title: Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De immortalitate Adae ex parte corporis.*[^1]

Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum articulum de immortalitate Adae ex parte corporis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum, anima non peccante, posset corpus Adae dissolvi.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum, ipsa peccante, posset per esum ligni vitae in vita perpetuari.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum corpus Adae, ipso non peccante, posset dissolvi.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod etiamsi Adam non peccasset, corpus eius dissolvi potuisset, tali ratione.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Adam in statu innocentiae habebat corpus mortale, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister in littera[^2], ergo corruptibile; sed «omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpetur, sicut vult Philosophus, quamvis non omne generabile de necessitate generetur»: ergo, corpus Adae corruptum fuisset, esto quod in statu innocentiae permansisset.

2. Item, contrarietas est causa pugnae, et pugna in composito est causa dissolutionis[^3]: ergo in illo statu, in quo potest esse contrarietas, potest esse dissolutio; sed corpus Adae etiam secundum statum innocentiae ex contrariis habebat compositionem: ergo, statu illo manente, poterat habere dissolutionem.

3. Item, cuicumque statui competit restauratio, competit deperditio; sed corpori Adae in statu innocentiae competebat restauratio per sumtionem ciborum: ergo et eidem corpori secundum statum innocentiae inerat deperditio. Sed cuicumque inest deperditio, inest et consumtio, et in quocumque ponitur consumtio, ponitur et corruptio: ergo corpus Adae, in statu innocentiae persistens, dissolvi poterat et corrumpi, nulla culpa interveniente.

4. Item, constans est, quod Adam non poterat vivere, nisi comederet, cum haberet corpus animale[^4]; sed poterat non comedere: ergo, poterat absque ullo peccato corpus eius deficere. Si tu dicas, quod peccaret in non comedendo, quia tenebatur comedere; *contra*: non semper tenebatur comedere — quia signemus aliquam horam, in qua tenebatur. In illa hora aut Adam esuriret, aut non. Si esuriret: ergo pateretur, antequam peccaret; si non esuriret: ergo natura non indigeret, cum natura bene disposita tempore necessitatis cibum appetat[^5]: ergo non teneretur tunc comedere nec alias[^6]; ergo nunquam.

5. Item, si Adam stetisset, aliquis de filiis eius poterat peccare. Ponatur ergo, quod peccasset; sed possibile est, virum iustum a peccatore, insidiante interfici absque sua culpa, sicut Abel interfectus est a Cain[^7]: ergo possibile esset, Adam saltem, dormientem ab eo iugulari et iugulatus interire nulla culpa sua interveniente. <!-- page 465 -->

6. Item, impassibilitas est dos corporum glorificatorum[^8]; sed corpus Adae in statu innocentiae glorificatum non erat: ergo in statu illo persistens impassibilitatem non habebat: ergo persistendo in statu illo mori et non mori poterat: ergo corpus Adae erat dissolubile, anima non peccante.

**Sed contra:**

**Fundamenta.**
1. Isidorus *de Trinitate*[^9]: «Si homo in paradiso innocenter viveret, nec ignis eum ureret, nec aqua mergeret, nec absentia aeris suffocaret, nec omnia quae nocent mortalibus, impedirent»: ergo videtur, quod ipso permanente in statu innocentiae, corpus eius non erat resolubile.

2. Item, mors est poena peccati[^10]; sed omnis poena est ordinata; poena autem non ordinatur nisi per culpam: nulli ergo potest inesse nec poena nec mors nec corruptio, nisi cui prius inest culpa: ergo anima non peccante, impossibile fuit, dissolvi corpus Adae.

3. Item, ad hoc, quod debite constituatur aliquod compositum, necesse est, materiam et formam proportionari ad invicem. Si igitur anima ut forma et perfectio unita est corpori, impossibile erat, corpus illud resolvi et corrumpi, nisi aliqua corruptio prius incideret ex parte animae; sed corruptio, quae potest incidere ex parte animae, non est nisi culpae: ergo impossibile fuit, corpus Adae resolvi et pati, nisi in anima culpa fuisset praeambula.

4. Item, status innocentiae medius erat inter statum gloriae et statum miseriae; sed dissolutio corporis omnino opponitur statui gloriae: cum ergo statui gloriae non opponeretur directe status innocentiae, Adam in statu innocentiae persistente, corpus eius non fuit resolubile.

5. Item, omnis passio est ab aliquo repugnante et praedominante; sed Adam in statu innocentiae existente, vel omnia concordarent ei, vel subiacerent: ergo nihil posset corpus eius laedere nec aliquam passionem inferre: ergo corpus eius nec esset passibile nec dissolubile.

6. Item, impossibile est, stante rectitudine alicuius, ipsum obliquari; sed omnis rectitudo consistit in subiacendo Deo et praesidendo aliis creaturis, tam corpori suo quam etiam brutis[^11]: ergo spiritu rationali stante in puritate innocentiae et obedientiae, impossibile fuit, corpus ab eius voluntate recedere. Sed anima semper appetit uniri corpori: ergo impossibile fuit, corpus in tali statu dissolvi.

> **Conclusio.** Corpus Adae in statu innocentiae actu non poterat dissolvi, licet haberet potentiam, ut dissolveretur.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quemadmodum, iuxta verbum Philosophi[^12], *sensus duplex.* haec est duplex: aliquid est nunc immortale, quia adverbium *nunc* potest hoc determinare, vel ratione actus moriendi, vel ratione potentiae; ita et locutio praecedens: utrum corpus hominis esset dissolubile sive posset dissolvi, ipso non peccante, distingui debet. Illi enim ablativi absoluti[^13] possunt determinare hoc verbum *posset*, vel hoc verbum *dissolvi*. *Conclusio 1.* Si hoc verbum *posset* determinent, veritatem habet locutio. Est enim sensus, quod Adam, dum existeret in statu innocentiae, *posse* habebat, ut corpus eius dissolveretur. — *Conclusio 2.* Si autem ablativi illi referantur ad *actum*, qui est *dissolvi*, sic locutio falsa est. Est enim sensus, quod Adam posset dissolvi in statu innocentiae, ita quod simul esset innocentia et mortis sive corruptionis poena; et hoc est impossibile, providente ordine divinae iustitiae, quae nullam inordinationem in universo sustinet. Si ergo poena deordinata est, nisi praecedat culpa, et corporis dissolutio non potest animae purae et innocenti non esse poena; inconveniens videtur et contra ordinem divinae iustitiae, quod corpus hominis dissolveretur in statu innocentiae. — Et hoc Sancti dicunt, et rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt, et ideo concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpitur[^14]; dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de illo corruptibili, cuius regimen non subiacet voluntati, sed soli virtuti naturali; et illud de necessitate habet corrumpi, quia habet causam corruptionis intra se. Corpus autem Adae, etsi esset mortale et corruptibile, tamen voluntati subiacebat ex ordine divinae iustitiae; et ideo, nisi voluntas deordinaretur, corpus illud nunquam corrumperetur. <!-- page 466 -->

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod componi ex contrariis competebat corpori secundum illum statum; dicendum, quod *Distinctio.* alio modo se habent contraria in compositione corporis secundum statum naturae lapsae, aliter secundum statum naturae institutae. Secundum statum enim naturae lapsae non solum agunt in aliquod extrinsecum, sed etiam ad invicem mutuo agunt et patiuntur, non solum in ipsa constitutione, sed etiam post constitutum esse. In statu autem innocentiae taliter commixta fuerunt et proportionata in prima compositione et ad tantam concordiam redacta[^15], ut, illo statu manente, mutuo non pugnarent. Et ideo propter illam compositionem corpus illud dissolvi necesse non erat.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum statum innocentiae in illo corpore fiebat deperditio; dicendum, quod sicut natura universalis patitur elementa corrumpi secundum partem, sed nullo modo patitur corrumpi secundum totum; sic et natura bene instituta in homine, regulata ab ordine iustitiae[^16] et providentiae admittebat, deperditionem, fieri in homine secundum aliquam partem propter statum animalitatis, in quo erat; sed nullo modo patiebatur corruptionem fieri in toto. Sicut enim fiebat corruptio et deperditio, ita etiam fiebat restauratio; et ideo non consequebatur dissolutio.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Adam a cibo poterat abstinere; dicendum, quod non poterat abstinere a comestione[^17], quando esset locus et tempus; tum quia sibi expresse praeceptum erat, ut comederet de lignis paradisi, aliis a ligno scientiae boni et mali[^18]; tum etiam, quia, si Dominus non praecepisset, natura bene instituta dictaret, quae dictat, nullum debere manum sibi iniicere. — Nec valet illa obiectio, quam obiicit de fame; debebat enim famem praevenire, et ipse bene sciebat horam et indigentiam suae naturae, quam si pertransiret, omitteret et peccaret.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccator potest occidere innocentem; dicendum, quod verum est secundum statum naturae lapsae, in quo omnis homo merito peccati originalis est mortis debitor. Unde permittere, innocentem occidi ab impio, non est contra ordinem divinae iustitiae secundum statum praesentem; in statu autem illo, quia nulla culpa praecesserat, ordo divinae iustitiae talem deordinationem vel punitionem admittere non debebat.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impassibilitas est dos corporum glorificatorum; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod impassibilitas privat et actum et potentiam passionis secundum omnem statum. Illa autem impassibilitas corpori Adae non inerat nisi secundum statum determinatum, et ideo perfecta non erat nec dos dici debebat.

english:
### Article II. *On Adam's immortality on the side of the body.*[^1]

Next it is asked, as concerns the second article, of Adam's immortality on the side of the body. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether, the soul not sinning, the body of Adam could have been dissolved.

Second it is asked, whether, the soul having sinned, it could have been perpetuated in life through the eating of the tree of life.

### Question I. *Whether the body of Adam, he himself not sinning, could have been dissolved.*

Concerning the first, it is proceeded thus, and it is shown that, even if Adam had not sinned, his body could have been dissolved, by this reasoning.

**To the opposite:**

1. Adam in the state of innocence had a mortal body, as Augustine and the Master in the text[^2] say, therefore corruptible; but "every corruptible thing will of necessity be corrupted, as the Philosopher holds, although not every generable thing is of necessity generated": therefore the body of Adam would have been corrupted, granted that he had remained in the state of innocence.

2. Likewise, contrariety is the cause of conflict, and conflict in a composite is the cause of dissolution[^3]: therefore in that state, in which contrariety can exist, dissolution can exist; but the body of Adam, even according to the state of innocence, had a composition from contraries: therefore, that state remaining, it could have had dissolution.

3. Likewise, to whatever state restoration belongs, loss belongs; but to the body of Adam in the state of innocence restoration through the taking of foods belonged: therefore loss also was in that same body according to the state of innocence. But in whatever loss is, consumption also is, and in whatever consumption is posited, corruption is posited: therefore the body of Adam, persisting in the state of innocence, could have been dissolved and corrupted, no fault intervening.

4. Likewise, it is established that Adam could not live unless he ate, since he had an animal body[^4]; but he could not-eat: therefore he could, without any sin, let his body fail. If you should say that he would sin in not eating, because he was bound to eat; *on the contrary*: he was not always bound to eat — for let us mark out some hour in which he was bound. In that hour either Adam would be hungry, or not. If he were hungry, then he would suffer before he sinned; if he were not hungry, then nature would not be in need, since a well-disposed nature seeks food in time of necessity[^5]: therefore he would not then be bound to eat, nor at another time[^6]; therefore never.

5. Likewise, if Adam had stood, some one of his sons could have sinned. Let it be supposed, then, that he had sinned; but it is possible that a just man be slain by a sinner lying in wait without his own fault, as Abel was slain by Cain[^7]: therefore it would be possible that Adam himself, at least while sleeping, be cut down by him and, cut down, perish, no fault of his own intervening. <!-- page 465 -->

6. Likewise, impassibility is a dowry of glorified bodies[^8]; but the body of Adam in the state of innocence was not glorified: therefore persisting in that state it did not have impassibility: therefore by persisting in that state it could die and not die: therefore the body of Adam was dissoluble, the soul not sinning.

**On the contrary:**

**Fundamenta.**
1. Isidore *On the Trinity*[^9]: "If man were to live innocently in paradise, neither would fire burn him, nor water drown him, nor the absence of air suffocate him, nor would all the things that harm mortals impede him": therefore it seems that, he remaining in the state of innocence, his body was not resoluble.

2. Likewise, death is the penalty of sin[^10]; but every penalty is ordered; a penalty, however, is not ordered except through fault: to none, therefore, can penalty nor death nor corruption be present, except to him in whom fault is first present: therefore, the soul not sinning, it was impossible for the body of Adam to be dissolved.

3. Likewise, to this — that a composite be duly constituted — it is necessary that matter and form be proportioned to one another. If, therefore, the soul as form and perfection is united to the body, it was impossible for that body to be resolved and corrupted, unless some corruption first fell upon the side of the soul; but the corruption which can fall upon the side of the soul is only of fault: therefore it was impossible for the body of Adam to be resolved and to suffer, unless fault had been preambulary in the soul.

4. Likewise, the state of innocence was a middle between the state of glory and the state of misery; but dissolution of the body is wholly opposed to the state of glory: since therefore the state of innocence would not be directly opposed to the state of glory, Adam persisting in the state of innocence, his body was not resoluble.

5. Likewise, every passion is from something repugnant and predominant; but Adam existing in the state of innocence, either all things would agree with him, or be subject to him: therefore nothing could harm his body nor inflict any passion: therefore his body would be neither passible nor dissoluble.

6. Likewise, it is impossible, the rectitude of anything standing, for it to be bent aside; but all rectitude consists in being subject to God and in presiding over the other creatures, both over its own body and also over the brutes[^11]: therefore the rational spirit standing in the purity of innocence and obedience, it was impossible for the body to recede from his will. But the soul always seeks to be united to the body: therefore it was impossible for the body in such a state to be dissolved.

> **Conclusion.** The body of Adam in the state of innocence could not in act be dissolved, although it had the potency that it might be dissolved.

**I respond:** For an understanding of what has been said it must be noted that just as, according to the word of the Philosopher[^12], *Twofold sense.* this is twofold: something is now immortal, because the adverb *now* can determine this either by reason of the act of dying, or by reason of potency; so too the foregoing locution: whether the body of man was dissoluble or could be dissolved, he himself not sinning, must be distinguished. For those absolute ablatives[^13] can determine either this verb *could*, or this verb *be dissolved*. *Conclusion 1.* If they determine the verb *could*, the locution has truth. For the sense is that Adam, while he existed in the state of innocence, had the *potency* that his body might be dissolved. — *Conclusion 2.* If, however, those ablatives are referred to the *act*, which is *to be dissolved*, then the locution is false. For the sense is that Adam could be dissolved in the state of innocence, so that there were at once innocence and the penalty of death or corruption; and this is impossible, the order of divine justice providing, which sustains no disorder in the universe. If, therefore, a penalty is disordered unless fault precedes, and dissolution of the body cannot but be a penalty to a pure and innocent soul; it seems unfitting and against the order of divine justice that the body of man should be dissolved in the state of innocence. — And this the Saints say, and the reasons adduced to this end show, and therefore they must be conceded, since they conclude truly.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, that every corruptible thing is of necessity corrupted[^14]; it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of that corruptible whose governance is not subject to will, but only to natural power; and that of necessity has to be corrupted, because it has the cause of corruption within itself. But the body of Adam, even though it was mortal and corruptible, nevertheless was subject to the will by the order of divine justice; and therefore, unless the will were disordered, that body would never be corrupted. <!-- page 466 -->

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that being composed from contraries belonged to the body according to that state; it must be said that *Distinction.* contraries comport themselves in one way in the composition of the body according to the state of fallen nature, otherwise according to the state of instituted nature. For according to the state of fallen nature they not only act upon something extrinsic, but they also act and suffer upon one another mutually, not only in the very constitution, but also after constituted being. In the state of innocence, however, they were so commingled and proportioned in the first composition and reduced to such concord[^15], that, that state remaining, they would not fight one another. And therefore on account of that composition that body did not need to be dissolved.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that according to the state of innocence in that body loss took place; it must be said that just as universal nature suffers the elements to be corrupted according to part, but in no way suffers them to be corrupted according to the whole; so also nature well instituted in man, regulated by the order of justice[^16] and providence, admitted loss to take place in man according to some part on account of the state of animality in which he was; but in no way did it suffer corruption to take place in the whole. For just as corruption and loss took place, so too restoration took place; and therefore dissolution did not follow.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that Adam could abstain from food; it must be said that he could not abstain from eating[^17], when there was place and time; both because it was expressly commanded him that he should eat of the trees of paradise, other than the tree of knowledge of good and evil[^18]; and also because, if the Lord had not commanded, nature well instituted would dictate what it dictates, that no one ought to lay a hand upon himself. — Nor does the objection avail which is raised concerning hunger; for he ought to forestall hunger, and he himself well knew the hour and the indigence of his nature, which if he were to let pass, he would omit and sin.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a sinner can kill an innocent man; it must be said that this is true according to the state of fallen nature, in which every man, by the merit of original sin, is a debtor of death. Hence to permit an innocent man to be killed by an impious one is not against the order of divine justice according to the present state; but in that state, since no fault had preceded, the order of divine justice ought not to admit such disordering or punishment.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that impassibility is a dowry of glorified bodies; it must be said that this is true according as impassibility deprives of both the act and the potency of passion according to every state. That impassibility, however, was present to the body of Adam only according to a determinate state, and therefore was not perfect nor ought to be called a dowry.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Hic c. 2. seqq. — De dicto Aristotelis, ab Averroe contracto, cfr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 133 (c. 12.), et VI. Metaph. text. 7. (V. c. 3.). — Mox post *Adae* cod. O interserit *de necessitate*.

en: Here c. 2 and following. — On Aristotle's dictum, contracted by Averroes, cf. *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 133 (c. 12), and *Metaph.* VI, text 7 (V c. 3). — Just after *Adae* cod. O inserts *de necessitate*.

la: Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 4: Compositio enim causa (ἀρχή) pugnae, pugna dissidii (διαστάσεως), dissidium solutionis (λύσεως).

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* I, c. 4: For composition is the cause (ἀρχή) of conflict, conflict of division (διαστάσεως), division of dissolution (λύσεως).

la: Cfr. quaest. seq. nec non a. 3. q. 1. et supra pag. 424, nota 7.

en: Cf. the following question, also a. 3 q. 1, and above p. 424, note 7.

la: Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.): Necessarium dicitur, sine quo non contingit vivere tanquam concausa, ut respirare et alimentum animali necessarium est; impossibile enim est absque his animal esse.

en: Aristotle, *Metaph.* V, text 6 (IV c. 5): The necessary is so called, without which life does not occur, as a concause, just as breathing and food are necessary to an animal; for it is impossible for an animal to be without these.

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 11: Alimenti cupiditas naturalis est; siccum enim, vel humidum alimentum, vel etiam utrumque, cum indigent, omnes cupiunt.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* III c. 11: The desire of food is natural; for all desire dry, or wet food, or also both, when they are in need.

la: Gen. 4, 8. — Codd. F aa: *Item, esto quod Adam* pro *Item, si Adam.*

en: Gen 4:8. — Codd. F, aa: *Item, esto quod Adam* in place of *Item, si Adam.*

la: Ostenditur IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. n. 1. princip. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 2. princip. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Shown in IV *Sent.* d. 49 p. II n. 1 princip. a. 2 q. 1 and a. 2 princip. a. 1 q. 1 seq.

la: Sive de Ordine creaturarum, c. 10. n. 8: Dum vero ibi homo immortaliter et beate viveret, nunquid et totius orbis subiectio sibi non subiaceret? Quid enim illum ab ingressu orbis intercluderet, qui in creaturis nocere sibi aliquid non timeret, dum ignis non ureret, non aqua mergeret, non bestiarum fortitudo mactaret, non spinarum vel cuiuscumque rei aculei vulnerarent, non absentia aeris suffocaret, non omnia, quae nocent mortalibus, impedirent?

en: Or *On the Order of Creatures*, c. 10 n. 8: While indeed there man was living immortally and blessedly, would not the subjection of the whole world also lie under him? For what would shut him off from entrance into the world, who would fear nothing in the creatures to harm him, while fire would not burn, nor water drown, nor strength of beasts slay, nor thorns or spines of any thing whatever wound, nor absence of air suffocate, nor all the things that harm mortals impede?

la: Rom. 6, 23: Stipendia enim peccati mors. — De propp. seqq. cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.

en: Rom 6:23: For the wages of sin is death. — On the following propositions cf. Augustine, *On Free Will* III c. 18 n. 51.

la: Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 23. n. 44; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 5. et de Quantit. animae, c. 36. n. 80. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 11, plura docet de rectitudine sive iustitia voluntatis. — Pro *omnis rectitudo* nonnulli codd. *rectitudo hominis.* Vat. post *Deo* adiungit *vel subiiciendo se Deo.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On True Religion* c. 23 n. 44; *Enarr. in Ps.* 145 n. 5, and *On the Quantity of the Soul* c. 36 n. 80. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I c. 11, teaches much on the rectitude or justice of the will. — In place of *omnis rectitudo* some codd. *rectitudo hominis.* The Vatican edition after *Deo* adds *vel subiiciendo se Deo.*

la: Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam anceps secundum amphibologiam est nunc incorruptibile esse; aut enim, quoniam non corrumpitur nunc, significat, aut quoniam non possibile corrumpi nunc, aut quoniam huiusmodi est nunc, ut nunquam possit corrumpi.

en: *Topics* VI c. 3 (c. 6): For it is ambiguous by amphiboly to be incorruptible *now*; for it signifies either that it is not corrupted now, or that it is not possible to be corrupted now, or that it is now of such a kind that it can never be corrupted.

la: Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 non bene *absolute*.

en: Most codd. and edd. 1, 2 not well *absolute*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et uno alteroque cod. *corrumpetur.*

en: The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 and one or another cod. reads *corrumpetur* [will be corrupted].

la: Fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 minus convenienter *educta*, cod. L *adducta*, cod. O *ducta* (*reducta*?). Deinde pro *non pugnarent* aliqui codd. et ed. 1 *non repugnarent.*

en: Nearly all codd. with edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 less suitably *educta*, cod. L *adducta*, cod. O *ducta* (*reducta*?). Then in place of *non pugnarent* some codd. and ed. 1 *non repugnarent.*

la: Codd. M Y aa *divinae institiae.*

en: Codd. M, Y, aa *divinae institiae* [of divine justice].

la: Scil. comedendi. — Paulo ante pro *quando* cod. cc et ed. 4 *quin.*

en: Namely, from eating. — A little before, in place of *quando* cod. cc and ed. 4 read *quin.*

la: Gen. 3, 4. seqq. Cfr. lit. Magistri hic c. 4. — Mox pro *si* Vat. *etsi*, quae et dein post *dictaret* cum ed. 4 addit *eum sumere cibum.*

en: Gen 3:4 and following. Cf. the text of the Master here c. 4. — Just after, in place of *si* the Vatican edition reads *etsi*, which then also after *dictaret* with ed. 4 adds *eum sumere cibum.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Loquendo de facto, fide constat, quod corpus Adae nullo modo incurrisset mortem vel corruptionem, dummodo ipse non peccasset. Unde statu innocentiae durante, excludebatur *actus moriendi*. Loquendo autem de *possibilitate vel impossibilitate moriendi*, cum S. Augustino et Magistro distingui debet *non posse mori*, quo negatur aptitudo sive potentia ad moriendum, et *posse non mori*, quo asseritur potentia non moriendi. In statu naturae glorificatae Beati omnino sunt inepti ad moriendum, unde habent simpliciter *non posse mori*. In statu naturae lapsae homo moritur et *non potest non mori*. In statu innocentiae, sicut habuit potentiam peccandi et non peccandi, ita etiam potentiam moriendi et non moriendi, sive «quodam modo erat mortalis, in quantum poterat mori, et quodam modo immortalis, in quantum poterat non mori» (S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 2; cfr. hic dub. 2.). Stante autem statu innocentiae, ut dicunt fere omnes, *in sensu composito* primi parentes non potuerunt mori, bene vero *in sensu diviso*. Scotus autem (in utroque Scripto hic q. unica n. 3.), contra modum loquendi, a Ss. Bonaventura et Thoma adhibitum, plura opponit. Nam negat, quod homo, stante statu innocentiae, non potuit mori, et dicit: «Stante statu innocentiae, potuit mori; ista tamen potentia non fuisset reducta ad actum, et sic poterat non mori». Ipse enim putat, primos homines non tam per donum intrinsecum integritatis, quam per protectionem Dei extrinsecam in statu innocentiae fuisse immortales, scil. quatenus a quolibet fuisset translatus, antequam virtus sua fuisset improportionabiliter debilitata ad hoc, quod anima esset in corpore» (ibid. n. 6.).

**II.** De hac et sequenti quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 1. — Scot., loc. cit. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit.; S. I. q. 97. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. § 5; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, tr. 13. q. 78. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1, de seq. quaest. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, de seq. quaest. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Speaking of the fact, by faith it is established that the body of Adam in no way would have incurred death or corruption, so long as he had not sinned. Hence, the state of innocence enduring, the *act of dying* was excluded. Speaking, however, of the *possibility or impossibility of dying*, with St. Augustine and the Master a distinction must be drawn between *not being able to die* (*non posse mori*), by which is denied aptitude or potency for dying, and *being able not to die* (*posse non mori*), by which is asserted the potency of not dying. In the state of glorified nature the Blessed are wholly inept for dying, whence they have simply *non posse mori*. In the state of fallen nature man dies and *cannot not-die*. In the state of innocence, just as he had the potency of sinning and of not sinning, so also the potency of dying and of not dying, or "in one way he was mortal, inasmuch as he could die, and in one way immortal, inasmuch as he could not die" (St. Thom., here q. unica a. 2; cf. here dub. 2). The state of innocence standing, however, as nearly all say, *in the composite sense* the first parents could not die, but indeed in the *divided sense*. Scotus, however (in both Scripta here q. unica n. 3), against the mode of speaking employed by Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas, raises many objections. For he denies that man, the state of innocence standing, could not die, and says: "The state of innocence standing, he could die; this potency, however, would not have been reduced to act, and thus he could not die." For he himself thinks that the first parents were immortal in the state of innocence not so much through an intrinsic gift of integrity as through an extrinsic protection of God, namely, inasmuch as anyone would have been translated before his power had been disproportionately weakened to the point that the soul should be in the body" (ibid. n. 6).

**II.** Concerning this and the following question: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 1. — Scot., loc. cit. — S. Thom., here loc. cit.; S. I. q. 97. a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 2. § 5; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, tr. 13. q. 78. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1, on the following question a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 1, on the following question q. 2. — Aegid. R., here q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following questions here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 466 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum, Adam peccante, corpus eius per esum ligni vitae posset perpetuari.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum, Adam peccante, corpus eius posset perpetuari per esum ligni vitae. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. *Primo* per textum Genesis tertio[^1]: *Nunc ergo ne forte sumat de ligno vitae et vivat in aeternum*[^2]; hoc dictum est de Adam post peccatum: ergo si post peccatum sumsisset, in aeternum vixisset, et corpus eius perpetuum fuisset.

<!-- page 467 -->

2. *Item,* hoc ipsum videtur per Richardum de sancto Victore[^3], qui de Adam ait sic: *Habuit ante peccatum corruptibilitatem, post peccatum corruptionem; sed utroque modo per esum ligni vitae potuit sustentari.*

3. *Item,* hoc probatur per experimentum. Henoch enim et Elias, sicut dicunt Glossa[^4] et auctoritates Sanctorum, in paradiso conservantur per esum ligni vitae usque ad antichristi adventum; sed qua ratione usque ad illud tempus conservari possunt, eadem ratione et deinceps: ergo pari ratione et corpus Adae.

4. *Item,* non fuit maioris efficaciae lignum scientiae boni et mali ad corpus perdendum, quam lignum vitae ad conservandum; sed per esum illius ligni corpus hominis factum est dissolubile: ergo pari ratione per esum alterius ligni poterat corpus corruptibile solidari et perpetuari, sicut econtra alterius ligni comestio corpus sanum et solidum reddidit dissolubile et infirmum.

5. *Item,* post peccatum, si spiritus hominis iungeretur fonti vitae[^5], disponeretur ad perpetuam beatitudinem et vitam immortalem: ergo si lignum vitae corporale sic se habebat ad corpus servandum, sicut lignum vitae spirituale se habet ad spiritum; videtur, quod si homo poenituisset et de ligno vitae gustasset, quod corpus eius esset factum indissolubile.

6. *Item,* homo bene complexionatus, si non habet impedimentum extrinsecum, vivere potest usque ad consumtionem humidi radicalis[^6]. Si igitur illud humidum posset restaurari, posset corpus eius in perpetuum incorruptum servari: si ergo illud lignum vitae, sicut dicunt doctores, habebat vim restaurandi humidum radicale; videtur, quod si homo de illo comedisset, quod corpus eius in aeternum posset durare, etiam post commissionem culpae.

*Fundamenta.*

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Romanos sexto[^7]: *Stipendia peccati mors;* ergo si, postquam homo peccavit, necessarium fuit, ipsum peccasse; necessarium fuit, ipsum mori: ergo necessarium fuit, corpus eius dissolvi: ergo non poterat perpetuari per esum alicuius ligni.

2. *Item,* sententia data fuit, Genesis secundo[^8]: *Quacumque die comederitis* etc. Si ergo illam sententiam nulla virtus creata potest infirmare, quantumcumque homo comederet de ligno vitae, necesse erat, ipsum mori et corpus eius resolvi. Et hoc ipsum dicit alius textus, Genesis tertio: *Pulvis es, et in pulverem* etc.

3. *Item,* homo per peccatum similis factus est iumentis insipientibus[^9]; sed iumenta si comederent de ligno vitae, non propter hoc corpora eorum fierent indissolubilia: ergo si homo quantum ad conditionem mortis iumentis similis effectus est per culpam; quantumcumque de ligno vitae comederet, corpus eius dissolvi necesse esset.

4. *Item,* non minus est de mortali immortalem facere quam de mortuo vivum; sed mortuum suscitare hoc est virtutis solius Dei et virtutis infinitae: ergo corpus dissolubile ad indissolubile reducere, hoc est solius virtutis divinae: ergo si homo post peccatum de illo ligno comederet, corpus eius nihilominus dissolvi esset necesse.

### Conclusio

> Esus ligni vitae post peccatum non potuisset Adam reddere immortalem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod eadem lege, qua divina iustitia non patitur, innocentem puniri et mori, non patitur etiam, malum remanere impunitum. Et ideo divinum decretum fuit, ut, si homo mandatum Dei transgrediendo peccaret et ipsi Auctori suo inobediens existeret, spiritus carnis dominium amitteret; et sicut voluntas a Deo recesserat, sic anima invita corpus ipsum desereret, et dissolutum in suam originem, unde sumtum erat, rediret. Et quoniam divinum decretum erat inviolabile, hinc est, quod postquam homo peccavit, quantumcumque de ligno vitae ederet, corpus eius non fieret indissolubile, ita quod mortem posset evadere[^10]. — Ideo concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de textu, dicendum, quod *aeternum* non dicit ibi vitae interminabilitatem[^11], sed vitae quandam diuturnitatem, quomodo saepe consuevit loqui Scriptura. Quamvis autem lignum vitae illud corpus non posset perpetuare, poterat tamen adeo naturam ipsius adiuvare et vigorare, ut diutius viveret[^12].

*Ad 2, 3.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia, scilicet ad verbum Richardi, et ad illud quod obiicitur de Henoch et Elia. Utrumque enim non concludit vitae interminabilitatem, sed solum quandam diuturnitatem; quam etsi lignum vitae posset homini lapso conferre per sibi divinitus collatam virtutem, non tamen poterat in aeternum conservare; quia divinum decretum infirmare[^13] non poterat, et corpus hominis peccantis ad hoc post peccatum habile non erat, et illud lignum in solo eo quod dispositionem habebat ad eius effectum, efficaciam habebat.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile de ligno scientiae boni et mali, dicendum, quod illud simile deficit dupliciter. *Primum,* quia illud lignum scientiae boni et mali non fecit, corpora illa esse dissolubilia, sed solum hominis culpa et divina sententia. *Secundo* vero, quia corpus Adae, antequam peccaret, nec habebat necessitatem ad permanendum nec necessitatem ad corrumpendum; sed postquam <!-- page 468 -->homo peccavit, corpus eius subiectum fuit necessitati moriendi, et ideo per esum ligni vitae non poterat conservari.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de coniunctione spiritus ad fontem vitae spiritualis etc., dicendum, quod illud simile deficit dupliciter. *Primo* quidem, quia voluntas facilius vertitur et revertitur quam natura. *Secundo* vero, quia fons vitae spiritualis multo potentior est super animam, quam illud lignum esset super corpus; et ideo non sequitur, quod si divinus Spiritus recreat et vivificat animam, quod lignum vitae reformet et consolidet corpus in statum pristinum.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lignum vitae restauraret humidum radicale; dicendum, quod etsi per sui esum sufficienter restauraret humidum in corpore hominis secundum statum naturae institutae, nunquam tamen in statu naturae *lapsae* sic restauraret, quin semper aliqua deperditio fieret; et ita, quamvis diutius conservaret, nihilominus tamen aliquando illud radicale humidum deficeret, et corpus ad dissolutionem perveniret[^14].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether, with Adam sinning, his body could have been perpetuated through eating of the tree of life.*

Secondly it is asked whether, with Adam having sinned, his body could have been perpetuated through eating of the tree of life. And that it could, it seems:

*On the affirmative side.*

1. *First* by the text of Genesis third[^1]: *Now therefore lest perhaps he take from the tree of life and live for ever*[^2]; this was said of Adam after sin: therefore if after sin he had taken, he would have lived forever, and his body would have been perpetual.

2. *Likewise,* this same thing seems through Richard of Saint Victor[^3], who says thus of Adam: *He had corruptibility before sin, corruption after sin; but in either mode he could have been sustained through eating of the tree of life.*

3. *Likewise,* this is proved by experiment. For Enoch and Elijah, as the Gloss[^4] and the authorities of the Saints say, are preserved in paradise through eating of the tree of life until the coming of antichrist; but by whatever reason they can be preserved up to that time, by the same reason also thereafter: therefore by parallel reasoning also the body of Adam.

4. *Likewise,* the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not of greater efficacy for losing the body, than the tree of life for preserving it; but through the eating of that tree man's body was made dissoluble: therefore by parallel reasoning through the eating of the other tree a corruptible body could be made solid and perpetual, just as conversely the eating of the other tree rendered a sound and solid body dissoluble and infirm.

5. *Likewise,* after sin, if the spirit of man were joined to the fount of life[^5], it would be disposed to perpetual beatitude and immortal life: therefore if the corporeal tree of life so stood to the body for preserving it, as the spiritual tree of life stands to the spirit; it seems that if man had repented and had tasted of the tree of life, his body would have been made indissoluble.

6. *Likewise,* a man of good complexion, if he has no extrinsic impediment, can live until the consumption of the radical moisture[^6]. If therefore that moisture could be restored, his body could be preserved incorrupt in perpetuity: if therefore that tree of life, as the doctors say, had the power of restoring the radical moisture; it seems that if man had eaten of it, his body could last forever, even after the commission of fault.

*Foundations.*

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans sixth[^7]: *The wages of sin is death;* therefore if, after man had sinned, it was necessary that he had sinned; it was necessary that he die: therefore it was necessary that his body be dissolved: therefore it could not be perpetuated through eating of any tree.

2. *Likewise,* a sentence was given, Genesis second[^8]: *On whatever day you shall eat* etc. If therefore no created power can weaken that sentence, however much man might eat of the tree of life, it was necessary that he die and his body be dissolved. And this same thing the other text says, Genesis third: *Dust thou art, and unto dust* etc.

3. *Likewise,* man through sin was made like the senseless beasts[^9]; but if the beasts were to eat of the tree of life, their bodies would not for that reason become indissoluble: therefore if man as regards the condition of death has been made like the beasts through fault; however much he might eat of the tree of life, his body would necessarily be dissolved.

4. *Likewise,* it is no less to make the immortal from the mortal than the living from the dead; but to raise the dead is of the power of God alone and of infinite power: therefore to reduce a dissoluble body to indissoluble, this is of divine power alone: therefore if man after sin were to eat of that tree, his body would nonetheless necessarily be dissolved.

### Conclusion

> The eating of the tree of life after sin could not have rendered Adam immortal.

**I respond:** It must be said that by the same law by which divine justice does not allow the innocent to be punished and to die, it likewise does not allow evil to remain unpunished. And therefore the divine decree was, that, if man by transgressing God's command should sin and should be disobedient to his very Author, the spirit would lose dominion of the flesh; and just as the will had withdrawn from God, so the soul, unwilling, would desert the body itself, and the body, dissolved, would return to its origin whence it had been taken. And since the divine decree was inviolable, hence it is that after man had sinned, however much he might eat of the tree of life, his body would not become indissoluble, in such a way that it could escape death[^10]. — Therefore the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposites.*

**To the arguments for the affirmative:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary from the text, it must be said that *for ever* does not there denote interminability of life[^11], but a certain length of life, in the way Scripture is often accustomed to speak. Although the tree of life could not perpetuate that body, it could nevertheless so aid and invigorate its nature that it would live longer[^12].

*To 2, 3.* And through this the response is clear to the two following points, namely to the saying of Richard, and to that which is objected concerning Enoch and Elijah. For neither concludes interminability of life, but only a certain length; which, even if the tree of life could confer it upon fallen man through the power divinely bestowed upon it, it could nevertheless not preserve forever; because it could not weaken[^13] the divine decree, and the body of sinning man was not suited for this after sin, and that tree had efficacy only in that it had a disposition to its effect.

*To 4.* To that which is objected through a parallel concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it must be said that that parallel falls short in two ways. *First,* because that tree of knowledge of good and evil did not make those bodies to be dissoluble, but only man's fault and the divine sentence did. *Secondly,* because the body of Adam, before he sinned, had neither a necessity for permanence nor a necessity for corruption; but after man had sinned, his body was subjected to the necessity of dying, and therefore through eating of the tree of life it could not be preserved.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning the conjunction of spirit to the fount of spiritual life etc., it must be said that that parallel falls short in two ways. *First* indeed, because the will is turned and turned back more easily than nature. *Secondly* however, because the fount of spiritual life is much more powerful over the soul, than that tree would be over the body; and therefore it does not follow, that if the divine Spirit recreates and vivifies the soul, that the tree of life should reform and consolidate the body to its pristine state.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the tree of life would restore the radical moisture; it must be said that even if through its eating it would sufficiently restore the moisture in man's body according to the state of *instituted* nature, never however in the state of *fallen* nature would it so restore it, that there would not always be some loss; and so, although it would preserve it longer, nonetheless at some time that radical moisture would fail, and the body would come to dissolution[^14].

---

la: Gen. 3, 1. seqq. Cfr. lit. Magistri hic c. 4. — Mox pro *si* Vat. *etsi*, quae et dein post *dictaret* cum ed. 1 addit *eum sumere cibum*.

en: Gen. 3:1ff. Cf. the text of the Master, here c. 4. — Soon after, for *si* the Vatican edition reads *etsi*, which also after *dictaret* with ed. 1 adds *eum sumere cibum*.

la: Vers. 22: *Nunc ergo ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat etiam de ligno vitae et comedat et vivat in aeternum*.

en: Verse 22: *Now therefore lest perhaps he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat and live for ever*.

la: Libro I. *de Emmanuele*, c. 11 dicit: *Perdidit sane... gloriam incorruptionis, qua immortalis factus est, praerogativam dignitatis... abundantiam plenitudinis... Denudationem immortalitatis audi, ubi de ligno vetito legis: Quacumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris.* Ut ibid. c. 15: *Certe lignum vitae ex eo nomen habuit, quod ex insita sibi natura ex eo comedentium vitam servare posse accepit.* — In textu Richardi pro *sustentari* multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *suscitari.* — Sententia similis tenoris invenitur in libro, olim Augustino tributo, cui titulus: *Quaestiones veteris et novi Testamenti*, q. 19.

en: Book I *On Emmanuel*, c. 11 he says: *He lost indeed... the glory of incorruption by which he had been made immortal, the prerogative of dignity... the abundance of fullness... Hear of the stripping of immortality, where you read concerning the forbidden tree: On whatever day you shall eat of it, by death you shall die.* Also ibid. c. 15: *Certainly the tree of life took its name from this, that from the nature implanted in it, it received the power of preserving the life of those eating of it.* — In Richard's text, for *sustentari* many codices with editions 1, 2 read *suscitari.* — A statement of similar tenor is found in the book once attributed to Augustine, with the title *Questions of the Old and New Testament*, q. 19.

la: In Gen. 5, 24; Eccli. 44, 16; Hebr. 11, 5. De Glossa cfr. August., VI. *Oper. imperf. contra Iulian.* c. 30; I. *contra Advers. Legis et Prophet.* c. 15. n. 26; I. *de Peccator. meritis et remiss. et de bapt. parvul.* c. 3. n. 3.

en: On Gen. 5:24; Ecclus. 44:16; Heb. 11:5. On the Gloss cf. Augustine, VI *Unfinished Work against Julian* c. 30; I *Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* c. 15, n. 26; I *On the Merits and Remission of Sins and the Baptism of Infants* c. 3, n. 3.

la: Psalm. 35, 10: *Quoniam apud te est fons vitae, et in lumine tuo videbimus lumen*.

en: Psalm 35:10: *For with thee is the fountain of life, and in thy light we shall see light*.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 316, nota 12, ubi ex Scoto cit. videri potest, quid sit *humidum radicale* iuxta opinionem illius aetatis. — Paulo post pro *servari* codd. T aa *conservari*.

en: Cf. tom. I, p. 316, note 12, where from Scotus, cited, can be seen what the *radical moisture* is according to the opinion of that age. — A little later, for *servari* codices T aa read *conservari*.

la: Vers. 23. — Paulo post sola Vat. omittit *necessarium fuit ipsum peccasse... mori, ergo*.

en: Verse 23. — A little later, the Vatican edition alone omits *necessarium fuit ipsum peccasse... mori, ergo*.

la: Vers. 17. — Seq. textus est Gen. 3, 19.

en: Verse 17. — The following text is Gen. 3:19.

la: Psalm. 48, 13. — Paulo inferius pro *mortis* plures codd. *mortalitatis*.

en: Psalm 48:13. — A little below, for *mortis* several codices read *mortalitatis*.

la: Cfr. August., XIII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 15. et XIV. c. 15.

en: Cf. Augustine, XIII *On the City of God*, c. 15 and XIV c. 15.

la: Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 6: *Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*.

en: Boethius, V *On Consolation*, prose 6: *Eternity therefore is the entire and perfect possession of an interminable life all at once*.

la: Cfr. August., XIII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 20.

en: Cf. Augustine, XIII *On the City of God*, c. 20.

la: Cod. aa melius *infirmari*.

en: Codex aa better: *infirmari*.

la: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- **Page span:** printed pp. 466 R-1 (raw 32834) – 468 L-1 (raw 32939). PDF offset +22 (Vol II constant). Q2 opens on p.466 R-1 immediately after the d19-a2-q1 SCHOLION II commentator list (`Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica`) and closes mid-p.468 L-1 at `corpus eius subiectum fuit necessi-` followed by `ARTICULUS III.` at raw 32940.
- **Apparatus split — 14 entries.** p.466 R-2 ⁴–⁵ = [^1]–[^2] (Gen 3,1 textual variants + Vers.22 Vulgate full text); p.467 L-2 ¹–² = [^3]–[^4] (Richard de S. Vict. long *de Emmanuele* c.11+c.15 block with *sustentari/suscitari* variant + Pseudo-Augustine *Qq. veteris et novi Test.* cross-ref; Glossa Henoch-Elias multi-citation); p.467 R-2 ³–¹⁰ = [^5]–[^12] (Psalm 35,10 fons vitae + Scotus *humidum radicale* tom.I p.316 note 12 cross-ref + Vers.23 Vat. omission + Gen 3,19 + Psalm 48,13 *mortis/mortalitatis* variant + Aug. XIII *Civ. Dei* c.15+XIV c.15 + Boethius *Aeternitas interminabilis* + Aug. XIII c.20); p.468 L-2 ¹–² = [^13]–[^14] (Cod. aa *infirmari* variant + *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*).
- **No scholion** — per locked Vol II Override step 5, no-scholion is normal when the sibling's scholion covers both. Confirmed by p.468 L-2 footer ² (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*), directing reader to d19-a2-q1 SCHOLION I + II.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** (three): *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Solutio oppositorum.* (Also *Conclusio* + *Conclusio* as h3 + blockquote per locked corpus convention.)
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 14 anchors crisp at 450 dpi. OCR cascade-fragmentation around Respondeo ad-5 *quia voluntas facilius vertitur et revertitur quam natura. Secundo vero, quia fons vitae spiritualis* (raw 32919–32925 cascade-shattered diagonally) resolved via p.468 L-1 column-band PDF read per Vol II Override step 1.
- **Cross-chunk hand-off:** received nothing from d19-a2-q1 (p.466 L-2 ¹–³ + R-2 ¹–³ all anchor in q1 SCHOLION + commentator list). Forward hand-off to **d19-a3-q1**: p.468 L-2 footers ³ (Aristot. *Eud. Eth.* c.9 *Atque fere duobus a natura quippiam inesse determinamus*) + ⁴ (*Hic a. 2. q. 1.*) migrate forward as a3-q1's first two apparatus entries (they anchor at a3-q1 args 1 *nobis naturale, quod nobis inscitur* + 2 *sicut probatum est supra*).
- **OCR cosmetics silently corrected:** `QUAESTIO 11.` → *Quaestio II*; `Adani` → *Adam*; `peccanle` → *peccante*; `ulrum` → *utrum*; `iViwic` → *Nunc*; `lertio` → *tertio*; `vilae` → *vitae*; `aetenium` → *aeternum*; `siimsisset` → *sumsisset*; `Riciiardnm` → *Richardum*; `Habnit` → *Habuit*; `corruptiljilitatem` → *corruptibilitatem*; `sirailis` → *similis*; `iramortalem` → *immortalem*; `faclum` → *factum*; `consumtionem` → *consumtionem* [Quaracchi spelling]; `radicalis '` → footnote ⁴; `Sed coNTn.\` → *Sed contra*; `Stipemlia` → *Stipendia*; `niimdDupeecati` (cascade) → *peccati*; `ipsura` → *ipsum*; `posilnnim` → *posset*; `consnevit` → *consuevit*; `Qnamvis` → *Quamvis*; `aotequam` → *antequam*; `permanendurn` → *permanendum*; `eorpus` → *corpus*; `viviflcat` → *vivificat*; `cumtam` and `oupiei i` marginal-bleed strips stripped; `deflceret` → *deficeret*. Running heads p.467 / p.468 OCR-crisp via PDF.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether that immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.

source_text:
<!-- page 468 -->

### ARTICULUS III. *De immortalitate primi hominis quantum ad coniunctum.*

Consequenter quaeritur de immortalitate primi hominis quantum ad coniunctum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas inesset homini a natura, vel a gratia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas esset eadem per essentiam cum immortalitate gloriosa.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum immortalitas inesset homini a natura, vel a gratia.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry begins with **La.** for the original Latin and **En.** for the literal English rendering.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas esset a *natura*, vel a *gratia*. Et quod a natura, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Illud est nobis *naturale*, quod nobis innascitur, et cum quo nati sumus[^1]; sed homo cum illa immortalitate productus est, et illa immortalitas indita est homini a sua conditione: ergo fuit ei naturalis vel a natura.

2. Item, mors non poterat inesse homini, nisi praecedente culpa, sicut probatum est supra[^2]; sed culpa non poterat homini inesse, nisi deordinaretur natura: si ergo mors inerat homini contra naturam, immortalitas inerat ei per naturam.

3. Item, per hoc homo erat immortalis, per quod erat innocens; sed innocens erat ex conditione naturae; esto enim, quod nullam haberet gratiam, nihilominus tamen haberet innocentiam: ergo immortalis erat ex conditione naturae, non ex beneficio gratiae.

4. Item, immortalitas hominis consistit in continua coniunctione animae et corporis, continua autem coniunctio animae et corporis est per continuum appetitum unius ad alterum; sed anima habet continuum appetitum ad corpus, et e converso, per naturam absque gratia: ergo immortalitas inerat homini per naturam.

5. Item, idem est principium, per quod datur rei *esse*, et per quod in *esse* continuatur; sed anima rationalis, quae est forma per naturam immortalis et incorruptibilis, corpori dabat naturaliter *esse* et complementum[^3]: ergo et ipsius corporis sive hominis *esse* naturaliter continuabat; sed a quo in *esse* est continuatio, ab eodem est immortalitatis perpetuatio: ergo etc.

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6. Item, naturale est homini comedere ea quae sibi apponuntur; sed homo per esum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum paradisi vitam suam poterat perpetuare, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister[^4]: ergo videtur, quod hominis perpetuatio inerat homini per naturam.

**Sed contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Augustinus super Genesim, et Magister dicit in littera[^5]: «Creatus est homo immortalis, quod erat ei de ligno vitae, non de conditione naturae; mortalis erat conditione corporis animalis, immortalis beneficio Conditoris». Et idem ipse Augustinus expressius dicit, quod sicut praestitum fuit filiis Israel, quod in quadraginta annis vestimenta eorum non veterascerent, ita praestitum fuit Adae, ut non moreretur.

2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo[^6]: *Exspoliaverunt eum, et plagis impositis* etc., Glossa exponit de primo homine, quem dicit expoliatum fuisse gratuitis et vulneratum in naturalibus: si ergo immortalitas non fuit vulnerata, sed simpliciter ablata ipsi homini per culpam, ergo non inerat ei a natura, sed a gratia.

3. Item, hoc videtur *ratione*. Proprietates naturales non derelinquunt subiectum propter culpam[^7]: ergo si immortalitas inerat homini a natura, non videtur, quod debuerit eum relinquere propter culpam; quodsi eam amisit, patet etc.

4. Item, impossibile est, duo opposita inesse eidem secundum eadem principia, maxime secundum principia naturaliter causantia, quae non inclinant ad opposita[^8]; sed homo per naturam suam poterat mori: ergo aut immortalis non erat, aut si erat, non erat per naturam, sed per gratiam solum.

5. Item, corpus Adae per naturam propriam erat nobiliter complexionatum, ergo molles et teneras carnes habebat; sed naturaliter molle cedit duro: ergo per naturam corpus Adae vulnerari poterat et secari: ergo per naturam Adam non erat immortalis.

6. Item, ignis naturaliter consumit corpus ex elementis quatuor constitutum, et corpus animale per naturam indiget aspiratione et respiratione[^9]: ergo, si homo caderet in aquam vel in ignem et non moreretur, hoc non esset *per virtutem naturae*, sed potius *contra* vel *supra*: non ergo esset a natura, sed potius ex gratia.

### Conclusio.

> *Immortalitas Adae in statu innocentiae quoad aptitudinem erat a natura, sed quoad completionem a gratia.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^10], circa hoc multiplex et varia fuit opinio. *Opinio duplex.* Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod immortalitas primi hominis esset a *natura*; quidam, quod esset a *gratia*. Utraque autem harum opinionum habuit aliquam efficacem rationem moventem, et utraque habet aliquid veritatis, licet una plus habeat quam altera. — *Exemplum.* Sicut enim, cum dicitur: homo est *beatificabilis*, duo tanguntur, et *aptitudo* et *dispositio*; ita etiam, cum dicitur: homo est *immortalis*. Unde, sicut homo quodam modo potest dici *beatificabilis per naturam*, quodam modo *per gratiam*; sic et in proposito. Prout enim hoc quod est *beatificabile* importat *aptitudinem*, sic inest homini *per naturam*; homo enim a natura sua habet *aptitudinem* ad beatitudinem. Secundum autem quod importat *dispositionem sufficientem*[^11], per quam quis pervenit ad beatitudinem, sive sufficientem ordinem ad *actum*, sic inest homini non *per naturam*, sed *per gratiam*, per quam sufficienter disponitur ad gloriam, nec sine illa potest sufficere natura. — *Conclusio.* Sic et in proposito *immortalis* quantum ad statum innocentiae dici poterat homo *per naturam*, immortalis etiam *per gratiam*, quia a natura habebat *aptitudinem*, sed a gratia habebat *completionem*.

Et hoc patet sic. *Triplex causa mortis.* Tripliciter enim potest mors homini contingere: aut per *elementorum* pugnam et dissolutionem, aut per *humidi*[^12] consumtionem, aut per *extrinsecam laesionem*. Immortalitas ergo dicit privationem huius triplicis modi moriendi quantum ad *actum* et *potentiam* in *Beatis*, qui dicuntur immortales, quia non possunt mori; quantum ad *actum* vero solum in *hominibus institutis*, qui dicuntur immortales, quia poterant non mori hoc triplici genere moriendi: habebant enim aptitudinem evadendi hoc triplex genus mortis per id quod habebant a natura.

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*Quoad 1. genus mortis.* Nam corpus valde bene erat complexionatum, et anima de se incorruptibilis erat, quae illud corpus regebat et conservabat; et ita idoneus erat primus homo ex his constitutus, quod nunquam deficeret per *elementorum pugnam*. Sed tamen illud non sufficiebat; hoc enim non posset anima peccatrix facere, si poneretur in consimili corpore[^13]. *Accedit donum gratiae.* Et ideo datum fuit illi animae donum *gratiae*, per quam posset corpori praesidere et illud regere et elementa quasi in quadam amicitia custodire, et hoc, quamdiu vellet, suo auctori subiacere. Hoc autem donum gratiae vocat Anselmus[^14] *iustitiam originalem*. Et sic patet, quod quantum ad immortalitatem contra primum genus moriendi *aptitudinem* habebat a *natura*, sed *complementum* a *gratia*.

*Quoad 2. genus.* Similiter quantum ad *secundum* genus moriendi, quod est per *humidi consumtionem*. Vis enim nutritiva potens erat ad convertendum alimentum sibi sufficiens, et alimenta efficacem habebant virtutem ad nutriendum; et ex hoc homo idoneus erat, ut conservaretur in eo sine corruptione humidum naturale. Sed quia humidum radicale paulative consumitur nec potest reparari per quodcumque alimentum: *Accedit vis ligni vitae.* ideo data est virtus specialis cuidam ligno, quod dictum est *lignum vitae*, per cuius sumtionem repararetur humidum radicale. Et hoc quidem non fuit ex *conditione naturae*, sed ex *beneficio Conditoris*, sicut dicit Augustinus.

*Quoad 3. genus.* Similiter et quantum ad *tertium* genus, quod quidem fit per *extrinsecam laesionem*. Adam enim fortis et potens erat ad repellendum nociva, sapiens et diligens ad praecavenda, nec habebat nociva extrinseca; et ideo *idoneitatem* habebat, ut per nullius laesionem incurreret mortem. Verumtamen quod bestiae, et si qua alia[^15] sunt, quae nocere possent, ipsum omnino non laederent, nec in somno nec in vigilia; *Accedit specialis providentia.* hoc non erat a *natura*, sed a Dei *speciali providentia*, quae ita eum custodiebat, ut sub pedibus eius omnia subiacerent[^16], ut nihil cuperet ipsum offendere, et si cuperet, non valeret.

Et sic patet, quod immortalitas, quae fuit in statu innocentiae, quantum ad *aptitudinem* fuit a *natura*, quantum ad *complementum* fuit a *gratia*. — Et per hoc pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta. Rationes enim, quae probant, quod non fuit simpliciter a natura, concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod fuit a natura, quia fuit ei innata; dicendum, quod non omne quod inest homini a principio suae nativitatis, *naturale* est, nisi extendatur hoc nomen *naturale*; multa enim bona gratis data concreantur et dantur cum natura, sicut planum est. Et ideo illud non valet.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mors non poterat intervenire, nisi praevia culpa; dicendum, quod hoc non erat solum propter *naturam*, sed propter *beneficium gratiae*, quod erat naturae superadditum. Quia enim originalis iustitia faciebat, naturam immortalem esse, et hanc non poterat perdere nisi per culpam; ideo mors non poterat intervenire nisi per culpam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod innocentia erat a natura, ergo similiter et immortalitas; dicendum, quod *innocentia* dupliciter potest dici: uno modo *privative*, quia privat culpam; alio modo *positive*, quia ponit iustitiam contrariam. *Distinctio notanda.* Innocentia autem non erat causa immortalitatis, secundum quod dicit puram *privationem*, sed secundum quod importat *originalem iustitiam*, merito cuius erat in anima vis totius corporis contentiva.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod continuatio vitae est ex coniunctione animae et corporis; dicendum, quod ad continuationem vitae non sufficit appetitus, sicut ad beatificationem non sufficit appetere beatitudinem; sed necessaria est ulterius virtus ad satisfaciendum appetitui. Omnis enim natura appetit *esse* et durare, non solum hominum, sed etiam brutorum[^17]; non tamen in omnibus est immortalitas. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi a natura sit continuatio appetitus, quod a natura sit continuatio immortalitatis.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod ab eodem est datio *esse*, et conservatio. Dicendum enim, quod etsi illud sit verum de *conservatione*, quae est ad tempus, non tamen est verum de *perpetuatione*; multa enim sunt, quae possunt dare *esse*, et tamen non possunt *perpetuare*[^18].

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod per esum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum poterat in <!-- page 471 -->*esse* conservari; dicendum, quod ista non erat tota causa; immo necessaria erat divina virtus protegens et prohibens nociva, et interior virtus conservans et concilians contraria. *Praeterea*, quod lignum vitae talem effectum haberet, hoc speciale donum erat Dei; sicut etiam, quod tanto tempore vestimenta et calceamenta populi Israel potuerunt sibi praebere obsequia. Et sic patet illud[^19].

english:
### ARTICLE III. *On the immortality of the first man as regards the composite [of soul and body].*

Next there is inquired about the immortality of the first man as regards the composite. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether that immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.

Second it is asked whether that immortality was the same in essence as glorious immortality.

### QUESTION I. *Whether immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.*

Concerning the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether that immortality was from *nature* or from *grace*. And that it was from nature, it seems.

*On the opposing side.*

1. That is *natural* to us which is innate in us and with which we are born[^1]; but man was produced with that immortality, and that immortality was instilled in him from his constitution: therefore it was natural to him, or from nature.

2. Likewise, death could not be in man unless culpability preceded, as has been proved above[^2]; but culpability could not be in man unless nature were disordered: therefore if death was in man contrary to nature, immortality was in him through nature.

3. Likewise, man was immortal through that by which he was innocent; but he was innocent from the constitution of nature; for grant that he had no grace, he would nonetheless still have innocence: therefore he was immortal from the constitution of nature, not from the benefit of grace.

4. Likewise, the immortality of man consists in the continuous union of soul and body, but the continuous union of soul and body is through the continuous appetite of one for the other; but the soul has a continuous appetite for the body, and conversely, through nature without grace: therefore immortality was in man through nature.

5. Likewise, the same is the principle by which *being* is given to a thing, and by which it is continued in *being*; but the rational soul, which is by nature an immortal and incorruptible form, naturally gave to the body *being* and completion[^3]: therefore it also naturally continued the *being* of the body itself, or of man; but from that from which the continuation in *being* comes, from the same is the perpetuation of immortality: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is natural for man to eat the things set before him; but man through the eating of the tree of life and of the other trees of paradise was able to perpetuate his life, as Augustine and the Master say[^4]: therefore it seems that man's perpetuation was in man through nature.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations.*

1. Augustine on Genesis, and the Master says in the text[^5]: «Man was created immortal, which belonged to him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature; he was mortal by the condition of the animal body, immortal by the benefit of the Creator». And the same Augustine says more expressly that just as it was granted to the sons of Israel that during forty years their garments did not wear out, so it was granted to Adam that he should not die.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Luke ch. 10[^6]: *They stripped him, and inflicted wounds upon him,* etc., the Gloss interprets it of the first man, whom it says was stripped of the gratuitous gifts and wounded in the natural ones: if therefore immortality was not wounded but simply taken away from man himself through culpability, therefore it was not in him from nature, but from grace.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by reason*. Natural properties do not abandon their subject on account of culpability[^7]: therefore if immortality was in man from nature, it does not seem that it ought to have left him on account of culpability; but if he lost it, it is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible for two opposites to be in the same subject according to the same principles, especially according to principles naturally causing, which do not incline toward opposites[^8]; but man through his own nature could die: therefore either he was not immortal, or if he was, he was not [so] through nature, but through grace alone.

5. Likewise, Adam's body, through its own nature, was nobly composed, therefore he had soft and tender flesh; but naturally what is soft yields to what is hard: therefore through nature Adam's body could be wounded and cut: therefore through nature Adam was not immortal.

6. Likewise, fire naturally consumes a body constituted of the four elements, and the animal body by nature requires inhalation and respiration[^9]: therefore if man fell into water or into fire and did not die, this would not be *through the power of nature*, but rather *against* or *above* it: therefore it would not be from nature, but rather from grace.

### Conclusion.

> *Adam's immortality in the state of innocence as regards aptitude was from nature, but as regards completion from grace.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^10], on this matter there was a manifold and varied opinion. *A twofold opinion.* For some have wished to say that the immortality of the first man was from *nature*; others, that it was from *grace*. Both of these opinions had some efficacious moving reason, and each has some truth, although one has more than the other. — *An example.* For just as when it is said: man is *beatifiable*, two things are touched on, both *aptitude* and *disposition*; so likewise when it is said: man is *immortal*. Hence, just as man in one way can be called *beatifiable through nature*, and in another way *through grace*; so also in the matter at hand. For insofar as that which is *beatifiable* implies *aptitude*, it belongs to man *through nature*; for man from his nature has *aptitude* for beatitude. But according as it implies *sufficient disposition*[^11], by which one arrives at beatitude, or sufficient order to the *act*, thus it belongs to man not *through nature*, but *through grace*, by which he is sufficiently disposed for glory, nor without it can nature suffice. — *Conclusion.* So also in the matter at hand, as regards the state of innocence, man could be called *immortal through nature*, and also *immortal through grace*, because from nature he had the *aptitude*, but from grace he had the *completion*.

And this is clear as follows. *Threefold cause of death.* For death can happen to man in three ways: either through the conflict and dissolution of the *elements*, or through the consumption of the *moisture*[^12], or through *extrinsic injury*. Immortality therefore signifies the privation of this threefold mode of dying as regards *act* and *potency* in the *Blessed*, who are called immortal because they cannot die; but as regards only the *act* in the *men in their original state*, who are called immortal because they were able not to die by this threefold kind of dying: for they had the aptitude to escape this threefold kind of death through that which they had from nature.

*As regards the 1st kind of death.* For the body was very well composed, and the soul was of itself incorruptible, which ruled and preserved that body; and so the first man was, constituted of these, suited never to fail through the *conflict of the elements*. But yet that was not sufficient; for a sinful soul could not do this, if it were placed in a similar body[^13]. *Grace's gift is added.* And therefore there was given to that soul the gift of *grace*, by which it might preside over the body and rule it and guard the elements as in a kind of friendship, and this, as long as it willed, by being subject to its Author. Now this gift of grace Anselm[^14] calls *original justice*. And thus it is clear that, as regards immortality against the first kind of dying, he had the *aptitude* from *nature*, but the *completion* from *grace*.

*As regards the 2nd kind.* Likewise as regards the *second* kind of dying, which is through the *consumption of the moisture*. For the nutritive power was capable of converting sufficient food for itself, and the foods had efficacious power to nourish; and from this man was suited to have the natural moisture preserved in him without corruption. But because the radical moisture is gradually consumed and cannot be repaired by any food whatsoever: *The power of the tree of life is added.* therefore a special power was given to a certain tree, which is called *the tree of life*, through whose eating the radical moisture would be repaired. And this indeed was not from the *condition of nature*, but from the *benefit of the Creator*, as Augustine says.

*As regards the 3rd kind.* Likewise also as regards the *third* kind, which indeed comes about through *extrinsic injury*. For Adam was strong and powerful to repel harmful things, wise and diligent to take precautions, nor did he have extrinsic harms; and therefore he had the *suitability* that he might not incur death through the injury of anything. Yet that beasts, and if there were any other things[^15] that could harm, did not harm him at all, neither in sleep nor in waking; *Special providence is added.* this was not from *nature*, but from God's *special providence*, which thus guarded him, that all things should be under his feet[^16], so that nothing should desire to offend him, and if it did desire, it would not be able.

And so it is clear that the immortality which was in the state of innocence, as regards *aptitude* was from *nature*, and as regards *completion* was from *grace*. — And through this for the most part the response to the objections is clear. For the reasons that prove that it was not simply from nature are to be conceded, because they conclude truly.

*Solution of the objections.*

1. To what is objected, that it was from nature because it was innate to him; it must be said that not everything that is in man from the beginning of his nativity is *natural*, unless this name *natural* be extended; for many goods given freely are co-created and given with nature, as is plain. And therefore that does not hold.

2. To what is objected, that death could not intervene without preceding culpability; it must be said that this was not solely on account of *nature*, but on account of the *benefit of grace*, which was superadded to nature. For because original justice made nature to be immortal, and he could not lose this except through culpability; therefore death could not intervene except through culpability.

3. To what is objected, that innocence was from nature, therefore likewise also immortality; it must be said that *innocence* can be spoken of in two ways: in one way *privatively*, because it excludes culpability; in another way *positively*, because it posits the contrary justice. *Distinction to be noted.* Now innocence was not the cause of immortality according as it expresses mere *privation*, but according as it implies *original justice*, by the merit of which there was in the soul a power containing the whole body.

4. To what is objected, that the continuation of life is from the union of soul and body; it must be said that for the continuation of life appetite does not suffice, just as for beatification it does not suffice to desire beatitude; but a power further is necessary to satisfy the appetite. For every nature desires *to be* and to endure, not only of men, but also of brutes[^17]; yet not in all is there immortality. And therefore it does not follow that, if continuation of appetite is from nature, then continuation of immortality is from nature.

5. And through this the response is clear to the other objection, that from the same source is the giving of *being* and the conservation. For it must be said that, though that be true of *conservation*, which is for a time, yet it is not true of *perpetuation*; for there are many things that can give *being*, and yet cannot *perpetuate*[^18] it.

6. To what is objected lastly, that through the eating of the tree of life and of other trees he was able to be preserved in *being*; it must be said that that was not the whole cause; rather divine power was necessary, protecting and prohibiting harmful things, and interior power conserving and reconciling contraries. *Moreover*, that the tree of life had such effect, this was a special gift of God; just as also, that for so long a time the garments and shoes of the people of Israel were able to render service to them. And thus that is clear[^19].

la: Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 9. (c. 8.) ait: *Atque his fere duobus a natura quippiam inesse determinamus*, eo scil. quod a nativitate statim omnibus inest, et quod, generatione existente, facile consequimur.

en: Aristotle, II *Eudemian Ethics* c. 9 (c. 8) says: *And by these two indications above all we determine that something is in [a thing] from nature* — namely, that which is immediately in all things from birth, and that which, once generation has taken place, we easily attain. *(p.468 L-2 footer 3 — forwarded from d19-a2-q2 hand-off.)*

en: Here a. 2 q. 1. *(p.468 L-2 footer 4 — forwarded from d19-a2-q2 hand-off: cross-reference to d19-a2-q1, where the proof that death required preceding culpability was set out.)*

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 perperam *animae*. In fine arg. Vat. addit *absque gratia*.

en: Quite a few codices, with ed. 1, wrongly read *animae* ("of the soul"). At the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds *absque gratia* ("without grace"). *(p.468 R-2 footer 5.)*

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 36. seq. (c. 4.), ubi ostenditur, animam esse causam corporis viventis in triplici genere causae, scil. formalis, finalis et efficientis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 36 ff. (c. 4), where it is shown that the soul is the cause of the living body in a threefold genus of cause, namely formal, final, and efficient.

la: Hic c. 6 et infra d. XXIX. c. 6., ubi et verba Augustini exhibentur. — In seq. prop., quae in ed. 1 desideratur, Vat. cum aliis edd. et paucis codd. *omnis* pro *hominis*.

en: Here c. 6 and below d. XXIX c. 6, where the words of Augustine are also displayed. — In the following proposition, which is missing in ed. 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions and a few codices reads *omnis* ("of every [man]") for *hominis* ("of man").

la: Hic c. 4., ubi et verba Augustini. — Seq. textus Augustini est ex l. de Peccatorum meritis et remiss. et de bapt. parvul. c. 3. n. 3: *Si enim Deus Israelitarum vestimentis et calceamentis praestitit, quod per tot annos non sunt obtrita* (Deut. 29, 3.), *quid mirum, si obedienti homini eiusdem potentia praestaretur, ut, animale ac mortale habens corpus, haberet in eo quendam statum, quo sine defectu esset annosus, tempore, quo Deus vellet, a mortalitate ad immortalitatem sine media morte venturus?*

en: Here c. 4, where also the words of Augustine. — The following text of Augustine is from the book *On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Little Ones* c. 3 n. 3: *For if God provided to the Israelites' garments and shoes that for so many years they were not worn out* (Deut. 29:5), *what wonder, if to the obedient man the power of the same were granted, that, having an animal and mortal body, he should have in it a certain state in which without defect he should be aged, ready to come, at the time God willed, from mortality to immortality without an intermediate death?*

la: Vers. 30. — Glossam, quae est ex Beda (super Evang. Luc.), vide apud Lyranum.

en: Verse 30. — For the Gloss, which is from Bede (on the Gospel of Luke), see in Lyra.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 122, nota 8. — Paulo inferius pro *relinquere* aliqui codd. et ed. 1 *derelinquere*.

en: Cf. above p. 122 note 8. — A little further down, for *relinquere* ("to leave") some codices and ed. 1 read *derelinquere* ("to abandon").

la: Vide supra pag. 100, nota 1. — In hac prop. post *eadem principia* Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 addit *et*.

en: See above p. 100 note 1. — In this proposition, after *eadem principia* the Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, adds *et*.

la: Quod ostensum est supra d. 17. a. 2. q. 3.

en: What was shown above, d. 17 a. 2 q. 3.

la: Vide supra pag. 464, nota 6.

en: See above p. 464 note 6.

la: Hic c. 4. seq.

en: Here c. 4 ff.

la: Vat. cum ceteris edd. (exc. 1) et nonnullis codd. addit *et propinquam*.

en: The Vatican edition with the other editions (except 1) and several codices adds *et propinquam* ("and proximate").

la: Cod. 1 *humidi radicalis*. Aliquanto inferius pro *hominibus institutis* plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *hominibus constitutis*.

en: Codex 1: *humidi radicalis* ("of the radical moisture"). Somewhat further down, for *hominibus institutis* most codices and edd. 1, 2 read *hominibus constitutis*.

la: Sensus est: si haec, scil. regere et conservare tale corpus, ex parte animae essent quid mere naturale, tunc anima quoque peccatrix ista praestare posset; sed non potest, quia mors secuta est peccatum.

en: The sense is: if these — namely to rule and conserve such a body — on the part of the soul were something merely natural, then the sinful soul also could provide these things; but it cannot, because death followed sin.

la: De Conceptu virgin. et origin. peccat. c. 1, ubi duplex vis vocis *originalis* distinguitur, respectu scilicet *iustitiae* et respectu *peccati*. Dicit enim auctor: *originale* «videtur dici aut ab originale humanae naturae… aut ab origine, hoc est ab origine uniuscuiusque personae… Sed quod [originale peccatum] ab initio humanae naturae descendat, non videtur; quoniam origo illius iusta fuit, quando primi parentes iusti facti sunt sine omni peccato. Videtur itaque dici *originale* ab ipsa origine uniuscuiusque personae humanae… Simili ratione potest dici *originalis* et *personalis* iustitia: siquidem Adam et Eva originaliter, hoc est in ipso sui initio, mox ut homines exstiterunt, sine intervallo, iusti simul fuerunt. *Personalis* autem dici potest iustitia, cum iniustus accipit iustitiam, quam ab origine non habuit». — Paulo superius pro *et illud regere* plures codd. *et illud agere*.

en: *On the Conception of the Virgin and on Original Sin* c. 1, where the twofold force of the word *original* is distinguished, namely with respect to *justice* and with respect to *sin*. For the author says: *original* «seems to be said either from the origin of human nature… or from the origin, that is, from the origin of each person… But that [original sin] descends from the beginning of human nature, does not seem [to be the case]; since its origin was just, when the first parents were made just, without any sin. It seems therefore to be called *original* from the very origin of each human person… By a similar reason there can be called both an *original* and a *personal* justice: since Adam and Eve originally — that is, in their very beginning, as soon as they existed as men, without interval — were at the same time just. But it can be called *personal* justice, when an unjust person receives justice which he did not have from his origin». — A little above, for *et illud regere* ("and to rule it") several codices read *et illud agere* ("and to act upon it").

la: Vat. cum ceteris edd. *si qua animalia*.

en: The Vatican edition with the other editions: *si qua animalia* ("if any animals").

la: Psalm. 8, 8: *Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius*.

en: Psalm 8:8: *Thou hast subjected all things under his feet*.

la: Quod fusius exponit Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11. De prop. praeced. cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Which Boethius expounds more fully, III *On Consolation* prose 11. On the preceding proposition cf. above a. 1 q. 1 ad 1. — See below d. 37 a. 1 q. 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione S. Bonav. iam praeiudicavit errorem Baii, a S. Pio V. damnatum (prop. 78.): «Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis conditio» (cfr. ibid. prop. 6. et prop. 17. synodi Pistoriensis, damnata a Pio VI.). — Triplici generi mortis (sive tribus modis et causis corruptionis hic in resp. relatis) a S. Thoma (hic q. unica a. 4.) additur quartum, scil. quod «res materiales habent virtutem finitam ad essendum». — Doctrinam huius quaestionis fere totam S. Doctor accepit ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. II. q. 88. m. 2.). — Scotus (hic in utroque Scripto) Seraphico Doctori, cui concordat S. Thomas, non consentit quoad doctrinam in solut. ad 2. et 3. contentam, scil. in eo, quod beneficium gratiae, quod erat naturae superadditum, per se et intrinsecus faciebat naturam immortalem, ita ut mors non posset intervenire nisi per culpam. Docet enim Scot., quod status innocentiae sive iustitiae originalis *formaliter* non repugnet morti, quae secundum statum *naturae purae* homini fuisset omnino naturalis, sicut animalibus; unde tunc non poena culpae esset, sed conditio naturae. Sed secundum *statum iustitiae originalis*, donis supernaturalibus exornatum, mors dicitur poena peccati, quatenus sequitur spoliationem donorum gratuitorum. Porro secundum doctrinam Scoti illa dona non excludebant formaliter *potentiam* moriendi, sed tantum *actum*, ob hanc rationem, «quia quilibet fuisset translatus in paradisum, antequam fuisset alteratus alteratione improportionata animae sive formae» (hic q. unica n. 5.). In fine autem (ad ult.) idem dicit, «quod stante illo statu, si Deus non transtulisset homines modo, quo dictum est, si fuissent mortui, non fuisset plus poena in hominibus quam in brutis» (cfr. Comment. Lycheti et supra a. 2. q. 1. schol.).

**II.** Praeter auctores citatos; S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 4; S. I. q. 97. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

**III.** Sequens quaestio facile ex praedictis solvitur, unde a multis Commentatoribus Lombardi explicite non tractatur. De ea disputant in eadem sententia, sed non omnes eisdem modis loquendi: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this question St. Bonaventure already anticipated the error of Baius, condemned by St. Pius V (prop. 78): «The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but a natural condition» (cf. ibid. prop. 6 and prop. 17 of the synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI). — To the threefold kind of death (or three modes and causes of corruption here related in the response) St. Thomas (here q. unica a. 4) adds a fourth, namely that «material things have a finite power for being». — Almost the entire doctrine of this question the holy Doctor received from Alexander of Hales (S. p. II q. 88 m. 2). — Scotus (here in either Scriptum) does not agree with the Seraphic Doctor, with whom St. Thomas concords, as regards the doctrine contained in the solutions to 2 and 3, namely in this, that the benefit of grace, which was superadded to nature, of itself and intrinsically made nature immortal, in such wise that death could not intervene except through culpability. For Scotus teaches that the state of innocence or original justice does not *formally* repugn to death, which according to the state of *pure nature* would have been wholly natural to man, as it is for animals; whence then it would not be a penalty of culpability, but the condition of nature. But according to the *state of original justice*, adorned with supernatural gifts, death is called the penalty of sin, inasmuch as it follows from the stripping of the gratuitous gifts. Further, according to Scotus's doctrine those gifts did not formally exclude the *potency* of dying, but only the *act*, for this reason, that «each one would have been translated into paradise before he had been altered by an alteration disproportionate to the soul or form» (here q. unica n. 5). At the end (ad ult.) he says the same thing, «that with that state standing, if God had not translated men in the manner stated, if they had died, there would not have been more penalty in men than in brutes» (cf. Comment. of Lychetus and above a. 2 q. 1 schol.).

**II.** Besides the cited authors: St. Thom., here q. unica a. 4; S. I q. 97 a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 2 a. 3. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3.

**III.** The following question is easily solved from what has been said, whence by many Commentators of Lombard it is not explicitly treated. They dispute about it in the same sense, but not all in the same modes of speaking: Alex. Hal., S. p. II q. 88 m. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3 a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 2 a. 4.

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translators_notes:
- **Cross-chunk hand-off received:** Per the d19-a2-q2 forward hand-off note, p.468 L-2 footers ³ + ⁴ migrate forward into this q1 as [^1]–[^2]. (p.468 L-2 footers ¹ + ² — Cod. aa *infirmari* variant and *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* — anchor in Q2 and stay with d19-a2-q2 as its [^13]–[^14] per that session.) Footer ³ anchors arg. 1 *cum quo nati sumus*; footer ⁴ anchors arg. 2 *probatum est supra*.
- **Page-split map for apparatus (19 entries):** p.468 L-2 ³–⁴ → [^1]–[^2]; p.468 R-2 ⁵ → [^3]; p.469 L-2 ¹ + R-2 ²–³ → [^4]–[^6]; p.469 R-2 ⁴–¹⁰ → [^7]–[^13]; p.470 L-2 ¹–² → [^14]–[^15]; p.470 R-2 ³–⁶ → [^16]–[^19]. (Boethius + d.37 cross-refs merged into [^19] as they anchor jointly at *Et sic patet illud* / *perpetuare*; the underlying printed footer ⁶ carries both notes.)
- **ARTICULUS III opener folded** into this Q1 per the locked Vol II Override step 5 (a short ARTICULUS opener `Consequenter… quaeruntur duo…` is folded into the article's q1).
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I (doctrinal: anticipation of Baius prop. 78 / Pius V condemnation + Pius VI synod of Pistoia + St. Thomas's fourth mode of corruption *res materiales habent virtutem finitam ad essendum* + dependence on Alexander of Hales + the long Scotus disagreement on solut. ad 2/3 — *formaliter non repugnet morti* + *statum naturae purae* vs *statum iustitiae originalis* + Lychetus cross-ref to a.2 q.1 schol.); SCHOLION II (standard commentator list); SCHOLION III (note that the *sequens quaestio* — i.e. d19-a3-q2 — is easily solved from this and not separately treated by many commentators, with a sibling-commentator list).
- **No `[?]` flags** — all 19 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.468–471. OCR around raw 32940–33151 two-column cascade-fragmented through the *Triplex causa mortis.* Respondeo block (Quoad 1–3 *genus*) and the SCHOLION I Scotus block; column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override step 1.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** per locked Vol II convention (fourteen labels): *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Opinio duplex.*, *Exemplum.*, *Conclusio.*, *Triplex causa mortis.*, *Quoad 1. genus mortis.*, *Accedit donum gratiae.*, *Quoad 2. genus.*, *Accedit vis ligni vitae.*, *Quoad 3. genus.*, *Accedit specialis providentia.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Distinctio notanda.*
- **Forward hand-off to d19-a3-q2:** none. d19-a3-q2 opens p.471 R-1 at raw 33152 with `QUAESTIO II.` + italic title *Utrum immortalitas innocentiae eadem per essentiam fuisset cum immortalitate gloriae.* and its own fresh apparatus block beginning on p.471 R-2.