title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum spes sit virtus gratuita
Whether hope is a gratuitous virtue

source_text:
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### Articulus (sole article). *De spe secundum considerationem absolutam.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum spes sit virtus gratuita.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum spes sit virtus gratuita. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos octavo[^1]: *Spe salvi facti sumus;* quod autem nos facit pervenire ad salutem, illud praecipue tenet rationem virtutis gratuitae: si ergo spes est huiusmodi, ergo est virtus gratuita.

2. Item, in Psalmo[^2]: *Beneplacitum est Domino super timentes eum, et in eis qui sperant super misericordia eius;* sed quod reddit acceptum Deo vel est virtus gratuita, vel habitus excellentior ipsa, sicut habitus doni, vel beatitudinis: si ergo spes non computatur inter habitus donorum et beatitudinum, necesse est, eam computari inter habitus virtutum gratuitarum.

3. Item, habitus directe repugnans culpae habet in se rationem virtutis gratuitae; sed spes undique repugnat culpae, quia repugnat praesumtioni et desperationi[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut difficile est credere quod est supra rationem, sic difficile est exspectare quod est supra omnem aestimationem; sed per spem exspectatur illud bonum, quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit[^4]: ergo sicut fides est virtus, qua creduntur invisibilia; sic videtur, quod spes est virtus, qua exspectantur inaestimabilia, hoc est bona spiritualia et aeterna.

5. Item, quod maxime firmat animam et rectificat et delectat, illud potissime habet rationem virtutis gratuitae — virtus enim est habitus potentiae regulativus et confirmativus, qui facit ipsam animam gaudere circa ea quae recta sunt, secundum quod vult Philosophus[^5] — sed spes est huiusmodi — ipsa enim confirmat et delectat, secundum quod dicitur ad Hebraeos sexto: *Fortissimum habemus solatium, per quod confugimus ad propositam nobis spem, quam sicut ancoram* etc.; et ad Romanos duodecimo: *Spe gaudentes* — videtur igitur manifeste, quod spes sit in genere virtutis gratuitae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Nulla passio est virtus: spes est una de quatuor passionibus, secundum quod dicit Boethius *de Consolatione*[^6]: ergo spes non est virtus. *Prima* probatur per illud quod dicit Philo-

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sophus, quod « cum tria sint in anima: *potentiae, passiones* et *habitus,* virtus non est in genere *passionis,* sed in genere *habitus* ». Si ergo spes non est *virtus,* constat, quod nec *virtus gratuita.*

2. Item, sicut contingit exspectare futura, sic contingit rememorari praeterita[^7]; sed rememoratio de praeteritis non est virtus, nec circa eam consistit aliqua virtus specialis: ergo nec circa exspectationem futurorum aliqua virtus consistit. Sed exspectatio futurorum vel est ipsa spes, vel procedit ab ipsa: ergo videtur, quod ipsa spes non habeat esse virtus.

3. Item, sicut contingit *sperare* recte et non recte, sic contingit etiam *timere* recte et non recte; sed habitus, qui dirigit animam in *timendo,* non reponitur in genere virtutis, utpote timor[^8]: ergo nec habitus, qui dirigit in *sperando:* ergo spes, etiam secundum quod nominat *habitum,* non est in genere virtutis.

4. Item, « omnis virtus moralis consistit circa bonum et difficile », ut vult Philosophus[^9], ergo multo fortius gratuita; sed in exspectatione bonorum promissorum nulla est difficultas: ergo cum spes non consistat circa difficile, non videtur esse in genere virtutis gratuitae.

5. Item, nulla virtus gratuita in suo actu repugnat perfectioni meriti; sed spes in suo actu perfectioni meriti repugnat — ex imperfectione enim procedit, quod quis servit Deo propter retributionem futuram, quia, secundum quod dicit Bernardus[^10], « caritas praemium non intuetur » — si ergo spes facit exspectare retributionem futuram, videtur perfectioni meriti repugnare: ergo non est in genere virtutis gratuitae.

### Conclusio.

> Spes est virtus gratuita, immo gratuitarum virtutum ancora et sustentamentum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomine spei potest intelligi affectio animae, iuxta illud quod philosophi et Sancti[^11] dicunt, quatuor esse animi affectiones, videlicet *gaudium* et *dolorem, spem* et *timorem.* Potest etiam nomine spei intelligi ipsa *res exspectata,* iuxta illud ad Titum secundo[^12]: *Exspectantes beatam spem.* Potest nihilominus sumi pro *habitu,* qui dirigit animae motum et affectum in illud quod exspectandum est. Et isto tertio modo dicendi spes non tantum est *virtus gratuita,* immo etiam virtutum gratuitarum *sustentamentum* et *ancora.* — *Virtus* quidem *gratuita* est, quoniam in hoc, quod facit, animam exspectare ea quae sunt supra omnem[^13] aestimationem humanam et ea quae promisit largitas divina, facit omnino *confidere* et *inniti* summae et immensae largitati, sicut fides facit assentire primae Veritati, et caritas facit adhaerere summae Bonitati; et dum anima ipsi immensae largitati innititur propter se et super omnia, *rectificatur* et *super se elevatur* et *Deo accepta* efficitur. Necesse est ergo, quod habitus, quo mediante fit illud, rationem habeat *virtutis gratuitae.* — Et quia, cum anima innititur ei qui non potest deficere, quamvis ipsa in se sit deficiens et vacillans, fundatur tamen per spem quasi super firmam petram[^14]; et propterea dixi, quod spes non tantummodo est in genere *virtutum gratuitarum,* sed etiam est earum *ancora* et *sustentamentum.* — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad obiecta in contrarium:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod spes est passio; iam patet responsio: quia nomen spei aequivoce accipitur, videlicet pro ipsa *affectione* et pro *habitu* regulante illius affectionis motum. Unde spes, secundum quod est *virtus,* est *habitus,* qui est principium motus, qui est *ab anima*[^15]; *passio* autem magis est *ad animam;* et secundum quod motus exspectationis sive spei *ab anima est,* sic potest fieri recte et non recte, secundum imperium liberi arbitrii. Et quantum ad hoc habet circa ipsum attendi perfectio virtutis, vel deformatio vitii.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet exspectatio ad futura, sic[^16] rememoratio ad praeterita; dicendum, quod non est usquequaque simile de rememoratione praeteritorum et de exspectatione futurorum. Non enim sic consistit rectificatio et obliquatio animae principaliter circa ea quae sunt praeterita, sicut circa ea quae sunt futura, nisi ex consequenti. Virtus enim proprie magis ordinat ad id quod agendum est, quam ad id quod actum est. — Praeterea, alia dissimilitudo est, quia rememoratio respicit actum cognitivae, exspectatio autem motum affectivae[^17]; rectitudo autem virtutis non sic attenditur penes ea quae sunt cognitionis, sicut penes ea quae sunt affectionis. Unde etiam rememorationi, secundum quod iungitur affectioni, annectitur actus virtutis, utpote prudentiae, vel poenitentiae, vel caritatis sive benevolentiae: secundum quod recordatur praeteritorum *factorum,* ut futura melius agat, vel praeteritorum *malorum,* ut doleat, vel[^18] praeteritorum *beneficiorum,* ut gratias agat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor non est in genere virtutis etiam in quantum habitus, ergo nec spes; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia affectio ipsius timoris consistit in quadam resilitione, sed affectio spei consistit in quadam protensione; et ideo affectio timoris plus habet de *passione,* affectio vero spei plus habet de *actione.* Et quoniam habitus virtutum dirigunt animam in *actibus,* in quibus consistit rectitudo vitae, iuxta illud quod dicitur, quod « virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur[^19] »; hinc est, quod spes magis est in genere virtutis quam timor.

Et ex hac eadem causa patet, quare magis circa affectionem spei consistit habitus virtutis, quam circa aliquam aliarum trium affectionum. *Gaudium* enim et *dolor,* quia habent obiecta sibi coniuncta, magis sunt in suscipiendo; affectio vero *spei* inter ceteras est, quae plus habet de ratione agendi et quae magis dicit motum ab anima; quamvis et ipsa secundum aliquid sui dicat passionem circa animam; et secundum illud non habet circa ipsam consistere habitus virtutis, sed magis secundum quod dicit rationem motus et protensionis ipsius animae in ipsam rem speratam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod exspectare bonum non est difficile; dicendum, quod sicut credere quod videtur non habet difficultatem, credere tamen firmissime quod non videtur habet magnam difficultatem; sic intelligendum est, quod quamvis sperare bona praesentia, quae aliquo modo videntur in se, vel in suo simili, non est multum difficile; bona tamen invisibilia et aeterna, quae oculus non vidit[^20], exspectare certa fiducia et pro illis temporalia bona contemnere et his omnibus, quae videntur, superferri, hoc magnam habet difficultatem et magnam dignitatem. Et ideo indubitanter verum est, spem esse in genere virtutis gratuitae.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod spes in suo actu impedit meriti perfectionem; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo, sicut ostendit Apostolus[^21], consurgit ex perfectione meriti; quanto enim aliquis maiora et meliora habet merita, tanto firmius et certius sperat. — Et si obiiciatur, quod « caritas praemium non intuetur »; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de praemio *creato;* de praemio autem *increato* non habet veritatem, quia maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum. Spes autem perfecta magis aspicit mercedem *increatam,* de qua dixit Dominus Abrahae, Genesis decimo quinto[^22]: *Ego merces tua,* quam *creatam.* Eum enim exspectat quis per spei habitum tenere in patria, cui per caritatem in via uniri desiderabat. — Alius est etiam modus respondendi distinguendo in mercimonia, qua quis servit Deo propter praemium, quod exspectat: quia quaedam est mercimonia, quae constituit finem in *proprio commodo;* et ista est mercimonia mala et non procedit a spe recta et formata. Quaedam etiam est, quae non constituit finem in proprio bono, sed totum confert et ordinat ad Bonum summum; et hanc mercimoniam facit spes, quae est virtus gratuita; et haec merito non repugnat. — Primus tamen modus dicendi videtur esse rationabilior, quia spes stare potest, exclusa omni intentione dile-

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ctionis mercenariae. Quantumcumque enim amor sit perfectus[^23] in via, est sibi virtus spei coniuncta. Unde simpliciter dicendum est, quod exspectatio boni aeterni non est mercenaria nec minuit meritum nec facit ad imperfectionem caritatis vel meriti, nisi in quantum mens hominis multum affectuose et intense aspicit ad commodum proprii boni. Multi autem sunt qui beatitudinem exspectant, et tamen parum de se et multum de Deo curant.

english:
### Article (sole article). *On hope according to the absolute consideration.*
### Question I. *Whether hope is a gratuitous virtue.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether hope is a gratuitous virtue. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. To the Romans, chapter eight[^1]: *By hope we have been made safe;* but that which makes us attain to salvation, that especially holds the formal character of a gratuitous virtue: if then hope is of this kind, then it is a gratuitous virtue.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm[^2]: *The Lord is well pleased with them that fear him, and in them that hope upon his mercy;* but that which renders one acceptable to God either is a gratuitous virtue, or a habit more excellent than it, such as the habit of a gift, or of a beatitude: if then hope is not counted among the habits of the gifts and beatitudes, it must necessarily be counted among the habits of the gratuitous virtues.

3. Likewise, a habit directly opposed to fault has in itself the formal character of a gratuitous virtue; but hope is on every side opposed to fault, since it is opposed to presumption and to despair[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as it is difficult to believe what is above reason, so it is difficult to await what is above all estimation; but through hope is awaited that good which neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man[^4]: therefore just as faith is the virtue by which things invisible are believed, so it seems that hope is the virtue by which things inestimable are awaited, that is, spiritual and eternal goods.

5. Likewise, that which most of all strengthens the soul and rectifies and delights it, that most of all has the formal character of a gratuitous virtue — for a virtue is a regulative and confirmative habit of a power, which makes the very soul rejoice concerning the things that are right, as the Philosopher holds[^5] — but hope is of this kind — for it confirms and delights, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter six: *We have a most strong comfort, by which we flee to the hope set before us, which we hold as an anchor* etc.; and to the Romans, chapter twelve: *Rejoicing in hope* — it seems therefore manifestly that hope is in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. No passion is a virtue: hope is one of the four passions, as Boethius says in *On Consolation*[^6]: therefore hope is not a virtue. The *first* [premise] is proved by what the Philosopher says,

that « since there are three things in the soul: *powers, passions* and *habits,* virtue is not in the genus of *passion,* but in the genus of *habit* ». If then hope is not a *virtue,* it is established that neither is it a *gratuitous virtue.*

2. Likewise, just as it happens that one awaits things future, so it happens that one remembers things past[^7]; but the remembering of things past is not a virtue, nor does any special virtue consist about it: therefore neither does any virtue consist about the awaiting of things future. But the awaiting of things future either is hope itself, or proceeds from it: therefore it seems that hope itself has not [the property] to be a virtue.

3. Likewise, just as it happens to *hope* rightly and not rightly, so it also happens to *fear* rightly and not rightly; but the habit which directs the soul in *fearing* is not placed in the genus of virtue, as for instance fear[^8]: therefore neither [is] the habit which directs in *hoping:* therefore hope, even insofar as it names a *habit,* is not in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, « every moral virtue consists about the good and the difficult », as the Philosopher holds[^9], therefore much more strongly the gratuitous [virtue]; but in the awaiting of promised goods there is no difficulty: therefore since hope does not consist about the difficult, it does not seem to be in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

5. Likewise, no gratuitous virtue in its act is opposed to the perfection of merit; but hope in its act is opposed to the perfection of merit — for it proceeds from imperfection that one serves God for the sake of future recompense, since, as Bernard says[^10], « charity does not look to reward » — if then hope makes one await future recompense, it seems to be opposed to the perfection of merit: therefore it is not in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

### Conclusion.

> Hope is a gratuitous virtue, indeed the anchor and support of the gratuitous virtues.

**I respond:** It must be said that by the name of hope can be understood an affection of the soul, according to that which the philosophers and the Saints[^11] say, that there are four affections of the mind, namely *joy* and *grief, hope* and *fear.* By the name of hope can also be understood the very *thing awaited,* according to that [text] to Titus, chapter two[^12]: *Awaiting the blessed hope.* It can nonetheless be taken for the *habit* which directs the motion and affection of the soul toward that which is to be awaited. And in this third manner of speaking hope is not only a *gratuitous virtue,* but indeed also the *support* and *anchor* of the gratuitous virtues. — It is indeed a *gratuitous virtue,* because in this, that it makes the soul await the things that are above all[^13] human estimation and the things that divine bounty has promised, it makes [the soul] wholly *trust* and *lean* upon the supreme and immense bounty, just as faith makes [it] assent to the first Truth, and charity makes [it] cleave to the supreme Goodness; and while the soul leans upon that immense bounty for its own sake and above all things, it is *rectified* and *raised above itself* and made *acceptable to God.* It is necessary therefore that the habit by whose mediation that is brought about should have the formal character of a *gratuitous virtue.* — And because, when the soul leans upon him who cannot fail, although it itself is in itself failing and wavering, it is nonetheless founded through hope as upon a firm rock[^14]; and on that account I said that hope is not only in the genus of *gratuitous virtues,* but is also their *anchor* and *support.* — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the objections on the contrary:**

1. As to that which is first objected on the contrary, that hope is a passion; the response is already plain: for the name of hope is taken equivocally, namely for the very *affection* and for the *habit* regulating the motion of that affection. Hence hope, insofar as it is a *virtue,* is a *habit* which is the principle of motion, which is *from the soul*[^15]; but *passion* is rather *toward the soul;* and insofar as the motion of awaiting or of hope is *from the soul,* it can thus be done rightly and not rightly, according to the command of free choice. And as to this, the perfection of virtue, or the deformity of vice, is to be regarded about it.

2. As to that which is objected, that as awaiting stands to things future, so[^16] remembering [stands] to things past; it must be said that the case is not in every respect alike concerning the remembering of things past and the awaiting of things future. For the rectification and the bending-aside of the soul does not consist principally about the things that are past in the way it does about the things that are future, except consequently. For virtue properly orders rather to that which is to be done than to that which has been done. — Moreover, there is another dissimilarity, because remembering regards the act of the cognitive [power], but awaiting [regards] the motion of the affective [power][^17]; but the rectitude of virtue is not so regarded in respect of the things that belong to cognition as in respect of the things that belong to affection. Hence even to remembering, insofar as it is joined to affection, is annexed an act of virtue, as for instance of prudence, or of penance, or of charity or benevolence: insofar as one recalls past *deeds,* that one may act better in future, or past *evils,* that one may grieve, or[^18] past *benefits,* that one may give thanks.

3. As to that which is objected, that fear is not in the genus of virtue even insofar as it is a habit, therefore neither is hope; it must be said that the case is not alike, because the affection of fear itself consists in a certain recoiling, but the affection of hope consists in a certain stretching-forth; and therefore the affection of fear has more of *passion,* but the affection of hope has more of *action.* And since the habits of the virtues direct the soul in *acts,* in which the rectitude of life consists, according to that which is said, that « virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly[^19] »; hence it is that hope is more in the genus of virtue than fear.

And from this same cause it is plain why the habit of virtue consists rather about the affection of hope than about any of the other three affections. For *joy* and *grief,* because they have their objects conjoined to them, are more in the receiving; but the affection of *hope* is, among the rest, that which has more of the character of acting and which more states a motion from the soul; although it too according to something of itself states a passion about the soul; and according to that it does not belong to it that the habit of virtue should consist about it, but rather insofar as it states the character of motion and of the stretching-forth of the soul itself into the very thing hoped for.

4. As to that which is objected, that to await a good is not difficult; it must be said that just as to believe what is seen has no difficulty, yet to believe most firmly what is not seen has great difficulty; so it is to be understood that although to hope for present goods, which are in some manner seen in themselves, or in their like, is not very difficult; yet to await with sure confidence invisible and eternal goods, which the eye has not seen[^20], and for their sake to despise temporal goods and to be borne above all those things that are seen — this has great difficulty and great dignity. And therefore it is undoubtedly true that hope is in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

5. As to that which is objected last, that hope in its act hinders the perfection of merit; it must be said that this is false, indeed, as the Apostle shows[^21], it arises from the perfection of merit; for the greater and better merits one has, the more firmly and surely one hopes. — And if it be objected that « charity does not look to reward »; it must be said that this is understood of *created* reward; but concerning *uncreated* reward it has no truth, because the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to possess God. But perfect hope looks rather to the *uncreated* reward, of which the Lord said to Abraham, Genesis chapter fifteen[^22]: *I am thy reward,* than to the *created.* For one awaits through the habit of hope to hold in the fatherland him to whom by charity in the way one desired to be united. — There is also another manner of responding, by distinguishing in the bargaining by which one serves God for the sake of the reward which one awaits: for there is a certain bargaining which sets its end in *one's own advantage;* and this is an evil bargaining and does not proceed from right and formed hope. There is also a certain [bargaining] which does not set its end in one's own good, but refers and orders the whole to the supreme Good; and this bargaining hope makes, which is a gratuitous virtue; and this is rightly not opposed [to merit]. — Yet the first manner of speaking seems to be more reasonable, because hope can stand, with every intention of mercenary love

excluded. For however perfect love may be[^23] in the way, the virtue of hope is conjoined to it. Hence it must simply be said that the awaiting of the eternal good is not mercenary, nor does it diminish merit, nor does it conduce to the imperfection of charity or of merit, except insofar as the mind of man looks very affectionately and intensely to the advantage of his own good. But there are many who await beatitude, and yet care little about themselves and much about God.

la: Psalm. 146, 11. — De minori cfr. infra d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.

en: Ps. 146, 11. — On the minor [premise] cf. below d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. and following.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 2, 9. — De fide vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 2, 9. — On faith see above d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Vide I. Rhetor. c. 20. (c. 9.); I. Ethic. c. 8; II. c. 3-6. et IV. c. 1. ac de Virtutibus, in fine. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Hebr. 6, 18; alter Rom. 12, 12. — In maiori pro animam codd. A F H K N U bb animum, codd. G I L V aa animus.

en: See *Rhetoric* I, c. 20 (c. 9); *Ethics* I, c. 8; II, c. 3–6, and IV, c. 1, and *On the Virtues,* at the end. — The following Scripture text is Heb. 6, 18; the other is Rom. 12, 12. — In the major [premise], for *animam* codd. A F H K N U bb [read] *animum,* codd. G I L V aa *animus.*

la: Libr. I. metr. 7: / Gaudia pelle, / Pelle timorem, / Spemque fugato, / Nec dolor adsit. / Aristot. sententia invenitur II. Ethic. c. 3.

en: Book I, metre 7: / "Drive off joys, / Drive off fear, / And put hope to flight, / Nor let grief be present." / The maxim of Aristotle is found in *Ethics* II, c. 3.

la: Aristot., de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1: Est enim praesentis quidem sensus, futuri vero spes, facti autem memoria.

en: Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminiscence,* c. 1: "For of the present there is indeed sensation, but of the future hope, and of what has been done, memory."

la: Secundum philosophos timor est affectus sive passio, quae regitur a fortitudine (cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. et III. c. 6.); secundum theologos autem est donum Spiritus S. (cfr. infra d. 34. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. et p. II. per totam).

en: According to the philosophers, fear is an affect or passion, which is governed by fortitude (cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 5, and III, c. 6); but according to the theologians it is a gift of the Holy Spirit (cf. below d. 34. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. and p. II. throughout).

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 1. Paulo inferius pro non consistat cod. C non consistit nisi.

en: *Ethics* II, c. 3. Cf. above p. 488, note 1. A little below, for *non consistat* cod. C [reads] *non consistit nisi.*

la: De Diligendo Deo, c. 7. n. 17: Non enim sine praemio diligitur Deus, etsi absque praemii intuitu diligendus sit. Vacua namque vera caritas esse non potest, nec tamen mercenaria est, quippe non quaerit quae sua sunt (I. Cor. 13, 5.)... Verus amor praemium non requirit, sed meretur etc. Cfr. Serm. 83. in Cantica, n. 4. seq. — Paulo ante pro servit cod. A serviat.

en: *On Loving God,* c. 7, n. 17: "For God is not loved without reward, although he is to be loved without a view to reward. For true charity cannot be empty, nor yet is it mercenary, since it does not seek the things that are its own (1 Cor. 13, 5)... True love does not require a reward, but earns it" etc. Cf. Sermon 83 on the Canticle, n. 4 and following. — A little before, for *servit* cod. A [reads] *serviat.*

la: Sic, ut unum sanctum auctorem afferamus, dicit Hieronymus, I. in Ezech. 1, 7: Audisse me memini quatuor perturbationes, de quibus plenissime Cicero in Tusculanis [libr. III. et IV.] disputat: gaudii, aegritudinis, cupidinis et timoris, quorum duo praesentia, duo futura sunt... de quibus et Virgilius breviter [Aen. VI. 733.]: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 8, ubi Stoicorum de hac re sententia exponitur. Horat., I. Epist. epist. 6. canit: Gaudeat, an doleat, cupiat metuatve, quid ad rem? — Pro animae edd. animi.

en: Thus, to cite one holy author, Jerome says, *On Ezekiel* I, 1, 7: "I remember to have heard of four perturbations, which Cicero discusses most fully in the *Tusculans* [books III and IV]: of joy, of distress, of desire, and of fear, of which two are present, two are future... concerning which Virgil also briefly [*Aen.* VI, 733]: 'Hence they fear and desire, grieve and rejoice.'" Cf. Augustine, *City of God* XIV, c. 8, where the opinion of the Stoics on this matter is set forth. Horace, *Epistles* I, epistle 6, sings: "Whether one rejoices, or grieves, desires or fears, what does it matter?" — For *animae* the editions [read] *animi.*

la: Vers. 13. — Paulo inferius pro affectum codd. A K affectionem.

en: Verse 13. [Titus 2, 13.] — A little below, for *affectum* codd. A K [read] *affectionem.*

la: Pro omnem codd. A U V communem. Aliquanto inferius pro et Deo accepta codd. A G U et ideo accepta, et mox pro fit illud cod. F anima innititur.

en: For *omnem* codd. A U V [read] *communem.* Somewhat below, for *et Deo accepta* codd. A G U [read] *et ideo accepta,* and presently for *fit illud* cod. F [reads] *anima innititur.*

la: Respicitur illud Matth. 7, 24: Omnis ergo, qui audit verba mea haec et facit ea, assimilabitur viro sapienti, qui aedificavit domum suam supra petram etc. — August., Enarrat. in Ps. 64. n. 3: Iam desiderio ibi [in caelis] sumus, iam spem in illam terram quasi ancoram praemisimus, ne in isto mari turbati naufragemus etc. — Pro et propterea dixi, quod habent codd. et edd., in Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal., congruentius legitur ideo dicitur.

en: There is regarded that [text of] Matt. 7, 24: "Everyone therefore who hears these my words and does them shall be likened to a wise man, who built his house upon a rock" etc. — Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms,* on Ps. 64, n. 3: "Already by desire we are there [in heaven], already we have sent hope ahead into that land as an anchor, lest, tossed about in this sea, we suffer shipwreck" etc. — For *et propterea dixi, quod,* which the codd. and edd. have, in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales it is more fittingly read *ideo dicitur.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 388, nota 2. — Paulo ante edd. voci habitus adiungunt gratuitus. In fine solut. pro vel deformatio codd. A K et deformatio.

en: Cf. above p. 388, note 2. — A little before, the editions add to the word *habitus* the word *gratuitus.* At the end of the solution, for *vel deformatio* codd. A K [read] *et deformatio.*

la: Hic codd. A K N repetunt se habet.

en: Here codd. A K N repeat *se habet.*

la: Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 5.

en: Cf. below a. 2. q. 5.

la: Pro vel, quod in codd. I L desideratur, plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 ita.

en: For *vel,* which is wanting in codd. I L, very many codd. and edd. 1, 2 [read] *ita.*

la: Secundum August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 50. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5, et Comment. dub. 3. — De discrimine, quod inter timorem interest et spem, vide infra a. 2. q. 1. et d. 34. p. II. dub. 1. — Quomodo gaudium, dolor et spes inter se differant, vide infra a. 2. q. 4. — Inferius pro suscipiendo edd. sustinendo.

en: According to Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 19, n. 50. Cf. II *Sentences,* text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5, and the Commentary, dub. 3. — On the difference that lies between fear and hope, see below a. 2. q. 1. and d. 34. p. II. dub. 1. — How joy, grief, and hope differ among themselves, see below a. 2. q. 4. — Below, for *suscipiendo* the editions [read] *sustinendo.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 2, 9. Quae S. Bonav. hic profert, non aliena sunt ab illa sententia, quae habetur in Comment. Epist. ad Rom. 3, 3, olim Ambrosio tributo: Contemnere enim praesentia et quae oblectamento sunt, et in pressura non cedere spe futurorum magni meriti est apud Deum. — Paulo ante pro tamen codd. A K N T aa et edd. 1, 2 autem. Mox pro et his omnibus cod. A et ex his omnibus, et deinde pro hoc [Vat. hic] magnam habet cod. C haec magnam habent.

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 2, 9. What St. Bonaventure here brings forward is not foreign to that opinion which is found in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 3, 3, formerly attributed to Ambrose: "For to despise things present and those that are for delight, and in pressure not to yield, by hope of things to come, is of great merit before God." — A little before, for *tamen* codd. A K N T aa and edd. 1, 2 [read] *autem.* Presently, for *et his omnibus* cod. A [reads] *et ex his omnibus,* and then for *hoc* [Vat. *hic*] *magnam habet* cod. C [reads] *haec magnam habent.*

la: Praeter locc. supra in fundam. 1. et 3. citt. vide Rom. 5, 1. seqq.: Patientia autem probationem [operatur], probatio vero spem, spes autem non confundit etc. Ibid. 15, 4: Ut per patientiam... spem habeamus; et v. 13: Deus autem spei repleat vos... ut abundetis in spe etc. Vide infra a. 2. q. 2. — Pro ostendit edd. dicit.

en: Besides the passages cited above in fundamenta 1 and 3, see Rom. 5, 1 and following: "But patience [works] probation, and probation hope, and hope does not confound" etc. Ibid. 15, 4: "That through patience... we may have hope"; and v. 13: "Now may the God of hope fill you... that you may abound in hope" etc. See below a. 2. q. 2. — For *ostendit* the editions [read] *dicit.*

la: Vers. 1. — Mox edd. omittunt quam creatam.

en: Verse 1. [Gen. 15, 1.] — Presently the editions omit *quam creatam.*

la: Codd. A K perfectionis. Circa finem solut. pro Multi autem cod. A Multi enim.

en: Codd. A K [read] *perfectionis.* Near the end of the solution, for *Multi autem* cod. A [reads] *Multi enim.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Spes in genere, ut est quaedam *affectio* animi, « de ratione sua dicit extensionem appetitus in aliquod arduum, quod non omnino excedit facultatem sperantis » (S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2.). De spe, ut est virtus, dicit S. Bonav. (infra q. 3. ad 4.): « Exspectatio spei consistit in quadam protensione ad bona aeterna, quae quidem consurgit ex confidentia, qua anima innititur ipsi Deo ex tota virtute sua ». — Tres spei definitiones vide infra dub. 2. — De obiecto *materiali* et *formali* spei cfr. infra dub. 14. et a. 2. q. 1. — Quoad obiectum *materiale,* quod ab aliis etiam vocatur *formale quod* sive *terminativum,* communiter dicitur, quod est sive ipse Deus, sive beatitudo aeterna, scilicet futura. Sed observandum est, quod beatitudo distinguitur in *formalem* et *obiectivam;* prima est quid creatum et consistit in actu visionis et fruitionis; altera est ipse Deus, sive ut possessus, sive ut possidendus. Durand. (hic q. 2.), a communissima aliorum sententia recedens, tenet, quod « immediatum obiectum spei non sit ipse Deus, sed beatitudo formalis », ita quod Deus sit quidem obiectum spei *principale,* sed *mediatum.* Hoc autem intelligit « de obiecto, quod est res sperata, quia, si obiectum spei dicatur id, a quo speramus beatitudinem, tunc ipse Deus est obiectum immediatum ». Ceteri doctores concorditer docent, ipsum Deum esse immediatum et primarium obiectum spei; bona vero creata, quae ad beatitudinem conducunt, vel ipsi annexa sunt, esse ipsius obiectum secundarium (cfr. infra q. 3. ad 3. et dub. 4.). Tamen circa relationem beatitudinis formalis ad obiectivam est duplex modus dicendi. Schola Scoti vult, obiectum materiale primarium non esse nec solum Deum nec solam eiusdem fruitionem, sed duo simul, scil. Deum possidendum; econtra multi ex schola S. Thomae dicunt, illud esse tantum Deum, at cum connotatione possessionis, ita ut possessio sive consecutio Dei non sit obiectum nec pars obiecti, sed solummodo conditio obiecti. Quidquid sit de his, manifesta est doctrina S. Thomae (S. 1. II. q. 11. a. 3. ad 3.), quod, cum finis dicatur dupliciter: uno modo ipsa res, alio modo adeptio rei, haec « non sunt duo fines, sed unus finis in se consideratus et alteri applicatus... Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est, qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine creata, quae in fruitione consistit ». — In assignando obiecto formali quo plures sunt opiniones, de quibus nonnulla referuntur infra in scholio ad a. 2. q. 4.

**II.** Quod spes est virtus vere et proprie, praeclare hic probatur; a qua conclusione solus Durand. (hic q. 1.) recedit contendens, quod spes, sicut et fides, sit quidem virtus, sed non nisi « largo modo accipiendo virtutem ». — Notanda est solutio ad 5, qua S. Bonav. contra illos Protestantes, qui operari ex spe praemii volebant esse rem vilis mercenarii, iam anticipavit doctrinam Concilii Trid. (Sess. VI. can. 31.): « Si quis dixerit, iustificatum peccare, dum intuitu aeternae mercedis bene operatur, a. s. »; et can. 27: « Si quis dixerit, iustos non debere pro bonis operibus, quae in Deo fuerint facta, exspectare et sperare aeternam retributionem a Deo per eius misericordiam et Iesu Christi meritum, si bene agendo et divina mandata custodiendo usque in finem perseveraverint, a. s. » (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2. et praecipue d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.). — Verba (ibid.): « Maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum » etc., elidunt etiam celeberrimi Fenelon errorem, reprobatum ab Innocentio XII. an. 1699, quo, sub praetextu amoris purissimi, actus sperandi mercedem aeternae fruitionis a statu perfectionis videbatur excludi.

**III.** De hac quaestione praeter Durandum: Scot. (de hac et seqq. qq.), in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 17. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**IV.** Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem constat, spem esse virtutem specialem a fide et caritate aliisque virtutibus distinctam. Hoc disertis verbis docet Scotus (hic q. unica n. 10.), licet (n. 2.) referat aliam opinionem quorundam, quod scilicet duae virtutes theologicae sufficiant, de qua dicit: « Tamen si auctoritas contemneretur, innitendo rationi naturali tantum... negaretur, spem esse virtutem distinctam a fide et caritate »; pro qua falsa opinione affert plura argumenta, at concludit: « Via illa non placet, quia videtur obviare auctoritatibus Sanctorum innitentibus dicto Pauli. » De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Hope in general, as it is a certain *affection* of the mind, « by its very character states an extension of the appetite into something arduous, which does not wholly exceed the faculty of the one hoping » (St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2.). Of hope as it is a virtue, St. Bonaventure says (below q. 3. ad 4.): « The awaiting of hope consists in a certain stretching-forth toward eternal goods, which indeed arises from the confidence by which the soul leans upon God himself with its whole strength ». — See the three definitions of hope below, dub. 2. — On the *material* and *formal* object of hope cf. below dub. 14. and a. 2. q. 1. — As to the *material* object, which by others is also called the *formal which* or the *terminative,* it is commonly said that it is either God himself, or eternal beatitude, namely future. But it must be observed that beatitude is distinguished into *formal* and *objective;* the first is something created and consists in the act of vision and fruition; the other is God himself, whether as possessed, or as to be possessed. Durand (here q. 2.), departing from the most common opinion of others, holds that « the immediate object of hope is not God himself, but formal beatitude », so that God is indeed the *principal* object of hope, but the *mediate* one. But he understands this « of the object which is the thing hoped for, since, if the object of hope be called that from which we hope for beatitude, then God himself is the immediate object ». The other doctors agree in teaching that God himself is the immediate and primary object of hope; but the created goods, which conduce to beatitude, or are annexed to it, are its secondary object (cf. below q. 3. ad 3. and dub. 4.). Yet concerning the relation of formal beatitude to objective there is a twofold manner of speaking. The school of Scotus holds that the primary material object is neither God alone nor the fruition of him alone, but the two together, namely God to be possessed; on the contrary many of the school of St. Thomas say that it is God alone, but with the connotation of possession, so that possession or the attaining of God is not the object nor part of the object, but only a condition of the object. Whatever be of these, the doctrine of St. Thomas is manifest (S. 1. II. q. 11. a. 3. ad 3.), that, since the end is said in two ways: in one way the thing itself, in another way the attainment of the thing, these « are not two ends, but one end considered in itself and applied to another... As therefore God and the fruition of God are not another end; so the account of fruition is the same by which we enjoy God and by which we enjoy the divine fruition. And the account is the same concerning created beatitude, which consists in fruition ». — In assigning the formal object by which there are several opinions, of which some are reported below in the scholion on a. 2. q. 4.

**II.** That hope is a virtue truly and properly is here excellently proved; from which conclusion Durand alone (here q. 1.) departs, contending that hope, like faith also, is indeed a virtue, but only « taking virtue in a broad sense ». — Notable is the solution to [objection] 5, by which St. Bonaventure, against those Protestants who held that to act from the hope of reward was the act of a base mercenary, already anticipated the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 31.): « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins when he does good with a view to the eternal reward, let him be anathema »; and can. 27: « If anyone shall say that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to await and hope for an eternal recompense from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by acting well and keeping the divine commandments they persevere unto the end, let him be anathema » (cf. below a. 2. q. 2. and especially d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.). — The words (ibid.): « The greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to possess God » etc., also refute the error of the most celebrated Fénelon, reprobated by Innocent XII in the year 1699, by which, under the pretext of purest love, the act of hoping for the reward of eternal fruition seemed to be excluded from the state of perfection.

**III.** On this question, besides Durand: Scotus (on this and the following questions), in both Writings here a single question. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 17. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. little-question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here a single question. — Biel, on this and the following questions here a single question.

**IV.** As to the following (2nd) question, it is established that hope is a special virtue distinct from faith and charity and the other virtues. This Scotus teaches in express words (here q. unica n. 10.), although (n. 2.) he reports another opinion of certain men, namely that two theological virtues suffice, of which he says: « Yet if authority were despised, leaning on natural reason alone... it would be denied that hope is a virtue distinct from faith and charity »; for which false opinion he brings forward several arguments, but concludes: « That way is not pleasing, because it seems to oppose the authorities of the Saints leaning on the saying of Paul. » On this question: St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. little-question 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 3. — Durand, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Page-split map:**
- p.555 (PDF 577): R-col foot — q1 header + objections 1–5 begin (objection 5 + *Sed contra* 1 run across the page break). Footers: n.1 belongs to the d.26 divisio (consumed); q1 carries **n.2–n.7** (n.7 = Boethius metre, in the R-col footer).
- p.556 (PDF 578): *Sed contra* completed, objections 2–5, **Conclusio,** Respondeo opening, reply 1. Footers **n.1–n.9.**
- p.557 (PDF 579): replies 2–5 (running head OCR'd *DIST. XXVI. ART. I. QUAEST. 1.*). Footers **n.1–n.8.**
- p.558 (PDF 580): tail of reply 5 (*…ctionis mercenariae… curant*), then **SCHOLION I–IV**; QUAESTIO II begins on the same page (L-2 band) and belongs to the next chunk. Only footer **n.1** (*Codd. A K perfectionis…*) belongs to q1; footer n.2 (Libr. IV Reg…) belongs to q2.

**Apparatus total: 24 entries** (p.555 ×6, p.556 ×9, p.557 ×8, p.558 ×1).

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**Hand-off forwarded (to d26-a1-q2):** q2 (*Utrum spes sit genus virtutis, an species specialissima*) opens at raw line 38836 (header) / 38837 (subtitle); body opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum spes sit genus virtutis, vel species specialissima. Et quod species specialissima, videtur.* on **p.558 R-col**, immediately after this chunk's scholion. Shared p.558 footer split: q1 takes only n.1; **q2 begins its p.558 apparatus at n.2** (*Libr. IV. Reg. 17, 21…*).

**Alignment check:** PASS. q1 header + body opener both read *utrum spes sit virtus gratuita* (= TRACTATIO's "Primo quaeritur"). No q-swap.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR clean across all four pages; column-band PDF reads confirmed Conclusio, Respondeo tail, and footer split.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum spes sit virtutis genus, an species specialissima

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 558 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum spes sit genus virtutis, an species specialissima.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum spes sit genus virtutis, vel species specialissima. Et quod species specialissima, videtur.

1. Una est virtus ab unitate obiecti; sed in uno solo sperandum est, videlicet in Deo, iuxta illud quod saepe dicitur in Scriptura[^p558-2], quod in Domino sperandum est, non in aliqua creatura: ergo videtur, quod spes sit virtus unica, nullo modo plurificata.

2. Item, merces omnium una est, et omnes unum et summum Bonum exspectant, in quo non cadit diversitas secundum speciem sive secundum formam[^p558-3]: ergo si spes est exspectatio aeternae mercedis, videtur, quod exspectatio illa nullo modo habeat formaliter diversificari: ergo spes non habet sub se alias species differentes: ergo habet in se unitatem speciei specialissimae.

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3. Item, pauciora sunt speranda, quam sint credenda — credimus enim praemia et supplicia, sed non speramus nisi tantum praemia[^p558-1] — ergo maior videtur esse unitas in spe quam in fide, vel etiam tanta; sed fides est una unitate speciei specialissimae: ergo et spes.

4. Item, spei succedit perfecta tentio, sicut fidei succedit visio[^p559-2]; sed perfecta tentio summi Boni est una secundum speciem in omnibus Beatis nec habet diversificari per alias dotes specie differentes: ergo nec spes habet subdividi in alias virtutes: igitur spes est virtus specialis et habet in se unitatem speciei specialissimae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Diversorum actuum diversi sunt habitus; sed *confidere* et *exspectare* sunt actus formaliter differentes: si ergo ad spem pertinet *confidere,* secundum quod dicimur sperare in Domino[^p559-3]; ad spem etiam pertinet *exspectare,* secundum quod dicimur sperare futuram gloriam: videtur ergo, quod spes habeat diversificari formaliter et ita subdividi in alias species.

2. Item, « spes est exspectatio futurae beatitudinis », secundum quod dicit Magister in littera[^p559-4], et habetur in Glossa ad Romanos quinto; sed « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus »: ergo spes exspectat omne bonum. Sed exspectatio diversificari habet secundum diversitatem boni exspectati, et spes non tantum exspectat unum bonum, immo congregationem omnium bonorum: ergo videtur, quod ipsa includit in se universitatem omnium virtutum.

3. Item, omnis virtus meritoria facit, hominem tendere ad finem suum assequendum, quem tamen nondum habet[^p559-5]; sed spes est virtus illa, qua quis exspectat praemium omnium meritorum: ergo videtur, quod virtus spei communis sit ad omnes virtutes: ergo non habet unitatem speciei specialissimae.

4. Item, sicut se habet gaudium respectu boni praesentis, sic se habet spes respectu boni futuri[^p559-6]; sed gaudium, quo quis gaudet de actu virtutis praesentis, non habet distingui ab ipsa virtute, immo est omnibus virtutibus generale — castus enim est qui continet et hoc ipso gaudet — ergo pari ratione videtur, quod spes de futuro bono sit communis ad omnes virtutes: ergo virtus spei non habet unitatem speciei specialissimae.

### Conclusio.

> Spes est una virtus et unitatem habet speciei specialissimae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quemadmodum fides, licet sit circa multa credibilia, una tamen virtus est, quia una est principaliter ratio movendi in omnibus credibilibus[^p559-7]; sic et virtus spei, quotcumque et quantacumque bona exspectet, una virtus est et unitatem habet speciei specialissimae, quia una est ratio, cui innititur in exspectando. — Sicut enim fidei virtus, assentiendo primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, omnia illa credit, quae sibi summa Veritas dictat esse credenda; sic ipsa spes, confidendo et innitendo immensae et indeficientissimae largitati divinae, omnia illa exspectat, quae sibi Deus promittit esse in futuro retribuenda. Et quemadmodum fidei virtus omnia quaecumque credit, principaliter non solum credit Deo, sed etiam de Deo et circa Deum; sic et ipsa spes omnia quae exspectat, non solum exspectat a Deo, sed etiam exspectat illa obtinere in ipso Deo, ut habendo Deum habeat omne bonum[^p559-8]. — Rursus, quemadmodum fides credit Deo tanquam rationi moventi et circa ipsum versatur tanquam circa obiectum et in ipsum tendit tanquam in finem proprium; sic et ipsa spes. Et quoniam unitas virtutis attenditur penes unitatem rationis moventis et obiecti principalis et finis proprii; et haec omnia reperire est in virtute spei sicut et in virtute fidei: concedendum est, ipsam spem esse unam unitate speciei specialissimae. — Et rationes, quae inducuntur ad hanc partem, sunt concedendae.

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1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversorum actuum diversi sunt habitus; dicendum, quod verum est, quando illi actus sunt principales respectu habituum; sed quando sic est, quod unus principaliter respicit habitum virtutis, et *alius* habet ad illum ordinem et connexionem et consequentiam naturalem, non oportet, habitum diversificari propter illorum actuum diversitatem. Et sic est in proposito reperire. Ideo enim spes exspectat magna bona promissa, quia confidit de immensa largitate promittentis; unde quia unus istorum actuum est ratio alterius, hinc est, quod non pertinent ad diversos habitus, sed ad unum. Unde unus est habitus, quo speramus *in Domino* et quo speramus *habere Dominum,* sicut unus, quo credimus *Deo* et quo credimus *Deum*[^p559-1].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes est respectu omnis boni, cum sit respectu beatitudinis; dicendum, quod sicut *fides* credit, iustos assecuturos beatitudinem, et *caritas* illam[^p560-2] beatitudinem cum bonorum universitate desiderat; et tamen *fides* una virtus est, quia non fertur super beatitudinem et ea quae ad beatitudinem spectant, nisi sub ratione una; sic etiam et *spes* in exspectando summam beatitudinem, et quidquid boni in ipsa est, non recedit ab unitate habitus et virtutis, quia una est in ipsa spe *ratio exspectandi,* in hoc videlicet, quod immensae et indeficienti innititur largitati. — *Praeterea,* quod dicitur, quod « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione[^p560-3] perfectus »; hoc non dicitur per bonorum *multitudinem* et *varietatem,* sed hoc dicitur per *aequivalentiam,* quia tantum erit illud unicum bonum, quod exspectatur, quod aequivalebit omni bono; per quem modum dixit Dominus Moysi, Exodi trigesimo tertio[^p560-4], cum peteret, ut ostenderet ei faciem suam: *Ego,* inquit, *ostendam tibi omne bonum:* et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, virtutem spei diversificari, quia exspectat perfectam beatitudinem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus tendit et ordinat ad finem suum assequendum; dicendum, quod tendere in finem potest esse dupliciter: aut *promerendo* et habilitando, aut *exspectando.* Primus modus tendendi est communis omnibus virtutibus, sed alius modus proprius est ipsi spei. Nulla enim virtute *exspectamus* beatitudinem nisi mediante ipsa spe, quamvis omni virtute ipsam beatitudinem *mereamur.* Potest quidem alia virtus actum exspectandi *imperare*[^p560-5], sed nulla virtus nisi spes potest *elicere,* quia illius virtutis est actus, loquendo formaliter.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod sicut se habet *gaudere* de bono praesenti ad ipsas virtutes, sic *exspectare* bonum futurum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia *gaudium* surgit ex complacentia boni praesentis; omnis autem virtus, in quantum huiusmodi, cum consistat in plena voluntate, quae quidem voluntas complacet sibi in *obiecto,* vel *actu suo,* habet quoddam gaudium sibi adiunctum, sicut sibi essentiale. Et hoc est quod vult Philosophus[^p560-6], quod nullus est vere castus, nisi complaceat sibi illius virtutis actus et usus; et si complacet sibi, hoc ipso gaudet, cum illum actum exercet. Secus autem est de exspectatione boni futuri; possunt enim *virtutes* in suos actus exire, nihil cogitando de remuneratione. *Praeterea,* exspectatio futuri boni actus est differens ab actibus ipsarum virtutum; sed *complacentia* ipsius actus virtutis est ipsius actus virtuosi complementum[^p560-7]. Ideo non sic distinguitur gaudium ab aliis speciebus virtutum, secundum quod ipsa spes; nec spes est omnibus communis et generalis, secundum quod gaudium[^p560-8].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether hope is a genus of virtue, or a most special species.*

Secondly it is asked, whether hope is a genus of virtue, or a most special species. And that it is a most special species seems to be the case.

1. A virtue is one by the unity of its object; but one is to hope in one alone, namely in God, according to what is often said in Scripture[^p558-2], that one is to hope in the Lord, not in any creature: therefore it seems that hope is a single virtue, in no way multiplied.

2. Likewise, the reward of all is one, and all await the one and highest Good, in which there falls no diversity according to species or according to form[^p558-3]: therefore if hope is the awaiting of the eternal reward, it seems that that awaiting can in no way be formally diversified: therefore hope does not have under itself other differing species: therefore it has in itself the unity of a most special species.

3. Likewise, fewer things are to be hoped for than are to be believed — for we believe both rewards and punishments, but we hope for nothing but the rewards alone[^p558-1] — therefore the unity in hope seems to be greater than in faith, or at least as great; but faith is one with the unity of a most special species: therefore hope also is.

4. Likewise, perfect holding [tentio] succeeds to hope, just as vision succeeds to faith[^p559-2]; but the perfect holding of the highest Good is one according to species in all the Blessed, nor does it have to be diversified by other endowments differing in species: therefore neither does hope have to be subdivided into other virtues: therefore hope is a special virtue and has in itself the unity of a most special species.

**On the contrary:** 1. Of diverse acts there are diverse habits; but *to be confident* and *to await* are formally differing acts: if therefore *to be confident* pertains to hope, according as we are said to hope in the Lord[^p559-3]; *to await* also pertains to hope, according as we are said to hope for future glory: it seems therefore that hope must be formally diversified and thus subdivided into other species.

2. Likewise, « hope is the awaiting of future beatitude », according as the Master says in the text[^p559-4], and is had in the Gloss on Romans, chapter five; but « beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods »: therefore hope awaits every good. But the awaiting must be diversified according to the diversity of the good awaited, and hope awaits not only one good, but rather the gathering of all goods: therefore it seems that it includes in itself the totality of all the virtues.

3. Likewise, every meritorious virtue makes a man tend toward attaining his end, which nevertheless he does not yet possess[^p559-5]; but hope is that virtue by which one awaits the reward of all merits: therefore it seems that the virtue of hope is common to all the virtues: therefore it does not have the unity of a most special species.

4. Likewise, as joy stands in relation to a present good, so hope stands in relation to a future good[^p559-6]; but the joy by which one rejoices over the act of a present virtue is not to be distinguished from the virtue itself, but rather is general to all the virtues — for he is chaste who restrains himself and by this very fact rejoices — therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that hope concerning a future good is common to all the virtues: therefore the virtue of hope does not have the unity of a most special species.

### Conclusion.

> Hope is one virtue and has the unity of a most special species.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as faith, although it is concerned with many things to be believed, is nevertheless one virtue, because there is principally one ground of moving in all things to be believed[^p559-7]; so also the virtue of hope, however many and however great the goods it awaits, is one virtue and has the unity of a most special species, because there is one ground upon which it relies in awaiting. — For just as the virtue of faith, by assenting to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, believes all those things which the highest Truth dictates to it are to be believed; so hope itself, by being confident in and relying upon the immense and most unfailing divine bounty, awaits all those things which God promises to it are to be given in return in the future. And just as the virtue of faith believes all whatsoever it believes, principally not only believing God, but also concerning God and about God; so hope itself, all the things which it awaits, not only awaits them from God, but also awaits to obtain them in God himself, so that by having God it may have every good[^p559-8]. — Again, just as faith believes God as the moving ground and is occupied about him as about its object and tends into him as into its proper end; so also is hope itself. And since the unity of a virtue is regarded according to the unity of the moving ground and of the principal object and of the proper end; and all these are to be found in the virtue of hope just as in the virtue of faith: it must be conceded that hope itself is one with the unity of a most special species. — And the reasons which are brought forward for this part are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that of diverse acts there are diverse habits; it must be said that this is true when those acts are principal with respect to the habits; but when it is so, that one principally regards the habit of the virtue, and *another* has toward it an order and connection and natural consequence, it is not necessary that the habit be diversified on account of the diversity of those acts. And so it is found in the present case. For hope awaits the great goods promised precisely because it is confident of the immense bounty of the one promising; whence, since one of these acts is the ground of the other, hence it is that they do not pertain to diverse habits, but to one. Whence there is one habit by which we hope *in the Lord* and by which we hope *to have the Lord,* just as there is one by which we believe *God* and by which we believe *God*[^p559-1].

2. To that which is objected, that hope is with respect to every good, since it is with respect to beatitude; it must be said that just as *faith* believes that the just will attain beatitude, and *charity* desires that[^p560-2] beatitude together with the totality of goods; and yet *faith* is one virtue, because it is not borne upon beatitude and the things that pertain to beatitude except under one ground; so also *hope* in awaiting the highest beatitude, and whatever of good is in it, does not depart from the unity of the habit and virtue, because there is one *ground of awaiting* in hope itself, namely in this, that it relies upon the immense and unfailing bounty. — *Moreover,* as to what is said, that « beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation[^p560-3] of all goods »; this is not said by reason of the *multitude* and *variety* of goods, but it is said by *equivalence,* because that one good which is awaited will be so great that it will be equivalent to every good; in which manner the Lord said to Moses, in Exodus, chapter thirty-three[^p560-4], when he asked that he would show him his face: *I,* he says, *will show thee every good:* and therefore from this it does not follow that the virtue of hope is diversified, because it awaits the perfect beatitude.

3. To that which is objected, that every virtue tends and is ordered toward attaining its end; it must be said that to tend into an end can be in two ways: either by *meriting* and disposing, or by *awaiting.* The first mode of tending is common to all the virtues, but the other mode is proper to hope itself. For by no virtue do we *await* beatitude except by the mediation of hope itself, although by every virtue we *merit* that very beatitude. Indeed another virtue can *command*[^p560-5] the act of awaiting, but no virtue except hope can *elicit* it, because it is the act of that virtue, speaking formally.

4. To that which is objected last, that as *to rejoice* over a present good stands to the virtues themselves, so *to await* a future good; it must be said that it is not alike: because *joy* arises from the complacency of a present good; but every virtue, insofar as it is such, since it consists in the full will, which will indeed takes complacency in its *object,* or in its *own act,* has a certain joy adjoined to it, as something essential to it. And this is what the Philosopher means[^p560-6], that no one is truly chaste unless the act and use of that virtue please him; and if it pleases him, by this very fact he rejoices, when he exercises that act. But it is otherwise with the awaiting of a future good; for the *virtues* can go forth into their acts, thinking nothing of the remuneration. *Moreover,* the awaiting of a future good is an act differing from the acts of the virtues themselves; but the *complacency* of the act of a virtue is the complement of the virtuous act itself[^p560-7]. Therefore joy is not distinguished from the other species of the virtues in the way that hope is; nor is hope common and general to all, in the way that joy is[^p560-8].

---

la: Libr. IV. Reg. 17, 21; Iob 8, 13; Ps. 2, 13; 72, 28; Ier. 17, 5. et 7. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 214, nota 3.

en: 2 Kings (IV Reg.) 17, 21; Job 8, 13; Ps. 2, 13; 72, 28; Jer. 17, 5 and 7. — On the major premise cf. above, p. 214, note 3.

la: Gen. 15, 1: *Ego protector tuus sum et merces tua magna nimis.* — De propos. seq. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et infra dub. 2. — In fine arg. pro *unitatem* codd. A K *veritatem.*

en: Gen. 15, 1: *I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great.* — On the proposition following cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, and below, dub. 2. — At the end of the argument, for *unitatem* codd. A K read *veritatem.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Quod fides sit virtus *una,* ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Mox pro *vel etiam* cod. Z *vel saltem.*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3. — That faith is *one* virtue was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — Presently, for *vel etiam* cod. Z reads *vel saltem.*

la: Cfr. infra q. 3. in corp. et supra pag. 394, nota 2. — Vat. sic prosequitur: *sed perfecta visio summi Veri est una* etc.

en: Cf. below, q. 3, in the body, and above, p. 394, note 2. — The Vatican edition continues thus: *but the perfect vision of the highest True is one* etc.

la: Psalm. 4, 6: *Sperate in Domino.* Ps. 36, 3: *Spera in Domino et fac bonitatem.* — De maiori vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.

en: Ps. 4, 6: *Hope in the Lord.* Ps. 36, 3: *Hope in the Lord and do good.* — On the major premise see above, p. 470, note 8, at the end.

la: Hic c. 1. Secundum S. Bonav. (infra dub. 2.) haec definitio sumta est ex Haymonis Exposit. in Epist. ad Rom. 5, 4. seq., unde in Glossam ordinariam transiit. Plenius quam alibi habetur apud Petr. Lombard. in Comment. super Rom. 5, 4. — Definitio beatitudinis, quae deinde datur, et in qua cod. bb cum textu originali *congregatione* pro *aggregatione,* est Boethii et invenitur in eius III. lib. de Consol. prosa 2. — In fine arg. Vat. *omnium bonarum virtutum.*

en: Here, c. 1. According to St. Bonaventure (below, dub. 2) this definition is taken from Haymo's *Exposition on the Epistle to the Romans* 5, 4 ff., whence it passed into the Ordinary Gloss. It is had more fully than elsewhere in Peter Lombard's *Commentary on Romans* 5, 4. — The definition of beatitude which is then given, and in which cod. bb with the original text reads *congregatione* for *aggregatione,* is from Boethius and is found in his *On Consolation,* book III, prose 2. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition reads *of all good virtues.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 9. — Pro *habet* edd. *videt.* Paulo inferius cod. U voci *meritorum* praemittit *virtutum et,* cod. aa *virtutum* tantum.

en: Cf. above, p. 488, note 9. — For *habet* the editions read *videt.* A little below, cod. U prefixes to the word *meritorum* the words *virtutum et,* cod. aa only *virtutum.*

la: Vide infra a. 2. q. 4. in corp. — Quae in minori proponuntur, insinuantur ab Aristol., II. Ethic. c. 3: *Signum autem habituum sit vel voluptas, vel aegritudo, quae facta subsequitur. Nam qui a corporis voluptatibus abstinet, si eo ipso gaudet, temperans* [Averroes hic *castus*], *si dolet, intemperans est existimandus.* Et I. Ethic. c. 8: *Qui bonis actionibus non delectatur bonus minime est; neque enim vel iustum quempiam dixeris, qui iuste agendo non delectetur* etc. — Mox pro *praesentis* non pauci codd. *praesente.*

en: See below, a. 2, q. 4, in the body. — The things proposed in the minor premise are insinuated by Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 3: *But let pleasure, or the pain that follows upon a deed, be the sign of habits. For he who abstains from the pleasures of the body, if by this very fact he rejoices, is to be judged temperate* [Averroes here reads *chaste*], *if he is pained, intemperate.* And *Ethics* I, c. 8: *He who is not delighted by good actions is by no means good; for you would not call anyone just who is not delighted in acting justly* etc. — Presently, for *praesentis* not a few codices read *praesente.*

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro *principaliter* codd. M O *principalis.* Post pauca edd. ante *bona* inserunt *et quaecumque.*

en: See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — For *principaliter* codd. M O read *principalis.* A little after, the editions before *bona* insert *et quaecumque.*

la: Bernard., Serm. 9. in Ps. (90.) *Qui habitat,* n. 8: *Ceterum quod dicit: Tu es, Domine, spes mea* (v. 9.), *forte amplius aliquid sonat et sublimius, quod videlicet non modo in eo speret, sed eam. Convenientius siquidem spes nostra dicitur quod speramus, quam in quo speramus.* — Voci *Deum* cod. aa praefigit *ipsum.*

en: Bernard, *Sermon* 9 on the Psalm (90) *Qui habitat,* n. 8: *Moreover, as to what he says: Thou art, O Lord, my hope* (v. 9), *perhaps it sounds something further and more sublime, namely that he should hope not merely in him, but him. For our hope is more fittingly said to be that which we hope for, than that in which we hope.* — To the word *Deum* cod. aa prefixes *ipsum.*

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et dub. 3. — Paulo superius pro *sed ad unum* cod. A *sed etiam ad unum.*

en: See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, and dub. 3. — A little above, for *sed ad unum* cod. A reads *sed etiam ad unum.*

la: Cod. Z *per illam* [simul audi *fidem*]. Aliquanto inferius ante *non recedit* Vat. interiicit *ideo.*

en: Cod. Z reads *per illam* [understand also *fidem*]. Somewhat below, before *non recedit,* the Vatican edition inserts *ideo.*

la: Pro *aggregatione* plurimi codd. *congregatione,* quemadmodum etiam in textu origin. legitur. Mox pro *per* edd. *propter.* Subinde pro *aequivalentiam* codd. U Z *aequipollentiam,* cod. A *aequalitatem.*

en: For *aggregatione* very many codices read *congregatione,* just as it is also read in the original text. Presently, for *per* the editions read *propter.* Thereupon, for *aequivalentiam* codd. U Z read *aequipollentiam,* cod. A *aequalitatem.*

la: Vers. 19.

en: Verse 19.

la: Ut fides, vel caritas. Cfr. quaest. seq. ad 5. — In initio solut. pro *ordinat* edd. *ordinatur.*

en: As faith, or charity. Cf. the following question, ad 5. — At the beginning of the solution, for *ordinat* the editions read *ordinatur.*

la: Vide supra pag. 559, nota 6. — Circa initium solut. post *futurum* Vat. addit *ad ipsas.*

en: See above, p. 559, note 6. — About the beginning of the solution, after *futurum* the Vatican edition adds *ad ipsas.*

la: Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 4.

en: Cf. below, a. 2, q. 4.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 38836–38958), verified verbatim against vol3 PDF column bands p.558–560 (pdf 580–582; offset pdf = printed + 22). Fresh literal English translation. No scholion of its own.
- **Page-split map:** Opener + arg. 1 (p.558-L bottom), arg. 2 (p.558-R bottom); args 3–4 + *sed contra* 1–4 (p.559-L); *sed contra* 4 tail + Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad 1 opener (p.559-R); Ad 1–2 (p.560-L), Ad 2 tail + Ad 3–4 (p.560-R). The left-column tail of p.560 ("...et ideo ex hoc non") flows into the right-column top ("sequitur, virtutem spei..."); verified continuous, not a cascade-merge defect.
- **Apparatus split (18 entries):** p.558 footers n.1 (q1's, NOT here) / **n.2–3 (this q's first two — hand-off picked up from q1)**; p.559 footers n.1–8 (single per-page sequence across both footer columns); p.560 footers n.1–8. p.560 footers n.9 (*Vers. 13*) and n.10 (*Cfr. infra d. 33...*) belong to q.3 and are NOT included here.
- **Hand-off picked up:** the shared p.558 footer split — q1 took only p.558 n.1; this q opens at p.558 n.2. Confirmed.
- **Scholion:** ABSENT for this quaestio. p.560 footer n.8 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) explicitly points to q.1's scholion; per the Vol II/III override, a quaestio with no scholion of its own is normal when a sibling carries it.
- **Alignment:** opener reads *Secundo quaeritur, utrum spes sit genus virtutis, vel species specialissima* — matches the title. q.3 opener (*Tertio quaeritur, utrum spes sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica*) at raw line 38962 / p.560-R sets the lower boundary.
- **No [?] flags.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0