title: Dist. 46

title_alt:
Distinctio XLVI. — Littera Magistri
Distinction XLVI — The Master's Text

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### DISTINCTIO XLVI.

### Cap. I.

#### *Quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, in nullo cassari potest.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Hic oritur quaestio. Dictum est enim in superioribus[^1] et auctoritatibus communitum, quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est vocaturque beneplacitum eius, cassari non potest, quia illa voluntate quaecumque voluit, fecit in caelo et in terra: cui, teste Apostolo, nihil resistit. « Quaeritur ergo, quomodo accipiendum sit quod Apostolus de Domino ait[^2]: *Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri*. Cum enim non omnes salvi fiant, sed plures damnentur, videtur utique non fieri quod Deus vult fieri, humana scilicet voluntate impediente voluntatem Dei. Dominus quoque in Evangelio impiam civitatem compellans: Quoties, inquit, *volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alas, et noluisti!* Ita[^3] haec dicuntur, tanquam Dei voluntas superata sit hominum voluntate, et infirmissimis nolendo impedientibus, non potuerit facere potentissimus quod volebat. Ubi est ergo illa omnipotentia, qua in caelo et in terra, secundum Prophetam, *omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit?* Et quomodo voluntati eius, secundum Apostolum, nihil resistit, si colligere filios Ierusalem voluit, et non fecit? » Haec enim praedictis plurimum obviare videntur.

### Cap. II.

#### *Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti, et illud: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri.*

Sed audiamus solutionem; ac primum, quomodo accipiendum sit illud quod Dominus ait, videamus. « Non enim ex eo sensu illud dictum est, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio[^4], praedictam solvens quaestionem, quasi Dominus voluerit colligere[^5] filios Ierusalem, et non sit factum quod voluit, quia ipsa noluerit; sed potius illa quidem filios suos ab ipso colligi noluit, qua tamen nolente, filios eius collegit ipse omnes quos voluit; quia in caelo et in terra non quaedam voluit et fecit, quaedam vero voluit et non fecit, sed *omnia* <!-- page 815 --> *quaecumque voluit, fecit*», ut sit sensus: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti! id est, congregavi voluntate mea semper efficaci, te nolente feci. — Ecce in evidenti positum est, quod[^6] illa Domini verba superioribus non repugnant.

Nunc videre restat, quomodo etiam praemissa verba Apostoli praedictis non contradicant, qui de Deo loquens ait: *Vult omnes homines salvos fieri*. Quorum occasione verborum multi a veritate deviaverunt dicentes, Deum multa velle fieri, quae non fiunt. Sed non est intelligendum, ea ratione illud esse dictum, quasi Deus voluerit aliquos salvari, et non salventur.

« Quis enim tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit et quando voluerit et ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere? Non est utique verum quod in Psalmo dicitur: *Quaecumque voluit, fecit*, si aliqua voluit et non fecit; et quod est indignius, ideo non fecit, quoniam, ne fieret quod volebat Omnipotens, voluntas hominis impedivit ». Ideoque « cum audimus et in sacris Litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines salvos fieri, quamvis certum sit nobis non omnes homines salvos fieri[^7], non tamen ideo debemus omnipotentissimae Dei voluntati aliquid derogare, sed ita intelligere quod scriptum est: *Vult omnes homines salvos fieri*, tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri salvum, nisi quem fieri[^8] ipse voluerit; non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem salvum fieri velit, sed quod nullus fiat salvus, nisi quem velit salvari; et ideo rogandus est, ut velit, quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit ». « Non est enim credendus Omnipotens aliquid voluisse fieri, quod factum non sit ». « Sic etiam intelligitur illud[^9]: *illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*, non quia nullus hominum est, qui non illuminetur, sed quia nisi ab ipso nullus illuminatur. Potest et alio modo illud intelligi, dum tamen credere non cogamur, Omnipotentem aliquid voluisse fieri, factumque non esse, qui sine ullis ambiguitatibus, si[^10] in caelo et in terra, sicut Veritas cantat, *omnia quaecumque voluit fecit*, profecto facere non voluit quaecumque non fecit ». — Ex his aperte ostenditur, quod Deus ea voluntate, quae ipse est, non vult aliquid fieri, quod non fiat, neque non fieri, quod fiat.

### Cap. III.

#### *Utrum mala Deo volente vel nolente fiant.*

Ideoque cum constet, omnia bona, quae fiunt, eius fieri voluntate, quae si fieri nollet, nullatenus fierent; recte quaeri solet: utrum et mala omnia, quae fiunt, id est peccata, Dei fiant voluntate, an nolente eo fiant. — Super hoc diversi, varie[^11] sentientes, sibi contradicere inveniuntur. Alii enim dicunt, quod Deus vult mala esse vel fieri, non tamen vult mala. Alii vero, quod nec vult mala esse nec fieri. In hoc tamen conveniunt et hi et illi, quod utrique fatentur, Deum mala non velle. Utrique vero rationibus atque auctoritatibus nituntur ad muniendam suam assertionem[^12].

Qui enim dicunt, Deum mala velle esse vel fieri, suam his modis muniunt intentionem. Si enim, inquiunt, mala non esse vel non fieri vellet, nullo modo essent vel fierent, quia, si vult ea non esse vel non fieri, et non potest id efficere, scilicet ut non sint vel non fiant, voluntati eius et potentiae aliquid resistit, et non est omnipotens, quia non potest omne quod vult, sed impotens est; sicut et nos sumus, qui quod volumus quandoque non valemus. Sed quia omnipotens est et in nullo impotens, certum est, non posse fieri mala vel esse, nisi eo volente. Quomodo enim, invito eo et nolente, posset ab aliquo malum fieri, cum scriptum sit: *Voluntati eius quis resistit?* Supra etiam dixit Augustinus[^13]: « Quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit ». Sed vult mala fieri, aut non fieri. Si vult non fieri, non fiunt; fiunt autem: vult ergo fieri. — Item, bonum est mala esse vel fieri, alioquin summe bonus non permitteret ea fieri. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio: « Quamvis ea, inquit, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sunt bona, tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotenti Bono, cui proculdubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc[^14] nisi credamus, periclitatur nostra confessio, qua nos in Patrem omnipotentem credere confitemur ». — Ecce hic aperte habes, quod bonum est mala esse, omnis autem boni Deus auctor est, qui vult, omne bonum esse quod est. Cum ergo bonum sit mala fieri vel esse, ergo[^15] et mala vult fieri vel esse. — His atque aliis huiusmodi rationibus et auctoritatibus utuntur qui dicunt Deum velle mala esse vel fieri.

Illi vero, qui dicunt, Dei voluntate mala non fieri vel non esse, inductionibus praemissis ita respondent dicentes, Deum nec velle mala fieri, nec velle non fieri, vel nolle fieri, sed tantum non velle fieri. Si enim vellet ea fieri vel esse, faceret utique ea fieri vel esse, et ita esset auctor malorum; non est autem auctor malorum, ut Sanctorum protestantur auctoritates: non ergo eius voluntate fiunt mala. Item, si nollet mala fieri vel vellet non fieri, et tamen fierent, omnipotens <!-- page 816 --> non esset, cum eius voluntas humanae voluntatis effectu impediretur. Ideoque non concedunt, Deum velle mala fieri, ne malorum auctor intelligatur; nec concedunt, eum velle mala non fieri vel nolle fieri, ne impotens esse videatur; sed tantum dicunt, eum non velle mala fieri, ut non auctor, sed permissor malorum monstretur. Unde et Evangelista, ubi ostendit, Deum auctorem esse omnium bonorum, dicens[^16]: *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt*, consequenter malorum auctorem esse negat dicens: *Et sine ipso factum est nihil*, id est peccatum. Non dixit, per eum factum esse, vel eo nolente et invito, sed tantum *sine eo*, id est sine eius voluntate, quia non eius voluntate fit peccatum. Non ergo Deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala, quia non subest Dei voluntati, ut malum fiat vel non fiat, sed ut fieri sinat[^17], quia bonum est sinere mala fieri; et utique volens sinit, non volens mala, sed volens sinere, ut ipsa fiant; quia nec mala sunt bona, nec ea fieri vel esse bonum est.

### Cap. IV.

#### *Quomodo intelligendum sit illud Augustini: mala fieri bonum est.*

Quod vero Augustinus ait: *Mala fieri bonum est, nec sinerentur mala ab omnipotenti Bono fieri, nisi hoc esset bonum, ut ea essent*; ea ratione dictum esse asserunt, quia ex malis, quae fiunt, Deus bona elicit, nec ipse permitteret ea fieri, nisi de eis boni[^18] aliquid faceret. Unde Augustinus in eodem libro Enchiridion[^19], aperte indicans, praedictorum verborum talem esse intelligentiam, ait: « Deus omnipotens, cui rerum est summa potestas, cum summe bonus sit, nullo modo sineret, aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo ». Item in eodem: « Melius iudicavit Deus de malis bona facere quam mala nulla permittere ». Ex hoc itaque sensu dictum est ac verum est, bonum esse mala fieri, quia ex malis, quae fiunt, bonis, qui *secundum propositum vocati sunt Sancti*[^20], accidit bonitas, id est utilitas. Talibus enim, ut ait Apostolus, *in bonum cooperantur omnia*, etiam mala, quia eis prosunt, quae aliis facientibus obsunt. Unde etiam aliquando in Scriptura legitur, malum appellari bonum, ut Hieronymus super Marcum[^21]: « Malum, inquit, Iudae bonum fuit, scilicet nobis. Nec si bonum est illi vel illi, inde sequitur, quod simpliciter bonum sit. Proprie enim ac simpliciter bonum est, quod in se et facienti bonum est ».

### Cap. V.

#### *De multiplici acceptione boni.*

Est enim aliquid, quod in se bonum est et cui fit, sed non est bonum facienti, ut cum subvenitur pauperi, sed non propter Deum. Et est aliquid bonum in se et facienti, sed non ei cui fit, ut cum veritas propter Deum alicui non obedienti praedicatur. Et est aliquid in se et facienti et ei cui fit bonum, ut cum veritas praedicatur propter Deum credenti. Unde Apostolus[^22]: *Bonus odor sumus Deo, aliis odor vitae, aliis odor mortis*. Est autem aliud, quod nec in se bonum est et facienti nocet et damnat, nisi poeniteat, ut malum, valet tamen ad aliquid. Ut enim ait Augustinus in Enchiridio[^23]: « A summe et aequaliter et immutabiliter bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia, nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona; sed tamen bona etiam singula. Simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis ».

### Cap. VI.

#### *Quod mala universitati valent.*

Hinc patet, quod ex malis, quae fiunt, aliquod provenit bonum, dum bona magis placent et laudabiliora existunt. Ipsis etiam facientibus ex malis, quae faciunt, interdum bona proveniunt[^24], si secundum propositum vocati sunt Sancti. « Talibus enim, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Correctione et gratia, usque adeo Deus omnia cooperatur in bonum, ut, si qui horum deviant et exorbitant, etiam hoc ipsum eis faciat proficere in bonum, quia humiliores redeunt atque doctiores », ut Petrus. « Illa etiam mala, quae ab iniquis fideles pie perferunt, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Trinitate[^25], ipsis utique prosunt vel ad delenda peccata, vel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam, vel ad demonstrandam huius vitae miseriam ». Ideoque et <!-- page 817 --> Iob Dei manum, et Apostolus satanae stimulum sensit; et uterque bene profecit, quia malum bene portavit.

Si quis igitur diligenter attendat quae scripta sunt, facile est ei percipere, ex malis bona provenire, et ea ratione dictum esse, quod bonum est mala fieri vel esse, non quia malum sit bonum, vel quia bonum sit malum fieri. Non est enim bonum malum fieri ab aliquo, quia non est bonum, ut aliquis faciat malum[^26]. Si enim hoc esset bonum, profecto huius Deus auctor esset, qui est auctor omnis boni. Quodsi huius Deus auctor est, eo ergo auctore homo agit malum, et ita eo auctore homo fit deterior. Et si eo auctore homo fit deterior, tunc eo volente homo fit deterior. Idem est enim dicere aliquid fieri Deo auctore quod Deo volente; Deo autem auctore homo non fit deterior: ergo nec Deo volente, ut Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^27] aperte astruit a minori dicens ita: « Nullo sapiente homine auctore fit homo deterior; tanta enim est ista culpa, quae in sapientem hominem cadere nequeat. Est autem Deus omni homine sapiente praestantior: multo minus igitur Deo auctore fit homo deterior. Multo enim est praestantior Dei voluntas quam hominis sapientis. *Illo autem auctore* cum dicitur, *illo volente* dicitur. Est ergo vitium voluntatis, quo est homo deterior. Quod vitium, si longe abest a Dei voluntate, ut ratio docet, a quo[^28] sit, quaerendum est ». — Ecce aperte dicit hic Augustinus, Deo auctore vel volente hominem non fieri deteriorem, sed vitio voluntatis suae. Non est ergo Deo auctore, quod malum fit ab aliquo, et ita Deo volente mala non fiunt.

### Cap. VII.

#### *Quod in Deo non est causa, ut sit homo deterior.*

Deinde idem Augustinus quaerens, quae sit causa, ut homo sit deterior, in Deo non esse asserit, in eodem libro sic dicens: « Ut sit homo deterior, aut in ipso causa est, aut in alio, aut in nihilo. Si in nihilo, nulla causa est; si in alio, aut in Deo, aut in alio[^29] quolibet homine, aut in eo quod neque Deus neque homo sit. Sed non in Deo; bonorum enim Deus tantum causa est: ergo aut in homine est, aut in eo quod nec Deus nec homo, aut in nihilo »[^30]. — Ex his aperte ostenditur, quod non est bonum, ut sit homo deterior, quia non est Deus eius rei causa, qui tantum causa bonorum est. Et si non est bonum, ut homo fiat deterior, non est igitur bonum, ut ab eo fiat malum: non igitur vult Deus, ut ab eo fiat malum.

Item aliter etiam ostenditur, quod Deo auctore, id est volente non fiunt mala, quia ipse non est causa tendendi ad non-esse. Tendere enim ad non-esse malum est. Ipse autem auctor mali non est; tendit vero ad non-esse qui operatur malum: non ergo Deo auctore est, quod aliquis operatur malum. Non est ergo bonum, quod aliquis operatur malum, quia tantum boni Deus auctor est. Hoc autem Augustinus in eodem libro[^31] aperte explicat ita dicens: « Qui omnium quae sunt, auctor est, et ad cuius bonitatem id pertinet, ut sit omne quod est, boni tantummodo causa est. Quocirca mali auctor non est, et ideo ipse summum bonum est, a quo in nullo deficere bonum est; et malum est deficere: non est igitur causa deficiendi, id est tendendi ad non-esse, qui, ut ita dicam, essendi causa est; quia omnium quae sunt, auctor est, quae in quantum sunt, bona sunt ». — Ecce aperte habes, quod deficere a Deo, qui summum est bonum, malum est: mala ergo facere malum est: non ergo Deo auctore vel volente mala fiunt.

Iam sufficienter ostensum est, quod Deo auctore non fiunt mala. Quidam tamen *sophistice* incedentes, et ideo Deo *odibiles*[^32], probare conantur, ex Deo auctore esse, quod mala fiunt, hoc modo. Quod mala fiunt, verum est; omne autem verum, quod est, est a veritate, quae Deus est: a Deo igitur est, quod mala fiunt. Quod autem omne verum a Deo sit, confirmant auctoritate Augustini in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^33] ita dicentis: « Omne verum a veritate verum est; est autem veritas Deus: Deum igitur habet auctorem omne verum ». Est autem verum, quod mala fiunt vel sunt: Deo ergo auctore est, quod sunt vel fiunt mala.

Quibus facile est nobis respondere; sed indignum responsione videtur quod dicunt: « Omne namque verum a Deo est », ut ait Augustinus, cui consonat Ambrosius[^34], qui tractans illud verbum Apostoli: *Nemo potest dicere: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu sancto*, dicit, quod « omne verum, a quocumque dicitur, a Spiritu sancto est ». Cum itaque verum sit, quod mala <!-- page 818 --> fiunt, hoc verum, quod dicitur illa locutione, scilicet *mala fiunt, a Deo est*; sed non inde sequitur, quod a Deo sit, ut mala fiant. Si enim hoc diceretur, auctor malorum Deus esse intelligeretur. Quod ex simili manifeste falsum ostenditur: Deus prohibet furtum fieri; sed furtum fieri verum est: ergo prohibet verum. Non sequitur.

Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi inania relinquentes, praemissae quaestionis parti saniori faventes, quae Sanctorum testimoniis plenius approbatur, dicamus, Deum non velle mala fieri, nec tamen velle non fieri, neque nolle fieri. Omne enim[^35] quod vult fieri, fit, et omne quod vult non fieri, non fit. Fiunt autem multa, quae non vult fieri, ut omnia mala.

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### DISTINCTION XLVI.

### Chapter I.

#### *That the will of God, which is himself, can in no way be frustrated.*

Here a question arises. For it has been said in the things above[^1] and confirmed by authorities, that the will of God, which is himself and is called his good pleasure, cannot be frustrated, because by that will whatsoever he willed, he did in heaven and in earth: to which, by the Apostle's testimony, nothing resists. « It is asked therefore how this is to be taken which the Apostle says of the Lord[^2]: *He wills all men to be saved*. For since not all are saved, but the more are damned, it seems indeed that what God wills to be done is not done, namely, the human will impeding the will of God. The Lord also in the Gospel, addressing the impious city: How often, he says, *did I will to gather thy sons together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldest not!* So[^3] these things are said, as though the will of God had been overcome by the will of men, and, the weakest by their unwillingness impeding, the most mighty could not do what he willed. Where then is that omnipotence by which in heaven and in earth, according to the Prophet, *all things whatsoever he willed, he did?* And how does nothing resist his will, according to the Apostle, if he willed to gather the sons of Jerusalem and did not? » For these things seem very greatly to stand in the way of what has been said before.

### Chapter II.

#### *How this is to be understood: I willed to gather thy sons, and thou wouldest not; and this: Who wills all men to be saved.*

But let us hear the solution; and first let us see how this is to be taken which the Lord says. « For this was not said in such a sense, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^4], in resolving the aforesaid question, as though the Lord had willed to gather[^5] the sons of Jerusalem, and what he willed had not been done, because she did not will it; but rather she indeed did not will her sons to be gathered by him, while she nevertheless being unwilling, he himself gathered all of her sons whom he willed; for in heaven and in earth he did not [will] some things and do them, and again some things he willed and did not do, but *all things* <!-- page 815 --> *whatsoever he willed, he did* », that this may be the sense: How often did I will to gather thy sons, and thou wouldest not! that is, I gathered them by my will, always efficacious, while thou wast unwilling. — Behold, it is plainly set forth, that[^6] those words of the Lord do not contradict what has gone before.

It now remains to see how the foregoing words of the Apostle do not contradict what has been said, who speaking of God says: *He wills all men to be saved*. By occasion of which words many have wandered from the truth, saying that God wills many things to be done which are not done. But it must not be understood, as if that were said on this ground, as though God had willed certain ones to be saved, and they are not saved.

« For who would be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn the evil wills of men, which he has willed and when he has willed and where he has willed, to good? It is certainly not true that what is said in the Psalm — *Whatsoever he willed, he did* — [is true], if he willed some things and did them not; and what is more unworthy, that on this ground he did not do [it], namely, lest there be done what the Omnipotent willed, the will of man impeded [him] ». Therefore « when we hear and read in the sacred Scriptures, that he wills all men to be saved, although it is certain to us that not all men are saved[^7], yet we must not on that account take anything away from the most omnipotent will of God, but rather understand what is written — *He wills all men to be saved* — as though it were said, that no man is made saved, except him whom he himself has willed to be made[^8] [saved]; not that there is none of men except him whom he wills to be saved, but that none is made saved except him whom he wills to be saved; and therefore he is to be entreated to will [it], because it must needs come to pass, if he shall have willed [it] ». « For it must not be believed that the Omnipotent has willed anything to be done, which has not been done ». « So also is to be understood that[^9]: *he enlightens every man coming into this world*, not because there is no one of men who is not enlightened, but because none is enlightened except by him. And in another way also this can be understood, provided we be not compelled to believe that the Omnipotent has willed anything to be done, and it has not been done — [he] who without any ambiguities, if[^10] in heaven and on earth, as the Truth sings, *did all things whatsoever he willed*, certainly did not will to do whatsoever he did not do ». — From these things it is plainly shown, that God by that will which is himself does not will anything to be done which is not done, nor anything not to be done, which is done.

### Chapter III.

#### *Whether evils come to pass with God willing or unwilling.*

And therefore, since it is established that all the goods that come to pass come to be by his will — which if it were unwilling them to come to be, they would in no way come to be — it is rightly wont to be asked: whether all the evils also which come to pass, that is, sins, come to be by God's will, or come to be while he is unwilling. — Concerning this, different men, thinking variously[^11], are found to contradict one another. For some say that God wills evils to be or come to pass, but does not however will evils [themselves]. Others, however, [say] that he neither wills evils to be nor to come to pass. In this however both these and those agree, that both parties confess that God does not will evils. But each side relies upon reasonings and authorities to fortify its assertion[^12].

For those who say that God wills evils to be or to come to pass, fortify their intention in these ways. If, say they, he were to will that evils not be or not come to pass, in no way would they be or come to pass, because, if he wills them not to be or not to come to pass, and cannot effect this — namely, that they not be or not come to pass — then something resists his will and his power, and he is not omnipotent, since he cannot [do] all that he wills, but is impotent; as we ourselves are, who sometimes cannot [do] what we will. But since he is omnipotent and in nothing impotent, it is certain that evils cannot come to pass or be, except with him willing. For how could evil be done by anyone against his will and while he is unwilling, when it is written: *Who resists his will?* Augustine also said above[^13]: « Because it must needs come to pass, if he shall have willed [it] ». But [God] either wills evils to come to pass, or [wills them] not to come to pass. If he wills [them] not to come to pass, they do not come to pass; yet they do come to pass: therefore he wills [them] to come to pass. — Likewise, it is good for evils to be or to come to pass, otherwise the supremely Good [one] would not permit them to come to pass. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « Although those things, he says, which are evil, in so far as they are evil, are not good, yet that there be not only goods but also evils, is good. For unless this were a good — that there should be also evils — in no way would they be allowed to be by the omnipotent Good [one], for whom undoubtedly it is as easy that what he wills not to be, he should not allow to be, as it is that he should do what he wills. Unless we believe this[^14], our confession is imperilled, by which we confess that we believe in the Father almighty ». — Behold, here you plainly have [it], that it is good that evils be, and God is the author of every good, who wills every good to be that is. Since therefore it is good for evils to come to pass or to be, therefore[^15] he wills evils too to come to pass or to be. — By these and other reasonings and authorities of this kind do those use, who say that God wills evils to be or come to pass.

But those who say that by God's will evils do not come to pass or are not, to the inductions set forth respond thus, saying that God neither wills evils to come to pass, nor wills [them] not to come to pass, nor is unwilling [them] to come to pass — but only does not will [them] to come to pass. For if he were to will them to come to pass or to be, he would certainly cause them to come to pass or to be, and thus he would be the author of evils; but he is not the author of evils, as the authorities of the Saints testify: therefore evils do not come to pass by his will. Likewise, if he were unwilling evils to come to pass, or were to will them not to come to pass, and yet they came to pass, he would not be omnipotent <!-- page 816 --> since his will would be impeded by the effect of the human will. And therefore they do not concede that God wills evils to come to pass, lest he be understood as the author of evils; nor do they concede that he wills evils not to come to pass or is unwilling [them] to come to pass, lest he seem to be impotent; but they say only that he does not will evils to come to pass, that he may be shown to be not the author, but the permitter of evils. Whence also the Evangelist, where he shows that God is the author of all goods, saying[^16]: *All things were made by him*, consequently denies that he is the author of evils, saying: *And without him was made nothing*, that is, sin. He did not say, that it was made by him, or with him unwilling and against his will, but only *without him*, that is, without his will, because sin is not made by his will. Therefore evils do not come to pass with God willing or unwilling, but with him not willing, because it is not subject to God's will that evil come to pass or not come to pass, but that he allow it[^17] to come to pass, because it is good to allow evils to come to pass; and surely willing he allows, not willing the evils, but willing to allow, that they themselves come to pass; because neither are evils good, nor is it good that they come to pass or be.

### Chapter IV.

#### *How that saying of Augustine is to be understood: it is good that evils come to pass.*

But [as for] that which Augustine says: *It is good that evils come to pass, nor would evils be allowed to come to pass by the omnipotent Good [one], unless this were good — that they should be*; they assert that it was said on this ground, because from the evils which come to pass God draws goods, nor would he himself permit them to come to pass, unless from them he were to make something of good[^18]. Whence Augustine in the same book *Enchiridion*[^19], plainly indicating that the understanding of the aforesaid words is such, says: « God omnipotent, to whom the supreme power of things [belongs], since he is supremely good, would in no way allow some evil to be in his works, unless he were to such an extent omnipotent and good as to do good even out of evil ». Likewise in the same: « God judged it better to make goods out of evils than to permit no evils ». From this sense therefore it has been said and is true that it is good for evils to come to pass, because from the evils which come to pass, to the good — who *are called Saints according to purpose*[^20] — goodness, that is, utility, accrues. For to such, as the Apostle says, *all things work together for good*, even evils, because they profit them, which to others doing [them] hurt. Whence also sometimes in Scripture it is read that evil is called good, as Jerome on Mark[^21]: « The evil of Judas, he says, was good, namely to us. Nor, if it is good for this man or that, does it follow on that account that it is simply good. For properly and simply that is good which is good both in itself and to the doer ».

### Chapter V.

#### *On the manifold acceptance of "good."*

For there is something which is good in itself and to him to whom it is done, but is not good for the doer — as when help is given to a poor man, but not for God's sake. And there is something good in itself and for the doer, but not for him to whom it is done — as when truth is preached for God's sake to one not obeying. And there is something good in itself and for the doer and for him to whom it is done — as when the truth is preached for God's sake to one believing. Whence the Apostle[^22]: *We are a good odor to God, to some an odor of life, to others an odor of death*. There is yet another, which is neither good in itself and harms and damns the doer, unless he repent — as evil [is] — yet has its worth toward something. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^23]: « By the supremely and equally and immutably good Trinity have been created all things — not supremely nor equally nor immutably good; but nevertheless good also taken singly. But all together very good, because from all consists the admirable beauty of the universe; in which even that which is called evil, well ordered and put in its place, more eminently commends the goods, that they should the more please and be the more praiseworthy, when compared with evils ».

### Chapter VI.

#### *That evils are of value to the universe.*

Hence it is plain that from the evils which come to pass some good comes forth, while the goods more please and are more praiseworthy. To the very doers themselves also, from the evils which they do, sometimes goods come forth[^24], if they are called Saints according to purpose. « For to such, as Augustine says in the book *On Correction and Grace*, God so far cooperates all things unto good, that, if some of them deviate and stray, this very thing he makes profit them unto good — because they return more humble and more learned », as Peter. « Those evils also, which the faithful piously endure from the wicked, as Augustine says in the book *On the Trinity*[^25], are surely of profit to them either for blotting out sins, or for exercising and proving justice, or for showing the misery of this life ». And therefore <!-- page 817 --> Job felt the hand of God, and the Apostle the goad of Satan; and both profited well, because [each] bore evil well.

If anyone therefore diligently attend to what has been written, it is easy for him to perceive that goods come from evils, and that it has been said on this ground that it is good for evils to come to pass or to be — not because evil is good, or because it is good for evil to come to pass. For it is not good that evil come to pass through anyone, since it is not good that anyone do evil[^26]. For if this were good, surely God would be its author, who is the author of all good. But if God is the author of this, then with him as author man does evil, and so with him as author man becomes worse. And if with him as author man becomes worse, then with him willing man becomes worse. For it is the same to say that something comes to be with God as author as [to say] with God willing; but with God as author man does not become worse: therefore neither with God willing — as Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions*[^27] plainly establishes, arguing *a minori* thus: « With no wise man as author does a man become worse; for so great is this fault, that it cannot fall on a wise man. But God is more excellent than every wise man: much less therefore with God as author does a man become worse. For God's will is much more excellent than that of a wise man. When *with him as author* is said, *with him willing* is said. Therefore there is a vice of the will, by which man is made worse. From which vice — if it be far from God's will, as reason teaches — must be sought, from whom[^28] it is ». — Behold, here Augustine plainly says that with God as author or willing, man is not made worse, but by the vice of his own will. Therefore it is not with God as author that evil is done by anyone, and so with God willing evils do not come to pass.

### Chapter VII.

#### *That in God there is no cause that man should be made worse.*

Then the same Augustine, asking what is the cause that man is worse, asserts that it is not in God, saying in the same book thus: « That man be worse, either the cause is in himself, or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, there is no cause; if in another, either in God, or in some other[^29] man, or in that which is neither God nor man. But not in God; for God is the cause only of goods: therefore either it is in man, or in that which is neither God nor man, or in nothing »[^30]. — From these things it is plainly shown that it is not good that man be worse, because God is not the cause of that thing, who is the cause only of goods. And if it is not good that man be made worse, it is not therefore good that evil be done by him: God does not therefore will that evil be done by him.

Likewise it is also otherwise shown that with God as author, that is, willing, evils do not come to pass, because he himself is not the cause of tending to non-being. For to tend to non-being is evil. But he himself is not the author of evil; whereas he tends to non-being who works evil: therefore it is not with God as author that anyone works evil. It is not therefore good that anyone work evil, since God is the author only of good. This Augustine in the same book[^31] plainly explains, saying thus: « He who is the author of all that is, and to whose goodness it pertains that there should be all that is, is the cause only of good. Wherefore he is not the author of evil, and therefore he himself is the highest good, from whom in nothing it is good to fall away; and evil is to fall away: therefore he is not the cause of falling away, that is, of tending to non-being, who, as I may so say, is the cause of being; because he is the author of all that is, which in so far as they are, are good ». — Behold, you plainly have [it], that to fall away from God, who is the highest good, is evil: therefore to do evils is evil: therefore evils do not come to pass with God as author or willing.

It has now sufficiently been shown that with God as author evils do not come to pass. Some however, advancing *sophistically*, and on that account *hateful* to God[^32], attempt to prove that with God as author it [is] that evils come to pass — in this manner. That evils come to pass is true; but every truth which is, is from the Truth, which is God: from God therefore it is, that evils come to pass. That every truth is from God, they confirm by the authority of Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions*[^33] saying thus: « Every truth is true by the Truth; but the Truth is God: therefore every truth has God as author ». But it is true that evils come to pass or are: therefore with God as author it [is] that evils are or come to pass.

To these it is easy for us to answer; but unworthy of answer seems what they say: « For every truth is from God », as Augustine says, with whom agrees Ambrose[^34], who treating the saying of the Apostle: *No man can say: The Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit*, says that « every truth, by whomsoever it be said, is from the Holy Spirit ». Since therefore it is true that evils <!-- page 818 --> come to pass, this truth, which is said in that locution, namely *evils come to pass*, is from God; but it does not follow from this that it is from God that evils come to pass. For if this were said, God would be understood [to be] the author of evils. Which from a similar [example] is manifestly shown to be false: God forbids theft to be done; but that theft be done is true: therefore he forbids the truth. It does not follow.

These things therefore and other vain things of this kind setting aside, favoring the sounder side of the foregoing question, which is more fully approved by the testimonies of the Saints, let us say that God does not will evils to come to pass, nor however wills them not to come to pass, nor is unwilling them to come to pass. For all that he wills to come to pass[^35], comes to pass, and all that he wills not to come to pass, does not come to pass. But many things come to pass which he does not will to come to pass — such as all evils.

---

la: Dist. XLV. — Vat. et plures edd. paulo inferius, addito *quae*, sic habent: *quae beneplacitum eius vocatur*. — Loci sequentes s. Scripturae sunt Psalm. 113, 11, et Rom. 9, 19.

en: Distinction XLV. — The Vatican edition and several editions, a little below, with *quae* ("which") added, have: *quae beneplacitum eius vocatur* ("which is called his good pleasure"). — The following Scripture passages are Psalm 113, 11, and Romans 9, 19.

la: 1. Tim. 2, 4. Sequens locus est Matth. 23, 37.

en: 1 Timothy 2, 4. The following passage is Matthew 23, 37.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 3, 6, 9 addunt *etiam*; ed. 8 *enim*; codd. et aliae edd. legunt ut in textu.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 3, 6, 9 add *etiam* ("also"); ed. 8 [reads] *enim* ("for"); the codices and other editions read as in the text.

la: Quae praecedunt excerpta sunt ex August., Enchirid. c. 97. n. 24.

en: What precedes is excerpted from Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. 97, n. 24.

la: Loc. cit. In quo textu Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, *voluerit congregare* pro *voluerit colligere*, et paulo inferius *potius eam* pro *potius illa*, contradicentibus codd.

en: The place cited. In which text the Vatican with the other editions, except 1, [reads] *voluerit congregare* ("had willed to congregate") in place of *voluerit colligere* ("had willed to gather"), and a little below *potius eam* ("rather her") in place of *potius illa* ("rather she"), against the codices.

la: Codd. et ed. 1 *quia*.

en: The codices and ed. 1 [read] *quia* ("because") [in place of *quod* "that"].

la: Verba: *quamvis certum... fieri* omittuntur in edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9.

en: The words *quamvis certum... fieri* ("although it is certain... to be made") are omitted in editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd. praemittunt *autem*, contradicentibus originali, ed. 1 et codd., excepto C.

en: The Vatican and other editions prefix *autem* ("but"), against the original, ed. 1 and the codices, except C.

en: John 1, 9.

la: Ita recte edd. 1, 8 cum originali; cod. C cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *sicut*; codd. ABE et ed. 6 *sive*; Vat. cum cod. D omni particula caret.

en: Thus rightly editions 1 and 8 with the original; codex C with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 [read] *sicut* ("as"); codices A, B, E and ed. 6 [read] *sive* ("or"); the Vatican with codex D lacks any particle.

la: Ita in codd. ABCE et ed. 1, in Vat. et aliis edd. varia.

en: Thus in codices A, B, C, E and ed. 1; in the Vatican and other editions [the reading] is varied.

la: Codd. AD *assertionem*. Paulo inferius codd. ABD omittunt *non* ante *fiunt*.

en: Codices A, D [read] *assertionem* ("assertion"). A little below, codices A, B, D omit *non* ("not") before *fiunt* ("they come to pass").

la: Enchirid. c. 103. n. 27; et locus qui sequitur est c. 96. n. 24.

en: *Enchiridion*, c. 103, n. 27; and the passage which follows is c. 96, n. 24.

la: Ita originale, codd. ABCE et ed. 1; in aliis edd. *haec*. Infra ante *et mala* codd. ABDE et ed. 1 omittunt *ergo*.

en: Thus the original, codices A, B, C, E and ed. 1; in the other editions [the reading is] *haec* ("these"). Below, before *et mala* ("and evils"), codices A, B, D, E and ed. 1 omit *ergo* ("therefore").

la: Cod. B hic addit: Gregorius super Genesim [sed est *Moral.* VI. c. 18. n. 33.]: *Deus alia concedit propitius, alia permittit iratus, atque quae permittit sic tolerat, ut [haec] in usum sui consilii vertat. Unde [mirum modo] fit, ut quod fit sive voluntate Dei agitur, voluntati Dei contrarium non sit: quia in bonum usum mala facta vertuntur, eius consilio militant etiam quae eius consilio repugnant. Hinc etiam per Psalmistam* (Psalm. 110, 2.) *dicitur: Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius*. Aliqua ex ed. Gregorii supplevimus.

en: Codex B here adds: Gregory on Genesis [but it is *Moralia* VI, c. 18, n. 33]: *God grants some things [as] favorable, permits others [as] angry, and what he permits he so endures that he turns [these things] to the use of his own counsel. Whence [it comes to pass in a wondrous manner] that what comes to pass — or is done by God's will — is not contrary to God's will: because evils done are turned to a good use; in his counsel those things also fight which fight against his counsel. Hence also through the Psalmist* (Psalm 110, 2) *it is said: Great are the works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills*. Certain things we have supplied from Gregory's edition.

en: John 1, 3.

la: Ita codd. et edd. 2, 3, 7; in aliis edd. non bene additur *sinit*.

en: Thus the codices and editions 2, 3, 7; in the other editions *sinit* ("he allows") is added — not rightly.

la: Omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *bene*, quae lectio sumta videtur ex verbis Augustini infra sequentibus, in quo loco tamen deest aliquid.

en: All the codices and editions 1, 2, 3 [read] *bene* ("well"), which reading seems taken from the words of Augustine which follow below, in which place however something is wanting.

la: Cap. 11. n. 3. Locus sequens est c. 27. n. 8.

en: Chapter 11, n. 3. The following passage is c. 27, n. 8.

la: Rom. 8, 28. — Paulo superius pro *bonum esse* edd. ACD et ed. 1 *bonum est*, et immediate post edd. 1, 6 *futilitas* pro *utilitas*.

en: Romans 8, 28. — A little above, in place of *bonum esse* ("to be good"), editions A, C, D and ed. 1 [read] *bonum est* ("it is good"), and immediately after, editions 1, 6 [read] *futilitas* ("futility") in place of *utilitas* ("utility").

la: Cap. 11: « Multi bonum, ut Iudas, faciunt; sed omnino illis non proficit ». Commentarius ille non est S. Hieronymi.

en: Chapter 11: « Many do good, as Judas, but it profits them nothing at all ». The Commentary is not Saint Jerome's.

en: 2 Corinthians 2, 15-16.

en: Chapter 10, n. 3.

la: Cap. 9. n. 24. — Paulo superius pro *bona proveniunt* codd. ACD et ed. 1 *bona veniunt*, cod. B *eveniunt*. — Quoad S. Petrum cfr. Luc. 22, 61. 62.

en: Chapter 9, n. 24. — A little above, in place of *bona proveniunt* ("goods come forth"), codices A, C, D and ed. 1 [read] *bona veniunt* ("goods come"); codex B [reads] *eveniunt* ("come out"). — As to Saint Peter, cf. Luke 22, 61-62.

la: Libr. XIII. c. 16. n. 20. In quo textu codd. BCDE et ed. 1 *demenda peccata* pro *delenda peccata*; originale *emendanda peccata*. Quoad Iob cfr. c. 19, 21, et c. 42; quoad S. Paulum cfr. II. Cor. 12, 7. — Circa finem ante *profecit* codd. omittunt *bene*.

en: Book XIII, c. 16, n. 20. In which text codices B, C, D, E and ed. 1 [read] *demenda peccata* ("sins to be taken away") in place of *delenda peccata* ("sins to be blotted out"); the original [reads] *emendanda peccata* ("sins to be corrected"). As to Job, cf. c. 19, 21, and c. 42; as to Saint Paul, cf. 2 Corinthians 12, 7. — Near the end, before *profecit* ("profited"), the codices omit *bene* ("well").

la: Ita codd. et ed. 1, Vat. et aliae edd. *mala*.

en: Thus the codices and ed. 1; the Vatican and other editions [read] *mala* ("evils").

la: Quaest. 3, nonnullis a Magistro omissis.

en: Question 3, with several [passages] omitted by the Master.

la: Contra originale et edd. 1, 6 in Vat. et aliis edd. non bene adiicitur *humanae*, ut patet ex sequenti propositione. Paulo inferius post *aperte. dicit* plures edd. omittunt *hic*.

en: Against the original and editions 1 and 6, in the Vatican and other editions *humanae* ("human") is added — not rightly, as appears from the proposition that follows. A little below, after *aperte. dicit*, several editions omit *hic* ("here").

la: ibid. q. 4. — Paulo inferius post *in Deo* Vat. cum paucis edd. addit *eam*.

en: The same place, q. 4. — A little below, after *in Deo* ("in God"), the Vatican with a few editions adds *eam* ("it").

la: Codd. et ed. 1 *aliquo*, originale *aliquo alio*.

en: The codices and ed. 1 [read] *aliquo* ("some"); the original [reads] *aliquo alio* ("some other").

la: Ita edd., excepta Vat., et omnes codd. Verba Augustini contracta sunt. In originali enim post *Deus tantum causa est* ita continuatur: « Si ergo in homine, aut vi, aut suasione. Sed vi nullo modo, ne sit Deo valentior. Siquidem Deus ita optime hominem fecit, ut si vellet manere optimus, nullo resistente impediretur. Suasione autem alterius hominis si concedimus hominem depravari, rursum quaerendum erit, suasor ipse a quo depravatus sit. Non enim potest pravus non esse talium suasor. Restat nescio quid, quod nec Deus nec homo sit; sed tamen hoc, quidquid est, aut vim intulit aut suasit. De vi hoc respondetur quod supra; de suasione autem quidquid est, quia suasio non cogit invitum ad eiusdem hominis voluntatem, causa depravationis eius redit, sive aliquo sive nullo suadente depravatus sit ». Vat. autem brevius sic habet: si ergo in homine est, aut vi aut suasione, sed neutro modo: neque etiam in eo est, quod neque Deus neque homo sit; et ex his.

en: Thus the editions, except the Vatican, and all the codices. Augustine's words have been compressed. For in the original, after *Deus tantum causa est* ("God alone is the cause"), it continues thus: « If therefore in man, either by force or by persuasion. But by force in no way, lest he be more powerful than God. For God so made man in the best way, that, if he willed to remain best, he would be impeded by none resisting. But if we concede that man is depraved by the persuasion of another man, again it must be asked, the persuader himself, by whom he has been depraved. For there cannot be a non-depraved persuader of such things. There remains some I-know-not-what, which is neither God nor man; but yet this, whatsoever it is, has either brought in force or persuaded. Concerning force, what was said above is the response; concerning persuasion, however, whatever it is — since persuasion does not compel one unwilling unto the will of the same man — the cause of his depravation returns, whether he was depraved by someone or no one persuading ». The Vatican however has [it] more briefly thus: if therefore it is in man, either by force or by persuasion, but [it is] in neither way; nor [is it] in that which is neither God nor man; and from these things.

la: Respicitur illud Eccli. 37, 23: Qui *sophistice* loquitur, *odibilis* est.

en: Reference is made to Ecclesiasticus 37, 23: He who speaks *sophistically* is *hateful*.

la: Quaest. 1. Ultima verba in originali sunt: *auctorem, ut sit omne*.

en: Question 1. The last words in the original are: *auctorem, ut sit omne* ("[has it as] author, that all that is may be").

la: In Epist. I. ad Cor. c. 12, 3: Quidquid enim verum a quocumque dicitur, a sancto dicitur Spiritu.

en: [Ambrose] *On the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, c. 12, 3: For whatever truth is said by whomsoever, is said by the Holy Spirit.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd. perperam *ergo*, contradicentibus codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican and other editions wrongly [read] *ergo* ("therefore"), against the codices and ed. 1.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 46, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVI. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLVI. Division of the text.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 818 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVI.

#### *De impletione divinae voluntatis.*

> *Hic oritur quaestio. Dictum est enim in superioribus* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Haec est secunda pars huius totalis tractatus de voluntate, in qua Magister agit de divinae voluntatis impletione. Et habet haec pars duas partes. In *prima*, supposito ex praecedentibus, quod Dei voluntas beneplaciti semper impletur, removet dubitationes[^1]. In *secunda* explicat veritatem, infra distinctione proxima: *Voluntas quippe Dei semper efficax est.*

*Prima* pars habet duas partes. In *prima* Magister removet dubitationem per comparationem ad bona; in *secunda* per comparationem ad mala, ibi: *Ideoque cum constet, omnia bona, quae fiunt* etc.

*Prima* pars habet duas partes. In *prima* Magister obiicit. In *secunda* solvit, ibi: *Sed audiamus solutionem.*

*Ideoque cum constet* etc. Haec est *secunda* pars, in qua Magister inquirit, utrum voluntas Dei impleatur respectu malorum; et ratione huius inquirit, utrum Deus velit mala fieri. Et quoniam fuerunt hic duae opiniones, quarum una fuit, quod Deus vult mala fieri — et haec opinio est falsa —, alia opinio est, quod Deus non vult mala fieri — et haec opinio est vera —, ideo haec pars[^2] habet duas partes. In *prima* Magister opponit ad partem falsam. In *secunda* opponit ad partem veram, ibi: *Si quis igitur diligenter attendat* etc.

*Prima* pars habet duas. In *prima* adducit rationes ad defensionem falsae opinionis. In *secunda* parte ponit solutiones, quas assignant illi, qui sunt contrariae positionis; et hoc ibi: *Illi vero, qui dicunt, Dei voluntate mala non fieri.* Et utraque partium duas habet. Nam in opponendo duas inducit rationes[^3], quarum una rationi innititur, alia auctoritati; et secundum hoc pars, in qua solvit, dividitur, quia ponuntur ibi duae responsiones iuxta duas obiectiones.

*Si quis igitur diligenter* etc. Haec est pars illa, in qua conatur Magister ad veram partem astruendam; et haec pars habet duas. In *prima* inducit rationes[^4] veras; in *secunda* dissolvit quandam rationem sophisticam, et hoc facit ibi: *Iam sufficienter ostensum est* etc. *Prima* pars habet tres partes secundum tres rationes, quas inducit. *Prima* sumta est ab hoc, quod idem est Deo fieri auctore, et Deo volente, et ponitur ibi: *Si quis igitur diligenter* etc. *Secunda* sumta est ab hoc, quod eadem est causa, qua malum fit, et qua homo fit deterior, et ponitur ibi: *Deinde idem Augustinus quaerens* etc. *Tertia* sumta est ab hoc[^5], quod malum facit tendere ad non-esse, et ponitur ibi: *Item etiam aliter ostenditur, quod Deo auctore* etc.

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Similiter *secunda* pars, in qua dissolvit rationem sophisticam, tres habet. In *prima* illam ponit, ibi: *Iam sufficienter ostensum est* etc. In *secunda* dissolvit, ibi: *Quibus facile est nobis respondere.* In *tertia* redit ad veritatis assertionem dicens, hanc partem esse veram, quod Deus non vult mala fieri, ibi: *Haec et alia huiusmodi* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad evidentiam eorum quae determinat Magister in praesenti distinctione, sex quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri voluntate beneplaciti.

*Secundo* quaeritur, utrum Deus velit mala fieri.

*Tertio*, utrum mala fieri sit bonum.

*Quarto*, utrum mala fieri sit verum.

*Quinto*, utrum mala ordinentur a Deo.

*Sexto* et ultimo, utrum mala augeant decorem [universi].

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XLVI.

#### *On the fulfillment of the divine will.*

> *"Here a question arises. For it has been said in what precedes,"* etc.

### Division of the text.

This is the second part of this whole treatise on the will, in which the Master treats of the fulfillment of the divine will. And this part has two parts. In the *first*, supposing from the preceding [discussion] that God's will of good pleasure is always fulfilled, he removes doubts[^1]. In the *second* he explains the truth, below in the next distinction: *"For the will of God is always efficacious."*

The *first* part has two parts. In the *first* the Master removes a doubt by comparison to good things; in the *second* by comparison to evil things, there: *"And therefore since it is established that all the goods which come to pass,"* etc.

The *first* part has two parts. In the *first* the Master raises an objection. In the *second* he resolves [it], there: *"But let us hear the resolution."*

*"And therefore since it is established,"* etc. — this is the *second* part, in which the Master inquires whether the will of God is fulfilled with respect to evils; and on this account he inquires whether God wills evils to come to pass. And since there were here two opinions — one of which was that God wills evils to come to pass (and this opinion is false), while another opinion is that God does not will evils to come to pass (and this opinion is true) — therefore this part[^2] has two parts. In the *first* the Master raises objections against the false part. In the *second* he raises objections against the true part, there: *"If therefore anyone diligently attends,"* etc.

The *first* part has two [parts]. In the *first* he adduces reasons for the defense of the false opinion. In the *second* part he sets forth the solutions which those of the contrary position assign; and this there: *"But those who say that evils do not come to pass by God's will."* And each of the parts has two [subparts]. For in raising the objection he introduces two reasons[^3], of which one rests on reason, the other on authority; and according to this the part in which he resolves [them] is divided, because there are placed there two responses corresponding to the two objections.

*"If therefore anyone diligently,"* etc. — this is that part in which the Master strives to establish the true side; and this part has two [subparts]. In the *first* he introduces true reasons[^4]; in the *second* he dissolves a certain sophistical reason, and this he does there: *"It has now been sufficiently shown,"* etc. The *first* part has three parts according to the three reasons which he introduces. The *first* is taken from this: that it is the same thing [whether] something comes to pass with God as author or with God as willing; and it is placed there: *"If therefore anyone diligently,"* etc. The *second* is taken from this: that the same is the cause by which evil comes to pass and by which a man becomes worse; and it is placed there: *"Then the same Augustine inquiring,"* etc. The *third* is taken from this[^5]: that evil makes [a thing] tend toward non-being; and it is placed there: *"Likewise it is also shown in another way, that with God as author,"* etc.

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Similarly the *second* part, in which he dissolves the sophistical reason, has three [subparts]. In the *first* he sets it forth, there: *"It has now been sufficiently shown,"* etc. In the *second* he dissolves [it], there: *"To which it is easy for us to respond."* In the *third* he returns to the assertion of the truth, saying that this part is true — that God does not will evils to come to pass — there: *"These and other things of this kind,"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of what the Master determines in the present distinction, six [questions] are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether God wills all human beings to be saved by the will of good pleasure.

*Second*, it is asked whether God wills evils to come to pass.

*Third*, whether for evils to come to pass is a good.

*Fourth*, whether for evils to come to pass is true.

*Fifth*, whether evils are ordered by God.

*Sixth* and finally, whether evils increase the beauty [of the universe].

---

la: Vat., paulo ante omissa voce *Dei*, et dein ante *removet* interiecta vocula *hic*, post *dubitationes* adiungit *quae ex hac suppositione oritur*.

en: The Vatican edition, a little earlier having omitted the word *Dei* ("of God"), and then before *removet* ("removes") having inserted the particle *hic* ("here"), after *dubitationes* ("doubts") adds *quae ex hac suppositione oritur* ("which arises from this supposition").

la: In Vat. omissio valde notabilis: desunt verba inde ab *et ratione huius* usque ad *ideo haec pars* (inclusive).

en: In the Vatican edition [there is] a very notable omission: the words from *et ratione huius* ("and on this account") up to *ideo haec pars* ("therefore this part") (inclusive) are missing.

la: Vat. *obiectiones*, et mox *duae rationes* pro *duae responsiones*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *obiectiones* ("objections"), and shortly after *duae rationes* ("two reasons") in place of *duae responsiones* ("two responses").

la: Vat. *responsiones*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *responsiones* ("responses").

la: Vat. *ad hoc*. Circa finem expositionis pro *hanc partem* cod. Z *hanc positionem*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *ad hoc* ("for this"). Near the end of the exposition, in place of *hanc partem* ("this part") codex Z [reads] *hanc positionem* ("this position"). ---

translators_notes:
Page-foot apparatus on printed p. 818 contains exactly 5 numbered Quaracchi footnotes, all anchoring inside this divisio body (the *Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVI* opens at the lower half of p. 818, beneath the closing of the *littera Magistri* on the same page). Anchors verified eyes-on against the 400 dpi render `raw/vision/vol1/d46-divisio-r400-408.png`: [^1] on *dubitationes* (OCR `dubitationes '`, line 39575); [^2] on *ideo haec pars* (OCR `ideo haec pars '`, line 39602) — this is a span-marker for the long Vat. omission running from *et ratione huius* through *ideo haec pars*; [^3] on *rationes* in *duas inducit rationes* (OCR `rationes *`, line 39576); [^4] on *rationes* in *inducit rationes veras* (OCR `rationes^ veras`, line 39587); [^5] on *ab hoc* in *Tertia sumta est ab hoc* (OCR `ab hoc "`, line 39604). The continuation of the divisio at the top of printed p. 819 (PDF p. 409) carries no footnote anchors; the footer on p. 819 belongs to *Articulus unicus, Quaestio I.* body content (q.1 chunk).

**Scope finding (printed-page span)**: the *DIVISIO TEXTUS* runs from the lower half of printed p. 818 (PDF 408) across to the top of printed p. 819 (PDF 409), ending immediately before *ARTICULUS UNICUS* / *QUAESTIO I.* at OCR line 39659. The handoff brief noted that lines 39659–39665 (the ARTICULUS UNICUS heading block) are intentionally left outside both this chunk and `d46-a1-q1` per the established d.46 pattern; this chunk respects that boundary.

**[?] flag**: [^5] tail clause "cod. Z *hanc positionem*" is reconstructed from a garbled OCR string (`cod. Z Aflflc positianem`); the Latin sense (codex Z reads *hanc positionem* for *hanc partem*) is clear from context (parallel `positio` ~ *partem*) but the exact siglum letter and the precise codex-Z lemma form were not eyes-on-resolved at 400 dpi — a 600 dpi crop of the printed footer 5 may be needed if the polish-pass insists on a verbatim rendering.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0