title: Dist. 28

title_alt: Distinctio XXVIII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXVIII — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXVIII.

### Cap. I. *Si iubemur totum proximum diligere et nos totos.*

Hic potest quaeri, utrum illo mandato dilectionis proximi totum proximum, id est animam et corpus, nosque ipsos totos diligere praecipiamur. — Ad quod dicimus, omne genus diligendarum rerum illis duobus mandatis contineri. «Quatuor enim diligenda sunt, ut ait Augustinus[^p619-1]: unum, quod supra nos est, scilicet Deus; alterum, quod nos sumus; tertium, quod iuxta nos est, scilicet proximus; quartum, quod infra nos est, scilicet corpus. De secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant», scilicet ut diligeremus nos, vel corpus nostrum; praecipitur autem Deus diligi et proximus. «Ut autem quisque se diligat, praecepto non est opus». «Quantumlibet enim homo excidat a veritate, remanet illi dilectio sui et dilectio corporis sui, quia *nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit*[^p619-2]. Nam viri iusti, qui corpus suum cruciant, non corpus, sed corruptiones eius et pondus oderunt». — Hic videtur Augustinus tradere, quod ex praecepto non teneamur diligere nosmetipsos, vel corpus nostrum. Quod si est, non omne genus diligendarum rerum illis duobus praeceptis continetur: quia[^p619-3], cum et nos ipsos et corpus nostrum diligere debeamus, ad quid necessarium est praeceptum, cum scriptum sit: *Qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam?* Sed speciale de hoc praeceptum non erat dandum, nec speciali praecepto opus erat id tradi, ut quisque se vel corpus suum diligeret, quia hoc in illo praecepto continetur: *Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum.* Ibi enim et proximum totum et te totum intelligere debes. Unde Augustinus in eodem[^p619-4]: «Si te totum intelligas, id est animam et corpus, et proximum totum, id est animam et corpus — homo enim ex anima constat et corpore — nullum rerum diligendarum genus in his duobus praeceptis praetermissum est. Cum enim praecurrat dilectio Dei, eiusque dilectionis modus praescriptus appareat, et sequatur dilectio proximi; de tua dilectione nihil dictum videtur. Sed cum dictum est: *Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum,* simul et tui abs te dilectio praetermissa non est». — Ecce hic aperte dicit, in illo praecepto non tantummodo proximi, sed et mei[^p619-5] dilectionem contineri et totius proximi totiusque mei. — Ex quo apparet, quod dictum est de secundo et

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quarto — id est de dilectione nostri et corporis nostri — nulla praecepta esse danda, ita esse intelligendum, scilicet specialia et divisa, quia in illo uno totum continetur, «et quia id quod sumus, et quod infra nos est, ad nos tamen pertinens, naturae lege diligimus, quae in bestiis etiam est. Ideoque[^p620-1] et de illo quod supra nos est, et de illo quod iuxta nos est, divisa praecepta sumsimus»; in quorum altero eius quod sumus, et illius quod infra nos est, dilectio continetur.

### Cap. II. *Quod in dilectione proximi includitur dilectio Angelorum.*

«Oritur autem hic de Angelis quaestio, utrum ad illud praeceptum dilectionis proximi etiam dilectio pertineat Angelorum. Nam quod nullum hominem exceperit qui praecepit proximum diligere, Dominus in parabola semivivi relicti ostendit, eum dicens proximum, qui erga illum exstitit misericors. Deinde subdit: *Vade, et tu fac similiter*[^p620-2]»: sit, Domino dicente: *Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos*[^p620-3]». «Manifestum est igitur, omnem hominem proximum esse deputandum». «Proximi vero nomen ad aliquid est, nec quisquam esse proximus nisi proximo potest». «Unde consequens est, et cui praebendum et a quo praebendum est officium misericordiae recte proximum dici. Manifestum est igitur, praecepto dilectionis proximi etiam sanctos Angelos contineri, a quibus tanta nobis misericordiae impenduntur officia. Ex quo et Dominus proximum nostrum se dici voluit, ut in parabola saucii significat et in Propheta[^p620-4]: *Quasi proximum et quasi fratrem nostrum sic complacebam.* Sed quia excellentior ac supra nostram naturam est divina substantia, praeceptum dilectionis Dei a proximi dilectione distinctum est». Ideoque licet Deus omnia nobis impendat beneficia, non tamen nomine proximi includitur in illo praecepto; quem non sicut nos diligere debemus, sed plus quam nos toto corde et tota anima; Christum vero, in quantum homo est, sicut nos diligere debemus, eiusque secundum hominem dilectio illo continetur mandato; quem etiam secundum hominem magis quam nos, sed non quantum Deum, debemus diligere, quia in quantum est homo, minor est Deo.

### Cap. III. *Quis sit proximus.*

«Ut eum proximum intelligamus, cui vel exhibendum est officium misericordiae, si indiget, vel exhibendum esset, si indigeret. Nullum vero exceptum esse, cui misericordiae negandum sit officium, quis non videat, cum usque ad inimicos etiam porrectum

### Cap. IV. *Quibus modis dicitur proximus.*

Hic notandum est, «proximum dici diversis modis, scilicet conditione primae nativitatis, spe conversionis, propinquitate cognationis, ratione beneficii exhibitionis[^p620-5]».

---

english:
### Cap. I. *Whether we are commanded to love the whole neighbor and our whole selves.*

Here it can be asked whether by that commandment of the love of neighbor we are commanded to love the whole neighbor, that is, soul and body, and our whole selves. — To which we say that every kind of things to be loved is contained in those two commandments. «For four things are to be loved, as Augustine says[^p619-1]: one, which is above us, namely God; another, which we ourselves are; a third, which is beside us, namely neighbor; a fourth, which is beneath us, namely the body. Concerning the second and the fourth no commandments were to be given», namely that we should love ourselves, or our body; but God is commanded to be loved, and neighbor. «But that each one should love himself, there is no need of a commandment». «For however much a man may fall away from the truth, there remains to him the love of himself and the love of his own body, because *no one ever hated his own flesh*[^p619-2]. For just men, who torment their own body, hate not the body, but its corruptions and burden». — Here Augustine seems to teach that by the commandment we are not bound to love ourselves, or our body. But if this is so, not every kind of things to be loved is contained in those two precepts: for[^p619-3], since we ought to love both ourselves and our body, to what end is the precept necessary, since it is written: *He who loveth iniquity hateth his own soul?* But a special precept concerning this was not to be given, nor was there need of a special precept that this be handed down, that each one should love himself or his own body, because this is contained in that precept: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* For there thou oughtest to understand both the whole neighbor and thy whole self. Hence Augustine in the same place[^p619-4]: «If thou understand thy whole self, that is soul and body, and the whole neighbor, that is soul and body — for man consists of soul and body — no kind of things to be loved is passed over in these two precepts. For since the love of God runs before, and the manner of that love appears prescribed, and the love of neighbor follows; concerning thy own love nothing seems to have been said. But when it was said: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,* at the same time the love of thyself by thee was not passed over». — Behold, here he plainly says that in that precept not only the love of neighbor, but also of myself[^p619-5] is contained, and of the whole neighbor and of my whole self. — From which it appears that what was said concerning the second and

the fourth — that is, concerning the love of ourselves and of our body — that no precepts were to be given, is so to be understood, namely special and divided precepts, because in that one all is contained, «and because that which we are, and that which is beneath us, yet pertaining to us, we love by the law of nature, which is even in beasts. And therefore[^p620-1] concerning that which is above us, and concerning that which is beside us, we have taken divided precepts»; in the other of which the love of that which we are, and of that which is beneath us, is contained.

### Cap. II. *That in the love of neighbor is included the love of Angels.*

«But a question arises here concerning Angels, whether to that precept of the love of neighbor the love of Angels also pertains. For that he who commanded neighbor to be loved excepted no man, the Lord shows in the parable of the half-dead man left behind, calling him neighbor who was merciful toward him. Then he adds: *Go, and do thou likewise*[^p620-2]»: as it is, the Lord saying: *Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you*[^p620-3]». «It is manifest therefore that every man is to be reckoned neighbor». «But the name of neighbor is relative to something, nor can anyone be neighbor save to a neighbor». «Whence it follows that both he to whom the office of mercy is to be shown and he by whom it is to be shown are rightly called neighbor. It is manifest therefore that by the precept of the love of neighbor the holy Angels also are contained, by whom so great offices of mercy are bestowed upon us. From which the Lord also willed to be called our neighbor, as he signifies in the parable of the wounded man and in the Prophet[^p620-4]: *As a neighbor and as our brother so was I well-pleased.* But because the divine substance is more excellent and above our nature, the precept of the love of God is distinguished from the love of neighbor». And therefore, although God bestows all benefits upon us, yet he is not included under the name of neighbor in that precept; whom we ought to love not as ourselves, but more than ourselves with the whole heart and the whole soul; but Christ, in so far as he is man, we ought to love as ourselves, and his love according to his manhood is contained in that commandment; whom also according to his manhood we ought to love more than ourselves, but not as much as God, because in so far as he is man, he is less than God.

### Cap. III. *Who is the neighbor.*

«That we may understand him to be neighbor to whom the office of mercy is to be shown, if he is in need, or would be shown, if he were in need. But that no one is excepted to whom the office of mercy is to be denied, who does not see, since it is extended even to enemies

### Cap. IV. *In what ways one is called neighbor.*

Here it is to be noted that «one is called neighbor in diverse ways, namely by the condition of first nativity, by the hope of conversion, by the nearness of kinship, by reason of the showing-forth of benefit[^p620-5]».

---

la: Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22. Seq. locus est ibid. c. 26. n. 27; tertius ibid. c. 23, 24, multis a Magistro omissis.

en: Book I, *On Christian Doctrine* c. 23, n. 22. The following passage is ibid., c. 26, n. 27; the third ibid., c. 23, 24, with many things omitted by the Master.

la: Ita codd. BCE et omnes edd., quae lectio parum congrua nobis videtur; codd. AD omittunt *quia* ante *cum,* atque ibi punctum post *continetur* ponunt. Pro *ad quid necessarium* codd. ABDE et edd. 6, 7 *ad quod necessarium,* sed Vat. *ad necessarium.* — Locus Scripturae est Ps. 10, 6, et inferius Matth. 19, 19.

en: So codices BCE and all editions, which reading seems to us little fitting; codices AD omit *quia* (because) before *cum,* and there place a full stop after *continetur.* For *ad quid necessarium* (to what end necessary) codices ABDE and editions 6, 7 have *ad quod necessarium,* but the Vatican edition *ad necessarium.* — The passage of Scripture is Ps. 10:6, and below Matt. 19:19.

la: Cap. 26. n. 27, ubi est etiam seq. locus in fine capituli.

en: Chapter 26, n. 27, where also the following passage is, at the end of the chapter.

la: Vat. et plures edd. pro *et mei* legunt *tui,* refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 3, 7, 8, sicut et inferius *tui* pro *mei.* Paulo superius pro *tantummodo* codd. *modo.*

en: The Vatican edition and several editions, for *et mei* (and of myself), read *tui* (of thyself), the codices and editions 1, 3, 7, 8 opposing, just as also below *tui* for *mei.* A little above, for *tantummodo* (only) the codices have *modo.*

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 5 *Ideo,* referendo perperam hoc verbum ad *Et quia,* ubi cum puncto novam incipiunt propositionem. — Nota, quod Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 hic interserunt locum Augustini, de quo supra d. XXVII. pag. 587, nota 6. locuti sumus.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 5 have *Ideo* (therefore), wrongly referring this word to *Et quia,* where with a full stop they begin a new sentence. — Note that the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 here insert the passage of Augustine, concerning which we spoke above at d. XXVII, p. 587, note 6.

la: August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 30. n. 31, ubi respicitur Luc. 10, 37.

en: Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 30, n. 31, where Luke 10:37 is referred to.

la: Loc. cit., ubi afferuntur Matth. 5, 44, et Luc. 6, 27. — Seq. locus ibid. n. 32; tertius n. 31; quartus n. 33.

en: In the place cited, where Matt. 5:44 and Luke 6:27 are adduced. — The following passage ibid., n. 32; the third n. 31; the fourth n. 33.

la: Psalm. 34, 14. Parabola de *saucio* est Luc. 10, 33. seqq. — Superius pro *significat* Vat. et aliae edd., exceptis 1, 8, *ostendit,* refragantibus codd.

en: Ps. 34:14. The parable of the *wounded man* is Luke 10:33 ff. — Above, for *significat* (signifies) the Vatican edition and other editions, except 1, 8, have *ostendit* (shows), the codices opposing.

la: Glossa in Ps. 11, 3, apud Lyranum.

en: Gloss on Ps. 11:3, in Lyra.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Lombard's text (*littera Magistri*) for Distinctio XXVIII (*Si iubemur totum proximum diligere et nos totos* — Whether we are commanded to love the whole neighbor and our whole selves; the commandment to love neighbor as oneself extends to soul, body, self, and the Angels — the Augustinian "four things to be loved," *de Doctr. christ.* I, c. 23–30). Re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{619,620}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 43061–43143) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The OCR for this distinction is two-column interleaved and the footers cascade; the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout, per the Vol II/III override (offset pdf = printed + 22). `type: littera`, **`has_scholion: false`** — the littera carries no scholion; its apparatus is the editorial *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM*. The outer-margin tags (`Augustinus.`, `Secundus.`, `Applicatio 2.`, `Ad oppositionem.`, `De utroque modo distinguendi.`, `Ad quaestionem.`, `Dubium 1.`–`Dubium 4.`, `De Angelis.`, `De Christo.`) printed beside the body are editorial cross-reference marginalia keyed to the Bonaventure commentary, not Lombard's text, and are omitted from the body.

**Cap. count + incipits (FOUR chapters, confirmed eyes-on):**
- **Cap. I** (p.619-L → R, continues to p.620-L top) — *Si iubemur totum proximum diligere et nos totos.* (opener *Hic potest quaeri, utrum illo mandato dilectionis proximi totum proximum…*)
- **Cap. II** (p.620-L → R) — *Quod in dilectione proximi includitur dilectio Angelorum.* (opener *«Oritur autem hic de Angelis quaestio, utrum ad illud praeceptum…»*)
- **Cap. III** (p.620-L → R) — *Quis sit proximus.* (opener *«Ut eum proximum intelligamus, cui vel exhibendum est officium misericordiae…»*)
- **Cap. IV** (p.620-R) — *Quibus modis dicitur proximus.* (opener *Hic notandum est, «proximum dici diversis modis…»*)

**Reading-order note (two-column interleave).** On p.619 the d.27 commentary tail (*Applicatio 2.* / *vires animae* discussion, ending *…patet etiam solutio obiectorum⁵.*) fills the R-column top; the DISTINCTIO XXVIII head spans both columns beneath it. Cap. I opens in the L-column (*Hic potest quaeri…*) and its second half continues at the top of the R-column (*non omne genus diligendarum rerum…* picking up directly from the L-column's *Quod si est,*). On p.620 Cap. I's tail closes at the top of the L-column (*…dilectio continetur.*), then Cap. II–III run L→R and Cap. IV closes in the R-column (*…ratione beneficii exhibitionis.*); after Cap. IV the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII begins, spanning both columns at the foot of p.620 (the next chunk, d28-divisio). True reading order was reconstructed from the column bands, not raw-line order (the raw OCR splices the two columns line-for-line and is badly fragmented).

**Page-split map.** Littera spans **printed pp.619–620** (PDF 641–642). The littera begins lower on **p.619** (the DISTINCTIO XXVIII head + Cap. I), immediately after the d.27 commentary tail closes (*…patet etiam solutio obiectorum⁵.* in the p.619 R-column). **Page break p.619→620** falls inside Cap. I: Cap. I's *…quod dictum est de secundo et* closes p.619-R; its continuation *quarto — id est de dilectione nostri et corporis nostri…* opens p.620-L. p.620: Cap. I-tail + Cap. II + Cap. III + Cap. IV, ending *…ratione beneficii exhibitionis.* (raw 43143); the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII` begins at raw 43144 (the next chunk, d28-divisio). Running heads: p.619 OCR `619`, p.620 OCR `620`; trusted via the +22 offset + running-head text `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`.

**Apparatus (10 entries), NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM, per-page restart:**
- **p.619** → nn. 1–5 (the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* header appears in the p.619 L-column footer, beneath the d.27 commentary's own numbered source-notes ¹Vers.37/²Vers.5/³Vers.5/⁴Cfr d.26/⁵Cfr de hoc dubio — those upper notes belong to the d.27 commentary atop p.619-L and are NOT mine): n.1 (Cap. I, *ait Augustinus* — Aug. de Doctr. christ. I c.23), n.2 (Cap. I, *odio habuit* — Eph. 5:29), n.3 (Cap. I R-col, *quia* — Ps. 10:6 / Matt. 19:19 + variant note), n.4 (Cap. I R-col, *in eodem* — Aug. de Doctr. christ. I c.26), n.5 (Cap. I R-col, *et mei* — *tui/mei* variant note).
- **p.620** → nn. 1–5 (NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM continues, restarting at n.1): n.1 (Cap. I-tail, *Ideoque* — *Ideo/Et quia* variant + Aug.-insertion note), n.2 (Cap. II, *fac similiter* — Aug. de Doctr. christ. I c.30 / Luc. 10:37), n.3 (Cap. II, *oderunt vos* — Matt. 5:44 / Luc. 6:27), n.4 (Cap. II, *in Propheta* — Ps. 34:14 / Luc. 10:33 + *significat/ostendit* variant), n.5 (Cap. IV, *exhibitionis* — Glossa in Ps. 11:3 apud Lyranum). A SEPARATE *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* block (n.1 = *Edd. intendit agere de ea quantum ad dilectorum…*) begins immediately below n.5 on p.620 — that footer belongs to the COMMENTARIUS (d28-divisio), NOT this littera.

**Footer ownership.**
- **Footers IN:** the p.619 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* nn.1–5 + the p.620 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* nn.1–5 migrate IN to this littera chunk (10 total). Per the hand-off, the p.619 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* n.1 was confirmed to belong to THIS chunk.
- **Footers OUT / NOT MINE:** the p.619 L-column upper numbered source-notes (¹Vers.37, ²Vers.5 [Bernard.], ³Vers.5, ⁴Cfr supra d.26 a.2 q.5 ad 2, ⁵Cfr de hoc dubio B. Albert…) belong to the **d.27 commentary tail** printed atop the p.619 L-column (already Tier-2, d27 chunks). On p.620 the *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footer (n.1 *Edd. intendit agere de ea quantum ad dilectorum. Inferius pro dubia cod. A dubilabilia.*; n.2 *Codd. inepte hic addunt quod vel quid; fortasse scriptura genuina fuit quidem.*) is a SEPARATE block for the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII (the next chunk, d28-divisio); do not touch it.

**Seam status.** CLEAN at both ends.
- **Open seam:** continuous after the d.27 commentary close (*…patet etiam solutio obiectorum⁵.* p.619 R-col) → DISTINCTIO XXVIII / Cap. I opens at raw 43061.
- **Close seam:** Cap. IV ends *…ratione beneficii exhibitionis.* (raw 43143); the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII` (subtitle *De caritate quoad diligendorum numerum et distinctionem*; raw 43144) is the next chunk (d28-divisio). The COMMENTARIUS opener (*Hic quaeri potest, utrum illo mandato dilectionis proximi etc.* → DIVISIO TEXTUS *Supra egit Magister de caritate quantum ad essentiam et definitionem…*) is a fresh COMMENTARIUS head, not a continuation of Cap. IV — seam clean.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All four chapter rubrics, all incipits, and all 10 footers were read eyes-on from the 450 dpi bands without ambiguity.

**HAND-OFF TO d28-divisio (forwarded):** the next chunk is **bon-sent-III-d28-divisio** — `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII` (subtitle *De caritate quoad diligendorum numerum et distinctionem*; incipit echo *Hic quaeri potest, utrum illo mandato dilectionis proximi etc.*) + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`. `type: divisio`, OMIT `articulus`/`quaestio`, **`has_scholion: false`**, apparatus = `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`. **Raw anchors:** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII header at raw **43144**; DIVISIO TEXTUS at raw **43150** (*Supra egit Magister de caritate quantum ad essentiam et definitionem. In hac parte intendit agere quantum ad diligendorum numerum et distinctionem. Dividitur autem pars ista in tres partes…*); TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM at raw **43179**; ARTICULUS UNICUS + QUAESTIO I body follow on p.621. **Page span:** the COMMENTARIUS begins at the FOOT of printed **p.620** (PDF 642, spanning both columns beneath Cap. IV) and runs onto p.621+. pdf = printed + 22. **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** footer block: header at the bottom of p.620's R-column (`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`), **n.1** = *Edd. intendit agere de ea quantum ad dilectorum. Inferius pro dubia cod. A dubilabilia.*; **n.2** = *Codd. inepte hic addunt quod vel quid; fortasse scriptura genuina fuit quidem.* (DIVISIO TEXTUS variant notes); more NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM on p.621. **d.28 ARTICLE/QUESTION STRUCTURE (read eyes-on from TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, raw 43179 onward):** the part has **ONE article only — ARTICULUS UNICUS, *De obiectis ex caritate diligendis*** — with **SIX questions** (the TRACTATIO heads them as *circa sex*): **I.** *utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales;* **II.** *utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones;* **III.** *utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines;* **IV.** *utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra;* **V.** *utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita;* **VI. (et ultimo)** *de diligendorum numero et sufficientia.* Unlike d.26/d.27 (two articles each) d.28 has **NO second article and NO dubia file** — the article runs unbroken q1→q6 (confirmed: no `DUBIA CIRCA` / `DUB.` block appears in the raw between the TRACTATIO and the COMMENTARIUS of d.29). The body's QUAESTIO I opens directly at *Utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales* (raw ~43195, p.621) — the TRACTATIO list and the body q-order align 1:1, no q-swap offset (the auto-chunker alignment check should pass). Use `vol3/bon-sent-III-d26-divisio.md` or `d27-divisio` as the structural template for the divisio chunk. So the full d.28 chunk slate is: **littera (DONE) · divisio · a-unicus-q1 · q2 · q3 · q4 · q5 · q6** = 8 chunks, no dubia.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 28, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVIII — divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXVIII — division of the text and treatment of the questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII.

#### *De caritate quoad diligendorum numerum et distinctionem.*

*Hic quaeri potest, utrum illo mandato dilectionis proximi etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de caritate quantum ad essentiam et definitionem. In hac parte intendit agere[^p620-1] quantum ad diligendorum numerum et distinctionem. Dividitur autem pars ista in tres partes. In quarum prima inquirit, quae et quot sint diligenda, et qualiter exprimantur per duo mandata. In secunda vero parte removet quaedam dubia, ibi: *Oritur autem hic quaestio de Angelis* etc. In tertia vero parte subiungit quandam distinctionem, quae facit ad praemissorum maiorem evidentiam, ibi: *Hic notandum est*[^p620-2], *proximum dici* etc.

<!-- page 621 -->

Prima pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima movet quaestionem et determinat. In secunda auctoritate Augustini confirmat, ibi: *Quatuor enim diligenda sunt, ut ait Augustinus.* — Item, secunda pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima removet dubium de Angelis. In secunda vero de Christo, ibi: *Christum vero, in quantum homo* etc. Ultima vero pars remanet indivisa.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa sex.

Primo quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de diligendorum numero et sufficientia.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXVIII.

#### *On charity as regards the number and distinction of the things to be loved.*

*Here it can be asked whether by that commandment of the love of neighbor, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of charity as regards its essence and definition. In this part he intends to treat[^p620-1] of the number and distinction of the things to be loved. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he inquires which and how many things are to be loved, and how they are expressed through the two commandments. But in the second part he removes certain doubts, there: *But here a question arises concerning the Angels,* etc. And in the third part he adds a certain distinction, which serves for the greater clarity of what has gone before, there: *Here it is to be noted*[^p620-2] *that one is called neighbor,* etc.

The first part is divided into two. In the first of these he raises the question and determines it. In the second he confirms it by the authority of Augustine, there: *For four things are to be loved, as Augustine says.* — Likewise, the second part is divided into two. In the first of these he removes the doubt concerning the Angels. But in the second concerning Christ, there: *But Christ, in so far as he is man,* etc. And the last part remains undivided.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part a question here falls under six heads.

First it is asked whether by charity irrational creatures are to be loved.

Secondly it is asked whether by charity the demons are to be loved.

Thirdly it is asked whether by charity wicked men are to be loved.

Fourthly it is asked whether by charity our bodies are to be loved.

Fifthly it is asked whether by charity the gratuitous gifts are to be loved.

Sixthly and lastly it is asked concerning the number and sufficiency of the things to be loved.

---

la: Edd. *intendit agere de ea quantum ad dilectorum.* Inferius pro *dubia* cod. A *dubitabilia.*

en: The editions read *intendit agere de ea quantum ad dilectorum* (he intends to treat of it as regards the loved ones). Below, for *dubia* (doubts) codex A has *dubitabilia* (doubtful matters).

la: Codd. inepte hic addunt *quod* vel *quid;* fortasse scriptura genuina fuit *quidem.*

en: The codices here ineptly add *quod* or *quid;* perhaps the genuine reading was *quidem.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** The *COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII* front-matter (subtitle *De caritate quoad diligendorum numerum et distinctionem*; incipit echo *Hic quaeri potest, utrum illo mandato dilectionis proximi etc.*) + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`. Re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{620,621}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 43144–43186) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing; the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout (Vol II/III override, offset pdf = printed + 22). `type: divisio`, **`has_scholion: false`** — a divisio chunk carries no scholion; its apparatus is the editorial *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM*.

**Structure (ARTICULUS UNICUS, six questions, no dubia).** Distinction XXVIII has a **single article — ARTICULUS UNICUS, *De obiectis ex caritate diligendis*** — with **six questions** (the TRACTATIO heads it *circa sex*): **I.** *utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales;* **II.** *utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones;* **III.** *utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines;* **IV.** *utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra;* **V.** *utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita;* **VI. (et ultimo)** *de diligendorum numero et sufficientia.* The TRACTATIO list and the body q-order align 1:1 (no q-swap offset). There is **no second article and no dubia file** — the article runs unbroken q1→q6.

**Page-split map.** Chunk spans **printed pp.620–621** (PDF 642–643). The `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII` head + subtitle + incipit echo span both columns at the **foot of p.620** (beneath Cap. IV of the littera), followed by `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`; the DIVISIO TEXTUS first paragraph (down to *…Hic notandum est, proximum dici etc.*) sits in the p.620 L→R columns. **Page break p.620→621** falls inside the DIVISIO: the second DIVISIO paragraph (*Prima pars dividitur in duas…Ultima vero pars remanet indivisa.*) opens the top of p.621 (both columns), followed by `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.` and the six-question list. After the TRACTATIO, `ARTICULUS UNICUS. / De obiectis ex caritate diligendis. / QUAESTIO I. / Utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales.` begins (still p.621 top) — that ARTICULUS opener + QUAESTIO I header belong to the **next chunk (d28-a1-q1)**, whose body opens at *Circa primum sic proceditur…* (raw ~43195). Running heads: p.620 OCR `620`; p.621 OCR `DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 621` (trusted via the +22 offset + running-head text `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`).

**Apparatus (2 entries), NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart:**
- **p.620** → nn. 1–2. The `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` header appears in the p.620 R-column footer, **beneath** the littera's *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* nn.4–5 (those upper footers belong to the d28-littera and are NOT mine). **n.1** (DIVISIO TEXTUS, marker after *intendit agere*) = *Edd. intendit agere de ea quantum ad dilectorum. Inferius pro dubia cod. A dubilabilia.*; **n.2** (DIVISIO TEXTUS, marker after *notandum est*) = *Codd. inepte hic addunt quod vel quid; fortasse scriptura genuina fuit quidem.* Both markers fall within the DIVISIO TEXTUS first paragraph (p.620). No NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footers on p.621 belong to this chunk — the p.621 footers (`Vers.25`, `Cfr. I Sent…`, `Augustinus Enarrat. in Ps…`) key to the QUAESTIO I body (d28-a1-q1).

**Footer ownership.**
- **Footers IN:** the p.620 *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* nn.1–2 migrate IN to this divisio chunk (2 total). Per the hand-off, these two notes were confirmed to belong to THIS chunk (the COMMENTARIUS), not the littera.
- **Footers OUT / NOT MINE:** on p.620 the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* nn.1–5 (p.620 littera notes: *Ideo* / *August. de Doctr.* / *Loc. cit.* / *Psalm. 34,14* / *Glossa in Ps. 11,3*) belong to the **d28-littera** (already Tier-2). On p.621 the *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footers (n.1 *Vers. 25: Diligis enim omnia…*, etc.) belong to the **QUAESTIO I body** (the next chunk, d28-a1-q1).

**Seam status.** CLEAN at both ends.
- **Open seam:** continuous after Cap. IV of the littera (*…ratione beneficii exhibitionis.* p.620 R-col); the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII` head (raw 43144) is a fresh COMMENTARIUS head spanning both columns at the foot of p.620 — seam clean.
- **Close seam:** the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM closes *…de diligendorum numero et sufficientia.* (raw 43186); the `ARTICULUS UNICUS / QUAESTIO I` header + body (*Circa primum sic proceditur…*, raw ~43195) is the next chunk (d28-a1-q1). The ARTICULUS/QUAESTIO header is a fresh article head, not a continuation of the TRACTATIO list — seam clean.

**`[?]` flags:** none. The COMMENTARIUS head, subtitle, incipit echo, both DIVISIO TEXTUS paragraphs, the full six-question TRACTATIO, and both p.620 footers were read eyes-on from the 450 dpi bands without ambiguity.

**HAND-OFF TO d28-a1-q1 (forwarded):** the next chunk is **bon-sent-III-d28-a1-q1** — `ARTICULUS UNICUS. / De obiectis ex caritate diligendis. / QUAESTIO I. / Utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales.` `type: quaestio`, `articulus: 1` (single article), `quaestio: 1`, **scholion TBD** (check the body's *Scholion* head). **Raw anchors:** ARTICULUS UNICUS header at raw **43187**; QUAESTIO I header at raw **43191**; QUAESTIO I body opens *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales. Et quod sic, videtur.* at raw **~43195** (top of p.621-L, below the TRACTATIO). **Page span:** QUAESTIO I body begins at the top of printed **p.621** (PDF 643, L-column) and runs onto p.622+ (the CONCLUSIO + Respondeo are on p.621-R → p.622). pdf = printed + 22. **Footer split (p.621):** a fresh *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* sequence on p.621 keys to the QUAESTIO I body — n.1 = *Vers. 25: Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil etc. — In conclus. respicitur illud I. Ioan. 4, 8: Qui non diligit non novit Deum…*; further notes (*Cfr. I Sent. d.3 p.1 q.2; August. de Doctr. christ. c.22 n.20*; *Vide I Sent. d.3…Itinerar. mentis in Deum c.1*; *August. Enarrat. in Ps. 9,16…*; *Cfr. supra pag. 387, nota 8*) follow — all p.621 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM belong to a1-q1, NONE to this divisio. **quaeritur alignment:** the TRACTATIO's *Primo quaeritur…creaturae irrationales* matches the QUAESTIO I body title 1:1 — alignment check passes, no q-swap. The d.28 chunk slate: **littera (DONE) · divisio (DONE) · a1-q1 · q2 · q3 · q4 · q5 · q6** = 8 chunks, no dubia.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 621 -->

### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De obiectis ex caritate diligendis.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sapientiae undecimo[^1]: *Diligis omnia, Domine, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti;* sed caritas facit nos diligere conformiter Deo: ergo si Deus, qui est caritas, diligit creaturas irrationales; videtur, quod et homines caritatem habentes eas ex caritate debeant diligere.

2. Item, creaturae rationales ex caritate diligendae sunt, propter hoc quod habent aliquam Dei similitudinem; sed in creaturis irrationalibus relucet Dei similitudo, licet minus perfecte quam in creaturis rationalibus; relucet enim Deus in eis sicut in vestigio[^2]: ergo si similitudo Dei est ratio diligendi ex caritate, videtur, quod ceterae creaturae irrationales ex caritate diligendae sint.

3. Item, sicut ad fidem pertinet credere, Deum esse creatorem creaturarum rationalium, ita ad ipsam spectat credere, ipsum esse creatorem irrationalium; et sicut intellectus noster cognoscit Deum in creaturis per creaturas rationales, ita et per irrationales, licet minus plene[^3]: si ergo fides et cognitio et contemplatio ipsius Dei indifferenter respicit ipsas creaturas rationales et irrationales, pari ratione videtur, quod et ipsa gratuita dilectio: ergo videtur, quod et irrationales creaturae ex caritate diligi possunt, cum caritas ita amet Deum, sicut fides credit.

4. Item, virtus et vitium habent esse circa idem: ergo circa quod habet esse amor vitiosus libidinis et cupiditatis, circa idem habet esse amor gratuitus et caritatis[^4]; sed homo potest libidinose et cupide amare creaturas irrationales: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod vir iustus ex caritate habeat eas diligere.

5. Item, aliquis diligit bona temporalia, ut per illa serviat Deo, sicut vir iustus diligit possessiones, ut faciat eleemosynas; sed constat, quod talis amor est amor meritorius; sed amor meritorius procedit ex caritate[^5]: ergo videtur, quod talia irrationalia sint ex caritate diligenda.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctrina christiana, et habetur in littera praecedentis distinctionis[^6]: «Ea sola ex caritate sunt diligenda, quae nobiscum societate quadam referuntur in Deum, sicut est homo et Angelus vel corpus nostrum»; sed talia non sunt irrationalia: ergo etc.

<!-- page 622 -->

2. Item, principale obiectum caritatis est Bonum increatum, cum caritas sit virtus theologica: ergo cum caritas faciat illi bono adhaerere et ipso frui, nihil in mundo diligit, nisi quod illo bono natum est frui et in illo beatificari[^7]; sed creaturae irrationales non possunt in Deo beatificari: ergo non possunt ex caritate diligi.

3. Item, caritas est vinculum connexionis, ergo illa sola sunt nata ex caritate diligi, quae per caritatem possunt necti; talia autem non sunt nisi illa quae sunt nata esse de unitate corporis Christi; sed talia non sunt nisi rationalia[^8]: ergo etc.

4. Item, nobilior est amor caritatis, quam sit amor socialis; sed amor socialis non potest esse nec debet nisi respectu rationalium creaturarum[^9]: ergo nec amor caritatis.

5. Item, illa solum sunt ex caritate diligenda, quorum dilectio clauditur et exprimitur in duobus mandatis caritatis[^10]; sed dilectio irrationalium nec includitur nec exprimitur in illis duobus mandatis: ergo videtur, quod amor caritatis ad creaturas irrationales non habeat extendi.

> **Conclusio.** Creaturae irrationales diligendae sunt ex caritate imperante, non ex eliciente, vel, ut alia via probatur, non diliguntur ex caritate nisi improprie, ita ut caritas non ponat circa illas affectum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum aliquis actus dicitur esse ex aliqua virtute, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo sicut a movente et imperante, alio modo sicut ab eliciente et informante. Primo modo potest dici, quod omnia opera meritoria sunt ex caritate, quia caritas imperat omne opus bonum; sicut ex caritate possum ire ad sanctum Iacobum et ex caritate levare festucam de terra. Secundo modo ille actus dicitur esse ex caritate, quem habitus caritatis respicit[^11] formaliter et directe, sicut diligere Deum et proximum, quem non habet anima elicere mediante alio habitu quam habitu caritatis.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod aliquid diligi ex caritate potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo ex caritate *imperante*; et sic concedi potest, quod irrationales creaturae sunt diligendae ex caritate. Sicut enim caritas imperat et movet ad faciendum et dicendum et cognoscendum[^12] omnia quae spectant ad salutem nostram et laudem divinam; sic etiam imperat ad amandum. Unde quia multae irrationales creaturae datae sunt nobis in adiutorium ad exercendum opera meritoria, ordinatae sunt etiam ad laudandum Deum[^13]; hinc est, quod caritas, quae est amatrix Dei et proximi, imperat, tales creaturas diligi.

Alio modo dicitur aliquid diligi ex caritate eliciente et informante; et sic diligitur ex caritate illud, in quod est formalis et proprius actus ipsius caritatis; tale autem non est nisi illud quod est summum Bonum, vel cui summum Bonum natum est aliquo modo uniri per cognitionem et amorem. Ideo cum creaturae irrationales non sint hoc modo Dei capaces, quia non sunt ad Dei imaginem, per caritatem non potest eis exoptari summum Bonum; et ideo caritas non descendit ad illa diligenda secundum suum actum proprium et formalem: ac per hoc talia non diliguntur ex caritate elicitive.

Et si tu quaeras: quae virtus elicit illum actum dilectionis, quo quis diligit creaturas, in quantum sunt a Deo et ad Deum? dicendum, quod hoc est cuiusdam pietatis et affectionis naturalis. Sicut enim homo diligit canem quadam pietate naturali, quia videt eum sibi obedientem; sic et ceteras alias bestias et irrationales creaturas naturaliter ex quadam pietate[^14] natus erat diligere et fovere, quantum erat ex prima conditione. Unde secundum quod homo plus reformatur et reducitur ad statum innocentiae, secundum hoc magis sibi mansuescunt huiusmodi creaturae, et ipse circa eas maiori pietate movetur; sicut de beato Francisco legitur[^15], quod erga huiusmodi creaturas mira pietatis teneritudine affluebat, quia iam quodam modo innocentiam recuperaverat. In cuius rei signum creaturae irrationales eidem obtemperabant.

Et secundum hanc distinctionem patet responsio ad quaestionem: quia uno modo creaturae irrationales sunt ex caritate diligendae, videlicet ex caritate imperante; alio vero modo non, videlicet ex caritate eliciente. — Secundum hoc etiam potest responderi ad obiecta ad utramque partem, quia procedunt secundum diversas vias, sicut intuenti apparet.

Est et alius hic modus dicendi praedicto modo non contrarius, sed potius consonus, quod aliquid

<!-- page 623 -->

diligi ex caritate potest esse tripliciter: vel ita, quod caritas faciat circa ipsum dilectum ponere affectionem et finem; et sic solus Deus diligitur ex caritate. Alio modo ita, quod caritas circa ipsum dilectum faciat ponere affectionem, non tamen finem; et sic diligitur proximus ex caritate, quia circa proximum affectu caritatis afficitur, optando ei summum Bonum, non propter ipsum, sed propter Deum. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid ex caritate diligi ita, quod caritas circa illud non ponit finem, nec etiam affectionem intuitu sui, sed solum ratione illius, propter quod diligit; et hoc modo creaturae irrationales, in quibus Deus relucet, diliguntur ex caritate, quia Deus diligitur in illis; per quem modum quis dicitur diligere canem amici sui, non quia afficiatur circa canem speciali affectione, sed quia afficitur circa amicum[^1b]. — Et huius signum est, quia affectus caritatis non alligat hominem creaturae irrationali, secundum quod alligat et connectit hominem ipsi proximo, vel etiam ipsi Deo. Unde sicut amor amicitiae, qui est in amicum, se extendit ad amici filium, ita quod filius amici amicus est et dilectus, non autem sic se extendit ad amici catulum, ut canis diligatur consimili affectu; sic intelligendum est, quod caritas, quae est amor Dei, se extendit ad illos qui sunt nati esse eius filii per gratiam adoptionis. Et quia creaturae irrationales non sunt huiusmodi, ideo proprie loquendo, non sunt natae ex caritate diligi, ita quod caritas circa illas ponat affectum, bene tamen[^2b] potest caritas in illis diligere Deum; ita quodam modo potest concedi, ut illae creaturae diligantur ex caritate, licet improprie. — Ideo non sunt numerandae inter illa quae proprie ex caritate diliguntur, sicut rationes ad hanc partem inductae ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus diligit creaturas irrationales; dicendum, quod Deum creaturas irrationales diligere est eas conservare in esse naturae[^3b]; sed aliquid diligere ex caritate, hoc est summum Bonum ei optare; et ideo plus connotatur, cum dicitur, aliquid esse ex caritate diligendum, et aliquid esse Deo dilectum. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi Deus eas diligit, quod ex caritate amandae sint. Et si tu obiicias[^4b], quod caritas conformat voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum primo et per se respectu omnium operum et quorumcumque obiectorum, sed respectu illorum quae habent expressam similitudinem, et quibus vult Deus dare se ipsum. Nam caritas omnibus, quae ex caritate diligit, optat Deum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, et habetur in distinctione praecedenti[^5b]: «Sic nos invicem diligamus, ut, quantum possumus, ad habendum in nobis Deum ex dilectione attrahamus».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creaturae rationales diliguntur ex caritate propter assimilationem ad Deum; dicendum, quod non quaecumque assimilatio ad Deum facit aliquid ex caritate diligibile, sed illa quae facit Dei capacem; et haec est similitudo *imaginis*. Anima enim «ideo est imago Dei, quia eius capax et particeps esse potest[^6b]». Caritas enim optat, illud summum Bonum haberi ab eo quem diligit; ad illud enim inclinat tanquam ad suum principale obiectum. Et quoniam similitudo *vestigii* non facit, creaturam ipsius Dei esse capacem per cognitionem et amorem; hinc est, quod non sequitur, quodsi in creaturis irrationalibus reperiatur aliqua *vestigii* similitudo, quod propter hoc ad ipsas extendatur caritatis dilectio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides ita credit Deum creatorem irrationalium sicut rationalium: dicendum, quod non est simile de fide et caritate. Nam fides non tantum est circa ipsum Deum, in quantum est *finis*, sed etiam in quantum est *principium* rerum. Et quia Deus est principium immediatum tam respectu rationalium quam irrationalium; ideo utroque respectu[^7b] in Deum credit et ipsum contemplatur. Caritas autem respicit Deum sub ratione *finis*, quia sub ratione *boni*. Et quia creaturae rationales et irrationales non eodem modo habent tendere in ipsum summum finem, quia rationales immediate, irrationales vero mediate[^8b]; hinc est, quod non sequitur, quod dilectio caritatis ad has et illas se habeat uniformiter.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus et vitium habent esse circa idem; dicendum, quod illud argumentum dupliciter peccat. Primo, quia, quamvis virtus et vitium habeant esse circa idem subiectum, non tamen oportet, quod generaliter habeant esse circa idem obiectum; plura enim exiguntur ad virtutem quam ad vitium[^9b]. Ideo si circa aliquid potest consistere vitium, non propter hoc sequitur, quod et virtus. — Alius etiam defectus est ibi, quia, cum

<!-- page 624 -->

caritas sit virtus et amor specialis[^10b], non oportet, quod circa illud consistat caritas, circa quod consistit quodlibet speciale vitium. Unde quamvis cupiditas consistat circa bona temporalia, non oportet, quod circa illa sit virtus caritatis, sed sufficit, quod sit virtus largitatis. Et ideo non oportet, huiusmodi temporalia ex caritate amari, sed ex largitate retineri et dispensari, quae iuxta eorum valorem novit eadem appretiari.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui diligit temporalia, ut per illa Deo serviat; iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt: quia ille motus est meritorius, non quia sit a caritate eliciente, sed quia est a caritate imperante, sicut ire ad sanctum Iacobum, vel facere quodcumque aliud opus in Dei obsequium. Praeterea, cum quis diligit temporalia ad serviendum Deo, affectio sua versatur circa eum cui vult servire, sicut prius tactum est. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod talia diligantur ex caritate, nisi valde extenso nomine. Nam proprie nihil ex caritate diligitur, circa quod caritas non ponat affectum specialem[^16b].

english:
### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *On the objects to be loved out of charity.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Wisdom, eleventh chapter[^1]: *Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest nothing of those things which thou hast made;* but charity makes us love conformably to God: therefore if God, who is charity, loves irrational creatures, it seems that men too who have charity ought to love them out of charity.

2. Likewise, rational creatures are to be loved out of charity, on account of the fact that they have some likeness of God; but in irrational creatures the likeness of God shines forth, though less perfectly than in rational creatures; for God shines forth in them as in a vestige[^2]: therefore if the likeness of God is the ground for loving out of charity, it seems that the other irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, just as it pertains to faith to believe that God is the creator of rational creatures, so it belongs to it to believe that He is the creator of irrational ones; and just as our intellect knows God in creatures through rational creatures, so also through irrational ones, though less fully[^3]: if then the faith and knowledge and contemplation of God Himself looks indifferently upon both rational and irrational creatures, by parity of reasoning it seems that gratuitous love does too: therefore it seems that irrational creatures too can be loved out of charity, since charity loves God just as faith believes Him.

4. Likewise, virtue and vice are concerned with the same thing: therefore that about which there is the vicious love of lust and cupidity, about the same there is the gratuitous love also of charity[^4]; but a man can love irrational creatures lustfully and covetously: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the just man should love them out of charity.

5. Likewise, someone loves temporal goods, so that through them he may serve God, just as the just man loves possessions, so that he may give alms; but it is plain that such love is meritorious love; but meritorious love proceeds from charity[^5]: therefore it seems that such irrational things are to be loved out of charity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*, and it is contained in the text of the preceding distinction[^6]: «Those things alone are to be loved out of charity which are referred together with us into God by a certain fellowship, as is a man and an Angel or our body»; but irrational things are not such: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the principal object of charity is the Uncreated Good, since charity is a theological virtue: therefore since charity makes one cleave to that good and enjoy it, it loves nothing in the world except what is born to enjoy that good and to be beatified in it[^7]; but irrational creatures cannot be beatified in God: therefore they cannot be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, charity is the bond of connection, therefore those things alone are born to be loved out of charity which can be joined through charity; but such are only those which are born to be of the unity of the body of Christ; but such are only the rational ones[^8]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the love of charity is nobler than is social love; but social love cannot and ought not be except in respect of rational creatures[^9]: therefore neither can the love of charity.

5. Likewise, those things alone are to be loved out of charity whose love is enclosed and expressed in the two commandments of charity[^10]; but the love of irrational things is neither included nor expressed in those two commandments: therefore it seems that the love of charity has no reason to be extended to irrational creatures.

> **Conclusion.** Irrational creatures are to be loved out of commanding charity, not out of eliciting charity; or, as is proved by another way, they are not loved out of charity except improperly, so that charity places no affection about them.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that when some act is said to be from some virtue, this can be understood in two ways: in one way as from something moving and commanding, in another way as from something eliciting and informing. In the first way it can be said that all meritorious works are from charity, because charity commands every good work; just as out of charity I can go to Saint James and out of charity lift a straw from the ground. In the second way that act is said to be from charity which the habit of charity regards[^11] formally and directly, as to love God and neighbor, which the soul does not elicit by means of any other habit than the habit of charity.

According to this it must be understood that for something to be loved out of charity can be understood in two ways: in one way out of *commanding* charity; and thus it can be granted that irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity. For just as charity commands and moves toward doing and saying and knowing[^12] all things that pertain to our salvation and the divine praise, so too it commands toward loving. Whence, because many irrational creatures have been given to us as a help for performing meritorious works, they are also ordered to the praising of God[^13]; hence it is that charity, which is the lover of God and of neighbor, commands that such creatures be loved.

In another way something is said to be loved out of eliciting and informing charity; and thus that is loved out of charity in which the formal and proper act of charity itself is; but such is only that which is the supreme Good, or that to which the supreme Good is born to be united in some way through knowledge and love. Therefore since irrational creatures are not in this way capable of God, because they are not unto the image of God, the supreme Good cannot be desired for them through charity; and therefore charity does not descend to loving them according to its proper and formal act: and through this such things are not loved out of charity elicitively.

And if you ask: which virtue elicits that act of love by which one loves creatures, insofar as they are from God and unto God? it must be said that this is of a certain natural piety and affection. For just as a man loves a dog by a certain natural piety, because he sees it obedient to him; so also he was born to love and cherish naturally, by a certain piety[^14], the other beasts and irrational creatures, as far as it was from the first condition. Whence according as a man is more reformed and led back to the state of innocence, accordingly creatures of this kind grow more tame toward him, and he is moved with greater piety about them; as is read of blessed Francis[^15], that toward creatures of this kind he overflowed with a wondrous tenderness of piety, because he had now in some way recovered innocence. As a sign of this thing irrational creatures obeyed him.

And according to this distinction the response to the question is plain: that in one way irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity, namely out of commanding charity; but in another way not, namely out of eliciting charity. — According to this also it can be answered to the objections on either side, because they proceed according to diverse ways, as is apparent to one who looks closely.

There is also here another manner of speaking, not contrary to the aforesaid manner, but rather consonant, namely that something

to be loved out of charity can be threefold: either thus, that charity makes one place about the beloved itself an affection and an end; and thus God alone is loved out of charity. In another way thus, that charity makes one place about the beloved itself an affection, yet not an end; and thus the neighbor is loved out of charity, because about the neighbor one is affected with the affection of charity, desiring for him the supreme Good, not on account of himself, but on account of God. In a third way something is said to be loved out of charity thus, that charity places about it no end, nor even affection with a view to it, but only by reason of that on account of which it loves; and in this way irrational creatures, in which God shines forth, are loved out of charity, because God is loved in them; in which way one is said to love the dog of his friend, not because he is affected about the dog with a special affection, but because he is affected about the friend[^1b]. — And the sign of this is that the affection of charity does not bind a man to an irrational creature in the way that it binds and connects a man to the neighbor himself, or even to God Himself. Whence just as the love of friendship, which is toward a friend, extends itself to the friend's son, so that the friend's son is a friend and beloved, yet does not thus extend itself to the friend's pup, so that the dog be loved with a like affection; so it must be understood that charity, which is the love of God, extends itself to those who are born to be His sons through the grace of adoption. And because irrational creatures are not of this kind, therefore properly speaking they are not born to be loved out of charity in such a way that charity places affection about them, though indeed[^2b] charity can love God in them; so that in a certain way it can be granted that those creatures are loved out of charity, although improperly. — Therefore they are not to be numbered among those things which are properly loved out of charity, as the reasons brought forward for this side show.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God loves irrational creatures; it must be said that for God to love irrational creatures is to conserve them in the being of nature[^3b]; but to love something out of charity is to desire the supreme Good for it; and therefore more is connoted when it is said that something is to be loved out of charity, and that something is loved by God. And therefore it does not follow that if God loves them, they are to be loved out of charity. And if you object[^4b] that charity conforms our will to the divine will; it must be said that this is not true primarily and *per se* in respect of all works and of whatever objects, but in respect of those which have an express likeness, and to which God wills to give Himself. For charity desires God for all those things which it loves out of charity. And this is what Augustine says, and it is contained in the preceding distinction[^5b]: «Let us so love one another that, as far as we can, we may by love draw toward having God within us».

2. To that which is objected, that rational creatures are loved out of charity on account of their assimilation to God; it must be said that not every assimilation to God makes something loveable out of charity, but that which makes it capable of God; and this is the likeness of *image*. For the soul «is therefore the image of God because it can be capable and partaker of Him[^6b]». For charity desires that that supreme Good be possessed by him whom it loves; for to that it inclines as to its principal object. And since the likeness of *vestige* does not make a creature capable of God Himself through knowledge and love; hence it is that it does not follow that if in irrational creatures some likeness of *vestige* be found, on this account the love of charity is extended to them.

3. To that which is objected, that faith believes God to be the creator of irrational things just as of rational ones: it must be said that the case of faith and charity is not similar. For faith is not only about God Himself, insofar as He is *end*, but also insofar as He is the *principle* of things. And because God is the immediate principle both in respect of rational and of irrational things; therefore in both respects[^7b] it believes in God and contemplates Him. But charity regards God under the aspect of *end*, because under the aspect of *good*. And because rational and irrational creatures do not in the same way have to tend into that supreme end, since rational ones immediately, but irrational ones mediately[^8b]; hence it is that it does not follow that the love of charity bears itself uniformly toward these and those.

4. To that which is objected, that virtue and vice are concerned with the same thing; it must be said that that argument is doubly faulty. First, because, although virtue and vice have being about the same subject, it is nevertheless not necessary that they generally have being about the same object; for more is required for virtue than for vice[^9b]. Therefore if vice can subsist about something, it does not on this account follow that virtue does too. — There is also another defect there, because, since

charity is a virtue and a special love[^10b], it is not necessary that charity subsist about that about which any special vice subsists. Whence although cupidity subsists about temporal goods, it is not necessary that the virtue of charity be about them, but it suffices that the virtue of largesse be. And therefore it is not necessary that temporal things of this kind be loved out of charity, but be retained and dispensed out of largesse, which knows how to appraise them according to their worth.

5. To that which is objected concerning him who loves temporal things in order that through them he may serve God; the response is already plain through what has been said: because that motion is meritorious, not because it is from eliciting charity, but because it is from commanding charity, just as to go to Saint James, or to do any other work in God's service. Moreover, when someone loves temporal things to serve God, his affection is occupied about Him whom he wishes to serve, as was touched on before. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that such things are loved out of charity, except by a very extended use of the name. For properly nothing is loved out of charity about which charity does not place a special affection[^16b].

la: Vers. 25: *Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil etc.* — In conclus. respicitur illud I. Ioan. 4, 8: *Qui non diligit non novit Deum, quoniam Deus caritas est.* (P. 621, n. 1.)

en: Verse 25: *For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing etc.* — In the conclusion there is regard to that of 1 John 4:8: *He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is charity.* (P. 621, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine. — De maiori cfr. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 20. seq. — Inferius cod. A bene omittit *ceteras*. (P. 621, n. 2.)

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, at the end. — On the major cf. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 22, n. 20 f. — Below, cod. A rightly omits *ceteras*. (P. 621, n. 2.)

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4, et Itinerar. mentis in Deum, c. I. seqq. (P. 621, n. 3.)

en: See I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4, and *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 1 ff. (P. 621, n. 3.)

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 9, 16: *In laqueo isto, quem absconderunt, comprehensus est pes eorum,* ait: *Pes animae recte intelligitur amor, qui, cum pravus est, vocatur cupiditas aut libido; cum autem rectus, dilectio vel caritas. Amore enim movetur tanquam ad locum, quo tendit. Locus autem animae... in delectatione,* «se pervenisse per amorem laetatur». — Maior innititur in illo axiomate: «opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem»; de quo vide supra pag. 611, nota 3. (P. 621, n. 4.)

en: Augustine, *Enarrat. in Ps.* 9, 16: *In that snare which they have hidden their foot is taken,* he says: *The foot of the soul is rightly understood as love, which, when it is depraved, is called cupidity or lust; but when it is right, charity or affection. For by love it is moved as toward a place, whither it tends. But the place of the soul... is in delight,* «it rejoices to have arrived through love». — The major rests on that axiom: «opposites are born to occur about the same thing»; on which see above, p. 611, note 3. (P. 621, n. 4.)

la: Cap. 8, ubi dictum August. plenius habetur. (P. 621, n. 6.)

en: Chapter 8, where the said passage of Augustine is contained more fully. (P. 621, n. 6.)

la: August., III. de Doctr. christ. c. 10. n. 16: *Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se atque proximo propter Deum.* (P. 622, n. 1.)

en: Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* III, c. 10, n. 16: *I call charity the motion of the soul toward enjoying God on account of Himself, and oneself and neighbor on account of God.* (P. 622, n. 1.)

la: Epist. I. Cor. 12, 27: *Vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra de membro.* Cfr. Rom. 12, 5. (P. 622, n. 2.)

en: Epistle, 1 Cor. 12:27: *Now you are the body of Christ and members of member.* Cf. Rom. 12:5. (P. 622, n. 2.)

la: Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 2: *De inanimatorum amore amicitia minime dicitur, quippe cum neque redamatio neque voluntas boni illorum ulla sit.* Ibid. c. 11: *Erga inanimata neque amicitia ulla est neque ius, neque erga equum aut bovem etc.* — Post *debet* cod. Z adiungit *dici*. (P. 622, n. 3.)

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 2: *Of the love of inanimate things friendship is by no means spoken, since there is neither return of love nor any willing of their good.* Ibid. c. 11: *Toward inanimate things there is no friendship nor right, nor toward a horse or ox etc.* — After *debet* cod. Z adds *dici*. (P. 622, n. 3.)

la: Matth. 22, 37. seqq. — Pro *mandatis* cod. Z *praeceptis*. (P. 622, n. 4.)

en: Matt. 22:37 ff. — For *mandatis* cod. Z reads *praeceptis*. (P. 622, n. 4.)

la: Edd. *inspicit*. Superius post *Secundo* codd. A K bb addunt *vero*. Mox pro *quem non habet* cod. W *quia non habet*. (P. 622, n. 5.)

en: The editions read *inspicit*. Above, after *Secundo* codd. A K bb add *vero*. Soon, for *quem non habet* cod. W reads *quia non habet*. (P. 622, n. 5.)

la: Codd. H M O Z bb *cogitandum*, plures codd. sunt dubiae lectionis; in cod. A desideratur *et cognoscendum*, in edd. 1, 2 *et dicendum*. (P. 622, n. 6.)

en: Codd. H M O Z bb read *cogitandum*, several codd. are of doubtful reading; in cod. A *et cognoscendum* is wanting, in edd. 1, 2 *et dicendum*. (P. 622, n. 6.)

la: Vat. addit *innata diligit et fovet, sicut*; edd. 1, 2 addunt *innata diligit et fovet*, sed deinde omittunt *natus erat diligere et fovere*. (P. 622, n. 8.)

en: The Vatican edition adds *innata diligit et fovet, sicut*; edd. 1, 2 add *innata diligit et fovet*, but then omit *natus erat diligere et fovere*. (P. 622, n. 8.)

la: Cfr. prima et secunda vita S. Francisci, auctore B. Thoma de Celano (in prima vita c. 21, in secunda c. 5. et 101. seqq.), nec non Legenda maior composita a S. Bonav. (c. 5. et 8.). — Mox pro *mira pietatis teneritudine* cod. A *affectu pietatis et reverentiae*. Pro *teneritudine* codd. G H I K L T U V aa *remuneratione*. (P. 622, n. 9.)

en: Cf. the first and second *Life of St. Francis*, by Bl. Thomas of Celano (in the first life c. 21, in the second c. 5 and 101 ff.), as well as the *Legenda maior* composed by St. Bonaventure (c. 5 and 8). — Soon, for *mira pietatis teneritudine* cod. A reads *affectu pietatis et reverentiae*. For *teneritudine* codd. G H I K L T U V aa read *remuneratione*. (P. 622, n. 9.)

la: Bernard., Serm. 1. in festo S. Michaelis, n. 3: *Dicitur certe vulgari quodam proverbio: Qui me amat amat et canem meum.* (P. 623, n. 1.)

en: Bernard, *Sermon* 1 on the feast of St. Michael, n. 3: *It is said indeed by a certain common proverb: Who loves me loves my dog also.* (P. 623, n. 1.)

la: Pro *bene tamen* codd. H L W aa et edd. 1, 2 *unde*, Vat. *unde quia*. Paulo inferius pro *ut illae creaturae diligantur* Vat. *quod creaturae irrationales diligantur*, et dein in fine corp. eadem Vat. cum edd. 1, 2 et cod. W post *ostendunt* addit *et* (cod. W *vel*) *concedunt*. (P. 623, n. 2.)

en: For *bene tamen* codd. H L W aa and edd. 1, 2 read *unde*, the Vatican edition *unde quia*. A little below, for *ut illae creaturae diligantur* the Vatican edition reads *quod creaturae irrationales diligantur*, and then at the end of the body the same Vatican edition with edd. 1, 2 and cod. W after *ostendunt* adds *et* (cod. W *vel*) *concedunt*. (P. 623, n. 2.)

la: In minori huius obiectionis. (P. 623, n. 4.)

en: In the minor of this objection. (P. 623, n. 4.)

la: Cap. 7. in fine. — Paulo superius pro *et quibus vult* cod. K *et in quibus vult*, cod. A *in quibus vult*. (P. 623, n. 5.)

en: Chapter 7, at the end. — A little above, for *et quibus vult* cod. K reads *et in quibus vult*, cod. A *in quibus vult*. (P. 623, n. 5.)

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — Paulo superius pro *diligibile* codd. H Z aa *diligere*. Paulo inferius pro *ab eo* cod. A *a Deo*. Circa finem solut. pro *reperiatur* codd. A K bb *reperitur*. (P. 623, n. 6.)

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — A little above, for *diligibile* codd. H Z aa read *diligere*. A little below, for *ab eo* cod. A reads *a Deo*. Near the end of the solution, for *reperiatur* codd. A K bb read *reperitur*. (P. 623, n. 6.)

la: Post *respectu* Vat. supplet *fides*. Mox pro *quia sub ratione boni* edd. *et sub ratione boni*. (P. 623, n. 7.)

en: After *respectu* the Vatican edition supplies *fides*. Soon, for *quia sub ratione boni* the editions read *et sub ratione boni*. (P. 623, n. 7.)

la: Vide supra pag. 499, nota 2. (P. 623, n. 9.)

la: Edd. *quia licet caritas sit motus et amor specialis, non tamen oportet etc.* In fine solut. pro *quae iuxta* edd. 1, 2 *qui iuxta*, Vat. *ab eo qui iuxta*. (P. 623, n. 10.)

en: The editions read *because, although charity is a motion and a special love, it is nevertheless not necessary etc.* At the end of the solution, for *quae iuxta* edd. 1, 2 read *qui iuxta*, the Vatican edition *ab eo qui iuxta*. (P. 623, n. 10.)

la: Codd. A K S *affectum suum*. (P. 624, n. 1.)

en: Codd. A K S read *affectum suum*. (P. 624, n. 1.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio auctoris primo loco posita, quam tenent etiam B. Albert. et Durandus, visa est S. Thomae, Petro a Tar. aliisque non esse sufficiens; cui opinioni etiam Richard. a Med. et Scotus magis favent. Hi quidem concedunt, quod creaturae irrationales non possint ita diligi ex caritate eliciente, ut caritas terminetur directe ad eas ut obiectum ipsius; tamen contendunt, eas nihilominus posse diligi ex caritate non tantum imperante, sed etiam eliciente, scilicet non dilectione amicitiae, sed concupiscentiae, quae includitur in actu caritatis, ita ut indirecte diligantur ut materia, circa quam versatur dilectio, sicut diliguntur bona amici. De hac distinctione cfr. S. Thom., hic a. I. — Ad rem dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. unica): «Verumtamen verbis Augustini et Magistri plus consonat positio Bonaventurae, et pro concordia potest dici, quod irrationabilia non diliguntur elicitive ex caritate proprie et perfecte, sed aliquantulum et imperfecte, quia nec donum gratiae nec donum gloriae eis optatur, tamen ex caritate ad Dei honorificentiam ordinantur». Huic Dionysii interpretationi satis concordat S. Bonav., ut patet ex ipsius solutione secunda; immo infra q. 5. quoad dona gratuita ad eandem, sicut S. Thomas, distinctionem recurrit.

De hac (I.) quaestione: Scot., III. Sent. d. 32. n. 6. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 3; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 4. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Circa sequentem (2.) quaestionem Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 6.) dicit simpliciter, quod daemones nullo modo sint ex caritate diligendi. S. Thom. eadem ac in praecedenti quaestione distinctione utitur et resolvit (S. loc. cit. a. 11; cfr. hic a. 5.): «Alio modo diligitur aliquid, sicut quod volumus permanere ut bonum alterius... et per hunc modum naturam daemonum etiam ex caritate diligere possumus, in quantum scilicet volumus, illos spiritus in suis naturalibus conservari ad gloriam Dei». De eadem quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. et 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of the author placed in the first position, which Bl. Albert and Durandus also hold, seemed to St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and others not to be sufficient; to which opinion Richard of Mediavilla and Scotus rather favor. These indeed grant that irrational creatures cannot be loved out of eliciting charity in such a way that charity terminates directly at them as its object; yet they contend that they can nonetheless be loved out of charity not only commanding but also eliciting, namely not by the love of friendship, but of concupiscence, which is included in the act of charity, so that they are loved indirectly as the matter about which love is occupied, just as the goods of a friend are loved. On this distinction cf. St. Thom., here a. 1. — To the point Dionysius Carthusianus says (here q. unica): «Nevertheless the position of Bonaventure is more consonant with the words of Augustine and the Master, and for concord it can be said that irrational things are not loved elicitively out of charity properly and perfectly, but somewhat and imperfectly, because neither the gift of grace nor the gift of glory is desired for them, yet they are ordered out of charity to the honoring of God». With this interpretation of Dionysius St. Bonaventure sufficiently agrees, as is plain from his own second solution; indeed below in q. 5, as regards gratuitous gifts, he has recourse to the same distinction, as does St. Thomas.

On this (first) question: Scot., III. Sent. d. 32. n. 6. — S. Thom., here a. 2; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 3; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Petr. of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 4. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following qq. here q. unica.

**II.** Concerning the following (second) question Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 6) says simply that demons are in no way to be loved out of charity. St. Thomas uses and resolves it by the same distinction as in the preceding question (S. loc. cit. a. 11; cf. here a. 5): «In another way something is loved, as that which we wish to remain as the good of another... and through this manner we can love even the nature of demons out of charity, namely insofar as we wish those spirits to be conserved in their natural endowments unto the glory of God». On the same question besides those cited: Bl. Albert, on this and the following q. here a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. and 3.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines ~43191–43411) with 450 dpi column-band PDF (pp. 621–624 = PDF 643–646, offset +22) authoritative for the Respondeo, the *tripliciter* development, the *Ad argumenta*, and all four page footers. OCR for this chunk was clean (single-column-style running prose reflows cleanly); PDF used to verify Respondeo/footer cascade-prone regions per the Vol III directive. Body fully agrees with OCR.

**Page-split map.**
- Title + objections 1–4 + *Sed contra* 1: p. 621.
- *Sed contra* 2–5, Conclusio, Respondeo, *Alio modo* through *non contrarius, sed potius consonus, quod aliquid*: p. 622.
- *diligi ex caritate... tripliciter*, *Ad argumenta* 1–4 (through *quia, cum*): p. 623.
- *caritas sit virtus...* (Defectus 2 tail), Ad 5, Scholion §I–II: p. 624.

**Apparatus split (per-page restart, 26 entries total).**
- p. 621: nn. 1–6 (`[^1]`–`[^6]`).
- p. 622: nn. 1–9 (`[^7]`–`[^15]`).
- p. 623: nn. 1–10 (`[^1]`–`[^10]`, second sequence).
- p. 624: n. 1 only (`[^16]`, the *affectum specialem* / *affectum suum* variant) belongs to q1's body tail. **p. 624 nn. 2–5 belong to q2 (daemones)** — q2's videtur begins at the bottom of p. 624-L.

**Hand-off picked up (from d28-divisio):** all p. 621 NOTAE go into this q1 (n. 1 *Vers. 25: Diligis enim omnia...*); the divisio took only p. 620 nn. 1–2. Confirmed.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d28-a1-q2, *daemones*):** q2 opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones* (QUAESTIO II header at raw ~43409–43411). q2 begins bottom of p. 624-L and spans into p. 625+ (running head `DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II. 625`). **Footer split: q2 takes p. 624 nn. 2–5** (n. 2 *Vers. 18, qui versus in Vulgata sic sonat...*; n. 1 *Codd. A K S affectum suum* stays with q1). Then p. 625 per-page restart.

**Scholion:** present (§I–II). §I = the Thomist/Scotist objection to Bonaventure's solutio + Dionysius Carthusianus concord + "De hac (I.) quaestione" bibliography; §II = bibliography/discussion for the *following* (daemones) question. Body-then-scholion order preserved; `### Scholion` is the last subsection of each language block.

**Alignment:** verified — q1 title and opener both read *creaturae irrationales*; no q-swap.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR was clean and PDF-confirmed throughout.