title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus malum condiderit Angelum.
Whether God made the angel evil

source_text:
<!-- page 112 -->

### Articulus I. *De qualitate, quam Angelus habuit in sua creatione.*

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus malum condiderit Angelum.*

Quod autem Deus fecerit ipsum malum, videtur:

1. Per *auctoritates*, quas adducit Magister in littera[^1]. Videtur etiam per *rationes*, quia oppositio mali ad bonum decorat universum, et confert saluti et gloriae Beatorum. Cum igitur Deus posset in omnem decorem et in omne quod utile est saluti electorum, et iterum ipsum facere sit conveniens; videtur, quod Deus non tantum fecerit Angelos bonos, sed etiam malos et caput malorum, scilicet ipsum luciferum. Et hoc est quod videtur dici Ecclesiastici trigesimo tertio[^2]: « Contra malum bonum, et contra mortem vita, et contra virum iustum peccator: et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi ».

2. Item, hoc videtur ex ordine. Inter naturam, quae est apta nata habere iustitiam et habet, et <!-- page 113 --> inter naturam, quae non est apta nata habere nec habet, cadit media illa natura, quae est apta nata habere et non habet iustitiam; sed Deus potest facere extrema et congruit eum facere: ergo pari ratione potest et congruit ei facere mediam: ergo naturam, quae est apta nata habere iustitiam, et non habentem congruit Deum facere. Sed talis est natura mala, scilicet creatura rationalis mala: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *a simili.* Sicut natura rationalis est mala, quae non habet iustitiam, ad quam est nata, ita creatura irrationalis[^3] — unde canis, cum sit natus ad latrandum, si non habet latratum, est malus — ergo cum Deus possit creaturas facere deficientes operationibus, ad quas natae sunt, ut puta canem non latrantem et oculum caecum, pari ratione potest facere voluntatem carentem iustitia. *Si tu dicas*, quod non est simile, quia creatura rationalis immediate ordinatur ad Deum, non sic irrationalis[^4]; *obiicitur* tunc ulterius, quod intellectus noster immediate ordinatur in Deum. Sed Deus potest facere intellectum carentem scientia, ad quam est sive quam debet habere, scilicet ignorantem; sicut dicit Augustinus in tertio libro de Libero Arbitrio[^5], quod si Deus talem condidisset hominem ante peccatum, qualis nunc est, nemo posset ex hoc accusare.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *a minori.* Plus dependet materia a forma perfectiva et magis est imperfecta in genere creaturarum sive entium, quam faciat[^6] rationalis natura a iustitia — sed hoc manifestum est, quia materia sine forma est ens omnino *incompletum* — sed creatura rationalis sine iustitia habet quodam modo *esse completum.* Cum igitur Deus fecerit materiam informem, ad minus sine distinctione formarum, sicut dicunt multi Sancti[^7]: ergo pari ratione potuit facere Angelum sine iustitia, quam debebat habere. Sed Anselmus dicit, « quod malum nihil aliud est quam privatio boni, ubi debet esse »: ergo videtur etc.

**Contra:** 1. Genesis primo[^8]: *Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona*: ergo, cum valde bona supponant bonum, cuncta quae Deus fecit, erant bona: ergo nihil malum.

2. Item, Dionysius[^9]: « Optimi est optima adducere »: ergo si Deus est optimus, non potest ergo producere malum, ita quod faciat malitiam in eo. Et eodem libro de Divinis Nominibus dicit, « quod sicut a calido non egreditur nisi calidum, ita nec a summo bono nisi bonum ».

3. Item, omne quod Deus indidit unicuique rei a sua conditione, est ei naturale: ergo si Deus fecisset Angelum malum, esset ei malitia naturalis. Sed pro naturalibus nemo est vituperandus, nemo puniendus[^10]: ergo nec vituperandus nec puniendus esset diabolus.

4. Item, si aliquod factum vitium facit aliquem dignum poena, magis facit actorem dignum quam alium[^11]: si ergo diabolus ob suam malitiam dignus est poena, si Deus eum fecisset malum, magis esset Deus dignus poena quam diabolus; sed hoc est absurdissimum: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Falsum est et impossibile, Deum fecisse Angelum originaliter malum.

**Respondeo:** Ponere, quod diabolus a Deo habuit originaliter sibi innatam malitiam voluntatis, non tantum falsum est, immo haereticum; et est falsum[^12], quod in se habet evidentiam suae falsitatis, si quis advertat.

Nam opus Dei, eo ipso quod opus Dei est, necesse est, ipsum esse *laudabile, ordinabile, acceptabile, perfectum* vel perfectibile.

Nihil enim facit Deus quod non deceat suam maiestatem. Si ergo *magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis*[^13], et in tantum laudabilis, quod non tantum *in se*, sed etiam in *nullo opere* potest vituperari iuste, immo in omnibus digne laudari: impossibile est, quod faciat opus vituperabile, quantum est de ipso auctore. Sed malum, eo ipso quod malum culpae, dignum est vituperio: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura ab ipso habeat istam conditionem. Et *rursus*, non tantum malum dignum est vituperio, immo est[^14] quodam modo in Dei vituperium. Si ergo Deus faceret creaturam malam, ipse faceret sibi vituperium et contumeliam.

Necesse est etiam[^15] esse *ordinabile*, quia nihil facit, nisi quod deceat suam *sapientiam*; sed nihil quod Deus facit, est ordinabile in *poena*, quia tunc Deus destrueret opera sua, et ita se praevaricatorem constitueret. « Deus enim illius rei est ultor, cuius non est auctor[^16] ». Ergo si Deus facit creaturam malam malitia *culpae*, erit ergo ordinabilis; et non in *poena*: ergo malum *culpae* maneret inultum sive impunitum, salvo ordine universi. Sed hoc est impossibile per se, quia tunc malum esset bonum per se, si aliter esset ordinatum: ergo si Deus faceret creaturam malam, creatura non esset mala.

Necesse est etiam, quod sit *acceptabile.* Nihil enim facit Deus, nisi quod *vult*; sed omne quod Deus vult, iusta et bona[^17] voluntate vult: ergo cum omne quod iusta et aequa voluntas approbat, sit omnibus acceptabile, si Deus faceret malum, malum esset omnibus acceptabile: ergo *acceptare malum* esset bonum, pari ratione et *facere*: ergo malum esset bonum.

Necesse est etiam, quod omne quod Deus facit, sit *perfectum* vel perfectibile, cum *Dei perfecta sint opera*[^18]. Ergo omne quod est in opere Dei a Deo, vel est de perfectione, vel inclinat ad perfectionem. Si ergo malitia est a Deo in creatura rationali, ergo vel est de perfectione Angeli, vel disponit ad perfectionem; sed nihil tale deordinat: ergo malum non deordinaret, et si non deordinaret, non noceret: ergo malum esset aliquid et non noceret.

Cum igitur hic sint quatuor incompossibilia manifesta, manifestum est, quod falsum est et impossibile, Deum fecisse Angelum originaliter malum. Et venit ista impossibilitas ex summa perfectione et nobilitate[^19] operantis et vilitate mali culpae: privat enim illas quatuor conditiones nobiles, quas necesse est esse in omni divino opere, non quia Deus teneatur operi illas dare, sed quia non *decet* eius voluntatem aliter operari vel facere.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod facit ad decorem; dico, quod est mali *productio*, et producti *ordinatio.* Productio mali foedat et turpat, quantum est de se, sed *ordinatio* decorat. Et quoniam Deus non potest foedare, sed decorare; ideo non potuit *producere*, sed *ordinare* secundum antithesim. Et secundum hoc intelligit Ecclesiasticus: *Contra bonum malum*, non quia Deus *fecerit*, sed quia quod in suis operibus factum invenit *ordinavit.*

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de natura, quae nata est habere iustitiam etc.; dicendum, quod cum dico *naturam privatam iustitia*, duo dico, scilicet quod *natura* est, et quod *privata.* In quantum *natura*, tenet medium et sequitur argumentum; in quantum vero *privata*, non tenet medium, immo locum *infimum*, immo ipsa privatio nullum[^20], quantum est de se, quia nihil est. Et ideo non valet, quod eam privatam fecerit. *Et si tu obiicias*, quod maior privatio est non habere nec *actum* nec *aptitudinem*, quam habere *aptitudinem* et non *actum*; dicendum, quod maior est privatio, si accipiatur large privatio[^21]; sed tamen ista est deformis, illa non. Unde cum dico: lignum non videt, dico negationem, sed non deformitatem; cum dico: homo non videt, dico utrumque. Et sic patet illud.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur *a simili* in aliis naturis, et *a minori* in ipsa materia; dico, quod non est ibi locus *a simili* nec *a minori*, si bene consideretur. Malum enim culpae aliter importat deordinationem sive privationem ordinis quam malum naturae vel poenae, quia, sicut dictum est distinctione quadragesima septima primi libri[^22], malum *culpae* dicit deordinationem sive privationem ordinis principalis, qui scilicet est imaginis ad Deum immediate; malum vero *naturae* vel *poenae* deordinationem ordinis non principalis, sed particularis. Et hinc est, quod Deus, salva condecentia suae bonitatis et sapientiae, potest facere rem malam malitia *poenae*, vel defectu naturae[^23], non sic privatam ordine iustitiae ex ea parte, qua procedit ab ipsa dispositione divinae sapientiae. Unde non sequitur: potest Deus facere hominem caecum: ergo potest facere iniquum.

english:
### Article I. *On the quality which the angel had in its creation.*

### Question I. *Whether God made the angel evil.*

That God made it evil, seems [so]:

1. By the *authorities* which the Master adduces in the text[^1]. It seems also by *reasons*, because the opposition of evil to good adorns the universe, and contributes to the salvation and glory of the Blessed. Since therefore God could [contribute] to every adornment and to everything which is useful to the salvation of the elect, and again to make it [evil] is fitting; it seems that God made not only good angels, but also evil [ones] and the head of the evil, namely Lucifer himself. And this is what seems to be said in Ecclesiasticus the thirty-third[^2]: « Against evil [is] good, and against death life, and against the just man the sinner: and so look upon all the works of the Most High ».

2. Likewise, this seems [so] from order. Between the nature which is apt and born to have justice and has [it], and <!-- page 113 --> between the nature which is not apt and born to have [it] nor has [it], there falls that middle nature which is apt and born to have and does not have justice; but God can make the extremes and it befits Him to make [them]: therefore by parity of reason He can and it befits Him to make the middle [one]: therefore it befits God to make the nature which is apt and born to have justice, and not having [it]. But such is the evil nature, namely the evil rational creature: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [so] *from a likeness.* Just as the rational nature is evil which does not have the justice for which it is born, so [is] the irrational creature[^3] — whence a dog, since it is born for barking, if it does not have barking, is bad — therefore since God can make creatures deficient in the operations for which they are born, as for instance a non-barking dog and a blind eye, by parity of reason He can make a will lacking justice. *If you say* that it is not alike, because the rational creature is immediately ordered to God, not so the irrational[^4]; *it is objected* then further, that our intellect is immediately ordered to God. But God can make an intellect lacking the knowledge which it [is born for] or ought to have, namely an ignorant [one]; as Augustine says in the third book *On Free Choice*[^5], that if God had made such a man before sin as he now is, no one could from this accuse [Him].

4. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [so] *from the lesser.* Matter depends more on the perfective form and is more imperfect in the genus of creatures or beings, than the rational nature [would be made imperfect][^6] by [the lack of] justice — but this is manifest, because matter without form is a being altogether *incomplete* — but the rational creature without justice has in a certain way a *complete being.* Since therefore God made unformed matter, at least without the distinction of forms, as many Saints say[^7]: therefore by parity of reason He could make an angel without the justice which it ought to have. But Anselm says, « that evil is nothing other than the privation of a good, where it ought to be »: therefore it seems etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Genesis the first[^8]: *God saw all the [things] which He had made, and they were very good*: therefore, since [things] very good presuppose good, all the [things] which God made were good: therefore nothing [was] evil.

2. Likewise, Dionysius[^9]: « It belongs to the best to bring forth the best [things] »: therefore if God is the best, He cannot then produce evil, so that He make malice in it. And in the same book *On the Divine Names* he says, « that just as from the hot nothing goes forth but the hot, so neither from the highest good [anything] but good ».

3. Likewise, everything which God implanted in each thing from its making is natural to it: therefore if God had made the angel evil, malice would be natural to it. But for natural [things] no one is to be blamed, no one to be punished[^10]: therefore neither would the devil be [one] to be blamed nor punished.

4. Likewise, if some committed fault makes someone deserving of punishment, it makes the agent deserving more than another[^11]: if therefore the devil on account of its malice is deserving of punishment, [then] if God had made it evil, God would be more deserving of punishment than the devil; but this is most absurd: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> It is false and impossible that God made the angel originally evil.

**I respond:** To posit that the devil had from God originally an innate malice of will is not only false, but rather heretical; and it is false[^12] [in such a way] that it has in itself the evidence of its falsity, if anyone attend.

For the work of God, by the very fact that it is the work of God, must necessarily itself be *laudable, orderable, acceptable, perfect* or perfectible.

For God makes nothing which does not befit His majesty. If therefore [He is] *a great Lord and exceedingly laudable*[^13], and so laudable that not only *in Himself*, but also in *no work* can He justly be blamed, but rather worthily praised in all: it is impossible that He make a blameworthy work, so far as is from the author Himself. But evil, by the very fact that it is evil of fault, is worthy of blame: therefore it is impossible that any creature have this condition from Him. And *again*, not only is evil worthy of blame, but rather it is[^14] in a certain way unto the blame of God. If therefore God made an evil creature, He would make for Himself blame and contumely.

It must necessarily also[^15] be *orderable*, because He makes nothing except what befits His *wisdom*; but nothing which God makes is orderable in *punishment*, because then God would destroy His own works, and thus would constitute Himself a transgressor. « For God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author[^16] ». Therefore if God makes an evil creature by evil of *fault*, it will then be orderable; and not in *punishment*: therefore the evil of *fault* would remain unavenged or unpunished, the order of the universe being preserved. But this is impossible in itself, because then evil would be good in itself, if it were ordered otherwise: therefore if God made an evil creature, the creature would not be evil.

It must necessarily also be *acceptable.* For God makes nothing except what He *wills*; but everything which God wills, He wills with a just and good[^17] will: therefore since everything which a just and equitable will approves is acceptable to all, [then] if God made evil, evil would be acceptable to all: therefore *to accept evil* would be good, and by parity of reason also *to make* [it]: therefore evil would be good.

It must necessarily also be that everything which God makes is *perfect* or perfectible, since *the works of God are perfect*[^18]. Therefore everything which is in the work of God from God either is of perfection, or inclines to perfection. If therefore malice is from God in the rational creature, then either it is of the angel's perfection, or it disposes to perfection; but nothing such disorders: therefore the evil would not disorder, and if it did not disorder, it would not harm: therefore the evil would be something and would not harm.

Since therefore here there are four manifest incompossibles, it is manifest that it is false and impossible that God made the angel originally evil. And this impossibility comes from the highest perfection and nobility[^19] of the agent and the vileness of the evil of fault: for it deprives [it of] those four noble conditions which must necessarily be in every divine work, not because God is bound to give them to His work, but because it does not *befit* His will to operate or make otherwise.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that it contributes to adornment; I say that there is a *production* of the evil, and an *ordering* of the produced. The production of evil befouls and disfigures, so far as is of itself, but the *ordering* adorns. And since God cannot befoul, but [can] adorn; therefore He could not *produce*, but [could] *order* according to antithesis. And according to this Ecclesiasticus understands: *Against good [is] evil*, not because God *made* [it], but because what He found made in His works He *ordered.*

2. To that which is objected concerning the nature which is born to have justice etc.; it must be said that when I say *a nature deprived of justice*, I say two [things], namely that it *is a nature*, and that it is *deprived.* Insofar as [it is] *a nature*, it holds the middle and the argument follows; but insofar as [it is] *deprived*, it does not hold the middle, but rather the lowest place, but rather the privation itself [holds] no [place][^20], so far as is of itself, because it is nothing. And therefore it does not hold that He made it deprived. *And if you object* that a greater privation is to have neither *act* nor *aptitude*, than to have *aptitude* and not *act*; it must be said that the privation is greater, if privation be taken broadly[^21]; but yet that [one] is deformed, this [one] is not. Whence when I say: wood does not see, I state a negation, but not a deformity; when I say: a man does not see, I state both. And so that is plain.

3. 4. To that which is objected *from a likeness* in other natures, and *from the lesser* in matter itself; I say that there is no place there *from a likeness* nor *from the lesser*, if it be well considered. For the evil of fault implies disorder or privation of order otherwise than the evil of nature or of punishment, because, as was said in the forty-seventh distinction of the first book[^22], the evil of *fault* states a disorder or privation of the *principal* order, which namely is [the order] of the image to God immediately; but the evil of *nature* or of *punishment* [states] a disorder of an order not principal, but particular. And hence it is that God, the becomingness of His goodness and wisdom being preserved, can make a thing evil with the evil of *punishment*, or by a defect of nature[^23], [a thing] not so deprived of the order of justice on that side by which it proceeds from the very disposition of the divine wisdom. Whence it does not follow: God can make a man blind: therefore He can make [him] iniquitous.

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4.

la: Vers. 15. — Hoc argumentum insinuatur ab Augustino, XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 17; Enchirid. c. 10. seq.; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 24. seqq.

en: Verse 15. — This argument is insinuated by Augustine, XI *On the City of God*, c. 17; *Enchiridion* c. 10 f.; III *On Free Choice* c. 9, n. 24 ff.

la: Supple cum codd. A cc et ed. 1 *si non habet operationem, ad quam* [cod. A *si non habet ad quod*] *nata est.*

en: Supply, with codices A cc and ed. 1, *if it does not have the operation for which* [cod. A *if it does not have that for which*] *it is born.*

la: Cap. 9. n. 23. et c. 20. n. 56. seqq. — In fine argumenti cod. W supplet *Deum*, pro quo codd. U Y exhibent *eum.*

en: Chapter 9, n. 23, and c. 20, n. 56 ff. — At the end of the argument codex W supplies *Deum*, for which codices U Y exhibit *eum.*

la: Cod. aa *sit.* — Vocem *faciat* interpretare *dependeat.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *sit.* — Interpret the word *faciat* [as] *dependeat.*

la: Vide infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. — Verba Anselmi, de Casu diaboli, c. 11, sunt: *Malum non est aliud quam non bonum aut absentia boni, ubi debet et expedit esse bonum.*

en: See below d. 12, a. 1, q. 2. — The words of Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 11, are: *Evil is nothing other than not-good or the absence of a good, where a good ought to and is expedient to be.*

la: Vers. 31.

en: Verse 31.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae: « *Neque enim ignis frigere, neque optimi non optima adducere* »; iuxta aliam versionem [in operibus S. Thomae]: « *Neque enim ignis est infrigidare, neque boni non bona producere* ». Quibus verbis contineri videtur etiam textus, qui mox allegatur, de quo et cfr. ibid. § 21, ubi dicitur: *Etenim neque in igne frigus, neque ille vitiatur eo et malum bono existente.*

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 19, according to the version of Scotus Eriugena: « *For neither [is it] for fire to be cold, nor for the best not to bring forth the best [things]* »; according to another version [in the works of St. Thomas]: « *For neither is it for fire to cool, nor for the good not to produce good [things]* ». By which words there seems to be contained also the text which is presently alleged, on which cf. also ibid. § 21, where it is said: *For neither [is there] cold in fire, nor is it vitiated by [the good] and by evil while the good exists.*

la: Cod. P adiungit *secundo Ethicorum, c. 5*, ubi ostendit Aristot., virtutem non esse affectus neque potentias naturales, quia his neque laudamur neque vituperamur. III. Ethic. c. 5. ait: *Qui enim natura deformes sunt, eos reprehendit nemo.* Cfr. II. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.): *Vituperantur autem laudanturque non quae a necessitate vel natura vel fortuna insunt, sed quorum ipsi causa sumus.*

en: Codex P adds *in the second [book] of the Ethics, c. 5*, where Aristotle shows that virtue is not affections nor natural potencies, because by these we are neither praised nor blamed. III *Ethics* c. 5 says: *For those who are by nature misshapen, no one reproves them.* Cf. II *Eudemian [Ethics]* c. 7 (c. 6): *But [those things] are blamed and praised not which are present from necessity or nature or fortune, but of which we ourselves are the cause.*

la: Sub quo respectu Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 11. dicit, quod deterius sit iniustitiam facere quam iniustitiam accipere. — Codd. aa bb *auctorem* pro *actorem.* Ultimam prop. argumenti *sed hoc est absurdissimum: ergo etc.* fide codd. E F I K P Q U Y X bb adiunximus.

en: Under which respect Aristotle, V *Ethics* c. 11, says that it is worse to do injustice than to receive injustice. — Codices aa bb [read] *auctorem* for *actorem.* The last proposition of the argument, *sed hoc est absurdissimum: ergo etc.*, we have added on the faith of codices E F I K P Q U Y X bb.

la: Cod. aa *tale falsum*, Vat. *et ita est falsum.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *tale falsum*, the Vatican [edition] *et ita est falsum.*

en: Psalm 47:2.

la: Fide codd. K U bb substituimus *est* pro *etiam*; codd. E cc et ed. 1 *immo etiam quodam modo redundat* [codd. I Y aa *est*] *in* etc.

en: On the faith of codices K U bb we substitute *est* for *etiam*; codices E cc and ed. 1 [read] *immo etiam quodam modo redundat* [codices I Y aa *est*] *in* etc.

la: Supple cum cod. Q *opus Dei*, et dein post *quia nihil facit* cum cod. W *Deus.*

en: Supply, with codex Q, *opus Dei*, and then after *quia nihil facit*, with codex W, *Deus.*

la: Fulgent., I. ad Monimum, c. 19.

en: Fulgentius, I *To Monimus*, c. 19.

la: Cod. W *aequa*; Vat. paulo inferius *bona* pro *aequa.*

en: Codex W [reads] *aequa*; the Vatican [edition], a little below, *bona* for *aequa.*

en: Deuteronomy 32:4.

la: Fere omnes codd. *voluntate*; perperam et contra cod. cc cum ed. 1.

en: Almost all codices [read] *voluntate*; wrongly and against codex cc with ed. 1.

la: Subaudi cum codd. F (Q T a secunda manu) *locum tenet*; Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et primis edd. supplet *habet medium*, sed minus congrue.

en: Understand, with codices F (Q T by a second hand), *locum tenet* [holds a place]; the Vatican [edition], with some codices and the first editions, supplies *habet medium*, but less fittingly.

la: Scil. prout idem est ac *negatio.*

en: Namely, insofar as it is the same as *negation.*

la: Quaest. 3. 4. — Paulo superius Vat. *magis importat* pro *aliter importat*, quae etiam circa initium solutionis ponit *in prima materia* pro *in ipsa materia.* Eadem Vat. paulo inferius *quae scilicet* pro *qui scilicet.*

en: Questions 3, 4. — A little above the Vatican [edition reads] *magis importat* for *aliter importat*, which also, about the beginning of the solution, puts *in prima materia* for *in ipsa materia.* The same Vatican [edition], a little below, [reads] *quae scilicet* for *qui scilicet.*

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 *vel defectum naturae.*

en: Several codices, with ed. 1, [read] *vel defectum naturae.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod Angelus in primo instanti fuerit malus, dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quod a Deo creatus fuerit malus, vel quod bonus creatus ipse in primo instanti se fecerit malum. De quaestione in primo sensu hic agitur, de altera in seq. quaest. Haec prima militat contra pestiferos Manichaeos et contra omnes, qui malum *culpae* eodem modo, sicut malum *poenae*, Deo auctori attribuere non erubescunt. De hoc dicit Concil. Later. cap. *Firmiter*: « Diabolus et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali ». De Manichaeis cfr. supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

**II.** Alex. Hal. S. p. II. q. 98. m. 1. a. 3. — Scoti loci collecti a Montefortino in Sum. t. II. p. I. q. 63. a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 63. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 107; de Malo, q. 16. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 4. q. unica circa finem.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That the angel was evil in the first instant can be understood in two ways: either that it was created evil by God, or that, created good, it itself made itself evil in the first instant. The question is treated here in the first sense, the other in the following question. This first [question] militates against the pestiferous Manichees and against all who do not blush to attribute the evil of *fault*, in the same mode as the evil of *punishment*, to God as author. On this the Lateran Council says, in the chapter *Firmiter*: « The devil and the other demons were indeed created good by God as to nature, but they themselves by themselves became evil ». On the Manichees cf. above d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 98, m. 1, a. 3. — The Scotus passages collected by Montefortino in the *Summa*, t. II, p. I, q. 63, a. 4. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 63, a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 107; *On Evil*, q. 16, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 13; *Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 8, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, II *Sent.* d. 4, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 4. — Biel, on this and the following question, II *Sent.* d. 4, the sole question near the end.

---

translators_notes:
- **Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 8507–8674) cross-verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (pp.112–114), per the Vol II override. The *videtur*/*Contra* args are clean running prose in the OCR; the Respondeo (the four-conditions argument — *laudabile / ordinabile / acceptabile / perfectibile* — + Epilogus) and the three replies cascade-shatter and were reflowed from the crops (L column then R column).
- **Page span / structure.** This chunk **folds in the `ARTICULUS I` opener** (raw 8507–8510, `De qualitate, quam Angelus habuit in sua creatione.`) per the Vol II ART-opener convention (the d.2 `d2-p2-a1-q1` precedent; the pars-2 `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` in committed `d3-p2-divisio` already enumerated this article's two questions, so the opener is a bare header+title with no sub-divisio). QUAESTIO I (*Utrum Deus malum condiderit Angelum*) opens **low on p.112** (L column, beneath committed `d3-p2-divisio`), and runs pp.112–114: 4 *videtur* args + 4 *Contra* args; a one-sentence *Conclusio* (blockquote); a Respondeo arguing the work of God must be *laudabile / ordinabile / acceptabile / perfectum-vel-perfectibile* (the *quatuor incompossibilia* with God's making evil) + Epilogus; replies 1, 2, 3.4; then an editorial **Scholion I–II** (the *dupliciter malus* distinction + the Lateran *Firmiter* canon against the Manichees; the parallel-loci commentator list) — references inline, **NO numbered apparatus** (same convention as the d.3 pars-1 editorial scholia). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Ad oppositum`, `Fundamenta`, `Conclusio`, `Ratio`, `Opus Dei laudabile/ordinabile`, `Item acceptabile`, `Item perfectibile`, `Epilogus`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Notandum`).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–23):** p.112 footer notes **3–4** → `[^1]`–`[^2]` (notes 1–2 are the committed dubia/divisio's; see incoming split); p.113 footer notes 1–12 → `[^3]`–`[^14]` (L col 1–7, R col 8–12; no L→R runover — note 7 is long but stays in the L column); p.114 footer notes 1–9 → `[^15]`–`[^23]` (L col 1–6, R col 7–9); p.114 note 6 (`Subaudi cum codd. F (Q T a secunda manu) locum…`) is an **L→R column-footer runover**, the R-col continuation (`tenet; Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et primis edd. supplet habet medium, sed minus congrue.`) folded into `[^20]`.
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (d3-p2-divisio → a1-q1): SPLIT at p.112 — 3-way (received).** p.112's footer has 4 notes anchoring three chunks: note 1 → committed `d3-p1-dubia` (`[^15]`); note 2 → committed `d3-p2-divisio` (`[^1]`); **notes 3–4 → this chunk** (`[^1]`–`[^2]`, anchoring QUAESTIO I's `Magister in littera³` and `Ecclesiastici trigesimo tertio⁴`). No backfill (the divisio documented this prospectively).
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a1-q1 → a1-q2): CLEAN.** q1's editorial Scholion I–II has no numbered apparatus and ends on p.114; `QUAESTIO II` opens on p.115 (raw 8675). p.114's footer is wholly q1's (`[^15]`–`[^23]`). No backfill outgoing; `d3-p2-a1-q2` starts its apparatus at the first p.115 footer note.
- **Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the cascade Respondeo/replies and the editorial Scholion were verified on the pp.112–114 crops; the OCR base is reliable for the *videtur*/*Contra* prose. The single L→R runover note (`[^20]`) was recovered from the R-col footer head per the standard Vol II pattern; secure on content. Cascade-region marker positions in the four-conditions Respondeo are content-matched in source order; per-clause positions may be off by a few words where the two-column linearization is ambiguous — parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 115 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus propria voluntate.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus actu propriae voluntatis. Et quod sic videtur:

1. *Auctoritate* canonicae Ioannis tertio[^1]: *Diabolus ab initio peccavit*; sed nihil est ante initium duratione: ergo nulla creatura praecessit duratione angelicum peccatum.

2. Item, Augustinus undecimo super Genesim ad litteram[^2]: « Non frustra putari potest, in initio temporis diabolum superbia cecidisse, nec fuisse ullum antea tempus, quo cum Angelis sanctis pacatus vixerit et beatus, sed in ipso primordio creaturae a suo Creatore apostatasse ». Si tu dicas mihi, quod hoc non dicit secundum suam opinionem, et bene, quia ibidem, ubi Augustinus ponit istam opinionem, alias etiam ponit, quas non tenet; *obiicitur*, quod hoc dixerit secundum suam opinionem, quia ipsius opinio fuit, quod omnia simul essent condita, et per *lucem* intelligit angelicam creaturam formatam, per *tenebras* intelligit aversam a Deo[^3]: ergo si simul lux facta est et a tenebris divisa, simul cum rerum prima conditione fuit peccatum Angeli; et ita videtur, quod nulla fuit omnino ibi mora.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: aliqua creatura corporalis est, quae simul et in eodem instanti est et operatur, sicut lux statim cum est, lucet; et Augustinus[^4] dicit, « quod lux et splendor sunt coaeva, et si esset lux aeterna, splendor esset aeternus »: ergo cum spiritualis natura sit magis vel aeque actualis, ut corporalis: ergo potest esse, quod in primo instanti cum est, sit in suo actu. Sed actus eius est velle: ergo statim cum est, potest velle, ita quod esse non praecedit velle tempore sive duratione, sed solum natura; sed qua ratione velle potest bonum, eadem ratione malum: ergo cum volens malum sit malus, in primo instanti potuit esse malus. Si tu dicas, quod[^5] potest habere operationem coaevam *naturalem*, sed non *liberum arbitrium*; *contra*: « liberum arbitrium est sub Deo potentissimum », sicut dicit Bernardus[^6], et nihil habet retardans in Angelo nec ligans, sed statim cum est, perfectum est et potest operationem illam habere.

4. Item, si oculus crearetur cum actualitate virtutis visivae et impressione speciei, simul esset et videret. Cum ergo Angelus a sui prima conditione habuerit intellectum agentem et species rerum innatas, ut post patebit[^7]: ergo simul fuit et intellexit, pari ratione et simul fuit et voluit. Si tu dicas, quod *intelligere* et *velle* fiunt in diversis instantibus; *contra*: *intelligere* Angeli est simplex et in instanti potest esse, similiter et *velle*; sed nihil prohibet, duo indivisibilia esse simul: ergo nihil prohibet, quod *intelligere* et *velle*, cum sint indivisibilia, saltem ratione indivisibilis simul sint, sicut ultima duarum linearum contiguarum simul[^8].

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *per simile.* Quia anima rationalis simul tempore conditur et vitiatur, nec est ibi aliqua oppositio: ergo similiter videtur, quod in Angelo esse potuerit, quod simul fieret et vitiaretur, non tamen a Deo, sicut nec originale peccatum est a Deo. Aut si non est simile, ego quaero rationem: quare anima haec duo potest habere simul, et non Angelus? Si dicas mihi, quod ab actu alieno inficitur anima, scilicet a corpore, sed Angelus a se; hoc nihil est, quia ita cito Angelus fuit cognitus a se, sicut ab alio: ergo pari ratione ita infici potuit ab actu proprio, sicut ab alieno.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ezechielis vigesimo octavo[^9]: *In deliciis paradisi fuisti, plenus sapientia* <!-- page 116 --> *et perfectus decore*, ergo etc.: ergo cum hoc intelligatur de diabolo, sicut exponunt Glossae, fuit ergo aliquando sine peccato.

2. Item, hoc dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo quinto: « *In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es*; ubi aliquando intelligitur fuisse sine peccato ».

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: omne peccatum actuale exit in esse per actum deliberationis; sed ubi deliberatio, ibi collatio et successio de necessitate: ergo si peccatum sequitur deliberationem Angeli, peccatum sequitur Angelum non tantum *natura*, verum etiam *duratione.* Si tu dicas, quod Angelus propter intellectum deiformem deliberat in instanti, et simul videt et deliberat; *ostendo*, quod[^10] non potest esse. Angelus enim ad hoc, quod appeteret, necessario tria praecognovit: et appetibile, et cui appetebat, et rationem moventem — aliqua enim ratio fuit, quae excitavit — sed ista sunt diversa, et impossibile est per naturam, aliquam potentiam simplicem simul et semel ad plura converti; propter quod etiam dicit Philosophus[^11], « quod intelligimus unum solum »: ergo si non simul, successive ergo cognovit.

4. Item, Angelus, quando conditus est, aut factus est *cum* sua operatione actuali, aut *absque* operatione actuali. Si *absque* operatione actuali: ergo post tempus peccavit necessario. Si *cum* sua operatione[^12]; sed non decuit Deum concreare alicui rei nisi operationem suae naturae convenientem: cum ergo actio deformis potius sit naturae disconveniens, patet etc.

5. Item, haec duo sunt vera per se, quod nullus in illo instanti, quo peccat, potest vitare peccatum; et nullus peccat actuali peccato in eo quod vitare non potest; sed si Angelus peccavit in illo instanti, non potuit[^13] in illo vitare, nec in aliquo, quod esset ante illud, nec post: ergo non potuit vitare. Sed si non potuit vitare, non peccavit: ergo si peccavit in primo instanti, non peccavit.

6. Item, malum est corruptivum boni; sed nihil corrumpitur nisi quod est vel fuit: ergo in Angelo aliquid fuit, quod amisit per peccatum. Tunc ergo quaero, utrum in primo instanti peccaverit, an non. Si non, tunc habeo propositum; si sic, ergo peccavit subito. Sed cum in subita mutatione simul sit *fieri* et *factum esse*, simul erit *corrumpi* et *corruptum esse*, et ita *non esse*: ergo bonum in primo instanti non est. Sed non corrumperetur, nisi fuerit: ergo in eodem instanti fuit et non fuit, et ita contradictorie opposita sunt simul vera. Sed hoc est impossibile, et propter hoc vult Philosophus[^14], « quod inter mutationes contrarias de necessitate sit quies media »: ergo inter illius boni productionem et ademptionem fuit quies media, et ita morula. Si tu dicas — sicut dicitur de anima rationali, quia similiter potest ibi obiici — quod[^15] non adimit bonum, quod infuit, sed quod infuisset, si non peccasset; nunquam enim fuit iustus et bonus, sed fuisset, si non peccasset; *contra* hoc est Augustinus de Correptione et gratia[^16]: « *Ille in veritate non stetit*, dictum est de diabolo, quia ibi fuit, sed non permansit »: ergo illa responsio nihil valet hic.

### Conclusio

> Morula fuit inter creationem Angeli et lapsum eius.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod antiqua positio fuit aliquorum, quod simul tempore fuit diabolus et peccavit, nec unquam fuit nisi malus; et videtur Augustinus illam approbare super Genesim ad litteram[^17]; et ideo aliqui moderni eam tenuerunt. — Sed quoniam, sicut expresse dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei[^18], praedicta positio accedit ad primam, quae est haeretica, et ita quasi haeresim sapit; communis opinio magistrorum Parisiensium est, quod duratione conditio Angeli praecessit lapsum; et de communi consilio magistrorum positio opposita excommunicata est ab episcopo Parisiensi[^19]. Ideo tanquam magis veram et catholicam, et magis probabilem et communem opinionem dico illam esse tenendam, quod morula fuit inter creationem et lapsum, licet parvula. Propter quam Sancti et expositores et ipsa Scriptura loquitur de malitia diaboli, quasi semper fuisset in ea, quia illud modicum quasi pro nihilo reputatur[^20].

<!-- page 117 -->
1. Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum, quia, ut dicit Augustinus[^21], sensus est: *diabolus ab initio peccat*, id est statim post initium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, dico, quod dicit secundum alienam opinionem; quod patet, quia contrarium dicit undecimo de Civitate Dei[^22]. — Et quod obiicitur, quod ipse posuit omnia simul facta; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad *esse naturale*, sed non quantum ad *bene esse.* Unde posuit, quod lux corporalis simul esset et divisa esset a tenebris, similiter, quod non est ordo materialium dierum; sed bene posuit ordinem spiritualium dierum secundum septemplicem conversionem intellectus angelici supra res[^23].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod statim fuit in actu; dicendum, quod quidam hoc negant in omni creatura; quia tamen Augustinus videtur dicere contrarium in luce et splendore, concedamus etiam in Angelo. Sed tamen non fuit statim[^24] in actu *electionis*, quia illum antecedit deliberatio et praecognitio plurium; quia, sicut dictum est in opponendo[^25], non possunt esse simul, non ob repugnantiam actuum vel simplicitatum, sed propter simplicitatem intellectus angelici, quia una conversione totus capitur intellectus ab uno obiecto, ita quod incompossibilis est in illo instanti conversio ad aliud obiectum.

4. 5. Et sic patet responsio ad duo sequentia. — Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de peccato animae, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia peccatum in anima non fit per actualem deliberationem, sed fit per unionem ad carnem infectam: et quoniam unio est in instanti, deliberatio et collatio non: ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the angel in the first instant of its creation was evil by its own will.*

Secondly it is asked whether the angel in the first instant of its creation was evil by the act of its own will. And that [it was] so seems [the case]:

1. By the *authority* of the canonical [letter] of John, the third [chapter][^1]: *The devil sins from the beginning*; but nothing is before the beginning in duration: therefore no creature preceded the angelic sin in duration.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the eleventh [book] *on Genesis according to the letter*[^2]: « It can not without reason be thought that in the beginning of time the devil fell by pride, and that there was no time before, in which he lived at peace and blessed with the holy angels, but that in the very first beginning of the creature he apostatized from his Creator ». If you say to me that he does not say this according to his own opinion, and [you say] well, because in the same place where Augustine sets down that opinion he also sets down others which he does not hold; *it is objected* that he said this according to his own opinion, because his opinion was that all [things] were created at once, and by *light* he understands the angelic creature [when] formed, by *darkness* he understands [it when] turned away from God[^3]: therefore if at once light was made and divided from darkness, at once with the first making of things was the sin of the angel; and so it seems that there was no delay at all there.

3. Likewise, *by reason* it seems [so]: there is some corporeal creature which at once and in the same instant both is and operates, as light, as soon as it is, shines; and Augustine[^4] says, « that light and splendor are coeval, and if light were eternal, splendor would be eternal »: therefore since the spiritual nature is more or equally actual as the corporeal: therefore it can be that in the first instant when it is, it is in its act. But its act is to will: therefore as soon as it is, it can will, so that being does not precede willing in time or duration, but only in nature; but by whatever reason it can will good, by the same reason [it can will] evil: therefore since one willing evil is evil, in the first instant it could be evil. If you say that[^5] it can have a coeval *natural* operation, but not *free choice*; *on the contrary*: « free choice is, under God, most powerful », as Bernard says[^6], and it has nothing retarding in the angel nor binding, but as soon as it is, it is perfect and can have that operation.

4. Likewise, if an eye were created with the actuality of the visual power and the impression of the species, it would at once both be and see. Since therefore the angel from its first making had an agent intellect and innate species of things, as will afterwards be plain[^7]: therefore at once it both was and understood, by parity of reason also at once it both was and willed. If you say that *to understand* and *to will* come about in diverse instants; *on the contrary*: the *understanding* of the angel is simple and can be in an instant, likewise also the *willing*; but nothing prohibits two indivisibles from being at once: therefore nothing prohibits *understanding* and *willing*, since they are indivisible, from being at once at least by reason of the indivisible, as the last [points] of two contiguous lines [are] at once[^8].

5. Likewise, this same [thing] is shown *through a likeness.* Because the rational soul is at the same time made and vitiated, nor is there any opposition there: therefore likewise it seems that it could be in the angel that it should at once be made and be vitiated, yet not by God, just as neither is original sin from God. Or if it is not alike, I ask the reason: why can the soul have these two at once, and not the angel? If you say to me that the soul is infected by an alien act, namely by the body, but the angel by itself; this is nothing, because the angel was just as quickly known by itself as by another: therefore by parity of reason it could just so be infected by its own act, as by an alien [one].

**But on the contrary:** 1. Ezekiel the twenty-eighth[^9]: *In the delights of paradise you were, full of wisdom* <!-- page 116 --> *and perfect in beauty*, therefore etc.: therefore since this is understood of the devil, as the Glosses expound, he was therefore at some time without sin.

2. Likewise, this Augustine says in the eleventh [book] *of the City of God*, in the fifteenth chapter: « *In the delights of the paradise of God you were, adorned with every precious stone*; where he is understood to have been at some time without sin ».

3. Likewise, *by reason* it seems [so]: every actual sin goes forth into being through an act of deliberation; but where [there is] deliberation, there [are] comparison and succession of necessity: therefore if sin follows the deliberation of the angel, sin follows the angel not only in nature, but also in duration. If you say that the angel, on account of its deiform intellect, deliberates in an instant, and at once both sees and deliberates; *I show* that[^10] this cannot be. For the angel, in order that it might desire, necessarily foreknew three [things]: both the desirable, and that for which it desired, and the moving reason — for there was some reason which roused [it] — but these are diverse, and it is impossible by nature for any simple potency to be turned to several [things] at once and at one time; on account of which the Philosopher also says[^11], « that we understand one only »: therefore if not at once, then it knew successively.

4. Likewise, the angel, when it was made, was either made *with* its actual operation, or *without* an actual operation. If *without* an actual operation: therefore after a time it sinned necessarily. If *with* its operation[^12]; but it did not befit God to co-create with anything except an operation befitting its nature: since therefore a deformed action is rather unbefitting to the nature, it is plain etc.

5. Likewise, these two [things] are true per se: that no one in that instant in which he sins can avoid the sin; and no one sins with actual sin in that which he cannot avoid; but if the angel sinned in that instant, it could not[^13] avoid [it] in that [instant], nor in any [instant] which was before it, nor after: therefore it could not avoid [it]. But if it could not avoid [it], it did not sin: therefore if it sinned in the first instant, it did not sin.

6. Likewise, evil is corruptive of good; but nothing is corrupted except what is or was: therefore in the angel there was something which it lost through sin. Then therefore I ask whether it sinned in the first instant, or not. If not, then I have what was proposed; if so, then it sinned suddenly. But since in a sudden change *to be made* and *to have been made* are at once, *to be corrupted* and *to have been corrupted* will be at once, and so *not to be*: therefore the good in the first instant is not. But it would not be corrupted unless it had been: therefore in the same instant it both was and was not, and so contradictory opposites are at once true. But this is impossible, and on account of this the Philosopher holds[^14] « that between contrary changes there is of necessity a rest in between »: therefore between the production and the removal of that good there was a rest in between, and so a delay. If you say — as is said of the rational soul, because it can be objected there likewise — that[^15] it does not remove the good which was present, but [the good] which would have been present, if it had not sinned; for it was never just and good, but would have been, if it had not sinned; *against* this is Augustine *On Rebuke and Grace*[^16]: « *He stood not in the truth*, it is said of the devil, because he was there, but he did not remain »: therefore that answer is worth nothing here.

### Conclusion

> There was a delay between the creation of the angel and its fall.

**I respond:** It must be said that there was an ancient position of some, that the devil at the same time was and sinned, nor was he ever [anything] but evil; and Augustine seems to approve it *on Genesis according to the letter*[^17]; and therefore some moderns held it. — But since, as Augustine expressly says in the eleventh [book] *of the City of God*[^18], the aforesaid position approaches the first, which is heretical, and so as it were savors of heresy; the common opinion of the masters of Paris is that the making of the angel preceded the fall in duration; and by the common counsel of the masters the opposite position was excommunicated by the bishop of Paris[^19]. Therefore as the more true and catholic, and the more probable and common opinion, I say that this is to be held, that there was a delay between the creation and the fall, though a very small [one]. On account of which the Saints and the expositors and Scripture itself speak of the malice of the devil as if it had always been in him, because that little [delay] is reckoned as it were for nothing[^20].

<!-- page 117 -->
1. From this is plain the response to the first, because, as Augustine says[^21], the sense is: *the devil sins from the beginning*, that is, immediately after the beginning.

2. To that which is objected concerning Augustine, I say that he speaks according to another's opinion; which is plain, because he says the contrary in the eleventh [book] *of the City of God*[^22]. — And to that which is objected, that he himself posited all [things] made at once; it must be said that it is true as to *natural being*, but not as to *well-being.* Whence he posited that corporeal light was at once and was divided from darkness, likewise that there is no order of material days; but he well posited an order of spiritual days according to the sevenfold conversion of the angelic intellect upon things[^23].

3. To that which is objected, that it was at once in act; it must be said that some deny this in every creature; yet because Augustine seems to say the contrary regarding light and splendor, let us concede [it] also in the angel. But yet it was not at once[^24] in the act of *election*, because deliberation and the foreknowledge of several [things] precede it; because, as was said in the objecting[^25], they cannot be at once, not on account of a repugnance of the acts or of the simplicities, but on account of the simplicity of the angelic intellect, because by one conversion the whole intellect is taken up by one object, so that there is incompossible in that instant a conversion to another object.

4. 5. And thus is plain the response to the two following [objections]. — But to that which is objected concerning the sin of the soul, it must be said that it is not alike, because sin in the soul does not come about through an actual deliberation, but comes about through union to infected flesh: and since the union is in an instant, [but] deliberation and comparison [are] not: therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

la: Epist. 1. 3, 8: *Quoniam ab initio diabolus peccat.* — In minori Vat. *durationis* pro *duratione.*

en: 1 [John] Letter, 3:8: *Because the devil sins from the beginning.* — In the minor the Vatican [edition reads] *durationis* for *duratione.*

la: Cap. 16. n. 21, in quibus verbis textus originalis *ab initio* pro *in initio* et *sed ab ipso* pro *sed in ipso.*

en: Chapter 16, n. 21, in which words the original text [has] *ab initio* for *in initio* and *sed ab ipso* for *sed in ipso.*

la: De quo vide I. Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 32. seqq.; IV. c. 22. n. 39. seqq. et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 19. seq. Cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 13. a. 1. q. 1.

en: On which see I *Genesis according to the letter* c. 17, n. 32 ff.; IV, c. 22, n. 39 ff., and XI *On the City of God*, c. 19 f. Cf. below d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 13, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 1: *Sicut splendor, qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur, coaevus est illi, et esset coaeternus, si esset ignis aeternus.* Cfr. etiam II. contra Maxim. Arian. c. 14. n. 6. et Tract. 20. in Ioan. n. 8. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. minus congrue *ergo si* pro *ergo cum*, quorum non pauci dein verbis *sit in suo actu* praefigunt *ita.*

en: Book VI *On the Trinity* c. 1: *Just as the splendor which is begotten from fire and is diffused is coeval with it, and would be coeternal, if the fire were eternal.* Cf. also II *Against Maximinus the Arian* c. 14, n. 6, and Tract 20 *on John*, n. 8. — A little below very many codices less fittingly [read] *ergo si* for *ergo cum*, not a few of which then prefix *ita* to the words *sit in suo actu.*

la: Supple: *Angelus*; non cum cod. Q (a secunda manu) *lux*, nec cum cod. A *sol.*

en: Supply: *Angelus*; not, with codex Q (by a second hand), *lux*, nor, with codex A, *sol.*

la: Haec sententia, quae etiam ab aliis Scholasticis allegatur, collecta est ex iis, quae S. Bernardus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio docet de libertate a necessitate, quae competit libero arbitrio. Haec enim, qua sumus « nobilis Deo creatura » et « praestamus ceteris animantibus » (c. 3. n. 7.), « aeque et indifferenter Deo universaeque tam malae, quam bonae rationali convenit creaturae », ac « manet tam integra pro suo modo in creatura, quam in Creatore, sed in Illo potentior » (c. 1. n. 9.). In hac libertate arbitrii « potentissimum aeternae et incommutabilis Divinitatis substantiva quaedam imago impressa videtur », ratione cuius « liberum arbitrium sui omnino defectum seu diminutionem non patitur neque augmentum » (c. 9. n. 28.). Ob hanc tandem libertatem creatura rationalis « sui iuris est » (c. 11. n. 36.), et voluntas a nullo potest cogi (c. 12. n. 39.). S. August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 7. n. 9. animarum rationalium liberum arbitrium vocat *potentissimum.* — Mox cod. F *sed nihil* pro *et nihil*, ac dein codd. L Q *operationem suam* pro *operationem illam.*

en: This opinion, which is also alleged by other Scholastics, is collected from those [things] which St. Bernard in the book *On Grace and Free Choice* teaches concerning the liberty from necessity which belongs to free choice. For this [liberty], by which we are « a creature noble to God » and « more excellent than the other living beings » (c. 3, n. 7), « befits the rational creature equally and indifferently with God and the whole [creation], both evil and good », and « remains as entire in its own mode in the creature as in the Creator, but in Him more powerful » (c. 1, n. 9). In this liberty of choice « a certain substantive image of the eternal and immutable Divinity seems to be impressed [as] most powerful », by reason of which « free choice suffers no defect or diminution of itself at all, nor increase » (c. 9, n. 28). On account of this liberty, finally, the rational creature « is of its own right » (c. 11, n. 36), and the will can be coerced by none (c. 12, n. 39). St. Augustine, II *On the Morals of the Manichees* c. 7, n. 9, calls the free choice of rational souls *most powerful.* — Presently codex F [reads] *sed nihil* for *et nihil*, and then codices L Q *operationem suam* for *operationem illam.*

la: Hic a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *fuit* (codd. P Q *sint*) *in diversis instantibus* pro *fiunt in diversis instantibus.*

en: Here a. 2, q. 1. — A little below not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *fuit* (codices P Q *sint*) *in diversis instantibus* for *fiunt in diversis instantibus.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 21. seqq. (c. 3.) et VI. text. 1. seq. — Paulo superius codd. F Q et ed. 1 *ratione indivisibilitatis* pro *ratione indivisibilis.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, V *Physics* text 21 ff. (c. 3) and VI, text 1 f. — A little above codices F Q and ed. 1 [read] *ratione indivisibilitatis* for *ratione indivisibilis.*

la: Vers. 12. seq.: *Plenus sapientia et perfectus decore. In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti.*

en: Verse 12 f.: *Full of wisdom and perfect in beauty. In the delights of the paradise of God you were.*

la: Codd. P aa *quod hoc.*

en: Codices P aa [read] *quod hoc.*

la: In cod. P bene (a secunda manu) additur *secundo Topicorum, c. 4. (c. 10.).* Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 2.

en: In codex P, indeed (by a second hand), is added *in the second [book] of the Topics, c. 4 (c. 10).* Cf. above p. 79, note 2.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt *actuali*, qui etiam paulo inferius cum nonnullis aliis mss. pro *concreare* substituunt *creare*, codd. T U *dare.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 add *actuali*, which also, a little below, with some other manuscripts, substitute *creare* for *concreare*, codices T U *dare.*

la: Cod. V hic *peccatum non potuit*, et paulo inferius post *ergo non potuit* interserit *peccatum.* Vat. circa initium argumenti post *quod nullus in illo* addit *primo.* — Cfr. de hoc arg. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. et 18, et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.

en: Codex V here [reads] *peccatum non potuit*, and a little below, after *ergo non potuit*, interposes *peccatum.* The Vatican [edition], about the beginning of the argument, after *quod nullus in illo* adds *primo.* — Cf. on this argument Augustine, III *On Free Choice* c. 1 and 18, and XI *On the City of God*, c. 15.

la: Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 62. et 71. (c. 7. et 8.). Cfr. V. Phys. text. 12. (c. 2.) et XI. Metaph. c. 11. (X. c. 12.). — Plures codd. cum ed. 1 *cadit* (cod. K *cadat*) *quies* pro *sit quies.* Dein post *productionem* in cod. Y additur *et corruptionem.*

en: Book VIII *Physics* text 62 and 71 (c. 7 and 8). Cf. V *Physics* text 12 (c. 2) and XI *Metaphysics* c. 11 (X, c. 12). — Several codices with ed. 1 [read] *cadit* (codex K *cadat*) *quies* for *sit quies.* Then after *productionem* in codex Y is added *et corruptionem.*

la: Subaudi: *malum.*

en: Understand: *malum* [evil].

la: Cap. 6. n. 10. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. *illa ratio* pro *illa responsio.*

en: Chapter 6, n. 10. — A little below some codices [read] *illa ratio* for *illa responsio.*

la: Libr. XI. c. 19. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Book XI, c. 19 ff. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Cap. 15: *Et illud, quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio, ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est; sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum.* — De *prima* positione, « quae est haeretica », cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Chapter 15: *And that [text], that the devil sins from the beginning, is not to be thought [to mean] that he sins from the beginning from which he was created; but from the beginning of sin, because from his own pride the sin began to be.* — On the *first* position, « which is heretical », cf. the preceding question.

la: Vide Scholion.

en: See the Scholion.

la: Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 3. (c. 2.): *Quae vero nihil aut admodum parva sunt, pro nihilo habenda esse putamus.* — Paulo superius cod. Q *propter quod* pro *propter quam.*

en: Aristotle, II *Rhetoric* c. 3 (c. 2): *But [things] which are nothing or exceedingly small we judge are to be held for nothing.* — A little above codex Q [reads] *propter quod* for *propter quam.*

la: Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30, de quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. circa finem, et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. — Vat. cum aliquibus mss. et ed. 1 *peccavit* pro *peccat.*

en: Book XI *Genesis according to the letter* c. 23, n. 30, on which see here the text of the Master, c. 4, near the end, and XI *On the City of God*, c. 15. — The Vatican [edition], with some manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *peccavit* for *peccat.*

la: Cap. 15. Vide supra pag. 116, nota 9.

en: Chapter 15. See above p. 116, note 9.

la: Libr. IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 39. seqq. Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Book IV *Genesis according to the letter* c. 22, n. 39 ff. Cf. below d. 13, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Supplent codd. Z cc et ed. 1 *in Angelo*, sed melius subaudiretur *Angelus*, vel lege cum codd. A I *in Angelo actus electionis.* Dein post *plurium* codd. I L U substituunt *quae* pro *quia.*

en: Codices Z cc and ed. 1 supply *in Angelo*, but it would be better to understand *Angelus*, or read, with codices A I, *in Angelo actus electionis.* Then after *plurium* codices I L U substitute *quae* for *quia.*

la: Fundam. 3. — Mox Vat. perperam *vel simplicitatem* pro *vel simplicitatum* i. e. indivisibilium. Dein plures codd. et T W aa bb et ed. 1 *qui* pro *quia.*

en: Fundamentum 3. — Presently the Vatican [edition] wrongly [reads] *vel simplicitatem* for *vel simplicitatum*, i.e. of the indivisibles. Then several codices and T W aa bb and ed. 1 [read] *qui* for *quia.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quoad hanc quaestionem inquiri potest 1. *de facto*, 2. *de possibili*, 3. *de ratione* huius possibilitatis sive potius impossibilitatis.

1. Loquendo *de facto*, communiter tenebatur sententia negativa, cum a. 1240 a Parisiensibus condemnata esset propositio, « quod malus angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuit malus et nunquam nisi malus » (Collect. iudicior. t. I. pag. 186, et infra d. 23. in fine).

2. Si quaeritur *de possibili*, Scot. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2; Report. II. Sent. d. 4. q. unica) cum aliis censet, Angelos in primo instanti potuisse non solum mereri, sed etiam contrahere malum sive culpae sive poenae. — Sed S. Bonav. omnino hoc negat quoad culpam, et etiam, praescindendo a Christo (de quo nihil determinare vult), negat, Angelum in primo instanti potuisse mereri (III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.), quia, ut multi dicant, « in omni creatura *esse* praecedit *operari* » (ibid. in corp.). — S. Thom. cum Ægid. R. distinguit et docet, Angelos in primo instanti mereri quidem potuisse, omnesque de facto meritos esse (S. 1. q. 63. a. 5. ad 4.), sed non potuisse peccare.

3. Quoad *rationem* probantem hanc impossibilitatem, et quoad *numerum instantium*, qui requiratur ad peccatum Angelorum, doctores valde dissentiebant. Praecipue controvertebatur de hoc, utrum creaturae produci possint in actuali operatione. — Alex. Hal., licet S. p. II. q. 98. m. 11. dubius esse videatur, tamen ubi ex professo de hac re tractat (ibid. q. 29. m. 1. a. 7. ad 1.), asserit, quod « nec in caelo nec in Angelo nec in aliqua creatura contingit illud, quod in eodem instanti, in quo primo est, habeat actum aliquem. In omni enim alio a primo prius est potentia quam actus, non solum natura, sed etiam duratione ». — Hanc rationem S. Bonav. hoc loco (ad 3.) propter auctoritatem S. Augustini aliquo modo restringit, cum quoad lucem et actus *naturales* Angeli rem relinquat ambiguam. Quoad *deliberatos* autem Angeli actus, qui sunt in genere morum (cfr. infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 1.), negativam responsionem omnino tenet. Assentiunt ipsi B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et etiam Richard. a Med., qui tamen sententiam S. Thomae ut probabilem admittit. — Attamen S. Thom. (cui concordat Ægid. R., reiectis sex aliis opinionibus) illam rationem non approbat (in Sum. loc. cit.) aliamque ibi et in Comment. (hic q. 2.) affert, contra quam hac vice Dionys. Carth. arguit. Omnes autem illas rationes Scotus evertere nititur, ut suam affirmativam responsionem ad secundum quaesitum sustineat.

**II.** Praeter laudatos supra et in Schol. praeced.: B. Albert., hic a. 14; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., q. 3, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 8. q. 10.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** As to this question it can be inquired 1. *concerning fact*, 2. *concerning possibility*, 3. *concerning the ground* of this possibility or rather impossibility.

1. Speaking *concerning fact*, the negative opinion was commonly held, since in the year 1240 there was condemned by the Parisians the proposition, « that the evil angel in the first instant of its creation was evil and never [anything] but evil » (*Collection of Judgments* t. I, p. 186, and below d. 23 at the end).

2. If it be asked *concerning possibility*, Scotus (II *Sent.* d. 3, q. 2; *Reportata* II *Sent.* d. 4, the sole question) with others judges that the angels in the first instant could not only merit, but also contract evil whether of fault or of punishment. — But St. Bonaventure altogether denies this as to fault, and also, prescinding from Christ (about whom he wishes to determine nothing), denies that the angel in the first instant could merit (III *Sent.* d. 18, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to 4), because, as many say, « in every creature *being* precedes *operating* » (ibid. in the body). — St. Thomas with Giles of Rome distinguishes and teaches that the angels in the first instant could indeed merit, and that all in fact did merit (*Summa* I, q. 63, a. 5, in reply to 4), but could not sin.

3. As to the *ground* proving this impossibility, and as to the *number of instants* required for the sin of the angels, the doctors greatly disagreed. Chiefly it was controverted whether creatures can be produced in actual operation. — Alexander of Hales, although in the *Summa* p. II, q. 98, m. 11, he seems to be doubtful, yet where he treats of this matter professedly (ibid. q. 29, m. 1, a. 7, in reply to 1), asserts that « neither in heaven nor in an angel nor in any creature does that happen, that in the same instant in which it first is, it have any act. For in everything other than the first, potency is prior to act, not only in nature, but also in duration ». — This ground St. Bonaventure in this place (in reply to 3) somewhat restricts on account of the authority of St. Augustine, since as to light and the *natural* acts of the angel he leaves the matter ambiguous. But as to the *deliberate* acts of the angel, which are in the genus of morals (cf. below d. 41, a. 1, q. 1), he altogether holds the negative response. There assent to him Blessed Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, and also Richard of Mediavilla, who however admits the opinion of St. Thomas as probable. — Yet St. Thomas (with whom Giles of Rome agrees, the six other opinions being rejected) does not approve that ground (in the *Summa*, loc. cit.) and adduces another there and in the Commentary (here q. 2), against which this time Dionysius the Carthusian argues. But all those grounds Scotus strives to overthrow, that he may sustain his affirmative response to the second question.

**II.** Besides those cited above and in the preceding Scholion: Blessed Albert, here a. 14; *Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 8, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8, q. 10.

---

translators_notes:
- **Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 8675–8857) cross-verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (pp.115–117), per the Vol II override. The *videtur*/*sed contra* args are clean running prose in the OCR; the Respondeo (the *antiqua positio* / 1240-condemnation / *morula*-conclusion) and the four replies cascade-shatter and were reflowed from the crops (L column then R column).
- **Page span / structure.** QUAESTIO II closes ARTICULUS I of d.3 **pars 2**. It opens at the **top of p.115** (running head + header, beneath committed `d3-p2-a1-q1`), and runs pp.115–117: 5 *videtur* args (quod sic — the angel was evil in the first instant) + 6 *Sed contra* args; a one-sentence *Conclusio* (blockquote); a Respondeo rejecting the *antiqua positio* (simul-creatus-et-malus, "savoring of heresy", excommunicated at Paris) for the *morula* (a small delay between creation and fall); replies 1, 2, 3, 4.5; then an editorial **Scholion I–II** (the *de facto / de possibili / de ratione* survey with the a. 1240 Paris condemnation, the Scotus/Aquinas/Bonaventure positions; the parallel-loci list) — references inline, **NO numbered apparatus** (same convention as the d.3 pars-1/p2-a1-q1 editorial scholia). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Ad oppositum`, `Fundamenta`, `Opinio 1.`, `Improbatur.`, `Opinio 2. et conclusio.`, `Solutio oppositorum.`, `Notandum.`).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–25):** p.115 footer notes 1–9 → `[^1]`–`[^9]` (L col 1–6, R col 7–9); p.115 note 6 (the long Bernardus *de Gratia et libero arbitrio* note) is an **L→R column-footer runover** folded into `[^6]`. p.116 footer notes 1–11 → `[^10]`–`[^20]` (L col 1–5, R col 6–11); p.116 note 5 (`Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 62…`) is an **L→R runover** folded into `[^14]`. p.117 footer notes 1–5 → `[^21]`–`[^25]` (L col 1–4, R col 5); p.117 note 4 (`Supplent codd. Z cc et ed. 1 in Angelo…`) is an **L→R runover** folded into `[^24]`.
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a1-q1 → a1-q2): CLEAN.** Committed `d3-p2-a1-q1`'s editorial Scholion I–II had no numbered apparatus and ended on p.114; p.115's footer is wholly q2's (`[^1]`–`[^9]`). No backfill incoming.
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a1-q2 → a2-q1): SPLIT at p.117.** q2's replies + editorial Scholion I–II occupy the top of p.117; the `ARTICULUS II` (*De naturali cognitione Angeli*) + its QUAESTIO I then open on p.117 (raw 8858). p.117's footer has ≥7 notes: **notes 1–5 → this chunk** (`[^21]`–`[^25]`, anchoring q2's replies — `Augustinus¹`, `de Civitate Dei²`, `res³`, `statim⁴`, `in opponendo⁵`); **notes 6–7 anchor the ARTICULUS II body** (`et⁶` of `Circa secundum principale et⁶`; `Ezechielis vigesimo octavo⁷`) and belong to `d3-p2-a2-q1` (next chunk). When building `d3-p2-a2-q1`, fold in the `ARTICULUS II` opener (`Circa secundum principale… duo quaeruntur`) and start its apparatus at p.117 footer note 6.
- **Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the cascade Respondeo/replies and the editorial Scholion were verified on the pp.115–117 crops; the OCR base is reliable for the *videtur*/*sed contra* prose. The three L→R runover notes (`[^6]`, `[^14]`, `[^24]`) were recovered from the R-col footer head per the standard Vol II pattern; secure on content. Cascade-region marker positions are content-matched in source order; per-clause positions may be off by a few words where the two-column linearization is ambiguous — parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0