title: Dist. 49, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS III. *De sensuum remuneratione.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum, circa hoc quaeritur de sensuum remuneratione. Et supposito, quod erunt[^p1017-10] in patria — quia erit anima habens omnes suas potentias, cum nullam amittat, erit etiam corpus habens organa omnia — circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum in patria omnes sensus habeant suos actus.

*Secundo*, utrum sensus illi, qui sunt in suo actu, cognoscant per receptionem speciei.

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### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum in patria omnes sensus habeant suos actus.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: note 10 of page 1017, notes 1–12 of page 1018, and notes 1–7 of page 1019.

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod *omnes* sensus erunt in suo actu:

1. Quia nobilior est potentia coniuncta suo actui quam non coniuncta; sed omnes potentiae erunt ibi in statu nobilissimo: ergo omnes erunt coniunctae actui[^p1018-1]: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut anima appetit uniri corpori, ita sensus obiecto; sed ad hoc, quod anima perfecte glorificetur, necesse est uniri corpori, ut ille appetitus quietetur[^p1018-2]: ergo similiter necesse est, sensum omnem uniri obiecto. Sed unio sensus ad obiectum est mediante actu: ergo etc.

3. Item, constat, quod corpus remuneratur, quia servit animae: ergo et sensus debet remunerari; sed omnis potentia nata delectari, si perfecte remuneratur, in perfecta delectatione constituitur; quiescit enim in illo, et haec quies est delectatio[^p1018-3]. Et hoc potest probari *per simile* in damnatis, quia ibi erit continuus dolor in sensu: ergo in Beatis continua delectatio. Ex hoc arguo: nulla potentia delectatur, nisi in eo quod cognoscit; sed sensus non cognoscit se nec organum nec quod supra se est[^p1018-4]: ergo cum solum obiectum cognoscat, delectatur in obiecto. Sed in illo non delectatur nisi in actu: ergo etc.

4. Item, summa delectatio potentiae est in suo actu: ergo si sensus ibi delectantur, in suis actibus ibi sunt[^p1018-5]. *Praeterea*, si delectatur, sentit; sicut sequitur, si dolet, quod sentiat: ergo cum probatum sit[^p1018-6], delectationem esse in omnibus sensibus, oportet, quod omnes sentiant.

5. Item, *visus* est in suo actu, qui est spiritualissimus; unde Iob decimo nono[^p1018-7]: *In carne mea videbo Deum*; et Apocalypsis primo: *Videbit eum omnis oculus*; et Augustinus dicit, quod « visus reficietur in contemplatione humanitatis », in libro *de Spiritu et anima*. — Est etiam ibi sensus *tactus*; quod patet, quia unum corpus glorificatum poterit aliud amplexari, et iste est maxime materialis[^p1018-8]. Quare, cum sit ibi actus sensus *spiritualis* et *materialis*: ergo et omnium sensuum.

**Contra:** Quod *nullus* sensus sit ibi in actu, videtur:

1. Quia omnis virtus finita plus potest in unum, quam quando dispergitur ad multa[^p1018-9]; sed anima habet virtutem finitam: ergo et intensius moveretur, si in solum Deum moveretur cognitione et delectatione: ergo cognitio et delectatio sensuum minuit motum in Deum, ergo et gloriam. Sed nihil debet ibi esse tale: ergo etc.

2. Item, si est sensus in actu, aut ille est *cum delectatione*, aut *sine*. Si *non est cum delectatione*, ergo non est in actu perfecto. Si vero *est cum delectatione*; sed quando aliquid delectatur in uno oppositorum, tristatur in reliquo; quando delectatur in medio, tristatur in extremis: ergo si delectatur in percipiendo, possibile est tristari[^p1018-10]. — *Si dicas*, quod nihil sibi repugnat nec corrumpit propter incorruptibilitatem; saltem *carentia* rei inducit *tristitiam*, cuius *praesentia* afferebat *delectationem*: ergo etc.

3. Item, *quidam* sensus sunt propter indigentiam, ut patet de gustu, ad[^p1018-11] restaurationem deperditi; sed tunc tolletur omnis indigentia: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Sensus visus et tactus et fortasse etiam auditus erunt in suis actibus, alii vero non.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *posse sentire* est ex coniunctione potentiae cum organo bene disposito, *sentire* vero ex coniunctione ipsius cum obiecto[^p1018-12]. Quoniam igitur ibi erunt potentiae iunctae organis bene dispositis, ibi erunt omnes *potentiae sentiendi*. Quoniam vero *obiecta* omnium sensuum non erunt in gloria, sed quorundam; ideo *quidam*

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erunt in *actu suo*, *quidam* vero *non*. — *Obiecta* enim *quorundam* sensuum sunt *proprietates absolutae*, quae reperiuntur in corpore glorificando[^p1019-1], utpote color visus, et levitas ipsius tactus; et quia corpus gloriosum resurget cum luminositate et levitate, erunt ibi obiecta duorum sensuum; ideo isti sensus erunt in suis actibus. Obiecta vero *aliorum* sensuum non sunt *proprietates corporis glorificandi* nec *proprietates absolutae*, sed *emanationes* a corporibus, ut odor et sonus et sapor; et quia non erunt in patria, ideo etc.

Alia etiam ratio sumitur ex parte *medii:* quia medium in *visu* potest esse omne quod habet rationem pervii, medium in *tactu* est caro sibi coniuncta[^p1019-2]; et ideo, quia ista duo media erunt in patria, et isti duo sensus in suis actibus erunt, *alii* vero minime, deficientibus sibi mediis, nisi forte quis instet in *auditu*, de quo relinquitur in dubio, sicut de *laude vocali* in patria, quam ibi ponere nec videtur necessarium nec aperte falsum; et ideo hic opinari est licitum[^p1019-3].

**Ad argumenta pro 1. parte:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *omnes* erunt in actibus propter nobilitatem potentiarum maiorem; dicendum, quod est actus *perfectionis*, et actus, qui habet *imperfectionem coniunctam*; et quoniam actus *gustandi* habet imperfectionem coniunctam ratione *status*, et similiter *olfactus* ratione *obiecti*, quod non glorificatur, et habet fieri per medium receptivum peregrinae impressionis[^p1019-4]: ergo etc.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod appetit sensus uniri; dicendum, quod alius est modus appetendi[^p1019-5]; ille enim animae appetitus est ratione perfectionis *esse naturalis*, sed iste solum est quantum ad *bene esse*; et ideo ille non potest terminari, nisi corpus uniatur; iste potest, si in tali statu ponatur, quod illo obiecto non egeat.

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de delectatione, dicendum, quod delectatio est in sensu dupliciter: una per *redundantiam*, alia per *obiecti praesentiam*. Per *redundantiam*, sicut quando anima est interius plena delectatione, ita inebriantur et potentiae sentiendi, quod nullo modo quaerunt nec egent exterius delectari; et haec delectatio erit praemium omnium sensuum et in omnibus[^p1019-6]. Hanc autem delectationem non habent *a se* nec ab *actu suo*, sed ab *actu animae*; et ideo non oportet, quod propter istam sint sensus in suo actu. — Alia est delectatio per *obiecti convenientis praesentiam*; et quia solum duo sunt sensus, qui habent obiecta gloriosa, ideo solum in duobus est; et hoc non est praemium, nisi valde accidentale, quia non magis est gloriosus sensus in illius praesentia quam absentia. — Aliud patet.

**Ad argumenta pro 2. parte:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod *nullus* sit sensus, quia unus actus impedit alium; dicendum, quod verum est, quando unus non ordinatur ad alium; non sic in proposito, sed actus *rationis* redundat in sensum, et actus *sensus* ordinatur et subservit actui rationis; et ideo unus vigoratur ex alio.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi delectatio, ibi tristitia; dicendum, quod quidam sensus delectatur in obiecto, quia est *conveniens, perficiens* et *conservans*, utpote est obiectum respectu sensus corporis; quidam, quia est *conveniens* et *perficiens*, ut intellectus in intelligibili veritate[^p1019-7]; quidam, quia tantum est *conveniens*, ut sensus gloriosus, *non perficiens*, quia interius perficitur, *non conservans*, quia incorruptibilis est; et talis non tristatur in *contrario*, quia non laeditur, nec in *absentia*, quia non efficitur imperfectus. Quod primo modo delectatur tristatur dupliciter; quod secundo, uno modo.

*Ad 3.* Ultima ratio concedenda est, quod illi sensus, qui sunt *per indigentiam*, non manebunt in suis actibus. Et sic patet totum.

english:
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### ARTICLE III. *On the remuneration of the senses.*

Next, as to the third article, inquiry is made concerning the remuneration of the senses. And it being supposed that they will be[^p1017-10] in the fatherland — since the soul will be one having all its powers, seeing that it loses none, and the body too will be one having all its organs — concerning this two things are asked.

*First* it is asked, whether in the fatherland all the senses have their acts.

*Second*, whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species.

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### QUESTION I. *Whether in the fatherland all the senses have their acts.*

As to the first, then, it is shown that *all* the senses will be in their act:

1. Because a power joined to its act is nobler than one not joined; but all the powers will be there in the noblest state: therefore all will be joined to their act[^p1018-1]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, as the soul desires to be united to the body, so does sense to its object; but for the soul to be perfectly glorified it is necessary that it be united to the body, so that that appetite may be quieted[^p1018-2]: therefore in like manner it is necessary that every sense be united to its object. But the union of a sense with its object is by means of an act: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is agreed that the body is remunerated because it serves the soul: therefore sense too ought to be remunerated; but every power born to be delighted, if it is perfectly remunerated, is established in perfect delight; for it rests in it, and this rest is delight[^p1018-3]. And this can be proved *by a parallel* in the damned, since there will be continuous pain in sense there: therefore in the Blessed continuous delight. From this I argue: no power is delighted except in that which it knows; but sense does not know itself, nor its organ, nor what is above itself[^p1018-4]: therefore, since it knows only its object, it is delighted in its object. But it is not delighted in it except in act: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the highest delight of a power is in its act: therefore if the senses are delighted there, they are there in their acts[^p1018-5]. *Moreover*, if it is delighted, it senses; just as it follows that if it grieves, it senses: therefore since it has been proved[^p1018-6] that delight is in all the senses, it must be that all of them sense.

5. Likewise, *sight* is in its act, which is the most spiritual; whence Job, chapter nineteen[^p1018-7]: *In my flesh I shall see God*; and Apocalypse, chapter one: *Every eye shall see him*; and Augustine says that « sight will be refreshed in the contemplation of the humanity », in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*. — There is also there the sense of *touch*; which is clear, because one glorified body will be able to embrace another, and this sense is the most material of all[^p1018-8]. Wherefore, since there is there the act of a *spiritual* and of a *material* sense: therefore also of all the senses.

**On the contrary:** That *no* sense is there in act seems to follow:

1. Because every finite power can do more upon one thing than when it is dispersed among many[^p1018-9]; but the soul has a finite power: therefore it would also be moved more intensely if it were moved toward God alone by knowledge and delight: therefore the knowledge and delight of the senses diminishes its motion toward God, and therefore also its glory. But nothing of that kind ought to be there: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if sense is in act, that act is either *with delight* or *without*. If it is *not with delight*, then it is not in a perfect act. If, however, it *is with delight*; but when something is delighted in one of two opposites, it is saddened in the other; when it is delighted in the mean, it is saddened in the extremes: therefore if it is delighted in perceiving, it is possible for it to be saddened[^p1018-10]. — *If you say* that nothing is repugnant to it nor corrupts it, on account of its incorruptibility; at least the *absence* of a thing induces *sadness* whose *presence* brought *delight*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, *certain* senses exist on account of need, as is clear of taste, for[^p1018-11] the restoration of what has been lost; but then all need will be taken away: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *The senses of sight and touch, and perhaps also hearing, will be in their acts; the others, however, will not.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *being able to sense* comes from the joining of the power with a well-disposed organ, but *to sense* comes from the joining of that power with an object[^p1018-12]. Since, therefore, the powers will there be joined to well-disposed organs, all the *powers of sensing* will be there. But since the *objects* of all the senses will not be in glory, but only of certain ones, therefore *certain* senses

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will be in *their act*, and *certain* ones *not*. — For the *objects* of *certain* senses are *absolute properties*, which are found in the body to be glorified[^p1019-1], such as color for sight and lightness for touch itself; and since the glorious body will rise with luminosity and lightness, the objects of two senses will be there; therefore those senses will be in their acts. But the objects of the *other* senses are not *properties of the body to be glorified* nor *absolute properties*, but *emanations* from bodies, such as odor and sound and savor; and since these will not be in the fatherland, therefore etc.

Another reason as well is drawn from the side of the *medium:* because the medium in *sight* can be everything that has the character of the transparent, while the medium in *touch* is the flesh joined to it[^p1019-2]; and therefore, since these two media will be in the fatherland, these two senses will also be in their acts, while the *others* will by no means be so, their media failing them — unless perhaps someone should press the case of *hearing*, about which the matter is left in doubt, as it is about *vocal praise* in the fatherland, which to posit there seems neither necessary nor openly false; and therefore here it is permissible to hold an opinion[^p1019-3].

**To the arguments for the first side:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that *all* will be in their acts on account of the greater nobility of the powers; it must be said that there is an act *of perfection*, and an act which has *imperfection joined to it*; and since the act of *tasting* has imperfection joined to it by reason of the *state*, and likewise *smell* by reason of its *object*, which is not glorified and has to come about through a medium receptive of an alien impression[^p1019-4]: therefore etc.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that sense desires to be united; it must be said that the mode of desiring is different[^p1019-5]; for that appetite of the soul is by reason of the perfection of *natural being*, but this one is only as regards *well-being*; and therefore the former cannot be terminated unless the body be united; the latter can be, if it be placed in such a state that it does not need that object.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected concerning delight, it must be said that delight is in sense in two ways: one by *redundance*, the other by the *presence of the object*. By *redundance*, as when the soul is inwardly full of delight, the powers of sensing too are so inebriated that they in no way seek nor need to be delighted outwardly; and this delight will be the reward of all the senses and in all of them[^p1019-6]. But this delight they do not have *from themselves* nor from *their own act*, but from the *act of the soul*; and therefore it is not necessary that on its account the senses be in their act. — The other delight is by the *presence of a suitable object*; and since there are only two senses which have glorious objects, therefore it is only in two; and this is not a reward, except a very accidental one, because a sense is not more glorious in that object's presence than in its absence. — The rest is clear.

**To the arguments for the second side:**

*To 1.* To that, however, which is objected, that there is *no* sense, because one act impedes another; it must be said that this is true when the one is not ordered to the other; but it is not so in the present case, for the act of *reason* redounds into sense, and the act of *sense* is ordered to and subserves the act of reason; and therefore the one is invigorated by the other.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that where there is delight, there is sadness; it must be said that a certain sense is delighted in its object because it is *suitable, perfecting* and *conserving*, as the object is with respect to bodily sense; another, because it is *suitable* and *perfecting*, as the intellect in intelligible truth[^p1019-7]; another, because it is only *suitable*, as the glorified sense — *not perfecting*, since it is perfected inwardly, *not conserving*, since it is incorruptible; and such a sense is not saddened by its *contrary*, since it is not harmed, nor in its *absence*, since it is not made imperfect. That which is delighted in the first way is saddened in two ways; that which is delighted in the second, in one way.

*To 3.* The last reason must be conceded, namely that those senses which exist *by reason of need* will not remain in their acts. And thus the whole is clear.

la: Codd. B E L supplent *sensus*.

en: Codices B E L supply *sensus*.

la: Vide supra p. I. q. 5. fundam. 1.

en: See above, p. I, q. 5, fundamentum 1.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3.

en: Compare above, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3.

la: Secundum Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 4. — Post *in illo* Vat. supplet *obiecto*, et superius habet *servivit* pro *servit*.

en: According to Aristotle, *Ethics* X, c. 4. — After *in illo* the Vatican edition supplies *obiecto*, and above it has *servivit* for *servit*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4, et II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 3. in corp. — Edd. prosequuntur: *ergo cum nullum solum suum obiectum cognoscat, delectatur solum in obiecto suo; sed... nisi mediante actu: ergo etc.*

en: See I *Sent.*, d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad 4, and II *Sent.*, d. 25, p. I, q. 3, in the body. — The editions continue: *therefore since it knows nothing but its own object alone, it is delighted only in its own object; but... except by means of an act: therefore etc.*

la: Codd. I K *erunt*, non pauci codd. omittunt *ibi sunt*, pro quo edd. *delectantur*.

en: Codices I and K read *erunt*; not a few codices omit *ibi sunt*, in place of which the editions have *delectantur*.

la: In arg. praeced. — Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 2.): Ubi enim sensus est, et dolor et voluptas consequitur. Cfr. ibid. text. 27. (c. 3.). — Post *Praeterea* in edd. additur *bene sequitur*.

en: In the preceding argument. — Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 20 (c. 2): For where there is sense, both pain and pleasure follow. Compare ibid., text 27 (c. 3). — After *Praeterea* the editions add *bene sequitur*.

la: Vers. 26. — Apoc. I, 7. — Verba auctoris libri de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 9, vide tom. III. pag. 19, nota 5. — Superius pro *spiritualissimus* plures codd. *specialissimus*.

en: Verse 26. — Apocalypse 1, 7. — The words of the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 9; see vol. III, p. 19, note 5. — Above, for *spiritualissimus* several codices read *specialissimus*.

la: Cfr. Bernard., Serm. 10. de Diversis, n. 4, et de Natura et dignitate amoris (inter opera Bernard.), c. 7. n. 16.

en: Compare Bernard, *Sermon* 10 *On Diverse Matters*, n. 4, and *On the Nature and Dignity of Love* (among the works of Bernard), c. 7, n. 16.

la: Libr. de Causis, propos. 17: Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata. Cfr. Avicenna, de Anima, p. V. c. 7, ubi dicit, quod una potentia posita in actu impedit aliam et retrahit ipsam a sua operatione. — Pro *in unum* cod. K (I a secunda manu) *unita*.

en: *Book of Causes*, proposition 17: Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. Compare Avicenna, *On the Soul*, p. V, c. 7, where he says that one power placed in act impedes another and draws it back from its operation. — For *in unum* codex K (and I, by a second hand) reads *unita*.

la: Codd. L X (bb a secunda manu) supplent *in contrario*, edd. *in non percipiendo*.

en: Codices L and X (and bb, by a second hand) supply *in contrario*; the editions, *in non percipiendo*.

la: Cod. F *qui est ad*.

en: Codex F reads *qui est ad*.

la: Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 53. seqq. (c. 5.).

en: See Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 53 ff. (c. 5).

la: Cod. E *glorificato*. Inferius pro *glorificandi* cod. K (E I a secunda manu) *glorificati*.

en: Codex E reads *glorificato*. Below, for *glorificandi*, codex K (and E, I, by a second hand) reads *glorificati*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 66-120. (c. 7. seqq.), et de Sensu et sens. c. 3. seqq.

en: Compare Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, texts 66–120 (c. 7 ff.), and *On Sense and Sensibles*, c. 3 ff.

la: Beda, III. in libr. Nehemiae, c. 33. (sive Glossa in II. Esdr. 12, 27.): « Cymbala autem, psalteria et citharae, ipsa possunt corpora Sanctorum iam tunc immortalia intelligi, in quibus suavissimos laudationis suae sonos sunt Domino reddituri ». Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum in Ps. 149, 6: *Exaltationes Dei in gutture;* sic enim laetantur *in cubilibus* et *faucibus,* id est in corde et lingua, ut non sibi tribuant quod boni sunt, sed Deo etc. Cfr. August. in hunc loc. Vide etiam II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. dub. 1.

en: Bede, *On the Book of Nehemiah* III, c. 33 (or the Gloss on II Esdras 12, 27): « The cymbals, moreover, the psalteries and the citharas — these can be understood as the bodies of the Saints, already then immortal, in which they are to render to the Lord the sweetest sounds of his praise. » The *ordinary* Gloss, in Strabo, on Psalm 149, 6: *The exaltations of God in their throat;* for thus they rejoice *in their beds* and *in their throats*, that is, in heart and tongue, so that they may not attribute to themselves the fact that they are good, but to God, etc. Compare Augustine on this passage. See also II *Sent.*, d. 2, p. II, dubium 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 979, nota 1.

en: Compare above, p. 979, note 1.

la: Scilicet, quo appetit sensus uniri cum obiecto, quam quo anima cum corpore. — Post *uniri* edd. supplent *obiecto*.

en: Namely, the mode by which sense desires to be united with its object differs from that by which the soul desires to be united with the body. — After *uniri* the editions supply *obiecto*.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 2. — Pro *et in omnibus*, quod habent codd. C M O R S, cod. bb *in omnibus*, edd. et plures codd. *et omnibus* (alii addunt *sensibus*).

en: See above, a. 1, q. 2. — For *et in omnibus*, which codices C M O R S have, codex bb reads *in omnibus*; the editions and several codices, *et omnibus* (others add *sensibus*).

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. — Aliquanto inferius ante *in absentia* edd. omittunt *nec*.

en: Compare I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2. — Somewhat below, before *in absentia*, the editions omit *nec*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De I. quaestione nihil temere asserendum; tamen cum S. Thoma (supra d. 44. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 4; Suppl. q. 82. a. 4.), Scoto (hic q. 13. n. 12.) et Richardo (hic a. 4. q. 3.) alii theologi probabilius esse censent, *omnes* sensus ibi aliquam operationem habituros; nec ipsum *gustum*, de quo magis dubitatur, excipiunt, quamvis non per cibi externi sumtionem saporem habeat. — De *laude vocali* et *auditu* non dubitandum esse, iidem affirmant. — De delectatione *redundante* vide ad 3. pro 1. parte.

**II.** Conclusionem quaestionis 2. approbat S. Thom. (loc. cit. quaestiunc. et a. 3.); qui etiam distinctionem a S. Bonav. adhibitam in solut. ad 4. aliis verbis ponit, scilicet inter immutationem *naturalem* et *spiritualem* (locus refertur infra pag. 1021, nota 3.). In *naturali* immutatione recipitur physice eadem qualitas *naturalis* (v. g. calor), quae inest rei immutanti; in *spirituali* vero recipitur tantum *species* sive *intentio*. Haec autem immutatio, non illa, proprie facit sensus esse in actu, quin immutet *naturam* recipientis. Idem docent Scot. et Richard. locis citt.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the first question nothing is to be rashly asserted; nevertheless, with St. Thomas (above, d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 4; *Supplementum* q. 82, a. 4), Scotus (here, q. 13, n. 12) and Richard (here, a. 4, q. 3), other theologians judge it more probable that *all* the senses will have some operation there; nor do they except *taste* itself, about which there is more doubt, although it would not have savor through the taking of external food. — That there is no doubt to be had concerning *vocal praise* and *hearing*, the same authors affirm. — Concerning *redundant* delight, see the reply to 3 for the first side.

**II.** The conclusion of the second question St. Thomas approves (in the place cited, the same quaestiuncula, and a. 3); he also puts in other words the distinction employed by St. Bonaventure in the solution to 4, namely that between *natural* and *spiritual* alteration (the passage is referred to below, p. 1021, note 3). In *natural* alteration there is received physically the same *natural* quality (e.g. heat) which is present in the thing altering; but in *spiritual* alteration only the *species* or *intention* is received. And it is this alteration, not the former, that properly makes the senses to be in act, without altering the *nature* of the recipient. Scotus and Richard teach the same in the places cited.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L108359–108610, reflowed column-by-column and verified throughout against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1017,1018,1019}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (gutters 1017:1608, 1018:2093, 1019:1670 — bands used as given, **none regenerated**). Editorial marginal glosses (`Argg. pro 1. parte.`, `Pro 2. parte`, `Ratio 1.`, `Conclusio 2.`, `Notandum.`, `Duplex delectatio.`, `Obiectum triplex.` etc.) are Quaracchi page furniture and are not transcribed. Running heads (`DIST. XLIX. P. II. SECT. I. ART. III. QUAEST. I.`) likewise omitted.

**ARTICULUS III opener.** The full-width centred heading `ARTICULUS III. / De sensuum remuneratione.` prints at the foot of p.1017 spanning the gutter (left band carries `ARTICUL…`, right band `…US III.`). It is a real printed heading and is rendered here, folded into this q1 per the frozen convention. Its praenotata promise **two** questions (`circa hoc duo quaeruntur` — *Primo* … *Secundo* …), which matches the two chunk files `…a3-q1` and `…a3-q2`. No lost-question signal.

**Page → apparatus split map (20 entries).**
- **p.1017 — 10 notes printed** (left footer 1–5, right footer 6–10; a clean split at the footer-column boundary). Notes **1–9 belong to `s1-a2-q2`**; **note 10 only is mine** (`Codd. B E L supplent sensus`), anchoring at *quod erunt*¹⁰ in the Art. III opener. Derived independently off the band, not taken from the hand-off. **`s1-a2-q1` holds no part of p.1017** on my reading — no anchor of mine or of the Art. III opener falls before note 10, and the opener is the only p.1017 content in this chunk; no conflict found.
- **p.1018 — 12 notes, all mine.** Left footer 1–7 (note 7 begins in the left column and its continuation prints at the head of the right footer column); right footer 8–12. Binding is straight reading order.
- **p.1019 — 7 notes, all mine.** Left footer 1–3 (note 3 is long and its continuation prints at the head of the right footer column); right footer 4–7, with the short **note 4 set beside note 3's continuation on the same physical line** rather than beneath it. Bound by content, not position.

**⚠ Correction to a hand-off received.** The brief passed on the claim that *p.1017's entire footer register is missing from the raw OCR and exists only on the bands*. **That is not so.** All ten of p.1017's notes are present in the raw (they sit in this chunk's skeleton fence, immediately after the Art. III opener). The band read confirms the raw's content and corrects two OCR garbles in notes not belonging to this chunk (note 8: raw `d. 18. p. IL q. i. ad S.` → band `d. 18. p. II. q. 4. ad 5.`). p.1017 should therefore **not** be counted as a footer-register dropout page; the d.49 tally of such pages stands at one (p.1003), not two.

**OCR-vs-band divergences resolved at band time** (band authoritative, no `[?]` warranted): p.1018 note 12 raw `text. 33.` → band **`text. 53.`**; p.1018 note 4 raw `Edd. pi'osequuntur ergo cum nullmn :` → band `Edd. prosequuntur: ergo cum nullum…`; p.1019 body raw `sensus erunl in suis aclibus` etc. normalised throughout.

**Scholion.** Prints full-width at the foot of p.1019, after `Et sic patet totum.` and before the p.1020 header, i.e. wholly inside this chunk's line range. It has two numbered parts and is rendered **last** in each language block per the parser rule. **§I** treats this question (q.1); **§II** treats **Quaestio II** (`Conclusionem quaestionis 2. approbat S. Thom.` — the *naturalis*/*spiritualis* immutatio distinction, which is q.2's subject). It is rendered here because it physically prints here and `s1-a3-q2`'s frontmatter carries `has_scholion: false`. **Hand-off forwarded to `s1-a3-q2`:** its scholion is not missing — it lives in §II of this chunk's scholion, and `s1-a3-q2` should not re-render it.

**Hand-off forwarded — page span of `s1-a3-q2`.** That chunk's skeleton declares `printed_pages: [1019, 1020, 1021]`. On my reading **1019 is a running-head bleed and should be dropped**: q.2 opens at raw L108611 with `QUAESTIO II.` under the **p.1020** header, and every line of p.1019 — body, replies, and the whole scholion — falls inside L108359–108610. All seven of p.1019's footer notes anchor in this chunk. Recommend `s1-a3-q2` narrow to `[1020, 1021]` / `pdf_pages: [1040, 1041]`. I have not touched that file.

**Dubia.** None in this range and none expected here (this chunk does not reach the end of the distinction). Checked the foot of p.1019 on both bands: after the scholion the page is blank to the footer rule — no `DUB.` header, cased or garbled.

**`[?]` flags:** none. Every band read in this range was legible.

**Marker parity:** 20 Latin anchors, 20 English anchors, 20 apparatus definitions.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 49, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 1027 -->

### Articulus III. *De dote subtilitatis.*

Consequenter quaeritur de dote subtilitatis, de qua duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de ipsa in se. Secundo, de ipsa per comparationem ad actum nostrum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum corpus gloriosum possit penetrare omne aliud corpus.*

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum corpus gloriosum possit penetrare omne aliud corpus non gloriosum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia dicitur Ioannis vigesimo[^p1027-5]: *Cum fores essent clausae*, quod *Iesus stetit in medio*; et Gregorius dicit, quod propter subtilitatem ostia clausa non obstiterunt: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia corpus gloriosum in suo[^p1027-6] motu non potest retardari, ergo nec impediri; et si non potest impediri, ergo nihil potest ei resistere: ergo in suo motu potest omne corpus penetrare.

3. Item, si non potest penetrare omne corpus; cum possibile sit, illud includi, possibile esset incarcerari; sed esse in carcere est miseriae: ergo possibile est, beatum fieri miserum[^p1027-7].

4. Item, Damascenus[^p1027-8]: « De Christo Domino post resurrectionem quaedam dicuntur secundum *dispensationem*, ut cicatrices, cibatio, potatio; quaedam secundum *naturam*, ut transire de loco ad locum infatigabiliter et clausis ianuis, intrare »: ergo si hoc est de natura corporis gloriosi, patet etc.

**Contra:** 1. Cum subtile et rarum obviat duro, non penetrat, sed penetratur, ut patet, quia lapis dividit aera et transit per ipsum: si ergo corpus gloriosum est subtile, ergo per illam dotem[^p1027-9] non contingit sibi penetrare, sed potius penetrari.

2. Item, corpus gloriosum non est maioris subtilitatis quam radius vel aer; sed radius sua subtilitate non penetrat corpora opaca, et aer non penetrat nisi porosa: ergo corpus gloriosum non potest omnia penetrare.

3. Item, si penetrat, aut hoc est *dividendo*, aut *subintrando per poros*, aut *simul coexistendo*. Si *dividendo*; sed quaedam sunt corpora indivisibilia et insecabilia; item, sunt alia, quae, si dividuntur, nunquam reiungentur; sunt et alia, quae, si dividuntur, corrumpuntur: ergo cum corpus gloriosum nihil destruat, quod non possit destrui[^p1027-10], sed etiam quod possit; non omnino poterit penetrare saltem
<!-- page 1028 -->
empyreum. — Si *subintrando per poros*; sed pori sunt discontinui: ergo necesse esset, corpus gloriosum discontinuari. — Si *simul coexistendo*; sed impossibile est per naturam, duo corpora esse simul[^p1028-1]; sed gloria non aufert naturam; ergo etc. Quod autem duo corpora esse simul in philosophia sit impossibile, dicit ratio ostensiva: quia corpori debetur locus ut propria mensura[^p1028-2], sed multiplicato mensurato, necesse est, multiplicari mensuram propriam: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut se habet unum locatum ad plura loca, ita plura locata ad unum locum; sed unum locatum impossibile est esse in pluribus locis simul: ergo nec plura locata possunt esse in eodem loco simul.

5. Item, hoc videtur per impossibile: quia tunc accipiatur corpus aequalis magnitudinis, ut corpus gloriosum; tunc ista duo omnino conterminantur, ergo soliditas in soliditate et superficies in superficie et linea in linea et punctus in puncto; sed duo indivisibilia sunt simul unum[^p1028-3]: ergo etc.

6. Item, trahatur linea a centro illius distantiae ad punctum circumferentiae per medium corpus glorificatum, et rursus alia ab eodem puncto ad idem per corpus non glorificatum; aut est una linea, aut duae. Si una, ergo corpus gloriosum et non gloriosum sunt unum; si duae lineae, tunc videntur inconvenientia tria: primum, quod ab eodem puncto ad idem punctum possunt esse duae lineae rectae, et ita duae lineae rectae, inter quas non cadit superficies media; et rursus, duae lineae rectae habentes eosdem terminos, cum lineae multiplicentur per terminos; item, duae lineae rectae faciunt figuram. Quae sunt tria maxima inconvenientia secundum Philosophum[^p1028-4].

7. Item, si corpus gloriosum potest propter sui subtilitatem coexistere et penetrare corpus grossum[^p1028-5], multo fortius aliud subtile: ergo duo corpora gloriosa possunt esse simul; et si duo, pari ratione tria; et si hoc, tunc omnia.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** *Corpora gloriosa habent dotem penetrabilitatis.*

**Respondeo:** Omnes concedunt, quod corpora gloriosa habent dotem penetrabilitatis[^p1028-6]. — Sed quidam dicunt, quod hanc habent, quoniam omnia corpora eis subiacent et obediunt, et ipsam virtutem habent super omnia. Unde dicunt, quod sicut aer cedit sagittae, sic omne corpus cedit corpori glorioso. — Sed illud improbatum est[^p1028-7], quia qua virtute seiungeretur lapis, si per ipsum transiret, et caelum similiter et corpus hominis non gloriosi.

Alii dicunt, quod non cedit; sed quia omnia corpora quodam modo sunt porosa, et corpus glorificatum habet rationem et naturam lucis, quae tota per essentiam salvatur in puncto et dilabitur, quando non habet resistentiam; volunt, quod corpus gloriosum pertranseat, et non per poros multos, sed potest per unum. — Sed illud adhuc videtur inconveniens. Ponamus enim, corpus aliquod non esse porosum; tunc per illud non posset transire. Item, quomodo est intelligendum, quod corpus gloriosum efficiatur ita modicum, sicut porus, quin deperdatur eius figura, eius quantitas et mensura? Ideo non est conveniens haec positio.

Alii ponunt, quod quia corpus est in perfecta obedientia respectu intellectus, et intellectus[^p1028-8] potest abstrahere a quantitate naturam secundum intelligentiam, et tunc abstrahere poterit secundum veritatem; et tunc corpus, abstracta quantitate, habet corporis substantiam et spiritualitatem. Unde sicut spiritus est simul cum corpore et a corpore non impeditur: sic glorificatum corpus cum non glorificato. — Sed hoc est impossibile et non intelligibile, quod sit corpus vivens et organicum et non sit corpus quantum[^p1028-9]; ideo hoc non est ponendum. Qualiter enim salvetur organizatio et membrorum distinctio in corpore a quantitate abstracto; hoc non video.

Alii vero dicunt, quod corpus gloriosum potest esse in eodem loco cum non glorioso; unde penetrat subintrando per totum, non per poros; et hoc potest sic intelligi. Quod enim duo corpora naturalia non possunt esse simul in eodem loco, non est eo, quod sunt duo; ante enim per naturam sunt duo, quam sint in uno loco vel duobus, quia per suas formas. Et hoc patet, quia duo puncta et duae lineae et duae superficies simul sunt in contactu physico, quia « contigua sunt quorum termini simul », et « simul sunt, quandocumque in eodem loco primo sunt[^p1028-10] ». Quod ergo non sunt simul, hoc
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est propter corpulentiam ipsorum, et quia unum non est alteri pervium. Si ergo ita sit, quod alterum habeat subtilem corporeitatem et penetrativam virtutem respectu alterius; tunc quidem poterunt esse simul. Et quoniam in dote penetrabilitatis datur corpori subtilitas et virtus activa ad penetrandum non glorificatum; ideo penetrat, illo non cedente. — Corpora vero mathematica et lineae et puncta ideo plura sunt, quia distantia; et ideo impossibile est, duo corpora mathematica vel duas lineas vel puncta esse simul, vel etiam mathematicum cum naturali, sicut vult Philosophus[^p1029-1].

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod subtile dispositum est penetrari, non penetrare; dicendum, quod hoc est verum ubi est subtilitas raritatis ad patiendum; sed hic est subtilitas iuncta virtuti agenti, sicut patet in igne et radio.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aequalis subtilitatis est radius; dicendum, quod etsi sit aequalis subtilitatis, non tamen est tantae virtutis in penetrando; et utrumque requiritur, ut visum est.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod duo corpora non possunt esse simul; iam patet responsio: quia, si intelligatur de corpore secundum *esse naturale*, non habet[^p1029-2] hoc, quia *corpus*, sed quia habet *corpulentiam*. — Quod ergo obiicitur de mensura, dicendum, quod duplex est mensura, scilicet *intra* et *extra*. Mensura *intra* est propria et multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem mensurati, quia est unigenea mensurato; mensura *extra* non oportet, quod multiplicetur in quantum mensura; sed si multiplicatur, hoc est propter indigentiam vel incompossibilitatem mensuratorum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unum corpus non potest esse in pluribus locis, ergo nec unus locus continet duo corpora; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia primum facit finitas[^p1029-3], qua creatura non privatur per gloriam; secundum facit corpulentia et grossities, quae aufertur per gloriam.

*Ad 5, 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de punctis et lineis, dicendum, quod non habent distinctionem manifestam, quae est secundum distantiam, sed distinctionem naturalem, quae est secundum diversam substantiam, quae simul in suis naturis coexistunt. Ipse vero opponit, ac si esset distinctio secundum *esse mathematicum*[^p1029-4].

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de corpore glorificato, utrum possit esse simul cum alio; aliqui dixerunt, quod sic, sicut duo radii et lumina simul sunt secundum Dionysium[^p1029-5]. Sed tamen hoc non credo, quia unum non est materiale respectu alterius nec pertransibile alio; et ideo, quamvis sit ibi subtilitas, deficit tamen penetrabilitas. Nec est simile de luminibus, quia formae sunt habentes multiplicationem non a *subiecto, in quo sunt*, sed a *principio effectivo*, sicut dicit Dionysius; et ideo plura corpora gloriosa non possunt esse simul, sicut gloriosum cum non glorioso.

> **De numeratione notarum.** Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The apparatus below is therefore labelled by page: notes 5–10 of page 1027, notes 1–10 of page 1028, and notes 1–5 of page 1029. Notes 1–4 of page 1027 belong to the preceding question (a. 2, q. 2) and are rendered there.

english:
<!-- page 1027 -->

### Article III. *On the dowry of subtlety.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the dowry of subtlety, about which two things are asked. First, inquiry is made concerning it in itself. Second, concerning it by comparison to our act.

### Question I. *Whether the glorified body can penetrate every other body.*

As to the first, then, it is asked whether the glorified body can penetrate every other non-glorified body. And that it can, seems so:

1. Because it is said in John the twentieth[^p1027-5]: *When the doors were shut*, that *Jesus stood in the midst*; and Gregory says that on account of subtlety the closed doors offered no obstacle: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because the glorified body cannot be retarded in its[^p1027-6] motion, therefore neither can it be impeded; and if it cannot be impeded, therefore nothing can resist it: therefore in its motion it can penetrate every body.

3. Likewise, if it cannot penetrate every body; since it is possible that it be enclosed, it would be possible for it to be imprisoned; but to be in prison belongs to misery: therefore it is possible for the blessed to be made miserable[^p1027-7].

4. Likewise, Damascene[^p1027-8]: « Of Christ the Lord after the resurrection certain things are said according to *dispensation*, such as the scars, eating, drinking; certain things according to *nature*, such as to pass from place to place untiringly and, the doors being shut, to enter »: therefore if this belongs to the nature of the glorified body, it is clear etc.

**Contra:** 1. When the subtle and rare meets the hard, it does not penetrate but is penetrated, as is clear, because a stone divides the air and passes through it: if therefore the glorified body is subtle, therefore by that dowry[^p1027-9] it does not fall to it to penetrate, but rather to be penetrated.

2. Likewise, the glorified body is not of greater subtlety than a ray or air; but a ray by its subtlety does not penetrate opaque bodies, and air does not penetrate save porous ones: therefore the glorified body cannot penetrate all things.

3. Likewise, if it penetrates, either this is *by dividing*, or *by entering through the pores*, or *by coexisting simultaneously*. If *by dividing*; but certain bodies are indivisible and incapable of being cut; likewise, there are others which, if they are divided, will never be rejoined; and there are still others which, if they are divided, are corrupted: therefore since the glorified body destroys nothing which cannot be destroyed[^p1027-10], but even what can be; it will not be able to penetrate everything, at least not
<!-- page 1028 -->
the empyrean. — If *by entering through the pores*; but the pores are discontinuous: therefore it would be necessary that the glorified body be made discontinuous. — If *by coexisting simultaneously*; but it is impossible by nature that two bodies be simultaneous[^p1028-1]; but glory does not take away nature; therefore etc. And that two bodies being simultaneous is impossible in philosophy, a demonstrative reason declares: because to a body there is due a place as its proper measure[^p1028-2], but when the measured is multiplied, it is necessary that the proper measure be multiplied: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as one thing placed stands to many places, so many things placed stand to one place; but it is impossible for one thing placed to be in many places at once: therefore neither can many things placed be in the same place at once.

5. Likewise, this seems [to lead] to an impossibility: because then let a body of equal magnitude to the glorified body be taken; then these two are wholly coterminous, therefore solidity is in solidity and surface in surface and line in line and point in point; but two indivisibles [that are] together are one[^p1028-3]: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, let a line be drawn from the centre of that distance to a point on the circumference through the middle of a glorified body, and again another from the same point to the same [point] through a non-glorified body; either it is one line, or two. If one, then the glorified and the non-glorified body are one; if two lines, then three unfitting consequences appear: first, that from the same point to the same point there can be two straight lines, and thus two straight lines between which no surface falls in the middle; and again, two straight lines having the same termini, whereas lines are multiplied by their termini; likewise, two straight lines make a figure. Which are three very great absurdities according to the Philosopher[^p1028-4].

7. Likewise, if the glorified body can, on account of its subtlety, coexist with and penetrate a gross body[^p1028-5], much more strongly another subtle one: therefore two glorified bodies can be simultaneous; and if two, by parity of reason three; and if this, then all.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** *Glorified bodies have the dowry of penetrability.*

**I respond:** All concede that glorified bodies have the dowry of penetrability[^p1028-6]. — But some say that they have this because all bodies are subject and obedient to them, and they have that very power over all things. Hence they say that as the air yields to an arrow, so every body yields to a glorified body. — But that has been disproved[^p1028-7], because [one asks] by what power a stone would be sundered, if [the glorified body] passed through it, and likewise the heaven and the body of a non-glorified man.

Others say that it does not yield; but because all bodies are in a certain manner porous, and the glorified body has the account and nature of light, which is wholly preserved in its essence in a point and slips through when it has no resistance; they hold that the glorified body passes through, and not through many pores, but that it can [pass] through one. — But that still seems unfitting. For let us suppose some body not to be porous; then it could not pass through it. Likewise, how is it to be understood that the glorified body is made so small, like a pore, without its figure, its quantity and measure being lost? Therefore this position is not fitting.

Others hold that, because the body is in perfect obedience with respect to the intellect, and the intellect[^p1028-8] can abstract nature from quantity according to understanding, then it will be able to abstract [it] according to truth; and then the body, quantity being abstracted, has the substance and the spirituality of a body. Hence as a spirit is together with a body and is not impeded by the body: so is a glorified body with a non-glorified one. — But this is impossible and unintelligible, that there should be a living and organic body which is not a quantified body[^p1028-9]; therefore this is not to be posited. For how organization and the distinction of members are preserved in a body abstracted from quantity; this I do not see.

But others say that the glorified body can be in the same place with the non-glorified; hence it penetrates by entering in through the whole, not through the pores; and this can be understood thus. For that two natural bodies cannot be simultaneously in the same place is not from this, that they are two; for they are two by nature before they are in one place or in two, since [they are two] by their forms. And this is clear, because two points and two lines and two surfaces are simultaneous in physical contact, since « contiguous things are those whose termini are together », and « they are together whenever they are in the same place primarily[^p1028-10] ». That therefore they are not together, this
<!-- page 1029 -->
is on account of their corpulence, and because the one is not pervious to the other. If therefore it be so, that the one has a subtle corporeity and a penetrative power with respect to the other; then indeed they will be able to be together. And since in the dowry of penetrability there is given to the body subtlety and an active power for penetrating the non-glorified; therefore it penetrates, the latter not yielding. — But mathematical bodies and lines and points are many for this reason, that they are distant; and therefore it is impossible that two mathematical bodies or two lines or points be together, or even a mathematical with a natural one, as the Philosopher holds[^p1029-1].

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that the subtle is disposed to be penetrated, not to penetrate; it must be said that this is true where there is a subtlety of rarity apt for undergoing; but here there is a subtlety joined to an agent power, as is clear in fire and in a ray.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a ray is of equal subtlety; it must be said that although it be of equal subtlety, it is nevertheless not of such power in penetrating; and both are required, as has been seen.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that two bodies cannot be together; the answer is now clear: because, if it be understood of a body according to *natural being*, it does not have[^p1029-2] this because it is *a body*, but because it has *corpulence*. — To what therefore is objected concerning measure, it must be said that measure is twofold, namely *within* and *without*. Measure *within* is proper and is multiplied according to the multiplication of the measured, because it is of one kind with the measured; measure *without* need not be multiplied insofar as it is a measure; but if it is multiplied, this is on account of the neediness or the incompossibility of the things measured.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that one body cannot be in many places, therefore neither does one place contain two bodies; it must be said that it is not alike: because the first is caused by finitude[^p1029-3], of which the creature is not deprived through glory; the second is caused by corpulence and grossness, which is taken away through glory.

*To 5, 6.* To that which is objected concerning points and lines, it must be said that they do not have a manifest distinction, which is according to distance, but a natural distinction, which is according to diverse substance, [substances] which coexist together in their natures. But he objects as though the distinction were according to *mathematical being*[^p1029-4].

*To 7.* To that which is objected concerning the glorified body, whether it can be together with another; some have said that it can, just as two rays and lights are together according to Dionysius[^p1029-5]. But nevertheless I do not believe this, because the one is not material with respect to the other nor passable-through by the other; and therefore, although there be subtlety there, penetrability is nevertheless lacking. Nor is it alike with lights, because forms are things having their multiplication not from the *subject in which they are*, but from the *effective principle*, as Dionysius says; and therefore many glorified bodies cannot be together, as a glorified one can be with a non-glorified.

la: Vers. 19: *Cum ergo sero esset... et fores* etc. — Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1: *Quid ergo mirum, si clausis ianuis post resurrectionem suam in aeternum iam victurus intravit, qui moriturus veniens non aperto utero Virginis exivit?*

en: Verse 19: *When therefore it was late... and the doors* etc. — Gregory, II. Homilies on the Gospel, homily 26, n. 1: *What wonder, then, if with the doors shut he entered, now about to live forever after his resurrection, who when coming to die went forth without opening the womb of the Virgin?*

la: Multi codd. *in sui*.

en: Many codices read *in sui*.

la: Cod. aa addit: *quod est impossibile*.

en: Codex aa adds: *which is impossible*.

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 18; pluribus interiectis.

en: Book IV of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 18; with several things interposed.

la: Pro *dotem*, quod in permultis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur, cod. bb (E a secunda manu) *naturam*.

en: For *dotem*, which is lacking in very many codices and in edition 1, codex bb (E by a second hand) reads *naturam*.

la: Cod. S addit *patet etc.*, et deinde pro *sed* substituit *Dato*; cod. M legit: *destrui, videtur, quod non possit omnia penetrare, saltem empyreum*. Allegatur communiter Iob 37, 18: *Qui [caeli] solidissimi quasi aere fusi sunt*.

en: Codex S adds *it is clear, etc.*, and then for *sed* substitutes *Dato*; codex M reads: *destroyed, it seems that it cannot penetrate all things, at least not the empyrean*. Job 37:18 is commonly adduced: *Who [the heavens] are most solid, as if cast of brass*.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 324, nota 9, ubi loci ex Aristot. allati sunt.

en: See vol. II, p. 324, note 9, where the passages from Aristotle are adduced.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 30. (c. 4.). — Vat. addit *proprio mensurato*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 30 (c. 4). — The Vatican edition adds *proprio mensurato*.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 226, nota 2.

en: See vol. II, p. 226, note 2.

la: Euclid., I. Geometr.: « Superficiei autem fines lineae sunt ». Idem inter *petitiones*, quae sunt in geometria, recenset hanc: « Prima, ut ab omni puncto in omne punctum *recta linea* [i. e. quae aequaliter in suis protenditur punctis, et ideo *una* tantum potest esse] ducatur, postulat ». « Rectilineae figurae sunt quae sub rectis lineis *continentur*; trilatera quidem figura est, quae sub tribus rectis lineis continetur » etc. Idem docet Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quanto*; II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 22. (c. 4.), et praesertim lib. de Lineis insecabilibus. — Cod. L *secundum philosophiam*.

en: Euclid, *Geometry* I: « The limits of a surface are lines ». The same author, among the *postulates* which are in geometry, reckons this one: « The first postulates that from every point to every point a *straight line* [i. e. one which is extended equally in its own points, and therefore can be only *one*] be drawn ». « Rectilinear figures are those which *are contained* under straight lines; a trilateral figure is one which is contained under three straight lines », etc. Aristotle teaches the same, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quantity*; *On the Heaven and the World* II, text 22 (c. 4), and especially the book *On Indivisible Lines*. — Codex L reads *secundum philosophiam*.

la: Cod. F *corpus non gloriosum*.

en: Codex F reads *corpus non gloriosum*.

la: Vat. addit *id est subtilitatis*. Inferius pro *hanc* codd. *hoc*, et pro *ipsam* edd. cum paucis codd. *ipsa*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *that is, of subtlety*. Below, for *hanc* the codices read *hoc*, and for *ipsam* the editions with a few codices read *ipsa*.

la: Cfr. hic arg. 3. ad oppos. — Post pauca substituimus *seiungeretur* ex cod. G pro *reiungeretur*.

en: Cf. here argument 3 to the contrary. — Shortly after we have substituted *seiungeretur* from codex G for *reiungeretur*.

la: Cod. A *intellectus autem nunc*, qui etiam inferius pro *corporis substantiam et spiritualitatem* substituit *substantiam spiritualitatis*.

en: Codex A reads *intellectus autem nunc*, which also below substitutes *substantiam spiritualitatis* for *corporis substantiam et spiritualitatem*.

la: Vide supra pag. 219, nota 5.

en: See above, p. 219, note 5.

la: Aristot., V. Phys. text. 22. (c. 3.): *Simul igitur dicuntur haec esse secundum locum, quaecumque in uno loco sunt primo; separatim autem, quaecumque sunt in altero. Tangere* [contigua] *autem, quorum extrema sunt simul*. Cfr. ibid. VI. text. 1. — Vat. omittit *et simul*. Aliquanto inferius post *penetrabilitatis* Vat. addit *id est subtilitatis*, et pro *subtilitas* cod. P substituit *penetrabilitas*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 22 (c. 3): *Those things then are said to be together in respect of place, whatsoever are in one place primarily; but separately, whatsoever are in another. And [they are said] to touch* [to be contiguous] *whose extremities are together*. Cf. ibid. VI, text 1. — The Vatican edition omits *et simul*. Somewhat below, after *penetrabilitatis*, the Vatican edition adds *that is, of subtlety*, and for *subtilitas* codex P substitutes *penetrabilitas*.

la: Libr. IV. Phys. text. 76. (c. 8.); ubi docet, quod corpus cubum, si ab omnibus *qualitatibus* sensibilibus separatum fuerit, in aqua adhuc aequale spatium occuparet et aquam penetrare non posset. Averroes hunc locum exponens ait: *Impossibilitas penetrationis corporum accidit eis ex suis terminis mathematicis, non ex suis accidentibus sensibilibus*.

en: *Physics* IV, text 76 (c. 8); where he teaches that a cubic body, if it were separated from all sensible *qualities*, would still occupy an equal space in water and could not penetrate the water. Averroes, expounding this passage, says: *The impossibility of the penetration of bodies befalls them from their mathematical termini, not from their sensible accidents*.

la: Edd. *tenet*. Aliquanto inferius pro *unigenea* ed. 1 *homogenea*; et pro *compossibilitatem* substituimus ex codd. E L Z *incompossibilitatem*.

en: The editions read *tenet*. Somewhat below, for *unigenea* edition 1 reads *homogenea*; and for *compossibilitatem* we have substituted, from codices E L Z, *incompossibilitatem*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. et 4.

en: Cf. II *Sentences*, d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 2 and 4.

la: Plures codd. et edd. *metaphysicum*.

en: Several codices and editions read *metaphysicum*.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 4, ubi etiam insinuatur responsio, quae paulo inferius ex Dionysio affertur. Vide tom. II. pag. 83, nota 1. et pag. 329, nota 4.

en: *On the Divine Names*, c. 2, § 4, where the answer is also intimated, which is adduced a little below from Dionysius. See vol. II, p. 83, note 1, and p. 329, note 4. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Rationem subtilitatis S. Thom. iterum repetit ex perfecto dominio animae glorificatae super corpus; Scotus vero dicit, eam esse extrinsecus a voluntate et potentia divina. — Insuper antiqui Scholastici sustinuerunt, corpus gloriosum ipsa dote *subtilitatis* posse in eodem loco simul esse cum alio corpore non glorioso, vel ut alii opinabantur, etiam glorioso; quod ut explicarent, varios modos excogitarunt, ut patet in littera auctoris. Opinionem S. Doctoris, quod tale corpus per quandam *spiritualitatis* proprietatem possit non occupare locum et per virtutem activam aliud corpus penetrare, placuit etiam Petro a Tar. et primitus B. Alberto, qui tamen postea (d. 44. a. 25; cfr. a. 23. 24. 26.) retractavit (« sine praeiudicio aliorum »). S. Thom. docet, non *vi huius dotis*, sed *sola divina virtute* corpus gloriosum posse simul esse in eodem loco cum alio corpore non glorioso, vel etiam glorioso; immo de quocumque corpore idem affirmat (d. 44. q. 2. a. 2; Suppl. q. 83. a. 1-5.). Sequentem vero quaestionem (2.) eodem modo solvit, ac S. Bonav. — Richard. a Med. sequitur sententiam S. Thomae, tamen dubius est, utrum etiam *duo corpora gloriosa* possint esse simul in uno loco; quod auctor noster negat. Cum Scotus ipsam hanc dotem tribuat immediatae efficientiae potentiae divinae; sibi constans docet, istam possibilitatem coexistentiae pariter non nisi a divina operatione oriri.

De utraque huius articuli quaestione praeter laudatos: Scot., hic q. 16. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4. 5. — Durand., d. 44. q. 5. 6. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 7.

**II.** Circa causam efficientem, unde *agilitatis* dos (a. 4.) repetenda sit, secundum iam tacta principia Scotus ab aliis recedit, cum non admittat proprie aliquam *dispositionem* seu qualitatem *supernaturalem* ad agilitatem *ab anima glorificata acquisitam*, licet virtus corporum motiva fiat perfectior. — Multiplex porro fuit opinio de quaestione, utrum motus Beatorum fiat *in instanti*; quod cum Scoto aliisque negat S. Thom., cum *probabilius* sit, haec corpora moveri *in tempore*, sed imperceptibili propter brevitatem (locis infra citt. quaestiunc. sive art. 3.); cui favet S. Bonav. q. 1. ad 1. — Alteram quaestionem S. Thomas similiter solvit (quaestiunc. sive art. 2.).

De utraque huius articuli quaestione: Scot., hic q. 14. — S. Thom. d. 44. a. 3; Suppl. q. 84. a. 1-3. — B. Albert., d. 44. a. 17-22. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 7. 8. — Durand., loc. cit. q. 7.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** St. Thomas again derives the account of subtlety from the perfect dominion of the glorified soul over the body; Scotus, however, says that it is extrinsic, from the divine will and power. — Moreover the ancient Scholastics maintained that the glorified body, by that very dowry of *subtlety*, could be in the same place together with another non-glorified body, or, as others thought, even with a glorified one; and in order to explain this they devised various modes, as is clear in the author's text. The opinion of the Holy Doctor, that such a body can, by a certain property of *spirituality*, not occupy place, and by an active power penetrate another body, pleased also Peter of Tarentaise and at first Blessed Albert, who nevertheless afterwards (d. 44, a. 25; cf. a. 23, 24, 26) retracted it (« without prejudice to others »). St. Thomas teaches that, not *by force of this dowry*, but *by the divine power alone*, the glorified body can be together in the same place with another non-glorified body, or even with a glorified one; indeed he affirms the same of any body whatever (d. 44, q. 2, a. 2; Suppl. q. 83, a. 1-5). The following question (2) he solves in the same manner as St. Bonaventure. — Richard of Middleton follows the opinion of St. Thomas, yet is doubtful whether even *two glorified bodies* can be together in one place; which our author denies. Since Scotus attributes this very dowry to the immediate efficiency of the divine power, he consistently teaches that this possibility of coexistence likewise arises only from the divine operation.

On both questions of this article, besides those praised: Scotus, here q. 16. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 4, 5. — Durandus, d. 44, q. 5, 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 7.

**II.** Concerning the efficient cause from which the dowry of *agility* (a. 4) is to be derived, Scotus, according to the principles already touched upon, departs from the others, since he does not properly admit any supernatural *disposition* or quality for agility *acquired from the glorified soul*, although the motive power of the bodies becomes more perfect. — Manifold, moreover, was the opinion on the question whether the motion of the Blessed takes place *in an instant*; which St. Thomas, with Scotus and others, denies, since it is *more probable* that these bodies are moved *in time*, but in an imperceptible one on account of its brevity (in the places cited below, the little question or article 3); to which St. Bonaventure is favourable, q. 1, ad 1. — The other question St. Thomas solves similarly (little question or article 2).

On both questions of this article: Scotus, here q. 14. — St. Thomas, d. 44, a. 3; Suppl. q. 84, a. 1-3. — Blessed Albert, d. 44, a. 17-22. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. 7, 8. — Durandus, loc. cit. q. 7.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L109392–109697, verified against 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p10{27,28,29}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands used as given — not regenerated). Damaged/cascade-shattered regions (Respondeo, solutiones, scholion, all three footer registers) read off the bands, which are authoritative there per the VOL II/IV override.

**Page-span correction.** Skeleton `printed_pages` was `[1027, 1028, 1029, 1030]`. The raw range ends exactly at the `1030 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.` running head (L109697), and the body closes on p.1029 with *…sicut gloriosum cum non glorioso*, followed by the SCHOLION and p.1029's footer register. **No p.1030 content belongs to this chunk**; corrected to `[1027, 1028, 1029]` / pdf `[1047, 1048, 1049]`. p.1030 is therefore *not* a shared seam for this chunk — it belongs wholly to `d49-p2-s2-a3-q2`.

**Articulus III opener.** The full-width centred `ARTICULUS III. / De dote subtilitatis.` header plus its praenotata (*Consequenter quaeritur de dote subtilitatis, de qua duo quaeruntur…*) are rendered here, per the frozen "article opener folds into that article's q1" convention. **Art. III promises TWO questions** (*duo quaeruntur*; ordinals *Primo … Secundo*), which matches the two existing chunks a3-q1 and a3-q2. No lost-question signal.

**Hidden-QUAESTIO sweep.** Swept pp.1027–1029 (all six body bands plus raw) for a centred full-width `QUAESTIO` header. Only two headers occur in or adjacent to the range: `QUAESTIO I.` at L109404 (this chunk) and `QUAESTIO II.` at L109698 — the latter is exactly the first line of `d49-p2-s2-a3-q2`, i.e. already mapped, not hidden. **Nothing lost.**

**Apparatus split map (21 entries).**
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- **p.1029 — 5 notes, all 5 mine** (left footer: tail of p.1028 n.10, then n.1; right footer: tail of n.1, then 2–5). The p.1029 register therefore **does not begin with note 1** — it opens with an unnumbered continuation belonging to the previous page, which is folded into `p1028-10` here.

**Cross-page footer continuations — swept all three register heads and tails.** d.49 shows a further binding behaviour here: a footer note can run onto the *following printed page's* footer register, not merely across the gutter.
- Head of p.1028's register: numbered `1`, no fragment — p.1027 n.10 closes complete (*…quasi aere fusi sunt.*).
- Head of p.1029's register: **unnumbered fragment**, the tail of p.1028 n.10 (*[contigua] autem, quorum extrema sunt simul…*) — folded into `p1028-10`.
- Head of p.1030's register: **unnumbered fragment** (*quae paulo inferius ex Dionysio affertur. Vide tom. II. pag. 83, nota 1. et pag. 329, nota 4.*). **Verified independently on the p.1030-L-2 band.** p.1029 n.5 breaks off mid-sentence on a comma (*…ubi etiam insinuatur responsio,*), and this fragment completes it. **Agreed with `s2-a3-q2`'s reading; the entry is rendered whole here as `p1029-5`.** It is correctly *not* rendered in a3-q2.

**Band condition.** p.1027 is one of the flagged near-abutting pages (8 px blank run). Both L and R bands at all three levels read cleanly — no first-character clipping, footer rules and marginal glosses fully captured. **Not clipped; band used as given, not re-cropped.**

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
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- `**[?]` flags: none.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 49, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 1020 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum sensus illi, qui sunt in suo actu, cognoscant per receptionem speciei.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: notes 1–10 of page 1020 and notes 1–3 of page 1021 (page 1021's notes 4–7 belong to the following chunk).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum illi sensus, qui sunt in suo actu, cognoscant per receptionem speciei. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia omnis cognitio est motus ad animam[^p1020-1]; sed omnis motus ad animam est in aliquid recipiendo: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis cognitio est per unionem cognoscibilis cum cognoscente[^p1020-2]; sed sensus gloriosus aliquid cognoscit, cui non unitur secundum veritatem, et cuius non habet per naturam speciem: ergo habet uniri mediante specie recepta.

3. Item, quanto speculum est clarius et purius, tanto est ad recipiendum magis idoneum; sed sensuum gloriosorum organa sunt purissima et denudata a formis obiectorum[^p1020-3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, ordo naturalis est, ut obiectum influat in organum[^p1020-4]; sed natura non tolletur per gloriam: ergo organum recipiet.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus in sexto *Musicae*[^p1020-5], et est propositio per se vera: « Minus nobile non agit in magis nobile »; sed quod recipit ab alio patitur ab illo: ergo visus non poterit recipere a corporibus inferioribus, cum organum eius sit nobilissimum.

2. Item, orbis primus non recipit peregrinam impressionem propter sui nobilitatem et incorruptionem[^p1020-6]: ergo si oculus est nobilior, patet etc.

3. Item, si est ibi receptio de novo; cum non sit receptio faciens esse sensum in actu, nisi adsit iudicium: ergo est ibi iudicium, ergo cogitatio animae, ergo nova cogitatio, et ita volubiles cogitationes; quod est contra Augustinum[^p1020-7].

4. Item, immutationem et receptionem animalem antecedit immutatio naturalis[^p1020-8]; sed corpus glorificatum et eius organum, cum sit incorruptibile, non recipiet naturalem immutationem: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Sensus glorificati cognoscunt recipiendo speciem a sensibili.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod non est receptio *ab extrinseco*; sed anima omnium quae vult videre species facit in oculo, et videt, quia tunc ordo erit commutatus, quia non erit receptio veniens ab inferiori, sed a superiori. — Sed haec solutio non potest stare; primum quidem, quia perverteretur ordo, cum species spiritualis fieret corporalis, perfectum fieret imperfectum; secundo, quia ita videret absentia, ut praesentia, ita oculis clausis, sicut apertis.

Secunda positio est, quod est sensus, sed non est intus suscipiendo, sed extra mittendo virtutem, quia non recipiet, sed influet. — Sed ista adhuc non potest stare, cum cognitio sit in unione, et[^p1020-9] organa sint maxime habilia ad recipiendum.

Tertia positio est, quod sensus glorificati cognoscunt recipiendo speciem ab ipso sensibili. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *minus nobile* etc.; dici potest, quod non oportet, quod *obiectum* sit nobilius *organo*, in quod agit, *simpliciter*, sed *secundum quid*, in hoc scilicet, quod habet speciem, et *illud* est denudatum[^p1020-10]; et hoc sufficit ad agendum. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod minus nobile non agit virtute propria, sed aliena; et in sensu glorificato est natura duplex in oculo, *perspicui* et *luminis*; quando igitur videt corpus se luminosius, illud corpus sua virtute facit speciem in oculo; quando vero minus luminosum, tunc virtute propria in se facit. Et sic patet illud.

<!-- page 1021 -->

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliena impressione, quod non est in orbe; dicendum, quod ibi notatur[^p1021-1] *aliena impressio*, quae est via ad corruptionem; sed de hac non intelligitur hic.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cogitationes volvuntur; dicendum, quod *cogitationes volvi* est dupliciter: uno modo, quia intellectus non habet defixum aspectum in uno, et hoc modo est in via et non erit in patria; alio modo est, quod principaliter et continue videt unum et alia multa propter illud, et inter illa multa modo unum, modo aliud; et hoc bene erit in patria[^p1021-2]; talis est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immutatio naturalis praecedit; dicendum, quod immutatio naturalis est duplex: quaedam est per *receptionem et abiectionem*, ut calidi a frigido, et haec non erit; quaedam per *receptionem tantum*, ut perspicui a luminoso[^p1021-3], et haec erit.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species.*

Secondly it is asked whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species. And that they do, seems to follow:

1. Because all cognition is a motion toward the soul[^p1020-1]; but every motion toward the soul consists in receiving something: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, all cognition is through the union of the knowable with the knower[^p1020-2]; but the glorified sense knows something to which it is not united according to truth, and of which it does not have the species by nature: therefore it has to be united by means of a received species.

3. Likewise, the clearer and purer a mirror is, the more apt it is for receiving; but the organs of the glorified senses are most pure and stripped bare of the forms of objects[^p1020-3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is the natural order that the object should flow into the organ[^p1020-4]; but nature will not be taken away through glory: therefore the organ will receive.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the sixth book of the *Music*[^p1020-5], and it is a proposition true of itself: « The less noble does not act upon the more noble »; but what receives from another is acted upon by it: therefore sight will not be able to receive from lower bodies, since its organ is most noble.

2. Likewise, the first sphere does not receive a foreign impression on account of its nobility and incorruptibility[^p1020-6]: therefore if the eye is more noble, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, if there is there a reception anew; since there is no reception making the sense to be in act unless judgment be present: therefore there is judgment there, therefore a thought of the soul, therefore a new thought, and thus rolling thoughts; which is against Augustine[^p1020-7].

4. Likewise, an animal alteration and reception is preceded by a natural alteration[^p1020-8]; but the glorified body and its organ, since it is incorruptible, will not receive a natural alteration: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> The glorified senses know by receiving a species from the sensible thing.

**I respond:** To this some have said that there is no reception *from without*; but the soul makes in the eye the species of all the things it wishes to see, and sees, because then the order would be reversed, since the reception would not come from what is lower, but from what is higher. — But this solution cannot stand; first indeed, because the order would be perverted, since a spiritual species would become corporeal, and the perfect would become imperfect; secondly, because it would see absent things just as present ones, and with the eyes closed just as with them open.

The second position is that there is sense, but not by taking in from within, rather by sending a power outward, because it will not receive but will flow in. — But this too cannot stand, since cognition consists in union, and[^p1020-9] the organs are most fit for receiving.

The third position is that the glorified senses know by receiving a species from the sensible thing itself. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that *the less noble* etc.; it can be said that it is not necessary that the *object* be more noble than the *organ* upon which it acts *simply*, but *in a certain respect*, namely in this, that it has the species, and *that* is stripped bare[^p1020-10]; and this suffices for acting. — Or it must be said otherwise, that the less noble does not act by its own power, but by another's; and in the glorified sense there is a twofold nature in the eye, that of *the transparent* and that of *light*; when therefore it sees a body more luminous than itself, that body by its own power makes the species in the eye; but when it sees a less luminous one, then it makes it in itself by its own power. And thus that is evident.

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2. To that which is objected concerning the foreign impression, that it is not in the sphere; it must be said that what is there noted[^p1021-1] is a *foreign impression* which is a way toward corruption; but of this there is no question here.

3. To that which is objected, that thoughts are rolled about; it must be said that *thoughts being rolled about* happens in two ways: in one way, because the intellect does not have a fixed gaze upon one thing, and in this way it is in the wayfaring state and will not be in the fatherland; in another way it happens that one principally and continuously sees one thing, and many others on account of it, and among those many now one, now another; and this indeed will be in the fatherland[^p1021-2]; such is the case in the matter proposed.

4. To that which is objected, that a natural alteration precedes; it must be said that natural alteration is twofold: one is through *reception and expulsion*, as of the hot by the cold, and this will not be; another through *reception only*, as of the transparent by the luminous[^p1021-3], and this will be.

---

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 562, nota 10.

en: See tom. I. p. 562, note 10.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 68, nota 2.

en: Cf. tom. I. p. 68, note 2.

la: Respiciuntur verba Averrois: *Omne recipiens debet esse denudatum a forma recepti* (cfr. tom. III. pag. 322, nota 4.). — Cod. Y *elementorum*.

en: The words of Averroes are referred to: *Everything that receives must be stripped bare of the form of what is received* (cf. tom. III. p. 322, note 4). — Codex Y reads *elementorum* ("of the elements").

la: Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 59. seqq. (c. 5.), et de Sensu et sens. c. 1. seq.

en: See Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 59 ff. (c. 5), and *On Sense and Sensibles* c. 1 f.

la: Cap. 5. n. 8. Vide supra pag. 932, nota 9. — Pro *per se vera* edd. *per se nota*.

en: Chapter 5, n. 8. See above, p. 932, note 9. — For *per se vera* ("true of itself") the editions read *per se nota* ("known of itself").

la: Vide supra pag. 979, nota 4.

en: See above, p. 979, note 4.

la: Libr. XV. de Trin. c. 16. n. 26. Cfr. supra pag. 901, nota 5. — De *antecedenti* vide tom. II. pag. 221, nota 4, et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 10. (c. 4.): *Sensitivo igitur calidum et frigidum iudicat [anima]* etc. — Post *ibi iudicium* codd. L E addunt *quodsi iudicium*.

en: *On the Trinity* book XV, c. 16, n. 26. Cf. above, p. 901, note 5. — On the *antecedent* see tom. II. p. 221, note 4, and Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 10 (c. 4): *By the sensitive [power], therefore, [the soul] judges the hot and the cold*, etc. — After *ibi iudicium* codices L and E add *quodsi iudicium*.

la: Scilicet in organo sensus.

en: That is, in the organ of sense.

la: Ita cod. K (I a secunda manu), cod. L (E a secunda manu) *cum etiam*, cod. P a secunda manu *cum organo, et cum*, alii codd. *cum*, edd., paulo superius voci *cum* praemisso *tum*, hic ponunt *tum cum*. — Cfr. Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 2: *Irrationabile vero omnino est, exeunte quodam, visum videre* etc.

en: So codex K (and I by a second hand); codex L (and E by a second hand) read *cum etiam*; codex P by a second hand *cum organo, et cum*; other codices *cum*; the editions, having prefixed *tum* to the word *cum* a little above, here put *tum cum*. — Cf. Aristotle, *On Sense and Sensibles* c. 2: *But it is altogether unreasonable that sight should see by something going out*, etc.

la: Scilicet, organum non habet speciem obiecti, et *sic* minus nobile est (cfr. fundam. 3.). — Secuti sumus cod. aa, alii codd. *denudandum* (scilicet obiectum), edd. *in videndo*. Aliquanto inferius post *sua virtute* edd. addunt *propria in se*.

en: That is, the organ does not have the species of the object, and *thus* it is the less noble (cf. fundamentum 3). — We have followed codex aa; other codices read *denudandum* (namely, the object), the editions *in videndo*. Somewhat further below, after *sua virtute*, the editions add *propria in se*.

la: Edd. *vocatur*.

en: The editions read *vocatur* ("is called").

la: Vide III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. — Superius pro *non habet* [non pauci codd. *habeat*] *defixum aspectum* edd. *aut habet defixum affectum*, et subinde cum pluribus codd. omittunt *videt*, pro quo codd. I K *videat*, codd. E P *habet*, cod. L *habeat*.

en: See III *Sent.* d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. — Above, for *non habet* [not a few codices *habeat*] *defixum aspectum* the editions read *aut habet defixum affectum*, and thereupon, with several codices, they omit *videt*, for which codices I and K read *videat*, codices E and P *habet*, codex L *habeat*.

la: S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 44. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3. ad 2: *Si autem [aliquid] natum sit immutari spiritualiter, non oportet, quod immutetur naturaliter, sicut est de aëre, qui non est receptivus coloris secundum esse naturale, sed solum secundum esse spirituale, sicut e converso corpora inanimata immutantur per qualitates sensibiles solum naturaliter et non spiritualiter. In corporibus autem gloriosis non poterit esse aliqua immutatio naturalis; et ideo ibi erit spiritualis immutatio tantum.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: St. Thomas, IV *Sent.* d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3, ad 2: *But if [something] is of such a nature as to be altered spiritually, it is not necessary that it be altered naturally, as is the case with air, which is not receptive of colour according to natural being, but only according to spiritual being; just as, conversely, inanimate bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. In glorious bodies, however, there will be able to be no natural alteration; and therefore there will be spiritual alteration only.* — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L108611–108776, verified throughout against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1020,1021}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands used as given at the pre-measured gutters 1020:2042, 1021:1616; **no bands were regenerated**). The Respondeo/Solutio region of p.1020-R is cascade-shattered in the OCR and was re-set from the band, which is authoritative there per the VOL II/IV override. Editorial marginal glosses (*Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Opinio 1/2/3*, *Improbatio*, *Solutio positorum*, *Duplex distinctio*, *Duplex immutatio*) are page furniture and are not rendered inline.

**`printed_pages` corrected: [1019, 1020, 1021] → [1020, 1021]** (and `pdf_pages` accordingly). The skeleton was one page too wide at the front. p.1019's running head is at L108607, but everything on p.1019 — body and its entire footer register — lies at or before L108610, i.e. wholly inside the preceding chunk `d49-p2-s1-a3-q1`. This chunk opens with the `QUAESTIO II.` header, which is the first item printed on p.1020. **No share of p.1019 is claimed here.**

**Apparatus split map — 13 entries.**
- **p.1020 — 10 notes, all 10 anchored in this chunk (whole page is mine).** Binding, read off the bands: notes 1–7 print in the **left** footer column, with **note 7 overflowing across the gutter into the top of the right footer column** (the `dum et frigidum iudicat [anima] etc. … quodsi iudicium.` continuation, which carries no number); notes 8–10 print in the **right** footer column. Body anchors run in straight reading order 1–8 (left body column) then 9–10 (right body column), so anchor order and footer order agree, but the *column* placement of note 7 does not — bound by content, not position.
- **p.1021 — 7 notes printed; 3 are mine (1–3), 4–7 are not.** Notes 1 (`quod ibi notatur`), 2 (`erit in patria`), 3 (`perspicui a luminoso`) anchor in this chunk's body, which is the last thing printed before the SECTIO II header. **Note 3 overflows across the gutter into the top of the right footer column** (`immutatio naturalis; et ideo ibi erit spiritualis immutatio tantum. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) — so the register splits mid-note at the footer-column boundary, not between notes. Notes 4–7 anchor in the SECTIO II / Art. I body and belong to `d49-p2-s2-a1-q1`.

**Hand-offs forwarded to `d49-p2-s2-a1-q1`:** p.1021 footer notes **4, 5, 6, 7** (`4 Cap. 20. n. 3. — Codd. E L post deformitas addunt omnis tarditas…`; `5 Sap. 9, 15.`; `6 Cfr. tom. II. pag. 449, nota 7…`; `7 Quod est secundum doctrinam Aristot. naturaliter incorruptibile…`), all printed in the **right** footer column beneath note 3's continuation. Note also that **SECTIO II's header + prologue (L108777–108790) fold into that chunk**, per CLAUDE.md §5a.

**Hand-off received from `d49-p2-s1-a3-q1`:** none needed — the page boundary at 1019/1020 coincides with the chunk boundary, and p.1019's footer register is entirely that chunk's. Derived independently from the bands, not from a neighbour's report.

**Sectio I → Sectio II boundary (L108776/L108777) — verified clean.** This chunk's last raw body line is L108772 (`quaedam per receptionem tantum, ut perspicui a luminoso³, et haec erit.`); L108773–108776 are blank; `SECTIO II.` opens at L108777 with `De gloria corporis in speciali.` at L108779 and its prologue (`Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo principali…` / the four `Primo–Quarto … de dote …` lines) running to L108790. **Nothing of Sectio II's header or prologue is trapped in this range**, and nothing of this chunk's text is stranded downstream. The closing sentence parses as a complete Latin period (a full `quaedam est per X … quaedam per Y …` correlative pair, both members present, terminal `et haec erit.`), so there is no cascade-merge signature at the seam. Confirmed against the p.1021-L-0 and p.1021-R-0 bands, on which the end of this chunk's text, the blank, and the `SECTIO II.` display header are all visible together.

**Scholion:** none for this question, and this is confirmed rather than assumed — p.1021 note 3 ends `— Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`, i.e. the editors point back to the scholion of `a3-q1`. `has_scholion: false`.

**Near-abutting columns on p.1021 (4 px blank run) — used as given, and it does not look clipped.** In `p1021-R-0`/`R-1` the right column's first characters are complete with the column rule visible to their left; in `p1021-L-0`/`L-2` the band overruns slightly *into* the right column (stray fragments `et / lu / et`, `fo / n / te` at the right edge), which is overlap, not truncation. The only truncation anywhere is the left-*margin* editorial gloss on p.1021-L (`…inctio.`, i.e. the tail of a *Duplex distinctio* marginal), cut by the page-edge crop; it is marginalia, not body text, and the same gloss is equally truncated in the raw. No new split needed.

**`[?]` flags:** none. Every OCR/band disagreement in this range was legible and resolved at band time — notably `slare`→`stare`, `adhue`→`adhuc`, `fleret`→`fieret`, `speoem`→`speciem`, `nobilias`→`nobilius`, `ocuHs`→`oculis`, `om\o`→`oculo`, `habiHa`→`habilia`, `palet`→`patet`, `cogilatio`→`cogitatio`, `inteliigitur`→`intelligitur`, `Uirum`→`Utrum`, `sunl`→`sunt`, `pe)-`→`per`, and the header `QUAESTIO 11.`→`QUAESTIO II.` (confirmed on the p.1020 band as a centred full-width `QUAESTIO II.`).

**Nothing unmapped.** No dubium, ordinal opener, scholion or section without a chunk file was found in this range; Art. III's opener promised two questions and both exist (`a3-q1`, `a3-q2`), so there is no lost-question signal here.