title: Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether 'man' is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident

source_text:
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### Articulus I.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit substantia, an homo praedicetur per modum habitus et accidentis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit substantia, an homo praedicetur per modum habitus et accidentis, sicut dicebat opinio tertia. Et quod Christus dicatur homo per modum habitus, ostenditur.

1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Ad Philippenses secundo[^1]: *Habitu inventus ut homo;* super quod verbum dicit Hilarius de Trinitate: « Non fuit ille habitus tantum hominis, sed ut hominis »: ergo videtur tam ex hoc verbo, quod dicit *habitu,* quam ex hoc, quod dicit *ut homo* — quod importat similitudinem — quod Christus alio modo dicatur homo quam alii homines: et ita videtur, quod dicatur per modum habitus, non per modum substantiae.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum dicit, et habetur in littera[^2], quod « quartum genus habitus competit huic comparationi »; et illud quartum genus spectat ad hoc quod dicitur praedicari per modum habitus, ut esse vestitum et calceatum, quod est in quadam adiacentia: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Quod advenit alicui iam in esse completo est illi accidens et praedicatur per modum accidentis[^3]; sed humana natura advenit personae Christi iam in esse completo: ergo videtur, quod ei adveniat ut accidens et praedicetur per modum accidentis, non ergo per modum substantiae.

4. Item, quod praedicatur denominative est accidens et praedicatur per modum accidentis[^4]; sed humana natura praedicatur de Christo denominative — unde Filius Dei dicitur humanatus, quod quidem non potest dici de alio homine — ergo videtur, quod non dicatur de ipso per modum substantiae, sed per modum accidentis.

5. Item, impossibile est, diversa genera praedicari de eodem essentialiter[^5]: ergo multo minus erit possibile, divinam naturam et humanam convenire eidem essentialiter: ergo si Christus, essentialiter loquendo, est Deus; videtur, quod homo dicatur solummodo per modum accidentis sive per modum habitus.

6. Item, quae habent diversas definitiones non possunt praedicari de uno et eodem essentialiter[^6]; sed Deus et homo diversas habent definitiones: ergo cum Deus dicatur de Christo essentialiter, homo non dicetur de eo substantialiter, sed solum accidentaliter.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) In decretali Alexandri Papae[^7]: « Cum Christus perfectus sit Deus et perfectus sit homo, qua temeritate audent aliqui dicere, quod Christus non est aliquid, secundum quod homo »: ergo secundum sententiam Alexandri Papae homo praedicatur de Christo per modum substantiae.

2. Item, « substantia nulli est accidens », ut vult Philosophus[^8]; sed humana natura in Christo est substantia: ergo nulli accidit: ergo non accidit personae Verbi.

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3. Item, si humana natura accidit Christo, aut accidit Christo Deo, aut Christo homini; Christo homini non, quia nulli homini est accidentale esse hominem[^1b]; Christo, secundum quod Deus, similiter accidere non potest, quia nullum accidens potest Christo inesse ratione divinae naturae: ergo nullo modo videtur, quod possit praedicari per modum accidentis.

4. Item, nihil est univocum substantiae et accidentis[^2b]: ergo si de Christo dicitur secundum accidens, et de aliis hominibus secundum substantiam, ergo non dicitur univoce, sed aequivoce. Sed si hoc verum est, non videtur, quod sit de nostro genere, nec mors eius nostrae redemptioni proficere.

5. Item, substantia nobilior est accidente[^3b]: ergo si homo de aliis dicitur per modum substantiae, et de Christo per modum habitus, ergo esse hominem minus nobiliter convenit Christo quam aliis. Quodsi hoc est impium dicere, restat igitur idem quod prius, quod homo non dicatur de Christo per modum habitus, sed per modum substantiae.

6. Item, quod praedicatur per modum habitus et accidentis, non praedicatur per modum substantiae — unde quamvis homo dicatur vestitus, nunquam tamen dicitur vestimentum — ergo si Filius Dei diceretur humanatus per modum habitus, nunquam diceretur homo; quodsi hoc falsum est, restat idem quod prius[^4b].

### Conclusio.

> Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia et aliquid, et homo de eo praedicatur substantialiter, non per modum accidentis et habitus nisi per quandam conformitatem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod homo dicitur de Christo per modum habitus et accidentis, (*Duplex sensus.*) dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod praedicatio illa sit pure accidentalis, ita quod non substantialis; aut ita, quod aliquo modo habeat rationem praedicationis accidentalis, et tamen secundum veritatem sit substantialis.

(*Conclusio 1.*) Si hoc ultimo modo intelligatur, sic veritatem habet, pro eo quod humana natura in Christo quodam modo proprietatem accidentis habet, in hoc videlicet, quod substantificatur in supposito alterius naturae, ita quod non dat illi supposito primum esse, sed advenit iam completo[^5b]. Unde sicut albedo non substantificatur in aliquo, quod sit in genere qualitatis, sed magis in substantia, nec illi dat esse, sed iam completo advenit; sic per quandam conformitatem est reperire circa Christi humanitatem, quae substantificatur in divina persona, habente perfectum esse ex alia natura quam ex ipsa humanitate, videlicet ex divina. (*Notandum.*) Et propterea nostri doctores dixerunt, quod humana natura in Christo vergit in accidens, secundum quandam conformitatem[^6b]. Et hoc si intelligatur sane, est dictum subtiliter et catholice. — (*De habitu.*) Maxime autem inter omnem modum accidentis modum habitus habet, pro eo quod habitus nominat adiacentiam unius substantiae respectu alterius, quae quidem potest esse, utriusque servata proprietate. Et ideo Apostolus, prudentissimus fidei praedicator, et Augustinus, subtilissimus fidei defensor, insinuant, aliquo modo Christum dici[^7b] hominem secundum habitum, non excludentes per hoc, quin homo dicatur de Christo secundum substantiam.

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(*Sensus alius.*) Alio modo est intelligere, quod Christus dicatur homo secundum accidens, ita quod modus ille praedicandi omnino sit accidentalis, et non secundum substantiam[^8b]. (*Conclusio 2.*) Et hic modus dicendi, licet aliquando visus fuerit habere opinionis probabilitatem, manifeste apparet in se habere erroris temeritatem. Unde et illa tertia opinio, quae posuit hoc, ab Alexandro reprobata est; nec immerito, quia veritati illius unionis repugnat. Hoc enim dicit fides recta, quod divina natura et humana unitae sunt in unam personam: ergo Deus dicitur de Christo tanquam de proprio supposito, et homo similiter. Sed homo cum praedicatur de aliquo sicut de proprio supposito, substantialiter praedicatur et significat ipsum, (*Conclusio 3.*) de quo dicitur, esse aliquam substantiam; et ideo ex ipso fidei fundamento necessario sequitur, quod sit aliquid, secundum quod homo[^9b]. — Unde rationes concedendae sunt, quae ad hoc inducuntur.

(*Solutio oppositorum.*) 1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur ad oppositum de auctoritate Apostoli et Augustini, iam patet responsio ex his quae iam dicta sunt. Nam etsi homo habeat aliquo modo modum habitus, non tamen habet omnino. Licet enim humanitas adveniat iam completo[^1c], nihilominus substantificatur in illo tanquam in proprio suo supposito, quia Dei Filius, qui est suppositum divinae naturae per naturam, fecit se suppositum humanae naturae per gratiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: *accidens est quod advenit iam completo* etc.; dicendum, quod si assimiletur in hoc, quod advenit iam completo, non tamen omnino; (*Notandum.*) quia accidens omnino adiacet extrinsecus et dicit modum essendi[^2c], sed humana natura sic advenit illi personae, quod non adiacet extrinsecus, nec dicit modum essendi tantum, sed ipsius hypostasis substantiam et naturam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedicatur denominative; dicendum, quod praedicatio denominativa potest esse quatuor modis: (*Modi 4 praedicationis denominativae.*) per modum inhaerentiae, ut cum dicitur: *iste est albus;* per modum transmutationis, ut cum dicitur: *Petrus est dealbatus;* per modum possessionis, ut cum dicitur: *asinus Socraticus;* et per modum unionis, ut cum dicitur: *ferrum ignitum,* id est igni unitum[^3c]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod praedicatio denominativa est accidentis; dicendum, quod verum est, quando est per modum inhaerentis, non autem est verum, si semper intelligatur de praedicatione denominativa secundum alios modos. — Cum autem dicitur: *Christus est humanatus;* non est ibi praedicatio per modum inhaerentis, sed per modum unionis et relationis. Et ideo non sequitur, quod humana natura sit accidens; nec sequitur ex hoc, quod persona divina sit mutata, quia, quamvis mutatio absoluta in accidente ponat mutationem in subiecto, introductio tamen ipsius relationis in esse potest esse ex mutatione facta in altero extremo[^4c].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impossibile est, diversorum[^5c] genera praedicari de eodem substantialiter; (*Notandum.*) dicendum, quod verum est de illis generibus, quae habent oppositionem et distinctionem, sicut sunt genera creatarum rerum. Non sic autem est de divina natura et humana, quia, cum humana sit omnino possibilis et in omnimoda obedientia, nihil impedit, quod humana natura et divina simul concurrunt in unam personam, ita quod de eadem persona praedicetur Deus essentialiter et per naturam, et de illa eadem praedicetur homo essentialiter propter unionem gratuitam, per quam Deus, sicut potuit et voluit, se fecit suppositum naturae humanae; quod quidem sic fuit sibi facile, sicut facile est homini sibi indumentum sumere, immo multo facilius, si consideretur eius summa potentia et creaturae obedientia[^6c].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus et homo diversas habent definitiones; dicendum, quod non sunt diversae, ita quod non possunt concurrere in suppositum unum, si Deus facere velit illud, (*Notandum.*) pro eo quod multo magis pendet et indiget humana natura respectu divinae personae, quam aliquod accidens respectu substantiae. Non est ergo Deo impossibile, immo valde credibile et possibile, immo verum, quod Dei Filius fecit se in natura humana in incarnatione personam et hypostasim et suppositum.

(*De 3 opinionum diversitate.*) Et qui hoc intelligit[^7c], manifeste videt, quae istarum trium opinionum magis accedit ad explicandum incarnationis sacramentum. Nam tertia opinio, quae negat, Christum aliquid esse, secundum quod homo, negat etiam[^8c], personam Filii hypostasim esse humanae naturae, simpliciter recedit a veritate. Prima vero opinio, quae dicit, in Christo duo esse supposita, a veritate deviat. Media vero opinio, quae dicit, unam personam, sive hypostasim duabus naturis esse suppositam, veritatem dicit. Unde omnes doctores communiter tenent hodie opinionem mediam, ut loco eius quod dicebat illa opinio, unam personam ex duabus naturis esse compositam, nunc dicatur una persona duabus naturis esse supposita, non mutando sensum, sed verba, quae multum sunt in tali materia observanda. Ex his igitur, quae dicta sunt, colligi potest, quae sit praedictarum opinionum diversitas, et in qua earum sit maior probabilitas veritatis[^9c].

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### Article I.
### Question III. *Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether "man" is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether "man" is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident, as the third opinion held. And that Christ is called a man after the manner of a habit is shown:

1. (*On the contrary.*) To the Philippians, chapter two[^1]: *Found in habit as a man;* upon which word Hilary says, in *On the Trinity:* "It was not that habit only of a man, but as of a man": therefore it seems, both from this word which says *in habit,* and from this which says *as a man* — which imports a likeness — that Christ is called a man in another way than other men are: and so it seems that he is said [to be a man] after the manner of a habit, not after the manner of a substance.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions,* says, and it is contained in the text [of Lombard][^2], that "the fourth genus of habit befits this comparison"; and that fourth genus pertains to what is said to be predicated after the manner of a habit, as to be clothed and shod, which is in a certain adjacency: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. That which comes to something already in completed being is to it an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident[^3]; but the human nature comes to the person of Christ already in completed being: therefore it seems that it comes to him as an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident, and therefore not after the manner of a substance.

4. Likewise, what is predicated denominatively is an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident[^4]; but the human nature is predicated of Christ denominatively — whence the Son of God is called "humanated," which indeed cannot be said of any other man — therefore it seems that it is not said of him after the manner of a substance, but after the manner of an accident.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that diverse genera be predicated of the same thing essentially[^5]: therefore much less will it be possible that the divine and human natures belong to the same thing essentially: therefore if Christ, speaking essentially, is God, it seems that "man" is said [of him] only after the manner of an accident or after the manner of a habit.

6. Likewise, things which have diverse definitions cannot be predicated of one and the same thing essentially[^6]; but God and man have diverse definitions: therefore since God is said of Christ essentially, "man" will not be said of him substantially, but only accidentally.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*The grounds.*) In the decretal of Pope Alexander[^7]: "Since Christ is perfect God and is perfect man, with what rashness do certain men dare to say that Christ is not anything, insofar as he is man": therefore according to the judgment of Pope Alexander "man" is predicated of Christ after the manner of a substance.

2. Likewise, "a substance is an accident to nothing," as the Philosopher will have it[^8]; but the human nature in Christ is a substance: therefore it is an accident to nothing: therefore it is not an accident to the person of the Word.

3. Likewise, if the human nature is an accident to Christ, either it is an accident to Christ as God, or to Christ as man; not to Christ as man, since to no man is it accidental to be a man[^1b]; nor likewise can it accrue to Christ insofar as he is God, since no accident can be in Christ by reason of the divine nature: therefore in no way does it seem that it can be predicated after the manner of an accident.

4. Likewise, nothing is univocal to substance and accident[^2b]: therefore if of Christ it is said according to accident, and of other men according to substance, then it is not said univocally, but equivocally. But if this is true, it does not seem that he is of our genus, nor that his death avails for our redemption.

5. Likewise, substance is nobler than accident[^3b]: therefore if "man" is said of others after the manner of a substance, and of Christ after the manner of a habit, then to be a man belongs less nobly to Christ than to others. But if it is impious to say this, then there remains the same as before, namely that "man" is not said of Christ after the manner of a habit, but after the manner of a substance.

6. Likewise, what is predicated after the manner of a habit and accident is not predicated after the manner of a substance — whence, although a man is called clothed, he is nevertheless never called a garment — therefore if the Son of God were called "humanated" after the manner of a habit, he would never be called a man; but if this is false, there remains the same as before[^4b].

### Conclusion.

> Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance and something, and "man" is predicated of him substantially, not after the manner of an accident and habit except by a certain conformity.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is said that "man" is said of Christ after the manner of a habit and accident, (*A twofold sense.*) it can be understood in two ways: either so that that predication is purely accidental, in such a way that it is not substantial; or so that in some way it has the character of an accidental predication, and yet according to the truth is substantial.

(*Conclusion 1.*) If it be understood in this last way, then it holds the truth, because the human nature in Christ in a certain way has the property of an accident, namely in this, that it is substantified in the supposit of another nature, in such a way that it does not give to that supposit its first being, but comes to it already complete[^5b]. Whence, just as whiteness is not substantified in something which is in the genus of quality, but rather in a substance, nor does it give being to it, but comes to it already complete; so by a certain conformity it is found in the case of Christ's humanity, which is substantified in the divine person, which has perfect being from a nature other than from the humanity itself, namely from the divine. (*Note.*) And therefore our teachers said that the human nature in Christ inclines toward an accident, according to a certain conformity[^6b]. And this, if it be soundly understood, is said subtly and catholically. — (*Concerning the habit.*) Most of all, however, among every mode of accident it has the mode of a habit, because a habit names the adjacency of one substance with respect to another, which adjacency can indeed be, the property of each being preserved. And therefore the Apostle, the most prudent preacher of the faith, and Augustine, the most subtle defender of the faith, intimate that in some way Christ is called[^7b] a man according to a habit, not thereby excluding that "man" is said of Christ according to substance.

(*Another sense.*) In another way it is to be understood that Christ is said to be a man according to accident, in such a way that that mode of predicating is altogether accidental, and not according to substance[^8b]. (*Conclusion 2.*) And this manner of speaking, although it has at some time seemed to have the probability of an opinion, manifestly appears to have in itself the rashness of error. Whence also that third opinion, which posited this, was reproved by Alexander; and not undeservedly, since it is repugnant to the truth of that union. For this the right faith says: that the divine and human natures are united into one person: therefore God is said of Christ as of his proper supposit, and "man" likewise. But when "man" is predicated of something as of its proper supposit, it is predicated substantially and signifies the very thing (*Conclusion 3.*) of which it is said, to be some substance; and therefore from the very foundation of the faith it necessarily follows that he is something, insofar as he is a man[^9b]. — Whence the reasons which are adduced to this [conclusion] are to be conceded.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1, 2. To that which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of the Apostle and of Augustine, the response is already clear from those things which have already been said. For although "man" has in some way the mode of a habit, it nevertheless does not have it altogether. For although the humanity comes [to him] already complete[^1c], nonetheless it is substantified in him as in its own proper supposit, since the Son of God, who is the supposit of the divine nature by nature, made himself the supposit of the human nature by grace.

3. To that which is objected: *an accident is that which comes to something already complete,* etc.; it must be said that, though it be like it in this, that it comes [to him] already complete, yet not altogether; (*Note.*) since an accident lies altogether outside and bespeaks a mode of being[^2c], but the human nature comes to that person in such a way that it does not lie outside, nor bespeak only a mode of being, but the substance and nature of the very hypostasis.

4. To that which is objected, that it is predicated denominatively; it must be said that denominative predication can be in four ways: (*The four modes of denominative predication.*) by the mode of inherence, as when it is said, *this man is white;* by the mode of transmutation, as when it is said, *Peter has been whitened;* by the mode of possession, as when it is said, *the ass of Socrates;* and by the mode of union, as when it is said, *iron set afire,* that is, united to fire[^3c]. When therefore it is said that denominative predication is of an accident; it must be said that this is true when it is by the mode of an inhering thing, but it is not true if it always be understood of denominative predication according to the other modes. — But when it is said, *Christ is humanated,* there is not there a predication by the mode of an inhering thing, but by the mode of union and relation. And therefore it does not follow that the human nature is an accident; nor does it follow from this that the divine person has been changed, since, although an absolute change in an accident posits a change in the subject, the introduction of the relation itself into being can nonetheless come about from a change made in the other extreme[^4c].

5. To that which is objected, that it is impossible that the genera of diverse things[^5c] be predicated of the same thing substantially; (*Note.*) it must be said that this is true of those genera which have opposition and distinction, such as are the genera of created things. But it is not so with the divine and human nature, since, the human being altogether possible and in complete obedience, nothing prevents the human and divine natures from concurring together into one person, in such a way that of the same person God is predicated essentially and by nature, and of that same person "man" is predicated essentially on account of the gratuitous union, by which God, as he was able and willed, made himself the supposit of the human nature; which indeed was as easy for him as it is easy for a man to take a garment to himself, nay, much easier, if his supreme power and the creature's obedience be considered[^6c].

6. To that which is objected, that God and man have diverse definitions; it must be said that they are not diverse in such a way that they cannot concur into one supposit, if God will to do it, (*Note.*) because the human nature depends and stands in need much more with respect to the divine person than any accident with respect to a substance. It is therefore not impossible for God, nay, very credible and possible, nay, true, that the Son of God made himself in the human nature, in the incarnation, a person and hypostasis and supposit.

(*On the diversity of the three opinions.*) And he who understands this[^7c] manifestly sees which of these three opinions comes nearer to explaining the mystery of the incarnation. For the third opinion, which denies that Christ is anything insofar as he is a man, denies also[^8c] that the person of the Son is the hypostasis of the human nature, and simply departs from the truth. But the first opinion, which says that in Christ there are two supposits, strays from the truth. But the middle opinion, which says that one person, or hypostasis, is the supposit of two natures, speaks the truth. Whence all the teachers commonly hold today the middle opinion, so that, in place of what that opinion used to say — that one person is composed of two natures — there is now said one person that is the supposit of two natures, not changing the sense, but the words, which in such matter are much to be observed. From these things, therefore, which have been said, it can be gathered what the diversity of the aforesaid opinions is, and in which of them is the greater probability of the truth[^9c].

la: Vers. 7. — Verba Hilarii habentur X. de Trin. n. 23. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. in fine.

en: [Phil. 2,] verse 7. — The words of Hilary are found in *On the Trinity* X, n. 23. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 5, at the end.

la: Hic c. 5. — In testimonio allato pro *comparationi,* qua voce Magister usus est ad abbreviandam longiorem Augustini sententiam, codd. B G L M O aa bb et edd. 1, 2 exhibent *compositioni.* De proposit. seq. cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de *Habere;* V. Metaph. text. 28. (IV. c. 23.); nec non Gilb. Porret., de Sex princip. c. de *Habitu,* ubi inter alia haec: *Habitus est corporum et eorum quae circa corpus sunt adiacentia, secundum quam hoc quidem habere, illa vero dicuntur haberi... ut armatum esse, calceatum esse.*

en: Here c. 5. — In the testimony adduced, for *comparationi* — which word the Master used to abbreviate a longer sentence of Augustine — codices B G L M O aa bb and editions 1, 2 give *compositioni.* On the following proposition cf. Aristotle, *Categories,* the chapter on *Having;* *Metaphysics* V, text 28 (IV, c. 23); and also Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles,* the chapter on *Habit,* where among other things he says: *A habit is the adjacency of bodies and of the things which are about a body, according to which the one is said to have, the others to be had... as to be armed, to be shod.*

la: Vide de hoc verba Averrois, tom. II. pag. 327, nota 1. allegata. — Vat. addit *de illo.* Paulo inferius pro *in esse completo* codd. E F G I (K a prima manu) N T U X et edd. 1, 2 *in esse complete.*

en: On this see the words of Averroes cited in vol. II, p. 327, note 1. — The Vatican edition adds *de illo.* A little below, for *in esse completo* ("in completed being"), codices E F G I (K by the first hand) N T U X and editions 1, 2 read *in esse complete.*

la: Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1, cuius verba explicata habentur tom. 1. pag. 473, nota 1. — In conclusione pro *dicatur* cod. U sincerius *praedicatur.*

en: According to Aristotle, *Categories,* c. 1, whose words are explained in vol. I, p. 473, note 1. — In the conclusion, for *dicatur,* codex U more genuinely [reads] *praedicatur.*

la: Cfr. secunda regula praedicamentalis, quam exhibet Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 4. (c. 2.), nec non IV. Topic. c. 2, quod cap. Alex. Aphrodisias (circiter an. 200 post Christum) exponens ait: *Genera duo eiusdem esse non possunt, nisi sit alterum sub altero.* — Paulo inferius pro *homo dicatur* codd. L aa *homo praedicatur.*

en: Cf. the second predicamental rule, which Aristotle sets forth in the *Categories,* c. 4 (c. 2), and also *Topics* IV, c. 2, on which chapter Alexander of Aphrodisias (about the year 200 after Christ), expounding it, says: *Two genera cannot belong to the same thing, unless the one be under the other.* — A little below, for *homo dicatur,* codices L aa [read] *homo praedicatur.*

la: Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): *Haec [essentiae] autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4): *But these [essences] are not the same, because their definitions are diverse.*

la: Libr. V. Decretal. Gregor. tit. 7. de Haereticis, c. 7, ubi textus origin. pro *qua temeritate audent aliqui dicere* exhibet *mandamus, quatenus sub anathemate interdicas, ne quis audeat dicere,* et dein post *quod homo* addit: *quia, sicut Christus verus est Deus, ita verus est homo, ex anima rationali et humano carne subsistens.* Cfr. Conc. Lateran. III. celebr. sub Alexandro III., tit. de Haeret. c. 20.

en: Book V of the *Decretals* of Gregory, title 7, *On Heretics,* c. 7, where the original text, for *with what rashness do certain men dare to say,* gives *we command that under anathema you forbid anyone to dare to say,* and then after *insofar as he is man* adds: *because, just as Christ is true God, so he is true man, subsisting from a rational soul and human flesh.* Cf. the Third Lateran Council, celebrated under Alexander III, title *On Heretics,* c. 20.

la: Libr. I. Phys. text. 27. et 30. (c. 3.): *Quod vere est [i. e. substantia] nulli accidit.*

en: *Physics* I, texts 27 and 30 (c. 3): *That which truly is [i.e. substance] is an accident to nothing.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. et 46. (VI. c. 1. et 13.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, texts 2 and 46 (VI, cc. 1 and 13).

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 2; VII. text. 1. seqq.; XI. c. 3. (III. c. 2; VI. c. 1; X. c. 3.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 2; VII, text 1 and following; XI, c. 3 (III, c. 2; VI, c. 1; X, c. 3).

la: Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 1. (VI. c. 1.). — Subinde pro *dicitur* et paulo inferius (in conclusione) pro *dicatur* cod. U bis *praedicatur.* In fine arg. post *per modum habitus* cod. aa sic prosequitur: *et accidentis, sed praedicatur per modum substantiae.*

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 1 (VI, c. 1). — Thereupon for *dicitur,* and a little below (in the conclusion) for *dicatur,* codex U twice [reads] *praedicatur.* At the end of the argument, after *per modum habitus,* codex aa continues thus: *and of an accident, but is predicated after the manner of a substance.*

la: Codd. K Z bb *restat quod et primum.*

en: Codices K Z bb [read] *restat quod et primum* ("there remains both that and the first").

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 3. et q. 2. ad 1. — Codd. F N T U X *iam completo esse.* Mox pro *in aliquo* edd. *in albo.*

en: Cf. above, q. 1, reply to [objection] 3, and q. 2, reply to 1. — Codices F N T U X [read] *iam completo esse.* Soon, for *in aliquo* ("in something"), the editions [read] *in albo* ("in something white").

la: Adverte, quod B. Albert., hic d. 7. a. 6. ait: *Natura humana nullo modo est accidens nec degenerat in accidens; nec antiqui dixerunt, quod degenerat in accidens, sed quod vergit in accidens,* et novelli *pergit* mutaverunt in *degenerat,* cum illa valde diversa sint. Videtur enim *vergere* in accidens propter convenientiam cum accidentis proprietate quadam, non propter accidentis naturam, scil. quod potest abesse Filio Dei sine diminutione personae et advenit ei sine augmento... sed absit, quod degeneret, quia potius generosa fit. Cfr. supra pag. 150, nota 4.

en: Note that B. Albert, here d. 7, a. 6, says: *The human nature is in no way an accident, nor does it degenerate into an accident; nor did the ancients say that it degenerates into an accident, but that it inclines toward an accident,* and the moderns changed *inclines* into *degenerates,* though these are very diverse. For it seems *to incline* toward an accident on account of an agreement with a certain property of an accident, not on account of the nature of an accident — namely, that it can be absent from the Son of God without diminution of the person, and comes to him without augmentation... but far be it that it should degenerate, since rather it is made noble. Cf. above, p. 150, note 4.

la: Codd. K Z adiiciunt *esse.*

en: Codices K Z add *esse.*

la: Cod. K *et non substantialis.* Paulo inferius pro *manifeste apparet* edd. *manifeste tamen patet.*

en: Codex K [reads] *et non substantialis.* A little below, for *manifeste apparet,* the editions [read] *manifeste tamen patet.*

la: Cfr. Apologia de Verbo incarnato, auctore, ut videtur, Ioanne Cornubiensi, in qua contra eos agitur, qui Christum *aliquid* esse negant, secundum quod est homo (inter opera Hug. a S. Vict.). — Paulo superius pro *ex ipso fidei* codd. I aa *ex ipsius fidei.*

en: Cf. the *Apology concerning the Word Incarnate,* by the author, as it seems, John of Cornwall, in which it is argued against those who deny that Christ is *anything* insofar as he is a man (among the works of Hugh of St. Victor). — A little above, for *ex ipso fidei,* codices I aa [read] *ex ipsius fidei.*

la: Scil. personae Verbi.

en: That is, [to the being] of the person of the Word.

la: Cfr. Aristot., 1. Topic. c. 4, et VII. Metaph. text. 1. seqq. (VI. c. 1.). — Codd. O U S U subiiciunt *tantum.* Pro *essendi* edd. hic substituunt *adhaerendi,* et paulo inferius *inhaerendi,* hoc ultimo loco omissa etiam voce *tantum.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 4, and *Metaphysics* VII, text 1 and following (VI, c. 1). — Codices O U S U add *tantum.* For *essendi* ("of being") the editions here substitute *adhaerendi* ("of adhering"), and a little below *inhaerendi* ("of inhering"), in this last place omitting also the word *tantum.*

la: Edd. addunt *et corpus animatum, id est animae unitum.* Mox pro *accidentis* cod. A *accidens,* codd. F N P bb *accidentalis.*

en: The editions add *and a body endowed with soul, that is, united to a soul.* Soon, for *accidentis,* codex A [reads] *accidens;* codices F N P bb [read] *accidentalis.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 11, nota 1. — Paulo superius post *in accidente* Vat. subdit *absoluto.*

en: Cf. above, p. 11, note 1. — A little above, after *in accidente,* the Vatican edition appends *absoluto.*

la: Vat. *diversa,* sicut et in obiectione ipsa habetur. Aliquanto inferius eadem Vat. pro *simul concurrunt* exhibet sic *concurrant* et omittit deinde *ita.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *diversa,* as it is also had in the objection itself. Somewhat below, the same Vatican edition, for *simul concurrunt,* gives thus *concurrant,* and then omits *ita.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. incorp. et ad 5.

en: Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in the body and in the reply to 5.

la: Pro *intelligit* cod. L *intellexit.* Subinde pro *accedit* codd. I L *excedit.*

en: For *intelligit,* codex L [reads] *intellexit.* Thereupon, for *accedit,* codices I L [read] *excedit.*

la: Pro *etiam* cod. A *ipsam.*

en: For *etiam,* codex A [reads] *ipsam.*

la: Cfr. etiam supra Praenotata post divisionem textus et a. 1.

en: Cf. also above, the Praenotata after the division of the text, and article 1. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hac quaestione eliditur gravissimus error tertiae opinionis (quam professus est Abaelardus), scilicet, quod homo de Christo praedicatur accidentaliter, sive, uti ipse dicebat, non *in quid,* sed *in quomodo se habens,* ut cum dicitur: *homo indutus.* Hinc orta est propositio etiam a Petro Lombardo (hic c. 1. 4.) relata, quod Christus non est aliquid, secundum quod homo. Hanc perniciosam propositionem condemnavit Alexander III. (cfr. hic I. fundam.), qui antea fuit celeberrimus magister iuris, vocatus Rolandus Bandinelli, Senensis († 1181), qui etiam quodam modo discipulus fuit Abaelardi. Nuper P. Denifle Ord. Praed. invenit in quodam codice saeculi XII. vel XIII. hucusque incognitum librum Sententiarum magistri « Rodlandi », in quo inter alios errores Abaelardi etiam praedicta propositio refellitur. Gravissimis autem argumentis P. Denifle persuadet, istum Rodlandum non esse alium ab Alexandro III. (cfr. periodicum *Archiv für Litt. u. Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* Heft 2. 3. pag. 434–461). — Quomodo sane intelligendum sit, quod humana natura in Christo vergit in accidens, bene explicatur in corp., et cfr. pag. 155, nota 6. Durandus quidem errorem Abaelardi reprobat; nihilominus displicet modus loquendi, quo idem explicat suam propositionem, accidentaliter esse Verbo unitam naturam humanam.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 6; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 37. 49. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 7. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** By this question is struck down the most grievous error of the third opinion (which Abelard professed), namely, that "man" is predicated of Christ accidentally, or, as he himself said, not *as to what* [a thing is], but *as to how it is disposed,* as when it is said: *a clothed man.* Hence arose the proposition, related also by Peter Lombard (here c. 1, 4), that Christ is not anything insofar as he is a man. This pernicious proposition Alexander III condemned (cf. here, fundamentum 1), who had earlier been a most celebrated master of law, called Roland Bandinelli of Siena († 1181), who also was in a certain way a disciple of Abelard. Recently Fr. Denifle, of the Order of Preachers, found in a certain codex of the twelfth or thirteenth century a hitherto-unknown book of *Sentences* of a master "Rodland," in which, among other errors of Abelard, the aforesaid proposition is also refuted. And by very weighty arguments Fr. Denifle makes it convincing that this Rodland is none other than Alexander III (cf. the periodical *Archiv für Litt. u. Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters,* Heft 2, 3, pp. 434–461). — In what sound sense it is to be understood that the human nature in Christ inclines toward an accident is well explained in the body [of the article], and cf. p. 155, note 6. Durandus indeed reproves the error of Abelard; nevertheless the manner of speaking displeases [him], by which the same man explains his proposition, that the human nature is united to the Word accidentally.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa,* p. III, q. 6, m. 3. — Scotus, in both his commentaries, q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; *Summa* III, q. 2, a. 6; *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, cc. 37, 49. — B. Albert, *III Sent.,* d. 7, a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 4, a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.154–156 (PDF 176–178; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 11166–11358). For this chunk the OCR is clean and matches the PDF bands closely (no cascade-shatter in the Respondeo/Solutio); the PDF bands confirmed the page-split boundaries, the per-page footer sequences, and the SCHOLION text. Fresh literal English translation; scholia and apparatus translated in full.

**Alignment.** VERIFIED. q3 opener reads *Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit substantia, an homo praedicetur per modum habitus et accidentis, sicut dicebat opinio tertia* — the third opinion (*secundum habitum*, Abelard's "habitus theory"). Distinct from q1 (*Utrum Christus sit duo*, DONE bb… → 82ba1f2) and q2 (*Utrum persona Christi sit una unitate simplici, an composita*, DONE bb6f6). LAST quaestio of Articulus I.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.154:** q2's SCHOLION sect. II tail occupies the top of p.154-L (ends "...praesertim can. 8. et 4. Con-"), then the QUAESTIO III header spans both columns; q3 opens. Fundamenta args 1–4 (p.154-L), Sed contra args 1–2 + opening of arg. 3 (p.154-R). Footer = notes 1–8 (single per-page sequence across both columns).
- **p.155:** Sed contra args 3–6, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo opens (twofold-sense distinction, Conclusio 1 + *vergit in accidens* + *de habitu*). Footer = notes 1–9 (suffixed `1b`–`9b`; note 6b = the long B. Albert *vergit/degenerat* note).
- **p.156:** Respondeo continued (sensus alius, Conclusio 2 + 3), Solutio oppositorum ad 1/2–6, *De 3 opinionum diversitate*, then the SCHOLION (I–II) opens at the foot of p.156-R and runs onto p.157. Footer = notes 1–10 (suffixed `1c`–`9c`; note 10 = *Cfr. etiam supra Praenotata* → `9c`). The two p.156 scholion-footer notes (Denifle source-list) carry no body markers; rendered inline in the scholion text.

**Footer hand-off.**
- PICKED UP from d6-a1-q2: **NONE** — q2's p.152+p.153 footers were fully exhausted in q2, and q2's p.154 content is the markerless SCHOLION (no footers). q3 opens its own p.154 footer sequence (first marker *Ad Philippenses secundo¹*).
- FORWARDED to d6-a2-q1: **NONE** — q3's p.154+155+156 footer sequences are fully exhausted here. The SCHOLION ends "Biel, hic q. 2." just before ARTICULUS II; the scholion's source-list footers (Denifle/Rodland refs) print on the p.156–157 footers and belong to q3. ARTICULUS II (raw 11359) opens its own footer sequence with q1's body markers.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: TRUE`. A standalone SCHOLION (sections **I–II**) prints at q3's tail, spanning p.156-R foot → p.157, ending "Biel, hic q. 2." just before ARTICULUS II. **I** = the question strikes down the gravest error of the third opinion (Abelard's accidental predication / *homo indutus*), the Lombard-related proposition condemned by Alexander III (= Roland Bandinelli, possibly the "Rodland" of Denifle's discovery), with a cross-ref to the body's sound sense of *vergit in accidens*. **II** = parallel commentator source-list. The scholion carries **NO footnote markers** (cross-references only: *hic I. fundam.*, *pag. 155 nota 6*).

**Apparatus count.** 27 entries: p.154 notes 1–8 (`[^1]`–`[^8]`), p.155 notes 1–9 (`[^1b]`–`[^9b]`), p.156 notes 1–10 collapsed to 9 body-anchored entries (`[^1c]`–`[^9c]`; the p.156 footer's final numbered note *Cfr. etiam supra Praenotata...* is `[^9c]`).

**[?] flags.** NONE.

**ARTICULUS II forecast (for d6-a2-q1).** ARTICULUS II *De qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis* (raw 11359; "ARTIGULUS II" is an OCR garble of ARTICULUS). Opener: *Consequenter quaeritur de qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis, ex qua consurgit diversitas istarum trium opinionum, circa quam quaeruntur tria* — three quaestiones: (1) de illa beatissima unione quantum ad **terminum**; (2) de ipsa quantum ad **modum**; (3) de eadem quantum ad **gradum**. q1 = *Utrum unio duarum naturarum sit terminata ad unitatem personae* (raw 11369, printed p.157+), opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad terminum; et quaeritur, utrum terminata sit ad unitatem personae, an non.*


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 157 -->

### Articulus II. *De qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis.*

Consequenter quaeritur de qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis, ex qua consurgit diversitas istarum trium opinionum, circa quam quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de illa beatissima unione quantum ad terminum.

Secundo vero quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad modum.

Tertio vero quaeritur de eadem quantum ad gradum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum unio duarum naturarum sit terminata ad unitatem personae.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad terminum; et quaeritur, utrum terminata sit ad unitatem personae, an non. Et quod sic, videtur.

(*Fundamenta.*) 1. Ioannis octavo[^1]: *Ego principium, qui et loquor vobis*; sed *ego* est pronomen demonstrativum, ergo certam demonstrat personam; et *qui* est nomen relativum, ergo et eandem refert personam: ergo una erat persona, quae erat principium, et quae loquebatur. Sed principium erat secundum divinam, et loquebatur secundum humanam naturam: ergo unio illa ad unitatem personalem videtur esse terminata.

2. Item, solus Filius Dei est unitus humanae naturae; sed Filius Dei non distinguitur a Patre nisi in persona: ergo necesse est, illam unionem habere pro termino unitatem personalem[^2].

3. Item, unio est via ad aliquam unitatem, ergo si non sit illa unio frustra, ad aliquam unitatem pervenit; sed non perduxit ad unitatem naturae, quia nec divina natura potest fieri humana, nec e converso, nec ex his potest fieri tertia: ergo necesse est, quod unio illa terminetur ad unitatem personae[^3].

4. Item, quando aliqua duo uniuntur, quorum unum praedominatur alteri, praedominans trahit ad se illud cui praedominatur; sed Dei Filius unitus est humanae naturae, cui per omnia praedominatur: ergo traxit eam ad propriam unitatem. Sed non traxit eam ad unitatem naturalem, sicut prius[^4] ostensum est: ergo traxit ad unitatem personalem.

(*Ad oppositum.*) Sed contra: 1. Aeternum non potest esse terminus rei temporalis; sed unitas personalis Filii Dei est aeterna, unio vero fuit temporalis: ergo illa unio non poterit terminari ad unitatem personalem.

2. Item, nihil unum et idem est medium et extremum et terminus in eadem actione[^5]; sed personae unitas in illa unione habet rationem extremi: ergo non videtur, quod habeat rationem termini.

3. Item, aequalis simplicitatis et dignitatis est persona divina, sicut et natura; sed propter dignitatem et simplicitatem illius naturae unionem illam impossibile est terminari ad unitatem naturae[^6]: ergo impossibile est terminari ad unitatem personae.

4. Item, sicut divinae naturae respondet persona increata, sic humanae naturae respondet persona creata: ergo cum terminus unionis aequaliter se habeat ad extrema, et unio illa non possit terminari ad unitatem personae creatae[^7], pari ratione videtur, quod non valeat terminari ad unitatem personae increatae: ergo simpliciter est verum, quod unio illa non terminatur ad unitatem personae.

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### Conclusio.

> Duarum naturarum in Christo unio terminatur ad unitatem personae divinae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam est unio, (*Species 4 unionis.*) in qua est unius unibilis in naturam alterius conversio; et hoc est, quia unius est ad alterum repugnantia et praedominantia, sicut si gutta aquae uniatur amphorae vini. — Quaedam vero est unio, in qua est utriusque unibilis alteratio et tertiae naturae productio; et hoc, quia est ibi repugnantia et non excellens praedominatio, sicut uniuntur elementa ad constituendum corpora mixta[^8]. — Quaedam vero est unio, in qua non est unitorum transmutatio, sed tertiae naturae constitutio; et hoc est, quia unibilia non habent repugnantiam, habent tamen mutuam dependentiam, sicut uniuntur corpus et anima ad constitutionem hominis. — Quaedam vero est unio, in qua nec est transmutatio[^9] nec tertiae naturae constitutio, sed unum unibilium fundatur tantum in altero. Et hoc est, quia nec est ibi repugnantia nec essentialis dependentia[^10], est tamen excellens praedominatio; sicut quando arbor una inseritur stipiti alterius arboris, tunc utraque arbor servat naturam propriam, et tamen una arbor substantificatur in stipite alterius arboris, ita quod unus est stipes utriusque.

(*Conclusio 1.*) Hoc tamen quarto unionis genere habet uniri natura divina humanae. Quia enim nulla est repugnantia inter naturam divinam et humanam, ideo nulla est ibi transmutatio, nec conversio. Quia vero non est mutua dependentia, non est tertiae naturae constitutio. Sed quia est ibi alterius, scilicet divinae naturae, praedominatio, necesse est, quod divina natura humanam naturam trahat ad unitatem; sed ad unitatem naturae non potest trahere sine transmutatione et conversione: (*Conclusio 2.*) necesse est ergo, quod eam trahat ad unitatem personae, et una et eadem hypostasis sit divinae naturae et humanae, ut quasi humana natura fundetur et substantificetur in divino stipite. — (*Corollarium.*) Et ideo multum assimilatur ista unio ei unioni, quae est per insertionem. Propter quod etiam fortassis dicit beatus Iacobus primo[^5b]: *In mansuetudine suscipite insitum Verbum.* — Concedendum est igitur, quod illa unio terminatur ad unitatem personae.

(*Solutio oppositorum.*) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas illius personae est aeterna; dicendum, quod *persona* nominat ipsum suppositum in comparatione ad naturam, cui subiicitur; sic et *dignitas personae* attendenda est respectu naturae[^6b]. Potest igitur persona illa comparari ad naturam divinam, et sic eius dignitas est aeterna. Potest etiam comparari ad naturam divinam pariter et humanam; et sic connotat aliquid temporale, et ratione illius connotati dicitur esse terminus unionis. Illa enim unio non fecit, ut illa persona esset vel una esset, sed fecit, quod persona, quae erat una in natura simplici, esset una in natura duplici[^7b].

(*Notandum.*) 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas[^8b] personalis est extremum, ergo non est terminus; dicendum, quod secundum unam comparationem, quam habet, videlicet ad divinam naturam, est extremum; secundum autem comparationem, quam habet ad humanam naturam, est unionis terminus, quia per illam unionem factum est, ut persona Verbi esset homo. Secundum autem comparationem, quam habet ad utramque naturam, tenet rationem medii. Nihil autem impedit, unum et idem diverso respectu habere comparationem medii et extremi et termini; et per hunc quidem modum in proposito intelligendum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propter summam simplicitatem divinae naturae[^9b] non potest uniri humanae naturae in unitatem naturae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia plures naturas in *unam naturam* cedere repugnat simplici naturae, sed (*Haec unio non repugnat simplicitati personae.*) plures naturas uniri in *unitatem personae* non repugnat simplici personae duplici ex causa. Una quidem est, quia, sicut plures personae possunt esse in una natura, ita quod non impediunt naturae simplicitatem; sic plures naturae in una persona[^10b]. Alia vero ratio est, quia persona divina potest fieri suppositum humanae naturae sola relatione humanae naturae ad

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ipsam, quae quidem relatio nihil ponit novum circa personam Verbi, sed solum in natura assumta; et ideo unio naturarum unitati personae non repugnat. Non sic autem est, quando unio terminatur ad unitatem naturae, ubi non solum notatur esse respectus, sed etiam notatur convenientia fieri in forma; et hoc non potest fieri sine compositione sive transmutatione aliqua.

(*Notandum.*) 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio illa non potest terminari ad unitatem personae creatae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia divina natura non potest substantificari in persona creata. Quod enim substantificatur in aliquo minus habet de stabilitate, quam illud in quo substantificatur; et ideo, quia veriori modo est ens et per se stans natura divina quam humana, ideo humana natura potest inniti[^1c] divinae personae, quamvis divina natura non possit inniti naturae creatae. Et ideo potest fieri unio in unitatem personae increatae, quamvis non possit fieri unio in unitatem personae creatae. — (*Alia ratio.*) Est et alia ratio: quia persona semper habet denominari a digniori proprietate[^2c]; et ideo divina natura et humana in unam concurrunt hypostasim. Et cum semper necesse sit, divinam naturam excellere dignitate, non potest fieri unio in unitatem personae creatae, licet possit fieri unio in unitatem personae increatae. Et ideo patet, quod non est simile quod assumit pro simili, sed valde dissimile.

english:
### Article II. *On the quality and nobility of that union.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the quality and nobility of that union, from which arises the diversity of those three opinions; and concerning it three things are asked.

First, there is inquiry concerning that most blessed union with respect to its *terminus*.

Second, there is inquiry concerning it with respect to its *mode*.

Third, there is inquiry concerning the same with respect to its *degree*.

### Question I. *Whether the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the person.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and there is inquiry concerning that union with respect to its terminus; and it is asked whether it is terminated at the unity of the person, or not. And that it is so, it seems.

(*Arguments.*) 1. John 8[^1]: *I am the beginning, who also speak to you*; but *I* is a demonstrative pronoun, therefore it points out a determinate person; and *who* is a relative noun, therefore it refers to the same person: therefore there was one person, who was the beginning, and who was speaking. But he was the beginning according to the divine nature, and was speaking according to the human nature: therefore that union seems to be terminated at the personal unity.

2. Likewise, the Son of God alone is united to the human nature; but the Son of God is not distinguished from the Father except in person: therefore it is necessary that that union have for its terminus the personal unity[^2].

3. Likewise, a union is a way toward some unity, therefore, if that union is not in vain, it arrives at some unity; but it did not lead to a unity of nature, since neither can the divine nature become human, nor the reverse, nor can a third be made from these: therefore it is necessary that that union be terminated at the unity of the person[^3].

4. Likewise, when any two things are united, one of which predominates over the other, the predominating one draws to itself that over which it predominates; but the Son of God was united to the human nature, over which he predominates in all things: therefore he drew it to his own unity. But he did not draw it to a natural unity, as was shown before[^4]: therefore he drew it to the personal unity.

(*On the contrary.*) But against this: 1. The eternal cannot be the terminus of a temporal thing; but the personal unity of the Son of God is eternal, while the union was temporal: therefore that union cannot be terminated at the personal unity.

2. Likewise, no one and the same thing is the middle and the extreme and the terminus in the same action[^5]; but the unity of the person in that union has the character of an extreme: therefore it does not seem that it has the character of a terminus.

3. Likewise, the divine person is of equal simplicity and dignity as the nature; but on account of the dignity and simplicity of that nature it is impossible for that union to be terminated at the unity of nature[^6]: therefore it is impossible for it to be terminated at the unity of the person.

4. Likewise, just as to the divine nature there corresponds an uncreated person, so to the human nature there corresponds a created person: therefore, since the terminus of a union is related equally to the extremes, and that union cannot be terminated at the unity of a created person[^7], by parity of reasoning it seems that it cannot be terminated at the unity of an uncreated person: therefore it is simply true that that union is not terminated at the unity of the person.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the divine person.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain union (*The four species of union.*) in which there is a conversion of one of the unitable things into the nature of the other; and this is because there is in the one a repugnance to, and predominance over, the other, as if a drop of water were united to a flagon of wine. — But there is a certain union in which there is an alteration of both unitable things and the production of a third nature; and this is because there is repugnance there and not an excelling predominance, as the elements are united to constitute mixed bodies[^8]. — But there is a certain union in which there is no transmutation of the things united, but the constitution of a third nature; and this is because the unitable things have no repugnance, yet have a mutual dependence, as body and soul are united for the constitution of man. — But there is a certain union in which there is neither transmutation[^9] nor the constitution of a third nature, but one of the unitable things is founded only in the other. And this is because there is there neither repugnance nor essential dependence[^10], yet there is an excelling predominance; as when one tree is grafted onto the stock of another tree, then each tree preserves its own nature, and yet the one tree is substantiated in the stock of the other tree, so that there is one stock of both.

(*First conclusion.*) Yet it is by this fourth kind of union that the divine nature has to be united to the human. For since there is no repugnance between the divine nature and the human, therefore there is there no transmutation, nor conversion. And since there is no mutual dependence, there is no constitution of a third nature. But because there is there the predominance of the other, namely of the divine nature, it is necessary that the divine nature draw the human nature to unity; but it cannot draw it to a unity of nature without transmutation and conversion: (*Second conclusion.*) it is necessary, therefore, that it draw it to a unity of person, and that there be one and the same hypostasis of the divine nature and the human, so that the human nature may be, as it were, founded and substantiated in the divine stock. — (*Corollary.*) And therefore this union is much assimilated to that union which is by grafting. On account of which also, perhaps, blessed James says, in chapter 1[^5b]: *With meekness receive the ingrafted Word.* — It must be conceded, therefore, that that union is terminated at the unity of the person.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. To that which is objected, that the unity of that person is eternal; it must be said that *person* names the supposit itself in comparison to the nature to which it is subjected; and so the *dignity of the person* must be regarded with respect to the nature[^6b]. The person, therefore, can be compared to the divine nature, and thus its dignity is eternal. It can also be compared to the divine nature and the human alike; and thus it connotes something temporal, and by reason of that thing connoted it is said to be the terminus of the union. For that union did not bring it about that the person should be, or should be one, but it brought it about that the person, which was one in a simple nature, should be one in a twofold nature[^7b].

(*Note.*) 2. To that which is objected, that the personal unity[^8b] is an extreme, therefore it is not a terminus; it must be said that according to one comparison which it has, namely to the divine nature, it is an extreme; but according to the comparison which it has to the human nature, it is the terminus of the union, because by that union it came about that the person of the Word was a man. But according to the comparison which it has to both natures, it holds the character of a middle. And nothing prevents one and the same thing from having, in a different respect, the comparison of middle and of extreme and of terminus; and it is in this way indeed that it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that on account of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature[^9b] it cannot be united to the human nature in a unity of nature; it must be said that it is not similar: because for several natures to coalesce into *one nature* is repugnant to a simple nature, but (*This union is not repugnant to the simplicity of the person.*) for several natures to be united in the *unity of a person* is not repugnant to a simple person, for a twofold cause. The one indeed is, because, just as several persons can be in one nature, in such a way that they do not impede the simplicity of the nature; so several natures can be in one person[^10b]. But the other reason is, because the divine person can become the supposit of the human nature by the relation alone of the human nature to

it, which relation indeed posits nothing new about the person of the Word, but only in the assumed nature; and therefore the union of the natures is not repugnant to the unity of the person. But it is not so when a union is terminated at a unity of nature, where there is noted not only a relation, but there is noted also that a fitting-together comes to be in the form; and this cannot come to be without some composition or transmutation.

(*Note.*) 4. To that which is objected, that that union cannot be terminated at the unity of a created person; it must be said that it is not similar, because the divine nature cannot be substantiated in a created person. For what is substantiated in something has less of stability than that in which it is substantiated; and therefore, since the divine nature is being and self-subsistent in a truer mode than the human, therefore the human nature can rest upon[^1c] the divine person, although the divine nature cannot rest upon a created nature. And therefore a union into the unity of an uncreated person can come to be, although a union into the unity of a created person cannot come to be. — (*Another reason.*) There is also another reason: because a person always has to be denominated from the worthier property[^2c]; and therefore the divine nature and the human concur into one hypostasis. And since it is always necessary that the divine nature excel in dignity, a union into the unity of a created person cannot come to be, although a union into the unity of an uncreated person can come to be. And therefore it is clear that what he takes for something similar is not similar, but very dissimilar.

la: Vers. 25. Cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 38. n. 11.

en: Verse 25. Cf. Augustine, *On the Gospel of John*, tract 38, n. 11.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. — In maiori edd. omittunt *solus*.

en: Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 5, a. 1, q. 1. — In the major premise the editions omit *solus*.

la: De hoc arg. cfr. Boeth., de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 6. seq.

en: On this argument cf. Boethius, *On the One Person and the Two Natures*, c. 6 and following.

la: Dist. 5. a. 1. q. 1. et q. 2. ad 4. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 7. seqq. (c. 2.), ubi docetur, corpus compositum moveri secundum elementum praedominans.

en: Distinction 5, a. 1, q. 1, and q. 2, ad 4. — On the major premise cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the Earth*, I, text 7 and following (c. 2), where it is taught that a composite body is moved according to the predominating element.

la: Codd. G U *unione*. Cfr. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Codices G and U read *unione* ("union"). Cf. d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et p. II. q. 2.

en: Cf. I. Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and p. II, q. 2.

la: Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

en: See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.

la: Hanc duplicem unionem Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 88. seqq. (c. 10.) describit sic: *Activorum autem et passivorum quaecumque sunt facile divisibilia, multa quidem paucis et magna parvis composita, non faciunt mixtionem, sed augmentationem dominantis; mutatur enim alterum in dominans. Ideo gutta vini decem millibus congiis aquae non miscetur; solvitur enim forma et mutatur in universam aquam. Quando autem potentiis adaequantur quodammodo, tunc mutatur quidem utrumque in dominans ex sui ipsius natura, non generatur autem alterum, sed medium et commune... Mixtio autem est miscibilium alteratorum unio.* — Paulo superius post *est ibi repugnantia* codd. F G X adiungunt *et praedominantia*, edd. 4, 2 *et praedominatio*, quae edd. et subinde pro *et non excellens* substituunt *sed non excellens*.

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, text 88 and following (c. 10), describes this twofold union thus: "But of active and passive things, whatever are easily divisible, when many are composed with few and great with small, do not make a mixture, but an increase of the dominant; for the one is changed into the dominant. Therefore a drop of wine is not mixed with ten thousand congii of water; for its form is dissolved and changed into the water as a whole. But when they are made equal in their powers in some way, then each is indeed changed into the dominant from its own nature, but the one is not generated, rather a middle and common thing... A mixture, however, is the union of mixable things that have been altered." — A little above, after *est ibi repugnantia*, codices F G X add *et praedominantia*, editions 4 and 2 *et praedominatio*; and these editions thereupon, in place of *et non excellens*, substitute *sed non excellens*.

la: Cod. U addit *unitorum*.

en: Codex U adds *unitorum* ("of the things united").

la: Ex iis quae praecedunt, supple cum Vat. *mutua*. De his modis unionis vide supra pag. 8, nota 3, et Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul., regul. 100.

en: From what precedes, supply with the Vatican edition *mutua* ("mutual"). On these modes of union see above, p. 8, note 3, and Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 100. <!-- page 158 -->

la: Vers. 21. — Paulo superius pro *et una* codd. Z bb *ut una*.

en: Verse 21. — A little above, in place of *et una*, codices Z and bb read *ut una*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. — Paulo superius post *dicendum, quod* edd. cum paucis codd. inserunt *sicut*; et subinde post *et sic eius dignitas* Vat. cum cod. cc supplet *et unitas*, de qua revera agit obiectio.

en: Cf. above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. — A little above, after *dicendum, quod*, the editions with a few codices insert *sicut*; and thereupon, after *et sic eius dignitas*, the Vatican edition with codex cc supplies *et unitas* ("and the unity"), which the objection really treats of.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 2.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Codd. I L aa cc *unio*.

en: Codices I, L, aa, cc read *unio* ("union").

la: Hic vel supple cum Vat. *ipsa*, vel lege cum edd. 4, 2 *divina natura* pro *divinae naturae*. Mox edd. bis *simplicitati* pro *simplici*.

en: Here either supply with the Vatican edition *ipsa* ("itself"), or read with editions 4 and 2 *divina natura* for *divinae naturae*. Presently the editions twice read *simplicitati* for *simplici*.

la: De quo vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1; de propos. seq. cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.

en: On which see I. Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 1; on the following proposition cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1. <!-- page 159 -->

la: Edd. nec non aliqui codd. hic et paulo post verbum *inniti* infeliciter transformarunt in *uniri*.

en: The editions, as also some codices, here and a little after unhappily transformed the word *inniti* ("rest upon") into *uniri* ("be united").

la: Quod probatum est supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

en: Which was proved above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione, quae multa continet notatu digna, plura magis explicantur, quae iam tacta sunt supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, ubi probatur, nullatenus in Christo fuisse assumtam personam humanam. Hic vero positive docetur, terminum huius unionis esse personam divinam. — In descriptione quatuor specierum unionis recensetur secundo loco unio, quae fit in mixtionibus sive combinationibus chimicis; ubi auctor talibus utitur terminis, qui differentiam opinionis, quae est inter Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram respectu unitatis formarum substantialium, satis manifestant, si conferuntur cum verbis S. Thomae de eadem specie unionis prolatis, quae sic sonant: « Tertia natura componitur ex duabus naturis non manentibus, sicut ex quatuor elementis componitur mixtum » (III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. in corp.). De hac differentia opinionum cfr. II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. in scholio.

**II.** Ad explicandam quartam speciem unionis, quae est in Christo, et praecipue, quod ita fit ista unio, ut unum sit alterius eique proprium, quin unum mutetur in alterum; hic adhibetur similitudo quaedam sumta ex arbore, quae inserta est in stipite alterius arboris. Haec similitudo magis explicatur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 7. m. 1. a. 1.) sic: « Surculus piri unitur arbori, cui inseritur, sicut pomo vel alii; servatur enim natura utriusque, scilicet piri et pomi, nec unquam fiet pirum pomum, nec e converso; nec ex illis efficitur tertium, scilicet arbor aliqua, quae nec sit pirum nec pomum; sed unum fit de altero, sive est de altero, sicut pirus de pomo, quia in insertione dominans trahit alterum ad sui unitatem, ita quod est de illo, sed non est illud » etc. « Secundum hunc modum dicendum, sicut possumus dicere — nam *non sumus digni corrigiam calceamenti solvere* [Luc. 3, 16; Ioan. 1, 27.], hoc est sacramentum unionis exponere — quod unio humanitatis ad Deitatem est illa, in qua unum fit, vel est de altero; et non, in qua unum, scilicet tertium, sit ex illis » [scilicet ut sit compositio rigorosa per mutationem utriusque extremi]. — Ipsa verba Alexandri iam insinuant, quod haec similitudo, licet sit apta ad quasdam proprietates huius unionis illustrandas, tamen claudicet in multis aliis, quae melius explicantur quibusdam aliis similitudinibus. Prae ceteris servit similitudo unionis animae et corporis, iam in Symbolo Athanasiano adhibita, de qua S. Thom. (Quaest. disput. de unione Verbi etc. a. 1.) dicit: « Huius unionis exemplum in rebus creatis nullum est propinquius quam unio animae rationalis ad corpus ». Tamen etiam haec analogia non parum deficit.

**III.** Praeter laudatum Alexandrum: Scot., in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. 5; Quodl. q. 19. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. 3.; S. III. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 5. a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 2. — Biel, III. Sent. d. 5. q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this question, which contains many things worthy of note, several matters are more fully explained which have already been touched upon above in d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, where it is proved that in no way was a human person assumed in Christ. Here, however, it is positively taught that the terminus of this union is the divine person. — In the description of the four species of union there is reckoned in the second place the union which comes about in mixtures or chemical combinations; where the author uses such terms as sufficiently manifest the difference of opinion which exists between Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure regarding the unity of substantial forms, if they are compared with the words of St. Thomas uttered concerning the same species of union, which run thus: "A third nature is composed of two natures not remaining, as a mixture is composed of four elements" (III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, in the body). Concerning this difference of opinions cf. II. Sent. d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, in the scholion.

**II.** To explain the fourth species of union, which is in Christ, and especially that this union comes about in such a way that one is the other's and proper to it, without one being changed into the other; here there is employed a certain likeness taken from a tree which is grafted onto the stock of another tree. This likeness is more fully explained by Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 7, m. 1, a. 1) thus: "A shoot of a pear is united to the tree onto which it is grafted, as to an apple or another; for the nature of each is preserved, namely of the pear and of the apple, nor will the pear ever become an apple, nor the reverse; nor is a third made from them, namely some tree which is neither pear nor apple; but one becomes of the other, or is of the other, as the pear is of the apple, because in grafting the dominant draws the other to its own unity, so that it is of it, but is not it" etc. "According to this mode it must be said, as we can say — for *we are not worthy to loose the latchet of the sandal* [Luke 3:16; John 1:27], that is, to expound the sacrament of the union — that the union of humanity to Deity is that in which one becomes, or is, of the other; and not that in which one, namely a third, is from them" [namely, so that there should be a rigorous composition through a change of both extremes]. — The very words of Alexander already intimate that this likeness, although it is apt for illustrating certain properties of this union, nevertheless limps in many other respects, which are better explained by certain other likenesses. Before the rest the likeness of the union of soul and body serves, already employed in the Athanasian Creed, concerning which St. Thomas (*Disputed Questions on the Union of the Word*, a. 1) says: "No example of this union in created things is nearer than the union of the rational soul to the body." Yet even this analogy falls not a little short.

**III.** Besides the cited Alexander: Scotus, in both *Scripta* on III. Sent. d. 1, q. 1, 5; Quodl. q. 19. — St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, 3; S. III. q. 2, a. 1, 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, III. Sent. d. 5, a. 4, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, 3. — Durandus, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 2. — Biel, III. Sent. d. 5, q. unica.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.157–159 (PDF 179–181; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 11359–11521), which is clean here (no cascade-shatter). Fresh literal English. Apparatus built continuously from the printed-page footer blocks.

**ARTICULUS II opener folded in.** Per the locked chunking convention, the short ARTICULUS II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis … circa quam quaeruntur tria*, with its 3-quaestio list: terminus / modus / gradus) is folded into a2-q1 — no standalone divisio chunk. ART. II prints at the foot of p.157-L (OCR "ARTIGULUS II"), title *De qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis*.

**Alignment VERIFIED.** q1 opener reads *Circa primum … quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad **terminum**; et quaeritur, utrum terminata sit ad unitatem personae, an non* — concerns the *terminus* of the union (terminated at the unity of the person), matching *title_la*. Not q2 (*modum*) nor q3 (*gradum*).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.157** (running head DIST. VI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.): ART. II opener + 3-quaestio list (foot of L); QUAESTIO I header; Fundamenta args 1–4 (L col); Sed contra (Ad oppositum) args 1–4 (R col). Footer notes 1–7 → `[^1]`–`[^7]`.
- **p.158** (running head 158 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. III., OCR "138"): CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (four species of union, *Species 4 unionis*) + Conclusio 1/2 + Corollarium (James 1:21 *insitum Verbum*); Solutio oppositorum ad 1/2/3 (*Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Haec unio non repugnat simplicitati personae*). Footer notes 1–10 → `[^1b]`–`[^10b]` (note 1b = long Aristot. *de Generat. et corrupt.* mixture text).
- **p.159** (running head DIST. VI. ART. II. QUAEST. II., OCR "139"): tail of Solutio ad 3 + ad 4 (*Notandum*) + *Alia ratio* (Respondeo close); then SCHOLION I–III; then QUAESTIO II header begins. q1 owns p.159 footer notes 1–2 (the *inniti¹* / *digniori proprietate²* markers in the ad-4/Alia-ratio tail) → `[^1c]`/`[^2c]`. **p.159 footer note 3 (*Algazel* / *Libr. I. c. 8.*) belongs to QUAESTIO II** (keys q2's body marker *Algazelis … Metaphysica*) — forwarded.

**Footer hand-off.**
- **PICKED UP from d6-a1-q3: NONE.** q3's p.154–156 footers + its scholion source-list (Denifle/Rodland) were exhausted in q3; ARTICULUS II opens its own footer sequence with the p.157 block (*Ioannis octavo¹* = John 8).
- **FORWARDED to d6-a2-q2: p.159 footer note 3** (*Libr. I. c. 8. … Algazel*), which keys QUAESTIO II's opening *Auctoritate ipsius Algazelis in sua Metaphysica* marker, not q1. q1's own p.157+158 footers and p.159 notes 1–2 are fully exhausted here.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (sections **I–III**) prints at q1's tail spanning p.159-L (foot) → p.159-R, ending "Biel, III. Sent. d. 5. q. unica." just before QUAESTIO II. It carries **NO footnote markers** (cross-references only): I = the question contains much *notatu digna*, positively teaches the divine person as the union's terminus, with the Thomas-vs-Bonaventure note on unity of substantial forms; II = the grafting-likeness from Alexander of Hales + the preferred soul-body (Athanasian Creed / Thomas *de unione Verbi*) analogy with its limits; III = the parallel-commentator source-list. Marginal labels rendered inline in parens (*Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Species 4 unionis, Conclusio 1/2, Corollarium, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum×2, Haec unio non repugnat simplicitati personae, Alia ratio*).

**`[?]` flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0