title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum hominem quem praesciebat expugnandum, Deus debuerit permittere per tentationem impugnari

title_alt: Whether God ought to have permitted the man whom He foreknew would be overcome to be assailed through temptation

source_text:
<!-- page 533 -->

### Articulus I. *De permissione primae tentationis.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus debuerit permittere, hominem impugnari.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum debuit Deus permittere, hominem impugnari. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per illud, quod dicit Magister in littera[^1]: « Non esset laudabile bene vivere, nisi esset qui male vivere suaderet »: ergo si debuit permittere omne quod faciebat ad humanam laudem ampliandam, debuit ergo permittere, hominem impugnari per suggestionem diabolicam.

2. Item, secundum rectum iudicium rationis et attestationem Apostoli, secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^2]: *Non coronabitur, nisi qui legitime certaverit*: si ergo homo perducendus erat ad coronam gloriae, videtur ex recto ordine, quod statui debuerit in conflictu tentationis et pugnae.

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3. Item, decet Deum sic administrare res et eis providere, ut salva sit lex, quam indidit eis a primaria conditione, iuxta illud Augustini septimo de Civitate Dei[^3]: « Sic res, quas Deus condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; sed Deus fecit et facere debuit hominem in vertibilitate arbitrii *et relinquere eum in manu consilii sui*, et similiter luciferum: ergo si diabolus voluit hominem vexare, et homo voluit ei consentire, Deus nullum illorum debuit impedire.

4. Item, facilius erat homini vincere adversarium, quam diabolo vincere hominem; homo enim non poterat vinci nisi volens: ergo pugna illa de se magis erat ordinata ad victoriam hominis quam ad victoriam diaboli: ergo magis ad bonum quam ad malum. Si ergo Deus permittere debet quod directe ad bonum hominis ordinatur, videtur, quod a tentatione primi hominis adversarius non erat arcendus.

**Contra:**
1. Impius esset pater, qui permitteret, filium aggredi bellum, in quo sciret, eum esse ab alio superandum; sed Deus noverat, Adam illa tentatione esse superandum: ergo videtur, quod non tanquam pius pater se habuit, dum permisit, eum a diabolo superari.

2. Item, non est bonus praelatus nec pastor, qui permittit, ovem a lupo morderi et rapi, dum potest ipsum repellere et arcere; sed Deus praelatus et pastor hominis erat: ergo cum videret, lupum atrociter insistere, videtur, quod non debuit permittere, ab adversario hominem impugnari sive impeti a lupo[^4].

3. Item, non est rectus iudex, qui bellum constituit inter eos qui non sunt aequaliter fortes; sed diabolus multo fortior erat viribus per naturam quam homo, cum *non sit potestas super terram, quae possit ei comparari*[^5]. Multo etiam erat obstinatior in malitia, quam homo esset confirmatus in gratia. Si igitur Deus iudex aequus est, non debuit permittere, eos invicem confligere.

4. Item, non est fortis possessor, qui permittit, alium invadere atrium suum: *cum enim fortis armatus custodit atrium suum, in pace sunt omnia quae possidet*[^6]. Cum igitur homo in primo statu atrium et templum esset Dei, et Dominus ipse custodiret[^7]; aut Deus non fuit fortis armatus et custos, aut non debuit permittere, adversarium vexare et invadere hominem per conflictum et pugnam tentationis.

### Conclusio.

> Propter plures rationes decuit Deum permittere, ut homo impugnaretur.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedicta dicendum est, quod cum Deus posset adversarium prohibere, ne hominem tentaret, decuit tamen ipsum permittere. — Et ratio condecentiae haberi potest ex rationibus praeassignatis in praecedenti problemate, in quo ostensum est, quod Deus debuit facere hominem in libertate[^8] liberi arbitrii.

Praeter has tamen rationes assignari potest ratio, primo ex ordine, qui attenditur ex comparatione *virtutis ad proprium actum*. « Sic enim Deus res omnes administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; et ideo tam hominem quam diabolum constituit in libertate arbitrii *et in manu consilii sui reliquit*, et utrumque permisit agere quod voluit[^9], sive hunc in tentando, sive illum in consentiendo. Hoc enim competebat regimini in conservatione ordinis, qui attenditur ex comparatione virtutis ad actum proprium.

Secundo vero sumitur ratio ex ordine, qui attenditur per comparationem *boni ad suum oppositum*, in quo gloriosior et laudabilior ostenditur virtus, sive ex ipsa praedicta comparatione, ob quam relucet et magis apparet, sive ex cuiusdam nobilis triumphi assecutione, ob quam fortificatur et vigoratur. Ideo, ut virtus hominis reluceret et proficeret, decuit Deum permittere, ipsum ab adversario impugnari; quia vel tunc, vel post ex ipsa tentationis impulsione manifestanda erat fortitudo et eminentia caritatis, de qua dicit Apostolus, quod *neque mors neque vita neque principatus neque potestates ab ea poterunt separare*, ad Romanos octavo[^10].

Tertio potest sumi ratio ex ordine, qui attenditur ex comparatione *morbi ad suum remedium*. Quia enim peccatum hominis non debebat carere remedio, propter hoc quod tota in ipso humana natura erat; sic debuit Deus hominem permittere peccare, quod deceret ipsum eidem Redemptorem praestare. Et ideo magis disposuit Deus permittere[^11], hominem peccare, alio suggerente et impellente, quam voluntate propria incurvante, qua fortassis incurvatione homo cecidisset, etsi nunquam adversarius pestifera suggessisset.

Quarta ratio sumi potest ex ordine, qui attenditur per comparationem *meriti ad praemium*. Quia enim nemo dignus est coronari, nisi qui certat legitime; ideo decuit Deum hominem militem suum in campo certaminis prius examinare, quam ipsum in gloria exaltare; et quia examinatio consistit in conflictu et pugna, permittere debuit, hominem a diabolo impugnari. — Sunt et aliae rationes, quae possunt de hoc ipso reddi; ad praesens tamen istae sufficiant.

**Ad obiecta:**

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1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de pietate paterna, dicendum, quod etsi Deus sit pater pius, est tamen iudex aequus; et ideo sic decebat Deum erga hominem pietatem paternam ostendere, ut tamen non omitteret officium potestatis iudiciariae; et ideo, quidquid de homine praenosset, sustinere debuit, ipsum ab adversario impeti tentationis bello.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bonitate praelationis, dicendum, quod praelatus debet ovem a morsu lupi eripere, sive quia ad hoc tenetur ex lege caritatis, sive quia ex malo *nescit*[^12], et ideo non *potest* elicere bonum maioris utilitatis. Utriusque horum oppositum reperitur in Deo, si quis attendat; et ideo illa ratio non cogit in proposito.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de rectitudine iudicis, dicendum, quod etsi diabolus fortior et astutior esset quam homo, in pugna tamen tentationis non erat fortior, immo multo debilior, sive ex generali lege tentationis, qua nemo vincitur nisi volens, sive ex fidelitate Dei, *qui non permittit, aliquem tentari supra id quod possit, immo facit cum tentatione proventum*[^13]. Et ideo impulsus tentationis primariae, cum fieret, et servata Dei fidelitate et tentationis lege, non fuit contra ordinem potestatis iudiciariae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fortitudine armati custodientis, dicendum, quod etsi Deus hominem fortiter custodiret, non tamen custodiebat invitum sive involuntarium, quia non acceptat Deus servitium coactum, sed liberale et voluntarium. Et ideo, si homo cum Deo stare voluisset, nullus violenter de manu Dei eum auferre potuisset; sed quia ipse ab eius custodia se subtraxit, ideo Deus suam ei custodiam denegavit, et ex hoc adversarius eum invasit, immo non ex defectu Dei custodientis, sed ex ingratitudine hominis custoditi.

---

english:
### Article I. *On the permission of the first temptation.*
### Question II. *Whether God ought to have permitted that man be assailed.*

Secondly it is asked whether God ought to have permitted that man be assailed. And that He ought, it seems:

1. By that which the Master says in the text[^1]: "It would not be praiseworthy to live well, unless there were someone who urged living badly": therefore if He ought to have permitted everything that contributed to enlarging human praise, He ought therefore to have permitted that man be assailed through diabolical suggestion.

2. Likewise, according to the right judgment of reason and the testimony of the Apostle, second to Timothy, chapter two[^2]: *He shall not be crowned, unless he strive lawfully*: if therefore man was to be led to the crown of glory, it seems from right order that he ought to have been set in the conflict of temptation and battle.

3. Likewise, it befits God so to administer things and to provide for them, that the law be preserved which He implanted in them from their first condition, according to that of Augustine in the seventh book of the City of God[^3]: "God so administers the things which He has founded, that He allows them to perform their own motions"; but God made, and ought to have made, man in the changeableness of free choice *and to leave him in the hand of his own counsel*, and likewise Lucifer: therefore if the devil willed to vex man, and man willed to consent to him, God ought to have hindered neither of them.

4. Likewise, it was easier for man to conquer his adversary than for the devil to conquer man; for man could not be conquered except willingly: therefore that battle was of itself more ordered to the victory of man than to the victory of the devil: therefore more to good than to evil. If therefore God ought to permit what is directly ordered to the good of man, it seems that the adversary was not to be kept away from the temptation of the first man.

**On the contrary:**
1. He would be an impious father who permitted his son to engage in a war in which he knew he would be overcome by another; but God knew that Adam would be overcome by that temptation: therefore it seems that He did not bear Himself as a loving father when He permitted him to be overcome by the devil.

2. Likewise, he is not a good prelate nor a shepherd who permits a sheep to be bitten and carried off by a wolf, when he can repel and ward him off; but God was the prelate and shepherd of man: therefore since He saw the wolf fiercely pressing on, it seems that He ought not to have permitted man to be assailed by the adversary or attacked by the wolf[^4].

3. Likewise, he is not a right judge who establishes a battle between those who are not equally strong; but the devil was by nature much stronger in powers than man, since *there is no power upon earth that can be compared to him*[^5]. He was also much more obstinate in malice than man was confirmed in grace. If therefore God is an equitable judge, He ought not to have permitted them to clash with one another.

4. Likewise, he is not a strong possessor who permits another to invade his court: for *when the strong man armed keeps his court, those things are in peace which he possesses*[^6]. Since therefore man in his first state was the court and temple of God, and the Lord Himself kept it[^7]; either God was not the strong man armed and the keeper, or He ought not to have permitted the adversary to vex and invade man through the conflict and battle of temptation.

### Conclusion.

> For several reasons it was fitting that God permit man to be assailed.

**I respond:** To the foregoing it must be said that, although God could have forbidden the adversary to tempt man, it was nonetheless fitting that He permit him. — And the ground of fittingness can be had from the reasons already assigned in the preceding problem, in which it was shown that God ought to have made man in the liberty[^8] of free choice.

But beyond these reasons a reason can be assigned, first, from the order which is regarded in the comparison of *virtue to its proper act*. "For God so administers all things, that He allows them to perform their own motions"; and therefore He constituted both man and the devil in liberty of choice *and left them in the hand of their own counsel*, and permitted each to do what he willed[^9], whether the one in tempting, or the other in consenting. For this belonged to His governance in the preservation of order, which is regarded in the comparison of virtue to its proper act.

Secondly, a reason is taken from the order which is regarded through the comparison of *good to its opposite*, in which virtue is shown more glorious and more praiseworthy, whether from that aforesaid comparison, on account of which it shines forth and appears the more, or from the attainment of a certain noble triumph, on account of which it is fortified and invigorated. Therefore, that the virtue of man might shine forth and advance, it was fitting that God permit him to be assailed by the adversary; because either then, or afterward, from the very impulse of the temptation the fortitude and eminence of charity was to be made manifest, of which the Apostle says that *neither death nor life nor principalities nor powers shall be able to separate from it*, to the Romans, chapter eight[^10].

Thirdly, a reason can be taken from the order which is regarded from the comparison of *disease to its remedy*. For because the sin of man ought not to lack a remedy, on account of this, that the whole human nature was in him; God thus ought to permit man to sin, in such a way that it would befit Him to furnish to that same man a Redeemer. And therefore God rather disposed to permit[^11] that man sin with another suggesting and impelling, than by his own will bending him, by which bending man perhaps would have fallen, even if the adversary had never suggested anything pestilential.

A fourth reason can be taken from the order which is regarded through the comparison of *merit to reward*. For because no one is worthy to be crowned except him who strives lawfully; therefore it was fitting that God should first examine man, His soldier, in the field of combat, before exalting him in glory; and because examination consists in conflict and battle, He ought to have permitted man to be assailed by the devil. — There are also other reasons which can be given concerning this very matter; but for the present let these suffice.

**To the objections:**

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary side concerning paternal piety, it must be said that, although God is a loving father, He is nonetheless an equitable judge; and therefore it so befitted God to show paternal piety toward man, that He should nonetheless not omit the office of judiciary power; and therefore, whatever He had foreknown concerning man, He ought to sustain that he be attacked by the adversary in the war of temptation.

2. To that which is objected concerning the goodness of prelacy, it must be said that a prelate ought to snatch a sheep from the bite of the wolf, either because he is bound to this by the law of charity, or because out of an evil he *does not know how*[^12], and therefore *cannot* elicit a good of greater usefulness. The opposite of each of these is found in God, if one attends to it; and therefore that reason does not compel in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected concerning the rectitude of the judge, it must be said that, although the devil was stronger and more cunning than man, yet in the battle of temptation he was not stronger, but indeed much weaker, whether from the general law of temptation, by which no one is conquered except willingly, or from the fidelity of God, *who does not permit anyone to be tempted beyond what he can bear, but indeed makes with the temptation an outcome*[^13]. And therefore the impulse of the first temptation, when it occurred, the fidelity of God and the law of temptation being preserved, was not against the order of judiciary power.

4. To that which is objected concerning the fortitude of the armed keeper, it must be said that, although God kept man strongly, He did not, however, keep him unwilling or involuntary, because God does not accept coerced service, but free and voluntary service. And therefore, if man had willed to stand with God, no one could violently have carried him off from the hand of God; but because he himself withdrew from His keeping, therefore God denied him His keeping, and from this the adversary invaded him — indeed, not from a defect of God the keeper, but from the ingratitude of man the kept.

---

la: Haec nec non seq. ratio insinuantur et ab August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12; Enchirid. c. 106. seqq. et XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 10. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3. — Hic c. 1. — Paulo inferius post *ergo si* aliqui codd., ut H Q aa, subiiciunt *Deus*.

en: This and the following reason are intimated also by Augustine, *On the City of God* XXI, c. 12; *Enchiridion* c. 106 ff. and *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 8, n. 10. Compare also *I Sent.* d. 47, q. 3. — Here, c. 1. — A little below, after *ergo si* some codices, such as H, Q, aa, add *Deus*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. — Vers. 5: *Nam et qui certat in agone, non coronatur, nisi legitime certaverit.* — Cod. W conclusionem seq. sic exhibet: *si ergo non perducendus erat ad coronam gloriae nisi ex recto ordine, statui debuit in conflictu* etc.; plures alii codd., inter quos F I K V Y cc, et ed. 1 legunt, verbis transpositis, sic: *videtur, quod ex recto ordine statui debuit* (aliqui *debuerit*) *in conflictu* etc.

en: Compare *I Sent.* d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1. — Verse 5: *For also he that striveth in the games is not crowned unless he strive lawfully.* — Codex W gives the following clause thus: *if therefore he was not to be led to the crown of glory except from right order, he ought to have been set in the conflict,* etc.; several other codices, among them F, I, K, V, Y, cc, and ed. 1 read, with the words transposed, thus: *it seems that from right order he ought to have been set* (some, *ought*) *in the conflict,* etc.

la: Cap. 27. n. 8, quo loco in textu originali legitur *bene* pro *bona* et post *mala* nulla adiicitur *esse*. — Cap. 30. — Seq. textus est Eccli. 13, 14: *Deus ab initio constituit hominem et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui.*

en: Chapter 27, n. 8, in which place in the original text *bene* is read for *bona*, and after *mala* no *esse* is added. — Chapter 30. — The following text is Ecclus. 13:14: *God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel.*

la: Alluditur ad Ioan. 10, 11, ubi Christus se vocat pastorem bonum. — Paulo supra edd. pluresque codd. *capi* pro *rapi*.

en: An allusion to John 10:11, where Christ calls Himself the good shepherd. — A little above, the editions and several codices have *capi* (to be taken) for *rapi* (to be carried off).

la: Luc. 11, 21, ubi Vulgata, omisso *enim*, substituit *ea* pro *omnia*. — Paulo inferius pro *et Dominus ipse custodiret* Vat. *et Dominus ipsum custodiret*, fere omnibus codd. et primis edd. contradicentibus.

en: Luke 11:21, where the Vulgate, omitting *enim*, substitutes *ea* for *omnia*. — A little below, for *et Dominus ipse custodiret* (and the Lord Himself kept it) the Vatican edition reads *et Dominus ipsum custodiret*, against nearly all the codices and the first editions.

la: Edd. 3, 4 et Vat. *vertibilitate*.

en: Editions 3, 4 and the Vatican edition read *vertibilitate* (turnability).

la: Cod. T addit *secundum hunc modum*.

en: Codex T adds *according to this mode*.

la: Vers. 38. — De hac ratione cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. I; de seq. cfr. supra, d. 21. a. 3. q. 2.

en: Verse 38. — On this reason compare the Master's text here, c. 1; on the following compare above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 2.

en: Romans 8:38–39.

la: Ed. 3 et Vat. non bene omittunt *permittere*.

en: Edition 3 and the Vatican edition, not rightly, omit *permittere* (to permit).

la: Nonnulli codd. hic supervacue subiiciunt *elicere bonum*, Vat. *eligere* (!) *bonum*. Mox plures codd., ut X Y aa cc, cum ed. 1 omittunt *ideo*.

en: Some codices here superfluously add *elicere bonum* (to elicit a good); the Vatican edition, *eligere* (!) *bonum* (to choose a good). Then several codices, such as X, Y, aa, cc, with ed. 1 omit *ideo* (therefore).

la: Epist. I. Cor. 10, 13. — Cfr. etiam supra scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: First Letter, 1 Cor. 10:13. — Compare also above, the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum tentationis impulsio desiderari debeat a viro iusto

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 535 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum a viro iusto debeat desiderari tentationis impulsio.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum tentationis impulsio desiderari debeat a viro iusto. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Iacobi primo[^1]: *Omne gaudium existimate, fratres, cum in varias tentationes incideritis.* Si ergo tentatio, cum praesens est, est materia gaudendi; cum absens est, videtur, quod debeat affectuose desiderari.

2. Item, in Psalmo[^2]: *Proba me, Domine, et tenta me.* Haec sancta anima petebat, et recte; sed nihil debet homo a Deo petere, nisi quod debet desiderare: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Omne enim illud quod facit ad virtutis exercitationem, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi; unde Gregorius[^3]: «Sanctus vir se tentari post virtutes desiderat, ne ex confidentia virtutum torpescat». Si igitur tentatio virtutes exercitat, patet etc.

4. Item, omne illud quod facit ad gratiae promotionem, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi; unde primae ad Corinthios decimo[^4]: *Faciet cum tentatione proventum* etc. Si igitur tentatio promovet ad bonum, videtur, quod ad ipsam anhelare debeat desiderium iustorum.

5. Item, omne illud quod est opus et effectus divinae acceptationis, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi; unde in Tobia, ultimo[^5]: *Quia acceptus eras Deo, necesse erat* etc.

6. Item, omne illud, per quod pervenitur ad meritorum consummationem, est appetendum; sed tentatio est huiusmodi — quod patet, quia nulla est maior tentatio, quam illa quae est per flagella; *tribulatio autem patientiam operatur, patientia vero opus perfectum habet*[^6] — ergo videtur, quod quicumque vult esse perfectus, appetere debet tentationis impulsum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Nihil est desiderandum, cuius contrarium continue petendum debet; sed omnes viri iusti illam petitionem debent facere: *Et ne nos inducas in tentationem*[^7]: ergo nullus debet appetere tentari.

2. Item, nihil est appetendum, quod diligenter est praecavendum; sed tentatio diligenter est praecavenda, sicut Dominus monet, Matthaei vigesimo sexto[^8]: *Vigilate et orate, ne intretis in tentationem*: ergo etc.

3. Item, nihil est appetendum, cui non debeat homo se offerre sponte; sed tentationi non debet se homo offerre sponte, sicut dicitur super illud Matthaei quarto[^9]: *Ductus est Iesus* etc., Glossa: «ductum esse Iesum commemorat, ut nos instruat, quod non sponte oportet in tentationem insilire».

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4. Item, nihil est appetendum, quod nostrae salutis adversarius optat; sed diabolus desiderat nos tentare: ergo videtur, quod nullus debeat tentationem appetere.

### Conclusio.
> Duplici responsione declaratur, quomodo aliquae tentationes a iustis virtute fortibus desiderari possint.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictam quaestionem via duplici responderi potest, et utraque satis probabiliter.

*Uno modo* sic, ut dicamus, quod cum triplex sit tentatio, sive a triplici principio, una scilicet a Deo, alia a carne, alia a diabolo[^10]; prima tentatio simpliciter appetenda est, quia Deus non tentat nos nisi ad bonum. Altera vero tentatio, scilicet quae est a carne, simpliciter fugienda est, quia illa non potest esse absque peccato, sicut supra dixit Magister distinctione vigesima prima[^11]. Tertia vero, quae est a diabolo, aliquibus fugienda est, aliquibus appetenda est. His enim, qui virtute fortes sunt nec de facili in tentationem induci possunt, etiamsi tentantur, appetibile est tentari ad suae virtutis exercitium et cumulum meritorum. Infirmis vero minime, quia timere possunt, ne ex ipso impulsu in tentationem inducantur, quod omnes debent refugere; nam, etsi tentari malum non sit, in tentationem tamen induci semper malum est, quia hoc est a tentatione superari. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate Dei[^12]: «Sicut se habet firmitas et infirmitas electorum, sic metuunt cupiuntque tentari». — Et secundum hanc distinctionem ad rationes ad utramque partem inductas potest de facili responderi, pro eo quod secundum diversas vias procedunt.

*Alius modus* dicendi est, quod dupliciter est loqui de tentatione. Aut sub propria ratione, et sic tentatio est impulsus ad illicitum, secundum quod de ea fit sermo in proposito. Loquimur enim hic de tentatione diaboli, quae fit per mali culpae suggestionem, qua diabolus hominem ad malum nititur incurvare; non de tentatione Dei, quae fit per flagellationem, qua Deus vult illos quos acceptat, approbare et probatos ostendere[^13]. Hanc igitur tentationem secundum se consideratam nullus debet appetere, immo abhorrere et refugere, maxime considerando finem. — Aliter est considerare tentationem, prout est materia exercendae virtutis; et sic a viris iustis desiderari potest, ab eis potissime, qui in caritate fervent adeo, quod ignis devotionis ipsorum potius inflammatur ex praesentia contrarii, quam exstinguatur. Ab eis autem, qui modicae sunt caritatis, non sic desiderari debet. Et est exemplum, quia ventus perflans fornacem magis et magis accendit, sed candelam exstinguit. — Et ideo tentationis impulsus, etsi, quantum in se est, refugiendus sit ab omnibus et ab infirmis potissime, sicut rationes ad secundam partem inductae ostendunt; in quantum tamen est virtutis exercendae materia, a viris ferventibus et perfectis appeti potest, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Illud tamen genus tentationis potissime appetunt viri iusti, quod est in flagellorum perpessione, sicut passus est Iob[^14] et Tobias, sicut etiam passi sunt martyres ab impiis zelo diabolico excitatis. Et ad hoc ostendendum procedunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur; ideo concedendae sunt.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the assault of temptation ought to be desired by a just man.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the assault of temptation ought to be desired by a just man. And that it ought, seems [to follow].

1. James 1[^1]: *Count it all joy, brethren, when you fall into various temptations.* If therefore temptation, when it is present, is matter for rejoicing, then when it is absent it seems that it ought to be affectionately desired.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm[^2]: *Prove me, O Lord, and try me.* This holy soul was asking this, and rightly so; but a man ought to ask nothing of God except what he ought to desire: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason. For everything that contributes to the exercise of virtue is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind; whence Gregory[^3]: «A holy man desires to be tempted after [acquiring] virtues, lest from confidence in his virtues he grow sluggish». If therefore temptation exercises the virtues, it is plain, etc.

4. Likewise, everything that contributes to the advancement of grace is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind; whence 1 Corinthians 10[^4]: *He will make with the temptation also an outcome* etc. If therefore temptation promotes the good, it seems that the desire of the just ought to pant after it.

5. Likewise, everything that is a work and effect of divine acceptance is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind; whence in Tobit, in the last [chapter][^5]: *Because thou wast acceptable to God, it was necessary* etc.

6. Likewise, everything by which one arrives at the consummation of merits is to be sought; but temptation is of this kind — which is plain, since there is no greater temptation than that which comes through scourges; *and tribulation works patience, and patience a perfect work*[^6] — therefore it seems that whoever wishes to be perfect ought to seek the assault of temptation.

**On the contrary:**

1. Nothing is to be desired whose contrary one must continually pray for; but all just men ought to make that petition: *And lead us not into temptation*[^7]: therefore no one ought to seek to be tempted.

2. Likewise, nothing is to be sought which must be diligently guarded against; but temptation must be diligently guarded against, as the Lord warns, Matthew 26[^8]: *Watch and pray, that you enter not into temptation*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, nothing is to be sought to which a man ought not to offer himself willingly; but a man ought not to offer himself willingly to temptation, as is said upon that text of Matthew 4[^9]: *Jesus was led* etc., the Gloss: «it records that Jesus was led, in order to instruct us that one ought not to leap willingly into temptation».

4. Likewise, nothing is to be sought which the adversary of our salvation wishes; but the devil desires to tempt us: therefore it seems that no one ought to seek temptation.

### Conclusion.
> By a twofold response it is declared how some temptations can be desired by the just who are strong in virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said that to the aforesaid question there can be a twofold response, and each one quite probable.

*In one way*, thus: that we say that, since temptation is threefold, or [arises] from a threefold source — one namely from God, another from the flesh, another from the devil[^10] — the first temptation is to be sought simply, since God does not tempt us except unto good. But the second temptation, namely that which is from the flesh, is to be fled simply, since it cannot be without sin, as the Master said above in distinction twenty-one[^11]. But the third, which is from the devil, is to be fled by some and to be sought by others. For by those who are strong in virtue and cannot easily be led into temptation, even if they are tempted, it is desirable to be tempted for the exercise of their virtue and the heaping-up of merits. But by the weak, by no means, since they can fear lest from the assault itself they be led into temptation, which all ought to flee; for although to be tempted is not an evil, yet to be led into temptation is always an evil, since this is to be overcome by temptation. And this is what Augustine says in book fourteen of *The City of God*[^12]: «As stands the strength and the weakness of the elect, so do they fear and desire to be tempted». — And according to this distinction, one can readily respond to the arguments adduced for either side, since they proceed according to diverse ways.

*Another way* of speaking is that there is a twofold way of speaking about temptation. Either under its proper account, and thus temptation is an impulse toward what is illicit, according to which it is spoken of in the present matter. For here we are speaking of the temptation of the devil, which comes through the suggestion of the evil of fault, by which the devil strives to bend man toward evil; not of the temptation of God, which comes through scourging, by which God wishes to approve those whom He accepts and to show them as proved[^13]. This temptation, therefore, considered in itself, no one ought to seek, but rather to abhor and to flee, especially considering its end. — In another way temptation is to be considered insofar as it is matter for the exercise of virtue; and thus it can be desired by just men, by those especially who burn so greatly in charity that the fire of their devotion is rather inflamed by the presence of what is contrary [to it] than extinguished. But by those who are of slight charity, it ought not so to be desired. And there is an example: that the wind blowing upon a furnace kindles it more and more, but extinguishes a candle. — And therefore the assault of temptation, although, as far as it is in itself, it must be fled by all and by the weak especially, as the arguments adduced for the second side show; yet insofar as it is matter for the exercise of virtue, it can be sought by the fervent and the perfect, as the arguments which are adduced for the first side show. Yet that kind of temptation just men especially seek, which lies in the endurance of scourges, as Job[^14] and Tobit suffered, as also the martyrs suffered from the wicked stirred up by diabolical zeal. And to show this the arguments proceed which are adduced for the first side; therefore they are to be granted.

en: Verse 1. (James 1:2.)

la: Psalm 25, 2. — In cod. K post *petebat* adiungitur *a Deo*.

en: Psalm 25:2. — In codex K, after *petebat* there is added *a Deo*.

la: Libr. VIII. Moral. c. 10. n. 20.

en: Book VIII of the *Morals*, c. 10, n. 20.

la: Vers. 13.

la: In Vulgata vero c. 12, 13.

en: But in the Vulgate, c. 12, 13. (Tobit 12:13.)

la: Iac. 1, 3. seq. (Cfr. Rom. 5, 3. seq.)

en: James 1:3 ff. (Cf. Rom. 5:3 ff.)

en: Matthew 6:13.

en: Verse 41. (Matthew 26:41.)

la: Vers. 1. — Glossa est ex Chrysost. hom. 13. in Matthaeum. — In cod. aa omittitur *dicitur*.

en: Verse 1. (Matthew 4:1.) — The Gloss is from Chrysostom, homily 13 on Matthew. — In codex aa the word *dicitur* is omitted.

la: Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et dub. 3.

en: Cf. above, d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, in the body and dubium 3.

la: Cap. 6.

en: Chapter 6.

la: Cap. 9. n. 1: *Sicut se infirmitas eorum firmitasque habuerit, metuunt tentari, cupiunt tentari.*

en: Chapter 9, n. 1: «As the weakness and strength of them shall stand, [so] they fear to be tempted, they desire to be tempted».

la: Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Codd. Z cc et ed. 1 *approbatos* pro *probatos*.

en: Cf. above, d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — Codices Z, cc and edition 1 read *approbatos* for *probatos*.

la: Iob 1, 12: seqq. — Tob. 2, 10. seqq. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 verbo *martyres* praefigunt *sancti*.

en: Job 1:12 ff. — Tobit 2:10 ff. — A little below, codex cc and edition 1 prefix *sancti* (holy) to the word *martyres* (martyrs).

latin_scholion:
**I.** «Appetendorum sunt duo genera: quaedam enim propter se appetenda sunt, ut sanari; quaedam propter aliud, ut secari. Tentatio per se non est bona, sed propter aliud, sicut nec sectio; unde nunquam per se appetenda est, sed propter aliud. — Est autem duplex tentatio: quaedam de bono et ad bonum tendens, qua Deus tentat, et haec ab hominibus debet appeti, non tamen propter se, sed propter bonum consequens; quaedam vero a malo et ad malum, et haec non. Haec enim duplex est: quaedam interior, scilicet a carne, quae semper peccatum est, et ideo nunquam debet appeti [cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. schol.], quaedam exterior, id est ab hoste, quae non est peccatum, nisi consentiatur ei, sed materia exercendae virtutis. Haec autem ab imperfectis, qui facile vincuntur a tentatione, non debet appeti, sed a perfectis» etc. (Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3.). — His verbis clare exponitur secundus modus dicendi, quem ponit S. Doctor in corp.; et similiter intelligi debet etiam modus primus. — Quod autem tentatio Dei, quatenus consistit in participatione passionis sive crucis, a perfectis appeti possit et ab omnibus Sanctis sit appetita, certissimum est.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 7. a. 3. § 4. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 21. q. I. a. 3. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 21. q. I. a. 3. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 21. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 21. q. 3. in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** «There are two kinds of things to be sought: for some are to be sought for their own sake, as to be healed; some for the sake of something else, as to be cut. Temptation is not good in itself, but for the sake of something else, just as neither is the cutting; hence it is never to be sought for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. — Now there is a twofold temptation: one tending from good and toward good, by which God tempts, and this ought to be sought by men, yet not for its own sake, but for the sake of the good that follows; another [tending] from evil and toward evil, and this [ought] not [to be sought]. For this latter is twofold: one interior, namely from the flesh, which is always sin, and therefore ought never to be sought [cf. above d. 21, a. 2, q. 1, scholion]; another exterior, that is, from the enemy, which is not sin unless one consents to it, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. This [latter], however, ought not to be sought by the imperfect, who are easily overcome by temptation, but by the perfect» etc. (Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3). — By these words the second way of speaking, which the Holy Doctor sets down in the body [of the article], is clearly explained; and the first way also ought to be understood similarly. — That the temptation of God, however, insofar as it consists in the participation of the passion or the cross, can be sought by the perfect and has been sought by all the Saints, is most certain.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 101, m. 7, a. 3, § 4. — St. Thomas, II *Sent.* d. 21, q. 1, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, II *Sent.* d. 21, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, II *Sent.* d. 21, q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, II *Sent.* d. 21, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II *Sent.* d. 21, q. 3, at the end.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p535-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p536-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`); raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines ~37567–37680) used for apparatus footer text and marker spacing. Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied to the cascade-shattered Respondeo (Via 1 / Via 2) and scholion. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (pp. 535–536 → PDF 557–558).

**Alignment VERIFIED.** Opener (raw 37567) = *Tertio quaeritur, utrum tentationis impulsio desiderari debeat a viro iusto* — matches ART I TRACTATIO sub-question 3. This is the LAST quaestio of ARTICULUS I; ARTICULUS II (*De primorum parentum cognitione*) opens at raw ~37681 / p.537. Running heads `DIST. XXIII. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` confirmed on pp.535–536.

**Page-split map.** 14 apparatus entries [^1]–[^14], renumbered continuously.
- p.535 footers ⁴–¹² → [^1]–[^9] (the q3 argument-side anchors): L-column ⁴ Vers.1 (Iac), ⁵ Psalm 25,2; R-column ⁶ Greg. Moral., ⁷ Vers.13 (1 Cor), ⁸ In Vulgata c.12,13 (Tob), ⁹ Iac.1,3 seq., ¹⁰ Matth.6,13, ¹¹ Vers.41 (Matth.26), ¹² Vers.1 + Chrysost. Gloss (Matth.4).
- p.536 corpus footers ¹–⁵ → [^10]–[^14] (Respondeo/scholion anchors): ¹ Cfr. d.21 (triplex principium), ² Cap.6 (Magister d.21), ³ Cap.9 n.1 (Augustine *Civ. Dei* XIV), ⁴ Cfr. d.21 + *approbatos/probatos* variant, ⁵ Iob 1,12 / Tob 2,10 + *sancti martyres* variant.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from `d23-a1-q2`: p.535 footers ⁴ ff. (which a1-q2 confirmed anchor in q3, since q2 consumed only p.535 ¹–³ = its *Ad obiecta* share). Confirmed: ⁴–¹² all anchor in q3's args/sed-contra — none belong to q2. FORWARDED: none — q3 ends cleanly before p.537 ART II; the p.537 footers belong to a2-q1.

**has_scholion: true.** Closing scholion for ARTICULUS I: SCHOLION I (Petr. a Tarentasia citation explicating both *modi dicendi* of the corpus) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll: Alex. Hal., Aquinas, Albert, Richard, Giles, Durandus, Dionysius Carth.).

**[?] flags:** none. Scholion II's Richard a Med. reference (`hic a. I. q. I.`) and Giles (`q. I. a. 3.`) read cleanly off the R-2 PDF band despite OCR garble.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II. *De cognitione primorum parentum.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum propositum quaeritur de cognitione primorum parentum, et incidit hic quaestio circa tria.

Primo enim quaerendum est de cognitione primorum parentum quantum ad *profectum*.

Secundo vero quaerendum est quantum ad *defectum*.

Tertio quaeritur de ipsa cognitione quantum ad *complementum et statum*.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum, si homo stetisset, in cognitione profecisset per temporum intervalla.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum, si homo stetisset, in cognitione profecisset per temporum intervalla. Et quod non, videtur:

1. *Primo* per verbum Hugonis in libro *de Sacramentis*[^1]: « Rerum omnium, quae cum homine et propter hominem factae sunt, perfectam cognitionem hominem accepisse, nulli dubium esse debet »: si ergo statim perfectam cognitionem habuit, ergo ulterius proficere non potuit.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quam facit ipse Hugo[^2]. Nomen debite impositum est naturae rei expressivum; nullus igitur potest res omnes nominare, nisi is qui omnium rerum plenam habet cognitionem. Sed Adam omnibus nomina imposuit, nec illis rebus alia sunt aliquando perfectiora nomina imponenda: videtur igitur, quod Adam perfecte cognoverit omnia creata: ergo in cognitione non profecisset, si in statu suae conditionis permansisset.

3. Item, nullus bene regit et gubernat ea quorum naturam ignorat; sed omnia fuerant commissa regimini et gubernationi Adae, secundum quod dicitur in Genesi[^3] et in Psalmo: *Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius* etc. A sui igitur conditione primaria habuit primus homo rerum cognitionem: ergo non profecisset ad illam per disciplinam per temporum intervalla.

4. Item, quidquid homo addiscit, addiscit mediante via sensus, memoriae et experientiae, et ita ab inferiori et ab exteriori. Si igitur homo in statu innocentiae didicisset, per inferiora et exteriora ad perfectionem venisset; sed talis ordo non congruit naturae institutae et bene ordinatae, sed solum lapsae, cum omni creaturae praeesset[^4]: videtur ergo, quod nihil sensibilium in statu illo didicisset.

**Sed contra:** 1. Adam in statu illo per intervalla temporum profecisset ad gratiam; alioquin peior esset conditio sua quam nostra, cum nos multiplicando merita crescamus in gratia: ergo pari ratione per intervalla temporum profecisset in rerum notitia.

2. Item, aut Adam *sciebat* quae ventura erant, aut *non sciebat*. Si *sic*: ergo praescivit lapsum suum, et quid ex illo posteris suis esset eventurum; quod plane apparet esse falsum[^5]. Si futura *non cognoscebat*; sed rerum naturae variantur in tempore: ergo multa incipiebat cognoscere secundum temporum variationem: ergo profecisset in cognitione.

3. Item, nec Adam omnia viderat nec omnia audierat. Esto igitur, quod videret aliquam rem, quam prius non vidisset; cum videre sit cognoscere, sicut intelligere: videtur, quod sicut necessario sequitur, quod si[^6] incepit intelligere, incepit cognoscere, similiter, si incepit videre, incepit cognoscere. Si ergo multa sensibilia vidisset, quae prius non viderat, videtur, quod multa didicisset sensibilia per temporum intervalla.

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4. Item, si homo stetisset, aut unus homo sciret voluntatem et cogitationem alterius, aut non. Si *sic*: ergo frustra egerent sermone. Si *non*: ergo cum posset ab alio edoceri, videtur, quod in statu innocentiae multa discere potuisset.

### Conclusio

> Adam, si stetisset, in cognitione rerum, quae naturali cursu fiunt, non profecisset quoad novi habitus acquisitionem, sed tantum quoad modum cognitionis et quoad habilitationem maiorem. Tamen proficere potuisset etiam nova cognitione respectu voluntariorum et mirabilium.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod profectus scientiae triplici via potest considerari: vel a parte *scibilium*, vel a parte *modorum cognoscendi*, vel a parte *maioris habilitationis* in cognoscendo. — Secundum primum modum loquendo, intelligendum est, quod quaedam sunt res, quae fiunt cursu *naturali*; quaedam, quae cursu *mirabili*; quaedam, quae fiunt cursu *voluntario*, secundum quod determinat Anselmus[^7].

In earum igitur rerum cognitione, quae quidem cursu *naturali* fiunt, non profecisset Adam quantum ad novi habitus acquisitionem. Accepit enim, sicut dicit Hugo, et Magister in littera[^8], « ab exordio omnium rerum plenam notitiam »; et hoc etiam ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Proficere tamen potuisset quantum ad alium modum cognoscendi, et quantum ad maiorem habitum sciendi. — Quantum ad alium modum[^9] proficere poterat, quia quod noverat simplici notitia cognoscere poterat experientia; et quod noverat intellectu cognoscere poterat et sensu. — Proficere etiam poterat quantum ad maiorem habilitationem, quia ex frequenti consideratione eorum quae noverat, promptior fuisset et paratior ad iudicandum de his rebus, quarum habebat cognitionem per habitum innatum. Etsi enim primus homo non haberet tarditatem hebetudinis per aggravationem corporis mortalis[^10]; habebat tamen spiritus eius quandam minorem velocitatem per vegetationem corporis animalis. — Et sic in cognitione rerum naturalium Adam quodam modo profecisset, quodam modo minime, si stetisset.

In earum vero rerum cognitione, quae fiunt cursu *voluntario* et *mirabili* sive supernaturali, simpliciter proficere potuisset, non solum quantum ad modum cognoscendi, sed etiam in acquirendo *novam cognitionem*. Nec mirum, quia ad hoc, quod cognosceret divina mysteria, indigebat superna illustratione; ad hoc vero, quod cognosceret secreta alterius, indigebat ipsius detectione[^11]. Nec talis profectus statui innocentiae derogabat, cum etiam beati Angeli in cognitione divinorum mysteriorum et humanorum secretorum proficiant; propter quod dicitur ad Ephesios tertio[^12]: *Ut innotescat Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam multiformis Dei sapientia.*

Et sic patet responsio ad propositam quaestionem. Nam rationes ad primam partem inductae procedunt de cognitione rerum naturalium, et sic intelligit Hugo. Illis enim rebus Adam nomina imposuit, et illarum rerum sibi cura commissa fuit. Ultima tamen ratio de perfectione ab inferiori et exteriori non cogit, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus in sexto *Musicae*[^13], « obiectum exterius non agit in animam nec ipsam perficit; sed ipsa anima se ipsam movet, occasione ab exteriori accepta, et informando se ipsam magis agit in obiectum, quam agatur ab ipso »; et hoc fuisset in Adam multo fortius et nobilius, quam sit post lapsum. Unde illa ratio non cogit, quod Adam non potuisset respectu eorum quae cognoscebat, novum modum cognitionis acquirere; nec praecedentes rationes hoc astruunt, quod Adam non posset[^14] magis habilitari in cognoscendo per frequentiam in considerando.

Rationes autem, quae ad partem oppositam inducuntur, ostendunt, quod Adam, si stetisset, proficere potuisset in cognitione respectu eorum quae sunt *voluntaria* et *mirabilia*. De aliis autem, scilicet de his quae naturaliter fiunt, non concludunt, quod Adam acquisivisset cognitionem novam. — Unde illa prima ratio de comparatione gratiae ad scientiam non valet, quia perfectio gratiae non tantum est ex dono, sed etiam ex merito. Perfectio autem cognitionis in Adam erat ex dono; et si stetisset, non solum in ipso, sed etiam in posteris non indocte a pluribus creditur similiter fuisse, saltem quantum ad habitum; et hoc dico propter aetatem infantiae[^15]. — Ad alia satis plana est responsio per iam dicta.

english:
### Article II. *On the knowledge of the first parents.*

Next, with respect to the second proposal, the question is asked concerning the knowledge of the first parents, and here a question falls under three heads.

For *first* it must be asked concerning the knowledge of the first parents as regards *advancement*.

*Second*, however, it must be asked as regards *defect*.

*Third*, the question is asked concerning that knowledge itself as regards its *completion and state*.

### Question I. *Whether, if man had stood, he would have advanced in knowledge through intervals of time.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether, if man had stood, he would have advanced in knowledge through intervals of time. And that he would not, seems [to follow]:

1. *First*, from the word of Hugh in his book *On the Sacraments*[^1]: « That man received perfect knowledge of all the things which were made together with man and on account of man, ought to be doubted by no one »: if therefore he had perfect knowledge at once, then he could not advance further.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by a reason which Hugh himself makes[^2]. A name duly imposed is expressive of the nature of the thing; no one therefore can name all things, except him who has full knowledge of all things. But Adam imposed names on all things, nor are other more perfect names ever to be imposed on those things: it seems therefore that Adam knew perfectly all created things: therefore he would not have advanced in knowledge, if he had remained in the state of his condition.

3. Likewise, no one rightly rules and governs those things whose nature he is ignorant of; but all things had been committed to the rule and governance of Adam, according to what is said in Genesis[^3] and in the Psalm: *Thou hast subjected all things under his feet,* etc. From his primary condition, therefore, the first man had knowledge of things: therefore he would not have advanced to it through instruction through intervals of time.

4. Likewise, whatever a man learns, he learns by means of the way of sense, memory, and experience, and thus from the lower and from the exterior. If therefore man had learned in the state of innocence, he would have come to perfection through lower and exterior things; but such an order does not befit a nature instituted and well-ordered, but only a fallen one, since he was set over every creature[^4]: it seems therefore that he would have learned nothing of sensible things in that state.

**On the contrary:** 1. Adam in that state would have advanced to grace through intervals of time; otherwise his condition would be worse than ours, since we grow in grace by multiplying merits: therefore by parity of reasoning he would have advanced in the knowledge of things through intervals of time.

2. Likewise, either Adam *knew* the things that were to come, or *he did not know*. If *so*: then he foreknew his own fall, and what would come of it to his posterity; which plainly appears to be false[^5]. If he *did not know* future things; but the natures of things vary in time: therefore he began to know many things according to the variation of times: therefore he would have advanced in knowledge.

3. Likewise, Adam had neither seen all things nor heard all things. Grant therefore that he saw some thing which he had not seen before; since to see is to know, just as to understand [is]: it seems that, just as it necessarily follows that if[^6] he began to understand, he began to know, similarly, if he began to see, he began to know. If therefore he had seen many sensible things which he had not seen before, it seems that he would have learned many sensible things through intervals of time.

4. Likewise, if man had stood, either one man would know the will and thought of another, or [he would] not. If *so*: then they would engage in speech in vain. If *not*: then since he could be taught by another, it seems that in the state of innocence he could have learned many things.

### Conclusion

> Adam, if he had stood, in the knowledge of the things which come about by the natural course, would not have advanced as regards the acquisition of a new habit, but only as regards the mode of knowledge and as regards greater aptitude. Yet he could have advanced even by new knowledge with respect to voluntary and miraculous things.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the advancement of knowledge can be considered in a threefold way: either on the part of the *knowable things*, or on the part of the *modes of knowing*, or on the part of *greater aptitude* in knowing. — Speaking according to the first mode, it must be understood that there are certain things which come about by the *natural* course; certain ones which [come about] by the *miraculous* [course]; certain ones which come about by the *voluntary* course, according as Anselm determines[^7].

In the knowledge therefore of those things which indeed come about by the *natural* course, Adam would not have advanced as regards the acquisition of a new habit. For he received, as Hugh says, and the Master in the text[^8], « from the beginning the full knowledge of all things »; and this also the reasons which are adduced for the first part show. Yet he could have advanced as regards another mode of knowing, and as regards a greater habit of knowing. — As regards another mode[^9] he could advance, because what he knew by simple cognition he could know by experience; and what he knew by understanding he could know also by sense. — He could also advance as regards greater aptitude, because from the frequent consideration of those things which he knew, he would have been readier and more prepared to judge concerning those things, of which he had knowledge through an innate habit. For although the first man did not have the slowness of dullness through the burdening of the mortal body[^10]; yet his spirit had a certain lesser swiftness through the vegetation of the animal body. — And thus in the knowledge of natural things Adam would in a certain way have advanced, in a certain way not at all, if he had stood.

But in the knowledge of those things which come about by the *voluntary* and *miraculous* or supernatural course, he could have advanced absolutely, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also in acquiring *new knowledge*. Nor is this surprising, because for the purpose of knowing the divine mysteries, he needed supernal illumination; but for the purpose of knowing the secrets of another, he needed the disclosure of that person[^11]. Nor did such advancement detract from the state of innocence, since even the blessed Angels advance in the knowledge of divine mysteries and of human secrets; on account of which it is said to the Ephesians, chapter three[^12]: *That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers through the Church.*

And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. For the reasons adduced for the first part proceed concerning the knowledge of natural things, and thus Hugh understands [it]. For on those things Adam imposed names, and of those things the care was committed to him. Yet the last reason concerning perfection from the lower and the exterior does not compel, because, as Augustine says in the sixth book of the *Music*[^13], « the exterior object does not act upon the soul nor perfect it; but the soul moves itself, on the occasion received from the exterior, and by informing itself it acts more upon the object than it is acted upon by it »; and this would have been in Adam much more strongly and nobly than it is after the fall. Hence that reason does not compel [the conclusion] that Adam could not, with respect to those things which he knew, acquire a new mode of knowledge; nor do the preceding reasons establish that Adam could not[^14] be more aptly disposed in knowing through frequency in considering.

But the reasons which are adduced for the opposite part show that Adam, if he had stood, could have advanced in knowledge with respect to those things which are *voluntary* and *miraculous*. But concerning the others, namely concerning those which come about naturally, they do not conclude that Adam would have acquired new knowledge. — Hence that first reason concerning the comparison of grace to knowledge is not valid, because the perfection of grace is not only from a gift, but also from merit. But the perfection of knowledge in Adam was from a gift; and if he had stood, not only in himself, but also in his posterity it is believed by many, not unlearnedly, to have been similar, at least as regards habit; and this I say on account of the age of infancy[^15]. — To the others the response is sufficiently plain through what has already been said.

la: Libr. I. p. VI. c. 13: *Rerum enim omnium visibilium, quae cum homine et propter hominem factae erant, perfectam* etc.

en: Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments*, Book I, part VI, c. 13: « Of all visible things, which had been made together with man and on account of man, the perfect [knowledge] » etc.

la: Loc. cit. — Hanc et seq. rationem ponit Magister hic in litt. c. 3. — Quod Adam animantibus terrae, volatilibus caeli etc. nomina imposuit, refertur Gen. 2, 19. seq. — De relatione, quam verba ad res habent, cfr. August., *de Magistro*, et Boeth., I. in libr. Aristotelis *de interpretatione*, c. *de Signis*. — In fine arg. pro *suae conditionis* edd. perperam et contra antiquiores codd. *suae cognitionis*.

en: Loc. cit. — This reason and the following one the Master sets down here in the text, c. 3. — That Adam imposed names on the animals of the earth, the birds of heaven, etc., is reported in Genesis 2:19 ff. — On the relation which words have to things, cf. Augustine, *On the Teacher*, and Boethius, Book I on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*, the chapter *On Signs*. — At the end of the argument, for *of his condition* the editions, wrongly and against the older codices, [read] *of his knowledge*.

la: Cap. I, 28: *Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subiicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris* etc. — Psalm. 8, 8. — In maiori Vat., discrepans a principalioribus codd. et edd. 1, 2, habet *quorum naturas* pro *quorum naturam*, aliqui codd., ut T ee, *quorum nomina*.

en: Chapter I, 28: *Increase and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fishes of the sea,* etc. — Psalm 8:8. — In the major [premise] the Vatican [edition], differing from the more important codices and editions 1, 2, has *whose natures* for *whose nature*; some codices, as T ee, *whose names*.

la: Gen. 1, 26: *Faciamus hominem... et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli* etc. — Prima huius arg. propositio est secundum Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 14. (c. 18.); II. c. ult. et I. *Metaph.* c. 1. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 falso et obnitentibus codd. substituit *interiori* et *interiora* pro *inferiori* et *inferiora*.

en: Genesis 1:26: *Let us make man... and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of heaven,* etc. — The first proposition of this argument is according to Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 14 (c. 18); II, last chapter, and *Metaphysics* I, c. 1. — The Vatican [edition], with editions 3, 4, falsely and against the resisting codices, substituted *interior* and *interior things* for *lower* and *lower things*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 2, ubi exponitur, quod angelus malus certam sui casus praescientiam habere non potuit.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, where it is explained that the wicked angel could not have certain foreknowledge of his own fall.

la: Vat. *quod*, cod. Y *si*; auctoritate nonnullorum codd., ut F I, substituimus *quod si*, quia contextus saltem particulam *si* exigit. Mox pro *similiter* plures codd., ut Iv T cc ee, et ed. I *sed mulier*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *quod*, codex Y *si*; on the authority of several codices, as F I, we have substituted *quod si* (« if »), because the context at least requires the particle *si*. Presently, for *similiter* (« similarly ») several codices, as Iv T cc ee, and edition I [read] *sed mulier*.

la: *De Conceptu virg. et orig. pecc.* c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 346, nota 1.

en: [Anselm,] *On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin,* c. 11. Cf. above, p. 346, note 1.

la: Hic c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro *habitum sciendi* ed. 1 *habilitatem sciendi*.

en: Here, c. 3. — A little below, for *habit of knowing* edition 1 [reads] *aptitude of knowing*.

la: In cod. M additur *sciendi*, pro quo fere omnes alii codd. cum primis edd. perperam substituunt *etiam*, qui error ceterum iam in pluribus codd. ab altera manu correctus est.

en: In codex M *sciendi* (« of knowing ») is added, for which nearly all the other codices, together with the first editions, wrongly substitute *etiam* (« also »), which error, moreover, has already in several codices been corrected by a second hand.

la: Sap. 9, 15: *Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.*

en: Wisdom 9:15: *For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul.*

la: Cod. Z *revelatione*.

en: Codex Z [reads] *revelatione* (« by revelation »).

la: Vers. 10. — Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 11. dub. 2.

en: Verse 10. — Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, to the first, and d. 11, dub. 2.

la: Cap. 5. n. 9. seq., sententialiter. Cfr. Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 5.

en: Chapter 5, n. 9 ff., in substance. Cf. Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* V, prose 5.

la: Codd. X aa *potuisset*.

en: Codices X aa [read] *potuisset* (« could have »).

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 2. — Vat., dissentientibus codd. et ed. 1, *propter causam infantiae*.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 90, m. 2. — The Vatican [edition], with the codices and edition 1 dissenting, [reads] *on account of the cause of infancy*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Maior pars trium qq. huius articuli ad verbum conveniunt cum iis quae Alex. Hal. habet, S. p. II. q. 92. In hac autem 1. quaest. argumenta ad oppos. et responsio conveniunt cum Summa Alexandri, loc. cit. m. 2. a. 3. Nihilominus non omnino certum est, S. Bonaventuram ista sumsisse ex dicta Summa. Constat enim, Alexandrum reliquisse suum opus imperfectum, et quidem in quatuor eius partibus lacunas restasse; constat etiam, Fr. Gulielmo de Melitona a. 1256 (i. e. postquam S. Bonav. hos Commentarios iam scripsit) a Summo Pontifice Alexandro IV. mandatum esse, ut imperfectam Summam perficeret, eundemque, ut vult Waddingus, usque ad a. 1260 vixisse. Hinc possibile est, quod praedictus Gulielmus aliquas lacunas huius Summae expleverit vel aliquid addiderit, adhibitis etiam S. Bonaventurae scriptis. Nec quoad factum assertio solius Sbaraleae, nihil a Gulielmo isto Summae additum fuisse, ullo firmo argumento nititur. Plura de his vide tom. I. Prolegomena p. LVIII. seqq.

**II.** Alex. Hal. praeter hanc quaestionem alibi (loc. cit. m. 1.) specialiter inquirit, utrum Adam statim habuerit *perfectam* scientiam, quam solvit affirmative, atque hoc congruum fuisse ostendit tribus rationibus, approbatis etiam a posterioribus Scholasticis. — Notandum, quod alii commentatores, excepto Biel, non praecise de profectu in cognitione, sed de perfectione primitiva huius cognitionis disputant; tamen in principiis satis conveniunt.

**III.** S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 94. a. 3; de Verit. q. 18. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. II. q. 89. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. unica in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The greater part of the three questions of this article agree word for word with what Alexander of Hales has, *Summa* p. II, q. 92. In this first question, however, the arguments to the opposite and the response agree with the *Summa* of Alexander, in the place cited, m. 2, a. 3. Nevertheless it is not altogether certain that St. Bonaventure took these from the said *Summa*. For it is established that Alexander left his work unfinished, and indeed that lacunae remained in four of its parts; it is established also that it was enjoined upon Friar William of Melitona in the year 1256 (that is, after St. Bonaventure had already written these Commentaries) by the Supreme Pontiff Alexander IV that he should complete the unfinished *Summa*, and that the same man, as Wadding holds, lived until the year 1260. Hence it is possible that the said William filled in some lacunae of this *Summa* or added something, employing also the writings of St. Bonaventure. Nor does the assertion of Sbaralea alone, as to the fact that nothing was added to that *Summa* by that William, rest on any firm argument. See more on these matters in tome I, Prolegomena, p. LVIII ff.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, besides this question, elsewhere (in the place cited, m. 1) specially inquires whether Adam had at once *perfect* knowledge, which he resolves affirmatively, and shows that this was fitting by three reasons, approved also by later Scholastics. — It must be noted that the other commentators, except Biel, dispute not precisely concerning advancement in knowledge, but concerning the primitive perfection of this knowledge; yet in their principles they agree sufficiently.

**III.** St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 94, a. 3; *de Veritate* q. 18, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. II, tr. II, q. 89, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3. — Biel, here the single question at the end.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p53{7,8}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (Vol II PDF-priority inversion). Cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 37681–37832. Printed pp. 537–538 = PDF pp. 559–560 (offset +22). Page-top running heads OCR-mangled (`338`/`S39`) but PDF confirms **537** (top-right) and **538** (top-left).

**ART II opener folded in (Override §5).** The short ARTICULUS II opener *De cognitione primorum parentum* (*Consequenter… quaeritur de cognitione primorum parentum, et incidit hic quaestio circa tria*) plus the three-question TRACTATIO listing (q1 *quantum ad profectum*, q2 *quantum ad defectum*, q3 *de ipsa cognitione quantum ad complementum et statum*) are folded into this q1 — no standalone divisio chunk.

**Alignment VERIFIED.** q1 opener raw 37691 = *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum, si homo stetisset, in cognitione profecisset per temporum intervalla.* TRACTATIO q1 = *quantum ad profectum*. Boundary: QUAESTIO II (*Utrum, si primi parentes stetissent in statu innocentiae, aliquando decipi potuissent*) opens raw ~37833 on p.538 (after this q1's scholion). No misalignment.

**Apparatus / page-split map (15 entries, renumbered continuously):**
- **p.537 footers 1–6 → [^1]–[^6]** (args + sed contra): ¹ Hugo *de Sacr.* I.VI.13 (arg 1); ² Hugo loc.cit. + Magister litt. c.3 (arg 2); ³ Gen.1,28 + Psalm 8,8 + *quorum naturam* var. (arg 3); ⁴ Gen.1,26 + Aristot. + *inferiori* var. (arg 4); ⁵ Cfr. d.4 a.2 q.2 (s.c. 2); ⁶ Vat. *quod*/*quod si* var. (s.c. 3).
- **p.538 footers 1–9 → [^7]–[^15]** (Respondeo): ¹→⁷ Anselm *de Conc.virg.* c.11; ²→⁸ Magister litt. c.3 + *habilitatem* var.; ³→⁹ cod.M *sciendi* var.; ⁴→¹⁰ Sap.9,15; ⁵→¹¹ cod.Z *revelatione*; ⁶→¹² Eph.3,10 + cfr. d.3/d.11; ⁷→¹³ Augustine *Musica* VI c.5 n.9 + Boeth.; ⁸→¹⁴ codd. *potuisset* var.; ⁹→¹⁵ Alex.Hal. + *propter causam infantiae* var.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none — a1-q3 closed clean on p.536; ART II opens fresh on p.537 with its own footer block. FORWARDED: none — q1 (incl. its SCHOLION I–III) closes before QUAESTIO II, which opens later on p.538; q1 holds all of p.537's footers and the first 9 footers of p.538. (q2 will carry p.538's remaining footers from its own body onward.)

**has_scholion:** true — closing SCHOLION for q1 (SCHOLION I+II on the Alex. Hal. parallel and the perfect-knowledge sub-question; SCHOLION III = commentator-roll). Per Override §5, q2/q3 may legitimately lack their own scholia (sibling-pointer to this article's roll).

**[?] flags:** none. Latin and footnotes read cleanly from the 450 dpi bands.