presently, for *numerat* ("numbers"), which codices R S W bb (E P by a second hand) have, codices O U aa read *mensurat* ("measures"), the editions *habet* ("has"); in several codices it is omitted.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3, ubi etiam habetur dictum Hieronymi: *Cum omnia possit Deus, suscitare virginem non potest post ruinam.*

en: See I Sent., d. 42, q. 3, where the saying of Jerome is also found: "Although God can do all things, He cannot raise up a virgin after her ruin."

la: Codd. aa bb et ed. 1 *est eiusdem.*

en: Codices aa bb and ed. 1 read *est eiusdem* ("is of the same").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 272, nota 3. — Pro *secundum numerum* hic et in fine corp. multi codd. et ed. 1 *secundum materiam* et *per illam* pro *per illa.* Subinde post *discontinuatio* codd. omittunt *in*, ed. 1 insuper *esse.*

en: Cf. above, p. 272, note 3. For *secundum numerum* ("according to number"), here and at the end of the corpus, many codices and ed. 1 read *secundum materiam* ("according to matter"), and *per illam* for *per illa.* Thereupon, after *discontinuatio*, the codices omit *in*, ed. 1 [omits] moreover *esse.*

la: Edd. *sic.* Mox ex cod. L posuimus *Separatio* pro *Beparatio.*

en: The editions read *sic* ("thus"). Presently, from codex L we have printed *Separatio* for *Reparatio.*

la: Libr. III. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 13. et c. 9. n. 16; III. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 14. n. 23; V. c. 23. n. 44; VI. c. 14. n. 25. seqq. et IX. c. 17. n. 31. seqq.; *Enarrat. in Ps.* 78. n. 5. — Paulo ante pro *sicut* cod. O *in qua fuit*, edd. legunt: *in materia post corruptionem, sicut manebat, antequam* etc.

en: *On the Trinity* Book III, c. 8, n. 13 and c. 9, n. 16; *On Genesis according to the Letter* III, c. 14, n. 23; V, c. 23, n. 44; VI, c. 14, n. 25ff. and IX, c. 17, n. 31ff.; *Expositions of the Psalms* 78, n. 5. A little earlier, for *sicut* ("just as"), codex O [reads] *in qua fuit*; the editions read: *in materia post corruptionem, sicut manebat, antequam* ("in the matter after corruption, just as it remained, before"), etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 232, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 232, note 1.

la: Codd. G H K Y et ed. 1 addunt *et.* Superius pro *perficit* non pauci codd. et ed. 1 *proficit*, cod. bb a secunda manu *producit.*

en: Codices G H K Y and ed. 1 add *et* ("and"). Above, for *perficit* ("perfects"), not a few codices and ed. 1 read *proficit* ("advances"), codex bb by a second hand *producit* ("produces").

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. — De seq. exemplo coloris cfr. Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 74. (c. 7.), et *de Sensu et sens.* c. 2. seq. — Inferius post *unde agit* Vat. addit *per* et pro *intrinseco* cum ed. 1 substituit *extrinseco.*

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the corpus. — Concerning the following example of color cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 74 (c. 7), and *On Sense and the Sensible* c. 2f. — Below, after *unde agit* the Vatican edition adds *per*, and for *intrinseco* it substitutes, with ed. 1, *extrinseco.*

la: Vide Avicennam, Logic. p. I. c. *de Differentia*, ubi privationes excludit de differentiis; B. Albert., Comment. in *Praedicab.* tr. 5. c. 3.

en: See Avicenna, Logic, p. I, ch. *On Difference*, where he excludes privations from the differences; Bl. Albert, Commentary on the *Predicables*, tr. 5, c. 3.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* n. 27: *Non enim ex compositis atque inanimis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit.* — Vocibus *qua compositum* Vat. interserit *est aliquid.* Inferius pro *nisi cum* cod. G *sine.*

en: *On the Trinity* Book VII, n. 27: "For God, who is life, does not subsist from composite and inanimate things." — Between the words *qua compositum* the Vatican edition inserts *est aliquid.* Below, for *nisi cum* codex G reads *sine.*

la: Cod. aa *sicut.* Mox post *spirituale* cod. bb bene addit *et corporale.*

en: Codex aa reads *sicut.* Presently, after *spirituale* codex bb rightly adds *et corporale* ("and the corporeal").

la: Ita codd. F I K, in aliis et edd. *his.*

en: So codices F I K; in the others and the editions *his* ("to these").

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. *continuum*, et inferius *esse actuale* pro *idem actuale.*

en: The Vatican edition, with a few codices, [reads] *continuum* ("continuous"), and below *esse actuale* for *idem actuale.*

la: Supple cum cod. Y *tempore.* In fine solut. pro *numerari* cod. K *reparari*, Vat. *iterari.*

en: Supply, with codex Y, *tempore* ("time"). At the end of the solution, for *numerari* ("to be numbered") codex K reads *reparari* ("to be repaired"), the Vatican edition *iterari* ("to be repeated"). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** «Omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus *suis*» (i. e. iisdem secundum numerum); ita docet Symbolum Athanasianum; quod confirmat Symbolum Concilii Toletani XI. (an. 675) dicens: «Nec in aerea, vel qualibet alia carne (ut quidam delirant) resurrecturos nos credimus, sed in ista qua vivimus, consistimus et movemur». Hoc unanimiter tenentes, Scholastici tantum quoad explicationem scientificam in aliquibus contrarias opiniones in medium protulerunt, quae fere ex diversis principiis ad naturalem philosophiam spectantibus exortae sunt. Primo occurrebat difficultas orta ex auctoritate Aristotelis, qui pluribus locis docere videtur (cfr. arg. 1. ad oppos.), quod illa quorum forma corrupta et iterum generata fuerit, non possint redire eadem secundum numerum. Circa hoc pauca notamus.

**1.** Duae opiniones extremae circa *possibilitatem* huiusmodi restitutionis prolatae sunt; quarum prima docuit, etiam *agens naturale* posse rem corruptam *eandem* numero reparare. Ex opposito Durand. (hic q. 3.) docuit (cum quadam tamen cautela), intrinsecus impossibile esse, ut entia corrupta redirent *eadem* numero; et hoc in genere de omnibus entibus asseruit, non tantum de *successivis* (quod communius conceditur), sed etiam de *permanentibus*. Pro hac sententia citat etiam plures locos S. Thomae, praesertim IV. Sent. d. 44. q. I. a. I. quaestiunc. 2. ad 3. Hinc putat, resurrectionem *hominis* non esse possibilem nisi in suppositione, quod in homine non sit *alia* forma quam anima rationalis, quae nunquam corrumpitur, utpote *immortalis*; et per consequens, talem resurrectionem bestiarum, corrupta earum forma, per se esse impossibilem. Eadem principia tenet opinio 2. hic in corp. relata. Attamen sententia communis principium illud Durandi reiicit (cfr. Henr. Gand., Quodl. 7. q. 16.).

**2.** S. Thom. *factum* quidem resurrectionis cum Durando hac ratione explicat, quod «nullum principiorum essentialium hominis per mortem omnino cedat in nihilum» (S. c. Gent. IV. c. 81.), manente scilicet tum forma *unica*, quae est anima

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rationalis, tum materia. In hoc autem a Durando recedit, quod minime negat, possibile esse Deo, ut entia, saltem permanentia, postquam corrupta sint, eadem numero reparet; quod clare resultat ex cit. loco. Quoad entia *successiva* vero, «quorum unitas in sui ratione habet durationis continuitatem, sicut patet in motu et tempore», dicit, quod «interruptio talium indirecte contrariatur unitati eorum secundum numerum». Idem concedit (Quodl. IV. q. 3. a. 5.), quod «Deus ea non potest eadem numero reparare». In hoc consentit S. Bonav., hic q. I. ad 4.

**3.** Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 2. seqq.), cum praeter animam rationalem ex parte corporis ponat formam *corporeitatis* in morte corrumpendam, explicare debet hanc difficultatem, quae ex parte formae talis morte corruptae et iterum alia transmutatione de potentia materiae educendae occurrit; qualis restitutio agenti naturali certo est impossibilis. Hinc ille totus est in eo, ut principium a Durando positum evertat et *Deo* soli hoc possibile esse demonstret. Idem etiam putat, non apparere repugnantiam, quin Deus etiam *successiva* reproducat eadem; quae sententia etiam extra scholam Scoti pluribus posterioribus placuit.

**II.** His visis, apparet, quomodo sententia S. Bonaventurae differat a praedictis. Ipse enim docet: *primo*, quod sub una perfectione sive forma *proprie substantiali* sint ex parte corporis aliae formae subordinatae et corruptibiles; *secundo*, ipse solvit difficultates recurrendo ad rationes seminales. Quoad *primum* hic affirmat, quod «forma carnis» et formae «mixti et elementorum» corrumpuntur; atque quoad *secundum*, quod «nulla forma *omnino* corrumpitur, sed manet in materia» post corruptionem, sicut erat, antequam produceretur, scil. in rationibus seminalibus. — Respectu *pluralitatis formarum* aliter docet ac S. Thomas, nec etiam cum Scoto convenit quoad extensionem huius principii, cum Scotus cum anima solam formam *corporeitatis* admittat. De hoc principio S. Bonaventurae cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. I. q. 3. et scholion, d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. et praecipue scholion, d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. I, d. 15. a. I. q. 2, d. 17. a. I. q. 2. ad 6. et a. 2. q. 2; cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. I. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2. 3; III. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. q. 1; IV. Sent. d. 11. p. I. dub. 4, d. 49. p. II. sect. 2. a. 1. q. I. — De rationibus seminalibus cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. I. q. 2. et 3; IV. Sent. d. 12. p. I. a. 2. q. I, ubi in scholiis plura de hac antiquorum Scholasticorum opinione relata sunt. Eaedem rationes seminales adhibentur infra q. 5. ad 6. et d. 44. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Iam observavimus, hanc praeexistentiam rerum in rationibus seminalibus quoad *essentiam*, non quoad *existentiam propriam et completam*, quam S. Doctor tanquam magis probabilem posuit, a posterioribus Scholasticis fere communiter fuisse improbatam, eamque esse explicatu satis difficilem. Quodsi haec doctrina posset probari, non tantum dogma resurrectionis, sed alia etiam mysteria scientiae naturalis non parum illustrarentur. — Petr. a Tar. in hac quaestione consentit S. Bonav. et recurrit (hic a. 7. praesertim ad 11.) ad rationes seminales, «in quibus forma mixtionis manet, et ex quibus virtute divina eadem numero reparatur».

**III.** De hac 4. quaestione praeter loca citt.: S. Thom., infra d. 44. q. I. a. 1; Suppl. q. 79. a. 1-3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 7. q. 16.

**IV.** In seq. (5.) quaestione quoad *factum* resurrectionis omnes concedunt, eam fieri modo et virtute supernaturali; item, absurdum esse antiquum Orientalium et Pythagorae errorem, qui cum transmigratione animarum posuit circulationem quandam omnium rerum. Tamen diversae sententiae exortae sunt quoad ea quae in reproductione rerum *possibilia* sunt activis *naturae* viribus. De quo Scot. (hic q. 3. n. 2. seqq.) praeter extremam et falsam opinionem antiquorum modo relatam recitat duas alias sententias, quarum prima dicit, *nullo modo* posse aliquid idem numero redire per *agens naturale*; secunda vero *media* putat, non quidem omnia, sed tamen aliquid per actionem naturae posse idem redire. *Mediam* hanc sententiam tenent Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. I.) aliique saltem ut probabilem; ipse Scot. eam non penitus reprobat, praefert tamen alteram communiorem sententiam. De hac 5. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 42. m. 2. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 75. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. I. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. 3.

**V.** Circa 6. quaestionem cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. a. I. q. I. et scholion. In solutione communiter consentiunt doctores; S. Thom. tamen, ut iam loc. cit. notavimus, humanitati Christi vim quandam instrumentalem ad opera supernaturalia tribuit. Unde dicit (hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 76. a. 1-3.): «Sed ipsa resurrectio Christi virtute Divinitatis adiunctae est causa quasi instrumentalis resurrectionis nostrae; operationes enim divinae agebantur mediante carne Christi quasi quodam organo; sicut ponit exemplum Damascenus (III. de Orthod. Fide c. 15.) de tactu corporali, quo mundavit leprosum, Matth. 8.». De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 20. m. 2. a. 1-6. — Scot., hic q. 5. n. 7. — S. Thom., locis citt. quaestiunc. 1-3, et a. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 5. et 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** "All men are to rise with their own bodies" (i.e. the same according to number); so teaches the Athanasian Creed; which the Creed of the Eleventh Council of Toledo (in the year 675) confirms, saying: "Nor do we believe that we shall rise in an aerial, or any other kind of flesh (as some rave), but in this very [flesh] in which we live, subsist, and move." Holding this unanimously, the Scholastics only as regards the scientific explanation put forward contrary opinions on some points, which arose for the most part from diverse principles pertaining to natural philosophy. First there arose a difficulty from the authority of Aristotle, who in several places seems to teach (cf. arg. 1 to the opposite) that those things whose form has been corrupted and again generated cannot return the same according to number. On this we note a few things.

**1.** Two extreme opinions concerning the *possibility* of such a restitution have been put forward; of which the first taught that even a *natural agent* can repair a corrupted thing as *the same* in number. On the opposite side, Durandus (here, q. 3) taught (with a certain caution, however) that it is intrinsically impossible for corrupted beings to return the same in number; and this he asserted in general concerning all beings, not only concerning *successive* ones (which is more commonly granted), but also concerning *permanent* ones. For this opinion he also cites several passages of St. Thomas, especially IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, ad 3. Hence he thinks that the resurrection *of man* is not possible except on the supposition that in man there is no *other* form than the rational soul, which is never corrupted, being *immortal*; and consequently, that such a resurrection of beasts, their form being corrupted, is of itself impossible. The same principles the opinion related here in the corpus as the second holds. Nevertheless the common opinion rejects that principle of Durandus (cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 7, q. 16).

**2.** St. Thomas indeed explains the *fact* of the resurrection, along with Durandus, by this reasoning, that "none of the essential principles of man passes entirely into nothing through death" (Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 81), namely with the *single* form remaining, which is the

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rational soul, and also the matter. But in this he departs from Durandus, that he by no means denies it to be possible for God that beings, at least permanent ones, after they have been corrupted, be repaired the same in number; which clearly results from the cited passage. As for *successive* beings, however, "whose unity has in its very account the continuity of duration, as is evident in motion and time," he says that "the interruption of such things is indirectly contrary to their unity according to number." He grants the same (Quodlibet IV, q. 3, a. 5), that "God cannot repair these the same in number." In this St. Bonaventure consents, here, q. 1, ad 4.

**3.** Scotus (here, q. 1, n. 2ff.), since besides the rational soul he posits on the side of the body a form of *corporeity* to be corrupted in death, must explain this difficulty, which arises on the side of a form of that kind, corrupted in death and again to be brought forth by another transmutation from the potency of the matter; a restitution of which kind is certainly impossible for a natural agent. Hence he is wholly engaged in this, to overthrow the principle posited by Durandus and to demonstrate that this is possible for *God* alone. He also thinks that no repugnancy appears in God's reproducing even *successive* things the same; which opinion pleased several later [thinkers] even outside the school of Scotus.

**II.** These things having been seen, it appears how the opinion of St. Bonaventure differs from the aforesaid. For he himself teaches: *first*, that under one perfection or *properly substantial* form there are, on the side of the body, other subordinate and corruptible forms; *second*, he himself resolves the difficulties by having recourse to the seminal reasons. As to the *first*, he here affirms that the "form of flesh" and the forms "of the mixture and of the elements" are corrupted; and as to the *second*, that "no form is *entirely* corrupted, but remains in the matter" after corruption, just as it was, before it was produced, namely in the seminal reasons. — With respect to the *plurality of forms* he teaches otherwise than St. Thomas, nor does he agree with Scotus either as to the extension of this principle, since Scotus admits with the soul only the form *of corporeity*. Concerning this principle of St. Bonaventure cf. II Sent., d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, and the scholion, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, and especially the scholion, d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, d. 15, a. 1, q. 2, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6, and a. 2, q. 2; cf. also II Sent., d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2, 3; III Sent., d. 6, a. 2, q. 1; IV Sent., d. 11, p. I, dub. 4, d. 49, p. II, sect. 2, a. 1, q. 1. — Concerning the seminal reasons cf. II Sent., d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2 and 3; IV Sent., d. 12, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, where in the scholia many things concerning this opinion of the ancient Scholastics are related. The same seminal reasons are employed below, q. 5, ad 6, and d. 44, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — We have already observed that this pre-existence of things in the seminal reasons as regards their *essence*, not as regards their *proper and complete existence*, which the Holy Doctor posited as more probable, was almost universally disapproved by the later Scholastics, and that it is rather difficult to explain. But if this doctrine could be proved, not only the dogma of the resurrection, but other mysteries of natural science as well, would be illustrated not a little. — Peter of Tarentaise in this question consents with St. Bonaventure and has recourse (here, a. 7, especially ad 11) to the seminal reasons, "in which the form of the mixture remains, and from which by divine power it is repaired the same in number."

**III.** Concerning this 4th question, besides the cited passages: St. Thomas, below, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1; Suppl., q. 79, a. 1-3. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 1, q. 2, 3. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 7, q. 16.

**IV.** In the following (5th) question, as regards the *fact* of the resurrection, all grant that it comes about in a supernatural mode and by supernatural power; likewise, that the ancient error of the Orientals and of Pythagoras is absurd, which, together with the transmigration of souls, posited a certain circulation of all things. Nevertheless diverse opinions have arisen as to those things which in the reproduction of things are *possible* to the active powers of *nature*. Concerning which Scotus (here, q. 3, n. 2ff.), besides the extreme and false opinion of the ancients just related, recounts two other opinions, of which the first says that *in no way* can anything return the same in number through a *natural agent*; but the second, a *middle* [opinion], thinks that not indeed all things, but yet something can return the same through the action of nature. This *middle* opinion Richard of Middleton (here, a. 3, q. 1) and others hold at least as probable; Scotus himself does not entirely reject it, yet prefers the other, more common opinion. Concerning this 5th question, besides those already praised: Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 42, m. 2, a. 5. — St. Thomas, here, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3; Suppl., q. 75, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit., q. 1, 2. — Durandus, here, q. 2, 3.

**V.** Concerning the 6th question cf. III Sent., d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, and the scholion. In the solution the doctors commonly consent; St. Thomas, however, as we have already noted at the cited place, attributes to the humanity of Christ a certain instrumental power for supernatural works. Whence he says (here, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1; Suppl., q. 76, a. 1-3): "But the very resurrection of Christ, by the power of the conjoined Divinity, is as it were the instrumental cause of our resurrection; for the divine operations were carried out by the mediation of the flesh of Christ as by a certain organ; as Damascene sets forth the example (On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 15) of the bodily touch by which He cleansed the leper, Matthew 8." Concerning the same question: Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 20, m. 2, a. 1-6. — Scotus, here, q. 5, n. 7. — St. Thomas, at the cited places, quaestiunculae 1-3, and a. 1-3. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 4, 5, and 26. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 3, q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the Internet Archive djvu OCR of *doctorisseraphic04bona* (raw `bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L94417–94830), corrected against the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{887–891}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (extract offset `pdf = printed + 20`; column split regenerated at 2120 for the left columns and 1620 for the right, since the default 1880 split clipped both). English is a fresh literal paragraph-for-paragraph translation. Two-column Vol IV → PDF-priority inversion applied in the cascade-shattered Respondeo and footer regions per the VOL II OVERRIDE.

**★ Page-span correction (auto-chunker error).** The skeleton frontmatter listed `printed_pages: [887–892]`. Eyes-on the bands shows **q4 (body + its scholion) ends mid-p.891**; QUAESTIO V (*Utrum resurrectio sit naturalis, an miraculosa*) opens at the foot of p.891 (both columns, below the scholion) and its body fills **all of p.892**. Page 892 is therefore entirely q5, not q4. Corrected `printed_pages` to **[887–891]** and `pdf_pages` to **[907–911]**. The a1-q5 chunk owns p.892 (and the p.891 foot + its footer notes 1–4, which anchor q5's opening arguments, NOT this scholion).

**Apparatus page-split map (25 entries, page-qualified).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; only the notes anchored in *this* body are claimed:
- **p.887 — notes 10 and 11** (rendered p887-10, p887-11). Notes 1–9 on p.887 belong to the tail of q3 (which prints at the top of p.887) and are owned by a1-q3.
- **p.888 — notes 1–10** (all in q4's Contra + Conclusio + Respondeo).
- **p.889 — notes 1–7** (Respondeo continuation + replies *Ad 1–3*).
- **p.890 — notes 1–6** (mortale-tripliciter + reply *Ad 4* + the *Sed obiicitur* discussion).
- **p.891 — ZERO.** The scholion (which occupies p.890 foot through mid-p.891) carries **no numbered footers** — it cites its authorities inline in parentheses (`(hic q. 3.)`, `(S. c. Gent. IV. c. 81.)`, etc.). The four numbered footers at the foot of p.891 anchor q5's arguments and are handed off to a1-q5.

**Scholion coverage (Art. I, second block — q4–q6).** This is the SECOND scholion block of Article I (OCR `SCHOLIOK`, raw ~L94719); the first block (q1–q3) lives in a1-q1. Rendered LAST in both language blocks per the parser rule. Structure: a lead section **I** (Athanasian Creed + Toledo XI + the Aristotelian difficulty) with two arabic sub-points **1** (the two extreme opinions, Durandus) and **2** (S. Thomas's *factum* explanation) plus **3** (Scotus's *corporeitas*); then **II** (Bonaventure's own doctrine + cross-refs); **III** = "de hac 4. quaestione" (this q4); **IV** = "in seq. (5.) quaestione" (q5); **V** = "circa 6. quaestionem" (q6). Thus the block indeed spans q4–q6 as briefed.

**`[?]` flags.** None unresolved. Minor OCR-vs-band reconciliations silently adopted from the bands: p.889 note 2 running head figures read on the band as *VI. c. 14. n. 25* and *Enarrat. in Ps. 78. n. 5* (djvu OCR had garbled `n. 23`/`n. 8`), and the lemma there is *pro sicut cod. O in qua fuit* (OCR dropped the `cod. O` siglum). The quaestio-title line prints *eorundem **corporum** secundum numerum* (with *corporum*), whereas the internal opener and the frontmatter `title_la` omit *corporum*; both readings preserved as printed.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0