site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 23, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 501 -->

# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa notificatione, quam Magister ponit: *Fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur.* Videtur enim ista definitio minus recte assignari, quia Ioannis vigesimo[^p501-1] dictum est Thomae: *Quia vidisti me, credidisti;* constat, quod Thomas credidit vera fide: ergo ista definitio non convenit omni fidei universaliter. — Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc de diversitate notificationum ipsius fidei, quae a diversis doctoribus assignantur. Videtur enim, quod minus recte, quia, cum « unius rei unum sit *esse* » ; et « definitio est ratio indicans *quid est esse* » ; videtur, quod fidei unica tantum debet assignari definitio[^p501-2]. Quaeritur ergo, penes quid, et quomodo differenter assignantur?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod virtus fidei, secundum quod multipliciter habet considerari, habet diversimode notificari. Consideratur enim fides quantum ad *genus proprium*; et sic definitur ab Augustino[^p501-3]: « Fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur ».

Consideratur secundo quantum ad *finem ultimum*; et sic definitur ab Apostolo[^p501-4]: « Fides est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium » ; et haec definitio explanatur a Damasceno in libro suo: « Fides est eorum quae sperantur hypostasis, rerum redargutio, quae non videntur ».

Consideratur tertio quantum ad *obiectum* et *principium motivum*; et sic definitur ab Augustino ad Consentium[^p501-5]: « Fides est illuminatio mentis ad summam Veritatem » .

Consideratur nihilominus quantum ad *actum proprium*; et sic definitur a Damasceno[^p501-6]: « Fides est non inquisitus consensus » circa primam Veritatem; vel secundum alios *affirmative:* « inquisitus consensus », quia in diversis translationibus utrumque reperitur; et utrumque potest intelligi vere, quia, quamvis videantur dicere oppositum, una tamen explanat alteram. Cum enim dicitur fides *consensus inquisitus*, hoc est dicere, id est consensus *non quaesitus*; et tunc *in* tenetur *privative* et tantum valet quantum *consensus non inquisitus*, hoc est assensus, quo quis libere assentit Veritati, non innitens alicui rationi.

Consideratur etiam in ordine ad *subiectum*; et sic definitur a Dionysio in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo septimo[^p501-7]: « Fides est unicum credentium fundamentum, eos collocans Veritati ».

Consideratur etiam in comparatione ad *habitus alios* quantum ad *assentiendi modum*; et sic definitur ab Hugone in libro de Sacramentis[^p501-8]: « Fides est certitudo quaedam de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta » .

Ex his patet, quod fides habet diversimode notificari, secundum quod habet diversimode considerari, videlicet in comparatione ad *genus proprium*, ad *finem ultimum*, ad *obiectum*, ad *actum proprium*, ad *subiectum* et ad *habitum disparatum*.

Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de Thoma, quod et vidit et credidit; dicendum, quod aliud *credidit*,

<!-- page 502 -->

scilicet Divinitatem, et aliud *vidit*, videlicet humanitatem. Sed hoc melius infra[^p502-1] determinabitur, cum agetur de obiecto fidei.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *fides accipitur tribus modis.* Videtur enim, quod insufficienter distinguat ipsam fidem; videmus enim, fidem aliquando accipi pro ipsa *conscientia*, secundum quod dicitur ad Romanos decimo quarto[^p502-2]: *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est;* quod non continetur sub aliquo praedictorum. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, de quot modis fides dicatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod fides invenitur accipi decem modis. — Aliquando enim accipitur pro *sponsione*; prima ad Timotheum quinto[^p502-3]: *Primam fidem irritam fecerunt.* — Aliquando pro *fidelitate*; Ieremiae septimo: *Periit fides et Sanctus de terra.* — Aliquando pro *conscientia*; ad Romanos decimo quarto: *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est.* — Aliquando pro *Sacramento fidei*, secundum quod dicit Augustinus ad Bonifacium[^p502-4], quod non est aliud parvulos habere fidem quam habere fidei Sacramentum. — Aliquando pro *acceptatione conclusionis per rationem probatae*, secundum quod dicit Boethius[^p502-5]: « Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem ». — Aliquando pro *cognitione comprehensionis*, secundum quod dicitur ad Romanos primo[^p502-6]: *Iustitia Dei revelatur ex fide in fidem;* Glossa: « in fidem speciei », quae dicitur fides, quia fidentissima et certissima est. — Aliquando pro *habitu fidei informis*; Iacobi secundo[^p502-7]: *Fides sine operibus mortua est.* — Aliquando pro *habitu fidei formatae*; ad Romanos primo: *Iustus ex fide vivit.* — Aliquando pro *actu fidei*, secundum quod dicit Augustinus[^p502-8]: « Fides est credere quod non vides ». — Aliquando pro *ipso obiecto fidei*, secundum quod dicitur in Symbolo Athanasii: « Haec est fides catholica » etc.

De omnibus autem his modis contingit dicere fidem secundum quandam *analogiam*, pro eo quod in omnibus reperitur quaedam ratio assensus et credulitatis[^p502-9] cuiusdam, licet non uniformiter. De his autem decem modis Magister solum tres assumit, quia illi sunt, qui faciunt ad suum propositum principale, videlicet ad praemissae definitionis explanationem[^p502-10].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Aliud est credere in Deum, aliud credere Deo, aliud credere Deum.* Si enim habitus distinguuntur per actus[^p502-11], videtur, quod non sit unius fidei omnia ista facere, sed diversarum; quod falsum est, quia una fide omnia haec tria facimus. — Item, videtur, quod male definiat *credere in Deum*, cum dicit, quod *credere in Deum est credendo amare* etc. Si enim *credere* et *amare* sunt actus disparati[^p502-12], videtur, quod unus per alterum non habeat definiri. — Item, videtur esse inculcatio verborum, cum dicit: *credendo amare, credendo in eum ire*[^p502-13]*, credendo incorporari;* idem enim videtur per verba illa dici.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Magister, aliud et aliud est sive alius et alius modus credendi: *credere Deo* et *Deum* et *in Deum*. Et isti quidem actus possunt ad diversos habitus pertinere, possunt etiam pertinere ad eundem, quoniam non sunt sic diversi, quin habeant ad invicem ordinem. Nam *credere Deum* respicit divinam Veritatem ut *obiectum*; *credere Deo*, ut *motivum*; *credere in Deum*, ut *finem ultimum*. Et istae tres comparationes circa eundem habitum reperiri habent. Et quoniam fides non perfecte tendit in Deum tanquam in *finem*[^p502-14], nisi prout est iuncta caritati; ideo actus cre-

<!-- page 503 -->

dendi in Deum definitur per actum amandi, non tanquam per actum *proprium*, sed tanquam per actum *annexum.* — Et iterum, quia quadruplex genus actus annexum est ipsi fidei, secundum quod iungitur caritati, secundum quadruplicem comparationem; ideo quatuor ponit in eius notificatione. Fides enim, prout iuncta est caritati, ordinat ad *amandum Deum*, ad *faciendum bonum*, ad *sustinendum*[^p503-1] *malum*, ad *diligendum proximum*. Et iuxta haec quatuor, quatuor ponit actus in illa notificatione, videlicet credendo *amare* quantum ad affectum, credendo *ire* quantum ad bonum opus, credendo ei *adhaerere* quantum ad tolerantiam mali, credendo *incorporari* membris quantum ad dilectionem proximi. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa quae quaerebantur[^p503-2].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: *Fidem ipsam videt quisque in corde suo esse.* Si enim virtutes ad invicem connexae sunt, et aliquis scit, se habere fidem; videtur per consequens, quod sciat, se habere caritatem; cuius contrarium in primo libro ostensum fuit distinctione decima septima[^p503-3]. — Item, si fides videtur et certissime cognoscitur, eo quod essentialiter sit in anima, cum caritas et gratia essentialiter sint in anima; est quaestio, quare non cognoscatur certissime ab his, a quibus habentur.

Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur de *modis visionis*, quos assignat Augustinus in littera[^p503-4]; videtur enim eadem illa divisio esse superflua, cum super Genesim ad litteram in libro duodecimo et in Glossa secundae ad Corinthios duodecimo non distinguantur nisi tria genera visionum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum verbum Augustini[^p503-5], *fides* essentialiter existens in anima cognoscitur per sui *essentiam*; et hoc communiter omnes tenent.

De *caritate* autem quidam dicunt, quod videtur *essentialiter*, et scit homo, se habere caritatem, qui habet; sed nescit, utrum in ea perseveret[^p503-6]. Dicunt enim, hoc esse generaliter verum, quod de omnibus, quae sunt essentialiter in anima, habet anima certam scientiam, quia cognoscit ea per eorum essentiam, sive sit habitus gratiae, sive caritatis, sive alterius virtutis. — Sed haec responsio contrariatur ipsi cognitioni experimentali. Multa enim sunt in nobis, quae nos latent; et multae animae sunt deformes, quae suas deformitates nullo modo noverunt; et multa sunt in nobis, quae patent[^p503-7]. Et propterea non est dicendum, quod omnia quae sunt in anima essentialiter, teneantur visione et cognitione certa. Et de caritate et gratia satis est planum, quia pauci vel nulli sunt, qui sciant certitudinaliter, se esse in gratia; et hoc melius scitur, si inquiratur a viris sanctis et bonis.

Ideo aliter dicunt alii, quod dupliciter scitur aliquid, videlicet *scientia notitiae* et *scientia discretionis*, secundum quod traditur ab Augustino in libro de Trinitate[^p503-8], quod aliud est rem *nosse*, aliud co-

<!-- page 504 -->

gitare et distinguere. Dicunt ergo, quod omnia quae essentialiter sunt in anima, certissime sciuntur *scientia notitiae*; qua quidem scientia dicit Augustinus[^p504-1], quod anima non potest se ipsam ignorare; et sic cognoscuntur tam fides quam caritas quam etiam alia. Sed si de *scientia discretionis* loquamur, sic non habet veritatem, pro eo quod ea quae essentialiter sunt in anima, etsi scientia notitiae cognoscantur, tamen ab aliis non semper *discernuntur*, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p504-2] de ipsa anima, quod etsi non possit se ipsam non *nosse*, nescit tamen aliquando se ab aliis *discernere*; sicut patet de illis qui posuerunt, animam esse corpus, vel aquam, vel ignem. Et hoc modo non habet quis notitiam de caritate, quae est in se, nec de gratia gratum faciente, quia nescit eam discernere a dono gratiae gratis datae, propter ipsius mentis obnubilationem ex phantasmatum involutione[^p504-3]. — Sed nec adhuc istud sufficit, quia non solum cognoscit quis habens fidem ipsum habitum *scientia notitiae*, sed etiam *discretionis* et *cognitionis*; discernit enim ipsum ab aliis habitibus virtutum.

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod cognitio, qua anima cognoscit illud quod habet in se, est cognitio cuiusdam *experientiae*; per hoc enim cognoscit aliquis, se habere fidem, dum ad se ipsum introrsus ingrediens experitur, utrum sit promptus ad credendum; sic de aliis habitibus virtutum et aliis omnibus, quae latent introrsus. Quoniam igitur anima non potest habere *experientiam*, nisi de eo quod est in potestate sua, et de eo quod respicit actum animae, cum experientia dicat usum alicuius potentiae[^p504-4]; hinc est, quod quando aliqua sic sunt in anima, quod reddunt eius potentiam *habilem ad aliquod opus*, vel circumstant alicui operi interiori, talia possunt cognosci ab ipsa anima *certitudinaliter*. Unde si aliquis est habilis ad aliquod opus, certissime se novit habere illum habitum, sicut fidelis habitum credendi, et amans habitum amandi, et sic de ceteris. Quando vero aliqua sic sunt in anima, quod ipsa principaliter non respiciunt usum alicuius potentiae, sicut character, vel sicut deformitas culpae praeteritae, vel quae sunt supra potestatem ipsius animae, sicut gratia, in quantum reddit acceptum Deo, et caritas similiter; quia de talibus non potest habere anima *experientiam*, non potest habere certam *notitiam*. Ideo cum dicitur, quod illa quae sunt essentialiter in anima, certitudinaliter cognoscuntur; hoc intelligitur de illis, de quibus potest sumere anima *certum experimentum*; de his autem, de quibus non potest sumere experimentum[^p504-5] nisi per coniecturam, non cognoscit nisi coniecturando. Et quoniam de fide, secundum quod reddit *habilem ad credendum*, certissima potest haberi *experientia*; secundum autem quod suum *credere* est Deo *acceptum*, certa *experientia* haberi non potest, sed solum *coniectura*: hinc est, quod fides quantum ad *habitum substratum* certissime videtur ab anima; in quantum autem est *formata*, non cognoscitur nisi per *coniecturam*; et sic est aliis connexa. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de caritate et gratia.

Ad illud quod obiicit de sufficientia illorum modorum, dicendum, quod *modi videndi* possunt dupliciter distingui: vel a parte *virtutis cognoscentis*, vel a parte *medii*. Si a parte *virtutis cognitivae*[^p504-6], cum illa sit triplex, scilicet sensitiva exterior, imaginativa et intellectiva; sic triplex distinguitur *visio*, videlicet corporalis, imaginativa et intellectualis. — Si autem a parte *medii*, tunc sex sunt differentiae, quarum sufficientia patet sic. Omne enim, quod videtur ab anima, aut videtur per sui *essentiam*, aut videtur per sui *speciem*, aut videtur per *rem aliam*, ab ipsa simpliciter differentem. Si per sui *essentiam* videtur, sic est unus modus, qui ponitur sexto loco[^p504-7]. Si per sui *speciem*, hoc potest esse tripliciter: nam illa species aut est omnino *concreta materiae*, aut *abstracta*, aut *partim concreta, partim abstracta.* Concreta est, prout apprehenditur a sensu exteriori, licet sit ibi aliqua abstractio[^p504-8]; simpliciter abstracta, prout apprehenditur ab intellectu; medio modo, prout apprehenditur ab imaginatione; et sic

<!-- page 505 -->

sunt tres primi modi. — Si autem res habet cognosci per rem ab ipsa *differentem*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quia comparatur ad ipsam sub ratione *similis*, aut in ratione *effectus.* Et sic duo sunt modi, videlicet quartus et quintus. Et si tu obiicias, quod aliquid potest comparari ad alterum in ratione *disparati*, vel in ratione *contrarii*; dicendum, quod nec *disparatum* nec *contrarium* facit cognoscere aliquid, nisi in quantum innuit aliquem modum in ratione *similis.* Unde qui cognoscit, quod « album disgregat », per consequens cognoscit, quod « nigrum congregat », quia « similiter se habet oppositum ad oppositum, sicut propositum ad propositum[^p505-1] ».

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Probatur futura resurrectio, quia ita crediderunt Patriarchae et alii Sancti*, et propter hoc vult dicere, quod fides dicatur *argumentum.* Hoc enim videtur potius ad oppositum quam ad propositum. Si enim *probatur* istud quod creditur per auctoritatem Patrum, tunc videtur, quod fides non sit *argumentum*, immo potius *conclusio*: ergo si fides est *argumentum*, videtur, quod non recte dicat, quod resurrectio probatur per fidem Patrum. — Item, si locus *ab auctoritate* est incertissimus[^p505-2], et fides trahit fundamentum a loco ab *auctoritate*: ergo videtur, quod fides sit incertissima.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum aliquos[^p505-3] verbum Magistri intelligitur hic de fide, quae est *acquisita* ex inspectione Scripturarum, non autem de illa, quae est *inspirata* et quae numeratur inter spiritualia charismata. — Sed illud non satisfacit, quia Magister hoc dicit ad exponendam illam definitionem, quam Apostolus[^p505-4] assignat; et constat, quod Apostolus loquitur de fide *formata.*

Et propterea dicendum est aliter, quod secundum quod Magister[^p505-5] dicit, illud quod creditur per fidem, « per ipsam fidem probatur ». Ipsum enim, quod creditur, probatur per *auctoritatem*; auctoritas autem nullius est efficaciae in probando nisi per *fidem*: et ita tota firmitas argumenti ad fidem redit. Unde si aliquis quaerat, utrum resurrectio sit futura, probatur ei[^p505-6] per auctoritates sacrae Scripturae et per verba Prophetarum, qui ita dixerunt. Sed si quaerat ulterius, ut probem ei, quod ipsi verum dixerunt; respondebitur ei, quod scimus, ipsos verum dixisse, quia a Spiritu sancto illuminati fuerunt[^p505-7], et ita certificati fuerunt per *fidem*, quam a Deo acceperunt; et nos certificamur de eorum certificatione per *fidem*, quam ab ipso Deo accipimus. — Et sic patet, quod expositio Magistri bona est, quia per hoc non vult dicere, quod fides *probetur*, sed magis, quod fides *probet*, ita quod vere et proprie dicatur ab Apostolo « *argumentum*[^p505-8] ».

### Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *fides caritatem praecedit.* Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia, sicut dicit Ambrosius[^p505-9], « caritas est mater virtutum » et caput; et mater praecedit illud cuius est mater. — Item, Glossa super illud Psalmi[^p505-10]: *Noli aemulari*, dicit, quod « spes est introitus ad fidem »: ergo videtur, quod fides non sit prima inter virtutes theologicas, secundum quod dicitur in littera. — Item, omnes virtutes simul infunduntur[^p505-11]: ergo non videtur, quod reperiatur in illis aliquis ordo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de fide et aliis virtutibus dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad *ha-*

<!-- page 506 -->

*bitum* et quantum ad *actum.* Si quantum ad *habitum*, sic est ibi *simultas*; si quantum ad *actum*, sic est ibi *naturalis ordo*, pro eo quod actus fidei *praeambulus* est ad actum spei et caritatis. Nemo enim aliquid sperat, vel amat, nisi illud cognoscat et aliquo modo credat[^p506-1].

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *caritas est mater*; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quantum ad rationem *merendi.* Praeterea, caritas dicitur esse *mater virtutum*, non quia illas generet, sed quia illas fovet et nutrit, ut perveniant ad statum perfectionis[^p506-2].

Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, dicendum, quod fides non accipitur ibi pro *fide-virtute*, vel eius actu, sed pro illo quod fidei *succedit*, videlicet pro ipsa beatissima *visione*[^p506-3].

english:
<!-- page 501 -->

# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that notification which the Master sets down: *Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed.* For this definition seems to be assigned less correctly, because in the twentieth chapter of John[^p501-1] it was said to Thomas: *Because you have seen me, you have believed;* it is established that Thomas believed by true faith: therefore this definition does not fit faith universally. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked about the diversity of the notifications of faith itself, which are assigned by various teachers. For it seems that this is less correct, because, since « of one thing there is one *being* » ; and « a definition is the account indicating *what the being is* » ; it seems that only a single definition ought to be assigned to faith[^p501-2]. It is asked, therefore, in regard to what, and how they are differently assigned?

**I respond:** It must be said that the virtue of faith, according as it can be considered in many ways, can be notified in diverse ways. For faith is considered with respect to its *proper genus*; and thus it is defined by Augustine[^p501-3]: « Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed ».

It is considered, secondly, with respect to its *ultimate end*; and thus it is defined by the Apostle[^p501-4]: « Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing » ; and this definition is explained by the Damascene in his book: « Faith is the hypostasis of those things which are hoped for, the refutation of things which are not seen ».

It is considered, thirdly, with respect to its *object* and its *motive principle*; and thus it is defined by Augustine, to Consentius[^p501-5]: « Faith is the illumination of the mind toward the highest Truth » .

It is considered, nevertheless, with respect to its *proper act*; and thus it is defined by the Damascene[^p501-6]: « Faith is an unsought consent » concerning the first Truth; or, according to others, *affirmatively*: « a sought consent », because in different translations both are found; and both can be understood truly, because, although they seem to say the opposite, the one explains the other. For when faith is called a *sought consent*, this is to say, that is, a consent *not investigated*; and then the *in-* is taken *privatively* and is worth just as much as *unsought consent*, that is, the assent by which someone freely assents to the Truth, not relying on any reasoning.

It is considered also in relation to its *subject*; and thus it is defined by Dionysius in the book on the Divine Names, chapter seven[^p501-7]: « Faith is the single foundation of believers, establishing them in the Truth ».

It is considered also in comparison with *other habits* with respect to the *mode of assenting*; and thus it is defined by Hugh in the book on the Sacraments[^p501-8]: « Faith is a certain certitude about absent things, established above opinion and below knowledge » .

From these things it is clear that faith can be notified in diverse ways, according as it can be considered in diverse ways, namely in comparison with its *proper genus*, with its *ultimate end*, with its *object*, with its *proper act*, with its *subject*, and with a *disparate habit*.

To that which is first objected concerning Thomas, that he both saw and believed; it must be said that he *believed* one thing,

<!-- page 502 -->

namely the Divinity, and *saw* another, namely the humanity. But this will be determined better below[^p502-1], when the object of faith is treated.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *faith is taken in three modes.* For it seems that he distinguishes faith itself insufficiently; for we see that faith is sometimes taken for *conscience* itself, according as it is said in the fourteenth chapter of Romans[^p502-2]: *Whatever is not from faith is sin;* which is not contained under any of the aforesaid. — In connection with this it is asked, in how many modes faith is spoken of.

**I respond:** It must be said that faith is found to be taken in ten modes. — For sometimes it is taken for a *pledge*; in the fifth chapter of First Timothy[^p502-3]: *They have made void their first faith.* — Sometimes for *fidelity*; in the seventh chapter of Jeremiah: *Faith and the holy one have perished from the earth.* — Sometimes for *conscience*; in the fourteenth chapter of Romans: *Whatever is not from faith is sin.* — Sometimes for the *Sacrament of faith*, according as Augustine says, to Boniface[^p502-4], that for little ones to have faith is nothing other than to have the Sacrament of faith. — Sometimes for the *acceptance of a conclusion proved by reason*, according as Boethius says[^p502-5]: « An argument is the account producing belief in a doubtful matter ». — Sometimes for the *cognition of comprehension*, according as it is said in the first chapter of Romans[^p502-6]: *The justice of God is revealed from faith unto faith;* the Gloss: « unto the faith of vision », which is called faith because it is most confident and most certain. — Sometimes for the *habit of unformed faith*; in the second chapter of James[^p502-7]: *Faith without works is dead.* — Sometimes for the *habit of formed faith*; in the first chapter of Romans: *The just man lives from faith.* — Sometimes for the *act of faith*, according as Augustine says[^p502-8]: « Faith is to believe what you do not see ». — Sometimes for the *object of faith* itself, according as it is said in the Symbol of Athanasius: « This is the catholic faith » etc.

But concerning all these modes it is fitting to speak of faith according to a certain *analogy*, for the reason that in all of them there is found a certain account of assent and of a certain *credulity*[^p502-9], although not uniformly. But of these ten modes the Master takes up only three, because they are the ones that serve his principal purpose, namely the explanation of the aforesaid definition[^p502-10].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *To believe in God is one thing, to believe God another, to believe a God another.* For if habits are distinguished by their acts[^p502-11], it seems that it does not belong to one faith to do all these things, but to diverse ones; which is false, because by one faith we do all these three things. — Likewise, it seems that he defines *to believe in God* badly, when he says that *to believe in God is by believing to love* etc. For if *to believe* and *to love* are disparate acts[^p502-12], it seems that the one ought not to be defined through the other. — Likewise, it seems to be a piling-up of words, when he says: *by believing to love, by believing to go into him*[^p502-13]*, by believing to be incorporated;* for the same thing seems to be said through those words.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says, the mode of believing is one and another, or the manner is one and another: *to believe God* and *a God* and *in God.* And these acts can indeed pertain to diverse habits; they can also pertain to the same one, since they are not so diverse that they do not have an order to one another. For *to believe a God* regards the divine Truth as *object*; *to believe God*, as *motive*; *to believe in God*, as *ultimate end.* And these three comparisons can be found about the same habit. And since faith does not tend perfectly into God as into an *end*[^p502-14], except insofar as it is joined to charity; therefore the act of be-

<!-- page 503 -->

lieving in God is defined through the act of loving, not as through a *proper* act, but as through an *annexed* act. — And again, because a fourfold genus of act is annexed to faith itself, according as it is joined to charity, according to a fourfold comparison; therefore he sets down four things in its notification. For faith, insofar as it is joined to charity, orders one *to love God*, *to do good*, *to bear*[^p503-1] *evil*, *to love one's neighbor.* And according to these four, he sets down four acts in that notification, namely by believing *to love* with respect to the affection, by believing *to go* with respect to the good work, by believing *to cleave* to him with respect to the toleration of evil, by believing *to be incorporated* into the members with respect to the love of neighbor. — And thus the response to the things that were asked is clear[^p503-2].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says: *Each one sees that faith itself is in his heart.* For if the virtues are connected to one another, and someone knows that he has faith; it seems consequently that he knows that he has charity; the contrary of which was shown in the first book, in the seventeenth distinction[^p503-3]. — Likewise, if faith is seen and is most certainly known, because it is essentially in the soul, since charity and grace are essentially in the soul; the question is why it is not most certainly known by those by whom it is had.

In connection with this it is also asked about the *modes of vision* which Augustine assigns in the text[^p503-4]; for that same division seems to be superfluous, since on Genesis according to the letter, in the twelfth book, and in the Gloss on the twelfth chapter of Second Corinthians, only three kinds of vision are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the word of Augustine[^p503-5], *faith*, existing essentially in the soul, is known through its *essence*; and this all commonly hold.

But concerning *charity* some say that it is seen *essentially*, and that a man who has charity knows that he has it; but he does not know whether he perseveres in it[^p503-6]. For they say that this is generally true, that of all things which are essentially in the soul the soul has certain knowledge, because it knows them through their essence, whether it be a habit of grace, or of charity, or of any other virtue. — But this response is contrary to experiential cognition itself. For there are many things in us which lie hidden from us; and many souls are deformed which in no way know their own deformities; and there are many things in us which lie open[^p503-7]. And therefore it must not be said that all things which are in the soul essentially are held by sure vision and cognition. And concerning charity and grace it is plain enough, because few or none are there who know with certitude that they are in grace; and this is better known if it is inquired of holy and good men.

Therefore others say otherwise, that something is known in two ways, namely by the *knowledge of acquaintance* and by the *knowledge of discernment*, according as it is handed down by Augustine in the book on the Trinity[^p503-8], that to *know* a thing is one thing, to think about it and dis-

<!-- page 504 -->

tinguish it another. They say, therefore, that all things which are essentially in the soul are most certainly known by the *knowledge of acquaintance*; by which knowledge Augustine says[^p504-1] that the soul cannot be ignorant of itself; and thus both faith and charity and other things too are known. But if we speak of the *knowledge of discernment*, then it does not hold true, for the reason that those things which are essentially in the soul, even if they are known by the knowledge of acquaintance, are nevertheless not always *discerned* from other things, as Augustine says[^p504-2] of the soul itself, that even if it cannot fail to *know* itself, it sometimes does not know how to *discern* itself from other things; as is clear concerning those who held that the soul is a body, or water, or fire. And in this manner one does not have acquaintance with the charity which is in oneself, nor with the grace that makes one pleasing, because he does not know how to discern it from the gift of grace freely given, on account of the clouding of the mind itself by the involvement of phantasms[^p504-3]. — But not even this yet suffices, because one who has faith knows the habit itself not only by the knowledge of acquaintance, but also by that of discernment and of cognition; for he discerns it from the other habits of the virtues.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that the cognition by which the soul knows that which it has in itself is the cognition of a certain *experience*; for through this someone knows that he has faith, while, entering inward to himself, he experiences whether he is ready to believe; thus concerning the other habits of the virtues and all other things that lie hidden within. Since, therefore, the soul cannot have *experience* except of that which is in its own power, and of that which regards the act of the soul, since experience denotes the use of some power[^p504-4]; hence it is that, when certain things are so in the soul that they render its power *fit for some work*, or stand about some interior work, such things can be known by the soul itself *with certitude.* Hence if someone is fit for some work, he most certainly knows that he has that habit, as the believer the habit of believing, and the lover the habit of loving, and so concerning the rest. But when certain things are so in the soul that they themselves principally do not regard the use of some power, like a character, or like the deformity of past fault, or which are above the power of the soul itself, like grace, insofar as it renders one acceptable to God, and charity likewise; because the soul cannot have *experience* of such things, it cannot have certain *acquaintance.* Therefore when it is said that those things which are essentially in the soul are known with certitude; this is understood of those things of which the soul can take *certain experiment*; but of those of which it cannot take experiment[^p504-5] except by conjecture, it does not know except by conjecturing. And since concerning faith, according as it renders one *fit for believing*, most certain *experience* can be had; but according as one's *believing* is *acceptable* to God, certain *experience* cannot be had, but only *conjecture*: hence it is that faith, with respect to the *underlying habit*, is most certainly seen by the soul; but insofar as it is *formed*, it is not known except by *conjecture*; and thus it is connected with the others. — And through this the response to that which is objected concerning charity and grace is clear.

To that which he objects concerning the sufficiency of those modes, it must be said that *the modes of seeing* can be distinguished in two ways: either on the part of the *knowing power*, or on the part of the *medium.* If on the part of the *cognitive power*[^p504-6], since it is threefold, namely the exterior sensitive, the imaginative, and the intellective; thus *vision* is distinguished as threefold, namely corporeal, imaginative, and intellectual. — But if on the part of the *medium*, then there are six differences, whose sufficiency is shown thus. For everything that is seen by the soul is seen either through its *essence*, or is seen through its *species*, or is seen through *another thing*, simply differing from it. If it is seen through its *essence*, thus there is one mode, which is placed in the sixth place[^p504-7]. If through its *species*, this can be in three ways: for that species is either wholly *concreted to matter*, or *abstracted*, or *partly concreted, partly abstracted.* It is concreted when it is apprehended by the exterior sense, although there is some abstraction there[^p504-8]; simply abstracted, when it is apprehended by the intellect; in the middle manner, when it is apprehended by the imagination; and thus

<!-- page 505 -->

these are the first three modes. — But if a thing is to be known through a thing *differing* from it, this can be in two ways: either because it is compared to it under the account of the *similar*, or in the account of an *effect.* And thus there are two modes, namely the fourth and the fifth. And if you object that something can be compared to another in the account of the *disparate*, or in the account of the *contrary*; it must be said that neither the *disparate* nor the *contrary* makes a thing known, except insofar as it hints at some mode in the account of the *similar.* Hence one who knows that « white disperses [the sight] » consequently knows that « black gathers [it] », because « the opposite is related to the opposite in the same way as the proposed to the proposed[^p505-1] ».

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The future resurrection is proved, because the Patriarchs and other saints believed thus*, and on account of this he means to say that faith is called an *argument.* For this seems to tend rather to the opposite than to the point at issue. For if that which is believed is *proved* through the authority of the Fathers, then it seems that faith is not an *argument*, but rather a *conclusion*: therefore if faith is an *argument*, it seems that he does not say correctly that the resurrection is proved through the faith of the Fathers. — Likewise, if the argument *from authority* is most uncertain[^p505-2], and faith draws its foundation from the argument from *authority*: therefore it seems that faith is most uncertain.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to some[^p505-3] the word of the Master is here understood of the faith which is *acquired* from the inspection of the Scriptures, but not of that which is *inspired* and which is numbered among the spiritual charisms. — But that does not satisfy, because the Master says this in order to explain that definition which the Apostle[^p505-4] assigns; and it is established that the Apostle speaks of *formed* faith.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that according to what the Master[^p505-5] says, that which is believed through faith « is proved through faith itself ». For that very thing which is believed is proved through *authority*; but authority is of no efficacy in proving except through *faith*: and thus the whole firmness of the argument returns to faith. Hence if someone asks whether the resurrection is to be, it is proved to him[^p505-6] through the authorities of sacred Scripture and through the words of the Prophets, who said thus. But if he asks further that I prove to him that they themselves said the truth; it will be answered him that we know that they said the truth, because they were illumined by the Holy Spirit[^p505-7], and so were made certain through the *faith* which they received from God; and we are made certain of their certification through the *faith* which we receive from God himself. — And thus it is clear that the exposition of the Master is good, because by this he does not mean to say that faith is *proved*, but rather that faith *proves*, so that it is truly and properly called by the Apostle « *argument*[^p505-8] ».

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *faith precedes charity.* For this seems to be false, because, as Ambrose says[^p505-9], « charity is the mother of the virtues » and the head; and the mother precedes that of which she is the mother. — Likewise, the Gloss on that verse of the Psalm[^p505-10]: *Do not emulate*, says that « hope is the entrance to faith »: therefore it seems that faith is not first among the theological virtues, according as it is said in the text. — Likewise, all the virtues are infused at the same time[^p505-11]: therefore it does not seem that any order is found in them.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of faith and the other virtues, namely with respect to the *ha-*

<!-- page 506 -->

*bit* and with respect to the *act.* If with respect to the *habit*, then there is *simultaneity*; if with respect to the *act*, then there is a *natural order*, for the reason that the act of faith is *preambular* to the act of hope and of charity. For no one hopes for or loves anything unless he knows it and in some way believes it[^p506-1].

To that, therefore, which is objected, that *charity is the mother*; it must be said that this is understood with respect to the account of *meriting.* Moreover, charity is called the *mother of the virtues*, not because she generates them, but because she fosters and nourishes them, so that they may come to the state of perfection[^p506-2].

To that which is objected concerning the Gloss, it must be said that faith is not taken there for *faith-the-virtue*, or its act, but for that which *succeeds* faith, namely for the most blessed *vision*[^p506-3] itself.

la: Vers. 29.

en: Verse 29.

la: Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.), propositis locis, ex quibus videre est, num quis « definiverit et dixerit, quid est esse » [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι], i. e. definiverit quidditatem sive essentiam (cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 7.), ait: Manifestum igitur, quod qui non per huiusmodi [scil. per priora et notiora] definivit, non definivit; si enim definivit, plures erunt eiusdem definitiones. Nam manifestum, quod et qui per priora ac notiora, iterum melius definivit; quare utraeque erunt definitiones eiusdem. Tale autem non videtur; nam unicuique eorum quae sunt, unum est *esse id ipsum quod est*; quare si plures erunt eiusdem definitiones, idem erit definito esse, quod quidem secundum utramque definitionem significatur; haec [esse sive essentiae] autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae etc. Cfr. II. Poster. c. 10. (c. 9.), et V. Metaph. text. 15. (IV. c. 8.), ac VII. text. 11. seqq. (VI. c. 4.), ubi illa *definitionis* notio allata invenitur, quae I. Topic. c. 4. etiam ad *terminum* (ὅρος) definitioni (ὁρισμός) respondentem applicatur, illa scilicet: « Oratio [λόγος] quid erat esse significans ». — Plurimi codd. habent *ratio, indicans quid est esse*, pro quo edd. fide paucorum tantum codd. substituerunt *oratio indicans, quid est esse rei.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4), the texts having been set forth from which it can be seen whether someone « has defined and stated what the being is » [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι], i.e. has defined the quiddity or essence (cf. above p. 341, note 7), says: It is manifest, therefore, that one who has not defined through things of this kind [namely through what is prior and more known] has not defined; for if he had defined, there would be several definitions of the same thing. For it is manifest that one who has defined through what is prior and more known has defined better a second time; wherefore both will be definitions of the same thing. But this does not seem so; for for each of the things that are, there is one *being which is that which it is*; wherefore if there will be several definitions of the same thing, the defined being will be the same, which indeed is signified according to each definition; but these [the being or the essence] are not the same, since the definitions are diverse, etc. Cf. *Posterior Analytics* II, c. 10 (c. 9), and *Metaphysics* V, text 15 (IV, c. 8), and VII, text 11 ff. (VI, c. 4), where that notion of *definition* cited is found, which in *Topics* I, c. 4 is also applied to the *term* (ὅρος) corresponding to the definition (ὁρισμός), namely this: « An account [λόγος] signifying what the being was ». — Most codices have *ratio, indicans quid est esse* [the account indicating what the being is], in place of which the editions, on the trust of only a few codices, have substituted *oratio indicans, quid est esse rei* [a discourse indicating what the being of the thing is].

la: Libr. II. Quaest. evang. q. 39. n. 1; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 79. n. 1. Cfr. ibid. tr. 40. n. 9. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Book II of the *Questions on the Gospels*, q. 39, n. 1; on the Gospel of John, tract 79, n. 1. Cf. ibid., tract 40, n. 9. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Hebr. 11, 1. Explanationem Damasc. (IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10.) videsis supra a. 1. q. 3. ad 1.

en: Hebrews 11:1. The Damascene's explanation (*On the Orthodox Faith* IV, c. 10) you may see above, a. 1, q. 3, to 1.

la: In Epist. 120. (olim in edd. in duas divisa et sub num. 222. et 85. exhibita), ubi tamen non ad verbum habetur definitio allata, sed eruitur ex iis quae S. Doctor ibi c. 1-4. n. 4-18. profert ostendens, nos per fidem, Deo intus adiuvante et illuminante, pervenire « non solum ad tantam intelligentiam rerum incorporearum et incommutabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus potest, verum etiam ad summitatem contemplationis, quam dicit Apostolus *facie ad faciem* » (I. Cor. 13, 12.). Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 3. a. 1. ait: Quaedam [cognitio] vero est ex lumine gratiae infuso, elevante ipsum intellectum supra se ad assentiendum Veritati primae propter se et super omnia, secundum quem modum dicit Augustinus: « Fides est illuminatio mentis ad summam Veritatem ». Et secundum hunc modum definitur a Ioanne Damasc. (IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10.): « Indistabilis et iniudicabilis spes [ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀδιάκριτος ἐλπίς] eorum quae a Deo nobis annuntiata sunt ». Cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro *ad Consentium* edd. *ad Constantium.*

en: In Letter 120 (formerly in the editions divided into two and exhibited under nn. 222 and 85), where nevertheless the cited definition is not had word for word, but is drawn out from the things which the holy Doctor there in cc. 1-4, nn. 4-18, brings forward, showing that through faith, with God inwardly helping and illumining, we come « not only to so great an understanding of incorporeal and unchangeable things as cannot in this life be grasped by all, but even to the summit of contemplation, which the Apostle calls *face to face* » (1 Cor. 13:12). Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 3, a. 1, says: But a certain [cognition] is from the light of grace infused, elevating the intellect itself above itself to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, according to which mode Augustine says: « Faith is the illumination of the mind toward the highest Truth ». And according to this mode it is defined by John Damascene (*On the Orthodox Faith* IV, c. 10): « The unwavering and unjudging hope [ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀδιάκριτος ἐλπίς] of those things which have been announced to us by God ». Cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1. — In place of *ad Consentium* the editions read *ad Constantium.*

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 11: Πίστις δέ ἐστιν ἀπολυπραγμόνητος [i. e. carens omni inquisitione] συγκατάθεσις. Similiter dicit Basil., in Ps. 115. n. 1: Fides prae cunctis rationalibus methodis animam trahens ad consensum; fides, quae non necessariis geometricis probationibus, sed Spiritus sancti operatione gignitur. — Non ita multo post complures codd. omittunt *tamen*, et deinde pro *quantum consensus non inquisitus* edd. substituunt *quantum assensus non quaesitus.*

en: Book IV of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 11: Πίστις δέ ἐστιν ἀπολυπραγμόνητος [i.e. lacking all inquiry] συγκατάθεσις. Similarly Basil says, on Psalm 115, n. 1: Faith, beyond all rational methods, drawing the soul to consent; faith which is generated not by necessary geometrical proofs, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. — Not long after, very many codices omit *tamen*, and then in place of *quantum consensus non inquisitus* the editions substitute *quantum assensus non quaesitus.*

la: Paragraph. 4, secundum versionem Scoti Erig. — Pro *Veritati* Vat. *in Veritate.*

en: Paragraph 4, according to the version of Scotus Eriugena. — In place of *Veritati* the Vatican edition reads *in Veritate.*

la: Libr. I. p. X. c. 2.

en: Book I, part X, c. 2.

la: Dist. 24. a. 2. q. 1. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 5. a. 1; in Supplemento, coll. 31. a. 1; item B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 8; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

en: Distinction 24, a. 2, q. 1. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 5, a. 1; in the Supplement, col. 31, a. 1; likewise Blessed Albert, here a. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, to 8; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1.

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Vers. 12. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Ier. 7, 28; tertius deinde Rom. 14, 23.

en: Verse 12. — The following scriptural passage is Jeremiah 7:28; then the third, Romans 14:23.

la: Epist. 98. (alias 23.) n. 9: Sicut ergo secundum quendam modum Sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est... ita Sacramentum fidei fides est. Nihil est autem aliud credere quam fidem habere. Ac per hoc, cum respondetur parvulus credere, qui fidei nondum habet affectum, respondetur, fidem habere propter fidei Sacramentum etc.

en: Letter 98 (otherwise 23), n. 9: As, therefore, in a certain manner the Sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ... so the Sacrament of faith is faith. But to believe is nothing other than to have faith. And through this, when it is answered that the little one, who does not yet have the affection of faith, believes, it is answered that he has faith on account of the Sacrament of faith, etc.

la: Libr. I. Comment. in Topic. Cicer., et I. de Differ. topic., quo posteriore loco verbis hic allatis addit: Non vero idem est *argumentum* et *argumentatio;* nam vis sententiae ratioque ea, quae clauditur oratione, cum aliquid probatur ambiguum, *argumentum* vocatur; ipsa vero argumenti elocutio *argumentatio* dicitur. — Pro *acceptatione* edd. *assensione.*

en: Book I of the *Commentary on Cicero's Topics*, and I *On Topical Differences*, in which latter place he adds to the words here cited: But *argument* and *argumentation* are not the same; for the force of the proposition and the reasoning which is enclosed in the discourse, when something ambiguous is proved, is called the *argument*; but the very utterance of the argument is called *argumentation.* — In place of *acceptatione* the editions read *assensione.*

la: Vers. 17. Penes Petrum Lombard. Glossa in hunc loc. sic sonat: « Vel transeundum fore intelligat de fide *verborum* et *spei* in fidem *rerum* et *speciei* ». Ipsa delibata est ex August., II. Quaest. evang. q. 39. n. 1. seq. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 109. n. 8. et n. 12. seqq. — Edd. perperam *in fidem spei.*

en: Verse 17. In Peter Lombard the Gloss on this passage runs thus: « Or let one understand that there is a passing over from the faith of *words* and of *hope* to the faith of *realities* and of *vision* ». It itself is excerpted from Augustine, II *Questions on the Gospels*, q. 39, n. 1 f. Cf. *Expositions on the Psalms*, on Psalm 109, n. 8 and n. 12 ff. — The editions wrongly read *in fidem spei* [unto the faith of hope].

la: Vers. 26. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Rom. 1, 17.

en: Verse 26. — The following scriptural passage is Romans 1:17.

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 40. n. 9, et Serm. 43. (alias 27. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 1. n. 1. — Mox pro *ipso obiecto fidei* edd. *obiecto ipsius fidei.*

en: On the Gospel of John, tract 40, n. 9, and Sermon 43 (otherwise 27, *On the Words of the Apostle*), c. 1, n. 1. — Soon, in place of *ipso obiecto fidei* the editions read *obiecto ipsius fidei.*

la: Edd. *ratio et assensus credulitatis.* Paulo inferius pro *quia illi sunt* codd. A G li *qui illi sunt*, edd. *et illi sunt.*

en: The editions read *ratio et assensus credulitatis* [an account and assent of credulity]. A little below, in place of *quia illi sunt* codices A G li read *qui illi sunt*, the editions *et illi sunt.*

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 64, m. 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, sub-question 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Subinde pro *unius fidei* cod. Z *eiusdem fidei.*

en: Cf. above p. 470, note 8. — Thereupon, in place of *unius fidei* codex Z reads *eiusdem fidei.*

la: Vide supra pag. 226, nota 1. — Mox pro *habeat* cod. Z *debeat.*

en: See above p. 226, note 1. — Soon, in place of *habeat* codex Z reads *debeat.*

la: Codd. Z bb *credendo ei adhaerere.* Proxime post cod. Z verbo *incorporari* adiicit *eius membris.* In textu Magistri (hic c. 4.) legitur: « credendo amare, credendo in eum ire, credendo ei adhaerere et eius membris incorporari », qui quatuor actus etiam circa finem solut. enumerantur.

en: Codices Z bb read *credendo ei adhaerere* [by believing to cleave to him]. Next, after the word *incorporari*, codex Z adds *eius membris* [into his members]. In the text of the Master (here c. 4) is read: « by believing to love, by believing to go into him, by believing to cleave to him and to be incorporated into his members », which four acts are also enumerated near the end of the solution.

la: Edd. supplent *ultimum.* Post pauca pro *genus actus* cod. Z *genus actuum.*

en: The editions supply *ultimum* [ultimate]. After a few words, in place of *genus actus* codex Z reads *genus actuum.*

la: Pro *sustinendum* edd. exhibent falso *fugiendum*, et paulo inferius *ad effectum* pro *ad affectum.* Subinde pro *credendo ire* cod. Z (a secunda manu) *credendo in eum ire.*

en: In place of *sustinendum* [to bear] the editions falsely present *fugiendum* [to flee], and a little below *ad effectum* in place of *ad affectum.* Thereupon, in place of *credendo ire* codex Z (by a second hand) reads *credendo in eum ire.*

la: De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 5. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.

en: On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 64, m. 5, a. 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, sub-question 2.

la: Part. I. q. 3. — De *connexione* virtutum vide infra d. 36. q. 1. seqq.

en: Part I, q. 3. — On the *connection* of the virtues see below, d. 36, q. 1 ff.

la: Hic c. 7, ubi sex modi visionis distinguuntur. Libr. XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 15. seqq. tria tantum genera visionum distinguuntur, scil. visio corporalis sive sensitiva, spiritualis sive imaginativa, et intellectualis. Glossa ut ordinaria habetur apud Lyranum et etiam apud Petr. Lombard. in II. Cor. 12, 2, ubi Apostolus ad tertium caelum se raptum esse refert, cui relationi Glossa annectit expositionem de triplici caelo, et huic respondentem commemorat triplicem ab Augustino assignatam visionem. — Paulo ante pro *non cognoscatur* [supple: hoc] codd. K T bb *non cognoscitur*, cod. A *non sequitur cognosci.*

en: Here c. 7, where six modes of vision are distinguished. In Book XII of *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 6, n. 15 ff., only three kinds of vision are distinguished, namely corporeal or sensitive vision, spiritual or imaginative, and intellectual. The Gloss as the ordinary one is had in Lyra and also in Peter Lombard on 2 Cor. 12:2, where the Apostle reports that he was caught up to the third heaven, to which report the Gloss attaches an exposition on the threefold heaven, and corresponding to this it mentions the threefold vision assigned by Augustine. — A little before, in place of *non cognoscatur* [supply: this] codices K T bb read *non cognoscitur*, codex A *non sequitur cognosci.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 7.

la: Praepositivus, S. p. III. quaestionem solvens, sciatne aliquis se habere caritatem, ait: Quidam dicunt, quod nemo scit, se habere caritatem; in praedictis auctoritatibus (Rom. 8, 38: Certus sum enim, quia neque mors etc.; II. Cor. 13, 3: An experimentum quaeritis eius, qui in me loquitur Christus etc.; 1. Cor. 7, 40; 11, 28; et August. VIII. de Trin. c. 8. n. 12: Magis enim novit dilectionem, qua diligit, quam fratrem, quem diligit etc.) accipitur *scio* pro *credo.* Nobis autem videtur, quod aliquis scit, se habere caritatem, ut Martinus, qui dixit: « Quid hic astas, cruenta bestia? Nihil in me funesti reperies »; et Apostolus, qui dicit: « Scio, quod Spiritum Dei habeam ». Aliqui credunt, se habere, et non habent, ut pharisaeus, qui dicebat: Gratias tibi ago, Domine, quia non sum sicut ceteri homines (Luc. 18, 11.). Aliqui credunt, se non habere, et habent, ut qui conteritur, tamen non credit, illam contritionem esse sufficientem. Et alii credunt, se habere, et habent, ut humiles, qui credunt, se satisfecisse. Quod ergo dicit Iob (1, 21.: « Sive nobiles fuerint filii eius, sive ignobiles, non intelliget »; et 9, 21: « Etiam si simplex fuero, hoc ipsum ignorabit anima mea »); dicimus, quod non loquitur in persona sua, sed in persona hominis generaliter; ita et de Paulo: Nihil mihi conscius etc. (I. Cor. 4, 4.). In auctoritate Augustini (Nemo scit, utrum dilectione dignus sit, an odio) intelligitur: finaliter nemo scit. — Dicit Praepositivus etiam (quae verba hic notentur ad enuntiatum seq.): Item, dilectio est motus animi ad fruendum Deum propter se et proximum propter Deum; ergo potest scire, se habere caritatem. — Paulo superius post *qui* [Vat. *quam*] habet codd. M O supplent *eam*; paulo inferius pro *habet anima* codd. A U *habet suam.*

en: Praepositivus, *Summa* p. III, solving the question whether someone knows that he has charity, says: Some say that no one knows that he has charity; in the aforesaid authorities (Rom. 8:38: For I am certain that neither death, etc.; 2 Cor. 13:3: Do you seek a proof of him who speaks in me, Christ, etc.; 1 Cor. 7:40; 11:28; and Augustine VIII *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 12: For he knows the love by which he loves more than the brother whom he loves, etc.) *I know* is taken for *I believe.* But to us it seems that someone does know that he has charity, like Martin, who said: « Why do you stand here, bloody beast? You will find nothing deadly in me »; and the Apostle, who says: « I know that I have the Spirit of God ». Some believe that they have it, and do not have it, like the Pharisee, who said: I give you thanks, Lord, that I am not as the rest of men (Luke 18:11). Some believe that they do not have it, and do have it, like one who is contrite, yet does not believe that contrition to be sufficient. And others believe that they have it, and do have it, like the humble, who believe that they have made satisfaction. As for what Job says (1:21: « Whether his sons be noble or ignoble, he will not understand »; and 9:21: « Even if I be simple, my soul will be ignorant of this very thing »); we say that he does not speak in his own person, but in the person of man in general; so too concerning Paul: I am conscious to myself of nothing, etc. (1 Cor. 4:4). In the authority of Augustine (No one knows whether he is worthy of love or of hatred) it is understood: in the end no one knows. — Praepositivus says also (let these words here be noted with reference to the following statement): Likewise, love is a motion of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake and the neighbor for God's sake; therefore one can know that he has charity. — A little above, after *qui* [Vat. *quam*] codices M O supply *eam*; a little below, in place of *habet anima* codices A U read *habet suam.*

la: Edd. *quae non patent.* Paulo ante pro *et multa* cod. K *et etiam multa.*

en: The editions read *quae non patent* [which do not lie open]. A little before, in place of *et multa* codex K reads *et etiam multa.*

la: Libr. X. c. 5. n. 7. seqq., ubi quaestio proponitur: Ut quid ergo ei [animae sive menti, quae sibi ipsi praesens est et se totam cognoscit] praeceptum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat? Quam quaestionem tractans S. Doctor, praemisso hoc, quod « aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare; neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum ignorare grammaticam dicimus, cum eam non cogitat, quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat »; et ostenso, quod error animae de se non inde veniat, quod ipsa sit absens, sed quod rerum sensarum imagines non secernat anima a semelipsa — concludit dicens: Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis, qua per alia vagabatur, statuat in semetipsam, et se cogitet... Non itaque velut absentem se quaerat cernere, sed praesentem se curet discernere. Nec se, quasi non norit, cognoscat; sed ab eo quod alterum novit, dignoscat etc. (c. 8. n. 11. seq.). Cfr. ibid. XV. c. 14. n. 23.

en: Book X, c. 5, n. 7 ff., where the question is proposed: Why, then, is it commanded to it [the soul or mind, which is present to itself and knows itself wholly] that it know itself? Treating this question, the holy Doctor, having premised this, that « it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think about oneself; for we do not say that one skilled in many disciplines is ignorant of grammar, when he is not thinking about it, because he is then thinking about the art of medicine »; and having shown that the soul's error about itself does not come from this, that it is absent, but that the soul does not separate the images of sensed things from itself — concludes saying: Let it therefore know itself, nor let it seek itself as though absent, but let it fix on itself the intention of will by which it was wandering through other things, and let it think about itself... Let it therefore not seek to behold itself as though absent, but take care to discern itself as present. Nor let it know itself as though it did not know it; but from that by which it knows another, let it recognize itself, etc. (c. 8, n. 11 f.). Cf. ibid. XV, c. 14, n. 23.

la: Libr. X. de Trin. c. 3. n. 5. seqq., et VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 21. n. 28. Ratio, cui S. Doctor innititur, est, quia anima sibi ipsi sit praesens. — Mox pro *et sic cognoscuntur*, quae verba in non paucis codd. desiderantur, in aliis autem, ut in bb, habentur, edd. *et sic cognoscitur*, cod. H (a secunda manu) *de quorum numero sunt.*

en: Book X *On the Trinity*, c. 3, n. 5 ff., and VII *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 21, n. 28. The reason on which the holy Doctor relies is that the soul is present to itself. — Soon, in place of *et sic cognoscuntur*, which words are lacking in not a few codices, but in others, as in bb, are had, the editions read *et sic cognoscitur*, codex H (by a second hand) *de quorum numero sunt.*

la: Libr. X. de Trin. c. 9. n. 13. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro *posuerunt* codd. A K *ponunt.*

en: Book X *On the Trinity*, c. 9, n. 13 ff. — A little below, in place of *posuerunt* codices A K read *ponunt.*

la: Hanc opinionem profitetur B. Albert., hic a. 15. De discretione caritatis Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 6. c. 6. q. 5, dicit: Istae [dilectio naturalis et gratuita] habent tantam affinitatem et coniunctionem inter se, quod non potest aliquis discernere, utrum suum diligere sit motus naturalis dilectionis, vel caritatis. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 3. ratio 2.

en: Blessed Albert professes this opinion, here a. 15. On the discernment of charity William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. III, tr. 6, c. 6, q. 5, says: These [natural and gratuitous love] have so great an affinity and conjunction between themselves that one cannot discern whether his loving is a motion of natural love, or of charity. Cf. I *Sentences*, d. 17, p. I, q. 3, reason 2.

la: Cfr. dictum Aristot., supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 3. ad oppos. allatum. — Paulo superius pro *et de eo* edd. *et ideo de eo.* Paulo inferius pro *quod reddunt* codd. H aa bb *quae reddunt*, omissa proxime ante vocula *sic.*

en: Cf. the saying of Aristotle cited above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, arg. 3, to the opposite. — A little above, in place of *et de eo* the editions read *et ideo de eo.* A little below, in place of *quod reddunt* codices H aa bb read *quae reddunt*, the little word *sic* immediately before having been omitted.

la: Edd. voci *experimentum* male praefigunt *certum.*

en: The editions wrongly prefix *certum* to the word *experimentum.*

la: Codd. E M P Q *cognoscentis.* Loco verborum *vel a parte medii. Si a parte virtutis cognitivae* edd. substituerunt solam voculam *et.*

en: Codices E M P Q read *cognoscentis.* In place of the words *vel a parte medii. Si a parte virtutis cognitivae* the editions have substituted only the little word *et.*

la: Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 7. — De triplici modo videndi a parte animae cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 4. et II. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. circa finem corp. Vide etiam August., Epist. 147. (alias 112.) c. 16. n. 38. — Paulo ante pro *differentem* edd. *differente.*

en: Here in the text of the Master, c. 7. — On the threefold mode of seeing on the part of the soul cf. I *Sentences*, d. 17, p. I, q. 4, and II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, near the end of the body. See also Augustine, Letter 147 (otherwise 112), c. 16, n. 38. — A little before, in place of *differentem* the editions read *differente.*

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121. (c. 12.): Oportet autem universaliter de omni sensu accipere, quod sensus est id quod est susceptivum formarum sine materia, ut cera anuli sine ferro et auro recipit signum etc. — De imaginationis et intellectus specie vide ibid. text. 156. seqq. et III. text. 6. ac 37. seqq. (III. c. 3. 4. 8.). — Aliquanto inferius pro *aut in ratione* codd. A K *aut sub ratione.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 121 (c. 12): But it must be taken universally concerning every sense, that the sense is that which is receptive of forms without matter, as the wax of the ring receives the impression without the iron and the gold, etc. — On the species of the imagination and of the intellect see ibid. text 156 ff. and III, text 6 and 37 ff. (III, cc. 3, 4, 8). — Somewhat below, in place of *aut in ratione* codices A K read *aut sub ratione.*

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4: Si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito erit. — De exemplo *albi* et *nigri* cfr. tom. II. pag. 643, nota 9. — Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.): Similis ratio in aliis est, ut quomodo malum cognoscit [anima], aut nigrum; contrario enim quodammodo cognoscit. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 7. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 15; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 4: If the opposite [is] in the opposite, the proposed will also be in the proposed. — On the example of *white* and *black* cf. vol. II, p. 643, note 9. — Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 25 (c. 6): The account is similar in other cases, as for how [the soul] knows evil, or black; for it knows in a certain way by the contrary. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 7, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 15; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Locus ab auctoritate, qui inter locos recensetur extrinsecos (i. e. in quibus argumentum sumitur ab eis quae omnino separata sunt a substantia rei) et locus a iudicio (sapientis) vocatur, a Cicerone, Topic. c. 19, describitur sic: « Haec ergo argumentatio, quae dicitur artis expers, in testimonio posita est. Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quod ab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem ». Cfr. Boeth., VI. Comment. in Topic. Cicer. circa finem. Idem in II. de Different. topic. maximam huius arg. assignat dicens: « Quod omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus hominibus videtur, ei contradici non oportere ». In Petri Hispan. Summul. tr. de Locis topicis extrinsecis habetur haec maxima: Unicuique experto in sua scientia credendum est.

en: The argument from authority, which is reckoned among the extrinsic arguments (i.e. in which the argument is taken from those things which are entirely separated from the substance of the matter) and is called the argument from the judgment (of the wise man), is described by Cicero, *Topics* c. 19, thus: « This argumentation, therefore, which is called devoid of art, is placed in testimony. But by testimony we now mean everything which is taken from some external thing to produce belief ». Cf. Boethius, VI *Commentary on Cicero's Topics*, near the end. The same author in II *On Topical Differences* assigns the maxim of this argument, saying: « That which seems [true] to all or to most or to wise men ought not to be contradicted ». In Peter of Spain's *Summulae*, the treatise on extrinsic topical arguments, this maxim is had: Everyone expert in his own science is to be believed.

la: Quibus assentitur B. Albert., hic a. 19. — De fide acquisita et inspirata vide supra a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Pro *intelligitur hic* edd. substituunt *intelligi potest*, et subinde post *de fide* omittunt cum non paucis codd. *quae est.*

en: With whom Blessed Albert agrees, here a. 19. — On acquired and inspired faith see above a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — In place of *intelligitur hic* the editions substitute *intelligi potest*, and thereupon after *de fide* they omit, with not a few codices, *quae est.*

la: Hebr. 11, 1: Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 5. Mox pro *formata* Vat. *inspirata.*

en: Hebrews 11:1: Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. Cf. above a. 1, q. 5. Soon, in place of *formata* the Vatican edition reads *inspirata.*

la: Hic c. 8.

en: Here c. 8.

la: Pro *ei, quod* in codd. A H K invenimus, codd. M O *ita ei*, alii codd. *enim*, edd. *quod sic.*

en: In place of *ei, quod* we find in codices A H K, codices M O read *ita ei*, other codices *enim*, the editions *quod sic.*

la: Epist. II. Petri 1, 21: Non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia, sed Spiritu sancto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines. — Paulo inferius pro *certificatione* non pauci codd. *certitudine*; subinde pro *accipimus* codd. A H K (N primitus) T U Z bb *accepimus.*

en: 2 Peter 1:21: For prophecy was not at any time brought by human will, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. — A little below, in place of *certificatione* not a few codices read *certitudine*; thereupon, in place of *accipimus* codices A H K (N originally) T U Z bb read *accepimus.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 5. ad 2. — Cfr. de hoc dub. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 1. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 19.

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 5, to 2. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 1, a. 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 19.

la: In Comment. in I. Cor. 8, 2. (inter opera Ambrosii) caritas dicitur « mater omnium bonorum »; in Comment. in Rom. 11, 1. « quasi mater animarum », in Precat. II. pro praeparat. ad Missam, n. 5. « fundamentum omnium virtutum et bonorum ». Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et 8.

en: In the *Commentary on 1 Cor.* 8:2 (among the works of Ambrose) charity is called « the mother of all good things »; in the *Commentary on Rom.* 11:1, « as it were the mother of souls », in the second Prayer in preparation for Mass, n. 5, « the foundation of all virtues and good things ». See here the text of the Master, cc. 3 and 8.

la: Psalm. 36, 1. Glossa, quae hic allegatur, spectat ad v. 3: *Spera in Domino* etc. Habetur apud Lombard. et sumta est ex Cassiodoro, qui verba illa commentans ait: Hoc [scil. sperare] introitus fidei, hoc initium salutis est. — Sententia Magistri habetur hic in lit. c. 8. seq.

en: Psalm 36:1. The Gloss which is cited here regards v. 3: *Hope in the Lord*, etc. It is had in Lombard and is taken from Cassiodorus, who, commenting on those words, says: This [namely to hope] is the entrance of faith, this is the beginning of salvation. — The opinion of the Master is had here in the text, c. 8 f.

la: Ut ostendetur infra d. 36. q. 1.

en: As will be shown below, d. 36, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et infra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and below d. 26, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vide infra d. 36. q. 6. — Paulo superius voci *virtutum* cod. A praemittit *omnium.*

en: See below, d. 36, q. 6. — A little above, codex A prefixes *omnium* to the word *virtutum.*

la: Plurimi codd. *videlicet* [cod. aa omittit *videlicet*] *per ipsam beatissimam visionem.* — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 9. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 21; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3.

en: Most codices read *videlicet* [codex aa omits *videlicet*] *per ipsam beatissimam visionem.* — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 9, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 21; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 4, sub-question 3, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw lines 34798–35180) and collated column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{501–506}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (PDF pp.523–528; `pdf = printed + 22`). The IA OCR is high quality for clean running prose; the PDF was authoritative for the cascade-fragmented stretches (esp. p.504 R-band "fides quantum ad habitum substratum… sex modi videndi") and for all footer bands. English is a fresh literal translation per the CLAUDE.md formula/terminology tables. `type: dubia`, so **no scholion** (`has_scholion: false`).

**Dubia count — SIX (correction to hand-off).** The d23-a2-q5 hand-off forecast only TWO dubia (Dub. I, Dub. II) over pp.501–504. The raw text in fact carries **six dubia (Dub. I–VI)** over **pp.501–506** — most markers were OCR-garbled (`dub. m.` = Dub. III, `Dcb. IV` = Dub. IV, `Dhb. V` = Dub. V, `Dud. VI` = Dub. VI), which is why the earlier grep saw only two. All six are well-aligned and ungarbled in body; no boundary ambiguity. Lemmas (each "quaeritur de hoc quod dicit…"):
- **Dub. I** (raw 34800, p.501): the Master's notification/definition of faith (*Fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur*) — why a single thing has several definitions; resolved by six modes of considering faith (genus, end, object, act, subject, disparate habit).
- **Dub. II** (raw 34869, p.502): *fides accipitur tribus modis* — that the Master distinguishes faith insufficiently; resolved by listing **ten** modes of which the Master takes only three.
- **Dub. III** (raw 34876, p.502→503): *Aliud est credere in Deum, aliud credere Deo, aliud credere Deum* — whether one faith can do all three, and the definition of *credere in Deum* as *credendo amare*.
- **Dub. IV** (raw 34965, p.503→505): *Fidem ipsam videt quisque in corde suo esse* — whether one who knows he has faith thereby knows he has charity, plus the modes of vision; long treatment (three opinions on self-knowledge of charity/grace; the six modes of seeing on the part of the medium).
- **Dub. V** (raw 35116, p.505): *Probatur futura resurrectio, quia ita crediderunt Patriarchae* — whether faith-as-argument is undercut by being proved from the authority of the Fathers; resolved (fides *probat*, non *probatur*).
- **Dub. VI** (raw 35123, p.505→506): *fides caritatem praecedit* — whether faith is really first, given charity is "mother of virtues"; resolved by habit (simultaneity) vs. act (natural order).

**Page-split map (printed → content; per-page apparatus restart):**
- **p.501** — Dub. I (opening through "aliud *credidit*"). Footers `[^p501-1..8]` (8): nn.1–5 L-col footer, nn.6–8 R-col footer.
- **p.502** — Dub. I close + Dub. II (full) + Dub. III opening (through "tendit in Deum tanquam in *finem*¹⁴"). Footers `[^p502-1..14]` (14): nn.1–6 L-col footer, nn.7–14 R-col footer; the ten-modes list is numbered in the margin (Sensus primus…Decimus, trimmed as marginalia).
- **p.503** — Dub. III close + Dub. IV opening through "…aliud *nosse*, aliud co-[gitare]". Footers `[^p503-1..8]` (8): nn.1–5 L-col, nn.6–8 R-col; n.6 (Praepositivus) and n.8 (de Trin. X) are long; **n.8's tail ("Non itaque velut absentem…") is printed at the TOP of p.504's footer band** but belongs to p.503 n.8 (folded in here).
- **p.504** — Dub. IV middle (through "…apprehenditur ab imaginatione"). Footers `[^p504-1..8]` (8): nn.1–4 L-col, nn.5–8 R-col.
- **p.505** — Dub. IV close + Dub. V (full) + Dub. VI opening (through "…quantum ad *ha-*[bitum]"). Footers `[^p505-1..11]` (11): nn.1–3 L-col footer (Dub. V notes), nn.4–11 R-col footer (Dub. VI notes); single per-page sequence split across the two footer columns.
- **p.506** — Dub. VI close (through "…beatissima *visione*³"). Footers `[^p506-1..3]` (3): printed at the bottom of the p.506 L-column footer (the R-column footer of p.506 already belongs to DISTINCTIO XXIV).

**Apparatus total = 52 entries** (8 + 14 + 8 + 8 + 11 + 3). The apparatus-count audit's "raw=54" estimate is ~2 over (it counts marginalia/running-head fragments); 52 is the printed footer truth, walked page by page on the PDF.

**Footer ownership / migration.** Footers IN: NONE (q5 closed cleanly at p.500 with its own band; p.501 opens fresh at n.1). Footers OUT: NONE (the dubia close at p.506 "visione³"; DISTINCTIO XXIV opens at raw 35181 with its own footer restart — the p.506 R-column footer block, headed "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" / d.24 nn.1–6, belongs to d.24, not here). Intra-chunk: p.503 n.8 tail bleeds onto p.504's footer top (handled above).

**Seam (both ends) CLEAN.** Opens at `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header (raw 34798, OCR-garble `MACISTISI`), continuous from q5's close (raw 34797). Closes at "…beatissima *visione*³" (raw 35180) immediately before `DISTINCTIO XXIV.` (raw 35181). After this chunk, **DISTINCTIO XXIII is COMPLETE.**

**[?] flags: NONE.** All six dubia, bodies and footers, were legible at 450 dpi. The four Greek strings ([^p501-2] τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι / ὅρος / ὁρισμός / λόγος; [^p501-5] ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀδιάκριτος ἐλπίς; [^p501-6] Πίστις δέ ἐστιν ἀπολυπραγμόνητος συγκατάθεσις) were transcribed from the PDF footer bands against the OCR fragments.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0