title: Dist. 34, Divisio Textus

source_text:
<!-- page 802 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV.

### *De peccato actuali secundum eius causalitatem.*

*Post praedicta de peccato actuali* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Ista totalis pars secundi libri, in qua Magister agit de lapsu hominis, divisa fuit in tres partes[^1], secundum quod tripliciter contingit considerare corruptionem peccati. Duabus partibus terminatis, in quibus Magister egit de peccato, quo persona corrumpit naturam, et iterum de peccato, quo natura corrumpit personam, utpote de originali, sequitur hic tertia pars, in qua agitur de peccato, in quo persona corrumpit se, hoc est de peccato actuali, et haec durat usque in finem libri. Dividitur autem haec pars in duas. In prima determinat de peccato sive de malo secundum id quod est. Secundo vero, qualiter a voluntate habeat malum sive peccatum committi, infra distinctione trigesima octava: *Post praedicta de voluntate* etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de peccato sive malo secundum eius causalitatem. Secundo vero, secundum eius quidditatem, infra distinctione trigesima quinta: *Post haec videndum est, quid sit peccatum.*

Prima pars continet praesentem distinctionem et dividitur in duas. In prima agit Magister de malo quantum ad causam originalem. In secunda de malo quantum ad subiectum sive causam efficientem, ibi: *Ostensa origine mali* etc. Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima aperit suam intentionem in generali. In secunda vero ostendit, quod malum ortum habet a causa bona, ibi: *Causa et origo* etc. In tertia vero, quod est a voluntate libera, ibi: *Mala autem voluntas* etc.

Similiter secunda pars principalis habet tres. In prima ostendit, quod malum est in bono, confirmans hoc auctoritate Augustini. Secundo vero elicit quoddam corollarium, scilicet quod in his contrariis fallit regula dialecticorum, ibi: *Ideoque in his contrariis* etc. In tertia vero et ultima removet quoddam dubium, ibi: *Ad hoc autem, quod dictum est* etc. — Et sic supposito, quod malum sit, duo manifestat Magister de malo, scilicet a quo sit et in quo.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis secundum duo, quae Magister determinat in littera, incidit hic quaestio circa duo principaliter.

Primo quaeritur, a quo sit malum tanquam ab originali principio.

Secundo, in quo sit tanquam in subiecto.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono, vel a malo.

Secundo, utrum sit a bono ut efficiente, vel deficiente.

Tertio, utrum sit ab intentione, vel praeter intentionem.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXIV.

### *On actual sin according to its causality.*

*After the foregoing concerning actual sin* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

This total part of the second book, in which the Master treats of the fall of man, was divided into three parts[^1], according to the threefold way in which it is possible to consider the corruption of sin. The two parts now being finished, in which the Master treated of the sin by which the person corrupts the nature, and again of the sin by which the nature corrupts the person, namely of original sin, there follows here the third part, in which there is treated the sin in which the person corrupts itself, that is, actual sin; and this lasts until the end of the book. Now this part is divided into two. In the first he determines concerning sin or evil according to that which it is. But secondly, how it comes about that evil or sin is committed by the will, below in the thirty-eighth distinction: *After the foregoing concerning the will* etc. The first part has two. In the first he determines concerning sin or evil according to its causality. But secondly, according to its quiddity, below in the thirty-fifth distinction: *After these things it must be seen what sin is.*

The first part contains the present distinction and is divided into two. In the first the Master treats of evil as to its original cause. In the second, of evil as to its subject or efficient cause, there: *The origin of evil having been shown* etc. The first part has three parts. In the first he opens his intention in general. But in the second he shows that evil has its rise from a good cause, there: *The cause and origin* etc. But in the third, that it is from the free will, there: *But an evil will* etc.

Likewise the second principal part has three. In the first he shows that evil is in a good, confirming this by the authority of Augustine. But secondly he draws out a certain corollary, namely that in these contraries the rule of the dialecticians fails, there: *And therefore in these contraries* etc. But in the third and last he removes a certain doubt, there: *But to this, which has been said* etc. — And thus, evil being supposed to be, the Master manifests two things concerning evil, namely from what it is and in what it is.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, according to the two things which the Master determines in the text, there here arises a question principally concerning two things.

First it is asked, from what evil comes as from its original principle.

Secondly, in what it is as in its subject.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether evil is from a good, or from an evil.

Secondly, whether it is from a good as from an efficient [cause], or from a deficient [one].

Thirdly, whether it is from intention, or beside intention.

---

la: Supra d. 21. divis. textus.

en: Above, distinction 21, division of the text. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 55857–55889) cross-checked against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed p.802 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p802-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Single printed page (802 = pdf 824, offset +22). Running heads confirmed: page-top `802 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` and page-bottom `DIST. XXXIV. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 803`.
- **Content captured:** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV opener + title (*De peccato actuali secundum eius causalitatem*) + lemma (*Post praedicta de peccato actuali* etc.), full DIVISIO TEXTUS (both columns reflowed), full TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (the "circa duo principaliter" two-head listing → art. I's "circa primum quaeruntur tria" three-question sub-listing of art. II's questions).
- **TRACTATIO alignment:** verified against PDF. The "circa primum quaeruntur tria" listing enumerates: (1) *utrum malum sit a bono, vel a malo*; (2) *utrum sit a bono ut efficiente, vel deficiente*; (3) *utrum sit ab intentione, vel praeter intentionem* — matches the brief exactly. (Note: this three-question listing is structurally the article that the chunker labels ART I q1–q3 in the chunk-id scheme; the divisio holds the listing.)
- **Page-split / boundary:** Chunk ends immediately before `ARTICULUS I.` / `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 55890/55893); those headers and the QUAESTIO I *Fundamenta* body belong to d34-a1-q1.
- **Apparatus page-split map (p.802 footers):** p.802 carries TWO distinct footer blocks. (a) The **main body notes** for QUAESTIO I (which begins on p.802): note 1 = the marginal note `Ad marginem codd. A B C E legitur haec nota: «Ioannes ait: Qui facit peccatum et iniquitatem…»`; note 2 = `Edd., excepta 1, in voluntate`; note 3 = `Libr. II. c. 19. n. 53: Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono…` (Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*). **All three FORWARD to d34-a1-q1** — they anchor in the QUAESTIO I *Fundamenta*, not in the divisio. (b) The **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** block (separate sequence, restarts at 1): the single entry `Supra d. 21. divis. textus.` — this is THIS divisio chunk's only apparatus, anchored at *tres partes* in the DIVISIO TEXTUS.
- **OCR corrections:** `lotalis`→*totalis*, `partes'`→*partes*[^1], `Duai3us partii)us`→*Duabus partibus*, `Magisler`→*Magister*, `liljri`→*libri*, `maluna`→*malum*, `commilti`→*committi*, `Posl praedicla`→*Post praedicta*, `secundura`→*secundum*, `In^ecunda`→*In secunda*, `efQcientem`→*efficientem*, `Secimdo`→*Secundo*, `litlera`→*littera*, `utruni`→*utrum*, `efBciente`→*efficiente*. Footnote-marker position taken from the PDF superscript at *tres partes*, not the OCR `'` glyph.
- No scholion (divisio chunk). No `[?]` flags.
</content>
</invoke>


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 802 -->

### ARTICULUS I.
### *De originali principio mali.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum malum sit a bono ut ab origine.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono ut ab origine. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini *de Libero Arbitrio*[^1], ubi sic ait: *Malum est, spreto incommutabili bono, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere, quod facimus libero voluntatis arbitrio.*[^2][^3] Si ergo liberum arbitrium est bonum, cum peccatum sit a libero arbitrio,

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peccatum sive malum est a bono.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *exemplo*. Esto, quod nihil esset nisi libera voluntas, constat, quod ipsa amaret se ipsam et posset se amare immoderate et vitiose; sed talis amor non est sine malitia: ergo tunc peccatum fieret, et non nisi a bono: ergo etc.

3. Item, *ratione*. Malum est vituperabile in se et vituperabilem reddit actorem[^4]; sed nihil est vituperandum in sua actione, nisi aliquo modo possit facere bene, vel nisi habeat naturalem aptitudinem ad hoc; omne autem tale est bonum: ergo nihil potest malum facere nisi bonum.

4. Item, nullus dicitur facere malum, nisi quia facit quod non debet, aut quia non facit quod debet[^5]: ergo malum omne suo actori est indebitum, et eius oppositum conveniens et debitum; sed omne illud, cui malum est indebitum et oppositum mali conveniens, est bonum: ergo omne illud, a quo fit malum, necesse est esse bonum.

5. Item, si malum est ab aliquo, aut illud est bonum, aut malum. Si bonum, habeo propositum. Si malum, aut illud est ab alio, aut a se ipso. Si ab alio; similiter erit quaerere de illo: ergo si non est abire in infinitum[^6], stare est in aliquo malo, quod sit a se ipso. Sed contra: omne quod est a se ipso, nullo alio indiget ut sit; et omne tale est sibi sufficiens; et omne quod sibi sufficiens est, omnino habet perfectionem et beatitudinem et in se et a se[^7]; et omne tale est perfecte bonum: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid sit malum et non sit ab alio. Restat igitur, cum sit stare et non abire in infinitum, quod malum est a bono.

6. Item, si malum est ab aliquo, aut illud, a quo est malum culpae, habet usum rationis, aut non. Si non habet usum rationis: ergo nullo modo potest culpari nec debet; hoc enim patet tam secundum legem naturalem, quam secundum legem civilem, quam etiam legem divinam: habet igitur necessario usum rationis. Sed ratio et eius usus magnum bonum est et nobile[^8]: necesse est igitur, malum a bono esse, si ab aliquo est.

**Contra:** 1. Matthaei septimo[^9]: *Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere.* Ex hac auctoritate necessario arguitur, quod bonum non potest esse causa mali: ergo si malum est ab aliquo, necesse est, quod sit a malo. — Item, expressius in Glossa[^10]: « Nihil medium, quin causa boni sit bona, et mali mala »: non est ergo malum a bono.

2. Item, hoc videtur per maximam dialecticorum, quae est: « *Cuius causa bona, ipsum bonum*[^11] »: si ergo mali causa est bona, ipsum malum est bonum: si igitur hoc est falsum, manifeste patet etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur per propositionem satis probabilem: « *Contrariorum contrariae sunt causae*[^12] »: si ergo causa boni est bona, et nullo modo malum causat bonum, ergo videtur, quod nullo modo bonum causet malum, nec quod malum sit a bono.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per propositionem necessariam et probatam: « *Quidquid enim est causa causae, est causa causati*[^13] »: si ergo omne bonum causatur a summo bono, si malum est ab aliquo bono, malum est a summo bono; ergo summum bonum facit malum. Sed nihil est perfecte bonum, quod facit malum: si igitur malum est a summo bono, summum bonum non est summum; et hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

5. Item, aut est ponere primum malum, aut non. Si non, est abire in infinitum in malis: si ergo hoc est impossibile, quia necesse est stare in ordine causarum, necesse est ergo ponere primum malum. Sed primum bonum non est ab alio, immo causa omnium bonorum, eo ipso quod primum[^14]: ergo pari ratione, si est ponere primum malum, videtur, quod illud non sit ab alio, sed causa omnium. Restat igitur, quod malum non sit a bono.

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### Conclusio.

> Malum a bono originem habet.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit et est etiam haeresis impiissimi Manichaei. Erravit enim in hoc, quod posuit, quod prima causa mali est malum, non bonum; unde posuit, quod cum homo possit bene facere, possit etiam peccare, duplex est in uno homine anima, quarum una est a Deo bono et semper cupit bona, altera vero a Deo malo et semper cupit mala. Et hinc est, quod in nobis est continua pugna; et omnia mala, quae facimus, oriuntur a principio malo, sicut bona a bono. — Hanc haeresim pessimam valde efficaciter improbat Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus, primo per ipsam peccati culpam, secundo per eius oppositum, scilicet poenitentiam.

— « Peccatum enim, ut ibidem[^15] dicit, est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum est abstinere ». « Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid non amittendum, vel adipiscendum ». Has duas notificationes manifestat, et post ex ipsis, tanquam ex manifestis, praedictum errorem ipse destruit, immo ostendit, quomodo error se ipsum destruit, dum ponit, animam malam non posse bene facere, et tamen principium peccati esse per propriam originem et naturam. Ponit enim, quod peccando non peccet, et ideo subiungit ibidem[^16]: « Quisquis has duas definitiones voluntatis atque peccati veras esse concedit, totam Manichaeorum haeresim brevissimis et paucissimis, sed plane invictissimis ratiunculis sine cunctatione condemnat ».

— Postremo in fine[^17] libri improbat per oppositum peccati, scilicet ipsam poenitentiam, sic arguens: planum est, quod poenitere de culpa bonum et iustum est; planum etiam, quod est possibile homini — nam ipsi Manichaei hoc suadent — certum est etiam, quod eius est poenitere, qui fecit malum: ergo idem ipsum, quod fuit principium mali, potest esse principium boni. Restat igitur, cum principium boni sit bonum, quod si idem est principium mali, quod potest esse principium boni, malum esse a bono. Haec est deductio Augustini, quamvis non sit series verborum.

Propter has igitur deductiones et consimiles, quae in obiiciendo adductae sunt, reiicienda est procul haeresis praefata, quia non tantum est contra fidem, verum etiam contra rectum iudicium rationis. Dicendum est igitur, sicut dicit fides sana, et Magister in littera[^18] Sanctorum auctoritatibus manifestat, quod malum a bono habet originem.

Ad obiectorum autem manifestationem intelligendum est, quod malum *culpae*, de quo est hic sermo, quod quidem consistit circa rationalem creaturam, tripliciter potest circa ipsam consistere et considerari: aut quantum ad *exteriorem effectum*, aut quantum ad *interiorem*[^19], aut quantum ad *habitum*. Malum enim sive peccatum dicitur aliquando *actus exterior*, aliquando *habitus interior*, aliquando *actus interior*. Unde *actus* furandi est malus, et *voluntas* furandi in actu est mala, et *habilitatio* sive habitualis affectio ad furandum est mala. Secundum igitur quod malum dicitur *opus exterius*, sic nec est primum in genere *entis* nec in genere *mali*, quoniam actus exterior causatur ab actu interiori, et malitia actus exterioris a malitia voluntatis interioris[^20]. — Secundum autem quod malum dicitur *malus habitus*, similiter nec est primum in genere *entis* nec in genere *mali*. Nam malus habitus a malo actu causatur: quia enim mala facimus, mali sumus[^21]. — Secundum autem quod malum dicitur *malus actus interior*, sic potest esse primum in genere *mali*, sed non in genere *entis*. In genere *mali* potest esse primum, sicut patet in prima deordinatione voluntatis luciferi, ante quam nulla praecesserat malitia; nec tamen potest esse principium in genere entis. Actus enim omnis a potentia procedit, et illa est posterior, tanquam effectus posterior est causa[^22]. Et quoniam potentia illa bona est et de genere bonorum, patet, quod malum originem habet a bono. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Domini in Matthaeo, et de Glossa, dicendum, quod tam textus quam Glossa intelligitur de malo, secundum quod consideratur circa actum exteriorem; et hoc quidem manifestum est per ipsum textum consequentem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de maxima illa: *Cuius causa bona* etc.: dicendum, quod illa maxima intelligenda est *per se* sive secundum se, videlicet si causat in quantum *bona*, et est bona, secundum quod *causat*. Hoc non est verum in proposito, quia si concedatur, quod bonum sit principium mali, non tamen conceditur, quod sit principium mali, secundum quod bonum. Quomodo autem debeat ipsum dici origo sive principium, patebit in sequenti problemate.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contrariorum contrariae sunt causae; dicendum, quod ista propositio habet veritatem, secundum quod intelligitur de contrariis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura, et in causis agentibus naturaliter et quae sunt ad unum effectum determinatae; aliter manifestum est esse falsum. Nam idem Deus, etiam secundum Manichaeos, fecit calidum et frigidum; et eadem rationalis potentia, secundum Philosophum[^23], est causa oppositorum. Et ideo non habet locum in malis, quia malum non dicit naturam aliquam, secundum quod malum, et quia est a voluntate, secundum quod libera, quae non est determinata ad alterum contrariorum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est causa causae etc.: dicendum, quod contra istam propositionem peccat locus sophisticus secundum accidens[^24], sicut et contra illam qua dicitur: « Quando alterum de altero praedicatur, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum et praedicatum ». Utraque enim propositio habet intelligi de praedicato et effectu, qui ita convenit uni, quod non est extraneum alteri. Non autem sic est in proposito. Nam etsi bonum est causa mali, hoc non est secundum id quod habet a summo bono, sed ratione defectibilitatis, quam habet de nihilo[^25].

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere primum malum, patet responsio. Dico enim, quod est ponere malum, ante quod non est aliud malum; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod sit primum *ens*, immo est ibi consequens[^26]. Arguitur enim cum superlativo, qui habet in se vim distributionis, ab eo quod est in minus, ad illud quod est in plus. Unde sicut non sequitur: est *primus homo*, ergo est *primum ens*; sic nec in proposito. Non sic autem est de bono, quia bonum et ens convertuntur. Quia ergo est ponere primum malum in genere *mali*, ideo non est procedere in infinitum; quia vero non est primum in genere *entis*, ideo non habet esse a se, sed aliunde; et ita a bono.

english:
### ARTICLE I.
### *On the original principle of evil.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether evil is from the good as from its origin.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether evil is from the good as from its origin. And that it is, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, *On Free Choice*[^1], where he says thus: *Evil is, the unchangeable good having been spurned, to cleave to changeable things, which we do by the free choice of the will.*[^2][^3] If therefore free choice is good, since sin is from free choice,

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sin or evil is from the good.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *example*. Suppose that there were nothing but the free will; it is agreed that it would love itself and could love itself immoderately and viciously; but such love is not without malice: therefore then sin would come about, and not except from the good: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by *reason*. Evil is blameworthy in itself and renders its agent blameworthy[^4]; but nothing is to be blamed in its action, unless it can in some way do well, or unless it has a natural aptitude for this; but everything of this kind is good: therefore nothing can do evil but the good.

4. Likewise, no one is said to do evil, except because he does what he ought not, or because he does not do what he ought[^5]: therefore all evil is undue to its agent, and its opposite is fitting and due; but everything to which evil is undue and the opposite of evil fitting is good: therefore everything from which evil comes about must necessarily be good.

5. Likewise, if evil is from something, either that thing is good or evil. If good, I have what was proposed. If evil, either it is from another or from itself. If from another, there will likewise be the same to ask about that: therefore if there is not to go to infinity[^6], a stop must be made in some evil which is from itself. But on the contrary: everything that is from itself needs nothing else in order to be; and everything of this kind is self-sufficient; and everything that is self-sufficient altogether has perfection and beatitude both in itself and from itself[^7]; and everything of this kind is perfectly good: therefore it is impossible that anything be evil and not be from another. It remains therefore, since there is a stop and not a going to infinity, that evil is from the good.

6. Likewise, if evil is from something, either that from which the evil of guilt comes has the use of reason, or not. If it does not have the use of reason: therefore it can in no way be blamed, nor ought it to be; for this is plain both according to the natural law, and according to the civil law, and also according to the divine law: it has therefore necessarily the use of reason. But reason and its use is a great and noble good[^8]: it is necessary therefore that evil be from the good, if it is from anything.

**On the contrary:** 1. Matthew, seventh [chapter][^9]: *A good tree cannot make bad fruits, nor a bad tree make good fruits.* From this authority it is necessarily argued that the good cannot be the cause of evil: therefore if evil is from anything, it is necessary that it be from evil. — Likewise, more expressly in the Gloss[^10]: « Nothing is intermediate, but that the cause of the good is good, and [the cause] of the evil evil »: therefore evil is not from the good.

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by the maxim of the dialecticians, which is: « *That whose cause is good, is itself good*[^11] »: if therefore the cause of evil is good, the evil itself is good: if therefore this is false, it is manifestly clear etc.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by a sufficiently probable proposition: « *Of contraries the causes are contrary*[^12] »: if therefore the cause of the good is good, and in no way does evil cause the good, therefore it seems that in no way does the good cause evil, nor that evil is from the good.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by a necessary and proven proposition: « *For whatever is the cause of a cause, is the cause of the thing caused*[^13] »: if therefore all good is caused by the highest good, [and] if evil is from some good, evil is from the highest good; therefore the highest good makes evil. But nothing is perfectly good which makes evil: if therefore evil is from the highest good, the highest good is not the highest; and this is impossible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, either a first evil is to be posited, or not. If not, there is a going to infinity in evils: if therefore this is impossible, because it is necessary to make a stop in the order of causes, it is necessary therefore to posit a first evil. But the first good is not from another, but rather is the cause of all goods, by the very fact that it is first[^14]: therefore by parity of reasoning, if a first evil is to be posited, it seems that it is not from another, but is the cause of all. It remains therefore that evil is not from the good.

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### Conclusion.

> Evil has its origin from the good.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that concerning this there was and even now is the heresy of the most impious Manichaeus. For he erred in this, that he posited that the first cause of evil is evil, not good; whence he posited that, since a human can do well and can also sin, there are in one human two souls, one of which is from God the good and always desires goods, the other indeed from a god [who is] evil and always desires evils. And hence it is that in us there is a continual struggle; and all the evils which we do arise from an evil principle, just as goods from the good. — This most wicked heresy Augustine very effectively refutes in the book *On the Two Souls*, first by the very guilt of sin, secondly by its opposite, namely penitence.

— « For sin, as he says in the same place[^15], is the will of retaining or pursuing what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain ». « The will is a motion of the mind, with no one compelling, toward not losing something, or toward acquiring [it] ». These two definitions he sets forth, and afterward from them, as from things manifest, he himself destroys the aforesaid error; rather he shows how the error destroys itself, while it posits that the evil soul cannot do well, and yet is the principle of sin through its own origin and nature. For it posits that in sinning it does not sin, and therefore he adds in the same place[^16]: « Whoever concedes that these two definitions of will and of sin are true, condemns the whole heresy of the Manichaeans without hesitation by the briefest and fewest, but plainly most invincible, little arguments ».

— Finally, at the end[^17] of the book, he refutes [it] by the opposite of sin, namely by penitence itself, arguing thus: it is plain that to repent of guilt is good and just; it is plain also that it is possible for a human — for the Manichaeans themselves urge this — it is certain also that it is for him to repent who did the evil: therefore the very same thing which was the principle of evil can be the principle of good. It remains therefore, since the principle of good is good, that if the same is the principle of evil which can be the principle of good, evil is from the good. This is the deduction of Augustine, although it is not the [exact] sequence of his words.

Therefore on account of these deductions and similar ones, which have been adduced in objecting, the aforesaid heresy is to be rejected far off, because it is not only against the faith, but also against the right judgment of reason. It must be said therefore, as sound faith says, and the Master in the text[^18] manifests by the authorities of the Saints, that evil has its origin from the good.

But for the clarification of the objections it must be understood that the evil *of guilt*, of which the discourse here is, which indeed consists about the rational creature, can consist and be considered about it in three ways: either as to the *exterior effect*, or as to the *interior*[^19], or as to the *habit*. For evil or sin is called sometimes an *exterior act*, sometimes an *interior habit*, sometimes an *interior act*. Whence the *act* of stealing is evil, and the *will* of stealing in act is evil, and the *aptitude* or habitual affection toward stealing is evil. Therefore insofar as evil is called an *exterior work*, thus it is not first either in the genus of *being* or in the genus of *evil*, since the exterior act is caused by the interior act, and the malice of the exterior act by the malice of the interior will[^20]. — But insofar as evil is called an *evil habit*, likewise it is not first either in the genus of *being* or in the genus of *evil*. For an evil habit is caused by an evil act: for because we do evils, we are evil[^21]. — But insofar as evil is called an *evil interior act*, thus it can be first in the genus of *evil*, but not in the genus of *being*. In the genus of *evil* it can be first, as is plain in the first disordering of the will of Lucifer, before which no malice had preceded; nor yet can it be a principle in the genus of being. For every act proceeds from a potency, and that is posterior, as the effect is posterior to the cause[^22]. And since that potency is good and of the genus of goods, it is plain that evil has its origin from the good. — And the reasons showing this are to be granted.

1. To that indeed which is objected from the authority of the Lord in Matthew, and from the Gloss, it must be said that both the text and the Gloss are understood of evil, insofar as it is considered about the exterior act; and this indeed is manifest from the text which follows.

2. To that which is objected from that maxim: *That whose cause is good* etc.: it must be said that that maxim is to be understood *per se* or in itself, namely if it causes insofar as it is *good*, and is good insofar as it *causes*. This is not true in the case at hand, because, even if it be conceded that the good is the principle of evil, yet it is not conceded that it is the principle of evil insofar as it is good. But in what manner it ought to be called its origin or principle, will appear in the following problem.

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3. To that which is objected, that of contraries the causes are contrary; it must be said that that proposition has truth insofar as it is understood of contraries, of which each is some nature, and in causes acting naturally and which are determined to one effect; otherwise it is manifestly false. For the same God, even according to the Manichaeans, made hot and cold; and the same rational potency, according to the Philosopher[^23], is the cause of opposites. And therefore it has no place in evils, because evil does not state any nature, insofar as it is evil, and because it is from the will, insofar as it is free, which is not determined to one of the contraries.

4. To that which is objected, that whatever is the cause of a cause etc.: it must be said that against that proposition there offends the sophistical *fallacy of accident*[^24], just as also against that one by which it is said: « When one thing is predicated of another, of whatever the subject [is predicated] the predicate also [is predicated] ». For each proposition is to be understood of a predicate and effect which so belongs to one that it is not foreign to the other. But it is not thus in the case at hand. For although the good is the cause of evil, this is not according to that which it has from the highest good, but by reason of the defectibility which it has from nothing[^25].

To that which is asked last, whether a first evil is to be posited, the answer is plain. For I say that an evil is to be posited before which there is no other evil; but from this it does not follow that it is a first *being*, but rather it is therein consequent[^26]. For it is argued with the superlative, which has in itself the force of distribution, from that which is in the lesser to that which is in the greater. Whence just as it does not follow: there is a *first man*, therefore there is a *first being*; so neither in the case at hand. But it is not so with the good, because the good and being are convertible. Because therefore a first evil is to be posited in the genus of *evil*, therefore there is no proceeding to infinity; but because it is not first in the genus of *being*, therefore it does not have being from itself, but from elsewhere; and so from the good.

la: Ad marginem codd. A B C E legitur haec nota: « Ioannes ait: *Qui facit peccatum et iniquitatem*. Super quem locum dicit Augustinus νόμος Graece, Latine *lex* est; inde ἀνομία, id est iniquitas, quae est contra legem; unde praevaricantes reputati sunt omnes peccatores terrae, non solum qui scriptam Legem contemnunt, sed etiam qui innocentiam naturalis legis corrumpunt ».

en: In the margin of codd. A B C E is read this note: « John says: *Who commits sin [also commits] iniquity* [cf. 1 John 3, 4]. On which place Augustine says that νόμος in Greek is *lex* (law) in Latin; whence ἀνομία, that is, iniquity, which is against the law; whence all the sinners of the earth are reckoned transgressors, not only those who despise the written Law, but also those who corrupt the innocence of the natural law ».

la: Edd., excepta 1, *in voluntate*.

en: The editions, except 1, [read] *in voluntate* ("in the will").

la: Libr. II. c. 19. n. 53: *Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat*... *Ita fit, ut neque illa bona, quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus, sed malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona* etc. Cfr. ibid. III. c. 1. n. 2.

en: Book II. c. 19. n. 53: *But the will, turned away from the unchangeable and common good and turned toward a private good, whether toward an exterior or toward an inferior [good], sins*... *So it comes about that neither those goods which are sought by sinners are in any way evil, nor the free will itself, which we have found is to be numbered among certain middle goods, but the evil is its turning-away from the unchangeable good and its turning toward changeable goods* etc. Cfr. ibid. III. c. 1. n. 2.

la: Similiter Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. de virtute dicit, quod ea « et bonus homo ipse efficietur », et quod « bene opus suum reddet ». — Mox pro *possit* multi codd. et ed. 1 *posset*.

en: Similarly Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 6, on virtue says that by it « the man himself is made good », and that « he renders his work well ». — Presently, for *possit* many codd. and ed. 1 [read] *posset*.

la: Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. regul., regula 73: *Omne peccatum fit aut in committendo quod non oportet, aut omittendo quod oportet.* — Subinde pro *malum omne* codd. I T Z aa bb ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 *malum omni*, cod. F *malum omnino*.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 73: *Every sin comes about either in committing what one ought not, or in omitting what one ought.* — Then, for *malum omne* codd. I T Z aa bb ee and others with edd. 1, 2 [read] *malum omni*, cod. F *malum omnino*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.), ubi ostenditur, processum in infinitum repugnare in omni genere causarum.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Metaphysics* text. 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.), where it is shown that a process to infinity is repugnant in every genus of causes.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 22: *Ubi nulla indigentia, nulla necessitas; ubi nullus defectus, nulla indigentia.*

en: Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 22: *Where there is no want, there is no necessity; where there is no defect, there is no want.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 525, nota 6. — Mox pro *necessario* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *necessarium*.

en: Cfr. above p. 525, note 6. — Presently, for *necessario* the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *necessarium*.

la: Vers. 18.

en: Verse 18.

la: Quae sumta est ex Comment. Hieronymi super Matth. 12, 33, et apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: *Nihil enim medium, quin boni auctoris bona tantum sint opera, et mali mala.*

en: Which is taken from the Commentary of Jerome on Matthew 12, 33, and in Strabo and Lyranus runs thus: *For nothing is intermediate, but that the works of a good author are only good, and [those] of an evil [author] evil.*

la: Hoc axioma cohaeret illis quae Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1, 2, 4. (c. 6.) de locis topicis ex generationibus et corruptionibus profert, quaeque Boeth., II. de Differ. topic. in haec pauciora verba contulit: « Ab effectibus vero et corruptionibus et usibus hoc modo: nam si bona est domus, et constructio domus bona est, et e contrario, si bona est constructio domus, bona est domus... Omnium autem maxima propositio: Cuius effectio bona est, ipsum quoque bonum est, et e converso » etc. Illud quoque hic respiciendum est quod Petr. Hispan., Summul. tract. de Locis topic. (locus de Causa), ait: *Si causa efficiens est bona, ipsum quod fit est bonum... cuius causa efficiens non est bona, ipsum quod fit non est bonum.* Et e converso tenet locus ab effectu ad causam efficientem, ut *domus est bona, ergo sua causa efficiens est bona.* — In fine arg. codd. H T Y aa bb ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 sic: *est falsum manifestum, patet* etc.

en: This axiom coheres with those things which Aristotle, III. *Topics* c. 1, 2, 4. (c. 6.) brings forward concerning the topical places from generations and corruptions, and which Boethius, II. *On Topical Differences* gathered into these fewer words: « From effects indeed and corruptions and uses thus: for if a house is good, the construction of the house also is good, and conversely, if the construction of the house is good, the house is good... But the greatest proposition of all: That whose effecting is good, is itself also good, and conversely » etc. This too is here to be regarded, which Peter of Spain, *Summulae* tract on the Topical Places (the place from Cause), says: *If the efficient cause is good, that which comes about is itself good... that whose efficient cause is not good, that which comes about is itself not good.* And conversely the place holds from the effect to the efficient cause, as *the house is good, therefore its efficient cause is good.* — At the end of the argument codd. H T Y aa bb ee and others with edd. 1, 2 [read] thus: *est falsum manifestum, patet* etc.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.). Cfr. IV. Meteor. text. 41. (c. 7.).

en: Aristotle, II. *On Generation and Corruption* text. 56. (c. 10.). Cfr. IV. *Meteorology* text. 41. (c. 7.).

la: Alan. ab Insulis, I. de Arte seu articulis cathol. fidei, n. 1.

en: Alan of Lille, I. *On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith*, n. 1.

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 9. 18. 20. 22.

en: Cfr. the *Book of Causes*, prop. 9. 18. 20. 22.

la: Cap. 11. n. 15. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 10. n. 14. — Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Chapter 11. n. 15. — The following text is ibid. c. 10. n. 14. — Cfr. above d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. in the body.

la: Cap. 12. n. 16. — In testimonio allato pro *ratiunculis* plures codd., ut F I X Z, cum ed. 1 exhibent *minusculis*, alii, ut F W bb, cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *minusculis*. — Aliquantulum prius pro *quomodo error* codd. H T substituunt *quod error*.

en: Chapter 12. n. 16. — In the testimony adduced, for *ratiunculis* several codd., as F I X Z, with ed. 1 give *minusculis*, others, as F W bb, with edd. 2, 3, 4 *minusculis*. — A little before, for *quomodo error* codd. H T substitute *quod error*.

en: Chapter 14. n. 22.

la: Hic c. 2. — Cfr. supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Here c. 2. — Cfr. above d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Codd. F M N (P a secunda manu) hic adiiciunt *actum*. — Paulo inferius pro *habilitatio* cod. cc et ed. 1 *habilitas*. Deinde cod. cc constanter substituit *principium in genere* pro *primum in genere*; sed cfr. quod supra exposuimus pag. 94, nota 4.

en: Codd. F M N (P by a second hand) here add *actum*. — A little below, for *habilitatio* cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *habilitas*. Then cod. cc constantly substitutes *principium in genere* for *primum in genere*; but cfr. what we explained above p. 94, note 4.

la: Vide infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: See below d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 718.

en: Cfr. above p. 718.

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph., text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): *Patet igitur, quod malum non est praeter res; malum namque natura posterius potentia est* etc. — Paulo superius cod. bb *et ille* pro *et illa*. In nostra lectione *illa* est ablativus.

en: Aristotle, IX. *Metaphysics*, text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): *It is plain therefore that evil is not apart from things; for evil is by nature posterior to potency* etc. — A little above, cod. bb [reads] *et ille* for *et illa*. In our reading *illa* is ablative.

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).

en: Aristotle, IX. *Metaphysics* text. 3. and 10. (VIII. c. 2. and 5.).

la: De hac fallacia vide tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5. — Testimonium, quod sequitur, depromptum est ex Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi legitur sic: *Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur, dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur; ut homo de homine quodam praedicatur, animal vero de homine: ergo et de quodam homine animal praedicabitur* etc.

en: On this fallacy see vol. I. p. 58, note 5. — The testimony which follows is drawn from Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. 3. (c. 2.), where it is read thus: *When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated, all are also said of the subject; as man is predicated of a certain man, and animal of man: therefore animal too will be predicated of the certain man* etc.

la: Ut exponitur in quaest. seq.

en: As is explained in the following question.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 628, nota 1. Ibid. pag. 32, nota 2. etiam indicatur, unde delibatum est illud: « *bonum et ens convertuntur* », de quo vide etiam Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6.

en: See vol. I. p. 628, note 1. Ibid. p. 32, note 2. it is also indicated whence that [saying] was drawn: « *the good and being are convertible* », on which see also Aristotle, I. *Ethics* c. 6.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De *malo*, quatenus refertur ad divinam voluntatem, iam tractatum est I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2-6, d. 47. q. 3-4. In hac et seq. dist. agitur copiose et profunde de malo in se et quidem de malo culpae; quaeritur autem, *quid sit* (infra a. 2. q. 3.), *unde sit* (a. 1. q. 1-3), *in quo sit* (a. 2. q. 1. 2.) et de effectu eius sive de corruptione, quam facit in ipsa anima (d. 33. a. 1. 2.). De malo vero *poenae* agitur d. 36. — Antiqui autem Scholastici, ducibus Ss. Augustino et Dionysio, qui vocatur Areopagita, in hac gravissima materia eandem doctrinam profitentur, scilicet quod malum, formaliter sumtum, non sit nisi *privatio boni* sive carentia boni debiti — quod non sit nisi *in bono* ut subiecto — quod non sit nisi *a bono*, non tamen ut causa *efficiente*, sed ut causa *deficiente* — et quod non existat aliquod *purum malum*. Haec principia concise declarantur in Breviloq. p. III. c. 1.

**II.** Hic et infra a. 2. q. 1. S. Doctor directe et graviter insectatur impiissimum errorem Manichaeorum, ut iam fecit supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 2, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. — Intelligendum autem est, quod bonum dicitur esse causa mali culpae, nec quatenus est *bonum* (hic ad 2.) nec per se, sed per accidens, nec ut *efficiens*, sed ut *deficiens* (cfr. q. 2. et 3.).

**III.** De tribus huius articuli quaestionibus alii auctores plerumque unica quaestione tractant, vel saltem rem tractandam aliter distribuunt, ut Alex. Hal., qui diffuse de causa mali disputat S. p. II. q. 94. m. 2. a. 1-6. — Scot., hic q. unica et praecipue Report. II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12 seqq., q. 2. n. 9. (ubi fuse disputat, quo sensu bonum dicatur esse causa mali per accidens et ut deficiens). — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. q. 49. a. 1; I. II. q. 75. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 10; de Malo, q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 3. 4; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 1, et p. I. tr. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Of *evil*, insofar as it is referred to the divine will, it has already been treated in I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2-6, d. 47. q. 3-4. In this and the following distinction it is treated copiously and profoundly of evil in itself and indeed of the evil of guilt; but it is asked *what it is* (below a. 2. q. 3.), *whence it is* (a. 1. q. 1-3), *in what it is* (a. 2. q. 1. 2.) and of its effect or of the corruption which it makes in the soul itself (d. 33. a. 1. 2.). But of the evil of *punishment* it is treated d. 36. — But the ancient Scholastics, under the lead of Ss. Augustine and Dionysius, who is called the Areopagite, in this very grave matter profess the same doctrine, namely that evil, taken formally, is nothing but the *privation of good* or the lack of a due good — that it is only *in the good* as in a subject — that it is only *from the good*, yet not as from an *efficient* cause, but as from a *deficient* cause — and that there exists no *pure evil*. These principles are concisely declared in the Breviloquium p. III. c. 1.

**II.** Here and below a. 2. q. 1. the holy Doctor directly and gravely assails the most impious error of the Manichaeans, as he already did above d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. and dub. 2, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. — But it must be understood that the good is said to be the cause of the evil of guilt, neither insofar as it is *good* (here, ad 2.) nor per se, but per accidens, nor as *efficient*, but as *deficient* (cfr. q. 2. and 3.).

**III.** On the three questions of this article other authors for the most part treat in a single question, or at least distribute the matter to be treated otherwise, as Alexander of Hales, who diffusely disputes on the cause of evil, *Summa* p. II. q. 94. m. 2. a. 1-6. — Scotus, here q. unica and especially *Reportata* II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12 seqq., q. 2. n. 9. (where he disputes at length in what sense the good is said to be the cause of evil per accidens and as deficient). — St. Thomas, here a. 3; S. I. q. 49. a. 1; I. II. q. 75. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 10; *On Evil*, q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 2. 3. 4; *Summa* p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 1, and p. I. tr. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. unica. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 55893–56088), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 802–805, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 824–827). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. Body running prose (Fundamenta 1–6, Contra 1–5) taken from OCR base; Respondeo/Solutio and all footers PDF-authoritative.

**Alignment (coordinator + subagent verified).** q1 opener `Utrum malum sit a bono ut ab origine` matches TRACTATIO topic (1) `utrum malum sit a bono, vel a malo`. The three-question listing in d34-divisio reads (1) a bono/a malo, (2) ut efficiente/deficiente, (3) ab intentione/praeter intentionem — q1 is correctly the first. No q-swap.

**Boundary.** This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I only. The ARTICULUS I opener (`ARTICULUS I. / De originali principio mali.`, raw 55890–55891, p. 802 bottom) is folded in as headings per Override §5 — the article-level `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` opener + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM belong to d34-divisio. The chunk ENDS at raw 56088, immediately before `QUAESTIO II.` (raw 56089, *Ulrum peccatum sit a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente*, body "Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bona causa…") — everything from 56089 onward is d34-a1-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 802–805.
- p. 802 (running head `DIST. XXXIV. ART. I. QU.VEST. I.` over the divisio): the QUAESTIO I opener + fundamentum 1 begin in the bottom band. *Fundamenta* footers 1–3 → [^1]–[^3] (received from d34-divisio per hand-off): [^1] marginal codd. A B C E note (Ioannes/νόμος) anchored at `auctoritate Augustini`; [^2] *in voluntate* variant anchored at `voluntatis arbitrio`; [^3] Libr. II c.19 n.53 *Voluntas aversa* anchored at the Augustine quote. The page also carries a NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footer 1 (`Supra d. 21. divis. textus`) belonging to the divisio commentary, NOT to q1 — left with d34-divisio.
- p. 803: fundamenta 2–6 + Contra 1–5; footers 1–11 → continuous [^4]–[^14]. Anchors: [^4] actorem (Aristot. Ethic.), [^5] facit quod debet (Alan reg.73), [^6] in infinitum (Aristot. Metaph.), [^7] in se et a se (August. 83 Qq), [^8] usus magnum bonum (supra p.525), [^9] Matthaei septimo (Vers.18), [^10] in Glossa (Hieron.), [^11] *Cuius causa bona* maxim (Boeth./Petr. Hisp.), [^12] *contrariae sunt causae* (Aristot. de Gen.), [^13] *causa causati* (Alan de Arte), [^14] eo ipso quod primum (Lib. de Causis).
- p. 804: Conclusio + Respondeo (Manichaean refutation, Rationes 1–3) + Solutio start (corpus + Ad obiecta 1–2); footers 1–10 → continuous [^15]–[^22] (eight footers reach q1's body; this is the full p.804 footer run). [^15] ut ibidem (Cap.11 n.15), [^16] subiungit ibidem (Cap.12 n.16), [^17] in fine (Cap.14 n.22), [^18] Magister in littera (Hic c.2), [^19] interiorem (codd. add actum / pag.94), [^20] voluntatis interioris (infra d.42), [^21] mali sumus (supra p.718), [^22] effectus posterior (Aristot. IX Metaph. text.19).
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**Hand-off received.** From d34-divisio: the three p.802 *Fundamenta* footers (marginal Ioannes note; *Edd. excepta 1, in voluntate*; *Libr. II. c. 19. n. 53: Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili…* — Augustine *De Libero Arbitrio* II), anchored in fundamentum 1 → [^1]–[^3].

**Hand-off forwarded to d34-a1-q2.** The `QUAESTIO II.` header (raw 56089, *Utrum peccatum sit a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente*) and everything below the SCHOLION belong to a1-q2. The p.805 footers tied to QUAESTIO II's *Fundamenta* (Augustine *Enchiridio* c.23 n.8 *Nemo quaerat causam malae voluntatis…*; the de-Praedicamentorum fallacy-cross-reference if reused; *Vide tom. I. pag. 628…* if its q2 anchor recurs) are forwarded to a1-q2 — this q1 claims no footer keyed to QUAESTIO II content.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 805, raw 56063–56088), items I, II, III. `has_scholion: true`. Item I situates the treatise on malum culpae (cross-refs d.46–47, Breviloq.); Item II treats the Manichaean error + good-as-deficient-cause (cfr. q.2, q.3); Item III is the commentator roll. q2/q3 may legitimately lack their own scholia per Override §5 (Item I/II already say *cfr. q. 2. et 3.*).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 802–805 read top→bottom. The p.802/803 seam (inside fundamentum 1, `…a libero ar-/bitrium…`), p.803/804 seam (Contra 5 → Conclusio), and p.804/805 seam (inside Ad obiectum 3, `…contra-/riorum`) are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.802 footer block is accounted across divisio (NOTAE + fundamenta-source notes) and this q1 ([^1]–[^3]); the shared p.805 footer block is split q1 ([^23]–[^26]) vs forwarded-to-q2.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum peccatum sit a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bona causa, utpote a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Fundamenta.*

1. Primo per Augustinum in *Enchiridio*[^1], ubi ait sic: « Nemo quaerat causam malae voluntatis; non enim habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem ».

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2. Item, hoc videtur per illud quod dicitur a Dionysio *de Divinis Nominibus*[^2]: « Malum est praeter naturam et causam »: sed constat, quod non vult dicere, quod malum non sit ab aliquo, vult ergo dicere, quod non est ab alio tanquam a vere causante et efficiente: ergo si aliquo modo est, restat, quod sit tanquam a deficiente.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur. Sicut se habet effectus ad actum efficientem, ita defectus ad ipsum deficere; sed verus effectus non potest educi in esse nisi a causa ut *efficiente*: ergo nec defectus nisi a *deficiente*. Sed « malum est defectus circa naturam », sicut dicit Augustinus[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne perfectum est a causa perfecta, ergo omne deficiens a causa deficiente; sed malum opus dicitur malum propter defectum alicuius debitae circumstantiae: ergo malum est a causa deficiente.

5. Item, *facere* et *deficere* opponuntur, similiter *construere* et *destruere* opponuntur: ergo sicut *construere* est facere, ita *destruere* est deficere. Sed in malum exire est aliquod bonum corrumpere, quia non dicitur malum, nisi quod nocet vel adimit aliquid de bono[^4]: igitur in malum exire est deficere.

6. Item, omnis efficientia est a primo et summo efficiente[^5]; sed malum nullo modo est a Deo: ergo nullo modo procedit ab aliquo ut principio effectivo.

**Contra:** 1. Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*[^6]: *Ad oppositum.* « Anima est causa mali, sicut ignis calefieri »; sed ignis est causa calefieri per modum efficientis: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne illud quod prius potest esse, quam sit, habet causam efficientem; sed malum prius potest esse, quam sit: ergo etc. Maior et minor manifestae sunt.

3. Item, respectu illius res magis iudicatur causa efficiens, respectu cuius est magis sufficiens; sed voluntas nostra magis sufficit ad malum quam ad bonum[^7]: ergo magis debet dici causa efficiens mali quam boni: si ergo bonum est a voluntate ut efficiente, malum consimiliter erit.

4. Item, si voluntas est causa mali, secundum quod deficiens, aut defectus ille est *poena*, aut *culpa*. Si *poena*: ergo poena ante culpam[^8]. Si *culpa* — loquamur igitur de prima culpa — aut igitur est a voluntate, secundum quod deficiens, aut non. Si sic: ergo ante primam culpam est culpa. Si non: ergo si primum malum non est a voluntate ut deficiente, videtur, quod nullum malum.

5. Item, si malum primum est a voluntate ut deficiente, aut ergo defectu naturali, aut praeternaturali. Si defectu naturali: ergo naturaliter et semper est principium mali, cum semper habeat hunc defectum in se. Si defectu praeternaturali: aut est *contractus*, aut *inflictus*, aut *voluntarie acquisitus*. Nullo istorum modorum potest poni in voluntate luciferi et hominis primi: ergo etc.

6. Item, si malum est a voluntate deficiente, aut in quantum deficit a *summo bono*, aut in quantum deficit a bono, quod *debet habere*. Si in quantum deficit a *summo* bono: ergo cum talis defectus est in omni creatura, in omni reperietur peccatum. Si in quantum deficit a bono, quod *debet habere*; sed nullus a tali bono deficit, nisi privetur merito alicuius culpae: ergo nullo modo prima culpa a voluntate deficiente esse potest.

*(Quaestio incidens.)* Est igitur quaestio: quae est ratio sive dispositio circa voluntatem, ratione cuius sit causa proxima et immediata ipsius mali? Non enim videtur esse causa, quia est *ens*, nam hoc convenit[^9] omni enti; nec quia *de nihilo*, quia hoc convenit tam voluntati bonae quam malae; nec etiam quia *volens*, per eandem rationem; nec quia *volens malum*, quoniam *velle malum* est primum peccatum, et *velle malum* est primum malum: si ergo idem non est ratio sui vel causa[^10], voluntas non dicetur causa mali, quia *volens malum*.

### Conclusio.

> Malum esse a voluntate ut deficiente, tripliciter recte intelligi potest.

**Respondeo:** *(Conclusio generalis.)* Dicendum, quod absque dubio malum sive peccatum est a voluntate ut deficiente, sicut expresse dicit Augustinus, et concordat Dionysius. *(Explicatur.)* Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quod cum aliquis effectus dicitur esse a causa aliqua sub dispositione vel conditione superadiecta[^11], hoc potest

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intelligi tripliciter: aut ita quod illa dispositio dicit aliquid *praeambulum* ad illum effectum, aut quia dicit aliquid *annexum*, aut quia dicit illum eundem effectum ut *informans et denominans* suum principium effectivum. Primo modo lumen dicitur esse a sole *lucente*; *lucere* enim est actus praeambulus ad *illuminare*. Secundo modo dicitur lumen esse a sole *calefaciente*; calor enim concomitatur lumen. Tertio modo dicitur lumen esse a sole *illuminante*; cum enim dico *solem illuminare*, et *lumen esse a sole*, idem influxus dicitur, aliter tamen et aliter importatus secundum diversam comparationem. — Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito, quod cum dicitur, quod malum est a voluntate deficiente, hoc potest intelligi tripliciter.

*(Triplex defectus in voluntate.)* Propter quod notandum, quod triplex defectus reperitur circa voluntatem; unus quidem *naturalis*, alius *culpabilis*, et tertius *poenalis*. Naturalem defectum voco ipsam defectibilitatem, quae inest voluntati hoc ipso, quod[^12] ex nihilo; defectum *culpabilem* voco ipsum peccatum; defectum *poenalem*, illud damnum sive nocumentum sive laesionem, quae consequitur ad illud.

*(His concludens ones speciales.)* De quolibet horum defectuum praedictus sermo veritatem habet. Nam malum culpae est a voluntate deficiente defectu *naturali*, ita quod ille defectus praeambulus est ad culpam; nunquam enim voluntas posset in volendo bonum deficere, nisi vanitatem et defectibilitatem in se haberet[^13]. Similiter malum est a voluntate deficiente defectu *poenali*, ita quod ille defectus est culpae annexus; nunquam enim est dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae[^14]. Verum est etiam, quod malum culpae est a voluntate deficiente defectu *culpabili*, non tamen alia culpa, sed eadem, diversimode comparata; eadem enim est culpa, qua deformatur voluntas et eius interior actio. Unde sic conceditur, malum esse a voluntate deficiente, sicut actus a substantia agente[^15].

*(Corollaria.)* Cum igitur triplex sit defectus circa voluntatem, ratione cuius malum dici potest a voluntate deficiente, quorum unus, scilicet *naturalis*, est praeambulus ad defectum *culpae*, alter vero, id est *poenalis*, est consequens et annexus; defectus *poenalis* inseparabiliter consequitur defectum *culpabilem*; impossibile enim est, esse « dedecus peccati, sicut dicit Augustinus[^16], sine decore vindictae ». Defectus autem *culpabilis* non sequitur necessario nec inseparabiliter ad defectum *naturalem*. Unde non necessario sequitur, si alicubi sit defectus naturalis, quod ibi sit *culpa*; voluntas enim non hoc ipso peccat, quia ex nihilo, sed hoc ipso, quod est ex nihilo, est potens deficere; hoc ipso quod voluntas est, potens est servare rectitudinem iustitiae; hoc ipso vero, quod voluntas est ex nihilo, potens est, quantum est de se, illam deserere; et ita defectus ille circa voluntatem reddit eam ad peccandum possibilem.

*(Ad quaestionem incidentem.)* Si autem tu quaeras, quid faciat ipsam voluntatem exire in peccatum, et quae sit dispositio ipsius immediata respectu culpae; dicendum, quod nulla superadditur dispositio; sed ipsa voluntas, quae est domina sui actus et libera, potest se ipsam convertere ad illud, ad quod vult et sicut vult; et si indebite se convertat, tunc peccat, nulla superinducta nova dispositione a parte voluntatis, quae sit praeambula ad ipsam culpam. Unde sicut ille qui stat rectus, posset statim, si vellet, sine nova dispositione adveniente dimittere se cadere; sic voluntas, recta consistens et in ordine ad ultimum finem, potest illum[^17] exire; et exitus ille peccatum est. — Ex dictis igitur patet, qualiter malum est a voluntate deficiente; et ex his manifesta est responsio ad omnia, quae in contrarium obiecta sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod anima est causa mali, sicut ignis calefieri; dicendum, quod non est similitudo quantum ad modum causandi *specialem*, sed *generalem*. In *generali* modo causandi est convenientia, quia utrumque se habet in ratione *causae efficientis*; sed in *speciali* est differentia, quia ignis est causa per modum naturae et necessitatis, anima vero per modum libertatis; ille per modum *positionis* et *vere efficientis*, ista per modum *privationis* et *deficientis*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum potest prius esse, quam sit etc.; dicendum, quod malum eo modo, quo habet *esse*, eo modo habet et *fieri*; et quoniam malum privatio est et defectus, sicut patebit inferius[^18]; hinc est, quod sicut *malum esse* non est aliquid *vere esse*, sic nec *malum effici* est *vere* ab aliquo *fieri* ut efficiente, sed ut deficiente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima magis potest in malum; dicendum, quod sufficientia in deficiendo non est sufficientia *simpliciter*, sed *secundum quid* sufficientia et *simpliciter* insufficientia; et ideo ex tali sufficientia inferre veram efficientiam est paralogismus *secundum quid et simpliciter*[^19].

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Prima enim propositio intelligitur de sufficientia *simpliciter*, sicut patet inspicienti.

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum ille defectus sit *culpa*, vel *poena*; et utrum sit *naturalis*, vel *praeternaturalis*; et iterum *respectu cuius*; iam patet responsio. Omnibus enim his modis, ut dictum est, potest accipi. Prout autem accipitur pro defectu *naturali*, qui inest creaturae ex hoc, quod de nihilo, non notatur ibi conditio defectus tanquam causa proxima et immediata ipsius peccati, ut prius dictum est. Prout autem accipitur pro *culpa*, non notatur, quod antecedat, sed quod voluntatem denominat. Nunquam enim est deformis *actus* a voluntate, quin *voluntas* deformetur. Prout accipitur pro *poena*, non notatur praecedere, sed concomitari. — Et per hoc illa tria patent et alia, quae quaeruntur consequenter.

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether sin is from the will, as from an efficient or a deficient [cause].*

Secondly it is asked, whether evil is from a good cause, namely from the will, as from an efficient or a deficient [cause]. And that it is, it seems:

*Fundamenta.*

1. First, by Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^1], where he says thus: « Let no one seek the cause of an evil will; for it has not an efficient cause, but a deficient one ».

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2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by what is said by Dionysius *On the Divine Names*[^2]: « Evil is beside nature and beside cause »: but it is agreed that he does not mean that evil is not from anything, he means therefore that it is not from another as from a truly causing and efficient [cause]: therefore if it is in any way [at all], it remains that it is as from a deficient [cause].

3. Likewise, it seems [to follow] by *reason*. As the effect stands to the efficient act, so the defect [stands] to the deficient itself; but a true effect cannot be drawn into being except by a cause as *efficient*: therefore neither a defect except by a *deficient* [cause]. But « evil is a defect about nature », as Augustine says[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything perfect is from a perfect cause, therefore everything deficient from a deficient cause; but an evil work is called evil on account of the defect of some due circumstance: therefore evil is from a deficient cause.

5. Likewise, *to do* and *to fail* are opposed, likewise *to construct* and *to destroy* are opposed: therefore just as *to construct* is to do, so *to destroy* is to fail. But to go forth into evil is to corrupt some good, since nothing is called evil except what harms or takes away something of good[^4]: therefore to go forth into evil is to fail.

6. Likewise, all efficiency is from the first and highest efficient [cause][^5]; but evil is in no way from God: therefore it in no way proceeds from anything as from an effective principle.

**On the contrary:** 1. Dionysius *On the Divine Names*[^6]: *To the opposite.* « The soul is the cause of evil, as fire of [the becoming] hot »; but fire is the cause of [the becoming] hot by the mode of an efficient [cause]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that can be before it is has an efficient cause; but evil can be before it is: therefore etc. The major and minor are manifest.

3. Likewise, that thing is the more judged the efficient cause with respect to which it is the more sufficient; but our will is the more sufficient for evil than for good[^7]: therefore it ought the more to be called the efficient cause of evil than of good: if therefore the good is from the will as efficient, evil will likewise be [so].

4. Likewise, if the will is the cause of evil, insofar as it is deficient, either that defect is *punishment*, or *guilt*. If *punishment*: therefore punishment before guilt[^8]. If *guilt* — let us then speak of the first guilt — either then it is from the will, insofar as it is deficient, or not. If so: therefore before the first guilt there is guilt. If not: therefore if the first evil is not from the will as deficient, it seems that there is no evil [at all].

5. Likewise, if the first evil is from the will as deficient, then either by a natural defect, or by a praeternatural [one]. If by a natural defect: therefore it is naturally and always a principle of evil, since it always has this defect in itself. If by a praeternatural defect: either it is *contracted*, or *inflicted*, or *voluntarily acquired*. In none of these ways can it be posited in the will of Lucifer and of the first human: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if evil is from a deficient will, either insofar as it fails from the *highest good*, or insofar as it fails from the good which it *ought to have*. If insofar as it fails from the *highest* good: therefore, since such a defect is in every creature, in every [creature] sin will be found. If insofar as it fails from the good which it *ought to have*; but no one fails from such a good unless he be deprived [of it] by the merit of some guilt: therefore in no way can the first guilt be from a deficient will.

*(An incidental question.)* There is therefore a question: what is the ground or disposition about the will, by reason of which it is the proximate and immediate cause of evil itself? For it does not seem to be the cause because it is a *being*, for this belongs[^9] to every being; nor because [it is] *from nothing*, since this belongs to a good will as much as to an evil one; nor again because [it is] *willing*, by the same account; nor because [it is] *willing evil*, since *to will evil* is the first sin, and *to will evil* is the first evil: if therefore the same is not the ground or cause of itself[^10], the will will not be called the cause of evil because it is *willing evil*.

### Conclusion.

> That evil is from the will as deficient can rightly be understood in three ways.

**I respond:** *(A general conclusion.)* It must be said that without doubt evil or sin is from the will as deficient, as Augustine expressly says, and Dionysius agrees. *(It is explained.)* For the understanding of which it is to be noted that, when some effect is said to be from some cause under a disposition or condition superadded[^11], this can

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be understood in three ways: either so that that disposition states something *praeambulary* to that effect, or because it states something *annexed*, or because it states that same effect as *informing and denominating* its effective principle. In the first way light is said to be from the *shining* sun; for *to shine* is an act praeambulary to *to illuminate*. In the second way light is said to be from the *warming* sun; for heat accompanies light. In the third way light is said to be from the *illuminating* sun; for when I say *the sun illuminates*, and *light is from the sun*, the same influx is meant, yet [it is] imported in one way and in another according to the diverse comparison. — In this manner it is to be understood in the matter proposed, that, when it is said that evil is from a deficient will, this can be understood in three ways.

*(A threefold defect in the will.)* On account of which it is to be noted that a threefold defect is found about the will; one indeed *natural*, another *culpable*, and a third *penal*. The *natural* defect I call defectibility itself, which is in the will by this very fact, that[^12] it is from nothing; the *culpable* defect I call sin itself; the *penal* defect, that loss or harm or injury which follows upon it.

*(Concluding from these the special [conclusions].)* Of each of these defects the aforesaid discourse holds truth. For the evil of guilt is from the will deficient by a *natural* defect, in such a way that that defect is praeambulary to guilt; for the will could never fail in willing the good, unless it had vanity and defectibility in itself[^13]. Likewise evil is from the will deficient by a *penal* defect, in such a way that that defect is annexed to guilt; for never is there the disgrace of sin without the beauty of justice[^14]. It is true also that the evil of guilt is from the will deficient by a *culpable* defect, yet not by another guilt, but by the same, compared in diverse ways; for it is the same guilt by which the will and its interior action are deformed. Whence it is thus conceded that evil is from the will deficient, just as the act [is] from the acting substance[^15].

*(Corollaries.)* Since therefore there is a threefold defect about the will, by reason of which evil can be called [as] from a deficient will, of which one, namely the *natural*, is praeambulary to the defect of *guilt*, but the other, that is the *penal*, is consequent and annexed; the *penal* defect inseparably follows the *culpable* defect; for it is impossible that there be « the disgrace of sin, as Augustine says[^16], without the beauty of vindication ». But the *culpable* defect does not follow necessarily nor inseparably upon the *natural* defect. Whence it does not necessarily follow, if anywhere there is a natural defect, that there be *guilt*; for the will sins not by this very fact, that it is from nothing, but by this very fact, that, being from nothing, it is able to fail; by this very fact, that it is a will, it is able to keep the rectitude of justice; but by this very fact, that the will is from nothing, it is able, so far as is in itself, to desert it; and so that defect about the will renders it capable of sinning.

*(To the incidental question.)* But if you ask what makes the will go forth into sin, and what is its immediate disposition with respect to guilt; it must be said that no disposition is superadded; but the will itself, which is mistress of its own act and free, can convert itself toward that to which it wills and as it wills; and if it convert itself unduly, then it sins, with no new disposition superinduced on the part of the will which is praeambulary to guilt itself. Whence just as he who stands upright could at once, if he willed, without a new disposition supervening, let himself fall; so the will, standing upright and in order toward the ultimate end, is able to go forth from it[^17]; and that going-forth is sin. — From what has been said, therefore, it is plain in what manner evil is from a deficient will; and from these things is manifest the response to all the things which have been objected to the contrary.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that which is first objected, that the soul is the cause of evil, as fire of [the becoming] hot; it must be said that there is no likeness as to the *special* mode of causing, but [only] the *general*. In the *general* mode of causing there is agreement, since each stands in the account of an *efficient cause*; but in the *special* there is difference, because fire is a cause by the mode of nature and necessity, but the soul by the mode of liberty; the former by the mode of *position* and of a *truly efficient* [cause], the latter by the mode of *privation* and of a *deficient* [cause].

2. To that which is objected, that evil can be before it is etc.; it must be said that evil, in the manner in which it has *being*, in that manner has also its *coming-to-be*; and since evil is a privation and a defect, as will appear below[^18]; hence it is that, just as *to be evil* is not *truly to be* something, so neither is *to be made evil* truly *to be made* by anything as efficient, but [only] as deficient.

3. To that which is objected, that the soul is the more able [to incline] toward evil; it must be said that sufficiency in failing is not sufficiency *simply*, but sufficiency *in a certain respect* and *simply* insufficiency; and therefore to infer true efficiency from such sufficiency is a paralogism *from a certain respect to the simple*[^19].

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For the first proposition is understood of sufficiency *simply*, as is plain to one who inspects [it].

4. 5. 6. To that which is asked, whether that defect be *guilt*, or *punishment*; and whether it be *natural*, or *praeternatural*; and again *with respect to what*; the response is now plain. For in all these ways, as has been said, it can be taken. But insofar as it is taken for the *natural* defect, which is in the creature from this, that it is from nothing, there is not noted there the condition of the defect as the proximate and immediate cause of sin itself, as was said before. But insofar as it is taken for *guilt*, it is not noted that it precedes, but that it denominates the will. For never is the *act* deformed by the will, but that the *will* be deformed. Insofar as it is taken for *punishment*, it is not noted to precede, but to accompany. — And by this those three things are plain, and the others which are asked consequently.

la: Cap. 23. n. 8. sententialiter. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. Fere ad verbum autem habetur ista sententia XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, ubi sic legitur: *Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis. Non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens.*

en: Chapter 23. n. 8, in substance. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 3. Almost word for word this sentence is had in XII. *On the City of God*, c. 7, where it reads thus: *Let no one then seek the efficient cause of an evil will. For it is not efficient, but deficient.*

la: Cap. 4. § 32, ubi iuxta abbatem Vercellensem legitur: *Malum ergo est praeter viam, praeter intentionem, praeter naturam, praeter causam* (ed. Argent. 1502). — Paulo inferius cod. aa *a voluntate*, cod. bb *a natura* pro *a vere*.

en: Chapter 4. § 32, where, according to the abbot of Vercelli, it reads: *Evil therefore is beside the way, beside intention, beside nature, beside cause* (ed. Argentina 1502). — A little below cod. aa [reads] *a voluntate*, cod. bb *a natura* for *a vere*.

la: Libr. II. de Morib. Manich. c. 5. n. 7. seq.; Contra Secundin. Manich. c. 11. et 17. seq.; Enchirid. c. 13. n. 4. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. et infra a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

en: Book II. *On the Morals of the Manichaeans* c. 5. n. 7. seq.; *Against Secundinus the Manichaean* c. 11. and 17. seq.; *Enchiridion* c. 13. n. 4. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 4. and below a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

la: August., VII. Confess. c. 12. n. 18; II. de Morib. Manich. c. 3. n. 5. et c. 8. n. 11; I. Contra Adversar. Legis et Proph. c. 5. n. 7; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. Cfr. lit. Magistri, hic c. 4.

en: Augustine, VII. *Confessions* c. 12. n. 18; II. *On the Morals of the Manichaeans* c. 3. n. 5. and c. 8. n. 11; I. *Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* c. 5. n. 7; XII. *On the City of God*, c. 3. Cfr. the text of the Master, here c. 4.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 3, 5: *Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est.* — Minor probatur I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2. Cfr. etiam infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *efficientia* edd., excepta 1, *efficacia.*

en: Epistle, II Cor. 3, 5: *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.* — The minor is proved I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2. Cfr. also below d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. and d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — For *efficientia* the editions, except 1, [read] *efficacia.*

la: Cap. 4. § 30: *Nunquid ergo anima causa est malorum, sicut ignis causa est caloris?* (Vercellens.).

en: Chapter 4. § 30: *Is the soul then the cause of evils, as fire is the cause of heat?* (Vercelli [version]).

la: Cfr. supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cfr. above d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.

la: Quod secundum Augustinum impossibile est; de quo vide supra pag. 432, nota 4.

en: Which according to Augustine is impossible; on which see above p. 432, note 4.

la: Codd. T bb cc et nonnulli alii cum edd. 1, 2 *conveniet*, codd. Y aa *conveniret*, cod. O *nam sic conveniret.*

en: Codd. T bb cc and several others with edd. 1, 2 [read] *conveniet*, codd. Y aa *conveniret*, cod. O *nam sic conveniret.*

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): *Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum.* Cfr. August., de Immort. animae, c. 8. n. 14. — Cod. T *principium peccati* pro *primum peccatum.*

en: Aristotle, II. *On the Soul*, text. 47. (c. 4.): *But nothing generates its very self.* Cfr. Augustine, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, c. 8. n. 14. — Cod. T [reads] *principium peccati* for *primum peccatum.*

la: Codd. F aa cum ed. 1 *superaddita.*

en: Codd. F aa with ed. 1 [read] *superaddita.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 post *quod* subiiciunt *est.*

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 after *quod* add *est.*

la: Cfr. August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 6. et 8.

en: Cfr. Augustine, II. *On Free Choice* c. 20. n. 54; XII. *On the City of God*, c. 6. and 8.

la: Vide supra pag. 770, nota 1. — Paulo inferius post *non tamen* cod. N interserit *est.*

en: See above p. 770, note 1. — A little below, after *non tamen* cod. N inserts *est.*

la: Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 2; Contra Secundin. Manich. c. 13. seqq.; et infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. — Cod. T omittit *sic*, pro quo cod. F *non.*

en: Cfr. Augustine, III. *On Free Choice* c. 1. n. 2; *Against Secundinus the Manichaean* c. 13. seqq.; and below d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. — Cod. T omits *sic*, for which cod. F [reads] *non.*

la: Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 13. n. 44. Vide supra pag. 770, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro *alicubi sit* codd. T V ee et alii cum ed. 1 *alicui sit*, cod. aa *alicui insit.*

en: Book III. *On Free Choice* c. 13. n. 44. See above p. 770, note 1. — A little below, for *alicubi sit* codd. T V ee and others with ed. 1 [read] *alicui sit*, cod. aa *alicui insit.*

la: Scil. ordinem. — Codd. K ee et ed. 1 *in illum*. Aliquanto superius inter verba *posset statim* cod. aa interiicit *tamen.*

en: Namely, the order. — Codd. K ee and ed. 1 [read] *in illum*. Somewhat above, between the words *posset statim* cod. aa inserts *tamen.*

la: Art. 2. q. 3. et d. 35. per totam.

en: Art. 2. q. 3. and d. 35. throughout.

la: De hac fallacia cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Paulo superius pro *sed secundum quid sufficientia et simpliciter insufficientia* cod. cc et ed. 1 *sed secundum quid; sufficientia autem secundum quid est simpliciter insufficientia.* Dein pro *efficientiam* Vat. *sufficientiam*, edd. 1, 2, 3 cum nonnullis codd., ut H aa, *efficaciam.* Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 6.

en: On this fallacy cfr. Aristotle, I. *Sophistical Refutations* c. 4. (c. 5.). — A little above, for *sed secundum quid sufficientia et simpliciter insufficientia* cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *sed secundum quid; sufficientia autem secundum quid est simpliciter insufficientia.* Then for *efficientiam* the Vatican [edition reads] *sufficientiam*, edd. 1, 2, 3 with several codd., as H aa, *efficaciam.* See below the text of the Master, d. XXXV. c. 6.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius (2.) gravissimae quaestionis fundatur in distinctione triplicis defectus voluntatis. De primo defectu, scil. *naturali*, cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8. De hoc defectu dicit ad mentem nostri Doctoris S. Thom. (hic a. 3. ad 4.): « Unus (defectus), qui est *potentialis* causa mali, scilicet ex nihilo; ex hoc enim, quod ex nihilo est, *potest* deficere peccando secundum vertibilitatem electionis. Non tamen iste defectus est *actualis* causa mali, quia sequeretur, quod voluntas semper deficeret, sicut crus claudum semper claudicat ». Ibidem etiam quoad alium defectum, qui est in actu voluntatis, idem consentit doctrinae S. Bonaventurae (ad quaest. incidentem) his verbis: « Illius autem defectus, qui est in actu voluntatis, non oportet, quod sit causa aliquis alius defectus, in voluntate praeexistens actu; quia sic in infinitum iretur; sed ipsamet voluntas secundum se considerata illius defectus causa est » etc.

**II.** Praeter auctores in praecedente scholio laudatos de 2. quaest. specialiter tractant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. Sequentem (3.) quaest. alii magistri tantum tangunt sub titulo, utrum bonum sit causa mali *per se*, an *per accidens*. Nam, ut dicit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), « aliquid *per se* est causa eius quod est ab ipso praeintentum; *per accidens* vero, quod est praeter intentionem ». De hoc agit S. Thom., S. c. Gent. III. c. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this (2nd) most grave question is founded in the distinction of a threefold defect of the will. Of the first defect, namely the *natural*, cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8. Of this defect St. Thomas says, in accord with the mind of our Doctor (here a. 3. ad 4.): « One [defect], which is the *potential* cause of evil, namely from nothing; for from this, that it is from nothing, it *can* fail by sinning according to the vertibility of choice. Yet this defect is not the *actual* cause of evil, because it would follow that the will always failed, as a lame leg always limps ». In the same place too, as to the other defect, which is in the act of the will, he [St. Thomas] agrees with the doctrine of S. Bonaventure (on the incidental question) in these words: « But of that defect which is in the act of the will, it is not required that the cause be some other defect, pre-existing in act in the will; because thus there would be a going to infinity; but the will itself, considered in itself, is the cause of that defect » etc.

**II.** Besides the authors praised in the preceding scholion, on the 2nd question specially treat: Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 4. The following (3rd) question other masters only touch under the title, whether the good is the cause of evil *per se*, or *per accidens*. For, as Petrus a Tarantasia says (here q. 2. a. 1.), « something is *per se* the cause of that which is pre-intended by it; but *per accidens* [the cause] of that which is beside intention ». Of this St. Thomas treats, S. c. Gent. III. c. 4.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 56089–56273), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (Respondeo, triplex-defectus, Ad-quaestionem-incidentem, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 805–808, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 827–830). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. Running prose (Fundamenta 1–6, Contra 1–6) taken from OCR base; Respondeo/Solutio and all footers PDF-authoritative.

**Alignment (coordinator + subagent verified).** q2 opener `Utrum peccatum sit a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente` (body "Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bona causa, utpote a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente") matches TRACTATIO topic (2) `ut efficiente, vel deficiente`. Confirmed against the d34-divisio three-question listing: (1) a bono/a malo [= q1], (2) ut efficiente/deficiente [= this q2], (3) ab intentione/praeter intentionem [= q3, raw 56274]. No q-swap.

**Boundary.** This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO II only. Opens at the full-width centered header `QUAESTIO II.` (raw 56089, p.805 R-column, after q1's SCHOLION III). The chunk ENDS at raw 56273, immediately before the full-width `QUAESTIO III.` header (raw 56274, *Utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter intentionem*, body "Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter") — everything from raw 56274 onward is d34-a1-q3.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 805–808 (running heads: p.805 `DIST. XXXIV. ART. I. QUAEST. II.`; p.806 `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` [verso]; p.807 `DIST. XXXIV. ART. I. QUAEST. II.`; p.808 `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` [verso, ART. II/QUAEST. III opens lower on this page]).
- p.805 (R-column, after q1 scholion): QUAESTIO II opener + *Fundamenta* 1 (start). The p.805 footer block is shared with q1: footers 1–4 belong to q1 (used there as q1's [^23]–[^26]); only **p.805 footer 5** (`Cap. 23. n. 8.…Enchiridio…XII de Civ. Dei c.7 Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis`) attaches to q2's *Fundamentum* 1 (the *in Enchiridio* marker) → [^1] (received from q1, see hand-off below).
- p.806: *Fundamenta* 1 (cont.)–6 + Contra 1–6 + Quaestio incidens + Conclusio + Respondeo (start). Footers 1–10 → continuous [^2]–[^11]; markers: [^2] Dionysius de Div. Nom. (Cap.4 §32), [^3] Augustinus (de Morib. Manich.), [^4] nocet/bono (Confess./de Civ. Dei), [^5] primo et summo efficiente (II Cor. 3,5), [^6] Contra1 Dionysius (Cap.4 §30), [^7] sufficit ad malum (d.28 a.2 q.3), [^8] poena ante culpam (impossibile, pag.432), [^9] convenit omni enti (codd. conveniet), [^10] ratio sui vel causa (Aristot. de Anima), [^11] superadiecta (codd. superaddita).
- p.807: Respondeo (triplex defectus, corollaria, Ad quaestionem incidentem) + Solutio oppositorum 1–3. Footers 1–8 → continuous [^12]–[^19]: [^12] quod ex nihilo (cod. cc post quod est), [^13] in se haberet (August. de Lib. Arb.), [^14] sine decore iustitiae (pag.770), [^15] actus a substantia agente (August. de Lib. Arb. III), [^16] dicit Augustinus (Lib. III de Lib. Arb. c.13 n.44), [^17] illum exire (Scil. ordinem / codd. in illum), [^18] patebit inferius (Art.2 q.3 et d.35), [^19] paralogismus secundum quid (Aristot. Elench.).
- p.808 (top, before QUAESTIO III opener): Solutio reply 1's tail ("Prima enim propositio…") + replies 4.5.6 + the "Prout autem accipitur" continuation + SCHOLION I–II. q2's content on p.808 carries **NO** footers of its own — every numbered p.808 footer (Paragr.32 Vide pag.806; de Div. Nom. c.4 §19 et 31; Aristot. II Ethic.; Aristot. IV de Generat. animal.; Aristot. II Phys.; Ambros. de Offic.) belongs to QUAESTIO III's body and is forwarded to d34-a1-q3.

**Hand-off received.** From d34-a1-q1: the p.805 QUAESTIO II *Fundamenta* footer (Augustine *Enchiridio* c.23 n.8 `Nemo quaerat causam malae voluntatis…`, with the XII. de Civ. Dei c.7 near-verbatim parallel) anchors here as q2's first apparatus entry → [^1]. (q1 also flagged a possible `Vide tom. I. pag. 628…` carry-over, but that note is p.805 footer 4 = q1's own [^26]; its anchor does NOT recur in q2 — not used here.)

**Hand-off forwarded to d34-a1-q3.** The `QUAESTIO III.` header (raw 56274, *Utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter intentionem*, body "Tertio quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono secundum intentionem, vel praeter") begins on p.808 immediately after q2's SCHOLION. ALL p.808 footers serve q3 body and are forwarded: footer 1 = `Paragr. 32. Vide supra pag. 806, nota 1.`; footer 2 = `De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. et 31. Cfr. Aristot., II. Magn. Moral. c. 7. (c. 6.). — …de intentione, accurate exponuntur infra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. seq.`; footer 3 = `Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6.`; footer 4 = `Vide Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 4, ubi dicit: Monstrosum est enim res praeter naturam. Cfr. II. Phys. text. 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).`; footer 5 = `Aristot., II. Phys. text. 31. (c. 3.); III. et V. Metaph. text. 3. (II. et IV. c. 2.); I. Ethic. c. 1; I. Magn. Moral. c. 2, seq. (c. 1. seq.).`; footer 6 = `Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 49. seqq. (c. 5. seqq.).`; footer 7 = `Haec sententia est Ambrosii, I. de Offic. minist. c. 30. n. 147.`

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q2 (p.808 bottom full-width), items I and II. `has_scholion: true`. This overrides the coordinator note that q2 *may* lack a scholion: q2 in fact carries its own scholion. Item I founds the solution in the triplex-defectus distinction (natural/culpable/penal), quotes St. Thomas (hic a.3 ad 4) as agreeing with the Doctor on both the potential cause and the incidental-question defect; Item II is the commentator roll for q2 (Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med.) and notes how other masters frame q3 (per se / per accidens, S. Thom. S.c.Gent. III c.4). Distinct from q1's scholion (which treated the Manichaean error + the malum/privatio principles + the article-wide commentator roll).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 805–808 read top→bottom. The p.805/806 seam (inside *Fundamentum* 1, "in Enchiridio… ait sic / [806] Dionysio de Divinis Nominibus" — actually fund.1 closes on p.805 R, fund.2 opens on p.806 L; clean break at a numbered-argument boundary), the p.806/807 seam (inside Respondeo "superadiecta, hoc potest / [807] intelligi tripliciter" — continuous), and the p.807/808 seam (inside Solutio reply 3 "est paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter / [808] Prima enim propositio intelligitur de sufficientia simpliciter" — continuous) are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The p.805 footer block is split q1 (footers 1–4) vs q2 (footer 5 = [^1]); the p.808 footer block belongs wholly to q3 (forwarded).

**[?] flags.** None.