title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum persona una possit simul uniri cum alia, assumendo unam et eandem numero naturam.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum persona una possit simul uniri cum alia, assumendo unam et eandem naturam numero. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Anselmus in libro: *Cur Deus homo,* capitulo nono[^1]: « Plures personae nequeunt unum et eundem hominem assumere; quare tantum in una persona fieri necesse est ».

2. Item, si personae plures unirentur uni et eidem naturae, aut ergo in unitate essentiae, aut in unitate suppositi. In unitate essentiae non, quia impossibile est, Creatorem et creaturam convenire in una essentia. In unitate personae non, quia tres personae in persona non conveniunt, sed personaliter distinguuntur: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo plures personae possint unum hominem accipere[^2].

3. Item, unio divinae naturae ad humanam facit sibi mutuo communicare propria idiomata[^3]: ergo si tres personae assumerent unum hominem, ille homo esset Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; et ex hoc sequeretur propter communicationem idiomatum, quod Pater esset Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et e converso; et si hoc, tunc periret personalis distinctio.

4. Item, si tres personae assumerent unum et eundem hominem, aut ergo unica unione, aut pluribus. Si unica: ergo cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non communicant nisi in essentia, unio illa esset in aliquo essentiali, quod est impossibile. Si pluribus: ergo plures essent incarnationes[^4]. Sed contra: impossibile est, esse plures incarnationes respectu unius carnis, quia incarnatio non habet inceptionem nisi ratione carnis, ergo pari ratione nec numerari habet nisi ratione carnis: ergo nec pluribus incarnationibus nec unica plures personae possent assumere unam et eandem naturam[^5].

**Sed contra:** 1. Humana natura idoneitatem habet ad hoc, ut assumatur a persona, in quantum est imago[^6]; sed una et eadem anima est imago trium personarum simul et semel: ergo videtur, quod a tribus personis possit simul et semel assumi.

2. Item, una persona potest assumere plures naturas, et nihil impedit, quod Dei Filius non possit assumere unum[^7] alium hominem, cum arctatus non sit ad illam singularem naturam, quam assumsit: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod plures personae possint assumere unam et eandem naturam, cum ita possint plures personae super unam naturam, sicut persona una in plures naturas.

3. Item, gratia habet conformari naturae; sed plures personae divinae communicant per naturam in una substantia et essentia simpliciter una: ergo pari ratione communicare possunt in una natura per unionem gratuitam: ergo plures personae possunt unam et eandem naturam assumere.

4. Item, aut una natura, quae assumitur ab una persona, potest assumi ab alia, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum. Si non, quaero, quid impedit? Cum non sit ibi nisi natura creata et persona divina, aut ergo erit impedimentum ex parte naturae creatae, aut ex parte personae divinae. Sed ex parte naturae creatae non potest, cum illa subiaceat omnino potentiae divinae personae. Ex parte divinae personae non, quia inter divinas personas nulla est resistentia, nulla est repugnantia, cum una aliam circumincedat, et una sit cum alia[^8]: ergo si nullum est impedimentum, videtur simpliciter, quod plures personae possint hominem unum assumere.

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### Conclusio

> Plures personae non possunt unam et eandem numero naturam assumere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Anselmus, « plures personae non possunt unum et eundem hominem assumere », non propter defectum potentiae, sed propter repugnantiam contradictionis implicitae. — Si enim plures personae assumerent unum hominem ad unitatem talem[^9], quae faceret communicationem idiomatum: ergo aut assumerent in unitatem, quae quidem esset unitas, quae se teneret ex parte assumentis, aut assumti. Si in unitatem, quae quidem se teneret ex parte assumentis, cum ex parte assumentis non sit reperire nisi unitatem personalem et unitatem essentialem; tunc plures personae assumerent unam naturam in unitatem essentiae, vel unitatem personae; sed utrumque horum simpliciter est impossibile. Nam plures personae divinae non possunt convenire in una persona, nec natura creata et increata possunt transire in unam naturam. — Si autem assumerent in unitatem, quae quidem se tenet ex parte assumti, cum illa sit unitas individualis, assumerent ergo in unitatem individui; sed illud adhuc est impossibile, quia assumens non trahitur ad unitatem assumti, sed potius trahit assumtum ad unitatem propriam. Nam assumere est ad se sumere.

Et sic patet, quod si dicatur, tres personas assumere unum et eundem hominem, omnibus modis implicatur[^10] contradictio, sive intelligatur, quod assumtio fiat in unitatem naturae, sive in unitatem personae. Nam si fit talis assumtio in unitatem naturae, ergo ex divina natura et humana constituitur una natura: ergo non est distinctio assumentis ad assumtum: ergo nec assumtio vera. Si autem fit assumtio in unitatem personae, ergo plures personae communicant in unam personam: ergo plures personae non sunt plures personae. Si autem fit assumtio in unitatem individui; cum illa unitas non se teneat ex parte assumentis, sed assumti, assumens non assumit naturam aliam ad propriam unitatem: ergo non assumit ad se, sed ad aliud; et si non assumit ad se, non assumit: assumtio igitur in unitatem individui non est assumere vere et proprie, sicut nunc loquimur de assumtione. — Propter igitur contradictionem implicitam, plures personas assumere unam et eandem naturam, nec est possibile nec est intelligibile. — Rationes igitur hoc ostendentes sunt concedendae.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad primum quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod una anima est imago trium; dicendum, quod imago de ratione sui dicit expressam repraesentationem, non secundum totum illud, in quo imago est, sed secundum aliquid sui. Unio autem, quae quidem est in incarnatione, totam humanam naturam in atomo et secundum totum facit uniri divinae personae, ita quod tota substantificatur in una tanquam in una propria hypostasi[^11]. Non est autem inconveniens, quod aliquid repraesentet plures personas secundum differentes proprietates et potentias; inconveniens autem est, quod unum et idem uniatur pluribus personis in personae unitatem; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi una anima potest esse imago trium, quod simul et semel possit uniri tribus personis.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una persona potest assumere plures naturas, ergo similiter plures personae unam naturam; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, cum unio illa incarnationis fiat in unitatem personae, non in unitatem naturae, pluralitas naturarum non sic repugnat unioni incarnationis, sicut pluralitas personarum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plures personae possunt communicare in eadem essentia per naturam etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam unitas personarum in una substantia dicit convenientiam in natura; convenientia autem in natura non repugnat distinctioni in persona, sicut nec econtra diversitas in natura repugnat unitati in persona. Sed unio gratuita non dicit convenientiam in natura, sed in persona; et ideo pluralitas personarum repugnat unitati unionis. Et propterea ratio praedicta non tenet, quia non est simile hinc inde[^12].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid impediat: dicendum, quod nec persona impedit per se, nec natura humana per se, sed modus unionis. Quia enim divina natura unitur humanae in unione[^13] personae, incompossibile est, quod in illa unione sit unitas ex parte extremorum et pluralitas ex parte medii, in quo attenditur illa unio. Unde sicut est incompossibile,
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quod plures personae sint una persona, non propter repugnantiam personarum, sed propter inclusionem duorum oppositorum; sic in proposito est intelligendum.

Haec autem dicta sunt de incarnatione ipsa[^14] secundum eum modum, secundum quem facit idiomatum communicationem, per quem modum Filius Dei factus est homo. Et isto modo impossibile est intelligere, plures personas assumere unum et eundem hominem, sicut ostendit Anselmus, et ostendunt rationes praemissae. In hoc tamen non excluditur omnis alius modus assumtionis, quia, cum multa possit Deus facere, quae intellectus noster non potest[^15] capere, quis audebit asserere, quod tres personae non possint unum et eundem hominem assumere? Nihil enim videtur impedire, quin tres personae possint per gratiam illud efficere, ut sint personae unius singularis naturae in tempore, cum illa natura sit possibilis, et omnino obediens respectu cuiuslibet personae in Trinitate. — Et pro tanto voluerunt aliqui[^16] dicere non irrationabiliter, quod poterant tres personae assumere unum hominem in unitate individui; quod si rationabiliter intelligatur, satis rationabiliter potest sustineri. Nec repugnat verbum Anselmi, nec ea[^17] quae praedeterminata sunt. Non enim volunt dicere, quod illa assumtio terminaretur ad unitatem individualem ex parte assumentis, sed quod tres personae, si unum hominem assumerent, essent unus homo, ita quod in illis tribus personis esset communis unitas singularis naturae assumtae, non unitas personae. — Quidquid autem sit de hoc, illud pro indubitanti habendum est, quod modo assumendi praedeterminato impossibile est, plures personas[^18] unum et eundem hominem assumere propter implicationem contradictionis implicitae; quia sequeretur, quod Filius esset Pater.

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### Question III. *Whether one person could be united together with another simultaneously, by assuming one and the same nature in number.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one person could be united together with another simultaneously, by assuming one and the same nature in number. And it seems that it could not.

1. Anselm in the book *Cur Deus homo,* chapter nine[^1]: « Several persons cannot assume one and the same man; wherefore it is necessary that it come to be in one person only ».

2. Likewise, if several persons were united to one and the same nature, then either in unity of essence, or in unity of supposit. Not in unity of essence, since it is impossible that the Creator and the creature come together in one essence. Not in unity of person, since the three persons do not come together in a person, but are distinguished personally: therefore it seems that in no way could several persons take up one man[^2].

3. Likewise, the union of the divine nature to the human brings it about that they communicate to one another their proper idioms[^3]: therefore if three persons were to assume one man, that man would be Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and from this it would follow, on account of the communication of idioms, that the Father would be the Son and the Holy Spirit, and conversely; and if this is so, then the personal distinction would perish.

4. Likewise, if three persons were to assume one and the same man, then either by a single union, or by several. If by a single one: then, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit communicate only in essence, that union would be in something essential, which is impossible. If by several: then there would be several incarnations[^4]. But on the contrary: it is impossible that there be several incarnations with respect to one flesh, since the incarnation has its inception only by reason of the flesh, therefore by like reasoning it can be numbered only by reason of the flesh: therefore neither by several incarnations nor by a single one could several persons assume one and the same nature[^5].

**On the contrary:** 1. Human nature has the aptitude to be assumed by a person, insofar as it is an image[^6]; but one and the same soul is the image of the three persons simultaneously and at once: therefore it seems that it could be assumed by three persons simultaneously and at once.

2. Likewise, one person can assume several natures, and nothing prevents the Son of God from being able to assume one[^7] other man, since he was not constrained to that singular nature which he assumed: therefore by like reasoning it seems that several persons could assume one and the same nature, since several persons can stand over one nature, just as one person can stand over several natures.

3. Likewise, grace has to be conformed to nature; but the several divine persons communicate through nature in one substance and essence simply one: therefore by like reasoning they can communicate in one nature through a gratuitous union: therefore several persons can assume one and the same nature.

4. Likewise, either one nature, which is assumed by one person, can be assumed by another, or not. If so, I have my point. If not, I ask, what prevents it? Since there is nothing there but a created nature and a divine person, then either there will be an impediment on the part of the created nature, or on the part of the divine person. But on the part of the created nature it cannot be, since that lies wholly subject to the power of the divine person. On the part of the divine person it cannot be, since among the divine persons there is no resistance, no repugnance, since the one mutually indwells the other, and the one is with the other[^8]: therefore if there is no impediment, it seems simply that several persons could assume one man.

### Conclusio

> Several persons cannot assume one and the same nature in number.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, as Anselm says, « several persons cannot assume one and the same man », not on account of a defect of power, but on account of the repugnance of an implicit contradiction. — For if several persons were to assume one man unto such a unity[^9] as would bring about the communication of idioms: then either they would assume unto a unity, which indeed would be a unity holding on the side of the assuming, or of the assumed. If unto a unity which indeed would hold on the side of the assuming, since on the side of the assuming there is nothing to be found but personal unity and essential unity; then several persons would assume one nature unto unity of essence, or unity of person; but each of these is simply impossible. For several divine persons cannot come together in one person, nor can a created and an uncreated nature pass over into one nature. — But if they were to assume unto a unity which indeed holds on the side of the assumed, since that is an individual unity, they would then assume unto unity of an individual; but that too is impossible, since the one assuming is not drawn to the unity of the assumed, but rather draws the assumed to its own unity. For to assume is to take to oneself.

And thus it is plain that, if it be said that three persons assume one and the same man, in every way a contradiction is implied[^10], whether it be understood that the assumption comes to be unto unity of nature, or unto unity of person. For if such an assumption comes to be unto unity of nature, then out of the divine nature and the human one nature is constituted: therefore there is no distinction of the assuming from the assumed: therefore neither is the assumption true. But if the assumption comes to be unto unity of person, then several persons communicate in one person: therefore several persons are not several persons. But if the assumption comes to be unto unity of an individual; since that unity does not hold on the side of the assuming, but of the assumed, the one assuming does not assume the other nature unto its own unity: therefore it does not assume to itself, but to another; and if it does not assume to itself, it does not assume: the assumption therefore unto unity of an individual is not to assume truly and properly, as we now speak of assumption. — On account therefore of the implicit contradiction, for several persons to assume one and the same nature is neither possible nor intelligible. — Therefore the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To the first which is objected to the contrary, that one soul is the image of the three; it must be said that an image, by its very account, bespeaks an express representation, not according to the whole of that in which the image is, but according to something of it. But the union which indeed is in the incarnation makes the whole human nature in its individual atom and according to its whole be united to the divine person, so that the whole is given subsistence in the one as in one proper hypostasis[^11]. But it is not unfitting that something represent several persons according to differing properties and powers; it is, however, unfitting that one and the same thing be united to several persons unto unity of person; and therefore it does not follow that, if one soul can be the image of the three, it could be united to the three persons simultaneously and at once.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that one person can assume several natures, therefore likewise several persons one nature; it must be said that it is not alike, since, because that union of the incarnation comes to be unto unity of person, not unto unity of nature, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to the union of the incarnation in the way that a plurality of persons is.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that several persons can communicate in the same essence through nature, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, since the unity of the persons in one substance bespeaks a coming-together in nature; but a coming-together in nature is not repugnant to a distinction in person, just as conversely a diversity in nature is not repugnant to a unity in person. But a gratuitous union does not bespeak a coming-together in nature, but in person; and therefore a plurality of persons is repugnant to the unity of the union. And on this account the aforesaid reasoning does not hold, since it is not alike on the one side and the other[^12].

*To 4.* To that which is asked, what prevents it: it must be said that neither does the person prevent it of itself, nor the human nature of itself, but the mode of union. For because the divine nature is united to the human in a union[^13] of person, it is incompossible that in that union there be unity on the part of the extremes and plurality on the part of the middle, in which that union is regarded. Hence just as it is incompossible
that several persons be one person, not on account of the repugnance of the persons, but on account of the inclusion of two opposites; so it is to be understood in the case proposed.

Now these things have been said concerning the incarnation itself[^14] according to that mode according to which it brings about the communication of idioms, by which mode the Son of God was made man. And in this mode it is impossible to understand that several persons assume one and the same man, as Anselm shows, and as the foregoing reasons show. In this, however, every other mode of assumption is not excluded, since, because God can do many things which our intellect cannot[^15] grasp, who will dare to assert that three persons could not assume one and the same man? For nothing seems to prevent the three persons from being able through grace to effect this, that they be persons of one singular nature in time, since that nature is possible, and wholly obedient with respect to any person whatever in the Trinity. — And to this extent some wished[^16] to say, not unreasonably, that the three persons could assume one man in unity of an individual; and if this be understood reasonably, it can be sustained reasonably enough. Nor does the word of Anselm stand against it, nor do those things[^17] which have been predetermined. For they do not wish to say that that assumption would be terminated at individual unity on the part of the assuming, but that the three persons, if they were to assume one man, would be one man, so that in those three persons there would be a common unity of the assumed singular nature, not a unity of person. — But whatever there be of this, this is to be held as beyond doubt, that by the predetermined mode of assuming it is impossible that several persons[^18] assume one and the same man, on account of the implication of an implicit contradiction; since it would follow that the Son would be the Father.

la: Libr. II. In Anselmi sententia textus originalis verbo *assumere* addit *in unitatem personae* et verbo *fieri* praemittit *hoc.*

en: Book II. In Anselm's text the original wording, at the verb *assumere* ("to assume"), adds *in unitatem personae* ("unto unity of person"), and prefixes *hoc* ("this") to the verb *fieri* ("to come to be").

la: Anselm., *de Fide Trinit. et de incarn. Verbi,* c. 4: Deus non sic assumsit hominem, ut natura Dei et hominis sit una et eadem; sed ut persona Dei et hominis una eademque sit, quod non nisi in una persona Dei esse potest. Diversas enim personas unam et eandem personam esse cum uno eodemque homine nequit intelligi. Nam si unus homo cum singulis pluribus personis una persona est, necesse est, plures personas, quae aliae sunt a se invicem, esse unam eandemque personam, quod non est possibile. Quapropter impossibile est, Deo incarnato secundum unamquamlibet personam, illum secundum aliam quoque personam incarnari. — Paulo superius pro *in unitate suppositi* cod. F *in unitate personae.*

en: Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word,* c. 4: God did not so assume man that the nature of God and of man should be one and the same; but that the person of God and of man should be one and the same, which can only be in the one person of God. For it cannot be understood that diverse persons are one and the same person with one and the same man. For if one man is one person with each of several persons, it is necessary that the several persons, which are other than one another, be one and the same person, which is not possible. Wherefore it is impossible, when God is incarnate according to any one person, that he be incarnate according to another person also. — A little above, for *in unity of supposit* codex F reads *in unity of person.*

la: Communicatio idiomatum (κοινωνία τῶν ἰδιωμάτων, i. e. communicatio proprietatum) a Damasc., III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3, sic explicatur: Verbum porro, quia ipsius sunt quae sanctae eius carnis sunt, ea quae humanitati conveniunt sibi vindicat, et vicissim carni quae sua sunt impertit; illo nimirum alternae communicationis modo (κατὰ τὸν ἀντιδόσεως τρόπον), ob mutuam inter se partium commeationem (περιχώρησιν) unionemve hypostaticam... Eo porro nomine Dominus ipse gloriae crucifixus dicitur, quamvis alioqui divina ipsius natura minime passa sit etc. (ed. Migne). Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; d. 2. dub. 2; d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; d. 7. a. 1. q. 2. in fine. — Cod. P post *humanam* supplet *naturam.*

en: The communication of idioms (κοινωνία τῶν ἰδιωμάτων, i.e. the communication of properties) is explained thus by Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 3: The Word, moreover, since the things of his holy flesh are his own, claims for himself those things which belong to the humanity, and in turn imparts to the flesh the things which are his own; namely by that mode of mutual exchange (κατὰ τὸν ἀντιδόσεως τρόπον), on account of the mutual passing-over of the parts among themselves (περιχώρησις) or the hypostatic union... And by that name the Lord himself is said to be the crucified Lord of glory, although otherwise his divine nature suffered not at all, etc. (ed. Migne). Cf. below a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; d. 2. dub. 2; d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; d. 7. a. 1. q. 2. at the end. — After *human* codex P supplies *nature.*

la: Vat. addit *respectu unius carnis.* Paulo superius pro *communicant,* quod habent complures codd. et primae edd., Vat. *communicent,* cod. Z, et, ut videtur, pauci alii *conveniant.*

en: The Vatican edition adds *with respect to one flesh.* A little above, for *communicant* ("communicate"), which several codices and the first editions have, the Vatican edition reads *communicent,* codex Z, and, as it seems, a few others, *conveniant.*

la: Quod quomodo intelligendum sit, exponitur in fine huius quaest. — Paulo superius pro *possent* Vat. *possunt.*

en: How this is to be understood is set out at the end of this question. — A little above, for *possent* ("could") the Vatican edition reads *possunt* ("can").

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. fundam. 3. et infra d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. — Post *a persona* cod. K. subiicit *divina.*

en: Cf. above q. 1, fundamentum 3, and below d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. — After *by a person* codex K adds *divine.*

la: Post *unum* codd. X Z interserunt *et.* Circa finem arg. pro *super* (codd. Q Z bb *in*) *unam naturam* Vat. substituit *assumere unam naturam,* et dein omittit *in* ante *plures naturas.*

en: After *one* codices X Z insert *and.* Near the end of the argument, for *over* (codices Q Z bb *in*) *one nature* the Vatican edition substitutes *to assume one nature,* and then omits *over* before *several natures.*

la: Ut monstratum est I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 1. — Proxime post pro *ergo si* plurimi codd. exhibent *ergo sicut,* codd. G H *ergo cum.* Paulo superius edd. 1, 2 verba *omnino potentiae* contraxerunt in *omnipotentiae.* In fine arg. codd. L Z bb voci *unum* adiungunt *et eundem.*

en: As was shown in I Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 1. — Immediately after, for *therefore if* very many codices read *therefore just as,* codices G H *therefore since.* A little above, editions 1 and 2 contracted the words *wholly to the power* into *to the omnipotence.* At the end of the argument codices L Z bb add to the word *one* the phrase *and the same.*

la: Cod. aa *unitate tali.*

en: Codex aa reads *by such a unity.*

la: Cod. X *implicabitur.*

en: Codex X reads *implicabitur* ("will be implied").

la: Cod. E *una et eadem.* Mox cod. K verbo *trium* addit *personarum.* Paulo inferius pro *secundum totum illud* Vat. *secundum totum id, vel illius.* Subinde pro *in quo* codd. F G H M W X *quod,* codd. B U T V *in quo quod.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et a. 2. q. 3.

en: Codex E reads *one and the same.* Soon after, to the word *of the three* codex K adds *persons.* A little below, for *according to the whole of that* the Vatican edition reads *according to the whole of it, or of which.* Then for *in which* codices F G H M W X read *which,* codices B U T V *in which that.* Cf. II Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1 following, and a. 2. q. 3.

la: Codd. E H L aa *hinc et inde.*

en: Codices E H L aa read *on the one side and the other.*

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. *unionem,* cod. H *unitate,* cod. bb *unitatem.* Paulo ante pro *modus unionis* cod. F *huius unionis modus.* Mox post *incompossibile est* multi codd. adiiciunt *illud,* et post pauca pro *sicut est incompossibile* codd. F L aa substituunt *sicut est impossibile.*

en: The editions, with some codices, read *union* (accusative), codex H *unity* (ablative), codex bb *unity* (accusative). A little before, for *the mode of union* codex F reads *the mode of this union.* Soon after *it is incompossible* many codices add *this,* and a little later, for *just as it is incompossible* codices F L aa substitute *just as it is impossible.*

la: Cod. W *de incarnatione Christi.*

en: Codex W reads *concerning the incarnation of Christ.*

la: Edd. *videtur posse.* Mox pro *non possint* codd. F H L T U Z *non possunt.* Deinde pro *ut sint personae* codd. A E F G L N T U V *ut sicut personae,* perperam.

en: The editions read *seems to be able.* Soon after, for *could not* codices F H L T U Z read *cannot.* Then for *that they be persons* codices A E F G L N T U V read *that just as persons,* wrongly.

la: Plurimi codd. *nec in his;* sed codd. A K prius pro *verbum Anselmi* substituunt *verbis Anselmi,* quae lectio congrua esset, si pro *nec ea* vel *nec in his* poneretur *nec his.* Paulo superius pro *voluerunt aliqui* codd. K Z *volunt aliqui,* et mox pro *quod si* codd. A N T V X nec non edd. 1, 2, *quia si.*

en: Very many codices read *nor in these;* but codices A K earlier substitute for *the word of Anselm* the reading *the words of Anselm,* which reading would be congruous, if for *nor those things* or *nor in these* one were to put *nor these.* A little above, for *some wished* codices K Z read *some wish,* and soon after for *and if* codices A N T V X, and also editions 1 and 2, read *since if.*

la: Supplevimus ex cod. F *plures personas.* Mox Vat. vocem *implicationem* mutavit in *multiplicationem.*

en: We have supplied from codex F *several persons.* Soon after, the Vatican edition changed the word *implication* into *multiplication.*

la: Pro *et* (Vat. *etiam*) codd. A E G L N T V aa perperam *in.*

en: For *and* (Vatican edition *also*) codices A E G L N T V aa wrongly read *in.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod tres personae divinae possint numero unam et eandem naturam assumere in unitatem unius personae, manifestam implicat contradictionem. Sed restat quaestio, an tres personae possint assumere unam naturam humanam tantum unitate singularis naturae, ita ut tres personae conveniant in una natura assumta, sicut conveniunt in ipsa divina natura; et de quaestione sic intellecta duplex est sententia theologorum. *Affirmative* respondent Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth., multique recentiores; sed S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) hoc affirmat, « loquendo de potentia absoluta, quamvis non sit congruum secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae »; quae restrictio etiam ad mentem aliorum huius sententiae patronorum dicta est. At Scotus defendit responsum *negativum,* cui favent B. Albert. nec non Richard. a Med., quamvis hic, distinctione utens, hoc tunc tantum esse possibile doceat, si supponatur, quod natura humana sustentetur immediate non per tres personas, sed per substantiam (aliqui substituunt subsistentiam) communem. Haec autem suppositio, intellecta de natura, non approbatur a S. Bonav. (hic et d. 5. a. 1. q. 4.) nec ab Alexandro Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3.). — S. Bonav. autem media quadam via incedit, ut in fine quaestionis explicatur. Consentit quippe omnino Scoto, si unio haec intelligitur secundum eum modum, quo facit idiomatum communionem; si autem sumitur secundum alium quendam modum Deo possibilem, tunc ipse non contradicit primae opinioni, ac sententiam sui magistri Alexandri, quod tres personae assumere possint unum hominem in unitate individui, censet esse non improbabilem.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. 2; Report. hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4; S. III. q. 3. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic d. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 8. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 6. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 1.

**III.** Sequens (4.) quaestio intelligenda est de potentia Dei *absoluta.* Quid sibi velit potentia absoluta et ordinata, bene explicatur a S. Thoma (hic q. 2. a. 3.), cum quadrupliciter distinguit ea quae ordini divinae potentiae attribui possunt. — In responsione ad quaestionem doctores communiter conveniunt. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 3. n. 7; Quodl. q. 19. n. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. III. q. 3. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That the three divine persons could assume numerically one and the same nature unto unity of one person manifestly implies a contradiction. But there remains the question whether the three persons could assume one human nature only by the unity of a singular nature, so that the three persons come together in one assumed nature, just as they come together in the divine nature itself; and concerning the question thus understood there is a twofold opinion of the theologians. *Affirmatively* respond Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth., and many more recent writers; but S. Thom. in the Commentary (here q. 2. a. 1.) affirms this « speaking of absolute power, although it is not congruous according to the order of divine wisdom »; which restriction is said also to be according to the mind of the others who patronize this opinion. But Scotus defends the *negative* answer, which is favored by B. Albert. and also Richard. a Med., although the latter, using a distinction, teaches that this is then only possible, if it be supposed that human nature is sustained immediately not by the three persons, but by a common substance (some substitute subsistence). But this supposition, understood of nature, is not approved by S. Bonav. (here and d. 5. a. 1. q. 4.) nor by Alexander Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3.). — But S. Bonav. proceeds by a certain middle way, as is explained at the end of the question. For he agrees entirely with Scotus, if this union be understood according to that mode by which it brings about the communion of idioms; but if it be taken according to some other mode possible to God, then he does not contradict the first opinion, and he reckons that the opinion of his master Alexander — that the three persons could assume one man in unity of an individual — is not improbable.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 4. — Scot., here q. 2; Report. here q. 3. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 4; S. III. q. 3. a. 6. — B. Albert., here d. 10. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 8. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 6. q. 7. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 1.

**III.** The following (4th) question is to be understood of the *absolute* power of God. What absolute and ordained power mean is well explained by S. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 3.), where he distinguishes in four ways the things that can be attributed to the order of divine power. — In the response to the question the doctors commonly agree. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 2. — Scot., here q. 3. n. 7; Quodl. q. 19. n. 3. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 3; S. III. q. 3. a. 8. — B. Albert., here a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 5.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 14–16 (PDF 36–38; offset pdf = printed + 22), reading each page Left column top→bottom then Right column, body bands then footer bands, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo and footers). Raw OCR range **1597–1786** (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). The OCR was used as a base for clean running prose (fundamenta / Sed contra) and for footnote-marker spacing; the PDF column bands are authoritative for the Respondeo, replies, Scholion, and all footers.

**Page-split map.**
- **p. 14** (raw ~1597–1662): QUAESTIO III title + opener, fundamenta 1–4, Sed contra 1–4. Footers 1–8 → `[^1]`–`[^8]` (footer 3 = the long Damascene *communicatio idiomatum* note, spans L-col → R-col foot; footers 4–8 in R-col).
- **p. 15** (raw ~1663–1748): CONCLUSIO, Respondeo (Ratio + Confirmatur), replies *Ad 1–4* (reply 4 begins here, wraps to p. 16). Footers 1–6 → `[^9]`–`[^14]` (footer 4 = the long Damascene *triplex consideratio naturae* note, spans L-col → R-col foot; footers 5–6 in R-col).
- **p. 16** (raw ~1749–1786): tail of *Ad 4* + determinatio/Notandum/Epilogus of the Respondeo, then q3's own **SCHOLION I–III**. q3's share of the p. 16 footers = **footers 1–4** → `[^15]`–`[^18]` (anchors: `[^15]` *de incarnatione ipsa*, `[^16]` *non potest* [capere], `[^17]` *voluerunt aliqui / nec ea*, `[^18]` *plures personas*). **p. 16 footers 5–6 (`Pro et … in`, `Cfr. Ioan. 5,19 seqq.`) belong to QUAESTIO IV** — they anchor q4's body markers ⁵ (`videtur, quod et⁵ persona Patris`) and ⁶ (`totum posse habeat Filius a Patre⁶`), which print at the foot/start of p. 16's R-col under the QUAESTIO IV heading. FORWARDED to d1-a1-q4; omitted here (not rendered anchorless).

**Incoming hand-off (from d1-a1-q2, commit 51b0768) — confirmed.** CLEAN PAGE BREAK at the q2→q3 seam: q2 consumed all of p. 13's footers, so q3 began with a fresh p. 14 footer sequence (no shared-footer split inherited). Verified against the p. 14 L-col running head `14 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` and the QUAESTIO III heading at the top of p. 14 R-col.

**Briefing correction (two items, both PDF-verified).** The briefing specified `printed_pages: [14, 15]` and `has_scholion: false`. Eyes-on the 450 dpi crops shows the chunk runs onto **p. 16**, where (a) the Respondeo's last reply + determinatio/Epilogus finish, and (b) q3 has its **own SCHOLION I–III** (distinct from a1-q1's Scholion I–IV; this one explicitly treats *q3's* question — "an tres personae possint assumere unam naturam … unitate singularis naturae" — and forwards section III to the *following (4th)* question on God's *absolute power*). Corrected to `printed_pages: [14, 15, 16]`, `pdf_pages: [36, 37, 38]`, `has_scholion: true`. This mirrors the q1 precedent (briefing said pp. 8–9; crops showed it ran through p. 11).

**Alignment result: PASS.** Opener = `Tertio quaeritur, utrum persona una possit simul uniri cum alia` = TRACTATIO q3 (*Tertio quaeritur*). No q-swap.

**Boundary lock + forward hand-off to d1-a1-q4.** q3's Scholion III ends grammatically complete at `…Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.` (p. 16 R-col, raw ~1786). `QUAESTIO IV` (`Quarto quaeritur, utrum quaelibet trium personarum possit incarnari per se ipsam`) begins raw **1787/1790** at the bottom of p. 16 L-col (heading `QUAESTIO IV.`) — NOT included; belongs to d1-a1-q4 (printed p. 16 onward). **q4 inherits p. 16 footers 5 and 6** (`Pro et (Vat. etiam) … perperam in` and `Cfr. Ioan. 5, 19. seqq.`), anchoring q4's fundamenta markers ⁵ and ⁶. q4 is the LAST question of ARTICULUS I; after it, ARTICULUS II (raw ~1944, printed p. 19) folds into a2-q1.

**Marker pairing:** 18 unique `[^N]` in the Latin body = 18 in the English body = 18 apparatus defs; 0 anchorless defs, 0 defless anchors (verified programmatically before commit).

**[?] flags:** none. All OCR garbles (e.g. `QUA.ESTIO`, `coramunicare`, `assuraerent`, `onmibus`, `Koiandnm`/`Kotandum` = the marginal *Notandum*, the scrambled Scholion III opener) were resolvable against the column-band PDF read; the Greek in `[^3]` was set from the PDF.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum quaelibet trium personarum potuerit incarnari per se ipsam

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 16 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum quaelibet trium personarum possit incarnari per se ipsam.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum quaelibet trium personarum possit incarnari per se ipsam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Tantundem distat creatura a persona Filii, quantum a persona Patris et Spiritus sancti: igitur qua ratione persona Filii incarnari potest, distantia non impediente, eadem ratione videtur, quod et[^1] persona Patris et Spiritus sancti.

2. Item, posse incarnari spectat ad dignitatem, alioquin non conveniret Filio; sed quidquid potest Filius ad dignitatem spectans, potest et Pater, cum totum posse habeat Filius a Patre[^2]: ergo si persona Filii potest incarnari et carnem sibi assumere, videtur, quod hoc possit et Pater consimili ratione.

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3. Item, ad incarnationem faciendam[^3] non plura exiguntur quam extrema unibilia et unitas in persona et immensitas in potentia, quae extrema illa coniungat; sed natura Patris ita est unibilis, sicut natura Filii, cum sit una et eadem, et persona Patris ita est una, sicut persona Filii, et potentia immensa: ergo etc.

4. Item, si persona Filii potest incarnari, aut eo ipso quo est Filius, aut eo ipso quo[^4] est persona. Non eo ipso quo est *Filius*, quia Filius solum dicit respectum ad Patrem, non ad creaturam: ergo si potest incarnari eo ipso quo est persona divina, ergo cum Pater et Spiritus sanctus sit persona divina, sequitur necessario, quod persona Patris et Spiritus sancti ita possit incarnari, sicut persona Filii.

**Sed contra:** 1. « Si persona Patris vel Spiritus sancti incarnaretur, tunc duo essent Filii in Trinitate »; sed hoc est inconveniens, « quodlibet autem inconveniens, sicut dicit Anselmus in libro: Cur Deus homo[^5], apud Deum est impossibile »: ergo videtur similiter esse impossibile, personam Patris incarnari vel Spiritus sancti.

2. Item, incarnari non est aliud quam in carnem mitti, sicut vult Augustinus[^6]; sed impossibile est, Patrem mitti, cum non habeat alium, a quo sit: ergo impossibile est Patrem incarnari.

3. Item, quod est proprium unius personae impossibile est alteri convenire[^7]; sed incarnari est proprium Filii et sibi soli convenit: ergo impossibile est, quod alteri personae conveniat.

4. Item, maiorem convenientiam habet natura assumta a Verbo cum aliis personis, quam alia natura, quae non est assumta: ergo si aliae personae non possunt illam naturam assumere, quae assumta est a Verbo; videtur, quod nec aliquam aliam. Sed illam non possunt assumere, sicut in praecedentibus[^8] monstratum est: ergo videtur, quod nullam aliam assumere valeant.

### Conclusio.

> Quaelibet divinarum personarum potuit et potest incarnari.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod nulla persona incarnari potuit nisi persona Verbi. Et rationem huius assignant: quia, si alia persona incarnaretur, nasceretur quaedam Trinitatis confusio, dum plures in Trinitate Filii dicerentur[^9]. Nasceretur etiam quaedam aequalitatis diminutio, dum duo Filii essent in Trinitate, quorum unus haberet excellentiorem nativitatem[^10] quam alter. Nasceretur etiam quaedam oppositorum indistinctio, quia tunc unus et idem Filius genitus et ingenitus diceretur, si Pater incarnaretur[^11]. Et haec omnia sunt inconvenientia; et quia nihil inconveniens potest poni in Deo et circa Deum: ideo dixerunt, quod nulla alia persona a persona Filii poterat incarnari, non propter defectum potentiae, sed propter dignitatem potentiae, quae non admittit aliquod indecens circa opus suum. — Sed licet videantur in hac positione sequi beatum Anselmum, ipsum tamen veraciter non sequuntur, pro eo quod nec Anselmus vult hoc dicere, esse impossibile apud Deum, aliam personam a Filio incarnari; sed vult hoc ostendere, quod non est ita decens de alia persona, sicut de persona Filii: et hoc verum est, sicut melius videbitur infra[^12].

Quod autem Pater aut Spiritus sanctus incarnari possit absque aliqua repugnantia, planum est. Posset enim formare corpus, quod sibi uniret de genere humano, non per viam generationis, sicut formavit corpus Evae, quae non dicitur esse filia Adae. — Praeterea, esto quod alia persona assumsisset

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carnem de Virgine, sicut assumsit Verbum, adhuc non esset ibi confusio nec aequalitatis diminutio secundum rem, quia ex hoc nulla fieret transmutatio circa personas divinas. Nulla enim est confusio, quando nos credimus, quod unus et idem est temporalis et aeternus, immortalis et mortuus, immensus et circumscriptus. Nullum etiam est inconveniens, cum dicimus, Filium esse aequalem Patri et minorem Patre secundum naturarum dualitatem. — Et ideo concedendum est, sicut Magister dicit in littera[^13], quod quaelibet trium personarum potest et potuit incarnari.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod si Pater incarnaretur, quod tunc duo essent Filii; dicendum, quod ista ratio procedit hoc supposito, quod Deus non possit aliter assumere carnem, quin eam[^14] assumeret de muliere tanquam ex matre. Hoc autem est falsum, quia aliter posset Deus carnem sibi assumere, si sibi placeret. — Praeterea, esto quod alia persona assumsisset carnem de Virgine et esset filius Virginis, hoc in nullo derogaret Deo, quia nihil perderet ibi divina persona; et ideo, si est inconveniens, hoc est solum propter nostram reputationem et ratiocinationem. — Cum autem dicit Anselmus, quod « quantumcumque parvum inconveniens in Deo est impossibile »; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de eo quod est inconveniens in Deo secundum se; et tale est inconveniens, quod nullo modo potest esse conveniens, et ideo est impossibile. De eo autem non habet veritatem, quod est inconveniens secundum nostram aestimationem, quia Deus posset illud facere conveniens. Unde sicut concedimus de aliquo malo, quod potest Deus facere illud, pro eo quod illud potest bene fieri, sicut est malum in se; de aliquo vero non, quod est secundum se malum[^15], quod nullo modo potest bene fieri; sic etiam in proposito est intelligendum, cum dicitur, quod quodlibet inconveniens in Deo est impossibile.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnatio[^16] non est aliud quam in carnem mitti; dicendum, quod verum est, prout incarnatio dicitur de Filio. Sed incarnari secundum suum intellectum generalem non dicit plus quam uniri carni in unitate personae. Et quamvis persona Patris non possit mitti, potest tamen uniri; et ideo ratio illa non tenet, pro eo quod procedit ab inferiori ad superius destruendo[^17].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnari est proprium Filii; dicendum, quod sicut, si Petrus sit unicus filius Pauli, esse filium Pauli est proprium Petri, non quia non possit convenire alii, sed quia nunc non convenit alii; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, quod incarnari dicitur esse proprium personae Filii, non quia alia persona non possit carni uniri, sed quia nulla alia persona actualiter unitur carni a persona Filii.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura assumta a Verbo plus convenit cum aliis personis quam non assumta; dicendum, quod, sicut in praecedentibus[^18] dictum est, etsi plus conveniat natura talis cum aliis personis ratione eminentiae et dignitatis, tamen minus convenit convenientia ordinis, quia, cum sit actualiter a persona Verbi assumta, non habet possibilitatem ad ulteriorem assumtionem. Non sic autem est de natura, quae assumta non est; et propterea illa ratio non concludit[^19].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether each of the three persons could be incarnate of itself.*

Fourthly it is asked whether each of the three persons could be incarnate of itself. And that it can, it seems:

1. A creature is just as distant from the person of the Son as it is from the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit: therefore, by whatever ground the person of the Son can be incarnate, the distance not impeding, by the same ground it seems that the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit can be too.[^1]

2. Likewise, to be able to be incarnate pertains to dignity, otherwise it would not belong to the Son; but whatever the Son can do that pertains to dignity, the Father can also, since the Son has his whole power from the Father:[^2] therefore if the person of the Son can be incarnate and assume flesh to himself, it seems that the Father can do this too by a like ground.

3. Likewise, for bringing about the incarnation[^3] no more is required than the extremes capable of being united and a unity in the person and an immensity in the power that may join those extremes; but the nature of the Father is just as capable of being united as the nature of the Son, since it is one and the same, and the person of the Father is just as much one as the person of the Son, and the power is immense: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if the person of the Son can be incarnate, either by the very fact that he is the Son, or by the very fact that[^4] he is a person. Not by the very fact that he is the *Son*, because "Son" states only a relation to the Father, not to a creature: therefore if he can be incarnate by the very fact that he is a divine person, then, since the Father and the Holy Spirit are a divine person, it follows necessarily that the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit can be incarnate just as the person of the Son.

**On the contrary:** 1. "If the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit were incarnate, then there would be two Sons in the Trinity"; but this is unfitting, "and whatever is unfitting, as Anselm says in the book *Why God Became Man*,[^5] is with God impossible": therefore it seems likewise to be impossible for the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit to be incarnate.

2. Likewise, to be incarnate is nothing other than to be sent into flesh, as Augustine holds;[^6] but it is impossible for the Father to be sent, since he has no other from whom he is: therefore it is impossible for the Father to be incarnate.

3. Likewise, what is proper to one person it is impossible should belong to another;[^7] but to be incarnate is proper to the Son and belongs to him alone: therefore it is impossible that it should belong to another person.

4. Likewise, the nature assumed by the Word has a greater agreement with the other persons than another nature that is not assumed: therefore if the other persons cannot assume that nature which is assumed by the Word, it seems that they cannot assume any other either. But they cannot assume that nature, as was shown in the foregoing:[^8] therefore it seems that they can assume no other.

### Conclusion.

> Each of the divine persons could be and can be incarnate.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that some have wished to say that no person could be incarnate except the person of the Word. And they assign the ground for this: that, if another person were incarnate, a certain confusion of the Trinity would arise, since several in the Trinity would be called Sons.[^9] There would also arise a certain diminution of equality, since there would be two Sons in the Trinity, of whom one would have a more excellent nativity[^10] than the other. There would also arise a certain non-distinction of opposites, because then one and the same Son would be called begotten and unbegotten, if the Father were incarnate.[^11] And all these are unfitting; and because nothing unfitting can be posited in God and about God: therefore they said that no other person than the person of the Son could be incarnate, not on account of a defect of power, but on account of the dignity of the power, which does not admit anything unbecoming about its own work. — But although in this position they seem to follow blessed Anselm, yet they do not truly follow him, because Anselm does not wish to say this, that it is impossible with God for another person than the Son to be incarnate; but he wishes to show this, that it is not as fitting concerning another person as concerning the person of the Son: and this is true, as will be better seen below.[^12]

But that the Father or the Holy Spirit could be incarnate without any repugnance is plain. For he could form a body, which he would unite to himself, from the human race, not by way of generation, just as he formed the body of Eve, who is not said to be the daughter of Adam. — Furthermore, granted that another person had assumed

flesh from the Virgin, as the Word assumed it, even so there would not be there confusion or diminution of equality in reality, because from this no change would be made about the divine persons. For there is no confusion when we believe that one and the same is temporal and eternal, immortal and dead, immense and circumscribed. There is also nothing unfitting when we say that the Son is equal to the Father and less than the Father according to the duality of natures. — And therefore it must be conceded, as the Master says in the text,[^13] that each of the three persons can be and could be incarnate.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that if the Father were incarnate, then there would be two Sons; it must be said that this argument proceeds on the supposition that God could not assume flesh otherwise than by assuming it from a woman[^14] as from a mother. But this is false, because God could assume flesh to himself otherwise, if it pleased him. — Furthermore, granted that another person had assumed flesh from the Virgin and were the son of the Virgin, this would in no way derogate from God, because the divine person would lose nothing there; and therefore, if it is unfitting, this is only on account of our reckoning and reasoning. — But when Anselm says that "however small a thing unfitting in God is impossible"; it must be said that this is understood of that which is unfitting in God in itself; and such is the unfitting that can in no way be fitting, and therefore is impossible. But it does not hold true of that which is unfitting according to our estimation, because God could make it fitting. Hence just as we concede of some evil that God can do it, inasmuch as it can well be done, as is an evil in itself; but not of another, which is evil according to itself,[^15] which can in no way be done well; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood, when it is said that whatever is unfitting in God is impossible.

2. To that which is objected, that incarnation[^16] is nothing other than to be sent into flesh; it must be said that it is true, insofar as incarnation is said of the Son. But to be incarnate, according to its general meaning, says no more than to be united to flesh in the unity of the person. And although the person of the Father cannot be sent, yet he can be united; and therefore that argument does not hold, because it proceeds from the lower to the higher by destruction.[^17]

3. To that which is objected, that to be incarnate is proper to the Son; it must be said that just as, if Peter is the only son of Paul, to be the son of Paul is proper to Peter, not because it could not belong to another, but because it does not now belong to another; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood that to be incarnate is said to be proper to the person of the Son, not because another person could not be united to flesh, but because no other person is actually united to flesh than the person of the Son.

4. To that which is objected, that the nature assumed by the Word agrees more with the other persons than the unassumed; it must be said that, as was said in the foregoing,[^18] although such a nature agrees more with the other persons by reason of eminence and dignity, yet it agrees less by the agreement of order, because, since it is actually assumed by the person of the Word, it does not have possibility for a further assumption. But it is not so concerning the nature that is not assumed; and therefore that argument does not conclude.[^19]

---

en: For *et* (the Vatican edition: *etiam*) the codices A E G L N T V aa wrongly read *in.*

la: Cfr. Ioan. 5, 19. seqq.

en: Cf. John 5:19 ff.

la: Cod. A *in incarnatione facienda.*

en: Codex A: *in incarnatione facienda* (in the incarnation that is to be brought about).

la: Codd. N X hic et in seqq. *eo ipso quod.*

en: Codices N X here and in what follows: *eo ipso quod* (by the very fact that).

la: Libr. I. c. 20: *Sed hoc est praestitum, quia quamlibet parvum inconveniens in Deo impossibile est.* — Ibid. II. c. 9. etiam quod in *maiori* dicitur his verbis exprimitur: « Si quaelibet alia persona [quam Filius] incarnetur, erunt duo Filii in Trinitate, Filius scilicet Dei, qui et ante incarnationem filius est, et ille qui per incarnationem filius erit Virginis; et erit in personis, quae semper aequales esse debent, inaequalitas secundum dignitatem nativitatum. Digniorem namque nativitatem habebit natus ex Deo quam natus ex Virgine ». Anselm. idem docet in libro *de Fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi* etc., c. 5. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. I.

en: Book I, c. 20: *But this has been established, that any unfitting thing in God, however small, is impossible.* — Likewise at Book II, c. 9, what is said in the *greater* [work] is expressed in these words: "If any other person [than the Son] should be incarnate, there will be two Sons in the Trinity, namely the Son of God, who is Son even before the incarnation, and the one who through the incarnation will be the Son of the Virgin; and there will be in the persons, which ought always to be equal, an inequality according to the dignity of the nativities. For one born of God will have a more worthy nativity than one born of the Virgin." Anselm teaches the same in the book *On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word*, etc., c. 5. Cf. also the Master's text here, c. I.

la: *In Ioan. Evang.* tr. 36. n. 7. seq.; II. *de Trin.* c. 5. n. 7. seqq. et IV. c. 19. n. 26. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. I. — De *minori* vide locc. ex libro *de Trin.* modo citt. nec non I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3.

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tr. 36, n. 7 f.; *On the Trinity* II, c. 5, n. 7 ff., and IV, c. 19, n. 26 ff. Cf. the Master's text here, c. I. — For the *minor* [premise] see the passages from the book *On the Trinity* just cited, as well as I Sent., d. 15, p. I, q. 3.

la: Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. I: *Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. I: "For no one states as a property that which can belong to another."

la: Quaest. 3. — Edd. 1, 2 in fine arg. ineptam in se glossam (de quo cfr. I. Sent. d. 16. q. 3. ad 2. et 3.) et contra finem arg. addunt: *sed altera persona alteram naturam assumsit, scilicet persona Spiritus sancti naturam columbae: ergo si* — superius pro *voluerunt aliqui* codd. K Z *volunt aliqui*, et mox pro *quod si* codd. A N T V X nec non edd. 1, 2, *quia si.*

en: Question 3. — Editions 1 and 2, at the end of the argument, [add] in themselves an inept gloss (on which cf. I Sent., d. 16, q. 3, ad 2 and 3), and near the end of the argument add: "but another person assumed another nature, namely the person of the Holy Spirit [assumed] the nature of a dove: therefore if —". Above, for *voluerunt aliqui* the codices K Z [read] *volunt aliqui*, and presently for *quod si* the codices A N T V X as well as editions 1 and 2 [read] *quia si.*

la: Anselm., *de Fide Trin.* etc. c. 5: *Unde quaedam nasceretur dubietatis confusio, cum de Deo Filio loqueremur: uterque enim esset Deus et Filius, quamvis alter Dei, alter hominis.* — Idem dicit Bernard., Serm. 2. in Annuntiat. B. Virg. n. 2.

en: Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity*, etc., c. 5: "Whence a certain confusion of doubt would arise, when we spoke of God the Son: for each would be God and Son, although one [the Son] of God, the other of man." — Bernard says the same, Sermon 2 on the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin, n. 2.

la: Ita codd. K aa bb, quo verbo etiam Anselm. utitur loc. supra nota 3. cit.; codd. C D G M N O *voluntatem*, cod. F *notionem*, alii cum edd. *notabilitatem.*

en: So codices K aa bb, which word Anselm too uses in the passage cited above in note 3; codices C D G M N O [read] *voluntatem*, codex F *notionem*, others with the editions *notabilitatem.*

la: Anselm., *de Fide Trin.* etc. c. 5, et II. *Cur Deus homo* c. 9. adhuc hanc profert inconvenientiam: *Si Pater fuerit incarnatus, erunt duo nepotes in Trinitate, quia Pater erit nepos parentum Virginis per hominem assumtum; et Verbum, cum nihil habeat de homine, nepos tamen erit Virginis, quia filii eius erit filius.* — Mox pro *poni in Deo*, quod ex codd. F N restituimus, alii codd. cum edd. *in Deum.* Deinde pro *alia persona a persona Filii* codd. F N *alia persona quam persona Filii.* Denique pro *propter dignitatem potentiae* Vat. et aliquot codd. *propter dignitatem personae.*

en: Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity*, etc., c. 5, and II *Why God Became Man*, c. 9, still adduces this unfitting consequence: "If the Father were incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity, because the Father will be a grandson of the Virgin's parents through the man assumed; and the Word, since it has nothing of man, will yet be a grandson of the Virgin, because it will be the son of her son." — Presently, for *poni in Deo*, which we have restored from codices F N, the other codices with the editions [read] *in Deum.* Then for *alia persona a persona Filii* the codices F N [read] *alia persona quam persona Filii.* Finally, for *propter dignitatem potentiae* the Vatican edition and several codices [read] *propter dignitatem personae.*

la: Art. 2. q. 3. — Mox pro *aut* codd. A N T U V *et.* Paulo inferius pro *de genere humano* cod. F *de genere humanae naturae.*

en: Article 2, question 3. — Presently, for *aut* the codices A N T U V [read] *et.* A little below, for *de genere humano* codex F [reads] *de genere humanae naturae.*

la: Hic c. 2. — Superius pro *cum dicimus* cod. P *credere.*

en: Here, c. 2. — Above, for *cum dicimus* codex P [reads] *credere.*

la: Voculam *eam*, quae in edd. nec non in aliis codd. deest, supplevimus ex cod. Y. In codd. G H T V pro *eam* habetur *non*, in cod. A vero. Codd. B C D pro *quin eam* exhibent *quam non.*

en: The little word *eam*, which is lacking in the editions as well as in other codices, we have supplied from codex Y. In codices G H T V, for *eam* there is *non*, but in codex A. The codices B C D, for *quin eam*, present *quam non.*

la: S. Doctor similiter loquitur I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4: *Est enim aliquid malum in se, aliquid malum secundum se. Malum in se potest fieri bene* [v. g. *furari* i. e. clam auferre rem alienam, si Deus dominium transfert]; *malum secundum se nullo modo potest fieri bene, immo hoc intelligere, quod fiat bene, est intelligere, quod idem sit malum et bonum* [v. g. *furari* ex libidine]. — Pro *malum in se* Vat. *malum poenae.*

en: The holy Doctor speaks similarly in I Sent., d. 47, q. 4: "For there is something evil in itself, [and] something evil according to itself. The evil-in-itself can be done well" [e.g. *to steal*, i.e. to take another's property secretly, if God transfers the ownership]; "the evil-according-to-itself can in no way be done well; rather, to understand this, that it be done well, is to understand that the same thing be evil and good" [e.g. *to steal* out of lust]. — For *malum in se* the Vatican edition [reads] *malum poenae* (an evil of punishment).

la: Codd. K bb *incarnari.*

en: Codices K bb: *incarnari* (to be incarnate).

la: Petr. Hispan., *Summul.* tr. *de Loc. topic.*, ubi de loco *a toto* agit, dicit: « *Totum universale*, ut hic sumitur, est quodlibet superius et substantiale sumtum ad suum inferius, ut animal ad hominem... *Pars subiectiva* dicitur quodlibet inferius sub toto universali sumtum. Locus *a toto universali* sive *a genere*... est semper *destructivus* praedicando totum... Maxima: a quocumque removetur genus sive totum universale, ab eodem removetur species sive pars subiectiva. Locus *a specie* sive *a parte subiectiva* est habitudo ipsius ad suum genus sive ad suum totum universale; et est semper *constructivus* et continet duo argumenta et duas maximas... Maxima (1): Quidquid praedicatur de specie vel de parte subiectiva, hoc etiam praedicatur de genere sive de toto universali..; Maxima (2): De quocumque praedicatur species sive pars subiectiva, de eodem praedicatur genus sive totum universale ». Quae regulae nituntur in eo quod Aristot., IV. *Topic.* c. I. seqq., de relatione generis ad speciem docet, v. g. quod species quidem participent genera, genera autem non participent species; quod nullum superiorum participet aliquod inferiorum etc.

en: Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract *On the Topical Places*, where he treats of the place *from the whole*, says: "*The universal whole*, as it is here taken, is anything higher and substantial taken in relation to its lower, as animal to man... *The subjective part* is called anything lower taken under the universal whole. The place *from the universal whole* or *from the genus*... is always *destructive* in predicating the whole... Maxim: from whatever the genus or universal whole is removed, from the same the species or subjective part is removed. The place *from the species* or *from the subjective part* is its relation to its genus or to its universal whole; and it is always *constructive* and contains two arguments and two maxims... Maxim (1): Whatever is predicated of the species or of the subjective part, this is also predicated of the genus or of the universal whole; Maxim (2): Of whatever the species or subjective part is predicated, of the same the genus or universal whole is predicated." These rules rest on what Aristotle teaches in *Topics* IV, c. I ff., concerning the relation of genus to species, e.g. that species indeed participate in genera, but genera do not participate in species; that none of the higher participates in any of the lower, etc.

la: Quaest. 1. et 3. — Paulo inferius pro *tamen minus* codd. A E G H N T U aa *quod minus* (plures codd. *unus* pro *minus*), edd. *tamen non plus.*

en: Questions 1 and 3. — A little below, for *tamen minus* the codices A E G H N T U aa [read] *quod minus* (several codices [read] *unus* for *minus*), the editions [read] *tamen non plus.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.16–18 (PDF 38–40; offset pdf = printed + 22), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 1787–1910) as base for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing. The Respondeo, replies, and all footers were verified column-by-column against the crops (Vol II/III PDF-priority override). Literal English, paragraph-for-paragraph. **19-entry apparatus.** This is the **LAST question of ARTICULUS I**.

**Alignment result: PASS.** Opener = `Quarto quaeritur, utrum quaelibet trium personarum possit incarnari per se ipsam. Et quod sic, videtur.` = TRACTATIO q4 (*Quarto quaeritur … incarnari per se ipsam*). No q-swap. (Note: the TRACTATIO listed *potuerit*; the body prints *possit* — same question, minor mood variance; title_la follows the TRACTATIO/INDEX wording *potuerit*.)

**Scholion disposition: NONE.** On the PDF crops, q4's last reply (reply 4) ends grammatically complete at `…propterea illa ratio non concludit⁷.` (p.18 R-col), and the **very next printed line is `ARTICULUS II.`** — no `SCHOLION` block prints for q4. (The earlier over-claim that a1-q1's Scholion "covers q2/q3/q4" was already corrected at q3, which carried its own scholion; q4, however, genuinely has none. Confirmed: p.18 footer 7 `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` is a *forward-reference belonging to the ART. II opener*, not a q4 scholion.) Set `has_scholion: false`.

**Page-split / running heads.** p.16 `… SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (R-col head trimmed in crop); p.17 `DIST. I. ART. I. QUAEST. IV. 17`; p.18 `18 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` The QUAESTIO IV heading prints at the bottom of p.16 L-col; the opener + fund. 1–2 run down p.16 R-col; fund. 3–4 + Sed contra 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo span p.17; the Respondeo tail + replies 1–4 finish on p.18 (L-col → R-col), immediately followed by ARTICULUS II.

**Footer split (per-page restart, continuous unique slugs 1–19).**
- **p.16 footers 5–6 INHERITED from the q3→q4 boundary** (q3 consumed p.16 f.1–4 as its `[^15]`–`[^18]`): f.5 = `Pro et (Vat. etiam)… in` → `[^1]` (anchors fund-1 `quod et⁵`); f.6 = `Cfr. Ioan. 5, 19. seqq.` → `[^2]` (anchors fund-2 `a Patre⁶`). Both verified against the p.16 R-col footer band.
- **p.17 footers 1–10 → `[^3]`–`[^12]`** (anchors: ³*faciendam* ⁴*eo ipso quo* ⁵*Cur Deus homo* ⁶*Augustinus* ⁷*alteri convenire* ⁸*praecedentibus* [Sed-contra-4] ⁹*dicerentur* ¹⁰*nativitatem* ¹¹*incarnaretur* ¹²*infra*). Footer 6 (`Quaest. 1, 2`-style note `sed altera persona alteram naturam assumsit…`) **wraps from the L-col foot to the R-col foot** — the wrap tail (`Spiritus sanctus naturam columbae… A destructione consequentis ad destructionem antecedentis.`) was joined into `[^8]`. The OCR's stray alphabetic `a Anselm…` footer = the printed numbered footer **9** (no separate lettered footer exists).
- **p.18 footers 1–7 → `[^13]`–`[^19]`** (anchors: ¹³*in littera* ¹⁴*eam* ¹⁵*secundum se malum* ¹⁶*incarnatio* ¹⁷*destruendo* ¹⁸*praecedentibus* [reply-4] ¹⁹*concludit*). **p.18 footer 8** (`Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 dignitatem… congruitatem`) anchors the ART. II opener `congruitatem⁸` and is therefore **OUT OF SCOPE — FORWARDED to d1-a2-q1**, omitted here rather than rendered anchorless.

**Marker pairing: 19 La = 19 En = 19 defs, 0 anchorless / 0 defless.**

**Incoming hand-off (picked up):** p.16 footers 5–6 (the only shared-page footers at the q3→q4 seam) rendered as q4's `[^1]`–`[^2]`. q4's opening (`Quarto quaeritur…`) is grammatically continuous after q3's Scholion III tail (`…Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.`, p.16 R-col, raw ~1786).

**Forward hand-off → `bon-sent-III-d1-a2-q1`:** q4 ends grammatically complete at `…illa ratio non concludit⁷.` (p.18 R-col, raw ~1910). `ARTICULUS II.` (subtitle *De incarnatione Verbi quantum ad congruitatem*; opener `Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de incarnatione Verbi quantum ad congruitatem⁸. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.` + the four-question list `Primo … utrum in opere incarnationis servetur debita congruentia / Secundo, quae sit incarnationis ratio praecipua / Tertio, quae sit personarum trium ad incarnationem magis idonea / Quarto … quae hora temporis magis fuerit congrua`) begins raw ~1911, printed p.18 bottom L-col → p.19. The short ART. II opener **FOLDS INTO d1-a2-q1** (no standalone articulus chunk). `QUAESTIO I. Utrum in opere incarnationis servetur debita congruentia ex parte Dei.` (opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in opere incarnationis servetur debita congruentia ex parte Dei. Et quod sic, videtur.` fund-1 `Infinita potentia, sapientia et bonitas debet se perfecte manifestare…`) begins raw ~1944, printed p.19. **FOOTER SPLIT forwarded:** p.18 footer **8** (`Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 dignitatem, sed supra in principio dist. recte habent congruitatem.`) belongs to a2-q1 (anchors the ART. II opener `congruitatem⁸`); the long p.18 footer **5** (Petr. Hispan. topic note) is q4's `[^17]`, fully consumed here. **ART. II scholion check:** p.18 footer 7 = `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` — verify in a2-q1 whether the ART. II scholion prints as `pro quaest. seq.` (i.e. whether a2-q1 carries a scholion forwarding to the next question) per the locked Vol II convention.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0