title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum fides sit in parte animae cognitiva, an affectiva.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum fides sit in parte animae cognitiva, an affectiva. Et quod sit in parte cognitiva, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Augustinum, qui sic definit credere in libro *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*[^p474-1]: «Credere est cogitare cum assensione», ad illam igitur vim pertinet credere, ad quam pertinet cogitare; sed cogitare est potentiae cognitivae: ergo et credere. Si igitur in illa potentia est fides, cuius actus est credere; videtur, quod fides sit in parte animae cognitiva.

2. Item, ad Romanos decimo[^p474-2]: *Fides est ex auditu;* ibi Gregorius: «Dat intellectum, dum de auditis mentem illustrat»: si ergo fides est per auditum, et fides illuminat mentem, et tam audire quam illuminari spectat ad partem animae cognitivam; videtur, quod fides sit in parte animae cognitiva.

3. Item, reformatio imaginis fit per tres virtutes theologicas; sed imago non tantum consistit in potentia affectiva, verum etiam in potentia cognitiva[^p474-3]: ergo necesse est, quod aliqua virtus theologica reformet potentiam cognitivam. Non est autem aliam dare nisi fidem; si ergo virtus est in ea potentia, quam reformat; videtur, quod fides sit in potentia cognitiva.

4. Item, in eadem vi est virtus gratuita et dos illi succedens in gloria; sed visio, quae succedit fidei[^p474-4], est in potentia cognitiva, sicut manifestum est: ergo etc.

5. Item, in illa potentia animae est virtus tanquam in subiecto, circa cuius actum explicat difficultatem — habitus enim in ea potentia collocatur, ad cuius opus habilitat — si ergo per fidem captivatur *intellectus in obsequium Christi*[^p474-5], ergo fides expedit actum ipsius potentiae intellectivae: est igitur in ipsa tanquam in subiecto.

**Sed contra:** 1. Tullius[^p474-6] definiens virtutem dicit, quod «virtus est habitus *voluntarius*»: ergo si fides est virtus, est habitus voluntarius; sed habitus voluntarius est in voluntate tanquam in subiecto: ergo et fides.

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2. Item, Augustinus *de Moribus Ecclesiae*[^p475-1], virtutem definiens dicit, quod «virtus non est aliud quam amor ordinatus»: ergo si omnis virtus est amor, essentialiter loquendo, omnis virtus est in ea potentia, cuius est amare; sed hoc est potentiae affectivae, non cognitivae: ergo omnis virtus est in potentia affectiva.

3. Item, Magister Hugo in libro *de Sacramentis*[^p475-2] dicit, quod «in affectu fidei substantia reperitur»; sed in ea potentia est virtus tanquam in subiecto proprio, in quo reperitur eius substantia: si ergo haec est potentia affectiva, videtur etc.

4. Item, in nulla potentia est virtus fidei, quae possit cogi, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p475-3], «cum cetera possit homo nolens, credere non potest nisi volens»; sed potentia cognitiva potest cogi: ergo fides non potest esse in potentia cognitiva; et est in potentia cognitiva, vel affectiva: ergo etc.

5. Item, in illa potentia est virtus sicut in subiecto, quae est principium actus et operationis illi virtuti debitae[^p475-4]; sed nullus assentit veritati non visae, nisi quia vult: ergo si principium actus credendi habet ortum a voluntate, necesse est, fidem esse in ea tanquam in subiecto proprio. Si tu dicas, quod simul est in intellectu et affectu; contra hoc est, quia unus habitus simplex non potest esse in duabus potentiis; sed cognitiva et affectiva sunt diversae potentiae, sicut ostensum est supra in secundo libro[^p475-5]: ergo si fides est habitus unus, non potest esse simul et semel in illis potentiis duabus. Et iterum, per hoc non solvitur, quia adhuc restat quaestio, in qua illarum potentiarum sit primo et principaliter, quia quodcumque horum detur, videntur obviare rationes, quae sunt ad oppositam partem.

### Conclusio.

> Fides, ut est virtus et principium meriti, est in libero arbitrio ut subiecto; ut est habitus, respicit quodam modo intellectum speculativum, quodam vero modo intellectum extensum sive practicum, et ipsum affectum eiusque actum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa senserunt. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod fides est in potentia cognitiva et in intellectu speculativo, secundum quod speculativus. — Et ratio eorum est ista, quia intellectus speculativus dicitur esse ille qui tendit in verum sub ratione veri[^p475-6]; fides autem facit intellectum credere articulos, non quia bonos, sed quia veros; ita enim quis credit damnationem malorum, sicut glorificationem bonorum. Et iterum, caritas et fides distinguuntur in obiecto quantum ad rationem motivi; et quoniam caritas tendit in Deum sub ratione boni, necesse est, quod fides tendat in Deum sub ratione veri; unde assentit summae Veritati, non quia bonitas, sed quia veritas. Quoniam igitur intellectus speculativus respicit verum sub ratione veri; hinc est, quod dixerunt, fidem esse in intellectu speculativo, in quantum est speculativus. — Nec obviant his verba philosophorum[^p475-7], quia ipsi de virtute fidei nihil intellexerunt.

Aliis autem aliter videtur esse dicendum, videlicet quod fides est in intellectu practico. Intellectus enim practicus dicitur esse intellectus extensus, secundum quod vult Philosophus[^p475-8], quod «intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus». Contingit autem, intellectum extendi tripliciter: vel per coniunctionem sui cum affectione, a qua inclinatur; vel per coniunctionem sui cum affectione, ad quam inclinat; vel per coniunctionem sui cum operatione, quam dirigit et regulat. — Omnibus autem his modis contingit fidem poni in intellectu extenso sive practico secundum varios ipsius fidei status. Nam fides simpliciter dicta, sive sit informis sive formata[^p475-9], quae facit, hominem credere Deo in his quae non videt, est in ipso intellectu, in quantum inclinatur ab ipsa voluntate; non enim crederet, nisi vellet. — Fides autem formata, qua quis credit in Deum, est in ipso intellectu, in quantum inclinat affectum. Ad hoc enim, quod aliquis credat in Deum per fidem formatam, oportet, ut in ipsum amando tendat, secundum quod habetur in littera[^p475-10]. — Fides autem perfecta, de qua dicit Apostolus, quod est operans per dilectionem, illa quidem est in ipso intellectu, in quantum mediante affectu dirigit opus. Et sic patet, quod secundum istos fides est in intellectu practico sive extenso secundum diversos ipsius fidei status, sive intellectus practicus dicatur communiter,

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sive proprie, sive magis proprie, secundum quod magis et magis habet extendi. — Ratio autem, quae movet istos hoc ponere, non solum est verbum Philosophi, qui dicit[^p476-1], quod virtutes sunt in intelligentia practica, sed etiam ipsa ratio recta, quae dicit, quod virtus non potest esse nisi habitus voluntarius, cum circa ipsam consistat laus et meritum; et ideo impossibile est, quod virtus fidei sit in intellectu, nisi in quantum intellectus iungitur affectui. Intellectus autem affectui iunctus et ipsi permixtus dicitur esse intellectus extensus vel intellectus practicus; et ideo dixerunt isti, fidem esse in practico intellectu.

Restat adhuc tertius modus dicendi, videlicet quod fides nec est omnino in potentia cognitiva nec omnino in potentia affectiva, sed quodam modo in hac, quodam modo in illa. Et hoc est quod dicit magister Hugo de sancto Victore in libro *de Sacramentis*[^p476-2]: «Duo, inquit, sunt, in quibus fides consistit, cognitio videlicet et affectio. In affectu quidem substantia fidei reperitur, in cognitione vero materia». — Ratio autem, quae movet ad hoc ponendum, est, quod actus voluntatis est essentialis ipsi fidei; nunquam enim esset virtuosum credere, nisi esset voluntarium. Unde et Augustinus dicit, quod «virtus non est aliud quam amor ordinatus». Si ergo fides est virtus, respicit actum voluntatis ut sibi essentialem: ergo et circa illam habet essentialiter consistere. Rursus, quia ipsi fidei cognitio essentialis est et illuminatio, per quam intellectus dirigitur[^p476-3] in summam Veritatem et ei subiicitur; ideo ipsa fides essentialiter respicit actum rationis. Et propterea dicunt illi, qui sunt huius positionis, fidem esse non tantum in ratione, sed etiam in voluntate, cum utrumque actum respiciat essentialiter. Quia vero actus rationis respectu actus voluntatis est materialis, cum ratio inclinetur a voluntate; ideo etiam dixerunt, quod in ratione materia fidei reperitur, in affectione vero substantia.

Omnes autem hi modi dicendi a magnis clericis sumserunt principium, et quilibet eorum habet satis rationabile fundamentum. Et si quis recte intelligat[^p476-4], inveniet, quemlibet eorum habere aliquid veritatis. Ut autem hoc planius fiat, ascendendum est altius ad videndum subiectum *virtutis in generali;* quod quidem intueri possumus satis plane, quibusdam praesuppositis. — Virtus enim est, secundum quam consistit laus et meritum, sicut culpa, secundum quam attenditur[^p476-5] vituperium et demeritum. Virtus etiam est habitus reddens potentiam facilem respectu alicuius actus. Si ergo virtus est principium laudis et meriti, necessarium est, eam poni in illa potentia animae, quae est principium primum operis laudabilis et meritorii. Nam si poneretur in potentia inferiori, tunc virtus potentiae naturalis imperaret virtuti gratuitae. Si ergo liberum arbitrium principium est meriti et demeriti[^p476-6], necesse est, omnem virtutem in libero arbitrio poni. Rursus, cum habitus sit in ea potentia, circa cuius actum explicat difficultatem, et virtus sit habitus; necesse est, eam reperiri in ea potentia sicut in subiecto, quam ad opus habilitat. Quoniam igitur quaedam virtutes explicant actus rationalis, quaedam actus concupiscibilis, quaedam actus irascibilis; ideo quasdam necesse est poni in rationali, quasdam in concupiscibili, quasdam in irascibili[^p476-7].

His praesuppositis, facile est videre, quod est[^p476-8] subiectum fidei. Si enim fides virtus est, circa quam consistit laus et meritum, necesse est, quod ipsa in libero arbitrio ponatur. Rursus, si fides habitus est, per quem intellectus captivatur in obsequium Christi et innititur primae Veritati propter se; et hoc modo dicitur intellectus quodam modo speculativus: necesse est, quod habitus fidei quodam modo sit in intellectu, secundum quod habet rationem speculativi. — Et quoniam intellectus non habilitatur ad assentiendum ipsi Veritati primae secundum suum iudicium, sed secundum voluntatis imperium; ideo fides non respicit intellectum tanquam pure speculativum, sed necessarium est, quod ipsa sit in ipso intellectu, secundum quod est quodam modo extensus et ab affectu inclinatus. — Rursus, quoniam ipsum velle credere est essentiale ipsi fidei, hinc est, quod habitus ille[^p476-9] non tantum respicit intellectum, ut speculatur summam Veritatem, nec etiam ut inclinatur ab affectu, sed etiam ipsum affectum.

Ex his patet, quod non est repugnantia inter praedictas positiones, si quis recte intelligat, immo ex omnibus quasi colligitur una veritas integra: quoniam fides, ut virtus est et principium meriti, respicit liberum arbitrium ut subiectum; in quantum vero habitus est, quodam modo respicit intellectum speculativum et eius actum, qui est credere verum, quia verum[^p476-10]; quodam modo intellectum extensum

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et eius actum, qui est credere voluntarie sive credendo tendere in Deum; quodam modo ipsum affectum et eius actum, qui est velle assentire ei, ad quod ratio ex se non potest attingere.

Si tu obiiceres[^p477-1], quod ista non possunt simul stare, quia, cum fides sit habitus simplex, et unus habitus simplex sit in una potentia tanquam in subiecto, non videtur, quod possit omnes illas potentias tanquam unum subiectum respicere; ad hoc dicendum, quod nihil impedit dicere, unam et eandem virtutem esse simul in libero arbitrio et ratione et voluntate: quia, sicut in secundo libro[^p477-2] ostensum fuit, liberum arbitrium non dicit potentiam distinctam a ratione et voluntate secundum rem et essentiam, immo, secundum quod vult beatus Augustinus, liberum arbitrium complectitur tres potentias, scilicet irascibilem, concupiscibilem et rationalem. Et ideo nullum inconveniens est, quod unaquaeque virtus, quae reponitur in unaquaque illarum[^p477-3] potentiarum secundum quod habitus, in libero arbitrio reponatur secundum quod virtus et meriti principium. — Similiter nullum est inconveniens ponere, unum habitum esse in ratione et voluntate, ita quod unam illarum potentiarum respiciat quantum ad actum materialem, alteram quantum ad actum formalem; sicut patet, quod habitus scientiae quoad quid respicit memoriam, scilicet quoad retentionem speciei, et quoad quid[^p477-4] intelligentiam, scilicet quoad facilitatem conversionis; et tamen dicitur unus habitus simplex. Quamvis enim potentiae distinctae sint, nihilominus tamen continuari habent in uno subiecto, ratione cuius potest esse in eis unitas proprietatis, sicut una sanitas ponitur esse in multis membris corporis interius[^p477-5], et una honestas in multis exterius.

Ex his potest elici et haberi generaliter, quid sit subiectum cuiuslibet virtutis, et quid sit etiam subiectum cuiuslibet vitii sive peccati[^p477-6]. Potest etiam haberi determinatio propositae quaestionis, videlicet quid sit subiectum fidei. Nam licet in quantum virtus meritoria dicenda sit esse in libero arbitrio, in quantum tamen habitus reddens potentiam facilem ponenda est quodam modo in potentia cognitiva, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem: quoniam ad fidem pertinet cogitare, ad fidem[^p477-7] pertinet illuminare et rationem reformare et intellectum captivare, ipsi etiam fidei succedit videre; quae omnia respiciunt cognitionem. Ideo rationes ad partem illam inductae sunt concedendae.

Nec eis obviant rationes ad oppositum: quoniam licet fides respiciat actum potentiae cognitivae, non tamen ipsum respicit omnino pure, sed in quantum habet affectionem concomitantem et quodam modo praesidentem[^p477-8]. Et ideo etiam necesse est ponere, quod fides quodam modo sit in affectione, sicut dicit magister Hugo de sancto Victore; et hoc, quia est habitus voluntarius et amor ordinatus, et talis naturae est actus eius, quod ad ipsum nemo potest cogi invitus. Et ideo concedi possunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem sequentem.

Quod autem rationes sibi invicem non obvient, sed utraeque verum concludant, satis clare potest videre[^p477-9], si quis potest capere, quod ad esse fidei virtutis concurrit actus rationis simul et voluntatis, quod bene innuit Apostolus[^p477-10] in ipsa notificatione fidei, cum dicit, fidem esse *substantiam rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparentium,* tangens quod est in ea cognitionis, et quod est affectionis. Nunquam enim fides esset virtus, quantumcumque intellectum illuminaret, nisi etiam voluntatem quodam modo rectificaret[^p477-11]; sicut patet in dono prophetiae: quia illuminat intellectum ad eadem, ad quae illuminat fides, et tamen non ponitur esse virtus, quoniam in illa illuminatione non cooperatur voluntas, secundum quod cooperatur in fidei assensu et actu. — Ex his patere possunt ea quae obiecta sunt et consimilia, quae circa hoc obiici possunt.

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### Question II. *Whether faith is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul.*

Secondly it is asked whether faith is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul. And that it is in the cognitive part is shown thus:

1. *First*, through Augustine, who defines belief thus in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^p474-1]: "To believe is to think with assent." To that power, therefore, belief pertains, to which thinking pertains; but thinking belongs to the cognitive power: therefore so too believing. If, then, faith—whose act is believing—is in that power, it seems that faith is in the cognitive part of the soul.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter ten[^p474-2]: *Faith comes from hearing;* and there Gregory says: "It gives understanding, while it illumines the mind from the things heard." If, then, faith comes through hearing, and faith illumines the mind, and both hearing and being illumined pertain to the cognitive part of the soul, it seems that faith is in the cognitive part of the soul.

3. Likewise, the reformation of the image takes place through the three theological virtues; but the image consists not only in the affective power, but also in the cognitive power[^p474-3]: therefore it is necessary that some theological virtue reform the cognitive power. But there is no other to assign except faith; if, then, the virtue is in that power which it reforms, it seems that faith is in the cognitive power.

4. Likewise, in the same power are the gratuitous virtue and the gift succeeding it in glory; but vision, which succeeds faith[^p474-4], is in the cognitive power, as is manifest: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, virtue is, as in its subject, in that power about whose act it unfolds difficulty—for a habit is placed in that power for whose work it makes apt—if, then, through faith the *intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ*[^p474-5], then faith forwards the act of the intellective power itself: it is therefore in it as in its subject.

**On the contrary:** 1. Tullius[^p474-6], in defining virtue, says that "virtue is a *voluntary* habit": therefore if faith is a virtue, it is a voluntary habit; but a voluntary habit is in the will as in its subject: therefore so too faith.

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2. Likewise, Augustine, *On the Morals of the Church*[^p475-1], in defining virtue says that "virtue is nothing other than ordered love": therefore if every virtue is love, speaking essentially, every virtue is in that power whose office is to love; but this belongs to the affective, not the cognitive, power: therefore every virtue is in the affective power.

3. Likewise, Master Hugh in the book *On the Sacraments*[^p475-2] says that "in the affection of faith its substance is found"; but the virtue is in that power as in its proper subject, in which its substance is found: if, then, this is the affective power, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, in no power is there the virtue of faith that can be compelled, because, as Augustine says[^p475-3], "while a man can do other things unwilling, he cannot believe except willing"; but the cognitive power can be compelled: therefore faith cannot be in the cognitive power; and it is either in the cognitive or in the affective power: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, virtue is, as in its subject, in that power which is the principle of the act and operation owed to that virtue[^p475-4]; but no one assents to an unseen truth except because he wills it: therefore if the principle of the act of believing takes its origin from the will, it is necessary that faith be in it as in its proper subject. If you say that it is at once in intellect and in affection, against this is that one simple habit cannot be in two powers; but the cognitive and the affective are diverse powers, as was shown above in the second book[^p475-5]: therefore if faith is one habit, it cannot be at once and at the same time in those two powers. And again, by this the question is not resolved, because there still remains the question in which of those powers it is first and principally, since whichever of these be granted, the reasons that are for the opposite part seem to stand in the way.

### Conclusion.

> Faith, as it is a virtue and a principle of merit, is in free choice as its subject; as it is a habit, it regards in one way the speculative intellect, in another way the extended or practical intellect, and the affection itself and its act.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that on this point different men have thought differently. For some wished to say that faith is in the cognitive power and in the speculative intellect, insofar as it is speculative. — And their reason is this: that the speculative intellect is said to be that which tends toward the true under the aspect of the true[^p475-6]; but faith makes the intellect believe the articles, not because they are good, but because they are true; for thus one believes the damnation of the wicked just as the glorification of the good. And again, charity and faith are distinguished in their object as regards the aspect of the motive; and since charity tends toward God under the aspect of the good, it is necessary that faith tend toward God under the aspect of the true; whence it assents to the highest Truth, not because of its goodness, but because of its truth. Since, then, the speculative intellect regards the true under the aspect of the true, hence it is that they said faith is in the speculative intellect, insofar as it is speculative. — Nor do the words of the philosophers[^p475-7] stand against this, since they understood nothing about the virtue of faith.

To others, however, it seems it must be said otherwise, namely that faith is in the practical intellect. For the practical intellect is said to be the extended intellect, according to what the Philosopher holds[^p475-8], that "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension." But it happens that the intellect is extended in three ways: either by the conjunction of itself with an affection by which it is inclined; or by the conjunction of itself with an affection toward which it inclines; or by the conjunction of itself with an operation which it directs and regulates. — But in all these ways it happens that faith is placed in the extended or practical intellect according to the various states of faith itself. For faith simply so called, whether it be unformed or formed[^p475-9], which makes a man believe God in those things which he does not see, is in the intellect itself, insofar as it is inclined by the will itself; for he would not believe unless he willed. — But formed faith, by which one believes in God, is in the intellect itself, insofar as it inclines the affection. For in order that someone believe in God through formed faith, it is necessary that he tend toward Him by loving, according to what is held in the text[^p475-10]. — But perfect faith, of which the Apostle says that it is one working through love, is indeed in the intellect itself, insofar as, by the mediation of the affection, it directs the work. And thus it is plain that, according to these, faith is in the practical or extended intellect according to the diverse states of faith itself, whether the practical intellect be spoken of commonly,

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or properly, or more properly, according as it has to be extended more and more. — But the reason which moves them to posit this is not only the word of the Philosopher, who says[^p476-1] that the virtues are in the practical intelligence, but also right reason itself, which says that virtue cannot be anything but a voluntary habit, since praise and merit consist about it; and therefore it is impossible that the virtue of faith be in the intellect, except insofar as the intellect is joined to the affection. But the intellect joined to and intermingled with the affection is said to be the extended intellect or the practical intellect; and therefore these men said that faith is in the practical intellect.

There still remains a third manner of speaking, namely that faith is neither wholly in the cognitive power nor wholly in the affective power, but in one way in this, in another way in that. And this is what Master Hugh of Saint Victor says in the book *On the Sacraments*[^p476-2]: "There are two things," he says, "in which faith consists, namely cognition and affection. In the affection indeed the substance of faith is found, but in the cognition its matter." — But the reason which moves toward positing this is that the act of the will is essential to faith itself; for it would never be virtuous to believe, unless it were voluntary. Whence Augustine too says that "virtue is nothing other than ordered love." If, then, faith is a virtue, it regards the act of the will as essential to it: therefore it must also essentially consist about it. Again, since cognition and illumination are essential to faith, by which the intellect is directed[^p476-3] into the highest Truth and subjected to it, therefore faith essentially regards the act of reason. And for that reason those who are of this position say that faith is not only in the reason, but also in the will, since it regards both acts essentially. But because the act of reason in respect of the act of the will is material, since reason is inclined by the will, therefore they also said that in the reason the matter of faith is found, but in the affection its substance.

But all these manners of speaking took their principle from great clerics, and each of them has a sufficiently reasonable foundation. And if one understands rightly[^p476-4], he will find that each of them has something of the truth. But that this may become plainer, we must ascend higher to see the subject of *virtue in general;* which indeed we can behold quite plainly, certain things being presupposed. — For virtue is that according to which praise and merit consist, just as fault is that according to which[^p476-5] blame and demerit are reckoned. Virtue is also a habit rendering a power apt in respect of some act. If, then, virtue is the principle of praise and merit, it is necessary that it be placed in that power of the soul which is the first principle of a praiseworthy and meritorious work. For if it were placed in a lower power, then the virtue of a natural power would command the gratuitous virtue. If, then, free choice is the principle of merit and demerit[^p476-6], it is necessary that every virtue be placed in free choice. Again, since a habit is in that power about whose act it unfolds difficulty, and virtue is a habit, it is necessary that it be found in that power as in its subject, which it makes apt for the work. Since, then, certain virtues unfold acts of the rational, certain acts of the concupiscible, certain acts of the irascible, therefore some must be placed in the rational, some in the concupiscible, some in the irascible[^p476-7].

These things presupposed, it is easy to see what is[^p476-8] the subject of faith. For if faith is a virtue, about which praise and merit consist, it is necessary that it be placed in free choice. Again, if faith is a habit, by which the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ and leans upon the first Truth for its own sake; and in this way the intellect is said to be in a certain way speculative: it is necessary that the habit of faith be in a certain way in the intellect, insofar as it has the character of the speculative. — And since the intellect is not made apt to assent to that first Truth according to its own judgment, but according to the command of the will, therefore faith does not regard the intellect as purely speculative, but it is necessary that it be in the intellect itself, insofar as it is in a certain way extended and inclined by the affection. — Again, since the very willing to believe is essential to faith itself, hence it is that that habit[^p476-9] regards not only the intellect, as it contemplates the highest Truth, nor only as it is inclined by the affection, but also the affection itself.

From these things it is plain that there is no contradiction among the aforesaid positions, if one understands rightly, but rather from them all there is gathered, as it were, one integral truth: namely that faith, as it is a virtue and a principle of merit, regards free choice as its subject; insofar as it is a habit, it regards in one way the speculative intellect and its act, which is to believe the true because it is true[^p476-10]; in one way the extended intellect

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and its act, which is to believe voluntarily, or by believing to tend toward God; in one way the affection itself and its act, which is to will to assent to that which reason of itself cannot attain.

If you should object[^p477-1] that these cannot stand together, because, since faith is a simple habit, and one simple habit is in one power as in its subject, it does not seem that it can regard all those powers as one subject; to this it must be said that nothing prevents saying that one and the same virtue is at once in free choice and in reason and in will: because, as was shown in the second book[^p477-2], free choice does not denote a power distinct from reason and will in reality and essence, but rather, according to what blessed Augustine holds, free choice embraces three powers, namely the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational. And therefore it is no impropriety that each virtue, which is placed in each of those[^p477-3] powers as a habit, be placed in free choice as a virtue and a principle of merit. — Similarly there is no impropriety in positing that one habit is in reason and will, in such a way that it regards one of those powers as regards the material act, the other as regards the formal act; just as it is plain that the habit of knowledge in one respect regards memory, namely as regards the retention of the species, and in one respect[^p477-4] the understanding, namely as regards the ease of turning; and yet it is called one simple habit. For although the powers are distinct, nevertheless they have to be continued in one subject, by reason of which there can be in them a unity of property, just as one health is posited to be in the many members of the body interiorly[^p477-5], and one comeliness in the many exteriorly.

From these things can be elicited and held generally what is the subject of any virtue, and what is also the subject of any vice or sin[^p477-6]. There can also be had the determination of the proposed question, namely what is the subject of faith. For although, insofar as it is a meritorious virtue, it must be said to be in free choice, yet insofar as it is a habit rendering the power apt, it must be placed in a certain way in the cognitive power, as the reasons for the first part show: since to faith it pertains to think, to faith[^p477-7] it pertains to illumine and to reform the reason and to take the intellect captive, and to faith too there succeeds vision; all of which regard cognition. Therefore the reasons brought forward for that part are to be conceded.

Nor do the reasons for the opposite stand against them: since although faith regards the act of the cognitive power, yet it does not regard it altogether purely, but insofar as it has an accompanying and in a certain way presiding affection[^p477-8]. And therefore it is also necessary to posit that faith is in a certain way in the affection, as Master Hugh of Saint Victor says; and this because it is a voluntary habit and ordered love, and such is the nature of its act that to it no one can be compelled unwilling. And therefore the reasons which are for the following part can be conceded.

But that the reasons do not stand against one another, but both conclude the truth, can be seen quite clearly[^p477-9], if one can grasp that to the being of the virtue of faith there concur at once the act of reason and of the will, which the Apostle[^p477-10] well intimates in the very description of faith, when he says that faith is *the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing,* touching what is in it of cognition, and what is of affection. For faith would never be a virtue, however much it illumined the intellect, unless it also in a certain way rectified the will[^p477-11]; as is plain in the gift of prophecy: for it illumines the intellect toward the same things toward which faith illumines, and yet it is not posited to be a virtue, since in that illumination the will does not cooperate, in the way it cooperates in the assent and act of faith. — From these things can become plain the things that were objected and the like, which can be objected concerning this.

la: Cap. 2. n. 5. In testimonio allato pro *assensione*, quod et in textu origin. habetur, edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. *assertione*. Idem mendum in hac et seqq. distinctionibus pluries apud eosdem redit. In fine arg. pro *cognitiva* complures codd. *cognitivae*.

en: Chapter 2, n. 5. In the testimony adduced, for *assensione* ["with assent"], which is also had in the original text, editions 1 and 2 with many codices read *assertione*. The same error returns several times in this and the following distinctions among the same. At the end of the argument, for *cognitiva* ["cognitive"], several codices read *cognitivae*.

la: Vers. 17. — Sententia Gregorii, quam etiam supplementum ad Sum. Alex. Hal., coll. 34. a. 1. affert, addito tamen *Deus* post *dat*, sumta videtur ex II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 3, ad quem locum etiam infra d. 24. dub. 2. in fine respicitur. Vide etiam XI. Moral. c. 9. n. 12, ubi sic legitur: *Mutum est os omne... si ille [Deus] interius in corde non clamet, qui aspirat verba, quae audiuntur.* Cfr. ibid. XXIX. c. 24. n. 49. Pro *Gregorius* edd. auctoritate nonnullorum codd. substituerunt *Glossa;* sed neque apud Strabum neque apud Lombardum neque apud Lyranum talis Glossa in loc. cit. invenitur. — Paulo inferius pro *ad partem animae cognitivam* [codd. T Z *cognitivae*] codd. G I L V aa *ad cognitionem animae*.

en: Verse 17. — The sentence of Gregory, which the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, coll. 34, a. 1, also adduces (with *Deus* added after *dat*), seems to be taken from the second Homily on the Gospel, hom. 30, n. 3, to which place reference is also made below at d. 24, dub. 2, at the end. See also XI *Moralia*, c. 9, n. 12, where it reads thus: *Every mouth is mute... if He [God] does not cry within in the heart, who inspires the words that are heard.* Cf. ibid. XXIX, c. 24, n. 49. For *Gregorius* the editions, on the authority of some codices, substituted *Glossa;* but no such Gloss is found in the cited place either in Strabo or in Lombard or in Lyra. — A little further on, for *ad partem animae cognitivam* [codices T, Z *cognitivae*] codices G, I, L, V, aa read *ad cognitionem animae*.

la: Cfr. de his duab. proposit. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cf. concerning these two propositions, *II Sent.*, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 10, 5. — Respectu *maioris* dicit Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 3: *Signum autem habituum sit vel voluptas, vel aegritudo [molestia], quae facta [opera] consequitur.*

en: Epistle, 2 Corinthians 10:5. — In respect of the *major*, Aristotle says, II *Ethics*, c. 3: *Let the sign of habits be either pleasure or pain [distress], which follows upon the deeds [works].*

la: Libr. V. *de Finib. bonor. et malor.* c. 13, ubi duo genera virtutum distinguit: «unum earum quae ingenerantur suapte natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum earum quae in voluntate positae magis proprio nomine virtutes appellari solent». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3, ubi aliae definitiones virtutis afferuntur, etiam illa Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 6: *Virtus est habitus voluntarius [electivus] in medio consistens, recta ratione determinatus, prout sapiens determinabit.*

en: Book V, *On the Ends of Goods and Evils*, c. 13, where he distinguishes two kinds of virtues: "one of those which are engendered by their own nature and are called non-voluntary, the other of those which, being placed in the will, are by a more proper name usually called virtues." Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 27, dub. 3, where other definitions of virtue are adduced, including that of Aristotle, II *Ethics*, c. 6: *Virtue is a voluntary [elective] habit consisting in a mean, determined by right reason, as the wise man will determine.*

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 23, ubi non quidem virtutem generatim sic definit, ut hic in Comment. asseritur, attamen docet, quatuor virtutes cardinales «ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu» dici. Melius fuisset lectorem delegare ad *Civ. Dei*, ubi XV. c. 22. S. Doctor sic dicit: *Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis: ordo est amoris.* — In fine arg. cod. K addit *non cognitiva*.

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 23, where he does not indeed define virtue in general thus, as is asserted here in the Commentary, yet he teaches that the four cardinal virtues are so called "from a certain varied affection of love itself." It would have been better to refer the reader to the *City of God*, where, XV, c. 22, the holy Doctor says thus: *Whence it seems to me that the brief and true definition of virtue is: it is the order of love.* — At the end of the argument codex K adds *non cognitiva*.

la: Libr. I. p. X. c. 3.

en: Book I, p. X, c. 3.

la: *In Ioan. Evang.* tr. 26. n. 2: *Intrare quisquam ecclesiam potest nolens, accedere ad altare potest nolens, accipere Sacramentum potest nolens, credere non potest nisi volens.* Cfr. supra pag. 217, nota 5.

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tr. 26, n. 2: *Anyone can enter a church unwilling, can approach the altar unwilling, can receive the Sacrament unwilling, but he cannot believe except willing.* Cf. above, p. 217, note 5.

la: Vide supra pag. 388, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 388, note 2.

la: Dist. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo ante pro *habitus simplex* cod. bb *habitus simul*.

en: Distinction 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — A little before, for *habitus simplex* ["simple habit"], codex bb reads *habitus simul* ["habit at once"].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Superius pro *ratio eorum* cod. A *ratio eius;* paulo inferius pro *bonorum* Vat. cum aliquot codd. *beatorum*.

en: Cf. above, p. 470, note 8. — Earlier, for *ratio eorum* ["their reason"], codex A reads *ratio eius* ["its reason"]; a little further on, for *bonorum* ["of the good"], the Vatican edition with some codices reads *beatorum* ["of the blessed"].

la: Quippe qui virtutem in intellectu practico ponunt, ut in seqq. tangitur. — Subinde pro *de virtute fidei* edd. *de veritate fidei*.

en: Namely those who place virtue in the practical intellect, as is touched upon in what follows. — Then, for *de virtute fidei* ["of the virtue of faith"], the editions read *de veritate fidei* ["of the truth of faith"].

la: Libr. III. *de Anima*, text. 34. et 49. (c. 7. et 9.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 538, nota 2. — Post pauca pro *a qua inclinatur* codd. A G (H I a prima manu) L T V aa bb perperam *ad quam inclinatur*.

en: Book III, *On the Soul*, texts 34 and 49 (c. 7 and 9). Cf. vol. II, p. 538, note 2. — A little after, for *a qua inclinatur* ["by which it is inclined"], codices A, G (H, I by the first hand), L, T, V, aa, bb wrongly read *ad quam inclinatur* ["toward which it inclines"].

la: Cfr. infra a. 2. q. I. seqq. — De differentia inter *credere Deo* et *credere in Deum* vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. et infra dub. 3. — Mox pro *in his* cod. F *de his*, et deinde codd. G I L aa cc voci *intellectu* addunt *practico*.

en: Cf. below, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — On the difference between *to believe God* and *to believe in God*, see here the text of the Master, c. 4, and below, dub. 3. — Soon, for *in his* ["in these"], codex F reads *de his* ["concerning these"], and then codices G, I, L, aa, cc add *practico* ["practical"] to the word *intellectu* ["intellect"].

la: Hic c. 4. — Verba Apostoli, quae hic respiciuntur, sunt illa Gal. 5, 6: *Fides, quae per caritatem operatur.*

en: Here, c. 4. — The words of the Apostle which are regarded here are those of Galatians 5:6: *Faith, which works through charity.*

la: Fusius II. *Ethic.* c. 1-7. et VI. c. 1-4. — Ibid. I. c. 12. seq. et II. c. 5. nec non III. c. 1. insinuatur etiam ratio, subinde allata et petita ex merito atque laude. — Superius pro *intellectus practicus* codd. I L V aa *intellectus extensus;* deinde plurimi codd. et edd. primo loco ponunt minus bene *proprie*, secundo loco *communiter;* refragantibus codd. A K, et paulo post pro *magis et magis* cod. A *magis et minus*. Aliquanto inferius pro *cum circa ipsam* codd. N O *cum circa ipsum*.

en: More fully, II *Ethics*, c. 1-7 and VI, c. 1-4. — Ibid., I, c. 12 f. and II, c. 5, as well as III, c. 1, the reason is also insinuated, subsequently adduced and drawn from merit and praise. — Earlier, for *intellectus practicus* ["practical intellect"], codices I, L, V, aa read *intellectus extensus* ["extended intellect"]; then most codices and editions place *proprie* ["properly"] less well in the first place, *communiter* ["commonly"] in the second; codices A, K disagreeing; and a little after, for *magis et magis* ["more and more"], codex A reads *magis et minus* ["more and less"]. Somewhat further on, for *cum circa ipsam* ["since about it (fem.)"], codices N, O read *cum circa ipsum* ["since about it (masc.)"].

la: Codd. G I L V aa *quae dirigit intellectum*. Mox post *ideo* memorati codd. omittunt *ipsa fides*, et post *essentialiter* codd. A K Z subiiciunt *etiam*.

en: Codices G, I, L, V, aa read *which directs the intellect*. Soon after *ideo* ["therefore"] the said codices omit *ipsa fides* ["faith itself"], and after *essentialiter* ["essentially"] codices A, K, Z add *etiam* ["also"].

la: Codd. A K *inspiciat*.

en: Codices A, K read *inspiciat* ["may examine"].

la: Pro *attenditur* codd. G I L V aa *consistit*. Infra post *tunc virtus* codd. G I L (aa primitus) omittunt *potentiae*.

en: For *attenditur* ["is reckoned"], codices G, I, L, V, aa read *consistit* ["consists"]. Below, after *tunc virtus* ["then the virtue"], codices G, I, L (aa originally) omit *potentiae* ["of the power"].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 381, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 381, note 1.

la: Vide Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. 13.

en: See Aristotle, I *Ethics*, c. 13.

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. *quid est*, et mox pro *circa quam* codd. G I L V aa *secundum quam*.

en: The editions and some codices read *quid est* ["what is"], and soon, for *circa quam* ["about which"], codices G, I, L, V, aa read *secundum quam* ["according to which"].

la: Codd. G I L V aa *habitus fidei*.

en: Codices G, I, L, V, aa read *habitus fidei* ["the habit of faith"].

la: Cod. F adiicit *dicit* (i. e. respicit). Vat. deinde sola sic prosequitur: *Quia vero est habitus operans per dilectionem et dirigens opus mediante affectu, respicit quodam modo intellectum* etc.

en: Codex F adds *dicit* (i.e., regards). The Vatican edition alone then continues thus: *But because it is a habit working through love and directing the work by the mediation of the affection, it regards in a certain way the intellect* etc.

la: Codd. F G L P Q V Z aa *obiicias*, cod. I *obiicis*. Paulo inferius pro *dicendum*, cui verbo codd. H N P Q T U addunt *est*, cod. A *dicimus*.

en: Codices F, G, L, P, Q, V, Z, aa read *obiicias*, codex I *obiicis* ["you object"]. A little further on, for *dicendum* ["it must be said"], to which word codices H, N, P, Q, T, U add *est*, codex A reads *dicimus* ["we say"].

la: Dist. 25. p. I. q. 2. seqq. — Ibid. q. 3. fundam. I: *Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota* (ex III. *Hypognost.* [inter opera Augusl.] c. 5.).

en: Distinction 25, p. I, q. 2 ff. — Ibid., q. 3, fundamentum 1: *When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but of the whole* (from the third *Hypognosticon* [among the works of Augustine], c. 5).

la: Edd. *in una istarum*.

en: The editions read *in una istarum* ["in one of these"].

la: Codd. G I L V Z aa hic repetunt *respicit*. Mox post *dicitur* codd. A K N inserunt *esse*.

en: Codices G, I, L, V, Z, aa here repeat *respicit* ["regards"]. Soon after *dicitur* ["is said"], codices A, K, N insert *esse* ["to be"].

la: Hoc exemplum invenitur etiam in August. *Epist.* 187. (alias 57.) c. 4. n. 13. Vide tom. I. pag. 171, nota 10; II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5. et d. 27. a. I. q. 2. idem dicitur de gratia. — Pro *unitas proprietatis* codd. A Z *veritas proprietatis*, et deinde pro *ponitur esse* codd. G I L V Z aa *potest esse*.

en: This example is found also in Augustine, *Epistle* 187 (otherwise 57), c. 4, n. 13. See vol. I, p. 171, note 10; in *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 5, and d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, the same is said of grace. — For *unitas proprietatis* ["unity of property"], codices A, Z read *veritas proprietatis* ["truth of property"], and then, for *ponitur esse* ["is posited to be"], codices G, I, L, V, Z, aa read *potest esse* ["can be"].

la: In hac nec non in seq. propositione fere omnes codd. pro *quid sit* minus recte exhibent *quod sit*.

en: In this and also in the following proposition nearly all codices, for *quid sit* ["what it is"], less correctly exhibit *quod sit* ["that it is"].

la: Pro *ad fidem* edd. *ad fidei proprietates;* in pluribus codd. desunt verba *cogitare, ad fidem pertinet*. Subinde pro *reformare* codd. G I L V aa *informare*.

en: For *ad fidem* ["to faith"], the editions read *ad fidei proprietates* ["to the properties of faith"]; in several codices the words *cogitare, ad fidem pertinet* ["to think, it pertains to faith"] are lacking. Then, for *reformare* ["to reform"], codices G, I, L, V, aa read *informare* ["to inform"].

la: Vocabulum *praesidentem* restituimus e codd. A K M N O U Z bb; eius loco codd. F L T Y aa et edd. 1, 2 habent *possidentem*, alii codd. *possibilitatem*, Vat. *post sequentem;* in codd. G V legitur *affectionem concordantem et possidentem*.

en: The word *praesidentem* ["presiding"] we have restored from codices A, K, M, N, O, U, Z, bb; in its place codices F, L, T, Y, aa and editions 1, 2 have *possidentem* ["possessing"], other codices *possibilitatem* ["possibility"], the Vatican edition *post sequentem* ["after following"]; in codices G, V is read *affectionem concordantem et possidentem* ["a concordant and possessing affection"].

la: Cod. V *patet* pro *potest videre*.

en: Codex V reads *patet* ["it is plain"] for *potest videre* ["one can see"].

la: Hebr. 11, 1. Cfr. infra q. 5.

en: Hebrews 11:1. Cf. below, q. 5.

la: Codd. T bb *regularet*, codd. I L V aa *recuperaret*. Post pauca pro *quia illuminat* codd. A K U Z *quod illuminat*.

en: Codices T, bb read *regularet* ["should regulate"], codices I, L, V, aa *recuperaret* ["should recover"]. A little after, for *quia illuminat* ["because it illumines"], codices A, K, U, Z read *quod illuminat* ["that it illumines"]. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** S. Thom. (*de Verit.* q. 14. a. 4.) arguit contra eos qui docebant, vel fidem esse in voluntate et intellectu simul et ex aequo, vel in voluntate principaliter (ut Hugo), vel in intellectu practico; econtra asserit, quod eadem «est in intellectu speculativo, quamvis sit ut occasio remota aliquid operandi; unde sibi non attribuitur operatio nisi mediante dilectione. Sciendum tamen, quod non est in intellectu speculativo absolute, sed secundum quod subditur imperio voluntatis». Eandem sententiam tenet hic q. 2. a. 3, et S. *I. II.* q. 56. a. 3, et consentit Gulielm. Antissiod. (Sum. p. III. tr. 3. c. 1. q. 2.). Quod autem fides sit in intellectu practico, tenet B. Albert. (hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 2.), Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.) et favet etiam Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 2. Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 68. m. 3.) vult, fidem materialiter consideratam esse in intellectu speculativo, sed formaliter consideratam in intellectu practico. — S. Bonav. hic pro more suo sapienter tres sententias in concordiam redigere conatur. Ut autem eius doctrina recte intelligatur, respiciendum est ad ipsius modum loquendi de libero arbitrio, qui aliqualenus recedit a via S. Thomae, ut dictum est II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 2. in scholio. Insuper notandum, quod S. Thom. intellectum practicum in sensu arctiore accipit ac S. Bonav. aliique. Dicit enim (*de Verit.* loc. cit.): «Sola extensio ad opus facit, aliquem intellectum esse practicum. Relatio autem ad affectionem vel antecedentem, vel consequentem non trahit ipsum extra genus speculativi intellectus». — Sententia autem S. Bonaventurae (loquendo de ipsa fide in se considerata) a discipulo eiusdem, Fr. Matthaeo de Aquasparta (in anecdota quaest. disputata de fide), sic exponitur: «Fides est in intellectu formaliter, sed in voluntate causaliter; in intellectu sicut in subiecto, in voluntate sicut in causa; in intellectu sicut in potentia, a qua eius actus elicitur, sed in voluntate tanquam in potentia, a qua eius actus imperatur». — Bene notanda sunt verba (in corp.), quod habitus fidei non tantum respicit intellectum, «ut inclinatur ab affectu, sed etiam ipsum affectum», quia includit actum obedientiae, plenum intellectus et voluntatis obsequium Deo libere praestantis. — Verba autem (circa finem corp., secundum lectionem a nobis reformatam): *habet affectionem concomitantem et quodam modo praesidentem,* approbantur a S. Thoma (*S. c. Gent.* III. c. 40.): «In cognitione fidei principalitatem habet voluntas; intellectus enim assentit per fidem his quae sibi proponuntur, quia vult, non autem ex ipsa veritatis evidentia necessario tractus».

**II.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal. loc. cit. m. 8. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Hoc loco iuvat notare, quod eadem quaestio tractatur etiam in Supplemento ad Summam Alexandri Hal., de quo famoso libro diffuse egimus in I. tom. Prolegomena pag. LIX–LXII. Ibi enim (collatio 34. a. 1.) primo loco verbotenus referuntur fere omnia, quae habentur in Summa Alexandri loc. cit. m. 8. a. 1. Deinde sequitur: «Ad maiorem declarationem adhuc obiicitur sic» etc.; et tunc transcribuntur argg. a S. Bonav. hic posita, uno alterove omisso, et deinde etiam tota responsio usque ad verba: *Ut autem hoc planius fiat* etc. (ubi in corp. conciliantur opiniones). Omittens quae sequuntur, compilator sic concludit: «Et forte in hoc conveniunt omnes, quod fides non est in intellectu antecedenter se habente ad voluntatem, sed consequenter, sicut tactum est supra in illo problemate, utrum fides sit virtus».

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english_scholion:
**I.** St. Thomas (*On Truth* q. 14, a. 4) argues against those who taught either that faith is in the will and the intellect at once and equally, or in the will principally (as Hugh), or in the practical intellect; against them he asserts that it "is in the speculative intellect, although it be as a remote occasion of doing something; whence no operation is attributed to it except by the mediation of love. It must be known, however, that it is not in the speculative intellect absolutely, but according as it is subjected to the command of the will." The same opinion he holds here in q. 2, a. 3, and in the *Summa I–II*, q. 56, a. 3, and William of Auxerre agrees (*Summa*, p. III, tr. 3, c. 1, q. 2). But that faith is in the practical intellect, Blessed Albert holds (here a. 6, quaestiuncula 2), Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 3, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2), and Richard of Mediavilla also favors it, here a. 6, q. 2. But Alexander of Hales (*Summa*, p. III, q. 68, m. 3) holds that faith considered materially is in the speculative intellect, but considered formally in the practical intellect. — St. Bonaventure here, after his usual manner, wisely strives to bring the three opinions into accord. But that his teaching may be rightly understood, regard must be had to his manner of speaking about free choice, which departs somewhat from the way of St. Thomas, as was said in *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. I, q. 2, in the scholion. It must moreover be noted that St. Thomas takes the practical intellect in a stricter sense than St. Bonaventure and others. For he says (*On Truth*, loc. cit.): "Extension to a work alone makes some intellect to be practical. But the relation to an affection, whether antecedent or consequent, does not draw it outside the genus of the speculative intellect." — But the opinion of St. Bonaventure (speaking of faith itself considered in itself) is expounded by his disciple, Friar Matthew of Aquasparta (in an unpublished disputed question on faith), thus: "Faith is in the intellect formally, but in the will causally; in the intellect as in a subject, in the will as in a cause; in the intellect as in a power from which its act is elicited, but in the will as in a power from which its act is commanded." — Well to be noted are the words (in the body) that the habit of faith regards not only the intellect, "as it is inclined by the affection, but also the affection itself," because it includes the act of obedience, the full submission of intellect and will rendering itself freely to God. — But the words (toward the end of the body, according to the reading reformed by us): *it has an accompanying and in a certain way presiding affection,* are approved by St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles*, III, c. 40): "In the cognition of faith the will has the principal place; for the intellect assents through faith to the things proposed to it, because it wills, not however drawn by the very evidence of the truth necessarily."

**II.** Besides the passages cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., m. 8, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Here it is worth noting that the same question is treated also in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, about which famous book we have written at length in the Prolegomena of vol. I, pp. LIX–LXII. For there (collation 34, a. 1) in the first place are recounted word for word nearly all the things which are had in the Summa of Alexander, loc. cit., m. 8, a. 1. Then there follows: "For greater explanation it is yet objected thus" etc.; and then are transcribed the arguments posited by St. Bonaventure here, with one or another omitted, and then also the whole response up to the words: *But that this may become plainer* etc. (where in the body the opinions are reconciled). Omitting what follows, the compiler concludes thus: "And perhaps in this all agree, that faith is not in the intellect as related antecedently to the will, but consequently, as was touched above in that problem, whether faith is a virtue."

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{474..478}-{L,R}-*.png`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 32953–33238, `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). English is a fresh literal translation. The QUAESTIO II header (`Utrum fides sit in parte animae cognitiva, an affectiva`) is rendered at the top of q2's body. **Opener alignment VERIFIED on PDF (p.474-L-1): "Secundo quaeritur, utrum fides sit in parte animae cognitiva, an affectiva. Et quod sit in parte cognitiva, videtur:" — this IS q2, matching the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM listing (q2 = cognitiva vel affectiva).**

**Page-split map** (pdf = printed + 22):
- p.474 (PDF 496): q1's scholion tail closes at page top; QUAESTIO II header, body opener, cognitive args 1–5, *Sed contra* 1 (Tullius). **6 footers** (`[^p474-1..6]`).
- p.475 (PDF 497): *Sed contra* 2–5 (mid-arg-1 break), Conclusio, Respondeo opinio 1 (speculative) + opinio 2 (practical, three modes of extension). **10 footers** (`[^p475-1..10]`).
- p.476 (PDF 498): Respondeo opinio 2 cont., opinio 3 (Hugh — neither/both), *Ratio*, *subiectum virtutis in generali*, four Conclusiones on the subject of faith, beginning of the reconciliation. **10 footers** (`[^p476-1..10]`).
- p.477 (PDF 499): reconciliation cont., the *Si tu obiiceres* objection + reply, *Epilogus*, Solutiones (*Ad argg. pro* both parts + *Non sibi obviant argg.* with the *Prophetia non est virtus* note); body ends; SCHOLION I begins at page foot. **11 footers** (`[^p477-1..11]`).
- p.478 (PDF 500): Scholion I (full-width band) cont. + Scholion II; then QUAESTIO III begins. **No q2 footers** — the p.478 footers (nn.1–4: Eph 4:5 / 1 Cor 13:13 etc.) all key to q3's body.

**Apparatus total: 37 body footers** (p.474 ×6 + p.475 ×10 + p.476 ×10 + p.477 ×11), per-page restart. The scholion (§§I–II) has no separate footnote apparatus — it is a continuous editorial note spanning the bottom two-column band of p.477 and the full-width band at the top of p.478, carrying no Quaracchi note-markers.

**Footers migrating IN (per d23-a1-q1 hand-off):** **none.** The shared printed page 474 was verified by body-anchor on the 450 dpi bands: q1's scholion tail occupies only the top of p.474-L and carries no footers, so the entire p.474 footer block (nn.1–6) belongs to q2 (keyed to q2's opener + cognitive args + Tullius/*Sed contra* 1). q1 closed clean at the QUAESTIO II header (raw 32953). **Footers migrating OUT:** none — q2's scholion ends at the top of p.478 before the QUAESTIO III header (raw 33239); p.478's footer notes are wholly q3's.

**Scholion finding:** q2 **HAS its own scholion** (§§I–II), as predicted by the hand-off (`SCHOLION.` at raw 33189). §I is the long S. Thomas / Albert / Peter of Tarentaise / Richard of Mediavilla / Alexander of Hales discussion of where faith resides, plus the Matthew of Aquasparta exposition of Bonaventure's *formaliter/causaliter* doctrine and the *praesidentem* textual restoration approved from *S.c.Gent.* III c.40; §II is the author-list (Alex. Hal. / Durandus / Dionysius Carthusianus) plus the note on the Supplement to Alexander's Summa (Prolegomena pp. LIX–LXII). The scholion is placed LAST in both language blocks (parser requirement).

**Seam integrity:** opens at the QUAESTIO II header + *Secundo quaeritur…* body (raw 32953–32956), continuous from q1's scholion close at the top of p.474-L. Closes at the end of scholion §II (*…utrum fides sit virtus».* raw 33238), immediately before the QUAESTIO III header *Utrum fides sit virtus una* (raw 33239) → forwards to **d23-a1-q3**.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All five PDF pages legible at 450 dpi; the OCR base was near-ABBYY quality and corroborated band-by-band. The OCR running-head digit `470` early in the q2 range is a mangled `475` (genuine running-heads 476, 477, 478 confirm the span runs pp.474–478, as predicted by the hand-off).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
Utrum fides sit virtus una
Whether faith is one virtue

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 478 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum fides sit virtus una.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit virtus una. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Ad Ephesios* quarto[^p478-1] dicitur: *Unus Deus, una fides, et unum baptisma;* sed baptisma unitatem habet secundum speciem, quod quidem est Sacramentum fidei: ergo videtur multo fortius, quod et ipsa fides.

2. Item, primae *ad Corinthios* decimo tertio[^p478-2]: *Nunc manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec;* sed spes et caritas habent unitatem secundum speciem: ergo et fides.

3. Item, fides nulli assentit nisi propter summam Veritatem; et summa Veritas tantum una est: ergo ratio credendi est una. Sed habitus diversificatur secundum formam et speciem a parte rationis motivae et inclinativae[^p478-3]: si ergo ratio credendi est una, necesse est, virtutem fidei, qua creditur, unam esse specie.

4. Item, qui credit Deo, non iudicatur esse fidelis, nisi credat in omnibus articulis; sed fides-virtus facit unumquemque esse fidelem: ergo non est vera fides-virtus, nisi per ipsam omnia credibilia credantur et in unum colligantur. Sed non colligerentur in unum per fidem, nisi fides esset virtus una[^p478-4]: ergo necesse est, quod fides una sit respectu omnium credibilium.

5. Item, non est alia obedientia secundum speciem, qua obedio Deo in mandatis primae tabulae et in mandatis secundae, licet mandata primae tabulae ordinent ad Deum, mandata vero secundae ordinent ad proximum[^p478-5]: ergo pari ratione, non erit alia fides, qua assentitur primae Veritati in articulis respicientibus Divinitatem et in articulis respicientibus humanitatem. Et non est dare aliud, secundum quod fides plurificetur et diversificetur: ergo necesse est, fidei virtutem esse unam secundum speciem.

**Sed contra:** 1. « Habitus diversificantur per actus, et actus per obiecta[^p478-6] »; sed obiectum fidei non solum est verum increatum, utpote quod Deus sit trinus et unus, sed etiam verum creatum, utpote quod Christus sit natus et passus: si ergo creatum et increatum nihil habent commune, immo differunt essentialiter et formaliter; necesse est ponere, quod fides, qua credimus Divinitatem, et fides, qua credimus humanitatem, sit alia et alia secundum speciem.

2. Item, sicut *voluntas* se habet ad volita, et *scientia* ad scibilia, sic se habet *fides* ad credibilia; sed voluntates diversificantur et numerantur secundum diversitatem volitorum, similiter *scientiae* secundum diversitatem scibilium[^p478-7]: videtur ergo ratione consimili, quod fides diversificari habeat se<!-- page 479 -->cundum diversitatem credibilium; et sic redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, donum *sapientiae* et *scientiae* sunt diversa dona, et hoc non ob aliud, nisi quia unum est de aeternis, et aliud est de temporalibus[^p479-1]: si ergo fides est de istis et de illis, videtur, quod et ipsa habeat formaliter diversificari.

4. Item, *timor* et *spes* sunt affectiones formaliter differentes, et hoc, quia timor est de futuris malis, spes autem de futuris bonis[^p479-2]; sed fides non tantum est de futuris bonis, utpote de gloria aeterna, sed etiam de futuris malis, utpote de supplicio aeterno: ergo videtur, quod fides de his et de illis habeat formaliter diversificari.

5. Item, nulla virtus habet plenam rationem virtutis, nisi eam concomitetur recta intentio respectu finis; sed « fides est, quae dirigit intentionem[^p479-3] »: ergo necesse est, quod fides omnes virtutes circumeat quantum ad earum fines: ergo si virtus, quae omnes virtutes circuit, non est virtus specialis, sed virtus generalis ad omnes; videtur ex hoc posse colligi, fidem non esse virtutem unam secundum speciem.

### Conclusio.

> Fides, sive sit in eodem, sive in diversis, est una virtus secundum speciem, quamvis in diversis diversificetur secundum numerum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod fides, sive in eodem, sive in diversis, una est secundum speciem, pro eo quod non dividitur in species[^p479-4], quamvis in diversis diversificetur secundum numerum. — Et huius ratio est, quoniam unitas virtutis attenditur secundum unitatem actus principalis; unitas autem actus principalis attenditur secundum unitatem obiecti primi; et quoniam obiectum primum fidei unum est: hinc est, quod necesse est, virtutem fidei esse unam. — Hoc autem planius fit per exemplum in consimili. Sicut enim videmus in habitu videndi, quod virtus visiva habet obiectum *per accidens*, sicut dicimur videre equum et hominem; habet etiam obiectum *per se*, sicut dicimur videre album et ni<!-- page 480 -->grum; habet etiam obiectum non solum *per se*, sed etiam *primo*, sicut dicimur videre lucidum[^p479-5] — et quamvis obiectum *per accidens* sive obiectum materiale ipsius visus diversificetur in specie, sicut equus differt specie ab homine, et etiam obiectum *per se* specie differat, sicut album specie differt a nigro; non tamen habitus videndi secundum speciem diversificatur, quia ratio obiecti primi, videlicet ipsa ratio luminositatis, una est in omni visibili — sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod licet fides habeat multa obiecta *per accidens*, sicut omnia quae consequuntur ad articulos, multa etiam obiecta *per se*, sicut[^p479-6] ipsos articulos plures et distinctos; quia tamen una est ratio credendi in omnibus, videlicet ipsa summa Veritas, cui ipsa fides innititur propter se et super omnia: ideo ipsa fides est specie una, quantacumque reperiatur in credibilibus[^p479-7] differentia. — Et est simile: si ego crederem alicui homini veraci, quia verax est, eadem credulitate, qua crederem, ipsum esse veracem, crederem, omnia esse vera, quae dicit, quantumcumque[^p479-8] de diversis materiis loqueretur. Per hunc modum in proposito intelligendum est. — Et idcirco concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, fidem habere unitatem secundum speciem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod actus diversificantur per obiecta; iam patet responsio, quoniam hoc non intelligitur de quocumque obiecto, sed de obiecto, quod est obiectum *per se* et *primo*, quod quidem non tantum habet rationem materialis, sed etiam rationem activi et motivi; hoc autem modo non est obiectum fidei, nisi ipsa Veritas summa, sicut infra[^p479-9] melius patebit, cum de obiecto fidei inquiretur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sic se habet fides ad credibilia, sicut voluntas ad volita, et scientia ad scibilia; dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam scientia in diversis scibilibus diversas intuetur rationes et diversa media, per quae illa cognoscit[^p479-10]: similiter voluntas in diversis volitis diversa intuetur appetibilia, propter quae illa appetit. Ideo tam voluntas quam scientia diversificatur penes illa quae appetit et cognoscit. Fides autem unicam intuetur rationem, secundum quam omnia credibilia credit. Et ideo propter diversitatem credibilium non habet diversificari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum sapientiae et scientiae diversificatur; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia sapientia negotiatur circa aeterna secundum rationes aeternas, et scientia circa temporalia secundum rationes temporales; et ideo diversificantur, quia negotiantur secundum rationes alias et alias. Fides autem non sic, immo tam circa creata quam circa increata versatur secundum dictamen Veritatis aeternae; et ideo non sic habet diversificari.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor et spes diversificantur, quia sunt de bonis et malis; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia timor respicit malum, secundum quod malum, et spes bonum, secundum quod bonum, et ita secundum rationes diversas. Fides autem bona et mala non considerat, nisi in quantum cadunt sub dictamine[^p480-1] Veritatis, et ita sub ratione una. Ita enim credit, malos puniri, sicut bonos praemiari; ita enim est verum unum, sicut et reliquum, et ita dictat Veritas unum, sicut alterum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides dirigit omnes virtutes; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod fides sit virtus generalis, pro eo quod contingit, virtutes se ipsas circumincedere, et obiectum unius virtutis bene potest esse materiale alterius virtutis, et tamen ab invicem distinctae sunt, quia distinguuntur penes obiecta propria, quae non tantum habent rationem materialis, verum etiam rationem motivi. Obiectum enim materiale nec facit convenientiam in specie nec differentiam. — Et propter hoc non sequitur, quod fides sit communis aliis virtutibus, quia respicit earum[^p480-2] obiecta et fines. Respicit enim illa solummodo per modum materiae, circa quam versatur; obiectum tamen proprium et primum habet distinctum ab aliis virtutibus, secundum cuius obiecti unitatem est ponere, fidem esse unam secundum speciem, sicut in praecedentibus ostensum est.

english:
### Question III. *Whether faith is one virtue.*

Thirdly it is asked whether faith is one virtue. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. To the *Ephesians*, chapter four[^p478-1], it is said: *One God, one faith, and one baptism;* but baptism has unity according to species, and indeed it is the Sacrament of faith: therefore it seems much more strongly that faith itself does too.

2. Likewise, first to the *Corinthians*, chapter thirteen[^p478-2]: *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three;* but hope and charity have unity according to species: therefore faith does too.

3. Likewise, faith assents to nothing except on account of the highest Truth; and the highest Truth is only one: therefore the ground of believing is one. But a habit is diversified according to form and species on the side of the motive and inclining ground[^p478-3]: if therefore the ground of believing is one, it is necessary that the virtue of faith, by which one believes, be one in species.

4. Likewise, one who believes God is not judged to be faithful unless he believes in all the articles; but faith-the-virtue makes each one to be faithful: therefore there is no true faith-the-virtue unless through it all things believable are believed and gathered into one. But they would not be gathered into one through faith unless faith were one virtue[^p478-4]: therefore it is necessary that faith be one with respect to all things believable.

5. Likewise, there is not, according to species, another obedience by which I obey God in the commandments of the first table and in the commandments of the second, although the commandments of the first table order [us] to God, while the commandments of the second order [us] to the neighbor[^p478-5]: therefore by parity of reasoning there will not be another faith by which one assents to the first Truth in the articles regarding the Divinity and in the articles regarding the humanity. And there is nothing else to be given according to which faith is multiplied and diversified: therefore it is necessary that the virtue of faith be one according to species.

**On the contrary:** 1. « Habits are diversified through acts, and acts through objects[^p478-6] »; but the object of faith is not only uncreated truth, as that God is three and one, but also created truth, as that Christ was born and suffered: if therefore the created and the uncreated have nothing in common, but rather differ essentially and formally; it is necessary to hold that the faith by which we believe the Divinity, and the faith by which we believe the humanity, are one and another according to species.

2. Likewise, just as the *will* is related to things willed, and *knowledge* to things knowable, so is *faith* related to things believable; but wills are diversified and numbered according to the diversity of things willed, likewise *forms of knowledge* according to the diversity of things knowable[^p478-7]: it seems therefore by like reasoning that faith must be diversified ac<!-- page 479 -->cording to the diversity of things believable; and thus the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, the gift of *wisdom* and [the gift] of *knowledge* are diverse gifts, and this for no other reason than that the one is about eternal things, and the other is about temporal things[^p479-1]: if therefore faith is about these and about those, it seems that it too must be formally diversified.

4. Likewise, *fear* and *hope* are formally differing affections, and this because fear is about future evils, but hope about future goods[^p479-2]; but faith is not only about future goods, as about eternal glory, but also about future evils, as about eternal punishment: therefore it seems that faith too must be formally diversified about these and about those.

5. Likewise, no virtue has the full character of a virtue unless a right intention with respect to the end accompanies it; but « it is faith that directs the intention[^p479-3] »: therefore it is necessary that faith range over all the virtues as regards their ends: therefore if a virtue that ranges over all the virtues is not a special virtue, but a virtue general to all; it seems that from this it can be gathered that faith is not one virtue according to species.

### Conclusion.

> Faith, whether it be in the same [subject] or in diverse [subjects], is one virtue according to species, although in diverse [subjects] it is diversified according to number.

**I respond:** It must be said that faith, whether in the same [subject] or in diverse [subjects], is one according to species, because it is not divided into species[^p479-4], although in diverse [subjects] it is diversified according to number. — And the reason for this is that the unity of a virtue is regarded according to the unity of its principal act; and the unity of the principal act is regarded according to the unity of the first object; and since the first object of faith is one: hence it is that the virtue of faith must necessarily be one. — But this becomes plainer through an example in something similar. For as we see in the habit of seeing, that the visive power has an object *per accidens*, as we are said to see a horse and a man; it has also an object *per se*, as we are said to see white and black<!-- page 480 -->; it has also an object not only *per se*, but even *primarily*, as we are said to see the luminous[^p479-5] — and although the object *per accidens*, that is, the material object of sight itself, is diversified in species, as a horse differs in species from a man, and even the object *per se* differs in species, as white differs in species from black; nevertheless the habit of seeing is not diversified according to species, because the character of the first object, namely the character of luminosity itself, is one in every visible thing — so too in the matter at hand it is to be understood that, although faith has many objects *per accidens*, as all the things that follow upon the articles, and also many objects *per se*, as[^p479-6] the articles themselves, many and distinct; nevertheless, because the ground of believing is one in all of them, namely the highest Truth itself, on which faith itself relies for its own sake and above all: therefore faith itself is one in species, however great a difference is found among things believable[^p479-7]. — And there is a parallel: if I were to believe some truthful man, because he is truthful, with the same credence by which I would believe him to be truthful, I would believe all the things he says to be true, however[^p479-8] he might speak about diverse matters. In this manner it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — And therefore the arguments showing that faith has unity according to species are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected first, that acts are diversified through objects; the response is already clear, since this is not understood of just any object, but of the object that is an object *per se* and *primarily*, which indeed has not only the character of the material, but also the character of the active and the motive; in this way, however, there is no object of faith except the highest Truth itself, as will appear better below[^p479-9], when the object of faith is inquired into.

2. To that which is objected, that faith is related to things believable just as the will to things willed, and knowledge to things knowable; it must be said that it is not alike, since knowledge in diverse knowable things beholds diverse grounds and diverse media, through which it knows them[^p479-10]: likewise the will in diverse things willed beholds diverse desirable things, on account of which it desires them. Therefore both the will and knowledge are diversified in respect of those things which they desire and know. But faith beholds a single ground, according to which it believes all things believable. And therefore on account of the diversity of things believable it need not be diversified.

3. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom and [the gift] of knowledge are diversified; it must be said that it is not alike: because wisdom is occupied about eternal things according to eternal grounds, and knowledge about temporal things according to temporal grounds; and therefore they are diversified, because they are occupied according to other and other grounds. But faith is not so; rather, it is concerned both with created and with uncreated things according to the dictate of eternal Truth; and therefore it does not have to be diversified in this way.

4. To that which is objected, that fear and hope are diversified, because they are about goods and evils; it must be said that it is not alike: because fear regards evil, as evil, and hope [regards] good, as good, and thus according to diverse grounds. But faith does not consider good and evil except insofar as they fall under the dictate[^p480-1] of Truth, and thus under one ground. For it believes that the wicked are punished just as that the good are rewarded; for the one is true just as the other, and Truth dictates the one just as the other.

5. To that which is objected, that faith directs all the virtues; it must be said that from this it does not follow that faith is a general virtue, because it happens that the virtues encompass one another, and the object of one virtue can well be the material [object] of another virtue, and yet they are distinct from one another, because they are distinguished in respect of their proper objects, which have not only the character of the material, but also the character of the motive. For the material object brings about neither agreement in species nor difference. — And on account of this it does not follow that faith is common to the other virtues, because it regards their[^p480-2] objects and ends. For it regards those only by way of matter, about which it is concerned; yet it has its proper and first object distinct from the other virtues, and according to the unity of this object it is to be held that faith is one according to species, as was shown in what precedes.

la: Vers. 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — In minori pro *quod quidem* codd. A K U *quae quidem.* Cfr. tom. II. pag. 26, nota 11. in fine, et pag. 355, nota 3. — Proxime ante pro *per fidem* edd. cum pluribus codd. *perfecte.*

en: Verse 5. Cf. here Lombard's text, c. 6. — In the minor [premise], for *quod quidem* codices A, K, U read *quae quidem.* Cf. tom. II, p. 26, note 11, at the end, and p. 355, note 3. — Just before, for *per fidem* the editions with several codices read *perfecte.*

la: Vers. 13. — De minori cfr. infra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Verse 13. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 27, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Ita bene cod. N; in aliis et edd. *intellectivae.* Cfr. Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 3. seqq., et supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Thus rightly codex N; in the others and the editions, *intellectivae.* Cf. Aristotle, VI *Ethics*, c. 3 ff., and above, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.

la: Nam multitudo non reducitur ad unitatem nisi per unum.

en: For a multitude is not reduced to unity except through one.

la: Cfr. infra d. 37. a. 1. et 2. — Superius pro *qua* [codd. G I L aa *secundum quam*] *obedio* edd. *qua obeditur.*

en: Cf. below, d. 37, a. 1 and 2. — Above, for *qua* [codices G, I, L, aa *secundum quam*] *obedio* the editions read *qua obeditur.*

la: Vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. — De minori cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2.

en: See above, p. 470, note 8. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 38. (c. 8.): « Secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res » (pro quo in versione Arabico-Latina sic legitur: *Dicamus igitur, quod scire et sentire dividuntur secundum divisionem entium*). De diversitate voluntatis vide supra pag. 308, nota 1. — Vat., pro *sed voluntates* posito *sed scientiae*, omittit deinde *volitorum, similiter scientiae secundum diversitatem.*

en: Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 38 (c. 8): « Knowledge therefore and sense are cut up into things » (in place of which, in the Arabic-Latin version, it reads thus: *Let us say therefore that knowing and sensing are divided according to the division of beings*). On the diversity of the will, see above, p. 308, note 1. — The Vatican [edition], having put *sed scientiae* for *sed voluntates*, then omits *volitorum, similiter scientiae secundum diversitatem.*

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 1, seqq., et Comment. ibid. q. 1. seq.

en: See below, Lombard's text, d. 35, c. 1 ff., and the Commentary there, q. 1 ff.

la: Cfr. infra d. 26. dub. 2. et d. 31. p. II. dub. 1.

en: Cf. below, d. 26, dub. 2, and d. 31, p. II, dub. 1.

la: Ut dicit August., supra pag. 471, nota 8. allegatus. — Codd. G I (L a prima manu) V voci *intentionem* praefigunt *rectam.*

en: As Augustine says, cited above at p. 471, note 8. — Codices G, I (L by the first hand), V prefix *rectam* to the word *intentionem.*

la: Codd. G I L V aa *non diversificatur secundum species.* Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: Codices G, I, L, V, aa read *non diversificatur secundum species.* Cf. here Lombard's text, c. 6.

la: De hoc triplici obiecto vide Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.) nec non *de Sensu et sens.* c. 2. seqq. — Superius pro *in habitu videndi* codd. A K Q Z *in actu videndi.*

en: On this threefold object, see Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 63 ff. (c. 6), and also *On Sense and the Sensible*, c. 2 ff. — Above, for *in habitu videndi* codices A, K, Q, Z read *in actu videndi.*

la: Non pauci codd. nec non edd. post *sicut* adiiciunt *etiam*, quod recte omittunt codd. H bb et etiam codd. G I L V aa, qui insuper omittunt *ipsos.*

en: Not a few codices and also the editions add *etiam* after *sicut*, which codices H, bb rightly omit, as do codices G, I, L, V, aa, which moreover omit *ipsos.*

la: Pro *credibilibus*, quod auctoritate codd. A C D M O W Z posuimus, alii codd. *credentibus*, edd. *credendis.*

en: For *credibilibus*, which on the authority of codices A, C, D, M, O, W, Z we have put, other codices read *credentibus*, the editions *credendis.*

la: Codd. L aa *quandocumque*, et paulo inferius pro *idcirco* cum codd. G I V *ideo.*

en: Codices L, aa read *quandocumque*, and a little further on, for *idcirco*, with codices G, I, V, *ideo.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. *Metaph.* text. 1. seqq. et XI. c. 1. (III. c. 1. seq. et X. c. 1.). — Pro *diversis scibilibus* Vat. *diversis speciebus scibilibus.* Paulo inferius pro *propter quae* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *per quae.* Subinde pro *unicam* cod. U *magis.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *Metaphysics*, text 1 ff. and XI, c. 1 (III, c. 1 f. and X, c. 1). — For *diversis scibilibus* the Vatican [edition reads] *diversis speciebus scibilibus.* A little further on, for *propter quae* the editions with some codices read *per quae.* Thereupon, for *unicam* codex U [reads] *magis.*

la: Pro *dictamine* codd. G I (L a prima manu) V *ratione.* Post pauca pro *bonos* edd. cum aliquot codd. *beatos* et subinde *ita etiam* pro *ita enim;* denique pro *dictat* cod. Z *indicat.*

en: For *dictamine* codices G, I (L by the first hand), V read *ratione.* A little after, for *bonos* the editions with several codices read *beatos*, and thereupon *ita etiam* for *ita enim;* finally, for *dictat* codex Z reads *indicat.*

la: Pro *earum* cod. Q *eadem.*

en: For *earum* codex Q [reads] *eadem.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec ab aliis etiam sic proponitur: utrum fides sit una virtus, specialis, vel generalis. Distinguitur enim triplex unitas: numerica, specifica, generica (cfr. 5. arg. ad oppos.). Quoad numericam unitatem patet, quod fidei habitus plurificetur secundum numerum subiectorum credentium. Restat igitur dubium, utrum fides (sicut diversae scientiae) habeat tantum unitatem genericam, an potius specificam. Haec autem, ut omnes docent, dependet non ab eius obiecto materiali, sed a formali. — In scholis nunc passim distinguitur obiectum *formale quod* et obiectum *formale quo.* Obiectum *formale quod* est illud, de quo agitur *primo et per se* et de aliis, ut *ordinantur* ad illud; quod vocatur hic in corp. *obiectum primum.* Obiectum *formale quo* est ratio formalis motiva, sub qua sive qua mediante attinguntur obiectum *formale quod* et omnia obiecta materialia, sive, ut auctor dicit (ad 1.), quod « habet rationem activi et motivi ». — Tamen est notandum, quod in fide divina idem *re* est obiectum *formale quod*, scilicet prima Veritas obiectiva, quae primo et per se cognoscitur (unde etiam dici potest primum et principale obiectum *materiale*); et obiectum *formale quo*, scilicet prima Veritas formalis, sive ratio motiva, propter quam intellectus tendit in obiectum (cfr. de hoc infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2.). Hinc vulgo obiectum *formale quo* etiam vocatur obiectum *formale quod*, sive potius utrumque hoc uno vocabulo significatur. — Observandum etiam, quod usus loquendi et modus dividendi fidei obiectum in diversis auctoribus minime est conveniens et constans; unde saepe eorum positiones magis apparenter quam realiter sunt diversae. Circa ipsam conclusionem nulla est opinionum diversitas.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 4. — Scot., III. *Sent.* d. 25. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is also proposed by others in this way: whether faith is one virtue, special, or general. For a threefold unity is distinguished: numerical, specific, generic (cf. the 5th argument *ad oppositum*). As to numerical unity, it is clear that the habit of faith is multiplied according to the number of believing subjects. It remains therefore a question whether faith (like the diverse sciences) has only generic unity, or rather specific. But this, as all teach, depends not on its material object, but on its formal one. — In the schools there is now commonly distinguished the *formal object which* (*obiectum formale quod*) and the *formal object by which* (*obiectum formale quo*). The *formal object which* is that which is treated *primarily and per se*, and the others insofar as they are *ordered* to it; this is here called in the body *the first object.* The *formal object by which* is the formal motive ground, under which, or by the mediation of which, the *formal object which* and all the material objects are attained, or, as the author says (in reply 1), that which « has the character of the active and the motive ». — Yet it must be noted that in divine faith the *formal object which* is in reality the same, namely the first objective Truth, which is known primarily and per se (whence it can also be called the first and principal *material* object); and the *formal object by which*, namely the first formal Truth, or the motive ground on account of which the intellect tends toward the object (cf. on this below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2). Hence the *formal object by which* is commonly also called the *formal object which*, or rather both are signified by this one word. — It must also be observed that the usage of speaking and the manner of dividing the object of faith among diverse authors is by no means fitting and consistent; whence often their positions are diverse more in appearance than in reality. Concerning the conclusion itself there is no diversity of opinions.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 68, m. 4. — Scotus, *III Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2; *Summa* III, q. 4, a. 6. — Blessed Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{478,479,480}-{L,R}-*.png`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 33239–33389). Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus (19 entries) transcribed from the raw OCR footer blocks page by page. PDF = printed + 22 (PDF pp. 500–502).

**Opener alignment VERIFIED on PDF** (p.478-L-1 and p.478-R-1): *Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit virtus una. Et quod sic, videtur.* — confirmed q3 (matches the d.23 TRACTATIO: a.1 q3 = *utrum fides sit virtus una*). No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- p.478 → p.479 falls mid-*Sed contra* arg 2 (*…fides diversificari habeat se|cundum diversitatem credibilium*).
- p.479 → p.480 falls mid-Respondeo, in the *exemplum* of sight (*…videre album et ni|grum*).
- The Scholion (§I–§II) prints on p.480: §I in the L/R foot-bands and R column, §II (author-list) at the R-column foot. Body-then-scholion order preserved per the `### Scholion`-last parser rule.

**Footer ownership (per-page restart, body-anchored).**
- **p.478 ×7** (`[^p478-1..7]`): all 7 belong to q3 — the page-top carries q2's scholion tail (II. Praeter locos citatos … *utrum fides sit virtus».*) which carries NO footers, so the entire p.478 footer block keys to q3's *Fundamenta* + first two *Sed contra* args. n.1 (Eph 4:5) and n.2 (1 Cor 13:13) key the Scripture *Fundamenta*; n.7 (Aristot. III *de Anima*) spans the column break, its tail printing in the p.479 L-column foot-band but belonging to p.478 n.7.
- **p.479 ×10** (`[^p479-1..10]`): all q3's (Sed contra 3–5, Respondeo exemplum, Solutiones Ad 1/Ad 2).
- **p.480 ×2** (`[^p480-1..2]`): ONLY n.1 (*dictamine*, keys Ad 4) and n.2 (*earum*, keys Ad 5) belong to q3. p.480's footers n.3 (Libr. XIII *de Trin.*), n.4 (Libr. II *Ethic.*), n.5 (Aristot. *Poster.*) belong to **QUAESTIO IV** and migrate OUT to q4.

**Hand-off picked up (from d23-a1-q2):** p.478 footer block read FRESH for q3; q2's scholion (top of p.478) confirmed footer-free, so all p.478 footers are q3's — verified on the PDF.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d23-a1-q4):** QUAESTIO IV — *Utrum fides sit certior quam scientia* — header at raw 33390, opener raw 33394 (*Quarto quaeritur, utrum fides sit certior quam scientia. Et quod sic, videtur.*). Opens on **p.480** right after q3's scholion §II. p.480's footers n.3/n.4/n.5 (Libr. XIII *de Trin.* = Aug. arg 1; Libr. II *Ethic.* = arg 2 Philosophus; Aristot. *Poster.* = arg 2 cont.) migrate IN to q4. Verify the "Quarto quaeritur… fides sit certior quam scientia" alignment on the PDF before drafting.

**Seam CLEAN both ends:** opens at QUAESTIO III header (raw 33239) continuous from q2's scholion close at the top of p.478; closes at end of scholion §II (*…hic q. 2.* raw 33388) before QUAESTIO IV (raw 33390).

**Scholion finding.** q3 HAS its own scholion (§I–§II). The header is OCR-garbled as `SCHOLIOK` (raw 33370); on the PDF (p.480-R-1) it reads `SCHOLION.`. §I is the *obiectum formale quod / formale quo* discussion; §II is the author-list (Alex. Hal. / Scot. / S. Thom. / B. Albert. / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Dionys. Carth.). Scholion has NO footers of its own.

**No [?] flags** — all three pages 450 dpi legible.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0