title: Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De obiecto fidei in comparatione ad nostram cognitionem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de obiecto fidei in comparatione ad nostram cognitionem, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur visio sensibilis.

Secundo, utrum sit de his, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis.

Tertio, utrum sit de his, de quibus habetur cognitio scientialis.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur visio sensibilis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur visio sensibilis. Et videtur, quod sic.

1. Ioannis vigesimo[^p517-7]: *Quia vidisti me, Thoma, credidisti*; sed constat, quod Thomas veram habuit fidem de Domino Iesu, quem vidit et tetigit: ergo simul de eodem erat fides interior et visio exterior.

2. Item, primae Ioannis primo[^p517-8]: *Quod vidimus et audivimus et perspeximus, et manus nostrae contrectaverunt de Verbo vitae*: si ergo de Verbo vitae habebant Apostoli fidem, hoc est de Christo, et de eodem habebant sensibilem cognitionem; redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, Apostoli viderunt Christum patientem[^p517-9] et Christum ascendentem, et constat, quod Christum esse passum et ascendisse, sunt articuli: si ergo Apostoli fidem et meritum quantum ad hos articulos non amiserunt, videtur, quod circa idem possit esse fides et visio exterior.

4. Item, beata Virgo sensibili experimento novit, se concepisse de Spiritu sancto absque virili semine; sed constans est[^p517-10], quod propter conceptionem Filii Dei nihil demptum est fidei suae: ergo

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simul stabant in ea cognitio fidei et cognitio sensibilis experimenti.

**Sed contra:** 1. Super illud Ioannis decimo quarto[^p518-1]: *Vado parare vobis locum*; Glossa Augustini: «Eat Dominus et paret locum: eat, ne videatur; lateat, ut credatur»: si ergo ad credere necessarium est latere, videtur, quod impossibile sit, visionem corporalem circa idem stare simul cum fide.

2. Item, Augustinus definiens fidem dicit: «Fides est credere quod non vides»; et in praecedenti distinctione[^p518-2] habitum est, quod «fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur»; et Gregorius in quadam homilia Paschali: «Quae videntur fidem non habent, sed agnitionem»: ergo non videtur, quod de eisdem possit esse fides interior et sensus exterior.

3. Item, visio patriae evacuat fidem et eius meritum propter manifestationem veritatis creditae[^p518-3]; sed visio corporalis Christi ita manifestat eius humanitatem, sicut visio patriae eius Divinitatem: ergo sicut fides Divinitatis non potest esse circa visum visione gloriosa; sic videtur, quod fides humanitatis non potest esse circa visum visione sensitiva.

4. Item, actus credendi, secundum quod ad virtutem spectat, est quid difficile et voluntarium[^p518-4]; sed credere quod homo videt oculis exterioribus, hoc est facile et necessarium: ergo non videtur, quod aliquid possit esse simul et semel exterius visum et interius creditum.

### Conclusio.

> Fides et visio sensibilis possunt esse simul circa unum, quamvis non secundum idem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam sunt, quae subiiciuntur sensui exteriori simpliciter et totaliter; et illa videre est clare et perfecte cognoscere, et circa talia non potest simul et semel esse habitus sive cognitio fidei cum visione exteriori, pro eo quod visio sive cognitio illa excludit omne aenigma et cognitionem aenigmaticam[^p518-5]. — Quaedam autem sunt, quae sic subiacent sensui secundum aliquid sui, ut secundum aliquid sui lateant ipsum sensum; et circa talia bene potest simul et semel esse visio secundum unum, et credulitas fidei secundum aliud: visio secundum id, secundum quod patent; credulitas fidei secundum id, secundum quod latent.

Et hoc modo est in Christo intelligere. Christus secundum naturam assumtam et corpoream Apostolorum sensibus apparebat, secundum autem divinam naturam omnem sensum latebat; et eadem persona et hypostasis secundum diversas naturas simul erat visui cognita et incognita[^p518-6]; ideo simul poterat esse visa et credita. — Et illud est satis facile intelligere, si quis attendat: quoniam circa idem potest esse certitudo et dubitatio secundum diversas naturas et diversos respectus et diversas conditiones. Esto enim, quod hic sit Christus coram oculis meis; etsi visu cognoscam, ipsum esse hominem, nunquam tamen per visum cognoscam, ipsum esse Filium Dei; ideo alius habitus necessarius est ad hoc, quod cognoscam, ipsum esse Deum. Et hoc est quod Dominus dixit Petro, quando dixerat: Tu es Christus, Filius Dei vivi: Caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi[^p518-7] etc. — Concedendum est igitur, quod fides et visio possunt esse circa unum et eundem, quamvis non secundum idem. — Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus[^p518-8] et Gregorius de Thoma, quod «aliud vidit, et aliud credidit, hominem vidit, et Deum confessus est dicens: Dominus meus et Deus meus». Et sicut de Thoma dicitur, ita etiam de ceteris Apostolis et de beata Virgine, quae, quamvis certitudinali experientia sciverit, se concepisse sine virili semine; tamen se concepisse personam Verbi novit mediante fide. Et breviter: quia in omnibus articulis implicatur aliquid divinum; quia «articulus est veritas de Deo[^p518-9]», et illud quidem latet: ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod visio corporalis fidem non excludit.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod fidei necessaria est latentia; dicendum, quod latentia Divinitatis haec est, quae necessaria est fidei; sed latentia humanitatis non est de fidei necessitate, facit tamen ad maiorem actus fidei puritatem. Purius enim Apostoli moti sunt motu fidei et motu dilectionis in Christum post eius ascensum vel abscessum, quam in eius praesentia. Et Dominus, Ioannis vigesimo[^p518-10], magis laudat fidem eorum

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qui non viderunt et crediderunt, quam fidem Thomae; et beatus Petrus in primae Canonicae primo commendat eos qui Christum non viderunt, et tamen in eum crediderunt; et hoc est quod vult illa Glossa dicere, quod Domini absentia corporalis faceret ad fidei promotionem: et ex hoc non sequitur, quod corporalis visio tollat ipsam fidem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini et Gregorii, dicendum, quod verba Augustini et Gregorii sunt intelligenda per se. Quod enim dicitur fides esse de non apparentibus et non visis, hoc dicitur, quia fides de illis est secundum eam naturam, secundum quam non apparent; et eo ipso est de ipsis, quae non apparent, quia secundum aliquid sui latent. Sed ex hoc non excluditur, quin quasi per accidens et per concomitantiam possit[^p519-1] dici, quod fides sit de aliquibus, quae apparent, pro eo quod unum et idem, sicut prius ostensum est, potest simul apparere et latere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod visio patriae tollit fidem Divinitatis; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod visio patriae excludit omne aenigma et aufert omnem latentiam; non sic visio viae. Quamvis enim Christus appareret quantum ad naturam humanam[^p519-2], latebat tamen quantum ad personam. Unde Christo demonstrato, istum pati, erat visum et creditum: visum, in quantum demonstrat suppositum humanae naturae, sed creditum, in quantum demonstrat personam sive hypostasim divinae naturae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod credere est difficile et voluntarium; dicendum, quod visio corporalis, sicut dictum est, quia non tollit latentiam, ideo non tollit difficultatem; nec tollit arbitrii libertatem ex ea parte, ex qua latet. Cum enim dicit, quod non est difficile nec voluntarium credere quod quis videt; dicendum, quod verum est secundum id, secundum[^p519-3] quod videt; sed tamen totus Christus secundum omnem sui naturam visioni non subiacebat; et ideo ratione illius naturae et personae voluntarium et difficile erat credere. Facile enim erat credere, quod ille homo pateretur, ab his qui videbant Christum pati; sed difficillimum erat credere, quod Deus esset qui pateretur; nec hoc credebat aliquis, nisi qui volebat, et quem illuminatio fidei adiuvabat.

english:
### Article II. *On the object of faith in relation to our cognition.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the object of faith in relation to our cognition, and concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is sensible vision.

Second, whether it is of those things of which there is probable opinion.

Third, whether it is of those things of which there is scientific cognition.

### Question I. *Whether faith is of those things of which there is sensible vision.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is sensible vision. And it seems that it is.

1. John, chapter twenty[^p517-7]: *Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed*; but it is established that Thomas had true faith concerning the Lord Jesus, whom he saw and touched: therefore there was at once concerning the same thing both interior faith and exterior vision.

2. Likewise, 1 John, chapter one[^p517-8]: *That which we have seen and have heard and have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life*: if therefore the Apostles had faith concerning the Word of life, that is, concerning Christ, and concerning the same thing had sensible cognition; the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, the Apostles saw Christ suffering[^p517-9] and Christ ascending, and it is established that Christ's having suffered and ascended are articles [of faith]: if therefore the Apostles did not lose faith and merit as to these articles, it seems that faith and exterior vision can be concerning the same thing.

4. Likewise, the Blessed Virgin knew by sensible experiment that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit without male seed; but it is constant[^p517-10] that on account of the conception of the Son of God nothing was taken away from her faith: therefore

there stood together in her at once the cognition of faith and the cognition of sensible experiment.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that text of John, chapter fourteen[^p518-1]: *I go to prepare a place for you*; the Gloss of Augustine: «Let the Lord go and prepare a place: let him go, that he be not seen; let him be hidden, that he be believed»: if therefore for believing it is necessary that [the thing] be hidden, it seems that it is impossible for corporeal vision to stand together with faith concerning the same thing.

2. Likewise, Augustine defining faith says: «Faith is to believe what you do not see»; and in the preceding distinction[^p518-2] it was held that «faith is a virtue by which the things that are not seen are believed»; and Gregory in a certain Paschal homily: «The things that are seen do not have faith, but recognition»: therefore it does not seem that interior faith and exterior sense can be concerning the same things.

3. Likewise, the vision of the fatherland empties out faith and its merit on account of the manifestation of the believed truth[^p518-3]; but the corporeal vision of Christ manifests his humanity just as the vision of the fatherland [manifests] his Divinity: therefore just as faith of the Divinity cannot be concerning what is seen by glorious vision, so it seems that faith of the humanity cannot be concerning what is seen by sensitive vision.

4. Likewise, the act of believing, insofar as it pertains to virtue, is something difficult and voluntary[^p518-4]; but to believe what one sees with the exterior eyes is something easy and necessary: therefore it does not seem that anything can be at once exteriorly seen and interiorly believed.

### Conclusion.

> Faith and sensible vision can be at once concerning one thing, although not according to the same [respect].

**I respond:** It must be said that there are certain things which are subjected to the exterior sense simply and totally; and to see these is to know clearly and perfectly, and concerning such things the habit or cognition of faith cannot be at once together with exterior vision, for the reason that that vision or cognition excludes every enigma and enigmatic cognition[^p518-5]. — But there are certain things which are subjected to sense according to some part of themselves in such a way that according to some part of themselves they lie hidden from the sense itself; and concerning such things there can well be at once both vision according to one [respect] and the belief of faith according to another: vision according to that by which they are open, the belief of faith according to that by which they lie hidden.

And in this way it is to be understood in Christ. Christ according to the assumed and corporeal nature appeared to the senses of the Apostles, but according to the divine nature lay hidden from every sense; and the same person and hypostasis according to the diverse natures was at once known and unknown to sight[^p518-6]; therefore it could at once be seen and believed. — And this is rather easy to understand, if one attends: since concerning the same thing there can be certitude and doubt according to diverse natures and diverse respects and diverse conditions. For suppose that Christ were here before my eyes; even though by sight I should know that he is a man, never however by sight should I know that he is the Son of God; therefore another habit is necessary in order that I should know that he is God. And this is what the Lord said to Peter, when he had said: Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God: Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee[^p518-7] etc. — It must be granted therefore that faith and vision can be concerning one and the same thing, although not according to the same [respect]. — And this is what Augustine[^p518-8] and Gregory say concerning Thomas, that «he saw one thing and believed another, he saw a man and confessed God, saying: My Lord and my God». And as it is said of Thomas, so also of the other Apostles and of the Blessed Virgin, who, although she knew by certain experience that she had conceived without male seed, nevertheless knew that she had conceived the person of the Word by means of faith. And in brief: because in all the articles something divine is implied; because «an article is a truth concerning God[^p518-9]», and that indeed lies hidden: therefore the reasons showing that corporeal vision does not exclude faith are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that hiddenness is necessary to faith; it must be said that the hiddenness of the Divinity is that which is necessary to faith; but the hiddenness of the humanity is not of the necessity of faith, yet it makes for a greater purity of the act of faith. For the Apostles were moved more purely by the motion of faith and by the motion of love toward Christ after his ascent or departure than in his presence. And the Lord, in John, chapter twenty[^p518-10], more praises the faith of those

who have not seen and have believed than the faith of Thomas; and blessed Peter in his first Canonical [epistle], chapter one, commends those who did not see Christ and yet believed in him; and this is what that Gloss means to say, that the Lord's corporeal absence would make for the promotion of faith: and from this it does not follow that corporeal vision takes away faith itself.

2. To that which is objected concerning the authority of Augustine and Gregory, it must be said that the words of Augustine and Gregory are to be understood in themselves. For when it is said that faith is of things not apparent and not seen, this is said because faith is of those things according to that nature according to which they do not appear; and by that very fact it is of those things which do not appear, because according to some part of themselves they lie hidden. But from this it is not excluded that, as if per accidens and by concomitance, it can[^p519-1] be said that faith is of certain things which appear, for the reason that one and the same thing, as was shown before, can at once appear and lie hidden.

3. To that which is objected, that the vision of the fatherland takes away faith of the Divinity; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the vision of the fatherland excludes every enigma and removes all hiddenness; not so the vision of the way. For although Christ appeared as to the human nature[^p519-2], yet he lay hidden as to the person. Hence when Christ was shown, that this one suffers was a thing seen and believed: seen, insofar as it shows the supposit of the human nature, but believed, insofar as it shows the person or hypostasis of the divine nature.

4. To that which is objected last, that to believe is difficult and voluntary; it must be said that corporeal vision, as has been said, since it does not take away hiddenness, therefore does not take away difficulty; nor does it take away freedom of choice on that side on which [the thing] lies hidden. For when one says that it is not difficult nor voluntary to believe what one sees; it must be said that this is true according to that by which[^p519-3] one sees; but nevertheless the whole Christ according to his every nature was not subjected to vision; and therefore by reason of that nature and person it was voluntary and difficult to believe. For it was easy to believe that that man suffered, by those who saw Christ suffer; but it was most difficult to believe that he who suffered was God; nor did anyone believe this except him who willed it, and whom the illumination of faith aided.

la: Vers. 29. — Paulo inferius post *Iesu* Vat. addit *quia credidit Iesum*.

en: Verse 29. — A little below, after *Iesu* the Vatican edition adds *quia credidit Iesum* ("because he believed Jesus").

la: Vers. 1.

en: Verse 1.

la: Codd. L T *pati*, edd. *passum*. Paulo inferius eaedem edd. voci *articuli* praefigunt *duo*.

en: Codices L T read *pati*, the editions *passum*. A little below the same editions prefix *duo* ("two") to the word *articuli*.

la: Cod. V *sed constat*.

en: Codex V reads *sed constat* ("but it is established").

la: Vers. 2. — Glossa August., a Strabo et Lyrano ut *ordinaria* exhibita, invenitur in S. Doctoris expos. in Ioan. Evang. tr. 68. n. 3; in ea pro *ne videatur* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam *ut videatur*.

en: Verse 2. — The Gloss of Augustine, set forth by Strabo and Lyra as the *ordinary* [gloss], is found in the Holy Doctor's exposition on John's Gospel, tract 68. n. 3; in it, for *ne videatur* not a few codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly read *ut videatur*.

la: In lit. Magistri, c. 2. Ibid. c. 7. etiam affertur Augustini (in Ioan. Evang. tr. 40. n. 9.) nec non Gregorii (II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 8.) definitio fidei. — In conclus. post *non videtur, quod* cod. Z adiicit *simul*, et deinde post *fides interior* addit *et visio exterior sive*.

en: In the text of the Master, c. 2. Ibid. c. 7 there is also adduced the definition of faith of Augustine (on John's Gospel, tract 40. n. 9.) as well as of Gregory (II. Homily on the Gospels, homily 26. n. 8.). — In the conclusion, after *non videtur, quod* codex Z adds *simul*, and then after *fides interior* adds *et visio exterior sive*.

la: Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *propter* codd. A K *per*.

en: See below, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. — For *propter* codices A K read *per*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *necessarium* codd. A Z perperam *voluntarium*.

en: Cf. above, d. 23. a. 1. q. 1 and following, and a. 2. q. 1. — A little below, for *necessarium* codices A Z wrongly read *voluntarium*.

la: Cognitio aenigmatica essentialis est fidei. Cfr. I. Cor. 13, 12. — Inferius post *patent* in codd. A K N U Z additur *et*.

en: Enigmatic cognition is essential to faith. Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 12. — Below, after *patent*, in codices A K N U Z *et* is added.

la: Cod. Z *ignota*. Cod. U *visui manifesta et fidei cognita*.

en: Codex Z reads *ignota* ("unknown"). Codex U reads *visui manifesta et fidei cognita* ("manifest to sight and known to faith").

la: Matth. 16, 16. seq. — Paulo inferius pro *et eundem* codd. K W Z bb *et idem*.

en: Matt. 16, 16 and following. — A little below, for *et eundem* codices K W Z bb read *et idem*.

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 79. n. 1; Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 8. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. Loc. Script. est Ioan. 20, 28.

en: On John's Gospel, tract 79. n. 1; Gregory, II. Homily on the Gospels, homily 26. n. 8. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7. The Scriptural passage is John 20, 28.

la: Cfr. infra a. 3. q. 1.

en: Cf. below, a. 3. q. 1.

la: Vers. 29. — Seq. Scripturae locus est I. Petr. 1, 8. Verba Glossae hic memoratae habentur in obiect., ad quam hic respondetur. — Paulo ante codd. partim omittunt cum edd. 1, 2 *vel abscessum*, partim *ascensum vel*; cod. bb ponit tantum *absentiam*. Superius cod. P omittit *haec est, quae*.

en: Verse 29. — The following Scriptural passage is 1 Pet. 1, 8. The words of the Gloss here recalled are found in the objection to which response is here made. — A little before, codices partly omit, with editions 1, 2, *vel abscessum*, partly *ascensum vel*; codex bb sets down only *absentiam*. Above, codex P omits *haec est, quae*.

la: Ita codd. A K T; in aliis *posset*.

en: So codices A K T; in others *posset* ("could").

la: In codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur *humanam*, quam vocem Vat. bene supplevit.

en: In the codices and editions 1, 2 *humanam* is wanting, which word the Vatican edition has rightly supplied.

la: Vat. hic male omisit *secundum* et paulo superius pro *arbitrii libertatem* gratis substituit *arbitrium liberum*. Pro *dicit* codd. A K *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican edition here wrongly omitted *secundum* and a little above gratuitously substituted *arbitrium liberum* for *arbitrii libertatem*. For *dicit* codices A K read *dicitur*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum manifestum sit, quod unum et idem secundum aliquid potest patere sensibus et secundum aliquid latere; communiter approbatur propositio (hic in corp.), quod fides et visio possunt esse circa unum, quamvis non secundum idem. — De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 21. — S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem plura notanda sunt. — S. Thom., (S. II. II. q. 1. a. 4; et de Verit. q. 14. a. 9. ad 6.), Scot. (hic q. unica n. 17. seqq.) et Richard. a Med. (hic q. 6.) alligue non admittunt distinctionem duplicis *opinionis probabilis*, sed hanc vocem accipiunt tantum in primo sensu ab auctore nostro relato, scilicet pro assensu cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis; et inde recte concludunt, quod *actus opinionis* non possit componi cum *actu fidei*. Admittunt tamen iidem *rationes probabiles* pro fide, sed hae tunc solummodo generant *opinionem probabilem*, si quis in assentiendo eis innititur *principaliter*; si quis autem, ut fit in vere fideli, principaliter innititur Deo revelanti, tunc secundum ipsos non generatur opinio probabilis. Remota hac de *nomine* differentia, cum sententia communi S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 2. a. 10.) de «rationibus inductivis ad ea quae sunt fidei», et quae ad voluntatem credentis se consequenter habent, idem docet, quod hic dicit S. Bonav. de opinione sumta in secundo sensu. Duplicem sensum *opinionis probabilis* admittit etiam Petr. a Tar. — De fide quaerente intellectum et de utilitate scientiae theologicae plura praeclare docet S. Bonav. I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. — Tota haec doctrina confirmatur a Concilio Vat. (c. 4. *de fide et ratione*) his verbis: «Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie et sobrie quaerit, aliquam, Deo dante, mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur, tum ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia, tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo; nunquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprium ipsius obiectum constituunt» etc. Quoad ultima verba a Concilio (ibid. can. 1.) definitum est: «Si quis dixerit, in revelatione divina nulla vera et proprie dicta mysteria contineri, sed universa fidei dogmata posse per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis intelligi et demonstrari, a. s.». Qua definitione eliditur error tum Abaelardi, egregie a S. Bernardo (Epist. 190. c. 1.) confutatus, tum aliarum antiquorum et recentiorum auctorum (cfr. infra dub. 3.).

**III.** Non tantum scientiae theologicae, sed etiam «omnium supernaturalium illuminationum», quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino, (ipsa fides est) et fundamentum stabiliens et lucerna dirigens et ianua introducens, secundum cuius etiam mensuram necesse est mensurari sapientiam nobis divinitus datam, ne quis sapiat *plus, quam oportet sapere*» etc. (Rom. 12, 3; ita S. Bonav. Breviloq. prooem. § 1.). Porro Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 12. q. 2, Quodl. 8. q. 14, et Sum. p. I. a. 13. q. 7.) praeter lumen naturale rationis triplex distinguit lumen, scilicet lumen *gloriae*, lumen *fidei* et aliud quasi *medium*, quo «clarior haberi possit notitia credibilium quam per fidem». Contra ipsum fuse arguit Scot. (loc. cit. n. 5. seqq.); qui etiam generaliter negat, cum fide posse stare scientiam proprie dictam; unde theologiae hoc nomen proprie convenire negat. Minime autem diffitetur, praeter fidem a Deo puris animis dari alias supernaturales illuminationes per dona Spiritus S., vel gratias gratis datas. Quod autem S. Bonav. (infra dub. 4. et aliis locis ibi citt.) docet de dono sapientiae et scientiae, hoc ab antiquis doctoribus communiter tenetur. Dionys. Carth. (hic q. unica paulo ante finem), licet non omnia dicta Henrici approbet, ad rem dicit: «Ceterum ponere lumen illud *clarius* lumine simplicis fidei, approbavi, et a doctore illo Solemni idonee comprobatur; immo ponere illud iuxta modum nunc introductum apertissime consonat Augustino in sermonibus variis de resurrectione et alibi, et in libro de Civitate Dei, atque in libro de Trinitate, et super Ioannem; et in hoc concordant doctores praecipui: Alexander, Thomas, Albertus, Bonaventura [qui infra ab eodem vocatur devotus ac dulcis doctor], Gulielmus Parisiensis, Antissiodorensis, Petrus, Uldaricus et alii multi». Praeter hos allegat varios locos Dionysii Areopag., Augustini, Bernardi et ipsius Platonis et Aristotelis. Addit plura de luce illa contemplationis, qua «menti illuminatae, unctae, succensae nihil rationabilius, nihil sapientialius, nihil verius neque divinius videatur, quam christianae fidei tenor, theoria, evangelizatio. Hanc lucem negare, irrisorie examinare et tanquam fictum quid reputare non est aliud quam propriam ignorantiam demonstrare» etc.

**IV.** De hac 2. quaestione praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since it is manifest that one and the same thing can according to some part be open to the senses and according to some part lie hidden; the proposition is commonly approved (here in the body) that faith and vision can be concerning one thing, although not according to the same [respect]. — On this 1st question: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 21. — St. Thomas, *Summa* II–II q. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the 2 following questions, here q. unica.

**II.** As to the following (2nd) question many things are to be noted. — St. Thomas (*Summa* II–II q. 1. a. 4; and *de Verit.* q. 14. a. 9. ad 6.), Scotus (here q. unica n. 17. seqq.) and Richard of Middleton (here q. 6.) do not admit the distinction of a twofold *probable opinion*, but take this word only in the first sense reported by our author, namely for assent with doubt and dread of the other side; and from this they rightly conclude that the *act of opinion* cannot be composed with the *act of faith*. Nevertheless the same admit *probable reasons* for faith, but these then only generate *probable opinion* if one in assenting relies upon them *principally*; but if one, as happens in the truly faithful, relies principally upon God revealing, then according to them probable opinion is not generated. With this difference of *name* removed, with the common opinion of St. Thomas (*Summa* II–II q. 2. a. 10.) concerning «inductive reasons toward those things which are of faith», and which have themselves consequently toward the will of the believer, he teaches the same as what St. Bonaventure here says concerning opinion taken in the second sense. Petr. a Tar. also admits a twofold sense of *probable opinion*. — Concerning faith seeking understanding and the utility of theological science St. Bonaventure teaches many things excellently, I Sent. prooem. q. 2. — This whole doctrine is confirmed by the Vatican Council (c. 4. *de fide et ratione*) in these words: «And reason indeed, illumined by faith, when it diligently, piously, and soberly seeks, attains, God granting, some understanding of the mysteries, and that a most fruitful one, both from the analogy of the things which it naturally knows and from the connection of the mysteries themselves among one another and with the last end of man; yet it is never rendered fit to perceive them after the manner of the truths which constitute its proper object» etc. As to the last words it was defined by the Council (ibid. can. 1.): «If anyone shall say that in divine revelation no true and properly so-called mysteries are contained, but that all the dogmas of faith can through reason duly cultivated be understood and demonstrated from natural principles, let him be anathema». By which definition is struck down the error both of Abelard, ably refuted by St. Bernard (Epist. 190. c. 1.), and of other ancient and recent authors (cf. below, dub. 3.).

**III.** Not only of theological science, but also of «all supernatural illuminations», so long as we are pilgrims away from the Lord, (faith itself is) both the stabilizing foundation and the directing lamp and the introducing door, according to whose measure also it is necessary to measure the wisdom divinely given to us, lest anyone «be wise *more than it behoves to be wise*» etc. (Rom. 12, 3; so St. Bonaventure, *Breviloq.* prooem. § 1.). Further, Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 12. q. 2, Quodl. 8. q. 14, and *Summa* p. I. a. 13. q. 7.) besides the natural light of reason distinguishes a threefold light, namely the light of *glory*, the light of *faith*, and another as it were *intermediate*, by which «a clearer knowledge of credible things can be had than through faith». Against him Scotus argues at length (loc. cit. n. 5. seqq.); who also generally denies that science properly so-called can stand together with faith; whence he denies that this name properly belongs to theology. Yet he by no means denies that, besides faith, other supernatural illuminations are given by God to pure souls through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, or graces freely given. But what St. Bonaventure (below, dub. 4. and in other places there cited) teaches concerning the gift of wisdom and science is commonly held by the ancient doctors. Dionys. Carth. (here q. unica a little before the end), although he does not approve all of Henry's sayings, says to the point: «But to posit that light as *clearer* than the light of simple faith, I have approved, and it is fittingly proved by that Solemn doctor; nay, to posit it according to the manner now introduced consonates most plainly with Augustine in various sermons on the resurrection and elsewhere, and in the book *de Civitate Dei*, and in the book *de Trinitate*, and upon John; and in this the chief doctors agree: Alexander, Thomas, Albert, Bonaventure [who is below called by the same a devout and sweet doctor], William of Paris, [the author] of Auxerre, Peter, Uldaricus, and many others». Besides these he alleges various passages of Dionysius the Areopagite, Augustine, Bernard, and of Plato himself and Aristotle. He adds many things concerning that light of contemplation, by which «to a mind illumined, anointed, kindled nothing seems more rational, nothing more wise, nothing more true nor more divine than the tenor, theory, and evangelization of the Christian faith. To deny this light, to examine it mockingly and reckon it as something feigned, is nothing other than to demonstrate one's own ignorance» etc.

**IV.** On this 2nd question, besides the passages cited: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 1. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert, on this and the following q., here a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 5. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 6.

---

translators_notes:
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**Scholion (shared with q2).** The printed SCHOLION (p.519) has four sections: **§I** glosses *this* question (q1: "De hac I. quaestione…"), while **§II–IV** preview/gloss the *following* question (q2: "Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem…" / "De hac 2. quaestione…"). The full four-section scholion is printed under q1 and carried here; q2 (d24-a2-q2) is `has_scholion: false` and should redirect to this scholion. The scholion uses inline cross-references only — no superscript footnote markers within the scholion text. Placed LAST in both language blocks (parser requirement).

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 520 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae Petri tertio[^p520-1]: *Parati omni poscenti reddere rationem de ea quae est in nobis fide et spe*; sed ratio probabilis est generativa opinionis: si ergo fides compatitur secum probabilem rationem, compatitur ergo et probabilem opinionem.

2. Item, Petrus, archiepiscopus Ravennas[^p520-2]: «Non est tutum credere sine ratione»; ergo ratio probabilis facit ad fidei utilitatem et securitatem: si igitur opinio generari habet ex probabili ratione, videtur etc.

3. Item, donum scientiae, intellectus et sapientiae simul potest stare cum fide; sed «quod credimus, debemus auctoritati, quod intelligimus, rationi[^p520-3]»: ergo ratiocinatio potest simul stare cum fide. Sed cum quocumque stat probabilis ratiocinatio, stat etiam et opinio: ergo etc.

4. Item, doctrina theologiae stat simul cum fide, cum sit fidei explicativa, et circa ea est, circa quae fides consistit: si ergo in doctrina theologiae multae fiunt probabiles rationes, videtur, quod rationis probabilitas simul cum fide maneat[^p520-4]: ergo pari ratione et probabilitas opinionis ex rationibus generatae poterit esse in eodem et respectu eiusdem, in quo et respectu cuius est ipsa fides.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Hebraeos undecimo[^p520-5]: *Fides est argumentum rerum non apparentium*; sed ea, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis, sunt apparentia — «probabile enim est quod videtur omnibus, vel pluribus» — ergo videtur, quod opinio probabilis et fides circa idem simul esse non possunt.

2. Item, acceptio opinionis probabilis colligitur ex humana ratiocinatione; sed, sicut dicit Gregorius[^p520-6], «fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum»: ergo videtur, quod probabilis acceptio auferat meritum ipsi fidei: ergo non potest se compati cum habitu ipsius fidei.

3. Item, «opinio est acceptio unius partis cum formidine alterius[^p520-7]», igitur ubi est opinio, ibi est vacillatio; sed fides excludit omnem vacillationem, dum facit firmiter adhaerere: ergo fides non potest simul stare cum opinione.

4. Item, opinio adhaeret rationi[^p520-8] propter se, unde deficiente probabilitate rationis, deficit probabilitas opinionis; sed fides adhaeret ipsi Veritati propter se et super omnia: ergo fides et opinio habent repugnantiam: ergo non videtur, quod simul possint esse in anima circa eandem materiam.

### Conclusio.

> De eodem potest esse fides et opinio probabilis, non quatenus habet dubitationem annexam, sed quatenus dicit acceptionem generatam et derelictam ex rationibus probabilibus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod opinio probabilis dupliciter consuevit accipi: uno modo dicitur opinio «acceptio unius partis cum formidine alterius»; alio modo dicitur opinio acceptio animae generata ex rationibus probabilibus, secundum quod consuevit dici, quod syllogismus dialecticus generat opinionem, syllogismus vero demonstrativus generat scientiam[^p520-9].

<!-- page 521 -->

Si igitur opinio dicatur primo modo, prout habet secum annexam formidinem et vacillationem, sic non potest simul stare cum habitu fidei circa eandem materiam, pro eo quod fides facit plene consentire in alteram partem, ita quod omnino reputat eius oppositum falsum et erroneum, nec propter aliquam rationem supervenientem posset ad oppositum inclinari; et ideo, quia tollit fluctuationem opinionis, isto modo dicendi opinionem opinio simul cum fide non potest se compati[^p521-1]. — Si autem opinio dicatur secundo modo, scilicet acceptio derelicta ex rationibus probabilibus; sic dicendum est, quod circa idem simul et semel potest esse opinio et fides, quoniam multi fideles habent ad ea quae credunt, multas verisimiles rationes et multas probabiles, quae habent generare opinionem quantum ad secundum modum dicendi opinionem; et illa quidem acceptio generata fidei non repugnat, immo subservit et famulatur. Est enim in fidei fomentum quantum ad infirmos et in oblectamentum quantum ad perfectos.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Opinio enim probabilis secundum unum modum dicendi potest stare simul cum fide, sicut rationes ad primam partem ostendunt; immo multum confert fidei probabilitas rationum, sicut dictum fuit in principio primi libri[^p521-2]. Secundum alium modum dicendi, in quantum sonat in imperfectionem, videlicet prout dicit vacillationem et innitentiam ipsius assensus super probabilitatem rationis principaliter, sic habet repugnantiam cum fide; et sic procedunt rationes ad secundam partem, maxime duae ultimae, quarum una sumta est ex ipsius opinionis incertitudine, altera vero ex ipsius opinionis fulcimento, quia principaliter innititur rationi probanti[^p521-3].

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de verbo Apostoli, quod fides est argumentum non apparentium; dicendum, quod Apostolus removet ibi a credibili apparentiam non quamcumque; non enim removet apparentiam probabilis opinionis, sed certitudinalis apprehensionis, sicut apparet Deus beatis[^p521-4].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Gregorii: *Fides non habet meritum* etc.; dicendum, quod hoc intelligit Gregorius, quando credulitas fidei omnino innititur experimento rationis probabilis; et hoc modo fides vera non stat cum opinione, ita quod innitatur opinioni tanquam fundamento, immo multo magis acceptio illa probabilis, ex rationibus acquisita, de qua dictum est, quod potest opinio dici, innititur ipsi fidei tanquam firmiori. Et huius signum est, quia multae rationes videntur nobis probabiles et valde rationabiles circa fidem, quae videntur esse abusiones quaedam hominibus infidelibus. Ideo magis illa acceptio innititur fidei quam e converso, licet aliquo modo illa fidem foveat et delectet, sicut dictum est[^p521-5].

3, 4. Ad duas ultimas rationes non oportet respondere; quia procedunt de ipsa opinione secundum alterum modum dicendi, secundum quem non potest simul stare cum fide, sicut prius tactum est[^p521-6].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether faith is of those things of which there is probable opinion.*

Secondly it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is probable opinion. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. First Peter, chapter three[^p520-1]: *Ready always to give a reason to everyone that asketh you of that hope and faith which is in you*; but a probable reason is generative of opinion: if therefore faith is compatible with a probable reason, it is therefore compatible also with a probable opinion.

2. Likewise, Peter, archbishop of Ravenna[^p520-2]: «It is not safe to believe without a reason»; therefore a probable reason makes for the usefulness and security of faith: if therefore opinion is to be generated from a probable reason, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the gift of knowledge, of understanding, and of wisdom can stand together with faith; but «what we believe, we owe to authority; what we understand, to reason[^p520-3]»: therefore reasoning can stand together with faith. But with whatever probable reasoning stands, opinion too stands: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the doctrine of theology stands together with faith, since it is explicative of faith, and is concerned with those things with which faith is concerned: if therefore in the doctrine of theology many probable reasons are made, it seems that the probability of reason remains together with faith[^p520-4]: therefore by parity of reasoning the probability of opinion generated from reasons too will be able to be in the same [subject] and with respect to the same [thing] in which and with respect to which faith itself is.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter eleven[^p520-5]: *Faith is the evidence of things that appear not*; but those things of which there is probable opinion are things that appear — «for the probable is that which seems [so] to all, or to most» — therefore it seems that probable opinion and faith cannot be at once about the same thing.

2. Likewise, the acceptance of probable opinion is gathered from human reasoning; but, as Gregory says[^p520-6], «faith has no merit, where human reason offers proof»: therefore it seems that probable acceptance takes away merit from faith itself: therefore it cannot be compatible with the habit of faith itself.

3. Likewise, «opinion is the acceptance of one part with fear of the other[^p520-7]», therefore where there is opinion, there is wavering; but faith excludes all wavering, since it causes [one] to adhere firmly: therefore faith cannot stand together with opinion at once.

4. Likewise, opinion adheres to a reason[^p520-8] for its own sake, whence, the probability of the reason failing, the probability of the opinion fails; but faith adheres to the Truth itself for its own sake and above all things: therefore faith and opinion have repugnance [to each other]: therefore it does not seem that they can be at once in the soul about the same matter.

### Conclusion.

> Concerning the same [thing] there can be faith and probable opinion, not insofar as it has doubt annexed, but insofar as it expresses an acceptance generated and left behind from probable reasons.

**I respond:** It must be said that probable opinion is wont to be taken in two ways: in one way opinion is called «the acceptance of one part with fear of the other»; in another way opinion is called an acceptance of the soul generated from probable reasons, according to which it is wont to be said that the dialectical syllogism generates opinion, but the demonstrative syllogism generates knowledge[^p520-9].

If therefore opinion be taken in the first way, insofar as it has annexed to itself fear and wavering, thus it cannot stand together with the habit of faith about the same matter, for the reason that faith causes [one] to consent fully to one part, in such a way that it altogether reckons its opposite false and erroneous, nor could it through any supervening reason be inclined to the opposite; and therefore, because it removes the fluctuation of opinion, in this way of speaking of opinion, opinion together with faith cannot be compatible[^p521-1]. — But if opinion be taken in the second way, namely as an acceptance left behind from probable reasons; thus it must be said that about the same [thing] there can be at once and together opinion and faith, since many of the faithful have, for the things which they believe, many likely reasons and many probable ones, which are apt to generate opinion as regards the second way of speaking of opinion; and that acceptance, indeed, when generated, is not repugnant to faith, but rather serves and ministers to it. For it is in faith a kindling as regards the weak, and a delight as regards the perfect.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also clear. For probable opinion, according to one way of speaking, can stand together with faith, as the reasons for the first part show; rather, the probability of reasons confers much upon faith, as was said in the beginning of the first book[^p521-2]. According to the other way of speaking, insofar as it sounds toward imperfection, namely as it expresses wavering and the reliance of the assent itself upon the probability of a reason principally, thus it has repugnance with faith; and thus the reasons for the second part proceed, especially the last two, of which one is taken from the uncertainty of the opinion itself, and the other from the support of the opinion itself, because it relies principally upon a proving reason[^p521-3].

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

1. To that which is objected first about the word of the Apostle, that faith is the evidence of things that appear not; it must be said that the Apostle removes there from the object of belief not just any appearance; for he does not remove the appearance of probable opinion, but of certitudinal apprehension, as God appears to the blessed[^p521-4].

2. To that which is objected from the word of Gregory: *Faith has no merit* etc.; it must be said that Gregory understands this [to mean] when the believing of faith relies altogether upon the proof of a probable reason; and in this way true faith does not stand with opinion, in such a way that it relies upon opinion as upon a foundation; rather, much more does that probable acceptance, acquired from reasons, of which it was said that it can be called opinion, rely upon faith itself as upon something firmer. And the sign of this is that many reasons seem to us probable and very reasonable concerning faith, which seem to be certain abuses to unbelieving men. Therefore that acceptance relies upon faith more than conversely, although in some way it fosters and delights faith, as has been said[^p521-5].

3, 4. To the last two reasons there is no need to respond; because they proceed concerning opinion itself according to the other way of speaking, according to which it cannot stand together with faith at once, as was touched upon before[^p521-6].

---

la: Vers. 15. — De minori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.) et I. Topic. c. I.

en: Verse 15. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 26 (c. 33), and *Topics* I, c. 1.

la: Scil. S. Petrus Chrysologus. Eius sententia hic allata erui potest ex eius Serm. 79. n. 6. seq., ubi, defendens Apostolos, qui mulieribus resurrectionem Christi annuntiantibus non crediderunt, dicit: *Decipi non potest qui non est facilis [auditor]... Sic Adam novus cito cecidit, dum cito credidit, et dum facile dat aures ad mulieris auditum, se suosque posteros pessimo addixit inimico* etc. — Pro *Ravennas* cod. aa Rhemensis, Vat. Ravennensis, edd. 1, 2 Levonensis.

en: That is, St. Peter Chrysologus. His statement adduced here can be drawn from his Sermon 79, n. 6 ff., where, defending the Apostles who did not believe the women announcing Christ's resurrection, he says: *He who is not an easy [hearer] cannot be deceived... Thus the new Adam fell quickly, while he believed quickly, and while he easily gave ear to the woman's hearing, he handed over himself and his posterity to the worst enemy* etc. — For *Ravennas* codex aa [reads] Rhemensis, the Vatican [codex] Ravennensis, editions 1, 2 Levonensis.

la: August., de Utilit. credendi, c. 11. n. 25. — De maiori cfr. infra d. 34. p. I. a. I. q. I. seqq. — Inter *sed* et *quod credimus* cod. A interiicit *quia*.

en: Augustine, *On the Usefulness of Believing*, c. 11, n. 25. — On the major [premise] cf. below, d. 34, p. I, a. I, q. I ff. — Between *sed* and *quod credimus* codex A inserts *quia*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. — Pro *fiunt* codd. A K bb *sunt*, cod. Z *fuerunt*.

en: Cf. *I Sentences*, prologue, q. 2. — For *fiunt* codices A K bb [read] *sunt*, codex Z *fuerunt*.

la: Vers. 1. — Definitio termini *probabilis* sumta est ex Aristot., I. Topic. c. I: *Probabilia autem sunt quae videntur omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus* etc. Cfr. supra pag. 505, nota 2.

en: Verse 1. — The definition of the term *probable* is taken from Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 1: *Probable, however, are those things which seem [so] to all, or to most, or to the wise* etc. Cf. above, page 505, note 2.

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1. — Vat. tam in hoc arg. quam in seqq. pro *acceptio* constanter exhibet *assensio*.

en: Book II of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 26, n. 1. — The Vatican [edition], both in this argument and in those following, consistently presents *assensio* in place of *acceptio*.

la: Avicenna, lib. de Anima (qui dicitur Sextus naturalium), p. V. c. I: *Opinio vero est conceptio, ad quam acceditur cum formidine alterius partis.* Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.) dicit, quod opinio «est acceptio immediatae propositionis et non necessariae». — Subinde pro *igitur* edd. *sed*, et mox cod. A voci *vacillationem* praemittit *formidinem et*.

en: Avicenna, *On the Soul* (which is called the Sixth [book] of the Natural [Philosophy]), p. V, c. 1: *Opinion, however, is a conception, to which one approaches with fear of the other part.* Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 26 (c. 33), says that opinion «is the acceptance of an immediate and non-necessary proposition». — Thereafter for *igitur* the editions [read] *sed*, and presently codex A prefixes *formidinem et* to the word *vacillationem*.

la: Vat. subdit *probabili*.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *probabili* [a probable reason].

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1; I. Poster. c. 2, et I. Topic. c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, c. 1; *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2; and *Topics* I, c. 1.

la: Bernard., V. de Consider. c. 3. n. 6: *Fides est voluntaria quaedam et certa praelibatio necdum propalatae veritatis. Intellectus est rei cuiuscumque invisibilis certa et manifesta notitia. Opinio est quasi pro vero habere aliquid, quod falsum esse nescias. Ergo, ut dixi, fides ambiguum non habet; aut si habet, fides non est, sed opinio.* — Paulo superius pro *posset* (sic codd. A K et bb a secunda manu) alii codd. *possit*, edd. *potest*. Mox pro *derelicta* cod. Z *relicta*.

en: Bernard, *On Consideration* V, c. 3, n. 6: *Faith is a certain voluntary and sure foretasting of a truth not yet made manifest. Understanding is the sure and manifest knowledge of any invisible thing. Opinion is, as it were, to hold something for true which you do not know to be false. Therefore, as I said, faith has nothing ambiguous; or if it has, it is not faith, but opinion.* — A little above, for *posset* (thus codices A K and bb by a second hand) other codices [read] *possit*, the editions *potest*. Presently for *derelicta* codex Z [reads] *relicta*.

la: Prooem. q. 2. — Subinde post *Secundum* cod. G subiungit *autem*.

en: [I Sentences,] prologue, q. 2. — Thereafter, after *Secundum*, codex G adds *autem*.

la: Codd. G H M O *probabili*, codd. I bb et edd. 1, 2 *probabiliori*; cod. Z *innititur rationis probabilitate*. Pro *quia* cod. F *et*.

en: Codices G H M O [read] *probabili*, codices I bb and editions 1, 2 *probabiliori*; codex Z *innititur rationis probabilitate* [relies on the probability of the reason]. For *quia* codex F [reads] *et*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. ad 2. — Codd. M O W *apparet de Beatis*. Pro *apprehensionis* codd. A K *comprehensionis*. Superius post *non apparentium* edd. supplent *rerum*.

en: Cf. above, d. 23, a. I, q. 3, ad 2. — Codices M O W [read] *apparet de Beatis* [appears concerning the blessed]. For *apprehensionis* codices A K [read] *comprehensionis*. Above, after *non apparentium* the editions supply *rerum*.

la: Vide I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. ad 6. — Pro *fidem* edd. perperam *fides*. Cod. F voci *fidei* praefigit *ipsi*.

en: See *I Sentences*, prologue, q. 2, ad 6. — For *fidem* the editions wrongly [read] *fides*. Codex F prefixes *ipsi* to the word *fidei*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0