title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De assumtione ex parte assumti.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de assumtione ex parte assumti. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque.

Primo quaeritur, utrum persona Dei assumserit humanam naturam.

Secundo, utrum assumserit humanam personam.

Tertio, utrum sit ponere perfectam intentionem personalitatis circa animam separatam.

Quarto, utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem.

Quinto et ultimo, utrum concedendum sit, quod assumserit humanitatem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum concedendum sit, naturam humanam assumtam esse a Deo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum sit concedendum, quod humana natura sit assumta a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Philippenses secundo[^1]: *Semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens;* sed veritas naturae attenditur quantum ad propriam formam: ergo si assumsit formam hominis, assumsit hominis naturam. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Item, Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum[^2]: «Deus humanam naturam in unitatem personae accepit».

3. Item, nullus est verus homo, nisi vere habeat humanam naturam; sed Dei Filius verus homo est: ergo habet humanam naturam in se. Sed non habet eam per aeternam generationem: ergo habet per assumtionem: igitur assumsit humanam naturam.

4. Item, quicumque est alicuius filius naturalis, communicat cum eo in natura[^3]; sed Dei Filius est Virginis filius naturalis: ergo communicat cum ea in natura. Aut igitur illam naturam habuit ab aeterno, vel ex tempore; constat, quod non ab aeterno, sed ex tempore. Si ex tempore, aut ex propria virtute, aut ex aliena; constat, quod ex virtute propria; sed quod accipit quis virtute propria dicitur assumere: restat igitur, quod humana natura sit a Deo assumta.

**Sed contra:** 1. Omne quod assumitur, est, antequam sit assumtum; sed humana natura Christi non fuit ante unionem ipsius cum Verbo[^4]: ergo non videtur, quod fuerit assumta a Verbo. (*Ad oppositum.*)

2. Item, omne quod assumitur ab aliquo, fit aliquo modo unum cum eo, a quo assumitur, quia assumtio ordinatur ad unionem[^5]: ergo si humana natura assumitur a Deo, fit unum cum Deo. Sed quae sunt eadem, unum potest praedicari de altero: ergo humana natura est Deus, et e converso; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod humana natura sit a Deo assumta.

3. Item, omne quod assumitur ab aliquo ad unionem, acquirit proprietatem aliquam eius, a quo assumitur et cui unitur; sed humana natura non acquirit aliquam proprietatem ipsius Verbi — nulla enim proprietas Verbi dicitur de humana natura — ergo non videtur, quod ipsa a Verbo Dei fuerit assumta.

4. Item, Boethius in libro de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi[^6] ponit quatuor definitiones naturae, quarum nulla videtur competere assumtioni divinae: ergo si recte et sufficienter definit naturam, non videtur esse concedendum, quod humana natura sit assumta a Deo. Quod patet discurrendo per singulas notificationes, quarum prima est: «Natura est earum rerum, quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt». Hoc modo non potest accipi, cum dicitur: humana natura est assumta; quia, si unam proprietatem hominis vel partem assumsisset, videtur assumsisse humanam naturam. — Secunda definitio naturae est: «Natura est vel quod agere, vel quod pati potest[^7]». Et adhuc ista notificatio non competit sibi, quia secundum istum modum sibi sufficeret assumsisse solum animam, ad hoc quod diceretur assumsisse humanam naturam. — Tertia notificatio est: «Natura est principium motus et quietis *per se*, et non secundum *accidens*[^8]». Adhuc nec ista competit, quia sufficeret, si solum corpus assumsisset. — Quarta notificatio est haec: «Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia». Sed nec etiam isto modo videtur assumtioni competere, quia, sicut dicit Damascenus tertio libro capitulo undecimo[^9]: «Verbum incarnatum non eam quae nuda contemplatione consideratur assumsit naturam — non enim incarnatio hoc esset, sed fictio et deceptio incarnationis — neque eam quae specie consideratur, sed eam quae est in atomo»: ergo nullo modo videtur esse concedendum, quod Deus humanam naturam assumsit. (*Definitiones naturae.*)

### Conclusio

> Vere et proprie loquendo, concedi potest et debet, quod humana natura est a Deo assumta.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod vere et proprie loquendo, concedi potest et debet, humanam naturam a Deo assumtam esse, pro eo quod, sicut dicit Philosophus[^1b]: «Natura accipitur et pro vera materia et pro vera forma», et de his dicitur secundum quandam analogiam. (*Conclusio.*) Quoniam igitur Deus assumsit carnem et animam humanam, et caro est principium hominis materiale, anima vero formale[^2b]; hinc est, quod vere non solum humanam naturam, sed etiam *totam* humanam naturam dicitur assumsisse. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.
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1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil assumitur nisi ens; dicendum, quod hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo sic: nihil assumitur nisi *ens in ipsa assumtione*; et hoc quidem verum est nec habet instantiam in proposito, quia humana natura simul habuit esse et *esse assumtum*. Alio modo potest intelligi, ut nihil assumatur, nisi *prius* sit, quam assumatur; et si hoc intelligitur de *esse in potentia*, veritatem habet, quia assumta natura prius est in potentia materiae, vel efficientis, quam uniatur ipsi assumenti. Si autem intelligatur quantum ad *esse in actu*, sic non habet veritatem, in ea potentia maxime, quae simul potest rem fabricare et sibi unire. Unde si quis posset vestimentum in dorso suo facere, simul esset vestimenti compositio et vestimenti assumtio. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito. (*Solutio oppositorum. Duplex sensus. Notandum.*)

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod assumtio unum facit etc.; dicendum, quod verum est; non tamen omnimode facit unum, sed secundum quod competit comparatione[^3b] assumentis ad assumtum. Si autem in aliqua assumtione reperitur unio, potissime reperitur in assumtione humanae naturae a Verbo; quia non tantum est ibi unitas *per adiacentiam*, sed etiam est ibi unitas, quae est ipsius naturae *ad hypostasim suam*[^4b]. Haec autem unitas aliquo modo admittit differentiam in omni creata natura; unde de nulla hypostasi, cuius sit natura creata, conceditur, quod sit sua essentia vel natura in abstractione, sed solum per modum *concretionis*; unde non dicitur, quod Petrus sit humanitas, sed quod Petrus sit homo. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito, quia, quamvis Deus non sit *humana natura*, est tamen *homo*. Et propterea non cogit illa ratio: unum non praedicatur de altero in abstractione, ergo non habent identitatem sive unitatem assumtioni competentem. (*Notandum.*)

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod assumitur ab aliquo, acquirit aliquam proprietatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod aliquam proprietatem acquirit; sed hoc potest esse *in recto*, vel *in obliquo*; vel ratione *suppositi*, vel ratione *formae*. Et quamvis non videatur humanae naturae acquiri proprietas ex ratione *formae*, acquiritur ratione *suppositi*; quamvis etiam[^5b] non conveniat ei proprietas *in recto*, convenit *in obliquo*, secundum quod natura abstractive sumitur. (*Notandum.*)

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: secundum quam illarum notificationum accipitur ibi natura? dico, quod secundum *omnem* potest accipi, maxime tamen secundum *ultimam*, quia completivam et specificam habuit hominis differentiam. Nec valent illae instantiae, quia Christus dicitur non solum assumsisse humanam naturam, sed *totam* humanam naturam; nec dicitur assumsisse specificam differentiam, secundum quod specifica differentia sumitur *per abstractionem* a singularibus, sed assumsit specificam differentiam *in particulari* veraciter existentem[^6b]; et hoc modo datur intelligi nomine naturae. — In hoc enim differt *essentia* a *natura*; quia *essentia* nominat rei formam in quadam *abstractione*, *natura* eam nominat *entem* in motu et materia ut naturalium operationum principium. (*Differt essentia a natura.*) Et ideo doctores catholici magis isto verbo uti voluerunt: Deus assumsit humanam *naturam*, quam hoc: Deus assumsit humanam *essentiam*, quamvis utraque sit vera; ista enim[^7b] est magis propria.

english:
### Article II. *On the assumption on the part of the thing assumed.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal matter, namely the assumption on the part of the thing assumed. And concerning this five questions are asked.

First it is asked whether the Person of God assumed a human nature.

Second, whether He assumed a human person.

Third, whether one must posit a complete intention of personality with respect to the separated soul.

Fourth, whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man.

Fifth and last, whether it is to be conceded that He assumed humanity.

### Question I. *Whether it is to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it is to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God. And that it is so, it seems.

1. To the Philippians 2[^1]: *He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant;* but the truth of a nature is attended to with respect to its proper form: therefore if He assumed the form of a man, He assumed the nature of a man. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Faith, to Peter*[^2]: «God took the human nature into the unity of the Person».

3. Likewise, no one is a true man unless he truly has a human nature; but the Son of God is a true man: therefore He has a human nature in Himself. But He does not have it through the eternal generation: therefore He has it through assumption: therefore He assumed a human nature.

4. Likewise, whoever is someone's natural son shares with him in nature[^3]; but the Son of God is the natural son of the Virgin: therefore He shares with her in nature. Therefore He had that nature either from eternity or in time; it is established that not from eternity, but in time. If in time, then either by His own power or by another's; it is established that by His own power; but what one receives by his own power he is said to assume: it remains, therefore, that the human nature was assumed by God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Everything that is assumed exists before it is assumed; but the human nature of Christ did not exist before its union with the Word[^4]: therefore it does not seem that it was assumed by the Word. (*Ad oppositum.*)

2. Likewise, everything that is assumed by something becomes in some way one with that by which it is assumed, because assumption is ordered to union[^5]: therefore if the human nature is assumed by God, it becomes one with God. But things that are the same — the one can be predicated of the other: therefore the human nature is God, and conversely; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows is false, namely that the human nature was assumed by God.

3. Likewise, everything that is assumed by something unto union acquires some property of that by which it is assumed and to which it is united; but the human nature does not acquire any property of the Word — for no property of the Word is said of the human nature — therefore it does not seem that it was assumed by the Word of God.

4. Likewise, Boethius in his book *On the Two Natures and the One Person of Christ*[^6] sets down four definitions of nature, none of which seems to befit the divine assumption: therefore if he defines nature rightly and sufficiently, it does not seem to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God. This is evident by running through the individual notifications, of which the first is: «Nature is of those things which, since they are, can in some way be grasped by the intellect». In this way it cannot be taken when it is said: the human nature is assumed; because, if He had assumed one property or part of a man, He would seem to have assumed the human nature. — The second definition of nature is: «Nature is that which can either act or be acted upon[^7]». And again this notification does not befit it, because in this way it would suffice Him to have assumed the soul alone, in order that He be said to have assumed the human nature. — The third notification is: «Nature is the principle of motion and rest *of itself*, and not according to *accident*[^8]». Again neither does this befit, because it would suffice if He had assumed the body alone. — The fourth notification is this: «Nature is the specific difference informing each thing». But not even in this way does it seem to befit the assumption, because, as Damascene says in his third book, chapter eleven[^9]: «The incarnate Word did not assume the nature considered in bare contemplation — for this would not be incarnation, but a feigning and a deception of incarnation — nor the one considered in its species, but the one which is in the individual»: therefore in no way does it seem to be conceded that God assumed the human nature. (*Definitiones naturae.*)

### Conclusion

> Speaking truly and properly, it can and ought to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, speaking truly and properly, it can and ought to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God, for this reason: that, as the Philosopher says[^1b], «Nature is taken both for true matter and for true form», and these are spoken of according to a certain analogy. (*Conclusio.*) Since, therefore, God assumed flesh and a human soul, and the flesh is the material principle of a man, while the soul is the formal[^2b]; hence it is that He is said truly to have assumed not only the human nature, but even the *whole* human nature. — And the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that nothing is assumed unless it is a being; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way thus: nothing is assumed unless it is a *being in the assumption itself*; and this indeed is true and has no counter-instance in the matter at hand, because the human nature had being and *being-assumed* at the same time. In another way it can be understood that nothing is assumed unless it *first* exists before it is assumed; and if this is understood of *being in potency*, it holds true, because the assumed nature first exists in the potency of matter, or of the efficient cause, before it is united to the one assuming it. But if it is understood with respect to *being in act*, then it does not hold true, especially in that potency which can at once fashion a thing and unite it to itself. Hence if someone could make a garment on his own back, the fashioning of the garment and the assumption of the garment would be simultaneous. In this way it must be understood in the matter at hand. (*Solutio oppositorum. Duplex sensus. Notandum.*)

2. To that which is objected, that assumption makes a unity, etc.; it must be said that it is true; yet it does not make a unity in every way, but according as it befits in the comparison[^3b] of the one assuming to the thing assumed. But if in any assumption a union is found, it is most fully found in the assumption of the human nature by the Word; because there is there not only a unity *by adjacency*, but there is also there the unity which is that of the nature itself *to its hypostasis*[^4b]. But this unity in some way admits a difference in every created nature; whence concerning no hypostasis whose nature is created is it conceded that it is its own essence or nature in abstraction, but only by the mode of *concretion*; whence it is not said that Peter is humanity, but that Peter is a man. In this way it must be understood in the matter at hand, because, although God is not *a human nature*, He is nevertheless *a man*. And therefore that argument does not compel: the one is not predicated of the other in abstraction, therefore they do not have the identity or unity befitting the assumption. (*Notandum.*)

3. To that which is objected, that everything which is assumed by something acquires some property; it must be said that it is true that it acquires some property; but this can be *in the direct* [case], or *in the oblique*; or by reason of the *supposit*, or by reason of the *form*. And although it does not seem that a property is acquired by the human nature from the account of *form*, it is acquired by reason of the *supposit*; and although[^5b] a property does not befit it *in the direct*, it befits it *in the oblique*, according as the nature is taken abstractively. (*Notandum.*)

4. To that which is objected: according to which of those notifications is nature taken there? I say that it can be taken according to *every* one, yet most of all according to the *last*, because He had the completive and specific difference of a man. Nor do those counter-instances avail, because Christ is said to have assumed not only the human nature, but the *whole* human nature; nor is He said to have assumed the specific difference, according as the specific difference is taken *by abstraction* from singulars, but He assumed the specific difference *in the particular*, truly existing[^6b]; and in this way it is given to be understood by the name of nature. — For in this *essence* differs from *nature*; because *essence* names the form of a thing in a certain *abstraction*, while *nature* names it as *a being* in motion and matter, as the principle of natural operations. (*Differt essentia a natura.*) And therefore the catholic doctors preferred to use this word: God assumed a human *nature*, rather than this: God assumed a human *essence*, although both are true; for the former[^7b] is more proper.

la: Vers. 7.

en: Verse 7.

la: Cap. 2. n. 18. Cfr. c. 16. n. 60. In testimonio allato pro *accepit* textus origin. exhibet *suscepit*, et pro *in unitatem* codd. K aa *in unitate*.

en: Chapter 2, n. 18. Cf. c. 16, n. 60. In the testimony adduced, for *accepit* the original text exhibits *suscepit*, and for *in unitatem* codices K, aa read *in unitate*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. dub. 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, dub. 2.

la: De quo vide supra lit. Magistri, d. 11. c. 3, et Comment. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.

en: On which see above, the Master's text, d. 11, c. 3, and the Commentary, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Ut ostensum est supra a. I. q. I. in corp.

en: As was shown above, a. I, q. I, in the body.

la: Cap. 1, ubi etiam ab auctore ostenditur, tres priores definitiones inter se differre *extensione*, quippe cum prima verificetur de substantiis et accidentibus, secunda de omnibus substantiis (corporeis et incorporeis), tertia autem de substantiis corporeis tantum valeat. — Paulo inferius pro *definit* cod. N *definivit*.

en: Chapter 1, where it is also shown by the author that the three earlier definitions differ among themselves in *extension*, since indeed the first is verified of substances and accidents, the second of all substances (corporeal and incorporeal), while the third holds only of corporeal substances. — A little below, for *definit* codex N reads *definivit*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., 1. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 33. seq. (c. 7.). — Infra edd. *solam animam* pro *solum animam*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, bk. 1, text 33 ff. (c. 7). — Below, the editions read *solam animam* for *solum animam*.

la: Est Aristot., II. Phys. text. 3.

en: It is from Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 3.

la: De Fide orthod. — In auctoritate allegata post *quae specie* [textus originalis *quae in specie*, Vat. cum edd. 1, 2 perperam *specie, quae*] *consideratur* textus originalis adiungit *non enim omnes personas assumsit*. — Paulo superius pro *Sed nec etiam* codd. K P Q bb *Sed nec adhuc*, cod. F *Sed nec in*, et subinde pro *assumtioni*, quod habent codd. K (a secunda manu) P Q R S U, cod. Z *assumere*; in aliis *assumtum*.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*. — In the authority alleged, after *quae specie* [the original text *quae in specie*; the Vatican edition, with editions 1 and 2, wrongly *specie, quae*] *consideratur*, the original text adds *for He did not assume all persons*. — A little above, for *Sed nec etiam* codices K, P, Q, bb read *Sed nec adhuc*, codex F *Sed nec in*, and then for *assumtioni*, which codices K (by a second hand), P, Q, R, S, U have, codex Z reads *assumere*; in the others *assumtum*.

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. 10. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi etiam habetur, quod *forma magis sit natura quam materia* (ideoque secundum analogiam, de quo cfr. I. Phys. text. 69. c. 7.). Cfr. ibid. text. 21. et 81. (c. 2. et 8.); V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.). — Cod. K omittit *bis vera*.

en: *Physics*, bk. II, text 10 ff. (c. 1), where it is also found that *form is more nature than matter* (and therefore according to analogy, on which cf. *Physics* I, text 69, c. 7). Cf. ibid., text 21 and 81 (cc. 2 and 8); *Metaphysics* V, text 5 (IV, c. 4). — Codex K omits *bis vera*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 4. (c. 1.). — Non pauci codd. *homini* pro *hominis*. Paulo inferius edd. verbo *concedendae* praefigunt *ideo*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 4 (c. 1). — Not a few codices read *homini* for *hominis*. A little below, the editions prefix *ideo* to the word *concedendae*.

la: Codd. K Z *in comparatione*, edd. *comparationi*.

en: Codices K, Z read *in comparatione*, the editions *comparationi*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — De differentia, quae est inter hypostasim et naturam in creaturis, vide scholion ad sequentem quaest.

en: Cf. below, d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 1 ff. — On the difference which is between hypostasis and nature in creatures, see the scholion to the following question.

la: Edd. habent *enim*, et tum post *acquiritur* tum post *convenit* subiciunt *tamen*. Aliquanto superius pro *proprietati in acquiritur* Edd. I. Z. illa, codd. aa bb *proprietatem acquirat*.

en: The editions have *enim*, and both after *acquiritur* and after *convenit* they subjoin *tamen*. Somewhat above, for *proprietati … acquiritur* editions I, Z [read] *illa*, codices aa, bb *proprietatem acquirat*.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. 11. c. 1, et Comment. a. 3. q. 3. — Subinde Vat. omittit *modo*.

en: Cf. above, the Master's text, d. 11, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 3, q. 3. — Then the Vatican edition omits *modo*.

la: Edd. *tamen*.

en: The editions read *tamen*.

latin_scholion:
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**I.** Ipsa conclusio satis manifesta est. — In arg. 4. ad oppos. hic referuntur quatuor definitiones naturae, quas Boethius sumsit ex Aristotele, qui V. Metaph. text. 5. septem habet huiusmodi definitiones, alibi a nostro Doctore tactas. Quod omnes istae quatuor definitiones aliquo modo adaptari possint ad ea quae de natura humana assumsit Christus, confirmat etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 1.), qui eodem modo ibi etiam solvit instantiam hanc, quod differentia specifica significet naturam nudam. Dicit enim: «Sicut *genus* est quaedam intentio, quam intellectus ponit circa formam intellectam, ita etiam *differentia* et omnia quae significant *secundas intentiones*. Tamen huic intentioni intellectae respondet natura quaedam, quae est in particularibus, quamvis, secundum quod est in particularibus, non habeat rationem *generis*, vel *speciei*» etc. — Locutionem hanc: Deus assumsit humanam *essentiam*, quam Ss. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 3.) et Bonav. (hic ad 4.) admitti posse dicunt, non approbat Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 4. m. 3.), hac ductus ratione: «Quamvis sint idem re natura et essentia, tamen differunt ratione. *Natura* enim respicit rem *in fieri*, *essentia* vero respicit rem secundum *esse*. Quia ergo non fuit in esse res assumta, ideo non debet concedi: assumsit humanam essentiam». Concedentes autem istam locutionem dicunt, quod «quamvis secundum grammaticam essentia dicatur ab essendo, tamen essentia est causa essendi, [quatenus «essentia se habet ad esse sicut id, per quod est esse», S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 3.]; unde naturaliter prior est esse actuali ipsius personae seu suppositi» (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 5.). — Nota etiam, quod ibi auctor naturae humanae attribuit esse distinctum.

**II.** Plures Scholastici hanc quaestionem tantum tangunt in aliis huius dist. quaestionibus. Praeter laudatos de ea agunt: B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., art. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion itself is sufficiently manifest. — In the 4th argument to the contrary there are reported here four definitions of nature, which Boethius took from Aristotle, who in *Metaphysics* V, text 5, has seven definitions of this kind, treated by our Doctor elsewhere. That all these four definitions can in some way be adapted to those things which Christ assumed of the human nature is confirmed also by St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1), who in the same way there also resolves this counter-instance, that the specific difference signifies a bare nature. For he says: «Just as *genus* is a certain intention which the intellect places about the form understood, so also is *difference* and all things that signify *second intentions*. Yet to this understood intention there corresponds a certain nature, which is in particulars, although, according as it is in particulars, it does not have the account of *genus* or *species*» etc. — This expression: God assumed a human *essence*, which Ss. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 3) and Bonaventure (here ad 4) say can be admitted, Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 4, m. 3) does not approve, led by this reasoning: «Although nature and essence are the same in reality, yet they differ in account. For *nature* regards a thing *in becoming*, while *essence* regards a thing according to *being*. Since, therefore, the assumed thing was not in being, it ought not to be conceded: He assumed a human essence». But those conceding this expression say that «although according to grammar essence is named from being (*essendo*), nevertheless essence is the cause of being, [inasmuch as «essence is related to being as that by which there is being», St. Thomas, loc. cit. ad 3]; whence it is naturally prior to the actual being of the person or supposit itself» (so Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1, ad 5). — Note also that there the author attributes a distinct being to the human nature.

**II.** Many of the Scholastics touch this question only in the other questions of this distinction. Besides those praised, the following treat of it: Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, art. cit. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p13{0,1,2}-{L,R}-*.png`), reading each page Left column top→bottom then Right column. Raw OCR lines 9483–9658 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`) used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing; the Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum, and footer blocks were PDF-priority (cascade-shattered in OCR). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (printed pp. 130–132 = PDF 152–154). Running heads: `DIST. V. ART. II.` / `DIST. V. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`

**ARTICULUS II opener folded in.** Per the locked ARTICULUS-opener convention, the short ART. II opener (*De assumtione ex parte assumti*) + its 5-quaestio TRACTATIO list + the QUAESTIO I title are folded into this q1 chunk; no standalone `d5-a2-divisio`.

**Alignment verified.** Raw 9508 / body 9511 reads *Utrum concedendum sit, naturam humanam assumtam esse a Deo* — whether the human nature is to be conceded to have been assumed by God. Matches the target; not q2–q5.

**Page-split map.**
- **p. 130** (PDF 152): ART. II opener + 5-q list + QUAESTIO I title + *Fundamenta* args 1–4 + *Sed contra* 1–3 + contra arg 4 (Boethius, four definitions of nature) + CONCLUSIO heading + start of Respondeo. Footer sequence = notes **1–9** (this chunk's `[^1]`–`[^9]`).
- **p. 131** (PDF 153): Respondeo continues (Philosopher; *Solutio oppositorum* replies ad 1–4) + start of SCHOLION (I). Footer sequence = notes **1–8**, suffixed `[^1b]`–`[^8b]` to avoid collision with p.130's restarted sequence.
- **p. 132** (PDF 154): SCHOLION continues (tail of I + II), ending at "Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1." just before QUAESTIO II. p.132's footer block belongs to **q2** (note 1 = *In libro de Una Persona…*), NOT to this chunk.

**Footer hand-off picked up:** NONE. q.V (d5-a1-q5) exhausted pp.128–129; ART. II opened fresh on p.130 with its own per-page footer sequence starting at note 1.

**Footer hand-off forwarded to d5-a2-q2:** NONE. q1's scholion ends on p.132-R before QUAESTIO II; the entire p.132 footer sequence (notes 1+) belongs to q2's body. q2 picks up p.132 footers from note 1.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (parts **I**, **II**) prints at q1's tail, spanning p.131 bottom-R into p.132-R. The scholion text carries **no footnote markers** (consistent with the resume forecast pattern for Vol III scholia). Part I treats Boethius/Aristotle's definitions and the *natura* vs *essentia* dispute (Thomas, Alexander of Hales, Petrus a Tarantasia); Part II lists Scholastics treating the question.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not anchored: *Fundamenta*, *Definitiones naturae*, *Ad oppositum*, *Conclusio*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Duplex sensus*, *Notandum* (×3), *Differt essentia a natura*.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum Deus assumserit humanam personam
Whether God assumed a human person

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 132 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus assumserit humanam personam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus assumserit humanam personam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Boethius[^1] definiens personam, dicit, quod est «individua substantia rationalis naturae»; sed Christus assumsit individuam substantiam rationalis naturae — ut dicit Damascenus: «Assumsit enim naturam in atomo» — ergo assumsit personam.

2. Item, ad dignitatem singularis spectat, ut illud singulare sit persona, persona enim nomen est dignitatis[^2]; sed natura assumta in Christo aeque vel magis nobilis est, quam sit in aliquo alio homine: si igitur in aliis non amittit rationem personae, videtur, quod in Christo habeat potissime: ergo etc.

3. Item, anima rationalis unita carni facit personam; sed cum Deus humanam carnem[^3] assumsit, animam rationalem carni coniunxit: ergo si assumsit animam carni coniunctam, videtur, quod assumserit personam.

4. Item, persona non gignit nisi personam; sed Dei Filius assumsit quod Virgo genuit: ergo si Virgo persona fuit, videtur, quod Deus ex ea personam assumserit.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus *de Fide ad Petrum*[^4]: «Deus naturam hominis assumsit, non personam». (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostendit Boethius[^5] tali ratione: in Christo non est nisi una persona: ergo si Dei Filius assumsit personam, idem assumsit se ipsum; sed hoc est falsum et non intelligibile: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod persona fuerit a Verbo assumta. Probat autem primam propositionem sic, scilicet quod Christus sit unus in persona: omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum est: si ergo Christus est, necesse est unum esse; sed non est unum in natura: ergo necesse est esse unum in persona.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *nominis rationem.* Persona enim dicit quid completum et distinctum ultima completione; sed quod assumitur, eo ipso quod assumitur, ad completius ordinatur: ergo videtur, quod in se non habeat rationem personae[^6].

4. Item, si assumsit, aut *consumsit,* aut *conservavit.* Constat, quod *non consumsit,* quia divina natura humanae nihil nobilitatis abstulit. Si *conservavit:* ergo cum assumens non sit assumtum, restat, quod in Christo sint duae naturae et duae personae, scilicet humana et divina: ergo nec Deus est homo, nec homo est Deus: igitur non est ibi aliqua unio, ac per hoc nec assumtio. Si igitur est ibi assumtio vera, manifestum est, quod persona non est assumta[^7].

### Conclusio.

> Falsum omnino est, quod persona divina assumserit personam humanam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omni modo falsum est, quod persona personam assumserit. (*Conclusio 1.*) — Hoc enim tripliciter potest intelligi: aut quod ipsum assumtum fuerit persona ante assumtionem, aut quod fuerit persona in assumtione, aut quod fuerit persona post assumtionem. (*Triplex sensus.*)

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(*Conclusio 2.*) Quolibet istorum trium modorum sumta, sententia praedicti sermonis est falsa. — Nam primus repugnat *veritati conceptionis,* secundus *veritati assumtionis,* et tertius *veritati unionis.*

(*Probatur quoad 3 membra.*) Primus namque, qui hoc ponit, quod ante assumtionem fuerit persona, veritati conceptionis repugnat. Si enim ante fuit persona, quam esset Deus, Virgo Maria non concepit Deum, sed hominem purum; quod est contra Evangelium et conceptionis articulum[^1b]. — Secundus vero modus, qui ponit, hominem illum tempore assumtionis fuisse personam, veritati assumtionis repugnat. Si enim in assumtione fuit persona, et post assumtionem desiit esse persona; potius in ipsa assumtione persona consumebatur quam assumebatur; non igitur fuit illa vera assumtio, sed magis consumtio. — Tertius vero modus intelligendi, quod persona fuerit post assumtionem illud quod assumtum est, veritati unionis repugnat. (*Notandum.*) Si enim assumens differt ab assumto; et illud quod assumtum est, est persona; et qui assumsit similiter est persona: ergo in Christo sunt duae personae; et duae sunt in eodem naturae, hoc constat: ac per hoc nulla est ibi unio; ac si hoc, nulla est incarnatio nec humani generis reparatio; quod adeo est absurdum, ut totius fidei christianae perimat fundamentum.

In hunc autem errorem pessimum decidit Nestorius, ut dicit Boethius[^2b], pro eo quod nescivit distinguere inter personam et naturam. (*Nestorio. Eutyche.*) Pro eo enim, quod vidit, in Christo duplicem esse naturam, intellexit, duplicem esse personam. Eutyches vero ex eadem causa erravit, sed non eodem modo. Quia enim nescivit discernere inter personam et naturam[^3b], et vidit, quod in Christo non poterat esse nisi una persona, ex hoc compulsus est ponere, quod in Christo non est nisi una natura. (*Ario et Sabellio.*) Et ideo sicut duo fuerunt errores in divinis, scilicet Arii et Sabellii, pro eo quod nesciverunt distinguere inter naturam et personam; sic duo fuerunt errores circa incarnationem Christi, videlicet Eutychis et Nestorii. — (*Media via Ecclesiae.*) Catholica vero Ecclesia per medium istorum errorum pertransiit dicens, in deitate plures esse personas et unam naturam, et in Christo plures naturas et unam personam. Et ideo simpliciter concedit, personam assumsisse naturam, et negat, personam assumsisse personam, sicut Magister dicit in littera[^4b]. — Unde rationes sunt concedendae inductae pro ista parte.

(*Solutio oppositorum.*) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia; dicendum, quod individuum in notificatione personae triplicem importat distinctionem, videlicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis. (*Notandum.*) Individuum enim dicitur quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum. Distinctionem singularitatis voco, quod aliquid non sit commune ad plura, sed dicatur de uno solo; propter quod Socrates dicit individuum, homo vero non dicit individuum[^5b]. — Distinctionem incommunicabilitatis dico, quod aliquid non sit alicuius pars sive veniens in compositionem tertii; unde pes vel manus hominis, proprie loquendo, non dicitur individuum. — Distinctionem supereminentis dignitatis intelligo illam, quae accipitur a proprietate digniori. Hoc enim nomen *persona* sumtum est a dignioribus; unde non reperitur nisi in individuo nobilissimae creaturae, utpote rationalis, et ratione suae nobilissimae proprietatis[^6b]. Quoniam igitur natura humana, assumta a Christo, ordinata est ad nobiliorem proprietatem eiusdem personae secundum alteram naturam; hinc est, quod non tenet ibi proprietatem personalitatis. Cadit enim ab una proprietate, quae quidem est supereminentis dignitatis, a qua quidem non cadit persona Verbi secundum divinam naturam. Et sic patet, quod distinctio[^7b] personae et ratio illa non valet, quia notificatio personae, recte intellecta, non convenit humanitati assumtae.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, iam patet responsio ex hoc quod iam dictum est, quia natura assumta in Christo eo ipso est nobilior, quod in nobiliori persona stabilitur, quia non in persona creata, sed in persona increata. (*Notandum.*) Unde ordinatio ad dignius, quamvis auferat rationem superpositionis[^8b], non aufert dignitatis proprietatem. Melius enim est subesse superiori, quam superesse alicui inferiori: Sicut perfectior est anima, cum possidetur a Deo, quam cum possidet res creatas; et melius nubit virgo nobilis, cum contrahit matrimonium cum rege, cui subsit, quam cum contrahit cum rustico, cui praesit. (*Exemplum.*) Unde esto, quod Deus aliquem assumeret, qui iam est persona, vel ens actu; ille, cum desineret esse persona, nihil tamen dignitatis amitteret; esset enim persona[^9b] secundum naturam assumentem, quamvis non secundum naturam assumtam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima rationalis unita carni facit personam; dicendum, quod

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verum est, quando anima et caro non coniungitur digniori; tunc enim non solum ex anima et carne constituitur ipsa *natura,* sed ex ipsa natura *hypostasis et persona.* (*Notandum.*) Non sic autem est in proposito; quia anima et caro fuerunt sibi invicem unita ipsi Verbo, nec in aliquo instanti fuit anima illa, quin esset unita Verbo; et ipsa hypostasis aeterna erat, in qua couniebantur corpus et anima: et ideo non constituebant personam, sed solum naturam. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi Dei Filius assumsit animam carni unitam, quod assumserit personam; quia non prius[^1c] fuit ipsi carni unita, quam esset assumta, quidquid sit de ordine secundum naturam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod beata Virgo genuit personam; dicendum, quod verum est, quia genuit Filium Dei; sed quoniam persona generatur ratione naturae, et duplex est natura in illa persona, scilicet creata et increata; ideo ratione duplicis naturae duplex convenit ei generatio, scilicet temporalis et aeterna: temporalis, in qua assimilatur Matri; aeterna secundum naturam, in qua assimilatur Patri[^2c]. Ideo non cogit ratio illa. (*Notandum.*) Quamvis enim generatio conveniat personae, convenit tamen ei ratione naturae; hoc maxime verum est in generatione creata, in qua est non tantum personalis distinctio, sed naturalis multiplicatio[^3c].

english:
### Question II. *Whether God assumed a human person.*

Secondly it is asked whether God assumed a human person. And that he did, it seems.

1. Boethius[^1], defining person, says that it is "an individual substance of a rational nature"; but Christ assumed an individual substance of a rational nature — as Damascene says: "For he assumed a nature in an atom [an individual]" — therefore he assumed a person.

2. Likewise, it belongs to the dignity of a singular that that singular be a person, for "person" is a name of dignity[^2]; but the nature assumed in Christ is equally or more noble than it is in any other man: if therefore in others it does not lose the account of person, it seems that in Christ it has it most of all: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a rational soul united to flesh makes a person; but when God assumed human flesh[^3], he joined a rational soul to the flesh: therefore if he assumed a soul joined to flesh, it seems that he assumed a person.

4. Likewise, a person begets nothing but a person; but the Son of God assumed what the Virgin bore: therefore if the Virgin was a person, it seems that God assumed a person from her.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Faith, to Peter*[^4]: "God assumed the nature of man, not the person." (*Fundamenta.*)

2. Likewise, Boethius[^5] shows this same thing by such a reasoning: in Christ there is but one person: therefore if the Son of God assumed a person, he assumed the very same as himself; but this is false and unintelligible: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that a person was assumed by the Word. And he proves the first proposition thus, namely that Christ is one in person: everything that is, is for this reason, because it is one: if therefore Christ is, it is necessary that he be one; but he is not one in nature: therefore it is necessary that he be one in person.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown through *the account of the name.* For "person" signifies something complete and distinct with an ultimate completion; but what is assumed, by the very fact that it is assumed, is ordered to something more complete: therefore it seems that in itself it does not have the account of person[^6].

4. Likewise, if he assumed, either he *consumed* or he *conserved.* It is established that he *did not consume,* because the divine nature took away nothing of nobility from the human. If he *conserved:* therefore, since the one assuming is not the thing assumed, it remains that in Christ there are two natures and two persons, namely human and divine: therefore neither is God man, nor is man God: therefore there is not there any union, and through this neither an assumption. If therefore there is there a true assumption, it is manifest that a person is not assumed[^7].

### Conclusion.

> It is altogether false that a divine person assumed a human person.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is in every way false that a person assumed a person. (*Conclusion 1.*) — For this can be understood in three ways: either that the very thing assumed was a person before the assumption, or that it was a person in the assumption, or that it was a person after the assumption. (*Threefold sense.*)

(*Conclusion 2.*) Taken in any of these three ways, the meaning of the aforesaid statement is false. — For the first is repugnant to *the truth of the conception,* the second to *the truth of the assumption,* and the third to *the truth of the union.*

(*It is proved with respect to the three members.*) For the first, which posits this, that before the assumption there was a person, is repugnant to the truth of the conception. For if there was a person before he was God, the Virgin Mary did not conceive God, but a mere man; which is against the Gospel and the article of the conception[^1b]. — But the second mode, which posits that that man at the time of the assumption was a person, is repugnant to the truth of the assumption. For if in the assumption there was a person, and after the assumption he ceased to be a person; rather in the assumption itself the person was consumed than assumed; therefore that was not a true assumption, but rather a consumption. — But the third mode of understanding, that the person was, after the assumption, that which was assumed, is repugnant to the truth of the union. (*Notandum.*) For if the one assuming differs from the thing assumed; and that which is assumed is a person; and the one who assumed is likewise a person: therefore in Christ there are two persons; and there are two natures in the same, this is established: and through this there is no union there; and if this, there is no incarnation nor reparation of the human race; which is so absurd that it destroys the foundation of the whole Christian faith.

But into this most evil error Nestorius fell, as Boethius says[^2b], because he did not know how to distinguish between person and nature. (*Nestorius. Eutyches.*) For because he saw that in Christ there is a twofold nature, he understood that there was a twofold person. But Eutyches erred from the same cause, yet not in the same way. For because he did not know how to discern between person and nature[^3b], and saw that in Christ there could be but one person, from this he was compelled to posit that in Christ there is but one nature. (*Arius and Sabellius.*) And therefore, just as there were two errors in things divine, namely those of Arius and of Sabellius, because they did not know how to distinguish between nature and person; so there were two errors concerning the incarnation of Christ, namely those of Eutyches and of Nestorius. — (*The middle way of the Church.*) But the Catholic Church passed through the midst of these errors, saying that in the deity there are several persons and one nature, and in Christ several natures and one person. And therefore it simply concedes that a person assumed a nature, and denies that a person assumed a person, as the Master says in the text[^4b]. — Hence the reasons adduced for that side are to be conceded.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature; it must be said that "individual" in the description of person carries a threefold distinction, namely of singularity, of incommunicability, and of supereminent dignity. (*Notandum.*) For "individual" is said to be that which is in itself undivided and distinct from others. I call distinction of singularity that something be not common to many, but be said of one alone; on account of which "Socrates" signifies an individual, but "man" does not signify an individual[^5b]. — I call distinction of incommunicability that something be not a part of something else or coming into the composition of a third; whence a foot or a hand of a man, properly speaking, is not called an individual. — By distinction of supereminent dignity I understand that which is taken from a more worthy property. For this name *person* is taken from the more worthy things; whence it is not found except in the individual of the most noble creature, namely the rational one, and by reason of its most noble property[^6b]. Since therefore the human nature, assumed by Christ, is ordered to a nobler property of the same person according to the other nature; hence it is that it does not hold there the property of personality. For it falls away from one property, which indeed is of supereminent dignity, from which property the person of the Word does not fall according to the divine nature. And so it is clear that the distinction[^7b] of person and that reasoning have no force, because the description of person, rightly understood, does not belong to the assumed humanity.

2. To that which is objected secondly, the response is already clear from what has already been said, because the nature assumed in Christ is by that very fact more noble, because it is established in a more noble person, since it is not in a created person, but in an uncreated person. (*Notandum.*) Hence ordination to something more worthy, although it takes away the account of superposition[^8b], does not take away the property of dignity. For it is better to be under a superior than to be over some inferior: just as the soul is more perfect when it is possessed by God than when it possesses created things; and a noble virgin marries better when she contracts marriage with a king, to whom she is subject, than when she contracts with a peasant, over whom she presides. (*Example.*) Hence let it be granted that God assumed someone who is already a person, or a being in act; that one, when he would cease to be a person, would nevertheless lose nothing of dignity; for he would be a person[^9b] according to the assuming nature, although not according to the assumed nature.

3. To that which is objected, that a rational soul united to flesh makes a person; it must be said that

it is true when the soul and flesh are not joined to something more worthy; for then not only is the *nature* itself constituted from soul and flesh, but from the nature itself the *hypostasis and person.* (*Notandum.*) But it is not so in the present case; because the soul and flesh were united to each other in the Word himself, nor in any instant was that soul not united to the Word; and the hypostasis itself was eternal, in which the body and soul were brought together: and therefore they did not constitute a person, but only a nature. And therefore it does not follow that, if the Son of God assumed a soul united to flesh, he assumed a person; because it was not united to that flesh before[^1c] it was assumed, whatever may be the case concerning the order according to nature.

4. To that which is objected, that the blessed Virgin bore a person; it must be said that it is true, because she bore the Son of God; but since a person is generated by reason of nature, and the nature in that person is twofold, namely created and uncreated; therefore by reason of the twofold nature a twofold generation belongs to him, namely temporal and eternal: temporal, in which he is made like to his Mother; eternal according to nature, in which he is made like to his Father[^2c]. Therefore that reasoning does not constrain. (*Notandum.*) For although generation belongs to a person, it belongs to him nevertheless by reason of nature; this is most true in created generation, in which there is not only a personal distinction, but a natural multiplication[^3c].

la: In libro de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 3. — Dictum Damasceni habetur III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. Cfr. q. praeced. et supra pag. 15, nota 4. — Pro *sed Christus* cod. K *sed Deus.*

en: In the book *On the One Person and the Two Natures,* c. 3. — The saying of Damascene is found in III. *On the Orthodox Faith,* c. 11. Cfr. the preceding question and above p. 15, note 4. — For *but Christ* codex K reads *but God.*

la: Codd. K Z bb *naturam.*

en: Codices K Z bb read *nature.*

la: Cap. 17. n. 60. Cfr. hic tit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Ch. 17, n. 60. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: In libro de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 4. — Versus finem arg. post *quia unum* Vat. adiicit *numero.*

en: In the book *On the One Person and the Two Natures,* c. 4. — Toward the end of the argument, after *because it is one,* the Vatican edition adds *in number.*

la: Hoc arg. etiam a Boeth. insinuatur loc. cit., ubi de Nestorio animadvertit, ipsum, qui in errorem inciderit, cum «putaverit, in omnibus naturis posse dici personam», vera definitione personae convinci.

en: This argument too is intimated by Boethius at the cited place, where he remarks concerning Nestorius that he, who fell into error, since he "supposed that in all natures a person can be spoken of," is convicted by the true definition of person.

la: Boeth. loc. cit. ait: *Iam vero sequitur, ut, personis manentibus, nullo modo a divinitate humanitas credatur assumta; omnino enim disiuncta sunt quae aeque personis naturisque separantur; prorsus, inquam, disiuncta sunt; nec magis inter se homines bovesque disiuncti sunt, quam divinitas in Christo humanitasque discreta est, si mansere personae. Homines quippe ac boves una animalis communitate iunguntur... Deo vero atque homini quid non erit diversa ratione disiunctum, si sub diversitate naturae personarum quoque credatur mansisse discretio? Non est igitur salvatum genus humanum, nulla in nos salus Christi generatione processit etc.* — In primo arg. membro verbum *consumere,* ut infra ex corp. quaest. apparet, proprie sumitur et significat destructionem eius quod prius erat; quo sensu acceptum supponeret, personam humanam reapse ante unionem exstitisse. Respicitur hic arg., ab aliis Scholasticis (cfr. S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 2. arg. 3.) ex quadam Decretali Innocentii III. sumtum, ubi dicitur, quod persona Dei consumsit personam hominis. Guliel. Antissiodorensis autem Concilio Nicaeno (potius Francofordiensi) attribuit hoc effatum: *In incarnatione Filii persona consumsit personam, non natura naturam.* Communiter respondent Scholastici, quod ibi *consumere* accipitur improprie pro *impedire,* ne humana natura propriam personalitatem habeat.

en: Boethius at the cited place says: *But now it follows that, the persons remaining, the humanity is in no way to be believed assumed by the divinity; for those things are altogether disjoined which are equally separated as to persons and natures; utterly, I say, are they disjoined; nor are men and oxen more disjoined among themselves than the divinity in Christ and the humanity are kept apart, if the persons remained. For men and oxen are indeed joined by one community of animal... but what will not be disjoined by a diverse account between God and man, if under a diversity of nature a discreteness of persons too is believed to have remained? Therefore the human race is not saved, no salvation has come to us by the generation of Christ, etc.* — In the first member of the argument the word *to consume,* as appears below from the body of the question, is taken properly and signifies the destruction of that which was before; taken in which sense it would suppose that the human person really existed before the union. There is regarded here an argument, taken by other Scholastics (cfr. St. Thomas, S. III. q. 4. a. 2. arg. 3.) from a certain Decretal of Innocent III, where it is said that the person of God consumed the person of the man. But William of Auxerre attributes to the Council of Nicaea (rather of Frankfurt) this dictum: *In the incarnation of the Son a person consumed a person, not a nature a nature.* The Scholastics commonly respond that there *to consume* is taken improperly for *to impede,* lest the human nature have its own personality.

la: Vide supra a. 1. a. 3. q. 3.

en: See above a. 1, a. 3, q. 3.

la: Loc. paulo superius cit. c. 4. 5. et 7, ubi, errore Nestorii comparato cum errore Eutychetis, catholicam doctrinam inter duos istos errores media via incedere praedicat. — Pro *Nestorius* codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam exhibent *Eutyches,* et dein pro *Eutyches* pariter erronee *Nestorius.*

en: At the place cited a little above, c. 4, 5, and 7, where, the error of Nestorius being compared with the error of Eutyches, he proclaims that Catholic doctrine advances by a middle way between those two errors. — For *Nestorius* the codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly exhibit *Eutyches,* and then for *Eutyches* likewise erroneously *Nestorius.*

la: Cod. bb *esset.* Superius cod. A *distinguere* pro *discernere.*

en: Codex bb reads *would be.* Above, codex A reads *to distinguish* for *to discern.*

la: Hic c. 1. et 3.

en: Here c. 1 and 3.

la: Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.): *Dico autem universale quod de pluribus praedicari natum est; singulare vero quod non* etc.

en: Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 5 (c. 7): *But I call universal that which is born to be predicated of many; the singular, however, that which is not* etc.

la: Codd. K aa bb addunt *sortitur aliquis nomen personae.* Paulo superius pro *a dignioribus* codd. H P Z bb *a dignitatibus.*

en: Codices K aa bb add *someone obtains the name of person.* A little above, for *from the more worthy things* codices H P Z bb read *from dignities.*

la: Vat. *definitio.* Cfr. quaest. seq. arg. 2. ad oppos.

en: The Vatican edition reads *definition.* Cfr. the following question, arg. 2, ad oppos.

la: Vat. et ed. 1 *suppositionis,* et dein *unum non* etc. Mox pro *subesse,* quae lectio habetur etiam in codd. A K U Z bb, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 falso *subesse,* Vat. *praeesse.*

en: The Vatican edition and edition 1 read *of supposition,* and then *not one* etc. Soon, for *to be under,* which reading is found also in codices A K U Z bb, the other codices and editions 1, 2 falsely read *to be under,* the Vatican edition *to be over.*

la: Multi codd. hic subiiciunt *vel.* Paulo superius pro *qui iam est* Vat. *qui iam esset,* et deinde pro *ens actu* codd. H K X bb *ens in actu.* Proxime post pro *ille, cum* non pauci codd. *ille tamen.*

en: Many codices here subjoin *or.* A little above, for *who already is* the Vatican edition reads *who already would be,* and then for *a being in act* codices H K X bb read *a being in act* [*ens in actu*]. Immediately after, for *that one, when* not a few codices read *that one, however.*

la: Supple cum codd. K bb et Vat. *tempore.* Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Aliquanto superius pro *in qua* fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 *in quo,* et subinde pro *couniebantur* Vat. *coaequabantur,* edd. 1, 2 *uniebatur,* codd. PQ *coniungebatur,* codd. H U *continebatur.*

en: Supply with codices K bb and the Vatican edition *in time.* Cfr. above d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Somewhat above, for *in which* (fem.) nearly all codices and editions 1, 2 read *in which* (neut.), and thereupon for *were brought together* the Vatican edition reads *were made equal,* editions 1, 2 *was united,* codices PQ *was joined,* codices H U *was contained.*

la: De duplici generatione videsis infra tit. Magistri, d. VIII. c. 2, et Comment. a. 2. q. 1.

en: On the twofold generation see below the text of the Master, d. VIII, c. 2, and the Commentary, a. 2. q. 1.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. — Paulo superius post *Quamvis* permulti codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *enim.*

en: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. — A little above, after *although,* very many codices and editions 1, 2 omit *for.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Recte dicitur a S. Bonav., quod Nestorius iuxta hic relatum tertium intelligendi modum haeresim suam docuerit. Nam quidquid non pauci in contrarium dixerint, constat ex ipsius Nestorii verbis (in suo 9. anathematismo), eum disertis verbis condemnasse errorem, qui a nostro auctore primo loco recensetur. — Multis decretis ecclesiasticis error Nestorii damnatus est, quorum unum transcribere libet, scilicet 2. anathematismum S. Cyrilli Alex., a Concilio Ephesino (an. 431) cum aliis anathematismis approbatum: «Si quis non confitetur, carni secundum substantiam [ita antiqua versio Latina reddit Graeca verba καθ' ὑπόστασιν] unitum Dei Patris Verbum, unumque esse Christum cum propria carne, eundem scilicet Deum et hominem, a. s.».

**II.** Constat igitur fide, distinctionem inter *personam* et *naturam* tum quoad divina tum quoad hominem omnino admittendam esse, ut salventur dogmata Trinitatis et incarnationis, pia, ut bene observatur hic in corp. quaestionis, eadem neglecta, pullulaverunt tot haereses, inter se oppositae, quae Ecclesiam per priora saecula perturbabant. Rationem autem *personae,* licet secundum analogiam de divina persona et humana dicatur (cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.), tamen multipliciter in utroque casu differre, exploratum est. Quid persona sit in divinis, diffuse tractatum est I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1, d. 25. per totam et d. 34. q. 1.2. Quaestio autem, quid sit persona vel *suppositum, personalitas* et *subsistentia* in creaturis, et in primis, quid ratio suppositi sive personae superaddat naturae singulari, occasionem dedit, ut scholae catholicae post Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram diversas opiniones docuerint et quasi infinitis et subtilibus disputationibus defenderint. Ea quae de his controversiis in I. tomo d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. in scholio breviter notavimus, hic paulo distinctius explicare iuvat.

I. Conveniunt auctores catholici, praeterquam quod vulgares definitiones Boethii et Richardi a S. Vict. admittunt, praecipue in tribus: a) Ratio personae, dignitatem quandam prae se ferens, non convenit nisi naturis intellectualibus; suppositum autem de quacumque substantia subsistente dicitur, unde ad personam se habet ut conceptus superior ad inferiorem. b) Persona ita distinguitur a natura singulari, ut haec assumi possit, quin assumatur illa. Hinc communissime docetur, personalitatem sive subsistentiam dicere aliquid realiter distinctum et separabile a natura singulari, simulque improbatur opinio paucorum, scilicet Durandi et Nominalium, qui distinctionem illam ad diversum modum concipiendi reducunt. c) Ratio personae vel suppositi importat omnino negationem communicabilitatis (vel dependentiae) respectu alterius substantiae, ita ut in illa terminationem vel completionem habeat. Hinc eadem positive dicit quandam completionem et terminum in genere substantiae.

2. *Differunt* autem opiniones in solutione quaestionum, quid proprie sit illud quo distinguuntur natura singularis et persona; quid haec superaddat illi; et praesertim, utrum addat aliquid *positivum,* et quale, an potius aliquid *negativum.* Praescindendo a nonnullis obsoletis opinionibus, quatuor celebres sententiae circumferuntur, quarum duae primae conveniunt in hoc, quod illud superadditum revera sit aliquid positivum.

*Prima* sententia cum Caietano et Philippo a S. Trinitate aliisque ex schola S. Thomae affirmat, quod dictum superadditum sit aliquid positivum et ultimum complementum substantiae, distinctum a natura non solum tanquam *modus a re modificata,* sed tanquam *res a re.* Alii tamen eiusdem scholae volunt, distinctionem esse quidem realem, sed modalem tantum.

*Secunda* sententia cum Suarez, Lugo aliisque plurimis tenet, illud complementum esse aliquid positivum, ast tantum modum substantialem per se existendi, a re modificata virtualiter distinctum et naturaliter ex substantia individua resultantem, qui reddit ipsam substantiam incommunicabilem et independentem. Dicitur autem modus substantialis, ut distinguatur a modo accidentali existendi in subiecto, et partiali existendi in toto.

*Tertia* sententia cum Scoto eiusque schola docet, subsistentiam vel personalitatem esse quidem ultimam actualitatem, constituentem substantiam in esse omnino incommunicabile et non ordinabile ad ulteriorem actum, sed non addere naturae singulari nisi duplicem negationem communicationis *ut quo,* tum actualis, tum aptitudinalis; (cfr. Scotus, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. n. 5. seqq., d. 5. q. 2. n. 4. 5. (cum diffuso commentario Pontii); Quodl. 19; I. Sent. d. 13. q. unica n. 9. 10, d. 23. q. unica n. 7, ubi asserit, quod persona non aliquam dignitatem ex formali significato, sed ex natura intellectuali connotata importet. Huic sententiae favent etiam Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 8.) aliique.

*Quarta* vero sententia reapse a sententia Scoti vix nisi in modo explicandi et probandi discedit, cum doceat, quamlibet creatam substantiam singularem per propriam essentiam habere potentiam per se et in se subsistendi, quin aliqua additione ad hoc indigeat, ast etiam quin excludatur possibilitas, quod a Deo ita uniatur alii substantiae, ut non subsistat nisi dependenter ab illa, cui communicatur. Hinc quaelibet substantia subsistentiam etiam actualem in se habet eo ipso, quod non uniatur alii substantiae subsistenti. Quodsi S. Thom. aliique antiqui dicunt, quod suppositum addat aliquid naturae, tunc hoc intelligendum esse volunt de natura, quatenus significat essentiam speciei. Ita non pauci nec spernendi recentiores, duce Claudio Tipliano S. I. (Declaratio ac defensio scholastica doctrinae Ss. Patrum Doctorisque angelici de hypostasi ac persona, Mussiponti 1634); qui etiam Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram sibi suffragari volunt.

**III.** S. Bonav. hic et alibi de ratione unionis hypostaticae nihil dicit, quod non optime conveniat cum doctrina S. Thomae. Praedicta autem quaestio philosophica, quid persona addat supra naturam singularem humanam (quae sane conneetitur cum profundissimis problematibus metaphysicis), a nostro Doctore explicite non tractatur. Hinc ei a diversis auctoribus diversae sententiae de hac re attribuuntur. P. Barthol. a Barberiis (Curs. theologic. l. 11. disp. 2. q. 1.) cum aliis eum exponit iuxta secundam opinionem, afferendo illos locos, qui aliquod positivum rationi personae attribuunt. P. Matthias Hauzeur (Collatio totius theol. t. II. col. 267 seqq.) non sine acumine Bonaventuram et Scotum sic exponit, ut non sibi contradicant, sed potius invicem suppleant. Similiter defensores quartae sententiae asserunt, ea quae in hac quaest. et alibi in hoc libro III. Sent. occurrunt, suam causam aperte sustinere. — Iudicium de his sapienti lectori remittentes, notamus tantum praecipuos locos et modos loquendi ad hanc rem spectantes, qui etiam in aliis huius libri quaestionibus inveniuntur. Hic in solut. ad 1. 2. 3. tria ad rationem personae requiruntur, scilicet *singularitas, incommunicabilitas, dignitas* (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6, ubi eadem ponuntur), quin tamen ratio formalis personae indicetur, sicut nec infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 3, praesertim in fine, ubi de *individuo et supposito* agitur. Ibid. q. 2. ad 2. docetur, quod Christus ut homo est res completa omni completione absoluta, non autem respectiva, quae est dignitas superexcellentiae. Ibid. ad 3. dicitur, quod natura hypostatice unita digniori non potest habere suam propriam personalitatem, sed bene natura dignior unita minus dignae. Item ad 4. legitur, quod persona duo dicit, scilicet hypostasim, in qua est subsistentia totius esse rei, et proprietatem supereminentis dignitatis; insuper quod in hypostasi divina substantificatur totum esse Christi. Deinde ad 5. docetur, quod natura humana Christi, si separaretur, eo ipso alium modum existendi [scilicet substantialem] haberet et fieret persona. Ibid. q. 3. suppositum nominatur fundamentum totius existentiae naturalis, «in quo totum esse rei stabilitur et fundatur». Insuper cfr. ibi seqq. qq., et d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. praesertim ad 6. et q. 3, a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 1. a. 1. q. 2, d. 2. a. 3. q. 4. in fine (de gratia unionis) et hic q. praeced. ad 2. 3. 4. In his aliisque locis passim occurrit phrasis, quod in hypostasi sive in supposito sive in persona totum esse rei substantificatur. Verbum *substantificari* sumtum est ex Latina versione Dionysii de Div. Nom. (c. 4. § 20.) ac Epist. 4. ad Caium, et exprimit Graecum verbum οὐσιοῦσθαι, ut iam notavimus tom. II. pag. 812, nota 6, et supra pag. 10, nota 4. S. Bonav. verbum substantificare intelligit de eo fundamento, quod hypostasis dat naturae. Eodem verbo utitur etiam S. Thom. (Quaest. disput. de Unione Verbi incarn. a. 4.), sed non in eodem sensu, cum dicat de persona Filii, quod «simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam». — Alii loci S. Bonav. ad hanc quaestionem spectantes videri possunt in citato scholio, I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, ubi etiam expressa auctoris verba afferuntur, quod privatio communitatis in persona magis sit positio quam privatio. Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., ubi auctor diversos gradus subsistentiae distinguit atque substantiis spiritualibus, ut formis subsistentibus, altiorem gradum in genere substantiae et subsistentiae vindicat. De personali discretione in Angelis agitur ibid. a. 2. q. 2. Quidquid autem sit de hac quaestione philosophica, quid ratio personae humanae addat humanae naturae; extra controversiam est, quod unio hypostatica in Christo fit per «additionem alicuius, quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam» (S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 2. ad 2.), quo humanae in Christo naturae confertur modus existendi et subsistendi prorsus unicus et dignitas infinita.

**IV.** De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3, q. 3. a. 3, S. III. q. 2. a. 2. q. 4. a. 2; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 34. 38; Quaest. disp. de Unione Verbi etc. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2, a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3, q. 3. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** It is rightly said by St. Bonaventure that Nestorius, according to the third mode of understanding here related, taught his heresy. For whatever not a few have said to the contrary, it is established from the very words of Nestorius (in his 9th anathematism) that he in express words condemned the error which is recounted in the first place by our author. — By many ecclesiastical decrees the error of Nestorius has been condemned, one of which it is pleasing to transcribe, namely the 2nd anathematism of St. Cyril of Alexandria, approved by the Council of Ephesus (a.d. 431) with the other anathematisms: "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father is united to flesh according to substance [thus the ancient Latin version renders the Greek words καθ' ὑπόστασιν], and that Christ is one with his own flesh, that is, the same one who is God and man, let him be anathema."

**II.** It is established therefore by faith that the distinction between *person* and *nature,* both as regards the divine and as regards man, is altogether to be admitted, in order that the dogmas of the Trinity and of the incarnation be preserved; for, as is well observed here in the body of the question, when it was neglected, so many heresies, opposed to one another, sprang up, which troubled the Church through earlier ages. But that the account of *person,* although it is said by analogy of a divine person and a human one (cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.), nevertheless differs in many ways in either case, is well explored. What person is in things divine has been treated at length in I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1, d. 25. throughout, and d. 34. q. 1.2. But the question, what person or *suppositum, personality,* and *subsistence* is in creatures, and chiefly, what the account of suppositum or person superadds to a singular nature, gave occasion for the Catholic schools after Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure to teach diverse opinions and defend them with almost infinite and subtle disputations. The things which we noted briefly concerning these controversies in the first volume, d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, in the scholion, it is helpful to explain here a little more distinctly.

I. Catholic authors agree, besides that they admit the common definitions of Boethius and Richard of St. Victor, chiefly in three things: a) The account of person, bearing a certain dignity before it, does not belong except to intellectual natures; but suppositum is said of any subsisting substance whatsoever, whence it stands to person as a higher concept to a lower. b) Person is so distinguished from a singular nature that the latter can be assumed without the former being assumed. Hence it is most commonly taught that personality or subsistence signifies something really distinct and separable from a singular nature, and at the same time the opinion of a few is reproved, namely of Durandus and of the Nominalists, who reduce that distinction to a diverse mode of conceiving. c) The account of person or of suppositum implies altogether a negation of communicability (or of dependence) with respect to another substance, in such a way that in it there is a termination or completion. Hence the same thing positively signifies a certain completion and term in the genus of substance.

2. *They differ,* however, the opinions, in the solution of the questions, what properly is that by which a singular nature and a person are distinguished; what the latter superadds to the former; and especially, whether it adds something *positive,* and of what sort, or rather something *negative.* Setting aside some obsolete opinions, four celebrated views are in circulation, of which the first two agree in this, that that superadded thing is really something positive.

The *first* view, with Cajetan and Philip of the Holy Trinity and others of the school of St. Thomas, affirms that the said superadded thing is something positive and an ultimate complement of the substance, distinct from the nature not only as a *mode from the thing modified,* but as a *thing from a thing.* Others nevertheless of the same school hold that the distinction is indeed real, but only modal.

The *second* view, with Suárez, Lugo, and very many others, holds that that complement is something positive, but only a substantial mode of existing per se, virtually distinct from the thing modified and naturally resulting from the individual substance, which renders the substance itself incommunicable and independent. And it is called a substantial mode, that it may be distinguished from the accidental mode of existing in a subject, and the partial mode of existing in a whole.

The *third* view, with Scotus and his school, teaches that subsistence or personality is indeed an ultimate actuality, constituting the substance in a being altogether incommunicable and not orderable to a further act, but adds to a singular nature nothing but a twofold negation of communication *as that by which,* both actual and aptitudinal; (cfr. Scotus, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. n. 5. seqq., d. 5. q. 2. n. 4. 5. (with the diffuse commentary of Pontius); Quodl. 19; I. Sent. d. 13. q. unica n. 9. 10, d. 23. q. unica n. 7, where he asserts that person implies not some dignity from its formal signification, but from a connoted intellectual nature. To this view are favorable also Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 5. q. 8.) and others.

But the *fourth* view in fact departs from the view of Scotus scarcely except in the mode of explaining and proving, since it teaches that any created singular substance whatsoever has through its own essence the power of subsisting per se and in itself, without needing any addition to this, but also without excluding the possibility that it be so united by God to another substance that it subsist only dependently on that to which it is communicated. Hence any substance has subsistence, even actual, in itself by the very fact that it is not united to another subsisting substance. But if St. Thomas and the other ancients say that the suppositum adds something to the nature, then they wish this to be understood of nature insofar as it signifies the essence of the species. So not a few, and not to be despised, of the more recent authors, with Claude Tiphaine, S.J., as their leader (Declaration and Scholastic Defense of the Doctrine of the Holy Fathers and of the Angelic Doctor on Hypostasis and Person, Mussiponti 1634), who also wish Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure to support them.

**III.** St. Bonaventure here and elsewhere says nothing concerning the account of the hypostatic union that does not most fittingly agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. But the aforesaid philosophical question, what a person adds above a singular human nature (which is surely connected with the most profound metaphysical problems), is not explicitly treated by our Doctor. Hence diverse views about this matter are attributed to him by diverse authors. Fr. Bartholomew a Barberiis (Theological Course, l. 11. disp. 2. q. 1.) with others expounds him according to the second opinion, adducing those passages which attribute something positive to the account of person. Fr. Matthias Hauzeur (Collation of the Whole Theology, t. II. col. 267 seqq.) not without acumen so expounds Bonaventure and Scotus that they do not contradict one another, but rather mutually supplement one another. Likewise the defenders of the fourth view assert that those things which occur in this question and elsewhere in this book III of the Sentences openly support their cause. — Leaving the judgment about these things to the wise reader, we note only the chief passages and ways of speaking pertaining to this matter, which are found also in other questions of this book. Here in the solution to 1. 2. 3. three things are required for the account of person, namely *singularity, incommunicability, dignity* (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6, where the same are posited), without however the formal account of person being indicated, just as neither below in d. 10. a. 1. q. 3, especially at the end, where *the individual and the suppositum* are treated. There q. 2. ad 2. it is taught that Christ as man is a thing complete with every absolute completion, but not with a respective one, which is the dignity of superexcellence. There ad 3. it is said that a nature hypostatically united to a more worthy one cannot have its own personality, but well a more worthy nature united to a less worthy one. Likewise ad 4. it is read that person signifies two things, namely the hypostasis, in which is the subsistence of the whole being of the thing, and the property of supereminent dignity; and moreover that in the divine hypostasis the whole being of Christ is substantified. Then ad 5. it is taught that the human nature of Christ, if it were separated, by that very fact would have another mode of existing [namely a substantial one] and would become a person. There q. 3. the suppositum is named the foundation of the whole natural existence, "in which the whole being of the thing is established and founded." And further cfr. there the following questions, and d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. especially ad 6. and q. 3, a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 1. a. 1. q. 2, d. 2. a. 3. q. 4. at the end (on the grace of union) and here the preceding question ad 2. 3. 4. In these and other passages there occurs everywhere the phrase that in the hypostasis or in the suppositum or in the person the whole being of the thing is substantified. The word *substantificari* is taken from the Latin version of Dionysius On the Divine Names (c. 4. § 20.) and Epistle 4 to Caius, and it expresses the Greek word οὐσιοῦσθαι, as we have already noted in volume II, p. 812, note 6, and above p. 10, note 4. St. Bonaventure understands the word substantificare of that foundation which the hypostasis gives to the nature. The same word is used also by St. Thomas (Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word, a. 4.), but not in the same sense, since he says of the person of the Son that "it is simply substantified through the divine nature." — Other passages of St. Bonaventure pertaining to this question can be seen in the cited scholion, I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, where also the express words of the author are adduced, that the privation of commonness in a person is rather a position than a privation. Cfr. also II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in the body, where the author distinguishes diverse grades of subsistence and to spiritual substances, as to subsisting forms, vindicates a higher grade in the genus of substance and of subsistence. Concerning personal discreteness in the Angels it is treated ibid. a. 2. q. 2. But whatever may be the case concerning this philosophical question, what the account of a human person adds to a human nature; it is beyond controversy that the hypostatic union in Christ comes about through "the addition of something which is above the human nature, which is union to a divine person" (S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 2. ad 2.), by which to the human nature in Christ is conferred a mode of existing and subsisting altogether unique and an infinite dignity.

**IV.** On the question itself: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6. — Scotus, in each Writing here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3, q. 3. a. 3, S. III. q. 2. a. 2. q. 4. a. 2; S. against the Gentiles IV. c. 34. 38; Disputed Question on the Union of the Word etc. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 14. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 4. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 2, a. 4. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. 3, q. 3. a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p13{2,3,4,5}-{L,R}-*.png`), reading each page Left column top→bottom then Right column. Raw OCR lines 9659–9916 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`) used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing; the Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum, scholion, and footer blocks were PDF-priority (cascade-shattered in OCR, e.g. the diagonal-fragmented "1. Ad illud quod obiicitur" reply opener). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (printed pp. 132–135 = PDF 154–157). Running heads: `DIST. V. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` (pp. 133–134) and `DIST. V. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` (p. 135, where q2's scholion still runs).

**Alignment verified.** Raw 9659–9663 reads QUAESTIO II / *Utrum Deus assumserit humanam personam* / *Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus assumserit humanam personam. Et quod sic, videtur.* Matches the target (whether God assumed a human *person*); not q1 (naturam humanam), q3 (personalitas in anima separata), q4 (Deus assumserit hominem), q5 (assumserit humanitatem).

**Page-split map.**
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**Footer hand-off picked up from d5-a2-q1:** NONE migrated as forwarded; but per q1's hand-off, q2 OWNS the entire p.132 footer sequence from note 1 (`In libro de Una Persona…` keying Boethius¹) — q1's scholion sits on p.132 but carries no footnote markers.

**Footer hand-off forwarded to d5-a2-q3:** NONE. q2's scholion ends mid-p.135-L before QUAESTIO III and carries no markers; the entire p.135 footer sequence belongs to q3's body. q3 picks up p.135 footers from note 1.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone SCHOLION (parts **I, II, III, IV**) prints at q2's tail, spanning p.134-L bottom → p.135-R, ending with the citation list "Biel, here q. unica." The scholion text carries **no footnote markers** (consistent with the Vol III pattern). Part I confirms Nestorius taught the third mode + transcribes Cyril's 2nd anathematism (Greek καθ' ὑπόστασιν preserved); Part II reviews person/nature distinction and the question of what *suppositum/personalitas/subsistentia* superadds (the four *sententiae*: Cajetan/Philip; Suárez/Lugo; Scotus/Henry of Ghent; the fourth quasi-Scotist with Tiphaine); Part III collates Bonaventure's loci (incl. the *substantificari* phrase from Dionysius, Greek οὐσιοῦσθαι); Part IV is the cross-author citation list. This is the scholion that q1's note `[^4b]` (*vide scholion ad sequentem quaest.*) cross-referenced for the hypostasis-vs-natura difference.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not anchored: *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio 1*, *Triplex sensus*, *Conclusio 2*, *Probatur quoad 3 membra*, *Notandum* (×4), *Nestorio/Eutyche*, *Ario et Sabellio*, *Media via Ecclesiae*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Exemplum*.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0