title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. (*Fundamenta.*) Augustinus *de Fide ad Petrum*[^2]: « Deus unigenitus, dum conciperetur, veritatem carnis accepit de Virgine » ; sed Deus unigenitus non est nisi persona: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia assumtio nihil plus dicit nisi actionem respectu creaturae et relationem[^3]; et utrumque natum est convenire divinae personae: ergo etc.

3. Item, assumtio est ad aliquam unionem[^4]; sed unio illa non terminatur ad naturam, sed ad personam, quia divinitas et humanitas eiusdem naturae esse non possunt: ergo videtur, quod ipsa assumtio vere et proprie conveniat ipsi personae.

4. Item, assumtio est ad redemptionem et satisfactionem pro humano genere; sed eadem persona competit esse, quae debet satisfacere et debitum solvere, et quae potest[^5]: ergo videtur, quod assumtio vere competat ipsi personae.

5. Item, cui competit missio et incarnatio, eidem competit assumtio; sed missio, vel incarnatio competit personae[^6]: ergo et assumtio.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Ubicumque est assumtio, ibi[^1] est unio ad alterum et communicatio; sed persona dicit quid distinctum et incommunicabile[^7]: ergo intellectus personae repugnat unioni et assumtioni: ergo non potest ei vere attribui.

2. Item, « persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae[^8] » ; sed individuum dicitur non so-

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lum quod est indivisum in se, sed quod est divisum ab aliis: ergo si assumtio dicit unionem et coniunctionem, videtur, quod nullo modo personae conveniat.

3. Item, omnis unio naturalis ordinatur ad illud quod est ita unum in se, quod non est alteri unibile, alioquin non esset status; illud autem unum est individuum rationalis naturae, quod quidem est persona et habet summam completionem in genere creaturae: si ergo ad dignitatem personae spectat, quod nulli alii uniatur, et divina persona habet quidquid dignitatis est; videtur, quod nihil possit sibi copulari, et ita nullam naturam assumere.

4. Item, nihil temporale potest fieri aeternum; sed unitas creaturae debita est temporalis, unitas divinae personae est aeterna: ergo divina persona non potest creaturam aliquam ad unitatem personae suae accipere. Sed hoc est assumere: ergo assumtio divinae personae non potest convenire.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Assumtio in incarnatione competit personae divinae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut dictum est[^1b] (*Conclusio.*), assumtio dicit actionem et relationem et terminum utriusque; et ratione horum omnium potest divinae personae convenire. — Nam divinae personae competit (*Probatio.*) esse principium activum et rationalis naturae suppositum; et utrumque spectat ad eius dignitatem et nobilitatem. Et ideo divina persona potest humanam naturam fabricare tanquam principium[^2b] effectivum et stabilire tanquam proprium suppositum, ita quod eiusdem naturae erit causale principium et suppositum personale; et ita per hoc se habet in ratione (*Solutio.*) principii et in ratione medii et in ratione termini. Ratione primi vel principii competit ei actio; ratione medii relatio; ratione termini[^3b] competit utriusque terminatio. Divina enim persona fecit, ut plures naturae unirentur in se. — Et ideo concedendum est, quod ipsa assumtio competit divinae personae. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. (*Solutio oppositorum.*) Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ubi est assumtio, ibi est communicatio et unio; dicendum, quod (*Communicabile dicitur tripliciter.*) communicabile potest dici tripliciter: aut per unius constitutionem, aut per praedicationem, aut per proprietatum et idiomatum communicationem. Cum ergo dicitur: ubi est assumtio, ibi est communicatio; dicendum, quod verum est tertio modo, sed non primo modo, vel secundo. Cum vero dicitur, quod persona dicit quid (*De persona.*) incommunicabile et distinctum; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur per oppositionem ad primum, vel secundum; quia nec venit ad tertii constitutionem, nec habet universalitatis praedicationem[^4b]. Et sic patet, quod persona cum assumtione non habet oppositionem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona est individua substantia; idem respondendum est, quod illud dicitur per privationem compositionis et praedicationis communis, non per privationem unionis; nisi forte dicatur unio respectu dignioris, sicut inferius[^5b] melius apparebit. Nullum autem horum est in proposito reperire.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis unio ordinatur ad unum, quod careat unibilitate; dicendum, quod verum est, loquendo de unione in eodem genere, videlicet de unione, quae est per compositionem. Sic autem non est in proposito; et ideo in nullo cogunt rationes illae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod temporale non potest fieri aeternale; dicendum, quod verum est (*Notandum.*) per identitatem essentiae; nihil tamen impedit hoc esse virtute unionis gratuitae. Sicut enim temporale potest a principio aeterno causari temporaliter, sic etiam inniti[^6b] potest supposito aeterno, ut, sicut Deus est principium cuiuslibet creaturae, sic Dei Filius sit suppositum rationalis naturae. Et pro tanto dicitur illa unitas ad unitatem personae terminari, non quia personae Filii Dei adveniat nova unitas, sed quia ex assumtione humanae fit, ut duarum naturarum sit una hypostasis atque persona[^7b].

english:
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### QUESTION II. *Whether to assume befits the divine person.*

Secondly it is asked, whether to assume befits the divine person. And that it does, it seems.

1. (*Fundamenta.*) Augustine, *On the Faith, to Peter*[^2]: « God the Only-begotten, while He was conceived, received the truth of flesh from the Virgin » ; but God the Only-begotten is nothing other than a person: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, by reason it seems: for assumption says nothing more than an action with respect to a creature and a relation[^3]; and each of these is naturally suited to befit the divine person: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, assumption is for some union[^4]; but that union does not terminate at a nature, but at a person, since divinity and humanity cannot be of the same nature: therefore it seems that assumption itself truly and properly befits the person itself.

4. Likewise, assumption is for the redemption and satisfaction on behalf of the human race; but it befits the same person to be the one who ought to make satisfaction and pay the debt, and who is able to[^5]: therefore it seems that assumption truly befits the person itself.

5. Likewise, to whom mission and incarnation befit, to that same one assumption befits; but mission, or incarnation, befits the person[^6]: therefore assumption also.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Wherever there is assumption, there[^1] is a union to another and a communication; but a person says something distinct and incommunicable[^7]: therefore the notion of a person is repugnant to union and assumption: therefore it cannot truly be attributed to it.

2. Likewise, « a person is an individual substance of a rational nature[^8] » ; but "individual" is said not only of what is undivided in itself, but of what is divided

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from others: therefore if assumption says union and conjunction, it seems that it in no way befits a person.

3. Likewise, every natural union is ordered to that which is so one in itself that it is not unitable to another, otherwise there would be no stopping-point; but that one thing is the individual of a rational nature, which indeed is a person and has the highest completion in the genus of creature: if then it pertains to the dignity of a person that it be united to no other, and the divine person has whatever of dignity there is; it seems that nothing can be coupled to it, and so that it assumes no nature.

4. Likewise, nothing temporal can become eternal; but the unity owed to a creature is temporal, the unity of the divine person is eternal: therefore the divine person cannot take any creature to the unity of its person. But this is to assume: therefore assumption cannot befit the divine person.

### CONCLUSION.

> Assumption in the incarnation befits the divine person.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been said[^1b] (*Conclusio.*), assumption says an action and a relation and the term of each; and by reason of all these it can befit the divine person. — For it befits the divine person (*Probatio.*) to be an active principle and the supposit of a rational nature; and each of these pertains to its dignity and nobility. And therefore the divine person can fashion the human nature as an effective principle[^2b] and establish it as its own supposit, in such a way that it will be the causal principle and the personal supposit of the same nature; and so through this it stands in the account of (*Solutio.*) a principle and in the account of a medium and in the account of a term. By reason of the first, or principle, action befits it; by reason of the medium, relation; by reason of the term[^3b] the termination of each befits it. For the divine person brought it about that several natures should be united in itself. — And therefore it must be conceded that assumption itself befits the divine person. Hence the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

1. (*Solutio oppositorum.*) To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is assumption, there is communication and union; it must be said that (*Communicabile dicitur tripliciter.*) "communicable" can be said in three ways: either by the constitution of one thing, or by predication, or by the communication of properties and idioms. When therefore it is said: where there is assumption, there is communication; it must be said that it is true in the third way, but not in the first way, or the second. But when it is said that a person says something (*De persona.*) incommunicable and distinct; it must be said that this is said by opposition to the first, or the second; for it neither comes to the constitution of a third thing, nor has the predication of universality[^4b]. And so it is clear that a person has no opposition to assumption.

2. To that which is objected, that a person is an individual substance; the same response must be made, that it is said by privation of composition and of common predication, not by privation of union; unless perhaps a union with respect to something worthier be spoken of, as will appear better below[^5b]. But none of these is to be found in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that every union is ordered to one thing which lacks unitability; it must be said that it is true, speaking of a union in the same genus, namely of the union which is by composition. But it is not so in the matter at hand; and therefore those reasons compel in nothing.

4. To that which is objected, that the temporal cannot become eternal; it must be said that it is true (*Notandum.*) by identity of essence; yet nothing prevents this from being by virtue of a gratuitous union. For just as the temporal can be caused temporally by an eternal principle, so also it can rest[^6b] upon an eternal supposit, so that, just as God is the principle of every creature, so the Son of God is the supposit of a rational nature. And to this extent that unity is said to be terminated at the unity of the person, not because a new unity accrues to the person of the Son of God, but because from the assumption of the human [nature] it comes about that of the two natures there is one hypostasis and person[^7b].

la: Cod. Y pro *aliqua persona.* Subinde pro *ibi* edd. *in.* (p.124, footer note 1)

en: Codex Y reads *aliqua persona* ("some person"). Thereafter, for *ibi* ("there") the editions read *in.* (printed page 124, footer note 1)

la: Cap. 2. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. (p.124, note 2)

en: Ch. 2, n. 17. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. (printed page 124, note 2)

la: Ut habetur in corp. quaest. praeced. — Deinde pro *et utrumque* codd. K Z bb *sed utrumque.* (p.124, note 3)

en: As is held in the body of the preceding question. — Then, for *et utrumque* ("and each") codices K Z bb read *sed utrumque* ("but each"). (printed page 124, note 3)

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — *Minor* exponitur infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. (p.124, note 4)

en: Cf. the preceding question. — The *minor* premise is set forth below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. (printed page 124, note 4)

la: Vel clarius verbis S. Thomae (hic q. I. a. 3. arg. ult.): « Ad hoc, quod fiat redemptio humani generis, oportet, quod sit agens satisfactionem unus, Deus, qui potest, et homo, qui debet » , scil. persona divina in natura humana. Cfr. infra d. 20. q. 2. seq. — Pro *sed eadem persona competit esse*, Vat. *sed eandem personam competit esse unitam.* Mox cod. U voci *assumtio* adiicit *naturae.* (p.124, note 5)

en: Or more clearly in the words of St. Thomas (here q. I, a. 3, last argument): « For the redemption of the human race to be effected, it is necessary that there be one agent making satisfaction, God, who is able, and man, who owes » , namely the divine person in the human nature. Cf. below, d. 20, q. 2 f. — For *sed eadem persona competit esse* ("but it befits the same person to be"), the Vatican edition reads *sed eandem personam competit esse unitam* ("but it befits the same person to be united"). Shortly after, codex U adds *naturae* ("of nature") to the word *assumtio.* (printed page 124, note 5)

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 15. p. 1. a. I. seqq. — Post *personae* Vat. subiungit *Filii.* (p.124, note 6)

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 15, p. 1, a. I, ff. — After *personae* ("of the person") the Vatican edition subjoins *Filii* ("of the Son"). (printed page 124, note 6)

la: De definitione deque proprietatibus personae in hoc et seqq. argg. occurrentibus vide plurimos auctoris locos infra a. 2. q. 2. in scholio. — In *maiori* post *assumtio* codd. K Z addunt *et incarnatio.* In fine arg. pro *vere* cod. X *recte.* (p.124, note 7)

en: On the definition and the properties of a person occurring in this and the following arguments, see the many passages of the author below, a. 2, q. 2, in the scholion. — In the *major* premise, after *assumtio* codices K Z add *et incarnatio* ("and incarnation"). At the end of the argument, for *vere* ("truly") codex X reads *recte* ("rightly"). (printed page 124, note 7)

la: Boeth., *de Una Persona et duabus naturis Christi*, c. 3. (p.124, note 8)

en: Boethius, *On the One Person and the Two Natures of Christ*, c. 3. (printed page 124, note 8)

la: Vide quaest. praeced. (p.125, note 1)

en: See the preceding question. (printed page 125, note 1)

la: Cod. K voci *principium* praemittit *eius.* (p.125, note 2)

en: Codex K prefixes *eius* ("its") to the word *principium.* (printed page 125, note 2)

la: Pro *termini* codd. A E G L N T V X aa et edd. 1, 2 *tertii.* Paulo ante edd. omittunt *primi vel;* cod. Z omittit *vel.* (p.125, note 3)

en: For *termini* ("of the term") codices A E G L N T V X aa and editions 1, 2 read *tertii* ("of the third"). A little before, the editions omit *primi vel* ("of the first, or"); codex Z omits *vel* ("or"). (printed page 125, note 3)

la: Ut humanitas, quae praedicatur e. gr. de Petro simul et de Paulo. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1. — Subinde voci *persona* edd. praefigunt *illa.* (p.125, note 4)

en: As humanity, which is predicated for example of Peter and at the same time of Paul. Cf. I Sent., d. 25, a. 2, q. 1. — Thereafter the editions prefix *illa* ("that") to the word *persona.* (printed page 125, note 4)

la: Art. 2. q. 2. ad 1. et q. 3. — Paulo superius post *compositionis* cod. K adiungit *constitutionis.* (p.125, note 5)

en: Article 2, q. 2, ad 1, and q. 3. — A little above, after *compositionis* ("of composition") codex K adds *constitutionis* ("of constitution"). (printed page 125, note 5)

la: Pro *inniti* codd. A H (K a secunda manu) M O Z bb *uniri;* edd. recurrunt infra q. 5. ad 2. Pro *causari* codd. K Z bb *creari.* (p.125, note 6)

en: For *inniti* ("to rest upon") codices A H (K by a second hand) M O Z bb read *uniri* ("to be united"); the editions recur below, q. 5, ad 2. For *causari* ("to be caused") codices K Z bb read *creari* ("to be created"). (printed page 125, note 6)

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (p.125, note 7)

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. (printed page 125, note 7)

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.124–125 (PDF 146–147; offset pdf = printed + 22), read L→R per the Vol II/III override (the IA djvu OCR of the Respondeo and the *Ad oppositum* replies is cascade-shattered — raw lines 9166–9217 are diagonally fragmented and unusable for those regions). Raw OCR lines 9136–9216. Fresh literal English. q2 concerns *whether to assume befits the divine person* — alignment confirmed against the opener « Secundo quaeritur, utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae » (not q3 *ratione naturae*, not q4 *abstracta omni persona*, not q5 *divina natura est caro facta*).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.124** (R-column foot, after q1's scholion): QUAESTIO II header + title; opener; args 1–5; *Sed contra* 1 (begins) + 2 (begins). Footer notes 1–8 (split across L and R columns: L holds 1–5, R holds 5-continuation–8).
- **p.125** (carries over from the foot of p.124): *Sed contra* 2 (continues "...divisum ab aliis") + 3 + 4; CONCLUSIO; Respondeo; Ad 1–4. Footer notes 1–8 (L holds 1–5, R holds 6–8).

**Footer hand-off to d5-a1-q3.** **p.125 footer note 8** (`Cfr. supra pag. 28, nota 2. — De minori cfr. I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro cui competit codd. K bb...`) belongs to QUAESTIO III, not q2 — it keys q3's arg 1 anchor *opus creationis⁸*. It is therefore NOT rendered here; it FORWARDS to d5-a1-q3, which should lead its apparatus with it. (Likewise p.125 R-column body carries the *Argg. pro 1. parte* margin into q3.) q2's own body anchors stop at p.125 note 7 (*una hypostasis atque persona⁷*).

**Scholion disposition.** **has_scholion: false.** Per d5-a1-q1 Scholion II ("Hanc et duas seqq. quaestiones posteriores Scholastici... De his igitur tribus qq. agunt..."), q1's scholion forward-covers q2 and q3; the raw at q2's tail (raw 9216, immediately before QUAESTIO III at 9217) carries no standalone `SCHOLION` block. A missing scholion here is expected, not an error.

**`[?]` flags.** None. (One minor judgment recorded, not flagged: p.124 footer note 1 — "Cod. Y pro *aliqua persona*. Subinde pro *ibi* edd. *in*." — is a variant note; its *ibi* lemma anchors at *Sed contra* 1's « ibi est unio », where `[^1]` is placed. The Quaracchi note carries no superscript in the body, so the placement follows the lemma word, consistent with q1's variant-note handling.)


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III. *Utrum assumere conveniat personae ratione naturae, an e converso.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum assumere personae conveniat ratione naturae, an e converso. Et quod conveniat ratione naturae, videtur.

(*Argg. pro 1. parte.*) 1. Ratione eius competit personae opus recreationis, cui competit opus creationis[^8b]; sed opus creationis competit personae ratione naturae: ergo et

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opus recreationis; sed assumtio est opus recreationis: ergo etc.

2. Item, assumtio est operatio virtuosa; sed omnis operatio virtuosa competit supposito ratione naturae sive naturalis potentiae[^1]: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod sic competit uni personae, quod competit alteri personae, hoc competit ratione naturae, non ratione personae: ergo cum assumtio sic competat personae Filii, quod possit competere alii personae, sicut supra[^2] dictum fuit; videtur, quod si conveniat Filio, conveniat ratione naturae.

4. Item, assumtio in extremis ponit diversitatem; sed in assumtione carnis a Deo est diversitas naturarum, non personarum: ergo videtur, quod assumtio primo conveniat naturae et per naturam personae.

**Sed contra:** (*Argg. pro 2. parte.*) 1. Assumtio dicit relationem[^3]; sed relatio non competit personae ratione naturae, sed magis ratione sui: ergo et assumere.

2. Item, assumtio dicit ordinationem ad unitatem aliquam; sed constat, quod non ad unitatem naturae, sed personae: ergo etc.

3. Item, si convenit personae ratione naturae; et omne tale dicitur de tribus: ergo et assumere conveniret[^4] tribus personis. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo et primum.

4. Item, si assumere convenit personae ratione naturae, ergo convenit naturae per se; et quod convenit per se convenit universaliter[^5], ergo pro quolibet suo supposito: sequeretur ergo idem quod prius, scilicet quod cuilibet personae conveniret assumtio.

> (*Conclusio.*) Assumere, quatenus dicit actionem, competit personae divinae ratione naturae; quatenus dicit terminationem, competit naturae ratione personae; quatenus dicit relationem, communiter competit utrique.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad hanc quaestionem satis patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Cum enim tria sint de intellectu huius vocabuli, quod est assumere (*Tria in assumtione.*), videlicet actio et relatio et terminatio; primum competit personae ratione naturae, ultimum competit naturae ratione personae, medium vero communiter convenit utrique (*Conclusio.*). — Ipsa namque assumtionis actio[^6] personae convenit ratione naturae, quia persona agit virtute naturae, unde illa virtus et operatio competit cuilibet personae (*Explicatur.*). Terminus vero assumtionis respicit ipsam proprie et per se; unde ad unitatem personalem et unius solius personae terminatur ipsa assumtionis actio et unionis relatio. Sed medium, videlicet relatio, communiter convenit utrique: et divina natura et divina persona unitur humanae[^7], et humana natura unita est divinae naturae et divinae personae, quia ad utramque habet ordinem et distinctionem formalem et gratuitam coniunctionem, quae implicantur in illa relatione.

Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad utramque partem (*Ad argg.*). Rationes enim verum concludunt secundum diversas vias nec habent in se aliquam repugnantiam. Et hoc melius patet pertractanti singulas[^8].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether assuming befits the person by reason of the nature, or conversely.*

Thirdly it is asked whether assuming befits the person by reason of the nature, or conversely. And that it befits [the person] by reason of the nature is seen [as follows].

(*Arguments for the first part.*) 1. By reason of it [the nature] the work of re-creation befits the person, to which [person] the work of creation befits[^8b]; but the work of creation befits the person by reason of the nature: therefore also

the work of re-creation; but assumption is a work of re-creation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, assumption is a virtuous operation; but every virtuous operation befits the supposit by reason of the nature, or of the natural power[^1]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that which befits one person in such a way that it befits another person, this befits [it] by reason of the nature, not by reason of the person: therefore, since assumption befits the person of the Son in such a way that it could befit another person, as was said above[^2], it is seen that, if it befits the Son, it befits [him] by reason of the nature.

4. Likewise, assumption posits a diversity in the extremes; but in the assumption of the flesh by God there is a diversity of natures, not of persons: therefore it is seen that assumption first befits the nature, and through the nature the person.

**On the contrary:** (*Arguments for the second part.*) 1. Assumption signifies a relation[^3]; but a relation does not befit the person by reason of the nature, but rather by reason of itself: therefore also assuming [does not].

2. Likewise, assumption signifies an ordering to some unity; but it is established that [this is] not to the unity of the nature, but of the person: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it befits the person by reason of the nature; and everything of this kind is said of the three: therefore assuming too would befit[^4] the three persons. But this is false: therefore also the first [is false].

4. Likewise, if assuming befits the person by reason of the nature, then it befits the nature in itself; and what befits [a thing] in itself befits [it] universally[^5], therefore for any of its supposits: there would follow therefore the same thing as before, namely that assumption would befit any person whatever.

> (*Conclusion.*) Assuming, insofar as it signifies an action, befits the divine person by reason of the nature; insofar as it signifies a termination, befits the nature by reason of the person; insofar as it signifies a relation, befits both in common.

**I respond:** It must be said that to this question the response is sufficiently clear from the things that have been said. For since there are three [elements] belonging to the understanding of this word, which is "to assume" (*The three [elements] in assumption.*), namely action and relation and termination; the first befits the person by reason of the nature, the last befits the nature by reason of the person, but the middle one belongs in common to both (*Conclusion.*). — For the very action of assuming[^6] befits the person by reason of the nature, because the person acts by the power of the nature, whence that power and operation befits any person whatever (*It is explained.*). But the term of the assumption regards [the person] itself properly and in itself; whence to the personal unity, and of one sole person, is the very action of assuming and the relation of union terminated. But the middle [element], namely the relation, belongs in common to both: both the divine nature and the divine person is united to the human[^7], and the human nature is united to the divine nature and to the divine person, because to both it has an order and a formal distinction and a gracious conjunction, which are implied in that relation.

And according to this the response to both parts is clear (*To the arguments.*). For the reasons conclude truly according to diverse ways, nor have they in themselves any contradiction. And this is better clear to one who treats them singly[^8].

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 28, nota 2. — De minori cfr. I. Sent. d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro *cui competit* codd. K bb accuratius *ratione cuius.* Edd., duabus prioribus huius propos. vocibus, scil. *Ratione eius,* interpunctione a se seiunctis, et voce *ratione* cum praeced. *videtur* coniuncta, hanc alteram propos. sic inchoant: *Ei* [pro *eius*] *personae competit* etc. Paulo superius pro *an e converso* cod. F *an ratione sui.*

en: Cf. above, p. 28, note 2. — On the minor [premise] cf. I Sent., d. 36, a. 1, q. 2. — For *cui competit* ("to which it befits") codices K bb [read] more accurately *ratione cuius* ("by reason of which"). The editions, with the first two words of this proposition, namely *Ratione eius* ("by reason of it"), separated off by punctuation, and the word *ratione* joined with the preceding *videtur*, begin this other proposition thus: *Ei* [for *eius*] *personae competit* etc. ("to the person it befits"). A little above, for *an e converso* ("or conversely") codex F [reads] *an ratione sui* ("or by reason of itself").

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 64. (c. 4.), ubi Philosophus vult, quod melius est «non dicere animam cogitare, sed hominem anima» (i. e. per animam).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 64 (c. 4), where the Philosopher holds that it is better "not to say that the soul thinks, but [that] the man [thinks] by the soul" (i.e. by means of the soul).

la: Dist. 1. a. 1. q. 4. — Pro *quod possit competere* cod. Z *quod non possit competere.*

en: Distinction 1, article 1, question 4. — For *quod possit competere* ("that it could befit") codex Z [reads] *quod non possit competere* ("that it could not befit").

la: Cfr. supra q. 1, ubi etiam videsis de *maiori* arg. seq., in qua Vat. pro *ordinationem* exhibet *deordinationem.*

en: Cf. above, question 1, where you may also see concerning the *major* [premise] of the following argument, in which the Vatican [edition], for *ordinationem* ("ordering"), presents *deordinationem* ("disordering").

la: Codd. L T U *diceretur,* cod. X *communicaretur.*

en: Codices L T U [read] *diceretur* ("it would be said"), codex X *communicaretur* ("it would be communicated").

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. — Paulo inferius codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *scilicet.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 4. — A little below, the codices and editions 1, 2 omit *scilicet* ("namely").

la: Codd. L (N a prima manu) S T U V aa cc *ratio.* Mox post *unde* codd. K Z subiungunt *et.*

en: Codices L (N by the first hand) S T U V aa cc [read] *ratio* ("reason"). Shortly after, following *unde* ("whence"), codices K Z append *et* ("and").

la: Scil. naturae. — Paulo ante pro *et divina natura* Vat. *Nam divina natura.* Paulo inferius pro *ordinem* codd. G aa *ordinationem.*

en: Namely, of the nature. — A little before, for *et divina natura* ("and the divine nature") the Vatican [edition reads] *Nam divina natura* ("For the divine nature"). A little below, for *ordinem* ("order") codices G aa [read] *ordinationem* ("ordering").

la: Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaest.

en: See the scholion to the first question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 125 R/foot–126, read Left column top→bottom then Right; the IA djvu OCR of the Conclusio + Respondeo cascade-fragments). Raw OCR range: `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 9217–9274. Offset pdf = printed + 22 (PDF pp. 147–148). Running head: `DIST. V. ART. I. QUAEST. III.`

**Page-split map.**
- **p.125 (R col, foot):** end of q2's Ad-replies (note 7, *...una hypostasis atque persona*), then QUAESTIO III header + title + opener (*Tertio quaeritur…*) + first argument (*pro 1. parte*) arg 1 down to *opus crea-/tionis competit personae ratione naturae: ergo et*. Footer note 8 (`8b` here) keys arg 1's *opus creationis*. Footer notes 6, 7 on this page belong to q2's body (already captured in d5-a1-q2).
- **p.126:** continuation of arg 1 (*opus recreationis…*), args 2–4 *pro 1. parte*, Sed contra args 1–4 *pro 2. parte*, Conclusio blockquote, Respondeo, and *Ad argg.* down to *…pertractanti singulas⁸*. Then QUAESTIO IV opens at the foot of p.126 L (*Utrum assumere possit convenire divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona*) — q3 ends just before it (raw 9274). Footer notes 1–8 on p.126 key q3's body markers; p.126 footer notes 9, 10, 11 belong to q4 (forwarded — see hand-off below).

**Footer hand-off picked up.** p.125 footer note 8 (forwarded from d5-a1-q2) is the lead apparatus entry here (`[^8b]`), keying arg 1's *opus creationis*.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to d5-a1-q4.** Printed p.126 footer notes **9, 10, 11** key q4's body (q4 opens at the foot of p.126 L): note 9 = `Respicitur Luc. 1, 37`; note 10 = `Cfr. Sap. 11, 25, et Eph. 2, 4`; note 11 = `Vide supra pag. 28, nota 2`. The next chunk (d5-a1-q4) must lead its apparatus with these three p.126 footer notes, then continue with p.127's own footer sequence.

**Scholion disposition.** has_scholion: **false.** No standalone `### Scholion` prints at q3's tail (raw 9274 → QUAESTIO IV at 9275). p.126 footer note 8 explicitly reads *Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaest.* ("See the scholion to the first question of this article"), confirming that q3's scholion material is gathered into q1's Scholion (per the d5-a1-q1 Scholion II forward-cover). Not flagged.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not as anchors: *Argg. pro 1. parte*, *Argg. pro 2. parte*, *Conclusio*, *Tria in assumtione*, *Explicatur*, *Ad argg*.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 126 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum assumere possit convenire divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum assumere convenire possit divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Abstractis omnibus personis, est intelligere Omnipotentem; sed Omnipotenti nullum verbum est impossibile[^9]: ergo videtur, quod omni personalitate abstracta, possibile sit, Deum carnem assumere.

2. Item, omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc est intelligere Deum summe bonum; sed quia summe bonus est, diligit creaturam, et per nimiam caritatem suam assumsit humanam naturam[^10]: ergo omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc est intelligere, Deum carnem humanam posse assumere.

3. Item, omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc est intelligere Deum potentem creare et potentem genus humanum reparare[^11]; sed reparat assumendo carnem: ergo videtur redire idem quod prius.

4. Item, omni personalitate abstracta, adhuc intelligitur Deus ut sapiens, ergo sciens et potens tyrannum superare et vincere; sed assumtionis my-
<!-- page 127 -->
sterium est ad[^1b] tyrannum vincere et superare: ergo intelligitur ut potens carnem assumere.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) Assumere est sibi unire, aut ergo in supposito, aut in forma; sed divina natura non potest sibi humanam unire in forma: ergo si unit aliquo modo, necesse est unire in supposito et persona[^2b]: ergo abstractis suppositis et personis, impossibile est amplius assumtionem intelligere.

2. Item, assumtio dicit aliquam actionem; sed nulla actio esse intelligitur alicuius nisi ut entis in actu — nihil enim[^3b] est in actu ens, nisi prout est in supposito — ergo supposito abstracto, non est intelligere assumtionem aliquam.

3. Item, impossibile est intelligere, ut humana natura assumatur, nisi assumatur in atomo vel in singulari, quia, sicut vult Damascenus[^4b], «natura praeter singularia solum est in nuda consideratione»: ergo pari ratione impossibile est intelligere, quod assumtio fiat in natura abstracta ab omni persona.

4. Item, impossibile est, assumtionem alicuius competere alicui nisi post completum suum esse — nemo enim assumit sibi aliquid, nisi postquam est completum[^5b] — sed perfecta completio naturae rationalis non est nisi persona: ergo omni personalitate circumscripta, impossibile est, quod natura humana assumatur a divina.

> ### Conclusio.
> Circumscripta omni personalitate, non potest intelligi, a divina natura assumi humanam; circumscripta vero personalitate a fide determinata, assumtio haec potest intelligi, sed non ita congrue.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit in divinis circumscribere personalitatem per intellectum: aut simpliciter, aut prout fides determinat. (*Distinctio.*) — (*Membrum 1.*) Simpliciter circumscribitur intellectus personalitatis, quando consideratur divina natura ut in se, non in aliquo supposito determinate, et in quantum communicabilis est a multis, non in quantum est in hoc vel in illo. Et hoc modo divina natura consideratur per modum cuiusdam ordinabilis ad alium. Et hoc modo non intelligitur secundum ra-
<!-- page 128 -->
tionem agendi nec patiendi, quia actio non attribuitur formae nisi in supposito. Et sic assumtio non potest ei convenire (*Conclusio 1.*), tum quia natura talis non intelligitur ut agens, quia actio est formae in supposito; tum etiam, quia natura talis, sic considerata, non habet in quo possit uniri cum humana natura; non enim potest uniri in forma. Et ista duo cadunt in intellectu huius vocabuli, quod est assumere; et ideo ratione utriusque impedimentum est, ut nequaquam naturae consideratae in abstractione ab omni personalitate possit assumtio intelligi convenire.

(*Membrum 2.*) Alio modo potest circumscribi a divinis[^6b] personalitas non simpliciter, sed per eum modum, per quem fides determinat, scilicet Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, ita tamen quod intelligatur ibi suppositum rationalis naturae, sicut intelligunt Iudaei et pagani. Et hoc modo potest intelligi assumtio convenire Deo (*Conclusio 2.*); licet non ita congrue, sicut intelligitur, praesupposita personali distinctione. — (*Explicatur.*) Intellecto enim, quod sola illa persona, quae est innascibilis, esset in divinis, posset utique humanitatem assumere, et intelligi potest[^7b], quod Deus fieret homo; sed tamen non ita congrueret, sicut nunc, quia tunc non esset ibi ratio mediationis nec satisfactionis nec missionis, sicut nunc est, cum Filius a Patre mittitur et Patri pro homine satisfacit et mediator est inter Deum Patrem[^8b] et genus humanum. Unde nullus intellexit unquam incarnationem, nisi praeintellexerit personarum distinctionem.

(*Epilogus.*) Concedendum est igitur, quod circumscripta personalitate a fide determinata, etsi possit intelligi assumtio, non tamen ita congrue. Omni vero personalitate circumscripta, non contingit, a divina natura assumi humanam. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad istam partem, quia procedunt secundum istam viam.

**Ad argumenta:** *1. 2. 3. 4.* (*Solutio oppositorum.*) Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod divina natura, abstractis personis, intelligitur ut summe potens, ut summe sapiens, et ut summe bona, et ut creaturarum causa effectiva; ad omnes illas rationes responderi potest interimendo[^9b], si intelligatur, quod fiat abstractio ab omni supposito. Necessario enim qui cogitat Deum cogitat ut aliquem habentem deitatem sive naturam intellectualem; alioquin non cogitat eum ut perfecte in se entem, et nec ut perfecte potentem, nec ut summe sapientem. Alter etiam[^10b] intellectus est ibi, quia ad assumtionem non tantum requiritur causa efficiens, sed etiam illud, in quo fiat unio. Et ideo esto[^1c], quod omni personalitate circumscripta, consideraretur divina natura in ratione perfecte potentis et sapientis, non tamen cogitari posset in ratione assumentis, quia non posset ibi esse intellectus unibilitatis.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether assuming can befit the divine nature, with every person abstracted.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether assuming can befit the divine nature, with every person abstracted. And that it can, it seems.

1. (*Toward the opposite.*) When all persons are abstracted, the Omnipotent is still understood; but to the Omnipotent no word is impossible[^9]: therefore it seems that, with every personality abstracted, it is possible for God to assume flesh.

2. Likewise, with every personality abstracted, God is still understood as supremely good; but because he is supremely good, he loves the creature, and through his exceeding charity he assumed human nature[^10]: therefore, with every personality abstracted, it is still possible to understand that God can assume human flesh.

3. Likewise, with every personality abstracted, God is still understood as able to create and able to restore the human race[^11]; but he restores by assuming flesh: therefore the same as before seems to return.

4. Likewise, with every personality abstracted, God is still understood as wise, and therefore as knowing and able to overcome and conquer the tyrant; but the mystery of the assumption is for[^1b] conquering and overcoming the tyrant: therefore he is understood as able to assume flesh.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Foundations.*) To assume is to unite to oneself, therefore either in a supposit or in a form; but the divine nature cannot unite the human to itself in a form: therefore if it unites in any way, it is necessary to unite in a supposit and a person[^2b]: therefore, with supposits and persons abstracted, it is altogether impossible to understand an assumption.

2. Likewise, assumption asserts some action; but no action is understood to belong to anything except as a being in act — for nothing is a being in act[^3b] except insofar as it is in a supposit — therefore, with the supposit abstracted, there is no understanding of any assumption.

3. Likewise, it is impossible to understand that a human nature is assumed, unless it be assumed in an individual or in a singular, because, as Damascene holds[^4b], «a nature apart from singulars exists only in bare consideration»: therefore by parity of reasoning it is impossible to understand that an assumption takes place in a nature abstracted from every person.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that the assumption of anything befit anyone except after its completed being — for no one assumes anything to himself except after he is complete[^5b] — but the perfect completion of a rational nature is nothing but a person: therefore, with every personality circumscribed, it is impossible that the human nature be assumed by the divine.

> ### Conclusion.
> With every personality circumscribed, it cannot be understood that the human is assumed by the divine nature; but with the personality circumscribed [only] as faith determines, this assumption can be understood, though not so fittingly.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of circumscribing personality in the divine by the intellect: either simply, or as faith determines. (*Distinction.*) — (*First member.*) The intellect of personality is circumscribed simply, when the divine nature is considered as in itself, not in any determinate supposit, and insofar as it is communicable to many, not insofar as it is in this one or in that one. And in this way the divine nature is considered after the manner of something orderable toward another. And in this way it is not understood according to the account of acting nor of being acted upon, because action is not attributed to a form except in a supposit. And so the assumption cannot befit it (*First conclusion.*), both because such a nature is not understood as an agent, since action belongs to a form in a supposit; and also because such a nature, considered thus, has nothing in which it could be united with a human nature; for it cannot be united in a form. And these two things fall within the meaning of this word, which is "to assume"; and therefore on account of both there is an impediment, such that the assumption can in no way be understood to befit a nature considered in abstraction from all personality.

(*Second member.*) In another way personality can be circumscribed in the divine[^6b] not simply, but in the manner in which faith determines, namely [the personality] of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, yet in such a way that there be understood there a supposit of rational nature, as the Jews and the pagans understand. And in this way the assumption can be understood to befit God (*Second conclusion.*); though not so fittingly as it is understood when the personal distinction is presupposed. — (*It is explained.*) For granted that only that person which is unbegettable were in the divine, he could indeed assume humanity, and it can be understood[^7b] that God should become man; but yet it would not be so fitting as it is now, because then there would not be there the account of mediation nor of satisfaction nor of mission, as there is now, when the Son is sent by the Father and makes satisfaction to the Father on behalf of man and is mediator between God the Father[^8b] and the human race. Hence no one has ever understood the incarnation, unless he has first understood the distinction of persons.

(*Epilogue.*) It must therefore be conceded that, with the personality circumscribed [only] as faith determines, even though the assumption can be understood, yet not so fittingly. But with every personality circumscribed, it does not come about that the human is assumed by the divine nature. Hence the reasons toward that side are to be conceded, because they proceed according to that way.

**To the arguments:** *1, 2, 3, 4.* (*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*) But to that which is objected on the contrary — that the divine nature, with the persons abstracted, is understood as supremely powerful, as supremely wise, and as supremely good, and as the effective cause of creatures — to all those reasons one can reply by way of destroying [them][^9b], if it be understood that an abstraction is made from every supposit. For necessarily whoever thinks of God thinks of him as someone having deity or an intellectual nature; otherwise he does not think of him as perfectly being in himself, nor as perfectly powerful, nor as supremely wise. There is also another[^10b] understanding there, because for the assumption there is required not only an efficient cause, but also that in which the union takes place. And therefore, granted[^1c] that, with every personality circumscribed, the divine nature were considered under the account of being perfectly powerful and wise, yet it could not be thought of under the account of an assumer, because there could not be there an understanding of unitability.

la: Respicitur Luc. 1, 37.

en: Reference is made to Luke 1:37.

en: Cf. Wisdom 11:25, and Ephesians 2:4.

la: Vide supra pag. 28, nota 2.

en: See above, page 28, note 2.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. omittit *ad.* Paulo superius pro *ergo sciens* cod. V *et sciens.*

en: The Vatican edition with a few codices omits *ad.* A little above, for *ergo sciens* codex V reads *et sciens.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Pro *enim* mallemus substituere *autem.* — Quod hic profertur, illo axiomate exprimi solet: *Actiones sunt suppositorum.* Cfr. supra pag. 126, nota 1. — Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.) ait: *Semper etenim ex eo quod potentia est, fit actu ens ab actu existente, ut homo ex homine, musicus ex musico, semper aliquo primo movente, movens autem actu iam est.*

en: For *enim* we should prefer to substitute *autem.* — What is brought forward here is usually expressed by that axiom: *Actions belong to supposits.* Cf. above, page 126, note 1. — Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 13 (VIII, c. 8) says: *For always from that which is in potency a being in act comes to be from a being existing in act, as man from man, musician from musician, always with some first mover, and the mover is already in act.*

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 1.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 11. Cf. above, page 15, note 1.

la: Scil. suum esse (*ens*); vel lege *completus* pro *completum.* — De propos. seq. cfr. infra n. 2. q. 3.

en: Namely, its own being (*a being*); or read *completus* for *completum.* — On the following proposition cf. below, n. 2, q. 3.

la: Post *non* cod. K repetit *ut.* Mox pro *et in quantum* edd. *sed in quantum.* Subinde Vat. omittit *a multis,* et paulo inferius pro *ad alium* rursum edd. 1, 2 exhibet *ad aliam.*

en: After *non* codex K repeats *ut.* Presently, for *et in quantum* the editions read *sed in quantum.* Thereupon the Vatican edition omits *a multis,* and a little below, for *ad alium* again, editions 1, 2 give *ad aliam.*

la: Cod. cc et edd. *in divinis;* in nostra lectione verbum *circumscribi* sumendum est pro *abstrahi.*

en: Codex cc and the editions read *in divinis;* in our reading the verb *circumscribi* is to be taken for *abstrahi.*

la: Edd. *posset,* et mox cum cod. T *congrue* pro *congrueret.*

en: The editions read *posset,* and presently, with codex T, *congrue* for *congrueret.*

la: Codd. A G H L T U V aa *Deum et Patrem.*

en: Codices A G H L T U V aa read *God and Father.*

la: Sive negando. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Proxime post pro *intelligatur* ed. 2 *intelligantur.*

en: That is, by denying. Cf. vol. I, page 87, note 4. — Immediately after, for *intelligatur* edition 2 reads *intelligantur.*

la: Vat. *Alter etenim.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *Alter etenim* [for *Alter etiam*]. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Alex. Hal. in uno loco (S. p. III. q. 2. m. 3.) ad quaestionem respondet simpliciter negando, his verbis: «Dico ergo, quod abstractis personis non intelligo divinam naturam posse uniri; et si quis forte posset hoc intelligere, ego non intelligo». Duplicem pro hac assertione affert rationem: primo, quia «natura divina et humana non possunt invicem mutari nec misceri, ut quaedam tertia fiat ex duabus» etc.; secundo, «quia nunquam intellectus intelligit, naturam esse in actu nisi in re naturae [supposito], sicut humanitatem esse in actu non intelligo nisi in habente ipsam... habens autem illam est persona vel hypostasis» etc. Attamen idem in alia simili quaestione (ibid. q. 7. m. 1. a. 2.) iam innuit eandem distinctionem, qua utuntur S. Bonav. et posteriores Scholastici, qui subsistentiam absolutam in Deo vel reapse admittunt, vel saltem a gentilibus eandem suppositam esse concedere debent. Hinc abstractis per intellectum proprietatibus personalibus, adhuc «remanebit in consideratione nostra natura divina ut subsistens et ut persona» (scilicet ut suppositum absolutum); ita S. Thom. (S. III. q. 3. a. 3. ad 1; cfr. idem, hic q. 2. a. 3.). Sed hoc modo, circumscriptis personis, intelligi potest natura divina assumens.

**II.** Praeter citatos: Scot., III. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. n. 6, et in utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

**III.** Seq. (5.) quaestio a Magistro (hic c. 2.) posita est; ad quam respondet, istam locutionem melius silendam, vel negandam esse. Posteriores Scholastici explicite de eadem non tractant, excepto B. Alberto, hic a. 13. S. Thom. rem tangit S. III. q. 3. a. 2, ubi cum S. Bonav. admittit alteram propositionem in corp. relatam. Approbat enim dictum Damasceni (III. de Fide orthod. c. 6.): «Dicimus, naturam Dei incarnatam esse, secundum beatos Athanasium et Cyrillum».

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Alexander of Hales in one place (S. p. III. q. 2. m. 3.) answers the question by simply denying, in these words: «I say therefore that, with the persons abstracted, I do not understand that the divine nature can be united; and if anyone perhaps could understand this, I do not understand it». He brings forward a twofold reason for this assertion: first, because «the divine and human nature cannot be mutually changed nor mingled, so that some third thing be made out of the two» etc.; second, «because the intellect never understands that a nature is in act except in the reality of the nature [the supposit], just as I do not understand that humanity is in act except in that which has it... but that which has it is a person or hypostasis» etc. Yet the same author in another similar question (ibid. q. 7. m. 1. a. 2.) already hints at the same distinction which St. Bonaventure and the later Scholastics use, who either really admit an absolute subsistence in God, or at least must concede that the gentiles supposed the same. Hence, with the personal properties abstracted by the intellect, there will still «remain in our consideration the divine nature as subsisting and as a person» (namely as an absolute supposit); so St. Thomas (S. III. q. 3. a. 3. ad 1; cf. the same, here q. 2. a. 3.). But in this way, with the persons circumscribed, the divine nature can be understood as assuming.

**II.** Besides those cited: Scotus, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. n. 6, and in both Scripta here q. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3.

**III.** The following (fifth) question was posed by the Master (here c. 2.); to which he replies that this way of speaking is better kept silent, or denied. The later Scholastics do not treat of it explicitly, except B. Albert, here a. 13. St. Thomas touches the matter at S. III. q. 3. a. 2, where with St. Bonaventure he admits the other proposition reported in the body. For he approves the saying of Damascene (III. On the Orthodox Faith c. 6.): «We say that the nature of God was incarnate, according to the blessed Athanasius and Cyril».

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.126–128 (PDF 148–150; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page, per the Vol II/III OCR-priority inversion (the two-column IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo, the *Solutio oppositorum*, the scholion, and every page footer — diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation + cross-column bleed). The clean *videtur*/*Sed contra* argument prose was base-checked against raw OCR lines 9275–9393; the damaged regions are authoritative from the column bands. Fresh literal English.

**Alignment.** VERIFIED q.IV = *Utrum assumere possit convenire divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona* (whether assuming can befit the divine nature, with every person abstracted). Body opener: *Quarto quaeritur, utrum assumere convenire possit divinae naturae, abstracta omni persona.* This is neither q.III (*ratione naturae an e converso*, done) nor q.V (*divina natura est caro facta*, next). Raw range 9275 (QUAESTIO IV) → 9393 (just before QUAESTIO V at 9394).

**Page-split map.**
- p.126 (foot, L→R): QUAESTIO IV title + opener + args 1–4 (arg 4 breaks at *my-* / *-sterium* into p.127). Body markers 9, 10, 11. Marginal label *Ad oppositum* (at arg 1).
- p.127 (L→R): rest of arg 4; Sed contra 1–4; Conclusio; Respondeo (Distinctio, Membrum 1, Conclusio 1, Membrum 2, Conclusio 2, Explicatur, Epilogus); start of Solutio oppositorum. Body markers 1b–10b. Marginal labels *Fundamenta*, *Distinctio*, *Membrum 1*, *Conclusio 1*, *Membrum 2*, *Conclusio 2*, *Explicatur*, *Epilogus*, *Solutio oppositorum*.
- p.128 (L→R): tail of Solutio oppositorum (ends *...unibilitatis.*) then the standalone SCHOLION (I, II, III) which runs to mid-page; QUAESTIO V follows. Body marker 1c (*Alter etiam¹*); the scholion text carries no footnote markers.

**Footer hand-off PICKED UP from d5-a1-q3:** p.126 footer notes 9 (*Respicitur Luc. 1, 37*), 10 (*Cfr. Sap. 11, 25, et Eph. 2, 4*), 11 (*Vide supra pag. 28, nota 2*) key this chunk's body markers (impossibile⁹, humanam naturam¹⁰, reparare¹¹) and lead the apparatus here. p.126 notes 1–8 were consumed by q.III.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to d5-a1-q5:** none from this chunk's pages directly. QUAESTIO V opens at the foot of p.128 R / continues onto p.129; its body markers key p.128's notes 2+ and p.129's own sequence. p.128 note 1 (*Alter etiam... Vat. Alter etenim*) is consumed here by q.IV's Solutio oppositorum, so q5 picks up p.128 footers from note 2 onward.

**Scholion disposition.** The forecast (q1's scholion forward-covering q4) was NOT borne out: a distinct standalone `SCHOLION` (I–III) prints at q4's tail on p.128 (raw 9375–9391) — `has_scholion: true`. (Part I discusses Alexander of Hales on the q4 question of the divine nature assuming with persons abstracted; parts II–III give the parallel-author register and Master Lombard's c.2 hand-off into q5.)

**`[?]` flags.** None. All readings resolved from the column bands; codex sigla in notes 9b/1c read cleanly at 450 dpi.


title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De assumtione ex parte assumentis.*
### Quaestio V. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta.*

Quinto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta. Et quod sic, videtur.

(*Ad oppositum.*) 1. Ioannes Damascenus, et habetur in littera[^2]: «Aimus, omnem et perfectam naturam deitatis in unam hypostasim incarnatam esse»; sed incarnari non est aliud quam carnem fieri: ergo si haec est vera: divina natura est incarnata, et haec, scilicet, divina natura est caro facta.

2. Item, nihil aliud est dicere: *Verbum est caro factum*, quam humana natura est assumta a Verbo; sed humana natura est assumta non solum a Verbo, sed etiam a divina natura, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^3]: ergo videtur, quod divina natura sit caro facta.

3. Item, nihil aliud est *Verbum carnem fieri*, quam Dei Filium esse factum hominem; sed Dei Filius est divina natura vel essentia, et propter unionem est communicatio idiomatum[^4]: ergo videtur, quod sicut ista conceditur: *Verbum caro factum est*; ita ista concedi debet: divina natura est facta caro.

**Sed contra:** (*Fundamenta.*) 1. Magister in littera[^5]: «Melius hoc puto negare quam asserere»: ergo secundum sententiam Magistri videtur praedicta locutio esse neganda.

2. Item, quia Filius Dei est caro factus, conceditur, quod Filius Dei fuit passus et mortuus; sed non conceditur: divina natura est passa, vel mortua[^6]: ergo nec ista debet concedi: divina natura est caro facta.

3. Item, quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod formaliter sunt distincta; si dicatur, unum fieri alterum, significatur, unum converti in alterum, utpote si dicatur aqua facta vinum; sed sic se habet caro et divina natura: cum ergo divina natura non sit in carnem conversa, videtur, quod haec non sit concedenda: divina natura est caro facta.

(*Quaestio incidens.*) Est igitur quaestio, quare magis conceditur: divina natura est incarnata, quam ista: divina natura est caro facta[^7].

### Conclusio.

> Locutio: divina natura est caro facta, non est admittenda.

**Respondeo:** (*Conclusio.*) Dicendum, quod ista debet et potest concedi: divina natura est incarnata, quia scripta legitur[^8] nec est simpliciter impropria.

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(*Duplex sensus.*) Duplicem enim facit intellectum, quorum unus est verus et catholicus, licet alius sit ambiguus: unus, cum dicitur: divina natura est incarnata, id est *carni unita*; et hoc absque dubio verum est. Cum enim unio dicat relationem, simul cum hoc notat naturarum distinctionem et excludit confusionem; et ideo ratione istius intellectus potest concedi: divina natura est incarnata.

(*Conclusio 2.*) Potest etiam alius esse sensus: divina natura est incarnata, id est *caro facta*. Et ratione istius non admittitur communiter a doctoribus. Haec enim non recipitur: divina natura est caro facta; habet enim duplicem intellectum, et in uno intellectu est *falsa* et in alio intellectu est adeo *expressiva*, quod potest deducere in errorem; et ideo nullo modo recipitur.

(*Ratio huius duplicis sensus.*) — Duplicem autem habet intellectum praedicta locutio ex eo, quod hoc quod est *facta*, potest cadere inter *subiectum et praedicatum*, et[^1b] *referri ad totum*. Si cadit *inter subiectum et praedicatum*, tunc notat factionem circa divinam naturam respectu formae carnis; et ideo sensus est: divina natura est caro facta, id est conversa in carnem; et haec quidem simpliciter[^2b] est *falsa*. — Si autem respiciat totum, sic sensus est: divina natura est caro facta, id est factum est, ut divina natura sit caro; (*Conclusio 3.*) et haec quidem, proprie loquendo, est falsa, quia caro non praedicatur de divina natura. Si autem intelligatur synecdochice[^3b], ut sit sensus: divina natura est caro, id est *homo*; etsi illud aliquo modo (*Conclusio 4.*) posset concedi propter convenientiam in hypostasi, quae facit idiomatum communicationem — propter hoc quod haec est vera: homo est divina natura, id est, ille qui est homo — propter nimiam tamen *expressionem* tacenda est, ne videatur natura praedicari de natura, vel naturarum fieri identitatem aut confusionem; quae omnia releganda sunt ab illa excellentissima unione et assumtione. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes locutionem praedictam non esse admittendam, licet non multum cogant.

**Ad obiecta:** (*Solutio oppositorum.*) 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod divina natura est incarnata et conceditur[^4b]; dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut iam visum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propter humanae naturae assumtionem ista conceditur: Verbum est factum caro; dicendum, quod non est simile, (*Notandum.*) quia Verbum dicit ipsam hypostasim, cui innititur[^5b] ipsa humana natura et quam habet denominare. Et ideo non significatur ex hoc aliqua naturarum mutatio vel confusio, sed solum Verbi ad humanam naturam denominatio, ut dicatur Verbum esse homo. Non sic autem est, cum dicitur: divina natura est facta caro, quia, cum istae naturae sint distinctae, nec una habeat ab altera denominari, quamvis habeat alteri uniri, magis a proprietate et veritate praedicta locutio recedit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum fieri carnem non est aliud, quam Verbum fieri hominem; dicendum, quod verum[^6b] est. Et quoniam ista est vera et propria: Verbum est factum homo; figurativa locutio, quae in eam immediate resolvitur, non est via ducendi in errorem, immo concedi potest satis catholice. Haec autem: divina essentia facta est homo, quamvis non sit *omnino falsa*, quia hypostasis praedicatur de divina natura per *identitatem*; non tamen est *adeo propria*, sicut ista: Filius Dei factus est homo, immo nimium est expressiva. Et propterea locutio figurativa, in qua significatur per synecdochen caro sumi pro toto homine, simpliciter respuitur, pro eo quod magis recedit a sermonis proprietate et ab expressione veritatis, et approximat intellectui erroris. — (*Notandum.*) Qua de causa multae negantur locutiones a doctoribus theologiae, ne paralogizentur et decipiantur simplices, qui nesciunt vocabulorum virtutes[^7b].

---

english:
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### Article I. *On the assumption on the part of the one assuming.*
### Question V. *Whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.*

Fifth and last it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh. And that it is so, it seems.

(*To the opposite.*) 1. John Damascene, and it is found in the text [of the Master][^2]: «We say that the whole and perfect nature of the deity was made incarnate into one hypostasis»; but to be made incarnate is nothing other than to be made flesh: therefore if this is true: the divine nature is made incarnate, then this also, namely: the divine nature is made flesh.

2. Likewise, to say *the Word is made flesh* is nothing other than that human nature has been assumed by the Word; but human nature has been assumed not only by the Word, but also by the divine nature, as was shown above[^3]: therefore it seems that the divine nature is made flesh.

3. Likewise, for *the Word to be made flesh* is nothing other than for the Son of God to be made man; but the Son of God is the divine nature or essence, and on account of the union there is a communication of idioms[^4]: therefore it seems that, just as this is conceded: *the Word is made flesh*; so this ought to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

**On the contrary:** (*Fundamental arguments.*) 1. The Master, in the text[^5]: «I think it better to deny this than to assert it»: therefore, according to the opinion of the Master, the aforesaid locution seems to be denied.

2. Likewise, because the Son of God is made flesh, it is conceded that the Son of God suffered and died; but it is not conceded: the divine nature suffered or died[^6]: therefore neither ought this to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

3. Likewise, whenever any two things are so related that they are formally distinct; if one is said to become the other, it is signified that the one is converted into the other, as for instance if water is said to be made wine; but flesh and the divine nature are so related: since therefore the divine nature is not converted into flesh, it seems that this is not to be conceded: the divine nature is made flesh.

(*An incidental question.*) There is therefore a question, why it is conceded rather: the divine nature is made incarnate, than this: the divine nature is made flesh[^7].

### Conclusion.

> The locution: the divine nature is made flesh, is not to be admitted.

**I respond:** (*Conclusion.*) It must be said that this ought to and can be conceded: the divine nature is made incarnate, because it is read as written[^8] and is not simply improper.

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(*A twofold sense.*) For it yields a twofold understanding, of which one is true and catholic, although the other is ambiguous: one, when it is said: the divine nature is made incarnate, that is, *united to flesh*; and this without doubt is true. For since union bespeaks a relation, together with this it notes the distinction of the natures and excludes confusion; and therefore by reason of this understanding it can be conceded: the divine nature is made incarnate.

(*Conclusion 2.*) There can also be another sense: the divine nature is made incarnate, that is, *made flesh*. And by reason of this it is not commonly admitted by the doctors. For this is not received: the divine nature is made flesh; for it has a twofold understanding, and in one understanding it is *false* and in the other understanding it is so *expressive* that it can lead into error; and therefore it is in no way received.

(*The reason for this twofold sense.*) — The aforesaid locution has a twofold understanding from this, that this which is *made* can fall between *subject and predicate*, and[^1b] *be referred to the whole*. If it falls *between subject and predicate*, then it notes a making with regard to the divine nature in respect of the form of flesh; and therefore the sense is: the divine nature is made flesh, that is, converted into flesh; and this indeed is simply[^2b] *false*. — But if it regards the whole, then the sense is: the divine nature is made flesh, that is, it is brought about that the divine nature be flesh; (*Conclusion 3.*) and this indeed, properly speaking, is false, because flesh is not predicated of the divine nature. But if it be understood synecdochically[^3b], so that the sense be: the divine nature is flesh, that is, *man*; even though that might in some way (*Conclusion 4.*) be conceded on account of the convergence in the hypostasis, which makes the communication of idioms — on account of this, that this is true: man is the divine nature, that is, he who is man — yet on account of its excessive *expressiveness* it must be passed over in silence, lest nature seem to be predicated of nature, or an identity or confusion of the natures be made; all of which must be banished from that most excellent union and assumption. — There are therefore to be conceded the arguments showing that the aforesaid locution is not to be admitted, although they do not greatly compel.

**To the objections:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. As to that indeed which is objected, that the divine nature is made incarnate and is conceded[^4b]; it must be said that it is not similar, as has already been seen.

2. As to that which is objected, that on account of the assumption of human nature this is conceded: the Word is made flesh; it must be said that it is not similar, (*Note.*) because the Word names the very hypostasis upon which the human nature itself rests[^5b] and which it has to denominate. And therefore there is not signified by this any mutation or confusion of the natures, but only the denomination of the Word to human nature, so that the Word is said to be man. But it is not so when it is said: the divine nature is made flesh, because, since these natures are distinct, and one cannot be denominated from the other, although it can be united to the other, the aforesaid locution recedes the more from propriety and truth.

3. As to that which is objected, that for the Word to be made flesh is nothing other than for the Word to be made man; it must be said that it is true[^6b]. And since this is true and proper: the Word is made man; the figurative locution, which is immediately resolved into it, is not a way of leading into error, but rather can be conceded quite catholically. But this: the divine essence is made man, although it is not *wholly false*, because the hypostasis is predicated of the divine nature by *identity*; nevertheless is not *so proper* as this: the Son of God is made man, but rather is excessively expressive. And therefore the figurative locution, in which it is signified by synecdoche that flesh is taken for the whole man, is simply rejected, for the reason that it recedes the more from the propriety of speech and from the expression of truth, and approaches the understanding of error. — (*Note.*) For which cause many locutions are denied by the doctors of theology, lest the simple, who do not know the force of words, be led into fallacy and deceived[^7b].

---

la: Hic c. 1 in fine. De minori vide ibid. c. 2.

en: Here [in the Master's text], c. 1, at the end. On the minor [premise] see ibid., c. 2.

la: Quaest. I.

en: Question I.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 3. — Pro *et propter* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *vel propter*.

en: Cf. above, p. 14, note 3. — For *et propter* ("and on account of") many codices and editions 1, 2 read *vel propter* ("or on account of").

la: Hic c. 2. — Edd. cum textu origin. *quam temere asserere*.

en: Here, c. 2. — The editions, with the original text, read *quam temere asserere* ("than rashly to assert").

la: Vide verba Hieronymi hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1, circa medium, insuper locum Damasceni, supra pag. 14, nota 3, allatum.

en: See the words of Jerome here in the text of the Master, c. 1, near the middle, and besides the passage of Damascene cited above, p. 14, note 3.

la: Hanc rationem Magister insinuat hic c. 2.

en: The Master intimates this reasoning here, c. 2.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. K *in Scriptura legitur*. Mox pro *ambiguus* cod. M *abusivus*, et subinde pro *unus*, quod habet Vat., edd. 1, 2 et codd. *unde*, sed non congrue.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Codex K reads *in Scriptura legitur* ("is read in Scripture"). Presently, for *ambiguus* ("ambiguous"), codex M reads *abusivus* ("abusive"); and thereafter, for *unus* ("one"), which the Vatican edition, editions 1, 2, and the codices have, [some read] *unde* ("whence"), but not fittingly.

la: Codd. H (K primitus) bb rectius *vel* pro *et*; Vat. post *et* subiicit *potest etiam*.

en: Codices H (K originally) bb more correctly read *vel* ("or") for *et* ("and"); the Vatican edition, after *et*, subjoins *potest etiam* ("can also").

la: Cod. H *et hoc sensu simpliciter*.

en: Codex H reads *et hoc sensu simpliciter* ("and in this sense, simply").

la: Cfr. tom. II, pag. 519, nota o.

en: Cf. tome II, p. 519, note o.

la: In edd. deest *et conceditur*.

en: In the editions *et conceditur* ("and is conceded") is lacking.

la: Pro *innititur* codd. K M O Z bb *unitur*. Mox pro *significatur* cod. Z *sequitur*. In fine solut. pro *recedit* cod. K *recedet*, cod. Y *excedit*.

en: For *innititur* ("rests upon") codices K M O Z bb read *unitur* ("is united"). Presently, for *significatur* ("is signified") codex Z reads *sequitur* ("follows"). At the end of the solution, for *recedit* ("recedes") codex K reads *recedet* ("will recede"), codex Y *excedit* ("exceeds").

la: Codd. G H I K L Y Z aa bb *vera*.

en: Codices G H I K L Y Z aa bb read *vera* ("true," fem.).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question [q. IV]. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 128–129 (PDF pp. 150–151; offset pdf = printed + 22). The IA djvu OCR (raw lines 9394–9482) cascade-shattered the *Quaestio incidens* / CONCLUSIO block, the entire Respondeo, the *Solutio oppositorum*, and every page-footer, so per the Vol II/III override the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout. Running heads: `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (p.128 verso), `DIST. V. ART. II.` (p.129 recto — note the head already advances to ART. II while q.V of ART. I is still running). Marginal labels rendered inline in parentheses, not as anchors: *Ad oppositum*, *Quaestio incidens*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio*, *Duplex sensus*, *Conclusio 2/3/4*, *Ratio huius duplicis sensus*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum* (×2).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.128** (R column): Quaestio V opens at the top of the R column (the L column and top of the R column hold q.IV's tail and its standalone scholion). Body of q.V on p.128 = the title, args 1–3 (arg 1 in the L column, args 2–3 carrying over to the R), Sed contra args 1–3, the *Quaestio incidens*, CONCLUSIO blockquote, and the opening of the Respondeo. Footer notes **2–8** (note 1 belongs to q.IV).
- **p.129** (both columns): continuation of the Respondeo (L column: *Duplex sensus* → *Conclusio 4*, ending `Concedendae`), and the *Solutio oppositorum* replies 1–3 (R column, ending `…vocabulorum virtutes`). q.V ends here; ARTICULUS II begins immediately below in the L column (no scholion intervenes). Footer notes **1b–7b**.

**Footer hand-off.** *Picked up from d5-a1-q4:* p.128 note 1 was consumed by q.IV's Solutio oppositorum, so q.V leads its p.128 sequence at note 2. *Forwarded to d5-a2-q1:* none — q.V's two printed pages (128–129) are fully consumed here; both p.128 (notes 2–8) and p.129 (notes 1b–7b) footer sequences are exhausted at the q.V / ARTICULUS II seam, and ARTICULUS II opens a fresh printed page (130, `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`) with its own per-page footer sequence.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. No SCHOLION block prints at q.V's tail — ARTICULUS II (`De assumtione ex parte assumti`) follows the *Solutio oppositorum* immediately on p.129. The forecast that q.V *might* carry a scholion (because q.IV unexpectedly did) is resolved negative by eyes-on: p.129 footer note 7 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`, keyed to body marker `virtutes`) explicitly cross-refers the scholion of the **preceding** question (q.IV, which prints at the top of p.128 R column), confirming q.V has none of its own.

**ARTICULUS II hand-off (for d5-a2-q1).** ARTICULUS II = *De assumtione ex parte assumti*, raw line 9483. Opener: `Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de assumtione ex parte assumti. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque.` Its 5-quaestio list (TRACTATIO): (1) *utrum persona Dei assumserit humanam naturam*; (2) *utrum assumserit humanam personam*; (3) *utrum sit ponere perfectam intentionem personalitatis circa animam separatam*; (4) *utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem*; (5) *utrum concedendum sit, quod assumserit humanitatem*. QUAESTIO I of ART. II (*Utrum concedendum sit, naturam humanam assumtam esse a Deo*) opens on printed p.130 (`Circa primum sic proceditur…`, raw ~9510). Per the locked ARTICULUS-opener convention, the short ART. II opener folds into d5-a2-q1 (no standalone a2-divisio).

**[?] flags.** None.