title: Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De passione doloris, prout respicit animam et carnem communiter.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum in Christo fuerit vera passio doloris.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerit vera passio doloris. Et quod sic, ostenditur.

1. Isaiae quinquagesimo tertio[^p345-3]: *Vidimus eum novissimum virorum, virum dolorum et scientem infirmitatem*; sed constat, quod non intelligit Propheta de scientia simplicis notitiae: ergo intelligit de scientia experientiae: ergo vere expertus est passiones doloris.

2. Item, in persona eius dicitur in Psalmo[^p345-4]: *Ego sum pauper et dolens*; sed Christus vere fuit pauper et mendicus temporaliter: ergo vero dolore fuit afflictus.

3. Item, anima coniuncta corpori passibili vere dolet, corpore patiente[^p345-5]; sed anima Christi iuncta fuit carni, quae non tantum fuit passibilis, immo etiam passa: ergo verum dolorem fuit perpessa.

4. Item, satisfactio facta est per poenam doloris; sed Christus veraciter satisfecit, quia *vere languores nostros ipse tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit*[^p345-6]: ergo veraciter doluit.

5. Item, non est magnum quid habere patientiam in illa passione, quae nullum infert dolorem; sed patientia Christi multum commendatur in tolerantia passionum[^p345-7]: ergo videtur, quod Christus verum dolorem in semetipso persenserit.

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6. Item, aut vere patiebatur et dolebat, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum; si non vere patiebatur, et videbatur pati: ergo seducebat oculos spectantium in sua passione, pari ratione et in qualibet alia sua operatione; et si hoc, totum Evangelium est mendacium, et eius miracula falsa, et fides christiana inanis per omnia[^p346-1]: si igitur huiusmodi sunt falsa et erronea, restat etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Hilarius in decimo libro *de Trinitate*[^p346-2]: « Virtus corporis sine sensu poenae vim poenae in se desaevientis excepit »; sed verus dolor non est sine sensu poenae: ergo in Christo non fuit verus dolor.

2. Item, Dionysius ad Ioannem Evangelistam[^p346-3]: « Absit, ut ego ita insaniam, ut credam, Sanctos aliquid pati, sed corporis passiones, secundum solum quod eas diiudicent, ipsos sentire credo »: si ergo hoc verum est, Sancti non sentiunt passiones nisi secundum iudicium, non ergo secundum experientiam: ergo patiendo non habent dolorem verum: ergo multo minus nec Sanctus Sanctorum, scilicet Christus.

3. Item, Moyses ieiunavit quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus sine aliqua corporis laesione propter continuam contemplationem[^p346-4]: si ergo perfectio contemplationis aufert passionem et sensum famis, pari ratione videtur, quod auferat sensum doloris in carne passibili. Sed in Christo fuit continua contemplatio et perfectissima: ergo videtur, quod nulla fuerit in eo doloris experientia.

4. Item, *ratione* videtur. « Natura agens praestantior est patiente[^p346-5] »; et natura assumta praestantior est omni alio: ergo non videtur, quod ab aliqua alia natura possit affligi vel laedi.

5. Item, res, quae est ablativa laesionis et doloris, passioni doloris non est subiecta; sed manus Christi curavit alienos dolores solo tactu[^p346-6]: ergo videtur, quod nullum dolorem potuerit perpeti.

6. Item, si anima Petri poneretur in inferno, ab ignibus non cruciaretur, quia non habet in se causam, per quam debeat dolere: ergo si anima Christi nullam causam passionis in se habebat, videtur, quod nullum dolorem sentiebat in carne quantumcumque passibili. Si ergo dolor est passio ipsius animae potius quam carnis, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p346-7]; videtur, quod in Christo non fuerit dolor verus.

### Conclusio

> Vera doloris passio fuit in Christo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut Evangelium dicit, et fides catholica sentit, vera doloris passio fuit in Christo. In ipso enim fuit caro passibilis et perforabilis, fuit etiam virtus sentiendi, secundum quam anima compatitur corpori laeso. Quoniam ergo haec duo verum dolorem faciunt, scilicet *vera laesio* et *verus laesionis sensus*[^p346-8], et haec duo vere fuerunt in Christo; indubitanter tenendum est, quod in Christo fuit vera doloris passio. — Nam si aliquis aliter dicat, secundum quod quidam haeretici[^p346-9] dicunt, et est error antiquus Saracenorum, quod Christus, etsi videretur pati et dolere, non tamen veraciter habuit dolorem et passionis sensum; non solum evacuat fidem Christi et Christi Evangelium, sed etiam evacuat redemptionem nostram et dicit, Christum non esse Christum. Dum enim dicit, ipsum non fuisse veraciter *passum*; dicit, ipsum non satisfecisse, ac per hoc non genus humanum esse redemptum. Dum vero dicit, ipsum *simulasse* se pati; dicit, ipsum esse mendacem, et ita nec vere fuisse Dei Filium nec Dei nuntium, et ita nec mediatorem, sed potius deceptorem. Et propterea qui dicunt, Christum non veraciter doluisse vel passum fuisse; etsi videantur ipsum exterius honorare, secundum veritatem[^p346-10] blasphemant ipsum impiissime. — Rationes igitur probantes, ipsum veraciter doluisse, sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Hilarii, tripliciter respondetur. Quidam enim dicunt, Hilarium verba illa retractasse. Unde audivi, Parisiensem episcopum Gulielmum referre, se librum illius retractationis vidisse et perlegisse[^p346-11]. — Aliter

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potest dici, quod Hilarius in verbo praedicto et in aliis ibidem positis non excludit sensum doloris a Christo secundum *humanam* naturam, sed secundum *divinam*; unde verba illa referenda sunt ad Christi personam. Et hoc quidem confirmatur, quia, sicut dicit idem Hilarius[^p347-1], « intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi ». Hilarius enim in verbis praemissis excludere voluit errorem Arii, qui dicebat, Christum secundum se totum passum fuisse. — Tertio modo respondetur, quod Hilarius non vult ostendere, Christum non habuisse *verum dolorem*, sed non habuisse *causam doloris*; et hunc quidem modum solvendi innuit Magister in littera[^p347-2], et satis est rationabilis, secundum quod in expositione litterae melius apparebit.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Dionysii, dicendum, quod Dionysius non voluit dicere nec sensit, quod beatus Ioannes et alii Sancti non experirentur dolorem in tormentis, sed vult commendare constantiam mentis, quae[^p347-3] non magis commovebatur ex experientia sensus, quam commoveretur ex sola consideratione et iudicio rationis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Moyse, dicendum, quod etsi dulcedo contemplationis quodam modo ipsum reficeret et a sensibus exterioribus abstraheret, adeo ut naturales virtutes quodam modo consopiret, ut non ita consumerent et cibum requirerent; tamen quod tanto tempore ieiunavit sine aliqua sui laesione, hoc fuit per speciale beneficium et divinum miraculum. Et ideo hoc non habet locum in proposito, quia Christus in passione sua non exercuit miracula potentiae, sed potius usus est armis patientiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura agens praestantior est patiente; dicendum, quod illud non oportet intelligi, quod sit verum *simpliciter*, sed solum secundum aliquam conditionem. Quia enim lapis laedit pedem, non oportet, quod lapis sit nobilior pede, sed sufficit, quod excedat in aliqua conditione, utpote in duritia et soliditate; et sic est in proposito. Quamvis enim clavus non esset nobilior carne Christi, erat tamen durior et solidior. Et si *tu obiicias* mihi de anima, quod non possit pati; dicendum, quod anima patiebatur *per accidens*, scilicet compatiendo carni. Vel secundum Augustinum in sexto *Musicae*[^p347-4], anima sumit occasionem patiendi ex carne; verumtamen patitur ex se; occasione accepta aliunde. — Potest etiam dici, quod illud verbum habet intelligi secundum institutionem naturae, non secundum dispensationem misericordiae et punitionem iustitiae, quorum primum respicit animam Christi, reliquum animam peccatricem, sicut in quadragesima quarta[^p347-5] distinctione libri quarti habetur expresse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod manus Christi fuit curativa dolorum: dicendum, quod hoc fuit virtute latentis divinitatis; et secundum illam virtutem, concedo bene, quod pati non poterat nec dolere. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod fuerit doloris expers. Erat enim ibi alia virtus creata, secundum quam dolere poterat, scilicet potentia animae sensitiva.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Petri non pateretur in inferno; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia anima Petri post purificationem perfectam non est passibilis ex causa propria, nec ex dispensatione divina propter salutem alienam; non autem sic est de anima Christi, quae dispensative et voluntarie passibilitatem habuit, cum carni passibili coniuncta fuit, sicut ex lectione praecedenti[^p347-6] habitum fuit.

english:
### Article I. *On the suffering of pain, insofar as it concerns the soul and the flesh in common.*
### Question I. *Whether in Christ there was a true suffering of pain.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether in Christ there was a true suffering of pain. And that there was, is shown.

1. Isaiah, chapter fifty-three[^p345-3]: *We saw him as the lowliest of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity*; but it is certain that the Prophet does not understand this of the knowledge of simple cognition: therefore he understands it of the knowledge of experience: therefore he truly experienced the sufferings of pain.

2. Likewise, in his person it is said in the Psalm[^p345-4]: *I am poor and sorrowful*; but Christ was truly poor and a beggar in temporal things: therefore he was afflicted with true pain.

3. Likewise, a soul joined to a passible body truly grieves, the body suffering[^p345-5]; but the soul of Christ was joined to flesh that was not only passible, but indeed also suffered: therefore it endured true pain.

4. Likewise, satisfaction is made through the penalty of pain; but Christ truly made satisfaction, because *he truly bore our infirmities, and carried our sorrows*[^p345-6]: therefore he truly grieved.

5. Likewise, it is no great thing to have patience in that suffering which brings on no pain; but the patience of Christ is greatly commended in the bearing of sufferings[^p345-7]: therefore it seems that Christ felt true pain in himself.

6. Likewise, either he truly suffered and grieved, or not. If so, I have my point; if he did not truly suffer, and seemed to suffer: then he deceived the eyes of those who beheld him in his passion, and by the same reasoning in any other of his operations; and if this is so, the whole Gospel is a lie, and his miracles false, and the Christian faith empty in every respect[^p346-1]: if therefore such things are false and erroneous, it remains, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hilary in the tenth book *On the Trinity*[^p346-2]: « The strength of the body, without sense of penalty, received the force of the penalty raging within itself »; but true pain is not without sense of penalty: therefore in Christ there was no true pain.

2. Likewise, Dionysius to John the Evangelist[^p346-3]: « Far be it that I should be so mad as to believe that the Saints suffer anything, but I believe that they perceive the sufferings of the body only insofar as they judge them »: if therefore this is true, the Saints do not perceive sufferings except according to judgment, therefore not according to experience: therefore in suffering they do not have true pain: therefore much less does the Holy of Holies, namely Christ.

3. Likewise, Moses fasted forty days and forty nights without any injury of the body on account of continual contemplation[^p346-4]: if therefore the perfection of contemplation takes away suffering and the sense of hunger, by the same reasoning it seems that it would take away the sense of pain in passible flesh. But in Christ there was continual and most perfect contemplation: therefore it seems that there was no experience of pain in him.

4. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*. « The acting nature is more excellent than the one acted upon[^p346-5] »; and the assumed nature is more excellent than every other: therefore it does not seem that it could be afflicted or injured by any other nature.

5. Likewise, a thing which removes injury and pain is not subject to the suffering of pain; but the hand of Christ cured the pains of others by mere touch[^p346-6]: therefore it seems that he could undergo no pain.

6. Likewise, if the soul of Peter were placed in hell, it would not be tormented by the fires, because it does not have in itself a cause on account of which it ought to grieve: therefore if the soul of Christ had no cause of suffering in itself, it seems that it felt no pain in flesh however passible. If therefore pain is a suffering of the soul itself rather than of the flesh, as Augustine says[^p346-7]; it seems that in Christ there was no true pain.

### Conclusion

> A true suffering of pain was in Christ.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, as the Gospel says and the catholic faith holds, a true suffering of pain was in Christ. For in him there was passible and pierceable flesh, there was also the power of perceiving, according to which the soul suffers along with the injured body. Since therefore these two things make true pain, namely *true injury* and *true sense of injury*[^p346-8], and these two truly were in Christ; it must be held without hesitation that in Christ there was a true suffering of pain. — For if anyone says otherwise, according to what certain heretics[^p346-9] say, and it is the ancient error of the Saracens, that Christ, although he seemed to suffer and grieve, nevertheless did not truly have pain and the sense of suffering; he not only empties out the faith of Christ and the Gospel of Christ, but also empties out our redemption and says that Christ is not Christ. For when he says that he did not truly *suffer*; he says that he did not make satisfaction, and on this account that the human race is not redeemed. But when he says that he *simulated* suffering; he says that he is a liar, and so that he was neither truly the Son of God nor the messenger of God, and so neither a mediator, but rather a deceiver. And therefore those who say that Christ did not truly grieve or suffer; even though they seem to honor him outwardly, in truth[^p346-10] they blaspheme him most impiously. — The reasons therefore proving that he truly grieved are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first concerning the authority of Hilary, the answer is threefold. For some say that Hilary retracted those words. Whence I have heard that William, the bishop of Paris, reports that he saw and read through the book of that retraction[^p346-11]. — Otherwise

it can be said that Hilary, in the aforesaid statement and in the others placed in the same passage, does not exclude the sense of pain from Christ according to the *human* nature, but according to the *divine*; whence those words are to be referred to the person of Christ. And this indeed is confirmed, because, as the same Hilary says[^p347-1], « the understanding of statements is to be taken from the causes of speaking ». For Hilary in the foregoing words wished to exclude the error of Arius, who said that Christ according to his whole self had suffered. — In a third way it is answered that Hilary does not mean to show that Christ did not have *true pain*, but that he did not have a *cause of pain*; and this manner of solving the Master indeed hints at in the text[^p347-2], and it is reasonable enough, as will better appear in the exposition of the text.

2. But to that which is objected concerning the authority of Dionysius, it must be said that Dionysius did not wish to say nor did he hold that the blessed John and the other Saints did not experience pain in their torments, but he wishes to commend the constancy of the mind, which[^p347-3] was no more moved by the experience of sense than it would be moved by mere consideration and the judgment of reason.

3. To that which is objected concerning Moses, it must be said that, although the sweetness of contemplation in a certain way refreshed him and drew him away from the exterior senses, so much so that it in a certain way lulled the natural powers, so that they did not consume and require food as they otherwise would; nevertheless that he fasted for so long a time without any injury to himself, this was through a special benefit and a divine miracle. And therefore this has no place in the matter at hand, because Christ in his passion did not exercise the miracles of power, but rather used the arms of patience.

4. To that which is objected, that the acting nature is more excellent than the one acted upon; it must be said that this need not be understood to be true *absolutely*, but only according to some condition. For because a stone injures the foot, it is not necessary that the stone be nobler than the foot, but it suffices that it exceed it in some condition, namely in hardness and solidity; and so it is in the matter at hand. For although the nail was not nobler than the flesh of Christ, it was nevertheless harder and more solid. And if *you object* to me about the soul, that it cannot suffer; it must be said that the soul suffered *by accident*, namely by suffering along with the flesh. Or, according to Augustine in the sixth book of the *Music*[^p347-4], the soul takes the occasion of suffering from the flesh; nevertheless it suffers of itself, the occasion having been received from elsewhere. — It can also be said that that statement is to be understood according to the institution of nature, not according to the dispensation of mercy and the punishment of justice, of which the first regards the soul of Christ, the latter the sinful soul, as is expressly had in the forty-fourth[^p347-5] distinction of the fourth book.

5. To that which is objected, that the hand of Christ was curative of pains: it must be said that this was by the power of the hidden divinity; and according to that power, I grant indeed that he could not suffer nor grieve. From this, however, it does not follow that he was free of pain. For there was there another created power, according to which he could grieve, namely the sensitive power of the soul.

6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Peter would not suffer in hell; it must be said that it is not similar, because the soul of Peter after perfect purification is not passible from a cause of its own, nor from divine dispensation for the salvation of another; but it is not so with the soul of Christ, which by dispensation and voluntarily had passibility, when it was joined to passible flesh, as was had from the preceding lecture[^p347-6].

la: Vers. 2. seq. In testimonio allato pro *infirmitatem* plurimi codd. *infirmitates*. — De minori vide supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. — In fine arg. pro *passiones doloris* codd. E U *passionem doloris*, cod. A *dolores passionis*.

en: Verse 2 and following. In the testimony adduced, for *infirmitatem* very many codices read *infirmitates*. — On the minor premise see above d. 14, a. 3, q. 2. — At the end of the argument, for *passiones doloris* codices E U read *passionem doloris*, codex A *dolores passionis*.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1. — Paulo ante pro *coniuncta* codd. A N U Z *iuncta*. In fine arg. cod. K supplet *anima eius*.

en: Cf. above the text of the Master, d. XV, c. 1. — Shortly before, for *coniuncta* codices A N U Z read *iuncta*. At the end of the argument codex K supplies *anima eius*.

la: Isa. 53, 4. — Subinde post *veraciter* cod. U subiicit *ipse*.

en: Isaiah 53:4. — Thereafter, after *veraciter* codex U adds *ipse*.

la: Vide supra pag. 44, nota 4. — In principio arg. pro *Si sic* edd. *Si vere, sic*.

en: See above page 44, note 4. — At the beginning of the argument, for *Si sic* the editions read *Si vere, sic*.

la: Num. 23. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Num. 23. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Epist. 10, ubi textus origin. loco vocis *Sanctos* habet *Vos*. Edd. in hoc testimonio pro *sed corporis passiones, secundum solum* substituerunt *secundum corporis passiones, sed solum*.

en: Epistle 10, where the original text in place of the word *Sanctos* has *Vos*. The editions, in this testimony, for *sed corporis passiones, secundum solum* substituted *secundum corporis passiones, sed solum*.

la: Exod. 34, 28, Deut. 9, 18. — Pro *continuam* cod. W *perfectam*. In fine arg. pro *fuerit* multi codd. *fuit*.

en: Exod. 34:28, Deut. 9:18. — For *continuam* codex W reads *perfectam*. At the end of the argument, for *fuerit* many codices read *fuit*.

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 19. (c. 5.); verba ipsa videsis tom. II. pag. 748, nota 1; cfr. August., XII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 16. n. 33. De altero enuntiato, scil. quod natura assumta praestantior sit omni alio (edd. *alia*), cfr. supra pag. 266, nota 5.

en: Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 19 (c. 5); the words themselves you may see in tom. II, page 748, note 1; cf. Augustine, XII *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 16, n. 33. On the other statement, namely that the assumed nature is more excellent than every other (editions: *alia*), cf. above page 266, note 5.

en: Matt. 8:3 and 15; Mark 6:5; Luke 13:13; 22:51. Cf. Hilary, X *On the Trinity* n. 32 and 46.

la: Libr. VII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 19. n. 25; XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 18. n. 2; XXI. c. 3. n. 2. Magister supra in lit. d. XV. c. 1. idem colligit ex August. XII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 24. n. 51.

en: Book VII *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 19, n. 25; XIV *On the City of God*, c. 18, n. 2; XXI, c. 3, n. 2. The Master above in the text, d. XV, c. 1, gathers the same from Augustine, XII *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 24, n. 51.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 482, nota 3. — Paulo superius pro *secundum quam anima* cod. U *per quam anima*.

en: Cf. tom. II, page 482, note 3. — A little above, for *secundum quam anima* codex U reads *per quam anima*.

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. — De Saracenis cfr. Damasc., *de Haeres.* n. 101. Mamed, ut ibi refertur, Christum Dei Verbum esse dicit eiusque spiritum, sed creatum et servum... Hunc cum Iudaei per summum nefas in crucem agere voluissent apprehendissentque, ipsius quidem umbram affixerunt cruci (Sur. 3-4.); Christus vero nec crucem nec mortem subiit. Eum quippe Deus, quia sibi carissimus erat, transtulerat in caelum.

en: See above d. 2, a. 2, q. 1. — On the Saracens cf. Damascene, *On Heresies* n. 101. Mamed (Muhammad), as is there reported, says that Christ is the Word of God and his spirit, but created and a servant... When the Jews, by the greatest impiety, wished to drag him to the cross and had seized him, they affixed only his shadow to the cross (Surahs 3-4); but Christ underwent neither cross nor death. For God, because he was most dear to him, had translated him into heaven.

la: Edd. subiiciunt *tamen*. Mox pro *Rationes igitur* non pauci codd. *Rationes vero*.

en: The editions add *tamen*. Soon after, for *Rationes igitur* not a few codices read *Rationes vero*.

la: Huius retractationis mentionem faciunt etiam B. Albert., hic d. 15. a. 10, et S. Thom., hic d. 13. circa lit. Mamertus Claudianus (+ 473 aut 474), II. *de Statu animae*, c. 9. n. 3. ait: *Sed quoniam beatus Hilarius opinionis huiusce vitium virtute confessionis abolevit, sic sustinet reprehensionis stylum, quod non patitur detrimenta meritorum*.

en: Mention of this retraction is also made by B. Albert, here d. 15, a. 10, and St. Thomas, here d. 13, near the text. Mamertus Claudianus († 473 or 474), II *On the State of the Soul*, c. 9, n. 3, says: *But since blessed Hilary abolished the fault of this opinion by the virtue of his confession, he so bears the pen of reproof that he suffers no loss of merits*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* n. 14, ubi S. Doctor verbis hic allegatis adiungit: *Quia non sermoni res, sed rei est sermo subiectus*. Cfr. ibid. I. n. 30. — Pro *idem*, quod a codd. A 11. aa abest, codd. B E F G K M T U habent *ibidem*, cod. D *ibi*.

en: Book IV *On the Trinity* n. 14, where the holy Doctor adjoins to the words here alleged: *Because the matter is not subject to the discourse, but the discourse to the matter*. Cf. ibid. I, n. 30. — For *idem*, which is absent from codices A 11 aa, codices B E F G K M T U have *ibidem*, codex D *ibi*.

la: Hic c. 1. Vide infra dub. 1-3. circa lit.

en: Here c. 1. See below dubia 1-3 on the text.

la: Ita codd. A 11 bb, cod. K *quia*, plures alii codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 *quo*, Vat. *qua*. Mox pro *ex experientia* codd. A K *experientia* tantum, cod. G *per experientiam*; in pluribus codd. legitur *et experientia sensus, qua* etc.

en: So codices A 11 bb, codex K *quia*, several other codices as well as editions 1, 2 *quo*, the Vatican edition *qua*. Soon after, for *ex experientia* codices A K have *experientia* only, codex G *per experientiam*; in many codices is read *et experientia sensus, qua* etc.

la: Cap. 5. n. 8. seqq. Cfr. eiusdem lib. *de Quantit. animae*, c. 23. n. 41. seqq. et c. 29. n. 56. seqq. — De prima ratione vide Aristot., I. *de Anima*, text. 62. seqq. (c. 4.). Damasc., III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 26, dicit, quod anima, « corpore inciso, ipsa non incisa condolet et compatitur corpori ». — Paulo superius pro *non possit* non pauci codd. *non posset*.

en: Chapter 5, n. 8 and following. Cf. the same author's book *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 23, n. 41 and following, and c. 29, n. 56 and following. — On the first reason see Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 62 and following (c. 4). Damascene, III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 26, says that the soul, « the body being cut, it itself uncut grieves with and suffers along with the body ». — A little above, for *non possit* not a few codices read *non posset*.

la: Part. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Pro *reliquum* edd. *secundum*.

en: Part II, a. 3, q. 2. — For *reliquum* the editions read *secundum*.

la: Dist. praeced. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro *lectione* edd. cum pluribus codd. *locutione*. Cod. bb habuit *cum carne possibili, cui coniuncta fuit* etc., quae lectio explicat mutilam lectionem aliorum codd., qui etiam exhibent *cum carne*, sed omittunt *cui*.

en: The preceding distinction, a. 1, q. 3. — For *lectione* the editions with many codices read *locutione*. Codex bb had *cum carne possibili, cui coniuncta fuit* etc., which reading explains the mutilated reading of the other codices, which also exhibit *cum carne*, but omit *cui*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Dolorem sensibilem in Christo fuisse, ex ipsis s. Scripturae verbis manifeste sequitur; unde non est verisimile, S. Hilarium contrarium unquam docuisse et postea retractasse, ut hic solut. ad 1. et etiam a S. Thoma (cfr. supra pag. 346, nota 11.) secundum auctoritatem alienam narratur. Alibi enim (in Ps. 53. n. 12.) idem passibilitatem non a natura assumta, sed a « Divinitatis natura » excludit. Vide defensionem Hilarii in editione Maurina, X. *de Trin.* n. 23. nota b. c. Ipse S. Bonav. hic duos modos verba Hilarii (hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. 2.) sane interpretandi ponit, quibus infra in dub. 3. tertium modum addit, scilicet, quod Hilarius nihil intenderit nisi excludere *necessitatem subiacendi* dolori (cfr. etiam dub. 1.). Similem expositionem habet S. Thom. (S. III. q. 15. a. 5. ad 1.), qui etiam cum nostro auctore duo ad sensibilem dolorem praerequiri docet, nempe laesionem corporis et sensum laesionis. De dolore in sensu *formali* eiusque radicibus plura satis subtiliter disputat (arguendo contra Henricum Gand.) Scot., hic q. unica n. 5. seqq.

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De hac et seq. quaestione ceteri commentatores agunt in praecedenti distinctione. Praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 1. et m. 2. a. 1. — S. Thom., d. 13. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — B. Albert., d. 15. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., d. 15. q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., d. 15. a. 2. q. 1-3. — Durand., d. 15. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 15. q. 2. — Biel, d. 15. q. unica.

**II.** De seq. (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 18. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3; S. III. q. 46. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. a. 4. q. 3. — Durand., loc. cit. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That sensible pain was in Christ follows manifestly from the very words of Sacred Scripture; whence it is not likely that St. Hilary ever taught the contrary and afterward retracted, as is here narrated in the solution to 1, and also by St. Thomas (cf. above page 346, note 11) on another's authority. For elsewhere (in Ps. 53, n. 12) the same author excludes passibility not from the assumed nature, but from the « nature of the Divinity ». See the defense of Hilary in the Maurist edition, X *On the Trinity* n. 23, note b. c. St. Bonaventure himself here sets down two ways of soundly interpreting Hilary's words (here the text of the Master, c. 1, 2), to which below in dubium 3 he adds a third way, namely that Hilary intended nothing but to exclude the *necessity of being subject* to pain (cf. also dubium 1). St. Thomas has a similar exposition (S. III, q. 15, a. 5, ad 1), who also teaches with our author that two things are prerequired for sensible pain, namely injury of the body and the sense of injury. Concerning pain in the *formal* sense and its roots, Scotus disputes much rather subtly (arguing against Henry of Ghent), here in the single question, n. 5 and following.

Concerning this and the following question the other commentators treat in the preceding distinction. Besides the places cited: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III, q. 18, m. 1 and m. 2, a. 1. — St. Thomas, d. 13, a. 3, little question 1. — B. Albert, d. 15, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, d. 15, a. 2, q. 1-3. — Durandus, d. 15, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 15, q. 2. — Biel, d. 15, single question.

**II.** Concerning the following (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 5, a. 1. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 18 and following. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. little question 3; S. III, q. 46, a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. little question 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. a. 4, q. 3. — Durandus, loc. cit. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit. q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p345..348-{L,R}-*.png`, PDF pp. 367–370 = printed 345–348, offset +22), per the Vol III PDF-priority inversion. English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus rendered page by page directly from the printed footers.

**Page-split map.**
- p.345 (PDF 367): ARTICULUS I header + subtitle + QUAESTIO I title (folded in from the d16-divisio hand-off) + fundamenta 1–5. Footers 3–7 (footers 1–2 belong to the divisio chunk).
- p.346 (PDF 368): fundamentum 6 + sed contra 1–6 + CONCLUSIO + RESPONDEO + opening of solutio 1. Footers 1–11.
- p.347 (PDF 369): solutiones 1 (tail), 2–6 + opening of SCHOLION. Footers 1–6.
- p.348 (PDF 370): SCHOLION tail only (items I cross-reference block + II forward-reference to q.2). **No q.1 footers on this page** — the page's footer block belongs to q.2 (*acerbitate*).

**Hand-offs picked up.** Per the d16-divisio hand-off: this chunk folds the ARTICULUS I header + subtitle (*De passione doloris, prout respicit animam et carnem communiter*) + QUAESTIO I title, and picks up **p.345 footers 3+** (`[^p345-3]`–`[^p345-7]`); the divisio retained only p.345 footers 1–2.

**Hand-off forwarded.** QUAESTIO II (*acerbitate*, `Utrum in Christo fuerit acerbissimus dolor`) begins at **raw line 24323** (`QIMESTIO II.`, OCR-mangled; body opener `Secundo quaeritur de doloris acerbitate` at raw 24326), printed p.348. **All p.348 footers (`1 Vers. 12.`, `2 Psal. 87, 8...`, etc.) migrate to the d16-a1-q2 chunk** — they are q.2's footers, not q.1's. **NB: `bon-sent-III-d16-a1-q2` is a MISSING skeleton that must be created next** (the auto-chunker emitted only a1-q1 and a1-q3; acerbitate was dropped). Do NOT renumber existing a1-q1/a1-q3.

**Scholion status.** This chunk has its OWN scholion (items **I** and **II**). Item **I** treats this question (*veritate*); item **II** forward-covers q.2 (*acerbitate*) with its parallel-commentator cross-reference list. There is no separate scholion for q.2 — q.2's commentator references live in this chunk's scholion item II.

**[?] flags.** None. The 450 dpi bands were fully legible across all four pages.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 348 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum in Christo fuerit acerbissimus dolor.*

Secundo quaeritur de doloris acerbitate, et est quaestio, utrum in Christo fuerit dolor acerbissimus. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Threnorum primo[^p348-1]: *O vos omnes, qui transitis per viam, attendite et videte, si est dolor, sicut dolor meus*; hoc dicitur in persona Christi: ergo videtur, quod nullus alius dolor habeat illi aequari.

2. Item, in Psalmo[^p348-2]: *Omnes fluctus tuos induxisti super me*, dicitur in persona Christi; sed non omnes induxit quantum ad varietatem: ergo omnes induxit quantum ad aequivalentiam et acerbitatem.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Quanto complexio nobilior est, tanto passio doloris in ea est acerbior; sed Christus nobilissimam habuit complexionem — nobilitas enim complexionis respondet nobilitati animae[^p348-3] — ergo cum Christus nobilissimam animam habuerit, habuit ergo in patiendo maximam doloris afflictionem.

4. Item, quanto sensus tactus est vivacior, tanto dolor, qui est secundum sensum, est acutior, unde in illis membris, in quibus viget sensus tactus, est dolor acutissimus; sed in Christo fuit sensus tactus vivacissimus; « prudentissimum enim animalium est homo », ut dicit Philosophus[^p348-4], et inter omnes Christus, cum fuerit optime dispositus: ergo dolor, quem sensit, super omnes dolores fuit acutissimus.

5. Item, quanto maius est bonum, quod amittitur, tanto maiorem infert dolorem ei qui cognoscit et habet usum rationis; sed vita Christi erat nobilissima, et passio illa vitam perimebat: ergo dolorem illi animae acutissimum inferebat[^p348-5].

6. Item, tanto poena est acerbior, quanto velocius virtutem naturae deiicit, maxime ubi aliquod membrorum principalium non corrumpit; sed Christus in Cruce suspensus adeo cito fuit mortuus, ut etiam miraretur Pilatus[^p348-6]: ergo videtur, quod dolor eius gravissimus fuisset.

**Sed contra hoc:** 1. Primo obiicitur a parte *generis poenae*, quia poena ignis acutius affligit quam poena ferri; sed Laurentius et Vincentius exusti fuerunt in igne: ergo videtur, quod maiorem dolorem senserint quam Christus.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte *voluntatis patiendi*, quia, quanto aliquis magis desiderat pati, tanto minus dolet in patiendo; sed Christus vehementer desiderabat pati pro genere humano, sicut dicitur in Lucae duodecimo[^p348-7]: *Baptismo habeo baptizari, et quomodo coarctor, usque dum perficiatur* etc.: ergo videtur, quod dolor eius valde parum de acerbitate habuit.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte *adiutorii*, quia quanto homo maiorem habet caritatem, tanto facilius sustinet cruciatum poenae; sed Christus maximae caritatis fuit: ergo facillime tormenta portavit: ergo valde parum doluit.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a parte *boni amissi*, quia, quanto maius est bonum, quod perditur, tanto maior dolor est ei qui amittit; sed peccator perdidit Deum, qui est maius bonum, quam sit vita ista corporalis: ergo videtur, quod acerbior dolor sit in viro contrito et poenitente, quam fuerit in Christo patiente.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte *recompensationis*, quia, quanto alicui fit maior et melior recompensatio de bono amisso, tanto mitior[^p348-8] est dolor; sed Christo pro dolore passionis et expositione vitae suae restituebatur stola gloriae in se et in ceteris membris suis: ergo etc.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex parte *spei*, quia quanto aliquis certius exspectat liberationem, tanto minus affligitur in passione; sed Christus certissimus erat de liberatione proxima: ergo videtur, quod afflictio eius erat valde modica.

### Conclusio

> Dolor passionis Christi inter ceteros dolores fuit acerbissimus et acutissimus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dolor passionis Christi inter ceteros dolores et passiones fuit acerbissimus et acutissimus. Et hoc patet, si illa considerentur, quae doloris passionem acerbiorem reddunt. Haec autem sunt tria, videlicet *causa passionis* et *modus patiendi* et *conditio patientis*.

<!-- page 349 -->

Si consideretur causa, ob quam Christus passus est, fuit in eo doloris afflictio magna. Non enim patiebatur pro culpa propria, immo pro aliena; non pro amicis tantum, sed etiam[^p349-1] pro inimicis, et etiam pro his quos videbat ingratos. — Si autem consideretur modus patiendi, fuit in eo passio doloris acerbior, tum propter generalitatem, quia in omnibus membris affligebatur, tum etiam propter continuitatem, quia suspendium eius continuabatur, et clavi adeo affligebant pendentem, sicut afflixerunt, quando manus eius et pedes confodiebantur, in quibus maxima erat afflictio propter nervos et musculos[^p349-2] ibidem concurrentes, in quibus praecipue viget sensus. — Si autem consideretur qualitas sive conditio patientis, maxima erat afflictio propter maximam complexionis aequalitatem et propter sensus vivacitatem. Unde quia nullus potuit ei aequari nec in aequalitate complexionis nec in vivacitate sensus, dolor illius omnium dolorum fuit acutissimus[^p349-3].

Et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedamus; et ei gratias, quantas possumus et supra quam possumus, referamus, si quo modo donetur nobis, ut tam graviter patienti compatiamur. — Rationes vero, quae obiiciuntur ad contrarium, quae ostendunt mitigationem doloris Christi, non obviant veritati, si recte intelligantur. Contingit enim esse acerbitatem in dolore quantum ad duo, videlicet quantum ad *experientiam sensus* et quantum ad *repugnationem*[^p349-4] *rationis*. Licet autem in Christo fuerit maxima doloris afflictio quantum ad experientiam sensus; ratio tamen Christi modicos reputabat omnes illos cruciatus, hoc tamen non auferebat acerbitatem, sed rationis subversionem.

**Ad opposita:** *Ad 2, 3, 5, 6.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad illas quatuor rationes, quae sumuntur ex parte voluntatis desiderantis, ex parte caritatis adiuvantis, ex parte recompensationis et ex parte exspectationis.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte generis poenae, dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex insufficienti. Acerbitas enim poenae non tantum pensatur ex parte agentis, quantum ex parte patientis. « Actus enim activorum est in patiente disposito[^p349-5] »; et quia qualitas in Christo reddebat ipsum ad maiorem dolorem dispositum, ideo bene concedo, quod clavus ferreus multo plus afflixit Christum, quam ignis Laurentium.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dolor in contrito excedit dolorem in Christo propter quantitatem boni amissi; dicendum, quod *damnificatio* per se non infert dolorem, sed *sensus damnificationis*[^p349-6]; quamvis autem peccator maius bonum amittat, quia tamen non magis sentit, sed minus, non sequitur, quod magis doleat, ut plurimum. Valde enim parum affligitur, quamvis magnam dolendi habeat rationem et causam[^p349-7].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether in Christ there was a most bitter pain.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the bitterness of pain, and the question is whether in Christ there was a most bitter pain. And that there was, it seems.

1. Lamentations, chapter one[^p348-1]: *O all you who pass by the way, attend and see, if there is any sorrow like my sorrow*; this is said in the person of Christ: therefore it seems that no other pain can be equaled to his.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm[^p348-2]: *You have brought in upon me all your billows*, is said in the person of Christ; but he did not bring them all in as regards variety: therefore he brought them all in as regards equivalence and bitterness.

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason. The nobler the complexion, the more bitter is the suffering of pain in it; but Christ had the noblest complexion — for the nobility of the complexion corresponds to the nobility of the soul[^p348-3] — therefore since Christ had the noblest soul, he had therefore in suffering the greatest affliction of pain.

4. Likewise, the more lively the sense of touch, the sharper is the pain which is according to sense, whence in those members in which the sense of touch is vigorous, the pain is sharpest; but in Christ the sense of touch was most lively; for « man is the most prudent of the animals », as the Philosopher says[^p348-4], and among all men Christ, since he was the best disposed: therefore the pain which he felt was sharpest above all pains.

5. Likewise, the greater the good which is lost, the greater the pain it brings on him who knows it and has the use of reason; but the life of Christ was the noblest, and that suffering was destroying his life: therefore it inflicted the sharpest pain on that soul[^p348-5].

6. Likewise, a penalty is the more bitter the more swiftly it casts down the strength of nature, especially where it does not destroy any of the principal members; but Christ, suspended on the Cross, died so quickly that even Pilate marveled[^p348-6]: therefore it seems that his pain was most grievous.

**On the contrary:** 1. First it is objected on the part of the *kind of penalty*, because the penalty of fire afflicts more sharply than the penalty of iron; but Lawrence and Vincent were burned in fire: therefore it seems that they felt greater pain than Christ.

2. Likewise, the same is shown on the part of the *will to suffer*, because, the more one desires to suffer, the less he grieves in suffering; but Christ vehemently desired to suffer for the human race, as is said in Luke chapter twelve[^p348-7]: *I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened until it be accomplished* etc.: therefore it seems that his pain had very little of bitterness.

3. Likewise, the same is shown on the part of the *aid*, because the greater the charity a man has, the more easily he bears the torment of penalty; but Christ was of the greatest charity: therefore he bore the torments most easily: therefore he grieved very little.

4. Likewise, the same seems so on the part of the *good lost*, because, the greater the good which is lost, the greater the pain to him who loses it; but the sinner lost God, who is a greater good than this bodily life: therefore it seems that there is more bitter pain in a contrite and penitent man than there was in the suffering Christ.

5. Likewise, the same is shown on the part of the *recompense*, because, the greater and better the recompense made to someone for the good lost, the milder[^p348-8] the pain; but to Christ, for the pain of the passion and the exposing of his life, there was being restored the robe of glory in himself and in his other members: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the same is shown on the part of *hope*, because the more certainly one expects deliverance, the less he is afflicted in suffering; but Christ was most certain of his deliverance soon to come: therefore it seems that his affliction was very moderate.

### Conclusion

> The pain of Christ's passion among other pains was most bitter and most sharp.

**I respond:** It must be said that the pain of Christ's passion, among other pains and sufferings, was most bitter and most sharp. And this is plain if those things are considered which render the suffering of pain more bitter. These are three, namely the *cause of the suffering* and the *manner of suffering* and the *condition of the sufferer*.

If the cause is considered, on account of which Christ suffered, there was in him a great affliction of pain. For he was not suffering for his own fault, but rather for another's; not for friends only, but also[^p349-1] for enemies, and even for those whom he saw to be ungrateful. — But if the manner of suffering is considered, there was in him a more bitter suffering of pain, both on account of its generality, because he was afflicted in all his members, and also on account of its continuity, because his hanging was continuous, and the nails afflicted him hanging as much as they afflicted him when his hands and feet were pierced, in which the affliction was greatest on account of the nerves and muscles[^p349-2] meeting there, in which sense is especially vigorous. — But if the quality or condition of the sufferer is considered, the affliction was greatest on account of the greatest evenness of complexion and on account of the liveliness of sense. Whence, because no one could be equaled to him either in evenness of complexion or in liveliness of sense, his pain was the sharpest of all pains[^p349-3].

And therefore let us grant the reasons which show this; and let us return him thanks, as much as we can and beyond what we can, if in any way it be granted us to suffer along with one suffering so grievously. — But the reasons which are objected to the contrary, which show a mitigation of Christ's pain, do not oppose the truth, if they are rightly understood. For it happens that there is bitterness in pain in two respects, namely as regards the *experience of sense* and as regards the *repugnance*[^p349-4] *of reason*. But although there was in Christ the greatest affliction of pain as regards the experience of sense; nevertheless the reason of Christ reckoned all those torments slight — yet this did not take away the bitterness, but the overthrow of reason.

**To the opposing arguments:** *To 2, 3, 5, 6.* And by this is plain the response to those four reasons which are taken on the part of the desiring will, on the part of the aiding charity, on the part of the recompense, and on the part of expectation.

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the part of the kind of penalty, it must be said that that reason proceeds from an insufficient ground. For the bitterness of a penalty is not weighed so much on the part of the agent as on the part of the patient. « For the act of agents is in a disposed patient[^p349-5] »; and because the quality in Christ rendered him disposed to greater pain, therefore I grant well that the iron nail afflicted Christ much more than the fire afflicted Lawrence.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the pain in the contrite man exceeds the pain in Christ on account of the quantity of the good lost; it must be said that *damage* of itself does not bring on pain, but the *sense of damage*[^p349-6]; and although the sinner loses a greater good, yet because he does not feel it more, but less, it does not follow that he grieves more, for the most part. For he is afflicted very little, although he has a great ground and cause for grieving[^p349-7].

---

la: Vers. 12.

en: Verse 12.

la: Psal. 87, 8. — In minori post *varietatem*, pro quo cod. H substituit *numerositatem* et edd. 1, 2 cum aliquot codd. *veritatem*, Vat. addit *seu multitudinem*.

en: Psalm 87:8. — In the minor premise, after *varietatem*, in place of which codex H substitutes *numerositatem* and editions 1, 2 with some codices read *veritatem*, the Vatican edition adds *seu multitudinem*.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. *de Generat. animal.* c. 3. Ipsa verba vide tom. II. pag. 380, nota 1.

en: According to Aristotle, II *On the Generation of Animals* c. 3. See the words themselves in tom. II, page 380, note 1.

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 94. (c. 9.): *Certiorem habemus gustum, propterea quod ipse quidam tactus est; hunc autem habet sensum homo certissimum. In aliis enim superatur ab animalibus multis, secundum autem tactum multo quam cetera excellentius percipit; unde et prudentissimum animalium est.* Lib. II. *de Partib. animal.* c. 16. asserit, « quod [homo] maxime omnium animalium valet sensu tactus »; et ibid. IV. c. 10. dicit: *Anaxagoras igitur hominem prudentissimum omnium animalium esse ait, quoniam unus omnium manus obtinet; sed recta ratio exigit, ut quoniam prudentissimus omnium est, ideo manus receperit; manus enim instrumentum sunt... qui enim prudentissimus est, recte plurimis uti instrumentis potest; manus autem esse videtur non unum instrumentum, sed multa* etc. — Pro *prudentissimum enim* Vat. substituit *temperatissimus enim* et deinde post *et inter omnes* interiicit *homines temperatissimus fuit*.

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 94 (c. 9): *We have a more certain taste, because it itself is a certain kind of touch; and this sense man has most certain. For in the other senses he is surpassed by many animals, but according to touch he perceives much more excellently than the rest; whence also he is the most prudent of the animals.* Book II *On the Parts of Animals* c. 16 asserts that « [man] is strongest of all animals in the sense of touch »; and ibid. IV, c. 10, he says: *Anaxagoras therefore says that man is the most prudent of all animals, because alone of all he possesses hands; but right reason requires that, since he is the most prudent of all, he therefore received hands; for hands are an instrument... for he who is most prudent can rightly use very many instruments; and the hand seems to be not one instrument but many* etc. — For *prudentissimum enim* the Vatican edition substitutes *temperatissimus enim* and then after *et inter omnes* inserts *homines temperatissimus fuit*.

la: Homo virtuosus et probus, ut Aristot., IX. *Ethic.* c. 4. docet, diligit vitam suam; « probo enim viro esse bonum est... At qui multa et gravia scelera perpetrarunt et ob pravitatem odio habentur et vitam fugiunt seque ipsos interficiunt ». — In maiori pro *qui cognoscit* codd. F G I K L N U Z aa *quod cognoscit*. In minori pro *passio illa vitam* codd. A E bb *passio illam vitam*.

en: The virtuous and upright man, as Aristotle teaches in IX *Ethics* c. 4, loves his own life; « for to the upright man it is good to be... But those who have perpetrated many and grievous crimes and on account of their depravity are held in hatred both flee life and kill themselves ». — In the major premise, for *qui cognoscit* codices F G I K L N U Z aa read *quod cognoscit*. In the minor premise, for *passio illa vitam* codices A E bb read *passio illam vitam*.

la: Vers. 50.

en: Verse 50.

la: Pro *mitior* codd. N U S *minor*. Paulo inferius codd. G H I L T Z aa bb omittunt *et* post *dolore passionis*, qua omissione admissa, pro *expositione* legendum erit *ex positione*.

en: For *mitior* codices N U S read *minor*. A little below, codices G H I L T Z aa bb omit *et* after *dolore passionis*, and if that omission is admitted, for *expositione* one must read *ex positione*.

la: Cod. U *immo etiam*.

en: Codex U reads *immo etiam* (rather, even).

la: Cod. Z *articulos*.

en: Codex Z reads *articulos* (joints).

la: Cod. K verbo *acutissimus* praemittit *acerbissimus et*.

en: Codex K prefixes to the word *acutissimus* the words *acerbissimus et*.

la: Cod. T *repugnantiam*, codd. A H K Y (bb a prima manu) *reputationem*. Paulo inferius ante *tamen non* cum codd. A Z bb inseruimus *hoc*, et deinde pro *desiderantis* non pauci codd. substituunt *deficientis*, cod. Z *considerantis*.

en: Codex T reads *repugnantiam*, codices A H K Y (bb in the first hand) *reputationem*. A little below, before *tamen non*, with codices A Z bb we inserted *hoc*, and then for *desiderantis* not a few codices substitute *deficientis*, codex Z *considerantis*.

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 21. (c. 2.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 361, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro *afflixit* cod. A *afflixerit*.

en: Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 21 (c. 2). Cf. tom. II, page 361, note 3. — A little below, for *afflixit* codex A reads *afflixerit*.

la: Sicut generatim dolor non est ipsa passio, sed passionis sensus. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 482, nota 3.

en: Just as pain in general is not the suffering itself, but the sense of the suffering. Cf. tom. II, page 482, note 3.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p34{8,9}-{L,R}-*.png`, PDF pp. 370–371 = printed 348–349, offset +22), per the Vol III PDF-priority inversion. English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus rendered page by page directly from the printed footers. **This chunk was CREATED from scratch:** the auto-chunker emitted only `bon-sent-III-d16-a1-q1` and `bon-sent-III-d16-a1-q3`; `a1-q2` (*de doloris acerbitate*) was dropped, although the d.16 TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM lists three questions for ART. I (veritate / acerbitate / necessitate). Raw span 24323→24434 (`QIMESTIO II.` OCR-mangled = QUAESTIO II at raw 24323; body opener `Secundo quaeritur de doloris acerbitate` at raw 24326).

**Page-split map.**
- p.348 (PDF 370): top carries the tail of q1's scholion (item II commentator list) in both columns; then the QUAESTIO II header + title; then this question's body — fundamenta 1–6 + sed contra 1–6 (through *recompensationis*) + opening of sed contra into CONCLUSIO + RESPONDEO opener. Footers 1–8 (all q2's).
- p.349 (PDF 371): RESPONDEO body (causa / modus patiendi / conditio patientis) + the *Nota* on giving thanks + the *Notandum* on experientia sensus vs repugnatio rationis + the solutions (*ad 2,3,5,6* collapsed; *ad 1*; *ad 4*). The LEFT column of p.349 already belongs to q.3 (its fundamenta + running head `DIST. XVI. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` and the `QUAESTIO III.` header at the foot); q.2's body sits in the RIGHT column. Footers shared with q.3: this question carries **footers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7**; footers 8, 9 belong to q.3.

**Hand-off picked up.** From d16-a1-q1's forwarded hand-off: QUAESTIO II body begins at raw 24323, printed p.348; **all p.348 footers migrate here** (set as `[^p348-1]`–`[^p348-8]`). Confirmed: q.1 held no footers on p.348 (its p.348 content is scholion tail only). Alignment confirmed: opener reads *de doloris acerbitate* / *utrum in Christo fuerit dolor acerbissimus* (= q2 acerbitate, not q1 veritate nor q3 necessitate).

**Hand-off forwarded (to d16-a1-q3).** QUAESTIO III (*Utrum Christus assumserit necessitatem patiendi*) begins at **raw line 24435** (`QUAESTIO III.`; title at raw 24436; body opener `Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus necessitatem assumsit patiendi` at raw 24438), printed p.349 foot. The p.349 footer block is SHARED: **q.3 keeps footers 8, 9 on p.349** (plus all of p.350's block, which the existing q3 skeleton already holds); q.2 (this chunk) took footers 1–7. When q3 is promoted, do NOT re-assign p.349 footers 1–7 to it — they are this question's.

**Scholion status.** `has_scholion: false`. This question has no own scholion; its parallel-commentator references are already in q1's scholion item II (verified on p.348 — the page top carries only the q1 scholion tail, and no SCHOLION header follows q2's *ad 4* before the QUAESTIO III header). Source-first: nothing q2-specific is printed.

**Backfill (2026-06-05).** Cross-chunk seam gap caught when sibling `d16-a1-q3` was verified eyes-on: p.349 footers **1** (`Cod. U immo etiam` — codex variant on *sed etiam* in this question's respondeo) and **2** (`Cod. Z articulos` — codex variant on *musculos* in this question's respondeo) anchor in q.2's RIGHT-column body, NOT in q.3. They were originally (and wrongly) parked with q.3. Recovered here as `[^p349-1]`/`[^p349-2]`, markers placed at the *sed etiam* / *musculos* anchors in both bodies. Apparatus count for this chunk: 8 (p.348) + 7 (p.349) = **15** entries.

**[?] flags.** None. The 450 dpi bands were fully legible across both pages.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 349 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum Christus assumserit necessitatem patiendi.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus necessitatem assumserit patiendi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Hebraeos nono[^p349-8]: *Quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori, post hoc autem iudicium, sic et Christus semel oblatus est*; Glossa: « Eadem necessitate et iure naturae »: ergo secundum hoc mortuus est Christus secundum statum naturae; sed qui sic moritur, moriendi habet necessitatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus ad Iulianum[^p349-9]: « Si talem carnem, qualem habuit Adam in primo statu, assumsit Christus, non solum caro Christi non esset caro peccati, sed nec similis carni peccati »: si ergo Christus fuit similis carni peccati, constat, quod non

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assumsit carnem secundum statum naturae institutae, sed secundum statum naturae lapsae. Sed haec caro habet necessitatem moriendi: ergo etc.

3. Item, Boethius in libro *de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi*[^p350-1] dicit, quod Christus de statu innocentiae assumsit peccati immunitatem, de statu vero naturae lapsae assumsit passibilitatem; sed passibilitas, quae est secundum statum naturae lapsae, est patiendi necessitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, Spiritus sanctus, cuius virtute illud corpus fabricatum fuit de utero Virginis, etsi purificaverit a foeditate corruptionis, non tamen purificavit a defectu passibilitatis[^p350-2]: ergo passibilitatem habuit per eum modum, per quem Virgo, quae eum genuit, excepto reatu peccati. Sed Virgo habuit necessitatem moriendi et patiendi: ergo et caro Christi: ergo et Christus.

5. Item, Christi corpus ita fuit passibile, sicut fuit animale et terrestre; sed corpus Christi propter animalitatem et terrestreitatem necessitatem habuit naturalem sumendi cibum et tendendi deorsum, aliter enim stare non potuisset nisi per miraculum: ergo pari ratione propter passibilitatem necessitatem habuit ad patiendum et moriendum.

6. Item, Christus assumsit omnes defectus naturales et generales, exceptis his qui ordinant ad peccatum[^p350-3]; sed necessitas patiendi est defectus in nobis naturalis et generalis, nec tamen ordinat ad peccatum: ergo Christus eam assumsit.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ioannis decimo[^p350-4]: *Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et iterum sumendi eam*; et paulo ante: *Nemo tollet eam a me, sed ego pono eam a me ipso*: ergo pati et mori erat in libertate voluntatis Christi: ergo non videtur, quod Christus aliquam ad hoc necessitatem habuerit.

2. Item, Augustinus super illud Ioannis tertio[^p350-5]: *Qui desursum venit super omnes est*: « Desursum venit, quia de altitudine humanae naturae ante peccatum accepit Verbum Dei humanam naturam »; sed in statu illo non habebat humana natura necessitatem ad moriendum: ergo nec prout fuit assumta a Christo.

3. Item, Anselmus in libro *Cur Deus homo*[^p350-6]: « Quoniam voluntas Dei nulla necessitate facit aliquid, sed sola potestate; et voluntas Christi fuit voluntas Dei: nulla igitur necessitate mortuus est, sed sola potestate ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostendit[^p350-7] alia ratione tali: « Omnis necessitas aut est coactio, aut prohibitio, quae duae necessitates convertuntur ad invicem contrariae, sicut *necesse* et *impossibile*; sed in Christo non fuit coactio ad mori, vel prohibitio ad non mori: ergo in Christo nulla fuit necessitas ad moriendum », et ita nec ad patiendum.

5. Item, quandocumque aliqua proprietas necessario inest alicui subiecto, comparatur ad illud sicut ad causam et subiectum[^p350-8]; sed passio non habuit causam in Christo: ergo non fuit necessarium, Christum pati: ergo Christus non assumsit necessitatem patiendi.

6. Item, quod necessario inest alicui inest ei, velit nolit: ergo si in Christo fuit necessitas ad patiendum, passus fuisset, vellet nollet; sed nihil tale est plene voluntarium et meritorium[^p350-9]: ergo Christus in patiendo non habuisset plenum meritum. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et primum, videlicet quod Christus habuit necessitatem ad patiendum.

### Conclusio.

> In Christo fuit necessitas patiendi, sed assumta, non contracta.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ad hoc voluerunt aliqui respondere distinguendo necessitatem secundum quatuor genera causarum. Est enim necessitas secundum causam *formalem*, secundum quam dicitur: necessarium est calidum calere. Est etiam necessitas secundum causam materialem, secundum quam dicitur, quod necesse est, calidum in summo converti in ignem. Est etiam necessitas secundum causam efficientem, quae dicitur necessitas secundum violentiam et coactionem; et secundum hanc dicimus, quod lapidem fortiter impulsum necesse est moveri. Et est necessitas secundum causam finalem, secundum quam dicimus, quod serram necesse est esse dentatam, quia est ad dividendum solida et dura[^p350-10]. Secundum hoc, cum quadrupliciter dicatur necessitas, solo *quar-*

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*to* modo necessitas patiendi fuit in Christo, videlicet propter nostram redemptionem. Quantum enim in se fuit, necessitatem ad patiendum non habuit, quia nec fuit in eo humanae conditionis corruptio, nec potuit esse coactio; et ideo non potest ei convenire necessitas secundum alia tria genera causarum. — Hic autem modus distinguendi satis rationabilis est in se et ad quaestionem propositam rationabiliter applicatur, si autem[^p351-1] quaeratur de necessitate patiendi in Christo, prout necessitas patiendi in Christo non tantum includit tempus *post* assumtionem, sed etiam *ante* assumtionem; hoc est, si quaeratur, utrum necessarium fuerit, Christum nostras poenalitates assumere; tunc enim verum est dicere, quod non fuit necessarium nisi necessitate *finis*. Et hoc modo istam quaestionem tractat beatus Anselmus[^p351-2].

Sed Magister aliter tractat istam quaestionem in littera. Quaerit enim, utrum iste defectus, qui est necessitas patiendi, cum sit in nobis per *contractionem*, fuerit in Christo per *voluntariam assumtionem*. Et ad hanc quaestionem dissolvi non potest per praedictam distinctionem. Et ideo aliter oportet dicere, non quia praedictus modus dicendi sit malus, sed quia non valet ad nostrum propositum.

— Sequentes igitur sententiam Magistri in littera, dicere possumus, quod Christus assumsit istum defectum, qui est necessitas patiendi. Quantum enim erat de lege naturae, corpus illud erat resolubile et mortale; et nisi fuisset conservatum miraculose, aliquando senio defecisset. — Attendendum est tamen, quod non *omni* modo fuit necessitas patiendi in Christo, per quem modum est in nobis, sed quodam modo sic, quodam modo aliter. Habet enim necessitas patiendi comparari ad tria, videlicet ad *causam* et ad *subiectum* et ad *virtutem* corporis *regitivam*. Si consideretur per comparationem ad *causam*, sic est in nobis ex duplici causa, videlicet propter foeditatem corruptionis culpabilis et propter qualitatem naturalis compositionis. Ideo enim habemus necessitatem ad patiendum, quia reatum originalis peccati contrahimus, et quia ex contrariis agentibus et patientibus constituti sumus, ita quod continua in corpore nostro sit resolutio. Christus autem necessitatem habuit solum ex *altera* causa; passibilis enim fuit non propter *reatum peccati originalis*, sed propter *modum talis compositionis*. — Similiter per comparationem ad *subiectum*, alio modo est necessitas patiendi in Christo et in nobis. In nobis enim est necessitas patiendi sive per comparationem ad naturam, sive per comparationem ad personam. In Christo autem necessitas erat ad patiendum non per comparationem ad *personam*, quia nulla poterat astringi necessitate, quia *omnia erant ei subiecta*[^p351-3], sed per comparationem ad *naturam* assumtam. — Similiter per comparationem ad *virtutem regitivam* aliter est in nobis necessitas patiendi quam in Christo. Est enim in nobis virtus regitiva et a parte *naturae* et a parte *voluntatis* regitivae[^p351-4]; et respectu utriusque est necessitas patiendi in nobis. Etenim nec natura nec voluntas potest in nobis passionem prohibere; patimur enim, nolimus velimus. In Christo autem necessitas fuit respectu virtutis *naturalis*, sed non respectu *voluntatis*. Nihil enim invitus sustinuit nec sustinere potuit, quia non meruit.

Et sic patet, quod necessitas patiendi assumta fuit a Christo et in Christo fuit per *assumtionem*, tamen non eo modo, quo in nobis est per *contractionem*[^p351-5]. Ideo Christus quasi medium tenet inter nos et statum naturae institutae. Nam in nobis natura et voluntas passioni subest; in *Adam* vero tam natura quam voluntas passioni praeerat; in *Christo* vero passioni suberat natura, sed praeerat voluntas. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus[^p351-6], quod « in Christo etsi passiones fiebant secundum legem naturae, non tamen coacte, sed voluntarie ». — Concedendum est igitur, quod in Christo fuit necessitas patiendi et moriendi non contracta, sed assumta. Concedendae ergo sunt rationes et auctoritates, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de decimo[^p351-7] Ioannis: *Ego pono animam meam* etc.; dicendum, quod illud est verbum personae Filii Dei, cuius non fuit necessitas patiendi vel moriendi; nullus enim ipsum poterat laedere, nisi ipse voluntarie permitteret: unde verbum illud non intelligit *effective*, sed *permissive*, nec excludit necessitatem respectu *naturae*, sed respectu *personae*.

2. Ad illud Augustini quod dicitur, quod assumsit carnem de altitudine humanae naturae; dicendum, quod hoc intelligit Augustinus, sicut exponit Boethius[^p351-8] quantum ad peccandi immunitatem, non quantum ad passibilitatem. Dicit enim idem Boethius, quod « de omni statu aliquid assumsit: de statu innocentiae peccati immunitatem, de statu gloriae peccandi impossibilitatem, de statu naturae lapsae passibilitatem »; unde secundum passibilitatem plus assimilatur naturae lapsae quam naturae institutae

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3. 4. Ad illud Anselmi de voluntate Christi iam patet responsio; non enim excludit necessitatem simpliciter, sed necessitatem respectu voluntatis divinae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod omnis necessitas aut est prohibitionis, aut coactionis; dicendum enim, quod hoc intelligitur de necessitate, quae *repugnat* voluntati, sicut dicit idem Anselmus; de ea autem necessitate, quae voluntati *subest*, non habet veritatem. Ideo ratio illa non probat, quod nulla fuit in Christo necessitas patiendi, sed quia non fuit aliqua eius voluntati contraria.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas, necessario inhaerens alicui, comparatur ad illud sicut ad subiectum et causam; responderi potest, quod verum est. Cum autem assumit, quod passio non habebat causam in Christo; dicendum, quod causa passionis dupliciter potest determinari: vel in genere *moris*, vel in genere *naturae*. In genere *moris* causa passionis est meritum peccati in nobis; et hoc verum est, quod non fuit in Christo. Causa vero in genere *naturae* est compositio ex contrariis secundum statum pugnae et actionis mutuae, et huiusmodi in Christo fuit mera voluntate; et pro hac causa dicimus in Christo fuisse patiendi necessitatem. Et hinc est, quod patiendi necessitas in Christo voluntatem non excludit, sed potius includit.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod necessario inest alicui inest ei, velit nolit; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem nisi de ea necessitate, quae est contra voluntatem, non de ea quae est ex voluntate et subest voluntati; et talis necessitas non diminuit de ratione meriti, sicut ponit Anselmus[^p352-1] exemplum de eo qui voluntarie se obligavit ad opera supererogationis. Et si obiiciatur, quod ista duo non possunt simul stare, quod aliquid sit necessarium et voluntarium, cum voluntarium possit sic et aliter se habere, necessarium vero minime[^p352-3]; dicendum, quod illud verum est de voluntate, quae habet secum annexam vertibilitatem, sed de voluntate invertibili non est verum. Christus enim voluntarie benefecit, et tamen necessarium fuit, ipsum bene facere; sic et voluntarie passibilitatem nostram assumsit, ita quod impossibile fuit, eum poenitere de hoc, quod assumserat defectum talem.

english:
### Question III. *Whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering. And that he did, it seems.

1. To the Hebrews, ninth chapter[^p349-8]: *As it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment, so Christ was once offered*; Gloss: « By the same necessity and right of nature »: therefore according to this Christ died according to the state of nature; but he who dies thus has the necessity of dying: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine *to Julian*[^p349-9]: « If Christ assumed such flesh as Adam had in the first state, not only would Christ's flesh not be flesh of sin, but neither would it be like the flesh of sin »: if therefore Christ was like the flesh of sin, it is clear that he did not

assume flesh according to the state of nature as instituted, but according to the state of fallen nature. But this flesh has the necessity of dying: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures and the one person of Christ*[^p350-1] says that Christ from the state of innocence assumed immunity from sin, but from the state of fallen nature assumed passibility; but passibility, which is according to the state of fallen nature, is the necessity of suffering: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit, by whose power that body was fashioned from the womb of the Virgin, although it purified it from the foulness of corruption, did not however purify it from the defect of passibility[^p350-2]: therefore it had passibility through that mode through which the Virgin who bore him had it, except for the guilt of sin. But the Virgin had the necessity of dying and suffering: therefore also the flesh of Christ: therefore also Christ.

5. Likewise, Christ's body was passible just as it was animal and earthly; but Christ's body, on account of its animality and earthliness, had a natural necessity of taking food and tending downward, for otherwise it could not have stood except by a miracle: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of passibility, it had a necessity of suffering and dying.

6. Likewise, Christ assumed all natural and general defects, except those which are ordered to sin[^p350-3]; but the necessity of suffering is a defect in us natural and general, and yet it is not ordered to sin: therefore Christ assumed it.

**On the contrary:**

1. John, tenth chapter[^p350-4]: *I have power to lay down my soul and to take it up again*; and a little before: *No man takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself*: therefore to suffer and to die was in the freedom of Christ's will: therefore it does not seem that Christ had any necessity for this.

2. Likewise, Augustine on that text of John, third chapter[^p350-5]: *He that comes from above is above all*: « He comes from above, because from the height of human nature before sin the Word of God took human nature »; but in that state human nature did not have a necessity of dying: therefore neither as it was assumed by Christ.

3. Likewise, Anselm in the book *Why God Became Man*[^p350-6]: « Since the will of God does nothing by any necessity, but by power alone; and the will of Christ was the will of God: by no necessity therefore did he die, but by power alone ».

4. Likewise, he shows[^p350-7] the same thing by another reasoning of this kind: « Every necessity is either compulsion or prohibition, which two necessities are converted into one another as contraries, just as the *necessary* and the *impossible*; but in Christ there was no compulsion to die, or prohibition against not dying: therefore in Christ there was no necessity of dying », and so neither of suffering.

5. Likewise, whenever some property necessarily inheres in some subject, it is related to it as to a cause and subject[^p350-8]; but the passion had no cause in Christ: therefore it was not necessary that Christ suffer: therefore Christ did not assume the necessity of suffering.

6. Likewise, what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it whether it will or not: therefore if in Christ there was a necessity for suffering, he would have suffered whether he willed or not; but nothing of this sort is fully voluntary and meritorious[^p350-9]: therefore Christ in suffering would not have had full merit. But if this is false, it remains that the first too is true, namely that Christ had a necessity for suffering.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ there was a necessity of suffering, but assumed, not contracted.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that to this some have wished to respond by distinguishing necessity according to the four genera of causes. For there is a necessity according to the *formal* cause, according to which it is said: it is necessary that what is hot be hot. There is also a necessity according to the material cause, according to which it is said that it is necessary that what is hot in the highest degree be converted into fire. There is also a necessity according to the efficient cause, which is called necessity according to violence and compulsion; and according to this we say that a stone strongly impelled must necessarily be moved. And there is a necessity according to the final cause, according to which we say that a saw must necessarily be toothed, because it is for dividing solid and hard things[^p350-10]. According to this, since necessity is said in four ways, only in the *fourth*

way was there a necessity of suffering in Christ, namely on account of our redemption. For as far as it lay in himself, he did not have a necessity for suffering, because there was in him neither corruption of the human condition, nor could there be compulsion; and therefore necessity according to the other three genera of causes cannot belong to him. — But this mode of distinguishing is reasonable enough in itself and is reasonably applied to the question proposed, if however[^p351-1] it be asked about the necessity of suffering in Christ, inasmuch as the necessity of suffering in Christ includes not only the time *after* the assumption, but also *before* the assumption; that is, if it be asked whether it was necessary that Christ assume our penalties; for then it is true to say that it was not necessary except by the necessity of the *end*. And in this way blessed Anselm treats this question[^p351-2].

But the Master treats this question otherwise in the text. For he asks whether this defect, which is the necessity of suffering, since it is in us through *contraction*, was in Christ through *voluntary assumption*. And to this question it cannot be resolved by the aforesaid distinction. And therefore it must be said otherwise, not because the aforesaid mode of speaking is bad, but because it does not avail for our purpose.

— Following therefore the opinion of the Master in the text, we can say that Christ assumed this defect, which is the necessity of suffering. For as far as it was of the law of nature, that body was dissoluble and mortal; and unless it had been preserved miraculously, it would at some time have failed through old age. — It must be noted, however, that the necessity of suffering was not in Christ in *every* mode in which it is in us, but in a certain mode thus, in a certain mode otherwise. For the necessity of suffering can be compared to three things, namely to the *cause* and to the *subject* and to the *governing power* of the body. If it is considered by comparison to the *cause*, thus it is in us from a twofold cause, namely on account of the foulness of culpable corruption and on account of the quality of natural composition. For we have a necessity for suffering, because we contract the guilt of original sin, and because we are constituted of contrary agents and patients, so that there is continual dissolution in our body. But Christ had the necessity only from the *other* cause; for he was passible not on account of the *guilt of original sin*, but on account of the *mode of such a composition*. — Likewise, by comparison to the *subject*, the necessity of suffering is in another mode in Christ and in us. For in us there is a necessity of suffering either by comparison to nature, or by comparison to person. But in Christ the necessity for suffering was not by comparison to the *person*, because it could be bound by no necessity, since *all things were subject to him*[^p351-3], but by comparison to the *nature* assumed. — Likewise, by comparison to the *governing power* the necessity of suffering is in us otherwise than in Christ. For there is in us a governing power both on the part of *nature* and on the part of the governing *will*[^p351-4]; and with respect to both there is the necessity of suffering in us. For neither nature nor will can prohibit suffering in us; for we suffer whether we will or not. But in Christ the necessity was with respect to the *natural* power, but not with respect to the *will*. For he endured nothing unwillingly, nor could he so endure, because he did not deserve it.

And thus it is clear that the necessity of suffering was assumed by Christ and in Christ it was through *assumption*, yet not in the mode in which it is in us through *contraction*[^p351-5]. Therefore Christ holds as it were a middle between us and the state of nature as instituted. For in us nature and will are subject to suffering; but in *Adam* both nature and will were superior to suffering; but in *Christ* nature was subject to suffering, yet the will was superior. And this is what Damascene says[^p351-6], that « in Christ, although the passions came about according to the law of nature, yet not by compulsion, but voluntarily ». — It must therefore be granted that in Christ there was a necessity of suffering and dying, not contracted, but assumed. The reasons and authorities therefore which are for this part are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary from the tenth chapter[^p351-7] of John: *I lay down my soul* etc.; it must be said that this is the word of the person of the Son of God, whose there was no necessity of suffering or dying; for no one could harm him, unless he himself voluntarily permitted it: hence that word does not mean *effectively*, but *permissively*, nor does it exclude necessity with respect to the *nature*, but with respect to the *person*.

2. To that of Augustine which is said, that he assumed flesh from the height of human nature; it must be said that Augustine means this, as Boethius expounds[^p351-8], as regards immunity from sinning, not as regards passibility. For the same Boethius says that « from every state he assumed something: from the state of innocence immunity from sin, from the state of glory the impossibility of sinning, from the state of fallen nature passibility »; hence as regards passibility he is more assimilated to fallen nature than to nature as instituted.

3. 4. To that of Anselm concerning the will of Christ the response is already clear; for it does not exclude necessity absolutely, but necessity with respect to the divine will. — And by this the response is clear to what follows, which is objected, that every necessity is either of prohibition or of compulsion; for it must be said that this is understood of the necessity which is *repugnant* to the will, as the same Anselm says; but of that necessity which is *subject* to the will, it does not hold true. Therefore that reasoning does not prove that there was no necessity of suffering in Christ, but that there was none contrary to his will.

5. To that which is objected, that a property necessarily inhering in something is related to it as to a subject and cause; it can be answered that this is true. But when he assumes that the passion had no cause in Christ; it must be said that the cause of passion can be determined in two ways: either in the genus of *morals*, or in the genus of *nature*. In the genus of *morals* the cause of passion is the merit of sin in us; and this is true, that it was not in Christ. But the cause in the genus of *nature* is composition from contraries according to a state of struggle and mutual action, and this in Christ was from pure will; and for this cause we say that there was in Christ a necessity of suffering. And hence it is that the necessity of suffering in Christ does not exclude the will, but rather includes it.

6. To that which is objected, that what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it whether it will or not; it must be said that this does not hold true except of that necessity which is against the will, not of that which is from the will and is subject to the will; and such necessity does not diminish from the character of merit, as Anselm sets out[^p352-1] the example of one who voluntarily bound himself to works of supererogation. And if it be objected that these two cannot stand together, that something be necessary and voluntary, since the voluntary can be thus and otherwise, but the necessary by no means[^p352-3]; it must be said that this is true of a will which has annexed to it changeableness, but of an unchangeable will it is not true. For Christ did good voluntarily, and yet it was necessary that he do good; so too he voluntarily assumed our passibility, in such a way that it was impossible for him to repent of this, that he had assumed such a defect.

la: Vers. 27. seq. — Glossa ut interlinearis habetur et apud Petr. Lombard. et apud Lyranum. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi etiam Glossa ordinaria habetur. — Pro *iure naturae* plurimi codd. *iuvamine naturae*. Mox pro *statum* mallemus *statutum*.

en: Verse 27 ff. — The Gloss is found as interlinear both in Peter Lombard and in Lyra. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, where also the ordinary Gloss is found. — For *by the right of nature* very many codices have *by the support of nature*. Soon, for *state* we should prefer *that which is appointed*.

la: Sive contra *Iulian. Pelagian.*, V. c. 15. n. 84. Cfr. IV. *Op. imperf. contra Iulian.* 79. et VI. c. 33.

en: Or *Against Julian the Pelagian*, V, c. 15, n. 84. Cf. *Unfinished Work against Julian* IV, 79, and VI, c. 33.

la: Cap. 8. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Chapter 8. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. I. seq. — Mox post *per quem Virgo* cod. F supplet *habuit*.

en: Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. I and following. — Soon after *through whom the Virgin*, codex F supplies *had*.

la: Vide supra d. 15. a. I. q. 2. — Vat. *ordinantur ad peccatum*.

en: See above, d. 15, a. I, q. 2. — The Vatican edition reads *are ordered to sin*.

la: Vers. 18, ubi et seq. testimonium.

en: Verse 18, where also the following testimony is found.

la: Vers. 31. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et August., VI. *Op. imperf.* c. 22; Serm. 362. (alias 121. de Diversis) c. 14. n. 16.

en: Verse 31. See here the text of the Master, c. 4, and Augustine, *Unfinished Work* VI, c. 22; Sermon 362 (otherwise 121, *On Various Matters*) c. 14, n. 16.

la: Libr. II. c. 17.

en: Book II, c. 17.

la: Libr. II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 18., ubi maior propositio hic allata ad verbum habetur, minor tamen et conclusio sententialiter tantum. — Pro *ostendit* edd. et complures codd. *ostenditur*. Pro *ad mori* cod. N substituit *ad moriendum* et dein omittit *ad non mori*.

en: Book II, *Why God Became Man*, c. 18, where the major proposition here adduced is found word for word, but the minor and the conclusion only in substance. — For *he shows* the editions and several codices have *it is shown*. For *to die* codex N substitutes *to dying* and then omits *against not dying*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, a. 2, q. 3, in the body.

la: Alan. ab Insul., *Theolog. Regul.* regul. 71: Omne meritum est voluntarium aut voluntate originis, aut origine voluntatis. Omne enim meritum, sive bonum sive malum, aut habet voluntatem praecedentem, aut concomitantem; et ita voluntarium est aut voluntate a qua, aut voluntate cum qua. — De merito Christi agitur infra d. 18. per totam. — Paulo superius pro *fuit necessitas* cod. A *fuisset necessitas*.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 71: Every merit is voluntary either by the will of origin, or by the origin of the will. For every merit, whether good or evil, has either a preceding will or a concomitant one; and so it is voluntary either by the will from which, or by the will with which. — The merit of Christ is treated below, throughout d. 18. — A little above, for *there was a necessity* codex A has *there would have been a necessity*.

la: Ut insinuat Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 88. et 90. (c. 9.), et I. *de Partib. animal.* c. 5. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 10, nota 9. De aliis speciebus necessitatis vide Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Oppositis; II. *Poster.* c. 11. (c. 10.); V. *Metaph.* text. 6. (IV. c. 5.); XII. text. 38. (XI. c. 7.); V. *de Generat. animal.* c. 8. et III. *Ethic.* c. 1.

en: As Aristotle suggests, *Physics* II, text 88 and 90 (c. 9), and *On the Parts of Animals* I, c. 5. Cf. tom. I, pag. 10, note 9. On the other species of necessity see Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter on the Opposites; *Posterior [Analytics]* II, c. 11 (c. 10); *Metaphysics* V, text 6 (IV, c. 5); XII, text 38 (XI, c. 7); *On the Generation of Animals* V, c. 8, and *Ethics* III, c. 1.

la: Ita fere omnes codd. et edd. I. 2 (melius esset *tamen*); sed deest in Vat. et cod. A.

en: So nearly all the codices and editions I and 2 (it would be better to read *however*); but it is lacking in the Vatican edition and codex A.

la: Libr. II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 17. seqq. — Sententia Magistri habetur hic in lit. c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro *Et ad hanc quaestionem dissolvi* [Vat. *responderi*] codd. K *Sed haec quaestio dissolvi*, edd. I, 2 *Et ideo hanc quaestionem dissolvere*. Post pauca pro *modus dicendi* codd. N U *modus distinguendi*.

en: Book II, *Why God Became Man*, c. 17 ff. — The opinion of the Master is found here in the text, c. 3. — A little below, for *And to this question it cannot be resolved* [Vat. *be answered*] codices K [read] *But this question be resolved*, editions I, 2 *And therefore to resolve this question*. After a few words, for *mode of speaking* codices N U [read] *mode of distinguishing*.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 15, 27.

en: 1 Corinthians 15, 27.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 2. q. I. ad I. et a. 3. q. I. — Pro *et a parte naturae* multi codd. *ex parte naturae*. Codd. K Z prosequuntur *et ex parte voluntatis*.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 19, a. 2, q. I, ad I, and a. 3, q. I. — For *and on the part of nature* many codices have *from the part of nature*. Codices K Z continue *and from the part of the will*.

la: Vide supra d. 15. a. I. q. 3.

en: See above, d. 15, a. I, q. 3.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 20. — Paulo inferius pro *Concedendae ergo sunt* cod. A *Concedendae sunt etiam*.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 20. — A little below, for *therefore they are to be granted* codex A has *they are also to be granted*.

la: Vers. 18. — Inferius pro *permitteret* Vat. *permisisset*.

en: Verse 18. — Below, for *he would permit* the Vatican edition reads *he had permitted*.

la: *De Una Persona et duab. natur.* c. 8. — Paulo inferius pro *peccati immunitatem* edd. *peccandi immunitatem*. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et supra d. 12. a. 2. q. I. ad 4.

en: *On the One Person and Two Natures*, c. 8. — A little below, for *immunity from sin* the editions read *immunity from sinning*. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, and above, d. 12, a. 2, q. I, ad 4.

la: Libr. II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 18, ubi inter alia dicit haec: *Et si vis omnium quae [Christus] fecit et quae passus est, veram scire necessitatem, scito, omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit; voluntatem vero eius nulla praecessit necessitas* etc. Cfr. ibid. c. 5, et *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. I. c. 2. Vide etiam infra solut. ad 6. — Paulo inferius pro *quod nulla* codd. G 1 L N U V Z *quia nulla*, et subinde pro *quia non* edd. *quod non*.

en: Book II, *Why God Became Man*, c. 18, where among other things he says this: *And if you wish to know the true necessity of all that [Christ] did and suffered, know that all came about of necessity, because he himself willed it; but no necessity preceded his will* etc. Cf. ibid. c. 5, and *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. I, c. 2. See also below, the solution to 6. — A little below, for *that none* codices G 1 L N U V Z have *because none*, and thereupon for *because not* the editions have *that not*.

la: Aristot., IV. *Metaph.* text. 23. (III. c. 5.): Necessarium enim non contingit aliter et aliter se habere; quare si quid necessario est, non ita et non ita habebit. — In fine solut. pro *assumserat* codd. F T *assumserit*, cod. V *assumsit*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 23 (III, c. 5): For the necessary cannot be otherwise and otherwise; wherefore if anything is necessarily, it will not be thus and not thus. — At the end of the solution, for *he had assumed* codices F T [read] *he assumed* [subjunctive], codex V *he assumed*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio iam tacta est supra d. 15. a. I. q. 3. De eadem, praecipue quoad necessitatem moriendi, pluribus quaestionibus tractant S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. 1-3.) aliique Commentatores, scilicet utrum necessitas moriendi sit homini ex peccato; utrum haec in Christo fuerit; denique, utrum haec in Christo subfuerit humanae voluntati. Ad hanc ultimam S. Thom. respondet negative (dubitantibus, vel contradicentibus aliis); sed in Sum. (III. q. 14. a. 2.) convenientius eam adhibita distinctione resolvit ac negat, in Christo fuisse hanc necessitatem « neque per respectum ad voluntatem humanam absolute, prout sequitur voluntatem deliberantem, sed solum secundum naturalem motum voluntatis, prout scilicet naturaliter refugit mortem et etiam corporis nocumentum ». Quae doctrina bene convenit cum iis, quae a S. Bonav. hic in corp. dicuntur de virtute regitiva animae, scilicet quod in Christo necessitas fuerit respectu virtutis naturalis, sed non respectu voluntatis.

**II.** Primus modus distinguendi ponitur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 1.); at bene observat noster auctor, quod Magister (hic c. 3.) in alio sensu quaestionem hanc intelligit ac Alexander. — Solutio auctoris communiter approbatur; tamen Richard. a Med. respectu virtutis regitivae immerito contradicit asserens, in natura Christi assumta nullam fuisse virtutem regitivam, nec naturalem nec desuper infusam, qua se a morte praeservare potuisset.

**III.** Praeter laudatos: Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. I. — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 1-4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question has already been touched above, d. 15, a. I, q. 3. Concerning the same, especially as regards the necessity of dying, St. Thomas (here q. I, a. 1-3) and other Commentators treat in several questions, namely whether the necessity of dying is in man from sin; whether this was in Christ; finally, whether this in Christ was subject to the human will. To this last St. Thomas responds negatively (others doubting or contradicting); but in the *Summa* (III, q. 14, a. 2) he more fittingly resolves it with a distinction applied, and denies that there was in Christ this necessity « either by respect to the human will absolutely, inasmuch as it follows the deliberating will, but only according to the natural motion of the will, namely inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and even from harm of the body ». This doctrine accords well with what is said here in the body by St. Bonaventure concerning the governing power of the soul, namely that in Christ the necessity was with respect to the natural power, but not with respect to the will.

**II.** The first mode of distinguishing is set out by Alexander of Hales (S[umma], p. III, q. 18, m. 3, a. 1); but our author rightly observes that the Master (here c. 3) understands this question in a different sense than Alexander. — The author's solution is commonly approved; yet Richard of Mediavilla undeservedly contradicts him with respect to the governing power, asserting that in the assumed nature of Christ there was no governing power, neither natural nor infused from above, by which he could have preserved himself from death.

**III.** Besides those praised: Scotus, in both *Writings* here q. I. — Blessed Albert, here a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 1-4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Biel, here the single question.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{349,350,351,352}-{L,R}-*.png` (the Vol II/III OCR-vs-PDF inversion applies: the bands are authoritative for the Respondeo, solutions, scholion, and every footer). Raw OCR span 24435→24649 in `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`. Offset pdf = printed + 22, so printed pp.349–352 = PDF pp.371–374. ART. I header + subtitle were already folded into d16-a1-q1; this is the LAST quaestio of ARTICULUS I.

**Page-split map (q3 body + per-page footers):**
- **p.349** (foot): QUAESTIO III header + title + fundamentum 1 (begins) + fundamentum 2 (begins). q3's anchors on this page: **footers 8, 9 only** (`Ad Hebraeos nono⁸`, `Augustinus ad Iulianum⁹`). Footers 1–7 belong to q2 (1,2 = q2's own *sed etiam*/*musculos*; 3–7 already captured by q2).
- **p.350**: fundamenta 2(cont)–6, Sed contra 1–6, CONCLUSIO, RESPONDEO (four genera causarum, begins). Footers **1–10**, all q3 (own per-page restart).
- **p.351**: RESPONDEO (cont): *solo quarto modo* … Anselm/Magister distinction, Conclusio 1–5, Epilogus, Solutio oppositorum 1–2. Footers **1–8**, all q3.
- **p.352**: Solutiones 3.4, 5, 6, then SCHOLION I–III. q3's anchors: **footers 1 and 3** (`ponit Anselmus¹`, `necessarium vero minime³`). Footer 2 (`Cur Deus homo c.17` Anselm quote) anchors in the ARTICULUS II opener → belongs to **d16-a2-q1**.

**Apparatus total: 22 entries** — p.349: 2 (notes 8,9); p.350: 10 (notes 1–10); p.351: 8 (notes 1–8); p.352: 2 (notes 1,3). Per-page restart, slugs `[^pNNN-K]`.

**Scholion:** present, items **I, II, III** (verified against p.352 L-bottom + R bands). Item I cross-refs S. Thomas + d.15 a.1 q.3; item II Alexander of Hales / Richard of Mediavilla; item III the commentator roll (Scotus, Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard, Durandus, Dionys. Carth., Biel). `has_scholion: true`.

**Hand-offs picked up (from d16-a1-q2):** on shared p.349, q2 took footers 3–7; q3 takes its true anchors **8, 9**. NOTE — the q2 hand-off stated "q3 keeps 1,2,8,9," but eyes-on the bands shows footers 1 (`Cod. U immo etiam` → q2's *sed etiam¹ pro inimicis*) and 2 (`Cod. Z articulos` → q2's *musculos²*) anchor in **q2's body**, not q3's. q2 captured only 3–7, so **footers 1,2 are an uncaptured q2 gap** (out of scope for this q3 commit; flagged here for a q2 fix-up). q3 correctly carries only 8,9 on p.349.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d16-a2-q1):** ARTICULUS II opens at **raw line 24650** (`ARTICULUS II.`; subtitle *De passibilitate et dolore animae Christi specialiter.*). Per the locked chunking convention, the short ART. II opener ("Consequenter quaeritur de passibilitate et dolore ipsius animae Christi specialiter. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.") **folds into a2-q1** — no standalone divisio chunk. The three sub-questions: (1) *utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an solum secundum sensualitatem* (raw 24681, QUAESTIO I); (2) dato quod secundum rationem, utrum passus secundum partem inferiorem et superiorem; (3) dato quod secundum utramque, utrum poenalius secundum rationem quam secundum partem sensualem. **Migrating footer:** on shared p.352, **footer 2** (`Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c.17` Anselm quote) belongs to the ART. II opener → a2-q1 must capture `[^p352-2]` plus the rest of p.352's footer block from the a2 opener onward and p.353+. q3 holds only p.352 footers 1 and 3. **Scholion forward-cover:** q3's own scholion (I–III) closes ARTICULUS I; it does NOT forward-cover a2 — a2-q1 will have its own scholion. Offset pdf = printed + 22. (d.20 is the next Vol III decade-polish gate — NOT YET.)

**[?] flags:** none — the 450 dpi bands were fully legible across all four pages.