title: Dist. 43, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De speciebus et differentiis huius peccati.*
### Quaestio II. *De speciebus huius peccati quoad rationes proprias.*

Secundo quaeritur de speciebus huius peccati quantum ad rationes proprias, et ostenditur, quod nulla istarum sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum.

1. Et primo de *desperatione*: quia peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est ex certa malitia; sed desperatio potius est ex infirmitate quam ex malitia: ergo videtur, quod desperatio non sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. *Si tu dicas*, quod saltem potest esse species, in quantum est ex malitia; *obiicitur* contra hoc: quia qui desperat cogitat in corde suo, quod maior est iniquitas sua quam Dei misericordia[^1]; et omnis talis errat et decipitur: ergo omnis desperatio ortum habet ex ignorantia: ergo non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum.

2. Secundo ostenditur hoc ipsum de *praesumtione*: quia frequenter praesumit quis potius ex confidentia vel audacia quam ex malitia: ergo non videtur esse species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. *Si tu dicas*, quod non est species, nisi in quantum procedit ex malitia; *obiicitur* contra hoc: quia praesumtio, undecumque procedat, species superbiae est, quae est capitale peccatum[^2]: ergo non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum.

3. Tertio ostenditur hoc ipsum de *obstinatione*: quia « obstinatio est induratae mentis in malitia pertinacia, per quam fit homo impoenitens[^3] »: si ergo induratio mentis venit ex permansione in peccato, et permansio in peccato non sit species peccati, sed potius circumstantia; videtur, quod obstinatio non sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. *Si tu dicas*, quod obstinatio, secundum quod est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, non tantum dicit permansionem, sed etiam dicit novum actum et motum; *obiicitur* contra hoc, quia actus ille non est aliud quam voluntas manendi in peccato: ergo non est aliud quam impoenitentia: ergo videtur, quod obstinatio non sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum ab impoenitentia distincta.

4. Quarto ostenditur hoc ipsum de *impugnatione veritatis agnitae*: quia frequenter veritas agnita impugnatur ex verecundia, quia homo timet confundi, quando dicit[^4] falsum: ergo videtur, quod non sit species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. *Si tu dicas*, quod non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, nisi quando est ex malitia; *obiicitur* contra hoc: quia tam veritas quam veritatis agnitio Filio appropriatur: ergo potius debet dici impugnatio veritatis agnitae peccatum in Filium quam peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

5. Quinto loco ostenditur hoc ipsum de *invidentia fraternae gratiae*: quia aliquis invidet alii ex corruptione naturae: ergo si omne peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est ex malitia, videtur, quod ista non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum. *Si tu dicas*, quod hoc modo est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quo modo procedit ex malitia; *obiicitur* contra hoc: quia invidentia fraternae gratiae semper continetur sub invidia, quod est peccatum capitale: ergo videtur, quod invidentia fraternae gratiae reducatur ad peccatum capitale et non sit[^5] peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

6. Sexto et ultimo ostenditur illud idem de *impoenitentia*: quia aliquis non poenitet, quia nescit se peccasse: ergo videtur, quod aliqua impoenitentia sit ex ignorantia: ergo non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quod universaliter est ex malitia[^6]. *Si tu dicas*, quod tunc est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quando est ex certa scientia; *obiicitur* contra hoc: quia scientia non variat genus peccati, cum sit circumstantia: si ergo impoenitentia procedens ex ignorantia non est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, videtur, quod nec impoenitentia procedens ex certa scientia.

### Conclusio.

> Istae sex species non nominant peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, nisi quatenus sunt ex malitia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quemadmodum in operibus[^7] meritoriis caritas dat formam, ita quod nihil est meritorium, nisi ex caritate procedat; sic intelligendum est in peccato in Spiritum sanctum, quod malitia dat formam huic peccato; unde nihil dicendum est esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, nisi quod ex certa malitia procedit. Et quoniam fere omnes actus animae, qui procedunt ex certa malitia, possunt procedere ex infirmitate et ignorantia; et nomina peccatorum imponuntur ab actibus[^8]: hinc est, quod nullum nomen praedictarum specierum est impositum alicui earum, secundum quod est <!-- page 995 --> praecise peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Et propterea in omnibus opus est hac generali et communi distinctione, ut dicamus, quod ista sex nominent peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, secundum quod sunt ex malitia. Si autem sint praeter malitiam, utpote ex ignorantia et infirmitate, tunc non sunt peccata in Spiritum sanctum. Hoc autem melius patet, si ad singula descendamus.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de *desperatione*, quod potest esse ex infirmitate; dicendum, quod aliquando desperat aliquis ex pusillanimitate, ita quod in ipsa desperatione non invenit complacentiam, sed dolet et renititur contra ipsam; et tunc non est dicendum esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia ex tali desperatione non proiicitur homo in profundum[^9]. — Est et alia desperatio, qua quis desperat *definitive*, abscondens se quasi a facie divinae misericordiae, secundum quod fecit Cain[^10], qui dixit: *Ecce, a facie tua eiicis me hodie*; et haec semper est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia est in contumeliam divinae misericordiae, cui suam praefert iniquitatem, sicut dixit Cain: *Maior est iniquitas mea* etc. Ex hoc tamen non iudicatur infidelis, aut quia talis bene sentit de aliis, sed male de se; aut certe quia non aestimat, Deum misereri non *posse*, sed potius misereri *nolle*; et tale peccatum semper habet coniunctam malitiam, pro eo quod qui sic desperat in tali culpa vult vitam suam finire; unde tales desperatissimi frequentissime sibi ipsis inferunt mortem[^11].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *praesumtione*, dicendum, quod est praesumtio de meritis et praesumtio de impunitate. Prima praesumtio, qua quis praesumit de meritis suis sive de aliquo, quod habet in se, est peccatum superbiae[^12]. Secunda vero praesumtio, qua quis praesumit de impunitate, dans totum divinae misericordiae et auferens ei omnino rigorem iustitiae, hoc est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia claudit viam ad gratiam et viam ampliat ad peccatum; et sic patet, quod aliter pertinet ad peccatum capitale, aliter ad peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *obstinatione*, quod obstinatio dicit permansionem in malo; dicendum, quod obstinatio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur obstinatio continua permansio in culpa. Alio modo dicitur obstinatio voluntas complacens sibi in culpa perpetrata et priorem culpam non detestans, sed approbans; et hoc modo dicit *actum*, actum, inquam, procedentem ex malitia; ideo est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Differt autem ab impoenitentia, secundum quod hic accipitur proprie; nam unum est respectu praeteriti, et reliquum respectu futuri. Et quamvis una sit virtus, cuius est « praeterita plangere et plangenda non committere[^13] », tamen circa istos duos actus possunt esse diversa vitia; sicut largitas, cum sit una virtus, tamen secundum duos actus, qui ad ipsam concurrunt, videlicet *dare* et *tenere*, habet duo vitia opposita, videlicet prodigalitatem et avaritiam.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *impugnatione veritatis agnitae*; dicendum, quod veritas agnita tripliciter potest intelligi impugnari: aut propter ipsam *veritatem*, aut propter ipsum *dicentem*, aut propter *effectum consequentem*. Primo modo nullus impugnat, cum « omnes homines natura scire desiderent[^14] ». Secundo modo et tertio potest impugnari ex infirmitate et etiam ex malitia; et cum quis impugnat eam pertinaciter, sive in confusionem dicentis, sive propter excusationem sui, quasi semper habet adiunctam malitiam, maxime cum est veritas ad salutem pertinens, ut est veritas christianae religionis; et sic est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Tunc autem dico, aliquem veritatem pertinaciter impugnare, quando ex sua impugnatione propter odium dicentis vel effectus consequentis aut facit vel vult facere praeiudicium veritati, ita quod, quamvis non odiat veritatem, secundum quod veritas est, tamen ratione adiuncti omnino eam abhorret; sicut aliquis odit Deum ratione iustitiae; et ratione illius odii contingit, quod homo delectatur in contumeliis Dei et in confutatione veritatis; et tunc recte dicitur moveri ex malitia et pertinacia. Si autem quis resistat non pertinaciter, tunc bene potest procedere talis impugnatio ex quadam infirmitate; nec talis impugnatio peccatum est in Spiritum sanctum. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod veritas et agnitio veritatis appropriatur Filio; quia talis impugnatio non procedit ex ipsa agnitione, sed potius procedit ex malitiosa voluntate. Unde Magister supra dixit in Prologo[^15]: « Dissentientibus voluntatibus, dissentiens fit animorum sensus, et dum aliud complacet, <!-- page 996 --> pietatis error obnititur et voluntatis invidia resultat »; et illud est quod movet ad veritatem impugnandam.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *invidia fraternae gratiae*, dicendum, quod dupliciter potest quis invidere gratiae alienae: aut quia ex hoc minuitur bonum proprium, cuius promotionem appetit singulariter, et sic est peccatum capitale; aut quia *gustus*[^16] animae sic est depravatus, ut, sicut non videt bonum in se, sic etiam nolit videre bonum in alio; et tunc est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Hoc autem est in illis maxime, qui vix possunt in aliquo homine videre bonum. Et ita alio modo est capitale peccatum, alio modo est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; et isto ultimo modo non procedit nisi ex magna corruptione et malitia voluntatis, quae adeo gustum eius pervertit, ut bonum faciat apparere malum, et malum faciat apparere bonum.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *impoenitentia*, dicendum, quod impoenitentia dicitur dupliciter, videlicet privative et contrarie. Si dicatur privative, sic non est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia non ponit novum peccatum, sed conditionem dicit sive circumstantiam peccati praecedentis. Alio modo potest dici *contrarie*, et tunc dicitur impoenitentia voluntas non poenitendi[^17]; et talis ex malitia procedit et peccatum est in Spiritum sanctum. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod scientia non variat genus. Dico enim, quod hoc non est ratione scientiae, sed ratione malitiae. Haec autem impoenitentia sic est species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quod tamen aliae species ad ipsam ordinantur, ut[^18] ipsa quodam modo omnibus aliis est annexa. Nec hoc impedit, quin sit diversa species ab aliis, quia, sicut in virtutibus una disponit ad alteram, sic etiam et in vitiis, quamvis non sit tanta connexio in habitibus vitiorum, sicut est in habitibus virtutum, sicut, dante Deo, in tertio libro[^19] manifestabitur.

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### Article III. *On the species and differences of this sin.*
### Question II. *On the species of this sin with respect to their proper accounts.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the species of this sin with respect to their proper accounts, and it is shown that none of these is a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

1. And first concerning *despair*: because the sin against the Holy Spirit is from settled malice; but despair is rather from weakness than from malice: therefore it seems that despair is not a sin against the Holy Spirit. *If you say* that it can at least be a species insofar as it is from malice; *it is objected* against this: because he who despairs thinks in his heart that his iniquity is greater than God's mercy[^1]; and every such man errs and is deceived: therefore all despair takes its origin from ignorance: therefore it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

2. Secondly, the same is shown concerning *presumption*: because frequently one presumes rather from confidence or boldness than from malice: therefore it does not seem to be a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. *If you say* that it is not a species except insofar as it proceeds from malice; *it is objected* against this: because presumption, from whatever source it proceeds, is a species of pride, which is a capital sin[^2]: therefore it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

3. Thirdly, the same is shown concerning *obstinacy*: because « obstinacy is the stubbornness of a mind hardened in malice, by which a man becomes impenitent[^3] »: if therefore the hardening of the mind comes from persistence in sin, and persistence in sin is not a species of sin but rather a circumstance; it seems that obstinacy is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. *If you say* that obstinacy, insofar as it is a sin against the Holy Spirit, does not only signify persistence, but also signifies a new act and motion; *it is objected* against this, because that act is nothing other than the will of remaining in sin: therefore it is nothing other than impenitence: therefore it seems that obstinacy is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit distinct from impenitence.

4. Fourthly, the same is shown concerning the *impugning of acknowledged truth*: because frequently acknowledged truth is impugned out of shame, because a man fears to be confounded when he speaks[^4] falsely: therefore it seems that it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. *If you say* that it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit except when it is from malice; *it is objected* against this: because both truth and the acknowledgment of truth are appropriated to the Son: therefore the impugning of acknowledged truth ought rather to be called a sin against the Son than a sin against the Holy Spirit.

5. In the fifth place, the same is shown concerning *envy of a brother's grace*: because one envies another out of the corruption of nature: therefore if every sin against the Holy Spirit is from malice, it seems that this is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. *If you say* that it is a sin against the Holy Spirit in the way in which it proceeds from malice; *it is objected* against this: because envy of a brother's grace is always contained under envy, which is a capital sin: therefore it seems that envy of a brother's grace is reduced to a capital sin and is not[^5] a sin against the Holy Spirit.

6. Sixthly and lastly, the same is shown concerning *impenitence*: because someone does not repent because he does not know that he has sinned: therefore it seems that some impenitence is from ignorance: therefore it is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is universally from malice[^6]. *If you say* that it is then a sin against the Holy Spirit when it is from settled knowledge; *it is objected* against this: because knowledge does not vary the genus of a sin, since it is a circumstance: if therefore impenitence proceeding from ignorance is not a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit, it seems that neither is impenitence proceeding from settled knowledge.

### Conclusion.

> These six species do not name a sin against the Holy Spirit, except insofar as they are from malice.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as in meritorious works[^7] charity gives the form, in such a way that nothing is meritorious unless it proceeds from charity; so it is to be understood in the sin against the Holy Spirit that malice gives the form to this sin; whence nothing is to be said to be a sin against the Holy Spirit except what proceeds from settled malice. And since almost all acts of the soul which proceed from settled malice can proceed from weakness and ignorance; and the names of sins are imposed from their acts[^8]: hence it is that no name of the aforesaid species is imposed on any of them insofar as it is <!-- page 995 --> precisely a sin against the Holy Spirit. And therefore in all of them there is need of this general and common distinction, that we may say that these six name a sin against the Holy Spirit insofar as they are from malice. But if they are apart from malice, namely from ignorance and weakness, then they are not sins against the Holy Spirit. This, moreover, appears better if we descend to the particulars.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected concerning *despair*, that it can be from weakness; it must be said that sometimes someone despairs from faint-heartedness, in such a way that in the despair itself he finds no complacency, but grieves and resists against it; and then it is not to be said to be a sin against the Holy Spirit, because by such despair a man is not cast into the depths[^9]. — And there is another despair, by which one despairs *definitively*, hiding himself as it were from the face of divine mercy, as Cain did[^10], who said: *Behold, thou dost cast me out this day from thy face*; and this is always a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it is to the contempt of the divine mercy, to which he prefers his own iniquity, as Cain said: *Greater is my iniquity* etc. Yet by this he is not judged unfaithful, either because such a one thinks well of others but ill of himself; or certainly because he does not reckon that God *cannot* have mercy, but rather *will not* have mercy; and such a sin always has malice joined to it, because he who thus despairs in such guilt wishes to end his life; whence such utterly despairing men very frequently inflict death upon themselves[^11].

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning *presumption*, it must be said that there is a presumption of merits and a presumption of impunity. The first presumption, by which one presumes upon his own merits or upon something which he has in himself, is the sin of pride[^12]. But the second presumption, by which one presumes upon impunity, giving everything to the divine mercy and taking away from it altogether the rigor of justice, this is a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it closes the way to grace and widens the way to sin; and thus it is clear that in one way it pertains to a capital sin, in another way to a sin against the Holy Spirit.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning *obstinacy*, that obstinacy signifies persistence in evil; it must be said that obstinacy is said in two ways. In one way obstinacy is said to be continual persistence in guilt. In another way obstinacy is said to be a will that takes complacency in a guilt committed and does not detest the prior guilt, but approves it; and in this way it signifies an *act*, an act, I say, proceeding from malice; therefore it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. It differs, however, from impenitence, insofar as the latter is here taken properly; for the one is with respect to the past, and the other with respect to the future. And although there is one virtue, whose office is « to bewail past things and not to commit things to be bewailed[^13] », nevertheless concerning these two acts there can be diverse vices; just as liberality, although it is one virtue, nevertheless according to the two acts which concur in it, namely *giving* and *keeping*, has two opposed vices, namely prodigality and avarice.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the *impugning of acknowledged truth*; it must be said that acknowledged truth can be understood to be impugned in a threefold way: either on account of the *truth* itself, or on account of the one *speaking* it, or on account of the *consequent effect*. In the first way no one impugns it, since « all men by nature desire to know[^14] ». In the second and third way it can be impugned from weakness and also from malice; and when one impugns it pertinaciously, whether to the confusion of the speaker, or for the excuse of himself, it almost always has malice joined to it, especially when it is a truth pertaining to salvation, as is the truth of the Christian religion; and so it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. But then I say that someone impugns truth pertinaciously when, out of his impugning on account of hatred of the speaker or of the consequent effect, he either does or wishes to do prejudice to the truth, in such a way that, although he does not hate the truth insofar as it is truth, nevertheless by reason of what is adjoined he wholly abhors it; just as someone hates God by reason of His justice; and by reason of that hatred it happens that a man takes delight in contempts of God and in the refutation of truth; and then he is rightly said to be moved by malice and pertinacity. But if one resists not pertinaciously, then such impugning can well proceed from a certain weakness; nor is such impugning a sin against the Holy Spirit. — Nor is that valid which he objects, that truth and the acknowledgment of truth are appropriated to the Son; because such impugning does not proceed from the acknowledgment itself, but rather proceeds from a malicious will. Whence the Master said above in the Prologue[^15]: « When wills disagree, the perception of minds becomes discordant, and while one thing pleases, <!-- page 996 --> error opposes piety and the envy of the will arises »; and that is what moves one to impugn the truth.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning *envy of a brother's grace*, it must be said that one can envy another's grace in two ways: either because by it one's own good is diminished, whose promotion he seeks for himself singularly, and thus it is a capital sin; or because the *taste*[^16] of the soul is so depraved that, just as it does not see the good in itself, so also it is unwilling to see the good in another; and then it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. This, moreover, is most of all in those who can scarcely see the good in any man. And thus in one way it is a capital sin, in another way it is a sin against the Holy Spirit; and in this last way it proceeds only from a great corruption and malice of the will, which so perverts its taste that it makes the good appear evil, and makes the evil appear good.

*To 6.* To that which is objected concerning *impenitence*, it must be said that impenitence is said in two ways, namely privatively and contrarily. If it is said privatively, then it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it does not posit a new sin, but signifies a condition or circumstance of a preceding sin. In another way it can be said *contrarily*, and then impenitence is said to be the will of not repenting[^17]; and such proceeds from malice and is a sin against the Holy Spirit. — Nor is that valid which he objects, that knowledge does not vary the genus. For I say that this is not by reason of knowledge, but by reason of malice. This impenitence, moreover, is a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit in such a way that nevertheless the other species are ordered to it, so that[^18] it is in a certain manner annexed to all the others. Nor does this prevent it from being a species diverse from the others, because, just as among the virtues one disposes to another, so also among the vices, although there is not so great a connection in the habits of vices as there is in the habits of virtues, as, God granting, will be made manifest in the third book[^19].

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la: Gen. 4, 13: *Dixitque Cain ad Dominum: Maior est iniquitas mea, quam ut veniam merear.*

en: Gen. 4:13: *And Cain said to the Lord: My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.*

la: Cfr. supra d. XLII. lit. Magistri, c. 7.

en: Cf. above, d. XLII, the text of the Master, c. 7.

la: De hac definitione obstinationis cfr. hic lit. Magistri, circa initium, nec non August., Serm. 71. (alias 11. de Verbis Domini) c. 13. n. 21. seqq. Infra ante *permansio* mallemus *cum* pro *et*, quod habent codd. et edd.

en: On this definition of obstinacy cf. here the text of the Master, near the beginning, as also Augustine, Sermon 71 (otherwise 11, On the Words of the Lord) c. 13, n. 21 ff. Below, before *permansio*, we should prefer *cum* for *et*, which the manuscripts and editions have.

la: Codd. K T X et *dixit*, quae lectio planior est.

en: Codices K T X also read *dixit* ["he said"], which reading is plainer.

la: Pro *non sit* cod. T *et sic*.

en: For *non sit* codex T reads *et sic*.

la: Ed. 1 omittit *quod universaliter est ex malitia*. Vat. his verbis praemittit *nisi* eisque adiicit *igitur* etc., prius post *ergo* inserto *si*.

en: Edition 1 omits *quod universaliter est ex malitia* ["which is universally from malice"]. The Vatican edition prefixes *nisi* to these words and adds to them *igitur* etc., having first inserted *si* after *ergo*.

la: Cod. T *rebus*.

en: Codex T reads *rebus* ["in things"].

la: Codd. V Z *actu*.

en: Codices V Z read *actu* ["from the act"].

la: Cfr. loc. ex libro Prov. supra pag. 984, nota 3. allatus.

en: Cf. the passage from the book of Proverbs cited above on p. 984, note 3.

la: Gen. 4, 14: *Ecce eiicis me hodie a facie terrae, et a facie tua abscondar.* — Seq. loc. Script. est ibid. v. 13. — Paulo superius pro *definitive* Vat. et nonnulli codd. exhibent *diffinitive*.

en: Gen. 4:14: *Behold thou dost cast me out this day from the face of the earth, and I shall be hidden from thy face.* — The following passage of Scripture is the same place, v. 13. — A little above, for *definitive* the Vatican edition and several codices exhibit *diffinitive*.

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

en: Cf. above, art. 2, q. 1, reply to 5.

la: Vide supra d. XLII. lit. Magistri, c. 7. — De seqq. cfr. supra pag. 992, nota 4.

en: See above, d. XLII, the text of the Master, c. 7. — On what follows cf. above, p. 992, note 4.

la: Gregor., II. in Evang. homil. 34. n. 15: *Poenitentiam quippe agere est et perpetrata mala plangere et plangenda non perpetrare.* — De *largitate* Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 7, ait: *Circa donationem acceptionemque pecuniarum mediocritas est liberalitas, excessus et defectus prodigalitas et illiberalitas seu avaritia.* — Mox pro *tamen circa* Vat. *tamen contra.* Paulo superius pro *nam unum* cod. T *nam unius.*

en: Gregory, On the Gospels, Book II, homily 34, n. 15: *For to do penance is both to bewail evils committed and not to commit things to be bewailed.* — On *liberality* Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 7, says: *Concerning the giving and receiving of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect are prodigality and illiberality or avarice.* — Presently, for *tamen circa* the Vatican edition reads *tamen contra.* A little above, for *nam unum* codex T reads *nam unius.*

la: Ut dicit Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. Prolog. dub. 6, ubi duplex veritatis *effectus* distinguitur, scil. *illuminare* (in quantum veritas illuminat, nemo eam odit et valet verbum Philosophi: « Omnes homines natura scire desiderant ») et *arguere* (veritas enim manifestando mala redarguit mala facientem, et quantum ad hoc valet illud Ioan. 3, 20: *Qui male agit odit lucem*).

en: As Aristotle says, Metaphysics I, c. 1. Cf. I Sent., Prologue, doubt 6, where a twofold *effect* of truth is distinguished, namely *to illuminate* (insofar as truth illuminates, no one hates it, and the word of the Philosopher holds: « All men by nature desire to know ») and *to convict* (for truth, by manifesting evils, convicts the evildoer, and as regards this the saying of John 3:20 holds: *He who does evil hates the light*).

la: Vide I. Sent. pag. 16. — Sententia, quam Magister ibi profert et quae hic repetitur, deprompta est ex Hilar., X. de Trin. n. 1. Cuius sententiae verba a Vat. et edd. 3, 4 magis integre redduntur sic: *Dissentientibus... et dum aliud alius aut videtur aut complacet, erroris vel non intellectae, vel offendenti* impietatis error obnititur et voluntatis invidia (codd. et edd. 1, 2 *impietatis error*) resultat.

en: See I Sent., p. 16. — The opinion which the Master there sets forth and which is here repeated is taken from Hilary, On the Trinity, Book X, n. 1. The words of this opinion are rendered more fully by the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 thus: *When men disagree... and while another thing either seems or pleases to another, the error of impiety either of what is not understood, or of one giving offense,* opposes, and the envy of the will (codices and editions 1, 2: *the error of impiety*) arises.

la: Ita codd. F I (K a prima manu) T W Y, alii et edd. *risus*; sed vox *gustus* in fine solut. omnibus codd. et edd. communis est.

en: Thus codices F I (K by the first hand) T W Y; the others and the editions read *risus* ["laughter"]; but the word *gustus* ["taste"] at the end of the solution is common to all codices and editions.

la: Pro *non poenitendi* edd., excepta 1, cum compluribus codd. *impoenitendi.* Paulo inferius dictae edd. solae post *sed* subiiciunt *etiam.*

en: For *non poenitendi* the editions, except 1, together with many codices read *impoenitendi.* A little below, those said editions alone insert *etiam* after *sed.*

la: Pro *et* codd. F X Y *unde*, cod. bb *nam.* Proxime ante pro *ordinentur* cod. F *ordinant.*

en: For *et* codices F X Y read *unde*, codex bb reads *nam.* Immediately before, for *ordinentur* codex F reads *ordinant.*

la: Dist. 36. q. 1. seqq. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Distinction 36, q. 1 ff. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{994,995,996}-{L,R}-*.png`, Vol II PDF-priority inversion) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 69015–69180). Fresh literal English. PDF pages = printed + 22.

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart):**
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- p.995 (PDF 1017): footers 1–7 → `[^9]`–`[^15]`. Markers: profundum¹, Cain², mortem³, superbiae⁴, committere⁵, desiderent⁶, Prologo⁷. (Footer 5 = the Gregory/Aristotle *largitas* note spanning both columns; footer 7 = the Hilary *Prologo* note, whose tail `Trin. n. 1…resultat` runs over to the head of p.996's footer block — grouped here under `[^15]`.)
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**Scholion:** none of its own. a3-q1 holds Article-III Scholion I–III; Scholion II ("Circa sequentem quaest.") + III ("De utraque quaestione") cover this q2. `has_scholion: false`.

**Hand-offs.** Picked up: none — a3-q1 consumed all p.993 footers; q2 opens a fresh p.994 footer sequence. **Forwarded to d43-dubia:** the DUBIA block (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` / `DUB. I.`) begins at raw line **69181**, in the R-column of printed **p.996** (PDF 1018), immediately after q2's tail `…in tertio libro manifestabitur.` (DUB. I opener `…postquam transit actu`). The seam is grammatically clean. q2 consumed all p.996 footers 1–4 (`[^16]`–`[^19]`); the dubia's first body-footers are a **fresh p.996 footer sequence further down the column** — verify the p.996 cross-chunk footer split when building d43-dubia (the dubia text `…non se extendit generaliter respectu omnium, sed respectu eorum, de quibus probabiliter sperare possumus` + the Matth. 18:17 *Quodsi Ecclesiam audire noluerit* citation belong to the dubia). After d43-dubia, **d.43 is COMPLETE**. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; OCR running-head digits mangled — confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render. d.50 is the next decade polish gate (far off).

**[?] flags:** none. OCR for this region is clean; the only cascade-damaged spot (the *Ad 4* "Triplex impugnatio" region, raw ~69104–69112, scrambled diagonally in the OCR) was reconstructed from the p.995 R-col 450 dpi crop and reads continuously.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 43, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XLIII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XLIII)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 996 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Est peccatum ad mortem, non pro eo dico, ut quis oret.* Videtur enim ex hoc, quod non habeat[^1] orari pro eo qui peccat in Spiritum sanctum. **Sed contra** hoc est: quia tales sunt diligendi ex caritate: ergo videtur, quod pro eis orandum sit. — Praeterea, tales magis indigent aliis et proniores sunt ad malum: ergo videtur, quod maior sit beneficentia misericordiae pro his orare quam pro aliis, qui non indigent.

Est igitur quaestio: quare dixit beatus Ioannes[^2], quod pro talibus orandum non sit, cum de nemine sit desperandum?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod peccatum ad mortem dicitur dupliciter: aut quia *perducit* ad mortem, aut quia *disponit* ad mortem. Et primo modo accipiendo, peccatum ad mortem omnino est irremissibile. Secundo modo accipiendo, peccatum ad mortem cum difficultate est remissibile. — Quolibet dictorum modorum intelligi habet praedictus sermo secundum differentem sui expositionem. Nam primo modo sensus est: non dico, ut pro eo oret quis, hoc est aliquis, nec parvus nec magnus. Secundo vero modo sensus est: non dico, ut pro eo oret quis, id est quaevis persona; quasi dicat: difficile est pro tali peccatore exaudiri, quia talis iam est inter incorrigibiles deputandus; de quo dicit Dominus Matthaei decimo octavo[^3]: *Quodsi Ecclesiam audire noluerit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus.* Et ita in *uno* sensu generaliter innuit, quod pro peccante ad mortem non est orandum; in *alio* vero sensu innuit, quod non est cuiuslibet impetrare tantum donum[^4]. — In nullo tamen dictorum sensuum *prohibet* orare; sed in hoc verbo ostendit, quod mandatum suum sive monitio, qua dixerat, orandum esse pro proximo, non se extendit generaliter respectu omnium, sed respectu eorum, de quibus probabiliter sperare possumus, quod nostris orationibus concedentur[^5]. — Et sic patet responsio ad illud.

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### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Qui blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum, non remittetur ei.* **Contra:** Glossa dicit ibidem[^6]: « Blasphemia remittetur, spiritus autem blasphemiae non remittetur »: ergo si blasphemia remittitur, sive blasphemet Patrem, sive Spiritum, remittetur.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quae differentia sit inter *blasphemiam* et *spiritum blasphemiae.* Videtur, quod gravius peccatum sit *blasphemia* quam *spiritus blasphemiae*, quia spiritus blasphemiae dicit voluntatem, *blasphemia* dicit opus, malum autem opus addit supra voluntatem[^7]. — Contrarium huius est quod dicit Glossa, quae dicit, quod *spiritus blasphemiae* non remittitur, sed *blasphemia* remittitur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Hugo[^8], « *blasphemia*, quantum est de se, indifferens est quantum ad hoc, quod sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, et non in Spiritum sanctum. Alii enim blasphemant ex *infirmitate* et *coactione*, et hi peccant in Patrem; alii ex *deceptione*, et hi peccant in Filium; alii ex *certa malitia*, et hi peccant in Spiritum sanctum, et hoc est sceleratissimum genus peccati, in vituperiis Dei delectari ». Et post subiungit: « Quid est *spiritus blasphemiae*, nisi affectus et desiderium vituperationis divinae? *Spiritus* enim *blasphemiae* sic spirat ad odium Dei, sicut Spiritus sanctus ad amorem Dei. Quando ergo dicitur: *qui blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum* etc., non intelligitur de quacumque blasphemia, sed de *spiritu blasphemiae*; unde non dicit: qui blasphemaverit Spiritum sanctum, sed qui blasphemaverit *in* Spiritum sanctum, id est peccando in Spiritum sanctum ». Et hoc declarat ipsa Glossa, quae dicit, quod *blasphemia* remittetur, *spiritus* autem *blasphemiae* non remittetur.

Per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod quaerit, quae differentia sit inter *blasphemiam* et *spiritum blasphemiae*, et quod gravius sit peccatum *spiritus blasphemiae* quam *blasphemia*. Non enim differunt, sicut voluntas et actus, sed sicut generale et speciale[^9].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *desperatio est, qua quis diffidit penitus de bonitate Dei, aestimans, malitiam suam Dei bonitatem excedere.* Videtur enim ex hoc, quod omnis desperans sit infidelis. Omnis enim, qui sic aestimat, credit, bonitatem Dei esse finitam, et omnis talis errat contra id quod fidei est. — Item, qui credit contrarium eius quod dicit Scriptura, haereticus et infidelis iudicatur; sed Scriptura[^10] dicit: *Quacumque hora ingemuerit peccator, omnium iniquitatum eius non recordabor;* desperans credit eius oppositum: ergo etc. — Praeterea, articulus specialis est de remissione peccatorum, et contra istum errat ille qui desperat. — Similiter potest obiici de eo qui *praesumit*; videtur enim, quod praesumtio[^11] tollat fidem. — Contrarium huius est, quia fides ita praecedit spem, sicut praecedit caritatem: ergo sicut odium non tollit spem, ita etiam nec desperatio fidem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod fides differt a spe in hoc, quod fides respicit ipsum obiectum in *universali*, sed spes respicit in *particulari*, videlicet respectu sperantis; et in hoc etiam, quod fides dicit certitudinem in *intellectu*, et spes dicit certitudinem in *affectu*[^12]. Sicut igitur contingit aliquando ignorari aliquid in *particulari* et sciri in *universali*, sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo Priorum[^13], sicut est de illo qui scit, omnem mulam esse sterilem, et tamen aestimat, hanc habere in utero; sic potest aliquis habens fidem carere spe; et sicut potest aliquis non habens certitudinem de aliquo in *affectu* habere in *intellectu*, sic potest aliquis non habens spem habere fidem.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod talis aestimat, malitiam suam Dei bonitatem excedere; dicendum, quod *aestimare*, malitiam bonitatem excedere, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut *in se*, aut *in effectu*; et in effectu dupliciter: aut *universaliter* respectu cuiuslibet, aut *particulariter* respectu sui. Et primo et secundo modo est infidelitatis, et tertio desperationis. Et hoc significat textus Genesis[^14], ubi dixit Cain desperans: *Maior est iniquitas mea, quam ut veniam merear;* non dixit, quod maior

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esset quam misericordia, sed quod amplior esset quam venia, ad quam pervenire posset. — Vel potest dici, quod talis aestimatio potius venit ex subversione *confidentiae* quam ex subversione *notitiae*; sicut homo aliquando bene scit aliquid, et tamen affectio adeo dominatur, ut ad aestimandum oppositum pertrahat ipsum.

Et per hanc viam respondendum est ad illa duo, quae postea obiiciuntur; non enim concludunt, quod desperatio tollat fidem, quia defectus est duplicis conditionis, sicut dictum est. Quamvis autem desperatio non tollat fidem simpliciter, nihilominus tamen plus laeditur fides per desperationem quam per odium, vel quodcumque aliud peccatum, quod non sit ei directe oppositum. In fide enim sunt tria, videlicet ipsa *credulitas* et *habilitas tendendi in Deum* et ipsa *tendentia*. Primum est quasi *terra*, et secundum quasi *semen*, et tertium est quasi *fructus*. Primum tollitur solum per infidelitatem; secundum vero tollitur per desperationem, qua efficitur homo inhabilis ad tendendum in Deum; tertium vero tollitur per omne peccatum[^15].

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *peccatum in Patrem* illud intelligitur, *quod fit per infirmitatem.* Si enim hoc verum est, tunc omne peccatum est peccatum in Patrem, quia, cum potentia peccandi potius sit impotentia quam potentia[^16], hoc ipso, quo aliquis potest peccare, potest deficere et infirmus esse. — Item, si peccatum in Filium est per ignorantiam, sicut ipse subiungit[^17]: « cum omnis peccator sit ignorans », sicut vult Philosophus, videtur, quod omne peccatum sit in Filium: ergo nulla est illa divisio peccatorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicitur peccatum esse ex *infirmitate* et *ignorantia*, non accipitur hic quaecumque infirmitas et quaecumque ignorantia, sed infirmitas, quae quidem est ex *carne*, et ignorantia, quae est respectu *alicuius circumstantiae* facientis rationem culpae. Et hoc modo talis infirmitas non est respectu omnis peccati, nec talis ignorantia; quamvis, largo modo accepta infirmitate pro quacumque impotentia, et ignorantia pro quacumque nescientia, sive cognitionis practicae, sive speculativae, in omni peccato reperiantur. Praeterea, sciendum est, quod quando dividitur peccatum per has differentias, quod illud dicitur peccatum ex *infirmitate*, quod procedit ex ipsa immediate, et similiter ex *ignorantia* et *malitia*; et sic istae tres differentiae non concurrunt in peccatum idem. Et sic patent obiecta. — Et haec sufficiant de ista divisione, quia supra quaesitum fuit de his, distinctione vigesima secunda[^18], ubi illa divisio ponitur et manifestatur.

---

english:
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: *There is a sin unto death; I do not say that one should pray for it.* For it seems from this that there is no [obligation] to pray[^1] for him who sins against the Holy Spirit. **But on the contrary** is this: that such are to be loved out of charity: therefore it seems that one ought to pray for them. — Moreover, such have more need of others and are more prone to evil: therefore it seems that it would be a greater beneficence of mercy to pray for these than for others, who have no need.

There is therefore a question: why did blessed John[^2] say that one ought not to pray for such, since one ought to despair of no one?

**I respond:** It must be said that "sin unto death" is said in two ways: either because it *leads* to death, or because it *disposes* to death. And taking it in the first way, sin unto death is altogether irremissible. Taking it in the second way, sin unto death is with difficulty remissible. — In either of the said ways the aforesaid saying is to be understood according to a different exposition of it. For in the first way the sense is: I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, no one, neither small nor great. But in the second way the sense is: I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, any person whatsoever; as if to say: it is difficult to be heard for such a sinner, since such a one is now to be reckoned among the incorrigible; of whom the Lord says in Matthew the eighteenth[^3]: *But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican.* And so in *one* sense he generally implies that one ought not to pray for one sinning unto death; but in *another* sense he implies that it does not belong to just anyone to obtain so great a gift[^4]. — Yet in neither of the said senses does he *forbid* praying; but by this word he shows that his command, or the admonition by which he had said that one ought to pray for one's neighbor, does not extend generally with respect to all, but with respect to those concerning whom we can probably hope that they will be granted to our prayers[^5]. — And thus the answer to that is clear.

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### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him.* **On the contrary:** the Gloss says in the same place[^6]: « Blasphemy shall be forgiven, but the spirit of blasphemy shall not be forgiven »: therefore if blasphemy is forgiven, whether one blaspheme the Father or the Spirit, it shall be forgiven.

In connection with this it is asked, what difference there is between *blasphemy* and the *spirit of blasphemy.* It seems that *blasphemy* is a graver sin than the *spirit of blasphemy*, because the spirit of blasphemy bespeaks the will, [whereas] *blasphemy* bespeaks the deed, and the evil deed adds something above the will[^7]. — The contrary of this is what the Gloss says, which says that the *spirit of blasphemy* is not forgiven, but *blasphemy* is forgiven.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Hugh says[^8], « *blasphemy*, as far as it is of itself, is indifferent as to this, whether it be a sin against the Holy Spirit or not against the Holy Spirit. For some blaspheme out of *weakness* and *compulsion*, and these sin against the Father; others out of *deception*, and these sin against the Son; others out of *certain malice*, and these sin against the Holy Spirit, and this is the most wicked kind of sin, to take delight in revilings of God ». And afterward he adds: « What is the *spirit of blasphemy*, except an affection and desire for reviling the divine? For the *spirit of blasphemy* breathes toward hatred of God, as the Holy Spirit breathes toward love of God. When therefore it is said: *whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit* etc., it is not understood of just any blasphemy, but of the *spirit of blasphemy*; whence he does not say: whoever shall blaspheme the Holy Spirit, but whoever shall blaspheme *against* the Holy Spirit, that is, by sinning against the Holy Spirit ». And the Gloss itself declares this, which says that *blasphemy* shall be forgiven, but the *spirit of blasphemy* shall not be forgiven.

By this is clear the answer to what is asked, namely what difference there is between *blasphemy* and the *spirit of blasphemy*, and that the sin of the *spirit of blasphemy* is graver than *blasphemy*. For they do not differ as the will and the act, but as the general and the special[^9].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *despair is that by which one wholly distrusts the goodness of God, esteeming his own malice to exceed God's goodness.* For it seems from this that everyone who despairs is unfaithful. For everyone who esteems thus believes that the goodness of God is finite, and everyone such errs against that which belongs to faith. — Likewise, whoever believes the contrary of what Scripture says is judged a heretic and unfaithful; but Scripture[^10] says: *In whatever hour the sinner shall groan, I will not remember all his iniquities;* the one who despairs believes the opposite of this: therefore etc. — Moreover, there is a special article concerning the remission of sins, and against this errs the one who despairs. — Similarly it can be objected concerning the one who *presumes*; for it seems that presumption[^11] takes away faith. — The contrary of this is, that faith precedes hope just as it precedes charity: therefore just as hatred does not take away hope, so also neither does despair take away faith.

**I respond:** It must be said that faith differs from hope in this, that faith regards the object itself in the *universal*, but hope regards it in the *particular*, namely with respect to the one hoping; and also in this, that faith bespeaks certitude in the *intellect*, and hope bespeaks certitude in the *affection*[^12]. Just as therefore it sometimes happens that something is unknown in the *particular* and known in the *universal*, as the Philosopher says in the second [book] of the *Prior [Analytics]*[^13], as is the case of one who knows that every mule is barren, and yet esteems that this one has [a foal] in its womb; so one can, having faith, lack hope; and just as one can, not having certitude about something in the *affection*, have it in the *intellect*, so one can, not having hope, have faith.

To that therefore which is first objected, that such a one esteems his own malice to exceed God's goodness; it must be said that *to esteem* one's malice to exceed [God's] goodness can be in two ways: either *in itself*, or *in effect*; and in effect in two ways: either *universally* with respect to anyone, or *particularly* with respect to oneself. And in the first and second way it belongs to unbelief, and in the third to despair. And this the text of Genesis signifies[^14], where Cain in despair said: *My iniquity is greater than that I should merit pardon;* he did not say that it was greater

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than [God's] mercy, but that it was wider than the pardon to which he could attain. — Or it can be said that such an esteem rather comes from a subversion of *confidence* than from a subversion of *knowledge*; just as a man sometimes well knows something, and yet affection so dominates that it draws him to esteem the opposite.

And by this way one must respond to those two [objections] which are afterward raised; for they do not conclude that despair takes away faith, because the defect is of a twofold condition, as has been said. But although despair does not take away faith simply, nevertheless faith is more harmed by despair than by hatred, or any other sin which is not directly opposed to it. For in faith there are three [things], namely *belief* itself and the *aptitude for tending toward God* and the *tending* itself. The first is as it were the *earth*, and the second as the *seed*, and the third is as the *fruit*. The first is taken away only by unbelief; the second is taken away by despair, by which a man is made unfit for tending toward God; the third is taken away by every sin[^15].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the sin against the Father* is understood to be that *which is done through weakness.* For if this is true, then every sin is a sin against the Father, because, since the power of sinning is rather an impotence than a power[^16], by this very fact, by which one can sin, he can fail and be weak. — Likewise, if the sin against the Son is through ignorance, as he himself adds[^17]: « since every sinner is ignorant », as the Philosopher holds, it seems that every sin is against the Son: therefore that division of sins is null.

**I respond:** It must be said that when sin is said to be from *weakness* and *ignorance*, there is not taken here just any weakness and just any ignorance, but the weakness which indeed is from the *flesh*, and the ignorance which is with respect to *some circumstance* constituting the formal character of fault. And in this way such weakness is not with respect to every sin, nor such ignorance; although, when weakness is taken in a broad sense for any impotence whatsoever, and ignorance for any want of knowledge whatsoever, whether of practical or of speculative cognition, they are found in every sin. Moreover, it must be known that when sin is divided by these differences, that sin is called [a sin] from *weakness* which proceeds immediately from it, and likewise from *ignorance* and *malice*; and thus these three differences do not concur in the same sin. And so the objections are answered. — And let these things suffice concerning this division, since above it was inquired concerning these matters, in the twenty-second distinction[^18], where that division is set down and made manifest.

---

la: Codd. Y (T bb a secunda manu) *debeat.*

en: Codices Y (T, bb by a second hand) read *debeat* ("ought").

la: I. Epist. 5, 16. — Cfr. sententia Augustini, in lit. Magistri allata. — Pro *quod... orandum non sit*, cod. T, oratione obliqua utens, *orandum non esse*, omisso *quod.*

en: 1 John 5:16. — Cf. the sentence of Augustine cited in the text of the Master. — For *quod... orandum non sit*, codex T, using indirect discourse, reads *orandum non esse*, omitting *quod.*

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17. [Matthew 18:17.]

la: Sed, ut ait B. Albert., hic a. 2, aliquis specialis sanctitatis et perfectionis debet orare pro talibus; quia magnorum est orare pro magnis.

en: But, as Blessed Albert says, here a. 2, someone of special sanctity and perfection ought to pray for such; because it belongs to the great to pray for the great.

la: Cod. bb *concedatur*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *emendentur.* Paulo ante pro *possumus* cod. T *possimus.* — De hoc dub. cfr. hic lit. Magistri nec non Comment. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. et a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 3. a. 6. § 2; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 23. q. 140. m. 3. a. 3. partic. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: Codex bb [reads] *concedatur*, the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 *emendentur.* Shortly before, for *possumus* codex T [reads] *possimus.* — On this doubt cf. here the text of the Master, and also the Commentary, a. 1, q. 1, reply 1, and a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, pt. IV, q. 26, m. 3, a. 6, § 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 2; *Summa*, pt. II, tr. 23, q. 140, m. 3, a. 3, particula 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here on the doubt, text 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 988, nota 5.

en: See above, p. 988, note 5.

la: Cfr. supra d. 42. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Sententia sub Hugonis nomine hic allata fere ad verbum habetur in Richardi a S. Vict. opusculo « de Spiritu blasphemiae », in quo opusculo auctor profitetur, se sequi magistrum Hugonem.

en: The sentence here cited under the name of Hugh is found almost word for word in Richard of St. Victor's opusculum « On the Spirit of Blasphemy », in which opusculum the author professes that he follows master Hugh.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 132. m. 1. seqq. et q. 136. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 23. q. 140. m. 3. a. 3. partic. 1; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, pt. II, q. 132, m. 1 ff. and q. 136, m. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 6; *Summa*, pt. II, tr. 23, q. 140, m. 3, a. 3, particula 1; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2; Giles of Rome, here on the doubt, text 5.

la: Ezech. 18, 21. seq. — Paulo ante cod. T post *haereticus* subiicit *est.*

en: Ezekiel 18:21 f. — Shortly before, codex T after *haereticus* adds *est.*

la: Pro *praesumtio*, quam vocem ex cod. O, exigente contextu, restituimus ceteri codd. et edd. *desperatio*; quam lectionem si quis retinere mallet, certo *videtur enim* mutandum esset in *videtur ergo.* Aliquanto inferius codd. C F K L O R S (T a prima manu) V W et alii cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt *ergo sicut odium non tollit spem*, et deinde (etiam edd. 3, 4) *fidem*, quod vocabulum tamen Vat. exhibet.

en: For *praesumtio* (presumption), which word we have restored from codex O as the context requires, the other codices and editions [read] *desperatio* (despair); if anyone should prefer to retain this reading, then certainly *videtur enim* would have to be changed to *videtur ergo.* Somewhat below, codices C F K L O R S (T by a first hand) V W and others, with editions 1, 2, omit *ergo sicut odium non tollit spem*, and then (also editions 3, 4) *fidem*, which word, however, the Vatican [edition] exhibits.

la: De *fide* et *spe* fusius agitur III. Sent. d. 24. et 26. — Aliquanto superius cod. bb *creditum*, edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. falso *odium* pro *obiectum.*

en: Of *faith* and *hope* there is fuller treatment in III Sent., d. 24 and 26. — Somewhat above, codex bb [reads] *creditum*, editions 1, 2 with several codices wrongly *odium* for *obiectum.*

la: Cap. 21. (c. 23.), ubi et exemplum de mula habetur, quod hic affertur. — Pro *in secundo Priorum* Vat. posuit *in primo Posteriorum*, in quo libro, c. 10. (c. 13.) in fine, similis sententia occurrit.

en: Chapter 21 (c. 23), where also the example of the mule is found, which is here adduced. — For *in the second [book] of the Prior [Analytics]* the Vatican [edition] put *in the first [book] of the Posterior [Analytics]*, in which book, c. 10 (c. 13) at the end, a similar sentence occurs.

la: Cap. 4, 13. — Mox pro *ubi* cod. bb *quando*, cod. H *quoniam*, alii codd. cum ed. 2 *qui*, alii *quem*; ed. 1, verbis transpositis, *Cain, qui dixit.*

en: Genesis 4:13. — Presently, for *ubi* codex bb [reads] *quando*, codex H *quoniam*, other codices with edition 2 *qui*, others *quem*; edition 1, with the words transposed, *Cain, qui dixit.*

la: Cfr. de hoc dub. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 157. m. 1. seqq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 23. q. 140. m. 2; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, pt. II, q. 157, m. 1 ff.; Blessed Albert, *Summa*, pt. II, tr. 23, q. 140, m. 2; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro *infirmus esse* codd. C F K L O R S Y et etc. *infirmus est.*

en: Cf. below, d. 44, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Presently, for *infirmus esse* codices C F K L O R S Y and etc. [read] *infirmus est.*

la: Hic in lit. circa finem. — Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, ait: Unusquisque igitur pravus (μοχθηρός), quid agendum, a quibusque abstinendum sit, ignorat.

en: Here in the text near the end. — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 1, says: Every wicked man (μοχθηρός) therefore is ignorant of what ought to be done and from what things one ought to abstain.

la: Art. 2. q. 1. seqq. Cfr. etiam hic a. 1. q. 1. solut. oppos. — Hoc dubium solvit Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Art. 2, q. 1 ff. [of d. 22]. Cf. also here a. 1, q. 1, solution of the contrary [arguments]. — Peter of Tarentaise resolves this doubt here on the text. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{996,997,998}-{L,R}-*.png`, Vol II PDF-priority inversion) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 69181–69326). Fresh literal English. PDF pages = printed + 22.

**Page-split / footer map (per-page footnote restart).**
- **p.996 (PDF 1018):** DUB. I body (L-col + R-col continuation). The dubia uses p.996 footers **5–9** → `[^1]`–`[^5]`. **Cross-chunk split (carried from d43-a3-q2):** a3-q2 consumed p.996 footers **1–4** (gustus¹/poenitendi²/ut³/tertio libro⁴) plus the Hilary-*Prologo* footer tail (`Trin. n. 1. Cuius sententiae verba…resultat`) that runs over from p.995's `[^15]`; do NOT re-claim them. Markers in DUB. I body: habeat⁵ → `[^1]`, beatus Ioannes⁶ → `[^2]`, decimo octavo⁷ (Vers.17) → `[^3]`, tantum donum⁸ → `[^4]`, concedentur⁹ → `[^5]`.
- **p.997 (PDF 1019):** footers **1–9** → `[^6]`–`[^14]`. DUB. II (L-col) uses footers 1–4 (ibidem¹ → `[^6]`, voluntatem² → `[^7]`, Hugo³ → `[^8]`, speciale⁴ → `[^9]`); DUB. III (R-col + p.998 L-col tail) uses footers 5–9 (Scriptura⁵ → `[^10]`, praesumtio⁶ → `[^11]`, affectu⁷ → `[^12]`, secundo Priorum⁸ → `[^13]`, Genesis⁹ → `[^14]`). Footer 6/`[^11]` spans both columns (L-col head → R-col tail).
- **p.998 (PDF 1020):** footers **1–4** → `[^15]`–`[^18]`. DUB. III tail marker omne peccatum¹ → `[^15]`; DUB. IV (L+R col) markers potentia² → `[^16]`, subiungit³ → `[^17]`, vigesima secunda⁴ → `[^18]`. The p.998 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block (its own footers 1–3) belongs to the **d.44 littera**, NOT the dubia — do NOT claim it here. **(Confirmed 2026-06-01 decade polish, 600 dpi p.998:** `[^16]` (`Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro infirmus esse … infirmus est.`) is correctly this chunk's — its variant lemma *infirmus esse* sits in DUB. IV's body here (`…potest deficere et infirmus esse`) and the footer is in the p.998 **L-col** footnote block. d44-littera had mistakenly duplicated this note as its own `[^1]`; that duplicate was removed in the same pass. No duplicate remains; both chunks agree the note lives here.)

**Hand-offs.** Picked up: the p.996 R-col footer split from d43-a3-q2 (footers 5–9 = dubia's `[^1]`–`[^5]`). **Forwarded to d44-littera:** see below.

> **HAND-OFF TO d44-littera:** `DISTINCTIO XLIV.` begins at raw line **69327**, immediately after the dubia tail `…ubi illa divisio ponitur et manifestatur.` (raw 69325). It opens in the **L-col of printed p.998** (PDF 1020) with `CAP. I. De potentia peccandi, an sit homini vel diabolo a Deo.` / `Post praedicta consideratione dignum occurrit, utrum peccandi potentia sit nobis a Deo, vel a nobis.` and continues onto p.999+. **The d.44 littera/commentary footers begin at the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` divider at the foot of p.998's R-col** (footer 1 = Fulgent., de Fide ad Petrum c. 3 n. 34 / *praeparari et tribui* var.; footer 2 = Rom. 13:1 + Ioan. 19:11 + Glossa note; footer 3 = Enarr. in Ps. 32 serm. 3 n. 12 / Iob 1:11 *Extende manum*). The dubia did NOT touch them. Seam grammatically clean. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; OCR running-head digits mangled — confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render. **d.43 is COMPLETE after this chunk.** d.50 is the next decade polish gate (far off).

**[?] flags:** none. OCR was clean for this region and every reading was confirmed line-by-line against the 450 dpi column-band crops.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 44

title_alt: De potentia peccandi, an sit homini vel diabolo a Deo; an aliquando resistendum sit potestati

title_alt: On the power of sinning, whether it is from God to man or to the devil; whether one must sometimes resist a power

source_text:
<!-- page 998 -->

# DISTINCTIO XLIV.

### Cap. I. *De potentia peccandi, an sit homini vel diabolo a Deo.*

Post praedicta consideratione dignum occurrit, utrum peccandi potentia sit nobis a Deo, vel a nobis. — Putant quidam, potentiam recte agendi nobis esse a Deo, potentiam vero peccandi non a Deo, sed a nobis, vel a diabolo esse; sicut *mala voluntas* non a Deo nobis est, sed a nobis et a diabolo, bona autem nobis a Deo tantum est. « Bonae namque voluntatis et cogitationis initium non homini ex se ipso nasci, sed divinitus parari et tribui, in eo Deus evidenter ostendit, quia nec diabolus nec aliquis Angelorum eius, ex quo in hanc caliginem sunt detrusi, bonam potuit vel poterit resumere voluntatem; quia, si possibile foret, ut humana natura, postquam, a Deo aversa, bonitatem perdidit voluntatis, ex se ipsa rursus eam habere potuisset, multo possibilius hoc natura haberet angelica, quae quanto minus gravatur terreni corporis pondere, tanto magis hac esset praedita facultate[^1] ... Non igitur homo vel Angelus a se voluntatem bonam habere potest, sed malam. Similiter et de *potentia* inquiunt, per similitudinem *voluntatis* de *potentia* boni vel mali disserentes, quod illa sit a Deo, non ista. »

Sed pluribus Sanctorum testimoniis indubitanter monstratur, quod omnis potestas mali a Deo est, a quo est omnis potestas. Ait enim Apostolus[^2]: *Non est potestas nisi a Deo*; quod non de potestate boni tantum, sed et mali intelligi oportet, cum Pilato etiam Veritas dicat: *Non haberes in me potestatem, nisi datum esset tibi desuper.* « Malitia nempe hominum, ut ait Augustinus[^3], cupiditatem nocendi per se habet; potestatem autem, si ille non dat, non habet ... Ideoque diabolus, antequam aliquid tolleret Iob, dicebat Domino: *Mitte manum tuam*, id est, da potestatem, « quia etiam nocentium potestas non est nisi a Deo, sicut Sa<!-- page 999 -->pientia ait: *Per me reges regnant, et tyranni per me tenent terram.* Unde Iob de Domino ait: *Qui facit regnare hypocritam propter perversitatem populi.* Et de populo Israel dicit Deus: *Dedi eis regem in ira mea[^4]* ». « Nocendi enim voluntas potest esse ab hominis animo, potestas autem non est nisi a Deo, et hoc abdita aptaque iustitia[^5] »; nam per potestatem diabolo datam iustos Deus facit suos. De hoc etiam Gregorius in Moralibus[^6] ait: « Tumoris elatio, non potestatis ordo, in crimine est. Potentiam Deus tribuit, elationem vero potentiae malitia nostrae mentis invenit. Tollamus ergo quod de nostro est, quia non potentia iusta, sed actio prava damnatur ». — His auctoritatibus aliisque plurimis evidenter ostenditur, quod non est potestas boni vel mali cuicumque nisi a Deo aequo, etsi te lateat aequitas.

### Cap. II. *An aliquando resistendum sit potestati.*

Hic oritur quaestio non transilienda silentio. Dictum est supra, quod potestas peccandi et nocendi non est homini vel diabolo nisi a Deo. Apostolus[^7] autem dicit, quod *qui potestati resistit Dei ordinationi resistit.* Cum ergo diabolo sit potestas mali Dei ordinatione, eius potestati non esse resistendum videtur. — Sed sciendum est, Apostolum ibi loqui de saeculari potestate, scilicet rege et principe et huiusmodi; quibus non est resistendum in his quae iubet Deus eis exhiberi, scilicet in tributis et huiusmodi. Si vero princeps aliquis vel diabolus aliquid iusserit vel suaserit contra Deum; tunc resistendum est. Unde Augustinus determinans, quando sit resistendum potestati, in libro *de Natura boni[^8]* ait: « Si aliquid iubeat potestas, quod non debes facere, hic sane contemne potestatem, timendo maiorem potestatem. Ipsos humanarum rerum gradus adverte. Si quid iusserit curator, nunquid faciendum est, si contra proconsulem iubeat? Rursus, si quid ipse proconsul iubeat, et aliud iubeat imperator, nunquid dubitatur, illo contempto, illi esse serviendum? Ergo si aliud imperator, aliud Deus iubeat, contempto illo, obtemperandum est Deo ». — Potestati ergo diaboli vel hominis tunc resistamus, cum aliquid contra Deum suggesserit, in quo Dei ordinationi non resistimus, sed obtemperamus. Sic enim Deus praecepit, ut in malis nulli potestati obediamus. — Iam nunc his intelligendis atque pertractandis, quae ad Verbi incarnati mysterium pertinent, integra mentis consideratione intendamus, ut de ineffabilibus vel modicum aliquid fari, Deo revelante, valeamus.

*Explicit liber secundus.*

---

english:
<!-- page 998 -->

# DISTINCTION XLIV.

### Chapter I. *On the power of sinning, whether it is from God to man or to the devil.*

After the foregoing matters it presents itself as worthy of consideration whether the power of sinning is from God to us, or from ourselves. — Some think that the power of acting rightly is from God to us, but the power of sinning is not from God, but from ourselves, or from the devil; just as an *evil will* is not from God to us, but from ourselves and from the devil, whereas a good one is from God alone to us. « For that the beginning of a good will and thought is not born to man from himself, but is divinely prepared and bestowed, God plainly shows in this, that neither the devil nor any of his Angels, from the time they were thrust down into this darkness, was able or will be able to resume a good will; for if it were possible that human nature, after, being turned away from God, it lost the goodness of its will, could of itself have it again from itself, much more possible would the angelic nature have this, which, the less it is weighed down by the burden of an earthly body, the more it would be endowed with this faculty[^1] ... Therefore neither man nor Angel can have a good will of himself, but only an evil one. And in like manner they say of *power* also, discoursing about the *power* of good or of evil after the likeness of the *will*, that the former is from God, not the latter. »

But by many testimonies of the Saints it is shown beyond doubt that all power of evil is from God, from whom is all power. For the Apostle says[^2]: *There is no power but from God*; which must be understood not of the power of good only, but also of evil, since to Pilate also the Truth says: *Thou shouldst have no power against me, unless it were given thee from above.* « For the malice of men, as Augustine says[^3], has of itself the desire of doing harm; but power it has not, unless He give it ... And therefore the devil, before he took away anything of Job's, said to the Lord: *Put forth thy hand*, that is, give power, « for even the power of those who do harm is only from God, as Wisdom says: *By me kings reign, and tyrants by me hold the earth.* Whence Job says of the Lord: *Who maketh a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people.* And of the people of Israel God says: *I gave them a king in my wrath[^4]* ». « For the will to do harm can be from the mind of man, but the power is only from God, and that by a hidden and fitting justice[^5] »; for by the power given to the devil God makes the just His own. Concerning this also Gregory in the *Morals[^6]* says: « It is the swelling of pride, not the order of power, that is in the crime. God bestows the power, but the malice of our mind devises the elation of power. Let us therefore take away what is from ourselves, since it is not just power, but the wicked deed, that is condemned ». — By these authorities and very many others it is evidently shown that there is no power of good or of evil to anyone except from a just God, even though His equity is hidden from thee.

### Chapter II. *Whether one must sometimes resist a power.*

Here arises a question not to be passed over in silence. It has been said above that the power of sinning and of doing harm is not in man or the devil except from God. But the Apostle says[^7] that *he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God.* Since therefore the devil has the power of evil by God's ordinance, it seems that his power must not be resisted. — But it must be known that the Apostle there speaks of secular power, namely the king and the prince and the like; whom one must not resist in those things which God commands to be rendered to them, namely in tributes and the like. But if some prince or the devil should command or persuade something against God, then it must be resisted. Whence Augustine, determining when a power must be resisted, in the book *On the Nature of the Good[^8]* says: « If a power commands something which thou oughtest not to do, here indeed despise the power, fearing a greater power. Consider the very grades of human affairs. If a curator commands something, is it to be done, if he commands against the proconsul? Again, if the proconsul himself commands something, and the emperor commands something else, is it doubted that, the former being despised, the latter is to be served? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, the former being despised, God is to be obeyed ». — Let us therefore resist the power of the devil or of man when it suggests something against God, wherein we do not resist God's ordinance, but obey it. For thus God has commanded, that in evil things we obey no power. — Now let us bend our whole consideration of mind to the understanding and treating of those things which pertain to the mystery of the incarnate Word, that we may be able, God revealing it, to utter at least some little about things ineffable.

*Here ends the second book.*

---

la: Fulgent., de Fide ad Petrum, c. 3. n. 34. In quo loco originale habet *et praeparari et tribui* pro *parari et tribui.*

en: Fulgentius, *On the Faith, to Peter*, c. 3, n. 34. In which passage the original has *et praeparari et tribui* (and to be prepared beforehand and bestowed) for *parari et tribui* (to be prepared and bestowed).

la: Rom. 13, 1. Seq. locus est Ioan. 19, 11. Quae sequuntur in hoc capitulo sumta sunt ex Glossa ad Rom. loc. cit., sed multis a Magistro omissis.

en: Rom. 13:1. The following passage is John 19:11. What follows in this chapter is taken from the Gloss on Romans at the cited place, but with many things omitted by the Master.

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 32. serm. 3. n. 12. Locus Scripturae est Iob 1, 11. Vulgata: *Extende manum* etc.

en: *Expositions on the Psalms*, on Ps. 32, sermon 3, n. 12. The scriptural passage is Job 1:11. The Vulgate has: *Stretch forth thy hand* etc.

la: August., de Natura boni, c. 32, in quo textu citantur Prov. 8, 15; Iob 34, 30, in quo pro *perversitatem*, quod cum originali Augustini habent nostri codd., Vulgata cum Vat. aliisque edd. *peccata.* Denique Ose. 13, 11: *Dabo tibi regem in furore meo.*

en: Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 32, in which text are cited Prov. 8:15; Job 34:30, where for *perversitatem* (perversity), which our codices have together with Augustine's original, the Vulgate together with the Vatican edition and others reads *peccata* (sins). Finally Hosea 13:11: *I will give thee a king in my fury.*

la: Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5, et fere idem dicitur Enarrat. in Ps. 29. serm. 2. n. 6. In hoc textu pro *abdita aptaque iustitia*, quod legitur in Glossa nostrisque codd. et edd., in libro Gen. ad lit. habetur *abdita altaque iustitia.*

en: Bk. XI of *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 3, n. 5, and nearly the same is said in *Expositions on the Psalms*, on Ps. 29, sermon 2, n. 6. In this text, for *abdita aptaque iustitia* (by a hidden and fitting justice), which is read in the Gloss and in our codices and editions, the book *On Genesis according to the Letter* has *abdita altaque iustitia* (by a hidden and lofty justice).

la: Libr. XXVI. c. 26. n. 48.

la: Non ibi, sed Serm. 62. (alias 6. de Verbis Domini) c. 8. n. 13. Pro *Si aliquid* originale et edd. 1, 8 *Si illud*, inferius pro *curator* edd. *procurator*, refragantibus codd. A B C D et originali.

en: Not there, but in Sermon 62 (otherwise 6, *On the Words of the Lord*), c. 8, n. 13. For *Si aliquid* (If anything) the original and editions 1, 8 read *Si illud* (If that), and below, for *curator* (curator) the editions read *procurator* (procurator), against codices A B C D and the original.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.998–999 (PDF 1020–1021), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR (raw lines 69327–69398). This is the **last littera of Vol II**: Lombard's two concluding chapters of Book II (CAP. I *De potentia peccandi*, CAP. II *An aliquando resistendum sit potestati*), ending with the rubric *Explicit liber secundus.*

**Page-split map.**
- p.998 (PDF 1020): DISTINCTIO XLIV / CAP. I opens in the L-col (below the d.43 dubia DUB. III/IV opening) and continues across the R-col, ending mid-page at the foot of the R-col (`...sicut Sa-`). Littera body markers on this page: `facultate` (→ `[^1]`, Fulgentius), `Apostolus` (→ `[^2]`, Rom 13:1), `Augustinus` (→ `[^3]`, Enarr. in Ps. 32). (`monstratur` carries NO footer — corrected 2026-06-01; see apparatus note below.)
- p.999 (PDF 1021): CAP. I tail (`-pientia ait...`) + CAP. II + `Explicit liber secundus.` Markers `mea` (→ `[^4]`), `iustitia` (→ `[^5]`), `Moralibus` (→ `[^6]`), `Apostolus` (→ `[^7]`), `boni` (→ `[^8]`).

**Apparatus split (8 entries, per-page NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM blocks):**
- p.998 has TWO column-foot footer blocks. The **L-col foot block (footers 1–4: Alex. Hal. / *Cfr. infra d.44 … infirmus esse* / Aristot. III Ethic. / Art. 2 q.1)** belongs entirely to **d43-dubia (DUB. IV)** and was consumed there as its `[^15]`–`[^18]`. The **R-col foot block under the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` divider (footers 1–3: Fulgent. de Fide ad Petrum / Rom. 13:1 + Ioan. 19:11 + Glossa / Enarr. in Ps. 32)** belongs to this d.44 littera and is rendered here as `[^1]`–`[^3]`.
- p.999 footers 1–5 (August. de Natura boni / Gen. ad lit. XI / Greg. Moral. XXVI / Rom. 13:2 / Serm. 62) are this littera's; rendered `[^4]`–`[^8]`. The p.999 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer (`Vat. et edd. 3, 4 supplent peccandi...`) belongs to **d44-divisio**, not the littera — forwarded.

**Footer mis-attribution CORRECTED — 2026-06-01 decade polish (600 dpi p.998, PDF 1020).** The chunk previously carried the p.998 **L-col** footer 2 (`Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro infirmus esse … infirmus est.`) as its `[^1]`, anchored at `facultate`, and a Notes flag claimed this was the littera's "true body home." **This was wrong.** The 600 dpi read (L-1/L-2 body+footer bands, R-0 body) shows: (a) the footer's variant lemma *infirmus esse* appears only in **DUB. IV** (`…potest deficere et infirmus esse`, d43-dubia), NOT anywhere in the CAP. I littera; (b) the footer sits in the p.998 **L-col** block (the DUB. III/IV footnote column), not in the R-col `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block; (c) the littera's CAP. I text has exactly THREE R-col `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footers — ¹ Fulgentius (the *parari et tribui* variant, anchoring the Fulgentius quote at `facultate`), ² Rom 13:1 (at *Apostolus*), ³ Enarr. in Ps. 32 (at *Augustinus*). The bogus `[^1]` (DUB. IV note) was therefore **removed**; the body marker that had wrongly sat on `monstratur` was deleted (no footer annotates *monstratur*); `facultate` now correctly carries the Fulgentius note as `[^1]`; and all subsequent markers/defs were renumbered down by one (old `[^2]`–`[^9]` → `[^1]`–`[^8]`). The note remains correctly in **d43-dubia as its `[^16]`** (its true home, anchored at *potentia* in the DUB. IV body). No duplicate remains; both chunks agree.

**Hand-off forwarded to d44-divisio:** `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIV.` (subtitle *Unde habeat ortum potentia peccandi.*) + lemma *Post praedicta consideratione dignum etc.* + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` begin at raw **69399**, in the **R-col of printed p.999** (PDF 1021), immediately after the littera tail `...Explicit liber secundus.` Seam grammatically clean. The **p.999 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footers belong to d44-divisio** (left col footers 1–2: August. de Natura boni c.32 + Libr. XI de Gen. ad lit.; the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` divider footer 1: `Vat. et edd. 3, 4 supplent peccandi...`) — none migrate from the littera. The DIVISIO TEXTUS divides this concluding part into four; TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (p.1000) lists ARTICULUS I (q1 *utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo*; q2 *utrum potentia peccandi sit bona an mala*). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render.


title: Dist. 44, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLIV — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLIV — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 999 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIV.
### *Unde habeat ortum potentia peccandi.*

*Post praedicta consideratione dignum etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter peccatum habet ortum a voluntate in generali et in speciali. In hac vero parte determinat, unde habeat ortum potentia peccandi; et haec pars durat usque ad finem libri.

Dividitur autem pars ista in partes quatuor. In quarum prima quaerit Magister, unde sit potentia peccandi; et determinat, quod potentia peccandi non est a Deo, secundum quorundam opinionem. In secunda vero parte ostendit, quod omnis potentia[^1] est a Deo, pluribus auctoritatibus, ibi: *Sed pluribus Sanctorum testimoniis* etc. In tertia vero parte determinat quandam dubitationem, quae ex praecedentibus habet ortum, videlicet, utrum alicui potestati sit resistendum, ibi: *Hic oritur quaestio non transilienda*; ubi determinat, quod aliquando est obediendum, aliquando resistendum. In quarta vero et ultima continuat Magister dicta dicendis, ut ex hoc libro ad librum tertium transeat, ibi: *Iam nunc illis intelligendis atque pertractandis* etc. Et posset haec particula ultima dividi contra totum praecedens; sed causa brevitatis non fuit divisa. Huiusmodi enim minutiae divisionum plus habent curiositatis quam utilitatis, et idcirco eas in praecedentibus praetermisi.

<!-- page 1000 -->

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa tria.

Primo quaeritur, unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.

Secundo vero quaeritur, unde sit in homine potestas praesidendi sive dominandi.

Tertio quaeritur de necessitate subiacendi potentiae praesidendi[^2].

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit in homine a Deo, vel a se ipso.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, sit bona, an mala.

---

english:
<!-- page 999 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLIV.
### *Whence the power of sinning has its origin.*

*After the foregoing matters, what next occurs as worthy of consideration, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed how sin has its origin from the will, in general and in particular. But in this part he determines whence the power of sinning has its origin; and this part lasts until the end of the book.

Now this part is divided into four parts. In the first of these the Master asks whence the power of sinning comes; and he determines that the power of sinning is not from God, according to the opinion of certain persons. In the second part he shows that all power[^1] is from God, by many authorities, there: *But by the many testimonies of the Saints* etc. In the third part he determines a certain doubt that arises out of the preceding, namely, whether one ought to resist any power, there: *Here arises a question not to be passed over*; where he determines that sometimes one must obey, sometimes resist. In the fourth and last part the Master joins what has been said to what is to be said, so that from this book he may pass over to the third book, there: *Now then, those things being understood and treated, etc.* And this last little portion could be divided over against the whole that precedes; but for the sake of brevity it was not divided. For such minutiae of divisions have more of curiosity than of usefulness, and therefore I have passed them over in what precedes.

<!-- page 1000 -->

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part there here arises a question concerning three things.

First, it is asked whence the power of sinning has its origin.

Second, it is asked whence there is in man the power of presiding or of ruling.

Third, it is asked concerning the necessity of being subject to the power that presides[^2].

Concerning the first, two questions are asked.

First, it is asked whether the power of sinning is in man from God, or from himself.

Second, it is asked whether the power of sinning, insofar as it is such, is good or evil.

---

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 supplent *peccandi*. Paulo ante pro *ostendit* cod. T substituit *ostenditur*. Paulo inferius pro *utrum alicui* Vat. habet *utrum aliquando*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 supply *peccandi* ("of sinning"). A little before, for *ostendit* ("he showed") codex T substitutes *ostenditur* ("it is shown"). A little further down, for *utrum alicui* ("whether to any [power]") the Vatican edition has *utrum aliquando* ("whether at any time").

la: Ita codd. F K bb et alii, sed edd. cum pluribus codd. *praesidendi*; infra autem in rubrica tertii articuli in omnibus, excepta Vat., legitur *praesidendi*.

en: So codices F, K, bb and others; but the editions, with several codices, [read] *praesidendi*; further below, however, in the rubric of the third article, in all [witnesses] except the Vatican edition, *praesidendi* is read.

translators_notes:
**Provenance / page-split map.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp.999–1000 = PDF 1021–1022; offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 69399–69447. Running heads confirmed via PDF render: p.999 = `DIST. XLIV. DIVISIO TEXTUS. 999`; p.1000 = `1000 ... SENTENTIARUM LIB. II. — TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.`

- **COMMENTARIUS opener + lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS** sit in the R-col / lower portion of printed **p.999**, immediately after the d44-littera tail `…Explicit liber secundus.` Seam grammatically clean (commentary opens `Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter peccatum habet ortum a voluntate…`).
- **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** sits at the head of printed **p.1000**, above the ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I body (which belongs to d44-a1-q1).

**Apparatus split (2 entries).**
- The five **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** footers on p.999 (August. de Natura boni c.32; Gen. ad lit. XI; Greg. Moral. XXVI; Rom.13:2; Serm.62) are the **littera's** footers and were already consumed by `d44-littera` as `[^5]`–`[^9]`. NOT re-claimed here.
- This divisio holds only the **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** divider footer on p.999 (rendered `[^1]`, anchored on `omnis potentia¹` in the DIVISIO body) + the **p.1000 TRACTATIO footer 1** (rendered `[^2]`, anchored on `potentiae praesidendi¹` in the TRACTATIO). p.1000 footers 2–5 (Psalm 29; Libr. IV; August. de Lib. Arb.; Vers. 10) belong to `d44-a1-q1`.

**AUTHORITATIVE d.44 STRUCTURE (resolved 2026-05-31).** The TRACTATIO asks *circa tria* (three things): (1) unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi; (2) unde sit in homine potestas praesidendi sive dominandi; (3) de necessitate subiacendi potentiae praesidendi. These three things become **three articles**, and verifying the raw OCR each article opener says `…quaeruntur duo`:
- **ARTICULUS I.** *Unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.* (raw 69449) — q1 = *Utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo* (raw 69454); q2 = *Utrum potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, sit bona, an mala* (raw 69622).
- **ARTICULUS II.** *De potestate praesidendi.* (raw 69792) — `Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo`: q1 = *Utrum omnis potestas dominandi sit a Deo* (raw 69937 QUAESTIO II marker; q1 opener raw 69804); q2 = *Utrum potestas dominandi sit a Deo secundum institutionem naturae, an secundum punitionem culpae* (raw 69937).
- **ARTICULUS III.** *De necessitate subiacendi potentiae praesidendi.* (raw 70068) — `Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo`: q1 = *Utrum Christiani teneantur subesse tyrannis sive potestati saeculari in aliquibus* (raw 70077); q2 = *Utrum religiosi teneantur subiacere praelatis suis in omnibus* (raw 70286).

**The auto-chunker's 6-chunk split (a1–a3 × q1/q2) MATCHES the TRACTATIO. No re-chunk needed.** Next action: `d44-a1-q1`.

**Hand-off forwarded to d44-a1-q1.** `ARTICULUS I. Unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.` + `QUAESTIO I. Utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo.` begin at raw **69449/69454**, on printed **p.1000** (PDF 1022) immediately below the TRACTATIO; q1 body opens `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:` Fund. 1 (Augustini super Psalmum, *Nocendi voluntas potest esse ab hominis animo; potestas autem non nisi a Deo*, cited by the Master in the littera); fund. 2 (Philosophus in Topicis, *Potest Deus… Qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus*); fund. 3 (potentia peccandi aut est in creatura rationali secundum quod est a Deo, aut secundum quod est ex nihilo). **a1-q1's first body-footer is the fresh p.1000 footer 2** (Psalm 29 / *XI. de Gen. ad lit.*); the **p.1000 TRACTATIO footer 1 (*praesidendi* variant) was consumed here as `[^2]`** — do NOT re-claim it. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. **d.44 is the LAST distinction of Vol II** — when d.44 completes, Vol II is DONE (update landing/About copy per MEMORY.md `update-about-copy-after-vol2`). d.50 polish gate does NOT apply (Vol II ends at d.44).

No `[?]` flags — OCR/PDF readings confirmed line-by-line against 450 dpi column crops.