title: Dist. 48, Art. 2, Q. 2

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### Articulus II. *De conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad divinam.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare in volito.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum teneamur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in volito. Et quod sic, videtur.

**Argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. *Matthaei* duodecimo[^1]: *Qui non est mecum, contra me est*: ergo si non consonat Deo in volito, est contra Deum: ergo si tenemur Deo non esse contrarii, tenemur velle quod Deus vult.

2. Item, super illud *Psalmi*[^2]: *Non adhaesit mihi cor pravum*, Glossa: « Pravum cor atque distortum habet qui non vult hoc quod Deus vult »; sed tenemur vitare cordis pravitatem: ergo tenemur velle quod Deus vult.

3. Item, Tullius[^3] definiens amicitiam dicit, quod amicitia est idem velle et idem nolle in rebus honestis; sed tenemur Deo servare amicitiam: ergo et idem velle in honestis. Sed Deus non vult nisi iustum et honestum: ergo debemus nostram voluntatem suae conformare in omnibus.

4. Item, omnis intellectus, qui discordat a prima veritate sive cognitione[^4], est falsus: ergo omnis affectus est iniquus, qui non concordat cum divina voluntate in volito: ergo etc.

5. Item, tenemur velle quod Deus praecipit, aut ergo quia praecipit, aut quia vult. Non quia praecipit, quia illi qui fuerunt mundati, quibus datum est praeceptum a Domino de tacendo[^5], non peccaverunt in revelando, quia divina inspiratione cognoverunt, Deum non velle illud quod praecipiebat: ergo tenemur ad praeceptum, quia tenemur ad voluntatem: ergo tenemur velle quod Deus vult.

6. Item, tenemur credere non tantum quod praecipit Deus credere, sed etiam omne quod dicit esse verum: ergo a simili tenemur velle non tantum quod praecipit Deus velle, sed[^6] omne quod Deus indicat se velle tanquam bonum: ergo tenemur velle omne quod scimus Deum velle.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus in *Enchiridio*[^7]: Aliquando homo bona voluntate vult quod non vult Deus.

2. Item, viri sancti frequenter volunt opposita, sicut Apostolus volebat alligari in Ierusalem, et discipuli nolebant, *Actuum* vigesimo primo[^8]; sed constat, quod Deus aliquid illorum volebat: ergo licet contrarium divinae voluntati velle meritorie: ergo etc.

3. Item, si tenemur in volito conformare; ergo cum in indifferentibus non sit nobis voluntas divina determinata, quicumque vult aliquod indifferens determinate, committit se discrimini: ergo peccat mortaliter, quod absurdum est. Si dicas, quod tenetur, quando scit Domini voluntatem; contra: scientia non inducit novum peccatum neque tentionem, sed solum aggravat peccatum: ergo propter scientiam nemo tenetur, sicut nec ignorans.

4. Item, Ieremias dolebat super destructionem Ierusalem, in *Threnis*; Christus flebat super Ierusalem, *Lucae* decimo nono[^9]; Beata Virgo et Apostoli super passionem Christi. Si flebant et dolebant, et dolor est de rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt, ergo nolebant. Et constat, quod omnes hi merebantur, et sciebant, Deum velle contrarium: ergo licite et meritorie possumus velle contrarium divinae voluntati, etiam ubi scitur.

5. Item, quantumcumque praelatus meus velit aliquid, non teneor illud velle, nisi mihi praecipiat, etiamsi sciam ipsum velle: ergo pari ratione, quantumcumque velit Deus aliquid, non teneor illud velle, quantumcumque mihi innotescat, nisi Deus mihi praecipiat.

6. Item, quod Deus consulit[^10] vult, et nos scimus eum velle, tamen non tenemur velle, quamvis multum sibi placeat, etiam plus quam praeceptum: ergo non tenemur velle omne quod scimus Deum velle.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Non tenetur voluntas nostra conformari voluntati divinae in quocumque volito, sed tantum in omni eo quod nobis innotescit Deum velle voluntate absoluta, vel in eo in quo consistit substantialiter ordo salutis.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in omni quod vult Deus — sed hoc est perfectionis et supererogationis, et hoc erit in patria — sed ad hoc solum tenemur, quod ipse nos vult velle. Dicunt autem, quod Deus nos vult velle solum quod praecipit, et nolle quod prohibet. Haec enim sunt signa, per quae sufficienter indicat nobis suam voluntatem, qua vult nos velle aliquid. In aliis volitis, sive innotescant sive non, licet velle contrarium sine peccato. Et per hoc solvunt ad utramque partem. Unde dicunt, quod licet nobis aliqua velle proprie, quia non decet velle opposita, ut est de destructione gentis nostrae, et de calamitatibus iustorum, et consimilium. Etiam si Deus pluat vel disponat pluere, oppositum possum petere et velle.

Sed haec licet sit facilior, tamen quia Augustinus[^11] dicit, quod impius est, cui non placet divina providentia, non tantum videtur, quod homo teneatur velle Dei mandata, sed etiam, quod teneatur velle Dei opera. Et iterum, quomodo non recalcitrat voluntas nostra voluntati divinae, quando Deus vult aliquid, et nos omnino volumus contrarium? Omnino videtur ei repugnare. Et iterum, Glossa praedicta videtur dicere, quod homo, qui non vult quod Deus vult, habet cor pravum; non dicit, quod Deus vult ipsum velle, vel quod Deus praecipit.

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Propterea aliter dicendum, quod revera non tenemur velle omne quod Deus vult, sed solum quod vult et innotescit, nec adhuc illud omne. Ideo notandum, quod aliquid ostendit se Deus velle absolute et quantum in se est, ut bona, quae facit. Et haec tenemur velle simpliciter et absoluta voluntate quantum in nobis est.

Aliquid ostendit se velle voluntate absoluta, sed oppositum velle, quantum in se est, ut mala, quae infligit. Et haec tenemur velle voluntate absoluta et deliberativa: tamen oppositum possumus velle voluntate pietatis, ut dicit Hugo[^12]. Unde sicut Deus non delectatur in nostris poenis, sed magis dicit: *Heu, heu, consolabor super hostibus meis*, *Isaiae* primo[^13]; sic et nos. Unde Hugo distinguit in nobis triplicem voluntatem, scilicet rationis, pietatis et carnis, et in Christo quadruplicem, extendens nomen voluntatis. Unde dicit in libro *de Voluntatibus Christi*, loquens de Christo: « Voluntas Deitatis per iustitiam sententiam dictabat; voluntas rationis per obedientiam veritatem approbabat; voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo[^14] suspirabat; voluntas carnis per passionem in malo proprio murmurabat ». Et ideo voluntate rationis debemus etiam velle malum poenae, quod scimus Deum velle; sed voluntate pietatis possumus conditionaliter, sive quantum est in nobis, si Deo placet, non velle. Nam et ipse Deus, quantum in se est, non vult, sicut praedictum est.

Aliquid ostendit Deus se velle, quantum in se est, circa quod consistit substantialiter ordo salutis, ut sunt ea quae praecipit fieri, et praecipit non fieri; et haec tenemur velle[^15].

Aliquid ostendit Deus se velle, quantum in se est, circa quod consistit expeditio salutis, ut sunt ea quae consulit. Et ad talia non obligat nec vult obligare: vult enim aliquos salvare sic, aliquos latiori via ire.

Ex his igitur patet, quod tenemur generaliter velle conformare voluntatem nostram[^16], non in omni volito, sed in omni eo quod innotescit tribus modis praedictis, alioquin frangeretur amicitia; et de tali volito currunt rationes et auctoritates. Ideo enim praecepto tenemur nos conformare, quia vult, nos velle quod praecipit; et hoc scimus. Et praelato meo teneor conformari in hoc, quod expresse scio ipsum velle me velle; sed in praelato nescio nisi per mandatum, sed in Deo scio per alia signa, sicut praedictum est.

**Ad argumenta pro parte contraria:**

*Ad 4.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in nullo potest discordare intellectus, quin sit falsus etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile de bono et vero. Nam verum dicitur absolute, bonum vero in relatione ad finem. Et quia duo opposita non sunt simul, ideo non possunt intellectus discordantes esse veri. Sed bonum dicitur in relatione ad finem. Et quoniam opposita volita possunt ad eundem finem ordinari, ideo simul possunt esse bona, et affectus respectu eorum esse recti. Ideo non necesse est in omni volito conformari, quia oppositum possumus sancte velle, quia ordinate in finem; sed oppositum eius, quod Deus vult nos velle, non possumus ordinare in finem, quia Deus non acceptat illud.

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Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non tenemur ad omne volitum; dicendum, quod verum est, quia nec ad volitum, quia volitum, nec quia scitum, sed quia scitum esse volitum a Deo[^17], ita quod nos velimus illud. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod tenemur, quia absolute volitum, sed excusamur per ignorantiam, maxime ubi adhibetur debita diligentia, sicut aliquis obligatur, ne cognoscat non suam. Unde de obligatione inducente culpam falsum est quod dicit, quod scientia non inducit novam obligationem. Sicut enim ignorantia facti excusat a toto, ita scientia per oppositum cum divina voluntate[^18] facit aliquem esse obligatum, ut nullo modo possit in contrarium sine culpa. Et sic in proposito; et sic patet illud.

*Ad 4 [de Christo et Beata Virgine].* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Christo et Beata Virgine et aliis compatientibus, dicendum, sicut dictum est, quod voluntate absoluta volebant quod Deus volebat; tamen voluntate conditionata sive voluntate pietatis debebant velle contrarium; et hac voluntate merebantur, quoniam haec[^19] non est naturae tantum, sed etiam rationis.

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### Article II. *On the conformity of our will to the divine.*
### Question II. *Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed.*

Secondly it is asked, whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed. And that we are, it seems.

**Arguments for the affirmative:**

1. *Matthew* twelve[^1]: *He who is not with me is against me*: therefore if he does not consent with God in the thing willed, he is against God: therefore if we are bound not to be contrary to God, we are bound to will what God wills.

2. Likewise, on that text of the *Psalm*[^2]: *A perverse heart hath not cleaved to me*, the Gloss: « A perverse and distorted heart he has who does not will what God wills »; but we are bound to avoid perversity of heart: therefore we are bound to will what God wills.

3. Likewise, Tully[^3], defining friendship, says that friendship is to will the same thing and to be unwilling of the same thing in honorable matters; but we are bound to keep friendship with God: therefore also to will the same in honorable matters. But God wills only what is just and honorable: therefore we ought to conform our will to his in all things.

4. Likewise, every intellect which disagrees with the first truth or cognition[^4] is false: therefore every affection is wicked which does not agree with the divine will in the thing willed: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, we are bound to will what God commands, then either because he commands, or because he wills. Not because he commands, since those who had been cleansed, to whom the commandment was given by the Lord to keep silent[^5], did not sin by revealing it, because by divine inspiration they recognized that God did not will what he was commanding: therefore we are bound to the precept because we are bound to the will: therefore we are bound to will what God wills.

6. Likewise, we are bound to believe not only what God commands us to believe, but also everything which he says to be true: therefore by a similar reasoning we are bound to will not only what God commands us to will, but[^6] everything which God indicates that he himself wills as good: therefore we are bound to will everything which we know God to will.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^7]: Sometimes a man with a good will wills what God does not will.

2. Likewise, holy men frequently will opposite things, as the Apostle willed to be bound at Jerusalem, and the disciples were unwilling, *Acts* twenty-one[^8]; but it is plain that God willed something of these things: therefore it is permitted meritoriously to will the contrary to the divine will: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if we are bound to conform in the thing willed; then, since in indifferent matters the divine will is not determined for us, whoever wills some indifferent thing in a determinate way commits himself to risk: therefore he sins mortally, which is absurd. If you say he is bound when he knows the Lord's will; on the contrary: knowledge does not introduce a new sin or obligation, but only aggravates the sin: therefore by reason of knowledge no one is bound, just as neither is one ignorant.

4. Likewise, Jeremiah grieved over the destruction of Jerusalem, in *Lamentations*; Christ wept over Jerusalem, *Luke* nineteen[^9]; the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles over the passion of Christ. If they wept and grieved, and grief is over things which befall us against our will, therefore they were unwilling. And it is plain that all these merited, and they knew that God willed the contrary: therefore licitly and meritoriously can we will the contrary to the divine will, even where it is known.

5. Likewise, however much my superior may will something, I am not bound to will it unless he commands me, even though I know that he wills it: therefore by parity of reasoning, however much God may will something, I am not bound to will it, however much it may become known to me, unless God commands me.

6. Likewise, what God counsels[^10] he wills, and we know that he wills it, yet we are not bound to will it, although it may please him much, even more than what is commanded: therefore we are not bound to will everything which we know God to will.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Our will is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in every thing willed, but only in everything which becomes known to us that God wills by absolute will, or in that in which the order of salvation substantially consists.

**Respondeo:** To this some say that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will in everything which God wills — but this belongs to perfection and supererogation, and this will be in the fatherland — but we are bound only to this, that he himself wills us to will. They say, however, that God wills us to will only what he commands, and to be unwilling of what he forbids. For these are the signs through which he sufficiently indicates to us his will, by which he wills us to will something. In other things willed, whether they become known or not, it is permitted to will the contrary without sin. And by this they solve [the arguments] on either side. Whence they say that it is permitted to us to will some things properly, because it is not fitting to will opposites, as in the matter of the destruction of our nation, and the calamities of the just, and the like. Even if God rains or disposes that it rain, I can ask and will the opposite.

But although this [opinion] is easier, nevertheless, because Augustine[^11] says that he is impious to whom divine providence is not pleasing, it seems not only that man is bound to will God's commandments, but also that he is bound to will God's works. And again, how does our will not kick against the divine will, when God wills something, and we will altogether the contrary? It seems wholly to oppose him. And again, the aforesaid Gloss seems to say that a man who does not will what God wills has a perverse heart; it does not say that God wills him to will it, or that God commands it.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that in truth we are not bound to will everything which God wills, but only what he wills and which becomes known, and not even all of that. Hence it should be noted that God shows himself to will something absolutely and as far as it lies in him, as the goods which he does. And these we are bound to will simply and with absolute will, as far as it lies in us.

Some thing he shows himself to will by absolute will, but the opposite, as far as it lies in him, as the evils which he inflicts. And these we are bound to will with absolute and deliberative will: yet the opposite we may will with the will of piety, as Hugh says[^12]. Whence just as God is not delighted in our punishments, but rather says: *Alas, alas, I will console myself over my enemies*, *Isaiah* one[^13]; so also we. Whence Hugh distinguishes in us a threefold will, namely of reason, of piety, and of the flesh, and in Christ a fourfold, extending the name of will. Whence he says in the book *On the Wills of Christ*, speaking of Christ: « The will of the Deity by justice dictated the sentence; the will of reason by obedience approved the truth; the will of piety by compassion in evil[^14] sighed; the will of the flesh through suffering in its own evil murmured ». And therefore by the will of reason we ought also to will the evil of punishment, which we know God to will; but by the will of piety we can conditionally, that is, as far as it lies in us, if it please God, not will it. For even God himself, as far as it lies in him, does not will it, as has been said.

Something God shows himself to will, as far as it lies in him, around which the order of salvation substantially consists, as are those things which he commands to be done, and which he commands not to be done; and these we are bound to will[^15].

Something God shows himself to will, as far as it lies in him, around which the expediting of salvation consists, as are those things which he counsels. And to such he does not bind nor will he bind: for he wills to save some thus, and others to go by a broader way.

From these things, then, it is plain that we are bound generally to conform our will[^16], not in every thing willed, but in everything which becomes known in the three ways aforesaid, otherwise friendship would be broken; and concerning such a thing willed the reasons and authorities run. For this is why by the precept we are bound to conform ourselves, because he wills us to will what he commands; and this we know. And to my superior I am bound to be conformed in this, that I expressly know him to will me to will; but in a superior I do not know except through a command, but in God I know through other signs, as has been said.

**To the arguments on the contrary side:**

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that in nothing can the intellect disagree without being false, etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar concerning the good and the true. For the true is said absolutely, but the good in relation to an end. And because two opposites are not together, therefore disagreeing intellects cannot be true. But the good is said in relation to an end. And since opposite things willed can be ordered to the same end, therefore they can simultaneously be good, and the affections in their regard can be right. Therefore it is not necessary to be conformed in every thing willed, because we can will the opposite in a holy manner, since it is ordered to the end; but the opposite of that which God wills us to will, we cannot order to the end, because God does not accept it.

To that which is objected on the contrary, that we are not bound to every thing willed; it must be said that this is true, because [we are bound] not to the thing willed because it is willed, nor because it is known, but because it is known to be willed by God[^17], such that we will it. — Yet otherwise it can be said, that we are bound, because [it is] absolutely willed, but we are excused through ignorance, especially where due diligence is employed, just as someone is bound not to be ignorant of what is his own [duty]. Whence concerning the obligation inducing fault, what he says is false, that knowledge does not induce a new obligation. For just as ignorance of fact excuses from the whole, so knowledge of opposition to the divine will[^18] makes someone to be bound, such that in no way can he go to the contrary without fault. And so in our case; and so that is plain.

*To 4 [on Christ and the Blessed Virgin].* To that which is objected concerning Christ and the Blessed Virgin and the others compassionating, it must be said, as has been said, that by absolute will they willed what God willed; yet by conditional will or by the will of piety they ought to will the contrary; and by this will they merited, since this[^19] [will] is not only of nature, but also of reason.

la: *Vers.* 30. — Mox pro *ergo si non* ed. 1 *ergo qui non*.

en: *Verse* 30. — Then for *ergo si non*, ed. 1 [reads] *ergo qui non*.

la: *Psalm.* 100, 3 et 4. — Glossa apud Lyranum: *Cor pravum, tortum. Quod habet qui non vult omnia quae Deus vult.*

en: *Psalm* 100:3 and 4. — The Gloss in Lyra: *A perverse, twisted heart. Which he has who does not will all the things which God wills.*

la: *Libr. de Amicitia*, c. 6, sic ait: « Est autem amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate summa consensio »; deinde in seqq.; expositis verae amicitiae finibus ac legibus, quarum prima haec est: « *ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus* », c. 16. auctor sic concludit: « His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas ». Ita Tullius Cicero, cum cuius expositione de amicitia definitio a S. Doctore hic ut Tulliana proposita certe convenit, si sensum spectas. At quoad verba magis congruere videtur cum illa C. Sallustii definitione, qui in libro, cui titulus est *Catilina*, c. 20. amicitiam sic definit: « Nam idem velle atque nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est ». — Paulo inferius Vat., refragantibus codd. nec non ed. 1, post *ergo et idem velle* repetit *ergo idem velle*.

en: *On Friendship*, c. 6, thus says: « Friendship is nothing else than the greatest accord of all divine and human matters together with goodwill and charity »; then in what follows, after the ends and laws of true friendship are set forth, of which the first is this: « *that we ask honorable things from our friends, that we do honorable things for our friends' sake* », c. 16, the author thus concludes: « With these ends, therefore, I think we should make use, so that, when the morals of friends are amended, there should then be among them, in all things, counsels, wills, without any exception, a community ». Thus Tullius Cicero, with whose exposition on friendship the definition proposed by the Holy Doctor here as Tullian certainly agrees, if you regard the sense. But as to the words, it seems to agree more with that definition of C. Sallust, who in the book whose title is *Catilina*, c. 20, defines friendship thus: « For to will the same things and to be unwilling of the same things, that at last is a firm friendship ». — A little further down, the Vatican edition, the codd. and ed. 1 dissenting, after *ergo et idem velle* repeats *ergo idem velle*.

la: Vat. *in cognito*, cod. cc *sive cognitione in cognito*. Cfr. de hoc argumento supra pag. 853, nota I.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *in cognito*, cod. cc *sive cognitione in cognito*. Cf. on this argument above p. 853, note I.

la: *Marc.* I, 44. — Vat. cum cod. cc in hoc argumento ter *praecepit* pro *praecipit*, et circa finem argumenti omittit *ad praeceptum, quia tenemur ad voluntatem: ergo tenemur*.

en: *Mark* 1:44. — The Vatican edition with cod. cc in this argument has three times *praecepit* for *praecipit*, and around the end of the argument omits *ad praeceptum, quia tenemur ad voluntatem: ergo tenemur*.

la: Cod. H subiicit *etiam*; deinde Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *Deus*.

en: Cod. H adds *etiam*; then the Vatican edition with cod. cc omits *Deus*.

la: Cap. 101, n. 26. Vide hic *lit. Magistri*, c. I.

en: Ch. 101, n. 26. See here the *Lombard's text*, c. I.

la: *Vers.* 12-14. — Mox pro *volebat* plures codd. V G H S T V ee fr *nolebat*.

en: *Verses* 12-14. — Then for *volebat* several codices V G H S T V ee fr [read] *nolebat*.

la: *Vers.* 41. — Definitio doloris, quae mox proponitur, insinuatur ab August., XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 15, n. 2, his verbis: « *Sed dolor carnis tantummodo offensio est animae ex carne, et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio; sicut animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt* ». Insinuatur etiam a Nemesio (episcopo Emesino, saec. IV.) in libro *de Natura hominis*, c. 17, his verbis: « *Nam cupiditas, dum quod vult assequitur, voluptatem efficit; contra, dum non assequitur, dolorem* ». — Codd. T V Z, omissa post *Christi* particula *Si*, verba *flebant et dolebant* coniungunt cum praecedentibus. In fine argumenti pro *divinae voluntati* codd. A T Z cc et ed. 1 *divinae voluntatis*.

en: *Verse* 41. — The definition of grief which is proposed shortly is implied by Augustine, XIV *On the City of God*, c. 15, n. 2, in these words: « *But the grief of the flesh is only an offense of the soul from the flesh, and a certain dissension from its passion; just as the grief of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissension from those things which have happened to us against our will* ». It is implied also by Nemesius (bishop of Emesa, 4th century) in the book *On the Nature of Man*, c. 17, in these words: « *For desire, when it attains what it wills, produces pleasure; on the contrary, when it does not attain, [produces] grief* ». — Codd. T V Z, omitting after *Christi* the particle *Si*, connect the words *flebant et dolebant* with what precedes. At the end of the argument, for *divinae voluntati*, codd. A T Z cc and ed. 1 [read] *divinae voluntatis*.

la: Vat. *consuluit*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *consuluit*.

la: *Enarrat.* 2 *in Psalm.* 31, II. sub n. 23, et I. *de Ordine*, c. 1, n. 1. — Paulo ante pro *possum* cod. A *possumus*.

en: *Enarration* 2 *on Psalm* 31, II, under n. 23, and I *On Order*, c. 1, n. 1. — A little before, for *possum*, cod. A [reads] *possumus*.

la: *Libr. de Quatuor Voluntatibus in Christo*: « *Idcirco voluntas pietatis voluntas humanitatis vocatur, quia hominis est pietate [compassione] moveri... In hac autem vita, ubi eiusdem divinae iustitiae sententiam perfecte nec scire nec praescire possumus, quaedam etiam, quae secundum ipsam iusta non sunt, sine iniustitia velle possumus, quia hoc solum ad nos pertinet, ut ubi nescimus, quid potius Deo placeat, hoc potissimum eligamus, quod pietati concordat* ».

en: *Book On the Four Wills in Christ*: « *Therefore the will of piety is called the will of humanity, because it is human to be moved by piety [compassion]... But in this life, where we can neither perfectly know nor foreknow the sentence of the same divine justice, we can without injustice will certain things which according to that [justice] are not just, because this alone pertains to us, that where we do not know what is most pleasing to God, we choose most especially that which agrees with piety* ».

la: *Vers.* 24. — De differentia voluntatis in nobis et in Christo, ex Hugone mox allata, in principio libri eiusdem auctoris *de Quatuor Voluntatibus in Christo* hoc legitur: « *Humana autem voluntas tripliciter consideratur: secundum rationem, secundum pietatem, secundum carnem. Ergo in Christo voluntas fuit Divinitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis. Voluntas Divinitatis per iustitiam sententiam dictabat... Voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo alieno suspirabat* » etc.

en: *Verse* 24. — On the difference of the will in us and in Christ, drawn shortly from Hugh, at the beginning of the book of the same author *On the Four Wills in Christ*, this is read: « *The human will, moreover, is considered in three ways: according to reason, according to piety, according to the flesh. Therefore in Christ there was the will of Divinity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh. The will of Divinity by justice dictated the sentence... The will of piety by compassion in another's evil sighed* » etc.

la: Supple: *alieno*, ut legitur in textu originali.

en: Supply: *alieno* [another's], as is read in the original text.

la: Cod. T *plueret*. Codd. V X, paulo ante ad verba *non fieri*, adiectis verbis *vel prohibet fieri*, addunt *illud nolle*. Vat. ante *praecepit non fieri* repetit *quae*.

en: Cod. T [reads] *plueret*. Codd. V X, a little before at the words *non fieri*, having added the words *vel prohibet fieri*, add *illud nolle*. The Vatican edition before *praecepit non fieri* repeats *quae*.

la: Supple cum cod. K *voluntati divinae*. Paulo ante codd. T X omittunt *velle*; Vat. post *velle* inserit *et*, ac paulo inferius post *tribus* addit *primis*.

en: Supply with cod. K *voluntati divinae* [to the divine will]. A little before, codd. T X omit *velle*; the Vatican edition after *velle* inserts *et*, and a little further down after *tribus* adds *primis*.

la: In codd. et ed. 1 deest *nos* ante *conformare*, quod certe cum Vat. supplendum est, aut substituendum *conformari* pro *conformare*. Fortasse in textu originali legebatur *conformari* (sine *nos*), quae passiva forma verbi incuria librariorum transmutata est in activam, scil. *conformare*. Proxime ante vocabulo *praecepto* Vat. adiicit *divino*.

en: In the codices and ed. 1, *nos* is lacking before *conformare*, which certainly must be supplied with the Vatican edition, or *conformari* must be substituted for *conformare*. Perhaps in the original text it read *conformari* (without *nos*), which passive form of the verb, through the carelessness of scribes, was changed into the active, namely *conformare*. Immediately before the word *praecepto*, the Vatican edition adds *divino*.

la: Vel aliis verbis: *sed quia scimus, aliquid esse volitum a Deo*. — Pro *esse volitum* cod. T *est volitum*.

en: Or, in other words: *but because we know something to be willed by God*. — For *esse volitum*, cod. T [reads] *est volitum*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, post *per oppositum* facto commate, pro *voluntate* exhibet *voluntas*. Mox pro *Et sic in proposito* cod. V cum ed. 1 *Et sic est in proposito*. Vat. *hoc*, quae et dein cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post *rationis* hanc addit propositionem: « *Praecipue autem hac voluntate merebatur in Christi filii passione beatissima Mater et virgo Maria, cui patienti, quantum sexus muliebris fragilitas sustinere poterat, compatiebatur* », quibus verbis tunc adnectit illa, quae infra circa finem ultimi dubii habentur: « *Nullo tamen modo est dubitandum etc.* »

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc, after *per oppositum* with a comma made, for *voluntate* exhibits *voluntas*. Then for *Et sic in proposito*, cod. V with ed. 1 [reads] *Et sic est in proposito*. The Vatican [reads] *hoc*, which and then with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 after *rationis* adds this proposition: « *Especially, however, by this will the most blessed Mother and virgin Mary merited in the passion of Christ her Son, with whom suffering, as far as the fragility of the female sex could bear it, she compassionated* », to which words there is then attached that which is found below near the end of the last *dubium*: « *In no way, however, must it be doubted* etc. ».

latin_scholion:
**I.** Praeter duas sententias in responsione positas Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 41. m. 5.) aliam commemorat his verbis: « Alii dixerunt, quod est voluntas vel appetitus rationalis et sensualitatis; voluntate ergo rationis tenemur velle, quod scimus Deum velle, non voluntate sensualitatis. Beata ergo Virgo et Apostoli passionem Christi voluerunt voluntate rationis, non sensualitatis, sed doluerunt de ea ». Eandem opinionem refert Richardus a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.), his verbis, quod « voluntate deliberativa tenemur velle absolute, et omnibus pensatis, quidquid scimus Deum velle voluntate absoluta, omnibus pensatis, dum tamen nobis congruat illud velle ». Haec tamen sententia non approbatur a Richardo; et quid veri illa sententia habeat a S. Bonaventura explicatur hic ad ult. et praecipue in dub. I.

In iisdem locis Seraphicus piissime loquitur de voluntate B. V. Mariae in passione Domini Iesu Christi; ipse cum communi sententia asserit, quod compatiendo meruerit. Hoc dictum est contra Antissiodorensem, qui hoc saltem quoad Apostolos explicite negavit, secundum verba eius a Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) relata, quia scil. « voluntas illa sensualitatis erat nec meritoria ».

**II.** *Authors:* Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 41. m. 4. § 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. § 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2, q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Besides the two opinions set forth in the response, Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 41, m. 5) records another in these words: « Others said that there is a will or appetite of the rational and of sensuality; therefore by the will of reason we are bound to will what we know God to will, not by the will of sensuality. Therefore the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles willed the passion of Christ by the will of reason, not of sensuality, but grieved over it ». The same opinion Richard of Mediavilla reports (here a. 2, q. 1) in these words, that « by deliberative will we are bound to will absolutely, and all things considered, whatever we know God to will by absolute will, all things considered, provided that to will it befits us ». This opinion, however, is not approved by Richard; and what truth that opinion has is explained by St. Bonaventure here at the end and especially in *dub.* I.

In the same places the Seraphic Doctor most piously speaks of the will of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ; he with the common opinion asserts that by compassionating she merited. This is said against the Antissiodorensis [William of Auxerre], who at least as to the Apostles explicitly denied this, according to his words as related by Dionys. Carth. (here q. 2), namely because « that will of sensuality was not meritorious ».

**II.** *Authors:* Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 41, m. 4, § 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *Summa* I-II, q. 19, a. 10. — B. Albert, here a. 2, §§ 6, 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 *princ.*, q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 48, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the letter of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially across the apparatus block covering printed pages 860–861, which is the closing matter of Liber I.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: *Multum interest, quid velle Deo, quid homini congruat*. Ergo ex hoc[^1] videtur, quod aliquid licite possit homo velle sciendo, quod Deus velit contrarium. Ponatur ergo per impossibile, quod alicui reveletur sua damnatio; constans est, quod Deus vult istum damnari voluntate absoluta. Aut ergo iste tenetur velle, aut non; vel — quidquid sit de tentione — quid est perfectius velle, utrum velle damnari, vel non? Si vult damnari: ergo vult a Deo separari; hoc[^2] voluntas recta nunquam potest appetere. Si non vult damnari: ergo perfecte se non conformat: ergo perfectior est voluntas opposita.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud est impossibile, quod alicui reveletur sua damnatio; et impossibili posito, non est mirum, si sequatur impossibile[^3]. — Tamen, si tu quaeras, quid est perfectius? respondeo, quod in aeterna damnatione sunt duo, scilicet poenae inflictio et aeterna a Deo separatio. Separationem aeternam a Deo nullo modo credo quod aliqua anima recte debeat velle, immo semper velle contrarium; sed poenam velle, si revelatum est sibi, debet. Et hoc patet, quia quilibet iustus de se et de alio debet velle, quod omnis peccans finaliter aeternaliter puniatur: ergo si ponitur praeexistens[^4] cognitio certitudinaliter circa se[^5], credo, quod quamdiu durat ei bona voluntas, quod hoc volet.

Si autem quaeras de eo, qui peccat, utrum velle debeat gratiam sibi subtrahi; quia[^6] videtur quod sic, cum Deus velit, et ipse sciat hoc esse iustum; dicendum ad hoc, quod gratiam subtrahi alicui sub triplici conditione potest respici, aut simpliciter, aut ad tempus. Et ad tempus adhuc dupliciter: vel in se, vel prout habet rationem poenae. Hoc modo[^7] vult Deus subtrahere, et hoc modo debet peccans velle, ut eum Deus puniat. — Unde regula generalis est, quod in omnibus, quae scimus Deum velle absolute, tenemur voluntate absoluta velle; tamen licet nobis velle contrarium voluntate conditionata, sive quantum in nobis est, quia hoc decet nos; et propter hoc dicit Augustinus[^8]: *Multum interest* etc.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *actio Iudaeorum fuit mala*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia actio Iudaeorum fuit causa passionis; sed si causa immediata mala, et effectus: ergo si actio fuit mala, et passio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod istud est verum de actione et passione in eodem genere bonitatis, secundum quod unum est causa alterius. Dicendum ergo, quod actio Iudaeorum fuit causa passionis in genere naturae, et in illo genere, sicut actio fuit mala, ita et passio; sed non fuit causa in eodem genere moris, immo Christi bona intentio[^9], quae passionem voluntariam dirigebat in bonum finem; econtra in actione Iudaeorum non habente rectum

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finem; et ideo in genere moris actio fuit mala et Deo displicens, et passio bona et Deo placens. Et sic patet totum[^10].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *voluit Christum pati et mori* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia occidere Christum erat malum facere: ergo Christum occidi, fuit malum fieri: si ergo Deus voluit Christum pati, Deus voluit malum fieri; quod supra[^11] negatum est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod occidere Christum fuit malum per comparationem ad subiectum. Quando ergo accipitur passio, aut[^12] simpliciter accipitur in comparatione ad patientem sive ad sustinentem poenam, et sic simpliciter est bonum; aut in comparatione ad inferentem, et sic ex illo respectu iudicatur malum, quia malitia moris potius intentionem respicit quam actum. Et primo modo est sensus: *Christum pati a Iudaeis est bonum*, id est Christum sustinere poenam, quam Iudaei intulerunt, est bonum. Secundo modo est sensus: *Christum pati a Iudaeis est bonum*, id est passionem inferri Christo a Iudaeis est bonum; et sic falsum, quia illatio passionis non fuit nisi mala, sed sufferentia non fuit nisi bona; et sic distinguit Magister[^13].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Hoc bonum tantum fuit, ut Apostolus Petrus, qui id fieri nolebat, ab ipso qui occisus est, satan diceretur*. Secundum hoc videtur, quod quicumque dolet et tristatur circa passionem Christi, est redarguendus: ergo peccavit beatissima Virgo, dum doluit, secundum quod dicitur Lucae secundo[^14]: *Tuam ipsius animam pertransibit gladius*. Peccaverunt similiter Apostoli. Falsum etiam dicit Apostolus secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^15]: *Si compatimur, et conregnabimus*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *dolere de aliquo* est dupliciter[^16]: aut ita quod dolens voluntate rationis absoluta velit contrarium eius, de quo dolet; et sic nulli licuit dolere de passione Christi, et Petrus, quia voluntate rationis contrarium volebat, est redargutus[^17]. Alio modo *dolere de aliquo* est ferri ad contrarium voluntate pietatis, tamen nihilominus *hoc*[^18] velle voluntate absoluta; sic bonum est condolere Christo et pie affici circa eum, et sic afficiuntur viri sancti, qui magnas gratias agunt Deo de passione Christi; sed tamen moventur pie in consideratione dolorum. Sic etiam piissima anima beatae Virginis dilectissimo Filio suo patienti, quantum sustinere poterat, compatiebatur[^19]. Nullo tamen modo est dubitandum, quin virilis eius animus et ratio constantissima vellet etiam Unigenitum tradere[^20] pro salute generis humani, ut Mater per omnia conformis esset Patri. Et in hoc miro modo debet laudari et amari, quod placuit ei, ut Unigenitus suus pro salute generis humani offerretur. Et tantum etiam compassa est, ut, si fieri posset, omnia tormenta quae Filius pertulit, ipsa multo libentius sustineret[^21]. Vere igitur fuit fortis et pia, dulcis pariter et severa, sibi parca, sed nobis largissima. Haec ergo praecipue est amanda et veneranda post Trinitatem summam et eius prolem beatissimam, Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, a cuius divinitatis mysterio enarrando ceterae linguae deficiunt, quia *consummatio sermonum ipse est*. *Ei igitur, qui potest omnia facere superabundanter, quam petimus aut intelligimus, secundum virtutem, quae operatur in nobis, ipsi gloria in Ecclesia et in Christo Iesu in omnes generationes saeculi saeculorum. Amen*[^22].

EXPLICIT LIBER PRIMUS.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first concerning that which Augustine says: *There is a great difference between what it befits God to will and what befits a man to will*. Therefore from this[^1] it seems that a man may licitly will something knowing that God wills the contrary. Suppose then per impossibile that to someone his own damnation be revealed; it is established that God wills him to be damned with an absolute will. Either, therefore, that man is bound to will [it], or not; or — whatever may be said about being held [to it] — what is more perfect to will: to will to be damned, or not? If he wills to be damned: therefore he wills to be separated from God; this[^2] an upright will can never desire. If he does not will to be damned: therefore he does not perfectly conform himself: therefore the opposite will is more perfect.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is impossible — that to someone his own damnation be revealed; and when an impossible thing is supposed, it is no wonder if an impossible thing follows[^3]. — Nevertheless, if you ask, what is more perfect? I reply that in eternal damnation there are two things, namely the infliction of punishment and eternal separation from God. As for eternal separation from God, in no way do I believe that any soul ought rightly to will it; indeed it should always will the contrary. But to will the punishment, if it has been revealed to it, it ought. And this is clear, because every just person ought to will, both concerning himself and concerning another, that every sinner finally and eternally be punished: therefore if there is supposed a pre-existing[^4] certain cognition concerning himself[^5], I believe that, as long as a good will endures in him, he will will this.

But if you ask concerning him who sins, whether he ought to will that grace be withdrawn from him; for[^6] it seems that yes, since God wills it, and he himself knows this to be just: it must be said to this that grace's being withdrawn from someone can be regarded under a threefold condition, either absolutely, or for a time. And for a time still in a twofold way: either in itself, or as it has the character of a penalty. In this way[^7] God wills to withdraw [it], and in this way the sinner ought to will that God punish him. — Hence the general rule is that in all things which we know God wills absolutely, we are bound to will [them] with an absolute will; nevertheless it is permitted to us to will the contrary with a conditioned will, that is, so far as in us lies, because this befits us; and on account of this Augustine says[^8]: *There is a great difference* etc.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *the action of the Jews was evil*. For this seems false to say, because the action of the Jews was the cause of the passion; but if the immediate cause is evil, [so also is] the effect: therefore if the action was evil, [so too] the passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true of action and passion in the same genus of goodness, according as the one is the cause of the other. It must therefore be said that the action of the Jews was the cause of the passion in the genus of nature, and in that genus, as the action was evil, so also the passion; but it was not the cause in the same genus of morality, but rather Christ's good intention[^9], which was directing the voluntary passion to a good end; whereas, on the contrary, in the action of the Jews, which had no right

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end; and therefore in the genus of morality the action was evil and displeasing to God, and the passion good and pleasing to God. And so the whole is plain[^10].

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he willed Christ to suffer and die* etc. For this seems ill said, because to kill Christ was to do evil: therefore for Christ to be killed was for an evil to come about: therefore if God willed Christ to suffer, God willed an evil to come about; which has been denied above[^11].

**I respond:** It must be said that to kill Christ was evil by comparison to the subject. When therefore the passion is considered, either[^12] it is considered simply in comparison to the one suffering or to the one undergoing the penalty, and so it is simply good; or in comparison to the one inflicting [it], and from this regard it is judged evil, because the malice of morality regards rather the intention than the act. And in the first mode the sense is: *For Christ to suffer at the hands of the Jews is good*, that is, for Christ to undergo the penalty which the Jews inflicted is good. In the second mode the sense is: *For Christ to suffer at the hands of the Jews is good*, that is, for the passion to be inflicted on Christ by the Jews is good; and so [it is] false, because the inflicting of the passion was nothing but evil, while the enduring [of it] was nothing but good; and so the Master distinguishes[^13].

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *This good was so great that the Apostle Peter, who did not will it to come about, was called Satan by that very One who was killed*. According to this it seems that whoever grieves and is saddened concerning the passion of Christ is to be rebuked: therefore the most blessed Virgin sinned when she grieved, according to what is said in Luke chapter two[^14]: *A sword shall pierce through thy own soul*. Likewise the Apostles sinned. The Apostle too speaks falsely in second Timothy chapter two[^15]: *If we suffer together, we shall also reign together*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to grieve concerning something* is in a twofold way[^16]: either so that the one grieving, by an absolute will of reason, wills the contrary of that of which he grieves; and so it was permitted to no one to grieve concerning the passion of Christ, and Peter, because by a will of reason he was willing the contrary, was rebuked[^17]. In another mode, *to grieve concerning something* is to be carried toward the contrary by a will of piety, while nevertheless willing *this*[^18] by an absolute will; in this way it is good to feel co-suffering with Christ and to be piously affected concerning him, and in this way holy men are affected, who give great thanks to God for the passion of Christ, but nevertheless are piously moved in the consideration of the sufferings. So likewise the most pious soul of the blessed Virgin co-suffered, so far as she could bear it, with her most beloved Son suffering[^19]. Yet in no way must it be doubted that her manly spirit and most steadfast reason willed even to hand over the Only-begotten[^20] for the salvation of the human race, that the Mother might be in all things conformed to the Father. And in this she must be praised and loved in a wondrous way, because it pleased her that her Only-begotten should be offered for the salvation of the human race. And she suffered together [with him] so greatly that, if it could come to pass, she would much more gladly bear all the torments which the Son endured[^21]. Truly therefore she was strong and pious, equally sweet and severe, sparing toward herself but most generous toward us. She therefore is especially to be loved and venerated after the highest Trinity and its most blessed offspring, Jesus Christ our Lord, in declaring the mystery of whose divinity all other tongues fall short, because *he himself is the consummation of discourses*. *To him therefore, who is able to do all things superabundantly beyond what we ask or understand, according to the power that worketh in us, to him be glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus throughout all generations of the world of worlds. Amen*[^22].

HERE ENDS THE FIRST BOOK.

---

la: Pro *quid* Vat. *cuius*. Paulo ante pro *Ergo ex hoc* ed. I *Ex hoc autem*.

en: In place of *quid*, the Vatican has *cuius*. A little before, in place of *Ergo ex hoc*, ed. I has *Ex hoc autem*.

la: Cod. Z *sed hoc*.

en: Cod. Z has *sed hoc*.

la: Aristot., I. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 119 (c. 12.): *Accidit autem impossibile ex impossibili*. — In initio huius solutionis post verba *Respondeo: Dicendum* cod. Z addit haec: *quod duplex est voluntas: approbando, et sic teneretur velle suam damnationem, appetendo autem nequaquam; quia Deus infixit istum appetitum in anima, scilicet beatitudinis, ita quod nullus potest appetere contrarium, quia sic diligeret Deum plus quam se; et hoc non potest absque gratia quae facit semper appetere bonum. Hoc autem est impossibile, quia velle separari a Deo et [est?] ipsum nihil appretiare; unde dicendum, quod illud est impossibile* etc.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 119 (c. 12): *An impossible thing follows from an impossible thing*. — At the beginning of this solution, after the words *Respondeo: Dicendum*, cod. Z adds the following: *that the will is twofold: by approval, and in this way one would be bound to will one's own damnation; but by desire, in no way; because God has fixed this desire in the soul, namely [the desire] for beatitude, so that no one can desire the contrary, since [if he did so] he would thus love God more than himself; and this he cannot do apart from the grace which makes one always desire the good. But this [willing of one's damnation] is impossible, because to will to be separated from God is to esteem him as nothing; whence it must be said that this is impossible* etc.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. I perperam *praeexigens*.

en: Very many codices, with ed. I, wrongly have *praeexigens* ("pre-requiring").

la: Pro *circa se* Vat. cum cod. cc *iuxta se*.

en: In place of *circa se*, the Vatican with cod. cc has *iuxta se* ("alongside himself").

la: Pro *quia* Vat. *et*, quae etiam paulo inferius, post *hoc esse iustum* posito puncto, novam lineam incipiens sic prosequitur: *Respondeo: Dicendum*. — Plurimi codd. cum ed. I incongrue *et dicendum*.

en: In place of *quia*, the Vatican has *et*; and a little below, after *hoc esse iustum*, having placed a period, [the Vatican] begins a new line thus: *Respondeo: Dicendum*. — Very many codices, with ed. I, incongruously have *et dicendum*.

la: Pro *Hoc modo* cod. Z clarius *Tertio modo*; cod. T (in marg.) verba praecedentia repetens sic: *Prout habet rationem poenae, hoc modo*.

en: In place of *Hoc modo*, cod. Z more clearly has *Tertio modo* ("In the third mode"); cod. T (in the margin) repeats the preceding words thus: *Prout habet rationem poenae, hoc modo* ("As it has the character of a penalty, in this mode").

la: *Enchirid.* c. 101. n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 41. m. 5. ad 5; a B. Alberto, hic a. 5. ad ult.; a S. Thoma, hic a. 1. ad 2; a Petro a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2; a Richardo a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.

en: *Enchiridion* c. 101, n. 26. See here the text of the Master, c. 1, at the end. — This doubt is also resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 41, m. 5, ad 5; by Bl. Albert, here a. 5, ad ult.; by St. Thomas, here a. 1, ad 2; by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2; by Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.

la: Intellige: *fuit*. — Subinde e codicibus restituimus *quae*, quam voculam suppressit Vat., non supplendo *fuit*. Pro *quae* cod. ... *quia*. Paulo inferius pro *econtra in actione* fere omnes codd. cum ed. I *econtra actione*; mendose.

en: Understand: *fuit* ("was"). Then from the codices we have restored the little word *quae* ("which"), which the Vatican suppressed, without supplying *fuit*. In place of *quae* a codex has *quia*. A little below, in place of *econtra in actione*, nearly all the codices, with ed. I, have *econtra actione*; faultily.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 hoc dubium ponunt tertio loco. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aegid. R., hic circa lit.

en: The Vatican and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 place this doubt in the third position. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and Giles of Rome, here in their commentary on the letter.

la: Post *accipitur* Vat. et cod. cc subiiciunt *aut*; sed perperam, cum, sicut ex subnexis apparet, in hac propositione non tria, sed duo tantum membra distinguantur.

en: After *accipitur*, the Vatican and cod. cc add *aut*; but wrongly, since, as appears from what follows, in this proposition not three but only two members are to be distinguished.

la: Hoc dubium solvunt etiam Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is also resolved by Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the letter.

la: Vers. 35. — Paulo ante pro *redarguendus* est Vat. *esset redarguendus*, et dein *mater* pro *Virgo*.

en: Verse 35. — A little before, in place of *redarguendus est*, the Vatican has *esset redarguendus*, and then *mater* for *Virgo*.

la: Vers. 12. — In Vulgata hoc textu *sustinebimus* et Vat. pro *compatimur*.

en: Verse 12. — In the Vulgate, in this text [the reading is] *sustinebimus* ("we shall endure"), and the Vatican [has the same] in place of *compatimur*.

la: Matth. 16, 23: *Qui conversus dixit Petro: Vade post me, satana, scandalum es mihi, quia non sapis ea quae Dei sunt, sed ea quae hominum*. — In principio huius propos. pro *est dupliciter* nonnulli codd. ut H I *dicitur dupliciter*.

en: Matthew 16:23: *And turning, he said to Peter: Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art a scandal to me, because thou savorest not the things that are of God, but the things that are of men*. — At the beginning of this proposition, in place of *est dupliciter*, some codices such as H, I have *dicitur dupliciter*.

la: Intellige: *Christum pati*.

en: Understand: *Christ to suffer*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, paulo superius omissa vocula *pie*, ultimam propositionis partem, suffragantibus etiam edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, sic exhibet: *sicut ei benignissima Virgo Maria in Filii sui mota est passione*. Quae sequuntur a Vat. translata sunt in finem q. 2. a. 2, ut iam supra pag. 859, nota 7, diximus.

en: The Vatican with cod. cc, having a little above omitted the little word *pie*, gives the last part of the proposition (with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 also in agreement) thus: *just as the most kindly Virgin Mary was moved [with compassion] in the passion of her Son*. What follows has been transferred by the Vatican to the end of q. 2, a. 2, as we have already said above at p. 859, note 7.

la: Vat. *vellet etiam tradere filium suum*.

en: The Vatican has *vellet etiam tradere filium suum* ("would also will to hand over her Son").

la: Vat. *sustinuisset*, et paulo ante *potuisset* pro *posset*.

en: The Vatican has *sustinuisset* ("would have endured"), and a little before *potuisset* for *posset*.

la: Eccli. 43, 29: *Consummatio autem sermonum ipse est in omnibus*. — Verba sequentia *Ei igitur, qui potest* etc. sunt ex Ephes. 3, 20. 21. Pro *Ei igitur qui potest* in Vulgata legitur *Ei autem, qui potens est*; pro *superabundanter* Vat. *superabundantius*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio supra a. 2. q. 2; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 41. m. 5. ad 1; B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Aegid. R., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1.

en: Ecclesiasticus 43:29 [Vulgate]: *He is the consummation of discourses in all things*. — The words that follow, *Ei igitur, qui potest* etc., are from Ephesians 3:20–21. In place of *Ei igitur qui potest*, the Vulgate reads *Ei autem, qui potens est* ("Now to him who is able"); in place of *superabundanter*, the Vatican has *superabundantius*. — Cf. on this doubt above a. 2, q. 2; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 41, m. 5, ad 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 5; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Giles of Rome, here in their commentary on the letter; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1.

la: Note 12 in the Quaracchi footer consolidates the two scripture references appearing in this concluding paragraph: Eccli. 43, 29 (*Consummatio autem sermonum ipse est in omnibus*) and Ephes. 3, 20–21, source of *Ei igitur, qui potest* etc. Pro *Ei igitur qui potest* in Vulgata legitur *Ei autem, qui potens est*; pro *superabundanter* Vat. *superabundantius*. (Cross-references already given in [^21] are not repeated.)

en: Quaracchi footer note 12 consolidates the two scripture references appearing in this concluding paragraph: Ecclesiasticus 43:29 (*He is the consummation of discourses in all things*) and Ephesians 3:20–21, the source of *Ei igitur, qui potest* etc. In place of *Ei igitur qui potest* the Vulgate reads *Ei autem, qui potens est*; in place of *superabundanter*, the Vatican has *superabundantius*. (Cross-references already given in [^21] are not repeated.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Praelocutio

title_alt: PRAELOCUTIO sancti Bonaventurae prooemio in secundum librum Sententiarum praemissa

title_alt: Praelocutio of Saint Bonaventure, prefixed to the proemium to the second book of the Sentences

source_text:
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### PRAELOCUTIO
#### SANCTI BONAVENTURAE
#### *PROOEMIO IN SECUNDUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM PRAEMISSA*[^p1-1]

Salvatoris opitulante gratia, ex quo perventum est ad completionem primi Sententiarum, Patrum interveniente instantia, oportet inchoare secundum. At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum vestigiis non recedam. Non enim intendo novas opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas retexere. Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator. — Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magistri Sententiarum, maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod, cum Magister primi libri distinctione tertia[^p1-2], in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in *mente, notitia* et *amore,* dicat, *mentem* accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. *Rursus,* cum Magister dicat distinctione septima, quod *potentia generandi* communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse propter relationem. — Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi, in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia, si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae *nosse* et *amare,* sicut videbitur infra[^p1-3], iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. *Iterum,* potentiae proprie non est[^p1-4], sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit: *mens novit* etc., *mens* ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. *Postremo,* cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint animae consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipitur pro *tota,* id est pro anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi.

Similiter nec in alio, scilicet in potentia generandi, discordavi ab ipso. Quod idem Magister distinctione septima innuit, potentiam generandi esse dictam secundum *substantiam,* et quod alii dicunt, esse dictam secundum *relationem* et esse proprium, non est controversia, immo utrumque verum est, si quis attendat. Nam si *divisim* loquimur de potentia generandi, secundum quod significatur per haec duo

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nomina, sic, cum nomen potentiae de se sit essentiale, et nomen virtutis generativae sit personale, dicit essentiam vel naturam ut in persona. Si autem loquimur de eo quod per illa duo vocabula significatur, ita quod concurrant[^p2-1] *in unius vocabuli intellectum,* tunc, cum nihil aliud sit potentia generandi quam fecunditas potentiae, et fecunditas in producendo personam aliquam omnino sit dictum secundum relationem, nec sit commune, sed proprium, sic absque dubio *potentia generandi* vel *posse generare* dicitur secundum relationem. Et sic patet, quod utraque istarum opinionum est vera, nec una repugnat alteri. Sed hanc sententiam magis approbavi, quia plus attingit ad veritatem rei, licet ad *plenam veritatis expressionem utramque oporteat sustinere.* — In his igitur et in aliis verbis Magistri adhaerens, debita servata reverentia[^p2-2]... et proposui et propono iuxta tenuitatem ingenii et paupertatem scientiae in his, in quibus potero, sustinere, his dumtaxat exceptis, in quibus magis communiter non sustinetur, immo communis opinio tenet contrarium. Haec autem sunt octo, ita quod in quolibet libro sunt duae de illis positionibus.

In primo enim libro haec duo dicit Magister quae communiter non tenentur, videlicet quod caritas, quae est amor Dei et proximi, non sit quid creatum, sed increatum, ut Spiritus sanctus. Aliud est, quod haec nomina *trinus, trinitas,* et alia numeralia non ponunt, sed tantum privant[^p2-3].

In his autem duabus positionibus deceptum credimus Magistrum, occasione sumta ex verbis Hilarii et Augustini. Unde utraque istarum fuit improbata.

In secundo libro similiter duae sunt, quarum una est, quod in Angelis beatis praemium praecessit meritum, meritum, inquam, respectu praemii substantialis, quod etsi valde videatur probabile, communiter tamen non tenetur. Altera est, quod nihil de cibo transit in veritatem humanae naturae, sed tota veritas humanae naturae fuit in Adam[^p2-4].

In tertio libro similiter duae inveniuntur opiniones: una est, quod anima soluta a corpore est persona; alia est, quod Christus in triduo fuit homo[^p2-5].

In quarto similiter duae reperiuntur: una de baptismo Ioannis; altera de potestate baptizandi sive dimittendi peccata, quam potuit conferre creaturae[^p2-6].

In his positionibus Magister a communi via recessit, et sicut in suis locis tractabuntur, ad minus probabilem partem declinavit, et ideo non sustinetur communiter a magistris. Et licet fortassis aliquis eum in aliquibus harum opinionum sustineat, verumtamen pater et magister noster bonae memoriae frater Alexander in nulla harum ipsum sustinuit, sed potius contrarium sensit, cuius vestigiis praecipue inhaerere propono.

Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me ab eius[^p2-7] sententia deviasse, cum sermo fuit de generatione aeterna in primo libro, distinctione vigesima septima[^p2-8]. Cum enim scribatur in Summa[^p2-9], quod ideo generat, quia est *pater,* magis visus sum adhaerere illi opinioni, quae dicit, quod Pater ideo generat, quia *Deus innascibilis.* Cum iterum ab eodem scribatur[^p2-10], quod est aliquod *dicere* in divinis, cui non respondet verbum, magis adhaesi[^p2-11] illi opinioni, quae dicit, quod non est *dicere* sine verbo, ac per hoc ab eius recessisse vestigio. — Sed si quis recte intelligat, non discordavi ab ipso nec in primo nec in secundo, quia verum non contrariatur vero.

Verum autem esse arbitror, et quod Pater generat, quia *innascibilis,* et quod generat, quia *Deus pater;* et hoc patet sic. Planum est enim et secundum omnem opinionem verum, quod ideo potentia Patris generat, quia *fecunda* est. Illud ergo recte dicitur esse ratio generandi, quod fecunditatem potentiae Patris importat. Fecunditas autem importatur et nomine *innascibilitatis* et nomine *paternitatis,* sed aliter et aliter. Nam *paternitas* importat fecunditatem quasi *praesupponendo* et praeintelligendo, licet principaliter imponatur ab *habitudine.* Dicitur enim paternitas habitudo Patris ad Filium. *Innascibilitas* autem importat fecunditatem *ex consequenti intellectu:* nam ex primo intellectu importat *privationem habitudinis* ad prius; sed ex illa sola privatione non posset esse proprietas, cum sit consequens essentiam. Et ideo innascibilis non solummodo dicitur Pater, quia ab alio non *accipit esse,* sed quia ab alio non accipit esse, et quia *habet unde alii det esse.*

Qui igitur superficialiter intelligit, attendendo vel aspiciendo, a quo primo nomen imponitur, utrumque negabit dicens, Patrem non ideo generare, quia *pater* est, nec ideo generare, quia *innascibilis* est, quia nec habitudo nec habitudinis privatio est ratio producendi personam. Et quantum ad hoc verum dicet, sed non *plene.* Qui autem *plenarium* intellectum capit utriusque, attendens fecunditatem importari per utrumque nomen, utrumque dicet: et quod generat, quia *Deus innascibilis,* et quod generat, quia *Deus pater.* Verum est enim, quod Pater generat, quia ipse nihil habet ab alio, sed habet unde det alii. Verum est etiam, quod Pater generat, quia fecunditatem habet in producendo sibi per omnia similem per modum naturae.

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Cum ergo dixi, quod Pater ideo est pater, quia generat, et non ideo generat, quia pater, non hoc dixi ratione *fecunditatis,* quam importat hoc nomen *paternitas* in divinis, sed ratione *habitudinis,* a qua verius nomen patris imponitur; et ideo magistro non contradixi, *sed hoc ibi dicere omisi et nunc suppleo,* quod paternitas non tantummodo dicit *habitudinem,* sed etiam *fecunditatem.* Unde licet rationes ibi inductae ostendant, quod non ideo generat, quia pater, et concessae sint, quia *verum* concludebant, secundum quod *pater* imponitur ab *habitudine;* addendum fuit, quod *non* concludunt, secundum quod nomen patris importat *fecunditatem.* Cum autem dixi, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non hoc dixi, in quantum hoc quod est *innascibilis* importat privationem habitudinis; sic enim negat magister; sed hoc dixi, in quantum in nomine *innascibilitatis* clauditur potentia fecunditatis. Et hoc necessarium est ponere ad hoc, quod innascibilitas sit proprietas, sicut ibi multipliciter ostensum fuit. Magis autem adhaesi huic positioni, quod Pater generat, quia *Deus innascibilis,* non quia innascibilitas magis sit *ratio generandi* quam paternitas, vel quod sit adeo propria ratio sicut paternitas, sed quia magis est ibi *status,* ultra quem non contingit quaerere. Si enim quaeratur, *quare* Pater generat, et respondeatur, quia pater est, id est, fecundus fecunditate naturae, adhuc dubitabit et quaeret, quare *illa* potentia magis est fecunda quam *alia*? Et respondebitur: hoc est, quia ipsa a nullo alio habet esse. Ideo enim Pater est totius deitatis principium, quia a nullo, ut dicit Magister[^p3-1]; hac ratione reddita, ibi status est, nec est ultra procedere. Et ideo dixi, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non ut assignarem generationis *propriam rationem,* sed magis propter *inquisitionis terminationem.* Nam in nomine *patris* importatur ratio generationis, ut *propria,* nomine vero *innascibilitatis,* ut *prima;* in uno *antecedenter,* in alio *consequenter;* in uno *communiter,* in altero *specialiter.*

In secundo autem nemo me arbitrabitur discordasse qui sciat distinguere inter propria et transumta. Sicut enim dicens, non esse verum risum sine ore, nec esse verum volatum sine alis, non contradicit ei qui dicit, pratum sine ore ridere, et sagittas sine alis volare; sic qui dicit, nomen loquendi vel dicendi proprie sumtum non esse sine verbo, sicut nec generare sine filio, non contradicit ei qui dicit, loqui vel dicere sic transumi posse et secundum aliquam significationem transumtivam dici de aliquo sine verbo generato.

In his igitur et in omnibus aliis, si quis aspiciat diligenter et pie, inveniet, me a patrum et maiorum vestigiis non fuisse ausum recedere; quoniam iuxta consilium Gregorii[^p3-2] sanius est alieno intellectui cedere quam contentionibus deservire, pro eo quod, sicut dicit documentum Doctoris gentium ad Timotheum[^p3-3]: *Servum Domini non oportet litigare, sed mansuetum esse ad omnes, docibilem, patientem, cum modestia corripientem eos qui renitent veritati.*

His igitur praelibatis, cum invocatione gratiae Dei calamus sumatur. *Exordium:* Solummodo hoc inveni etc.

---

english:
### PRAELOCUTIO
#### OF SAINT BONAVENTURE
#### *PREFIXED TO THE PROEMIUM TO THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES*[^p1-1]

By the help of the Saviour's grace, now that we have come to the completion of the first book of the Sentences, and at the insistence of the Fathers, we must begin the second. But just as in the first book I held to the sentences and to the common opinions of the masters, and most of all of our master and father of good memory, brother Alexander, so in the books that follow I shall not depart from their footsteps. For I do not intend to set new opinions against them, but to weave together the common and approved ones. Nor let anyone suppose that I wish to be the fabricator of a new writing; for this I think and confess, that I am a poor and slender compiler. — Perhaps, however, it will seem to someone that I have turned aside from the positions of the Master of the Sentences, chiefly in two places: in this, namely, that whereas the Master, in the third distinction of the first book[^p1-2], in the second assigning of a trinity, which he says consists in *mind, knowledge* and *love,* says that *mind* is taken not for the soul but for the higher portion, it is found to be said by me that mind there stands for the substance of the soul. *Again,* whereas the Master says, in the seventh distinction, that the *power of generating* is common to the three persons, inasmuch as it is a name signifying the essence, I rather held to that opinion which says that the power of generating is so called on account of relation. — But if anyone look rightly, in neither of the aforesaid will he find that I have turned aside either from the Master's position or from the path of truth. For when I said that in that assigning of a trinity mind is taken for the substance of the soul by reason of its higher part, this was said for this reason: that if mind stood there for the higher portion, since that is a power of the soul, and since *to know* and *to love* do not belong to one power, as will be seen below[^p1-3], there would then be there not a trinity but a quaternity. *Again,* it does not properly belong to a power[^p1-4], but to the substance through a power; and therefore, if Augustine speaks properly and truly when he says *the mind knows* etc., *mind* there supposits for the substance of the soul. And Augustine intimates this again when afterwards, on occasion of this trinity, he shows through almost the whole tenth book *On the Trinity* that the soul knows itself. *Lastly,* since those habits of knowledge and of love are consubstantial with the soul, they do not add a new essence over the power, but by their very selves are fitted to the power, and so they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves or with the higher part of reason. And therefore the Master does not deny that mind is taken for the soul itself, but that it is not taken for the *whole* soul, that is, for the soul according to all its powers, but for the substance itself by reason of the higher portion. In this, therefore, I did not contradict the Master, but rather set forth his word according to the rule of truth, as I judge.

Likewise neither in the other matter, namely in the power of generating, did I disagree with him. That the same Master intimates, in the seventh distinction, that the power of generating is said according to *substance,* and that others say it is said according to *relation* and is a proper [attribute] — there is no controversy here; rather both are true, if one attend. For if we speak *dividedly* of the power of generating, according to what is signified by these two

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names, then, since the name of power is of itself essential and the name of generative virtue is personal, it names the essence or nature as in a person. But if we speak of that which is signified through those two words, so that they run together[^p2-1] *into the understanding of a single word,* then, since the power of generating is nothing other than the fecundity of a power, and fecundity in producing some person is said wholly according to relation, and is not common but proper, so without doubt the *power of generating* or *to be able to generate* is said according to relation. And so it is clear that each of these opinions is true, and that the one is not repugnant to the other. But I rather approved this sentence, because it reaches further to the truth of the thing, although *for the full expression of the truth both must be upheld.* — Cleaving, therefore, to these and to other words of the Master, with due reverence preserved[^p2-2]... I both have proposed and do propose, according to the slenderness of my wit and the poverty of my knowledge, to uphold those things in which I shall be able, these only excepted in which more commonly it is not upheld, but rather the common opinion holds the contrary. And these are eight, so that in each book there are two of those positions.

For in the first book the Master says these two things which are not commonly held, namely, that charity, which is the love of God and of neighbour, is not something created but uncreated, as the Holy Spirit is. The other is that these names *threefold, trinity,* and the other numerals do not posit anything, but only remove[^p2-3].

Now in these two positions we believe the Master to have been deceived, the occasion being taken from the words of Hilary and of Augustine. Whence each of these was disapproved.

In the second book likewise there are two, of which one is that in the blessed Angels reward preceded merit — merit, I say, in respect of the substantial reward — which, although it seem very probable, is nevertheless not commonly held. The other is that nothing of food passes over into the truth of human nature, but the whole truth of human nature was in Adam[^p2-4].

In the third book likewise two opinions are found: one is that the soul separated from the body is a person; the other, that Christ during the three days was a man[^p2-5].

In the fourth likewise two are found: one about the baptism of John; the other about the power of baptizing or of forgiving sins, which he could have conferred upon a creature[^p2-6].

In these positions the Master withdrew from the common way, and, as will be treated in their proper places, turned aside to the less probable part, and therefore he is not commonly upheld by the masters. And although perhaps someone may uphold him in some of these opinions, nevertheless our father and master of good memory brother Alexander upheld him in none of them, but rather held the contrary, in whose footsteps I chiefly propose to walk.

Perhaps, however, it will seem to someone that I deviated from his[^p2-7] sentence when the discourse was about the eternal generation, in the first book, the twenty-seventh distinction[^p2-8]. For since it is written in the *Summa*[^p2-9] that he generates for this reason, that he is *father,* I was rather seen to hold to that opinion which says that the Father generates for this reason, that he is *unbegotten God.* And since again it is written by the same[^p2-10] that there is some *saying* in divine things to which no word answers, I rather held[^p2-11] to that opinion which says that there is no *saying* without a word, and by this to have withdrawn from his footstep. — But if anyone understand rightly, I did not disagree with him either in the first or in the second, because the true is not contrary to the true.

But I judge it to be true both that the Father generates because he is *unbegotten,* and that he generates because he is *God the Father;* and this appears thus. For it is plain, and true according to every opinion, that the power of the Father generates for this reason, that it is *fruitful.* That, therefore, is rightly said to be the ground of generating which imports the fecundity of the Father's power. Now fecundity is imported both by the name of *unbegottenness* and by the name of *paternity,* but otherwise and otherwise. For *paternity* imports fecundity as it were by *presupposing* and pre-understanding it, although it is principally imposed from a *respect.* For paternity is said to be the respect of the Father to the Son. But *unbegottenness* imports fecundity *by a consequent understanding:* for by the first understanding it imports the *privation of a respect* to something prior; but from that privation alone there could not be a property, since it is consequent upon the essence. And therefore the Father is called unbegotten not only because he does not *receive being* from another, but because he does not receive being from another, and because *he has whence he may give being to another.*

He, therefore, who understands superficially, attending or looking to that from which the name is first imposed, will deny both, saying that the Father does not generate because he is *father,* nor generate because he is *unbegotten,* since neither a respect nor the privation of a respect is the ground of producing a person. And as to this he will say what is true, but not *fully.* But he who takes the *full* understanding of both, attending that fecundity is imported through each name, will say both: both that he generates because he is *unbegotten God,* and that he generates because he is *God the Father.* For it is true that the Father generates because he himself has nothing from another, but has whence he may give to another. It is true also that the Father generates because he has fecundity in producing one like to himself in all things by way of nature.

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When, therefore, I said that the Father is father for this reason, that he generates, and does not generate for this reason, that he is father, I did not say this by reason of the *fecundity* which this name *paternity* imports in divine things, but by reason of the *respect,* from which the name of father is more truly imposed; and therefore I did not contradict the master, *but I there omitted to say this and now supply it,* that paternity names not only a *respect,* but also a *fecundity.* Whence, although the reasons there adduced show that he does not generate for this reason, that he is father, and although they were granted because they concluded what was *true* according as *father* is imposed from a *respect,* it ought to have been added that they do *not* conclude according as the name of father imports *fecundity.* But when I said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, I did not say this inasmuch as this which is *unbegotten* imports the privation of a respect — for so the master denies it — but I said this inasmuch as in the name of *unbegottenness* the power of fecundity is enclosed. And this is necessary to posit in order that unbegottenness may be a property, as was there shown in many ways. But I rather held to this position, that the Father generates because he is *unbegotten God,* not because unbegottenness is more the *ground of generating* than paternity is, or because it is as proper a ground as paternity, but because there is there rather a *stopping-place,* beyond which it does not fall to us to inquire. For if it be asked *why* the Father generates, and it be answered, because he is father, that is, fruitful with the fecundity of nature, one will still doubt and ask, why *that* power is more fruitful than *another*? And it will be answered: this is because it has being from no other. For the Father is the principle of the whole deity for this reason, that he is from none, as the Master says[^p3-1]; and this ground being rendered, there is the stopping-place, nor is there any going further. And therefore I said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, not in order to assign the *proper ground* of generation, but rather for the sake of *terminating the inquiry.* For in the name *father* the ground of generation is imported as *proper,* but in the name of *unbegottenness* as *first;* in the one *antecedently,* in the other *consequently;* in the one *commonly,* in the other *specially.*

But in the second matter no one will judge that I disagreed, who knows how to distinguish between what is proper and what is taken by transumption. For just as one who says that there is no true laughter without a mouth, nor true flight without wings, does not contradict him who says that a meadow laughs without a mouth and that arrows fly without wings; so he who says that the name of speaking or of saying, taken properly, is not without a word, just as neither is generating without a son, does not contradict him who says that to speak or to say can be so transumed and, according to some transumptive signification, be said of something without a word generated.

In these things, therefore, and in all others, if anyone look diligently and piously, he will find that I have not dared to withdraw from the footsteps of the fathers and of our elders; since, according to Gregory's counsel[^p3-2], it is sounder to yield to another's understanding than to be a slave to contentions, for this reason, that, as the teaching of the Doctor of the Gentiles to Timothy says[^p3-3]: *The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all, apt to teach, patient, with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth.*

These things, therefore, being set down beforehand, let the pen be taken up with the invocation of God's grace. *Exordium:* Only this I have found etc.

---

la: Hucusque inedita remansit haec praelocutio, qua S. Bonaventura dilucidam reddit rationem nonnullarum sententiarum, quas in libro I. sui Commentarii posuit, et quae quibusdam displicuerant. Eam primus detexit in codice (sign. 193) bibliothecae civitatis Andegavensis atque transcripsit P. Fidelis a Fanna, ut in Prolegomenis nostrae editionis t. I. p. LVII (col. II.) iam notavimus. Magnam eiusdem praelocutionis partem iam in Scholiis primi tomi publicavimus. Eandem integram et quantum ope unici codicis fieri potuit, satis correctam hoc loco exhibemus.

en: Until now this praelocutio has remained unpublished, in which St. Bonaventure gives a clear account of several of the sentences which he set down in book I of his Commentary and which had displeased certain persons. P. Fidelis a Fanna first detected it in a codex (shelfmark 193) of the library of the city of Angers and transcribed it, as we have already noted in the Prolegomena of our edition, t. I p. LVII (col. II). A great part of the same praelocutio we have already published in the Scholia of the first tome. Here we exhibit the whole of it, and, so far as could be done by the help of a single codex, sufficiently corrected.

la: Cap. 3; et S. Bonav. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; alter locus est d. VII. c. 2. in fine, et S. Bonav. d. 7. q. 1.

en: Chapter 3; and St. Bonaventure d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 1; the other passage is d. VII c. 2 at the end, and St. Bonaventure d. 7 q. 1.

en: II Sentences d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 1.

la: Supple: nosse se et amare se. — Pro maiore explicatione doctrinae huius praefationis consulendi sunt loci I. libri Sententiarum, de quibus hic tractatur.

en: Supply: to know itself and to love itself. — For a fuller explanation of the doctrine of this preface, the passages of book I of the Sentences which are treated of here are to be consulted.

la: Lectio huius vocabuli est dubia.

en: The reading of this word is doubtful.

la: Aliqua verba desunt.

en: Some words are wanting.

la: De his agitur I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1; et d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, a. 2. q. 1.

en: These matters are treated in I Sentences d. 17 p. I q. 1; and d. 24 a. 1 q. 1, a. 2 q. 1.

en: On these, II Sentences d. 5 a. 3 q. 2; and d. 30 a. 3 q. 2.

en: On these, III Sentences d. 5 a. 2 q. 3; and d. 22 a. 1 q. 1.

en: On these, IV Sentences d. 2 p. I a. 2 q. 3; and d. 5 a. 3 q. 1.

la: Scilicet Alexandri.

en: Namely Alexander's.

la: Pars I. q. 2.

en: Part I q. 2.

en: Part I q. 59 m. 3.

en: Summa p. I q. 62 m. 2.

en: Distinction 27 p. II q. 1.

la: Dist. XXIX. c. 1.

en: Distinction XXIX c. 1.

la: Libr. XXVIII. Moral. c. 11. n. 27, secundum sensum.

en: Book XXVIII of the Morals c. 11 n. 27, according to the sense.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Printed pp. 1–3 (PDF 23–25, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`
L701–L831. The IA djvu OCR in this region is clean running prose, **not** cascade-shattered, so it
served as the base — but it interleaves the two printed columns line by line, so every paragraph was
reflowed column-by-column against the 450 dpi bands, and italics, marginalia and the whole apparatus
were read off the plate, which the OCR does not carry.

**★★ TYPE — `praelocutio`, AND IT IS BOOK II's ALONE.** Vol II prints **two** display-headed units
before the Master's text: this `PRAELOCUTIO` (pp. 1–3) and then the `PROOEMIUM` (pp. 3–6). They are
not one unit and must not be folded: the Praelocutio is what p. 1 n. 1 calls a text that *remained
unpublished until Quaracchi found it in a single Angers codex,* and folding it into the proemium
would bury the *pauper et tenuis compilator* sentence inside a chunk titled "Proemium" and print two
"Proemium" entries in one division. `build-content.mjs` gained the type, a title, and a typeOrder of
**−2** (ahead of `proemium`). ⛔ **Do not generalize the type** — like `-sN-` sectio in Vol IV d. 49,
it exists in exactly one place in the corpus.

**★★ WHY THIS CHUNK MATTERS DISPROPORTIONATELY TO ITS LENGTH.** *Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi
scripti velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator*
(p. 1, left column) is the single most-quoted sentence Bonaventure wrote about his own method, and
until now it was not in the corpus at any tier.

**Page-split map.**
- **p. 1** — display heading `PRAELOCUTIO / SANCTI BONAVENTURAE / PROOEMIO IN SECUNDUM LIBRUM
  SENTENTIARUM / PRAEMISSA¹`, then the body in two columns. **★ The heading itself carries anchor 1**
  — unlike the Hexaemeron's collatio headings, nineteen of which carry none. Footer nn. **1–4**:
  nn. 1–2 anchored in the left column, nn. 3–4 in the right; **the left block holds nn. 1–4 and n. 1
  runs over the gutter** (*…Eandem integram et* | *quantum ope unici codicis fieri potuit…*), so the
  left block overruns the column division by two. The `S. Bonav. — Tom. II.` signature sits under the
  left block and the signature mark `1` under the right.
- **p. 2** — running head `PRAELOCUTIO.` Footer nn. **1–11**: nn. 1–6 anchored in the left column,
  nn. 7–11 in the right; the left block holds nn. 1–5, so it **underruns by one**. No runover.
- **p. 3** — running head `PROOEMIUM.` **although the Praelocutio still fills the upper half of the
  leaf** — the asymmetric-running-head class again; the boundary was fixed from the printed
  `PROOEMIUM` display heading, not the head. This chunk holds the two upper columns and ends
  *…Exordium: Solummodo hoc inveni etc.* Footer nn. **1–3** are this chunk's.

**Apparatus count.** 18 entries owned (p. 1 nn. 1–4; p. 2 nn. 1–11; p. 3 nn. 1–3). Numbering restarts
per printed page.

**★★ HAND-OFF FORWARDED — p. 3 n. 4 AND ITS GUTTER RUNOVER BELONG TO `bon-sent-II-proem`.** p. 3's
left footer block holds nn. 1–4 and breaks inside n. 4 (*…quia tamen codd. in sequentibus, ubi idem
textus recurrit, sibi non constant et* | …), which continues unnumbered at the head of the right
block. **n. 4 is anchored on the PROOEMIUM's lemma** (*…se infinitis immiscuit quaestionibus⁴*, Eccl.
7:30), so the whole of it — the numbered share, the runover, and the ownership of the rest of p. 3's
register — is the proemium's, not this chunk's. ⚠ Re-derive it; do not adopt it.

**★★ THE VOL II GUTTER CONSTANT IS WRONG ON THESE LEAVES, AND IT IS WRONG BY UP TO 250 px.**
CLAUDE.md gives `colcrop.py vol2 <page> 1660` as the Vol II default. Measured here, per leaf:
**p. 1 = 1512** (band 1474–1551) · **p. 2 = 1769** (band 1729–1809) · **p. 3 = 1538** (band
1495–1582). At 1660 the p. 1 right-column crop silently loses the first character of every line
(*est* read as *st*), and at 1666 the p. 2 left-column crop clips the last word. **The text block
shifts leaf to leaf in the front matter — profile every leaf.** ⚠ Note also that
`colcrop.py vol2 1 auto` returns 1724 on a **506 px** run: the auto measurement fails outright on a
leaf carrying a full-measure display heading and a short right column, exactly as the frozen Vol V
rule predicts, and Vol II has no printed centre rule to anchor the band (peak ink 6).

**★★ QUARACCHI FLAG TWO PLACES THEMSELVES, AND THE PRINTED ELLIPSIS IS TRANSMITTED TEXT.** p. 2 n. 1
reads *Lectio huius vocabuli est dubia* (on *concurrant*), and p. 2 n. 2 reads *Aliqua verba desunt* —
the latter attaching to a printed *reverentia²**…*** where the edition sets an ellipsis for a lacuna
in its single codex. **The ellipsis is rendered as printed and no `[?]` is added**: the doubt is the
editors' and it is already recorded in their own apparatus. Same discipline as c19's blank-paper
lacuna in the Hexaemeron.

**Register — set from Book I's own settlement, not invented here.**
- ***habitudo* → "respect", *relatio* → "relation".** The Itinerarium's freeze (*habitudo* →
  "relation") **cannot stand in this text**, because both words are live in one argument here
  (*dictam esse propter relationem* against *ratione habitudinis*). **Vol I d. 28 a. 1 q. 2 already
  settled it this way** — *unbegotten* imports a *respect* to a principle, *father* a *respect* to a
  principiate — and that is the very distinction this Praelocutio is defending. Follow d. 27–d. 28.
- ***innascibilis* → "unbegotten", *innascibilitas* → "unbegottenness"** — the corpus's dominant
  reading (118 occurrences against 10 of "innascibility"), and d. 28's own title form.
- *fecunditas* → "fecundity" · *fecunda* → "fruitful" · *ratio generandi* → "the ground of
  generating" · *status* → **"stopping-place"** (the argument's terminus, not the corpus's technical
  *status*) · *transumta / transumtive / significatio transumtiva* → "what is taken by transumption /
  by transumption / a transumptive signification", carried from Vol I d. 19 p. II a. 1 q. 3 ·
  *praelocutio* → left **untranslated** in the title, as the printed unit's own name.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body, transcribed here in body order).
p. 1: *Notandum.* · *Visus est a Magistro declinasse in duobus.* · *Hoc negatur quoad primum.* ·
*Item quoad secundum.*
p. 2: *Octo positiones Magistri improbantur.* · *Duae in I. libro.* · *Duae in II.* · *Duae in III.* ·
*Duae in IV.* · *Notandum.* · *A sententiis Alexandri deviasse videtur.* · *Defenditur prima
sententia.*
p. 3: *Notandum.* · *Defenditur secunda sententia.* · *Epilogus.*

**⛔ THE THREE GUARD-RAIL AUDITS CANNOT SEE THIS CHUNK, AND THEY WILL REPORT CLEAN ANYWAY.**
`audit-{paraphrase,headers,apparatus-count}.py --volume 2` select files by the filename regex
`bon-sent-II-d(\d+)-`; this chunk has no `-dN-` segment and can never match at any `--min-d`, so all
three print a clean verdict on **0 chunks audited**. Do **not** record it as audits-clean. What was
actually run: marker pairing (Latin 18 / English 18 / defs 18, order-identical), `build-content.mjs`,
`build-citations.py`, `polish-style-scan.py`, and eyes-on 450 dpi column bands for all three leaves,
body and footer registers.

**`[?]` flags: none.** Every reading was settled on the band; the two doubtful places are Quaracchi's
own and are carried in their apparatus, above.

**★★ ONE QA FLAG, DISPOSITIONED — AND IT IS NOT A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR.** `build-citations.py` flags
p. 2 n. 6's `IV. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3` as dangling. The digits were read at 2.0× and are
right; **the target exists as `bon-sent-IV-d2-a2-q3`** (printed pp. 57–58). The mismatch is the
*pars*: **Quaracchi cite Book IV d. 2 with a `p. I.` that the corpus's Book IV chunking does not
model** — `vol4/` holds `IV-d2-a1-q1..q3` and `IV-d2-a2-q1..q3` with no pars segment, and the raw
carries no `DIST. II. P. I.` running head. ⚠ **Two other Vol IV chunks already cite `d. 2. p. I.`**
(`IV-d11-p1-a1-q4`, `IV-d49-p2-s2-a4-q1`), so this is a **pre-existing Book IV chunking question**,
not something this chunk introduced. Nothing here is emended; the flag is left standing and the
question is forwarded to whoever next works the Book IV front. Corpus QA flags moved **225 → 223**
across this commit: this chunk contributes 13 records (11 `chunk`, 1 `verse`, this 1 `dangling`) and
its arrival resolved three references elsewhere that had been pointing into printed pp. 1–3 of Vol II
with nowhere to land — the same thing the Book III proemium did.