title: Dist. 38, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit de mendacio obstetricum, quod *propter misericordiam veniale fuit peccatum, non tamen nullum.* Sed contra hoc obiicitur per illud quod dicit Gregorius in Glossa super primum[^1] Exodi: « Benignitatis earum merces, quae in aeterna vita remunerari poterat, per culpam mendacii in terrenam recompensationem commutata est »; sed nihil commutat mercedem aeternam in temporalem nisi mortale peccatum: ergo videtur, quod mortaliter peccaverunt. — Item, videtur, quod hic contradicat Hieronymus Gregorio. Hieronymus[^2] enim dicit, quod aedificavit eis Dominus domos spirituales: ergo non videtur, quod retribuerit eis in praesenti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi. Quidam[^3] volunt dicere, quod mendacium obstetricum habuit duplicem respectum, videlicet ad vitam puerorum et ad vitam propriam; mentiebantur enim pro utraque servanda. Et secundum quod habuit respectum ad vitam puerorum, sic erat ex *pietate;* secundum autem quod habuit respectum ad servandam vitam *propriam,* quam magis dilexerunt quam veritatem, sic erat ex *libidine.* Et primo modo erat peccatum *veniale,* quia erat mendacium officiosum; secundo modo erat peccatum *mortale,* quia procedebat ex mala radice, videlicet ex libidinoso amore vitae propriae[^4], et eo tempore, quo veritas confitenda esset: et ideo haec culpa abstulit eis mercedem, quam meruerant ex pietate, quam prius habuerant servando parvulos ex timore Dei. Et secundum hoc dicunt currere diversas Sanctorum auctoritates. — Sed iste modus satis calumniabilis est, quia durum videtur dicere,

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quod aliquis pro servanda proprii corporis salute mortaliter peccet, dicendo aliquod mendacium leve.

Alius modus dicendi est, quod in ipsis obstetricibus duo est considerare, *pietatis beneficium* praecedens et *mendacium* subsequens. Et *primum* fuit ex quadam naturali pietate nec erat meritorium, sed disponebat ad meritum; *mendacium* vero subsequens disponebat[^5] ad contrarium: et ideo pietas praecedens fuit *temporaliter* remunerata propter mendacium, non quia mendacium illud auferret vitam gratiae prius habitae, sed quia ad gratiam habendam viam praecluderet, quod quidem bene potest facere peccatum *veniale.* Et hoc est quod vult Gregorius dicere, cum dicit: « Benignitatis earum merces, quae in aeterna vita remunerari *poterat* »; *poterat,* inquam, non potentia disposita et propinqua, sed potentia remota. — Et ex hoc patet, quod nulla est controversia inter Gregorium et Augustinum[^6], nulla etiam est contrarietas inter eos et Hieronymum, quia non vult dicere Hieronymus, quod obstetrices habuerint domos spirituales per assecutionem gratiae, sed quia quodam modo ad gratiam praeparatae fuerunt per timorem et pietatem[^7].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *quartum sola mentiendi fallendique libidine fit, quod merum mendacium est.* Contra hoc enim obiicitur: videtur enim, quod nullum tale sit mendacium, quia, secundum quod dicit Dionysius[^8], « nullus operatur ad malum aspiciens ». Si ergo mentiri de se malum est, videtur, quod nullus unquam mentiatur solummodo aspiciens ad ipsum mendacium. — Item, *libido est radix omnium malorum*[^9]: ergo non solum convenit quarto generi mendacii, sed etiam omni mendacio, quod fit ex libidine: ergo penes hoc non debet assignari aliquod genus mendacii. — Item, mendacium, quod fit sola libidine mentiendi, nullum habet excusatorium; et peccatum quanto minus habet excusationis, tanto est gravius[^10]: ergo videtur, quod illud mendacium sit primum et capitale inter omnia mendacia et non sit quartum genus.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicendum est, quod mendacium illud dicitur fieri ex *libidine,* quo quidem homo mentitur solum, ut placeat sibi. — Propter quod notandum est, quod *libido* multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo dicitur libido *improba voluntas;* et sic est radix mortalium peccatorum. Alio modo dicitur libido quaecumque *immoderata delectatio;* et sic libido dicitur a *libendo*[^11], et hoc modo non solum est radix mortalium, sed etiam venialium. Hoc autem dupliciter potest accipi: vel *communiter,* prout quaerit finem in actu proprio, aut consequenti, aut *specialiter,* prout in actu proprio quiescit. Primo quidem modo *communis* est omni peccato; secundo vero modo penes ipsam accipitur *differentia* mendacii, quod fit ex libidine, quod, inquam, non dicitur fieri ex libidine[^12], quia procedat ex mala voluntate, sed quia homo in mentiendo non quaerit aliud quam *semetipsum oblectare* in ipso mendacio. Et huiusmodi minus malum est quam illud, in quo intendit *alii nocere,* et maius malum est quam illud, in quo intendit *alii prodesse;* et ideo medium locum tenet inter[^13] mendaciorum genera.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod nullus operatur ad malum aspiciens; dicendum, quod in mendacio duo sunt, videlicet *veritatis absentia* et quaedam *ars et astutia.* Et licet non delectetur quis in *absentia veritatis;* contingit tamen, aliquem delectari in quadam *arte et astutia* mentiendi; et hoc aliquo modo habet speciem boni. Et ratione illius dicit Augustinus[^14], quod sola mentiendi libidine contingit aliquem mentiri.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libido est radix omnium malorum; dicendum, quod libido ibi sumitur *large;* sed hic appropriatur ad delectationem, quae habetur in ipso actu mentiendi, qua quis finem in se quaerit et non in altero; quae ideo constituit speciem mendacii, quoniam in aliis speciebus mendacii homo non tantum in se, sed etiam in aliis finem quaerit.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud mendacium dicitur[^15] esse maximum; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, quia magnitudo mendacii attenditur secundum maiorem obliquationem intentionis; magis autem obliquatur qui in mendacio intendit *alium offendere,* quam *semetipsum delectare:* et ideo ratio illa non valet[^16].

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### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Mendacium est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi.* Obiicitur enim contra hoc, quia abstracti et concreti eadem est definitio. Sed mentiri potest quis sine falsa vocis significatione, secundum quod Magister dicit post[^17], videlicet cum quis, intendens dicere falsum, dicit verum: ergo ista non est recta definitio. — Item, sicut mendacium contingit esse in verbis, ita etiam contingit esse in factis[^18]: ergo non tantum debet dici *falsa vocis significatio,* sed etiam *falsa operis significatio.* — Item, videtur, quod praedicta notificatio non conveniat omni mendacio, quia qui mentitur mendacio officioso non intendit *fallere,* sed *prodesse;* et qui etiam mentitur mendacio iocoso non intendit nisi se *delectare*[^19]: ergo non videtur ista definitio omni mendacio convenire.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut tactum fuit in praecedentibus[^20], ad completum *esse* mendacii duo concurrunt, videlicet *falsa vocis significatio* sicut materiale, et *fallendi intentio* sicut formale; et ideo recte est assignata praedicta notificatio mendacii.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod abstracti et concreti eadem est definitio; dicendum, quod *mendacium,* sicut prius[^21] tactum est, non tantum dicit comparationem ad *mentientem,* sed etiam ad *ipsam rem,* de qua fit sermo; *mentiri* vero proprie dicit comparationem ad ipsum *mentientem;* et ideo plus claudit in se *mendacium* quam *mentiri,* nec est idem omnino *mentiri* et *mendacium dicere,* sicut Magister in littera[^22] dicit aperte. Nec sequitur, quod, si aliquis *mentitur,* quod *dicat mendacium,* si proprie accipiatur mendacium, nisi forte *large* accipiatur mendacium ad mendacium *secundum quid* et *simpliciter.*

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mendacium non solummodo est in verbis, sed etiam in factis; dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo est in factis, secundum quod innuit Ambrosius[^23], proprie tamen loquendo in verbis est, secundum quod dicit Augustinus. Verba enim sunt proprie signa indicantia mentis conceptum, pro eo quod ab interiori procedunt et voluntarie formantur; et quoniam mendacium respectum dicit ad id quod est in mente interius: hinc est, quod proprie est in sermonibus et vocibus et per falsam vocis significationem definitur, licet et in aliis aliquo modo *analogice* et *per posterius* reperiatur.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ista notificatio non convenit mendacio iocoso et officioso; dicendum, quod notificatio ista per prius convenit mendacio pernicioso; iocoso autem et officioso convenit quodam modo quasi *per posterius.* Unde vocabulum *fallendi* in notificatione mendacii non tantum importat *decipere,* sed etiam *falsum dicere;* et hoc est omni mendacio commune et generale. *Falsum* enim *dicere* exterius quodam modo fallere est, dum[^24] homo id dicit, quod potest hominem ad falsitatem deducere et deducendo ad falsitatem fallere et decipere.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Iacob *matre auctore fecit, ut falleret patrem, videtur non esse mendacium, sed mysterium.* Videtur enim hoc non habere veritatem, quia Iacob dixit falsum cum intentione fallendi patrem; intendebat enim significare, quod ipse esset Esau: ergo videtur, quod simpliciter fuit mendacium: ergo videtur, quod simpliciter fuerit[^25] mentitus. — Item, mendacium est ita malum, quod nullo modo potest fieri bonum, nec per se nec per dispensationem aliquam[^26]: videtur ergo, quod nullo Spiritus sancti consilio nec matris imperio potuit ipse Iacob a mendacio excusari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum beatum Augustinum[^27] et etiam Ambrosium Iacob vir sim-

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plex a mendacio excusatur et quantum ad id quod dixit *verbo,* et quantum ad id quod fecit in *facto;* *verbo* enim dixit et *facto* simulavit, se esse Esau. Quantum ad id quod dixit *verbo,* excusatur, quia non intendebat patrem *fallere,* sed *dirigere;* non intendebat etiam[^28] dicere, se esse Esau quantum ad *personam,* sed quantum ad *dignitatem* primogeniturae et benedictionis, quam sibi a Deo vindicaverat. Et hoc, inquam, non propria auctoritate, sed matris imperio et Spiritus sancti consilio dicebat; qui quidem Spiritus sanctus in uno et eodem vocabulo multiplicem habet intelligentiam. — Quantum etiam ad id quod fecit *facto,* simulando, se esse Esau, non peccavit, quia secundum Ambrosium *factum* illud figuram praetendebat futurorum. Unde propter praefigurationem et rectam intentionem, quae dirigebatur secundum Spiritus sancti inspirationem, dicit Augustinus, Iacob non commisisse mendacium[^31], sed implesse mysterium iuxta Scripturae testimonium[^29], quae dicit eum *virum simplicem,* non dolosum.[^30][^32]

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# DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about this which he says concerning the lie of the midwives, that *on account of mercy it was a venial sin, yet not no [sin] at all.* But against this it is objected through that which Gregory says in the Gloss upon the first [chapter][^1] of Exodus: « The reward of their kindness, which could have been recompensed in eternal life, was changed, through the fault of the lie, into an earthly recompense »; but nothing changes the eternal reward into a temporal one except mortal sin: therefore it seems that they sinned mortally. — Likewise, it seems that here Jerome contradicts Gregory. For Jerome[^2] says that the Lord built spiritual houses for them: therefore it does not seem that he requited them in the present.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking. Some[^3] wish to say that the lie of the midwives had a twofold respect, namely to the life of the boys and to their own life; for they lied for the preservation of both. And according as it had respect to the life of the boys, thus it was out of *piety;* but according as it had respect to the preservation of their *own* life, which they loved more than the truth, thus it was out of *lust.* And in the first way it was a *venial* sin, because it was an officious lie; in the second way it was a *mortal* sin, because it proceeded from an evil root, namely from a lustful love of their own life[^4], and at that time when the truth ought to have been confessed: and therefore this fault took away from them the reward which they had merited out of the piety which they had previously had in preserving the little ones out of the fear of God. And according to this they say that the diverse authorities of the Saints are reconciled. — But this manner [of speaking] is quite open to censure, because it seems hard to say

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that someone should sin mortally for the preservation of his own body's safety, by speaking some light lie.

Another manner of speaking is that in the midwives themselves there are two things to consider, the preceding *benefit of piety* and the *lie* that follows. And the *first* was out of a certain natural piety, and was not meritorious, but disposed toward merit; but the *lie* that followed disposed[^5] toward the contrary: and therefore the preceding piety was *temporally* rewarded on account of the lie, not because that lie took away the life of grace previously had, but because it would block the way to the having of grace, which indeed a *venial* sin can well do. And this is what Gregory means to say, when he says: « The reward of their kindness, which *could have* been recompensed in eternal life »; *could,* I say, not by a power disposed and proximate, but by a remote power. — And from this it is plain that there is no controversy between Gregory and Augustine[^6], nor is there any contrariety between them and Jerome, because Jerome does not mean to say that the midwives had spiritual houses through the attainment of grace, but because in a certain manner they were prepared for grace through fear and piety[^7].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *the fourth [kind] is made by the lust of lying and deceiving alone, which is mere lying.* For against this it is objected: for it seems that no such thing is a lie, because, according to what Dionysius says[^8], « no one works while looking toward evil ». If therefore to lie is of itself evil, it seems that no one ever lies merely looking toward the lie itself. — Likewise, *lust is the root of all evils*[^9]: therefore it belongs not only to the fourth kind of lie, but also to every lie that is made out of lust: therefore no kind of lie ought to be assigned according to this. — Likewise, the lie which is made by the lust of lying alone has nothing excusing [it]; and the less excuse a sin has, the graver it is[^10]: therefore it seems that that lie is the first and chief among all lies and is not a fourth kind.

**I respond:** To this it must be said that that lie is said to be made out of *lust,* by which indeed a man lies only that he may please himself. — On account of which it is to be noted that *lust* is said in many ways. In one way lust is called a *wicked will;* and thus it is the root of mortal sins. In another way lust is called any *immoderate delight* whatever; and thus lust is named from *taking pleasure* (*libendo*)[^11], and in this way it is the root not only of mortal but also of venial [sins]. Now this can be taken in two ways: either *commonly,* according as it seeks the end in its own act, or in a consequent [act], or *specially,* according as it rests in its own act. In the first way indeed it is *common* to every sin; but in the second way the *difference* of that lie is taken with respect to it, [the lie] which is made out of lust, which, I say, is not said to be made out of lust[^12] because it proceeds from an evil will, but because man in lying seeks nothing other than *to delight himself* in the lie itself. And a [lie] of this kind is a lesser evil than that in which one intends *to harm another,* and a greater evil than that in which one intends *to benefit another;* and therefore it holds a middle place among the[^13] kinds of lies.

To that, then, which is first objected, that no one works while looking toward evil; it must be said that in a lie there are two things, namely the *absence of truth* and a certain *art and cunning.* And although one is not delighted in the *absence of truth;* yet it happens that someone is delighted in a certain *art and cunning* of lying; and this in some manner has the appearance of good. And by reason of that Augustine says[^14] that by the lust of lying alone it happens that someone lies.

To that which is objected, that lust is the root of all evils; it must be said that lust is there taken *broadly;* but here it is appropriated to the delight which is had in the very act of lying, by which one seeks the end in himself and not in another; which therefore constitutes a species of lie, since in the other species of lie man seeks the end not only in himself, but also in others.

To that which is objected, that that lie is said[^15] to be the greatest; it must be said that this is not true, because the magnitude of a lie is attended to according to the greater deviation of the intention; but he deviates more who in a lie intends *to offend another,* than [he who intends] *to delight himself:* and therefore that argument is not valid[^16].

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### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving.* For against this it is objected, that of the abstract and the concrete the definition is the same. But one can lie without a false signification of the voice, according to what the Master says afterward[^17], namely when someone, intending to say what is false, says what is true: therefore this is not a correct definition. — Likewise, just as a lie happens to be in words, so also it happens to be in deeds[^18]: therefore it ought to be called not only *a false signification of the voice,* but also *a false signification of the deed.* — Likewise, it seems that the aforesaid definition does not befit every lie, because he who lies with an officious lie does not intend *to deceive,* but *to benefit;* and he also who lies with a jocose lie intends nothing but to *delight* himself[^19]: therefore it does not seem that this definition befits every lie.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched upon in the preceding [discussions][^20], to the complete *being* of a lie two things concur, namely a *false signification of the voice* as the material, and the *intention of deceiving* as the formal; and therefore the aforesaid description of a lie is correctly assigned.

But to that which is objected, that of the abstract and the concrete the definition is the same; it must be said that a *lie* (*mendacium*), as was touched upon before[^21], states a relation not only to the *one lying,* but also to the *thing itself,* about which the speech is made; but *to lie* (*mentiri*) properly states a relation to the *one lying* himself; and therefore a *lie* encloses more in itself than *to lie,* nor is *to lie* and *to speak a lie* altogether the same, as the Master in the letter[^22] plainly says. Nor does it follow that, if anyone *lies,* he *speaks a lie,* if a lie is taken properly, unless perhaps a lie be taken *broadly,* [taking] a lie for a lie *in a certain respect* and *simply.*

To that which is objected, that a lie is not only in words, but also in deeds; it must be said that although in some manner it is in deeds, according to what Ambrose intimates[^23], yet properly speaking it is in words, according to what Augustine says. For words are properly signs indicating the concept of the mind, for the reason that they proceed from within and are voluntarily formed; and since a lie states a relation to that which is in the mind interiorly: hence it is that it is properly in speeches and voices and is defined through a false signification of the voice, although it is also found in others in some manner *analogically* and *by way of the posterior.*

To that which is objected, that this description does not befit the jocose and officious lie; it must be said that this description befits the pernicious lie first; but it befits the jocose and officious lie in a certain manner as it were *by way of the posterior.* Hence the word *deceiving* in the description of a lie does not only import *to deceive,* but also *to speak what is false;* and this is common and general to every lie. For *to speak* what is *false* exteriorly is in a certain manner to deceive, while[^24] a man says that which can lead a man to falsity and, by leading [him] to falsity, deceive and beguile [him].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that Jacob, *with his mother as the author, acted so as to deceive his father, [and yet] it seems not to be a lie, but a mystery.* For it seems that this does not have truth, because Jacob spoke what was false with the intention of deceiving his father; for he intended to signify that he himself was Esau: therefore it seems that it was simply a lie: therefore it seems that he simply lied[^25]. — Likewise, a lie is so evil that it can in no way become good, neither of itself nor through any dispensation[^26]: it seems therefore that by no counsel of the Holy Spirit nor by the command of his mother could Jacob himself be excused from a lie.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to blessed Augustine[^27] and also Ambrose, Jacob, a simple

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man, is excused from a lie both as regards that which he said by *word,* and as regards that which he did in *deed;* for by *word* he said and by *deed* he simulated that he was Esau. As regards that which he said by *word,* he is excused, because he did not intend to *deceive* his father, but to *direct* [him]; nor did he intend even[^28] to say that he was Esau as regards the *person,* but as regards the *dignity* of the birthright and of the blessing, which he had claimed for himself from God. And this, I say, he said not by his own authority, but by the command of his mother and the counsel of the Holy Spirit; which Holy Spirit indeed in one and the same word has a manifold understanding. — Also as regards that which he did in *deed,* by simulating that he was Esau, he did not sin, because according to Ambrose that *deed* held forth a figure of things to come. Hence on account of the prefiguration and the right intention, which was directed according to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, Augustine says that Jacob did not commit a lie[^31], but fulfilled a mystery, according to the testimony of Scripture[^29], which calls him *a simple man,* not crafty.[^30][^32]

la: Vers. 21. Glossa, quae apud Strabum et Lyranum est ordinaria, sumta est ex Gregor., XVIII. *Moral.* c. 3. n. 6: Benignitatis earum merces, quae eis in aeterna potuit vita retribui, pro admixta culpa mendacii in terrenam est recompensationem declinata. — Pro *in terrenam* cod. bb *in temporalem,* plures codd. *in nostram.*

en: Verse 21. The Gloss, which in Strabus and Lyra is the ordinary [Gloss], is taken from Gregory, *Morals* XVIII, c. 3, n. 6: « The reward of their kindness, which could have been requited to them in eternal life, was, on account of the admixed fault of the lie, turned aside into an earthly recompense. » — For *into an earthly* codex bb [reads] *into a temporal,* several codices *into ours.*

la: Libr. XVIII. *in Isai.* 65, 21: Quales sibi aedificasse et obstetrices dicuntur in Exodo, quae timebant Deum, licet scriptum sit in Hebraico, a Deo eis aedificatas domos, quia timuerunt eum (*Exod.* 1, 21.).

en: Book XVIII, *On Isaiah* 65, 21: « Of what sort the midwives also are said in Exodus to have built for themselves, [the midwives] who feared God, although it is written in the Hebrew that the houses were built for them by God, because they feared him (*Exod.* 1, 21). »

la: Codd. NU addunt *enim,* et subinde cod. N cum cod. K substituit *voluerunt* pro *volunt.*

en: Codices NU add *for* (*enim*), and likewise codex N with codex K substitutes *they wished* (*voluerunt*) for *they wish* (*volunt*).

la: Guliel. Antissiodor., *S.* p. III. tr. 23. c. 4. q. 2: Mendacium obstetricum potuit esse mortale, potuit esse veniale; quia si radix fuit mortalis, id est, si magis dilexerunt vitam suam temporalem quam Deum, tunc mendacium fuit mortale; si vero venialis, mendacium fuit veniale nec facit illas indignas vita aeterna. — Paulo inferius pro *esset* cod. U *erat.*

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa,* p. III, tr. 23, c. 4, q. 2: « The lie of the midwives could be mortal, could be venial; because if the root was mortal, that is, if they loved their temporal life more than God, then the lie was mortal; but if [the root was] venial, the lie was venial and does not make them unworthy of eternal life. » — A little below, for *ought to be* (*esset*) codex U [reads] *was* (*erat*).

la: Codd. minus congrue *disponit.* Aliquanto superius pro *duo est* cod. T *duo sunt.*

en: The codices, less fittingly, [read] *disposes* (*disponit*). Somewhat above, for *there are two things* (*duo est*) codex T [reads] *there are two* (*duo sunt*).

la: Cuius verba exhibent textum huius dubii; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Immediate post supplevimus ex codd. AU HZ bb cc *nulla etiam est contrarietas inter eos,* a qua lectione codd. KLU aa in eo solum discedunt, quod omittant *contrarietas.* Codd. FN legunt *et eos,* cod. B *inter eos.*

en: Whose words present the text of this doubt; cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 1. — Immediately after, we have supplied from codices AU HZ bb cc *nor is there any contrariety between them,* from which reading codices KLU aa diverge only in this, that they omit *contrariety.* Codices FN read *and them,* codex B *between them.*

la: Vide de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 123. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., hic a. 4. ad 3.; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. ad 5.; Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. ad 4.

en: See on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. II, q. 123, m. 6; Blessed Albert, here a. 5; St. Thomas, here a. 4, ad 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5, ad 5; Richard of Middleton, here q. 4, ad 4.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 31. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 801, nota 6.

en: *On the Divine Names,* c. 4, § 31. Cf. vol. I, p. 801, note 6.

la: *Epist. I. Tim.* 6, 10: Radix enim omnium malorum est cupiditas.

en: *First Epistle to Timothy* 6, 10: « For the root of all evils is covetousness. »

la: Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. — Superius pro *nullum habet excusatorium* cod. A *nullam habet excusationem.*

en: Cf. II *Sentences,* d. 21, a. 3, q. 3. — Above, for *has nothing excusing [it]* (*nullum habet excusatorium*) codex A [reads] *has no excuse* (*nullam habet excusationem*).

la: Libr. IV. *Hypognost.* (inter opera Augusti) c. 2: Quaerendum est igitur, cur hoc malum, de quo agitur, *libido* dicatur. Sine dubio a *libendo,* id est, a libitu per derivationem *libido* est nuncupata. — De duplici acceptione libidinis vide II. *Sent.* d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Superius pro *multipliciter* codd. *dupliciter,* et subinde voci *mortalium* cod. U praemittit *omnium.* Aliquanto inferius pro *vel consequenti* edd. et plures codd. *aut consequenti.*

en: Book IV, *Hypognosticon* (among the works of Augustine), c. 2: « It must therefore be asked why this evil, of which we treat, is called *lust* (*libido*). Without doubt *lust* is named from *taking pleasure* (*libendo*), that is, from pleasure (*libitu*), by derivation. » — On the twofold acceptation of lust see II *Sentences,* d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — Above, for *in many ways* (*multipliciter*) the codices [read] *in two ways* (*dupliciter*), and likewise before the word *mortal* codex U prefixes *of all.* Somewhat below, for *or in a consequent* (*vel consequenti*) the editions and several codices [read] *or in a consequent* (*aut consequenti*).

la: In edd. omittitur *ex libidine,* et paulo inferius pro *in quo* bis substituitur *quo* tantum.

en: In the editions *out of lust* (*ex libidine*) is omitted, and a little below for *in which* (*in quo*), twice, *which* (*quo*) only is substituted.

la: Cod. N *inter alia.*

en: Codex N [reads] *among other things* (*inter alia*).

la: In textu huius dubii. — Paulo ante pro *aliquo modo* edd. *inter alios* (sic) codd. *alio modo.*

en: In the text of this doubt. — A little before, for *in some manner* (*aliquo modo*) the editions [read] *among others* (so) the codices *in another manner* (*alio modo*).

la: Ita codd. AV, alii cum edd. *debet.*

en: Thus codices AV; the others, with the editions, [read] *ought* (*debet*).

la: Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 123. m. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 3. et 6. seq.; S. Thom., hic a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2.

en: The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. II, q. 123, m. 7; Blessed Albert, here a. 3 and 6 f.; St. Thomas, here a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2.

la: Cap. 4. — Maior fundatur in eo, quod abstractum et concretum, licet sub uno respectu distinguantur (abstractum enim significat formam tantum, concretum autem formam ut afficientem subiectum), sub alio tamen idem sunt, scil. respectu formae, quae in creatis ut abstracta induit rationem universalis et praedicatur de concretis ut de suis inferioribus. Cfr. Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 21. (VI. c. 6.), et de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, necnon VI. *Topic.* c. 4. (c. 9.), ubi monet, « si sit quidem habitus [in abstracto] definitio, considerandum in habente [in concreto], si quidem habentis, in habitu ». Vide etiam Averroem in V. *Metaph.* text. 14, ubi impugnat Avicennam, qui docet, concretum primarie significare subiectum et secundarie formam. — In fine arg. cod. A supplet *mendacii.*

en: Chapter 4. — The major [premise] is founded on this, that the abstract and the concrete, although under one respect they are distinguished (for the abstract signifies the form only, but the concrete the form as affecting the subject), under another respect are the same, namely with respect to the form, which in created things, as abstract, takes on the character of the universal and is predicated of the concretes as of its inferiors. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 21 (VI, c. 6), and *On the Categories,* the chapter on Substance, as well as *Topics* VI, c. 4 (c. 9), where he advises, « if indeed there be a definition of the disposition [in the abstract], it must be considered in the one having [it] [in the concrete], if indeed [it be a definition] of the one having, [it must be considered] in the disposition. » See also Averroes on *Metaphysics* V, text 14, where he impugns Avicenna, who teaches that the concrete primarily signifies the subject and secondarily the form. — At the end of the argument codex A supplies *of a lie* (*mendacii*).

la: Ut insinuat Aristot., IV. *Ethic.* c. 7.

en: As Aristotle intimates, *Ethics* IV, c. 7.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq.

en: See here the letter of the Master, c. 1 f.

la: Quaest. 1.

en: Question 1.

la: Quaest. 1. — Inferius pro *proprie dicit comparationem* cod. U *dicitur proprie per comparationem.*

en: Question 1. — Below, for *properly states a relation* (*proprie dicit comparationem*) codex U [reads] *is properly said by relation* (*dicitur proprie per comparationem*).

la: Hic c. 4. — Paulo post pro *quod dicat* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *quod dicit.* Subinde pro *et simpliciter,* quod habent codd. GKNUWZ aa bb, in aliis et edd. *vel simpliciter.*

en: Here c. 4. — A little after, for *that he speaks* (*quod dicat*) not a few codices, with editions 1 and 2, [read] *that he speaks* (*quod dicit*). Likewise, for *and simply* (*et simpliciter*), which codices GKNUWZ aa bb have, in others and in the editions [it reads] *or simply* (*vel simpliciter*).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 842, nota 7. De sententia Augustini cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ex quo textus huius dubii sumtus est. — Quod verba sunt signa conceptuum, docet Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 1, de quo vide supra pag. 686, nota 9. et tom. II. pag. 509, nota 2. — Inferius post *pro eo quod ab interiori* cod. K supplet *mente.*

en: Cf. above, p. 842, note 7. On the opinion of Augustine cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 3, from which the text of this doubt is taken. — That words are signs of concepts, Aristotle teaches, *On Interpretation* I, c. 1, on which see above, p. 686, note 9, and vol. II, p. 509, note 2. — Below, after *for the reason that [they proceed] from within* (*pro eo quod ab interiori*) codex K supplies *the mind* (*mente*).

la: Codd. AV (T primitus) *dummodo.* — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 123. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.

en: Codices AV (T originally) [read] *provided that* (*dummodo*). — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. II, q. 123, m. 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas, here a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here q. 1.

la: Plurimi codd. *esset,* cod. U *sit,* cod. A legit *fuisset mendacium.*

en: Very many codices [read] *was* (*esset*), codex U *is* (*sit*), codex A reads *would have been a lie* (*fuisset mendacium*).

la: Aristot., IV. *Ethic.* c. 7: Per se quidem mendacium pravum est et vituperatione dignum, verum autem honestum et laudabile. August., III. *Quaest. in Pentateuch.* q. 68: Quia iniustum erat mendacium, ideo prohibitum; non quia prohibitum, ideo factum iniustum. — Mox post *nullo* in codd. AK additur *modo.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* IV, c. 7: « A lie of itself indeed is depraved and worthy of blame, but the true is honorable and praiseworthy. » Augustine, *Questions on the Pentateuch* III, q. 68: « Because a lie was unjust, therefore it was forbidden; not because it was forbidden, was it therefore made unjust. » — Soon after *no* (*nullo*) in codices AK is added *way* (*modo*).

la: *Contra Mendacium,* c. 10. n. 24. — Ambros., II. *de Iacob et vita beata,* c. 2. n. 6. seqq.

en: *Against Lying,* c. 10, n. 24. — Ambrose, *On Jacob and the Blessed Life* II, c. 2, n. 6 ff.

la: Cod. A *enim.*

en: Codex A [reads] *for* (*enim*).

la: *Gen.* 25, 27: Iacob autem vir simplex habitabat in tabernaculis. — Aliquanto superius pro *praetendebat* edd. *praeferebat.*

en: *Genesis* 25, 27: « But Jacob, a simple man, dwelt in tents. » — Somewhat above, for *held forth* (*praetendebat*) the editions [read] *displayed* (*praeferebat*).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 570, note 6.

la: In edd. additur *in Spiritum sanctum.* Paulo inferius pro *hoc modo,* quod cod. K omittit, codd. A Z bb *sermo,* codd. G H L T *primo.* Subinde post *aliud* edd. supplent *tamen.*

en: In the editions there is added *into the Holy Spirit (in Spiritum sanctum).* A little lower, for *hoc modo* (« in this manner »), which codex K omits, codices A Z bb [read] *sermo* (« discourse »), codices G H L T *primo* (« first »). Then, after *aliud* (« another »), the editions supply *tamen* (« nevertheless »).

la: *Gen.* 27, 27. seqq. et 28. 3. seq. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 123. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom., hic a. 3. ad 1; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5; Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. ad 2.

en: *Genesis* 27, 27 ff. and 28, 3 f. — The same dubium is solved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 123, m. 6; B. Albert, here a. 9; S. Thomas, here a. 3 ad 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2 ad 2.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p85{4,5,6,7}-{L,R}-*.png`) under the Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion, with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines **59276–59450**) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Fresh literal English. Bounded forward by `DISTINCTIO XXXIX.` (raw 59451; Cap. I *De periurio* begins on p.857 R-col — that is d39-littera, not this chunk).

**Page-split map.** Opens lower on **p.854 L-col** beneath a1-q6's *Unde si pro-* tail; the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` header runs into both columns. Dub. I body L-col → R-col (Respondeo). p.854→p.855 break inside Dub. I Respondeo (*…satis calumniabilis est, quia durum videtur dicere, | quod aliquis pro servanda…*). Dub. II opens on **p.855 L-col**, runs L→R, closes at *ratio illa non valet¹²* (p.855 R-col). Dub. III opens **p.856 L-col**, runs L→R. Dub. IV opens **p.856 R-col** (*Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Iacob…*), runs onto **p.857 L-col**, closes at *…virum simplicem, non dolosum.* Running heads: p.854 `DIST. XXXVIII. DUBIA`, p.855 `DIST. XXXVIII. DUBIA 855`, p.856 `856 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`, p.857 `DISTINCTIO XXXIX` (digits OCR-mangled `8S8`/`8S6`/`857`; trusted running-head TEXT + offset pdf = printed + 22).

**Dubia enumeration.** EXACTLY FOUR dubia — **Dub. I** (raw 59278; obstetric midwives' lie, venial vs mortal), **Dub. II** (raw 59342; the 4th kind of lie made *sola mentiendi libidine*), **Dub. III** (raw 59385, OCR-garbled `Dub. 111.`; the definition *falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi*), **Dub. IV** (raw 59407; Jacob deceiving Isaac — lie or mystery?). **NO Dub. V** — grep-walked 59407→59451; the next header is `DISTINCTIO XXXIX.`. Only Dub. III's OCR header was garbled (`Dub. 111.` for `Dub. III.`); I–II–IV clean.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- **PICKED UP ← a1-q6: p.854 footer nn.5–8** (= [^1]–[^4]). a1-q6's own band closed at p.854 n.4 (*Vide scholion ad 4. quaest.* redirect). n.5 (Vers. 21 Glossa/Gregor.) keys to Dub. I *super primum⁵ Exodi*; nn.6–8 likewise key to Dub. I args/Respondeo.
- **FORWARDED → d39-littera: NOTHING.** This chunk owns the ENTIRE p.857 **L-col** *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* block (nn.1–5 = [^28]–[^32]), all keyed to the Dub. IV Jacob/Esau body that runs down the p.857 L-col and ends at *…virum simplicem, non dolosum.* **CORRECTION (d.31–d.40 decade polish, 600 dpi p.857 PDF 879):** a prior note here wrongly claimed p.857 nn.3–5 were d39-littera's — they are NOT. p.857 prints **two** *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* blocks: the **L-col** block (nn.1–5) is this Jacob dubium's (n.3 `Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 6`; n.4 the *in Spiritum sanctum / hoc modo* variant; n.5 `Gen. 27,27. seqq.… Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal.…`), and the **R-col** block (nn.1–3, Hieronymus/Apostolus/Augustinus) is d39-littera's. d38-dubia had stopped at L-col n.2; nn.3–5 were backfilled here ([^30]–[^32]). d39-littera correctly owns only its R-col block.

**Apparatus.** 32 markers, NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM, per-page restart renumbered continuous: **p.854 nn.5–8 → [^1]–[^4]** (picked up), **p.855 nn.1–12 → [^5]–[^16]**, **p.856 nn.1–11 → [^17]–[^27]**, **p.857 L-col nn.1–5 → [^28]–[^32]**. Marker pairing 32/32 (Latin + English bodies). nn.3–5 ([^30]–[^32]) were **backfilled at the d.31–d.40 decade polish** (600 dpi p.857 L-col, PDF 879) — they are the Jacob/Esau dubium's editorial cross-ref (n.3), the *in Spiritum sanctum / hoc modo* variant (n.4), and the Gen. 27 parallel-loci `Idem dub. solvit` note (n.5), all anchored at the Dub. IV close (n.3/n.5 unanchored editorial notes per Quaracchi convention, clustered at the dubium end; n.4 the variant on *mendacium*). The apparatus-count heuristic's ~31-opener flag for this range was therefore an **undercount-corrected** truth: 32 is right. Walked every page footer band by eye at 600 dpi.

**`has_scholion`: false** — grep-verified NO SCHOLI/SOHOLI/SOHOLIO header in raw 59276–59450; the dubia carry no scholion (scholia are article/question-level in d.38). No `## Scholion` block.

**`[?]` flags:** NONE — pp.854–857 fully legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 39

title_alt:
De periurio
On perjury

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 857 -->

> Le note numerate qui sotto corrispondono ai richiami nel corpo latino qui sopra e nella traduzione inglese. — The numbered footnotes below correspond to the markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation.

### Cap. I. *De periurio.*

Nunc de periurio videamus. Periurium est mendacium iuramento firmatum. Hic quaeritur, utrum sit periurium, ubi non est mendacium. Quod quibusdam videtur ex auctoritate Hieronymi[^1] dicentis: « Advertendum est, quod iusiurandum tres habet comites: veritatem, iudicium et iustitiam; si ista defuerint, non erit iuramentum, sed periurium. Ubi autem falsum iuratur, veritas deest ». Si ergo falsum iuretur, etsi non sit ibi intentio fallendi, videtur esse periurium, quia deest veritas.

### Cap. II. *An sit periurium quod non est mendacium.*

Quibusdam placet, non esse periurium, ubi non est mendacium, et sicut dicitur aliquando falsum sine mendacio, ita iuratur falsum sine periurio. Falsum forte dixit Apostolus[^2], cum se venturum ad Corinthios promisit; nec tamen, sicut ei imponebatur, culpam mendacii contraxit, quia sic animo sentiebat. Et si iuramento illud confirmasset, non periurium incurrisset, quia, quantum in ipso fuit, verum dixit; et si iurationem addidisset, quantum in se foret, verum iurasset, etsi aliter evenerit, quam dixit. Ideo, sicut quis non est mendax, nisi aliter sentiat animo, quam dicit, sive ita sit, sive non; ita videtur quibusdam, neminem periurum constitui, nisi aliter sentiat animo, quam loquitur, sive ita sit, sive non.

### Cap. III. *De triplici modo periurii.*

Sed melius creditur et ille peierare, qui falsum, voluntate fallendi, iurat; et qui verum, putans falsum, iurat; et qui falsum, putans verum, quod falsum est, iurat. Unde Augustinus[^3]: « Homines falsum iurant, vel cum fallunt, vel cum falluntur: aut putat homo, verum esse quod falsum est, et temere iurat; aut scit vel putat, falsum esse, et tamen pro vero iurat, et nihilominus cum scelere iurat. Distant autem ista periuria duo, quae commemoravi. Fac illum iurare, qui verum esse putat pro quo iurat; verum putat esse, et tamen falsum est: non ex animo iste peierat, sed fallitur. Hoc pro vero habet, quod falsum est; non pro

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falsa re sciens iurationem interponit. Da alium qui scit, falsum esse, et dicit, verum esse; et iurat, tanquam verum sit, quod scit falsum esse; videtis, quam ista detestanda sit bellua. Fac alium qui putat, falsum esse, et iurat, tanquam verum sit; et forte verum est — verbi gratia, ut intelligatis, pluit in illo loco; interrogas hominem, et dicit pluisse; et tunc pluit ibi, sed putat non pluisse — periurus est. Interest, quemadmodum verbum procedat ex animo; ream linguam non facit nisi rea mens ». — His evidenter traditur, quod tripliciter peierat homo, ut supra diximus, dum vel sciens falsum iurat, vel putans falsum quod verum est, iurat, vel existimans verum quod falsum est, iurat. — Sed hoc extremum non videtur esse periurium, vel si periurium nominetur, eo quod falsum iuratur, non videtur esse reus periurii qui sic iurat, quia non est mens eius rea, et ideo nec lingua. — Immo eius mens rea est, dum iurare praesumit quod perspicue verum non deprehendit. Non ergo omne periurium mendacium est, nec omnis qui peierat, mentitur; sed omnis mentiendo iurans peierat, et omnis qui falsum iurat, sive mentiens, sive non, peierat.

Cum vero quis iurat quod verum est, existimans esse falsum; quaeritur, quid sit ibi periurium. Ipsa significatio vocis vera est; quia verum nescienter loquitur. Non igitur ipsa significatio vel falsum vel mendacium est, quia vera est; et quod verum est periurium non videtur esse. — Ad hoc dicimus, loqui sic, scilicet contra mentem, sub attestatione iuramenti esse periurium. Mentiri ergo, adhibita iuratione, periurium est. Periurium ergo est vel iurando loqui falsum cum intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui falsum sine intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui verum cum intentione fallendi. — Hic opponitur: si omnis qui falsum iurat, peierat; tunc qui alicui promittit dare sub certo termino aliquid, quod tamen non faciet, ex quo iuravit, peieravit, quia falsum iuravit. Non enim ita futurum erat, ut iuravit. — Ad hoc dici potest, quia non omnis qui iurat quod falsum est, ex quo iurat, periurus est, sicut iste, de quo agimus; sed ex quo propositum mutat, vel terminum transgreditur, iuratio talis fit periurium reatu.

### Cap. IV. *An iuratio sit malum.*

Si autem quaeratur, utrum iurare sit malum; dicimus, aliquando malum esse, aliquando non. Sponte enim et sine necessitate iurare, vel falsum iurare peccatum grande est. Ex necessitate autem iurare, scilicet vel ad asserendam innocentiam, vel ad foedera pacis confirmanda, vel ad persuadendum auditoribus quod est eis utile, malum non est, quia necessarium est. Unde Augustinus[^4]: « Iuramentum faciendum est in necessariis, cum pigri sint homines credere quod eis est utile. Iuratio non est bona, non tamen mala, cum est necessaria », id est, non est appetenda sicut bona, nec tamen fugienda tanquam mala, cum est necessaria. « Non est enim contra praeceptum Dei iuratio, sed ita intelligitur Dominus prohibuisse a iuramento, ut, quantum in ipso est, quisque non iuret — quod multi faciunt, in ore habentes iurationem tanquam magnum atque suave aliquid — Apostolus enim novit praeceptum Domini, et tamen iuravit[^5] ». Prohibemur ergo iurare vel cupiditate, vel delectatione iurandi. « Quod ergo Christus ait in Evangelio: Ego dico vobis, non iurare omnino; ita intelligitur praecepisse, ne quisquam sicut bonum appetat iuramentum et assiduitate iurandi labatur in periurium ». Quod vero addidit: « Sit sermo vester: est, est; non, non; bonum est et appetendum. Quod autem amplius est a malo est, id est, si iurare cogeris, scias, de necessitate venire infirmitatis eorum quibus aliquid suades; quae infirmitas utique malum est, unde nos quotidie liberari precamur dicentes: Libera nos a malo. Ideoque non dixit: quod amplius est malum est. Tu enim non facis malum, qui bene uteris iuratione, sed a malo est illius qui aliter non credit », id est ab infirmitate, quae aliquando poena est, aliquando poena et culpa. Ibi ergo Dominus prohibuit malum, suasit bonum, indulsit necessarium.

### Cap. V. *De iuramento, quod fit per creaturas.*

Quaeritur etiam, utrum liceat iurare per creaturam. Quod non videtur, cum in Lege[^6] scriptum sit: Reddes autem Domino iuramenta tua; et Christus in Evangelio praecipiat, non iurare omnino, nec per caelum nec per terram nec per Ierosolymam nec per caput tuum. « Iudaeis quasi parvulis concessum fuit iurare per Creatorem, et praeceptum, ut, si iurare contingeret, non nisi per Creatorem iurarent, non per creaturam; quia iurantes per Angelos et elementa creaturas venerabantur honore; et melius erat hoc exhiberi Deo quam creaturis ». Infirmis ergo illud prohibuit, sanctis vero, qui in creaturis Creatorem venerabantur tantum, non prohibuit. Unde Ioseph[^7] per salutem Pharaonis iuravit, « Dei iudicium in eo veneratus, quo positus erat in infimis ». Christus vero ita per creaturas iurare prohibuit, ne vel aliquid divinum in eis crederetur, pro quo reverentia eis deberetur; vel ne per eas iurantes falsum homines se iuramento non teneri putarent.

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### Cap. VI. *Quae iuratio sit gravior, an quae fit per Deum, an quae fit per creaturas, vel per Evangelium.*

Si autem quaeritur, quis magis teneatur, an qui per Deum, an qui per Evangelium, vel per creaturas iurat; dicimus: qui per Deum, quia per eum haec sancta facta sunt. Unde Chrysostomus[^8]: « Si qua causa fuerit, modicum videtur facere qui iurat per Deum; qui vero per Evangelium, maius aliquid fecisse videtur. Quibus dicendum est: Stulti, Scripturae propter Deum factae sunt, non Deus propter Scripturas »; ita et creaturae factae sunt propter Deum.

### Cap. VII. *Quid est dicere: per Deum.*

Hic quaeritur, quid sit dicere: per Deum iuro; hoc est testem adhibere Deum. Iuravit enim Apostolus[^9] dicens: Testis est mihi Deus; ac si dixisset: per Deum ita est. Unde Augustinus: « Ridiculum est putare hoc: si dicas: per Deum, iuras; si dicas: testis est Deus, non iuras. Quid est enim per Deum nisi testis est Deus; aut quid est testis est Deus nisi per Deum? Quid est autem iurare nisi ius Deo reddere, quando per Deum iuras »? ius scilicet veritatis et non falsitatis. Item[^10]: « Ecce dico caritati vestrae: et qui per lapidem iurat falsum periurus est »; quia non lapidem, qui non audit, sed eius Creatorem adhibet testem. Hoc est ergo iurare per quamlibet creaturam, scilicet Creatorem eius testem adhibere.

« Est etiam quoddam genus iuramenti gravissimum, quod fit per exsecrationem, ut cum homo dicit: si illud feci, illud patiar, vel illud contingat filiis meis ». Secundum quem modum accipitur etiam interdum, cum aliquis iurando dicit: per salutem meam, vel per filios meos, et huiusmodi. Obligat enim haec Deo. Unde Augustinus: « Cum quis ait: per salutem meam, salutem suam Deo obligat. Cum dicit: per filios meos, oppignerat eos Deo, ut hoc eveniat in caput eorum, quod exit de ore ipsius: si verum, verum; si falsum, falsum. Et sicut per hoc iurans aliquando hoc Deo obligat, ita per Deum iurans ipsum adhibet testem ». In omni ergo iuratione aut Deus testis adhibetur, aut creatura Deo obligatur et oppigneratur, ut hoc sit iurare, scilicet Deum testem adhibere, vel Deo aliquid oppignerare. Hoc est ergo iurare per quamlibet creaturam, scilicet Creatorem eius testem adhibere[^11].

### Cap. VIII. *De illis qui iurant per falsos deos.*

Post haec quaeritur, utrum fide eius utendum sit, qui per daemonia vel idola iuraverit. De hoc Augustinus scribens ad Publicolam[^12] ait: « Te prius considerare volo, utrum, si quispiam per deos falsos iuraverit et fidem non servaverit, non tibi videtur bis peccasse. Bis utique peccavit, quia iuravit, per quos non debuit; et contra pollicitam fecit fidem, quod non debuit. Ideoque qui utitur fide illius, quem constat iurasse per deos falsos, et utitur non ad malum, sed ad bonum, non peccato illius se sociat, quo per daemonia iuravit, sed bono pacto eius, quo fidem servavit. Et sine dubitatione minus malum est per deos falsos iurare veraciter, quam per Deum verum fallaciter. Quanto enim per quod iuratur magis sanctum est, tanto magis est poenale periurium ».

### Cap. IX. *Quod iuramentum vel promissio contra Deum facta non est tenenda.*

Nunc superest videre, utrum omne iuramentum implendum sit. Si enim quis aliquid iuraverit contra fidem et caritatem, quod observatum peiorem vergat in exitum, potius est mutandum quam adimplendum. Unde Ambrosius[^13]: « Est contra officium nonnunquam promissum solvere sacramentum, ut Herodes fecit ». Item Isidorus: « In malis promissis rescinde fidem, in turpi voto muta decretum. Quod incaute vovisti ne facias; impia est promissio, quae scelere adimpletur ». Idem: « Non est observandum sacramentum, quo malum incaute promittitur, ut si quis adulterae perpetuam fidem cum ea permanendi polliceatur. Tolerabilius est enim non implere sacramentum quam permanere in stupro ». Item Beda[^14]: « Si quid nos incautius iurare contigerit, quod observatum peiorem vergat in exitum, libere illud salubriori consilio mutandum noverimus; ac magis, instante necessitate, peierandum esse nobis, quam pro vitando periurio in aliud crimen gravius esse divertendum. Denique iuravit David[^15] per Deum occidere Nabal, virum stultum; sed ad primam intercessionem Abigail, feminae prudentis, remisit minas, revocavit ensem in vaginam, nec aliquid culpae se tali periurio contraxisse doluit ». Item Augustinus[^16]: « Quod David iuramentum per sanguinis effusionem non implevit, maior pietas fuit. Iuravit David temere, sed non implevit iurationem maiori pietate ». — Ex his aliisque pluribus ostenditur, quaedam iuramenta non observanda esse. Et qui sic iurat vehementer peccat; cum autem mutat, bene facit; qui autem non mutat dupliciter peccat: et quia iniuste iuravit, et quia facit quod non debet.

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### Cap. X. *Si est periurus qui non facit quod incaute iurat.*

Qui vero mutat, utrum periurus debeat dici, solet quaeri. Beda supra[^17] tale iuramentum vocavit periurium. Ioannes etiam Apocrisarius[^18] orientalium sedium dixit: « Sermo patris nostri Sophronii significat, quod melius est, iurantem peierare quam servare sacramentum in fractione sanctarum imaginum ». Sed periurium dicitur tale iuramentum non observatum, et peierare dicitur qui non implet, quia falsum iurat, non quia inde reus sit, quod non observat, sed quia iuravit iniustum, ex quo reus est, sicut ille qui peierat.

### Cap. XI. *De illis qui verborum calliditate iurant.*

Hoc etiam sciendum est, quod « quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus tamen, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille cui iuratur, intelligit. Dupliciter autem reus fit, qui et nomen Dei in vanum assumit et proximum in dolo capit[^19] ».

### Cap. XII. *De illo qui cogit aliquem iurare.*

Quaeritur etiam, si peccet qui hominem iurare cogit. De hoc Augustinus[^20] ait: « Qui exigit iurationem, multum interest, si nescit, illum iuraturum falsum, an scit. Si enim nescit, et ideo dicit: iura mihi, ut fides ei sit; non est peccatum, tamen humana tentatio est[^21]. Si vero scit, eum fecisse, et cogit eum iurare, homicida est ». Idem: « Qui provocat hominem ad iurationem et scit, eum falsum iurare, vincit homicidam; quia homicida corpus occisurus est, ille animam, immo duas animas, et eius quem iurare provocavit, et suam ». Sancta Synodus decrevit, nisi pro pace facienda, ut omnes fideles ieiuni ad sacramenta accedant[^22].

---

english:
### Ch. I. *On perjury.*

Let us now consider perjury. Perjury is a falsehood confirmed by an oath. Here it is asked whether there is perjury where there is no falsehood. This seems so to some from the authority of Jerome[^1], who says: « It must be noted that an oath has three companions: truth, judgment, and justice; if these are lacking, there will not be an oath, but perjury. But where what is false is sworn, truth is lacking ». If therefore something false is sworn, even though there be no intention of deceiving, it seems to be perjury, because truth is lacking.

### Ch. II. *Whether there is perjury which is not a falsehood.*

It is the view of some that there is no perjury where there is no falsehood, and that, just as something false is sometimes said without a falsehood, so what is false is sworn without perjury. The Apostle[^2] perhaps said something false when he promised that he would come to the Corinthians; nor yet, as was charged against him, did he incur the fault of a falsehood, because he so felt in his mind. And if he had confirmed it with an oath, he would not have incurred perjury, because, as far as it lay in him, he spoke the truth; and if he had added an oath, as far as it was in himself, he would have sworn the truth, even though it turned out otherwise than he said. Therefore, just as a man is not a liar unless he feels otherwise in his mind than he says, whether it be so or not; so it seems to some that no one is made a perjurer unless he feels otherwise in his mind than he speaks, whether it be so or not.

### Ch. III. *On the threefold mode of perjury.*

But it is better believed that he too perjures himself who swears what is false, with the will to deceive; and he who swears what is true, thinking it false; and he who swears what is false, thinking it true, while it is false. Hence Augustine[^3]: « Men swear what is false either when they deceive or when they are deceived: either a man thinks that to be true which is false, and rashly swears; or he knows or thinks it to be false, and yet swears it as true, and nonetheless swears it with wickedness. Now these two perjuries which I have mentioned differ. Suppose a man swears who thinks that to be true for which he swears; he thinks it to be true, and yet it is false: this man does not perjure himself from his mind, but is deceived. He holds that for true which is false; not

falsely does he knowingly interpose an oath upon a matter. Take another who knows it to be false, and says it to be true; and swears, as though it were true, what he knows to be false; you see how detestable a monster this is. Take another who thinks it to be false, and swears as though it were true; and perhaps it is true — for example, that you may understand, it rained in such a place; you question a man, and he says it rained; and at that time it did rain there, but he thinks it did not rain — he is a perjurer. It matters in what way the word proceeds from the mind; nothing makes the tongue guilty except a guilty mind ». — By these things it is plainly handed down that a man perjures himself in three ways, as we have said above, when he either knowingly swears what is false, or swears thinking false what is true, or swears reckoning true what is false. — But this last does not seem to be perjury, or, if it be named perjury, since what is false is sworn, he who so swears does not seem to be guilty of perjury, because his mind is not guilty, and therefore neither is his tongue. — On the contrary, his mind is guilty, since he presumes to swear what he does not clearly perceive to be true. Therefore not every perjury is a falsehood, nor does everyone who perjures himself lie; but everyone who swears while lying perjures himself, and everyone who swears what is false, whether lying or not, perjures himself.

But when someone swears what is true, reckoning it to be false; it is asked what the perjury is there. The very signification of the utterance is true; because he unknowingly speaks the truth. Therefore the signification itself is neither false nor a falsehood, because it is true; and what is true does not seem to be perjury. — To this we say that to speak thus, namely against one's mind, under the attestation of an oath, is perjury. To lie, therefore, with an oath employed, is perjury. Perjury therefore is either to speak what is false while swearing with the intention of deceiving, or to speak what is false while swearing without the intention of deceiving, or to speak what is true while swearing with the intention of deceiving. — Here it is objected: if everyone who swears what is false perjures himself; then he who promises someone to give a certain thing within a fixed term, which nevertheless he will not do, has, from the fact that he swore, perjured himself, because he swore what is false. For it was not going to be so, as he swore. — To this it can be said that not everyone who swears what is false is, from the fact that he swears, a perjurer, like this man of whom we are speaking; but from the fact that he changes his purpose, or transgresses the term, such an oath becomes perjury in guilt.

### Ch. IV. *Whether an oath is an evil.*

But if it be asked whether to swear is an evil; we say that it is sometimes an evil, sometimes not. For to swear willingly and without necessity, or to swear what is false, is a great sin. But to swear out of necessity, namely either to assert one's innocence, or to confirm covenants of peace, or to persuade hearers of what is useful to them, is not an evil, because it is necessary. Hence Augustine[^4]: « An oath is to be made in necessary matters, since men are slow to believe what is useful to them. An oath is not good, yet not evil, when it is necessary », that is, it is not to be sought as good, nor yet shunned as evil, when it is necessary. « For an oath is not against the precept of God, but the Lord is understood to have forbidden swearing in such wise that, as far as it lies in oneself, each should not swear — which many do, having an oath in their mouth as some great and pleasant thing — for the Apostle knew the Lord's precept, and yet swore[^5] ». We are therefore forbidden to swear either from cupidity or from delight in swearing. « As for what Christ says in the Gospel: I say to you, do not swear at all; it is understood that he so commanded, lest anyone should seek an oath as a good and through assiduity in swearing slip into perjury ». But as for what he added: « Let your speech be: yes, yes; no, no; that is good and to be sought. But what is more than this is from evil, that is, if you are compelled to swear, know that it comes from the necessity of the infirmity of those whom you are persuading of something; which infirmity is certainly an evil, whence we daily pray to be freed, saying: Deliver us from evil. And therefore he did not say: what is more is evil. For you do not do evil, you who use an oath well, but it is from the evil of him who otherwise does not believe », that is, from the infirmity which is sometimes a punishment, sometimes a punishment and a fault. There, therefore, the Lord forbade the evil, urged the good, allowed the necessary.

### Ch. V. *On the oath which is made by creatures.*

It is also asked whether it is lawful to swear by a creature. This does not seem so, since in the Law[^6] it is written: But you shall render to the Lord your oaths; and Christ in the Gospel commands not to swear at all, neither by heaven nor by earth nor by Jerusalem nor by your head. « To the Jews, as to little children, it was conceded to swear by the Creator, and commanded that, if it should happen that they swear, they should swear only by the Creator, not by a creature; because those swearing by Angels and the elements were venerating creatures with honor; and it was better that this be rendered to God than to creatures ». To the weak, therefore, he forbade it, but to the holy, who in creatures venerated only the Creator, he did not forbid it. Hence Joseph[^7] swore by the welfare of Pharaoh, « venerating the judgment of God in him, by which he was set over those in the lowest places ». But Christ forbade swearing by creatures in such wise lest anything divine be believed in them, on account of which reverence would be owed to them; or lest men, swearing falsely by them, should think themselves not bound by the oath.

### Ch. VI. *Which oath is graver, whether that which is made by God, or that which is made by creatures, or by the Gospel.*

But if it be asked who is more bound, whether he who swears by God, or he who swears by the Gospel, or by creatures; we say: he who swears by God, because through him these holy things were made. Hence Chrysostom[^8]: « If there be some cause, he who swears by God seems to do a small thing; but he who swears by the Gospel seems to have done something greater. To these it must be said: Fools, the Scriptures were made for the sake of God, not God for the sake of the Scriptures »; and so too creatures were made for the sake of God.

### Ch. VII. *What it is to say: by God.*

Here it is asked what it is to say: I swear by God; this is to bring forward God as witness. For the Apostle[^9] swore, saying: God is my witness; as if he had said: by God it is so. Hence Augustine: « It is ridiculous to think this: if you say: by God, you swear; if you say: God is witness, you do not swear. For what is « by God » except « God is witness »; or what is « God is witness » except « by God »? But what is to swear except to render right to God, when you swear by God »? the right, namely, of truth and not of falsehood. Likewise[^10]: « Behold, I say to your charity: even he who swears falsely by a stone is a perjurer »; because he brings forward as witness not the stone, which does not hear, but its Creator. This therefore is to swear by any creature whatsoever, namely to bring forward its Creator as witness.

« There is also a certain most grievous kind of oath, which is made by execration, as when a man says: if I have done that, may I suffer that, or may that befall my children ». According to which mode it is also sometimes taken, when someone says in swearing: by my welfare, or by my children, and the like. For these things bind one to God. Hence Augustine: « When someone says: by my welfare, he binds his welfare to God. When he says: by my children, he pledges them to God, so that this may come upon their head, which goes forth from his mouth: if true, true; if false, false. And just as one swearing by this sometimes binds this to God, so one swearing by God brings God himself forward as witness ». In every oath, therefore, either God is brought forward as witness, or a creature is bound and pledged to God, so that this is to swear, namely to bring forward God as witness, or to pledge something to God. This therefore is to swear by any creature whatsoever, namely to bring forward its Creator as witness[^11].

### Ch. VIII. *On those who swear by false gods.*

After these matters it is asked whether the good faith of one who has sworn by demons or idols is to be used. On this Augustine, writing to Publicola[^12], says: « I wish first to consider with you whether, if anyone has sworn by false gods and has not kept faith, it does not seem to you that he has sinned twice. He certainly sinned twice, because he swore by those by whom he ought not; and he acted against the faith he had promised, which he ought not. And therefore he who uses the good faith of one who, it is established, has sworn by false gods, and uses it not for evil but for good, does not associate himself with that man's sin, by which he swore by demons, but with the good pact of his, by which he kept faith. And without doubt it is a lesser evil to swear truthfully by false gods than to swear deceitfully by the true God. For the more holy that by which one swears is, the more punishable is the perjury ».

### Ch. IX. *That an oath or promise made against God is not to be kept.*

Now it remains to see whether every oath is to be fulfilled. For if anyone has sworn something against faith and charity, which, if observed, would tend toward a worse outcome, it is rather to be changed than fulfilled. Hence Ambrose[^13]: « It is sometimes against duty to discharge a promised oath, as Herod did ». Likewise Isidore: « In evil promises rescind your faith, in a base vow change your decision. What you have incautiously vowed, do not do; impious is the promise which is fulfilled by a crime ». The same: « An oath is not to be observed by which an evil is incautiously promised, as if someone should pledge to an adulteress perpetual faith of remaining with her. For it is more tolerable not to fulfill the oath than to remain in fornication ». Likewise Bede[^14]: « If it should happen that we have sworn somewhat too incautiously something which, if observed, would tend toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is to be freely changed by more wholesome counsel; and rather, when necessity presses, that we must perjure ourselves than that, to avoid perjury, we should turn aside into another, graver crime. Finally, David[^15] swore by God to kill Nabal, a foolish man; but at the first intercession of Abigail, a prudent woman, he relaxed his threats, returned the sword to its sheath, and did not grieve that he had contracted any fault by such perjury ». Likewise Augustine[^16]: « That David did not fulfill his oath through the shedding of blood was the greater piety. David swore rashly, but did not fulfill the oath with greater piety ». — From these and many other things it is shown that certain oaths are not to be observed. And he who so swears sins gravely; but when he changes, he does well; while he who does not change sins doubly: both because he swore unjustly, and because he does what he ought not.

### Ch. X. *Whether he is a perjurer who does not do what he incautiously swears.*

But whether he who changes ought to be called a perjurer is wont to be asked. Bede above[^17] called such an oath perjury. John the Apocrisarius[^18] of the Eastern sees also said: « The word of our father Sophronius signifies that it is better for one swearing to perjure himself than to keep the oath in the breaking of the holy images ». But such an oath not observed is called perjury, and he is said to perjure himself who does not fulfill it, because he swears what is false, not because he is therein guilty in that he does not observe it, but because he swore what is unjust, from which he is guilty, like him who perjures himself.

### Ch. XI. *On those who swear by craftiness of words.*

This too is to be known, that « by whatever craft of words a man swears, God nevertheless, who is witness of the conscience, takes it just as he to whom it is sworn understands it. But he becomes doubly guilty who both takes the name of God in vain and entraps his neighbor by deceit[^19] ».

### Ch. XII. *On him who compels someone to swear.*

It is also asked whether he sins who compels a man to swear. On this Augustine[^20] says: « He who exacts an oath, it matters much whether he does not know that the man is going to swear falsely, or whether he knows. For if he does not know, and therefore says: swear to me, that I may have assurance; it is not a sin, yet it is a human temptation[^21]. But if he knows that the man has done it, and compels him to swear, he is a murderer ». The same: « He who provokes a man to an oath and knows that he is swearing falsely surpasses a murderer; because a murderer is going to kill the body, but that man the soul — nay, two souls: both that of the one whom he provoked to swear, and his own ». The holy Synod decreed that, except for the sake of making peace, all the faithful should approach the sacraments fasting[^22].

---

la: Libr. 1. Comment. in Ierem. c. 4, 2. Definitio periurii sumta est ex Hugone de S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. 4. c. 8, et quae sequuntur magna ex parte ex Gratian., C. *Animadvertendum* c. 22. q. 2.

en: Book 1 of the Commentary on Jeremiah, c. 4, 2. The definition of perjury is drawn from Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 4. c. 8, and what follows is for the most part from Gratian, *Decretum* C. *Animadvertendum* c. 22. q. 2.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 16, 5. — Infra pro *confirmasset* edd., exceptis 1, 8, *firmasset.*

en: 1 Corinthians 16, 5. — Below, for *confirmasset* the editions, except 1 and 8, read *firmasset.*

la: Sermo 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apost.) c. 2. n. 2. In hoc textu pro *iste peierat,* quod habent plurimae edd. cum originali, in aliis *iste periurat* (codd. et edd. modo una, modo altera forma verbi utuntur, quod etiam in August. observari potest); et post *falsum esse* eaedem omittunt *et dicit, verum esse.*

en: Sermon 180. (otherwise 28. on the Words of the Apostle) c. 2. n. 2. In this text, for *iste peierat,* which most editions have together with the original, others read *iste periurat* (the codices and editions use now one, now the other form of the verb, which can also be observed in Augustine); and after *falsum esse* the same editions omit *et dicit, verum esse.*

la: Libr. 1. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 17. n. 51.

en: Book 1 of *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* c. 17. n. 51.

la: August., Exposit. in Gal. (1, 20.) n. 9. — Sequentes duo loci sunt eiusdem, l. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 17. n. 51, ubi citantur Matth. 5, 34. 37. et 6, 13.

en: Augustine, *Exposition on Galatians* (1, 20.) n. 9. — The following two passages are of the same author, in his book *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* c. 17. n. 51, where Matthew 5, 34. 37. and 6, 13 are cited.

la: Ita Matth. 5, 33; cfr. Levit. 19, 12. et Deut. 23, 21. cum Ps. 49, 14: Redde Altissimo *vota* tua. Seq. locus est Matth. 5, 34. — Pro *fuit concessum* cod. B et edd., exceptis 1, 8, *est concessum.* — Quod sequitur secundum sensum sumtum est ex Comment. Hieronymi ad Matth. 5, 34.

en: Thus Matthew 5, 33; cf. Leviticus 19, 12. and Deuteronomy 23, 21. with Psalm 49, 14: Render to the Most High your *vows.* The following passage is Matthew 5, 34. — For *fuit concessum* codex B and the editions, except 1 and 8, read *est concessum.* — What follows is taken according to the sense from Jerome's Commentary on Matthew 5, 34.

la: Cfr. Gen. 42, 15. 16. — Ex Gratian. C. *Movet* c. 22. q. 1. § 2.

en: Cf. Genesis 42, 15. 16. — From Gratian, *Decretum* C. *Movet* c. 22. q. 1. § 2.

la: Opus imperfect. in Matth. homil. 44. — Superius ante *haec sancta* plurimae edd. *Deum* pro *eum;* porro edd. 1, 6, 8 *facta et sancta* pro *sancta facta.* Deinde codd. A (a secunda manu) B et edd. 1, 8 *sanctae sunt* pro *factae sunt.*

en: *Unfinished Work on Matthew,* homily 44. — Above, before *haec sancta,* most editions read *Deum* for *eum;* further, editions 1, 6, 8 read *facta et sancta* for *sancta facta.* Then codices A (by a second hand) and B and editions 1, 8 read *sanctae sunt* for *factae sunt.*

la: Rom. 1, 9. — Locus August. est l. de Serm. Dom. in monte, c. 17. n. 51, et Serm. 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apost.) c. 6. n. 6. seqq.

en: Romans 1, 9. — The Augustine passage is in the book *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* c. 17. n. 51, and Sermon 180. (otherwise 28. on the Words of the Apostle) c. 6. n. 6. and following.

la: Serm. cit. 180. c. 12. n. 13. Seq. locus est Enarrat. in Ps. 7. n. 3; tertius Serm. cit. 180. c. 6. n. 7.

en: The cited Sermon 180. c. 12. n. 13. The following passage is the *Exposition on Psalm* 7. n. 3; the third is the cited Sermon 180. c. 6. n. 7.

la: Haec propositio deest in edd. 1, 8; et cod. Erf. annotat: Quidam habent hanc litteram, quidam non. — Edd. 1, 6, 8 supra scribunt constanter *oppignorare* pro *oppignerare.*

en: This sentence is lacking in editions 1, 8; and codex Erf. notes: Some have this reading, some do not. — Editions 1, 6, 8 above write consistently *oppignorare* for *oppignerare.*

la: Epist. 47. (alias 154.) n. 2, nonnullis omissis et mutatis. — Pro *se sociat,* quo edd., exceptis 2, 5, 6, *se sociat qui,* refragantibus codd. et originali; denique edd. 1, 8 iterum ponunt *qui fidem* pro *quo fidem.*

en: Letter 47. (otherwise 154.) n. 2, with some things omitted and altered. — For *se sociat,* which the editions have, except 2, 5, 6, which read *se sociat qui,* against the codices and the original; finally editions 1, 8 again put *qui fidem* for *quo fidem.*

la: Libr. 1. de Officiis, c. 50. n. 264. Loci Isidori sunt II. Synonymorum n. 58; II. Sent. c. 31. n. 9.

en: Book 1 of *On Duties,* c. 50. n. 264. The Isidore passages are *Synonyms* II. n. 58; *Sentences* II. c. 31. n. 9.

la: Homil. 20. in festo Decoll. S. Ioan. Bapt., et Gratian. C. *Si aliquid* c. 22. q. 4.

en: Homily 20. on the feast of the Beheading of St. John the Baptist, and Gratian, *Decretum* C. *Si aliquid* c. 22. q. 4.

en: Cf. 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 25, 13.

la: Serm. 308. (alias 11. ex additis a Parisiens.) c. 2. n. 2, qui locus est in Gratian. C. *quod David* c. 22. q. 4.

en: Sermon 308. (otherwise 11. from those added by the Parisians) c. 2. n. 2, which passage is in Gratian, *Decretum* C. *quod David* c. 22. q. 4.

la: Hic c. 9.

en: Here, c. 9 [i.e. above, in Cap. IX].

la: Gratian., C. *Actione quarta* c. 22. q. 4.

en: Gratian, *Decretum* C. *Actione quarta* c. 22. q. 4.

la: Isidor., II. Sent. c. 31. n. 8.

en: Isidore, *Sentences* II. c. 31. n. 8.

la: Serm. 180. supra cit. c. 10. n. 11. Seq. locus ibid. c. 4. n. 4.

en: Sermon 180, cited above, c. 10. n. 11. The following passage is in the same place, c. 4. n. 4.

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 10, 13: Tentatio vos non apprehendat nisi humana. — Quomodo autem tentatio *humana* distinguatur a *diabolica* et tres habeat species, explicatur II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 3.

en: Reference is made to 1 Corinthians 10, 13: Let no temptation take hold of you but such as is human. — How, moreover, *human* temptation is distinguished from *diabolical,* and that it has three species, is explained in *Sentences* II. d. 21. dub. 3.

la: Vide Gratian. loc. cit. q. 5. can. *Honestum.*

en: See Gratian, in the place cited, q. 5. canon *Honestum.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for **DISTINCTIO XXXIX — *De periurio* ("On perjury"), Cap. I–XII.** This is Peter Lombard's text (the *Sentences* proper), NOT Bonaventure's commentary; the Bonaventure commentary (`COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX` + `DIVISIO TEXTUS`) begins at raw 59696 and belongs to `bon-sent-III-d39-divisio`.

**Raw range.** Littera body = raw **59476–59695** in `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`. The `DISTINCTIO XXXIX.` header is at raw 59476; raw 59451–59474 above it is the d38-dubia Dub. IV (Jacob/Esau) tail and is NOT included here (it lives in `bon-sent-III-d39-dubia`/d38-dubia). The littera ends at raw 59695 (`...ut omnes fideles ieiuni ad sacramenta accedant`), immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX.` at raw 59696.

**Method.** Vol III PDF-priority inversion: Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF colcrop bands (pp.857–860, PDF 879–882), because the two-column IA djvu OCR interleaves the chapters in zigzag order (e.g. raw line order runs Cap. I → Cap. III → Cap. II → ... with R-column fragments spliced between L-column lines). Reading order recovered from the PDF: L-col top→bottom, then R-col. Raw OCR used only for clean-prose and marker-spacing cross-check.

**Page-split map (printed page → chapters → footnotes):**
- **p.857** (R-col, opens lower — the L-col + R-col top of p.857 are the d38-dubia Jacob/Esau tail): Cap. I (Hieronymus), Cap. II (Apostolus), Cap. III opens (Augustinus, runs over to p.858). Footers = p.857 **R-col** NOTAE nn.1–3 → `[^1]`–`[^3]`.
- **p.858**: Cap. III tail, Cap. IV (Augustinus), Cap. V (Lex/Ioseph), Cap. VI opens. Footers nn.1–4 → `[^4]`–`[^7]`.
- **p.859**: Cap. VI (Chrysostomus), Cap. VII (Apostolus/Augustinus), Cap. VIII (Publicola), Cap. IX (Ambrosius/Isidorus/Beda/David/Augustinus). Footers nn.1–9 → `[^8]`–`[^16]`.
- **p.860** (littera ends mid-page where COMMENTARIUS begins): Cap. X (Beda/Apocrisarius), Cap. XI (calliditate verborum), Cap. XII (Augustinus, Sancta Synodus). Footers nn.1–6 → `[^17]`–`[^22]` (the separate `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block lower on p.860 R-col belongs to d39-divisio).

**Apparatus = 22 footnotes**, per-page restart renumbered continuous (3 + 4 + 9 + 6). Marker pairing 22/22 in both bodies.

**has_scholion: false** — grep-verified NO SCHOLI/SOHOLI in raw 59476–59695. Lombard's littera carries no scholion. (The `SCHOLION`/`DIVISIO TEXTUS` material at raw ~59697+/59870 is the d39-divisio's.)

**Footer hand-offs:**
- *Picked up:* NOTHING from d38-dubia. d38-dubia closed its band at p.857 **L-col** n.2 (`[^29]`, Gen. 25,27, Jacob *virum simplicem*). This littera's p.857 footers are the **R-col** NOTAE block (nn.1–3, Hieronymus/Apostolus/Augustinus) — a fresh per-distinction footer block (p.857 prints two `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` blocks, one per distinction straddling the page).
- *Forwarded → d39-divisio:* the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block on p.860 R-col (nn.1–3: `Cod. K In tertia vero inquirit...`, `Permulti codd. periurium`, `Codd. FGLTV...iurandi`) belongs to the commentary/divisio that opens at the bottom of p.860 — d39-divisio starts its own fresh band there.

**`[?]` flags / discrepancy with dispatch brief (IMPORTANT — flag for review, NOT a body error):**
- **d38-dubia under-capture, p.857 L-col footer nn.3–5 — RESOLVED (d.31–d.40 decade polish, 600 dpi p.857 PDF 879).** The dispatch brief (and d38-dubia's old `## Notes`) had stated that p.857 footer nn.3–5 (`Cfr. supra pag. 570…`; the *in Spiritum sanctum / hoc modo* variants; `Gen. 27, 27. seqq.… Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal.…`) were THIS littera's first footers. That is **not** the case: p.857 prints **two** `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` blocks — the **L-col** block (nn.1–5) keys to the L-column body, which on p.857 is entirely the **d38 Jacob/Esau dubium** (n.3 `Cfr. supra pag. 570`, n.4 the *in Spiritum sanctum / hoc modo* variant, n.5 `Gen. 27,27 … Idem dub. solvit …` are all Jacob/Esau-dubium notes), and the **R-col** block (nn.1–3) keys to the R-column body = the littera Cap. I/II/III (n.1 Comment. in Ierem. = perjury definition / Hieronymus; n.2 1 Cor 16,5 = Apostolus; n.3 Serm. 180 = Augustinus). This littera correctly owns p.857 **R-col nn.1–3** (= `[^1]`–`[^3]`) and does NOT pick up p.857 L-col nn.3–5. The three Jacob/Esau notes were a genuine **d38-dubia under-capture** (d38 had stopped at L-col n.2) and have now been **backfilled into `bon-sent-III-d38-dubia` as [^30]–[^32]** (apparatus 29→32; verified at 600 dpi). No body text in either chunk is affected; it was an apparatus-attribution fix on the prior chunk. See `manual-review/vol3-d31-d40-polish-resolution-log.md`.
- No other `[?]` flags: pp.857–860 are legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIX — De periurio

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXIX — On perjury

source_text:
<!-- page 860 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX.
### *De periurio.*

*Nunc de periurio videamus etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below; each entry gives the Latin apparatus note (**La.**) followed by an English rendering (**En.**).

Supra egit Magister de mendacio, quod opponebatur quinto praecepto secundae tabulae. In hac vero parte intendit agere de periurio. Haec autem pars continet praesentem distinctionem et dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima inquirit Magister, quid sit periurium. In secunda vero determinat, qualiter sit iurandum, ibi: *Quaeritur etiam, utrum liceat iurare per creaturam.* In tertia vero, quod iuramentum[^1] sit adimplendum etc., ibi: *Nunc superest investigare, utrum omne iuramentum sit implendum etc.*

Prima pars dividitur in partes duas. In quarum prima determinat de periurio per comparationem ad mendacium. In secunda vero per comparationem ad iuramentum, ibi: *Si autem quaeritur, utrum iurare sit malum etc.*

Hac secunda parte indivisa remanente, prima dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima inquirit, utrum essentiale sit periurio[^2] esse mendacium, et determinat secundum opinionem alienam. In secunda vero determinat secundum opinionem propriam, ibi: *Sed melius creditur etc.* In tertia vero removet dubitationem annexam, ibi: *Cum vero quis iurat quod verum est etc.*

Similiter secunda pars, in qua determinat, quomodo sit iurandum, dividitur in partes duas. In quarum prima determinat de forma iuramenti licita. In secunda de forma iuramenti[^3] illicita, ibi: *Post haec quaeritur, utrum fide eius utendum sit etc.*

Et hac parte remanente indivisa, prima dividitur in tres. In quarum prima quaerit, quae sit forma iuramento congrua. In secunda, quae forma sit magis obligatoria, ibi: *Si autem quaeritur, quis magis teneatur.* In tertia vero determinat, quae sit formae iurandi intelligentia, ibi: *Hic quaeritur, quid sit dicere: per Deum iuro.*

Per hunc etiam modum tertia pars principalis dividitur in partes duas. In quarum prima determinat de iuramenti obligatione. In secunda vero de honestate, ibi: *Sancta Synodus decrevit etc.* Et illa parte remanente indivisa, prima dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima determinat, utrum iuramentum illicitum sit obligatorium.

<!-- page 861 -->

In secunda, utrum iuramentum dolosum[^4], ibi: *Hoc etiam sciendum est, quod quacumque arte verborum etc.* In tertia vero inquirit, utrum iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium, ibi: *Quaeritur etiam, si peccat qui hominem iurare cogit.* Sententia autem et[^5] subdivisio partium satis manifesta est in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis secundum ea quae Magister determinat, incidit hic quaestio circa tria.

*Primo* quaeritur de culpa periurii.

*Secundo* quaeritur de forma iurandi.

*Tertio* vero quaeritur de obligatione iuramenti.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit mendacium.

*Secundo* quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit peccatum.

*Tertio* quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum.

### ARTICULUS I.
### *De culpa periurii.*

english:
<!-- page 860 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXIX.
### *On perjury.*

*Now let us consider perjury, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry gives the Latin apparatus note (**La.**) followed by an English rendering (**En.**).

Above, the Master treated of lying, which was opposed to the fifth precept of the second table. But in this part he intends to treat of perjury. Now this part contains the present distinction and is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master inquires what perjury is. In the second he determines how one ought to swear, there: *It is also asked whether it is lawful to swear by a creature.* In the third, that an oath[^1] is to be fulfilled, etc., there: *Now it remains to investigate whether every oath is to be fulfilled, etc.*

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he determines concerning perjury by comparison to lying. But in the second by comparison to the oath, there: *But if it is asked whether to swear is evil, etc.*

This second part remaining undivided, the first is divided into three parts. In the first of these he inquires whether it is essential to perjury[^2] to be a lie, and determines according to another's opinion. But in the second he determines according to his own opinion, there: *But it is better believed, etc.* But in the third he removes an attached doubt, there: *But when someone swears what is true, etc.*

Likewise the second part, in which he determines how one ought to swear, is divided into two parts. In the first of these he determines concerning the lawful form of the oath. In the second, concerning the unlawful[^3] form of the oath, there: *After these things it is asked whether one ought to use his faith, etc.*

And this part remaining undivided, the first is divided into three. In the first of these he asks what form is fitting for an oath. In the second, what form is more binding, there: *But if it is asked who is more bound.* But in the third he determines what is the understanding of the form of swearing, there: *Here it is asked what it is to say: I swear by God.*

In this same manner also the third principal part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he determines concerning the obligation of the oath. But in the second concerning its uprightness, there: *The Holy Synod decreed, etc.* And that part remaining undivided, the first is divided into three parts. In the first of these he determines whether an unlawful oath is binding.

<!-- page 861 -->

In the second, whether a deceitful[^4] oath, there: *This also must be known, that by whatever art of words, etc.* But in the third he inquires whether a coerced oath is binding, there: *It is also asked whether he sins who compels a man to swear.* But the meaning and[^5] the subdivision of the parts is sufficiently manifest in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, according to the things which the Master determines, a question here falls under three heads.

*First*, it is asked concerning the fault of perjury.

*Second*, it is asked concerning the form of swearing.

*Third*, it is asked concerning the obligation of the oath.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether all perjury is a lie.

*Second*, it is asked whether all perjury is a sin.

*Third*, it is asked whether all perjury is a mortal sin.

### ARTICLE I.
### *On the fault of perjury.*

en: Here, c. 9.

en: Gratian, on the canon *Actione quarta*, c. 22, q. 4.

la: Isidor., II. *Sent.* c. 31. n. 8.

en: Isidore, *Sentences* II, c. 31, n. 8.

la: Cod. K *In tertia vero inquirit, utrum omne iuramentum.*

en: Codex K reads *But in the third he inquires whether every oath.*

la: Edd. omittunt *Sententia autem et.*

en: The editions omit *But the meaning and.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed **pp.860–861** (PDF 882–883; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` 59696–59755). Running head `DIST. XXXIX. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 861` (OCR `QUA.EST.`) confirmed at the p.860→861 break (raw 59734; trust running-head TEXT over OCR'd digits). Vol III two-column; PDF-priority inversion applies, but the COMMENTARIUS/DIVISIO/TRACTATIO band is clean in OCR and the PDF read confirmed it 1:1. The COMMENTARIUS header OCRs as `COMMENTAMUS` (raw 59696); corrected silently.

**Page-split map.** The divisio opens at the **bottom of p.860** beneath the d39-littera Cap. XII tail (Sancta Synodus … accedant⁶ = the littera's last footer): `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX` header + *De periurio* + opener *Nunc de periurio videamus etc.* (raw 59696) → DIVISIO TEXTUS (raw 59700, both columns) → its NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band (p.860 R-col footer, nn.1–3). The break to **p.861** falls **inside the DIVISIO TEXTUS prose** — the running head `DIST. XXXIX. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 861` (raw 59734) sits between `…utrum iuramentum illicitum sit obligatorium.` (p.860 R-col tail) and `In secunda, utrum iuramentum dolosum¹…` (p.861 top). On p.861: the DIVISIO TEXTUS tail (raw 59735–59739, ending *…manifesta est in littera*) → TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw 59740: three articles + Circa primum three questions) → ARTICULUS I *De culpa periurii* opener (raw 59751). Bounded forward at `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 59756), whose body (*Circa primum sic procedicur et quaeritur…*, raw 59760) is **a1-q1**. The QUAESTIO I header/title (*Utrum omne periurium sit mendacium*) and body fold into a1-q1.

**Apparatus = two per-page bands, per-page restart (5 notes).** p.860 R-col *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* band, nn.1–3 → [^1]–[^3], keyed to DIVISIO TEXTUS markers `iuramentum¹` (n.1 *Hic c. 9.*), `periurio²` (n.2 *Gratian., C. Actione quarta…*), `iuramenti³ illicita` (n.3 *Isidor., II. Sent. c. 31. n. 8.*). p.861 footer band nn.1–2 → [^4]–[^5], keyed to the DIVISIO TEXTUS tail on p.861: `dolosum¹` (n.1 *Cod. K In tertia vero inquirit, utrum omne iuramentum*) and `Sententia autem et²` (n.2 *Edd. omittunt Sententia autem et*). Marker pairing 5/5. The TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + ARTICULUS I opener carry NO footer markers.

**Footer hand-off.** Picked up NOTHING from d39-littera (its *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* band closed at p.860 L-col n.6 = the littera's [^22], *Vide Gratian. loc. cit. q. 5. can. Honestum*; the COMMENTARIUS opens its own separate *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* band on the same page R-col). **FORWARD p.861 footer nn.3–9 to a1-q1** — those notes key to the **QUAESTIO I** body markers (n.3 *Exod. 20, 16…* keys `falsum testimonium³`; n.4 *Vide supra lit. Magistri d. XXXVIII. c. 5* keys `institutus est⁴`; n.5 *Ut dicit August.…* keys `mens rea⁵`; nn.6–9 key to the *Sed contra* Hieronymus/peierat/peierans/`sermonis⁹` markers). a1-q1 starts its own per-page band at p.861 n.3. d39-divisio holds only p.861 nn.1–2.

**`has_scholion: false`** — no SCHOLION header in the divisio range (grep-verified raw 59696–59755; no SCHOLI/SOHOLI variant). The SCHOLION at raw 59870 sits between QUAESTIO I (raw 59756) and QUAESTIO II (raw 59902) and is **a1-q1's** article-master scholion, NOT this chunk's.

**No `[?]` flags** — pp.860–861 legible at 450 dpi.

---

### ⭐ VERBATIM TRACTATIO ARTICLE + QUESTION FRAMING (for a1-q* alignment checks)

d.39 has a **THREE-article frame** stated in the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM: *"Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis secundum ea quae Magister determinat, incidit hic quaestio circa tria."* →

> - **Art. I** — *Primo quaeritur de culpa periurii.* (*De culpa periurii* — own ARTICULUS I header raw 59751)
> - **Art. II** — *Secundo quaeritur de forma iurandi.*
> - **Art. III** — *Tertio vero quaeritur de obligatione iuramenti.*

(Art. II and Art. III question-counts are stated later in the text, NOT in this Art. I TRACTATIO band.)

**ARTICULUS I** (*De culpa periurii*) has **THREE questions** (*"Circa primum quaeruntur tria"*):

> 1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit mendacium.* → **a1-q1 (NEXT)** (`QUAESTIO I.` raw 59756, title *Utrum omne periurium sit mendacium*; body opens *Circa primum sic procedicur et quaeritur, utrum omni periurio conveniat esse mendacium. Et quod sic, videtur:* raw 59760)
> 2. *Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit peccatum.* → **a1-q2**
> 3. *Tertio quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum.* → **a1-q3**

**Resolved d.39 slate (Art. I part):** littera(✅) · divisio(✅ this) · a1-q1 · a1-q2 · a1-q3 · a2-q1 · a2-q2 · a2-q3 (+ 3 `-dup2` dedup) · dubia.