title: Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II.

### *De modo, quo Angeli sunt in loco.*

Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeruntur quatuor.

Primum est, utrum substantiae spirituales sint in loco corporeo.

Secundum est, utrum Angelus sit in pluribus locis simul, aut tantum in uno.

Tertium est, utrum sit in loco punctali, an composito.

Quartum est, utrum plures Angeli possint simul esse[^1] in eodem loco primo.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Angeli sint in loco corporeo.*

Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum loci corporalis sit locare Angelos. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Dicit Strabus[^2]: «Statim ut factum est caelum empyreum, repletum est Angelis».

2. Item, Damascenus[^3]: «Caelum est continentia visibilium et invisibilium»; loquitur de empyreo: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne creatum est de universo, ergo est intra primum continens sive ultimum corpus; sed supremum corpus ambiens dicitur empyreum[^4]: ergo omnis creatura continetur infra ipsum: ergo et angelicus spiritus.

4. Item, nulla substantia operatur, nisi ubi est eius virtus[^5]; sed nulla virtus potest elongari a substantia nisi distantia proportionali — nam virtus infinita nullo modo elongatur, virtus finita non potest elongari nisi finite — ergo necesse est, Angelum esse ubi operatur, vel prope. Ergo cum operatur in loco corporali, ut patet in corpore, quod movet, ergo ibi est, vel in loco proximo est: ergo si locus maxime aptus contemplationi est empyreum, videtur, quod ibi sit.

5. Item, spiritus maligni in eodem loco tormentorum habebunt collocari, in quo et homines

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damnati, sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^6]: *Ite maledicti* etc.; ergo ab oppositis vel a simili in contrario Angeli cum beatis hominibus in eodem loco corporali erunt; sed locus aptus hominibus beatis est ille qui praedictus est, scilicet caelum empyreum, quod est supremum, quietum, clarum, uniforme et spatiosum: ergo etc.

6. Item, maior requiritur proportio perfectionis ad perfectibile quam locati ad locum; sed videmus, quod substantia spiritualis adeo proportionari potest corporali, et e converso, quod una unitur alteri ut perfectio, ut patet in homine: ergo multo fortius potest una uniri alteri ut locatum loco. Ergo cum caelum empyreum sit nobilissimum corporum simplicium, vel erit in Angelo, vel Angelus in eo; sed ipsum non est in Angelo: ergo e converso.

**Sed contra:**

1. Boethius de Hebdomadibus[^7]: «Communis animi conceptio, quae omnibus videtur, est, incorporeum in loco non esse».

2. Item, Gregorius[^8]: «Locus animae Deus est»; sed non est spiritualior locus animae quam Angeli: ergo si Deus est locus animae, et Angeli.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia loci ad locatum est mutua indigentia, sicut patet — locatum enim indiget loco suo, ut terra centro; et locus etiam indiget locato, unde refugit vacuitatem; et impossibile est, quod locus sit sine locato, quin aliquid suppleat indigentiam loci[^9] — sed caelum empyreum non indiget Angelis nec aliquis locus, nec similiter Angelus loco, quia, omni corpore circumscripto, adhuc Angelus remaneret et secundum substantiam et secundum operationem, quae est contemplatio: ergo nullo modo est locus Angeli.

4. Item, locus habet influentiam et potentiam super locatum — unde superiora nobiliora locant minus nobilia, sicut patet ex hoc[^10] quod aqua terram, aer aquam, et sic de aliis — sed corporale non habet influere in spirituale nisi secundum ordinem iustitiae, sicut in anima peccatrice vel spiritu: ergo spiritus non habet locum in corpore nisi per culpam.

5. Item, omne locatum habet pondus et inclinationem ad locum; sed Augustinus[^11] dicit: «Quod est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus»; sed inclinatio amoris angelici est ad bonum spirituale, non ad locum corporalem: ergo non habent locum corporaliter, sed solum spiritualiter.

### Conclusio

> Caelum empyreum locat Angelos ut locus continens, non autem ut mensurans vel conservans.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod caelum empyreum locat Angelos et est locus Angelorum, sicut probant rationes ad primam partem.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum est notandum, quod locus habet triplicem comparationem ad locatum. Comparatur enim primo in ratione *continentis*, secundo in ratione *mensurantis* et tertio in ratione *conservantis*. Continet enim ut vas, mensurat ut quantitas, sed *conservat* ut natura[^12]. — Secundum hanc triplicem habitudinem sunt in loco substantiae *finitae, corporales* et *corruptibiles*: quia finitae et limitatae, sunt in loco continente; quia corporales, in mensurante; quia corruptibiles, in loco conservante. Secundum comparationes duas primas sunt in loco substantiae finitae et corporales, sed incorruptibiles. Secundum primam vero sunt in loco substantiae finitae, spirituales et incorruptibiles, ut Angeli. Et hoc dico in loco corporali; nam Angelus habet locum spiritualem conservantem, scilicet Dei virtutem; locum mensurantem sive circumscribentem, propriae substantiae et[^13] virtutis limitationem sive clausionem; locum vero continentem, non tantum spiritualem, sed etiam corporalem.

Ratio autem, quare Angeli continentur loco sive aliquo ambiente, est ordinatio partium universi. Si enim non haberent aliquid continens, non esset eorum existentia ordinata ad invicem[^14], nec haberet ordinem unus ad alterum; hoc autem non decet universum nec summum opificem. — Ratio autem, quare continentur loco corporali, duplex est: una, scilicet limitatio ipsius spiritus creati. Cum enim spiritus increatus, qui Deus est, habeat in se simplicitatem, per quam est intra omnia, et immensi-

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tatem, per quam continet omnia et est extra omnia[^15], communicat illas conditiones creaturae eatenus, quatenus nata est recipere. Unde simplicitatem communicat spiritui; sed spiritus non potuit recipere virtutem continentiae. Quia enim simplicitas eius finita est, ideo est hic et nunc[^16]; et quia non habet partem et partem, ideo secundum totum est hic et nunc: et ideo non potest habere universalem capacitatem rerum. Corpus autem, quia compositum est et habet partes innumerabiles, non potuit participare simplicitatem, sed propter partium extensionem potuit recipere capacitatem; ideo Deus fecit unum corpus nobilissimum, quod esset natum omnia ambire, et extra quod omnino nihil esset; et hoc est empyreum; et ideo necesse est, Angelum esse intra ipsum. — Alia ratio est, quia in solo corpore est distinctio. Nam si gratis statur, ceterae creaturae ordinem habent in mundo, distinctionem et positionem habent secundum gradus perfectionum, et ita quod una est hic, et alia ibi, una sursum, et alia deorsum, et[^17] in solo corpore est potentialis distinctio secundum hic et ibi: ideo inter creaturas soli corpori debuit dari universalis potentia locandi, et respectu visibilium et invisibilium, ut sic universum esset unum in omnibus suis partibus ordinatum.

Et sic patet ratio duplex, quare data est corpori potentia locandi spiritum, et spiritum contineri a corpore. Hoc enim exigebat ordo universi tum propter limitationem spiritus creati, tum quia in solo corpore distinctio est secundum hic et ibi.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes monstrantes, quod caeli empyrei est locare Angelos.

1. Quod enim obiicitur in contrarium primo, quod incorporeum non est in loco; dicendum, quod intelligit[^18] de esse in loco, sicut mensuratum est in mensura.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod locus Angeli et animae Deus est; dicendum, quod intelligit[^19] de loco conservante, non de loco definiente. Et iterum ratio non cogit: quod si Deus est locus[^20], quod nihil creatum locet spiritum.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod loci ad locatum est mutua indigentia; dicendum, quod verum est de his quae locantur propter defectum sui; sed non est verum de his quae locantur propter servandum ordinem universi. — Unde si quaeratur, utrum lapis possit esse extra caelum; dicendum, quod non, tum propter suam indigentiam, quia non haberet locum conservantem, tum quia non patitur hoc ordo universi. Sed de Angelo, quod caelum non exeat, non est ratio loci corporalis indigentia, sed corporis ultimi universalis continentia, secundum quam universum est perfectum et ordinatum.

4. 5. Et ad alias duas[^21] rationes patet responsio, quod[^22] procedunt de esse in loco tanquam in conservante, ratione cuius ponitur influentia in locante, ponitur etiam inclinatio in locato; iste autem modus essendi in loco non convenit Angelo.

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english:
### ARTICLE II.

### *On the mode in which the angels are in a place.*

Consequently, concerning the second article, four [things] are asked.

The first is, whether spiritual substances are in a corporeal place.

The second is, whether an Angel is in several places at once, or only in one.

The third is, whether [an Angel] is in a punctual place or a composite [one].

The fourth is, whether several Angels can be at once[^1] in the same primary place.

### Question I. *Whether the angels are in a corporeal place.*

It is asked, therefore, first, whether it belongs to a corporeal place to locate Angels. And that [it does] so, it seems.

1. Strabus says[^2]: «As soon as the empyrean heaven was made, it was filled with Angels».

2. Likewise, Damascene[^3]: «Heaven is the containment of visible and invisible [things]»; he speaks of the empyrean: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every created thing is of the universe, therefore is within the first container or the ultimate body; but the supreme encompassing body is called the empyrean[^4]: therefore every creature is contained within it: therefore also the angelic spirit.

4. Likewise, no substance operates except where its power is[^5]; but no power can be distanced from the substance except by a proportional distance — for an infinite power is in no way distanced, a finite power cannot be distanced except finitely — therefore it is necessary that the Angel be where it operates, or near. Therefore since it operates in a corporeal place, as is plain in a body which it moves, therefore it is there, or is in the nearest place: therefore if the place most apt for contemplation is the empyrean, it seems that it is there.

5. Likewise, the malign spirits will have to be placed in the same place of torments in which also the men

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[who are] damned [will be], as is said in Matthew twenty-five[^6]: *Go, you cursed* etc.; therefore from the opposites or from the like in the contrary, the Angels with the blessed men will be in the same corporeal place; but the place apt for blessed men is that which was aforesaid, namely the empyrean heaven, which is supreme, quiet, bright, uniform, and spacious: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, a greater proportion of the perfection to the perfectible is required than of what is located to the place; but we see that a spiritual substance can be so proportioned to a corporeal one, and conversely, that the one is united to the other as a perfection, as is plain in man: therefore much more strongly can the one be united to the other as what is located to the place. Therefore since the empyrean heaven is the noblest of the simple bodies, either it will be in the Angel or the Angel in it; but it is not in the Angel: therefore conversely.

**But on the contrary:**

1. Boethius, *On the Hebdomads*[^7]: «It is a common conception of the mind, which seems [true] to all, that the incorporeal is not in a place».

2. Likewise, Gregory[^8]: «The place of the soul is God»; but there is not a more spiritual place for the soul than for the Angels: therefore if God is the place of the soul, [he is] also [the place] of the Angels.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason, because there is a mutual need of the place to what is located, as is plain — for what is located needs its place, as earth [needs] the center; and the place too needs what is located, whence it flees emptiness; and it is impossible that a place be without what is located, but that something supply the need of the place[^9] — but the empyrean heaven does not need the Angels, nor does any place [need them], nor likewise [does] the Angel [need] a place, because, every body being removed, the Angel would still remain both according to substance and according to operation, which is contemplation: therefore in no way is it the place of the Angel.

4. Likewise, the place has influence and power over what is located [there] — whence the higher, nobler [things] locate the less noble, as is plain from this[^10], that water [locates] earth, air water, and so of the rest — but the corporeal does not have [the power] to influence the spiritual except according to the order of justice, as in a sinful soul or spirit: therefore the spirit does not have a place in a body except through fault.

5. Likewise, everything located has weight and inclination toward the place; but Augustine[^11] says: «What weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits»; but the inclination of angelic love is toward the spiritual good, not toward a corporeal place: therefore they do not have a place corporeally, but only spiritually.

### Conclusion

> The empyrean heaven locates the Angels as a containing place, but not as measuring or conserving.

**I respond:** It must be said that the empyrean heaven locates the Angels and is the place of the Angels, as the reasons for the first part prove.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that the place has a threefold comparison to what is located. For it is compared, first, in the character of *containing*, secondly in the character of *measuring*, and thirdly in the character of *conserving*. For it contains as a vessel, it measures as a quantity, but *conserves* as a nature[^12]. — According to this threefold relation, *finite, corporeal*, and *corruptible* substances are in a place: because finite and limited, they are in a containing place; because corporeal, in a measuring [one]; because corruptible, in a conserving place. According to the first two comparisons, finite and corporeal but incorruptible substances are in a place. According to the first only, finite, spiritual, and incorruptible substances, like the Angels, are in a place. And this I say [as to being] in a corporeal place; for the Angel has a spiritual conserving place, namely the power of God; a measuring or circumscribing place, the limitation or enclosure of its own substance and[^13] power; but a containing place, not only spiritual but also corporeal.

But the reason why the Angels are contained by a place or by something encompassing [them] is the ordering of the parts of the universe. For if they did not have something containing [them], their existence would not be ordered to one another[^14], nor would one have order to another; but this does not befit the universe nor the highest Maker. — But the reason why they are contained by a corporeal place is twofold: one, namely the limitation of the created spirit itself. For since the uncreated spirit, who is God, has in himself simplicity, through which he is within all things, and immensity,

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through which he contains all things and is outside all things[^15], he communicates those conditions to the creature in so far as it is born to receive [them]. Hence he communicates simplicity to the spirit; but the spirit could not receive the power of containment. For because its simplicity is finite, therefore it is here and now[^16]; and because it does not have part and part, therefore it is here and now according to [its] whole: and therefore it cannot have a universal capacity of things. But the body, because it is composite and has innumerable parts, could not participate simplicity, but on account of the extension of [its] parts it could receive capacity; therefore God made one most noble body, which was born to encompass all [things], and outside of which there would be nothing at all; and this is the empyrean; and therefore it is necessary that the Angel be within it. — Another reason is that distinction is in body alone. For, if it is granted freely, the other creatures have order in the world, [and] have distinction and position according to grades of perfections, and so that one is here and another there, one above and another below, and[^17] in body alone is there a potential distinction according to here and there: therefore among creatures to body alone had to be given the universal power of locating, with respect both to visible and invisible [things], so that thus the universe might be one [thing] ordered in all its parts.

And so the twofold reason is clear, why the power of locating a spirit was given to body, and [why] a spirit is contained by a body. For the order of the universe demanded this, both on account of the limitation of the created spirit, and because in body alone is distinction according to here and there.

The reasons showing that it belongs to the empyrean heaven to locate the Angels are therefore to be granted.

1. For what is objected to the contrary first, that the incorporeal is not in a place; it must be said that it is understood[^18] of being in a place as what is measured is in a measure.

2. To what is objected, that the place of the Angel and of the soul is God; it must be said that it is understood[^19] of a conserving place, not of a defining place. And again the reason does not compel: that if God is the place[^20], [it does not follow] that nothing created locates a spirit.

3. To what is objected, that there is a mutual need of the place to what is located; it must be said that this is true of those [things] which are located on account of a defect of themselves; but it is not true of those which are located for the sake of preserving the order of the universe. — Whence if it is asked whether a stone can be outside the heaven; it must be said no, both on account of its [own] need, because it would not have a conserving place, and because the order of the universe does not allow this. But concerning the Angel, that it does not leave the heaven, the reason is not the need of a corporeal place, but the universal containment of the ultimate body, according to which the universe is perfect and ordered.

4. 5. And to the other two[^21] reasons the response is clear, that[^22] they proceed [on the supposition] of being in a place as in a conserving [one], by reason of which an influence is posited in what locates, and an inclination also is posited in what is located; but this mode of being in a place does not befit the Angel.

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la: Ita plures codd. ut U W Y bb; alii multi omittunt hoc loco *simul*, quod tamen infra in titulo quaestionis ponunt.

en: So several codices, as U W Y bb; many others omit *simul* in this place, which however they put below in the title of the question.

la: Cfr. lit. Magistri, hic c. 4.

en: Cf. the text of the Master, here c. 4.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 6.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *caelum empyreum.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *caelum empyreum.*

la: De repugnantia actionis in distans cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Aliquanto inferius plures codd. *Ergo cum operetur* pro *Ergo cum operatur.* De relatione angelicae operationis ad locum cfr. Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 13, cuius verba infra pag. 79, nota 5. referuntur.

en: On the incompatibility of action at a distance cf. I *Sent.* d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — Somewhat below several codices [read] *Ergo cum operetur* for *Ergo cum operatur.* On the relation of angelic operation to place cf. Damascene, I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13, whose words are reported below p. 79, note 5.

la: Vers. 41; Vulgata: *Discedite a me maledicti* etc. *Ite* [est] secundum translationem Benedicti Ariae Montani. Vide August., Enarrat. 1. in Ps. 36. n. 11.

en: Verse 41; the Vulgate: *Depart from me, you cursed* etc. *Ite* ["Go"] is according to the translation of Benedictus Arias Montanus. See Augustine, *Enarration* 1 on Psalm 36, n. 11.

la: Circa initium, ubi propositionem per se notam seu communem animi conceptionem ita distinguit: *Nam ita una communis est, ut omnium hominum sit... alia vero est doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus venit, ut est: quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse.*

en: Near the beginning, where he distinguishes the self-evident proposition or common conception of the mind thus: *For one is common in such a way that it is of all men... but another is of the learned only, which nevertheless comes from such common conceptions of the mind, as is: that the things which are incorporeal are not in a place.*

la: Libr. IV. Moral. c. 33. n. 67: *Deus enim, qui sine situ omnia continet, nobis ad se venientibus locus non localis manet.* Cfr. etiam VIII. c. 19. n. 35, ubi dicit, quod Deus [sit] locus hominis. — Ioan. de Rupella, Summa de Anima, p. I. c. 52. citat August., de Quant. animae, ubi c. 1. n. 2. legitur: *Propriam quandam habitationem animae ac patriam Deum ipsum credo esse, a quo creata est.*

en: Book IV *Morals*, c. 33, n. 67: *For God, who without position contains all [things], remains for us, as we come to him, a place not local.* Cf. also VIII, c. 19, n. 35, where he says that God [is] the place of man. — John of La Rochelle, *Summa on the Soul*, p. I, c. 52, cites Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul*, where c. 1, n. 2 it is read: *I believe God himself, by whom it was created, to be a certain proper dwelling and homeland of the soul.*

la: Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi principia huius argumenti ac seqq. tanguntur, et in notis adiectis verba Aristotelis adducuntur. — Vat. *impleat* pro *suppleat.*

en: Cf. 1 *Sent.* d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where the principles of this argument and the following are touched on, and in the added notes the words of Aristotle are adduced. — The Vatican edition [reads] *impleat* for *suppleat.*

la: Melius cum codd. aa bb cc et ed. 1 omitteretur *ex hoc.* Paulo inferius cod. T *in animam peccatricem vel spiritum.*

en: It would be better, with codices aa bb cc and ed. 1, that *ex hoc* be omitted. A little below codex T [reads] *in animam peccatricem vel spiritum.*

la: Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 28: *Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur.* Cfr. XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10, quem textum invenies tom. 1. pag. 544, nota 3. — Circa finem argumenti plures codd. cum Vat. *non habent locari* pro *non habent locum.*

en: Book XI *On the City of God*, c. 28: *For a body is borne by weight, just as a mind by love, wherever it is borne.* Cf. XIII *Confessions* c. 9, n. 10, which text you will find in tom. 1, p. 544, note 3. — Near the end of the argument several codices with the Vatican edition [read] *non habent locari* for *non habent locum.*

la: Vat. sola, omissa particula *et*, mutat interpunctionem legendo *circumscribentem propriae substantiae, virtutis*; lectio falsa.

en: The Vatican edition alone, the particle *et* omitted, changes the punctuation, reading *circumscribentem propriae substantiae, virtutis*; a false reading.

la: Vat. cum paucis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4 prosequitur *quia ordinem non haberent in creatione, eo quod creata sunt simul, nec haberent ordinem unius ad alterum.*

en: The Vatican edition, with a few manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 4, continues *because they would not have order in [their] creation, by the fact that they were created together, nor would they have the order of one to another.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, et p. II. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and p. II, a. 1, q. 2, at the end.

la: Locus enim et tempus determinatum important per se quid limitatum, ideoque et inter notas individuantes obtinent primatum; cfr. tom. I. pag. 338, nota 1.

en: For a determinate place and time imply of themselves something limited, and therefore among the individuating marks they obtain the primacy; cf. tom. 1, p. 338, note 1.

la: Vat. *secundum hic et ibi.* Paulo inferius multi codd. *secundum gradus positionem*, cod. cc et ed. 1 *secundum gradus* pro *secundum gradus perfectionum.* Dein Vat. *et ita una* pro *et ita quod una.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *secundum hic et ibi.* A little below many codices [read] *secundum gradus positionem*, codex cc and ed. 1 *secundum gradus* for *secundum gradus perfectionum.* Then the Vatican edition [reads] *et ita una* for *et ita quod una.*

la: Supple cum Vat. *quia.*

en: Supply, with the Vatican edition, *quia.*

la: Vat. cum nonnullis mss. *intelligitur.*

en: The Vatican edition, with some manuscripts, [reads] *intelligitur.*

la: In Vat. suppletur *animae.*

en: In the Vatican edition *animae* is supplied.

la: Plures codd. ut F I T W aa bb *quia.*

en: Several codices, as F I T W aa bb, [read] *quia.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Iam 1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. tractatum est de motu Angelorum, ubi plura dicta sunt, quae servire possunt ad intelligendas quatuor hic propositas quaestiones de modo, quo Angeli sunt in loco. De proprietatibus loci cfr. ibid. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3, in specie de differentia inter *esse in loco, esse locatum, esse localem* (ibid. q. 1. ad 1.). Ibidem in corp. enumerantur quatuor leges loci, scil. *continendi, mensurandi, salvandi, terminandi*, hic autem tantum tres, omissa ultima, fortasse quia sub vocabulo *continendi* comprehenditur etiam vocabulum *terminandi*, minus aptum ad significandum modum, quo Angeli in loco definitive sunt praesentes. Manifestum autem est, a loco non posse nec mensurari nec conservari nisi substantiam corporalem. Mensuratur autem Angelus a limitatione propriae substantiae (S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 1. ad 3.) et altiori modo a Deo, qui est omnium mensura extra genus. Conservatur autem Angelus a solo Deo, cuius virtutem S. Bonav. (hic in corp.) vocat *locum spiritualem*, consentiente S. Thoma (1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 3.). Porro Angelus in stricto sensu etiam non continetur in loco, i. e. sicut mensuratum in mensura, sed continetur in eo «quodam modo», nempe definitive (1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.). S. Thom. (S. I. q. 52. a. 1.) vocabulum *continere* non admittere videtur, dicens: «Angelus dicitur esse in loco corporeo non ut contentum, sed ut continens aliquo modo». — Ceterum de ista qualicumque praesentia Angeli in loco non mediocriter illa aetate disputatum est, et quidem tum de facto, utrum sit revera praesens in loco, atque de necessitate, utrum indigeat loco, tum de ratione in genere, quare determinetur ad aliquem locum, tum de modo sive ratione formali huius praesentiae in loco.

**II.** Quoad quaestionem de facto exortae sunt duae opiniones extremae et in verbis quidem oppositae, sed fere in eodem errore sibi propinquae. Quidam enim inter philosophos Arabes dixerunt, quod substantiae separatae *nusquam* sunt secundum substantiam; quae propositio, si intelligitur, quod substantia non sit in loco, reprobata est ab Episc. Paris. a. 1276 (*Collect. iudicior.* p. 192. cap. 7. n. 27.), et a S. Thoma (1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 1.) nominatur *«haeretica, quia secundum fidem nostram ponimus, Angelos immediate circa nos operari»* (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 32. m. 2, et propositio a. 1240 damnata, quae 1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in Scholio est relata). E contrario Durandus (1. Sent. d. 37. q. 1.) Angelos esse ubique opinatur, sed «absque assertione; solummodo inquirendo et dando occasionem peritioribus ulterius inquirendi». Hanc autem ubiquitatem idem intelligit omnino diversam esse a divina, eamque ponit in eo, quod pro libitu possint ubique operari, in quo totam rationem praesentiae consistere putat. Media autem sententia, quod Angeli nec sint ubique nec nusquam, sed aliquo modo in loco, communissime sustinetur.

**III.** Altera quaestio, utrum Angelus indigeat ex se, quod ad aliquem corporalem locum definiatur, a S. Bonav. (hic ad 3. et clarius infra q. 4. in corp.) in sensu negativo solvitur. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. (loco cit.), S. Thom. (1. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. ad 4.) et Scotus (hic q. 6. n. 11.), qui dicit: «Quod Angelus non necessario est in loco, quia multo magis posset fieri Angelus sine creatione creaturae corporalis, vel facta creatura corporali, posset fieri et esse extra omnem creaturam corporalem. Et tamen in Angelo est potentia passiva, qua posset esse in loco. Et ista potentia vel fundatur immediate in eius substantia, qua posset esse in loco, vel in ipsa, in quantum est natura limitata, actualiter existens, vel in aliquo extrinseco ipsi Angelo, quidquid sit illud. Et ideo non oportet quaerere aliquam intrinsecam rationem essendi Angelum in loco necessario». Sed his suppositis, iterum duplex se offerebat quaestio: 1. quare et quomodo Angelus determinetur in genere, ut sit in aliquo loco et intra mundum; et 2. quid sit illud, per quod actualiter Angelus praesentiam habeat in hoc loco et non in alio. Primam quaestionem hic et infra q. 4. solvit S. Bonav. ita, ut causa finalis sit ordo universi servandus, et causa efficiens divina ordinatio, quae corporali naturae dedit quandam capacitatem continendi universalem, et Angelo quandam potentiam passivam, ut possit contineri in loco. Haec autem ordinatio divina habet rationem tum in limitatione substantiae angelicae, tum quia in solo corpore est et capacitas continendi et distinctio secundum hic et ibi. Eodem modo respondet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 32. m. 1.) et addit, quod illa proprietas in corporali natura, qua capax est continendi aliquo modo spiritus, «non sit corporalis, ex parte corporis proveniens, sed potius est divinitus data». Item, quod «spiritus angelicus habet ad minus ex parte sua, quod debeat definiri loco, et quod sit hic, ita quod non ibi». Tamen «posset esse, etsi non esset in loco corporali, quoniam ab hac ratione continendi [scil. passive] non dependet *esse* Angeli, sed solum ab hac ratione continendi, qua dicimus, quod Deus continet omnia». Idem autem de hac solutione ait: «Hoc dicimus sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae, quia hoc non invenimus plane determinatum in s. Scriptura nec a Sanctis nec ab expositoribus s. Scripturae». Etiam Scotus hanc doctrinam approbare videtur et (loc. cit. n. 15.) concludit: «Illud quo primo (Angelus) potest esse in loco, est a Deo producente ipsum super creaturam corporalem continentem; sed ex tunc potest reducere se ipsum ad actum istum (scil. ut sit actualiter in loco, et in hoc loco vel illo). — Posteriores scholastici, neglecta hac quaestione, potius disputant de sequenti.

**IV.** Quoad modum huius praesentiae, omnes doctores conveniunt, quod Angelus est in loco non circumscriptive, sed definitive, sive, ut ait Caietanus (in S. I. q. 52. a. 1.), conveniunt «in hoc, quod Angelus est in loco non per quantitatem molis nec per contactum quantitativum, sed per quantitatem et contactum virtualem. Et rursus in hoc etiam convenire omnes videntur, quod contactus ille sit relatio praesentiae Angeli ad locum causaliter, vel formaliter. Sed differentia opinionum et difficultas consistit in assignando, quod sit illius praesentiae fundamentum. Excedit enim evidentia eius humani ingenii capacitatem, propterea quod ex sacris eloquiis habemus, Angelos alicubi esse, et non apparet, quomodo tangant illum locum». — Durandus (loc. cit.) quatuor affert opiniones; sed duae prae aliis sunt celebres. S. Thom. in Summa (loc. cit.) docet, quod «per applicationem virtutis angelicae ad aliquem locum qualitercumque dicitur Angelus esse in loco». Quomodo autem hoc intelligendum sit, a discipulis Angelici non eodem modo exponitur (cfr. Caietan., loc. cit.). Contra sententiam S. Thomae late disputat Scot. (hic q. 6. et Report. q. 2.) et in re convenire videtur cum Richardo a Med. (1. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.) dicente: «Ratio applicationis Angeli ad locum est sua simultas cum loco vel cum re in loco existente... sicut formalis ratio applicationis corporis ad locum est circumscriptio». Ambo afferunt articulum ab Episc. Paris. reprobatum, qui est: «Substantiae separatae sunt alicubi per operationem», qui censuratur sic: «Error, si intelligatur, sine operatione substantiam non esse in loco» (*Collect. iudic.* t. 1. p. 192. cap. 7. n. 25, sed cfr. supra Scholion pag. 30). De hac et de altera propositione damnata (supra n. II.) loquuntur etiam Durand. (loc. cit.) et praecipue Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 2. q. 9.), cuius verba notatu digna sunt: «In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus, unanimiter concedentes, quod substantia Angeli non est ratio, Angelum esse in loco secundum substantiam; et consimili ratione verum est indubitanter, quod si Angelus per potentiam suam, scil. intellectum ac voluntatem, virtutem suam non applicat ad locum operando circa ipsum, quod similiter potentia eius... non est ratio eius essendi ipsum in loco, nisi forte potentia eius sit minoris abstractionis, quam sit eius substantia». Idem in fine asserit, nullam se sustinere nec defendere specialem opinionem de hac re. De hac ultima quaest. S. Bonav., sicut nec Alex. Hal., explicite non tractat. Verba autem eius, incidenter prolata, favent sententiae Richardi, Scoti et Petri a Tar., ut hic q. 3. ad 2, q. 4. in corp.; 1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.

**V.** Praeter locos iam citatos: S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 1; Quodl. 1. q. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., 1. Sent. d. 37. a. 26; S. p. I. tr. 18. q. 73. m. 2. a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 4. a. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Alii commentatores de hac et seqq. qq. plerumque agunt 1. Sent. d. 37.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Already in 1 *Sent.* d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, 2, 3, the motion of the Angels was treated, where many [things] were said which can serve for understanding the four questions here proposed concerning the mode in which the Angels are in a place. On the properties of place cf. ibid. a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3, in particular on the difference between *being in a place, being located, being local* (ibid. q. 1, ad 1). There in the body four laws of place are enumerated, namely *of containing, of measuring, of saving, of terminating*; here, however, only three, the last omitted, perhaps because under the word *of containing* is comprehended also the word *of terminating*, less apt for signifying the mode in which the Angels are definitively present in a place. But it is manifest that by a place neither can [anything] be measured nor conserved except a corporeal substance. The Angel, however, is measured by the limitation of its own substance (St. Thomas, S. I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 3) and in a higher mode by God, who is the measure of all [things] outside the genus. The Angel, moreover, is conserved by God alone, whose power St. Bonaventure (here in the body) calls a *spiritual place*, St. Thomas consenting (1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 3, a. 3). Further, the Angel in the strict sense is also not contained in a place, i.e. as what is measured in a measure, but is contained in it «in a certain mode», namely definitively (1 *Sent.* d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the body). St. Thomas (S. I, q. 52, a. 1) seems not to admit the word *to contain*, saying: «An Angel is said to be in a corporeal place not as contained, but as containing in some mode». — Moreover, about this presence of the Angel in a place, of whatever kind, there was no slight dispute in that age, and indeed both about the fact, whether it is really present in a place, and about the necessity, whether it needs a place, and about the reason in general, why it is determined to some place, and about the mode or formal character of this presence in a place.

**II.** As to the question of fact, there arose two extreme opinions, opposed indeed in words, but in nearly the same error close to one another. For some among the Arab philosophers said that separate substances are *nowhere* according to substance; which proposition, if it is understood [to mean] that the substance is not in a place, was reproved by the Bishop of Paris in the year 1276 (*Collection of Judgments* p. 192, cap. 7, n. 27), and by St. Thomas (1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 3, a. 1) is named *«heretical, because according to our faith we posit that the Angels operate immediately around us»* (cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 32, m. 2, and the proposition condemned in the year 1240, which is reported in 1 *Sent.* d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the Scholion). On the contrary, Durandus (1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 1) is of the opinion that the Angels are everywhere, but «without assertion; only by inquiring and giving occasion to the more skilled for inquiring further». This ubiquity, however, the same [author] understands to be wholly different from the divine, and posits it in this, that they can at pleasure operate everywhere, in which he thinks the whole character of presence consists. But the middle opinion, that the Angels are neither everywhere nor nowhere, but in a place in some mode, is most commonly maintained.

**III.** The other question, whether the Angel of itself needs to be defined to some corporeal place, is solved by St. Bonaventure (here ad 3 and more clearly below q. 4 in the body) in the negative sense. Alexander of Hales (loc. cit.), St. Thomas (1 *Sent.* d. 37, a. 1, ad 4), and Scotus (here q. 6, n. 11) consent, [the latter] saying: «That the Angel is not necessarily in a place, because much more could an Angel come to be without the creation of a corporeal creature, or, a corporeal creature having been made, [the Angel] could come to be and be outside every corporeal creature. And yet in the Angel there is a passive potency by which it could be in a place. And this potency is either founded immediately in its substance, by which it could be in a place, or in it in so far as it is a limited nature actually existing, or in something extrinsic to the Angel itself, whatever that be. And therefore there is no need to seek some intrinsic reason for the Angel's being necessarily in a place». But these [things] being supposed, again a twofold question offered itself: 1. why and how the Angel is determined in general, so that it is in some place and within the world; and 2. what that is, through which the Angel actually has presence in this place and not in another. The first question here and below q. 4 St. Bonaventure solves so that the final cause is the order of the universe to be preserved, and the efficient cause is the divine ordination, which gave to corporeal nature a certain universal capacity of containing, and to the Angel a certain passive potency, that it might be able to be contained in a place. But this divine ordination has its reason both in the limitation of the angelic substance, and because in body alone there is both a capacity of containing and a distinction according to here and there. In the same mode Alexander of Hales responds (S. p. II, q. 32, m. 1) and adds that that property in corporeal nature, by which it is capable of containing a spirit in some mode, «is not corporeal, coming from the part of the body, but rather is divinely given». Likewise, that «the angelic spirit has at least on its own part [the property] that it ought to be defined by a place, and that it is here, so that not there». Yet «it could be, even if it were not in a corporeal place, since on this reason of containing [namely passively] the *being* of the Angel does not depend, but only on this reason of containing by which we say that God contains all [things]». But the same [author] says of this solution: «We say this without prejudice to a better opinion, because we do not find this plainly determined in sacred Scripture nor by the Saints nor by the expositors of sacred Scripture». Scotus too seems to approve this doctrine and (loc. cit. n. 15) concludes: «That by which first (the Angel) can be in a place is from God producing it over the containing corporeal creature; but from then it can reduce itself to that act (namely that it be actually in a place, and in this place or that)». — The later scholastics, this question being neglected, rather dispute about the following [one].

**IV.** As to the mode of this presence, all the doctors agree that the Angel is in a place not circumscriptively but definitively, or, as Cajetan says (on S. I, q. 52, a. 1), they agree «in this, that the Angel is in a place not by quantity of mass nor by quantitative contact, but by virtual quantity and contact. And again in this also all seem to agree, that that contact is the relation of the Angel's presence to the place causally or formally. But the difference of opinions and the difficulty consists in assigning what is the foundation of that presence. For its evidence exceeds the capacity of human ingenuity, because from the sacred discourses we have [it] that the Angels are somewhere, and it does not appear how they touch that place». — Durandus (loc. cit.) brings forward four opinions; but two beyond the others are famous. St. Thomas in the Summa (loc. cit.) teaches that «by the application of angelic power to some place in whatever manner the Angel is said to be in a place». But how this is to be understood is not expounded in the same mode by the disciples of the Angelic [Doctor] (cf. Cajetan, loc. cit.). Against the opinion of St. Thomas Scotus disputes at length (here q. 6 and *Reportatio* q. 2) and in substance seems to agree with Richard of Middleton (1 *Sent.* d. 37, a. 2, q. 1) who says: «The reason of the application of the Angel to a place is its simultaneity with the place or with the thing existing in the place... just as the formal reason of the application of a body to a place is circumscription». Both bring forward the article reproved by the Bishop of Paris, which is: «Separate substances are somewhere through operation», which is censured thus: «An error, if it is understood [that] without operation the substance is not in a place» (*Collection of Judgments* t. 1, p. 192, cap. 7, n. 25, but cf. above the Scholion p. 30). On this and on the other condemned proposition (above n. II) speak also Durandus (loc. cit.) and especially Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 2, q. 9), whose words are worthy of note: «For in this all the masters of theology gathered upon this [matter], of whom I was one, agreed, unanimously conceding that the substance of the Angel is not the reason of the Angel's being in a place according to substance; and by a like reason it is undoubtedly true that, if the Angel by its potency, namely intellect and will, does not apply its power to a place by operating around it, that likewise its potency... is not the reason of its being in the place, unless perhaps its potency be of less abstraction than its substance is». The same [author] at the end asserts that he sustains nor defends no special opinion on this matter. On this last question St. Bonaventure, like Alexander of Hales, does not explicitly treat. But his words, incidentally uttered, favor the opinion of Richard, Scotus, and Peter of Tarentaise, as here q. 3 ad 2, q. 4 in the body; 1 *Sent.* d. 37, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1.

**V.** Besides the places already cited: St. Thomas, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 3, a. 1; Quodl. 1, q. 1, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, a. 26; S. p. I, tr. 18, q. 73, m. 2, a. 13. — Peter of Tarentaise, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 4, a. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. 2. — Other commentators on this and the following questions for the most part treat [them in] 1 *Sent.* d. 37.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Angelus simul et semel sit in pluribus locis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum unus Angelus simul et semel sit in pluribus locis, an tantum in uno. Et quod in pluribus locis, videtur:

1. Primo per Augustinum, qui dicit, «quod Angelus ibi est, ubi vult», in libro de Civitate Dei[^1]; sed existens in caelo, vult esse in terra: ergo existens in caelo, est in terra: ergo simul est in pluribus locis.

2. Item, Damascenus[^2] dicit, «quod ibi est, ubi operatur»; sed Angelus vel est vel potest esse motor caeli, et motor operatur super totum mobile: ergo unus Angelus in utraque parte circumferentiae

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caeli potest esse simul et semel. Ergo si magis distat una pars circumferentiae ab alia quam caelum a terra, patet etc.

3. Item, quanto aliquid simplicius est, tanto in pluribus reperitur[^3]. Et ratio huius est, quia tanto magis recedit a coarctatione et magis appropinquat ad divinum esse, quod ubique est. Ergo si Angelus inter creaturas maxime ad Deum appropinquat, videtur, quod simul et semel in pluribus locis esse possit, sicut universale propter suam simplicitatem est ubique et semper.

4. Item, spiritus glorificatus non habet cogitationes volubiles, immo potest per donum gloriae simul multa cogitare[^4]; sed intellectus per naturam in unico instanti non aspicit nisi ad unicum intelligibile, et per gloriam simul videt multa: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod Angelus glorificatus simul possit esse in diversis locis.

5. Item, corpus nunquam potest elevari, nec per gloriam, nec per unionem, ut sit excelsius[^5] spiritu glorioso; sed corpus Christi per gratiam unionis potest esse in locis diversis: ergo pari ratione, ut videtur, et Angelus gloriosus.

**Contra:**

1. Ambrosius in libro de Spiritu sancto[^6]: «Omnis creatura certis suae naturae est circumscripta limitibus»; sed quod potest esse unum et idem totum et secundum actum ita in hoc loco, quod etiam in alio, non est circumscriptum: ergo vel Angelus non est creatura, vel, si sit, in pluribus locis simul esse non potest.

2. Item, Damascenus in libro primo[^7]: «Angelus dicitur esse in loco, quia adest intelligibiliter et circumscribitur, ubi et operatur, non enim potest secundum idem in diversis locis operari»: ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, si Angelus simul esset in diversis locis, non indigeret mitti nec moveri; sed moventur Angeli, sicut patet per Scripturam veteris et novi Testamenti[^8]: ergo etc.

4. Item, si Angelus simul et semel esse posset in diversis locis, simul et semel posset in uno loco tacere et in alio loco loqui, in uno moveri et in alio quiescere: ergo duo opposita simul et semel essent vera de eodem.

### Conclusio

> Angelus simul et semel est tantum in uno loco.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum Angelus habeat esse individuatum, habet esse hic et nunc[^9]; quia vero habet esse limitatum et virtutem limitatam, habet esse in uno *hic* sive in uno loco tantum. Quoniam ergo tam individuatio quam limitatio naturaliter et inseparabiliter inest Angelo, hinc est, quod Angelum simul et semel oportet esse tantum in uno loco; et hoc dicunt auctoritates, et rationes probant. — Et ideo concedendae sunt pro eo, quod verum concludunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo, quod ibi est, ubi vult; dicendum, quod illud non est dictum per concomitantiam simultatis, quod in eodem instanti, in quo est velle esse in quocumque loco, sit esse; sed ideo dictum est, quia esse in loco volito sequitur velle sine mora temporis magna, propter velocitatem angelicam, ut Damascenus[^10] dicit. Sequitur etiam esse in loco tali vel tali velle Angeli ad nutum, quia Angelus non vult, nisi quod competit naturae suae. Unde non vult ibi esse in instanti, sed in eo tempore, in quo scit se posse pervenire. Eodem modo intelligendum est verbum praedictum de corpore glorioso.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ibi est, ubi operatur; dicendum, quod operari alicubi est dupliciter: vel mediate, vel immediate; immediate, ut puta anima operatur in manu; sed mediante manu anima[^11] nautae operatur in tota navi, quia movendo manum movet temonem, et movendo temonem totam navem movet; nec tamen oportet, quod sit in tota navi, sed ubi operatur primo. — Per hunc modum

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intelligendum est in proposito, quod, etsi Angelus esset motor caeli vel movens, primo moveret unam partem, sicut illam, super quam esset influentia motoris, et in illa esset, non in tota re mobili vel mota. Sic etiam intelligendum est de Angelis, qui subverterunt Sodomam[^13].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate, dicendum, quod esse simplex est dupliciter: aut per privationem partium componentium in esse naturae[^12], aut per privationem partium constituentium in esse definito[^14] sive in genere. Quando ergo dicitur, quod quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto in pluribus; hoc dicitur de simplicitate secundo modo, quam scilicet habet genus respectu speciei, et ideo in pluribus reperitur quam species. Cum autem dicimus Angelum simplicem, hoc est secundum aliud genus simplicitatis; ideo nihil ad propositum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de pluralitate cognoscibilium, quae intelligit simul et semel; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ratione: quia vis cognitiva magis efficitur deiformis per gloriam, quam vis motiva motu exteriori. Praeterea, aliud est, quia Deus et exemplar[^15] divinum in glorificatis est ratio cognoscendi secundum rem et essentiam; ideo intellectus glorificatus multa cognoscit, ita quod non dispergitur, sed circa unum colligitur. Sed Angelum esse in pluribus locis, hoc non potest esse per collectionem virtutis ad unum locum, sicut intellectus ad unum primum cognoscibile; et ideo non est simile.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de corpore Christi, dicendum, quod non est locus *a minori*, nec *a simili*, quia corpus Christi in pluribus locis est, quia multa convertuntur in ipsum. — *Et si quaeras*, quare magis congruit aliqua in ipsum converti quam in aliud corpus; ratio huius est, quia est cibus, in quo uniuntur et reficiuntur omnia membra Christi. — *Et si quaeras*, quare cibus est huiusmodi? eadem quaestio est de carbone, quare calefacit? Propter coniunctionem cum igne. Sic caro Christi repleta est delectatione, ut carbo ignitus igne, et hoc tactum est diffusius in primo libro et in quarto[^16].

english:
### Question II. *Whether an Angel is at once and at the same time in several places.*

Secondly it is asked whether one Angel is at once and at the same time in several places, or only in one. And that [it is] in several places, it seems:

1. First, through Augustine, who says «that an Angel is there where it wills», in the book *On the City of God*[^1]; but, existing in heaven, it wills to be on earth: therefore, existing in heaven, it is on earth: therefore it is at once in several places.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^2] says «that it is there where it operates»; but the Angel either is or can be the mover of the heaven, and the mover operates over the whole movable: therefore one Angel in either part of the circumference

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of the heaven can be at once and at the same time. Therefore if one part of the circumference is more distant from another than the heaven [is] from the earth, it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more it is found in several [things][^3]. And the reason for this is that the more it recedes from constriction and the more it approaches the divine being, which is everywhere. Therefore if the Angel among creatures most of all approaches God, it seems that it can be at once and at the same time in several places, just as the universal, on account of its simplicity, is everywhere and always.

4. Likewise, the glorified spirit does not have volatile thoughts; indeed it can by the gift of glory think many [things] at once[^4]; but the intellect by nature in one instant looks only to one intelligible, and by glory sees many at once: therefore by parity of reason it seems that the glorified Angel can at once be in diverse places.

5. Likewise, a body can never be elevated, neither by glory nor by union, so as to be higher[^5] than a glorious spirit; but the body of Christ by the grace of union can be in diverse places: therefore by parity of reason, as it seems, also the glorious Angel.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ambrose, in the book *On the Holy Spirit*[^6]: «Every creature is circumscribed by the fixed limits of its nature»; but what can be one and the same whole and according to act so in this place that [it is] also in another, is not circumscribed: therefore either the Angel is not a creature, or, if it is, it cannot be in several places at once.

2. Likewise, Damascene in the first book[^7]: «An Angel is said to be in a place because it is present intelligibly and is circumscribed where it also operates, for it cannot according to the same [thing] operate in diverse places»: therefore the same [conclusion] as before.

3. Likewise, if an Angel were at once in diverse places, it would not need to be sent nor to be moved; but the Angels are moved, as is plain through the Scripture of the Old and New Testament[^8]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if an Angel could be at once and at the same time in diverse places, it could at once and at the same time be silent in one place and speak in another, be moved in one and at rest in another: therefore two opposites would at once and at the same time be true of the same [thing].

### Conclusion

> An Angel is at once and at the same time only in one place.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the Angel has an individuated being, it has being here and now[^9]; but because it has a limited being and a limited power, it has being in one *here* or in only one place. Since therefore both individuation and limitation are naturally and inseparably in the Angel, hence it is that the Angel at once and at the same time must be only in one place; and this the authorities say, and the reasons prove [it]. — And therefore they are to be granted for that which they truly conclude.

1. To what is objected first, that it is there where it wills; it must be said that this is not said by a concomitance of simultaneity, [as] that in the same instant in which there is the willing to be in any place, there is the being [there]; but it is said for this reason, that being in the willed place follows the willing without great delay of time, on account of the angelic velocity, as Damascene[^10] says. It follows also that being in such or such a place [follows] the Angel's will at [its] nod, because the Angel does not will except what befits its nature. Hence it does not will to be there in an instant, but in that time in which it knows it can arrive. In the same mode the aforesaid saying is to be understood of the glorious body.

2. To what is objected, that it is there where it operates; it must be said that to operate somewhere is twofold: either mediately or immediately; immediately, as for instance the soul operates in the hand; but by means of the hand the soul[^11] of the sailor operates in the whole ship, because by moving the hand it moves the rudder, and by moving the rudder it moves the whole ship; nor however is it necessary that it be in the whole ship, but where it operates first. — In this mode

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it must be understood in the matter at hand, that, even if the Angel were the mover of the heaven or [its] moving [cause], it would first move one part, like that over which the influence of the mover would be, and would be in it, not in the whole movable or moved thing. So also it must be understood of the Angels who overthrew Sodom[^13].

3. To what is objected concerning simplicity, it must be said that to be simple is twofold: either by the privation of parts composing in the being of nature[^12], or by the privation of parts constituting in defined being[^14] or in a genus. When therefore it is said that the simpler something [is], the more [it is] in several; this is said of simplicity in the second mode, namely which a genus has with respect to a species, and therefore it is found in more [things] than a species. But when we call the Angel simple, this is according to another genus of simplicity; therefore [it is] nothing to the purpose.

4. To what is objected concerning the plurality of knowables, which it understands at once and at the same time; it must be said that it is not similar, for a twofold reason: because the cognitive power is made more deiform by glory than the motive power [is] by exterior motion. Moreover, [there is] another [reason], because God and the divine exemplar[^15] in the glorified is the reason of knowing according to thing and essence; therefore the glorified intellect knows many [things], so that it is not dispersed, but is gathered around one. But that the Angel be in several places, this cannot be through a gathering of power to one place, as the intellect [is gathered] to one first knowable; and therefore it is not similar.

5. To what is objected concerning the body of Christ, it must be said that it is not an argument *from the lesser* nor *from the like*, because the body of Christ is in several places [for the reason] that many [things] are converted into it. — *And if you ask* why it is more fitting that some [things] be converted into it than into another body; the reason for this is that it is food, in which all the members of Christ are united and refreshed. — *And if you ask* why the food is of this kind? [it is] the same question as concerning a coal, why it heats? On account of [its] conjunction with fire. So the flesh of Christ is filled with delight, like a coal ignited by fire, and this has been touched on more diffusely in the first book and in the fourth[^16].

la: Collectum videtur ex libro XXII. c. 30. n. 1, ubi de aeterna felicitate hominum loquens ait: *Certe ubi volet spiritus, ibi protinus erit corpus.* — Paulo inferius post *terra* cod. Q adiungit *simul.*

en: It seems collected from book XXII, c. 30, n. 1, where, speaking of the eternal felicity of men, he says: *Surely where the spirit wills, there at once will the body be.* — A little below, after *terra*, codex Q adds *simul.*

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 13. Textum vide infra pag. 79, nota 5.

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13. See the text below p. 79, note 5.

la: Cfr. Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.), de quo vide tom. 1. pag. 638, nota 1. — De *simili*, quod in ultima prop. argumenti profertur, vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.), quod iam in tom. 1. pag. 642, nota 4. allegatum est.

en: Cf. Aristotle, XI *Metaphysics* c. 1 (X, c. 1), on which see tom. 1, p. 638, note 1. — On the *like* which is brought forward in the last proposition of the argument, see Aristotle, I *Posterior [Analytics]* c. 24 (c. 31), which has already been alleged in tom. 1, p. 642, note 4.

la: August., XV. de Trin. c. 16. n. 26: «Fortassis etiam volubiles non erunt nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus». In *minori* alluditur ad verba Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.): *Contingit enim plura scire, intelligere autem non.*

en: Augustine, XV *On the Trinity*, c. 16, n. 26: «Perhaps our thoughts will also not be volatile, going from some [things] to others and returning, but we shall see all our knowledge in one simultaneous view». In the *minor* allusion is made to the words of Aristotle, II *Topics* c. 4 (c. 10): *For it happens that [one] knows many [things], but does not understand [them].*

la: Plures codd. ut F U aa bb *excellentius.* Mox codd. K T U Y aa cc et ed. 1 *propter gratiam* pro *per gratiam.*

en: Several codices, as F U aa bb, [read] *excellentius.* Then codices K T U Y aa cc and ed. 1 [read] *propter gratiam* for *per gratiam.*

la: Libr. I. c. 7. n. 81. — In *minori* cod. cc et ed. 1 *secundum totum* pro *secundum actum.*

en: Book I, c. 7, n. 81. — In the *minor* codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *secundum totum* for *secundum actum.*

la: aa Fide orthod. c. 13: *Angelus autem, etsi non ad modum corporis ita in loco continetur, ut formam et figuram recipiat, in loco tamen esse dicitur, quia spirituali modo* [νοητῶς] *adest et agit, prout naturae suae consentaneum est; nec alibi est, sed ibi intelligibili modo* [νοητῶς] *circumscribitur, ubi et operatur. Neque enim in diversis locis eodem tempore operari potest. Dei namque solius est ubique simul operari. Nam Angelus quidem ob naturae pernicitatem, ac quia prompte ac celeriter pertransit, in diversis locis operatur* etc. — Cfr. etiam II. c. 3.

en: [II *On the*] *Orthodox Faith*, c. 13: *But the Angel, although it is not contained in a place in the manner of a body, so as to receive form and figure, is nevertheless said to be in a place, because in a spiritual mode* [νοητῶς, "intelligibly"] *it is present and acts, as is consonant with its nature; nor is it elsewhere, but is there circumscribed in an intelligible mode* [νοητῶς] *where it also operates. For it cannot operate in diverse places at the same time. For it belongs to God alone to operate everywhere at once. For the Angel indeed, on account of the swiftness of [its] nature, and because it passes promptly and quickly, operates in diverse places* etc. — Cf. also II, c. 3.

en: Isaiah 6:6; Daniel 10:12 and 20; Luke 1:19.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 77, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 77, note 2.

la: Vide hic nota 5. et II. de Fide orthod. c. 3, ubi dicit, quod Angelus confestim invenitur ubi divinus iusserit nutus, velocitate naturae.

en: See here note 5, and II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3, where he says that the Angel is found at once where the divine nod has commanded, by the velocity of [its] nature.

la: Plures codd. ut C R S bb *sed mediate anima.*

en: Several codices, as C R S bb, [read] *sed mediate anima.*

la: Cod. F *primam*; cod. aa *aliquam*; multi codd. ... *illam*, contra codd. K L cc et ed. 1, in quibus exhibetur nostra lectio.

en: Codex F [reads] *primam*; codex aa *aliquam*; many codices ... *illam*, against codices K L cc and ed. 1, in which our reading is exhibited.

en: Genesis 19:13.

la: Plures codd. ut F K T bb cc et ed. 1 *definitivo.*

en: Several codices, as F K T bb cc and ed. 1, [read] *definitivo.*

la: Vat. *quia idem exemplar.* Paulo inferius post *ideo* ed. 1 prosequitur *cum intellectus glorificatus multa cognoscit, cognoscit ita quod* etc., quae lectio probatur mutila lectione ceterorum codd., qui exhibent quidem particulam *cum*, sed [non] repetunt verbum *cognoscit.* Dein nonnulli codd. ut A K *se dispartitur* pro *dispergitur.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *quia idem exemplar.* A little below, after *ideo*, ed. 1 continues *cum intellectus glorificatus multa cognoscit, cognoscit ita quod* etc., which reading is proved [defective] by the mutilated reading of the other codices, which exhibit indeed the particle *cum*, but do not repeat the verb *cognoscit.* Then some codices, as A K, [read] *se dispartitur* for *dispergitur.*

la: Libr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 10. p. I. q. 1, ubi exemplum de carbone ignito adscribitur Damasceno, qui IV. de Fide orthod. c. 13. ait: *Carbonem* vide Isaias (6, 2.); *carbo non est simplex lignum, sed igni unitum* [ἠνωμένον πυρί]; *sic quoque panis communionis non simplex est panis, sed divinitati unitus.* — Cod. L transponit *diffusius* post *in primo libro et.*

en: Book I *Sent.* d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and IV *Sent.* d. 10, p. I, q. 1, where the example of the ignited coal is ascribed to Damascene, who IV *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13, says: *the Coal* — see Isaiah (6:2); *the coal is not simple wood, but [wood] united to fire* [ἠνωμένον πυρί, "united to fire"]; *so also the bread of communion is not simple bread, but [bread] united to divinity.* — Codex L transposes *diffusius* after *in primo libro et.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Responsio negativa auctoris, quae communiter approbatur, intelligenda est de locis virtuti Angeli adaequatis, et de potentia naturali. De locis vero inadaequatis, qui intra sphaeram activitatis huius Angeli sunt, contrarium tenetur. Si autem respicitur ad potentiam Dei absolutam, Scotus (hic q. 7. et IV. Sent. d. 10. q. 2.) certissimum esse censet, virtute divina Angelum etiam in adaequatis locis pluribus esse posse; de quo alii dubitant.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 32. m. 3. — S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 32. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 18. q. 73. m. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., 1. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The negative response of the author, which is commonly approved, is to be understood of places adequate to the power of the Angel, and of natural potency. But of inadequate places, which are within the sphere of activity of this Angel, the contrary is held. But if regard is had to the absolute power of God, Scotus (here q. 7, and IV *Sent.* d. 10, q. 2) reckons it most certain that by the divine power the Angel can be even in several adequate places; about which others doubt.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 32, m. 3. — St. Thomas, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 3, a. 2; S. I, q. 32, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 18, q. 73, m. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, a. 2, q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 78-80 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {78,79,80}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 6126–6244), per the Vol II override. Read L then R per page, body then footer; R-col footer left edges recovered from the full-width cascade IA OCR.

**Page span / structure.** QUAESTIO II spans printed pp. **78–80**: opens on p.78 (beneath a2-q1's Scholion tail) with 5 *videtur* + 4 *Contra* arguments; a *Conclusio* (an Angel is at once only in one place) + a Respondeo (individuated + limited being → one place) with 5 numbered *Solutio* replies; **Scholion I–II** (I = the negative-answer note re adequate/inadequate places + Scotus on God's absolute power; II = bibliographic). The Scholion carries no numbered apparatus (references inline). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Ad oppositum`, `Fundamenta`, `Conclusio`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Duplex simplicitas`, `Ratio 1/2`, `Quaestio incidens 1/2`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Renumbered continuously 1–16:
- **p. 78** footer: notes 1–2 → `[^1]`–`[^2]` (q2's; the a2-q1→q2 boundary is clean — see below).
- **p. 79** footer: L col notes 1–5 + R col notes 6–9 → `[^3]`–`[^11]` (9 notes).
- **p. 80** footer: **notes 1–5 only** → `[^12]`–`[^16]` (the outgoing split — see below).

**Cross-chunk footer boundaries.**
- *Incoming (a2-q1 → a2-q2): CLEAN, no split.* Committed `d2-p2-a2-q1` owns p.75 (n.4–8) + p.76 (n.1–9) + p.77 (n.1–8); its Scholion I–V topped p.78 with no apparatus, so **p.78's footer (notes 1–2) is q2's**. No backfill.
- *Outgoing (a2-q2 → a2-q3): SPLIT at p.80.* q2's replies + Scholion I–II occupy the upper/middle of p.80; `QUAESTIO III` of the next chunk begins lower on p.80. p.80's footer splits by body anchor: **notes 1–5 → this chunk** (`[^12]`–`[^16]`, anchored in q2 replies 3/4/5); **notes 6–9 → `d2-p2-a2-q3`** (n.6 `Libr. 1. de Fide orthod. c. 13. … in loco vel partibili vel pro in loco impartibili sive`; n.7 `Aristot., 1. de Anima, text. 70…`; n.8 `Cod. aa locus ille`; n.9 `Libr. de Causis, prop. 10. et 20. seq.…`). When `d2-p2-a2-q3` is built, **start its apparatus at p.80 footer note 6**, by body anchor; **no backfill to this chunk.**

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the 450 dpi crops were clean. The p.80 footer notes 1–5 (`[^12]`–`[^16]`) anchor in the two-column-cascade Solutio replies 3/4/5; their per-clause marker positions are content-matched to the printed footer (note 1 → reply 3's *esse naturae* var.; n.2 → reply 4 *Sodomam* [Gen 19]; n.3 → reply 3 *in esse definito*; n.4 → reply 4 *exemplar*; n.5 → reply 5 *in primo libro et in quarto*) and may be off by a few words where the L/R linearization is ambiguous — secure on content, parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum Angelus sit in loco impartibili sive punctali.*

Tertio quaeritur de modo essendi Angelum in loco. Et quaeritur, utrum sit in loco impartibili sive punctali. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus[^1] dicit, «quod Angelus est in loco, non figuraliter, sed intelligibiliter»: cum ergo nihil ipsius loci sit infigurabile et intelligibile nisi punctus, est in puncto.

2. Item, proportio debet esse locati ad locum; sed Angelus est simplex et impartibilis: ergo ei debetur locus simplex et impartibilis[^2]. Sed hic est solus punctus loci: ergo etc.

3. Item, ponamus, Angelum esse in loco, in quo minori non potest esse, quaero: aut ille locus est partibilis, aut impartibilis. Si partibilis: ergo cum Angelus sit simplex, ergo adhuc potest esse in minori. Quod si non potest esse in minori, videtur, quod ille[^3] sit impartibilis; sed nihil est impartibile in loco nisi punctus: ergo etc.

4. Item, «quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur ibi per modum recipientis, non[^4] per modum recepti»: si ergo Angelus est in loco partibili, est partibiliter. Sed impossibile est, Angelum recipere partitionem: ergo etc.

5. Item, si Angelus est in loco partibili tan-

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quam in loco primo, aut ergo est totus in qualibet parte, aut est ita in toto, quod pars est in parte. Si totus est in toto, ita quod pars in parte, ergo est partibilis; si ita quod in qualibet parte totus, cum ergo partes loci sint multae, erit[^5] in pluribus locis. Si tu dicas, quod est in omnibus illis tanquam in loco uno, sicut anima est in omnibus partibus corporis; *contra*: esto quod corpus illud dividatur et locus, in quo est Angelus[^6]; constat, quod nihilominus potest esse in omnibus partibus, cum non pendeat in aliqua parte principaliter. Et si hoc, cum sit ibi locorum multitudo, erit Angelus in pluribus locis.

**Contra:**

1. Punctus nec est locus, nec pars loci[^7]: ergo quod est in puncto vel in loco punctali non est in loco.

2. Item, «punctus, ut dicit Philosophus[^8], est substantia posita», id est essentia habens positionem, in quo differt ab unitate: ergo si Angelus est in puncto secundum proportionem puncto convenientem, ergo Angelus habet positionem. Sed forma, habens positionem in materia, non est motor sufficiens eius in quo est: ergo etc.

3. Item, si Angelus est in puncto, primo ergo influit virtutem supra punctum: ergo cum punctus sit improportionalis corpori, impossibile est, quod virtus eius se extendat ad corpus; et ita nunquam movebit corpus.

4. Item, anima est in toto corpore; sed hoc non facit unio, quia ex hoc ipso habet dependentiam, et ita arctationem: ergo hoc est ratione simplicitatis[^9]. Cum ergo Angelus sit aeque simplex, vel magis quam anima, videtur, quod multo fortius in maiori loco vel aequali totus possit esse.

### Conclusio

> Angelus definitive est in loco divisibili, ita tamen, ut non sit locus ita parvus, quin Angelus adhuc possit esse in minori.

**Respondeo:** Triplex fuit circa hoc positio.

Fuerunt enim quidam dicentes, quod Angelus, quamvis sit in loco corporali, non tamen est in eo corporaliter, sed spiritualiter. Quoniam vero non est in loco situaliter, ideo nec secundum totum, nec secundum partem, nec secundum impartibile, quia nulla omnino est commensuratio Angeli ad locum. — Sed ista positio non intelligibilis esse videtur, quomodo scilicet aliquid possit esse in aliquo et definiri et contineri, nec tamen primo[^10] immediate sit in toto, vel in parte, vel in impartibili. Omne enim quod est in aliquo toto, vel est ratione totius, vel ratione alicuius partis.

Et ideo fuit circa hoc secunda positio, scilicet quod Angelus est in loco impartibili sive punctali. Et ratio eorum erat ista, quia Angelus non habet materiam omnino differentem a corporalium materia nisi[^11] secundum esse, scilicet quia non est extensa. Unde cum materia sit simplex ut punctus de se, dicunt, Angelum habere simplicitatem proportionalem puncto, et ita est in loco punctali. — Sed haec positio falsa est et non intelligibilis. Quidquid enim sit de materia, sicut infra[^12] dicetur, hoc tamen est verum, quod omnis locus corporeus est partibilis: ergo sicut est oppositio in adiecto, dicere corpus impartibile sive punctale, ita et dicere locum punctalem. Et iterum, cum punctus non sit locus, ponere Angelum in puncto est ponere, ipsum non esse in loco.

Et ideo est tertia positio, quod Angelus, cum contineatur a loco corporali, quod est in loco partibili, tanquam in loco primo; et quoniam non potest extendi in eo, ideo necesse est, quod sit in toto, ita quod totus in toto, et totus in qualibet parte. Et in hoc est similis quodammodo simplicitas Angeli simplicitati divinae: sed deficit, quia Angelus in uno loco sic est[^13], Deus autem ubique. Ex hoc dicit Ioannes Damascenus, quod Angelus est in loco corporali, sed intelligibiliter, non figuraliter[^14], quia hoc solum capit intellectus, quomodo videlicet substantia tota sit in partibus et tota in toto.

1. Et ita patet responsio ad verbum Damasceni.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod debet esse proportio; dicendum, quod non oportet, quod sit proportio secundum speciales conditiones et proprias[^15] Angeli vel loci, quia Angelus non ponitur esse in loco pro-

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prie; est tamen ibi proportio quoad finitatem et limitationem, per quae duo Angelus definitur et est in loco; sicut enim Angelus habet substantiam et virtutem finitam, sic locus eius arctatus est et limitatus.

3. Quod quaeritur de hoc: si ponatur Angelus in loco, in quo minori non possit esse; dicendum, quod in hoc differt existentia Angeli in corpore et animae, quod anima, quia est perfectio corporis nati vivificari vita rationali[^16], et illud est in determinata quantitate, ideo potest esse in corpore ita parvo, quod non in minori, quia minus non esset organizabile et vivificabile; Angelus autem, quia non est ut perfectio et simplex est, est in qualibet parte loci totus, quantumcumque parva est — quia ratio loci salvatur in qualibet[^17] — non potest accipi locus ita parvus, quin adhuc possit esse in minori — et ideo non est dare locum, in quo minori non possit esse; est tamen dare, in quo maiori non potest, sicut et anima, quia hoc venit ex limitatione. Sicut ergo in corporibus status est in ascendendo, sed in dividendo nunquam est ponere statum, nec unquam devenitur ad impartibile: sic intelligendum est circa existentiam Angeli in loco.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod est per modum recipientis etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi receptum dependet a recipiente, sicut species recipitur in organo, recipitur et in intellectu, et existentia eius pendet ex eo in quo recipitur, et se habet ad illud per modum informantis; hinc est, quod recipit modum suae existentiae ab eo in quo recipitur. Non sic Angelus recipitur a loco, quia non pendet ex illo.

5. Quod obiicitur: si totus est in qualibet parte loci, cum sint plura loca etc.; dicendum, quod totus est in qualibet parte, nec tamen in pluribus locis, sicut nec anima, dum vivificat totum corpus, non vivificat diversa corpora, sed unum.

Quod autem obiicitur: esto quod corpus illud sive locus, in quo est Angelus, dividatur; dico, quod si divideretur in mille partes, dum tamen partes non sequestrarentur longe ab invicem, totus esset in omnibus, et omnes essent ei unus locus, quia nullam habent rationem ambiendi vel definiendi Angelum, sed illud quod complectitur omnes partes. Locus[^18] enim non numeratur secundum numerum corporum locantium, sed in comparatione ad locatum[^19]; sicut patet, quia unum corpus potest esse partim in aere, partim in aqua, partim in terra, nec tamen in tribus locis, sed in uno est.

english:
### Question III. *Whether an Angel is in an impartible or punctual place.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the mode of the Angel's being in a place. And it is asked whether it is in an impartible or punctual place. And that [it is] so, it seems.

1. Damascene[^1] says «that an Angel is in a place not figurally but intelligibly»: since therefore nothing of the place itself is unfigurable and intelligible except the point, it is in a point.

2. Likewise, there ought to be a proportion of what is located to the place; but the Angel is simple and impartible: therefore to it is owed a simple and impartible place[^2]. But this is the point of place alone: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, let us suppose the Angel to be in a place than which it cannot be in a lesser; I ask: either that place is partible or impartible. If partible: therefore since the Angel is simple, it can therefore still be in a lesser [one]. But if it cannot be in a lesser [one], it seems that that [place][^3] is impartible; but nothing is impartible in place except the point: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, «what is received in something is received there in the mode of the receiver, not[^4] in the mode of what is received»: if therefore the Angel is in a partible place, it is [there] partibly. But it is impossible that the Angel receive partition: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if the Angel is in a partible place as

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in a primary place, then either it is whole in any part, or it is so in the whole that part is in part. If it is whole in the whole, so that part [is] in part, then it is partible; if so that it is whole in any part, then, since the parts of the place are many, it will be[^5] in several places. If you say that it is in all of them as in one place, just as the soul is in all the parts of the body; *on the contrary*: suppose that that body be divided, and the place in which the Angel is[^6]; it is established that it can nonetheless be in all the parts, since it does not depend principally on any part. And if [it is] so, since there is there a multitude of places, the Angel will be in several places.

**On the contrary:**

1. The point is neither a place nor a part of place[^7]: therefore what is in a point or in a punctual place is not in a place.

2. Likewise, «the point, as the Philosopher says[^8], is a posited substance», that is, an essence having position, in which it differs from unity: therefore if the Angel is in a point according to a proportion befitting a point, then the Angel has position. But a form, having position in matter, is not a sufficient mover of that in which it is: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if the Angel is in a point, then it first influences power upon the point: therefore since the point is disproportionate to body, it is impossible that its power extend to body; and so it will never move a body.

4. Likewise, the soul is in the whole body; but union does not do this, because from this very [union] it has dependence, and so constriction: therefore this is by reason of simplicity[^9]. Since therefore the Angel is equally simple, or more so than the soul, it seems that much more strongly it can be whole in a greater or equal place.

### Conclusion

> An Angel is definitively in a divisible place, yet so that there is no place so small but that the Angel can still be in a smaller [one].

**I respond:** There were three positions concerning this.

For there were some saying that the Angel, although it is in a corporeal place, is nevertheless not in it corporeally, but spiritually. But since it is not in a place situally, therefore [it is] neither according to whole, nor according to part, nor according to the impartible, because there is no commensuration at all of the Angel to the place. — But this position does not seem intelligible, namely how something could be in something and be defined and contained, and yet not first[^10] immediately be in the whole, or in a part, or in the impartible. For everything that is in some whole is either by reason of the whole or by reason of some part.

And therefore there was concerning this a second position, namely that the Angel is in an impartible or punctual place. And their reason was this, that the Angel does not have matter wholly different from the matter of corporeal [things] except[^11] according to being, namely because it is not extended. Hence, since matter is simple as a point of itself, they say that the Angel has a simplicity proportional to a point, and so is in a punctual place. — But this position is false and not intelligible. For whatever be [the truth] about matter, as will be said below[^12], this however is true, that every corporeal place is partible: therefore just as it is a contradiction in the adjective to say an impartible or punctual body, so also to say a punctual place. And again, since a point is not a place, to posit the Angel in a point is to posit that it is not in a place.

And therefore there is a third position, that the Angel, since it is contained by a corporeal place, [is] in a partible place as in a primary place; and since it cannot be extended in it, therefore it is necessary that it be in the whole, so that [it is] whole in the whole and whole in any part. And in this the simplicity of the Angel is in a certain way similar to the divine simplicity: but it falls short, because the Angel is so[^13] in one place, but God [is] everywhere. From this John Damascene says that the Angel is in a corporeal place, but intelligibly, not figurally[^14], because the intellect grasps this only, namely how the substance is whole in the parts and whole in the whole.

1. And so the response to the word of Damascene is clear.

2. To what is objected, that there ought to be a proportion; it must be said that it is not necessary that there be a proportion according to the special and proper[^15] conditions of the Angel or of the place, because the Angel is not posited to be in a place prop-

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erly; yet there is there a proportion as to finitude and limitation, by which two [the Angel] is defined and is in a place; for just as the Angel has a finite substance and power, so its place is constricted and limited.

3. As to what is asked about this: if the Angel be posited in a place than which it could not be in a lesser; it must be said that in this the existence of the Angel in a body and [that] of the soul differ, [namely] that the soul, because it is the perfection of a body born to be vivified by rational life[^16], and that [body] is in a determinate quantity, therefore it can be in a body so small that [it can] not [be] in a lesser [one], because a lesser [one] would not be organizable and vivifiable; but the Angel, because it is not as a perfection and is simple, is whole in any part of the place, however small it is — because the character of place is preserved in any [part][^17] — a place cannot be taken so small but that it can still be in a lesser [one] — and therefore there is no giving a place than which it could not be in a lesser; yet there is giving [one] than which [it can] not [be] in a greater, just as also [in] the soul, because this comes from limitation. As therefore in bodies there is a stop in ascending, but in dividing there is never a stop to posit, nor is it ever arrived at the impartible: so it is to be understood concerning the existence of the Angel in a place.

4. To what is objected, that it is in the mode of the receiver etc.; it must be said that this is true where what is received depends on the receiver, as a species [which] is received in an organ is received also in the intellect, and its existence depends on that in which it is received, and is related to it in the mode of [something] informing; hence it is that it receives the mode of its existence from that in which it is received. Not so is the Angel received by a place, because it does not depend on it.

5. To what is objected: if it is whole in any part of the place, since there are several places etc.; it must be said that it is whole in any part, nor however in several places, just as neither [does] the soul, while it vivifies the whole body, vivify diverse bodies, but one.

But as to what is objected: suppose that that body or place in which the Angel is be divided; I say that if it were divided into a thousand parts, provided however that the parts were not sequestered far from one another, it would be whole in all, and all would be one place to it, because they have no character of encompassing or defining the Angel, but [only] that which embraces all the parts. For a place[^18] is not numbered according to the number of locating bodies, but in comparison to what is located[^19]; as is plain, because one body can be partly in air, partly in water, partly in earth, nor however in three places, but is in one.

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 13. Vide supra pag. 79, nota 5. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. perperam *in loco partibili sive*, recte cod. M *in loco vel partibili vel* pro *in loco impartibili sive.*

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13. See above p. 79, note 5. — A little above most codices wrongly [read] *in loco partibili sive*, rightly codex M *in loco vel partibili vel* for *in loco impartibili sive.*

la: Aristot., 1. de Anima, text. 70. (c. 4.): *Quorum enim locus est indivisibilis, et ipsa* [sunt indivisibilia].

en: Aristotle, 1 *On the Soul*, text 70 (c. 4): *For those things whose place is indivisible, [they] themselves [are indivisible].*

la: Cod. aa *locus ille.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *locus ille.*

la: Libr. de Causis, prop. 10. et 20. seq. Cfr. etiam Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H K O S Y cc et edd. 1, 2 *partialiter* pro *partibiliter.* Dein cod. T prosequitur *Sed impossibile est, Angelum esse partitum vel recipere partitionem.*

en: The book *On Causes*, prop. 10 and 20 ff. Cf. also Boethius, V *On Consolation*, prose 4. — A little below several codices, as C H K O S Y cc and editions 1, 2, [read] *partialiter* for *partibiliter.* Then codex T continues *But it is impossible that the Angel be divided or receive partition.*

la: Cod. A *simul erit.* — Simile argumentum S. Bonav. de anima ponit I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. fundam. 3; et ibid. ad 6. habetur illa replicatio, quae mox affertur.

en: Codex A [reads] *simul erit.* — A similar argument St. Bonaventure puts concerning the soul in I *Sent.* d. 8, p. II, q. 3, fundamentum 3; and there, ad 6, is had that rejoinder which is presently brought forward.

la: Vat., mutata interpunctione, *dividatur; et locus est in quo est Angelus.* Mox post *partibus* codd. U Y adiungunt *corporis.* Dein fide codd. B D H I U V aa cc et ed. 1 substituimus *in aliqua parte* pro *ex aliqua parte.*

en: The Vatican edition, the punctuation changed, [reads] *dividatur; et locus est in quo est Angelus.* Then after *partibus* codices U Y add *corporis.* Then on the faith of codices B D H I U V aa cc and ed. 1 we substitute *in aliqua parte* for *ex aliqua parte.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 47. (c. 5.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *Physics* text 47 (c. 5).

la: Libr. 1. Poster. c. 23. (c. 27.): *Unitas substantia est sine positione, punctum autem substantia posita.* Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). De ultima propositione arg. vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 *secundum positionem* pro *secundum proportionem.*

en: Book 1 *Posterior [Analytics]*, c. 23 (c. 27): *Unity is a substance without position, but the point a posited substance.* Cf. I *On the Soul*, text 68 (c. 4) and V *Metaphysics* text 12 (IV, c. 6). On the last proposition of the argument see I *Sent.* d. 8, p. II, q. 3, in the body. — A little below codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *secundum positionem* for *secundum proportionem.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 8, p. II, q. 3.

la: Codd. L O interserunt *et.* Aliquanto superius Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *Sed ista ratio* pro *Sed ista positio.* — De seq. prop. vide Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.), ubi affert duplicem modum essendi in aliquo, scil. aut *secundum se*, aut *secundum alterum* i. e. *secundum partem.* — Vat. cum pluribus mss. *in aliquo loco toto* pro *in aliquo toto*; nimis constricte.

en: Codices L O insert *et.* Somewhat above the Vatican edition with some codices [reads] *Sed ista ratio* for *Sed ista positio.* — On the following proposition see Aristotle, IV *Physics* text 24 (c. 3), where he brings forward a twofold mode of being in something, namely either *according to itself*, or *according to another*, i.e. *according to a part.* — The Vatican edition with several manuscripts [reads] *in aliquo loco toto* for *in aliquo toto*; too constricted.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. omittens *non* et nisi modo positivo propositionem format, fortasse, quia multi codd. minus congrue omittunt solummodo *non*, quod exhibetur in codd. B (F a secunda manu) I Q U aa bb.

en: The Vatican edition with a few codices, omitting *non* and forming the proposition only in the positive mode, perhaps because many codices less congruously omit *non* alone, which is exhibited in codices B (F by a second hand) I Q U aa bb.

en: Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Codd. B E H (bb in marg.) addunt *quod non in alio*; nonnulli, ut N Z legunt *sic tantum est*, codd. I cc et ed. 1 *uno loco tantum est*, Vat. omittit *sic.*

en: Codices B E H (bb in the margin) add *quod non in alio*; some, as N Z, read *sic tantum est*, codices I cc and ed. 1 *uno loco tantum est*, the Vatican edition omits *sic.*

la: In cod. A subnectitur *id est, circumscriptibiliter.*

en: In codex A is appended *that is, circumscriptibly.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 4 *proprietates.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 4 [read] *proprietates.*

la: Idem dicitur vulgari definitione: *actus primus corporis physici, organici, vitam rationalem potentia habentis.* Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. seqq. — Paulo ante non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *et anima* pro *et animae*, et dein codd. aa cc ed. 1 *quod anima, quae* pro *quod anima, quia.*

en: The same is said by the common definition: *the first act of a physical, organic body having rational life in potency.* Cf. Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 6 ff. — A little before, not a few codices with ed. 1 [read] *et anima* for *et animae*, and then codices aa cc ed. 1 *quod anima, quae* for *quod anima, quia.*

la: Fide cod. 1 emendavimus falsam editionem et codicum lectionem, quae, transposita particula *quia* et omisso verbo [salvatur], haec est: *simplex est, quia in qualibet parte loci totus, qu[antum]cumque parva est ratio loci, salvatur in qualibet.* Post *in qualibet* Vat. addit *et ideo.*

en: On the faith of cod. 1 we have emended the false [reading of the] edition and of the codices, which, the particle *quia* transposed and the verb [salvatur] omitted, is this: *it is simple, because whole in any part of the place, however small the character of the place is, it is preserved in any [part].* After *in qualibet* the Vatican edition adds *et ideo.*

la: Simul audi: *Angelus.* — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 *in corporalibus* pro *in corporibus.*

en: At the same time understand: *the Angel.* — A little below codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *in corporalibus* for *in corporibus.*

la: In Vat. deest *sed in comparatione ad locatum.*

en: In the Vatican edition *sed in comparatione ad locatum* is lacking. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quid sit esse definitive in loco, explicatur hic in fine corp. — Prima et secunda opinio hic recensita etiam a S. Thoma reiicitur, qui secundum principia de fundamentali ratione praesentiae angelicae in loco ab ipso stabilita resolvit, Angelos posse suam virtutem pro libitu applicare vel loco indivisibili, vel divisibili. Idem sentit Petr. a Tar. — Sed S. Bonav. cum Aegidio R. aliisque negat, Angelum posse esse in loco indivisibili, hac ductus ratione, quod punctum non sit locus. Hanc suam sententiam declarat in solut. ad 3. — Scotus (hic q. 6. n. 13.) putat, non esse rationem necessariam nec ad unam nec ad aliam partem, quod etiam Richard. (loc. citand. ad 3.) approbat.

**II.** S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 3; S. I. q. 52. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 4. a. 2. praesertim ad 4. — Richard. a Med., 1. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** What it is to be definitively in a place is explained here at the end of the body. — The first and second opinion here reviewed are also rejected by St. Thomas, who, according to the principles concerning the fundamental character of angelic presence in a place established by himself, resolves that the Angels can apply their power at pleasure either to an indivisible or to a divisible place. Peter of Tarentaise thinks the same. — But St. Bonaventure with Giles of Rome and others denies that the Angel can be in an indivisible place, led by this reason, that a point is not a place. He declares this opinion of his in the solution to [argument] 3. — Scotus (here q. 6, n. 13) thinks that there is no necessary reason either to one or to the other part, which Richard also (at the place to be cited, ad 3) approves.

**II.** St. Thomas, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 3, a. 3; S. I, q. 52, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 4, a. 2, especially ad 4. — Richard of Middleton, 1 *Sent.* d. 37, a. 2, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 80-82 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {80,81,82}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 6245–6381), per the Vol II override. Read L then R per page, body then footer; R-col footer left edges recovered from the full-width cascade IA OCR.

**Page span / structure.** QUAESTIO III spans printed pp. **80–82**: opens on p.80 (beneath q2's Scholion tail) with 5 *videtur* + 4 *Contra* arguments; a *Conclusio* + a *triplex-positio* Respondeo (not corporeally/spiritually only — rejected; in a punctual place — rejected; in a partible place, whole in whole and whole in any part — accepted) + 5 numbered *Solutio* replies (with a trailing *Quod autem obiicitur*); **Scholion I–II** (I = the Thomas/Scotus/Richard/Bonaventure-vs-Giles survey; II = bibliographic). The Scholion carries no numbered apparatus. Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Ad oppositum`, `Fundamenta`, `Conclusio`, `Opinio 1/2/3`, `Improbatur`, `Reprobatur`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Notandum`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Renumbered continuously 1–17:
- **p. 80** footer: **notes 6–9 only** → `[^1]`–`[^4]` (the inherited split; notes 1–5 are committed `d2-p2-a2-q2`'s `[^12]`–`[^16]`).
- **p. 81** footer: L col notes 1–6 + R col notes 7–11 → `[^5]`–`[^15]` (11 notes).
- **p. 82** footer: **notes 1–4** → `[^16]`–`[^19]` (the outgoing split — see below; n.3–4 backfilled session 29).

**Cross-chunk footer boundaries.**
- *Incoming (a2-q2 → a2-q3): SPLIT at p.80 — INHERITED.* p.80 footer notes 1–5 are committed `d2-p2-a2-q2`'s `[^12]`–`[^16]`; **notes 6–9 are this chunk's** (`[^1]`–`[^4]`, anchored in q3's *videtur* args 1–4). **No backfill** to committed `d2-p2-a2-q2`.
- *Outgoing (a2-q3 → a2-q4): SPLIT at p.82.* q3's replies + Scholion I–II occupy the upper/middle of p.82; `QUAESTIO IV` of the next chunk begins lower on p.82. p.82's footer splits by body anchor: **notes 1–4 → this chunk** (`[^16]` reply 3 *vivificari vita rationali*; `[^17]` the *salvatur in qualibet* emendation note; `[^18]` reply-5 tail *Simul audi: Angelus*; `[^19]` reply 5 *sed in comparatione ad locatum*); **notes 5–6 → `d2-p2-a2-q4`** (n.5 `Text. 6. (c. 4.)…` → q4 arg 1 *Philosophus tertio de Anima*; n.6 `Libr. V. Phys. text. 22. seqq.…` → q4 arg 2 *Philosophus*). **n.3–4 were backfilled into this chunk in session 29** (discovered while building `d2-p2-a2-q4`: their lemmas — *Simul audi: Angelus*, *sed in comparatione ad locatum* — anchor q3's reply 5, not q4); committed `d2-p2-a2-q4` correctly starts its apparatus at p.82 footer note 5.

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the 450 dpi crops were clean. The p.81 Respondeo/replies markers (`[^10]`–`[^15]`, two-column-cascade *triplex-positio* region) are content-matched to the printed footer in source order; per-clause anchor positions may be off by a few words where L/R linearization is ambiguous (esp. `[^10]` *primo immediate* and `[^17]` the *salvatur in qualibet* clause) — secure on content, parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.