title: Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De comparatione actionis malae ad voluntatem.*

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum principale, scilicet de comparatione actionis malae ad voluntatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum actuale, tam mortale quam veniale, sit voluntarium. Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum mortale sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum. Tertio quaeritur, utrum puniri, sicut etiam peccare, sit ipsius voluntatis proprium.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum omne peccatum actuale sit voluntarium.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum actuale sit voluntarium; et cum certum sit de mortali, quod sic, quaeritur de veniali. Et quod omne peccatum veniale sit voluntarium, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^1]: « Usque adeo peccatum est voluntarium, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, nisi sit voluntarium »: ergo si peccatum veniale peccatum est, ergo necesse est, ipsum esse voluntarium. Si tu dicas, quod omne peccatum est voluntarium, aut voluntate propria, aut voluntate Adae, et veniale est peccatum, quia voluntarium voluntate Adae: obiicitur contra hoc: quia, si ad rationem peccati venialis sufficit, quod sit voluntarium voluntate Adae; cum illud peccatum, quod Adam transfudit, in nobis[^2] sit peccatum originale, veniale peccatum esset originale. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et primum.

2. Item, motus inordinati et ad illicita, qui dicuntur esse in nobis peccata, non sunt peccata nec in parvulis nec in furiosis; hoc autem non est, nisi quia non moventur usu rationis et voluntatis[^3]: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi peccata sint in nobis voluntaria voluntate propria.

3. Item, quando stomachus exinanitus ante horam comestionis appetit comedere, nulla est ibi culpa, quamvis sit ille appetitus immoderatus et ad illud quod non licet tali tempore; hoc autem non est, nisi quia motus ille inest de necessitate: ergo videtur, quod ad hoc, quod aliquis motus ad illicitum sit veniale peccatum, necesse sit, ipsum esse voluntarium.

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4. Item, omne quod quis facit, aut facit naturaliter, aut facit voluntarie, aut violenter: si igitur venialia committimus, aut ergo per violentiam, aut per naturam, aut per voluntatem. Si per violentiam: ergo nulla est ibi culpa. Si per naturam: similiter, quia in iis quae naturaliter fiunt[^4] non est culpa: ergo si peccatum veniale culpa est, necesse est, quod sit a voluntate.

5. Item, demonstrato aliquo veniali, aut potest aliquis vitare hoc peccatum, aut non potest. Si non potest, et « nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest »: ergo committendo hoc peccatum, non peccat. Si potest vitare; et quod committimus, potentes vitare, committimus voluntarie: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto[^5]: *Septies in die* etc.: Glossa: « Singulis diebus per necessitatem vel fragilitatem carnis, vel volentes, vel inviti peccamus ». Si ergo peccamus venialiter, velimus nolimus; videtur, quod non omne peccatum veniale voluntarium sit.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro Retractationum[^6]: « Sunt, inquit, quaedam necessitate facta improbanda, ut qui vult recte facere, et non potest. Unde est illud Apostoli: Non quod volo, hoc facio bonum, sed quod odi malum »; sed talia sunt peccata venialia: ergo aliqua venialia sunt de necessitate, non ergo a voluntate.

3. Item, Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei[^7]: « Nonnullum vitium est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum »; sed caro concupiscit adversus spiritum frequenter, ipso nolente, sicut in littera habetur: ergo velit nolit, homo peccat venialiter: non ergo omne peccatum veniale est voluntarium. Minor probatur in littera: « Ille qui, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne, non ea quae vult, facit, concupiscit quidem nolens, et in eo facit quod non vult ».

4. Item, peccata venialia sunt in nobis ex repugnantia sensualitatis ad rationem, et etiam ex surreptione, sicut sunt primi motus; sed velimus nolimus, est in nobis repugnantia sensualitatis, et multi etiam motus inordinati ex surreptione surgunt. Si igitur voluntas non potest sensualitatem domare, et quod est ex surreptione praevenit voluntatem; videtur, quod peccata venialia, quae sunt primi motus, non sunt voluntaria[^8].

5. Item, aut aliquod peccatum veniale est involuntarium, aut non. Si sic; habeo propositum; si non: igitur omne peccatum veniale est voluntarium. Sed omne voluntarium per voluntatem vitari potest: ergo per voluntatem potest quis vitare omne veniale peccatum: igitur potest quis cavere, ut nunquam peccet venialiter. Si igitur hoc est impossibile, quod aliquis diu vivat in hac carne, quin committat aliquod veniale; videtur, quod necessarium sit ponere, aliquod veniale peccatum non esse voluntarium.

### Conclusio

> Omne peccatum actuale est voluntarium vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid, ut aliqua venialia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod voluntarium potest aliquid dici tripliciter: aut voluntate aliena, aut voluntate propria, aut partim voluntate aliena, partim voluntate propria. Et secundum hunc triplicem modum dicendi voluntarium, triplex est differentia peccati.

Peccatum namque originale voluntarium est, sed non voluntate eius in quo est, voluntaria scilicet Adae, a quo enim est, sed voluntate eius, scilicet Adae, qui in transgressione corrupit se et totam posteritatem[^9]. — Voluntarium autem voluntate propria est peccatum actuale mortale; hoc quidem genere peccati nullus peccat nisi consentiens. — Voluntarium autem medio modo, scilicet partim voluntate propria, partim voluntate aliena, est veniale peccatum, illud maxime, quod consurgit ex repugnantia carnis ad spiritum, vel ex corruptione[^10] virium animae. Hoc inquam peccatum, quia partim est a voluntate aliena, partim a voluntate propria, ideo quodam modo secundum Augustinum tenet rationem poenae, quodam <!-- page 949 --> modo rationem culpae. Propterea dicit Augustinus[^11]: « Quia homo non voluit vitare peccatum, dum valuit, inflictum est, ut non possit, dum velit ». Voluntarium, inquam, dicitur per comparationem ad voluntatem Adae, quia Adam deliberative voluit; unde et corruptio subsecuta est, ex qua oriuntur in nobis motus inordinati, qui dicuntur esse peccata venialia. Voluntarium autem voluntate propria sive peccantis, non est omne peccatum veniale simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Illud enim est voluntarium simpliciter, quod est a voluntate praeambula et movente. Illud autem, quod oritur voluntate concomitante et non prohibente vel praecavente, dum possit prohibere vel praecavere, dicitur voluntarium quodam modo sive interpretative, pro eo quod talis deordinatio voluntati imputatur. Et hoc modo saltem omne peccatum veniale dicitur voluntarium, quia nemo peccat venialiter, nisi cum habet voluntatis usum; nemo etiam venialiter peccat in eo quod nullo modo potest prohibere nec etiam potuit praecavere. Venialia enim peccata etsi omnia non possint praecaveri nec prohiberi, nullum tamen est singulare peccatum, quod non possit prohiberi, vel quod saltem non potuerit praecaveri. Licet enim aliquis sit status, in quo necesse est, aliquem cadere in aliquod peccatum determinatum, illum tamen statum potuit quis praecavere; et ideo, si non praecavit, voluntati eius imputatur, quamvis tunc illud prohibere non possit[^12]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod omne peccatum actuale est voluntarium. Nam mortale est voluntarium simpliciter, veniale autem vel est voluntarium simpliciter, sicut illud quod fit ex deliberatione, ut mendacium iocosum; vel secundum quid sive quodam modo, sicut illud quod fit ex surreptione, sicut sunt primi motus.

**Ad obiecta:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod singulis diebus inviti peccamus; dicendum, quod in Glossa illa dicitur aliquis invitus peccare non per privationem voluntatis omnimodam, sed per privationem voluntatis plenae sive complacentiae. Et hoc quidem verum est, quod frequenter inviti peccamus, et nobis displicet, quod sic inordinate movemur; si tamen bene praecavissemus, in hunc actum vel illum non incidissemus, licet non sic possimus praecavere, quin in aliquod cadamus; sicut exemplum ponitur in nauta, qui potest praecavere et custodire, ne aqua per aliquod foramen determinatum ingrediatur; non tamen potest facere, quod per nullum habeat ingressum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam necessitate facta sunt improbanda; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de necessitate venialium, non quantum ad hoc veniale vel illud determinate, sed generaliter quantum ad peccata venialia, vel etiam quantum ad aliquod genus venialis peccati; sicut videmus in iuvene et forti, quod nunquam potest omnino vitare motus carnis, licet possit hac hora vel illa, vel hunc motum vel illum vitare. Et quia nihil impedit, quod sit necessitas quaedam in universali, et voluntas quodam modo in particulari; ideo auctoritas illa non obviat his quae dicta sunt.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nonnullum vitium est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; dicendum, quod verum est. — Sed quod subiungit, quod necessarium est concupiscere: dicendum, quod verum est de concupiscentia, loquendo generaliter; de concupiscentia vero huius vel illius, hoc tempore vel illo, non est verum. Et quod dicit Augustinus, quod concupiscit nolens; et Apostolus[^13]: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago; non privat omnimode voluntatem, sed hoc privat, quod voluntas non est ibi movens principale.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primi motus sunt ex surreptione et ex rebellione; iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Verum est enim, quod prohiberi, vel praecaveri non possunt generaliter, ita quod nullus insurgat; quilibet tamen per se praecaveri potest. Unde et huius signum[^14] est, quia nos non ponimus, peccatum esse circa primos motus nutritivae, sicut generativae; actus enim nutritivae necessarius est ad salutem nutriti, non autem actus generativae; licet et alia ratio possit assignari: quia nutritiva est corrupta tantum, generativa corrupta et infecta. Prima tamen ratio melius valet. Nam, sicut vult Augustinus in primo de Civitate Dei[^15], si aliqua mulier corrumpatur violenter, si omnino repugnat, absque omni culpa est; et tamen <!-- page 950 --> a delectatione omnino immunis non est. Ait enim sic: « Si illa concupiscentialis inobedientia, quae adhuc in membris habitat, praeter voluntatis legem quasi lege sua movetur, et absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis ». Ex hoc patet, quod si venialia rationem culpae habent, hoc est, quia a voluntate in particulari et divisim vitari et praecaveri possunt.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si potest vitari hoc et illud, et sic de singulis, ergo omne; dicendum, quod haec est duplex: iste potest vitare omne peccatum veniale, sicut haec: iste potest vincere omnem hominem: aut quia potentia vitandi, vel vincendi comparatur ad obiectum coniunctim, vel divisim. Si divisim; sic vera est ista; iste potest vitare vel praecavere omne veniale peccatum, quia non est dare aliquod, quod non posset vitari. Si autem coniunctim; tunc est falsa; est enim sensus, quod possit facere, ut omnino sit absque veniali peccato; et in hoc sensu dicitur, quod non possumus omnia peccata venialia vitare. — Nec valet ratio illa: possum vitare hoc et illud et illud, ergo omnia simul; immo est ibi figura dictionis[^16], sive ex diversa suppositione huius quod dico veniale, sive potius, quia proceditur a pluribus determinatis suppositionibus huius verbi potest ad unam; sicut si argueretur: iste potest ferre hunc lapidem et illum et illum, et sic usque ad decem lapides: ergo potest ferre hos decem lapides; et sicut si diceretur: homo est Socrates, homo est Plato: ergo homo est Socrates et Plato. Praemissae sunt verae, et conclusio falsa, et proceditur a pluribus suppositionibus determinatis ad unam. Suppositio autem determinata dicitur, quando terminus non confunditur, sed debet reddere locutionem veram pro uno, sicut est, cum dicitur: homo currit. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia hoc verbum potest, prout accipitur respectu omnis venialis coniunctim, respicit omne veniale tanquam obiectum unum, et dicit unam perfectam potentiam excedentem et vincentem omnem impulsum ad veniale peccatum; sicut si diceretur: iste potest vincere decem homines, vel ferre decem lapides. — Et sic patet, quod ille processus non tenet, quia non servatur ibi lex illationis rectae.

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### Article II. *On the comparison of the evil action to the will.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the comparison of the evil action to the will. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether every actual sin, both mortal and venial, is voluntary. Second it is asked whether every mortal sin is in the will as in a subject. Third it is asked whether to be punished, just as also to sin, is proper to the will itself.

### Question I. *Whether every actual sin is voluntary.*

As to the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether every actual sin is voluntary; and since it is certain concerning mortal sin that it is, the inquiry concerns venial sin. And that every venial sin is voluntary, it seems.

1. As Augustine says, and as is had in the text (*littera*)[^1]: « So far is sin voluntary that in no way is it sin unless it is voluntary »: therefore if venial sin is a sin, then it is necessary that it be voluntary. If you should say that every sin is voluntary, either by one's own will or by the will of Adam, and a venial sin is a sin because it is voluntary by the will of Adam: against this it is objected: because, if it suffices for the character of venial sin that it be voluntary by the will of Adam; since that sin which Adam transmitted into us[^2] is original sin, a venial sin would be original sin. But if this is false, it remains that the first too is false.

2. Likewise, the inordinate movements toward illicit things, which are said to be sins in us, are sins neither in little children nor in the insane; but this is only because they are not moved by the use of reason and will[^3]: therefore it seems that sins of this kind are in us voluntary by our own will.

3. Likewise, when the emptied stomach before the hour of eating craves to eat, there is no fault there, although that appetite is immoderate and toward that which is not licit at such a time; but this is only because that movement is present of necessity: therefore it seems that, for some movement toward the illicit to be a venial sin, it is necessary that it be voluntary.

4. Likewise, everything that one does, one does either naturally, or voluntarily, or by violence: if therefore we commit venial sins, then we do so either through violence, or through nature, or through the will. If through violence: then there is no fault there. If through nature: likewise, because in those things which are done naturally[^4] there is no fault: therefore if a venial sin is a fault, it is necessary that it be from the will.

5. Likewise, given some venial sin, either one can avoid this sin, or one cannot. If one cannot, and « no one sins in that which he cannot avoid »: then in committing this sin, he does not sin. If he can avoid it; and what we commit, being able to avoid it, we commit voluntarily: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Proverbs, chapter twenty-four[^5]: *Seven times in a day* etc.: the Gloss: « Each day, through necessity or the frailty of the flesh, whether willing or unwilling, we sin ». If therefore we sin venially, whether we will or not; it seems that not every venial sin is voluntary.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of *Retractations*[^6]: « There are, he says, certain things done of necessity which are to be disapproved, as when one wishes to do rightly and cannot. Whence is that saying of the Apostle: Not what I will, this good I do, but what I hate, the evil »; but such are venial sins: therefore some venial sins are of necessity, and so not from the will.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the nineteenth book of *On the City of God*[^7]: « It is no small vice, when the flesh lusts against the spirit »; but the flesh lusts against the spirit frequently, the man himself being unwilling, as is had in the text: therefore, willing or not, a man sins venially: therefore not every venial sin is voluntary. The minor is proved in the text: « He who, when the flesh lusts against the spirit, does not do the things which he wills, indeed lusts unwillingly, and does in this what he does not will ».

4. Likewise, venial sins are in us from the resistance of sensuality to reason, and also from sudden onset (*surreptio*), as are the first movements; but, willing or not, there is in us the resistance of sensuality, and many inordinate movements also arise from sudden onset. If therefore the will cannot subdue sensuality, and what is from sudden onset forestalls the will; it seems that venial sins, which are first movements, are not voluntary[^8].

5. Likewise, either some venial sin is involuntary, or not. If so, I have my point; if not, then every venial sin is voluntary. But everything voluntary can be avoided through the will: therefore through the will one can avoid every venial sin: therefore one can take care never to sin venially. If therefore this is impossible, that anyone should live long in this flesh without committing some venial sin; it seems that it is necessary to hold that some venial sin is not voluntary.

### Conclusion

> Every actual sin is voluntary either simply, or in a certain respect, as are some venial sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that something can be called voluntary in three ways: either by another's will, or by one's own will, or partly by another's will and partly by one's own will. And according to this threefold mode of speaking of the voluntary, there is a threefold distinction of sin.

For original sin is voluntary, but not by the will of him in whom it is, namely the will of Adam from whom it is, but by the will of him, namely of Adam, who in the transgression corrupted himself and all his posterity[^9]. — But voluntary by one's own will is actual mortal sin; in this kind of sin no one sins except by consenting. — But voluntary in the middle way, namely partly by one's own will and partly by another's will, is venial sin, especially that which arises from the resistance of the flesh to the spirit, or from the corruption[^10] of the powers of the soul. This sin, I say, because it is partly from another's will and partly from one's own will, therefore in a certain way, according to Augustine, holds the character of a penalty, and in a certain <!-- page 949 --> way the character of a fault. Therefore Augustine says[^11]: « Because man did not will to avoid sin while he was able, it has been inflicted that he cannot, when he wills ». Voluntary, I say, it is called by comparison to the will of Adam, because Adam willed deliberately; whence also corruption followed, from which arise in us inordinate movements, which are said to be venial sins. But voluntary by one's own will or by the will of the one sinning, not every venial sin is voluntary simply, but in a certain respect. For that is voluntary simply which is from a will going before and moving. But that which arises from a will accompanying and not prohibiting or forestalling, while it could prohibit or forestall, is called voluntary in a certain way or interpretatively, for this reason, that such disorder is imputed to the will. And in this way at least every venial sin is called voluntary, because no one sins venially except when he has the use of the will; nor does anyone sin venially in that which he can in no way prohibit, nor was even able to forestall. For although all venial sins cannot be forestalled nor prohibited, yet there is no single sin which cannot be prohibited, or which at least could not have been forestalled. For although there may be a state in which it is necessary that someone fall into some determinate sin, yet one could have forestalled that state; and therefore, if he did not forestall it, it is imputed to his will, although then he cannot prohibit it[^12]. — Therefore the reasons showing that every actual sin is voluntary are to be granted. For mortal sin is voluntary simply, while venial sin is either voluntary simply, like that which comes about from deliberation, as a jesting lie; or in a certain respect or in a certain way, like that which comes about from sudden onset, as are the first movements.

**To the objections:**
*To 1.* As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that each day we sin unwillingly; it must be said that in that Gloss someone is said to sin unwillingly not through a complete privation of will, but through the privation of full will or of complacency. And this indeed is true, that we frequently sin unwillingly, and it displeases us that we are thus moved inordinately; yet if we had taken good care beforehand, we would not have fallen into this act or that, although we cannot so take care that we do not fall into some; just as the example is given of the sailor, who can take care and watch lest water enter through some determinate opening; yet he cannot bring it about that it has entry through none.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that certain things done of necessity are to be disapproved; it must be said that Augustine speaks of the necessity of venial sins, not as to this venial sin or that determinately, but generally as to venial sins, or even as to some kind of venial sin; just as we see in a young and strong man, that he can never altogether avoid the movements of the flesh, although he can avoid this hour or that, or this movement or that. And because nothing prevents there being a certain necessity in the universal, and the will being in a certain way in the particular; therefore that authority does not stand against the things which have been said.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that it is no small vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit; it must be said that it is true. — But as to what is subjoined, that it is necessary to lust: it must be said that it is true of concupiscence, speaking generally; but of the concupiscence of this thing or that, at this time or that, it is not true. And as to what Augustine says, that one lusts unwillingly; and the Apostle[^13]: The evil that I will not, this I do; it does not deprive the will in every way, but it deprives it of this, that the will is not there the principal mover.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that the first movements are from sudden onset and from rebellion; the response is already clear from the things which have been said. For it is true that they cannot be prohibited or forestalled generally, so that none should arise; yet each one taken by itself can be forestalled. Whence also a sign of this[^14] is that we do not hold there to be sin concerning the first movements of the nutritive power, as of the generative; for the act of the nutritive power is necessary for the health of the one nourished, but not the act of the generative; although another reason too can be assigned: because the nutritive power is only corrupted, while the generative is corrupted and infected. Yet the first reason holds better. For, as Augustine holds in the first book of *On the City of God*[^15], if some woman is violated by force, if she altogether resists, she is without any fault; and yet <!-- page 950 --> she is not altogether immune from delight. For he says thus: « If that concupiscential disobedience, which still dwells in the members, is moved beyond the law of the will as if by its own law, it is also without fault in the body of one not consenting ». From this it is clear that, if venial sins have the character of fault, this is because they can be avoided and forestalled by the will in particular and divisively (*divisim*).

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that if this and that can be avoided, and so of the individual ones, then all; it must be said that this is twofold: "this man can avoid every venial sin," like this: "this man can conquer every man": either because the power of avoiding or of conquering is compared to its object conjointly, or divisively. If divisively; thus this is true; this man can avoid or forestall every venial sin, because there is none to be given which could not be avoided. But if conjointly; then it is false; for the sense is that he could bring it about that he be altogether without venial sin; and in this sense it is said that we cannot avoid all venial sins. — Nor is that reasoning valid: "I can avoid this and that and that, therefore all together"; rather there is there a figure of speech (*figura dictionis*), either from the diverse supposition of this term which I call "venial," or rather because the argument proceeds from several determinate suppositions of this verb "can" to one; just as if it were argued: "this man can carry this stone and that and that, and so on up to ten stones: therefore he can carry these ten stones"; and just as if it were said: "man is Socrates, man is Plato: therefore man is Socrates and Plato." The premises are true, and the conclusion false, and the argument proceeds from several determinate suppositions to one[^16]. But supposition is called determinate when the term is not confused, but ought to render the statement true for one, as it is when it is said: "man runs." So too in the present case it must be understood, because this verb "can," insofar as it is taken with respect to every venial sin conjointly, regards every venial sin as one object, and asserts one perfect power exceeding and conquering every impulse toward venial sin; just as if it were said: "this man can conquer ten men, or carry ten stones." — And thus it is clear that that process does not hold, because the law of right inference is not preserved in it.

la: Hic c. 3. — In codd. T W et nonnullis aliis deest conclusio: *ergo si peccatum veniale... esse voluntarium.*

en: Here, c. 3. — In codices T W and certain others the conclusion is lacking: *therefore if venial sin... that it is voluntary.*

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4, ubi cum interpunctione etiam sententia mutata est, legitur sic: *quod Adam transfudit in nos, sit* etc. Pro *transfudit* codd. F H T et alii plures *transfundit.*

en: In the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4, where along with the punctuation the sense too is changed, it reads thus: *which Adam transmitted into us, is* etc. For *transmitted* codices F H T and several others read *transmits.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 525, nota 6. — De motibus inordinatis cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 3. schol. et ibid. dub. 4.

en: Cf. above, p. 525, note 6. — On the inordinate movements cf. above, d. 21, a. 2, q. 3, schol., and ibid., dub. 4.

la: Cod. T *solet.* — De minori eiusque probatione, quae delibata est ex August., I. Retract. c. 13. n. 5, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Codex T reads *is wont.* — On the minor premise and its proof, which is drawn from Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 13, n. 5, see here the text of the Master (*lit. Magistri*), c. 3.

la: Vers. 16. Vulgata omittit *in die.* — Glossa deprompta est ex Beda super hunc loc. et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. — Mox pro *velimus nolimus,* quod habent plurimi codd. et ed. 1, in Vat. aliisque edd. et codd. *vel velimus, vel nolimus.*

en: Verse 16. The Vulgate omits *in a day.* — The Gloss is drawn from Bede on this passage and is found in Strabo and Lyranus. — Presently, for *whether we will or not,* which very many codices and ed. 1 have, the Vatican edition and other editions and codices read *either we will, or we will not.*

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50. Cfr. supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3. et ibid. dub. 3.

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 50. Cf. above, d. XXVIII, text of the Master, c. 3, and ibid., dub. 3.

la: Libr. 1. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. Cfr. supra d. XXXVI, lit. Magistri, c. 5, et ibid. dub. 4. — Verba Apostoli habentur Rom. 7, 19.

en: Book I, c. 9, n. 5, and *On Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 51. Cf. above, d. XXXVI, text of the Master, c. 5, and ibid., dub. 4. — The words of the Apostle are had in Rom. 7:19.

la: Cap. 1. n. 3, ubi ostendens, ipsam virtutem in hac vita propter conflictum cum vitiis imperfectam esse, ait: *Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum sicut dicit Apostolus (Gal. 5, n.): Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, cui vitio contraria virtus est, cum, sicut idem dicit: Spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem* etc.

en: Chapter 1, n. 3, where, showing that virtue itself in this life is imperfect on account of the conflict with the vices, he says: *For neither is there no vice, since, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5): The flesh lusts against the spirit, to which vice the contrary virtue is, when, as the same says: The spirit lusts against the flesh* etc.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. et 12. atque ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.

en: Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 9 and 12, and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Quamvis plerique codd. primaeque edd. exhibeant *vel corruptionis,* tamen lectio Vat. nobis facilior visa est eamque relinquimus.

en: Although most codices and the first editions exhibit *or of the corruption,* yet the reading of the Vatican edition seemed to us easier, and we retain it.

la: Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 52: *Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut omittat quisque quo bene uti noluit, cum sine ulla posset difficultate, si vellet. Id est autem, ut qui sciens recte non facit, amittat scire, quid rectum sit; et qui recte facere, cum posset, noluit, amittat posse, cum velit.* — Pro *Quia homo* codd. H V Y ee et nonnulli alii *quod homo,* et subinde pro *non voluit* codd. F V atque ed. 1 *noluit.*

en: Book III, *On Free Choice of the Will*, c. 18, n. 52: *For this is the most just penalty of sin, that each one should lose that which he was unwilling to use well, when he could without any difficulty, if he wished. And that is, that he who knowingly does not act rightly should lose the knowledge of what is right; and he who, when he was able, was unwilling to act rightly, should lose the ability, when he wishes.* — For *Because man* codices H V Y ee and certain others read *that man,* and thereupon for *did not will* codices F V and ed. 1 read *was unwilling.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro *imputatur* cod. T *imputabitur.* Paulo inferius pro *ostendentes, quod* verbum *quod* multi codd. nec non primae edd. omittunt, cod. V *quae ostendunt.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for *is imputed* codex T reads *will be imputed.* A little below, for *showing that,* the word *that* many codices as well as the first editions omit; codex V reads *which show.*

la: Rom. 7, 19. — Dictum Augustini vide supra in ipsa 3. obiectione, ad quam hic respondetur. — In principio huius solut. ante *nonnullum vitium* Vat. cum pluribus codd. perperam inserit *non.*

en: Rom. 7:19. — For the saying of Augustine see above in the third objection itself, to which reply is here made. — At the beginning of this solution, before *no small vice,* the Vatican edition with several codices wrongly inserts *not.*

la: Complures codd., inter quos L O R W, *ratio.* In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur: *Et ratio huius est,* in codd. C H 3 T ee: *Unde et huius est* (omissa voce *signum*). Paulo superius post *insurgat* cod. K supplet *motus.* — Vide supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 3.

en: Very many codices, among them L O R W, read *reason.* In the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 it reads: *And the reason of this is,* in codices C H 3 T ee: *Whence also of this there is* (the word *sign* being omitted). A little above, after *should arise,* codex K supplies *movement.* — See above, d. 31, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Cap. 23: *Quodsi illa concupiscentialis inobedientia, quae adhuc in membris moribundis habitat, praeter nostrae voluntatis legem quasi lege sua movetur, quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis?* — Codd. F X bb in testimonio Augustini ante ultima verba *non consentientis* interserunt *dormientis, quanto magis est absque culpa in corpore.* Vat. hoc testimonium sic reddit: *Si illa... inobedientia, quod adhuc... voluntatis legem, quia lege sua movetur, ab omni culpa immunis est in* etc.

en: Chapter 23: *But if that concupiscential disobedience, which still dwells in the dying members, is moved beyond the law of our will as if by its own law, how much more is it without fault in the body of one not consenting, if it is without fault in the body of one sleeping?* — Codices F X bb in the testimony of Augustine, before the last words *not consenting,* insert *sleeping, how much more is it without fault in the body.* The Vatican edition renders this testimony thus: *If that... disobedience, which still... the law of the will, because it is moved by its own law, is immune from all fault in* etc.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro *non posset* codd. O S *ne unquam.* Dein pro *venialiter* codd. V X Z *voluntarie.* — Aliquanto superius pro *modum dicendi* Vat. *modum distinguendi,* et paulo inferius eadem Vat. verbis *hoc quidem genere* praefigit *et.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for *could not* codices O S read *never.* Then for *venially* codices V X Z read *voluntarily.* — Somewhat above, for *mode of speaking* the Vatican edition reads *mode of distinguishing,* and a little below the same Vatican edition prefixes *and* to the words *this indeed in kind.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Extra controversiam est, quod peccatum, quatenus habet rationem culpae, non potest esse nisi circa ea quae in dominio voluntatis sunt. Hoc autem variis modis intelligi potest, unde S. Doctor (hic dub. 3.) distinguit novem gradus voluntarii. Quo sensu peccatum originale dici possit voluntarium, scilicet voluntate alterius personae, quae fuit caput generis humani, explicatum est supra d. 30. a. 1. 2. et d. 31. a. 1. 2. — De peccatis mortalibus et illis venialibus, quorum proxima et immediata causa et divisim et coniunctim est libera voluntas, nulla est difficultas, sed tantum de peccatis venialibus, quae quidem divisim et in particulari possunt praecaveri, non autem universaliter et coniunctim. Haec difficultas egregie hic explicatur, consentientibus aliis magistris (cfr. Conc. Trident. Sess. VI. c. 11.).
Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 1. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 8, q. 77. a. 1. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 115. a. 2. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**II.** Quoad sequentem quaest. vide supra d. 39. dub. 1, ubi duplex ratio affertur, quare malitia (culpa) spectet ad actus voluntatis, non vero aliarum potentiarum. S. Doctor hic apte utitur distinctione inter peccatum ut *culpam*, et peccatum ut *vitium*, et quoad vitium iterum subdistinctione, ut patet in littera (cfr. supra d. 24. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. 2, d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. ad 2.). Hinc infert, peccatum in ratione culpae in sola esse voluntate ut subiecto (cfr. supra d. 32. dub. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 2, et d. 36. a. 1. q. 2.). — Aliis distinctionibus utitur S. Thom., scilicet quod aliquid possit inesse in aliqua potentia vel ut in causa, vel ut in subiecto, quod iterum possit esse vel primum (voluntas), vel proximum (potentia, quae elicit actum). Secundum hanc distinctionem concluditur: « Non solum voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed omnes illae potentiae, quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis reprimi per voluntatem » (S. Thom., S. 1. II. q. 74. a. 2.).
De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 5. a. 2, q. 108. m. 6. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, d. 42. q. 1-3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. II. q. 74. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 136. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 39. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 39. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** It is beyond controversy that sin, insofar as it has the character of fault, cannot be except concerning those things which are in the dominion of the will. But this can be understood in various ways, whence the holy Doctor (here, dub. 3) distinguishes nine grades of the voluntary. In what sense original sin can be called voluntary, namely by the will of another person, who was the head of the human race, has been explained above, d. 30, a. 1, 2 and d. 31, a. 1, 2. — Concerning mortal sins and those venial sins whose proximate and immediate cause, both divisively and conjointly, is the free will, there is no difficulty, but only concerning those venial sins which indeed can be forestalled divisively and in particular, but not universally and conjointly. This difficulty is admirably explained here, the other masters agreeing (cf. Council of Trent, Session VI, c. 11).
Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 108, m. 1, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I-II, q. 109, a. 8, q. 77, a. 1 sqq. — B. Albert, here a. 9; S. p. II, tr. 18, q. 115, a. 2, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**II.** As to the following question, see above d. 39, dub. 1, where a twofold reason is brought forward why malice (fault) pertains to the acts of the will, but not of the other powers. The holy Doctor here aptly uses the distinction between sin as *fault* (*culpa*) and sin as *vice* (*vitium*), and, with regard to vice, again a subdistinction, as is clear in the text (cf. above d. 24, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, 2; d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2). Hence he infers that sin in the character of fault is in the will alone as in a subject (cf. above d. 32, dub. 1, 2, a. 2, q. 2; and d. 36, a. 1, q. 2). — St. Thomas uses other distinctions, namely that something can be in some power either as in a cause or as in a subject, which again can be either primary (the will), or proximate (the power which elicits the act). According to this distinction it is concluded: « Not only the will can be the subject of sin, but all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or be restrained from them, by the will » (St. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 74, a. 2).
On this (second) question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 94, m. 5, a. 2, q. 108, m. 6. — Scotus, in both Scripts, d. 42, q. 1-3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. I-II, q. 74, a. 1, 2. — B. Albert, II Sent., d. 39, a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 136. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2. — Durandus, II Sent., d. 39, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent., d. 39, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 65832–66063) with PDF column-band verification at 450 dpi (printed pp.947–950 = PDF 969–972, offset +22). The OCR body for this quaestio was clean (single-column running prose usable as base); the PDF L/R body and footer bands were read to confirm anchors and apparatus and to resolve a few OCR garbles (`Cod. T solet`, the Respondeo's *peccatum originale voluntarium est, sed...voluntate eius...Adae* clause heavily fragmented in OCR, reflowed from PDF).

**Folded ARTICULUS II opener.** Per Vol II convention (Override §5), the short ARTICULUS II opener (`Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum principale...Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria...`) + the article subtitle *De comparatione actionis malae ad voluntatem* are folded into this q1; there is no standalone `d41-a2-divisio` chunk. The three sub-questions of Art. II are: q1 = utrum omne peccatum actuale sit voluntarium (this chunk); q2 = utrum omne peccatum mortale sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum; q3 = utrum puniri, sicut etiam peccare, sit ipsius voluntatis proprium.

**Alignment check (passed).** Opener `Primo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum actuale, tam mortale quam veniale, sit voluntarium` = QUAESTIO I title `Utrum omne peccatum actuale sit voluntarium` (the FIRST of the "quaeruntur tria"). No q-swap. Note: the article subtitle in print reads *actionis malae* (not *peccati*) — verified at 450 dpi against the coordinator's *de comparatione peccati* gloss; the printed text is *De comparatione actionis malae ad voluntatem.*

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. This q1 holds the **article-level** SCHOLION (items I–II) printed at the foot of p.949 onto p.950. Item II explicitly forward-references "the following question" (*Quoad sequentem quaest....*, i.e. q2, on sin being in the will as in a subject) and gives the q2 parallel-place register, so **q2 and q3 have NO own scholion** — confirm independently before setting has_scholion=false there.

**Apparatus page-split map** (per-page footer restart; 16 raw footers → 16 sequential `[^N]` markers, 1:1):
- **p.947** footer nn.1–3 → [^1]–[^3]. n.1 (`Hic c. 3`) anchors Fund. 1 (*in littera*); n.2 (*transfudit* var.) anchors arg. 1 (*in nobis*); n.3 (*Cfr. supra pag. 525...d.21*) anchors arg. 2 (*usu...voluntatis*).
- **p.948** footer nn.1–5 → [^4]–[^8]. n.1 (`Cod. T solet` + *De minori...Retract.*) → [^4] (arg. 4, *naturaliter fiunt*); n.2 (August. III de Lib. Arb. c.18 n.50) → [^6] (Sed contra 2, Retractationum); n.3 (Prov. *Vers. 16*) → [^5] (Sed contra 1, *vigesimo quarto*); n.4 (Libr. I c.9 + Rom 7,19) → [^7] (Sed contra 3, *de Civitate Dei*); n.5 (Cap. 1 n.3, Gal. 5) → [^8] (Sed contra 4, *non sunt voluntaria*). Footnote ORDER on the page follows print column flow; markers reordered to body anchor.
- **p.949** footer nn.1–4 → [^9]–[^12]. n.1 (*Cfr...lit. Magistri d.XXIV*) → [^9] (Respondeo, *totam posteritatem*); the *vel corruptionis* var. → [^10] (Respondeo, *ex corruptione*); n. (Libr. III de Lib. Arb. c.18 n.52, *Illa est...peccati poena*) → [^11] (Respondeo, Augustine *Quia homo non voluit*); n. (*Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c.3* + *imputatur* var.) → [^12] (Respondeo tail, *prohibere non possit*). The R-col footers (Rom 7,19 / *ratio* var. / Cap. 23 de Civ. Dei) → [^13], [^14], [^15] (replies *Ad 3*, *Ad 4*, *Ad 4* Augustine Civ. Dei I).
- **p.950** footer → [^16] (*Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c.3* + *non posset*/*ne unquam* + *figura dictionis* region var.), anchors *Ad 5* (*figura dictionis*). The scholion (items I–II) carries no inline footnote markers.

**Hand-offs IN (from d41-a1-q3):** NONE — Article I (incl. its closing scholion §I–III) fully consumed by a1-q3; a2-q1 opened cleanly at top of p.947 L-col with its own fresh p.947 footer block.

**Hand-off forwarded to a2-q2:** NONE. q1 ends with its article-level scholion (I–II) at foot of p.950; QUAESTIO II (raw 66064, *Utrum peccatum sit in sola voluntate sicut in subiecto*) begins on p.950 R-col / p.951 with its own fresh per-page footer sequence. q2 `has_scholion`: likely FALSE per Scholion item II above (which already treats the *sequens quaestio* and gives its parallel-place register) — confirm independently. a2-q3 at raw 66237.

**[?] flags:** none. (The OCR garble `Cod. T SWlt` resolved to `Cod. T solet` from the p.948 footer band at 450 dpi; the cascade-fragmented Respondeo *peccatum originale...voluntate eius...Adae* clause reflowed from the p.948 R-col PDF body band.)


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum omne peccatum sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum proprium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum proprium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Anselmum in libro de Originali Peccato[^1]: « Nusquam nisi in voluntate peccatum est ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum probatur tali ratione. « Membra et opera, et quidquid nos sumus, subiecit Deus voluntati; quidquid igitur faciunt, totum imputandum est voluntati[^2] »: si ergo in eo est culpa, cui imputatur; et omnis culpa voluntati imputatur: ergo omnis culpa est in voluntate tanquam in subiecto proprio.

3. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa, in qua nata est esse iustitia, « quia opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem[^3] »; sed iustitia est in voluntate tanquam in subiecto, quia, ut dicit Anselmus, « iustitia nihil aliud est quam voluntatis rectitudo »: ergo in eadem potentia, scilicet in voluntate, est culpa tanquam in subiecto proprio.

4. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa, quae cogi non potest; nam nullus peccat nisi in eo, a quo libere potest abstinere[^4]; sed sola potentia voluntatis est, quae cogi non potest: ergo etc.

5. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa, quae aliquando denominatur bona, aliquando mala; sed nos non dicimur habere intelligentiam vel memoriam malam, sed solum voluntatem malam: si ergo accidens denominat subiectum[^5] et culpa denominat solam voluntatem, ergo culpa est in sola voluntate tanquam in subiecto proprio.

6. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa tanquam in subiecto proprio, ad cuius actum comparatur sicut ad causam proximam et immediatam; sed nulla potentia animae est causa proxima et immediata culpae nisi sola potentia rationalis; nam « memorari malum vel intelligere malum non est culpa, sed velle malum culpa est[^6] »: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Nunquam peccatur mortaliter nisi per consensum; sed consensus non tantummodo est voluntatis, sed etiam rationis: si ergo culpa est circa illam potentiam, per cuius actum perpetratur, ergo non tantum est circa voluntatem, sed etiam circa rationem.

2. Item, non tantum peccatur affectione, sed etiam peccatur oblivione, sicut dicitur *Deuteronomii* sexto[^7]: *Cave, ne obliviscaris Domini Dei tui,* et frequenter in Scriptura reprehendit eos Dominus, qui eius sunt obliti: ergo si oblivio est in memoria, videtur, quod non tantum peccatum sit in voluntate, sed etiam in memoria.

3. Item, non solum peccatur delectatione, verum etiam cogitatione, secundum quod homo confitetur quotidie[^8]; sed cogitatio est intellectus, non affectus: ergo non tantum in affectu, verum etiam in intellectu habet esse peccatum.

4. Item, non tantum peccatur deliberatione, verum etiam suggestione, secundum quod vult Gregorius[^9]; sed suggestio est in parte sensibili: ergo peccatum non tantum est in parte rationali, sed etiam in parte sensibili.

5. Item, peccatum est deformitas, formaliter loquendo; sed constat, quod omni peccato imago deformatur — nam quodlibet peccatum, quantum est de se, gratiam expellit, quae est reformativa imaginis — ergo si imago non tantum respicit voluntatem, sed etiam alias potentias[^10]; videtur, quod peccatum non solum in voluntate, sed etiam in aliis potentiis habeat esse.

6. Item, nullus amat, nisi quod iudicat esse amandum, ergo ante amorem inordinatum praecedit iudicium inordinatum. Si ergo primum iudicium inordinatum non potuit esse poena, quia poena non praecedit culpam; necesse est, quod fuerit culpa[^11]: ergo prius est peccatum in ratione quam in voluntate: potius igitur videtur, quod subiectum peccati debeat assignari ratio quam voluntas.

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### Conclusio.

> Peccatum, ut tenet rationem culpae, voluntatem respicit ut subiectum; ut vero tenet rationem vitii, causaliter loquendo, est in sola voluntate, ut principio et subiecto primo, materialiter loquendo, est etiam in actibus aliarum potentiarum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod peccatum de sua ratione duo dicit[^12]. Dicit enim deordinationem sive privationem ordinis circa actum alicuius potentiae; dicit nihilominus illam deordinationem ut dignam vituperatione et punitione. Et quantum ad primum peccatum tenet rationem vitii aliquo modo corrumpentis; quantum ad secundum tenet rationem culpae et demeriti. Cum igitur comparamus peccatum ad subiectum proprium, aut loquimur de ipso, in quantum est culpa, aut loquimur de ipso, in quantum est vitium.

Si de ipso loquimur, in quantum est culpa et demeritum; sic proprie et praecise respicit liberum arbitrium. Quoniam enim libero arbitrio commissum est regimen totius hominis; si aliqua deordinatio fiat in regno totius animae, ipsi libero arbitrio imputatur. Unde si omnia membra, per quae consummata est[^13], et omnes potentiae, in quibus aliqua deordinatio facta est, traherentur in causam; omnia conquererentur de libero arbitrio, cui subiecta sunt, et ei Dominus totum imputaret, quidquid in eis mali gestum fuit. Unde si tollatur liberum arbitrium, iam nullo modo erit peccatum. Et quia libertas arbitrii principaliter residet penes voluntatem, sicut in praecedentibus ostensum fuit[^14]; hinc est, quod culpa sub ratione culpae in voluntate tanquam in subiecto proprio dicitur esse.

Si autem loquamur de culpa, secundum quod est vitium, sic dupliciter adhuc[^15] contingit. Cum peccatum dicatur vitium, in quantum deordinat aliquem actum alicuius potentiae, secundum quod deordinatio illa dupliciter habet comparari; sic et peccatum, ut est vitium. Comparatur autem deordinatio illa ad actum alicuius potentiae tanquam ad materiale circa quod, et tanquam ad causale a quo. — Si igitur loquamur de illa deordinatione materialiter, sic dico, quod non solum circa actum voluntatis, sed etiam circa actus aliarum potentiarum animae consistit. Actus enim et memoriae et intelligentiae et aliarum potentiarum animae, subiacentium voluntati, deordinari habent per diversa peccata. — Si autem loquamur de illa deordinatione causaliter; sic omnis talis deordinatio est a voluntate.

Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, dicendum, quod huius ratio est triplex: prima, quia penes voluntatem consistit regiminis dominium; secunda, quia in ipsa reperitur rectitudinis principium; tertia vero, quia ad ipsam pertinet regiminis complementum. — In ipsa namque consistit regiminis dominium, pro eo quod ipsa aliis potentiis imperat et a nulla imperatur. — In ipsa etiam attenditur rectitudinis principium; amor enim principium est rectitudinis et obliquitatis, sicut ostendit Augustinus[^16]; unde bonus amor est fundamentum civitatis Dei, et malus fundamentum civitatis diaboli. Et ratio huius est, quia amor est radix omnium affectionum et tantae adhaerentiae, ut transformet amantem in amatum. — Penes ipsam etiam consistit rectitudinis et regiminis complementum, quoniam ipsius obiectum est bonum; « bonum autem et finis est idem ». Et quia in directione ad finem consistit bonitatis completio, in obliquatione vero consistit bonitatis amissio; hinc est, quod ab ipsa voluntate oritur omne peccatum. Et propterea Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus definiens peccatum, dicit, quod « peccatum est voluntas assequendi, vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, et a quo liberum est abstinere »; per hoc autem quod ait: *voluntas assequendi* etc., describit peccatum, secundum quod est vitium et deordinatio, quae a voluntate habet ortum. Per hoc autem quod dicit: *a quo liberum est abstinere,* notificat peccatum, secundum quod tenet rationem culpae; quia nemo culpatur in eo quod vitare non potest, sicut ipse dicit ibidem.

Sic igitur patet, quod peccatum, in quantum tenet rationem culpae, voluntatem respicit ut subiectum; in quantum etiam tenet rationem vitii, respicit voluntatem ut principium et ut subiectum primum, licet aliquo modo respiciat actus aliarum potentiarum. — Unde rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

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**Ad oppositorum solutionem:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod non peccamus nisi consentiendo; dicendum, quod etsi consensus respiciat simul rationem et voluntatem, principalius tamen et completius voluntatem respicit, quia in ea consummatur. Quantumcumque enim ratio deliberet, nisi voluntas alterum praeoptet, nunquam eligit nec consentit; et quod est ibi culpae et iniustitiae, hoc est ratione voluntatis adiunctae.

*Ad 2, 3, 4.* Ad tria sequentia, quae subiungit, quod peccatur oblivione, cogitatione et suggestione; patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt; nam talia non sunt peccata, nisi quia voluntaria. Unde nunquam circa actum memoriae culpa consistit nec etiam circa actum intelligentiae, nisi eis immisceat se voluntas vel antecedenter, vel concomitanter[^17], vel consequenter. Similiter nec suggestio, si est omnino ab extrinseco, est culpa, sed illa quae est ab intrinseco, quae quodam modo voluntaria est, sive quia a voluntate Adae habuit ortum, sive quia a voluntate peccantis non praecavetur.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum deformat totam imaginem; dicendum, quod etsi tota imago deformetur et vitietur, illa tamen sola deformatio, quae est in voluntate, est illa quae est ratio inculpandi; et ideo non sequitur, quod culpa respiciat alias potentias animae sub ratione culpae, quamvis circa actus earum consistat corruptio vitiosa.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnem malam voluntatem praecedit malum iudicium; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad actum voluntatis, qui quidem est consensus plenarius; illud autem nunquam in creatura rationali, secundum quod instituta fuit, iudicium erroneum interveniret, nisi voluntas se illi iudicio immisceret; nunquam enim Adam praesumsisset, vel de se praesumtuose iudicasset, nisi amore voluntatis nimium sibi adhaesisset. Unde amor mirabiliter pervertit iudicium. Licet igitur primus Angelus sive Adam, quando peccavit, prius praesumserit, quam amaverit; illius tamen praesumtionis perversitas a voluntate habuit ortum, et ambitionis scelus in voluntate fuit consummatum: et ita peccatum respicit voluntatem principaliter, tum quia in ipsa primo inchoatur, tum quia in ipsa consummatur. Ideo recte dicitur subiectum primum peccati, quia et primum est origine, primum etiam complemento sive consummatione.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether every sin is about the will as about its proper subject.*

Secondly it is asked whether every sin is about the will as about its proper subject. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. *First*, through Anselm in the book *On Original Sin*[^1]: « Nowhere save in the will is there sin ».

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by such a reasoning. « The members and the works, and whatever we are, God has subjected to the will; whatever therefore they do, the whole is to be imputed to the will[^2] »: if therefore the fault is in that to which it is imputed; and every fault is imputed to the will: therefore every fault is in the will as in its proper subject.

3. Likewise, fault is in that power alone in which justice is born to be, « because opposites are born to come to be about the same thing[^3] »; but justice is in the will as in its subject, because, as Anselm says, « justice is nothing other than rectitude of the will »: therefore in the same power, namely in the will, is fault as in its proper subject.

4. Likewise, fault is in that power alone which cannot be coerced; for no one sins except in that from which he is able freely to abstain[^4]; but it is the power of the will alone that cannot be coerced: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, fault is in that power alone which is sometimes called good, sometimes evil; but we are not said to have an evil understanding or memory, but only an evil will: if therefore an accident denominates its subject[^5] and fault denominates the will alone, then fault is in the will alone as in its proper subject.

6. Likewise, fault is in that power alone as in its proper subject, to whose act it is compared as to its proximate and immediate cause; but no power of the soul is the proximate and immediate cause of fault except the rational power alone; for « to remember evil or to understand evil is not a fault, but to will evil is a fault[^6] »: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Never is there mortal sin except through consent; but consent belongs not only to the will, but also to reason: if therefore fault is about that power by whose act it is perpetrated, then it is not only about the will, but also about reason.

2. Likewise, one sins not only by affection, but one sins also by forgetfulness, as is said in *Deuteronomy* six[^7]: *Take heed, lest thou forget the Lord thy God,* and frequently in Scripture the Lord reproves those who have forgotten him: therefore if forgetfulness is in the memory, it seems that sin is not only in the will, but also in the memory.

3. Likewise, one sins not only by delight, but also by thought, according to what man confesses daily[^8]; but thought belongs to the intellect, not to the affect: therefore sin has its being not only in the affect, but also in the intellect.

4. Likewise, one sins not only by deliberation, but also by suggestion, according to what Gregory holds[^9]; but suggestion is in the sensitive part: therefore sin is not only in the rational part, but also in the sensitive part.

5. Likewise, sin is a deformity, formally speaking; but it is established that by every sin the image is deformed — for any sin whatever, so far as is of itself, expels grace, which is reformative of the image — therefore if the image regards not only the will, but also the other powers[^10]; it seems that sin has its being not only in the will, but also in the other powers.

6. Likewise, no one loves except what he judges to be lovable, therefore before disordered love there precedes a disordered judgment. If therefore the first disordered judgment could not be a punishment, because punishment does not precede fault; it is necessary that it was a fault[^11]: therefore sin is prior in reason than in the will: rather, therefore, it seems that the subject of sin ought to be assigned to reason than to the will.

### Conclusion.

> Sin, as it holds the character of fault, regards the will as its subject; but as it holds the character of vice, speaking causally, it is in the will alone, as principle and first subject; speaking materially, it is also in the acts of the other powers.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that sin from its very nature says two things[^12]. For it says a disorder or privation of order about the act of some power; it says nonetheless that disorder as worthy of blame and punishment. And as to the first, sin holds the character of a vice in some way corrupting; as to the second, it holds the character of fault and demerit. When therefore we compare sin to its proper subject, either we speak of it insofar as it is fault, or we speak of it insofar as it is vice.

If we speak of it insofar as it is fault and demerit, thus it properly and precisely regards free choice. For since to free choice is committed the governance of the whole man, if any disorder arise in the kingdom of the whole soul, it is imputed to free choice itself. Hence if all the members through which it was consummated[^13], and all the powers in which any disorder has been done, were drawn into the cause, all would complain of free choice, to which they are subject, and the Lord would impute the whole to it, whatever of evil was done in them. Hence if free choice be taken away, there will now in no way be sin. And because the freedom of choice principally resides in the will, as was shown in what precedes[^14]; hence it is that fault under the character of fault is said to be in the will as in its proper subject.

But if we speak of fault insofar as it is vice, thus it still happens in two ways[^15]. Since sin is called a vice insofar as it disorders some act of some power, according as that disorder can be compared in two ways; so also sin, as it is vice. Now that disorder is compared to the act of some power as to the material *about which*, and as to the causal *from which*. — If therefore we speak of that disorder materially, thus I say that it consists not only about the act of the will, but also about the acts of the other powers of the soul. For the acts both of memory and of understanding and of the other powers of the soul, which are subject to the will, are liable to be disordered through diverse sins. — But if we speak of that disorder causally, thus all such disorder is from the will.

But if the reason for this be asked, it must be said that the reason for this is threefold: first, because in the will consists the lordship of governance; second, because in it is found the principle of rectitude; third, because to it pertains the completion of governance. — For in it consists the lordship of governance, inasmuch as it commands the other powers and is commanded by none. — In it also is observed the principle of rectitude; for love is the principle of rectitude and of obliquity, as Augustine shows[^16]; whence good love is the foundation of the city of God, and evil love the foundation of the city of the devil. And the reason of this is that love is the root of all the affections and of so great an adherence that it transforms the lover into the beloved. — In it also consists the completion of rectitude and of governance, since its object is the good; « now the good and the end are the same ». And because in direction to the end consists the completion of goodness, but in obliquity consists the loss of goodness; hence it is that from the will itself arises all sin. And therefore Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*, defining sin, says that « sin is the will to attain or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain »; now by this that he says: *the will to attain* etc., he describes sin insofar as it is vice and disorder, which takes its origin from the will. But by this that he says: *from which one is free to abstain,* he marks out sin insofar as it holds the character of fault; for no one is faulted in that which he cannot avoid, as he himself says in the same place.

Thus therefore it is clear that sin, insofar as it holds the character of fault, regards the will as subject; insofar also as it holds the character of vice, it regards the will as principle and as first subject, although it in some way regards the acts of the other powers. — Whence the reasons which are brought forward for the first part are to be granted.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:**
*To 1.* As to that, then, which is first objected, that we do not sin except by consenting; it must be said that although consent regards at once reason and the will, nevertheless it more principally and more completely regards the will, because in it it is consummated. For however much reason may deliberate, unless the will prefer the one alternative, it never chooses nor consents; and whatever there is there of fault and of injustice, this is by reason of the will joined to it.

*To 2, 3, 4.* To the three following, which it adds, that one sins by forgetfulness, by thought, and by suggestion; the response is clear from what has been said; for such things are not sins, except inasmuch as they are voluntary. Hence never does fault consist about the act of memory nor even about the act of understanding, unless the will mingle itself with them either antecedently, or concomitantly[^17], or consequently. Likewise neither is suggestion, if it is wholly from without, a fault, but that which is from within, which is in a certain way voluntary, whether because it took its origin from the will of Adam, or because it is not guarded against by the will of the one sinning.

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that sin deforms the whole image; it must be said that although the whole image is deformed and vitiated, nevertheless that deformation alone which is in the will is the one which is the ground of inculpating; and therefore it does not follow that fault regards the other powers of the soul under the character of fault, although about their acts there consists a vicious corruption.

*To 6.* As to that which is objected, that every evil will is preceded by an evil judgment; it must be said that this is true as regards the act of the will, which indeed is full consent; but that judgment never, in a rational creature, according as it was instituted, would an erroneous judgment intervene, unless the will mingled itself with that judgment; for never would Adam have presumed, or judged of himself presumptuously, unless by the love of his will he had clung too much to himself. Hence love marvelously perverts judgment. Although therefore the first Angel or Adam, when he sinned, presumed before he loved; nevertheless the perversity of that presumption took its origin from the will, and the crime of ambition was consummated in the will: and thus sin regards the will principally, both because in it it is first begun, and because in it it is consummated. Therefore it is rightly called the first subject of sin, because it is both first in origin and first also in completion or consummation.

---

la: Cap. 4. — Codd. T bb et alii nec non Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *possit.*

en: Chapter 4. — Codices T, bb and others, as also the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, read *possit.*

la: Cap. 3. seq., secundum sententiam — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi praecise eadem sententia Augustini habetur. — Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. peccat. c. 4: *Denique, si de actionibus voluntariis, quae iniuste fiunt, arguentur membra et sensus, quibus fiunt, respondere possunt: Deus nos et potestatem, quae in nobis est, subiecit voluntati... Dominae, quam Deus nobis dedit, nec possumus nec debemus non obedire... Ergo quid peccant membra vel sensus vel opera, quae Deus sic subiecit voluntati, si servant quod Deus illis ordinavit? Quidquid igitur faciunt, totum imputandum est voluntati.* — Mox pro *si ergo in eo* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *si ergo in ea potentia.*

en: Chapter 3 and following, according to the sense — Cf. here the Master's text, c. 3, where precisely the same opinion of Augustine is found. — Anselm, *On the Conception of the Virgin and on Original Sin* c. 4: *Finally, if for the voluntary actions which are done unjustly the members and senses by which they are done were to be arraigned, they can answer: God has subjected us and the power which is in us to the will... To the Lady whom God has given us we neither can nor ought not to obey... Therefore in what do the members or senses or works sin, which God has thus subjected to the will, if they keep what God ordained for them? Whatever therefore they do, the whole is to be imputed to the will.* — Presently, for *si ergo in eo* (if therefore in that) the Vatican and editions 3, 4 read *si ergo in ea potentia* (if therefore in that power).

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Dictum Anselmi habetur in eius Dialogo de veritate, c. 12, et de Conceptu virgin. et orig. peccat. c. 3, ubi et de maiori huius arg. videas. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 722, nota 3. — Pro *nata sunt fieri* cod. T *sunt nata esse.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories* in the chapter on Opposites, and *Topics* II c. 3 (c. 7). The saying of Anselm is found in his *Dialogue on Truth* c. 12, and in *On the Conception of the Virgin and on Original Sin* c. 3, where you may also see about the major of this argument. Cf. also above p. 722, note 3. — For *nata sunt fieri* codex T reads *sunt nata esse.*

la: Vide definitionem peccati, ab Augustino positam, quae habetur infra in corp. quaest. — De minori cfr. supra d. 28. p. II. q. 4. ad 5.

en: See the definition of sin, set down by Augustine, which is found below in the body of the question. — On the minor cf. above d. 28, p. II, q. 4, ad 5.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 920, nota 1. in fine et August., I. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 8. n. 37: *Nam si quaeratur, qualis sit Angelus vel homo malae voluntatis, rectissime respondetur: malus; magis accipiens qualitatis nomen ex voluntate mala quam ex natura bona.* — De minori vide supra d. 39. dub. 1. — Plurimi codd. et ed. 1 omittunt in fine arg. *proprio.* Edd. 2. 3, omisso principio seq. arg., verba *ad cuius actum* etc. immediate adnectunt ad verbum finale arg. praeced., scilicet ad *proprio,* sicque ex duobus argg. faciunt unum.

en: Cf. above p. 920, note 1 at the end, and Augustine, *Against Julian the Pelagian* I, c. 8, n. 37: *For if it be asked what sort of being is an Angel or a man of evil will, the most correct answer is: evil; taking the name of quality rather from the evil will than from the good nature.* — On the minor see above d. 39, dub. 1. — Very many codices and edition 1 omit at the end of the argument *proprio* (proper). Editions 2, 3, having omitted the beginning of the following argument, annex the words *ad cuius actum* etc. immediately to the final word of the preceding argument, namely to *proprio,* and thus from two arguments make one.

la: Ut legitur supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXXIX. c. 2. — In minori post *potentia rationalis* simul audi: *affectiva (motiva).*

en: As is read above in the Master's text, d. XXXIX, c. 2. — In the minor, after *rational power* understand also: *affective (motive).*

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. seqq. et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — De minori vide supra pag. 893, nota 2. — Vers. 13: *Cave diligenter, ne obliviscaris Domini, qui eduxit te* etc. — De propos. seq. cfr. Isai. 17, 10; 51, 13; 37, 11; Ierem. 2, 32; 13, 25. — De memoria et oblivione vide supra d. 7. p. II. a. I. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above the Master's text, d. XXIV, c. 9ff., and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — On the minor see above p. 893, note 2. — Verse 13: *Take diligent heed, lest thou forget the Lord, who brought thee out* etc. — On the following proposition cf. Isa. 17:10; 51:13; 37:11; Jer. 2:32; 13:25. — On memory and forgetfulness see above d. 7, p. II, a. I, q. 2, in the body.

la: In recitanda illa pervulgata formula confessionis generalis, quae incipit: *Confiteor Deo omnipotenti* etc. — August., X. Confess. c. 11. n. 18. ait: *Cogo et cogito sic est, ut ago et agito, facio et factito. Verumtamen sibi animus hoc verbum proprie vindicavit, ut non quod alibi, sed quod in animo colligitur i. e. cogitur, cogitari proprie iam dicatur.* — Pro *cogitatione* plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *in cogitatione.*

en: In the reciting of that widely known formula of the general confession, which begins: *I confess to almighty God* etc. — Augustine, *Confessions* X, c. 11, n. 18, says: *« I drive together » and « I think » stand as « I act » and « I am active », « I do » and « I do repeatedly ». Nevertheless the mind has claimed this word properly for itself, so that not what is gathered elsewhere, but what is gathered i. e. driven together (cogitur) in the mind is now properly said to be thought (cogitari).* — For *cogitatione* very many codices with editions 1, 2 read *in cogitatione.*

la: Libr. IV. Moral. c. 27. n. 49, ubi peccatum quatuor modis in corde, ac totidem in opere perpetrari docet his verbis: *In corde namque suggestione, delectatione, consensu et defensionis audacia perpetratur. Fit enim suggestio per adversarium, delectatio per carnem, consensus per spiritum, defensionis audacia per elationem.* — De minori cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. — Pro *deliberatione* in cod. U habetur *delectatione,* et in fine arg. pro *sensibili* cod. K et ed. 1 substituunt *sensuali.*

en: *Morals* book IV, c. 27, n. 49, where he teaches that sin is perpetrated in four ways in the heart, and as many in the deed, in these words: *For in the heart it is perpetrated by suggestion, delight, consent, and the boldness of defence. For suggestion comes about through the adversary, delight through the flesh, consent through the spirit, the boldness of defence through pride.* — On the minor cf. above the Master's text, d. XXIV, c. 9. — For *deliberatione* codex U has *delectatione* (by delight), and at the end of the argument for *sensibili* codex K and edition 1 substitute *sensuali.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

la: Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 24. n. 72. seqq. — Pro *primum iudicium* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *praevium iudicium.* Circa finem arg. pro *assignari* cod. T *esse.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 24, n. 72ff. — For *primum iudicium* (the first judgment) the Vatican with editions 3, 4 reads *praevium iudicium* (the previous judgment). Toward the end of the argument, for *assignari* codex T reads *esse.*

la: Cod. T *dicit.*

en: Codex T reads *dicit* (says).

la: Cod. A supplet *culpa.* In cod. V legitur sic: *Unde si omnia membra, secundum quae consummata est culpa, et omnes* etc. Pro *omnes potentiae, in quibus* cod. T *omnis potentia, in qua,* qui cod. et paulo superius pro *Si de ipso loquimur* exhibet *Si de ipso loquamur.* Aliquanto inferius pro *imputaret* codd. H W *imputat,* et subinde pro *gestum fuit* codd. H V *gestum est.*

en: Codex A supplies *culpa* (fault). In codex V it is read thus: *Hence if all the members, according to which fault was consummated, and all* etc. For *omnes potentiae, in quibus* (all the powers, in which) codex T reads *omnis potentia, in qua* (every power, in which), which codex also, a little above, for *Si de ipso loquimur* exhibits *Si de ipso loquamur.* Somewhat below, for *imputaret* codices H W read *imputat,* and thereupon for *gestum fuit* codices H V read *gestum est.*

la: Dist. 25. p. 1. q. 6. Post pauca pro *proprio* cod. T *proprie.* — Edd., excepta 1, ex praeced. supplent *loqui.* Subinde post *cum* cod. Q (W a secunda manu) subiicit *enim.* — Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiiciunt *ei.*

en: Distinction 25, p. 1, q. 6. A little after, for *proprio* codex T reads *proprie.* — The editions, except the first, supply from the preceding *loqui.* Thereupon after *cum* codex Q (W by a second hand) adds *enim.* — The Vatican and editions 3, 4 add *ei.*

la: Vide supra pag. 150, nota 1. Cfr. etiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 9. n. 15. et in Ps. 122. n. 1. — Quod amor sit radix omnium affectionum, docet August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2, et quod amor amantem transformet in amatum, dicunt Dionys. et Hugo de S. Vict., ut videre est supra pag. 121, nota 4.

en: See above p. 150, note 1. Cf. also Augustine, *Commentary on the Psalms* on Ps. 9, n. 15, and on Ps. 122, n. 1. — That love is the root of all the affections, Augustine teaches, *City of God* XIV, c. 7, n. 2; and that love transforms the lover into the beloved, Dionysius and Hugh of St. Victor say, as may be seen above p. 121, note 4.

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 808, nota 3. — Loc. cit. (de Duabus Animabus): *Quodsi nemo vituperatione vel damnatione dignus est, aut non contra vetitum iustitiae faciens, aut quod non potest non faciens, omne autem peccatum vel vituperandum est, vel damnandum; quis dubitet, tunc esse peccatum, cum et velle iniustum est, et liberum nolle* etc. Cfr. supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3. et ibid. Comment. dub. 3.

en: According to Aristotle, on whom see above p. 808, note 3. — In the place cited (*On the Two Souls*): *But if no one is worthy of blame or condemnation, either when not acting against what justice forbids, or when doing what he cannot not do, while however every sin is either to be blamed or to be condemned; who would doubt that there is sin then, when both to will is unjust, and it is free to be unwilling* etc. Cf. above d. XXVIII, the Master's text, c. 3, and there the Commentary, dub. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.; de suggestione, supra eodem loco et lit. Magistri huius dist. — Subinde pro *concomitanter* nonnulli codd. *comitanter.*

en: Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 1, q. 2; on suggestion, above in the same place and the Master's text of this distinction. — Thereupon for *concomitanter* (concomitantly) several codices read *comitanter.*

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (the auto-chunker's reading-order body for d.41 a.2 q.2), cross-checked against 450 dpi PDF column-band crops of printed pp. 951–953 (PDF pp. 973–975; offset pdf = printed + 22). The OCR for this quaestio is clean single-column-style running prose (not cascade-shattered), so per the Vol II recipe it served as the base; marginal Quaracchi running glosses (*Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Duo in peccato*, *subdistinctio*, *Triplex ratio*, *Ratio 1/2/3*, *Notandum.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*) are editorial marginalia, not Bonaventure's text, and have been trimmed.
- **Page-number correction.** The prior auto-chunked frontmatter and the OCR's embedded running-head digits suggested pp. 980–982, but the 450 dpi PDF renders show pp. 980–983 are **DISTINCTIO XLIII** (*De peccato in Spiritum sanctum*). The true location of this quaestio is **pp. 951–953**, confirmed by the PDF running heads: p.951 `DIST. XLI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`, p.952 `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` (CONCLUSIO mid-quaestio), p.953 `DIST. XLI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` (q2 solutions finish at the top, then q3 begins). The OCR digits `981 / 9S2 / 953` were garbles of `951 / 952 / 953`.
- **Alignment confirmed.** Opener reads *Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum proprium* — the SECOND of Art. II's three sub-questions (the subject-of-sin topic; q1 = the division of deliberative action, q3 = *Tertio quaeritur, utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium*). No q-swap.
- **No own scholion.** Confirmed: q2's printed range contains no SCHOLION header; the d.41-a.2 article-level scholion is held by a.2-q.1, whose §II forward-references this *sequens quaestio*. Frontmatter `has_scholion: false`.
- **Page-split map.** Footnote numbering restarts per page. p.951 carries Quaracchi notes 1–6 (chunk [^1]–[^6]); p.952 carries notes 1–6 (chunk [^7]–[^11], with [^7] collating the two p.952 footer entries that share the Deuteronomy reference); p.953 carries notes 1–4 (chunk [^12]–[^17]). Page breaks inserted as `<!-- page 952 -->` (before `### Conclusio.`, which opens p.952) and `<!-- page 953 -->` (before the *Ad 1* solution, which opens p.953).
- **Hand-offs.** Picked up from a.2-q.1: none material — q2 opens fresh at the top of p.951 L-column with its own fundamenta and a fresh p.951 footer sequence (the hand-off's "p.950" reference was based on the same garbled page numbering; the true opener is at the top of p.951). Forwarded to a.2-q.3: q3 (*Tertio quaeritur, utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium*) begins lower on p.953 with its own SCHOLION and footer sequence — no shared p.953 footer migrates to q3 (p.953's footer block is fully consumed by this quaestio's solutions; the q3 SCHOLION + footers start a fresh sequence).
- **No [?] flags.** All readings resolved against the OCR + PDF crops; OCR garbles silently corrected per the OCR-cleanup rules (e.g. *quaeritnr→quaeritur, utnim→utrum, Ansehnum→Anselmum, niemoria→memoria, raalam→malam, iTKlicium→iudicium, consunimatur→consummatur, repeviiiir→reperitur, Augustiuus→Augustinus, amMerit→amaverit*).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0