title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum congruum fuerit humanam naturam a Deo reparari

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De congruentia nostrae redemptionis factae per passionem Christi.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum congruum fuerit, humanam naturam a Deo reparari.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum congruum fuerit, humanam naturam a Deo reparari. Et quod sic, videtur per quatuor suppositiones manifestas, quae elici possunt ex dictis Anselmi in secundo *Cur Deus homo*[^p416-3]. Prima est haec: nullatenus decet summam stabilitatem permittere suum propositum infirmari. — Secunda est haec: nullatenus decet summam benignitatem pro peccato unius hominis totam posteritatem eius[^p416-4] sempiternaliter damnari. — Tertia est haec: nullatenus decet summam sapientiam nobilissimam creaturam permittere universaliter fine suo fraudari. — Quarta est haec: nullatenus de

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cet summam virtutem permittere, servum suum ab alio in sempiternum iniuste detineri.

1. *Ex prima* arguitur ita: si non decet Dei propositum infirmari; et Deus proposuerat[^p417-1] hominem perducere ad beatitudinem, et perduci non habet, quamdiu manet in statu ruinae: ergo indecens est, hominem in tali statu relinqui: ergo *ab oppositis* decens est, ipsum reparari et relevari.

2. *Ex secunda* arguitur sic: non decet[^p417-2] totam posteritatem sempiternaliter damnari pro peccato unius hominis; sed tota sempiternaliter damnaretur, nisi reparatio interveniret: ergo congruum fuit et decens, ut Deus hominem repararet.

3. *Ex tertia* arguitur sic: non decet summam sapientiam permittere, universaliter nobilissimam creaturam fine suo fraudari; sed nisi reparatio interveniret, omnes homines fine suo essent fraudati, et ita *vane* omnes *filii hominum essent constituti*[^p417-3]; quod divinae sapientiae non congruit, quae nihil incongruum facit: ergo restat, quod valde congruum fuit, genus humanum reparari.

4. *Ex quarta* arguitur sic: non decet summam virtutem permittere, servos suos iniuste et violenter ab adversario detineri; sed nisi reparatio interveniisset, multi servi Dei et Sancti detinerentur in limbo: ergo congruum fuit et decens, per reparationis beneficium subveniri generi humano.

**Sed contra** hoc obiicitur sic: 1. Si indecens fuisset, genus humanum non reparari, et inconveniens; et « quodlibet minimum inconveniens, sicut dicit Anselmus in primo *Cur Deus homo*[^p417-4], Deo est impossibile»: ergo fuit impossibile, Deum genus humanum non reparare. Et ex hoc elicitur duplex inconveniens: unum, quod Deus non reparavit genus humanum propter *misericordiam*, sed potius propter vitandam indecentiam; aliud, quod non reparavit ex *liberalitate*, sed ex necessitate. Quod si verum est, non tenemur ei ad tantas gratiarum actiones; quod impium et crudelissimum est dicere[^p417-5].

2. Item, nobilior creatura est Angelus quam homo, et propter beatitudinem est facta, sicut homo; sed non decuit Deum relevare angelum a suo lapsu[^p417-6]: ergo nec decuit reparare genus humanum.

3. Item, sicut decet divinam sapientiam et bonitatem relevare cadentem, sic etiam decet sustentare stantem; sed non decuit Deum tenere genus humanum, ne laberetur[^p417-7]: ergo videtur, quod non decuit ipsum relevare post ipsum lapsum.

4. Item, non decet Deum[^p417-8] facere contra suam iustitiam; sed homo, cum peccavit, meruit a Deo in aeternum separari: si ergo per reparationem Deo habet coniungi, videtur, quod nunquam decuit, genus humanum reparari.

5. Item, sicut homo meruit per peccatum mortem carnis, ita etiam meruit mortem sempiternae damnationis; sed non decuit Deum sic reparare genus humanum, ut non moreretur morte carnis[^p417-9]: ergo non decuit sic reparare, ut non moreretur morte sempiternae damnationis.

6. Item, non decet Deum facere contra dispositionem suae sapientiae; sed Deus talem fecerat hominem, ut, si vellet stare, staret, et si vellet cadere, caderet: ergo sicut non decet Deum facere de stante, ut cadat, ita non decet ipsum facere de cadente, ut resurgat: ergo non decet eum reparare humanam naturam[^p417-10].

### Conclusio.

> Genus humanum reparari, congruum et decens est tum ex parte Dei, tum ex parte hominis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio congruum est et decens, reparari genus humanum; congruum, inquam, est et decens non solum ex parte Dei, sed etiam ex parte hominis. Ex parte Dei, quia decet Dei sapientiam et misericordiam, sicut in opponendo monstratum est supra[^p417-11]. — Ex parte vero hominis congruentia est similiter, si consideretur dignitas hominis conditi et modus labendi et status lapsi. — Dignitas namque hominis tanta erat, ut propter ipsum facta sunt uni

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versa[^p418-1]. Si ergo homo careret suo fine, iam omnia essent suo fine defraudata. — *Modus* vero *labendi* fuit, quod humana natura totaliter cecidit, *alio peccante*, et *alio suggerente*; et ideo decens fuit, ipsam per *alium* relevari, ut, sicut filii peccaverunt in *parente*, et parens peccavit, *diabolo* suggerente, sic etiam homo repararetur, *Domino* relevante. — *Status* etiam hominis *lapsi* reparationi congruit, quia in illo statu simul fuit *poenitentia* cum *miseria*; et *poenitentia* quodam modo placabat divinam iustitiam, *miseria* vero provocabat misericordiam.

Et sic patet, quod per omnem modum congruum fuit, reparari genus humanum, congruum, inquam, ex parte *opificis*, et congruum ex parte *operis*. Sed congruitas ex parte *operis* pura congruentia est, ita quod non ponit necessitatem. Congruitas vero ex parte *opificis* ponit necessitatem, necessitatem, inquam, non *inevitabilitatis*, quae dividitur in coactionem et prohibitionem, sed necessitatem *immutabilitatis*, quae consurgit ex stabilitate et immutabilitate divinae dispositionis. Haec autem non arctat divinam potentiam ad oppositum, sed eam determinat ad tale propositum. Unde Anselmus in secundo *Cur Deus homo*[^p418-2]: « Cum dicimus, Deum aliquid facere necessitate, intelligendum est, quod hoc facit necessitate *servandi honestatem*, quae necessitas non est aliud quam *immutabilitas honestatis*».

Ex his quae dicta sunt, patet responsio ad propositam quaestionem. Si enim quaeratur, utrum congruum sit, reparari genus humanum; concedendum est *simpliciter*, quod verum est. Si vero quaeratur, utrum sit *necessarium*; non est simpliciter respondendum, sed distinguendum. Est enim necessarium ex parte Dei, non ex parte nostri; et ex parte Dei[^p418-3] non quacumque necessitate, sed necessitate *immutabilitatis*, quae non opponitur libertati voluntatis, ac per hoc nec gratiae nec liberalitati.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum; non enim sequitur, si Deus reparat necessitate suae *immutabilitatis*, quod propter hoc non reparet ex liberalitate suae benignitatis; haec enim simul possunt stare[^p418-4].

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod creatura angelica nobilior est etc.; dicendum, quod quamvis Angelus nobilior sit creatura[^p418-5], non tamen est adeo ad reparationem idoneus, sicut homo, propter *modum labendi* et *statum hominis lapsi*. Homo enim poenituit, angelus vero obstinatus fuit; homo *totaliter*, angelus *particulariter* cecidit; homo per *alium*, angelus per *se ipsum*; et haec sunt quae faciunt angelum ad reparationem minus idoneum.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod non decuit Deum tenere hominem, ne caderet; dicendum, quod si homo voluisset stare, nunquam Deus dereliquisset eum, ut caderet; sed quia stare noluit, non debuit ipsum conservare invitum; sed quia homo post lapsum voluit resurgere, ideo decuit Deum sibi manum porrigere, ita quod manus ista ad illos se extendit, qui voluntarie resurgunt[^p418-6], non ad eos qui nolunt resurgere.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod non decet Deum facere contra suam iustitiam; dicendum, quod verum est. Decet tamen aliquid ipsum facere praeter rigorem iustitiae, quia reparatio humani generis non repugnat divinae iustitiae. Concurrunt enim in illa simul misericordia et veritas, sicut videbitur infra[^p418-7]. Unde quod dicitur, quod homo meruit per peccatum in aeternum separari a Deo; hoc verum est, quantum est de se; possunt tamen alia merita intervenire, quae infringent illam obligationem, et in quibus servabitur ordo iustitiae divinae.

5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod per peccatum meruit homo ita puniri poena sempiternae damnationis, sicut poena mortis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia de poena mortis statim fuit sententia lata, de poena vero sempiternae *damnationis* adhuc differtur sententia. Et quia divina sententia est irrevocabilis, postquam *lata* est — licet mutari possit sententia *per prophetiam praedicata*, sicut patet in *Iona*[^p418-8] — antequam feratur, potest remedium inveniri; ideo reparari potuit genus humanum, ut non incurreret poenam *damnationis* sempiternae in aliqua eius parte, quamvis non fuerit liberatum, ut non incurreret poenam *mortis*. — Et si tu quaeras, quare sententia ista fuit lata, et illa dilata, cum homo meruisset utramque de se; dicendum, quod prima est *via* poenitentiae, secunda vero *aufert* locum poenitentiae; ideo non debebat secunda sententia inferri contra hominem, quamdiu erat in statu viae.

6. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod non decebat Deum facere contra ordinem suae sapientiae; dicendum, quod genus humanum reparando contra sapientiam suam non fecit, quia ex sapientia sua fecerat ipsum reparabilem, praevidens eius lapsum. Nec valet illud quod obiicit: nec decuit facere de stante, ut caderet: ergo nec decuit de labente, ut resurgeret; quia, quamvis « nullo sapiente fiat homo deterior[^p418-9] », aliquo tamen sapiente potest fieri melior. Et licet non deceat Deum de bono facere malum, decet tamen de malo facere bonum.

english:
### Article, the Only One. *On the fittingness of our redemption accomplished through the passion of Christ.*
### Question I. *Whether it was fitting for human nature to be repaired by God.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it was fitting for human nature to be repaired by God. And that it was so seems to be the case from four manifest suppositions, which can be drawn from what Anselm says in the second [book] of *Cur Deus homo*[^p416-3]. The first is this: it in no way befits supreme stability to permit its own purpose to be weakened. — The second is this: it in no way befits supreme benignity that for the sin of one man his whole posterity[^p416-4] should be damned for ever. — The third is this: it in no way befits supreme wisdom to permit the noblest creature to be universally defrauded of its end. — The fourth is this: it in no way be

fits supreme power to permit its own servant to be unjustly held by another for ever.

1. *From the first* it is argued thus: if it does not befit that God's purpose be weakened; and God had purposed[^p417-1] to lead man through to beatitude, and he cannot be led through so long as he remains in the state of ruin: therefore it is unfitting that man be left in such a state: therefore *from the opposites* it is fitting that he be repaired and raised up.

2. *From the second* it is argued thus: it does not befit[^p417-2] that the whole posterity be damned for ever for the sin of one man; but the whole would be damned for ever, unless repair intervened: therefore it was fitting and becoming that God should repair man.

3. *From the third* it is argued thus: it does not befit supreme wisdom to permit the noblest creature to be universally defrauded of its end; but unless repair intervened, all men would be defrauded of their end, and thus *in vain would all the sons of men be constituted*[^p417-3]; which does not befit the divine wisdom, which does nothing unfitting: therefore it remains that it was very fitting for the human race to be repaired.

4. *From the fourth* it is argued thus: it does not befit supreme power to permit its servants to be unjustly and violently held by the adversary; but unless repair had intervened, many servants of God and Saints would be held in limbo: therefore it was fitting and becoming that the human race be succored through the benefit of repair.

**On the contrary**, against this it is objected thus: 1. If it had been unfitting that the human race not be repaired, and unbecoming; and « every least unbecoming thing, as Anselm says in the first [book] of *Cur Deus homo*[^p417-4], is impossible for God»: therefore it was impossible for God not to repair the human race. And from this a twofold unbecoming thing is drawn: one, that God did not repair the human race on account of *mercy*, but rather to avoid unbecomingness; the other, that he did not repair it out of *liberality*, but out of necessity. But if this is true, we are not bound to give him so great thanks; which it is impious and most cruel to say[^p417-5].

2. Likewise, an Angel is a nobler creature than man, and was made for the sake of beatitude, just as man; but it did not befit God to raise the angel up from his fall[^p417-6]: therefore neither did it befit him to repair the human race.

3. Likewise, just as it befits the divine wisdom and goodness to raise up the one falling, so also it befits to sustain the one standing; but it did not befit God to hold the human race so that it might not fall[^p417-7]: therefore it seems that it did not befit him to raise it up after its fall.

4. Likewise, it does not befit God[^p417-8] to act against his own justice; but man, when he sinned, deserved to be separated from God for ever: if therefore through repair he is to be joined to God, it seems that it was never fitting for the human race to be repaired.

5. Likewise, just as man through sin deserved the death of the flesh, so also he deserved the death of eternal damnation; but it did not befit God so to repair the human race that it should not die the death of the flesh[^p417-9]: therefore it did not befit him so to repair it that it should not die the death of eternal damnation.

6. Likewise, it does not befit God to act against the disposition of his own wisdom; but God had made man such that, if he willed to stand, he would stand, and if he willed to fall, he would fall: therefore just as it does not befit God to make the one standing fall, so it does not befit him to make the one falling rise again: therefore it does not befit him to repair human nature[^p417-10].

### Conclusion.

> That the human race be repaired is fitting and becoming both on the part of God and on the part of man.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt it is fitting and becoming that the human race be repaired; fitting, I say, and becoming not only on the part of God, but also on the part of man. On the part of God, because it befits God's wisdom and mercy, as was shown above in the objecting[^p417-11]. — On the part of man, however, the fittingness is similar, if one considers the dignity of man as created, and the manner of his falling, and the state of the fallen. — For the dignity of man was so great that for his sake all things were made[^p418-1].

If therefore man were to lack his end, then all things would be defrauded of their end. — But the *manner of falling* was this, that human nature fell totally, with *another sinning* and *another suggesting*; and therefore it was becoming that it be raised up by *another*, so that, just as the sons sinned in the *parent*, and the parent sinned at the *devil's* suggestion, so also man should be repaired with the *Lord* raising him up. — The *state* also of *fallen* man befits repair, because in that state there was at once *penitence* together with *misery*; and *penitence* in a certain manner appeased the divine justice, while *misery* provoked mercy.

And thus it is clear that in every manner it was fitting that the human race be repaired, fitting, I say, on the part of the *maker*, and fitting on the part of the *work*. But the fittingness on the part of the *work* is pure fittingness, such that it posits no necessity. The fittingness on the part of the *maker*, however, posits necessity, necessity, I say, not of *inevitability*, which is divided into compulsion and prohibition, but the necessity of *immutability*, which arises from the stability and immutability of the divine disposition. This, however, does not constrain the divine power to the opposite, but determines it to such a purpose. Hence Anselm in the second [book] of *Cur Deus homo*[^p418-2]: « When we say that God does something by necessity, it must be understood that he does this by the necessity of *preserving honorableness*, which necessity is nothing other than the *immutability of honorableness*».

From the things that have been said, the response to the proposed question is clear. For if it be asked whether it is fitting that the human race be repaired; it must be conceded *simply* that it is true. But if it be asked whether it is *necessary*; it must not be answered simply, but a distinction must be made. For it is necessary on the part of God, not on our part; and on the part of God[^p418-3] not by any necessity whatever, but by the necessity of *immutability*, which is not opposed to the freedom of the will, and through this neither to grace nor to liberality.

1. And through this the response to the first objection is clear; for it does not follow, if God repairs by the necessity of his *immutability*, that on account of this he does not repair out of the liberality of his benignity; for these can stand together at once[^p418-4].

2. *To that* which is objected, that the angelic creature is nobler etc.; it must be said that although the Angel is a nobler creature[^p418-5], nevertheless he is not so suited to repair as man, on account of the *manner of falling* and the *state of fallen man*. For man repented, but the angel was obstinate; man fell *totally*, the angel *partially*; man through *another*, the angel through *himself*; and these are the things that make the angel less suited to repair.

3. *To that* which is objected, that it did not befit God to hold man lest he fall; it must be said that if man had willed to stand, God would never have abandoned him so that he should fall; but because he was unwilling to stand, he ought not to have preserved him against his will; but because man after the fall willed to rise again, therefore it befitted God to stretch out his hand to him, in such a way that this hand extends itself to those who rise willingly[^p418-6], not to those who are unwilling to rise.

4. *To that* which is objected, that it does not befit God to act against his own justice; it must be said that it is true. Yet it does befit him to do something beyond the rigor of justice, because the repair of the human race is not repugnant to the divine justice. For in it mercy and truth concur together, as will be seen below[^p418-7]. Hence, as to what is said, that man deserved through sin to be separated from God for ever; this is true so far as it is of itself; yet other merits can intervene which will break that obligation, and in which the order of divine justice will be preserved.

5. *To that* which is objected, that through sin man deserved to be punished with the punishment of eternal damnation just as with the punishment of death; it must be said that it is not alike, because concerning the punishment of death the sentence was passed at once, but concerning the punishment of eternal *damnation* the sentence is still deferred. And because the divine sentence is irrevocable, after it has been *passed* — although a sentence *proclaimed through prophecy* can be changed, as is clear in *Jonah*[^p418-8] — before it is passed, a remedy can be found; therefore the human race could be repaired so that it should not incur the punishment of eternal *damnation* in any part of it, although it was not freed so as not to incur the punishment of *death*. — And if you ask why this sentence was passed and that one deferred, since man deserved both of himself; it must be said that the first is the *way* of penitence, but the second *takes away* the place of penitence; therefore the second sentence ought not to be inflicted against man so long as he was in the state of the way.

6. *To that* which is objected, that it did not befit God to act against the order of his own wisdom; it must be said that in repairing the human race he did not act against his own wisdom, because out of his wisdom he had made it repairable, foreseeing its fall. Nor does that which he objects avail: it did not befit him to make the one standing fall: therefore neither did it befit him to make the one falling rise again; because, although « by no wise man is a man made worse[^p418-9] », nevertheless by some wise man he can be made better. And although it does not befit God to make evil out of good, nevertheless it does befit him to make good out of evil.

la: Cap. 4, ubi tres priores suppositiones insinuantur his verbis: *Ex his est facile cognoscere, quoniam aut hoc de humana natura perficiet Deus, quod incepit, aut in vanum fecit tam sublimem naturam ad tantum bonum. At si nihil pretiosius agnoscitur Deus fecisse quam rationalem naturam ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut ullam rationalem naturam penitus perire sinat.* Ibid. l. c. 4: « Genus humanum, tam scil. pretiosum opus eius, omnino perierat, nec decebat, ut quod Deus de homine proposuerat, penitus annihilaretur». Quoad quartam suppositionem cfr. ibid. l. c. 7. et c. 22. seq. nec non II. c. 16, ubi docetur (quod infra in i. fundam. tangitur), ianuam paradisi omnibus clausam fuisse; de quo cfr. supra pag. 66, nota 7, et Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. I.

en: Ch. 4, where the three prior suppositions are intimated in these words: *From these it is easy to recognize that either God will perfect concerning human nature what he began, or he made so sublime a nature for so great a good in vain. But if nothing more precious is recognized as having been made by God than a rational nature for rejoicing in him, it is quite foreign to him that he should let any rational nature perish utterly.* Ibid. l.c. 4: « The human race, namely so precious a work of his, had wholly perished, nor was it becoming that what God had purposed concerning man should be utterly annihilated». As to the fourth supposition cf. ibid. l.c. 7 and c. 22 f., and also II, c. 16, where it is taught (which is touched on below in the first fundamentum) that the gate of paradise was closed to all; on which cf. above p. 66, note 7, and Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. I.

la: Vat. hic inserit *permittere*.

en: The Vatican edition here inserts *permittere*.

la: Codd. C I. U aa *proposuit*, codd. B D G H I M N O T V *proposuerit*.

en: Codices C, I, U, aa read *proposuit*; codices B, D, G, H, I, M, N, O, T, V *proposuerit*.

la: Cod. R. supplet *summam clementiam*.

en: Codex R supplies *summam clementiam* (supreme clemency).

la: Psalm. 88, 18: *Numquid enim vane constituisti omnes filios hominum?*

en: Psalm 88:18 [89:47]: *For hast thou indeed constituted all the sons of men in vain?*

la: Cap. 20. Cfr. ibid. c. 10, et de Fide Trin. c. 8. Pro *Deo*, quam lectionem fide codd. D F K M conservavimus, textus origin. *in Deo*, edd. *erga Deum*. — Subinde pro *ergo fuit impossibile* cod. B *ergo decuit*, et pro *reparare* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 vitiose *reparari*.

en: Ch. 20. Cf. ibid. c. 10, and *On the Faith of the Trinity* c. 8. For *Deo*, which reading we have preserved on the faith of codices D, F, K, M, the original text has *in Deo*, the editions *erga Deum*. — Then for *ergo fuit impossibile* codex B has *ergo decuit*, and for *reparare* many codices and editions 1, 2 corruptly *reparari*.

la: Hoc duplex inconveniens tangit Anselm., II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 5. dicens: *Sed si ita est, videtur quasi cogi Deus necessitate vitandi indecentiam, ut salutem procuret humanam. Quomodo ergo negari poterit, plus hoc propter se facere quam propter nos? At si ita est, quam gratiam illi debemus pro eo quod facit propter se? Quomodo etiam nostram imputabimus salutem eius gratiae, si nos salvat necessitate?*

en: This twofold unbecoming thing Anselm touches on, II *Cur Deus homo*, c. 5, saying: *But if it is so, God seems as it were compelled by the necessity of avoiding unbecomingness to procure human salvation. How then can it be denied that he does this more for his own sake than for ours? But if it is so, what thanks do we owe him for that which he does for his own sake? How too shall we impute our salvation to his grace, if he saves us by necessity?*

la: Vide Anselm., II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 21, et supra d. 2. a. I. q. 2.

en: See Anselm, II *Cur Deus homo*, c. 21, and above d. 2, a. I, q. 2.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. I. q. I. seq. — Pro *ne laberetur* edd. 1, 2 *ante lapsum*, quae verba Vat. verbis *ne laberetur* adiungit. Mox pro *post ipsum lapsum* codd. A K Z bb et edd. 1, 2 *post lapsum*.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 23, a. I, q. I f. — For *ne laberetur* editions 1, 2 have *ante lapsum*, which words the Vatican edition adjoins to the words *ne laberetur*. Soon for *post ipsum lapsum* codices A, K, Z, bb and editions 1, 2 have *post lapsum*.

la: Pro *Deum* multi codd. *ipsum*.

en: For *Deum* many codices have *ipsum*.

la: August., II. *de Peccat. merit. et remiss.* etc. c. 31. n. 50: *Poterat autem etiam hoc donare credentibus, ut nec istius experirentur corporis mortem, sed si hoc fecisset, carni quaedam felicitas adderetur, minueretur autem fidei fortitudo... Quid enim magnum erat, videndo, non mori eos qui crederent, credere, se non moriturum? Quanto est maius, quanto fortius, quanto laudabilius ita credere, ut se speret moriturus sine fine victurum?* etc. Vide etiam Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 3. c. 9. — Post pauca pro *sic reparare* non pauci codd. *sic reparari*.

en: Augustine, II *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* etc. c. 31, n. 50: *He could indeed also have granted this to believers, that they should not experience the death even of this body; but if he had done this, a certain felicity would be added to the flesh, while the fortitude of faith would be diminished... For what great thing was it, by seeing that those who believed did not die, to believe that one would not die oneself? How much greater, how much stronger, how much more praiseworthy is it so to believe that one, though to die, hopes to live without end?* etc. See also Anselm, *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice* q. 3, c. 9. — A little after, for *sic reparare* not a few codices have *sic reparari*.

la: Cod. Y *genus humanum*.

en: Codex Y has *genus humanum*.

la: Hic in fundam. Cfr. etiam supra d. I. a. 2. q. 1. — De rationibus *ex parte hominis* cfr. supra d. 2. a. I. q. 2, et II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 2.

en: Here in the fundamentum. Cf. also above d. I, a. 2, q. 1. — On the reasons *on the part of man* cf. above d. 2, a. I, q. 2, and II Sent. d. 21, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — Voci *hominis* edd. adtexunt *conditi*.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 1. — To the word *hominis* the editions attach *conditi*.

la: Cap. 5, ubi textus origin. post *necessitate*, cui voci praefigit *quasi*, addit *vitandi inhonestatem*, quam utique non timet, potius. Cfr. supra pag. 350, nota 7. et pag. 352, nota 2.

en: Ch. 5, where the original text after *necessitate*, to which word it prefixes *quasi*, adds *vitandi inhonestatem* (of avoiding dishonorableness), which indeed he does not fear, rather. Cf. above p. 350, note 7, and p. 352, note 2.

la: Vat. subiicit *necessarium quidem*.

en: The Vatican edition subjoins *necessarium quidem*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 5. — Pro *reparet* multi codd. *reparat*.

en: Cf. Anselm, II *Cur Deus homo*, c. 5. — For *reparet* many codices have *reparat*.

la: Edd. addunt *quam homo*.

en: The editions add *quam homo* (than man).

la: Edd. *qui volunt resurgere*.

en: The editions read *qui volunt resurgere* (who will to rise again).

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

la: Cap. 3, 4. seqq. — Pro *licet mutari* cod. O *licet aliquo modo mutari*; inferius pro *debebat* cod. A *decebat*.

en: Ch. 3, 4 ff. [Jonah]. — For *licet mutari* codex O has *licet aliquo modo mutari*; further down for *debebat* codex A has *decebat*.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 3. — De ult. propos. solutionis cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo superius ante *de labente* supple: *facere*.

en: Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 3. — On the last proposition of the solution cf. I Sent. d. 46, q. 2 ff. — A little above, before *de labente*, supply: *facere*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In quaestionibus huius distinctionis solvendis Scholastici sequuntur praecipue S. Anselmi librum *Cur Deus homo*, cum quadam tamen restrictione, de qua vide infra q. 6. — Solutione huius I. quaestionis illustratur doctrina supra d. 2. a. I. q. 2. (de congruentia incarnationis) et II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. 1. (de obstinatione daemonum) explicata; nec circa conclusionem dubium esse potest. A congruentia auctor in responsione transit ad necessitatem quandam incarnationis, quam secundum S. Anselmum et Alexandrum Hal. nominat necessitatem immutabilitatis. Sed istud vocabulum sumitur hoc loco non in sensu absoluto, ut alibi, sed conditionato, ut ipsa verba auctoris hic manifestant et magis infra q. 6. Bene dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. I. m. 3.): « Secundum Anselmum proprie dicitur necessitas, quae est coactionis et prohibitionis; necessitas autem immutabilitatis proprie non debet dici, sed improprie ». Eadem necessitas a S. Thoma (hic a. I. quaestiunc. 3; cfr. S. III. q. 46. a. 2.) vocatur necessitas *ex suppositione*, quam distinguit a necessitate coactionis et necessitate absoluta, et addit, quod non sit necessitas « *ex suppositione finis*, quia non est dubium, quin Deus ad aliquem finem possit inducere multis aliis viis... sed ex suppositione alicuius, quod est in ipso, scilicet praescientiae, vel voluntatis, quae mutari non possunt; secundum quem modum dicitur, quod necessarium est, praedestinatum salvari. Et haec dicitur necessitas immutabilitatis a quibusdam. Et per hunc modum necessarium fuit ex parte Dei, humanam naturam reparari ». — De hac et aliis necessitatis speciebus cfr. S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 6. q. I. et scholion, d. 38. a. 2. q. I. et scholion; II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. I. q. 3, d. 25. p. II. q. 2. 3; III. Sent. d. II. a. I. q. 3. ad 4, d. 16. a. I. q. 3. — Verba in solut. ad 3. non nimis premenda sunt, quasi sine gratia praeveniente Christi homo lapsus voluerit resurgere, at homo innocens noluerit surgere. Sed ibi respicitur haec veritas, quod gratia Christi de facto non salvat adultos, nisi volentes resurgere, dum protoparentes de facto noluerunt stare.

De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. 3, et q. 18. m. 3. a. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. I. 3; tangitur etiam S. III. q. 46. a. I, praesertim ad 3, et q. I. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.

**II.** In seq. (2.) quaestione Seraphicus egregie explicat rationes congruentiae pro conclusione, de qua inter Christianos non potest esse controversia.

De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4, et q. 18. m. I. a. I. — S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 2; cfr. S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3. — B. Albert. tangit quaestionem hic a. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In solving the questions of this distinction the Scholastics follow chiefly St. Anselm's book *Cur Deus homo*, with a certain restriction, however, concerning which see below, q. 6. — By the solution of this first question the doctrine explained above at d. 2, a. I, q. 2 (on the fittingness of the incarnation) and at II Sent. d. 7, p. I, a. I, q. 1 (on the obstinacy of the demons) is illustrated; nor can there be doubt concerning the conclusion. From fittingness the author passes in the response to a certain necessity of the incarnation, which, following St. Anselm and Alexander of Hales, he names the necessity of immutability. But this term is taken here not in an absolute sense, as elsewhere, but in a conditioned sense, as the very words of the author here manifest and more so below, q. 6. Alexander of Hales rightly says (Summa, p. III, q. I, m. 3): « According to Anselm, necessity is properly said of that which is of compulsion and prohibition; but the necessity of immutability ought not properly to be called [necessity], but improperly ». The same necessity is called by St. Thomas (here a. I, quaestiuncula 3; cf. S. III, q. 46, a. 2) necessity *from supposition*, which he distinguishes from the necessity of compulsion and from absolute necessity, and he adds that it is not a necessity « *from the supposition of the end*, because there is no doubt that God can bring about some end by many other ways... but from the supposition of something which is in him, namely of foreknowledge or of will, which cannot be changed; according to which manner it is said that it is necessary that the predestined be saved. And this is called by some the necessity of immutability. And in this manner it was necessary on the part of God that human nature be repaired ». — On this and on other species of necessity cf. St. Bonaventure, I Sent. d. 6, q. I and scholion, d. 38, a. 2, q. I and scholion; II Sent. d. 7, p. II, a. I, q. 3, d. 25, p. II, q. 2. 3; III Sent. d. II, a. I, q. 3 ad 4, d. 16, a. I, q. 3. — The words in the solution to [objection] 3 are not to be pressed too far, as though without prevenient grace the fallen man of Christ willed to rise again, but the innocent man was unwilling to rise. But there is regarded this truth, that the grace of Christ in fact does not save adults except those willing to rise, while the first parents in fact were unwilling to stand.

On this first question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2. 3, and q. 18, m. 3, a. I. — Scotus, on this and the following questions in both Writings here, one question. — St. Thomas, here a. I, quaestiuncula I. 3; it is also touched on at S. III, q. 46, a. I, especially ad 3, and q. I, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. 2. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. I. — Biel, here one question.

**II.** In the following (2nd) question the Seraphic Doctor excellently explains the reasons of fittingness for the conclusion, concerning which there can be no controversy among Christians.

On the same question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4, and q. 18, m. I, a. I. — St. Thomas, here a. I, quaestiuncula 2; cf. S. III, q. 46, a. 1. 3. — B. Albert touches on the question here a. 1. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.416–419 (PDF 438–441), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 28992–29176). English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus drawn page-by-page from the printed footers (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each page).

**Page-split map (q1 = printed pp.416–419):**
- **p.416** (PDF 438): q1 opener (`Circa primum sic proceditur…`) through the first suppositiones (`…nullatenus de-`). Footers: **nn.3–4 picked up here** (`Cur Deus homo³`, `posteritatem eius⁴`). p.416 nn.1–2 (`inquirit¹`, `possit²`) belong to the d20-divisio chunk and were captured there.
- **p.417** (PDF 439): the four *quod sic* fundamenta + the six *Sed contra* objections + Conclusio + start of Respondeo. Footers nn.1–11 (all 11 captured; L-col footer nn.1–6, R-col footer nn.7–11).
- **p.418** (PDF 440): Respondeo body (*dignitas / modus labendi / status lapsi*, necessitas immutabilitatis) + replies 1–6 to the objections. Footers nn.1–9 (L-col nn.1–4, R-col nn.5–9).
- **p.419** (PDF 441): the SCHOLION only (sections I–II), printed under the running head `DIST. XX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II` but belonging to q1; QUAESTIO II body begins below it on p.419. The scholion carries no numbered footnotes (references are inline).

**Apparatus count:** 24 entries (p.416 nn.3–4; p.417 nn.1–11; p.418 nn.1–9).

**Scholion status.** This is **q1's own scholion**. Section I solves/contextualizes the present (first) question (necessitas immutabilitatis, Anselm/Alexander/Thomas) and lists parallel treatments *de hac I. quaestione*. Section II is a short forward-pointer to q2 (*in seq. (2.) quaestione…*) with its own parallel-citation list — i.e. the scholion forward-references q2 but is not an article-wide scholion covering all six questions. (The other questions q2–q6 have their own scholia.) `has_scholion: true`.

**Hand-offs:**
- *Picked up* from d20-divisio: p.416 footers **nn.3–4** (q1 body anchors `Cur Deus homo³` + `posteritatem eius⁴`). Confirmed divisio held only p.416 nn.1–2.
- *Forwarded to d20-a1-q2:* QUAESTIO II (*Utrum magis congruerit, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam*) begins at **raw line 29177**, printed **p.419** (PDF 441), opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum magis congruat, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam.` The q2 body shares **p.419** with q1's scholion; q1's scholion sits above the q2 body on p.419. **No q1 footers migrate to q2** — q1's body closes at the foot of p.418; the p.419 footers (which begin the q2 sequence) are q2's property. Offset reminder: pdf = printed + 22.

**[?] flags:** none — 450 dpi bands fully legible.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 419 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum magis congruerit, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum magis congruat, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam. Et quod sic, ostenditur per quatuor suppositiones[^p419-1], quarum prima est haec: illa via magis conveniens fuit ad reparationem humani generis, in qua magis servatur ordo divinae iustitiae. — Secunda est haec: illa via magis congruit reparationi humani generis, in qua magis servatur ordo divinae sapientiae. — Tertia est haec: illa via magis convenit reparationi humani generis, in qua magis servatur praesidentia divinae potestatis. — Quarta est haec: illa via magis convenit reparationi humani generis, in qua magis servatur honorificentia divinae maiestatis.

1. His praesuppositis, arguitur sic: magis servatur ordo divinae iustitiae, cum malum punitur, quam cum relinquitur impunitum; sed cum peccator reparatur per satisfactionem, malum punitur; cum sine satisfactione, relinquitur impunitum: ergo magis servatur ordo divinae iustitiae in reparatione per satisfactionem quam sine satisfactione: ergo per primam suppositionem via ista magis convenit reparando generi humano[^p419-2].

2. Item, secundo arguitur sic: ordinatio peccantium in suppliciis, sive peccati in poena, manifestat decorem divinae sapientiae, quae non patitur, universum ex aliqua sui parte turpari; sed cum peccator relevatur per satisfactionem, ad culpam sequitur poena; cum vero sine satisfactione, culpa non ordinatur per poenam: ergo reparatio generis humani per satisfactionem plus convenit divinae sapientiae quam sine: ergo per secundam suppositionem via ista reparandi magis est congrua et idonea in se[^p419-3].

3. Item, tertio arguitur sic: si malum non puniretur et relinqueretur sine aliqua satisfactione, iniustitia nulli legi subiaceret; et si hoc, divina potestas non omnibus praesideret;

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sed cum pro peccato satisfactio exigitur, peccator subditur poenae auctoritate divinae iustitiae: ergo in modo reparandi genus humanum per satisfactionem magis praelucet praesidentia divinae potestatis quam per aliam viam: igitur per tertiam suppositionem via ista magis est congrua[^p420-1].

4. Item, quarto arguitur sic: peccator, cum peccat, per praevaricationem Deum inhonorat[^p420-2]: si ergo peccatum dimittitur sine satisfactione, peccatum relinquitur absque honoris ablati recompensatione; cum autem satisfactio redditur, honor recompensatur: ergo in modo reparandi hominem per satisfactionem magis servatur honorificentia divinae maiestatis quam per alium modum: igitur per quartam suppositionem hac via reparationis magis congruit genus humanum reparari.

Ex his eisdem rationibus non solum potest concludi, quod haec via sit magis congrua, sed etiam, quod alia non potest esse congrua; verumtamen non sunt ita efficaces ad probandum secundum, sicut ad probandum primum, quia praeter has[^p420-3] congruentias possunt et aliae reperiri, licet istae sint magis excellentes.

**Sed contra:** 1. Magis decet Deum facere quod magis facit ad ostensionem suae benignitatis et misericordiae; sed dimittere peccata omnia absque aliqua satisfactione poenae, hoc est maioris misericordiae quam exigere ab illis poenam: si ergo Deus est misericordissimus et benignissimus, adeo ut benignior cogitari non possit; videtur ergo, quod modus ille reparandi, qui est praeter satisfactionem, magis conveniat divinae excellentiae[^p420-4].

2. Item, modus ille magis convenit reparationi humani generis, qui magis est ostensivus divinae sufficientiae; sed si sic Deus genus humanum repararet, quod nullam requireret satisfactionem, magis appareret divina sufficientia — ostenderetur enim tunc, quod emendarum nostrarum et bonorum nostrorum non indiget[^p420-5] — ergo modus reparandi absque omni satisfactione magis esset conveniens humano generi.

3. Item, ille modus magis convenit reparationi humanae, qui magis est ostensivus divinae potentiae, pro eo quod reparatio est quaedam recreatio[^p420-6]; sed si Deus absque omni satisfactione solo verbo reparasset genus humanum, sicut fabricavit mundum, maior esset ibi divinae virtutis ostensio: ergo magis convenit iste modus humano generi reparando.

4. Item, modus ille magis convenit reparationi generis humani, in quo homo magis astringitur ad amandum et laudandum Deum; sed si Deus culpam homini reliquisset absque omni satisfactione et poena, esset magis amandus et laudandus ab homine, homo enim plura a Deo percepisset: ergo talis modus reparationi humanae magis congrueret.

5. Item, modus ille magis congruit reparationi generis humani, in quo magis eruditur homo ad exsecutionem divini mandati et imitationem Dei; sed homo debet remittere et condonare alii culpam et poenam[^p420-7]: ergo si Deus homini debuit dare exemplum perfectionis, videtur, quod magis Deum decuerit reparare genus humanum totum relaxando quam satisfactionem aliquam exigendo.

6. Item, ille modus reparandi magis decet Deum, qui est a Deo immediate, quam qui est a Deo mediante adiutorio creaturae — quoniam sicut decuit Deum magis per se ipsum creare, sic magis videtur esse decens per se ipsum recreare[^p420-8] — sed reparatio per satisfactionem est mediante creatura satisfaciente: ergo videtur, quod magis decuerit Deum reparare genus humanum absque omni satisfactione per se ipsum, quam mediante satisfactione per creaturae adiutorium.

### Conclusio.

> Magis fuit congruum et ex parte Dei et ex parte nostra, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio magis congruum fuit, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam, secundum quod dicit Anselmus, et Augustinus[^p420-9]. Et ratio huius est ex parte Dei et ex parte nostra. Ex parte, inquam, Dei, quia universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas[^p420-10], cum ipse sit summe iustus et misericors.

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Et ideo in reparatione generis humani, quae est excellentissima viarum Dei, congruum est, ut simul currat misericordia cum iustitia. Et ideo decens fuit, ut Deus ab homine satisfactionem exigeret pro iniuria sibi facta, et si homo non posset, tunc misericordia divina subveniret dando sibi mediatorem, qui pro eo satisfaceret. Et iste modus magis fuit congruus quam alius. Nam si Deus culpam non dimisisset, sed vindictam exegisset; non manifestaretur eius misericordia; si vero omnino dimisisset nec satisfactionem exegisset, non manifestaretur iustitia. Si ergo istae duae conditiones sunt in Dei opere servandae praecipue[^p421-1], magis congruebat, humanam naturam reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam, ex parte Dei reparantis.

Magis etiam congruebat ex parte nostri, pro eo quod reparatio nostra ad hoc erat, ut nos reduceret a culpa ad iustitiam, a miseria ad gloriam. Sicut ergo, cum genus humanum cecidit per culpam, Deum inhonoravit per praevaricationem et inordinatam delectationem; sic, cum redit a culpa ad iustitiam, decens est, ut Deum honoret sustinendo poenam, et in hoc magis reparatur ad normam iustitiae. Rursus, sicut gloriosius est acquirere vitam aeternam per merita quam sine meritis[^p421-2], sic gloriosius est reconciliari Deo per satisfactionem quam sine. — Modus igitur reparandi per satisfactionem plus convenit nostrae iustificationi et nostrae glorificationi. Si igitur haec duo principaliter considerantur in reparatione generis humani, planum est, quod hic modus reparandi magis conveniens est tam ex parte Dei reparantis, quam ex parte humani generis reparati. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de manifestatione benignitatis et misericordiae, dicendum, quod summa benignitas et misericordia in Deo non excludunt iustitiam, et ideo non sic debuit manifestari[^p421-3] in opere reparationis, quod iustitia non haberet locum; sed ita debuit manifestari divina misericordia, quod simul cum hoc ostenderetur divina iustitia. Et hoc idem factum est, cum Deus reparavit genus humanum per mortem Filii sui, ubi fuit maxima aequitas in exigendo tantae satisfactionis pretium, et maxima benignitas in tradendo unigenitum Filium suum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis manifestaretur[^p421-4] divina sufficientia, si non exigeret satisfactionem; dicendum, quod sicut Deus exigit a nobis mandatorum suorum observantiam non propter suam indigentiam, sed propter ordinationem nostram, qua debemus ei tanquam Domino obedire: sic et peccatorum exigit emendam, non propter hoc, quod indigeat, sed ut nos reducat ad ordinationem debitam. Et ideo obiectio illa procedebat ex suppositione falsi, cum dicebatur, magis sine satisfactione divinam sufficientiam manifestari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod modus alius magis manifestaret divinam potentiam; dicendum, quod etsi in omni opere Dei ostendatur divina potentia, in opere tamen reparationis magis manifestatur benignitas et misericordia, et per consequens ipsa iustitia eis annexa. Et ideo, cum posset uno verbo genus humanum reparare, maluit tamen reparare cum difficultate et poenalitate, quia magis opportunum erat, ibi ostendi misericordiam quam potentiam. Potentia enim satis claruerat in rerum eductione; sed adhuc latebat misericordia, quam ostendebat Deus in hominis reparatione[^p421-5].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod reparatio, praetermissa satisfactione, magis astringeret nos ad laudandum et amandum Deum; dicendum, quod hoc falsum est; plus enim nos astringit ad amorem et laudem Dei hoc, quod dedit Unigenitum suum pro nobis, quam si absque hoc condonasset nobis et poenam et culpam. Multo enim maius fuit, quod Deus pro nobis mortem subiret, quam peccata nostra condonaret; multo etiam maius fuit dando nobis Filium peccata condonare, quam si simpliciter peccata condonasset. *Qui enim proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum, quomodo non omnia nobis cum illo donavit?* sicut dicitur ad Romanos octavo[^p421-6]. Et sic patet illud, quod procedebat ex suppositione falsi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si satisfactionem non exegisset, magis praebuisset formam imitandi se; dicendum, quod etsi debeamus Deum imitari in aliquibus, non tamen nostrum est imitari in omnibus. Ad Deum enim spectat quaerere gloriam et vindictam, secundum quod dicitur ad Romanos duodecimo[^p421-7]: *Mihi vindicta, et ego retribuam;* ad nos autem non pertinet, quia nostrum non est iudica-

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re, sed iudicari; et ideo in hoc non debuit dare formam imitandi se. — Aliter posset dici, quod Deus exigendo satisfactionem magis praebuit nobis formam, quam si non exegisset. Praebuit enim exemplum et subditis et praelatis: subditis in hoc, quod remisit et pepercit; praelatis vero in hoc, quod emendam requisivit, ut decor iustitiae servaretur, quod spectat ad eos qui iudicant terram, secundum illud Sapientiae primo[^p422-1]: *Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram.*

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod decentius fuisset reparare genus humanum sine adiutorio humano, et ita sine satisfactione[^p422-2]; dicendum, quod hoc falsum est. Summae enim bonitatis est communicare creaturae operationes nobiles, secundum quod ipsa nata est suscipere; et creatura aliquid potest facere in reparatione, quamvis solius Dei sit operari in primaria rerum productione, ubi non est operatio in aliquam materiam praeiacentem[^p422-3].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether it was more fitting that the human race be repaired through satisfaction than by another way.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is more fitting that the human race be repaired through satisfaction than by another way. And that it is so is shown through four suppositions[^p419-1], of which the first is this: that way was more fitting for the repair of the human race in which the order of divine justice is more preserved. — The second is this: that way is more congruent to the repair of the human race in which the order of divine wisdom is more preserved. — The third is this: that way is more fitting to the repair of the human race in which the presidency of divine power is more preserved. — The fourth is this: that way is more fitting to the repair of the human race in which the honor of the divine majesty is more preserved.

1. These things being presupposed, one argues thus: the order of divine justice is more preserved when evil is punished than when it is left unpunished; but when the sinner is repaired through satisfaction, evil is punished; when without satisfaction, it is left unpunished: therefore the order of divine justice is more preserved in repair through satisfaction than without satisfaction: therefore by the first supposition this way is more fitting for repairing the human race[^p419-2].

2. Likewise, secondly one argues thus: the ordering of sinners in their punishments, or of sin in its penalty, manifests the beauty of divine wisdom, which does not allow the universe to be made base in any part of itself; but when the sinner is relieved through satisfaction, penalty follows upon fault; when, however, without satisfaction, the fault is not ordered through penalty: therefore the repair of the human race through satisfaction agrees more with divine wisdom than without it: therefore by the second supposition this way of repairing is more congruent and suitable in itself[^p419-3].

3. Likewise, thirdly one argues thus: if evil were not punished and were left without any satisfaction, injustice would be subject to no law; and if this, divine power would not preside over all things;

but when satisfaction is exacted for sin, the sinner is subjected to penalty by the authority of divine justice: therefore in the mode of repairing the human race through satisfaction the presidency of divine power shines forth more than by another way: therefore by the third supposition this way is more congruent[^p420-1].

4. Likewise, fourthly one argues thus: the sinner, when he sins, dishonors God through transgression[^p420-2]: if, therefore, sin is remitted without satisfaction, sin is left without recompense for the honor taken away; but when satisfaction is rendered, the honor is recompensed: therefore in the mode of repairing man through satisfaction the honor of the divine majesty is more preserved than by another mode: therefore by the fourth supposition it is more fitting that the human race be repaired by this way of repair.

From these same reasons it can be concluded not only that this way is more congruent, but also that another cannot be congruent; nevertheless they are not as effective for proving the second as for proving the first, because besides these[^p420-3] congruences others too can be found, although these are the more excellent.

**On the contrary:** 1. It more befits God to do what He does more for the showing of His kindness and mercy; but to remit all sins without any satisfaction of penalty, this is of greater mercy than to exact penalty from them: if, therefore, God is most merciful and most kind, so much so that one more kind cannot be conceived; it seems, therefore, that that mode of repairing which is apart from satisfaction would better agree with the divine excellence[^p420-4].

2. Likewise, that mode agrees more with the repair of the human race which is more indicative of the divine sufficiency; but if God so repaired the human race that He required no satisfaction, the divine sufficiency would appear more — for it would then be shown that He has no need of our amends and of our goods[^p420-5] — therefore the mode of repairing without any satisfaction would be more fitting for the human race.

3. Likewise, that mode agrees more with human repair which is more indicative of the divine power, inasmuch as repair is a certain re-creation[^p420-6]; but if God had repaired the human race by His word alone without any satisfaction, as He fashioned the world, there would be a greater display of divine power there: therefore this mode agrees more with the human race to be repaired.

4. Likewise, that mode agrees more with the repair of the human race in which man is more bound to loving and praising God; but if God had left man's fault to him without any satisfaction and penalty, He would be more to be loved and praised by man, for man would have received more from God: therefore such a mode would be more congruent to human repair.

5. Likewise, that mode is more congruent to the repair of the human race in which man is more instructed toward the carrying out of the divine command and the imitation of God; but man ought to remit and pardon another his fault and penalty[^p420-7]: therefore if God ought to give man an example of perfection, it seems that it would have more befitted God to repair the human race by releasing the whole than by exacting some satisfaction.

6. Likewise, that mode of repairing more befits God which is from God immediately than that which is from God by the mediating help of a creature — since, just as it befitted God to create more by Himself, so it seems more fitting to re-create by Himself[^p420-8] — but repair through satisfaction is by the mediation of a satisfying creature: therefore it seems that it would have more befitted God to repair the human race without any satisfaction by Himself, than by means of satisfaction through a creature's help.

### Conclusion.

> It was more fitting, both on God's part and on our part, that the human race be repaired through satisfaction.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt it was more fitting that the human race be repaired through satisfaction than by another way, according to what Anselm and Augustine say[^p420-9]. And the reason for this is on God's part and on our part. On God's part, I say, because *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*[^p420-10], since He is supremely just and merciful.

And therefore in the repair of the human race, which is the most excellent of God's ways, it is fitting that mercy run together with justice. And therefore it was becoming that God should exact satisfaction from man for the injury done to Him, and if man could not, then the divine mercy would come to his aid by giving him a mediator who would make satisfaction for him. And this mode was more fitting than another. For if God had not remitted the fault, but had exacted vengeance, His mercy would not be manifested; if, however, He had wholly remitted it and had not exacted satisfaction, justice would not be manifested. If, therefore, these two conditions are especially to be preserved in God's work[^p421-1], it was more fitting that human nature be repaired through satisfaction than by another way, on the part of the repairing God.

It was also more fitting on our part, inasmuch as our repair was for this, that it might lead us back from fault to justice, from misery to glory. As, therefore, when the human race fell through fault, it dishonored God through transgression and disordered delight; so, when it returns from fault to justice, it is becoming that it should honor God by enduring penalty, and in this it is more repaired to the norm of justice. Again, just as it is more glorious to acquire eternal life through merits than without merits[^p421-2], so it is more glorious to be reconciled to God through satisfaction than without it. — The mode, therefore, of repairing through satisfaction agrees more with our justification and our glorification. If, therefore, these two are principally considered in the repair of the human race, it is plain that this mode of repairing is more fitting both on the part of the repairing God and on the part of the repaired human race. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected concerning the manifestation of kindness and mercy, it must be said that the highest kindness and mercy in God do not exclude justice, and therefore it ought not to have been manifested[^p421-3] in the work of repair in such a way that justice would have no place; but the divine mercy ought to have been manifested in such a way that together with this the divine justice would be shown. And this same thing was done when God repaired the human race through the death of His Son, where there was the greatest equity in exacting the price of so great a satisfaction, and the greatest kindness in handing over His only-begotten Son.

2. To that which is objected, that the divine sufficiency would be more manifested[^p421-4] if He did not exact satisfaction; it must be said that, just as God exacts from us the observance of His commandments not on account of His own need, but on account of our ordering, by which we ought to obey Him as Lord: so too He exacts amends for sins, not because He has need, but that He may lead us back to the due ordering. And therefore that objection proceeded from a false supposition, when it was said that the divine sufficiency is more manifested without satisfaction.

3. To that which is objected, that another mode would more manifest the divine power; it must be said that, although in every work of God the divine power is shown, yet in the work of repair the kindness and mercy are more manifested, and consequently the justice itself joined to them. And therefore, since He could repair the human race by one word, He nevertheless preferred to repair it with difficulty and penalty, because it was more opportune that mercy rather than power be shown there. For power had shone forth sufficiently in the bringing-forth of things; but mercy still lay hidden, which God showed in the repair of man[^p421-5].

4. To that which is objected, that repair, with satisfaction set aside, would more bind us to praising and loving God; it must be said that this is false; for this binds us more to the love and praise of God, that He gave His Only-begotten for us, than if without this He had pardoned us both penalty and fault. For it was much greater that God should undergo death for us than that He should pardon our sins; it was also much greater, by giving us His Son, to pardon sins, than if He had simply pardoned sins. *For He who did not spare His own Son, but handed Him over for us all, how has He not also with Him given us all things?* as is said to the Romans, the eighth chapter[^p421-6]. And so that is plain which proceeded from a false supposition.

5. To that which is objected, that if He had not exacted satisfaction, He would have offered more the form of imitating Himself; it must be said that, although we ought to imitate God in some things, yet it is not for us to imitate Him in all things. For to God it belongs to seek glory and vengeance, according to what is said to the Romans, the twelfth chapter[^p421-7]: *Vengeance is mine, and I will repay;* but to us it does not pertain, because it is not for us to judge,

but to be judged; and therefore in this He ought not to have given the form of imitating Himself. — Otherwise it could be said that God, by exacting satisfaction, offered us the form more than if He had not exacted it. For He offered an example both to subjects and to prelates: to subjects in this, that He remitted and spared; to prelates indeed in this, that He required amends, that the beauty of justice might be preserved, which pertains to those who judge the earth, according to that of Wisdom, the first chapter[^p422-1]: *Love justice, you who judge the earth.*

6. To that which is objected last, that it would have been more becoming to repair the human race without human help, and so without satisfaction[^p422-2]; it must be said that this is false. For it is of the highest goodness to communicate noble operations to the creature, according as it is born to receive them; and the creature can do something in repair, although it belongs to God alone to operate in the primary production of things, where there is no operation upon any pre-existing matter[^p422-3].

---

la: Quae elici possunt ex August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 24. seqq.; de Vera Relig. c. 40. n. 74. seqq.; de Natura boni, c. 7. seqq.; XIII. de Trin. c. 10. n. 13. seqq.; et ex Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12. seqq.

en: Which can be drawn from Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 9, n. 24 ff.; *On True Religion* c. 40, n. 74 ff.; *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 7 ff.; *On the Trinity* XIII, c. 10, n. 13 ff.; and from Anselm, *Why God Became Man* I, c. 12 ff.

la: Anselm. loc. in praeced. nota cit. dicit: Dimittere peccatum non est aliud quam non punire; et quoniam recte ordinare peccatum sine satisfactione non est nisi punire, si non punitur, inordinatum dimittitur... Deum vero non decet aliquid in suo regno inordinatum dimittere. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 458, nota 6. et pag. 967, nota 3. — In minori pro peccator reparatur cod. U peccatum reparatur, cod. F peccator vel peccatum reparatur, edd. peccata reparantur.

en: Anselm, in the place cited in the preceding note, says: To remit sin is nothing other than not to punish; and since rightly to order sin without satisfaction is nothing but to punish, if it is not punished, the disordered thing is dismissed... But it does not befit God to leave anything disordered in His kingdom. Cf. tom. II, p. 458, note 6, and p. 967, note 3. — In the minor, for *peccator reparatur* cod. U has *peccatum reparatur*, cod. F *peccator vel peccatum reparatur*, the editions *peccata reparantur*.

la: Anselm. loc. cit. c. 15. ait: Ipsa namque perversitatis spontanea satisfactio, vel a non satisfaciente poenae exactio; excepto hoc, quod Deus de malis multimodis bona facit; in eadem universitate locum tenent suum et ordinis pulcritudinem. Quas si divina sapientia, ubi perversitas rectum ordinem perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa universitate, quam Deus debet ordinare, quaedam ex violata ordinis pulcritudine deformitas, et Deus in sua dispositione videretur deficere. Quae duo quoniam, sicut sunt inconvenientia, ita sunt impossibilia; necesse est, ut omne peccatum satisfactio, aut poena sequatur. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 760, nota 1.

en: Anselm, in the place cited, c. 15, says: For the spontaneous satisfaction of perversity itself, or the exaction of penalty from one who does not satisfy; excepting this, that God in manifold ways makes good things out of evils; hold their own place and the beauty of order in the same universe. If divine wisdom did not add these where perversity strives to disturb the right order, there would arise in the universe itself, which God ought to order, a certain deformity from the violated beauty of order, and God would seem to fail in His ordering. Since these two, just as they are unfitting, so are they impossible; it is necessary that either satisfaction or penalty follow upon every sin. Cf. tom. II, p. 760, note 1.

la: Anselm., loc. cit. c. 12. dicit, quod, si peccatum dimitteretur impunitum, etiam haec tria inconvenientia sequerentur, scil. quod «similiter erit apud Deum peccanti et non peccanti, quod Deo non convenit»; peccatum nulli legi subiaceret, «liberior igitur est iniustitia, si sola misericordia dimittitur quam iustitia, quod valde inconveniens videtur»; et iniustitia esset similis Deo, «quia sicut Deus nullius legi subiacet, ita et iniustitia». — Pro praelucet codd. A K P Q bb relucet.

en: Anselm, in the place cited, c. 12, says that, if sin were dismissed unpunished, these three unfitting things too would follow, namely that «it will be alike with God for the one sinning and the one not sinning, which does not befit God»; sin would be subject to no law, «injustice therefore is freer, if it is dismissed by mercy alone than justice, which seems very unfitting»; and injustice would be like God, «because just as God is subject to no one's law, so too injustice». — For *praelucet* codd. A K P Q bb have *relucet*.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 2, 23: Qui in Lege gloriaris per praevaricationem Legis Deum inhonoras. — Anselm., loc. cit. c. 13: Necesse est ergo, ut aut ablatus honor solvatur, aut poena sequatur; alioquin aut sibi ipsi Deus iustus non erit, aut ad utrumque impotens erit, quod nefas est vel cogitare.

en: There is regard to that of Rom. 2:23: You who glory in the Law, through transgression of the Law dishonor God. — Anselm, in the place cited, c. 13: It is necessary therefore that either the honor taken away be paid back, or that penalty follow; otherwise either God will not be just to Himself, or He will be powerless for both, which it is wicked even to think.

la: Vat., omisso quia, hic addit etiam.

en: The Vatican edition, omitting *quia*, here adds *etiam*.

la: Anselm., loc. cit. c. 12, graviores ex obiectionibus hic propositis breviter complectitur his verbis: Cum Deus sic sit liber, ut nulli legi, nullius subiaceat iudicio; et sit ita benignus, ut nihil benignius cogitari queat; et nihil sit rectum aut decens, nisi quod ipse vult: mirum videtur, si dicimus, quia nullatenus vult aut non ei licet iniuriam suam dimittere, a quo etiam de his quas aliis facimus, solemus indulgentiam petere. — In minori pro ab illis edd. pro illis. Deinde pro praeter satisfactionem codd. P Q praeter omnem satisfactionem.

en: Anselm, in the place cited, c. 12, briefly comprises the weightier of the objections here proposed in these words: Since God is so free that He is subject to no law, to no one's judgment; and is so kind that nothing kinder can be conceived; and nothing is right or becoming except what He wills: it seems strange if we say that He in no way wills, or that it is not lawful for Him, to dismiss His own injury, from whom even for those things we do to others we are accustomed to ask indulgence. — In the minor, for *ab illis* the editions have *pro illis*. Then for *praeter satisfactionem* codd. P Q have *praeter omnem satisfactionem*.

la: Respicitur illud Psalm. 15, 2: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. — Edd. indigeret.

en: There is regard to that of Ps. 15:2: You are my God, for You have no need of my goods. — The editions have *indigeret*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 30, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, p. 30, note 5.

la: Vide Matth. 6, 12. seqq. — Subinde in codd. desideratur Deum. In fine arg. pro exigendo cod. F exhibendo.

en: See Matt. 6:12 ff. — Thereupon in the codices *Deum* is lacking. At the end of the argument, for *exigendo* cod. F has *exhibendo*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 28, nota 2. — Cod. D reparare pro recreare.

en: Cf. above, p. 28, note 2. — Cod. D has *reparare* for *recreare*.

la: Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12. seqq.; August., XIII. de Trin. c. 10. n. 13. seqq. Cfr. etiam Bernard., Tract. de erroribus Abaelardi c. 6. n. 15. seq.

en: Anselm, *Why God Became Man* I, c. 12 ff.; Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIII, c. 10, n. 13 ff. Cf. also Bernard, *Treatise on the Errors of Abelard* c. 6, n. 15 f.

la: Cfr. Anselm., Proslog. c. 11, et IV. Sent. d. 46. a. 2. — Paulo ante edd. voci iustitia praefigunt eius. Paulo inferius pro ex parte nostri cod. V ex parte nostra.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 11, and IV *Sentences* d. 46, a. 2. — A little before, the editions prefix *eius* to the word *iustitia*. A little below, for *ex parte nostri* cod. V has *ex parte nostra*.

la: Vide supra pag. 387, nota 4. — Vat. hic supplet eam acquirere.

en: See above, p. 387, note 4. — The Vatican edition here supplies *eam acquirere*.

la: Cod. O hic repetit misericordia. — De principio, cui S. Anselm. innititur solvens obiectionem, vide supra pag. 267, nota 5.

en: Cod. O here repeats *misericordia*. — On the principle on which St. Anselm relies in solving the objection, see above, p. 267, note 5.

la: Non pauci codd. manifestatur. Aliquanto inferius pro sic et peccatorum cod. Z sic et a peccatore.

en: Not a few codices have *manifestatur*. Somewhat below, for *sic et peccatorum* cod. Z has *sic et a peccatore*.

la: Cfr. Bernard., Serm. I. in Nativ. Domini, n. 2, ubi inter alia egregie dicta: Apparuerat ante potentia in rerum creatione; apparebat sapientia in earum gubernatione; sed benignitas misericordiae nunc maxime apparuit in humanitate: Serm. in fer. IV. hebdom. sanctae, n. 13; Serm. 29. de Diversis, n. 3; Serm. II. in Cantic. n. 7.

en: Cf. Bernard, *Sermon I on the Nativity of the Lord*, n. 2, where among other excellent sayings: Power had appeared before in the creation of things; wisdom appeared in their governance; but the kindness of mercy now appeared most fully in the humanity: *Sermon for Wednesday of Holy Week*, n. 13; *Sermon 29 on Diverse Matters*, n. 3; *Sermon II on the Canticle*, n. 7.

la: Vers. 32. — Paulo superius pro quam peccata codd. A Z bb quam quod peccata.

en: Verse 32. — A little above, for *quam peccata* codd. A Z bb have *quam quod peccata*.

la: Vers. 19. — Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12: Deus hoc [dimittere peccantibus in nos] praecipit nobis, ut non praesumamus quod solius Dei est. Ad nullum enim pertinet vindictam facere, nisi ad illum qui Dominus est omnium; nam cum terrenae potestates hoc recte faciunt, ipse facit Deus, a quo ad hoc ipsum sunt ordinatae. — Paulo superius pro non tamen nostrum est codd. M O non tamen necesse [edd. 1, 2 necessarium] est.

en: Verse 19. — Anselm, *Why God Became Man* I, c. 12: God commands this [to remit to those who sin against us] to us, that we may not presume what belongs to God alone. For to no one does it belong to take vengeance, except to Him who is Lord of all; for when earthly powers do this rightly, God Himself does it, by whom they are ordained for this very thing. — A little above, for *non tamen nostrum est* codd. M O have *non tamen necesse* [editions 1, 2 *necessarium*] *est*.

la: Vers. 1.

en: Verse 1.

la: Edd. satisfactore. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

en: The editions have *satisfactore*. — Cf. II *Sentences* d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{419..422}-{L,R}-*`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 29177–29357). English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus transcribed from the printed per-page footers.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.419** (PDF 441): QUAESTIO II header + opener + the four suppositions + fund.1 + arg.2 + arg.3 (begins). On this page the q2 body occupies the **left column plus the lower right column**; the **upper right column carries q1's scholion (§§I–II)**, which belongs to the already-completed `d20-a1-q1` chunk, not here. Footers nn.1–3 (`[^p419-1..3]`) are q2's (n.3 = the Anselm c.15 note on the right-column foot).
- **p.420** (PDF 442): arg.3 (cont.) + arg.4 + the *Nota* + Sed contra args 1–6 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (begins). Footers nn.1–10 (`[^p420-1..10]`).
- **p.421** (PDF 443): Respondeo (cont., *ex parte Dei* and *ex parte nostri*) + replies ad 1–5 (ad 5 runs onto p.422). Footers nn.1–7 (`[^p421-1..7]`).
- **p.422** (PDF 444): tail of reply ad 5 (left-column top) + reply ad 6 (right-column top); **q2 ends here**. QUAESTIO III opens lower on the same page. **Shared-page footer split:** the p.422 footer block runs nn.1–7, but only **nn.1–3 belong to q2** (n.1 = Wisdom 1:1 quote in ad 5; n.2 = the *satisfactore* variant + cross-ref in ad 6; n.3 = "see the scholion to the preceding question" on the close of ad 6). **Footers nn.4–7 of p.422 belong to q3** (n.4 on q3 arg.1 `culpam suam`, etc.) and migrate forward to `d20-a1-q3`.

**Hand-offs picked up.** NONE. q1's body closed at the foot of p.418; no q1 footers migrate into q2. q1's scholion (sitting above the q2 body on p.419) is q1's own.

**Hand-off forwarded → `d20-a1-q3`.** QUAESTIO III *Utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano* begins at **raw line 29358**, printed **p.422** (PDF 444). Opener: `Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano.` **q3 shares p.422 with the tail of q2** (q2's ad 6 sits in the right-column top; q3 begins in the left column below the Wisdom quote). **Migrating footers:** p.422 **nn.4–7** belong to q3 (n.4 `culpam suam ⁴`; n.5 `innocentem ⁵`; n.6 `peccatorum ⁶`; n.7 the Fulgentius note). q3 then continues onto p.423+. Offset reminder: **pdf = printed + 22.**

**Scholion.** None. This question carries no scholion of its own; q1's scholion §II is a short forward-pointer covering q2–q6 collectively (documented in the q1 chunk). `has_scholion: false`.

**[?] flags.** None — the 450 dpi bands were fully legible across all four pages.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0