title: Dist. 26, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XXVI)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XXVI)

source_text:
<!-- page 647 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Voluntas est animi motus ad aliquid assequendum* etc. Sicut enim dicit Philosophus[^1]: «Peccat qui definit id quod est in quiete, per id quod est in motu»; sed voluntas est potentia: ergo male definitur, cum dicitur: «Voluntas est animi motus».

<!-- page 648 -->

— Item, velle plus est agere quam pati, ergo plus movere quam moveri: si ergo motus sonat in passionem, videtur, quod voluntas non debeat dici animi motus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Anselmus[^2], voluntas dicitur aequivoce ad voluntatem-instrumentum, et voluntatem-affectionem, et voluntatem-usum. Et Augustinus non definit hic voluntatem, prout accipitur pro potentia, sed prout accipitur pro usu. — Et si tu quaeras, quare magis definit voluntatem, prout accipitur pro *usu* quam pro *potentia*? ratio huius est, quia potentiae manifestantur per actus[^3], et ideo, cognita voluntate-usu, per consequens cognoscitur voluntas-potentia. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod usus voluntatis non est passio, sed actio, et ita non debet dici motus; dicendum, quod motus non tantummodo accipitur passive, immo etiam accipitur active; et praeterea omnes actiones animae quodam modo passiones sunt[^4].

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans est fides cum dilectione*. Videtur enim, quod ista notificatio gratiae non sit conveniens. Cum enim gratia et virtus diversas habeant notificationes, non videtur, quod unum habeat notificari per alterum[^5]. — Item, cum gratia non solummodo ponat in anima fidem et caritatem, sed etiam spem; videtur insufficienter dicere Magister, cum dicit, quod est fides cum dilectione.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum diversae definitiones et notificationes gratiae assignentur diversimode, penes quid sumitur ratio et distinctio harum?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister non intendit in illo verbo notificare gratiam gratum facientem quantum ad suam *essentiam*, sed intendit eam notificare quasi *per posterius* et quodam modo *per effectum*. Cum enim habitus cognoscantur per actus, et actus gratiae duplex sit secundum duplicem potentiam, videlicet secundum intellectum et affectum: ideo per illos habet gratia notificari. Et quia in illos actus non exit gratia, nisi mediantibus habitibus virtutum, videlicet fidei et caritatis, ideo notificans gratiam dicit, quod gratia nihil aliud est quam fides cum dilectione, pro eo quod per istos duos habitus habet anima in actus exire, per quos innotescit nobis gratia[^6].

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur de pluralitate definitionum, dicendum, quod gratia habet comparari ad suum *principium*, habet comparari ad suum *subiectum*, habet comparari ad suum *oppositum*, habet comparari ad suum *effectum*, habet etiam comparari ad suum *praemium*; et secundum has diversas comparationes diversae reperiuntur eius notificationes.

Secundum comparationem ad suum *principium* est illa Isidori[^7]: «Gratia est divinae misericordiae donum, per quod bonae voluntatis est exitus». — Per comparationem autem ad suum *subiectum*, sic est illa quae datur super illud Psalmi[^8]: *Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo*: «Gratia est quidam nitor animae ad conciliandum sanctum amorem». — Per comparationem ad suum *oppositum*, sic est illa quae datur in Glossis super Epistolas[^9]: «Gratia est iustificatio et remissio peccatorum». — Per comparationem ad suum *effectum*, sic est illa Chrysostomi[^10]: «Gratia est sanitas mentis et delectatio cordis». — Per comparationem autem ad suum *praemium*, sic est illa: Gratia est similitudo gloriae. — Secundum autem omnes comparationes istas sic assignatur una definitio magistralis[^11], quae talis est: Gratia est forma, a Deo gratis data sine

<!-- page 649 -->

meritis, gratum faciens habentem et opus eius bonum reddens. Invenitur autem et alia notificatio gratiae, qua dicitur: Gratia est manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, quae sumta est ex illo quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^12]: *Unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus* etc.; sed ista est notificatio gratiae gratis datae.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Fides, qua iustificatus es, gratis tibi data est.* Ex hoc enim videtur velle dicere Augustinus, et Magister, quod mediante fide fit iustificatio; sed contrarium huius est, quia ab eodem est animae iustificatio, a quo est vivificatio. Sed vivificatio est ab ipsa gratia; nam fides sine gratia non vivificat, immo mortua est: ergo non videtur, quod iustificatio sit a fide, sed a gratia. Si tu dicas, quod iustificationem attribuat fidei ratione adiunctae gratiae; quaeritur: quare non attribuit alii virtuti, sicut fidei? — Item, quaeritur: quid est quod dicit, quod *fides impetrat iustificationem*[^13]? Aut intelligit de informi, aut de formata. Non de informi, quia per eam nihil meremur et nihil impetramus. Si de formata, hoc non potest sane intelligi. Nemo enim habet fidem formatam, nisi sit iustificatus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod iustificatio dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo iustificatio dicitur iustitiae infusio; alio modo iustificatio dicitur in iustitia[^14] exercitatio. Secundum autem quod iustificatio dicitur *in iustitia exercitatio*, sic verbum Magistri, immo Augustini, verum est et planum. Nemo enim in iustitia exercitatur, nisi mediante fide operante per dilectionem; et haec[^15] dicitur impetrare iustificationem, id est profectum iustitiae, qui consequitur ex bonorum operum et meritorum multiplicatione, quod non contingit esse sine fide et caritate. Sine fide enim, sicut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo[^16], *impossibile est placere Deo*; sine caritate etiam impossibile est, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio. — Si autem dicatur iustificatio *iustitiae infusio*, sic adhuc habet veritatem, licet non ita plane. Aut enim est infusio iustitiae in parvulo, aut in adulto. Si in parvulo; sic dicitur esse iustificatio per fidem non propriam, sed parentum, vel totius Ecclesiae, sicut dicit Augustinus ad Bonifacium[^17]. Si autem sit iustificatio in adulto; sic, cum quatuor concurrant ad iustificationem, scilicet *gratiae infusio, contritio, motus liberi arbitrii* et *peccati remissio*, sicut dicunt magistri; et motus liberi arbitrii sit motus, qui pertinet ad virtutem fidei: non inconvenienter dicitur adultus *per fidem iustificari*; nec huic obstat, quod iustificatur *per gratiam*. Illa enim quatuor necessario requiruntur ad iustificationem impii; et ideo aliquando homo dicitur iustificari per *gratiam*, aliquando per *fidem*, aliquando per *poenitentiam*, quia peccati remissio praesupponit illa tria. Et per hoc patent obiecta. Ista enim melius explanantur in quarto, distinctione decima septima[^18].

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is asked about what he says: *The will is a motion of the soul toward attaining something*, etc. For, as the Philosopher says[^1]: «He errs who defines that which is at rest by that which is in motion»; but the will is a potency: therefore it is ill-defined, when it is said: «The will is a motion of the soul».

— Likewise, to will is more to act than to be acted upon, therefore more to move than to be moved: if therefore motion sounds of passion, it seems that the will ought not to be called a motion of the soul.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Anselm says[^2], "will" is said equivocally of the will-as-instrument, the will-as-affection, and the will-as-use. And Augustine does not here define the will as it is taken for the potency, but as it is taken for the use. — And if you ask, why he rather defines the will as it is taken for *use* than for *potency*? the reason for this is that potencies are made known through their acts[^3], and therefore, once the will-as-use is known, the will-as-potency is consequently known. — To that which is objected, that the use of the will is not a passion but an action, and so ought not to be called a motion; it must be said that motion is not taken only passively, but indeed is also taken actively; and moreover all the actions of the soul are in a certain way passions[^4].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *grace, going before and preparing the will, is faith with love*. For it seems that this notification of grace is not fitting. For since grace and virtue have diverse notifications, it does not seem that the one should be made known through the other[^5]. — Likewise, since grace places in the soul not only faith and charity, but also hope; it seems that the Master speaks insufficiently, when he says that it is faith with love.

Alongside this it is asked: since the diverse definitions and notifications of grace are assigned in diverse ways, in respect of what is the ground and distinction of these taken?

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master, in that word, does not intend to make grace, which makes-pleasing, known as to its *essence*, but he intends to make it known as it were *through what is posterior* and in a certain way *through its effect*. For since habits are known through their acts, and the act of grace is twofold according to the twofold potency, namely according to the intellect and the affection: therefore through these grace is made known. And because grace does not go forth into those acts except through the mediating habits of the virtues, namely of faith and charity, therefore he, making grace known, says that grace is nothing other than faith with love, for the reason that through these two habits the soul has its going-forth into the acts through which grace becomes known to us[^6].

But to that which is asked about the plurality of definitions, it must be said that grace may be compared to its *principle*, may be compared to its *subject*, may be compared to its *opposite*, may be compared to its *effect*, and may also be compared to its *reward*; and according to these diverse comparisons diverse notifications of it are found.

According to the comparison to its *principle* there is that of Isidore[^7]: «Grace is the gift of the divine mercy, through which there is the going-forth of a good will». — But by the comparison to its *subject*, there is that which is given upon that word of the Psalm[^8]: *That he may make glad the face with oil*: «Grace is a certain brightness of the soul for procuring holy love». — By the comparison to its *opposite*, there is that which is given in the Glosses upon the Epistles[^9]: «Grace is justification and the remission of sins». — By the comparison to its *effect*, there is that of Chrysostom[^10]: «Grace is the health of the mind and the delight of the heart». — But by the comparison to its *reward*, there is that: Grace is the likeness of glory. — And according to all these comparisons there is thus assigned one magisterial definition[^11], which is as follows: Grace is a form, given freely by God without

merits, making the one who has it pleasing and rendering his work good. But there is also found another notification of grace, by which it is said: Grace is the manifestation of the spirit unto profit, which is taken from that which is said in the first to the Corinthians, the twelfth chapter[^12]: *To each is given the manifestation of the spirit* etc.; but this is the notification of grace freely given.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The faith by which you have been justified has been freely given to you.* For from this Augustine, and the Master, seem to wish to say that justification comes about through the mediation of faith; but the contrary of this is the case, because the justification of the soul is from the same source as is its vivification. But vivification is from grace itself; for faith without grace does not vivify, but rather is dead: therefore it does not seem that justification is from faith, but from grace. If you say that he attributes justification to faith by reason of the adjoined grace; it is asked: why does he not attribute it to another virtue, as to faith? — Likewise, it is asked: what is it that he says, that *faith obtains justification*[^13]? Either he understands it of unformed faith, or of formed. Not of unformed, because through it we merit nothing and obtain nothing. If of formed, this cannot be soundly understood. For no one has formed faith, unless he is justified.

**I respond:** It must be said that justification can be spoken of in two ways. In one way justification is called the infusion of justice; in another way justification is called the exercise in justice[^14]. But according as justification is called *the exercise in justice*, thus the word of the Master, indeed of Augustine, is true and plain. For no one is exercised in justice except by the mediation of faith working through love; and this[^15] is said to obtain justification, that is, the advance of justice, which follows from the multiplication of good works and merits, which does not happen to be without faith and charity. For without faith, as it is said to the Hebrews, the eleventh chapter[^16], *it is impossible to please God*; and without charity it is likewise impossible, as it is said in the first to the Corinthians, the thirteenth chapter. — But if justification be called *the infusion of justice*, thus it still has truth, although not so plainly. For either there is an infusion of justice in an infant, or in an adult. If in an infant; thus it is said to be a justification through a faith not its own, but of the parents, or of the whole Church, as Augustine says to Boniface[^17]. But if there be justification in an adult; thus, since four things concur to justification, namely *the infusion of grace, contrition, the motion of free choice*, and *the remission of sin*, as the masters say; and the motion of free choice is a motion which pertains to the virtue of faith: it is not unfittingly said that the adult *is justified through faith*; nor does it stand against this, that he is justified *through grace*. For those four are necessarily required for the justification of the impious; and therefore sometimes a man is said to be justified by *grace*, sometimes by *faith*, sometimes by *penance*, because the remission of sin presupposes those three. And by this the objections are clear. For these things are better explained in the fourth book, the seventeenth distinction[^18].

---

la: Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.), ubi agens de vitiis definitionis (si definitio non derivatur et formatur ex simpliciter notioribus, neque ex iis quae nobis notiora sunt) ait: Si eius quod est in quiete et definitione, per indefinitum et quod in motu est, assignata est oratio nobis. Prius enim est et notius quod manens est et definitum, eo quod indefinitum et in motu est. — Mox edd., excepta I, et pauci codd. voci *potentia* praefigunt *in*.

en: Bk. VI of the *Topics*, c. 3 (c. 4), where, treating of the vices of definition (if a definition is not derived and formed from things simply more known, nor from those things which are more known to us), he says: If the account given to us of that which is at rest and in its definition is given through what is indefinite and in motion [it is faulty]. For that which abides and is definite is prior and more known, inasmuch as the indefinite is also in motion. — Further on, the editions, except I, and a few codices prefix *in* to the word *potentia*.

la: De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. Vide supra pag. 601, nota 6.

en: *On the Harmony of God's Foreknowledge [Predestination, and Grace] with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 11. See above, p. 601, note 6.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 118. (c. 11.) et III. text. 2. et 12. seqq. (c. 4. seq.), ubi dicit, sentire et intelligere esse «pati quoddam». — Pro *omnes actiones* cod. bb *omnes affectiones*. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 8, et S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 1; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 118 (c. 11) and III, text 2 and 12 ff. (c. 4 f.), where he says that to perceive and to understand are «a certain being-acted-upon». — For *omnes actiones* codex bb reads *omnes affectiones*. — This doubt is also resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 8, and *Summa* p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 1; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1.

la: Nam, ut ait Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 2, neque unam duorum, neque duas eiusdem definitiones possibile est esse. — Definitiones varias virtutis videsis infra d. 27. dub. 3.

en: For, as Aristotle says, *Topics* VII, c. 2, it is impossible that there be either one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. — You may see the various definitions of virtue below, d. 27, dub. 3.

la: Vat. omittit *gratia*, substituto paulo superius *dicitur gratia* pro *habet anima*. Mox pro *de pluralitate* codd. I V *de diversitate*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *gratia*, having substituted a little above *dicitur gratia* for *habet anima*. Next, for *de pluralitate* codices I, V read *de diversitate*.

la: Libr. II. Differentiarum (de Differentiis rerum; alias: de Differ. spiritual.) c. 32. (alias 27.) n. 115: Gratia autem est divinae misericordiae donum gratuitum, per quod et bonae voluntatis initium et operis promeremur effectum. Explicationem huius sent. vide infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.

en: Bk. II of the *Differences* (*On the Differences of Things*; otherwise: *On Spiritual Differences*) c. 32 (otherwise 27), n. 115: But grace is the gratuitous gift of the divine mercy, through which we merit both the beginning of a good will and the effect of the work. See the explanation of this opinion below, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.

la: Ps. 103, 16. — Haec definitio delibata est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc locum; vide supra pag. 637, nota 3.

en: Ps. 103:16. — This definition is drawn from Augustine, *Enarration* on this passage; see above, p. 637, note 3.

la: In Glossa interlin. super Rom. 1, 3. et 5, 15. Glossa ordinaria in I. Tim. 1, 2. annotat: *Misericordia* hic accipitur pro eo quod in aliis Epistolis *gratia* dicitur, id est remissio peccatorum.

en: In the interlinear Gloss on Rom. 1:3 and 5:15. The ordinary Gloss on 1 Tim. 1:2 notes: *Mercy* here is taken for that which in the other Epistles is called *grace*, that is, the remission of sins.

la: Explicans illud Rom. 1, 7: *Gratia vobis et pax*, dicit (hom. 1. n. 4.), quod «qui adoptionem servat et sanctificationem accurate custodit, illo qui diademate redimitur et purpura induitur, longe splendidior feliciorque est, atque in praesenti vita tranquillitate fruitur magna, spe bona fretus nullamque habens tumultus et perturbationis occasionem, sed voluptate perpetua gaudens. Hilaritatem enim et laetitiam non imperii magnitudo... parere solet, sed recte factum spirituale tantum et bona conscientia». Ibid. c. 3, 14. verba *abundantiam gratiae* interpretans ait (hom. 10. n. 2): Haec itaque omnia abundantiam gratiae Paulus vocavit ostendens, nos pharmacum accepisse non modo par vulneri, sed etiam sanitatem» etc. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 6: «Secundum Anselmum gratia est cordis delectatio; secundum alios gratia est sanitas mentium». S. Thom., de Verit. q. 27. a. 1: Damascenus dicit, quod gratia est delectatio animae. — De seq. definit. gratiae cfr. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro *et delectatio* cod. K *vel delectatio*.

en: Explaining that of Rom. 1:7: *Grace to you and peace*, he says (hom. 1, n. 4) that «he who keeps adoption and carefully guards sanctification is far more splendid and happy than he who is crowned with a diadem and clad in purple, and in the present life enjoys great tranquillity, relying on good hope and having no occasion of tumult and disturbance, but rejoicing in perpetual delight. For it is not the greatness of empire... that is wont to produce cheerfulness and gladness, but only a spiritual right deed and a good conscience». Likewise, c. 3, 14, interpreting the words *the abundance of grace*, he says (hom. 10, n. 2): All these things, then, Paul called the abundance of grace, showing that we have received a remedy not only matched to the wound, but even health» etc. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 6: «According to Anselm grace is the delight of the heart; according to others grace is the health of minds». St. Thomas, *On Truth* q. 27, a. 1: Damascene says that grace is the delight of the soul. — On the following definition of grace cf. d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — For *et delectatio* codex K reads *vel delectatio*.

la: B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 3; «Praepositivus et alii antiqui magistri sic definierunt eam: Gratia est habitus infusus, divinae bonitati et caritati similis, gratum faciens habentem et opus eius gratum reddens». Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6[1]. m. 2. a. 6. hanc quoque definitionem magistralem affert (secundum B. Albert., hic a. 1, et S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 3. delibatam ex August., libro de Corrept. et gratia): Gratia est habitus mentis universaliter totius vitae ordinativus.

en: Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 3: «Praepositinus and the other ancient masters defined it thus: Grace is an infused habit, like to the divine goodness and charity, making the one who has it pleasing and rendering his work pleasing». Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 6, also adduces this magisterial definition (according to Blessed Albert, here a. 1, and *Summa* p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 3, drawn from Augustine, the book *On Rebuke and Grace*): Grace is a habit of the mind ordering the whole of life universally.

la: Vers. 7. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal. et B. Albert., locc. in nota praec. citt.

en: Verse 7. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales and Blessed Albert, in the places cited in the preceding note.

la: Cap. 2. Vat. cum ed. 3, 4 *de hoc* pro *quid est*.

en: Ch. 2. The Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, reads *de hoc* for *quid est*.

la: Pro *in iustitia* codd. H T *iustitiae*. Paulo inferius Vat. cum ed. 3, 4 omittit verba *immo Augustini*, loco quorum ed. 2 cum aliquibus codd. ponit *immo magis*; cod. aa cum ed. 4 exhibet *immo magis Augustini*.

en: For *in iustitia* codices H, T read *iustitiae*. A little below, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 omits the words *immo Augustini*, in place of which edition 2 with some codices puts *immo magis*; codex aa with edition 4 gives *immo magis Augustini*.

la: Ita Codd. A C K L O R S T etc. alii *hoc*, Vat. *hic*, quae subinde etiam cum ed. 3, 4 substituit *quae* pro *qui*.

en: Thus codices A, C, K, L, O, R, S, T etc.; others read *hoc*, the Vatican edition *hic*, which thereupon also, with editions 3, 4, substitutes *quae* for *qui*.

la: Ver. 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 1. seqq.: Si linguis hominum loquar etc. — Mox pro *plane* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *plene*.

en: Verse 6. — The following text is the passage cited, v. 1 ff.: If I speak with the tongues of men etc. — Next, for *plane* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *plene*.

en: *Letter* 98 (otherwise 23), n. 5 and 9.

la: Part. I. q. 1. per totum. — Pro *decima septima* codd. et primae edd. *decima sexta*, sed ibi agitur tantummodo de contritione. — Hoc dubium solvit Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Part I, q. 1, throughout. — For *the seventeenth* the codices and the early editions read *the sixteenth*, but there it is treated only of contrition. — Peter of Tarentaise resolves this doubt, here on the text.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF per the Vol II Override (raw lines ~45231–45348 of `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`; offset pdf = printed + 22). The IA djvu OCR interleaves the two columns and fragments the Respondeo/footers; reflowed Left-column-then-Right per page. OCR garbles silently corrected: litterara→litteram, quaeritnr→quaeritur, Volunlas/molus/niotus→Voluntas/motus, polentia→potentia, cli·fec^wne→dilectione, notiflcatio→notificatio, notiflcare→notificare, innolescit→innotescit, comparari/coraparationem→comparationem, iustiflcatio→iustificatio, viviflcatio→vivificatio, nani→nam, profectum/profectum (kept), pluralitnte→pluralitate.

**DUB count verified = three (DUB. I, DUB. II, DUB. III)** at 450 dpi. DUB.I = re Lombard's "*Voluntas est animi motus*" definition (Aristot. VI Topic c.3: one ought not define what-is-at-rest by what-is-in-motion); resolved by Anselm's threefold equivocation of *voluntas* (instrument/affection/use). DUB.II = re "*gratia... est fides cum dilectione*" — Isidore (principium), Psalm-Gloss (subiectum), Epistle-Gloss (oppositum), Chrysostom (effectum), gloria-likeness (praemium), the magisterial def. (all five), and the *manifestatio spiritus* def. of *gratia gratis data*. DUB.III = re "*Fides, qua iustificatus es, gratis tibi data est*" (ad Hebr. 11 *impossibile est placere Deo*) — justification as *iustitiae infusio* vs *in iustitia exercitatio*; the four concurrents in the adult.

**Page-split map.** p.647 (R-col bottom, after the q6 SCHOLION tail): DUBIA header + DUB.I opener (Philosophus quote) — footer ¹ (Topic VI c.3). p.648: DUB.I body tail + Respondeo (Anselm) + DUB.II (args + Respondeo + the five comparison-definitions + magisterial def. opener) — footers ¹–¹¹. p.649 (L-col): DUB.II tail (*manifestatio spiritus*, def. septima) + DUB.III (args + Respondeo, ending "...melius explanantur in quarto, distinctione decima septima") — footers ¹–⁷. The true `DISTINCTIO XXVII / CAP. I` begins immediately after DUB.III on p.649 R-col (its NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers belong to d.27, NOT here).

**Apparatus split map (19 entries, body-anchor order):** p.647 footer ¹ → [^1]. p.648 footers ¹–¹¹ → [^2]–[^11] (Anselm de Concord. → [^2]; Aristot. de Anima text.33 → [^3]; Aristot. de Anima text.118 + cod. bb + Albert/Thom/Petr/Richard/Aegid solvent → [^4]; Aristot. VII Topic c.2 + d.27 dub.3 → [^5]; Vat. omittit gratia → [^6]; Isidore Differ. → [^7]; Ps.103:16 August. → [^8]; Glossa Rom. → [^9]; Chrysostom hom.1+10 + Alex.Hal + S.Thom de Verit → [^10]; Albert/Praepositinus + Alex.Hal magisterial def → [^11]). p.649 footers ¹–⁷ → [^12]–[^18] (I Cor.12 v.7 → [^12]; Cap.2 Vat. var → [^13]; *in iustitia* cod. var + *immo Augustini* var → [^14]; codd A C K L O R S T *hoc/hic/quae* var → [^15]; Hebr.11 v.6 + *plane/plene* → [^16]; August. Epist.98 ad Bonifacium → [^17]; IV Sent. Part.I q.1 + *decima septima/sexta* + Petr. a Tar. → [^18]). No content dropped; no merges. The p.649 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footers (August. Epist.186; Edd. var) belong to DISTINCTIO XXVII, excluded here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED nothing (the q6 SCHOLION closed clean on p.647 before the DUBIA header). FORWARDED nothing (DUB.III closes at p.649 with footer ⁷; DISTINCTIO XXVII owns its own p.649 R-col + footer block).

**Dup resolution.** The auto-chunked canonical `d26-dubia` (raw 45172–45232) was MIS-RANGED: it held the QUAESTIO VI SCHOLION II–IV tail (the *de auxiliis* controversy material, ending "...quos vide in scholio ad d. 27. a. 1. q. 1."), NOT the DUBIA body — that material belongs to d26-a1-q6's scholion, already captured there. The true DUBIA body (DUB. I–III) was in the stray `d26-dubia-dup2` (raw 45233–45348). This canonical chunk was rebuilt from the dup2 range + 450 dpi PDF; `d26-dubia-dup2` is `git rm`'d. No content lost. (Same misranged-stray pattern resolved earlier for d26-divisio.)

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 27

title_alt: Distinction XXVII — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 649 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXVII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Utrum eadem gratia sit, quae dicitur operans et cooperans.*

Hic considerandum est, cum praedictum sit, per gratiam *operantem* et *praevenientem* voluntatem hominis liberari ac praeparari, ut bonum velit, et per gratiam *cooperantem* et *subsequentem* adiuvari, ne frustra velit; utrum una et eadem sit gratia, id est unum munus gratis datum, quod operetur et cooperetur; an diversa, alterum operans, et alterum cooperans. — Quibusdam non irrationabiliter videtur, quod una et eadem sit gratia, idem donum, eadem virtus, quae *operatur* et *cooperatur*, sed propter diversos eius effectus et dicitur operans et cooperans. *Operans* enim dicitur, in quantum liberat et praeparat voluntatem hominis, ut bonum velit; *cooperans* vero, in quantum eandem adiuvat, ne frustra velit, scilicet ut opus faciat bonum. Ipsa enim gratia non est otiosa, sed meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici[^1].

#### Cap. II.

#### *Quomodo gratia meretur augeri.*

Si vero quaeritur, quomodo ipsa[^2] gratia praeveniens mereatur augeri et perfici, cum nullum meritum sit absque libero arbitrio; et quid sit ipsa gratia, an virtus, an non; et si virtus, an actus, vel non: ut hoc aperte insinuari valeat, praemittendum est, tria esse genera bonorum.

<!-- page 650 -->

#### Cap. III.

#### *De tribus generibus bonorum.*

Alia namque sunt *magna*, alia *minima*, alia *media*, ut Augustinus ait in primo libro Retractationum[^3]: « Virtutes, inquit, quibus recte vivitur, magna bona sunt. Species autem quorumlibet corporum, sine quibus recte vivi potest, minima bona sunt. Potentiae vero animi, sine quibus recte vivi non potest, media bona sunt. Item, virtutibus nemo male utitur; ceteris autem bonis, id est mediis et minimis, non solum bene, sed etiam male quisque uti potest; et ideo virtute nemo male utitur, quia opus virtutis est bonus usus istorum, quibus etiam non bene uti possumus; nemo autem bene utendo male utitur. Non solum autem magna, sed etiam media et minima bona esse praestitit bonitas Dei ». — Ecce habes tria genera bonorum distincta.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *In quibus bonis sit liberum arbitrium.*

Quaeritur autem, in quibus bonis contineatur liberum arbitrium. De hoc Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum[^4] ita ait: « In mediis quidem bonis invenitur liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quia et male illo uti possumus; sed tamen tale est, ut sine illo recte vivere nequeamus. Bonus autem usus eius iam virtus est, quae in magnis reperitur bonis, quibus male uti nullus potest. Et quia bona et magna et media et minima ex Deo sunt, sequitur, ut ex Deo sit etiam bonus usus liberae voluntatis, qui virtus est et in magnis numeratur bonis ». — Attende diligenter quae dicta sunt, et confer in unum; sic enim aperietur quod supra quaerebatur. Dixit equidem, opus virtutis esse bonum usum illorum bonorum, quibus etiam non bene uti possumus, id est mediorum, in quibus posuit liberum arbitrium, cuius quoque bonum usum dixit esse virtutem. Quod si est, non est ergo opus virtutis, quod supra dixit, quia aliud est virtus, aliud opus eius.

#### Cap. V.

#### *De virtute, quid sit, et quid actus eius.*

Hic videndum est, quid sit virtus, et quid sit actus vel opus eius. — Virtus est, sicut ait Augustinus[^5], bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur. Ideoque opus Dei tantum est, sicut de virtute iustitiae Augustinus docet super illum locum Psalmi[^6]: *Feci iudicium et iustitiam*, ita dicens: « Iustitia magna virtus animi est, quam non fecit in homine nisi Deus. Ideoque, cum ait Propheta ex persona Ecclesiae: *Feci iustitiam*, non ipsam virtutem, quam non facit homo, sed opus eius intelligi voluit ». — Ecce aperte insinuatur hic, quod iustitia in homine non est opus hominis, sed Dei; quod et de aliis virtutibus itidem intelligendum est.

Nam de gratia fidei Ephesiis scribens Apostolus, similiter fidem non ex homine, sed ex Deo tantum esse, asserit inquiens: *Gratia estis salvati per fidem, et hoc non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est*. Quod a Sanctis ita exponitur: « Hoc, id est[^7] fides, non est vi naturae nostrae, quia donum Dei pure est ». — Ecce et hic manifeste traditur, quod fides non est ex libertate arbitrii sive ex arbitrio voluntatis, quod superioribus consonat, ubi dictum est, gratiam praevenientem vel operantem esse virtutem, quae voluntatem hominis liberat et sanat. Unde Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et littera ait: « Iustificati sumus non per liberam voluntatem, sed per gratiam Christi; non quod sine voluntate nostra fiat, sed voluntas nostra ostenditur infirma per legem, ut sanet gratia voluntatem, et sana voluntas impleat legem ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *De gratia, quae liberat voluntatem, si virtus est, vel non.*

Si igitur gratia, quae sanat et liberat voluntatem hominis, virtus est vel una, vel plures; cum ipsa gratia non sit ex arbitrio voluntatis, sed eam potius sanet ac praeparet, ut bona sit; consequitur, ut virtus non sit ex libero arbitrio, et ita non sit motus vel affectus mentis, cum omnis motus vel affectus mentis sit ex libero arbitrio, sed bonus ex gratia et libero arbitrio, malus vero ex libero arbitrio tantum. Ut enim ait Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum[^8]: « Homo sponte et libero arbitrio cadere potuit, non etiam resurgere ». Idem in libro de Duabus Animabus[^9]: « Animae si libero ad faciendum et non faciendum motu animi careant[^10], si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur; earum peccatum tenere non possumus ». — Hic aperte ostenditur, quod motus animi, sive ad bonum sive ad malum, ex libero arbitrio est. Ideoque, si gratia vel virtus motus mentis est, ex libero arbitrio est. Si vero ex libero arbitrio vel ex parte est, iam non solus Deus sine homine eam facit. Propterea quidam[^11] non inerudite tradunt, virtutem esse bonam mentis qualitatem sive formam, quae animam informat; et ipsa non est motus vel affectus animi, sed ea liberum arbitrium iuvatur, ut ad bonum moveatur et erigatur; et ita ex virtute et libero arbitrio nascitur bonus motus vel affectus animi, et exinde bonum opus procedit exterius. Sicut pluvia rigatur terra, ut germinet et fructum faciat, nec pluvia est terra nec germen nec fructus, nec terra germen vel fructus, nec germen

<!-- page 651 -->

fructus; ita gratis terrae mentis nostrae, id est arbitrio[^12] voluntatis, infunditur pluvia divinae benedictionis, id est, inspiratur gratia — quod solus Deus facit, non homo cum eo — qua rigatur voluntas hominis, ut germinet et fructificet; id est, sanatur et praeparatur, ut bonum velit, secundum quod dicitur *operans*; et iuvatur, ut bonum faciat, secundum quod dicitur *cooperans*. Et illa gratia *virtus* non incongrue nominatur, quia voluntatem hominis infirmam sanat et adiuvat.

#### Cap. VII.

#### *Quomodo ex gratia incipiant bona merita, et de qua gratia hoc intelligatur.*

Cum ergo ex gratia dicuntur esse bona merita et incipere; aut intelligitur gratia gratis dans, id est Deus, vel potius gratia gratis data, quae voluntatem hominis praevenit. Non enim esset magnum, si haec a Deo dicerentur esse, a quo sunt omnia; sed potius eius gratia gratis data intelligitur, ex qua incipiunt bona merita, quae cum ex sola gratia esse dicantur, non excluditur liberum arbitrium, quia nullum meritum est in homine, quod non sit per liberum arbitrium. Sed in bonis merendis causae principalitas gratiae attribuitur; quia principalis causa bonorum meritorum est ipsa gratia, qua excitatur liberum arbitrium et sanatur, atque iuvatur voluntas hominis, ut sit bona.

#### Cap. VIII.

#### *Quod bona voluntas gratia principaliter dicitur.*

Quae ipsa etiam donum Dei est et hominis meritum, immo gratiae, quia ex gratia principaliter est et gratia est. Unde Augustinus ad Sixtum presbyterum[^13]: « Quid est meritum hominis ante gratiam, cum omne bonum meritum nostrum non in nobis facit nisi gratia »? Ex gratia enim, ut dictum est, quae praevenit et sanat arbitrium hominis, et ex ipso arbitrio procreatur in anima hominis bonus affectus sive bonus motus mentis; et hoc est primum bonum hominis meritum. Sicut, verbi gratia, ex fidei virtute et hominis arbitrio generatur in mente motus quidam bonus et remunerabilis, scilicet ipsum credere; ita ex caritate et libero arbitrio alius quidam motus provenit, scilicet diligere, bonus valde; sic de ceteris virtutibus intelligendum est. Et isti boni motus vel affectus *merita* sunt et *dona Dei*[^14], quibus meremur et ipsorum augmentationem et alia, quae consequenter hic et in futuro nobis apponuntur[^15].

#### Cap. IX.

#### *Qua ratione dicitur fides mereri iustificationem.*

Cum ergo dicitur fides mereri iustificationem et vitam aeternam, ex ea ratione dictum accipitur, quia per actum fidei meretur illa. Similiter de caritate et iustitia et de aliis accipitur. Si enim fides[^16] ipsa, virtus praeveniens, diceretur esse mentis actus, qui est meritum, iam ipsa ex libero arbitrio originem haberet; quod quia non est, *sic* dicitur esse meritum, quia actus eius est meritum, si tamen adsit caritas, sine qua nec credere nec sperare meritum est vitae. Unde apparet vere, quia caritas est Spiritus sanctus[^17], quae animae qualitates informat et sanctificat, ut eis anima informetur et sanctificetur, sine qua animae qualitas non dicitur *virtus*, quia non valet sanare animam.

#### Cap. X.

#### *De muneribus virtutum, et de gratia, quae non est, sed facit meritum.*

Ex muneribus[^18] itaque virtutum boni sumus et iuste vivimus; et ex gratia, quae non est meritum, sed facit, non tamen sine libero arbitrio, proveniunt merita nostra, scilicet boni affectus eorumque progressus atque bona opera, quae Deus remunerat in nobis, et haec ipsa sunt Dei dona. Unde Augustinus ad Sixtum presbyterum[^19]: « Cum coronat Deus merita nostra, nihil aliud coronat quam munera sua. Unde vita aeterna, quae in fine a Deo meritis praecedentibus redditur — quia et eadem merita, quibus redditur, non a nobis sunt, sed in nobis facta sunt per gratiam — recte et ipsa vita gratia nuncupatur, quia gratis datur. Nec ideo gratis, quia non meritis datur, sed quia data sunt per gratiam et ipsa merita, quibus datur ». Ex praemissis iam innotescere nobis aliquatenus potest, qualiter gratia praeveniens meretur augeri, et alia; et quid ipsa sit, an virtus, an aliud; et si virtus, an sit actus, vel non. Ostensum enim est supra[^20] ex parte quorundam, quod ipsa est virtus, et virtus non est actus, sed eius causa, non tamen sine libero arbitrio. Unde quod supra[^21] Augustinus dixit, bonum usum liberi arbitrii esse virtutem, ita accipi potest, id est, actum virtutis; alioquin sibi contradicere videretur, qui etiam opus virtutis supra dixit esse bonum usum eorum, quibus non bene uti possumus, in quibus posuit liberum arbitrium. Si vero bonus usus liberi arbitrii opus virtutis est, iam virtus non est. Cum ergo bonum usum eius virtutem esse dixit, nomine virtutis ipsius usum significavit.

<!-- page 652 -->

#### Cap. XI.

#### *Quod idem est usus virtutis et liberi arbitrii, sed virtutis principaliter.*

Idem nempe usus bonus ex virtute est et ex libero arbitrio, sed ex virtute principaliter. Et bonus ille usus in magnis bonis annumerandus est. Illa autem gratia praeveniens, quae et virtus est, non usus liberi arbitrii est, sed ex ea potius est bonus usus liberi arbitrii; quae nobis est a Deo, non a nobis. Usus vero bonus arbitrii et ex Deo est et ex nobis; et ideo bonum meritum est. Ibi enim solus Deus operatur, hic Deus et homo. Hoc meritum ex illa purissima gratia provenit; quod Apostolus[^22] notavit dicens: *Gratia Dei sum id quod sum, et gratia eius in me vacua non fuit*. Super quem locum Augustinus ita ait: « Recte gratiam nominat; primum enim solam gratiam dat Deus, et non nisi gratis, cum non praecedant nisi mala merita; sed post per gratiam incipiunt bona merita. Et ut ostenderet etiam liberum arbitrium, addit: *Et gratia eius in me vacua non fuit*. Et ne ipsa voluntas sine gratia Dei putetur aliquid boni posse, subdit: *Non autem ego*, solus scilicet sine gratia, *sed gratia Dei mecum*, id est cum libero arbitrio ». Plane cum data fuerit gratia, incipiunt esse nostra merita bona, per illam tamen; quia si illa defuerit, cadit homo.

#### Cap. XII.

#### *Quidam putant, virtutes bonos usus esse liberi arbitrii, id est actus mentis.*

Alii vero dicunt, virtutes esse bonos usus minorum potentiarum, non tamen omnes, sed tantummodo interiores, qui in mente sunt; exteriores vero, qui per corpus geruntur, non virtutes esse dicunt, sed opera virtutum. Et ideo quod Augustinus dicit, opus virtutis esse bonum usum naturalium potentiarum, de usu exteriori accipiunt; quod vero dicit, bonum usum liberi arbitrii virtutem esse et in magnis numerari bonis, de usu interiori intelligunt. Et virtutes nihil aliud esse quam bonos affectus vel motus mentis, asserunt, quos Deus in homine facit, non homo; quia, licet illi motus sint liberi arbitrii, non tamen esse queunt, nisi Deus ipsum liberet et adiuvet gratia sua operante et cooperante; quam Dei gratuitam voluntatem accipiunt, quia Deus est, qui et operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum.

Quod autem virtutes sint *motus mentis*, testimoniis Sanctorum astruunt. Dicit enim Augustinus super Ioannem[^23]: « Quid est fides? Credere quod non vides ». Credere autem motus mentis est. Idem in libro tertio de Doctrina christiana: « Caritatem autem voco motum animi ». Si vero caritas et fides motus animi sunt, virtutes ergo motus animi sunt. — Quibus alii respondentes, praemissa verba Augustini ita intelligenda fore inquiunt: Fides est credere quod non vides, id est, fides est virtus, qua creditur quod non videtur. Item: Caritas est motus animi, id est gratia, qua movetur animus ad diligendum. Et quod haec et his similia ita accipienda sint, ex his coniicitur, quae alibi Augustinus ait. Nam in secundo libro Quaestionum Evangelii[^24] inquit: « Est fides, qua creduntur ea quae non videntur, quae proprie dicitur fides ». Item, in decimo tertio libro de Trinitate[^25]: « Aliud sunt ea quae creduntur, aliud est fides, qua creduntur ». Ex quibus verbis sic argumentando procedunt: aliud est credere, aliud illud quo creditur. Praedictum autem est, fidem id esse, quo creditur. Sic igitur credere non est fides, quia credere non est id quo creditur. Addunt quoque: Virtus opus Dei tantum est, quam ipse solus facit in nobis. Ipsa ergo non est usus vel actus liberi arbitrii; sed credere est actus liberi arbitrii: non est itaque virtus. — Praemissis aliisque rationibus ac testimoniis innituntur utrique. Horum autem iudicium diligentis lectoris relinquo examini, ad alia properans.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXVII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Whether the grace which is called operating is the same as that which is called cooperating.*

Here it must be considered, since it has been said above that by *operating* and *prevenient* grace the will of man is freed and prepared, so that it may will the good, and by *cooperating* and *subsequent* grace is aided, lest it will in vain: whether the grace is one and the same, that is, one freely-given gift, which both operates and cooperates; or whether it is diverse, the one operating, the other cooperating. — To certain men it seems not irrationally that it is one and the same grace, the same gift, the same virtue, which both *operates* and *cooperates*, but on account of its diverse effects it is also called operating and cooperating. For it is called *operating* insofar as it frees and prepares the will of man, so that he may will the good; and *cooperating* insofar as it aids that same will, lest it will in vain, namely that it may do a good work. For grace itself is not idle, but merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected[^1].

#### Cap. II.

#### *In what way grace merits to be increased.*

But if it is asked in what way this[^2] prevenient grace merits to be increased and perfected, since no merit exists apart from free choice; and what this grace itself is, whether a virtue, or not; and if a virtue, whether an act, or not: so that this may be plainly intimated, it must be premised that there are three kinds of goods.

<!-- page 650 -->

#### Cap. III.

#### *On the three kinds of goods.*

For some are *great*, some *least*, and some *middling*, as Augustine says in the first book of the Retractations[^3]: « The virtues, he says, by which one lives rightly, are great goods. But the appearances of any bodies whatsoever, without which one can live rightly, are least goods. And the powers of the soul, without which one cannot live rightly, are middling goods. Likewise, no one uses the virtues badly; but the other goods, that is, the middling and the least, anyone can use not only well but also badly; and therefore no one uses virtue badly, because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can use also not well; but no one by using well uses badly. And not only the great, but also the middling and least goods, the goodness of God bestowed ». — Behold, you have the three kinds of goods distinguished.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *In which goods free choice is found.*

But it is asked, in which goods free choice is contained. On this Augustine in the first book of the Retractations[^4] thus says: « In the middling goods indeed is found the free choice of the will, because we can also use it badly; but yet it is such that without it we cannot live rightly. But the good use of it is now a virtue, which is found among the great goods, which no one can use badly. And since goods both great and middling and least are from God, it follows that the good use of free will is also from God, which is a virtue and is numbered among the great goods ». — Attend diligently to what has been said, and gather it into one; for thus will be opened what was asked above. He said indeed that the work of virtue is the good use of those goods which we can also use not well, that is, of the middling goods, in which he placed free choice, whose good use too he said to be a virtue. But if this is so, then it is not the work of virtue, as he said above, because virtue is one thing, the work of it another.

#### Cap. V.

#### *On virtue, what it is, and what its act is.*

Here it must be seen what virtue is, and what its act or work is. — Virtue is, as Augustine says[^5], a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly, which God alone works in man. Therefore it is the work of God alone, as Augustine teaches concerning the virtue of justice upon that place of the Psalm[^6]: *I have done judgment and justice*, thus saying: « Justice is a great virtue of the soul, which none has made in man save God. Therefore, when the Prophet, in the person of the Church, says: *I have done justice*, he willed not the virtue itself, which man does not make, but the work of it, to be understood ». — Behold, it is here plainly intimated that justice in man is not the work of man, but of God; which is likewise to be understood of the other virtues.

For writing to the Ephesians concerning the grace of faith, the Apostle similarly asserts that faith is not from man, but from God alone, saying: *By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves; for it is the gift of God*. Which is thus expounded by the Saints: « This, that is[^7], faith, is not by the power of our nature, because it is purely the gift of God ». — Behold, here too it is manifestly handed down that faith is not from the liberty of choice or from the choice of the will, which is consonant with what was said above, where it was said that prevenient or operating grace is the virtue which frees and heals the will of man. Whence Augustine in the book on the Spirit and the Letter says: « We are justified not through free will, but through the grace of Christ; not that this comes about without our will, but our will is shown to be infirm through the law, so that grace may heal the will, and the healed will may fulfill the law ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *On the grace which frees the will, whether it is a virtue, or not.*

If, then, the grace which heals and frees the will of man is a virtue, whether one or several; since grace itself is not from the choice of the will, but rather heals and prepares it, that it may be good; it follows that virtue is not from free choice, and thus is not a motion or affection of the mind, since every motion or affection of the mind is from free choice, but the good [motion] is from grace and free choice, while the bad is from free choice alone. For as Augustine says in the first book of the Retractations[^8]: « Man of his own accord and by free choice was able to fall, but not also to rise again ». The same in the book on the Two Souls[^9]: « If souls lack the motion of the mind for doing and not-doing freely, if finally no power of abstaining from their own work is granted them[^10], we cannot hold them guilty of sin ». — Here it is plainly shown that the motion of the mind, whether to good or to evil, is from free choice. Therefore, if grace or virtue is a motion of the mind, it is from free choice. But if it is from free choice even in part, then God alone does not make it without man. Therefore certain men[^11] not unlearnedly hand down that virtue is a good quality or form of the mind, which informs the soul; and it itself is not a motion or affection of the soul, but by it free choice is aided, that it may be moved and raised toward the good; and thus from virtue and free choice is born a good motion or affection of the soul, and thence a good work proceeds outwardly. Just as by rain the earth is watered, that it may germinate and bear fruit, yet the rain is not the earth, nor the sprout, nor the fruit, nor is the earth the sprout or fruit, nor the sprout

<!-- page 651 -->

the fruit; so into the earth, freely given, of our mind, that is, into the choice[^12] of the will, is poured the rain of the divine blessing, that is, grace is breathed in — which God alone does, not man with him — by which the will of man is watered, that it may germinate and bear fruit; that is, it is healed and prepared, so that it may will the good, according to which it is called *operating*; and it is aided, that it may do the good, according to which it is called *cooperating*. And that grace is not incongruously named a *virtue*, because it heals and aids the infirm will of man.

#### Cap. VII.

#### *In what way good merits begin from grace, and of which grace this is to be understood.*

When therefore good merits are said to be from grace and to begin; either grace freely-giving is understood, that is, God, or rather grace freely given, which goes before the will of man. For it would be no great thing if these were said to be from God, from whom are all things; but rather his grace freely given is understood, from which good merits begin, which, although they are said to be from grace alone, free choice is not thereby excluded, because no merit is in man which is not through free choice. But in the meriting of good things the principality of cause is attributed to grace; because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is stirred and healed, and the will of man is aided, that it may be good.

#### Cap. VIII.

#### *That the good will is said to be principally from grace.*

Which good will is itself also the gift of God and the merit of man, nay rather of grace, because it is principally from grace and is grace. Whence Augustine to the priest Sixtus[^13]: « What is the merit of man before grace, since grace alone makes our every good merit in us »? For from grace, as has been said, which goes before and heals the choice of man, and from that choice itself, is procreated in the soul of man a good affection or a good motion of the mind; and this is man's first good merit. Just as, for example, from the virtue of faith and the choice of man is generated in the mind a certain good and rewardable motion, namely the very act of believing; so from charity and free choice another certain motion proceeds, namely loving, very good; and so is it to be understood of the other virtues. And these good motions or affections are *merits* and *gifts of God*[^14], by which we merit both their increase and other things, which are consequently bestowed upon us here and in the future[^15].

#### Cap. IX.

#### *By what reckoning faith is said to merit justification.*

When therefore faith is said to merit justification and eternal life, it is taken to be said on this account, that through the act of faith it merits them. Similarly it is taken of charity and justice and the others. For if faith[^16] itself, the prevenient virtue, were said to be an act of the mind, which is a merit, then it itself would have its origin from free choice; which, because it is not so, it is *thus* said to be a merit, because its act is a merit, provided however that charity is present, without which neither to believe nor to hope is a merit of life. Whence it appears truly that charity is the Holy Spirit[^17], which informs and sanctifies the qualities of the soul, that by them the soul may be informed and sanctified, without which a quality of the soul is not called a *virtue*, because it has no power to heal the soul.

#### Cap. X.

#### *On the gifts of the virtues, and on the grace which is not, but makes, merit.*

From the gifts[^18] of the virtues, therefore, we are good and live justly; and from the grace which is not a merit, but makes [merit], yet not without free choice, proceed our merits, namely good affections and their progress and good works, which God rewards in us, and these very things are the gifts of God. Whence Augustine to the priest Sixtus[^19]: « When God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts. Whence eternal life, which at the end is rendered by God to preceding merits — since even the very merits, to which it is rendered, are not from us, but are made in us through grace — is rightly itself also called grace, because it is given freely. Nor freely on this account, that it is given not to merits, but because those very merits also, to which it is given, were given through grace ». From the foregoing it can now in some measure become known to us how prevenient grace merits to be increased, and other things; and what it itself is, whether a virtue, or something else; and if a virtue, whether it is an act, or not. For it has been shown above[^20], on the part of certain men, that it itself is a virtue, and that virtue is not an act, but its cause, yet not without free choice. Whence, what Augustine said above[^21], that the good use of free choice is a virtue, can be taken thus, that is, [as] the act of virtue; otherwise he would seem to contradict himself, who also said above that the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can use not well, in which he placed free choice. But if the good use of free choice is the work of virtue, then it is not virtue. Therefore, when he said that its good use is a virtue, by the name of virtue he signified the use of it.

<!-- page 652 -->

#### Cap. XI.

#### *That the use of virtue and of free choice is the same, but principally of virtue.*

For indeed the same good use is from virtue and from free choice, but principally from virtue. And that good use is to be numbered among the great goods. But that prevenient grace, which is also a virtue, is not the use of free choice, but rather from it is the good use of free choice; which is to us from God, not from us. But the good use of choice is both from God and from us; and therefore it is a good merit. For there God alone operates, here God and man. This merit proceeds from that most pure grace; which the Apostle[^22] noted, saying: *By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been void*. Upon which place Augustine thus says: « Rightly does he name grace; for first God gives grace alone, and not save freely, since nothing precedes save evil merits; but afterward through grace good merits begin. And to show free choice also, he adds: *And his grace in me has not been void*. And lest the will itself without the grace of God be thought able to do something good, he subjoins: *Not however I*, alone namely without grace, *but the grace of God with me*, that is, with free choice ». Plainly, when grace has been given, our good merits begin to be, yet through it; because if it is wanting, man falls.

#### Cap. XII.

#### *Some think that the virtues are good uses of free choice, that is, acts of the mind.*

But others say that the virtues are good uses of the lesser powers, yet not all, but only the interior ones, which are in the mind; while the exterior ones, which are carried out through the body, they say are not virtues, but works of the virtues. And therefore what Augustine says, that the work of virtue is the good use of the natural powers, they take of the exterior use; but what he says, that the good use of free choice is a virtue and is numbered among the great goods, they understand of the interior use. And they assert that the virtues are nothing other than good affections or motions of the mind, which God makes in man, not man; because, although those motions are of free choice, yet they cannot be unless God frees and aids him by his grace operating and cooperating; which gratuitous will of God they take [it to be], because it is God who both works in us to will and to do the good.

But that the virtues are *motions of the mind*, they establish by the testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says upon John[^23]: « What is faith? To believe what you do not see ». But to believe is a motion of the mind. The same in the third book on Christian Doctrine: « But charity I call a motion of the soul ». But if charity and faith are motions of the soul, then the virtues are motions of the soul. — To whom others, answering, say that the foregoing words of Augustine are thus to be understood: Faith is to believe what you do not see, that is, faith is the virtue by which is believed what is not seen. Likewise: Charity is a motion of the soul, that is, the grace by which the soul is moved to loving. And that these and the like are thus to be taken, is gathered from these things which Augustine says elsewhere. For in the second book of the Questions on the Gospel[^24] he says: « It is faith by which are believed those things which are not seen, which is properly called faith ». Likewise, in the thirteenth book on the Trinity[^25]: « The things which are believed are one thing, the faith by which they are believed another ». From which words they thus argue and proceed: to believe is one thing, that by which one believes another. But it has been said before that faith is that by which one believes. Thus therefore to believe is not faith, because to believe is not that by which one believes. They add also: Virtue is the work of God alone, which he alone makes in us. It therefore is not the use or act of free choice; but to believe is an act of free choice: it is therefore not a virtue. — Upon the foregoing and other reasons and testimonies both [parties] rely. The judgment of these things I leave to the examination of the diligent reader, hastening on to other matters.

---

en: Augustine, Letter 186, c. 3, n. 10.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *illa*. — Mox post *augeri* codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *et perfici*.

en: Editions 1 and 8 read *illa*. — Shortly after, following *augeri*, the codices and edition 1 omit *et perfici*.

la: Cap. 9. n. 4, et II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 50.

en: Chapter 9, n. 4, and the second book on Free Choice, c. 19, n. 50.

la: Loc. cit. n. 6.

en: The place cited, n. 6.

la: Haec definitio virtutis ex variis locis S. Augustini collecta est, praesertim ex I. Retract. c. 9. n. 3, et II. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. 19. — Ut iam dictum est, hoc loco communiter assignatur initium et cap. I. d. XXVII. S. Thom. in Comment. eandem divisionem habet, sicut S. Bonav.

en: This definition of virtue is gathered from various places of St. Augustine, especially from the first book of the Retractations, c. 9, n. 3, and the second book on Free Choice, cc. 18, 19. — As has already been said, at this place the beginning is commonly assigned also to c. I of d. XXVII. St. Thomas in his Commentary has the same division, as does St. Bonaventure.

en: Psalm 118, [verse] 121, Sermon 26, n. 1.

la: Cap. 2, 8; cfr. ibi Glossa interlinearis. Pro *Hoc, id est* Vat. ceteraeque edd., exceptis 1, 8, cum cod. C habent *Haec scilicet*. Mox Vat. cum pluribus edd. *aperte* pro *manifeste*.

en: Chapters 2, 8; cf. the interlinear Gloss there. For *Hoc, id est* the Vatican edition and the rest, except 1 and 8, together with codex C have *Haec scilicet*. Shortly after, the Vatican edition with several editions reads *aperte* for *manifeste*.

en: Chapter 9, n. 15.

la: Cap. 9. n. 6; II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54; de Dono persev. c. 11. n. 27.

en: Chapter 9, n. 6; the second book on Free Choice, c. 20, n. 54; on the Gift of Perseverance, c. 11, n. 27.

la: Cap. 12. n. 17, et I. Retract. c. 15. n. 6. — Paulo inferius edd. 1, 8 *carent* pro *careant*.

en: Chapter 12, n. 17, and the first book of the Retractations, c. 15, n. 6. — A little further down, editions 1 and 8 read *carent* for *careant*.

la: Cfr. Hugo, I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 17.

en: Cf. Hugh, the first book on the Sacraments, part VI, c. 17.

la: Vat. ceteraeque edd., exceptis 1, 8, cum cod. C praefigunt *libero*, et paulo superius eadem cum edd. 2, 9 legit *gratia terrae* pro *gratis terrae*.

en: The Vatican edition and the rest, except 1 and 8, together with codex C prefix *libero*, and a little above the same [editions] with editions 2 and 9 read *gratia terrae* for *gratis terrae*.

la: Solummodo Vat. et plures edd. addunt *bonus*.

en: Only the Vatican edition and several editions add *bonus*.

la: Cod. Erf. annotat: *supra d. 26. cap. Itaque bona* etc. Huic sententiae Magistri satis concordat Gandolph. III. c. 114; sed tamen in fine probat, quod fides meretur, per Glossam Rom. 12: *Unicuique sicut Deus divisit mensuram fidei*, et est in Glossa ibid. i. e. ea ratione, quod Deus dedit unicuique divisim dona mensurata, quae fides meretur; et patet exponendo sic: quae dona fides meretur i. e. ex fide sunt nobis dona, quibus meremur.

en: Codex Erf. notes: *above, d. 26, the chapter Itaque bona*, etc. With this opinion of the Master agrees well enough Gandulph, book III, c. 114; yet in the end he proves that faith merits, through the Gloss on Romans 12: *To each as God has apportioned the measure of faith*, and it is in the Gloss there, i.e. by this reckoning, that God gave to each separately measured gifts, which faith merits; and it is plain by expounding thus: which gifts faith merits, i.e. from faith there are to us the gifts by which we merit.

la: Cod. A addit *scilicet*.

en: Codex A adds *scilicet*.

la: De hac opinione Magistri cfr. Comment. supra d. 26. q. 2.

en: On this opinion of the Master cf. the Commentary above, d. 26, q. 2.

la: Edd. 1, 5, 8 adiiciunt *vel actibus*. Cod. Erf. advertit: Alii habent: *ex actibus itaque et muneribus*, ut *actus* sumatur pro *usu*, *munus* pro *habitu*.

en: Editions 1, 5, 8 add *vel actibus*. Codex Erf. observes: Others have *ex actibus itaque et muneribus*, so that *actus* is taken for *usus*, and *munus* for *habitus*.

la: Epist. 194. c. 5. n. 19; in Ioan. tract. 3. n. 10; de Corrept. et gratia, c. 13. n. 41. Est etiam in Glossa ad Rom. 6, 23. — In principio huius textus post *Cum coronat* codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt *Deus*.

en: Letter 194, c. 5, n. 19; on John, tract 3, n. 10; on Rebuke and Grace, c. 13, n. 41. It is also in the Gloss on Romans 6, 23. — At the beginning of this text, after *Cum coronat*, the codices and editions 1 and 8 omit *Deus*.

la: Hic c. 5. seqq. — Mox Vat. pro *et virtus* habet *quia virtus*, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.

en: Here, c. 5 and following. — Shortly after, the Vatican edition for *et virtus* has *quia virtus*, against the codices and editions 1 and 8.

en: Here, cc. 3, 4.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 15, 10. August., de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 5. n. 12, et de Corrept. et gratia, c. 13. n. 41. — In quo textu post *gratia eius* edd. 1, 8 *gratiam nominat* pro *gratis*.

en: The Epistle, 1 Corinthians 15, 10. Augustine, on Grace and Free Choice, c. 5, n. 12, and on Rebuke and Grace, c. 13, n. 41. — In which text, after *gratia eius*, editions 1 and 8 read *gratiam nominat* for *gratis*.

la: Tract. 40. n. 9. Sequens textus est loc. cit. c. 10. 16: *Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum*.

en: Tract 40, n. 9. The following text is from the place cited, c. 10, [n.] 16: *I call charity a motion of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake*.

la: Quaest. 39. n. 1.

en: [Questions on the Gospel, Book II,] question 39, n. 1.

la: Cap. 2. n. 5. — Paulo inferius ante *illud quo* codd. B C et edd. 1, 8 addunt *est*.

en: Chapter 2, n. 5. — A little further down, before *illud quo*, codices B and C and editions 1 and 8 add *est*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 649–652 = PDF 671–674, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline; the IA djvu OCR (raw 45349–45572) was used only to confirm footnote-marker spacing and clean running-prose readings. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXVII; it is created fresh — the auto-chunker produced no `d27-littera`, and `d27-divisio` (raw 45577) begins at the COMMENTARIUS.

**Capitula (12).** Cap. I *Utrum eadem gratia sit, quae dicitur operans et cooperans*; Cap. II *Quomodo gratia meretur augeri*; Cap. III *De tribus generibus bonorum*; Cap. IV *In quibus bonis sit liberum arbitrium*; Cap. V *De virtute, quid sit, et quid actus eius*; Cap. VI *De gratia, quae liberat voluntatem, si virtus est, vel non*; Cap. VII *Quomodo ex gratia incipiant bona merita*; Cap. VIII *Quod bona voluntas gratia principaliter dicitur*; Cap. IX *Qua ratione dicitur fides mereri iustificationem*; Cap. X *De muneribus virtutum, et de gratia, quae non est, sed facit meritum*; Cap. XI *Quod idem est usus virtutis et liberi arbitrii, sed virtutis principaliter*; Cap. XII *Quidam putant, virtutes bonos usus esse liberi arbitrii*. (The resume note said "Cap. I–XI(+)"; eyes-on at 450 dpi confirms a full Cap. I–XII run.)

**Page-split map.** p.649 (L-col, after the d.26 DUB. III tail): DISTINCTIO XXVII header + Cap. I + Cap. II opener; Cap. I/II text closes into the p.649 footer block. p.650: Cap. III + Cap. IV + Cap. V opener (L→R). p.651: Cap. V tail (*Hoc, id est*) + Cap. VI + Cap. VII + Cap. VIII + Cap. IX + Cap. X (L→R). p.652: Cap. XI + Cap. XII (L→R), ending "…ad alia properans" immediately before COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVII (raw 45573). Body seams 649→650 / 650→651 / 651→652 grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**Apparatus split map (25 entries, body-anchor order).** p.649 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footers 1–2 → [^1]–[^2] (August. Epist. 186 → [^1]; Edd. *illa* / omit *et perfici* → [^2]). p.650 footers 1–9 → [^3]–[^11] (Retract. c.9 n.4 → [^3]; Loc. cit. n.6 → [^4]; *definitio virtutis* collecta + S. Thom. div. → [^5]; Ps. 118 Serm. 26 → [^6]; Cap. 2,8 Glossa + *Haec scilicet* / *aperte* var → [^7]; Cap. 9 n.15 → [^8]; Cap. 9 n.6 + de Lib. Arb. + de Dono persev. → [^9]; Cap. 12 n.17 + *carent/careant* → [^10]; Hugo de Sacram. → [^11]). p.651 footers 1–10 → [^12]–[^21] (Vat. *libero* / *gratia terrae* → [^12]; Epist. 194 → [^13]; addunt *bonus* → [^14]; Cod. Erf. + Gandulph + Glossa Rom. 12 → [^15]; Cod. A *scilicet* → [^16]; opinio Magistri d.26 q.2 → [^17]; *vel actibus* / *ex actibus* → [^18]; Epist. 194 + in Ioan. + de Corrept. + omit *Deus* → [^19]; Hic c.5 seqq. + *quia virtus* → [^20]; Hic c.3.4 → [^21]). p.652 footers 1–4 → [^22]–[^25] (1 Cor. 15,10 + de Gratia et lib. arb. + *gratiam nominat* var → [^22]; Tract. 40 n.9 + de Doctrina christiana c.10,16 → [^23]; Quaest. Evang. Lib. II qu.39 n.1 → [^24]; de Trin. XIII c.2 n.5 + *illud quo*/B C/edd.1,8 *est* var → [^25]). The p.652 L-col NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block runs footers 1–2 (→ [^22]–[^23]); the R-col band continues the same NOTAE block as footers 3–4 (→ [^24]–[^25], the two Cap. XII Augustine citations: *Quaestiones Evangelii* and *de Trinitate* XIII), before the NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM block (which belongs to d27-divisio). [^24]/[^25] restored 2026-05-30 (d.21–d.30 polish-blocker — they had been dropped). No merges, no splits; one printed footer per entry.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED the p.649 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footers 1–2 from d26-dubia, which explicitly excluded them as belonging to DISTINCTIO XXVII (see d26-dubia ## Notes). The separate p.649 footer sequence (Vers. 7; Cap. 2; *in iustitia*; ACKLORST; Ver. 6; Epist. 98; Part. I) was the DUB. I–III apparatus and was consumed by d26-dubia as its [^12]–[^18] — NOT re-used here. FORWARDED nothing: the littera closes "…ad alia properans" at raw 45572; the COMMENTARIUS (d27-divisio) owns its own p.652 R-col + following footer block (the p.652 *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* notes belong to d27-divisio).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. perficl→perfici, raota-tio→mutatio, friictus→fructus, dlcimtur→dicuntur, presbyterum spacing, miiituntur→innituntur, uidicmra→iudicium).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVII — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXVII — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 652 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVII.

### *De adiutorio gratiae in comparatione ad suas differentias et ad virtutem et meritum.*

*Hic considerandum est, cum praedictum sit* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de adiutorio gratiae in se; hic vero agit de ipso in comparatione. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas. In prima comparat unam differentiam gratiae ad aliam sub ratione habitus. In secunda vero comparat unum habitum ad alium sub ratione usus; usus autem gratiae est meritum. Unde primo comparat gratiam praevenientem ad subsequentem secundum identitatem et diversitatem. Secundo vero comparat gratiam ad virtutem et ad merendi efficaciam, ibi: *Si vero quaeritur, quomodo illa gratia praeveniens mereatur* etc. Et illa secunda pars dividitur in duas. In prima parte movet quaestiones et praemittit quaedam praeambula ad determinationem. In secunda vero incipit dissolvere, ibi: *Hic videndum est, quid sit virtus*, ubi communiter signatur distinctio vigesima septima, quae melius signaretur aliquantulum ante, sicut signavimus, quia ibi, ubi signatur, sicut apparet, determinatio ponitur[^1] quaestionis prae-

<!-- page 653 -->

missae. Illa igitur pars, in qua solvit, habet duas partes. In prima solvit ad praedictam quaestionem secundum opinionem communiorem. In secunda vero determinat secundum aliorum opinionem, quae minus tenetur communiter, ibi: *Alii vero dicunt, virtutes esse bonos usus* etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima Magister determinat. In secunda epilogat, ibi: *Ex praemissis iam innotescere* etc. Prima pars habet duas secundum determinationem duorum dubiorum. Primo enim determinat illam quaestionem, qua quaeritur[^2] de comparatione gratiae ad virtutem. Secundo vero determinat illam quaestionem, qua quaeritur de comparatione gratiae et virtutis ad meritum. Primum facit ibi: *Hic videndum est, quid sit virtus* etc. Secundum facit ibi: *Cum ergo ex gratia dicuntur esse bona* etc. Subdivisiones autem partium manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua agitur de gratiae comparatione, duo quaeruntur, secundum quod gratia dupliciter comparari habet.

Et primo quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum.

Secundo vero quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad merendi exercitium.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de una differentia gratiae in comparatione ad aliam.

Secundo vero quaeritur de ipsa gratia in comparatione ad virtutem gratuitam.

Tertio vero quaeritur de ipsa gratia in comparatione ad gloriam.

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXVII.

### *On the help of grace in comparison to its differences and to virtue and merit.*

*Here it must be considered, since it has been said before* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the help of grace in itself; here, however, he treats of it in comparison. Now this part is divided into two. In the first he compares one difference of grace to another under the aspect of habit. In the second he compares one habit to another under the aspect of use; and the use of grace is merit. Hence first he compares prevenient grace to subsequent grace according to identity and diversity. Second he compares grace to virtue and to the efficacy of meriting, there: *But if it is asked how that prevenient grace merits* etc. And that second part is divided into two. In the first part he raises questions and sets forth certain preambles to the determination. In the second he begins to resolve [them], there: *Here it must be seen what virtue is*, where distinction twenty-seven is commonly marked, which would better be marked a little before, as we have marked it, since there, where it is marked, as appears, the determination of the foregoing question is placed[^1].

For that part, then, in which he resolves, has two parts. In the first he resolves the aforesaid question according to the more common opinion. In the second he determines according to the opinion of others, which is held less commonly, there: *But others say that the virtues are good uses* etc. The first part has two [divisions]. In the first the Master determines. In the second he gives an epilogue, there: *From the foregoing it can now become known* etc. The first part has two [divisions] according to the determination of two doubts. For first he determines that question by which it is asked[^2] concerning the comparison of grace to virtue. Second he determines that question by which it is asked concerning the comparison of grace and virtue to merit. The first he does there: *Here it must be seen what virtue is* etc. The second he does there: *When therefore from grace they are said to be good* etc. Now the subdivisions of the parts are manifest in the text.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part, in which the comparison of grace is treated, two [things] are asked, according as grace is to be compared in two ways.

And first it is asked concerning grace in comparison to another habit.

Second it is asked concerning grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting.

Concerning the first, three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked concerning one difference of grace in comparison to another.

Second it is asked concerning grace itself in comparison to gratuitous virtue.

Third it is asked concerning grace itself in comparison to glory.

---

la: NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. Edd. *prioris*, incongrue; Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 propter hoc post *ubi signatur* adiicit *fit*.

en: Notes on the commentary. The earlier editions read *prioris* ("of the former"), incongruously; the Vatican edition together with editions 3 and 4, on this account, after *ubi signatur* ("where it is marked"), adds *fit* ("is made").

la: Plures codd., ut F T aa cc ee, cum ed. 1 *quae quaerit*.

en: Several codices, such as F T aa cc ee, together with edition 1, read *quae quaerit* ("which asks").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 652–653 = PDF 674–675, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 45573–45618 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). This chunk holds the **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVII** opener (lemma *Hic considerandum est, cum praedictum sit*) + **DIVISIO TEXTUS** + **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** (the listing of the two principal questions = the two articles, and ARTICULUS I's three sub-questions). `has_scholion=false` (no scholion attaches to a divisio chunk). The Vol II PDF-priority inversion applies: the OCR cascade-shattered the two-column DIVISIO TEXTUS, so the Latin was reflowed from the 450 dpi column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p652-{L,R}-*`, `vol2-p653-{L,R}-*`), reading each page Left column then Right column.

**Page-split map.** The COMMENTARIUS header + lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS opener sit on **p.652 R-col** (running head `652 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; the COMMENTARIUS follows immediately after the littera tail *…ad alia properans*). `<!-- page 653 -->` placed mid-word at *quaestionis prae-‖missae* (the column-foot break): the rest of the DIVISIO TEXTUS + the full TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM continue on **p.653** (running head `DIST. XXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 653`), ending immediately before **ARTICULUS I / De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum / QUAESTIO I / Utrum gratia gratum faciens dividi habeat per differentias essentialiter diversas**. QUAESTIO I body begins at raw 45623 (p.653, R-col mid-page) and — per Override §5, the short ARTICULUS I opener *De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum* folds into a1-q1 — is held by the `d27-a1-q1` chunk.

**Apparatus split map (2 entries).** The divisio carries 2 body markers and their footers:
- [^1] = the **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** footer on **p.652 R-col** ("Edd. *prioris*, incongrue; Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 propter hoc post *ubi signatur* adiicit *fit*"), anchored at the DIVISIO-TEXTUS word *ponitur* (Bonaventure's note on where the Master marks distinction 27).
- [^2] = **p.653 footer 1** ("Plures codd., ut F T aa cc ee, cum ed. 1 *quae quaerit*"), anchored at the divisio word *quaeritur* on p.653 ("…qua quaeritur de comparatione gratiae ad virtutem"; the variant *quae quaerit* applies to this *quaeritur*, NOT to the QUAESTIO I body which opens a few lines below).
The remaining **p.653 footers** (2 "Dist. praeced. c. 2. seqq…", 3 "Vers. 13…Glossam", 4 "Vers. 4", 5 "Aristot. I. Topic.", 6 "Aristot. II. Ethic.") anchor in the QUAESTIO I body and belong to `d27-a1-q1` — NOT duplicated here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none (d27-littera closed clean at *…ad alia properans* before the COMMENTARIUS; the littera owns p.652 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers 1–2 = its [^22]–[^23]). FORWARDED: none — the divisio closes clean at the end of the TRACTATIO question-list, immediately before ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I (raw 45619–45622); `d27-a1-q1` owns the QUAESTIO I body + p.653 footers 2–6 onward.

**⚠ Cross-chunk gap flagged for d27-littera (Override §4).** p.652's NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footer block runs **1–4** plus a separate NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM 1. The littera build captured only footers **1–2** (its [^22]–[^23]). Footers **3 ("Quaest. 39. n. 1.")** and **4 ("Cap. 2. n. 5. — Paulo inferius ante *illud quo* codd. BC et edd. 1, 8 addunt *est*.")** are NOTAE AD LIBR. text-notes for the LITTERA Cap. XII text (footer 3 = Augustine *Quaestionum Evangelii* lib. II q. 39 n. 1, cited by the littera's "in secundo libro Quaestionum Evangelii"; footer 4's *illud quo* annotates the littera's "aliud est credere, aliud *illud quo* creditur"). They do NOT anchor in the divisio body. They appear to have been dropped from `d27-littera` (which ends at [^23]) and should be added there as [^24]–[^25] when d.27 is polished. Logged here so the gap is not lost.

**TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, verified at 450 dpi — q-alignment reference for the d.27 articles):**

*Two principal questions (= the two articles; theme of the distinction: De adiutorio gratiae in comparatione ad suas differentias et ad virtutem et meritum):*
- (ART. I) *Et primo quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum.*
- (ART. II) *Secundo vero quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad merendi exercitium.*

*ARTICULUS I — three sub-questions ("Circa primum quaeruntur tria"; theme De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum):*
1. *Primo quaeritur de una differentia gratiae in comparatione ad aliam.*  (= a1-q1 — *Utrum gratia gratum faciens dividi habeat per differentias essentialiter diversas*)
2. *Secundo vero quaeritur de ipsa gratia in comparatione ad virtutem gratuitam.*  (= a1-q2)
3. *Tertio vero quaeritur de ipsa gratia in comparatione ad gloriam.*  (= a1-q3)

*ARTICULUS II — three sub-questions: the "Circa secundum quaeruntur tria" list is printed at the ARTICULUS II opener (raw ~46173), NOT in this divisio; to be recorded verbatim when a2-q1 is built.*

**Dup note.** `d27-dubia-dup2` (line_start 46814) is still to be resolved at d.27-dubia time (vs canonical `d27-dubia` line_start 46673 — same misranged-stray pattern as d.26).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. *cle→de*, *eoniparat→comparat*, *graliae→gratiae*, *habilus→habitus*, *virlulem→virtutem*, *eflicaciam→efficaciam*, *Sivero→Si vero*, *quaerilur→quaeritur*, *praeambnla→praeambula*, *seplima→septima*, *nielius→melius*, *liaJjet→habet*, *prinia→prima*, *communiler→communiter*, *virtiUes→virtutes*, *imXotescere→innotescere*, *intelligentiara→intelligentiam*, *dupHciter→dupliciter*, *exercitiura→exercitium*).
</content>
</invoke>