title: Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

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### Quaestio IV

*Utrum tres tantum sint divinae personae.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere trinitatem. Et quod non, immo magis dualitatem, ostenditur sic.

**1.** Pater totum quod potest, dat Filio[^1]; sed qui dat totum quod potest, non potest amplius dare: ergo nec aliam personam producere, cum illud sit dare.

**2.** Item, Pater generat Filium tanquam Verbum per omnia aequale et per omnia dicens et exprimens ipsum; sed multiplicatio personarum est ad declarationem virtutis: ergo videtur, quod superfluat alium producere.

**3.** Item, ostenditur quod ibi debeat esse quaternitas per rationem emanationis. Quia enim Filius emanat per generationem, non per processionem, ideo, quamvis non generet, tamen spirando producit; eadem ratione videtur, quod Spiritus sanctus, quamvis non producat spirando, possit generare sive generet, cum non generetur.

**4.** Item, cum in divinis sit duplex modus producendi[^2], scilicet unus per modum naturae, alius per modum voluntatis, et ibi debeat esse completa ratio productionis, videtur etiam, quod ibi debeat esse modus producendi tertius per modum artis. Et si sic, erit ibi ponere quartam personam secundum hunc modum producendi.

*Sed contra:* Quod sit ibi trinitas tantum, ostenditur ex suppositionibus superius factis, quia necesse est, in illa Trinitate esse beatitudinem, perfectionem, simplicitatem[^3], primitatem.

**1.** Ex prima suppositione ostenditur sic: si est ibi summa beatitudo: ergo summa concordia; ergo est summa germanitas, summa caritas. Sed si essent plures quam tres, non esset ibi summa germanitas; si pauciores, non esset ibi summa caritas: ergo sunt tres tantum. Probatio minoris. Si est ibi quarta persona, aut procedit ab una, aut a duabus, aut a tribus. Si ab una vel[^4] duabus tantum, tunc non perfecte et aequaliter convenit cum omnibus; si autem a tribus, tunc duae personae intermediae magis conveniunt ad invicem quam cum extremis, quia producuntur et producunt; et ita non est ibi perfectus nexus. — Item, si essent pauciores quam tres, non esset ibi perfecta caritas, quia perfectus amor et est liberalis et est communis: quia liberalis, ideo tendit in[^5] alterum; quia communis, ideo vult illum diligi ab altero et diligere alterum sicut se et a se: ergo est ibi dilectio et condilectio; hoc autem non potest esse minus quam in tribus.

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**2.** Ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo persona producens perfecte producit et quantum ad modum producendi, et quantum ad eum qui producitur. Sed non reperitur nisi duplex modus producendi nobilis; «omne enim agens aut agit per modum naturae, aut per modum voluntatis», sicut vult Philosophus[^6]; ergo his duobus modis et tantum his producit; sed persona producta quolibet istorum modorum est perfectissima: ergo si ultra perfectionem omne quod est superfluit, et quod est citra deficit, necesse est, esse tantum duas personas emanantes et non plures nec pauciores, et unam, a qua emanant: ergo tantum tres.

**3.** Item, ex tertia sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, Pater totum dat cuilibet: ergo procedentes sive emanantes non distinguuntur penes ea quae accipiunt[^7], sed penes modum accipiendi vel emanandi; sed duo tantum sunt modi emanandi: ergo non possunt esse nisi duae personae emanantes et tertia producens: ergo etc.

**4.** Item, ex quarta sic: si ratione primitatis est ibi summa fecunditas, nulla persona potest producere aliquo genere producendi, quo producitur[^8], quia respectu illius non est prior: ergo cum duae personae emanent secundum duos modos emanandi, impossibile est, quod his modis producant, et non sunt alii modi: ergo non possunt producere aliam personam: ergo sunt tantum tres.

### Conclusio

> *Tres tantum esse personas divinas, et fides catholica docet, et ratio suadet.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut fides catholica dicit, ponere est tantum tres personas, non plures nec pauciores. Et ad hoc sumitur ratio *necessitatis* et *congruitatis*.

**Ratio utique[^9] necessitatis**, quare non possunt esse pauciores quam tres, est summa beatitudo et summa perfectio. Nam summa beatitudo exigit dilectionem et condilectionem; summa perfectio duplicem emanationem, scilicet naturae et liberalitatis; et ad hoc ad minus exiguntur tres personae. — Item, ratio necessitatis, quare non possunt esse plures, est summa simplicitas, quae non patitur personas distingui nisi secundum modos emanandi; et[^10] iterum *principalis fecunditas*, quae non permittit personam producere aliquo genere emanationis, nisi secundum rationem intelligendi sit prior illo. Unde prima persona, quia[^11] est innascibilis et inspirabilis, generat et spirat; secunda, quia inspirabilis, sed genita, non generat, sed spirat; tertia vero persona, quia spiratur et procedit a generante, nec generat nec spirat. Et ideo impossibile est, esse plures[^12] quam tres.

**Ratio congruitatis** sumitur ex *sufficientia combinationum* et ex *perfectione numeri ternarii*.

*Ex sufficientia combinationum*, quia cum «amor sit in omnibus personis», ut dicit Richardus[^13], et non sit nisi triplex amor, videlicet «gratuitus et debitus et ex utroque permixtus», tantum erunt tres personae: una, quae tantum dat, in qua est amor gratuitus; alia, quae tantum accipit, in qua est amor debitus; et media, quae dat et accipit, in qua est amor permixtus ex utroque. — Item, alio modo possunt combinari secundum rationem originis; et huiusmodi combinationis sufficientia in tribus consistit. Nam contingit intelligere personam, quae est principium personae et non est principiatum, et rursum personam, quae est principiatum et non principium personae, et tertio modo personam, quae est principiatum et principium. Quartus autem modus[^14], quod nec sit principium nec principiatum, est omnino impossibilis et non intelligibilis.

*Ratio congruitatis ex parte numeri* est, quia numerus iste, scilicet ternarius, habet primam[^15] perfectionem et summam, sive consideretur in se, sive in quantitate continua, sive in creatura.

**In se** habet primam perfectionem, quoniam ternarius primus numerus est, qui constat ex omnibus partibus suis, scilicet unitate et dualitate, quae simul iunctae[^16] faciunt tria. Senarius autem dicitur primus perfectorum, quia constat ex omnibus partibus suis aliquotis, scilicet tribus, duobus et uno. — Item, summa perfectio est in eo, quia unitas, quae est principium et completio omnis numeri, reflexa supra se reduplicatione perfecta[^17], qualis in solido quadrato, triplicatur secundum rationem, remanens una secundum veritatem; ut si dicatur: *semel unum semel*. Et istud est valde simile Trinitati increatae,

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in qua in unitate substantiae est trinitas rationum[^18]; non tamen est omnino simile, quia ibi cum unitate substantiae est trinitas rationum et rerum, scilicet personarum; hic tantummodo rationum.

**Similiter**, si consideretur numerus iste in *quantitate continua*, habet in se primam perfectionem et summam: primam, quia omnis quantitas habet principium[^19], medium et ultimum; summam, quia perfectio quantitatis continuae suprema consistit in trina dimensione, scilicet longitudine, latitudine et altitudine. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in principio *de Caelo et mundo*[^20]: «Omne enim perfectum in tribus dicimus, et hoc numero adhibuimus nosmetipsos magnificare Deum unum, creatorem omnium, eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata».

**Similiter**, si consideretur iste numerus in creatura, habet in se primam perfectionem et summam: primam, quia trinitatem vestigii contingit reperire in qualibet creatura, quantumcumque parva, quantumcumque minima; summam[^21], quia secundum trinitatem imaginis reformatam et deiformatam attenditur summa et nobilissima perfectio creaturae, scilicet beatitudo.

**1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *Pater dat Filio totum quod potest*; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non dat[^22] omni modo, quo potest. Et ideo in illatione est *accidens*: «non potest amplius dare, ergo nec aliam personam producere», quia hoc non est dare amplius, sed alio modo.

**2.** Similiter sequens[^23] patet, quia Filius non omni modo declarat, quia, etsi secundum rationem naturae, non tamen secundum liberalitatem voluntatis, nisi in quantum ex ipso Verbo procedit Spiritus.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *Spiritus sanctus debet generare*; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia[^24] persona Filii praecedit spirationem, ideo habet rationem primitatis; persona Spiritus sancti sequitur generationem, et ideo non generat, quia non est innascibilis.

**4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio modo emanandi, scilicet *de arte*; dicendum, quod ars non habet fecunditatem ad emanandum sive ad producendum nisi per voluntatem; et ideo modus ille non debet distingui a modo producendi[^25] per modum liberalitatis sive voluntatis.

Vel aliter et melius. Modus producendi per artem convenit cum modo producendi per naturam in hoc, quod utrobique producitur simile[^26]. Differt autem, quia in productione naturali producitur similis in substantia et natura, alius in persona; in productione autem artis producitur simile secundum rationem formae exemplaris, dissimile vero in substantia et natura. Talis autem modus producendi est incompossibilis divinae essentiae, quae non compatitur diversitatem essentiarum.

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### Question IV

*Whether there are only three divine persons.*

Fourth and finally, it is asked whether a trinity is to be posited in the divine persons. And that this is not so — but rather a duality — is shown thus:

**1.** The Father gives to the Son all that he can[^1]; but one who gives all that he can give cannot give any more: therefore neither can he produce another person, since that would be a giving.

**2.** Likewise, the Father begets the Son as a Word, in all things equal to himself and in all things saying and expressing himself; but the multiplication of persons is for the declaration of power: therefore it seems superfluous to produce another.

**3.** Likewise, it is shown that there ought to be a quaternity there, by an argument from emanation. For since the Son emanates by generation and not by procession, therefore, even though he does not generate, he nonetheless produces by spirating; by the same reasoning it seems that the Holy Spirit, even though he does not produce by spirating, could generate or does generate, since he is not generated.

**4.** Likewise, since in divine things there is a twofold mode of producing[^2] — one by way of nature, and the other by way of will — and since there ought to be a complete account of production there, it seems also that there ought to be a third mode of producing, by way of art. And if so, a fourth person would have to be posited according to this mode of producing.

*On the contrary:* That there is only a trinity there is shown from the suppositions made above, because it is necessary that in that Trinity there be beatitude, perfection, simplicity[^3], and primacy.

**1.** From the first supposition it is shown thus: if there is supreme beatitude there, then there is supreme concord; therefore supreme kindredship, supreme charity. But if there were more than three, there would not be supreme kindredship; if fewer, there would not be supreme charity: therefore there are only three. Proof of the minor: if there is a fourth person there, it proceeds either from one, from two, or from three. If from one or[^4] from two only, then it does not agree perfectly and equally with all; but if from three, then the two intermediate persons agree more with one another than with the extremes — because they are both produced and produce — and thus there is not a perfect bond there. — Likewise, if there were fewer than three, there would not be perfect charity, because perfect love is both generous and shared: because it is generous, it tends toward[^5] another; because it is shared, it wills that the beloved be loved by another, and that the other be loved as itself and by itself: therefore there is love and *co-love*; but this cannot exist with fewer than three.

**2.** From the second supposition thus: if there is supreme perfection there, then the producing person produces perfectly both with respect to the mode of producing and with respect to the one produced. But there is found only a twofold noble mode of producing; «for every agent acts either by way of nature or by way of will», as the Philosopher holds[^6]. Therefore it produces by these two modes and only by these; but the person produced by either of these modes is most perfect: therefore, since everything beyond perfection is superfluous and what is below it is deficient, it is necessary that there be only two persons emanating and no more nor fewer, and one from whom they emanate: therefore, only three.

**3.** Likewise, from the third thus: if there is supreme simplicity there, the Father gives the whole to each: therefore those proceeding or emanating are not distinguished according to what they receive[^7], but according to the mode of receiving or emanating; but there are only two modes of emanating: therefore there can be only two persons emanating and a third producing: therefore, etc.

**4.** Likewise, from the fourth thus: if by reason of primacy there is supreme fruitfulness there, no person can produce by any kind of producing by which it itself is produced[^8], because with respect to that it is not prior: therefore, since two persons emanate according to the two modes of emanating, it is impossible that they produce by these modes, and there are no other modes: therefore they cannot produce another person: therefore there are only three.

### Conclusion

> *That there are only three divine persons is both taught by the Catholic faith and persuaded by reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Catholic faith declares, one must posit only three persons — neither more nor fewer. And for this there is taken a reason of *necessity* and a reason of *congruence*.

**The reason indeed[^9] of necessity** why there cannot be fewer than three is *supreme beatitude* and *supreme perfection*. For supreme beatitude demands love and co-love; supreme perfection demands a twofold emanation — namely of nature and of liberality — and for this at least three persons are required. — Likewise, the reason of necessity why there cannot be more is *supreme simplicity*, which does not allow the persons to be distinguished except by the modes of emanating; and[^10] again *principal fruitfulness*, which does not permit a person to produce by any kind of emanation unless he is prior to the one produced according to the account of understanding. Hence the first person, because[^11] he is unborn and unspirable, both generates and spirates; the second, because he is unspirable but begotten, does not generate but spirates; the third person, because he is spirated and proceeds from one who generates, neither generates nor spirates. And therefore it is impossible that there be more[^12] than three.

**The reason of congruence** is taken from the *sufficiency of combinations* and from the *perfection of the ternary number*.

*From the sufficiency of combinations*, because since, as Richard says[^13], «love is in all the persons», and there are only three kinds of love — namely, *gratuitous, owed, and mixed of both* — there will be only three persons: one who only gives, in whom there is gratuitous love; another who only receives, in whom there is owed love; and a middle one, who both gives and receives, in whom there is the love mixed of both. — Likewise, in another way they can be combined according to the account of origin; and the sufficiency of this kind of combination consists in three. For one can understand a person who is a principle of a person and is not a principiate, and again a person who is a principiate and is not a principle of a person, and in a third mode a person who is both principiate and principle. But a fourth mode[^14] — that one be neither principle nor principiate — is altogether impossible and unintelligible.

*The reason of congruence from number* is that this number — namely, the ternary — has the first[^15] perfection and the supreme, whether it is considered in itself, or in continuous quantity, or in a creature.

**In itself** it has the first perfection, because the ternary is the first number that consists of all its parts — namely, unity and duality, which joined together[^16] make three. But the senary (six) is called the first of the *perfect* numbers, because it consists of all its aliquot parts — namely, three, two, and one. — Likewise, the supreme perfection is in it, because unity, which is the principle and completion of every number, when reflected upon itself by perfect reduplication[^17] — such as occurs in a solid square — is tripled in the account of reason, while remaining one in reality; as if one should say: *once one once* (*semel unum semel*). And this is very like the uncreated Trinity,

in which in the unity of substance there is a trinity of accounts[^18]; nevertheless it is not altogether similar, because there, together with unity of substance, there is a trinity of accounts and of *things* — that is, of persons — whereas here there is only a trinity of accounts.

**Likewise**, if this number is considered in *continuous quantity*, it has in itself the first perfection and the supreme: the first, because every quantity has a beginning[^19], a middle, and an end; the supreme, because the perfection of continuous quantity supremely consists in threefold dimension, namely length, width, and height. And this is what the Philosopher says at the beginning of *On the Heavens*[^20]: «For we say that everything perfect is in three, and by this number we have employed ourselves to magnify the one God, the creator of all things, eminent in the properties of those things which are created».

**Likewise**, if this number is considered in a creature, it has in itself the first perfection and the supreme: the first, because a trinity of vestige is found in every creature, however small, however least; the supreme[^21], because according to the trinity of image — reformed and made deiform — the supreme and most noble perfection of the creature, namely beatitude, is attained.

**1.** To the objection, then, that *the Father gives to the Son everything he can*: it must be said that this is true, but he does not give[^22] in every mode in which he can. And so in the inference there is the fallacy of *accident*: «he cannot give more, therefore he cannot produce another person either»; for this is not to give more, but to give in another mode.

**2.** Similarly, the following objection is clear[^23], because the Son does not declare [the Father] in every mode; for although he does so according to the account of nature, nevertheless he does not do so according to the liberality of the will, except insofar as from the Word himself the Spirit proceeds.

**3.** To the objection that *the Holy Spirit ought to generate*: it must be said that it is not similar, because[^24] the person of the Son precedes spiration, and therefore has the account of primacy; the person of the Holy Spirit follows generation, and therefore does not generate, because he is not unborn.

**4.** To the objection about a third mode of emanating — namely, *by way of art*: it must be said that art has no fruitfulness for emanating or producing except through the will; and therefore that mode is not to be distinguished from the mode of producing[^25] by way of liberality or will.

Or — differently and better — the mode of producing by art agrees with the mode of producing by nature in this: that in both cases something similar is produced[^26]. But it differs, because in natural production what is produced is similar in substance and nature, but another in person; in the production of art, however, what is produced is similar according to the account of the exemplary form, but dissimilar in substance and nature. But such a mode of producing is incompossible with the divine essence, which does not suffer a diversity of essences.

la: Ioan. 16, 13: *Omnia quaecumque habet Pater mea sunt*.

en: John 16:13: *«All things whatsoever the Father has are mine»*.

la: Plurimi codd. (A C G I K L M O R S Z etc.) minus recte et non sibi constantes *procedendi*. Paulo infra post *artis* ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 restituimus particulam *Et*.

en: Many codices (A C G I K L M O R S Z etc.) less correctly and inconsistently with themselves read *procedendi*. A little below, after *artis*, on the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, we have restored the particle *Et*.

la: Codd. X cc et ed. 1 hic addunt *et*.

en: Codd. X, cc, and ed. 1 here add *et*.

la: Plures mss. cum ed. 1 repetunt hic *a*.

en: Several manuscripts, with ed. 1, here repeat *a*.

la: Vat., adversantibus mss. et ed. 1, *ad* loco *in* et paulo post *alium* pro *illum*; deinde, contrariantibus insuper edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post *altero* legendo *sicut a se et vult diligere*, omittit postea *et a se*; quae lectio gracilior quidem est, sed sensum nimis coarctare videtur, eo quod non contineat unum visionis respectu triplicis mutuae dilectionis. Elliptica constructio textus nostri illud membrum satis indicat. Sensus enim propositionis hic est: *ideo Pater vult, quod Filius diligatur a Spiritu sancto, et diligat Spiritum sanctum, sicut vult, quod ipse, scilicet Pater, diligatur ab utroque et a se diligatur uterque*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *ad* for *in*, and a little later *alium* for *illum*; then, against edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, after *altero* reading *sicut a se et vult diligere*, it afterwards omits *et a se*; this reading is indeed more graceful, but seems to constrict the sense too much, because it does not contain the one vision with respect to the threefold mutual love. The elliptical construction of our text indicates that member sufficiently. For the sense of the proposition is: *Therefore the Father wills that the Son be loved by the Holy Spirit, and love the Holy Spirit — just as he wills that he himself, namely the Father, be loved by both, and that each be loved by himself*.

la: Libr. II *Phys.* text. 49 (c. 3), ubi dicit, quod eorum quae fiunt propter finem *alia quidem secundum propositum fiunt, alia vero non*... *sunt autem propter hoc (i. e. finem) quaecumque ab intellectu utique aguntur et quaecumque a natura*. Cfr. III *Ethic.* c. *de Voluntario*, et I *Magnor. Moral.* c. *de Spontaneo* et seqq.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 49 (c. 3), where he says that of those things which come about for the sake of an end, *«some come about according to deliberate choice, and others not»*... *«but those things are for the sake of this [the end] which are brought about by understanding, and whatever come about by nature»*. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* III, chap. on *the Voluntary*, and *Great Ethics* I, chap. on *the Spontaneous* and following.

la: Salvo sensu multi codd. A C F G L O S U V W etc. *accipiuntur*. Paulo infra post *accipiendi* substituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 *vel* pro *et*; cod. O *sive*.

en: Without prejudice to the sense, many codices (A C F G L O S U V W etc.) read *accipiuntur*. A little below, after *accipiendi*, on the witness of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substitute *vel* for *et*; cod. O reads *sive*.

la: Cod. 1 *producere aliam illo genere, quo producitur*, et paulo infra *quod his duobus modis emanandi producant*.

en: Cod. 1 reads *producere aliam illo genere, quo producitur* ("to produce another by that kind by which it is produced"), and a little below *quod his duobus modis emanandi producant* ("that they produce by these two modes of emanating").

la: Adiecimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *utique*.

en: We have added *utique* on the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Faventibus codd. et ed. 1, substituimus *et* loco *Est*. Immediate post *plures* codd. ut A C R S W pro *fecunditas* ponunt *fecunditatis*, sed male.

en: With the codices and ed. 1 favoring it, we have substituted *et* for *Est*. Immediately afterward, several codices (A C R S W) read *fecunditatis* for *fecunditas*, but wrongly.

la: Restituimus ope plurimorum antiquorum mss. ut A G I K M R S T U W X Y etc. et ed. 1 *quia*, quod Vat. cum aliquibus codd. minus congrue mutavit in *quae*. Mox Vat., antiquioribus mss. obnitentibus, legit *secunda vero persona* et omittit *vero* post *tertia*.

en: We have restored *quia*, on the witness of most of the ancient manuscripts (A G I K M R S T U W X Y etc.) and ed. 1, which the Vatican edition, with some codices, less suitably changed to *quae*. Soon afterward the Vatican edition, against the older manuscripts, reads *secunda vero persona* and omits *vero* after *tertia*.

la: Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt hic *personas*, quod legitur in Vat. Paulo infra post *sumitur* ed. 1 adiungit *et*.

en: The codices, with ed. 1, here omit *personas*, which is read in the Vatican edition. A little below, after *sumitur*, ed. 1 adds *et*.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 23: *Quantum igitur ad substantiam dilectionis erit unus atque idem amor in omnibus personis*. Et ibid. c. 16: *Constat autem, quod verus amor potest esse aut solum gratuitus, aut solum debitus, aut ex utroque permixtus*.

en: Richard of St Victor, *On the Trinity* V, c. 23: *«Therefore, as regards the substance of love, there will be one and the same love in all the persons».* And ibid. c. 16: *«It is established that true love can be either only gratuitous, or only owed, or mixed of both».*

la: Cod. X *Quarto modo et consequenter impossibile nec intelligibile*.

en: Cod. X reads *Quarto modo et consequenter impossibile nec intelligibile* ("In a fourth mode, and consequently impossible nor intelligible").

la: Licet pauci solummodo codd. B D T habeant *creatura* pro *natura*, praeferimus tamen eorum lectionem, quia et congruentior est, et omnes codd. cum Vat. infra in explicatione huius membri legunt *creatura*.

en: Although only a few codices (B D T) have *creatura* in place of *natura*, we nevertheless prefer their reading, both because it is more congruent and because all the codices, with the Vatican edition, in the exposition of this member below read *creatura*.

la: Multi codd. ut A F G H K S T V W X Y etc. cum ed. 1 *iuncta*.

en: Many codices (A F G H K S T V W X Y etc.), with ed. 1, read *iuncta*.

la: Adstipulantibus mss. et ed. 1, delevimus *quadrata*, quod Vat. hic addit. Paulo infra post *rationem* in cod. U adiungitur *tamen* et in pluribus aliis codd. ut A C G K R S V nec non in ed. 1 *ratio*; cod. ff post *rationem* inserit *ratione* mutando *remanens* in *remanente*.

en: With the manuscripts and ed. 1 supporting it, we have deleted *quadrata*, which the Vatican edition here adds. A little below, after *rationem*, cod. U adds *tamen*, and in several other codices (A C G K R S V), as well as in ed. 1, *ratio*; cod. ff after *rationem* inserts *ratione*, changing *remanens* to *remanente*.

la: Cod. Z addit *vel relationum*. Pro horum maiore intelligentia notentur haec B. Albert. verba: *Dicunt quidam modernorum, quod relatio est medium entis et non entis, eo quod ipsa est ratio rei et non res etc.* (I. Sent. d. 26. a. 10.) — Paulo post Cod. R *in unitate* loco *cum unitate*.

en: Cod. Z adds *vel relationum* ("or of the relations"). For a greater understanding of these matters, let these words of Bl. Albert be noted: *«Some of the moderns say that a relation is a middle between being and non-being, in that it is the account of a thing and not a thing itself, etc.»* (I Sent. d. 26. a. 10). — A little later, Cod. R reads *in unitate* for *cum unitate*.

la: Multi codd. ut A C F G I K L O S T U Z etc. cum ed. 1 *primum* loco *principium*.

en: Many codices (A C F G I K L O S T U Z etc.), with ed. 1, read *primum* for *principium*.

la: Libr. I. text. 2, ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489 in translatione arabico-latina ita habetur: *Et hoc (ternarius) est numerus cuiuslibet, et est demonstrans trinitatem rerum, et non invenimus istum numerum nisi ex natura, et sustinemus ipsum quasi legem nobis; et secundum istum numerum tenemur magnificare Deum creatorem remotum a modis creaturarum*. Ed. Paris. hunc text. sic exhibet: *Nam, ut Pythagorici etiam inquiunt, ipsum omne atque omnia tribus sunt definita: finis enim, medium atque principium ipsius omnis numerum habent; haec autem trinitatis. Quapropter hoc a natura numero sumto, perinde atque quadam illius lege et in deorum sacrificiis celebrandis uti solemus*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 2, where according to the Venice edition of 1489 in the Arabic-Latin translation it reads thus: *«And this [the ternary] is the number of everything, and it is what demonstrates the trinity of things; and we do not find this number except from nature, and we hold it as a kind of law for ourselves; and according to this number we are bound to magnify God the creator as removed from the modes of creatures»*. The Paris edition presents this text thus: *«For, as the Pythagoreans also say, the whole itself and all things are defined by three: for the end, the middle, and the beginning of the whole have its number; and these are of trinity. Wherefore, having taken this number from nature, just as by a certain law of it, we are accustomed to use it also in celebrating sacrifices to the gods»*.

la: Praeferimus lectionem cod. Z *summam* pro *perfectam* utpote praecedentibus correspondentem. Cod. T *penes* et cod. V *per* loco *secundum*; deinde ope omnium mss. et edd. 2, 3 substituimus *deiformatam* pro *deiformem*. Cod. R, omissa praepositione *secundum*, post *deiformatam* addit *in qua*, ita ut *trinitatem imaginis* referatur ad superius positum *contingit reperire*; plures alii codd. ut A C G K O H S huic lectioni in tantum favent, in quantum omittunt praepositionem *secundum*.

en: We prefer the reading of cod. Z, *summam* in place of *perfectam*, as corresponding to what precedes. Cod. T reads *penes* and cod. V *per* in place of *secundum*; then, with the help of all the manuscripts and edd. 2, 3, we substitute *deiformatam* for *deiformem*. Cod. R, omitting the preposition *secundum*, after *deiformatam* adds *in qua*, so that *trinitatem imaginis* refers to the earlier *contingit reperire*; several other codices (A C G K O H S) favor this reading to the extent that they omit the preposition *secundum*.

la: Plurimi codd. non ita bene omittunt *dat*. Paulo post quando S. Doctor dicit *accidens*, intellige *fallaciam accidentis*, de qua Aristot., I *Elench.* c. 4 (c. 5): *«Ex accidente quidem paralogismi sunt, cum quidvis postulatum fuerit aeque rei atque accidenti inesse. Quoniam enim multa eidem accidunt, non est necesse, omnibus praedicatis et subiecto, de quo illa praedicantur, haec omnia inesse; nam alioquin omnia erunt eadem».* — Hoc loco a re ad modum rei falso concluditur.

en: Most of the codices, not so well, omit *dat*. A little later, when the Holy Doctor says *accidens*, understand the *fallacy of accident*, of which Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, ch. 4 (c. 5): «There are paralogisms from accident when whatever is posited is claimed to belong equally to the thing and to the accident. For since many things happen to the same subject, it is not necessary that all of these belong to all the predicates and to the subject of which they are predicated; for otherwise all things will be the same». — In this passage there is a false inference from the thing to the mode of the thing.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus hic a Vat. additum *obiectio per hoc*. Paulo infra post *rationem* codd. Y ee addunt *originis et perfectionem*, cum quibus concordant codd. G H N X in eo tantum divergentes, quod codd. H N omittant *et*, cuius loco cod. G habet *seu*, cod. X vero *declaret*. — De differentia utriusque modi procedendi cfr. infra d. 13. q. 3.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have removed here the Vatican addition *obiectio per hoc*. A little below, after *rationem*, codd. Y ee add *originis et perfectionem*, with which codd. G H N X agree, diverging only in that codd. H N omit *et* — in whose place cod. G has *seu*, and cod. X has *declaret*. — On the difference between the two modes of proceeding, see below d. 13, q. 3.

la: Cod. R addit *enim*. Deinde plures antiquiorum codd. ut A B C L O T W etc. ponunt *principium* loco *rationem* moxque post *persona* codd. cum ed. 1 supprimunt *autem*, quod Vat. addit.

en: Cod. R adds *enim*. Then several of the older codices (A B C L O T W etc.) read *principium* for *rationem*, and soon after, following *persona*, the codices with ed. 1 suppress *autem*, which the Vatican edition adds.

la: Sequimur cod. Y loco *procedendi* ponendo *producendi*, quod et praecedentibus et sequentibus magis conforme est, licet sensus in utraque lectione sit idem.

en: We follow cod. Y in reading *producendi* for *procedendi*, which is more conformable to both what precedes and what follows, although the sense in both readings is the same.

la: Cod. O *simile*, qui et cum codd. C Y post *natura* adiungit *et*. Paulo infra plures codd. ut A F G K T etc. cum ed. 1 *dissimilis* loco *dissimile*. Mox ex plurimis mss. ut A D F G H K N T etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *incompossibilis* pro *impossibilis*.

en: Cod. O reads *simile*, and together with codd. C Y adds *et* after *natura*. A little below, several codd. (A F G K T etc.), with ed. 1, read *dissimilis* for *dissimile*. Finally, on the witness of most of the manuscripts (A D F G H K N T etc.) and of ed. 1, we have substituted *incompossibilis* for *impossibilis*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quae hic de proprietatibus numerorum dicuntur, occurrunt etiam *Hexaem.* Serm. 4, nec non in illa *Expositione Psalmorum* (Psal. 129), quae inter Opera S. Bonav. impressa, sed auctori suo Michaeli Meldensi, Archiepiscopo Senonensi († 1199), a P. Fidele a Fanna (*Ratio novae collectionis* p. 180 seqq.) vindicata est. Haec antiquam doctrinam exhibent mathematicorum Graecorum, ut Euclidis (*Elementa* IX. 36), quos sequuntur S. Augustinus (*Gen. ad lit.* IV. c. 2), S. Isidorus (*Etymol.* III. c. 3. n. 11; *de Arithmet.* I. c. 20), aliique innumeri cum Petro Bungo (*de Numerorum Mysteriis*, Paris. 1617. p. 456) et Stephano Brulefero (*Comment. in hanc quaest.*).

1. *Partes aliquotae* sive *aliquantae* alicuius numeri ab antiquis dicebantur illae, quae aliquoties sumptae reddunt praecise suum totum. Ita 5 et 2 sunt partes aliquotae numeri 10. *Pars non aliquota* est illa, quae aliquoties sumpta non potest reddere totum aliquem numerum, ut 3 respectu numeri 10. 2. Numerus perfectus secundum antiquos est ille, qui constat ex suis partibus aliquotis, simul sumptis; et in hoc sensu numerus ternarius est primus perfectus, quia constat ex parte aliquota (1) et non aliquota (2), quae simul iuncta faciunt tria. Dicitur *primus* numerus perfectus, quia binarius, licet constet ex suis partibus simul sumptis, i. e. duabus unitatibus, non dicitur numerus perfectus, quia *unum* proprie non dicebatur numerus.

3. Aliquis numerus potest super se reflecti duobus modis, vel *imperfecte*, quando semel ducitur in se ipsum (ut 2 × 2 = 4), et tunc efficitur numerus quadratus, sed non solidus; vel *perfecte*, quando bis ducitur in se ipsum (ut 2 × 2 × 2 = 8), et haec reduplicatio perfecta reddit quadratum solidum.

**II.** His praesuppositis, patet triplex propositio S. Doctoris.

1. Numerus ternarius in se consideratus habet primam et summam perfectionem: *primam* quidem, quia est primus numerus constans ex omnibus suis partibus per additionem simul sumptis; *summam* vero, quia unum triplicatum manet unum (1 × 1 × 1 = 1).

2. Consideratus ut in quantitate continua, i. e. in quantum applicatur ad quantitatem, habet primam perfectionem, «quia omnis quantitas habet principium, medium et ultimum; summam vero, quia perfectio quantitatis continuae consistit in trina dimensione, scil. longitudine, latitudine et altitudine», ut habetur in textu.

3. Consideratus ut in qualibet creatura, iterum habet primam et summam perfectionem: *primam* quidem, quia in qualibet etiam minima creatura invenitur trinitas vestigii (*unum, verum, bonum*); *summam* vero, quia in angelica et humana natura invenitur trinitas imaginis, praesertim quando nobilissima pars animae est reformata vel imperfecte per deiformitatem gratiae, vel perfecte per deiformitatem gloriae. De hoc cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et p. II. per totam, et II. Sent. d. 16. per totam.

**III.** De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 45. m. 7. — Scot., hic q. 5 et 7, et *Report.* hic q. 8. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1. a. 5; *S.* I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 10. a. 12. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 10. princ. 2. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** What is said here about the properties of numbers recurs also in *Hexaëmeron*, Sermon 4, and in that *Exposition of the Psalms* (Ps. 129) which, though printed among the works of St. Bonaventure, has been vindicated for its proper author Michael of Meaux, Archbishop of Sens († 1199) by Fr. Fidelis a Fanna (*Ratio novae collectionis*, p. 180 ff.). These pages exhibit the ancient doctrine of the Greek mathematicians — such as Euclid (*Elements* IX, 36), followed by St. Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* IV, 2), St. Isidore (*Etymol.* III.3.11; *de Arithmet.* I.20), and innumerable others, together with Pietro Bungo (*On the Mysteries of Numbers*, Paris 1617, p. 456) and Stephen Brulefer (*Commentary on this question*).

1. *Aliquot* or *aliquant* parts of some number were called by the ancients those parts which, taken a certain number of times, give back exactly the whole. Thus 5 and 2 are aliquot parts of 10. A *non-aliquot* part is one which, taken a certain number of times, cannot give back any whole number — such as 3 with respect to 10.

2. A *perfect* number, according to the ancients, is one which consists of its aliquot parts taken together; and in this sense the ternary number is the first perfect number, because it consists of an aliquot part (1) and a non-aliquot part (2), which joined together make three. It is called the *first* perfect number because the binary, although it consists of its parts taken together — that is, two units — is not called a perfect number, since *one* was not properly called a number.

3. A number can be reflected upon itself in two ways: either *imperfectly*, when it is multiplied by itself once (as 2 × 2 = 4), and this yields a square number but not a solid one; or *perfectly*, when it is multiplied by itself twice (as 2 × 2 × 2 = 8), and this perfect reduplication yields a solid cube.

**II.** With these things presupposed, the threefold proposition of the Holy Doctor is clear.

1. The ternary number considered in itself has the first and supreme perfection: the *first* indeed, because it is the first number consisting of all its parts taken together by addition; the *supreme* because one tripled remains one (1 × 1 × 1 = 1).

2. Considered as being in continuous quantity — that is, insofar as it is applied to quantity — it has the first perfection, «because every quantity has a beginning, a middle, and an end; and the supreme perfection because the perfection of continuous quantity consists in threefold dimension, namely length, width, and height», as is stated in the text.

3. Considered as being in any creature whatsoever, it again has the first and supreme perfection: the *first* because in any creature, even the smallest, is found a trinity of vestige (*one, true, good*); the *supreme* because in the angelic and human nature is found the trinity of image — especially when the noblest part of the soul has been reformed either imperfectly by the deiformity of grace, or perfectly by the deiformity of glory. On this, see below d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and p. II throughout; and II Sent. d. 16 throughout.

**III.** On the whole question: Alex. Hal., *Summa*, p. I, q. 45, m. 7. — Scot., here q. 5 and 7, and *Report.*, here q. 8. — S. Thom., I Sent. d. 10, q. 1, a. 5; *S.* I, q. 30, a. 2. — B. Albert, I Sent. d. 10, a. 12. — Aegid. R., I Sent. d. 10, princ. 2, q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here, q. 6.

---

translators_notes:
- **Chunk scope.** This chunk covers Q4 of the *articulus unicus* on printed pp. 56–58 (PDF 158–160). It opens with the Q4 title (*Utrum tres tantum sint divinae personae*), gives four *fundamenta* arguments for positing a quaternity or duality rather than a trinity, then the four *sed contra* arguments from beatitude, perfection, simplicity, and primacy, the *Conclusio*, Bonaventure's *Respondeo* (which distinguishes the reason of necessity from the reason of congruence, and elaborates the reason of congruence from the *sufficiency of combinations* and the *perfection of the ternary number* — the latter considered in itself, in continuous quantity, and in a creature), the four replies, and the Quaracchi editors' scholion on number theory. **B2 re-cut applied:** the legacy `d2-a1-q4` file contained the first six Dubia of d. 2 (DUB. I–VI) embedded after the scholion; those have been moved out (logically, for the deferred `d2-dubia` rebuild) and are no longer part of this chunk.

- **2026-05-11 apparatus rebuild.** Apparatus expanded from 11 entries to 26 entries (p.56: 6 entries; p.57: 11 entries; p.58: 9 entries), per Quaracchi's per-printed-page restart convention. Also restored to the body three paragraphs that had been dropped from the prior version: (a) the *in qua in unitate substantiae est trinitas rationum* tail of the *In se* section (which had been merged into a chunk-internal page break too early); (b) the *Similiter, si consideretur numerus iste in quantitate continua* paragraph, with its Aristotle *de Caelo et mundo* citation; (c) the *Similiter, si consideretur iste numerus in creatura* paragraph on trinitas vestigii / trinitas imaginis. Page break moved from before *Ratio congruitatis ex parte numeri* (p.57) to after *valde simile Trinitati increatae,* / before *in qua in unitate substantiae* (the true OCR boundary between p.57 and p.58).

- **Key terms in this chunk:**
  - *germanitas* ("kindredship") — literally the relationship of siblings born of the same parents; rendered "kindredship" to convey the close consanguineal bond among the persons, which would be disrupted if one person shared less fully in the common procession.
  - *condilectio* ("co-love") — a technical term from Richard of St. Victor's Trinitarian theology (*De Trinitate* III), denoting the love that two persons share toward a third. Bonaventure's argument here tracks Richard's famous claim that perfect love requires a third person as the shared object of mutual love. Retained as "co-love" to preserve the technical usage.
  - *principalis fecunditas* ("principal fruitfulness") — the Father's unique capacity, as innascible, to be the source of both Son and Spirit.
  - *sufficientia combinationum* ("sufficiency of combinations") — the combinatorial argument: only three kinds of love (gratuitous, owed, mixed) yield only three persons; only three modes of originative relation (principle-without-principiate, principiate-without-principle, both-principle-and-principiate) yield only three persons.
  - *fallacia accidentis* ("fallacy of accident") — the logical error called out in reply 1, where the opponent infers from "Father gives all he can" to "cannot produce another person" by treating the accidental mode of giving as identical with the thing given.
  - *trinitas vestigii* / *trinitas imaginis* — the distinction between the trinitarian trace found in every creature (*one, true, good*) and the trinitarian image found in intellectual creatures (memory, understanding, will); a characteristic Bonaventurian map referenced and elaborated in the *in creatura* paragraph and again in the scholion.

- **Richard of St. Victor citation.** The "love is in all the persons" phrase is from Richard of St. Victor's *De Trinitate* V (cited as such in [^13]), where Richard articulates the famous argument that supreme charity requires not merely two but three persons, since the perfection of love is in *condilectio* — a shared love directed toward a third. Bonaventure's whole *ratio necessitatis* rests on this Richardine framework.

- **Aristotle citations.** Two: (1) *Physics* II text 49 ([^6]) — distinguishes things that come about by deliberate choice from those by nature, providing the warrant for the "two noble modes" (nature/will) framework; (2) *On the Heavens* I text 2 ([^20]) — the Pythagoreanizing remark that "we say everything perfect is in three", invoked in the *quantitas continua* argument to ground the threefold dimension of solid bodies as a created likeness of trinitarian perfection.

- **Scholion on number theory.** The scholion's elaborate treatment of aliquot parts, perfect numbers, and square/cube reduplication derives from Greek mathematical tradition (Euclid, *Elements* IX.36) filtered through Augustine, Isidore, Boethius, and later compilers. The Quaracchi editors note that Bonaventure himself touches these themes in *Hexaëmeron* Sermon 4; the *Expositio in Psalmum 129* that follows the same lines is now attributed not to Bonaventure but to Michael of Meaux († 1199).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 2, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri, Distinctio II

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master, Distinction II

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram primo est dubitatio de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *purgatissimis mentibus cernitur.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia nulla mens, dum est in via, purgatissima est, sed tantum in patria.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mens ad hoc quod Deum contempletur perfecte, indiget purgari quoad intellectum et affectum; ideo dicit *per iustitiam fidei*, id est per fidem, quae facit iustum in opere et per se purgat intellectum, sed iustitia affectum. Utriusque autem purgationis triplex est gradus. Nam intellectus purgatus est, cum abstrahitur a sensibilibus speciebus, purgatior, cum mundatur a phantasticis imaginibus, purgatissimus, cum a philosophicis[^1] rationibus. Gradus purgationis affectus sunt isti: purgatus est affectus, cum mundatur a culpa, purgatior, cum a sequela, purgatissimus, ab occasione[^2]; et in hoc statu idoneus est contemplari.

### Dub. II.

Item opponitur de hoc quod dicit: *Mentis humanae acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur* etc. Videtur enim, quod etiam[^3] mundata non figatur ibi, quia quantumcumque mundetur, adhuc excedit lux illa improportionabiliter aciem mentis: ergo si propter sui excellentiam non potest videri a non habente fidem, nec etiam ab habente.

**Respondeo:** Differt dicere: *considerari* et *figi* et *comprehendi*. Considerari potest a mente immunda; sed figi in illa non potest nisi mens pura; comprehendere non potest nisi immensa[^4]. Ratio autem,

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quare non potest figi, est duplex: una, quia est supra intellectum, et ideo intellectus in ea non figitur, nisi habeat gluten affectus, sed statim recidit[^5]; alia ratio, quia oculus sanus est illi luci proportionabilis qualitative, etsi non quantitative; sed oculus infirmus sive lippus utroque modo est improportionabilis, et ideo non figitur.

### Dub. III.

Item obiicitur de hoc verbo Ambrosii: *Deus et Dominus nomen est naturae et nomen potestatis*, quia dicit Damascenus[^6], quod hoc nomen *Deus* imponitur ab operatione, unde dicitur ab *aithein*, quod est ardere, vel a *theein*, quod est fovere, vel a *theasthai*, quod est videre.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de hoc nomine, et consimilibus est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad id cui imponitur; et sic est nomen naturae, quia ei imponitur quod[^7] est summa natura; aut quantum ad id a quo imponitur; et sic est nomen operationis, quia imponitur ab operatione.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hac circumlocutione: *Ego sum qui sum*, utrum hoc nomen: *Ego sum* etc., sit nomen essentiae, vel personae. Et quod personae, videtur, quia pronomen demonstrativum certam significat personam. Et iterum, loqui est actus personae. Si forte dicas, quod *ego*, quia significat originem, stat pro persona Patris, *sum*, quia significat actum egredientem, pro persona Filii, *qui*, relativum utrumque nectens, stat pro persona Spiritus sancti; hoc nihil est, quia pro eodem stat relativum et antecedens.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud nomen *qui est*, et *Ego sum qui sum* est nomen essentiae proprie: hoc[^8] enim est quaedam circumlocutio, significans entitatem in omnimoda perfectione et absolutione, et hoc est nomen proprium divinae substantiae. Et quod obiicitur, quod pronomen significat certam personam; dicendum, quod persona ibi dicitur certum suppositum Verbi, et hoc est substantia et natura[^9].

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hac auctoritate: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*, utrum imago stet ibi pro essentia aut pro persona[^10]. Si pro essentia, ergo idem est dicere imaginem nostram, quod essentiam nostram; si pro persona, non debet dici nostra, sed mea; si pro imagine creata, nihil ad propositum, quia per hoc non probatur unitas naturae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, secundum quod Sancti hic accipiunt, imago et similitudo dicit essentiam et relationem[^11]. Importat enim imago unitatem cum distinctione, et similitudo similiter propter intrinsecam relationem. Et ideo in hoc nomine *imago* et *similitudo* quantum ad aliquid suae significationis notatur unitas essentiae, quantum ad aliquid notatur pluralitas personarum. Et ideo aliter exponit Augustinus, aliter exponit Hilarius[^12]. Augustinus considerat partem significati, scilicet essentiae unitatem; sed Hilarius totum. Unde dicit, quod nomine imaginis et similitudinis simul intelligitur unitas et pluralitas. Similiter Augustinus in hoc quod est, *faciamus* et *nostram*, considerat solum consignificatum; et ideo pluralitatem. Hilarius vero considerat significatum et consignificatum, et[^13] ideo in utroque dicit intelligi pluralitatem et unitatem.

### Dub. VI.

Item Hilarius dicit: *Neque diversitatem duobus admisceri alterius ad alterum similitudo permittit.*

**Sed contra:** Similitudo est rerum differentium eadem qualitas: ergo similitudo compatitur secum differentiam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est similitudo secundum accidens, et similitudo secundum substan-

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tiam. Et haec est duplex, secundum totum et secundum partem. Similitudo secundum accidens, vel secundum partem substantiae admittit diversitatem[^14]; sed non similitudo secundum totum. Et quoniam in divina essentia est summa simplicitas, ideo non potest esse similitudo secundum accidens neque secundum partem: et ideo similitudo non compatitur diversitatem naturae[^15].

### Dub. VII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Significavit, nomine consortii non poni aliquid, sed removeri*, quia ex hoc videtur, quod omnis numeralis dictio secundum ipsum nihil ponit, sed tantum privat; sed hoc videtur falsum. Cum enim in divinis sit vera pluralitas personarum, non tantum privative, sed etiam positive videntur[^16] dici.

**Respondeo:** Haec fuit positio Magistri, quae communiter non tenetur, quia non habet veritatem, sicut infra melius patebit[^17]. Tamen Magister excusatur, quia dixit, quod non ponunt aliquid nomina numeralia, quia important numerum, qui non est proprie in divinis. Numerus enim causatur ex unitatum aggregatione et distinctione; et distinctio unitatum fit tripliciter: continui divisione, formarum disparatione[^18], gradu sive ordine. Quoniam igitur in divinis non est aggregatio nec talis[^19] distinctio, ideo nec numerus proprie.

### Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In principio creavit Deus*, quare magis hoc nomen *Deus* stet sive supponat pro persona Patris quam pro persona Filii, et quomodo Trinitas intelligatur ex hoc.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicendum, quod[^20] octo modis innuitur nobis personarum pluralitas in Scriptura. Primo modo significatione; Matthaei ultimo[^21]: *In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.* Secundo modo[^22] consignificatione; Genesis in principio, ubi nos habemus *Deus*, Hebraei habent *Heloym*, quod est nominativus pluralis huius singularis *Hel*. Tertio modo suppositione, ut cum dicitur: *Deus genuit Deum*; Proverbiorum octavo[^23]: *Ante omnes colles generavit me Dominus.* Quarto modo appropriatione, ut ibi[^24]: *In principio creavit Deus* etc. *Deus* enim ibi Patri appropriatur et *Principium* Filio. Quinto modo iteratione, ut Isaiae sexto[^25]: *Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus Dominus Deus Sabaoth.* Sexto modo ordine verborum; Psalmus[^26]: *Benedicat nos Deus, Deus noster, benedicat nos Deus.* Septimo modo connotatione in actu missionis, ut cum dicitur ad Galatas quarto[^27]: *Misit Deus* etc. Octavo modo apparitione, sicut apparuerunt Abrahae tres viri; Genesis decimo octavo[^28].

### Dub. IX.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: *Ille etiam maximus Prophetarum*, quia super illud Matthaei decimo septimo[^29]: *Apparuerunt illis Moyses et Elias*, dicit Glossa: « Elias fuit maximus Prophetarum »: non ergo David.

**Respondeo:** Spiritus prophetiae, in maiori abundantia datus, prophetam Domini facit excellentiorem. Potest ergo dupliciter dari in maiori abundantia: aut quia ad plura, aut quia ad altiora. Eliae datus est ad plura, quia ad futurorum praevisionem et miraculorum operationem; sed David ad altiora, quia, sicut patet ex eius prophetia, plura vidit et[^30] clarius, quia prophetia intellectuali.

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### Dub. X.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: *Dominus possedit me*; quia possessio est rei inferioris, ordo rei posterioris, conceptio similiter sonat in sexus fragilitatem et partus similiter; quae[^31] non conveniunt divinis.

**Respondeo:** Sapientia describitur per comparationem ad effectus et per comparationem ad principium. Et quoniam per comparationem ad effectus habet in se thesaurum infinitum in numerositate, et habet ordinem in discretione, ideo describitur per verbum *possidendi* et *ordinandi*[^32]. Per comparationem ad suum principium emanat emanatione intrinseca in eo, quod est de substantia emanantis; ideo describitur per verbum *conceptionis* et *parturitionis*.

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english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Dub. I.

In this part, concerning the text, there is first a doubt about what the Master says, that *it is discerned by minds most thoroughly purged.* For he seems to speak ill, since no mind, while it is in the way [*in via*], is most thoroughly purged, but only in the fatherland [*in patria*].

**I respond:** It must be said that the mind, in order that it may contemplate God perfectly, needs to be purged with respect to intellect and affect; therefore he says *through the justice of faith*, that is, through faith, which makes one just in deed and of itself purges the intellect, while justice [purges] the affect. Of each purgation there is a threefold degree. For the intellect is *purged* when it is abstracted from sensible species, *more purged* when it is cleansed from phantasmal images, *most purged* when from philosophical[^1] reasonings. The degrees of the purgation of the affect are these: the affect is *purged* when it is cleansed from fault, *more purged* when from its consequence, *most purged* from its occasion[^2]; and in this state it is fit for contemplation.

### Dub. II.

Likewise objection is raised about what he says: *The weak edge of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light* etc. For it seems that even[^3] when it is cleansed it is not fixed there, since however much it may be cleansed, that light still exceeds the edge of the mind disproportionately: therefore if on account of its excellence it cannot be seen by one not having faith, neither even by one having [it].

**I respond:** It is one thing to say *to be considered*, *to be fixed [upon]*, and *to be comprehended*. It can be considered by an unclean mind; but cannot be fixed in by any except a pure mind; cannot be comprehended by any except an immense [one][^4]. The reason, however,

why it cannot be fixed [upon] is twofold: one, because it is above the intellect, and therefore the intellect is not fixed in it unless it have the glue of affect, but immediately falls back[^5]; the other reason, because the sound eye is proportional to that light qualitatively, even if not quantitatively; but a weak or bleary eye is in both ways disproportional, and therefore is not fixed.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is objected concerning this saying of Ambrose: *God and Lord is the name of nature and the name of power*, because Damascene[^6] says that this name *God* is imposed from operation, whence it is called from *aithein*, which is "to burn," or from *theein*, which is "to cherish," or from *theasthai*, which is "to behold."

**I respond:** It must be said that of this name, and the like, one may speak in two ways: either with respect to that to which it is imposed; and so it is a name of nature, because it is imposed upon what[^7] is the highest nature; or with respect to that from which it is imposed; and so it is a name of operation, because it is imposed from operation.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about this circumlocution: *I am who I am*, whether this name *I am* etc. is a name of essence or of person. And that it is of person, seems so, because a demonstrative pronoun signifies a determinate person. And again, to speak is an act of a person. If perchance you should say that *I*, since it signifies origin, stands for the person of the Father, *am*, since it signifies an outgoing act, for the person of the Son, *who*, joining both as a relative, stands for the person of the Holy Spirit; this is nothing, because the relative and the antecedent stand for the same.

**I respond:** It must be said that that name *who is*, and *I am who I am*, is properly a name of essence: for this[^8] is a certain circumlocution, signifying entity in every mode of perfection and absoluteness, and this is the proper name of the divine substance. And as to the objection, that the pronoun signifies a determinate person; it must be said that *person* there is called the determinate supposit of the Word, and this is substance and nature[^9].

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning this authority: *Let us make man to our image and likeness*, whether *image* there stands for essence or for person[^10]. If for essence, then it is the same to say *our image* as *our essence*; if for person, it ought not to be said *our*, but *mine*; if for created image, it is nothing to the point, because by this the unity of nature is not proved.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the way the Saints take it here, *image* and *likeness* signify essence and relation[^11]. For *image* implies unity with distinction, and *likeness* likewise on account of intrinsic relation. And therefore in this name *image* and *likeness*, with respect to one part of its signification is noted unity of essence, with respect to another is noted plurality of persons. And therefore Augustine expounds it one way, Hilary another[^12]. Augustine considers a part of the signified, namely the unity of essence; but Hilary the whole. Whence he says that by the name of *image* and *likeness* unity and plurality are simultaneously understood. Likewise Augustine, in the words *let us make* and *our*, considers only the consignified; and therefore plurality. But Hilary considers the signified and the consignified, and[^13] therefore in both says that plurality and unity are understood.

### Dub. VI.

Likewise Hilary says: *Likeness does not permit diversity to be mingled in two things one to the other.*

**On the contrary:** Likeness is the same quality of differing things: therefore likeness admits of difference along with itself.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a likeness *according to accident*, and a likeness *according to substance*.

And this latter is twofold: *according to whole* and according to part. A likeness according to accident, or according to part of substance, admits diversity[^14]; but not a likeness according to whole. And since in the divine essence there is the highest simplicity, therefore there cannot be a likeness according to accident nor according to part: and therefore likeness does not admit of diversity of nature[^15].

### Dub. VII.

Likewise it is objected concerning what the Master says: *He has signified, by the name of consortium, not that something is posited, but [something] removed*, because from this it seems that every numerical word according to him posits nothing, but only privates; but this seems false. For since in divine matters there is true plurality of persons, they seem to be said[^16] not only privatively, but also positively.

**I respond:** This was the position of the Master, which is not commonly held, since it does not have truth, as will appear better below[^17]. Nevertheless the Master is excused, because he said that the numerical names do not posit something, since they import number, which is not properly in divine matters. For number is caused from the aggregation and distinction of unities; and the distinction of unities happens in three ways: by division of the continuous, by disparation of forms[^18], by degree or order. Since therefore in divine matters there is no aggregation nor such[^19] distinction, therefore neither is there number properly.

### Dub. VIII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *In the beginning God created*, why this name *God* should rather stand or supposit for the person of the Father than for the person of the Son, and how the Trinity is understood from this.

**I respond:** To this it must be said, that[^20] in eight modes the plurality of persons is intimated to us in Scripture. *In the first mode* by signification; in the last [chapter] of Matthew[^21]: *In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* *In the second mode*[^22] by consignification; in Genesis at the beginning, where we have *Deus*, the Hebrews have *Heloym*, which is the nominative plural of this singular *Hel*. *In the third mode* by supposition, as when it is said: *God begot God*; Proverbs eight[^23]: *Before all hills the Lord generated me.* *In the fourth mode* by appropriation, as in this[^24]: *In the beginning God created* etc. For *God* there is appropriated to the Father and *Beginning* to the Son. *In the fifth mode* by iteration, as in Isaiah six[^25]: *Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God of Sabaoth.* *In the sixth mode* by order of words; in the Psalm[^26]: *May God bless us, our God, may God bless us.* *In the seventh mode* by connotation in the act of mission, as when it is said in Galatians four[^27]: *God sent* etc. *In the eighth mode* by appearance, as the three men appeared to Abraham; Genesis eighteen[^28].

### Dub. IX.

Likewise it is objected concerning what he says: *That one also greatest of the Prophets*, since on that passage of Matthew seventeen[^29]: *There appeared to them Moses and Elias*, the Gloss says: « Elias was the greatest of the Prophets »: therefore not David.

**I respond:** The spirit of prophecy, given in greater abundance, makes the prophet of the Lord more excellent. It can therefore be given in greater abundance in two ways: either because to more things, or because to higher things. To Elias it was given to more things, since to the foreseeing of futures and the working of miracles; but to David to higher things, since, as is clear from his prophecy, he saw more things and[^30] more clearly, because by intellectual prophecy.

### Dub. X.

Likewise it is objected concerning what he says: *The Lord possessed me*; since possession is of an inferior thing, order of a posterior thing, conception likewise sounds in the fragility of sex, and birth likewise; which[^31] do not befit divine matters.

**I respond:** Wisdom is described by comparison to its effects and by comparison to its principle. And since by comparison to its effects it has in itself an infinite treasure in numerosity, and has order in discretion, therefore it is described by the verb *to possess* and *to order*[^32]. By comparison to its principle it emanates by intrinsic emanation in that which is of the substance of the one emanating; therefore it is described by the verb *of conceiving* and *of bringing forth*.

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la: Ita codd. L O contra Vat., quae habet *physicis*; in multis codd. propter abbreviationem lectio est dubia. Sed nostram praeferendam esse, patet ex doctrina S. Doctoris alibi tradita. In perfecta siquidem contemplatione iuxta doctrinam Seraphici Doctoris, quam sumsit ex Dionysio Areopagita *de Mystica theol.*, oportet « et sensus deserere et intellectuales operationes et sensibilia et invisibilia » (Itinerar. mentis, c. 7. circa finem.). Has rationes philosophicas S. Doctor enumerat in libro *Incendium amoris*, c. 1. ante finem, ubi dicit, quod ille, quem perfectus contemplator diligit, « non est demonstrabilis, definibilis, opinabilis ». Cfr. ibid. c. 3. in fine; Breviloq. p. V. c. 6; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 2. circa finem et Serm. 20. circa medium; Comment. in Luc. IX, 28. — Quoad solutionem huius dubii cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Richard. et Petr. a Tar., hic in expositione litterae.

en: Thus codices L O against the Vatican [edition], which has *physicis*; in many codices the reading is doubtful on account of abbreviation. But that our [reading] is to be preferred is clear from the doctrine of the Holy Doctor handed down elsewhere. For in perfect contemplation, according to the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor, which he took from Dionysius the Areopagite *On Mystical Theology*, it is necessary « both to abandon the senses and intellectual operations and sensible and invisible things » (*Itinerarium mentis*, c. 7, near the end). The Holy Doctor enumerates these philosophical reasonings in the book *Incendium amoris*, c. 1, before the end, where he says that he whom the perfect contemplator loves « is not demonstrable, definable, [or] opinable ». Cf. ibid. c. 3, at the end; Breviloq. p. V, c. 6; II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 2, near the end, and Serm. 20, near the middle; Comment. in Luc. IX, 28. — On the solution of this doubt cf. Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 2, m. 2, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Richard and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the exposition of the text.

la: Contra auctoritatem mss. et edd. 1, 3, 6 Vat., applicando praedicta ad obiectionem, addit *hoc autem possibile est fieri in via; ideo dicit Magister: Purgatissimis mentibus* etc. Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 post *purgatior* et omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 3, 6 post *purgatissimus* omittunt *cum*, a Vat. additum.

en: Against the authority of the mss. and editions 1, 3, 6, the Vatican [edition], applying the foregoing to the objection, adds: *but this can be done in the way; therefore the Master says: To minds most thoroughly purged* etc. A little before, very many codices with ed. 1 after *purgatior*, and all codices with editions 1, 3, 6 after *purgatissimus*, omit *cum*, which is added by the Vatican.

la: Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *etiam*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit. Paulo infra cod. I *excellit* pro *excedit*; in fine obiectionis cod. dd addit *eam*.

en: From the ancient mss. and ed. 1 we added *etiam*, which the Vatican [edition] with codex cc less well omits. A little below codex I has *excellit* in place of *excedit*; at the end of the objection codex dd adds *eam*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 textum variis additionibus corrumpit ita legendo: *Considerari potest lux divina a mente non munda, ut a Philosophis; sed figi non potest in illa nisi mens a vitiis pura, comprehendi non potest nisi in patria.*

en: The Vatican [edition], against the mss. and ed. 1, corrupts the text with various additions, reading thus: *The divine light can be considered by a mind not clean, as by the Philosophers; but it cannot be fixed in by any except a mind pure from vices, it cannot be comprehended except in the fatherland.*

la: Plures codd. ut A I S Y etc. cum ed. 1 secuti posuimus *recidit* pro *recedit*. Mox post *proportionabilis* Vat., non consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, ita prosequitur: *secundum qualitatem, etsi non secundum quantitatem; sed si oculus sit infirmus sive lippus, sicut est in non habente fidem, utroque* etc.

en: Following many codices such as A I S Y etc. with ed. 1, we have placed *recidit* for *recedit*. Soon after *proportionabilis* the Vatican [edition], with the mss. and ed. 1 not agreeing, continues thus: *according to quality, even if not according to quantity; but if the eye be weak or bleary, as it is in one not having faith, in both* etc.

la: Libr. 1. *de Fide orthod.* c. 9, ubi sic ait: *Secundum nomen est* Θεός *(id est Deus), quae vox vel a verbo* θεεῖν *ducta est, quia currat et omnia circumobeat, vel ab* αἴθειν *id est urere: Deus enim ignis consumens est, vel denique* ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι, *hoc est, quia omnia conspiciat.* — Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, post *Damascenus* addidimus *quod*.

en: Book 1, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 9, where he says thus: *The second name is* Θεός *(that is, God), which word is derived either from the verb* θεεῖν, *because he runs and goes about all things, or from* αἴθειν, *that is, to burn: for God is a consuming fire, or finally from* ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι, *that is, because he beholds all things.* — With the mss. and ed. 1 favoring, after *Damascenus* we added *quod*.

la: Cod. R *qui*. In fine responsionis ope codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *operatione* loco *opere*.

en: Codex R [reads] *qui*. At the end of the response, with the help of the codices and ed. 1, we have substituted *operatione* in place of *opere*.

la: Graecam constructionem *haec* pro *hoc* exhibent codd. A C G I K S T U aa ce ff cum ed. 1.

en: Codices A C G I K S T U aa ce ff with ed. 1 exhibit the Greek construction *haec* for *hoc*.

la: De hoc Dei nomine *Qui est* cfr. infra d. 22. q. 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 19. m. 4. a. 1.

en: Concerning this name of God *He who is*, cf. below d. 22, q. 3, and Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 19, m. 4, a. 1.

la: Cod. K hic addit *aut pro imagine creata*, sed non bene, quia agitur tantum de imagine, in quantum Deum concernit; et si S. Doctor postea dicit *si pro imagine creata*, hoc dicit magis excludendo, quam tamquam membrum disiunctionis exhibendo, ut patet ex ipsius modis. Paulo infra post *persona* cod. K satis huic adiungit *aut uni aut pluribus; non pluribus, quia deberet dicere imaginis; si pro una.*

en: Codex K here adds *or for created image*, but not well, since the discussion concerns only image insofar as it concerns God; and if the Holy Doctor afterward says *if for created image*, he says this rather by way of exclusion than as exhibiting it as a member of the disjunction, as is clear from his modes. A little below, after *persona*, codex K adjoins rather fully to this: *either to one or to many; not to many, because he ought to say "of an image"; if for one.*

la: Quamvis mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 non faveant, reliquimus tamen *et relationem*, cum contextus et doctrina S. Doctoris infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et 2. tradita id apertissime exigant. Paulo ante Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *doctores sancti*. Cod. R legit *secundum quod hic accipiuntur, imago et similitudo dicunt essentiam.*

en: Although the mss. with editions 1, 2, 3 do not favor [it], nevertheless we have left *and relation*, since the context and doctrine of the Holy Doctor handed down below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2 most plainly demand it. A little before, the Vatican [edition], against the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *the holy doctors*. Codex R reads *according to the way they are taken here, image and likeness signify essence.*

la: Verba Augustini et Hilarii vide supra in textu Magistri, c. 4. — Paulo post ope mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus *secundum* in *scilicet*.

en: See the words of Augustine and Hilary above in the text of the Master, c. 4. — A little later, with the help of the mss. and ed. 1, we changed *secundum* into *scilicet*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. particulam *et*.

en: We supplied from the mss. the particle *et*.

la: Cod. K addit *substantiae*.

en: Codex K adds *substantiae*.

la: Plura de hac re vide d. 31. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et 2.

en: See more on this matter at d. 31, p. I, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2.

la: Codd. F X et edd. 4, 5 *videtur*.

en: Codices F X and editions 4, 5 [read] *videtur*.

la: De ista sententia Magistri cfr. infra d. 24. a. 2. q. 1.

en: On this opinion of the Master cf. below d. 24, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Multi codd. ut ACFGKLORSTXZ etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 minus congruenter *dispersione*, alii *disposicione*; Vat. *dispenitione*; codd. HPQ ee ff et ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptam.

en: Many codices such as ACFGKLORSTXZ etc. with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 less fittingly [read] *dispersione*, others *disposicione*; the Vatican [edition] [reads] *dispenitione*; codices HPQ ee ff and ed. 1 exhibit the reading received into the text.

la: Vat. contra mss. *taliter*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the mss., [reads] *taliter*.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *quod*.

en: From the mss. and ed. 1 we added *quod*.

en: Verse 19. [Matthew 28:19.]

la: Ex mss. adiecimus *modo*; deinde ope mss. post *principio* delevimus *creavit*, ita ut *in principio* non sit ipse s. Scripturae textus, sed locum textus indicet. Mox in Vat. deest *habent* et post *huius* additur *nominativi*, sed contra codd. et ed. 1. Cod. X *numerus* loco *nominativus*.

en: From the mss. we added *modo*; then with the help of the mss., after *principio* we deleted *creavit*, so that *in principio* is not the text of Holy Scripture itself, but indicates the place of the text. Soon in the Vatican [edition] *habent* is missing, and after *huius* is added *nominativi*, but against the codices and ed. 1. Codex X [reads] *numerus* in place of *nominativus*.

la: Vers. 25, ubi Vulgata legit: *Ante colles ego parturiebar*, dum ed. s. Scripturae Brixiensis an. 1496 addit *omnes*, cum qua Vat. convenit et adiungit: *id est, generavit me Dominus.* Pro lectione codd. militant et translatio ex Septuaginta: *ante omnes colles generat me*, et August., 1. *de Trin.* c. 12. n. 24: *ante omnes colles genuit me*; Cyprian., II. *Testimon.* c. 1; Hilar., XII. *de Trin.* n. 37. et Iustinus, *Dialog. cum Tryph.* n. 61.

en: Verse 25, where the Vulgate reads: *Before the hills I was being brought forth*, while the edition of Holy Scripture of Brescia of the year 1496 adds *all*, with which the Vatican [edition] agrees and joins: *that is, the Lord generated me.* For the reading of the codices both the translation from the Septuagint militates: *before all hills he generates me*, and Augustine, 1 *On the Trinity*, c. 12, n. 24: *before all hills he begot me*; Cyprian, II *Testimonia*, c. 1; Hilary, XII *On the Trinity*, n. 37, and Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 61.

la: Gen. 1, 1. — Vat. contra mss. omittit *ut*. Paulo post codd. cum ed. 1 nimis abbreviate: *Deus Patri et Principium Filio.*

en: Genesis 1:1. — The Vatican [edition], against the mss., omits *ut*. A little after, the codices with ed. 1 [read] too abbreviated: *God to the Father and Beginning to the Son.*

en: Verse 3. [Isaiah 6:3.]

en: Psalm 66:6. [Verses 6 and 8.]

en: Verse 4. [Galatians 4:4.]

la: Vers. 2. — Vat. obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1 *apparuerant*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 4, qui septem horum modorum enumerat. Idem fere repetit Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4.

en: Verse 2. — The Vatican [edition], with the mss. and ed. 1 resisting, [reads] *apparuerant*. — Cf. on this doubt Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 67, m. 4, who enumerates seven of these modes. Richard of Mediavilla repeats almost the same here, a. 2, q. 4.

en: Verse 3. [Matthew 17:3.]

la: In Vat. desideratur *et*, quod mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent. — De prophetia intellectuali seu visione cfr. II. Sent. d. 10. a. 3. q. 2. in corp.; Hexaem. Serm. 9; Centiloq. p. III. sect. 46. — S. August., XII. *de Genes. ad lit.* c. 6. et seqq. ac libr. *contra Adimantum, Manichaei discipulum*, c. 28. — De quaestione: *quis fuerit simpliciter maximus Prophetarum*, vide S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 174. a. 4, ubi dicit, quod licet quantum ad aliquid aliquis alius Prophetarum fuerit maior Moyse, simpliciter tamen Moyses fuit omnibus aliis maior. Lyranus in praefatione super Psalterium rationes S. Thomae nititur infringere; Dionys. Carth. in prooemio Expos. in Psalmos opiniones reconciliare conatur.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *et* is missing, which the mss. with ed. 1 exhibit. — On intellectual prophecy or vision, cf. II Sent. d. 10, a. 3, q. 2, in the body; Hexaem. Serm. 9; Centiloq. p. III, sect. 46. — St. Augustine, XII *On Genesis Literally*, c. 6 and following, and the book *Against Adimantus, Disciple of Manichaeus*, c. 28. — On the question, *who was simpliciter the greatest of the Prophets*, see St. Thomas, S. II–II, q. 174, a. 4, where he says that although in some respect some other of the Prophets was greater than Moses, nevertheless simpliciter Moses was greater than all the others. Lyranus in the preface to the Psalter strives to break St. Thomas's reasons; Dionysius the Carthusian in the proem of the Exposition on the Psalms attempts to reconcile the opinions.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 addit *omnia*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the more ancient codices with ed. 1, adds *omnia* ["all"].

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, constructione mutata, Vat. hic ita prosequitur: *Describitur etiam per comparationem ad suum principium, a quo emanat.* Paulo infra cod. R omittit praepositionem *in*, et plures codd. ut K M X Y ee post *emanantis* addunt *emanatione perfecta.*

en: Against the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, with the construction changed, the Vatican [edition] here continues thus: *It is also described by comparison to its principle, from which it emanates.* A little below, codex R omits the preposition *in*, and many codices such as K M X Y ee, after *emanantis*, add *emanatione perfecta* ["by perfect emanation"].

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0