title: Dist. 34, Part 2, Dubia

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# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur super hoc quod dicit in principio: *Et quia de timore tractandi occurrit nobis locus, sciendum est, quatuor esse timores.* Videtur, quod inordinate procedat in tractando, quoniam via definitiva praecedit divisivam[^1]: ergo prius est timorem *definire* quam *dividere*. Si tu dicas, quod non est unam communem definitionem ipsius timoris assignare; in contrarium huius opponitur: quia, cum timor habeat ortum ex amore, et unum sit assignare definitionem amoris, sicut Dionysius[^2] definit amorem per *vim unitivam*; videtur, quod similiter sit ex parte timoris. — Sed in contrarium huius opponitur: quia, quando aliquid in una sui acceptione est *passio*, in altera vero est *habitus*, aequivoce dicitur; sed timor, qui est donum, est *habitus*; timor vero naturalis est *passio*[^3]: ergo de timore non potest assignari una communis ratio. — Item, Augustinus et Damascenus timorem definiunt; Augustinus super decimum Ioannis sic: « Timor est fuga animi, ne amittat quod habet »; Damascenus sic: « Timor est exspectatio futuri mali »: sed neutrum convenit timori in statu patriae, sicut patet: ergo non videtur, quod sit generalem rationem ipsius timoris invenire.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de istis duabus definitionibus praetactis, quoniam videntur sibi contrariari. Si enim *fuga* et *exspectatio* opponuntur; et timor est *fuga*, secundum Augustinum: non ergo est *exspectatio*, ut dicit Damascenus.

Ulterius quaeritur iuxta hoc, utrum timor secundum generalem sui acceptionem habeat unum obiectum commune. Quod sic, videtur: quia naturalis timor conformis est gratuito, et gratuitus glorioso; alioquin nec timor naturalis perficeretur a gratuito, nec gratuitus a glorioso[^4]; hoc autem esse non posset, nisi haberent unum obiectum commune: ergo etc. — Item, tantae generalitatis est amor, quantae generalitatis est timor; sed omnis amor est respectu obiecti sub una ratione, videlicet sub ra-

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tione boni: ergo videtur similiter de timore. — Sed contra est, quod timor viae est respectu mali, timor autem patriae non potest esse respectu mali, cum ibi nullum sit malum: ergo non videtur, quod timoris viae et timoris patriae possit esse[^5] unum obiectum commune, ac per hoc nec una communis ratio assignari. — Item, timor viae est respectu futuri, timor autem patriae respectu futuri non potest esse: ergo non possunt communicare in ratione unius obiecti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod timor, cum multas habeat differentias, de illis nec dicitur omnino univoce nec aequivoce, sed secundum quandam analogiam. Ubi autem est analogia, ibi est comparatio ad aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, maxime ubi est dicere proprie analogia[^6]; et ideo timor secundum omnes suas differentias habet aliquod obiectum unum sive unam rationem obiecti, circa quod consistit eius actus secundum prius et posterius. Obiectum autem timoris sub ratione sua generali est *arduum*; actus vero communis est *resilitio* ab illo arduo; et hoc est in omni timore reperire. Unde una communis ratio potest de omni timore assignari, ut dicatur, quod timor est *resilitio ab aliquo arduo sive excellente*, sive illud arduum sit in genere boni, sive sit in genere mali. Sed cum est in genere boni, est *resilitio cum reverentia*; cum vero est in genere mali, est *resilitio cum fuga*.

Sed quia iuxta analogiam frequenter latet aequivocatio quaedam, secundum Philosophum[^7]: propter tollendam ambiguitatem Magister primo maluit *dividere* quam *definire*; quia in multiplicibus primo est dividendum et postea definiendum. — Et hinc est, quod Augustinus et Damascenus timorem definiunt non quidem in sua generalitate, sed respectu mali. Et quia timor respectu mali duplicem actum habet, unum antecedentem, qui est aestimatio sive suspicio, qua quis credit malum sibi superventurum; alium consequentem[^8], qui est fuga illius mali aestimati: hinc est, quod unus illorum definit per *exspectationem*, alter vero per *fugam*, ita quod nulla est ibi controversia. Accipitur enim ibi *exspectatio* large pro quacumque aestimatione sive credulitate de adventu mali. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum, quod quaerebatur de timoris notificatione.

Ad illud vero quod quaerebatur ulterius de timoris obiecto; dicendum, quod obiectum eius est *arduum* sub ratione ardui et excellentis et quodam modo *superexcellentis*[^9]. — Unde quod obiicit de malo et de futuro, non valet, quia illa ratio non respicit timorem nisi quantum ad statum viae, nec adhuc generaliter; in statu enim viae est timor reverentiae, sicut ex praecedentibus[^10] habitum est.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sciendum est, quatuor timores esse, scilicet mundanum et humanum* etc. Et obiicitur contra hoc primo, quia videtur Magister esse *insufficiens*; omittit enim timorem naturalem[^11]. — Item, obiicitur, quia videtur sibi contradicere: primo enim dicit, *quatuor* esse timores, et postmodum subiungit *quinque*. Quodsi tu dicas, quod ipse enumerat pro uno mundanum et humanum; contra: timor mundanus surgit ex *concupiscentia oculorum*, timor humanus ex *concupiscentia carnis*[^12]; sed istae concupiscentiae sunt diversae: ergo et illi timores.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum sex differentiae assignantur, videlicet *naturalis*, *mundanus* et *humanus*, *servilis*, *initialis* et *filialis*, penes quid sumantur et quomodo distinguantur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sex differentiae timoris habent distingui secundum differentiam suarum originum. Timor enim aut est ex *natura*, aut ex *libidine* sive *concupiscentia*, aut ex *gratia*. — Si est ex natura, tunc est timor *naturalis*[^13]. — Si est ex concupiscentia, hoc dupliciter: aut est ex nimio amore sui, aut ex nimio amore suorum. Si ex nimio amore sui, sic est *humanus*; si ex nimio amore suorum, sic est *mundanus*. — Si autem ex gratia: aut ex gratia gratis data, et sic est *servilis*; aut ex gratia gratum faciente, sed inchoata, et sic est *initialis*; aut est ex gratia perfecta, et sic est *filialis*[^14]. — Et sic patet, quod sex sunt differentiae timoris secundum suam generalem divisionem ex parte suae originis.

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Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Magister est *insufficiens*, quia non ponit nisi quatuor; dicendum, quod Magister, cum intendat hic agere de timore-dono[^15], non dividit timorem nisi eatenus, quatenus ad propositum suum spectat. Timor autem donum quadrupliciter habet considerari: aut per comparationem ad suum *oppositum*, quod expellit; et hic est timor *malus*, qui opponitur dono Spiritus sancti, ut *mundanus* et *humanus*, quos Magister non dividit, licet sint timores diversi, quia sub una ratione eos considerat, videlicet in quantum oppositionem habent ad donum timoris. — Aut per comparationem ad obiectum *minus principale*, et hoc quidem est malum poenae; et sic est timor *servilis*. — Aut per comparationem ad obiectum *magis principale*, quod quidem est malum culpae sive offensae; et sic est timor *initialis*. — Aut per comparationem ad obiectum *maxime principale*, quod quidem est excellentia[^16] Maiestatis divinae; et quantum ad hoc est timor *filialis*. — Et sic patet, quod secundum quadruplicem comparationem ipsius timoris-doni assignantur quatuor timoris differentiae; et Magister sufficienter dividit timorem, quantum spectat ad propositum.

Aliter potest dici, quod timor sub ratione doni potest secundum aliam considerationem quadrupliciter dividi: quia timor aut est simpliciter *oppositum*[^17] dono, et sic est una differentia, videlicet *mundanus* et *humanus*; aut est *donum*, tamen cum opposito doni, et sic est timor *servilis*; aut est *donum non cum opposito*, tamen cum quadam approximatione ad oppositum, et sic est timor *initialis*; aut est perfectum donum, et sic est timor *filialis*. — Et sic patet sufficientia horum membrorum et dissolutio obiectorum[^18].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Attende, quod hic quatuor distinguuntur timores*, cum supra Beda dixerit, duos esse; ex hoc enim videtur, quod vel Magister sit *superfluus*, vel Beda *diminutus*. — Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur de divisione, quam ponit Damascenus[^19], ubi dividit timorem in sex differentias, quarum nullam ponit nec Magister nec Beda; dicit enim, quod « sex sunt genera timorum, videlicet *segnities*, *erubescentia*, *verecundia*, *admiratio*, *stupor* et *agonia* ». Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod aut ipse Damascenus, aut Magister in dividendo non recte procedit[^20]. — Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur de sufficientia membrorum, quae ponit Damascenus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de timore[^21], secundum quod est donum praecise; aut secundum quod est donum et oppositum dono; aut secundum quod comprehendit donum et oppositum dono et passionem naturae; aut specialiter de ipso, secundum quod timor est passio. — Si secundum quod est donum; sic dividitur in duo membra, et sic accipit Beda, dividens timorem in *servilem* et *castum*, quia potest esse donum gratuitum, aut gratis datum. — Si secundum quod comprehendit donum et oppositum dono; sic est divisio Magistri in quatuor membra, secundum quod dictum fuit supra[^22]; et quia Magister largius accipit, ideo plura membra ponit. — Si autem accipitur, prout comprehendit donum et oppositum dono et etiam passionem naturae; sic dividitur in sex membra prius[^23] posita. — Si vero, prout accipitur specialiter pro passione naturae; sic est divisio Damasceni, quae est quasi subdivisio respectu praecedentis.

Sufficientia autem et numerus horum membrorum sic patet: quia timor-passio aut est respectu *mali*, aut respectu *ardui*. Si respectu mali, hoc est dupliciter: aut respectu mali *poenae*, aut respectu mali *culpae*. — Si respectu mali poenae, hoc est dupliciter[^24]: quia aut respectu mali poenae *in se*, aut respectu mali poenae *in ordine ad culpam*. — Si respectu mali poenae in se, hoc est dupliciter: aut prout timetur *difficultas* in opere superexcedens vires nostras; et sic est *segnities*, de qua dicit ipse Damascenus[^25], quod « segnities est timor futurae operationis ». — Aut prout timetur malum poenae, nec tamen est a nobis, sed potius a fortuna et per accidens; et sic est ipsa *agonia*, de qua dicit ipse Damascenus, quod « agonia timor est per casum sive infortunium ». — Si autem est timor respectu mali poenae[^26] in comparatione ad culpam, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut respectu culpae, *quae iam est*; et sic est *verecundia*, de qua dicit Damascenus, quod « verecundia est timor in turpi actu »; aut respectu culpae, *quae iam non est*, sed potest esse; et sic est *erubescentia*, de qua dicit Damascenus, quod « erubescentia est timor in ex-

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spectatione convitii[^27] ». — Si autem est respectu *ardui* sive *magni*, aut est magnum, in quod non possumus cognoscendo et operando propter defectum cognitionis; tunc est *admiratio*, de qua dicit Damascenus, quod « admiratio est timor in magna imaginatione phantasiae[^28] »; aut est arduum, ad quod inassueti sumus; et sic est *stupor*, de quo dicit, quod « stupor est timor ex inassueta imaginatione ».

Vel aliter: timore-passione aut timetur quod est vere timendum, aut timetur quod de se timendum non est, sed propter defectum a parte timentis[^29]. Si timetur quod est timendum de se, hoc potest esse tripliciter: quoniam aut est *praesens*, et sic est *verecundia*; aut *futurum certum*, et sic est *erubescentia*; aut *futurum dubium*, et sic est *agonia*. Si autem timetur aliquid propter defectum a parte timentis, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut propter defectum *virtutis*, et sic est *segnities*; aut propter defectum *cognitionis*, et sic est *admiratio*; aut propter defectum *consuetudinis*, et sic est *stupor*. — Et sic patet praedictorum numerus et sufficientia; et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad obiecta[^30].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Beda vocat *amicabilem* timorem *castum*. Videtur enim, quod alius sit timor *castus*, et alius timor *amicabilis*[^31], et alius timor *filialis*. Aliud enim timet sponsa, et aliud amicus, et aliud filius. Filius enim timet patris *indignationem*, amicus voluntatum *dissensionem*, sponsa complexuum *separationem*: ergo videtur, quod illi sunt diversi timores. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur: propter quid timor perfectus sortitur illa tria vocabula; et quare magis vocatur *amicabilis* quam *socialis*?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod licet isti timores in his sensibilibus[^32] habeant differentiam, tamen respectu Dei unus et idem timor censetur hoc triplici nomine. Sicut enim una est gratia, quae facit esse filium Dei per adoptionem, facit etiam amicum et desponsat animam in coniugium[^33]; sic etiam in proposito est intelligendum, quoniam unus et idem timor est, quo quis timet amittere Deum sive separari a Deo sub hac triplici ratione. — Et ex hoc patet, quare iste timor hoc triplici nomine nominetur[^34]; patet etiam responsio ad obiecta.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod uterque timor, scilicet *initialis* et *servilis*, dicitur *initium sapientiae*. Si enim timor *initialis* dicitur, quia in eo inchoatur sapientia et gratia; timor autem *servilis* est huiusmodi: videtur ergo, quod timor servilis sit *initialis*; quod falsum est. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur: propter quid timor in sacra Scriptura potius dicitur *initium sapientiae* quam aliud donum; et quare magis dicitur *initium sapientiae* quam alicuius alterius doni, aut virtutis, aut gratiae?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum duplex sit initium, videlicet *intra*, vel *extra*[^35]; *initialis* denominatur a principio *intra*, quod est naturae principium intrinsecum; *servilis* autem habet rationem principii *extra*, et propterea nec est nec debet dici *initialis*.

Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare magis dicitur *principium sapientiae* quam aliud donum, et quare magis *sapientiae*[^36] quam alterius doni? dicendum, quod in proficiendo in bonum donum timoris est primum inter omnia dona, et donum sapientiae est supremum. Quia ergo ratio initii et principii debet attribui primo; hinc est, quod ratio initii debet attribui timori. — Quia vero in summo est status[^37]; hinc est, quod timor magis dicitur principium sapientiae quam alicuius alterius doni. — Alia vero, quae dicuntur in littera, sunt satis plana.

Ex his autem, quae in littera dicta sunt, possent formari sex problemata de timore, ut primum sit de timoris *definitione*; secundum de *obiecto*; tertium de *divisione Magistri*; quartum de *divisione Damasceni*[^38]; quintum de *doni gratuiti nominatione*; sextum et ultimum de *eius comparatione ad donum sapientiae*.

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# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says at the beginning: *And because the place for treating of fear now occurs to us, it must be known that there are four fears.* It seems that he proceeds inordinately in his treatment, since the way of definition precedes that of division[^1]: therefore one ought first to *define* fear rather than to *divide* it. If you say that one cannot assign a single common definition of fear itself; against this it is objected: that, since fear has its origin from love, and one can assign a definition of love — as Dionysius[^2] defines love by the *uniting power* — it seems that it is likewise on the side of fear. — But against this it is objected: that, when something in one of its acceptations is a *passion*, and in another is a *habit*, it is said equivocally; but the fear which is a gift is a *habit*; whereas natural fear is a *passion*[^3]: therefore one cannot assign a single common account of fear. — Likewise, Augustine and Damascene define fear; Augustine on the tenth [chapter] of John thus: « Fear is a flight of the soul, lest it lose what it has »; Damascene thus: « Fear is the expectation of a future evil »: but neither of these is fitting to fear in the state of the heavenly fatherland, as is clear: therefore it does not seem that one can find a general account of fear itself.

In connection with this it is asked about those two definitions just touched upon, since they seem to be contrary to one another. For if *flight* and *expectation* are opposed; and fear is *flight*, according to Augustine: then it is not *expectation*, as Damascene says.

Further, in connection with this it is asked whether fear according to its general acceptation has one common object. That it does, seems clear: because natural fear is conformed to gratuitous [fear], and gratuitous to glorious [fear]; otherwise neither would natural fear be perfected by the gratuitous, nor the gratuitous by the glorious[^4]; but this could not be, unless they had one common object: therefore etc. — Likewise, love is of as great a generality as fear is; but all love is with respect to its object under one account, namely under the ac-

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count of the good: therefore it seems likewise concerning fear. — But on the contrary: the fear of the way is with respect to evil, but the fear of the fatherland cannot be with respect to evil, since there is no evil there: therefore it does not seem that there can be[^5] one common object of the fear of the way and the fear of the fatherland, and through this neither one common account assigned. — Likewise, the fear of the way is with respect to the future, but the fear of the fatherland cannot be with respect to the future: therefore they cannot share in the account of one object.

**I respond:** It must be said that fear, since it has many differences, is said of them neither altogether univocally nor equivocally, but according to a certain *analogy*. But where there is analogy, there is a comparison to some one thing according to prior and posterior, especially where one may speak of analogy in the proper sense[^6]; and therefore fear according to all its differences has some one object or one account of an object, about which its act consists according to prior and posterior. Now the object of fear under its general account is the *arduous*; and the common act is *recoiling* from that arduous thing; and this is to be found in every fear. Hence one common account can be assigned of every fear, so that it be said that fear is *a recoiling from something arduous or excellent*, whether that arduous thing be in the genus of good, or be in the genus of evil. But when it is in the genus of good, it is *a recoiling with reverence*; but when it is in the genus of evil, it is *a recoiling with flight*.

But because along with analogy a certain equivocation frequently lies hidden, according to the Philosopher[^7]: in order to remove the ambiguity, the Master preferred first to *divide* rather than to *define*; because in things manifold one must first divide and afterwards define. — And hence it is that Augustine and Damascene define fear not indeed in its generality, but with respect to evil. And because fear with respect to evil has a twofold act — one antecedent, which is an estimation or suspicion, by which one believes that an evil will come upon him; another consequent[^8], which is the flight from that estimated evil — hence it is that one of them defines [it] by *expectation*, the other by *flight*, so that there is no controversy there. For *expectation* is taken there broadly for any estimation or belief concerning the coming of evil. — And through this is clear the response to the first [question], which was asked concerning the notification of fear.

But to that which was further asked concerning the object of fear; it must be said that its object is the *arduous* under the account of the arduous and the excellent and in a certain way the *superexcellent*[^9]. — Hence what is objected concerning evil and concerning the future is of no force, because that account regards fear only as to the state of the way, and not even then generally; for in the state of the way there is the fear of reverence, as has been established from what precedes[^10].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *It must be known that there are four fears, namely the worldly and the human* etc. And it is objected against this, first, that the Master seems to be *insufficient*; for he omits natural fear[^11]. — Likewise, it is objected that he seems to contradict himself: for first he says that there are *four* fears, and afterwards subjoins *five*. But if you say that he reckons the worldly and the human as one; on the contrary: worldly fear arises from *the concupiscence of the eyes*, human fear from *the concupiscence of the flesh*[^12]; but these concupiscences are diverse: therefore also those fears.

In connection with this it is asked, since six differences are assigned — namely *natural*, *worldly* and *human*, *servile*, *initial* and *filial* — on what basis they are taken and how they are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that the six differences of fear are to be distinguished according to the difference of their origins. For fear is either from *nature*, or from *lust* or *concupiscence*, or from *grace*. — If it is from nature, then it is *natural* fear[^13]. — If it is from concupiscence, this is twofold: either it is from excessive love of self, or from excessive love of one's own. If from excessive love of self, thus it is *human*; if from excessive love of one's own, thus it is *worldly*. — But if from grace: either from grace freely given, and thus it is *servile*; or from grace making pleasing, but inchoate, and thus it is *initial*; or it is from perfect grace, and thus it is *filial*[^14]. — And thus it is clear that there are six differences of fear according to its general division on the side of its origin.

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To that, therefore, which is objected, that the Master is *insufficient*, because he posits only four; it must be said that the Master, since he intends here to treat of fear-as-gift[^15], does not divide fear except in so far as it pertains to his purpose. Now fear-as-gift may be considered in fourfold manner: either by comparison to its *opposite*, which it expels; and this is *evil* fear, which is opposed to the gift of the Holy Spirit, as the *worldly* and the *human*, which the Master does not divide, although they are diverse fears, because he considers them under one account, namely inasmuch as they have opposition to the gift of fear. — Or by comparison to a *less principal* object, and this indeed is the evil of punishment; and thus it is *servile* fear. — Or by comparison to a *more principal* object, which indeed is the evil of fault or of offense; and thus it is *initial* fear. — Or by comparison to the *most principal* object, which indeed is the excellence[^16] of the divine Majesty; and as to this it is *filial* fear. — And thus it is clear that according to a fourfold comparison of fear-as-gift four differences of fear are assigned; and the Master divides fear sufficiently, as far as pertains to his purpose.

Otherwise it can be said that fear under the account of a gift can, according to another consideration, be divided fourfold: because fear is either simply *opposed*[^17] to a gift, and thus it is one difference, namely the *worldly* and the *human*; or it is *a gift*, yet with the opposite of a gift, and thus it is *servile* fear; or it is *a gift not with [its] opposite*, yet with a certain approximation to the opposite, and thus it is *initial* fear; or it is a perfect gift, and thus it is *filial* fear. — And thus is clear the sufficiency of these members and the resolution of the objections[^18].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Note that here four fears are distinguished*, whereas above Beda had said that there are two; for from this it seems that either the Master is *superfluous*, or Beda *deficient*. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked about the division which Damascene posits[^19], where he divides fear into six differences, of which neither the Master nor Beda posits any; for he says that « there are six kinds of fears, namely *sluggishness*, *bashfulness*, *shame*, *wonder*, *astonishment* and *agony* ». For it seems, according to this, that either Damascene himself, or the Master, does not proceed rightly in dividing[^20]. — In connection with this it is also asked about the sufficiency of the members which Damascene posits.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of fear[^21] according as it is a gift precisely; or according as it is a gift and an opposite of a gift; or according as it comprehends a gift and an opposite of a gift and the passion of nature; or specially of it, according as fear is a passion. — If according as it is a gift; thus it is divided into two members, and thus Beda takes it, dividing fear into *servile* and *chaste*, because it can be a gratuitous gift, or [a gift] freely given. — If according as it comprehends a gift and an opposite of a gift; thus it is the Master's division into four members, according to what was said above[^22]; and because the Master takes [it] more broadly, therefore he posits more members. — But if it is taken as comprehending a gift and an opposite of a gift and also the passion of nature; thus it is divided into the six members posited before[^23]. — But if it is taken specially for the passion of nature; thus it is Damascene's division, which is as it were a subdivision with respect to the preceding.

Now the sufficiency and number of these members is thus clear: because fear-as-passion is either with respect to *evil*, or with respect to the *arduous*. If with respect to evil, this is twofold: either with respect to the evil of *punishment*, or with respect to the evil of *fault*. — If with respect to the evil of punishment, this is twofold[^24]: because it is either with respect to the evil of punishment *in itself*, or with respect to the evil of punishment *in its order to fault*. — If with respect to the evil of punishment in itself, this is twofold: either inasmuch as one fears a *difficulty* in a work exceeding our powers; and thus it is *sluggishness*, of which Damascene himself says[^25] that « sluggishness is fear of a future operation ». — Or inasmuch as one fears the evil of punishment, yet [one] not from ourselves, but rather from fortune and by accident; and thus it is *agony* itself, of which Damascene himself says that « agony is fear by chance or misfortune ». — But if it is fear with respect to the evil of punishment[^26] in comparison to fault, this can be twofold: either with respect to fault *which already is*; and thus it is *shame*, of which Damascene says that « shame is fear in a base act »; or with respect to fault *which is not yet*, but can be; and thus it is *bashfulness*, of which Damascene says that « bashfulness is fear in the ex-

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pectation of reproach[^27] ». — But if it is with respect to the *arduous* or *great*, either it is something great, into which we cannot [enter] by knowing and operating on account of a defect of knowledge; then it is *wonder*, of which Damascene says that « wonder is fear in a great imagining of the fancy[^28] »; or it is something arduous, to which we are unaccustomed; and thus it is *astonishment*, of which he says that « astonishment is fear from an unaccustomed imagining ».

Or otherwise: by fear-as-passion either one fears what is truly to be feared, or one fears what of itself is not to be feared, but on account of a defect on the part of the one fearing[^29]. If one fears what is to be feared of itself, this can be threefold: since it is either *present*, and thus it is *shame*; or *certainly future*, and thus it is *bashfulness*; or *doubtfully future*, and thus it is *agony*. But if one fears something on account of a defect on the part of the one fearing, this can be threefold: either on account of a defect of *virtue*, and thus it is *sluggishness*; or on account of a defect of *knowledge*, and thus it is *wonder*; or on account of a defect of *custom*, and thus it is *astonishment*. — And thus is clear the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid; and through this also is clear the response to the objections[^30].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which Beda calls *chaste* fear *amicable*. For it seems that *chaste* fear is one thing, and *amicable*[^31] fear another, and *filial* fear another. For the bride fears one thing, the friend another, and the son another. For the son fears the father's *indignation*, the friend the *dissension* of wills, the bride the *separation* of embraces: therefore it seems that those are diverse fears. — In connection with this it is asked: on what account does perfect fear obtain those three appellations; and why is it called *amicable* rather than *social*?

**I respond:** It must be said that, although these fears have a difference in these sensible things[^32], nevertheless with respect to God one and the same fear is reckoned under this threefold name. For just as there is one grace, which makes [one] to be a son of God by adoption, makes [one] also a friend and espouses the soul into matrimony[^33]; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood, since it is one and the same fear by which one fears to lose God or to be separated from God under this threefold account. — And from this it is clear why this fear is named by this threefold name[^34]; the response to the objections is also clear.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that each fear, namely the *initial* and the *servile*, is called *the beginning of wisdom*. For if *initial* fear is so called because in it wisdom and grace are begun; and *servile* fear is of this kind: it seems therefore that servile fear is *initial*; which is false. — In connection with this it is asked: on what account is fear in sacred Scripture called *the beginning of wisdom* rather than another gift; and why is it called *the beginning of wisdom* rather than of any other gift, or virtue, or grace?

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the beginning is twofold, namely *within*, or *without*[^35]; the *initial* is denominated from a beginning *within*, which is the intrinsic beginning of nature; whereas the *servile* has the account of a beginning *without*, and therefore neither is nor ought to be called *initial*.

To that which is asked: why is it called *the beginning of wisdom* rather than another gift, and why rather of *wisdom*[^36] than of another gift? it must be said that, in progressing toward the good, the gift of fear is first among all the gifts, and the gift of wisdom is supreme. Since therefore the account of beginning and of principle ought to be attributed to the first; hence it is that the account of beginning ought to be attributed to fear. — But because the [final] state is in the highest[^37]; hence it is that fear is rather called the beginning of wisdom than of any other gift. — But the other things which are said in the letter are sufficiently plain.

Now from these things which have been said in the letter, six problems concerning fear could be formed: the first being concerning the *definition* of fear; the second concerning its *object*; the third concerning the *division of the Master*; the fourth concerning the *division of Damascene*[^38]; the fifth concerning the *naming of the gratuitous gift*; the sixth and last concerning *its comparison to the gift of wisdom*.

la: Cicero, l. de Offic. c. 3: *Omnis enim quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio debet a definitione proficisci, ut intelligatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur.* Cfr. Boeth., de Definitione.

en: Cicero, *On Duties*, bk. 1, ch. 3: *For every systematic treatment undertaken by reason concerning any matter ought to begin from a definition, so that it may be understood what that is which is under discussion.* Cf. Boethius, *On Definition*.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 15. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. in fine. — Quomodo timor ex amore oriatur, insinuatur ab August., de quo vide supra pag. 338, nota 3. Pro *unam* sit cod. K *unum continuum.*

en: [Dionysius,] *On the Divine Names*, ch. 4, § 15. Cf. above, d. 27, art. 1, q. 2, reply to 6, at the end. — How fear arises from love is suggested by Augustine, on which see above, p. 338, note 3. For *unam* codex K reads *unum continuum.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 555, nota 7. et pag. 556, nota 5. — Aequivoca, ut Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1. exponit, dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa.

en: Cf. above, p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5. — Equivocals, as Aristotle expounds in the *Categories*, ch. 1, are said [to be] those whose name alone is common, but according to the name the account of substance is diverse.

en: See below, doubt 1. — The editions read *summi boni ardui* [of the arduous highest good].

la: Cod. Z *assignari.* Paulo superius pro *non potest esse* edd. *non est.*

en: Codex Z reads *assignari* [assigned]. A little above, for *non potest esse* the editions read *non est.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.), et IV. Metaph. text. 4. (III. c. 2.). — Mox post *aliquod obiectum* auctoritate cod. K supplevimus *unum.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 24 and following (ch. 4), and *Metaphysics* IV, text 4 (bk. III, ch. 2). — Soon after, following *aliquod obiectum*, on the authority of codex K we have supplied *unum.*

la: Libr. VII. Phys. text. 31. (c. 4.). Cfr. II. Poster. c. 15. (c. 12.), et I. Topic. c. 13. Ibid. c. 14. (c. 16.) dicitur (quae verba proposit. seq. tangunt): *Si enim immanifestum sit, quotupliciter dicitur, contingit non ad idem etiam qui respondet et qui interrogat ferre intellectum* etc. — Paulo inferius post *Et hinc* [cod. G *hoc*] *est, quod* codd. G I L T aa et edd. 1, 2 inserunt *dicit*, et dein post *timorem* subiiciunt *vero*, edd. 1, 2 *enim.*

en: *Physics* bk. VII, text 31 (ch. 4). Cf. *Posterior [Analytics]* II, ch. 15 (ch. 12), and *Topics* I, ch. 13. Ibid., ch. 14 (ch. 16) it is said (which words touch on the following proposition): *For if it be unmanifest in how many ways [a thing] is said, it happens that the one who answers and the one who asks do not bring their understanding to the same thing*, etc. — A little below, after *Et hinc est, quod* (cod. G *hoc*) codices G I L T aa and editions 1, 2 insert *dicit*, and then after *timorem* subjoin *vero*, editions 1, 2 *enim.*

la: Sic Vat., cuius lectio procul dubio aptior praestantiorque est quam scriptura codicum, quorum alii (etiam edd. 1, 2) exhibent *et consequenter* [cod. A *consequentem*] *est fuga*, alii *et consignificat consequenter* [cod. F *consequentem*, codd. G I L N O *quantum*]. Paulo ante pro *qua quis* codd. F G H I L N T V *et quia quis*, cod. K *quando quis.*

en: Thus the Vatican [edition], whose reading is without doubt more apt and superior to the writing of the codices, of which some (also editions 1, 2) exhibit *et consequenter* (cod. A *consequentem*) *est fuga*, others *et consignificat consequenter* (cod. F *consequentem*, codd. G I L N O *quantum*). A little before, for *qua quis* codices F G H I L N T V [read] *et quia quis*, cod. K *quando quis.*

la: Cod. A *superexcedentis.*

en: Codex A reads *superexcedentis.*

la: Art. 2. q. 1. seq. — Pro *ex praecedentibus* codd. A K Z *in praecedentibus.* — Quoad hoc dubium cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1.

en: Art. 2, q. 1 and following. — For *ex praecedentibus* codices A K Z [read] *in praecedentibus.* — As to this doubt cf. Blessed Albert, here, art. 6; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 1, little-question 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, art. 1.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 9.

en: See the Master's letter here, ch. 9.

la: Respicitur I. Ioan. 2, 16. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Post pauca pro *assignantur* cod. Z *distinguuntur*, edd. *assignentur.*

en: Reference is made to 1 John 2:16. Cf. the Master's letter here, ch. 4. — A little after, for *assignantur* codex Z reads *distinguuntur*, the editions *assignentur.*

la: Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 23, et supra d. 15. dub. 3.

en: Cf. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, ch. 23, and above, d. 15, doubt 3.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. et a. 2. q. 2.

en: Cf. above, art. 1, q. 2, reply to 4, and art. 2, q. 2.

la: Codd. A F G I L N T V *de timore divino.* Mox pro *quatenus* plurimi codd. *qua*, cod. aa *quantum.* Subinde pro *Timor autem* [cod. T *enim*] *donum* codd. F N *Timor autem Domini.*

en: Codices A F G I L N T V read *de timore divino* [of divine fear]. Soon, for *quatenus* most codices [read] *qua*, cod. aa *quantum.* Then, for *Timor autem* (cod. T *enim*) *donum* codices F N [read] *Timor autem Domini.*

la: Ita cod. U, in aliis *excellentiae.* Paulo inferius pro *ipsius timoris doni* cod. K *in ipsius timoris dono.*

en: Thus codex U; in the others *excellentiae.* A little below, for *ipsius timoris doni* codex K reads *in ipsius timoris dono.*

la: Codd. I L *oppositus*; alii *ut opponitur.*

en: Codices I L read *oppositus*; the others *ut opponitur.*

la: Ita codd. H L aa bb; in aliis et edd. perperam deest *non.*

en: Thus codices H L aa bb; in the others and the editions *non* is wrongly absent.

la: Vide de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic n. 7; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; qui tres auctores ibi etiam de seq. dubio tractant.

en: See on this doubt Blessed Albert, here, n. 7; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 1, little-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, art. 1, little-question 3; which three authors there also treat of the following doubt.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 15. — Paulo superius post *videtur*, *quod* cod. W inserit *in illis*, plures alii codd. *nullus.*

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* bk. II, ch. 15. — A little above, after *videtur, quod* codex W inserts *in illis*, several other codices *nullus.*

la: Edd. *loqui quadrupliciter de timore: aut secundum* etc., in fine enuntiati *est passio naturae.*

en: The editions read *loqui quadrupliciter de timore: aut secundum* etc., [and] at the end of the statement *est passio naturae.*

la: In principio solut. dubii praeced.

en: At the beginning of the solution of the preceding doubt.

la: Dub. praeced.

en: The preceding doubt.

la: Exhibemus lectionem cod. U, quae completior est aliis, in quibus praecedens *in se mali* omittitur.

en: We exhibit the reading of codex U, which is more complete than the others, in which the preceding *in se mali* is omitted.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 15, unde et seqq. definitiones sumtae sunt. Cfr. Ioan. de Rupella, Sum. de anima, p. II. c. 31.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* bk. II, ch. 15, whence also the following definitions are taken. Cf. John of La Rochelle, *Summa on the Soul*, part II, ch. 31.

la: Ita codd. A P S U Z bb in aliis et edd. *Si autem est timor mali respectu poenae.*

en: Thus codices A P S U Z bb; in the others and the editions *Si autem est timor mali respectu poenae.*

la: Pro *convitii* (ψόγου) edd. falso *cogniti.*

en: For *convitii* (ψόγου, reproach) the editions falsely [read] *cogniti.*

la: Pro *phantasiae* (in textu Graeco legitur φόβος ἐκ μεγάλης φαντασίας) edd. perperam *finita.*

en: For *phantasiae* (in the Greek text is read φόβος ἐκ μεγάλης φαντασίας, fear from a great imagining) the editions wrongly [read] *finita.*

la: Edd. omittunt *sed propter defectum a parte timentis* et paulo inferius pro iisdem verbis substituunt *quod de se timendum non est.* Paulo superius pro *est vere timendum* edd. *est de se timendum.*

en: The editions omit *sed propter defectum a parte timentis* and a little below, for the same words, substitute *quod de se timendum non est.* A little above, for *est vere timendum* the editions read *est de se timendum.*

la: De hoc dubio praeter supra cit. locos cfr. S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: On this doubt, besides the places cited above, cf. St. Thomas, here, on the letter.

la: Plurimi codd. hic et inferius *amicalis.*

en: Most codices here and below read *amicalis.*

la: Edd. cum multis codd. *sensibus.*

en: The editions, with many codices, read *sensibus.*

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 27, art. 1, q. 1 and following, and d. 29, art. 1, q. 1.

la: Cod. A *nominatur*, cod. U *censetur.* — Cfr. solut. huius dubii apud B. Albert., hic a. 9. quaestiunc. 5, et apud Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Codex A reads *nominatur*, codex U *censetur.* — Cf. the solution of this doubt in Blessed Albert, here, art. 9, little-question 5, and in Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the letter.

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, voluntarium docet esse quod ex principio intrinseco efficiatur, involuntarium (ad quod quodam modo reducitur factum ex timore), quod ex principio extrinseco.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* III, ch. 1, teaches that the voluntary is what is brought about from an intrinsic principle, the involuntary (to which the deed done from fear is in a certain way reduced) that [which is] from an extrinsic principle.

la: Edd. omittunt *quam aliud… sapientiae.* Paulo ante pro *principium sapientiae* codd. N Z *initium sapientiae*, cod. O *initium vel principium sapientiae.*

en: The editions omit *quam aliud… sapientiae.* A little before, for *principium sapientiae* codices N Z read *initium sapientiae*, codex O *initium vel principium sapientiae.*

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. *quia non in summo status* [Vat. *statu*] *est.* — Cfr. supra p. I. dub. 2, et de hoc 5. dubio S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: The editions, with a few codices, read *quia non in summo status* (Vat. *statu*) *est.* — Cf. above, part I, doubt 2, and on this fifth doubt St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the letter.

la: Edd. 1, 2 cum plurimis codd. *doni.*

en: Editions 1, 2, with most codices, read *doni.*

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.767–770 (PDF 789–792; offset +22), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 53266–53514) as base for clean running prose. Running heads confirm the span: p.767 R `DIST. XXXIV. P. II. DUBIA.`; p.768 L `768 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`; p.769 R `P. II. DUBIA. 769`; p.770 L `770 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`. The next printed page (771) opens DISTINCTIO XXXV (`CAP. I. De sapientia et scientia, quo differant`), confirming the Dubia close on p.770.
- **Number of dubia = 5.** Dub. I (*Et quia de timore tractandi occurrit nobis locus, sciendum est, quatuor esse timores* — order of definition vs. division; the two definitions Augustine/Damascene; whether fear has one common object → *resilitio ab arduo* analogy answer); Dub. II (*Sciendum est, quatuor timores esse* — Master "insufficient"/self-contradictory: four vs. five vs. six; the six differences by origin); Dub. III (*Attende, quod hic quatuor distinguuntur timores* — Master vs. Beda's two vs. Damascene's six; the fourfold mode of speaking of fear + the Damascene six-species derivation *segnities/erubescentia/verecundia/admiratio/stupor/agonia*); Dub. IV (*amicabilem timorem castum* — chaste/amicable/filial one fear or three; why "amicable" not "social"); Dub. V (*uterque timor… dicitur initium sapientiae* — servile vs. initial; why fear called *initium sapientiae* rather than another gift; closes with the **six problemata** that could be formed from the letter).
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- **Footer hand-off PICKED UP** (from d34-p2-a2-q3, commit 096a233): p.767 notes 5–9 anchor the Dubia's opening and LEAD this chunk's apparatus → n.5 (*Cicero, l. de Offic. c. 3*) = [^1] at *divisivam*; n.6 (*De Div. Nom. c. 4 § 15*) = [^2] at *Dionysius*; n.7 (*Cfr. supra pag. 555… Aequivoca*) = [^3] at *passio*; n.8 (*Vide infra dub. 1; Edd. summi boni ardui*) = [^4] at *glorioso*; n.9 (*Cod. Z assignari*) = [^5] at *possit esse*. a2-q3 retained p.767 nn.1–4 (closing with [^16]=n.4=*Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*).
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- **Marginal glosses trimmed** (editorial side-notes, not Bonaventure's text): *Notandum.*, *Obiectum timoris.*, *Actus ipsius.*, *Definitio.*, *Ad 2. quaest.*, *Comparatio quadruplex.*, *Divisio quadruplex.*, *Quaestiones de divisione Damasceni.*, *Distinctiones cum subdistinctionibus.*, *Species 1–6.*, *Aliter monstratur sufficientia.*, *Quaestiones.*, *Nota.* etc.
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- **This chunk CLOSES Pars II and DISTINCTIO XXXIV in full** (Pars I + Pars II both now fully Tier-2).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 35

title_alt: Distinctio XXXV — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXXV — text of the Master of the Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXV.

### Cap. I. *De sapientia et scientia, quo differant.*

Post praemissa diligenter considerandum est, in quo differat sapientia a scientia. De hoc Augustinus[^1] ita ait: «Philosophi disputantes de sapientia definierunt eam dicentes: Sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia. Ego quoque utrarumque rerum cognitionem, id est divinarum et humanarum, et sapientiam et scientiam dici posse, non nego. Verum iuxta distinctionem Apostoli, qua dixit: Alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, illa definitio dividenda est, ut rerum divinarum cognitio sapientia proprie nuncupetur, humanarum vero cognitio proprie scientiae nomen obtineat. Neque vero quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis, ubi plurimum supervacuae vanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est, huic scientiae tribuo, sed illud tantum, quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur; qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo, quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam; aliud est scire, quomodo hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quae proprio vocabulo appellatur scientia». De his quoque duabus virtutibus idem Augustinus[^2], differentiam inter eas assignans, super Psalmum ait: «Distat sapientia a scientia, testante sancto Iob, qui quodam modo singula definiens ait: Sapientia est pietas, scientia vero est abstinere a malis. Pietatem vero hoc loco posuit Dei cultum, quae Graece dicitur theosebia, quae est in cognitione et dilectione eius quod semper est et incommutabiliter manet, quod Deus est. Abstinere vero a malis est in medio pravae nationis prudenter versari». Idem quoque, inter haec duo aperte distinguens, ait in libro duodecimo de Trinitate[^3]: «Distat ab aeternorum contemplatione actio, qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur; quamvis et illa, quae sapientia est, possit nuncupari scientia, ut Apostolus[^4] loquitur, ubi dicit: Nunc scio ex parte; quam scientiam profecto contemplationis Dei vult intelligi. In hoc ergo differentia est, quia ad contemplationem sapientia, ad actionem vero scientia pertinet». — Ecce aperte demonstratum est, in quo differant spiritus sapientiae et spiritus scientiae, scilicet ut sapientia divinis, scientia humanis attributa sit rebus. Et ut docet Augustinus[^5], utrumque agnoscimus in Christo, scilicet et rem divinam et rem humanam, et ideo de ipso habemus sapientiam et scientiam. «Cum enim legitur: Verbum caro factum est; in Verbo intelligitur verus Dei Filius, in carne agnoscitur verus hominis filius». Item, cum dicitur: Vidimus plenum gratiae et veritatis; gratiam referamus ad scientiam, et veritatem ad sapientiam, quia in Christo scientia et sapientia fuit plenarie, et nos scientiam et sapientiam de eo habemus, qui Deus est et homo.

### Cap. II. *In quo differat sapientia ab intellectu.*

Ostensa differentia inter scientiam et sapientiam, quid distet inter sapientiam et intellectum, videamus. — In hoc differunt illa duo, quia sapientia proprie est de aeternis, quae Veritati aeternae contemplandae intendit; intelligentia vero non modo de aeternis est, sed etiam de rebus invisibilibus et spiritualibus temporaliter exortis. Per eam enim et natura summa, quae fecit omnes naturas, id est divina, consideratur, et quae post ipsam sunt spirituales et invisibiles naturae, ut Angeli et omnes animae bonae affectiones conspiciuntur. In hoc ergo differentia est, quia sapientia Creator tantum conspicitur[^6], intellectu vero et Creator et creatura quaedam. Item, intellectu intelligibilia capimus tantum, sapientia vero non modo capimus superiora, sed etiam in cognitis delectamur. Sic ergo distingui potest inter illa tria, scilicet scientiam, intellectum et sapientiam: scientia valet ad rectam administrationem rerum temporalium et ad bonam inter malos conversationem, intelligentia ad Creatoris et creaturarum invisibilium speculationem, sapientia vero ad solius aeternae Veritatis contemplationem et delectationem.

### Cap. III. *Utrum intellectus et scientia, quae inter dona numerantur, sint illa quae naturaliter habet homo.*

Et notandum, quod intellectus et scientia, quae dicuntur dona Spiritus sancti, alia sunt ab intellectu et scientia, quae naturaliter sunt in anima hominis. Hae enim virtutes sunt, quae per gratiam infunduntur animis fidelium, ut per eas recte vivant; illa vero naturaliter habet homo ex beneficio creationis, a Deo tamen. Per has autem virtutes, quae dicuntur Spiritus sancti dona, illa naturalia reformantur atque adiuvan-

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tur, ut verbi gratia, intellectus naturalis, peccato obtenebratus, per virtutem quandam et gratiam, quae dicitur spiritus intelligentiae, reformatur atque adiuvatur[^7] ad intelligendum; ita et per illam virtutem, quae dicitur spiritus sapientiae, iuvatur atque erigitur mentis ratio ad contemplationem et delectationem aeternae Veritatis. Illud etiam sciendum est, quod sapientia, de qua nunc disserimus, non illa est Dei sapientia, ut ait Augustinus[^8], quae Deus est, sed hominis sapientia, verumtamen quae secundum Deum est ac verus et praecipuus cultus eius est. Si ergo colat mens hominis Deum, cuius ab eo capax facta est et cuius esse particeps potest, sapiens ipsa fit, et non sua luce, sed summae illius lucis participatione sapiens fit. Ista ergo hominis sapientia etiam Dei est; verum non ita Dei est, ut ea sapiens sit Deus; non enim participatione sui sapiens est, sicut mens participatione Dei. Sic etiam dicitur iustitia Dei non solum illa qua ipse iustus est, sed etiam illa quam dat homini, cum iustificat impium.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXV.

### Chapter I. *On wisdom and knowledge, in what they differ.*

After the foregoing, it must be diligently considered in what wisdom differs from knowledge. Concerning this Augustine[^1] speaks thus: «The philosophers, disputing about wisdom, defined it, saying: Wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine. I too do not deny that the cognition of both kinds of things, that is, of things divine and human, can be called both wisdom and knowledge. But according to the distinction of the Apostle, by which he said: To one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, that definition must be divided, so that the cognition of things divine be properly named wisdom, but the cognition of things human properly obtain the name of knowledge. Nor indeed do I assign to this knowledge whatever can be known by man in human affairs, where there is very much superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity, but only that by which the most wholesome faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; with which knowledge very many of the faithful are not endowed, although they are endowed in a high degree with the faith itself. For it is one thing to know merely what a man ought to believe for the sake of attaining the blessed life; it is another thing to know how this very thing may both help the pious and be defended against the impious, which is called by its proper word knowledge». Concerning these two virtues also the same Augustine[^2], assigning the difference between them, says upon the Psalm: «Wisdom differs from knowledge, holy Job bearing witness, who in a certain manner, defining each, says: Wisdom is piety, but knowledge is to abstain from evils. And by piety in this place he set down the worship of God, which in Greek is called theosebia, which consists in the cognition and love of that which always is and abides unchangeably, which is God. But to abstain from evils is to live prudently in the midst of a depraved nation». The same [Augustine] too, plainly distinguishing between these two, says in the twelfth book On the Trinity[^3]: «Action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from the contemplation of eternal things, and the latter is assigned to wisdom, the former to knowledge; although even that which is wisdom can be called knowledge, as the Apostle[^4] speaks, where he says: Now I know in part; which knowledge he assuredly wishes to be understood of the contemplation of God. In this therefore is the difference, that wisdom pertains to contemplation, but knowledge to action». — Behold, it has been plainly shown in what the spirit of wisdom and the spirit of knowledge differ, namely that wisdom is attributed to things divine, knowledge to things human. And as Augustine[^5] teaches, we acknowledge both in Christ, namely both a divine thing and a human thing, and therefore concerning him we have wisdom and knowledge. «For when it is read: The Word was made flesh; in the Word is understood the true Son of God, in the flesh is recognized the true son of man». Likewise, when it is said: We saw [him] full of grace and truth; let us refer grace to knowledge, and truth to wisdom, because in Christ knowledge and wisdom were fully, and we have knowledge and wisdom concerning him, who is God and man.

### Chapter II. *In what wisdom differs from understanding.*

The difference between knowledge and wisdom having been shown, let us see what distinguishes wisdom from understanding. — In this those two differ, that wisdom is properly of eternal things, which is intent upon contemplating the eternal Truth; but understanding is not only of eternal things, but also of things invisible and spiritual that have arisen temporally. For by it both the supreme nature, which made all natures, that is the divine, is considered, and the spiritual and invisible natures which are after it, such as the Angels and all the good affections of the soul, are beheld. In this therefore is the difference, that by wisdom the Creator alone is beheld[^6], but by understanding both the Creator and a certain creature. Likewise, by understanding we grasp intelligible things only, but by wisdom we not only grasp higher things, but also delight in the things known. Thus therefore one can distinguish among those three, namely knowledge, understanding, and wisdom: knowledge avails for the right administration of temporal things and for good conduct among the wicked, understanding for the speculation of the Creator and of the invisible creatures, but wisdom for the contemplation and delight of the eternal Truth alone.

### Chapter III. *Whether the understanding and knowledge which are numbered among the gifts are those which man has naturally.*

And it is to be noted that the understanding and knowledge which are called gifts of the Holy Spirit are other than the understanding and knowledge which are naturally in the soul of man. For these are virtues which are infused by grace into the minds of the faithful, that by them they may live rightly; but the former man has naturally by the benefit of creation, yet from God. But by these virtues, which are called gifts of the Holy Spirit, those natural things are reformed and aided

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— as for example, the natural understanding, darkened by sin, is reformed and aided[^7] for understanding by a certain virtue and grace which is called the spirit of understanding; so too by that virtue which is called the spirit of wisdom, the reason of the mind is helped and raised up to the contemplation and delight of the eternal Truth. This too is to be known, that the wisdom of which we now treat is not that wisdom of God, as Augustine[^8] says, which is God, but the wisdom of man, yet such as is according to God and is the true and chief worship of him. If therefore the mind of man worship God, of whom it has been made capable and of whom it can be a partaker, it itself becomes wise, and is wise not by its own light, but by participation in that supreme light. This wisdom of man therefore is also of God; yet it is not so of God that by it God is wise; for he is not wise by participation of himself, as the mind is by participation of God. Thus too the justice of God is said [to be] not only that by which he himself is just, but also that which he gives to man, when he justifies the ungodly.

---

la: Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 1. n. 3. Locus Scripturae est I. Cor. 12, 8. — Post *humanarum vero* plurimae edd. adiciunt *rerum.*

en: Book XIV, *On the Trinity,* c. 1, n. 3. The scriptural passage is 1 Corinthians 12:8. — After *humanarum vero* (but of human things) most editions add *rerum* (of things).

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 135, n. 8, nonnullis mutatis; cfr. Enchirid. c. 2. n. 1. Locus Scripturae est Iob 28, 28. (Vulgata: *Ecce timor Domini, ipsa est sapientia, et recedere a malo intelligentia*) et respicitur Phil. 2, 15. — Pro *versari,* quod habent codd. BCDE et edd. 1, 8 cum originali, in aliis *conversari.*

en: *Enarration* on Psalm 135, n. 8, with some things altered; cf. *Enchiridion* c. 2, n. 1. The scriptural passage is Job 28:28. (Vulgate: *Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding*) and reference is made to Philippians 2:15. — For *versari* (to live), which codices BCDE and editions 1, 8 have with the original, in others *conversari.*

la: Cap. 14. n. 22. — Pro *sapientia est* edd., exceptis 1, 8, *sapientiae est,* refragantibus codd. et originali.

en: Chapter 14, n. 22. — For *sapientia est* (is wisdom) the editions, except 1, 8, [read] *sapientiae est,* the codices and the original resisting.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12. — Pro *loquitur* edd., exceptis 1, 8, *asserit,* refragante etiam originali. Infra pro *differant spiritus* codd. A BCE et edd. 1, 8 *differat spiritus.*

en: The Epistle 1 Corinthians 13:12. — For *loquitur* (speaks) the editions, except 1, 8, [read] *asserit* (asserts), the original also resisting. Below, for *differant spiritus* (the spirits differ) codices A BCE and editions 1, 8 [read] *differat spiritus* (the spirit differs).

la: Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 19. n. 24, nonnullis mutatis. Loci duo Scripturae sunt Ioan. 1, 14. Etiam quae sequuntur excerpta sunt ex eodem loco Augustini.

en: Book XIII, *On the Trinity,* c. 19, n. 24, with some things altered. The two scriptural passages are John 1:14. The things which follow also are excerpted from the same place of Augustine.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *inspicitur.* — Quae hic dicuntur de obiecto intellectus excerpta esse videntur ex August., XII. de Genes. ad lit. c. 24. n. 50, ubi idem docetur de «intelligentiae lumine», quo Deus, spiritus et «omnis animae affectio bona» intelligatur.

en: Editions 1, 8 [read] *inspicitur* (is looked into). — The things which are here said concerning the object of the understanding seem to be excerpted from Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter,* book XII, c. 24, n. 50, where the same is taught concerning «the light of understanding», by which God, spirit, and «every good affection of the soul» may be understood.

la: Codd. A B C D *iuvatur.*

en: Codices A B C D [read] *iuvatur* (is helped).

la: Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1; cfr. ibid. c. 12. n. 15. — Infra pro *verum non ita Dei est, ut* edd. 1, 8 *Verumtamen ita Dei est, ut non.* Deinde plurimae edd. repetunt *Deus* ante *sicut mens.*

en: Book XIV, *On the Trinity,* c. 1, n. 1; cf. ibid. c. 12, n. 15. — Below, for *verum non ita Dei est, ut* (yet it is not so of God, that) editions 1, 8 [read] *Verumtamen ita Dei est, ut non* (nevertheless it is so of God, that not). Then most editions repeat *Deus* (God) before *sicut mens* (as the mind). ---

translators_notes:
**Chapter subjects.** DISTINCTIO XXXV is Lombard's treatment *de sapientia et scientia* — wisdom and knowledge among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Three chapters captured (**Cap. I–III**): **Cap. I** (*De sapientia et scientia, quo differant*) gathers Augustine (*de Trin.* XIV; *Enarrat. in Ps.* 135 on Job 28:28; *de Trin.* XII) that wisdom is the cognition of things divine, knowledge of things human (per 1 Cor. 12:8 and the *contemplatio/actio* division of *de Trin.* XII), and that both were in Christ (Word/flesh, grace/truth). **Cap. II** (*In quo differat sapientia ab intellectu*) distinguishes wisdom (of the eternal, contemplating eternal Truth) from understanding (of the eternal *and* of invisible/spiritual things temporally arisen) — wisdom beholds the Creator alone, understanding both Creator and creature — yielding the threefold distinction *scientia / intellectus / sapientia* (administration of temporals / speculation of Creator and invisible creatures / contemplation of eternal Truth alone). **Cap. III** (*Utrum intellectus et scientia, quae inter dona numerantur, sint illa quae naturaliter habet homo*) distinguishes the gift-virtues (infused by grace) from the natural understanding/knowledge (had by the benefit of creation); the gifts reform and aid the natural powers, and the wisdom here treated is the wisdom *of man* (according to God, by participation in the supreme light), not the wisdom which is God.

**Provenance (PDF-priority inversion).** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{771,772}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (read L column top→bottom, then R column; body bands then footer bands). The IA djvu OCR for this band (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw 53515–53596) is a two-column cascade-shatter — the footer NOTAE in particular are heavily fragmented — and was used only as the base for clean running prose and exact `[^N]` marker spacing; all footer NOTAE blocks were read eyes-on from the PDF. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (printed 771–772 = PDF 793–794). Running heads confirmed eyes-on: `771` (p.771 R-0) and `772 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (p.772 L-0/R-0). Editorial side-marginalia (*Augustinus*, *Dubium 1/2/3*) are trimmed as editorial glosses, not Lombard's text.

**Page-split map ([^N] → printed page).**
- **p.771 (PDF 793):** `[^1]`–`[^6]`. Two-column body, the littera flowing L→R within Cap. I, and Cap. II / Cap. III each spanning L→R. Footer band split by column: **L footer-column nn.1–3 → [^1]–[^3]** (de Trin. XIV / Enarrat. in Ps. 135 / Cap. 14); **R footer-column nn.4–6 → [^4]–[^6]** (1 Cor. 13:12 / de Trin. XIII / obiecto intellectus). Body markers: `Augustinus¹`, `idem Augustinus² super Psalmum`, `de Trinitate³` (L col); `Apostolus⁴`, `docet Augustinus⁵`, `Creator tantum conspicitur⁶` (R col + L-col tail).
- **p.772 (PDF 794):** `[^7]`–`[^8]`. Littera body is short here: L-col top (`tur, ut verbi gratia …`, continuing p.771-R `adiuvan-`) through R-col `… cum iustificat impium.` Body markers `adiuvatur⁷` and `ait Augustinus⁸` (both L col). The p.772 **L footer-column** carries the littera's two `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` notes (n.1 *Codd. A B C D iuvatur* → [^7]; n.2 *Libr. XIV. de Trin. … Verumtamen ita Dei est* → [^8]) **above** the start of the separate **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** block.

**Boundary / footer hand-off.** The littera body stops cleanly on p.772 R-col at `… cum iustificat impium.`, confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p772-R-0.png`. The **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.** header (subtitle *De dono sapientiae, intellectus et scientiae*, incipit *Post praemissa diligenter considerandum est etc.*, then `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`) begins below it at **raw line ~53597** — that block and everything after it (incl. `ARTICULUS UNICUS / QUAESTIO I.`) belong to **`d35-divisio`**. The **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** footer family — beginning in the p.772 **L footer-column** immediately below the littera's n.2 (`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. ¹ Cod. U addit eorum. Subinde ante alia codd. H K Z omittunt ad.`) and continuing in the p.772 **R footer-column** (nn.2–4: *Verba prout sunt dona …*; *Hic c. 1 seqq. … agit de dono sapientiae …*; *Edd. omittunt … quod pro quo … quid*) — cites the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS body and is the **`d35-divisio` chunk's own footer**, NOT a forward of a NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note. **Nothing is parked here for the divisio** from this littera's apparatus family.

**`d35-divisio` forward aid (verbatim — do NOT rechunk here).** p.772 R-col already shows the divisio opening: `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV. — De dono sapientiae, intellectus et scientiae. — Post praemissa diligenter considerandum est etc. — DIVISIO TEXTUS. Supra egit Magister de donis generaliter et de timore specialiter. In hac vero parte de aliis donis determinat satis breviter, maxime de donis, quae sunt ex parte cognitivae, scilicet de sapientia, scientia et intellectu. … In secunda vero assignat differentiam intellectus ad duo praedicta, ibi: Ostensa differentia inter sapientiam et scientiam. …` Then `ARTICULUS UNICUS. — De ceteris sex donis Spiritus sancti in specie. — QUAESTIO I. — Utrum actus doni sapientiae attendatur penes cognitionem veri, an penes affectionem boni.` (the ARTICULUS UNICUS opener + the six-question TRACTATIO fold into `d35-divisio`/the first question per convention). Per the resume slate, d.35 = single articulus, 6 questions: `littera(✅) · divisio · a1-q1..q6 · dubia`. The divisio's own footer is the **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** band beginning p.772 (claim p.772 COMMENTARIUM nn.1 ff.).

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body readings and all 8 NOTAE entries were confirmed against the 450 dpi PDF bands (pp.771–772 legible; the OCR-shattered footer regions were re-set eyes-on from the PDF, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 35, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum: De dono sapientiae, intellectus et scientiae

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions: On the gift of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge

source_text:
<!-- page 772 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.

#### *De dono sapientiae, intellectus et scientiae.*

*Post praemissa diligenter considerandum est etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de donis generaliter et de timore specialiter. In hac vero parte de aliis donis determinat satis breviter, maxime de donis, quae sunt ex parte cognitivae, scilicet de sapientia, intellectu et scientia, ostendens differentiam[^1] inter se et ad alia. Et ideo pars ista dividitur in partes duas. In quarum prima assignat differentiam inter dona tria praedicta. In secunda vero assignat differentiam ipsorum ad alia, quae non sunt dona, ibi: *Et notandum, quod intellectus et scientia* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima assignat differentiam inter sapientiam et scientiam. In secunda vero assignat differentiam intellectus ad duo praedicta, ibi: *Ostensa differentia inter sapientiam et scientiam.*

Similiter secunda pars principalis dividitur in duas. In quarum prima assignat differentiam ipsius intellectus et scientiae, prout sunt dona, ad se ipsa, et[^2] prout sunt acquisita. In secunda vero assignat differentiam inter sapientiam-donum et Sapientiam increatam, ibi: *Illud etiam sciendum est, quod sapientia, de qua disserimus* etc. Divisiones vero partium satis manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa sex, secundum quod sex dona sunt ultra donum timoris, licet Magister in littera[^3] non tangat nisi tria.

Primo quaeritur, quis sit actus, et quod[^4] obiectum proprium doni sapientiae.

Secundo, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni scientiae.

Tertio, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni intellectus.

Quarto, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni consilii.

Quinto, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni fortitudinis.

Sexto et ultimo, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni pietatis.

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.

#### *De ceteris sex donis Spiritus sancti in specie.*

---

english:
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## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXV.

#### *On the gift of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge.*

*After the foregoing it must be diligently considered, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the gifts in general and of fear specifically. But in this part he determines concerning the other gifts rather briefly, chiefly concerning the gifts which are on the side of the cognitive [power], namely concerning wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, showing the difference[^1] among themselves and in relation to others. And so this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he assigns the difference among the three aforesaid gifts. In the second he assigns their difference in relation to others, which are not gifts, there: *And it must be noted that understanding and knowledge* etc.

The first part is divided into two. In the first of these he assigns the difference between wisdom and knowledge. In the second he assigns the difference of understanding in relation to the two aforesaid, there: *The difference between wisdom and knowledge having been shown.*

Likewise the second principal part is divided into two. In the first of these he assigns the difference of understanding and knowledge themselves, insofar as they are gifts, with respect to themselves and[^2] insofar as they are acquired. In the second he assigns the difference between wisdom-as-gift and uncreated Wisdom, there: *That too must be known, that the wisdom of which we are speaking* etc. But the divisions of the parts are sufficiently manifest in the letter [of the text].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part a question here arises concerning six things, according as there are six gifts beyond the gift of fear, although the Master in the letter[^3] touches on only three.

First it is asked what is the act, and what the proper[^4] object of the gift of wisdom.

Second, what is the act, and what the object of the gift of knowledge.

Third, what is the act, and what the object of the gift of understanding.

Fourth, what is the act, and what the object of the gift of counsel.

Fifth, what is the act, and what the object of the gift of fortitude.

Sixth and last, what is the act, and what the object of the gift of piety.

### SOLE ARTICLE.

#### *On the remaining six gifts of the Holy Spirit, specifically.*

---

la: Cod. U addit *eorum.* Subinde ante *alia* codd. H K Z omittunt *ad.*

en: Codex U adds *eorum* ("of them"). Then, before *alia* ("others"), codices H K Z omit *ad* ("in relation to").

la: Verba *prout sunt dona, ad se ipsa, et* absunt ab edd., et verba *ad se ipsa* etiam a cod. F omittuntur, sed hic solus bene habet *et* post *ipsa.* Inferius pro *Divisiones* codd. K S *Subdivisiones.*

en: The words *insofar as they are gifts, with respect to themselves, and* are absent from the editions, and the words *with respect to themselves* are omitted also by codex F, but this one alone rightly has *and* after *themselves.* Lower down, for *Divisiones* ("divisions") codices K S read *Subdivisiones* ("subdivisions").

la: Hic c. 1. seqq., et quidem agit tantummodo de dono sapientiae, scientiae et intellectus.

en: Here c. 1 and following; and indeed [the Master] treats only of the gift of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding.

la: Edd. omittunt hic et in seqq. propositionibus *quod,* pro quo pauci codd. habent *quid.*

en: The editions omit, here and in the following propositions, *quod* ("what" [object]), for which a few codices have *quid* ("what").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed p.772 (PDF 794; `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p772-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 53596–53629. Running head verified `772 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` (verso) against the +22 offset; the COMMENTARIUS header was OCR-garbled as `COMMENTARIUS IN MSTINCTIONEM XXXV.` Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied.

**Scope / chunking.** This is the d.35 divisio chunk (no pars — d.35 has none). Per the Vol II/III convention it holds: the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV` opener (*De dono sapientiae, intellectus et scientiae*; incipit *Post praemissa diligenter considerandum est etc.*), the `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the six-question listing), and the short `ARTICULUS UNICUS` opener (*De ceteris sex donis Spiritus sancti in specie.*). It stops **before** `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 53630, *Utrum actus doni sapientiae attendatur penes cognitionem veri, an penes affectionem boni*), which folds into `bon-sent-III-d35-a1-q1`.

**TRACTATIO question listing (verbatim — for a1-q1..q6 alignment checks).** d.35 is a single article (`ARTICULUS UNICUS`) with six questions:
1. *Primo quaeritur, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum proprium doni sapientiae.* → **a1-q1**
2. *Secundo, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni scientiae.* → **a1-q2**
3. *Tertio, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni intellectus.* → **a1-q3**
4. *Quarto, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni consilii.* → **a1-q4**
5. *Quinto, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni fortitudinis.* → **a1-q5**
6. *Sexto et ultimo, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni pietatis.* → **a1-q6**

The six questions = the six gifts beyond fear (wisdom · knowledge · understanding · counsel · fortitude · piety). Auto-chunker split into six skeleton files `d35-a1-q1..q6` — listing order verified, no q-swap detected in the divisio listing (the next agents must still verify each question's own opener against this list).

**Page-split / apparatus map.** Single printed page **p.772**. The page carries **two** distinct footer families:
- **Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum** — L-col nn.1–2 (*Codd. A B C D iuvatur* / *Libr. XIV. de Trin. c.1 n.1…*). These anchor the **Littera's** body markers (`adiuvatur` / `ait Augustinus`, *de Trinitate* XIV) and belong to `bon-sent-III-d35-littera` (claimed there as [^7]–[^8]). **NOT claimed here.**
- **Notae ad Commentarium** — nn.1–4 (this chunk's [^1]–[^4]): n.1 *Cod. U addit eorum…* (anchored at `differentiam¹`); n.2 *Verba prout sunt dona…* (anchored at `et²`, the R-col DIVISIO line); n.3 *Hic c.1. seqq.…* (anchored at `in littera³`); n.4 *Edd. omittunt… quod…* (anchored at `quod⁴`, the first TRACTATIO question). Marker pairing 4/4 clean.

**Footer hand-off picked up:** from `d35-littera` — the p.772 **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** band (nn.1–4), per the forwarded hand-off. Claimed here in full as [^1]–[^4].

**Footer hand-off forwarded → a1-q1:** none of the divisio's footer carries over — the COMMENTARIUM band closes at n.4 on p.772, and QUAESTIO I (`Utrum actus doni sapientiae…`, raw 53630) opens its own fresh footer sequence (visible on p.772 R-2 lower: `Ad oppositum`, `1. Primo per verbum Sapientis, Proverbiorum…`) that continues onto p.773. a1-q1 begins a NEW per-page footer band.

**has_scholion:** false — no `SCHOLION.` header in the divisio range (the article-master scholion, if any, appears within the questions).

**[?] flags:** none. All of p.772 is legible at 450 dpi.