title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Pars II — De appropriatione nominum relativorum quae communiter et aeternaliter dicuntur. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Pars II — On the appropriation of relative names said commonly and eternally. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 540 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXI.

### Pars II.

#### *De appropriatione nominum relativorum, quae communiter et aeternaliter dicuntur.*

> *Non est hic praetermittendum, quod vir illustris Hilarius*[^1].

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnote below corresponds to a marker in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. It is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Terminata parte illa, in qua agit de significatione horum nominum *similis* et *aequalis*, hic incipit secunda pars, in qua agit de horum nominum appropriatione, et habet haec pars duas partes. In prima assignat appropriationes; in secunda movet et solvit dubitationem, quae ex huiusmodi appropriatione habet originem, infra distinctione trigesima secunda: *Hic oritur quaestio ex praedictis deducta.*

Prima pars dividitur in duas partes: in prima assignat appropriata secundum Hilarium; in secunda secundum Augustinum, ibi: *Illud etiam sciri oportet, quod eandem trium personarum distinctionem.* Prima pars habet tres. In prima assignat Hilarii appropriationem et eius explanationem propter sui obscuritatem. In secunda ostendit, quod illa quae Hilarius assignat, non sunt propria, sed appropriata, ibi: *Non enim secundum praemissam expositionem.* In tertia vero ostendit, quod illa quibus haec appropriat, sunt propria. Appropriatio enim est communis respectu proprii, et hoc facit ibi: *Propria igitur personarum.*

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*Illud etiam sciri oportet, quod eandem trium personarum* etc. Haec est secunda pars huius partis, in qua assignat Magister appropriationem Augustini, et habet haec pars duas partes. In prima ponit ipsam appropriationem; in secunda ponit eius expositionem, ibi: *Sed plurimos movet, quod Patri attribuit* etc. Et haec pars habet tres secundum illa tria appropriata. In prima ostendit, qualiter Patri appropriatur unitas, ostendens etiam incidenter, qualiter aliqua dicuntur *unum*. In secunda vero ostendit, quomodo Filio appropriatur aequalitas, ibi: *Nunc videamus, quare aequalitas.* In tertia vero ostendit, quomodo Spiritui sancto approprietur concordia, ibi: *Quod autem in Spiritu sancto dicitur esse utriusque concordia.*

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur in hac parte, duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de appropriatione Hilarii.

Secundo, de appropriatione Augustini.

Et quantum ad primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum imago dicatur in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.

Secundo, dato quod secundum relationem, quaeritur, utrum imago sit proprium Filii.

Tertio quaeritur de ratione appropriationis illorum trium, scilicet aeternitatis, speciei et usus.

---

english:
<!-- page 540 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXXI.

### Part II.

#### *On the appropriation of relative names which are said commonly and eternally.*

> *It must not be passed over here in silence that the illustrious man Hilary*[^1].

### Division of the text.

That part being concluded, in which he treated of the signification of these names *like* and *equal*, here begins the second part, in which he treats of the appropriation of these names; and this part has two divisions. In the first he assigns the appropriations; in the second he raises and resolves a doubt which has its origin from such appropriation, below in distinction thirty-two: *Here a question arises drawn from what has been said.*

The first part is divided into two parts: in the first he assigns what is appropriated according to Hilary; in the second according to Augustine, at: *It must also be known, that the same distinction of the three persons.* The first part has three. In the first he assigns Hilary's appropriation and its explanation on account of its obscurity. In the second he shows that those things which Hilary assigns are not properties, but appropriations, at: *For not according to the foregoing exposition.* In the third he shows that those things by which he appropriates are properties. For appropriation is something common with respect to what is proper, and this he does at: *Therefore the properties of the persons.*

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*It must also be known, that the same distinction of the three persons* etc. This is the second part of this part, in which the Master assigns Augustine's appropriation, and this part has two divisions. In the first he sets down the appropriation itself; in the second he sets down its exposition, at: *But it moves many, that he attributes to the Father* etc. And this part has three divisions according to those three appropriated things. In the first he shows how unity is appropriated to the Father, showing also incidentally how some things are said to be *one*. In the second he shows how equality is appropriated to the Son, at: *Now let us see, why equality.* In the third he shows how concord is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, at: *Now, that it is said in the Holy Spirit to be the concord of both.*

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of those things which are said in this part, two things are principally asked.

First, concerning the appropriation of Hilary.

Second, concerning the appropriation of Augustine.

And as to the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether image is said in divine matters according to substance, or according to relation.

Second, granted that it is according to relation, it is asked whether image is proper to the Son.

Third it is asked concerning the reason for the appropriation of those three, namely of eternity, of species, and of use.

---

la: Cap. 1. seqq. — Mox pro *est* cod. T.

en: Lombard, *Sentences* Bk. I, d. 31, c. 1 and following. — Just below, for *est* codex T [reads otherwise]. ---

translators_notes: [The TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM here lists only the three questions of Articulus I. The three questions of Articulus II are introduced separately at the article-2 boundary in the OCR (raw c. line 12823), per the multi-article distinction pattern.]


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 31, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus.
#### *De nominibus similis et aequalis.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum aequalitas et similitudo positive vel privative de Deo dicantur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Et quod dicantur secundum privationem, videtur:

1. Per auctoritatem Magistri in littera[^1]: «Quibusdam videtur nomine aequalitatis et similitudinis non aliquid poni, sed removeri, ut dicatur Filius aequalis Patri, quia nec maior nec minor est eo».

2. Item, hoc potest probari sic: Euclides[^2] definit aequale sic: «Aequale est quod alteri suppositum non excedit nec exceditur»: ergo cum haec definitio sit data secundum privationem, patet etc.

3. Item, aequale et simile non tantum dicunt unitatem, sed etiam diversitatem[^3]; sed non est ponere diversitatem in divinis: ergo haec nomina non dicuntur secundum positionem, sed secundum privationem.

4. Item, aequale, secundum quod dicit positionem, dicit commensurationem[^4]; sed in divinis non est commensuratio nec excessus: ergo dicuntur per privationem excessus, non per positionem.

**Sed contra:**

1. Similitudo et aequalitas in his inferioribus dicuntur positive; sed haec completius sunt in Deo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus[^5] in Filio primo reperitur ratio similitudinis et aequalitatis: ergo multo fortius in Deo dicunt positionem.

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2. Item, omnis negatio, quae non est pura negatio, fundatur supra positionem: ergo cum hoc quod dico *aequale* importet remotionem excessus et non importet puram negationem — quia tunc chimaera esset aequalis Deo — oportet quod importet positionem.

3. Item, haec est falsa: Pater et Filius sunt inaequales: ergo hoc quod est *inaequale* aliquid privat quod est in Deo; sed hoc non est nisi importatum per aequalitatem: ergo aequalitas aliquid ponit, quia si eius oppositum privat, necesse est ipsum ponere.

4. Item, haeretici dicunt hanc[^6] falsam: *Pater est aequalis Filio*, aut ergo quia aliquid ponitur, aut quia aliquid removetur. Non quia removetur, quia dicunt hanc veram: *Pater est inaequalis*, quae removet: ergo quia aliquid ponitur, ergo etc. — Et fundatur utraque istarum rationum[^7] super oppositionem inaequalis ad aequale. Si enim aequale et inaequale acciperentur remotive, tunc, eo quod opposita, acciperentur positive.

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### Conclusio.

> *Aequalitas et similitudo non dicuntur de Deo privative, sed positive.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum quod in littera innuitur et doctores antiqui dicunt, positio Magistri fuit, quod nomina, quae non dicunt personalem proprietatem vel essentiae unitatem, privative accipiantur. Unde quia *similis* et *aequalis* dicit respectum Patris ad Filium, et ille respectus non est personalis proprietas nec essentia; voluit ponere, quod omnia talia secundum privationem dicerentur, sicut *duo*, *tres*, *similes* et *aequales* et consimilia. — Tamen ista positio stare non potest, sicut supra probatum est de unitate et pluralitate nominum divinorum. Si enim in divinis est unitas positive et pluralitas, et haec duo faciunt similitudinem et aequalitatem, necesse est, haec positive accipi in divinis. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod aequale est quod non excedit; dicendum, quod illi negationi substernitur affirmatio et positio, quae notificatur per privationem oppositi, scilicet excessus.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est diversitas in divinis; dicendum, quod non indicant diversitatem nisi suppositi, non formae de se; et quia in divinis est pluralitas suppositorum, patet etc.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum quod dicuntur positive, dicunt commensurationem; dicendum, quod in divinis non est commensuratio simpliciter, sed tamen est commensuratio respectu infiniti, et haec non ponit simpliciter commensurationem.

Aliter potest dici, quod *aequale* et *simile* de natura, suo primo intellectu ponunt unitatem quantitatis et qualitatis; quod autem ponat commensurationem hoc quod est *aequale*, est, quia quantitas illa est mensurata. Quoniam ergo in divinis est immensa, dicit ibi convenientiam in quantitate virtutis, quamvis non ponat ibi commensurationem.

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english:
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### Articulus Unicus. *On the names "like" and "equal."*
### Question I. *Whether equality and likeness are said of God positively or privatively.*

That they are said by way of privation is shown:

1. By the authority of the Master in the text[^1]: "It seems to some that by the name of equality and likeness nothing is posited but [something is] removed, so that the Son is said to be equal to the Father because he is neither greater nor less than he."

2. Likewise, this can be proved thus: Euclid[^2] defines *equal* thus: "The equal is what, when applied to another, neither exceeds nor is exceeded": therefore since this definition is given by way of privation, it is clear etc.

3. Likewise, *equal* and *like* express not only unity but also diversity[^3]; but diversity is not to be posited in the divine: therefore these names are said not by way of position, but by way of privation.

4. Likewise, *equal*, insofar as it expresses position, expresses commensuration[^4]; but in the divine there is no commensuration nor excess: therefore they are said by way of privation of excess, not by way of position.

**On the contrary:**

1. Likeness and equality among lower things are said positively; but these are more completely in God, since, as Augustine says[^5], in the Son is first found the account of likeness and equality: therefore much more strongly do they express position in God.

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2. Likewise, every negation that is not a pure negation is founded upon position: therefore since this which I call *equal* imports a removal of excess and does not import a pure negation — for then a chimaera would be equal to God — it must be that it imports position.

3. Likewise, this is false: "the Father and the Son are unequal": therefore that which is *unequal* deprives [the Father and Son] of something that is in God; but this is nothing other than what is imported by *equality*: therefore *equality* posits something, because if its opposite deprives, it is necessary that it itself posits.

4. Likewise, the heretics call this[^6] false: "the Father is equal to the Son" — therefore either because something is posited, or because something is removed. Not because something is removed, since they call this true: "the Father is unequal," which removes: therefore [it must be] because something is posited, therefore etc. — And each of these reasons[^7] is founded upon the opposition of *unequal* to *equal*. For if *equal* and *unequal* were taken privatively, then, since they are opposites, they would [equally] be taken positively.

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### Conclusion.

> *Equality and likeness are not said of God privatively, but positively.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to what is intimated in the text and what the ancient doctors say, the position of the Master was that names which do not express a personal property or unity of essence are taken privatively. Hence, since *like* and *equal* express the relation of the Father to the Son, and that relation is neither a personal property nor essence, he wished to hold that all such [names] are said by way of privation, just as *two*, *three*, *like* and *equal* and similar [terms]. — Yet this position cannot stand, as was proved above concerning the unity and plurality of the divine names. For if in the divine there is unity positively and plurality, and these two make likeness and equality, it is necessary that these be taken positively in the divine. And the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments on the affirmative side:**

*2.* To that which is objected, that the equal is that which does not exceed; it must be said that beneath that negation lies an affirmation and a position, which is signified through the privation of its opposite, namely excess.

*3.* To that which is objected, that there is no diversity in the divine; it must be said that they indicate no diversity except of supposit, not of form in itself; and since in the divine there is a plurality of supposits, it is clear etc.

*4.* To that which is objected, that insofar as they are said positively, they express commensuration; it must be said that in the divine there is no commensuration absolutely, but nevertheless there is commensuration with respect to the infinite, and this does not posit commensuration absolutely.

Otherwise it can be said that *equal* and *like*, by [their] nature, in their primary understanding posit a unity of quantity and quality; but that *equal* posits commensuration is because that quantity is measured. Since therefore in the divine [the quantity] is immense, [*equal*] there expresses an agreement in the quantity of power, although it does not posit commensuration there.

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la: Cap. 1. — Pro *et similitudinis* cod. W cum textu Magistri vel *similitudinis*.

en: Chapter 1. — In place of *et similitudinis*, codex W with the text of the Master [reads] simply *similitudinis*.

la: Libr. I. Element. § de animi conceptionibus: *Si aliqua res alicui supponatur appliceturque ei nec excedat altera alteram, illae sibi invicem erunt aequales* (ed. Venet. 1509). — In ipso textu pro *suppositum*, codd. AFGKPQWXY cum ed. 1 *superpositum*.

en: Book I of the *Elements*, § *On the conceptions of the mind*: "If any thing be set under another and applied to it and one does not exceed the other, they will be equal to each other" (Venice ed. 1509). — In the text itself, in place of *suppositum*, codices AFGKPQWXY with edition 1 [read] *superpositum*.

la: Scilicet diversas res, inter quas est aequalitas et similitudo. Sub quo respectu Hilarius, III. de Trin. n. 23. ait: *Similitudo non sibi est*.

en: Namely diverse things, between which there is equality and likeness. Under which respect Hilary, *On the Trinity* III, n. 23, says: "Likeness is not [a relation] of a thing to itself."

la: Nam aequale ita acceptum dicit relationem realem, fundatam in unitate determinatae quantitatis. Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 13.).

en: For *equal* taken in this way expresses a real relation, founded in the unity of a determinate quantity. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV, c. 13).

la: Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11: *Ubi (scil. in Filio) iam est tanta congruentia et prima aequalitas et prima similitudo, nulla in re dissidens et nullo modo inaequalis et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem respondens ei cuius imago est.* — Pro *primo* ed. 1 *prius*.

en: Book VI of *On the Trinity*, c. 10, n. 11: "Where (namely, in the Son) there is already so great a congruity and first equality and first likeness, in no thing differing and in no way unequal and in no part dissimilar, but answering identically to him whose image he is." — In place of *primo*, edition 1 [reads] *prius*.

la: Cod. V hic et aliquanto inferius post *hanc* interiicit *esse*, et subinde post *inaequalis* addit *Filio*.

en: Codex V here and a little later inserts *esse* after *hanc*, and subsequently adds *Filio* after *inaequalis*.

la: Ex vetustioribus codd. et ed. 1 restituimus *rationum*, pro qua voce Vat. cum cod. cc *positionum*; lectio falsa, quia hic duo ultima argumenta respiciuntur. Paulo inferius pro *eo quod*, quae lectio probatur ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1, Vat. *eorum*; etiam cod. W *eorum*, sed minus male, cum paulo ante pro *inaequale* exhibeat *simile*.

en: From older codices and edition 1 we restore *rationum*, for which word the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *positionum*; a false reading, since the last two arguments are referred to here. A little below, in place of *eo quod*, which reading is proved from very many manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican [edition reads] *eorum*; codex W also [reads] *eorum*, but less badly, since a little before, in place of *inaequale*, it exhibits *simile*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Bonav., qui iam d. 19. p. I. q. I. 2. de aequalitate in divinis tractavit, hic, Magistrum secutus, ad eandem rem, sed sub alia ratione, discutiendam redit ob causam infra in dub. 1. dictam. — Quoad rationem similitudinis notandum, nonnullos Patres eam noluisse in Deo admittere, ad cautelam, quia Ariani ecclesiastico termino ὁμοούσιον (*consubstantiale*) fraudulenter substituerant ὁμοιούσιον (*similis substantiae*). At cessante erroris periculo, haec locutio communiter recipitur (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 2. 3.).

Nec obstat, quod in Deo, in quo eadem est natura, excludi videatur ratio aequalis vel similis. Distinguuntur enim hae tres relationes, ut iam observavit Aristoteles (cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 6.), et quidem sic, ut idem fundetur super unitate substantiae, simile super qualitate, sed aequale super quantitate. Unde apte ad divina transferri possunt. Et bene observat Scotus (hic q. 1. n. 6.), consentiente S. Thom. (loc. cit.), quod aequalitas etiam in divinis includit in se similitudinem et aliquid addit, quod scil. excludit excessum. — Quoad obsoletam opinionem Magistri in hac re et quoad rationem unitatis et pluralitatis cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, a. 2. q. 1.

**II.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. q. 54. m. I. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. n. 70. q. 1. n. 46. seqq. — Durand., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** St. Bonaventure, who already in d. 19, p. I, q. I, 2 treated of equality in the divine, here, following the Master, returns to discuss the same matter, but under a different account, for the reason given below in dub. 1. — Concerning the account of likeness, it must be noted that some of the Fathers were unwilling to admit it in God, as a precaution, because the Arians had fraudulently substituted ὁμοιούσιον (*similis substantiae*) for the ecclesiastical term ὁμοούσιον (*consubstantiale*). But once the danger of error had ceased, this manner of speaking is commonly received (cf. St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 2, 3).

Nor is it an objection that in God, in whom the nature is the same, the account of *equal* or *like* would seem to be excluded. For these three relations are distinguished, as Aristotle already observed (cf. above p. 342, n. 6), and indeed in such a way that *the same* is founded upon unity of substance, *like* upon quality, but *equal* upon quantity. Hence they can fittingly be transferred to the divine. And Scotus rightly observes (here q. 1, n. 6), with St. Thomas in agreement (loc. cit.), that equality even in the divine includes in itself likeness and adds something, namely that it excludes excess. — Concerning the obsolete opinion of the Master in this matter, and concerning the account of unity and plurality, cf. above d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

**II.** Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, *S.* p. I, q. 54, m. I, a. 1. — Scot., here q. unica; *Report.* here q. 2. — St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 42, a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 1 *princ.* q. 3. — Henr. Gand., *S.* n. 70, q. 1, n. 46 seqq. — Durand., here q. 2.

---

translators_notes: [Notes pending]

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 31, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum aequalitas et similitudo in divinis dicantur secundum substantiam an secundum relationem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomina supradicta dicantur secundum substantiam an secundum relationem. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Magistri in littera[^1]: «Aequalitas, inquit, non est relatio vel notio, sed naturae unitas vel identitas»; et Hilarius *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Similitudo est indifferens essentia»: ergo tam similitudo quam aequalitas dicit divinam essentiam.

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2. Item, aequalitas dicitur secundum quantitatem, et similitudo secundum qualitatem[^3]; sed in divinis qualitas et quantitas transeunt in substantiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod dicitur secundum relationem, importat distinctionem de suo principali intellectu; sed *simile* et *aequale* dicunt convenientiam: ergo non dicuntur secundum relationem.

4. Item, nihil quod dicitur secundum relationem, dicitur de duobus, nisi importet relationem in communi — hoc dico propter hoc nomen *relatus* et *distinctus* — sed *simile* et *aequale* important specialem relationem, si eam important[^4], quia non est assignare specialiores sub ipsis, et dicuntur de pluribus: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Hilarius *de Trinitate*[^5]: «Similitudo sibi non est»; sed omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur ad se: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur de pluribus singulariter; sed *similis* et *aequalis* dicitur pluraliter: ergo etc.

3. Item, aequalitate refertur Pater ad Filium, et Filius ad Patrem, sed non essentia: ergo aequalitas non dicit essentiam.

4. Item, aut Pater est aequalitas Filii ad Patrem, aut non. Si sic: ergo cum Filius aequalitate illa sit aequalis Patri[^6], Pater est aequalis sibi; quod non conceditur. Quod si Pater non est aequalitas Filii ad Patrem, ergo aequalitas non dicitur de omnibus: ergo non dicit essentiam; essentia enim Filii est Pater.

### Conclusio.

> *Similitudo et aequalitas dicuntur aliquo modo tum secundum substantiam tum secundum relationem, sed proprie et principaliter secundum relationem, ex consequenti et causaliter secundum substantiam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum communem omnium opinionem, cum *simile* et *aequale* dicant convenientiam plurium in uno, quod[^7] de se important distinctionem in suppositis et unionem sive unitatem in essentia. Et quia distinctio personarum spectat ad modum dicendi secundum relationem, unitas essendi ad modum dicendi secundum substantiam, ideo huiusmodi nomina nec omnino dicuntur secundum substantiam, nec omnino secundum relationem, sed quodam modo secundum substantiam, quodam modo secundum relationem. Sed quia non possunt secundum hunc duplicem modum dici principaliter[^8], sed necesse est, quod secundum alterum, ideo ulterius oportet quaerere, secundum quem modum dicendi accipiantur in divinis. Et hic sunt diversae opiniones.

Quidam enim dicunt quod huiusmodi nomina, secundum concretionem significata, dicuntur principaliter secundum relationem. Nam *similes* dicuntur habentes eandem qualitatem. Quia ergo respicit suppositum per se secundum quod concretum, ideo dicitur secundum relationem. Sed in abstractione, quia *similitudo* est unitas naturae vel essentiae, quia respicit unitatem formae primo, non distinctionem suppositorum nisi ex consequenti, principaliter dicitur secundum substantiam. — Sed iste modus solvendi non est conveniens. Nam est eadem significatio in concreto et in abstracto in principali significato[^9][^16]: ergo si dicitur secundum substantiam unum, et reliquum similiter: ergo hoc non solvit quod dictum est.

Secunda opinio est, quod huiusmodi nomina et in concretione et in abstractione dicuntur principaliter secundum substantiam, et connotant distinctionem in suppositis. Et ratio ipsorum est, quia cum *similitudo* respiciat ista duo, scilicet convenientiam et differentiam[^17], immediatius et completius respicit convenientiam[^10]. Dicuntur enim differentes esse similes, in quantum conveniunt, convenientes vero non dicuntur similes, in quantum differunt. Respicit ergo *similitudo* distinctionem per modum materiae[^11][^18], sed per modum formae respicit unitatem essentiae; et ideo completive dicitur secundum substantiam tam *similitudo* quam *similis*. — Sed ista positio non potest stare. Certum enim est, quod *similitudo* dicitur respectus aliquorum ad invicem; sed in divinis non est nisi respectus personae ad personam. Respectus autem personae ad personam non potest dici secundum substantiam: ergo necesse est, quod hoc nomen *simile*, quod a *similitudine* imponitur, secundum substantiam non dicatur.

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Et ideo est tertia opinio, quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur secundum relationem, formaliter loquendo. Dicunt enim respectum suppositorum distinctorum convenientium in aliquo uno; et ita respectus cadit ibi per modum formalis, sed unitas essentiae et pluralitas suppositorum[^12] cadit per modum causae. Ideo proprie et principaliter secundum relationem, ex consequenti vero secundum substantiam causaliter loquendo dicuntur. Et hoc magis patet, si consideremus significationem horum nominum in creaturis, unde fit translatio. Similitudo enim est[^13] secundum qualitatem, similiter et aequalitas secundum quantitatem; et similitudo dicit relationem formaliter, sed qualitatem causaliter, similiter aequalitas dicit quantitatem causaliter sed relationem formaliter. Non enim est similitudo qualitas, sed relatio, quae attenditur secundum qualitatem.

**Ad argumenta:**

*1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Magistro et Hilario, quod est essentia; dicendum, quod causaliter intelliguntur omnes tales sermones.

*2.* Ad illud quod postea dicitur, quod *aequale* dicitur secundum quantitatem; dicendum, quod secundum dicit causam efficientem, non dicit formam; sic de simili.

*3.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod relativa important distinctionem; dicendum, quod quaedam in divinis dicuntur secundum relationem, quae sunt distinctiva relatorum, ut *Pater* et *Filius*; et talia[^14] important respectum distinguentem, et talia important distinctionem ut exercitam. Quaedam autem dicuntur secundum relationem, quae sunt relativa distinctorum, ut *similis* et *aequalis*; et talia important respectum, sed ille respectus non est notio distinguens, sed consequens distinguentem. Importat enim distinctionem non ut exercitam, sed ut conceptam. Nam respectus distinguens est unius personae ad aliam, secundum quod est ab illa. In huiusmodi vero nominibus importatur respectus unius personae ad aliam, secundum quod communicant unam naturam. Et quia respectus est relatio, ideo plurificatur; quia vero respectus unius essentiae, ideo dicitur de pluribus.

*4.* Et ideo patet ultimum quod dicitur, quod nullum relativum dicitur de pluribus, nisi dicat relationem in communi. Dicendum enim, quod hoc non solum est in his nominibus, quae important distinctionem in communi, ut *relatus* et *distinctus*, verum etiam in his[^15] quae dicunt respectum plurium, ut communicant in aliquo. Tale enim nomen dicit respectum in communi, specificatum tamen ratione communicationis in uno; unde *similes* dicuntur ad invicem relati, participantes unam qualitatem.

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english:
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### Question II. *Whether equality and likeness in divine matters are said according to substance or according to relation.*

Secondly it is asked whether the aforesaid names are said according to substance or according to relation. And that [they are said] according to substance, is shown:

1. By the authority of the Master in the text[^1]: "Equality," he says, "is not relation or notion, but unity or identity of nature"; and Hilary, *On the Trinity*[^2]: "Likeness is undifferentiated essence": therefore both likeness and equality express the divine essence.

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2. Likewise, equality is said according to quantity, and likeness according to quality[^3]; but in the divine, quality and quantity pass over into substance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that is said according to relation imports distinction in its principal understanding; but *like* and *equal* express agreement: therefore they are not said according to relation.

4. Likewise, nothing that is said according to relation is said of two things, unless it imports relation in general — I say this on account of this name *related* and *distinct* — but *like* and *equal* import a special relation, if they import [any][^4], since one cannot assign more specific [relations] under them, and they are said of more than [two]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Hilary, *On the Trinity*[^5]: "Likeness is not [a relation] of a thing to itself"; but everything that is said according to substance is said with respect to itself: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that is said according to substance is said of many in the singular; but *like* and *equal* are said in the plural: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by equality the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, but not by essence: therefore equality does not express essence.

4. Likewise, either the Father is the equality of the Son to the Father, or he is not. If so: then since the Son by that equality is equal to the Father[^6], the Father is equal to himself; which is not conceded. But if the Father is not the equality of the Son to the Father, then equality is not said of all [the persons]: therefore it does not express essence; for the essence of the Son is the Father.

### Conclusion.

> *Likeness and equality are said in some way both according to substance and according to relation, but properly and principally according to relation, consequentially and causally according to substance.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the common opinion of all, since *like* and *equal* express the agreement of many in one, [it is the case that][^7] of themselves they import distinction in supposits and union or unity in essence. And since the distinction of persons pertains to the mode of speaking according to relation, and the unity of being to the mode of speaking according to substance, therefore names of this sort are neither said wholly according to substance, nor wholly according to relation, but in some way according to substance, in some way according to relation. But since they cannot be said in this twofold mode principally[^8], but it is necessary that [they be said] according to one or the other, therefore one must further inquire according to which mode of speaking they are taken in the divine. And here there are diverse opinions.

For some say that names of this sort, signified according to concretion, are said principally according to relation. For *like* are said [those] having the same quality. Since therefore [this name] looks to a supposit per se insofar as it is concrete, therefore it is said according to relation. But in the abstract, since *likeness* is the unity of nature or essence, since it looks first to the unity of form, not to the distinction of supposits except consequently, principally it is said according to substance. — But this manner of solving is not suitable. For the signification is the same in the concrete and in the abstract in [their] principal signification[^9][^16]: therefore if one is said according to substance, the other is so likewise: therefore this does not solve what was said.

The second opinion is that names of this sort, both in concretion and in abstraction, are said principally according to substance, and connote distinction in supposits. And their reason is that, since *likeness* looks to these two, namely agreement and difference[^17], more immediately and more completely it looks to agreement[^10]. For different things are said to be alike insofar as they agree, but agreeing things are not said to be alike insofar as they differ. *Likeness* therefore looks to distinction by way of matter[^11][^18], but by way of form it looks to the unity of essence; and therefore completively both *likeness* and *like* are said according to substance. — But this position cannot stand. For it is certain that *likeness* is said [as] a respect of some things to one another; but in the divine there is only the respect of person to person. But the respect of person to person cannot be said according to substance: therefore it is necessary that this name *like*, which is imposed from *likeness*, not be said according to substance.

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And therefore there is a third opinion, that names of this sort are said according to relation, formally speaking. For they express the respect of distinct supposits agreeing in some one thing; and so the respect falls there by way of the formal, but the unity of essence and the plurality of supposits[^12] falls by way of cause. Therefore properly and principally [they are said] according to relation, consequently however according to substance, speaking causally. And this is more clear, if we consider the signification of these names in creatures, whence the transfer is made. For likeness is[^13] according to quality, likewise equality according to quantity; and *likeness* expresses relation formally, but quality causally, likewise *equality* expresses quantity causally but relation formally. For likeness is not a quality, but a relation, which is regarded according to quality.

**To the arguments:**

*1.* To that which is objected from the Master and Hilary, that it is essence; it must be said that all such expressions are understood causally.

*2.* To that which is afterwards said, that *equal* is said according to quantity; it must be said that *according to* expresses the efficient cause, not the form; so also of *like*.

*3.* To that which is objected, that relatives import distinction; it must be said that some [names] in the divine are said according to relation, which are distinctive of the related, as *Father* and *Son*; and such[^14] import a distinguishing respect, and such import distinction as exercised. But some are said according to relation, which are relative of the distinct, as *like* and *equal*; and such import a respect, but that respect is not a distinguishing notion, but consequent on the one distinguishing. For it imports distinction not as exercised, but as conceived. For the distinguishing respect is of one person to another, insofar as it is from that one. But in names of this sort there is imported the respect of one person to another, insofar as they share one nature. And since respect is relation, therefore it is pluralized; but since [it is] a respect of one essence, therefore it is said of more than [one].

*4.* And therefore the last [point] which is said is clear, that no relative is said of more than [two], unless it expresses relation in general. For it must be said that this is not only [the case] in those names which import distinction in general, as *related* and *distinct*, but also in those[^15] which express the respect of many, insofar as they share in something. For such a name expresses respect in general, specified however by reason of communication in one [thing]; whence *like* are said [to be] related to one another, sharing one quality.

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la: Cod. R *essentialem*. Subinde post *unitatem* multi codd. cum ed. 1 repetunt *quod*.

en: Codex R [reads] *essentialem*. Subsequently after *unitatem* many codices with edition 1 repeat *quod*.

la: Dist. 24. a. 1. q. 1, et ibid. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius post *duo* cod. T interiicit *et*.

en: Distinction 24, a. 1, q. 1, and *ibid.* a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, after *duo*, codex T inserts *et*.

la: Cod. V *subiacet*.

en: Codex V [reads] *subiacet*.

la: Quae diversitas in divinis dicitur *distinctio*. Cfr. supra d. 22. q. 4.

en: Which diversity in the divine is called *distinction*. Cf. above d. 22, q. 4.

la: Maior pars codd. cum ed. 1 *mensuratio*.

en: The greater part of the codices with edition 1 [read] *mensuratio*.

la: Supple cum codd. L quantitas, scil. virtutis, de qua vide supra d. 19. p. I. q. 1. 2. 3, ubi et plura alia occurrunt, quae hanc quaestionem concernunt.

en: Supply with codices L *quantitas* — namely, *virtutis* — concerning which see above d. 19, p. I, q. 1, 2, 3, where also many other things occur which concern this question.

la: Cap. 1; aliam autem lectionem recepimus; cfr. ibi nota 4.

en: Chapter 1; we have however received another reading; cf. there note 4.

la: Hilarius in opere suo *de Trin.* saepe saepius, praesertim in libr. VII. et VIII, aequalitatem sive similitudinem (iuxta ipsum in libr. *de Synodis* haec nomina eandem vim habent) Filii Dei ex eo demonstrat, quod in Filio Dei sit «indifferens natura sive essentia». Definitionem similitudinis magis perspicuam invenies in libro *de Synodis*. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, pag. 529, nota 5.

en: Hilary in his work *On the Trinity* very often, especially in books VII and VIII, demonstrates the equality or likeness of the Son of God (according to him in the book *On the Synods* these names have the same force) from this, that in the Son of God there is "an undifferentiated nature or essence." A more clear definition of likeness you will find in the book *On the Synods*. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 1, p. 529, n. 5.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 6. De minori vide supra d. 22. q. 4.

en: Cf. above p. 342, n. 6. Concerning the minor [premise] see above d. 22, q. 4.

la: Intellige: si aliquam relationem important. — Vat. post *si eam* subiicit *inquam*, pro quo codd. K V X *aeque*.

en: Understand: if they import any relation. — The Vatican [edition] after *si eam* adds *inquam*, in place of which codices K V X [read] *aeque*.

la: Libr. III. n. 23.

en: Book III, n. 23.

la: Complures codd. ut G I T V W Y Z aa bb ee hic interponunt *Pater est aequalis Patri*.

en: Several codices, such as G I T V W Y Z aa bb ee, here interpose *Pater est aequalis Patri* ["the Father is equal to the Father"].

la: Solummodo Vat. omittit *quod*; sed mos est Seraphici, in similibus constructionibus repetere *quod*.

en: Only the Vatican [edition] omits *quod*; but it is the custom of the Seraphic [Doctor], in similar constructions, to repeat *quod*.

la: Supple cum Vat. *principaliter*. — Paulo superius ante *necesse est* ex mss. restituimus *sed*, quod a Vat. abest.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *principaliter*. — A little above, before *necesse est*, from the manuscripts we restore *sed*, which is absent from the Vatican [edition].

la: Intellige: locutio illa in concreto; vel: *similis* et *aequalis*.

en: Understand: that expression in the concrete; or: *similis* and *aequalis*.

la: Ita bene Vat.; pro *principali significato* codd. cum ed. 1 substituunt partim *et supposito*, partim *et in supposito* vel *et in sumto*, quae lectiones corruptionem sapiunt.

en: Thus rightly the Vatican [edition]; in place of *principali significato* the codices with edition 1 substitute partly *et supposito*, partly *et in supposito* or *et in sumto*, which readings savor of corruption.

la: Codd. C L W Y addunt *quam differentiam*, codd. R S U V perperam *et differentiam*, cod. X adiungit *et secundario differentiam*.

en: Codices C L W Y add *quam differentiam* ["than difference"], codices R S U V incorrectly [read] *et differentiam*, codex X adds *et secundario differentiam* ["and secondarily difference"].

la: Sive *materialiter*, i. e. minus principaliter et quasi connotando.

en: Or *materially*, i. e. less principally and as if by connotation.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Constat, nomina *simile* et *aequale* in Deo importare et distinctionem in personis et unitatem in essentia. Sed quaestio oritur, quem modum dicendi dicant principalius, utrum eum, qui est secundum relationem, an alium, qui est secundum substantiam. — Tertia sententia in respons., quae est auctoris, videtur esse nunc communis. Convenit S. Thomas etiam in hoc, quod «unitas essentiae et pluralitas suppositorum cadit per modum causae». Nam in *Comment.* (hic q. 1. a. 1.) dicit: «Unitas quantitatis est causa ipsius» (aequalitatis), et in *Sum.* (I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 1.): «quia ex hoc personae sunt sibi invicem aequales, quod sunt unius magnitudinis et essentiae».

**II.** De natura harum relationum controvertitur. Scotus (hic q. 3. n. 2, d. 19. q. unica; *Quodlib.* 6.) docet, eas esse reales, et videtur hoc respondere suae distinctioni formali. S. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 4.) omnino tenet, eas distingui tantum secundum rationem. In editione Vaticana ad marginem (iuxta solutionem ad 1.) legitur: «Ex his licet videre, quod apud S. Bonav. tales sunt relationes reales». Consentit D. Bonav. Scotus hic; sed Bassol. dicit, haec non trahi, quod Doct. ponat has relationes esse reales. Et revera non videmus, quo iure ex ista solutione erui possit, S. Bonaventuram docuisse istam Scoti sententiam.

**III.** Quoad solut. ad 1. cfr. hic dub. 3. — Solut. ad 1. fundatur in eo, quod relationes communes in duplici sensu intelligi possunt: scil. vel quatenus *commune* dicit aliquod genus superius, quod sub se habet inferiores species, ut *distinctus* *relatus*; vel quatenus *commune* opponitur *proprio*, et sic plures personae dicuntur aequales vel similes, secundum quod conveniunt in una essentia.

**IV.** Praeter iam citatos: Scot., *Report.* hic q. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; *S.* p. I. tr. M. q. 47. m. 1. ad 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. (qui doctrinam S. Bonav. fere repetit). — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 68. q. 4. n. 8. seqq. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** It is established that the names *like* and *equal* in God import both distinction in persons and unity in essence. But the question arises: which mode of speaking do they express more principally — that which is according to relation, or another, which is according to substance? — The third opinion in the *respondeo*, which is the author's, seems now to be the common one. St. Thomas agrees also in this, that "the unity of essence and the plurality of supposits falls by way of cause." For in the *Commentary* (here q. 1, a. 1) he says: "The unity of quantity is the cause of it" (of equality), and in the *Summa* (I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1): "because from this the persons are equal to one another, that they are of one magnitude and essence."

**II.** Concerning the nature of these relations there is controversy. Scotus (here q. 3, n. 2; d. 19, q. unica; *Quodlib.* 6) teaches that they are real, and this seems to correspond to his formal distinction. St. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 4) holds altogether that they are distinguished only according to reason. In the Vatican edition in the margin (next to the solution ad 1) is read: "From these things one may see that, according to St. Bonaventure, such relations are real." Scotus here agrees with St. Bonaventure; but Bassolis says that this cannot be drawn [from the text], that the Doctor [Bonaventure] holds these relations to be real. And in truth we do not see by what right from this solution it can be elicited that St. Bonaventure taught that opinion of Scotus.

**III.** Concerning the solution to [arg.] 1, cf. here dub. 3. — The solution to [arg.] 1 is founded on this, that common relations can be understood in two senses: namely, either insofar as *common* expresses some higher genus which has under itself lower species, as *distinct* [and] *related*; or insofar as *common* is opposed to *proper*, and thus several persons are said to be equal or alike, insofar as they agree in one essence.

**IV.** Besides those already cited: Scot., *Report.* here q. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 3; *S.* p. I, tr. M, q. 47, m. 1, ad 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 2 (who almost repeats the doctrine of St. Bonaventure). — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Ægid. R., here 1 *princ.* q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 68, q. 4, n. 8 seqq. — Durand., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. unica.

---


title: Dist. 31, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum aequalis et similis secundum mutuam relationem in divinis dicantur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum praedicta nomina, scilicet *aequalis* et *similis*, dicant mutuam relationem, secundum quam Pater Filio, et Filius Patri sit aequalis. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia secundum Dionysium[^1]: «In causalibus non recipimus reciprocationem»; sed Pater est principium Filii: ergo non cadit ibi reciprocatio, ut dicatur Pater aequalis Filio.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione; quia enim Filius similis est Patri, ideo dicitur *similitudo Patris*: ergo si e converso Pater est similis Filio perfecte, ergo Pater est *similitudo Filii*. Haec autem non recipitur: ergo etc.

3. Item, qui est aequalis alii secundum aequalitatem sibi adaequatur: si ergo Pater est aequalis Filio, ergo ei[^2] adaequatur; quaero: a quo? aut a se, aut ab alio. Non a se, quia quicumque aequat se alii, aliquid agit in se; sed Pater nihil agit in se, ergo non adaequatur nec a se; nec ab alio aequatur: ergo non est aequalis Filio.

**Contra:**

1. *Simile* et *aequale* sunt relativa aequiparantiae; sed ista denominant consimiliter[^3] utrumque extremum: ergo si Filius est similis Patri, pari ratione Pater est similis Filio.

2. Item, ratio similitudinis est convenientia vel indifferentia in qualitate vel substantia; sed convenientia aequaliter respicit utrumque extremum, et indifferentia[^4]: ergo si Filius est indifferens Patri et e converso, Pater est similis Filio.

3. Item, omne plurale geminat suum singulare; sed haec conceditur: *Pater et Filius sunt similes et aequales*, ergo Pater est similis; quaero: cui? aut sibi, aut alii[^5]. Non sibi: ergo alii.

### Conclusio.

> *Similis et aequalis in divinis dicuntur secundum mutuam relationem, prout simpliciter dicunt convenientiam in quantitate et qualitate; non vero, prout superaddunt rationem originis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *similis* et *aequalis* dupliciter accipiuntur: aut prout dicunt convenientiam in quantitate vel qualitate, aut prout supra convenientiam addunt imitationem vel expressionem perfectam. Primo quidem modo sunt relativa aequiparantiae, et dicuntur ad convertentiam, secundum quod probant rationes secundo inductae. Alio modo *similis* et *aequalis* addunt super hoc[^6] rationem originis — unde *aequalis* dicitur quasi *adaequatus*, et *similis* quasi *assimilatus* — hoc modo non convenit nisi ei qui est ab altero, et hoc modo procedunt primae rationes, quod Pater non dicitur *similitudo Filii* per imitationem, nec aequatur Filio per emanationem ab alio, sed aequat sibi Filium.

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**Ad argumenta:**

*1.* Quod tamen dicit Dionysius, quod non recipimus reciprocationem etc.; loquitur de causa[^7] proprie, prout differt ab effectu per essentiam: hoc autem modo Pater non est causa Filii, immo bene est habitudo Filii ad Patrem, sicut e converso; et sic patent omnia.

english:
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### Question III. *Whether 'equal' and 'like' are said in divine matters according to a mutual relation.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the aforesaid names, namely *equal* and *like*, express a mutual relation, according to which the Father is equal to the Son, and the Son to the Father. And that they do not, is shown:

1. Because according to Dionysius[^1]: "In causal [things] we do not admit reciprocation"; but the Father is the principle of the Son: therefore reciprocation does not fall there, such that the Father be called equal to the Son.

2. Likewise, this seems [to be so] by reason; for since the Son is like the Father, therefore he is called the *likeness of the Father*: therefore if conversely the Father is perfectly like the Son, then the Father is the *likeness of the Son*. But this is not admitted: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, he who is equal to another according to equality is equated to him: if therefore the Father is equal to the Son, then he is equated to him[^2]; I ask: by whom? either by himself, or by another. Not by himself, since whoever equates himself to another, does something in himself; but the Father does nothing in himself, therefore he is not equated either by himself; nor is he equated by another: therefore he is not equal to the Son.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Like* and *equal* are relatives of equivalence (*aequiparantiae*); but these denominate similarly[^3] each extreme: therefore if the Son is like the Father, by equal reasoning the Father is like the Son.

2. Likewise, the ground of likeness is agreement or undifferentiation in quality or substance; but agreement looks equally to each extreme, and so does undifferentiation[^4]: therefore if the Son is undifferentiated from the Father and conversely, the Father is like the Son.

3. Likewise, every plural doubles its singular; but this is conceded: *the Father and the Son are like and equal*; therefore the Father is like; I ask: like whom? either to himself, or to another[^5]. Not to himself: therefore to another.

### Conclusion.

> *'Like' and 'equal' are said in the divine according to a mutual relation, insofar as they simply express agreement in quantity and quality; but not insofar as they superadd a ground of origin.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *like* and *equal* are taken in two ways: either insofar as they express agreement in quantity or quality, or insofar as, beyond agreement, they add imitation or perfect expression. In the first way they are relatives of equivalence (*aequiparantiae*), and are said with convertibility, according to which the reasonings adduced second prove [their point]. In the other way, *like* and *equal* add upon this[^6] a ground of origin — whence *equal* is said as if *adequated*, and *like* as if *assimilated* — in this way it [only] applies to him who is from another, and in this way the first reasonings proceed, [namely] that the Father is not called the *likeness of the Son* by imitation, nor is he equated to the Son by emanation from another, but rather equates the Son to himself.

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**To the arguments:**

*1.* As to what Dionysius says, that we do not admit reciprocation, etc.; he is speaking of *cause*[^7] properly, insofar as it differs from its effect by essence: but in this way the Father is not the cause of the Son; rather, there is indeed a relation (*habitudo*) of the Son to the Father, just as conversely; and so all [the points] are clear.

la: Vide pag. 346, nota 4.

la: Pro *ei*, quae est lectio omnium ferme codd., Vat. cum cod. cc *si*, codd. G S *si ei*. Circa finem argumenti Vat. *ergo non adaequat se, nec alii aequatur* pro *ergo non adaequatur nec a se; nec ab alio aequatur*, quod habent codd. K M T ff, et etiam *alio* sed omittendo *a* et *ab*; cod. P *ergo non adaequat se alii nec ab alio aequatur*, cum qua lectione concordat ed. 1, omittens tantummodo *alii*.

en: In place of *ei*, which is the reading of nearly all the codices, the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *si*, codices G S *si ei*. Near the end of the argument the Vatican [reads] *ergo non adaequat se, nec alii aequatur* in place of *ergo non adaequatur nec a se; nec ab alio aequatur*, which is what codices K M T ff have, and also *alio* but omitting *a* and *ab*; codex P [reads] *ergo non adaequat se alii nec ab alio aequatur*, with which reading edition 1 agrees, omitting only *alii*.

la: Cfr. pag. 346, nota 3. — Proxime ante *similiter* Vat. omittit *consimiliter*; male.

en: Cf. p. 346, n. 3. — Just before *similiter* the Vatican [edition] omits *consimiliter*; wrongly.

la: Supple: *similiter*, i. e. indifferentia aequaliter respicit utrumque extremum. — Pro *et* ed. 1 *etiam*.

en: Supply: *similiter*, i. e. undifferentiation looks equally to each extreme. — In place of *et*, edition 1 [reads] *etiam*.

la: Cod. V *an sibi an alii*.

en: Codex V [reads] *an sibi an alii* ["whether to himself or to another"].

la: Plures codd. ut AFGHIK (T a prima manu) V etc. omittunt *hoc*, pro quo codd. P Q (T a secunda manu) Z ee substituunt *convenientiam*; in ed. 1 pro *addunt super hoc* legitur *superaddit*.

en: Several codices, such as AFGHIK (T from the first hand) V etc., omit *hoc*, in place of which codices P Q (T from the second hand) Z ee substitute *convenientiam* ["agreement"]; in edition 1, in place of *addunt super hoc* one reads *superaddit*.

la: Cod. [?] hic addit *et de causatis illis quae non plene et perfecte recipiunt similitudinem suae causae*. Cfr. d. 19. p. 1. q. 3. ad 4.

en: A codex [siglum illegible in OCR] here adds *et de causatis illis quae non plene et perfecte recipiunt similitudinem suae causae* ["and concerning those caused things which do not fully and perfectly receive the likeness of their cause"]. Cf. d. 19, p. 1, q. 3, ad 4.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Eandem distinctionem, quae hic in respons. adhibetur, S. Doctor supra d. 19. p. I. q. 3. sic exprimit: «Aut prout dicit respectum aequiparantiae, aut prout ultra respectum concernit actum coaequationis». Solutio est sententia communis. — Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 54. m. 1. a. 2. 3. — Scotus, *Report.* hic q. 3; I. *Sent.* d. 19. q. — S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 3. — B. Albert., d. 19. a. — Petr. a Tar., d. 19. q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 8. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The same distinction which is here employed in the *respondeo*, the holy Doctor above at d. 19, p. I, q. 3, expresses thus: "Either insofar as it expresses a respect of equivalence (*aequiparantiae*), or insofar as, beyond the respect, it concerns the act of co-equating." The solution is the common opinion. — Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 54, m. 1, a. 2, 3. — Scotus, *Report.* here q. 3; I *Sent.* d. 19, q. — St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3. — B. Albert., d. 19, a. — Petr. a Tar., d. 19, q. 1, a. 3. — Richard. a Med., d. 19, a. 1, q. 2. — Ægid. R., here 1 *princ.* q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 8, q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum imago in divinis secundum substantiam an secundum relationem dicatur

title_alt: Whether 'image' is said in divine matters according to substance or according to relation

source_text:
<!-- page 541 -->

### Articulus I.
#### *De appropriatione Hilarii.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum imago in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem dicatur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem imago dicatur secundum substantiam, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Hilarius quarto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Deus ad communem sibi cum Deo imaginem eandemque similitudinem reperitur hominem operari».

2. Item, Beda[^2] super illud: *Faciamus hominem* etc.: «In hoc, quod dicit imaginem, notatur una et aequalis substantia Trinitatis»: ergo imago, cum pertineat ad communitatem et unitatem substantiae, dicitur secundum substantiam.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia illud idem, quod dicit[^3] exemplar active, dicit imago passive; sed exemplar in divinis dicitur secundum substantiam, non secundum relationem: ergo etc.

4. Item, imago consistit in repraesentando aliquid non tantum in substantia, sed etiam in distinctione et ordine distinctorum: si ergo in divinis non cadit distinctio in una persona, necesse est, quod in divinis attendatur imago, secundum quod unitas essentiae est in tribus personis: ergo non notionaliter, sed essentialiter dicitur imago in divinis.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus in septimo *de Trinitate*[^4]: «Quid absurdius quam imaginem dici ad se»? sed omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur ad se: ergo cum imago non dicatur ad se, non dicitur secundum substantiam.

2. Item, Hilarius tertio *de Trinitate*[^5]: «Imago sola non est», ergo imago in divinis est cum alio[^6]; sed essentia non est cum alio: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem imaginis, quia Hilarius[^7] dicit, quod «imago est rei ad rem coaequandam» etc.; sed res, quae coaequatur rei, est persona: ergo imago est personae ad personam. Sed quod dicit respectum unius ad alterum dicitur secundum relationem: ergo et imago.

4. Item, hoc videtur per etymologiam. Imago enim dicitur quasi *imitago*[^8]: ergo ubi est ratio imaginis, ibi est imitatio; sed divina essentia non imitatur aliquid, quia omne tale est ab aliquo: ergo imago non dicitur secundum substantiam vel essentiam.

<!-- page 542 -->

### Conclusio.

> *Imago, proprie loquendo, dicitur non secundum substantiam, sed notionaliter.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut exemplar secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit expressionem per modum activi — unde exemplar dicitur ad cuius imitationem fit aliquid[^9] — sic e contrario imago dicitur per modum passivi, et dicitur imago quod alterum exprimit et imitatur. Et hoc modo accipitur imago dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est expressio, scilicet vel in naturae unitate, vel in naturae diversitate: in naturae communitate sive unitate, sicut filius imperatoris dicitur imago patris; in naturae diversitate, sicut imago imperatoris est in nummo[^10].

Sic respectu Dei dicitur imago per expressionem secundum identitatem naturae; et sic est imago increata et dicitur notionaliter sive secundum relationem, quia imago dicit emanationem, emanatio autem in unitate naturae non est nisi personae. Dicitur etiam imago per expressionem in diversitate naturae; et sic dicitur imago creata respectu totius Trinitatis. Et sic patet, quod imago, in divinis accepta, dicitur secundum relationem personae ad personam; et hoc secundum vocabuli proprietatem, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae.

Sed quoniam contingit abuti[^11] nomine exemplaris, ut etiam dicatur exemplar, quod ad imitationem alterius fit, sic e contrario contingit abuti imagine, ut dicatur imago, ad cuius expressionem fit aliud; et sic cum creatura fiat ad expressionem unitatis essentiae in trinitate personarum, potest dici imago de tota Trinitate; et sic dicitur imago imaginans, cum de ratione nominis dicat[^12] imaginatum; sicut exemplar dicitur exemplatum abusive, quamvis exemplar sit exemplans. Et secundum istum modum videntur accepisse Hilarius et Beda, ut dicit decima sexta distinctione secundi libri.

Tamen potest dici, quod uterque loquitur de imagine creata, quae cum sit respectu unius essentiae, est communis imago trium personarum et indicat unitatem substantiae in tribus. Unde nunquam imago pure dicitur ad se, quia semper dicit respectum vel ad aliam personam vel ad creaturam[^13], sive creaturae ad divinam naturam. Nunquam etiam dicitur pure secundum substantiam, quia semper notat distinctionem vel interius, vel exterius. Unde imago non dicitur essentia simpliciter, sed essentia ut in tribus personis considerata. — Tamen proprietatem sermonis servando, imago dicitur secundum relationem personalem, prout dicitur imago aeterna. Et concedendae sunt auctoritates et rationes ad hoc.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*1. 2.* Ad auctoritates in oppositum patet responsio.

*3.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod exemplar dicitur essentialiter, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia tota Trinitas est principium. Et ideo quia exemplar rationem producentis dicit — unde secundum substantiam dicitur et convenit toti Trinitati, sed non tota Trinitas est principiata — et quia imago dicit rationem producti proprie: ideo non convenit toti Trinitati nec dicitur secundum substantiam.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad hoc, quod sit imago, debet exprimere distinctionem et ordinem; dicendum, quod illud verum est in imagine, quae est imago rei habentis distinctionem et ordinem, sicut habet homo in partibus[^14][^15], et tota Trinitas in personis; sed cum res, cuius est imago, non habeat distinctionem, ut puta una persona, non oportet sic exprimi. — Vel potest dici, quod illud verum est, quando imago substantialiter differt. Tunc enim ad hoc, quod expresse exprimat, necesse est imitari in conditionibus consequentibus substantiam: sed cum imitatur in eadem forma substantiae, non oportet.

english:
<!-- page 541 -->

### Article I. *On the appropriation of Hilary.*
### Question I. *Whether 'image' is said in divine matters according to substance, or according to relation.*

That *image* is said according to substance is shown thus.

1. Hilary, in the fourth book *On the Trinity*[^1]: "God is found to have wrought man toward an image and likewise a likeness common to himself with God."

2. Likewise, Bede[^2] on that text: *Let us make man* etc.: "In this, that he says *image*, is signified one and equal substance of the Trinity": therefore *image*, since it pertains to the commonality and unity of substance, is said according to substance.

3. Likewise, this same point seems [to follow] by reason, since that very thing which *exemplar* says actively, *image* says passively[^3]; but *exemplar* in the divine is said according to substance, not according to relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *image* consists in representing something not only in substance, but also in the distinction and order of the things distinguished: if therefore in the divine no distinction falls within one person, it is necessary that in the divine *image* be considered insofar as the unity of essence is in three persons: therefore *image* in the divine is said not notionally, but essentially.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^4]: "What is more absurd than that *image* be said toward itself?" but everything that is said according to substance is said toward itself: therefore since *image* is not said toward itself, it is not said according to substance.

2. Likewise, Hilary, in the third book *On the Trinity*[^5]: "An image alone does not exist," therefore an image in the divine is *with another*[^6]; but the essence is not with another: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same point seems [to follow] by the definition of *image*, since Hilary[^7] says that "an image is a thing's [relation] to a thing for the sake of co-equating" etc.; but the thing that is co-equated to a thing is a person: therefore *image* is of person to person. But what expresses the regard of one to another is said according to relation: therefore *image* also.

4. Likewise, this is shown by etymology. For *image* (*imago*) is so called as if *imitago*[^8]: therefore wherever the account of an image is, there imitation is; but the divine essence does not imitate anything, since every such thing is from another: therefore *image* is not said according to substance or essence.

<!-- page 542 -->

### Conclusion.

> *Image, properly speaking, is said not according to substance, but notionally.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *exemplar* according to the propriety of the word expresses [its meaning] by way of the active — whence *exemplar* is said [of that] toward whose imitation something is made[^9] — so on the contrary *image* is said by way of the passive, and that is called an *image* which expresses and imitates another. And in this way *image* is taken in two ways, according as expression is twofold, namely either in unity of nature, or in diversity of nature: in commonality or unity of nature, as the son of an emperor is called the image of the father; in diversity of nature, as the image of the emperor is in a coin[^10].

Thus with respect to God *image* is said by expression according to identity of nature; and so it is the uncreated image and is said notionally or according to relation, since *image* expresses an emanation, and emanation in unity of nature is only [an emanation] of a person. *Image* is also said by expression in diversity of nature; and so the created image is said with respect to the whole Trinity. And so it is clear that *image*, taken in the divine, is said according to the relation of person to person; and this according to the propriety of the word, as the reasons adduced for this prove.

But since it happens that the name *exemplar* is misused[^11], so that even that is called an *exemplar* which is made in imitation of another, so on the contrary it happens that *image* is misused, so that that is called *image* toward whose expression another is made; and thus, since the creature is made for the expression of the unity of essence in the trinity of persons, it can be called *image* of the whole Trinity; and thus it is called an imaging *image*, since by the account of the name it expresses[^12] *the imaged*; just as an *exemplar* is called an *exemplated* abusively, although the *exemplar* is the *exemplating*. And in this way it seems that Hilary and Bede took it, as he says in the sixteenth distinction of the second book.

Yet it can be said that each speaks of the created image, which, since it is with respect to one essence, is the common image of the three persons and indicates the unity of substance in the three. Hence *image* is never said purely toward itself, since it always expresses regard either to another person or to a creature[^13], or [the regard] of a creature to the divine nature. Nor is it ever said purely according to substance, since it always denotes distinction either internally or externally. Hence *image* is not called essence simply, but essence as considered in three persons. — Yet preserving the propriety of speech, *image* is said according to personal relation, insofar as it is called the eternal image. And the authorities and reasons for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*1. 2.* To the authorities on the opposite side the response is plain.

*3.* To that which is objected, that *exemplar* is said essentially, therefore etc.; it must be said that the case is not the same, since the whole Trinity is the principle. And therefore, since *exemplar* expresses the account of the producer — whence it is said according to substance and applies to the whole Trinity, but the whole Trinity is not principiated — and since *image* properly expresses the account of the produced: therefore it does not apply to the whole Trinity nor is it said according to substance.

*4.* To that which is objected, that for there to be an *image*, it must express distinction and order; it must be said that this is true of an image which is the image of a thing having distinction and order, as a man has [distinction and order] in his parts[^14][^15], and the whole Trinity in the persons; but since the thing of which it is the image does not have distinction, as for instance one person, it is not necessary that it be expressed thus. — Or it can be said that this is true when the image differs substantially. For then, in order that it expressly express, it is necessary to imitate in the conditions consequent upon the substance: but when it imitates in the same form of substance, this is not necessary.

la: Num. 18. Sensus verborum citatorum est: Deus (Pater) reperitur operari sive fecisse hominem ad imaginem sibi cum Deo (Filio) communem. Cfr. supra d. XXVIII. c. 7.

en: *Number* 18. The sense of the words cited is: God (the Father) is found to have wrought, or made, man toward an image common to himself with God (the Son). Cf. above d. XXVIII, c. 7.

la: *In Hexaem.* I. (ad Genes. 1, 26.) In eo vero quod sequitur: *ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*, una et aequalis substantia eiusdem sanctae Trinitatis indicatur.

en: *On the Hexaemeron* I (on Genesis 1:26). In that which follows, namely *toward our image and likeness*, the one and equal substance of the same holy Trinity is signified.

la: Vat., omisso *quod*, hic et immediate post pro *dicit* bis exhibet *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition], omitting *quod*, here and immediately after, twice exhibits *dicitur* in place of *dicit*.

la: Cap. I. n. 2.

en: Chapter I, n. 2.

en: *Number* 23.

la: Cod. W *primo ergo praemittit* «.

en: Codex W puts the opening quotation mark *«* before *primo ergo*.

la: *De Synod.* n. 13; in qua definitione sola Vat. *coaequatio* pro *coaequandum* etc. — Integram definitionem invenies in *lit. Magistri* hic c. 2, notula. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *unius*.

en: *On the Synods*, n. 13; in which definition only the Vatican [edition reads] *coaequatio* for *coaequandum* etc. — You will find the entire definition in the *Master's text* here at c. 2, in the note. — A little later the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc omits *unius*.

la: Haec etymologia nominis *imitago* attribuitur Sexto Pompeio Festo, qui Verrii Flacci librum *de Verborum significatione* in compendium redegit saec. 3. vel 4. post Christum natum (cfr. Forcellini). Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 1. (c. 2.) ait: *Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est.*

en: This etymology of the name *imitago* is attributed to Sextus Pompeius Festus, who reduced into compendium the book of Verrius Flaccus *On the signification of words* in the 3rd or 4th c. after Christ (cf. Forcellini). Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 1 (c. 2), says: "For an image is that whose generation is by imitation."

la: Et si hoc exemplar est in mente artificis, vocatur *idea*, quae a Seneca, *Epist.* 65. ad Lucilium, sic definitur: *exemplar, ad quod respiciens artifex, id quod destinabat, effecit.* — Cod. T cum pluribus aliis paulo ante pro *activi* ponit *activum*, et dein *passivum* pro *passivi*.

en: And if this exemplar is in the mind of the artist, it is called the *idea*, which is defined by Seneca, *Epistle* 65 to Lucilius, thus: "the exemplar, looking to which the artist makes that which he had intended." — Codex T with many others a little before puts *activum* for *activi*, and then *passivum* for *passivi*.

la: August., *Serm.* IX (*de Decem Chordis*) c. 8. n. 9: *Nam etiam imagines in hominibus diversae sunt. Filius hominis habet imaginem patris sui, et hoc est quod pater eius, quia homo est sicut pater eius; in speculo autem imago tua non hoc est quod tu... Sicut enim in nummo imago imperatoris aliter est, aliter in filio; nam imago et imago est, sed aliter impressa est in nummo, aliter in filio; aliter in solido aureo imago imperatoris; sic et tu nummus Dei es* etc.

en: Augustine, *Sermon* IX (*On the Ten Strings*) c. 8, n. 9: "For images in human beings are also various. The son of a man has the image of his father, and this is what his father is, since the man is as his father is; but in a mirror your image is not that which you are... For just as in a coin the image of the emperor is in one way, in the son in another; for an image is an image, but it is impressed in one way in a coin, in another in the son; and in another way in a gold *solidus* the image of the emperor; so you also are a coin of God" etc.

la: Id est: improprie vel falso accipere.

en: That is: to take improperly or falsely.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. et ed. 1 *dicatur*. Paulo inferius pro *exemplans* codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 non recte *exemplaris*, et subinde pro *videntur* Vat., faventibus nonnullis codd., *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with a few codices and edition 1 [reads] *dicatur*. A little below, in place of *exemplans*, the codices with editions 1, 2, 3 incorrectly [read] *exemplaris*, and subsequently in place of *videntur* the Vatican [edition], with several codices in agreement, [reads] *dicitur*.

la: Sola Vat. textum sic supplet: *vel personae ad aliam personam, vel essentiae ad creaturam.* Mox post *Nunquam* pro *etiam* cod. R *ergo*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone supplies the text thus: "either of person to another person, or of the essence to a creature." Soon after *Nunquam*, in place of *etiam*, codex R [reads] *ergo*.

la: Cod. W adiicit *Dei*.

en: Codex W adds *Dei*.

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *animae*, id est *in potentiis*, cod. T (in marg.) adiungit *vel in potentiis*.

en: Codices aa, bb add *animae*, that is *in potentiis*; codex T (in margin) appends *vel in potentiis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De creata imagine Dei actum est supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine, et p. II. a. I. q. 2, et diffusius agetur II. *Sent.* d. 16. Hic vero tractatur de imagine increata, quae nomen proprium est Filii. — Primo definitur et explicatur nomen *imago* in sensu proprio, deinde idem nomen in sensu improprio («contingit abuti imagine»), quatenus est imago imaginans sive faciens imaginem (cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 16. dub. 3.). — In fine respons. auctor concludit, quod imago, in quocumque sensu intelligatur, semper includit respectum, et quidem in ipso Deo respectum secundum relationem personalem, si intelligitur in sensu proprio. — Ex hac quaest. et dub. 2. 3. aliisque locis eruitur secundum mentem S. Bonaventurae tria requiri ad perfectam imaginis rationem, scil. ut aliquid sit simile ei, quod repraesentat, vel specie, vel saltem in signo speciei — ut illud alterum imitetur et exprimat (unde deficiente hac conditione, ovum non est imago ovi, ut dicit S. August., *83 Quaestion.* q. 74.) — ut imago referatur ad imaginatum ut ad suum *prototypum* realiter ab ipso distinctum. Aliis verbis idem docet S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 2. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 35. a. 1.

**II.** Quod imago et secundum relationem dicatur, et «secundum vocabuli proprietatem», et quod Filii sit proprium nomen (q. seq.), inter doctores Latinos est sententia communis contra paucos, inter quos Durandus (I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 3.), qui sicut de verbo (cfr. supra d. 27. p. II. q. 1.), ita de imagine docet, quod «non conveniat proprie divinis, prout tamen dicitur personaliter, et non essentialiter».

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 61. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., locis cit. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 9; *S.* p. I. tr. 8. q. 35. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 3. q. 1. — Ægid. R., I. *Sent.* princ. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 68. q. 2. n. 21 seqq. — Durand., loc. cit. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Of the created image of God treatment was had above d. 3, p. I, q. 2, at the end, and p. II, a. I, q. 2, and more at length it will be treated in II *Sent.* d. 16. Here, however, treatment is had of the uncreated image, which is the proper name of the Son. — First, the name *image* is defined and explained in its proper sense; then the same name in an improper sense ("it happens that *image* is misused"), insofar as it is an imaging *image* or one making an image (cf. II *Sent.* d. 16, dub. 3). — At the end of the response the author concludes that *image*, in whatever sense it be understood, always includes a regard, and indeed in God himself a regard according to personal relation, if it is understood in the proper sense. — From this question and dub. 2 and 3 and other places it is gathered, according to the mind of St. Bonaventure, that three things are required for the perfect account of an image, namely: that something be like that which it represents, either in species, or at least in a sign of the species — that it imitate and express the other (whence, this condition failing, an egg is not the image of an egg, as St. Augustine says, *83 Questions*, q. 74) — that the image be referred to the imaged as to its *prototype* really distinct from itself. In other words, St. Thomas teaches the same thing, I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 2, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 35, a. 1.

**II.** That *image* is said also according to relation, and "according to the propriety of the word," and that it is the proper name of the Son (next q.), is among the Latin doctors the common opinion, against a few, among whom Durandus (I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 3), who, just as he teaches concerning the Word (cf. above d. 27, p. II, q. 1), so concerning *image* teaches that "it is not properly applied to the divine, although [yet] it is said personally and not essentially."

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 61, m. 1, 2. — St. Thom., at the places cited. — B. Albert., on this and the next question, I *Sent.* d. 28, a. 9; *S.* p. I, tr. 8, q. 35, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 3, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 28, a. 3, q. 1. — Ægid. R., I *Sent.* *princ.* 2, q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 68, q. 2, n. 21 seqq. — Durand., at the place cited. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 4.

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