title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum homo in statu innocentiae, circumscripto dono gratiae, esset Deo acceptus

title_alt: Whether man in the state of innocence, the gift of grace being set aside, would be acceptable to God

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum.*

### Quaestio I. *Utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Genesis primo[^1]: *Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona;* sed summo bono non potest non complacere illud quod est valde bonum: si ergo homo inter ceteras creaturas inferiores principatum obtinebat, videtur, quod ipse valde bonus erat; et si hoc, ergo Deus illum acceptabat.

2. Item, Sapientiae undecimo[^2]: *Diligis omnia, Domine, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti;* sed homo in statu innocentiae nihil habebat, quod esset dignum odio, et totum quod habebat, a Deo factum erat: ergo Deus ipsum totaliter diligebat; sed quod sic a Deo diligitur ab eo acceptatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, Proverbiorum octavo[^3]: *Ego diligentes me diligo;* sed homo secundum statum naturae institutae diligebat Deum propter se et super omnia, quia rectus erat: ergo videtur, quod etiam praeter omnem gratiam Deus eum amabat; et si hoc, ergo Deo acceptus erat.

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4. Item, artifex creatus complacet sibi in opere suo et illud acceptat, quando ipsum fabricat ad voluntatem suam[^4]; sed Deus, qui est summus artifex, hominem formaverat ad imaginem suam, et optima ratione eum condiderat: ergo videtur, quod ex naturalibus sibi datis homo Deo placebat.

5. Item, nihil est, quod plus faciat animam caram Deo et acceptam, quam quod sit tota pulcra, et nulla sit in ea macula[^5]; sed anima Adae in statu innocentiae tota erat pulcra, et nulla erat in ea macula, quantum erat ex naturali conditione: ergo absque omni gratia superaddita Deo erat accepta.

6. Item, aut Deus poterat facere aliquam creaturam ita bonam, quod ex puris naturalibus sibi placeret, aut non. Si non, videtur, quod non esset omnipotens. Si sic, ergo non videtur, quod ad hoc, quod natura placeat Deo, necessarium sit superaddi donum gratiae. Si igitur homo perfecte conditus fuit secundum exigentiam status naturae[^6], videtur, quod Deo placebat absque omni dono gratiae superadditae.

**Sed contra:**

1. Hebraeorum undecimo[^7]: *Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo;* sed fides est donum superadditum naturae, secundum quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios duodecimo: ergo sine dono gratiae naturae superadditae nullus potest placere Deo.

2. Item, Sapientiae septimo[^8]: *Neminem diligit Deus, nisi illum qui cum sapientia inhabitat;* sed sapientia est donum Dei naturae superadditum, secundum quod infra subiungitur nono capitulo: *Mitte illam de caelis sanctis tuis* etc.: ergo absque dono gratiae naturae superadditae impossibile est, Dei amicum esse.

3. Item, Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia[^9]: «Lex divinitatis est inferiora per media, et media per superiora reducere»; sed media bona sunt potentiae naturales, bona maxima sunt gratia et virtutes, quibus non contingit male uti: ergo secundum rectum ordinem anima non potest ad Deum redire nec Deo placere, nisi perficiatur per dona virtutum et gratiae.

4. Item, nihil excellentius est secundum naturam in homine quam ipsa imago[^10]; sed imago indifferens est ad acceptandum et non acceptandum: ergo ad hoc, quod aliqua anima a Deo acceptetur, necesse est, ultra naturalia esse aliquod donum naturae superadditum.

5. Item, quotiescumque Deus animam acceptat, eam in coniugium sibi *desponsat*. Unde et animam dicit *sponsam suam* in Cantico[^11]. Sed quantumcumque aliqua creatura sit excellens, semper in infinitum est Deo inferior: ergo nunquam digna est in coniugium assumi, nisi Deus ex mera liberalitate condescendat; et hoc est praestare gratiam: ergo etc.

6. Item, cum Deus hominem acceptat, *filium suum reputat,* secundum quod dicitur Ioannis primo[^12]: *Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri.* Sed creatura, quantumcumque sit nobilis, semper est Dei serva; sed servus non potest adoptari in filium, quin fiat ei gratia: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura acceptetur a Deo sine munere gratiae superadditae.

> **Conclusio.** Homo in statu innocentiae ad hoc, ut consecretur in templum Dei, adoptetur in filium, assumatur in coniugium, indiguit gratia gratum faciente.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod dupliciter contingit dicere *aliquid acceptari a Deo*: uno modo quadam acceptatione generali, ut idem sit *acceptare aliquid* quod *reputare bonum et in bono conservare*; et hac acceptatione non tantum acceptatur creatura rationalis, sed etiam omne opus Dei[^13]. Est etiam alia acceptatio specialis, qua dicitur Deus *acceptare* illud quod dignum reputatur aeterna beatitudine; et tali acceptatione non acceptat Deus nisi creaturam rationalem; illa enim sola est, quae «eius capax est et particeps esse potest[^14]». Hanc autem creaturam rationalem tunc acceptat, cum *consecrat* in templum et *adoptat* in filium et *assumit* in coniugium. Nam animae sanctae, quae Deo placent, et dicuntur templum Dei et dicuntur filiae Dei et dicuntur sponsae Dei, secundum quod colligitur ex novo et veteri Testamento[^15].

Primum genus acceptationis non requirit superaddi donum gratiae ultra ea quae sunt de conditione naturae. Secundum vero genus acceptationis non potest non esse gratuitum, tum propter gratuitam Dei condescensionem, tum propter creaturae exaltationem ultra terminos sive status naturae. — Gratuita namque condescensio[^16] in huiusmodi acceptatione necessario requiritur.

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Quod enim Deus immensus habitare velit in anima ut in templo, quod iterum[^17] velit servum reputare pro filio, quod ancillam suam assumere velit in coniugium; hoc nemo dubitat esse merae gratiae et condescensionis liberalissimae. — Creaturae etiam *sublimatio* in tali acceptatione ultra statum naturae reperitur. Quod enim creatura consecretur in templum, adoptetur in filium, assumatur in coniugium, hoc est supra naturale complementum omnis creaturae; et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptatio nec unio animae ad Deum fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae, sed per aliquod donum gratiae superadditum, quod animam consecret, ut sit templum; assimilet, ut sit Dei filia; quod faciem animae decoret, ut apta sit esse Dei sponsa. Haec autem omnia facit gratia gratum faciens, cui est adeo iuncta sanctitas, ut nullo modo possit inquinari[^18], adeo iuncta Dei conformitas, ut nullo modo possit Deo dissimilis fieri; adeo iuncta spiritualis venustas, ut nullo modo possit deformari; et ideo reddit animam Deo acceptam. Et est ratio acceptandi secundum illas tres proprietates praedictas, quae quidem conveniunt ei non secundum tropum aut transumtionem, sed secundum *veritatem* aut *proprietatem*. — Et sic patet, quod homo in statu innocentiae gratia gratum faciente indiguit ad hoc, ut Deo placeret. Et haec necessitas sumta est ex parte *modi acceptandi*.

Posset nihilominus et alia sumi ratio ex parte *acceptantis*. Deus enim, qui omnia fecit in gloriam suam et nullius indiget[^19], potissime requirit a creatura rationali honorem. Et quia honorem Deo exhibemus, quando in ipsum omnia referimus tanquam in omnium auctorem et finem, non decrevit Deus hominem perducere ad perfectionem gloriae per aliquid, quod ortum haberet ex principiis naturae, sed per munus additum naturalibus, ut ex hoc homo Deo magis gratus existeret et totius salutis suae opus Deo attribueret[^20]. — Et sic patet, quod nemo potest acceptari a Deo absque munere gratiae superadditae naturae; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad rationes ad oppositum, planum est respondere ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam duae primae auctoritates intelliguntur de acceptatione et dilectione secundum generalem modum; nos autem loquimur hic de acceptatione secundum modum specialem, quo Deus acceptat ipsam animam, ut reputet eam dignam aeterna gloria.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: *Ego diligentes me diligo* etc.; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de dilectione caritatis, quae non est absque gratia; et haec plurimum differt a dilectione naturali, qua homo diligebat Deum propter se et super omnia, sicut ostensum est supra, distinctione tertia[^21].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod artifex creatus complacet sibi in opere suo; dicendum, quod istud est verum de illa *generali* acceptatione et complacentia, qua aliquis reputat aliquid esse bonum; sed de illa acceptatione, qua aliquis sic acceptat aliquid, ut reputet se illi obligatum ad retribuendum aliquid magnum, non habet veritatem. Hanc enim solum contingit reperire circa opus divinum, quod habet liberum arbitrium, et circa quod nata est[^22] laus et vituperium.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura instituta absque omni gratia esset tota pulcra et sine macula; dicendum, quod etsi esset sine macula, non tamen esset tota pulcra ea pulcritudine, quae est a gratia. Pulcritudo enim gratiae est sancti amoris conciliativa, secundum quod dicit Glossa super illud Psalmi[^23]: *Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo;* Glossa: «Gratia est quidam nitor animae ad conciliandum sanctum amorem».

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum Deus posset talem naturam facere, quae esset ei accepta absque munere gratiae; dicendum, quod etsi ipse posset omnia tanquam omnipotens, natura tamen non esset capax, unde impossibilitas venit ex parte creaturae. Si enim hoc faceret, nihil aliud esset facere, quam quod faceret, donum gratiae esse donum naturae, et gratiam esse naturam. Hoc autem impossibile est, cum donum gratiae sit ultra terminos naturae. Unde sicut impossibile est, quod homo fiat a Deo *beatus per naturam*, quamvis possit creari beatus, quia beatitudo consistit in bono, quod est supra omnem naturam; sic etiam intelligendum est et in gratia. — *Praeterea*, esto quod posset facere, non tamen decrevit, quia non decuit. Et ratio huius dicta est, videlicet ut ex hoc divina servetur gloria, in cuius praeiudicium Deus neminem acceptat; conservetur etiam nihilominus ipsa gratia, quae nullo modo potest nec debet esse *ingrata*; et ideo sic debet dari, ut reputetur esse gratis data[^24].

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english:
### Article I. *On the necessity of grace before the sin of the first human beings.*

### Question I. *Whether without the gift of grace man would be acceptable to God in the state of innocence.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether without the gift of grace man would be acceptable to God in the state of innocence. And that he would, it seems.

1. Genesis 1[^1]: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good;* but the highest good cannot fail to take complacency in that which is very good: if therefore man held the chief place among the other lower creatures, it seems that he was very good; and if so, then God accepted him.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 11[^2]: *Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made;* but man in the state of innocence had nothing that was worthy of hatred, and everything that he had was made by God: therefore God loved him wholly; but what is thus loved by God is accepted by him: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Proverbs 8[^3]: *I love them that love me;* but man according to the state of instituted nature loved God for his own sake and above all things, because he was upright: therefore it seems that even apart from all grace God loved him; and if so, then he was acceptable to God.

4. Likewise, a created craftsman takes complacency in his own work and accepts it, when he fashions it according to his own will[^4]; but God, who is the supreme craftsman, had formed man to his own image, and had created him by the best plan: therefore it seems that from the natural endowments given to him man was pleasing to God.

5. Likewise, there is nothing that makes the soul more dear and acceptable to God than that it be wholly beautiful, and that there be no stain in it[^5]; but the soul of Adam in the state of innocence was wholly beautiful, and there was no stain in it, so far as pertained to its natural condition: therefore apart from all superadded grace it was acceptable to God.

6. Likewise, either God could make some creature so good that from its pure natural endowments it would be pleasing to him, or not. If not, it seems that he would not be omnipotent. If so, then it does not seem that, for nature to be pleasing to God, it is necessary that a gift of grace be superadded. If therefore man was perfectly constituted according to the exigency of the state of nature[^6], it seems that he was pleasing to God apart from any superadded gift of grace.

**On the contrary:**

1. Hebrews 11[^7]: *Without faith it is impossible to please God;* but faith is a gift superadded to nature, according to what is said in First Corinthians 12: therefore without a gift of grace superadded to nature no one can please God.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 7[^8]: *God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom;* but wisdom is a gift of God superadded to nature, according to what is added below in the ninth chapter: *Send her out of thy holy heavens* etc.: therefore without a gift of grace superadded to nature it is impossible to be a friend of God.

3. Likewise, Dionysius in the book *On the Angelic Hierarchy*[^9]: «It is the law of the Godhead to lead back the lower things through the middle, and the middle through the higher»; but the middle goods are the natural powers, the greatest goods are grace and the virtues, which cannot be used ill: therefore according to right order the soul cannot return to God nor please God, unless it be perfected through the gifts of the virtues and of grace.

4. Likewise, there is nothing more excellent according to nature in man than the image itself[^10]; but the image is indifferent to being accepted and not accepted: therefore in order that any soul be accepted by God, it is necessary that beyond the natural endowments there be some gift superadded to nature.

5. Likewise, whenever God accepts a soul, he *espouses* it to himself in marriage. Hence he even calls the soul *his bride* in the Canticle[^11]. But however excellent any creature may be, it is always infinitely inferior to God: therefore it is never worthy to be taken into marriage, unless God condescends out of mere liberality; and this is to bestow grace: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when God accepts man, he *reckons him as his son,* according to what is said in John 1[^12]: *He gave them power to be made the sons of God.* But a creature, however noble it may be, is always the handmaid of God; but a servant cannot be adopted into a son without grace being made for him: therefore it is impossible that any creature be accepted by God without a gift of grace superadded.

> **Conclusion.** Man in the state of innocence, in order that he be consecrated as a temple of God, adopted as a son, taken into marriage, had need of grace that makes pleasing.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that *something is said to be accepted by God* in two ways: in one way by a certain general acceptance, so that *to accept something* is the same as *to reckon it good and to conserve it in the good*; and by this acceptance not only the rational creature is accepted, but also every work of God[^13]. There is also another, special acceptance, by which God is said *to accept* that which is reckoned worthy of eternal beatitude; and by such an acceptance God accepts none but the rational creature; for that alone is the creature which «is capable of him and can be a partaker of him[^14]». And he accepts this rational creature when he *consecrates* it as a temple and *adopts* it as a son and *takes* it into marriage. For the holy souls, which are pleasing to God, are called both the temple of God and called daughters of God and called brides of God, according to what is gathered from the New and the Old Testament[^15].

The first kind of acceptance does not require that a gift of grace be superadded beyond those things which are of the condition of nature. But the second kind of acceptance cannot but be gratuitous, both on account of the gratuitous condescension of God, and on account of the exaltation of the creature beyond the bounds or the state of nature. — For a gratuitous condescension[^16] is necessarily required in an acceptance of this kind.

For that God the immense should wish to dwell in the soul as in a temple, that again[^17] he should wish to reckon a servant as a son, that he should wish to take his handmaid into marriage; no one doubts that this is of mere grace and of most liberal condescension. — An *exaltation* of the creature also, beyond the state of nature, is found in such an acceptance. For that a creature should be consecrated as a temple, adopted as a son, taken into marriage, this is above the natural completion of every creature; and therefore neither the consecration nor the adoption nor the union of the soul with God comes about through any property of nature, but through some superadded gift of grace, which consecrates the soul, that it may be a temple; assimilates it, that it may be a daughter of God; which adorns the face of the soul, that it may be fit to be the bride of God. And all these things grace that makes pleasing brings about, to which is joined holiness so closely that it can in no way be defiled[^18], a conformity to God joined so closely that it can in no way be made unlike to God; a spiritual comeliness joined so closely that it can in no way be deformed; and therefore it renders the soul acceptable to God. And it is the ground of acceptance according to those three properties aforesaid, which indeed belong to it not according to a figure or transferred sense, but according to *truth* and *propriety*. — And so it is plain that man in the state of innocence had need of grace that makes pleasing in order that he be pleasing to God. And this necessity is taken on the side of the *mode of accepting*.

There could nonetheless be taken yet another ground on the side of the one *accepting*. For God, who made all things for his own glory and stands in need of nothing[^19], most chiefly requires honor from the rational creature. And since we render honor to God when we refer all things to him as to the author and end of all, God decreed not to lead man to the perfection of glory through something that would take its rise from the principles of nature, but through a gift added to the natural endowments, so that from this man might be more pleasing to God and might attribute to God the whole work of his salvation[^20]. — And so it is plain that no one can be accepted by God without a gift of grace superadded to nature; and the grounds adduced for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:**

*To 1, 2.* To the grounds for the opposite it is easy to reply from the things that have been said. For the first two authorities are to be understood of acceptance and love according to the general mode; but we are speaking here of acceptance according to the special mode, by which God accepts the soul itself, so as to reckon it worthy of eternal glory.

*To 3.* To that which is objected: *I love them that love me* etc.; it must be said that this is understood of the love of charity, which is not without grace; and this differs very greatly from the natural love by which man loved God for his own sake and above all things, as was shown above, in the third distinction[^21].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that a created craftsman takes complacency in his own work; it must be said that this is true of that *general* acceptance and complacency, by which someone reckons something to be good; but of that acceptance by which someone so accepts something as to reckon himself bound to it to repay something great, it does not hold true. For this is found only with regard to a divine work, which has free choice, and with regard to which praise and blame are by nature in place[^22].

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that nature as instituted, apart from all grace, would be wholly beautiful and without stain; it must be said that even if it were without stain, it would nevertheless not be wholly beautiful with that beauty which is from grace. For the beauty of grace is conciliative of holy love, according to what the Gloss says upon that verse of the Psalm[^23]: *That he may make the face cheerful with oil;* the Gloss: «Grace is a certain brightness of the soul for conciliating holy love».

*To 6.* To that which is objected, whether God could make such a nature as would be acceptable to him without a gift of grace; it must be said that although he himself could do all things as omnipotent, nature nevertheless would not be capable, whence the impossibility comes on the side of the creature. For if he were to do this, it would be nothing else than to make the gift of grace to be a gift of nature, and grace to be nature. But this is impossible, since the gift of grace is beyond the bounds of nature. Hence just as it is impossible that man be made *blessed by nature* by God, although he can be created blessed, because beatitude consists in a good that is above all nature; so also is it to be understood in the matter of grace. — *Moreover*, granted that he could do it, he nonetheless did not decree it, because it was not fitting. And the ground of this has been stated, namely that from this the divine glory be preserved, to whose prejudice God accepts no one; and that grace itself likewise be preserved, which can in no way and ought in no way to be *ungratuitous*; and therefore it ought to be given in such a way that it be reckoned to be given gratuitously[^24].

la: Vers. 31.

la: Vers. 25, ubi pro *Domine* Vulg. *quae sunt.*

en: Verse 25 (Wisd. 11, 25), where for *O Lord* the Vulgate has *which are.*

la: Vers. 17. — Ratio *minori* addita: *quia rectus erat,* respicit illud Eccl. 7, 30: *Solummodo hoc inveni, quod Deus fecerit hominem rectum.*

en: Verse 17 (Prov. 8, 17). — The reason added to the *minor* premise: *because he was upright,* looks to that text of Ecclesiastes 7, 30: *Only this I have found, that God made man upright.*

la: Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 7. de artificibus ait: *Unusquisque enim opus proprium magis amat, quam ab opere amaretur, si animatum fieret.* De *minori* cfr. Gen. 1, 26.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* IX. c. 7, says of craftsmen: *For each one loves his own work more than he would be loved by the work, if it became animate.* On the *minor* premise cfr. Gen. 1, 26.

la: Alluditur ad illud Cant. 4, 7: *Tota pulcra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te.*

en: Allusion is made to that text of Canticles 4, 7: *Thou art all fair, my love, and there is no spot in thee.*

la: Deut. 32, 4: *Dei perfecta sunt opera.* — Pro *perfecte* cod. aa *in perfectione.*

en: Deut. 32, 4: *The works of God are perfect.* — For *perfectly* codex aa reads *in perfection.*

la: Vers. 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 9: *Alteri [datur] fides in eodem Spiritu.*

en: Verse 6 (Heb. 11, 6). — The following text is from the place cited, v. 9 (1 Cor. 12, 9): *To another [is given] faith in the same Spirit.*

la: Vers. 28: *Neminem enim diligit Deus nisi eum qui* etc. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 10.

en: Verse 28 (Wisd. 7, 28): *For God loveth none but him who* etc. — The following text is from the place cited, v. 10 (Wisd. 9, 10).

la: Cap. 4. § 3. Ipsa verba vide supra pag. 277, nota 7. — De *minori,* quae est secundum Augustinum, cfr. supra d. XXVII. c. 3. lit. Magistri.

en: Chapter 4, § 3. For the very words see above, p. 277, note 7. — On the *minor* premise, which is according to Augustine, cfr. above d. XXVII. c. 3. in the text of the Master.

la: Vide supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Hoc arg. in cod. cc et ed. 1 terminatur sic: *aliquod donum gratiae superadditum naturae.*

en: See above d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — This argument in codex cc and edition 1 ends thus: *some gift of grace superadded to nature.*

la: Cap. 4, 8: *Veni de Libano, sponsa mea.*

en: Chapter 4, 8 (Cant. 4, 8): *Come from Libanus, my bride.*

la: Vers. 12. — Paulo inferius pro *quin fiat ei gratia* cod. cc et ed. 1 *nisi fiat ex gratia.*

en: Verse 12 (John 1, 12). — A little below, for *without grace being made for him* codex cc and edition 1 read *unless it be made from grace.*

la: Sap. 6, 8: *Aequaliter cura est illi de omnibus.* Ibid. 11, 2-5: *Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.*

en: Wisd. 6, 8: *He hath equally care of all.* Ibid. 11, 2-5: *For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made.*

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 393, nota 6, ubi idem ab Aristot. dictum invenies.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. above p. 393, note 6, where you will find the same said by Aristotle.

la: Vat. voci *condescensio* praefigit *Dei.*

en: The Vatican edition prefixes *of God* to the word *condescension.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 hic repetunt *iterum.* Mox pro *in coniugium* codd. et edd. 1, 2 *in coniugio,* qui codd. et edd. ceterum paulo inferius etiam exhibent *in coniugium.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 here repeat *again.* Presently, for *into marriage* the codices and editions 1, 2 read *in marriage,* which codices and editions however a little below also exhibit *into marriage.*

la: Verba *sanctitas* etc. usque ad *adeo iuncta* inclusive, quae in Vat. desunt, restituimus ex codd. A F X Y aa bb ee. Paulo superius pro *Dei filia* codd. F H K T X Z et alii cum edd. 1, 2. *divina filia.* Paulo inferius pro *Dei conformitas* codd. A N *deiformitas.*

en: The words *holiness* etc. up to and including *joined so closely,* which are wanting in the Vatican edition, we have restored from codices A F X Y aa bb ee. A little above, for *daughter of God* codices F H K T X Z and others with editions 1, 2 read *divine daughter.* A little below, for *conformity to God* codices A N read *deiformity.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Edd., excepta 1, addunt *laude.*

en: Cfr. above d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in the body. — The editions, except the first, add *with praise.*

la: Vide supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., ubi haec ratio magis explicatur.

en: See above d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. in the body, where this reasoning is more fully explained.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 agglutinat *esse,* quod etiam in cod. F a manu posteriore adiectum est.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 appends *esse* («to be»), which has also been added in codex F by a later hand.

la: Psalm. 103, 16. — Verba Augustini super hunc locum, ex quibus Glossa delibata est, vide supra pag. 637, nota 8.

en: Psalm 103, 16. — The words of Augustine upon this place, from which the Gloss is drawn, see above p. 637, note 8.

la: Rom. 11, 6: *Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.*

en: Rom. 11, 6: *And if by grace, then not now by works; otherwise grace is no more grace.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Responsio ad hanc quaest. confirmatur condemnatione multarum propositionum Baii, e. g. prop. 4: «Vita aeterna homini integro et Angelo promissa fuit intuitu bonorum operum; et bona opera ex lege naturae ad illam consequendam per se sufficiunt» (cfr. propp. 2. 3. 9. 11. 12. 13. 17. 21. 23.).

Pro duplici acceptatione, quam Seraphicus in principio respons. habet, Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3. § 1.) ponit triplicem eiusdem distinctionem: generaliter, quatenus omnes creaturae in se consideratae sunt bonae et Deo acceptae; specialius respectu creaturae rationalis, «in quantum est creatura huiusmodi; specialissime sive propriissime creatura rationalis, in quantum consecratur Deo, ut sit eius templum, adoptatur in filium et sumitur in sponsam. Haec autem sublimatio creaturae rationalis est supra naturale complementum; et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptio nec assumtio huiusmodi fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae, sed per donum superadditum naturae, consecrans animam, ut sit templum, assimilans Deo, ut sit filius vel filia; confoederans Deo sive uniens per conformitatem voluntatis, ut sit sponsa». — In Breviloq. p. V, ubi tota de gratia doctrina dilucide contracta exhibetur, ad rem dicitur (c. 1.), quod gratia «est donum, per quod anima efficitur sponsa Christi, filia Patris aeterni et templum Spiritus S.; quod nullo modo fit nisi ex dignativa condescensione et condescensiva dignatione Maiestatis aeternae per donum gratiae suae»; quae verba deinde praeclara expositione probantur. — Praedicta triplici formula, quae sumta est ex s. Scriptura, bene exprimitur ineffabilis sublimatio, qua creatura rationalis elevatur in consortium et societatem (κοινωνίαν) divinarum personarum (1. Ioan. 1, 3.) et consors fit divinae naturae (II. Petr. 1, 4.). Haec perfectio, quae est omnino gratuita et naturae creatae indebita, vocatur a S. Doctore (infra d. 34. dub. 3.) «perfectio superabundantiae». — De adoptione in filium Dei cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. dub. 6; III. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4.

**II.** S. Thom. a S. Bonav. aliquatenus recedit in hoc, quod magis insistit regenerationi supernaturali, quatenus ea respicit ipsam naturam animae. Nam idem subiectum primum gratiae non potentiam, sed ipsam naturam animae esse docet. Hinc ad rem dicit (S. I. II. q. 110. a. 4. in corp.): «Sicut per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei, et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat secundum quandam similitudinem naturam divinam per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem» (cfr. ibid. a. 3; de Verit. q. 27. a. 2.). Licet autem S. Bonav. minime neget, animam etiam secundum naturam («quoad esse primum») perfici a gratia; tamen ipse putat, animam gratia et gloria perfici primo secundum potentias, sive secundum mentem, quam vocat (in Breviloq. p. V. c. 4.) faciem superiorem animae. Unde etiam deiformitas ab ipso primo ponitur in libero arbitrio, ita tamen, ut tota persona et etiam natura elevetur, ut digna sit mysticis sponsalibus et nuptiis cum Deo. Quae qualiscumque differentia inter duos Ss. Doctores a recente auctore, cl. Dr. J. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, l. III. n. 807.), fere determinatur, ut sequitur. Secundum S. Bonaventuram status gratiae primo loco significat gratuitam exaltationem personae in sponsam Dei assumtae et decoratae, et inde adoptione et iure haereditario auctae; deiformitas autem interna, primo residens in voluntate, in quo est principium merendi, praecipue manifestatur in producendis fructibus Deo dignis; totum tamen hominem facit Deo acceptum eique infundit id, quod S. Bonav. vocat bene esse. Sed secundum S. Thomam status gratiae primo importat exaltationem ipsius naturae, ex Deo per participationem divinae naturae renatae et dignitate filiationis divinae ita decoratae, ut digna fiat sponsa Filii Dei.

**III.** Quaestio seq. huius articuli innititur principiis in 1. quaest. positis; sed in eadem, plura magis confirmantur et explicantur. — Notanda est egregia solut. ad 3, de qua cfr. etiam supra d. 28. dub. 1. Haec autem quaestio fere tota, praesertim in resp., convenit cum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3, § 2. Idem maxima ex parte dicendum est de 4 seqq. quaest., quae ibid. inveniuntur hoc ordine: a. 2. q. 1. loc. cit. m. 2. a. 1. — a. 2. q. 2. ibid. m. 1. a. 1. — a. 3. q. 1. ibid. m. 2. a. 2. § 2. — a. 3. q. 2. ibid. m. 2. a. 2, initium resp. est ibi ad 4. (cfr. de hoc supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in schol.).

**IV.** Pauci antiqui de his duabus quaest. explicite tractant; principia eorum inveniuntur in seqq. quaest. huius dist. et praecipue in II. Sent. d. 24. — Praeter Alexandrum Hal. iam citatum de quaest. 1. tractat Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; de quaest. 2. S. Thom., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 1. 3. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The response to this question is confirmed by the condemnation of many of the propositions of Baius, e. g. prop. 4: «Eternal life was promised to man in his integrity and to the Angel in view of good works; and good works by the law of nature suffice of themselves to attain it» (cfr. propp. 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 21, 23).

For the twofold acceptance which the Seraphic Doctor sets down at the beginning of the response, Alexander of Hales (S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3. § 1.) posits a threefold distinction of the same: generally, inasmuch as all creatures considered in themselves are good and acceptable to God; more specially with respect to the rational creature, «inasmuch as it is a creature of this kind; most specially or most properly the rational creature, inasmuch as it is consecrated to God, that it may be his temple, is adopted as a son and is taken as a bride. But this exaltation of the rational creature is above the natural completion; and therefore neither the consecration nor the adoption nor the assumption of this kind comes about through any property of nature, but through a gift superadded to nature, consecrating the soul, that it may be a temple, assimilating it to God, that it may be a son or daughter; allying it to God or uniting it through conformity of will, that it may be a bride». — In the Breviloquium, p. V, where the whole doctrine of grace is set forth lucidly in brief, it is said to the point (c. 1.) that grace «is a gift through which the soul is made the bride of Christ, the daughter of the eternal Father and the temple of the Holy Spirit; which comes about in no way except from the deigning condescension and the condescending deigning of the eternal Majesty through the gift of his grace»; which words are then proved by a splendid exposition. — By the aforesaid threefold formula, which is taken from holy Scripture, there is well expressed the ineffable exaltation by which the rational creature is raised into the consortium and fellowship (κοινωνίαν) of the divine persons (1 John 1, 3.) and is made a partaker of the divine nature (2 Peter 1, 4.). This perfection, which is wholly gratuitous and not owed to created nature, is called by the holy Doctor (below, d. 34. dub. 3.) «the perfection of superabundance». — On the adoption into a son of God cfr. I Sent. d. 26. dub. 6; III Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. and dub. 4.

**II.** St. Thomas departs somewhat from St. Bonaventure in this, that he insists more on the supernatural regeneration inasmuch as it regards the nature of the soul itself. For he teaches that the same first subject of grace is not the power but the nature of the soul itself. Hence he says to the point (S. I. II. q. 110. a. 4. in corp.): «Just as through the intellective power man participates in the divine cognition through the virtue of faith, and according to the power of will in the divine love through the virtue of charity; so also through the nature of the soul he participates according to a certain likeness in the divine nature through a certain regeneration or recreation» (cfr. ibid. a. 3; de Verit. q. 27. a. 2.). But although St. Bonaventure by no means denies that the soul is perfected by grace also according to nature («as to first being»); nevertheless he himself holds that the soul is perfected by grace and glory first according to the powers, or according to the mind, which he calls (in the Breviloquium p. V. c. 4.) the higher face of the soul. Hence also deiformity is placed by him first in free choice, yet in such a way that the whole person and also the nature is elevated, that it may be worthy of the mystical betrothals and nuptials with God. This difference of whatever kind between the two holy Doctors is approximately determined by a recent author, the distinguished Dr. J. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, vol. III. n. 807.), as follows. According to St. Bonaventure the state of grace signifies in the first place the gratuitous exaltation of the person taken up and adorned as a bride of God, and thence increased by adoption and hereditary right; but the interior deiformity, residing first in the will, in which is the principle of meriting, is manifested chiefly in the producing of fruits worthy of God; yet it makes the whole man acceptable to God and infuses into him that which St. Bonaventure calls *well-being*. But according to St. Thomas the state of grace imports first the exaltation of nature itself, reborn from God through participation in the divine nature and so adorned with the dignity of divine filiation that it becomes worthy to be the bride of the Son of God.

**III.** The following question of this article rests upon the principles set down in the first question; but in it many things are more confirmed and explained. — Worthy of note is the excellent solution to 3, on which cfr. also above d. 28. dub. 1. This question, moreover, almost wholly, especially in the response, agrees with Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3, § 2. The same is for the most part to be said of the 4 following questions, which are found there in this order: a. 2. q. 1. loc. cit. m. 2. a. 1. — a. 2. q. 2. ibid. m. 1. a. 1. — a. 3. q. 1. ibid. m. 2. a. 2. § 2. — a. 3. q. 2. ibid. m. 2. a. 2, the beginning of the response is there at ad 4. (cfr. on this above d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in the scholion).

**IV.** Few of the ancients treat explicitly of these two questions; their principles are found in the following questions of this distinction and especially in II Sent. d. 24. — Besides Alexander of Hales already cited, on question 1 there treats Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1; on question 2 St. Thomas, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 1. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, II Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 48413–48623) with 450 dpi PDF column-band reconstruction (`tools/colcrop.py vol2 694–697`) of the cascade-shattered Respondeo opening (the marginal-bleed region in OCR at p.695 R: *Daf\e% / aliquid acceptatione modo quadam* etc. is editorial side-gloss bleed — reconstructed as *uno modo quadam acceptatione generali…*). English freshly translated literally.

**THIRD unit of DISTINCTIO XXIX; first quaestio.** Per Vol II Override §5 the short ARTICULUS I opener (title + theme *De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum*) is folded into this q1 — no standalone article-opener chunk. Single-pars distinction.

**Alignment verified:** opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae* = divisio TRACTATIO item 1 (*Primo quaeritur, utrum homo in statu innocentiae, circumscripto dono gratiae, esset Deo acceptus*). Same question; the `title_la` uses the TRACTATIO phrasing. ✅

**Page-split map:**
- p.694: ARTICULUS I opener + QUAESTIO I title + opener + args 1–3 (arg.4 opens at foot of p.694 R).
- p.695: arg.4 tail + args 5–6, Sed contra 1–4, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo opening (through *Gratuita namque condescensio…*).
- p.696: Respondeo continuation (Ratio 1 / Ratio 2 / Alia ratio ex parte acceptantis) + replies Ad 1–6.
- p.697: SCHOLION I–IV (no numbered footers on this page).

**Apparatus split map (24 entries):**
- [^1]–[^3] = p.694 footers 2–4 (Vers.31 Gen / Vers.25 Wisd / Vers.17 Prov.+Eccl.7,30) — **RECEIVED hand-off from d29-divisio**, lead apparatus, renumbered from divisio's parked 2–4. (Divisio's footer 1 *Plures codd…praedictis* stays in divisio.)
- [^4]–[^16] = p.695 footers 1–13 (by printed footer sequence): [^4](arg.4 *ad voluntatem suam*, Aristot Ethic IX), [^5](arg.5 *macula*, Cant 4,7), [^6](arg.6 *exigentiam status naturae*, Deut 32,4), [^7](Sed contra 1 *Hebraeorum undecimo*, Vers.6 Heb), [^8](SC2 *Sapientiae septimo*, Vers.28 Wisd), [^9](SC3 *de Angelica Hierarchia*, Cap.4 §3 Dionys), [^10](SC4 *ipsa imago*, Vide supra d.16), [^11](SC5 *sponsam suam in Cantico*, Cant 4,8), [^12](SC6 *Ioannis primo*, Vers.12 Ioan), [^13](Respondeo *omne opus Dei*, Sap 6,8+11), [^14](*eius capax…particeps esse potest*, August de Trin XIV), [^15](*novo et veteri Testamento*, Epist 1+2 Cor etc.), [^16](*Gratuita namque condescensio*, Vat condescensio).
- [^17]–[^24] = p.696 footers 1–8: [^17](Resp *iterum*, Cod. cc / *in coniugio* variant), [^18](Resp *possit inquinari* — *sanctitas…adeo iuncta* restitution note), [^19](Resp *nullius indiget*, Cfr. d.1 p.II + *laude* variant), [^20](Resp *totius salutis…attribueret*, Vide supra d.12), [^21](ad 3 *distinctione tertia*, Part.II a.3 q.1 ad 3), [^22](ad 4 *nata est*, Vat agglutinat *esse*), [^23](ad 5 *super illud Psalmi*, Psalm 103,16), [^24](ad 6 *gratis data*, Rom 11,6). (24 La = 24 En = 24 defs.)

**CASCADE-DROPOUT CAUGHT + REPAIRED:** the IA djvu two-column OCR cascade-merged the right column of p.695, dropping **Sed contra args 5 and 6** entirely (arg.5 *quotiescumque Deus animam acceptat…sponsam suam in Cantico*; arg.6 *cum Deus hominem acceptat, filium suum reputat…Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri*). Both recovered from the 450 dpi p.695 R column band and re-set as [^11]/[^12] with their footers (Cant 4,8 / Vers.12). Without the column-band read these two arguments + 2 footnotes would have been silently lost (the paraphrase/header/apparatus audits do not fire on a mid-page two-arg splice).

**Hand-offs:** RECEIVED p.694 footers 2–4 from divisio (now [^1]–[^3]). FORWARDED to a1-q2: none — q1 closes clean at SCHOLION IV (raw 48623), immediately before QUAESTIO II header (raw 48624, p.697). a1-q2 opens fresh on p.697 with its own footer sequence.

**has_scholion = true** — SCHOLION I (Baius condemnation + Alex. Hal. triple distinction + Breviloq. + perfectio superabundantiae) + II (S. Thomas comparison + Scheeben) + III (forward link to a1-q2 + Alex. Hal. concordance for the 4 following quaestiones) + IV (commentator roll for a1-q1+q2 jointly). SCHOLION III/IV are **joint** for q1+q2 ("de his duabus quaest.") — they sit physically at q1's tail; a1-q2 should sibling-point here for its commentator roll.

**Body seams:** p.694→695 (arg.4 *…in opere | suo et illud acceptat*), p.695→696 (Ratio 1 *…condescensio…ne- | cessario requiritur*), p.696→697 (Ad 6 *…gratis data* | SCHOLION) all grammatically continuous (450 dpi).

**No [?] flags** — raw + PDF agree throughout; the cascade-shattered Respondeo opening and the two cascade-dropped Sed contra arguments (SC5/SC6) were fully recovered from the p.695 R column band.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum homo in statu naturae institutae potuerit mereri absque dono gratiae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo in statu naturae institutae posset in opus meritorium exire absque dono gratiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro *de Natura et gratia*[^1]: « Quis nesciat, ita factum hominem, ut in eo liberum arbitrium ad iuste vivendum pro possibilitate et capacitate sua constitueretur »? Ergo videtur, quod ex libertate arbitrii naturali posset iuste vivere, ergo et opera meritoria facere.

2. Item, Damascenus[^2]: « Manentes in eo quod est secundum naturam, in virtute sumus »; sed opera virtuosa sunt meritoria: ergo liberum arbitrium in integritate suae naturae manens, absque omni gratia poterat facere opera meritoria.

3. Item, *Dei perfecta sunt opera*[^3], et « perfectum est aliquid, ut vult Philosophus, cum attingit propriae virtuti »: ergo si homo perfectus conditus est, poterat exire in operationem, propter quam factus est; haec autem est operatio, per quam pervenitur ad gloriam: ergo etc.

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4. Item, in omnibus creaturis, si distant a suo termino, ad quem ordinantur, data est virtus, per quam possint ad illum finem pervenire, sicut patet in igne, qui cum deorsum est, sua levitate potest sursum ferri: ergo aut liberum arbitrium miserabilius fuit inter ceteras creaturas, aut si aliae creaturae per naturam habent potentiam perveniendi ad suum finem, videtur multo fortius, quod et hoc homo posset per virtutem naturae ante statum miseriae.

5. Item, « natura nihil facit frustra nec deficit in necessariis[^4] »; sed nihil est magis necessarium homini quam illud, sine quo non potest beatificari: ergo cum potestas merendi huiusmodi sit, videtur, quod haec inesset ei per naturam, omni gratia circumscripta.

6. Item, circumscripta gratia, intelligamus, hominem in statu naturae servare divina mandata; aut igitur *meretur aliquid*, aut *nihil*. Si *nihil*, ergo frustra operatur; sed frustra operari non potest esse sine aliqua poena; hoc autem non poterat esse in natura instituta[^5]. Si *aliquid meretur*, cum opus rectum sit ad beatitudinem ordinatum, videtur, quod ex puris naturalibus mereri possit praemium aeternum.

**Contra:**
1. Ad Romanos sexto[^6]: *Gratia Dei vita aeterna*; et Glossa: « Nihil aliud in nobis Deus coronat quam munera sua ». Tam ex textu quam ex Glossa colligitur, quod vitam aeternam non contingit mereri absque gratia.

2. Item, Deus nullo modo indiget bonis nostris[^7]: ergo si acceptat bona nostra, hoc non est propter aliquam suam utilitatem, sed si est, hoc est per meram benignitatem: igitur nisi divina iustitia condescendat per gratiam, impossibile videtur, quod reputet aliquem dignum gloria propter aliqua opera, quae faciat.

3. Item, meritum et praemium debent esse proportionabilia; sed natura, quantumcumque eminens, improportionabilis est et alterius generis est, quam sit beatitudo gloriae: igitur impossibile est mereri gloriam per pura naturalia.

4. Item, nobilior est substantia quam operatio[^8]; sed Deus nunquam acceptat hominem absque munere gratiae: ergo nec operationem hominis reputat meritoriam, nisi procedat a libero arbitrio et a gratia.

### Conclusio

> Homo in statu naturae institutae sine gratia non poterat facere opus meritorium, propter conditionem tum retribuentis, tum retributionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non solummodo gratia necessaria est ad merendum secundum statum naturae lapsae, sed etiam secundum statum naturae institutae, licet secundum statum naturae lapsae magis indigeat liberum arbitrium dono gratiae. — In statu namque naturae institutae necessaria erat gratia, tum propter conditionem retribuentis, tum etiam propter conditionem retributionis. Propter conditionem retribuentis: quoniam ipse Deus bonorum nostrorum non indiget[^9]; ideo nec acceptat hominem propter opera, nec aliquod meritum obligare potest ipsum secundum rationem dati et accepti; ideo ad hoc, quod aliquod bonum opus creaturae suae ad remunerandum Deo complaceat, necesse est, quod ipsius gratuitae bonitatis influentia in operante praecedat[^10], per quam creatura ipsi Creatori grata existat. — Similiter propter conditionem retributionis impossibile erat, liberum arbitrium mereri sine auxilio gratiae gratum facientis, pro eo quod illud praemium, quod meremur, est beatitudo aeterna. Beatitudo autem aeterna consistit in habendo eum qui est omne et summum bonum, et qui est super omnem naturam exaltatus et *lucem habitat inaccessibilem*[^11]; et ideo impossibile est, quod homo merendo ad illud summum bonum ascendat et perveniat, nisi per aliquod adiutorium, quod sit ultra naturam. — Sic igitur homo in statu naturae institutae absque dono gratiae mereri non poterat, tum propter conditionem retribuentis, tum propter conditionem retributionis.

In statu vero naturae lapsae non solummodo indiget gratia ad merendum propter has conditiones, sed etiam propter conditionem operantis et operationis meritoriae. — Operans enim in statu naturae lapsae semper est in peccato et Dei adversarius et inimicus, nisi a peccato relevetur per gratiae donum; et ideo, quidquid faciat, nisi voluntas eius praeveniatur a gratia, quae Deo reconciliet, nihil meretur merito condigni, pro eo quod Dei est adversarius et inimicus. Deus autem opera non acceptat, nisi prius acceptet personam, sicut innuitur Genesis quarto[^12]:

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*Respexit Dominus ad Abel et ad munera eius*; prius dicit *ad Abel*, et postea dicit *ad munera*. — Propter conditionem etiam operationis necessaria est gratia, quia nulla est operatio meritoria nisi recta; et nulla est[^13] recta, nisi fiat ex recta intentione; et nulla potest esse recta intentio, nisi quae bonum summum omni bono praeponit. Nulla autem intentio potest hoc facere in statu naturae lapsae sine dono gratiae. Et propterea, qualemcumque vel quantamcumque faciat homo operationem absque gratia, non meretur, quia non pensat Deus *quantum*, sed *ex quanto* hoc faciat.

Patet igitur, quod multiplex est necessitas gratiae ad merendum, scilicet propter conditiones retribuentis et retributionis, operantis et bonae operationis, ita quod haec quadruplex necessitas concurrit ad statum naturae lapsae, et duplex ad statum institutae. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera[^14], quod homo indigebat gratia operante et cooperante secundum statum naturae institutae, licet non secundum omnem modum gratiae operantis.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Augustini et Damasceni, dicendum, quod illud dictum est, non quia potestas liberi arbitrii et naturae sit sufficiens in opus meritorium, sed quia natura bene ordinata concordat cum gratia et discordat a culpa.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *Dei perfecta sunt opera*; dicendum, quod est perfectio quantum ad esse primum, et est perfectio quantum ad esse secundum. Et perfectio quantum ad esse secundum duplex est. Quaedam enim est, quae habet ortum a perfectione secundum esse primum, sicut illa perfectio, quae attenditur in accidentibus, quae oriuntur ex principiis subiecti. Est alia perfectio quantum ad esse secundum, quae non causatur a perfectione secundum esse primum, sed potius est supra illud, sicut est perfectio in esse gratuito vel glorioso, quae quidem est *in nobis*, non *ex nobis*, sed *ex Deo*[^15]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod *Dei perfecta sunt opera*, hoc intelligitur quantum ad esse primum et quantum ad esse secundum, quod causatur ab illo. Quantum autem ad illud esse secundum, quod non causatur a perfectione secundum esse primum, veritatem non habet. Non enim fecit Deus omnes beatos et gloriosos, sed illos solos beatificavit, *quos praedestinavit, conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui*[^16]; hoc enim disponit dare per merita tanquam bonum laudabile. Et ratio huius assignata fuit supra distinctione vigesima septima[^17].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliae creaturae possunt pervenire in finem, ad quem sunt, per virtutem naturae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia finis creaturae rationalis est summum bonum, quod est supra omnem naturam. Finis vero aliarum creaturarum est bonum creatum, quod est infra terminos naturae: ideo creatura rationalis magis indiget dono gratiae, ut possit pervenire in[^18] suum finem, quam aliae creaturae.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non deficit in necessariis; iam patet responsio ex praedictis. Hoc enim intelligitur de necessariis, quae quidem attenduntur quantum ad esse primum, vel quantum ad esse secundum, quod causatur ex principiis naturae. Quantum vero ad illud esse secundum, quod est supra naturam, necesse est, naturam deficere, et tale est esse gratuitum et gloriosum. Nullum tamen ex hoc fit naturae praeiudicium, quia Deus defectum naturae supplet et semper praesto est, cum se offert tempus et locus, complere et dare quod natura non poterat.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, utrum homo mereretur aliquid vel nihil, si faceret opera; dicendum, quod non mereretur aliquid de condigno, sed de congruo; et sic merendo disponeret se ad gratiam, et ideo non operaretur frustra[^19]. — Ex praedictis patet, quantum humana natura in statu innocentiae eguerit gratia[^20].

*(Scholion: vide a1-q1. SCHOLION III et IV illius articuli sunt de his duabus quaestionibus communiter: « Pauci antiqui de his duabus quaest. explicite tractant ».)*

---

english:
### Article I. *On the necessity of grace before the sin of the first human beings.*
### Question II. *Whether man in the state of instituted nature could merit without the gift of grace.*

Secondly it is asked, whether man in the state of instituted nature could go forth into a meritorious work without the gift of grace. And that he could, it seems.

1. Augustine in the book *On Nature and Grace*[^1]: « Who does not know that man was so made that in him free choice was established for living righteously according to its possibility and capacity »? Therefore it seems that by the natural freedom of choice he could live righteously, and therefore also do meritorious works.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^2]: « Remaining in that which is according to nature, we are in virtue »; but virtuous works are meritorious: therefore free choice, remaining in the integrity of its nature, could without any grace do meritorious works.

3. Likewise, *the works of God are perfect*[^3], and « a thing is perfect, as the Philosopher holds, when it attains its proper virtue »: therefore if man was created perfect, he could go forth into the operation for which he was made; but this is the operation by which one arrives at glory: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in all creatures, if they are distant from their term, to which they are ordered, a power has been given by which they may be able to arrive at that end, just as is evident in fire, which, when it is below, can by its lightness be borne upward: therefore either free choice was more wretched than the other creatures, or, if the other creatures by nature have the power of arriving at their end, it seems much more strongly that man too could have this by the virtue of nature before the state of misery.

5. Likewise, « nature does nothing in vain nor falls short in necessary things[^4] »; but nothing is more necessary to man than that without which he cannot be made blessed: therefore, since the power of meriting is of this kind, it seems that this belonged to him by nature, every grace set aside.

6. Likewise, grace being set aside, let us understand that man in the state of nature keeps the divine commandments; either therefore *he merits something*, or *nothing*. If *nothing*, then he works in vain; but to work in vain cannot be without some penalty; but this could not be in instituted nature[^5]. If *he merits something*, since a right work is ordered to beatitude, it seems that from pure natural endowments he can merit the eternal reward.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter six[^6]: *The grace of God is eternal life*; and the Gloss: « God crowns nothing else in us than his own gifts ». Both from the text and from the Gloss it is gathered that one does not happen to merit eternal life without grace.

2. Likewise, God in no way needs our goods[^7]: therefore if he accepts our goods, this is not on account of any usefulness to himself, but if it is, this is through mere benignity: therefore unless the divine justice condescends through grace, it seems impossible that it should reckon anyone worthy of glory on account of any works that he does.

3. Likewise, merit and reward ought to be proportionate; but nature, however eminent, is disproportionate and of another genus than is the beatitude of glory: therefore it is impossible to merit glory through pure natural endowments.

4. Likewise, substance is nobler than operation[^8]; but God never accepts a man without the gift of grace: therefore neither does he reckon a man's operation meritorious, unless it proceeds from free choice and from grace.

### Conclusion

> Man in the state of instituted nature could not without grace do a meritorious work, on account of the condition both of the one who rewards and of the reward.

**I respond:** It must be said that grace is necessary for meriting not only according to the state of fallen nature, but also according to the state of instituted nature, although according to the state of fallen nature free choice has greater need of the gift of grace. — For in the state of instituted nature grace was necessary, both on account of the condition of the one who rewards, and also on account of the condition of the reward. On account of the condition of the one who rewards: because God himself does not need our goods[^9]; therefore he neither accepts man on account of his works, nor can any merit bind him according to the account of what is given and received; therefore, in order that some good work of his creature may be pleasing to God for rewarding, it is necessary that the influence of his gratuitous goodness precede in the one working[^10], through which the creature may exist as pleasing to its Creator. — Likewise, on account of the condition of the reward, it was impossible for free choice to merit without the help of grace that makes pleasing, for the reason that that reward which we merit is eternal beatitude. But eternal beatitude consists in having him who is the whole and supreme good, and who is exalted above every nature and *dwells in inaccessible light*[^11]; and therefore it is impossible that man should by meriting ascend and arrive at that supreme good, except through some help which is beyond nature. — Thus therefore man in the state of instituted nature could not merit without the gift of grace, both on account of the condition of the one who rewards, and on account of the condition of the reward.

But in the state of fallen nature he needs grace for meriting not only on account of these conditions, but also on account of the condition of the one working and of the meritorious operation. — For the one working in the state of fallen nature is always in sin and an adversary and enemy of God, unless he be relieved from sin through the gift of grace; and therefore, whatever he does, unless his will be anticipated by grace which reconciles him to God, he merits nothing by the merit of condignity, for the reason that he is an adversary and enemy of God. But God does not accept works, unless he first accept the person, as is intimated in Genesis the fourth[^12]:

*The Lord looked upon Abel and upon his gifts*; he says first *upon Abel*, and afterwards he says *upon his gifts*. — Also on account of the condition of the operation grace is necessary, because no operation is meritorious unless it is right; and none is[^13] right, unless it be done from a right intention; and no intention can be right except that which prefers the supreme good above every good. But no intention can do this in the state of fallen nature without the gift of grace. And therefore, of whatever kind or however great an operation a man does without grace, he does not merit, because God does not weigh *how much*, but *out of how much* he does this.

It is evident, therefore, that the necessity of grace for meriting is manifold, namely on account of the conditions of the one who rewards and of the reward, of the one working and of the good operation, so that this fourfold necessity concurs for the state of fallen nature, and a twofold for the state of instituted nature. And this is what the Master says in the text[^14], that man needed operating and cooperating grace according to the state of instituted nature, although not according to every mode of operating grace.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected on the contrary from the authority of Augustine and Damascene, it must be said that this was said, not because the power of free choice and of nature is sufficient for a meritorious work, but because nature well-ordered agrees with grace and disagrees with fault.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that *the works of God are perfect*; it must be said that there is a perfection with respect to first being, and there is a perfection with respect to second being. And the perfection with respect to second being is twofold. For there is a certain one which has its origin from the perfection according to first being, just as that perfection which is observed in accidents, which arise from the principles of the subject. There is another perfection with respect to second being, which is not caused by the perfection according to first being, but rather is above it, just as is the perfection in gratuitous or glorious being, which indeed is *in us*, not *from us*, but *from God*[^15]. When therefore it is said that *the works of God are perfect*, this is understood with respect to first being and with respect to second being, which is caused by him. But with respect to that second being, which is not caused by the perfection according to first being, it is not true. For God did not make all blessed and glorious, but he beatified those alone *whom he predestinated to be made conformed to the image of his Son*[^16]; for this he disposes to give through merits as a laudable good. And the reason for this was assigned above, in the twenty-seventh distinction[^17].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that other creatures can arrive at the end for which they are, through the virtue of nature; it must be said that it is not alike, because the end of the rational creature is the supreme good, which is above every nature. But the end of other creatures is a created good, which is below the bounds of nature: therefore the rational creature has greater need of the gift of grace, that it may be able to arrive at[^18] its end, than the other creatures.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that nature does not fall short in necessary things; the response is already evident from what has been said. For this is understood of necessary things which indeed are observed with respect to first being, or with respect to second being which is caused from the principles of nature. But with respect to that second being which is above nature, it is necessary that nature fall short, and such is gratuitous and glorious being. Yet from this no prejudice arises to nature, because God supplies the defect of nature and is always at hand, when time and place present themselves, to complete and to give what nature could not.

*To 6.* To that which is objected last, whether man would merit something or nothing, if he did works; it must be said that he would not merit something of condignity, but of congruity; and thus by meriting he would dispose himself to grace, and therefore he would not work in vain[^19]. — From what has been said it is evident how much human nature in the state of innocence needed grace[^20].

*(Scholion: see a1-q1. SCHOLION III and IV of that article concern these two questions jointly: « Few of the ancients treat these two questions explicitly ».)*

---

la: Cap. 43. n. 50: *Quis enim eum* [hominem] *nescit sanum et inculpabilem factum, et libero arbitrio atque ad iuste vivendum potestate libera constitutum?*

en: Ch. 43, n. 50: *For who does not know that he* [man] *was made sound and blameless, and constituted with free choice and with free power for living righteously?*

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 30.

en: Book II, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 30.

la: Deut. 32, 4. — Dictum Aristotelis, quod hic secundum antiquam translationem affertur, habetur VII. *Phys.* text. 18. (c. 3.), et explicatur illis verbis eiusdem auctoris, V. *Metaph.* text. 21. (IV. c. 16.): *Virtus quoque quaedam perfectio est; unumquodque namque tunc perfectum est cunctaque substantia tunc perfecta, cum secundum speciem propriae virtutis nulla desit particula magnitudinis naturalis.* — Vat. cum ed. 4 post *attingit* addit *proprio fini seu*.

en: Deut. 32:4. — The saying of Aristotle, which is here adduced according to the old translation, is found in *Physics* VII, text 18 (c. 3), and is explained by these words of the same author, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16): *Virtue too is a certain perfection; for each thing is then perfect, and every substance then perfect, when, according to the species of its proper virtue, no particle of natural magnitude is lacking.* — The Vatican edition with ed. 4, after *attains*, adds *to its proper end, or*.

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 43. (c. 9.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 43 (c. 9).

la: Vide dictum Augustini, supra pag. 432, nota 4. allatum.

en: See the saying of Augustine, adduced above, p. 432, note 4.

la: Vers. 23. — Glossa hic allata apud Lyranum habetur non ad loc. cit., sed ad Eph. 1, 4, et est Augustini, in cuius operibus pluries occurrit, ut e. g. *Enarrat. in Ps.* 70. serm. 2. n. 5; in Ps. 102. n. 7; *Epist.* 194. (alias 105.) c. 5. n. 19; *Serm.* 170. (alias 49. de Tempore) c. 10. n. 10; *de Gratia et lib. arb.* c. 6. n. 15.

en: Verse 23. — The Gloss here adduced is found in Lyra not at the place cited, but at Eph. 1:4, and is Augustine's, in whose works it occurs several times, as e.g. *Enarration on Ps.* 70, sermon 2, n. 5; on Ps. 102, n. 7; *Letter* 194 (alias 105), c. 5, n. 19; *Sermon* 170 (alias 49, On the Season), c. 10, n. 10; *On Grace and Free Choice*, c. 6, n. 15.

la: Psalm. 15, 2: *Bonorum meorum non eges.* — In fine arg. post *propter aliqua* cod. aa subiungit *bona*.

en: Psalm 15:2: *You have no need of my goods.* — At the end of the argument, after *on account of any*, codex aa adds *goods*.

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 5. (c. 12.): *Nam unicuique optimum, in substantia maxime.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 5 (c. 12): *For what is best for each thing is most of all in substance.*

la: Psalm. 15, 2. — Mox post *propter opera* codd. Y aa bb ee addunt *sed opera propter hominem*. Subinde pro *meritum* cod. T *meritorum*.

en: Psalm 15:2. — Soon after *on account of works*, codices Y aa bb ee add *but works on account of man*. Thereupon, for *merit*, codex T reads *of merits*.

la: Cod. O *in operantem descendat*.

en: Codex O reads *may descend into the one working*.

la: Epist. I. Tim. 6, 16, ubi Vulgata *inhabitat* pro *habitat*, ut iam saepius notatum est.

en: First Letter to Timothy 6:16, where the Vulgate reads *inhabits* for *dwells*, as has now been frequently noted.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Cod. S *potest esse*. — De hac ratione cfr. Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 3. c. 3. seq.

en: Codex S reads *can be*. — On this reasoning cf. Anselm, *On the Concord of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 3 ff.

la: Hic c. 1, ubi etiam pro sua sententia adducit Augustinum.

en: Here, c. 1, where he also adduces Augustine in support of his opinion.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 3.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, q. 3.

la: Art. 2. q. 3. — Codd. et edd. perperam delegant ad d. 24.

en: Article 2, q. 3. — The codices and editions wrongly refer to d. 24.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *ad*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *to* [*ad* for *in*].

la: Cfr. supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *opera* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *mandata Dei*.

en: Cf. above, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1. — A little earlier, for *works*, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *the commandments of God*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (pp. 697–699, PDF 719–721, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 48624–48763. Fresh literal English translation. has_apparatus=true (20 entries).

**has_scholion=FALSE — sibling-pointer to a1-q1.** ARTICULUS I's joint commentator-roll sits in a1-q1's SCHOLION III and IV, which are explicitly *de his duabus quaestionibus* (« Pauci antiqui de his duabus quaest. explicite tractant »; SCHOLION III opens *Quaestio seq. huius articuli innititur principiis in 1. quaest. positis*). The scholion block physically sits at the tail of q1 on p.697 (raw ~48604–48623), immediately before this QUAESTIO II header at raw 48624. Footer [^20] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms the cross-reference. Same pattern as d.21-a2-q2→q1.

**Page-split map:** QUAESTIO II header + args 1–3 on **p.697** (raw 48624 ff., directly after q1's SCHOLION IV); arg 4 tail + args 5–6 + Sed contra 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo (duplex conditio: retribuentis + retributionis; then the fourfold/twofold necessity) on **p.698**; Respondeo continuation (Genesis/Abel + Epilogus) + Ad 1.2–Ad 6 on **p.699**, closing *…in statu innocentiae eguerit gratia*[^20] at raw 48763, immediately before ARTICULUS II at raw 48764.

**Apparatus page-split (20 entries):**
- **p.697 footers 1–3** = [^1]–[^3]: arg1 *de Natura et gratia* (Cap.43 n.50) / arg2 Damascenus (Fide orthod. II c.30) / arg3 *Dei perfecta sunt opera* (Deut.32,4 + Aristot. *Phys.* VII / *Metaph.* V).
- **p.698 footers 1–9** = [^4]–[^12]: arg5 *necessariis* (Aristot. *de An.* III) / arg6 *natura instituta* (Vide dictum Aug. pag.432) / Sed contra 1 *Romanos sexto* (Vers.23 Glossa) / Sed contra 2 *bonis nostris* (Psalm 15,2) / Sed contra 4 *operatio* (Aristot. *Topic.* VI) / Respondeo *bonorum nostrorum non indiget* (Psalm 15,2 codd.) / Respondeo *in operante praecedat* (Cod. O) / Respondeo *lucem habitat inaccessibilem* (I Tim 6,16) / Respondeo *Genesis quarto* (Vers.4).
- **p.699 footers 1–8** = [^13]–[^20]: Respondeo *nulla est recta* (Cod. S + Anselm) / Epilogus *Magister in littera* (Hic c.1) / Ad 3 *ex Deo* (Cfr. d.26 q.3) / Ad 3 *imaginis Filii sui* (Rom 8,29) / Ad 3 *vigesima septima* (Art.2 q.3 — codd. wrongly to d.24) / Ad 4 *pervenire in* (Vat. *ad*) / Ad 6 *frustra* (Cfr. d.28 a.2 q.1) / Ad 6 *eguerit gratia* (Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.).

**Hand-offs:** RECEIVED none (a1-q1 closed clean at SCHOLION IV raw 48623, owns its pp.694–696 footers). FORWARDED none — q2 closes clean at raw 48763 immediately before ARTICULUS II (raw 48764); footer [^20] (p.699 R footer 8) anchors on q2's closing word *eguerit gratia*, so no footer spills into a2-q1.

**Cascade-dropout check:** all four Sed contra args read against both 450 dpi columns (a1-q1 had SC5/SC6 silently dropped by the OCR cascade-merge — this q2 has 4 Sed contra, all present and grammatically intact). Body seams 697→698 (arg 3 tail *…per quam factus est; haec autem est operatio…*) and 698→699 (Respondeo *…sicut innuitur Genesis quarto: ‖ Respexit Dominus ad Abel…*) both grammatically continuous (450 dpi).

**[?] flags:** NONE. All 20 marker→footer assignments verified eyes-on at 450 dpi (notably arg5 *necessariis*¹ vs arg6 *natura instituta*² disambiguated, and Sed contra 4 *operatio*⁵ confirmed against footer 5 Aristot. *Topic.* VI).

**ARTICULUS II TRACTATIO (verbatim, for next dispatch):** *Consequenter quaeritur, utrum homo in statu innocentiae habuerit gratiam gratum facientem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum habuerit gratiam ante lapsum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus.* (ART II opener + theme *Utrum homo ante peccatum habuerit gratiam gratum facientem* at raw 48764, p.699 R foot; per Override §5 the short ART II opener folds into a2-q1. a2-q1 = QUAESTIO I *Utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam*, header raw 48787, p.700.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0