title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum natura humana merito primae transgressionis fuerit corrupta poenaliter tantum, an etiam culpabiliter.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum merito primae transgressionis humana natura fuerit corrupta poenaliter tantum, an etiam culpabiliter. Et quod culpabiliter corrupta sit, videtur.

**Fundamenta.**

1. Ad Romanos quinto[^1]: *Sicut per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors, ita et in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.* Ex isto verbo colligitur, quod omnes in Adam fuerunt infecti et peccatores constituti. Si forte dicas, sicut dicunt Pelagiani, quod
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pertransiit per imitationem; contra: ad Ephesios secundo[^2]: *Eramus natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri*; sed nemo est filius irae nisi per culpam: si ergo per naturam omnes eramus filii irae, omnes per naturam contrahimus culpam: ergo in ceteris natura humana culpabiliter est infecta.

2. Item, Ioannis tertio[^3]: *Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto* etc.; sed nullus a praemio aeterno excluditur nisi pro peccato: si igitur omnes non baptizati excluduntur, sive sint parvi sive adulti, ergo omnes, ex quo nati sunt, habent culpam; sed non culpam, quam fecerunt, cum huic sententiae subiaceant ante usum rationis, sicut patet in parvulis incircumcisis, Genesis decimo septimo: igitur haec est culpa, quae per naturalem generationem reperitur in quolibet: ergo etc.

3. Item, si tota natura esset in una persona, corrupta illa persona quantum ad esse, necesse est, totam naturam corrumpi quantum ad esse: ergo pari ratione, si corrumperetur quantum ad bene esse, corrumperetur tota natura quantum ad bene esse. Sicut enim sequitur: si Adam moritur, homo moritur; sic sequitur: si Adam peccat, homo peccat. Cum igitur tota natura esset in Adam, quando peccavit; videtur, quod tota in eo peccaverit, ac per hoc tota in omnibus et singulis culpabiliter infecta fuerit[^4].

4. Item, venenato fonte, per consequens venenantur et rivuli a fonte procedentes. Si igitur omnes homines processerunt ab Adam, sicut rami a radice, et rivuli a fonte; et ipse corruptus fuit morbo concupiscentiae, quae[^5] fuit in eo culpa: videtur, quod et ceteros corrupit eodem corruptionis genere, et ita culpabiliter.

5. Item, sicut se habet innocens respectu innocentis generandi, sic peccator respectu peccatoris; sed si Adam stetisset in sua innocentia, omnes filios genuisset innocentes: ergo tota humana natura esset innocens et pura, quantum esset ex ipso. Hoc satis planum est[^6]: ergo pari ratione, cum peccavit, totam humanam naturam constituit peccatricem, ita quod omnes filios gigneret peccatores.

6. Item, quia Adam peccavit, factus est mortalis; et quia mortalis est, necesse fuit, quod generaret omnes filios mortales; sed sicut se habet effectus ad effectum, ita se habet causa ad causam[^7]: si igitur causa mortalitatis fuit culpa, et mortalitas personae Adae totam humanam naturam fecit mortalem et totam corrupit poenaliter; pari ratione videtur, quod culpa Adae totam humanam naturam infecerit culpabiliter et omnes ex illo exeuntes corruperit culpabiliter. — Si igitur culpa, quae omnibus inest per naturam, est culpa originalis; colligitur ex omnibus his rationibus, quod ponere sit culpam originalem.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ezechielis decimo octavo[^8]: *Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, et pater* etc. Si igitur haec lex divina est, secundum divinam legem quilibet peccat sibi et non alii, iuxta illud Proverbiorum nono: *Si sapiens eris, tibimetipsi eris: si autem illusor, solus portabis malum*: igitur non videtur, quod ex peccato patris filius habeat infici culpabiliter.

2. Item, tam in novo quam in veteri Testamento nuptiae concessae sunt tanquam bonae et licitae[^9]; sed ad nullum bonum necessario consequitur malum; sed ad nuptias necessario sequeretur malum, si proles culpam contraheret a sua origine: ergo vel nuptiae sunt malae et illicitae, quod est contra sacram Scripturam et fidem christianam, vel non est ponere peccatum originale.

3. Item, corrupta re transmutabili et minus nobili, non propter hoc corrumpitur quod est intransmutabile et maius nobile; sed persona hominis est transmutabilis et minus nobilis quam natura — tota enim natura speciei perpetua est et magis nobilis quam una persona singularis — ergo impossibile fuit, eam a persona Adae totaliter et per culpam infici.

4. Item, in malis generaliter est verum, quod malum *habitum* praecedit malus *actus*, quamvis e contrario sit in bonis[^10]: ergo habitualis corruptio naturae oritur ex actuali culpa ipsius naturae. Sed natura, quantum est de se, semper est recta et non peccat, quia peccatum proprie est voluntatis: ergo non videtur, quod tota natura infecta fuerit, vel etiam potuerit infici.

5. Item, nullum naturale est culpabile, pro eo quod « in naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur[^11] »; sed originalis corruptio est naturalis, cum sit eadem apud omnes: ergo videtur, quod ista duo sint incompossibilia, quod aliqua corruptio sit culpabilis, et quod sit originalis: ergo non videtur, quod natura tota a persona potuerit culpabiliter infici.

6. Item, nullum necessarium est voluntarium; sed corruptio originalis est necessaria: ergo non est voluntaria. Sed omnis culpa est affectio voluntaria,
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secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^12]: ergo impossibile est, originalem corruptionem esse culpam: redit igitur idem quod prius, quod nulla culpa sit originalis, et quod natura humana in Adam non fuerit infecta culpabiliter.

### Conclusio.

> Humana natura in omnibus hominibus corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter, et hoc quidem peccato Adae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio tota natura, hoc est natura[^13] in omnibus hominibus, seminaliter ab Adam descendentibus, corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter. Hoc enim manifestat visionis Dei carentia, rationalis erubescentia, concupiscentiae praedominantia. — *Carentia visionis Dei* hoc manifestat, quia nullus debet aeterno bono, ad quod factus est, privari, nisi in se habeat aliquid, per quod indignus sit divino aspectui praesentari; tale autem non est nisi culpa. Si igitur omnes, quotquot sunt, visione Dei privantur, nisi per baptismum fluminis vel flaminis renascantur; planum est, quod omnes, quotquot sunt, contrahunt ex sua origine culpam[^14].

*Erubescentia* etiam rationis hoc manifestat. Nullus enim rationabiliter erubescit de his passionibus, quas habet a natura, nisi insint ei per aliquam culpam; sed omnis homo naturaliter erubescit ex genitalium membrorum motu. Ex hoc igitur colligitur et manifestatur, quod quilibet in se ipso non tantum poenaliter, sed etiam vituperabiliter et culpabiliter est corruptus, quantum est de sua naturali origine[^15].

*Praedominantia concupiscentiae* hoc evidentissime manifestat. Certum est enim, quod tunc anima hominis est ordinata, quando spiritus est sub Deo, et caro et virtutes animales sunt sub spiritu et sequuntur eius imperium. Ab oppositis igitur tunc anima hominis est perversa, quando caro et virtutes animales praesunt spiritui rationali. Et hoc quidem verum est de plano, non tantummodo secundum fidem, verum etiam secundum philosophiam[^16]. Sed in homine vigor concupiscentiae et lex membrorum, quam unusquisque habet a nativitate, captivat spiritum et ei praedominatur. Ex hoc igitur clarum et apertum est, quod anima cuiuslibet hominis a nativitate perversa est et inordinata; sed sicut ordinatio in homine et rectitudo iustitia est, sic perversitas et inordinatio culpa est. Si ergo anima[^17] cuiuslibet hominis per legem concupiscentiae perversa est a sua origine, in quolibet homine indubitanter ponendum est esse peccatum originale, quantum est de sua prima nativitate. — Et de hoc nemo dubitat, nisi qui nescit, quantus sit vigor concupiscentiae, et qualiter spiritus rationalis Deo debeat subesse. Constat enim, quod non subest spiritus noster perfecte Deo, nisi diligat ipsum super omnia et propter se. Planum est etiam, quod nullus in statu naturae corruptae Deum diligit super omnia et propter se sine dono gratiae, immo necessario vincitur a vigore concupiscentiae, ut magis amet se, vel aliquod bonum apparens[^18]. Planum est igitur, quod anima cuiuslibet hominis in sua nativitate peccatrix est, cum subversa et inordinata sit, sicut ostensum est. Et ideo dicit Apostolus ad Romanos septimo[^19], in persona hominis lapsi: *Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me in lege peccati.* Et exclamat: *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?* Et respondet: *Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum.* Hanc igitur legem et inordinationem[^20] ad Deum si quis velit attendere, nullo modo dubitabit, hominem esse peccatorem a sua nativitate, immo ita certum est, ut dubitari non possit de originali, sicut etiam nec de actuali. — Hoc tamen ignoraverunt philosophi et etiam aliqui haeretici, quia nescierunt attendere, in quo attenditur rectitudo animae et iustitia[^21], et pro quanto anima dici debet ad Deum ordinata. Constat igitur, quod tota humana natura corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter.

A quo autem corrupta fuerit, hoc planum est ex ipsa Scriptura[^22], quia ab Adam. Potuit autem Adam totam naturam corrumpere et culpabilem facere suo peccato, triplici conditione concurrente. Prima est, quia non tantum erat humanae naturae *individuum*,
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sed totius humanae naturae principium. Secunda est, quia non tantum fuit sibi datum mandatum sicut singulari personae, sed tanquam stipiti totius humanae naturae; et hoc bene indicat textus[^23], quia mandatum illud descendit per virum ad mulierem. Tertia, quia Adam innocentiam et immortalitatem susceperat pro se et sua tota posteritate: unde ipse innocens et immortalis generasset immortalem et innocentem. Quia igitur ipse erat omnium principium; et transgressus est mandatum quod ei datum erat, secundum quod erat principium; et amisit illam iustitiam et innocentiam, quam debebat omnibus posteris conservare: hinc est, quod per ipsum originali iustitia sumus privati, et in eius infectione ceteri sunt infecti, non tantum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter: tum propter debitum ordinationis, quae deberet esse in nobis; tum propter carentiam illius innocentiae, quam deberemus habere; tum propter praedominantiam concupiscentiae, per quam animae nostrae sunt inordinatae et iniustae; et si iniustae sunt et inordinatae, necesse est, eas summae iustitiae displicere. — Patet igitur, quod tota humana natura corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter. Patet nihilominus, a quo fuerit corrupta, quoniam a primo parente. Qualiter autem illa culpa traduci habeat, hoc determinabitur infra[^24]. Rationes igitur ad primam partem concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod *filius non portabit iniquitatem patris*; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de peccato, quo pater peccat ut singularis persona, sicut melius manifestabitur infra[^25]; et ideo locum non habet in transgressione primaria, quia illa non fuit omnino singularis personae, sicut explanatum est supra.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad bonum non necessario consequitur malum; dicendum, quod verum est per se loquendo. Unde ad nuptias non necessario sequitur genitae prolis corruptio, in quantum est ibi maris et feminae coniunctio naturalis, sed in quantum illi coniunctioni adiuncta est corruptio vitiosa seminis ob peccatum primi parentis. Et si tu obiicias, sicut obiicit haereticus[^26], quod qualitercumque sequatur malum, omittendum esset illud bonum; dicendum, quod illud non est verum, nisi quando malum praeponderat bono. Nunc autem non est sic, quia in generantibus non est ulla culpa; in generato vero melius est sic esse quam non esse, maxime cum subveniatur ei per gratiam baptismalem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corrupto minus nobili et transmutabili, non corrumpitur magis nobile et perpetuum; dicendum, quod illud verum est et locum habet, quando illud quod est magis nobile et perpetuum, non dependet a minus nobili et transmutabili. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia tota natura humana dependebat a persona Adae quantum ad existentiam. Unde si Adam fuisset mortuus, totum genus humanum esset in eo corruptum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum habitum praecedit malus actus; dicendum, quod hoc verum est; verumtamen ex hoc non oportet, quod malum habitum naturae praecedat malus actus naturae, secundum quod natura, sed sufficit, quod praecedat malus actus personae, pro eo quod natura et persona sunt indivisa; et ideo corruptio personalis potest effici naturalis, sicut ostendit Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*[^27]. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi natura in se non peccaverit, peccavit tamen, prout erat in Adam; ipse enim Adam peccavit, in quantum erat omnium hominum principium.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum naturale est culpabile; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus[^28], differt dicere naturam et naturam corruptam. Potest igitur aliquid esse naturale, quod consequitur ipsam naturam secundum institutionem, et aliquid esse naturale, quod consequitur ipsam naturam secundum corruptionem. Dico igitur, quod illud quod est naturale, quod consequitur naturam secundum institutionem, nullo modo est culpabile; illud vero quod sic est naturale, quod consequitur naturam secundum corruptionem, culpabile est; et tale est originale. Et sic patet illud.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum necessarium voluntarium est; dicendum, quod etsi hoc respectu eiusdem veritatem possit habere, tamen respectu diversorum non necesse est, quod habeat veritatem. Quod enim necessarium est uni, voluntarium potest esse alteri; et sic est in originali, quod quidem, etsi nobis sit necessarium, Adae tamen fuit voluntarium; et ratione illius voluntatis nobis imputatur in peccatum, unde dicuntur omnes peccasse in ipso[^29]. Hoc autem melius ostendetur, cum manifestabitur, qualiter originale peccatum traducitur.
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### Question II. *Whether human nature, by the merit of the first transgression, was corrupted penally only, or also culpably.*

Secondly it is asked whether, by the merit of the first transgression, human nature was corrupted penally only, or also culpably. And that it was corrupted culpably, it seems.

**Arguments.**

1. To the Romans 5[^1]: *As by one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, so also death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.* From this word it is gathered that all in Adam were infected and constituted sinners. If perhaps you say, as the Pelagians say, that
[sin] passed by imitation; on the contrary: to the Ephesians 2[^2]: *We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest*; but no one is a child of wrath except by fault: if therefore by nature we were all children of wrath, by nature we all contract fault: therefore in the rest [of men] human nature is culpably infected.

2. Likewise, John 3[^3]: *Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit* etc.; but no one is excluded from the eternal reward except for sin: if therefore all the unbaptized are excluded, whether they be little ones or adults, then all, from the time they are born, have fault; but not a fault which they have committed, since they are subject to this sentence before the use of reason, as is clear in uncircumcised little ones, Genesis 17: therefore this is a fault which is found in each one through natural generation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if the whole nature were in one person, that person being corrupted as to being, it is necessary that the whole nature be corrupted as to being: therefore by parity of reasoning, if it were corrupted as to well-being, the whole nature would be corrupted as to well-being. For just as it follows: if Adam dies, man dies; so it follows: if Adam sins, man sins. Since therefore the whole nature was in Adam when he sinned, it seems that the whole sinned in him, and through this the whole was culpably infected in all and each[^4].

4. Likewise, the fountain being poisoned, consequently the streams proceeding from the fountain are also poisoned. If therefore all men proceeded from Adam, as branches from a root and streams from a fountain, and he was corrupted by the disease of concupiscence, which[^5] was in him a fault: it seems that he corrupted the others too by the same kind of corruption, and thus culpably.

5. Likewise, as the innocent stands in relation to the innocent to be generated, so the sinner to the sinner; but if Adam had stood in his innocence, he would have generated all his sons innocent: therefore the whole of human nature would be innocent and pure, as far as it would be from him. This is plain enough[^6]: therefore by parity of reasoning, when he sinned, he constituted the whole of human nature a sinner, in such a way that he would generate all his sons sinners.

6. Likewise, because Adam sinned, he was made mortal; and because he is mortal, it was necessary that he generate all his sons mortal; but as effect stands to effect, so cause stands to cause[^7]: if therefore the cause of mortality was fault, and the mortality of the person of Adam made the whole of human nature mortal and corrupted the whole penally; by parity of reasoning it seems that the fault of Adam infected the whole of human nature culpably and corrupted culpably all who go forth from him. — If therefore the fault that is in all by nature is original fault, it is gathered from all these reasons that one must posit an original fault.

**On the contrary:** 1. Ezekiel 18[^8]: *The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, and the father* etc. If therefore this is a divine law, according to the divine law each one sins to himself and not to another, according to that [saying] of Proverbs 9: *If you be wise, you shall be so for yourself: but if you be a scorner, you alone shall bear the evil*: therefore it does not seem that from the sin of the father the son should be culpably infected.

2. Likewise, both in the New and in the Old Testament marriages were granted as good and licit[^9]; but to no good does evil necessarily follow; but to marriage evil would necessarily follow, if the offspring contracted fault from its origin: therefore either marriages are evil and illicit, which is against sacred Scripture and the Christian faith, or one must not posit original sin.

3. Likewise, a changeable and less noble thing being corrupted, that which is unchangeable and more noble is not on that account corrupted; but the person of man is changeable and less noble than the nature — for the whole nature of the species is perpetual and more noble than one singular person — therefore it was impossible that it be totally and through fault infected by the person of Adam.

4. Likewise, in evil things it is generally true that a bad *habit* precedes a bad *act*, although in good things it is the contrary[^10]: therefore the habitual corruption of nature arises from the actual fault of nature itself. But nature, as far as it is of itself, is always right and does not sin, since sin properly belongs to the will: therefore it does not seem that the whole nature was infected, or even could be infected.

5. Likewise, nothing natural is culpable, for the reason that « in natural things we are neither praised nor blamed[^11] »; but original corruption is natural, since it is the same in all: therefore it seems that these two are incompossible, that some corruption be culpable and that it be original: therefore it does not seem that the whole nature could be culpably infected by a person.

6. Likewise, nothing necessary is voluntary; but original corruption is necessary: therefore it is not voluntary. But every fault is a voluntary affection,
according to what Augustine says in the book *On Free Choice*[^12]: therefore it is impossible that original corruption be a fault: there returns therefore the same [conclusion] as before, that no fault is original, and that human nature in Adam was not culpably infected.

### Conclusion.

> Human nature in all men is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably, and this indeed by the sin of Adam.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, the whole nature, that is, the nature in all men descending seminally from Adam[^13], is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably. For this the lack of the vision of God, the shame of reason, and the predominance of concupiscence manifest. — *The lack of the vision of God* manifests this, because no one ought to be deprived of the eternal good for which he was made, unless he have in himself something through which he is unworthy to be presented to the divine gaze; but such a thing is nothing other than fault. If therefore all, as many as there are, are deprived of the vision of God unless they be reborn by the baptism of the river [water] or of the breath [Spirit], it is plain that all, as many as there are, contract fault from their origin[^14].

*The shame* of reason also manifests this. For no one is reasonably ashamed of those passions which he has from nature, unless they be in him through some fault; but every man is naturally ashamed at the motion of the genital members. From this, therefore, it is gathered and manifested that each one is corrupted in himself not only penally, but also blamably and culpably, as far as is from his natural origin[^15].

*The predominance of concupiscence* manifests this most evidently. For it is certain that the soul of man is then ordered when the spirit is under God, and the flesh and the animal powers are under the spirit and follow its command. From the opposite [conditions], therefore, the soul of man is perverted when the flesh and the animal powers preside over the rational spirit. And this indeed is true plainly, not only according to faith, but also according to philosophy[^16]. But in man the force of concupiscence and the law of the members, which each one has from birth, captivates the spirit and predominates over it. From this, therefore, it is clear and manifest that the soul of each man is perverted and disordered from birth; but just as ordination and rectitude in man is justice, so perversity and disorder is fault. If therefore the soul[^17] of each man is perverted by the law of concupiscence from its origin, in each man it must undoubtedly be posited that there is original sin, as far as is from his first birth. — And of this no one doubts, except one who does not know how great is the force of concupiscence, and how the rational spirit ought to be subject to God. For it is certain that our spirit is not perfectly subject to God unless it love Him above all things and for His own sake. It is also plain that no one in the state of corrupted nature loves God above all things and for His own sake without the gift of grace, but rather is necessarily overcome by the force of concupiscence, so that he loves himself more, or some apparent good[^18]. It is plain, therefore, that the soul of each man is a sinner at his birth, since it is subverted and disordered, as has been shown. And therefore the Apostle says to the Romans 7[^19], in the person of fallen man: *I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin.* And he exclaims: *Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* And he answers: *The grace of God by Jesus Christ.* If anyone, therefore, wishes to attend to this law and disorder[^20] toward God, he will in no way doubt that man is a sinner from his birth — rather, it is so certain that one cannot doubt of the original [sin], just as not even of the actual. — This, however, the philosophers, and also some heretics, did not know, because they did not know how to attend to that in which the rectitude of the soul and its justice is attended to[^21], and in relation to what the soul ought to be said to be ordered toward God. It is certain, therefore, that the whole of human nature is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably.

But by whom it was corrupted, this is plain from Scripture itself[^22], namely, by Adam. And Adam was able to corrupt the whole nature and make it culpable by his sin, three conditions concurring. The first is that he was not only an *individual* of human nature,
but the principle of the whole of human nature. The second is that the commandment was given not to him only as to a singular person, but as to the stock of the whole of human nature; and the text well indicates this[^23], since that commandment descended through the man to the woman. The third is that Adam had received innocence and immortality for himself and for his whole posterity: hence he, innocent and immortal, would have generated [offspring] immortal and innocent. Since, therefore, he was the principle of all; and transgressed the commandment which had been given to him, insofar as he was a principle; and lost that justice and innocence which he ought to have preserved for all his descendants: hence it is that through him we are deprived of original justice, and in his infection the rest are infected, not only penally, but also culpably: both on account of the debt of the ordination which ought to be in us; and on account of the lack of that innocence which we ought to have; and on account of the predominance of concupiscence, through which our souls are disordered and unjust; and if they are unjust and disordered, it is necessary that they displease supreme justice. — It is clear, therefore, that the whole of human nature is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably. It is likewise clear by whom it was corrupted, namely, by the first parent. But how that fault is propagated will be determined below[^24]. The reasons, therefore, for the first part are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that *the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father*; it must be said that this is understood of the sin by which the father sins as a singular person, as will be better manifested below[^25]; and therefore it has no place in the first transgression, since that was not entirely of a singular person, as was explained above.

2. To that which is objected, that to a good evil does not necessarily follow; it must be said that this is true, speaking per se. Hence to marriage the corruption of the offspring generated does not necessarily follow, insofar as there is there a natural conjunction of male and female, but insofar as to that conjunction is joined the vicious corruption of the seed on account of the sin of the first parent. And if you object, as the heretic objects[^26], that in whatever way evil follows, that good ought to be omitted; it must be said that this is not true, except when the evil outweighs the good. But now it is not so, since in those who generate there is no fault; while in the one generated it is better so to be than not to be, especially since he is aided by baptismal grace.

3. To that which is objected, that, a less noble and changeable thing being corrupted, the more noble and perpetual is not corrupted; it must be said that this is true and holds when that which is more noble and perpetual does not depend on the less noble and changeable. But it is not so in the matter at hand, since the whole of human nature depended on the person of Adam as to existence. Hence if Adam had died, the whole human race would have been corrupted in him.

4. To that which is objected, that a bad habit precedes a bad act; it must be said that this is true; nevertheless from this it is not necessary that a bad habit of nature precede a bad act of nature, insofar as it is nature, but it suffices that a bad act of the person precede, for the reason that nature and person are undivided; and therefore a personal corruption can be made natural, as Anselm shows *On the Virginal Conception*[^27]. — Yet it could be said that, even if nature did not sin in itself, it nevertheless sinned insofar as it was in Adam; for Adam himself sinned, inasmuch as he was the principle of all men.

5. To that which is objected, that nothing natural is culpable; it must be said that, as Augustine says[^28], it is one thing to speak of nature and [another] of corrupted nature. Something, therefore, can be natural which follows nature itself according to [its] institution, and something can be natural which follows nature itself according to [its] corruption. I say, therefore, that that which is natural in such a way that it follows nature according to institution is in no way culpable; but that which is natural in such a way that it follows nature according to corruption is culpable; and such is the original [corruption]. And thus that [objection] is clear.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing necessary is voluntary; it must be said that, although this can have truth with respect to the same thing, nevertheless with respect to diverse things it is not necessary that it have truth. For what is necessary to one can be voluntary to another; and so it is in the original [sin], which indeed, although it is necessary to us, was nevertheless voluntary to Adam; and by reason of that will it is imputed to us as sin, whence all are said to have sinned in him[^29]. But this will be better shown when it is manifested how original sin is propagated.

la: Vers. 12, ubi Vulgata *in hunc mundum* pro *in mundum*. Pro *pertransiit* ed. I et plurimi codd. *pertransit*. — Aliquantulum post pro *fuerunt* codd. C L O R S et alii *fuerint*.

en: Verse 12, where the Vulgate [reads] *into this world* for *into the world*. For *pertransiit* (passed through) ed. I and very many codices [read] *pertransit*. — A little after, for *fuerunt* (were) codices C L O R S and others [read] *fuerint*.

la: Vers. 3. — De sententia Pelagianorum cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Verse 3. — On the opinion of the Pelagians cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 17, ubi Deus dicit ad Abraham: *Masculus, cuius praeputii caro circumcisa non fuerit, delebitur anima illa de populo suo: quia pactum meum irritum fecit.* — Pro *quam fecerunt* codd. H T cc et ed. I *fecerint*.

en: Verse 5. — The following text is from the cited place, v. 17, where God says to Abraham: *The male whose flesh of his foreskin shall not be circumcised, that soul shall be blotted out from his people: because he has made void my covenant.* — For *quam fecerunt* (which they have committed) codices H T cc and ed. I [read] *fecerint*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., *de Concept. virgin. et orig. pecc.* c. 23.

en: Cfr. Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin*, c. 23.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *qui*. Mox pro *corrupit* codd. T Y cum ed. 1 *corruperit*, codd. aa bb *corrumpit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *qui* (which [masc.]). Soon, for *corrupit* (corrupted) codices T Y with ed. 1 [read] *corruperit*, codices aa bb *corrumpit*.

la: Et ostendit Anselm., *de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc.* c. 10. et 24. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 1. a. 1.

en: And Anselm shows [this], *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin*, c. 10 and 24. Cfr. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 90. m. 1. a. 1.

la: Haec propos. minor idem dicit quod Boeth., II. *de Differentiis topicis*, verbis generalioribus sic exprimit: *Quod in unaquaque re evenit, id in eius proportionali evenire necesse est.*

en: This minor proposition says the same as Boethius, II. *On Topical Differences*, expresses in more general words thus: *What happens in each thing must happen in its proportional.*

la: Vers. 20. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. 12, ubi Vulgata *fueris* habet pro *eris*. — In fine arg. pro *infici culpabiliter* cod. aa *effici culpabilis*.

en: Verse 20. — The following text is from the cited place, [Prov. 9,] 12, where the Vulgate has *fueris* (you shall be) for *eris*. — At the end of the argument, for *infici culpabiliter* (to be culpably infected) cod. aa [reads] *effici culpabilis* (to be made culpable).

la: Gen. 1, 27. seq.; Matth. 19, 3. seqq.; I. Cor. 7, 2. seqq.; I. Tim. 4, 3. Cfr. August., *de Nuptiis et concupisc.* per totum.

en: Gen. 1, 27 and following; Matt. 19, 3 and following; 1 Cor. 7, 2 and following; 1 Tim. 4, 3. Cfr. Augustine, *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, throughout.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 4. et 6.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 4 and 6.

la: Secundum Aristot., cuius verba vide supra pag. 113, nota 8. De ratione, quae additur minori, cfr. supra pag. 397, nota 1.

en: According to Aristotle, whose words see above p. 113, note 8. On the reason which is added to the minor, cfr. above p. 397, note 1.

la: Libr. II. c. ult. n. 54, ubi peccatum nominat *motum voluntarium*, quam notationem postea fusius explicat III. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. Ibid. c. 9. n. 26. ait: *Non enim peccatum et supplicium peccati naturae sunt quaedam, sed affectiones naturarum, illa voluntaria, ista poenalis.* — Paulo superius post *affectio voluntaria* ed. 1 addit *sed nihil est peccatum, nisi sit voluntarium*; paulo inferius pro *esse culpam* edd., excepta 1, *esse per culpam*, quae et deinde pro *originalis* substituunt *a natura*, pro quo cod. C *naturalis*.

en: Bk. II, last chapter, n. 54, where he names sin a *voluntary motion*, which observation he afterward explains more fully in bk. III, c. 1, n. 1 and following. In the same place, c. 9, n. 26, he says: *For sin and the punishment of sin are not certain natures, but affections of natures, the one voluntary, the other penal.* — A little earlier, after *affectio voluntaria* (voluntary affection) ed. 1 adds *but nothing is sin unless it be voluntary*; a little below, for *esse culpam* (to be a fault) the editions, except 1, [read] *esse per culpam* (to be through fault), which then also substitute *a natura* (from nature) for *originalis* (original), for which cod. C [reads] *naturalis*.

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 *absque dubio tota massa, hoc est natura humana*. Post pauca pro *rationalis* codd. H V aa *carnalis*, quae lectio non congruit cum seqq.

en: The Vatican [edition] with ed. 4 [reads] *without doubt the whole mass, that is, human nature*. After a few [words], for *rationalis* codices H V aa [read] *carnalis* (carnal), which reading does not agree with what follows.

la: Ita et August., Serm. 294. (alias 14. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 3. n. 3, ubi illud Pelagianorum confutatur, parvulos baptizandos esse non propter *vitam aeternam*, sed propter *regnum caelorum*. Cfr. III. Contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 9.

en: Thus also Augustine, Serm. 294 (otherwise 14, On the Words of the Apostle) c. 3, n. 3, where that [opinion] of the Pelagians is refuted, that little ones are to be baptized not for the sake of *eternal life*, but for the sake of the *kingdom of heaven*. Cfr. III. Against Julian the Pelagian, c. 3, n. 9.

la: Cfr. August., I. *de Nuptiis et concupisc.* c. 6. n. 7; I. *Contra duas epist. Pelagianor.* c. 15. n. 31. seq.; III. *Contra Iulian. Pelagian.* c. 10. n. 20. — Edd., excepta 1, omittunt *naturali*.

en: Cfr. Augustine, I. *On Marriage and Concupiscence* c. 6, n. 7; I. *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* c. 15, n. 31 and following; III. *Against Julian the Pelagian* c. 10, n. 20. — The editions, except 1, omit *naturali* (natural).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 604, nota 5, ubi auctoritatem Aristotelis adduximus. Cfr. etiam August., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 145. n. 5; II. *de Actis cum Felice Manich.* c. 4. et 17. — In seq. propos. respicitur Rom. 7, 23.

en: Cfr. above p. 604, note 5, where we adduced the authority of Aristotle. Cfr. also Augustine, *Enarration on Ps.* 145, n. 5; II. *On the Acts with Felix the Manichee* c. 4 and 17. — In the following proposition Rom. 7, 23 is referred to.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et aliquibus codd. *natura*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4 and some codices [read] *natura* (nature).

la: Codd. cum vetustioribus edd. *debet*.

en: The codices, with the older editions, [read] *debet* (ought).

la: Cfr. supra d. 28, praesertim a. 1. q. 3. et d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. praesertim ad 3. — Vers. 23. seqq.

en: Cfr. above d. 28, especially a. 1. q. 3, and d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1, especially ad 3. — Verses 23 and following.

la: Ita non pauci codd., ut N V X Z bb cc ee, cum ed. 1; Vat. cum aliis *ordinationem*.

en: Thus not a few codices, as N V X Z bb cc ee, with ed. 1; the Vatican [edition] with others [reads] *ordinationem* (ordination).

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *iustitiae*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *iustitiae*.

la: Rom. 5, 12. — Mox pro *conditione* cod. aa *ratione*.

en: Rom. 5, 12. — Soon, for *conditione* (condition) cod. aa [reads] *ratione* (account).

la: Gen. 2, 16. seq.: *Praecepitque ei dicens... ne comedas* etc. Quem textum August., VIII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 17. n. 36. eodem sensu interpretatur, de quo vide supra d. XXI. lit. Magistri, c. 8. — De rationibus hic propositis cfr. Anselm., *de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc.* c. 2. 9. 10. 23. seq.

en: Gen. 2, 16 and following: *And he commanded him, saying... do not eat* etc. This text Augustine, VIII. *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 17, n. 36, interprets in the same sense, on which see above d. XXI. of the text of the Master, c. 8. — On the reasons here proposed cfr. Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin*, c. 2, 9, 10, 23 and following.

la: Cfr. August., *de Peccato orig.* c. 33. n. 38. seq.; II. *de Nuptiis et concup.* c. 21. seqq. — Paulo superius pro *seminis* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, paucis codd. suffragantibus, *in hominis semine*.

en: Cfr. Augustine, *On Original Sin* c. 33, n. 38 and following; II. *On Marriage and Concupiscence* c. 21 and following. — A little earlier, for *seminis* (of the seed) the Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4, a few codices favoring, [reads] *in hominis semine* (in the seed of the man).

la: Cap. 23, ubi ait: *Quod Adam comedebat, hoc natura exigebat; quia, ut hoc exigeret, sic creata erat. Quod vero de ligno vetito comedit, non hoc voluntas naturalis, sed personalis*, hoc est propria, *fecit; quod tamen egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat, quod dicebatur Adam; natura, quod homo; fecit igitur persona peccatricem naturam, quia cum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Siquidem non quia homo erat, ut vetitum praesumeret, impulsus est; sed propria voluntate, quam non exigit natura, sed persona concepit, attractus est.* — Paulo superius post *personae* codd. F Y ee et alii cum ed. I omittunt *pro*. Paulo inferius post *in Adam* Vat. adiungit *peccante*.

en: Ch. 23, where he says: *What Adam ate, this nature required; for, that it should require this, it had been so created. But that he ate of the forbidden tree, this not the natural will, but the personal*, that is, the proper [will], *did; yet what the person did, he did not do without the nature. For person was that which was called Adam; nature, that which was [called] man; the person therefore made the nature a sinner, since when Adam sinned, man sinned. For he was not impelled to presume the forbidden [thing] because he was man; but he was drawn by his proper will, which nature does not require, but the person conceived.* — A little earlier, after *personae* codices F Y ee and others with ed. I omit *pro*. A little below, after *in Adam* the Vatican [edition] adds *peccante* (sinning).

la: Libr. I. *Retract.* c. 10. n. 3. et c. 13. n. 6; *de Natura et gratia*, c. 3. n. 3; II. *de Nuptiis et concup.* c. 21. n. 36. — Paulo inferius pro *institutionem* ed. I *primam constitutionem*.

en: Bk. I. *Retractations* c. 10, n. 3, and c. 13, n. 6; *On Nature and Grace*, c. 3, n. 3; II. *On Marriage and Concupiscence* c. 21, n. 36. — A little below, for *institutionem* (institution) ed. I [reads] *primam constitutionem* (the first constitution).

la: Rom. 5, 12: In quo omnes peccaverunt. — Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. 2. ubi de modo propagationis peccati originalis.

en: Rom. 5, 12: In whom all have sinned. — Cfr. below d. 31. a. 1. 2, where [it treats] of the mode of propagation of original sin.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio est de fide, ut constat ex Concilio Arausicano II. (can. 2.) et Tridentino (Sess. V. can. 2.), et communiter a Scholasticis approbatur. Mirum autem est et improbandum, quod Durand. (hic q. 2.), licet confiteatur, quod « in nobis est per originem aliquod peccatum, seu aliqua culpa », tamen postea favere videatur iis qui opinabantur, quod « in parvulis peccatum originale non sit proprie culpa, sicut est actuale, sed solum interpretative ».

Notatu dignum est quod dicitur (hic in corp.) de triplici conditione concurrente in Adam, ut corrumpere potuerit naturam in omnibus hominibus; quae doctrina repetitur et applicatur infra d. 33. a. I. q. I, et cum S. Anselmo docetur: « Si Adam nequisset ad eos quos generaturus erat, iustitiam suam perducere, nequaquam posset ad eos iniustitiam (culpam) suam perducere ». Certe carentia iustitiae originalis nequit habere pro genere humano rationem culpae, nisi supponatur, quod conservatio eiusdem habuerit pro eodem rationem debiti. Hoc autem rursus supponit, tum quod ex Dei ordinatione totum genus humanum adstrictum fuerit ad finem supernaturalem assequendum, tum quod a Deo acceperit ius quoddam ad dona supernaturalia (gratiam et integritatem) sibi ab Adamo cum ipsa natura transmittenda. Hoc ultimum denique supponit, quod Adam fuerit caput et principium secundarium humani generis in ordine et naturali et supernaturali et quasi depositarius ipsius, cui, ut dicit S. Doctor, non fuit « datum mandatum sicut singulari personae, sed tanquam stipiti totius humanae naturae ». — Essentia peccati originalis magis explicatur infra a. 2. q. I. — Quoad argumenta quaedam rationis recole schol. ad praecedentem quaest.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2; S. I. II. q. 81. a. 1. 3, q. 82. a. I; de Malo, q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is of faith, as is established from the Council of Orange II (can. 2.) and from the Council of Trent (Sess. V. can. 2.), and is commonly approved by the Scholastics. But it is astonishing and to be disapproved that Durandus (here q. 2.), although he confesses that « in us there is through [our] origin some sin, or some fault », nevertheless afterward seems to favor those who held that « in little ones original sin is not properly a fault, as the actual [sin] is, but only interpretatively ».

It is worthy of note what is said (here in the corpus) of the threefold condition concurring in Adam, that he could corrupt the nature in all men; which doctrine is repeated and applied below in d. 33. a. I. q. I, and with St. Anselm it is taught: « If Adam had been unable to convey his justice to those whom he was to generate, he could in no way have conveyed to them his injustice (fault) ». Certainly the lack of original justice cannot have for the human race the character of fault, unless it be supposed that the preservation of the same had for it the character of a debt. But this in turn supposes, both that by God's ordination the whole human race was bound to attain a supernatural end, and that it received from God a certain right to the supernatural gifts (grace and integrity) which were to be transmitted to it by Adam together with the nature itself. This last, finally, supposes that Adam was the head and the secondary principle of the human race in both the natural and the supernatural order, and as it were the depositary thereof, to whom, as the Holy Doctor says, the commandment was given not « as to a singular person, but as to the stock of the whole of human nature ». — The essence of original sin is more fully explained below in a. 2. q. I. — As to certain arguments of reason, recall the scholion to the preceding question.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 1. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. I. a. 2; S. I-II. q. 81. a. 1. 3, q. 82. a. I; de Malo, q. 4. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 30, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 721 -->

### Articulus II. *De quidditate originalis peccati.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo, videlicet quid sit originale peccatum. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur:

Primo quaeritur, utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ignorantia.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum peccatum originale sit concupiscentia.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos sexto[^1]: *Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore*, ibi Glossa: *Peccatum*, id est «fomes peccati»; sed fomes peccati non est aliud quam concupiscentia: si igitur fomes peccati est peccatum, et non est peccatum actuale; restat, quod sit originale.

2. Item, ad Romanos septimo[^2]: *Concupiscentiam nesciebam esse peccatum* etc., Glossa: «Concupiscentia est, unde omnia mala proveniunt». Si igitur illud quod est origo omnium malorum, est originale peccatum; videtur, quod originale peccatum nihil aliud sit quam concupiscentia.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Quales sunt actus, tales sunt habitus[^3]; sed concupiscere est peccatum: ergo necessitas concupiscendi mala est et peccatum. Sed necessitatem concupiscendi a natura contrahimus: si igitur peccatum, quod a natura contrahitur, est peccatum originale: videtur etc.

4. Item, in omni peccato est conversio aliqua ad commutabile bonum, vel in actu vel in habitu[^4]: si igitur peccatum originale est peccatum, ergo est ibi aliqua conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile. Sed conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile nihil est aliud quam concupiscentia: ergo necesse est, peccatum originale esse concupiscentiam.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Romanos septimo[^5]: *Peccatum, occasione accepta, per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam*; hoc autem non potest intelligi de peccato actuali: intelligitur ergo de originali. Si igitur operans non est operatum, ergo concupiscentia non est originale peccatum, nec e converso.

2. Item, Beda[^6] dicit, quod quatuor sunt nobis
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inflicta propter primum peccatum, videlicet ignorantia, infirmitas, malitia et quartum, ex his conflata concupiscentia; sed quod est inflictum pro peccato, non est ipsum peccatum: ergo si haec merito originalis peccati sunt nobis inflicta, secundum quod dicit Beda: ergo etc.

3. Item, concupiscentia manet cum gratia; originale peccatum non potest manere cum gratia: ergo originale peccatum non est concupiscentia. Si tu dicas, quod concupiscentia manet cum gratia, in quantum est remissa, et sic est poena; in quantum autem est intensa, non manet, et sic est culpa[^7]; contra: magis et minus non diversificant speciem: ergo si concupiscentia remissa non est culpa, sed poena, pari ratione videtur, quod nec concupiscentia intensa. — Item, concupiscentia, postquam remissa est, intendi potest et in pristinum dominium revocari, sicut experimento patet: si igitur originale peccatum esset[^8] iterabile, tunc et baptismus; quod est contra institutionem Ecclesiae.

Est igitur quaestio, quid sit originale peccatum per essentiam. Et cum a Magistro dicatur, et ab Augustino esse *concupiscentia*, sicut patet in littera, ab Anselmo autem in libro de Conceptu virginali dicatur esse *debitae iustitiae carentia*, quaestio est, quomodo ista duo verba possint esse simul vera; et in quo horum verborum magis explicatur, quid sit originalis culpa.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Peccatum originale est concupiscentia, prout in se claudit debitae iustitiae carentiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut *actuale* peccatum non dicit omnimodam privationem, eo quod non tantum dicit aversionem, immo etiam quandam conversionem; non etiam dicit omnimodam *boni* privationem, immo relinquit aptitudinem et aliquem actum, privando circumstantiam erga ipsum[^9]: sic etiam in *originali* suo modo intelligendum est. Unde sicut non dicitur peccatum *actuale* esse in aliquo ex hoc solo, quod careat iustitia — quia tunc lapis diceretur peccatum habere — sed ex hoc, quod aliquam inclinationem habet ad aliquid, in qua[^10], cum deberet esse iustitia, non reperitur: sic etiam *originale* peccatum dicitur esse in aliquo non solum, quia caret iustitia originali, sed etiam, quia curvitatem habet et necessitatem concupiscendi. Unde quemadmodum videmus in aegritudine corporali, utpote in paralysi, quod talis morbus inest ex quadam dissolutione virtutis, ita tamen, quod non omnino privatur virtus motiva, sicut in mortuo, sed aliquo modo manet, non potens membrum regere; et ita sequitur partim ex positione, partim ex defectu manus tremulatio: sic intelligendum est tam in actuali quam in originali peccato. Quemadmodum igitur, si quis quaereret, quid esset peccatum carnis, dupliciter posset ei notificari, videlicet ratione *inclinationis deordinatae*, ut dicatur esse immoderatus appetitus rei tractabilis secundum carnem[^11]; et ratione *privationis boni*, ut dicatur esse privatio castitatis et continentiae; et utroque modo respondetur satis convenienter: sic, cum quaeritur, quid sit originale peccatum, recte respondetur, quod sit *concupiscentia immoderata*; recte etiam respondetur, quod sit *debitae iustitiae carentia*; et in una istarum responsionum clauditur altera, licet una notificet ipsum originale ratione eius quod est in ipso habens modum *conversionis*, altera vero, ratione *privationis*.

Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt, et Magister dicit in littera, quod originale peccatum est *concupiscentia*, et haec non quaecumque, sed concupiscentia, prout claudit in se debitae iustitiae carentiam. Haec autem est concupiscentia *immoderata* et *intensa*, adeo ut sit carnis ad spiritum praedominantia, et talis semper est iuncta *carentiae debitae iustitiae*, et secundum quod inest nobis ab origine, dicitur *peccatum originale*. Et hoc est quod dicit Glossa super illud[^12]: *Beati, quorum remissae sunt iniquitates*, Glossa: «Iniquitatem dicit fomitem, qui ante baptismum non tantum *poena* est, sed *culpa*; post baptismum vero *poena* tantum est, et non *culpa*. Cum enim deletur originale, non deletur, ut omnino non sit, sed ut non sit peccatum». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. Ad rationes autem ad oppositum satis planum est respondere per ea quae dicta sunt.

**Ad argumenta ad oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod peccatum operatur concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de concupiscentia quantum ad actum; quam[^13] dicitur operari mandatum, quia occasiona-
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liter excitat in nobis ipsam concupiscentiam, quae se habet per modum habitus.

*Ad 2. 3.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod concupiscentia est nobis inflicta per peccatum; dicendum, quod intelligitur[^14] de concupiscentia, prout est *remissa*, et sic sortitur rationem poenae; et hoc modo non est originalis culpa, sed ipsius sequela. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens quod obiicitur, quod manet simul cum gratia; non enim manet, prout dictum est in opponendo[^15], prout *intensa* est, quia sic dicit animae perversionem, ac per hoc originalis iustitiae privationem; prout autem est *remissa* per gratiae praesentiam, hoc non dicit. Et si obiicias, quod magis et minus non variant speciem; dicendum, quod etsi istud locum habeat in *naturalibus*, non tamen habet veritatem in *moralibus*, quoniam virtutes et vitia in moribus attenduntur penes medietatem, et eius extrema, quae sunt superfluum et diminutum. Et hoc non solum verum est apud moralem philosophum[^16], sed etiam apud theologum, qui dicit, quod amor creaturae *citra* Deum vel *sub* Deo non est peccatum mortale; si vero *supra* Deum intendatur, mortale peccatum efficitur.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod concupiscentia remissa iterum potest intendi; dicendum, quod etsi intendi possit et intendatur, hoc est per peccatum *actuale*; concupiscentia vero *intensa* non dicebatur esse peccatum originale, nisi prout sic contrahebatur a *prima origine*; et quia hoc non potest esse nisi semel, quantumcumque et quotiescumque concupiscentia intendatur, originale peccatum non iteratur.

english:
### Article II. *On the quiddity of original sin.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second point, namely what original sin is. And concerning this two things are asked:

First it is asked, whether original sin is concupiscence.

Second it is asked, whether it is ignorance.

### Question I. *Whether original sin is concupiscence.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether original sin is concupiscence. And that it is, it seems.

1. To the Romans, chapter six[^1]: *Let not sin reign in your mortal body*, where the Gloss says: *Sin*, that is, "the tinder of sin"; but the tinder of sin is nothing other than concupiscence: if therefore the tinder of sin is sin, and is not actual sin; it remains that it be original.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter seven[^2]: *I did not know that concupiscence was sin* etc., the Gloss: "Concupiscence is that from which all evils proceed." If therefore that which is the origin of all evils is original sin; it seems that original sin is nothing other than concupiscence.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. As the acts are, so are the habits[^3]; but to lust is sin: therefore the necessity of lusting after evils is also sin. But we contract the necessity of lusting from nature: if therefore the sin which is contracted from nature is original sin: it seems so etc.

4. Likewise, in every sin there is some turning toward a changeable good, whether in act or in habit[^4]: if therefore original sin is sin, then there is in it some disordered turning toward a changeable good. But a disordered turning toward a changeable good is nothing other than concupiscence: therefore it is necessary that original sin be concupiscence.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter seven[^5]: *Sin, taking occasion, wrought in me by the commandment all concupiscence*; but this cannot be understood of actual sin: it is understood therefore of original sin. If therefore the working is not the thing worked, then concupiscence is not original sin, nor conversely.

2. Likewise, Bede[^6] says that four things are inflicted upon us
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on account of the first sin, namely ignorance, infirmity, malice, and a fourth, concupiscence, conflated out of these; but what is inflicted for sin is not sin itself: therefore if these are inflicted upon us by the merit of original sin, according to what Bede says: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, concupiscence remains together with grace; original sin cannot remain together with grace: therefore original sin is not concupiscence. If you say that concupiscence remains together with grace insofar as it is remitted, and thus is a punishment; but insofar as it is intense, it does not remain, and thus is a fault[^7]; on the contrary: more and less do not diversify the species: therefore if remitted concupiscence is not a fault but a punishment, by parity of reasoning it seems that neither is intense concupiscence. — Likewise, concupiscence, after it has been remitted, can be intensified and recalled to its former dominion, as is plain by experience: if therefore original sin were[^8] repeatable, then so too would baptism be; which is against the institution of the Church.

There is therefore a question as to what original sin is by its essence. And since by the Master, and by Augustine, it is said to be *concupiscence*, as is plain in the text, but by Anselm in the book On the Virginal Conception it is said to be *the lack of due justice*, the question is how these two terms can both be true at once; and in which of these terms is more explained what original fault is.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Original sin is concupiscence, insofar as it encloses within itself the lack of due justice.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *actual* sin does not bespeak total privation, since it bespeaks not only an aversion but also a certain turning; nor does it bespeak total privation of *the good*, but rather leaves the aptitude and some act, depriving it of a circumstance with respect to it[^9]: so too in the *original* it must be understood after its own manner. Hence just as *actual* sin is not said to be in someone from this alone, that he lacks justice — for then a stone would be said to have sin — but from this, that he has some inclination toward something, in which[^10], where justice ought to be, it is not found: so too *original* sin is said to be in someone not only because he lacks original justice, but also because he has a crookedness and a necessity of lusting. Hence just as we see in bodily sickness, for instance in paralysis, that such a disease is present from a certain dissolution of power, yet so that the motive power is not wholly removed, as in a dead man, but in some manner remains, unable to govern the member; and thus there follows, partly from a positive cause, partly from a defect, the trembling of the hand: so it must be understood both in actual and in original sin. Therefore just as, if someone were to ask what the sin of the flesh is, it could be made known to him in two ways, namely by reason of the *disordered inclination*, so that it be said to be an immoderate appetite for a thing manageable according to the flesh[^11]; and by reason of the *privation of the good*, so that it be said to be a privation of chastity and continence; and in either way it is answered fittingly enough: so, when it is asked what original sin is, it is rightly answered that it is *immoderate concupiscence*; it is also rightly answered that it is *the lack of due justice*; and in one of these answers the other is enclosed, although the one makes known the original itself by reason of that which is in it having the mode of a *turning*, the other by reason of *privation*.

It must therefore be granted, as the reasons show, and as the Master says in the text, that original sin is *concupiscence*, and this not any whatever, but concupiscence insofar as it encloses within itself the lack of due justice. And this is *immoderate* and *intense* concupiscence, so much so that it is a predominance of the flesh over the spirit, and such is always joined to the *lack of due justice*, and according as it is in us from our origin, it is called *original sin*. And this is what the Gloss says upon that text[^12]: *Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven*, the Gloss: "It calls the tinder iniquity, which before baptism is not only *punishment* but *fault*; but after baptism it is *punishment* only, and not *fault*. For when the original is destroyed, it is not destroyed so that it be not at all, but so that it be not sin." — The reasons therefore which show this must be granted. But to the reasons to the opposite it is plain enough to respond through the things that have been said.

**To the arguments to the opposite:**

*To 1.* For to that which is objected first, that sin works concupiscence; it must be said that this is understood of concupiscence as to the act; which[^13] the commandment is said to work, because it occasion-
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ally excites in us concupiscence itself, which holds itself after the manner of a habit.

*To 2 and 3.* But to that which is objected, that concupiscence is inflicted upon us by sin; it must be said that it is understood[^14] of concupiscence insofar as it is *remitted*, and thus takes on the character of punishment; and in this way it is not original fault, but its sequel. — And through this the response is plain to what is objected next, that it remains together with grace; for it does not remain, as was said in the objecting[^15], insofar as it is *intense*, because thus it bespeaks a perversion of the soul, and through this the privation of original justice; but insofar as it is *remitted* by the presence of grace, this it does not bespeak. And if you object that more and less do not vary the species; it must be said that, although this holds in *natural* matters, it nevertheless does not hold true in *moral* matters, since virtues and vices in morals are attended to according to a mean, and its extremes, which are the superfluous and the diminished. And this is true not only with the moral philosopher[^16], but also with the theologian, who says that love of a creature *below* God or *under* God is not mortal sin; but if it be directed *above* God, it becomes mortal sin.

But to that which is objected, that remitted concupiscence can again be intensified; it must be said that, although it can be intensified and be intensified, this is by *actual* sin; but *intense* concupiscence was not said to be original sin, except insofar as it was thus contracted from the *first origin*; and since this cannot be except once, however much and however often concupiscence be intensified, original sin is not repeated.

la: Vers. 12. — Glossam, quae est interlinearis, vide apud Lyranum. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. II.

en: Verse 12. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, see in Lyra. Cf. here the Master's text, c. II.

la: Vers. 7: *Nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces.* — Glossa ordinaria, quae est secundum August., de Spir. et lit. c. 4. n. 6, apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: *Nam concupiscentiam*; hoc elegit Apostolus generale, unde omnia. *Bona lex*, quae dum hoc prohibet, omnia prohibet. *Concupiscentiam*; aliqui generalem intelligunt... quia ex ea omne malum.

en: Verse 7: *For I did not know concupiscence, except the law had said: Thou shalt not covet.* — The ordinary Gloss, which is according to Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter c. 4. n. 6, in Strabo and Lyra reads thus: *For concupiscence*; this the Apostle chose as something general, whence all things. *The good law*, which while it forbids this, forbids all things. *Concupiscence*; some understand it generally... because from it is every evil.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 635, nota 5, et pag. 653, nota 6. — Paulo inferius post *mala est* Vat. omittit *et*.

en: Cf. above p. 635, note 5, and p. 653, note 6. — A little below, after *mala est*, the Vatican edition omits *et*.

la: Vide infra d. 35. dub. 6, ubi hoc principium S. Augustini ponitur, quod magis explicatur infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 2 et a. 3. q. 2.

en: See below d. 35. dub. 6, where this principle of St. Augustine is set down, which is more explained below d. 42. a. 1. q. 2 and a. 3. q. 2.

la: Vers. 8: *Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *operatum* Vat. *peccatum*.

en: Verse 8: *But sin, taking occasion, by* etc. — A little below, for *operatum* the Vatican edition reads *peccatum*.

la: Vide supra pag. 528, nota 2. Cfr. etiam Appendix ad Hugonis opera, I. Excerpt. c. 3.

en: See above p. 528, note 2. Cf. also the Appendix to Hugh's works, Excerpt. I, c. 3.

la: Cfr. infra d. XXXII, lit. Magistri, c. 1, et Comment. a. 1. q. 1. — De prop. seq. vide supra pag. 338, nota 2 in fine, et pag. 659, nota 7.

en: Cf. below d. XXXII, the Master's text, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 1. q. 1. — On the following proposition see above p. 338, note 2 at the end, and p. 659, note 7.

la: Supple cum cod. Y *concupiscentia, videtur quod haberet iterari, et si peccatum originale esset.*

en: Supply with codex Y: *concupiscence, it seems that it would have to be repeated, and if original sin were [repeatable].*

la: Hic c. 8, seqq., ubi et Augustini verba exhibentur, Anselmus loc. cit. c. 3, sic ait: *Non est aliud originale peccatum quam iniustitia. Quod si ita est, et iniustitia non est aliud quam absentia debitae iustitiae; non enim videtur esse iniustitia nisi in natura, quae, cum debet habere, iustitiam non habet: utique originale peccatum clauditur sub eadem definitione iniustitiae.* — Paulo inferius post *simul* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 addit *et semel*.

en: Here c. 8 and following, where Augustine's words also are set forth, Anselm in the place cited c. 3 says thus: *Original sin is nothing other than injustice. But if this is so, and injustice is nothing other than the absence of due justice; for injustice does not seem to be except in a nature which, when it ought to have justice, does not have it: original sin is certainly enclosed under the same definition of injustice.* — A little below, after *simul*, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 adds *et semel*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 34. a. 2. q. 2, d. 35. per totam. — Vat. *circa ipsum*.

en: Cf. below d. 34. a. 2. q. 2, d. 35. throughout. — The Vatican edition reads *circa ipsum*.

la: Codd. A L *quo*.

en: Codices A L read *quo*.

la: Psalm. 31, 1. — Glossa, quae est secundum August., l. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 23. n. 28, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. Cfr. infra d. XXXII, lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi agitur de modo, quo peccatum originale baptismo deletur.

en: Psalm 31, 1. — The Gloss, which is according to Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence c. 23. n. 28, is found in Strabo and Lyra. Cf. below d. XXXII, the Master's text, c. 1, where the manner is treated in which original sin is destroyed by baptism.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Ethic. 4; II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7 (c. 6.). — Paulo inferius pro *satis convenienter*, quod ex codd. K M Q aa bb ee restauravimus, Vat. *sic convenienter*, codd. F I et ed. 1 *convenienter* tantum.

en: Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VII. 4; Great Morals II. c. 7 (c. 6.). — A little below, for *satis convenienter*, which we have restored from codices K M Q aa bb ee, the Vatican edition reads *sic convenienter*, codices F I and edition 1 *convenienter* only.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quem*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *quem*.

la: Pro *intelligitur* codd. C H R S (T a prima manu) bb et alii *non intelligit* [scil. Beda], lectio mutila, quae suppletur verbis *intensa, sed*, ut legitur in codd. A I K: *quod non intelligit de concupiscentia intensa, sed* prout cod. I verbis *intensa, sed* etiam addit *intelligit de concupiscentia.*

en: For *intelligitur* the codices C H R S (T by the first hand) bb and others read *non intelligit* [namely, Bede], a mutilated reading, which is supplied with the words *intensa, sed*, as is read in codices A I K: *that he does not understand of intense concupiscence, but*; while codex I by the words *intensa, sed* also adds *he understands of concupiscence.*

la: In hac ipsa obiectione. — Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. et infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, ubi agitur de differentia quae est inter peccata mortalia et venialia. — Vat. adiicit *prima*.

en: In this very objection. — Cf. Aristotle, Ethics II. c. 6. and below d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, where the difference between mortal and venial sins is treated. — The Vatican edition adds *prima*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ad hanc intricatissimam de essentia peccati originalis quaestionem facilius intelligendam iuvat pauca annotare tum de erroribus principalibus fidei catholicae contrariis, tum de sententia, cui adhaeret S. Bonaventura.

1. Errores duo reprobandi exprimuntur eisdem verbis, hac scilicet propositione, quod ipsa concupiscentia per se sit tota essentia peccati originalis; quae tamen a diversis intelligitur in sensu extreme opposito. Quidam enim, rationalismo addicti, eam ita intelligunt, ut in peccato originali rationem peccati sive culpae vel penitus eliminent, vel saltem indebite infirment; unde ab his concupiscentia et ipsum peccatum originale restringitur ad defectum quendam naturae, qui retardat vel impedit vitam moralem. Non defuerunt etiam inter recentiores catholicos, qui huic opinioni vel omnino, vel ex parte adhaererent. Huic errori S. Bonav. iam praevenit contraria sua doctrina, supra a. 1. q. 2. — Ex adverso stat interpretatio praedictae propositionis, quam induxerunt novatores saec. XVI. et XVII., qui, dum simul exaggerabant malum concupiscentiae in homine lapso, asserebant, tum concupiscentiam solam constituere peccati originalis essentiam, tum ipsam esse peccatum per se, nullo habito respectu ad liberam voluntatem nec Adae nec hominis, in quo est, licet sit renatus baptismo; ex quo falso principio, a Concilio Trid. (Sess. V. can. 5.) reprobato, scaturiunt plurimi alii et nefandi errores. Ad rem spectat condemnata Baii propositio 47: «Unde peccatum originis vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla relatione ac respectu ad voluntatem, a qua originem habuit» (cfr. propp. 46. 48. 49. 50. 51.). — S. Bonav. e contrario duo distinguit in peccato originali: «aut prout est culpa reddens animam Deo odiosam, aut prout est vitium deordinans ipsam potentiam» (infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. cfr. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.); et distincte docet, *a)* in peccato originali praeter concupiscentiam esse carentiam iustitiae originalis (hic et passim); *b)* rationem culpae concupiscentiae inesse non per se, sed per reatum annexum, qui resultat ex relatione, quam interior vitiosus status hominis lapsi habet ad praevaricationem Adae (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. schol.). Ille autem reatus ita annexus est concupiscentiae, ut ab ea possit separari (hic in corp.), quod revera fit per gratiam Christi in renatis, ut infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. docetur. In eodem sensu intelligenda sunt verba S. Augustini et Magistri, quando concupiscentiam dicunt esse peccatum.

2. Quoad *sententiam* S. Bonaventurae haec notamus.

*a)* Iam constat ex praedictis, quod ipse quoad rationem culpae, quae inest peccato originali, consentiat S. Thomae (S. I. II. q. 81. a. 1, q. 83. a. 1.), qui docet, ipsam fundari non praecise in inordinato habitu vel dispositione hominis lapsi, i. e. in sola carentia gratiae sanctificantis et integritatis, sed potius in eadem, quatenus est privatio derivata a primo parente peccante (cfr. idem II. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2.).

*b)* In ipso statu vel habitu vitioso animae S. Doctor duo distinguit: alterum, quod ipsi deest, at inesse deberet, scilicet ipsa iustitia originalis sive conversio habitualis ad finem; alterum, quod inest, at deesse deberet, scil. inordinata concupiscentia (hic et a. 1. q. 2.) sive conversio inordinata, sed habitualis, ad commutabile bonum. Haec inordinatio a S. Bonav. vocatur passim corruptio, vel vitium, morbus, curvitas naturae. Unde in Breviloq. p. III. c. 6. dicit: «Et sic incurrit simul carentiam iustitiae et morbum concupiscentiae, ex quibus duobus, tanquam ex aversione et conversione, dicitur integrari, secundum Augustinum et Anselmum, peccatum originale». Consentit S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 82. a. 3.). Sed notandum, quod «concupiscentia non accipitur hic specialiter pro eo quod est potentiae concupiscibilis; sed generaliter, prout est cuiuslibet appetitivae rationalis ex coniunctione primaria cum carne corrupta. Est tamen alia concupiscentia, quae est partis sensibilis, et haec dicitur esse poena. Illa vero, quae rationalis est, aliquando dicitur culpa» etc. (ita Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3.). Unde etiam a S. Thoma (S. loc. cit.) concupiscentia notatur ut inordinatio virium animae, ex qua omne genus peccati oriri potest (cfr. Bonav. infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.).

*c)* Haec concupiscentia sive pronitas ad peccandum in peccato originali est sicut *materiale*, carentia vero iustitiae originalis sicut *formale* (infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). Consentiunt S. Thom. (locis citt. et de Malo, q. 4. a. 2.) et Alex. Hal., qui (loc. cit. m. 1. a. 1. ad 2.) dicit: «Cum dicitur: peccatum originale est concupiscentia, materialis videtur esse praedicatio; formalis autem, cum dicitur macula sive deformitas [privatio iustitiae], ex origine primorum parentum contracta». Idem docent Scotus (hic q. 2.) aliique communiter.

*d)* Hinc concupiscentia, in praedicto sensu accepta, non est solummodo poena peccati originalis, sicut mors corporalis aliaeque poenalitates, sed ea pertinet ad ipsum peccatum origi-
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nale, quatenus dicit habitum vitiosum sive inordinatam dispositionem animae. Consentit S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 82. a. 1, praesertim ad 1., ubi dicit, quod illud peccatum non est privatio pura, sed (positive) quidam habitus corruptus. Haec facilius intelligi possunt, si comparamus habitum peccati originalis cum habituali peccato ipsius Adae, postquam actuale peccatum commisit. Actuale enim peccatum Adae in duobus distinguitur a quocumque alio peccato et angelorum et hominum; primo quidem, quia ipse perdidit in se non tantum donum gratiae sanctificantis (quod in omni peccato mortali accidit), sed etiam dona integritatis, quorum nonnulla ad ipsam interiorem animae rectitudinem spectant; secundo vero, quia utraque dona non tantum sibi, sed etiam toli generi humano perdidit. Ad peccatum autem habituale ipsius Adae sive ad pravam dispositionem, quae ex actuali eiusdem peccato orta erat, praeter carentiam gratiae sanctificantis pertinet etiam carentia praedictae interioris rectitudinis, in cuius locum successit habitualis conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile, ita ut utraque carentia in ipso esset culpabilis. Simili modo etiam de habitu peccati originalis in aliis hominibus iudicari potest. Ex quo conficitur, ut, sicut privatio gratiae sanctificantis habet rationem culpae, et quidem principaliter, ita etiam concupiscentia non tantum sit poena vel sequela huius peccati, sed in non renatis etiam suo modo culpa; id quod toties cum S. Augustino et plurimis antiquis Scholasticis S. Bonav. repetit. Consentit S. Thom. (de Malo, q. 4. a. 2. in corp.) his verbis: «Superior pars animae, et etiam quaedam inferiorum virium, quae sunt sub voluntate et ei natae sunt obedire, recipiunt huiusmodi sequelam primi peccati secundum rationem culpae... Sed inferiores vires, quae non subduntur voluntati, scilicet potentiae animae vegetabilis et etiam ipsum corpus, suscipiunt huiusmodi sequelam secundum rationem poenae, non secundum rationem culpae, nisi forte virtualiter» etc. (cfr. S. I. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Concordat etiam Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, l. III. q. 82. a. 3.

*e)* Differentia tamen notabilis est quoad doctrinam hanc inter Ss. Bonaventuram et Thomam. Nam licet conveniant in hoc, quod peccatum originale asserunt esse privationem iustitiae originalis sive carentiam eiusdem cum debito eam habendi; tamen non eodem modo intelligunt ipsam iustitiam originalem, ut iam dictum est (supra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. 2.), et per consequens nec privationem eiusdem. Nam secundum S. Thomam ipsa gratia sanctificans est essentia iustitiae originalis et radix omnium aliorum donorum; hinc etiam originale peccatum primario et constitutive est privatio eiusdem gratiae. Secundum S. Bonav. vero iustitia originalis primo consistit in illa rectitudine integritatis, quae concipitur ut dispositio, ad quam posterius ipsa gratia sanctificans secuta est. Hinc praevaricatio primitiva primo et directe aufert hanc rectitudinem integritatis, qua ablata, etiam gratia sanctificans perditur. Aliis verbis: peccatum originale inchoative et praecise consistit in privatione iustitiae integritatis, quae est quaedam «mentis et carnis integritas» (supra d. 8. a. 3. q. 1. in corp., et d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 2.), sed completur in privatione gratiae sanctificantis. Secundum hanc positionem culpabilis illa inordinatio et rebellio concupiscentiae et vitiatio naturae est illud quod praecipue spectatur in peccato originali (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, praesertim ad 6.). — Ex hac principali differentia inter duos Ss. Doctores etiam aliae variationes sententiae consequuntur, de quibus infra d. 31.

**II.** Solutio ad 1. 2, in qua distinguitur concupiscentia remissa et intensa, maiori explicatione eget, quam ipse auctor dat infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.

**III.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3, m. 7. a. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 2. — S. Thom., locis citt. — B. Albert., hic q. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 107. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 5. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** To make this most intricate question concerning the essence of original sin more easily understood, it helps to note a few things, both concerning the principal errors contrary to the Catholic faith, and concerning the opinion to which St. Bonaventure adheres.

1. Two errors to be reproved are expressed in the same words, namely in this proposition, that concupiscence itself by itself is the whole essence of original sin; which nevertheless is understood by different persons in an extremely opposite sense. For some, addicted to rationalism, so understand it that in original sin they either entirely eliminate the character of sin or fault, or at least unduly weaken it; whence by these concupiscence and original sin itself is restricted to a certain defect of nature which retards or impedes the moral life. Nor were there lacking even among more recent Catholics those who adhered to this opinion either entirely or in part. To this error St. Bonav. has already forestalled with his contrary doctrine, above a. 1. q. 2. — On the opposite side stands the interpretation of the aforesaid proposition, which the innovators of the 16th and 17th centuries introduced, who, while at the same time exaggerating the evil of concupiscence in fallen man, asserted both that concupiscence alone constitutes the essence of original sin, and that it is sin by itself, with no regard had to the free will either of Adam or of the man in whom it is, although he be reborn by baptism; from which false principle, reproved by the Council of Trent (Sess. V. can. 5.), spring forth very many other and abominable errors. To the point belongs the condemned proposition 47 of Baius: "Hence the sin of origin truly has the character of sin without any relation and regard to the will from which it took its origin" (cf. propp. 46. 48. 49. 50. 51.). — St. Bonav., on the contrary, distinguishes two things in original sin: "either insofar as it is a fault rendering the soul hateful to God, or insofar as it is a vice disordering the power itself" (below d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. in the body; cf. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.); and he distinctly teaches, *a)* that in original sin, besides concupiscence, there is the lack of original justice (here and throughout); *b)* that the character of fault is in concupiscence not by itself, but through an annexed guilt, which results from the relation which the interior vicious state of fallen man has to the transgression of Adam (cf. above a. 1. q. 2. scholion). But that guilt is so annexed to concupiscence that it can be separated from it (here in the body), which truly happens through the grace of Christ in the reborn, as is taught below d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. In the same sense are to be understood the words of St. Augustine and of the Master, when they say concupiscence to be sin.

2. As to the *opinion* of St. Bonaventure we note these things.

*a)* It is already clear from what has been said that he, as to the character of fault which is in original sin, agrees with St. Thomas (Summa I. II. q. 81. a. 1, q. 83. a. 1.), who teaches that it is founded not precisely on the disordered habit or disposition of fallen man, i.e. on the mere lack of sanctifying grace and integrity, but rather on the same, insofar as it is a privation derived from the first parent sinning (cf. the same, II Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2.).

*b)* In the very vicious state or habit of the soul the holy Doctor distinguishes two things: one, which is lacking to it, but ought to be present, namely original justice itself or the habitual turning toward the end; the other, which is present, but ought to be absent, namely disordered concupiscence (here and a. 1. q. 2.) or the disordered, but habitual, turning toward a changeable good. This disorder is called by St. Bonav. throughout corruption, or vice, disease, crookedness of nature. Hence in the Breviloquium p. III. c. 6. he says: "And thus it incurs at once the lack of justice and the disease of concupiscence, out of which two, as out of aversion and conversion, original sin is said to be integrated, according to Augustine and Anselm." St. Thom. agrees (here q. 1. a. 3; Summa I. II. q. 82. a. 3.). But it must be noted that "concupiscence is not taken here specially for that which belongs to the concupiscible power; but generally, insofar as it belongs to any rational appetite from its primary conjunction with the corrupt flesh. There is, however, another concupiscence, which belongs to the sensible part, and this is said to be a punishment. But that which is rational is sometimes called fault" etc. (so Alex. Hal., Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3.). Hence also by St. Thomas (Summa, loc. cit.) concupiscence is noted as a disorder of the powers of the soul, from which every kind of sin can arise (cf. Bonav. below d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.).

*c)* This concupiscence or proneness to sinning in original sin is as it were the *material*, but the lack of original justice is as it were the *formal* (below d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). St. Thom. agrees (in the places cited and de Malo, q. 4. a. 2.) and Alex. Hal., who (loc. cit. m. 1. a. 1. ad 2.) says: "When it is said: original sin is concupiscence, the predication seems to be material; but it is formal when it is called a stain or deformity [the privation of justice], contracted from the origin of the first parents." The same is taught by Scotus (here q. 2.) and others commonly.

*d)* Hence concupiscence, taken in the aforesaid sense, is not only the punishment of original sin, like bodily death and the other penalties, but it pertains to original sin itself,
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inasmuch as it bespeaks a vicious habit or disordered disposition of the soul. St. Thom. agrees, Summa I. II. q. 82. a. 1, especially ad 1., where he says that that sin is not a pure privation, but (positively) a certain corrupt habit. These things can be more easily understood if we compare the habit of original sin with the habitual sin of Adam himself, after he committed the actual sin. For the actual sin of Adam is distinguished in two ways from any other sin both of angels and of men; first indeed, because he lost in himself not only the gift of sanctifying grace (which happens in every mortal sin), but also the gifts of integrity, some of which pertain to the interior rectitude of the soul itself; but secondly, because he lost both gifts not only for himself, but also for the whole human race. But to the habitual sin of Adam himself, or to the depraved disposition which had arisen from his actual sin, besides the lack of sanctifying grace there pertains also the lack of the aforesaid interior rectitude, in whose place succeeded a habitual disordered turning toward a changeable good, so that both lacks in him were culpable. In a similar way it can be judged also of the habit of original sin in other men. From which it follows that, just as the privation of sanctifying grace has the character of fault, and indeed principally, so also concupiscence is not only the punishment or sequel of this sin, but in the unregenerate is also in its own way a *fault*; which St. Bonav. so often repeats with St. Augustine and very many ancient Scholastics. St. Thom. agrees (de Malo, q. 4. a. 2. in the body) in these words: "The superior part of the soul, and also certain of the inferior powers, which are under the will and are born to obey it, receive this sequel of the first sin according to the character of fault... But the inferior powers, which are not subject to the will, namely the powers of the vegetable soul and also the body itself, receive this sequel according to the character of punishment, not according to the character of fault, unless perhaps virtually" etc. (cf. Summa I. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Scotus also concurs, in Hier. de Montefortino, l. III. q. 82. a. 3.

*e)* There is, however, a notable difference as to this doctrine between Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas. For although they agree in this, that they assert original sin to be the privation of original justice or the lack of the same together with the debt of having it; nevertheless they do not understand original justice itself in the same way, as has already been said (above d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. 2.), and consequently neither the privation of the same. For according to St. Thomas sanctifying grace itself is the essence of original justice and the root of all the other gifts; hence also original sin is primarily and constitutively the privation of that same grace. But according to St. Bonav. original justice first consists in that rectitude of integrity which is conceived as a disposition, upon which afterward sanctifying grace itself followed. Hence the primitive transgression first and directly takes away this rectitude of integrity, and when it is taken away, sanctifying grace too is lost. In other words: original sin inchoatively and precisely consists in the privation of the justice of integrity, which is a certain "integrity of mind and flesh" (above d. 8. a. 3. q. 1. in the body, and d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 2.), but is completed in the privation of sanctifying grace. According to this position, that culpable disorder and rebellion of concupiscence and vitiation of nature is that which is chiefly regarded in original sin (cf. below d. 31. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, especially ad 6.). — From this principal difference between the two holy Doctors there follow also other variations of opinion, concerning which see below d. 31.

**II.** The solution to 1 and 2, in which remitted and intense concupiscence are distinguished, needs a fuller explanation, which the author himself gives below d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.

**III.** Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3, m. 7. a. 1. — Scotus, in both Writings, here q. 2. — St. Thom., in the places cited. — B. Albert, here q. 3; Summa p. II. tr. 18. q. 107. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 1. — Aegidius Rom., here q. 1. a. 5. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, here q. 1.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 721–724 = PDF 743–746, offset +22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 50247–50478). Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus from the raw OCR per-page footer blocks, renumbered continuously to body order. SCHOLION I–III read from the 450 dpi PDF.

**Carve / alignment.** This is the FIRST quaestio of ARTICULUS II (*De quidditate originalis peccati*). The short ART II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de secundo… Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo… utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia. Secundo… utrum sit ignorantia.*) is folded into this q1 per Vol II Override §5. The auto-chunked skeleton was correctly ranged to q1 only (raw 50255→50478, just before QUAESTIO II at raw 50479) — it did NOT bundle q2. Alignment verified: q1 opener title = ART II TRACTATIO item 1 (*utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia*) ✅.

**Structure.** 4 fundamenta (1 Rom. 6,12 fomes-peccati=concupiscentia / 2 Rom. 7 origo-omnium-malorum / 3 quales-actus-tales-habitus / 4 conversio-inordinata-ad-bonum-commutabile) + 4 Sed contra (1 Rom. 7 operans-non-operatum / 2 Beda quatuor-inflicta-non-est-peccatum / 3 manet-cum-gratia + magis-et-minus + iterabile-contra-baptismum / 4 *est igitur quaestio* framing Magister/Augustine *concupiscentia* vs Anselm *debitae iustitiae carentia*) + Conclusio (*concupiscentia, prout in se claudit debitae iustitiae carentiam*) + Respondeo (actuale-non-omnimoda-privatio analogy → originale per inclinationem; paralysis/tremulatio simile; peccatum carnis dupliciter notificari → originale = concupiscentia immoderata = debitae iustitiae carentia, each enclosing the other) + Ad 1 + Ad 2.3 (joint, with the *magis et minus* sub-reply + the *intendi-potest* sub-reply).

**has_scholion = TRUE** — SCHOLION I (the long doctrinal note: §1 two errors — rationalist + 16th/17th-c. innovators, Trent Sess.V can.5, Baius prop. 47; Bonav.'s twofold distinction culpa/vitium; §2 a–e on Bonav.'s sentence vs S. Thomas, materiale/formale, Breviloq. III.6, the Bonav.–Thomas difference on iustitia originalis) + SCHOLION II (Solutio ad 1.2 — concupiscentia remissa/intensa, fuller infra d. 32) + SCHOLION III (commentator-roll: Alex.Hal / Scotus / S.Thom / Albert / Petr.a.Tar / Richard / Aegid.R / Durand / Dionys.Carth).

**Page-split map.** p.721: ART II opener + QUAESTIO I + fundam. 1–4 + Sed contra 1 + Sed contra 2 opener (footers 1–6). p.722: Sed contra 2 cont. + 3 + *est igitur quaestio* + Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad 1 opener (footers 1–8). p.723: Ad 1 cont. + Ad 2.3 + SCHOLION I opener (footers 1–4). p.724: SCHOLION I §2 d–e + II + III; then QUAESTIO II body opens lower on p.724.

**Apparatus mapping (16 markers, renumbered to body order).** p.721 footers 1–6 → [^1]–[^6]. p.722 footers 1–8 → [^7]–[^14], placed at their body anchors (not in raw footer order: [^12] = p.722 f7 Psalm.31,1 Glossa-de-Nuptiis anchors *Beati, quorum remissae*; [^13] = p.722 f6 Aristot.VII-Ethic/*satis convenienter* anchors Ad-1 *quam dicitur operari mandatum*; [^14] = p.722 f8 *Vat. quem*; the remaining f1–f5 → [^7]–[^11] in order). p.723 footers 1–4 → [^15]–[^16]: [^15] = p.723 f1 (*Pro intelligitur… non intelligit Beda*) anchors Ad-2.3 *intelligitur*; [^16] merges p.723 f2 (*In hac ipsa obiectione*) + f3 (Aristot.II-Ethic c.6 + d.42) + f4 (*Vat. adiicit prima*), all attaching to the single *magis-et-minus / apud moralem philosophum* reply clause. The *Notandum* marginal at the *intensa* reply carries no numbered footer. **p.724's two numbered footers (Psalm. 24,7 Glossa / Libr. 1 c. 28) belong to QUAESTIO II's body** (the *ignorantia* args opening lower on p.724) — FORWARDED to a2-q2, NOT claimed here. Marker pairing OK (16 La = 16 En = 16 defs).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: NONE — a1-q2 closed clean at its SCHOLION II end (*…Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.*) at the top of p.721; the p.721 a1-q2 SCHOLION carries no numbered footers; ART II opens fresh lower on p.721. FORWARDED to a2-q2: p.724's two numbered footers (Psalm. 24,7 Glossa / Libr. 1 c. 28) + the entire QUAESTIO II body opening lower on p.724.

**Cascade-dropout check PASSED** — all 4 fundamenta + 4 Sed contra + the full Respondeo (paralysis simile, peccatum-carnis dupliciter, two-answer enclosure) + Ad 1 + Ad 2.3 + all three SCHOLION parts read against both 450 dpi column bands pp.721–724; body seams 721→722→723→724 grammatically continuous (722 opens *inflicta propter primum peccatum…* continuing Sed-contra-2 *quatuor sunt nobis ‖ inflicta*; 723 opens *liter excitat…* continuing Ad-1 *occasiona-‖liter*; 724 opens *nale, quatenus dicit habitum…* continuing SCHOLION I-2-d *ad ipsum peccatum origi-‖nale*).

**[?] flags:** NONE.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0