title: Dist. 5

title_alt: Distinctio V — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction V — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO V.

### Cap. I. *Si persona vel natura personam [vel naturam] assumserit, et si natura Dei incarnata sit.*

Praeterea inquiri oportet, cum ex praemissis constet, Verbum Dei carnem et animam simul assumsisse in unitatem personae; quid horum potius concedendum sit, scilicet quod persona personam, vel[^1] natura naturam, vel persona naturam, vel natura personam assumserit; et an ita conveniat dici, divinam naturam esse incarnatam, sicut Deus incarnatus et Verbum incarnatum sane dicitur. *(Quaestiones quatuor principales.)* — Haec inquisitio sive quaerendi ratio iuxta sacrarum auctoritatum testimonia partim implicita atque perplexa, partim vero explicita est et aperta. *(Quaestio incidens.)* Certum est enim et sine ambiguitate verum, quod non natura personam, nec persona personam, sed persona naturam assumsit. *(Resp. ad 3. quaest.)* Quod Sanctorum subditis comprobatur testimoniis et astruitur documentis. Ait enim Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^2]: *(Fulgentius.)* «Deus unigenitus, dum conciperetur, veritatem carnis accepit ex Virgine; et cum nasceretur, integritatem virginitatis servavit in Matre». Et paulo post: «Sic Deus humanam naturam in unitatem personae suscepit, quod se humilians per misericordiam incorruptae Virginis uterum ex ea nasciturus implevit. Formam ergo servi, id est naturam servi, in suam accepit Deus ille personam». Item: «Deus enim Verbum non accepit personam hominis, sed naturam». Item: «Dei Filius unigenitus, ut carnem hominis animamque mundaret, susceptione carnis animaeque rationalis incarnatus est». — His aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur, non naturam personam, nec personam personam, sed personam naturam accepisse. — De quarto vero quaestionis articulo *(4. quaestione)*, scilicet utrum natura naturam assumserit, scrupulosa etiam inter doctos quaestio est, quia et in hoc plurimum dissentire videntur qui auctoritate praeclari aliisque doctiores in sacra Pagina exstiterunt[^3]. Nec tantum alii ab aliis, verum etiam iidem a se ipsis dissonare videntur, sicut subiecta capitula docent.

Legitur enim in Concilio Toletano sexto[^4] traditum sic *(Auctoritates pro 1. parte.)*: «Solum Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis; et cum tota Trinitas operata sit formationem suscepti hominis — quoniam inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis — solus tamen Filius accepit hominem in singularitatem personae, non in unitatem divinae naturae, id est, id quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune

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est Trinitati». Item in Concilio Toletano undecimo[^5]: «Unius substantiae credimus Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, non tamen dicimus, ut huius Trinitatis unitatem Maria Virgo genuerit, sed tantum Filium, qui solus naturam nostram in unitatem personae suae assumsit. Incarnationem quoque huius Filii Dei tota Trinitas operata esse credenda est; solus tamen Filius formam servi accepit in singularitatem personae». — His insinuari videtur, quod persona tantum naturam, non natura naturam assumserit. Si enim quod commune est Trinitati non accepit hominem: ergo non natura divina, quae communis est tribus personis. *(Pro 2. parte.)* — Cui videtur obviare quod Augustinus ait in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^6] *(Dubium 1.)*: «Nec divinitas, inquit, Christi aliena est a natura Patris, secundum id quod in principio erat Verbum; nec humanitas eius aliena est a natura Matris, secundum id quod Verbum caro factum est. Illa enim natura, quae semper genita manet ex Patre, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit, ut nasceretur ex Virgine». — Hac auctoritate videtur tradi, quod divina natura humanam suscepit; ubi vehementer moveri possumus, quod eam genitam aeternaliter ex Patre dicit, nisi forte naturam pro persona hic accipiat; alioquin, si dixerimus, naturam tribus personis communem genitam esse, occurrunt nobis ex adverso quae in tractatu *de Trinitate* disseruimus[^7], ubi diximus, non naturam naturam, sed personam personam genuisse; quia, si natura genuisset naturam, cum una eademque sit natura Trinitatis, eadem res se ipsam genuisset; quod Augustinus[^8] posse fieri negat. — Sed alibi certum reperimus documentum, quo natura naturam assumsisse monstratur. Ait enim Augustinus *(Augustinus.)* in libro primo *de Trinitate*[^9]: «Etiam se ipso Christus minor factus est, formam servi accipiens. Neque enim sic accepit formam servi, ut amitteret formam Dei, in qua erat aequalis Patri, ut et in forma servi et in forma Dei idem ipse sit unigenitus Filius Patris, quia forma Dei accepit formam servi». Si autem forma Dei formam servi accepit, sine dubio natura naturam accepit. Formae enim nomine natura significatur, ut Augustinus evidenter docet in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^10] *(Dubium 2.)*: «Cum, inquit, de Christo audis, quia in forma Dei erat, oportet agnoscere firmissimeque tenere, in illo formae nomine naturalem plenitudinem debere intelligi. In forma igitur Dei erat, quia in natura Dei Patris semper erat, de qua natus erat». Hilarius quoque in libro duodecimo *de Trinitate*[^11] ait: «Esse in forma Dei non alia intelligentia est, quam in Dei manere natura». — Didicisti, nomine formae intelligentiam fieri naturae, et audisti, quod forma Dei formam servi suscepit; unde consequens est, quod natura divina naturam humanam suscepit. Quod etiam Hieronymus *(Hieronymus.)* in *Explanatione fidei*[^12] evidenter insinuat inquiens: «Passus est Filius Dei, non putative, sed vere; secundum illud passus est, quod pati poterat, id est non secundum illam substantiam, quae assumsit, sed secundum illam, quae assumta est». — Ex quo apparet, divinam substantiam assumsisse humanam. — Ex verbis autem Augustini superius[^13] positis, adhibita diligentia, innui videtur, solum Verbum carnem factum et naturam solum suscepisse humanam, et divinam naturam eandem accepisse. Ait enim: «Trinitas nos sibi reconciliavit per hoc, quod solum Verbum carnem ipsa Trinitas fecit. In quo sic veritas incommutabilis manet divinae humanaeque naturae, ut sicut vera semper est eius divinitas, quam de Patre habet, ita vera semper atque incommutabilis eius sit humanitas, quam sibi unitam summa divinitas gerit». — Ecce, et solum Verbum dixit carnem factum, et humanitatem divinitati unitam. Idem quoque superius[^14] dixit, «servilem formam a solo Filio susceptam, quam tota Trinitas fecit». Iam facile est agnoscere, quam diversa et multiplicia super quaestione proposita auctores tradiderunt; ideoque posteriores ea legentes varias atque contrarias, ex praedictis occasionem sumentes, promunt sententias.

Nos autem omnis mendacii et contradictionis notam a sacris Paginis secludere cupientes, orthodoxis Patribus atque catholicis doctoribus, nulla pravae intelligentiae suspicione notatis, consentimus dicentes, et personam Filii assumsisse naturam humanam, et naturam divinam humanae naturae in Filio unitam eamque sibi unisse vel assumsisse. *(Concordia auctoritatum.)* Unde et vere incarnata dicitur. *(De divina natura incarnata.)* Quod vero dicitur solus Filius formam servi accepisse[^15], per hoc non excluditur divina natura ab acceptione servilis formae, sed aliae duae personae, Pater scilicet et Spiritus sanctus. Item et illud aliud, scilicet id quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune est Trinitati, hominem accepit, sic oportet intelligi, id est, proprie in hypostasi Filii, non in tribus communiter personis, divina natura humanam naturam sibi univit. Qui sensus ex verbis Ioannis Damasceni[^16] confirmatur, qui totam divinam naturam in una hypostaseon incarnatam esse evidenter asserit dicens: «In humanatione[^17] Dei Verbi aimus omnem et perfectam naturam deitatis in una eius hypostaseon incarnatam esse, id est unitam esse humanae naturae, et non partem parti. Omni enim humanae naturae aimus unitam esse omnem deitatis naturam vel substantiam». *(Dubium 3.)* Item: «Eadem est natura in singula hypostaseon, id est personarum; et quando dicimus, naturam Verbi incarnatam esse, secundum beatos Athanasium et Cyrillum, deitatem dicimus esse unitam carni, et unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam confitemur. Verbum autem et quod commune est substantiae possidet et quod proprietatis est habens hypostaseos»[^18], id est per-

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sonae. — Ex his manifeste ostenditur, quod natura divina incarnata est. Unde et eadem vere dicitur suscepisse humanam naturam.

### Cap. II. *An divina natura debeat dici caro facta.*

Sed quaeritur, utrum eadem divina natura debeat dici caro facta, sicut Verbum dicitur caro factum. Si enim idem est incarnari quod est carnem fieri, videri potest ita debere dici, quod sit caro facta, sicut dicitur incarnata. *(Quaest. incidens solvitur.)* — Ad quod dicimus, quia, si illud dictum in sacra Scriptura reperiretur, ex eadem intelligentia acciperetur, qua, cum dicitur incarnata. Sed quia illud auctoritas subticuit, atque locutionis modus nimiam videretur[^19] facere expressionem, si natura divina diceretur caro facta; melius hoc silere puto vel negare quam temere asserere, ne, si illud dicatur, convertibilitas naturae in naturam significari putetur. — Ex praemissis[^20] indubitabiliter constat, quod persona Verbi sive natura *hominis* naturam, scilicet carnem et animam, assumsit, sed non personam hominis. Si autem natura divina naturam hominis accepit *(Obiectio.)*, quare non dicitur facta homo, vel esse homo, sicut Verbum Dei? *(Solutio.)* — Ad quod dici potest, quod Dei Filius dicitur factus homo, vel esse homo, non solum quia[^21] hominem assumsit, sed quia ipsum in unitatem et singularitatem sui, id est personae, accepit. Natura autem divina hominem quidem accepit, id est, hominis formam sibi univit, sed non in singularitatem et unitatem sui. Servata enim proprietate ac diversitate duarum naturarum, personae singularitas exstitit. Ideoque non sic dicitur divina natura esse homo, vel facta homo, sicut Dei Filius. *(Dubium 4.)* — Quidam tamen indifferenter utrumque concedunt.

### Cap. III. *Quare non accepit personam hominis, cum assumserit hominem, quod quidam probare nituntur.*

Ideo vero non *personam* hominis assumsit, quia *(Redit ad principalem quaest.)* caro illa et anima illa non erant unita in unam personam, quam assumserit, quia non ex illis constabat persona, quando illis unitum est Verbum. Nam sibi invicem sunt unita simul, cum Verbo unita sunt[^22]. Altera tamen unione invicem unita sunt illa duo, scilicet anima et caro, alia unione Verbo unita sunt; quia alia est unio animae illius ad carnem, et alia est unio Verbi ad animam illam et carnem. Non ergo accepit Verbum Dei personam hominis, sed naturam, quia non erat ex carne illa et anima illa composita persona una, quam Verbum acceperit[^23], sed accipiendo univit et uniendo accepit. *(Opponitur.)* Hic a quibusdam opponitur, quod persona assumserit personam. Persona enim est «substantia rationalis individuae naturae[^24]»; hoc autem est anima: ergo si animam assumsit, et personam. *(Resp.)* — Quod ideo non sequitur, quia anima non est persona, quando alii rei est unita personaliter, sed quando per se est. Absoluta enim a corpore persona est[^25], sicut Angelus. Illa autem anima nunquam fuit, quin esset alii rei coniuncta. Ideoque non, ea assumta, persona est assumta. *(Obiicitur iterum.)* — Aliter quoque nituntur probare, Verbum Dei assumsisse personam, quia assumsit aliquem hominem. Assumsit enim hominem Iesum Christum: ergo aliquem hominem. Quod autem hominem Iesum Christum assumserit, Augustinus in *Expositione Symboli*[^26] sub anathemate tradit dicens: «Si quis dixerit atque crediderit, hominem Iesum Christum a Filio Dei assumtum non fuisse, anathema sit». Qui etiam in pluribus scripturae locis[^27] huiusmodi utitur locutionibus: «ille homo a Verbo Dei est assumtus»; «ille homo factus est Christus». Et Propheta, de homine Christo loquens, Deo ait[^28] *(Resp.)*: *Beatus, quem elegisti et assumsisti.* Ex quibus consequi videtur, quod aliquis homo assumtus sit a Verbo, et ita persona sit assumta a persona. — Sed quia hoc nefas est dicere aut sentire, praemissae locutiones eisque similes secundum hanc intelligentiam sane accipi debent, ut homo Christus, sive homo ille, sive quidam homo dicatur assumtus a Verbo sive unitus Verbo, non quia hominis persona sit assumta vel unita Verbo, sed quia anima illa et caro illa assumta sunt et unita Verbo, in quibus subsistit persona Dei et hominis, ut ad hominis naturam, non ad personam respicias, cum assumtum, vel unitum, vel quendam, vel aliquem in huiusmodi locutionibus scriptura memorat. Quocirca, cum quaeritur sine proposita auctoritate, an aliquis, vel quidam homo sit assumtus a Verbo, vel unitus Verbo; sine distinctione intelligentiae non est hic[^29] reddenda responsio, quoniam multiplex praemissa est quaestio; sed instantiam quaerentis ita determinato: si de hominis persona quaeris, respondeo: non; si de hominis natura, dico: est.

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### DISTINCTION V.

### Chap. I. *Whether person or nature has assumed person [or nature], and whether the nature of God has been incarnate.*

Further, it must be inquired, since from what precedes it is established that the Word of God assumed flesh and soul together into the unity of person, which of these is rather to be granted, namely whether person assumed person, or[^1] nature nature, or person nature, or nature person; and whether it is fitting to say in this way that the divine nature has been incarnate, just as God is rightly said to be incarnate and the Word incarnate. *(The four principal questions.)* — This inquiry, or manner of seeking, according to the testimonies of the sacred authorities, is partly implicit and perplexed, partly explicit and open. *(An incidental question.)* For it is certain and true without ambiguity that not nature assumed person, nor person person, but person assumed nature. *(Reply to the 3rd question.)* This is confirmed by the testimonies set down by the Saints and is established by documents. For Augustine says in the book *On Faith, to Peter*[^2]: *(Fulgentius.)* «The only-begotten God, while he was being conceived, took the truth of flesh from the Virgin; and when he was born, he preserved the integrity of virginity in his Mother». And a little after: «Thus God took up human nature into the unity of person, in that, humbling himself through mercy, he filled the womb of the incorrupt Virgin, about to be born of her. Therefore that God took the form of a servant, that is the nature of a servant, into his own person». Likewise: «For God the Word did not take the person of man, but the nature». Likewise: «The only-begotten Son of God, that he might cleanse the flesh and soul of man, was incarnate by the assumption of flesh and rational soul». — By these and many other authorities it is evidently shown that not nature took person, nor person person, but person took nature. — But concerning the fourth article of the question *(the 4th question)*, namely whether nature assumed nature, there is a question scrupulous even among the learned, because in this too those who were eminent in authority and more learned than others in sacred Scripture[^3] seem greatly to disagree. And not only do some differ from others, but even the same authors seem to be at variance with themselves, as the chapters set down below teach.

For it is read that in the Sixth Council of Toledo[^4] this was handed down *(Authorities for the 1st part.)*: «The Word alone was made flesh and dwelt among us; and although the whole Trinity wrought the formation of the man assumed — since the works of the Trinity are inseparable — yet the Son alone took the man into the singularity of person, not into the unity of the divine nature, that is, that which is proper to the Son, not what is common

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to the Trinity». Likewise in the Eleventh Council of Toledo[^5]: «We believe the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be of one substance; yet we do not say that the Virgin Mary begot the unity of this Trinity, but only the Son, who alone assumed our nature into the unity of his person. The Incarnation of this Son of God also is to be believed to have been wrought by the whole Trinity; yet the Son alone took the form of a servant into the singularity of person». — By these it seems to be intimated that person only assumed nature, not nature nature. For if what is common to the Trinity did not take man: therefore neither did the divine nature, which is common to the three persons. *(For the 2nd part.)* — To this there seems to be opposed what Augustine says in the book *On Faith, to Peter*[^6] *(Doubt 1.)*: «Neither, he says, is the divinity of Christ foreign to the nature of the Father, according to that which in the beginning was the Word; nor is his humanity foreign to the nature of the Mother, according to that which the Word was made flesh. For that nature which ever remains begotten from the Father took up our nature without sin, that it might be born of the Virgin». — By this authority it seems to be conveyed that the divine nature took up the human; in which we can be greatly moved, because he says that it was begotten eternally from the Father, unless perhaps he here takes nature for person; otherwise, if we should say that the nature common to the three persons was begotten, there occur against us the things which we discussed in the treatise *On the Trinity*[^7], where we said that not nature begot nature, but person person; because, if nature had begotten nature, since the nature of the Trinity is one and the same, the same thing would have begotten itself; which Augustine[^8] denies can come to pass. — But elsewhere we find a sure document by which it is shown that nature assumed nature. For Augustine says *(Augustine.)* in the first book *On the Trinity*[^9]: «Christ was made less even than himself, taking the form of a servant. For he did not so take the form of a servant as to lose the form of God, in which he was equal to the Father, so that both in the form of a servant and in the form of God he himself is the only-begotten Son of the Father, because the form of God took the form of a servant». But if the form of God took the form of a servant, without doubt nature took nature. For by the name of *form* nature is signified, as Augustine evidently teaches in the book *On Faith, to Peter*[^10] *(Doubt 2.)*: «When, he says, you hear concerning Christ that he was in the form of God, you must acknowledge and most firmly hold that in him by the name of *form* natural fullness ought to be understood. He was therefore in the form of God, because he was ever in the nature of God the Father, of which he was born». Hilary too in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*[^11] says: «To be in the form of God is no other understanding than to remain in the nature of God». — You have learned that by the name of *form* an understanding of nature comes about, and you have heard that the form of God took up the form of a servant; whence it follows that the divine nature took up the human nature. This also Jerome *(Jerome.)* in his *Exposition of the Faith*[^12] evidently intimates, saying: «The Son of God suffered, not in appearance, but truly; according to that he suffered which was able to suffer, that is not according to that substance which assumed, but according to that which was assumed». — From which it appears that the divine substance assumed the human. — But from the words of Augustine set down above[^13], if diligence be applied, it seems to be intimated that the Word alone was made flesh and took up the human nature alone, and that the divine nature took up the same. For he says: «The Trinity reconciled us to itself through this, that the Trinity itself made the Word alone flesh. In which the incommutable truth of the divine and human nature so remains, that just as his divinity, which he has from the Father, is ever true, so his humanity, which the supreme divinity bears united to itself, is ever true and incommutable». — Behold, he said both that the Word alone was made flesh, and that the humanity was united to the divinity. The same author also said above[^14] that «the servile form was taken up by the Son alone, which the whole Trinity made». Now it is easy to recognize how diverse and manifold are the things the authors handed down upon the proposed question; and therefore those who come after, reading them, bring forth various and contrary opinions, taking occasion from the foregoing.

But we, desiring to remove every mark of falsehood and contradiction from the sacred Pages, agree with the orthodox Fathers and catholic doctors, marked with no suspicion of perverse understanding, saying both that the person of the Son assumed human nature, and that the divine nature was united to the human nature in the Son, and united or assumed it to itself. *(Concord of the authorities.)* Whence it is also truly said to be incarnate. *(On the divine nature incarnate.)* But as to what is said, that the Son alone took the form of a servant[^15], by this the divine nature is not excluded from the taking of the servile form, but the other two persons, namely the Father and the Holy Spirit. Likewise that other point also, namely that «that which is proper to the Son, not what is common to the Trinity, took man», must be so understood, that is, that properly in the hypostasis of the Son, not in the three persons in common, the divine nature united the human nature to itself. This sense is confirmed by the words of John Damascene[^16], who evidently asserts that the whole divine nature was incarnate in one of the hypostases, saying: «In the becoming-human[^17] of God the Word we say that the whole and perfect nature of the deity was incarnate in one of his hypostases, that is, that it was united to the human nature, and not part to part. For we say that to all human nature the whole nature or substance of the deity was united». *(Doubt 3.)* Likewise: «The nature is the same in each of the hypostases, that is, of the persons; and when we say that the nature of the Word was incarnate, according to the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, we say that the deity was united to the flesh, and we confess one incarnate nature of God the Word. But the Word possesses both what is common to the substance and what belongs to property, having a hypostasis»[^18], that is, a per-

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son. — From these things it is manifestly shown that the divine nature was incarnate. Whence the same is also truly said to have taken up the human nature.

### Chap. II. *Whether the divine nature ought to be said to have been made flesh.*

But it is asked whether the same divine nature ought to be said to have been made flesh, just as the Word is said to have been made flesh. For if to be incarnate is the same as to be made flesh, it can seem that it ought to be said in this way, that it has been made flesh, just as it is said to be incarnate. *(The incidental question is resolved.)* — To which we say that, if that expression were found in sacred Scripture, it would be taken in the same understanding by which, when it is said, it is incarnate. But because authority has kept silence on that, and the mode of expression would seem[^19] to make an excessive declaration, if the divine nature were said to have been made flesh; I think it better to keep silent on this or to deny it than rashly to assert it, lest, if it be said, a convertibility of nature into nature be thought to be signified. — From what precedes[^20] it is indubitably established that the person of the Word, or the nature *of the man*, assumed nature, namely flesh and soul, but not the person of man. But if the divine nature took the nature of man *(Objection.)*, why is it not said to have been made man, or to be man, just as the Word of God? *(Solution.)* — To which it can be said that the Son of God is said to have been made man, or to be man, not only because[^21] he assumed man, but because he took him into the unity and singularity of himself, that is, of his person. But the divine nature indeed took man, that is, it united the form of man to itself, but not into the singularity and unity of itself. For, the property and diversity of the two natures being preserved, the singularity of person came to be. And therefore the divine nature is not said to be man, or made man, in the same way as the Son of God. *(Doubt 4.)* — Some, however, indifferently concede both.

### Chap. III. *Why he did not take the person of man, although he assumed man, which some endeavor to prove.*

But he did not take the *person* of man for this reason, that *(He returns to the principal question.)* that flesh and that soul were not united into one person, which he assumed, because the person was not constituted from them, when the Word was united to them. For they are united to one another at the same time, when they are united to the Word[^22]. Yet by one union those two are united to one another, namely soul and flesh, by another union they are united to the Word; because one is the union of that soul to the flesh, and another is the union of the Word to that soul and flesh. Therefore the Word of God did not take the person of man, but the nature, because there was not from that flesh and that soul one composite person which the Word might have taken[^23], but by taking he united and by uniting he took. *(It is objected.)* Here it is objected by some that person assumed person. For person is «a rational substance of individual nature[^24]»; but this is the soul: therefore if he assumed the soul, he also assumed person. *(Reply.)* — Which does not follow for this reason, that the soul is not a person when it is united personally to another thing, but when it exists through itself. For absolved from a body it is a person[^25], like an Angel. But that soul never was without being joined to another thing. And therefore, it being assumed, person was not assumed. *(It is objected again.)* — In another way too they endeavor to prove that the Word of God assumed person, because he assumed a certain man. For he assumed the man Jesus Christ: therefore a certain man. And that he assumed the man Jesus Christ, Augustine in his *Exposition of the Symbol*[^26] hands down under anathema, saying: «If anyone shall say and believe that the man Jesus Christ was not assumed by the Son of God, let him be anathema». He also in many places of Scripture[^27] uses expressions of this kind: «that man was assumed by the Word of God»; «that man was made Christ». And the Prophet, speaking of the man Christ, says to God[^28] *(Reply.)*: *Blessed is he whom you have chosen and assumed.* From which it seems to follow that a certain man was assumed by the Word, and so that person was assumed by person. — But because this is impious to say or to think, the foregoing expressions and those like them must be soundly understood according to this understanding, that the man Christ, or that man, or a certain man is said to be assumed by the Word or united to the Word, not because the person of man was assumed or united to the Word, but because that soul and that flesh were assumed and united to the Word, in whom subsists the person of God and man, so that you may look to the nature of man, not to the person, when Scripture mentions «assumed», or «united», or «a certain one», or «some one» in expressions of this kind. Wherefore, when it is asked, without an authority proposed, whether some, or a certain man was assumed by the Word, or united to the Word; without a distinction of understanding a response is not here[^29] to be given, since the question proposed is manifold; but the instance of the one asking determine thus: if you ask concerning the person of man, I respond: no; if concerning the nature of man, I say: it is.

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la: Cod. E et edd. 1, 8 repetunt *quod*.

en: Codex E and editions 1, 8 repeat *quod*.

la: Cap. 2. n. 17. (auctor huius libri est S. Fulgentius); seq. locus est ibid. n. 18, ubi respicitur Phil. 2, 6. 8: et pro *Sic Deus* codd. et ed. 6, *Hic Deus*. Tertius locus est ibid. c. 17. n. 60; quartus ibid. c. 2. n. 17.

en: Chap. 2, n. 17 (the author of this book is St. Fulgentius); the next passage is at the same place, n. 18, where Phil. 2, 6. 8 is regarded: and for *Sic Deus* the codices and ed. 6 read *Hic Deus*. The third passage is at the same place, c. 17, n. 60; the fourth at the same place, c. 2, n. 17.

la: Cod. E et edd. 1, 8 sic legunt: *qui in sacra Pagina auctoritate praeclari, alii doctores* (ed. 8 *doctiores*) *exstiterunt*.

en: Codex E and editions 1, 8 read thus: *who in sacred Scripture, eminent in authority, other doctors* (ed. 8 *more learned*) *were eminent*.

la: Cap. I, apud Isidorum Mercatorem ad lit., in quo textu ed. Migne (t. 130, col. 487) pro *singularitatem personae... unitatem naturae* habet *singularitate personae... unitate naturae*. Similiter in seq. textu legitur *unitate* pro *unitatem*, *singularitate* pro *singularitatem*.

en: Chap. I, in Isidore Mercator on the passage, in which text the Migne edition (vol. 130, col. 487) for *singularitatem personae... unitatem naturae* has *singularitate personae... unitate naturae*. Likewise in the following text *unitate* is read for *unitatem*, *singularitate* for *singularitatem*.

la: In prologo.

en: In the prologue.

la: Cap. 2. n. 14 (interpolate); ubi respicitur Ioan. I, 1. 14.

en: Chap. 2, n. 14 (interpolated); where John I, 1. 14 is regarded.

la: Libr. I. d. V. c. I.

en: Book I, dist. V, c. I.

la: Libr. I. *de Trin.* c. I. n. I.

en: Book I, *On the Trinity*, c. I, n. I.

la: Num. 6.

la: Ad Damasum (inter opera Hieronymi).

en: To Damasus (among the works of Jerome).

la: Dist. I. c. 3, ubi est etiam seq. locus de *Fide ad Petrum* c. 2. n. 23.

en: Dist. I, c. 3, where there is also the following passage from *On Faith, to Peter*, c. 2, n. 23.

la: Dist. II. c. 3.

en: Dist. II, c. 3.

la: Cod. E et edd. I, 8 *tradiderint*.

en: Codex E and editions I, 8 read *tradiderint*.

la: Cod. E et edd. I, 8 *assumsisse*. Haec secunda propositio ex Concilio Toletano supra cit.

en: Codex E and editions I, 8 read *assumsisse*. This second proposition is from the Council of Toledo cited above.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orth.* c. 6. — Paulo inferius pro *una hypostaseon*, quod habet cod. D, Vat. cum nonnullis edd. male *unam hypostasin*.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6. — A little below, for *una hypostaseon*, which codex D has, the Vatican edition with some editions wrongly reads *unam hypostasin*.

la: Cod. D *incarnatione*, ed. S *inhumanatione*. Paulo inferius ante *hypostaseon* Vat. cum codd. A B E omittit *eius*. — Seq. locus ibid. in fine capituli.

en: Codex D reads *incarnatione*, ed. S *inhumanatione*. A little below, before *hypostaseon*, the Vatican edition with codices A B E omits *eius*. — The following passage is at the same place, at the end of the chapter.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *videtur*, minus bene.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *videtur*, less well.

la: Hic c. I. — Quae sequuntur conveniunt cum Hugone, II. *de Sacram.* p. I. c. 9.

en: Here c. I. — What follows agrees with Hugh, *On the Sacraments*, II, p. I, c. 9.

la: Edd. I, 8 bis *quo* pro *quia*, et primo loco conveniunt etiam codd. B C E.

en: Editions I, 8 read *quo* twice for *quia*, and in the first place codices B C E also agree.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd. omittunt *unita sunt*, refragantibus codd. B C D E et edd. I, 5, 8.

en: The Vatican and other editions omit *unita sunt*, against codices B C D E and editions I, 5, 8.

la: Edd., excepta 5 et 8, *accepit*, refragantibus codd.

en: The editions, except 5 and 8, read *accepit*, against the codices.

la: Boethius *de Una Persona et duabus naturis* c. 3.

en: Boethius, *On the One Person and Two Natures*, c. 3.

la: De hac sententia Magistri cfr. Comment. hic a. 2. q. 3.

en: On this opinion of the Master cf. the Commentary here, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Potius est Serm. 233. (alias 129 de tempore), qui inscribitur *Serm. I. de Fide catholica*, n. 2, ubi verbotenus ista inveniuntur.

en: It is rather Sermon 233 (otherwise 129, on time), which is entitled *Sermon I, On the Catholic Faith*, n. 2, where these things are found word for word.

la: *Enarrat. in Ps.* 56. n. 5; I. *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 15. n. 30. *Enarrat. in Ps.* 64. n. 7.

en: *Enarration on Ps.* 56, n. 5; I, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 15, n. 30. *Enarration on Ps.* 64, n. 7.

la: Codd. B C D *sic*. Deinde post *respondeo* cod. E et edd. I, 5, 8 addunt *quod*.

en: Codices B C D read thus. Then after *respondeo* codex E and editions I, 5, 8 add *quod*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.118–120 (PDF 140–142; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the two-column littera and interleaves the columns). Raw OCR range 8727–8914. This is the **littera Magistri** (Peter Lombard's text, Cap. I–III of Dist. V) printed at the head of the distinction — kept as ONE Tier-2 chunk separate from Bonaventure's *COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V* (the next chunk, `bon-sent-III-d5-divisio`).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.118** (PDF 140): Dist. V opens at the foot of the page, below the close of Dist. IV's Dub. VI (`…non sunt extendendae⁵`). Carries the `DISTINCTIO V. / Cap. I.` title + the Cap. I opener through `…id quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune` (i.e. the Cap. I opener AND the start of the Toledo VI quote `Legitur enim in Concilio Toletano sexto⁴ traditum sic…` are on p.118 — the page break falls *inside* the Toledo VI quote, after `non quod commune` / before `est Trinitati`). All four NOTAE superscripts (¹ ² ³ ⁴) sit on p.118. Footer NOTAE 1–4 → [^1]–[^4].
- **p.119** (PDF 141): Cap. I body continues (`est Trinitati. Item in Concilio Toletano undecimo¹…` through `…et quod proprietatis est habens hypostaseos`, i.e. the *per-* catchword at the foot). Footer NOTAE 1–14 → [^5]–[^18] (L-col notes 1–9, R-col notes 10–14).
- **p.120** (PDF 142): Cap. I closes (`sonae. — Ex his manifeste ostenditur…humanam naturam.`); Cap. II (`An divina natura debeat dici caro facta`); Cap. III through the littera's end `…si de hominis natura, dico: est.` Footer NOTAE 1–11 → [^19]–[^29] (L-col notes 1–6, R-col notes 7–11).

**Structure verified from raw (before translating).** Dist. V littera = **3 chapters (Cap. I, II, III)**, no pars division. Bonaventure's commentary begins at raw 8915 (`COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V`, printed p.121), followed by `DIVISIO TEXTUS` and `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`. The commentary has **2 articles of 5 quaestiones each** (ARTICULUS I raw 8956, q.I–q.V; ARTICULUS II raw 9483, q.I–q.V) — matching the scaffold (a1-q1..q5, a2-q1..q5, no pars files). DISTINCTIO VI begins at raw 10421.

**Footer hand-off.**
- *Picked up:* none — Dist. IV's last footer (`extendendae⁵`, p.118 left-column block) belongs entirely to d4-dubia; this littera's footers start fresh with the p.118 right-column `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block (notes 1–4). The p.118 **left-column** footer notes 1–5 (`Codd. UX sibi…`, `Cfr. hic lit. Magistri…`, `Vers. 9…`, `Lit. Magistri c.3…`, `Cfr. B. Albert.…`) are Bonaventure's COMMENTARIUS apparatus, NOT the littera's — they are forwarded to `bon-sent-III-d5-divisio` (they key the COMMENTARIUS/DIVISIO body that begins on p.121).
- *Forwarded to d5-divisio:* the p.118 left-column Bonaventure apparatus notes 1–5; the COMMENTARIUS proper begins on p.121 with its own page-1 footer sequence.

**Editorial marginalia.** The Quaracchi marginal labels (*Quaestiones 4 principales*, *Quaest. incidens*, *Resp. ad 3. quaest.*, *Fulgentius*, *Pro 1./2. parte*, *Dubium 1./2./3./4.*, *Augustinus*, *Hieronymus*, *Concordia auctoritatum*, *De divina natura incarnata*, *Obiectio*, *Solutio*, *Redit ad principalem quaest.*, *Opponitur*, *Resp.*, *Obiicitur iterum*) are rendered inline in parentheses at their printed positions — they are editorial signposts, not footnote anchors.

**In-text anchor correction (2026-06-03, eyes-on 600 dpi PDF p.118 / colcrop bands).** The Pass-2 build left notes [^2], [^3], [^4] as orphan apparatus defs (no body anchors; body went `[^1]` then jumped to `[^5]`), AND it had misplaced `[^1]` onto the *de Fide ad Petrum* lemma. Verified the printed superscript positions on p.118 and re-anchored all four (all four superscripts ¹ ² ³ ⁴ are on **p.118**, not split across the page break):
  - **¹** sits on `vel` in `scilicet quod persona personam, vel¹ natura naturam` (note 1 = *Cod. E et edd. 1, 8 repetunt quod* — i.e. some witnesses insert a repeated *quod* there). `[^1]` moved here from its wrong position on *de Fide ad Petrum*.
  - **²** sits on `de Fide ad Petrum²` (the opener of the four Fulgentius «…» quotations). `[^2]` anchor inserted (this is where `[^1]` had been wrongly placed).
  - **³** sits on `…in sacra Pagina exstiterunt³`. `[^3]` anchor inserted.
  - **⁴** sits on `Legitur enim in Concilio Toletano sexto⁴` (opener of the Toledo VI quote). `[^4]` anchor inserted.
  Anchors mirrored at the matching English lemmas (`or¹ nature nature` / `On Faith, to Peter²` / `in sacred Scripture³` / `Sixth Council of Toledo⁴`).

**Page-break correction (2026-06-03).** The `<!-- page 119 -->` comment was wrongly placed *before* `Legitur enim in Concilio Toletano sexto…`. The Toledo VI quote opener is on **p.118**; p.119 begins with `est Trinitati. Item in Concilio Toletano undecimo¹…` (matching the page-split map). The break was moved into the Toledo VI quote, after `…non quod commune` / before `est Trinitati`, in both the Latin and English bodies.

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 5, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem V — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction V — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 121 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem V

*De modo unionis duarum naturarum secundum fidei assertionem.*

*Praeterea inquiri oportet, cum ex praedictis etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de mysterio incarnationis quantum ad veram unionem naturarum. In hac parte intendit inquirere uniendi modum. Et quoniam dupliciter contingit procedere inquirendo, aut secundum fidei stabilitatem, aut secundum opinionis probabilitatem; ideo pars ista habet duas partes. In prima enim determinat de modo unionis illarum duarum naturarum secundum fidei assertionem, ostendens, quod illa unio est in persona. In secunda vero determinat secundum diversorum doctorum opinionem, infra[^1]: *Ex praemissis autem emergit quaestio.*

Prima pars continet praesentem distinctionem, quae dividitur in duas partes. In prima movet Magister multiplicem quaestionem circa unionem duarum naturarum in persona, sive circa assumtionem humanae naturae a divina. In secunda vero determinat[^2], ibi: *Haec inquisitio sive inquirendi ratio etc.*

Prima pars remanet indivisa, sed secunda pars dividitur in tres partes. In quarum prima Magister determinat quaestionem principalem. In secunda vero quaestionem incidentem determinat, ibi: *Sed quaeritur, utrum eadem divina natura etc.* In tertia vero regreditur ad principalis quaestionis explanationem, ibi: *Ideo vero non personam hominis etc.*

Prima pars dividitur in duas partes. In quarum prima respondet ad quaestionem propositam secundum triplicem eius articulum, et perplexitatem ostendit esse quartum[^3] articulum propter apparentem contrarietatem auctoritatum. In secunda vero auctoritates, quae videntur esse contrariae, reducit ad intellectum, concordiam et veritatem, ibi: *Nos vero omnis mendacii etc.*

Secunda vero pars principalis, ubi determinat quaestionem incidentem, duas habet partes. In prima determinat primam[^4] dubitationem. In secunda solvit quandam sophisticam rationem, ibi: *Ex praemissis constat.*

Similiter et tertia pars principalis, in qua solutionem principalem explanat, habet duas partes. In quarum prima praehabitam solutionem confirmat per rationem. In secunda vero dissolvit oppositiones, quae ipsam videntur impugnare, ibi: *Hic a quibusdam opponitur, quod persona assumserit personam etc.* Subdivisiones partium in littera manifestae sunt. — Intellectus autem generalis versatur circa assumtionem humanae naturae a divina in unitatem personae, tam ex parte assumentis quam ex parte naturae assumtae.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa assumtionem humanae naturae a divina. Et versatur hic quaestio circa duo principaliter.

Primo quaeritur de ipsa assumtione ex parte assumentis.

Secundo vero quaeritur ex parte assumti.

Circa primum quaeruntur quinque.

Primo quaeritur, utrum assumere sit actus conveniens divinae naturae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit actus conveniens divinae personae.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum conveniat personae per se, an ratione naturae.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum conveniat naturae, abstracta omni persona.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta.

---

english:
## Commentary on Distinction V

*On the mode of the union of the two natures according to the assertion of the faith.*

*Moreover it must be inquired, since from what has been said before, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the mystery of the incarnation as regards the true union of the natures. In this part he intends to inquire into the mode of uniting. And since one can proceed in inquiring in two ways, either according to the stability of the faith or according to the probability of opinion, therefore this part has two parts. For in the first he determines about the mode of the union of those two natures according to the assertion of the faith, showing that this union is in the person. In the second, however, he determines according to the opinion of the various doctors, below[^1]: *But from the premises a question emerges.*

The first part contains the present distinction, which is divided into two parts. In the first the Master raises a manifold question concerning the union of the two natures in the person, or concerning the assumption of the human nature by the divine. In the second, however, he determines[^2], where: *This inquiry, or the manner of inquiring, etc.*

The first part remains undivided, but the second part is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master determines the principal question. In the second, however, he determines the incidental question, there: *But it is asked whether the same divine nature, etc.* In the third, however, he returns to the explanation of the principal question, there: *But therefore not the person of the man, etc.*

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he answers the question proposed according to its threefold article, and shows the perplexity to be a fourth[^3] article on account of the apparent contrariety of the authorities. In the second, however, he reduces the authorities which seem to be contrary to [right] understanding, concord, and truth, there: *But we, [free] of all falsehood, etc.*

The second principal part, where he determines the incidental question, has two parts. In the first he determines the first[^4] doubt. In the second he resolves a certain sophistical argument, there: *From the premises it is established.*

Likewise also the third principal part, in which he explains the principal solution, has two parts. In the first of these he confirms the foregoing solution by reason. In the second, however, he dissolves the objections which seem to attack it, there: *Here by some it is objected that the person assumed a person, etc.* The subdivisions of the parts are manifest in the text. — Now the general understanding turns on the assumption of the human nature by the divine into the unity of the person, both on the part of the assuming and on the part of the assumed nature.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part a question arises here concerning the assumption of the human nature by the divine. And here the question turns principally on two things.

First it is asked about the assumption itself on the part of the one assuming.

Second, however, it is asked on the part of the thing assumed.

Concerning the first, five things are asked.

First it is asked whether to assume is an act befitting the divine nature.

Second it is asked whether it is an act befitting the divine person.

Third it is asked whether it befits the person in itself, or by reason of the nature.

Fourth it is asked whether it befits the nature, with every person abstracted.

Fifth it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

---

la: Scil., ut etiam in codd. F K Z habetur, infra dist. 6, pro quo edd. exhibent *sequenti distinctione.*

en: That is, as it is also found in codices F K Z, "below, distinction 6," for which the editions present *"in the following distinction."*

la: Edd. verbo *determinat* praefigunt *eam.*

en: The editions prefix *eam* ("it") to the word *determinat* ("determines").

la: Vat. cum aliquibus codd. voci *quartum* praemittit *circa.*

en: The Vatican edition, with some codices, prefixes *circa* ("concerning") to the word *quartum* ("fourth").

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. omittunt *primam.*

en: The editions and several codices omit *primam* ("first").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed p.121 (PDF 143; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, body bands then footer bands. Corresponds to raw OCR lines 8915–8954 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). The OCR was used only to confirm marker spacing; the column-band PDF read is authoritative (Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion).

**Scope of chunk.** This divisio chunk holds `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V` (header + thema *De modo unionis…* + the lemma *Praeterea inquiri oportet…*), `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, and `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the listing of the two articles / ten quaestiones). Per the locked Vol II/III chunking convention, the short `ARTICULUS I` opener (*De ipsa assumtione ex parte assumentis*) and `QUAESTIO I` title fold into the next chunk **d5-a1-q1**, not a standalone divisio. Distinction V has **no pars division**; the commentary is **2 articles of 5 quaestiones each**.

**Page-split map.** The entire divisio sits on printed **p.121** (running head `DIST. V. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`). The TRACTATIO lists Article I's five quaestiones (q.I–q.V on the part of the one assuming); Article II (ex parte assumti) is announced ("Secundo vero quaeritur ex parte assumti") but its own five-question sub-list appears later, in Article II's territory. ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I body begin at the foot of p.121 (raw 8956–8964) and continue onto p.122.

**Apparatus / footer.** p.121 footer notes 1–4 are the DIVISIO TEXTUS's own apparatus (markers ¹ *infra*, ² *determinat*, ³ *quartum*, ⁴ *primam*) → `[^1]`–`[^4]`. **Footer note 5** (`Cap. 2, n. 14. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. In textu origin.`) keys `ad Petrum⁵` in the QUAESTIO I body and is **FORWARDED to d5-a1-q1**.

**Footer hand-off — correction of d5-littera's note.** The d5-littera resume note claimed "p.118 left-column footer notes 1–5 are Bonaventure's COMMENTARIUS apparatus to be picked up by d5-divisio." That note was confused: the COMMENTARIUS body is on p.121 and carries its **own** fresh page-footer sequence (the four notes above, beginning `Scil., ut etiam in codd. F K Z…`). There is **no migration of any p.118 footer block** into this chunk; the p.118 notes belong with the littera (already correctly anchored there to the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* block). Verified against the p.121 column bands.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 121 -->

### ARTICULUS I. *De ipsa assumtione ex parte assumentis.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum assumere sit actus conveniens divinae naturae.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum assumere sit actus conveniens divinae naturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) Auctoritate Augustini in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^1]: « Illa natura, quae semper genita manet apud Patrem, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit » ; sed suscipere et assumere idem est: ergo natura Dei naturam nostram suscepit.

<!-- page 122 -->

2. Item, expressius in libro *de Trinitate*[^2]: « Forma Dei accepit formam servi » ; sed forma Dei non est aliud quam natura Dei: ergo si forma formam accepit, natura naturam assumsit.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Haec est vera et propria: natura divina unita est humanae; aut ergo in illa unione[^3] se habet ut *agens*, aut ut *patiens*; constat, quod non ut *patiens*: ergo se habet ut *agens*. Sed in ipsa unione *agere* nihil aliud est quam ipsam naturam assumere: ergo videtur, quod *assumere* conveniat divinae naturae.

4. Item, natura divina et humana uniuntur in unitate[^4] personae; sed ex illa unione vere et proprie dicitur humana natura esse assumta: ergo pari ratione divina natura vel debet dici ex illa unione *assumens*, vel *assumta*. Sed non *assumitur*: ergo illius est *assumere*.

**Sed contra** 1. (*Ad oppositum.*) est auctoritas Concilii Toletani, quam Magister ponit in littera[^5]: « Cum tota Trinitas operata sit formationem suscepti hominis, solus tamen Filius suscepit hominem in unitate personae, non in unitate naturae » : ergo si hoc soli Filio convenit, non videtur, quod conveniat divinae naturae.

2. Item, Anselmus[^6]: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nullo modo differunt in natura: ergo quod convenit divinae naturae convenit Patri et Filio et Spiritui sancto; sed assumtio humanae naturae nullo modo convenit Patri, vel Spiritui sancto: ergo nullo modo videtur divinae naturae competere.

3. Item, divina natura est quoddam simplicissimum; sed simplicissimum, cum unitur, totaliter unitur: ergo si divina natura unitur humanae et eam assumit, videtur, quod hoc conveniat cuilibet personae.

4. Item, si aliquod unum, in quo plura uniuntur, unitur alicui, necesse est per consequens, et illa uniri, sicut patet. Nam si punctus, cui uniuntur multae lineae, alicui coniungitur, necesse est, et illas lineas[^7] uniri; si etiam anima, cui uniuntur potentiae, unitur alicui, necesse est, et eidem potentias uniri. Ergo si divinae personae magis uniuntur in natura, quam linea in puncto, vel potentiae in anima; si assumere convenit divinae naturae, necesse est, quod conveniat cuilibet personae; sed constat, quod non convenit cuilibet personae: ergo nec naturae.

5. Item, haec simpliciter est falsa et nullo modo conceditur: *divina essentia generat vel natura,* quoniam ille actus est actus proprius conveniens uni soli personae: ergo si assumere est actus conveniens uni soli personae, utpote personae Filii; videtur, quod haec sit neganda tanquam falsa: *divina natura assumit humanam.*

6. Item, regula est, et habita fuit in primo libro[^8], quod essentia non supponit personam nec e converso: ergo divina essentia vel natura non potest pro persona locutionem reddere veram, nec pro alio; hoc constat, quia soli Filio convenit assumere: ergo videtur simpliciter esse neganda praedicta locutio.

> **CONCLUSIO.** Terminus *assumere* non convenire potest divinae naturae, nisi quatenus tantum dicit respectum ad relationem unionis, quae est in una persona, non autem in ipsa natura.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod tam per verbum *uniendi* quam per verbum *assumendi* importatur unio divinae naturae ad humanam, differenter tamen quantum ad modum significandi (*Differunt dupliciter unire et assumere.*): quia verbum *uniendi* dicitur ab unione, quae magis importat *relationem* quam actionem; verbum autem *assumendi* dicitur ab assumtione, quae principalius importat *actionem.* Unde quamvis concedatur, quod divina natura *uniat* sibi humanam, et eidem etiam *uniatur*; nullo modo tamen conceditur, quod divina natura *assumatur* (*Notandum.*). — Alia etiam est differentia: quia *unire*, quantum est de se, non dicit terminum relationis vel actionis *determinate*; potest enim aliquis aliquid unire *sibi* et *alii.* *Assumere* autem importat *terminum intrinsecum* tam actionis quam relationis; *assumere* enim hoc[^9] est *ad se sumere.*

Cum igitur vocabulum *assumendi* importet simul *relationem* et *actionem*, terminus ille, interius intellectus, potest referri ad *utrumque*, vel ad *alterum* tantum, videlicet ad *relationem* (*Distinctio.*). Si ad *utrumque* referatur; cum *actio illa* terminetur ad unitatem aliquam, tunc *assumere* dictum de aliquo significat non solum *unionem*, sed etiam illam unionem *terminari ad unitatem assumentis.* Et quoniam illa unio non terminatur ad unitatem *naturae*, sed potius ad unitatem *personae*; ideo secundum istum intellectum *assumere* non convenit divinae naturae (*Conclusio 1.*). Divina enim natura non assumsit humanam in unitatem naturae; et ideo isto modo non conceditur, quod eam assumserit divina natura, hoc est *ad se* sive ad propriam unitatem sumserit. — Si autem terminus ille habeat respectum ad *relationem unionis*[^1b]; tunc conceditur, quod divina natura humanam assumserit, hoc est sibi unierit (*Conclusio 2.*). Univit enim sibi humanam naturam, quamvis non *in se ipsa*, sed *in una persona.* — Et isto modo procedunt rationes et auctoritates, quae ad hoc inducuntur; et ideo sunt concedendae.

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1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod solus Filius suscepit humanam naturam; dicendum, quod *solum*[^2b] non excludit ibi *naturam*, quae est in persona et praedicatur de persona, sed excludit *alias duas personas*, scilicet Patrem et Spiritum sanctum (*Solutio oppositorum.*). — Praeterea, auctoritas illa non dicit *simpliciter*, quod solus Filius susceperit, sed quod solus Filius suscepit *in unitatem propriam*[^3b] (*Aliter.*); et tunc non est instantia de natura, quia, ut dictum est, natura divina non suscepit humanam in unitatem naturae, sed in unitatem personae[^4b].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nullo modo differunt in natura; dicendum, quod ista duplex est (*Duplex sensus.*). Uno modo potest intelligi sic: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nullo modo differunt in natura, id est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, habentes unam naturam, nullo modo differunt; et hoc est falsum, quia Pater et Filius personaliter differunt et habent proprietates distinctas. — Alio modo potest intelligi, ut sit sensus: Pater et Filius non differunt in natura, id est, non differunt diversitate naturae; nihilominus tamen differunt a se invicem *re*, et ab ipsa essentia vel natura differunt *ratione* vel *attributione.* Aliquid enim attribuitur personae, quod non naturae, et e converso[^5b]. Et ideo, sicut non sequitur: *divina natura est in tribus personis: ergo persona Patris est in tribus personis una*; sic non sequitur: *divina natura unit sibi vel assumit humanam: ergo persona Patris assumit*; immo est ibi sophisma *accidentis*, vel locus sophisticus *accidentis*[^6b].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de divina natura, quod est quid simplicissimum; dicendum, quod quamvis sit simplicissimum in forma, habet tamen distinctionem in hypostasibus sive in personis[^7b]. Cum ergo intelligimus, aliquid uniri alicui, hoc possumus intelligere aut quantum ad unionem secundum *formam*, aut quantum ad unionem secundum *suppositum* (*Notanda distinctio.*). Dico ergo, quod si divina natura uniretur alicui secundum *formam*, quod necessario tota uniretur, hoc est in qualibet persona, cum simplicissimum[^8b] sit. Sed quia unio ista vel assumtio non est quantum ad unionem in *forma*, sed quantum ad unionem in *persona* et supposito; ideo non sequitur, quod quamvis sit simplicissima, quod tota sit unita, secundum quod *totum* distribuit pro personis. Unde non valet processus ille, quo proceditur a simplicitate naturae ad personarum pluralitatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura est illud, in quo personae uniuntur: ergo ipsa unita, tres personae uniuntur, et ipsa assumente, assumunt; dicendum, quod non sequitur. Quando enim dicitur, quod ad unionem eius, in quo alia uniuntur, sequitur unio illorum, hoc verum est, quando uniuntur *secundum illud et in eo*, in quo alia uniuntur in eo (*Notandum.*), sicut est in puncto, in quo lineae uniuntur tanquam in termino, et ipse punctus ut terminus potest alii uniri; similiter et in anima et in suis potentiis. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia illae personae uniuntur in natura quantum ad unitatem naturalem sive essentialem; sed divina natura non unitur humanae in unam essentiam, sed unitur in unitate hypostasis, in qua quidem hypostasis unitate aliae personae magis distinguuntur quam conveniant.

Et huius exemplum haberi potest in aeternis rationibus, secundum quas Deus producit (*Exemplum 1.*), quae quidem omnes unum sunt in essentia Dei et substantia; non tamen sequitur, quod si Deus facit aliquid secundum rationem unam, quod secundum illam et eandem faciat omnia alia[^9b]. Unde idem sunt idea hominis et idea asini in divina substantia; cum tamen divina substantia facit asinum, non facit illum secundum ideam hominis, sed secundum ideam asini. — Aliud etiam exemplum ponit Anselmus[^10b] in fonte, rivo et lacu (*Exemplum 2.*), qui sunt unius naturae, et unus fluit ab alio. Unde Nilus dicitur fons et dicitur rivus et dicitur lacus; et unus est Nilus, et una est aqua, et unius naturae, quamvis non sit unus fons et unus rivus et unus lacus. Et contingit, Nilum infistulari, ut rivus est, non ut fons neque ut lacus; et hoc est, quia, quamvis eadem aqua primo sit in

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fonte, postea in rivo, postea in lacu, diversum tamen habet modum essendi. In ideis autem est multitudo respectu connotatorum. Et haec duo in divinis personis ponuntur, videlicet pluralitas respectuum, et distinctio modorum essendi ab alio et non ab alio. — Et sic patet, quod non sequitur: *divina natura assumsit, ergo quaelibet persona assumsit*, propter relationem intrinsecam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullo modo conceditur: *essentia generat*, quia illud est proprium personae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia *generare* importat distinctionem, quae nullatenus convenit naturae; *assumere* vero dicit actionem et relationem, quae convenit divinae naturae secundum unum intellectum, ut prius visum est.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non supponit pro persona; dicendum, quod verum est; et quod dicitur: *natura divina assumsit humanam*, iste terminus *natura* non reddit locutionem veram pro persona, sed magis stat ibi natura pro se ipsa. Ipsi enim naturae convenit assumtionem facere, et convenit uniri humanae naturae; et haec duo importat verbum *assumendi* secundum unam sui acceptionem.

### SCHOLION

**I.** Petrus Lombardus in principio huius dist. quatuor ponit quaestiones, quarum tres priores supposita fide catholica, solvi facile possunt; de quarto autem articulo scrupulosam dicit esse etiam inter doctos quaestionem. Hinc S. Bonav. de ista quarta quaestione disputat diffuse, et quidem in quatuor primis quaestionibus huius articuli. Solutio autem propositae difficultatis sponte fluit ex determinatione differentiae, quae est inter *assumere* et *unire.* S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaest. 3.) quinque differentias inter assumtionem et unionem enumerat, quarum principales etiam a S. Bonaventura in 1. quaestione recensentur, vel in seqq. tanguntur. Insuper notandum, quod vocabulum *assumtio*, ut verbis Richardi a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.) utamur, « tripliciter potest dici, scilicet *communiter* et *proprie* et *magis proprie.* Primo modo accipitur pro *sumere*; et sic concedendum, quod tota Trinitas humanam naturam assumsit ipsi Filio, quia fecit unionem humanae naturae cum persona ipsius Filii. Secundo modo *assumere* accipitur pro *ad se sumere*; et sic concedendum, quod divina natura naturam humanam assumsit in persona Filii, in quantum per eam factum est, ut natura humana simul esset cum divina in eadem persona. Tertio modo *assumere* accipitur pro *ad se sumere et in se sumere ut in supposito*; et sic dicendum, quod divina natura non assumsit humanam naturam, nec aliqua persona nisi persona ipsius Filii ».

**II.** Hanc et duas seqq. quaestiones posteriores Scholastici vel una, vel duabus quaestionibus absolvunt. De his igitur tribus qq. agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; S. III. q. 3. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. 4. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2. — Biel, de his et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the assuming itself, on the part of the one assuming.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether to assume is an act befitting the divine nature.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and asks whether to assume is an act befitting the divine nature. And that it is, it seems:

1. (*Foundations.*) On the authority of Augustine in the book *On the Faith, to Peter*[^1]: "That nature, which always remains begotten with the Father, took up our nature without sin"; but to take up and to assume are the same: therefore the nature of God took up our nature.

2. Likewise, more expressly in the book *On the Trinity*[^2]: "The form of God received the form of a servant"; but the form of God is nothing other than the nature of God: therefore if the form received a form, the nature assumed a nature.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. This is true and proper: the divine nature is united to the human; therefore in that union[^3] it stands either as *agent* or as *patient*; it is established that it is not as *patient*: therefore it stands as *agent*. But in that very union to *act* is nothing other than to assume the nature itself: therefore it seems that to *assume* befits the divine nature.

4. Likewise, the divine and human natures are united in the unity[^4] of a person; but from that union the human nature is truly and properly said to be assumed: therefore by parity of reasoning the divine nature too ought to be called, from that union, either *the one assuming* or *the one assumed*. But it is not *assumed*: therefore *to assume* is its own.

**On the contrary** 1. (*To the opposite.*) there is the authority of the Council of Toledo, which the Master sets down in the text[^5]: "Although the whole Trinity wrought the formation of the man taken up, yet the Son alone took up the man into the unity of person, not into the unity of nature": therefore if this befits the Son alone, it does not seem that it befits the divine nature.

2. Likewise, Anselm[^6]: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in no way in nature: therefore what befits the divine nature befits the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but the assumption of the human nature in no way befits the Father, or the Holy Spirit: therefore in no way does it seem to belong to the divine nature.

3. Likewise, the divine nature is something most simple; but what is most simple, when it is united, is united wholly: therefore if the divine nature is united to the human and assumes it, it seems that this befits any person whatsoever.

4. Likewise, if some one thing, in which several things are united, is united to something, it is necessary as a consequence that those too be united, as is evident. For if a point, to which many lines are united, is joined to something, it is necessary that those lines[^7] too be united; if also a soul, to which the powers are united, is united to something, it is necessary that the powers be united to the same. Therefore if the divine persons are united in nature more than a line in a point, or the powers in the soul; if to assume befits the divine nature, it is necessary that it befit any person whatsoever; but it is established that it does not befit any person whatsoever: therefore neither the nature.

5. Likewise, this is simply false and in no way conceded: *the divine essence, or nature, generates*, since that act is a proper act befitting one person alone: therefore if to assume is an act befitting one person alone, namely the person of the Son; it seems that this is to be denied as false: *the divine nature assumes the human.*

6. Likewise, there is a rule, and it was held in the first book[^8], that the essence does not supposit for the person, nor conversely: therefore the divine essence or nature cannot render a statement true with respect to a person, nor with respect to anything else; this is established, because to assume befits the Son alone: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement is simply to be denied.

> **CONCLUSION.** The term *to assume* cannot befit the divine nature except insofar as it expresses only a relation toward the relation of union, which is in one person, but not in the nature itself.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that both by the word *to unite* and by the word *to assume* the union of the divine nature with the human is signified, yet differently as to the mode of signifying (*To unite and to assume differ in two ways.*): for the word *to unite* is named from union, which imports *relation* more than action; but the word *to assume* is named from assumption, which more principally imports *action.* Hence although it be conceded that the divine nature *unites* the human to itself, and is even *united* to it; yet in no way is it conceded that the divine nature *is assumed* (*To be noted.*). — There is also another difference: for *to unite*, of itself, does not express the term of a relation or of an action *determinately*; for someone can unite something to *himself* and to *another.* But *to assume* imports an *intrinsic term* both of the action and of the relation; for *to assume*[^9] is *to take to oneself.*

Since therefore the word *to assume* imports at once *relation* and *action*, that term, inwardly understood, can be referred to *both*, or to *one* only, namely to the *relation* (*Distinction.*). If it is referred to *both*; since *that action* is terminated at some unity, then *to assume* said of something signifies not only the *union*, but also that the union *is terminated at the unity of the one assuming.* And since that union is not terminated at the unity of *nature*, but rather at the unity of *person*; therefore according to that understanding *to assume* does not befit the divine nature (*Conclusion 1.*). For the divine nature did not assume the human into the unity of nature; and therefore in this way it is not conceded that the divine nature assumed it, that is, *took it to itself* or to its own unity. — But if that term has reference to the *relation of union*[^1b]; then it is conceded that the divine nature assumed the human, that is, united it to itself (*Conclusion 2.*). For it united the human nature to itself, though not *in itself*, but *in one person.* — And in this way the reasons and authorities adduced for this proceed; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that the Son alone took up the human nature; it must be said that *alone*[^2b] does not there exclude the *nature*, which is in the person and is predicated of the person, but excludes the *other two persons*, namely the Father and the Holy Spirit (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*). — Moreover, that authority does not say *simply* that the Son alone took up, but that the Son alone took up *into the proper unity*[^3b] (*Otherwise.*); and then there is no counter-instance from the nature, since, as has been said, the divine nature did not take up the human into the unity of nature, but into the unity of person[^4b].

2. To that which is objected, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in no way in nature; it must be said that this is twofold (*Twofold sense.*). In one way it can be understood thus: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in no way in nature, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, having one nature, differ in no way; and this is false, because the Father and the Son differ personally and have distinct properties. — In another way it can be understood, so that the sense is: the Father and the Son do not differ in nature, that is, they do not differ by a diversity of nature; nevertheless they differ from one another *in reality*, and from the essence or nature itself they differ *by reason* or *by attribution.* For something is attributed to the person which is not attributed to the nature, and conversely[^5b]. And therefore, just as it does not follow: *the divine nature is in three persons: therefore the person of the Father is one in three persons*; so it does not follow: *the divine nature unites or assumes the human to itself: therefore the person of the Father assumes*; nay, there is here the sophism of *accident*, or the sophistical topic of *accident*[^6b].

3. To that which is objected concerning the divine nature, that it is something most simple; it must be said that although it is most simple in form, yet it has distinction in the hypostases or in the persons[^7b]. When therefore we understand that something is united to something, we can understand this either as to a union according to *form*, or as to a union according to *suppositum* (*A distinction to be noted.*). I say therefore that if the divine nature were united to something according to *form*, it would necessarily be wholly united, that is, in any person whatsoever, since it is most simple[^8b]. But because this union or assumption is not as to a union in *form*, but as to a union in *person* and suppositum; therefore it does not follow that, although it be most simple, it is wholly united, in the sense in which *whole* is distributed over the persons. Hence that process is invalid, by which one proceeds from the simplicity of the nature to the plurality of persons.

4. To that which is objected, that the nature is that in which the persons are united: therefore it being united, the three persons are united, and it being the assumer, they assume; it must be said that it does not follow. For when it is said that to the union of that in which others are united there follows the union of those, this is true when they are united *according to that and in it*, in which the others are united in it (*To be noted.*), as is the case in a point, in which lines are united as in a terminus, and the point itself as terminus can be united to another; likewise also in the soul and in its powers. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because those persons are united in nature as to a natural or essential unity; but the divine nature is not united to the human in one essence, but is united in the unity of a hypostasis, in which unity of a hypostasis indeed the other persons are more distinguished than they agree.

And an example of this can be had in the eternal reasons, according to which God produces (*Example 1.*), which are all one in the essence and substance of God; yet it does not follow that if God makes something according to one reason, He makes all other things according to that same one[^9b]. Hence the idea of man and the idea of an ass are the same in the divine substance; yet when the divine substance makes an ass, it does not make it according to the idea of man, but according to the idea of an ass. — Anselm[^10b] also gives another example, in a spring, a stream, and a lake (*Example 2.*), which are of one nature, and one flows from the other. Hence the Nile is called a spring and is called a stream and is called a lake; and the Nile is one, and the water is one, and of one nature, although the spring and the stream and the lake are not one. And it happens that the Nile is channeled as it is a stream, not as a spring nor as a lake; and this is because, although the same water is first in

the spring, afterward in the stream, afterward in the lake, yet it has a different mode of being. But in the ideas there is a multitude with respect to the connotates. And these two are posited in the divine persons, namely a plurality of respects, and a distinction of the modes of being from another and not from another. — And so it is evident that it does not follow: *the divine nature assumed, therefore any person whatsoever assumed*, on account of the intrinsic relation.

5. To that which is objected, that in no way is it conceded: *the essence generates*, because that is proper to a person; it must be said that it is not similar: for *to generate* imports a distinction, which in no way befits the nature; but *to assume* expresses an action and a relation, which befits the divine nature according to one understanding, as was seen before.

6. To that which is objected, that the nature does not supposit for the person; it must be said that it is true; and as for what is said: *the divine nature assumed the human*, this term *nature* does not render the statement true with respect to the person, but rather there the nature stands for itself. For to the nature itself it belongs to perform the assumption, and it belongs to be united to the human nature; and these two the word *to assume* imports according to one of its acceptations.

### SCHOLION

**I.** Peter Lombard, at the beginning of this distinction, sets down four questions, of which the three former, granting the catholic faith, can be solved easily; but concerning the fourth article he says there is a scrupulous question even among the learned. Hence St. Bonaventure disputes this fourth question at length, and indeed in the first four questions of this article. The solution of the proposed difficulty flows of itself from the determination of the difference which exists between *to assume* and *to unite.* St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 3) enumerates five differences between the assumption and the union, of which the principal ones are also reviewed by St. Bonaventure in the first question, or are touched on in the following ones. Moreover it is to be noted that the word *assumption*, to use the words of Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 1), "can be said in three ways, namely *commonly* and *properly* and *more properly.* In the first way it is taken for *to take*; and so it must be conceded that the whole Trinity assumed the human nature for the Son himself, because it made the union of the human nature with the person of the Son himself. In the second way *to assume* is taken for *to take to oneself*; and so it must be conceded that the divine nature assumed the human nature in the person of the Son, inasmuch as through it it was brought about that the human nature was together with the divine in the same person. In the third way *to assume* is taken for *to take to oneself and to take into oneself as into a suppositum*; and so it must be said that the divine nature did not assume the human nature, nor did any person except the person of the Son himself."

**II.** This and the two following questions the later Scholastics dispatch in one, or in two, questions. Concerning these three questions, then, the following treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 4, m. 1. 2. 3. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1. 2; Summa III, q. 3, a. 1. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. 3. 4. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1. 2. — Biel, on these and the following questions, here in one question.

---

la: Cap. 2, n. 14. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. In textu origin. (p.121, footer note 5)

en: *On the Faith, to Peter*, ch. 2, n. 14. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. In the original text. (printed page 121, footer note 5)

la: Libr. I. c. 7. n. 14. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. (p.122, n. 1)

en: Book I, c. 7, n. 14. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. (printed page 122, note 1)

la: Ita cod. bb et edd., alii codd. *aut ergo illa unio;* edd. deinde post *se habet* addunt *natura divina.* — De maiori vide verba Damasceni, hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. allata, quae et pro seq. arg. animadvertenda sunt. (p.122, n. 2)

en: Thus codex bb and the editions; other codices read *aut ergo illa unio* ("or therefore that union"); the editions then, after *se habet*, add *natura divina.* — On the major premise see the words of the Damascene cited here in the text of the Master, c. 1, which are also to be noted for the following argument. (printed page 122, note 2)

la: Codd. E F H L T U Z aa bb *in unitatem.* In seqq. codd. non sibi constant, modo ponentes *in unitate*, modo *in unitatem.* (p.122, n. 3)

en: Codices E F H L T U Z aa bb read *in unitatem* ("into the unity"). In what follows the codices are not consistent with themselves, now putting *in unitate* ("in the unity"), now *in unitatem.* (printed page 122, note 3)

en: Here, c. 1. (printed page 122, note 4)

la: Libr. de Fide Trin. c. 3. seq. ubi S. Doctor falsissimum illud arg. Roscellini: *si una eademque res Deus est, et ipsa eadem est Pater et Filius: ergo si Filius incarnatur, incarnatur et Pater*, refellit obiiciendo, quod Filius sit alia persona. Cfr. Monolog. c. 43. et 58. seq., et de Processione Spir. S. c. 2. et 17. (p.122, n. 5)

en: *On the Faith of the Trinity*, c. 3 f., where the holy Doctor refutes that most false argument of Roscelin — *if God is one and the same thing, that same thing is the Father and the Son: therefore if the Son is incarnate, the Father too is incarnate* — by objecting that the Son is another person. Cf. *Monologion* c. 43 and 58 f., and *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* c. 2 and 17. (printed page 122, note 5)

la: Nonnulli codd. cum edd. subiiciunt *illi.* Circa finem arg. codd. K bb omittunt *constat, quod*, codd. E G H L N T U V X aa et edd. 1, 2 totam minorem *sed constat... personae.* (p.122, n. 6)

en: Several codices, with the editions, subjoin *illi* ("to it"). Toward the end of the argument codices K bb omit *constat, quod* ("it is established that"); codices E G H L N T U V X aa and editions 1, 2 omit the whole minor premise *sed constat... personae* ("but it is established... person"). (printed page 122, note 6)

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 5, a. 1, q. 1. (printed page 122, note 7)

la: Dist. 4. q. 1. (ubi et in scholio expositum est, quid sibi velint verba *locutionem reddere veram*) et q. 4; d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. nec non d. 28. dub. 4, et ibid. pag. 576, nota 1. — Mox pro *hoc constat* Vat. *cui hoc conveniat.* (p.122, n. 8)

en: Distinction 4, q. 1 (where also in the scholion it is set forth what the words *to render the statement true* mean) and q. 4; d. 5, a. 1, q. 1; and also d. 28, dub. 4, and there p. 576, note 1. — Shortly after, for *hoc constat* the Vatican edition reads *cui hoc conveniat* ("to which this befits"). (printed page 122, note 8)

la: In Vat. deest *hoc*, pro quo edd. 1, 2 *hic.* (p.122, n. 9)

en: In the Vatican edition *hoc* is lacking, for which editions 1, 2 read *hic* ("here"). (printed page 122, note 9)

la: Vat. adiicit *tantum.* (p.123, n. 1)

en: The Vatican edition adds *tantum* ("only"). (printed page 123, note 1)

la: Codd. Z bb *solus.* (p.123, n. 2)

en: Codices Z bb read *solus* ("alone"). (printed page 123, note 2)

la: Sive, ut utamur ipsis verbis Concilii, *in singularitate personae.* (p.123, n. 3)

en: Or, to use the very words of the Council, *into the singularity of the person.* (printed page 123, note 3)

la: Easdem duas solutiones etiam a Magistro afferuntur hic in lit. c. 1. circa finem. (p.123, n. 4)

en: The same two solutions are also brought forward by the Master here in the text, c. 1, toward the end. (printed page 123, note 4)

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. seq. et d. 34. q. 1. seq. — Mox post *tribus personis* codd. F K U Y subiiciunt *una.* Codd. L K S aa cc in fine solut. omittunt verba *vel locus sophisticus accidentis.* De sophismate accidentis vide Aristot., l. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.) et tom. II. pag. 870, nota 8. (p.123, n. 5)

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 33, q. 1 f. and d. 34, q. 1 f. — Shortly after *tribus personis* codices F K U Y subjoin *una* ("one"). Codices L K S aa cc at the end of the solution omit the words *vel locus sophisticus accidentis* ("or the sophistical topic of accident"). On the sophism of accident see Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* c. 4 (c. 5), and tome II, p. 870, note 8. (printed page 123, note 5)

en: See I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 1. (printed page 123, note 6)

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. *simplicissima*, et deinde in fine solut. cum edd. 1, 2 *ita proceditur* pro quo *proceditur.* (p.123, n. 7)

en: The Vatican edition, with a few codices, reads *simplicissima*, and then at the end of the solution, with editions 1, 2, *ita proceditur* ("thus one proceeds"), for which *proceditur* ("one proceeds"). (printed page 123, note 7)

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 2 ff. (printed page 123, note 8)

la: In libr. de Fide Trin. c. 8. Cfr. de Process. Spir. S. c. 17. (p.123, n. 9) — Mox (p.123, n. 10): Qua similitudine Incarnatio significatur, ut loc. cit. ipse Anselm. explicat.

en: In the book *On the Faith of the Trinity*, c. 8. Cf. *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, c. 17. (printed page 123, note 9) — And shortly after (printed page 123, note 10): By which likeness the Incarnation is signified, as in the cited place Anselm himself explains. (printed page 123, note 10)

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp.121 foot–124, read Left column top→bottom then Right column, per the VOL II/III override), with raw OCR lines 8956–9135 as the spacing/marker base. Fresh literal English. The short ARTICULUS I opener (*De ipsa assumtione ex parte assumentis*) + QUAESTIO I title are folded into this chunk per the locked chunking convention (no standalone a1-divisio).

**Page-split map (footers, Quaracchi per-page restart):**
- **p.121** — body opener only (foot of page, below the divisio). Footer note **5** (`Cap. 2, n. 14. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1`) is this quaestio's FIRST footer, picked up as the hand-off from d5-divisio (which consumed p.121 notes 1–4). Rendered as `[^1]`, keying *ad Petrum⁵* in the opener. ✓ confirmed against d5-divisio.
- **p.122** — videtur args 2–4, sed contra 1–6, CONCLUSIO, RESPONDEO. Footer notes 1–9 → `[^2]`–`[^9]`, `[^1b]`.
- **p.123** — replies 1–4 (through the Nile example). Footer notes 1–10 → `[^2b]`–`[^10b]` (note 10 appended to `[^10b]` as the Anselm-similitude gloss; it anchors no separate marker in Quaracchi).
- **p.124** — replies 4 (tail)–6, then SCHOLION I–II (spanning both columns at the foot). The p.124 page-footers visible on the page (Augustine *de Fide ad Petrum*; *ratione videtur*; etc.) belong to **q2** (q2's *Fundamenta* and body begin on p.124-R after the scholion) — NOT carried here. The SCHOLION itself carries no footnote anchors (it uses inline `(hic q. N…)` references).

**Apparatus count:** 20 entries (p.121 n.5 + p.122 nn.1–9 + p.123 nn.1–10).

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses, not as anchors: *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*, *Differunt dupliciter unire et assumere*, *Notandum*, *Distinctio*, *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Aliter*, *Duplex sensus*, *Notanda distinctio*, *Exemplum 1*, *Exemplum 2*.

**Scholion disposition:** `has_scholion: true`. Two parts. **Scholion II explicitly forecasts forward-coverage:** "This and the two following questions (q2, q3) the later Scholastics dispatch in one or two questions" — so q2 and q3 may legitimately lack their own scholia (their material is gathered here). Check the siblings before flagging a missing scholion on q2/q3.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to d5-a1-q2:** printed **p.124's** page-footer sequence (Augustine *de Fide ad Petrum*; *ratione videtur*; *assumtio est ad aliquam unionem*; etc.) belongs to **q2**, whose QUAESTIO II opener (*Utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae*; *Secundo quaeritur, utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae…*) begins on p.124-R immediately after this scholion. d5-a1-q2 must LEAD its apparatus with p.124's note 1 onward (there is no ARTICULUS opener to fold; q2 is a bare QUAESTIO).

**[?] flags:** none.