title: Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum materia producta sit in perfecta actualitate.*

*Ad oppositum.* Secundo quaeritur, utrum materia illa producta sit in perfecta actualitate. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per textum Genesis secundo[^1]: *Istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae in die, qua creavit Deus caelum et terram et omne virgultum agri* etc.: ergo in eodem die producta sunt quae prius dixit per sex dierum numerum fuisse distincta.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo octavo[^2]: *Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul.* Si omnia simul sunt creata, ergo corporalia et spiritualia et omnis corporalium differentia.

3. Item, Iob quadragesimo[^3]: *Ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum*; sed Behemoth est Angelus primo factus, et homo ultimo die factus: ergo omnia simul facta sunt. — His auctoritatibus arguit Augustinus pro sua opinione in hac parte.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione. Ab agente perfectae potentiae debet exire effectus, secundum quod *magis* est manifestativus summae potentiae; sed maioris potentiae est posse simul omnia producere quam successive: ergo magis est declarativa divinae potentiae productio materiae cum perfecta actualitate formae simul et semel sibi collatae, quam postmodum ex illa successive eductae: si ergo Deus operatur, secundum quod eius potentiam magis decet[^4], videtur etc.

5. Item, «*perfecte sapientis est ordinare*»[^5]: ergo si confusio repugnat ordinationi, videtur, quod Deus nihil produxerit cum confusione, cum sit perfecte sapiens; produxit igitur sub ordine. Sed ordo praesupponit distinctionem: ergo etc.

6. Item, perfectio effectus attestatur perfectae <!-- page 296 -->
bonitati in efficiente: si ergo Deus est bonitatis perfectissimae, videtur, quod statim cum produxit materiam, debuit ipsam formis plene perficere, cum ipse hoc posset, et materia etiam exigeret. *Si tu dicas,* quod hoc non concludit, quod statim debuit perficere, sed quod ex rationabili causa et potuit et debuit differre; *obiicitur* contra hoc: quia natura et ars operatur quam citius potest, et de excellentia virtutis et bonitatis est, quod effectum suum compleat velociter: ergo si tam natura quam ars est imitatrix divinae artis et virtutis[^6], videtur, quod Deus, cum statim complere potuerit, quod nulla mora temporis vel durationis distulerit.

*Fundamenta.* **Sed contra:** 1. Primo per textum Genesis[^7] arguitur, ubi dicitur, quod per sex dierum spatium *complevit Dominus opus, quod inchoaverat*: ergo videtur, quod non subito materia sit in perfecta actualitate producta, secundum sacrae Scripturae sententiam. Si igitur «*maior est huius Scripturae auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii perspicacitas*», ut dicit Augustinus[^8], magis standum est huic sententiae quam omni persuasioni humanae. *Si dicas,* quod rudibus loquebatur legislator, nec potuit *simul dicere* quod *simul* potuit Deus *facere*; neutra istarum responsionum videtur sufficiens, quia propter ruditatem auditoris non debet ei aliquis dare occasionem deceptionis; Moyses autem bene noverat, quod ipsi verba eius ad litteram intelligerent: ergo scienter docebat eos id, unde possent decipi et errare. Item, quamvis non simul potuerit omnia *dicere* et opera illa exprimere, tamen potuit exprimere, omnia simul facta esse.

2. Item, Chrysostomus *super Ioannem,* homilia vigesima secunda[^9] ait, «*quod simul exstitit per substantiam materiae non simul apparuit per speciem formae*»: ergo non videtur, quod simul producta sit sub formis. — Ad hoc sunt auctoritates communiter Sanctorum et doctorum, ut Ambrosii[^10], Hieronymi, Gregorii, Basilii, Dionysii et Damasceni et aliorum plurium, tam Graecorum quam Latinorum.

3. Item, per *rationem* videtur hoc ipsum. Quamvis Deus posset statim hominem in beatitudine collocare et universum in ea perfectione, in qua erit post iudicium, facere; maluit tamen ordinem servare non solum in mundi *existentia,* sed etiam in *decursu,* quia efficacius sic manifestatur eius sapientia[^11]. Ergo similiter videtur, quod in primario rerum exitu non tantummodo servaverit ordinem quantum ad ipsum *esse,* sed etiam quantum ad ipsum *producere* sive *facere*: ergo non videtur, quod omnia simul produxerit, sed successive.

4. Item, divina potentia non tantum manifestatur in *productione formae,* sed etiam tantum et amplius manifestatur in *eductione materiae*; materia autem secundum maiorem sui capacitatem magis declarat efficientis potestatem. Sed tanto maior est capacitas in materia, quanto maior est in ea informitas: si ergo ad manifestationem divinae potentiae debuit materia produci capax, secundum quod erat possibile, videtur, quod Deus debuit eam producere in tanta informitate, in quanta materia posset aliquo modo subsistere: ergo non sub perfecta formarum distinctione.

5. Item, impossibile est, dies materiales[^12] simul esse: ergo impossibile est hoc intelligere, quod Deus simul omnia produxerit, et tamen ea produxerit per *sex dies.* Oportet ergo secundum positionem, quae ponit, omnia simul esse producta, senarium illum dierum intelligere *spiritualiter,* et ita *lucem spiritualem* et *noctem spiritualem.* Ergo si haec omnia simul producta sunt, in primo instanti divisa est lux a tenebris, id est boni Angeli a malis: ergo non fuit mora inter creationem et lapsum, quod est supra[^13] improbatum, et ostensum est esse contra Augustinum.

6. Item, cum sacra Scriptura ordinat opera sex dierum, aut ordinat quantum ad ordinem *durationis,* aut quantum ad ordinem *naturae,* aut quantum ad ordinem *dignitatis.* Si quantum ad ordinem *dignitatis*: ergo cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum, debuit eius productio attribui primae diei. Si quantum ad ordinem *naturae*: ergo productio solis et lunae[^14] ante productionem plantarum et herbae. Restat igitur, hoc esse dictum quantum ad ordinem *temporis* sive *durationis.*

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Probabilius est, omnia corporalia simul esse creata secundum materiam, non autem simul, sed per sex dies esse distincta secundum formam.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversae fuerunt Sanctorum opiniones.

Quidam enim Sancti in hac quaestione magis secuti sunt viam *theologicam,* trahentes rationem ad ea quae sunt fidei. *Opinio Augustini.* Quidam vero, inter quos praecipuus fuit Augustinus, magis secuti sunt viam *philosophicam,* quae illa ponit, quae magis videntur rationi consona: unde et intellectum Scripturae traxit ad rationis confirmationem et attestationem. Unde cum videatur rationabilius, a summa potentia omnia produci simul, et mora temporis interiacentis nullius videatur esse utilitatis vel necessitatis; posuit, omnia simul esse producta, suam positionem confirmans per auctoritates sacrae Scripturae, et exponens illud quod videtur sibi contraire, videlicet de *dierum distinctione,* ostendens, quod illi dies non fuerunt dies materiales, sed potius spirituales, qui omnes simul potuerunt esse. — Et haec positio multum fuit rationabilis et valde subtilis.

*Non omnibus placet.* Verumtamen, quia ad hanc positionem videtur intellectus Scripturae distrahi, et securius est et magis meritorium, intellectum nostrum et rationem omnino Scripturae *supponere,* quam ipsam aliquo modo *distrahere*: ideo communiter alii doctores, et qui praecesserunt Augustinum, et qui secuti sunt, sic intellexerunt et posuerunt, sicut textus et littera sacrae Scripturae Genesis sonare videtur. Unde posuerunt, omnia corporalia *Conclusio.* simul esse creata in *materia,* sed non simul, sed per senarium dierum, esse distincta in *forma.* — *Defenditur rationibus.* Hanc positionem, etsi minus videatur rationabilis quam alia, non tamen <!-- page 297 -->
est irrationabile sustinere. Quamvis enim ratio non percipiat huius positionis congruitatem, prout considerationi suae innititur, percipit tamen, prout sub lumine fidei captivatur. Est enim huius successivae formationis et distinctionis *ratio quadruplex,* videlicet *litteralis, moralis, allegorica* et *anagogica.*

*Ratio 1. Litteralis* in hoc, quod Deus non tantum intendit facere quod *potest,* quantum[^15] etiam communicare creaturae quod potest *recipere.* Unde cum possit dare beatitudinem absque meritis, vult tamen, quod mereamur. Sic cum posset statim perficere materiam, maluit tamen ipsam sub quadam informitate et imperfectione facere, ut ex sua imperfectione quasi materia ad Deum clamaret, ut ipsam perficeret[^16]. Et hoc idem voluit per *senarium* dierum differre, ut in perfectione numeri simul ostenderetur perfectio universi[^17]. Secundum enim arithmeticum *senarius* est numerus perfectus, quia constat ex omnibus suis partibus aliquotis, ita quod nec deficit nec excrescit. Partes autem *aliquotae* dicuntur, quae sumtae aliquoties reddunt totum.

*Ratio 2.* Ratio *moralis* est, ut in hoc erudiatur homo, quod sicut natura corporea per se ipsam informis existit, tunc autem formatur, cum divina bonitas eius informitati tribuit formam; sic anima formari non potest per se ipsam, nisi Deus gratiam suam infundat[^18]. Cui etiam *senarius* numerus attestatur, quia tempus est merendi per universum tempus vitae praesentis, ut postmodum detur homini quies, quia non pervenitur ad perfectionem meriti usque ad consummationem gratiae finalis, post quam nulla sequitur vespera: et ideo dies septimus non habet sibi assignatum *vespere* in Scriptura[^19].

*Ratio 3. Allegorica* vero ratio est, quia, sicut expresse Augustinus[^20] ostendit, in illa prima mundi conditione, quae distincta est per *senarium,* totum spatium decursus mundi praesentis secundum sex aetates praesignatur: ut primus dies primae aetati respondeat, secundus secundae, et sic deinceps, secundum quod plane adaptat Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^21]; quod hic longum esset repetere.

*Ratio 4.* Ratio autem *anagogica* est, ut in illa dierum distinctione intelligatur perfectio cognitionis in angelica natura beatificata, secundum quod plane ostendit Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram* quasi per totum[^22], quod ideo vocat *ad litteram,* quia expositionem istam, quam alii reputabant anagogicam, dixit legislatorem intendisse ad litteram. *Notandum.* Nihil tamen ibi asserendo dicit, sed protestatur ipse, modo *inquisitorio* se ibi procedere. Et sicut patet ex eius intentione ibidem[^23], magis volebat intellectum ex Scriptura elicere, ex quo Scriptura non posset a viris philosophicis derideri, nec propter hoc aliquis, naturali philosophia imbutus, a fidei veritate retardari, sicut ipse aliquando fuerat retardatus, magis, inquam, quam intellectum principalem exponere, quem ibi habuit legislator; et magis intendit ostendere, quid *congruum* fuerit vel tunc esse potuerit, quam quid *factum* fuerit. *Notandum.* Et in duodecimo *Confessionum*[^24] ostendit, quod una et eadem Scriptura multipliciter potest intelligi, et in omnibus sensibus vere, quorum nullus Spiritum sanctum latuit, ex cuius inspiratione Scriptura edita fuit. Et in hoc manifeste ostendit, quod aliis non contradicit. — Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo, ad obiecta in contrarium respondendum est.

*Solutio oppositorum.* **Ad 1.** Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de textu *Genesis,* dicendum, quod illud dictum est per *recapitulationem,* et iste terminus *die* ibi confunditur, ut teneatur pro diversis diebus, vel tenetur *zeugmatice*[^25], ut reddatur singulis membris illius recapitulationis.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ecclesiastici decimo octavo[^26]: *Qui vivit in aeternum* etc.; dicendum, quod Scriptura facit vim inter *creare* et *facere.* Nam *creationem* vocat productionem ex nihilo, *factionem* vero ipsam distinctionem; et hoc bene significatur Genesis secundo, ubi dicitur, quod *cessavit ab omni opere suo, quod creavit, ut faceret.* Omnes igitur Sancti in hoc concordant, quod omnia sunt simul producta in materia; et ideo concedunt, omnia simul esse *creata,* sed tamen non simul *facta.*
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**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de Iob quadragesimo, dicendum, quod Gregorius[^27] exponit, quod *cum* dicit ibi simultatem non temporis, sed similitudinem rationis, quasi dicat, *ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum,* id est tibi similem in rationis capacitate.

**Ad 4. 5. 6.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris potentiae est declarativum, producere multa simul; dicendum, quod Deus potentiam suam magis intendebat manifestare in productione de *non-esse* in *esse* quam postmodum in *formatione*; ibi enim magis manifestat *sapientiam* et *bonitatem.* Et ut singillatim et distinctim et appropriatim in productione effectuum manifestaretur perfectio *potentiae, sapientiae* et *bonitatis*: placuit divino Auctori praemittere opus *creationis,* postmodum subiungere opus *distinctionis,* postremo vero opus *ornatus* et *decorationis.* Et in primo manifestatur *potentia,* in secundo *sapientia,* in tertio vero *bonitas* perfecta, licet omnia in quolibet horum manifestari possint. *Notandum.* Et ideo[^28] bene manifestata sunt post consummatum esse rerum illa tria, sicut si in principio statim materia fuisset producta et distincta et ornata. — Et per hoc patent duo sequentia, quae procedunt consimili via, videlicet de *bonitatis* et *sapientiae* perfectione. Illae enim rationes non concludunt, nisi quod Deus materiam in informitate non debuit relinquere, quia hoc esset contra ordinem et perfectionem; sed dum fecit informem, ut formaret, et imperfectam, ut perficeret, ostendit, et perfectionem et ordinem a se materiae dari. *Et si tu obiicias,* quod ad perfectionem omnium horum spectat velociter effectum perficere et ordinare[^29] et distinguere; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi agens agit secundum totum suum *posse*; ubi vero condescendit possibilitati et infirmitati et utilitati alienae, non habet veritatem; et sic est in proposito. *Notandum.* Sicut enim Deus sacram Scripturam nobis tradidit quasi rudi modo et inepto, ut quilibet posset capere et intelligere, cum tamen in Christo sint *infiniti thesauri sapientiae et scientiae*[^30]; sic etiam in formatione rerum, quantum decebat, condescendit modo naturae et etiam eruditioni rationalis creaturae. Et quia ex illa dilatione homo erudiebatur, sicut prius visum est; ideo placuit divinae potentiae, bonitati et sapientiae, rerum formas sub dierum successione distinguere, cum tamen posset eis subito materiam distinguere et ornare.

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### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether matter was produced in perfect actuality.*

*Ad oppositum.* Secondly it is asked whether that matter was produced in perfect actuality. And that yes, it seems:

1. First by the text of Genesis 2[^1]: *These are the generations of the heavens and the earth in the day when God created the heavens and the earth and every plant of the field* etc.: therefore in the same day were produced those things which he had earlier said were distinguished through the number of six days.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 18[^2]: *He who lives forever created all things at once.* If all things were created at once, then both corporeal and spiritual and every difference of corporeal things [were so created].

3. Likewise, Job 40[^3]: *Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee*; but Behemoth is the Angel first made, and man was made on the last day: therefore all things were made at once. — By these authorities Augustine argues for his opinion in this part.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown by reason. From an agent of perfect potency the effect ought to come forth in such measure as is *more* manifestative of supreme potency; but it is of greater potency to be able to produce all things at once than successively: therefore the production of matter with the perfect actuality of form conferred all at once and simultaneously is more declarative of divine potency than [the production] of matter [first], from which [the forms] are afterwards successively brought forth: if therefore God works according to what most befits his potency[^4], it seems [that he did so] etc.

5. Likewise, «*it belongs to the perfectly wise to order*»[^5]: therefore if confusion is repugnant to ordering, it seems that God produced nothing with confusion, since he is perfectly wise; therefore he produced [things] under order. But order presupposes distinction: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the perfection of the effect attests to perfect <!-- page 296 -->
goodness in the efficient [cause]: if therefore God is of most perfect goodness, it seems that immediately when he produced matter, he ought to have perfected it fully with forms, since he himself could do this, and matter also was demanding it. *If you say* that this does not conclude that he ought to have perfected [matter] immediately, but that from a reasonable cause he both could and ought to defer; *it is objected* against this: that nature and art work as quickly as they can, and it belongs to excellence of power and goodness that one's effect be completed swiftly: therefore if both nature and art are an *imitator* of divine art and power[^6], it seems that God, since he could have completed [the work] at once, would not have allowed any delay of time or duration.

*Fundamenta.* **On the contrary:** 1. First by the text of Genesis[^7] one argues, where it is said that through the space of six days *the Lord completed the work which he had begun*: therefore it seems that matter was not produced suddenly in perfect actuality, according to the meaning of sacred Scripture. If therefore «*the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the perspicacity of human ingenuity*», as Augustine says[^8], one must rather stand by this opinion than by every human persuasion. *If you say* that the legislator was speaking to the rude, and could not *say at once* what God could *do at once*; neither of these responses seems sufficient, since on account of the rudeness of the hearer one ought not to give him occasion of deception; but Moses well knew that they would understand his words to the letter: therefore he was knowingly teaching them that by which they could be deceived and err. Likewise, although he could not *say* all things at once and express those works, yet he could express that all things were made at once.

2. Likewise, Chrysostom, *on John,* homily twenty-two[^9], says, «*what existed at once in the substance of matter did not at once appear through the species of form*»: therefore it seems not that [matter] was produced simul under forms. — To this point there are the authorities commonly of the Saints and doctors, such as Ambrose[^10], Jerome, Gregory, Basil, Dionysius, and Damascene, and many others, both Greek and Latin.

3. Likewise, the same is shown by *reason.* Although God could immediately place man in beatitude and make the universe in that perfection in which it will be after the Judgment; yet he chose to preserve order not only in the world's *existence* but also in its *course,* since thus his wisdom is more efficaciously manifested[^11]. Therefore likewise it seems that in the primary going-forth of things he preserved order not only as regards their *being* but also as regards their *producing* or *making*: therefore it seems that he did not produce all things at once, but successively.

4. Likewise, the divine potency is manifested not only in the *production of form,* but also as much and more is manifested in the *bringing forth of matter*; for matter, according to its greater capacity, more declares the power of its efficient [cause]. But the capacity in matter is so much the greater as informity in it is the greater: if therefore for the manifestation of divine potency matter ought to be produced as capacious as possible, it seems that God ought to have produced it in as much informity as matter could in some way subsist in: therefore not under perfect distinction of forms.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that material days[^12] be simul: therefore it is impossible to understand this — that God produced all things at once, and yet produced them through *six days.* It is therefore necessary, according to the position which holds that all things were produced at once, to understand that senary of days *spiritually,* and so the *spiritual light* and *spiritual night.* Therefore if all these things were produced at once, in the first instant light was divided from darkness, that is, the good Angels from the evil: therefore there was no delay between creation and the [angelic] fall, which is rejected above[^13] and shown to be against Augustine.

6. Likewise, when sacred Scripture orders the works of the six days, it either orders [them] as to the order of *duration,* or as to the order of *nature,* or as to the order of *dignity.* If as to the order of *dignity*: then since man is the most dignified of creatures, his production ought to have been assigned to the first day. If as to the order of *nature*: then the production of sun and moon[^14] [ought to be] before the production of plants and grass. It remains therefore that this was said as to the order of *time* or *duration.*

### CONCLUSION.

> *It is more probable that all corporeal things were created at once according to matter, but not at once — rather, were distinguished through six days according to form.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this question there have been diverse opinions of the Saints.

For some Saints in this question followed more the *theological* way, drawing reasoning toward those things which are of the faith. *Opinion of Augustine.* But others, among whom the principal was Augustine, followed more the *philosophical* way, which lays down those things which seem more consonant with reason: hence he also drew the meaning of Scripture toward the confirmation and attestation of reason. Therefore, since it seems more reasonable that all things be produced at once by the supreme power, and that an intervening delay of time would seem to be of no utility or necessity, he held that all things were produced at once, confirming his position through the authorities of sacred Scripture, and explaining that which seems to him to contradict it — namely, the *distinction of days* — by showing that those days were not material days but rather spiritual [days], which could all be at once. — And this position was very reasonable and very subtle.

*Not pleasing to all.* Nevertheless, because the meaning of Scripture seems to be twisted by this position, and it is safer and more meritorious to *submit* our understanding and reason wholly to Scripture rather than in any way to *twist* it: therefore commonly the other doctors, both those who preceded Augustine and those who came after, understood and held [the matter] as the text and letter of sacred Scripture of Genesis seems to sound. Hence they held that all corporeal things were created at once *Conclusion.* in *matter,* but not at once — rather, through a senary of days — were distinguished in *form.* — *Defended by reasons.* This position, even though it may seem less reasonable than the other, nevertheless is not <!-- page 297 -->
unreasonable to maintain. For although reason does not perceive the fittingness of this position so far as it relies on its own consideration, yet it perceives [it] so far as it is taken captive under the light of faith. For of this successive formation and distinction there is a *fourfold reason,* namely *literal, moral, allegorical,* and *anagogical.*

*Ratio 1.* The *literal* [reason] is in this, that God intends not only to make what he *can,* but rather[^15] also to communicate to the creature what it can *receive.* Hence, since he can give beatitude without merits, yet he wills that we merit. So although he could immediately perfect matter, he preferred rather to make it under a certain informity and imperfection, so that, from its imperfection, matter as it were might cry out to God, that he might perfect it[^16]. And he willed to defer this same thing through a *senary* of days, so that in the perfection of the number the perfection of the universe might at once be shown forth[^17]. For according to the arithmetician, the *senary* is a perfect number, since it consists of all its aliquot parts, in such a way that it neither falls short nor exceeds. Now *aliquot* parts are called those which, taken some number of times, yield the whole.

*Ratio 2.* The *moral* reason is, that in this man may be instructed: that just as corporeal nature of itself exists formless, but is then formed when the divine goodness bestows form on its informity; so the soul cannot be formed of itself, unless God pour in his grace[^18]. To this the *senary* number also attests, since [our] time is for meriting through the whole time of the present life, so that afterwards rest may be given to man, since one does not attain the perfection of merit until the consummation of final grace, after which no evening follows: and therefore the seventh day has no *evening* assigned to it in Scripture[^19].

*Ratio 3.* The *allegorical* reason is — since, as Augustine expressly[^20] shows — in that first establishment of the world, which was distinguished by the *senary,* the whole span of the course of the present world is prefigured according to six ages: such that the first day corresponds to the first age, the second to the second, and so on, according as Augustine plainly adapts in *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^21]; which would here be long to repeat.

*Ratio 4.* The *anagogical* reason is, that in that distinction of days the perfection of cognition in the beatified angelic nature may be understood, according as Augustine plainly shows in *On Genesis according to the Letter* almost throughout[^22]; which he therefore calls *to the letter* because he said that the legislator intended *to the letter* this exposition which others reputed anagogical. *Note.* Yet he says nothing there by way of assertion, but himself protests that he there proceeds in an *inquisitive* manner. And, as is evident from his intention in the same place[^23], he wished rather to elicit from Scripture a meaning according to which Scripture could not be ridiculed by philosophical men, nor on this account anyone, imbued with natural philosophy, be deterred from the truth of the faith, as he himself had once been deterred — [he wished], I say, rather [this] than to set forth the principal meaning which the legislator had there; and he intends rather to show what *fitting* there may have been or could then have been, than what *was done.* *Note.* And in the twelfth [book] of the *Confessions*[^24] he shows that one and the same Scripture can be understood in many ways, and in all senses truly, none of which was hidden from the Holy Spirit, by whose inspiration Scripture was put forth. And in this he manifestly shows that he does not contradict the others. — Therefore, maintaining this position, the objections to the contrary must be answered.

*Solution of the contrary [arguments].* **To 1.** To that which is first objected from the text of *Genesis,* it must be said that this is said by way of *recapitulation,* and the term *day* there is used confusedly, so that it is taken for diverse days, or it is taken *zeugmatically*[^25], so that it is rendered for the individual members of that recapitulation.

**To 2.** To that which is objected from Ecclesiasticus 18[^26]: *He who lives forever* etc.; it must be said that Scripture makes a distinction between *creating* and *making.* For it calls *creation* the production from nothing, but *making* the very distinction; and this is well signified in Genesis 2, where it is said that *he rested from every work which he created, that he might make.* All the Saints therefore concord in this — that all things are produced at once in matter; and they therefore concede that all things were *created* at once, but not yet *made* at once.
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**To 3.** To that which is objected from Job 40, it must be said that Gregory[^27] explains that *cum* there indicates not simultaneity of time, but a likeness of reason — as if to say, *Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee,* that is, like to thee in the capacity of reason.

**To 4. 5. 6.** To that which is objected, that it is more declarative of greater potency to produce many things at once, it must be said that God intended to manifest his potency more in the production from *non-being* to *being* than afterwards in *formation*; for there he more manifests *wisdom* and *goodness.* And so that individually and distinctly and appropriately in the production of effects the perfection of *potency, wisdom* and *goodness* might be manifested, it pleased the divine Author to send forth first the work of *creation,* then to add the work of *distinction,* finally the work of *adornment* and *decoration.* And in the first *potency* is manifested, in the second *wisdom,* in the third perfect *goodness,* though all may be manifested in any of these. *Note.* And therefore[^28] those three are well manifested after the consummate being of things, just as if matter had been produced and distinguished and adorned immediately at the beginning. — And by this the two following [arguments] are evident, which proceed by a like way, namely concerning the perfection of *goodness* and *wisdom.* For those reasons do not conclude anything except that God ought not to have left matter in informity, since this would be against order and perfection; but in making it formless that he might form it, and imperfect that he might perfect it, he showed that both perfection and order are given to matter from himself. *And if you object* that to the perfection of all these belongs swiftly to perfect and order[^29] and distinguish the effect, it must be said that this is true where an agent acts according to its whole *power*; but where it condescends to the possibility and infirmity and utility of another, it does not hold; and so it is in the present case. *Note.* For just as God handed down sacred Scripture to us as it were in a rude and unrefined manner, so that anyone might be able to grasp and understand, even though in Christ are the *infinite treasures of wisdom and knowledge*[^30]; so also in the formation of things, as far as was fitting, he condescended to the manner of nature and also to the instruction of the rational creature. And since by that delay man was instructed, as has been seen above, therefore it pleased the divine potency, goodness and wisdom to distinguish the forms of things under the succession of days, even though he could have suddenly distinguished and adorned matter for them.

la: Vers. 4. — Paulo inferius plures codd. omittunt *sex.*

en: Verse 4. — A little lower, several codices omit *six.*

la: Vers. 1.

en: Verse 1.

la: Vers. 10. — Sententiam Augustini vide IV. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 33. n. 52. seqq.; V. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. et c. 23. n. 44. seqq.; VI. c. 1. seq.; XI. *de Civ. Dei,* c. 6. seq.

en: Verse 10. — For Augustine's view see *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV, c. 33, n. 52 ff.; V, c. 3, n. 5 ff. and c. 23, n. 44 ff.; VI, c. 1 f.; *On the City of God* XI, c. 6 f.

la: Deut. 32, 4: *Dei perfecta sunt opera.* — Paulo ante non pauci codd. *successione eductae* pro *successive eductae.*

en: Deuteronomy 32, 4: *God's works are perfect.* — A little earlier, not a few codices [read] *by succession brought forth* in place of *successively brought forth.*

la: Aristot., I. *Metaph.* c. 2. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 685, nota 1. — Cod. cc cum ed. 1 et Vat. *ordinate operari.* Paulo inferius cod. Y *sub confusione* pro *cum confusione,* et deinde post *sub ordine* cod. O bene addit *omnia.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, c. 2. Cf. vol. I, p. 685, note 1. — Codex cc with edition 1 and the Vatican [edition read] *to work in an ordered way.* A little lower, codex Y [reads] *under confusion* for *with confusion*; and then after *under order* codex O well adds *all things.*

la: Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 78.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On 83 Different Questions,* q. 78.

la: Cap. 2, 2, ubi Vulgata *patrarat* pro *inchoaverat.*

en: Chapter 2, 2, where the Vulgate has *had accomplished* in place of *had begun.*

la: Libr. II. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 5. n. 9.

en: Book II *On Genesis according to the Letter,* c. 5, n. 9.

la: Hom. 22. (alias 21.) n. 1, ubi in explicatione illius verbi *Nondum venit hora mea* (Ioan. 2, 4.) ait: *Verum per haec dicta hoc vult significare, se omnia congruenti tempore operari nec simul facere, ne hinc rerum ordo turbaretur, si non opportuno tempore singula ederet, sed omnia simul misceret, generationem, resurrectionem, iudicium. Hic animum adhibe: oportuit creaturam facere, sed non omnem simul; hominem et mulierem, sed non una ambos.* Idem docet hom. 2. n. 4. et hom. 3. n. 3. seq. in cap. 1. Gen. — Ipsa autem verba huius sententiae inveniuntur in Gregor., XXXII. *Moral.* c. 12. n. 16: *Rerum quippe substantia simul creata est, sed simul species formata non est; et quod simul exstitit per substantiam materiae, non simul apparuit per speciem formae.*

en: Homily 22 (alias 21), n. 1, where in the explanation of that word *My hour has not yet come* (John 2, 4) he says: *Truly by these words he wishes to signify this — that he works all things at a fitting time and does not make them at once, lest from this the order of things be disturbed, if he were to produce individual things at an unsuitable time, but rather mix all things together — generation, resurrection, judgment. Apply your mind here: it was fitting to make the creature, but not all at once; man and woman, but not both at once.* He teaches the same thing in hom. 2, n. 4 and hom. 3, n. 3 ff. on Gen. c. 1. — The very words of this opinion are found in Gregory, *Moralia* XXXII, c. 12, n. 16: *For the substance of things was created at once, but the species was not formed at once; and what existed at once through the substance of matter did not at once appear through the species of form.*

la: Libr. I. *Hexaem.* c. 7. seq. — Hieron., *Comment. in Epist. ad Titum,* 1, 3. seq. — Gregorii verba vide in nota praecedente. — Basil., Hom. 2. *in Hexaem.* — Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 4. et c. 5. § 7. seq. — Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 5. seqq. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. seqq.

en: Book I *Hexaemeron* c. 7 f. — Jerome, *Commentary on the Epistle to Titus,* 1, 3 f. — For Gregory's words see the preceding note. — Basil, Homily 2 *on the Hexaemeron.* — Dionysius, *On the Divine Names,* c. 4 § 4 and c. 5 § 7 f. — Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 5 ff. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3 ff.

la: Cfr. verba Chrysost. hic nota 1.

en: Cf. the words of Chrysostom here, note 1 [= apparatus entry [^9]].

la: Codd. H W bb substituunt *naturales* pro *materiales*; sed infra in corp. legitur etiam in his *materiales.*

en: Codices H, W, bb substitute *natural* for *material*; but below, in the body, *material* is also read in these [codices].

la: Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Distinction 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 f.

la: Supple cum cod. aa *debuit esse,* pro quo Vat. *fuit.* Eadem Vat. dein *planetarum et herbarum* pro *plantarum et herbae* substituit.

en: Supply with codex aa *ought to be,* in place of which the Vatican [edition has] *was.* The Vatican [edition] then substitutes *of planets and grasses* for *of plants and grass.*

la: Cod. Q praemittit *nec.* Vat. substituit *tantum* et bis *quantum potest* pro *quod potest.* Cod. bb post *etiam* a manu suppari addit *intendit.* Sed lectiones codd. et edd. sunt parum congruae.

en: Codex Q prefixes *nec.* The Vatican [edition] substitutes *only* and twice *as much as he can* for *what he can.* Codex bb after *also,* by a near-contemporary hand, adds *intends.* But the readings of the codices and editions are little congruent.

la: Cfr. August., I. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 4. n. 9. seq.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* I, c. 4, n. 9 f.

la: Cfr. August., IV. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 2. n. 2. seqq. et Bonav., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4, scholion. — Paulo superius unus alterque cod. cum edd. 2, 3 *Augustinum* pro *arithmeticum.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV, c. 2, n. 2 ff., and Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 2, q. 4, scholion. — A little higher, one or another codex with editions 2 and 3 [reads] *Augustine* in place of *arithmetician.*

la: Vide August., 1. *contra Advers. legis et proph.* c. 8. n. 11.

en: See Augustine, *Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets* I, c. 8, n. 11.

la: Gen. 2, 2. seq. — Cfr. August., IV. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 18. n. 31.

en: Genesis 2, 2 f. — Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV, c. 18, n. 31.

la: Libr. I. *de Genesi contra Manich.* c. 23. n. 35. seqq.; XXII. *de Civ. Dei,* c. 30. n. 5; IV. *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 7; *Enarrat. in Ps.* 92. n. 1.

en: Book I *On Genesis against the Manichees,* c. 23, n. 35 ff.; *On the City of God* XXII, c. 30, n. 5; *On the Trinity* IV, c. 4, n. 7; *Commentary on the Psalms,* Ps. 92, n. 1.

la: Intellige: Librum I. *de Genesi contra Manichaeos,* c. 23. n. 35. seqq., cuius ipse Augustinus, VIII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 2. n. 3, mentionem facit. — Paulo superius cod. aa *praefiguratur* pro *praesignatur.*

en: Understand: Book I *On Genesis against the Manichees,* c. 23, n. 35 ff., of which Augustine himself makes mention in *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, c. 2, n. 3. — A little higher, codex aa [reads] *prefigured* in place of *presignified.*

la: Praecipue libr. IV. c. 21. n. 38. seqq. — August., II. *Retract.* c. 24. n. 1. ait: *Tituli eorum librorum inscribitur de Genesi ad litteram,* id est, non secundum allegoricas significationes, sed secundum rerum gestarum proprietatem. In quo opere plura quaesita quam inventa sunt, et eorum quae inventa sunt, pauciora firmata, cetera vero ita posita, velut adhuc requirenda sint. Cfr. I. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 1. n. 1, c. 17. n. 34, c. 21. n. 41; IV. c. 28. n. 45 et VIII. c. 1. n. 4. seq.; I. *de Gen. contra Manich.* c. 1. seq. — Cod. T *quem ideo* pro *quod ideo.*

en: Especially Book IV, c. 21, n. 38 ff. — Augustine, *Retractations* II, c. 24, n. 1, says: *The title of those books is inscribed* On Genesis according to the Letter, *that is, not according to allegorical significations, but according to the propriety of the things done.* In this work more things are inquired than discovered, and of those discovered, fewer are firmly established; the rest are set down as though still to be sought. Cf. *On Genesis according to the Letter* I, c. 1, n. 1; c. 17, n. 34; c. 21, n. 41; IV, c. 28, n. 45 and VIII, c. 1, n. 4 f.; *On Genesis against the Manichees* I, c. 1 f. — Codex T [reads] *quem ideo* (whom therefore) for *quod ideo* (which therefore).

la: Libr. I. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 19-21; IX. c. 12. n. 22. — In fine propositionis non pauci codd. cum ed. 2 *gratum,* Vat. *creatum* pro *congruum,* quod tamen recurrit etiam infra d. 15. dub. 3, in quo respicitur hic locus; dein post *vel tunc* ex pluribus codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus *esse.*

en: Book I *On Genesis according to the Letter,* c. 19–21; IX, c. 12, n. 22. — At the end of the proposition, not a few codices with edition 2 [read] *grateful,* the Vatican [edition] *created,* in place of *fitting* — which, however, recurs also below in d. 15, dub. 3, where this passage is referenced; then, after *or then,* from several codices and edition 1 we have supplied *to be.*

en: Chapters 18–32.

la: A Graeco vocabulo ζεῦγμα, i. e. *connexio,* per quod apud grammaticos significatur illa dictionis figura, qua plura (plures sensus) uno verbo connectuntur. — Verbum *confunditur* accipitur pro *distribuitur*; cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1, scholion.

en: From the Greek word *zeugma,* that is, *connection,* by which among the grammarians is signified that figure of speech by which several things (several senses) are connected by one word. — The verb *confunditur* (is used confusedly) is to be taken for *distribuitur* (is distributed); cf. I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, scholion.

la: Vers. 1. — Seq. textus est Gen. 2, 3, ubi Vulgata post *creavit* subiungit *Deus.*

en: Verse 1. — The following text is Genesis 2, 3, where the Vulgate, after *created,* adds *God.*

la: Vers. 10. Verba Gregorii, XXXII. *Moral.* c. 12. n. 17, sunt: *Sed si rerum causas subtili discussione pensamus, simul Angelum factum hominemque cognoscimus: simul videlicet non unitate temporis, sed cognitione rationis; simul per acceptam imaginem sapientiae, et non simul per coniunctam substantiam formae... In cuncta igitur creatura homo et Angelus simul conditus exstitit, quia ab omni creatura irrationali distinctus processit. Quia ergo in cuncta conditione rerum nullum rationale animal nisi Angelus et homo est, quidquid ratione uti non potest, cum homine factum non est.* — Ed. 1 et Vat. *simultatem rationis* pro *similitudinem rationis.* Dein multi codd. *sui similem* pro *tibi similem.*

en: Verse 10. The words of Gregory, *Moralia* XXXII, c. 12, n. 17, are: *But if we weigh the causes of things with subtle discussion, we recognize the Angel and man to have been made at once: at once, namely, not by unity of time, but by knowledge of reason; at once through the received image of wisdom, and not at once through the conjoined substance of form... In the whole of the creature, therefore, man and Angel were at once established, since [the rational creature] went forth distinct from every irrational creature. Since therefore in the whole establishment of things there is no rational animal except the Angel and man, whatever cannot use reason was not made with man.* — Edition 1 and the Vatican [edition read] *simultaneity of reason* for *likeness of reason.* Then many codices [read] *like himself* for *like to thee.*

la: In codd. L O additur *adeo*; in Vat. *ita.*

en: In codices L, O *adeo* (so much) is added; in the Vatican [edition], *ita* (thus).

la: Vat. *ornare.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *to adorn.*

la: Colos. 2, 3: *In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi.* — Mox post *formatione* in multis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur *rerum.* In fine solutionis plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *ordinare* pro *ornare.*

en: Colossians 2, 3: *In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden.* — Soon after *formation,* in many codices and edition 1, *of things* is missing. At the end of the solution, several codices with editions 2 and 3 [read] *to order* in place of *to adorn.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Augustinus ob rationes, quae hic *ad opposit.* tactae sunt, singularem expositionem duorum primorum capitulorum Genesis fecit, quam S. Thom. (hic q. unica, a. 2.) sic explicat: «*Augustinus enim vult, in ipso creationis principio quasdam res per species suas distinctas fuisse in natura propria, ut elementa, corpora caelestia et substantias spirituales, alia vero in rationibus seminalibus tantum, ut animalia, plantas et homines, quae omnia postmodum in naturis propriis producta sunt in illo opere, quo post senarium illorum dierum Deus naturam prius conditam administrat... Nec in distinctione rerum attendendum esse ordinem temporis, sed naturae et doctrinae: naturae, sicut sonus praecedit cantum natura, sed non tempore; et ita quae naturaliter priora sunt prius facta memorantur, sicut terra prius quam animalia, et aqua prius quam pisces, et sic de aliis; doctrinae vero ordine, sicut patet in docentibus geometriam. Quamvis enim partes figurae sine ordine temporis figuram constituant, tamen geometria docet, constitutionem fieri protrahendo lineam post lineam*» etc. Unde Augustinus *sex dies creationis* intellexit esse *spirituales,* quia una dies, distincta secundum diversa rerum genera, sex illuminationibus ab intellectu angelico cognoscitur (cfr. infra d. 13. a. I. q. 1.). — Sed aliorum Ss. Patrum communis interpretatio sex illos dies intellexit in ordine temporis sibi succedentes; quam sententiam Scholastici communiter magis verbis s. Scripturae consonam et magis securam esse censebant. Sed de sententia S. Augustini S. Thomas (loc. cit.) dicit: «*Haec opinio plus mihi placet*»; cui consentiunt B. Albert. et Uldaricus; alii autem ob auctoritatem S. Augustini eam aestimant esse probabilem et valde rationabilem. — Licet igitur fide certum sit, mundum a Deo esse creatum nec esse aeternum, tamen circa *modum* et *ordinem* distinctionis rerum et circa *interpretationem* illorum capitulorum Genesis diversae semper fuerunt sententiae in Ecclesia. Sapienter autem cavendum esse admonet S. Thom. (*de Potent.* q. 4. a. 1.), «*ne aliquis ita Scripturam ad unum sensum cogere velit, quod alios sensus, qui in se veritatem continent et possunt, salva circumstantia litterae, Scripturae aptari, penitus excludantur*».

Hoc monitum pro nostra aetate eo maioris momenti esse videtur, quia ex ipsa rerum naturalium scientia nova orta sunt systemata, vel potius magna ex parte coniecturae circa *geogoniam,* ut dicunt, quae ex positione et ordine rerum destructarum, praecipue organicarum, sub terra latentium, res istas successive, per longas periodos et certo quodam ordine productas esse concludunt. Nec desunt nostra aetate catholici auctores, qui egregie, licet diversis viis, probaverunt, ea quae certa explorataque sunt secundum scientiam naturalem, nullo modo contradicere verbis s. Scripturae, immo potius eadem confirmare.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 46. m. 1-4, q. 49. m. 2. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 66. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 2. 3; S. 1. q. 66. a. 1; *de Potent.* q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. II. q. 46. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Saint Augustine, on account of the reasons which were here touched on the side of the *opposit.*, made a singular exposition of the first two chapters of Genesis, which Saint Thomas (here, the single question, a. 2) thus explains: «*For Augustine wills that in the very principle of creation certain things were distinguished by their own species in their own nature — such as the elements, the heavenly bodies, and the spiritual substances — while others [were created] only in their seminal reasons — such as animals, plants, and men — all of which afterwards were produced in their own natures in that work by which, after the senary of those days, God administers the nature first established... Nor in the distinction of things is the order of time to be attended to, but [the order] of nature and of teaching: of nature, as sound precedes song by nature but not by time; and so those things which are by nature prior are recorded as made first — as earth before animals, and water before fishes, and so on; but [also the order] of teaching, as is evident in those teaching geometry. For although the parts of a figure constitute the figure without order of time, yet geometry teaches that the construction takes place by drawing line after line*» etc. Hence Augustine understood the *six days of creation* to be *spiritual* days, since one day, distinguished according to the diverse genera of things, is known by six illuminations from the angelic intellect (cf. below d. 13, a. I, q. 1.). — But the common interpretation of the other holy Fathers understood those six days as following one another in the order of time; which view the Scholastics commonly considered as more consonant with the words of sacred Scripture and more secure. But concerning the opinion of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas (loc. cit.) says: «*This opinion pleases me more*»; with whom Blessed Albert and Ulric agree; others, however, on account of the authority of Saint Augustine, esteem it to be probable and very reasonable. — Therefore, although it is certain by faith that the world was created by God and is not eternal, nevertheless concerning the *mode* and *order* of the distinction of things, and concerning the *interpretation* of those chapters of Genesis, there have always been diverse opinions in the Church. But Saint Thomas (*de Potent.* q. 4, a. 1) wisely admonishes us to take care «*lest anyone wish to compel Scripture to one sense in such a way that other senses, which contain truth in themselves and could, with the circumstances of the letter preserved, be fitted to Scripture, be wholly excluded*».

This admonition seems to be of so much the greater importance in our age, since from the very science of natural things have arisen new *systems,* or rather, in great part, conjectures about *geogony,* as they say, which conclude — from the position and order of destroyed things, especially organic ones, lying hidden under the earth — that those things were produced successively, over long periods and in a certain order. Nor are there lacking in our age Catholic authors who, by various ways, have excellently proved that those things which are certain and explored according to natural science in no way contradict the words of sacred Scripture, but rather confirm them.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. II, q. 46, m. 1-4; q. 49, m. 2. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 66, a. 1. — Saint Thomas, here, the single question, a. 2. 3; *Summa* I, q. 66, a. 1; *de Potent.* q. 4, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here, a. 1; *Summa,* p. II, tr. II, q. 46. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, the single question, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, q. 6. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 1. — Biel, here, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
- Four printed pages (p.295–p.298 = PDF 317–320). Two-column quaestio body opens at the bottom of p.295 L (QUAESTIO II + *Utrum materia producta sit in perfecta actualitate* + *Secundo quaeritur* — immediately below the SCHOLION end of `d12-a1-q1`), runs through p.296, p.297, with SCHOLION (**I** S. Thomas's exposition of Augustine + Magisterium-of-the-Church admonition + geogony note; **II** parallel-citations list) occupying the bottom half of p.298 R immediately before QUAESTIO III opens on p.298 R-bottom.
- **Apparatus (30 entries, renumbered continuously across pp. 295–298):**
  - p.295 (8 entries): [^1] Gen 2:4 + codd. omit *sex* — at *Genesis secundo* in arg.1; [^2] Ecclus 18:1 — at *Ecclesiastici decimo octavo* in arg.2; [^3] Iob 40:10 + Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* IV/V/VI + *de Civ. Dei* XI — at *Iob quadragesimo* in arg.3; [^4] Deut 32:4 + *successione/successive eductae* variant — at *eius potentiam magis decet* in arg.4; [^5] Aristot., *Metaph.* I c. 2 + variants — at *perfecte sapientis est ordinare* in arg.5; [^6] Aug., *83 Qq* q.78 — at *imitatrix divinae artis et virtutis* in arg.6; [^7] Gen 2:2 (*patrarat/inchoaverat*) — at *complevit Dominus opus, quod inchoaverat* in Sed contra 1; [^8] Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* II c.5 n.9 — at *ut dicit Augustinus* in Sed contra 1.
  - p.296 (6 entries): [^9] Chrysost., *Hom.* 22 + Gregor., *Moral.* XXXII (verbal source) — at *Chrysostomus super Ioannem, homilia vigesima secunda* in Sed contra 2; [^10] Ambros., *Hexaem.* I + Hieron., Gregor., Basil., Dionys., Damasc. — at *Ambrosii* (parallel-Sancti list) in Sed contra 2; [^11] Cfr. note 1 (= [^9]) — at *efficacius sic manifestatur eius sapientia* in Sed contra 3; [^12] codd. H W bb *naturales* / *materiales* variant — at *dies materiales* in Sed contra 5; [^13] *Dist. 3. p.II.a.1.q.1.seq.* cross-ref — at *est supra improbatum* in Sed contra 5; [^14] *debuit esse / fuit* + *planetarum/plantarum* variants — at *productio solis et lunae* in Sed contra 6.
  - p.297 (12 entries, heaviest Quaracchi-side cluster of d.12): [^15] cod. Q *nec* + Vat. *tantum* variants — at *non tantum intendit facere quod potest* in Ratio 1; [^16] Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* I c.4 n.9 — at *ut ipsam perficeret* in Ratio 1; [^17] Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* IV c.2 + Bonav. I Sent. + *Augustinum/arithmeticum* variant — at *perfectio universi* in Ratio 1; [^18] Aug., *contra Advers. legis et proph.* I c.8 — at *nisi Deus gratiam suam infundat* in Ratio 2; [^19] Gen 2:2 + Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* IV c.18 — at *dies septimus non habet sibi assignatum vespere in Scriptura* in Ratio 2; [^20] Aug., *de Gen. contra Manich.* I c.23 + *de Civ. Dei* XXII + *de Trin.* IV + *Enarr. in Ps.* 92 — at *expresse Augustinus* in Ratio 3; [^21] *Intellige: Librum I. de Genesi contra Manichaeos* + cod. aa *praefiguratur/praesignatur* — at *Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram* in Ratio 3; [^22] Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* IV c.21 + *Retract.* II c.24 + cod. T *quem/quod ideo* — at *super Genesim ad litteram quasi per totum* in Ratio 4; [^23] Aug., *de Gen. ad lit.* I c.19-21 + IX c.12 + *gratum/creatum/congruum* variants — at *quid congruum fuerit vel tunc esse potuerit* in Ratio 4; [^24] Aug., *Confess.* XII c.18-32 — at *in duodecimo Confessionum* in Ratio 4 Notandum; [^25] Graeco *ζεῦγμα* etymology + *confunditur/distribuitur* — at *tenetur zeugmatice* in Ad 1; [^26] Ecclus 18:1 + Gen 2:3 *creavit Deus* variant — at *de Ecclesiastici decimo octavo* in Ad 2.
  - p.298 (4 entries): [^27] Iob 40:10 + Gregor., *Moral.* XXXII c.12 n.17 + *simultatem/similitudinem rationis* + *sui/tibi similem* variants — at *Gregorius exponit* in Ad 3; [^28] codd. L O *adeo* / Vat. *ita* — at *Et ideo* in Ad 4.5.6 Notandum; [^29] Vat. *ornare* — at *ordinare* (mid-Notandum, parallel verb) in Ad 4.5.6; [^30] Col 2:3 + codd. omit *rerum* + *ordinare/ornare* variant — at *infiniti thesauri sapientiae et scientiae* in Ad 4.5.6.
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum materia corporalium creata sit sub aliqua diversitate formarum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum materia illa corporalium creata sit sub aliqua formarum diversitate. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Per textum[^1]: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*: ergo videtur, quod in principio suae conditionis habuit formam caelestem et formam elementarem. Si tu dicas, quod *caelum* stat ibi pro caelo empyreo, et *terra* pro materia corporalium; obiicitur per textum sequentem[^2]: *Congregentur aquae in locum unum, et appareat arida*: ergo videtur, quod tertio die *terra* solummodo manifestata fuerit, non producta: ergo in ipso chaos videbantur iam esse elementa.

2. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore[^3]: «Nomine *terrae* hic terrae elementum significatum puto»: si ergo erat ibi elementum *terrae*, pari ratione et alia elementa. Si tu dicas, quod ibi vocat elementum *terrae*, non quia iam erat, sed quia futurum erat; obiicitur per illud quod subditur: «Eratque terrenum hoc elementum medio et uno loco subsidens, ceteris in confusione permixtis». Si ergo permixtio non est eiusdem, sed diversorum, videtur, quod ibi iam erant diversae formae elementares.

3. Item, *ratione* hoc videtur. Primae formae, quae insunt materiae, sunt formae elementares, sicut patet, quia ultra illas non est resolutio nisi ad materiam primam: ergo si materia illa aliquam formam habuit corporalem, videtur, quod habuerit formam elementarem. Sed formae elementares sunt aeque primae[^4]: ergo videtur, quod simul habuit omnes.

4. Item, constans est secundum positionem Sanctorum, quod lux illa faciebat noctem et diem[^5]; sed diem non poterat facere, nisi esset corpus transparens et illuminabile, noctem non poterat facere, nisi esset corpus opacum, quod umbram proiiceret: videtur ergo, quod in primaria conditione materia in quadam sui parte fuerit transparens et in quadam opaca, et ita quod in se habuerit formas diversas.

5. Item, «nihil est in genere, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie[^6]»: ergo si materia illa erat quid corporeum, erat igitur aliquod corpus: ergo vel simplex, vel mixtum; sed non erat corpus simplex, quia nec caeleste nec elementare; ergo permixtum, ergo habebat in se diversitatem formarum.

6. Item, materia illa, cum esset imperfecta, habebat aliquem appetitum[^7]; aut ergo ad unam formam, aut ad plures. Si ad unam: ergo videtur, cum Deus compleverit appetitum eius, quod debuit dare unam solam formam corporalem; si ad plures: ergo cum multiformitas appetituum veniat ex multiformitate dispositionum, et multiformitas dispositionum ex multiformitate formarum, ergo videtur, quod illa materia condita fuerit sub formarum diversitate.

*Fundamenta.*

**Sed contra:** 1. Genesis primo[^8]: *Terra autem erat inanis et vacua*; sed si esset in materia formarum diversitas, non esset inanis et vacua: ergo etc.

2. Item, alia translatio[^9]: *Terra erat invisibilis et incomposita*; sed si esset ibi forma caelestis et elementaris, esset iam materia aliquo modo et visibilis et composita.

3. Item, si erant ibi formae plures, aut ergo erant *permixtae*, aut *distinctae*. Si *distinctae*: ergo non erat materia illa informis; si *permixtae*: ergo videtur, quod haberet formam mixtionis, et ita non erat informis, immo magis formata, quam si haberet solam formam elementarem[^10].

4. Item, miscibilia praecedunt mixtum[^11]: ergo si ibi erant formae *permixtae*, per naturam prius sunt elementa quam illa materia, quae primo est condita: ergo videtur ordo praeposterus, quando Deus ex materia illa fecit elementa in sequentibus diebus.

5. Item, si *permixtae* erant ibi formae, ergo materia illa magis approximabat mixto perfecta mixtione, quam approximet[^12] elementum: ergo magis approximabat ad opus quintae diei et sextae quam elementorum distinctio: ergo videtur, quod non debuit productio illius materiae determinari in rerum primordio.

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6. Item, si erat ibi formarum diversitas, ergo videtur, quod esset ibi actio et passio, et ita generatio et corruptio et alteratio: et ita non erat dicenda materia *informis*, cum in tali statu essent operationes, quae competunt formis distinctis[^13].

### Conclusio

> *Materia corporalium non fuit creata sub completa formarum diversitate, sed forma, quam habebat materia informis vocata, non dabat esse completum, sed erat potius dispositio ad formas ulteriores.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod *informitatem* illius materiae corporalis diversimode intellexerunt diversi.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam namque voluerunt dicere, quod materia illa diceretur *chaos* propter formarum multitudinem et contrarietatem, quae erat in partibus materiae, ita quod illae partes non distinguebantur ad invicem secundum loca determinata, nec ita proportionaliter invicem iungebantur, ut ex eis resultaret aliquod *mixtum completum*. Et ideo erat ibi quaedam permixtio non proportionis, sed confusionis; et sicut non erat ibi proportionalis mixtio, ita nec erat ibi regularis actio, immo cuiusdam pugnae confusio, ita ut calida pugnarent frigidis, et humida siccis[^14]; et sic recte posset materia illa *chaos* appellari. — Sed iste modus ponendi potius est poeticus quam philosophicus, quia magis sequitur imaginationis fictionem quam rationem, cum secundum istam positionem ponantur elementa illam materiam sic productam naturaliter praecedere; quod nec rationi consonat nec sacrae Scripturae.

*Opinio 2.* Et ideo est alius modus dicendi rationabilior, quod materia illa producta est sub aliqua forma, sed illa non erat *forma completa* nec dans materiae *esse completum*; et ideo non sic formabat, quin adhuc materia diceretur *informis*, nec appetitum materiae adeo finiebat, quin materia adhuc alias formas appeteret; *Conclusio 1.* et ideo *dispositio* erat ad formas ulteriores, non completa perfectio. Et quoniam ad multas formas materia informis appetitum et inclinationem habebat, ideo, quamvis illa forma non haberet in se *naturas diversas*, *Conclusio 2.* tamen materia in diversis suis partibus quandam *diversitatem imperfectam* habebat, non ex diversis actibus completis, sed magis ex appetitibus ad diversa; et ideo *permixta* dicitur et *confusa*. — *Exemplum.* Sicut exemplum ponitur in embryone, quod actu habet unam formam et figuram quandam massae carnis, illa tamen est dispositio ad diversas membrorum figurationes. *Deficit exemplum.* Istud tamen non est omnino simile, quia forma illa non erat tantae actualitatis, sicut est forma embryonis, nec in tanta propinquitate ad eductionem formarum sequentium, sicut forma embryonis ad eductionem membrorum. Forma enim embryonis est visibilis et per vim naturae ad perfectam completionem est perducibilis[^15]; illa vero materia sub tali forma incomposita erat et invisibilis, et ad formas subsequentes sola divina virtute et operatione poterat perduci. Et ideo propter imperfectionem formae illius materia illa dicitur *informis*; et propter indeterminatum appetitum multarum formarum *confusa* dicitur et *permixta*.

*Iudicium hac opinione.* Et haec positio satis videtur esse intelligibilis et probabilis. Et iuxta hanc positionem concedendum est, quod materia non fuit creata sub formarum diversitate, sicut rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de textu, dicendum, quod *caelum* stat ibi pro empyreo. Et si obiicitur, quod Scriptura consequenter dicit, *terram apparuisse*, non *formatam esse*; dicendum, quod sicut artifex facit apparere effectum producendo, non ostendendo solum; sic intelligendum est, quod Deus fecit *terram apparere*, non solum separando elementa ab invicem, sed etiam producendo, ita quod productio fuit cum distinctione, et distinctio cum productione.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Hugo dicit, per *terram* intelligi *elementum terrae*; dicendum, quod hoc dicit non propter *formam terrae*, quae iam inesset illi materiae, sed propter quandam *aptitudinem incompletam*, quae inerat illi parti materiae, ut perficeretur postmodum forma terrae, per eum modum, secundum quem consuevit aliquid appellari eius nomine, ad quod ordinatur. *Notandum.* Materia enim illa non poterat nisi quodam modo balbutiendo describi, quia necdum erat quod sermo perfecte explicet[^16], sed etiam intellectus in imaginatione deficit. Unde et illud quod ipse subiungit de *permixtione*, non est hoc dictum, quia ibi fuerit vera oppositarum formarum coniunctio, sed quia non erat ibi perfecte formarum distinctio.

3. *Notandum.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod formae elementares sunt primae in materia corporali; dicendum, quod verum est de formis, quae dant materiae *esse completum*; forma vero illa, quam habebat informis materia, non dabat sibi *esse completum*, et ideo tam formas simplices quam compositas, quae *esse completum* tribuunt, praecedebat vel praecedere poterat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod erat ibi corpus

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opacum et transparens; dicendum, quod nec erat ibi perfecta opacitas nec perfecta transparentia; erat tamen in diversis partibus materiae, secundum quod Conditor ordinaverat ex eis diversas formas producere, aliquis diversus *dispositionis* modus, qui non ponebat diversitatem *formarum*. Sicut si intelligatur, quod aliquod corpus in una parte sit rarius et in alia magis compactum, salva formae unitate; sic intelligi debet in illa materia, quae formam habebat maxime[^17] ad multa possibilem.

5. *Notandum.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est in genere, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie; dicendum, quod illud verum est de eo quod est in genere tanquam *ens completum*; sed materia illa non sic erat corporea, quod esset *completa* in genere corporum, sed sic habebat *extensionem* et *corporeitatem*, quod non habebat perfectam formae actualitatem, sicut praedictum est prius[^18].

6. *Notandum.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de diversitate appetituum, dicendum, quod *appetitus* non semper sequitur *formam completam*, sed etiam attenditur secundum *appetentis indigentiam* et aliquam *dispositionem semiplenam*; nisi fortassis sit talis appetitus, qui consequatur dispositionem, quae est *necessitas*[^19]; sed talis non erat in illa informi materia, sed secundum quandam maiorem subtilitatem et raritatem in partibus materiae erat dispositio longinqua ad formas alias et alias.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the matter of bodily things was created under some diversity of forms.*

Third, it is asked whether that matter of bodily things was created under some diversity of forms. And that it was, seems thus:

*To the opposite.*

1. By the text[^1]: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*: therefore it seems that in the beginning of its founding it had both a heavenly form and an elemental form. If you say that *heaven* here stands for the empyrean heaven, and *earth* for the matter of bodily things; the objection is raised by the following text[^2]: *Let the waters be gathered into one place, and let the dry land appear*: therefore it seems that on the third day the *earth* was only made manifest, not produced: therefore in the chaos itself the elements seemed already to be present.

2. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor[^3]: «By the name *earth* here I judge the element of earth to be signified»: if therefore the element of *earth* was there, by parity of reasoning the other elements as well. If you say that he there calls it the element of *earth* not because it then was, but because it was to be; the objection is raised by what is added: «And this earthen element was settled in the middle and in one place, the rest being mixed in confusion together». If therefore the mixture is not of the same but of diverse things, it seems that diverse elemental forms were already there.

3. Likewise, this is seen *by reason*. The first forms which are present in matter are the elemental forms, as is clear, because beyond them there is no resolution except into first matter: therefore if that matter had any bodily form, it seems that it had an elemental form. But the elemental forms are equally primary[^4]: therefore it seems that it had them all at once.

4. Likewise, it is constant according to the position of the Saints that that light made night and day[^5]; but it could not make day unless there were a transparent and illuminable body, nor could it make night unless there were an opaque body which would cast a shadow: therefore it seems that in its primary founding the matter was in some part of itself transparent and in some part opaque, and thus that it had diverse forms in itself.

5. Likewise, «nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it[^6]»: therefore if that matter was something bodily, it was therefore some body: therefore either simple or mixed; but it was not a simple body, since neither heavenly nor elemental; therefore mixed, therefore it had in itself a diversity of forms.

6. Likewise, that matter, since it was imperfect, had some appetite[^7]; either therefore for one form or for many. If for one: then it seems, since God fulfilled its appetite, that he ought to have given one sole bodily form; if for many: then since the multiformity of appetites comes from the multiformity of dispositions, and the multiformity of dispositions from the multiformity of forms, it seems that that matter was founded under a diversity of forms.

*Foundations.*

**On the contrary:** 1. In Genesis 1[^8]: *And the earth was empty and void*; but if there were a diversity of forms in matter, it would not be empty and void: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, another translation[^9]: *The earth was invisible and incomposite*; but if there were a heavenly and elemental form there, the matter would already be in some way both visible and composed.

3. Likewise, if there were many forms there, then either they were *mixed* or *distinct*. If *distinct*: then that matter was not unformed; if *mixed*: then it seems that it would have the form of mixture, and so it was not unformed, but rather more formed than if it had only elemental form[^10].

4. Likewise, things-to-be-mixed precede the mixture[^11]: therefore if *mixed* forms were there, by nature the elements are prior to that matter which was first founded: therefore the order seems preposterous, when God afterwards on the following days made the elements from that matter.

5. Likewise, if *mixed* forms were there, then that matter approximated more closely to a perfectly-mixed mixture than the element approximates[^12]: therefore it approximated more closely to the work of the fifth and sixth days than to the distinction of the elements: therefore it seems that the production of that matter ought not to have been settled in the primordial of things.

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6. Likewise, if there was a diversity of forms there, then it seems that there was action and passion there, and so generation and corruption and alteration: and so the matter ought not to have been called *unformed*, since in such a state there were operations which belong to distinct forms[^13].

### Conclusio

> *The matter of bodily things was not created under a complete diversity of forms, but the form which the so-called unformed matter had did not give complete being but was rather a disposition toward further forms.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that diverse [authors] have understood the *unformedness* of that bodily matter in diverse ways.

*Opinion 1.* For some have wished to say that that matter was called *chaos* on account of the multitude and contrariety of forms which was in the parts of matter, in such a way that those parts were not distinguished from one another in determinate places, nor were they joined together in such proportion that any *complete mixture* should result from them. And therefore there was there a kind of mixture, not of proportion but of confusion; and just as there was no proportional mixture there, so neither was there regular action there, but rather the confusion of a kind of strife, such that hot things fought with cold, and moist with dry[^14]; and so that matter could rightly be called *chaos*. — But this manner of positing is poetic rather than philosophical, because it follows the fiction of imagination rather than reason, since on this position the elements would naturally precede that matter so produced; which is consonant neither with reason nor with Sacred Scripture.

*Opinion 2.* And therefore there is another, more reasonable, manner of speaking: that that matter was produced under some form, but that form was not a *complete form* nor one giving matter *complete being*; and therefore it did not so form it that matter would not still be called *unformed*, nor did it so terminate matter's appetite that matter would not still desire other forms; *Conclusio 1.* and therefore there was a *disposition* toward further forms, not complete perfection. And since unformed matter had appetite and inclination toward many forms, therefore, although that form did not have in itself *diverse natures*, *Conclusio 2.* nevertheless matter in its diverse parts had a certain *imperfect diversity*, not from diverse complete acts, but rather from appetites toward diverse things; and therefore it is called *mixed* and *confused*. — *An example.* Just as the example is given of an embryo, which has in act one form and a certain shape of a mass of flesh, yet this is a disposition toward the diverse shapings of members. *The example falls short.* This however is not wholly similar, because that form was not of such great actuality as is the form of an embryo, nor in such proximity to the eduction of subsequent forms as is the form of the embryo to the eduction of the members. For the form of the embryo is visible and by the power of nature is able to be brought through to perfect completion[^15]; but that matter under such a form was incomposite and invisible, and to subsequent forms could be brought through only by divine virtue and operation. And therefore on account of the imperfection of the form, that matter is called *unformed*; and on account of the indeterminate appetite for many forms, it is called *confused* and *mixed*.

*A verdict on this opinion.* And this position seems sufficiently intelligible and probable. And according to this position it must be granted that matter was not created under a diversity of forms, as the reasons adduced to this effect show.

*Solution of the opposites.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary from the text, it must be said that *heaven* there stands for the empyrean. And if it is objected that Scripture consequently says that the *earth appeared*, not that it was *formed*; it must be said that just as a craftsman makes an effect to appear by producing it, not only by showing it; so it must be understood that God made the *earth appear* not only by separating the elements from one another, but also by producing them, so that the production was with distinction, and the distinction with production.

2. To that, however, which is objected that Hugh says that by *earth* the *element of earth* is understood; it must be said that he says this not on account of the *form of earth* which would already be in that matter, but on account of a certain *incomplete aptitude* which was in that part of matter, that it might afterwards be perfected by the form of earth, in the manner according to which something is wont to be called by the name of that to which it is ordered. *Note.* For that matter could only be described in a kind of stammering way, because there was not yet that which speech could perfectly explain[^16], and even the intellect fails in imagination. Hence what he subjoins about *mixture* is not said because there was there a true conjunction of opposite forms, but because there was not there a perfect distinction of forms.

3. *Note.* To that which is objected that the elemental forms are first in bodily matter; it must be said that this is true of the forms which give matter *complete being*; but that form which unformed matter had did not give it *complete being*, and therefore it preceded, or could precede, both simple and composite forms which confer *complete being*.

4. To that which is objected that there was there an opaque and transparent body;

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it must be said that there was neither perfect opacity nor perfect transparency there; yet there was in diverse parts of matter, according as the Creator had ordered to produce diverse forms from them, some diverse mode of *disposition*, which did not posit a diversity of *forms*. Just as if it were understood that some body in one part be rarer and in another more compact, the unity of form being preserved; so it must be understood in that matter, which had a form maximally[^17] open to many possibilities.

5. *Note.* To that which is objected that nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it; it must be said that this is true of what is in a genus as a *complete being*; but that matter was not so bodily that it was *complete* in the genus of bodies, but it so had *extension* and *bodiliness* that it did not have perfect actuality of form, as was said before[^18].

6. *Note.* To that, however, which is objected concerning the diversity of appetites, it must be said that *appetite* does not always follow *complete form*, but is also attended according to the *indigence of the one desiring* and some *half-full disposition*; unless perhaps it be such an appetite as follows a disposition which is *necessity*[^19]; but such was not in that unformed matter, but, according to a certain greater subtlety and rarity in the parts of matter, there was a remote disposition toward various other forms.

la: Libr. I. *de Sacram.* p. 1. c. 6, ubi etiam seq. textus habetur.

en: Book I, *On the Sacraments*, pt. 1, c. 6, where the following text is also found.

la: Averroes, XII. *Metaph.* text. 11. ait: Opinatur [Aristoteles], quod prima materia est unum secundum subiectum et multa secundum *habilitatem*. Primo enim habet habilitates ad recipiendum primas contrarietates, scilicet formas omnium quatuor elementorum. Secundo vero habet potentias consimilium partium, mediantibus formis quatuor elementorum; et istae potentiae diversantur secundum diversitatem mixtionis quatuor elementorum, ita quod ex hoc diversantur formae generabilium.

en: Averroes, *Metaphysics* XII, text 11, says: He [Aristotle] holds that first matter is one in subject and many in *fitness*. For first it has fitnesses to receive the first contrarieties, namely the forms of all four elements. Second, it has the potencies of similar parts, mediated by the forms of the four elements; and these potencies are diversified according to the diversity of mixture of the four elements, such that from this the forms of generable things are diversified.

la: Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Aristot., II. *Topic.* c. 2. (c. 4.), ubi ait, quod necessarium sit, de quibus genus praedicatur, et specierum aliquam praedicari, et quaecumque habent genus vel denominative dicuntur a genere, et specierum aliquam habere vel denominative ab aliqua specierum dici, ut si de aliquo disciplina praedicatur, et grammatica vel musica vel aliqua disciplinarum aliarum praedicabitur.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 2 (c. 4), where he says that it is necessary that, of whatever a genus is predicated, some species also be predicated, and that whatever things have a genus, or are called denominatively from a genus, must also have, or be called denominatively from, some species — as if "discipline" is predicated of something, then "grammar" or "music" or some one of the other disciplines will also be predicated [of it].

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 81. (c. 9.), ubi dicit, materiam appetere formam, sicut turpe pulcrum.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 (c. 9), where he says that matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful.

la: Vers. 2.

en: Verse 2.

la: Septuaginta interpretum.

en: [The translation] of the Septuagint translators.

la: Cfr. hic nota 4.

en: Cf. note 4 here.

la: Nam, ut ait Aristot., I. *de Gener. et corrupt.* text. 90. (c. 10.), «mixtio est miscibilium alteratorum unio».

en: For, as Aristotle says in *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 90 (c. 10), «mixture is the union of altered miscibles».

la: Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *approximaret*.

en: Some codices, with edition 1, [read] *approximaret* [for *approximet*].

la: Averroes, III. *de Anima*, text. 18: Nihil agit nisi per suam formam. Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 5. et tom. I. pag. 84, nota 7.

en: Averroes, *On the Soul* III, text 18: Nothing acts except through its own form. Cf. above p. 89, note 5, and tome I, p. 84, note 7.

la: Ovid., I. *Metamorph.* 19: *Quia corpore in uno* — *Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis.* — Hinc ad Ovidium respicitur, cum continuo dicitur, hunc modum ponendi esse potius poeticum quam philosophicum.

en: Ovid, *Metamorphoses* I, 19: *Because in one body — cold things fought with hot, moist with dry.* — Hence reference is made to Ovid when it is said next that this manner of positing is rather poetic than philosophical.

la: Cod. T *ad perfectionem est perducibilis*. Paulo inferius post *incomposita erat* plures codd. omittunt *et*.

en: Codex T [reads] *can be brought through to perfection*. A little below, after *was incomposite*, several codices omit *and*.

la: Vat. *quia nedum sermo perfecte non explicat*. Paulo post multi codd. minus bene *fuerat*, codd. W cc *fuit* pro *fuerit*. — Cfr. de hac solutione Magist. hic c. 3. 5.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *because not yet does speech perfectly explain*. A little later many codices, less well, [read] *fuerat*, codices W and cc [read] *fuit* for *fuerit*. — Cf. on this solution the Master here, c. 3, 5.

la: In cod. cc et ed. 1 deest *maxime*.

en: In codex cc and edition 1, *maxime* is missing.

la: In corp. quaest. et ad 3. — Cod. M omittit *prius*.

en: [Cf.] the body of the question and the reply to 3. — Codex M omits *prius*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1, ubi inter alias necessitatis species affertur illa, quae «est ex principio sufficiente in disponendo», et haec est necessitas materiae *dispositae*, quae potest dici necessitas *exigentiae*.

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 6, q. 1, where among other species of necessity that one is brought forward which «is from a principle sufficient in disposing», and this is the necessity of *disposed* matter, which can be called the necessity of *requirement*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Omissis duabus extremis opinionibus, de quibus in 1. et 2. quaest. actum est, remanent duae aliae opiniones hic expositae. Primam earum, sed sobrie determinatam, tenet S. Thom., qui (de Potent. q. 4. a. 1. ad 13.) dicit, quod illa materia in principio suae creationis «habebat in diversis partibus formas *elementares* diversas. Dicebatur tamen materia *informis*, quia nondum formae mixtorum corporum supervenerant materiae, ad quas formae elementares sunt in potentia; nec etiam erat situs elementorum adhuc conveniens eorum generationi» (cfr. S. 1. q. 66. a. 1.). Idem autem in Commentar. (hic a. 4.) alio loquendi modo eandem sententiam explicat: «Sed dico, quod *virtutes activae* et *passivae* nondum in principio partibus mundi collatae fuerant, secundum quas postmodum distingui et ordinari dicuntur. Et hoc esse possibile, patet, si sustinere volumus opinionem Avicennae, qui ponit, elementa in mixto remanere secundum *formas substantiales* quantum ad *primum esse*, transmutari autem quantum ad secundum, scil. quantum ad qualitates activas et passivas... Unde possibile est, materiam esse sub forma substantiali sine hoc, quod habeat qualitates activas et passivas in suo complemento; et sic, cum *esse primum* naturaliter praecedat *esse secundum*, expressus est ordo naturae in successione temporis, dum res prius fiunt in *esse primo*, quam perficiantur in *esse secundo*». Observandum autem est, S. Doctorem in posterioribus suis scriptis dictam opinionem Avicennae, cui favet B. Albertus, non approbare. — Haec igitur prima opinio, quam praeferunt etiam B. Albert. et Aegid. R., asserit, primas formas huius materiae fuisse ipsas formas *elementares*, quod a S. Bonaventura non probatur. — Notum autem est, antiquam et illa aetate communem de quatuor elementis doctrinam, cui innititur ex parte ista opinio, nostra aetate novis scientiae chimicae repertis eliminatam esse, praesertim quatenus docebatur, quod aer, aqua, terra sint corpora simplicia.

**II.** Secundam autem opinionem, quae est Bedae et Walafridi Strabi, sequitur S. Bonav., quia «satis videtur esse intelligibilis et probabilis». Eandem ut probabilem admittit Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 4.), qui de ista una forma communi et incompleta dicit, quod «communis erat non per praedicationem, sed per indistinctionem, sicut humor arboris sub forma una speciali est communis per indistinctionem ramis ibi producendis et foliis et floribus et fructibus; et sicut forma seminis se habet respectu diversorum membrorum. Illa autem materia secundum diversas sui partes maiorem habebat aptitudinem, ratione raritatis aut densitatis, respectu formae terrae, aut aquae, aut ignis, sicut una pars humoris respectu rami, alia respectu folii, aut floris, aut fructus». — Ad obiectionem autem principalem, quam primae sententiae patroni ex metaphysica opponunt, scil. quod nihil potest esse in genere, quin sit in aliqua eius specie, idem Petrus (ibid. ad 7.) sic respondet: «*Forma generalis* dupliciter potest dici; vel *per communem praedicationem*, vel *per indistinctionem*; hoc secundo modo *generalis* erat forma illa, non primo modo, immo *specialis*. Nec oportet, quidquid est in aliquo genere *per reductionem* ut *ens incompletum*, esse in aliqua specie generis, sed quod est in aliquo genere ut *ens completum*. Non enim humor, de quo generabitur ramus aut folium, aut flos, aut fructus, est in aliqua illarum specierum, nec semen in specie animalis, quod inde generatur». Eandem obiectionem solvit S. Bonav., hic ad 3, ubi notanda sunt verba: «*Materia illa non sic erat corporea, quod esset completa in genere corporum, sed sic habebat extensionem et corporeitatem, quod non habebat perfectam formae actualitatem*». In corp. autem dicitur de hac forma incompleta, quod «*dispositio erat ad formas ulteriores, non completa perfectio*», et infra de eadem dicitur quod «*incomposita erat et invisibilis, et ad formas subsequentes sola divina virtute et operatione poterat reduci*».

Sententiae S. Bonaventurae favet Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 44. m. 2, et etiam Richard. a Med. (hic q. 6; licet Dionys. Carth. dicat, eum esse S. Bonaventurae contrarium) his verbis: «Ego autem aestimo, quod quamvis materia *caeli empyrei* creata fuerit sub forma completa, quod materia *aliorum corporum* non fuit creata sub forma *completa*; sed partes illius molis, contentae infra caelum empyreum, creatae fuerunt sub formis *incompletis* illorum corporum, quae postea de illis partibus facta sunt per intervalla sex dierum». Et praemittit haec: «Et videtur mihi, quod illi qui dicunt, in nullo composito uno esse nisi unam formam substantialem, et nullam formam substantialem recipere magis et minus, necesse habent sequi opinionem immediate praedictam», nempe opinionem S. Augustini, quod in primo instanti temporis omnia simul et sub perfectis formis creata sint. — Etiam Scotus, licet hic totus sit in arguendo, quod materia sit entitas positiva, a forma distincta et per virtutem divinam ab ea separabilis, eandem sententiam ut probabilem refert II. Report. d. 14. q. 1. n. 9, sicut et Biel, hic q. 1. in fine. Lyranus autem primum Genesis capitulum

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duplici expositione secundum utramque opinionem interpretatus est.

Etiam S. Thom. admittit suo modo formas *intermedias* et incompletas, quae in generatione sibi *succedunt*, ita «quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima et adhuc amplius: et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus» (S. I. q. 118. a. 2. ad 2.). In Sum. c. Gent. (II. c. 89. in fine corp.) istas formas vocat «*intermedias*, quibus gradatim ad formam ultimam veniatur»; et dicit, quod «ista intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut via ad speciem; et ideo non generantur, ut permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniatur». — Hoc autem dictum est secundum sententiam, quae in eodem composito *unitatem* formae substantialis in toto rigore sustinet; quae positio aliquatenus temperatur a S. Bonaventura, ut patet per ea quae dicit de luce infra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, ad 5. et de rationibus seminalibus d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, et iam insinuatum est supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, scholion. Cfr. etiam infra d. 15. q. 2. fund. 3. — Notandum autem est, hanc primam et incompletam materiae formam non esse confundendam cum rationibus seminalibus; ut patet infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 3.

**III.** Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 44. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Omitting the two extreme opinions, which were treated in questions 1 and 2, there remain the two other opinions here set forth. The first of them — but soberly determined — is held by St. Thomas, who (de Potent. q. 4. a. 1. ad 13.) says that that matter at the beginning of its creation «had in diverse parts diverse *elemental* forms. Yet the matter was called *unformed*, because the forms of mixed bodies had not yet supervened upon the matter — those forms to which the elemental forms are in potency; nor was the position of the elements yet suitable to their generation» (cf. S. I. q. 66. a. 1.). The same author in his Commentary (here a. 4.) explains the same opinion in another mode of speaking: «But I say that the *active* and *passive virtues* had not yet at the beginning been conferred on the parts of the world, according to which afterwards they are said to be distinguished and ordered. And that this is possible is clear if we wish to maintain the opinion of Avicenna, who posits that the elements remain in the mixture according to their *substantial forms* as to the *first being*, but are transmuted as to the second, namely as to the active and passive qualities... Hence it is possible that matter be under a substantial form without having active and passive qualities in their completion; and so, since *first being* naturally precedes *second being*, the order of nature is expressed in succession of time, while things first come to be in *first being*, before they are perfected in *second being*». It must however be observed that in his later writings the Saint Doctor does not approve the said opinion of Avicenna, which Blessed Albert favors. — This first opinion, then, which Blessed Albert and Aegidius Romanus also prefer, asserts that the first forms of this matter were the *elemental* forms themselves, which is not proved by St. Bonaventure. — It is well known, however, that the ancient and at that time common doctrine concerning the four elements, on which this opinion in part rests, has in our age been eliminated by new discoveries of chemical science, especially insofar as it was taught that air, water, and earth are simple bodies.

**II.** The second opinion, however, which is that of Bede and Walafrid Strabo, is followed by St. Bonaventure, because «it seems sufficiently intelligible and probable». The same is admitted as probable by Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 4.), who concerning this single common and incomplete form says that «it was common not by predication but by indistinction, just as the sap of a tree under one specific form is common by indistinction to the branches there to be produced and to leaves and flowers and fruits; and just as the form of the seed is related to the diverse members. But that matter according to its diverse parts had greater aptitude — by reason of rarity or density — for the form of earth, or water, or fire, just as one part of the sap is for the branch, another for the leaf, or flower, or fruit». — To the principal objection, however, which the patrons of the first opinion bring from metaphysics — namely that nothing can be in a genus without being in some species of it — the same Peter (ibid. ad 7.) thus responds: «*General form* can be spoken of in two ways: either by *common predication* or by *indistinction*; in this second mode that form was *general*, not in the first mode, but rather *specific*. Nor is it required that whatever is in any genus *by reduction* as an *incomplete being* should be in some species of the genus, but [only] what is in any genus as a *complete being*. For the sap from which a branch or leaf, or flower, or fruit, will be generated is not in any of those species, nor is the seed in the species of the animal which is generated from it». The same objection is solved by St. Bonaventure here at reply 3, where the words must be noted: «*That matter was not so bodily that it was complete in the genus of bodies, but it so had extension and bodiliness that it did not have perfect actuality of form*». In the body [of the question], however, it is said of this incomplete form that «*disposition was toward further forms, not complete perfection*», and below it is said of the same that «*it was incomposite and invisible, and to subsequent forms could be brought back only by divine virtue and operation*».

The opinion of St. Bonaventure is favored by Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 44. m. 2, and also by Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 6; though Denis the Carthusian says he is contrary to St. Bonaventure), in these words: «But I judge that, although the matter of the *empyrean heaven* was created under a complete form, the matter of *other bodies* was not created under a *complete* form; but the parts of that mass, contained beneath the empyrean heaven, were created under *incomplete* forms of those bodies which were afterwards made out of those parts during the intervals of the six days». And he premises this: «And it seems to me that those who say that in no composite there is more than one substantial form, and that no substantial form can receive more and less, must necessarily follow the opinion immediately mentioned above» — namely, the opinion of St. Augustine, that in the first instant of time all things were created together and under perfect forms. — Even Scotus, although here he is wholly engaged in arguing that matter is a positive entity, distinct from form and separable from it by divine power, refers to the same opinion as probable in II. Report. d. 14. q. 1. n. 9, as does Biel, here q. 1. at the end. Lyranus, moreover, has interpreted the first chapter of Genesis

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by a double exposition, according to each opinion.

St. Thomas too admits in his own way *intermediate* and incomplete forms, which *succeed* one another in generation, such that «both in man and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes, there is corruption of the prior, yet so that the subsequent form has whatever the first had and still more: and thus through many generations and corruptions one arrives at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and in other animals» (S. I. q. 118. a. 2. ad 2.). In the Sum. contra Gent. (II. c. 89. at the end of the body) he calls these forms «*intermediate*, by which one comes step by step to the ultimate form»; and he says that «these intermediates do not have a complete species, but are as a way to the species; and therefore they are not generated to remain, but in order that through them one may arrive at the ultimately generated thing». — This, however, is said according to the opinion which in the same composite maintains in full rigor the *unity* of substantial form; which position is to some extent tempered by St. Bonaventure, as is clear from what he says about light below d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, ad 5. and concerning seminal reasons d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, and as has already been intimated above at d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, scholion. Cf. also below d. 15. q. 2. fund. 3. — It must, moreover, be noted that this first and incomplete form of matter is not to be confused with the seminal reasons; as is clear below at d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in the body and at reply 3.

**III.** Besides those already cited: Blessed Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 44. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. a. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0