title: Dist. 21, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXI)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction 21)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc, quod dicitur, quod diabolus loquebatur per serpentem ignorantem, sicut per energumenos. Sed contra: Diabolus movet energumenos mediante virtute sensibili: ergo videtur similiter, quod moverit serpentem ad formandam locutionem mediante sensibili virtute; hoc autem non videtur possibile, quia imaginatio serpentis non erat capax sermonis et locutionis: ergo mediante illa non poterat vox articulata formari. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, a qua virtute fuerit illius locutionis formatio principaliter; et utrum data sit *nova* potestas serpenti; utrum etiam fuerit *miraculum*, sicut fuit in locutione asinae Balaam[^1].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad locutionis formationem ista tria concurrunt: primo *instrumentorum aptitudo* et convenientia; secundo vero *virtus motiva*; et tertio *virtus directiva*, cuius regimine formatur[^2] vox articulata. Et haec tria sunt in homine complete a sui natura; in brutis vero animalibus reperiuntur incomplete. Habent enim quaedam animalia organa apta, licet non complete, ad vocis formationem; habent etiam vim sensibilem[^3] motivam; habent etiam vim excogitativam sive imaginativam, ratione cuius erudiuntur ad aliquas voces pronuntiandas; non tamen est in eis complete, sed cum adest vis rationalis, quae possit et regere et movere, tunc illa potentia incompleta ad actum habet reduci. — Et sic fuit in illa prima tentatione. Nam diabolus excitabat vim motivam et adiuvabat et dirigebat,
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ut posset illas voces articulatas formare, ita quod serpenti non est data nova potestas, sed potestas superior assistebat[^4]. Unde proprie *miraculum* non erat, licet quis rationabiliter admirari posset, cum esset supra potestatem irrationalis creaturae, talia verba formari. — Licet igitur maior sit aptitudo in energumenis ratione vis motivae et organorum in loquendo quam in serpente; quia tamen virtus principaliter movens utrobique et dirigens in formando est virtus daemonis, ideo dicit Magister, eodem modo locutum esse diabolum per serpentem, quo modo loquitur per daemoniacum.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod imaginativa vis serpentis non erat capax locutionis; dicendum, quod verum est de locutione quantum ad *significationem*, sed non est verum quantum ad vocis *expressionem*. — Vel posset dici, quod quamvis motus serpentis cooperaretur ad motum linguae, non tamen cognitiva cooperabatur ad vocis articulationem. — Et per hoc patent ea quae quaesita sunt.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *serpens callidissimus dictus est propter astutiam diaboli*. Sed si haec est ratio, quare serpens dictus est callidissimus; pari ratione, si diabolus quodcumque aliud animal assumsisset, callidissimum diceretur: ergo non esset ratio, quare magis illud animal assumsisset quam aliud.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod calliditas attenditur in cognitione ordinata ad nocendum et seducendum. Et quoniam duplex est nocumentum, videlicet spirituale et corporale, duplex potest esse calliditas: aut in nocendo *corporaliter*, aut in nocendo *spiritualiter*. Calliditatem in nocendo corporaliter homini habet serpens a naturae suae industria, loquendo saltem secundum statum naturae lapsae. Calliditatem vero nocendi spiritualiter non habet a se, sed a diaboli praesentia; et de hoc loquitur Augustinus[^5] et Magister in littera. Et quia spiritualia debent significari per corporalia sibi similia, ideo, cum serpens ex se habeat calliditatem nocendi et insidiandi corporaliter, congruum fuit, per ipsum diabolum exercere calliditatem suam contra hominem in nocendo spiritualiter; et secundum hunc duplicem sensum intelligi potest Scriptura[^6].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit scriptura: *Sciendum est, duas esse species tentationis, interiorem et exteriorem.* Exterior enim tentatio non est nisi propter interiorem nec ad culpam perducit nisi mediante interiori: ergo non videtur, quod ab invicem habeant distingui. — Item, subdividit[^7] interiorem in eam quae est ab hoste, et in eam quae est a carne; et videtur, quod divisio illa sit insufficiens, quia non solum tentatio est ab hoste et a carne, sed etiam a mundo, secundum illud primae Ioannis secundo[^8]: *Omne quod est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis* etc.

Quaeritur ergo de *sufficientia* horum membrorum. Et cum alibi legantur plures aliae differentiae tentationis, quaeritur, quomodo distinguantur ab illis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tentatio quinque modis considerari potest, scilicet quantum ad *motivum* et quantum ad *instrumentum* et quantum ad *effectum* et quantum ad *gradum* et quantum ad *modum*. — Quantum ad *motivum*: vel generaliter vel specialiter. Si generaliter; sic dividitur tentatio in eam quae est ab hoste et a carne et a mundo, ut dicitur in quadam sequentia[^9]: «Mundus, caro, daemonia diversa movent proelia». — Si specialiter, ut dicatur motivum, quod se offert non solum per modum *obiecti*, sed etiam quod inducit et excitat per modum *impulsivi*; sic est illa divisio, quam ponit Magister in littera, quod tentatio alia est ab hoste, alia est a carne, quorum utrumque habet ad malum incendere.

Si autem loquamur quantum ad *instrumentum*, sic dupliciter potest considerari: aut generaliter, aut specialiter. Si generaliter; sic est illa divisio Gregorii[^10], quod tentatio quaedam est per *vitia*, quaedam per *flagella*. — Si specialiter; sic est illa divisio tentationis, quam ponit Glossa in Psalmo[^11] super illud: *Omnem escam abominata est* etc, ubi dicitur, quod multiplex est tentatio; quarum prima est *error* sive nescientia viae veritatis; secunda, *difficultas vincendarum concupiscentiarum*; tertia, *taedium boni*; quarta, *tempestas saeculi*.

Si tertio modo, scilicet quantum ad *effectum*, consideretur ipsa tentatio, similiter dupliciter potest considerari: aut generaliter, aut specialiter. Si
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generaliter; sic est illa divisio, quae ponitur in Glossa super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo[^12]: *Tentatio vos non apprehendat* etc, ubi dicitur in Glossa, quod tentatio alia est *diabolica*, alia est *humana*. Et differunt, quia, sicut ibidem innuitur, tentatio diabolica est, quae malum habet exitum et quae terminatur ad mortale peccatum; tentatio vero humana dicitur, quae exitum periculosum non habet, quia vel est ibi peccatum veniale, vel nulla est ibi culpa, secundum quod ostenditur in Glossa, ubi dicitur, quod tribus modis habet fieri tentatio humana. — Si specialiter; sic est illa Augustini *de Doctrina christiana*[^13], quod diabolus tentat aut vexando carnem, aut vulnerando naturalia, aut exspoliando gratuita: hic enim ponuntur specialiter effectus tentationis diabolicae.

Si autem quarto modo consideretur tentatio, scilicet quantum ad *gradum*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut generaliter, aut specialiter. Si generaliter; sic est illa, quam ponit Magister in littera: tentatio alia est *exterior*, alia *interior*. — Si specialiter; sic est illa, quam ponit Gregorius, et habetur in Glossa super illud Iacobi primo[^14]: *Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia* etc, quod tentatio tripliciter perficitur: *suggestione, delectatione* et *consensu*, ubi notantur gradus in progressu tentationis explicite, qui ponebantur in divisione prius habita implicite. Per tentationem enim exteriorem intelligimus suggestionem; per interiorem intelligimus illam, in qua est delectatio vel consensus. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod illa membra ad invicem non distinguuntur, cum unum ordinetur ad alterum.

Si autem quinto modo consideretur tentatio, scilicet quantum ad tentandi *modum*; hoc similiter aut erit generaliter, aut specialiter. Si generaliter; hoc potest esse explicite, vel implicite. Si implicite; sic est illa, quae ponitur in Glossa super Psalmum[^15]: *Qui habitat in adiutorio*, ubi dicitur, quod quaedam est tentatio levis et occulta; quaedam gravis et occulta; quaedam levis et manifesta; quaedam gravis et manifesta. Si autem explicite; sic est illa quam ponit Bernardus[^16] per septem membra. Quarum prima est *importuna*, scilicet quae procaciter insistit; secunda *dubia*, scilicet quae animum dubietatis nebula involvit; tertia est *subita*, scilicet quae iudicium rationis praevenit; quarta *occulta*, quae scilicet deliberationis ordinem praeterfugit; quinta *violenta*, quae vires nostras transcendit; sexta *fraudulenta*, quae scilicet animum seducit; septima *perplexa*, quae variis vitiis impedit. — In hac enim divisione explicantur difficultates et gravitates tentationum sive modorum tentandi, et latentiae, quae in priori divisione implicite claudebantur. Verumtamen tam haec divisio quam praecedens est de modis tentationis in sua generalitate consideratae. — Si autem consideretur specialiter tentatio, prout contrahitur ad tentationem diaboli, sic modi eius dupliciter possunt assignari: vel implicite; et sic dividit Augustinus in quodam sermone[^17]: «Diabolus tentat ut leo, tentat ut draco». Vel explicite; et sic est illa divisio Gregorii super Iob quadragesimo[^18], super quem locum dicit Gregorius sic: «Fideli famulo Dominus cunctas hostis callidi machinationes insinuat, scilicet quod opprimendo *rapit*, insidiando *circumvenit*, minando *terret*, suadendo *blanditur*, desperando *frangit*, promittendo *decipit*». In hac autem divisione explicantur modi, quos Augustinus clauserat sub his duobus verbis, quod «tentat ut leo, tentat ut draco». — Et sic patet ratio assignandi diversas divisiones tentationis secundum diversas eius considerationes. Patet nihilominus responsio ad obiecta[^19].

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: *Tentatio, quae fit ex carne, non est sine peccato.* Cum enim diabolus possit carnem commovere et vexare, videtur similiter, quod tentatio, quae est ab hoste, sine peccato esse non possit. — Item, cum non sit in nostra potestate tentari, vel non
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tentari, videtur, quod tentatio de se non ponat in nobis culpam, nisi ei consentiatur. Sicut ergo tentatio hostis, cui non consentitur, est materia exercendae virtutis, ita videtur etiam tentatio carnis. — Propter hoc est quaestio, quare tentatio carnis magis est semper cum peccato quam tentatio hostis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tentatio carnis est impulsus sensualitatis, quem consuevimus appellare *primum motum*; et quoniam in illo impulsu sensualitas movetur inordinate et praeter rationis ordinem, hinc est, quod tentatio carnis nunquam est in nobis, quin sit in nobis aliqua inordinatio, et ita aliqua venialis culpa. Tentatio vero hostis omnino extra est et potest esse sine aliqua delectatione inordinata in nobis existente. Et ideo dicit Magister, quod tentatio hostis potest esse sine peccato, tentatio vero carnis minime. — Alia etiam posset reddi ratio, quoniam caro est in potestate nostra, et eam possumus ad libitum nostrum domare; et ideo potius imputatur nobis in culpam carnis impulsio quam diabolica suggestio. Quomodo autem carnis impulsus sive primi motus debeant dici esse peccatum, infra suo loco magis expresse determinabitur.

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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first about what is said, that the devil spoke through an ignorant serpent, just as through those possessed. But on the contrary: The devil moves the possessed by means of a sensible power: therefore it seems likewise that he moved the serpent to form speech by means of a sensible power; but this does not seem possible, because the imagination of the serpent was not capable of speech and discourse: therefore by means of it articulate speech could not be formed. — In keeping with this it is asked from what power that speech was principally formed; and whether a *new* power was given to the serpent; and whether also it was a *miracle*, as it was in the speaking of Balaam's ass[^1].

**I respond:** It must be said that three things concur for the formation of speech: first, *the aptitude of the instruments* and their fittingness; second, *a motive power*; and third, *a directive power*, by whose governance articulate speech is formed[^2]. And these three are in man completely by his nature; but in brute animals they are found incompletely. For some animals have organs apt, though not completely, for the formation of voice; they have also a sensible[^3] motive power; they have also a cogitative or imaginative power, by reason of which they are trained to pronounce certain sounds; yet it is not in them completely, but when a rational power is present, which can both govern and move, then that incomplete potency must be reduced to act. — And so it was in that first temptation. For the devil aroused the motive power and assisted and directed it,
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so that it could form those articulate words, in such a way that no new power was given to the serpent, but a higher power was assisting[^4]. Hence properly it was not a *miracle*, although one might reasonably wonder, since it was above the power of an irrational creature that such words be formed. — Therefore, although there is a greater aptitude in the possessed by reason of the motive power and the organs in speaking than in the serpent; yet because the power principally moving in both cases, and directing in the forming, is the power of the demon, therefore the Master says that the devil spoke through the serpent in the same way that he speaks through one possessed.

To that, then, which is objected, that the imaginative power of the serpent was not capable of speech; it must be said that this is true of speech as to its *signification*, but it is not true as to the *expression* of the voice. — Or it could be said that, although the motion of the serpent cooperated toward the motion of the tongue, yet the cognitive power did not cooperate toward the articulation of the voice. — And by this what was asked is made clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *the serpent was called most cunning on account of the cunning of the devil*. But if this is the reason why the serpent was called most cunning, by the same reasoning, if the devil had assumed any other animal whatever, it would be called most cunning: therefore there would be no reason why he assumed that animal rather than another.

**I respond:** It must be said that cunning is observed in a knowledge ordered to harming and seducing. And since harm is twofold, namely spiritual and corporeal, cunning can be twofold: either in harming *corporeally*, or in harming *spiritually*. The cunning in harming man corporeally the serpent has from the industry of its own nature, speaking at least according to the state of fallen nature. But the cunning of harming spiritually it does not have of itself, but from the presence of the devil; and of this Augustine speaks[^5], and the Master in the text. And because spiritual things ought to be signified by corporeal things like them, therefore, since the serpent has of itself the cunning of harming and lying in wait corporeally, it was fitting for the devil through it to exercise his cunning against man in harming spiritually; and according to this twofold sense Scripture can be understood[^6].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what Scripture says: *It must be known that there are two species of temptation, interior and exterior.* For exterior temptation is only on account of the interior, nor does it lead to fault except by means of the interior: therefore it does not seem that they should be distinguished from each other. — Likewise, he subdivides[^7] the interior into that which is from the enemy, and into that which is from the flesh; and it seems that that division is insufficient, because temptation is not only from the enemy and from the flesh, but also from the world, according to that of the first of John, chapter two[^8]: *Everything that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh* etc.

It is asked therefore concerning the *sufficiency* of these members. And since elsewhere several other differences of temptation are read, it is asked how they are distinguished from those.

**I respond:** It must be said that temptation can be considered in five modes, namely as to its *motive* and as to its *instrument* and as to its *effect* and as to its *degree* and as to its *manner*. — As to the *motive*: either generally or specially. If generally; thus temptation is divided into that which is from the enemy and from the flesh and from the world, as is said in a certain sequence[^9]: «World, flesh, demons stir up diverse battles». — If specially, so that the motive be called that which presents itself not only by way of *object*, but also that which induces and incites by way of an *impelling* thing; thus is that division which the Master places in the text, that one temptation is from the enemy, another from the flesh, each of which has the power to enkindle toward evil.

But if we speak as to the *instrument*, thus it can be considered in two ways: either generally, or specially. If generally; thus is that division of Gregory[^10], that one temptation is through *vices*, another through *scourges*. — If specially; thus is that division of temptation which the Gloss places on the Psalm[^11] upon that text: *Her soul abhorred all food* etc, where it is said that temptation is manifold; of which the first is *error* or ignorance of the way of truth; the second, *the difficulty of overcoming concupiscences*; the third, *weariness of the good*; the fourth, *the storm of the world*.

If in the third mode, namely as to the *effect*, the temptation itself be considered, likewise it can be considered in two ways: either generally, or specially. If
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generally; thus is that division which is placed in the Gloss upon that text of the first to the Corinthians, chapter ten[^12]: *Let no temptation take hold of you* etc, where it is said in the Gloss that one temptation is *diabolical*, another is *human*. And they differ because, as is there intimated, diabolical temptation is that which has an evil outcome and which terminates in mortal sin; but human temptation is called that which does not have a perilous outcome, because either there is venial sin there, or there is no fault there, according to what is shown in the Gloss, where it is said that human temptation comes about in three ways. — If specially; thus is that of Augustine *On Christian Doctrine*[^13], that the devil tempts either by vexing the flesh, or by wounding the natural endowments, or by despoiling of the gratuitous gifts: for here the effects of diabolical temptation are placed specially.

But if in the fourth mode temptation be considered, namely as to its *degree*, this can be in two ways: either generally, or specially. If generally; thus is that which the Master places in the text: one temptation is *exterior*, another *interior*. — If specially; thus is that which Gregory places, and is had in the Gloss upon that text of James, chapter one[^14]: *Each one is tempted by his own concupiscence* etc, that temptation is accomplished in three ways: by *suggestion, delight*, and *consent*, where the degrees in the progress of temptation are noted explicitly, which in the division had before were placed implicitly. For by exterior temptation we understand suggestion; by the interior we understand that in which there is delight or consent. — And by this is made clear the response to that which is first objected, that those members are not distinguished from one another, since one is ordered to the other.

But if in the fifth mode temptation be considered, namely as to the *manner* of tempting; this likewise will be either generally, or specially. If generally; this can be explicitly, or implicitly. If implicitly; thus is that which is placed in the Gloss upon the Psalm[^15]: *He who dwells in the aid*, where it is said that one temptation is light and hidden; another grave and hidden; another light and manifest; another grave and manifest. But if explicitly; thus is that which Bernard places[^16] through seven members. Of which the first is *importunate*, namely that which presses on boldly; the second *doubtful*, namely that which involves the soul in a cloud of doubt; the third is *sudden*, namely that which forestalls the judgment of reason; the fourth *hidden*, which namely escapes the order of deliberation; the fifth *violent*, which transcends our strength; the sixth *fraudulent*, which namely seduces the soul; the seventh *perplexing*, which entangles with diverse vices. — For in this division are explained the difficulties and gravities of temptations or of the modes of tempting, and the hidden qualities, which in the prior division were enclosed implicitly. Nevertheless both this division and the preceding one is concerning the modes of temptation considered in their generality. — But if temptation be considered specially, as it is contracted to the temptation of the devil, thus its modes can be assigned in two ways: either implicitly; and thus Augustine divides in a certain sermon[^17]: «The devil tempts as a lion, he tempts as a dragon». Or explicitly; and thus is that division of Gregory upon Job, chapter forty[^18], upon which place Gregory speaks thus: «To his faithful servant the Lord intimates all the machinations of the cunning enemy, namely that by oppressing he *snatches away*, by lying in wait he *circumvents*, by threatening he *terrifies*, by persuading he *flatters*, by causing despair he *breaks*, by promising he *deceives*». But in this division are explained the modes which Augustine had enclosed under these two words, that «he tempts as a lion, he tempts as a dragon». — And thus is made clear the reason for assigning the diverse divisions of temptation according to its diverse considerations. There is made clear nonetheless the response to the objections[^19].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says in the text: *The temptation which comes from the flesh is not without sin.* For since the devil can stir up and vex the flesh, it seems likewise that the temptation which is from the enemy could not be without sin. — Likewise, since it is not in our power to be tempted, or not
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to be tempted, it seems that temptation of itself does not place fault in us, unless it be consented to. As therefore the temptation of the enemy, which is not consented to, is matter for the exercise of virtue, so it seems also is the temptation of the flesh. — On account of this there is a question, why the temptation of the flesh is more always with sin than the temptation of the enemy.

**I respond:** It must be said that the temptation of the flesh is an impulse of sensuality, which we are accustomed to call *the first motion*; and since in that impulse sensuality is moved inordinately and beside the order of reason, hence it is that the temptation of the flesh is never in us without there being in us some inordination, and so some venial fault. But the temptation of the enemy is altogether outside, and can be without any inordinate delight existing in us. And therefore the Master says that the temptation of the enemy can be without sin, but the temptation of the flesh by no means. — Another reason also could be given, namely that the flesh is in our power, and we can subdue it at our pleasure; and therefore the impulse of the flesh is imputed to us as fault rather than diabolical suggestion. But in what way the impulse of the flesh, or the first motions, ought to be said to be sin, will be determined below in its proper place more expressly.

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la: Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 27. n. 34. seq. — De locutione asinae Balaam cfr. l. de Mirabil. s. Script. (inter opera S. August.) c. 34. (Num. 22, 28 seqq.)

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 27, n. 34 ff. — On the speaking of Balaam's ass, cf. the book *On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture* (among the works of St. Augustine) c. 34. (Numbers 22:28 ff.)

la: Boeth., l. in librum de Aristotelis interpretatione (ed. secunda), ubi de iis quae Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 87. seqq. (c. 8), profert, fusius disserit et dicit: *Vox est aeris per linguam percussio, quae per quasdam gutturis partes, quae arteriae vocantur, ab animali profertur. Sunt enim quidam alii soni, qui eodem perficiuntur flatu, quos lingua non percutit, ut est tussis... Quocirca vox haec non dicitur, sed tantum sonus. Illa quoque potest esse definitio vocis, ut eam dicamus sonum esse cum quadam imaginatione significandi. Vox namque, cum emittitur, significationis alicuius causa profertur. Tussis vero, cum sonus sit, nullius significationis causa surrepit potius, quam profertur. Quare quoniam flatus noster ita sese habet, ut si ita percutiatur atque formetur, ut cum lingua percutiat, vox sit. Si eum lingua ita percutiat, ut terminato quodam et circumscripto sono, vox exeat, locutio fit, quae Graece dicitur λέξις. Locutio enim est articulata vox... cuius locutionis partes sunt litterae, quae cum coniunctae fuerint, unam efficiunt vocem coniunctam compositamque, quae locutio praedicatur... Ut igitur sit locutio, voce opus est... Sed ut haec locutio significativa sit, illud quoque addi oportet, ut sit aliqua significandi imaginatio, per quam id quod in voce vel in locutione est, proferatur* etc. [textus post medium corruptus est].

en: Boethius, in his book on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* (second edition), where, concerning what Aristotle sets forth in *On the Soul* II, text 87 ff. (c. 8), he discourses at length and says: *Voice is a striking of the air by the tongue, which is uttered by an animal through certain parts of the throat which are called arteries. For there are certain other sounds which are produced by the same breath, which the tongue does not strike, such as a cough... Wherefore this is not called voice, but only sound. This also can be the definition of voice, that we say it to be a sound with a certain imagination of signifying. For voice, when it is emitted, is uttered for the sake of some signification. But a cough, since it is a sound, creeps up rather without any cause of signifying than is uttered. Wherefore, since our breath is so disposed that, if it be thus struck and formed that it strike with the tongue, there is voice. If the tongue so strikes it that, with a certain terminated and circumscribed sound, the voice goes forth, speech (locutio) comes about, which in Greek is called λέξις. For speech is articulate voice... of which speech the parts are letters, which, when they have been joined, make one joined and composed voice, which is called speech... Therefore, that there be speech, voice is needed... But that this speech be significative, this too must be added, that there be some imagination of signifying, through which that which is in the voice or in the speech is uttered* etc. [the text after the middle is corrupt].

la: Non pauci codd., inter quos F K T W aa ee cum ed. 2, omittunt *vim*; cod. cc et ed. 1 pro *vim sensibilem* substituunt *virtutem*.

en: Not a few codices, among which F K T W aa ee with ed. 2, omit *vim* ("power"); codex cc and ed. 1 substitute *virtutem* ("strength") for *vim sensibilem* ("sensible power").

la: Vat. cum ceteris edd. et pluribus codd. *servatur*.

en: The Vatican edition with the other editions and several codices reads *servatur* ("is preserved").

la: Cod. aa *bene motiva*, scil. vis. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 103. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 4. q. 1. incidens; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 4.

en: Codex aa reads *bene motiva*, namely the power. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 103 m. 6; B. Albert, here a. 6; Summa p. II tr. 14 q. 86 m. 4 q. 1 incidental; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here doubt on the text 4.

la: Vide supra a. I. q. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: See above, art. I, q. 2; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Magister, hic in lit. c. 6.

en: The Master, here in the text, c. 6.

la: De omnibus Sanctis, attributa Adamo de S. Victore. — Cfr. Mone, Hymni latini medii aevi, tom. 3. pag. 10. — Paulo inferius verbo *impulsivi* nonnulli codd., ut T ee, praefigunt *obiecti*; pro *impulsivi* cod. W *impulsui*.

en: "On All Saints," attributed to Adam of St. Victor. — Cf. Mone, *Latin Hymns of the Middle Ages*, vol. 3, p. 10. — A little below, before the word *impulsivi* some codices, such as T ee, prefix *obiecti*; for *impulsivi* codex W reads *impulsui*.

la: Libr. XXIII. Moral. c. 1. n. 1; c. 24. n. 47. seq. et c. 25. n. 51, quo ultimo loco dicitur: *Non solum tentant vitia, sed etiam flagella castigant... Vitia, dum nos tentant, proficientes in nos virtutes humiliant; flagella, dum tentant, surgentes in corde huius mundi voluptates eradicant* etc.

en: Book XXIII of the *Morals*, c. 1, n. 1; c. 24, n. 47 ff. and c. 25, n. 51, in which last place it is said: *Not only do vices tempt, but scourges also chastise... Vices, while they tempt us, humble in us the virtues that are advancing; scourges, while they tempt, root out the pleasures of this world rising in the heart* etc.

la: Psalm. 106, 18. — Glossa sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. n. 8: *Prima tentatio erroris et famis verbi; secunda difficultatis vincendarum concupiscentiarum; tertia taedii atque fastidii; quarta tempestatis et periculorum.*

en: Psalm 106:18. — The Gloss is taken from Augustine, *Exposition on this Psalm* n. 8: *The first temptation is of error and of hunger for the word; the second, of the difficulty of overcoming concupiscences; the third, of weariness and disgust; the fourth, of storm and perils.*

la: Vers. 13. — Glossa est ex August., II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 9. n. 34. Cfr. etiam Haymo, in I. Cor. 10, 13. — Triplex modus tentationis humanae secundum Augustinum, loc. cit., ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 6. ita exponitur: *Una est aliter sapere, quam res se habeat, cum bono tamen animo. Secunda est, cum quis bono animo, secundum tamen humanam fragilitatem in aliquo labitur consilio. Tertia est, cum irritatur in fratrem studio corrigendi plus, quam christiana tranquillitas postulat.* Ibid. et haec expositio datur: *Dicitur enim humana tentatio, quando est de his, sine quibus ista vita non agitur. Dicitur iterum tentatio humana, cum quis in necessitate vel pressura diffidit de Deo, auxilium humanum requirendo. Dicitur iterum tentatio humana, cum quis aliter sapit, quam res se habet, salvo tamen bono animo.*

en: Verse 13. — The Gloss is from Augustine, *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* II, c. 9, n. 34. Cf. also Haymo, on 1 Cor. 10:13. — The threefold mode of human temptation according to Augustine, loc. cit., is thus expounded by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 101 m. 6: *One is to be wise otherwise than the matter stands, yet with a good mind. The second is when one, with a good mind, yet according to human frailty, slips in some counsel. The third is when one is provoked against a brother by zeal for correcting more than Christian tranquillity demands.* In the same place this exposition too is given: *For temptation is called human when it is about those things without which this life is not lived. Temptation is again called human when one in necessity or distress distrusts God, by seeking human aid. Temptation is again called human when one is wise otherwise than the matter stands, yet with a good mind preserved.*

la: Haec divisio, quam etiam sub eadem citatione affert B. Albert., hic a. 8., forsan derivata est ex illa parabola, quam Dominus proposuit, Luc. 10, 29, de homine descendente ab Ierusalem in Iericho, qui incidit in latrones, cuius mentionem facit August., loc. cit. libr. I. c. 30. n. 30. et dicit, ipsum graviter vulneratum, saucium et semivivum esse derelictum. Cfr. supra pag. 306, nota 3.

en: This division, which under the same citation B. Albert also brings forward, here a. 8, was perhaps derived from that parable which the Lord proposed, Luke 10:29, of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, who fell among robbers, of which Augustine makes mention, loc. cit. book I, c. 30, n. 30, and says that he was gravely wounded, hurt, and left half-alive. Cf. above, p. 306, note 3.

la: Vers. 14. — Gregor., in Evang. homil. 16. n. 1.

en: Verse 14. — Gregory, *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 16, n. 1.

la: Psalm. 90, 1. — Glossa est ex August., Enarrat. super hunc Psalm. v. 5. — Cfr. etiam Hugo de S. Vict., VII. Allegor. in Vetus Testam. c. 14. et Serm. 89. in prima Domin. Quadrag.

en: Psalm 90:1. — The Gloss is from Augustine, *Exposition on this Psalm*, v. 5. — Cf. also Hugh of St. Victor, *Allegories on the Old Testament* VII, c. 14, and Sermon 89, on the first Sunday of Lent.

la: Divisio tentationis septemplex, quae hic Bernardo tribuitur, habetur in Richard. a S. Vict., Adnotat. in Ps. 90. (Enarrat. in Ps. 90, 13, Serm. 2. n. 9. Cfr. Sermo 315. n. 2. et Soliloq. animae ad Deum, c. 17, quae duo opera olim Augustino falso attribuebantur, nunc autem in appendicem reposita sunt.)

en: The sevenfold division of temptation, which is here attributed to Bernard, is found in Richard of St. Victor, *Notes on Psalm 90*. (Exposition on Psalm 90:13, Sermon 2, n. 9. Cf. Sermon 315, n. 2, and the *Soliloquy of the Soul to God*, c. 17, which two works were once falsely attributed to Augustine, but are now placed in an appendix.)

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 90, 13, Serm. 2. n. 9. (Cfr. supra.)

en: *Exposition on Psalm 90:13*, Sermon 2, n. 9. (Cf. above.)

la: Vers. 9. — Locus e Gregorio cit. invenitur in eius XXXII. Moral. c. 11. n. 15, ubi textus in eo differt a textu hic posito, quod post *scilicet* insertum exhibetur *omne*, et singulis verbis *insidiando, suadendo, desperando, promittendo* praefixum est *omne quod*, insuper verbo *circumvenit* mutato in *circumvolat*.

en: Verse 9. — The cited passage of Gregory is found in his *Morals* XXXII, c. 11, n. 15, where the text differs from the text set here, in that after *scilicet* the word *omne* is inserted and exhibited, and to the individual words *insidiando, suadendo, desperando, promittendo* there is prefixed *omne quod*, and moreover the word *circumvenit* is changed to *circumvolat*.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 7. q. 28; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. dub. lat. 1.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 101 m. 6; B. Albert, here a. 8; Summa p. II tr. 7 q. 28; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1; Giles of Rome, here q. 1 doubt on the text 1. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 509–512 = PDF 531–534, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 35771–35962. Two-column layout: each printed page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column. DUBIA opens mid-p.509 (below a3-q3's SCHOLION, which occupies the top of p.509).

**Structure.** Four doubts: DUB I (whether the devil spoke through the serpent by a new power / a miracle — three concurring factors for speech-formation, the *asina Balaam* parallel); DUB II (why the serpent was called *callidissimus* — twofold cunning, corporeal vs. spiritual); DUB III (the two species of temptation interior/exterior; the five modes of considering temptation — *motivum / instrumentum / effectum / gradum / modum* — with Gregory's *vitia/flagella*, the Glossa fourfold, the diabolical/human distinction, the *suggestio/delectatio/consensus* progression, and Bernard's [Richard of St. Victor's] sevenfold *importuna/dubia/subita/occulta/violenta/fraudulenta/perplexa*); DUB IV (the temptation of the flesh is not without sin — *primum motum*, inordinate sensuality always involves at least venial fault, vs. the enemy's wholly-external temptation).

**Page-split map (apparatus, 19 entries renumbered continuously):**
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- p.510 footers ¹–⁸ = [^1] (Aug. Gen ad lit + asina Balaam, DUB I), [^5]–[^6] (DUB II: Cod. aa *motiva* + commentator-roll; *Vide supra a.I q.2*), [^7]–[^9] (DUB III openers: Magister c.6; 1 John 2,16; *De omnibus Sanctis* sequentia/Adam of St. Victor), [^10]–[^11] (Gregory Moral.; Ps 106,18 Glossa).
- p.511 footers ¹–⁸ = [^12]–[^19] (DUB III continued: 1 Cor 10,13 + Alex. Hal. threefold-human exposition; the Luke 10,29 parable note; Jas 1,14 / Gregory homil. 16; Ps 90,1 Glossa + Hugh of St. Victor; Bernard/Richard of St. Victor sevenfold; Enarrat. Ps 90 Serm. 2; Job 40 / Gregory Moral. XXXII; the closing commentator-roll for the *responsio ad obiecta*).
- p.512: **no d.21 footer.** DUB IV's resolution finishes at the top of p.512 R column; the only p.512 footer block (`¹ Dist. 11 a.2 q.1...` + the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* header) belongs to DISTINCTIO XXII (Cap. I, *De origine illius peccati*), which begins immediately below.

**Marker note on [^1].** Quaracchi's note on the *asina Balaam* / new-power question appears on p.510 footer ¹ and combines the *de locutione asinae Balaam* reference (Num 22,28, cited at p.509 footer ³). Both DUB I anchors (the *asina Balaam* in the objection and the *miraculum* in the Respondeo) point to this single combined note [^1]; p.509 footer ³ (Num 22,28) is folded into it rather than given a separate marker, since Quaracchi prints the Numbers citation as a sub-clause of the de-Mirabilibus note.

**Cross-chunk hand-offs.** RECEIVED from `bon-sent-II-d21-a3-q3`: p.509 footers ²–⁵ (Boeth. de Interpretatione; Num 22,28 *asina Balaam*; Vat. *servatur*; codd. *vim*/*virtutem*) — all anchored here in DUB I. FORWARDED: none — DUB IV closes d.21 at the top of p.512; DISTINCTIO XXII opens fresh below with its own Cap. I + footer block.

**DUB IV `infra` reference.** DUB IV's resolution ends "…infra suo loco magis expresse determinabitur" (a forward cross-reference, treated as plain prose: no separate numbered Quaracchi footer exists for it on p.512 — that page's footer is DISTINCTIO XXII's). Rendered without an apparatus marker.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 22

title_alt: Distinction XXII — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 512 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De origine illius peccati.*

Hic videtur diligenter investigandum esse, quae fuerit origo et radix illius peccati. — Quidam putant, quandam elationem in animo hominis praecessisse, ex qua diaboli suggestioni consensit. Quod videtur Augustinus innuere super Genesim[^1], ita dicens: « Non est putandum, quod homo deiiceretur, nisi praecessisset in eo quaedam elatio comprimenda, ut per humilitatem peccati sciret, quam falso de se praesumserit, et quod non bene se habet natura, si a faciente recesserit ». Item in eodem: « Quomodo verbis tentatoris crederet mulier, Deum se a re bona et utili prohibuisse, nisi inesset eius menti amor ille propriae potestatis et de se superba praesumtio, *quae* per tentationem fuerat convincenda aut perimenda? Denique non contenta suasione serpentis, aspexit[^2] lignum bonum esu, decorum aspectu; nec credens, se inde posse mori, forte putavit, Deum alicuius causa significationis illa dixisse. Ideo manducavit et dedit viro suo, fortassis cum aliqua suasione, quam Scriptura intelligendam reliquit. Vel forte non fuit suaderi necesse, cum eam mortuam esse illo cibo non videret vir ». « Sicut ergo non est permissus diabolus tentare feminam nisi per serpentem, ita nec virum nisi per feminam », ut, sicut praeceptum Dei per virum venit ad mulierem, ita diaboli tentatio per mulierem transiret ad virum. « In muliere vero, quae rationalis erat, non est ipse locutus, ut in serpente, sed persuasio eius, quamvis instinctu adiuvaret interius, quod per serpentem gerebat exterius ». — Ex praedictis tentationis modus atque progressus insinuatur, nec non etiam quod praediximus innui videtur, scilicet quod tentationem praecesserit quaedam elatio et praesumtio in mente hominis.

Quod si ita fuit, non igitur alterius suggestione prius peccavit, cum auctoritas[^3] tradat, ideo peccatum diaboli incurabile esse, quia non suggestione, sed propria superbia cecidit; hominis vero curabile, quia non per se, sed per alium cecidit, et ideo per alium resurgere potuit. Quocirca praedicta verba Augustini pium ac diligentem lectorem efflagitant, quae sic intelligere sane quimus: non deiiceretur homo, scilicet in actum illius peccati, ut scilicet lignum vetitum ederet, et in has miserias per tentationem diaboli, nisi elatio comprimenda praecessisset, non utique tentationem, sed opus peccati. Talis enim fuit ordinis processus: diabolus tentando dixit: *Si comederitis, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum;* quo audito statim menti mulieris surrepsit elatio quaedam et amor propriae potestatis; ex quo placuit ei facere quod diabolus suadebat, et utique fecit. Suggestione igitur peccavit, quia tentatio praecessit, ex qua in mente eius orta est elatio, quam peccatum operis secutum est et poena peccati.

#### Cap. II.

#### *De mulieris elatione.*

Et talis quidem elatio in mente mulieris fuit certo, qua credidit et voluit habere similitudinem Dei cum aequalitate quadam, putans, id esse verum quod diabolus dicebat. Et ideo specialiter mulierem commemorat Augustinus[^4] inquiens: « Quomodo crederet mulier diabolo, nisi esset in mente eius de se superba praesumtio »? Et quod ibi sequitur, scilicet, « *quae* per tentationem fuerat convincenda, vel perimenda »; ad mulierem referendum est, ut intelligatur *quae* mulier, non elatio, fuerat per tentationem etc.

#### Cap. III.

#### *De viri elatione.*

Solet quaeri, utrum illa talis elatio et amor propriae potestatis in viro fuerit, sicut in muliere. — Ad quod dicimus, quod *Adam non fuit seductus*[^5] eo modo, quo mulier; non enim putavit, esse verum quod diabolus suggerebat. In eo tamen fuisse seductum credi potest, quod commissum veniale putaverit, quod peremptorium erat. Sed nec prior seductus fuit, nec in eo in quo mulier, ut crederet, Deum illud lignum ideo tangere prohibuisse, quoniam, si tangeret, fierent sicut dii. Verumtamen praevaricator fuit Adam, ut testatur Apostolus. Potuit ergo aliqua elatio menti eius inesse illico post tentationem, ex qua voluit lignum vetitum experiri, cum mulierem non videret mortuam, esca illa percepta. Unde Augustinus super Genesim[^6]: « Cum Apostolus Adam praevaricatorem fuisse ostendat dicens: *In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae*, seductum tamen negat, ubi ait: *Adam non est seductus, sed mulier*. Unde et interrogatus non ait: Mulier seduxit me; sed: *Dedit mihi et comedi*. Mulier vero inquit: *Serpens seduxit me* ». Hanc autem seductionem[^7] proprie vocavit Apostolus, per quam id quod suadebatur, cum falsum esset, verum putatum est, scilicet quod Deus lignum illud ideo tangere prohibuerit, quia sciebat, eos, si tetigissent, sicut deos futuros, tanquam eis divinitatem invideret, qui eos homines fecerat. « Sed etsi virum propter aliquam mentis elationem, quae Deum latere non poterat, sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum mulierem videret, accepta illa esca, non esse mortuam; non tamen eum arbitror, si iam spirituali mente praeditus erat, ullo modo credidisse quod diabolus suggerebat[^8] ».

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quis magis deliquerit, vir, an mulier.*

Ex quo manifeste animadverti potest, quis eorum plus peccaverit, Adam scilicet, vel Eva. Plus enim videtur peccasse mulier, quae voluit usurpare divinitatis aequalitatem et nimia praesumtione elata credidit, ita esse futurum[^9]. « Adam vero nec illud credidit, et de poenitentia et Dei misericordia cogitavit, dum uxori morem gerens, eius persuasioni consensit, nolens eam contristare et a se alienatam relinquere, ne periret, arbitratus, illud esse veniale, non mortale delictum ». Unde Augustinus[^10]: « Apostolus inquit: *Adam non est seductus;* quod utique ita accipi potest, ut intelligatur non esse seductus *prior* scilicet, vel *in eo in quo mulier*, ut scilicet crederet, illud esse verum: *Eritis sicut dii*[^11]; sed putavit, utrumque posse fieri, ut et uxori morem gereret et per poenitentiam veniam haberet. Minus ergo peccavit qui de poenitentia et Dei misericordia cogitavit ». « Postquam enim mulier manducavit eique dedit, ut simul ederent, nolens eam contristare, quam credebat sine suo solatio intabescere et a se alienatam omnino interire; non eidem carnali victus concupiscentia, quam nondum senserat, sed amicabili quadam benevolentia, qua plerumque fit, ut offendatur Deus, ne offendatur amicus; et eum facere non debuisse, divinae sententiae iustus actus indicavit ». « Ergo alio quodam modo ipse etiam deceptus est ». « Inexpertus enim divinae severitatis falli potuit, ut veniale crederet esse commissum[^12] »; « sed dolo illo serpentino, quo mulier seducta est, nullo modo arbitror illum potuisse seduci ». — Ex quo datur intelligi, quod mulier plus peccaverit, in qua maioris tumoris praesumtio fuit; quae etiam in se maximum et in Deum peccavit, vir autem tantum in se et in Deum. Inde etiam colligitur, quod mulier plus peccaverit, quia gravius punita est, cui dicitur: *In dolore paries filios*[^13] etc.

Sed huic videtur contrarium quod Augustinus super Genesim[^14] de viro et muliere peccatum suum excusantibus ait: « Dixit Adam: *Mulier, quam dedisti mihi, dedit mihi de ligno, et comedi;* non dicit: Peccavi. Superbia enim habet confusionis deformitatem, non confessionis humilitatem ». « Nec etiam mulier confessa est peccatum, sed refert in alterum, dicens: *Serpens decepit me, et comedi*, in impari sexu, sed pari ». — Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, quia parem fastum habuit mulier cum viro; pariter ergo superbierunt et pariter peccaverunt. — Sed hoc ita determinari potest, ut dicamus, parem utriusque fuisse fastum in causatione peccati et etiam in esu ligni vetiti, sed parem et in muliere multo maiorem in eo, quod credidit et voluit esse sicut Deus, quod non vir. — Verumtamen et de viro legitur, quod voluit esse sicut Deus. Dicit enim Augustinus super illum locum Psalmistam[^15]: *Quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam:* « Rapuit Adam et Eva, praesumentes, ut diabolus, de divinitate; rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem ». Item super illum locum: *Deus, quis similis erit tibi*? « Qui per se vult esse ut Deus, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut diabolus, qui noluit sub eo esse, homo, qui ut servus noluit teneri praecepto, sed voluit, ut nullo sibi dominante, esset quasi Deus ». Item, super illum Epistolae[^16] locum: *Non rapinam arbitratus est, se esse aequalem Deo:* « Quia non usurpavit quod suum non esset, ut diabolus et primus homo ».

Ideo quibusdam videtur, quod etiam Adam ambivit esse sicut Deus, non tamen credidit[^17], id fieri posse; et ideo falsum esse quod diabolus promittebat, cognovit. Et licet divinitatis aequalitatem concupierit, non tamen adeo exarsit nec tanta est affectus ambitione, sicut mulier, quae illud fieri posse putavit, et ideo magis illud ambiendo superbivit. Virum autem aliqua forte ambitionis subreptio movit, sed non ita, ut illud putaret verum vel possibile fore. — Aliis[^18] autem videtur ideo dictum esse, quod Adam illud voluerit, quia mulier de eo sumta illud voluit, sicut, inquiunt, peccatum dicitur *per unum hominem intrasse in mundum*[^19], id est in humanam naturam, cum tamen mulier ante virum peccaverit, quia per mulierem intraverit de viro factam. Vel potius ideo per *hominem* dicitur intrasse, quia, etiam peccante muliere, si vir non peccasset, humanum genus minime peccatis corruptum periret. Minus ergo peccavit vir quam mulier.

His autem opponi solet hoc modo: « Tribus modis, ut Isidorus[^20] ait, peccatum geritur, scilicet *ignorantia, infirmitate, industria*. Et gravius est *infirmitate* peccare quam *ignorantia*, graviusque *industria* quam *infirmitate*. Eva autem videtur ex *ignorantia* peccasse, quia seducta fuit, Adam vero ex *industria*, quia non fuit seductus, ut Apostolus ait ». — Ad quod dicimus, quia, licet Eva in hoc per *ignorantiam* deliquerit, quod putavit, verum esse quod diabolus suadebat, non tamen in hoc, quin noverit, illud Dei esse mandatum, et peccatum esse contra agere. Et ideo excusari a peccato per *ignorantiam* non potuit.

#### Cap. V.

#### *De ignorantia excusabili et inexcusabili.*

Est enim ignorantia, quae *excusat* peccantem; et est ignorantia talis, quae *non excusat;* est autem ignorantia *vincibilis*, et ignorantia *invincibilis*. Excusatio omnis tollitur, ubi mandatum non ignoratur. Est autem ignorantia triplex: et eorum scilicet qui scire *nolunt*, cum possint, quae non excusat, quia et ipsa peccatum est; et eorum qui *volunt*, sed non possunt, quae excusat et est poena peccati, non peccatum; et eorum qui quasi *simpliciter nesciunt*, non renuentes vel proponentes scire, quae neminem plene excusat, sed sic fortasse, ut minus puniatur. Unde Augustinus ad Valentinum[^21]: « Eis aufertur excusatio, qui mandata Dei noverunt, quam solent habere homines de ignorantia ». « Et licet gravius sit peccare scienter quam nescienter, non ideo tamen confugiendum est ad ignorantiae tenebras, ut in eis quisquam excusationem requirat. Aliud est enim *nescisse*, aliud *scire noluisse* », « quia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, ipsa ignorantia peccatum est; in eis vero qui non potuerunt, poena peccati[^22] ». « Ignorantia vero, quae non est eorum qui scire nolunt, sed eorum qui tanquam simpliciter nesciunt, nullum sic excusat, ut aeterno igne non ardeat, sed fortasse, ut minus ardeat ». — Non igitur mulier excusationem habuit de ignorantia, cum et mandatum noverit, et peccatum esse secus agere non ignoraverit.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *An voluntas praecesserit illud peccatum.*

Solet etiam quaeri, cum sine vitio esset natura hominis, unde consensus mali processerit. — Ad quod responderi potest, quia ex libero arbitrio propriae voluntatis fuit. In eo[^23] *ipso* enim et in *alio* causa exstitit, ut fieret deterior: in *alio*, quia in diabolo, qui suasit; in *ipso*, quia voluntate liberi arbitrii consensit. Et cum liberum arbitrium sit bonum, ex re utique bona malus ille consensus provenit, et ita ex bono malum manavit. De hoc autem in sequenti[^24] plenius tractabimus, cum origo mali, et in qua re coalescat, investigabitur.

Si vero quaeritur, utrum voluntas illud peccatum praecesserit; dicimus, quia peccatum illud et in voluntate et in actu constitit[^25], et voluntas actum praecessit; sed ipsam voluntatem alia hominis voluntas mala non praecessit, atque ex diaboli persuasione et hominis arbitrio illa voluntas mala prodiit, qua iustitiam deseruit et iniquitatem inchoavit; et ipsa voluntas iniquitas fuit.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXII.

#### Chapter I.

#### *On the origin of that sin.*

Here it seems it must be diligently investigated what was the origin and root of that sin. — Some suppose that a certain elation preceded in the mind of man, from which he consented to the suggestion of the devil. This Augustine seems to suggest on Genesis[^1], saying thus: “It is not to be supposed that man was cast down unless there had first been in him a certain elation to be checked, so that through the humility of sin he might know how falsely he had presumed of himself, and that nature does not stand well if it withdraws from its Maker.” Likewise in the same place: “How would the woman believe the words of the tempter, that God had forbidden her a good and useful thing, unless there were in her mind that love of her own power and a proud presumption about herself, *which* was to be convinced or destroyed by the temptation? Finally, not content with the persuasion of the serpent, she looked upon[^2] the tree as good for food and fair to the sight; and not believing that she could thereby die, she perhaps supposed that God had said that for the sake of some signification. Therefore she ate and gave to her husband, perhaps with some persuasion which Scripture has left to be understood. Or perhaps it was not necessary to persuade him, since the husband did not see her dead from that food.” “Therefore, just as the devil was not permitted to tempt the woman except through the serpent, so neither the man except through the woman,” so that, just as the precept of God came to the woman through the man, so the temptation of the devil might pass to the man through the woman. “But in the woman, who was rational, he did not himself speak, as in the serpent, but his persuasion did, although by an interior instinct he was aiding what through the serpent he carried on outwardly.” — From the foregoing the manner and progress of the temptation is intimated, and also what we said before seems to be suggested, namely that a certain elation and presumption preceded the temptation in the mind of man.

But if this was so, then he did not sin first by another’s suggestion, since authority[^3] hands down that the sin of the devil is therefore incurable, because he fell not by suggestion but by his own pride; but that of man is curable, because he fell not through himself but through another, and therefore could rise again through another. Wherefore the foresaid words of Augustine demand a devout and diligent reader, which we can soundly understand thus: man was not cast down, namely into the act of that sin, that is, that he should eat the forbidden tree, and into these miseries through the temptation of the devil, unless an elation to be checked had preceded — not indeed the temptation, but the work of the sin. For such was the process of the order: the devil in tempting said: *If you eat, you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil;* and on hearing this there crept at once into the mind of the woman a certain elation and love of her own power; from which it pleased her to do what the devil was urging, and indeed she did it. Therefore she sinned by suggestion, because the temptation preceded, from which there arose in her mind the elation, which the work of the sin followed, and the punishment of the sin.

#### Chapter II.

#### *On the elation of the woman.*

And such elation was certainly in the mind of the woman, by which she believed and willed to have the likeness of God with a certain equality, supposing that what the devil said was true. And therefore Augustine specially mentions the woman[^4], saying: “How would the woman believe the devil, unless there were in her mind a proud presumption about herself?” And what follows there, namely, “*which* was to be convinced or destroyed by the temptation,” is to be referred to the woman, so that it is understood *who*, that is the woman, not the elation, was [to be convinced] by the temptation, etc.

#### Chapter III.

#### *On the elation of the man.*

It is wont to be asked whether such elation and love of one’s own power was in the man as in the woman. — To which we say that *Adam was not seduced*[^5] in the manner in which the woman was; for he did not suppose that what the devil was suggesting was true. Yet he can be believed to have been seduced in this, that he supposed what was deadly to be a venial offense. But he was not seduced first, nor in that in which the woman was, namely to believe that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because, if they touched it, they would become as gods. Nevertheless Adam was a transgressor, as the Apostle testifies. There could therefore have been some elation in his mind immediately after the temptation, from which he willed to try the forbidden tree, since he did not see the woman dead after that food was taken. Hence Augustine on Genesis[^6]: “Since the Apostle shows that Adam was a transgressor, saying: *After the likeness of the transgression of Adam*, yet he denies that he was seduced, where he says: *Adam was not seduced, but the woman*. Hence also, when questioned, he did not say: The woman seduced me; but: *She gave me, and I ate*. But the woman said: *The serpent seduced me*.” Now the Apostle properly called this a seduction[^7], by which that which was urged, though false, was supposed to be true, namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because He knew that they, if they touched it, would be as gods, as though He envied them the divinity, He who had made them men. “But even if some desire of experiencing solicited the man on account of some elation of mind, which could not be hidden from God, when he saw the woman, after that food was taken, not to be dead; yet I do not think that he, if he was already endowed with a spiritual mind, in any way believed what the devil was suggesting[^8].”

#### Chapter IV.

#### *Who sinned more, the man or the woman.*

From this it can be clearly observed which of them sinned more, namely Adam, or Eve. For the woman seems to have sinned more, who willed to usurp equality of divinity and, lifted up by excessive presumption, believed it would be so[^9]. “But Adam neither believed that, and thought of penance and of God’s mercy, when, complying with his wife, he consented to her persuasion, not willing to grieve her and leave her alienated from himself, lest she perish, judging that it was a venial, not a mortal, offense.” Hence Augustine[^10]: “The Apostle says: *Adam was not seduced;* which indeed can be taken so as to be understood that he was not seduced *first*, namely, or *in that in which the woman was*, that is, that he should believe that to be true: *You shall be as gods*[^11]; but he supposed that both could be done, namely that he should both comply with his wife and through penance have pardon. Therefore he sinned less who thought of penance and of God’s mercy.” “For after the woman ate and gave to him, that they might eat together, not willing to grieve her, whom he believed to pine away without his comfort and, alienated from himself, to perish utterly; not by the concupiscence of carnal food, which he had not yet felt, but by a certain friendly benevolence, by which it often happens that God is offended lest a friend be offended; and the just act of the divine sentence showed that he ought not to have done it.” “Therefore in some other manner he too was deceived.” “For, inexperienced in the divine severity, he could be deceived so as to believe the deed committed to be venial[^12];” “but by that serpentine guile, by which the woman was seduced, in no way do I think he could have been seduced.” — From which it is given to understand that the woman sinned more, in whom there was a presumption of greater swelling; she also sinned most against herself and against God, but the man only against himself and against God. Hence also it is gathered that the woman sinned more, because she was more grievously punished, to whom it is said: *In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children*[^13], etc.

But to this there seems contrary what Augustine on Genesis[^14] says of the man and the woman excusing their sin: “Adam said: *The woman, whom thou gavest me, gave me of the tree, and I ate;* he does not say: I have sinned. For pride has the deformity of confusion, not the humility of confession.” “Nor did the woman confess the sin, but refers it to another, saying: *The serpent deceived me, and I ate*, in unequal sex, but equal.” — Behold, here Augustine says that the woman had pride equal to the man’s; therefore they grew proud equally and sinned equally. — But this can be so determined that we say that the pride of both was equal in the occasioning of the sin and also in the eating of the forbidden tree, but equal and even in the woman much greater in this, that she believed and willed to be as God, which the man did not. — Nevertheless it is read also of the man that he willed to be as God. For Augustine says on that passage of the Psalmist[^15]: *What I took not away, then did I pay:* “Adam and Eve seized, presuming, as the devil did, concerning divinity; they willed to seize divinity, and lost felicity.” Likewise on that passage: *O God, who shall be like to thee*? “He who of himself wills to be as God, perversely wills to be like God, as the devil, who would not be under Him, and man, who as a servant would not be held to the precept, but willed, with none lording it over him, to be as it were God.” Likewise, on that passage of the Epistle[^16]: *He thought it not robbery to be equal with God:* “Because He did not usurp what was not His own, as the devil and the first man did.”

Therefore it seems to some that Adam too aspired to be as God, yet did not believe[^17] that it could be done; and therefore he knew that what the devil was promising was false. And although he coveted equality of divinity, yet he did not burn for it so greatly nor was affected with so great an ambition, as the woman, who supposed it could be done, and therefore in aspiring to it grew prouder. But some stealth of ambition perhaps moved the man, yet not so as to suppose it to be true or possible. — But to others[^18] it seems to have been said that Adam willed it because the woman taken from him willed it, just as, they say, sin is said to have *entered into the world through one man*[^19], that is, into human nature, although the woman sinned before the man, because it entered through the woman made from the man. Or rather it is said to have entered through *man*, because, even with the woman sinning, if the man had not sinned, the human race would not have perished corrupted by sins. Therefore the man sinned less than the woman.

But to these it is wont to be objected in this way: “In three ways, as Isidore[^20] says, sin is committed, namely by *ignorance, infirmity, deliberation*. And it is more grievous to sin by *infirmity* than by *ignorance*, and more grievous by *deliberation* than by *infirmity*. But Eve seems to have sinned from *ignorance*, because she was seduced, but Adam from *deliberation*, because he was not seduced, as the Apostle says.” — To which we say that, although Eve transgressed in this by *ignorance*, that she supposed what the devil was urging to be true, yet not in this, but that she knew that it was God’s commandment, and that to act against it was a sin. And therefore she could not be excused from sin by *ignorance*.

#### Chapter V.

#### *On excusable and inexcusable ignorance.*

For there is an ignorance which *excuses* the sinner; and there is such an ignorance as *does not excuse;* and there is *vincible* ignorance and *invincible* ignorance. All excuse is taken away where the commandment is not unknown. Now ignorance is threefold: namely of those who *will not* know, when they can — which does not excuse, because it is itself a sin; and of those who *will* but cannot — which excuses and is a punishment of sin, not a sin; and of those who as it were *simply do not know*, not refusing nor proposing to know — which excuses no one fully, but perhaps so that he may be less punished. Hence Augustine to Valentinus[^21]: “The excuse which men are wont to have from ignorance is taken away from those who have known the commandments of God.” “And although it is more grievous to sin knowingly than unknowingly, not for that reason, however, is one to take refuge in the darkness of ignorance, that anyone may seek therein an excuse. For it is one thing to *have been ignorant*, another *to have been unwilling to know*,” “because in those who were unwilling to understand, the ignorance itself is a sin; but in those who could not, it is a punishment of sin[^22].” “But the ignorance which is not of those who will not know, but of those who as it were simply do not know, excuses no one so that he should not burn in the eternal fire, but perhaps so that he should burn less.” — Therefore the woman did not have an excuse from ignorance, since she both knew the commandment and was not ignorant that to act otherwise was a sin.

#### Chapter VI.

#### *Whether the will preceded that sin.*

It is wont also to be asked, since the nature of man was without fault, whence the consent to evil proceeded. — To which it can be answered that it was from the free choice of one’s own will. For in[^23] *itself* and in *another* there was a cause that it should become worse: in *another*, because in the devil who urged; in *itself*, because it consented by the will of free choice. And since free choice is good, from a thing certainly good that evil consent came forth, and so from good evil flowed. But of this we shall treat more fully in what follows[^24], when the origin of evil, and in what thing it takes root, shall be investigated.

But if it is asked whether the will preceded that sin; we say that the sin consisted both in the will and in the act[^25], and the will preceded the act; but no other evil will of man preceded the will itself, and from the devil’s persuasion and man’s choice that evil will came forth, by which he forsook justice and began iniquity; and that will itself was iniquity.

---

la: Lib. XI. c. 5. n. 7. Seq. textus ibid. c. 30. n. 39, tertius et quartus ibid. c. 27. n. 34. Cfr. Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 6.

en: (Augustine,) Book XI *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 5, n. 7. The following text is from the same place, c. 30, n. 39; the third and fourth from the same place, c. 27, n. 34. Compare Hugh (of St. Victor), *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 3, c. 6.

la: Respicitur Gen. 3, 6. seqq. Supra *quae* intellige: mulier.

en: Reference is to Genesis 3:6 ff. Above, understand *quae* (“which/who”) as: the woman.

la: Gregor. IV. Moral. c. 13. n. 8, et Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 22, et August., loc. cit. c. 42. n. 60.

en: Gregory, *Morals* IV, c. 13, n. 8, and Anselm, *Why God Became Man* II, c. 22, and Augustine, in the cited place, c. 42, n. 60.

en: In the cited place, c. 30, n. 39.

la: I. Tim. 2, 14: Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit. — Paulo inferius pro *Potuit ergo* Vat. cum nonnullis edd. *Poterat enim*.

en: 1 Timothy 2:14: “And Adam was not seduced; but the woman, being seduced, was in the transgression.” — A little below, for *Potuit ergo* (“He could therefore”) the Vatican edition, with some editions, reads *Poterat enim* (“For he could”).

la: Lib. XI. c. 42. n. 58, et XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et est in Glossa ad I. Tim. 2, 14. — Verba *In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae* sunt Rom. 5, 14.

en: (Augustine,) Book XI *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 42, n. 58, and *On the City of God* XIV, c. 11, n. 2, and it is in the Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14. — The words *After the likeness of the transgression of Adam* are Romans 5:14.

la: Quid proprie sit *seducere*, dicit August., super Evang. Ioan. tr. 29. n. 1.

en: What *to seduce* properly is, Augustine states in his commentary on the Gospel of John, tract 29, n. 1.

la: August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 60, et est in Glossa ad Gen. 3.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 42, n. 60, and it is in the Gloss on Genesis 3.

la: Codd. B E adiungunt *ita esse futurum*.

en: Codices B, E add *ita esse futurum* (“that it would be so”).

la: Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 58, et seq. loc. ibid. n. 59, tertius etiam ibid. n. 60, sententialiter; sed haec sicut et quae praecedunt et quae sequuntur, verbotenus leguntur in Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 10, et etiam in Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 6. Cfr. etiam Glossa in I. Tim. 2, 14.

en: (Augustine,) Book XI *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 42, n. 58, and the following passage there, n. 59, the third also there, n. 60, in substance; but these, like what precedes and what follows, are read word for word in Hugh (of St. Victor), book *On the Sacraments* part VII, c. 10, and also in the *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 3, c. 6. Compare also the Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14.

en: Genesis 3:5.

la: August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2; quod sequitur de Gen. ad lit. loc. cit. n. 60.

en: Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, c. 11, n. 2; what follows is from *On Genesis according to the Letter*, the cited place, n. 60.

la: Gen. 3, 16. — Immediate ante pro *fuit* edd. 1, 8 *est*.

en: Genesis 3:16. — Immediately before, for *fuit* (“was”) editions 1, 8 read *est* (“is”).

la: Lib. XI. c. 35. n. 47. Seq. locus ibid. n. 48. Locus Scripturae est Gen. 3, 12. 13. Cod. Erf. annotat, haec et seqq. usque in finem cap. esse ex Gandolph. II. Sent. c. 181 et 182.

en: (Augustine,) Book XI c. 35, n. 47. The following passage is there, n. 48. The Scripture passage is Genesis 3:12–13. Codex Erf. notes that these and the following down to the end of the chapter are from Gandulph, *Sentences* II, cc. 181 and 182.

la: Psalm. 68, 5; August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. serm. 2. Cfr. Glossa ibid. — Paulo post pro *praesumentes* codd. cum paucis edd. *praesumens*. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Psalm. 70, 19; et August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. serm. 2. n. 6, sententialiter, sed fere ad verbum ibi in Glossa.

en: Psalm 68:5; Augustine, *Enarration* on this Psalm, sermon 2. Compare the Gloss there. — A little after, for *praesumentes* (“presuming,” pl.) the codices with a few editions read *praesumens* (sg.). — The following Scripture passage is Psalm 70:19; and Augustine, *Enarration* on this Psalm, sermon 2, n. 6, in substance, but almost word for word there in the Gloss.

la: Philip. 2, 6; August., tr. 17. in Ioan. n. 16, sententialiter; expressius in Glossa ad loc. cit.

en: Philippians 2:6; Augustine, tract 17 on John, n. 16, in substance; more expressly in the Gloss on the cited place.

la: Vat. cum paucis aliis edd. *crediderit*.

en: The Vatican edition, with a few other editions, reads *crediderit* (“that he believed,” subjunctive).

la: Cod. Erf. hic annotat: Gandolphus, II. c. 182, respondet ad primam auctoritatem: Adam et Eva, i. e. alter illorum, ut ibi: *Id ipsum properabant latrones*, i. e. alter illorum; infra nomine uno *hominis* in seqq. auctoritatibus Eva intelligitur, vel quia de latere hominis formata est, vel quia de ea omnis homo propagandus erat.

en: Codex Erf. notes here: Gandulph, II, c. 182, replies to the first authority: “Adam and Eve,” that is, one of them, as there: *The robbers were hastening to the very same thing*, that is, one of them; below, under the single name of *man* in the following authorities, Eve is understood, either because she was formed from the side of man, or because from her all mankind was to be propagated.

la: Rom. 5, 12. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 26. n. 8.

en: Romans 5:12. Compare Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 26, n. 8.

la: Sent. sive de Sum. Bono, II. c. 17. n. 3, et Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 11. n. 28.

en: (Isidore,) *Sentences* or *On the Highest Good* II, c. 17, n. 3, and Gregory, *Morals* XXV, c. 11, n. 28.

la: De Gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 3. n. 5, ubi et seq.

en: (Augustine,) *On Grace and Free Choice* c. 3, n. 5, where also the following.

la: Prosper, lib. Sent. n. 314. Quod sequitur est August., loc. cit.

en: Prosper, book of *Sentences* n. 314. What follows is Augustine, in the cited place.

la: Codd. A B C E cum edd. 1, 8, 6 praefigunt *Et*.

en: Codices A, B, C, E with editions 1, 8, 6 prefix *Et* (“And”).

la: Infra dist. XXXIV.

en: Below, distinction XXXIV.

la: Vat. cum codd. A E et plurimis aliis edd. minus bene *consistit*. Mox pro *non praecessit* omnes codd. cum ed. 1 *non praeest*.

en: The Vatican edition, with codices A, E and most other editions, reads less well *consistit* (“consists,” present). Soon after, for *non praecessit* (“did not precede”) all codices with edition 1 read *non praeest* (“is not over”). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 512 (L-bottom DISTINCTIO XXII title block + Cap. I opener, below the d.21 a2-q1 *tentatio carnis* commentary tail; R column Cap. I continuation + Cap. II + Cap. III opener), 513 (L+R: Cap. III continuation + Cap. IV + Cap. V opener), 514 (L+R: Cap. IV/V continuation + Cap. V + Cap. VI). Per the Vol II Override the column-band PDF read is authoritative; the IA djvu OCR (raw lines ~35964–36190) cascade-fragments the Cap. headings into two-column bleed (e.g. `Cap. Y.` [Cap. V] and `Cap. VI.` surface on the same raw line 36121 from L/R columns; `DIVISIO TEXTUS` bleeds into the Cap. V/VI region).
- **Page-split map.**
  - **p. 512** R column body: Cap. I (opener through *poena peccati*) + Cap. II (full) + Cap. III opener (*Adam non fuit seductus*). p. 512 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers ¹–⁵ = [^1]–[^5]: ¹ Lib. XI c.5 n.7 (= *super Genesim*); ² Gen. 3,6 (= *aspexit*); ³ Gregor. IV Moral. + Anselm. + August. (= *auctoritas tradat*); ⁴ Loc.cit. c.30 n.39 (= Cap. II *Augustinus*); ⁵ I. Tim. 2,14 + *Potuit ergo*/*Poterat enim* variant (= Cap. III *seductus*).
  - **p. 513** L column: Cap. III continuation (*non enim putavit* … *suggerebat*[^8]) + Cap. IV opener through *credidit* etc. R column: Cap. IV continuation (*manducavit eique dedit* … through the Psalmist quotations) into the *credidit*[^17] close. p. 513 footers ¹–¹² = [^6]–[^17]: ¹ Lib. XI c.42 n.58 + de Civ. Dei XIV (= Cap. III *super Genesim*); ² seducere/Ioan. tr.29 (= *seductionem*); ³ August. XI c.42 n.60 (= *suggerebat*); ⁴ Codd. B E *ita esse futurum* (= *futurum*); ⁵ Lib. XI c.42 n.58 + Hugo/Sum.Sent. (= Cap. IV *Augustinus*); ⁶ Gen. 3,5 (= *Eritis sicut dii*); ⁷ de Civ. Dei XIV c.11 (= *commissum*); ⁸ Gen. 3,16 (= *paries filios*); ⁹ Lib. XI c.35 n.47 + Gandolph. (= *super Genesim*); ¹⁰ Psalm. 68,5 + Enarrat. (= *Psalmistam*); ¹¹ Philip. 2,6 + Ioan. tr.17 (= *Epistolae*); ¹² Vat. *crediderit* (= *credidit*).
  - **p. 514** L column: Cap. IV continuation (*Aliis autem* … *non potuit*) + Cap. V opener (*Est enim ignorantia* … *non pec-*). R column: Cap. V continuation (*-catum* … *minus ardeat*) + Cap. VI (full, *An voluntas praecesserit* … *voluntas iniquitas fuit*). p. 514 footers ¹–⁸ = [^18]–[^25]: ¹ Cod. Erf./Gandolph. II c.182 (= Cap. IV *Aliis*); ² Rom. 5,12 + Enchirid. (= *per unum hominem intrasse in mundum*); ³ Sent. de Sum. Bono II c.17 + Gregor. XXV Moral. (= *Isidorus*); ⁴ De Gratia et libero arbitrio c.3 n.5 (= Cap. V *ad Valentinum*); ⁵ Prosper lib. Sent. n.314 (= *poena peccati*); ⁶ Codd. A B C E *Et* (= Cap. VI *In ipso*); ⁷ Infra dist. XXXIV (= *in sequenti*); ⁸ Vat. *consistit* + *non praeest* variants (= *in actu constitit*).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d21-dubia`: the resume note flagged the p.512 footer block as DISTINCTIO XXII's. On eyes-on at 450 dpi, p.512's **first** footer ¹ (*Dist. 11 a. 2 q. 1 — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal. …*) anchors the *tentatio carnis* commentary tail (`infra ¹ suo loco magis expresse determinabitur`) that closes `d21-a2-q1` at the top of p.512 — it is **not** the littera's and is NOT picked up here. The littera's apparatus on p.512 is the separate **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** block (footers ¹–⁵), all folded as [^1]–[^5]. *Forwarded* to `d22-divisio`: none of the littera footers — the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII / DIVISIO TEXTUS (*Supra egit Magister de lapsu hominis* …) opens on p.514 (L-bottom + R, raw line ~36174) below Cap. VI and carries its own footer ¹ (*Cap. 31 n. 31, sententialiter* …, raw 36244) — that is the divisio chunk's apparatus.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 25 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 512–514, including the long Cod. Erf./Gandulph footer [^18] and the chained Psalm/Philippians authority-roll in Cap. IV.
- **Six Lombard capitula** preserved verbatim with Quaracchi's italic chapter titles: I *De origine illius peccati*; II *De mulieris elatione*; III *De viri elatione*; IV *Quis magis deliquerit, vir, an mulier*; V *De ignorantia excusabili et inexcusabili*; VI *An voluntas praecesserit illud peccatum*. Cap. VI ends the littera at *et ipsa voluntas iniquitas fuit*; the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM that follow belong to `d22-divisio`.
- **Lombard marginals** on pp. 512–514 (`Opinio 1`, `Opponitur`, `Augustinus`, `Dubium 1/2`, `Obiicitur ex August.`, `Solutio 1/2/3`, `Replicatur ex August.`, `Dub. 2 et obiectio`, `Responsio`) are editorial running-margin labels; per Vol II convention they are not rendered as separate margin nodes here (the d.22 quaestio-articles pick up their own marginals downstream).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 22, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Distinctio XXII — Commentarius, Divisio textus, Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Distinction XXII — Commentary, Division of the Text, Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 514 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.
### *De hominis transgressione.*

> *Hic videtur diligenter investigandum* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de lapsu hominis in comparatione ad diabolum tentantem; in hac vero parte agit quantum ad hominem transgredientem. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In prima determinat de peccato primorum parentum quantum ad genus. In secunda vero, quantum ad radicem, utrum
<!-- page 515 -->
scilicet fuerit ex industria, an ex ignorantia, ibi: *His autem opponi solet hoc modo*.

Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima determinat de genere primi peccati generaliter. In secunda vero de genere peccati viri et mulieris specialiter, ibi: *Et talis quidem elatio in mente mulieris* etc. In tertia vero inquirit, quis eorum peccaverit magis graviter, ibi: *Ex quo manifeste animadverti potest* etc. Quaelibet autem harum partium dividi potest in duas. Nam in qualibet primo determinat veritatem, et secundo removet dubitationem. — Secunda vero pars principalis, in qua determinat de peccato quantum ad radicem, dividitur in partes tres. In prima inquirit, utrum peccatum illud ex ignorantia processerit et per illam excusari habeat. In secunda vero quaerit, unde processerit primi peccati malitia, ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri, cum sine vitio esset natura* etc. In tertia vero inquirit, cum peccatum illud fuerit a voluntate, utrum primo ante voluerit, quam peccaverit, ibi: *Si vero quaeritur, utrum voluntas peccatum illud praecesserit* etc. Subdivisiones partium et intellectus satis apparent. Primo enim Magister determinat de ipsa culpa primorum parentum *in se*; secundo vero, prout comparari habet ad *radicem ignorantiae*.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis circa duo incidit hic quaestio.

Primo igitur quaeritur de culpa primorum parentum in se quantum ad inordinationem affectus.

Secundo vero quaeritur in comparatione ad ignorantiam intellectus.

Et circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, quo genere peccati mulier peccaverit.

Secundo, utrum quod mulier appetiit vir cupierit.

Tertio vero quaeritur, quis horum gravius peccaverit.

---

english:
<!-- page 514 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXII.
### *On the transgression of man.*

> *Here it seems that diligent investigation must be made,* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the fall of man in his relation to the devil who tempted; but in this part he treats of man as transgressing. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first he determines about the sin of the first parents as to its *kind*. In the second, as to its *root* — namely whether
<!-- page 515 -->
it proceeded from deliberateness or from ignorance — at the place: *But this is wont to be objected in the following way*.

The first part has three sections. In the first he determines about the kind of the first sin generally. In the second about the kind of the sin of the man and of the woman specifically, at: *And such indeed was the elation in the mind of the woman* etc. In the third he inquires which of them sinned the more gravely, at: *From which it can be plainly observed* etc. Now each of these sections can be divided into two. For in each he first determines the truth, and secondly removes the doubt. — The second principal part, however, in which he determines about the sin as to its *root*, is divided into three sections. In the first he inquires whether that sin proceeded from ignorance and is to be excused on that account. In the second he asks whence the malice of the first sin proceeded, at: *It is also wont to be asked, since the nature was without vice* etc. In the third he inquires, since that sin was from the will, whether the will preceded before he sinned, at: *But if it is asked whether the will preceded that sin* etc. The subdivisions of the parts and their sense are sufficiently evident. For first the Master determines about the fault of the first parents *in itself*; secondly, insofar as it has to be compared to the *root of ignorance*.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part a question arises here on two heads.

First, then, it is asked about the fault of the first parents in itself, as to the *disorder of the affection*.

Second it is asked in comparison to the *ignorance of the intellect*.

And about the first three things are asked.

First it is asked by what kind of sin the woman sinned.

Second, whether the man desired what the woman craved.

Third it is asked which of them sinned the more gravely.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of p. 514 R-bottom (the full-width spanner header `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.` / title *De hominis transgressione.* / lemma *Hic videtur diligenter investigandum* etc. / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`) and the L+R DIVISIO opening, then p. 515 L+R (DIVISIO TEXTUS continuation through *radicem ignorantiae* + the full-width `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.` heading + the two-question + three-sub-question enumeration). Per Vol II Override the column-band PDF read is authoritative; the IA djvu OCR (raw ~36120–36230) cascade-shatters the spanner headings and two-column-bleeds Cap. VI of the littera into the divisio region. Crops cached at `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p51{4,5}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`.
- **Page-split map.** p. 514 R-2 (bottom): COMMENTARIUS spanner header + DIVISIO TEXTUS heading + DIVISIO opening *Supra egit Magister … Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In prima determinat … quantum ad radicem, utrum* (page break mid-sentence at *utrum*). p. 515 L-0+R-0 (top body band): DIVISIO continuation *scilicet fuerit ex industria … radicem ignorantiae*. p. 515 L-1+R-1: `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.` heading + the two-head question listing + the *Et circa primum quaeruntur tria* three-sub-question split (closes at *quis horum gravius peccaverit* — ARTICULUS I / *De culpa primorum parentum quoad inordinationem affectus.* / QUAESTIO I / *Quo genere peccati mulier peccaverit.* / *Circa primum sic proceditur* open immediately below in `d22-a1-q1`).
- **Apparatus: NONE.** The DIVISIO TEXTUS and TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM body carries no footnote markers. The numbered footers on p. 514 (¹–⁸) belong to Lombard's Cap. IV–VI littera and were consumed by `d22-littera` ([^18]–[^25] there). The numbered footers on p. 515 (¹ Eccli. *Vers. 1-5*; ² *Cap. 31 n. 31 sententialiter* = Gregor. IV *Moral.* on superbia/invidentia; ³ Cfr. supra d.21 a.3 q.1; etc.) all anchor in the ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I body (*1. Ecclesiastici decimo … 2. Sed contra …*) and are forwarded to `d22-a1-q1` (see hand-off). `has_apparatus: false`.
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d22-littera`: NONE — the d22-littera (resume 2026-05-29) forwarded none; its Cap. VI (*An voluntas praecesserit illud peccatum.* / *Si vero quaeritur, utrum voluntas illud peccatum praecesserit … et ipsa voluntas iniquitas fuit*) closes the Lombard littera on p. 514 immediately above the COMMENTARIUS spanner, with its own footer ⁸ (Vat. cum codd. AE … *non praeit*). *Forwarded* to `d22-a1-q1`: the p. 515 page-footer sequence (¹ Eccli. 10 *Vers. 1-5*; ² Aug.? / Gregor. IV *Moral.* superbia note *Cap. 31 n. 31 sententialiter*; ³ Cfr. supra d.21 a.3 q.1 et infra d.31 a.1 q.2; ⁴ Gen. 3,5 *Et eritis sicut dii*; ⁵ Gen. 3,11 *Vers. 11*; etc.) — these anchor at the *1. Ecclesiastici decimo … Item, Augustinus in libro de Virginitate … Sed contra: 2.* lemmas opening QUAESTIO I, and are the d22-a1-q1 chunk's first native apparatus entries (renumbered from [^1] per the locked Vol II per-chunk convention).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All headings and division-lemmas crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 514–515.
- **TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, for q-alignment when ARTICULUS I quaestiones are built):**
  - Two principal heads: **Primo** — *de culpa primorum parentum in se quantum ad inordinationem affectus* (ARTICULUS I); **Secundo** — *in comparatione ad ignorantiam intellectus* (ARTICULUS II).
  - ARTICULUS I sub-questions (*Et circa primum quaeruntur tria*): **Primo** — *quo genere peccati mulier peccaverit* (= q1, raw ~36172, running head `DIST. XXII. ART. I. QUAEST. I`); **Secundo** — *utrum quod mulier appetiit vir cupierit* (= q2, raw ~36418); **Tertio** — *quis horum gravius peccaverit* (= q3, skeleton `d22-a1-q3`, raw ~36560).
  - NB: the ARTICULUS I opener label (read on p. 515: *De culpa primorum parentum quoad inordinationem affectus.*) matches the divisio's first head; QUAESTIO I's stated theme *Quo genere peccati mulier peccaverit* matches the first sub-question — alignment confirmed for q1.
- **Auto-chunker note.** The 2026-05-13 auto-chunker omitted a standalone d22-divisio chunk entirely (it merged the divisio region into a column-cascade fragment). This chunk is created fresh from PDF column bands per the Vol II single-chunk recipe.