title: Dist. 38

title_alt:
De triplici genere mendacii
On the threefold kind of lying

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVIII.

#### Cap. I. — *De triplici genere mendacii.*

Sciendum est tamen, tria esse genera mendaciorum. Sunt enim mendacia quaedam pro salute vel commodo alicuius, non malitia, sed benignitate dicta, qualiter obstetrices mentitae sunt et Raab[^1]. — Est et aliud mendacii genus, quod fit ioco, quod non fallit. Scit enim cui dicitur, causa ioci dici. Et haec duo genera mendaciorum non sunt sine culpa, sed non cum magna. Perfectis vero non convenit mentiri, nec etiam pro

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temporali vita alicuius, ne pro corpore alterius animam suam occultent. Licet autem eis verum tacere, sed non falsum dicere, ut si quis non vult hominem ad mortem prodere, verum taceat, sed non falsum dicat. — Tertium vero genus mendacii est, quod ex malignitate et duplicitate procedit[^2], cunctis valde cavendum. — His innui videtur, mendacia illa, quae fiunt ioco, vel pro salute alicuius, imperfectis esse venialia peccata, perfectis vero illud quod pro commodo alterius dicitur, esse damnabile; quod etiam de mendacio iocoso putari potest, praecipue si iteretur. — De mendacio autem obstetricum et Raab, quod fuerit veniale, Augustinus[^3] tradit dicens: « Forsitan, sicut obstetrices non remuneratae sunt, quia mentitae sunt, sed quia infantes liberaverunt, et propter hanc misericordiam veniale fuit peccatum, non tamen nullum; sic Raab liberata est propter liberationem exploratorum, pro qua fuit veniale peccatum. Sed ne putet quisque, in ceteris peccatis, si propter liberationem hominum fiant, ita posse concedi veniam. Multa enim mala detestanda talem sequuntur errorem ». « Possumus enim et furando alicui prodesse, si pauper, cui datur, sentit commodum, et dives, cui tollitur, non sentit incommodum; ita et adulterando possumus, si aliqua, nisi ad hoc ei consentiatur, appareat amando moritura, et si vixerit, poenitendo purganda. Nec ideo peccatum grave negabitur tale adulterium ». — « In his autem tanto minus peccat quisque, cum mentitur, quanto magis a primo recedit. Quisquis vero aliquod genus esse mendacii, quod peccatum non sit, putaverit, decipiet se ipsum turpiter, cum honestum esse deceptorem aliorum arbitretur[^5] ». — Omne ergo genus mendacii summopere fuge, quia omne mendacium non est a Deo.

#### Cap. II. — *De octo speciebus mendacii.*

Sciendum est etiam, octo esse genera mendacii, ut Augustinus in libro de Mendacio[^4] tradit, quae diligenter notanda sunt, ut appareat, quod mendacium sit veniale, et quod damnabile. « Primum capitale est mendacium longeque fugiendum, quod fit in doctrina religionis, ad quod nulla causa quisquam debet adduci. — Secundum, quod tale est, ut nulli prosit et obsit alicui. — Tertium, quod ita prodest alicui, ut obsit alteri. — Quartum, sola mentiendi fallendique libidine, quod merum mendacium est. — Quintum, quod fit placendi cupiditate de suaviloquio. — His omnibus evitatis, sequitur sextum genus, quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui, ut si quis pecuniam alicuius iniuste tollendam sciens, ubi sit, nescire se mentiatur. — Septimum, quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui, ut si quis, nolens hominem ad mortem quaesitum prodere, mentiatur. — Octavum, quod nulli obest et ad hoc prodest, ut ab immunditia corporali aliquem tueatur ».

#### Cap. III. — *Quid sit mendacium.*

Hic videndum est, quid sit mendacium, et quid sit mentiri; deinde, utrum omne mendacium sit peccatum, et quare. — « Mendacium est, ut ait Augustinus[^6], falsa significatio vocis cum intentione fallendi ». Ut ergo mendacium sit, necesse est, ut falsum proferatur et cum intentione fallendi. « Hoc enim malum est proprium mentientis, aliud habere clausum in pectore, aliud promptum in lingua ».

#### Cap. IV. — *Quid sit mentiri.*

Mentiri vero est loqui contra hoc quod animo sentit quis, sive illud verum sit, sive non. Omnis ergo, qui loquitur mendacium, mentitur, quia loquitur contra hoc quod animo sentit, id est voluntate fallendi; sed non omnis qui mentitur, mendacium dicit, quia quod verum est loquitur aliquando mentiendo, sicut e converso falsum dicendo aliquando verax est. Unde ait Augustinus[^7]: « Nemo sane mentiens iudicandus est, qui dicit falsum, quod putat verum, quia, quantum in ipso est, non fallit ipse, sed fallitur. Non igitur mendacii arguendus est qui falsa incautius credit ac pro veris habet; potiusque e contrario ille mentitur, qui dicit verum, quod putat falsum. Quantum enim ad animum eius attinet, non verum dicit, quia non quod sentit dicit, quamvis verum inveniatur esse quod dicit. Nec ille liber est a mendacio, qui ore nesciens loquitur verum, sciens autem voluntate mentitur ».

Hic quaeri solet, si Iudaeus dicat, Christum esse Deum, cum non ita sentiat animo, utrum loquatur mendacium. Non est mendacium quod dicit, quia, licet aliter teneat animo, verum est tamen quod dicit; et ideo non est mendacium; mentitur tamen, illud quod verum est dicens. — Quod vero omne mendacium sit peccatum, Augustinus[^8] insinuat. « Mihi, inquit, videtur omne mendacium esse peccatum. Sed multum

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interest, quo animo, et de quibus rebus quisque mentiatur. Non enim sic peccat qui consulendi, ut qui nocendi voluntate mentitur; nec tantum nocet qui viatorem mentiendo in diverso itinere mittit, quantum qui viam vitae mendacio depravat ».

#### Cap. V. — *Quod omne mendacium peccatum sit, sive prosit, sive non, et quare.*

« Porro omne mendacium ideo dicendum est esse peccatum, quia hoc debet loqui homo, quod animo gerit, sive illud verum sit, sive putetur, et non sit. Verba enim ideo sunt instituta, non ut per ea homines invicem fallant, sed ut per ea in alterius notitiam suas cogitationes ferant. Verbis ergo uti ad fallaciam, non ad quod sunt instituta, peccatum est. — Nec etiam ideo ullum mendacium putandum est non esse peccatum, quia possumus alicui aliquando prodesse mentiendo. Possumus enim, ut praedictum est, et furando et adulterando prodesse ». « Mendacium quoque non tunc tantum esse, possumus dicere, quando aliquis laeditur. Cum enim a sciente dicitur falsum, mendacium est, sive quis sive nemo laedatur[^9] ». — Ecce ex his constat, omne mendacium esse peccatum. Non tamen de omni mendacio accipiendum est illud: *Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium*; nec illud: *Os, quod mentitur, occidit animam*; nec omne mendacium isto praecepto prohiberi videtur, nec praemissa descriptione mendacium ioci includi.

#### Cap. VI. — *In quibus rebus cum periculo erratur, vel non.*

Illud etiam sciendum est, quod « in quibusdam rebus magno malo, in quibusdam parvo, in quibusdam nullo fallimur[^10] ». « In quibus rebus nihil interest ad capessendum Dei regnum, utrum credantur, an non, vel utrum vera putentur, an falsa, sive sint, sive non; in his errare, id est aliud pro alio putare, non arbitrandum est esse peccatum; vel si est, minimum atque levissimum ». « Et sunt vera, quamvis non videantur, quae nisi credantur, ad vitam aeternam non potest perveniri ». « Et licet error maxima cura cavendus sit non modo in maioribus, sed etiam in minoribus rebus, nec nisi rerum ignorantia possit errari; non est tamen consequens, ut continuo erret, quisquis aliquid nescit, sed quisquis se existimat scire quod nescit. Pro vero enim approbat falsum, quod est erroris proprium. Verumtamen, in qua re quisquis erret, interest plurimum. Sunt enim quae nescire sit melius quam scire. Item, nonnullis errare profuit aliquando, sed in via pedum, non in via morum ».

Solet quaeri de Iacob, qui se dixit esse Esau, aliter animo sentiens, utrum mentitus sit. De hoc Augustinus[^11] ait: « Iacob quod matre fecit auctore, ut falleret patrem, si diligenter attendatur, videtur non esse mendacium, sed mysterium ». Intendebat enim matri obedire, quae per Spiritum noverat mysterium. Et ideo propter familiare consilium Spiritus sancti, quod mater acceperat, a mendacio excusatur Iacob.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. They are the editors' *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* (the apparatus on the Master's text), numbered continuously here though the printed edition restarts the numbering on each page.

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

#### Chap. I. — *On the threefold kind of lying.*

It must be known, nevertheless, that there are three kinds of lie. For there are certain lies told for the welfare or advantage of someone, spoken not from malice but from kindness, in the manner in which the midwives lied, and Rahab[^1]. — And there is another kind of lie, which is done in jest, which does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it is said for the sake of a jest. And these two kinds of lie are not without fault, but not with a great one. But to the perfect it is not fitting to lie, not even for

the temporal life of someone, lest for the sake of another's body they should conceal their own soul. Yet it is permitted to them to be silent about the truth, but not to speak a falsehood, so that if someone does not wish to betray a man to death, he may keep silent about the truth, but not speak a falsehood. — But the third kind of lie is that which proceeds[^2] from malice and duplicity, greatly to be avoided by all. — By this it seems to be intimated that those lies which are done in jest, or for the welfare of someone, are venial sins for the imperfect, but that for the perfect that lie which is told for the advantage of another is damnable; which can also be thought of the jesting lie, especially if it is repeated. — But concerning the lie of the midwives and of Rahab, that it was venial, Augustine[^3] hands down, saying: « Perhaps, just as the midwives were not rewarded because they lied, but because they delivered the infants, and on account of this mercy the sin was venial, yet not nothing; so Rahab was delivered on account of the deliverance of the spies, for which it was a venial sin. But let no one suppose, in the other sins, that if they are done for the deliverance of men, pardon can thus be granted. For many detestable evils follow such an error ». « For we can also by stealing benefit someone, if the poor man to whom it is given perceives the advantage, and the rich man from whom it is taken does not perceive the disadvantage; so also by committing adultery we can, if some woman, unless this be consented to her, appears about to die from love, and, if she lives, to be purged by repenting. Nor on that account will so grave a sin as such adultery be denied ». — « But in these matters each one sins so much the less, when he lies, the more he withdraws from the first. But whoever shall have supposed that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin will deceive himself basely, since he reckons it honorable to be a deceiver of others[^5] ». — Therefore flee with all your might every kind of lie, because every lie is not from God.

#### Chap. II. — *On the eight species of lying.*

It must also be known that there are eight kinds of lie, as Augustine hands down in the book *On Lying*[^4], which are to be diligently noted, so that it may appear which lie is venial and which damnable. « The first is the capital lie, far to be fled, which is done in the teaching of religion, to which no cause ought anyone to be led. — The second, which is such that it profits no one and harms someone. — The third, which so profits someone that it harms another. — The fourth, by the mere lust of lying and deceiving, which is a pure lie. — The fifth, which is done from a desire of pleasing by smooth speech. — When all these have been avoided, there follows the sixth kind, which both harms no one and profits someone, as if someone, knowing where the money of another unjustly to be taken away is, should lie that he does not know. — The seventh, which both harms no one and profits someone, as if someone, unwilling to betray a man sought for death, should lie. — The eighth, which harms no one and is for this profitable, that it may protect someone from bodily defilement ».

#### Chap. III. — *What a lie is.*

Here it must be seen what a lie is, and what it is to lie; then, whether every lie is a sin, and why. — « A lie is, as Augustine[^6] says, a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving ». In order, therefore, that there be a lie, it is necessary that a falsehood be uttered and with the intention of deceiving. « For this is the evil proper to the one lying: to have one thing closed up in the breast, another ready on the tongue ».

#### Chap. IV. — *What it is to lie.*

But to lie is to speak against that which one feels in the mind, whether that be true or not. Everyone, therefore, who speaks a lie, lies, because he speaks against that which he feels in the mind, that is, with the will of deceiving; but not everyone who lies speaks a lie, because he sometimes speaks what is true while lying, just as conversely he is sometimes truthful by speaking what is false. Whence Augustine[^7] says: « No one indeed is to be judged a liar who says what is false which he thinks true, because, as far as in him lies, he himself does not deceive, but is deceived. He is not therefore to be accused of a lie who too incautiously believes what is false and holds it for true; and rather, on the contrary, that man lies who speaks what is true which he thinks false. For as far as concerns his mind, he does not speak the truth, because he does not say what he feels, although what he says is found to be true. Nor is that man free from a lie who unknowingly speaks the truth with his mouth, but knowingly lies in his will ».

Here it is wont to be asked, if a Jew should say that Christ is God, while he does not so feel in his mind, whether he speaks a lie. What he says is not a lie, because, although he holds otherwise in his mind, yet what he says is true; and therefore it is not a lie; yet he lies, in saying that which is true. — But that every lie is a sin, Augustine[^8] suggests. « To me, he says, every lie seems to be a sin. But it matters much

with what mind, and concerning what matters, each one lies. For he does not sin in the same way who lies with the will of counseling as he who lies with the will of harming; nor does he harm as much who by lying sends a traveler onto a different road, as he who depraves the way of life by a lie ».

#### Chap. V. — *That every lie is a sin, whether it profits or not, and why.*

« Furthermore, every lie is for this reason to be said to be a sin, because a man ought to speak that which he bears in his mind, whether that be true, or be thought true, and is not. For words were instituted for this, not that by them men should deceive one another, but that by them they should carry their thoughts into the knowledge of another. To use words, therefore, for deception, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin. — Nor for this reason is any lie to be thought not to be a sin, because we can sometimes profit someone by lying. For we can, as has been said before, profit also by stealing and by committing adultery ». « We can also say that a lie is not only then [a lie] when someone is harmed. For when a falsehood is spoken by one who knows, it is a lie, whether anyone or no one be harmed[^9] ». — Behold, from these things it is established that every lie is a sin. Yet not of every lie is that to be understood: *Thou shalt destroy all that speak a lie*; nor that: *The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul*; nor does every lie seem to be prohibited by that precept, nor, by the description set forth above, is the lie of jest included.

#### Chap. VI. — *In what matters one errs with danger, or not.*

This too must be known, that « in some matters we are deceived with great evil, in some with small, in some with none[^10] ». « In which matters it makes no difference for the attaining of the kingdom of God, whether they be believed or not, or whether they be thought true or false, whether they be so or not; to err in these, that is, to suppose one thing for another, is not to be reckoned a sin; or if it is, the least and lightest. — And there are things true, although they do not appear so, which unless they be believed, one cannot attain to eternal life ». « And although error is to be avoided with the greatest care, not only in greater but also in lesser matters, nor can one err except through ignorance of things; nevertheless it is not consequent that he should at once err, whoever does not know something, but whoever supposes himself to know what he does not know. For he approves the false for the true, which is proper to error. Yet, in what matter each one may err, it matters very much. For there are things which it is better not to know than to know. Likewise, to some it has at some time profited to err, but in the way of the feet, not in the way of morals ».

It is wont to be asked concerning Jacob, who said that he was Esau, while feeling otherwise in his mind, whether he lied. Concerning this Augustine[^11] says: « Jacob, in what he did with his mother as the prompter, that he might deceive his father, if it be diligently attended to, seems not to be a lie, but a mystery ». For he intended to obey his mother, who through the Spirit knew the mystery. And therefore, on account of the intimate counsel of the Holy Spirit, which his mother had received, Jacob is excused from a lie.

la: De obstetricibus illis cfr. Exod. 1, 19; de Raab Ios. 2, 4; ad rem August., Enarrat. in Ps. 5. n. 7.

en: Concerning those midwives, cf. Exod. 1:19; concerning Rahab, Joshua 2:4; on the matter, Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms*, on Ps. 5, n. 7.

la: Codd. et edd. 2, 3, 7 prodit.

en: Codices and editions 2, 3, 7 read *prodit* [comes forth].

la: Libr. III. Quaestion. in Pentateuch. (in Levit.) q. 68. — Codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt *est* post *liberata*, refragante originali. — Seq. locus est eiusdem, Enchirid. c. 22. n. 7, in quo loco post *adulterando possumus* cum codd. et originali omisimus *prodesse*, quod subiungunt edd.

en: Book III of the *Questions on the Pentateuch* (on Leviticus), q. 68. — Codices and editions 1, 8 omit *est* after *liberata*, the original being to the contrary. — The following passage is from the same author, *Enchiridion* c. 22, n. 7, in which place, after *adulterando possumus*, we have, with the codices and the original, omitted *prodesse*, which the editions subjoin.

la: Cap. 14. n. 25. Cfr. de hoc et seqq. Gratian., C. *Primum* c. 22. q. 2. — Pro *prodest alicui*, quod habent codd. B C et edd. 1, 8, cod. D *prodest uni*, in aliis *prodest alteri*. Deinde pro *merum mendacium* codd. et plurimae edd. et ipse Gratian. perperam *mirum mendacium*.

en: Chap. 14, n. 25. Cf. on this and what follows Gratian, the canon *Primum*, c. 22, q. 2. — For *prodest alicui* [profits someone], which codices B C and editions 1, 8 have, codex D reads *prodest uni* [profits one], in others *prodest alteri* [profits another]. Then for *merum mendacium* [a pure lie] the codices and most editions and Gratian himself wrongly read *mirum mendacium* [a wondrous lie].

la: Loc. cit. c. 21. n. 42, ubi in originali ante *deceptorem* ponitur *se* pro *esse*.

en: The place cited, c. 21, n. 42, where in the original *se* is placed before *deceptorem* in place of *esse*.

la: Contra Mendacium ad Consentium, c. 12. n. 28. Seq. locus est eiusd. in Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6. — Pro *in pectore* codd. B C et edd., exceptis 1, 8, *in corde*, refragante originali.

en: *Against Lying, to Consentius*, c. 12, n. 28. The following passage is from the same author in the *Enchiridion* c. 18, n. 6. — For *in pectore* [in the breast] codices B C and the editions, except 1, 8, read *in corde* [in the heart], the original being to the contrary.

la: Loc. cit., Enchirid. parum superius. — Pro *incautius* Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *incautus*, refragante etiam originali.

en: The place cited, *Enchiridion*, a little above. — For *incautius* [too incautiously] the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 read *incautus* [incautious], the original being likewise to the contrary.

la: Loc. cit. Enchirid. — Quaestio de Iudaeo sumta est ex Hugone a S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. 4. c. 5. — Pro *diverso itinere* sola ed. 8 rectius *diversa itinera*; August. *diversum iter*. — Seq. locus (in c. 5.) Enchirid. c. 22. n. 7.

en: The place cited, *Enchiridion*. — The question concerning the Jew is taken from Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 4, c. 5. — For *diverso itinere* edition 8 alone reads more correctly *diversa itinera*; Augustine [reads] *diversum iter*. — The following passage (in c. 5) is *Enchiridion* c. 22, n. 7.

la: August., III. Quaestion. in Pentateuch. (in Levit.) q. 68. — Infra loci Scripturae sunt Ps. 5, 7; Sap. 1, 11.

en: Augustine, Book III of the *Questions on the Pentateuch* (on Leviticus), q. 68. — The scriptural passages below are Ps. 5:7; Wisdom 1:11.

la: August., Enchirid. c. 19. n. 6; secundus locus ibid. c. 21. n. 7; tertius ibid. c. 20. n. 7; quartus ibid. c. 17. n. 5.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 19, n. 6; the second passage, ibid. c. 21, n. 7; the third, ibid. c. 20, n. 7; the fourth, ibid. c. 17, n. 5.

la: Contra Mendac. ad Consent. c. 10. n. 24; cfr. Gen. 27, 19. seqq. — Superius post *solet* edd. plurimae addunt *etiam*.

en: *Against Lying, to Consentius*, c. 10, n. 24; cf. Gen. 27:19 ff. — Above, after *solet*, most editions add *etiam*.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Littera Magistri (Peter Lombard's text) for DISTINCTIO XXXVIII, Cap. I–VI, on the threefold kind of lying (officiosum / iocosum / perniciosum), the eight species of lying (Augustine, *de Mendacio*), the definitions of *mendacium* and *mentiri*, the universal sinfulness of lying (Augustine, *contra Mendacium* / *Enchiridion*), and the Jacob-Esau *mysterium non mendacium* discussion. Re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{836,837,838}-{L,R}-*.png`); OCR base from raw lines **58033–58169** of `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`.
- **Page-split map.** Opens at the BOTTOM of **p.836** (PDF 858), in BOTH columns beneath the d37-dubia (Dub. VIII) tail: Cap. I starts at the bottom of the L-col (`Sciendum est tamen…`) and continues at the bottom of the R-col (`…modo alicuius, non malitia, sed benignitate dicta…`). Cap. I continues + Cap. II (De octo speciebus) on **p.837** L-col; Cap. III + Cap. IV + Quaestio de Iudaeo + start of *Quod omne mendacium peccatum* on **p.837** R-col. Cap. IV tail + Cap. V on **p.838** L-col; Cap. VI + Jacob/Esau *mysterium* on **p.838** R-col, ending `…a mendacio excusatur Iacob.` Reflowed in logical chapter order Cap. I→VI (the two-column print interleaves the chapters).
- **Forward bound.** Stops immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII` (raw **58170**, p.838 R-col, mid-page) = Bonaventure's commentary, which is the scaffolded `d38-divisio` material, NOT part of this littera.
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- **`has_scholion: false`** — grep-verified NO `SCHOLI`/`SOHOLI`/`SCHOLIOK`/`SOHOLIOK`/`SOHOLIO` header in raw 58033–58169.
- **No `[?]` flags** — pp.836–838 legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 38, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVIII — De mendacio

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXVIII — On lying

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII.
### *De mendacio.*

*Sciendum tamen, tria esse genera mendaciorum etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below; each entry gives the Latin apparatus note (**La.**) followed by an English rendering (**En.**).

Supra egit Magister de expositione mandatorum, in hac vero parte intendit agere de obliquitatibus, quae illis mandatis opponuntur et per illa prohibentur. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas. In quarum prima determinat de mendacio. In secunda de periurio, ibi[^1]: *Nunc de periurio videamus.*

Prima autem pars, in qua agit de mendacio, dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima determinat de speciebus et differentiis mendacii. In secunda determinat, quid sit mendacium, et quid mentiri, ibi: *Hic videndum est, quid sit mendacium*[^2]. In tertia vero determinat de his quae ad mendacium consequuntur, ibi: *Illud etiam sciendum, quod in quibusdam rebus etc.*

Prima pars dividitur in partes duas. In quarum prima ponit trimembrem divisionem mendacii. In secunda vero subiungit aliam divisionem octo membrorum, ibi: *Sciendum est etiam, octo esse genera mendacii.*

Similiter secunda pars principalis dividitur in duas. In quarum prima determinat Magister, quid sit mendacium, et quid mentiri secundum rem. In secunda vero determinat, quid sit secundum vitii deformitatem, ibi: *Quod vero omne mendacium sit peccatum etc.*

Similiter tertia pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima ostendit, quod non omnis deceptio est aequalis periculi[^3]. In secunda vero inquirit, utrum Iacob mentitus fuerit, ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri de Iacob etc.*

<!-- page 839 -->

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis possunt sex breviter quaeri.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit omni[^4] mendacio esse falsum.

*Secundo* quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse peccatum.

*Tertio* quaeritur, utrum mendacium sit peccatum mortale ratione sui generis.

*Quarto* quaeritur, utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis.

*Quinto* quaeritur de numero mendaciorum.

*Sexto et ultimo* quaeritur de gradibus eorundem.

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.
### *De mendacio.*

english:
<!-- page 838 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII.
### *On lying.*

*Nevertheless it must be known that there are three kinds of lies, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry gives the Latin apparatus note (**La.**) followed by an English rendering (**En.**).

Above, the Master treated of the exposition of the commandments, but in this part he intends to treat of the obliquities which are opposed to those commandments and prohibited by them. Now this part is divided into two. In the first of these he determines concerning lying. In the second, concerning perjury, there[^1]: *Now let us consider perjury.*

But the first part, in which he treats of lying, is divided into three parts. In the first of these he determines concerning the species and differences of lying. In the second he determines what lying is, and what it is to lie, there: *Here it must be seen what lying is*[^2]. But in the third he determines concerning those things which follow upon lying, there: *That also must be known, that in certain matters, etc.*

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he sets down a threefold division of lying. But in the second he adds another division of eight members, there: *It must be known also that there are eight kinds of lying.*

Likewise the second principal part is divided into two. In the first of these the Master determines what lying is, and what it is to lie according to the thing itself. But in the second he determines what it is according to the deformity of the vice, there: *That every lie is a sin, etc.*

Likewise the third part is divided into two. In the first of these he shows that not every deception is of equal peril[^3]. But in the second he inquires whether Jacob lied, there: *It is also wont to be asked concerning Jacob, etc.*

<!-- page 839 -->

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part six things can be briefly asked.

*First*, it is asked whether it is essential to every[^4] lie to be false.

*Second*, it is asked whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin.

*Third*, it is asked whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind.

*Fourth*, it is asked whether every lie is mortal for perfect men.

*Fifth*, it is asked concerning the number of lies.

*Sixth and last*, it is asked concerning the degrees of the same.

### SOLE ARTICLE.
### *On lying.*

la: Scilicet infra d. XXXIX.

en: That is, below, d. 39.

la: Edd. *ibi: Mentiri vero est.*

en: The editions read *there: But to lie is.*

la: Vat. *peccati.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *of sin* (i.e., "not every deception is of equal sin," for *periculi*, "of peril").

la: Cod. K omittit *omni,* quod econtra Vat. paulo inferius adiungit.

en: Codex K omits *omni* (« every »), which on the contrary the Vatican edition adds a little lower down.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed **pp.838–839** (PDF 860–861; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` 58170–58216). Running head `DIST. XXXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 839` confirmed at the p.838→839 break (raw 58195 area; trust running-head TEXT over OCR'd digits). Vol III two-column; PDF-priority inversion applies, but the COMMENTARIUS/DIVISIO/TRACTATIO band is clean in OCR and the PDF read confirmed it 1:1.

**Page-split map.** The divisio opens at the **bottom of p.838** beneath the d38-littera Cap. VI Jacob/Esau tail (both columns), spanning both columns: `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII` header (raw 58170) → DIVISIO TEXTUS (raw 58175) → its NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band (p.838, nn.1–3). The break to **p.839** falls between the DIVISIO TEXTUS and the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (running head `DIST. XXXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 839`). On p.839: TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw 58204, six questions) → ARTICULUS UNICUS *De mendacio* opener (raw 58213). Bounded forward at `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 58217), whose body (`Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur…`, raw 58218) is **a1-q1**. The QUAESTIO I header/title (*Utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum*) and body fold into a1-q1 per the divisio-chunk convention.

**Apparatus = p.838 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band (3 notes) + p.839 L-col n.1 (1 note), per-page restart, 4 notes total → [^1]–[^4].** The COMMENTARIUS opens its OWN fresh *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* band on p.838 (R-col footer, nn.1–3), distinct from d38-littera's *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* band (which closed at p.838 n.3 = the littera's [^11] in the L-col footer). The 3 p.838 notes key to the DIVISIO TEXTUS markers `de periurio, ibi ¹` (n.1 *Scilicet infra d. XXXIX.*), `quid sit mendacium ²` (n.2 *Edd. ibi: Mentiri vero est.*), `aequalis periculi ³` (n.3 *Vat. peccati.*). **[^4] = p.839 L-col n.1** (`Cod. K omittit omni, quod econtra Vat. paulo inferius adiungit`), anchored on *omni* in the TRACTATIO's first question (`utrum essentiale sit omni¹ mendacio esse falsum`) — **backfilled at the d.31–d.40 decade polish** (600 dpi p.839 L-col, PDF 861). The earlier note here that "p.839 carries NO footer markers" was wrong: p.839 L-col n.1 is divisio's (the *omni* note); p.839 nn.2–8 are a1-q1's (a1-q1's [^1] = p.839 n.2). Marker pairing 4/4.

**Footer hand-off.** Picked up NOTHING from d38-littera (its *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* band closed at p.838 n.3 = [^11]; the COMMENTARIUS opens its own separate *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* band on the same page). **Forwarded → a1-q1: p.839 nn.2–8** (a1-q1 begins its band at p.839 n.2 = its [^1]). This chunk owns p.838 nn.1–3 ([^1]–[^3]) AND **p.839 L-col n.1** ([^4], the *omni* note) — the latter keys to the TRACTATIO line at the top of p.839, above the QUAESTIO I body.

**`has_scholion: false`** — no SCHOLION header in the divisio range (grep-verified raw 58170–58216; no SCHOLI/SOHOLI variant).

**`[?]` flags.** None. The one parked retro-fix — p.839 L-col n.1 (*omni*) under-capture — was **RESOLVED** at the d.31–d.40 decade polish (600 dpi p.839, PDF 861): added as [^4] anchored on *omni* in the TRACTATIO. See `manual-review/vol3-d31-d40-polish-resolution-log.md`. pp.838–839 otherwise legible at 450 dpi.

---

### ⭐ VERBATIM TRACTATIO ARTICLE + QUESTION FRAMING (for a1-q* alignment checks)

d.38 has a **SINGLE article** — *ARTICULUS UNICUS, De mendacio* (own header raw 58213, no separate *Consequenter quaeritur* opener; its six questions are pre-stated in the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM). The frame (TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM): *"Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis possunt sex breviter quaeri."* → **6 questions**:

> 1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit omni mendacio esse falsum.* → **a1-q1 (NEXT)** (`QUAESTIO I.` raw 58217, title *Utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum*; body opens `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum. Et quod sic, videtur` raw 58218)
> 2. *Secundo quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse peccatum.* → **a1-q2**
> 3. *Tertio quaeritur, utrum mendacium sit peccatum mortale ratione sui generis.* → **a1-q3**
> 4. *Quarto quaeritur, utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis.* → **a1-q4**
> 5. *Quinto quaeritur de numero mendaciorum.* → **a1-q5**
> 6. *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de gradibus eorundem.* → **a1-q6**

**Resolved d.38 slate:** littera(✅) · divisio(✅ this) · a1-q1 · a1-q2 · a1-q3 · a1-q4 · a1-q5 · a1-q6 · dubia.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

<!-- page 839 -->

### Articulus unicus. *De mendacio.*

### Quaestio I. *Utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse falsum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per definitionem mendacii, quam ponit Augustinus in libro de Mendacio[^1]: « Mendacium, inquit, est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi »: si ergo definitio et partes definitionis sunt essentiales definito: ergo essentiale est mendacio esse falsum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per illud quod dicit Augustinus, contra Mendacium[^2]: « Sicut lux opponitur tenebris, ita veritas opponitur mendacio »; sed tenebra, essentialiter loquendo, est privatio lucis: ergo mendacium est privatio veritatis. Sed veritatis privatio est falsitas: ergo a primo, essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse falsum.

3. Item, sicut se habent esse veracem et mendacem circa *hominem*, sic se habent circa *orationem*; sed ista duo sunt incompossibilia circa eundem hominem simul et semel, videlicet ipsum esse veracem et mendacem: ergo similiter erunt incompossibilia circa *sermonem*: ergo impossibile est, quod idem sermo sit simul verus et mendax[^3]. Si ergo mendacium non potest se compati cum veritate, videtur, quod inseparabiliter habeat sibi annexam falsitatem.

4. Item, omne verum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a Veritate prima[^4]; sed nullum mendacium est a Veritate prima: ergo nullum mendacium est verum. Et est verum, vel falsum: ergo essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse falsum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in libro de Mendacio[^5] dicit, quod « ille mentitur, qui dicit verum, quod putat esse falsum »; sed qui mentitur mendacium dicit: ergo aliquis dicendo verum facit mendacium: non ergo omne mendacium necessario est falsum.

2. Item, sicut verbum discordat ab intentione, cum quis negat illud quod novit, sic etiam discordat, quando affirmat illud quod ignorat et de quo dubitat[^6]; sed possibile est, aliquem affirmare aliquod verum, de quo dubitat; ponatur ergo, cum sit possibile; sed in tali affirmatione discordat sermo ab intentione loquentis: ergo est ibi vitium et peccatum. Sed non est nisi peccatum mendacii: ergo videtur, quod aliquid simul possit esse verum, et tamen nihilominus est mendacium.

3. Item, si intentio est recta, totum est rectum[^7]: ergo si intentio est mendax, totum est mendax; sed aliquis potest dicere dictum verum intentione mentiendi: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis dicendo verum sit mendax. Sed non est mendax nisi in illo dicto: ergo possibile est, dictum verum esse mendacium.

4. Item, sicut se habet peccatum ad bonitatem, ita se habet mendacium ad veritatem; sed qui facit aliquod bonum opus mala intentione committit peccatum[^8]:

<!-- page 840 -->

ergo similiter qui dicit verum fallendi intentione incurrit mendacium: ergo idem quod prius. Si dicas, secundum quod Magister videtur dicere in littera[^9], quod possibile est, aliquem dicere verum et mentiri, sed non est possibile, aliquod dictum esse verum et mendacium simul; videtur esse « oppositio in adiecto »: quia, sicut se habet peccans ad peccatum, sic se habet mentiens ad mendacium; sed omnis peccans peccatum committit: ergo omnis mentiens mendacium dicit: ergo si veritas dicti non repugnat actui mentiendi, non repugnat rationi ipsius mendacii.

### Conclusio.

> Licet sola intentio fallendi sufficiat ad hoc, ut quis dicatur mentiri, ad completam tamen mendacii rationem requiritur duplex falsitas, scilicet respectu intentionis et rei.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod dictum exterius prolatum comparatur ad intentionem dicentis et ad ipsam rem *significatam*; et secundum hoc sortitur dictum illud rationem duplicis falsitatis, vel veritatis. Nam per comparationem ad rem dicitur sermo verus, per comparationem autem ad intentionem dicentis dicitur verax[^10]. Sic etiam falsitas duplex est circa sermonem. Nam per comparationem ad rem, videlicet cum non est adaequatio rei et sermonis, dicitur sermo falsus; per comparationem vero ad intentionem dicentis, cum non est adaequatio sermonis et intentionis, dicitur sermo fallax sive mendax.

Quoniam igitur mendacium nominat ipsum dictum per comparationem ad rem et ad ipsum dicentem; hinc est, quod ad completam mendacii rationem duplex falsitas concurrit: una per comparationem ad rem, et altera per comparationem ad intentionem loquentis. Et hanc duplicem falsitatem tangit Augustinus in definitione mendacii, cum dicit: « Mendacium est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi ». Prima autem falsitas tenet in ipso mendacio rationem *materialis*; secunda vero rationem *formalis*, et ab illa secunda denominatur quis mendax. Propter hanc ergo duplicem comparationem, quam importat ipsum mendacium de ratione sui nominis, necesse est, ad eius completam rationem concurrere praedictam duplicem differentiam falsitatis. — *Mentiri* autem dicit actum per comparationem ad ipsum loquentem. Unde ad hoc, quod aliquis dicatur mentiri, sufficit falsitas, quae concurrit ex discordia vocis et intentionis; et hoc patet ex ipsa definitione vocabuli, quia *mentiri est contra mentem ire*[^11]. Contra mentem autem vadit non solum ille qui dicit falsum scienter, sed etiam qui dicit verum quod putat esse falsum. Unde minus importatur, cum dicimus, aliquem *mentiri*, quam quando dicimus, aliquem *dicere mendacium*. Quamvis enim intentio fallendi sufficiat ad hoc, ut aliquis dicatur mentiri; non tamen sufficit ad plenam rationem mendacii, secundum quod Magister dicit in littera[^12], et manifeste apparet ex ipsa notificatione Augustini et rationibus ad primam partem adductis.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod ille mentitur, qui dicit verum quod putat esse falsum; iam patet responsio: quia plura requiruntur ad perfectam rationem mendacii quam ad hoc, quod aliquis dicatur mentiri.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut verbum discordat ab intentione in eo qui asserit falsum, ita etiam in eo qui asserit dubium et incertum; dicendum, quod etsi sit ibi similitudo quantum ad discordiam *intentionis*, dissimilitudo tamen est quantum ad discordiam *sermonis et rei*, quia, cum asseritur falsum scienter, non tantummodo discordat sermo ab *intentione*, sed etiam discordat a *re*; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi in assertione falsi cogniti est mendacium, quod sit propter hoc in assertione veri incerti, nisi *secundum quid*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intentio recta totum rectificat, et obliqua totum falsificat; dicendum, quod etsi intentio obliqua totum dictum falsificet, non tamen falsificat secundum *omnem respectum*, sed[^13] secundum respectum, quem habet ad *dicentem*; et ille respectus non sufficit ad mendacii rationem, sicut tactum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui facit bonum mala intentione committit peccatum, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod bonum mala intentione factum non est *simpliciter* peccatum, sed peccatum *illi* qui facit, sicut, cum quis dat eleemosynam ex vana gloria, *dare eleemosynam* non est peccatum, sed *illi* qui mala intentione hoc facit. Sic etiam in proposito potest concedi. Et propterea ex hoc non habetur, quod veritas simul stet cum eo quod est mendacium *simpliciter*, sed solum cum eo quod est mendacium *secundum quid* sive *alicui*[^14]. — Aliter etiam posset dici, quod non est simile: quia peccatum

<!-- page 841 -->

dicit privationem *bonitatis*; bonitas autem dicit ordinationem in finem, quae quidem habet esse mediante recta *intentione*: et ideo, recta intentione sublata, cum simpliciter pereat ordinatio, *simpliciter* iudicabitur aliquid esse peccatum[^15]. Mendacium autem dicit privationem *veritatis*, quae quidem non tantum consistit in comparatione ipsius sermonis ad *intentionem*, sed etiam ad ipsam *rem*.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicit consequenter, quod quicunque peccat, peccatum committit: ergo qui mentitur similiter committit mendacium. Non enim est simile, sicut iam visum est. Esto tamen, quod ista conclusio concederetur, quod iste mentiendo committeret mendacium, non tamen sequeretur, quod esset mendacium *in se*; immo est ibi *quid* et *simpliciter*, sicut prius explanatum est. Unde solum illud dictum, in quo est falsitas per comparationem ad *rem* et *intentionem*, est mendacium *simpliciter* et *complete*. Illud vero, in quo est falsitas solum per comparationem ad *intentionem*, est mendacium *alicui* et *minus complete*. Illud autem, in quo est falsitas per comparationem ad *rem* tantum, est mendacium *secundum quid* et *minime complete*. Unde fere omnes rationes praemissae et etiam consimiles in processu suo peccant *secundum quid* et *simpliciter*[^16].

english:
### Article unique. *On lying.*

### Question I. *Whether it is essential to a lie to be false.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether it is essential to a lie to be false. And that it is, it seems:

1. *First*, through the definition of a lie which Augustine sets down in the book *On Lying*[^1]: « A lie, he says, is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving »: if therefore the definition and the parts of the definition are essential to what is defined: therefore it is essential to a lie to be false.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through what Augustine says, *Against Lying*[^2]: « As light is opposed to darkness, so truth is opposed to a lie »; but darkness, speaking essentially, is the privation of light: therefore a lie is the privation of truth. But the privation of truth is falsity: therefore, from the first, it is essential to a lie itself to be false.

3. Likewise, as being truthful and being lying stand with respect to a *man*, so they stand with respect to *speech*; but these two are incompossible in the same man at one and the same time, namely his being truthful and lying: therefore they will likewise be incompossible in *discourse*: therefore it is impossible that the same discourse be at once true and lying[^3]. If therefore a lie cannot coexist with truth, it seems that it has falsity inseparably annexed to itself.

4. Likewise, every truth, as such, is from the first Truth[^4]; but no lie is from the first Truth: therefore no lie is true. And it is true, or false: therefore it is essential to a lie itself to be false.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *On Lying*[^5] says that « he lies who says what is true, which he thinks to be false »; but he who lies utters a lie: therefore someone, by saying what is true, makes a lie: not every lie, therefore, is necessarily false.

2. Likewise, just as speech is at variance with intention when one denies what he knows, so too it is at variance when he affirms what he is ignorant of and what he doubts[^6]; but it is possible for someone to affirm some truth about which he doubts; let it be posited, then, since it is possible; but in such an affirmation the speech is at variance with the intention of the speaker: therefore there is a fault and a sin there. But it is none other than the sin of a lie: therefore it seems that something can at once be true, and yet nonetheless be a lie.

3. Likewise, if the intention is right, the whole is right[^7]: therefore if the intention is lying, the whole is lying; but someone can say a true utterance with the intention of lying: therefore it is possible that someone, by saying what is true, be lying. But he is lying only in that utterance: therefore it is possible that a true utterance be a lie.

4. Likewise, as sin stands to goodness, so a lie stands to truth; but he who does some good work with a bad intention commits a sin[^8]:

therefore likewise he who says what is true with the intention of deceiving incurs a lie: therefore the same as before. If you should say, according as the Master seems to say in the text[^9], that it is possible for someone to say what is true and to lie, but it is not possible that any utterance be at once true and a lie; it seems to be « an opposition in the adjunct »: because, as the sinner stands to sin, so the liar stands to a lie; but every sinner commits a sin: therefore every liar utters a lie: therefore if the truth of the utterance is not repugnant to the act of lying, it is not repugnant to the very account of a lie.

### Conclusion.

> Although the intention of deceiving alone suffices for someone to be said to lie, nevertheless for the complete account of a lie a twofold falsity is required, namely with respect to the intention and to the thing.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that an utterance outwardly brought forth is compared to the intention of the speaker and to the *thing signified* itself; and according to this that utterance obtains the account of a twofold falsity, or truth. For by comparison to the thing the speech is called true, but by comparison to the intention of the speaker it is called truthful[^10]. So too falsity is twofold with respect to speech. For by comparison to the thing, namely when there is no adequation of the thing and the speech, the speech is called false; but by comparison to the intention of the speaker, when there is no adequation of the speech and the intention, the speech is called fallacious or lying.

Since therefore a lie names the utterance itself by comparison to the thing and to the speaker himself; hence it is that for the complete account of a lie a twofold falsity concurs: one by comparison to the thing, and the other by comparison to the intention of the speaker. And Augustine touches upon this twofold falsity in the definition of a lie, when he says: « A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving ». Now the first falsity holds in the lie itself the account of the *material*; but the second the account of the *formal*, and from that second [falsity] one is denominated a liar. On account of this twofold comparison, therefore, which the lie itself implies from the account of its name, it is necessary that for its complete account the aforesaid twofold difference of falsity concur. — But *to lie* names an act by comparison to the speaker himself. Hence for someone to be said to lie, the falsity that arises from the discord of the voice and the intention suffices; and this is plain from the very definition of the word, because *to lie is to go against the mind*[^11]. Now against his mind goes not only he who knowingly says what is false, but also he who says what is true which he thinks to be false. Hence less is implied when we say that someone *lies* than when we say that someone *utters a lie*. For although the intention of deceiving suffices for someone to be said to lie; nevertheless it does not suffice for the full account of a lie, according as the Master says in the text[^12], and is manifestly apparent from Augustine's own description and from the reasons brought forward to the first part.

1. To that indeed which is objected to the contrary, that he lies who says what is true which he thinks to be false; the response is now plain: because more is required for the perfect account of a lie than for someone to be said to lie.

2. To that which is objected, that just as speech is at variance with intention in him who asserts what is false, so too in him who asserts what is doubtful and uncertain; it must be said that although there is there a likeness as regards the discord of *intention*, nevertheless there is an unlikeness as regards the discord of *speech and thing*, because, when what is false is knowingly asserted, the speech is at variance not only with the *intention*, but is also at variance with the *thing*; and therefore it does not follow that, if in the assertion of a known falsehood there is a lie, there should be on this account [a lie] in the assertion of an uncertain truth, except *in a qualified sense*.

3. To that which is objected, that a right intention rectifies the whole, and an oblique one falsifies the whole; it must be said that although an oblique intention falsifies the whole utterance, nevertheless it does not falsify it according to *every respect*, but[^13] according to the respect which it has to the *speaker*; and that respect does not suffice for the account of a lie, as has been touched upon.

4. To that which is objected, that he who does a good thing with a bad intention commits a sin, therefore etc.; it must be said that a good thing done with a bad intention is not *absolutely* a sin, but a sin *to him* who does it, just as, when someone gives alms out of vainglory, *to give alms* is not a sin, but [it is a sin] *to him* who does this with a bad intention. So too in the matter at hand it can be granted. And therefore from this it is not had that truth coexists with that which is a lie *absolutely*, but only with that which is a lie *in a qualified sense* or *to someone*[^14]. — In another way too it could be said that it is not similar: because sin

names the privation of *goodness*; but goodness names an ordering to an end, which indeed has being by means of a right *intention*: and therefore, the right intention being removed, since the ordering perishes absolutely, something will *absolutely* be judged to be a sin[^15]. But a lie names the privation of *truth*, which indeed consists not only in the comparison of the speech itself to the *intention*, but also to the *thing* itself.

And through this is plain the response to that which it objects consequently, that whoever sins commits a sin: therefore he who lies likewise commits a lie. For it is not similar, as has now been seen. Yet granting that that conclusion were granted, that this man by lying commits a lie, it would nevertheless not follow that it be a lie *in itself*; rather there is there [a lie] *in a qualified way* and not *absolutely*, as has been explained before. Hence only that utterance in which there is falsity by comparison to the *thing* and the *intention* is a lie *absolutely* and *completely*. But that in which there is falsity only by comparison to the *intention* is a lie *to someone* and *less completely*. But that in which there is falsity by comparison to the *thing* only is a lie *in a qualified sense* and *least completely*. Hence nearly all the foregoing reasons, and likewise the similar ones, fail in their procedure [by arguing] *in a qualified sense* and *absolutely*[^16].

la: Cap. 3. n. 3. seq. sententialiter, sed verbotenus in lib. contra Mendacium ad Consentium, c. 12. n. 26: Mendacium est quippe falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Aristot., II. Poster. c. 3: Definitio enim ipsius quod quid est [i. e. essentiae] esse videtur. Cfr. ibid. c. 10. (c. 9.); VI. Topic. c. 1. seqq., et VII. Metaph. text. 33. (VI. c. 10.), nec non supra pag. 501, nota 2.

en: *On Lying*, c. 3, n. 3ff. in sense, but verbatim in the book *Against Lying, to Consentius*, c. 12, n. 26: A lie is indeed a false signification with the will of deceiving. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, c. 3: For the definition seems to be of the very what-it-is [i.e. of the essence]. Cf. ibid. c. 10 (c. 9); *Topics* VI, c. 1ff., and *Metaphysics* VII, text 33 (VI, c. 10), as also above p. 501, note 2.

la: Cap. 3. n. 4: Nam sicut lux et tenebrae, pietas et impietas... ita inter se sunt veritas mendaciumque contraria. — Minorem exhibet Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 70. (c. 7.). De falsitate cfr. V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 29.).

en: *Against Lying*, c. 3, n. 4: For just as light and darkness, piety and impiety... so among themselves truth and a lie are contraries. — The minor [premise] is exhibited by Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 70 (c. 7). On falsity cf. *Metaphysics* V, text 34 (IV, c. 29).

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia (circa finem), ubi ostendit, eandem orationem contrariorum non esse susceptibilem, scil. non posse simul esse veram et falsam. — Codd. A N U Z *simul verax et mendax.* In maiori post *sic* cod. A addit *etiam,* et post *orationem* Vat. subiungit *veritas et mendacium.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, c. on Substance (near the end), where he shows that one and the same statement is not susceptible of contraries, namely cannot be at once true and false. — Codices A N U Z read *at once truthful and lying.* In the major, after *thus* codex A adds *also,* and after *statement* the Vatican edition appends *truth and a lie.*

la: Vide supra pag. 797, nota 2. in fine, verbo August. allegata, et eius lib. 83 Qq. q. 1.

en: See above p. 797, note 2, at the end, the words alleged from Augustine, and his book *83 Questions*, q. 1.

la: Cap. 3. n. 3. et 4. Videsis etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 4, ubi eadem verba ex Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6. afferuntur.

en: *On Lying*, c. 3, nn. 3 and 4. See also here the text of the Master, c. 2 and 4, where the same words are brought forward from the *Enchiridion*, c. 18, n. 6.

la: Cfr. August. loc. in praeced. nota cit.

en: Cf. Augustine, the place cited in the preceding note.

la: Matth. 6, 22: Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit. Vide II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Matthew 6:22: If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. See *II Sent.*, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. August., contra Mendac. c. 7. n. 18.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Against Lying*, c. 7, n. 18.

la: Hic c. 4. — Dictio « oppositio in adiecto » invenitur in Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11). — Inferius pro *simul* cod. K *sic similiter,* edd. 1, 2 *similiter,* quod coniungunt cum *videtur.*

en: Here c. 4. — The expression « opposition in the adjunct » is found in Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 2 (c. 11). — Below, for *at once* codex K reads *thus likewise,* editions 1, 2 *likewise,* which they join with *it seems.*

la: De prima acceptione veritatis cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5, et Anselm., Dialog. de veritate c. 2. seq. De secunda vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 7. et IV. c. 7.

en: On the first acceptation of truth cf. vol. I, p. 707, note 5, and Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 2ff. On the second see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 7, and IV, c. 7.

la: Cfr. Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 23. c. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa, p. III, tr. 23, c. 1, q. 2.

la: Hic c. 3. et 4.

en: Here c. 3 and 4.

la: Edd. addunt *solum,* cod. K *tantum.*

en: The editions add *only,* codex K *merely.*

la: Ex cod. K supplevimus *sed solum cum eo quod est mendacium secundum quid sive,* quae lectio confirmatur lectione mutila plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, qua pro his verbis exhibetur tantum *sive;* Vat. substituit *sed tantum.* Paulo ante pro *Et propterea* Vat. *Sed praeterea.*

en: From codex K we have supplied *but only with that which is a lie in a qualified sense or,* which reading is confirmed by the mutilated reading of very many codices and editions 1, 2, in which for these words is exhibited only *or;* the Vatican edition substitutes *but only.* A little before, for *And therefore* the Vatican edition reads *But moreover.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. Superius pro *ordinatio* plures codd. incongrue *ordinant,* cod. K bene *quod ordinat.*

en: See *II Sent.*, d. 38, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 40, a. 1, q. 1. Above, for *ordering* several codices incongruously read *they order,* codex K well *what it orders.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 258, nota 2. — Codd. A N *est ibi secundum quid et simpliciter.*

en: Cf. above p. 258, note 2. — Codices A N read *there is there [a lie] in a qualified sense and absolutely.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hoc tractatu de mendacio S. Bonav. aliique principales Scholastici presse sequuntur S. Augustinum, satisque eorum doctrina concordat. — In hac I. quaestione explanatur, quid sit mendacium; cfr. etiam hic dub. 3; et de tribus mendacii speciebus vide infra q. 5, ubi etiam de alia divisione per octo membra agitur. Quod verbis: *falsa vocis significatio,* exprimatur quasi materiale mendacii, sed intentio fallendi sit formale, docet etiam S. Thom. (hic a. 1; S. II. II. q. 98. a. 1, ad 3.); tamen non ab omnibus conceditur, hanc intentionem in *omni* casu requiri ad constituendum mendacium verum.

De mendacio *simpliciter* et *secundum quid* (quod dupliciter esse potest) cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Bene etiam S. Thom. in Summa (II. II. q. 110. a. 1.), ubi hanc nostram quaestionem tractat, dicit: « Si ergo ista tria concurrant, scilicet quod falsum sit id quod enuntiatur, et quod adsit voluntas falsum enuntiandi, et iterum intentio fallendi; tunc est falsitas *materialiter*, quia falsum dicitur, et *formaliter* propter voluntatem falsum dicendi, et *effective* propter voluntatem falsitatem imprimendi ». — Differentia hic assignata inter *mentiri* et *mendacium dicere*, quam S. Bonav. sumsit ex Magistro (hic c. 3.), posterioribus non probatur; qui pro eo distinguunt mendacium vel *materiale* tantum, vel *formale* tantum, vel *simul formale et materiale*. Attamen praedicta distinctio valde antiqua est, teste Forcellini (Lexicon etc., Mendacium § 4.), qui citat: « *Nigid.* apud *Gellium* 11. 11, et *Non.* 5. 80, ubi addit: Vir bonus praestare debet, ne mentiatur; prudens, ne mendacium dicat ». — In afferendis responsionis rationibus Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1.) sequitur S. Bonaventuram.

De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. II. q. 123. m. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — De hac et seqq. qq. Dionys. Carth. et Biel, hic q. unica.

**II.** Conclusio sequentis (2.) quaestionis quoad primam partem, scilicet quod omne mendacium *de facto* sit peccatum, communissime approbatur a catholicis contra errorem nonnullorum antiquorum, et praesertim haereticorum; quod facile probatur ex sacra Scriptura, ex Ss. Patribus et ex iure canonico, suffragante ipsa ratione philosophica. Sed quoad secundam eiusdem partem, quae est de possibili, utrum scilicet mendacium sit ita essentialiter et intrinsecus malum, quod nec divina quidem dispensatione fieri possit licitum, non idem est doctorum consensus. Nam responsioni affirmativae, quam tenent Alex. Hal., S. Bonav., S. Thom., Scot. aliique communiter, contradicunt Occam, Nominales, illique qui volunt, omne malum ideo tantum malum esse, quia prohibitum. — Non autem facile est afferre rationem stricte convincentem pro communi opinione. Quod nec prima nec secunda ratio hic relata satis convincat, communius conceditur. — S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 110. a. 3.) sine distinctione affert rationem hic tertio loco positam, scilicet quod mendacium est « actus cadens super indebitam materiam », quia « innaturale est et indebitum, quod aliquis voce significet id quod non habet in mente ». Hanc rationem impugnat Scotus (hic q. unica n. 4. 5.) tanquam non aptam ad evincendam impossibilitatem divinae dispensationis. Idem (n. 5.) refert etiam rationem S. Bonaventurae, quam nec approbat nec improbat, sed tantum exponit. — Quoad facta, quae Scriptura narrat de Iacob aliisque, antiqui Scholastici cum S. Bonav. approbant doctrinam S. Augustini eundem a mendacio excusantem. Sed Scot. (hic q. unica n. 13.) cum aliis posterioribus dicit de Patribus veteris Test., quod « non videtur multum rationabile negare, illos quandoque fuisse mentitos vel potuisse mentiri. Quodsi ita est, etsi laudemus bona facta eorum et illa sumamus in exemplum; mala autem nec recipimus in exemplum nec pertinaciter excusamus. Dicitur tamen, quod tales sermones possunt *figuralite*r intelligi, vel sub alio intellectu, quam verba primo exprimunt; sed circa tales intellectus non oportet immorari ».

De hac (2.) quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 3. q. 25.

**III.** Circa solutionem sequentis (3.) quaestionis non est controversia. De ea agunt: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 8. 9. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. II. II. q. 110. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this treatise on lying St. Bonaventure and the other principal Scholastics closely follow St. Augustine, and their doctrine sufficiently agrees. — In this first question it is explained what a lie is; cf. also here dub. 3; and on the three species of lying see below, q. 5, where there is also treatment of another division by eight members. That by the words *false signification of the voice* the quasi-material of a lie is expressed, but that the intention of deceiving is the formal, St. Thomas also teaches (here a. 1; S. II-II, q. 98, a. 1, ad 3); yet it is not granted by all that this intention is required in *every* case for constituting a true lie.

On a lie *absolutely* and *in a qualified sense* (which can be twofold) cf. below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. St. Thomas also well, in the Summa (II-II, q. 110, a. 1), where he treats this our question, says: « If therefore these three concur, namely that what is uttered be false, and that there be present the will to utter what is false, and again the intention of deceiving; then there is falsity *materially*, because what is false is said, and *formally* on account of the will to say what is false, and *effectively* on account of the will to imprint falsity ». — The difference here assigned between *to lie* and *to utter a lie*, which St. Bonaventure took from the Master (here c. 3), is not approved by later authors; who in place of it distinguish a lie as either *material* only, or *formal* only, or *at once formal and material*. Nevertheless the aforesaid distinction is very ancient, as Forcellini testifies (*Lexicon* etc., Mendacium § 4), who cites: « *Nigidius* in *Gellius* 11. 11, and *Nonius* 5. 80, where he adds: A good man ought to take care not to lie; a prudent man, not to utter a lie ». — In bringing forward the reasons of the response, Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 1) follows St. Bonaventure.

On this question, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, Sum. p. II, q. 123, m. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following q., here q. 1. — On this and the following qq. Dionysius the Carthusian and Biel, here q. unica.

**II.** The conclusion of the following (2nd) question as to the first part, namely that every lie *in fact* is a sin, is most commonly approved by Catholics against the error of certain ancients, and especially of heretics; which is easily proved from sacred Scripture, from the holy Fathers, and from canon law, with philosophical reason itself supporting it. But as to the second part of the same [question], which is about the possible, namely whether a lie is so essentially and intrinsically evil that it cannot even by divine dispensation be made licit, the consensus of the doctors is not the same. For to the affirmative response, which Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Scotus, and others commonly hold, Occam, the Nominalists, and those who hold that every evil is evil only because it is forbidden, are opposed. — But it is not easy to bring forward a strictly convincing reason for the common opinion. That neither the first nor the second reason here reported convinces sufficiently is more commonly granted. — St. Thomas (S. II-II, q. 110, a. 3) without distinction brings forward the reason here placed in the third place, namely that a lie is « an act falling upon an undue matter », because « it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice what he does not have in his mind ». Scotus impugns this reason (here q. unica, n. 4, 5) as not apt to prove the impossibility of a divine dispensation. The same author (n. 5) also reports St. Bonaventure's reason, which he neither approves nor disapproves, but only sets forth. — As to the facts which Scripture narrates concerning Jacob and others, the ancient Scholastics with St. Bonaventure approve St. Augustine's doctrine excusing him from a lie. But Scotus (here q. unica, n. 13) with other later authors says of the Fathers of the Old Testament that « it does not seem very reasonable to deny that they sometimes lied or could have lied. But if this is so, although we praise their good deeds and take them for an example; their bad deeds we neither receive as an example nor obstinately excuse. Yet it is said that such utterances can be understood *figuratively*, or under another meaning than the words primarily express; but about such meanings one need not linger ».

On this (2nd) question, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; S. loc. cit. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 3, q. 25.

**III.** Concerning the solution of the following (3rd) question there is no controversy. Of it treat: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 8, 9. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; S. II-II, q. 110, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2.

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translators_notes:
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