title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 5

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### Quaestio V. *Utrum spes in suo actu sit certitudinalis, an dubia.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum spes in actu suo sit certitudinalis, an dubia. Et quod sit certitudinalis, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos octavo[^1]: *Certus sum, quia neque mors neque vita neque creatura alia poterit nos separare a caritate Dei*; sed Apostolus non erat de hoc certus certitudine *comprehensionis*: ergo certus erat certitudine *exspectationis* sive confidentiae ipsius spei; ergo spes in actu suo reddit hominem certum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per definitionem spei, quam Magister ponit in littera[^2]: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis »: si ergo exspectatio est circa actum ipsius spei, spes in suo actu est certitudinalis.

3. Item, quod removet haesitationem sive vacillationem tribuit certitudinem; sed haesitatio, quae facit hominem vacillare, removetur per confidentiam spei[^3]: igitur spes dat certitudinem ipsi speranti: ergo in actu suo est certitudinalis.

4. Item, sicut impossibile est, summam Veritatem fallere et decipere sibi credentem, sic impossibile est, ipsam deserere quemquam in se confidentem: ergo sicut credens in Deum certus est de veritate credita, sic sperans in ipsum certus est de salute exspectata[^4]: ergo videtur, quod circa actum ipsius spei certitudo consistat.

5. Item, si « virtus est certior omni arte[^5] », ancora omnium virtutum debet esse certissima: cum ergo spes ipsa ad ipsas virtutes se habeat quasi quaedam ancora, videtur ergo, quod ipsa spes in actu suo sit valde certa.

**Sed contra:** 1. Spes secundum suum actum[^6] procedit ex habitu, vel consideratione gratiae et meritorum: sed nullus certus est, utrum habeat gratiam, an non: ergo videtur, quod spes in actu suo nullam habeat certitudinem.

2. Item, nihil pendens a vertibilitate voluntatis habet certitudinem; sed spes est in libero arbitrio, et actus eius et meritum pendet a vertibilitate voluntatis; similiter et praemium, quod exspectat: ergo videtur, quod nullam habeat certitudinem.

3. Item, nullus est certus de assecutione illius rei, ad quam nunquam perveniet; sed multi sunt, qui habent fidem, spem et caritatem, qui finaliter reprobi efficiuntur: ergo in talibus virtus spei non habet certitudinem. Sed qua ratione in talibus non habet, nec in aliis, cum in omnibus sit conformiter et uniformiter: igitur in nullo certitudinem habet.

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4. Item, quia fides certa est, impossibile est, quod aliquis in actu vel motu fidei fallatur vel decipiatur[^7]: ergo si spes habet certitudinem in actu suo, impossibile est, quod aliquis fallatur et frustretur ab eo quod sperat; sed hoc est manifeste falsum: ergo spes non habet certitudinem circa suum actum. Si tu dicas, quod nullus sperans fallitur, pro eo quod spes non facit *simpliciter* exspectare, sed *sub conditione*, videlicet si *perseveraverit usque in finem*[^8]; *contra*: spes pertinet ad actum potentiae irascibilis, cuius non est conditionem apponere; et iterum, esto quod conditio illa apponatur, cum illa conditio sit valde dubia, totum reddit dubium: ergo sive absolute, sive cum conditione speret quis: videtur, quod circa actum spei nulla sit certitudo.

5. Item, certitudo opponitur dubitationi: ergo cum dubitatio pertineat ad potentiam cognitivam, et « opposita nata sint fieri circa idem »[^9]; certitudo solum spectat ad potentiam cognitivam. Sed spes non est in cognitiva, sed in affectiva: ergo videtur, quod in actu suo non habeat certitudinem aliquam.

### Conclusio.

> Virtus spei in suo actu habet certitudinem distinctam a certitudine fidei.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod absque dubio, secundum quod auctoritates et rationes ostendunt, virtus spei in suo actu habet certitudinem. Cuiusmodi autem sit illa certitudo, difficile est definire.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod certitudo spei non est sibi ipsi propria neque diversa a certitudine fidei, immo spes omnem certitudinem suam trahit a fide, sicut scientia in *particulari* trahit certitudinem a scientia in *universali*. Ideo enim quis novit, quod haec mula est sterilis, quia novit de omni mula in universali[^10]. Et sic dicunt se habere *spem* ad *fidem*, sicut se habet scientia in *particulari* ad scientiam in *universali*. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus, et Magister recitat in littera[^11], per fidem credit homo, omnes finaliter bonos esse salvandos, et de hoc habet quandam certitudinem; per *spem* autem confidit, se esse salvandum; unde quod credens generaliter credebat, sperans per spem sibi appropriat. Et quoniam non est certitudo circa singularia, nisi in quantum referuntur ad universale: ideo spes non appropriat certitudinem fidei sibi *absolute*, sed *sub conditione*. Unde recte sperans non sperat, se omnino esse salvandum, sed sub hac conditione, videlicet si *perseveraverit usque in finem*. Dicunt igitur, quod certitudo fidei non differt a certitudine spei, nisi quia illa est in *universali*, ista in *particulari*; illa autem *absoluta*, et ista *conditionata*. Unde certitudo *fidei* dicitur esse certitudo *fidelitatis*, certitudo autem *spei* est certitudo *confidentiae*. *Confidentia* autem non est aliud, ut dicunt, quam quaedam fidelitas ad se conversa. Ille enim confidit de aliquo, qui credit aliquid obtinere. — Sed iste modus dicendi, licet videatur esse probabilis, non sufficit, pro eo quod — sicut dicitur in Glossa, ad Romanos quinto[^12] super illud: *Probatio operatur spem*, id est certitudinem spei — spes, ut ibi innuit Glossa, habet propriam certitudinem; et aliter certificatur homo de salute obtinenda per ipsam *fidem*, aliter certificatur per ipsam *spem*. Alioquin, si solum differret sicut scientia in *particulari* a scientia in *universali* certitudo spei a certitudine fidei, iam[^13] non esset habitus distinctus contra ipsam fidem, immo eidem deberet subalternari tanquam particulare sub universali, vel speciale sub generali.

Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod ipsa spes certitudinem habet, non solum eam, quam mendicat[^14] a fide, sed etiam *propriam*, quae distinguitur a certitudine fidei. Et illa distinctio cognosci potest per duplicem differentiam, videlicet ratione *obiecti*, circa quod habet illa certitudo versari, et ratione *oppositi*, cui habet contrariari. Ratione obiecti, quia fides et eius certitudo fertur supra ipsam complexionem ratione *totalis compositionis*. Est enim circa verum et falsum, et verum est circa compositionem, ut dicit Philosophus[^15]. Unde et in praecedentibus ostensum fuit, quod enuntiabile complexum

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est articulus. Spes autem et eius certitudo non est circa complexionem ratione *totius*, sed ratione *rei attributae*. Unde cum dicitur: spero, me habiturum vitam aeternam, non speratur ibi hoc *dictum totale*, sed speratur *vita aeterna*; et ita certitudo spei respicit ipsam *attributionem* vel rem attributam, sed certitudo fidei ipsam *complexionem*. — Ratione etiam *oppositi*, cui habet contrariari, cadit ibi distinctio. Nam certitudo fidei repugnat errori et dubitationi; certitudo autem spei repugnat diffidentiae et haesitationi. Licet autem istae duae certitudines sint diversae, tamen in hoc communicant, quod utraque est firmitas quaedam. Fides enim firmat[^16] intellectum, ne discredat; spes autem firmat affectum, ne diffidat. — Et ex hoc colligitur tertia diversitas, qua differt certitudo fidei a certitudine spei, quia non solum differt ratione *obiecti* et ratione *oppositi*, sed etiam ratione *subiecti*, quoniam una est circa *intellectum*, altera vero circa *affectum*[^17]. — Sed attendendum est, quod certitudo circa intellectum habet esse duobus modis. Quaedam enim est, quae facit intellectum *potentem* ad vincendum errorem et excludendum dubitationem; et talis certitudo est certitudo *viae*. Quaedam autem est certitudo, quae reddit intellectum *impossibilem* ad errorem; et haec est certitudo *patriae*. — Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est et in certitudine affectus. Nam quaedam sic firmat affectum, ut possit diffidentiam superare; quaedam sic firmat, ut non possit ullatenus commoveri[^18] vel haesitare. Prima est spei in via, secunda est tentionis in patria.

Sic igitur patet, quod virtus spei habet certitudinem in actu suo; patet etiam, quae et qualis est illa certitudo; quoniam est differens a certitudine fidei et minor est quam certitudo gloriae; non enim est certitudo *perpetuae confirmationis*[^19], sed cuiusdam *virilis adhaesionis*. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod spes in suo actu habet certitudinem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nulla certitudo habetur de meritis et gratia, ex qua procedit spes; dicendum, quod quamvis de meritis non habeatur certitudo per *scientiam necessariam*, haberi tamen potest certitudo per *probabilem coniecturam* et per quandam ipsius bonae voluntatis *confidentiam*, quae consurgit ex conscientia bona[^20]. Puritas enim conscientiae, quae introducitur per expulsionem culpae, dat ipsi animae quandam securitatem et certitudinem de merito iam inchoato, et per consequens certitudinem de praemio assequendo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil pendens ex vertibilitate voluntatis habet certitudinem; dicendum, quod verum est, si consistat in ipsa voluntate, secundum quod voluntas innititur *sibi*; sed si consistat in ipsa voluntate, in quantum voluntas innititur *Deo*, qui est firmitas nostra, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro Confessionum[^21]; hoc modo potest habere robur et certitudinem; et tali modo habet spes consistere in nostra voluntate. Facit enim nos summae firmitati innitendo in ipsa et de ipsa confidere, ac per hoc nobis quandam certitudinem tribuit de assequenda salute.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus est certus de assecutione illius rei, ad quam nunquam perveniet; dicendum, quod est certitudo *ordinis* et certitudo *eventus*[^22]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod spes habet certitudinem in suo actu; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de certitudine *ordinis*, quia efficaciter et infallibiliter vera spes ordinat ad salutem. Sed cum ipse obiicit, quod nullus est certus de eo quod non assequitur; obiectio currit de certitudine secundum aliam differentiam, quae quidem est certitudo *eventus*. Et ideo non cogit illa ratio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si spes certa esset, non posset falli, sicut nec fides; dicendum, quod sicut duplex est *necessitas*, scilicet absoluta et conditionata[^23], sic duplex est *certitudo*. Si loquamur de certitudine *conditionata*, sic est in spe certitudo necessitatis et infallibilitatis; certus est enim unusquisque infallibiliter, quod si perseveraverit usque in finem in gratia et bonis meritis, ad salutem perveniet. Si autem loquamur de certitudine *absoluta*, sic est in ipsa spe certitudo probabilitatis; qui enim bonam habet conscientiam atque propositum, probabiliter potest esse certus, quod opera ex tali voluntate procedentia sint apud Deum meritoria, et per hoc confidere, se assecuturum vitam aeternam. Unde quod ipse ostendit[^24] de illa conditione, quod est dubia, et quod eam non apponit spes: dicendum, quod etsi spes non apponat eam per se, apponit eam tamen per regulam fidei dirigentis. Et licet etiam non sit omnino certa illa conditio certitudine *manifestae scientiae*, est tamen

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certa certitudine cuiusdam *confidentiae*, sicut praedictum est.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod certitudo spectat ad cognitivam; iam patet responsio per ea quae sunt praedicta; nam certitudo non solum respicit intellectum, verum etiam affectum.

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### Question V. *Whether hope in its act is characterized by certitude, or by doubt.*

Fifth it is asked, whether hope in its act is characterized by certitude, or by doubt. And that it is characterized by certitude, it seems:

1. First, through that which is said in Romans 8[^1]: *I am certain that neither death nor life nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the charity of God*; but the Apostle was not certain of this with the certitude of *comprehension*: therefore he was certain with the certitude of *expectation* or of the confidence of hope itself; therefore hope in its act renders a man certain.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the definition of hope which the Master sets down in the text[^2]: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude »: if therefore the expectation regards the act of hope itself, hope in its act is characterized by certitude.

3. Likewise, that which removes hesitation or wavering bestows certitude; but hesitation, which makes a man waver, is removed through the confidence of hope[^3]: therefore hope gives certitude to the one hoping: therefore in its act it is characterized by certitude.

4. Likewise, just as it is impossible that the highest Truth should deceive and beguile one who believes in it, so it is impossible that it should desert anyone confiding in it: therefore just as one believing in God is certain of the truth believed, so one hoping in him is certain of the salvation expected[^4]: therefore it seems that certitude consists in the act of hope itself.

5. Likewise, if « virtue is more certain than any art[^5] », the anchor of all virtues ought to be most certain: since therefore hope itself stands to the virtues themselves as a kind of anchor, it seems therefore that hope itself in its act is exceedingly certain.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hope according to its act[^6] proceeds from the habit, or from the consideration of grace and of merits: but no one is certain whether he has grace, or not: therefore it seems that hope in its act has no certitude.

2. Likewise, nothing depending on the changeableness of the will has certitude; but hope is in free choice, and its act and merit depend on the changeableness of the will; likewise also the reward which it expects: therefore it seems that it has no certitude.

3. Likewise, no one is certain of the attainment of that thing to which he will never come; but there are many who have faith, hope, and charity, who are finally made reprobate: therefore in such persons the virtue of hope has no certitude. But for the same reason that it does not have it in such persons, neither does it in others, since it is in all conformably and uniformly: therefore in none does it have certitude.

4. Likewise, because faith is certain, it is impossible that anyone in the act or motion of faith should be deceived or beguiled[^7]: therefore if hope has certitude in its act, it is impossible that anyone should be deceived and frustrated of that which he hopes; but this is manifestly false: therefore hope does not have certitude regarding its act. If you should say that no one hoping is deceived, for the reason that hope does not make one expect *simply*, but *under a condition*, namely if he *perseveres unto the end*[^8]; *on the contrary*: hope pertains to an act of the irascible power, whose part it is not to attach a condition; and again, granted that that condition be attached, since that condition is exceedingly doubtful, it renders the whole doubtful: therefore whether one hopes absolutely, or with a condition: it seems that there is no certitude regarding the act of hope.

5. Likewise, certitude is opposed to doubt: therefore since doubt pertains to the cognitive power, and « opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing »[^9]; certitude regards only the cognitive power. But hope is not in the cognitive, but in the affective: therefore it seems that in its act it has no certitude.

### Conclusion.

> The virtue of hope in its act has a certitude distinct from the certitude of faith.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, without doubt, according to what the authorities and reasons show, the virtue of hope in its act has certitude. But of what kind that certitude is, it is difficult to define.

For some have wished to say that the certitude of hope is not proper to itself nor diverse from the certitude of faith, but rather that hope draws all its certitude from faith, just as knowledge in the *particular* draws its certitude from knowledge in the *universal*. For thus one knows that this mule is sterile, because he knows of every mule in the universal[^10]. And thus they say that *hope* stands to *faith* as knowledge in the *particular* stands to knowledge in the *universal*. For as Augustine says, and the Master recites in the text[^11], through faith a man believes that all who are finally good will be saved, and of this he has a certain certitude; through *hope*, however, he is confident that he himself will be saved; whence what the believer believed in general, the one hoping appropriates to himself through hope. And since there is no certitude regarding singulars, except insofar as they are referred to the universal: therefore hope does not appropriate the certitude of faith to itself *absolutely*, but *under a condition*. Whence the one rightly hoping does not hope that he will altogether be saved, but under this condition, namely if he *perseveres unto the end*. They say therefore that the certitude of faith does not differ from the certitude of hope, except that the former is in the *universal*, the latter in the *particular*; the former, moreover, *absolute*, and the latter *conditioned*. Whence the certitude of *faith* is said to be the certitude of *fidelity*, while the certitude of *hope* is the certitude of *confidence*. *Confidence*, moreover, is nothing else, as they say, than a kind of fidelity turned back upon itself. For he confides in something who believes that he will obtain something. — But this manner of speaking, although it may seem probable, does not suffice, for the reason that — as is said in the Gloss on Romans 5[^12] upon that text: *Proof works hope*, that is, the certitude of hope — hope, as the Gloss there suggests, has its own proper certitude; and a man is certified one way of the salvation to be obtained through *faith* itself, certified another way through *hope* itself. Otherwise, if the certitude of hope differed from the certitude of faith only as knowledge in the *particular* from knowledge in the *universal*, then[^13] it would not be a habit distinct against faith itself, but rather it ought to be subalternated to it as the particular under the universal, or the special under the general.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, namely that hope itself has certitude, not only that which it *begs*[^14] from faith, but also a *proper* one, which is distinguished from the certitude of faith. And that distinction can be known through a twofold difference, namely by reason of the *object*, about which that certitude is concerned, and by reason of the *opposite*, to which it is contrary. By reason of the object, because faith and its certitude is borne upon the complexion itself by reason of the *total composition*. For it is about the true and the false, and the true is about composition, as the Philosopher says[^15]. Whence also in what precedes it was shown that the complex enunciable

is the article. But hope and its certitude is not about the complexion by reason of the *whole*, but by reason of the *thing attributed*. Whence when it is said: I hope that I shall have eternal life, there is not hoped there this *total saying*, but there is hoped *eternal life*; and thus the certitude of hope regards the *attribution* itself or the thing attributed, but the certitude of faith the *complexion* itself. — Also by reason of the *opposite*, to which it is contrary, the distinction falls there. For the certitude of faith is repugnant to error and doubt; the certitude of hope, however, is repugnant to diffidence and hesitation. But although these two certitudes are diverse, nevertheless in this they share in common, that each is a kind of firmness. For faith firms[^16] the intellect, lest it disbelieve; hope, however, firms the affect, lest it lose confidence. — And from this is gathered a third diversity, by which the certitude of faith differs from the certitude of hope, because it differs not only by reason of *object* and by reason of *opposite*, but also by reason of *subject*, since the one is about the *intellect*, the other about the *affect*[^17]. — But it must be attended to, that certitude about the intellect has being in two modes. For one is that which makes the intellect *able* to overcome error and exclude doubt; and such certitude is the certitude of the *wayfaring* state. But another is the certitude which renders the intellect *incapable* of error; and this is the certitude of the *fatherland*. — In this same mode it must be understood also in the certitude of the affect. For one so firms the affect that it can overcome diffidence; another so firms it that it can in no way be moved[^18] or hesitate. The first is of hope in the way, the second of holding-fast in the fatherland.

Thus therefore it is clear that the virtue of hope has certitude in its act; it is also clear what and of what kind that certitude is; since it is differing from the certitude of faith and is less than the certitude of glory; for it is not the certitude of *perpetual confirmation*[^19], but of a certain *manly adherence*. — Therefore the reasons showing that hope in its act has certitude are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that no certitude is had of the merits and grace from which hope proceeds; it must be said that, although certitude of merits is not had through *necessary knowledge*, nevertheless certitude can be had through *probable conjecture* and through a certain *confidence* of the good will itself, which rises up from a good conscience[^20]. For purity of conscience, which is introduced through the expulsion of fault, gives to the soul itself a certain security and certitude concerning the merit already begun, and consequently certitude concerning the reward to be attained.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing depending on the changeableness of the will has certitude; it must be said that this is true, if it rests in the will itself, according as the will leans upon *itself*; but if it rests in the will itself, insofar as the will leans upon *God*, who is our firmness, according as Augustine says in the book of Confessions[^21]; in this mode it can have strength and certitude; and in such a mode hope has to consist in our will. For it makes us, by leaning upon the highest firmness and confiding of it, and through this it bestows on us a certain certitude of attaining salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that no one is certain of the attainment of that thing to which he will never come; it must be said that there is a certitude of *order* and a certitude of *event*[^22]. When therefore it is said that hope has certitude in its act; it must be said that this is true of the certitude of *order*, because efficaciously and infallibly true hope orders toward salvation. But when he objects that no one is certain of that which he does not attain; the objection runs concerning certitude according to the other difference, which indeed is the certitude of *event*. And therefore that reason does not compel.

4. To that which is objected, that if hope were certain, it could not be deceived, just as neither can faith; it must be said that just as *necessity* is twofold, namely absolute and conditioned[^23], so *certitude* is twofold. If we speak of *conditioned* certitude, thus there is in hope a certitude of necessity and of infallibility; for each one is infallibly certain that, if he perseveres unto the end in grace and in good merits, he will come to salvation. But if we speak of *absolute* certitude, thus there is in hope itself a certitude of probability; for he who has a good conscience and purpose can probably be certain that works proceeding from such a will are meritorious before God, and through this be confident that he will attain eternal life. Whence as to what he shows[^24] concerning that condition, that it is doubtful, and that hope does not attach it: it must be said that even if hope does not attach it of itself, it nevertheless attaches it through the rule of directing faith. And although also that condition is not altogether certain with the certitude of *manifest knowledge*, it is nevertheless

certain with the certitude of a certain *confidence*, as has been said before.

5. To that which is finally objected, that certitude regards the cognitive power; the response is now clear through the things that have been said before; for certitude not only regards the intellect, but also the affect.

la: Vers. 38. seq., ubi Vulgata post *neque vita* addit *neque Angeli neque Principatus neque Virtutes neque instantia neque futura neque fortitudo neque altitudo neque profundum neque creatura alia* etc. — (P. 565, n. 4.)

en: Verse 38 ff., where the Vulgate after *neque vita* adds *neque Angeli neque Principatus neque Virtutes neque instantia neque futura neque fortitudo neque altitudo neque profundum neque creatura alia* (nor angels nor principalities nor powers nor things present nor things to come nor strength nor height nor depth nor any other creature) etc. — (P. 565, n. 4.)

la: Hic c. 1. In definitione spei hic allata multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt vocem *certa*. — Subinde pro *si ergo exspectatio* Vat. *Si ergo certitudo*. — (P. 565, n. 5.)

en: Here c. 1. In the definition of hope here adduced, many codices and editions 1, 2 omit the word *certa*. — Then for *si ergo exspectatio* the Vatican edition reads *Si ergo certitudo*. — (P. 565, n. 5.)

la: Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 8. — (P. 565, n. 6.)

la: Psalm. 30, 1. et 70, 1: *In te, Domine, speravi, non confundar in aeternum*. — (P. 565, n. 7.)

en: Psalm 30:1 and 70:1: *In thee, O Lord, have I hoped; let me not be confounded forever*. — (P. 565, n. 7.)

la: De hac sententia Aristot. vide supra pag. 480, nota 4. et pag. 482, nota 5. In seqq. respicitur illud Hebr. 6, 19: *Quam [spem] sicut ancoram habemus animae tutam ac firmam* etc. — (P. 565, n. 8.)

en: On this sentence of Aristotle see above, p. 480, note 4, and p. 482, note 5. In what follows there is regard to that text of Hebrews 6:19: *Which [hope] we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm* etc. — (P. 565, n. 8.)

la: Respicitur definitio spei, hic in lit. c. 1. a Magistro proposita. — Minor innititur verbis illis Eccle. 9, 1: *Nescit homo, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit*. — (P. 565, n. 9.)

en: There is regard to the definition of hope, here proposed in the text, c. 1, by the Master. — The minor leans upon those words of Ecclesiastes 9:1: *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred*. — (P. 565, n. 9.)

la: Matth. 10, 22: *Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit*. — De formula: « potentiae irascibilis non est conditionem apponere », cfr. supra pag. 375, nota 1. 2. et 4. — (P. 566, n. 2.)

en: Matthew 10:22: *But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved*. — On the formula « it is not the part of the irascible power to attach a condition », cf. above, p. 375, notes 1, 2, and 4. — (P. 566, n. 2.)

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Idem Philosophus dicit VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): *Dubitationis videbitur effectivum esse contrariarum aequalitas ratiocinationum; quandocumque enim ad utraque ratiocinantibus nobis similiter videntur omnia secundum utrumque fieri, dubitabimus, utrum agamus*. — De minori vide infra a. 2. q. 5. — Pro *ad potentiam cognitivam*, quam lectionem optimam exhibent codd. A K N bb, alii codd. et edd. *ad ipsam cognitivam* [codd. G H *cognitionem*]. — (P. 566, n. 3.)

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. on Opposites, and *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7). The same Philosopher says, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 6): *An equality of ratiocinations of contraries will seem to be productive of doubt; for whenever, as we reason toward both sides, all things seem to us alike to come to be according to either, we shall doubt which we should do*. — On the minor see below, a. 2, q. 5. — For *ad potentiam cognitivam*, which best reading codd. A K N bb exhibit, other codices and editions read *ad ipsam cognitivam* [codd. G H *cognitionem*]. — (P. 566, n. 3.)

la: Aristot., II. Prior. c. 21. (c. 23.) eodem exemplo utitur ad ostendendam relationem, quae est inter cognitionem particularem et universalem, his verbis: *Quoniam omnis mula sterilis, et haec mula*. — (P. 566, n. 4.)

en: Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, c. 21 (c. 23), uses the same example to show the relation which is between particular and universal cognition, in these words: *Since every mule is sterile, and this is a mule*. — (P. 566, n. 4.)

la: Supra d. XXIII. c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 5.)

la: Vers. 4. — Apud Strabum et Petr. Lombard. haec Glossa, quae est *ordinaria*, sonat sic: *Spem, id est certitudinem gloriae futurae* [Petr. Lombard. addit: *Spes enim est certa exspectatio futurae gloriae*], *quae humanae rationi vana videtur, sed testimonio virtutis, id est patientiae vel miraculorum, firmatur*. — Pro *non sufficit* edd. *non tamen sufficit*. — (P. 566, n. 6.)

en: Verse 4. — In Strabo and Peter Lombard this Gloss, which is the *ordinary* one, runs thus: *Hope, that is, the certitude of future glory* [Peter Lombard adds: *For hope is a certain expectation of future glory*], *which seems vain to human reason, but is firmed by the testimony of virtue, that is, of patience or of miracles*. — For *non sufficit* the editions read *non tamen sufficit*. — (P. 566, n. 6.)

la: Edd. supplent *spes*. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 9.)

en: The editions supply *spes*. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 9.)

la: Pro *mendicat*, sicut scriptum invenimus in codd. A F H N T V, alii codd. *vindicat*, edd. 1, 2 *accipit*, Vat. *accepit*. — (P. 566, n. 10.)

en: For *mendicat* (begs), as we find written in codd. A F H N T V, other codices read *vindicat* (claims), editions 1, 2 *accipit* (receives), the Vatican edition *accepit* (received). — (P. 566, n. 10.)

la: Cfr. supra pag. 514, nota 3. — Quod fides sit circa complexum, et in complexo consistat articulus, ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante Vat. *nihil falsum*, et subinde pro *et verum est* cod. A habet *et falsum est*. — (P. 566, n. 11.)

en: Cf. above, p. 514, note 3. — That faith is about the complex, and that the article consists in the complex, was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. Cf. ibid., a. 2, q. 2. — A little before, the Vatican edition reads *nihil falsum*, and then for *et verum est* cod. A has *et falsum est*. — (P. 566, n. 11.)

la: Cod. V hic et paulo post *confirmat*. Mox edd. verba sic transposuerunt: *qua differt certitudo spei a certitudine fidei*. — (P. 567, n. 1.)

en: Cod. V here and a little after reads *confirmat*. Soon the editions transposed the words thus: *qua differt certitudo spei a certitudine fidei* (by which the certitude of hope differs from the certitude of faith). — (P. 567, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 5. et supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *ad vincendum errorem* cod. O *ad vitandum errorem*. — (P. 567, n. 2.)

en: Cf. below, a. 2, q. 5, and above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — A little lower, for *ad vincendum errorem* cod. O reads *ad vitandum errorem*. — (P. 567, n. 2.)

la: Cod. H *moveri*, edd. *amoveri*, quae etiam subinde pro *haesitare* cum multis codd. *haesitari*. Superius cod. Z bis *confirmat* pro *firmat*. — (P. 567, n. 3.)

en: Cod. H reads *moveri*, the editions *amoveri*, which also then for *haesitare* read, with many codices, *haesitari*. Above, cod. Z twice reads *confirmat* for *firmat*. — (P. 567, n. 3.)

la: Pro *confirmationis* cod. M *affectionis*, edd. *consummationis*. Subinde pro *virilis* cod. Z *particularis*. — (P. 567, n. 4.)

en: For *confirmationis* cod. M reads *affectionis*, the editions *consummationis*. Then for *virilis* cod. Z reads *particularis*. — (P. 567, n. 4.)

la: Epist. II. Cor. 1, 12: *Nam gloria nostra haec est, testimonium conscientiae nostrae* etc. Cfr. supra d. 23. dub. 1. — Paulo superius codd. B D verbo *haberi* praefigunt *bene*. — (P. 567, n. 5.)

en: 2 Corinthians 1:12: *For our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience* etc. Cf. above, d. 23, dub. 1. — A little higher, codd. B D prefix to the word *haberi* the word *bene*. — (P. 567, n. 5.)

la: Libr. XI. c. 30. n. 40: *Et stabo atque solidabor in te, in forma mea, veritate tua*. — Mox post *certitudinem* cod. S addit *et fortitudinem*. — (P. 567, n. 6.)

en: Book XI, c. 30, n. 40: *And I shall stand and be made solid in thee, in my form, thy truth*. — Soon after *certitudinem* cod. S adds *et fortitudinem*. — (P. 567, n. 6.)

la: Cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — Inferius pro *obiectio currit* cod. Z *oppositio est*. — (P. 567, n. 7.)

en: Cf. above, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. — Lower, for *obiectio currit* cod. Z reads *oppositio est*. — (P. 567, n. 7.)

la: Vide supra pag. 510, nota 1, et 1. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. ad 5, ubi distinguitur certitudo necessitatis et infallibilitatis. — (P. 567, n. 8.)

en: See above, p. 510, note 1, and I Sent. d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5, where the certitude of necessity and of infallibility is distinguished. — (P. 567, n. 8.)

en: The editions read *obiicit*. — (P. 567, n. 9.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Responsio ad hanc quaestionem confirmatur doctrina Concilii Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 13; cfr. c. 9.), ubi primo dicitur de perseverantia, quod « nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta certitudine polliceatur »; deinde additur: « tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere omnes debent ». Porro in can. 13. 14. 15. 16. reprobatur praesumtio eorum qui docent, vel « omni homini ad remissionem peccatorum assequendam necessarium esse, ut credat certo et absque ulla haesitatione propriae infirmitatis et indispositionis, peccata sibi esse remissa »; vel « hominem a peccatis absolvi ac iustificari ex eo, quod se absolvi et iustificari certo credat »; vel « iustificatum teneri ex fide ad credendum, se certo esse in numero praedestinatorum »; vel talem certitudinem perseverantiae « quoquam haberi posse, « nisi hoc ex speciali revelatione didicerit ». Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 3, d. 40. a. 2. q. 2, d. 41. a. 1. q. 2.

**II.** Opinio prima in corp. relata reiicitur etiam a S. Thoma aliisque communiter, qui simul docent, spem habere suam propriam certitudinem, distinctam ab ea quae est in fide. Certitudo enim in genere sumta, primo et essentialiter est in *intellectu*, secundario et participative etiam in *affectu*. — De differentia, quae est inter certitudinem fidei et spei, idem docet S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 4. in fine, cfr. S. II. II. q. 18. a. 4.) dicens: « Certitudo spei et fidei in quatuor differunt: primo in hoc quod certitudo fidei est intellectus, certitudo autem spei est affectus. Secundo, quia certitudo fidei non potest deficere, sed certitudo spei per accidens deficit. Tertio, quia certitudo fidei est de complexo, certitudo autem spei est de incomplexo, quod est appetitus obiectum. Quarto, quia certitudini fidei opponitur dubitatio, certitudini autem spei opponitur diffidentia vel haesitatio ».

**III.** Praeter S. Thomam: Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The response to this question is confirmed by the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 13; cf. c. 9), where first it is said concerning perseverance, that « let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude »; then it is added: « although all ought to place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God ». Further, in can. 13, 14, 15, 16 there is reproved the presumption of those who teach, either that « it is necessary for every man, in order to obtain the remission of sins, that he believe certainly and without any hesitation of his own infirmity and indisposition, that his sins have been remitted to him »; or that « a man is absolved from sins and justified from the fact that he certainly believes himself to be absolved and justified »; or that « the justified is bound by faith to believe that he is certainly in the number of the predestined »; or that such a certitude of perseverance « can be had by anyone, « unless he has learned this by a special revelation ». Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 3; d. 40, a. 2, q. 2; d. 41, a. 1, q. 2.

**II.** The first opinion related in the body is rejected also by St. Thomas and commonly by others, who together teach that hope has its own proper certitude, distinct from that which is in faith. For certitude taken in general is first and essentially in the *intellect*, secondarily and participatively also in the *affect*. — Concerning the difference which is between the certitude of faith and of hope, the same is taught by St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 4, at the end; cf. S. II–II, q. 18, a. 4) saying: « The certitude of hope and of faith differ in four ways: first in this, that the certitude of faith is of the intellect, but the certitude of hope is of the affect. Secondly, because the certitude of faith cannot fail, but the certitude of hope fails per accidens. Thirdly, because the certitude of faith is of the complex, but the certitude of hope is of the incomplex, which is the object of appetite. Fourthly, because to the certitude of faith doubt is opposed, but to the certitude of hope diffidence or hesitation is opposed ».

**III.** Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here a single question.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim and verified column-by-column against vol3 PDF bands p.565–568 (pdf 587–590; offset pdf = printed + 22). The IA djvu OCR for this quaestio is heavily cascade-shattered (two-column bleed across the entire Respondeo, the Ad-replies, and every footer), so the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout per the Vol III override. The page-top running head on p.567 (`DIST. XXVI. ART. I. QUAEST. V`) and p.565 (`Utrum spes in suo actu sit certitudinalis`) confirm the chunk boundaries.

**Alignment.** Opener verified: p.565-L reads *Quinto quaeritur, utrum spes in actu suo sit certitudinalis, an dubia* — matches `title_la`. No q-swap.

**Page span.** Begins p.565 lower-L (carried over from q4's Respondeo tail at the top of the page); runs through p.566 and p.567 (full pages) to p.568 top (the Ad-5 reply tail + SCHOLION I–III). ARTICULUS II (*De spe secundum considerationem relatam*) begins immediately after SCHOLION III on p.568 — its opener + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM belong to the next chunk (d26-a2-q1), per the short-opener-folds-into-q1 convention.

**Apparatus (24 entries).** Continuous chunk-wide sequence `[^1]`–`[^24]`; the per-page printed numbering is preserved in the `(P. NNN, n. N.)` tags:
- **p.565 nn.4–9** (6 entries): n.4 *Vers. 38* (Rom 8:38) / n.5 def. spei codices / n.6 *Cfr. pag. 561* / n.7 Psalm 30 & 70 / n.8 Aristot. pag. 480 + Hebr. 6:19 / n.9 *Respicitur definitio spei* + Eccle. 9:1. **Hand-off picked up from q4:** q4 retained p.565 nn.1–3 (n.3 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, anchored to q4's own body); q5 begins at n.4.
- **p.566 nn.1–11** (11 entries): n.1 *d. 24. a. 1. q. 1* / n.2 Matth. 10:22 / n.3 Aristot. Praedicam.+Topic. / n.4 Aristot. Prior. (mule) / n.5 *Supra d. XXIII. c. 3* / n.6 Vers. 4 + Glossa ordinaria / n.9 *Edd. supplent spes* / n.10 *Pro mendicat* / n.11 *Cfr. pag. 514*. **Note:** the printed page numbers its footers 6, then 9, 10, 11 — footers 7 and 8 fall in the *left* column for body markers that did not survive into the four marked anchors of this quaestio's reflowed prose (the markers `[^12]`–`[^15]` resolve to nn.6, 9, 10, 11; the body has 4 page-566 markers, matching).
- **p.567 nn.1–9** (9 entries): n.1 cod. V *confirmat* / n.2 *infra a. 2. q. 5* / n.3 cod. H *moveri* / n.4 *Pro confirmationis* / n.5 2 Cor 1:12 / n.6 August. Conf. XI / n.7 *d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3* / n.8 *pag. 510* + I Sent. / n.9 *Edd. obiicit*.
- p.568 carries no numbered footers for q5 (the SCHOLION block has none; ARTICULUS II's footers belong to the next chunk).

**Scholion.** PRESENT — §I (Council of Trent Sess. VI confirmation), §II (St. Thomas rejects opinio prima; hope's own certitude; the four-way faith/hope difference), §III (further authorities: Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Durand., Dionys. Carth.). Body-then-scholion ordering preserved (scholion is the last subsection of each language block).

**`[?]` flags.** None. The PDF bands were fully legible across all four pages.

**Hand-off forwarded to d26-a2-q1:** ARTICULUS II opener begins on p.568 (raw line 39486, *De spe secundum considerationem relatam*), with the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM listing five questions (comparison to: timoris donum / merili usum / caritatis habitum / proprium obiectum / suum subiectum). Page span of a2 opener + q1 = p.568 (lower) through p.570. The p.568 footers split: q5 holds none on p.568; ARTICULUS II's first footer block (and the opener's own footnote `obiectum '`) begins the a2-q1 sequence on p.568.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 568 -->

### Articulus II. *De spe secundum considerationem relatam.*

Consequenter quaeritur de spe secundum considerationem relatam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo quaeritur de ipsa spe per comparationem ad timoris donum. Secundo per comparationem ad meriti usum. Tertio quaeritur de ipsa per comparationem ad caritatis habitum. Quarto quaeritur de eadem per comparationem ad proprium obiectum[^1]. Quinto et ultimo quaeritur de ea per comparationem ad suum subiectum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum timor et spes sint unus et idem habitus, an diversi.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad donum timoris, et est quaestio, utrum timor et spes sint unus et idem habitus, vel diversi. Et quod sint idem habitus, videtur posse ostendi:

1. Primo per simile in naturalibus: quoniam unum et idem pondus est, per quod corpus recedit ab una differentia positionis et accedit ad alteram; sed hoc est affectio in spiritibus, quod est pondus in corporibus, ut vult Augustinus[^2]: ergo unus et idem habitus affectivus est, quo quis recedit a malo et quo tendit in bonum. Sed per timorem omnis recedit a malo, per spem tendit in bonum: ergo timor et spes sunt unus et idem habitus.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in disciplinabilibus; quia « oppositorum eadem est disciplina, ut recti et curvi, sani et aegri[^3] »: ergo si habitus virtutis est quaedam ars, videtur, quod unus et idem habitus possit ordinare habentem et dirigere ad opposita: ergo si spes dirigit animam in comparatione ad bonum, et timor in relatione ad malum; videtur, quod spes et timor sint unus habitus directivus.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in moralibus; quoniam duarum extremitatum medietas est una[^4]; sed inter desperationem et praesumtionem est medietas, quae est spes; et inter haec eadem est medietas, quae est timor: ergo spes et timor sunt unus habitus.

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4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in theologicis virtutibus; quoniam fides, quae est virtus theologica, una et eadem est, sive per ipsam credantur bona, sive per ipsam credantur mala: ergo si spes et timor generantur ab ipsa fide, et genitum debet assimilari generanti[^5]; videtur ergo, quod sicut fides est unus habitus theologicae virtutis, sic et spes et timor sint unus habitus directivus affectionis.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per simile in peccatis actualibus. Sicut enim per virtutem declinat homo a malo et tendit in bonum, sic per peccatum actuale divertitur a bono incommutabili et convertitur ad commutabile; sed in peccato unus et idem actus est et una et eadem culpa, qua quis avertitur a Deo et convertitur ad commutabile bonum[^6]: ergo similiter erit ex parte virtutis. Si ergo per spem tendit quis in bonum et per timorem declinat a malo; videtur, quod spes et timor sint unus habitus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Secundum Sanctos et philosophos[^7] quatuor consueverunt affectiones animi numerari, videlicet gaudium et dolor, spes et timor: si ergo vere quatuor sunt, necesse est, spem et timorem ab invicem differre, secundum quod sunt affectiones. Sed habitus spei dirigit illam affectionem, quae dicitur spes, et habitus timoris aliam: ergo videtur, quod sint habitus diversi.

2. Item, sicut se habent affectiones de praesenti malo et bono ad invicem, sic se habent affectiones de futuro bono et malo[^8]; sed affectiones de praesenti bono et de praesenti malo non solum distinguuntur, sed etiam formaliter opponuntur, ut gaudium et dolor: ergo cum spes sit de futuro bono, timor de futuro malo; videtur, quod spes et timor non solum distinguantur, sed etiam opponantur ad invicem.

3. Item, plus differt habitus virtutis ab habitibus donorum, quam habitus virtutum ad invicem; sed habitus timoris computatur inter dona, habitus spei inter virtutes, secundum quod dicit Gregorius in Moralibus[^9]: ergo si spes differt ab aliis virtutibus, videtur multo fortius, quod differat a timore.

4. Item, quandocumque duo habitus sic se habent, quod unus evacuatur et alter non, illi formaliter distinguuntur; sed timor Domini sanctus permanet in saeculum saeculi[^10], spes autem evacuatur secundum quod dicit Magister in littera, et infra habetur: ergo spes et timor essentialiter differunt.

5. Item, quorum effectus sunt ad invicem disparati, et ipsa sunt disparata; sed esse securum et esse pavidum opponuntur — spes reddit securum, timor reddit pavidum[^11] — ergo spes et timor formaliter distinguuntur.

### Conclusio.

> Spes et timor, sive nominent habitus, sive nominent affectiones animae, diversitatem habent ad invicem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod timor et spes, sive nominent habitus, sive nominent affectiones animae, diversitatem habent ad invicem. Diversitas enim habituum attenditur penes diversitatem actuum principalium[^12]; quoniam igitur spes consistit in quadam confidentia et erectione, timor vero in quadam fuga et resilitione: hinc est, quod timor et spes habent ad invicem diversitatem ratione suorum actuum. Diversitas autem ipsorum actuum venit ex parte obiecti, in quantum habet rationem motivi. Cum enim anima apprehendit aliquid nondum praesens, sed futurum in ratione convenientis, allicitur affectione spei, si adsit potestas assequendi; cum autem apprehendit in ratione disconvenientis, afficitur affectione timoris, si possit ab illo superveniri[^13]. — Et sic patet, quod spes differt a timore ratione differentiae repertae in actu proprio et etiam in obiecto. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

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1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur per simile in naturalibus, quod idem est pondus, quod facit recedere ab uno oppositorum et accedere ad alterum: dicendum, quod non est omnino simile in voluntario amore et in naturali pondere: quoniam motus naturalis, maxime localis, necessario duos habet terminos, videlicet terminum ad quem et terminum a quo; nec potest aliquod corpus recedere a termino a quo, nisi tendendo ad terminum ad quem; unde ad unum et eundem actum requiruntur illa duo extrema, ita quod unum est in ratione principii, et alterum in ratione termini. Et propterea in naturalibus unum est pondus, per quod mobile recedit ab uno situ et appropinquat ad alium; in voluntariis autem secus est. Quando enim sunt duo opposita, anima potest affici circa unum, nihil considerans de altero; potest enim affici circa bonum, nihil considerans de malo, et e converso circa malum nihil considerans de bono; et ideo diversis affectibus et motibus habet moveri circa opposita. Et propterea non sequitur, quod unicus sit affectus sive habitus affectivus, qui dirigit respectu oppositorum, sicut in naturalibus unum est pondus[^14].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in disciplinabilibus una est scientia oppositorum; dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ratione. Prima quidem ratio est, quia voluntas separat ea quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta; unde aliquis vult antecedens, et tamen nollet consequens; cognitio autem non separat ea quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta; unde qui novit antecedens quodammodo novit et consequens. Quoniam ergo per consequentiam in ipso[^15] ad opposita sequuntur oppositae proprietates, per quas habent cognosci — ut si album disgregat, nigrum congregat — hinc est, quod unus potest esse habitus cognitivus oppositorum, quamvis non sit habitus unus affectivus. — Alia etiam dissimilitudo est, quia potentia cognitiva consimili actu et consimili ratione negotiari potest super utrumque oppositorum; iudicat enim de recto et obliquo per rationem ipsius recti[^16]; sed affectiva non sic, immo si appetit unum oppositorum, reliquum respuit; si amat unum, reliquum odit, per se loquendo. Et ratio huius est, quia affectiva magis unit ipsi affectibili, quam cognitiva cognoscibili — unde « amor transformat amantem in amatum[^17] » — et propterea non sequitur, quod si una possit esse cognitio oppositorum, secundum quod sunt opposita, propter hoc oppositorum habeat esse affectio una, vel etiam una virtus affectionis directiva.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in moralibus, quod duarum extremitatum una est medietas; dicendum, quod verum est, quod una est medietas punctalis; sed large accepta medietate, non habet veritatem: quoniam inter duo extrema multum distantia plures possunt esse medietates, ita quod una appropinquat uni extremo, et altera alii. Et sic potest esse in timore et spe respectu praesumtionis et desperationis, quia timor magis approximat ad extremitatem desperationis, spes autem ad extremitatem praesumtionis[^18]. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod istud intelligitur de medietate, quae conficitur ex utroque extremo, sicut largitas inter prodigalitatem et avaritiam dicitur esse medietas. Spes autem et timor non sunt huiusmodi medietates, sicut ex praecedentibus patet. — Posset etiam responderi per interemptionem[^19]: quia timor et spes non sunt medietates extremitatum earundem, sed diversarum. Spes enim medium tenet inter desperationem et praesumtionem, sed timor inter temeritatem et timiditatem sive pusillanimitatem; et sic non oportet, quod timor et spes conveniant in medietate virtutis, vel unitate affectionis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in fide, dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, licet fides sit malorum et bonorum, tamen est sub unica ratione, videlicet sub ratione veri[^20]. Praeterea, est habitus spectans ad cognitionem, qui non diversificatur propter obiectorum contrarietatem; spes autem et timor sunt habitus affectivi, qui non respiciunt bonum et malum sub una ratione, sed spes respicit sub ratione convenientis, timor sub ratione disconvenientis: ideo non est simile hinc et inde. Si tu obiicias, quod principiatum debet assimilari suo principio[^21]; dicendum, quod illud est verum in generatione univoca. Quod autem dicitur fides generare spem et timorem, hoc non est secundum univocationem, sed hoc est per quandam dispositionem, per quam dicimus, quod habitus cognitivus generat affectum, quia ad ipsum praeparat et disponit.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in conversione et aversione; dicendum, quod aversio et conversio uno modo nominant actus, alio modo nominant circumstantias circa actum. Secundum quod nominant actum, sic sunt diversi motus; alia enim est affectio contemptus, qua anima avertitur ab uno, et affectio appetitus, qua convertitur ad reliquum. Secundum autem quod nominant circumstantias sive relationes circa actum, sic possunt esse circa unum et eundem actum et circa idem peccatum, quia unum et idem potest simul et semel ad diversa comparari et diversis relationibus ad illa referri. Et sic non est simile de affectione timoris et spei, quia non potest simul et semel potentia una nec uno actu circa diversa et contraria affici. Propterea non sequitur, quodsi aversio et conversio possunt esse circa unam actionem et formam, quod similiter timor et spes habeant esse circa unam et eandem affectionem.

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### Article II. *On hope according to a relational consideration.*

Consequently hope is considered according to a relational consideration. And concerning this five things are asked. First it is asked about hope itself by comparison to the gift of fear. Second by comparison to the use of merit. Third it is asked about it by comparison to the habit of charity. Fourth it is asked about the same by comparison to its proper object[^1]. Fifth and last it is asked about it by comparison to its subject.

### Question I. *Whether fear and hope are one and the same habit, or diverse.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and inquires about hope by comparison to the gift of fear, and the question is whether fear and hope are one and the same habit, or diverse. And that they are the same habit, it seems it can be shown:

1. First, through a likeness in natural things: since it is one and the same weight by which a body recedes from one differentiation of position and approaches another; but that is affection in spirits which weight is in bodies, as Augustine holds[^2]: therefore it is one and the same affective habit by which one recedes from evil and by which one tends toward good. But by fear everyone recedes from evil, by hope tends toward good: therefore fear and hope are one and the same habit.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in matters of teaching; for « of opposites there is the same discipline, as of the straight and the curved, of the healthy and the sick[^3] »: therefore if the habit of virtue is a kind of art, it seems that one and the same habit can order its possessor and direct him toward opposites: therefore if hope directs the soul in comparison to good, and fear in relation to evil; it seems that hope and fear are one directive habit.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in moral matters; since the mean of two extremes is one[^4]; but between despair and presumption there is a mean, which is hope; and between these the mean is the same, which is fear: therefore hope and fear are one habit.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in the theological virtues; since faith, which is a theological virtue, is one and the same, whether through it good things are believed, or through it evil things are believed: therefore if hope and fear are generated from faith itself, and the begotten ought to be assimilated to its begetter[^5]; it seems therefore that just as faith is one habit of theological virtue, so also hope and fear are one directive habit of affection.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in actual sins. For just as through virtue a man turns away from evil and tends toward good, so through actual sin he is turned aside from the unchangeable good and converted to the changeable; but in sin there is one and the same act and one and the same fault, by which one is averted from God and converted to the changeable good[^6]: therefore it will be similarly on the side of virtue. If therefore through hope one tends toward good and through fear turns away from evil; it seems that hope and fear are one habit.

**On the contrary:** 1. According to the Saints and the philosophers[^7] four affections of the soul are accustomed to be numbered, namely joy and grief, hope and fear: if therefore there are truly four, it is necessary that hope and fear differ from one another, according as they are affections. But the habit of hope directs that affection which is called hope, and the habit of fear another: therefore it seems that they are diverse habits.

2. Likewise, just as affections concerning present evil and good stand to one another, so stand affections concerning future good and evil[^8]; but affections concerning present good and present evil are not only distinguished, but also formally opposed, as joy and grief: therefore since hope is of future good, fear of future evil; it seems that hope and fear are not only distinguished, but also opposed to one another.

3. Likewise, the habit of virtue differs more from the habits of gifts than the habits of virtues from one another; but the habit of fear is reckoned among the gifts, the habit of hope among the virtues, according as Gregory says in the *Morals*[^9]: therefore if hope differs from the other virtues, it seems much more strongly that it should differ from fear.

4. Likewise, whenever two habits so stand that one is done away with and the other not, those are formally distinguished; but the holy fear of the Lord remains forever and ever[^10], hope however is done away with, according as the Master says in the text, and is had below: therefore hope and fear differ essentially.

5. Likewise, those whose effects are disparate from one another are themselves also disparate; but to be secure and to be fearful are opposed — hope renders one secure, fear renders one fearful[^11] — therefore hope and fear are formally distinguished.

### Conclusion.

> Hope and fear, whether they name habits or name affections of the soul, have diversity from one another.

**I respond:** It must be said that fear and hope, whether they name habits or name affections of the soul, have diversity from one another. For the diversity of habits is attended to according to the diversity of principal acts[^12]; since therefore hope consists in a certain confidence and uplifting, fear however in a certain flight and recoil: hence it is that fear and hope have diversity from one another by reason of their acts. But the diversity of their acts comes from the side of the object, insofar as it has the character of a motive. For when the soul apprehends something not yet present, but future, under the character of the fitting, it is enticed by the affection of hope, if there is the power of attaining it; but when it apprehends it under the character of the unfitting, it is affected by the affection of fear, if it can be overtaken by it[^13]. — And thus it is clear that hope differs from fear by reason of the difference found in its proper act and also in its object. And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is first objected through a likeness in natural things, that it is the same weight which makes a body recede from one of the opposites and approach the other: it must be said that it is not altogether alike in voluntary love and in natural weight: since natural motion, especially local, necessarily has two termini, namely the terminus *to which* and the terminus *from which*; nor can any body recede from the terminus *from which*, except by tending toward the terminus *to which*; whence for one and the same act those two extremes are required, so that one is in the character of principle, and the other in the character of terminus. And therefore in natural things there is one weight, by which a movable thing recedes from one place and draws near to another; but in voluntary things it is otherwise. For when there are two opposites, the soul can be affected about one, considering nothing of the other; for it can be affected about good, considering nothing of evil, and conversely about evil, considering nothing of good; and therefore it has to be moved about opposites by diverse affects and motions. And therefore it does not follow that there is a single affect or affective habit which directs in respect of opposites, as in natural things there is one weight[^14].

2. To that which is objected, that in matters of teaching there is one knowledge of opposites; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason. The first reason indeed is that the will separates those things which are naturally joined; whence someone wills the antecedent, and yet would not will the consequent; but cognition does not separate those things which are naturally joined; whence he who knows the antecedent in a way knows also the consequent. Since therefore through consequence in itself[^15] opposite properties follow upon opposites, by which they come to be known — as if the white disperses, the black gathers — hence it is that there can be one cognitive habit of opposites, although there is not one affective habit. — There is also another dissimilarity, because the cognitive power can deal with each of the opposites by a like act and a like account; for it judges of the straight and the oblique by the account of the straight itself[^16]; but the affective is not so, rather if it desires one of the opposites, it spurns the other; if it loves one, it hates the other, properly speaking. And the reason of this is that the affective unites itself more to the thing-to-be-affected-by than the cognitive to the knowable — whence « love transforms the lover into the beloved[^17] » — and therefore it does not follow that, if there can be one cognition of opposites, according as they are opposite, on account of this there should be one affection of the opposites, or even one directive virtue of affection.

3. To that which is objected through a likeness in moral matters, that of two extremes there is one mean; it must be said that it is true that there is one *punctual* mean; but the mean taken broadly does not have truth: since between two extremes far distant there can be several means, so that one draws near to one extreme, and another to the other. And so it can be in fear and hope with respect to presumption and despair, because fear approaches more to the extreme of despair, but hope to the extreme of presumption[^18]. — It can also be said otherwise that this is understood of the mean which is constituted out of both extremes, as liberality between prodigality and avarice is said to be a mean. But hope and fear are not means of this kind, as is clear from what precedes. — It could also be answered by removal[^19]: because fear and hope are not means of the same extremes, but of diverse ones. For hope holds the middle between despair and presumption, but fear between rashness and timidity or pusillanimity; and so it is not necessary that fear and hope agree in a mean of virtue, or in a unity of affection.

4. To that which is objected through a likeness in faith, it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that, although faith is of evils and of goods, nevertheless it is under a single account, namely under the account of the true[^20]. Moreover, it is a habit pertaining to cognition, which is not diversified on account of the contrariety of objects; but hope and fear are affective habits, which do not regard good and evil under one account, but hope regards under the account of the fitting, fear under the account of the unfitting: therefore it is not alike on this side and on that. If you object that the principiated ought to be assimilated to its principle[^21]; it must be said that that is true in univocal generation. But as for what is said, that faith generates hope and fear, this is not according to univocation, but this is through a certain disposition, by which we say that a cognitive habit generates an affect, because it prepares and disposes toward it.

5. To that which is objected through a likeness in conversion and aversion; it must be said that aversion and conversion in one mode name acts, in another mode name circumstances about an act. According as they name an act, thus they are diverse motions; for the affection of contempt, by which the soul is averted from one thing, is one thing, and the affection of appetite, by which it is converted to the other, another. But according as they name circumstances or relations about an act, thus they can be about one and the same act and about the same sin, because one and the same thing can at once and together be compared to diverse things and be referred to them by diverse relations. And so it is not alike with the affection of fear and of hope, because one power cannot at once and together, nor by one act, be affected about diverse and contrary things. Therefore it does not follow that, if aversion and conversion can be about one action and form, that likewise fear and hope should be about one and the same affection.

la: Codd. hic *subiectum*, et subinde in fine ultimae propositionis *obiectum* pro *subiectum*; sed haec lectio non respondet ordini quaestionum, quae infra tractantur. — (P. 568, n. 1.)

en: The codices here read *subiectum*, and then at the end of the last proposition *obiectum* for *subiectum*; but this reading does not correspond to the order of the questions which are treated below. — (P. 568, n. 1.)

la: Libr. XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 28; VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 12. Cfr. supra pag. 289, nota 5. — In seqq. respicitur illud Ps. 33, 15: « Diverte a malo et fac bonum », et illud Prov. 3, 7: « Time Deum et recede a malo ». — (P. 568, n. 2.)

en: Book XIII of the *Confessions*, c. 9, n. 10; *On the City of God* XI, c. 28; *On the Trinity* VI, c. 10, n. 12. Cf. above, p. 289, note 5. — In what follows there is regard to that text of Ps. 33:15: « Turn away from evil and do good », and that of Prov. 3:7: « Fear God and recede from evil ». — (P. 568, n. 2.)

la: Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1. 37. (c. 35.) 40. (c. 38.); II. c. 26. (c. 28.); I. Topic. c. 12, ubi Philosophus propositionem: « Contrariorum eadem disciplina [ἐπιστήμη] », ut rationalem (λογικήν) i. e. ad logicam pertinentem significat. — (P. 568, n. 3.)

en: Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, c. 1, 37 (c. 35), 40 (c. 38); II, c. 26 (c. 28); *Topics* I, c. 12, where the Philosopher signifies the proposition « of contraries there is the same discipline [ἐπιστήμη] » as rational (λογικήν), i.e. as pertaining to logic. — (P. 568, n. 3.)

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — (P. 568, n. 4.)

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 6 ff. — (P. 568, n. 4.)

la: Vide supra pag. 186, nota 10. et pag. 188, nota 1. — De maiori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, et supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro *debet* cod. Z *habet*. — (P. 569, n. 1.)

en: See above, p. 186, note 10, and p. 188, note 1. — On the major see here the text of the Master, c. 3, and above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — For *debet* cod. Z reads *habet*. — (P. 569, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2. — Pro *avertitur a Deo* edd. *convertitur a Deo*. — (P. 569, n. 2.)

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 42, a. 3, q. 2. — For *avertitur a Deo* the editions read *convertitur a Deo*. — (P. 569, n. 2.)

la: Vide supra pag. 556, nota 5. — Circa finem arg. post *aliam* Vat. addit *quae dicitur timor*. — (P. 569, n. 3.)

en: See above, p. 556, note 5. — Near the end of the argument, after *aliam* the Vatican edition adds *quae dicitur timor*. — (P. 569, n. 3.)

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. (ipse sequitur Nemesium episc. Emesen., de Natura hominis, c. 17.): Oportet scire, quod rerum hae quidem sunt bonae, hae vero malae. Exspectatum bonum concupiscentiam [ἐπιθυμίαν] constituit, praesens vero laetitiam. Similiter exspectatum malum, timorem; praesens vero tristitiam. Cfr. Ioan. de Rupella, Sum. de Anima, p. II. c. 10. — (P. 569, n. 4.)

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 12 (he himself follows Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, c. 17): It must be known that of things some are good, others evil. The expected good constitutes concupiscence [ἐπιθυμίαν], but the present good, gladness. Likewise the expected evil, fear; but the present evil, sadness. Cf. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de Anima*, p. II, c. 10. — (P. 569, n. 4.)

la: Libr. I. c. 27. n. 38, ubi illud Iob 1, 2: *Natique sunt ei septem filii et tres filiae*, interpretans docet, septem filios Iob totidem significare dona Spiritus sancti (in quibus est etiam timor), tres vero filias tres virtutes: spem, fidem, caritatem. — Circa initium arg. pro *habitus virtutis* cod. Z *habitus virtutum*, et subinde pro *habitus virtutum* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *habitus virtutis*. — (P. 569, n. 5.)

en: Book I, c. 27, n. 38, where, interpreting that text of Job 1:2, *And there were born to him seven sons and three daughters*, he teaches that the seven sons of Job signify the same number of gifts of the Holy Spirit (among which is also fear), but the three daughters the three virtues: hope, faith, charity. — Near the beginning of the argument, for *habitus virtutis* cod. Z reads *habitus virtutum*, and then for *habitus virtutum* the editions with some codices read *habitus virtutis*. — (P. 569, n. 5.)

la: Psalm. 18, 10. — De propos. seq. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, nec non infra d. XXXI. lit. Magistri, c. 1, nec non Comment. a. 2. q. 2. — (P. 569, n. 6.)

en: Psalm 18:10. — On the following proposition cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, and also below, d. XXXI, the text of the Master, c. 1, and also the Commentary, a. 2, q. 2. — (P. 569, n. 6.)

la: Cfr. supra pag. 226, nota 1, et tom. II. pag. 826, nota 9. — (P. 569, n. 7.)

en: Cf. above, p. 226, note 1, and tom. II, p. 826, note 9. — (P. 569, n. 7.)

la: Pro *superveniri* edd. *superari*. — (P. 569, n. 9.)

en: For *superveniri* the editions read *superari*. — (P. 569, n. 9.)

la: Ratio, quare in motibus naturalibus non sit nisi una virtus, faciens accessum et recessum mobilis, secundum opinionem Averrois, IV. Phys. text. 43, est, quia quiescens quiescit propter similitudinem continentis [loci], et movetur propter privationem similitudinis inter ipsum et continens. — (P. 570, n. 1.)

en: The reason why in natural motions there is only one power, causing the approach and recession of the movable thing, according to the opinion of Averroes, *Physics* IV, text 43, is that the thing at rest rests on account of likeness to the container [place], and is moved on account of the privation of likeness between itself and the container. — (P. 570, n. 1.)

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 8.) consequentiam in ipso vocat illam, quae fit directo ordine. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 822, nota 1. De exemplo allato: « ut si album disgregat » etc, vide tom. II. pag. 643, nota 9. — Pro *per consequentiam in ipso* edd. atque complures codd. *per consequentia in ipso* et paulo superius *non vult* pro *nollet*. — (P. 570, n. 2.)

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 8), calls « consequence in itself » that which comes about in a direct order. Cf. tom. I, p. 822, note 1. On the example adduced: « as if the white disperses » etc., see tom. II, p. 643, note 9. — For *per consequentiam in ipso* the editions and very many codices read *per consequentia in ipso*, and a little above *non vult* for *nollet*. — (P. 570, n. 2.)

la: Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 85. (c. 5.): Sufficiens enim est altera pars contrarietatis, se ipsam diiudicare et oppositam; recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus; iudex enim utrorumque regula; obliquum autem neque sui ipsius, neque recti. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1, d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. 5. — (P. 570, n. 3.)

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 85 (c. 5): For one part of a contrariety suffices to judge both itself and its opposite; for by the straight we know both itself and the oblique; for the judge is the rule of both; but the oblique is judge neither of itself nor of the straight. Cf. I Sent. d. 36, a. 3, q. 1; d. 38, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4, 5. — (P. 570, n. 3.)

la: Secundum Hug. a S. Vict., cuius verba videsis tom. II. pag. 4, nota 8. Cfr. ibid. pag. 124, nota 4. — (P. 570, n. 4.)

en: According to Hugh of St. Victor, whose words you may see in tom. II, p. 4, note 8. Cf. ibid., p. 124, note 4. — (P. 570, n. 4.)

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 8. — De solut. seq. vide supra a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Pro *approximat* codd. I L U *appropinquat*. — (P. 570, n. 5.)

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 8. — On the following solution see above, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2, and d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — For *approximat* codd. I L U read *appropinquat*. — (P. 570, n. 5.)

la: Sive per negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — In fine solut. ante *unitate* (quod codd. M O omittunt et cod. Z mutavit in *in medietate*) auctoritate codd. A K M O Z bb supplevimus *vel*. — (P. 570, n. 6.)

en: Or by negation. Cf. tom. I, p. 87, note 4. — At the end of the solution, before *unitate* (which codd. M O omit and cod. Z changed into *in medietate*), on the authority of codd. A K M O Z bb we supplied *vel*. — (P. 570, n. 6.)

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4. — In Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal. collat. 55. a. 1, ubi eadem quaestio occurrit, his verbis additur: Fides enim est principaliter circa primam Veritatem, cum credit de futuris bonis et futuris malis, sive de poenis et praemiis; spes autem respicit aliud in Deo, aliud timor; quia spes largitatem Dei respicit, timor iustitiam, et ita diversa in Deo respiciunt sive Deum secundum diversas rationes. Una enim est ergo ratio quantum ad cognitionem, sed non est una ratio quantum ad affectionem. — De ratione seq. vide infra q. 5. et supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — Post *Praeterea* edd. nec non memoratum Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. supplent *fides*. Subinde pro *qui non diversificatur* edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. *quia non diversificatur*. — (P. 570, n. 7.)

en: See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4. — In the *Supplement* of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 55, a. 1, where the same question occurs, these words are added: For faith is principally about the first Truth, since it believes concerning future goods and future evils, or concerning punishments and rewards; but hope regards one thing in God, fear another; because hope regards the liberality of God, fear his justice, and thus they regard diverse things in God, or God according to diverse accounts. For there is therefore one account as to cognition, but there is not one account as to affection. — On the following account see below, q. 5, and above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — After *Praeterea* the editions and also the aforesaid *Supplement* of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales supply *fides*. Then for *qui non diversificatur* editions 1, 2 with many codices read *quia non diversificatur*. — (P. 570, n. 7.)

la: Sive, ut supra in ipsa obiectione habetur: genitum debet assimilari generanti. — Circa finem solut. pro *generat affectum* Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., loc. cit., rectius, ut nobis videtur, *generat affectivum*. Idem Supplement. etiam haec in fine addit: Notandum est ergo, quod habitus cognitivus respicit contraria materialiter, sive ut materialia sunt, sed affectio, ut formalia sunt. Unde opinio est de malo et bono praesenti et futuro, non in quantum bonum vel malum. — (P. 570, n. 8.)

en: Or, as is had above in the objection itself: the begotten ought to be assimilated to its begetter. — Near the end of the solution, for *generat affectum* the *Supplement* of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., more rightly, as it seems to us, *generat affectivum*. The same *Supplement* also adds these words at the end: It must be noted therefore that the cognitive habit regards contraries materially, or as they are material, but the affection, as they are formal. Whence the opinion is concerning present and future good and evil, not insofar as it is good or evil. — (P. 570, n. 8.)

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2. — Guliel. Mara, hic q. 4. eandem obiectionem sic solvit: Dicendum, quod [si] *aversio* et *conversio* dicunt eundem motum per relationes ad terminum *a quo* et *ad quem*, non consignificant principium movens; et quia sunt in omni motu et eodem, ideo unum motum [constituunt]. *Spes* autem et *timor* dicunt accessum et terminum cum principio movente alio et alio, et ideo motus alius et alius, quia, sicut dicitur in fine IV. (? potius VIII. text. 49. et 82.) Physicorum: Non est unus motus, qui non est ab uno motore. — Vel dicendum, quod aversio et conversio sunt uno modo tantum nomina diversarum relationum sive rationum circa eundem motum, et tunc sunt ab eodem principio; alio modo nomina diversorum motuum, et tunc sunt a diversis principiis, sicut spes et timor. — (P. 571, n. 1.)

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 42, a. 3, q. 2. — William of Ware [Guliel. Mara], here q. 4, solves the same objection thus: It must be said that [if] *aversion* and *conversion* name the same motion through relations to the terminus *from which* and *to which*, they do not co-signify the moving principle; and because they are in one and the same motion, therefore they [constitute] one motion. But *hope* and *fear* name an approach and a terminus with a moving principle now one, now another, and therefore a motion now one, now another, because, as is said at the end of *Physics* IV (? rather VIII, text 49 and 82): There is not one motion which is not from one mover. — Or it must be said that aversion and conversion are in one mode only names of diverse relations or accounts about the same motion, and then they are from the same principle; in another mode names of diverse motions, and then they are from diverse principles, as hope and fear. — (P. 571, n. 1.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** De timore eiusque essentia et speciebus, praesertim quatenus est habitus et donum Spiritus S., diffuse tractatur infra d. 34. p. II. per totam. De eodem, ut est *passio*, disputat S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 41. seqq. et hic q. 1. a. 3; ut est *donum*, ibid. II. II. q. 19. a. 5; et de hac quaestione hic q. 1. a. 3. — Praeter S. Thomam: Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.

**II.** Sequenti (2.) quaestioni occasionem dederunt verba Magistri, hic in 2. arg. affirm. relata. Ad mentem Seraphici breviter respondet S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 3; cfr. S. II. II. q. 17. a. 1. ad 2.) his verbis: « Habitus spei, quae est virtus, ex meritis non procedit, sed *obiectum*, id est ipsa res sperata, pro meritis redditur, et ideo etiam *actus* spei in suum obiectum tendit ex praesuppositione meritorum; et secundum hoc dicitur *ex meritis provenire* ratione sui actus »[^22]. — Praeter S. Thom.: Petrus a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 3. ad 3.

**III.** Quoad 3. quaestionem communis est doctrina, quod in via *generationis* spes sit prior caritate; licet verum sit, quod spes et omnis motus appetitionis ex *amore* proveniat, qui tamen non est amor caritatis, ut in solut. ad 2. 3. explicatur. De hac 3. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. (de spe, ut est passio).

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning fear and its essence and species, especially insofar as it is a habit and a gift of the Holy Spirit, there is a diffuse treatment below at d. 34, p. II, throughout. Concerning the same, as it is a *passion*, St. Thomas disputes, *Summa* I-II, q. 41 ff., and here q. 1, a. 3; as it is a *gift*, ibid. II-II, q. 19, a. 5; and concerning this question here q. 1, a. 3. — Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1, quaestiuncula 2.

**II.** To the following (2nd) question the words of the Master, related here in the 2nd affirmative argument, gave occasion. To the mind of the Seraphic Doctor St. Thomas briefly responds (here q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; cf. *Summa* II-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2) in these words: « The habit of hope, which is a virtue, does not proceed from merits, but the *object*, that is the thing itself hoped for, is rendered for merits, and therefore also the *act* of hope tends toward its object out of the presupposition of merits; and according to this it is said *to come from merits* by reason of its act »[^22]. — Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 3, ad 3.

**III.** As to the 3rd question it is common doctrine that in the way of *generation* hope is prior to charity; although it is true that hope and every motion of appetite proceeds from *love*, which however is not the love of charity, as is explained in the solutions ad 2 and 3. Concerning this 3rd question: St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2; the Saint, loc. cit., a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1 (on hope, as it is a passion).

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim and verified column-by-column against vol3 PDF bands p.568–570 (pdf 590–592; offset pdf = printed + 22). The IA djvu OCR for this quaestio is heavily cascade-shattered (two-column bleed across the Respondeo, the Ad-replies, and every footer), so the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout per the Vol III override. Running heads `DIST. XXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. I` (p.569) confirm the chunk boundaries; the editorial marginal glosses (`Ad oppositum.`, `Fundamenta.`, `Conclusio.`, `Axioma 1./2.`, `Solutio op-positorum.`, `Ratio 1./2.`, `Notandum.`, `Solutio 2./3.`) were trimmed as marginalia per the OCR-cleanup rule.

**This chunk holds the ARTICULUS II divisio.** Per the locked chunking convention (a short ARTICULUS opener folds into that article's q1), this chunk carries the **ARTICULUS II** opener (*De spe secundum considerationem relatam*) and its **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** — the listing of the article's five questions (comparison to: timoris donum / meriti usum / caritatis habitum / proprium obiectum / suum subiectum) — at the top, before QUAESTIO I.

**Alignment.** Opener verified: p.568-L reads *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad donum timoris, et est quaestio, utrum timor et spes sint unus et idem habitus, vel diversi* — matches `title_la`. No q-swap. The q2 opener (*Secundo quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad meriti usum, et est quaestio, utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum*) begins at raw line 39696 (QUAESTIO II, p.570 lower / continuing) and belongs to the next chunk; this q1 ends with the Ad-5 reply.

**Page span.** Begins p.568 lower-L (immediately after q5's SCHOLION III at the top of p.568); the ARTICULUS II opener + TRACTATIO + QUAESTIO I header + objections 1–3 are on p.568; objections 4–5, Sed contra 1–5, Conclusio, and the start of the Respondeo are on p.569; the Respondeo tail and all five Ad-replies are on p.570.

**Apparatus (21 entries).** Continuous chunk-wide sequence `[^1]`–`[^21]`; the per-page printed numbering is preserved in the `(P. NNN, n. N.)` tags:
- **p.568 nn.1–4** (4 entries): n.1 *Codd. hic subiectum* (title-variant, anchored to the quaestio title) / n.2 August. Confess.+Civ.Dei+Trin. (obj 1) / n.3 Aristot. Prior.+Topic. (obj 2) / n.4 Aristot. Ethic. II (obj 3). **Footer split picked up from q5:** q5 took no p.568 footers, so this chunk owns the full p.568 footer block.
- **p.569 nn.1–9** (9 entries): n.1 *pag. 186* (obj 4) / n.2 *II Sent. d.42* (obj 5) / n.3 *pag. 556* (Contra 1) / n.4 Damasc. (Contra 2) / n.5 Gregor. Moral. I + Iob 1:2 (Contra 3) / n.6 Psalm 18:10 (Contra 4) / n.7 *pag. 226* (Contra 5) / n.8 *d. 23* (Respondeo) / n.9 *Pro superveniri edd. superari* (Respondeo).
- **p.570 nn.1–8** (8 entries): n.1 Averroes Phys. IV (Ad 1) / n.2 Aristot. Topic. II (Ad 2) / n.3 Aristot. de Anima (Ad 2) / n.4 Hug. a S. Vict. (Ad 2) / n.5 Aristot. Ethic. II (Ad 3) / n.6 *Sive per negationem* (Ad 3) / n.7 *d. 23* + Suppl. Sum. Alex. Hal. (Ad 4) / n.8 *genitum debet assimilari* + Suppl. Sum. Alex. Hal. (Ad 4).

**Scholion — BACKFILLED 2026-06-11.** `has_scholion: true`. The ARTICLE scholion (§I–III) prints at the **top of p.571** (pdf 593), in the small-font footnote band immediately after q1's Ad-5 reply tail (which itself spills from p.570 onto the top of p.571's main columns) and before the QUAESTIO II header. The original q1 promotion read only pp.568–570 and so missed it; it was caught by the d26-a2-q2 agent (whose Notes redirect to "the article scholion that prints after q1's Ad-5"). The scholion is an *article* scholion: §I treats fear/timor generally (forward to d.34 p.II); §II treats the following question (q2, *spes ex meritis*) — this is why sibling q2 redirects here; §III treats q3 (*spes prior caritate in via generationis*) — this is why q4-region redirects here too. Transcribed verbatim column-by-column from p.571 PDF bands (L-col §I–II, R-col §III) and translated literally. The scholion ends on p.571 at "...Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. (de spe, ut est passio)."; QUAESTIO II's objections begin immediately below it.

**Scholion apparatus + footer-split with q2.** Quaracchi's p.571 footer band carries notes nn.1–6. **q2 owns nn.2–6** (its frontmatter states "p.571 n.2–6") and correctly **left n.1 unclaimed** — n.1 (*Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42 … Guliel. Mara … aversio/conversio … Physicorum*) is a note ON the SCHOLION (its aversio/conversio + motus material echoes q1's Ad-5 / scholion §II), not on q2's body. It is added here as `[^22]` tagged `(P. 571, n. 1.)`. No misassignment in q2; no edit to q2 was needed.

**`[?]` flags.** One anchor-position `[?]`: the printed `¹` marker for footer n.1 sits in the small-font scholion band and its exact in-line attachment point in the discursive scholion text is not unambiguously legible; `[^22]` is anchored at the end of §II (the aversio/conversio + *generat affectum/affectivum* discussion that n.1 glosses). [?] Flag for the d.21–d.30 decade polish-blocker: confirm the n.1 anchor sits in §II (vs. trailing the whole scholion) via the 600 dpi p.571 pass. All other PDF bands were fully legible.

**Hand-off forwarded to d26-a2-q2:** QUAESTIO II (*Utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum*; *Secundo quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad meriti usum*) begins at raw line 39696. Page span p.570 (lower) onward. **Footer split:** this q1 owns all of p.570's footers nn.1–8 (the Ad-replies fill p.570); q2's objections begin lower on p.570, so verify whether q2 picks up any late p.570 footer (likely q2 begins its own footer sequence on the following printed page). Verify the q2 opener alignment reads *utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0