title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum solus Deus immutabilis sit
Whether God alone is unchangeable

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum solus Deus immutabilis sit.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum immutabilitas sit divinae essentiae proprietas, ita quod nulli creaturae conveniat. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum ultimo[^1] dicitur de Deo, quod solus habet immortalitatem. Et Augustinus dicit contra Maximinum[^2]: «In omni natura mutabili nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio»: ergo si solus Deus habet immortalitatem, solus habet immutabilitatem.

2. Item, omne vertibile est mutabile; sed omnis creatura est vertibilis; unde Damascenus[^3]: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit»: ergo etc.

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3. Item, omne quod sibi relictum in nihilum cedit[^4], quantum est de se, est mutabile: sed omnis creatura est huiusmodi: unde Gregorius[^5]: «Cuncta in nihilum tenderent, nisi manus Conditoris ea retineret»: ergo etc.

4. Item, nullum accidens de se habet stabilitatem; sed esse omni creaturae accidit, sicut dicit Hilarius et habetur in littera[^6], quia ab alio venit: ergo omnis creatura quantum ad esse est instabilis.

5. Item, omne vanum est subiectum variabilitati; sed omnis creatura vana, cum sit ex nihilo; unde ad Romanos octavo[^7]: *Vanitati subiecta est creatura* etc.: ergo si omnis creatura vana, nulla immutabilis.

6. Item, omne mutatum habet in se mutabilitatem; sed omnis creatura facta est: ergo omnis creatura mutata, ergo nulla immutabilis.

**Contra:** Immutabilitas non dicitur nisi tripliciter. Dicitur enim immutabilitas aut invariabilitas, aut incorruptibilitas, aut invertibilitas.

1. Ostenditur autem, quod invariabilitas conveniat creaturis, utpote principiis. Nam Augustinus ostendit in duodecimo Confessionum[^8], quod materia informis est invariabilis; quia quod caret forma, caret ordine, et quod caret ordine, caret vicissitudine, ergo variatione. Auctor autem sex Principiorum[^9] dicit hoc de forma, «quod est in simplici et invariabili essentia consistens».

2. Item videtur, quod invariabilitas conveniat Beatis, quia ubi perfecta beatitudo, ibi nulla deperditio, et ubi hoc[^10], nulla variatio.

3. Item, variatio attenditur, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram[^11], aut secundum locum, aut secundum tempus; sed aliqua creatura caret determinato loco et tempore, ut universale, quod est semper et ubique[^12], et caelum empyreum, quod est extra tempus et locum: ergo etc.

4. Item, si immutabilitas dicatur incorruptibilitas, idem ostenditur. «Nam omnis corruptio naturalis venit ex contrarietate», sicut dicit Philosophus in libro de Morte et vita[^13]; sed multae creaturae carent contrarietate: ergo et corruptibilitate.

5. Item, omnis corruptio est in aliquid prius se, quia corruptio naturalis in aliquid est[^14]; sed principia non habent aliquid prius, utpote materia: ergo sunt incorruptibilia.

6. Item, omne perpetuum incorruptibile; sed aliqua creatura naturaliter est perpetua: ergo etc. Minor probari potest sic: perpetuitas est de ratione imaginis; unde Augustinus[^15]: «Non esset anima imago, si mortis termino clauderetur»; cum ergo anima naturaliter sit imago, ergo naturaliter est immortalis sive perpetua.

7. Item, ostenditur, quod creatura sit invertibilis, sic: vertibilitas est in non esse; sed nihil est, quod possit creaturam aliquam vertere in non esse, quia a se non vertitur, cum nihil se corrumpat[^16]; ab alio non, quia actio creaturae in id terminatur, ex quo incipit; sed nullius creaturae actio incipit a non esse: ergo etc. Praeterea, distantia infinita est inter esse creaturae et nihil; sed inter extrema in infinitum distantia non potest fieri mutatio per virtutem finitam: ergo nihil potest cedere in nihil, nisi Deo faciente.

8. Item, vertibilitas dicitur per corruptionem in non esse omnino; sed nihil, quod corrumpitur, secedit omnino in non ens[^17]: ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile. Si tu dicas, quod invertibilitatem non habet creatura per naturam, sed solum per gratiam[^18]; contra: quod omnibus inest, est naturale,

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quoniam gratia speciale est; sed naturale est quod est idem apud omnes[^19]; sed fere omnis creatura est invertibilis, quia nulla redigitur in nihilum: ergo hoc est naturale.

9. Item, ostenditur, quod nec per gratiam; quia gratia est perfectio naturae: ergo quod repugnat naturae, non datur per gratiam: ergo si invertibilitas est contra naturam creaturae, ergo non datur per gratiam.

10. Item, obiicitur de illa gratia, quia si est creatura, est[^20] vertibilis; si ergo conveniat ei invertibilitas, oportet quod per aliam gratiam; et sic erit abire in infinitum. Si ergo oportet stare, patet quod non per gratiam. Si dicas, quod gratia illa non dicitur habitus, sed Deus gratis conservans; hoc nihil est, quia sine Deo operante[^21] nulla creatura operatur: ergo sicut nulla creatura est invertibilis nisi per gratiam, sic nulla creatura operatur nisi per gratiam: ergo nulla operatio est naturalis, quod stultum est dicere.

> **Conclusio.** Immutabilitas, accepta ut invariabilitas, est propria solius Dei, accepta ut incorruptibilitas aut invertibilitas, a Deo communicatur aliquibus creaturis vel per naturam vel per gratiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur per privationem mutabilitatis. Mutatio autem dicitur tripliciter: uno modo ab ente in ens; et haec est mutatio secundum accidens[^22] et dicitur variatio; alio modo ab ente simpliciter in ens potentia sive secundum quid; et haec est mutatio secundum formam et dicitur corruptio; alio modo est mutatio ab ente in simpliciter non ens; et haec est secundum totam rei substantiam et dicitur versio. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur tripliciter: uno modo invariabilitas, alio modo incorruptibilitas, et tertio modo invertibilitas.

Si ergo immutabilitas dicatur invariabilitas, sic dico, quod in nulla omnino est creatura neque per naturam neque per gratiam; nam omne creatum aut est accidens, aut habet accidens, et ita variabile; et haec[^23] est proprie proprium ipsius Dei.

Si autem dicatur immutabilitas incorruptibilitas, sic dico, quod in aliquibus est creaturis: in quibusdam per naturam, ut puta in simplicibus, in quibusdam per gratiam, ut puta in glorificatis corporibus. Nec sic est proprie proprium divinae essentiae.

Si vero tertio modo dicatur immutabilitas[^24], sic omnibus creaturis inest per gratiam, nulli autem per naturam nisi soli Deo. Invertibile enim per naturam est, quod ex se ipso habet, ut possit stare; hoc autem est, in quo nulla est vanitas[^25] et in quo omnino nulla essentiae mutatio nec ad esse, nec ad non esse; et hoc est solum aeternum. Ideo haec invertibilitas est in solo Deo et est proprie proprium eius. Invertibilitas autem per gratiam inest omnibus vel pluribus creaturis, quia Deus sua gratuita bonitate cetera continet, ne in nihil cedant; et loquor de creaturis, quae dicunt quid completum et per se.

Concedendum igitur, quod immutabilitas, prout privat variationem secundum accidens quantum ad actum[^26] et potentiam, solius Dei est. Similiter prout privat mutationem in non esse secundum actum et potentiam, quantum est de natura, solius Dei est, licet per gratiam conveniat multis creaturis; et sic procedunt rationes ad primam partem, unde concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod principia rerum sunt invariabilia; dicendum, quod verum est, si considerentur secundum essentiam abstractam; sed si considerentur secundum esse naturae, sic de necessitate habent accidentia coniuncta et possunt variari; variatio autem[^27] accidentalis respicit esse.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Beatis non potest esse variatio; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad substantiam praemii sive quantum ad praemium substantiale; cadit tamen quantum ad conversionem ad inferius, tum quantum ad affectiones, sicut patet in Angelis, tum quantum ad actiones. Unde Beati erunt agiles et poterunt moveri.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de universali et de empyreo, dicendum, quod utrumque recipit variationem; sed universale ratione eius in quo est; quia, «motis[^28] nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis

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sunt»; empyreum vero ratione contenti. Potest enim aliquid continere, quod non continet, et aliquid non continere, quod continet.

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de incorruptibilitate, dicendum, sicut praetactum est, quod convenit creaturis; aliquae enim creaturae sunt ita simplices et ita bona coniunctione coniunctae, quod nulla cadit in eis contrarietas, nec est in eis maior ratio corruptionis quam in principiis. Unde sicut principia non sunt resolubilia in aliquid, tamen cederent in nihil, si sibi relinquerentur; sic intelligendum in aliquibus substantiis. Unde non est dicendum, quod sit verum, quod omne compositum sit resolubile secundum rem; sed sicut dicit Anselmus[^29], «est resolubile re, vel intellectu». Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

7. 8. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de vertibilitate, dicendum, quod quaelibet creatura[^30] vertibilis est per naturam, si sibi relinquatur.

Si quaeritur causa huius, dicendum, quod huius versionis, cum sit defectus purus, non est reddenda causa efficiens vel reducens in non esse, sed solum deficiens. Propter quod notandum, quod natura dicitur naturalis origo. Origo autem creaturae et est ex nihilo et est ex suis principiis: secundum hoc dupliciter dicitur aliquid ipsi creaturae naturale, vel quia inest ei ex eo, quod est ex nihilo, vel quia inest ei ex eo, quod est ex suis principiis. Et quia nihil nullius est causa efficiens, sed deficiens, ideo proprietates, quae insunt creaturae ratione eius, quod est ex nihilo, non sunt positiones, sed defectus, nec sunt a virtute, sed a defectu virtutis, nec habent causam efficientem, sed deficientem: et tales sunt vanitas, instabilitas, vertibilitas. Si igitur quaeratur, a quo est vertibilis creatura, dico, quod non ab aliquo efficiente, sed per defectum in se ipsa. Secundum autem quod naturale dicitur quod inest[^31] rei per propria et intrinseca principia, sic non dicuntur naturaliter inesse privationes vel defectus, sed habilitates: et ideo hoc modo accipiendo naturale, nulla creatura est vertibilis in non esse; nec tamen dicitur invertibilis naturaliter, quia naturale est in quod potest natura; sed principia rei non possunt in rei conservationem nec conservationem sui; et ideo invertibilitas non est huiusmodi naturalis. Nec tamen est contra naturam, immo est ei consona; quia omnis natura[^32] appetit salvari, quamvis ex se non possit, et maxime illa creatura, quae appetit beatificari, et haec est illa quae ad Dei imaginem facta est. Et quia desiderium naturae non est frustra[^33], ubi deficit natura, supplet Dei gratuita influentia. Et sic patet, quod vertibilitas inest per naturam, sed invertibilitas per gratiam.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione gratiae ad naturam, intelligendum est, quod gratia dicitur adiutorium, veniens a superiori, respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae. Hoc autem adiutorium est duplex: aut respectu esse simpliciter, aut respectu esse perfecti.

Si respectu esse simpliciter, ut puta conservationis esse, quia nulla principia, cum sint vana[^34], de se possunt se ipsa conservare, sic non est mediante aliquo habitu infuso vel dato. Quia respicit esse, et quia[^35] esse est commune omnibus, ideo haec gratia est omnibus communis. Unde haec est gratia habens modum naturae, et haec est gratia, qua dicuntur cetera invertibilia[^36].

Alio modo dicitur gratia adiutorium respectu perfecti esse, et quia perfectio esse est in his quae ad beatitudinem ordinantur, respicit bene esse et[^37] quod non est omnium. Ideo haec est habitus specialis aliquorum, non omnium, et haec est gratia per modum gratiae. Ex his patet quod obiicit[^38] de gratia: obiicit enim secundum quod gratia est specialis habitus divisus contra naturam, quia sic dicit aliquid de novo creatum; sed gratia praedicto modo non.

10. Et ex hoc patet ultimo obiectum: quia gratia dicitur adiutorium respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae; et quia conservatio principiorum est supra posse naturae, non autem egressus actionum, immo infra, ideo patet etc.

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### Question II. *Whether God alone is unchangeable.*

Secondly, it is asked whether unchangeability is a property of the divine essence, in such a way that it belongs to no creature. And that it is so, seems [evident].

1. In the last [chapter] of First Timothy[^1] it is said of God that He alone has immortality. And Augustine says against Maximinus[^2]: «In every changeable nature change itself is a certain death»: therefore if God alone has immortality, He alone has unchangeability.

2. Likewise, everything turnable is changeable; but every creature is turnable; whence Damascene[^3]: «Everything that begins from a turning, tends toward a turning»: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which, left to itself, slips into nothing[^4], is of itself changeable: but every creature is of this sort: whence Gregory[^5]: «All things would tend into nothing, unless the hand of the Creator held them back»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no accident has stability of itself; but being is accidental to every creature, as Hilary says and as is contained in the *littera*[^6], because it comes from another: therefore every creature is unstable as to being.

5. Likewise, every vain thing is subject to variability; but every creature is vain, since it is from nothing; whence Romans 8[^7]: *The creature is made subject to vanity*, etc.: therefore if every creature is vain, none is unchangeable.

6. Likewise, everything changed has changeability in itself; but every creature has been made: therefore every creature has been changed, therefore none is unchangeable.

**On the contrary:** Unchangeability is said only in three ways. For unchangeability is said either as invariability, or as incorruptibility, or as inconvertibility.

1. Now it is shown that invariability belongs to creatures, namely as principles. For Augustine shows in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*[^8] that unformed matter is invariable; because what lacks form, lacks order, and what lacks order, lacks alternation, therefore variation. And the author of the *Six Principles*[^9] says this of form, «which consists in a simple and invariable essence».

2. Likewise, it seems that invariability belongs to the Blessed, because where there is perfect blessedness, there is no loss, and where this [is the case][^10], no variation.

3. Likewise, variation is attended to, as Augustine says in *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^11], either according to place, or according to time; but some creature lacks a determined place and time, such as the universal, which is always and everywhere[^12], and the empyrean heaven, which is outside time and place: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if unchangeability is taken as incorruptibility, the same is shown. «For all natural corruption comes from contrariety», as the Philosopher says in the book *On Death and Life*[^13]; but many creatures lack contrariety: therefore [they lack] also corruptibility.

5. Likewise, all corruption is into something prior to itself, because natural corruption is into something[^14]; but principles do not have anything prior, as matter: therefore they are incorruptible.

6. Likewise, every perpetual thing is incorruptible; but some creature is naturally perpetual: therefore etc. The minor can be proved thus: perpetuity belongs to the account of an image; whence Augustine[^15]: «The soul would not be an image, if it were enclosed by the term of death»; since therefore the soul is naturally an image, therefore it is naturally immortal or perpetual.

7. Likewise, it is shown that the creature is inconvertible, thus: turnability is into non-being; but there is nothing which can turn any creature into non-being, since it is not turned by itself, because nothing corrupts itself[^16]; nor by another, because the action of a creature terminates in that from which it begins; but no creature's action begins from non-being: therefore etc. Furthermore, there is an infinite distance between the being of a creature and nothing; but between extremes infinitely distant change cannot occur by a finite power: therefore nothing can slip into nothing, except by God's doing.

8. Likewise, turnability is said by corruption into non-being altogether; but nothing which is corrupted withdraws altogether into non-being[^17]: therefore no corruptible [thing] is turnable. If you say that the creature does not have inconvertibility by nature, but only through grace[^18]; on the contrary: what belongs to all is natural, since grace is something special; but the natural is what is the same in all[^19]; but nearly every creature is inconvertible, because none is reduced to nothing: therefore this is natural.

9. Likewise, it is shown that neither [is it] through grace; because grace is the perfection of nature: therefore what is repugnant to nature is not given through grace: therefore if inconvertibility is contrary to the creature's nature, therefore it is not given through grace.

10. Likewise, it is objected concerning that grace, that if it is a creature, it is[^20] turnable; if then inconvertibility belongs to it, it must be through another grace; and so there will be a going on to infinity. If therefore one must stop, it is clear that [it is] not through grace. If you say that that grace is not called a habit, but God graciously conserving; this is nothing, because without God working[^21] no creature operates: therefore just as no creature is inconvertible except through grace, so no creature operates except through grace: therefore no operation is natural, which is foolish to say.

> **Conclusion.** Unchangeability, taken as invariability, is proper to God alone; taken as incorruptibility or inconvertibility, it is communicated by God to some creatures either through nature or through grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that unchangeability is said by the privation of changeability. Now change is said in three ways: in one way, from being into being; and this is change according to accident[^22] and is called *variation*; in another way, from being simply into being in potency or in a qualified sense; and this is change according to form and is called *corruption*; in another way change is from being into simply non-being; and this is according to the whole substance of the thing and is called *conversion*. According to this it must be understood that unchangeability is said in three ways: in one way as invariability, in another way as incorruptibility, and in a third way as inconvertibility.

If, then, unchangeability is said as invariability, thus I say that it exists in no creature at all neither through nature nor through grace; for everything created either is an accident or has accidents, and so is variable; and this[^23] is properly proper to God Himself.

But if unchangeability is said as incorruptibility, thus I say that it is in some creatures: in some through nature, as for example in simples; in some through grace, as for example in glorified bodies. Nor in this way is it properly proper to the divine essence.

But if unchangeability is said in the third way[^24], thus it is in all creatures through grace, but in none through nature except in God alone. For that is inconvertible by nature, which has from itself that it can stand; and this is that in which there is no vanity[^25], and in which there is no change of essence whatsoever, neither toward being nor toward non-being; and this alone is eternal. Therefore this inconvertibility is in God alone and is properly proper to Him. But inconvertibility through grace is in all or in many creatures, because God by His gratuitous goodness contains the rest, lest they slip into nothing; and I speak of creatures which signify something complete and per se.

Therefore it is to be conceded that unchangeability, insofar as it removes variation according to accident as to act[^26] and potency, is God's alone. Likewise, insofar as it removes change into non-being according to act and potency, as far as concerns nature, it is God's alone, although through grace it belongs to many creatures; and thus the arguments to the first part proceed, whence they are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that the principles of things are invariable; it must be said that this is true, if they are considered according to their abstract essence; but if they are considered according to their natural being, thus they necessarily have accidents conjoined and can be varied; and accidental[^27] variation regards being.

2. To that which is objected, that in the Blessed there cannot be variation; it must be said that this is true as to the substance of the reward or as to the substantial reward; yet it falls [otherwise] as to conversion to what is below, both as to affections, as is plain in the Angels, and as to actions. Whence the Blessed will be agile and will be able to be moved.

3. To that which is objected concerning the universal and the empyrean, it must be said that each receives variation; but the universal by reason of that in which it is; because, «we being moved[^28], those things which are in us are moved»; but the empyrean by reason of what it contains. For something can contain that which it does not contain, and something not contain that which it contains.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected concerning incorruptibility, it must be said, as has already been touched, that it belongs to creatures; for some creatures are so simple and so well joined together, that no contrariety befalls them, nor is there a greater ground of corruption in them than in principles. Whence just as principles are not resolvable into anything, yet would slip into nothing, if they were left to themselves; so it is to be understood in some substances. Whence it is not to be said that it is true that every composite is resolvable in reality; but as Anselm[^29] says, «it is resolvable in reality, or in understanding». Whence the arguments adduced to this point are to be conceded.

7. 8. To that which is objected concerning turnability, it must be said that every creature[^30] is turnable by nature, if it is left to itself.

If the cause of this is asked, it must be said that of this conversion, since it is a pure defect, an efficient cause or one reducing into non-being is not to be assigned, but only a deficient one. On account of which it must be noted that *nature* is called *natural origin*. Now the origin of the creature is both from nothing and from its [own] principles: according to this, something is said to be natural to the creature in two ways, either because it belongs to it from the fact that it is from nothing, or because it belongs to it from the fact that it is from its principles. And because nothing is the efficient cause of nothing, but [only] a deficient one, therefore the properties which belong to the creature by reason of its being from nothing are not positings, but defects, nor are they from power, but from defect of power, nor do they have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: and such are vanity, instability, turnability. If, then, it be asked by what the creature is turnable, I say that [it is] not by anything efficient, but through a defect in itself. But according as the natural is called that which belongs[^31] to a thing through its proper and intrinsic principles, thus privations or defects are not said to belong naturally, but [only] aptitudes: and therefore taking *natural* in this way, no creature is turnable into non-being; nor yet is it said to be inconvertible naturally, because the natural is that which nature can [reach]; but the principles of a thing cannot effect the conservation of the thing nor the conservation of themselves; and therefore inconvertibility is not natural in this manner. Yet neither is it contrary to nature, but rather consonant with it; because every nature[^32] desires to be preserved, although it cannot by itself, and especially that creature which desires to be beatified, and this is that which has been made to the image of God. And because the desire of nature is not in vain[^33], where nature falls short, the gratuitous influence of God supplies. And thus it is plain that turnability belongs through nature, but inconvertibility through grace.

9. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of grace to nature, it must be understood that grace is called a help coming from above, with respect to that which is beyond the power of nature. Now this help is twofold: either with respect to being simply, or with respect to being perfected.

If with respect to being simply, namely the conservation of being, since no principles, being vain[^34], can preserve themselves of themselves, in this way it is not by means of any infused or given habit. Because it regards being, and because[^35] being is common to all, therefore this grace is common to all. Whence this is grace having the mode of nature, and this is the grace by which the rest are said to be inconvertible[^36].

In another way grace is called a help with respect to perfected being, and because the perfection of being is in those things which are ordered to beatitude, it regards well-being and[^37] [is] that which is not of all. Therefore this is a special habit of some, not of all, and this is grace by the mode of grace. From these things is clear what is objected[^38] concerning grace: for he objects according as grace is a special habit divided against nature, since thus it signifies something newly created; but grace in the aforesaid manner is not so.

10. And from this the last objection is clear: because grace is called a help with respect to that which is above the power of nature; and because the conservation of principles is above the power of nature, but not the issuing forth of actions, but rather below it, therefore [the matter] is clear, etc.

la: Vers. 16.

en: Book II, c. 12, n. 2. [Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*.]

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3: *Quorum enim esse a mutatione incepit, ea mutationi quoque subsint necesse est.*

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3: *Those whose being began from a change, it is necessary that they too be subject to change.*

la: Codd. ut D F K X cc cum ed. I *tendit*.

en: Codices such as D F K X cc with ed. I read *tendit* ["tends"].

la: Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 37: *Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret.*

en: Book XVI of the *Morals*, c. 37: *For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would tend again to nothing, unless the author of all held it back with the hand of His governance.*

la: Cap. 1. in fine.

en: Chapter 1, at the end. [Reference within Lombard's *Sentences*.]

la: Vers. 10. — Mox in fine argumenti codd. cum edd. I, 2, 3, 6 omittunt *est* additum a Vat.

en: Verse 10 [recte Rom. 8:20]. — Shortly afterward at the end of the argument, the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, 6 omit *est*, which was added by the Vatican edition.

en: Chapter 9, n. 9.

la: Gilbert. Porretan., c. 1: *Forma est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens.* — Post quem textum cod. O addit *et ita nec forma nec materia variatur*.

en: Gilbert of Poitiers, c. 1: *Form is something accruing to a composition, consisting in a simple and invariable essence.* — After this text, codex O adds *and thus neither form nor matter is varied*.

la: Ex antiquis mss. et ed. I pro *haec* substituimus *hoc*, quod sensus expostulat. Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *ibi*, qui et in fine argumenti ponunt *mutatio* loco *variatio*.

en: From the ancient manuscripts and ed. I we have substituted *hoc* for *haec*, as the sense demands. A little before, very many codices with ed. 1 omit *ibi*; and at the end of the argument they place *mutatio* for *variatio*.

la: Libr. VIII. c. 20.

en: Book VIII, c. 20.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.). — Mox nomine *caeli empyrei* intellige ultimam sphaeram, quae iuxta opinionem tunc communiter receptam est immobilis et uniformis, quia eius intrinseca principia, scil. materia et forma, sunt «ita bona coniunctione coniuncta, quod nulla cadit in illud contrarietas», ut ait S. Doctor infra ad 4. obiectionem. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. opp. 1., et Aristot., I. de Caelo text. 100. (c. 9.).

en: Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 24 (c. 31). — By the name *empyrean heaven* understand the outermost sphere, which according to the opinion then commonly received is immobile and uniform, because its intrinsic principles, namely matter and form, are «so joined together by a good conjunction that no contrariety falls upon it», as the holy Doctor says below in reply to the 4th objection. Cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, opp. 1; and Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 100 (c. 9).

la: Melius poneretur: *in libro de Longitudine et brevitate vitae*. Aristoteles siquidem duo scripsit opuscula, quorum uni titulus: *de Iuventute et senectute, de vita et morte*; alteri autem: *de Longitudine et brevitate vitae*. In priore opusculo perpauca occurrunt de re, quam S. Doctor hic proponit; in posteriore tamen, c. 2. et seq., fusius de hac re tractatur, et inter cetera inveniuntur haec: *Quare, cui non est contrarium et ubi non est, impossibile utique erit corrumpi*.

en: Better would be: *in the book On Length and Shortness of Life*. For Aristotle wrote two opuscula, of which one has the title: *On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death*; the other: *On Length and Shortness of Life*. In the former opusculum very little occurs concerning the matter which the holy Doctor proposes here; in the latter, however, c. 2 and following, the matter is more fully treated, and among other things these words are found: *Wherefore, that to which there is no contrary and where there is none, will surely be incapable of being corrupted*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 42. et 82. (c. 6. et 9. in fine), et I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 11. seqq. (c. 3.), ubi et propos. minor huius argum. insinuatur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 42 and 82 (c. 6 and c. 9 at the end), and *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 11 ff. (c. 3), where also the minor proposition of this argument is suggested.

la: Vide Aristot., I. de Caelo, text. 110. seqq. (c. 11. et 12.).

en: See Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 110 ff. (c. 11 and 12). [The footer attaches this Aristotle reference at the *perpetuum incorruptibile* anchor; the Augustine *non esset anima imago* quotation is glossed by the next footer entry.]

la: Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 2-4. n. 4-6., ex quo loco propositio ista colligi potest, sed quoad litteram habetur in libro *de Spiritu et anima* c. 18, et in M. Aurelii Cassiodori libro *de Anima*, c. 2: *Nam quemadmodum poterat esse imago aut similitudo Dei, si animae hominum mortis termino clauderentur?* — Paulo infra post *ergo anima* Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *naturalis* pro *naturaliter*.

en: Book XIV *On the Trinity*, c. 2–4, nn. 4–6, from which place that proposition can be gathered, but as to the letter it is found in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 18, and in M. Aurelius Cassiodorus' book *On the Soul*, c. 2: *For how could the souls of men be the image or likeness of God, if they were enclosed by the term of death?* — A little below, after *ergo anima*, the Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, reads *naturalis* for *naturaliter*. [?Marker placement: this gloss-block covers both the Augustine quotation and the subsequent *naturaliter* phrase; anchored at the first marker in the body.]

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), et Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. — Mox ope plurium mss. ut H I L O S U etc. substituimus *a non esse* (i. e. *a nihilo*) pro *ante esse*, quod Vat. habet quodque non ita correspondet modo loquendi Scholasticorum; multi codd. propter compendiosam scripturam sunt dubiae lectionis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 (c. 9), and Boethius, *Consolation* III, Prose 11. — Shortly afterward, by aid of many manuscripts such as H I L O S U etc. we have substituted *a non esse* (i.e. *from nothing*) for *ante esse* ["before being"], which the Vatican edition has and which does not correspond so well to the manner of speaking of the Scholastics; many codices, because of compendious writing, are of doubtful reading.

la: Hinc Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 17. (c. 3.): *Huius corruptio alterius est generatio*.

en: Hence Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 17 (c. 3): *The corruption of this is the generation of another*.

la: Vat. cum multis codd. hic omittit *solum* et transponit, paulo supra legendo *ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile solum*; quae lectio falsa est, nisi fiat transpositio terminorum v. g. *ergo nullum solum corruptibile, vertibile*; vel *ergo nullum vertibile corruptibile solum*. Codd. E H Z ii omittunt *solum* utrobique; codd. P Q ee vero ponunt eo loco, quo nos posuimus. — *Gratiam* accipias hic sensu largo, quo Ioan. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 3. de Angelo ait: *Immortalis est non quidem natura, sed Dei munere et gratia*.

en: The Vatican edition with many codices here omits *solum* and transposes, reading shortly above *ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile solum*; which reading is false, unless a transposition of terms is made, e.g. *therefore no corruptible alone is turnable*, or *therefore no turnable [thing] is corruptible alone*. Codices E H Z ii omit *solum* in both places; but codices P Q ee place it where we have placed it. — Take *grace* here in the broad sense in which John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 3, says of an angel: *He is immortal not indeed by nature, but by God's gift and grace*.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. — In fine argumenti post *hoc* supplevimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. I *est*.

en: See Aristotle, *Periermeneias* I, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, after *hoc*, we have supplied *est* from the older manuscripts and ed. I.

la: Cod. T cum ed. 1 *ergo* pro *est*.

en: Codex T with ed. 1 reads *ergo* for *est*.

la: Cod. A *cooperante*.

en: Codex A reads *cooperante* ["co-working"].

la: Multi codd. ut ABCDEFGLRSTU etc. *actus* loco *accidens*, minus bene, ut patet ex paulo infra positis de invariabilitate. — De primis duabus mutationis speciebus vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. seqq. (c. 1.) ac I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 23. et 24. (c. 4.).

en: Many codices such as A B C D E F G L R S T U etc. [read] *actus* in place of *accidens*, less well, as is plain from what is set down a little below concerning invariability. — On the first two species of change see Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 7 ff. (c. 1) and *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 23 and 24 (c. 4).

la: Supple: *invariabilitas*. Vat. *Sic accepta immutabilitas* loco *et haec*, sed contra plurimos codd., quorum tamen aliqui ut A F T etc. cum ed. I pro *haec* ponunt minus bene *hoc*.

en: Supply: *invariability*. The Vatican edition reads *Sic accepta immutabilitas* in place of *et haec*, but against many codices, of which however some such as A F T etc., with ed. I, read *hoc* less well in place of *haec*.

la: In cod. T ab altera manu hic additur *invertibilitas*.

en: In codex T, by another hand, *invertibilitas* is here added.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A F G H I S T Z etc. cum ed. I addit hic *vel varietas*, et mox post *nulla* verbum *est*.

en: The Vatican edition, against many codices such as A F G H I S T Z etc. with ed. I, here adds *vel varietas* ["or variety"], and shortly after *nulla* [adds] the verb *est*.

la: Vat. *naturam* loco *actum*, sed falso et contra mss. et ed. 1 *enim*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *naturam* in place of *actum*, but falsely and against the manuscripts and ed. 1 *enim*.

la: Substituimus *motis* pro *moventibus*, rationem vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. 1. argum. 3. ad opp.

en: We have substituted *motis* for *moventibus*; for the reason see above d. 8, a. 2, q. 1, argument 3 to the contrary.

la: Libr. de Fide Trin. c. 3: *Quoniam omne compositum necesse est aut actu aut intellectu posse disiungi.* — Mox plerique codd. ut A G H S T X cum ed. 1 *adductae* loco *inductae*.

en: Book *On the Faith of the Trinity*, c. 3: *Since every composite must necessarily be able to be disjoined either in act or in understanding.* — Shortly afterward, most codices such as A G H S T X with ed. 1 read *adductae* in place of *inductae*.

la: Codd. P Q bene *vertibilitas creaturae*.

en: Codices P Q rightly [read] *vertibilitas creaturae* ["the turnability of the creature"].

la: Vat. minus distincte ac contra mss. et ed. I *inesse* loco *quod inest*.

en: The Vatican edition, less distinctly and against the manuscripts and ed. I, reads *inesse* in place of *quod inest*.

la: Cod. Z cum ed. I *creatura*. — Vide Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11, ubi haec propositio probatur.

en: Codex Z with ed. I reads *creatura*. — See Boethius, *Consolation* III, Prose 11, where this proposition is proved.

la: Vide Aristot., I. de Caelo. text. 32. (c. 4. in fine) et III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.). — Codd. V X *in vanum* loco *frustra*.

en: See Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 32 (c. 4 at the end) and *On the Soul* III, text 45 (c. 9). — Codices V X read *in vanum* in place of *frustra*.

la: Plerique codd. ut F G H I K P Q S T etc. minus bene *varia*; cod. X *mutabilia*. — Paulo infra post *sic non est* subaudi: *adiutorium vel gratia*.

en: Most codices such as F G H I K P Q S T etc. read less well *varia* ["various"]; codex X [reads] *mutabilia* ["changeable"]. — A little below, after *sic non est*, supply: *help or grace*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 in principio huius propositionis ponit *Et*, deinde hic pro *et quia* habet *quod*, quo vis rationis debilitatur.

en: The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts and ed. 1, places at the beginning of this proposition *Et*, then here in place of *et quia* has *quod*, by which the force of the reasoning is weakened.

la: Vat. incongrue *dantur cetera vertibilia*; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 *invertibilia*; cod. cc *dantur*, antiquiores autem codd. *dicuntur*, licet aliqui propter abbreviationem dubiae sint lectionis.

en: The Vatican edition incongruously reads *dantur cetera vertibilia* ["the rest are given as turnable"]; all the codices with ed. 1 read *invertibilia*; codex cc reads *dantur*, but the older codices read *dicuntur*, although some, because of the abbreviation, are of doubtful reading.

la: Vat. *vel esse* loco *et*, quod maior pars codd. habet; aliqui codd. ut O T cum ed. I omittunt insuper particulam *et*, pro qua cod. cc habet *vel*. Paulo post aliqui codd. ut A M T aa cum ed. 1 bis hic loco *haec*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *vel esse* in place of *et*, which the greater part of the codices have; some codices such as O T with ed. I omit besides the particle *et*, for which codex cc has *vel*. A little after, some codices such as A M T aa with ed. 1 [read] *bis* here in place of *haec*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *obiicitur*, sed propter subnexa minus bene. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc *et* loco *quia*, at minus distincte et praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. I.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads *obiicitur*, but on account of what follows less well. Shortly afterward, the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *et* in place of *quia*, but less distinctly and against the faith of the other manuscripts and ed. I.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Triplex illa distinctio mutationis, cui correspondet triplex immutabilitas, sumta est ex Damasceno (de Fide orthod. l. c. 3.). Prima mutatio, quae a S. Doctore vocatur *variatio*, tunc fit, quando subiectum de aliquo accidente mutatur in aliud accidens; haec nunc communiter vocatur *motus* sive *mutatio accidentalis*. Secunda est *corruptio* sive mutatio ab esse substantiali formae in materia ad non esse eiusdem, manet tamen materia in potentia ad actum. Tertia est *annihilatio*, a S. Bonav. vocata *versio*, qua fit de ente simpliciter non ens; cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. Aristoteles (V. Phys. c. 1.), omittendo hoc ultimum membrum, mutationes sic distinguit: ex subiecto in subiectum (alteratio, augmentatio), ex subiecto in non-subiectum (corruptio), ex non-subiecto in subiectum (generatio).

**II.** S. Doctor non sibi contradicit hic asserendo, quibusdam creaturis, ut Angelis, inesse incorruptibilitatem per naturam, et alibi dicendo, solius Dei esse incorruptibilitatem. Nam in primo loco sermo est de incorruptione respectu suae particularis naturae, non respectu dependentiae a causa prima; in secundo loco loquitur de illa proprietate, quae soli primae causae competit, quae potest creare et annihilare. Cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 9. a. 2. in corp. — Notanda est egregia doctrina in solut. ad 6. 7. 8. exposita. Circa causam efficientem et deficientem, cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 2.

**III.** Quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 4. m. 3. et p. II. q. 13. m. 2. 3. 4. — Scot., hic q. 5; et Report. hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. et 2; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 16. et seqq.; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 21. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The threefold distinction of change, to which corresponds a threefold unchangeability, is taken from Damascene (*On the Orthodox Faith*, bk. l, c. 3). The first change, which is called *variation* by the holy Doctor, occurs when a subject is changed from one accident into another accident; this is now commonly called *motion* or *accidental change*. The second is *corruption*, or change from the substantial being of a form in matter to the non-being of the same, although the matter remains in potency to an act. The third is *annihilation*, called *conversion* by St. Bonaventure, by which from being there comes simply non-being; cf. II Sent., d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2, in the body. Aristotle (*Physics* V, c. 1), omitting this last member, distinguishes changes thus: from subject to subject (alteration, augmentation), from subject to non-subject (corruption), from non-subject to subject (generation).

**II.** The holy Doctor does not contradict himself here in asserting that some creatures, such as the Angels, have incorruptibility through nature, and elsewhere saying that incorruptibility belongs to God alone. For in the first place the discourse is about incorruption with respect to their particular nature, not with respect to dependence on the first cause; in the second place he speaks of that property which belongs to the first cause alone, which can create and annihilate. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 9, a. 2, in the body. — The excellent doctrine set forth in the solution to [arguments] 6, 7, 8 is to be noted. Concerning efficient and deficient cause, cf. II Sent., d. 34, a. 1, q. 2.

**III.** As to the conclusion: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 4, m. 3, and p. II, q. 13, m. 2, 3, 4. — Scotus, here q. 5; and *Reportata*, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1 and 2; *Summa* loc. cit. — Bl. Albert, here a. 16 and following; *Summa* p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 3. princ. q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit summe simplex
Whether God is supremely simple

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 166 -->

### Articulus unicus

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus sit summe simplex.*

Circa primum, quod in Deo sit summa simplicitas, sic probatur[^1].

1. Omne primum est simplicissimum, quia *quanto aliquid prius, tanto simplicius*[^4]; sed Deus est primum in genere entium, eo quod nec est nec esse potest nec cogitari prius: ergo est ita simplex, quod ipso nihil simplicius esse potest vel cogitari: ergo est simplicissimum.

2. Item, omne quod est quidquid habet, est simplicissimum[^5]; sed Deus est quidquid habet: ergo etc. Prima[^2] patet in se. Minor probatur sic: Deus habet potentiam, sapientiam, et sic de aliis: aut ergo est sua potentia, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum. Si non est sua potentia, cum sit potens potentia, habet *posse* ab alio[^3] — ergo Deus est ab alio; quod si hoc est falsum, ergo [falsum est] illud ex quo sequitur.

3. Item, in esse nobilissimo debet omnis conditio nobilitatis poni in summo; sed Deus est ens nobilissimum, et simplicitas est conditio nobilitatis: ergo ponenda est in Deo in summo: ergo Deus est summe simplex.

4. Item, quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto est potentius in virtute, et e converso, quia *«virtus unita plus potest quam multiplicata»*[^6]; sed Deus est infinitus et immensus virtute: ergo est infinitus simplicitate: ergo in Deo est summa simplicitas.

**Contra:**

1. Simplicius cogitatur aliquid cum cogitatur ut *abstractum a pluribus*, quam quod[^7] cogitatur ut *contentum in pluribus*: ergo cum fides nostra cogitet Deum ut *in pluribus*, non cogitat eum ut simplicissimum: ergo si fides vere cogitat, Deus non est simplicissimus.

2. Item, maior est simplicitas ubi est *identitas sine diversitate* quam cum diversitate; sed in Deo est *identitas cum diversitate suppositorum*: ergo in Deo non est summa simplicitas.

3. Item, maior est simplicitas ubi est *unitas sine pluralitate*[^8], quia numerus dicit aliquo modo compositionem, respectu cuius unitas est simplex: ergo cum in Deo sit unitas cum pluralitate personarum, patet etc.

4. Item, maior est simplicitas ubi non tantum subiectum, sed etiam proprietas est eadem cum proprietate[^9] — quia quando proprietas differt a proprietate in uno, sunt plura differentia, ergo non est simplex. Sed in divinis personis in eadem persona

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differt proprietas a proprietate, unde *innascibilitas* differt a *paternitate*: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Summa simplicitas est in Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut primae rationes probant, in Deo ponenda est summa simplicitas.

**Ad argumenta contra:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod fides[^10] non intelligit ipsum ut simplicissimum; dicendum, quod fides intelligit eum ut simplicissimum, et qui aliter intelligit non intelligit ut summe simplex.

*Triplex modus simplicitatis.* Quod patet sic: quoniam est intelligere *unum in uno*, et *unum in pluribus multiplicatum*, et *unum in pluribus non multiplicatum*. Simplicius autem[^12] intelligitur *unum in pluribus* esse *multiplicatum* quam *unum in uno* — quod patet, quia universale est simplicius singulari[^11]; et adhuc multo simplicius intelligitur quod est *unum in pluribus non multiplicatum*. Hoc modo intelligit fides nostra Deum. Et ideo simplicior est Deus, quia est in omnibus[^13] non-multiplicatus, quam si esset in uno solo, vel[^14] in pluribus multiplicatus. Hinc est, quod Deus simplicissimus est, et fides nostra eum ut simplicissimum intelligit.

Et qui intelligit Deum plurificatum in essentia, vel unum in supposito, derogat summae simplicitati eius, derogat etiam nobilitati simplicitatis[^15] eius. Quoniam ubi summa simplicitas intelligitur, oportet *summam actualitatem* intelligi, si summe nobilis est. Et ubi est summa actualitas, summa *diffusio et communicatio* debet poni; et ista non potest esse nisi in *sempiterna productione rei omnino infinitae et aequalis in virtute*; et hoc non potest esse in alietate[^16] essentiae: ergo non potest intelligi divina essentia simplicissima, nisi in tribus personis intelligatur tota esse, quarum una sit ab alia.

Quando ergo obiicitur, quod simplicius est *abstractum a pluribus* quam[^17] *in pluribus*: verum est, si in illis pluribus plurificetur. Si autem non plurificatur, non est verum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est simplicitas ubi nulla diversitas; dicendum, quod diversitas dupliciter potest venire: vel *ex additione*, vel *ex origine*.

*Ex additione* — cum est diversitas in proprietatibus absolutis, quae diversae sunt in diversis, ut *albedo* in Petro et *nigredo* in[^18] Paulo; et haec [diversitas] privat simplicitatem, quia ponit compositionem.

Est alia diversitas veniens *ex sola origine* — ut puta, quia una persona *emanat*[^19] ab alia, differt ab ea; et haec[^20] non repugnat simplicitati, quia nullam ponit compositionem, sed solum ordinem et respectum ad alium; et haec non proprie dicitur *diversitas*, sed *distinctio et discretio*. Et hoc manifestum est, si intelligamus Patrem *se ipso* generare Filium, et intelligamus eum generare et iterum non generare — nulla est hic compositio, quia nulla additio.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est simplicitas ubi nulla pluralitas; dicendum, quod *duplex est pluralitas*.

Quaedam, in qua *plus est in duobus quam in uno* — ut in duobus hominibus plus est de bonitate quam in uno; et ista pluralitas repugnat simplicitati, quia unitas addit supra unitatem.

Quaedam autem est pluralitas, in qua *tantum in pluribus est quantum in uno*; et haec est in divinis, quia tantum de esse et bonitate et virtute est in una persona quantum in pluribus; et ista pluralitas nihil addit ad unitatem: et ideo nullam omnino ponit compositionem nec privat simplicitatem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Patre differt proprietas a proprietate; dicendum, quod proprietas differt a proprietate *tripliciter*: aut respectu *subiecti*, aut respectu *sui*, aut respectu *obiecti*.

*Si respectu subiecti*, quia causantur ex diversis naturis[^21] in ipso repertis — sic ponit compositionem, quia ponit subiectum esse ex[^22] pluribus.

*Si respectu sui*, sic differt *musica* et *grammatica* in Petro; et sic ponit similiter compositionem, quia ponit subiectum subesse *pluribus*.

*Si respectu obiecti*, sic ponit subiectum comparari pluribus; et ex hoc[^23] non ponitur compositio, sed *distinctio*. Exemplum est in *puncto*, quod est principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum. Hoc modo est differentia proprietatum in divinis.

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english:
### Article unique

### Question I. *Whether God is supremely simple.*

Concerning the first [question] — that there is supreme simplicity in God — it is proved thus[^1].

1. Every *first* [thing] is most simple, since *"the more prior something is, the more simple it is"*[^4]; but God is *first* in the genus of beings, since nothing prior to Him is, nor can be, nor can be thought: therefore He is so simple that nothing simpler than He can be or be thought: therefore He is most simple.

2. Likewise, everything that *is* whatever it *has*, is most simple[^5]; but God is whatever He has: therefore etc. The major[^2] is clear in itself. The minor is proved thus: God has power, wisdom, and so on; either, therefore, He is His power, or He is not. If He is, I have what was to be proved. If He is not His power, then since He is powerful by a power, He has *to-be-able* from another[^3] — therefore God is from another; but if this is false, then false also is that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, in the noblest being every condition of nobility ought to be placed in the highest degree; but God is the noblest being, and simplicity is a condition of nobility: therefore it ought to be placed in God in the highest degree: therefore God is supremely simple.

4. Likewise, the simpler a thing is, the more powerful it is in strength, and conversely — since *"a united power can do more than one multiplied"*[^6]; but God is infinite and immense in strength: therefore He is infinite in simplicity: therefore in God is supreme simplicity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Something is thought as simpler when it is thought as *abstracted from many*, than when[^7] it is thought as *contained in many*: therefore since our faith thinks God as *in many*, it does not think Him as most simple: therefore, if faith truly thinks, God is not most simple.

2. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where there is *identity without diversity*, than with diversity; but in God there is *identity with diversity of supposits*: therefore in God there is not supreme simplicity.

3. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where there is *unity without plurality*[^8] — because number signifies in some way composition, with respect to which unity is simple: therefore since in God there is unity with plurality of persons, the conclusion is plain etc.

4. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where not only the subject, but also the property itself is the same as another property[^9] — because when property differs from property in one [subject], there are several things differing, therefore it is not simple. But in the divine persons, in the same person

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property differs from property — hence *innascibility* differs from *paternity*: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Supreme simplicity is in God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the first reasons prove, supreme simplicity is to be placed in God.

**To the arguments for the contrary:**

*To 1.* As for the objection that faith[^10] does not understand Him as most simple, it must be said that faith does understand Him as most simple, and whoever understands Him otherwise does not understand Him as supremely simple.

*Threefold mode of simplicity.* This is plain thus: for there is the understanding of *one in one*, of *one in many multiplied*, and of *one in many not multiplied*. Now[^12] *one in many multiplied* is understood as simpler than *one in one* — which is plain, since the universal is simpler than the singular[^11]; and still simpler is that which is *one in many, not multiplied*. It is in this way that our faith understands God. And therefore God is simpler because He is *not-multiplied* in all[^13], than if He were in one alone, or[^14] in many multiplied. Hence God is most simple, and our faith understands Him as most simple.

And whoever understands God *multiplied* in essence, or as *one in a supposit*, detracts from His supreme simplicity, and also from the nobility of His simplicity[^15]. For where supreme simplicity is understood, *supreme actuality* must also be understood, if He is supremely noble. And where there is supreme actuality, *supreme diffusion and communication* must be placed; and this cannot be except in the *eternal production of a thing altogether infinite and equal in strength*; and this cannot be in *otherness*[^16] *of essence*: therefore the divine essence cannot be understood as most simple unless it is understood to be wholly in three persons, of whom one is from another.

When, therefore, it is objected that *abstracted from many* is simpler than[^17] *in many*: that is true, if it is multiplied in those many. But if it is not multiplied, it is not true.

*To 2.* As for the objection that greater is simplicity where no diversity is; it must be said that diversity can come in two ways: either *from addition*, or *from origin*.

*From addition* — when there is diversity in absolute properties, which are diverse in diverse things, as *whiteness* in Peter and *blackness* in[^18] Paul; and this [diversity] takes away simplicity, since it posits composition.

There is another diversity coming *from origin alone* — as, for example, because one person *emanates*[^19] from another, it differs from it; and this[^20] does not conflict with simplicity, since it posits no composition, but only order and relation to another; and this is not properly called *diversity*, but *distinction and discretion*. And this is manifest if we understand the Father generating the Son *by Himself*, and we understand Him generating and also not generating — there is here no composition, because no addition.

*To 3.* As for the objection that greater is simplicity where no plurality is; it must be said that *plurality is twofold*.

One kind, in which there is *more in two than in one* — as in two men there is more goodness than in one; and this plurality conflicts with simplicity, since unity adds upon unity.

But there is another plurality, in which there is *as much in many as in one*; and this is in the divine [persons], since there is as much being and goodness and power in one person as in many; and this plurality adds nothing to unity: and therefore it posits no composition at all, nor takes away simplicity.

*To 4.* As for the objection that in the Father property differs from property, it must be said that property differs from property in three ways: with respect to *subject*, with respect to *itself*, or with respect to *object*.

*If with respect to subject* — because [the properties] are caused from diverse natures[^21] found in it — thus it posits composition, since it posits the subject to be *from*[^22] *many*.

*If with respect to itself* — as *music* and *grammar* differ in Peter; and thus it likewise posits composition, since it posits the subject to underlie *many*.

*If with respect to object* — thus it posits the subject as compared to many; and from this[^23] no composition is posited, but *distinction*. The example is in a *point*, which is principle and end with respect to diverse lines. In this way is the difference of properties in God.

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la: Cod. I addit: *Et primo per rationem communem, et secundo per propriam, ibi: Nihil enim simplex.*

en: Codex I adds: *"And first by common reason, and secondly by proper, at that point: For nothing is simple."*

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 praemittit *tertia*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices and ed. 1, prefixes *tertia* ("the third").

la: Fide omnium mss. et ed. 1 restituimus verba in parte ista.

en: On the authority of all the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have restored the words in this part.

la: Cfr. Aristot., XI *Metaph.* c. 1 (X, c. 1). — Paulo infra post *prius* cod. O adiungit *eo*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1). — A little below, after *prius*, codex O adds *eo*.

la: Boeth., *de Hebdomadibus*. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *sed*. — De hoc argumento vide August., XI *de Civ. Dei* c. 10, et Boeth., *de Trinitate* c. 2.

en: Boethius, *On the Hebdomads*. — Then, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we added *sed*. — On this argument see Augustine, *City of God* XI, c. 10, and Boethius, *On the Trinity* c. 2.

la: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 17. — In princ. huius argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc bis omittit *est*, quod tamen in aliis codd. et ed. 1 habetur. Cod. M post *simplicius* bene addit *in essentia*.

en: *Book of Causes*, proposition 17. — At the start of this argument the Vatican edition, with codex cc, twice omits *est*, which is nevertheless found in the other codices and ed. 1. Codex M, after *simplicius*, well adds *in essentia*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut H ee ff cum ed. 1 forte melius *cum* loco *quod*. Mox pauci codd. ut H V ee *concretum* pro *contentum*.

en: Some codices, as H ee ff with ed. 1, perhaps better, read *cum* in place of *quod*. Then a few codices, as H V ee, read *concretum* for *contentum*.

la: Supple cum cod. Z *quam cum pluralitate* vel cum cod. I *quam ubi non*.

en: Supply with codex Z *quam cum pluralitate* ("than with plurality") or with codex I *quam ubi non* ("than where it is not").

la: Subaudi cum cod. Z: *quam ubi differunt*; vel cum codd. Q bb: *quam quando proprietas differt a proprietate*.

en: Understand with codex Z: *quam ubi differunt* ("than where they differ"); or with codices Q bb: *quam quando proprietas differt a proprietate* ("than when property differs from property").

la: Codd. inter se non conveniunt; plures enim ut FHIN P Q R U cum ed. 1 loco *fides* habent *immo*; alii ut C L O Z bene; alii ut A T aa legunt *quod ipsum intelligit ut*; alii demum, sicut Vaticana et ed. nostra.

en: The codices do not agree among themselves; for many, as FHIN P Q R U with ed. 1, in place of *fides* have *immo*; others, as C L O Z, [read] correctly; others, as A T aa, read *quod ipsum intelligit ut* ("that it understands Him as"); and finally others as the Vatican edition and our own.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I *Poster.* c. 20 (c. 24).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 20 (c. 24).

la: Plures codd. ut E I P Q X Z cum ed. 1 addunt *autem*.

en: Many codices, as E I P Q X Z with ed. 1, add *autem* ("however").

la: Hoc est, in tribus personis divinis; aliqui codd. ut H I Z cum ed. 1 *pluribus* pro *omnibus*, quae lectio in se praeferenda videtur.

en: That is, in the three divine persons; some codices, as H I Z with ed. 1, [read] *pluribus* ("many") for *omnibus* ("all"), which reading in itself seems preferable.

la: Cod. Y adiungit *vel*.

en: Codex Y adds *vel* ("or").

la: Supplevimus ope vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omissum *simplicitatis*.

en: We have supplied, with the help of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, *simplicitatis* ("of simplicity"), which had been less well omitted.

la: Cod. Z *nisi in identitate* pro *in alietate*.

en: Codex Z [reads] *nisi in identitate* ("except in identity") for *in alietate* ("in otherness").

la: Supple: *contentum*; vel cum cod. H *contractum*.

en: Supply: *contentum* ("contained"); or with codex H *contractum* ("contracted").

la: Auctoritate multorum mss. ut EHKMPQUVZ etc. et ed. 1 adiecimus *et nigredo in*, quod et contextus postulare videtur. Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 post *Paulo* addit *et Gregorio*.

en: On the authority of many manuscripts, as EHKMPQUVZ etc. and ed. 1, we have added *et nigredo in* ("and blackness in"), which the context also seems to require. The Vatican edition, with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, after *Paulo* adds *et Gregorio* ("and in Gregory").

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *emanat* loco [*manat*].

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *emanat* ("emanates") in place of [*manat*]. [Quaracchi footer truncated in OCR — the displaced reading is `manat` per witness pattern.]

la: Faventibus pluribus mss. ut A I T etc. et ed. 1 nec non contextu, reposuimus *haec* pro *hoc*. Cod. V *hoc modo*. Paulo ante cod. O *aliam* loco *alium*.

en: With the support of many manuscripts, as A I T etc. and ed. 1, and also of the context, we have restored *haec* in place of *hoc*. Codex V [reads] *hoc modo*. A little before, codex O [reads] *aliam* in place of *alium*.

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *vel principiis*.

en: Codices aa bb add *vel principiis* ("or from principles").

la: Praeferimus lectionem multorum mss. ut H I K L O T X Z aa bb etc. *ex* pro *in*, quae et contextu confirmatur.

en: We prefer the reading of many manuscripts, as H I K L O T X Z aa bb etc., *ex* ("from") in place of *in* ("in"), which is also confirmed by the context.

la: Vat. *hoc modo* pro *ex hoc*, sed obstat auctoritas antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *hoc modo* in place of *ex hoc*, but the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 is opposed.

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Simplicitas* dicit modum quendam unitatis nobilissimum, et simplicitas divina summam simul actualitatem. Distinguitur hic et in sequenti quaestione id quod est *simpliciter simplex* et quod est *summe simplex*. Primum invenitur etiam in creaturis, et est illud quod non est resolubile in *partes essentiales* sive *constitutivas*; sic et *materia prima* per ablationem omnis actus et perfectionis dicitur simplex. *Summa* vero simplicitas excludit qualemcumque compositionem, tam *activam* sive compositionem *ex aliis*, quam *passivam* sive compositionem *cum aliis*. Haec summa simplicitas certe importat non tantum privationem compositionis, sed etiam *«modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae»* (q. seq. ad 1).

**II.** Quoad argum. 3 in fund. notandum, illud axioma (quo utitur etiam S. Thom., *S. c. Gent.* I, c. 18, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 3, q. 1), quod *simpliciora sint nobiliora*, valere tantum *ceteris paribus*. In rebus enim corruptibilibus totum compositum, quod complectitur perfectionem sui et partium, potest esse perfectius quam pars simplex — sicut homo nobilior est quam materia, vel etiam quam sola anima. Cfr. Richard., loc. cit. q. 2.

**III.** Conclusio ipsa, qua eliditur error Gilberti Porretani et abbatis Ioachim, definita est primo in Concilio Rhemensi, tum in *Lateran.* IV, c. *Firmiter, de S. Trinit.*: *«Deus est... una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino.»* Cfr. infra dub. 6. — Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 5, mm. 1–2, et q. 14, m. 1. — Scotus, hic q. 1; *Report.*, hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1 et q. 4, a. 1; *S. Th.* I, q. 3, aa. 3, 4, 7, 8; *S. c. Gent.* I, cc. 16, 18. — B. Albert, hic a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* aa. 28 et 29. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 7, dub. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** *Simplicity* signifies a certain most-noble mode of unity, and the divine simplicity signifies at the same time *supreme actuality*. Here and in the following question a distinction is made between what is *simpliciter simple* and what is *supremely simple*. The first is found also in creatures, and is that which is *not resolvable into essential or constitutive parts*; thus *prime matter*, by the removal of every act and perfection, is called simple. But *supreme* simplicity excludes composition of any kind — both *active* (composition *from* other things) and *passive* (composition *with* other things). This supreme simplicity certainly implies not only the privation of composition, but also *"that most noble mode of unity, which God communicates to no creature"* (following q., ad 1).

**II.** Regarding the 3rd argument in the affirmative, it should be noted that the axiom (used also by St. Thomas, *S. c. Gent.* I, c. 18, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1) that *simpler things are nobler* holds only *ceteris paribus*. For in corruptible things, the whole composite, which embraces the perfection of itself and its parts, can be more perfect than a simple part — as a man is nobler than matter, or even than the soul alone. Cf. Richard, loc. cit. q. 2.

**III.** The conclusion itself, by which the error of Gilbert Porretanus and of Abbot Joachim is struck down, was defined first in the Council of Rheims, then in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter *Firmiter, on the Holy Trinity*: *"God is... one essence, one substance or nature altogether simple."* Cf. below dub. 6. — Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 5, mm. 1–2, and q. 14, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1; *Report.*, here q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, and q. 4, a. 1; *S. Th.* I, q. 3, aa. 3, 4, 7, 8; *S. c. Gent.* I, cc. 16, 18. — B. Albert, here a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* aa. 28–29. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, here q. 7, dub. 2.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0