title: Dist. 34, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum dona sint priora virtutibus, an e converso.*

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione donorum ad virtutes quantum ad ordinem, et est quaestio, utrum dona sint priora virtutibus, an e converso. Et quod dona praecedant, videtur.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Matthaei sexto[^1] super orationem dominicam dicitur in Glossa: « In precibus est, ut impetremus dona; in donis, ut operemur mandata; de operatione beatitudines sequuntur »: ergo videtur, quod profectus hominis incipiat a donis. Sed illi habitus gratuiti sunt priores, in quibus inchoatur principium bene agendi: ergo dona sunt priora virtutibus.

2. Item, prius est sanari quam bene operari;

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sed per dona sanantur potentiae et per virtutes habilitantur ad bene operandum[^2]: ergo dona priora sunt virtutibus.

3. Item, prius est *declinare a malo* quam *facere bonum*[^3]; sed per primum inter dona declinamus a malo, per virtutes ordinamur ad bene faciendum: ergo dona sunt priora virtutibus.

4. Item, prius est generans quam generatum; sed per scientiam generatur fides, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, decimo quarto de Trinitate[^4] dicens, quod « scientia est de his, quibus fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur et roboratur »: ergo donum scientiae prius est quam fides. Sed fides est prima virtutum: ergo dona sunt priora virtutibus.

5. Item, intellectus est prior quam affectus[^5], ergo habitus intellectivi priores sunt quam habitus affectivi; sed dona ex maiori sui parte sunt in rationali, virtutes ex maiori parte sunt in affectiva: ergo priora sunt dona, quam sint virtutes.

**Sed contra:**

1. Super illud Iob primo[^6]: *Ventus vehemens* etc.; ibi dicit Gregorius: « Spiritus ante omnia mentem septem virtutibus ornat »: ergo naturaliter habitus virtutum prius sunt a gratia quam habitus donorum.

2. Item, Threnorum secundo[^7]: *Praecipitavit omnia moenia eius*; ibi Glossa: « In his rectus ordo servatur, quia, cum peccatrix anima relinquitur, prius ab ea dona virtutum, quae data sunt ad manifestationem Spiritus, auferuntur, deinde fundamenta fidei, spei et caritatis evertuntur ». Si ergo is est ordo in destruendo, ut prius destruatur illud quod ultimo fuit in componendo; et prius auferuntur dona quam fundamenta virtutum; videtur, quod prius sint virtutes quam habitus donorum.

3. Item, prius est recte agere quam expedite[^8] in eodem genere: si ergo habitus virtutum sunt ad rectificandum, et habitus donorum ad expediendum: ergo dona non sunt priora virtutibus.

4. Item, timor est primum donorum, sicut fides est prima virtutum; sed fides prior est, quam sit timor, quia timor ortum habet a fide: ergo simpliciter videtur, quod virtutes sint priores donis, quia, « si primum in uno genere est prius primo in altero genere, hoc simpliciter est illo prius » secundum considerationem Philosophi[^9].

5. Item, is est ordo habituum, qui est ordo actuum — ideo enim fides dicitur esse prior spe, quia credere prius est quam sperare — cum ergo virtutes sint ad actus primos, dona ad actus medios[^10]; sequitur necessario, quod virtutes sint ante dona.

> ### Conclusio.
> Virtutes non quoad originem, sed quoad usum praecedunt dona.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de habitibus virtutum et donorum: aut quantum ad ipsorum habituum originem, aut quantum ad usum. Si quantum ad originem, cum omnes habitus gratuiti ortum habeant a gratia, sic omnes sunt simul origine, quia omnes habitus gratuiti simul infunduntur, infusa gratia, quae est ipsorum principium[^11]. — Si vero loquamur de ipsis habitibus donorum et virtutum in comparatione ad sequentes usus; sic concedendum est, quod virtutes praecedunt dona. Licet enim actus alicuius doni specialis praecedat actum alicuius virtutis, sicut actus timoris actum spei[^12]; quia tamen actus primae virtutis, videlicet fidei, praecedit actum primi doni, scilicet timoris; et generaliter actus cuiuslibet virtutis praecedit actum doni sibi correspondentis, sicut actus primus praecedit medium: hinc est, quod generaliter concedi potest, quod habitus virtutum per comparationem[^13] ad actus et usus priores sunt respectu donorum; et hoc dico respectu eiusdem. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes et auctoritates, quae adducebantur ad partem istam.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod in donis est inchoatio bene agendi; dici potest, quod dona accipiuntur ibi large pro virtutibus; aut si accipiuntur pro donis proprie dictis, secundum quod videtur littera praecedens[^14] dicere; tunc operatio mandatorum ibi stat non pro quacumque, sed pro operatione expedita, in qua consistit noster profectus, per cuius progressum beatitudines subsequuntur. Unde et preces illae impetrantes in virtutibus radicantur: alioquin non impetrarent nec efficaciter mererentur.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est sanari quam bene operari; dicendum, quod illud verum est de quadam sanitate, et de quadam alia sanitate falsum. Est enim sanari *a morbo* et est sanari *a sequela morbi*[^15]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod prius est sanari quam bene operari; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de sanatione, quae consistit in amotione morbi et culpae; non autem de ea quae consistit in amotione symptomatis et sequelae. Cum autem dicitur, quod dona sunt ad sanandum: hoc non intelligitur de sanatione primo modo, sed secundo. Et sic patet, quod illa ratio non concludit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est declinare a malo quam facere bonum; dicendum, quod hoc est verum: sed *declinare a malo* non solummodo est donorum, sed etiam virtutum, sicut patet de poenitentia et iustitia. Quod autem declinatio a malo attribuatur timori, hoc est propter expeditionem, quia donum timoris facit a malo faciliter declinare.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generans est prius generato; dicendum, quod illud est verum de eo quod est generaliter principium generandi reliquum: sed scientia non est sic principium fidei. Nam in eodem prius est fides, quam sit scientia, quae est fidei generativa. Unde verbum Augustini intelligitur solum particulariter et respectu diversorum: quia scientia in praedicante via est ad generandum fidem in audiente[^16].

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod intellectus praecedit affectum; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad actus et habitus, qui sunt eiusdem coordinationis[^17] — unde cognitio dirigens ad affectionem est illi praeambula, propter quod prius est credere quam amare — sed de habitibus et actibus, qui non sunt eiusdem ordinationis, non habet veritatem, quia non est prius videre Deum quam amare Deum, immo e contrario. Et quoniam habitus donorum et actus non sunt eiusdem coordinationis cum habitibus et actibus virtutum, quia actus virtutum sunt in primo gradu, actus vero donorum in medio: hinc est, quod non est necesse, dona esse priora virtutibus, quamvis habitus isti magis respiciant intellectum, et illi magis respiciant affectum[^18].

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english:
### Question II. *Whether the gifts are prior to the virtues, or conversely.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the comparison of the gifts to the virtues as regards order, and the question is whether the gifts are prior to the virtues, or conversely. And that the gifts go before, it seems.

**To the opposite:**

1. On Matthew six[^1], upon the Lord's Prayer, it is said in the Gloss: « In prayers it is that we may obtain the gifts; in the gifts, that we may carry out the commandments; from the working follow the beatitudes »: therefore it seems that a man's advance begins from the gifts. But those gratuitous habits are prior in which the beginning of acting well is initiated: therefore the gifts are prior to the virtues.

2. Likewise, to be healed is prior to acting well;

sed per dona sanantur potentiae — but by the gifts the powers are healed and by the virtues they are enabled for acting well[^2]: therefore the gifts are prior to the virtues.

3. Likewise, *to turn away from evil* is prior to *doing good*[^3]; but by the first among the gifts we turn away from evil, by the virtues we are ordered to doing good: therefore the gifts are prior to the virtues.

4. Likewise, the generating is prior to the generated; but by knowledge faith is generated, according to what Augustine says in the fourteenth book of *On the Trinity*[^4], saying that « knowledge concerns those things by which most saving faith is begotten, nourished, and strengthened »: therefore the gift of knowledge is prior to faith. But faith is the first of the virtues: therefore the gifts are prior to the virtues.

5. Likewise, intellect is prior to affect[^5], therefore the intellective habits are prior to the affective habits; but the gifts are for the greater part in the rational [power], the virtues for the greater part in the affective: therefore the gifts are prior to what the virtues are.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that text of Job one[^6]: *A vehement wind* etc.; there Gregory says: « The Spirit before all things adorns the mind with seven virtues »: therefore naturally the habits of the virtues come before from grace prior to the habits of the gifts.

2. Likewise, Lamentations two[^7]: *He has cast down all her ramparts*; there the Gloss: « In these the right order is kept, because, when a sinful soul is abandoned, first the gifts of the virtues, which are given for the manifestation of the Spirit, are taken from it, then the foundations of faith, hope, and charity are overthrown ». If therefore that is the order in destroying, that what was last in composing is first destroyed; and the gifts are taken away before the foundations of the virtues; it seems that the virtues are prior to the habits of the gifts.

3. Likewise, to act rightly is prior to acting expeditiously[^8] in the same genus: if therefore the habits of the virtues are for setting right, and the habits of the gifts for expediting: therefore the gifts are not prior to the virtues.

4. Likewise, fear is the first of the gifts, as faith is the first of the virtues; but faith is prior to fear, because fear takes its origin from faith: therefore it seems simply that the virtues are prior to the gifts, because « if the first in one genus is prior to the first in another genus, this is simply prior to that » according to the consideration of the Philosopher[^9].

5. Likewise, that is the order of habits which is the order of acts — for thus faith is said to be prior to hope, because to believe is prior to hoping — since therefore the virtues are for the first acts, the gifts for the middle acts[^10]; it follows necessarily that the virtues are before the gifts.

> ### Conclusion.
> The virtues precede the gifts not as regards origin, but as regards use.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking about the habits of the virtues and of the gifts: either as regards the origin of the habits themselves, or as regards use. If as regards origin, since all gratuitous habits take their origin from grace, thus all are simultaneous in origin, because all gratuitous habits are infused together, grace being infused, which is their principle[^11]. — But if we speak of the habits of the gifts and of the virtues themselves in comparison to the uses that follow; then it must be conceded that the virtues precede the gifts. For although the act of some special gift precedes the act of some virtue, as the act of fear [precedes] the act of hope[^12]; yet because the act of the first virtue, namely of faith, precedes the act of the first gift, namely of fear; and generally the act of any virtue precedes the act of the gift corresponding to it, as the first act precedes the middle: hence it is that it can be generally conceded that the habits of the virtues, by comparison[^13] to acts and prior uses, are so with respect to the gifts; and this I say with respect to the same [subject]. — Hence the reasons and authorities which were brought forward for that side must be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that in the gifts there is the inception of acting well; it can be said that the gifts are there taken broadly for the virtues; or if they are taken for the gifts properly so called, according to what the preceding text[^14] seems to say; then the working of the commandments there stands not for any whatever, but for the expedited working, in which our advance consists, by whose progress the beatitudes follow. Hence also those obtaining prayers are rooted in the virtues: otherwise they would not obtain nor efficaciously merit.

2. To that which is objected, that to be healed is prior to acting well; it must be said that this is true of a certain health, and false of a certain other health. For there is a being-healed *from disease* and there is a being-healed *from the aftereffect of disease*[^15]. When therefore it is said that to be healed is prior to acting well; it must be said that this is true of the healing which consists in the removal of disease and fault; but not of that which consists in the removal of the symptom and aftereffect. And when it is said that the gifts are for healing: this is understood not of healing in the first mode, but in the second. And thus it is clear that that reasoning does not conclude.

3. To that which is objected, that to turn away from evil is prior to doing good; it must be said that this is true: but *to turn away from evil* belongs not only to the gifts, but also to the virtues, as is clear of penance and justice. But that turning-away from evil is attributed to fear, this is on account of the expediting, because the gift of fear makes [one] turn away from evil easily.

4. To that which is objected, that the generating is prior to the generated; it must be said that that is true of what is generally the principle of generating the rest: but knowledge is not in this way the principle of faith. For in the same [subject] faith is prior to the knowledge which is generative of faith. Hence the saying of Augustine is understood only particularly and with respect to different [subjects]: because knowledge in the preacher is a way to generating faith in the hearer[^16].

5. To that which is last objected, that the intellect precedes the affect; it must be said that it is true as regards acts and habits which are of the same coordination[^17] — hence cognition directing toward affection is preambular to it, on account of which it is prior to believe than to love — but of habits and acts which are not of the same ordination, it does not hold true, because it is not prior to see God than to love God, but rather the contrary. And since the habits of the gifts and their acts are not of the same coordination as the habits and acts of the virtues, because the acts of the virtues are in the first degree, but the acts of the gifts in the middle: hence it is that it is not necessary that the gifts be prior to the virtues, although these habits regard the intellect more, and those regard the affect more[^18].

---

la: Vers. 9. — Glossa (interlin. apud Strabum et Lyranum) secundum August., II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 10, n. 36. seqq., additis tamen in Glossa nonnullis. — Pro *impetremus* (in Vat. et originale) codd. et edd. 1, 2 *impetrentur*. Deinde pro *profectus*, quod ex codd. E F H. T U restituimus, alii codd. partim *perfectus*, partim cum edd. *perfectio*.

en: Verse 9. — The Gloss (interlinear, in Strabo and Lyra) following Augustine, *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount*, book II, c. 10, n. 36 ff., though with some additions in the Gloss. — For *impetremus* (in the Vatican [ed.] and the original) codices and editions 1, 2 read *impetrentur*. Then for *profectus*, which we have restored from codices E F H T U, other codices [read] partly *perfectus*, partly with the editions *perfectio*.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro *per virtutes habilitantur* codd. T Z *virtutes habilitant*.

en: Cf. the preceding question. — For *per virtutes habilitantur* codices T Z [read] *virtutes habilitant*.

la: Psalm. 36, 27: *Declina a malo et fac bonum*.

en: Psalm 36, 27: *Turn away from evil and do good*.

la: Cap. I. n. 3. Pro *de Trinitate* edd. et nonnulli codd. *de Civitate Dei*. — De prioritate fidei cfr. supra d. 23. a. I. q. I. in corp. — Inferius pro *virtutum* cod. U *virtus*.

en: Chapter 1, n. 3. For *de Trinitate* the editions and several codices [read] *de Civitate Dei*. — On the priority of faith cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — Below, for *virtutum* codex U [reads] *virtus*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima text. 20. et 27. seqq. (c. 2. seq.), et III. text. 56. seq. (c. 10. seq.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* book II, text 20 and 27 ff. (c. 2 f.), and book III, text 56 f. (c. 10 f.).

la: Vers. 19. — Gregor., II. Moral. c. 49. n. 77: *Donum quippe Spiritus, quod in subiecta mente ante alia prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam format, eandem mentem, ut contra singula quaeque tentamenta erudiat, in septem mox virtutibus temperat*.

en: Verse 19. — Gregory, *Morals* book II, c. 49, n. 77: *For the gift of the Spirit, which in the subject mind forms before other things prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, the same mind — that it may instruct it against each several temptation — at once tempers in seven virtues*.

la: Vers. 8. — Glossa est ordinaria et sumta ex Paschasii Radberti exposit. in hunc loc.; in eius textu origin. pro *evertuntur* legitur *destruuntur*, pro quo cod. U substituit *subvertuntur*. — Inferius pro *et prius auferuntur* plurimi codd. *ut prius auferantur*.

en: Verse 8. — The Gloss is the ordinary [Gloss] and is taken from Paschasius Radbertus' exposition on this passage; in his original text for *evertuntur* there is read *destruuntur*, for which codex U substitutes *subvertuntur*. — Below, for *et prius auferuntur* very many codices [read] *ut prius auferantur*.

la: Edd. *recte agens quam expediens*. Deinde pro *ergo dona non sunt priora virtutibus* codd. H Z bb *ergo dona sunt posteriora virtutibus*, multi alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *ergo dona sunt priora virtutibus*, cod. K (a secunda manu) *ergo virtutes sunt priores donis*.

en: The editions [read] *recte agens quam expediens*. Then for *ergo dona non sunt priora virtutibus* codices H Z bb [read] *ergo dona sunt posteriora virtutibus*, many other codices and editions 1, 2 *ergo dona sunt priora virtutibus*, codex K (by a second hand) *ergo virtutes sunt priores donis*.

la: Libr. III. Topic. c. 2: *Et si optimum optimo melius, et simpliciter hoc illo melius, ut si optimus homo optimo equo melior, et simpliciter homo simpliciter equo melior*. — De minori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: *Topics* book III, c. 2: *And if the best is better than the best, also this is simply better than that, as if the best man is better than the best horse, so simply man is simply better than horse*. — On the minor [premise] cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp.

en: Cf. the preceding question, in the body.

la: Vide infra d. 36. q. 1.

en: See below d. 36, q. 1.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Ita codd. F H K U Z bb, alii et edd. *comparationes*.

en: Thus codices F H K U Z bb; others and the editions [read] *comparationes*.

la: Scil. in Glossa, supra in Matth. 6, 9. allegata, quae revera de donis et ordine, quo Isaias ea enumerat, loquitur. — Pro *accipiuntur* cod. V *accipi videntur*; in edd. deest *large*. Inferius pro *per cuius progressum* codd. F V *pro cuius progressu*.

en: Namely in the Gloss cited above on Matt. 6, 9, which in fact speaks of the gifts and of the order in which Isaiah enumerates them. — For *accipiuntur* codex V [reads] *accipi videntur*; in the editions *large* is lacking. Below, for *per cuius progressum* codices F V [read] *pro cuius progressu*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 736, nota 7. — Superius pro *alia sanitate* codd. A bb *alia sanatione*, Vat. omittit *alia*.

en: Cf. above p. 736, note 7. — Above, for *alia sanitate* codices A bb [read] *alia sanatione*; the Vatican [ed.] omits *alia*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 24. dub. 2. et 3. et praecipue infra d. 35. dub. 2.

en: Cf. above d. 24, dub. 2 and 3, and especially below d. 35, dub. 2.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 8. seq. et d. XXIV. c. 3. — Paulo ante pro *eiusdem ordinationis* codd. A (K a secunda manu) L T Z aa bb *eiusdem coordinationis*, et superius pro *eiusdem coordinationis* codd. G V *eiusdem ordinationis*, ubi post *dirigens* cod. U omittit *ad*.

en: See above the text of the Master, d. 23, c. 8 f. and d. 24, c. 3. — A little before, for *eiusdem ordinationis* codices A (K by a second hand) L T Z aa bb [read] *eiusdem coordinationis*, and above, for *eiusdem coordinationis* codices G V [read] *eiusdem ordinationis*, where after *dirigens* codex U omits *ad*.

la: Vide scholion ad 1. quaest.

en: See the scholion on the 1st question. — *[This question carries no own scholion; the* ordo *doctrine is treated in the article-master scholion of `bon-sent-III-d34-p1-a1-q1` (q1 §III), which gathers the* consentientes *dossier on the order of the gifts to the virtues: Alex. Hal. loc. cit. m. 4; S. Thom. S. 1.II. q. 68. a. 8. ad 2; B. Albert hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar. hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; Dionys. Carth. hic q. 2.]*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`tools/colcrop.py vol3 739` / `740` / `741`), per the Vol III PDF-priority inversion (offset pdf = printed + 22; pp.739→761, 740→762, 741→763). IA djvu OCR (raw lines 51339–51452) used as a cross-check only for the clean videtur/contra prose and footnote-marker spacing. English is a fresh literal translation.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 34, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *De comparatione donorum ad virtutes quantum ad praecellentiam.*
#### *Utrum virtutes sint excellentiores donis, an e converso.*

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione donorum ad virtutes quantum ad praecellentiam, et est quaestio, utrum virtutes sint excellentiores donis, an e converso. Et quod habitus virtutum sint excellentiores, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Apostolum, primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^1]: *Adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro*; ibi Glossa: « *Demonstro vobis viam* eundi ad Deum, id est caritatem, quia maius omnibus donum est ». Si ergo caritas virtus est, videtur, quod virtutes sint excellentiores quam dona.

2. Item, Philosophus[^2] definiens virtutem dicit, quod « virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum »; et alibi dicit, quod « perfectum est cui non potest fieri additio »; sed si aliqui habitus essent perfectiores ultra habitus virtutum, esset additio ad perfectum: restat ergo, quod dona non sunt virtutibus perfectiora.

3. Item, alibi[^3] Philosophus dicit, quod « virtus est ultimum de potentia »; sed eo quod est ultimum in potentia, nihil est maius neque excellentius: ergo non videtur, quod ultra habitus virtutum possint esse aliqui habitus in anima maioris perfectionis et dignitatis.

4. Item, tanto habitus est excellentior et perfectior, quanto actus eius magis appropinquat ad medium; sed habitus virtutum maxime in medietate consistunt quantum ad suos actus[^4]: ergo non videtur, quod ultra virtutes sint aliqui habitus excellentiores.

5. Item, nobilitas habituum attenditur quantum ad rationem gratuiti et meritorii; sed habitus virtutum maxime appropinquant ad gratiam, quia immediate fluunt ab ea, et circa actus virtutum maxime attenditur meritum, unde et caritas dicitur esse merendi principium[^5]: ergo videtur, quod habitus virtutum excellentiores sint inter omnes alios habitus.

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6. Item, sicut se habet imago creationis ad *esse* naturae ipsius animae, sic se habet imago recreationis ad *esse* gratiae; sed imago creationis attenditur quantum ad id quod est excellentissimum in anima in *esse* naturae[^6]: ergo imago recreationis attenditur quantum ad id quod est excellentissimum in anima in *esse* gratiae; imago autem recreationis attenditur quantum ad habitus virtutum theologicarum: videtur ergo, quod nulli habitus sint excellentiores illis habitibus.

**Sed contra:**
1. Bernardus in libro *de Amore Dei*, capitulo secundo[^7]: « Amor proficit in caritatem, caritas proficit in sapientiam »; sed non est profectus nisi per progressum ad aliquid excellentius: ergo donum sapientiae est excellentius caritate: ergo simpliciter dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, per considerationem Philosophi, quia, « si optimum in uno genere melius est optimo in alio genere, et simpliciter hoc illo melius ».

2. Item, nobilitas et dignitas habituum dignoscitur per actus; sed actus donorum sunt excellentiores quam actus virtutum, sicut ex praecedentibus[^8] patet, quia virtutes sunt ad actus primos, dona vero ad actus medios: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod se habet ex additione ad alterum in genere boni excellentius est illo, sicut « bene vivere melius est quam vivere[^9] »: cum ergo dona se habeant per additionem ad virtutes, quia virtutibus sunt posteriora et sunt ad agendum expedite; ergo dona sunt perfectiora et excellentiora quam virtutes.

4. Item, illi habitus sunt excellentiores, qui faciunt hominem magis similem statui gloriae et perfectioni, quae fuit in Christo; sed dona sunt huiusmodi, quia omnia fuerunt in Christo et sunt in statu gloriae, quod non potest dici de virtutibus[^10]: ergo videtur, quod dona sint excellentiora virtutibus.

> **Conclusio.** Dona et virtutes quoad gratiam informantem sunt aequalis dignitatis; quoad actus egredientes unus habitus est nobilior altero; quoad status consequentes dona sunt virtutibus excellentiora.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de habitibus virtutum et donorum sub ratione dignitatis est loqui tripliciter secundum triplicem istorum habituum comparationem: aut in comparatione ad *gratiam* ipsos habitus informantem et gratuitos facientem, aut in comparatione ad *actus egredientes*, aut in comparatione ad *status consequentes*. Si in comparatione ad *gratiam* ipsos habitus informantem; cum ipsa sit una, reddens aequaliter animam acceptam Deo et eius potentiam et habitus et opera[^11]; sic aequalis dignitatis et meriti sunt ceteri habitus existentes in eadem anima. — Si autem loquamur de ipsis in comparatione ad *actus egredientes*; sic unus habitus est nobilior altero, sicut virtutes theologicae sunt excellentiores cardinalibus, cum actus earum immediate tendant in Deum, et inter theologicas caritas est excellentissima. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad *status consequentes*; cum usus virtutum habeantur in statu imperfectionis, usus vero donorum promoveant[^12] hominem ad statum perfectionis; sic dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, sicut status proficientium perfectior est statu incipientium; et hoc est, quia status ille secundus praesupponit statum praecedentem. Unde sicut bene esse melius est quam esse, quia bene esse dicit esse et adhuc amplius; sic habitus reddentes potentias expeditas ad actus medios excellentiores sunt habitibus reddentibus eas expeditas[^13] ad actus primos, non ratione eius quod addunt solum, sed ratione eius quod addunt et praesupponunt. — Unde concedendum est, quod hoc modo dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, et rationes concedendae sunt, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas excellentior est omnibus donis; dicendum, quod Apostolus comparat caritatem ad illa quae possunt sine caritate haberi, sicut fides et spes et aliae virtutes, quae possunt sine caritate haberi[^14]. Sed quia dona Spiritus sancti caritatem praesupponunt et ultra habitum caritatis aliquid addunt, sicut habitus sapientiae addit aptitudinem et promptitudinem ad faciliter degustandum, *quam suavis est Dominus*; hinc est, quod comparatio illa non habet hic locum, pro eo quod alterum in altero clauditur.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dicendum, quod est perfectio *sufficientiae* et perfectio *excellentiae* et perfectio *superabundantiae*[^15]. Prima est perfectio in genere et *secundum quid*; ultima vero est perfectio simpliciter.

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Huic autem perfectioni, scilicet primae, aliquid potest addi, quia ultra sufficientiam necessitatis est excellentia supererogationis, quae illi potest superaddi. Cum ergo dicitur, quod perfecto non potest fieri additio: hoc non intelligitur de perfecto primo modo dicto, sed ultimo. Cum vero dicitur, quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; hoc intelligitur primo modo, sed non ultimo; quia sic perficit, quod ad optimum disponit.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est ultimum potentiae; dicendum, quod illa definitio data est de virtute naturali[^16]; et ideo non habet hic locum. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod sicut habitus virtutum dicitur in medietate consistere, non quia sit medium punctale, sed quia ad medium punctale appropinquat[^17]; sic etiam virtus dicitur ultimum de potentia, non quia ponat ipsam potentiam in summo, sed quia facit ipsam appropinquare ad summum. Et propterea ex hoc haberi non potest, quod ultra habitum virtutis non sit ponere alium habitum excellentiorem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus virtutis maxime consistit in medietate; dicendum, quod illud est verum in eis habitibus, in quorum actibus[^18] potest esse excessus; hoc autem non est verum in omnibus actibus nec in omnibus virtutibus, sicut patet in virtutibus theologicis; et propterea ratio illa non cogit, sicut patet: quia melius est servare continentiam virginalem, quae omnino videtur ad extremum declinare, quam continentiam coniugalem;

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ille habitus dignior est, qui plus habet gratuiti et meritorii; respondendum est per interemptionem minoris: quia caritas, quae est in anima respectu habituum existentium in eadem, aequaliter influit et aequaliter eos reddit gratos et in actibus suis meritorios. Et si obiiciat, quod meritum primo attribuitur caritati; dicendum, quod hoc non obstat, quia, sicut dictum est, dona in actibus suis praesupponunt caritatem et eius actum, ac per hoc et meriti complementum.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago recreationis, quae est nobilissima in *esse* gratiae, attenditur in virtutibus; dicendum, quod illud est verum quantum ad primum esse gratiae; verumtamen quantum ad maiorem profectum in bono non tantum consistit imago recreationis in anima in habitibus virtutum[^19], sed etiam quantum ad habitus donorum et beatitudinum; quod patet, quia nostra cognitiva primo reparatur ad habitum fidei, et deinde amplius reparatur per donum intellectus, et post per munditiam cordis, quae disponit ad Deum contemplandum[^20].

---

english:
### Question III. *On the comparison of the gifts to the virtues, as to pre-eminence.*
#### *Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts, or the reverse.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the comparison of the gifts to the virtues as to pre-eminence, and the question is whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts, or the reverse. And that the habits of the virtues are more excellent, it seems:

1. *First*, through the Apostle, First to the Corinthians, chapter twelve[^1]: *And yet I show you a more excellent way*; there the Gloss: « I show you the way of going to God, that is, charity, because it is the greatest gift of all ». If therefore charity is a virtue, it seems that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher[^2], defining virtue, says that « virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best »; and elsewhere he says that « the perfect is that to which no addition can be made »; but if any habits were more perfect beyond the habits of the virtues, there would be an addition to the perfect: it remains, therefore, that the gifts are not more perfect than the virtues.

3. Likewise, elsewhere[^3] the Philosopher says that « virtue is the utmost of a power »; but than that which is the utmost in a power, nothing is greater or more excellent: therefore it does not seem that beyond the habits of the virtues there can be any habits in the soul of greater perfection and dignity.

4. Likewise, a habit is the more excellent and more perfect, the more its act approaches the mean; but the habits of the virtues consist most of all in the mean as regards their acts[^4]: therefore it does not seem that beyond the virtues there are any more excellent habits.

5. Likewise, the nobility of habits is reckoned according to the character of the gratuitous and the meritorious; but the habits of the virtues approach grace most of all, because they flow immediately from it, and about the acts of the virtues merit is most of all reckoned, whence also charity is said to be the principle of meriting[^5]: therefore it seems that the habits of the virtues are more excellent than all other habits.

6. Likewise, as the image of creation stands to the *being* of the soul's own nature, so the image of recreation stands to the *being* of grace; but the image of creation is reckoned according to that which is most excellent in the soul in the *being* of nature[^6]: therefore the image of recreation is reckoned according to that which is most excellent in the soul in the *being* of grace; but the image of recreation is reckoned according to the habits of the theological virtues: it seems therefore that no habits are more excellent than those habits.

**On the contrary:**
1. Bernard in the book *On the Love of God*, chapter two[^7]: « Love advances into charity, charity advances into wisdom »; but there is no advance except by progress toward something more excellent: therefore the gift of wisdom is more excellent than charity: therefore the gifts are simply more excellent than the virtues, by the consideration of the Philosopher, because, « if the best in one genus is better than the best in another genus, it is simply better than it ».

2. Likewise, the nobility and dignity of habits is recognized through their acts; but the acts of the gifts are more excellent than the acts of the virtues, as is plain from what precedes[^8], because the virtues are for first acts, the gifts for intermediate acts: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, what is constituted by addition to another in the genus of good is more excellent than it, as « to live well is better than to live[^9] »: since therefore the gifts are constituted by addition to the virtues, because they are posterior to the virtues and are for acting readily; therefore the gifts are more perfect and more excellent than the virtues.

4. Likewise, those habits are more excellent which make a man more like the state of glory and the perfection that was in Christ; but the gifts are of this kind, because they all were in Christ and are in the state of glory, which cannot be said of the virtues[^10]: therefore it seems that the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

> **Conclusion.** The gifts and the virtues, as regards the grace informing them, are of equal dignity; as regards their acts going forth, one habit is nobler than another; as regards the states following upon them, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning the habits of the virtues and of the gifts under the character of dignity one must speak in three ways, according to the threefold comparison of these habits: either in comparison to the *grace* informing the habits themselves and making them gratuitous, or in comparison to the *acts going forth*, or in comparison to the *states following upon them*. If in comparison to the *grace* informing the habits themselves; since it is one, rendering equally the soul acceptable to God and its power and habits and works[^11]; thus the other habits existing in the same soul are of equal dignity and merit. — But if we speak of them in comparison to the *acts going forth*; thus one habit is nobler than another, as the theological virtues are more excellent than the cardinal, since their acts tend immediately into God, and among the theological [virtues] charity is the most excellent. — But if we speak as regards the *states following upon them*; since the uses of the virtues are had in the state of imperfection, but the uses of the gifts promote[^12] a man to the state of perfection; thus the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, as the state of those advancing is more perfect than the state of those beginning; and this is because that second state presupposes the preceding state. Whence, as well-being is better than being, because well-being states being and still something more; so the habits rendering the powers ready for intermediate acts are more excellent than the habits rendering them ready[^13] for first acts, not by reason of that which they add alone, but by reason of that which they add and presuppose. — Whence it must be conceded that in this manner the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, and the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that charity is more excellent than all the gifts; it must be said that the Apostle compares charity to those things which can be had without charity, such as faith and hope and the other virtues, which can be had without charity[^14]. But because the gifts of the Holy Spirit presuppose charity and add something beyond the habit of charity, as the habit of wisdom adds an aptitude and promptitude for tasting readily *how sweet the Lord is*; hence it is that that comparison has no place here, for the reason that the one is enclosed in the other.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best; it must be said that there is a perfection of *sufficiency* and a perfection of *excellence* and a perfection of *superabundance*[^15]. The first is a perfection in a genus and *in a certain respect*; but the last is a perfection simply.

To this perfection, namely the first, something can be added, because beyond the sufficiency of necessity there is the excellence of supererogation, which can be superadded to it. When therefore it is said that no addition can be made to the perfect: this is not understood of the perfect said in the first manner, but in the last. But when it is said that virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best; this is understood in the first manner, but not in the last; because it so perfects that it disposes toward the best.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that virtue is the utmost of a power; it must be said that that definition is given of natural virtue[^16]; and therefore it has no place here. — It can also be said otherwise, that as the habit of the virtues is said to consist in the mean, not because it is a punctual mean, but because it approaches the punctual mean[^17]; so too virtue is said to be the utmost of a power, not because it places the power itself at the summit, but because it makes it approach the summit. And therefore from this it cannot be had that beyond the habit of virtue there is no positing of another, more excellent habit.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the act of virtue consists most of all in the mean; it must be said that this is true in those habits in whose acts[^18] there can be excess; but this is not true in all acts nor in all virtues, as is plain in the theological virtues; and therefore that reason does not compel, as is plain: for it is better to keep virginal continence, which seems altogether to incline toward the extreme, than conjugal continence;

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that that habit is worthier which has more of the gratuitous and the meritorious; the answer is to be made by destroying the minor [premise]: for charity, which is in the soul with respect to the habits existing in the same, equally influences and equally renders them gracious and meritorious in their acts. And if it be objected that merit is first attributed to charity; it must be said that this is no obstacle, because, as has been said, the gifts in their acts presuppose charity and its act, and through this also the completion of merit.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the image of recreation, which is the noblest in the *being* of grace, is reckoned in the virtues; it must be said that this is true as regards the first being of grace; nevertheless as regards the greater advance in good the image of recreation consists not only in the soul in the habits of the virtues[^19], but also as regards the habits of the gifts and the beatitudes; which is plain, because our cognitive [power] is first repaired unto the habit of faith, and then further repaired through the gift of understanding, and afterward through cleanness of heart, which disposes one toward contemplating God[^20].

---

la: Vers. 31. — Glossa, sicut hic affertur, invenitur apud Petr. Lombard. (in hunc loc.), additis tamen post *caritatem* verbis *excellentiorem* praedictis. Apud Lyranum prima pars Glossae habetur ut Glossa interlinearis, secundo ut ordinaria; apud Strabum tertia pars tantum habetur, pariter ut Glossa ordinaria.

en: Verse 31 [1 Cor. 12:31]. — The Gloss, as it is here adduced, is found in Peter Lombard (on this passage), with the words *more excellent* added, however, after *charity*, as aforesaid. In Lyra the first part of the Gloss is given as an interlinear Gloss, the second as ordinary; in Strabo only the third part is found, likewise as an ordinary Gloss.

la: Libr. VII. Phys. text. 17. (c. 3.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — De altero dicto Philosophi vide supra pag. 95, nota 10.

en: Book VII of the *Physics*, text 17 (c. 3). Cf. II *Sent.*, d. 27, dub. 3. — On the other saying of the Philosopher see above, p. 95, note 10.

la: Libr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. ult. (c. 11.). Vide tom. I. pag. 564, nota 1, et tom. II. pag. 671, n. 6.

en: Book I *On the Heavens and the World*, last text (c. 11). See vol. I, p. 564, note 1, and vol. II, p. 671, n. 6.

la: Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Mox pro *ultra virtutes* edd. *aliud habitus virtutum*.

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6 ff. — Presently, for *beyond the virtues* the editions read *another, the habits of the virtues*.

la: Vide August., XIV. de Trin. c. 4. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — De imagine recreationis cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. in corp., et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

en: See Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 4, n. 6, and c. 8, n. 11. — On the image of recreation cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, in the body, and II *Sent.*, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Num. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. — Sententia Philosophi invenitur III. Topic. c. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 740, nota 8.

en: N. 3. Cf. above, p. 596, note 7. — The opinion of the Philosopher is found in *Topics* III, c. 2. Cf. above, p. 740, note 8.

la: Quaest. I. — De maiori vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.

en: Question I. — On the major [premise] see above, p. 470, note 8, at the end.

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. — De proposit. seq. vide quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro *expedite* edd. *expedita*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2. — On the following proposition see the preceding question. — A little below, for *readily* the editions read *ready*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et supra d. XXVII. c. 1. — Subinde pro *sint* codd. A G H K bb *sunt*.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3, and above, d. XXVII, c. 1. — Thereafter, for *should be* codices A G H K bb read *are*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro *ceteri* edd. *cuncti*; cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 1. Inferius voci *cardinalibus* cod. A praemittit *virtutibus*.

en: See II *Sent.*, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Presently, for *the other* the editions read *all*; cf. above, p. 680, note 1. Below, before the word *cardinal* codex A prefixes *virtues*.

la: Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *promovent*, Vat. *promoveat*; et etiam paulo ante cum pluribus codd. *habeatur* pro *habeantur*.

en: Many codices and editions 1, 2 read *promote* [indic.], the Vatican *may promote* [subj.]; and likewise a little before, with several codices, *should be had* [sing.] for *should be had* [plur.].

la: Edd. subiungunt *primo*.

en: The editions add *first*.

la: Petr. Lombard. in I. Cor. 12, 31: *Et adhuc* [excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro], gradatim illos ad utiliora provehit ostendens, praedictas gratias non semper ad meritum pertinere, sed ad honorificentiam Dei... Unde in fine his qui dicent: *Domine, in nomine tuo prophetavimus...* dicet Dominus: *Recedite a me* etc. — Paulo inferius respicitur illud Ps. 33, 9: *Gustate et videte, quoniam suavis est Dominus.* Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 1.

en: Peter Lombard on 1 Cor. 12:31: *And yet* [I show you a more excellent way], showing that he advances them step by step toward more useful things, that the aforesaid graces do not always pertain to merit, but to the honoring of God... Whence at the end, to those who will say: *Lord, in thy name we have prophesied...* the Lord will say: *Depart from me*, etc. — A little below there is reference to that of Ps. 33:9: *Taste and see that the Lord is sweet.* Cf. below, d. 35, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 654, nota 7. Vide etiam Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).

en: Cf. above, p. 654, note 7. See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — Pro *et ideo* codd. G L T aa *et iam*.

en: See II *Sent.*, d. 27, dub. 3. — For *and therefore* codices G L T aa read *and now*.

la: Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. — Paulo inferius post *sed quia facit* codd. omittunt *ipsam*.

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6. — A little below, after *but because it makes* the codices omit *it*.

la: Cod. Z *habitus virtutum*. Post pauca pro *in quorum actibus* Vat. *in quorum actus*.

en: Codex Z reads *the habits of the virtues*. After a few words, for *in whose acts* the Vatican [reads] *in which the act*.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and 2, as well as d. 27, a. 2, q. 5.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 570, note 6.

translators_notes:
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**Page-split map (body).** p.741 R-col-lower opens with the header + opener; arguments 1–2 in p.741-L (lower), arguments 3–5 in p.741-R. Argument 6 + *Sed contra* (1–4) + Conclusio + Respondeo + replies 1–2 on p.742. Replies 3–4 on p.743-L (top); replies 5–6 on p.743-R; q3 closes at *…quae disponit ad Deum contemplandum.* (raw 51566). ARTICULUS II opener (`ARTICULUS U.`) follows immediately in p.743-L (raw 51600) — see bounding below.

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**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false` — **REDIRECT to q1's article-master scholion §IV** (the *praecellentia* dossier: S. Thom. S. loc. cit. a. 8 + II.II q. 9 a. 1 ad 3 «perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus» / theol. virt. «praeferuntur donis et regulant ea»; B. Albert hic a. 1; Richard. Med. hic a. 1 q. 1). No `SCHOLION.` header occurs in q3's range; q1 §IV forward-covers this question (same pattern as q2 → §III). See `vol3/bon-sent-III-d34-p1-a1-q1.md` § IV.

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**ARTICULUS II bounding.** The next semantic boundary is the `ARTICULUS U.` opener at **raw line 51600** (printed `ARTICULUS II. — De donis in comparatione ad se invicem. — Consequenter quaeritur de donis secundum comparationem, quam habent ad se invicem. Et circa hanc quaeruntur tria…`), printed p.743-L. q3 is bound there.

**`[?]` flags:** NONE. All three pages legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0