title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De cognitione daemonum.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum in daemonibus cadat deceptio circa praesentia.*

Quod autem deceptio cadat in daemonibus circa praesentia, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos primo[^1]: *Quoniam non probaverunt habere Deum in notitia, tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum;* hoc dicit Apostolus de hominibus. Si ergo aeque vel magis severus est Deus in Angelos, ergo videtur, quod dati sint in reprobum sensum; sed in omnibus talibus cadit error: ergo etc. *Si tu dicas,* quod illud intelligitur de sensu in agendis, non in cognoscendis; *contra:* Augustinus dicit super Genesim ad litteram[^2], quod « mali angeli intelliguntur per tenebras, boni vero per lucem »; sed tenebra magis dicit privationem luminis quam caloris: ergo videtur, quod cognitio eorum sit obscurata, ergo et errori subiecta.

2. Item, videtur, quod errori sit penitus subiecta, quia Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*[^3] dicit, quod « in daemonibus est furor irrationalis, amens concupiscentia, phantasia proterva »; sed phantasia est principium erroris: ergo videtur, quod ratio eorum penitus sit subiugata errori.

3. Item, *per simile.* Homini inflicta est pro peccato ignorantia non tantum agendorum, sed etiam cognoscendorum: ergo si non minus peccatum angelicum debuit puniri, patet etc.

4. Item, hoc videtur *per simile.* Sicut se habet affectus ad bonum, ita intellectus ad verum;
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sed affectus daemonum adeo est depressus, quod non potest moveri in amorem boni, aut inordinate movetur, si amat[^4]: ergo nec intellectus in speculationem veri. *Si tu dicas,* quod peccatum magis corrumpit affectum daemonum quam intellectum; *contrarium videtur:* nam omnem pravam electionem praecedit pravum iudicium, quia non eligit voluntas deliberative, nisi praecedat iudicium[^5]: ergo videtur, quod prima ratio deordinandi sit in iudicio, et ita in cognitiva: ergo magis quam in voluntate vel aeque debet esse punitio. Item, hoc confirmatur, quia excaecatio et obstinatio sunt poenae peccati: ergo sicut affectio praesupponit cognitionem, ita obstinatio, quae est poena affectionis, excaecationem, quae est poena cognitionis: ergo cum diabolus sit obstinatus, etiam est excaecatus.

5. Item, « *bonum est diffusivum sui*[^6] » et verum similiter, et magis est diffusivum sui bonum quam verum, quia hoc habet de sua ratione: ergo Deus, in quantum bonus, subtrahit influentiam bonitatis affectivae ipsorum daemonum, ergo in quantum verum, diffusionem luminis ipsi cognitivae.

6. Item, quidquid sit de conservatione luminis dati, tamen daemonibus, cum sint in statu damnationis, nova dona non debent dari a Deo; sed « nihil potest aliquis addiscere, nisi Christo docente », sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Magistro*[^7]: ergo si Christus non debet nova dona dare eis, ergo nec novam cognitionem: ergo in his quae ante lapsum non cognoverunt, ex quo non habent doctorem veritatis, necessario errant et decipiuntur.

**Sed contra:** 1. Lucae decimo sexto[^8] dicitur, quod *filii huius saeculi prudentiores sunt filiis lucis in generatione sua;* loquitur de malis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*[^9]: « Data ipsis dona nequaquam mutata dicimus, sed sunt integra et splendidissima »; loquitur de daemonibus: ergo si habuerunt naturale iudicatorium illuminatum et potens dirigi in cognoscendis, videtur etc.

3. Item, Isidorus *de Summo Bono*[^10]: « Praevaricatores angeli, etiam sanctitate dimissa, sensum angelicae naturae non amiserunt ».

4. Item, peccatum non est contra *actum,* sed contra *ordinem actus*: ergo non est contra cognitionem simpliciter, sed contra cognitionem ordinatam in finem: si ergo cognitio speculativa, quantum est de se, non dicit cognitionem ordinatam in finem, patet, quod per peccatum non debet depravari.

### Conclusio

> *In daemonibus iudicium intellectus speculativi, etsi maneat integrum quantum ad substantiam potentiae, tamen per culpam est aliquo modo obnubilatum; iudicium vero intellectus practici est omnino subversum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod deceptio et error venit ex deordinatione sive deviatione iudicii. Iudicium autem duplex est in quolibet ratiocinante: unum, quod est *cognoscendorum,* quod est veri sub ratione veri; aliud *agendorum* sub ratione boni[^11]. Et primum est intellectus *speculativi* nec spectat ad liberum arbitrium; secundum vero est intellectus *practici* et est pars liberi arbitrii.

Primum iudicium, etsi maneat integrum quantum ad *substantiam potentiae,* nihilominus per culpam est in Angelis aliquo modo *obnubilatum*; quia errant frequenter in iudicando de multis et in multis decipiuntur, maxime cum iudicant de contingentibus. Aliud iudicium est in eis omnino *subversum*; et quantum ad hoc *excaecati* sunt angeli mali, sicut quantum ad affectum *obstinati*[^12]; et propter istius iudicii subversionem dicuntur facti *tenebra* et *dati in reprobum sensum.*

1. Et sic patet responsio ad primum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Dionysio, quod est in daemonibus *phantasia proterva*; dicendum, quod phantasia dupliciter accipitur: aliquando pro vi *sensitiva,* collativa sensibilium receptorum; aliquando phantasia dicitur *apparitio,* secundum quod dicitur a *phanos*[^13], quod est apparitio; et primo modo est in solis corporalibus, secundo modo in spiritibus. Haec autem phantasia dicitur *proterva* esse in daemonibus, quoniam, etsi daemones intelligentes sint et multa vera cognoscant, tamen alios nolunt docere, sed[^14] a veritate seducere; et ideo, quia non possunt nisi per apparentes similitudines, hinc est, quod
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studium daemonum maxime circa talia est intentum — sicut magnus clericus, qui vellet alios paralogizare, studeret in sophismatibus — et ideo *phantastici* dicuntur propter rationes phantasticas et apparentes, quas adinveniunt. Et hanc phantasiam dicit *protervam,* quia, cum secundum iudicium suum veritatem cognoscant, tamen cognitam scienter impugnant; et hoc est *protervire,* scilicet veritati intellectae obviare; ideo habent *phantasiam protervam.* Habent etiam *concupiscentiam amentem,* quia, cum non deberent appetere nisi honestum et conferens, appetunt res maxime nocivas, sicut peccare et alios in peccatum praecipitare, quamvis hoc non intendant finaliter. Est etiam[^15] *furor irrationalis,* quia cum solis malis deberent ex ratione irasci, irascuntur et furiunt contra bona.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homini inflicta est ignorantia secundum intellectum speculativum; dicendum, quod verum est in posteris; sed Adae non est *inflicta* ignorantia *cognoscendorum,* quia habuit cognitionem sibi innatam. Similiter et daemones, quia habuerunt cognitionem sibi innatam, et Deus vix subtrahit dona sua naturalia, scilicet gratis data; ideo non *inflixit* ita ignorantiam in intellectu *speculativo*; sed tamen ignorantiae poena acta est[^16] et caecitas in intellectu *practico.* Parvulis autem *infligere* dicitur ignorantiam, non subtrahendo scientiam, sed non apponendo. *Praeterea,* moles carnis corruptae aggravat intellectus iudicium[^17]; et ideo non est simile.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affectus est privatus rectitudine voluntatis; dicendum, quod peccatum magis respicit voluntatem et magis directe opponitur *bonitati affectionis* quam *veritati cognitionis*; et ideo daemones non sunt ita privati lumine cognitionis per culpam, sicut bonitate affectionis. Verumtamen, sicut prius[^18] tactum est, quoddam est iudicium, quod est coniunctum voluntati, et est subversum in malis angelis et excaecatum. Et ideo patet solutio ad alia duo sequentia.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *bonum est diffusivum sui*; dicendum, quod est loqui de diffusione *boni simpliciter,* vel *boni gratuiti.* Si loquimur de diffusione *boni simpliciter,* ad tot se extendit ratio boni, ad quot et veri, quia utrumque convertitur cum ente et in omnibus entibus[^19]. Si autem de diffusione *boni gratuiti,* non est verum; quia multi sunt, qui idonei sunt ad capiendam intelligentiam, qui tamen non sunt idonei ad capiendam gratiam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non debent dari eis dona; dicendum, quod donum dupliciter potest accipi: *proprie* et *communiter.* Proprie donum dicitur quod simpliciter aliunde est, cuiusmodi sunt gratiae infusae sive dona infusa; et talis est gratia gratum faciens vel ad eam habilitans. Alio modo dicitur donum, quod est per adiutorium divinum, nihilominus tamen per acquisitionem nostram; et illud non dicitur *proprie* donum, sed habito respectu ad hoc, quod non acquiritur sine Dei adiutorio; et hoc modo Deus dat dona bonis et malis. Quia enim Deus dedit lumen cognitionis ab initio, quod poterat in acquisitionem multorum scibilium; et ipse non subtrahit quod *dedit,* nec etiam *conservationem,* cum talia possint stare cum peccato mortali: ideo qui habet primum donum potest multiplicare, etiam reprobus existens; et Deus dicitur *docere,* non *inspirando* sive infundendo, sed *cooperando* lumini dato et *conservando* illud. — Exemplum huius est: Deus dedit *frumentum* avaro et dedit *terram* potentem fructificare; cum recolligit multum de blado de bona terra, Deus dat, sed non ita, sicut si ipse sterilem terram sine iactu seminis faceret fructificare; hoc enim *proprie* esset donum, primo modo solum *large.* Sic dat Deus dona[^20] bonis et malis, et daemonibus et hominibus, quamvis ipsis ipsa haec in mala convertantur.

Ad ea autem quae obiiciuntur ad oppositum, dicendum, quod intelliguntur de iudicio speculativo; tamen de illo non est intelligendum, quod magis vigeat[^21] quam in bonis, vel etiam tantum, sicut ante lapsum, quia revera, quamvis multa clare cognoscant, maxime illa quorum cognitio est eis innata, ratione quorum dicit Dionysius, quod habent sibi data integra; tamen in multis errant et falluntur illi nefandi spiritus, quia praesumtuosi et curiosi sunt, et ideo frequenter iudicant de his quae eorum iudicio non subsunt; et ideo a veritatis tramite in errorem labuntur. Et sic patent omnia obiecta.
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english:
### Article I. *On the cognition of demons.*
### Question I. *Whether deception falls upon demons concerning present things*

That deception falls upon demons concerning present things, it seems.

1. Romans 1[^1]: *Because they did not approve to have God in [their] knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense;* the Apostle says this of men. If therefore God is equally or more severe toward the angels, then it seems that they were given up to a reprobate sense; but in all such [cases] error falls: therefore, etc. *If you say* that this is understood of sense in things-to-be-done, not in things-to-be-known; *on the contrary:* Augustine says on Genesis according to the letter[^2] that "the evil angels are understood by darkness, but the good by light"; but darkness signifies privation of light rather than of heat: therefore it seems that their cognition is darkened, therefore also subject to error.

2. Likewise, it seems that it is utterly subject to error, because Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^3], says that "in the demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, wanton phantasy"; but phantasy is the source of error: therefore it seems that their reason is utterly subjugated to error.

3. Likewise, *by a likeness.* Upon man, for sin, was inflicted ignorance not only of things-to-be-done, but also of things-to-be-known: therefore since the angelic sin ought to be punished no less, [the conclusion] is evident, etc.

4. Likewise, this is seen *by a likeness.* As affect is related to good, so intellect to truth;
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but the affect of the demons is so depressed that it cannot be moved into the love of good, or is moved inordinately, if it loves[^4]: therefore neither [can] the intellect [be moved] into the speculation of truth. *If you say* that sin corrupts the affect of the demons more than the intellect; *the contrary is seen:* for every depraved choice is preceded by a depraved judgment, because the will does not choose deliberatively unless a judgment precede[^5]: therefore it seems that the first ground of disordering is in the judgment, and so in the cognitive [power]: therefore the punishment ought to be more in [it] than in the will, or equally. Likewise, this is confirmed, because blinding and obstinacy are punishments of sin: therefore just as affection presupposes cognition, so obstinacy, which is the punishment of the affection, [presupposes] blinding, which is the punishment of cognition: therefore since the devil is obstinate, he is also blinded.

5. Likewise, "*the good is diffusive of itself*[^6]" and the true likewise, and the good is more diffusive of itself than the true, because this it has of its own account: therefore God, insofar as He is good, withdraws the influence of affective goodness from the demons themselves; therefore, insofar as He is truth, [He withdraws] the diffusion of light from their cognitive [power].

6. Likewise, whatever [be the case] concerning the conservation of the light given, nevertheless to the demons, since they are in the state of damnation, new gifts ought not to be given by God; but "no one can learn anything except with Christ teaching," as Augustine says in the book *On the Teacher*[^7]: therefore if Christ ought not to give them new gifts, then neither new cognition: therefore in those things which they did not know before the fall, since they have no teacher of truth, they necessarily err and are deceived.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Luke 16[^8] it is said that *the children of this world are wiser than the children of light in their generation;* he speaks of the evil [ones]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^9]: "The gifts given to them themselves we say are by no means changed, but are entire and most splendid"; he speaks of the demons: therefore if they had a natural power of judgment, illuminated and able to be directed in things-to-be-known, it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, Isidore, *On the Highest Good*[^10]: "The transgressing angels, even with sanctity sent away, did not lose the sense of the angelic nature."

4. Likewise, sin is not against the *act,* but against the *order of the act*: therefore it is not against cognition simply, but against cognition ordered to the end: if therefore speculative cognition, as far as it is of itself, does not state cognition ordered to the end, it is evident that by sin it ought not to be depraved.

### Conclusion

> *In the demons the judgment of the speculative intellect, although it remains entire as to the substance of the power, is nevertheless in some way darkened by fault; but the judgment of the practical intellect is wholly subverted.*

**I respond:** It must be said that deception and error come from the disordering or deviation of judgment. Now judgment is twofold in every reasoning [being]: one, which is of *things-to-be-known,* which is of the true under the account of the true; another, of *things-to-be-done,* under the account of the good[^11]. And the first belongs to the *speculative* intellect and does not pertain to free choice; the second belongs to the *practical* intellect and is a part of free choice.

The first judgment, although it remains entire as to the *substance of the power,* is nevertheless in some way *darkened* in the angels by fault; because they frequently err in judging about many things and are deceived in many [things], especially when they judge about contingent [things]. The other judgment is in them wholly *subverted*; and as to this the evil angels are *blinded,* just as as to the affect [they are] *obstinate*[^12]; and on account of the subversion of this judgment they are said to have been made *darkness* and *given up to a reprobate sense.*

1. And so the response to the first [objection] is evident.

2. To that which is objected from Dionysius, that there is in the demons a *wanton phantasy*; it must be said that "phantasy" is taken in two ways: sometimes for the *sensitive* power, collating the sensibles received; sometimes phantasy is called *appearance,* according as it is named from *phanos*[^13], which is "appearance"; and in the first way it is in corporeal [things] alone, in the second way in spirits. Now this phantasy is said to be *wanton* in the demons, since, although the demons are intelligent and know many true [things], nevertheless they do not wish to teach others, but[^14] to seduce [them] from the truth; and therefore, since they cannot [do so] except through apparent likenesses, hence it is that
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the study of the demons is most of all bent upon such [things] — like a great cleric who would want to lead others into paralogism [and so] would study sophisms — and therefore they are called *phantastic* on account of the phantastic and apparent reasonings which they devise. And He calls this phantasy *wanton,* because, although by their own judgment they know the truth, nevertheless they knowingly impugn the known [truth]; and this is *to be wanton,* namely to set oneself against the understood truth; therefore they have a *wanton phantasy.* They also have *mad concupiscence,* because, since they ought not to desire anything but the honorable and the profitable, they desire things most harmful, such as to sin and to cast others into sin, although they do not intend this finally. There is also[^15] *irrational fury,* because, since they ought by reason to be angry at evil [things] alone, they are angry and rage against good [things].

3. To that which is objected, that upon man was inflicted ignorance as to the speculative intellect; it must be said that this is true in [his] posterity; but upon Adam was not *inflicted* ignorance of *things-to-be-known,* because he had cognition innate to him. Likewise also the demons, because they had cognition innate to them, and God scarcely withdraws their natural gifts, namely those freely given; therefore He did not so *inflict* ignorance in the *speculative* intellect; but yet there was an enacted punishment of ignorance[^16] and blindness in the *practical* intellect. But upon little children He is said to *inflict* ignorance, not by withdrawing knowledge, but by not adding [it]. *Furthermore,* the mass of corrupt flesh weighs down the judgment of the intellect[^17]; and therefore it is not the same.

4. To that which is objected, that the affect is deprived of the rectitude of the will; it must be said that sin regards the will more and is more directly opposed to the *goodness of affection* than to the *truth of cognition*; and therefore the demons are not so deprived of the light of cognition by fault as of the goodness of affection. Nevertheless, as was touched on before[^18], there is a certain judgment which is conjoined to the will, and it is subverted in the evil angels and blinded. And therefore the solution to the [other] two following [objections] is evident.

5. To that which is objected, that the good is diffusive of itself; it must be said that there is speaking of the diffusion of *good simply,* or of *gratuitous good.* If we speak of the diffusion of *good simply,* the account of good extends to as many [things] as that of the true, because each is convertible with being and [is] in all beings[^19]. But if [we speak] of the diffusion of *gratuitous good,* it is not true; because there are many who are fit to receive intelligence, who nevertheless are not fit to receive grace.

6. To that which is objected, that gifts ought not to be given to them; it must be said that "gift" can be taken in two ways: *properly* and *commonly.* Properly a gift is called that which is simply from elsewhere, of which kind are infused graces or infused gifts; and such is sanctifying grace or [grace] enabling for it. In another way a gift is called that which is through divine help, yet nevertheless through our own acquisition; and that is not called *properly* a gift, but [only] with respect to this, that it is not acquired without God's help; and in this way God gives gifts to good and evil [alike]. For since God gave the light of cognition from the beginning, which could [extend] to the acquisition of many knowables; and He Himself does not withdraw what He *gave,* nor even [its] *conservation,* since such [things] can stand with mortal sin: therefore he who has the first gift can multiply [it], even being a reprobate; and God is said *to teach,* not by *inspiring* or infusing, but by *cooperating* with the light given and *conserving* it. — An example of this is: God gave *grain* to a miser and gave *land* able to bear fruit; when he gathers much corn from the good land, God gives, but not as if He Himself made barren land bear fruit without the casting of seed; for this would *properly* be a gift, [whereas] in the first way only *broadly* [so]. So God gives gifts[^20] to good and evil [alike], and to demons and men [alike], although these very [gifts] are turned into evil for them.

But to those things which are objected on the opposite side, it must be said that they are understood of the speculative judgment; yet of that it is not to be understood that it is more vigorous[^21] than in the good [angels], or even as much [as] before the fall, because in truth, although they know many [things] clearly, especially those whose cognition is innate to them, by reason of which Dionysius says that they have the [gifts] given to them entire; nevertheless in many [things] those unspeakable spirits err and are deceived, because they are presumptuous and curious, and therefore frequently judge about things which are not subject to their judgment; and therefore they slip from the path of truth into error. And so all the objections are clear.
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la: Vers. 28: *Et sicut non probaverunt* etc.

en: Verse 28: "And as they did not approve" etc.

la: Cod. I *si movetur et amat.* Cod. aa legit *aut si movetur, inordinate movetur sive amat.*

en: Codex I [reads] *si movetur et amat.* Codex aa reads *aut si movetur, inordinate movetur sive amat.*

la: De ordine actuum rationis et voluntatis vide Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut E P Q V *ratio deordinationis* pro *ratio deordinandi.* Dein post ultimum *ergo* Vat. interiicit *in cognitiva.*

en: On the order of the acts of reason and will see Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, ch. 22. — A little below several manuscripts, such as E P Q V, [read] *ratio deordinationis* for *ratio deordinandi.* Then after the last *ergo* the Vatican edition inserts *in cognitiva.*

la: Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. et de Div. Nom. c. 1. § 1. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., ubi hoc et ratio addita exponitur.

en: Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* ch. 4, and *On the Divine Names* ch. 1, § 1. See also I Sent. d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, where this and the added reason are expounded.

la: In his verbis exprimitur libri praedicti summa, quae praecipue c. 14. n. 38. seqq. innotescit. Cfr. etiam V. Confess. c. 6. n. 10. et Enarr. in Ps. 118. Serm. 18. n. 4.

en: In these words is expressed the gist of the aforesaid book, which becomes known especially [at] ch. 14, n. 38 ff. Cf. also *Confessions* V, ch. 6, n. 10, and *Enarrationes in Ps. 118,* Sermon 18, n. 4.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8.

la: Cap. 4. § 23. Vide supra pag. 122, nota 8.

en: Ch. 4, § 23. See above, p. 122, note 8.

la: Sive Sententiarum libro I. c. 10. n. 17: *Praevaricatores angeli, etiam sanctitate amissa, non tamen amiserunt vivacem creaturae angelicae sensum.*

en: Or [in] the book of the Sentences I, ch. 10, n. 17: "The transgressing angels, even with sanctity lost, nevertheless did not lose the keen sense of the angelic creature."

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 46. seqq. (c. 9. seq.). — Vat. post *agendorum* addit *quod est boni.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 46 ff. (ch. 9 f.). — The Vatican edition after *agendorum* adds *quod est boni.*

la: Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 12. ait: *Nam pravitas distorquet facitque, ut circa activa principia fallamur.* — Paulo inferius plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 omittunt *facti.*

en: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, ch. 12, says: "For depravity distorts and brings it about that we are deceived about the principles of action." — A little below several manuscripts with the 2nd and 3rd editions omit *facti.*

la: Graece φανός. — Paulo superius post *receptorum* in cod. W additur *in sensibus particularibus,* in Vat. *a sensu particulari.*

en: In Greek φανός. — A little above, after *receptorum,* in codex W is added *in sensibus particularibus,* in the Vatican edition *a sensu particulari.*

la: Supple cum cod. V *volunt.*

en: Supply, with codex V, *volunt.*

la: Cod. aa adiungit *in eis.* In fine responsionis Vat. *bonos* pro *bona.*

en: Codex aa adds *in eis.* At the end of the response the Vatican edition [reads] *bonos* for *bona.*

la: Poenae *actae* opponuntur poena *inflicta* et poena *contracta,* de quibus cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 1. ad ult. — Vat. *poena contraria est,* quae etiam cum uno alteroque cod. *istam ignorantiam,* plures codd. *ibi ignorantiam* pro *ita ignorantiam.*

en: To enacted (*acta*) punishments are opposed inflicted (*inflicta*) punishment and contracted (*contracta*) punishment, concerning which cf. I Sent. d. 40, a. 4, q. 1, ad ult. — The Vatican edition [reads] *poena contraria est,* which also with one or another codex [reads] *istam ignorantiam,* [while] several manuscripts [read] *ibi ignorantiam* for *ita ignorantiam.*

la: Sap. 9, 15: *Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.*

en: Wisdom 9, 15: "For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul."

la: Ut ostendit Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 1. seqq. — Non negat S. Doctor, quod etiam *verum,* quatenus convertitur cum ente, sit *sui diffusivum*; hoc autem profunde explicat Hexaëm. Serm. 11. a medio.

en: As Dionysius shows, *On the Divine Names* ch. 5, § 1 ff. — The Holy Doctor does not deny that the *true* also, inasmuch as it is convertible with being, is *diffusive of itself*; but he explains this profoundly [in the] *Hexaëmeron,* Sermon 11, from the middle.

la: Multi codd. *bona*; non cohaerenter cum praemissis.

en: Many manuscripts [read] *bona*; not coherently with what precedes.

la: Supple cum aliquibus mss. et Vat. *in malis.*

en: Supply, with some manuscripts and the Vatican edition, *in malis.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Licet daemonibus interdum aliqua supernaturaliter communicari possint, Deo ita disponente, ipsi tamen nullam habent cognitionem, quae est proprie *ex gratia,* et nullo modo cognitionem *affectivam.* De naturali autem eorum cognitione docet S. Thom. (S. I. q. 64. a. 1.), eam in daemonibus « nec esse ablatam, nec diminutam ». Hoc autem intelligendum esse videtur de potentia intellectiva in se, non de eiusdem actuali usu, saltem non de usu quoad scientiam practicam et bonum morale. Sub hoc respectu eandem esse diminutam, plurimi doctores dicunt; immo S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal., Aegidio R. aliisque tenet, ipsum speculativum eorum intellectum quoad usum esse aliquo modo obnubilatum, scil. spirituali vitio et malitia, eundemque in multis errare (hic ad ultim.).

**II.** De seq. quaest., quae agit de oblivione, pauci antiqui loquuntur. Sententiam S. Bonaventurae Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 3.) sic exponit: « Triplex est actus seu officium memoriae: recipere et retinere et super speciem receptam converti reminiscendo. Quoad primum et secundum in daemone non cadit oblivio, sed quoad tertium cecidit; non enim convertitur ad considerandum Dei misericordiam et suam culpam et huiusmodi ». Consentiunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 100. m. 3. a. 1. 2. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1; Dionys. Carth. (loc. cit.). Henr. Gand. (Quodl. II. q. 13.) oblivionem improprie dictam in daemone esse putat, quatenus « per passiones obnubilatus, sine variatione facta in habitu, sed solum in actu mentis, potuit aliquando ad horam ignorare quod prius scivit ».

**III.** De quaest. hac: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 1. 2. 3. 4. — Scoti loci collecti ab Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 64. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 64. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de utraque q. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Although some things can sometimes be supernaturally communicated to the demons, God so disposing, they themselves nevertheless have no cognition which is properly *from grace,* and in no way an *affective* cognition. But concerning their natural cognition S. Thomas teaches (S. I, q. 64, a. 1) that in the demons it is "neither taken away nor diminished." But this seems to be understood of the intellective power in itself, not of its actual use, at least not of [its] use as to practical knowledge and moral good. Under this respect that [cognition] is diminished, very many doctors say; indeed S. Bonaventure with Alexander of Hales, Aegidius Romanus, and others holds that their speculative intellect itself, as to [its] use, is in some way darkened, namely by spiritual vice and malice, and that the same errs in many [things] (here, at the end).

**II.** Of the following question, which treats of forgetfulness, few of the ancients speak. The opinion of S. Bonaventure Petr. a Tar. (here q. 2, a. 3) expounds thus: "The act or office of memory is threefold: to receive, and to retain, and to turn back upon the species received by recollecting. As to the first and second, forgetfulness does not fall upon a demon, but as to the third it has fallen; for he does not turn to considering God's mercy and his own fault and the like." Alex. of Hales agrees, S. p. II, q. 100, m. 3, a. 1, 2, 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1; Dionysius the Carthusian (loc. cit.). Henry of Ghent (Quodl. II, q. 13) thinks that forgetfulness is improperly said [to be] in a demon, inasmuch as "darkened by passions, with no variation made in the habit, but only in the act of the mind, he could at some time for an hour be ignorant of what he previously knew."

**III.** On this question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. a. 1, 2, 3, 4. — The passages of Scotus collected by Hier. de Montefortino, t. II, q. 64, a. 1. — S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 64, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 2, a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on both questions here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars II** (*De consequentibus ad obstinationem*) — *Utrum in daemonibus cadat deceptio circa praesentia* (whether deception/error concerning present things falls upon the demons). Per the locked Vol II chunking convention, the short **ARTICULUS I opener** (*De cognitione daemonum*, raw 13755–13758) is folded into this q1 chunk — there is no standalone `d7-p2-a1-divisio`. Structure: 6 *videtur* (Rom. 1 *reprobum sensum* w/ the *Si tu dicas… contra* Augustine-*super Genesim* sub-exchange / Dionysius *furor irrationalis* / *per simile* ignorance / *per simile* affect↔intellect w/ the *Replicatur dupliciter* pravum-iudicium-precedes-electionem rejoinder / *bonum diffusivum sui* / *nihil addiscere nisi Christo docente*) + **Sed contra** in 4 membra (Luke 16 *filii saeculi prudentiores* / Dionysius *dona integra et splendidissima* / Isidore *sensum non amiserunt* / sin contra *ordinem actus* not *actum*) + *Conclusio* (blockquote) + a **duplex-iudicium Respondeo** (judgment of *cognoscenda* [speculative, not free choice] vs *agenda sub ratione boni* [practical, part of free choice] — the speculative entire-in-substance but darkened, the practical wholly subverted = blinding) + a 6-member **Solutio** (incl. the *phantasia dupliciter* / *a phanos* etymology, the *magnus clericus* paralogism simile, the *donum proprie/communiter* + *frumentum avaro* example) + the *Ad ea quae ad oppositum* reply + editorial **Scholion I–III**.
- **`has_scholion: true`.** The editorial SCHOLION I–III (S. Thomas S. I q. 64 a. 1 on natural cognition *nec ablata nec diminuta* + the Bonaventure/Alex. Hal./Aegid. R. *obnubilatum quoad usum* position; the forward-pointer to the *oblivio* question with the Petr. a Tar. threefold-memory exposition + Alex. Hal./Richard. a Med./Dionys. Carth./Henr. Gand. survey; the doctor list) carries **no numbered apparatus** — only inline parenthetical cross-refs (S. I q. 64 a. 1; hic q. 2 a. 1/a. 3; Quodl. II q. 13; etc.). Consistent with the Vol II editorial-scholion pattern (d7-a1-q1 / d7-a2-q1).
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in daemonibus cadat oblivio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in daemonibus cadat oblivio circa praeterita. Et quod sic, videtur.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Nullus de sapiente fit stultus, nisi aliquid obliviscatur; daemones autem de sapientibus facti sunt stulti, maxime lucifer, de quo Ezechielis vigesimo octavo[^1]: *Tu plenus sapientia* etc., et de quo Ecclesiastis quarto: *Melior est puer sapiens rege sene et stulto*; Glossa exponit de lucifero sive diabolo: ergo etc.

2. Item, *gratia* reparat et reformat totam imaginem, ergo et *peccatum* deformat; sed deformatio memoriae et corruptio est per oblivionem: ergo videtur, quod peccatum in vim memorativam inducat in Angelis oblivionem.

3. Item, intelligere et memorari ipsorum daemonum est cum variatione, ergo est in tempore; sed omne quod mensuratur a tempore, senescit et tendit ad corruptionem, quia « *tempus facit distare quod est* », ut dicit Philosophus[^2], unde est principium corruptionis per se: ergo cum corruptio circa vim memorativam sit tantum per oblivionem, patet etc.

4. Item, sicut se habet *intelligentia* ad errorem, ita *memoria* ad oblivionem; sed in intelligentia Angeli cadit deceptio et in voluntate obliquatio[^3]: ergo in memoria cadit oblivio.

5. Item, « *opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem*[^4] »; sed memoria Angeli potest proficere addiscendo: ergo pari ratione deficere obliviscendo, cum status ille sit magis aptus ad defectum quam ad profectum.

6. Item, « mente humana solus Deus superior est », sicut vult Augustinus[^5]; sed contingit in mentem nostram cadere oblivionem: ergo si par est angelicae, multo fortius in mentem daemonum. Quod autem in mentem nostram cadat oblivio quantum ad superiorem partem, patet, quia Augustinus dicit, quod cognitio eorum quae spectant ad divinitatem, est superioris partis; sed frequenter talium obliviscimur: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. Quod est *naturale* est indelebile; sed species existentes in angelica memoria sunt ei innatae et concreatae: ergo sunt indelebiles. Si ergo oblivio venit per deletionem specierum, patet etc.

2. Item, « omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum[^6] recipientis »: ergo species, quae est in angelica memoria, est ibi per modum recipientis; sed memoria angelica est incorruptibilis nec dependet a corruptibili, nec quantum ad *substantiam* nec quantum ad *operationem*, nec per se nec *per accidens*: ergo species, quae ibi recipitur, est simpliciter incorruptibilis.

3. Item, hoc videtur *a minori*. Vertibilior est voluntas quam aliqua interiorum potentiarum; sed culpa, quae adhaeret voluntati, adhaeret invertibiliter: ergo multo fortius species, quae est in memoria, est in ea indelebiliter: si ergo oblivio est propter deletionem speciei, patet etc.

4. Item, « omne quod corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur, quia habet contrarium, aut quia est ex contrariis, aut quia est in aliquo, quod habet contrarium, vel est ex contrariis » — haec scripta est a Philosopho in libro *de Morte et vita*[^7] — sed

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species existens in memoria daemonis nullo praedictorum modorum est corruptibilis: ergo etc.

5. Item, Philosophus dicit, quod virtus sensitiva non senescit, quantum est de se, sed solum ratione organi. Unde in primo *de Anima*[^8] dicit: « Si senex acciperet oculum pueri, videret utique, sicut videt puer »: ergo cum virtus memorativa ipsius daemonis non pendeat ex organo, non senescit nec lassatur in operando: ergo nec in recipiendo species, et ita, ut videtur, nihil obliviscitur.

### Conclusio

> *Quatenus memoria dicit habitum, nulla in daemonibus est oblivio; quatenus autem dicit actum memorandi, et quidem respectu beneficiorum Dei et salutis, potest esse oblivio.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod actum memoriae contingit accipere[^9] per modum *habitus*; et iste est *retinere speciem*, et esse dicitur per modum habitus, quia continue tenet et dicit magis statum sive conservationem quam actionem. Est alius actus memoriae[^10], qui est *meminisse* sive *recordari*. Primus quidem actus naturalis est et non subest voluntati, nec penes illum attenditur meritum vel demeritum. Secundus vero actus potest ordinari ad bonum et eius oppositum, scilicet ad malum. — Secundum hunc duplicem modum distinguendum est in oblivione.

Nam si dicatur oblivio per oppositionem ad *retentionem speciei*, sic[^11] est deletio speciei de memoria; si autem dicatur per oppositionem ad *recordationem*, sic dicit dehabilitationem quantum ad istum actum, qui est *meminisse*. Et hoc potest esse bonum, scilicet cum obliviscimur malorum illatorum nobis, et malum, cum obliviscimur beneficiorum nobis a Deo collatorum, vel obliviscimur eorum quae nobis essent expedientia ad salutem; contra quod dicitur Deuteronomii quarto[^12]: *Cave, ne unquam obliviscaris Domini Dei tui* etc.

Si igitur loquamur de oblivione primo modo, sic dico, quod non cadit in daemonibus; nulla enim est in eis deletio speciei. Si secundo modo, sic dico, quod cadit, immo cecidit magna oblivio, quia obliti sunt suae salutis, obliti beneficiorum Dei, quia, cum convertuntur ad mala, inhabiles fiunt ad recolenda bona; hoc modo bene concedo, quod obliti sunt.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Et sic procedunt duae primae rationes: prima, quae sumpta est a stultitia, secunda, quae sumpta est ab imagine deformata; nam procedunt hac via.

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *intelligere* cadit in tempore: dicendum, quod cadit in tempore, extenso nomine temporis, non prout est motus primi mobilis mensura, quia nec daemonum *esse* nec *intelligere* pendet ex illo. — Tamen aliter potest dici, quod quamvis actus ut « actus » cadat sub tempore vel in tempore, non tamen actus ut habitus, quia habet modum substantiae[^13], in ipsa nec habet variationem; et ideo, sicut substantia daemonum non corrumpitur nec senescit in tempore, nec habitus, ita etiam nec actus ut habitus; et talis est *retentio speciei*. — Et per hoc patet aliud, quod non est simile de *intelligere* et *oblivisci*; quia *intelligere* non tam est actus naturalis, quam etiam conformis voluntati, et similiter *errare*; sed speciem tenere vel amittere est ex potentia vel impotentia naturali. Praeterea, ratio illa non valet, cum memoria habeat naturam *specularem* sive speculi, intelligentia naturam *luminosam* sive luminis; et Angelus[^14] plus habet de natura speculi et de potentia recipiendi quam de natura luminis; illa enim in solo Deo est potissime, vel in his qui sunt *deiformes* per gloriam: ideo non valet nec est simile. Magis enim potest in tenendo speciem quam in recte iudicando; aliqua enim sunt supra iudicium Angeli, non sic est de retentione speciei.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem*; verum est, nisi alterum naturaliter insit; et natura Angeli *possibilis est*[^15] ad receptionem per naturam, ad deletionem vero minime.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solus Deus est maior mente humana; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad rationem *perficiendi*; tamen, quia mens humana ex coniunctione cum corpore terrestri aliquas contrahit proprietates et defectus *deprimentes*, quantum ad hoc est inferior mente angelica; et ideo, sicut mens humana impeditur ab actuali consideratione propter depressionem corporis, ita etiam compellitur oblivisci. Intellectus autem angelicus semper est in actu intelligendi; et ideo non est mirum, si memoria semper est in actu conservandi. **Et sic patent obiecta**[^16].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether forgetfulness falls upon the demons.*

In the second place it is asked whether forgetfulness falls upon the demons concerning things past. And that it does, seems thus:

**For the opposite side:**

1. No one becomes a fool from being wise unless he forgets something; but the demons have been made fools out of having been wise, most of all Lucifer, of whom Ezekiel chapter twenty-eight[^1] says: *Thou wast full of wisdom* etc., and of whom Ecclesiastes chapter four says: *Better is a wise child than an old and foolish king* — the Gloss expounds this of Lucifer or the devil: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, *grace* repairs and reforms the whole image, therefore *sin* deforms it; but deformation and corruption of the memory is by way of forgetfulness: therefore it seems that sin induces forgetfulness in the memorative power in the Angels.

3. Likewise, the understanding and remembering of the demons themselves takes place with variation, and therefore in time; but everything that is measured by time grows old and tends to corruption, since « *time makes that which is depart from what it was* », as the Philosopher says[^2], whence it is per se a principle of corruption: therefore since the only corruption regarding the memorative power is by forgetfulness, the point is plain.

4. Likewise, as the *intellect* stands to error, so the *memory* stands to forgetfulness; but in the Angel's intellect there falls deception, and in the will obliquity[^3]: therefore in memory there falls forgetfulness.

5. Likewise, « *opposites are by nature apt to occur about the same thing*[^4] »; but the Angel's memory can advance by learning more: therefore by parity of reason it can decline by forgetting, since that state is more apt to defect than to progress.

6. Likewise, « only God is higher than the human mind », as Augustine holds[^5]; but it happens that forgetfulness falls upon our mind: therefore if the angelic mind is on a par with ours, much more so will it fall upon the mind of the demons. And that forgetfulness falls upon our mind as regards its superior part is plain, because Augustine says that the cognition of those things that pertain to the divinity belongs to the superior part; but we frequently forget such things: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. What is *natural* is indelible; but the species existing in the angelic memory are innate and concreate to it: therefore they are indelible. If therefore forgetfulness comes about by deletion of species, the point is plain etc.

2. Likewise, « everything that is received in something is there after the manner of[^6] the receiver »: therefore the species which is in the angelic memory is there after the manner of the receiver; but the angelic memory is incorruptible and does not depend on anything corruptible, neither as to *substance* nor as to *operation*, neither per se nor *per accidens*: therefore the species which is received there is simply incorruptible.

3. Likewise, this is shown *from the lesser case*. The will is more changeable than any of the interior powers; but the fault that adheres to the will adheres unchangeably: therefore much more so the species which is in the memory is there indelibly: if then forgetfulness is on account of the deletion of species, the point is plain etc.

4. Likewise, « everything that is corrupted is corrupted either because it has a contrary, or because it is from contraries, or because it is in something which has a contrary, or is from contraries » — this is written by the Philosopher in the book *On Life and Death*[^7] — but

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the species existing in the demon's memory is not corruptible in any of the aforesaid modes: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the sensitive power does not grow old of itself, but only by reason of the organ. Whence in book one *On the Soul*[^8] he says: « If an old man were to receive the eye of a boy, he would certainly see as the boy sees »: therefore since the memorative power of the demon does not depend on an organ, it does not grow old or weary in operating: therefore neither in receiving species, and so, as it seems, it forgets nothing.

### Conclusion

> *In so far as memory denotes a habit, there is no forgetfulness in the demons; but in so far as it denotes the act of remembering, and indeed with respect to God's benefits and to salvation, there can be forgetfulness.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the act of memory may be taken[^9] after the manner of a *habit*; and this is *to retain a species*, and is said to be after the manner of a habit because it continuously holds and denotes a state or conservation rather than an action. There is another act of memory[^10], which is *to remember* or *to recall*. The first is indeed a natural act and is not subject to the will, nor is merit or demerit reckoned in regard to it. The second act, however, can be ordered to the good and to its opposite, namely to evil. — According to this twofold mode a distinction must be made in forgetfulness.

For if forgetfulness be spoken of by opposition to the *retention of a species*, in that sense[^11] it is the deletion of the species from the memory; if however it be spoken of by opposition to *recollection*, in that sense it denotes a disabling as regards that act which is *to remember*. And this can be good, namely when we forget evils inflicted upon us, and evil, when we forget the benefits conferred upon us by God, or forget the things which would be expedient to us for salvation; against which it is said in Deuteronomy chapter four[^12]: *Beware lest thou ever forget the Lord thy God* etc.

If therefore we speak of forgetfulness in the first mode, in that sense I say that it does not fall upon the demons; for there is no deletion of species in them. If in the second mode, in that sense I say that it does fall — nay, that there fell upon them a great forgetfulness, because they have forgotten their own salvation, forgotten God's benefits; since, when they turned to evils, they became unfit for recalling good things; in this mode I freely concede that they have forgotten.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* And so the first two reasons proceed: the first, which was taken from foolishness; the second, which was taken from the deformed image; for they proceed in this way.

*To 3, 4.* To the objection that *understanding* falls in time, it must be said that it does fall in time, with the name of time taken broadly, not as it is the measure of the motion of the first mobile, because neither the *being* nor the *understanding* of the demons depends on that. — Yet it can be put another way: that although the act qua « act » falls under time or in time, nevertheless not the act qua habit, because it has the mode of substance[^13], in which there is no variation; and therefore, just as the substance of the demons is not corrupted nor grows old in time, nor is the habit, so neither is the act qua habit; and such is the *retention of species*. — And by this is plain the other point: that the case is not similar with *understanding* and *forgetting*; because *understanding* is not so much a natural act as also one conformed to the will, and likewise *erring*; but to hold or to lose a species is from natural power or impotence. Moreover, that reason does not hold, since memory has a *mirror-like* nature or that of a mirror, the intellect a *luminous* nature or that of light; and the Angel[^14] has more of the nature of a mirror and of receptive power than of the nature of light; for that nature is most fully in God alone, or in those who are *deiform* by glory: therefore the parity does not hold, nor is the case similar. For the Angel can do more in holding a species than in judging rightly; some things indeed are above the judgment of the Angel, but it is not so with the retention of species.

*To 5.* To the objection that *opposites are by nature apt to occur about the same thing*, it is true unless one of them is naturally present; and the nature of the Angel *is in potency*[^15] to reception by nature, but by no means to deletion.

*To 6.* To the objection that only God is greater than the human mind, it must be said that this is true as regards the manner of *perfecting*; nevertheless, because the human mind, by reason of its conjunction with an earthly body, contracts certain properties and *depressing* defects, in this respect it is inferior to the angelic mind; and therefore, just as the human mind is impeded from actual consideration on account of the depression of the body, so it is also compelled to forget. The angelic intellect, however, is always in the act of understanding; and therefore it is no wonder if the memory is always in the act of conserving. **And so the objections are plain**[^16].

---

la: Vers. 12. — Sequens textus est Eccle. 4, 13, in quo Vulgata post *puer* addit *pauper et*. — Glossa, quae apud Lyranum in hunc locum habetur, est Hieronymi, Comment. in Eccle., ubi dicit, praedictam explicationem factam fuisse ab Origene et Victorino, qui « super Christo et diabolo hunc locum interpretati sunt, quod *puerum pauperem et sapientem* Christum velint... Iste natus est in regno *senis*; et idcirco dicit: *Si esset de hoc mundo regnum meum* etc. »

en: Verse 12. — The following text is Eccle. 4:13, in which the Vulgate after *child* adds *poor and*. — The Gloss, which is found at this place in Lyranus, is from Jerome's *Commentary on Ecclesiastes*, where he says that the foregoing exposition was given by Origen and Victorinus, who « interpreted this passage of Christ and the devil, taking the *poor and wise child* to mean Christ... He is born in the kingdom of the *old man*; and therefore he says: *If my kingdom were of this world* etc. »

la: Libr. IV. Phys. text. 117. (c. 12.), ubi etiam principia huius argumenti indicantur. Cfr. supra pag. 66, nota 2. — In cod. U post *distare quod est* additur *scilicet a principio*, et ideo corrumpit per elongationem ab ipso.

en: Book IV of the *Physics*, text 117 (c. 12), where the principles of this argument are also indicated. Cf. above p. 66, note 2. — In codex U, after *that which is depart from what it is*, there is added *namely from its principle*, and so it corrupts by elongation from it.

la: Ut in quaest. praeced. ostensum est.

en: As was shown in the preceding question.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis* et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.).

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter *On Opposites*, and *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 45, nota 5. — De sententia Augustini, quae paulo inferius affertur, vide XII. *de Trin.* c. 7. n. 12.

en: Cf. above p. 45, note 5. — On the opinion of Augustine which is brought in a little below, see *On the Trinity* XII, c. 7, n. 12.

la: Libr. *de Causis*, prop. 10. 20. seqq. Cfr. etiam Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 4.

en: The *Book of Causes*, propositions 10, 20 and following. Cf. also Boethius, *Consolation* V, prose 4.

la: Duo opuscula composuit Aristoteles, quae *de vita* agunt; unum inscribitur: *de Longitudine et brevitate vitae*; alterum *de Iuventute et senectute, vita et morte*. In posteriore, c. 3. (c. 5.), duo modi corruptionis recensentur, scil. *a se ipso* et *a contrario*; in priore autem, c. 2, triplex corruptionis modus insinuatur. — Post *haec* supple cum cod. aa *divisio* vel etiam *propositio*. Vat. *scripta sunt*.

en: Aristotle composed two short works which treat *of life*: one is entitled *On the Length and Shortness of Life*; the other *On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death*. In the latter, c. 3 (c. 5), two modes of corruption are reviewed, namely *of itself* and *from a contrary*; in the former, however, c. 2, a threefold mode of corruption is suggested. — After *this* supply with codex aa *division*, or even *proposition*. The Vatican edition reads *are written*.

la: Text. 65. (c. 4.), in quo textu antiqui codd., graeco verbo πρεσβύτης servato, *Si presbyter* pro *Si senex*.

en: Text 65 (c. 4), in which text the ancient codices, preserving the Greek word πρεσβύτης, read *If a presbyter* for *If an old man*.

la: Codd. U aa bene adiciunt *dupliciter, scilicet*. Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 substituunt *actus memoriae* pro *actum memoriae*; incongrue, et deinde post *accipere* multi addunt *et*.

en: Codices U and aa well add *in two ways, namely*. Most codices with editions 1 and 2 substitute *acts of memory* for *act of memory*; incongruously, and then after *to take* many add *and*.

la: Cod. I addit *per modum usus, scilicet super speciem se convertere*; Vat. *per modum usus sive actus*. Cod. aa, omissis verbis *Est alius actus memoriae*, ponit *et per modum actus memoriae*.

en: Codex I adds *after the manner of use, namely to turn upon the species*; the Vatican edition reads *after the manner of use or of act*. Codex aa, omitting the words *There is another act of memory*, has *and after the manner of an act of memory*.

la: Supple cum cod. I *oblivio*. In nonnullis mss. ut F cc (T a secunda manu) et ed. 1 perperam hic additur *non*. Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 substituunt *tentionem speciei* pro *retentionem speciei*. — Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 20. ait: *Oblivio est memoriae ablatio (iactura)*.

en: Supply with codex I *forgetfulness*. In several manuscripts such as F and cc (T by a second hand) and edition 1, *not* is here wrongly added. Most codices with editions 1, 2, and 3 substitute *holding of species* for *retention of species*. — Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 20, says: *Forgetfulness is the loss (deprivation) of memory*.

la: Vers. 23: *Cave, ne quando obliviscaris pacti Domini Dei tui*.

en: Verse 23: *Beware lest at any time thou forget the covenant of the Lord thy God*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius post *modum substantiae* Vat. prosequitur: *intra, sive in qua est, nec habet* etc.

en: Cf. above, dist. 2, pars I, art. 1, quest. 1 and following. — A little below, after *mode of substance*, the Vatican edition continues: *within, or in which it is, nor has it* etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 83, note 1.

la: Multi codd. non bene *possibilis sit* pro *possibilis est*; paulo superius cod. aa bene legit *sed natura* pro *et natura*. — Cfr. supra pag. 182, nota 9.

en: Many codices read, not well, *be in potency* for *is in potency*; a little above, codex aa rightly reads *but the nature* for *and the nature*. — Cf. above p. 182, note 9.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO II** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars II** (*De consequentibus ad obstinationem*) — *Utrum in daemonibus cadat oblivio* (whether forgetfulness falls upon the demons). Structure: 6 *videtur* (foolishness from Ezech.28+Eccle.4 / sin deforming the image / variation→time→corruption / parity intellect↔memory / *opposita circa idem* learning↔forgetting / Augustine *mente humana solus Deus superior*) + 5 **Sed Contra/Fundamenta** (natural→indelible / *per modum recipientis* + incorruptible angelic memory / *a minori* via the will / Aristotle *de Morte et vita* threefold-corruption modes / *de Anima* sensitive-power-does-not-of-itself-grow-old) + *Conclusio* (blockquote: memory as habit no oblivio / memory as act-of-remembering can have oblivio re benefits & salvation) + **Respondeo** (twofold act of memory — habit *retinere speciem* vs act *meminisse/recordari*; mapped onto twofold *oblivio* — deletion-of-species vs disabling-recollection; Deuteronomy *Cave, ne unquam obliviscaris*) + a 4-block **Solutio** (*Ad 1.2 / Ad 3.4 / Ad 5 / Ad 6* — the time-vs-substance-mode distinction; the memory-as-mirror vs intellect-as-light disanalogy; the *natura possibilis* to reception not deletion; the human-mind-with-body vs angelic-intellect-always-in-act). Closes *Et sic patent obiecta⁹* with the sibling-scholion cross-ref.

- **`has_scholion: false`.** No own scholion: the editorial SCHOLION II of the sibling `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a1-q1` explicitly opens *De seq. quaest., quae agit de oblivione*, surveying Petr. a Tar.'s threefold-memory exposition (recipere / retinere / converti reminiscendo — first two not subject to *oblivio* in the demon, third yes) and the Alex. Hal. / Richard. a Med. / Dionys. Carth. / Henr. Gand. positions, and the cross-ref is the explicit terminal note ⁹ of this quaestio's footer rendered here as [^16] (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`). Sibling-scholion confirmed on the p.193 R-col-2 crop, not assumed (the d5-a2-q2 / d7-p1-a1-q3 / d7-p1-a2-q3 pattern).

- **Cross-chunk footer — INCOMING p2-a1-q1→p2-a1-q2 at p.192 (RECEIVED clean, no backfill).** Per the committed `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a1-q1` Notes (verified 2026-05-19), its last numbered apparatus is **p.191 [^21]** (`Supple cum aliquibus mss. et Vat. in malis.`); its editorial SCHOLION I–III tail spans the top of p.192 carrying **no** numbered apparatus; QUAESTIO II opens lower on p.192 (raw 13933). All of p.192's footer (¹–⁷ on the column-band crops) anchors this chunk's *videtur* + Sed Contra 2, 4 (¹ at *octavo¹* in videtur 1; ² at *Philosophus²* in videtur 3; ³ at *obliquatio³* in videtur 4; ⁴ at *circa idem⁴* in videtur 5; ⁵ at *Augustinus⁵* in videtur 6; ⁶ at *modum⁶ recipientis* in Sed Contra 2; ⁷ at *de Morte et vita⁷* in Sed Contra 4), and is wholly taken here → [^1]–[^7]. No backfill; `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a1-q1` not modified.

- **Cross-chunk footer — OUTGOING a1-q2→a1-q3 at p.193/p.194 (CLEAN cross-page, no split).** This chunk's body ends mid-R-col on p.193 at *Et sic patent obiecta⁹*; its last numbered apparatus is **p.193 [^16]** (the sibling-scholion cross-ref *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*). p.193 R-col below the footer line carries no further body for this chunk; QUAESTIO III (*Utrum in daemonibus sit praecognitio quoad futura* — next chunk `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a1-q3`) opens fresh at the top of p.194 (raw 14056). p.194's footer is wholly the next chunk's; no backfill into this one. Frontmatter `printed_pages: [192, 193]` (the resume's earlier "spans pp.192–194" was imprecise — corrected on the p.193 R-col-2 crop, which shows *patent obiecta⁹* + footer note ⁹ as the chunk-closing pair).

- **Apparatus crosswalk:** p.192 ¹–⁷ → [^1]–[^7] (Ezech.28-Vers.12+Eccle.4,13-Glossa-Hieronymi / IV-Phys.-text.117 / Ut-in-quaest.-praeced.-ostensum-est / Praedicam.-de-Oppositis+II-Topic / supra-p.45-nota-5+XII-de-Trin.-c.7-n.12 / de-Causis-prop.10.20+Boeth.-V-Consol.-prosa-4 / de-Longitudine-et-brevitate+de-Iuventute-et-senectute); p.193 ¹–⁹ → [^8]–[^16] (de-Anima-text.65+πρεσβύτης / Codd.U-aa-dupliciter+actus-vs-actum / Cod.I-per-modum-usus / Supple-oblivio+tentionem-vs-retentionem+Damasc.-II-de-Fide-orthod.-c.20 / Deut.4-Vers.23-Cave-ne-quando / supra-d.2-p.I-a.1-q.1+Vat.-intra-sive-in-qua / supra-p.83-nota-1 / Multi-codd.-possibilis-sit+cod.aa-sed-natura+supra-p.182-nota-9 / Vide-scholion-ad-praecedentem-quaest.). 16 markers, 16 defs, La==En==defs exact.

- **No `[?]` flags.** All 16 superscripts + both page-footers verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{192,193}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`); Greek πρεσβύτης transcribed from the p.193-L-2 crop; raw-OCR garbles (`OUAESTIO U.`/`niliil oliliviscitur`/`Sed coNTnA`/`actum memoriae) °`/`Toxl. 6.5.`/`h.mn^c.`/`piaesl.`) silently corrected against the crops per CLAUDE.md.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0