title: Dist. 3

title_alt: Distinctio III — textus Magistri Sententiarum (Caps. I–IV)

title_alt: Distinction III — text of the Master of the Sentences (Chs. I–IV)

source_text:
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### Distinctio III.
### Pars I.

#### *De cognitione Creatoris per creaturas, in quibus Trinitatis vestigium apparet.*

Apostolus namque ait[^1], quod *invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas*. Per *creaturam mundi* intelligitur homo «propter excellentiam, qua excellit inter alias creaturas, vel propter convenientiam, quam habet cum omni creatura». Homo ergo invisibilia Dei intellectu mentis conspicere potuit vel etiam conspexit per ea quae facta sunt, id est, per creaturas visibiles vel[^2] invisibiles. A duobus enim iuvabatur, scilicet a natura, quae rationalis erat, et ab operibus a Deo factis, ut manifestaretur homini veritas. Ideo Apostolus dixit[^3]: *quia Deus revelavit illis*, scilicet dum fecit opera, in quibus artificis aliquatenus relucet indicium.

Nam sicut ait Ambrosius[^4]: «Ut Deus, qui natura invisibilis est, etiam a visibilibus posset sciri, opus fecit, quod opificem visibilitate sui manifestavit, ut per certum incertum posset sciri, et ille Deus omnium esse crederetur, qui hoc fecit, quod ab homine impossibile est fieri». Potuerunt ergo cognoscere sive cognoverunt, ultra omnem creaturam esse illum qui ea fecit, quae nulla creaturarum facere vel destruere valet[^5]. Accedat, quaecumque vis, creatura et faciat tale caelum et talem terram, et dicam, quia Deus est. Sed quia nulla creatura talia facere valet, constat, super omnem creaturam esse illum qui ea fecit; ac per hoc, illum esse Deum, humana mens cognoscere potuit.

Alio etiam modo Dei veritatem ductu rationis cognoscere potuerunt vel etiam cognoverunt. Ut enim Augustinus ait in Libro *de Civitate Dei*[^6]: «Viderunt summi philosophi nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt, quaerentes Deum; viderunt etiam, quidquid mutabile est non esse summum Deum omniumque principium, et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque spiritus transcenderunt; deinde viderunt, omne, quod mutabile est, non posse esse nisi ab illo, qui incommutabiliter et simpliciter est. Intellexerunt ergo, eum et omnia ista fecisse et a nullo fieri potuisse».

«Consideraverunt etiam, quidquid est in substantiis vel corpus esse vel spiritum, meliusque aliquid spiritum esse quam corpus, sed longe meliorem qui spiritum fecit et corpus».

«Intellexerunt etiam, corporis speciem esse sensibilem et spiritus speciem intelligibilem, et intelligibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae visu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt, intelligibilia, quae conspectu mentis intelligi[^7]. Cum ergo in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent; si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: viderunt esse aliquid, quo illa speciosa facta sunt, ubi est prima et incommutabilis species, ideoque incomparabilis; et illud esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo cuncta facta essent». Ecce tot modis potuit cognosci veritas Dei. Cum ergo Deus una sit et simplex essentia, quae ex nulla diversitate partium vel accidentium consistit, pluraliter tamen dicit Apostolus: *invisibilia Dei*, quia pluribus modis cognoscitur veritas Dei per ea quae facta sunt. Ex perpetuitate namque creaturarum intelligitur Conditor aeternus; ex magnitudine creaturarum omnipotens; ex ordine et dispositione sapiens; ex gubernatione bonus. Haec autem omnia ad unitatem Deitatis pertinent monstrandam.

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### Cap. II.
#### *(De cognitione Trinitatis per creaturas.)*

Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt aliquod Trinitatis vestigium vel indicium exiguum[^8] haberi potuerit. De hoc Augustinus in libro sexto *de Trinitate*[^9] ait: «Oportet, ut Creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intellectu conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus. Huius enim Trinitatis vestigium in creaturis apparet. Haec enim omnia[^10], quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Nam quodque horum creatorum et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae corporum et animarum, et aliqua specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum ac doctrinae vel artes animarum, et ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes corporum et amores vel delectationes animarum; et ita in creaturis praelucet vestigium Trinitatis. In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est omnium rerum et perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio». Summa autem origo, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro *de Vera Religione*[^11], intelligitur Deus Pater, a quo sunt omnia, a quo Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris, nulla ex parte ei dissimilis, quam[^12] cum ipso et in ipso Patre veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt et ad unum referuntur, quae tamen omnia nec fierent a Patre per Filium neque suis finibus salva essent, nisi Deus summe bonus esset, qui et nulli naturae, quae[^13] ab illo bona esset, invidit, et ut in bono ipso maneret, alia quantum vellet, alia quantum posset, dedit; quae bonitas intelligitur Spiritus sanctus, qui est donum Patris et Filii. Quare ipsum donum Dei cum Patre et Filio aeque incommutabile colere et tenere nos convenit. Per considerationem itaque creaturarum unius substantiae Trinitatem intelligimus, scilicet unum Deum Patrem, a quo sumus, et Filium, per quem sumus, et Spiritum sanctum, in quo sumus, scilicet principium, ad quod recurrimus, et formam quam sequimur, et gratiam qua reconciliamur: unum scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus, et similitudinem eius, per quam ad unitatem reformamur, et pacem, qua Unitati adhaeremus: scilicet Deum, qui dixit[^14]: *fiat*; et Verbum, per quod factum est omne, quod substantialiter et naturaliter est; et Donum benignitatis eius, qua placuit quod ab eo per Verbum factum est et reconciliatum est auctori, ut non interiret». Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago Trinitatis indicatur; non enim per creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia Trinitatis potest haberi vel potuit sine doctrinae vel interioris inspirationis revelatione. Unde illi antiqui philosophi quasi per umbram et de longinquo viderunt veritatem, deficientes in contuitu Trinitatis, ut magi Pharaonis in tertio signo[^15]. Adiuvamur tamen in fide invisibilium per ea, quae facta sunt.

### Cap. III.
#### *De imagine et similitudine Trinitatis in anima humana.*

«Nunc vero[^16] ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana, quae novit Deum vel potest nosse, Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus». Ut enim ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro *de Trinitate*[^17]: «Licet humana mens non sit eius naturae, cuius Deus est, imago tamen illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est, quo natura nostra nihil habet melius, id est in mente. In ipsa enim[^18] mente, etiam antequam sit particeps Dei, eius imago reperitur; etsi enim, amissa Dei participatione, deformis sit, imago tamen Dei permanet. Eo enim ipso imago Dei est mens, quo capax eius est eiusque particeps esse potest. Iam ergo in ea Trinitatem, quae Deus est, inquiramus. Ecce ergo[^19] mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum, sed imaginem Dei. Hic enim quaedam apparet trinitas memoriae, intelligentiae et amoris». Haec ergo tria potissimum tractemus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem». «Haec igitur tria, ut Augustinus ait

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in libro decimo *de Trinitate*[^20], non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, una essentia. Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid, et intelligentia et voluntas sive dilectio similiter ad aliquid dicitur; vita vero dicitur ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Haec igitur tria eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria sunt, quo ad se invicem referuntur».

«Aequalia etiam sunt non solum singula singulis, sed etiam singula omnibus; alioquin non se invicem caperent; se autem invicem capiunt. Capiuntur[^21] enim et a singulis singula et a singulis omnia. Memini enim, me habere memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem; et intelligo, me intelligere et velle atque meminisse; et volo, me velle et meminisse et intelligere».

«Totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul memini. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini, illud non est in memoria mea; nihil autem tam in memoria est, quam ipsa memoria: totam ergo[^22] memini. Item, quidquid intelligo, intelligere me scio, et scio, me velle quidquid volo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam ergo intelligentiam totamque voluntatem meam memini».

«Similiter, cum haec tria intelligo, tota simul intelligo. Neque enim quidquam intelligibilium est, quod non intelligam, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec memini nec volo. Quidquid igitur[^23] intelligibilium non intelligo, consequenter etiam nec memini nec volo. Quidquid ergo intelligibilium memini et volo, consequenter intelligo».

«Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum utor toto eo quod intelligo et memini. Cum itaque invicem a singulis et omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia». «Ecce illius summae Unitatis atque Trinitatis, ubi una est essentia et tres personae, imago est humana mens, licet impar[^24]». Mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur, ubi est illa imago Trinitatis; «proprie vero mens dicitur, ut ait Augustinus[^25], non ipsa anima, sed quod in ea est excellentius», qualiter saepe accipitur. Illud etiam sciendum est, quod memoria non solum est absentium et praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro *de Trinitate*[^26], alioquin non se caperet.

Hic attendendum est diligenter, ex quo sensu accipiendum sit quod supra dixit, illa tria, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem esse unum, unam mentem, unam essentiam. Quod utique non videtur esse verum iuxta proprietatem sermonis. Mens enim, id est spiritus rationalis, essentia est spiritualis et incorporea. Illa vero tria naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis et a se invicem differunt, quia memoria non est intelligentia vel voluntas, nec intelligentia voluntas sive amor.

«Et haec tria etiam ad se ipsa referuntur», ut ait Augustinus in nono libro *de Trinitate*[^27]: «Mens enim amare se ipsam vel meminisse non potest, nisi etiam noverit se: nam quomodo amat vel meminit quod nescit»? Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis; et tamen eorum singulum et simul omnia una essentia est, cum et relative dicantur ad invicem.

Sed iam videndum est, quo modo haec tria dicantur una substantia; ideo scilicet, quia in ipsa anima vel mente substantialiter existunt, non sicut accidentia in subiectis, quae possunt adesse et abesse. Unde Augustinus in libro nono *de Trinitate*[^28] ait: «Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in animo existere substantialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, quia etsi relative dicuntur[^29] ad invicem, singula tamen substantialiter sunt in sua substantia». Ecce ex quo sensu illa tria dicantur esse unum vel una substantia. «Quae tria, ut Augustinus ait in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^30], in mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur enim per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem), profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem».

### Cap. III. (sive secundum nostros titulos: De dissimilitudine.)
#### *De similitudine creantis et creatae trinitatis.*

«Verumtamen caveat, ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet, ut omnino existimet similem, sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat[^31]».

«Quod breviter ostendi potest. Homo unus per illa tria meminit, intelligit, diligit, qui nec memoria est nec intelligentia nec dilectio, sed haec habet. Unus ergo homo est, qui habet haec tria, non ipse est haec tria. In illius vero summa simplicitate naturae, quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae

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sunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus»[^32], et hae tres unus Deus. «Aliud est itaque Trinitatis res ipsa, aliud imago Trinitatis in re alia; propter quam imaginem etiam illud in quo sunt haec tria, imago dicitur, scilicet homo. Sicut imago dicitur et tabula et pictura, quae est in ea; sed tabula nomine imaginis appellatur propter picturam, quae in ea est[^33]».

«Rursus ista imago, quae est homo habens illa tria, una persona est. Illa vero Trinitas non una persona est, sed tres personae, Pater Filii et Filius Patris et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Itaque in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt. In illa vero summa Trinitate, cuius haec imago est, non unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed unus Deus; et tres sunt illae, non una persona[^34]». «Illa enim tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt vel in homine sunt. Sed nunquid possumus dicere, Trinitatem sic esse in Deo, ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa sit Deus[^35]»? Absit ut hoc credamus. Dicamus ergo, in mente nostra imaginem Trinitatis[^36], sed exiguam et qualemcumque esse, quae summae trinitatis ita gerit similitudinem, ut ex maxima parte sit dissimilis. Sciendum vero est, quod «haec Trinitas mentis, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro *de Trinitate*[^37], non propterea tantum imago Dei est, quia sui meminit mens et intelligit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare illum, a quo facta est».

Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus distingui trinitas in anima, quae est imago illius summae et ineffabilis Trinitatis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in nono libro *de Trinitate*[^38]: «Mens et notitia eius et amor tria quaedam sunt. Mens enim novit se et amat se; nec amare se potest, nisi etiam noverit se. Duo quaedam sunt mens et notitia eius; item duo quaedam sunt mens et amor eius». «Cum ergo se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, scilicet mens, amor et notitia». «Mens autem hic accipitur non pro anima, sed pro eo quod in anima excellentius est». Haec autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, dicuntur tamen esse unum, quia in anima substantialiter existunt.

Et est ipsa mens quasi parens, et notitia eius quasi proles eius. «Mens enim cum se cognoscit, notitiam sui gignit et est sola parens suae notitiae. Tertius est amor, qui de ipsa mente et notitia procedit, dum mens cognoscens se diligit se; non enim posset se diligere, nisi cognosceret se. Amat etiam placitam prolem, id est notitiam suam; et ita amor quidam complexus est parentis et prolis[^39]».

«Nec minor est proles parente, dum tantam se novit mens, quanta est; nec minor est amor parente et prole, id est mente et notitia, dum tantum se diligit mens, quantum se novit et quanta est[^40]».

«Sunt etiam haec singula in se ipsis, quia et mens amans in amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in mente noscente est[^41]». Ecce in his tribus qualecumque Trinitatis vestigium apparet.

Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam, in qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem Creatoris et videt unitatem in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate. Intelligit enim, unum esse Deum, unam essentiam, unum principium. Intelligit enim, quia si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret; quia si aliquid deesset uni, quod haberet alter, non esset ibi summa perfectio; si vero nihil uni deesset, quod haberet alter, cum in uno essent omnia, alter superflueret. Intellexit ergo, unum esse Deum, unum[^42] omnium auctorem, et vidit, quia absque sapientia non sit, quasi res fatua; et ideo intellexit, eum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est; et quia sapientiam suam diligit, intellexit etiam, ibi esse amorem.

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### Cap. IV.
#### *De Trinitatis unitate.*

«Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem, ut ait Augustinus in libro nono *de Trinitate*[^43], credamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum, universae creaturae conditorem et rectorem; nec Patrem esse Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum vel Patrem esse vel Filium, sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum». Ut enim ait ipse in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^44]: «Una est natura sive essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, non una persona. Si enim sic esset una persona, sicut est una substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, veraciter trinitas non diceretur. Rursus quidem trinitas esset vera, sed unus Deus Trinitas ipsa non esset, si quemadmodum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti». «Fides autem Patriarcharum, Prophetarum atque Apostolorum unum Deum praedicat esse Trinitatem[^45]». «In illa igitur sancta Trinitate unus est Deus Pater, qui solus essentialiter de se ipso Filium unum genuit; et unus Filius est, qui de uno Patre solus essentialiter natus; et unus Spiritus sanctus, qui solus essentialiter a Patre Filioque procedit. Hoc autem totum non potest una persona, id est, gignere se et nasci de se et procedere de se». Ut enim ait Augustinus in primo libro *de Trinitate*[^46]: «Nulla res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit».

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### Distinction III.
### Part I.

#### *On the knowledge of the Creator through creatures, in which the vestige of the Trinity appears.*

For the Apostle says[^1] that *the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen through the things that have been made, also his eternal power and divinity*. By *creature of the world* is understood man, "on account of the excellence by which he excels among other creatures, or on account of the affinity which he has with every creature." Man therefore was able to behold the invisible things of God with the understanding of the mind, or even did behold them, through the things that have been made, that is, through visible or[^2] invisible creatures. For he was helped by two things, namely by nature, which was rational, and by the works made by God, so that the truth might be made manifest to man. Therefore the Apostle said[^3]: *because God revealed it to them*, that is, when he made the works in which there shines forth, to some extent, an indication of the craftsman.

For as Ambrose says[^4]: "So that God, who by nature is invisible, might also be known from visible things, he made a work which manifested the workman by its own visibility, so that through the certain the uncertain might be known, and he be believed to be the God of all things who made this which by man is impossible to be made." They therefore were able to know, or did know, that beyond every creature is he who made those things which no creature has the power to make or to destroy[^5]. Let any creature you please come forward and make such a heaven and such an earth, and I shall say that it is God. But since no creature has the power to make such things, it is plain that above every creature is he who made them; and through this, the human mind has been able to know that he is God.

In yet another way they were able, or did, come to know the truth of God by the lead of reason. For as Augustine says in the book *On the City of God*[^6]: "The highest philosophers saw that no body is God, and therefore they transcended all bodies in seeking God; they saw also that whatever is mutable is not the highest God and the principle of all things, and therefore they transcended every soul and all mutable spirits; then they saw that everything that is mutable can have being only from him who is unchangeably and simply. They understood therefore that he both made all these things and could have been made by none."

"They considered also that whatever is in substances is either body or spirit, and that something is better as spirit than as body, but far better is he who made both spirit and body."

"They understood likewise that the species of body is sensible, and the species of spirit is intelligible, and they preferred the intelligible species to the sensible. We call *sensible* those things which can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body, *intelligible* those which are grasped by the gaze of the mind[^7]. Since therefore in their view both body and soul were more or less beautiful, but if they could be wholly without form they would not exist at all: they saw that there is something by which those things are made beautiful, where there is the first and unchangeable species, and therefore incomparable; and they most rightly believed this to be the principle of things, which itself is not made, and from which all things are made." Behold, in so many ways the truth of God could be known. Since therefore God is one and a simple essence, which consists of no diversity of parts or accidents, nevertheless the Apostle says in the plural: *the invisible things of God*, because in many ways is the truth of God known through the things that have been made. For from the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Founder is understood; from their magnitude, his omnipotence; from their order and disposition, his wisdom; from their governance, his goodness. And all these belong to manifesting the unity of the Deity.

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### Ch. II.
#### *(On the knowledge of the Trinity through creatures.)*

Now it remains to show whether through the things that have been made some vestige or slight indication[^8] of the Trinity could have been had. On this Augustine says, in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^9]: "It behooves us that, beholding the Creator with the understanding through the things that have been made, we should understand the Trinity. For the vestige of this Trinity appears in creatures. For all these things[^10] which have been made by the divine art exhibit in themselves both a certain unity and a species and an order. For each of these created things is some one thing, as are the natures of bodies and souls, and is formed by some species, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the disciplines or arts of souls, and seeks or holds some order, as are the weights or arrangements of bodies and the loves or delights of souls; and so in creatures the vestige of the Trinity shines forth. For in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things and the most perfect beauty and the most blessed delight." Now the supreme origin, as Augustine shows in the book *On True Religion*[^11], is understood to be God the Father, from whom are all things, from whom are the Son and the Holy Spirit. The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son, namely the truth of the Father, in no part unlike him, whom[^12] together with him and in him, the Father, we venerate, who is the form of all things which have been made by the one and are referred to the one — which all things, however, neither would be made by the Father through the Son, nor would be preserved in their proper limits, unless God were supremely good, who neither envied any nature which[^13] from him was good, and so that it might remain in good itself, gave to some things as much as he willed, to others as much as they could receive; which goodness is understood to be the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of the Father and the Son. Wherefore it is fitting that we worship and hold this very gift of God, with the Father and the Son, as equally unchangeable. Through the consideration of creatures therefore we understand the Trinity of one substance, namely one God the Father, from whom we are, and the Son, through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit, in whom we are; that is, the principle to which we return, and the form which we follow, and the grace by which we are reconciled: namely, the one by whose authorship we have been founded, and his likeness through which we are re-formed to unity, and the peace by which we cleave to the Unity: namely, God who said[^14]: *let it be done*; and the Word, through which was made every thing that substantially and naturally is; and the Gift of his kindness, by which it pleased him that what was made by him through the Word should also be reconciled to its author, that it might not perish." Behold, it has been shown how, in creatures, in some measure, the image of the Trinity is indicated; for through the contemplation of creatures a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity neither can be had nor could have been had without the revelation of doctrine or of interior inspiration. Hence those ancient philosophers, as through a shadow and from afar, saw the truth, falling short in their contuition of the Trinity, like the magicians of Pharaoh at the third sign[^15]. We are nevertheless helped in the faith of invisible things through the things that have been made.

### Ch. III.
#### *On the image and likeness of the Trinity in the human soul.*

"Now indeed[^16] let us come to that discussion, where in the human mind, which knows God or is able to know him, we may find the image of the Trinity." For as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*[^17]: "Although the human mind is not of that nature of which God is, nevertheless his image — than whom nothing is better — must be sought and found there, where our nature has nothing better, that is, in the mind. For in the mind itself[^18], even before it shares in God, his image is found; for even if, having lost participation in God, it is deformed, yet it remains the image of God. For by this very fact is the mind the image of God: that it is capable of him and can be his participant. Now then let us seek in it the Trinity which is God. Behold therefore[^19]: the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity — not yet, indeed, God, but the image of God. For here there appears a certain trinity of memory, intelligence, and love." Therefore let us treat especially of these three: memory, intelligence, will. "These three therefore, as Augustine says

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in the tenth book *On the Trinity*[^20], are not three lives but one life, not three minds but one mind, one essence. But memory is said in relation to something, and intelligence and will or love are likewise said in relation to something; whereas life is said with reference to itself, and mind, and essence. These three therefore are one in this, that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are said singly with reference to themselves, even together they are said not in the plural but in the singular. But they are three in this, that they are referred to one another."

"They are equal also, not only severally to one another singly, but also severally to all together; otherwise they would not contain one another mutually; but they do contain one another mutually. For[^21] both singulars are contained by singulars, and the whole by singulars. For I remember that I have memory and intelligence and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will that I will and remember and understand."

"And I remember together my whole memory and intelligence and will. For what I do not remember of my memory is not in my memory; nothing however is so much in memory as memory itself: therefore I remember it whole[^22]. Likewise, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; and whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember my whole intelligence and my whole will."

"Likewise, when I understand these three, I understand the whole together. For there is not anything among intelligible things which I do not understand, except what I do not know. But what I do not know, I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore[^23] of intelligible things I do not understand, consequently I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore of intelligible things I remember and will, I consequently understand."

"My will also contains my whole intelligence and my whole memory, when I use all that I understand and remember. Since then by singulars the whole and the wholes are mutually contained, the whole singulars are equal to the whole singulars and the whole singulars together are equal to all the wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence." "Behold, of that supreme Unity and Trinity, where there is one essence and three persons, the human mind is the image, although unequal[^24]." Here however "mind" is taken for the soul itself, where that image of the Trinity is; "but properly *mind* is said," as Augustine says[^25], "not of the soul itself but of what is more excellent in it," in which sense it is often taken. It must also be known that memory is not only of things absent and past, but also of things present, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*[^26]; otherwise it would not contain itself.

Here it must be carefully attended to, in what sense it is to be taken which he said above, namely that those three — memory, intelligence, and will — are one, one mind, one essence. Which surely does not seem true according to the propriety of speech. For *mind*, that is, rational spirit, is a spiritual and incorporeal essence. But those three are the natural properties or powers of the mind itself and differ from one another, since memory is not intelligence or will, nor is intelligence will or love.

"And these three are also referred to themselves," as Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^27]: "For the mind cannot love or remember itself unless it also knows itself: for how does it love or remember what it does not know"? In a wondrous way therefore these three are inseparable from one another; and yet each of them, and all together, is one essence, though they are said relatively to one another.

But now it must be seen how these three are said to be one substance: namely, in this way, because they exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, not as accidents in subjects, which can be present and absent. Hence Augustine in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^28] says: "We are admonished, if we can in any way see it, that these exist in the soul substantially, not as in a subject, as color in a body, because although they are said relatively[^29] to one another, yet singly they are substantially in their substance." Behold in what sense those three are said to be one or one substance. "Which three, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^30], in the mind naturally and divinely instituted, whoever vividly perceives, and how great a thing it is in it whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, beheld, longed for (for it is recollected through memory, beheld through intelligence, embraced through love), certainly finds the image of that supreme Trinity."

### Ch. III. (continued — On dissimilitude.)
#### *On the likeness of the creating and created trinity.*

"Yet nevertheless let one beware, lest he so compare this image made by that same Trinity to it, that he reckon it altogether similar, but rather, in any such likeness, let him discern a great dissimilitude also[^31]."

"This can be briefly shown. One man, through those three, remembers, understands, loves, who is neither memory nor intelligence nor love, but has these. There is therefore one man who has these three; he himself is not these three. But in that supreme simplicity of nature which is God, although there is one God, nevertheless three persons

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there are, Father and Son and Holy Spirit"[^32], and these three are one God. "It is one thing therefore, the very reality of the Trinity, and another, the image of the Trinity in another thing; on account of which image, even that in which these three are, is also called an image, namely man. Just as both the panel and the picture which is on it are called an image; but the panel is called by the name *image* on account of the picture which is on it[^33]."

"Again, this image, which is man having those three, is one person. But that Trinity is not one person, but three persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Therefore in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man, but they are of one man. But in that supreme Trinity, of which this is the image, those three are not of one God, but they are one God; and there are three of them, not one person[^34]." "For those three are not man, but are of man or are in man. But can we say that the Trinity is so in God as to be something of God, and itself not to be God[^35]"? Far be it from us to believe this. Let us say therefore that in our mind there is the image of the Trinity[^36], but a slight one of whatever kind, which bears the likeness of the supreme Trinity in such a way that for the greatest part it is unlike. But it must be known that "this Trinity of the mind, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*[^37], is not for this reason alone the image of God, because the mind remembers itself and understands and loves itself, but because it can also remember and understand and love him by whom it was made."

It is also possible to distinguish in another way and by other names the trinity in the soul, which is the image of that supreme and ineffable Trinity. For as Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^38]: "Mind and the knowledge of it and love are three something. For the mind knows itself and loves itself; nor can it love itself unless it also knows itself. Two something are mind and the knowledge of it; likewise, two something are mind and the love of it." "When therefore the mind knows itself and loves itself, a trinity remains, namely mind, love, and knowledge." "But *mind* is taken here not for the soul, but for that which is more excellent in the soul." These three, however, although they are distinct from one another, are nonetheless said to be one, because they exist substantially in the soul.

And the mind itself is as it were the parent, and its knowledge as it were its offspring. "For the mind, when it knows itself, begets its own knowledge and is the sole parent of its own knowledge. The third is love, which proceeds from the mind itself and the knowledge, while the mind, knowing itself, loves itself; for it could not love itself unless it knew itself. It loves also its pleasing offspring, that is, its own knowledge; and so a certain love is the embrace of parent and offspring[^39]."

"Nor is the offspring less than the parent, while the mind knows itself in its full extent; nor is the love less than the parent and offspring, that is, than the mind and the knowledge, while the mind loves itself as much as it knows itself and as much as it is[^40]."

"These are also each in themselves, since the loving mind is in love, and love is in the knowledge of the lover, and knowledge is in the knowing mind[^41]." Behold, in these three some sort of vestige of the Trinity appears.

The rational mind therefore, considering these three and that one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator and sees unity in trinity and trinity in unity. For it understands that God is one, one essence, one principle. For it understands that, if there were two, either each would be insufficient, or one would be superfluous; because if anything were lacking to one which the other possessed, there would not be the highest perfection there; but if nothing were lacking to one which the other possessed, since in one would be all things, the other would be superfluous. It understood therefore that there is one God, one[^42] author of all, and it saw that he is not without wisdom, as it were a foolish thing; and therefore it understood that he has wisdom, which has been begotten from him; and because he loves his wisdom, it also understood that there is love there.

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### Ch. IV.
#### *On the unity of the Trinity.*

"Wherefore according to this consideration, as Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^43], let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, the founder and ruler of all creation; and that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a Trinity of persons related to one another." For as he himself says in the book *On the Faith, to Peter*[^44]: "One is the nature or essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, not one person. For if it were one person in the same way as the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, the Trinity would not truly be spoken of. Again, the Trinity would indeed be true, but the one God would not be the Trinity itself, if as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of the persons, so they were also distinct by a diversity of natures." "But the faith of the Patriarchs, the Prophets, and the Apostles preaches that one God is the Trinity[^45]." "In that holy Trinity therefore there is one God the Father, who alone essentially has begotten one Son from himself; and there is one Son, who alone is essentially born from the one Father; and there is one Holy Spirit, who alone essentially proceeds from the Father and the Son. But all this one person cannot do, that is, to beget himself and to be born from himself and to proceed from himself." For as Augustine says in the first book *On the Trinity*[^46]: "There is no thing which begets itself, that it may be."

---

la: Rom. 1, 20; Vulgata: *Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura...* Glossa ordinaria, qua Magister, paucis variatis, mox utitur, verbum *a creatura* sic interpretatur: *Ab homine per excellentiam, quia excellit inter alias creaturas, vel propter convenientiam, quam habet cum omnibus creaturis.* Tum Vulgata *eius virtus* pro *virtus eius*, quod nostri mss. et edd. summo consensu exhibent. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 addit *omnia*.

en: Rom. 1:20; the Vulgate reads *Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura...* The *Glossa ordinaria*, which the Master, with a few variations, presently uses, interprets the word *a creatura* thus: "from man by excellence, because he excels among the other creatures, or on account of the affinity he has with all creatures." Also, the Vulgate has *eius virtus* for *virtus eius*, which our manuscripts and editions exhibit with the highest consensus. — The Vatican edition, against the older codices, with edition 1, adds *omnia*.

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, constructione mutata, Vat. hic ita prosequitur: *Describitur etiam per comparationem ad suum principium, a quo emanat.* Paulo infra cod. R omittit praepositionem *in* et plures codd. ut K M X Y ee post *emanantis* addunt *emanatione perfecta*.

en: Beyond the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, with construction altered, the Vatican here continues thus: *It is also described by comparison to its principle, from which it emanates.* A little further on, codex R omits the preposition *in*, and many codices such as K, M, X, Y, ee after *emanantis* add *emanatione perfecta*.

la: Respicit ad Rom. I, 19: *Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis. Deus enim illis manifestavit.* — Vat. cum aliis edd. *Ideoque* contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 8.

en: It refers to Rom. 1:19: *That which is known of God is manifest in them. For God revealed it to them.* — The Vatican with the other editions reads *Ideoque*, against all codices and editions 1, 8.

la: In *Epist. ad Rom.* c. 1, 19, paucis a Magistro mutatis et omissis. In fine huius textus ante *impossibile est* Vat. sola repetit supervacanee: *ait Ambrosius*.

en: In *On the Epistle to the Romans*, c. 1, 19, with a few things changed and omitted by the Master. At the end of this text, before *impossibile est*, the Vatican alone repeats superfluously: *ait Ambrosius*.

la: Mss. BDE *potest*. Tum in Vat. sola: *quaecumque vis creaturae*; in textu accipe *vis* a *velle* et *quaecumque* ut neutrum in plurali. Subinde eadem Vat. cum plerisque excusis ante *terram* praetermittit *talem* contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.

en: Manuscripts BDE read *potest*. Then in the Vatican alone: *quaecumque vis creaturae*; in the text take *vis* from *velle* and *quaecumque* as a neuter plural. Thereafter the same Vatican, with most printed editions, omits *talem* before *terram* against the codices and editions 1, 6, 8.

la: Libr. VIII. c. 6, nonnullis transpositis et omissis. Etiam infra tertia et quarta ratio inde sumtae sunt. Paulo ante solus cod. D *potuerunt et* pro *potuerunt vel etiam*.

en: Book VIII, ch. 6, with some things transposed and omitted. Also the third and fourth reasons further below are taken from there. A little earlier, codex D alone reads *potuerunt et* for *potuerunt vel etiam*.

la: Edd. contra codd. nostros et ed. Augustini, ponendo punctum ante *intelligibilia*, praemittunt hic *possunt*.

en: The editions, against our codices and the edition of Augustine, placing a full stop before *intelligibilia*, here prefix *possunt*. **Page 63 footer:**

la: Cod. A omittit *exiguum*; Codd. BCDE et ed. 1, omisso *vestigium* et transpositis verbis, satis bene legunt *Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum*, accepto *vel* pro *saltem* vel pro *etiam*.

en: Codex A omits *exiguum*; codices BCDE and edition 1, with *vestigium* omitted and the words transposed, read fairly well *Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum*, taking *vel* for *saltem* or for *etiam*.

la: Cap. 10, n. 12, sed transposito ordine propositionum. — In initio huius textus Vat. et ed. 4 male legunt *intellecta* pro *intellectu*; ed. Augustini *intellectum*.

en: Ch. 10, n. 12, but with the order of propositions transposed. — At the beginning of this text, the Vatican and ed. 4 wrongly read *intellecta* for *intellectu*; the edition of Augustine reads *intellectum*.

la: Omnes codd. et edd. praeter Vat. omittunt *omnia*, quod tamen et ed. Augustini et ipse S. Bonav. infra dub. 3 habent. — Paulo post codd. C E cum textu Augustini *quidquid horum* pro *quodque horum*. Deinde Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7 cum textu Augustini ante *animarum* addunt *ingenia*, quod deest in codd. omnibus et aliis edd.

en: All codices and editions except the Vatican omit *omnia*, which however both the edition of Augustine and St. Bonaventure himself below in dub. 3 retain. — A little later, codices C and E, with Augustine's text, have *quidquid horum* for *quodque horum*. Then the Vatican and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, with Augustine's text, before *animarum* add *ingenia*, which is absent in all codices and the other editions.

la: Ex cap. 55, n. 113, passim collecta. — In prima propositione huius textus post *omnia* solus cod. C addit particulam *et*.

en: Gathered passim from ch. 55, n. 113. — In the first proposition of this text, after *omnia*, codex C alone adds the particle *et*.

la: Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. 6 et omnes codd. *quem* pro *quam* et mox contra eosdem codd. et edd. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 *qui forma* pro *quae forma*. Lectio nostra confirmatur textu Augustini, qui habet: *Quare ipsam quoque veritatem nulla ex parte dissimilem, in ipso et cum ipso veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt.* — Paulo post cod. C *ab ipso* et edd. 5, 6 *ab initio* loco *ab uno*. Deinde cod. D *quae omnino non fierent* pro *quae tamen omnia nec fierent*.

en: The Vatican and other editions, against ed. 6 and all the codices, read *quem* for *quam*, and shortly after, against the same codices and editions 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, read *qui forma* for *quae forma*. Our reading is confirmed by the text of Augustine, who has: *Quare ipsam quoque veritatem nulla ex parte dissimilem, in ipso et cum ipso veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt.* — A little later, codex C reads *ab ipso*, and editions 5, 6 *ab initio* in place of *ab uno*. Then codex D reads *quae omnino non fierent* for *quae tamen omnia nec fierent*.

la: Codd. ABCE satis bene *quod*, sed refragantibus edd. et textu Augustini. Immediate post codd. A B et edd. 9, 10 *bono* pro *bona*.

en: Codices ABCE read, well enough, *quod*, but with the editions and Augustine's text disagreeing. Immediately after, codices A and B and editions 9, 10 read *bono* for *bona*.

la: Gen. 1, 3. — Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 7, 8 et codd. DE post *fiat* male addit *lux*, refragantibus ceteris edd. et codd. nec non textu Augustini.

en: Gen. 1:3. — The Vatican, with editions 4, 6, 7, 8 and codices DE, after *fiat* wrongly adds *lux*, with the other editions and codices, and also Augustine's text, dissenting.

en: Exodus 8:18.

la: Cap. 8, n. 11, unde etiam accepta sunt, quae praecedunt, ab illis verbis: *Nunc vero*, sed de more non paucis omissis vel additis.

en: Ch. 8, n. 11, whence likewise are taken the things which precede, from those words: *Nunc vero*, but in the customary way with not a few things omitted or added.

la: (Heading: *de Trinitate*; reference partly merged with the preceding entry — see note 16.)

en: (See note 16; the heading-citation for *de Trinitate* lib. xiv is implied; the Quaracchi footer treats both citations together.)

la: Vat. et aliae edd., exceptis 1, 8, minus bene: *In ipsa etiam mente antequam*.

en: The Vatican and other editions, except 1 and 8, less well read: *In ipsa etiam mente antequam*.

la: Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1, 6 legit *enim*; et paulo post edd. 2, 3, 7 ante *si cernimus* habent *haec* pro *hoc*.

en: The Vatican, against the codices and editions 1, 6, reads *enim*; and a little after, editions 2, 3, 7 before *si cernimus* have *haec* for *hoc*. **Page 64 footer:**

la: Cap. 11, n. 17, 18. Ex eodem capite sumta sunt omnia, quae sequuntur usque ad: *Ecce illius summae Unitatis.*

en: Ch. 11, nn. 17, 18. From the same chapter are taken all that follows up to: *Ecce illius summae Unitatis.*

la: Vat. et ed. 9 corrupte *Capiunt*. Immediate post codd. D E *etiam* pro *enim*, sed contra textum Augustini et alios codd. et omnes edd.

en: The Vatican and ed. 9 corruptly read *Capiunt*. Immediately after, codices D and E read *etiam* for *enim*, but against the text of Augustine and the other codices and all the editions.

la: Codd. et textus Augustini *igitur*. Paulo post contra contextum et originale plures codd. et edd. habent *memini, scio* pro *scio, memini*.

en: The codices and the text of Augustine read *igitur*. A little after, against the context and the original, several codices and editions have *memini, scio* for *scio, memini*.

la: Edd. *ergo*; Augustinus *itaque*.

en: The editions read *ergo*; Augustine reads *itaque*.

la: Libr. X. *de Trin.* c. 12, n. 19: «Cuius impar imago est humana mens, sed tamen imago»; sed prima pars propositionis est ex libr. XV. *de Trin.* c. 7, n. 11. — Antea Vat. omittit *est* post *ubi una*. Paulo post cod. D *anima ipsa* pro *animo ipso*.

en: Book X *On the Trinity*, c. 12, n. 19: "Of which the human mind is the unequal image, but yet an image"; but the first part of the proposition is from book XV *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 11. — Earlier the Vatican omits *est* after *ubi una*. A little after, codex D reads *anima ipsa* for *animo ipso*.

la: Libr. XV. *de Trin.* c. 7, n. 11, secundum sensum.

en: Book XV *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 11, according to the sense.

la: Cap. 11, n. 14, ubi longiore discursu hanc sententiam a S. Bonaventura receptam probat (cfr. hic. p. II. a. I. q. I. ad 3.).

en: Ch. 11, n. 14, where in a longer discussion he proves this proposition, received by St. Bonaventure (cf. here, pt. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3).

la: Cap. 3, n. 3, sed de suo addidit Magister *quae ad memoriam referuntur*, nempe *vel meminisses* et *vel meminerit*. Verba praecedentia *Et haec tria*, iam supra citata, occurrunt libr. X. *de Trin.* c. 11, ubi edd. 1, 6, 8 habent *ad se invicem* pro *ad se ipsa*.

en: Ch. 3, n. 3, but the Master added on his own account *quae ad memoriam referuntur*, namely *vel meminisses* and *vel meminerit*. The preceding words *Et haec tria*, already cited above, occur in book X *On the Trinity*, c. 11, where editions 1, 6, 8 have *ad se invicem* for *ad se ipsa*.

la: Cap. 4, n. 5. Sed multo fusius Augustinus. Paulo ante pro *et abesse* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 legit *vel abesse*.

en: Ch. 4, n. 5. But Augustine much more fully. A little earlier, for *et abesse*, the Vatican with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 reads *vel abesse*.

la: Cod. B et ed. 2 *dicantur*.

en: Codex B and ed. 2 read *dicantur*.

la: Cap. 20, n. 39, ubi post *reminiscitur* deest *enim*, quod et a mss. B C D abest; ceterum, etiam omisso *enim*, verba *reminiscitur per memoriam* etc. parenthesis esse videntur. — Ibid., sed cum nonnullis adiunctis.

en: Ch. 20, n. 39, where after *reminiscitur* there is no *enim*, which is also absent from manuscripts B, C, D; for the rest, even with *enim* omitted, the words *reminiscitur per memoriam*, etc., seem to be a parenthesis. — Ibid., but with a few additions. **Page 65 footer:**

la: (Quaracchi here refers to Augustine, *de Trin.* libr. XV; cf. note 30 above. The Master continues quoting Augustine on dissimilitude.)

en: (Quaracchi here refers to Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book XV; cf. note 30 above. The Master continues quoting Augustine on dissimilitude.)

la: Loc. cit. c. 22, n. 42, secundum sensum. — Pro *per illa tria* Vat. cum nonnullis edd. *per ista tria*, et infra edd. 1, 8 post *non* addunt *tamen*. Denique Vat. et plurimae edd. ante *simplicitate* legunt *summa* pro *summae*.

en: The same place, c. 22, n. 42, according to the sense. — For *per illa tria* the Vatican with several editions reads *per ista tria*, and below editions 1, 8 after *non* add *tamen*. Finally the Vatican and most editions before *simplicitate* read *summa* for *summae*.

la: Vat. cum multis edd. explicando addit *personae sunt*. — Ibid. n. 43.

en: The Vatican with many editions, by way of explanation, adds *personae sunt*. — Ibid., n. 43.

la: Loc. cit. — Edd. omnes, dempta 1, in fine textus post *sunt illae* adiciunt *personae* contra codd. et originale. Paulo ante modernae editiones Augustini, omisso *non*, legunt *est, unius Dei sunt*, sed haec lectio importat locutionem falsam nec correspondet contextui et tollit antithesim. Nam tria illa, scil. memoria, intellectus, voluntas, per appropriationem sumta pro tribus personis, stricte dici non possunt esse *unius Dei*, sed sunt *Deus unius* Deus, quia inter personas et essentiam non datur realis distinctio. Recte itaque Augustinus negat paritatem inter imaginem creatam et increatam. Nam unius hominis sunt illa tria, cum potentiae hominis non sint homo, sed habeantur ab homine. Tres vero personae stricto sensu sunt unus Deus. Ita ipse Augustinus in sequenti textu. — Vide infra dub. 10, ubi Seraphicus Doctor negantem particulam non solum cum Magistro admittit, sed defectu ipsius propositionem fieri simpliciter falsam ostendit.

en: The same place. — All the editions, except 1, at the end of the text after *sunt illae* add *personae* against the codices and the original. A little earlier, the modern editions of Augustine, with *non* omitted, read *est, unius Dei sunt*; but this reading carries a false expression, does not correspond to the context, and destroys the antithesis. For those three — namely memory, intellect, will — taken by appropriation for the three persons, cannot strictly be said to be "of one God," but they are God himself who is one God, since between persons and essence there is no real distinction. Rightly therefore does Augustine deny parity between the created and uncreated image. For those three are of one man, since the powers of man are not man, but are had by man. But the three persons in the strict sense are one God. So Augustine himself in the following text. — See below dub. 10, where the Seraphic Doctor not only admits the negative particle along with the Master, but also shows that, were it lacking, the proposition would become simply false.

la: Loc. cit. c. 7, n. 11, sed multo diffusius.

en: The same place, c. 7, n. 11, but much more diffusely.

la: Codd. BCDE et A (prima manu) et ed. 1 *imaginis trinitatem*, quae lectio nec in se commendatur nec cum verbis *sed exiguam et qualemcumque* bene cohaeret. Vat. sola immediate adiungit *ita*. — Haec conclusio Magistri quoad sensum invenitur in Augustino, loc. cit. c. 22, n. 43.

en: Codices BCDE and A (first hand) and ed. 1 read *imaginis trinitatem*; this reading is neither commendable in itself nor does it cohere well with the words *sed exiguam et qualemcumque*. The Vatican alone immediately adds *ita*. — This conclusion of the Master, as to its sense, is found in Augustine, the same place, c. 22, n. 43.

la: Cap. 12, n. 15. — Codd. ABDE et ed. 1 omittunt *est* post *Sciendum vero*. Mox in ipso textu Augustini codd., excepto D, et plurimae edd. incongrue legunt *meminent* pro *meminit*.

en: Ch. 12, n. 15. — Codices ABDE and ed. 1 omit *est* after *Sciendum vero*. Soon afterwards, in the very text of Augustine, the codices, except D, and most editions incongruously read *meminent* for *meminit*.

la: Cap. 4, n. 4: «Sicut autem quaedam sunt mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt mens et notitia eius, cum se novit. Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt». Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex c. 5, n. 8; de ultimo textu vide supra nota 6, p. 64.

en: Ch. 4, n. 4: "But just as mind and its love are something, when it loves itself, so mind and its knowledge are two something, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself and its love and knowledge are three something, and these three are one, and when they are perfect, they are equal." What follows is taken from c. 5, n. 8; on the last text, see above note 6, p. 64.

la: August., IX. *de Trin.* c. 12, n. 18, ubi autem multa adiecta et mutata leguntur. In quo textu cod. C verbo *procedit* praemittit *eius*. Mox Vat. cum paucis aliis edd. pro *cognoscens se diligit* habet *cognoscit se et diligit*. Paucis interjectis, codd. ADE pro *Amat etiam* legunt *Amat enim*, sed contra contextum, cum duplex distinguatur amor mentis, scil. erga se et suam prolem. — Codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 *animo* (for *anima*).

en: Augustine, IX *On the Trinity*, c. 12, n. 18, where however many things are read with additions and changes. In which text codex C before the verb *procedit* prefixes *eius*. Soon the Vatican with a few other editions, for *cognoscens se diligit*, has *cognoscit se et diligit*. A few words later, codices ADE for *Amat etiam* read *Amat enim*, but against the context, since a double love of the mind is distinguished, namely toward itself and toward its offspring. — The codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 read *animo* (for *anima*).

la: Loc. cit.

en: The same place.

la: August., libr. cit. c. 5, n. 8 [recte: 9].

en: Augustine, the cited book, c. 5, n. 8 [correctly: 9].

la: Abest in Vat. et paucis aliis edd. *unum*. Et paulo infra post *absque sapientia* Vat. contra auctoritatem codd. et edd., omissa particula *non* et inde variato sensu, *absque sapientia sit quasi res fatua*. In nostra et vera lectione supple *esset* post *fatua*. In fine capituli codd. ABD *ibi etiam* pro *etiam ibi*, quae lectio confirmat sensum nos[trum in]sinuatum.

en: *Unum* is absent in the Vatican and a few other editions. And a little below, after *absque sapientia*, the Vatican against the authority of the codices and editions, with the particle *non* omitted and the sense thus varied, reads *absque sapientia sit quasi res fatua*. In our true reading, supply *esset* after *fatua*. At the end of the chapter, codices ABD read *ibi etiam* for *etiam ibi*, which reading confirms the sense we have suggested. **Page 66 footer:**

la: Cap. 1, n. 4. — Auctor huius libri, S. Fulgentius, multo fusius de his tractat, in quo textu codd. CDE addendo *non* et mutando *sed in si* sic legunt: *Rursus quidem Trinitas non esset vera, si unus Deus Trinitas non esset: si quemadmodum... Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti.* Sed haec lectio duplicem suppositionem et argumentationem confundit. In fine textus Vat. *fuissent quoque naturae* pro *fuissent naturarum quoque*.

en: Ch. 1, n. 4. — The author of this book, St. Fulgentius, treats these things much more fully; in which text codices CDE, by adding *non* and changing *sed in* to *si*, read thus: *Rursus quidem Trinitas non esset vera, si unus Deus Trinitas non esset: si quemadmodum... Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti.* But this reading confuses the double supposition and the argument. At the end of the text the Vatican reads *fuissent quoque naturae* for *fuissent naturarum quoque*.

la: Loc. cit.; auctoritas sequens ibid. n. 6.

en: The same place; the authority that follows, in the same place, n. 6.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem III — Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction III — Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 66 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

### Pars I.

*De cognitione Dei per similitudines longinquas.*

> *Apostolus namque ait, quod invisibilia Dei etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Superius egit Magister de sancta Trinitate et Unitate[^1][^2], in quantum creditur. In hac secunda parte agit de ipsa, in quantum intelligitur. Et haec pars dividitur in tres partes, in quarum prima ad intelligendum Trinitatem adducit congruas similitudines et rationes. In secunda solvit emergentes dubitationes, infra distinctione quarta in principio: *Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria. Constat etc.* In tertia, illis dubitationibus solutis, determinat Trinitatis et Unitatis proprietates et conditiones, infra distinctione octava: *Nunc de veritate sive proprietate*[^3][^4] etc.

Item prima pars habet duas. In prima adducit similitudines longinquas; in secunda similitudines propinquas sive expressas, quae attenduntur in imagine, ibi: *Nunc vero iam ad eam perveniamus disputationem.*

Item prima pars habet duas partes. In prima ostendit Unitatem, in secunda Trinitatem, ibi: *Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt etc.*

Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima probat auctoritate Apostoli ad Romanos primo[^5][^6], quod Deus est cognoscibilis per creaturam. In secunda vero adducit varios modos cognoscendi et rationes, ibi: *Nam sicut ait Ambrosius.* In tertia dicit, illos modos in auctoritate Apostoli implicari, ibi: *Ecce tot modis.* In quarta tangit, quid per praedictas rationes possit probari, scilicet essentiae unitas, non trinitas, ibi: *Haec autem omnia ad unitatem etc.*

*Nunc*[^7][^8] *restat ostendere, utrum etc.* Supra ostendit Magister per rationes divinae essentiae unitatem sive entitatem. In hac secunda parte ostendit Trinitatem similitudine longinqua, quae attenditur in vestigio, et habet hoc capitulum quatuor particulas. In prima ostendit Magister rationem vestigii in creatura. In secunda ostendit, quid respondeat vestigio in Creatore, quoniam trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet originis, pulcritudinis et delectationis, ut singula reddantur singulis, ibi: *In illa namque Trinitate summa.*

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In tertia docet contemplari in Deo trinitatem per considerationem vestigii in creatura, ibi: *Per considerationem itaque creaturarum etc.*, ubi ostendit trinitatem appropriatorum in Deo et quantum ad actum conditionis, et quantum ad actum reformationis. In quarta autem particula ostendit, quod consideratio Trinitatis per vestigium non est sufficiens, sed longinqua, ibi: *Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis.*

*Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem.* Haec[^9] est secunda pars istius distinctionis, in qua Magister probat Trinitatem et Unitatem per similitudinem propinquam et expressam, cuiusmodi est imago. Et dividitur haec pars in duas: in prima ostendit trinitatem et unitatem in Creatore per trinitatem et unitatem consideratam in potentiis animae; in secunda vero in habitibus, ibi: *Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus.*

Prima iterum pars habet quatuor[^10] particulas. In quarum prima ostendit, ubi quaerenda sit imago in anima, quoniam in parte superiori et in[^11] tribus potentiis eius, scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate. In secunda vero tangit imaginis conditiones, quae sunt trinitas, unitas et aequalitas, ibi: *Haec ergo tria, ut ait Augustinus.* In tertia vero movet et solvit dubitationem, quae oritur ex praedictis: utrum scilicet anima sit suae potentiae, ibi: *Hic attendendum est diligenter.* In quarta autem docet cavere errorem, qui posset causari vel[^12] oriri ex ostensione trinitatis creatae, quod omnimoda similitudo esset ad increatam; ubi ostendit, quod maxima est dissimilitudo imaginis ad Deum, ibi: *Verumtamen caveat.*

*Potest etiam alio modo aliisque etc.* Haec est secunda pars partis secundae huius distinctionis[^13], in qua intendit investigare Magister imaginem in habitibus animae secundum quod possibile est, et dividitur haec pars in quatuor particulas. Primo enim illa tangit, in quibus imago Trinitatis attenditur, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Secundo, illis praetactis, ostendit, quod in his attenditur imago propter consubstantialitatem, ordinem et aequalitatem, ibi: *Haec autem tria cum sint etc.* Tertio ostendit, quomodo mens rationalis in contemplatione trinitatis creatae proficit ad videndam et cognoscendam Trinitatem increatam in Unitate, ibi: *Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria.* Quarto vero breviter recolligit quae supra sunt demonstrata, ibi: *Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem.*

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae in hac parte prima distinctionis tanguntur, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

Secundum est, utrum sit cognoscibilis per creaturam.

Tertium est, utrum modus cognoscendi per creaturam conveniat homini quantum ad omnem statum, scilicet statum innocentiae, statum naturae lapsae et statum naturae glorificatae.

Quartum est, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturam.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. Each entry gives the Quaracchi editors' reference (Lombard chapter, scriptural locus, or patristic source) together with the textual notes from the NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III.

### Part I.

*On the cognition of God through remote likenesses.*

> *For the Apostle says that the invisible things of God etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the holy Trinity and Unity[^1][^2] insofar as it is believed. In this second part he treats of it insofar as it is understood. And this part is divided into three parts, in the first of which, in order to understand the Trinity, he adduces fitting likenesses and arguments. In the second he resolves the emerging difficulties, below in distinction four at the beginning: *Here arises a question sufficiently necessary. It is established etc.* In the third, those difficulties having been resolved, he determines the properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity, below in distinction eight: *Now concerning the truth or property*[^3][^4] etc.

Likewise the first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he adduces remote likenesses; in the second proximate or express likenesses, which are attended to in the image, there: *Now indeed let us at last come to that disputation.*

Likewise the first part has two parts. In the first he shows the Unity, in the second the Trinity, there: *Now it remains to show whether through the things that have been made etc.*

The first part has four subdivisions. In the first he proves by the authority of the Apostle to the Romans, chapter one[^5][^6], that God is knowable through the creature. In the second indeed he adduces various modes of knowing and reasons, there: *For as Ambrose says.* In the third he says that those modes are implied in the authority of the Apostle, there: *Behold, in so many modes.* In the fourth he touches upon what can be proved by the aforesaid arguments, namely the unity of the essence, not the trinity, there: *But all these things lead to unity etc.*

*Now*[^7][^8] *it remains to show whether etc.* Above the Master showed by arguments the unity or entity of the divine essence. In this second part he shows the Trinity by a remote likeness, which is attended to in the vestige, and this chapter has four subdivisions. In the first the Master shows the account of the vestige in the creature. In the second he shows what corresponds to the vestige in the Creator, namely a trinity of appropriated [attributes], that is, of origin, beauty, and delight, so that the individual [appropriations] are rendered to the individual [persons], there: *For in that supreme Trinity.*

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In the third he teaches us to contemplate the Trinity in God through the consideration of the vestige in the creature, there: *Through the consideration therefore of creatures etc.*, where he shows the trinity of appropriated [attributes] in God both as to the act of founding and as to the act of reforming. In the fourth subdivision, however, he shows that the consideration of the Trinity through the vestige is not sufficient, but remote, there: *Behold, it has been shown in what way in creatures.*

*Now indeed let us at last come to that disputation.* This[^9] is the second part of this distinction, in which the Master proves the Trinity and Unity through a proximate and express likeness, of which sort the image is. And this part is divided into two: in the first he shows the trinity and unity in the Creator through the trinity and unity considered in the powers of the soul; in the second indeed in the habits, there: *It can also be done in another way and by other names.*

The first part again has four[^10] subdivisions. In the first of which he shows where the image is to be sought in the soul, namely in the superior part and in[^11] its three powers, that is, memory, intelligence, and will. In the second indeed he touches upon the conditions of the image, which are trinity, unity, and equality, there: *These three therefore, as Augustine says.* In the third indeed he raises and resolves a difficulty which arises from the foregoing: namely whether the soul is its own powers, there: *Here it is to be attended to diligently.* In the fourth, however, he teaches us to avoid the error which could be caused by or[^12] arise from the demonstration of the created trinity, namely that there would be a total likeness to the uncreated; where he shows that there is the greatest dissimilitude of the image to God, there: *Nevertheless let him beware.*

*It can also be done in another way and by other [names] etc.* This is the second part of the second part of this distinction[^13], in which the Master intends to investigate the image in the habits of the soul insofar as is possible, and this part is divided into four subdivisions. For first he touches upon those [things] in which the image of the Trinity is attended to, which are mind, knowledge, and love. Secondly, these having been mentioned beforehand, he shows that the image is attended to in these on account of consubstantiality, order, and equality, there: *But these three, since they are etc.* Thirdly, he shows how the rational mind, in the contemplation of the created trinity, advances toward seeing and knowing the uncreated Trinity in the Unity, there: *Therefore the rational mind, considering these three.* Fourthly indeed he briefly recollects what has been demonstrated above, there: *Wherefore according to this consideration.*

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of the things which are touched upon in this first part of the distinction, four [questions] are asked.

The first is whether God is knowable by the creature.

The second is whether he is knowable through the creature.

The third is whether the mode of knowing through the creature befits man as to every state, namely the state of innocence, the state of fallen nature, and the state of glorified nature.

The fourth is what concerning God is knowable through the creature.

---

la: Cap. I. n. 1.

en: [Lombard,] cap. I, n. 1.

la: Absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. *et Unitate.*

en: Without any manuscript authority, and against ed. 1, the Vatican edition omits *et Unitate* ("and Unity").

la: Cap. 1. n. 4. — Auctor huius libri, S. Fulgentius, multo fusius de his tractat, in quo textu codd. CDE addendo *non* et mutando *sed* in *si* sic legunt: *Rursus quidem Trinitas non esset vera, si unus Deus Trinitas non esset: si quemadmodum... Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti. Sed haec lectio duplicem suppositionem et argumentationem confundit.* In fine textus Vat. *fuissent quoque naturae* pro *fuissent naturarum quoque.*

en: [Lombard,] cap. 1, n. 4. — The author of this book, St. Fulgentius, treats of these matters much more fully [than Lombard]; in his text the codices CDE, by adding *non* instead of *et* and reading *si* in place of *sed,* have it thus: *"Again, indeed, the Trinity would not be true, if the one God were not the Trinity: if just as... the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of the persons, so they would have been separated also by a diversity of natures. But this reading confuses the twofold supposition and argumentation."* At the end of the text the Vatican edition [reads] *fuissent quoque naturae* in place of *fuissent naturarum quoque.*

la: Cod. P hic addit: *Item prima pars habet duas partes, in quarum prima ostendit Magister, quod Deus est trinus et unus; in secunda, quia rationes et similitudines, quas adducit non sunt sufficientes ad plene intelligendum Trinitatem et Unitatem in divinis, concludit, hoc esse in dubio, in fine istius distinctionis: Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem.*

en: Codex P here adds: *"Likewise the first part has two parts, in the first of which the Master shows that God is triune and one; in the second, because the reasons and likenesses which he adduces are not sufficient for fully understanding the Trinity and Unity in things divine, he concludes that this remains in doubt, at the end of this distinction: Wherefore according to this consideration."*

en: Loc. cit.; the authority that follows is from the same place, n. 6.

la: Vers. 20.

en: Verse 20 [of Romans 1].

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omissis verbis *Nunc restat* usque ad *entitatem* et mutata constructione, prosequitur: *Similiter secunda pars, in qua ostendit Trinitatem per similitudinem longinquam, quae attenditur in vestigio, habet quatuor particulas.*

en: The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and of ed. 1, omitting the words *Nunc restat* down to *entitatem* and with the construction altered, continues thus: *"Likewise the second part, in which he shows the Trinity through a remote likeness, which is attended to in the vestige, has four subdivisions."*

la: Vat., seiungendo duas praesentis distinctionis partes, sequentem expositionem litterae infra in principio secundae partis huius distinctionis affert, sed contra mss. Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 *huius* loco *istius.*

en: The Vatican edition, by separating the two parts of the present distinction, places the following exposition of the letter further on at the beginning of the second part of this distinction, but against the manuscripts. Immediately after, the Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the codices and ed. 1, reads *huius* in place of *istius.*

la: Cod. O habet *sex* particulas et singulas enumerando, ubi de tertia agit, legit: *In tertia ad evidentiam dictorum docet, quomodo in dicta assignatione imaginis accipiatur mens et memoria, ibi: Mens autem hic pro animo,* deinde sub quarta et quinta exhibet tertiam et quartam in textu positam, ac demum addit: *In sexta particula docet, respectu cuius obiecti attenditur imago in dictis potentiis, ibi: Sciendum vero, quod haec trinitas mentis.*

en: Codex O has *six* subdivisions and, in enumerating them one by one, where it treats of the third reads: *"In the third [subdivision] he teaches for the clarification of the things said how mind and memory are to be taken in the said assignment of the image, there: But here 'mind' [is taken] for 'soul,'"* then under the fourth and fifth it sets forth the third and fourth that stand in the [printed] text, and finally adds: *"In the sixth subdivision he teaches in respect of which object the image is attended to in the said powers, there: But it is to be known, that this trinity of the mind."*

la: Vat. contra unanimem consensum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *in* et *eius.*

en: The Vatican edition, against the unanimous consensus of the manuscripts and of ed. 1, omits *in* and *eius* ("its").

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *et* pro *vel.*

en: The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and ed. 1 opposing, [reads] less well *et* ("and") in place of *vel* ("or").

la: Vat., omissis verbis Magistri variataque constructione, sic: *Similiter secunda pars, in qua... possibile est, dividitur in quatuor;* sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, with the Master's words omitted and the construction altered, [reads] thus: *"Likewise the second part, in which... is possible, is divided into four [subdivisions];"* but against the manuscripts and ed. 1.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem III, Pars II — Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction III, Part II — Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 80 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem III — Pars II

*De cognitione Dei per similitudines propinquas sive per imaginem.*

> *«Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem.»*

Textum Magistri vide supra p. 63 et divisionem eiusdem p. 66.

### Tractatio Quaestionum — Articulus I

*De prima assignatione imaginis.*

Consequenter ad intelligentiam istius partis secundae praesentis distinctionis, cuius divisio posita est supra, quantum ad primam assignationem imaginis, quae est per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, tria quaeruntur.

*Primum* est, utrum in his tribus attendatur ratio imaginis.

*Secundum* est de comparatione istarum ad obiectum.

*Tertium* est de comparatione earum ad animam vel subiectum.

---

english:
## Commentary on Distinction III — Part II

*On the knowledge of God through near likenesses, or through the image.*

> *"But now let us come to that discussion."*

For the Master's text see above, p. 63, and its division, p. 66.

### Treatment of the Questions — Article I

*On the first assignment of the image.*

Next, for the understanding of this second part of the present distinction — the division of which was set out above — with respect to the first assignment of the image, which is through memory, understanding, and will, three things are asked.

*The first* is whether the account of the image is found in these three.

*The second* concerns the comparison of these to their object.

*The third* concerns their comparison to the soul or subject.

---