title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 6

title_alt: Whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to exterior effect only, or at the same time in respect to interior affect and effect

source_text:
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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum. Et quod penes utrumque, videtur:

1. Primae Ioannis tertio[^1]: *Diligamus non verbo neque lingua, sed opere et veritate:* non est ergo vera dilectio, nisi sit in corde et opere, in affectu et in effectu: ergo pari ratione non est verus dilectionis ordo, nisi penes illorum utrumque attendatur.

2. Item, Gregorius in quadam homilia[^2]: « Probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis »: ergo ubi est maior operis exhibitio, ibi probatur maior esse dilectio, et e converso: si ergo caritas ordinata est in diligendo, videtur, quod ordinari debeat in corde et in facto.

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3. Item, ordinatio in *effectu* ortum habet ab ordinatione in *affectu:* si ergo caritas ordinari debet in *effectu,* necesse est, quod primo ordinetur in *affectu.* Sed caritas ordinata est quantum ad *effectum,* sicut patet per illud quod dicit Apostolus[^3]: *Operemur bonum ad omnes, maxime autem ad domesticos:* ergo necesse est, caritatem ordinatam esse quantum ad *affectum.*

4. Item, « magis pensat Deus, *ex quanto* homo facit, quam *quantum* facit[^4] »: ergo si ordo caritatis est Deo acceptus, videtur, quod non solum consistat in opere exteriori, sed etiam in affectu interiori.

**Sed contra:**
1. Quod non consistat in *affectu,* videtur per illud quod dicitur in Proverbiis, decimo octavo[^5]: *Vir amicabilis ad societatem magis erit amicus quam frater;* sed constat, quod ista amicitia, de qua Sapiens loquitur, non adversatur ipsi caritati, immo potius est ei consona; sed secundum istam dicit, quod magis diligitur homo bonae societatis quam frater secundum carnem: videtur ergo, quod secundum praeassignatas differentias non attendatur ordo dilectionis quantum ad affectum.

2. Item, delectatio in familiaritate consequitur ad dilectionem et affectum diligendi[^6]; sed multi sunt, qui plus delectantur loqui cum amico suo quam per orationem loqui cum Deo: ergo videtur, quod nullus talis caritatem habeat ordinatam; quod valde durum videtur dicere.

3. Item, quod non attendatur penes *effectum,* videtur, quia multi sunt impotentes ad impendenda opera dilectionis: ergo tales non possunt habere ordinem caritatis; quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc.

4. Item, si ordo caritatis attendatur penes *effectum,* ergo recte et secundum ordinem caritatis agit qui praebendale beneficium potius dat suo consanguineo quam alicui extraneo; quod tamen reprehendit propheta Michaeas, tertio[^7]: *Vae! qui aedificat Sion in sanguinibus;* et Ezechiel, quadragesimo quarto: *Sufficiat vobis domus Israel, qui introducitis incircumcisos in sanctuarium Dei;* ubi reprehenduntur illi qui beneficia ecclesiastica magis conferunt domesticis quam aliis.

> ### Conclusio.
> Caritatis ordo respectu diligibilium diversorum non solum attenditur quantum ad effectum exteriorem, sed etiam quantum ad interiorem affectum, quod intelligitur, ceteris paribus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera[^8], aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod huiusmodi ordo caritatis attendatur solum quantum ad effectum exteriorem, non quantum ad affectum interiorem nisi per comparationem nostri ad Deum; per comparationem autem proximi ad proximum solum consistit ordo quantum ad exteriorem effectum. Et innituntur his auctoritatibus Augustini, quae in littera[^9] ponuntur, in quibus videtur expresse sentire, quod ordo caritatis respectu proximi attendatur solum in exterioris operis exhibitione. Et hoc ipsum videtur dicere in libro *de Vera Religione*[^10], ubi dicit, quod « haec est perfecta iustitia, ut plus potiora bona et minus minora diligamus ». Ex quo videtur posse elici, quod istae differentiae propinquitatis nihil faciant ad affectum dilectionis. — Verumtamen, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^11], et verba Ambrosii sonant, et rationes prius inductae comprobant, ordo caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum et unius proximi ad alterum non solum attenditur secundum effectum, verum etiam secundum affectum; et hoc idem intelligendum est, ceteris aliis paribus. Si enim in duobus dilectis est par dignitas et necessitas, quantum est de istis proprietatibus et conditionibus, aequaliter sunt amandi effectu et affectu; sed si in altero illorum superaddatur sanguinis propinquitas, facit ipsum magis amabilem utroque modo. Et isto modo intendit Ambrosius caritatis ordinem assignare respectu proximorum; quod notat, cum dicit[^12], « quod domestici, si boni sunt, malis filiis sunt praeponendi ».

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Et si tu quaeras: cum ad ordinem caritatis concurrant meriti dignitas et indigentiae opportunitas, sicut et *propinquitas*[^13], quare magis Ambrosius assignat ordinem caritatis penes propinquitatem quam penes bonitatem, vel indigentiae necessitatem? dicendum, quod conditio bonitatis nec est nobis ita nota nec est in se ita stabilis et firma, sicut propinquitatis conditio. Aliquis enim, qui hodie est malus, cras erit bonus, et qui hodie est minus bonus, cras forsassis erit melior; similiter est de necessitate et opportunitate. Ideo penes gradus necessitatis, bonitatis et opportunitatis non potuit ita certitudinaliter ordo caritatis assignari, sicut penes conditiones propinquitatis.

Concedendum est ergo, quod ordo caritatis secundum differentias praeassignatas non solum attenditur quantum ad *effectum exteriorem,* sed etiam quantum ad *affectum interiorem;* et hoc intelligendum est, *aliis paribus.* Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

Ad evidentiam autem rationum[^14], quae adducuntur in contrarium, notandum est, quod multipliciter contingit *affectum* nostrum accipi, et *effectum* multiplicem reperiri, ita quod ordo caritatis nec omnem *affectum* respicit uniformiter nec omnem *effectum.* Accipitur enim aliquando affectus pro *passione,* aliquando vero pro *motu,* ita quod affectus-passio dicitur quaedam mulcebris complacentia, affectus vero motus dicitur quaedam rationalis eligentia[^15]. — Affectus autem motus dupliciter adhuc accipitur. Nam quidam est a caritate *elicitus,* quidam vero *imperatus.* Affectus a caritate elicitus est ille quo quis optat alteri summum Bonum; affectus vero imperatus est ille quo quis optat alii aliquod bonum temporale, quod est ordinatum ad conservationem naturae. — Sic igitur triplex est affectus: unus a caritate elicitus, quo quidem opto alicui summum Bonum; alius imperatus, quo opto alicui aliquod bonum terrenum; tertius vero annexus, quo delector in alterius bono, qui magis tenet rationem passionis quam motus.

Et cum sit triplex[^16] affectus, ordo caritatis praeassignatus respicit affectum a caritate elicitum principaliter, quia magis mihi debeo optare beatam vitam quam alii; et post me magis patri meo quam alii, et sic ulterius procedendo. Affectum vero imperatum respicit minus principaliter; unde pro diversis opportunitatibus et conditionibus ordo quantum ad illum affectum potest variari et praeposterari. Affectum vero annexum, qui est passio mulcebris, minime respicit ordo caritatis; ille enim potius respicit sensibilem experientiam quam rationis eligentiam, sicut patet: quia plus delectatur aliquis et gaudet in respiciendo socium, quem videt praesentem, quam in recolendo patrem, qui absens est, quamvis ipsum magis diligat; cuius signum est, quod[^17] pro patre faceret multo maiora.

Similiter et ex parte *effectus* distinguendum est. Nam quidam est effectus sive beneficium, quod respicit utilitatem communem[^18], sicut collatio ecclesiastici beneficii; quoddam, quod respicit personam singularem, et istud duplex est: quoddam enim est, quod respicit animae salutem; aliud vero, quod respicit sustentationem vitae praesentis. Et sic triplex est effectus exterior: unus, qui est procuratio salutis aeternae; alius, qui est relevatio temporalis necessitatis; tertius vero, qui est commissio beneficii ecclesiastici, qui est quodam modo spiritualis. — Primum autem istorum effectuum respicit ordo caritatis principaliter; primo enim debeo procurare salutem meam[^19] quam salutem proximi, et primo salutem patris quam alicuius alterius, et sic deinceps procedendo. — Secundum vero effectum respicit minus principaliter, quia secundum diversas opportunitates potest et debet homo magis et minus esse beneficus in collatione alicuius commodi temporalis. — Tertium vero effectum, qui est collatio alicuius beneficii ecclesiastici, minime respicit ordo caritatis; in collatione enim talium beneficiorum multum attendenda est meriti dignitas, et parum aut nihil sanguinis proximitas. Verendum enim valde est, ne sub pallio caritatis affectus lateat carnalitatis. — Ex his patent omnia quae obiecta[^20] sunt.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de affectu amicabili, qui est ad socium magis quam ad fratrem: iam patet responsio: quia illud intelligitur de affectu, qui est cuiusdam mulcebris complacentiae, ratione cuius plus delectatur homo habitare[^21] cum bono socio quam cum fratre vel cum consanguineo.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc, quod plus delectatur homo loqui cum amico quam loqui cum Deo; similiter iam patet responsio: quia talis delectatio sequitur sensibilem experientiam; et quia proximum suum videt, Deum autem non videt: hinc est, quod plus delectatur aliquando alloqui proximum quam orare Deum, licet multo plus Deum diligat quam amicum suum. Licet autem iste affectus in viris carnalibus, qui huic mundo dediti sunt, aliquo modo sit tolerabilis; in viris tamen spiritualibus, quorum est experiri, quam *suavis et dulcis est Dominus*[^22], valde est reprehensibilis et cum magna diligentia debet exstirpari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod effectus non est in potestate nostra; dicendum, quod etsi non sit in potestate nostra effectum exterius impendere, est tamen in potestate nostra ipsum effectum velle; et quando voluntas perfecta est, pro facto reputatur[^23]: et ideo defectus potentiae in exsequendo non tollit ordinem caritatis, qui quantum ad effectum exteriorem habet attendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beneficio praebendali, iam patet responsio: quia quantum ad illum effectum[^24] minime, ut dictum est, attenditur caritatis ordo.

---

english:
### Question VI. *Whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect only, or at the same time in respect to affect and effect.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect only, or at the same time in respect to affect and effect. And that [it is attended to] in respect to both, seems [the case]:

1. First [Epistle] of John three[^1]: *Let us love not in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth:* therefore there is no true love unless it be in the heart and in the deed, in affect and in effect: therefore by parity of reasoning there is no true order of love unless it be attended to in respect to both of them.

2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily[^2]: « The proof of love is the showing forth of work »: therefore where there is a greater showing forth of work, there a greater love is proved [to be], and conversely: if therefore charity is ordered in loving, it seems that it ought to be ordered in the heart and in the deed.

3. Likewise, the ordering in *effect* takes its rise from the ordering in *affect:* if therefore charity ought to be ordered in *effect,* it is necessary that it first be ordered in *affect.* But charity is ordered as regards *effect,* as is evident by that which the Apostle says[^3]: *Let us work good toward all, but most of all toward those of the household:* therefore it is necessary that charity be ordered as regards *affect.*

4. Likewise, « God weighs more *from how much* a man does than *how much* he does[^4] »: therefore if the order of charity is acceptable to God, it seems that it consists not only in the exterior work, but also in the interior affect.

**On the contrary:**
1. That it does not consist in *affect,* seems [evident] by that which is said in Proverbs, the eighteenth[^5]: *A man friendly to society shall be more a friend than a brother;* but it is established that that friendship, of which the Wise Man speaks, is not opposed to charity itself, nay rather is consonant with it; but according to that [friendship] he says that a man of good society is loved more than a brother according to the flesh: it seems therefore that according to the aforeassigned differences the order of love is not attended to as regards affect.

2. Likewise, delight in familiarity follows upon the love and affect of loving[^6]; but there are many who delight more to speak with their friend than to speak with God through prayer: therefore it seems that no such person has ordered charity; which seems very hard to say.

3. Likewise, that it is not attended to in respect to *effect* seems [evident], because there are many who are powerless to expend the works of love: therefore such persons cannot have the order of charity; but if this is false, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, if the order of charity is attended to in respect to *effect,* then he acts rightly and according to the order of charity who gives a prebendal benefice rather to his blood-relation than to some stranger; which nevertheless the prophet Micah reproves, the third[^7]: *Woe! who builds Sion in bloods;* and Ezekiel, the forty-fourth: *Let the house of Israel suffice you, who bring in the uncircumcised into the sanctuary of God;* where those are reproved who confer ecclesiastical benefits more on those of the household than on others.

> ### Conclusion.
> The order of charity, in respect to diverse lovable [persons], is attended to not only as regards the exterior effect, but also as regards the interior affect, which is understood, other things being equal.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, according to what the Master says in the littera[^8], some have wished to say that this order of charity is attended to only as regards the exterior effect, not as regards the interior affect except by comparison of ourselves to God; but by comparison of one neighbor to another the order consists only as regards the exterior effect. And they rely on these authorities of Augustine, which are set down in the littera[^9], in which he seems expressly to hold that the order of charity in respect to the neighbor is attended to only in the showing forth of exterior work. And this same thing he seems to say in the book *On True Religion*[^10], where he says that « this is perfect justice, that we love the weightier goods more and the lesser goods less ». From which it seems possible to elicit that these differences of nearness do nothing toward the affect of love. — Nevertheless, as the Master says in the littera[^11], and the words of Ambrose sound forth, and the reasons adduced earlier confirm, the order of charity, by comparison of ourselves to the neighbor and of one neighbor to another, is attended to not only as regards effect, but also as regards affect; and this same thing is to be understood, all other things being equal. For if in two beloved [persons] there is equal dignity and need, as far as concerns these properties and conditions, they are to be loved equally in effect and in affect; but if in one of them there be superadded blood-nearness, it makes him more lovable in both ways. And in this way Ambrose intends to assign the order of charity in respect to neighbors; which he notes when he says[^12], « that those of the household, if they are good, are to be preferred to evil sons ».

And if you should ask: since to the order of charity there concur the dignity of merit and the opportuneness of need, as also *nearness*[^13], why does Ambrose assign the order of charity in respect to nearness rather than in respect to goodness, or the necessity of need? it must be said that the condition of goodness is neither so known to us nor in itself so stable and firm as the condition of nearness. For someone who today is evil, tomorrow will be good, and he who today is less good, tomorrow perhaps will be better; likewise it is concerning need and opportuneness. Therefore in respect to the degrees of need, goodness, and opportuneness the order of charity could not be assigned so certainly as in respect to the conditions of nearness.

It must therefore be granted that the order of charity, according to the aforeassigned differences, is attended to not only as regards the *exterior effect,* but also as regards the *interior affect;* and this is to be understood, *other things being equal.* Whence also the reasons which show this are to be granted.

But for the evidence of the reasons[^14] which are adduced to the contrary, it must be noted that our *affect* can be taken in manifold ways, and *effect* be found to be manifold, so that the order of charity neither regards every *affect* uniformly nor every *effect.* For affect is sometimes taken for a *passion,* but sometimes for a *motion,* so that affect-as-passion is called a certain soothing complacency, but affect-as-motion is called a certain rational choosing[^15]. — But affect-as-motion is further taken in two ways. For one is *elicited* from charity, but another *commanded.* Affect elicited from charity is that by which one wishes for another the highest Good; but affect commanded is that by which one wishes for another some temporal good, which is ordered to the conservation of nature. — Thus therefore affect is threefold: one elicited from charity, by which indeed I wish for someone the highest Good; another commanded, by which I wish for someone some earthly good; but a third annexed, by which I am delighted in another's good, which holds rather the character of passion than of motion.

And since affect is threefold[^16], the aforeassigned order of charity regards the affect elicited from charity principally, because I ought to wish the blessed life more for myself than for another; and after myself more for my father than for another, and so proceeding further. But it regards the commanded affect less principally; whence for diverse opportunenesses and conditions the order as regards that affect can be varied and reversed. But the annexed affect, which is a soothing passion, the order of charity by no means regards; for that [affect] regards rather sensible experience than the choosing of reason, as is evident: because one is more delighted and rejoices in looking upon a companion whom he sees present than in recalling a father who is absent, although he loves [the father] more; the sign of which is, that[^17] for the father he would do much greater things.

Likewise also on the part of *effect* a distinction must be made. For there is a certain effect or benefit which regards the common usefulness[^18], as the conferral of an ecclesiastical benefice; another which regards the individual person, and this is twofold: for there is one which regards the salvation of the soul; but another which regards the sustenance of the present life. And thus exterior effect is threefold: one, which is the procuring of eternal salvation; another, which is the relieving of temporal need; but a third, which is the committing of an ecclesiastical benefice, which is in a certain way spiritual. — But the first of these effects the order of charity regards principally; for I ought first to procure my own salvation[^19] rather than the salvation of my neighbor, and first the salvation of my father rather than of any other, and so proceeding thenceforth. — But it regards the second effect less principally, because according to diverse opportunenesses a man can and ought to be more and less beneficent in the conferral of some temporal advantage. — But the third effect, which is the conferral of some ecclesiastical benefice, the order of charity by no means regards; for in the conferral of such benefices the dignity of merit is much to be attended to, and little or nothing the nearness of blood. For it is greatly to be feared lest under the cloak of charity there lie hidden an affect of carnality. — From these things all the things which were objected[^20] are evident.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the friendly affect, which is toward a companion more than toward a brother: the response is already evident: because that is understood of the affect which is of a certain soothing complacency, by reason of which a man is more delighted to dwell[^21] with a good companion than with a brother or with a blood-relation.

2. To that which is objected concerning this, that a man is more delighted to speak with a friend than to speak with God; likewise the response is already evident: because such delight follows sensible experience; and because he sees his neighbor, but does not see God: hence it is that he is sometimes more delighted to address his neighbor than to pray to God, although he loves God much more than his friend. But although this affect in carnal men, who are given over to this world, is in some way tolerable; in spiritual men, however, whose [part] it is to experience how *sweet and gentle is the Lord*[^22], it is very reprehensible and ought to be rooted out with great diligence.

3. To that which is objected, that the effect is not in our power; it must be said that even if it is not in our power to expend the effect outwardly, it is nevertheless in our power to will the effect itself; and when the will is perfect, it is reputed as the deed[^23]: and therefore the defect of power in carrying out does not take away the order of charity, which as regards the exterior effect has to be attended to.

4. To that which is objected concerning the prebendal benefice, the response is already evident: because as regards that effect[^24] the order of charity is by no means attended to, as has been said.

---

la: [p.649, footer 4] Vers. 18. — Proxime ante pro *effectum tantum,* codd. et edd. *affectum tantum,* sed minus bene, ut non solum ex verbis Magistri, verum etiam ex hac ipsa quaest. palam fit. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 637, nota 5.

en: [p.649, footer 4] Verse 18. — Just before, for *effectum tantum,* the codices and editions [read] *affectum tantum,* but less well, as is plain not only from the words of the Master, but also from this very question. Cf. also above, page 637, note 5.

la: [p.649, footer 5] Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 1.

en: [p.649, footer 5] Book II of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 30, n. 1.

la: [p.650, footer 1] Gal. 6, 10. — Verbo *domesticos* codd. A K et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. a. 6. cum Vulgata adiiciunt *fidei.* Paulo ante pro *quod primo* edd. habent *quod prius.*

en: [p.650, footer 1] Galatians 6:10. — To the word *domesticos* codices A K and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, a. 6, with the Vulgate add *fidei.* A little before, for *quod primo* the editions have *quod prius.*

la: [p.650, footer 2] Secundum Gregor. et Bedam; cfr. tom. II. pag. 906, nota 6. — Mox pro dativo *Deo* non pauci codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *in Deo.*

en: [p.650, footer 2] According to Gregory and Bede; cf. tome II, page 906, note 6. — Soon after, for the dative *Deo* not a few codices and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales [read] *in Deo.*

en: [p.650, footer 3] Verse 24.

la: [p.650, footer 4] Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 8: *Laetari enim ex affectionibus animae est; unicuique autem id est iucundum, ad quod spectando talis rei studiosus quispiam dicitur, ut equus equorum, spectaculum spectaculorum studioso* etc. — Pro *delectatio,* quae lectio habetur in codd. A W et in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., edd. cum aliis codd. *dilectio.*

en: [p.650, footer 4] Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 8: *For to rejoice is [a thing] of the affections of the soul; but to each that is pleasant, in respect to looking upon which anyone is called studious of such a thing, as the horse [is studious] of horses, the spectacle of spectacles to the one studious [of them],* etc. — For *delectatio,* which reading is had in codices A W and in the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, the editions with other codices [read] *dilectio.*

la: [p.650, footer 5] Vers. 10: *Qui aedificatis Sion in sanguinibus.* Edd. allegant *Habacuc* (2, 12: *Vae, qui aedificat civitatem in sanguinibus*). Nonnulli codd. perperam citant *Isaiam.* Pro *Michaeas,* tertio cod. W substituit *dicens.* — Seq. Script. locus est Ezech. 44, 6. seq.: *Sufficiant vobis omnia scelera vestra, domus Israel, eo quod inducitis filios alienos incircumcisos corde et incircumcisos carne, ut sint in sanctuario meo* etc. — Pro *quod tamen* codd. A K *quem multum.*

en: [p.650, footer 5] Verse 10: *You who build Sion in bloods.* The editions cite *Habakkuk* (2:12: *Woe, who builds a city in bloods*). Some codices wrongly cite *Isaiah.* For *Micah,* the third, codex W substituted *saying.* — The following Scripture passage is Ezekiel 44:6 f.: *Let all your wickednesses suffice you, house of Israel, in that you bring in foreign sons uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, that they may be in my sanctuary,* etc. — For *quod tamen* codices A K [read] *quem multum.*

la: [p.650, footer 6] Hic c. 2. — Post pauca pro *attendatur* codd. I K L U bb *attenditur.*

en: [p.650, footer 6] Here c. 2. — A little after, for *attendatur* codices I K L U bb [read] *attenditur.*

la: [p.650, footer 7] Hic c. 2. — Paulo ante pro *innituntur his* cod. Z bene *innituntur hi.*

en: [p.650, footer 7] Here c. 2. — A little before, for *innituntur his* codex Z rightly [reads] *innituntur hi.*

la: [p.650, footer 8] Cap. 48. n. 93: *Et haec est perfecta iustitia, qua potius potiora et minus minora diligimus.*

en: [p.650, footer 8] Chapter 48, n. 93: *And this is perfect justice, by which we love the weightier things more and the lesser things less.*

la: [p.650, footer 9] Hic c. 2, ubi et verba Ambrosii (Origenis) inveniuntur. Cfr. Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 50. n. 2. seqq., et Comment. in Cantic. ex Bernardo (inter opera Bernardi), n. 33. — Paulo post pro *prius* edd. *primo.*

en: [p.650, footer 9] Here c. 2, where also the words of Ambrose (Origen) are found. Cf. Bernard, *Sermons on the Canticle,* sermon 50, n. 2 ff., and the *Commentary on the Canticle from Bernard* (among the works of Bernard), n. 33. — A little after, for *prius* the editions [read] *primo.*

la: [p.650, footer 10] Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: [p.650, footer 10] Here in the littera of the Master, c. 2.

la: [p.651, footer 1] Vide quaest. praeced. in fine corp. et infra dub. 3.

en: [p.651, footer 1] See the preceding question at the end of the body, and below, dubium 3.

la: [p.651, footer 2] Pro *rationum* cod. Z *omnium eorum,* qui etiam superius pro *aliis paribus* legit *ceteris paribus.*

en: [p.651, footer 2] For *rationum* codex Z [reads] *omnium eorum,* which also above for *aliis paribus* reads *ceteris paribus.*

la: [p.651, footer 3] Cfr. supra d. 17. dub. 1. — Pro *eligentia* codd. A K T *diligentia.* Adiectivo *mulcebris* utitur etiam Alanus de Insulis (de Planctu naturae), de *amore* cantans: « Mulcebris infernus, tristis paradisus »; cfr. etiam Ioan. Salisburensis, l. Polycraticus (Migne, Patrol. lat. t. 199 col. 414.).

en: [p.651, footer 3] Cf. above, d. 17, dubium 1. — For *eligentia* codices A K T [read] *diligentia.* The adjective *mulcebris* (soothing) is used also by Alan of Lille (*On the Complaint of Nature*), singing of *love*: « A soothing hell, a sad paradise »; cf. also John of Salisbury, the *Policraticus* (Migne, *Patrologia Latina* t. 199, col. 414).

la: [p.651, footer 4] Pro *triplex affectus* cod. C et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *triplex ratio affectus,* multi codd. *triplex respectu* (*respectus?*) *affectus.* Paulo superius pro *tertius vero* cod. bb *tertius est.*

en: [p.651, footer 4] For *triplex affectus* codex C and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales [read] *triplex ratio affectus,* many codices *triplex respectu* (*respectus?*) *affectus.* A little above, for *tertius vero* codex bb [reads] *tertius est.*

la: [p.651, footer 5] Codd. A K *quia.* Mox pro *multo maiora* edd. cum paucis codd. *multa maiora.*

en: [p.651, footer 5] Codices A K [read] *quia.* Soon after, for *multo maiora* the editions with a few codices [read] *multa maiora.*

la: [p.651, footer 6] Edd. ordinem membrorum invertunt ponentes primo et secundo loco, quae codd. secundo et tertio loco exhibent. Pro *respicit utilitatem communem* edd. 1, 2 *respicit personam spiritualem communem,* Vat. *respicit personam spiritualem communem vel utilitatem communem.*

en: [p.651, footer 6] The editions invert the order of the members, placing in the first and second place what the codices exhibit in the second and third place. For *respicit utilitatem communem* editions 1, 2 [read] *respicit personam spiritualem communem,* the Vatican [edition] *respicit personam spiritualem communem vel utilitatem communem.*

la: [p.651, footer 7] Cod. Z *propriam.*

en: [p.651, footer 7] Codex Z [reads] *propriam.*

la: [p.651, footer 8] Edd. *dicta.*

en: [p.651, footer 8] The editions [read] *dicta.*

la: [p.651, footer 9] Cod. F *loqui et habitare.*

en: [p.651, footer 9] Codex F [reads] *loqui et habitare.*

la: [p.652, footer 1] Psalm. 33, 9. — Paulo superius pro *amicum suum* cod. Z *proximum suum.*

en: [p.652, footer 1] Psalm 33:9. — A little above, for *amicum suum* codex Z [reads] *proximum suum.*

en: [p.652, footer 2] Cf. *II Sentences,* d. 40, a. 1, q. 3.

la: [p.652, footer 3] Edd. *affectum.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: [p.652, footer 3] The editions [read] *affectum.* — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi two-column PDF (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p649-R-*.png` for the opener + fund.1–2, `vol3-p650-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p651-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p652-{L,R}-*.png`), with the Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum, and footers (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters these regions). IA djvu OCR (raw 45162–45326) used as base only for the clean running fundamenta/contra prose and exact footnote-marker spacing. English freshly translated literally.

**Page span.** q6 opens at the FOOT of printed p.649 R-col (PDF 671), BELOW q5's SCHOLION — the q5/q6 boundary falls inside printed p.649. Runs p.649 (opener + fund.1–2) → p.650 (fund.3–4, contra 1–4, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo opener) → p.651 (Respondeo cont.: *Quaestio incidens* + triplex *affectus*/triplex *effectus* + Epilogus + Solutio 1) → p.652 (Solutio 2–4). q6 ends with Solutio 4 (*…minime, ut dictum est, attenditur caritatis ordo.*) at the foot of p.652 R-col, immediately before the full-width **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** header (printed p.652, raw ~45327). q6 is the LAST quaestio of d.29's single article (ARTICULUS UNICUS); after it the article slate closes and the d.29 dubia begin.

**Apparatus (24 markers, 1–24 in body order).** Per-page Quaracchi footer numbers are bracketed in every entry.
- p.649 footer nn.4–5 → markers 1–2 (received from q5; n.4 = Vers.18 / 1 John 3:18 on fund.1, n.5 = Gregory homily on fund.2).
- p.650 footer nn.1–10 → markers 3–12 (n.1 Gal.6:10 on fund.3; n.2 Gregor./Beda on fund.4; n.3 Prov 18:24 on contra 1; n.4 Aristot. Ethic. on contra 2; n.5 Michaeas/Ezech. on contra 4; nn.6–10 = Respondeo: *Magister in littera*, *in littera ponuntur*, *de Vera Religione*, *Magister in littera*, *cum dicit*).
- p.651 footer nn.1–9 → markers 13–21 (n.1 *Quaestio incidens* propinquitas; n.2 *rationum*; n.3 *rationalis eligentia* + Alanus/Ioan. Salisb.; n.4 *triplex affectus*; n.5 *cuius signum est*; n.6 *utilitatem communem*; n.7 *salutem meam*; n.8 *quae obiecta*; n.9 Solutio 1 *delectatur homo habitare*).
- p.652 footer nn.1–3 → markers 22–24 (n.1 Ps 33:9 on Solutio 2; n.2 *II Sent. d.40* on Solutio 3; n.3 *Edd. affectum / Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* on Solutio 4).

**Alignment verified (PASS).** Opener reads *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum* — correctly q6 (no auto-chunker q-swap), topic = exterior effect vs. interior affect-and-effect, matching the briefed band (*…consistat in opere exteriori, sed etiam in affectu interiori; Sed contra: 1. Quod non consistat in affectu*). Title verified verbatim from the full-width QUAESTIO VI band straddling p.649 L/R cols: *Utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum.*

**Scholion — ABSENT (`has_scholion: false`).** There is NO `SCHOLION.` header inside q6's range (p.649 R-col foot through p.652 R-col, ending at the DUBIA header). q5's printed scholion §III already forwarded to this question (« Conclusio sequentis (6.) quaestionis conformis est principiis communiter approbatis… De eadem quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. »), so the editor placed no fresh scholion at q6; the q6 apparatus's own [^24] redirects « Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. » This is a *Vide-scholion-redirect* situation, not a dropped scholion — confirmed eyes-on across all four pages' bands.

**q5 → q6 footer hand-off (RECEIVED + consumed).** q5 forwarded p.649 footers nn.4–5 (n.4 = Vers.18 / effectum-tantum variant on q6 fund.1; n.5 = Gregory's *Homil. in Evang.* 30 on q6 fund.2). Consumed in full as markers 1–2.

**q6 → d29-dubia footer hand-off (FORWARDED).** The q6/dubia boundary falls inside printed p.652. q6 owns p.652 footers nn.1–3 (markers 22–24, anchoring Solutio 2–4). **p.652 footers nn.4–6 (and the per-page restart that continues on the dubia) belong to `bon-sent-III-d29-dubia`** — n.4 (Aristot. I. Ethic. c. 2: *Nam si etiam et uni homini et civitati bonum idem sit…* on Dub. I), n.5 (Cod. U *supereminentem proprietatem*; Paulo inferius pro *non meretur* edd. *non mereor.* on Dub. I), n.6 (the *auctoritas Magistri in littera* ref on Dub. I). The DUBIA block restarts its own footer numbering; the dubia chunk should re-derive its sequence eyes-on, claiming p.652 nn.4–6 first.

**[?] flags.** None outstanding (450 dpi legible throughout all four pages; running heads OCR digit-mangled — *6S0*=650, *632*=652 — trusted via +22 offset + running-head text *DIST. XXIX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI* on p.651). The marginal side-notes printed in the Respondeo (*Quaestio incidens solvitur*, *Epilogus*, *Praenotanda ad solutionem oppositorum*, *Triplex affectus*, *Subdistinctio*, *Axiomata tria*, *Triplex effectus exterior*, *Solutio oppositorum*) are editorial margin glosses (per CLAUDE.md OCR-cleanup rule) and are not transcribed into the body.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 29, Dubia

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Peccat qui praepostere agit.* Videtur enim esse falsum. Ponatur enim, quod aliquis exponat se morti pro salute alterius melioris se, et sustineat penuriam, ut alii meliori se provideat ad sufficientiam; praemittit sibi alium, et tamen non videtur contra caritatem facere, immo valde caritative procedere. — Item, esto quod faciam patri quidquid debeo, non obligor ad faciendum ei amplius: ergo si plus facio alii quam sibi, non praeiudico ei nec ordini caritatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam est praeposteratio huius ordinis *ex* debita causa, quaedam *praeter* causam, quaedam *contra* debitam causam. Tunc est praeposteratio *ex* debita causa, quando quis bonum commune praeponit bono proprio in temporalibus; et haec quidem praeposteratio facit ad meriti cumulum, et licet videatur praeposteratio, multo magis est perfectior ordinatio[^p652-4]. — Alia est praeposteratio *praeter* causam debitam, uti si ex sola liberalitate voluntatis meae magis me exhibeam alicui extraneo quam domestico et consanguineo, et etiam patri meo, considerando in ipso aliquam strenuitatem[^p652-5] magis quam Dei voluntatem, aut meriti dignitatem; et haec praeposteratio aufert meritum, quia in hoc non meretur. — Tertia vero est praeposteratio *contra* debitam causam, utpote si pater meus magis indigeat, et ego possim ei subvenire, et ipso neglecto, subveniam extraneo; et ista inducit peccatum, et de hac intelligitur auctoritas Magistri in littera[^p652-6]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius in littera: *Multorum caritas inordinata est.* Contra: caritas non potest esse informis, sed semper formata[^p652-7]; et caritas formata semper est ordinata: ergo implicantur opposita, cum dicitur *caritas inordinata.* — Item, videtur male dicere in hoc quod subdit: *quod in primo est ponunt tertium, vel quartum.* Si enim primo diligendus est Deus, et qui praeponunt aliquid Deo non habent caritatem; videtur, quod male dicat, quod aliqui habent caritatem inordinatam, ex eo quod ponunt Deum tertio, vel quarto loco.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomen caritatis accipitur *large* et *proprie: large* ad quamcumque dilectionem, quae multum habet amatum carum; et ista potest esse ordinata, vel inordinata[^p652-8]; ipse autem obiicit de caritate *proprie* sumta.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illis sex gradibus, quos ponit Magister ibi: *Ante omnia Deum, deinde nos ipsos, post parentes, deinde filios, deinde domesticos, postmodum inimicos diligamus.* Videtur enim in hac distinctione Magister, immo Ambrosius[^p652-9], esse *superfluus,* primo, quia Augustinus non enumerat nisi quatuor gradus, hic autem enumerat sex: ergo videtur, si Augustinus non est *diminutus,* quod iste sit *superfluus. Si tu dicas,* quod sub uno illorum membrorum, videlicet sub dilectione proximi, continentur quatuor de illis membris; *ostenditur* tunc, quod sit

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diminutus, quia dilectio corporis nostri ibi non tangitur. — Item, sicut gradus sunt in dilectione proximorum, sic videtur esse in dilectione Dei: quia multum debemus diligere Deum creatorem, et amplius recreatorem, et maxime glorificatorem: ergo insufficienter assignat gradus dilectionis. — Item, multae aliae sunt conditiones, in quibus membra Christi invicem coniunguntur praeter praedictas, videlicet relatio *uxoris* ad virum, *discipuli* ad magistrum, *domini* ad servum, *subditi* ad praelatum, quas omnes omittit Ambrosius: ergo videtur insufficienter diligendorum ordinem assignare.

Quaeritur ergo de numero et sufficientia ipsorum graduum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dictum fuit[^p653-1], ordo ab Augustino assignatus respicit ipsam caritatem *secundum se;* ideo attenditur secundum principales differentias boni, quae sunt bonum *supra* nos et *intra* nos et *iuxta* nos et *infra* nos. Ordo autem Ambrosii respicit ipsam caritatem, prout est *in natura,* quam dirigit et regit; et hic non tantum attenditur penes *differentias boni,* sed etiam penes *rationem* proprii et alieni, propinqui et remoti: et hic ordo multiplicatur in sex differentias.

Nam caritas aut respicit bonum *simpliciter,* quod est summum Bonum, et sic est *primus* gradus; aut respicit bonum *proprium,* et sic est gradus *secundus*[^p653-2]; aut respicit bonum *alienum* ut sibi coniunctum, et sic quadruplex est gradus, secundum quod quadruplex est differentia *modi coniungendi.* Aut enim est coniunctio in *naturae conformitate,* et sic est *ultimus* gradus, qui attenditur in dilectione inimicorum; aut in *naturae conformitate* et *conversationis familiaritate,* et sic est *penultimus*[^p653-3], qui attenditur in dilectione domesticorum; aut in *his* et praeter haec in *sanguinis propinquitate,* et haec potest esse dupliciter: aut in *ascendendo,* et sic est filii ad patrem; aut in *descendendo,* et sic est patris ad filium, et penes haec accipiuntur duo gradus *intermedii.* — Et sic patet numerus et sufficientia illorum sex graduum, patet etiam dissolutio obiectorum.

Ad illud enim quod obiicitur de Augustino, iam patet responsio, quia aliter assignatur ordo diligendorum ab Augustino, aliter ab Ambrosio.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilectione corporis nostri, dicendum, quod haec reducitur ad dilectionem sui.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod gradus sunt in dilectione Dei; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia unus est Deus dilectus, et illae non sunt nisi rationes moventes ad Deum diligendum et inducentes nos secundum plus et minus, quae tamen non constituunt ex parte dilecti diversitatem graduum[^p653-4].

Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis conditionibus, secundum quas attenditur vinculum et coniunctio; dicendum, quod omnes possunt reduci ad istas. Nam uxor, cum sit caro viri[^p653-5], et e converso, reducitur ad dilectionem sui; pater vero spiritualis reducitur ad dilectionem patris naturalis; ceteri consanguinei ad dilectionem filii; dominus et servus, magister et discipulus ad domesticos referuntur. Et sic patet, quod nihil superfluum, nihil etiam diminutum in praedictis gradibus continetur[^p653-6].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de solutione illius quaestionis, quam Magister proponit ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri: si parentes nostri mali sunt* etc. Rationes enim videntur esse ad utramque partem. Ratione enim propinquitatis videtur, quod mali parentes praeferendi sint bonis extraneis, cum parentes ponantur in tertio gradu[^p653-7]; ratione vero bonitatis videtur contrarium. Et *si tu respondeas,* quod non est contrarietas, quia diversis respectibus possunt invicem sibi praeponi et habent se sicut excedentia et excessa; hoc non solvit, quia adhuc restat quaestio, quod illorum magis excellit, utrum bonitas, vel propinquitas. Et quod bonitas, videtur, cum caritas per se et primo respiciat bonitatem. Quod iterum propinquitas, videtur, quia penes illam attenditur et assignatur ordo caritatis[^p653-8].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est amor *complacentiae* et amor *beneficentiae.* Amore *complacentiae* amat quis aliquem, quando eius facta acceptat et ipsum approbat et in bonitate eius complacet sibi. Amore vero *beneficentiae* amat quis aliquem, quando vult ei benefacere et diligit eum, non tantum *quia*[^p653-9] sit bonus, sed *ut* sit bonus. Quantum ad primum amorem ponderat *bonitas,* quantum ad secundum ponderat *propinquitas.* Unde esto, quod pater meus sit malus, et alius extraneus sit bonus; magis debeo velle et desiderare et procurare, quod pater meus sit bonus et in caritate permaneat quam alius extraneus, licet ipsum et facta eius, quamdiu est in statu peccati, non debeam approbare[^p653-10]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta.

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### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Perfecta caritas haec est, ut quis paratus sit pro fratribus mori.* Obiicitur enim contra hoc: quia, si haec est perfecta caritas, ut sit paratus pro fratribus mori; cum homo[^p654-1] in imperfecta caritate consistens non sit paratus mori pro Deo, videtur, quod perfectus amplius diligat *proximum,* quam imperfectus *Deum.* Sed in contrarium huius est: quia caritas quantumcumque parva diligit Deum propter se et super omnia; hoc autem perfectus nunquam facit proximo.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum caritas sit nobilissimum opus Dei, et Dei perfecta sint opera[^p654-2]; videtur, quod omnis caritas sit perfecta: male ergo hic distinguitur per *perfectum* et *imperfectum.*

Iuxta hoc etiam posset quaeri, quomodo caritas imperfecta habeat perfici et augeri; sed hoc fuit determinatum in primo libro, distinctione decima septima, et secundo, distinctione vigesima septima[^p654-3].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *signum* perfectae caritatis et *effectus* est promptitudo moriendi pro fratre; ista tamen promptitudo non inest caritati solummodo ex dilectione fratris, sed ex dilectione fratris relata ad dilectionem Dei, quem perfectus propter se et super omnia diligit et ob cuius amorem etiam pro ipso fratre vult mori. Ideo, quamvis hoc non reperiatur in viro imperfecto respectu *Dei,* non tamen sequitur, quod minus diligat Deum, quam perfectus proximum, sed quod minor est dilectio unius respectu Dei quam alterius[^p654-4].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas semper est perfecta; dicendum, quod *perfectum* dicitur dupliciter: vel *in se,* vel *in ordine*[^p654-5]. Loquendo de perfectione *in se,* caritas in sui principio est imperfecta, sed per crementum perficitur. Loquendo autem de perfectione *ordinis,* qua quidem perfectione omnia opera Dei dicuntur esse perfecta; sic caritas, in quocumque statu sit, perfectionem habet, quia ordinata est in suum finem et potest[^p654-6] elicere debitam operationem. — Aliter distinguitur perfectio *sufficientiae* et *excellentiae,* sive perfectio secundum *naturam* et secundum *tempus,* sicut in secundo libro, distinctione quarta[^p654-7] est explanatum.

### Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod caritas, cum ad perfectionem venerit, dicit: *Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo.* Contra hoc est, quia beatus Martinus[^p654-8], qui valde perfectam habebat caritatem, in morte dicebat: « Domine, si adhuc populo tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem ». — Item, hoc ipsum videtur per rationem, quia maioris perfectionis signum est appetere laborare et affligi pro aliquo, quam appetere quiescere cum eo: ergo videtur, quod ad perfectam caritatem non pertineat dicere: *Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo,* sed magis: cupio laborare pro Christo[^p654-9].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod desiderium quiescendi cum Christo potest venire ex duplici causa: vel propter *taedium malorum praesentium,* vel propter *contemptum terrenorum* et abundantem *praegustationem caelestium.* Primo modo est signum *imperfectionis,* non perfectionis, quia sic recusat laborare; secundo modo signum est *perfectionis,* quia non recusat laborare, sed spiritus tanto amoris Christi desiderio stringitur, quod vix potest inter se et Deum interpositionem corporalis parietis sustinere; unde hoc signum est, quod amat Deum perfecte. — Alia vero, quae dicuntur in littera, satis sunt plana, et quaedam ex eis[^p654-10] satis declarabuntur in distinctione proxima.

---

english:
# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Dub. I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that which he says: *He sins who acts in reverse order.* For it seems to be false. For suppose that someone exposes himself to death for the salvation of another better than himself, and endures want, in order that he may provide for another better than himself unto sufficiency; he puts another before himself, and yet he does not seem to act against charity, nay rather to proceed very charitably. — Likewise, granted that I do for my father whatever I owe, I am not obliged to do more for him: therefore if I do more for another than for him, I neither do him an injury nor [an injury to] the order of charity.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain reversal of this order *from* a due cause, a certain [reversal] *beside* a cause, a certain [reversal] *against* a due cause. There is a reversal *from* a due cause when one prefers the common good to his own good in temporal things; and this reversal indeed makes for the heaping-up of merit, and although it may seem a reversal, it is much more a more perfect ordering[^p652-4]. — Another is a reversal *beside* the due cause, as if from the mere liberality of my own will I show myself more to some stranger than to one of the household and a blood-relation, and even to my father, considering in him some strenuousness[^p652-5] rather than the will of God, or the dignity of merit; and this reversal takes away merit, because in this he does not merit. — But the third is a reversal *against* a due cause, namely if my father be more in need, and I am able to come to his aid, and, neglecting him, I come to the aid of a stranger; and this brings about sin, and of this is understood the authority of the Master in the littera[^p652-6]. — And by this the response to the objections is evident.

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which Ambrose says in the littera: *The charity of many is disordered.* On the contrary: charity cannot be unformed, but is always formed[^p652-7]; and formed charity is always ordered: therefore opposites are implied when *charity* is called *disordered.* — Likewise, he seems to speak badly in that which he subjoins: *that in the first place they put the third, or the fourth.* For if God is first to be loved, and those who put anything before God do not have charity; it seems that he speaks badly [in saying] that some have disordered charity from the fact that they put God in the third, or fourth place.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name of charity is taken *broadly* and *properly: broadly* for any love whatsoever which holds a beloved [object] greatly dear; and this can be ordered, or disordered[^p652-8]; but he objects concerning charity taken *properly.*

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning those six grades, which the Master sets down there: *Before all things let us love God, then ourselves, after [that] our parents, then our children, then those of the household, lastly our enemies.* For in this distinction the Master, nay rather Ambrose[^p652-9], seems to be *superfluous,* first, because Augustine enumerates only four grades, but here he enumerates six: therefore it seems, if Augustine is not *deficient,* that this one is *superfluous. If you say* that under one of those members, namely under the love of neighbor, four of those members are contained; *it is shown* then that it is

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deficient, because the love of our own body is not touched upon there. — Likewise, as there are grades in the love of neighbors, so it seems there are in the love of God: because we ought to love God the creator much, and the recreator more, and the glorifier most: therefore he insufficiently assigns the grades of love. — Likewise, there are many other conditions in which the members of Christ are joined to one another besides the aforesaid, namely the relation of *wife* to husband, of *disciple* to master, of *lord* to servant, of *subject* to prelate, all of which Ambrose omits: therefore he seems to assign the order of those-to-be-loved insufficiently.

It is asked therefore concerning the number and sufficiency of these grades.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was said[^p653-1], the order assigned by Augustine regards charity itself *in itself;* therefore it is attended to according to the principal differences of good, which are the good *above* us and *within* us and *beside* us and *below* us. But the order of Ambrose regards charity itself, as it is *in nature,* which it directs and rules; and here it is attended to not only in respect to the *differences of good,* but also in respect to the *account* of one's own and another's, of near and far: and here the order is multiplied into six differences.

For charity either regards good *simply,* which is the highest Good, and thus it is the *first* grade; or it regards one's *own* good, and thus it is the *second*[^p653-2] grade; or it regards *another's* good as joined to oneself, and thus the grade is fourfold, according as the difference of the *mode of joining* is fourfold. For either there is a joining in *the conformity of nature,* and thus it is the *last* grade, which is attended to in the love of enemies; or in *the conformity of nature* and *the familiarity of common life,* and thus it is the *next-to-last*[^p653-3], which is attended to in the love of those of the household; or in *these* and beyond these in *the nearness of blood,* and this can be in two ways: either in *ascending,* and thus it is [the love] of son toward father; or in *descending,* and thus it is [the love] of father toward son, and in respect to these two *intermediate* grades are taken. — And thus the number and sufficiency of those six grades is evident, the dissolution of the objections is also evident.

For to that which is objected concerning Augustine, the response is already evident, because the order of those-to-be-loved is assigned in one way by Augustine, in another by Ambrose.

To that which is objected concerning the love of our own body, it must be said that this is reduced to the love of oneself.

But to that which is objected, that there are grades in the love of God; it must be said that it is false, because there is one God [who is] loved, and those [grades] are nothing but accounts moving toward the loving of God and leading us according to more and less, which nevertheless do not constitute on the part of the [object] loved a diversity of grades[^p653-4].

To that which is objected concerning the other conditions according to which the bond and conjunction is attended to; it must be said that all can be reduced to these. For the wife, since she is the flesh of the husband[^p653-5], and conversely, is reduced to the love of oneself; but the spiritual father is reduced to the love of the natural father; the other blood-relations to the love of the son; lord and servant, master and disciple are referred to those of the household. And thus it is evident that nothing superfluous, nothing also deficient, is contained in the aforesaid grades[^p653-6].

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the solution of that question which the Master proposes there: *It is also wont to be asked: if our parents are evil* etc. For there seem to be reasons on either side. For by reason of nearness it seems that evil parents are to be preferred to good strangers, since parents are placed in the third grade[^p653-7]; but by reason of goodness the contrary seems [the case]. And *if you should respond* that there is no contrariety, because by diverse respects they can be preferred to one another and stand as exceeding and exceeded; this does not solve [it], because the question still remains, which of them more excels, whether goodness, or nearness. And that [it is] goodness, seems [the case], since charity through itself and first regards goodness. That again [it is] nearness, seems [the case], because in respect to it the order of charity is attended to and assigned[^p653-8].

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a love of *complacency* and a love of *beneficence.* By the love of *complacency* one loves someone when he accepts his deeds and approves him and takes complacency in his goodness. But by the love of *beneficence* one loves someone when he wishes to do him good and loves him, not only *because*[^p653-9] he is good, but *that* he may be good. As regards the first love, *goodness* weighs; as regards the second, *nearness* weighs. Whence granted that my father be evil, and some other stranger be good; I ought more to will and desire and procure that my father be good and remain in charity than [that] some other stranger [should], although I ought not to approve him and his deeds so long as he is in the state of sin[^p653-10]. — And by this the response to the proposed question is evident, the response to the objections is also evident.

<!-- page 654 -->

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *This is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren.* For it is objected against this: that, if this is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren; since a man[^p654-1] established in imperfect charity is not ready to die for God, it seems that the perfect [man] loves his *neighbor* more than the imperfect [man loves] *God.* But against this is: that charity, however small, loves God for His own sake and above all things; but this the perfect [man] never does toward his neighbor.

Alongside this it is asked: since charity is the noblest work of God, and the works of God are perfect[^p654-2]; it seems that all charity is perfect: badly therefore is it here distinguished by *perfect* and *imperfect.*

Alongside this also it could be asked how imperfect charity has [the capacity] to be perfected and increased; but this was determined in the first book, distinction seventeen, and in the second, distinction twenty-seven[^p654-3].

**I respond:** It must be said that the *sign* of perfect charity and [its] *effect* is the readiness of dying for a brother; yet this readiness is not in charity from the love of a brother alone, but from the love of a brother referred to the love of God, whom the perfect [man] loves for His own sake and above all things and for love of whom he wishes to die even for the brother himself. Therefore, although this is not found in an imperfect man in respect to *God,* it nevertheless does not follow that he loves God less than the perfect [man] loves his neighbor, but that the love of the one is less in respect to God than [the love] of the other[^p654-4].

To that which is objected, that charity is always perfect; it must be said that *perfect* is said in two ways: either *in itself,* or *in order*[^p654-5]. Speaking of perfection *in itself,* charity in its beginning is imperfect, but is perfected by increase. But speaking of the perfection *of order,* by which perfection indeed all the works of God are said to be perfect; thus charity, in whatever state it be, has perfection, because it is ordered to its end and can[^p654-6] elicit the due operation. — Otherwise perfection is distinguished into [that] of *sufficiency* and [that] of *excellence,* or perfection according to *nature* and according to *time,* as was explained in the second book, distinction four[^p654-7].

### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that charity, when it shall have come to perfection, says: *I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.* Against this is, that blessed Martin[^p654-8], who had very perfect charity, said at death: « Lord, if I am still necessary to your people, I do not refuse the labor ». — Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason, because it is a sign of greater perfection to desire to labor and be afflicted for someone than to desire to rest with him: therefore it seems that it does not pertain to perfect charity to say: *I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ,* but rather: I desire to labor for Christ[^p654-9].

**I respond:** It must be said that the desire of resting with Christ can come from a twofold cause: either on account of *weariness of present evils,* or on account of *contempt of earthly things* and an abundant *foretaste of heavenly things.* In the first way it is a sign of *imperfection,* not of perfection, because thus he refuses to labor; in the second way it is a sign of *perfection,* because he does not refuse to labor, but the spirit is bound by so great a longing of the love of Christ that it can scarcely endure the interposition of the bodily wall between itself and God; whence this is a sign that he loves God perfectly. — But the other things which are said in the littera are plain enough, and certain of them[^p654-10] will be sufficiently explained in the next distinction.

---

la: Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2: *Nam si etiam et uni homini et civitati bonum idem sit, bonum tamen civitatis et acquirere et conservare maius quid ac divinius videtur. Ac contentus quidem esse etiam unusquisque potest, si uni soli; pulcrius tamen ac divinius, si genti ac civitatibus bonum efficiatur.* — Pro *multo magis* multi codd. *multo maior,* edd. tamen *multo maior,* cod. R *multo maior et perfectior ordinatur.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 2: *For even if the same good be both for one man and for a city, yet to acquire and conserve the good of a city seems something greater and more divine. And indeed each individual can also be content if [it be done] for one alone; yet it is more beautiful and more divine if the good be brought about for a nation and for cities.* — For *multo magis* many codices [read] *multo maior,* but the editions [read] *multo maior,* codex R *multo maior et perfectior ordinatur.*

la: Cod. U *supereminentem proprietatem.* Paulo inferius pro *non meretur* edd. *non mereor.*

en: Codex U [reads] *supereminentem proprietatem.* A little below, for *non meretur* the editions [read] *non mereor.*

la: Hic c. 1. — Paulo superius pro *et ego possim ei subvenire* edd. *et ego possum ei magis subvenire.* — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 3, et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Here c. 1. — A little above, for *et ego possim ei subvenire* the editions [read] *et ego possum ei magis subvenire.* — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 3, and Peter of Tarentaise, here near the littera.

la: Supple: *est.* Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. nec non q. 1. huius dist. — Post *sed* cod. K repetit *caritas.*

en: Supply: *est* [is]. Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and also q. 1 of this distinction. — After *sed* codex K repeats *caritas.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 616, nota 6. — Vide de hoc dubio S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above, page 616, note 6. — See on this doubt St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here near the littera.

la: Cui Magister haec verba tribuit. — De sententia Augustini, prolata l. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et dist. praeced. lit. Magistri, c. 1, nec non Comment. q. 6, ubi etiam in solut. ad 4. obiectio occurrit, quae hic adtexitur.

en: To whom the Master attributes these words. — Concerning the opinion of Augustine, set forth in the book *On Christian Doctrine,* c. 23, n. 22, see here the littera of the Master, c. 1, and the littera of the Master of the preceding distinction, c. 1, and also the Commentary, q. 6, where also in the solution to the fourth [objection] occurs the objection which is here woven in.

la: Quaest. 5. seq. et d. 28. q. 6.

en: Question 5 ff. and d. 28, q. 6.

la: Vat. *et sic sumus nos.* Post pauca cod. A voci *coniunctio* bene praefigit *ibi.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *et sic sumus nos.* After a little, codex A rightly prefixes *ibi* to the word *coniunctio.*

la: Ibid. hic addunt *modus* et paulo inferius pro *praeter haec* substituunt *propter haec.*

en: In the same place they here add *modus* and a little below substitute *propter haec* for *praeter haec.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 3. seq. et q. 5. in corp.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, to the 3rd [objection] ff., and q. 5 in the body.

la: Vide Gen. 2, 24; Matth. 19, 5. seq.; I. Cor. 6, 16. — Proxime ante pro *cum sit* cod. K *est sicut.* Non ita multo post edd. omittunt *et servus.*

en: See Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5 f.; 1 Corinthians 6:16. — Just before, for *cum sit* codex K [reads] *est sicut.* Not much after, the editions omit *et servus.*

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 2.

en: Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 2.

la: Vide dub. praeced.

en: See the preceding doubt.

la: Ut ostensum est in dub. praeced. — Paulo superius pro *excellit* codd. A V *excellat.*

en: As was shown in the preceding doubt. — A little above, for *excellit* codices A V [read] *excellat.*

la: Respiciuntur verba Augustini supra d. 28. q. 2. fundam. a. allata. — Cod. V *sed etiam ut sit bonus.* Mox cod. bb (K a secunda manu) bis *praeponderat* pro *ponderat.*

en: The words of Augustine adduced above, d. 28, q. 2, fundament a, are referred to. — Codex V [reads] *sed etiam ut sit bonus.* Soon codex bb (K by a second hand) [reads] twice *praeponderat* for *ponderat.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 1.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, to the 1st [objection].

la: Pro *homo* cod. A *ergo.* Aliquanto inferius pro *quia caritas* codd. G K exhibent *quod caritas,* et subinde post *quantumcumque* cod. K subdit *est.* Deinde codd. B M voci *proximo* praemittunt *pro.*

en: For *homo* codex A [reads] *ergo.* Somewhat below, for *quia caritas* codices G K exhibit *quod caritas,* and thereupon after *quantumcumque* codex K adds *est.* Then codices B M prefix *pro* to the word *proximo.*

la: Deut. 32, 4. — Post pauca pro *distinguitur* Vat. *distinguit.*

en: Deuteronomy 32:4. — After a little, for *distinguitur* the Vatican [edition reads] *distinguit.*

la: Art. 2. q. 2. (Codd. et edd. allegant d. 26.), et I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq.

en: Article 2, q. 2 (the codices and editions cite d. 26), and *I Sentences,* d. 17, p. II, q. 1 f.

la: Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).

la: Cod. K *quia cum ordinata est in suum finem, potest elicere* etc.

en: Codex K [reads] *quia cum ordinata est in suum finem, potest elicere* etc.

la: Lit. Magistri, in fine, et Comment. dub. 3. (ubi exponitur, quid differat inter perfectionem *secundum naturam* et perfectionem *secundum tempus*). Cfr. ibid. d. 31. (ubi quid perfectum sit *secundum sufficientiam,* quid *secundum superabundantiam,* docetur). Edd. allegant d. 3. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: The littera of the Master, at the end, and the Commentary, doubt 3 (where it is set forth what differs between perfection *according to nature* and perfection *according to time*). Cf. the same place, d. 31 (where it is taught what is perfect *according to sufficiency,* what *according to superabundance*). The editions cite d. 3. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here near the littera.

la: Vide Antiph. 2. ad Laudes in festo S. Martini (11. Nov.). Cfr. etiam Alcuin., Serm. de translat. S. Martini, n. 14, et Bernard., Serm. in festo S. Martini, n. 17, ubi in notula sermoni apposita allegatur Sulpit., Epist. 3. ad Bassul.

en: See the second Antiphon at Lauds on the feast of St. Martin (November 11). Cf. also Alcuin, *Sermon on the translation of St. Martin,* n. 14, and Bernard, *Sermon on the feast of St. Martin,* n. 17, where in a little note appended to the sermon there is cited Sulpicius, *Epistle 3 to Bassula.*

la: Cod. Z *pro proximo.* Paulo superius cod. K omittit *cum Christo.*

en: Codex Z [reads] *pro proximo.* A little above, codex K omits *cum Christo.*

la: Exempli gratia, de dilectione inimicorum et de perfectione caritatis. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: For example, concerning the love of enemies and concerning the perfection of charity. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here near the littera.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi two-column PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p652-{L,R}-*.png` for the DUBIA opener + Dub. I–III, `vol3-p653-{L,R}-*.png` for Dub. III tail + Dub. IV, `vol3-p654-{L,R}-*.png` for Dub. V–VI), with the Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the Respondeo blocks and footers. IA djvu OCR (raw 45327–45515) used as base only for clean running prose + exact footnote-marker spacing. English freshly translated literally.

**Page span.** The dubia OPENS at the foot/middle of printed p.652 (PDF 674), below q6's Solutio 4 (which closes at the top of p.652 R-col): the full-width header **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** (OCR'd `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAf.ISTRI.`) sits mid-p.652, with Dub. I in the L-col, Dub. II in the R-col, and Dub. III opening at the foot of the R-col. Runs p.652 (Dub. I + II + III opener) → p.653 (running head *DIST. XXIX. DUBIA. 653*; Dub. III cont./resolution + Dub. IV) → p.654 (running head *654 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.*; Dub. V + Dub. VI). Dub. VI closes at the foot of p.654 R-col (*…satis declarabuntur in distinctione proxima.*), immediately before **DISTINCTIO XXX.** on the next page. **No bleed past DISTINCTIO XXX.** — verified eyes-on. This CLOSES Distinctio XXIX.

**Dubia structure — SIX dubia (I–VI):**
- **Dub. I** — *Peccat qui praepostere agit* (whether one sins who acts in reverse order): threefold reversal of the order — *ex* / *praeter* / *contra* a due cause.
- **Dub. II** — Ambrose's *Multorum caritas inordinata est* (charity called disordered, vs. formed charity always ordered): caritas taken *large* vs. *proprie.*
- **Dub. III** — the six grades of love (Ambrose's six vs. Augustine's four): number and sufficiency of the grades; reconciliation of the two orderings.
- **Dub. IV** — *si parentes nostri mali sunt* (evil parents vs. good strangers): amor *complacentiae* (weighs goodness) vs. amor *beneficentiae* (weighs nearness).
- **Dub. V** — *Perfecta caritas… ut quis paratus sit pro fratribus mori* (perfect charity as readiness to die for the brethren): the twofold *perfectum* — *in se* vs. *in ordine.*
- **Dub. VI** — *Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo* (desire to be dissolved vs. St. Martin's "non recuso laborem"): the twofold cause of the desire to rest with Christ.

**Apparatus (26 markers, per-page anchors).** Per-page Quaracchi footer numbers preserved in the `[^pNNN-N]` anchors.
- p.652 footer nn.4–9 (6 entries; received from q6): n.4 = Aristot. I. Ethic. c. 2 on Dub. I; n.5 = Cod. U *supereminentem* on Dub. I; n.6 = *auctoritas Magistri in littera* on Dub. I; n.7 = *Supple: est* / d. 27 cross-ref on Dub. II; nn.8–9 = Dub. III (*Cfr. supra pag. 616*; *Cui Magister haec verba tribuit*). (p.652 nn.1–3 belong to q6's Solutio 2–4.)
- p.653 footer nn.1–10 (10 entries): nn.1–6 = Dub. III resolution (Quaest. 5 cross-ref; *et sic sumus nos* variant; *modus*/*propter haec*; q.1 cross-ref; Gen 2:24/Matth 19:5/1 Cor 6:16; B. Albert.); nn.7–10 = Dub. IV (third-grade ref; *ostensum in dub. praeced.*; Augustine d. 28 ref; q.1 ad 1).
- p.654 footer nn.1–10 (10 entries): nn.1–7 = Dub. V (cod. A *ergo*; Deut 32:4; d. 17/d. 26 cross-ref; d. 30 q. 2; Aristot. V. Metaph.; cod. K variant; Lit. Magistri + d. 31); nn.8–10 = Dub. VI (Antiph. S. Martini; cod. Z variant; *Exempli gratia* + cross-refs).

**Scholion — ABSENT (`has_scholion: false`).** DUBIA blocks carry no scholion (confirmed eyes-on: no `SCHOLION.` header anywhere in the p.652–654 dubia range; Dub. VI's close hands off the remainder to "the next distinction," not to a scholion). This matches every other Vol III `*-dubia` chunk.

**q6 → d29-dubia footer hand-off (RECEIVED + consumed).** q6 forwarded p.652 footers nn.4–6 (n.4 = Aristot. I. Ethic. c. 2; n.5 = Cod. U *supereminentem*; n.6 = *auctoritas Magistri*) — all on Dub. I. Consumed as `[^p652-4]`–`[^p652-6]`. Eyes-on additionally recovered p.652 nn.7–9 (Dub. II + Dub. III), which q6 did not list because those footers anchor body on this page; the full p.652 dubia footer share is therefore **nn.4–9** (6 entries), not just nn.4–6.

**d29-dubia → d30-littera footer hand-off (FORWARDED).** NONE. The dubia closes at the foot of printed p.654 R-col; **DISTINCTIO XXX. opens on the NEXT printed page**, so no footer block is shared at the d.29/d.30 boundary. The d30-littera chunk starts a fresh page (and a fresh footer sequence) — nothing to pick up from p.654.

**Margin glosses (not transcribed).** The editorial side-notes printed in the columns — *Triplex praeposteratio* (Dub. I), *Quaestio* / *Ad quaestionem* (Dub. III), *Notandum* (Dub. III/IV), *Duplex amor* (Dub. IV), *Difficultas* / *Notandum* / *Ad difficultatem* / *Duplex perfectum* (Dub. V), *Alia perfecti distinctio* / *Duplex causa* (Dub. VI) — are editorial margin glosses (per CLAUDE.md OCR-cleanup rule) and are not transcribed into the body.

**[?] flags.** None outstanding (450 dpi legible throughout all three pages; running heads OCR digit-mangled — *6S2*/*633*=652, *653*, *654* — trusted via +22 offset + running-head text *DIST. XXIX. DUBIA* on p.653). The "Dubium 3" margin marker appearing in the raw near the DISTINCTIO XXX seam (raw ~45526) belongs to **d.30's** Cap. unicum body, NOT to this d.29 dubia — verified: it sits after the DISTINCTIO XXX header.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 30

title_alt: Distinctio XXX — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXX — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
<!-- page 655 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXX.

### Cap. unicum. *Si melius sit diligere inimicos quam amicos.*

Hic solet quaeri, quid potius sit plurisque meriti, diligere amicos, an diligere inimicos. Sed haec comparatio implicita est. Si enim conferatur dilectio amicorum tantum dilectioni amicorum et etiam inimicorum, perspicua est absolutio. Sed si in aliquo uno homine, qui diligit simul amicum et inimicum, quid horum potius sit, quaeratur; obscura est responsio, quia de motu mentis agitur, de quo non est nobis facile iudicium, an unus et idem motus sit erga amicum et inimicum, sed erga amicum intensior; an duo, unus erga inimicum, qui dicitur *difficilior,* alter erga amicum, qui videtur *ferventior.* Nec incongrue putatur melior qui est *ferventior;* vel si unus idemque est, idem[^p655-1] potior, ubi est ardentior, non improbe aestimatur. — Augustinus tamen sentire videtur, maius esse diligere inimicum quam amicum; qui[^p655-2] perfectorum esse dicit diligere inimicos et benefacere eis; neque hoc a tanta multitudine impleri, quanta exauditur in oratione dominica, cum dicitur: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris.* Illam enim sponsionem dicit a multis impleri, qui nondum diligunt inimicos. Ait enim sic[^p655-3]: «Magnum est erga eum qui tibi nihil mali fecerit, esse benevolum et beneficum; illud multo grandius et magnificentissimae bonitatis est, ut tuum quoque inimicum diligas, et ei qui tibi malum vult et, si potest, facit, tu semper bonum velis faciasque quod possis, audiens dicentem Iesum: *Diligite inimicos vestros, et benefacite his qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos.* Sed quoniam perfectorum filiorum Dei est istud, quo quidem se debet omnis fidelis extendere et humanum animum ad hunc affectum[^p655-4], orando Deum secumque agendo luctandoque, perducere; tamen, quia hoc tam magnum bonum tantae multitudinis non est, quantam credimus exaudiri, cum in oratione dicitur: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris,* procul dubio verba sponsionis huius implentur, si homo, qui nondum ita profecit, ut etiam diligat inimicum, tamen, quando rogatur ab homine, qui peccavit in eum, ut ei dimittat, dimittit ex corde; qui etiam sibi roganti vult dimitti, cum orat et dicit: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris». «Quicumque vero rogat hominem, in quem peccavit, si peccato suo movetur, ut roget, non est adhuc deputandus inimicus, ut eum diligere sit difficile, sicut erat, quando inimicitias exercebat. Quisquis vero roganti et poenitenti non dimittit, non existimet[^p655-5] a Domino sua peccata dimitti; quia mentiri Veritas non potest, quae, cum docuisset orationem, hanc in ea positam sententiam commendavit dicens: *Si dimiseritis hominibus peccata eorum, dimittet et vobis Pater vester. Si vero non dimiseritis, nec Pater vester dimittet vobis peccata vestra*». — Ecce hinc haberi videtur, quod et praetaxavimus, scilicet maioris virtutis esse diligere inimicum et benefacere ei, quam illum qui nihil mali nobis fecit, vel amicum. — Quod si quis simpliciter concedere noluerit dicens: intensius diligitur amicus quam inimicus, et ideo illud[^p655-6] potius isto; determinet ista secundum praemissam intelligentiam dicens, ibi comparationem esse factam inter dilectionem, qua diligitur tantum amicus, et illam qua amicus et inimicus diligitur. — Illud vero, quod sequitur, magis nos movet, quod scilicet dicit, non esse tantae multitudinis diligere inimicos, quanta exauditur, cum dicitur: *Dimitte nobis* etc; tibi datur[^p655-7] intelligi, quod alicui a Deo dimittuntur peccata non diligenti inimicum, si tamen fratri roganti, qui in se peccavit, dimittit. Sed cum peccata non dimittantur alicui adulto, nisi caritatem habeat; sequitur, ut caritatem habeat qui non diligit inimicum. Quomodo ergo nomine *proximi* omnis homo intelligitur in illo mandato[^p655-8]: *Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum?* Si enim *omnis* homo proximus est, tunc et *inimicus:* praecipimur ergo et inimicos diligere. Et quia illud praeceptum *generale* est, *omnibus* praecipitur omnes homines diligere, etiam inimicos. — Quidam quod hic dicitur simpliciter tenere volentes, illud praeceptum determinant dicentes, illic perfectis dari in praeceptum diligere omnem hominem, etiam inimicum; minoribus vero in *consilium,* in *praeceptum* vero eos *diligere,* qui nihil mali fecerunt eis, et inimicos *non odire.* — Sed melius est, ut intelligatur, omnibus illo mandato praecipi cunctos diligere, etiam inimicos; cui sensui attestantur superius positae auctoritates et aliae multae. Illud vero Augustini novissime positum, de *perfecta* caritate dictum intelligitur, quae tantum perfectorum est, qui non solum amicos, sed etiam inimicos perfecte diligunt eisque benefaciunt; quae *perfectio* dilectionis non est tantae multitudinis, quanta exauditur in oratione dominica. Et hoc re vera grande est et eximiae bonitatis, scilicet *perfecte* diligere inimicum; ita et, cum dicit[^p655-9]: «impleri verba illius sponsionis ab homine, qui non ita profecit, ut diligat inimicum»; de dilectione *perfecta* accipiendum est.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXX.

### Sole chapter. *Whether it is better to love enemies than friends.*

Here it is wont to be asked which is the more excellent and of greater merit: to love friends, or to love enemies. But this comparison is ambiguous. For if the love of friends only is compared with the love both of friends and of enemies, the resolution is plain. But if the question is which of these is the more excellent in some one man, who loves at once a friend and an enemy, the answer is obscure, because the matter concerns a motion of the mind, about which judgment is not easy for us — whether it is one and the same motion toward friend and enemy, but more intense toward the friend; or whether they are two motions, one toward the enemy, which is called *more difficult,* the other toward the friend, which seems *more fervent.* And it is not unfitting that the one which is *more fervent* be reckoned the better; or, if it is one and the same, that the same[^p655-1] be esteemed — not improperly — the more excellent where it is more ardent. — Augustine, however, seems to hold that it is greater to love an enemy than a friend; for he[^p655-2] says that to love enemies and to do good to them belongs to the perfect, and that this is not fulfilled by so great a multitude as is heard in the Lord's Prayer, when it is said: *Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors.* For he says that that promise is fulfilled by many who do not yet love their enemies. For he speaks thus[^p655-3]: «It is a great thing to be benevolent and beneficent toward one who has done you no harm; it is something far greater and of most magnificent goodness, that you should love even your enemy, and that toward him who wishes you evil and, if he can, does it, you should always will good and do what you can, hearing Jesus who says: *Love your enemies, and do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute and slander you.* But since this belongs to the perfect sons of God — to which indeed every faithful soul ought to extend itself and to bring the human spirit to this disposition[^p655-4], by praying to God and by striving and wrestling with itself — yet, because this so great good is not of so great a multitude as we believe is heard when it is said in the prayer: *Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors,* without doubt the words of this promise are fulfilled if a man, who has not yet so advanced as even to love an enemy, nevertheless, when he is asked by the man who has sinned against him to forgive him, forgives from the heart; and who also wishes to be forgiven when he himself asks, when he prays and says: as we also forgive our debtors». «But whoever asks the man against whom he has sinned, if he is moved by his own sin to ask, is not to be reckoned still an enemy, so that to love him should be difficult, as it was when he was carrying on enmities. But whoever does not forgive one who asks and repents, let him not suppose[^p655-5] that his own sins are forgiven by the Lord; because the Truth cannot lie, who, when he had taught the prayer, commended this sentence set within it, saying: *If you forgive men their sins, your Father also will forgive you. But if you do not forgive, neither will your Father forgive you your sins*». — Behold, from this it seems to be gathered, what we also noted beforehand, namely that it is of greater virtue to love an enemy and to do good to him than to love one who has done us no harm, or a friend. — But if anyone is unwilling to concede this simply, saying: a friend is loved more intensely than an enemy, and therefore that[^p655-6] is to be preferred to this; let him determine these things according to the aforesaid understanding, saying that there the comparison was made between the love by which only a friend is loved, and that by which both friend and enemy are loved. — But that which follows moves us more, namely that he says that to love enemies is not of so great a multitude as is heard, when it is said: *Forgive us* etc.; you are given[^p655-7] to understand that sins are forgiven by God to someone who does not love his enemy, provided nevertheless that he forgives a brother who asks, who has sinned against him. But since sins are not forgiven to any adult unless he have charity; it follows that he has charity who does not love his enemy. How then is every man understood under the name of *neighbor* in that commandment[^p655-8]: *You shall love your neighbor as yourself?* For if *every* man is a neighbor, then also an *enemy:* we are therefore commanded to love even enemies. And because that precept is *general,* it is commanded to *all* to love all men, even enemies. — Some, wishing to hold simply what is here said, determine that precept, saying that there it is given to the perfect as a precept to love every man, even an enemy; but to the lesser it is given as a *counsel,* while as a *precept* it is given to them to *love* those who have done them no harm, and *not to hate* enemies. — But it is better that it be understood that by that commandment all are commanded to love all, even enemies; to which sense the authorities set down above and many others bear witness. But that statement of Augustine set down last is understood as spoken of *perfect* charity, which belongs only to the perfect, who love perfectly and do good not only to friends but even to enemies; and this *perfection* of love is not of so great a multitude as is heard in the Lord's Prayer. And this is truly a great thing and of exceeding goodness, namely to love an enemy *perfectly;* and so too, when he says[^p655-9]: «that the words of that promise are fulfilled by a man who has not so advanced as to love an enemy»; it is to be taken of *perfect* love.

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la: Codd. BCDE edd. 1, 6, 8 *inde,* sicut etiam Erf., qui addit: alii *ibi,* quod etiam in nostra lectione supplendum est. Paulo superius post *melior* codd. CD adiciunt *ille.*

en: Codices BCDE and editions 1, 6, 8 read *inde* (thence), as does the Erfurt codex, which adds: others read *ibi* (there), which is also to be supplied in our reading. A little above, after *melior* (better), codices CD add *ille* (that one).

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 8 *quia,* refragantibus etiam codd. — Locus Scripturae est Matth. 6, 12.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6, 8 read *quia* (because), with the codices also opposing. — The scriptural passage is Matthew 6:12.

la: August., *Enchirid.* c. 73, n. 19. — Loci Scripturae sunt Matth. 5, 44; Luc. 6, 27. — Vat. cum originali incipit sic: *Minus magnum* etc. — Seq. locus ibid. c. 74.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 73, n. 19. — The scriptural passages are Matthew 5:44; Luke 6:27. — The Vatican edition, with the original, begins thus: *Minus magnum* (a lesser great thing) etc. — The following passage is in the same place, c. 74.

la: Codd. ACE cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 *effectum,* refragante etiam originali.

en: Codices ACE with editions 1, 2, 3, 7 read *effectum* (effect), with the original also opposing.

la: Ita originale, codd. CE et Vat. cum ed. 4, in aliis *aestimet.* — Locus Scripturae est Matth. 6, 14, 15. — Pro *dimittet et vobis Pater vester* cod. D et edd. 1, 8 *dimittentur et vobis peccata vestra,* refragante etiam originali.

en: Thus the original, codices CE, and the Vatican edition with edition 4; in others *aestimet.* — The scriptural passage is Matthew 6:14–15. — For *dimittet et vobis Pater vester* (your Father also will forgive you) codex D and editions 1, 8 read *dimittentur et vobis peccata vestra* (your sins also will be forgiven you), with the original also opposing.

la: Supple: est, scil. diligere amicum.

en: Supply: «is» — namely, to love a friend.

la: Ita edd. 1, 8; in aliis *dat.* Inferius pro *dimittit,* edd. 1, 8 *dimittit.*

en: Thus editions 1, 8; in others *dat* (he gives). Below, for *dimittit* (he forgives), editions 1, 8 read *dimittit.*

en: Matthew 22:37.

la: Scil. Augustinus, loco supra nota 3 cit.

en: Namely Augustine, in the place cited above at note 3. ---

translators_notes:
**Chapter subject.** DISTINCTIO XXX opens Lombard's treatment of *whether it is better to love enemies than friends* (*Si melius sit diligere inimicos quam amicos*). The Cap. unicum weighs the Augustinian view (loving an enemy is greater, belongs to the perfect) against the objection that the general precept *Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum* (Matt. 22:37 / 19:19) binds all to love all, enemies included; resolved by distinguishing the *general* precept (to love all, even enemies) from the *perfect* charity of the few that fulfils the Lord's-Prayer promise.

**Page-split map.** The littera is a single chapter (Cap. unicum) printed entirely on **p.655** (PDF 677). Body flows L column → R column; the editorial marginalia (*Comparatio ne utriusque actus, Dubium 1, Opinio Magistri, Aliter loquitur Augustinus, Dubium 3, Augustinum interpretatur, Difficultas quod diligentem, Determinatio aliorum, Determinatio Magistri, Dubium 2, Dubium 4*) are NOT Lombard's text and were trimmed. The chapter ends mid-page R column at *«…de dilectione perfecta accipiendum est.»* The **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** footer for p.655 carries **9 entries** (nn.1–4 in the left footer, nn.5–9 in the right footer) → `[^p655-1]`–`[^p655-9]`.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* NONE. The d.29 dubia (`bon-sent-III-d29-dubia`, commit c79d486) determined d.30 opens on a fresh printed page (p.655) after the dubia closed at the foot of p.654 — no shared-page footer carries into d.30.
- *Forwarded:* NONE from the littera itself. The COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX begins on the **next** printed page (p.656, PDF 678), which carries its own *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footer block → those belong wholly to the next chunk (`bon-sent-III-d30-divisio`). No littera footer splits across the p.655/656 seam.

**Boundary verification.** Auto-chunk skeleton (`line_start: 45516, line_end: 45600`) included the COMMENTARIUS opener line (raw ~45596) in its range, but the littera body was re-set entirely from the PDF and stops cleanly at *accipiendum est*; no commentary text leaked in. p.656 eyes-on confirmed it opens with `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX` → `De caritate quantum [ad meriti perfectionem]` → `DIVISIO TEXTUS` — the d30-divisio chunk's content.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All 9 footer entries and all body readings confirmed against the 450 dpi PDF bands.