site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum in ideis ponenda sit pluralitas secundum rem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in ideis pluralitatem secundum rem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Augustinus dicit, quod «ideae sunt formae aeternae et incommutabiles»[^1]. Si sunt formae plures, cum forma dicat ipsum quod est idea absolute, tunc videtur, quod sint plures, secundum id quod sunt absolute.

2. Item, idea est similitudo exprimens ideatum secundum totum; sed quaecumque uni et eidem secundum totum sunt similia, nullo modo ad invicem differunt[^2]: ergo si idea omnium, secundum id quod est, esset una, tunc omnia essent indifferentia.

3. Item, si idea est unum quid, aut una communis aut una propria similitudo: si una communis: ergo per ipsam nunquam res distinguuntur; si una propria: ergo per ipsam nunquam plura cognoscuntur.

4. Item, si idea est ratio cognoscendi; sed unumquodque cognoscens cognoscit secundum exigentiam rationis cognoscendi: ergo si idea est unum quid, cum in uno non cadat distinctio, Deus non cognoscit res distincte, sed indistincte.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus sexto *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Filius est ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium, et omnia in ipso unum sunt».

2. Item, quod perfectius est Deo est attribuendum: sed perfectius est uno posse cognoscere plura et operari quam pluribus[^4]: ergo Deo est attribuendum: ergo Deus una idea omnia cognoscit.

3. Item, in omni genere causae status est in uno simplici, utpote in genere efficientis et finis[^5]: ergo cum Deus sit exemplar, in quo est omnimode status, est ergo in Deo summa unitas. Sed exemplar, quod continet multa, non est omnino unum et simplex: ergo in divino exemplari non est nisi una idea secundum rem.

### Conclusio.

> *Ideae in Deo sunt ipsa divina veritas, et ideo secundum rem est una idea.*

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam praedictorum est notandum, quod hic fuit duplex opinio.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod ideae in Deo secundum rem habent distinctionem. Dixerunt enim, quod est considerare universitatem formarum in Deo, in anima et in mundo sive in materia. Et in materia sive in universo habent distinctionem, compositionem et oppositionem, quia sunt ibi materialiter. In anima vero humana habent distinctionem et compositionem, sed non habent oppositionem, et hoc, quia sunt aliquo modo[^6] spiritualiter, non tamen omnino, quia sunt a rebus extra; ideo est compositio: differunt enim ab anima. In Deo habent distinctionem, sed non compositionem, nec oppositionem propter summam simplicitatem. Et quamvis in Deo sint distinctae, sunt tamen unum exemplar, sicut plures formae particulares in sigillo faciunt unum sigillum. — Sed ista positio, quamvis in sui initio videatur probabilis, in fine tamen continet errorem. Nam si in Deo esset ponere ideas realiter differentes sive distinctas, tunc esset ibi alia pluralitas realis, quam sit pluralitas personalis; quod abhorrent aures piae. Si dicas, quod non est pluralitatem aliam[^7] absolutam ponere, sed respectivam; tunc quaero de illo respectu: aut est aliquid, aut nihil: si nihil, nulla est ibi realis distinctio; si aliquid, non est dare nisi divinam essentiam; sed omnia essentialia in Deo unum sunt.

Et ideo est alia positio, quod ideae sunt unum secundum rem. Et hoc patet sic: idea in Deo dicit similitudinem, quae est ratio cognoscendi; illa autem secundum rem est ipsa divina veritas, sicut

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supra[^8] monstratum est; et quia illa est una, patet, quod secundum rem omnes ideae unum sunt. Et hoc dicit Augustinus expresse, quod in illa arte omnia sunt unum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sunt formae; dicendum, quod forma duplex est, scilicet forma, quae est perfectio rei, et forma exemplaris. Et Augustinus accipit ideas in ratione formae pro forma exemplari. Utraque tamen relative dicitur[^9], illa ad materiam, quam informat, sed ista ad exemplatum. Et ideo, quia forma dicit ut ad alterum, sicut similitudo, quando dicuntur *plures formae*, non ex hoc notatur, quod in ideis sit pluralitas secundum rem sive secundum id quod sunt, sed secundum id ad quod sunt[^10].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idea est similitudo exprimens secundum totum: ergo etc.; ad hoc est unus modus dicendi, quod idea non dicit similitudinem aliquam, per quam cognoscens assimiletur aliis, sed cui multa assimilantur; et multa possunt assimilari uni, sicut si a forma sigilli eadem fiat expressio figurae in cera, poterunt[^11] esse ab eadem forma una multae et variae impressiones, secundum quod sigillum magis et minus imprimitur. Sic in Deo intelligunt: quoniam multitudo in rebus venit secundum gradus et approximationem ad ipsum esse divinum. — Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quia Deus facit omnia diversa secundum formam, non tantum secundum gradum et dignitatem; et illa cognoscit per unum secundum rem, quod quidem est similitudo cogniti. — Si tu dicas, quod hoc est, quia Deus se ipso cognoscit, sicut se ipso agit, ideo, sicut uno agit multa, ita uno cognoscit multa; adhuc non est solutum, quia adhuc manet quaestio, quomodo ipse Deus possit assimilari multis.

Propter hoc dicendum, quod similitudo *quaedam* est *secundum proprietatem generis*; et de hac non est dubium, quod non potest esse una plurium genere differentium; et haec est similitudo, quae exprimitur et causatur a re generis determinati[^12]. Alia est similitudo simpliciter extra genus; et haec, quia ad hoc genus non arctatur, qua ratione est huius ea ratione est illius, et qua ratione est huius secundum partem, eadem ratione secundum totum; et talis similitudo est divina veritas et idea in Deo. — Si tu quaeras, quomodo hoc possit intelligi; aliqualiter intelligi potest, quamvis non possit aptari omnino simile. Cum enim illa similitudo sit actus purus et ipsa veritas, sicut dictum est[^13], et omnia alia cognoscibilia, quantumcumque nobilia secundum id quod sunt, comparentur ad ipsam per modum possibilis: sicut unum secundum formam potest assimilari pluribus secundum materiam[^14] diversis, sic in proposito una realis similitudo potest esse omnium cognoscibilium. Et potest poni exemplum in luce aliquo modo, quae una secundum numerum exprimit multas et varias species colorum. In cognitione autem nostra, quoniam se habet per modum possibilis respectu cogniti et quodam modo informabilis ab illo, non potest inveniri similitudo, immo invenitur dissimilitudo; et ideo aspiciendo ad cognitionem nostram videtur nobis in Deo non esse intelligibile.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum illa similitudo sit propria vel communis; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur causa universalis nec particularis simpliciter; sed aliquid habet de nobilitate causae universalis, quia potest in plurimos effectus; similiter[^15] aliquid de causa particulari, quia immediate et sufficienter potest in effectum quemlibet. Sic in cognitione Dei intelligendum, quod nec omnino est in universali, nec omnino in particulari. Similiter de similitudine et idea intelligendum est, quod communis est quantum ad indifferentiam et amplitudinem, propria[^16] vero quantum ad discretissimam expressionem. Ratio huius est, quia est similitudo exprimens, non impressa nec expressa:

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quia omnino exprimens, ideo summe exprimit et secundum omnes conditiones. Et rursus, ex hoc quod non est expressa, ideo non est arctata nec limitata, sed extendit se ad omnia, sicut divina essentia; quamvis tota sit in uno, non tamen sic est in uno, quod non sit in alio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod cognoscit secundum exigentiam rationum; dicendum, quod sicut ratio cognoscendi est una, et tamen plura cognita distinctissime repraesentat secundum proprias conditiones; sic divina cognitio quantum ad modum cognoscendi, qui est in ipsa, est una et simplex non distincta; sed in comparatione ad obiectum distincte cognoscit. Quando ergo dicitur: *Deus cognoscit omnia distincte*; si distinctio ponitur in cognitione per comparationem ad cognoscentem, falsa est; si autem per comparationem ad cognitum, sic habet veritatem.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether plurality according to the thing is to be posited in the ideas.*

Secondly it is asked, whether a plurality is to be posited in the ideas according to the thing. And that there is, appears thus:

1. Because Augustine says that "the ideas are eternal and unchangeable forms"[^1]. If they are several forms, since *form* states the very thing which the idea is absolutely, then it appears that they are several according to that which they are absolutely.

2. Likewise, the idea is a likeness expressing the ideated thing according to the whole; but whatever things are similar to one and the same according to the whole differ in no way from one another[^2]: therefore if the idea of all things, according to that which it is, were one, then all things would be indifferent.

3. Likewise, if the idea is one thing, [it is] either one common or one proper likeness: if one common: therefore through it things are never distinguished; if one proper: therefore through it many [things] are never known.

4. Likewise, if the idea is a ground of knowing; but every knower knows according to the requirement of the ground of knowing: therefore if the idea is one thing, since in what is one no distinction falls, God does not know things distinctly, but indistinctly.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book six[^3]: "The Son is a certain art of the omnipotent God, full of all the living accounts, and all things in him are one."

2. Likewise, that which is more perfect is to be attributed to God: but it is more perfect to be able to know and to operate many things by one than by many[^4]: therefore it is to be attributed to God: therefore God knows all things by one idea.

3. Likewise, in every kind of cause there is a stop in one simple [thing], as in the kind of efficient and of end[^5]: therefore since God is the exemplar in which there is in every way a stop, there is therefore in God supreme unity. But an exemplar which contains many is not altogether one and simple: therefore in the divine exemplar there is, according to the thing, only one idea.

### Conclusion.

> *The ideas in God are the very divine truth, and therefore according to the thing there is one idea.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that here there has been a twofold opinion.

For some have said that the ideas in God have a distinction according to the thing. They said indeed that one can consider the totality of forms in God, in the soul, and in the world, that is, in matter. And in matter, that is, in the universe, they have distinction, composition, and opposition, since they are there materially. In the human soul they have distinction and composition, but they do not have opposition, and this because they are in some way[^6] spiritually, yet not altogether [so], since they are from things outside; and so there is composition: for they differ from the soul. In God they have distinction, but not composition, nor opposition, on account of the supreme simplicity. And although in God they are distinct, they are nonetheless one exemplar, just as several particular forms in a seal make one seal. — But this position, although in its beginning it appears probable, in the end nevertheless contains an error. For if in God ideas were to be posited as really differing or distinct, then there would be there another real plurality, beyond what the personal plurality is — which pious ears abhor. If you say that there is no other[^7] absolute plurality to posit, but a respective one; then I ask about that respect: it is either something or nothing: if nothing, there is no real distinction there; if something, nothing can be given but the divine essence; but all the essentials in God are one.

And therefore there is another position, that the ideas are one according to the thing. And this is clear thus: an idea in God states a likeness, which is a ground of knowing; but that, according to the thing, is the very divine truth, as

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was shown above[^8]; and since that is one, it is clear that according to the thing all ideas are one. And this Augustine expressly says, that in that art all things are one.

1. Therefore to that which is objected, that they are forms; it must be said that *form* is twofold, namely the form which is the perfection of a thing, and the exemplar form. And Augustine takes ideas in the account of *form* for *exemplar form*. Yet each is said relatively[^9], the former to the matter which it informs, but the latter to the exemplated thing. And therefore, since *form* states [something] as toward another, like a likeness, when *several forms* are spoken of, it is not from this noted that there is in the ideas a plurality according to the thing or according to that which they are, but according to that toward which they are[^10].

2. To that which is objected, that the idea is a likeness expressing according to the whole: therefore etc.; to this there is one mode of speaking, that the idea does not state some likeness through which the knower is assimilated to other things, but [a likeness] to which many things are assimilated; and many can be assimilated to one, just as if from the form of a seal the same expression of the figure should be made in wax, there can be[^11] from the same one form many and varied impressions, according as the seal is more or less impressed. Thus they understand it in God: that the multitude in things comes according to grades and approximation to the divine being itself. — But that does not suffice to say, since God makes all things diverse according to form, not only according to grade and dignity; and he knows them through one [thing] according to the thing, which indeed is the likeness of the known. — If you say that this is because God knows by himself, just as he acts by himself, therefore, just as by one [thing] he acts many, so by one he knows many; still it is not solved, since the question still remains, how God himself can be assimilated to many.

On account of this it must be said that one likeness is *according to the property of a genus*; and concerning this there is no doubt that there cannot be one [likeness] of many things differing in genus; and this is the likeness which is expressed and caused by a thing of a determinate genus[^12]. Another is the likeness simply outside [any] genus; and this, since it is not constricted to this genus, by what account it is *of this* by that account it is *of that*, and by what account it is of this in part, by the same account [it is so] in whole; and such a likeness is the divine truth and the idea in God. — If you ask how this can be understood; it can be in some way understood, although a wholly similar [example] cannot be fitted. For since that likeness is pure act and the very truth, as has been said[^13], and all other knowables, however noble according to that which they are, are compared to it after the manner of a possible: just as one [thing] according to form can be assimilated to several diverse [things] according to matter[^14], so in the proposition one real likeness can be of all knowables. And an example can be given in a way in light, which, being one according to number, expresses many and varied species of colors. In our knowledge, however, since it is had after the manner of a possible with respect to the known, and in some way informable by it, no likeness can be found, rather a dissimilarity is found; and therefore looking to our knowledge it seems to us that in God [this] is not intelligible.

3. To that which is asked, whether that likeness is proper or common; it must be said that God is not called a universal cause nor a particular [one] simply; but he has something of the nobility of a universal cause, since he is able for very many effects; likewise[^15] something of a particular cause, since immediately and sufficiently he is able for any effect whatever. Thus in the knowledge of God it is to be understood that it is neither altogether in the universal, nor altogether in the particular. Likewise concerning the likeness and the idea it is to be understood that it is common as to indifference and amplitude, but proper[^16] as to most-discrete expression. The reason of this is that it is an expressing likeness, not impressed nor expressed:

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since it is altogether expressing, therefore it expresses in the highest [degree] and according to all conditions. And again, from this, that it is not expressed, therefore it is not constricted nor limited, but extends itself to all things, like the divine essence; although the whole is in one, yet it is not so in one that it is not in another.

4. To that which is objected lastly, that [God] knows according to the requirement of the grounds; it must be said that just as the ground of knowing is one, and yet represents many known [things] most distinctly according to their proper conditions; so the divine knowing as to the mode of knowing, which is in itself, is one and simple, not distinct; but in comparison to the object it knows distinctly. When therefore it is said: *God knows all things distinctly*; if the distinction is placed in the knowing by comparison to the knower, it is false; but if by comparison to the known, thus it has truth.

la: Vide supra pag. 602, *Scholion* n. I. — Post verba Augustini citata Vat., interiecta particula *sed*, sic prosequitur: «*sed formae sunt plures: et cum* etc.».

en: See above p. 602, *Scholion* n. I. — After the words of Augustine cited, the Vatican [edition], with the particle *sed* interjected, continues thus: "*sed formae sunt plures: et cum* etc."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 546, nota 2. — Hoc argumentum etiam sic formari potest: quae sunt similia uni tertio, inter se sunt similia; sed creata omnia supponuntur similia uni ideae: ergo sunt inter se similia; sed consequens est falsum: ergo et antecedens.

en: Cf. above p. 546, n. 2. — This argument can also be formed thus: things which are similar to one third are similar among themselves; but all created things are supposed to be similar to one idea: therefore they are similar among themselves; but the consequent is false: therefore the antecedent also.

en: Chapter 10, n. 11.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 63. seqq. (c. 12.), ubi ostenditur, illud quod paucioribus actionibus bonitatem participat, nobilius esse quam quod pluribus. — In fine huius obiectionis ante *cognoscit* Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *omnia*, quod in omnibus codd. et ed. 1 exstat.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens* II, text 63 ff. (c. 12), where it is shown that that which participates in goodness through fewer actions is nobler than what [does so] through more. — At the end of this objection, before *cognoscit*, the Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* omits *omnia*, which is present in all the codices and edition 1.

la: In codd. L O adiungitur *et materiae*. — Cfr. Aristot., II. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 22. (c. 4.), et II. *Metaph.* text. 5. (I. *brevior* c. 2.).

en: In codices L O is added *et materiae*. — Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens* II, text 22 (c. 4), and *Metaphysics* II, text 5 (I, *shorter* c. 2).

la: Cfr. August., XI. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 9. — Sensus est: Obiecta cognita habent in anima esse spirituale, quia quidquid recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis; non tamen omnino spirituale, quia sunt species a materialibus rebus acceptae. — Paulo superius verbis *aliquo modo* sola Vat. non male praefigit *ibi*. Dein post *ideo est* codd. L O sic prosequuntur: *ibi distinctio; quia vero aliud ab anima, ideo est ibi compositio. In Deo vero habent* etc.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XI, c. 8, n. 9. — The sense is: known objects have in the soul a spiritual being, since whatever is received is received after the manner of the receiver; yet not altogether spiritually, since they are species received from material things. — A little earlier, before the words *aliquo modo*, the Vatican [edition] alone, not badly, prefixes *ibi*. Then after *ideo est*, codices L O continue thus: "*ibi distinctio; quia vero aliud ab anima, ideo est ibi compositio. In Deo vero habent* etc."

la: In Vat. et cod. cc deest *aliam*; non bene, quia defensores illius opinionis *aliam* quidem pluralitatem ponunt, non tamen absolutam.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and codex *cc*, *aliam* is missing; not well, since the defenders of that opinion do indeed posit *another* plurality, yet not an absolute one.

la: *Quaest. praec.* — Mox pro *secundum rem*, quam lectionem auctoritate codd. P Q aa bb in textum recepimus, Vat. minus distincte *per eam*.

en: The preceding question. — Soon, in place of *secundum rem*, which reading on the authority of codices P Q aa bb we have received into the text, the Vatican [edition] less distinctly [reads] *per eam*.

la: Vat., fere omnibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 refragantibus, *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3 against [it], [reads] *dicitur*.

la: Verba ultima *sed secundum id ad quod sunt* a vetustioribus codd. absunt. Forte a librariis ut supervacanea habita et omissa sunt propter consonantiam cum verbis immediate antecedentibus. In Vat. nec non in ed. I exstant, et insuper in Vat. eis adiungitur: *id est, ad ea quae sunt extra, scilicet ratione connotatorum, ut sunt ipsa ideata*. Paulo ante pro *sive* codd. aa bb *sed solum*; male.

en: The last words *sed secundum id ad quod sunt* are absent from the older codices. Perhaps they were held by the scribes as superfluous and omitted, on account of the consonance with the words immediately preceding. They stand in the Vatican [edition] and also in edition I, and moreover in the Vatican there is added to them: "*that is, to those things which are outside, namely by reason of what is connoted, as are the ideated things themselves*." A little earlier, in place of *sive*, codices aa bb [read] *sed solum*; badly.

la: Vat. *possunt*. Nostram lectionem *poterunt*, quae est codicis Z, non obscure suadent permulti codd. legentes *poterit*, et cod. I exhibens *potuerunt*.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *possunt*. Our reading *poterunt*, which is that of codex Z, is not obscurely supported by very many codices reading *poterit*, and codex I exhibiting *potuerunt*.

la: Sola Vat. *determinate*, et paulo inferius *eadem* pro *ea*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *determinate*, and a little below *eadem* in place of *ea*.

la: In corp. quaest.

en: In the body of the question.

la: Pro *materiam* plurimi codd. et omnes primae edd. excepta I, perperam *naturam*, cod. U *numerum*. Post *materiam* ed. I inserit *etiam*. Subinde pro *una realis* cod. T *eadem realis*.

en: In place of *materiam*, very many codices and all the first editions except I, wrongly [read] *naturam*; codex U *numerum*. After *materiam*, edition I inserts *etiam*. Soon thereafter, in place of *una realis*, codex T [reads] *eadem realis*.

la: Pro *similiter* codd. T X et ed. A *simul*, quod cod. I sine interpunctionis signo cum praecedentibus connectit, post *simul* ponens virgulam. Eadem constructio, verborum ordine tantum paulo immutato, invenitur in cod. X: *in plurimos simul effectus*, quae tamen lectio nobis minus arridet, quia conceptum causae universalis nimis arctat. Ad rem Scot., II. *Phys.* q. 8: *Dicitur causa universalis in causando, et tunc universalitas causae attenditur penes diversitatem effectuum, quos illa causa potest producere; secundo penes diversitatem locorum, in quibus potest simul producere diversos effectus; et tertio penes diversitatem temporum, in quibus potest producere diversos effectus successive: ita quod illa causa dicatur universalior, quae potest simul producere effectus plures in pluribus locis, aut in pluribus temporibus potest plures effectus producere*.

en: In place of *similiter*, codices T X and edition A [read] *simul*, which codex I, without a punctuation mark, connects with what precedes, placing a comma after *simul*. The same construction, with only the word-order slightly altered, is found in codex X: *in plurimos simul effectus*, which reading however pleases us less, since it too narrowly constricts the concept of universal cause. To the point Scotus, II *Physics*, q. 8: "A cause is called universal in causing, and then the universality of the cause is attended to according to the diversity of effects which that cause can produce; secondly according to the diversity of places in which it can produce diverse effects at the same time; and thirdly according to the diversity of times in which it can produce diverse effects successively: so that that cause is called more universal which can at the same time produce several effects in several places, or in several times can produce several effects."

la: Cod. X *particularis*, et dein *distinctissimam* pro *discretissimam*. Paulo inferius post *nec expressa* cod. R addit: *quia omnino exprimens, non impressa nec expressa*.

en: Codex X [reads] *particularis*, and then *distinctissimam* in place of *discretissimam*. A little below, after *nec expressa*, codex R adds: "*quia omnino exprimens, non impressa nec expressa*."

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia doctrinae de ideis, quam profitetur Seraphicus, maximi momenti sunt solutiones ad 2. et 3. Eandem doctrinam profundam comprobat Scotus, IV. Sent. d. 50. q. 3, et pluries alibi. — Quinque differentiae, quae obtinent inter cognitionem et ideas Dei et nostras, hic innuuntur. 1. Intellectus divinus est purus actus, et cognoscibile est in ratione potentiae ad illum, dum intellectus noster est potentia et in potentia ad cognoscibile. 2. Intellectus et intellectio in Deo est ipsa divina substantia; intellectio nostra ut actus est accidens. 3. Intellectus divinus non accipit a rebus ullam speciem impressam vel expressam, sed potius ut similitudo expressiva rebus exprimit et dat assimilationem, sive, ut dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 23. m. 1.), «cognoscit per similitudinem, quae non est a rebus sed ad res»; intellectus noster a rebus mutuat speciem impressam et format speciem expressam. 4. Idea realiter una in Deo est perfectissima similitudo omnium cognoscibilium, sive actualium sive possibilium (cfr. hic q. 4. ad 2.). 5. Ideae nostrae non exprimunt rem nisi ex parte, divina idea vero exprimit rem cum omnibus modis, ad obiectum quomodocumque spectantibus. Breviter hoc exprimit Seraphicus in *Breviloq.* (p. I. c. 8.): «Quia exemplar (in Deo) est simplicissimum et perfectissimum, ideo actus purus; quia vero infinitum et immensum, ideo extra omne genus. Et hinc est, quod existens unum, potest esse similitudo expressiva multorum».

**II.** Alii auctores fere omnes hanc et sequentem quaestionem simul tractant. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1, et q. M. m. 1; p. II. q. 3. m. 2. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 15. a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* I. c. 54. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 9; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 43. m. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. d. 36. q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 36. a. 2. q. 3. — Ægid. R., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 36. princ. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 68. q. 5. n. 9. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the understanding of the doctrine on the ideas which the Seraphic [Doctor] professes, the solutions to [arguments] 2 and 3 are of greatest moment. The same profound doctrine Scotus also confirms, IV *Sent.* d. 50, q. 3, and several times elsewhere. — Five differences which hold between the knowing and the ideas of God and ours are here intimated. 1. The divine intellect is pure act, and the knowable is in the account of a potency toward it, while our intellect is a potency and in potency toward the knowable. 2. The intellect and the intellection in God is the very divine substance; our intellection as an act is an accident. 3. The divine intellect does not receive from things any impressed or expressed species, but rather as an expressive likeness it expresses to things and gives assimilation; or, as Alexander of Hales says (*S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 1), "[God] knows by a likeness which is not from things but toward things"; our intellect borrows the impressed species from things and forms the expressed species. 4. The really one idea in God is the most perfect likeness of all knowables, whether actual or possible (cf. here q. 4, *ad* 2). 5. Our ideas do not express a thing except in part, but the divine idea expresses a thing with all the modes pertaining to the object in any way whatever. Briefly the Seraphic [Doctor] expresses this in the *Breviloquium* (p. I, c. 8): "Since the exemplar (in God) is most simple and most perfect, therefore [it is] pure act; but since [it is] infinite and immense, therefore [it is] outside every genus. And hence it is that, existing as one, it can be a likeness expressive of many."

**II.** Almost all other authors treat this and the following question together. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 1, a. 1, and q. M, m. 1; p. II, q. 3, m. 2. — S. Thom., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 15, a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* I, c. 54. — B. Albert., on this and the following question here a. 9; *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 43, m. 2, a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., on this and the following question, d. 36, q. 2, a. 3. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 36, a. 2, q. 3. — Ægid. R., on this and the following question, I *Sent.* d. 36, *princ.* 2, q. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 68, q. 5, n. 9. — Durand., on this and the following question, I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum in ideis sit pluralitas secundum rationem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in ideis sit pluralitas secundum rationem. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^1]: «Alia ratione conditus est homo, alia equus»: ergo si idea dicit ipsam rationem cognoscendi, necesse est, quod plurificetur secundum rationem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex modo loquendi et definiendi, quia Augustinus[^2] loquitur in plurali et definit in plurali ipsas ideas dicens, quod sunt *formae*: ergo plurificantur *re*, vel *ratione*; sed non re; ergo ratione.

3. Item, idea dicit similitudinem ad cognitum, et similitudo, quamvis in Deo sit quid absolutum, habet modum dicendi ad alterum sive respectum; sed plurificatio similitudinis relativae est a re, cui assimilatur[^3]: ergo cum res ideatae sint plures, ideae sunt plures secundum rationem dicendi.

4. Item, Deus, antequam res producat, distincte cognoscit et actu; sed non est distinctio in Deo cognoscente nec in cognito: ergo oportet, quod sit in ratione cognoscendi.

**Contra:**

1. Si est[^4] plurificatio secundum rationem, cum non sit re, tunc videtur illa pluralitas non esse aliud quam vanitas.

2. Item, si est in hoc nomine *idea* pluralitas, aut ratione eius *quod est*, aut ratione eius *ad quod est*: non ratione eius *quod est*, quia est divina essentia; si ratione eius *ad quod est*, ergo cum *verbum* et *exemplar* et *ars* dicant respectum ad creaturam, saltem secundum nomen debent plurificari, quod tamen falsum est.

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3. Item, si ideae sunt plures, non propter significatum, sed propter connotatum, tunc *quaero*: aut connotatum illud est *aeternum*, aut *temporale*: si *aeternum*, ergo videtur, quod plura sint ab aeterno; si *temporale*, ergo videtur, quod idea non dicatur de Deo nisi ex tempore, sicut nec *dominus* nec *creator* dicuntur nisi ex tempore.

4. Item, ideae, si sunt plures propter ideata, aut ergo secundum *esse*, quod habent ideata in Deo, aut in *proprio genere*. Si propter *esse*, quod habent in *Deo*; *contra*: in Deo sunt unum, ergo ratione illius *esse* non possunt dici plures. Si propter *esse*, quod habent in *proprio genere*; sed[^5] non habent nisi ex tempore: ergo vel ideae non sunt plures nisi ex tempore, vel temporale est causa aeterni; quorum utrumque est inconveniens.

5. Item, idea aut dicit *aliquid*, aut *nihil*: si *nihil*, ergo nec pluralitatem habet nec unitatem; si *aliquid* dicit, ergo si sunt plures ideae, sunt plures res: ergo si plures ideae sunt ab aeterno, plures res sunt ab aeterno; sed non plures res personaliter, quia idea non dicit quid personale: ergo plures essentialiter.

### Conclusio.

> *Ideae in Deo sunt unum secundum rem, sed plures secundum rationem intelligendi.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex praedictis distinctione trigesima[^6], quamvis in Deo nullus sit respectus ad creaturam a parte rei, tamen contingit, ipsam essentiam significari in respectu ad creaturam per multa nomina. Nec tamen nomen sive vocabulum[^7] est vanum. Intelligendum igitur est, quod hoc nomen *idea* significat divinam essentiam in comparatione sive in respectu ad creaturam. Idea enim est similitudo rei cognitae, quae quamvis in Deo sit[^8] absolutum, tamen secundum modum intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cognoscens et cognitum. Et quamvis ille respectus secundum rem plus se teneat ex parte cognoscentis, quia est ipse Deus, tamen secundum rationem[^9] intelligendi sive dicendi similitudo plus se tenet ex parte cogniti. Et quoniam cognoscens est unum, et cognita sunt multa; ideo omnes ideae in Deo sunt unum secundum rem, sed tamen plures secundum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi. Unde concedendum est[^10], omnes rationes in Deo esse unum quid, sed non unam ideam sive rationem, sed plures.

1. *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur*, quod isti rationi nihil subest ex parte rei; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia respectui[^11] subest ex parte Dei essentia, non respectus; ex parte vero creaturae subest verus respectus, et ideo respectus ille significatus non inducit falsitatem. Sic pluralitati respectuum, quamvis non subsit pluralitas ex parte Dei, subest tamen ex parte connotatorum; unde respectus ille sic plurificatus non habet falsitatem nec vanitatem.

2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod *verbum* et *ars* dicunt respectum; dicendum est, quod dicunt, sed aliter quam *idea* vel *ratio*[^12]. Nam *idea* sive *ratio cognoscendi* plus se tenet secundum rationem intelligendi ex parte cogniti. *Similitudo* enim, secundum quod huiusmodi, non dicit respectum ad id *in quo* est, sed *cuius* est; sed *verbum* plus se tenet a parte dicentis, similiter et *ars* et *exemplar* ex parte producentis: et quia multa sunt cognita, et unum cognoscens, ideo *ideae* sunt plures, et *ars* tantum una. — Vel aliter, *ratio* et *idea* dicunt respectum ad res in quantum distinctae sunt, non sic alia vocabula.

3. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod connotata non[^13] sunt plura ab aeterno; dicendum, quod pluralitas est in ideis ratione connotatorum. Sed de connotatis est loqui dupliciter: aut *in quantum sunt*, aut *in quantum sunt connotata*. *In quantum sunt*, sic sunt solum ex tempore; *in quantum* autem *connotantur*, sic possunt connotari et *aeternaliter* et *temporaliter*: aeternaliter, quando[^14] respectus importatur ut in habitu, sicut per hoc nomen *praedestinatio* — ideo praedestinatio est aeterna, quia connotat effectum non in actu, sed in habitu — temporaliter vero, quando respectus importatur in actu, sicut per hoc verbum *creare*. Quoniam igitur sic connotantur temporalia, ut futura sunt, et futura sunt multa; ideo connotantur ut multa. Sed tamen sic connotata, quamvis ab aeterno connotentur[^15], non sunt ab aeterno, sed ex tempore; ita multitudo connotatorum, quamvis ab aeterno dicatur, tamen non ponit realem multitudinem nisi ex tempore.

4. *Ad illud quod quaeritur*, utrum secundum *esse* ideatorum sint ideae plures; dicendum, quod

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secundum *esse*, quod habiturae sunt res ideatae in proprio genere[^16]. Et quamvis illud non habeant nisi ex tempore, tamen ab aeterno fuerunt habiturae: et ideae sunt rerum ut futurae sunt: ideo intelliguntur non tantum plures ex tempore, verum etiam ab aeterno. Sic differt intelligere praedestinationem fuisse ab aeterno et reprobationem, non ratione eius quod fuit ab aeterno, sed ratione eius quod futurum erat ex tempore.

5. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*: si plures ideae, ergo plures res[^17]; dicendum, quod idea non dicit tantum quod *est*, sed respectum *ad id quod futurum est*, vel etiam potest esse: et ratione illius respectus recipit plurificationem. Et quia ille nihil ponit in actu, sed solum in potentia, hinc est, quod pluralitas idearum aeterna non ponit aliquam pluralitatem actualem; sicut non ponitur, si dicatur, quod[^18] potest facere plura. Sed hoc nomen *res* quod dicit importat absolute; et ideo cum dicitur, plures res esse, ponitur pluralitas in actu; et ideo argumentum illud non valet, immo est ibi *quid et simpliciter*[^19], sicut si dicatur: plura sunt possibilia Deo, vel plura sunt cognita: ergo plura sunt. Sic nec valet, plures ideae sunt: ergo plures res sunt; quia ideae non sunt plures ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius *ad quod sunt*.

english:
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### Question III.
#### *Whether there is plurality according to reason in the ideas.*

It is asked thirdly whether there is plurality according to reason in the ideas. And that there is, is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, in the book of *Eighty-Three Questions*[^1]: "By one account man was made, by another the horse": therefore if *idea* names the very account of knowing, it is necessary that it be plurified according to reason.

2. Likewise, this same point is shown from the mode of speaking and defining, since Augustine[^2] speaks in the plural and defines the ideas themselves in the plural, saying that they are *forms*: therefore they are plurified either *in the thing*, or *in reason*; but not in the thing; therefore in reason.

3. Likewise, *idea* names a likeness to the thing known, and likeness, although in God it is something absolute, has a mode of speaking-toward-another, that is, a respect; but the plurification of a relative likeness is from the thing to which it is assimilated[^3]: therefore since the things ideated are many, the ideas are many according to the reason of speaking.

4. Likewise, God, before he produces things, knows them distinctly and in act; but there is no distinction in God knowing nor in the [thing] known: therefore it is necessary that it be in the account of knowing.

**On the contrary:**

1. If there is[^4] a plurification according to reason, since there is none in the thing, then it seems that that plurality is nothing other than vanity.

2. Likewise, if there is in this name *idea* a plurality, [it is] either by reason of that *which it is*, or by reason of that *to which it is*: not by reason of that *which it is*, since it is the divine essence; if by reason of that *to which it is*, then since *word* and *exemplar* and *art* name a respect to the creature, they ought, at least according to the name, to be plurified, which however is false.

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3. Likewise, if the ideas are many, not on account of the signified, but on account of the connoted, then I ask: that connoted [thing] is either *eternal* or *temporal*: if *eternal*, then it seems that many things are from eternity; if *temporal*, then it seems that *idea* is not said of God except from time, just as neither *Lord* nor *Creator* are said [of him] except from time.

4. Likewise, the ideas, if they are many on account of the things ideated, [are so] either according to the *being* which the things ideated have in God, or [the being they have] in their *proper genus*. If on account of the *being* which they have in *God*; on the contrary: in God they are one, therefore by reason of that *being* they cannot be called many. If on account of the *being* which they have in their *proper genus*; but[^5] this they do not have except from time: therefore either the ideas are not many except from time, or the temporal is the cause of the eternal; either of which is unfitting.

5. Likewise, *idea* names either *something* or *nothing*: if *nothing*, then it has neither plurality nor unity; if it names *something*, then if there are many ideas, there are many things: therefore if many ideas are from eternity, many things are from eternity; but not many things personally, since *idea* does not name something personal: therefore [many] essentially.

### Conclusion.

> *The ideas in God are one according to the thing, but many according to the reason of understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is clear from what has been said in the thirtieth distinction[^6], although in God there is no respect to the creature on the side of the thing, nevertheless it happens that the essence itself is signified in respect to the creature by many names. Nor however is the name or word[^7] vain. It must therefore be understood that this name *idea* signifies the divine essence in comparison or in respect to the creature. For *idea* is a likeness of the thing known, which, although in God it is[^8] something absolute, nevertheless according to the mode of understanding names a respect midway between knower and known. And although that respect according to the thing holds itself more on the side of the knower, since it is God himself, nevertheless according to the reason[^9] of understanding or of speaking the likeness holds itself more on the side of the known. And since the knower is one, and the known are many; therefore all the ideas in God are one according to the thing, but nevertheless many according to the reason of understanding or of speaking. Whence it must be conceded[^10] that all the accounts in God are one something, but not one *idea* or account, but many.

1. *To that therefore which is objected*, that nothing underlies that account on the side of the thing; it must be said that this is false, since under the respect[^11] there underlies, on God's side, the essence, not a respect; on the creature's side, however, there underlies a true respect, and therefore that signified respect does not introduce falsity. Thus, although the plurality of respects is not undergirded by a plurality on God's side, it is yet undergirded on the side of the connoted [terms]; whence that respect, thus plurified, has neither falsity nor vanity.

2. *To that which is objected*, that *word* and *art* name a respect; it must be said that they do, but otherwise than *idea* or *account [ratio]*[^12]. For *idea* or *account of knowing* holds itself more, according to the reason of understanding, on the side of the known. For *likeness*, considered as such, does not name a respect to that *in which* it is, but [to that] *whose* it is; but *word* holds itself more on the side of the speaker, and likewise *art* and *exemplar* on the side of the producer: and since the known are many, and the knower is one, therefore *ideas* are many, and *art* only one. — Or alternatively, *account* and *idea* name a respect to things insofar as they are distinct; the other words do not so [name].

3. *To that which is objected*, that the connoted [terms] are not[^13] many from eternity; it must be said that the plurality is in the ideas by reason of the connoted [terms]. But of the connoted [terms] one may speak in two ways: either *insofar as they are*, or *insofar as they are connoted*. *Insofar as they are*, thus they are only from time; but *insofar as they are connoted*, they can be connoted both *eternally* and *temporally*: eternally, when[^14] the respect is borne as in habit, as by this name *predestination* — therefore predestination is eternal, since it connotes the effect not in act, but in habit — but temporally, when the respect is borne in act, as by this verb *to create*. Since therefore the temporal [things] are thus connoted, as they are future, and many things are future; therefore they are connoted as many. Yet thus connoted, although they be connoted from eternity[^15], they are not from eternity, but from time; and so the multitude of the connoted, although it be said [to be] from eternity, nevertheless does not posit a real multitude except from time.

4. *To that which is asked*, whether according to the *being* of the things ideated the ideas are many; it must be said, that

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according to the *being* which the things ideated are to have in their proper genus[^16]. And although they have it only from time, nevertheless from eternity they were going to have it: and the ideas are of things as they are future: therefore they are understood as many not only from time, but also from eternity. Thus it differs to understand that predestination has been from eternity and reprobation, not by reason of that which has been from eternity, but by reason of that which was going to be from time.

5. *To that which is objected*: if many ideas, therefore many things[^17]; it must be said that *idea* does not name only *that which is*, but a respect *to that which is to be in the future*, or also can be: and by reason of that respect it receives plurification. And since that [respect] posits nothing in act, but only in potency, hence it is that the eternal plurality of ideas does not posit any actual plurality; just as none is posited if it is said that[^18] [God] can make many things. But this name *thing* names what it imports absolutely; and therefore when it is said that there are many *things*, plurality is posited in act; and therefore that argument does not hold; rather, there is a [fallacy] *secundum quid et simpliciter* [i.e., from a qualified to an unqualified sense][^19], as if one were to say: many things are possible to God, or many things are known [by him]: therefore many things are. So neither does it hold: many ideas are: therefore many things are; since the ideas are not many by reason of that *which they are*, but by reason of that *to which they are*.

la: Quaest. 46. n. 2.

en: Question 46, n. 2.

la: Loc. cit. Vide supra pag. 602, *Scholion* n. I.

en: Loc. cit. See above, p. 602, *Scholion* n. I.

la: Nam regula est, quod ad pluralitatem relationum sufficit pluralitas unius terminorum; unde in uno puncto respectu diversarum linearum possunt esse plures relationes. Cfr. hic q. 4. *ad* 3. 4. — Paulo superius pro *habet* Vat. *habet tamen*.

en: For the rule is that for the plurality of relations the plurality of one of the [pair of] terms suffices; whence in one point, with respect to diverse lines, there can be several relations. Cf. here q. 4, *ad* 3, 4. — A little earlier, in place of *habet* the Vatican [reads] *habet tamen*.

la: Cod. Z et ed. 1 post *est* subiiciunt *ibi*. Mox pro *cum non sit re* cod. T *cum secundum rem non sit*.

en: Codex Z and edition 1 add *ibi* after *est*. Soon after, in place of *cum non sit re*, codex T [reads] *cum secundum rem non sit*.

la: Supple cum codd. Z aa bb et ed. I *hoc*.

en: Supply, with codices Z aa bb and edition I, *hoc*.

la: Quaest. 3. — Mox verba *a parte rei* idem significant quod *realis*.

en: Question 3. — Soon after, the words *a parte rei* signify the same as *realis* (real).

la: Sola Vat. sic: *Nec tamen hoc nomen sive vocabulum* Idea *est vanum*.

en: The Vatican alone reads thus: *Nor however is this name or word* Idea *vain*.

la: Sola Vat. hic addit *quid*. Paulo ante pro *Idea enim est* cod. bb cum ed. 1 *Idea enim dicitur*.

en: The Vatican alone here adds *quid*. A little earlier, in place of *Idea enim est*, codex bb with edition 1 [reads] *Idea enim dicitur*.

la: Pro *secundum rationem* Vat. cum solo cod. cc *ratione*.

en: In place of *secundum rationem*, the Vatican with codex cc alone [reads] *ratione*.

la: Vat. perperam *concedendae sunt*.

en: The Vatican wrongly [reads] *concedendae sunt*.

la: In cod. O adtexitur *vel rationi*.

en: In codex O is appended *vel rationi*.

la: Codd. V W adiiciunt *cognoscendi*.

en: Codices V W add *cognoscendi*.

la: Particula *non* perperam abest a Vat. et cod. cc. Propositio post *connotata* in cod. V sic incipit: *Si in quantum sunt, sic* etc.

en: The particle *non* is wrongly absent from the Vatican and codex cc. The proposition after *connotata* in codex V begins thus: *Si in quantum sunt, sic*, etc.

la: Pro *quando* codd. A F G H I W X Y minus bene *quia*. Paulo inferius post *ideo* cod. R inserit *enim*.

en: In place of *quando*, codices A F G H I W X Y less aptly [read] *quia*. A little further down, after *ideo*, codex R inserts *enim*.

la: Codd. A C K G H K L R S W X cum primis edd. *connotent*. Paulo ante pro *Sed tamen sic* cod. R *Sed tamen sicut*.

en: Codices A C K G H K L R S W X with the first editions [read] *connotent*. A little earlier, in place of *Sed tamen sic*, codex R [reads] *Sed tamen sicut*.

la: Sive: *secundum esse actuale, quod habebunt in se et quod contradistinguitur ab esse ideali, quod habent in Deo*. — Paulo inferius pro *Sic differt intelligere praedestinationem*, quae lectio est praestantiorum codd., cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, verbo *intelligere* omisso, *Sic differt praedestinationem*; Vat. *Sic dicitur praedestinationem* etc.

en: Or: *according to the actual being which they will have in themselves and which is contradistinguished from the ideal being which they have in God*. — A little further down, in place of *Sic differt intelligere praedestinationem* (which is the reading of the more excellent codices), codex cc with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, with the word *intelligere* omitted, [reads] *Sic differt praedestinationem*; the Vatican [reads] *Sic dicitur praedestinationem*, etc.

la: Multi codd. *rationes*; perperam. Mox pro *tantum quod est* Vat. cum cod. cc *tantum quid est*.

en: Many codices [read] *rationes*; wrongly. Soon after, in place of *tantum quod est*, the Vatican with codex cc [reads] *tantum quid est*.

la: Supple cum codd. Z W et ed. 1 *Deus*. Post pauca pro *dicitur, plures* Vat. *dicit plures*.

en: Supply, with codices Z W and edition 1, *Deus*. A little later, in place of *dicitur, plures*, the Vatican [reads] *dicit plures*.

la: Cod. V completius *est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*, de qua vide Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4. (c. 5.).

en: Codex V more fully [reads] *est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter* ("there is here a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*"), on which see Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5).

latin_scholion:
Conclusione eliditur error Avicennae fingentis, in Deo unam tantum esse ideam respectu primae intelligentiae a Deo emanatae, in qua aliarum rerum sint ideae. — In conclusione doctores catholici conveniunt, non autem in ipsius determinatione et explicatione. Durand. (d. 36. q. 4.) ideo plures ideas esse asserit, quia plures significantur res creabiles, a Deo ab aeterno intellectae; cum quo fere convenit Scotus cum aliis, iuxta eorum sententiam circa rationem propriam idearum (cfr. *Scholion* hic q. I.). Auctores vide in *Scholio praeced.*

---

english_scholion:
By the conclusion is overthrown the error of Avicenna, who fabricated that in God there is only one idea with respect to the first intelligence emanated from God, in which [intelligence] are the ideas of the other things. — In the conclusion the catholic doctors agree, but not in its determination and explanation. Durandus (d. 36, q. 4) for this reason asserts that the ideas are many, since many creatable things, intellected by God from eternity, are signified; with whom Scotus, with others, almost agrees, according to their opinion concerning the proper account of the ideas (cf. *Scholion* here, q. I). For the authors, see in the *preceding Scholion*.

---


title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 609 -->

### Quaestio IV.
#### *Utrum ideae plurificentur per comparationem ad ideata, quatenus haec in specie vel in individuo diversa sunt.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quarto quaeritur, utrum ideae plurificentur per comparationem ad ideata secundum multitudinem ideatorum quantum ad diversitatem universalium aut singularium. Et quod singularium, videtur:

1. Quoniam per ideas est ratio distinguendi, sed Deus non tantum distinguit universale ab universali, sed etiam singulare a singulari. Sed quia distinguit universale ab universali, ideo habet plurium universalium ideas plures et rationes. Unde «alia ratione conditus est equus, alia ratione conditus est homo»[^1]: ergo etc.

2. Item, cognitio rei verissima est secundum rei totalitatem[^2]; sed singulare aliquid addit supra universale: ergo cum Deus totum cognoscat, non tantum habet ideam universalis, sed etiam superadditi, scilicet singularis; similiter et alterius singularis. Ergo si addita sunt diversa secundum rationem sive multitudinem idealem, patet etc.

3. Item, Deus quosdam ex hominibus praedestinat, quosdam reprobat; sed alia ratione praedestinat, et alia ratione reprobat: ergo secundum aliam rationem et ideam sunt praesciti et praedestinati in Deo. Sed haec est diversitas individualis sive numeralis: ergo etc.

4. Item, idea multiplicatur in divinis ratione respectus et relationis ad ideatum, ergo multiplicato uno[^3], multiplicatur et reliquum: cum ergo homo qui est ideatum, multiplicetur in diversis individuis secundum rem, multiplicabitur idea respectu illorum secundum rationem.

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**Contra:**

1. Augustinus ad Nebridium[^4]: «Dico, quantum ad hominem pertinet, tantum quidem hominis, non meam vel tuam, ibi esse rationem»: ergo multiplicatio vel distinctio idearum attenditur solum secundum diversitatem universalium.

2. Item, artifex creatus per unam ideam producit multa: ergo cum hoc sit nobilitatis, Deus per unam ideam re et ratione multa diversa[^5] numero producit.

3. Item, singulare ut singulare est compositius universali: ergo si est idea in Deo singularis ut singularis, tunc ergo est una idea altera simplicior; sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

4. Item, singulare magis proprium est quam universale[^6]: si ergo in Deo est idea universalis ut universalis, et singularis ut singularis, ergo una idea communis, altera propria. Sed commune prius est et simplicius est quam proprium: ergo una idea est altera prior et simplicior: ergo in Deo est ponere ordinem et compositionem essentialem, ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Ideae plurificantur non solum secundum multitudinem universalium, sed etiam singularium.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod idea in Deo secundum rem est divina veritas, secundum rationem intelligendi est similitudo cogniti. Haec autem similitudo est ratio expressiva cognoscendi non tantum universale, sed etiam singulare, quamvis ipsa non sit universalis nec singularis, sicut nec Deus[^7]. Et ideo non tantum est similitudo universalis, ut universale est, sed etiam singularis ut singulare, et ideo, quia similitudo est utrorumque, non solum multiplicatur secundum multitudinem universalium, sed etiam singularium. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus ad Nebridium: «Dico, quantum ad hominem faciendum[^8] hominis tantum esse rationem, quantum vero ad orbem temporis varias hominum rationes in illa sinceritate vivere».

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Et ex hoc patet solutio illius verbi Augustini, quia Augustinus dicit, quod quamvis universalis, ut universale est, una sit idea, tamen singularium ut singularia sunt plures. Unde ibidem dicit[^9], «quod si quis velit facere angulum, sufficit habere anguli rationem. Si quis autem velit pingere quadrangulum, necesse est, quod rationem habeat quatuor angulorum».

2. *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur*, quod artifex creatus producit multa per unam ideam; dicendum, quod hoc facit per applicationem ipsius ad diversas materias. Unde si habet solum ideam unam, impossibile est intelligere, quod secundum illam simplici aspectu cognoscat diversa; Deus autem simplici aspectu cognoscit singularia ut diversa[^10], ita quod secundum totum et secundum proprias differentias et proprietates; ideo non est simile.

3. 4. *Ad illud quod obiicitur* de compositione et prioritate, dicendum, quod nec secundum rem nec secundum rationem oportet quod idea habeat ideati proprietates. Nam corporalis[^11] est similitudo spiritualis, et compositi est similitudo simplex, etiam in creaturis; ideo non oportet, quod una idea sit altera simplicior vel prior. Similitudo tamen secundum rationem intelligendi habet proprietatem ideati secundum distinctionem, tum propter correlationem, quia oportet quod, uno relativorum[^12] multiplicato, multiplicetur et reliquum, saltem secundum rationem, ubi est relatio secundum rationem; tum etiam, quia similitudo illa est ratio exprimendi et distinguendi; et ideo, quamvis recipiatur proprietas distinctionis, non oportet tamen de aliis[^13].

english:
<!-- page 609 -->

### Question IV.
#### *Whether the ideas are pluralized by comparison to the ideated, insofar as these differ in species or in individual.*

Fourthly it is asked whether the ideas are pluralized by comparison to the ideated according to the multitude of the ideated, as to the diversity of universals or of singulars. And that [they are pluralized as to the diversity] of singulars, appears thus:

1. Since through the ideas there is the ground of distinguishing, but God distinguishes not only universal from universal, but also singular from singular. But since he distinguishes universal from universal, therefore he has many ideas and accounts of many universals. Hence "by one account the horse is constituted, by another account the man is constituted"[^1]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the truest cognition of a thing is according to the totality of the thing[^2]; but a singular adds something beyond the universal: therefore since God knows the whole, he has not only the idea of the universal, but also of what is superadded, namely of the singular; and likewise of another singular. Therefore if the things added are diverse according to reason or according to the ideal multitude, the point is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, God predestines some among men, and reprobates others; but he predestines by one account, and reprobates by another account: therefore according to another account and idea they are foreknown and predestined in God. But this is an individual or numerical diversity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, idea is multiplied in the divine by reason of respect and relation to the ideated; therefore, with one [relatum] multiplied[^3], the other also is multiplied: since therefore man, who is ideated, is multiplied in diverse individuals according to the thing, the idea will be multiplied with respect to those [individuals] according to reason.

<!-- page 610 -->

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *to Nebridius*[^4]: "I say that, as far as concerns man, there is there an account of the man only, not of mine or of yours": therefore the multiplication or distinction of the ideas is taken only according to the diversity of the universals.

2. Likewise, a created artisan produces many things through one idea: therefore since this is of nobility, God through one idea — in thing and in reason — produces many things diverse[^5] in number.

3. Likewise, the singular as singular is more composite than the universal: therefore if there is in God an idea of the singular as singular, then one idea is simpler than another; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the singular is more proper than the universal[^6]: if therefore in God there is an idea of the universal as universal, and of the singular as singular, then one idea is common, the other proper. But the common is prior and simpler than the proper: therefore one idea is prior and simpler than another: therefore in God there is to be posited an essential order and composition: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The ideas are pluralized not only according to the multitude of universals, but also of singulars.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the idea in God, according to the thing, is the divine truth; according to the mode of understanding, it is the likeness of the known. But this likeness is the expressive ground of cognizing not only the universal, but also the singular, although it itself is neither universal nor singular, just as neither is God[^7]. And therefore it is not only the likeness of the universal as universal, but also of the singular as singular, and therefore, since the likeness is of both, [the idea] is multiplied not only according to the multitude of the universals, but also of the singulars. And this is what Augustine says *to Nebridius*: "I say that, as far as regards the making[^8] of man, there is an account of the man only, but as regards the round of time, the various accounts of men live in that sincerity."

**To the arguments:**

1. And from this is clear the solution to that saying of Augustine, since Augustine says that, although of the universal as universal there is one idea, yet of singulars as singulars there are several. Hence in the same place he says[^9], "that if anyone wishes to make an angle, it suffices to have the account of an angle. But if anyone wishes to paint a quadrangle, it is necessary that he have the account of four angles."

2. *To that therefore which is objected*, that a created artisan produces many things through one idea; it must be said that he does this through the application of [the idea] to diverse matters. Hence if he has only one idea, it is impossible to understand that according to it he should know diverse things by a single regard; but God by a single regard knows the singulars as diverse[^10], in such a way that [he knows them] according to the whole and according to their proper differences and properties; therefore the case is not similar.

3. 4. *To that which is objected* concerning composition and priority, it must be said that neither according to the thing nor according to reason is it necessary that the idea have the properties of the ideated. For the likeness of the spiritual is corporeal[^11], and the likeness of the composite is simple, even in creatures; therefore it is not necessary that one idea be simpler or prior to another. The likeness, however, according to the mode of understanding, has the property of the ideated as to distinction, both on account of the correlation — since it is necessary that, with one of the correlatives multiplied[^12], the other also be multiplied, at least according to reason, where the relation is according to reason — and also, because that likeness is the ground of expressing and distinguishing; and therefore, although the property of distinction be received [into the idea], it is not necessary nevertheless concerning the others[^13].

la: August., *83 Qq.* q. 46. n. 2. — Paulo superius post *plurium* multi codd. interiiciunt *et*.

en: Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 46, n. 2. — A little earlier, after *plurium*, many codices insert *et*.

la: S. Doctor vult dicere: perfectissime et verissime res cognoscitur, quando secundum totum cognoscitur; quae cognitio ab Augustino *comprehensio* dicitur, de quo vide supra pag. 69, nota 4. De propositione subsequenti cfr. Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 20. (c. 24.).

en: The Holy Doctor means to say: a thing is most perfectly and most truly known when it is known according to the whole; which cognition is by Augustine called *comprehensio*, on which see above p. 69, n. 4. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 20 (c. 24).

la: Scilicet ideato. — In codd. F Q W et ed. 1 voci *uno* adiungitur *relativorum*, quod additamentum nimis videtur generale. Mox pro *cum ergo*, quam lectionem assumpsimus ex codd. V X Z, Vat. *et cum*; codd. A F G H I K T et alii cum primis edd. omittunt *ergo*.

en: Namely [with one] of the ideated. — In codices F Q W and edition 1, to the word *uno* is added *relativorum* ("of the correlatives"), which addition seems too general. Soon, in place of *cum ergo*, which reading we have taken from codices V X Z, the Vatican [reads] *et cum*; codices A F G H I K T and others with the first editions omit *ergo*.

la: *Epist.* 14. n. 1. — In textu allato Vat. post *hominem* addit *faciendum*, neque codd. neque ed. 1 suffragantibus; et subinde pro *non meam* non pauci codd. perperam substituunt *ut meam*. Mox pro *idearum* Vat. cum cod. cc *ideatorum*.

en: *Letter* 14, n. 1. — In the text cited, the Vatican after *hominem* adds *faciendum*, with neither the codices nor edition 1 in support; and shortly thereafter, in place of *non meam*, not a few codices wrongly substitute *ut meam*. Soon, in place of *idearum*, the Vatican with codex cc [reads] *ideatorum*.

la: Multi codd. *ut* A C F G I K R S T U etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *diverso*; cod. V *distincto*.

en: Many codices, as A C F G I K R S T U etc., with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *diverso*; codex V [reads] *distincto*.

la: Hoc eruitur ex definitione *proprii*, quod iuxta Aristot. I. *Topic.* c. 4. soli convenit: «Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse». Et I. *Periherm.* c. 5. (c. 7.): «Dico autem universale quod in pluribus praedicari natum est; singulare vero quod non». — Mox post *idea communis* codd. V W subiiciunt *est*.

en: This is drawn from the definition of *the proper*, which according to Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 4, belongs to one alone: "For no one says to be proper what happens to be in another." And *On Interpretation* I, c. 5 (c. 7): "But I call universal that which is by nature predicated of many; and singular that which is not." — Soon after *idea communis*, codices V W add *est*.

la: Cfr. hic q. 5. *ad* 3, et d. 19. p. II. q. 2, ubi et plura occurrunt, quae ad obiectiones respiciunt.

en: Cf. here q. 5, *ad* 3, and d. 19, p. II, q. 2, where also several things occur which look to the objections.

la: Vat. hic addit *pertinet*, pro quo in textu originali *attinet*. Nostra lectio sequitur praestantiores codd. Paulo post pro *orbem* Vat. cum ed. 1, codd. et textu originali repugnantibus, *ordinem*.

en: The Vatican here adds *pertinet*, in place of which in the original text [is read] *attinet*. Our reading follows the more excellent codices. A little later, in place of *orbem*, the Vatican with edition 1, against the codices and the original text, [reads] *ordinem*.

la: *Epist.* 14. n. 4, ubi textus originalis sic: *Itaque quoties demonstrare angulum volo, non nisi una ratio anguli mihi occurrit, sed quadratum nequaquam scriberem, nisi quatuor simul angulorum rationem intuerer*.

en: *Letter* 14, n. 4, where the original text [reads] thus: "And so as often as I wish to demonstrate an angle, no more than one account of an angle occurs to me, but I would by no means write [draw] a square unless I were beholding the account of four angles together."

la: Codd. K L O Y aa adiungunt *singularia*; paulo inferius codd. L W voci *proprietates* praemittunt *diversas*.

en: Codices K L O Y aa add *singularia*; a little later, codices L W prefix *diversas* to the word *proprietates*.

la: Vat. *Nam rei naturalis*. Mox eadem Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *altera*.

en: The Vatican [reads] *Nam rei naturalis* ("For of a natural thing"). Soon, the same Vatican, with codex cc, omits *altera*.

la: Cod. T cum nonnullis aliis codd. et ed. 3 *correlativi*. Paulo inferius post *ideo* cod. R inserit *enim*.

en: Codex T with several other codices and edition 3 [reads] *correlativi*. A little later, after *ideo*, codex R inserts *enim*.

la: Id est: non oportet, quod aliae proprietates ideatorum in intellectum recipiantur, praeter illam proprietatem distinctionis.

en: That is: it is not necessary that other properties of the ideated be received into the intellect, beyond that property of distinction.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio est contra nonnullos, qui Platonem secuti «omnium singularium in Deo ideas esse negant, dicentes, singularia non habere aliam ideam quam ideam speciei, et Deum cognoscere per ideam specierum omnia singularia contenta sub specie» (ita dicit Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 36. a. 2. q. 4.). Huic sententiae favere videtur Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 3.). Sed communis sententia cum S. Bonav. et S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 15. a. 3. *ad* 4.) et eodem Richardo illam opinionem reprobat. Attamen S. Thom. in alio loco (*de Verit.* q. 3. a. 8. *ad* 2.) utramque sententiam sic conciliat: «Si loquamur de idea proprie, secundum quod est rei eo modo quo est in esse producibilis; sic una idea respondet singulari, speciei et generi, individualis in ipso singulari, eo quod Socrates, homo, et animal, non distinguitur secundum esse. Si autem accipiamus ideam communiter pro similitudine vel ratione, sic, cum diversa sit consideratio Socratis, ut Socrates est, et ut homo est, et ut est animal, respondebunt ei plures ideae vel similitudines». Hoc convenit cum principiis S. Bonaventurae. In *solut. ad* 3. 4. notanda est exceptio ibi facta in regula generali, quod idea non habeat proprietates ideati; excipitur enim proprietas distinctionis. Simul attendenda est probatio huius exceptionis, duplici ratione firmata. Difficultas circa prioritatem idearum magis explicatur hic q. 6.

**II.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 6. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. *Report.* I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 3. 4. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2. a. 3; *S. c. Gent.* I. c. 63. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 36. a. 2. q. 4. — Ægid. R., I. *Sent.* d. 36. *princ.* 2, q. 4. *collat.* 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is against certain ones who, following Plato, "deny that there are ideas of all singulars in God, saying that singulars do not have an idea other than the idea of the species, and that God knows through the idea of the species all singulars contained under the species" (so says Richard of Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 36, a. 2, q. 4). To this opinion Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* 5, q. 3) seems to favor. But the common opinion, with St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 15, a. 3, *ad* 4.) and the same Richard, rejects that opinion. Yet St. Thomas in another place (*de Verit.* q. 3, a. 8, *ad* 2) reconciles both opinions thus: "If we speak of idea properly, according as it is of the thing in the mode in which it is in producible being, then one idea responds to the singular, the species, and the genus — in the singular itself it is individual — since Socrates, man, and animal are not distinguished according to being. But if we take idea commonly for likeness or account, then, since the consideration of Socrates as he is Socrates, as he is man, and as he is animal is diverse, several ideas or likenesses will respond to him." This agrees with the principles of St. Bonaventure. In the *solution to* 3 and 4 there is to be noted the exception there made to the general rule, that the idea does not have the properties of the ideated; for the property of distinction is excepted. At the same time the proof of this exception is to be attended to, secured by a twofold reason. The difficulty concerning the priority of the ideas is more explained here in q. 6.

**II.** Besides the places cited: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 6. — Scot., on this and the following question, *Report.* I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 3, 4. — S. Thom., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2, a. 3; *S. c. Gent.* I, c. 63. — Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2, a. 4. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 36, a. 2, q. 4. — Ægid. R., I *Sent.* d. 36, *princ.* 2, q. 4, *collat.* 3. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 611 -->

### Quaestio V.
#### *Utrum ideae in Deo sint numero finitae, an infinitae.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quinto quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit ponere multitudinem idearum secundum numerum finitum, vel infinitum. Et quod secundum numerum infinitum, videtur.

1. Augustinus *de Civitate Dei* undecimo[^1]: «Una est sapientia, in qua infiniti sunt thesauri omnium rerum intelligibilium».

2. Item, Augustinus sexto *de Trinitate*[^2] dicit, quod «Filius est ars plena omnium rationum viventium»; sed constat, quod ars illa est infinita: ergo non impletur nisi infinitis, ergo sunt ibi infinitae rationes.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia constat, quod Deus cognoscit omnes species numeri, ergo omnes habent ideas in Deo; sed species numeri sunt infinitae[^3]: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod sunt infinitae species quoad nos, non secundum rem; contra: ponatur quod omnes species numeri sint in re; hoc posito, de necessitate sequitur, quod infinita simpliciter actu sunt: ergo si omnium specierum numeri sunt in Deo ideae actu, patet etc.

4. Item, Deus potest infinita producere[^4]; sed nihil potest producere, cuius non habeat cognitionem et ideam: ergo habet ideas infinitorum. Sed plurium sunt ideae plures: ergo infinitorum sunt infinitae.

5. Item, omnibus finitis possunt excogitari plura, quia omni finito potest excogitari aliquid maius; sed nec Deus, nec homo habet plura cogitare his quae Deus cognoscit, quia tunc Dei scientia non esset summa: et si hoc, cum cognoscat per ideas, patet etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus *de Civitate Dei* duodecimo[^5]: «Quidquid scitur, scientis comprehensione finitur»; sed constat, quod rationes cognoscendi sciuntur: ergo finiuntur. Sed quaecumque finiuntur, sunt finita: ergo etc.

2. Item, multitudo idearum est secundum multitudinem ideatorum; sed constat, omnia alia a Deo de necessitate esse finita actu: ergo similiter et ideas.

3. Item, ubi est infinitas, ibi est confusio et inordinatio; sed in exemplari aeterno nulla cadit confusio nec inordinatio: ergo etc.

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4. Item, ponere infinitatem actu in creatura est ponere imperfectionem, unde omne creatum eo est finitum, quo perfectum[^6]; sed omnis conditio imperfectionis est a Deo releganda: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Ideae divinae non sunt in numero finito, sed infinito.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in Psalmo[^7], divinae sapientiae non est numerus, ac per hoc nec rationum, per quas divina sapientia cognoscit; et quoniam non habent numerum, non sunt numerabiles: ideo non sunt in numero finito, sed infinito. Et concedendae sunt rationes et auctoritates ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur*, quod omne scibile est finitum, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod omne scibile per comprehensionem est finitum comprehendenti; rationes autem aeternae per comprehensionem a solo Deo sciuntur, ideo soli Deo sunt finitae. Sed quemadmodum non sequitur: hoc aequatur infinito, ergo est finitum; immo est ibi quid et simpliciter[^8], et potius sequitur oppositum: ergo non est finitum; sic etiam in proposito iudicandum. Rationes autem illae non sunt comprehensibiles ab aliquo intellectu finito; ideo patet illud.

2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod multitudo idearum est a multitudine ideatorum; dicendum, quod sicut dictum est[^9], non venit a multitudine ideatorum in quantum creata, sed in quantum connotata. Idea autem non connotat ideatum secundum actualem existentiam, sed solum secundum potentiam. Et quia Deus potest facere infinita, quamvis nunquam faciat nisi finita, ideo ideae vel rationes cognoscendi sunt in Deo infinitae, quia non tantum sunt entium vel futurorum, sed omnium Deo possibilium. Nihil enim potest Deus, quod non actu cognoscat.

3. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod infinitas ponit confusionem; dicendum, quod est ponere infinitatem secundum diversitatem realem; et sic privat et distinctionem et ordinem, si ponatur actu. Sed multitudo idearum non est rerum diversarum, sed dicit immensitatem divinae veritatis in exprimendo[^10] et cognoscendo omne quod est Deo possibile, et hoc quidem secundum rem et actum est unum: ideo non est confusio.

4. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod imperfectionis est infinitas in creatura; dicendum, quod quamvis sit imperfectionis in creatura, non tamen est in Creatore, quia est intelligere infinitatem per defectum et per excessum. Infinitas per defectum potest esse in creatura ut in materia, et hoc est imperfectionis; haec autem nullatenus est in Creatore. Infinitas autem per excessum non potest simpliciter esse in creatura, quoniam habet esse creatum et compositum et limitatum; Deus autem nihil horum habet, et ideo habet infinitatem, et haec est summae perfectionis.

english:
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### Question V.
#### *Whether the ideas in God are finite or infinite in number.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether in God a multitude of ideas is to be posited according to a finite number, or an infinite. And that [it is] according to an infinite number, [thus] it appears.

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, book eleven[^1]: "There is one wisdom, in which are infinite treasures of all intelligible things."

2. Likewise, Augustine in book six *On the Trinity*[^2] says, that "the Son is the art full of all the accounts of living things"; but it is established that that art is infinite: therefore it is not filled except with infinite [accounts], therefore the accounts there are infinite.

3. Likewise, it appears by reason, since it is established that God knows all the species of number, therefore all have ideas in God; but the species of number are infinite[^3]: therefore etc. If you say that they are infinite species as far as we are concerned, not according to the thing; on the contrary: let it be supposed that all species of number are in reality; this supposed, it follows of necessity that infinite [things] are in act simply: therefore if there are ideas in God in act of all species of number, [the conclusion] is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, God can produce infinite [things][^4]; but he can produce nothing of which he does not have cognition and idea: therefore he has ideas of infinite [things]. But of more [things] there are more ideas: therefore of infinite [things] there are infinite [ideas].

5. Likewise, beyond all finite [things] more can be thought up, since beyond every finite [thing] something greater can be thought up; but neither God nor man has [the power] to think more than those things which God knows, since then God's knowledge would not be supreme: and if so, since he knows through ideas, [the conclusion] is clear etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, book twelve[^5]: "Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower"; but it is established that the accounts of knowing are known: therefore they are bounded. But whatever things are bounded, are finite: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the multitude of ideas is according to the multitude of things-ideated; but it is established that all things other than God are of necessity finite in act: therefore likewise also the ideas.

3. Likewise, where there is infinity, there is confusion and disorder; but in the eternal exemplar no confusion or disorder falls: therefore etc.

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4. Likewise, to posit infinity in act in a creature is to posit imperfection, whence every created thing is finite by that by which it is perfect[^6]; but every condition of imperfection is to be banished from God: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The divine ideas are not in a finite number, but in an infinite [one].*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is said in the Psalm[^7], of the divine wisdom there is no number, and through this neither [is there a number] of the accounts by which the divine wisdom knows; and since they have no number, they are not numerable: therefore they are not in a finite number, but in an infinite [one]. And the reasons and authorities adduced for this must be conceded.

**To the arguments to the opposite:**

1. *To that which is objected*, that everything knowable is finite, therefore etc.; it must be said that everything knowable by comprehension is finite to him who comprehends; but the eternal accounts are known by comprehension by God alone, therefore they are finite to God alone. But just as it does not follow: this is equated to the infinite, therefore it is finite; rather, there is there something simply [infinite][^8], and the opposite rather follows: therefore it is not finite; so also is it to be judged in the proposition. But those accounts are not comprehensible by any finite intellect; therefore that is clear.

2. *To that which is objected*, that the multitude of ideas is from the multitude of things-ideated; it must be said that, as has been said[^9], it does not come from the multitude of things-ideated insofar as [they are] created, but insofar as [they are] connoted. But the idea does not connote the thing-ideated according to actual existence, but only according to potency. And since God can make infinite [things], although he never makes [anything] except finite [things], therefore the ideas or accounts of knowing are in God infinite, since they are not only of beings or of future things, but of all things possible to God. For God can [do] nothing which he does not actually know.

3. *To that which is objected*, that infinity posits confusion; it must be said that one can posit infinity according to real diversity; and so it deprives [the thing] of both distinction and order, if it be posited in act. But the multitude of ideas is not of diverse things, but expresses the immensity of divine truth in expressing[^10] and knowing all that is possible to God, and this indeed according to thing and act is one: therefore there is no confusion.

4. *To that which is objected*, that infinity in a creature is of imperfection; it must be said that, although it be of imperfection in a creature, yet it is not [of imperfection] in the Creator, since one can understand infinity by defect and by excess. Infinity by defect can be in a creature, as in matter, and this is of imperfection; but this is in no way in the Creator. But infinity by excess cannot simply be in a creature, since it has being which is created and composite and limited; but God has none of these, and therefore he has infinity, and this [infinity] is of supreme perfection.

la: Cap. 10. Loco citato textus originalis post *in qua* adiungit *quidam atque*.

en: Chapter 10. In the place cited, the original text after *in qua* adds *quidam atque*.

en: Chapter 10, n. 11.

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 36 (c. 5.), et XI. *Metaph.* c. 9 (X. c. 10.) infinitum vocat passionem (proprietatem) numeri.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 36 (c. 5), and *Metaphysics* XI, c. 9 (X, c. 10), calls the infinite a passion (property) of number.

la: Quod tamen in se non est possibile. Licet enim Deus actu cognoscat infinitos numeros, non sequitur, quod actu infinitos ad extra producere possit. Cfr. infra d. 43. q. 3. — Proxime ante pro *non secundum rem* cod. T *sed finitae secundum rem*, cod. V *finitae secundum rem*. In fine argumenti post *ideae* Vat. interponit *et sunt infinitae*, quae accessio habetur et in ed. 1, omissa tamen vocula *et* ac posita ante *ideae* virgula.

en: Which however is not possible in itself. For although God knows in act infinite numbers, it does not follow that he could produce infinite [numbers] in act outside [himself]. Cf. below d. 43, q. 3. — Just before, in place of *non secundum rem*, codex T [reads] *sed finitae secundum rem*, codex V *finitae secundum rem*. At the end of the argument, after *ideae*, the Vatican interposes *et sunt infinitae*, which addition is found also in edition 1, the small word *et* however being omitted and a comma placed before *ideae*.

la: Intellige: infinita in potentia, id est, non potest producere tot, quin non possit plura. Cfr. infra d. 43. q. 3. — Cod. T cum ed. I *potest*. — Cap. 18. Loci citati textus originalis hic est: *Quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis* etc.

en: Understand: infinite in potency, that is, he cannot produce so many that he could not [produce] more. Cf. below d. 43, q. 3. — Codex T with edition I [reads] *potest*. — Chapter 18. The original text of the place cited is this: *Whatever is comprehended by knowledge, [is bounded] by the comprehension of the knower*, etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 21 (IV. c. 16.), ubi inter alia ea dicuntur perfecta, quae finem habent sive acquirunt.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16), where among other things those things are said to be perfect which have or acquire an end.

la: Psalm. 146, 5. — Paulo inferius verba *sed infinito* in sola Vat. desiderantur.

en: Psalm 146:5. — A little below, the words *sed infinito* are missing in the Vatican alone.

la: Codd. V W *secundum quid et simpliciter*, de quo ibi vide supra pag. 343, nota 7. Mox pro *sic etiam* codd. A S T X et alii nonnulli cum ed. 1 *solummodo sic*.

en: Codices V W [read] *secundum quid et simpliciter*, on which see there above p. 343, n. 7. Soon, in place of *sic etiam*, codices A S T X and several others with edition 1 [read] *solummodo sic*.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro *ideatum* plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *ideitatem*, et subinde *exigentiam* pro *existentiam*; corrupte. — Cod. sic: *sed dicit infinitatem vel modorum imitandi divinam essentiam, sicut alias dictum est, divinae veritatis imprimendo et cognoscendo* etc.

en: The preceding question. — A little below, in place of *ideatum*, very many codices with editions 2, 3 [read] *ideitatem*, and subsequently *exigentiam* in place of *existentiam*; corruptly. — One codex thus: *sed dicit infinitatem vel modorum imitandi divinam essentiam, sicut alias dictum est, divinae veritatis imprimendo et cognoscendo*, etc.

la: In cod. T et aliis nonnullis omittitur *est*. — Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 40 (VI. c. 11.): *Cum materia namque non est, indefinitum (ἀόριστον) etenim* etc.

en: In codex T and several others *est* is omitted. — Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 40 (VI, c. 11): "For when matter is not [present], [the thing is] indefinite (ἀόριστον), for [matter]" etc.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius quaestionis dependet a solutione alterius quaestionis, scil. utrum etiam rerum mere possibilium sint ideae in Deo statuendae; quod omnes concedunt, sed cum quadam differentia explicant. S. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 15. a. 3. *ad* 2.) distinguit ideam in sensu strictiore ut exemplar et principium operandi, et in sensu largiore ut principium seu rationem cognoscendi. Idem dicit (*de Verit.* q. 3. a. 6.): «Quod idea proprie dicta respicit practicam cognitionem non solum in actu, sed in habitu. Unde cum Deus de his quae facere potest, quamvis nunquam sint facta nec futura, habeat cognitionem virtualiter practicam; relinquitur, quod idea possit esse eius, quod nec est, nec fuit, nec erit» etc. Ex principiis hic positis solvi potest alia quaestio, utrum idea pertineat ad scientiam speculativam, an ad practicam. Resolvendum enim est, quod ad practicam pertinet, quatenus est principium operandi; ad speculativam vero, quatenus est principium cognoscendi. Convenit S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 3. a. 3; addit tamen etiam alium modum loquendi, secundum quem proprie loquendo idea respiciat scientiam practicam vel actu vel virtute, dum vocabula *similitudo* et *ratio* tam speculativam quam practicam scientiam respiciunt.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 36. a. 2. q. 5. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 43. q. 2. n. 12. seq. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 36. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question depends on the solution of another question, namely whether ideas are also to be posited in God of merely possible things; which all concede, but they explain it with a certain difference. St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 15, a. 3, *ad* 2) distinguishes the idea, in the stricter sense as exemplar and principle of operating, and in the broader sense as principle or account of knowing. He says the same (*On Truth*, q. 3, a. 6): "That the idea, properly so called, regards practical knowledge not only in act, but in habit. Whence, since God has a virtually practical cognition concerning those things which he can do, although they may never be done or be future; it remains that there can be an idea of that which neither is, nor was, nor shall be," etc. From the principles here laid down another question can be solved, namely whether the idea pertains to speculative or to practical science. For it must be resolved that it pertains to the practical insofar as it is the principle of operating; but to the speculative insofar as it is the principle of knowing. St. Thomas agrees, *On Truth*, q. 3, a. 3; nevertheless he adds also another mode of speaking, according to which, properly speaking, the idea regards practical science either in act or in power [*virtute*], whereas the words *similitudo* and *ratio* regard both speculative and practical science.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 36, a. 2, q. 5. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 43, q. 2, n. 12 seq. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 36, q. 3.

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