title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum consensus ad tempus faciat matrimonium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum consensus ad tempus faciat matrimonium, ut cum dicitur: accipio te in meam usque ad decem annos. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia hic est consensus viri in uxorem et uxoris in virum, facta expressione per verbum: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia, sicut se habet simpliciter ad simpliciter, sic secundum tempus ad secundum tempus; sed consensus simpliciter facit uxorem simpliciter et matrimonium simpliciter: ergo similiter consensus ad tempus facit matrimonium ad tempus.

3. Item, sicut aliquis fit servus simpliciter, se subdendo simpliciter[^1], ita etiam fit servus ad tempus, se subdendo ad tempus: ergo similiter videtur in coniugio, et sic videtur, quod ad certum tempus possit fieri matrimonium.

4. Item, qui aliquid potest dare simpliciter potest dare et ad tempus; sed vir potest dare simpliciter potestatem sui corporis: ergo et ad tempus. Sed non potest potestatem sui corporis dare nisi uxori: ergo potest habere uxorem ad tempus. Si tu dicas, quod Dominus instituit ad semper; contra: nihil debet Dominus instituere, quod possit vergere in diminutionem sui honoris, vel nostrae perfectionis; sed si matrimonium esset temporale, posset quis se totum ad Dei obsequium deputare, quando vellet: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. In quadam decretali[^2] Gregorii noni, *de Conditionibus appositis in desponsationibus*, dicitur: «Si quis dicat: contraham tecum, donec inveniam aliam honore, vel facultatibus digniorem; matrimonialis contractus, quantumcumque sit favorabilis, caret effectu».

2. Item, ad hoc est definitio Hugonis[^3], qui dicit, quod matrimonium «est consensus individuam vitae consuetudinem tenens».

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia de esse matrimonii, ut supra[^4] ostensum est, est indissolubilitas: ergo qui consentit in matrimonium ad omne tempus se obligat: ergo si exprimit, quod non obligatur nisi ad tempus, nullo modo est matrimonium.

4. Item, nulla anima unitur Deo per desponsationem, nisi simpliciter consentiat et proponat coniungi: ergo similiter in signo, si hoc est conveniens signum; sed matrimonium est conveniens signum[^5]: ergo non fit matrimonium, nisi exprimatur simpliciter consensus.

> **Conclusio.**
> Ut matrimonium sit validum, oportet simpliciter et ad omne tempus consentire et talem consensum simpliciter exprimere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod sit matrimonium, necesse est, consensum esse et exprimi simpliciter — unde dici debet: accipio te in meam — quodsi alio modo consentiat, non est consensus matrimonialis sive coniugalis, sed adulterinus[^6]. Unde deficit matrimonium verum, sive deficiat in corde, sive in ore consensus simpliciter; sed quando in corde, tunc in conspectu Dei et secundum veritatem; quando in ore, tunc in facie Ecclesiae.

Ratio autem, quare oportet simpliciter consentire, et quod nihil valet consensus ad tempus, est, quia consensus non facit matrimonium nisi eatenus, quatenus praesupponit divinam institutionem; divina autem institutio respicit congruam significationem. Si ergo est significatio rei indivisibilis sive coniunctionis, ideo constituit[^7] Dominus coniunctionem talem ad perpetuitatem; et huic etiam competit dictamen iuris naturalis. Et ideo, si consensus consonat institutioni, necesse est, quod sit ad omne tempus, alioquin causa particularis non concordat universali; et ideo nihil fit, nec consentit in talem ut in uxorem, sed potius ut in concubinam. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, quia in forma verborum implicatur aliquid, quod est «contra matrimonii substantiam[^8]».

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet simpliciter etc.; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ubi contingit reperire secundum quid in utroque extremorum; sed matrimonium nullo modo est secundum tempus: et ideo non valet illud.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de servitute, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia servitutis vinculum potest esse temporale et perpetuum, sed matrimonium est perpetuum[^9].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potestas corporis potest dari ad tempus; dicendum, quod non potest dari ad tempus, nisi detur simpliciter; et est simile: quia Deus non acceptat bonam voluntatem vel servitium alicuius, nisi velit vel proponat semper sibi servire.

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Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Dominus non debuit instituere; dicendum, quod in huius Sacramenti institutione magis congruitas in significando et necessitas quam aliud consideratur; et haec exigunt, ipsum esse perpetuum[^10].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether consent for a fixed time makes a marriage.*

Secondly it is asked, whether consent for a time makes a marriage, as when it is said: "I take you as mine up to ten years." And that it does, it seems:

1. Because here there is the consent of the husband toward the wife and of the wife toward the husband, the expression having been made through a word: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because, as the simple stands to the simple, so a determinate time stands to a determinate time; but consent given simply makes a wife simply and a marriage simply: therefore likewise consent for a time makes a marriage for a time.

3. Likewise, just as someone becomes a slave simply, by submitting himself simply[^1], so too he becomes a slave for a time, by submitting himself for a time: therefore it seems to be likewise in marriage, and so it seems that marriage can be contracted for a fixed time.

4. Likewise, whoever can give something simply can give it also for a time; but a man can give simply the power over his own body: therefore also for a time. But he cannot give the power over his own body except to a wife: therefore he can have a wife for a time. If you should say that the Lord instituted marriage to last forever; on the contrary: the Lord ought not to institute anything that could tend toward a diminishment of his own honor, or of our perfection; but if marriage were temporal, one could devote himself wholly to the service of God whenever he wished: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. In a certain decretal[^2] of Gregory IX, *On the Conditions Attached to Betrothals*, it is said: "If someone should say: I will contract [marriage] with you until I find another more worthy in honor or in wealth — a matrimonial contract, however favorable it may be, lacks effect."

2. Likewise, to this end is the definition of Hugh[^3], who says that marriage "is a consent maintaining an undivided sharing of life."

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because indissolubility belongs to the being of marriage, as was shown above[^4]: therefore whoever consents to marriage obligates himself for all time: therefore if he expresses that he is obligated only for a time, it is in no way a marriage.

4. Likewise, no soul is united to God through betrothal unless it consents simply and purposes to be joined [to him]: therefore likewise in the sign, if this is a fitting sign; but marriage is a fitting sign[^5]: therefore a marriage does not come about unless the consent is expressed simply.

> **Conclusion.**
> In order for a marriage to be valid, it is necessary to consent simply and for all time, and to express such consent simply.

**I respond:** It must be said that, for there to be a marriage, it is necessary that the consent both *be* simply and *be expressed* simply — hence one ought to say: "I take you as mine" — but if one consents in some other way, it is not a marital or conjugal consent, but an adulterous one[^6]. Hence the true marriage is lacking, whether the simple consent is lacking in the heart or in the mouth; but when it is lacking in the heart, then [the matter stands] in the sight of God and according to the truth; when in the mouth, then in the face of the Church.

The reason, moreover, why it is necessary to consent simply, and why consent for a time is worth nothing, is that consent does not make a marriage except insofar as it presupposes the divine institution; but the divine institution regards a fitting signification. If, then, it is the signification of an indivisible thing, or of a union, the Lord therefore established[^7] such a union with a view to perpetuity; and to this the dictate of natural law also corresponds. And therefore, if the consent accords with the institution, it is necessary that it be for all time; otherwise the particular cause does not agree with the universal; and therefore nothing comes about, nor does he consent to take her as a wife, but rather as a concubine. — And the arguments for this must be granted, because in the form of the words something is implied that is "against the substance of marriage[^8]."

**To the arguments:**

*To the 2nd.* To that which is objected, that as the simple stands [to the simple, so a determinate time to a determinate time], etc.; it must be said that this is true where it happens that one finds "in a certain respect" in both extremes; but marriage is in no way "according to a time": and therefore that [argument] does not hold.

*To the 3rd.* To that which is objected concerning servitude, it must be said that it is not alike, because the bond of servitude can be temporal or perpetual, but marriage is perpetual[^9].

*To the 4th.* To that which is objected, that the power over the body can be given for a time; it must be said that it cannot be given for a time, unless it is given simply; and it is similar [to the case of servitude]: for God does not accept anyone's good will or service, unless he is willing or purposes to serve him forever.

To that which is objected, that the Lord ought not to have instituted [marriage as perpetual]; it must be said that in the institution of this Sacrament, fittingness in signifying and necessity are considered more than anything else; and these require that it be perpetual[^10].

---

la: Cod. K (l a secunda manu) supplet *alicui*.

en: Codex K (in a second hand) supplies *alicui* ["to someone"].

la: Quae incipit *Si conditiones* (7.), X. lib. IV. tit. 5.

en: [The decretal] which begins *Si conditiones* (c. 7), Decretals (X.), book IV, title 5.

la: Libr. II. de Sacrament. p. XI. c. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 679, nota 8. — Pro *tenens* codd. G K *retinens*.

en: Book II, *On the Sacraments*, part XI, ch. 4. Cf. above, p. 679, note 8. — For *tenens*, codices G and K read *retinens*.

en: Distinction 27, article 3, question 1 and following.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As was shown above, distinction 26, article 2, question 1.

la: Ita codd. E I K L, in aliis et edd. *adulterium*.

en: So codices E, I, K, L; in the other [codices] and in the printed editions, *adulterium* ["adultery"].

la: Codd. F K L aa (l a secunda manu) *instituit*. Inferius post *naturalis* Vat. addit: *quia vir potest uxori dare simpliciter potestatem sui corporis*, quae verba, mutato *quia* in *sed*, ed. l paulo inferius post *tempus* subnectit.

en: Codices F, K, L, aa (in a second hand) read *instituit* ["he instituted"]. Further below, after *naturalis*, the Vatican [codex] adds: "because the husband can give his wife the power over his own body simply" — words which, with *quia* changed to *sed*, edition 1 appends a little further below, after *tempus*.

la: Ut dicit Gregor. IX. in praeallegato C. *Si conditiones* contra substantiam coniugii inserantur etc.

en: As Gregory IX says in the aforecited chapter *Si conditiones*: [conditions] inserted against the substance of marriage, etc.

la: Codd. E M O U W Y addunt *tantum*.

en: Codices E, M, O, U, W, Y add *tantum* ["only"].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Raw OCR line range 74587–74704 (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`), printed pp. 690–691, pdf pp. 710–711 (offset `pdf = printed + 20`, confirmed against the running heads `.690`/`691` and `DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III.`). Per the Vol II/III/IV PDF-priority-inversion override, the Latin body was re-set from 400 dpi PDF column-band crops (`colcrop.py vol4 690 1880` and `colcrop.py vol4 691 1880`) rather than from the raw OCR, which cascade-shatters this passage character-by-character across the two columns. The "Secundo quaeritur" opener was verified against `QUAESTIO 11.` (OCR-garbled "II") at raw line 74587 and confirms correct alignment for Q2 — no q-swap.

**Boundary check.** Q2 occupies all of printed p. 690 and the first ~5 lines of printed p. 691 (through "...ipsum esse perpetuum[^10]"), ending immediately before `QUAESTIO III.` at raw line 74705. The running head at the top of p. 691 (`DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III.`) names the *page's* dominant quaestio (III), not a boundary error — Q2's tail is still on this page before Q3's own header appears.

**Scholion hand-off.** Q2 has **no independent scholion** — its own final footnote ([^10] here, "1." in the page-691 footer) reads *"Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"), pointing back to `d28-a1-q1.md`'s `## Scholion`, part **II**: *"Circa 2. quaestionem patet, quod cum indissolubilitas matrimonio sit essentialis, consensus ad tempus non est verus nec sufficiens consensus."* This is the Vol II/III/IV override's "no scholion is normal" case (rule 5) — confirmed directly by the cross-reference rather than inferred. `d28-a1-q1.md` is still Tier 1 (skeleton) as of this promotion; when it is promoted, retain its scholion part II intact since it covers this question.

**Footer split with d28-a1-q3.** Printed p. 691's footer restarts numbering at "1." per Quaracchi convention. Footnote "1." (→ `[^10]` in this file) belongs to Q2 (attached to "perpetuum" at the very end of Q2's last reply). Footnotes "2." through "7." on p. 691's footer belong to **d28-a1-q3** (attached to markers in Q3's own body: *conditionatus matrimonium faciat²*, *iudicari⁵*, etc.) — do not duplicate them into this file, and confirm they land in q3's apparatus when it is promoted.

**Reply-numbering note (no `[?]` — resolved by literal rendering).** The printed "Ad argumenta" section replies only to the four *videtur quod sic* arguments (1–4), since the four `Contra` arguments support the Conclusio rather than oppose it. The reply to argument 1 is folded into the end of the Ratio paragraph via an em-dash ("— Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc...") rather than given its own "Ad 1." heading, and the final reply (addressing the "Si tu dicas... Dominus instituit ad semper" sub-argument inside argument 4) likewise carries no printed numeral. Rendered exactly as printed — no numerals were invented — with only *Ad 2.*, *Ad 3.*, *Ad 4.* appearing as explicit markers.

**No `[?]` flags** — both pages were fully legible in the 400 dpi column-band crops.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 691 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum consensus conditionatus faciat matrimonium.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum consensus conditionatus faciat matrimonium, ut: accipio te in meam, si dederis mihi centum libras. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per simile: quia votum conditionatum votum est: ergo similiter videtur, quod consensus conditionatus matrimonium faciat[^1].

2. Item, aliquis consentiens in aliquam spe pecuniae habendae matrimonium contrahit: ergo si consensus talis competit matrimonio, ergo ipsius expressio non repugnat: ergo si dicat: consentio, si dederis, patet etc.

3. Item, quando aliquis promittit aliquid sub conditione; si stet conditio, stat obligatio et promissio; sed possibile est, stare conditionem: ergo et consensum et obligationem et matrimonium.

**Contra:**

1. Plus se obligat qui simpliciter de futuro promittit, quam qui sub conditione — nam prima est obligatio simpliciter, secunda vero non — sed consensus per verba de futuro expressus non facit matrimonium[^2]: ergo etc.

2. Item, post consensum istum aut est uxor aut non. Si uxor; sed possibile est, conditionem non stare, et non consenserat nisi sub conditione: ergo est uxor sine consensu. Sed non est uxor[^3]: ergo talis consensus non efficit matrimonium.

3. Item, matrimonium est vinculum nullo modo solubile; sed omnis obligatio vel pactio sub conditione facta est solubilis: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Consensus conditionatus expressus per verba de futuro non facit nisi sponsalia, ast omnino non valet, si conditio fit per modum poenae, sive ut determinatio contractus inhonesta et contra substantiam matrimonii; si autem fit per verba de praesenti, etiam tunc non facit matrimonium, si conditio est de futuro contingenti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod consensus conditionatus, si fiat per verba de futuro, iudicari[^4] habet, sicut et consensus de futuro non facit matrimonium, sed desponsationem sive sponsalia; sic nec talis consensus sub conditione.

Attendendum tamen, quod conditio aut apponitur per modum poenae, aut ut determinatio contractus. Si per modum poenae, nullius est vigoris, pro eo quod matrimonia debent esse libera. Unde si quis proponat: promitto tecum sub contrahere poena centum marcarum, vel si non contraxero, dabo tibi centum: etiam si non contrahat, non debet nec tenetur ad illam poenam[^5]. — Si autem apponitur ut determinatio contractus sive consensus, distinguendum est: aut enim est conditio honesta, aut inhonesta. Si est honesta, stante conditione, stant sponsalia; non stante, non stant, ut si quis dicat: contraham tecum, si placuerit patri meo, vel si tu volueris converti ad fidem. — Si autem est inhonesta, duplex est: aut est contra substantiam matrimonii, aut non. Si contra substantiam matrimonii, tunc nulla est obligatio, ut si dicat: contraham tecum, si procuraveris venena sterilitatis, vel aliquod huiusmodi. Si autem est inhonesta et non contra substantiam matrimonii, ut si dicatur: contraham tecum si furatus fueris, vel si Deum offenderis, talis conditio pro non adiecta habenda est. Et hoc totum probatur per illa quae dicuntur Extra, in quarto libro de Conditionibus appositis in desponsatione[^6].

Si autem consensus fiat per verba de praesenti; aut conditio est praeterita, aut praesens, aut futura. Si conditio est praeterita, ut: accipio te in meam, si mortuus est pater tuus; vel de praesenti, ut: accipio te in meam, si es virgo; stante conditione, stat matrimonium. Si autem conditio est de futuro; aut futuri necessarii, aut futuri contingentis. Si futuri necessarii, ut: accipio te in meam si sol oriatur cras; tunc est matrimonium. Si autem conditio est contingens, dico, quod non est matrimonium, eo quod consensus pendet de futuro, sicut et conditio; et ideo iudicandum est tunc, sicut

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de futuro, nec est matrimonium, nisi carnalis copula subsequatur, quia tunc intelligitur a conditione apposita recessisse[^7].

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur ad secundam partem, quod non stat matrimonium per consensum conditionatum; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi[^8] est conditio de futuro contingenti, quia tunc consensus pendet ex futuro.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod simpliciter stat, per simile in voto; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia votum est pura obligatio, matrimonium autem est coniunctio; et non est coniunctio nisi per praesens, sed obligatio est bene per futurum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consensus ex spe pecuniae facit matrimonium; verum[^9] est, quia simplex potest esse et absolutus; sed cum exprimitur sub conditione, non exprimitur ut simpliciter nec ut absolutus nec ut praesens; et ideo non est simile.

*Ad 3.* Ad aliud dicendum, quod matrimonium plus dicit quam obligationem. Unde dico, quod non sequitur: iste est obligatus isti mulieri, ut eam accipiat in uxorem: ergo est eius vir; sicut non sequitur: obligavit se ad persolvendum: ergo solvit. Unde matrimonium non tantum est obligatio, immo ipsius vinculi indissolubilis unio[^10].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether conditioned consent makes a marriage.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether conditioned consent makes a marriage, as: "I take you as mine, if you shall have given me a hundred pounds." And that it does, it seems:

1. By a like case: because a conditioned vow is [still] a vow: therefore it seems likewise that conditioned consent makes a marriage[^1].

2. Likewise, someone consenting in the hope of having some money contracts a marriage: therefore if such a consent is competent to marriage, then its expression is not repugnant [to marriage]: therefore if he should say: "I consent, if you shall have given [it]," it is plain, etc.

3. Likewise, when someone promises something under a condition; if the condition stands, the obligation and the promise stand; but it is possible for the condition to stand: therefore also the consent and the obligation and the marriage [stand].

**On the contrary:**

1. He who promises simply for the future obligates himself more than he who [promises] under a condition — for the first is an obligation simply, but the second is not — but consent expressed by words of the future does not make marriage[^2]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, after this consent, either she is his wife or not. If she is his wife; but it is possible for the condition not to stand, and he had not consented except under the condition: therefore she is his wife without consent. But she is not his wife[^3]: therefore such a consent does not effect a marriage.

3. Likewise, marriage is a bond in no way dissoluble; but every obligation or pact made under a condition is dissoluble: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusion.** Conditioned consent expressed by words of the future produces only a betrothal, but it is of no force at all if the condition is by way of a penalty, or is a stipulation of the contract that is dishonorable and against the substance of marriage; but if it is expressed by words of the present, even then it does not make marriage, if the condition is of a future contingent thing.

**I respond:** It must be said that conditioned consent, if it is made by words of the future, is to be judged[^4] to hold in the same way as consent for the future [simply]: it does not make marriage, but a betrothal or espousal; so too neither does such a consent under a condition.

It must be noted, however, that a condition is attached either by way of a penalty, or as a stipulation of the contract. If it is by way of a penalty, it is of no force, on the ground that marriages ought to be free. Hence if someone should propose: "I promise to contract with you under penalty of a hundred marks, or if I do not contract, I will give you a hundred [marks]"; even if he does not contract, he neither owes nor is bound to that penalty[^5]. — But if it is attached as a stipulation of the contract or of the consent, a distinction must be made: for either the condition is honorable, or dishonorable. If it is honorable, while the condition stands the betrothal stands; when it does not stand, [the betrothal] does not stand, as if someone should say: "I will contract with you, if it should please my father," or "if you should be willing to convert to the faith." — But if it is dishonorable, it is twofold: either it is against the substance of marriage, or not. If it is against the substance of marriage, then there is no obligation at all, as if he should say: "I will contract with you, if you procure poisons of sterility," or something of this kind. But if it is dishonorable and not against the substance of marriage, as if it should be said: "I will contract with you if you shall have committed theft, or if you shall have offended God," such a condition is to be held as not attached [at all]. And all this is proved through those things which are said in the Decretals, in the fourth book, *On Conditions Attached in a Betrothal*[^6].

But if the consent is made by words of the present; either the condition is past, or present, or future. If the condition is past, as: "I take you as mine, if your father is dead"; or present, as: "I take you as mine, if you are a virgin"; while the condition stands, the marriage stands. But if the condition is of the future; either of a necessary future, or of a contingent future. If of a necessary future, as: "I take you as mine if the sun shall rise tomorrow," then it is marriage. But if the condition is contingent, I say that it is not marriage, because the consent hangs upon the future, just as the condition does; and therefore it must be judged then, just as

concerning the future, it is not marriage either, unless carnal intercourse should follow, because then it is understood that [the marriage] has receded from the condition attached[^7].

To that, then, which is objected as to the second part, that marriage does not stand through conditioned consent; it must be said that this is true where[^8] the condition is of a future contingent thing, because then the consent hangs upon the future.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that it holds simply, by the like case of the vow; it must be said that it is not alike: because a vow is a pure obligation, but marriage is a conjoining; and there is no conjoining except through the present, whereas an obligation may well be through the future.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that consent from the hope of money makes marriage; this is true[^9], because a simple [consent] can be both actual and unconditional; but when it is expressed under a condition, it is not expressed as simple, nor as unconditional, nor as present; and therefore it is not alike.

*To 3.* To the other it must be said that marriage says more than an obligation. Hence I say that it does not follow: "this man is obligated to this woman, to take her [in marriage]: therefore he is her husband"; just as it does not follow: "he obligated himself to paying: therefore he has paid." Hence marriage is not only an obligation, but rather the union of an indissoluble bond itself[^10].

---

la: Multi codd. *matrimonium sit*, cod. K (l a secunda manu) et ed. l *sit consensus*, cui Vat. addit: *et per consequens matrimonium efficit*.

en: Many codices [read] *that it is a marriage*; codex K (in a second hand) and edition 1, *that it is consent*, to which the Vatican [codex] adds: *and consequently it effects a marriage*.

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. I.

en: As was shown above, question I.

la: Cod. aa supplet *sine consensu*, cod. T substituit *ergo non* pro *sed non*.

en: Cod. aa supplies *without consent*; cod. T substitutes *therefore not* for *but not*.

la: Non pauci codd. et ed. l *iudicium*.

en: Not a few codices, and edition 1, [read] *iudicium* ["judgment," for *iudicari*].

la: Cfr. C. *Gemma* (29.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. I.); Iustinian., C. V. de Sponsalibus etc. (tit. I.), lex *Mulier iuris sui* (5.), in fine, et VIII. de Inutilibus Stipulationibus (tit. 39.), lex *Libera matrimonia* (2.).

en: Cf. c. *Gemma* (29), Decretals, bk. IV, tit. I, *On Betrothals and Marriage*; Justinian, Code V, *On Betrothals* etc. (tit. I), law *Mulier iuris sui* (5), at the end, and [Code] VIII, *On Void Stipulations* (tit. 39), law *Libera matrimonia* (2).

la: Tit. 5. c. 1-7. — Mox post *aut conditio* cod. T addit *apposita*.

en: Tit. 5, cc. 1–7. — Shortly after *aut conditio*, cod. T adds *apposita* ["attached"].

la: Vide supra q. 1. ad 3. et 4.

en: See above, question 1, replies to 3 and 4.

la: Cod. I *quando*.

en: Cod. I [reads] *quando* ["when," for *ubi*].

la: Cod. K *dicendum, quod verum*. Pro *quia simplex potest esse* edd. *quando simplex est*.

en: Cod. K [reads] *dicendum, quod verum* ["it must be said, that it is true"]. For *quia simplex potest esse*, the printed editions [read] *quando simplex est*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Edd. cum pluribus codd. *indivisibilis unio*. — Vide scholion ad [?] articuli quaest.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, in the body [of the response]. — The printed editions, with several codices, [read] *indivisibilis unio* ["an indivisible union"]. — See the scholion for [this][?] question of the article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Raw OCR line range 74705–74819 (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`); the OCR cascade-shatters this two-column span into an unreadable interleave (confirmed on sight against the pre-promotion skeleton, now superseded), so per the Vol II/III/IV PDF-priority-inversion override the Latin was re-set from 450 dpi column-band PDF crops: `tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol4 --pages 691-692 --dpi 450` (p.692 required a `--force` re-extract — a stray 200 dpi `p-692.png` from an earlier session was too narrow for the x≈1880 column split and was regenerated) + `tools/colcrop.py vol4 {691,692} 1880`. Printed pp. 691 (continuing from d28-a1-q2's tail) and 692 (only the top of the page — Quaestio III ends after the "Ad 3" reply and `QUAESTIO IV.` begins immediately in both columns). PDF pp. 711–712 (offset `pdf = printed + 20`, confirmed against the running head `DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III.` atop p.691).

**Alignment check.** Confirmed via raw line 74705 (`QUAESTIO III.`) and the opener "Tertio quaeritur, utrum consensus conditionatus faciat matrimonium" — correctly the third question per the article's `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` list. No q-swap. `QUAESTIO IV.` begins cleanly at raw line 74820 with "Quarto quaeritur, utrum consensus tacitus faciat matrimonium" — confirmed boundary.

**Scholion disposition.** Per `d28-a1-q1.md`'s Notes (confirmed on read before this promotion), the single master Scholion printed at the end of Q1 (p.689) covers all three questions of this article: **I.** = Q1, **II.** = Q2, **III.** = Q3 ("Solutio 3. quaestionis quoad principia est communis; in applicatione ad plures casus oriuntur varia dubia..."). This chunk therefore carries **no independent Scholion section** (`has_scholion: false`) — see `bon-sent-IV-d28-a1-q1.md`'s `## Latin`/`## English` Scholion, part **III**, for the material covering this question. Footnote [^10] above (printed p.692, note 4) independently confirms this hand-off: "*Vide scholion ad [?] articuli quaest.*" — a direct cross-reference from Q3's own apparatus back to the article's scholion.

**Footer hand-off from `d28-a1-q2`.** Per `d28-a1-q2.md`'s Notes, printed p.691's footer restarts Quaracchi's per-page numbering at "1", and note "1" (→ q2's own `[^10]`) belongs to Q2 while notes "2" through "7" belong to this chunk. Confirmed directly against the PDF: p.691 footer notes 2–7 attach to markers *faciat*², *matrimonium*³, *non est uxor*⁴, *iudicari*⁵, *poenam*⁶, and *desponsatione*⁷ in this chunk's own Latin body — no duplication, no gaps. Printed p.692 restarts its own footer numbering at "1"; all four of its notes (1–4) belong to this chunk (Q3's tail ends before Q4's own footer notes, which restart again at "5" through "10" on the same page — not reproduced here, as they belong to `d28-a1-q4`).

**`[?]` flag.** Footnote [^10] (printed p.692, note 4): "*Vide scholion ad [?] articuli quaest.*" — the PDF at 450 dpi reads clearly "*Vide scholion ad*" at the end of one footer line, then "*articuli quaest.*" beginning the next, with no legible word or numeral filling the gap (checked against a dedicated 1.8–3× zoom crop of that exact line-break region; no ink is present between "ad" and "articuli" beyond ordinary word-spacing). The sense is unambiguous from context and from Q1's/Q2's parallel cross-references (almost certainly an abbreviated demonstrative such as *hanc* or *huius*, or possibly a dropped "3."), but the exact word is not rendered — flagged rather than silently supplied.

**Marginalia.** The printed pages carry running structural marginalia in a smaller type face outside the two body columns (*Distinctio.*, *Subdistinctio.*, *Iterum subdistinctio.*, *Conclusio 1.*–*8.*, *Membrum 2. cum distinctione.*, *Adargg. pro parte negat.*, *Adargg. pro parte affirm.*) marking the Respondeo's nested distinctions for the printed edition's own analytical apparatus. These are editorial finding-aids, not part of Bonaventure's text (per the corpus convention of trimming marginal glosses), and are omitted from the body; the "Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa" heading and the *Ad 1/2/3* markers in the English/Latin above render the corresponding structure literally without inventing numbering the print does not give the negative-part reply.

**Hand-off to `d28-a1-q4`.** (1) Printed p.692's footer notes 5–10 (visible in the same page's footer block, confirmed via `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p692-{L,R}-1.png` and `-2.png`) belong to Q4's own arguments (*responsalibus*⁵, *exteriori*⁶, *unum*⁷, *post*⁸, *sensui*⁹, *baptizat*¹⁰) — do not duplicate them here; confirm they land in q4's apparatus when it is promoted. (2) Q4's opener "Quarto quaeritur, utrum consensus tacitus faciat matrimonium" begins at raw line 74820/PDF p.712, already read in this session (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p692-{L,R}-0.png` and `-1.png`) — q4's dispatch can reuse these crops rather than re-extracting p.692.

**No other `[?]` flags.** All other text on both pages was fully legible in the 450 dpi column-band PDF crops; no further guesswork was needed.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 692 -->

### Articulus Unicus.
### Quaestio IV. *Utrum consensus tacitus faciat matrimonium.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum consensus tacitus faciat matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per decretalem quarti libri, *de Sponsalibus*[^1]: «Tuae fraternitati» etc. Matrimonium in veritate contrahitur per legitimum viri et mulieris consensum; sed necessaria sunt verba quantum ad Ecclesiam ad consensum exprimendum de praesenti»: ergo videtur, quod quantum ad Deum sit matrimonium sine verbo.

2. Item, ratione alia videtur: quia peccatum adulterii sive fornicationis solo interiori consensu iudicatur consummatum, etiam sine signo exteriori[^2]: ergo si plus potest consensus castus quam incestus, patet etc.

3. Item, consensus verborum exteriorum non unit nisi per consensum interiorem; sed «ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum[^3]»: ergo videtur, quod si adsit unus consensus interior, idem omnino faciet.

4. Item, aliquae duae personae consentiunt aeque intense et plene ante expressionem et post[^4]: ergo si post expressionem est matrimonium, et ante similiter.

5. Item, si aliquis voveat interius tantum, nihilominus vovet et obligatur ad votum: ergo similiter, si consentit interius tantum. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia votum fit Deo, qui videt corda, matrimonium vero respectu hominis, qui corda nescit; obiicitur tunc, quod saltem in conspectu Dei debet esse matrimonium.

6. Item, hoc ostenditur per simile: quia qui vere contritus est interius, in conspectu Dei vere poenitens iudicatur, etiam si non adsit confessio oris: ergo similiter est in matrimonio.

**Contra:**
1. Matrimonium est Sacramentum; sed omne Sacramentum est signum, et signum est quod offert se sensui[^5]: ergo etc.

2. Item, si consensus interius faceret matrimonium; ergo cum nesciat homo occulta alterius, nesciret, utrum esset vir illius, an non: ergo si illi coniungeretur exterius, nesciret, utrum esset matrimonium, et ita in periculo se poneret.

3. Item, quantumcumque velim voluntate plena alteri aliquid dare, nullum ius acquiritur illi ex mea voluntate, si non promittam exterius per signum; sed in matrimonio ius acquirunt coniuges inter se invicem: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratione videtur: quia quantumcumque credat aliquis et innuat, nisi sermone exprimat: *ego te baptizo*, non baptizat[^6]: ergo a simili videtur, quod non contrahat, quantumcumque consentiat, nisi sermone exprimat. — Et ex hoc videtur, quod mutus non possit contrahere.

> **Conclusio.** Matrimonium non contrahitur, nisi interior consensus exterius exprimatur vel verbis, vel nutibus, vel scripto.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad omnis Sacramenti esse necessario requiritur significatio sive expressio.
<!-- page 693 -->
Omne enim Sacramentum signum est et ut signum administratur; et ideo istud est necessarium[^7]. Sed in aliquibus est materia determinata et forma verborum praescripta, quae vim habent sibi ad hoc datam; et talia Sacramenta nunquam fiunt, nisi illa verba pronuntientur. In aliquibus autem non venit vis a verbo exteriori, sed ab intrinseco, ut in poenitentia quantum ad confessionem et in matrimonio; et in talibus sufficit, qualiscumque fiat expressio, sive verbo, sive scripto, sive etiam quocumque nutu[^8] alio. — Concedendum est igitur, quod matrimonium non contrahitur, nisi consensus exterius exprimatur, vel per verba convenientia, vel per nutus idem importantes.

1. Et per hoc patet primum ad primam partem, scilicet quod de decretali obiiciebatur. Patet etiam, quod inter mutos potest contrahi, non tamen sine aliquo signo[^9]. — Similiter ultimum ad oppositum, quod non est simile de baptismo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de adulterio, vel peccato, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia peccatum est in interiori deordinatione, sed Sacramentum consistit in exteriori significatione.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi unum propter alterum, ergo utrobique tantum unum; dicendum, quod differt dicere unum *propter* alterum, et unum *per* alterum: quia ubi est dicere unum *per* alterum, ibi est ponere duo, quorum alterum est sicut efficiens, alterum sicut instrumentum; et non est verum, quod efficiens possit tantum per se, quantum potest cum instrumento. Quod autem dicitur, ubi unum propter alterum etc., loquitur de unitate obiecti, ubi propter quod dicit causam formalem, ut: *video colorem, quia lucidum*, et *amo vinum, quia dulce*[^10], et sic in similibus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voto, dicendum, quod non est simile propter duas rationes: una, quia votum non est Sacramentum; alia, quia obligat se homo Deo, ad quem *cogitare* est *loqui*[^11]; matrimonium autem est Sacramentum, per quod obligatur homo homini.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vere contritus dicitur poenitens; dicendum, quod verum est de poenitentia-virtute, sed non Sacramento[^12]; matrimonium autem est Sacramentum, non virtus; et praeterea est ad alterum semper, non ad se, sicut contritio: et ideo non est simile, ut patet.

english:
### Article Unicus.
### Question IV. *Whether a tacit consent brings about marriage.*

Fourth, the question is asked whether a tacit consent brings about marriage. And it seems that it does:

1. By the decretal of the fourth book, *On Betrothals*[^1]: "To your fraternity," etc.: "A marriage is truly contracted through the lawful consent of a man and a woman; but words are necessary, as far as the Church is concerned, for expressing consent as to the present." Therefore it seems that, as far as God is concerned, there can be marriage without a word.

2. Likewise, it seems so for another reason: because the sin of adultery or of fornication is judged to be consummated by interior consent alone, even without an external sign[^2]; therefore, if a chaste consent can do more than an incestuous one, the point is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, the consent of exterior words does not unite except through interior consent; but "where one thing exists on account of another, in both cases there is only one thing[^3]": therefore it seems that if a single interior consent is present, that alone will accomplish everything.

4. Likewise, some two persons consent equally intensely and fully both before the expression and after[^4]: therefore, if there is marriage after the expression, likewise there is marriage before it as well.

5. Likewise, if someone makes a vow interiorly only, he nonetheless vows and is bound to the vow: therefore likewise, if he consents interiorly only [to marriage, the same should hold]. If you say that it is not similar, because the vow is made to God, who sees hearts, whereas marriage concerns man, who does not know hearts — it is then objected that at least in the sight of God there ought to be marriage.

6. Likewise, this is shown by a similar case: because one who is truly contrite interiorly is judged, in the sight of God, to be truly a penitent, even if there is no confession by mouth: therefore likewise it is so in marriage.

**On the contrary:**
1. Marriage is a Sacrament; but every Sacrament is a sign, and a sign is that which offers itself to the senses[^5]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, if interior consent alone made marriage, then, since a man cannot know another's hidden acts, he would not know whether he was that woman's husband, or not: therefore if he were joined to her outwardly, he would not know whether it was marriage, and thus he would place himself in danger.

3. Likewise, however much I may wish, with a full will, to give something to another, no right is acquired by that other from my will alone, unless I promise it outwardly by some sign; but in marriage the spouses acquire rights over one another: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because however much someone may believe and nod assent, unless he expresses it in speech — "I baptize you" — he does not baptize[^6]: therefore, by a similar argument, it seems that one does not contract marriage, however much he consents, unless he expresses it in speech. — And from this it seems to follow that a mute person could not contract marriage.

> **Conclusion.** Marriage is not contracted unless the interior consent is expressed outwardly, either by words, or by gestures, or in writing.

**I respond:** It must be said that for the being of every Sacrament, some signification or expression is necessarily required. For every Sacrament is a sign, and as a sign it is administered; and therefore this is necessary[^7]. But in some Sacraments the matter is determinate and the form of words prescribed, which have a force given to them for this purpose; and such Sacraments never come to be unless those words are pronounced. In others, however, the force does not come from an exterior word, but from within, as in penance as regards confession, and in marriage; and in such cases whatever expression is made suffices, whether by word, or in writing, or even by any other gesture[^8]. — It must therefore be granted that marriage is not contracted unless the consent is expressed outwardly, either through fitting words, or through gestures conveying the same thing.

1. And by this the first point as to the first part is clear, namely what was objected concerning the decretal. It is also clear that marriage can be contracted between mutes, though not without some sign[^9]. — Likewise for the last objection to the contrary, that it is not similar in the case of baptism.

2. To what is objected concerning adultery, or sin, it must be said that it is not similar: because sin consists in an interior disorder, whereas a Sacrament consists in an exterior signification.

3. and 4. To what is objected, that in that case one thing exists on account of another, therefore in both cases there is only one thing; it must be said that it is one thing to say "one on account of the other," and another to say "one through the other": because where one says "one through the other," there one posits two things, of which the one is like the efficient cause and the other like the instrument; and it is not true that the efficient cause by itself alone can do as much as it can with the instrument. But when it is said "where one exists on account of the other," etc., this speaks of the unity of the object, where "on account of" designates the formal cause, as: *I see the color, because it is bright*, and *I love the wine, because it is sweet*[^10], and so in similar cases.

5. To what is objected concerning a vow, it must be said that it is not similar, for two reasons: one, because a vow is not a Sacrament; the other, because a man binds himself to God, for whom *to think* is *to speak*[^11]; whereas marriage is a Sacrament, by which a man is bound to another man.

6. To what is objected, that one who is truly contrite is called a penitent — it must be said that this is true of penance as a virtue, but not of it as a Sacrament[^12]; marriage, however, is a Sacrament, not a virtue; and moreover it always relates to another, not to oneself, as contrition does: and therefore it is not similar, as is evident.

la: Tit. 1. c. 25. Finem textus originalis exhibet sic: sed necessaria sunt quantum ad Ecclesiam verba consentientia [cod. aa habet exprimentia] de praesenti.

en: Tit. 1, c. 25. The original text's ending reads thus: "but words expressing consent [codex aa has 'exprimentia'] are necessary as regards the Church, as to the present."

la: Cfr. Matth. 5, 28, quem locum allegant etiam codd. N aa. — Inferius pro incestus edd. incastus.

en: Cf. Matthew 5:28, which passage codices N aa also cite. — Below, for "incestus" the editions read "incastus."

la: Secundum Aristot., vide supra pag. 197, nota 5. — Inferius pro unus codd. EWY solus, et pro interior, quod habent codd. ENW aa, alii codd. et edd. perperam exterior.

en: According to Aristotle, see above p. 197, note 5. — Below, for "unus" codices EWY read "solus" [alone], and for "interior," which codices ENW aa have, other codices and editions wrongly read "exterior."

la: Cod. E ut post.

en: Codex E reads "ut post."

la: Ut docet August. supra in lit. Magistri, d. 1. c. 3.

en: As Augustine teaches above, in the Master's text, d. 1, c. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. Pro sermone permulti codd. et edd. bis sermonem, codd. N X per sermonem. Edd. omittunt innuat.

en: Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2. For "sermone," very many codices and editions read "sermonem" twice; codices N X read "per sermonem." The editions omit "innuat."

la: Vide supra d. 1. p. I. q. 2.

en: See above d. 1, p. I, q. 2.

la: Codd. A aa modo, cod. L medio, codd. GH motu. Pro qualiscumque codd. E L qualitercumque.

en: Codices A aa read "modo," codex L "medio," codices GH "motu." For "qualiscumque" codices E L read "qualitercumque."

la: Cfr. C. Cum apud sedem (23.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).

en: Cf. c. "Cum apud sedem" (23), X, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis (Bk. IV, tit. 1).

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 3.): In vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est; nam per se dulce desiderat, vinum autem per accidens; si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat; per accidens ergo desiderabat. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. ad 4, ubi exemplum de colore lucido explicatur. Vide etiam supra d. 9. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 2 (c. 3): "In wine, what is loved is the sweetness, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet; for what one desires per se is the sweet thing, whereas the wine is desired only per accidens — for if it turns sour, one no longer desires it; therefore it was desired only per accidens." Cf. III Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 5, ad 4, where the example of a bright color is explained. See also above d. 9, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1.

la: Cfr. Gregor., XXXV. Moral. c. 3. n. 4. — Superius post Sacramentum Vat. addit: per quod obligatur homo homini.

en: Cf. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXV, c. 3, n. 4. — Above, after "Sacramentum" the Vatican [codex] adds: "by which man is bound to man."

la: Vide supra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 4. et a. 2. q. 4.

en: See above d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 4, and a. 2, q. 4.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestionem 4, in qua solvenda omnes consentiunt, plerique commentatores Lombardi tractant supra d. 27. Cfr. Scot., hic q. unica n. 2. — S. Thom., d. 27. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 43. a. 2. — B. Albert., d. 27. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., d. 27. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Durand., d. 27. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

**II.** Circa 5. quaestionem plura sunt notanda. 1. Secundum novum ius, a Concilio Trident. (Sess. XXIV. c. 1. de Reform.) promulgatum, matrimonia clandestina (id est, quae «aliter, quam praesente parocho vel alio sacerdote de ipsius parochi seu ordinarii licentia, et duobus, vel tribus testibus, contrahuntur») in omnibus locis, ubi hoc decretum promulgatum est, non tantum sunt illicita, sed etiam prorsus irrita et invalida. — 2. Sed ante hoc Concilium «clandestina matrimonia, libero contrahentium consensu facta, rata et vera matrimonia [erant], quamdiu Ecclesia ea irrita non fecit» (ibid.). — 3. Eadem, cum essent rata et vera, habebant etiam rationem Sacramenti, cum «inter fideles matrimonium dari non possit, quin uno eodemque tempore sit Sacramentum... ac proinde a coniugali foedere Sacramentum separari nunquam possit» (Pius IX. Allocut. 27. Sept. 1852). — 4. Hinc falsa est opinio et a doctrina Scholasticorum aliena, quam saec. XVI. introduxerunt aliqui praeclari theologi (Canus, Estius, Sylvius), quae asserit, non consensum contrahentium legitime manifestatum esse materiam et formam huius Sacramenti, sed verba a sacerdote pronuntiata: *Ego vos coniungo* etc.; ac proinde ministrum huius Sacramenti esse sacerdotem. Contrarium nunc constat ex damnata in Syllabo Pii IX. thesi 66: «Matrimonii Sacramentum non est nisi quid contractui accessorium ab eoque separabile; ipsum Sacramentum in una tantum nuptiali benedictione situm est». Veram doctrinam docet S. Bonav. etiam infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, d. 35. q. 4, d. 42. a. 3. q. 2.

De hac 5. quaestione: Scot., supra d. 26. q. unica n. 14–15. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; Suppl. q. 45. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3.

**III.** De 6. quaestione cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. et de matrimonio B. Virginis infra d. 30. q. 2. et dub. 4. 5; in qua distinctione etiam alii commentatores Lombardi de eodem agunt, cum quadam differentia circa votum virginitatis, ut ibi (q. 2.) in scholio exponitur.
<!-- page 694 -->
Cum purissimum matrimonium B. Virginis cum S. Iosepho sit verum matrimonium (ut fere omnes certum esse putant); supponitur quidem, ipsam consensisse in ea quae essentialia sunt matrimonio; ast non usus potestatis traditae, sed tantum vinculum est ei essentiale, ut loc. cit. probatum est; hinc consensus debet habere hoc vinculum cum traditione potestatis pro obiecto, non vero expresse actum coniugalem. Hinc I. opinio repudianda est. — S. Thom. (hic a. 4; Suppl. q. 48. a. 1.) favet 2. et 3. opinioni his verbis: «Patet, quod dixerunt illi qui dixerunt, quod consentire in matrimonium est consentire in carnalem copulam implicite, non explicite. Non enim debet intelligi, nisi sicut implicite continetur effectus in sua causa, quia potestas carnalis copulae, in quam consentitur, est causa carnalis copulae, sicut potestas utendi re sua est causa usus». Idem in Sum. (III. q. 29. a. 2.) dicit: «Non expresse in copulam carnalem (consensit) nisi sub conditione, si Deo placeret».

De 6. quaestione: B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., infra d. 30. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Question 4, in resolving which all agree, most of Lombard's commentators treat above at d. 27. Cf. Scotus, here q. unica, n. 2. — St. Thomas, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 43, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, d. 27, a. 4. — Peter of Tarantaise, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — Durandus, d. 27, q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. unica.

**II.** Concerning the 5th question several things are to be noted. 1. According to the new law promulgated by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIV, c. 1, De Reform.), clandestine marriages — that is, those contracted "otherwise than in the presence of the parish priest, or another priest with the license of that parish priest or of the ordinary, and of two or three witnesses" — are, in all places where this decree has been promulgated, not only unlawful, but altogether null and invalid. — 2. But before this Council, "clandestine marriages, made by the free consent of the contracting parties, were valid and true marriages, so long as the Church had not made them null" (ibid.). — 3. These same marriages, since they were valid and true, also had the character of a Sacrament, since "among the faithful a marriage cannot be given without at one and the same time being a Sacrament... and accordingly the Sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal bond" (Pius IX, Allocution of 27 Sept. 1852). — 4. Hence the opinion is false and foreign to the doctrine of the Scholastics which certain distinguished theologians of the sixteenth century (Canus, Estius, Sylvius) introduced, asserting that the matter and form of this Sacrament is not the lawfully manifested consent of the contracting parties, but the words pronounced by the priest — "I join you" etc. — and that accordingly the minister of this Sacrament is the priest. The contrary is now established from the thesis condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX, no. 66: "The Sacrament of Matrimony is nothing but an accessory of the contract, separable from it; the Sacrament itself consists solely in the nuptial blessing." St. Bonaventure teaches the true doctrine also below, at d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; d. 35, q. 4; d. 42, a. 3, q. 2.

On this 5th question: Scotus, above d. 26, q. unica, n. 14–15. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 3; Suppl. q. 45, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 3.

**III.** On the 6th question, cf. above d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, and on the marriage of the Blessed Virgin, below d. 30, q. 2 and dub. 4, 5; in which distinction other commentators of Lombard also treat the same matter, with a certain difference concerning the vow of virginity, as is set forth there (q. 2) in the scholion. Since the most pure marriage of the Blessed Virgin with St. Joseph is a true marriage (as almost all hold to be certain), it is supposed indeed that she consented to those things that are essential to marriage; but it is not the use of the power handed over [in marriage], but only the bond, that is essential to it, as has been proven in the place cited; hence her consent must have had this bond, together with the handing-over of the power, as its object, but not expressly the conjugal act itself. Hence the first opinion is to be rejected. — St. Thomas (here a. 4; Suppl. q. 48, a. 1) favors the 2nd and 3rd opinion in these words: "It is clear what those meant who said that to consent to marriage is to consent implicitly, not explicitly, to carnal intercourse. For this should be understood only as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, since the power of carnal intercourse, to which consent is given, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power of using one's own property is the cause of its use." The same author, in the Summa (III, q. 29, a. 2), says: "She did not consent expressly to carnal intercourse, except under the condition, should it please God."

On the 6th question: Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 4. — Denis the Carthusian, below d. 30, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Full PDF-verified rebuild (400 dpi extract + `colcrop.py vol4 {692,693,694} 1880`, all bands read column-by-column top-to-bottom) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 74820–75057). The auto-chunked skeleton's Latin was discarded entirely — the raw text for this span is severely cascade-shattered (two-column bleed, marginal-gloss labels like "Ad opposi-tam.", "Notandum.", "Differentia notanda." interleaved mid-line) and was unusable as a base; every paragraph was re-set from the PDF column bands per the Vol II/III/IV override.

**Page-boundary map.**
- p. 692: tail of Q3's Ad-replies + apparatus (page-local notes 1–4, belongs to the *prior* chunk `d28-a1-q3.md` — not yet promoted; flagging so the q3 promoter picks these up) — then `QUAESTIO IV.` heading, both "Et quod sic" objections 1–6 and "Contra" 1–4, the Conclusio, and the opening of the Respondeo. Page-local footnotes 5–10 (chunk [^1]–[^6]) belong to this quaestio.
- p. 693: heading running-head `DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV.` confirms alignment. Rest of Respondeo, replies 1–6, and Scholion I–III (partial) through the Syllabus/Pius IX citation and into the "purissimum matrimonium B. Virginis" discussion. Page-local footnotes 1–6 (chunk [^7]–[^12]) belong here.
- p. 694: top of page carries the tail of Scholion III (the unmarked continuation of the "causa usus" sentence — this is running scholion prose, not a separate footnote) plus its closing bibliography line ("De 6. quaestione: B. Albert...") before `QUAESTIO V.` begins. No apparatus markers on this fragment belong to Q4; the footnotes visible at the top of p. 694 (numbered 4–7 in the source) belong to Q5 and are out of scope here.

**Hand-off to `d28-a1-q3.md` (not yet promoted).** When q3 is promoted, its printed-page-692 footer share is page-local notes 1–4: (1) "Vide supra q. 1. ad 3. et 4."; (2) "Cod. l quando."; (3) "Cod. K dicendum, quod verum... quando simplex est."; (4) "Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. ... indivisibilis unio. — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest." These sit in the same bottom-of-page-692 footer block as this chunk's notes 5–10 and were read directly off the PDF in this session; no further page-692 re-extraction should be needed for q3.

**Structural note on the Scholion.** This quaestio's Scholion is unusually broad: section I addresses Q4 proper, but sections II and III explicitly preview material for "5. quaestio" (clandestine marriages) and "6. quaestio" (mute persons / the marriage of the Blessed Virgin) — i.e., Q5 and Q6 of this same articulus. This is the source's own structure (a combined scholion printed once, after Q4, covering all three questions), not a chunking error; transcribed in full as printed. No `[?]` flags — PDF and OCR were mutually confirming throughout this span; two OCR-only "-" hyphenation artifacts were silently resolved (`indivisibHis`→`indivisibilis` in the prior chunk's footer, not touched here; `dicendum` OCR garble in note references silently corrected from clean PDF read).

**Hand-off to Q5.** Q5's opening ("Quinto quaeritur, utrum consensus de praesenti expressus in occulto verum faciat matrimonium") begins immediately after the Scholion III bibliography line on p. 694; the p.694 footer notes (numbered 1–7 in source, referencing Evaristus Papa, Concilium clandestinum citations, etc.) belong entirely to Q5 — not reproduced here.


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 694 -->

### Quaestio V. *Utrum consensus de praesenti expressus in occulto faciat matrimonium.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum consensus de praesenti expressus in occulto verum faciat matrimonium. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia Evaristus Papa dicit, et habetur in littera[^1], loquens de occultis et clandestinis connubiis: «Non coniugia, sed adulteria vel fornicationes sunt».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia personae, quae secundum institutionem Ecclesiae non sunt legitimae ad matrimonium contrahendum, ut frater et soror in secundo gradu, si de facto contrahunt, nihil faciunt, immo separantur: cum ergo huiusmodi clandestina sint contra Ecclesiae prohibitionem[^2]: ergo nihil fit in eis.

3. Item, si aliquis contrahat cum aliqua in occulto et cum alia in manifesto, et veniatur ad iudicium Ecclesiae; Ecclesia dicit illam uxorem, quam accepit in manifesto[^3]: ergo si recte iudicat, illa est uxor, ergo alia non fuit uxor.

4. Item, matrimonium est Sacramentum Ecclesiae, ergo debet accipi in facie Ecclesiae: ergo si accipitur in occulto, non est Sacramentum Ecclesiae: ergo nec verum Sacramentum, ergo nec matrimonium[^4].

**Contra:**
1. Sacramentum matrimonii pro materia habet personas legitimas et pro forma consensum; sed haec duo integre possunt esse in occulto: ergo etc.

2. Item, ita baptizatus est aliquis in occulto, sicut in manifesto: ergo matrimonium est ita in occulto, sicut in manifesto, a simili.

3. Item, contractus matrimonii est per verba maris et feminae, aliis nihil agentibus nec dicentibus: ergo ita est integrum, si fiat, illis absentibus, sicut et praesentibus.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: quare Ecclesia prohibuit, matrimonium contrahi in occulto, cum alias esset licitum; et non prohibuit aliquem baptizare in occulto, vel etiam consecrare?

> **Conclusio.** Matrimonia clandestina secundum ius antiquum vera sunt matrimonia, sed prohibita.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad esse matrimonii ista duo sufficiunt, scilicet legitimitas in personis et unitas in consensu. Ad solemnitatem vero et decorem sive honestatem requiritur et parentum traditio et sacerdotum benedictio[^5]; haec autem ita sunt ad decorem Sacramenti, ut tamen sint de necessitate praecepti. — Et ratio huius est vitatio periculi: quia frequenter qui in occulto contrahunt poenitent et cum aliis de facto contrahunt; et cum non potest primus contractus probari, necesse habet Ecclesia decipi et contra veritatem dare sententiam: et ideo oportuit, talia prohiberi. Hinc est, quod si aliquis cum aliqua contrahit in occulto, quamvis sit matrimonium, tamen coniunctio illa non est sine peccato, sicut nec coniunctio fornicarii, non tamen tantum.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Et inde est, quod Evaristus dicit, quod «non sunt connubia, sed adulteria», propter culpam.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud matrimonium, quod fit contra institutionem Ecclesiae, irritatur; dicendum, quod quaedam instituit Ecclesia tanquam necessaria, utpote quod personae sint legitimae; quaedam tanquam expedientia, utpote in aperto contrahere; et matrimonium, quod primo modo fit contra institutionem Ecclesiae, irritat Ecclesia[^6]; quod secundo modo, minime.

*Ad 3.* Ad aliud respondendum, quod Ecclesia in casu illo necessario decipitur; non tamen decipitur, ut non iuste iudicet, quia iuste iudicare est iudicare secundum allegata; decipitur tamen secundum veritatem latentem[^7].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est Sacramentum Ecclesiae; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen
<!-- page 695 -->
accipitur etiam ab his qui sunt extra Ecclesiam, ut baptismus, non tamen ad salutem nisi ab his qui sunt in ipsa Ecclesia; et baptismus accipitur in occulto, quia est Sacramentum necessitatis, et non est ibi periculum, immo vitatur periculum; sed illud in facie Ecclesiae accipitur salubrius, in occulto vero accipitur vere, sed non salubriter, quia contra ecclesiasticam sanctionem[^8].

---

english:
### Question V. *Whether consent for the present expressed in secret makes a marriage.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether consent for the present, expressed in secret, makes a true marriage. And that it does not, it seems:

1. Because Pope Evaristus says, as is found in the text[^1], speaking of secret and clandestine unions: "They are not marriages, but adulteries or fornications."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason: because persons who, according to the institution of the Church, are not legitimate for contracting marriage — as a brother and sister in the second degree — if they contract marriage in fact, accomplish nothing, but rather are separated: since, then, clandestine unions of this kind are against the Church's prohibition[^2]: therefore nothing comes about in them.

3. Likewise, if someone should contract marriage with one woman in secret and with another openly, and the matter comes before the judgment of the Church, the Church declares her to be his wife whom he took openly[^3]: therefore, if it judges rightly, that one is his wife, therefore the other was not his wife.

4. Likewise, marriage is a Sacrament of the Church, therefore it ought to be received in the face of the Church: therefore if it is received in secret, it is not a Sacrament of the Church: therefore neither a true Sacrament, therefore neither a marriage[^4].

**On the contrary:**
1. The Sacrament of marriage has, for its matter, legitimate persons, and for its form, consent; but these two can be present whole and entire in secret: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, someone is baptized in secret just as [validly] as openly: therefore marriage exists in secret just as [it does] openly, by a like case.

3. Likewise, the contracting of marriage is through the words of the man and the woman, with others doing and saying nothing: therefore it is just as complete if it takes place with those others absent as with them present.

In connection with this it is asked: why did the Church prohibit marriage from being contracted in secret, when otherwise it would be licit; and yet did not prohibit anyone from baptizing in secret, or even from consecrating [in secret]?

> **Conclusion.** Clandestine marriages, according to the ancient law, are true marriages, but forbidden.

**I respond:** It must be said that these two things suffice for the being of marriage, namely, legitimacy in the persons and unity in the consent. But for solemnity, and for decorum or honorableness, there is required both the handing-over by the parents and the priests' blessing[^5]; these, however, pertain to the adornment of the Sacrament in such a way that they are nevertheless of the necessity of a precept. — And the reason for this is the avoidance of danger: because frequently those who contract marriage in secret afterward repent and contract marriage in fact with others; and since the first contract cannot be proven, the Church is necessarily deceived and must give a judgment contrary to the truth: and therefore it was fitting that such things be forbidden. Hence it is that if someone contracts marriage with a woman in secret, although it is a marriage, nevertheless that union is not without sin, just as neither is the union of a fornicator — though not to the same degree.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* And hence it is that Evaristus says that "they are not marriages, but adulteries," on account of the fault [involved].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a marriage which comes about against the institution of the Church is annulled; it must be said that the Church has instituted certain things as necessary — as, for instance, that the persons be legitimate — and certain things as merely expedient — as, for instance, that the contracting take place openly; and a marriage which comes about against the institution of the Church in the first way, the Church annuls[^6]; one which does so in the second way, not at all.

*To 3.* To the other it must be answered that the Church, in that case, is necessarily deceived; yet it is not deceived in such a way that it judges unjustly, because to judge justly is to judge according to what has been alleged; it is deceived, however, with respect to the hidden truth[^7].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is a Sacrament of the Church; it must be said that this is true; nevertheless it is received also by those who are outside the Church, as is baptism, though not unto salvation except by those who are within the Church itself; and baptism is received in secret, because it is a Sacrament of necessity, and there is no danger in it — rather, danger is avoided; but that [Sacrament of marriage], received in the face of the Church, is received more salutarily, whereas in secret it is indeed truly received, but not salutarily, because [it is done] against ecclesiastical sanction[^8].

---

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, chapter 1 [i.e., Gratian's *Decretum*, C. 30, q. 5, c. 1, already cited in the preceding question's apparatus].

la: Vide C. 30. q. 5, ex qua Magister hic in lit. c. 1, quaedam allegat, et X. de Clandestina desponsatione (lib. IV. tit. 3.).

en: See Causa 30, question 5, from which the Master here, in the text, chapter 1, alleges certain things, and the Decretals (X), *On Clandestine Betrothal* (book IV, title 3).

la: Cfr. C. *Quod nobis* (2.), X. de Clandestina desponsatione (lib. IV. tit. 3.). — Pro *veniatur* cod. aa *veniat*.

en: Cf. the chapter *Quod nobis* (c. 2), Decretals (X), *On Clandestine Betrothal* (book IV, title 3). — For *veniatur*, codex aa reads *veniat*.

la: Cod. aa *nec verum matrimonium*.

en: Codex aa [reads]: "nor a true marriage."

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq.

en: See here the text of the Master, chapter 1 and following.

la: Pro *irritat Ecclesia* codd. F I K V aa (E a secunda manu) *irritatur*.

en: For *irritat Ecclesia* ["the Church annuls"], codices F, I, K, V, aa (E in a second hand) read *irritatur* ["is annulled"].

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et ad 3.

en: Cf. above, distinction 27, article 2, question 2, in the body and in the reply to the third [objection].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Raw OCR line range 75058–75148 (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`), printed pp. 694–695, pdf pp. 714–715 (offset `pdf = printed + 20`, confirmed by the running heads "694 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." and "DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI. 695" — the OCR's "69b" for 695 is a digit/letter garble, resolved by the 300 dpi PDF crop). Per the Vol II/III/IV PDF-priority-inversion override, the Latin body was verified/re-set against 300 dpi PDF column-band crops (`colcrop.py vol4 694 1880` and `colcrop.py vol4 695 1880`) rather than the raw OCR alone, which garbles routine letters throughout this passage (`liabetur`→`habetur`, `aduUeria`→`adulteria`, `contratiendum`→`contrahendum`, `ahquis`→`aliquis`, `aha`→`alia`, `iliam`→`illam`, `mairimonia`→`matrimonia`, `Ecciesiae`→`Ecclesiae`). The "Quinto quaeritur" opener was verified against `QUAESTIO V.` at raw line 75058 (PDF p.694, `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p694-L-0.png`) and confirms correct alignment for Q5 — no q-swap. The chunk closes cleanly at raw line 75148, immediately before `QUAESTIO VI.` (raw line 75149; PDF p.695, confirmed "Sexto et ultimo quaeritur" opener) — no boundary drift.

**Marginal glosses omitted.** The printed page carries editorial side-rubrics (`Ad oppositum.`, `Fundamenta.`, `Quaestio incidens.`, `Solutio posita.`, `Notandum.`-type labels rendered in the PDF as small marginal words next to `Axi[oma]`, `Rat[io]`, `Sol[utio] posi[ta]`) — these are Quaracchi editorial marginalia, not Bonaventure's text, and are omitted from the body per corpus convention (matching d11-p1-a1-q1 and d12-p1-a1-q1's disposition of the same rubric class).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. Q5 has no independent scholion. Its final apparatus entry ([^8] here, printed "1." restarting on p.695's footer) reads *"Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."* ("See the scholion to the preceding question") — this points to **Q4's own SCHOLION**, which is embedded within `d28-a1-q4`'s raw range (found at raw line 74996, OCR-garbled as `SCHOLIOK`), not to q1's master scholion (which covers only q1–q3). `d28-a1-q4` is still Tier 1 (skeleton) as of this promotion; when it is promoted, its own Scholion section should be transcribed there, and this cross-reference will resolve correctly.

**Footer split on p.695.** Printed p.695's footer restarts Quaracchi's per-page numbering at "1." Footnote "1." (→ `[^8]` in this file) belongs to Q5 (its marker sits at the very last word of Q5's body, "sanctionem"). Footnotes "2." through "12." on the same p.695 footer belong to **d28-a1-q6** (Q6's own body markers, e.g. *Hieronymus*², *Hugo*³, *Virgo vovit*¹⁰, *Ioannes*¹²) — not claimed here; confirm they land in q6's apparatus when it is promoted (q6 is currently skeleton).

**No `[?]` flags.** Both printed pages (694–695) were fully legible in the 300 dpi column-band PDF crops; all OCR garbles were resolvable with high confidence against the image.