title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus III.
#### *Qualiter Deus sit in rebus.*

Tertio loco principaliter quaeritur de tertio articulo, scilicet qualiter Deus sit in rebus. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus aequaliter sive uniformiter.

Secundo quaeritur, quibus modis, et qualiter Deus sit in rebus.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus aequaliter sit in omnibus rebus.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem sit uniformiter, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^1], « prima causa uno modo se habet ad omnia, licet omnia non habeant se uno modo ad ipsam »; sed omnia in Deo sunt uniformiter, quia sunt vita et creatrix essentia: ergo multo fortius Deus in omnibus rebus est aequaliter et uniformiter.

2. Item, quod est ubique totum est aequaliter et uniformiter[^2]; sed cum Deus sit simplicissimus, est ubique totus: ergo aequaliter et uniformiter est in omnibus rebus.

3. Item, unicuique rei intima est materia et forma; sed forma non unitur materiae nisi mediante appetitu, appetitus autem ortum habet ab essentia[^3]; sed hoc non posset nisi per Dei praesentiam: ergo Deus magis est intimus omni rei quam sua forma. Sed forma unicuique rei est summe intima: ergo Deus in termino intimus est cuilibet. Sed quod habet esse in termino est uniformiter: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ostenditur per impossibile: quia, si Deus non est aequaliter in rebus, ergo cum[^4] magis intime est in una quam in alia, ergo in aliqua non est summe intime: ergo aliquid est in re intrinsecum, in quo non est Deus: ergo Deus non est intimum quod est. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo et primum.

**Sed contra:**

1. « Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum recipientis, et non recepti »[^5]; sed creaturae non sunt aequaliter capaces Dei: ergo non est aequaliter in eis Deus.

2. Item, sicut se habet intellectus ad primam lucem, sic ens ad primam essentiam, et vivens ad primam vitam[^6]; sed maior intellectus magis participat divinam lucem: ergo perfectius ens, et perfectius vivens divinam essentiam et vitam: ergo Deus perfectius est in uno quam in alio.

3. Item, existentia Dei in rebus est conservatio rerum[^7]; sed non omnes res aequaliter conservantur: ergo non est aequaliter in omnibus.

4. Item, cum Deus sit ubique, solum dicitur habitare in iustis; sed hoc non esset, si aequaliter et uniformiter esset in omnibus: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus uniformiter est in rebus, quatenus non connotantur effectus; sed quatenus uni creaturae Deus dat plus quam alii, magis dicitur esse in una quam in alia.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod Deum esse in rebus dupliciter

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potest intelligi: uno modo, ut idem sit quod esse praesentem cuilibet rei, non connotando effectum; et sic uniformiter est in omnibus rebus, eo quod intimus est cuilibet rei et summe praesens et totus in qualibet re. Alio modo potest connotare effectum, sicut artifex dicitur in artificio esse per connotationem effectus et per impressionem suae similitudinis; et sic, cum uni creaturae plus det quam alii, magis est in una quam in alia. — Et hoc potest esse tripliciter[^8]: vel extensive, quantum ad ea quae habent esse diuturnius, ut in corpore incorruptibili plus quam in anima sensibili; vel intensive, quantum ad ea quae habent esse nobilius, ut in anima sensibili[^9] quam in corpore incorruptibili; vel utroque modo, ut in anima rationali quam in corpore corruptibili.

His visis patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Procedunt enim his duabus viis, ut patet, exceptis duobus primis ad utramque partem.

Quod enim obiicitur, quod Deus uniformiter se habet ad omnes res; si intelligatur uniformitas ex parte divini esse, verum est; si autem intelligatur ex parte effectus, falsum est. Quoniam Deus uniformiter et stabiliter existens, cetera movet[^10] et multos et varios effectus producit, et efficiendo diversa in rebus facit, quod res non se habeant uniformiter ad ipsum. Quoniam igitur, cum dicitur Deus esse in rebus, uno modo connotatur effectus, alio modo non; ideo uno modo conceditur, quod sit uniformiter, alio modo quod non. Similiter e converso, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt in Deo, uno modo potest connotari effectus, sicut patet in praedestinatione et reprobatione, et sic non est uniformiter; alio modo non connotatur effectus, et sic uniformiter.

Quod obiicitur iterum ad oppositum, quod omne quod recipitur, est per modum recipientis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi receptum dependet a recipiente, ut species[^11] a virtute cognoscente; in proposito autem non sic est. Unde divina essentia, existens in re, non accipit modum rei; et sic patet illud.

english:
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### Article III.
#### *In what manner God is in things.*

In the third place, principally, inquiry is made concerning the third article, namely in what manner God is in things. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether God is in all things equally or uniformly.

Second it is asked, in what modes, and in what manner God is in things.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God is equally in all things.*

That, however, he is [in them] uniformly, appears thus:

1. Because, as the Philosopher says[^1], "the first cause stands in one mode toward all things, although all things do not stand in one mode toward it"; but all things are in God uniformly, since they are life and creative essence: therefore much more strongly is God in all things equally and uniformly.

2. Likewise, what is whole everywhere is [there] equally and uniformly[^2]; but since God is most simple, he is whole everywhere: therefore he is equally and uniformly in all things.

3. Likewise, to each thing, matter and form are inmost; but form is not united to matter except by mediation of appetite, and appetite has its origin from essence[^3]; but this could not be except through God's presence: therefore God is more inmost to every thing than its form. But form is in the highest degree inmost to each thing: therefore God is, at the limit, inmost to anything whatever. But what has being at the limit is [there] uniformly: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this is shown through the impossible: for, if God is not equally in things, then since[^4] he is more inmostly in one than in another, therefore in some he is not in the highest degree inmostly: therefore there is something intrinsic in the thing in which God is not: therefore God is not the inmost which is. But this is impossible: therefore so is the first [thesis].

**On the contrary:**

1. "Everything which is received in something is there according to the mode of the receiver, and not of the received"[^5]; but creatures are not equally capable of God: therefore God is not equally in them.

2. Likewise, as intellect stands toward the first light, so being toward the first essence, and the living toward the first life[^6]; but a greater intellect more participates the divine light: therefore a more perfect being, and a more perfect living, [more participates] the divine essence and life: therefore God is more perfectly in one than in another.

3. Likewise, the existence of God in things is the conservation of things[^7]; but not all things are equally conserved: therefore he is not equally in all.

4. Likewise, since God is everywhere, he is said to dwell only in the just; but this would not be so, if he were equally and uniformly in all: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *God is uniformly in things, insofar as effects are not connoted; but insofar as God gives more to one creature than to another, he is more said to be in one than in another.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that "to be in things" can be understood of God in two ways:

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in one way, so that it is the same as to be present to each thing, not connoting an effect; and thus he is uniformly in all things, since he is inmost to each thing and most highly present and whole in any thing whatever. In another way, it can connote an effect, just as the artificer is said to be in the artifact through the connotation of the effect and through the impression of his likeness; and thus, since he gives more to one creature than to another, he is more in one than in another. — And this can be in three ways[^8]: either extensively, with respect to those which have a more lasting being, as more in an incorruptible body than in a sensible soul; or intensively, with respect to those which have a more noble being, as in a sensible soul[^9] [more] than in an incorruptible body; or in both ways, as in the rational soul [more] than in a corruptible body.

With these things seen, the objections to either side are clear. For they proceed by these two ways, as appears, except the first two on each side.

For what is objected, that God stands uniformly toward all things; if uniformity is understood on the side of the divine being, it is true; if, however, it is understood on the side of the effect, it is false. For God, existing uniformly and stably, moves[^10] other things and produces many and varied effects, and by effecting diverse [things] in things brings it about that things do not stand uniformly toward him. Therefore since, when God is said to be in things, in one mode an effect is connoted, in another not; therefore in one mode it is conceded that he is [there] uniformly, in another that he is not. Similarly conversely, when it is said that all things are in God, in one mode an effect can be connoted, as appears in predestination and reprobation, and so it is not uniformly; in another mode an effect is not connoted, and so [it is] uniformly.

What is objected again on the opposite side, that everything which is received is [received] according to the mode of the receiver; it must be said that this is true where the received depends on the receiver, as a species[^11] [depends] on the cognitive power; in the case under consideration, however, it is not so. Hence the divine essence, existing in a thing, does not take on the mode of the thing; and so that [point] is plain.

la: Philosophus hic intelligitur auctor libri *de Causis*, qui prop. 24. ait: *Causa prima existit in omnibus rebus secundum unam dispositionem, sed res omnes non existunt in causa prima secundum unam dispositionem.* — De minori huius argumenti vide supra d. 36. a. 2. q. I.

en: "The Philosopher" here is understood [to be] the author of the book *On Causes*, who at prop. 24 says: "The first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition." — On the minor of this argument see above d. 36, a. 2, q. I.

la: Cod. T in marg. non incongrue addit *in omnibus*.

en: Codex T in the margin not unfittingly adds *in omnibus* ("in all").

la: Quid sibi velit haec sententia, explicat Alexander Hal., ut invenies infra in *Scholio* huic quaestioni adiuncto. — Mox post *posset* codd. P V inserunt *esse*. In fine argumenti auctoritate plurimorum codd. posuimus *in termino intimus est*, et deinde *in termino* i. e. summe sive quantum possibile est, pro quo Vat. *intimior intimo est intimus*, et deinde *in intimo* pro *in termino*. Cod. T primo loco *intimior est intimo*, et cod. W *summe et in termino est intimus*.

en: What this sentence intends, Alexander Hal. explains, as you will find below in the *Scholion* attached to this question. — Soon after *posset*, codices P V insert *esse*. At the end of the argument, on the authority of most of the codices, we have set *in termino intimus est*, and then *in termino* i.e. "in the highest [degree]" or "as much as possible," in place of which the Vatican [edition reads] *intimior intimo est intimus*, and then *in intimo* for *in termino*. Codex T in the first place [reads] *intimior est intimo*, and codex W [reads] *summe et in termino est intimus*.

la: In pluribus codd. ut H P Q V desideratur *cum*. Paulo inferius pro *intimum* Vat. cum nonnullis mss. *in omni*, cod. T a secunda manu *intimum omni*.

en: In several codices, such as H P Q V, *cum* is wanting. A little below, in place of *intimum*, the Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] *in omni*, codex T from a second hand [reads] *intimum omni*.

la: Libr. *de Causis*, prop. 10. 20. seqq. Cfr. etiam Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 4.

en: Book *On Causes*, prop. 10, 20 ff. Cf. also Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* V, prose 4.

la: Cfr. liber *de Causis*, prop. 18. seqq. — Immediate post pro *maior intellectus* codd. M P Q *magis intelligens* et cod. T cum aliquibus aliis *magis intellectus*. In initio argumenti pro *sicut se habet intellectus* codd. P Q *sicut se habet intelligens*.

en: Cf. the book *On Causes*, prop. 18 ff. — Immediately after, in place of *maior intellectus*, codices M P Q [read] *magis intelligens*, and codex T with some others [reads] *magis intellectus*. At the beginning of the argument, in place of *sicut se habet intellectus*, codices P Q [read] *sicut se habet intelligens*.

la: Cfr. hic a. I. q. I. seq. — Voci *existentia* in initio huius propos. codd. A D Z aa ff et plures alii praefigunt *ex*, qua particula addita propositionis sententia clare apparet.

en: Cf. here a. I, q. I, [and] following. — Before the word *existentia* at the beginning of this proposition, codices A D Z aa ff and several others prefix *ex* ("from"), with which particle added the sense of the proposition clearly appears.

la: Vat. cum multis codd. perperam *dupliciter*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with many codices wrongly [reads] *dupliciter* ("in two ways").

la: Supple cum cod. H *plus*.

en: Supply with codex H *plus* ("more").

la: Respicitur illud Boeth., III. *de Consol.* metr. 9: *Tu numeris elementa ligas, ut frigora flammis, Arida conveniant liquidis, ne purior ignis Evolet, aut mersas deducant pondera terras.*

en: Reference is made to that [verse of] Boethius, *On the Consolation* III, metre 9: "Thou bindest the elements by numbers, that cold may agree with flame, the dry with the liquid, lest the purer fire fly off, or weights drag down the submerged lands."

la: Scilicet *intentionales*, quae concurrunt ad actum cognitionis.

en: Namely *intentional* [species], which concur in the act of cognition.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio, a paucis antiquis explicite tractata, viam sternit ad sequentem quaest. enodandam. — In arg. 3. inter fundam. difficilis locus: « forma non unitur materiae nisi mediante appetitu; appetitus autem ortum habet ab essentia », profunde ab Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 86. m. 2. a. 2. § I. explicatur: « In omni motu sive ad formam sive ad situm primum principium motus intrinsecum est appetitus. Hic etenim est vis a Creatore omnibus indita creaturis, per quam ad sui complementum ordinantur et in suo complemento stant et radicantur. Nec solum sic est in creaturis, sed etiam in creaturarum essentialibus principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, actus et potentia. Neque enim materia se ipsa movetur ad formam, quia cum nullam determinet, non magis moveretur ad hanc quam ad illam; neque forma se ipsam facit in materia; sed per appetitum insitum utraque ad invicem ordinantur et per appetitum huiusmodi inseparabiliter coniunguntur. Nec solum appetitus rem completam in esse sequitur, sed in ipsis rerum principiis essentialibus radicatur et fundatur. Et sicut est in motu ad formam, sic est in omni motu non violento; in omni enim motu appetitus excitat motorem ad motum. Ex quo patet, ipsum esse principium motus intrinsecum universale ». Pergit explicans differentias appetituum et eorum in quibus est appetitus, secundum quod magis vel minus habent vel de forma vel de materia. Illud autem principium intrinsecum motus et vitae minime excludit influxum primae causae, immo eum postulat, ut ibid. a. 1. § 1. probatur. — Ex hoc Alexandri loco patet, errare Trigosum (*Sum.* q. 6. a. 5.), qui, nullo codice vel editione suffragante, textum mutavit ponendo *ortum habet ab esse* pro *ortum habet ab essentia*, hac innixus ratione, quod scil. antiqua lectio nullum sensum haberet.

Quod anima sensibilis perfectius habeat esse quam corpus incorruptibile, magis explanatur III. *Sent.* d. 21. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. (cfr. S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 70. a. 3. ad 2.).

**II.** Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 10. m. 5. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. *Report.* hic q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic p. I. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. circa med.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question, treated explicitly by few of the ancients, prepares the way for unfolding the next question. — In argument 3, among the *fundamenta*, [there is] a difficult passage: "form is not united to matter except by mediation of appetite; and appetite has its origin from essence," profoundly explained by Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II, q. 86, m. 2, a. 2, § I: "In every motion, whether toward form or toward place, the first intrinsic principle of motion is appetite. For this is a force implanted by the Creator in all creatures, by which they are ordered toward their completion, and stand and are rooted in their completion. Nor is this so only in creatures, but also in the essential principles of creatures, which are matter and form, act and potency. For neither does matter move itself toward form, since, as it determines no [form], it would be no more moved to this than to that; nor does form make itself in matter; but through implanted appetite the two are ordered to each other, and through this appetite are inseparably joined. Nor does appetite follow only the thing complete in being, but is rooted and grounded in the very essential principles of things. And as it is in motion toward form, so it is in every non-violent motion; for in every motion appetite stirs the mover to motion. From which it appears that this is the universal intrinsic principle of motion." He goes on, explaining the differences of appetites and of those in which appetite is, according to which they have more or less either of form or of matter. But that intrinsic principle of motion and life by no means excludes the influx of the first cause, but rather requires it, as is proved at the same place, a. 1, § 1. — From this passage of Alexander it appears that Trigosus (*Sum.* q. 6, a. 5) errs, who, with no codex or edition supporting him, altered the text by putting *ortum habet ab esse* for *ortum habet ab essentia*, relying on this reasoning, namely that the ancient reading would have no sense.

That a sensible soul has being more perfectly than an incorruptible body is more fully explained III. *Sent.* d. 21, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 (cf. St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 70, a. 3, ad 2).

**II.** As for the question itself: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 10, m. 5. — Scotus, on this and the following q., *Report.* here q. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. I, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Durand., on this and the following q., here p. I, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2, near the middle.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Quibus modis Deus in rebus esse dicatur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, quibus modis, et qualiter, sit Deus in rebus. Et assignat Magister dupliciter[^1] modos existendi Deum in rebus. Et unum modum[^2] accipit ab Augustino de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum[^3], qui dicit, quod « aliter est Deus in omnibus creaturis, aliter in Sanctis, aliter in Christo. In creaturis singulis per naturam, in Sanctis per inhabitantem gratiam, in Christo per unionem ». Alium modum accipit a Gregorio, qui dicit super quintum Canticorum[^4], « quod Deus est in rebus tripliciter, scilicet potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialiter ». Quaeritur ergo de distinctione, sufficientia et ordine istorum modorum.

1. Et obiicitur contra assignationem Augustini: aut enim accipiuntur modi illi quantum ad divinam substantiam, aut quantum ad creaturam, aut quantum ad effectus. Si quantum ad effectus, cum innumerabiles sint, innumerabiles sunt modi essendi. Si quantum ad creaturam suscipientem, cum solum duplex sit suscipiens, scilicet natura et voluntas, videtur quod tantum duo sint modi, scilicet per naturam, et per gratiam. Si quantum ad Dei substantiam, cum in ea non cadat diversitas, erit tantum unus modus.

2. Item, sicut gratia est effectus superadditus naturae, ita operatio miraculosa: ergo sicut in habentibus gratiam est aliter Deus quam in non habentibus, ita et in re, in qua operatur miraculose, ut in asina Balaam[^5], erit alio modo essendi.

3. Item, sicut gratia gratum faciens est supra naturam, ita gratia gratis data, ut prophetia, ita etiam poena et gloria: ergo cum ista differant genere et specie, debent secundum hoc diversi modi essendi distingui: ergo non distinguit Magister sufficienter.

4. Item, obiicitur contra assignationem Gregorii: aut enim illa assignatio est secundum effectus, aut conditiones et proprietates Dei. Si secundum effectus, tunc cum essentia nullum connotet effectum, non deberet poni. Si secundum conditiones Dei; sed non tantum est Dei potentia, sed etiam sapientia et voluntas: ergo videtur, quod insufficienter assignet.

5. Item, videtur esse praeposteratio in ordine. Nam secundum rem et rationem intelligendi essentia praecedit potentiam, et potentia praesentiam: ergo male ordinat.

6. Item, verborum inculcatio videtur, quia in Deo idem est potentia, essentia et praesentia: quaeritur[^6] ergo distinctio.

### Conclusio.

> *Utraque assignatio modorum essendi Deum in rebus conveniens est, tam illa quae est Augustini, quam quae Gregorii: illa enim respicit diversitatem modorum essendi in rebus, haec conditiones eorundem modorum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod assignatio Augustini respicit diversitatem modorum essendi Deum in rebus, sed assignatio Gregorii respicit conditiones modorum essendi. Ubicumque enim est Deus, sive per naturam sive per gratiam, est essentialiter, potentialiter, praesentialiter.

Diversitas autem modorum essendi accipitur penes diversitatem effectuum, et non qualemcumque, sed solum trimembrem. Quidam enim est effectus, secundum quem comparatur res[^7] ad Deum per modum exeuntis; et hi omnes continentur sub modo naturae, extenso nomine. Quidam per modum redeuntis; et hic est effectus gratiae inchoatae, vel consummatae, vel gloriae, et quantum ad hunc est secundus modus essendi. Quidam est effectus, secundum quem comparatur creatura ad Deum ut perveniens[^8], et hic est effectus unionis, in qua uniuntur in unitate personae creatura et Creator, ut homo-Deus. Quoniam igitur tres sunt modi effectuum, secundum quos creatura diversimode comparatur ad Deum; ideo tantum tribus modis dicitur esse in rebus.

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Et primus — qui attenditur quantum ad exitum, assimilatur lineae rectae; secundus, quantum ad reditum, lineae reflexae; tertius, quantum ad perfectionem, assimilatur circulo. Et primus quidem modus similis est lineae; secundus, quia includit primum, similis est superficiei; tertius, quia utrumque, similis est soliditati. Et ideo optime dicit Apostolus ad Colossenses secundo[^9], quod *in Christo tota divinitas habitat corporaliter*: est enim perfectissime, quia est ad modum circuli, quae est natura perfecta, et per modum altitudinis, quae est quantitas perfecta. Ex his patet sufficientia et distinctio, et solutio obiectorum.

Assignatio autem beati Gregorii accipitur quantum ad conditiones modorum essendi. In his enim tribus circumloquitur beatus Gregorius perfectionem modorum existendi Deum in omnibus, in quibus est, hoc modo. Aliquid enim est in aliquo secundum *praesentialitatis indistantiam*, ut contentum in continente, ut aqua in vase; aliquid secundum *virtutis influentiam*, ut motor in mobili; aliquid secundum *intimitatis existentiam*, ut illud quod est continens intra, ut anima in corpore[^10]. Et omne quod perfecte est in re, necesse est esse quantum ad hanc triplicem conditionem; et hoc modo est Deus. Et ideo dicitur esse potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialiter, quia secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, secundum virtutis influentiam, secundum intimitatis existentiam.

Et sic patet distinctio, sufficientia et ordo, quoniam secundum rationem intelligendi conditiones istae se habent per additionem, et ideo bene ordinat beatus Gregorius, primo praesentialiter etc.

Aliqui tamen huiusmodi conditiones voluerunt distinguere penes substantiam, virtutem et operationem. Sed licet modus existendi essentialiter respondeat substantiae, et potentialiter virtuti, tamen praesentialiter non respondet operationi; nam praesens est aliquis alicui, etiamsi non operetur.

Aliqui accipiunt penes genera causarum. Sed nec illud videtur conveniens, quia essentialiter consistere non connotat genus causalitatis.

Aliqui penes trinitatem vestigii, scilicet modum, speciem et ordinem; sed omnia haec praecedit essentia secundum rationem intelligendi.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *In what modes God is said to be in things.*

Secondly it is asked, in what modes, and in what manner, God is in things. And the Master assigns in two ways[^1] the modes of God's existing in things. And one mode[^2] he takes from Augustine on the presence of God to Dardanus[^3], who says that "God is in all creatures in one way, in the saints in another way, in Christ in another way. In individual creatures by nature, in the saints by indwelling grace, in Christ by union." Another mode he takes from Gregory, who says on the fifth [chapter] of Canticles[^4], that "God is in things in three ways, namely potentially, presentially, and essentially." Therefore it is asked concerning the distinction, sufficiency, and order of these modes.

1. And it is objected against the assignation of Augustine: for either those modes are taken with respect to the divine substance, or with respect to the creature, or with respect to the effects. If with respect to the effects, since they are innumerable, the modes of being are innumerable. If with respect to the creature receiving, since the receiver is only twofold, namely nature and will, it seems that there are only two modes, namely by nature, and by grace. If with respect to the substance of God, since no diversity falls in it, there will be only one mode.

2. Likewise, just as grace is an effect superadded to nature, so [is] miraculous operation: therefore just as in those having grace God is otherwise than in those not having [it], so also in a thing in which he works miraculously, as in the ass of Balaam[^5], he will be in another mode of being.

3. Likewise, just as gratum-faciens grace is above nature, so [also] gratuitously-given grace, such as prophecy, and likewise also punishment and glory: therefore since these differ in genus and species, diverse modes of being ought to be distinguished accordingly: therefore the Master does not distinguish sufficiently.

4. Likewise, it is objected against the assignation of Gregory: for either that assignation is according to effects, or [according to] the conditions and properties of God. If according to effects, then since the essence connotes no effect, it ought not to be posited. If according to the conditions of God; but there is not only the potency of God, but also wisdom and will: therefore it seems that he assigns insufficiently.

5. Likewise, there seems to be a reversal in the order. For according to the thing and the account of understanding, essence precedes potency, and potency [precedes] presence: therefore he orders badly.

6. Likewise, there seems to be a heaping-up of words, since in God potency, essence, and presence are the same: therefore the distinction is asked for[^6].

### Conclusion.

> *Each assignation of the modes of God's being in things is fitting, both that of Augustine and that of Gregory: for the former regards the diversity of the modes of being in things, the latter the conditions of the same modes.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the assignation of Augustine regards the diversity of the modes of God's being in things, but the assignation of Gregory regards the conditions of the modes of being. For wherever God is, whether by nature or by grace, he is essentially, potentially, presentially.

But the diversity of the modes of being is taken according to the diversity of effects, and not just any [diversity], but only a three-membered one. For there is a certain effect according to which a thing[^7] is compared to God by way of going-out (*exeuntis*); and all these are contained under the mode of nature, in an extended sense of the name. There is another by way of returning (*redeuntis*); and this is the effect of grace inchoate, or consummated, or of glory, and as to this is the second mode of being. There is another effect, according to which the creature is compared to God as arriving (*perveniens*)[^8], and this is the effect of union, in which creature and Creator are united in unity of person, as the God-man. Therefore since there are three modes of effects, according to which the creature is compared to God in diverse ways, therefore he is said to be in things in only three modes.

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And the first — which is attended to with respect to *going-out* — is likened to a straight line; the second, with respect to *return*, to a reflected line; the third, with respect to *perfection*, is likened to a circle. And the first mode indeed is similar to a line; the second, because it includes the first, is similar to a surface; the third, because [it includes] both, is similar to solidity. And therefore the Apostle most aptly says to the Colossians, second [chapter][^9], that *in Christ the whole divinity dwells corporeally*: for he is [there] most perfectly, since he is after the manner of a circle, which is a perfect nature, and after the manner of altitude, which is a perfect quantity. From these the sufficiency and the distinction, and the solution of the objections, is clear.

But the assignation of blessed Gregory is taken with respect to the conditions of the modes of being. For in these three [terms] blessed Gregory circumlocutes the perfection of the modes of God's existing in all [things] in which he is, in this way. For something is in something according to *the indistance of presentiality*, as the contained in the container, as water in a vessel; something according to *the influence of power*, as the mover in the mobile; something according to *the existence of intimacy*, as that which is containing within, as the soul in the body[^10]. And everything that is perfectly in a thing must necessarily be [there] as to this threefold condition; and in this mode is God. And therefore he is said to be potentially, presentially, and essentially, since [he is] according to the indistance of presentiality, according to the influence of power, according to the existence of intimacy.

And thus the distinction, sufficiency, and order are clear, since according to the account of understanding these conditions are related by addition, and therefore blessed Gregory orders well, first *presentially* etc.

Some however have wished to distinguish such conditions according to substance, power, and operation. But although the mode of existing essentially answers to substance, and potentially to power, nevertheless presentially does not answer to operation; for someone is present to someone, even if he does not operate.

Some take [them] according to the genera of causes. But neither does that seem fitting, since to subsist essentially does not connote a genus of causality.

Some [take them] according to the trinity of the vestige, namely mode, species, and order; but essence precedes all these according to the account of understanding.

en: The Vatican [edition], with many codices, wrongly [reads] *dupliciter*.

la: *Epist.* 187. c. 12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3. — Verba textus citati *In creaturis singulis per naturam, in Sanctis per inhabitantem gratiam, in Christo* in Vat. desunt.

en: *Letter* 187, c. 12. See here the Master's text, c. 1 and 3. — The words of the cited text *In individual creatures by nature, in the saints by indwelling grace, in Christ* are missing in the Vatican [edition].

la: De hoc textu, qui falso attribuitur Gregorio, cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Triplex hic essendi modus insinuatur ab Anselmo, *de Fide Trin.* c. 1, et a Richardo de S. Vict., II *de Trin.* c. 23.

en: On this text, which is falsely attributed to Gregory, cf. here the Master's text, c. 1. This threefold mode of being is insinuated by Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity* c. 1, and by Richard of St. Victor, II *On the Trinity* c. 23.

la: *Num.* 22, 23 seqq. — Ita Vat., omnes codd. pro *erit* habent *erat*, quod minus congruum nobis videtur. Post *miraculose* supple cum codd. K V X *quam in re, in qua non operatur miraculose*.

en: *Numbers* 22, 23 ff. — Thus the Vatican [edition]; all codices for *erit* have *erat*, which seems to us less fitting. After *miraculose* supply with codices K V X *quam in re, in qua non operatur miraculose* ("than in a thing in which he does not work miraculously").

la: Pro *quaeritur* aliqui codd. ut C I aa bb *quare*.

en: In place of *quaeritur*, some codices, such as C I aa bb, [read] *quare*.

la: Codd. F R (T in marg.) *creatura*.

en: Codices F R (T in margin) [read] *creatura* ("creature").

la: Vat. absque auctoritate codd. addit *vel perficiens*; deinde post *effectus* codd. D W adiiciunt *gratiae*. Paulo inferius lectionem cod. T *Homo-Deus* in textum recepimus pro *homo et Deus*, ut in Vat. legitur.

en: The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices, adds *vel perficiens* ("or perfecting"); then after *effectus* codices D W add *gratiae* ("of grace"). A little below we have received into the text the reading of codex T, *Homo-Deus*, for *homo et Deus*, as is read in the Vatican [edition].

la: Vers. 9: *Quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter.* — Mox post *perfectissime* supple cum Vat. et cod. cc *in eo*. Dein pro *natura* Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *figura*. — Cfr. August., *de Quant. animae*, c. 12. n. 19, et c. 16. n. 27, ubi de praestantia circuli agitur.

en: Verse 9: *For in him dwells all the fullness of divinity corporeally.* — Soon after *perfectissime* supply with the Vatican [edition] and codex cc *in eo* ("in him"). Then in place of *natura* the Vatican [edition], with some manuscripts, [reads] *figura* ("figure"). — Cf. Augustine, *On the Greatness of the Soul* c. 12, n. 19, and c. 16, n. 27, where the excellence of the circle is treated.

la: Cod. T in margine *soliditatis*, qui terminus magis conveniens esse videtur.

en: Codex T in the margin [reads] *soliditatis*, which term seems to be more fitting.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In assignatione S. Augustini connotantur diversi effectus praesentiae divinae, et secundum hos distinguuntur tres gradus; unde sic Deus non est uniformiter in rebus creatis (cfr. q. praeced.). — Triplex comparatio creaturae per modum *exeuntis*, *redeuntis*, *pervenientis*, sub variis formulis familiaris est Seraphico, et sumta est ex Dionysio Areop. (*de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 4. 10. 14; *de Caelest. Hier.* c. 1.). — Verba in primo membro divisionis posita: « hi (effectus) continentur sub modo naturae, extenso nomine », insinuant, quod *natura* hic in sensu largiore intelligitur, ut comprehendat simul etiam *gratias gratis datas* v. g. operationem miraculorum. — Exemplum triplicis lineae sumtum est ex Dionys. (*de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 8.). — De circulo, qui est « figura simplicissima, capacissima, pulcherrima » (IV. *Sent.* d. 24. p. I. a. I. q. 1.), quatenus repraesentat Christum, cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. — De altero exemplo, sumto ex triplici quantitate, cfr. supra d. 2. q. 4.

**II.** In explicanda secunda assignatione, quae fundatur in verbis per errorem a Scholasticis S. Gregorio attributis (vide pag. 632 col. II, nota 2.), antiqui magistri in diversas vias abeunt; quae, quia vera in se dicunt, plus minusve probabilitatis habent. Positio S. Bonaventurae profunda et plana est; ipsa distinctionem horum modorum, ordinem eorum (quia sequens modus per additionem quandam gradationem exprimit) et sufficientiam praeclare explicat. Modus distinguendi, secundo loco positus, est Alexandri Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 10. m. 4.), qui dicit: « In Deo sunt tria: essentia, virtus, operatio... per essentiam est in rebus essentialiter, per virtutem est in rebus potentialiter, per operationem praesentialiter ». Hic modus distinguendi placet etiam Durando et Ægidio R., sed non S. Bonaventurae. — Tertius modus est « penes genera causarum », id est secundum causam efficientem, exemplarem et finalem. Contra hanc arguit Seraphicus, quod essentialiter non connotat genus aliquod causalitatis. — Quartus modus est secundum distinctionem modi (mensurae), speciei et ordinis (cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2, et dub. 3.), quae tria secundum Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 18. m. 2.) in hoc sensu sunt essentialia, quia referunt rem ad suas causas essentiales. « Modus enim dicit relationem ad Deum ut ad efficientem, species ut ad formam [scil. exemplarem], ordo ut ad finem ». Unde in hac sententia *essentialiter* responderet *modo*, *praesentialiter* speciei, *potentialiter* ordini. Sed S. Doctor hoc improbat his verbis ob brevitatem obscuris: « Sed omnia haec praecedit essentia secundum rationem intelligendi ». Sensus est: cum essentia rerum praecedat illas tres relationes, sequeretur, quod respectu essentiae rerum non esset praesentia Dei; quod est falsissimum. — S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 8. a. 3.) cum multis sic distinguit: « In omnibus est per potentiam, in quantum omnia eius potestati subduntur; est per praesentiam in omnibus, in quantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius; est in omnibus per essentiam, in quantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi ».

**III.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 10. m. 2. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the assignation of St. Augustine diverse effects of the divine presence are connoted, and according to these three grades are distinguished; whence in this way God is not uniformly in created things (cf. the preceding question). — The threefold comparison of the creature by way of *going-out*, *returning*, and *arriving*, under various formulae, is familiar to the Seraphic [Doctor], and is taken from Dionysius the Areopagite (*On the Divine Names* c. 4, §§ 4, 10, 14; *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 1). — The words placed in the first member of the division: "these (effects) are contained under the mode of nature, in an extended sense of the name," insinuate that *nature* here is understood in a broader sense, so that it includes also the *gratuitously-given graces*, e.g. the working of miracles. — The example of the threefold line is taken from Dionysius (*On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 8). — On the circle, which is "the simplest, most capacious, most beautiful figure" (IV *Sent.*, d. 24, p. I, a. I, q. 1), insofar as it represents Christ, cf. III *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1. — On the other example, taken from threefold quantity, cf. above d. 2, q. 4.

**II.** In explaining the second assignation, which is founded on words attributed by error by the Scholastics to St. Gregory (see p. 632, col. II, note 2), the ancient masters depart into different ways; which, since they say things true in themselves, have more or less of probability. The position of St. Bonaventure is profound and plain; it itself explains in distinguished fashion the distinction of these modes, their order (since the following mode by addition expresses a certain gradation), and the sufficiency. The mode of distinguishing, placed in the second position, is that of Alexander of Hales (*S.* p. I, q. 10, m. 4), who says: "In God there are three: essence, power, operation... by essence he is in things essentially, by power he is in things potentially, by operation presentially." This mode of distinguishing pleases also Durandus and Ægidius R., but not St. Bonaventure. — The third mode is "according to the genera of causes," that is, according to the efficient, exemplary, and final cause. Against this the Seraphic [Doctor] argues that *essentially* does not connote any genus of causality. — The fourth mode is according to the distinction of mode (measure), species, and order (cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2, and dubium 3), which three according to Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I, q. 18, m. 2) in this sense are essential, since they refer the thing to its essential causes. "For *mode* indicates a relation to God as to the efficient [cause], *species* as to the form [namely, the exemplary], *order* as to the end." Whence in this opinion *essentially* would correspond to *mode*, *presentially* to species, *potentially* to order. But the holy Doctor disapproves this in these words, obscure on account of brevity: "But essence precedes all these according to the account of understanding." The sense is: since the essence of things precedes those three relations, it would follow that with respect to the essence of things there would be no presence of God; which is most false. — St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 8, a. 3), with many [others], distinguishes thus: "He is in all by power, inasmuch as all are subject to his power; he is by presence in all, inasmuch as all are bare and open to his eyes; he is in all by essence, inasmuch as he is present to all as the cause of being."

**III.** Besides the places cited: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 10, m. 2, 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 5, 10. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 1, *princ.* q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit localis
Whether God is in a place

source_text:
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### Articulus I.
#### *De incircumscriptibilitate Dei.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus sit localis.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Circa primam[^1] proceditur sic. Quod Deus sit localis, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Esse in loco et esse locatum convertuntur; sed Deus est in loco, ut in praecedentibus probatum est[^2]: ergo Deus est locatum. Sed esse locatum est locale: ergo Deus est localis.

2. Item, quod est in uno loco tantum locale est: ergo si plus possunt omnia loca quam unum, et magis sapit naturam rei quod habet esse in toto, quam quod habet in parte, multo magis est locale quod est in omni loco. Sed Deus est in omni loco, quia ubique; ergo videtur maxime esse localis.

3. Item, Deus est ubique; ergo est hic a toto[^3]: sed quod hic est, est in loco determinato, et quod est in loco determinato est locale: ergo etc.

4. Item, Deus est in loco aliquo determinato aut ergo secundum totum, aut secundum partem. Si secundum partem: ergo habet partem et partem, quod est inconveniens. Si secundum totum; sed quod secundum totum est in aliquo comprehenditur ab illo, et quod comprehenditur ab aliquo loco determinato est locale; ergo Deus est localis.

**Contra:**

1. Magister in littera[^4]: «Localis non est, quia penitus non circumscribitur loco».

2. Item, ratione probatur sic: nihil dicitur temporale, nisi quod exceditur a tempore — temporalia enim in tempore sunt corruptibilia — ergo nihil dicitur locale, nisi quod exceditur a loco[^5]; sed Deus non exceditur a loco: ergo etc.

3. Item, locus est accidens, ergo non denominat illud, nisi ad quod comparatur ut accidens[^6]; sed ad Deum non potest comparari ut accidens: ergo non denominat Deum: ergo Deus non est localis.

4. Item, locus est quantitas continua divisibilis. Punctus autem est principium quantitatis indivisibile[^7]; ergo magis convenit cum Deo punctus quam locus, quantum ad proprietates; sed Deus non dicitur punctalis nisi improprie et falso: ergo non debet dici localis.

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### Conclusio.

> *Licet Deus aliquo modo sit in loco, tamen nullatenus dicitur localis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod locale dicitur quod sequitur leges loci, sicut temporale quod sequitur leges temporis. Leges autem loci sunt quantum ad actum continendi, mensurandi, salvandi, terminandi, secundum quas locus se habet ad locatum per modum impartientis, et locatum se habet ad locum per modum suscipientis[^8]. Et quoniam Deus sic est praesens loco, ut nihil ab eo omnino recipiat, sed solum eius indigentiam suppleat et det loco virtutem continendi et locato virtutem replendi; hinc est, quod Deus nullo modo dicendus est localis, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^9]. Et rationes ad hoc inductae concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod esse in loco et esse locatum convertuntur; dicendum, quod convertuntur ratione materiae circa ipsum corpus, tamen ratione virtutis vocabuli non. Nam haec determinatio *in loco*, ad hoc quod habeat veritatem locutio, non exigit nec ponit nisi praesentialitatem et indistantiam; sed *esse locatum* ponit ambitum et continentiam, *esse locale* ponit idoneitatem ad proprietates loci et indigentiam aliquam. Et ideo haec conceditur: *Deus est in loco*; tamen aliquid habet improprietatis, propter hoc quod haec praepositio *in* videtur importare continentiam ambientem. Sed haec est magis impropria: *Deus est locatus*. Et adhuc ista est plus impropria: *Deus est localis*; et ideo non est recipienda, sed exponenda.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est in uno loco est locale; dicendum, quod illud est, quia[^10] locus superexcellit ipsum locatum, unde illud determinat et definit; sed quando est in omnibus, ipsum superexcellit omnia loca. Et ideo super hoc non tantum possunt omnia loca, quantum potest unus locus super illud, quod est tantum in uno loco. Et ideo non est localis dicendus Deus.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est hic etc.; dicendum, quod *hic* potest teneri dupliciter: aut demonstrative tantum, aut demonstrative et discretive[^11]. Si tantum demonstrative, sic verum est, Deum esse hic, quia non est signare locum, cui Deus non sit praesens. Si autem discretive, falsum est esse hic; et non sequitur ex prima, et hoc sensu procedit sua ratio.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut Deus est secundum totum etc.; dicendum, quod in Deo sunt simul simplicitas et infinitas. Quando ergo apponitur circa Deum nomen importans totalitatem, potest dupliciter apponi: vel ratione simplicitatis, et sic significatur per nomen, ut si dicatur: *totus Deus*[^12]. Et quoniam Deus in omni loco simplex est, et quodlibet est capax simplicitatis divinae; ideo ratione simplicitatis Deus est in quolibet loco totus. Potest iterum totalitas apponi ratione infinitatis, et hoc fit per adverbium, ut si dicatur: *Deus est totaliter in loco hoc* sive *secundum totum*; et sic, cum divina infinitas a nullo loco includatur, Deus in nullo est *secundum totum*.

Quando ergo quaeritur: aut secundum partem, aut secundum totum; dicendum, quod non dividit per immediata[^13], quia Deus nec est secundum partem, quia simplex, nec secundum totum, quia infinitus. Et ideo dicendus est totus in quolibet loco, non tamen totaliter; et ideo est in loco, non tamen localiter.

english:
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### Article I.
#### *On the incircumscriptibility of God.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether God is in a place.*

Concerning the first[^1] one proceeds thus. That God is *localis* [in a place / spatially located] is shown in this manner.

1. To be in a place and to be located [*esse locatum*] are convertible; but God is in a place, as has been proved in the preceding[^2]: therefore God is something located. But to be located is to be *locale* [in-place-able]: therefore God is *localis*.

2. Likewise, what is in only one place is *locale*: therefore if all places can [contain] more than one [can], and that which has being in the whole more savors the nature of a thing than that which has [being] in a part, then much more is that *locale* which is in every place. But God is in every place, since he is everywhere; therefore he seems most of all to be *localis*.

3. Likewise, God is everywhere; therefore he is here *a toto* [from-the-whole][^3]: but what is here, is in a determinate place, and what is in a determinate place is *locale*: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, God is in some determinate place either, then, according to the whole, or according to a part. If according to a part: then he has part and part, which is unfitting. If according to the whole; but what is in something according to the whole is comprehended by it, and what is comprehended by some determinate place is *locale*; therefore God is *localis*.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Master in the *littera*[^4]: "He is not *localis*, since he is in no way circumscribed by place."

2. Likewise, by reason it is proved thus: nothing is called temporal, except what is exceeded by time — for temporal things in time are corruptible — therefore nothing is called *locale*, except what is exceeded by place[^5]; but God is not exceeded by place: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, place is an accident, therefore it does not denominate that, except [the thing] to which it is compared as an accident[^6]; but to God it cannot be compared as an accident: therefore it does not denominate God: therefore God is not *localis*.

4. Likewise, place is a continuous divisible quantity. The point, however, is the indivisible principle of quantity[^7]; therefore the point agrees more with God than place does, as regards [its] properties; but God is not called *punctalis* [point-like] except improperly and falsely: therefore he ought not be called *localis*.

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### Conclusion.

> *Although God is in some manner in a place, nevertheless he is in no way called* localis.

**I respond:** It must be said that *locale* is so called which follows the laws of place, just as *temporale* [is so called] which follows the laws of time. The laws of place, however, are with regard to the act of containing, measuring, preserving, terminating, according to which place stands to the located by the manner of imparting, and the located stands to the place by the manner of receiving[^8]. And since God is so present to a place that he receives nothing at all from it, but only supplies its indigence and gives to the place the power of containing and to the located the power of filling; hence it is, that God is in no way to be called *localis*, as the Master says in the *littera*[^9]. And the reasonings adduced for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that to be in a place and to be located are convertible; it must be said that they are convertible by reason of the matter [in question] regarding the body itself, but not by reason of the force of the term. For this determination *in loco*, in order that the speech may have truth, neither requires nor posits anything except presentiality and non-distance; but *esse locatum* posits a circuit and containment, *esse locale* posits a fittingness for the properties of place and some indigence. And therefore this is conceded: *God is in a place*; yet it has something of impropriety, because the preposition *in* seems to import an enveloping containment. But this is more improper: *God is located*. And further this is more improper still: *God is* localis; and therefore it is not to be received, but to be expounded.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that what is in one place is *locale*; it must be said that this is so, because[^10] the place exceeds the located thing itself, whence it determines and defines it; but when [something] is in all [places], it itself exceeds all places. And therefore over this all places cannot prevail as much as one place can over that which is in one place only. And therefore God is not to be called *localis*.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that God is here etc.; it must be said that *here* can be taken in two ways: either demonstratively only, or demonstratively and discretively[^11]. If only demonstratively, then it is true that God is here, since one cannot point to a place to which God is not present. But if discretively, it is false to be here; and it does not follow from the first [proposition], and in this sense his reason proceeds.

*To 4.* To that which is asked: either God is according to the whole etc.; it must be said that in God there are at once simplicity and infinity. When therefore there is applied to God a name importing totality, it can be applied in two ways: either by reason of simplicity, and so it is signified by the noun, as if one says: *totus Deus* ["the whole God"][^12]. And since God in every place is simple, and any [place] is capable of the divine simplicity; therefore by reason of simplicity God is whole in any place. Again, totality can be applied by reason of infinity, and this is done through an adverb, as if one says: *Deus est totaliter in loco hoc* ["God is wholly in this place"] or *secundum totum* ["according to the whole"]; and so, since the divine infinity is included by no place, God is in no [place] *according to the whole*.

When therefore it is asked: either according to a part, or according to the whole; it must be said that he does not divide by immediates[^13], because God is neither according to a part, since simple, nor according to the whole, since infinite. And therefore he is to be called whole in any place, yet not wholly; and therefore he is in a place, yet not *localiter* [place-wise].

la: Supple cum ed. 1 *Magister*. Paulo superius pro *illocalitate* Vat. *illocabilitate*, et *mutabilitate* pro *mutatione*.

en: Supply with ed. 1 *Magister*. A little above, in place of *illocalitate* the Vatican [edition reads] *illocabilitate*, and *mutabilitate* in place of *mutatione*.

la: Parte I. huius dist. a. 1. q. 2. — Adiectivum *localis* hic idem sonat ac *loco circumscriptibilis*. — Paulo inferius pro *Sed esse* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *sed omne*, et subinde post *locatum* est ed. 1 interiicit *esse*.

en: Part I of this distinction, a. 1, q. 2. — The adjective *localis* here means the same as *loco circumscriptibilis* [circumscribable by place]. — A little below, in place of *Sed esse* the Vatican [edition] together with some codices [reads] *sed omne*, and thereupon after *locatum est* ed. 1 inserts *esse*.

la: Verbis *a toto* significatur locus sive modus argumentandi, qui iuxta diversitatem totius multiplex est, scil. locus *a toto universali*, *a toto integrali*, *a toto in modo*, *a toto in loco*, *a toto in tempore*. «*Totum in loco* [de quo hic agitur] est dictio comprehendens omnem locum adverbialiter, ut *ubique*, *nusquam*. *Pars in loco* est dictio comprehendens aliquem locum adverbialiter, ut *hic*, *ibi*. Locus *a toto in loco* est habitudo ipsius ad suam partem et tenet constructive et destructive. Constructive sic: *Deus est ubique, ergo Deus est hic*. Maxima: *Cuicumque competit totum in loco, et quaelibet eius pars*. Destructive sic: *Caesar est nusquam, ergo Caesar non est hic*. Maxima: *Quidquid removetur a toto in loco, et a qualibet eius parte*. Locus *a parte in loco* est habitudo ipsius ad suum totum; et est semper destructivus, ut: *Caesar non est hic, ergo non est ubique*. Maxima: *Cuicumque non competit pars in loco, nec eius totum*» (Petr. Hispan., *Sum.* tract. de Syllog. topico). — Vat. omittit *a toto*.

en: By the words *a toto* is signified the topic or mode of arguing which, according to the diversity of the whole, is manifold, namely the topic *a toto universali* [from the universal whole], *a toto integrali* [from the integral whole], *a toto in modo* [from the whole in mode], *a toto in loco* [from the whole in place], *a toto in tempore* [from the whole in time]. "*Totum in loco* [the 'whole in place,' of which we treat here] is a term comprehending every place adverbially, such as *ubique* [everywhere], *nusquam* [nowhere]. *Pars in loco* ['part in place'] is a term comprehending some place adverbially, such as *hic* [here], *ibi* [there]. The topic *a toto in loco* is the relation of itself to its part and holds constructively and destructively. Constructively thus: *God is everywhere, therefore God is here*. Maxim: *Whatever the whole-in-place belongs to, also any part of it [does]*. Destructively thus: *Caesar is nowhere, therefore Caesar is not here*. Maxim: *Whatever is removed from the whole-in-place, [is removed] also from any part of it*. The topic *a parte in loco* is the relation of itself to its whole; and is always destructive, as: *Caesar is not here, therefore he is not everywhere*. Maxim: *To whatever the part-in-place does not belong, neither [does] its whole*" (Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract on the topical syllogism). — The Vatican [edition] omits *a toto*.

la: Cap. 5.

en: Chapter 5.

la: Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 117. (c. 12.): *Quoniam autem est, ut in numero, esse in tempore; accipietur aliquod maius tempus omni eo quod est in tempore. Quapropter necesse est, omnia ea quae in tempore sunt contineri a tempore, sicut et alia quaecumque in aliquo sunt, ut ea quae in loco sunt, a loco.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 117 (c. 12): "Since, however, to be in time is, as it were, [to be] in a number; some greater time will be taken than every [time] which is in time. Wherefore it is necessary that all those things which are in time be contained by time, just as also whatever other things are in something, as those which are in a place [are contained] by place."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 475, nota 1.

en: Cf. above page 475, note 1.

la: Vide Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Quantitate, et VI. *Phys.* text. 1. seqq.

en: See Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on Quantity, and *Physics* VI, text 1 ff.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 30. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 30 (c. 4).

la: Cap. 5. seqq. — Cfr. etiam Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 22.

en: Chapter 5 ff. — Cf. also Anselm, *Monologion* c. 22.

la: Cod. T bene adiungit *tantum*, quod et in obiectione habetur.

en: Codex T rightly adds *tantum* ["only"], which is also had in the objection.

la: Id est, discernendo hunc locum ab alio, ita ut hic sit et alibi non. Ad vocem *prima*, quae in subnexis occurrit, intellige: *propositione*, nempe: *Deus est hic*; et subinde *sua ratio* accipe pro *ratio obiicientis*.

en: That is, by distinguishing this place from another, in such a way that he is here and not elsewhere. As to the word *prima* ["the first"] which occurs in what follows, understand: *propositione* ["proposition"], namely: *God is here*; and thereupon take *sua ratio* ["his reason"] for *ratio obiicientis* ["the reason of the one objecting"].

la: *Quod est totus*, pro quo Vat. minus congrue *totum*. — Mox post *simplicitatis divinae* plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 adiungunt *vel dictum*, omittentes simul voculam subsequentem *ideo*, quam tamen cod. T retinet.

en: *Quod est totus* ["which is whole"], for which the Vatican [edition reads] less fittingly *totum*. — Soon after *simplicitatis divinae* very many codices with ed. 1 add *vel dictum* ["or the saying"], omitting at the same time the following little word *ideo* ["therefore"], which however codex T retains.

la: Hoc sibi vult; obiiciens non dividit per immediata membra. — In fine solutionis Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba *et ideo est in loco, non tamen localiter*. Pro *localiter* multi codd. *totaliter*; mendose.

en: This is what he means; the one objecting does not divide by immediate members. — At the end of the solution the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc omits the words *et ideo est in loco, non tamen localiter* ["and therefore he is in a place, yet not place-wise"]. In place of *localiter*, many codices [read] *totaliter* ["wholly"]; erroneously.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Huius articuli quaestiones discutiuntur, ut ob ubiquitate divina removeantur illae imperfectiones, quae creaturarum praesentiam in loco comitantur, ut ipse S. Doctor observat supra in divisione textus huius distinctionis. — Solutio ad 4. eruitur ex communiter recepta distinctione inter *totum simpliciter* et *totum* et *totaliter*, quae in multis quaestionibus theologicis solvendis adhibetur. Aliis verbis eandem distinctionem adhibet S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 8. a. 2. ad 3.

**II.** Auctores: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 32. q. 5. n. 39–42. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The questions of this article are discussed so that there may be removed from the divine ubiquity those imperfections which accompany the presence of creatures in a place, as the Holy Doctor himself observes above in the *divisio textus* of this distinction. — The solution to [argument] 4 is drawn from the commonly received distinction between *totum simpliciter* and *totum* and *totaliter*, which is employed in solving many theological questions. In other words St. Thomas employs the same distinction, *S.* I. q. 8. a. 2. ad 3.

**II.** Authors: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 9, m. 1, 2. — B. Albert., here a. 14, 18. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 32, q. 5, n. 39–42. — Durand., here p. I, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. *unica*.

---


title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum Deus sit mutabilis secundum locum.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur utrum Deus sit mutabilis secundum locum. Et quod non, videtur sic.

1. Magister in littera[^1] dicit et accipit ab Augustino *super Genesim*: «Deus est in omni tempore, et in omni loco, non tamen movetur per loca vel tempora».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur, quia «motus est actus imperfectus[^2]»; sed in Deo nulla est imperfectio: ergo nec secundum locum mutatio.

3. Item, per omnem motum aliquid acquiritur[^3]; sed Deus nullum locum potest acquirere, quia est ubique: ergo impossibile est, Deum secundum locum mutari.

4. Item, nobilior dispositio est quies quam motus[^4]; sed quod nobilius est Deo est attribuendum: ergo impossibile est, Deum secundum locum mutari, quia semper quiescit.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus *ad Orosium*[^5]: «Deus movet se sine tempore et loco»: ergo videtur quod Deus moveatur; sed perfectissimus motuum est motus secundum locum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Isidorus[^6]: «Cum sit illocalis Deus, localiter tamen ambulat in Sanctis»: ergo saltem videtur mutari per accidens.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia «motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt». Hoc dicit Philosophus[^7], et dicit propter formas, quae non sunt in uno determinate: ergo si Deus est in nobis, Deus movetur in nobis saltem secundum accidens.

4. Item, quamvis Deus quantum ad existentiam per essentiam non determinet locum[^8], tamen quantum ad habitationem definite est in aliquibus, ita quod non in aliis: ergo saltem quantum ad hunc modum est mutabilis.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus nec per se, nec per accidens mutatur per locum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Magister in littera[^9], Deus nullo modo mutatur per locum; et hoc verum est, quia nec per se, nec per accidens mutatur, et hoc est propter summam immensitatem, qua adest omnibus et nulli abest. Et si incipiat esse in re, vel desinat, hoc solum est secundum rei mutationem, non secundum mutationem eius: ut puta, si aere illuminato intelligatur creari crystallus, radius incipit esse in eo, et crystallo amoto, desinit esse, nulla facta mutatione in radio.

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus movet se; dicendum, quod Augustinus non dicit simpliciter, quod movet se, sed[^10] *sine tempore et loco*. Et quoniam omnis motus secundum Augustinum comprehenditur sub mutatione secundum tempus et secundum locum; ideo tantum est hoc dicere quantum esset dicere: movet se sine motu, et ita non movet se vere, nec implicatur contradictio. Sed cum in motu sint duo, scilicet quod est actus et quod est variatio sive imperfectio[^11], vult dicere Augustinus, quod movet se sine motu, quia semper est in actu, sed non in actu imperfecto, immo perfecto. — Quod dicit Isidorus est intelligendum

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metaphorice, vel causaliter, quia Sanctos facit ambulare, id est per fidem de virtute in virtutem[^12].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motis nobis etc. dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, nisi in illis quae sunt in aliis per dependentiam et definitionem. Unde quia radius est in aere, sed non dependet ab aere, ideo non movetur, moto aere; et quia anima est in manu, nec definitur manu, ideo non movetur, mota manu. Deus autem non dependet a rebus nec definitur, ideo non movetur ad motum rerum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de habitatione Dei, dicendum, quod determinate est in aliquibus non ratione immensitatis, sed ratione influentiae gratiae; et ideo non determinatur ipse Deus, sed effectus tantum. Hinc est, quod non per se, nec per accidens movetur nec moveri potest, quia a nullo dependet nec dependere potest[^13], a nullo definitur nec potest definiri; et non solum non est possibile, sed etiam non intelligibile.

Obiiciet autem aliquis sic: intelligamus corpus[^14] egredi a loco, nullo introeunte, tunc remanet vacuum: aut ergo ibi est Deus, aut non: si sic, ergo in eo est quod nihil est, quod stultum est dicere[^15]; si non est, et prius ibi fuit, ergo videtur esse mutatus saltem per accidens: ergo videtur, quod Deus exeat cum re et cum re alia ingrediatur, quia si res tantum exiret, Deus non[^16] exiret. — Ad hoc respondeo, quod si per impossibile ponatur, locum evacuari, tunc remanere intelligitur capacitas loci privata; capacitas aliquid est, et in illa Deus est; privatio autem nihil est, et in illa Deus esse non potest: non ergo in[^17] eo quod desinit Deus esse, remanet post recessum corporis; sed cum res privatur, aufertur comparatio eius ad Deum. Quod enim nihil est, nullam habet comparationem.

Sed cum res movetur, Deum non dimittit, nec ad Deum accedit, nec Deus cum re venit: quia sic est in re, ut sit extra rem idem; ideo nec res eum dimittit nec novum invenit. Et hoc est intelligibile, si quis potest intelligere, quod Deus sit simplex, et infinitus et immensus. Quia enim est immensus, ita est intra, quod extra[^18]; quia simplex, secundum unum et idem est intra et extra: ideo nec dimittitur, nec acquiritur aliud in re; nec ab ipso itur ad ipsum, cum[^19] dimittitur, ut alibi et alibi inveniatur[^20].

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether God is mutable according to place.*

Secondly it is asked whether God is mutable according to place. And that he is not, is seen thus.

1. The Master in the *littera*[^1] says, taking [it] from Augustine *On Genesis*: "God is in every time, and in every place, yet he is not moved through places or times."

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason, since "motion is an imperfect act[^2]"; but in God there is no imperfection: therefore neither change according to place.

3. Likewise, through every motion something is acquired[^3]; but God can acquire no place, since he is everywhere: therefore it is impossible that God be changed according to place.

4. Likewise, rest is a more noble disposition than motion[^4]; but what is more noble must be attributed to God: therefore it is impossible that God be changed according to place, since he always rests.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine *to Orosius*[^5]: "God moves himself without time and place": therefore it seems that God is moved; but the most perfect of motions is motion according to place: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Isidore[^6]: "Although God is non-local, yet locally he walks in the Saints": therefore at least he seems to be changed *per accidens*.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason, since "when we are moved, those things which are in us are moved." This the Philosopher says[^7], and he says it on account of forms, which are not in one [place] determinately: therefore if God is in us, God is moved in us at least *per accidens*.

4. Likewise, although God as to existence by essence does not determine a place[^8], nevertheless as to habitation he is definitely in some [things], in such a way that not in others: therefore at least according to this mode he is mutable.

### Conclusion.

> *God is changed according to place neither* per se *nor* per accidens.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the *littera*[^9], God is in no way changed according to place; and this is true, since he is changed neither *per se* nor *per accidens*, and this is on account of [his] highest immensity, by which he is present to all and absent from none. And if he begin to be in a thing, or cease, this is only according to a change of the thing, not according to a change of him: as for example, if a crystal be understood to be created in the air [already] illuminated, the ray begins to be in it, and when the crystal is removed, [the ray] ceases to be, no change having been made in the ray.

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected, that God moves himself; it must be said that Augustine does not say simply that he moves himself, but[^10] *without time and place*. And since every motion according to Augustine is comprehended under change according to time and according to place, therefore to say this is just as much as to say: he moves himself without motion, and so he does not truly move himself, nor is a contradiction implied. But since in motion there are two [things], namely what is act and what is variation or imperfection[^11], Augustine wishes to say that he moves himself without motion, since he is always in act, but not in imperfect act, but rather in perfect [act]. — What Isidore says is to be understood

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metaphorically, or causally, since he makes the Saints to walk, that is, through faith from virtue to virtue[^12].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that "when we are moved" etc., it must be said that this does not have truth except in those things which are in others through dependence and definition. Hence because the ray is in the air, but does not depend on the air, therefore it is not moved when the air is moved; and because the soul is in the hand, nor is it defined by the hand, therefore it is not moved when the hand is moved. But God does not depend on things nor is defined [by them], therefore he is not moved at the motion of things.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the habitation of God, it must be said that he is definitely in some [things] not by reason of [his] immensity, but by reason of the influence of grace; and therefore God himself is not determined, but only the effect. Hence it is, that he is moved neither *per se* nor *per accidens* nor can be moved, since he depends on nothing and cannot depend [on anything][^13], is defined by nothing nor can be defined; and it is not only not possible, but also not intelligible.

But someone will object thus: let us understand a body[^14] to go forth from a place, with nothing entering, then a vacuum remains: either therefore God is there, or not: if so, then he is in that which is nothing, which is foolish to say[^15]; if he is not, and previously was there, therefore he seems to have been changed at least *per accidens*: therefore it seems that God goes out with the thing and enters with another thing, since if only the thing went out, God would not[^16] go out. — To this I respond, that if by the impossible it be supposed that the place is emptied, then there is understood to remain a privative capacity of place; capacity is something, and in it God is; but privation is nothing, and in it God cannot be: therefore it is not in[^17] that wherein God ceases to be that he remains after the withdrawal of the body; but when the thing is deprived [of being], its comparison to God is taken away. For what is nothing, has no comparison.

But when the thing is moved, it does not let go of God, nor does it approach to God, nor does God come with the thing: since he is in the thing in such a way that he is the same outside the thing; therefore neither does the thing let go of him nor find [him] anew. And this is intelligible, if anyone can understand, that God is simple, and infinite and immense. For because he is immense, he is so within, that [he is] without[^18]; because [he is] simple, according to one and the same [thing] he is within and without: therefore neither is he let go, nor is anything else acquired in the thing; nor is there a passing from him to him, when[^19] he is let go, so that he should be found in one place and another[^20].

la: Cap. 3. Locus S. Augustini secundum sensum est VIII. *Genes. ad lit.* c. 20. n. 39. 40.

en: Chapter 3. The passage of St. Augustine according to its sense is *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, c. 20, n. 39–40.

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 15. (c. 2.): *Motus actus quidem aliquis esse videtur, imperfectus tamen.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 15 (c. 2): "Motion seems indeed to be some act, yet imperfect."

la: Aliter possibile esset, aliquem simul moveri et motum esse, *quo movebatur, quando movebatur*, ut «si quis Thebas it, impossibile est simul ire Thebas et ivisse Thebas», ut ait Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 7. (c. 1.).

en: Otherwise it would be possible that someone be at once moved and have been moved, *by that by which he was being moved, when he was being moved*, as "if someone goes to Thebes, it is impossible at once to be going to Thebes and to have gone to Thebes," as Aristotle says, *Physics* VI, text 7 (c. 1).

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 4.): *Prius enim est et notius quod manens est et definitum eo, quod indefinitum et in motu est.* — In fine argumenti pro *quia semper*, quod cum codd. etiam edd. 1, 2, 3 habent, Vat. *sed semper*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4): "For prior and better known is what is abiding and definite than what is indefinite and in motion." — At the end of the argument, in place of *quia semper*, which along with the codices also editions 1, 2, 3 have, the Vatican [edition reads] *sed semper*.

la: Sive *Quaestionum 65 Dialogus*, q. 41. De minori cfr. Aristot., VIII. *Phys.* text. 37. seqq. (c. 7.).

en: Or rather the *Dialogue of the 65 Questions*, q. 41. On the minor, cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 37 ff. (c. 7).

la: Libr. I. *Sent.* sive *de Summo bono*, c. 2. n. 5.

en: Book I of the *Sentences* or *On the Highest Good*, c. 2, n. 5.

la: Libr. II. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 7.), ubi et verba subsequentia: «*et dicit propter formas, quae non sunt in uno determinate*», explicantur. Aristot. enim tractans de ideis Platonicis ait: *Nam et moveri et quiescere easdem (ideas) accidet et etiam sensibiles et insensibiles esse; nam videntur ideae quiescere et immobiles et intelligibiles esse iis qui ponunt, ideas esse; attamen cum sint in nobis, impossibile est immobiles esse; nam motis nobis necessarium est, et quae in nobis sunt omnia simul moveri.* Cfr. supra pag. 116, nota 8.

en: Book II of the *Topics* c. 3 (c. 7), where also the words that follow, "*and he says it on account of forms, which are not in one [place] determinately*," are explained. For Aristotle, treating of the Platonic ideas, says: "For both being moved and resting will happen to the same (ideas), and likewise being sensible and insensible; for the ideas seem to those who posit ideas to exist to rest and to be unmoved and intelligible; nevertheless, since they are in us, it is impossible that they be unmoved; for when we are moved, it is necessary that those things also which are in us all be moved together." Cf. above page 116, note 8.

la: Id est, non sit determinate in aliquibus tantum, sed in omnibus. — Mox pro *habitationem* cod. Y *inhabitationem*.

en: That is, that he be not determinately in some [things] only, but in all. — Soon, for *habitationem*, codex Y [reads] *inhabitationem*.

la: Cap. 5. seq. — Post pauca pro *per locum* V bene *secundum locum*.

en: Chapter 5 ff. — A little after, in place of *per locum*, [codex] V well [reads] *secundum locum*.

la: Plures codd. ut F N W X (T in marg.) hic repetunt verba praecedentia *quod movet se*, Vat. autem cum cod. cc hic subiicit *cum* his additionibus. — De propositione sequenti consule hic *lit. Magistri*, c. 6, ubi et ipsa verba Augustini proferuntur.

en: Several codices such as F N W X (T in margin) here repeat the preceding words *quod movet se*; the Vatican [edition], however, with codex cc here adds *cum* with these additions. — On the proposition that follows, consult here the *littera Magistri*, c. 6, where the very words of Augustine are produced.

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 6. seqq. (c. 1.) motum definit sic: *motus est actus entis in potentia prout in potentia*, i. e. actualis tendentia rei mobilis ad terminum. — Paulo ante pro *movet se vere* maior pars codd. cum ed. 1 *movet vere* (omisso *se*), quae lectio contextui non respondet; Vat. *movetur*. Paulo inferius post *quod movet* rursum non pauci codd. perperam omittunt *se*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 6 ff. (c. 1) defines motion thus: "*motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency*," that is, the actual tendency of a movable thing toward its terminus. — A little before, in place of *movet se vere*, the greater part of the codices with ed. 1 [read] *movet vere* (omitting *se*), a reading which does not correspond to the context; the Vatican [edition reads] *movetur*. A little below, after *quod movet*, again not a few codices wrongly omit *se*.

la: Respicitur illud II. Cor. 5, 7: *Per fidem enim ambulamus*; et illud Psalm. 83, 8: *Ibunt de virtute in virtutem*. — Pro *per fidem* Vat. cum ed. 1 *proficere*.

en: Reference is to that of 2 Cor. 5:7: "*For we walk by faith*"; and that of Psalm 83:8: "*They shall go from virtue to virtue*." — In place of *per fidem*, the Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 [reads] *proficere*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. *Phys.* text. 46. seqq. (c. 8.), ubi docetur, primum motorem esse omnino immobilem nec moveri per se nec per accidens.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 46 ff. (c. 8), where it is taught that the first mover is altogether immovable and is moved neither *per se* nor *per accidens*.

la: Cod. T addit *aliquid*.

en: Codex T adds *aliquid* ("something").

la: Et sic Deus esset in nihilo, quod absurdum est dicere.

en: And thus God would be in nothing, which is absurd to say.

la: Ante *exiret* ex codd. L O revocavimus *non*, quod in Vat. desideratur, sed a contextu exigitur.

en: Before *exiret*, from codices L O we have restored *non*, which is missing in the Vatican [edition], but is required by the context.

la: Ex cod. R restituimus *in pro ab*, quod Vat. exhibet.

en: From codex R we have restored *in* in place of *ab*, which the Vatican [edition] gives.

la: Cod. K *in eo intra rem*, quod ed. *extra*.

en: Codex K [reads] *in eo intra rem*, [where] the edition [reads] *extra*.

la: Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, in qua lectione omnino supplendum est *res*, quae scil. a loco ad locum dimittitur. Vat. nec *pro cum*, quae lectio nobis minus arridet.

en: Thus the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, in which reading *res* must altogether be supplied, namely [the thing] which is let go from place to place. The Vatican [edition reads] *nec* in place of *cum*, a reading which pleases us less.

la: Sola Vat. omittit *nihil est*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone omits *nihil est*.

latin_scholion:
Duplex est motus sive mutatio secundum locum, scil. per se vel per accidens, ut docet Aristot., praecipue I. *de Anima*, text. 37. seqq. Neuter modus convenit Deo. Ut aliqua res per accidens moveatur, requiritur, ut ipsa in alia re, quae per se movetur, sit modo *circumscriptivo*, ut corpus in navi, vel saltem *definitivo*, ut anima est in corpore. — *Terminus quiescit* in ultimo arg. fundam. dicitur de Deo in sensu improprio, cum nec motus nec privatio motus proprie Deo conveniant. — In *solut.* ad 1. satis subtiliter replicatur. Hanc instantiam solvit Seraphicus hac distinctione: si remanet aliquid positivum (capacitas loci), tunc hoc positivum habet relationem ad Deum; quatenus autem per privationem *nihil* remanet, «*aufertur comparatio ad Deum*», id est respectus, quem res existens habet realiter ad Deum, et Deus *secundum rationem* ad rem, penitus aufertur, quin tamen Deus nec per se nec per accidens moveatur.

Auctores: B. Albert., hic a. 19. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 30. n. 5.

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english_scholion:
Twofold is motion or change according to place, namely *per se* or *per accidens*, as Aristotle teaches, especially in *On the Soul* I, text 37 ff. Neither mode befits God. For some thing to be moved *per accidens*, it is required that it itself, in another thing which is moved *per se*, exist in a *circumscriptive* mode, like a body in a ship, or at least *definitively*, as the soul is in the body. — *The terminus rests* in the last argument of the *fundamenta* is said of God in an improper sense, since neither motion nor privation of motion properly befits God. — In the *solutio* to 1, [the matter] is rather subtly replied to. The Seraphic [Doctor] solves this instance by this distinction: if something positive remains (the capacity of place), then this positive [item] has a relation to God; but inasmuch as through privation *nothing* remains, "*the comparison to God is taken away*," that is, the regard which the existing thing has really to God, and God *according to reason* to the thing, is wholly taken away, without however God being moved *per se* or *per accidens*.

Authors: B. Albert., here a. 19. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 30, n. 5.

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