title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in morte Christi Divinitas sit separata a carne.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in morte[^p438-2] Divinitas sit separata a carne. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Soluto medio, solvuntur extrema; sed «Verbum unitur carni mediante intellectu», sicut dicit Damascenus, et habitum est supra distinctione secunda[^p438-3]: si ergo in morte separata fuit anima a carne, restat, quod Divinitas separata fuit ab eadem.

2. Item, destructo priori, destruitur posterius[^p438-4]; sed unio carnis ad animam prior est naturaliter, quam sit unio carnis ad Divinitatem, quia prima est *naturalis,* secunda *gratuita,* et natura prior est quam gratia: ergo soluta unione animae ad carnem, necesse est, solvi unitatem carnis ad Deitatem.

3. Item, Divinitas non est unibilis naturae insensibili et irrationali[^p438-5]; sed caro post separationem animae facta est insensibilis: ergo non videtur fuisse idonea tunc, ut uniretur Divinitati: videtur igitur, quod in morte unio illa fuerit soluta, quae erat Divinitatis ad carnem assumtam.

4. Item, omnis unio terminatur ad aliquod unum: si ergo caro unita erat Deitati, aut ergo ista unio faciebat unum in *natura,* aut unum in *persona.* In *natura* non, hoc constat[^p438-6]; in *persona* non, ut videtur, quia non est dicere, quod Filius esset persona carnis: ergo non videtur, quod aliquo genere unionis in morte Divinitas unita fuerit carni.

**Sed contra:**
1. Leo Papa[^p438-7]: «Tanta est unio Dei et hominis, ut nec supplicio posset dirimi nec morte disiungi»; sed de integritate humanae naturae est non tantum anima, verum etiam caro: ergo in morte non fuit separata caro a Verbo. Hoc ipsum dicit Augustinus contra Felicianum, cuius auctoritas habetur in littera[^p438-8].

2. Item, *ratione* videtur. Christus in triduo di<!-- page 439 -->citur iacuisse in sepulcro; sed hoc non dicitur nisi ratione carnis coniunctae[^p439-1]: ergo in triduo caro fuit coniuncta Divinitati.

3. Item, quandocumque[^p439-2] aliqua duo unita separantur, aut elongantur secundum *dissimilitudinem,* aut secundum *positionem;* sed caro Christi non fuit elongata a Verbo secundum dissimilitudinem — talis enim elongatio est peccati — nec fuit elongata secundum positionem, quia Verbum Dei est ubique: ergo in morte non fuit soluta unio Divinitatis ad carnem.

4. Item, nihil unitum carni per passionem separabatur a carne, quod non pateretur, carne patiente; sed Deitas, patiente carne, non patiebatur: ergo per passionem et mortem ab ea non separabatur[^p439-3].

### Conclusio.

> *In morte Christi Deitas a carne non fuit separata.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in morte[^p439-4] non fuit Deitas separata a carne. Et ratio huius triplex est, videlicet *liberalitas* ex parte assumentis, *dignitas* ex parte assumtibilis, *utilitas* ex parte assumtionis. — *Liberalitas,* inquam, ex parte assumentis, quia, cum Deus dat aliquod donum, non subtrahit illud sine culpa; si ergo nulla culpa intervenit, non decuit divinam liberalitatem carnem, quam sibi liberaliter unierat, separare a se. — *Dignitas* etiam ex parte assumtibilis fuit in causa, quare ista unio non debuit separari. Caro enim illa non debuit videre corruptionem, secundum illud quod dicitur in Psalmo[^p439-5]: *Non dabis Sanctum tuum videre corruptionem;* sicut ergo nunquam decuit, ipsam incinerari, sic nunquam decuit, ipsam a Verbo separari. — *Utilitas* autem ex parte assumtionis ad hoc ipsum faciebat. Ad hoc enim fiebat illa unio Divinitatis ad humanam naturam et carnis ad animam, ut procuraretur nostra salus. Et quoniam separatio carnis a Divinitate in nullo faceret ad nostram salutem, pro eo quod non potest per eam fieri satisfactio[^p439-6], cum Divinitas non possit sentire dolorem et poenam in separatione ipsius a carne; hinc est, quod non erat conveniens, carnem separari a Divinitate. Unde nec passio habebat ad hoc aliquem ordinem. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes inductae ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod soluto medio, solvuntur extrema; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de medio *necessitatis*[^p439-7], non autem de medio *congruitatis;* anima autem non erat medium necessitatis, sed congruitatis; praeterea, non solum erat medium ratione coniunctionis secundum *actum,* sed etiam secundum *habitum.* Et licet anima non esset unita carni in morte, erat tamen ei unibilis, et per hoc caro etiam unibilis Divinitati.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod destructo priori, destruitur posterius; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi posterius *dependet essentialiter* a priori; ubi vero aliquid praecedit alterum sicut *dispositio congrua,* non oportet, quod habeat veritatem; et sic est in proposito. Nam unio Divinitatis ad carnem sive carnis ad Divinitatem[^p439-8] non *dependet essentialiter* sive dependentia *necessitatis* ab unione illorum duorum ad invicem, sed si illam praesupponit, hoc est quaedam *congruitatis* convenientia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Divinitas non est unibilis naturae irrationali et insensibili; dicendum, quod si[^p439-9] caro Christi tunc careret et ratione et sensu, habebat tamen ordinem ad animam, quae rationem et sensum in se habet. Et si tu obiicias, quod illud non sufficiat, quod aliquid sit possibile ad unionem animae rationalis, ad hoc quod congruum sit uniri cum Divinitate; dicendum, quod absque dubio hoc non suffecisset in primordio incarnationis, immo simul decuit Divinitatem uniri carni et animae ut coniunctis[^p439-10]; secus autem est in mysterio nostrae redemptionis, quod quidem debuit consummari per mortem; et ratione cuius congruum fuit, ut illa quae prius valde coniuncta erant, non minus congrue essent ad tempus divisa, caro videlicet et anima; et pro isto tempore bene sufficiebat ipsi carni unibilitas ad animam loco congruitatis reddentis eam idoneam ad unionem cum Divinitatis natura.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio terminatur ad aliquod unum; dicendum, quod verum est. Talis enim unio terminatur ad unum in persona; nam caro unitur divinae naturae in unitate hypostasis et personae Filii Dei. Sed attendendum, quod aliter dicitur illa hypostasis *carnis* et[^p440-1] hypostasis *hominis.* Hypostasis enim *hominis* dicitur non solum in *obliquo,* sed etiam in *recto;* est enim hypostasis, quae est *homo.* Sed hypostasis *carnis* intelligitur in *obliquo,* non quia *esset* caro, sed quia *habebat* carnem; unde illa poterat dici *caro Verbi.* Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus[^p440-2]: «Si mortuus est ut homo, et sancta illa anima ab eius corpore divisa est; Divinitas tamen inseparabilis ab utroque permansit, neque ita una hypostasis in duas divisa est; etenim corpus et anima a principio in Verbi hypostasi habuerunt sustinentiam, et in morte a se invicem divisa manserunt, singulum autem eorum unam hypostasim Verbi habens. Neque enim corpus neque anima propriam habuit hypostasim praeter hypostasim Verbi». Et sic patet illud[^p440-3].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether in the death of Christ the Divinity was separated from the flesh.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in death[^p438-2] the Divinity was separated from the flesh. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. When the middle is dissolved, the extremes are dissolved; but «the Word is united to the flesh by the mediation of the intellect», as Damascene says, and as was held above in the second distinction[^p438-3]: if therefore in death the soul was separated from the flesh, it remains that the Divinity was separated from the same.

2. Likewise, when the prior is destroyed, the posterior is destroyed[^p438-4]; but the union of the flesh to the soul is by nature prior to the union of the flesh to the Divinity, because the first is *natural,* the second *gratuitous,* and nature is prior to grace: therefore, the union of the soul to the flesh being dissolved, the unity of the flesh to the Deity must necessarily be dissolved.

3. Likewise, the Divinity cannot be united to a nature insensible and irrational[^p438-5]; but the flesh, after the separation of the soul, became insensible: therefore it does not seem to have been fit at that time to be united to the Divinity: it seems therefore that in death that union was dissolved which was of the Divinity to the assumed flesh.

4. Likewise, every union terminates at some one [thing]: if therefore the flesh was united to the Deity, then either this union made one in *nature,* or one in *person.* It did not [make one] in *nature*—this is established[^p438-6]; nor in *person,* as it seems, because one cannot say that the Son was the person of the flesh: therefore it does not seem that by any kind of union the Divinity was united to the flesh in death.

**On the contrary:**
1. Leo the Pope[^p438-7]: «So great is the union of God and man, that it could be sundered neither by punishment nor disjoined by death»; but to the integrity of human nature belongs not only the soul, but also the flesh: therefore in death the flesh was not separated from the Word. This same thing Augustine says against Felician, whose authority is had in the text [of the Master][^p438-8].

2. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason.* Christ is said to have lain in the sepulchre during the three days; but this is not said except by reason of the flesh conjoined [to him][^p439-1]: therefore during the three days the flesh was conjoined to the Divinity.

3. Likewise, whenever[^p439-2] any two united things are separated, they are removed apart either according to *dissimilarity,* or according to *position;* but the flesh of Christ was not removed apart from the Word according to dissimilarity—for such a removal is [the removal] of sin—nor was it removed apart according to position, because the Word of God is everywhere: therefore in death the union of the Divinity to the flesh was not dissolved.

4. Likewise, nothing united to the flesh through the passion was separated from the flesh which would not suffer, the flesh suffering; but the Deity, the flesh suffering, did not suffer: therefore through the passion and death it was not separated from it[^p439-3].

### Conclusion.

> *In the death of Christ the Deity was not separated from the flesh.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in death[^p439-4] the Deity was not separated from the flesh. And the reason for this is threefold, namely *liberality* on the part of the one assuming, *dignity* on the part of what is assumable, *utility* on the part of the assumption. — *Liberality,* I say, on the part of the one assuming, because, since God gives some gift, he does not withdraw it without fault; if therefore no fault intervened, it did not befit the divine liberality to separate from itself the flesh which it had liberally united to itself. — *Dignity* also on the part of what is assumable was a cause why this union ought not to be separated. For that flesh ought not to see corruption, according to that which is said in the Psalm[^p439-5]: *Thou shalt not give thy Holy One to see corruption;* as therefore it never befitted that it be reduced to ashes, so it never befitted that it be separated from the Word. — *Utility* moreover on the part of the assumption made for this same [end]. For unto this was that union of the Divinity to human nature and of the flesh to the soul made, that our salvation might be procured. And since the separation of the flesh from the Divinity would in no way make for our salvation, for the reason that satisfaction[^p439-6] cannot be made through it, since the Divinity cannot feel pain and punishment in its separation from the flesh; hence it is that it was not fitting for the flesh to be separated from the Divinity. Whence neither did the passion have any ordering to this. — Therefore the reasons brought forward to this side are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that when the middle is dissolved, the extremes are dissolved; it must be said that this holds true of a middle of *necessity*[^p439-7], but not of a middle of *congruity;* now the soul was not a middle of necessity, but of congruity; moreover, it was a middle not only by reason of conjunction according to *act,* but also according to *habit.* And although the soul was not united to the flesh in death, yet it was unitable to it, and through this the flesh too was unitable to the Divinity.

2. To that which is objected, that when the prior is destroyed, the posterior is destroyed; it must be said that this is true where the posterior *depends essentially* on the prior; but where something precedes another as a *congruous disposition,* it need not hold true; and so it is in the case at hand. For the union of the Divinity to the flesh, or of the flesh to the Divinity[^p439-8], does not *depend essentially* or with a dependence of *necessity* upon the union of those two to one another, but if it presupposes it, this is a certain fittingness of *congruity.*

3. To that which is objected, that the Divinity cannot be united to an irrational and insensible nature; it must be said that, although[^p439-9] the flesh of Christ then lacked both reason and sense, it nevertheless had an ordering to the soul, which has reason and sense in itself. And if you object that it does not suffice that something be possible for the union of a rational soul, in order that it be congruous to be united with the Divinity; it must be said that, without doubt, this would not have sufficed at the first beginning of the incarnation—indeed it befitted that the Divinity be united at once to the flesh and the soul as conjoined[^p439-10]; but it is otherwise in the mystery of our redemption, which indeed had to be consummated through death; and by reason of this it was congruous that those things which before were very much conjoined should be no less congruously divided for a time, namely the flesh and the soul; and for that time the unitability to the soul well sufficed for the flesh itself, in place of a congruity rendering it fit for union with the nature of the Divinity.

4. To that which is objected, that the union terminates at some one [thing]; it must be said that this is true. For such a union terminates at one [thing] in person; for the flesh is united to the divine nature in the unity of the hypostasis and person of the Son of God. But it must be attended to, that the hypostasis is called *of the flesh* and[^p440-1] the hypostasis *of the man* in different ways. For the hypostasis *of the man* is said not only in the *oblique,* but also in the *direct;* for there is a hypostasis which *is* the man. But the hypostasis *of the flesh* is understood in the *oblique,* not because it *was* flesh, but because it *had* flesh; whence it could be called the *flesh of the Word.* And this is what Damascene says[^p440-2]: «If he died as a man, and that holy soul was divided from his body; the Divinity nevertheless remained inseparable from both, nor was the one hypostasis thus divided into two; for the body and the soul from the beginning had their subsistence in the hypostasis of the Word, and in death remained divided from one another, each of them however having the one hypostasis of the Word. For neither the body nor the soul had its own hypostasis apart from the hypostasis of the Word». And thus that [matter] is clear[^p440-3].

---

la: Edd. addunt *Christi.*

en: The editions add *Christi* [of Christ].

la: Art. 3. q. 1. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine arg. pro *ab eadem* codd. D bb *a carne.*

en: Article 3, question 1. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, for *ab eadem* [from the same], codices D bb read *a carne* [from the flesh].

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 54. et XI. c. 1. (VI. c. 15. et X. c. 1.), nec non Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et speciei, ex quo cap. nonnulla transcripsimus tom. II. pag. 95, nota 2. In fine arg. pro *solvi unitatem* mallemus *solvi unionem;* sed nihil mutavimus, refragantibus et codd. et edd.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 54, and XI, c. 1 (VI, c. 15 and X, c. 1), as well as Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* the chapter on the commonalities and differences of genus and species, from which chapter we transcribed a few things in vol. II, p. 95, note 2. At the end of the argument, for *solvi unitatem* [the unity to be dissolved] we should prefer *solvi unionem* [the union to be dissolved]; but we have changed nothing, both the codices and the editions opposing it.

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. — In fine arg. pro *assumtam* Vat. *assumtio.*

en: See above, distinction 2, article 1, question 1. — At the end of the argument, for *assumtam* [assumed], the Vatican [edition reads] *assumtio* [assumption].

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Cf. above, distinction 6, article 2, question 1.

la: Serm. 68. (alias 66.) sive 17. de Passione, c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 162, nota 2. — Pro *disiungi* multi codd. et edd. *distingui.*

en: Sermon 68 (otherwise 66), or 17 *On the Passion,* c. 1. Cf. above, p. 162, note 2. — For *disiungi* [disjoined] many codices and editions [read] *distingui* [distinguished].

la: Hic c. 1. in fine.

en: Here [in the text of the Master], c. 1, at the end.

la: Cfr. infra d. 22. q. 1.

en: Cf. below, distinction 22, question 1.

la: Multi codd. perperam *quantumcumque.* Subinde pro *unita* codd. A aa *iuncta,* cod. K *coniuncta.* Mox et paulo inferius pro *dissimilitudinem* cod. A *disiunctionem* et similiter bis *potentiam* pro *positionem.*

en: Many codices wrongly [read] *quantumcumque* [however much]. Thereupon, for *unita* [united], codices A aa [read] *iuncta* [joined], codex K *coniuncta* [conjoined]. Soon, and a little below, for *dissimilitudinem* [dissimilarity], codex A [reads] *disiunctionem* [disjunction], and likewise twice *potentiam* [power] for *positionem* [position].

la: Gregor. Nyss., Epist. 3. ad Eustathiam et Ambrosiam: *In morte ut corpus ab anima separaretur, per dispensationem fecit; at Deitas, quae divisionem nullam admittit, ubi semel ei subiecto cohaesit, neque a corpore neque ab anima unquam fuit divulsa.*

en: Gregory of Nyssa, *Letter 3, to Eustathia and Ambrosia: In death he brought it about by dispensation that the body should be separated from the soul; but the Deity, which admits no division, once it had adhered to that subject, was never torn away either from the body or from the soul.*

la: Edd. supplent *Christi.*

en: The editions supply *Christi* [of Christ].

la: Psalm. 15, 10, quem versum August. (Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 10.) sic interpretatur: *Neque sanctificatum corpus, per quod et alii sanctificandi sunt, corrumpi patieris.* — Post pauca pro *incinerari* cod. V *corrumpi.* Subinde pro *Utilitas autem* codd. A V *Utilitas etiam.*

en: Psalm 15, 10, which verse Augustine (*Commentary on this Psalm,* n. 10) thus interprets: *Neither wilt thou suffer the sanctified body, through which others too are to be sanctified, to be corrupted.* — A little after, for *incinerari* [to be reduced to ashes], codex V [reads] *corrumpi* [to be corrupted]. Thereupon, for *Utilitas autem* [Utility moreover], codices A V [read] *Utilitas etiam* [Utility also].

la: Cfr. supra d. 20. q. 3. — Paulo inferius pro *aliquem ordinem* codd. R U *aliquam ordinationem.*

en: Cf. above, distinction 20, question 3. — A little below, for *aliquem ordinem* [any ordering], codices R U [read] *aliquam ordinationem* [any ordination].

la: Id est illud, sine quo coniunctio extremorum esse nequit; quod medium supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. vocatur *medium colligantiae.* — Paulo inferius pro *non solum... sed etiam* Vat. exhibet *tantummodo non... sed et;* deinde inter verba *Et licet* interiicit *ideo.*

en: That is, that without which the conjoining of the extremes cannot be; which middle, above at distinction 2, article 3, question 1, is called the *middle of binding-together.* — A little below, for *non solum... sed etiam* [not only... but also] the Vatican [edition] exhibits *tantummodo non... sed et* [only not... but also]; then between the words *Et licet* [And although] it interjects *ideo* [therefore].

la: Pro *Divinitatem* codd. et edd. 1, 2 *animam.* Fortasse prima codd. scriptura fuit *sive Divinitatis ad animam* pro *sive carnis ad Divinitatem.* Etiam in fine huius solut. edd. habent lectionem variantem, hanc scilicet: *sed si illa supponit, hoc est quaedam congruitatis convenientia.* Codd. A N T X *haec est* pro *hoc est.*

en: For *Divinitatem* [the Divinity] codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *animam* [the soul]. Perhaps the first reading of the codices was *sive Divinitatis ad animam* [or of the Divinity to the soul] for *sive carnis ad Divinitatem* [or of the flesh to the Divinity]. Also at the end of this solution the editions have a variant reading, namely this: *sed si illa supponit, hoc est quaedam congruitatis convenientia.* Codices A N T X [read] *haec est* for *hoc est.*

la: Edd., pro *si* substituto *etsi,* subinde omittunt *tunc.*

en: The editions, *etsi* [even if] being substituted for *si* [if], thereupon omit *tunc* [then].

la: Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *mysterio* edd. cum aliquot codd. *ministerio.* Inferius pro *sufficiebat* cod. B *satisfaciebat.*

en: See above, distinction 3, part II, article 3, question 2. — Soon, for *mysterio* [mystery], the editions, with some codices, [read] *ministerio* [ministry]. Below, for *sufficiebat* [sufficed], codex B [reads] *satisfaciebat* [satisfied].

la: Codd. R Z *et aliter.*

en: Codices R Z [read] *et aliter* [and otherwise].

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 27: *Si mortuus... et in morte a se invicem divisa, singulum eorum mansit,* unam hypostasim Verbi habens. *Quam ob rem una Verbi hypostasis, et Verbi et animae et corporis erat hypostasis.* Neque enim corpus etc. — In testimonio allato pro *sustinentiam* cod. A *subsistentiam* (ὕπαρξιν). Paulo inferius pro *habens,* quod fide codd. A Q restituimus, alii codd. partim *habent,* partim *habet;* etiam edd. exhibent *habet.* Demum pro *habuit* codd. G H L aa cc *habuerunt,* codd. A Q U *habent.*

en: *On the Orthodox Faith,* Book III, c. 27: *If he died... and in death, divided from one another, each of them remained,* having the one hypostasis of the Word. *For which reason there was one hypostasis of the Word, and a hypostasis both of the Word and of the soul and of the body.* For neither the body, etc. — In the testimony cited, for *sustinentiam* [subsistence] codex A [reads] *subsistentiam* (*hyparxin*). A little below, for *habens* [having], which on the authority of codices A Q we have restored, other codices read partly *habent* [they have], partly *habet* [it has]; the editions too exhibit *habet.* Finally, for *habuit* [had], codices G H L aa cc [read] *habuerunt* [they had], codices A Q U *habent* [they have].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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**Hand-offs picked up.** From d21-a1-q1: q2 opens at raw 30482 (printed p.438 R-col). **Correction to inbound hand-off:** q2 inherits p.438 **nn.2–8** (not merely nn.2–4) — the inbound note flagged only the L-band footer (nn.2–4); the R-band footer (nn.5–8) anchors equally in q2's body (markers 5,6,7,8). p.438 n.1 was correctly already captured by q1.

**Hand-off forwarded.** See `next-session-resume.md`: q3 (*Utrum Verbum unitum fuerit carni et animae duplici unione*) begins at raw line 30600, printed p.440 (PDF 462), opening on p.440's RIGHT column below q2's tail. q3 inherits p.440 **n.4** (*Nam unio est relatio… Cfr. supra pag. 193, nota 4.*) on fund. 1's *unibilia⁴* marker, then continues with its own p.441+ footer sequence. Seam CLEAN — q2 closes with the complete Damascene quotation (*…praeter hypostasim Verbi». Et sic patet illud*), q3 opens fresh with *Tertio quaeritur*.

**`[?]` flags.** None — 450 dpi bands fully legible across pp.438–440.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 440 -->

### Articulus I. *De separatione, facta in morte, per comparationem ad unionis vinculum.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum Verbum unitum fuerit carni et animae duplici unione.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Verbum unitum fuerit carni et animae duplici unione. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Unio numeratur per extrema unibilia[^p440-4]; sed caro et anima sunt diversa unibilia, hoc enim est corporale, et illud spirituale: ergo si uniuntur Verbo, pluribus unionibus uniuntur.

2. Item, si aliquod unum unitur aliquibus alterutrum divisis, unitur eis diversis unionibus; sed hypostasis Verbi unita fuit in morte carni et animae alterutrum divisis: ergo uniebatur eis unionibus diversis. Sed eodem modo unita fuit Divinitas carni et animae in incarnatione et in morte et post mortem, quia illa unio non fuit variata: ergo si post mortem uniebatur diversis unionibus, necessario sequebatur, quod et in ipsa incarnatione.

3. Item, ubicumque est ordo prioris ad posterius, ibi est numeratio et distinctio; sed per prius unitur anima ipsi Verbo quam caro, caro enim unitur mediante anima[^p440-5]: ergo si in huiusmodi unionibus est ordo, ibi est distinctio: ergo pluribus unionibus uniuntur.

4. Item, anima unitur Divinitati et unitur carni; nec unitur unione unica, sed duplici[^p440-6]: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod hypostasis Verbi, cum unitur carni et animae, duplici unione unitur. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia ex Deitate et carne non fit unum, sicut fit ex carne et anima; tunc obiicitur: esto quod ex carne et anima non fiat unum, sicut fuit in morte; videtur tunc, quod illa iam non sit una unio, sed duae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Unio terminatur ad unum; sed caro et anima uniuntur ipsi Verbo in unam personam[^p440-7]: ergo videtur, quod uniantur ei unione unica.

2. Item, unio facta est per assumtionem[^p440-8], ergo ubi est una assumtio, ibi est una unio; sed Verbum assumsit totam naturam humanam unica assumtione: ergo univit sibi carnem et animam unica unione.

3. Item, sicut totus homo componitur ex carne et anima, ita totum corpus componitur[^p440-9] ex partibus organicis: ergo si essent diversae uniones carnis et animae ad naturam divinam, pari ratione essent diversae uniones manus et pedis ad eandem, et aliorum membrorum. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens, restat, quod carnis et animae una est unio ad Deitatem.

4. Item, cum caro et anima uniuntur unione naturali, una unione uniuntur: ergo pari ratione, quando uniuntur[^p440-10] unione personali, cum ita bene sit unum illud quod est unum in persona, sicut illud quod est unum in natura; sed caro et anima uniuntur Verbo unione personali: ergo uniuntur unione unica, non unione multiplici.

<!-- page 441 -->

> ### Conclusio.
> Loquendo de unione in sensu activo et passivo, unica unione caro et anima fuerunt unitae Verbo; loquendo de unione ut relatione, ante mortem fuerunt unitae unica unione in actu et pluribus in potentia, post mortem autem pluribus in actu.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod unio dicitur tribus modis: uno modo dicitur unio actio unientis, alio modo dicitur passio unibilis, tertio modo dicitur relatio unitorum. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum anima et corpus uniantur ipsi hypostasi Verbi unione duplici; respondendum est, quod si loquamur de unione-actione, non est ibi nisi unica unio. Unica enim unione univit sibi Verbum carnem et animam, sicut unica assumtione assumsit corpus et animam. Similiter, si loquamur de unione passive[^p441-1], non fuit ibi nisi unica unio. Caro enim et anima non fuerunt unita ipsi Verbo in unionis primordio ut divisa, sed ut coniuncta in unam substantiam et naturam; ideo assumta et unita fuerunt assumtione et unione unica. — Si autem loquamur de unione, secundum quod est relatio unibilium; sic dicendum est, quod cum relatio numeretur per extrema[^p441-2], eo modo habet multiplicari, quo habet plurificari ipsum unibile. Quoniam igitur unibile ex parte humanae naturae fuit unum in actu et plura in potentia — quia extremum illud erat humana natura, constans ex corpore et anima, quae concurrebant in unum secundum actum et poterant esse divisa[^p441-3] et distincta — hinc est, quod quamdiu corpus et anima fuerunt coniuncta, unica unione uniebantur Verbo, unica, inquam, in actu, sed pluribus in potentia; quando vero ab invicem in morte fuerunt separata, uniebantur unionibus pluribus. Caro enim dicebatur unita Verbo et unita anima; et haec relatio ex parte carnis et animae erat alia et alia. Intellecto enim, quod caro non esset unita, adhuc posset intelligi esse unita anima.

Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Uno enim modo concedi potest, quod caro et anima uniantur Divinitati multiplici unione, secundum illud quod consuevit dici[^p441-4], quod triplex fuit ibi unio: una Divinitatis ad carnem, alia Divinitatis ad animam, alia animae ad carnem. Et secundum istam viam procedunt rationes, quae ostendunt, ibi fuisse uniones plures. — Aliis autem modis dicendum est, quod ibi fuit una tantum unio; et secundum hanc viam procedunt rationes ad oppositum. Et sic patet totum. Sed quoniam aliquae de rationibus ad primam partem inductis sophisticae sunt et concludunt etiam, unionem plurificari simpliciter; ideo ad eas oportet respondere.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod caro et anima sunt diversa unibilia, quia unum spirituale, alterum corporale; dicendum, quod licet caro et anima diversitatem habeant inter se, sunt tamen partes constituentes unum in essentia et natura; et quia in unam naturam concurrunt, hinc est, quod in illa unione, qua Dei Filius humanam naturam assumsit, rationem tenent unius extremi.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in morte Verbum unitum erat duobus diversis et divisis; dicendum, quod etsi illa essent localiter divisa, erant tamen secundum naturalem inclinationem ad invicem[^p441-5] ordinata, et ratione illius ordinis caro erat idonea, ut esset unita Deitati. Praeterea, esto quod plures essent uniones post mortem, secundum quod unio nominat relationem, non tamen sequitur, quod similiter essent in vita, quia, quamvis unio manserit uniformiter et immutabiliter quantum ad vinculum, facta est tamen quaedam immutatio in altero extremorum, scilicet in humana natura, cuius principia constituentia fuerunt in morte seiuncta, cum tamen essent unita in vita.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi ordo, ergo distinctio; dicendum, quod quidam est ordo, qui ponit simpliciter distinctionem, quando est ordo, qui attenditur secundum positionem et gradum inter res consimilis generis; sed quando aliqua sic ordinantur, quod ibi est unum propter alterum[^p441-6]; non oportet, ibi esse numerationem; sicut si teneam equum per frenum, per prius teneo frenum quam equum, quia equum teneo mediante freno; non tamen duplici tentione teneo utrumque, sed unica. Et sic patet, quod non cogit illa ratio. Non tamen est omnino simile de huiusmodi tentione et de unione; sed hoc inductum est ad illius rationis dissolutionem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima unitur Divinitati et carni duplici unione etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Divinitas et caro non cedunt in unam naturam, immo naturaliter et essentialiter sunt distincta; non sic autem est de carne et anima, quia[^p441-7] unam naturam constituunt; et ideo non oportet, quod Deitas eis diversis unionibus uniatur.

<!-- page 442 -->

english:
### Article I. *On the separation, made in death, by comparison to the bond of union.*
### Question III. *Whether the Word was united to the flesh and the soul by a twofold union.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the Word was united to the flesh and the soul by a twofold union. And that it was so, it seems.

1. A union is numbered according to the unitable extremes[^p440-4]; but the flesh and the soul are diverse unitables, for the one is corporeal and the other spiritual: therefore if they are united to the Word, they are united by several unions.

2. Likewise, if some one thing is united to certain things mutually divided, it is united to them by diverse unions; but the hypostasis of the Word was united in death to the flesh and the soul, which were mutually divided: therefore it was united to them by diverse unions. But the Divinity was united to the flesh and the soul in the same manner in the incarnation and in death and after death, since that union was not varied: therefore if after death it was united by diverse unions, it necessarily followed that this was so even in the incarnation itself.

3. Likewise, wherever there is an order of prior to posterior, there is numeration and distinction; but the soul is united to the Word prior to the flesh, for the flesh is united by the mediation of the soul[^p440-5]: therefore if in unions of this kind there is order, there is distinction therein: therefore they are united by several unions.

4. Likewise, the soul is united to the Divinity and is united to the flesh; nor is it united by a single union, but by a twofold one[^p440-6]: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the hypostasis of the Word, when it is united to the flesh and the soul, is united by a twofold union. If you say that the case is not alike, because from the Deity and the flesh there is not made one thing, as there is from the flesh and the soul; then it is objected: granted that from the flesh and the soul one thing is not made, as was the case in death; it then seems that this is no longer one union, but two.

**On the contrary:** 1. A union is terminated at one thing; but the flesh and the soul are united to the Word himself into one person[^p440-7]: therefore it seems that they are united to him by a single union.

2. Likewise, the union was made through assumption[^p440-8], therefore where there is one assumption, there is one union; but the Word assumed the whole human nature by a single assumption: therefore he united the flesh and the soul to himself by a single union.

3. Likewise, just as the whole man is composed of flesh and soul, so the whole body is composed[^p440-9] of organic parts: therefore if there were diverse unions of the flesh and the soul to the divine nature, by parity of reasoning there would be diverse unions of the hand and the foot to the same, and of the other members. But if this is unfitting, it remains that there is one union of the flesh and the soul to the Deity.

4. Likewise, since the flesh and the soul are united by a natural union, they are united by one union: therefore by parity of reasoning, when they are united[^p440-10] by a personal union — since that which is one in person is just as truly one as that which is one in nature; but the flesh and the soul are united to the Word by a personal union — therefore they are united by a single union, not by a manifold one.

> ### Conclusion.
> Speaking of union in the active and passive sense, the flesh and the soul were united to the Word by a single union; speaking of union as a relation, before death they were united by a single union in act and several in potency, but after death by several in act.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that "union" is said in three ways: in one way union is called the action of the one uniting, in another way it is called the passion of the unitable, in a third way it is called the relation of the things united. When therefore it is asked whether the soul and the body are united to the hypostasis of the Word itself by a twofold union, it must be answered that, if we speak of union-as-action, there is there but a single union. For the Word united the flesh and the soul to himself by a single union, just as by a single assumption he assumed the body and the soul. Likewise, if we speak of union passively[^p441-1], there was there but a single union. For the flesh and the soul were not united to the Word as divided in the first beginning of the union, but as conjoined into one substance and nature; therefore they were assumed and united by a single assumption and union. — But if we speak of union according as it is a relation of unitables, then it must be said that, since a relation is numbered according to the extremes[^p441-2], it has to be multiplied in the same way as the unitable itself has to be made several. Since therefore the unitable on the side of the human nature was one in act and several in potency — because that extreme was the human nature, consisting of body and soul, which concurred into one according to act and could be divided[^p441-3] and distinct — hence it is that, so long as the body and the soul were conjoined, they were united to the Word by a single union, single, I say, in act, but several in potency; but when they were separated from one another in death, they were united by several unions. For the flesh was said to be united to the Word and united to the soul; and this relation on the side of the flesh and the soul was one thing and another. For granted that the flesh were not united, the soul could still be understood to be united.

And according to this the reply to the question proposed is clear. For in one way it can be conceded that the flesh and the soul are united to the Divinity by a manifold union, according to what is customarily said[^p441-4], namely that there was there a threefold union: one of the Divinity to the flesh, another of the Divinity to the soul, another of the soul to the flesh. And along this way the arguments proceed which show that there were several unions there. — But in other ways it must be said that there was there but one union; and along this way the arguments to the opposite proceed. And so the whole matter is clear. But since some of the arguments brought forward for the first part are sophistical and conclude also that the union is multiplied simply, they must therefore be answered.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the flesh and the soul are diverse unitables, because the one is spiritual, the other corporeal; it must be said that, although the flesh and the soul have a diversity between themselves, they are nevertheless parts constituting one thing in essence and nature; and because they concur into one nature, hence it is that in that union, by which the Son of God assumed the human nature, they hold the account of one extreme.

2. To that which is objected, that in death the Word was united to two diverse and divided things; it must be said that, even though those were locally divided, they were nevertheless ordered toward one another[^p441-5] according to a natural inclination, and by reason of that order the flesh was fit to be united to the Deity. Moreover, granted that there were several unions after death, according as union names a relation, it does not nevertheless follow that they would be so in life; for although the union remained uniformly and immutably as to the bond, there was nevertheless made a certain change in the other of the extremes, namely in the human nature, whose constituting principles were sundered in death, although they were united in life.

3. To that which is objected, that there is order there, therefore distinction; it must be said that there is a certain order which posits distinction simply, when it is an order that is regarded according to position and grade among things of a like genus; but when some things are so ordered that there is one thing on account of another[^p441-6], it is not necessary that there be numeration there; just as if I hold a horse by the bridle, I hold the bridle prior to the horse, because I hold the horse by the mediation of the bridle; nevertheless I do not hold both by a twofold holding, but by a single one. And so it is clear that that argument does not compel. Yet the case of such holding and of union is not altogether alike; but this has been adduced for the dissolution of that argument.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul is united to the Divinity and to the flesh by a twofold union, etc.; it must be said that the case is not alike, because the Divinity and the flesh do not yield into one nature, but rather are naturally and essentially distinct; whereas it is not so with the flesh and the soul, since[^p441-7] they constitute one nature; and therefore it is not necessary that the Deity be united to them by diverse unions.

la: Nam unio est *relatio*, quae respectum habet ad terminum. Cfr. supra pag. 193, nota 4.

en: For a union is a *relation*, which has a respect to a term. Cf. above, p. 193, note 4.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori, et I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. — Cod. V post *anima* supplet *ipsi*, et post *ordo* codd. A K *restat quod.*

en: Cf. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 1. — On the major premise cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter "On the Prior," and I Sent., d. 20, a. 2, q. 1. — Codex V, after *anima*, adds *ipsi*, and after *ordo* codices A, K read *restat quod.*

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 3.

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 3.

la: Ut habetur supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As is had above, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.

la: Cod. A *ita corpus hominis componitur.*

en: Codex A reads *thus the body of man is composed.*

la: Cod. K supplet *Verbo.* Paulo inferius pro *unum in natura* plurimi codd. *unum natura.* — Duae hae uniones, licet sint bene distinguendae, non sunt accidentales, sed *substantiales*, quia substantia «dupliciter dicitur: uno modo pro *essentia* sive natura, alio modo pro *supposito* sive hypostasi» (S. Thom., S. III. q. 2. a. 6. ad 3.).

en: Codex K adds *Verbo* ["to the Word"]. A little below, for *unum in natura* very many codices read *unum natura.* — These two unions, although they are well to be distinguished, are not accidental but *substantial*, since "substance is said in two ways: in one way for the *essence* or nature, in another way for the *supposit* or hypostasis" (St. Thomas, *Summa* III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3).

la: Edd. *passione.*

en: The editions read *passione* ["by passion"].

la: Vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro *relatio numeretur per*, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A K (N a secunda manu) bb, Vat. *relatio non numeretur nisi per*, alii codd. *relatio non uniretur per*, edd. 1, 2 *relatio non uniatur.*

en: See above, d. 8, a. 2, q. 2. — A little before, for *relatio numeretur per* ["a relation is numbered according to"], which reading codices A, K (N by a second hand), bb defend, the Vatican edition reads *relatio non numeretur nisi per* ["a relation is not numbered except according to"], other codices *relatio non uniretur per*, the editions 1, 2 *relatio non uniatur.*

la: Pro *divisa* codd. B C D F M N O T *diversa.* Inferius pro *ab invicem* edd. et plures codd. *ad invicem.* Subinde post *separata* edd. repetunt *in morte.*

en: For *divisa* ["divided"] codices B, C, D, F, M, N, O, T read *diversa* ["diverse"]. Below, for *ab invicem* the editions and several codices read *ad invicem.* Then after *separata* the editions repeat *in morte* ["in death"].

la: Pro *ad invicem* cod. bb *in unionem*, codd. A K *in unione.*

en: For *ad invicem* codex bb reads *in unionem*, codices A, K *in unione.*

la: Respicitur illud Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2: «Ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum». Cfr. supra pag. 222, nota 9. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. *sed aliqua sic ordinantur, quod ubi est unum propter alterum.* Paulo superius pro *quando* [cod. Q *sicut*] *est ordo* edd. *quidam est ordo.*

en: There is regarded that saying of Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2: «Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one thing». Cf. above, p. 222, note 9. Cf. also I Sent., d. 20, a. 2, q. 1. — The Vatican edition reads *sed aliqua sic ordinantur, quod ubi est unum propter alterum.* A little above, for *quando* [codex Q: *sicut*] *est ordo* the editions read *quidam est ordo.*

la: Pro *quia* codd. A K bb *quae.*

en: For *quia* codices A, K, bb read *quae.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Triplex hic distinguitur sensus vocabuli *unionis*, sicut supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. ad 6. distincta est triplex *gratia unionis*. De aliis modis et speciebus unionis cfr. loci supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in scholio citati. — Responsio ad hanc quaestionem supponit principia supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 1. explicata. Conclusiones approbat et ultimas explicat S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. ad 5.) his verbis: *Relationes secundum rem* [i. e. reales] *multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem eorum, supra quae fundantur relationes; unde contingit, quod relatio ex parte unius extremi est una, quae ex parte alterius multiplicatur, sicut de illo qui una paternitate ad multos filios refertur, qui ad ipsum multis filiationibus referuntur. Ita etiam est hoc, quia ex parte ipsius Filii Dei est una tantum, quamvis non sit ex parte ipsius relatio realis, sed rationis tantum. Ex parte autem assumtorum, quae divisa sunt, sunt duae uniones in actu post mortem; ante autem erat una in actu et multae in potentia. Unde non oportet, quod aliqua unio fiat ibi de novo, sicut nec in divisione continui etc.* (cfr. S. Bonav., hic solut. ad 2.). — Notanda est doctrina in solut. ad 1. 2. 4. tradita, qua solvitur etiam difficultas, a Richardo a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.) sic expressa: «Verbum non remansit unitum carni post separationem animae ut cuidam toti, sed ut parti humanae naturae. Et ideo, sicut de hypostasi Ioannis non praedicatur pars humanae naturae… ita a simili aliqualiter dico, quod post separationem animae a carne Christi, caro non potuit vere praedicari de Verbo». Idem docet S. Bonav. supra q. 1. ad 2, q. 2. ad 4. et infra a. 2. q. 3. ad 2. Consentit S. Thom., in Comment. loc. cit. ad 3. 4. 6, et S. III. q. 50. a. 2. ad 2, a. 3. ad 3.

**II.** Specialem quaestionem de eadem re habent Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.). Alii ipsam tangunt in praecedentibus duabus quaestionibus, vel III. Sent. d. 2, praesertim in quaestione, utrum totum assumserit mediantibus partibus (S. Thom., ibi q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Scot., ibi q. 2.).

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Here a threefold sense of the word *union* is distinguished, just as above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 6, a threefold *grace of union* was distinguished. On the other modes and species of union, cf. the passages cited above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in the scholion. — The reply to this question presupposes the principles explained above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 1. St. Thomas approves the conclusions and explains the last ones (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, ad 5) in these words: *Relations according to the thing* [i.e., real relations] *are multiplied according to the multiplication of the things upon which the relations are founded; whence it happens that the relation on the side of one extreme is one, which on the side of the other is multiplied, as in the case of one who by one paternity is referred to many sons, who are referred to him by many filiations. So too is this, because on the side of the Son of God himself it is one only, although on his side it is not a real relation but only one of reason. But on the side of the things assumed, which are divided, there are two unions in act after death; before, however, there was one in act and many in potency. Whence it is not necessary that any union come to be there anew, just as neither in the division of a continuum, etc.* (cf. St. Bonaventure, here, in the solution to argument 2). — Note the doctrine handed down in the solutions to arguments 1, 2, 4, by which is also resolved the difficulty expressed thus by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 2, ad 2): «The Word did not remain united to the flesh after the separation of the soul as to a certain whole, but as to a part of the human nature. And therefore, just as a part of the human nature is not predicated of the hypostasis of John… so by a similar reasoning I say in a certain way that, after the separation of the soul from the flesh of Christ, the flesh could not truly be predicated of the Word». St. Bonaventure teaches the same above, q. 1, ad 2; q. 2, ad 4; and below, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2. St. Thomas agrees, in his Commentary at the place cited, ad 3, 4, 6, and *Summa* III, q. 50, a. 2, ad 2; a. 3, ad 3.

**II.** A special question on the same matter is treated by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2) and Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 4). Others touch upon it in the two preceding questions, or in III Sent., d. 2, especially in the question whether [the Word] assumed the whole by the mediation of the parts (St. Thomas, there q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3; Scotus, there q. 2).

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.440–442 (PDF 462–464; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 30600–30736). The CONCLUSIO / Respondeo / Ad-1–4 / scholion regions are cascade-shattered in the IA OCR (two-column bleed + diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation), so for those regions the column-band PDF read is authoritative (Vol II/III override); the OCR served as base only for the clean fundamenta/Sed-contra running prose and for footnote-marker spacing.

**Opener alignment — VERIFIED.** Running head + body read *Tertio quaeritur, utrum Verbum unitum fuerit carni et animae duplici unione* (NOT q1's *anima separata a Deitate*, NOT q2's *Divinitas separata a carne*). This is the THIRD and LAST question of ARTICULUS I.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.440** (q3 opens at the foot of the LEFT column, below q2's tail *…caro Verbi. Et hoc est…*, then continues RIGHT column): question opener + fundamenta 1–4 + Sed contra 1–4. Footers: **n.4** (inherited as q3's first body footnote) + **nn.5–10** (p.440 nn.1–3 were q2's). `<!-- page 440 -->`.
- **p.441**: CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + replies Ad 1–4. Footers: **nn.1–7**. `<!-- page 441 -->`.
- **p.442**: Scholion §I–II (the scholion fills p.442's LEFT column and the top of its RIGHT column; below it ARTICULUS II opens). The scholion carries **no numbered footers** — its citations are inline parentheticals. `<!-- page 442 -->`.

**Apparatus coverage.** 14 entries total: p.440 nn.4–10 (7) + p.441 nn.1–7 (7). Per-page restart preserved. Verified against both L-band and R-band foot crops of pp.440–441.

**Scholion coverage.** q3 has its OWN scholion (§I–II), confirmed eyes-on pp.441–442 — q1's scholion §II said *De hac (1.) quaestione… De seq. (2.) quaestione* (covering q1+q2 only), so q3 was predicted to carry its own scholion; that prediction is CONFIRMED. Ordered body-then-scholion (`### Scholion` last in each language block) per the parser requirement.

**Migrating footer picked up IN:** p.440 **n.4** (*Nam unio est relatio… Cfr. supra pag. 193, nota 4.*) on fundamentum 1's *unibilia⁴* — flagged in the inbound hand-off; captured here. p.440 nn.1–3 were q2's and are NOT duplicated.

**Hand-off OUT (to d21-a2-q1):** ARTICULUS II begins at **raw line 30739**, printed **p.442** (PDF 464), below q3's scholion. Its short opener *Consequenter quaeritur de effectu illius separationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria* folds into a2-q1 per the locked convention. QUAESTIO I (*Utrum post instans separationis anima Christi impassibilis effecta sit*) opener at raw 30748, on p.442's RIGHT column. **No footer migrates out of q3** — the scholion runs unmarked to the bottom of p.442's columns; a2-q1 begins p.442's own fresh footer sequence (a2-q1's first marker is on fund. 1 *corpus¹* / fund. 2 *contrario²*). Seam CLEAN: q3 closes with the complete scholion §II (*…Scot., ibi q. 2.*); ARTICULUS II opens fresh.

**[?] flags.** None — pp.440–442 fully legible at 450 dpi.

**Seam IN.** CLEAN — q2 closes on p.440 with the complete Damascene quotation (*…praeter hypostasim Verbi». Et sic patet illud³*); q3 opens fresh below with *Tertio quaeritur*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 442 -->

### Articulus II. *De effectu illius separationis.*

Consequenter quaeritur de effectu illius separationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum post instans separationis anima Christi impassibilis fuerit effecta. Secundo, utrum ex ipsa separatione caro fuerit mortua. Tertio quaeritur, utrum propter mortem carnis mors sit ipsi personae Verbi attribuenda.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum post instans separationis anima Christi impassibilis effecta sit.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum post instans separationis anima Christi impassibilis sit effecta. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Anima Christi non fuit passibilis nisi propter unionem sui ad corpus[^p442-1]: ergo statim, dum fuit separata, amisit passibilitatem: ergo facta fuit impassibilis.

2. Item, nihil patitur nisi secundum ordinem naturae, sicut contrarium patitur a contrario[^p442-2]; vel secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, sicut peccator patitur ab aliquo afflictionem; vel secundum dispensationem divinae misericordiae, sicut Redemptor passus est pro sanando nostro morbo; sed nullo istorum modorum post separationem passio potuit inesse ipsi animae Christi — non enim habuit *contrarium* nec habuit *peccatum,* et *consummatum* erat nostrae redemptionis mysterium, sicut dicitur Ioannis decimo nono[^p442-3]: *Consummatum est* — ergo nullo modo pati poterat: restat ergo, quod statim impassibilis est effecta.

3. Item, animae Sanctorum, quando non habent aliquem reatum, statim efficiuntur impassibiles: ergo si anima Christi multo velocius digna erat omni glorificatione quam omnis alia anima, videtur, quod statim impassibilis est effecta.

4. Item, nulla passio potuit esse in Christo, quae vacaret merito[^p442-4]; sed anima Christi statim post separationem amisit potentiam sive statum merendi: ergo statim amisit potentiam patiendi: ergo statim facta est impassibilis.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut passibilitas inerat animae Christi praeter peccati debitum, ita et carni[^p442-5]: ergo sicut velociter collata est impassibilitas animae, ita velociter debuit conferri ipsi corpori; sed impassibilitas non est collata ipsi corpori usque ad triduum, quo resurrexit: ergo similiter videtur quod nec animae ante tempus illud.

<!-- page 443 -->

2. Item, ponatur, quod anima iterum uniretur corpori illi secundum statum, in quo ipsum deseruit; tunc arguitur sic: si anima passibili corpori uniretur, esset passibilis; sed anima Christi poterat uniri illi corpori ante glorificationem, quia nihil eam impediebat: ergo adhuc poterat pati: non ergo erat impassibilis.

3. Item, nihil novum collatum est animae in ipso instanti separationis a corpore: ergo si prius non habebat impassibilitatem, videtur, quod nec tunc habuit[^p443-1] ante diem resurrectionis.

4. Item, anima, quae impassibilitatem habet, statim cum a corpore recedit, evolat[^p443-2]; sed anima Christi non statim evolavit nec ascendit statim ad caelos, sed descendit ad inferos: ergo non statim post instans separationis facta est impassibilis.

### Conclusio.

> Valde probabile est, quod anima Christi statim post separationem a corpore fuerit facta impassibilis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ex certitudine auctoritatis non est nobis omnino determinatum, utrum anima Christi statim post separationem impassibilis fuerit effecta, sicut Magister tangit supra distinctione decima octava[^p443-3]. Unde sine periculo fidei potest quis utrumque horum sentire, vel quod impassibilis effecta est statim post separationem, vel in ipsa corporis glorificatione. Verumtamen probabilitati rationis magis consonare videtur, quod statim post separationem habuerit impassibilitatem. Si enim non patiebatur anima Christi nisi dispensative[^p443-4] et propter nostram salutem; si iam non erat tempus et locus merendi, iam anima Christi non debebat nec poterat pati. — Unde non solum de anima Christi probabile est, quod statim post separationem a corpore facta sit impassibilis, sed etiam de qualibet anima viri sancti, in qua non reperitur reatus alicuius peccati. — Ideo rationes, quae ad partem istam sunt, satis rationabiliter possunt concedi.

**Ad oppositorum solutionem:** 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod corpus non statim impassibilitate fuit dotatum: dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ex causa: primum quidem, quia anima propinquior erat gloriae quam caro; erat enim beata secundum aliquam sui partem[^p443-5]; secundo vero, quia dilatio impassibilitatis in carne faciebat ad fidei nostrae confirmationem, videlicet ut ostenderetur Christus veraciter passus et mortuus fuisse; non sic dilatio impassibilitatis in anima: ideo magis dilata fuit impassibilitas corporis quam impassibilitas animae ex dispensatione divina.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima illa iterum uniri poterat corpori passibili; dicendum, quod quaedam animae separantur a corpore separatione definitiva sive finali, quaedam vero separantur a corpore ad tempus propter gloriae Dei manifestationem; sicut est in illis qui resuscitantur ad statum vitae praeteritae, sicut fuit in Lazaro[^p443-6] et in aliis mirabiliter suscitatis. Quae primo modo separantur ingrediuntur novum statum; quae vero secundo modo separantur secundum divinam dispositionem adhuc a statu suo retardantur. Unde primae, nisi obstet reatus peccati, statim efficiuntur impassibiles nec unibiles sunt corpori passibili, quamvis secundae per divinum miraculum aliquando habeant coniungi. Et primo modo anima Christi separata fuit, quoniam Deus non decreverat[^p443-7], eam ulterius uniri carni passibili; et ideo positio illa nulla est. Non enim poterat carni passibili uniri, non quia aliquid creatum illud impediret, sed quia divina iustitia illud non permitteret.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil collatum est animae; dicendum, quod illud non constat, quamvis non legatur; nec etiam[^p443-8] cogit. Anima enim Christi per illud quod habebat ex sola separatione a carne passibili, iam caruit aptitudine patiendi, et ita reddita est impassibilis; nec oportet, propter hoc aliquid novi sibi conferri; satis enim sufficiebat, passionis et passibilitatis causam sibi auferri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod animae, quae statim post separationem efficiuntur impassibiles, statim evolant; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet nunc post Christi ascensionem, sed ante non habebat veritatem. Differebatur enim aliquarum animarum evolatio, scilicet sanctorum Patrum, propter primi peccati obligationem[^p443-9]; animae vero Christi differebatur propter hominum eruditionem et nostrae fidei confirmationem et rectificationem et carnis propinquam glorificationem.

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english:
### Article II. *On the effect of that separation.*

Next it is asked about the effect of that separation. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether after the instant of separation the soul of Christ was made impassible. Second, whether from that very separation the flesh was made dead. Third it is asked whether, on account of the death of the flesh, death is to be attributed to the very person of the Word.

### Question I. *Whether after the instant of separation the soul of Christ was made impassible.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether after the instant of separation the soul of Christ was made impassible. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. The soul of Christ was not passible except on account of its union to the body[^p442-1]: therefore at once, when it was separated, it lost passibility: therefore it was made impassible.

2. Likewise, nothing suffers except according to the order of nature, as a contrary suffers from a contrary[^p442-2]; or according to the order of divine justice, as a sinner suffers affliction from someone; or according to the dispensation of divine mercy, as the Redeemer suffered for the healing of our disease; but in none of these ways could suffering be present in the soul of Christ after the separation — for it had no *contrary,* nor did it have *sin,* and the mystery of our redemption was *consummated,* as it is said in John, chapter nineteen[^p442-3]: *It is consummated* — therefore in no way could it suffer: it remains, therefore, that it was at once made impassible.

3. Likewise, the souls of the Saints, when they have no guilt, are at once made impassible: therefore if the soul of Christ was much more swiftly worthy of all glorification than every other soul, it seems that it was at once made impassible.

4. Likewise, no suffering could be in Christ that was void of merit[^p442-4]; but the soul of Christ at once after the separation lost the power or the state of meriting: therefore it at once lost the power of suffering: therefore it was at once made impassible.

**On the contrary:** 1. Just as passibility was in the soul of Christ apart from any debt of sin, so also in the flesh[^p442-5]: therefore just as impassibility was swiftly conferred on the soul, so swiftly ought it to have been conferred on the body itself; but impassibility was not conferred on the body until the three days, in which he rose again: therefore likewise it seems that neither [was it conferred] on the soul before that time.

2. Likewise, let it be posited that the soul were again united to that body according to the state in which it deserted it; then it is argued thus: if the soul were united to a passible body, it would be passible; but the soul of Christ could be united to that body before glorification, because nothing impeded it: therefore it could still suffer: therefore it was not impassible.

3. Likewise, nothing new was conferred on the soul in the very instant of separation from the body: therefore if previously it did not have impassibility, it seems that neither did it then have it[^p443-1] before the day of resurrection.

4. Likewise, a soul that has impassibility, at once when it withdraws from the body, flies away[^p443-2]; but the soul of Christ did not at once fly away, nor did it at once ascend to the heavens, but it descended to the lower regions: therefore it was not at once after the instant of separation made impassible.

### Conclusion.

> It is highly probable that the soul of Christ was at once after the separation from the body made impassible.

**I respond:** It must be said that, from the certitude of authority, it is not entirely determined for us whether the soul of Christ was at once after the separation made impassible, as the Master touches upon above, in the eighteenth distinction[^p443-3]. Hence, without peril to faith, anyone may hold either of these, namely either that it was made impassible at once after the separation, or in the very glorification of the body. Nevertheless it seems more consonant with the probability of reason that it had impassibility at once after the separation. For if the soul of Christ did not suffer except dispensatively[^p443-4] and for our salvation; if there was now no time and place for meriting, then now the soul of Christ neither ought nor was able to suffer. — Hence not only concerning the soul of Christ is it probable that it was at once after the separation from the body made impassible, but also concerning any soul of a holy man in which the guilt of no sin is found. — Therefore the reasons that are for this side can be quite reasonably conceded.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:** 1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that the body was not at once endowed with impassibility: it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold cause: first indeed, because the soul was nearer to glory than the flesh; for it was blessed according to some part of itself[^p443-5]; second truly, because the delay of impassibility in the flesh served for the confirmation of our faith, namely so that it might be shown that Christ truly suffered and died; not so the delay of impassibility in the soul: therefore the impassibility of the body was more delayed than the impassibility of the soul, by divine dispensation.

2. To that which is objected, that that soul could again be united to a passible body; it must be said that certain souls are separated from the body by a definitive or final separation, while certain ones are separated from the body for a time on account of the manifestation of God's glory; as is the case in those who are raised again to the state of a past life, as was the case in Lazarus[^p443-6] and in others miraculously raised up. Those that are separated in the first way enter a new state; those that are separated in the second way are, according to the divine disposition, still held back from their state. Hence the first, unless the guilt of sin stands in the way, are at once made impassible and are not unible to a passible body, although the second sometimes have to be conjoined [to it] through a divine miracle. And in the first way the soul of Christ was separated, since God had not decreed[^p443-7] that it should be further united to passible flesh; and therefore that supposition is null. For it could not be united to passible flesh, not because anything created impeded it, but because divine justice would not permit it.

3. To that which is objected, that nothing was conferred on the soul; it must be said that this is not established, although it is not read; nor indeed does it[^p443-8] compel [the conclusion]. For the soul of Christ, through that which it had from the separation alone from passible flesh, already lacked the aptitude for suffering, and thus was rendered impassible; nor is it necessary, on account of this, that anything new be conferred on it; for it sufficed well enough that the cause of suffering and of passibility be taken away from it.

4. To that which is objected, that the souls which are at once after separation made impassible at once fly away; it must be said that this holds true now after Christ's ascension, but before it did not hold true. For the flying-away of certain souls, namely of the holy Fathers, was deferred on account of the obligation of the first sin[^p443-9]; but for the soul of Christ it was deferred on account of the instruction of men and the confirmation and rectification of our faith and the near glorification of the flesh.

la: Cfr. supra d. 16. a. I. q. I. ad 4, ubi etiam videsis de maiori arg. seq. — Mox pro *passibilitatem* Vat. perperam *impassibilitatem.*

en: Cf. above d. 16, a. I, q. I, ad 4, where you may also see concerning the major [premise] of the following argument. — Shortly after, for *passibilitatem* the Vatican edition wrongly [reads] *impassibilitatem.*

la: Vide Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.). — Post pauca pro *peccator* cod. G *reus.*

en: See Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 50 ff. (c. 7). — A little after, for *peccator* codex G [reads] *reus.*

la: Vers. 30.

en: Verse 30.

la: Cfr. supra d. 18. a. I. q. 3.

en: Cf. above d. 18, a. I, q. 3.

la: Vide supra d. 16. a. I. q. 3. — Mox voci *animae* cod. U praefigit *ipsi.*

en: See above d. 16, a. I, q. 3. — Shortly after, before the word *animae* codex U prefixes *ipsi.*

la: Non pauci codd. *habuerit.*

en: Not a few codices [read] *habuerit.*

la: Sive venit in caelum. — Paulo inferius pro *separationis,* quam lectionem e codd. A K Y bb recepimus, alii codd. et edd. perperam *resurrectionis.*

en: Or [rather] comes into heaven. — A little below, for *separationis,* which reading we have received from codices A K Y bb, other codices and editions wrongly [read] *resurrectionis.*

la: Cap. I. Innocent. III, Serm. 20. de Temp. dicit: *Puto, quod anima Christi mox, ut exivit a corpore, facta est impassibilis, cum illico fuerit ab omni causa passionis immunis; quoniam tunc nec alieno consortio nec ex delicto nec ex propria pati poterat natura, nisi forsitan illud videatur obsistere, quod sicut corpus et anima Christi simul incipiens passibilitati subesse, quoniam illud fuit corpus simul et formando animatum et animando formatum, ita et corpus et anima Christi simul impassibilitatem acceperunt, ut anima reddita corpori simul fuerit glorificata cum illo.*

en: Chap. I. Innocent III, *Sermon* 20 *de Tempore*, says: *I think that the soul of Christ, as soon as it went out from the body, was made impassible, since it was at once immune from every cause of suffering; for then the nature could suffer neither from another's company nor from a transgression nor from itself, unless perhaps this seems to stand against it, that just as the body and soul of Christ together began to be subject to passibility — since that body was at once both animated in being formed and formed in being animated — so also the body and soul of Christ together received impassibility, so that the soul, restored to the body, was glorified together with it.*

la: Cod. U *ex dispensatione,* plures codd. *dispensatione.* In Vat. desideratur *nisi* ante *dispensative.* Mox pro *si iam* cod. R *et iam.* Paulo inferius post *separationem* cod. O subiicit *animae.*

en: Codex U [reads] *ex dispensatione,* several codices *dispensatione.* In the Vatican edition *nisi* is wanting before *dispensative.* Shortly after, for *si iam* codex R [reads] *et iam.* A little below, after *separationem* codex O adds *animae.*

la: Scilicet secundum partem superiorem. Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Namely according to the superior part. Cf. above d. 16, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Ioan. 11, 4: *Audiens autem Iesus (Lazarum infirmari) dixit eis: Infirmitas haec non est ad mortem, sed pro gloria Dei* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *dispositionem* codd. N U *dispensationem.*

en: John 11:4: *But Jesus, hearing (that Lazarus was sick), said to them: This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God,* etc. — A little below, for *dispositionem* codices N U [read] *dispensationem.*

la: Cod. U *determinavit,* edd. *determinaverat.* Subinde pro *uniri* codd. G I K L Z aa bb *unire,* et paulo post pro *poterat* quod habent codd. A K L aa bb in aliis *potuerat.*

en: Codex U [reads] *determinavit,* the editions *determinaverat.* Thereupon for *uniri* codices G I K L Z aa bb [read] *unire,* and a little after, for *poterat* which codices A K L aa bb have, in others [it is] *potuerat.*

la: Cod. U inserit *ratio.* In fine solut. pro *causam sibi auferri,* quod habent codd. F Z, edd. *rationem* (cod. S a secunda manu *occasionem*) *sibi auferri;* alii multi loco horum terminorum falso nihil habent; sed in codd. A K P Q U legitur *sufficiebat, passiones et passibilitates sibi auferri.*

en: Codex U inserts *ratio.* At the end of the solution, for *causam sibi auferri,* which codices F Z have, the editions [read] *rationem* (codex S, by a second hand, *occasionem*) *sibi auferri;* many others in place of these terms falsely have nothing; but in codices A K P Q U it is read *sufficiebat, passiones et passibilitates sibi auferri.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. — In initio solut. pro *post separationem,* quod habent codd. A K M O T, alii *per separationem.* Paulo post pro *rectificationem* cod. Z expresse *rectitudinem;* alii codd. sunt dubiae lectionis.

en: Cf. above d. 18, a. 2, q. 3. — At the beginning of the solution, for *post separationem,* which codices A K M O T have, others [read] *per separationem.* A little after, for *rectificationem* codex Z expressly [reads] *rectitudinem;* other codices are of doubtful reading.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Magister supra d. XVIII. c. I. tetigit hanc quaestionem, sed non solvit. Commentatores multi ibi specialem ponunt quaestionem non (ut hic) de tempore, quando incepit haec impassibilitas, sed utrum Christus sibi impassibilitatem animae meruerit. Sed hic tantum in dubiis supra lit. aliqui, ut Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., cum nostro Doctore docent, quod anima Christi probabilius statim post separationem a corpore facta sit impassibilis. Suarez autem asserit, hanc doctrinam esse omnino certam.

**II.** Sequens (2.) quaestio ita exprimitur a Petr. a Tar.: utrum caro viveret per Deitatem sibi unitam. Quod autem ex unione Divinitatis ad carnem non resultet *vita carnis,* quamvis Divinitas sit essentialiter *vita et causa vitae;* manifestum est. « *Vita* enim est actus et perfectio naturae; Divinitas vero non unitur carni in unitate naturae » (ita Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 19. m. 2. ad ult.), sive Deus creaturis est *fons vitae* effective, non formaliter. De eadem quaestione praeter Alexandrum: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. I. quaestiunc. I. ad 3; S. III. q. 30. a. 2. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. I. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.

**III.** Solutio 3. quaestionis et argumentorum ad oppos. procedit secundum regulas de communicatione idiomatum. Ea enim, « quae solum ad *naturam* pertinent, simpliciter et sine determinatione de Christo dici possunt » (S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; cfr. supra a. I. q. 3, scholion). — Magister hic (c. 2.) docet: « Sane dici potest, quod *mortuus* est Deus et *non mortuus* »; haec verba explicantur hic dub. 3; quae interpretatio, brevius contracta, refertur etiam a Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. Praeter citatos de hac quaestione agunt: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Master, above, in d. XVIII, c. I, touched on this question but did not resolve it. Many commentators there pose a special question not (as here) about the time, when this impassibility began, but whether Christ merited impassibility of soul for himself. But here only in the *dubia* upon the text above do some, like Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, together with our Doctor, teach that the soul of Christ was more probably made impassible at once after the separation from the body. Suárez, however, asserts that this doctrine is entirely certain.

**II.** The following (2nd) question is so expressed by Peter of Tarentaise: whether the flesh lived through the Deity united to it. But that from the union of the Divinity to the flesh there does not result the *life of the flesh,* although the Divinity is essentially *life and the cause of life,* is manifest. « For *life* is the act and perfection of nature; but the Divinity is not united to the flesh in unity of nature » (thus Alex. of Hales, S. p. III, q. 19, m. 2, ad ult.), or [rather] God is to creatures the *fount of life* effectively, not formally. On the same question, besides Alexander: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. I, quaestiuncula I, ad 3; S. III, q. 30, a. 2, ad 3. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. I, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2, ad 3.

**III.** The solution of the 3rd question and of the arguments to the opposite proceeds according to the rules concerning the communication of idioms. For those things « which pertain to *nature* alone can be said of Christ simply and without determination » (St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; cf. above a. I, q. 3, scholion). — The Master here (c. 2) teaches: « It can rightly be said that God *died* and *did not die* »; these words are explained here in *dubium* 3; which interpretation, more briefly contracted, is reported also by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. Besides those cited, on this question treat: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p44{2,3,4}-{L,R}-*.png`, vol3 offset pdf = printed + 22 → PDF pp.464–466) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines **30743–30869**. English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus transcribed directly from the printed page footers.

**Article-opener fold.** The short **ARTICULUS II** opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de effectu illius separationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria…*, raw 30743) is folded into this q1 per the locked chunking convention — no standalone `d21-a2-divisio` chunk. The three-question listing (q1 *impassibilis effecta* / q2 *ex separatione caro mortua* / q3 *propter mortem carnis mors personae Verbi attribuenda*) is reproduced at the head of the Latin and English bodies. The d.21 divisio already carries the article-level listing.

**Opener alignment — VERIFIED.** Body opener reads *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum post instans separationis anima Christi impassibilis sit effecta* — matches `title_la` and the ART. II first-question listing (NOT q2's *ex separatione caro mortua*, NOT q3's *propter mortem carnis*). Confirmed against p.442 R-band (QUAESTIO I header + title) and p.443 running head *DIST. XXI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.*

**Page-split map (footnote numbering restarts each printed page):**
- **p.442** — ART. II opener; QUAESTIO I; fundamenta 1–4; Sed contra 1 (Sed contra 2 begins, runs over to p.443). Footers **nn.1–5** (`[^p442-1..5]`): n.1 on fund.1 *corpus*; n.2 on fund.2 *contrario*; n.3 on the John 19 *Consummatum est* citation (Vers. 30); n.4 on fund.4 *merito*; n.5 on Sed contra 1 *carni.*
- **p.443** — Sed contra 2–4; CONCLUSIO; Respondeo; solutions Ad 1–4. Footers **nn.1–9** (`[^p443-1..9]`): L-column nn.1–4 (n.1 *habuerit*; n.2 *Sive venit in caelum…*; n.3 the long Innocent III *Sermo 20* quotation; n.4 *ex dispensatione*); R-column nn.5–9 (n.5 *partem superiorem*; n.6 the Lazarus John 11:4 note; n.7 *determinavit/determinaverat*; n.8 *ratio/causam sibi auferri*; n.9 *post separationem*).
- **p.444** — SCHOLION §I–III only (top of page, before QUAESTIO II opens below). **No numbered footers** — the scholion's citations are inline parentheticals.

**Page breaks.** `<!-- page 443 -->` at Sed contra 2 (raw 30782, the *2. Item, ponatur…* clause that opens p.443's L-column); `<!-- page 444 -->` at the scholion (raw 30852, scholion §I opens the top of p.444).

**Scholion coverage.** q1 carries its **OWN** scholion **§I–III** (p.444). §I = the historical note on the Master (d. XVIII, c. I) + Suárez; §II forward-references the SEQUENS (2nd) question (caro viveret per Deitatem) — i.e. it touches a2-**q2** but is printed as part of q1's scholion block; §III treats the communication-of-idioms basis of the Ad-oppositorum solution (3rd argument). Ordered body-then-scholion per the parser requirement. q2's `has_scholion` should be re-checked against p.444/445 eyes-on — §II here reads on the next question, so a2-q2 may itself be `has_scholion: false` (covered forward by this §II); confirm in the next dispatch.

**Migrating footers IN.** None. The tail of q3 (its scholion §II) closed at the foot of p.442's columns; ART. II opens fresh on p.442 below it with *Consequenter quaeritur*, and q1 opens its own p.442 per-page footer sequence (n.1 on fund.1 *corpus*). Seam IN clean.

**Seam OUT.** q1's scholion §III closes (*…Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4.*) at the top of p.444; **QUAESTIO II** (*Utrum ex illa separatione caro Christi fuerit mortua, an post eam habuerit vitam*) opens fresh below it on p.444. Clean. (next chunk = `bon-sent-III-d21-a2-q2`, raw line 30870, printed p.444.)

**`[?]` flags.** None — 450 dpi bands fully legible across pp.442–444.


title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 444 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum ex illa separatione caro Christi fuerit mortua, an post eam habuerit vitam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ex illa separatione caro fuerit mortua, an post eam habuerit vitam. Et quod vitam habuerit, videtur.

1. Omne quod est unitum vitae, vivit per participationem; sed caro Christi post separationem erat unita ipsi vitae, scilicet Verbo Dei[^p444-1]: ergo ab ipso vivificabatur. Si tu dicas, quod hoc est verum de vita creata, non de increata; *obiicitur contra:* potentior est vita increata in vivificando quam vita creata, quoniam ipsa est *fons vitae*[^p444-2]: si ergo anima nulli corpori potest uniri, quin det ei vitam; multo fortius videtur, quod nec persona divina possit uniri carni, nisi tribuat ei vitam.

2. Item, impossibile fuit, *animam* Christi uniri Verbo, quin reciperet vitam ab ipso: ergo si suo modo *caro* erat vivificabilis, impossibile fuit uniri Verbo, quin reciperet vitam ab eo.

3. Item, nobilior est substantia vivens substantia non vivente[^p444-3]; sed nulla caro erat nobilior carne Christi, etiam post separationem animae: ergo si vita reperitur in alia carne, necesse est, quod caro Christi viveret, etiam anima separata.

4. Item, caro illa non poterat videre corruptionem[^p444-4], ergo necesse erat, eam ab aliquo vegetari; sed non nisi a Deitate: ergo eam ita vegetabat, sicut anima. Sed anima eam vegetando dabat ei vitam: ergo pari ratione caro illa vivebat per Divinitatem influentem in ipsam.

**Sed contra:**
1. In Symbolo[^p444-5] dicitur, quod Christus «mortuus est et sepultus»; sed hoc non dicitur nisi ratione carnis: ergo caro Christi fuit mortua, anima separata.

2. Item, omnis vita est ab aliquo informante[^p444-6]; sed caro post separationem animae non uniebatur alicui vivificanti per modum formae: ergo post separationem animae caro non habebat vitam.

3. Item, omne quod vivit, habet aliquem usum vitae, utpote uti alimento, vel sensu, vel motu, vel intellectu[^p444-7]; sed nullum istorum caro Christi habebat post separationem animae: ergo non vivebat.

4. Item, nihil vivum suscitatur vel resurgit, quia suscitatio et resurrectio non est nisi mortui; sed caro Christi resurrexit et suscitata fuit: ergo post separationem animae vitam non habuit.

### Conclusio.

> Caro Christi post separationem ab anima vere mortua fuit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio caro Christi post separationem animae mortua fuit; caruit enim usu et complemento vitae. Res enim corporalis non est nata vivificari nisi ab aliqua forma spirituali, ipsam complente et sibi proportionali. Quoniam ergo in ipsa separatione animae caro Christi caruit huius<!-- page 445 -->modi forma, ideo vere fuit mortua; et quamvis haberet Divinitatem unitam, non tamen ab ea vivificabatur, non propter defectum a parte *vivificantis,* sed propter improportionem a parte *vivificabilis.* — Rationes igitur, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**
1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod unitum vitae vivit; iam patet responsio. Hoc enim veritatem habet, quando unitur ei sicut perfectibile suae perfectioni; sic autem non unitur caro personae Verbi: et ideo non est simile de ipsa anima et de persona divina.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima non potuit uniri ipsi Verbo, quin vivificaretur ab ipso, ergo nec caro; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod ipsa anima, cum sit imago Dei et immediate nata ferri in Deum, «capax eius est et particeps esse potest[^p445-1]»; et ita immediate habet ab illo et in illo vivere per cognitionem et amorem. Non sic autem est de carne: non enim est nata Deum cognoscere vel amare.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est substantia vivens substantia non vivente; dicendum, quod verum est, ceteris aliis paribus; sed caro Christi, licet careret[^p445-2] vita, erat tamen Divinitati unita, et hoc quidem praeponderat multis aliis dignitatibus. Praeterea, cum dicitur, quod nobilior est substantia vivens substantia non vivente; hoc intelligitur de substantia, quae caret vita *simpliciter;* caro autem Christi non carebat vita *simpliciter,* sed *ad tempus.* Unde sicut nobilior est filius regis captus[^p445-3] et incarceratus filio rustici in libertate sua constituto; sic etiam intelligendum est de carne Christi, quae modico tempore caruit complemento vitae, ut postea nobilissimam vitam resumeret.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caro illa non potuit incinerari[^p445-4]; dicendum, quod divina virtus ipsam conservabat; sed tamen illa conservatio non erat vivificatio nec operatio vitae. Conservatio enim et vegetatio, quae est operatio vitae, procedit a forma completiva, operante per modum naturae[^p445-5]; sed illa conservatio, quae erat in carne Christi, ne corrumperetur, erat a virtute divina, operante super naturam; et ideo non cogit illa ratio[^p445-6].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether by that separation the flesh of Christ was dead, or whether after it it had life.*

Secondly it is asked whether by that separation the flesh was dead, or whether after it it had life. And that it had life seems [to be the case].

1. Everything that is united to life lives by participation; but the flesh of Christ after the separation was united to life itself, namely to the Word of God[^p444-1]: therefore it was vivified by it. If you say that this is true of created life, not of uncreated life; *the objection to the contrary [is]:* uncreated life is more powerful in vivifying than created life, since it is itself the *fountain of life*[^p444-2]: if therefore the soul cannot be united to any body without giving it life, much more does it seem that not even a divine person can be united to flesh without bestowing life upon it.

2. Likewise, it was impossible for the *soul* of Christ to be united to the Word without receiving life from it: therefore if in its own way the *flesh* was capable of being vivified, it was impossible for it to be united to the Word without receiving life from it.

3. Likewise, a living substance is nobler than a non-living substance[^p444-3]; but no flesh was nobler than the flesh of Christ, even after the separation of the soul: therefore if life is found in other flesh, it is necessary that the flesh of Christ should live, even with the soul separated.

4. Likewise, that flesh could not see corruption[^p444-4], therefore it was necessary that it be quickened by something; but only by the Deity: therefore [the Deity] quickened it just as the soul did. But the soul, by quickening it, gave it life: therefore by like reasoning that flesh lived through the Divinity flowing into it.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Creed[^p444-5] it is said that Christ "was dead and buried"; but this is said only by reason of the flesh: therefore the flesh of Christ was dead, the soul having been separated.

2. Likewise, all life is from something informing[^p444-6]; but the flesh after the separation of the soul was not united to anything vivifying [it] in the manner of a form: therefore after the separation of the soul the flesh did not have life.

3. Likewise, everything that lives has some use of life, such as making use of nourishment, or sense, or motion, or intellect[^p444-7]; but the flesh of Christ had none of these after the separation of the soul: therefore it was not living.

4. Likewise, nothing living is raised up or rises again, because resuscitation and resurrection belong only to what is dead; but the flesh of Christ rose again and was raised up: therefore after the separation of the soul it did not have life.

### Conclusion.

> The flesh of Christ, after the separation from the soul, was truly dead.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the flesh of Christ after the separation of the soul was dead; for it lacked the use and completion of life. For a corporeal thing is not apt to be vivified except by some spiritual form, completing it and proportioned to it. Since therefore in that very separation of the soul the flesh of Christ lacked a form of this kind, it was therefore truly dead; and although it had the Divinity united [to it], nevertheless it was not vivified by it, not on account of a defect on the part of the *vivifying [principle],* but on account of the disproportion on the part of the *vivifiable.* — The reasons therefore which are brought forward to this side are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that what is united to life lives; the response is already clear. For this holds true when [a thing] is united to it as the perfectible to its perfection; but the flesh is not so united to the person of the Word: and therefore the case is not the same with the soul and with the divine person.

2. To that which is objected, that the soul could not be united to the Word itself without being vivified by it, therefore neither [could] the flesh; it must be said that the case is not the same, for the reason that the soul itself, since it is the image of God and is apt to be borne immediately into God, "is capable of him and able to be a partaker [of him][^p445-1]"; and thus immediately it has from him and in him to live through knowledge and love. But it is not so with the flesh: for it is not apt to know or to love God.

3. To that which is objected, that a living substance is nobler than a non-living substance; it must be said that this is true, all other things being equal; but the flesh of Christ, although it lacked[^p445-2] life, was nevertheless united to the Divinity, and this indeed outweighs many other dignities. Moreover, when it is said that a living substance is nobler than a non-living substance; this is understood of a substance that lacks life *absolutely;* but the flesh of Christ did not lack life *absolutely,* but *for a time.* Hence, just as a captured[^p445-3] and imprisoned son of a king is nobler than the son of a peasant established in his own liberty; so too it must be understood concerning the flesh of Christ, which for a short time lacked the completion of life, that afterward it might resume a most noble life.

4. To that which is objected, that that flesh could not be reduced to ashes[^p445-4]; it must be said that the divine power was preserving it; but nevertheless that preservation was not a vivification nor an operation of life. For preservation and quickening, which is an operation of life, proceeds from a completive form, operating in the manner of nature[^p445-5]; but that preservation, which was in the flesh of Christ, that it might not be corrupted, was from the divine power, operating above nature; and therefore that reasoning does not compel [its conclusion][^p445-6].

---

la: Vide supra a. I. q. 2. — Pro *Dei* cod. U *divino,* codd. G H I T V *Deo.*

en: See above, a. I, q. 2. — For *Dei* ("of God") codex U [reads] *divino* ("divine"), codices G H I T V *Deo* ("to God").

la: Psalm. 35, 10: *Apud te est fons vitae.* Cfr. verba August. contra Felicianum directa, quae hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. circa finem habentur. — Paulo superius post *obiicitur contra* codd. A N subdunt *quod.*

en: Psalm 35:10: *With thee is the fountain of life.* Cf. the words of Augustine directed against Felicianus, which are found here in the text of the Master, c. 1, near the end. — A little above, after *obiicitur contra* codices A N add *quod.*

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 1. docet, quod «anima sit corpore melior, animatumque inanimato praestet propter animam, et esse quam non-esse, et vivere quam non vivere melius sit». — Paulo inferius pro *in alia carne* cod. U *in aliqua carne.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 1, teaches that "the soul is better than the body, and the animate excels the inanimate on account of the soul, and that to be is better than not to be, and to live than not to live." — A little below, for *in alia carne* ("in other flesh") codex U [reads] *in aliqua carne* ("in some flesh").

la: Respicitur illud Ps. 15. 10: *Nec dabis Sanctum tuum videre corruptionem.*

en: Reference is made to that [verse] of Psalm 15:10: *Neither wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption.*

la: Apostolorum.

en: [The Creed] of the Apostles.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.): *Quoniam «anima id est quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo, anima utique ratio quaedam erit et forma».* — Vat. hic addit *vivificante.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 24 (c. 2): "Since the soul is that by which primarily we live and perceive and are moved and understand, the soul will indeed be a certain account and form." — The Vatican edition here adds *vivificante* ("by [something] vivifying").

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 13. (c. 2.) dicit, quod si alicui «unum aliquod horum insit solum, vivere ipsum dicimus, ut intellectus et sensus et motus et status secundum locum, adhuc autem motus secundum alimentum et augmentum et decrementum». — Pro *vivit* cod. Z *vivificatur.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 13 (c. 2), says that if any one of these "be present in something alone, we say that it itself lives, as intellect and sense and motion and rest with respect to place, and further motion with respect to nourishment and growth and diminution." — For *vivit* ("lives") codex Z [reads] *vivificatur* ("is vivified").

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius ante *imago Dei* edd. 1, 2 interserunt *opus et.*

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 8, n. 11. Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above, before *imago Dei* editions 1, 2 insert *opus et.*

la: Edd. et multi codd. *careat.*

en: The editions and many codices [read] *careat* ("may lack").

la: Codd. A K *captivus.* Paulo ante pro *caro autem* codd. I L aa *caro enim.*

en: Codices A K [read] *captivus* ("captive"). A little before, for *caro autem* codices I L aa [read] *caro enim.*

la: Cod. K *videre corruptionem.*

en: Codex K [reads] *videre corruptionem* ("to see corruption").

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 46. seqq. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 46 ff. (c. 4).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 444–445 (PDF 466–467; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 30870–30945). The IA OCR cascade-shatters the two-column layout here (Sed contra / Conclusio / Respondeo / Solutio interleaved across columns and with the page-444 footers), so per the Vol II/III PDF-priority OVERRIDE the column-band PDF read is authoritative for the body; OCR is base only for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing.

**Page-split map.**
- **p. 444** — Quaestio header + title; fundamenta 1–4 (L column); Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo opening (R column). Footer **nn. 1–7** (L-band nn.1–3, R-band nn.4–7), all q2's: n.1 *Verbo Dei¹* (fund.1), n.2 *fons vitae²* (fund.1), n.3 *vivente³* (fund.3), n.4 *corruptionem⁴* (fund.4), n.5 *Symbolo⁵* (Sed contra 1), n.6 *informante⁶* (Sed contra 2), n.7 *intellectu⁷* (Sed contra 3). Sed contra 4 carries no marker.
- **p. 445** — Respondeo continuation + Solutio Ad 1–4 (q2 tail; L column Ad 1–3 opening, R column Ad 3 continuation + Ad 4). q2 ends mid-page; QUAESTIO III opens at the foot of p.445's L column. Footer **nn. 1–6 are q2's** (q2 owns the whole L-band footer): n.1 *potest¹* (Ad 2), n.2 *careret²* (Ad 3), n.3 *captus³* (Ad 3), n.4 *incinerari⁴* (Ad 4), n.5 *naturae⁵* (Ad 4), n.6 *ratio⁶* (Ad 4). **p.445 R-band footer nn.7–12 forward to q3** (*Scilicet Apostolorum* / *Cap. 5* / *Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c.2* / *Ut ostensum est supra d.20 q.3* / *Vide supra pag.14 nota 3* / *Cfr. supra d.6...*) — q3's body opens on this same page.

**Page break.** Mid-Respondeo seam: *…caro Christi caruit huius-* / *-modi forma…* (raw ~30901). `<!-- page 445 -->` placed inside the word `huiusmodi` per the printed line break.

**Scholion coverage.** **has_scholion: false** — q2 has no scholion of its own. The SCHOLION printed at the TOP of p.444 (§I–III, spanning both columns) belongs to **q1** (a2-q1, *impassibilis effecta*); its §II explicitly reads *on* this question — *"Sequens (2.) quaestio sic exprimitur a Petr. a Tar.: utrum caro viveret per Deitatem sibi unitam…"* — and forward-covers it. q2's own footer n.6 (p.445) confirms this: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"). Verified eyes-on: q2's body runs continuously from Respondeo (p.444) through Solutio Ad 4 (p.445) directly into QUAESTIO III, with no intervening SCHOLION block. Prediction CONFIRMED.

**Seam IN (clean).** q1's scholion §I–III runs unmarked to the bottom of p.444's q1-block (top of both columns); QUAESTIO II opens fresh below it with *Secundo quaeritur*. No footer migrates in.

**Seam OUT (clean).** q2 closes at *…et ideo non cogit illa ratio.* (raw 30945); QUAESTIO III (*Utrum propter mortem carnis sit mors personae Verbi attribuenda*) opens fresh at raw 30946, on the same printed page (p.445 L-column foot). p.445 R-band footers nn.7–12 forward to q3 (flagged for the q3 hand-off).

**[?] flags.** None — pp. 444–445 fully legible at 450 dpi.