title: Dist. 13, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether light is a substantial or an accidental form

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum lux sit forma substantialis, vel accidentalis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum lux sit forma substantialis, vel accidentalis. Et quod sit forma substantialis, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Prior est generatio substantiae quam accidentis[^1]: sed lux inter omnes formas corporales describitur primo fuisse creata: ergo non videtur accidens, sed substantia, aut illa operatio fuit inordinata.

2. Item, forma substantialis est nobilior quam accidentalis; sed lux est nobilissima formarum corporalium, sicut in multis locis dicit Augustinus[^2]: ergo cum multae aliae formae corporales sint substantiae, videtur, quod lux sit forma substantialis.

3. Item, lux inter omnia corporalia maxime assimilatur luci aeternae, sicut ostendit Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus[^3], et maxime in virtute et efficacia: ergo si hoc totum magis competit formae substantiali quam accidentali, videtur, quod lux sit substantia.

4. Item, nullum accidens est causa substantiae[^4]; sed lux corporis caelestis est principium educendi animam vegetabilem et sensibilem, quae sunt formae substantiales: ergo videtur, quod sit substantia.

5. Item, nullum accidens est per semetipsum activum, cum nullum sit per se existens: ergo sicut per se non est, ita etiam nec per se agit; sed corpus luminosum, in quantum luminosum, per se activum est: ergo videtur, quod lux non sit ei accidens, sed substantialis forma.

6. Item, nullum accidens facit gradum et nobilitatem in rebus secundum differentias specificas propter sui ipsius participationem maiorem et minorem[^5]: sed corpora mundi, secundum quod plus et minus participant de luce, sunt magis et minus nobilia quantum ad *esse substantiale*, et specie differentia, sicut patet respiciendo gradus in corporibus mundi: ergo impossibile est, lucem esse accidens corpori luminoso.

*Ad oppositum:*

1. Nihil est de constitutione accidentis nisi accidens; sed lux est de compositione coloris, cum color non sit aliud quam *lux incorporata*[^6]: ergo cum color sit accidens, lux est forma accidentalis.

2. Item, nihil est per se obiectum sensus nisi accidens[^7], quia omne obiectum sensus ponitur in tertia specie qualitatis; sed lux se ipsa videtur et percipitur sensu visus, et est illud, quo mediante cetera sentiuntur, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram duodecimo[^8]: ergo lux est accidens. Ait enim Augustinus sic: «*Visus agit pura luce, auditus luce incorporata in subtilissimo aëre,*

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*deinde lux mixta in aëre caliginoso, deinde cum corpulento humore, demum cum terrena crassitudine et sic quinque sensus efficit*».

3. Item, quod augetur in aliquo, salva eius substantia et natura, ipsum est sibi accidens; sed lux augetur in corporibus praecipue luminosis, sicut dicitur Isaiae trigesimo[^9]: *Erit lux lunae sicut lux solis, et lux solis septempliciter* etc.: ergo lux non est substantia, sed accidens, cum substantia non recipiat magis et minus.

4. Item, sicut ignis naturaliter lucet, ita etiam naturaliter calet, nec maior est virtus in ipso lucere quam calere sive calefacere; sed caliditas est qualitas accidentalis ipsius ignis[^10]: ergo et luminositas.

5. Item, si lux in igne est forma substantialis, aut ergo *ultima* completiva, aut *citra ultimam*. Si est forma *ultima* completiva, ergo videtur, quod ignis non differat a caelesti natura, nec quod aliqua luminosa differant specifica differentia[^11]. Si est forma *citra ultimam*: ergo minus est forma perfecta quam forma ignis specifica, cum forma ultima completiva sit in re perfectissima: ergo non videtur, quod in igne lux sit nobilissima forma. Si ergo in caelo est forma ultima, videtur, quod digniora sive nobiliora sint corpora elementaria quam caelestia; quod si falsum est, restat etc.

6. Item, in creaturis qualitas est immediatum principium actionis; unde forma substantialis agit mediantibus proprietatibus accidentalibus tanquam instrumentis[^12]; sed lux est immediatum principium actionis: ergo videtur, quod lux sit accidens.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Lux sub uno respectu est forma substantialis, sub alio vero forma accidentalis.*

**Respondeo:** *Notandum.* Praenotandum est, quod in hac quaestione sapientes opinantur contraria sapientibus.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod lux est *accidens* corpori luminoso, sicut sapientia sive scientia, quae est lux spiritualis, est accidens ipsi animae, et sicut color est accidens corpori terminato[^13], et sicut calor est accidens corpori calido. Dixerunt enim, quod sic se habet corpus luminosum ad lucem, sicut anima ad cognitionem, et sicut corpus terminatum ad colorem, et sicut corpus calidum ad calorem, quoniam per ipsam decoratur, per ipsam sentitur et per ipsam operatur; et ideo, si dicatur forma nobilis, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad *esse primum*, sed quantum ad *esse secundum*; sicut scientia et gratia nobilissimae formae ponuntur, quamvis accidentia esse dicantur. Et sic pro magna parte rationes evadunt. — *Non omnino probatur.* Sed quoniam sacra Scriptura lucem inter ceteras formas pure corporales commendat[^14], et catholici tractatores, sicut Dionysius in quarto de Divinis Nominibus, et Augustinus in multis locis, et philosophi etiam principatum operandi in corporibus luci attribuunt: ideo lucem magis esse substantiam quam accidens sentire videntur.

*Opinio 2, conclusio.* Et ideo est alia positio, quod lux est forma *substantialis* corporum, secundum cuius maiorem et minorem participationem corpora habent verius et dignius *esse* in genere entium. Unde[^15] nobilissi-

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mum corporum, sicut est empyreum illud, est praecipue luminosum, infimum vero, sicut terra, maxime est opacum, intermedia vero, secundum quod sunt magis et minus nobiliora, participant plus et minus. Et quod omnia corpora naturam lucis participent, hoc satis de plano ostendunt, quia vix est corpus opacum, quin per multam tersionem et politionem possit effici luminosum, sicut patet, cum de cinere fit vitrum, et de terra carbunculus.

Utraque autem harum positionum *magnorum* est, et quaelibet valde probabilis nec de facili improbari potest. Si autem interius considerare velimus, quae istarum positionum verior sit, inveniemus, quod utraque earum fundata fuit super aliquod verum. Verum est enim, quod lux, cum sit forma nobilissima inter corporalia, sicut dicunt philosophi et Sancti, secundum cuius participationem maiorem et minorem sunt corpora magis et minus entia, est *substantialis forma*. Verum est etiam, quod cum lux sit per se sensibilis, sit etiam instrumentum operandi, sit etiam augmentabilis et minuibilis, salva forma substantiali, quod ipsa habet *naturam formae accidentalis*[^16].

Et ideo notandum est ad intelligentiam auctoritatum et rationum, quod sicut lux *incorporata* est principium coloris in ipso corpore terminato, qui quidem color est accidens et passibilis[^17] qualitas et sensu percipitur; sic etiam lux in corpore luminoso est principium cuiusdam *fulgoris*, qui ad modum coloris est accidens, et mediante quo luminosum corpus a sensu apprehenditur. — *Distinctio.* Et secundum hoc lux dupliciter potest accipi. — *Conclusio 1.* Uno modo lux dicitur *ipsa forma*, quae dat *esse* corpori lucido, et a qua luminosum corpus principaliter est activum, sicut a primo movente et regulante[^18]. — *Conclusio 2.* Alio modo lux dicitur ipse *fulgor*, qui est circa corpus luminosum, qui consequitur existentiam lucis in tali materia, et qui etiam est sensus obiectum et operationis instrumentum; et sic est *accidentale complementum*.

Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam pro magna parte responsio ad obiecta. Rationes enim ostendentes, lucem esse substantialem formam, procedunt secundum *primam* viam, sicut patet intuenti. Rationes autem ad partem oppositam procedunt via alia, exceptis quibusdam, ad quas satis de facili responderi potest.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod lux est de compositione coloris dici potest, quod lux non dicitur esse de compositione coloris tanquam principium *intrinsecum*, sed tanquam principium *effectivum*, cum accidentia simplicia sint; forma autem substantialis bene potest esse principium effectivum accidentis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est forma sensibilis; dicendum, quod non sentitur ratione suae essentiae, sed ratione *fulgoris* vel *coloris* eam inseparabiliter concomitantis, maxime ubi est vehementia lucis.

3. *Notandum.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augetur; dicendum est, quod augmentum illud attenditur ratione *fulgoris*, non ratione *lucis*, quae est forma substantialis; et si ratione illius attenderetur, adhuc ratio non valeret, quia, quamvis forma substantialis *secundum se* non recipiat magis et minus, habet tamen intendi et remitti secundum *esse* ipsius *in materia*[^19]. Et hoc maxime verum est de formis generalibus, in quibus magis consistit communitas analogiae secundum magis et minus, et prius et posterius quam univocationis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod calor non est forma substantialis calidi; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia non est tantae dignitatis et perfectionis forma caloris, sicut forma lucis. Et hoc patet, quia forma lucis plus recedit a natura contrarietatis, corruptionis et alterationis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est forma ultima in igne; dicendum, quod si lux ponitur esse forma substantialis corporum specie diversorum, utpote caeli et ignis, neutrius est forma ultimo completiva. Ideo ex hoc non concluditur, quod natura elementaris sit nobilior caelesti; nec ex hoc etiam potest concludi, quod alia forma sit nobilior forma lucis, quamvis sit ulterior. — *De duplici forma, communi et ultima.* Forma enim lucis cum ponitur in eodem corpore cum alia forma, non ponitur sicut *dispositio imperfecta*, quae nata sit perfici per ultimam formam, sed ponitur tanquam *forma et natura omnis alterius corporalis formae conservativa* et dans ei agendi efficaciam, et secundum quam attenditur cuiuslibet formae corporalis mensura in dignitate et excellentia. — Et quod obiicitur, quod forma ultimo[^20] completiva nobilior est; hoc verum est, ubi forma illa habet compleri et perfici per ultimam, scilicet ubi forma communis habet perfici per ultimam et specialem. — *Alia solutio.* Vel dicendum, quod hoc veritatem habet, ubi

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utraque forma, scilicet *communis* et *ultima*, est in suo potissimo[^21]. *esse*; sic autem lux non est nisi in caelesti corpore.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est immediatum principium operandi; dicendum, quod illud non cogit necessario, ut videtur; — *Notandum.* forma enim substantialis[^22] per se posse agere videtur. Sed quia exemplum huius non de facili invenitur in aliis, quamvis non irrationabiliter credatur in forma lucis esse possibile, cum sit maxime activa; concedi potest, quod quamvis lux *interius perficiens* sit substantialis forma, tamen *fulgor* ille, quo corpus illud instrumentaliter operatur, sentitur et decoratur, ad naturam accidentis, sicut praedictum est, pertinere non indocte credi potest[^23].

english:
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### Question II. *Whether light is a substantial form, or an accidental [form].*

Secondly it is asked whether light is a substantial or an accidental form. And that it is a substantial form is seen [as follows].

*Foundations.*

1. The generation of substance is prior to that of accident[^1]: but light is described as the first of all corporeal forms to have been created; therefore it does not seem to be an accident, but a substance — or else that operation was disordered.

2. Likewise, a substantial form is more noble than an accidental [form]; but light is the most noble of corporeal forms, as Augustine says in many places[^2]: therefore, since many other corporeal forms are substances, it seems that light is a substantial form.

3. Likewise, light among all corporeals is most assimilated to the eternal light, as Dionysius shows in *On the Divine Names*[^3], and most of all in power and efficacy: therefore if this whole [property] befits a substantial form more than an accidental one, it seems that light is a substance.

4. Likewise, no accident is the cause of a substance[^4]; but the light of a celestial body is the principle of drawing forth the vegetative and sensitive soul, which are substantial forms: therefore it seems that it is a substance.

5. Likewise, no accident is active through itself, since none exists through itself: therefore just as it is not through itself, so neither does it act through itself; but a luminous body, insofar as it is luminous, is active through itself: therefore it seems that light is not an accident to it, but a substantial form.

6. Likewise, no accident makes a grade and nobility in things according to specific differences on account of its own greater and lesser participation[^5]: but the bodies of the world, according as they participate more or less of light, are more or less noble as regards *substantial being*, and differ in species, as is clear when one looks at the grades in the bodies of the world: therefore it is impossible that light be an accident of the luminous body.

*On the contrary:*

1. Nothing belongs to the constitution of an accident except an accident; but light belongs to the composition of color, since color is nothing other than *incorporated light*[^6]: therefore since color is an accident, light is an accidental form.

2. Likewise, nothing is *per se* the object of sense except an accident[^7], because every object of sense is placed in the third species of quality; but light by itself is seen and perceived by the sense of sight, and is that by means of which other things are sensed, as Augustine says on *Genesis according to the Letter*, book 12[^8]: therefore light is an accident. For Augustine speaks thus: «*Sight operates by pure light, hearing by light incorporated in the most subtle air,*

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*then light mixed in murky air, then with corpulent moisture, finally with earthly thickness — and so it produces the five senses*».

3. Likewise, that which is augmented in something, with its substance and nature preserved, is itself an accident to it; but light is augmented in bodies, especially luminous ones, as is said in Isaiah 30[^9]: *The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun sevenfold*, etc.: therefore light is not a substance, but an accident, since substance does not receive more and less.

4. Likewise, just as fire naturally shines, so also it naturally is hot, nor is there a greater power in its shining than in its being hot or heating; but heat is an accidental quality of fire itself[^10]: therefore also luminosity.

5. Likewise, if light in fire is a substantial form, then either *ultimately completive* or *short of the ultimate*. If it is the *ultimate completive* form, then it seems that fire would not differ from the celestial nature, nor would any luminous [bodies] differ by specific difference[^11]. If it is a form *short of the ultimate*, then it is a less perfect form than the specific form of fire, since the ultimate completive form is in the most perfect thing: therefore it does not seem that in fire light is the most noble form. If, then, in heaven it is the ultimate form, it seems that elementary bodies are more worthy or noble than celestial — which if false, the rest follows, etc.

6. Likewise, in creatures quality is the *immediate* principle of action; hence a substantial form acts mediated by accidental properties as by instruments[^12]; but light is the *immediate* principle of action: therefore it seems that light is an accident.

### CONCLUSION.

> *Light, under one respect, is a substantial form; but under another, an accidental form.*

**I respond:** *Note.* It must be premised that in this question wise [men] hold contraries to wise [men].

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that light is an *accident* of the luminous body, just as wisdom or knowledge, which is spiritual light, is an accident of the soul itself; and just as color is an accident of a determinate body[^13]; and just as heat is an accident of a hot body. For they said that the luminous body stands to light as the soul to cognition, as the determinate body to color, and as the hot body to heat — since through it [the body] is adorned, through it is sensed, and through it operates; and on this account, if [light] be called a noble form, this is not understood as regards *first being*, but as regards *second being*, just as knowledge and grace are posited as most noble forms, although they are said to be accidents. And thus for the most part the [contrary] reasons are evaded. — *It is not entirely proven.* But since sacred Scripture commends light among other purely corporeal forms[^14], and the Catholic treatise-writers — such as Dionysius in the fourth [chapter] of *On the Divine Names*, and Augustine in many places, and the philosophers also — attribute the principate of operation in bodies to light: therefore they seem to hold that light is rather a substance than an accident.

*Opinion 2, conclusion.* And therefore there is another position: that light is a *substantial* form of bodies, according to whose greater or lesser participation bodies have more truly and worthily *being* in the genus of beings. Hence[^15] the most noble

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of bodies, as is that empyrean, is principally luminous; the lowest, on the other hand, like earth, is most opaque; and the intermediate, according as they are more or less noble, participate more or less. And that all bodies participate the nature of light, this is shown plainly enough by the fact that there is scarcely any opaque body which by much rubbing and polishing cannot be made luminous, as is clear when out of ashes glass is made, and out of earth a carbuncle.

But each of these positions is *of great [authors]*, and each [is] very probable, nor can [either] be easily disproved. If, however, we wish to consider inwardly which of these positions is the truer, we shall find that each of them was founded upon some truth. For it is true that light, since it is the most noble form among corporeals — as the philosophers and the Saints say — according to whose greater and lesser participation bodies are more and less beings, is a *substantial form*. It is also true that, since light is *per se* sensible, and is also an instrument of operation, and is augmentable and diminishable while the substantial form is preserved, it itself has the *nature of an accidental form*[^16].

And on this account it must be noted, for the understanding of the authorities and reasons, that just as *incorporated* light is the principle of color in a determinate body — which color is an accident and a passive[^17] quality and is perceived by sense — so also light in a luminous body is the principle of a certain *fulgor* (radiance) which, after the manner of color, is an accident, and by means of which the luminous body is apprehended by sense. — *Distinction.* And in accordance with this, light can be taken in two ways. — *Conclusion 1.* In one way, light is called the very *form* which gives *being* to a shining body, and from which the luminous body is principally active, as from a first mover and regulator[^18]. — *Conclusion 2.* In another way, light is called the *fulgor* (radiance) itself, which is around the luminous body, which follows upon the existence of light in such matter, and which also is the object of sense and the instrument of operation; and so it is an *accidental complement*.

And thus the response to the proposed question is clear; the response to the objections is also clear for the most part. For the reasons showing that light is a substantial form proceed according to the *first* way, as is clear to one who looks. But the reasons on the opposite side proceed by the other way, except for some, to which it can easily enough be replied.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that which is first objected — that light belongs to the composition of color — it can be said that light is not said to belong to the composition of color as an *intrinsic* principle, but as an *effective* principle, since accidents are simple; whereas a substantial form can well be the effective principle of an accident.

2. To that which is objected, that it is a sensible form: it must be said that it is not sensed by reason of its essence, but by reason of the *fulgor* or *color* inseparably accompanying it, especially where there is intensity of light.

3. *Note.* To that which is objected, that it is augmented: it must be said that that augmentation is regarded by reason of the *fulgor*, not by reason of the *light*, which is a substantial form; and even if it were regarded by reason of [the substantial form], the argument still would not hold, because although a substantial form *in itself* does not receive more and less, it nevertheless can be intensified and remitted according to its *being in matter*[^19]. And this is most true of *general* forms, in which there consists more the commonness of *analogy* according to more and less, and prior and posterior, than that of *univocation*.

4. To that which is objected, that heat is not the substantial form of the hot [thing]: it must be said that it is not similar, because the form of heat is not of as great dignity and perfection as the form of light. And this is clear, because the form of light recedes more from the nature of contrariety, corruption, and alteration.

5. To that which is objected, that it is not the ultimate form in fire: it must be said that if light is posited as the substantial form of bodies specifically diverse — as of the heaven and of fire — it is the ultimately completive form of neither. Therefore from this it is not concluded that the elementary nature is more noble than the celestial; nor can it from this be concluded that another form is more noble than the form of light, although it be further. — *On the twofold form, the common and the ultimate.* For the form of light, when it is posited in the same body with another form, is not posited as an *imperfect disposition* born to be perfected by the ultimate form, but is posited as the *form and nature conservative of every other corporeal form* and giving it efficacy of acting, and according to which is regarded the measure of any corporeal form in dignity and excellence. — And that which is objected, that the *ultimately completive*[^20] form is more noble — this is true where that form has to be completed and perfected by the ultimate, namely where the *common* form has to be perfected by the ultimate and special. — *Another solution.* Or it must be said that this holds true where

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each form, namely *common* and *ultimate*, is in its [most] potent[^21] *being*; but light is not so [posited] except in a celestial body.

6. To that which is objected, that it is the immediate principle of operation: it must be said that this does not necessarily compel [the conclusion], as it appears; *Note.* for a substantial form[^22] seems to be able to act *per se*. But because an example of this is not easily found in others — although it would not be irrationally believed possible in the form of light, since it is most of all active — it can be conceded that, although light *inwardly perfecting* is a substantial form, nevertheless that *fulgor* by which that body operates instrumentally, [and which] is sensed and adorns [it], can not unlearnedly be believed to pertain to the nature of accident, as has been said[^23].

la: Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 3. seq. et text. 47. (VI. c. 1. et 13.), ubi etiam insinuatur *maior* 2. et 5. fundam.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 3 and following, and text 47 (VI, c. 1 and 13), where also the major of fundamenta 2 and 5 is intimated.

la: Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 16; III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 7, VII. c. 15. n. 21. et c. 19. n. 25, XII. c. 16. n. 32.

en: [Augustine,] *On Free Choice* III, c. 5, n. 16; *On Genesis according to the Letter* III, c. 4, n. 7; VII, c. 15, n. 21, and c. 19, n. 25; XII, c. 16, n. 32.

la: Cap. 4. § 1. et 4. — In fine arg. cod. Q *forma substantialis* pro *substantia*.

en: [*On the Divine Names,*] c. 4, § 1 and 4. — At the end of the argument cod. Q [reads] *forma substantialis* for *substantia*.

la: *Nullus enim effectus est nobilior sua causa*, sive, ut Scholastici dicunt, quia *nihil agit ultra suam speciem* (naturam); nam «*agere est actus eiusdem speciei cum essentia, cuius est actus*» (Simplicius, in Praedicam.). — De *minori* cfr. supra pag. 74, nota 2.

en: *For no effect is more noble than its cause*, or, as the Scholastics say, because *nothing acts beyond its species* (nature); for «*to act is the act of the same species as the essence whose act it is*» (Simplicius, *On the Categories*). — On the *minor*, cf. above p. 74, note 2.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia. — De *minori* vide Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 3. — In ipsa minori Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *et specie et differentia* pro *et specie differentia*.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. *On Difference*. — On the *minor*, see Aristotle, *On Sense and the Sensed*, c. 3. — In the minor itself the Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] *et specie et differentia* for *et specie differentia*.

la: Avicenna, de Anima sive in libro sexto Naturalium, p. III. c. 3. ait: *Dicemus igitur, quod cum lux est pars compositionis huius visibilis, quod vocamus colorem, et est quiddam, quod cum admixtum fuerit colori, qui est in potentia, tunc ex utroque proveniet id quod est color in effectu, propter commiscibilitatem. Si autem non fuerit haec aptitudo, erit lumen et splendor per se tantum; lux enim est sicut pars eius quod est color, et commixtio eius, sicut albedo et nigredo habent commixtiones, ex quibus accidunt alii colores medii.* Cfr. Averroes, de Sensu et sens. c. 3, ubi docet, quod lux non est causa tantum in inductione colorum ad visum, sed in *esse* eorum. Contrarium tamen dicit in II. de Anima, text. 67.

en: Avicenna, *On the Soul* or in the sixth book of the *Naturalia*, p. III, c. 3, says: *We say therefore that since light is a part of the composition of this visible [thing] which we call color, and is something which, when mixed with the color that is in potency, then from both will come forth that which is color in actuality, on account of mixability. But if this aptitude is not present, there will be lumen and splendor by themselves only; for light is as it were a part of that which is color, and its mixture — just as whiteness and blackness have mixtures from which other intermediate colors result.* Cf. Averroes, *On Sense and the Sensed*, c. 3, where he teaches that light is the cause not only in the induction of colors to vision, but also in their *being*. The contrary, however, he says in *On the Soul* II, text 67.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.). De tertia qualitatis specie, scil. passione et patibili qualitate cfr. supra pag. 229, nota 7.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 63 and following (c. 6). On the third species of quality, namely passion and passible quality, cf. above p. 229, note 7.

la: Cap. 16. n. 32: «*Illud quod est subtilissimum in corpore et ob hoc animae vicinius quam cetera, id est lux, primum per oculos sola diffunditur emicatque in radiis oculorum ad visibilia contuenda, deinde mixtura quadam, primum cum aëre puro, secundo cum aëre caliginoso atque nebuloso, tertio cum corpulentiore humore, quarto cum terrena crassitudine, quinque sensus cum ipso, ubi sola excellit, oculorum sensu efficit, sicut in libro quarto (! tertio, c. 5. n. 7.) itemque in septimo disseruisse me recolo*». Libr. III. c. 3. n. 7. ait: *Per subtilius corpus agitat [anima] vigorem sentiendi. Inchoat itaque motum in omnibus sensibus a subtilitate ignis, sed non in omnibus ad idem pervenit. In visu enim pervenit represso calore usque ad eius lucem. In auditu usque ad liquidiorem aerem calore ignis penetrat. In olfactu autem transit aerem purum et pervenit ad humidam exhalationem, unde crassior haec aura subsistit. In gustatu et hanc transit et pervenit usque ad humorem corpulentiorem, quo etiam penetrato atque traiecto, cum ad terrenam gravitatem pervenit, tangendi ultimum sensum agit*. — Fide codd. et edd. 1, 2 substituimus *auditus luce* pro *deinde*. Mox plurimi codd. *subtilissimo aëris* pro *subtilissimo aëre*.

en: [*On Genesis according to the Letter* XII,] c. 16, n. 32: «*That which is the most subtle in body, and on this account nearer to the soul than other [things] — that is, light — first through the eyes alone is diffused and flashes out in the rays of the eyes for the seeing of visibles; then by a certain mixture, first with pure air, secondly with murky and misty air, thirdly with the more corpulent moisture, fourthly with earthly thickness, it effects the five senses together with itself, where it alone excels, by the sense of the eyes — as I recall I disputed in book four (! third, c. 5, n. 7) and likewise in book seven*». Book III, c. 3, n. 7 says: *Through a more subtle body [the soul] sets the vigor of sensing in motion. It begins, then, motion in all senses from the subtlety of fire, but does not in all reach the same end. For in sight it reaches, with the heat repressed, as far as its light. In hearing it penetrates by the heat of fire as far as the more liquid air. In smell, however, it passes through the pure air and reaches the moist exhalation whence this thicker breeze subsists. In taste it passes through this also and reaches as far as the corpulent moisture, through which also being penetrated and passed through, when it reaches earthly weight, it produces the last sense of touch*. — On the authority of the codices and editions 1, 2 we have substituted *auditus luce* for *deinde*. Soon, very many codices [read] *subtilissimo aëris* for *subtilissimo aëre*.

la: Vers. 26. — Quod substantia non recipiat magis et minus, docet Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia.

en: [Isaiah 30,] v. 26. — That substance does not receive more and less, Aristotle teaches, *Categories*, c. *On Substance*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 17. et VII. text. 2. (II. c. 5. et VI. c. 1.); II. de Partib. animal. c. 2.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, text 17, and VII, text 2 (II, c. 5 and VI, c. 1); *On the Parts of Animals* II, c. 2.

la: Quod est contra doctrinam Aristotelis, qui I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 5. seqq. (c. 2.) asserit, caelum esse corpus a quatuor elementis (ergo ab igne) diversum, cuius substantiam ipse in libro de Mundo, c. 2. dicit esse *aetherem* (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν ἀεὶ i. e. *a currendo semper*. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 22. c. 3.) i. e. «*elementum a quatuor illis diversum*», et II. de Anima, text. 69. (c. 7.), distinguit caelum, in quantum est corpus illuminativum, ab igne, et V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.) tres ponit species ignis, scil. carbonem, flammam et lucem.

en: Which is against the doctrine of Aristotle, who in *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 5 and following (c. 2), asserts that the heaven is a body diverse from the four elements (therefore from fire), whose substance he himself says in the book *On the World*, c. 2, to be *aether* (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν ἀεὶ, i. e. *from always running*; *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 22, c. 3) — i. e. «*an element diverse from those four*»; and *On the Soul* II, text 69 (c. 7), he distinguishes the heaven, inasmuch as it is an illuminative body, from fire; and *Topics* V, c. 3 (c. 5), posits three species of fire, namely charcoal, flame, and light.

la: Sic secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 41. (c. 4.) ignis sive calor naturalis instrumentum (concausa) est animae vegetativae ad perficiendam nutritionem, et, ut ipse in libro de Sensu et sens. c. 4. vult, «*ignis, qua ignis, et terra, qua terra, nihil natum est agere vel pati, nec aliud quidquam, sed quatenus inest contrarietas in eis*». — Ex codd. F H K V Y et ed. 1 supplevimus *tanquam instrumentis*, pro quo codd. L O substituunt *tanquam principio*.

en: So according to Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 41 (c. 4), fire or natural heat is the instrument (co-cause) of the vegetative soul for perfecting nutrition; and, as he himself wishes in the book *On Sense and the Sensed* c. 4, «*fire, as fire, and earth, as earth, is born to do or undergo nothing, nor anything else, except as contrariety is in them*». — From codices F H K V Y and edition 1 we have supplied *tanquam instrumentis*, for which codices L O substitute *tanquam principio*.

la: Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 3. colorem definit: Χρῶμα μὲν εἴη τὸ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν σώματι ὡρισμένῳ πέρας i. e. *color utique erit perspicui in corpore determinato (definito) extremitas*. Averroes in Comment. super hunc locum et super II. de Anima, text. 67. ait: *Color enim, ut dicitur, est ultimum diaphani terminati, lux autem est complementum diaphani non terminati*. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. omittit *et sicut corpus terminatum ad colorem*.

en: Aristotle, *On Sense and the Sensed* c. 3, defines color: Χρῶμα μὲν εἴη τὸ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν σώματι ὡρισμένῳ πέρας, i. e. *color indeed would be the extremity of the transparent in a determinate (defined) body*. Averroes in his commentary on this place and on *On the Soul* II, text 67 says: *Color, as is said, is the ultimate of the terminated diaphanous, but light is the complement of the diaphanous not terminated*. — A little later, the Vatican [edition] omits *et sicut corpus terminatum ad colorem*.

la: Cfr. Sap. 7, 29, ubi comparatio fit inter sapientiam et lucem. — Dionys., loc. cit. § 1. et 4; cfr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 15. § 2, ubi ultra triginta ignis proprietates notantur. — De Augustino vide supra pag. 319, nota 2. 8. Ex philosophis cfr. Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 42. seq. (c. 7.) una cum iis quae dicit II. de Gener. et corrup. text. 58. seqq. (c. 10.) et I. Meteor. c. 4. (c. 3.); Avicenna, de Caelo et mundo, c. 14.

en: Cf. Wisdom 7, 29, where a comparison is made between wisdom and light. — Dionysius, loc. cit. § 1 and 4; cf. *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 15, § 2, where over thirty properties of fire are noted. — On Augustine, see above p. 319, notes 2 and 8. Among the philosophers cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the World* II, text 42 and following (c. 7), together with what he says *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 58 and following (c. 10), and *Meteorology* I, c. 4 (c. 3); Avicenna, *On the Heavens and the World*, c. 14.

la: In plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2 incongrue additur *si*, quod Vat. mutavit in *sicut*, quae dein post *luminosum* subiungit *ita*; secuti sumus codd. N W aa. Paulo inferius plures codd. post *maxime est* supplent *corpus*. In fine propositionis in nonnullis codd. a secunda manu adiungitur vel *naturam lucis* (in cod. N), vel *de natura lucis* (in cod. Q), vel *opacitatis et luminositatis* (in cod. bb).

en: In most manuscripts and editions 1, 2, *si* is incongruously added, which the Vatican [edition] changed to *sicut*, then subjoining *ita* after *luminosum*; we have followed codices N, W, aa. A little later, several codices after *maxime est* supply *corpus*. At the end of the proposition, in some codices, by a second hand is added either *naturam lucis* (in cod. N), or *de natura lucis* (in cod. Q), or *opacitatis et luminositatis* (in cod. bb).

la: Vat. *formam naturae accidentalis*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *formam naturae accidentalis* (a form of accidental nature).

la: Cod. K *patibilis*.

en: Cod. K [reads] *patibilis*.

la: In cod. I additur *et sic est substantialis forma ipsius corporis luminosi*. Mox nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 et Vat. *esse fulgor* pro *ipse fulgor*. Dein codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *et quod etiam* pro *et qui etiam*.

en: In cod. I is added *et sic est substantialis forma ipsius corporis luminosi*. Soon, some codices with edition 1 and the Vatican [edition read] *esse fulgor* for *ipse fulgor*. Then codices with editions 1, 2, 3 [read] *et quod etiam* for *et qui etiam*.

la: Aristot., III. de Generat. animal. c. 11: «*Ignis semper formam non propriam habere videtur, sed in alio corpore: aut enim aer, aut fumus, aut terra esse videtur quod ignitum est*». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: «*Ignis existens in loco suo, qui scil. est concavum orbis lunae, est simplex, cum quo nihil elementorum admiscetur; et ideo ignis non videtur esse nisi forma alterius corporis, videlicet quando ignitur et inflammatur in alio corpore*». Haec a Scholasticis exprimebantur illis verbis: *Ignis in propria materia non lucet, sed in aliena*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* III, c. 11: «*Fire always seems to have a form not its own, but in another body: for what is ignited seems to be either air, or smoke, or earth*». Averroes expounds these words thus: «*Fire existing in its own place, which namely is the concavity of the orb of the moon, is simple, with which nothing of the elements is mixed; and on this account fire does not seem to be except the form of another body, namely when [the other body] is ignited and inflamed in another body*». These [things] were expressed by the Scholastics in these words: *Fire does not shine in its own matter, but in another's*.

la: Nam quidquid recipitur, recipitur per modum eius in quo recipitur, sive, ut ait Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 6. (VII. c. 2.): *Actus alius alterius materiae*. Cfr. XII. text. 19. seqq.

en: For whatever is received, is received according to the mode of that in which it is received — or, as Aristotle says, *Metaphysics* VIII, text 6 (VII, c. 2): *One act of one matter, another of another*. Cf. XII, text 19 and following.

la: Cod. F *ultima*.

en: Cod. F [reads] *ultima*.

la: Codd. X Z *ultimo*.

en: Codices X, Z [read] *ultimo*.

la: Vat. *specialis*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *specialis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primam sententiam in corp. relatam S. Thom., B. Albert., Richard., Scot. et fere omnes posteriores Scholastici tenent, pro qua praeter alia argumenta etiam hoc communiter affertur: *Lux est per se sensibilis; sed nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis; ergo* etc. Nec iidem approbant fundamentum secundae opinionis, quod in omnibus corporibus sit lux secundum maiorem vel minorem *formae* participationem, quam sententiam Seraphicus ex S. Augustino accepit (cfr. hic ad 4; infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. art. princ. 2. a. 2. q. 1.). Nostra autem aetate non pauci physici docent, naturam vel qualitatem lucidi esse in omni corpore. — Quodsi autem admittitur recentiorum doctrina de aethere subtilissimo tanquam primo subiecto luminis aliorumque phaenomenorum, tunc argumenta et sententiae antiquorum in nonnullis reformanda sunt. — S. Bonav. pro more suo viam mediam inter utramque opinionem ingreditur, distinguendo inter lucem in se spectatam, prout est forma corporis lucidi et a sensibus non perceptibilis, et effectum eius consequentem et sensibilem, quem vocat *fulgorem*, qui non differt a *lumine*, nisi quatenus *lumen* est in *medio*, *fulgor* autem in ipso *luminis fonte*, sive in *luce* (cfr. infra a. 3. q. 2. in corp.). Haec sententia S. Doctoris ab aliis Scholasticis non videtur esse recepta.

**II.** Modus loquendi, quo S. Doctor in solut. ad 5. utitur, conciliari non posse videtur cum sententia, quae tenet, in eodem composito *semper* non esse nisi *unam* formam substantialem. Cum enim iam dixerit, lucem in se esse formam substantialem, omnibus corporibus aliquo modo communem, addit, eam poni in eodem corpore cum alia forma, non quidem sicut *dispositio imperfecta*, quae nata sit perfici per ultimam formam, sed «*tanquam forma et natura omnis alterius corporalis formae conservativa et dans ei agendi efficaciam*». Deinde loquitur de duabus formis, scil. communi et ultima (cfr. etiam infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.). — Hinc iuvat pauca de celebri controversia circa unitatem formae substantialis hoc loco adnotare et iis adiungere, quae supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in scholio dicta sunt.

**1.** Principales Scholastici consentiunt in his. a) Si sermo est de forma substantiali in sensu proprio, sive de forma ultima et completa, quae dat *esse perfectum* et *specificum* (sive «*esse distinctum et limitatum*», ut dicit S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 8. p. II. q. 3. fundam. 2.); tunc unam solam in unoquoque composito esse formam substantialem, omnino constat. Nam «*unius perfectibilis una sola est perfectio*» (supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 3. 4.); et in hoc distinguitur forma substantialis, quae spectat ad *primum esse*, a forma accidentali, quae spectat ad *esse secundum*, quod ex accidentalibus formis et earum subiectis «*non fit unum per essentiam, sicut fit unum per essentiam ex corpore vivificato et anima vivificante*» (infra d. 26. q. 3. ad 4.). — b) In viventibus unum est *principium vitae*, i. e. una sola anima. — c) In homine autem unica anima intellectiva per se et immediate est forma substantialis corporis, quae «*non tantum dat esse, verum etiam vivere et sentire et intelligere*» (Breviloq. p. II. c. 9. et infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.).

**2.** S. Thomas generale principium, quod unius rei una tantum sit forma substantialis, in omnibus omnino entibus obtinere docet, ita ut forma, quae praeter materiam et primam formam substantialem sit in ente corporali, formis accidentalibus adnumeranda sit. Hinc legitime sequitur, in generatione substantiali solam materiam primam esse subiectum eiusdem, et similiter in corruptione fieri resolutionem usque ad materiam primam.

**3.** Non omnes autem antiqui magistri haec quoad omnia concedebant, sed distinctionem adhibentes inter formas *completas* et *incompletas* (sive, ut aliis placet, *subordinatas* vel *diminutas*) duplicem exceptionem ab illa regula generali esse volebant.

Primo quidem non pauci illud principium non admittunt respectu formarum imperfectarum, quae sunt in corporibus *anorganicis*, quae ex mixtione corporum simplicium sive ex combinationibus chimicis resultant. Hi cum Avicenna (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3. scholion n. I.) docent, formas corporum simplicium quoad ipsum *primum esse*, licet modo imperfecto, remanere. Hoc autem intelligi potest vel ita, ut istae formae ibi sint ut verae formae, vel ut dispositiones ad formam, vel generatim ut aliquae realitates, quae non proprie rationem formae retinent. Sententiae Avicennae B. Albert. (I. de Generat. et corrupt. tr. 6. c. 5. seqq.) valde favet.

Secundo, respectu omnium *viventium* praeter animam, quae est forma completa et ultima, formam esse *corporeitatis*, docet cum suis Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 11. q. 3. n. 25. seqq.), qui tamen quoad formas elementares in mixtis S. Thomae consentit. Haec forma *corporeitatis* secundum eundem non est *specifica*, sed *generica*, et non dat nisi aliquod *esse corporeum* indeterminatum, non autem in linea accidentali, sed substantiali. Terminus *forma corporeitatis* adhibetur etiam a S. Bonav. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3. ad 5. (cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 2. pro parte affirm.) et ab Avicenna I. Sufficientiae c. 2. 3. — Sententiam hanc Scoti ad solos homines restringit Henr. Gand., Quodl. 2. q. 2. 3, Quodl. 4. q. 13. 14.

Manifestum autem est, utramque hanc doctrinae S. Thomae modificationem supponere praedictam distinctionem inter formas *completas* et *incompletas*; vel si nomen *formae incompletae* displicet, inter formam substantialem et aliquam realitatem positivam, quae non sit nec materia nec forma accidentalis. Hanc distinctionem inter formas *completas* et *incompletas* saepius adhibet Seraphicus v. g. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3, ubi in solut. ad 5. etiam eandem, ac Scotus, responsionem ad gravissimam obiectionem dat, quod scil. nihil est in genere, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie.

**4.** S. Bonav. quaestionem illam de unitate formae substan-

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tialis explicite non tractat; nihilominus etiam in aliis locis modos loquendi adhibet, qui a sententia S. Thomae alieni esse videntur. Ita infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. fund. 3, ubi dicitur, quod corpus humanum, «*non est aptum ad diversas operationes nisi per diversas virtutes, nec ad diversas virtutes nisi per diversas naturas, nec habet diversas naturas, nisi quia ex diversis est compositum*» (observandum autem est quoad significationem termini *natura*, quod «*dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo ratione partium constituentium, alio modo ratione formae communis consequentis totum*», III. Sent. d. 8. a. 1. q. 2; cfr. ibid. d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.). Idem docet hic in divisione textus et infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. circa finem, et ad 1. Similia non pauca occurrunt d. 15. q. 1. 2. 3; d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 6, a. 2. q. 2. ad 6; infra d. 30. a. 3. q. 1, in improbatione 3. opinionis; IV. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2, d. 49. p. II. art. princ. 2. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicitur, quod «*elementa manent in corpore illo (glorioso) secundum substantiam et qualitates et operationes. Sed attendendum, quod quadruplex est operatio elementorum*» etc. Item, Hexaëm. Serm. 4. ante med. a verbis: «*Tertia divisio est potentiae et actus*». Sed maioris momenti est tota S. Bonaventurae doctrina de *rationibus seminalibus*, quae infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3 diffuse exponitur et iam supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. quoad principia generalia tractata est.

**5.** Etiam Alex. Hal. plura habet in favorem sententiae S. Bonaventurae, ut S. p. II. q. 63. m. 4. solut. obiect., ubi dicit, quod anima «*non est ibi proprie actus materiae, sed actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur forma corporalis*». Explicite et diffuse de hac quaestione disputat Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 5, qui propriam opinionem ita exponit: *Videtur ergo mihi dicendum ad quaestionem, quod in Adam fuit aliqua substantialis forma incompleta cum anima intellectiva; et ita est in quolibet alio homine, quae educitur de potentia ipsius materiae, ex qua et materia constituitur unum compositum incompletum, quod cum aliquibus suis accidentalibus dispositionibus incompletis est materia proxima et propria ad recipiendum animam intellectivam, per quam formam sine intellectiva materia non potest constitui in esse stabili et quieto et plene terminato* etc. — Alii etiam doctores Ord. Min. ante Scotum eandem opinionem defendunt, ut ex multis adhuc ineditis manuscriptis constat. Hinc Scotus opinionem suam iam tactam non ipse excogitavit, sed suo modo exposuit et sententiam antecessorum potius restrinxit.

**6.** Licet memorata sententia S. Thomae de unitate formarum in Ecclesia nunc et a saeculis magna gaudeat auctoritate, tamen et vivente S. Doctore et praecipue post ipsius mortem usque ad canonizationem eadem acriter est impugnata, praecipue ob rationes theologicas, immo censuris immerito condemnata est, ut videri potest in egregio opere Card. Zigliara *de Mente Concil. Vienn.* p. 196–214, et apud D'Argentré, *Collectio iudicior.* t. I. p. 216 seqq. Prima huius sententiae censura facta est an. 1276 a Fr. Roberto de Kilwardby, archiep. Cantuariensi (Ord. Praed., ut vult Echardus), et habetur in *Collect. iudic.* (p. 183 et p. 201); secunda et tertia facta a Ioanne Pechamo Ord. Min., successore Roberti, an. 1284 (ibid. p. 234. seq.). Iam monuimus supra pag. 30 in scholio, has censuras omni carere auctoritate. — Ceterum lugendum est, dissensionem circa hunc articulum dedisse primam occasionem controversiarum acrium et diuturnarum inter duos Ordines Praedicatorum et Minorum. — Nostra autem aetate, post sex saecula, adhuc diversae de compositione corporum sententiae philosophicae a doctoribus catholicis, sciente ac permittente Apostolica Sede, ut probabiles defenduntur, sicut constat ex litteris de mandato Summi Pontificis Pii IX. a D. Wladimiro Czacki 5. Iunii 1877 datis.

Auctores vide in scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The first opinion related in the body S. Thomas, B. Albert, Richard [of Mediavilla], Scotus, and almost all later Scholastics hold; for which, besides other arguments, this is also commonly adduced: *Light is per se sensible; but no substantial form is per se sensible; therefore* etc. Nor do these approve the foundation of the second opinion — that in all bodies there is light according to a greater or lesser participation of *form* — which opinion the Seraphic [Doctor] received from St. Augustine (cf. here *ad* 4; below d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, *ad* 4; IV *Sent.* d. 49, p. II, art. princ. 2, a. 2, q. 1.). In our age, not a few physicists teach that the nature or quality of the luminous is in every body. — But if the more recent doctrine concerning the most subtle aether as the primary subject of light and other phenomena be admitted, then the arguments and opinions of the ancients in some respects need to be reformed. — St. Bonaventure, as is his manner, enters upon a middle way between both opinions, by distinguishing between light considered in itself — as it is the form of a shining body and not perceptible to the senses — and its consequent and sensible effect, which he calls *fulgor*, which does not differ from *lumen* except inasmuch as *lumen* is in the *medium*, but *fulgor* in the very *source of light*, that is, in *lux* (cf. below a. 3, q. 2, in the body). This opinion of the holy Doctor does not seem to have been received by the other Scholastics.

**II.** The mode of speaking which the holy Doctor uses in the solution to argument 5 does not seem able to be reconciled with the opinion which holds that in the same composite *there is always only one* substantial form. For when he has already said that light in itself is a substantial form, common to all bodies in some manner, he adds that it is posited in the same body with another form — not indeed as an *imperfect disposition* born to be perfected by the ultimate form, but «*as the form and nature conservative of every other corporeal form and giving it efficacy of acting*». Then he speaks of two forms, namely the *common* and the *ultimate* (cf. also below d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.). — Hence it is useful to note here a few [things] about the celebrated controversy concerning the unity of substantial form, and to join them to what was said above at d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in the scholion.

**1.** The principal Scholastics agree in these [points]. a) If the discourse is about substantial form in the proper sense, or about the *ultimate* and *complete* form which gives *perfect* and *specific* being (or «*distinct and limited being*», as St. Bonav. says, I *Sent.* d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 8, p. II, q. 3, *fundamentum* 2.); then that there is in each composite one only substantial form, is altogether established. For «*of one perfectible there is only one perfection*» (above d. 8, p. II, q. 1, *ad* 3, 4); and in this is the substantial form, which regards *first being*, distinguished from the accidental form, which regards *second being*, which from accidental forms and their subjects «*does not become one per essentiam, just as one per essentiam is made out of a body vivified and a soul vivifying*» (below d. 26, q. 3, *ad* 4.). — b) In living things there is one *principle of life*, i. e. one only soul. — c) In man, however, the one intellective soul through itself and immediately is the substantial form of the body, which «*not only gives being, but also living and sensing and understanding*» (*Breviloquium* p. II, c. 9, and below d. 15, a. 1, q. 3, in the body).

**2.** S. Thomas teaches that the general principle, that of one thing there is only one substantial form, holds in absolutely all beings — so that the form which, besides matter and the first substantial form, is in a corporeal being, is to be numbered among accidental forms. Hence it follows legitimately that in substantial generation only prime matter is the subject of the same, and similarly in corruption the resolution goes back to prime matter.

**3.** Not all the ancient masters, however, conceded these things in every respect; but, employing a distinction between *complete* and *incomplete* forms (or, as is pleasing to others, *subordinate* or *diminished* [forms]), they wished there to be a twofold exception from that general rule.

First, indeed, not a few do not admit that principle with respect to the imperfect forms which are in *inorganic* bodies, which result from the mixture of simple bodies or from chemical combinations. These, with Avicenna (cf. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, scholion n. I.), teach that the forms of simple bodies, as regards *first being* itself, although in an imperfect manner, remain. This can be understood either in such a way that those forms are there as true forms, or as dispositions to form, or generally as certain realities which do not properly retain the character of form. The opinion of Avicenna B. Albert (*On Generation and Corruption* I, tr. 6, c. 5 and following) strongly favors.

Secondly, with respect to all *living things* besides the soul, which is the complete and ultimate form, Scotus and his [followers] teach that there is a form of *corporeity* (IV *Sent.* d. 11, q. 3, n. 25 and following) — although as to elementary forms in mixtures he agrees with St. Thomas. This *form of corporeity*, according to him, is not *specific* but *generic*, and gives only some indeterminate *corporeal being* — not, however, in the accidental line, but in the substantial. The term *form of corporeity* is also employed by St. Bonav. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, *ad* 5 (cf. ibid. a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2, for the affirmative side), and by Avicenna *Sufficientia* I, c. 2, 3. — This opinion of Scotus Henr. Gand. restricts to men only, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 2, 3; *Quodlibet* 4, q. 13, 14.

It is, however, manifest that each of these modifications of St. Thomas's doctrine supposes the aforesaid distinction between *complete* and *incomplete* forms; or, if the name *incomplete form* displeases, between substantial form and some positive reality which is neither matter nor accidental form. This distinction between *complete* and *incomplete* forms the Seraphic [Doctor] more often employs — e. g. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, where in the solution to 5 he also gives the same response as Scotus to the gravest objection, namely that nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it.

**4.** S. Bonav. does not explicitly treat that question of the unity of substantial form;

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nevertheless, even in other places he employs modes of speaking which seem to be foreign from St. Thomas's opinion. So below d. 15, a. 1, q. 2, *fundamentum* 3, where it is said that the human body «*is not apt for diverse operations except through diverse powers, nor for diverse powers except through diverse natures, nor does it have diverse natures except because it is composed out of diverse [things]*» (it must be observed, however, regarding the signification of the term *nature*, that it «*can be taken in two ways: in one way by reason of the constituent parts, in the other way by reason of the common form following the whole*», III *Sent.* d. 8, a. 1, q. 2; cf. ibid. d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, *ad* 3.). The same he teaches here in the division of the text and below at d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the body near the end, and *ad* 1. Not a few similar [things] occur d. 15, q. 1, 2, 3; d. 17, p. I, q. 2, *ad* 6; a. 2, q. 2, *ad* 6; below d. 30, a. 3, q. 1, in the refutation of the third opinion; IV *Sent.* d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, *ad* 1, 2; d. 49, p. II, art. princ. 2, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, where it is said that «*the elements remain in that (glorified) body according to substance and qualities and operations. But it must be attended to, that there is a fourfold operation of the elements*», etc. Likewise, *Hexaëmeron* Sermon 4 before the middle, from the words: «*The third division is of potency and act*». But of greater moment is the whole teaching of St. Bonaventure on the *seminal reasons*, which is set forth diffusely below d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, 3, and was already treated above at d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, as regards the general principles.

**5.** Also Alex. Hal. has many [things] in favor of S. Bonaventure's opinion — as *Summa* p. II, q. 63, m. 4, *solut. obiect.*, where he says that the soul «*is not there properly the act of matter, but the natural act of a complete body in a natural form, which form is called corporeal form*». Explicitly and diffusely on this question Richard of Mediavilla disputes, II *Sent.* d. 17, a. 1, q. 5, who sets forth his own opinion thus: *It seems to me, therefore, that it must be said to the question that in Adam there was some incomplete substantial form together with the intellective soul; and so it is in any other man, which is drawn forth from the potency of the matter itself, out of which and matter is constituted one incomplete composite, which with some of its incomplete accidental dispositions is the proximate and proper matter for receiving the intellective soul — through which form, without the intellective [soul,] the matter cannot be constituted in a stable and quiet and fully terminated being*, etc. — Other doctors of the Order of Friars Minor also, before Scotus, defend the same opinion, as is clear from many still-unedited manuscripts. Hence Scotus did not himself invent the opinion already touched on, but in his own way expounded it and rather restricted the opinion of his predecessors.

**6.** Although the said opinion of St. Thomas on the unity of forms now and for centuries enjoys great authority in the Church, nevertheless, both while the holy Doctor was alive and especially after his death up to canonization, the same was vigorously impugned — especially on account of theological reasons — and indeed undeservedly was condemned by censures, as can be seen in Cardinal Zigliara's excellent work *de Mente Concilii Viennensis* p. 196–214, and in D'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* t. I, p. 216 and following. The first censure of this opinion was made in the year 1276 by Fr. Robert of Kilwardby, archbishop of Canterbury (of the Order of Preachers, as Echardus holds), and is found in *Collectio iudiciorum* (p. 183 and p. 201); the second and third [were] made by John Pecham of the Order of Friars Minor, successor to Robert, in the year 1284 (ibid. p. 234 and following). We have already noted above on p. 30 in the scholion that these censures lack all authority. — Moreover it is to be lamented that the dissension over this article gave the first occasion to bitter and long-lasting controversies between the two Orders of Preachers and Minors. — In our age, however, after six centuries, still diverse philosophical opinions about the composition of bodies are defended as probable by Catholic doctors — with the knowledge and permission of the Apostolic See — as is clear from the letters by mandate of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, given to Dom Wladimir Czacki on June 5, 1877.

See the authors in the scholion to the preceding question.

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translators_notes:
- **Page span**: q2 opens at **top of p.319 L** (immediately below d13-a2-q1 scholion item III's "*Biel, hic q. unica*") with the centred "QUAESTIO II." banner + italic title *Utrum lux sit forma substantialis, vel accidentalis.* Body fills p.319 L→R, p.320 L→R (CONCLUSIO + Respondeo *Notandum* opener on p.320 R upper; *Opinio 1* + *Non omnino probatur* + *Opinio 2 conclusio* on p.320 R lower), p.321 L→R (*Distinctio*, *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*, *Solutio oppositorum* 1–5 + *De duplici forma communi et ultima* + *Alia solutio*), p.322 L→R (closing of solutio 5 + solutio 6 + *Notandum* + closing of body). SCHOLION header at p.322 R mid; items I + II.1 on p.322 R lower; II.2 + II.3 + II.4 opener on p.322 R bottom → p.323 L upper; II.4 continuation + II.5 + II.6 + "Auctores vide…" close on p.323 L mid. ARTICULUS III opens on p.323 L mid (centred banner + rubric *De lucis effectu et irradiatione* + article opener) — owned by `d13-a3-q1`.
- **Apparatus count**: 24 entries — 8 on p.319 + 7 on p.320 + 6 on p.321 + 3 on p.322 — renumbered sequentially [^1]–[^24] in body-order of appearance (which matches printed-footer order on each page). p.323 carries scholion text but no q2-owned footers. Body anchor [^24] sits on the scholion-closing footer for *non indocte credi potest* (this anchor was placed at the end of the body's last sentence per Quaracchi's printed-footer placement).
- **Scholion**: two top-level items spanning p.322 R bottom → p.323 L mid. **I.** notes that the Thomas/Albert/Richard/Scotus line holds the first opinion (lux est accidens), that the modern aether physics may require reformulating the antiquorum arguments, and that Bonaventure's middle way (lux substantialis + fulgor accidentalis) was not received by other Scholastics. **II.** is a lengthy editorial excursus on the celebrated *unitas formae substantialis* controversy, with internal sub-numeration **1** (the agreed-upon principles), **2** (Aquinas's generalization), **3** (the Avicenna+Albert and Scotus exceptions with the *formae incompletae* distinction), **4** (Bonaventure's own non-explicit treatment, with cross-references through the corpus), **5** (Alex. Hal. + Richard of Mediavilla's support), and **6** (the 1276 Kilwardby + 1284 Pecham censures, the 19th-cent. Sacred Penitentiary toleration of diverse philosophical schools per the 1877 Czacki letter under Pius IX). Closes with "*Auctores vide in scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem*" cross-referencing q1's scholion III.
- **Boundary integrity (per CLAUDE.md polish-cadence pass 3)**: backward boundary with `d13-a2-q1` at p.319 L mid is clean — q1 scholion III closes "*Biel, hic q. unica*" and the centred "QUAESTIO II." banner with italic title opens immediately below. Forward boundary at p.323 L mid is clean — q2 scholion II.6 closes with "*Auctores vide in scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem*", and the centred "ARTICULUS III." banner + italic rubric *De lucis effectu et irradiatione* + article opener "*Consequenter quaeritur de lucis effectu et irradiatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo… Secundo…*" opens immediately below — owned by `d13-a3-q1` per Vol II convention (the Article opener folds into Article's q1).
- **Frontmatter line-range**: `line_start: 22586, line_end: 22883` matches the semantic range (QUAESTIO II opener "Secundo quaeritur, utrum lux sit forma substantialis" → end of scholion item II.6 "*Auctores vide in scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem*"). The auto-chunker boundary is correct.
- **Solo-session size**: this chunk is the longest in d.13 (raw 4659 words, 24 apparatus entries, 8-paragraph scholion). Done as a solo session per the CLAUDE.md "large cascade-damaged quaestiones are solo sessions" convention.
- **No `[?]` flags raised.** Body reconciled column-by-column against p.319 L-1/L-2/R-1/R-2, p.320 L-0/L-1/L-2/R-0/R-1/R-2, p.321 L-0/L-1/L-2/R-0/R-1/R-2, p.322 L-0/L-1/L-2/R-0/R-1/R-2, and p.323 L-0/L-1/R-0/R-1; footers reconciled against the L-2/R-2 footer bands of each page. Marginal labels (*Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Notandum.* [Respondeo opener], *Opinio 1.*, *Non omnino probatur.*, *Opinio 2 conclusio.*, *Distinctio.*, *Conclusio 1.*, *Conclusio 2.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Notandum.* [Solutio 3 + Solutio 6], *De duplici forma, communi et ultima.*, *Alia solutio.*) preserved inline per Vol II convention, not promoted to headings.