title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum omnes virtutes cardinales sint una virtus, an diversae.*

Secundo quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad ipsarum diversitatem, et quaeritur, utrum omnes virtutes cardinales sint una virtus, an diversae. Et quod sint diversae, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* per *potentias,* quas dirigunt: quia prudentia dirigit rationalem, temperantia concupiscibilem, fortitudo irascibilem[^1]: cum ergo potentiae sint propria subiecta habituum, et propriis subiectis diversificatis formaliter, necesse est, ipsarum habitus formaliter diversificari; et praedictae potentiae animae sunt diversae; videtur, quod necesse sit, cardinales virtutes esse distinctas et essentialiter diversas.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per *actus,* quos eliciunt: quoniam alius est actus ipsius prudentiae, formaliter loquendo, alius temperantiae, sicut patet: cum ergo habitus diversificentur per actus diversificatione formali et essentiali[^2], videtur, quod necessarium sit, habitus cardinalium virtutum essentialiter distingui.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *obiecta:* quia temperantia est circa delectationes et fortitudo circa passiones[^3]: cum ergo prima distinctio habituum ortum habeat ab obiectis, videtur ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, hoc ipsum quarto loco ostenditur per *vitia,* contra quae sunt. Si enim vitia, quibus opponuntur huiusmodi virtutes, simpliciter sunt diversorum generum, et privationes distinguuntur et diversificantur secundum ipsos habitus[^4]; videtur ergo, quod necessarium sit, habitus virtutum cardinalium formaliter et essentialiter ab invicem distingui.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *medietates,* secundum quas huiusmodi virtutes attenduntur. Si enim huiusmodi virtutes cardinales habent medietates formaliter differentes; cum medietates respiciant virtutes secundum ipsarum rationem formalem[^5], videtur ergo, quod necesse sit, ipsas virtutes cardinales essentialiter et formaliter esse differentes.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus, *de Moribus Ecclesiae*[^6]: « Illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur »; sed hoc non dicit diversitatem secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum relationem: ergo videtur, quod virtutes cardinales solummodo secundum comparationem habeant distingui, non secundum essentiam absolutam.

2. Item, Augustinus, in libro *de Quantitate animae*[^7]: « Virtus est aequalitas vitae undique rationi consentiens »; sed aequalitas vitae undique non potest esse secundum unam solam comparationem, sed secundum comparationem ad omnem actum et ad omne obiectum: ergo si haec est definitio virtutis recte assignata, videtur, quod quaelibet virtus ad

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omnem actum et ad omne obiectum habeat animam ordinare. Sed hoc non esset, si virtutes distinguerentur penes actus et obiecta: ergo videtur, quod virtutes cardinales non habeant aliquam essentialem differentiam.

3. Item, nullae formae ad invicem disparatae et diversae se ipsas denominant — quamvis enim vere dicatur, quod musicum sit album, tamen nullo modo conceditur, quod musica sit alba — sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod vult Bernardus[^8] et Augustinus, se ipsas denominant, quia fortitudo est prudens et prudentia fortis: ergo videtur, quod non habeant essentialem differentiam.

4. Item, « iustitia, secundum quod dicit Anselmus[^9], est rectitudo voluntatis »; sed omnis cardinalis virtus est rectitudo voluntatis: ergo omnis cardinalis virtus est iustitia. Si ergo iustitia nominat unam speciem virtutis, videtur, quod cardinales virtutes non habeant essentialem diversitatem sive formalem.

5. Item, cuilibet virtuti essentiale est inspicere *medium,* cuilibet etiam essentiale est *medium servare,* cuilibet etiam essentiale est *aggredi difficile,* cuiuslibet etiam est *ordinare*[^10]. Si ergo *medium inspicere* est ipsius prudentiae, *medium servare* temperantiae, *aggredi difficile* fortitudinis, *ordinare* ipsius iustitiae; videtur, quod quaelibet istarum virtutum intret essentiam alterius: non ergo formaliter distinguuntur.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Virtutes cardinales formaliter distinguuntur, quatenus ordinantur ad speciales actus, minus tamen distinguuntur, quatenus sunt gratia informatae et caritate meritoriae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad formam, per quam sunt *gratuitae,* et quantum ad formam, per quam sunt *meritoriae,* et quantum ad formam, per quam sunt ad speciales actuum differentias ordinatae.

Si loquamur de forma, per quam sunt *gratuitae;* sic in illa potius uniuntur, quam distinguuntur, quia illa forma est gratia gratum faciens, quae licet sit una, tamen gratam reddit Deo animam cum universis eius potentiis et habitibus virtuosis, sicut in secundo libro ostensum fuit, distinctione vigesima septima[^11]. — Similiter si loquamur de ipsis virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad formam, per quam sunt meritoriae et habent rationem merendi perfecte; sic magis connectuntur et uniuntur, quam distinguantur; quia illa forma est caritas, per quam virtutes ceterae tanquam pondere unico ad unum finem ultimum inclinantur quasi ad locum proprium; et hoc infra melius ostendetur in tractatu de connexione virtutum[^12]. — Si vero loquamur de ipsis virtutibus secundum formam, per quam sunt ad speciales actuum differentias ordinatae; sic dico, quod virtutes cardinales essentialiter et formaliter distinguuntur. Et earum diversitas colligitur ex quinque comparationibus, sicut in obiiciendo fuit ostensum, videlicet ex diversitate *potentiarum,* quas informant et perficiunt, et ex diversitate *actuum,* quos eliciunt, et ex diversitate *obiectorum,* ad quae ordinantur, et ex diversitate *medietatum,* circa quas consistunt, et ex diversitate *vitiorum* oppositorum, quae excludunt. Et ideo rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod virtus non est aliud quam varius affectus amoris; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de virtutibus cardinalibus, secundum quod reduci habent ad unam radicem caritatis, per quam habent perfecta ordinatione ad ipsum Deum ordinare, et ex hoc sortiuntur quandam connexionem et unitatem; vel hoc patet per litteram sequentem, qua definiens temperantiam dicit[^13]: « Temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem, fortitudinem amorem omnia propter Deum facile perferentem », et sic de aliis. Talis autem relatio temperantiae et fortitudinis in Deum per amorem non est virtutum cardinalium, nisi in quantum a caritate reguntur et informantur et imperantur. Et hoc modo verum est, quod habent quandam unitatem ratione unius motoris; sed propter hoc non sequitur, quod non diversificentur propriis formis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est aequalitas vitae undique rationi consentiens; dicendum, quod per hoc quod est *undique* dupliciter potest intelligi, quod fiat distributio. Aut ita quod hoc quod est *undique* distribuat pro duabus *extremitatibus* consistentibus circa medietatem; et sic convenit cuilibet virtuti cardinali per se, quia nec declinat ad superfluum nec ad diminutum. Alio modo hoc quod est *undique* potest distribuere pro omnibus *partibus*

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*potentialibus* animae[^14]; et sic non competit alicui virtuti cardinali *absolute,* sed in quantum habet *connexionem* cum alia. Et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus *essentialiter,* sed quod possunt dici una per quandam *connexionem* et aggregationem; sicut omnes potentiae animae, quamvis sint diversae, dant tamen ipsi animae unum *integrum posse,* ita quod una sine altera non posset animam facere potentem[^15]. Sic intelligendum est de *aequalitate vitae,* quae consistit penes unam virtutem *partialiter,* penes autem omnes consistit *integre* et perfecte.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una virtus denominat aliam; dicendum, quod est praedicatio multiplex, videlicet per *causam* et per *essentiam* et per *concomitantiam*[^16]. Et cum dicitur, quod una virtus denominat alteram, hoc non est propter *essentialem* convenientiam, sed hoc est propter hoc, quod *concomitantur* se circa unum animae subiectum et circa potentias, quae se mutuo circumincedunt. Et si tu obiicias, quod concomitantia non sufficit, quia non conceditur, quod musica sit alba; dicendum, quod concomitantia non sufficit *simpliciter,* sed concomitantia cum *simplicitate subiecti,* per quam subiectum potest reflectere se super se et super omne illud, quod est in se; sicut patet, quod anima intellectiva simpliciter potest se convertere super se per actum intelligendi et similiter per actum diligendi. Et hinc est, quod virtutes in talibus potentiis existentes possunt se mutuo denominare; et ideo non est simile de *omnibus* actibus, etiam si circa idem subiectum habeant consistere.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis cardinalis virtus est quaedam voluntatis rectitudo, ita quod omnis virtus cardinalis est iustitia; dicendum, quod iustitia dupliciter accipitur: quia est iustitia *generalis,* et est iustitia *specialis.* Et iustitia generalis complectitur omnes virtutes, non solum cardinales, sed etiam theologicas[^17]. Iustitia vero specialis non est simpliciter rectitudo voluntatis, sed rectitudo voluntatis ordinans ad alterum; et hoc non competit cuilibet virtuti cardinali; et propterea non sequitur, quod cardinales virtutes non habeant ad invicem distingui.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de illis quatuor conditionibus, quae sunt in qualibet virtute; responderi potest, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod virtutes non sint distinctae: quia quod quaelibet illarum conditionum attribuatur alicui virtuti speciali, hoc non est per *proprietatem,* sed magis per *appropriationem.* Cuiuslibet enim virtutis est medium tenere; sed hoc appropriatur temperantiae, quia maxime opportunum est circa delectationes medium custodire; sic et de aliis conditionibus intelligendum est. — Si tamen obiiciat, quod *inspicere medium* hoc est proprium ipsius prudentiae, et ita videtur, quod prudentia sit de essentia aliarum virtutum cardinalium; dicendum, quod *inspectio medii* est duobus modis, vel per modum *considerationis discretae,* vel per modum *inclinationis determinatae.* Primo modo *medium inspicere* est proprium ipsius prudentiae, quae perficit potentiam rationalem, cuius est considerare et discernere; et hoc modo *inspicere medium* non convenit virtuti cardinali per sui essentiam, sed per concomitantiam, quia habet prudentiam directivam. Unde sicut oculus videt sibi et aliis membris, sic prudentia inspicit sibi et virtutibus ceteris. — Alio modo *inspicere medium* est per modum *inclinationis determinatae;* et sic non tantum est prudentiae, sed etiam cuiuslibet virtutis, quia quaelibet virtus est quoddam pondus recte inclinans et movens ad medium, circa quod habet consistere. Unde sicut gravitas lapidis recte dicitur inspicere locum deorsum sive medium mundi; sic quaelibet virtus rationabiliter potest dici inspicere medium recte vivendi; et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod prudentia ab aliis virtutibus non habeat diversificari[^18].

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### Question II. *Whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse.*

Secondly it is asked of the cardinal virtues as to their diversity, and it is asked whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse. And that they are diverse is shown:

1. *First,* through the *powers* which they direct: for prudence directs the rational [power], temperance the concupiscible, fortitude the irascible[^1]: since therefore the powers are the proper subjects of habits, and, the proper subjects being formally diversified, it is necessary that their habits be formally diversified; and the aforesaid powers of the soul are diverse; it seems that it is necessary that the cardinal virtues be distinct and essentially diverse.

2. Likewise, the same is seen through the *acts* which they elicit: since the act of prudence itself is one, formally speaking, [and] that of temperance another, as is clear: since therefore habits are diversified through acts by a formal and essential diversification[^2], it seems that it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be essentially distinguished.

3. Likewise, the same is shown through the *objects:* for temperance is about pleasures and fortitude about passions[^3]: since therefore the first distinction of habits takes its origin from objects, it seems therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, the same is shown in the fourth place through the *vices,* against which they are. For if the vices to which such virtues are opposed are simply of diverse genera, and the privations are distinguished and diversified according to the habits themselves[^4]; it seems therefore that it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be formally and essentially distinguished from one another.

5. Likewise, the same is shown through the *means* according to which such virtues are regarded. For if such cardinal virtues have means formally differing; since the means regard the virtues according to their formal character[^5], it seems therefore that it is necessary that the cardinal virtues themselves be essentially and formally differing.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Morals of the Church*[^6]: «That which is called the fourfold virtue is so called from a certain varied affection of love itself, as far as I understand»; but this does not assert a diversity according to essence, but only according to relation: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues have to be distinguished only according to comparison, not according to absolute essence.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul*[^7]: «Virtue is the equality of life consenting on every side to reason»; but the equality of life on every side cannot be according to one single comparison, but according to comparison to every act and to every object: therefore if this is the rightly assigned definition of virtue, it seems that any virtue has [the office] of ordering the soul to

every act and to every object. But this would not be, if the virtues were distinguished in respect of acts and objects: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have any essential difference.

3. Likewise, no forms disparate and diverse from one another denominate themselves — for although it be truly said that the musical [thing] is white, yet it is in no way conceded that music is white — but the cardinal virtues, according to what Bernard[^8] and Augustine hold, denominate themselves, because fortitude is prudent and prudence is brave: therefore it seems that they do not have an essential difference.

4. Likewise, «justice, according to what Anselm[^9] says, is the rectitude of the will»; but every cardinal virtue is rectitude of the will: therefore every cardinal virtue is justice. If therefore justice names one species of virtue, it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have an essential or formal diversity.

5. Likewise, to every virtue it is essential to look to the *mean,* to every one it is also essential to *preserve the mean,* to every one it is also essential to *attempt the difficult,* to every one it also belongs to *order*[^10]. If therefore *to look to the mean* belongs to prudence, *to preserve the mean* to temperance, *to attempt the difficult* to fortitude, *to order* to justice; it seems that any of these virtues enters the essence of another: therefore they are not formally distinguished.

### CONCLUSION.

> *The cardinal virtues are formally distinguished, insofar as they are ordered to special acts; yet they are less distinguished, insofar as they are informed by grace and meritorious through charity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a speaking of the cardinal virtues as to the form by which they are *gratuitous,* and as to the form by which they are *meritorious,* and as to the form by which they are ordered to special differences of acts.

If we speak of the form by which they are *gratuitous;* thus in it they are rather united than distinguished, because that form is the grace that makes [one] pleasing, which, although it be one, nonetheless renders the soul pleasing to God together with all its powers and virtuous habits, as was shown in the second book, distinction twenty-seventh[^11]. — Similarly, if we speak of the cardinal virtues themselves as to the form by which they are meritorious and have the formal character of meriting perfectly; thus they are more connected and united than distinguished; because that form is charity, by which the other virtues are inclined, as by a single weight, to one ultimate end as to their proper place; and this will be better shown below in the treatise on the connection of the virtues[^12]. — But if we speak of the virtues themselves according to the form by which they are ordered to special differences of acts; thus I say that the cardinal virtues are essentially and formally distinguished. And their diversity is gathered from five comparisons, as was shown in the objecting [arguments], namely from the diversity of the *powers* which they inform and perfect, and from the diversity of the *acts* which they elicit, and from the diversity of the *objects* to which they are ordered, and from the diversity of the *means* about which they consist, and from the diversity of the opposed *vices* which they exclude. And therefore the reasons which are adduced for this side are to be granted, because they conclude truly.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that virtue is nothing other than a varied affection of love; it must be said that Augustine speaks there of the cardinal virtues insofar as they have to be reduced to the one root of charity, through which they have [the office] of ordering, by a perfect ordering, to God Himself, and from this they obtain a certain connection and unity; or this is clear from the following text, in which, defining temperance, he says[^13]: «Let us say that temperance is the love keeping itself whole and uncorrupted for God, fortitude the love bearing all things easily for the sake of God», and so of the others. But such a relation of temperance and fortitude to God through love does not belong to the cardinal virtues, except insofar as they are governed and informed and commanded by charity. And in this way it is true that they have a certain unity by reason of one mover; but on account of this it does not follow that they are not diversified by their proper forms.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is the equality of life consenting on every side to reason; it must be said that by this [word] *on every side* the distribution can be understood in two ways. Either so that this [word] *on every side* distributes for the two *extremes* consisting about the mean; and thus it belongs to any cardinal virtue per se, because it neither declines to excess nor to defect. In another way this [word] *on every side* can distribute for all the *potential parts*

of the soul[^14]; and thus it does not belong to any cardinal virtue *absolutely,* but insofar as it has *connection* with another. And from this it cannot be concluded that all the virtues are one virtue *essentially,* but that they can be called one through a certain *connection* and aggregation; just as all the powers of the soul, although they be diverse, nonetheless give to the soul itself one *whole capacity,* so that one without the other could not make the soul capable[^15]. Thus it must be understood of the *equality of life,* which consists *partially* in respect of one virtue, but in respect of all consists *wholly* and perfectly.

3. To that which is objected, that one virtue denominates another; it must be said that there is a manifold predication, namely by *cause* and by *essence* and by *concomitance*[^16]. And when it is said that one virtue denominates another, this is not on account of *essential* agreement, but it is on account of this, that they *accompany* one another about one subject of the soul and about powers which mutually interpenetrate one another. And if you object that concomitance does not suffice, because it is not conceded that music is white; it must be said that concomitance does not suffice *simply,* but concomitance with *simplicity of the subject,* by which the subject can reflect upon itself and upon all that which is in itself; as is clear, that the intellective soul can simply turn upon itself through the act of understanding and similarly through the act of loving. And hence it is that the virtues existing in such powers can mutually denominate one another; and therefore it is not the same with *all* acts, even if they have to consist about the same subject.

4. To that which is objected, that every cardinal virtue is a certain rectitude of the will, so that every cardinal virtue is justice; it must be said that justice is taken in two ways: for there is *general* justice, and there is *special* justice. And general justice embraces all the virtues, not only the cardinal ones, but also the theological ones[^17]. But special justice is not simply rectitude of the will, but rectitude of the will ordering to another; and this does not belong to every cardinal virtue; and therefore it does not follow that the cardinal virtues do not have to be distinguished from one another.

5. To that which is objected concerning those four conditions which are in any virtue; it can be answered that it is true; but nonetheless from this it does not follow that the virtues are not distinct: because that any of those conditions be attributed to some special virtue, this is not by *property,* but rather by *appropriation.* For it belongs to every virtue to hold the mean; but this is appropriated to temperance, because it is most fitting to guard the mean about pleasures; so also it must be understood of the other conditions. — If, however, one objects that *to look to the mean* is proper to prudence itself, and thus it seems that prudence is of the essence of the other cardinal virtues; it must be said that *the looking to the mean* is in two ways, either by way of *discerning consideration,* or by way of *determinate inclination.* In the first way *to look to the mean* is proper to prudence itself, which perfects the rational power, whose [office] it is to consider and discern; and in this way *to look to the mean* does not belong to a cardinal virtue by its essence, but by concomitance, because it has directive prudence. Hence just as the eye sees for itself and for the other members, so prudence looks for itself and for the other virtues. — In another way *to look to the mean* is by way of *determinate inclination;* and thus it belongs not only to prudence, but also to any virtue, because every virtue is a certain weight rightly inclining and moving to the mean about which it has to consist. Hence just as the heaviness of the stone is rightly said to look to the place below or the middle of the world; so any virtue can reasonably be said to look to the mean of living rightly; and from this it cannot be concluded that prudence does not have to be diversified from the other virtues[^18].

Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.

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la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Virtut. et vitiis* (sive *de Laudabilibus*), c. 1. seqq. De hoc 1. arg. vide Aristot., I. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 32. seq. (c. 33.), et supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. fundam., quo posteriore loco etiam plura invenies, quae ad 3. seqq. argg. spectant. — Paulo inferius pro *ipsarum* edd. *ipsorum.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Virtues and Vices* (or *On Praiseworthy Things*), c. 1 ff. On this 1st argument see Aristotle, I *Great Ethics* c. 32 ff. (c. 33), and above d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, in the *fundamenta,* in which latter place you will also find many things which pertain to the 3rd ff. arguments. — A little below, for *ipsarum* the editions [read] *ipsorum.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 170, nota h. in fine; ibid. etiam seq. arg. insinuatur. — De actibus prudentiae et temperantiae vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1; infra dub. 2. et 4. nec non Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 10. seqq. et VI. c. 5. — Ita rescribuntur cod. A *diversificetur,* codd. F G K L T V *diversificatur,* cod. aa *diversificantur.*

en: Cf. above p. 170, note h, at the end; there too the following argument is insinuated. — On the acts of prudence and temperance see here the text of the Master, c. 1; below dub. 2 and 4, as also Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 10 ff. and VI c. 5. — Thus is rewritten codex A *diversificetur,* codices F G K L T V *diversificatur,* codex aa *diversificantur.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 9. seqq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 9 ff.

la: Vide Aristot., V. *Ethic.* c. 1, et infra pag. 720, nota 1. — Pro *secundum ipsos habitus,* quemadmodum legitur in codd. A H T U et in *Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal.* collat. 76. a. 2, alii codd. et edd. *per ipsos habitus.*

en: See Aristotle, V *Ethics* c. 1, and below p. 720, note 1. — For *secundum ipsos habitus,* as is read in codices A H T U and in the *Supplement* to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 76, a. 2, other codices and editions [read] *per ipsos habitus.*

la: Secundum Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 6. seq. — Hic pro *essentialiter* cod. K *naturaliter.*

en: According to Aristotle, II *Ethics* c. 6 ff. — Here for *essentialiter* codex K [reads] *naturaliter.*

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. — In fine arg. pro *essentiam absolutam* nonnulli codd. (cum paucis codd.) *substantiam absolutam.*

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 25. — At the end of the argument, for *essentiam absolutam* several codices (with a few codices) [read] *substantiam absolutam.*

en: Chapter 16, n. 27.

la: Serm. 72. *de Diversis* (alias 35. *ex Parvis*), n. 2. Cfr. I. *de Considerat.* c. 8. n. 10. seq., et August., *Epist.* 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 5, VI. *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 6. (vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVI. c. 2.). Idem dicit Gregor., XXII. *Moral.* c. 1. n. 2.

en: Sermon 72 *On Various Matters* (alias 35 *From the Lesser*), n. 2. Cf. I *On Consideration* c. 8, n. 10 ff., and Augustine, *Letter* 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 5, VI *On the Trinity* c. 4, n. 6 (see below the text of the Master, d. XXXVI, c. 2). The same says Gregory, XXII *Morals* c. 1, n. 2.

la: *Dialog. de Veritate,* c. 12; *de Concept. virgin. et origin. peccat.* c. 3. et 5. — In fine arg. pro *diversitatem* edd. *differentiam.*

en: *Dialogue on Truth,* c. 12; *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin,* c. 3 and 5. — At the end of the argument, for *diversitatem* the editions [read] *differentiam.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 3. et 6. — Bernard., I. *de Considerat.* c. 8. n. 11. ait: *Ergo modum tenere iustitia est, temperantia est, fortitudo est* etc. — Pro *cuiuslibet* cod. A et *cuilibet.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Ethics* c. 3 and 6. — Bernard, I *On Consideration* c. 8, n. 11, says: *Therefore to hold the measure is justice, is temperance, is fortitude,* etc. — For *cuiuslibet* codex A also [reads] *cuilibet.*

la: Art. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Art. 1, q. 1 ff.

la: Dist. 36. q. 6. Cfr. etiam supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Dist. 36, q. 6. Cf. also above d. 27, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Scil. in fundamentis. — Paulo inferius pro *medietatum,* circa [cod. N *secundum*] *quas* edd. et nonnulli codd. mediorum, *circa quae.*

en: Namely in the *fundamenta.* — A little below, for *medietatum,* about [cod. N *according to*] *which,* the editions and several codices [read] *of the means, about which.*

la: Sive pro *omnibus potentiis animae rationalis.* Vide quaest. seq. Cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 600, nota 1, ubi describitur *totum potentiale.* — Pro *potentialibus,* quam lectionem restituimus ex codd. A T U Y Z bb, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *rationabilibus,* alii codd. et Vat. *rationalibus,* cod. K *rationalis,* et *Supplement.* Sum. Alex. Hal. *possibilibus.*

en: Or for *all the powers of the rational soul.* See the following question. Cf. also vol. II p. 600, note 1, where the *potential whole* is described. — For *potentialibus,* which reading we have restored from codices A T U Y Z bb, other codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *rationabilibus,* other codices and the Vatican edition *rationalibus,* codex K *rationalis,* and the *Supplement* to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales *possibilibus.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 8. — Paulo inferius pro *partialiter* edd. *particulariter.*

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 8. — A little below, for *partialiter* the editions [read] *particulariter.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 171, nota 1; pag. 226, nota 4; pag. 528, nota 3.

en: Cf. above p. 171, note 1; p. 226, note 4; p. 528, note 3.

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. opinionem primam eiusque improbationem. — Paulo ante pro *omnibus actibus,* quibus verbis Vat. addit *vel accidentibus,* cod. Y substituit *de aliis actibus.*

en: See above d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, the first opinion and its refutation. — A little before, for *all acts,* to which words the Vatican edition adds *or accidents,* codex Y substitutes *of the other acts.*

la: Aristot., V. *Ethic.* c. 1, inter alia dicit: « Adde quod in proverbium dicimus: Iustitia in se virtutes complectitur omnes... Itaque neque haec iustitia pars virtutis, sed integra virtus est, neque huic opposita iniustitia pars vitii, sed integra vitiositas ». De iustitia speciali (quae est ad alterum) agitur ibid. c. 2. seqq. — Paulo post pro *et hoc* Vat. *et haec.* — [Cod. Z subdit *cardinales.* — Cfr. Bernard., I. *de Considerat.* c. 8. n. 9. seqq. — Codd. A H F et *Supplement.* Sum. Alex. Hal. *discretae* (secundum Du Cange, *Glossarium* etc., *discretus* idem dicit ac *discernens, prudens*), pro quo fortasse melius esset *discretivae,* alii plurimi codd. *directae,* Vat. *directivae.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6. — Edd. omittunt *quia habet prudentiam.* Superius pro *prudentiam* directivam cod. F *ipsam vim rationalem.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.]

en: Aristotle, V *Ethics* c. 1, among other things says: «Add that we say in a proverb: Justice in itself embraces all the virtues... And so neither is this justice a part of virtue, but the whole virtue, nor is the injustice opposed to it a part of vice, but the whole viciousness». On special justice (which is toward another) it is treated ibid. c. 2 ff. — A little after, for *et hoc* the Vatican edition [reads] *et haec.* — [Codex Z adds *cardinales.* — Cf. Bernard, I *On Consideration* c. 8, n. 9 ff. — Codices A H F and the *Supplement* to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales [read] *discretae* (according to Du Cange, *Glossary* etc., *discretus* says the same as *discerning, prudent*), for which perhaps *discretivae* would be better; very many other codices [read] *directae,* the Vatican edition *directivae.* Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6. — The editions omit *quia habet prudentiam.* Above, for *prudentiam* directive codex F [reads] *the rational power itself.* — See the scholion to the preceding question.]

translators_notes:
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**[?] flags:** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum virtutes cardinales sint in parte animae rationali, an in ea parte, quae solum obtemperat rationi.*

Tertio quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad subiectum, et est quaestio, utrum sint in parte animae rationali[^1], an in ea parte, quae solum obtemperat rationi. Et quod sint in parte animae rationali, videtur:

1. *Primo* per auctoritatem Augustini in *Soliloquiis*[^6]: « Virtus est ratio recta perducens in finem »; sed constat, quod hic est praedicatio causalis sive materialis: ergo videtur, quod subiectum virtutis sit ipsa ratio sive potentia rationalis.

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2. *Item*, virtus est principium merendi et operis meritorii et laudabilis: ergo circa illam potentiam habet esse, circa cuius actum consistit laus et meritum; sed talis est potentia rationalis, scilicet liberum arbitrium: ergo videtur idem quod prius[^2].

3. *Item*, in eo subiecto est virtus, in quo anima habet imaginem Dei, cum virtutes ceterae habeant ortum a gratia, cuius anima est capax, per hoc quod est imago; sed non est imago nisi per potentiam rationalem[^3]: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, omnis virtus consistit circa electionem boni et fugam mali[^4]; sed habitus electivus est solius potentiae rationalis proprie dictae: ergo videtur, quod omnis virtus proprie sit in rationali parte ipsius animae.

5. *Item*, virtus est in genere honesti, secundum quod vult Tullius[^5]; sed bonum, quod est honestum, et eius oppositum est obiectum solius rationalis virtutis, quia potentiae sensitivae solummodo feruntur ad ea bona, quae sunt de genere commodi: ergo videtur, quod virtus sit solum in parte animae rationali.

**Sed contra:**
1. Fortitudo est in irascibili, et temperantia in concupiscibili; sed istae non sunt rationales, nisi quia obtemperantes rationi, secundum quod dicit Philosophus in fine *Novae Ethicae*[^6b]: ergo videtur, quod cardinales virtutes non habeant esse in parte rationali, sed potius in parte sensibili.

2. *Item*, in ea parte est habitus virtutis expediens et rectificans, circa quam habet esse pronitas et obliquitas; sed haec duo sunt maxime circa motivam sensibilem, quae quidem sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis[^7]: ergo videtur, quod in illis habeat collocari virtus cardinalis.

3. *Item*, in ea parte est habitus virtutis tanquam in subiecto proprio, quae immediatius et proximius elicit actum ipsius virtutis; sed temperantiae et fortitudinis actus eliciuntur immediate a concupiscibili et irascibili, quae sunt obedientes rationi[^8]: ergo videtur, quod in eis virtutes cardinales habeant poni.

4. *Item*, virtutes cardinales distinguuntur a theologicis, sicut consuetudinales ab intellectualibus; sed intellectuales, ut sapientia et intelligentia et phronesis, ponuntur in ratione proprie dicta, consuetudinales vero in ea parte, quae obtemperat rationi[^9]: ergo videtur similiter, quod theologicae debent reponi in parte rationali, et cardinales in parte sensibili, secundum quod rationi obedit.

5. *Item*, in ea parte maxime habet reponi habitus virtutis, quae magis indiget rectificari; sed pars, quae magis indiget rectificari, est pars sensitiva, quoniam, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[^10], « intellectus semper est rectus, phantasia recta et non recta »: cum ergo phantasia nominet potentiam sensitivam, videtur, quod circa ipsam habeant esse virtutes cardinales.

### Conclusio.

> Secundum theologos virtutes cardinales omnes ponendae sunt in parte animae rationali, quatenus rationale dicitur quod participat rationem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum rationale dicatur dupliciter, secundum quod vult Philosophus[^11], videlicet quod rationem participat, et quod rationi obedit. Si large accipiatur pars rationalis, sic non est dubium, quin omnes virtutes in parte rationali sint, sive theologicae sive cardinales, sive intellectuales, sive consuetudinales. — Si vero rationale dicatur proprie, secundum quod participat rationem, sic voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod quaedam virtutes cardinales sunt in parte rationali, utpote prudentia et iustitia; quaedam vero non, sed in potentia inferiori, quae est rationalis largo modo dicta, quia obtemperat rationi, ut fortitudo et temperantia, quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili.

Licet autem hic modus dicendi aliquo modo probabilis videatur secundum morales philosophos; tamen secundum theologum non videtur rationabiliter dici, quasdam virtutes cardinales reponi in parte superiori et quasdam in inferiori; cum omnes virtutes cardinales aequales sint quantum ad meriti dignitatem[^12]; omnes etiam sunt principium merendi. Et propterea, cum meritum consistat radicaliter circa liberum arbitrium, in solis illis potentiis habent esse virtutes, sive cardinales sive theologicae, in quibus reperitur libertas arbitrii. — Propter quod, cum libertas arbitrii non sit nisi in parte animae rationali, secundum quod rationale dicitur quod participat rationem[^13][^23]; necesse est, ceteras virtutes cardinales in parte illa reponi. Et hoc necessario exigit earum dignitas; cum ipsae habeant ortum a gratia, et sint perfectiones animae multo nobiliores quam ipsa scientia, quae ponitur tanquam in subiecto in parte animae rationali et intellectiva[^14][^24]. — Et propterea concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

Ad evidentiam vero obiectorum, quae in contrarium opponuntur, notandus est alius modus distinguendi rationale secundum theologum. Uno enim modo distinguitur rationale contra partem sensitivam; alio modo distinguitur contra potentiam affectivam. Secundum quod distinguitur contra potentiam sensitivam, sic sunt in parte ista rationali omnes virtutes. Secundum vero quod distinguitur contra potentiam affectivam, sic non sunt in ea omnes virtutes, sed illae solum, quae dirigunt in discernendo, sicut fides et prudentia; aliae vero reponuntur in potentia affectiva, quae quidem pars est liberi arbitrii et dicitur voluntas, secundum quod est coniuncta rationi; dicitur etiam concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod diversimode habet affici et moveri. Nihil enim aliud est voluntas quam affectus sive appetitus ratiocinatus[^15][^25]. Omnis autem affectus sive appetitus vel est vis irascibilis, vel concupiscibilis, quae duae vires, secundum quod sunt liberi arbitrii partes, rationales sunt; et in ipsis possunt esse virtutes theologicae et cardinales: theologicae, in quantum immediate elevantur in Deum, ipsum diligendo et ipsi innitendo; cardinales vero, in quantum versantur circa bonum creatum. Et per hoc pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta.

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**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa** [Ad opposita]:

*Ad 1.* Ad illud[^16][^26] quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod fortitudo et temperantia sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, et istae solum sunt rationales, quia obtemperant rationi; dicendum, quod absque dubio istae duae virtutes cardinales quantum ad habitus substratos in illis duabus viribus reponuntur, licet quantum ad rationem primariam merendi et ordinandi omnis virtus in libero arbitrio ponenda sit. Et ista duo sunt compossibilia, pro eo quod liberum arbitrium non est potentia distincta a rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili secundum rem[^17][^27]. Et propterea illa assumtio est falsa, quod concupiscibilis et irascibilis solummodo sunt rationales, quia obtemperant rationi. — In nobis enim est duplex irascibilis et concupiscibilis, videlicet rationalis et sensibilis: rationalis, secundum quam immediate nati sumus in Deum ferri, et in qua communicamus cum Angelis, et in qua secundum diversas comparationes habet reponi theologica virtus et cardinalis. Alia vero est irascibilis et concupiscibilis sensibilis[^18][^28], quae solummodo dicitur rationalis, quia obtemperat rationi. Et in his non consistit libertas arbitrii, nec in his sicut in subiecto ponitur virtus cardinalis, licet per frequentem assuefactionem aliquo modo illae potentiae non incongrue dicantur habilitari; illa tamen habilitatio non est de virtutis essentia, sed potius sibi annexa.

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*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pronitas et obliquitas habent esse circa partem sensibilem, quia nata est rationi subiacere; dicendum, quod obliquitas habet esse circa aliquam potentiam dupliciter: aut quia in ea inchoatur, aut quia consummatur. Primo modo est obliquitas in parte sensibili, scilicet quantum ad inchoationem, et hoc propter fomitis inclinationem. Secundo vero modo est in parte rationali propter consensum et deliberatam electionem, et in hac principaliter residet obliquitas vitii, et per oppositum rectitudo virtutis, et ideo non[^19][^29] in parte sensibili, sed magis in rationali.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus virtutis fortitudinis et temperantiae immediate eliciuntur a concupiscibili et irascibili; dicendum, quod illud verum est, loquendo de concupiscibili et irascibili humana; sed si loquamur de concupiscibili et irascibili brutali et sensibili, sic per illas potentias non immediate elicitur actus istarum virtutum, immo quasi consequenter: quia, rectificata concupiscibili et irascibili rationali per habitum virtutis, per consequens rectificatur ipsa concupiscibilis et irascibilis brutalis, quae illis habent subiici et famulari. — Unde sicut rectificata voluntate in dispensando, per consequens rectificatur manus ad tribuendum beneficium, tamen largitas non est in manu sicut in subiecto, sed in ipsa voluntate; sic intelligendum est in proposito.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consuetudinales virtutes reponuntur in ea parte, quae obtemperat rationi; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia habitus consuetudinalis virtutis, secundum quod virtus est, habeat esse in illa parte sensibili, quae rationali obtemperat; sed quia ex quadam consuetudine bene faciendi in parte illa relinquitur quaedam habilitas. Et ideo potest dupliciter ad rationem illam responderi: primum quidem, quia non est simile de virtute cardinali et consuetudinali, secundum quod consuetudinalis est: quia cardinalis virtus nominat habitum dirigentem in operibus electivae, consuetudinalis vero praeter hoc nominat habitum acquisitum ex frequenti bene agere[^20][^30]. — Aliter etiam responderi potest per interemptionem minoris: quia consuetudinalis virtus, etsi aliquo modo sit in parte sensibili quasi in exsequente et subiacente; in rationali vero est principaliter tanquam in imperante actum virtutis et potentiae sensibili praesidente.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia sensibilis magis indiget rectificari quam intellectualis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia rectitudo et obliquatio, quae homini imputatur, haec est, quae habet ortum a parte rationis. — Et quod obiicit, quod intellectus semper est rectus; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de intellectu, secundum quod respicit leges aeternas et ab ipsis recipit et in eis speculatur, non autem qualitercumque ex se movetur, immo frequenter est obliquus et erroneus[^21][^31]. — Vel potest dici, quod hoc intelligitur de intellectu, secundum quod est acceptio principiorum notissimorum in qualibet scientia, utpote dignitatum, circa quae non contingit errare[^22][^32], non autem prout habet applicari ad opera specialia; et ideo ad ipsarum directionem virtutes sunt sibi necessariae. Et propter hoc ratio illa non concludit, quia procedebat ex falsa assumtione.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the cardinal virtues are in the rational part of the soul, or in that part which only obeys reason.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the cardinal virtues as regards their subject, and the question is whether they are in the rational part of the soul[^1], or in that part which only obeys reason. And that they are in the rational part of the soul seems to be the case:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine in the *Soliloquies*[^6]: « Virtue is right reason leading to the end »; but it is established that this is a causal or material predication: therefore it seems that the subject of virtue is reason itself, that is, the rational power.

2. *Likewise*, virtue is the principle of meriting and of meritorious and praiseworthy work: therefore it has its being about that power about whose act praise and merit consist; but such is the rational power, namely free choice: therefore the same seems to follow as before[^2].

3. *Likewise*, virtue is in that subject in which the soul has the image of God, since the other virtues have their origin from grace, of which the soul is capable through this, that it is an image; but there is no image except through the rational power[^3]: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, every virtue consists about the choice of the good and the flight from evil[^4]; but the elective habit belongs to the rational power properly so called alone: therefore it seems that every virtue is properly in the rational part of the soul itself.

5. *Likewise*, virtue is in the genus of the honorable, according to what Tully holds[^5]; but the good which is honorable, and its opposite, is the object of the rational virtue alone, since the sensitive powers are borne only toward those goods which are of the genus of the advantageous: therefore it seems that virtue is only in the rational part of the soul.

**On the contrary:**
1. Fortitude is in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible; but these are not rational, except because they obey reason, according to what the Philosopher says at the end of the *New Ethics*[^6b]: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have their being in the rational part, but rather in the sensible part.

2. *Likewise*, the habit of virtue, expediting and rectifying, is in that part about which proneness and obliquity have their being; but these two are most of all about the sensible motive [power], which indeed are the irascible and concupiscible[^7]: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtue is to be placed in them.

3. *Likewise*, the habit of virtue is as in its proper subject in that part which more immediately and more proximately elicits the act of the virtue itself; but the acts of temperance and fortitude are elicited immediately from the concupiscible and irascible, which are obedient to reason[^8]: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues are to be placed in them.

4. *Likewise*, the cardinal virtues are distinguished from the theological, as the customary [virtues] from the intellectual; but the intellectual, as wisdom and understanding and *phronesis*, are placed in reason properly so called, while the customary are in that part which obeys reason[^9]: therefore it likewise seems that the theological ought to be set in the rational part, and the cardinal in the sensible part, according as it obeys reason.

5. *Likewise*, the habit of virtue is most of all to be placed in that part which more needs to be rectified; but the part which more needs to be rectified is the sensitive part, since, according to what the Philosopher says[^10], « the intellect is always right, the imagination right and not right »: since therefore the imagination names the sensitive power, it seems that the cardinal virtues have their being about it.

### Conclusion.

> According to the theologians all the cardinal virtues are to be placed in the rational part of the soul, insofar as that is called rational which participates in reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since "rational" is said in two ways, according to what the Philosopher holds[^11], namely that which participates in reason, and that which obeys reason. If the rational part is taken broadly, then there is no doubt that all the virtues are in the rational part, whether theological or cardinal, whether intellectual or customary. — But if "rational" is said properly, according as it participates in reason, then some have wished to say that certain cardinal virtues are in the rational part, such as prudence and justice; but certain others are not, but rather in a lower power, which is rational in the broad sense, because it obeys reason, as fortitude and temperance, which are in the irascible and concupiscible.

But although this manner of speaking seems in some way probable according to the moral philosophers; nevertheless according to the theologian it does not seem to be said reasonably, that some cardinal virtues are set in a higher part and some in a lower; since all the cardinal virtues are equal as to the dignity of merit[^12]; they are also all a principle of meriting. And therefore, since merit consists radically about free choice, the virtues have their being only in those powers, whether cardinal or theological, in which the freedom of choice is found. — On account of which, since the freedom of choice is only in the rational part of the soul, according as that is called rational which participates in reason[^13][^23]; it is necessary that the remaining cardinal virtues be placed in that part. And this their dignity necessarily requires; since they themselves have their origin from grace, and are perfections of the soul far nobler than knowledge itself, which is placed as in its subject in the rational and intellective part of the soul[^14][^24]. — And therefore the reasons which are for this position are to be granted.

But for the elucidation of the objections which are urged to the contrary, another manner of distinguishing "rational" according to the theologian must be noted. For in one way "rational" is distinguished against the sensitive part; in another way it is distinguished against the affective power. According as it is distinguished against the sensitive power, so all the virtues are in this rational part. But according as it is distinguished against the affective power, so not all the virtues are in it, but only those which direct in discerning, as faith and prudence; while the others are placed in the affective power, which indeed is a part of free choice and is called the will, according as it is joined to reason; it is also called concupiscible and irascible, according as it is variously affected and moved. For the will is nothing other than an affection or a ratiocinated appetite[^15][^25]. But every affection or appetite is either the irascible power or the concupiscible, which two powers, according as they are parts of free choice, are rational; and in them can be theological and cardinal virtues: theological, inasmuch as they are immediately raised up into God, loving Him and leaning upon Him; but cardinal, inasmuch as they are occupied about the created good. And by this the response to the objections is for the most part clear.

**To the arguments for the negative part** [To the opposed]:

*To 1.* To that[^16][^26] which is first objected to the contrary, that fortitude and temperance are in the irascible and concupiscible, and these alone are rational, because they obey reason; it must be said that without doubt these two cardinal virtues, as regards the habits underlying them, are placed in those two powers, although as regards the primary ground of meriting and ordering every virtue is to be placed in free choice. And these two are compossible, for the reason that free choice is not a power distinct in reality from the rational, concupiscible, and irascible[^17][^27]. And therefore that assumption is false, that the concupiscible and irascible are rational only because they obey reason. — For in us there is a twofold irascible and concupiscible, namely rational and sensible: the rational, according to which we are immediately born to be borne into God, and in which we have communion with the Angels, and in which according to diverse comparisons the theological and cardinal virtue is to be placed. But the other is the sensible irascible and concupiscible[^18][^28], which is called rational only because it obeys reason. And in these the freedom of choice does not consist, nor is the cardinal virtue placed in these as in a subject, although through frequent habituation those powers may in some way not incongruously be said to be made apt; that aptitude, however, is not of the essence of the virtue, but rather annexed to it.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that proneness and obliquity have their being about the sensible part, because it is born to be subject to reason; it must be said that obliquity has its being about some power in two ways: either because it is begun in it, or because it is consummated. In the first way obliquity is in the sensible part, namely as regards its beginning, and this on account of the inclination of the tinder [fomes]. But in the second way it is in the rational part on account of consent and deliberate choice, and in this principally resides the obliquity of vice, and by the opposite the rectitude of virtue, and therefore not[^19][^29] in the sensible part, but more in the rational.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the act of the virtue of fortitude and temperance is elicited immediately from the concupiscible and irascible; it must be said that this is true, speaking of the human concupiscible and irascible; but if we speak of the brute and sensible concupiscible and irascible, then through those powers the act of these virtues is not elicited immediately, but rather as it were consequently: because, the rational concupiscible and irascible having been rectified by the habit of virtue, consequently the brute concupiscible and irascible itself is rectified, which have to be subjected to and to serve them. — Hence just as, the will having been rectified in dispensing, consequently the hand is rectified for bestowing the benefit, yet liberality is not in the hand as in a subject, but in the will itself; so it is to be understood in the matter proposed.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the customary virtues are placed in that part which obeys reason; it must be said that this is not because the habit of the customary virtue, according as it is a virtue, has its being in that sensible part which obeys reason; but because from a certain custom of doing well a certain aptitude is left in that part. And therefore that argument can be answered in two ways: first indeed, because the case of the cardinal virtue and of the customary is not alike, according as it is customary: for the cardinal virtue names a habit directing in the works of the elective [power], while the customary, beyond this, names a habit acquired from frequently acting well[^20][^30]. — It can also be answered otherwise, by the destruction of the minor: because the customary virtue, although in some way it is in the sensible part as in something executing and subjacent; yet in the rational part it is principally as in something commanding the act of the virtue and presiding over the sensible power.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the sensible power more needs to be rectified than the intellectual; it must be said that it is false, because the rectitude and the obliquation which is imputed to man, this is what has its origin from the part of reason. — And as to what it objects, that the intellect is always right; it must be said that this is understood of the intellect according as it regards the eternal laws and from them receives and in them contemplates, but not however according as it is moved in any way whatever from itself, nay rather it is frequently oblique and erroneous[^21][^31]. — Or it can be said that this is understood of the intellect according as it is the reception of the most evident principles in any science, such as the axioms, about which it does not happen to err[^22][^32], but not as it has to be applied to special works; and therefore for the directing of these the virtues are necessary to it. And on account of this that argument does not conclude, because it proceeded from a false assumption.

la: Sive pro omnibus potentiis animae rationalis. Vide quaest. seq. Cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 600, nota 1, ubi describitur *totum potentiale*. — Pro *potentialibus*, quam lectionem restituimus ex codd. ATOYZbb, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *rationabilibus*, alii codd. et Vat. *rationalibus*, cod. K *rationalis*, et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *possibilibus*.

en: Or, "for all the powers of the rational soul." See the following question. Cfr. also tom. II, p. 600, note 1, where the *whole potential* is described. — For *potentialibus*, the reading we have restored from codices ATOYZbb, other codices and editions 1, 2 read *rationabilibus*, other codices and the Vatican *rationalibus*, codex K *rationalis*, and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales *possibilibus*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 8. — Paulo inferius pro *partialiter* edd. *particulariter*.

en: Cfr. II Sent. d. 24 p. 1 a. 3 q. 1 ad 8. — A little below, for *partialiter* the editions read *particulariter*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 171, nota 1; pag. 226, nota 1; pag. 528, nota 5.

en: Cfr. above, p. 171, note 1; p. 226, note 1; p. 528, note 5.

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. opinionem primam eiusque improbationem. — Paulo ante pro *de omnibus actibus*, quibus verbis Vat. addit *vel accidentibus*, cod. V substituit *de aliis actibus*.

en: See above, d. 27 a. 1 q. 1 in the corpus, the first opinion and its rejection. — A little before, for *de omnibus actibus*, to which words the Vatican adds *vel accidentibus*, codex V substitutes *de aliis actibus*.

la: Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 1. inter alia dicit: « Adde quod in proverbium dicimus: *Iustitia in se virtutes complectitur omnes*... Itaque neque haec iustitia pars virtutis, sed integra virtus est, neque huic opposita iniustitia pars vitii, sed integra est vitiositas ». De iustitia speciali (quae est ad alterum) agitur ibid. c. 2. seqq. — Paulo post pro *et hoc* Vat. *et haec*.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* V c. 1, among other things says: « Add that we say in a proverb: *Justice embraces in itself all the virtues*... And so neither is this justice a part of virtue, but the whole virtue, nor is the injustice opposed to it a part of vice, but the whole viciousness ». Of special justice (which is toward another) it is treated ibid. c. 2 ff. — A little after, for *et hoc* the Vatican has *et haec*. [Tully's *honestum* here equated with Aristotle's general justice.]

la: Cod. Z subdit *cardinales*. [Marker on *Soliloquiis*, fundam. 1.] — Cfr. Bernard., I. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 9. seqq.

en: Codex Z adds *cardinales*. [Marker on *Soliloquia*, fundamentum 1.] — Cfr. Bernard, *On Consideration* I c. 8 n. 9 ff.

la: Codd. a n i et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *discretae* (secundum Du Cange, Glossarium etc., *discretus* idem dicit ac *discernens*, *prudens*), pro quo fortasse melius esset *discretivae*, alii plurimi codd. *directae*, Vat. *directivae*. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 3. [Marker on *Novae Ethicae*, sed contra 1.]

en: Codices a, n, i and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales read *discretae* (according to Du Cange's *Glossarium* etc., *discretus* means the same as *discerning*, *prudent*), for which perhaps it would be better to read *discretivae*; very many other codices read *directae*, the Vatican *directivae*. Cfr. II Sent. d. 24 p. 1 a. 3. [Marker on *New Ethics*, sed contra 1.]

la: Edd. omittunt *quin habet prudentiam*. Superius pro *potentiam rationalem* cod. F *ipsam vim rationalem*.

en: The editions omit *quin habet prudentiam*. Above, for *potentiam rationalem* codex F reads *ipsam vim rationalem*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. [Marker on *obedientes rationi*, sed contra 3.]

en: See the scholion on the preceding question. [Marker on *obedient to reason*, sed contra 3.]

la: [In hac parte, sed contra 4: textual continuity with the p.716 band.] Cfr. supra fundam. 4.

en: [In this part, sed contra 4: continues into the p.716 footer band.] Cfr. above, fundamentum 4.

la: Sed contra 5: marker on *Philosophus* (Aristot., III. de Anima); vide infra notam ad textum.

en: Sed contra 5: marker on *the Philosopher* (Aristotle, *On the Soul* III); see the note below on the text. <!-- p.716 (Respondeo band, nn.1–11) -->

la: Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13. Cfr. supra pag. 448, nota 9. — Quoad hanc definitionem virtutis in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 16. a. 2. q. 6. dicitur: *Non est formalis praedicatio, quia virtus non est ipsa ratio, sed est habitus in ratione existens, quantum est ex parte cognitionis* etc. Cfr. supra pag. 616, nota 8. et pag. 528, nota 5.

en: Book I c. 6 n. 13. Cfr. above, p. 448, note 9. — Concerning this definition of virtue, in the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collatio 16 a. 2 q. 6, it is said: *It is not a formal predication, because virtue is not reason itself, but is a habit existing in reason, as far as it is on the side of cognition*, etc. Cfr. above, p. 616, note 8, and p. 528, note 5.

la: Cfr. Aristot., 1. Ethic. c. 12; II. c. 5; III. c. 1. seqq.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *Ethics* I c. 12; II c. 5; III c. 1 ff.

la: Vide August., XIV. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — Quod virtutes aliquo modo ortum habeant a gratia, vide infra q. 5. et in scholio. — In maiori pro *in eo* [cod. G *eodem*] *subiecto* codd. AFTVbb *in eo solo*. Vocabulum *ceterae* hic idem valet ac *cunctae*; cfr. supra pag. 880, nota 1.

en: See Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV c. 3 n. 6 and c. 8 n. 11. — That the virtues in some way have their origin from grace, see below q. 5 and in the scholion. — In the major premise, for *in eo* [cod. G *eodem*] *subiecto* codices AFTVbb read *in eo solo*. The word *ceterae* here is equivalent to *cunctae* ("all"); cfr. above, p. 880, note 1.

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, virtutem declarat *habitum electivum in mediocritate quantum ad nos consistentem* etc. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 671, nota 9. Ibid. pag. 599, nota 5. vide de minori.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* II c. 6, declares virtue to be *an elective habit consisting in a mean relative to us*, etc. Cfr. tom. II p. 671 note 9. Ibid. p. 599 note 5, see concerning the minor.

la: Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 53. et 54. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 593, nota 1, ubi et explicatio minoris habetur.

en: Book II of the *Rhetoric* c. 53 and 54. Cfr. tom. II p. 593 note 1, where also the explanation of the minor is had.

la: Sive in fine Ethic. ex Graeco in Latinum translatae (cfr. tom. I. pag. 10, nota 2.). Docetur ibi, quod in anima forsse sit quidpiam praeter rationem, quod ei adversetur ac resistat; « quod tamen etiam ipsum rationis esse particeps videtur... continentis enim rationi obtemperat. Atque etiam magis forsse in temperante ac forti obediens est; omnia enim in his rationi consonant. Esse igitur irrationalis quoque haec duplex videtur; nam vegetalis nullo modo cum ratione communicat; concupiscibilis autem et omnino appetibilis particeps rationis quodam modo est, quatenus ipsi obedit imperioque eius obtemperat ». — De maiori cfr. Aristot., de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 1.

en: Or, at the end of the *Ethics* translated from Greek into Latin (cfr. tom. I p. 10 note 2). It is there taught that in the soul there is perhaps something beside reason, which opposes and resists it; « which yet itself also seems to be a participant of reason... for in the continent man it obeys reason. And still more perhaps in the temperate and the brave man it is obedient; for all things in these are consonant with reason. So the irrational also seems to be twofold; for the vegetative in no way communicates with reason; but the concupiscible and altogether the appetible is in a certain way a participant of reason, insofar as it obeys it and complies with its command ». — On the major, cfr. Aristotle, *On Virtues and Vices* c. 1.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 50. (c. 10.): *Appetitus autem movet praeter rationem; concupiscentia enim appetitus quidam est.* Cfr. ibid. text. 47. (c. 9.). — In initio arg. post *in ea* [cod. G *eadem*] *parte* cod. Z subdit *solum*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III text 50 (c. 10): *But appetite moves beside reason; for concupiscence is a certain appetite.* Cfr. ibid. text 47 (c. 9). — At the beginning of the argument, after *in ea* [cod. G *eadem*] *parte* codex Z adds *solum*.

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 10: *Hae* [fortitudo et temperantia] *enim irrationalium partium esse virtutes videntur.* Cfr. de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 2. — Paulo ante pro *actum ipsius virtutis* cod. Z *actum suum*.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* III c. 10: *For these* [fortitude and temperance] *seem to be virtues of the irrational parts.* Cfr. *On Virtues and Vices* c. 2. — A little before, for *actum ipsius virtutis* codex Z reads *actum suum*.

la: Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 13: *Virtus quoque secundum hanc differentiam* [quatenus scil. rationem proprie in se habet, aut rationi obtemperat] *distinguitur; nam alias ex ipsis intellectivas, alias morales dicimus; sapientiam, perspicaciam* [σύνεσιν] *et prudentiam* [φρόνησιν] *intellectivas; liberalitatem et temperantiam morales.* — Pro *in ratione* codd. H U *in ratione virtute*, edd. *in rationali parte*.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* I c. 13: *Virtue also is distinguished according to this difference* [namely insofar as it properly has reason in itself, or obeys reason]; *for some of these we call intellective, others moral; wisdom, sagacity* [σύνεσις] *and prudence* [φρόνησις] *intellective; liberality and temperance moral.* — For *in ratione* codices H U read *in ratione virtute*, the editions *in rationali parte*.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 51. (c. 10.). In textu origin. ante *phantasia recta* habetur *appetitus autem et*.

en: Book III of *On the Soul*, text 51 (c. 10). In the original text, before *phantasia recta* ("the imagination right") there is *appetitus autem et*.

la: Libr. I. Ethic. c. 13. Cfr. supra nota 6. et 9. — *Rationale, in quantum rationem participat*, ab aliis, ut a S. Thoma, appellatur etiam *rationale per essentiam*; et *in quantum rationi obedit, rationale per participationem*.

en: Book I of the *Ethics* c. 13. Cfr. above, notes 6 and 9. — *The rational, inasmuch as it participates in reason*, is also called by others, as by St. Thomas, *rational by essence*; and *inasmuch as it obeys reason, rational by participation*. <!-- p.717 (replies band, nn.1–7) -->

la: Vide infra d. 36. q. 5. in fine corp. — Quoad rationem seq. cfr. supra pag. 381, nota 1, et verba *Alani ab Insulis*, tom. II. pag. 892, nota 2. allata. — Subinde pro *principium* cod. A exhibet *principia* et paulo inferius cum codd. Zbb verbis *liberum arbitrium* praemittit *ipsum*.

en: See below, d. 36 q. 5 at the end of the corpus. — Concerning the following ground cfr. above, p. 381 note 1, and the words of *Alan of Lille* cited tom. II p. 892 note 2. — Thereafter for *principium* codex A exhibits *principia*, and a little below, with codices Zbb, it prefixes *ipsum* to the words *liberum arbitrium*.

la: Cod. V *dicitur per participationem*.

en: Codex V reads *is called by participation*.

la: Cfr. August., I. de Morib. Eccles. c. 15. n. 25. — Guliel. Mara, hic q. 1, ex August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 5. et XIV. de Trin. c. 9. (cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 6.) nec non ex Beda, super Exod. 25, 31. (II. de Tabernac. et vasis eius, c. 11.) adiungit, quod hae virtutes sint in spiritibus separatis. — Paulo inferius pro *notandus est* codd. FK *notandum est, quod est*, et deinde pro *contra partem* cod. bb *contra potentiam*; Vat. post *contra partem* subiungit *sive potentiam*.

en: Cfr. Augustine, *On the Morals of the Church* I c. 15 n. 25. — William de la Mare, here q. 1, from Augustine, *City of God* IX c. 5 and *On the Trinity* XIV c. 9 (cfr. above, p. 680 note 6), as well as from Bede, on Exod. 25, 31 (II *On the Tabernacle and its Vessels* c. 11), adds that these virtues are in the separated spirits. — A little below, for *notandus est* codices FK read *notandum est, quod est*, and then for *contra partem* codex bb *contra potentiam*; the Vatican after *contra partem* adds *sive potentiam*.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.): « In ratiocinativa enim voluntas fit » (cfr. ibid. text. 46.), et text. 50. (c. 10.): *Voluntas enim appetitus est* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 6. ad 2.). — Cod. a *ratiocinationis*, cod. V *rationalis*, Vat. *ratiocinativus*. Superius pro *liberi arbitrii* Vat. *liberum arbitrium*. Circa finem corp. pro *innitendo*, quae lectio est codd. AEG U T f Z bb, edd. cum pluribus codd. *inhaerendo*, cod. K *adhaerendo*, cod. V *uniendo*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III text 42 (c. 9): « For in the ratiocinative [part] the will arises » (cfr. ibid. text 46), and text 50 (c. 10): *For the will is an appetite* (cfr. II Sent. d. 25 p. 1 q. 6 ad 2). — Codex a reads *ratiocinationis*, codex V *rationalis*, the Vatican *ratiocinativus*. Above, for *liberi arbitrii* the Vatican reads *liberum arbitrium*. Toward the end of the corpus, for *innitendo*, which is the reading of codices AEG U T f Z bb, the editions with several codices read *inhaerendo*, codex K *adhaerendo*, codex V *uniendo*.

la: Codd. T U Z bb addunt *enim*.

en: Codices T U Z bb add *enim*.

la: Vide verba Bonaventurae, supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. in scholio allata.

en: See the words of Bonaventure cited above, d. 26 a. 2 q. 5 in the scholion.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 12. (c. 9.): *In irrationabili* [parte] *concupiscentia et ira.* — Pro *sensibilis* edd. hic et infra etiam pluries cum pluribus codd. *sensualis*. Paulo ante pro *comparationes* cod. G *rationes*, codd. AV *operationes*. Paulo inferius pro *libertas arbitrii* edd. *liberum arbitrium*, et dein *habilitas* pro *habilitatio*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III text 12 (c. 9): *In the irrational* [part] *concupiscence and anger.* — For *sensibilis* the editions here and below, also several times with several codices, read *sensualis*. A little before, for *comparationes* codex G reads *rationes*, codices AV *operationes*. A little below, for *libertas arbitrii* the editions read *liberum arbitrium*, and then *habilitas* for *habilitatio*. <!-- p.718 (replies + scholion band, nn.1–4) -->

la: Cod. U supplet *est*. Paulo superius pro *deliberatam* cod. A habet *deliberativam*, et subinde post *et in hac* edd. repetunt *parte*. — De hac solut. cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Codex U supplies *est*. A little above, for *deliberatam* codex A has *deliberativam*, and thereafter after *et in hac* the editions repeat *parte*. — On this solution cfr. II Sent. d. 31 a. 1 q. 2 in the corpus and d. 41 a. 2 q. 2.

la: Cfr. infra q. 5. et dub. 5. — Paulo ante pro *habitum dirigentem* cod. K substituit *habituum dignitatem*, et dein pro *electivae* (cfr. hic fundam. 4.) Vat. *electice*, codd. EFHTU VZ et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *active*, cod. A *ratione*. — De locutione *per interemptionem* vide supra pag. 640, nota 2.

en: Cfr. below, q. 5 and dub. 5. — A little before, for *habitum dirigentem* codex K substitutes *habituum dignitatem*, and then for *electivae* (cfr. here, fundamentum 4) the Vatican reads *electice*, codices EFHTU VZ and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales *active*, codex A *ratione*. — On the expression *per interemptionem* ("by destruction") see above, p. 640 note 2.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. et d. 24. p. 2. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. — Paulo superius post *non autem* Vat. inserit *secundum quod*, et versus initium solut. pro *rectitudo* substituit *rectificatio*.

en: See II Sent. d. 5 a. 3 q. 1 ad 2 and d. 24 p. 2 a. 1 q. 1 ad 2. — A little above, after *non autem* the Vatican inserts *secundum quod*, and toward the beginning of the solution it substitutes *rectificatio* for *rectitudo*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 481, nota 1. et pag. 482, nota 2.

en: Cfr. above, p. 481 note 1 and p. 482 note 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione solvenda est duplex modus dicendi. S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 56. a. 4.) docet, ipsam irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae sunt in appetitu sensibili, esse subiectum virtutis, scilicet temperantiae et fortitudinis, quatenus participant rationem per hoc, quod natae sunt rationi obedire; unde vult, quod ista virtus « nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem » (S. loc. cit.). Idem docet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.). Cum multis aliis S. Bonav. putat, quod in concupiscibili et irascibili sensibili non ponatur virtus cardinalis sicut in subiecto; subiungit autem: « Licet per frequentem assuefactionem aliquo modo illae potentiae non incongrue dicantur habilitari; illa tamen habilitatio non est de virtutis essentia, sed potius sibi annexa » (hic ad 1; cfr. ad 4.). Huic modo dicendi favent etiam B. Albert. et Uldaricus (apud Dionys. Carth.), Richard. a Med., Henric. Gandav., Scot. et Dionys. Carth., qui (hic q. 2.) dicit: « Fateor, me amplius inclinari ad positionem dicentium, quod subiective sint in parte animae superiori, et in parte inferiori per impressionem et relucentiam quandam ». — Controversia autem fere reducitur ad quaestionem, utrum dispositiones illae vel impressiones in parte sensitiva mereantur proprie nomen virtutis, an non; de quo plura dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.). Eadem autem differentia in modo loquendi occurrit etiam in quaestione de subiecto peccati et vitii; de quo vide II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2, et scholion, nec non S. Thomam, S. I. II. q. 74. a. 2. seqq. — De duplici irascibili et concupiscibili (hic ad 1.) cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 5, in scholio. — Nota in principio corp. etiam specialem modum loquendi de rationali, et cfr. supra pag. 716, nota 11.

**II.** Praeter laudatos: Scot., hic q. unica n. 4. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. ad 6. 7. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 22. — Durand., hic q. 1.

**III.** In numero quaternario virtutum cardinalium omnes conveniunt; sed in assignandis rationibus pro aptitudine et sufficientia huius numeri magistri diversas ineunt vias. S. Thom. in Sum. (I. II. q. 61. a. 2.) duplicem viam assignat, scilicet alteram secundum principia formalia, alteram secundum subiecta; et secunda convenit cum septima, quam auctor noster iudicat esse magis probabilem (cfr. hic dubia circa lit.).

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english_scholion:
**I.** In solving this question a twofold manner of speaking must be distinguished. St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; *Summa* I-II q. 56 a. 4) teaches that the irascible and concupiscible themselves, which are in the sensible appetite, are the subject of virtue, namely of temperance and fortitude, insofar as they participate in reason through this, that they are born to obey reason; whence he holds that this virtue « is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason » (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). The same is taught by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2). With many others St. Bonaventure holds that in the sensible concupiscible and irascible the cardinal virtue is not placed as in a subject; but he adds: « Although through frequent habituation those powers may in some way not incongruously be said to be made apt; that aptitude, however, is not of the essence of the virtue, but rather annexed to it » (here ad 1; cfr. ad 4). To this manner of speaking are favorable also Blessed Albert and Ulric (in Dionysius the Carthusian), Richard of Mediavilla, Henry of Ghent, Scotus, and Dionysius the Carthusian, who (here q. 2) says: « I confess that I am more inclined to the position of those saying that they are subjectively in the higher part of the soul, and in the lower part by a certain impression and reflection ». — But the controversy is reduced almost to the question whether those dispositions or impressions in the sensitive part properly merit the name of virtue, or not; on which Richard of Mediavilla says more (here a. 1, q. 1). But the same difference in manner of speaking occurs also in the question concerning the subject of sin and vice; on which see II Sent. d. 41 a. 2 q. 2, and the scholion, as well as St. Thomas, *Summa* I-II q. 74 a. 2 ff. — On the twofold irascible and concupiscible (here ad 1) cfr. above, d. 26 a. 2 q. 5, in the scholion. — Note also at the beginning of the corpus the special manner of speaking concerning the rational, and cfr. above, p. 716, note 11.

**II.** Besides those cited: Scotus, here q. unica n. 4 ff. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2 ad 6, 7. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 4 q. 22. — Durandus, here q. 1.

**III.** In the number four of the cardinal virtues all agree; but in assigning the reasons for the aptness and sufficiency of this number the masters enter upon diverse ways. St. Thomas in the *Summa* (I-II q. 61 a. 2) assigns a twofold way, namely one according to the formal principles, the other according to the subjects; and the second agrees with the seventh, which our author judges to be more probable (cfr. here, the dubia on the letter).

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p71{5,6,7,8,9}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion (CLAUDE.md "VOL II OVERRIDE"). IA djvu OCR base raw 49685–49923, used only for clean running prose and marker spacing. Offset pdf = printed + 22; running-head TEXT trusted over OCR'd digits (`DIST. XXXIII. ART. ONICCS QUA.EST. III` OCR-mangled = *ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III*).

**Page span.** Printed **pp.715–719** (PDF 737–741). QUAESTIO III header + opener at the foot of **p.715** (raw 49685); QUAESTIO IV opens on **p.719** (raw 49924). The body runs: Fundamenta + Sed contra (p.715 foot → p.716), Conclusio + Respondeo (p.716–717), replies 1–5 (p.717–718), SCHOLION §I–III (p.718 foot → p.719 top).

**Apparatus — 32-entry NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart, renumbered continuous.** Page-split map:
- **p.715 (Quaestio III opener band) nn.1–10 → [^1]–[^10]** (q3's OWN fresh band; the *rationali* opener variant n.1, the Soliloquia/Bernard n.6, *Novae Ethicae* discretae n.6b, and the *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* n.8). Two markers landed on adjacent body words near the page seam (sed contra 4/5), rendered [^9]/[^10].
- **p.716 (Respondeo band) nn.1–11 → [^11]–[^21]** (the *dupliciter rationale* Aristotle citations, the *ratiocinatus* will note, the *rationale per essentiam/participationem* gloss n.11→[^21]).
- **p.717 (replies band) nn.1–7 → [^22]–[^28]** (*per participationem* n.2→[^23]; the William de la Mare / separated-spirits note n.3→[^24]; the *voluntas/innitendo* variant cluster n.4→[^25]).
- **p.718 (replies + scholion band) nn.1–4 → [^29]–[^32]** (the *per interemptionem* note n.2→[^30]; the *rectificatio* variant n.3→[^31]; n.4→[^32] closes the band). Marker pairing 32/32/32 clean.

**Scholion disposition.** q3 carries its **OWN** `### Scholion` §I–III (printed at the foot of p.718 spanning into p.719). NOT a redirect: §I treats the duplex-modus-dicendi controversy (S. Thom./Petr. a Tar. vs Bonav.) on the subject of cardinal virtue, with the *de duplici irascibili* cross-ref to d. 26 a. 2 q. 5; §II lists further authorities (Scot., Albert, Henr. Gand., Durand.); §III opens the *numerus quaternarius* discussion that bridges to QUAESTIO IV (cfr. hic dubia circa lit.). Body-then-scholion order preserved per the `extractLanguageBlock` rule. This differs from q1/q2 (which redirected to the q1 article-master scholion); q3 begins a fresh scholion series, exactly as d.32-q4 did.

**Footer hand-offs.** PICKED-UP: NONE — q3 opens a fresh NOTAE sequence on p.715 (the q2→q3 hand-off correctly forwarded nothing on the footer axis; all p.715 nn.1–10 in q2's band anchored q2's body, and this q3-opener band is a physically distinct second footer block at the foot of p.715). FORWARDED to **d33-a1-q4**: NONE on the footer axis — q4 opens a fresh band; **p.719's footer band (nn.1 ff., `Vers. 7…`, `Vers. 38…`) belongs entirely to QUAESTIO IV's body**, not to q3's scholion. q3's scholion footnotes are fully contained in the p.718 band ([^29]–[^32]); the §III text simply concludes on p.719 with no q3 footer there.

**`[?]` flags.** None. Two-column bands were clean at 450 dpi; the OCR-garbled running head and the cascade-fragmented opener were resolved against the PDF.

**J4 Class-B orphan repair (2026-07-17).** [^23]–[^32] existed as apparatus definitions with no `[^N]` anchor in either body (the page-split map above already correctly described where they belonged, but the anchors themselves were never inserted). Re-extracted 450 dpi bands for pp.716–718 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p71{6,7,8}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, split 1500/1660) and read the printed footer digits directly against body superscripts (TRAP 1/2 discipline: keyed on the apparatus entry's own content, page-tag comments treated as hints only — several proved off by a page, e.g. the Respondeo's "Si large accipiatur..." paragraph is tagged `<!-- page 716 -->` in this chunk but is printed on **717**). All 10 were placed with direct textual/visual confirmation, each stacked immediately after the pre-existing (untouched) marker at the same lemma:
- **[^23]** ("Cod. V *dicitur per participationem*") → p.717 footer n.2, on *participat rationem* (Conclusio 2, next to existing [^13]).
- **[^24]** (August./Guliel. Mara, virtues in separated spirits) → p.717 footer n.3, on *intellectiva* (next to existing [^14]).
- **[^25]** (Aristot. *De Anima* III, *ratiocinativa*/*voluntas*) → p.717 footer n.4, on *ratiocinatus* (next to existing [^15]).
- **[^26]** (codd. TUZbb add *enim*) → p.717 footer n.5, on *Ad illud* (Ad 1 opener, next to existing [^16]).
- **[^27]** (cross-ref to d.26 a.2 q.5 in scholio) → p.717 footer n.6, on *secundum rem* (next to existing [^17]).
- **[^28]** (Aristot. *De Anima* III, *in irrationabili parte*) → p.717 footer n.7, on *sensibilis* (next to existing [^18]).
- **[^29]** (Cod. U *supplet est*; cross-ref II Sent d.31/d.41) → p.718 footer n.1, on *non* (Ad 2, next to existing [^19]).
- **[^30]** (*electivae*/*active* variant; *per interemptionem*) → p.718 footer n.2, on *agere* (Ad 4, next to existing [^20]).
- **[^31]** (cross-ref II Sent d.5/d.24; *rectitudo*/*rectificatio*) → p.718 footer n.3, on *erroneus* (Ad 5, next to existing [^21]).
- **[^32]** (cross-ref pp.481–482) → p.718 footer n.4, on *errare* (Ad 5, next to existing [^22]).

No Latin text, English wording, or apparatus prose was changed — only `[^N]` marker tokens were added, mirrored at the same lemma in both bodies. Pre-existing anchors [^1]–[^22] were left untouched even where the page evidence suggested some may be mis-anchored by position (a Trap-1-shaped question, out of scope for this Class-B orphan pass).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0