title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I.
#### *De causalitate praescientiae divinae.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum praescientia divina sit causa rerum.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Et quod sit causa rerum, ostenditur sic.

1. Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Ideo res futurae sunt, quia Deus eas novit».

2. Item, ratione sic: omne illud quod antecedit aliud, et ipso posito, ponitur aliud, ipsum est causa illius — hoc patet per definitionem causae[^2]; sed divina praescientia praecedit omne futurum, et iterum ponit futurum, respectu cuius est; ergo praescientia est causa.

3. Item, omnis res aut est a Deo, aut a natura, aut a libero arbitrio, et accipio causas istas large, prout comprehendunt casum et fortunam; sed nulla res a natura esse potest nec a libero arbitrio, nisi operante Deo: ergo omnis res est a Deo sive omne futurum. Sed non est a Deo agente nisi secundum artem et cognitionem: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne quod scitur, aliquo modo est in se, vel in sua causa[^3]; ergo quod praescitur a Deo est in Deo ut in causa: sed omne quod est in Deo, est a Deo: ergo omne futurum praescitum est a divina praecognitione ut causa: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne quod scitur, aut scitur per causam, aut per speciem, aut per effectum: si ergo Deus praescit, ergo aliquo istorum modorum. Non per effectum, quia effectus sequitur; non per speciem sive similitudinem, quia illa est simul vel etiam post rem, cuius est similitudo: ergo per causam, ergo divina praescientia est causa praesciti.

**Contra:**

1. Deus nullius est causa nisi per voluntatem; sed multa praescit, ad quae non est eius voluntas: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: praescit, te mentiri, et tamen non est dicere, quod velit, te mentiri: ergo non est causa illius.

2. Item, si praescientia est causa, aut ratione scientiae, aut ratione antecessionis. Ratione eius quod est *prae*, non[^4], quia non dicit nisi ordinem. Ratione similiter scientiae, non, quia multa cognoscit Deus quae nunquam faciet: ergo nullo modo est causa.

3. Item, si praescientia causa est praesciti, cum praesciat mala, Deus erit causa mali; hoc autem falsum.

4. Item, si est causa, cum communicet alicui praescientiam rei creandae, per consequens communicat causalitatem respectu illius; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

5. Item, Anselmus *de Concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii*[^5] dicit, quod «tantum est dicere: si Deus praescit, erit, quantum hoc: si erit, de necessitate erit»; sed hic nulla notatur causalitas: ergo nec ibi.

### Conclusio.

> *Praescientia et scientia divina aliquo modo semper importat causalitatem, sed non semper respectu praesciti.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praescientia dicit praecognitionem futuri. Est igitur loqui de praescientia aut quantum ad rem significatam, aut prout significatur per illud nomen[^6]. Si quantum ad rationem nominis, sic non significat in ratione causae; si quantum ad rem importatam, sic dicit causam; sed tamen non semper respectu praesciti sive futuri.

Futurum enim in triplici differentia est. Quoddam <!-- page 670 -->enim est, cuius Deus est tota causa, ut sunt illa quae creantur; quoddam, cuius creatura, ut voluntas, est tota causa, ut sunt defectus et peccata; quoddam, cuius Deus et creatura simul sunt causa, ut sunt opera naturalia et opera moralia, quia Deus cooperatur creaturae.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod respectu primi futuri divina praescientia est causa et tota causa; respectu vero secundi futuri nec est causa nec tota, quia non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem[^7], est tamen causa sui oppositi: respectu vero tertii est causa, sed non tota. Concedendum ergo est, quod divina scientia vel praescientia aliquo modo respectu futurorum est causa. Tamen si accipiatur in sua generalitate, dicendum, quod divina praescientia semper importat causalitatem aliquam, sed non semper respectu praesciti, ut puta cum praescitum est malum. Et in hac ratione procedunt argumenta ostendentia, quod non sit causa.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod est causa praesciti per verbum Augustini; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de scientia rerum sive bonorum, quae a Deo procedunt.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa est quae praecedit et ponit aliud; dicendum, quod ponere aliud est dupliciter, scilicet[^8] secundum productionem, vel secundum consecutionem; et quod ponit secundum productionem est causa vere in essendo, quod vero ponit secundum consecutionem non est causa in essendo, sed solum in consequendo.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod est a libero arbitrio est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est de eo quod est a libero arbitrio efficiente, sed vitia et peccata sunt ab ipso deficiente.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de necessitate omne futurum scitur a Deo per causam; dicendum, quod sicut supra[^9] tactum fuit de cognitione mali, in omni cognitione est assimilatio; nihil autem assimilatur Deo nisi quod est ab illo: et ideo in omni cognitione Dei est causalitas. Et cum quidem est respectu eius quod dicit entitatem simpliciter, respectu illius est causa et idea; sed cum respectu privationis est praecognitio, tunc ratio causalitatis et ideae est respectu oppositi. Dicendum ergo, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid cognoscatur, necesse est, quod ipsum vel eius oppositum habeat esse in re, vel in causa. Non solum autem oppositum mali, sed etiam ipsa voluntas, quae est mali principium, est in Deo ut in causa; tamen malum non est in Deo ut in causa, nec per se nec per accidens, quia mutatur ratio causandi, sicut postea dicetur[^10]. — Exemplum huius manifestum est. Si artifex operetur[^11] super materiam nodosam, quae non esset idonea ad receptionem speciei, praesciret, quod defectus futurus est in imagine, sed non ab ipso. Similiter intelligendum in Deo et libero arbitrio, quod facit vitium in opere, dum non conformat se et obedit Deo operanti; et ideo sufficit, quod oppositum mali, sive illud a quo est malum sit in Deo, tanquam in causa, ad hoc quod praesciatur.

english:
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### Article I.
#### *On the causality of divine foreknowledge.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether divine foreknowledge is the cause of things.*

That it is the cause of things is shown thus.

1. Augustine in *On the Trinity* XV[^1]: "Things are future for this reason, that God knows them."

2. Likewise, by reason thus: everything which precedes another, and, when it is posited, [the other] is posited, is itself the cause of that — this is plain by the definition of cause[^2]; but divine foreknowledge precedes every future thing, and again posits the future, with respect to which it is; therefore foreknowledge is a cause.

3. Likewise, every thing is either from God, or from nature, or from free choice, and I take these causes broadly, as comprehending chance and fortune; but no thing can be from nature nor from free choice, except by God's operation: therefore every thing — that is, every future — is from God. But it is not from God acting except according to art and cognition: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is known is in some way in itself, or in its cause[^3]; therefore what is foreknown by God is in God as in [its] cause: but everything which is in God is from God: therefore every future thing foreknown is from divine pre-cognition as from a cause: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, everything that is known is known either through a cause, or through a *species*, or through an effect: if therefore God foreknows, then [it is] in some one of these modes. Not through an effect, since the effect comes after; not through a *species* or likeness, since that is simultaneous with, or even after, the thing of which it is the likeness: therefore through a cause, therefore divine foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown.

**On the contrary:**

1. God is the cause of nothing except through [his] will; but he foreknows many things to which his will does not extend: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [proposition]: he foreknows you to lie, and yet it is not to be said that he wills you to lie: therefore he is not the cause of that.

2. Likewise, if foreknowledge is a cause, [it is so] either by reason of [its being] knowledge, or by reason of [its] precedence. By reason of that which is *prae* ["before"], not[^4], because it expresses nothing but order. By reason of knowledge likewise, not, because God knows many things which he will never make: therefore in no way is it a cause.

3. Likewise, if foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown, since he foreknows evils, God will be the cause of evil; but this is false.

4. Likewise, if it is a cause, since he communicates to someone foreknowledge of a thing-to-be-created, consequently he communicates causality with respect to it; but this is impossible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, Anselm in *On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Choice*[^5] says, that "it is just as much to say: 'if God foreknows [it], it will be,' as this: 'if it will be, of necessity it will be'"; but here no causality is noted: therefore neither there.

### Conclusion.

> *Foreknowledge and divine knowledge always import some causality, but not always with respect to the foreknown.*

**I respond:** It must be said that foreknowledge expresses pre-cognition of the future. There is therefore [room] to speak of foreknowledge either as regards the thing signified, or as it is signified through that name[^6]. If as regards the meaning of the name, so it does not signify in the character of cause; if as regards the thing imported, so it expresses a cause; yet not always with respect to the foreknown or the future.

For the future is in a threefold difference. There is [a future] of which God is the whole cause, as are those things which are created; <!-- page 670 -->[another] of which the creature, as the will, is the whole cause, as are defects and sins; [another] of which God and creature are at once the cause, as are natural works and moral works, since God cooperates with the creature.

According to this it must be understood, that with respect to the first kind of future divine foreknowledge is a cause, and the whole cause; but with respect to the second kind of future it is neither a cause nor the whole, since it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one[^7], yet it is the cause of its opposite: with respect to the third it is a cause, but not the whole. It is therefore to be conceded, that divine knowledge or foreknowledge is in some manner a cause with respect to future things. Yet if it is taken in its generality, it must be said that divine foreknowledge always imports some causality, but not always with respect to the foreknown — as for instance when the foreknown is an evil. And in this sense the arguments proceed which show that it is not a cause.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected, that it is the cause of the foreknown by the word of Augustine; it must be said that Augustine speaks of the knowledge of things or goods which proceed from God.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the cause is what precedes and posits another; it must be said that to posit another is twofold, namely[^8] according to production, or according to consequence; and what posits according to production is truly a cause in being, but what posits according to consequence is not a cause in being, but only in consequence.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that what is from free choice is from God; it must be said that this is true of what is from free choice as efficient, but vices and sins are from it as deficient.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that of necessity every future is known by God through a cause; it must be said that, as was touched above[^9] concerning the cognition of evil, in every cognition there is assimilation; but nothing is assimilated to God except what is from him: and therefore in every cognition of God there is causality. And when indeed it is with respect to that which expresses being simply, with respect to that it is cause and idea; but when with respect to a privation it is pre-cognition, then the character of causality and of idea is with respect to the opposite. It must therefore be said that, in order that something be cognized, it is necessary that it itself or its opposite have being in reality, or in [its] cause. Now not only the opposite of evil, but also the will itself, which is the principle of evil, is in God as in [its] cause; yet evil is not in God as in [its] cause, neither *per se* nor *per accidens*, since the *ratio* of causing is changed, as will be said afterwards[^10]. — The example of this is plain. If a craftsman were to work[^11] upon knotty material, which would not be fit for the reception of the form, he would foreknow that a defect will be in the image, but not from himself. Likewise it is to be understood in [the case of] God and free choice, which makes a fault in the work, when it does not conform itself and obey God working; and therefore it suffices that the opposite of the evil, or that from which the evil is, be in God, as in [its] cause, in order that [the evil] be foreknown.

la: Cap. 13. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Chapter 13, n. 22. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1.

la: De qua vide supra d. 3. a. 2. cf. 2. fundam. 2. et ibid. dub. 3.

en: On which see above d. 3, a. 2, [*contra* 2 — fundament 2], and ibidem dub. 3.

la: Vat. cum edd. 1, 8: *est in sciente vt in sua causa*. Nostra lectio confirmatur ex solutione ad ult. arg. — Mox pro *ut in causa* codd. DEK *ut sua causa*, alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *ut causa*. — De propositione minori *sed omne quod est in Deo, est a Deo*, vide supra d. XXXVI. c. 2. seq. et ibid. *Comment.* a. 1. q. 1. nec non a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Dein post *praescitum* Vat. addit *necessario*, et proxime post pro *praecognitione* cod. T substituit *cognitione*.

en: The Vatican [edition] together with edd. 1, 8 [reads]: *est in sciente vt in sua causa* ["is in the knower as in its cause"]. Our reading is confirmed from the solution to the last argument. — Soon, in place of *ut in causa* codd. DEK [read] *ut sua causa*, other codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 *ut causa*. — Concerning the minor proposition *sed omne quod est in Deo, est a Deo* ["but everything which is in God is from God"], see above d. XXXVI, c. 2 seq. and ibidem *Commentary*, a. 1, q. 1, and also a. 3, q. 1 seq. — Then after *praescitum* the Vatican adds *necessario* ["necessarily"], and immediately after, in place of *praecognitione* codex T substitutes *cognitione*.

la: Vat. sic: *Ratione antecessionis non, quia hoc quod est ante, non dicit etc.*

en: The Vatican [reads] thus: *Ratione antecessionis non, quia hoc quod est ante, non dicit etc.* ["By reason of precedence, no, because that which is *ante* ['before'] expresses etc."].

la: *Quaest.* 1. c. 2: *Quare cum dico, quia si praescit Deus aliquid, necesse est, illud esse futurum; quod idem est ac si dicam: si erit, ex necessitate erit.*

en: Question 1, c. 2: "Wherefore when I say, that if God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future; which is the same as if I were to say: if it will be, of necessity it will be."

la: Scilicet praescientia, qui terminus nihil significat nisi notitiam scientiae. Similiter dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 24. m. 2.). Praescientia approbationis potest dicere causam ratione [rei] intellectae, non ratione antecessionis, quae intelligitur per *ante*.

en: That is, *foreknowledge*, which term signifies nothing except the cognizance of knowledge. Likewise says Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I, q. 24, m. 2). The foreknowledge of approbation can express a cause by reason of the [thing] understood, not by reason of precedence, which is understood through *ante* ["before"].

la: Cfr. August., XII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 7, et *Enchir.* c. 23. — Mox pro *oppositi* cod. T *suppositi*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *City of God* XII, c. 7, and *Enchiridion* c. 23. — Soon, in place of *oppositi* codex T [reads] *suppositi*.

la: Cod. T *vel*.

en: Codex T [reads] *vel* ["or"].

en: Distinction 36, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Dist. 46. q. 3, ubi exponitur differentia inter *ducere in finem per modum causae*, vel *per modum casus*, vel *per modum occasionis*, et quomodo in casu, de quo hic agitur, ratio mutetur causandi, in quantum scilicet transitur a ratione causae proprie dictae ad rationem occasionis.

en: Distinction 46, q. 3, where is expounded the difference between *to lead to an end through the mode of cause*, or *through the mode of chance*, or *through the mode of occasion*, and how in the case of which we treat here, the *ratio* of causing is changed, namely inasmuch as one passes from the *ratio* of cause properly so called to the *ratio* of occasion.

la: Non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 voculam *cum* in *tamen*. Paulo inferius pro *sed cum* nonnulli codd. et dictae edd. *sed tamen*, Vat. *si autem*. — Mox pro *operetur* codd. AB *operaretur*, et subinde pro *super* Vat. cum cod. cc *secundum*.

en: Not a few codices with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 [change] the little word *cum* into *tamen*. A little below, in place of *sed cum* several codices and the said editions [read] *sed tamen*, the Vatican *si autem*. — Soon, in place of *operetur* codd. AB [read] *operaretur*, and thereupon in place of *super* the Vatican together with codex cc [reads] *secundum*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac et sequenti distinctione tractatur difficillima materia de divina praescientia et scientia, de qua definivit Concilium Vaticanum (Constit. I *de Fide*, c. 1): «Omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius (*Hebr.* 4, 13.), etiam ea quae libera creaturarum actione futura sunt». De hac quaestione inter theologos catholicos gravissimae controversiae agitatae sunt, quae, licet exortae sint ex differentia opinionum de concordia inter divinam gratiam et liberum arbitrium stabilienda, tamen in hoc loco amplissimum disputationum campum invenerunt. Tanta enim est inter divinam cognitionem et nostram differentia, tam immense nostram capacitatem excedit altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei (*Rom.* 11, 33), ut difficultates et obscuritates nobis eo magis augeantur, quo magis ad quaestiones speciales descenditur et quasi receditur ab immensa et simplicissima unitate illius actus purissimi, qui divina scientia simul est et substantia. Attamen satis conveniunt omnes theologi catholici in praecipuis principiis, ad explicationem eiusdem fidei adhibendis. Dum in humana cognitione realiter distinguuntur cognoscens et cognitum, *ratio cognoscendi*, *potentia cognoscendi* et *actus cognoscendi*, omnes concedunt, quod «in Deo intellectus intelligens, et id quod intelligitur, et species intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere sunt omnino unum et idem» (S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 14. a. 4; cfr. S. Bonav., d. 39. a. 2. q. 1.) — quod eademque divina essentia est ipsa lux omnia illuminans, in comparatione cuius «omnis cognitio, qua creaturarum quamlibet in se ipsa novimus, non immerito *nox* dici potest» (S. August., *de Gen. ad Lit.* IV. c. 23.) — quod divina scientia a re nec causatur nec oritur; ideo ab illa non dependet nec discurrit cognoscendo *ex causa effectum*, sed potius cognoscit *effectum in causa* (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 7. ad 2.) — quod divina scientia res cognoscat sub mensura aeternitatis et aeque perfecte praeterita, praesentia et futura. Nos autem res conci<!-- page 671 -->pimus sub differentiis temporis et spatii, et res praesentes imperfecte cognoscimus, memorando vero aliqua praeterita adhuc imperfectius scimus, et confidendo tantum pauca futura potius auguramur quam scimus.

**II.** Haec una simplicissima scientia Dei, ipsa in se nullo modo diversificatur, licet diversa nomina sortiatur. In quantum enim est cognoscitiva omnium possibilium, dicitur *scientia* sive *cognitio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium quae in universo fiunt, dicitur *visio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium quae bene fiunt, dicitur *approbatio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae futura sunt, dicitur *praescientia* sive *praevisio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae ab ipso Deo fienda sunt, dicitur *dispositio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae praemianda sunt, dicitur *praedestinatio*; in quantum vero est cognoscitiva eorum quae damnanda sunt, dicitur *reprobatio*» (S. Bonav., *Breviloq.* p. 1. c. 8.). — Imprimis notanda est triplex species scientiae divinae, communiter in scholis recepta et a S. Doctore infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. explicata (cfr. hic dub. 3, et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2; et d. 36. dub. 3.), scilicet *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, quae terminatur ad res mere possibiles vel etiam ad «solum eventum» (hic dub. 3.), *scientia approbationis*, et *scientia visionis*. Scientia approbationis «connotat complacentiam voluntatis» (d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.) et «effectum et bonitatem» (hic dub. 3, et d. 36. dub. 3.), unde non est respectu malorum; dicitur etiam *practica* (d. 40. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2, et dub. 3.). Ideo *scientia visionis*, quae est omnium quae unquam fuerunt, sunt et erunt, ad plura se extendit quam scientia approbationis; et non pauci theologi (ut notum) scientiam visionis subdividunt in scientiam approbationis et improbationis. — Praecipue autem observandum est, quod proprie loquendo, tribuenda est Deo *potius scientia quam praescientia*. In praescientia enim notatur non tantum ordo prioris, sed etiam quaedam distantia inter scientiam cognoscentis et rei eventum, cum tempus quasi quoddam *medium* inter utrumque concipiatur. Revera autem non est hoc medium inter cognitionem Dei et cognitum, unde «non est futurum respectu divinae scientiae, quae, in momento aeternitatis existens, ad omnia praesentialiter se habet» (S. Thom., *S. c. G.* I. c. 67. Cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 3; S. Thom., *de Veritate* q. 2. a. 12.).

**III.** Quoad quaestionem hic propositam consentiunt omnes theologi in his: 1. quod «scientia secundum rationem scientiae, non dicit aliquam causalitatem, alias omnis scientia esset causa; sed in quantum est scientia artificis operantis res, sic habet rationem causae respectu rei operatae per artem... Patet etiam, quod principalitas causalitatis consistat penes voluntatem» (S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1.). 2. Quoad causalitatem Dei respectu futurorum omnes admittunt distinctionem hic in corp. positam, quod aliquorum Deus est tota et sola causa, aliquorum est causa simul cum causis secundariis (cfr. infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.), aliquorum, scilicet malorum, nullo modo dicendus est causa. 3. Praescindendo a cognitione malorum, profitentur plerique, quod scientia Dei, quatenus adiunctam habet voluntatem, «in sua generalitate semper importat causalitatem aliquam» (hic in corp.) et quod «in omni cognitione Dei est causalitas» (cfr. infra d. 46. q. 4. ad 4.). Controvertitur autem de modo huius causalitatis, utrum sit non tantum *directim* (de quo non est dubium), an insuper proxime et immediate *effectim*, quod a multis negatur, ne libertati voluntatis creatae praeiudicetur. 4. Respectu mali, formaliter sumti ut privatio, non datur causa efficiens, sed tantum *deficiens*, et nullatenus in Deo est mali ulla causa, sive efficiens, sive exemplaris, sive finalis; tamen in cognitione mali ratio causalitatis multipliciter implicatur. Nam manifeste hic valet causalitas improprie dicta, quae vocatur *consequentiae*, de qua agitur in solut. ad 2, et quae explicatur infra a. 2. q. 1. Haec enim non ponit rem producendo, sed simpliciter inferendo consequentiam, scilicet vel ab eventu scientiam, vel a scientia eventum. Sed etiam aliis modis in cognitione mali implicatur ratio causalitatis, scilicet respectu boni, cuius malum est corruptio, sicut hic ad 4. S. explicatur. Plura de hoc vide d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. *Scholion*.

**IV.** Pro illustratione et confirmatione conclusionum serviunt verba S. Thomae (*de Verit.* q. 2. a. 14.): «Scientia in quantum scientia non dicit causam activam, sicut nec forma in quantum est forma». «Inter scientiam Dei, quae est causa rei, et ipsam rem causatam invenitur duplex medium: unum ex parte Dei, scilicet divina voluntas; aliud ex parte ipsarum rerum quantum ad quosdam effectus, scilicet causae secundae, quibus mediantibus proveniunt res a scientia Dei. Omnis autem effectus non solum sequitur conditionem causae primae, sed etiam mediae; et ideo res scitae a Deo procedunt ab eius scientia per modum voluntatis et per modum causarum secundarum, nec oportet, quod in omnibus modum scientiae sequantur».

Auctores: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. 1. q. 24. m. 2. — S. Thom. de hac, et seq. q. hic q. unica, a. 1; *S.* I. q. 14. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 11; *S.* p. I. tr. 18. q. 61. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 36. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 6.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this and the following distinction is treated the most difficult matter concerning divine foreknowledge and knowledge, of which the Vatican Council defined (Constitution I *On the Faith*, c. 1): "All things are bare and open to his eyes (*Heb.* 4:13), even those things which are to be by the free action of creatures." Concerning this question among Catholic theologians the gravest controversies have been waged, which, although they arose from a difference of opinions concerning how to establish the concord between divine grace and free choice, nevertheless have found here the amplest field of disputation. For so great is the difference between divine cognition and ours, so immensely does the height of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God (*Rom.* 11:33) exceed our capacity, that the difficulties and obscurities are increased for us all the more, the more one descends to particular questions and as it were withdraws from the immense and most simple unity of that purest act, which is at once divine knowledge and substance. Nevertheless, all Catholic theologians sufficiently agree on the chief principles to be employed in the explanation of the same faith. While in human cognition the knower and the known, the *ratio of knowing*, the *power of knowing*, and the *act of knowing* are really distinguished, all concede that "in God the intellect understanding, and that which is understood, and the intelligible *species*, and the very act of understanding are altogether one and the same" (St. Thomas, *S.* I. q. 14, a. 4; cf. St. Bonaventure, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1) — and that the same divine essence is itself the light illuminating all, in comparison with which "every cognition by which we know any creature in itself can not undeservedly be called *night*" (St. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV, c. 23) — that divine knowledge is neither caused nor arises from a thing; therefore it does not depend on it, nor does it discursively know *the effect from the cause*, but rather knows *the effect in the cause* (St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 7, ad 2) — and that divine knowledge knows things under the measure of eternity and equally perfectly the past, the present, and the future. We, however, conceive things <!-- page 671 -->under the differences of time and space, and we know present things imperfectly; recalling some past things we know still more imperfectly, and trusting only [in such recall] we rather divine than know a few future things.

**II.** This one most simple knowledge of God is in itself in no way diversified, although it receives diverse names. For inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of all possibles, it is called *knowledge* or *cognition*; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of all things which come to pass in the universe, it is called *vision*; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of all things which come to pass well, it is called *approbation*; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of those things which are future, it is called *foreknowledge* or *prevision*; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of those things which are to be done by God himself, it is called *disposition*; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of those things which are to be rewarded, it is called *predestination*; inasmuch indeed as it is cognoscitive of those things which are to be condemned, it is called *reprobation*" (St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* p. 1, c. 8). — Especially to be noted is the threefold species of divine knowledge, commonly received in the schools and explained by the Holy Doctor below at d. 39, a. 1, q. 3 (cf. here dub. 3, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; and d. 36, dub. 3), namely the *knowledge of simple intelligence*, which is terminated to merely possible things or even to "the bare event" (here dub. 3), the *knowledge of approbation*, and the *knowledge of vision*. The knowledge of approbation "connotes the complacency of the will" (d. 39, a. 1, q. 2) and "effect and goodness" (here dub. 3, and d. 36, dub. 3), whence it is not with respect to evils; it is also called *practical* (d. 40, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2, and dub. 3). Therefore the *knowledge of vision*, which is of all the things which ever were, are, or will be, extends itself to more than the knowledge of approbation; and not a few theologians (as is known) subdivide the knowledge of vision into the knowledge of approbation and of disapprobation. — Especially it must be observed that, properly speaking, *knowledge rather than foreknowledge* is to be attributed to God. For in foreknowledge there is noted not only the order of the prior, but also a certain distance between the knowledge of the knower and the event of the thing, since time is conceived as a sort of *medium* between the two. But truly there is no such medium between God's cognition and the cognized; whence "[a thing] is not future with respect to divine knowledge, which, existing in the moment of eternity, is related presentially to all things" (St. Thomas, *S. c. G.* I, c. 67. Cf. St. Bonaventure, below d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; St. Thomas, *de Veritate* q. 2, a. 12).

**III.** As to the question here proposed, all theologians agree in these [points]: 1. that "knowledge in respect of the *ratio* of knowledge does not state any causality, otherwise every knowledge would be a cause; but inasmuch as it is the knowledge of an artisan working things, so it has the *ratio* of cause with respect to the thing produced through art... It is also plain that the chief part of causality consists in the will" (St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1). 2. As to God's causality with respect to future things, all admit the distinction here placed in the body, that of some [futures] God is the whole and sole cause, of some he is cause together with secondary causes (cf. below d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1), of some — namely evils — he is in no way to be called cause. 3. Setting aside the cognition of evils, very many profess that the knowledge of God, inasmuch as it has the will joined to it, "in its generality always imports some causality" (here in corp.) and that "in every cognition of God there is causality" (cf. below d. 46, q. 4, ad 4). But it is controverted concerning the mode of this causality, whether it is not only *directim* [directively] (concerning which there is no doubt), but also next-and-immediately *effectim* [effectively], which is denied by many, lest the liberty of the created will be prejudiced. 4. With respect to evil, formally taken as privation, no efficient cause is given, but only *deficient*, and in no way is there in God any cause of evil, whether efficient, exemplar, or final; nevertheless in the cognition of evil the *ratio* of causality is implicated in many ways. For manifestly here that causality holds which is improperly called [the causality] *of consequence*, of which there is treatment in the solution to [argument] 2, and which is explained below at a. 2, q. 1. For this [kind] does not posit a thing by producing it, but simply by inferring a consequence, namely either knowledge from the event, or the event from knowledge. But also in other modes is the *ratio* of causality implicated in the cognition of evil, namely with respect to the good, of which evil is the corruption, as is here explained at [reply to obj.] 4. See more on this at d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, *Scholion*.

**IV.** For the illustration and confirmation of the conclusions, the words of St. Thomas serve (*de Verit.* q. 2, a. 14): "Knowledge inasmuch as it is knowledge does not state an active cause, just as neither does form inasmuch as it is form." "Between the knowledge of God, which is the cause of the thing, and the caused thing itself there are found two media: one on God's side, namely the divine will; the other on the side of the things themselves, as regards certain effects, namely the secondary causes, by whose mediation things proceed from the knowledge of God. Now every effect not only follows the condition of the first cause, but also of the middle [cause]; and therefore things known by God proceed from his knowledge in the manner of will and in the manner of secondary causes, nor must it be that in all things they follow the manner of the knowledge."

Authors: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. 1, q. 24, m. 2. — St. Thomas on this and the following question, here q. *unica*, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 14, a. 8. — B. Albert, here a. 11; *S.* p. I, tr. 18, q. 61, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. Med., here q. 2. — Aegid. R., here 1 *princ.* q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 36, q. 4. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 6.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum praescientia divina sit causata a rebus.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum praescientia divina sit causata a rebus. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Origenes super *Epistolam ad Romanos*[^1] dicit: «Quia aliquid est futurum, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat». Quia ergo aut dicit causam essendi, aut consequendi. Si consequendi, sicut sequitur: hoc est futurum, ergo praescitum, ita e converso: ergo, sicut dicit: quia futurum est, ideo praescitur, ita deberet dicere e converso: quia scitur, ideo futurum est; et hoc negat in *littera*[^2]: «Non propterea aliquid erit, quia scit Deus»: ergo dicit causam essendi.

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia intellecto, quod Deus nihil praesciat, potest intelligi aliquid futurum[^3], sed non e converso: ergo haec est ratio et causa illius.

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3. Item, hoc argumentum est bonum: iste mentitur, ergo Deus praescivit, istum mentiri: ergo est ibi aliqua habitudo localis[^4], et nulla potest inveniri nisi causae ad effectum. Sed Deus non est causa mendacii: restat ergo, quod futurum est causa praescientiae.

4. Item, quaecumque duo sic se habent, quod invicem se consequuntur, aut ambo causantur a tertio, aut unum est causa alterius; sed sic se habent ista duo, scilicet istum mentiri, et Deum praescire, et non est dicere, quod ambo causentur a tertio: ergo unum est causa alterius.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus[^5]: «Non enim quae creata sunt ideo Deus novit, quia facta sunt».

2. Item, ratione videtur, quod non sit causata a rebus, quia omnis causa nobilior est suo effectu[^6]: si ergo divina praescientia causatur a re aliqua, cum divina praescientia sit increata, et res creata, ergo creatura nobilior increato.

3. Item, divina praescientia est aeterna: ergo cum res sit temporalis, si causatur a rebus, temporale est causa aeterni; et cum causa sit prior effectu[^7], ergo temporale prius aeterno.

4. Item, si res sunt causa praescientiae, aut ratione principalis significati, aut ratione connotati; si ratione principalis significati, cum illud sit divina essentia, ergo res sunt causa Dei; si ratione connotati, cum connotata sint res ipsae, tunc sunt causa sui[^8].

### Conclusio.

> *Praescientia divina tantum secundum rationem inferendi et dicendi in rebus aliquatenus causam habet.*

**Respondeo:** Aliqui[^9] voluerunt dicere, quod causa dicitur dupliciter: proprie, et communiter; proprie, quod dat alteri esse; et sic nullo modo res sunt causa praescientiae divinae. Alio modo dicitur communiter causa illud, sine quo res non est, et sic dicitur *causa sine qua non*; et hoc modo, quia praescientia Dei non est, quin res sint futurae, ideo hoc modo dicuntur causa. — Sed quoniam hoc nomen *causa* semper importat honorabilitatem respectu cuius dicitur causa et quandam superpositionem; ideo non videtur illud adhuc omnino sanum dicere, quod sit causa *sine qua non*. Et praeterea, illud non solvit ad auctoritatem Origenis, quia ipse negat conversam[^10].

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod est causam accipere secundum triplicem modum, scilicet secundum rationem essendi, et secundum rationem inferendi, et secundum rationem dicendi. Dico ergo, quod secundum rationem essendi praescientia potest esse causa aliquorum praescitorum, licet non omnino[^11], sed nullo modo e converso. Secundum rationem inferendi, sunt mutuo causae, quia mutuo antecedunt et consequuntur; et antecedens est causa consequentis[^12]. Secundum rationem dicendi, futurum est causa praescientiae, et non e converso. Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem. Constat ergo, quod importat ordinem ad posterius; et quoniam, si scitum esset semper praesens, esset scientia, sed non praescientia; ad hoc[^13], quod praescientia dicatur, venit ex futuritione rei. Et sic intelligit Origenes, et patet primum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de habitudine locali, dicendum, quod est *locus a convertibili*[^14].

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod habet instantiam in proposito; et quia in solo Deo est instantia, ideo ferenda est. Ratio autem huius est, quia Dei praescientia est respectu veri, et respectu omnis veri; ideo ponit et ponitur. Et quia potest esse respectu veri, quod non est ab ipso

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secundum id quod subest, nec e converso[^15]: ideo nec causa est, nec causatur. Ergo praescientia est respectu veri, quia divina; respectu omnis veri, quia nihil latet Deum: ideo ponit et ponitur. Rursus, quia scientia est, quae dicit simplicem notitiam, ideo non causat; quia divina, ideo non causatur. Ideo ponit et ponitur, et non causat, nec causatur.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether divine foreknowledge is caused by things.*

In the second place it is asked, whether divine foreknowledge is caused by things. And that it is so, is shown in this manner.

1. Origen on the *Epistle to the Romans*[^1] says: "Because something is going to be, therefore it is known by God, before it comes about." Since therefore [this saying] either states a cause of being or [a cause] of consequence. If of consequence, just as there follows: this is future, therefore foreknown, so [the converse follows]: therefore, just as he says: because it is future, therefore it is foreknown, so he ought to say conversely: because it is known, therefore it is future; and this he denies in the *littera*[^2]: "Not on this account will something be, because God knows it": therefore [Origen] states a cause of being.

2. Likewise, by reason it appears [that things are the cause]: since, on the supposition that God foreknows nothing, something can [still] be understood as future[^3], but not conversely: therefore this [the future] is the *ratio* and cause of that [foreknowledge].

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3. Likewise, this argument is good: this man is lying, therefore God foreknew that this man would lie: therefore there is there some local relation[^4], and none can be found except [that] of cause to effect. But God is not the cause of falsehood: it remains therefore that the future is the cause of foreknowledge.

4. Likewise, whatever two [things] so stand to each other that they mutually follow upon one another, either both are caused by a third, or one is the cause of the other; but these two so stand to each other, namely this man's lying and God's foreknowing, and one cannot say that both are caused by a third: therefore one is the cause of the other.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine[^5]: "For the things that are created, God did not know on this account, that they were made."

2. Likewise, by reason it appears that [foreknowledge] is not caused by things, since every cause is nobler than its effect[^6]: if therefore divine foreknowledge is caused by some thing, since divine foreknowledge is uncreated, and the thing is created, therefore the creature is nobler than the uncreated.

3. Likewise, divine foreknowledge is eternal: therefore since the thing is temporal, if it is caused by things, the temporal is the cause of the eternal; and since the cause is prior to the effect[^7], therefore the temporal is prior to the eternal.

4. Likewise, if things are the cause of foreknowledge, [it is] either by reason of [the term's] principal signification, or by reason of [its] connotation; if by reason of the principal signification, since that is the divine essence, then things are the cause of God; if by reason of the connotation, since the things connoted are the things themselves, then they are the cause of themselves[^8].

### Conclusion.

> *Divine foreknowledge in some measure has a cause in things only according to the* ratio *of inferring and of speaking.*

**I respond:** Some[^9] have wished to say that *cause* is so called in two ways: properly, and commonly; properly, that which gives being to another; and in this sense things are in no way the cause of divine foreknowledge. In another way *cause* is called commonly that without which the thing is not, and so it is called *causa sine qua non* [a cause-without-which-not]; and in this manner, since the foreknowledge of God does not exist without things being future, therefore in this manner [things] are called a cause. — But since the noun *cause* always imports a [certain] dignity in respect of that of which it is called *cause*, and a certain superposition; therefore it does not yet seem altogether sound to say that it is *causa sine qua non*. And besides, that does not resolve [the appeal] to the authority of Origen, since he denies the converse[^10].

And therefore otherwise it must be said, that *cause* can be taken in a threefold manner, namely according to the *ratio* of being, according to the *ratio* of inferring, and according to the *ratio* of speaking. I say therefore, that according to the *ratio* of being, foreknowledge can be the cause of some foreknown things, although not of all[^11], but in no way conversely. According to the *ratio* of inferring, [foreknowledge and the future] are mutually causes, since they mutually antecede and consequent each other; and the antecedent is the cause of the consequent[^12]. According to the *ratio* of speaking, the future is the cause of foreknowledge, and not conversely. For *praescientia* is called knowledge before the thing. It is clear therefore that it imports an order to something posterior; and since, if the known were always present, it would be knowledge, but not *fore*knowledge; that[^13] foreknowledge be so called, comes from the futurity of the thing. And so Origen understands it, and the first [argument] is plain.

3. To that which is objected in the third [argument] concerning the local relation, it must be said that it is a *locus a convertibili*[^14] [a topic from a convertible].

4. To that which is objected in the last [argument], it must be said that it has an instance in the matter at hand; and since in God alone is the instance, therefore it is to be brought forward. The reason of this is, that God's foreknowledge is with respect to the true, and with respect to every truth; therefore it posits and is posited. And since [foreknowledge] can be with respect to a truth that is not from him

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according to that which underlies [it], nor conversely[^15]: therefore neither is it the cause, nor is it caused. Therefore foreknowledge is with respect to the true, because [it is] divine; with respect to every truth, because nothing is hidden from God: therefore it posits and is posited. Again, since [foreknowledge] is knowledge, which states simple cognition, therefore it does not cause; since [it is] divine, therefore it is not caused. Therefore it posits and is posited, and neither causes nor is caused.

la: Vide hic *lit. Magistri*, c. 1, ubi et invenies expositionem textus Origenis hic citati. — Aliquanto inferius post *ita e converso* in plurimis codd. desideratur *ergo*.

en: See here the Master's *littera*, c. 1, where you will also find an exposition of the text of Origen here cited. — A little below, after *ita e converso* in very many codices *ergo* is wanting.

la: Intellige: Origenes. Nam verba, quae sequuntur, sunt Origenis loc. cit. — Loco *Origenis* cod. Z post *negat* supplet *Magister*, qui tamen conversam non negat.

en: Understand: Origen [is the subject]. For the words which follow are Origen's at the place cited. — In place of *Origenis*, codex Z after *negat* supplies *Magister*, who however does not deny the converse.

la: Cod. M et ed. 1 *futurum* praefigunt *esse*. Huius argumenti sensus est: in hypothesi, quod Deus nihil praesciat, adhuc intelligi potest aliquid futurum; sed in hypothesi, quod nihil sit futurum, praescientia neque intelligi neque haberi potest: ergo futurum est causa praescientiae. Sive, ut ait Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 24. m. 3: *Item, quo posito, ponitur aliud, quo remoto, removetur aliud, illud est aliquo modo causa illius*; sed re futura posita, ponitur, et re futura remota, removetur praescientia: ergo res futura est causa praescientiae Dei.

en: Codex M and ed. 1 prefix *esse* to *futurum*. The sense of this argument is: on the supposition that God foreknows nothing, something can still be understood as future; but on the supposition that nothing is future, foreknowledge can neither be understood nor had: therefore the future is the cause of foreknowledge. Or, as Alex. Hal. says (*S.* p. I, q. 24, m. 3): "Likewise, [if] when one is posited, another is posited, [and] when one is removed, another is removed, that [first] is in some way the cause of [the second's] being"; but with the future thing posited, [foreknowledge] is posited, and with the future thing removed, foreknowledge is removed: therefore the future thing is the cause of God's foreknowledge.

la: Nomine *locus* (τόπος) Scholastici significant sedem argumenti vel id, a quo ad propositam quaestionem trahitur argumentum, et consistit *locus* in habitudine aliquorum terminorum inter se. Sic v. g. *locus a causa*, qui mox a S. Doctore tangitur, est habitudo ipsius causae ad suum effectum.

en: By the noun *locus* (τόπος [topos]) the Scholastics signify the seat of an argument or that from which an argument is drawn to the proposed question, and the *locus* consists in the relation of certain terms among themselves. Thus, for example, *locus a causa*, which is soon touched on by the Holy Doctor, is the relation of the cause itself to its effect.

la: *Libr.* XV. *de Trin.* c. 13. n. 22. Vide hic *lit. Magistri*, c. 1.

en: *On the Trinity* XV, c. 13, n. 22. See here the Master's *littera*, c. 1.

la: Avicenna, VI. *Metaph.* c. 3: *Causa dignior est causato*.

en: Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VI, c. 3: "The cause is more worthy than the caused."

la: Aristot., II. *Poster.* c. 17. (c. 14.).

en: Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* II, c. 17 (c. 14).

la: Quod absurdum esset dicere. Generat enim nihil ipsum se ipsum, ut dicit Aristot. II. *de Anima* text. 47. (c. 4.).

en: Which it would be absurd to say. For nothing generates itself, as Aristotle says, *On the Soul* II, text 47 (c. 4).

la: Inter quos Magister Sent., hic c. 1.

en: Among whom is the Master of the *Sentences*, here c. 1.

la: Intellige: res sive futurum, vel substitue pro *sit* cum cod. R *sint*, scil. *res futurae*.

en: Understand: the thing or the future, or substitute for *sit* with codex R *sint*, namely *res futurae* [future things].

la: Scilicet propositionis: *quia aliquid est futurum, ideo scitur a Deo*. Conversa est: *quia scitur a Deo, ideo erit futurum*.

en: Namely, of the proposition: *because something is future, therefore it is known by God*. The converse is: *because it is known by God, therefore it will be future*.

la: Cod. Z *omni*. Mallemus *omnium* pro *omnino*.

en: Codex Z [reads] *omni*. We would prefer *omnium* in place of *omnino*.

la: Supple cum cod. *secundum rationem inferendi* (non *essendi*); nam aeque bene concluditur: *hoc Deus praescit, ergo erit*, ac: *hoc erit, ergo Deus praescit*. Hoc est quod in solut. ad 4. vocat *ponit et ponitur*. Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Priori*, ubi haec prioritas vocatur prioritas «eorum quae convertuntur secundum esse consequentiam», et proponitur hoc exemplum: «*Si homo est, vera est oratio, qua dicimus, quod homo est; et convertitur, nam si vera est oratio qua dicimus, quod homo est, est homo*».

en: Supply with codex *secundum rationem inferendi* [according to the *ratio* of inferring] (not *essendi* [of being]); for it is just as well concluded: *this God foreknows, therefore it will be*, as: *this will be, therefore God foreknows it*. This is what in the solution to [argument] 4 he calls *ponit et ponitur* [it posits and is posited]. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter *On the Prior*, where this priority is called the priority "of those things which are convertible according to the being of consequence," and this example is proposed: "*If man is, the speech is true by which we say that man is; and it converts, for if the speech is true by which we say that man is, [then] man is*."

la: Cod. R *ideo ad hoc*; cod. W *ad hoc ergo*.

en: Codex R [reads] *ideo ad hoc*; codex W [reads] *ad hoc ergo*.

la: Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. ad 1. similem obiectionem solvit sic: *Dico, quod verum est* (scil. quod sit ibi aliqua habitudo localis); *sed illa habitudo est habitudo relativi ad relativum*, sicut hic: praescientia est: ergo aliquid praescitum est, et e converso, et loquor de relatione secundum rationem. — Pro *tertio* codd. cum edd. falso *secundo*. — Ex cod. X restituimus *Deo*, quam vocem ceteri codd. et ed. 1 omittunt, et pro qua Vat. *hoc*. — Vera esset, si hic immediate ageretur de actione mala. Paulo inferius post *nec causatur* eadem Vat. cum cod. cc et ed. 1 subiicit *quia*.

en: Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3, ad 1, resolves a similar objection thus: "I say that it is true" (namely that there is some local relation there); "but that relation is the relation of a relative to a relative," as here: foreknowledge exists: therefore something foreknown exists, and conversely, and I speak of relation according to *ratio*. — For *tertio* the codices with the [printed] editions falsely [read] *secundo*. — From codex X we have restored *Deo*, which word the other codices and ed. 1 omit, and for which the Vatican [edition reads] *hoc*. — [The argument] would be true, if [the matter] were immediately treated here of an evil action. A little below, after *nec causatur*, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc and ed. 1 inserts *quia*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Huic quaestioni occasionem dederunt verba Origenis a Magistro et S. Bonav. (hic arg. 1. ad oppos.) citata, et etiam ab aliis Patribus secundum sensum repetita, quae rebus futuris quandam causalitatem respectu scientiae divinae tribuere videntur. De intellectu harum sententiarum inde ab illis temporibus usque ad nostram aetatem multum disputatum est.

Prima solutio, quae est ipsius Magistri, distinguit inter *causam in sensu proprio*, quae manifeste dependentiam scientiae divinae a rebus futuris implicat et nullatenus admitti potest, et *causam in sensu improprio*, scil. *causam sine qua non*, qua non tam *causa*, quam potius *occasio*, *dispositio* sive *praerequisitum aliquod* exprimitur, quod in hac re admitti posse, nonnulli putant. Haec solutio Magistri Seraphico non videtur esse satis sana; cui adstipulatur Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 24. m. 3.), qui vocem *causae* etiam in sensu improprio non admittit, «quia concedendum non est, quod temporale sit aliquo modo causa aeterni, quia nec per se nec per accidens». Idem tenent S. Thom., B. Albert., Scotus, Richard., aliique. Bene dicit Seraphicus (infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.), quod scientia Dei «nullo modo pendet ex praecognito; non enim secundum eius exigentiam cognoscit, sed secundum exigentiam luminis et claritatis aeternae, in qua nulla cadit dubietas, sed certitudo».

**II.** S. Bonaventurae solutio cum triplici distinctione vix a quopiam improbari potest. Sane secundum rationem dicendi nomen *praescientia* ideo dicitur, quia refertur ad futura; non e converso aliquid ideo dicitur futurum, quia praescitur. Quodsi non essent futura, sed tantum praesentia, inepte diceretur *praescientia*, cum non esset nisi *scientia*. Item manifestum est, quod secundum rationem inferendi liceat concludere ex existentia futuri, quod Deus illud praesciverit, et e converso. Hanc explicationem approbat S. Thom. (*de Verit.* q. 2. a. 14. ad 1.) dicens, quod in dicto Origenis «non importatur causa essendi, sed causa inferendi» (cfr. *S.* I. q. 14. a. 8. ad 1.). Sed tunc remanet difficultas, quia verba Origenis «negant conversam» i. e. non admittunt propositionem: quia res a Deo sciuntur, ideo futura sunt; quod tamen, si *quia* et *ideo* sumuntur in sensu illativo et non causali, ab ipso concedendum erat. — Tertio modo, secundum rationem essendi, conceditur ab omnibus, nullatenus futura esse posse causam divinae praescientiae; at vix negari posse videtur, in omni praescientia futurorum aliquo modo implicari causalitatem, cum nullum ens possit esse futurum, nisi supposita approbatione divinae voluntatis, nullumque malum sine permissione ipsius.

Aliae etiam ab antiquis doctoribus explicationes horum dictorum afferuntur ad solvendam, ut videtur, iam dictam difficultatem, quod scil. negatur conversa. Unde Alex. Hal. (loc. cit.): «Vel dicendum, quod Origenes non ponit activum, sed passivum; unde non est concedendum: quia futurum est, *ideo scit Deus*, sed *ideo scitur* a Deo. Sic enim notatur causa *aptitudinis* ad sciendum ex parte *scibilis*. In activo vero magis notatur causa respectu alicuius *in sciente*». Idem repetit B. Albertus (*S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 3.). Thom. praeter modum explicandi iam relatum etiam dicit (*Sum.* loc. cit.) Origenes locutus est, attendens rationem scientiae, cui non convenit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate»; et (*de Verit.* loc. cit.): «Intentio Origenis est dicere, quod scientia Dei non est causa, quae inducat necessitatem in scito».

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 24. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question was occasioned by the words of Origen cited by the Master and St. Bonaventure (here, in the first argument *ad oppositum*), and likewise repeated according to their sense by other Fathers, [words] which seem to attribute to future things a certain causality with respect to divine knowledge. Concerning the meaning of these statements there has been from those times down to our own age much disputed.

The first solution, which is that of the Master himself, distinguishes between *cause in the proper sense*, which manifestly implies a dependency of the divine knowledge on future things and can in no way be admitted, and *cause in the improper sense*, namely *causa sine qua non*, by which there is expressed not so much a *cause* as rather an *occasion*, a *disposition*, or some *prerequisite*, which some think can in this matter be admitted. This solution of the Master does not seem to the Seraphic [Doctor] to be quite sound; with him agrees Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I, q. 24, m. 3), who does not admit the term *cause* even in an improper sense, "since it is not to be conceded, that a temporal [thing] is in any way the cause of an eternal [thing], because [it is so] neither *per se* nor *per accidens*." The same is held by St. Thomas, B. Albert, Scotus, Richard, and others. Well does the Seraphic [Doctor] say (below, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1), that the knowledge of God "in no way depends upon the foreknown; for it does not know according to the [foreknown's] requirement, but according to the requirement of eternal light and clarity, in which no doubt falls, but [only] certitude."

**II.** St. Bonaventure's solution with its threefold distinction can scarcely be disapproved by anyone. Indeed according to the *ratio* of speaking the noun *praescientia* is so called, because it refers to future things; and not conversely is something called *future* because it is foreknown. For if [things] were not future, but only present, *praescientia* would be ineptly so called, since it would be nothing but *scientia* [knowledge]. Likewise it is manifest, that according to the *ratio* of inferring it is permitted to conclude from the existence of the future that God has foreknown it, and conversely. This explanation is approved by St. Thomas (*de Verit.* q. 2, a. 14, ad 1), saying that in Origen's saying "there is not implied a cause of being, but a cause of inferring" (cf. *S.* I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1). But then the difficulty remains, since Origen's words "deny the converse," i.e., do not admit the proposition: because things are known by God, therefore they are future; which nevertheless, if *because* and *therefore* are taken in an illative and not causal sense, ought to have been conceded by him. — In the third way, according to the *ratio* of being, it is conceded by all, that future things can in no way be the cause of divine foreknowledge; yet it can scarcely seem to be denied, that in every foreknowledge of future things some causality is implied, since no being can be future, except on the supposition of the approval of the divine will, and no evil without the permission of [God] himself.

Other explanations of these sayings are also adduced by the ancient doctors to resolve, as it seems, the difficulty just mentioned, namely that the converse is denied. Whence Alex. Hal. (*loc. cit.*): "Or it must be said, that Origen does not posit [the relation] actively, but passively; whence it is not to be conceded: *because the future is, therefore God knows*, but rather *therefore it is known* by God. For thus is noted the cause of *fitness* for being known on the part of the *knowable* (*scibilis*). In the active [predication], however, the cause is rather noted with respect to someone *in the knower*." The same is repeated by B. Albert (*S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 61, m. 3). Thomas, besides the manner of explaining already related, also says (*Sum.* loc. cit.) [that] "Origen has spoken, attending to the *ratio* of knowledge, to which the *ratio* of causality does not pertain, except with the will adjoined"; and (*de Verit.* loc. cit.): "Origen's intention is to say, that the knowledge of God is not a cause which induces necessity in the thing known."

**III.** Authors: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 24, m. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 3; *S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 61, m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum divina praescientia ponat necessitatem circa praescitum

title_alt: Whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity on the foreknown

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
#### *De praescientia quantum ad rationem necessitatis.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de divina praescientia quantum ad rationem necessitatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum divina praescientia ponat necessitatem circa praescitum. Secundo, utrum divina praescientia habeat in se necessitatem.

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### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem imponat.*

Et quod divina praescientia ponat necessitatem ostenditur sic.

1. Anselmus in libro *de Concordantia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii*[^1]: « Quae praescivit Deus, necesse est futura esse ».

2. Item, ratione sic: « ex maiori de necessario et minori de inesse semper concluditur de necessario », sicut dicit Philosophus in primo *Priorum*[^2]. Fiat ergo talis syllogismus: omne praescitum necesse est esse futurum — hoc patet per Anselmum — sed hoc est praescitum, quolibet demonstrato: ergo necesse est esse futurum.

3. Item, omne quod Deus praescit, est verum; sed ut dicit Philosophus in primo *Perihermeneias*[^3]: « omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse »: ergo si modo verum, necesse est, praescitum est nunc esse verum. Et futurum est praescitum: ergo modo necessarium est esse futurum: ergo de necessitate eveniet.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile: Deus praescit aliquid in partem affirmativam; quaero ergo, utrum illud possit non esse: si non: ergo est necessarium; si sic: ergo potest aliter evenire quam Deus praescit: ergo divina praescientia est fallibilis et incerta. Et hoc est argumentum Augustini[^4] et etiam Boethii in quinto *de Consolatione*: « Si aliorsum, quam praevisae sunt, detorqueri valent res praevisae, iam non erit firma futuri praescientia ».

5. Item, Deus praescit, aliquid esse futurum: aut ergo possibile est, non esse futurum, aut impossibile: si impossibile, non esse, ergo necesse est esse; si autem possibile; sed omne possibile [poni]bile, et falso possibili posito in esse, quod sequitur non est impossibile[^5]. Ponatur ergo, hoc non esse; et Deus praescivit hoc esse: ergo Deus praescivit falsum. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est aliquod praecedentium.

**Contra:**

1. Quod non inferat necessitatem, ostenditur auctoritate Augustini, sumta a simili, in libro *de Libero arbitrio*[^6]: « Sicut mea memoria non cogit, facta esse quae praeterierunt, sic Dei praescientia non cogit, facienda esse quae futura sunt ».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur illud idem: intelligamus, Deum nihil praescire, ergo ex hoc nihil accrescit libero arbitrio: ergo positio praescientiae nihil ei aufert[^7]: ergo cum liberum arbitrium de se sit causa rerum ad utrumlibet et contingentium, divina praescientia hoc non tollit.

3. Item, sicut supra probatum est[^8], divina praescientia in pluribus aut non est causa, aut non est tota causa; sed quod dat alicui necessitatem, habet rationem causae, quia a quo est esse, est esse necessarium: cum igitur divina praescientia multorum futurorum non sit causa, ut malorum, nullam rebus imponit necessitatem.

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4. Item, divina praescientia praescit res, sicut sunt eventurae, cum nihil praesciat nisi verum: ergo cum praescit, aliquem peccaturum, cum peccatum non sit nisi per voluntatem, praescit, istum per voluntatem hoc facere, et praescit, aliud posse facere. Ergo si omne quod praescit, est verum, verum est, quod iste per voluntatem hoc faciet et poterit aliud facere; et si hoc est contingens: ergo, si cum divina praescientia est contingentia circa res, non ergo necessitas.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus ducentibus ad impossibile. Si imponit praescientia rebus necessitatem, perit ergo casus et fortuna. Secundum impossibile est, quod perit liberum arbitrium et consilium. Tertium, quod perit meritum et demeritum. Quartum, quod perit laus et vituperium[^9].

### Conclusio.

> *Praescientia divina rebus non imponit necessitatem, sed ipsum modum contingentiae rerum contingentium praescit.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tres circa hoc fuerunt positiones.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod praescientia necessario, cum sit infallibilis, imponit necessitatem, et ideo abstulerunt liberum arbitrium et peccatum. Et ista positio fuit haeretica et iniqua, quia destruit bonos mores.

Alia positio fuit, quod divina praescientia, si esset, necessitatem imponeret, et sic omnis virtus et laus periret. Et quia dilexerunt rem publicam, ideo abstulerunt a Deo praescientiam, et a propositionibus de futuro abstulerunt veritatem. — Et haec haeretica fuit et impia, quia derogat nobilitati divinae.

Tertia positio est catholica, quae Deum honorat et bonos mores conservat, et ideo iusta, pia et vera: quod divina praescientia est, et tamen non imponit rebus necessitatem. Omnia enim sic praecognoscit esse eventura, sicut eventura sunt; et ideo, cum multa sint eventura contingenter, ut illa quae sunt a libero arbitrio et casu et fortuna, sicut praescit, haec esse futura ab istis, sic praescit modum contingentiae secundum quem sunt ab istis.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod duplex est necessitas, scilicet *absoluta*, et *respectiva*. *Necessitas absoluta*, quae opponitur contingentiae, dicitur necessitas *consequentis*. *Necessitas respectiva* dicitur necessitas *consequentiae*; et haec non opponitur contingenti. Nam aliquod contingens necessario sequitur, ut si ambulet, necessario sequitur, quod movetur.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Dicendum ergo, quod in praescito non est necessitas absoluta, sed solum consequentiae, quia necessario sequitur: Deus praescit hoc, ergo hoc erit. Et hoc modo intelligitur auctoritas Anselmi, et consimiles auctoritates, quae proponuntur cum modo necessitatis; et sic patet primum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur de syllogismo ex maiori de necessario et minori de inesse; dicendum, quod sicut patet, et Philosophus exponit, hoc intelligitur de ea propositione, quae est *de inesse simpliciter*, quod aequivalet necessario; sed minor huius syllogismi, scilicet: *hoc est praescitum*, non est de inesse simpliciter; sicut enim infra patebit, non est necessaria.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de praescito, quod verum est, et si verum est, necessario est modo; dicendum, quod istam rationem facit Philosophus ad ostendendum, quod in futuris non est veritas; et est sophistica[^10]. Nam quando dicitur: *omne quod est, quando est, necessario est*; intelligitur de eo, quod ponit aliquid in actu circa suppositum, quod ex quo positum est, impossibile est non esse positum; sed verum de futuro nihil ponit circa subiectum, quia non est verum pro praesenti, sed solum pro futuro: et ideo nulla est necessitas, neque simpliciter, neque ut nunc, quia nihil ponit ut nunc.

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*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur per impossibile, quod si posset aliter esse, posset falli etc.; dicendum, quod[^11] falsitas venit ex discordia intellectus ad cognitum, similiter potentia fallendi ex potentia discordandi. Dico igitur, quoniam necessario praescitum sequitur ad praescientiam, ideo non possunt discordare: et ideo nunquam fallitur, nec potest falli.

*Ad 5.* Quod ergo obiicitur, utrum aliter possit esse; dicendum, quod aliter potest esse, quia Deus potest aliter praescisse; et cum ponitur, quod aliter sit[^12], ponitur, quod aliter praescit. Quando ergo infertur: potest aliter esse, quam sit: et Deus praescivit sic: ergo aliter[^13] quam Deus praescit, distinguenda est conclusio: quia potest intelligi divisim, et sic vera est; et est sensus: Deus praescit hoc posse evenire, et possibile est, illud non evenire; si autem coniunctim, falsa; et est sensus: illud est possibile, quod Deus praescit uno modo, et eveniat alio. Et est fallacia compositionis in illo processu, sicut hic: *currens potest non moveri*: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis currat et non moveatur; non sequitur. Similiter, cum quaeritur, quod ponatur: ponendum est; sed cum assumit: *Deus praescivit, hoc*; est oppositum ponenti[^14]: et ideo est negandum.

english:
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### Article II.
#### *On foreknowledge with respect to the account of necessity.*

Consequently there is a question concerning the second article, namely, on divine foreknowledge with respect to the account of necessity. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity on the foreknown. Second, whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in itself.

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### Question I.
#### *Whether God's foreknowledge imposes necessity on things foreknown.*

That divine foreknowledge imposes necessity is shown thus.

1. Anselm in the book *On the Concordance of Foreknowledge and Free Choice*[^1]: "What God has foreknown, it is necessary that it be future."

2. Likewise, by reason thus: "From a major premise concerning the necessary and a minor premise concerning the *de inesse* (in-being), there is always concluded a proposition concerning the necessary," as the Philosopher says in the first book of the *Prior Analytics*[^2]. Let then such a syllogism be made: every foreknown thing is necessarily going to be — this is clear by Anselm — but this thing, whatever be pointed out, is foreknown: therefore it is necessarily going to be.

3. Likewise, everything that God foreknows is true; but as the Philosopher says in the first book of *On Interpretation*[^3]: "Everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be": therefore if it is now true, it is necessary that what is foreknown be now true. And the future is foreknown: therefore now it is necessary that it be future: therefore it will come about by necessity.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown by [reduction to the] impossible: God foreknows something on the affirmative side; I ask therefore whether it could not be: if it could not, then it is necessary; if it could, then it can come about otherwise than as God foreknows: therefore divine foreknowledge is fallible and uncertain. And this is the argument of Augustine[^4] and also of Boethius in the fifth book of *On Consolation*: "If foreseen things can be turned otherwise than as they were foreseen, then there will no longer be a firm foreknowledge of the future."

5. Likewise, God foreknows that something will be future: either then it is possible for it not to be future, or it is impossible: if it is impossible for it not to be, therefore it is necessary that it be; but if it is possible, then since every possible is *ponibile* (capable of being posited), and when a false possible has been posited as in being, what follows is not impossible[^5]. Let it be posited, then, that this thing not be; and God has foreknown this thing to be: therefore God has foreknown a falsehood. But this is impossible: therefore one of the preceding [premises] is impossible.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it does not introduce necessity is shown by the authority of Augustine, taken from a likeness, in the book *On Free Choice*[^6]: "Just as my memory does not compel things to have happened that have already passed, so God's foreknowledge does not compel things to be done that are future."

2. Likewise, the same thing is shown by reason: let us understand that God foreknows nothing — therefore from this nothing accrues to free choice; therefore the positing of foreknowledge takes nothing from it[^7]: therefore, since free choice is of itself a cause of things in either direction and of contingents, divine foreknowledge does not take this away.

3. Likewise, as has been proved above[^8], divine foreknowledge in many cases is either not the cause, or not the entire cause; but that which gives necessity to anything has the account of a cause, since from that which is comes being, and necessary being: since therefore divine foreknowledge is not the cause of many future things, such as evils, it imposes no necessity on things.

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4. Likewise, divine foreknowledge foreknows things as they are going to come about, since it foreknows nothing but the true: therefore when it foreknows that someone will sin, since sin is only by the will, it foreknows that this person will do this through his will, and it foreknows that he could do otherwise. Therefore if everything that it foreknows is true, it is true that this man will do this through his will and will be able to do otherwise; and if this is contingent: therefore, since with divine foreknowledge there is contingency about things, there is therefore not necessity.

5. Likewise, the same is shown by reasonings leading to an impossible. If foreknowledge imposes necessity on things, then chance and fortune perish. The second impossible is that free choice and counsel perish. The third, that merit and demerit perish. The fourth, that praise and blame perish[^9].

### Conclusion.

> *Divine foreknowledge does not impose necessity on things, but rather foreknows the very mode of contingency of contingent things.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there were three positions about this.

For some said that foreknowledge, since it is infallible, necessarily imposes necessity, and so they took away free choice and sin. And this position was heretical and iniquitous, because it destroys good morals.

Another position was that divine foreknowledge, if it existed, would impose necessity, and so all virtue and praise would perish. And because they loved the commonwealth, they took away foreknowledge from God, and from propositions about the future they took away truth. — And this was heretical and impious, because it derogates from the divine nobility.

The third position is the catholic one, which honors God and preserves good morals, and is therefore just, pious and true: namely, that divine foreknowledge exists, and yet it does not impose necessity on things. For it foreknows all things to be going to come about exactly as they are going to come about; and therefore, since many things are going to come about contingently, like those that are from free choice and from chance and fortune, just as it foreknows that these things will be future from these [causes], so it foreknows the mode of contingency according to which they are from these.

For the understanding of the objections it should be noted that necessity is twofold, namely *absolute* and *relative*. *Absolute necessity*, which is opposed to contingency, is called the necessity *of the consequent*. *Relative necessity* is called the necessity *of the consequence*; and this is not opposed to the contingent. For some contingent thing necessarily follows, as if he walks, it necessarily follows that he is moved.

**Replies to the affirmative arguments:**

*To 1.* It must be said, then, that in the foreknown there is no absolute necessity, but only [necessity] of the consequence, since it follows necessarily: God foreknows this, therefore this will be. And in this way is to be understood the authority of Anselm, and the like authorities, which are propounded with the mode of necessity; and so the first is clear.

*To 2.* As to what is objected secondly about the syllogism from a major *de necessario* and a minor *de inesse*; it must be said that, as is clear, and as the Philosopher expounds, this is to be understood of that proposition which is *de inesse simpliciter*, which is equivalent to the necessary; but the minor of this syllogism, namely, *this is foreknown*, is not *de inesse simpliciter*; for as will be clear below, it is not necessary.

*To 3.* As to what is objected concerning the foreknown, that it is true, and if it is true, it is now necessarily so; it must be said that the Philosopher makes this argument to show that in future things there is no truth; and it is sophistical[^10]. For when it is said: *everything that is, when it is, is necessarily*; it is understood of that which posits something in act about the supposit, in such a way that, since it has been posited, it is impossible for it not to be posited; but the true about the future posits nothing about the subject, since it is not true for the present, but only for the future: and therefore there is no necessity, neither absolutely, nor as-of-now, since it posits nothing as-of-now.

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*To 4.* As to what is objected by [reduction to the] impossible, that if it could be otherwise, it could be deceived etc.; it must be said that[^11] falsity comes from a discord between the intellect and what is known, just as the power of being deceived comes from the power of discord. I say therefore, since the foreknown follows necessarily upon foreknowledge, that they cannot discord: and therefore [foreknowledge] is never deceived, nor can it be deceived.

*To 5.* As to what is objected, whether it could be otherwise; it must be said that it could be otherwise, because God could have foreknown otherwise; and when it is posited that it be otherwise[^12], it is posited that he foreknows otherwise. When therefore it is inferred: it can be otherwise than it is: and God foreknew thus: therefore otherwise[^13] than God foreknows — the conclusion must be distinguished: because it can be understood divisively, and so it is true; and the sense is: God foreknows this can come about, and it is possible that it not come about; but if [taken] compositely, [it is] false; and the sense is: it is possible that what God foreknows in one way come about in another. And there is a fallacy of composition in that process, as here: *the running man can not-be-moved*: therefore it is possible that someone be running and not be moved; this does not follow. Likewise, when it is asked that something be posited: it is to be posited; but when it assumes: *God has foreknown this*; this is the opposite of what is being posited[^14]: and therefore it is to be denied.

la: *Quaest.* 1. c. 1. — Paulo ante verbo *necessitatem* cod. V adiungit *circa praescitum*.

en: *Question* 1, c. 1. — A little earlier, after the word *necessitatem*, codex V adds *circa praescitum*.

la: Cap. 9. — Duae generatim species propositionum, duce Aristotele (*loc. cit.* c. 2.), distinguuntur, scil. absoluta et modalis. Prior est illa, in qua simpliciter dicitur, praedicatum convenire (inesse), vel non convenire subiecto; posterior autem est illa, in qua etiam exprimitur modus, quo praedicatum convenit, vel non convenit subiecto. Prior vocatur etiam propositio *de inesse*, quae duplex est, scilicet *de inesse simpliciter*, et *de inesse ut nunc*, prout praedicatum subiecto convenit aut necessario (v. g. *homo est animal*), aut contingenter. Similiter propositio *de necessario* duplex est, scilicet *de necessario simpliciter*, et *de necessario ut nunc*. — Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 4. a. 3. ad 2, et S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 2. a. 12. obiect. 4, secundum antiquiores Aristotelis expositores, Theophrastum, Eudemium et Themistium, dicunt, in tali syllogismo *non sequi* conclusionem de necessario. At S. Bonaventura et etiam S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 5. obiect. 5. contrarium dicunt cum ipso Aristotele, nec non cum Averroe, qui in Comment. in hunc textum, de hac controversia disserens, illos interpretes multis verbis impugnat. Ceterum hae duae opiniones contrariae bene conciliari possunt, si dicatur, unam opinionem loqui de inesse simpliciter, alteram de inesse ut nunc. Cfr. Scot., *I. Prior.* q. 28, ubi cum distinctione tam unam quam alteram opinionem approbat. — Verba Anselmi, ad quae P. Doctor mox provocat, sunt citata in argum. praecedenti.

en: Chapter 9. — Two general kinds of propositions are distinguished, with Aristotle as guide (*loc. cit.* c. 2), namely the absolute and the modal. The former is that in which the predicate is simply said to belong (*inesse*), or not to belong, to the subject; the latter is that in which the *manner* in which the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject is also expressed. The former is also called the *de inesse* proposition, which is twofold, namely *de inesse simpliciter* and *de inesse ut nunc*, according as the predicate belongs to the subject either necessarily (e.g. *man is an animal*) or contingently. Likewise the *de necessario* proposition is twofold, namely *de necessario simpliciter* and *de necessario ut nunc*. — Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 4. a. 3. ad 2, and St. Thomas, *On Truth* q. 2. a. 12. obj. 4, following the older expositors of Aristotle — Theophrastus, Eudemius, and Themistius — say that in such a syllogism the conclusion *de necessario* does *not* follow. But St. Bonaventure and also St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 5. obj. 5, say the contrary with Aristotle himself, and also with Averroes, who in his commentary on this passage, discussing this controversy, attacks those interpreters with many words. Moreover, these two contrary opinions can be well reconciled if one says that the one opinion speaks *de inesse simpliciter*, the other *de inesse ut nunc*. Cf. Scotus, *I. Prior.* q. 28, where, with a distinction, he approves both opinions. — The words of Anselm to which the Holy Doctor presently appeals are cited in the preceding argument.

la: Cap. 7. (c. 9.), ubi agitur de veritate et falsitate propositionum, quae respiciunt futura contingentia. « Igitur, ait ibi Philosophus, *esse quod est, quando est, et non esse quod non est, quando non est, necesse est* ».

en: Chapter 7 (c. 9), where he treats of the truth and falsity of propositions concerning future contingents. "Therefore," says the Philosopher there, "*it is necessary that what is be, when it is, and that what is not be not, when it is not*."

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. Verba Boethii invenies *loc. cit.* prosa 3. — Aliquanto superius post *utrum* illud Vat. inserit *non*, quod repugnat et sententiae argumenti et codd. H P Q T Z etc.

en: Cf. here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1, at the end. The words of Boethius are found *loc. cit.*, prose 3. — A little earlier, after the word *utrum*, the Vatican edition inserts *non*, which conflicts both with the sense of the argument and with codices H P Q T Z etc.

la: Respicitur illa contingentis definitio, quam Aristoteles proponit *I. Prior.* c. 12: « Dico autem contingere et contingens, quo non existente necessario, posito autem in esse, nihil erit propter hoc impossibile »; et *VIII. Phys.* text. 36. (c. 5.): « Si ergo ponamus possibile esse, nullum impossibile accidet, falsum autem fortassis »; quae verba Scholastici sic reddere solebant: *Possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile* (cfr. Gilb. Porret., *de Sex princ.* circa finem).

en: Reference is made to that definition of the contingent which Aristotle proposes in *Prior Analytics* I. c. 12: "I call *to contingere* and *contingent* that which, although it does not exist necessarily, when posited in being, nothing on this account will be impossible"; and *Physics* VIII. text 36 (c. 5): "If therefore we suppose what is possible to be, no impossible will occur, but perhaps a false will." Which words the Scholastics used to render thus: *When the possible has been posited as in being, nothing impossible follows* (cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles*, near the end).

la: Libr. III. c. 4. n. 11. In textu originali verba citata sic sonant: *Sicut enim in memoria tua non cogis, facta esse quae praeterierunt* etc.

en: Book III, c. 4, n. 11. In the original text the cited words run thus: "*For just as you do not in your memory compel things which have passed by to have happened*" etc.

la: Sensus est: sicut si fingeremus, Deum nihil praescire, libero arbitrio nihil accresceret, sive liberum arbitrium esset omnino indifferens ad utrumlibet: ita, posita praescientia, nihil ei aufertur, sed ipsum manet indifferens.

en: The sense is: just as if we were to imagine that God foreknows nothing, nothing would accrue to free choice, that is, free choice would be wholly indifferent to either side: so, with foreknowledge posited, nothing is taken from it, but it itself remains indifferent.

la: Art. praeced. q. 1. — Cfr. et Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. I. c. 7.

en: The preceding article, q. 1. — Cf. also Anselm, *On the Concordance of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. I. c. 7.

la: Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2, 3 indebite omittunt *cum*. — Cfr. de hoc argumento Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 3. seq., et Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 2. c. 3. — Cfr. de his Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 7. (c. 9.) et Boeth., *Comment.* in hunc locum, nec non August., III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 2. seqq., et V. *de Civ. Dei* c. 9. seq., ubi recensentur diversae opiniones, quae mox in corpore quaestionis a S. Doctore adducuntur. — In cod. Y additur *et imponitur Tullio et sequacibus eius*. — Cod. R *scilicet quod*; Vat. cum cod. cc *quia*. — Secundum Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 3. et 6. haec duplex necessitas vocatur *absoluta* et *conditionalis*; secundum Anselm., II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 17, et *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 1. c. 3. dicitur *antecedens* et *consequens*. — Paulo superius post *sequitur* cod. addit *ad aliud contingens*. Mox post *Dicendum* in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 desideratur *ergo*.

en: Very many codices, as well as editions 1, 2, and 3, unduly omit *cum*. — Cf. on this argument Boethius, V *On Consolation* prose 3 ff., and Anselm, *On the Concordance of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 2. c. 3. — Cf. on these points Aristotle, I *On Interpretation* c. 7 (c. 9) and Boethius, *Commentary* on this passage, as well as Augustine, III *On Free Choice* c. 2 ff., and V *On the City of God* c. 9 ff., where the various opinions are reviewed which are presently adduced by the Holy Doctor in the body of the question. — In codex Y is added *and it is imputed to Tully and his followers*. — Codex R, *scilicet quod*; the Vatican edition with codex cc, *quia*. — According to Boethius, V *On Consolation* prose 3 and 6, this twofold necessity is called *absolute* and *conditional*; according to Anselm, II *Cur Deus homo* c. 17, and *On the Concordance of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice* q. 1. c. 3, it is called *antecedent* and *consequent*. — A little earlier, after *sequitur*, a codex adds *ad aliud contingens*. Soon after *Dicendum* in very many manuscripts and edition 1 *ergo* is lacking.

la: Sophistica est illa ratio non in sensu, quod illud principium Aristotelis sit falsum, sed quatenus applicatur ad probandum, vel quod in propositionibus de futuro nulla sit veritas, etiam supposito respectu ad primam causam (ut vult opinio 2. in corp. relata), vel quod etiam futurum contingens praescitum necessario eveniat (ut vult opinio 1. et opponens). Ceterum quod in futuro, quantum est ex parte rei contingentis, nulla sit certitudo, cum S. Thoma docet S. Bonav. *infra* q. 2. Aliter loquendum de futuro sub ratione divinae praescientiae. — Codd. R X sic: *veritas determinata; et ista ratio est sophistica*. Pro *sophistica* ed. 1 *sophisma*. Mox pro *omne quod* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *esse quod*. — Cod. T particulam *quia*, hic suppressam, paulo ante interiicit post verba *de futuro*. In fine solutionis verba *quia nihil ponit, ut nunc*, sic sunt explicanda: *quia nullum ponit subiectum actu existens*.

en: This argument is sophistical not in the sense that the Aristotelian principle is false, but inasmuch as it is applied to prove either that in propositions concerning the future there is no truth — even granting reference to the first cause (as the second opinion reported in the body holds) — or that even a foreknown future contingent necessarily comes about (as the first opinion and the opponent hold). However, that in the future, as far as concerns the contingent thing itself, there is no certainty, St. Bonaventure teaches with St. Thomas *below* in q. 2. One must speak otherwise of the future under the formality of divine foreknowledge. — Codices R, X read thus: *veritas determinata; et ista ratio est sophistica*. For *sophistica* edition 1 has *sophisma*. Soon after, for *omne quod* many codices and editions 1, 2, 3 have *esse quod*. — Codex T inserts the particle *quia*, here suppressed, a little earlier, after the words *de futuro*. At the end of the solution the words *quia nihil ponit, ut nunc* are to be explained thus: *because it posits no actually existing subject*.

la: Sicut veritas venit ex concordia intellectus ad rem cognitam, haec autem concordia non est aliud, quam *adaequatio rei et intellectus*: sic [intelligendum est de potentia fallendi]. Mox post *Dico igitur* codd. H T interserunt *quod*.

en: Just as truth comes from the concord of the intellect with the thing known — and this concord is nothing other than the *adequation of thing and intellect* — so [is the power of being deceived to be understood]. Soon after *Dico igitur*, codices H and T insert *quod*.

la: Fide codd. A F H K T et plurium aliorum, postulante insuper contextu, cum ed. 1 substituimus *sit* pro *scit*, quae est vitiosa lectio Vat. Paulo ante pro *praescisse* cod. V *praescire*.

en: On the authority of codices A F H K T and many others, with the context further requiring it, with edition 1 we have substituted *sit* for *scit*, which is the corrupt reading of the Vatican edition. A little earlier, for *praescisse* codex V has *praescire*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, nullo codice suffragante, addit *volunt*; conclusio potest intelligi in sensu diviso et in sensu composito.

en: The Vatican edition, together with editions 4 and 5, with no codex supporting it, adds *volunt*; the conclusion can be understood in the divided sense and in the composite sense.

la: Intelligo: *hoc potest esse* sive *evenire*. — Verba quae mox sequuntur: *potest intelligi divisim... coniunctim*, dicere [volunt? possibile]: conclusio potest intelligi in sensu diviso et in sensu composito. — Vat. *posito*, et paulo ante *ponitur* pro *ponatur*. Utraque lectio est obscura ob brevitatem et ambiguum sensum verbi *ponere*, quod vel *inferre*, vel *supponere* poterit significare. Facilior explicatio videtur esse haec: post *ponatur* supple: *etc.*, scil. *hoc non esse*, ut legitur in 4. ad opposit. Verba *Ponendum est* concedunt applicationem principii ibi memorati: *omne possibile [est] ponibile*.

en: I take it as: *this can be* or *come about*. — The words which presently follow, *potest intelligi divisim... coniunctim*, [seem to] mean: the conclusion can be understood in the divided sense and in the composite sense. — The Vatican edition has *posito*, and a little earlier *ponitur* for *ponatur*. Either reading is obscure on account of brevity and the ambiguous sense of the verb *ponere*, which can signify either *to infer* or *to suppose*. The easier explanation seems to be this: after *ponatur* supply *etc.*, namely *hoc non esse*, as is read in argument 4 *ad oppositum*. The words *Ponendum est* concede the application of the principle there mentioned: *every possible is positable*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Utramque opinionem, quae vel libertatem creaturae negat, ut divinam praescientiam salvet, vel praescientiam tollit, ut libertatem salvet, ut iam respuendam esse, catholica fide constat. Cum autem divinae praescientiae conveniat omnimoda infallibilitas et immutabilitas in sciendo, et in ea etiam implicetur quaedam causalitas respectu sciti, ex utroque capite libertati creati arbitrii praeiudicari posse videtur. Secundum hanc difficultatem S. Doctor hic 3. et 5. argg. in fundam. breviter elidit; plura vide hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp., et infra d. 40. dub. 7, et ibid. a. 2. q. 1. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Omnino constat, quod causalitas illa, qua Deus influit in causas secundas et cooperatur liberis actibus creaturarum intellectualium, congruit naturae agentium nec libertatem tollit, sed potius ponit: tamen de modo, quo fiat hic concursus et quo libertas sit salvanda, inter theologos catholicos disceptatur. — Prima autem difficultas hic cum communi sententia evidenter solvitur, adhibita illa distinctione inter necessitatem consequentis et consequentiae, quam ex Boethio (*de Consolat.* V. pros. 6.) scholae catholicae sub variis nominibus receperunt. Verba Boethii sunt: « Duae sunt necessitates: simplex una, veluti quod necesse est, omnes homines esse mortales: altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est. Quod enim quisque novit, id esse aliter ac notum est nequit. Sed haec conditio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim necessitatem non propria facit natura, sed conditionis adiectio. Nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere voluntarie gradientem, quamvis eum tamen, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit ». Deinde idem auctor hanc distinctionem adhibet ad demonstrandum, divinam providentiam non laedi libertatem creatam. — Eandem distinctionem S. Doctor adhibet infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 47. q. 1. et alibi.

**II.** Solutiones ad 2. 3. fundantur in distinctione rei actu existentis et rei futurae. Quoad rem existentem vera est sententia Aristotelis, quod *omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse*, necessitate scilicet, quae consequitur ex suppositione, quod subiectum nunc existit (unde vocatur a S. Doctore « necessitas ut nunc »), quia existentia excludit non-existentiam; non autem verum est de eo quod nondum est, sed futurum est, quia pro nunc nihil ponit in re circa subiectum. — In 5. ad opposit. supponitur, aliquid esse a Deo praescitum, et tamen non esse futurum. Ad eludendum sophisma opponentium S. Doctor utitur celebri distinctione *sensus compositi* et *divisi*, uti ex littera patet. Eandem obiectionem S. Thom. (hic a. 3. ad 3.) in eodem sensu solvit, adhibita distinctione, « quod potest esse (propositio) *de dicto*, vel *de re*; et si sit *de dicto*, vera est (scil. quod omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse), et si sit *de re*, falsa est ».

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. 1. q. 24. m. 4. 5. — Scot., *I. Sent.* d. 39. q. unica; *de Rerum principio*, q. 4. a. 2. sectio 5. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5; *S.* I. q. 14. a. 13; *S. c. Gent.* I. c. 67; *de Verit.* q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. n. 19. seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic [q. unica?].

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english_scholion:
**I.** Both opinions — the one which [removes] the freedom of the creature in order to safeguard divine foreknowledge, the other which [removes] foreknowledge in order to safeguard freedom — that they are now to be rejected, is established by the catholic faith. But since to divine foreknowledge there belongs every kind of infallibility and immutability in knowing, and since there is also implied in it a certain causality with respect to the thing known, on both heads it can seem that prejudice is done to the freedom of created choice. According to this difficulty the Holy Doctor here briefly disposes of arguments 3 and 5 in the *fundamenta*; for more, see here a. 1. q. 2. in corp., and below d. 40. dub. 7, and ibid. a. 2. q. 1, d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. It is altogether established that the causality by which God flows into secondary causes and cooperates with the free acts of intellectual creatures is congruous with the nature of the agents and does not [destroy?] freedom, but rather posits it: yet about the manner in which this concurrence comes about, and how freedom is to be safeguarded, catholic theologians dispute. — But the first difficulty is here clearly resolved with the common opinion, by employing that distinction between the necessity *of the consequent* and *of the consequence*, which the catholic schools, under various names, received from Boethius (*On Consolation* V, prose 6). Boethius's words are: "There are two necessities: a simple one, as that it is necessary that all men be mortal; and one of condition, as that, if you know someone to be walking, he must necessarily be walking. For what each one knows cannot be otherwise than as it is known. But this conditional [necessity] does not at all draw with itself the simple one. For its own nature does not make this necessity, but the addition of the condition. For no necessity compels him to walk who is walking voluntarily, although nevertheless, when he walks, it is necessary that he walk." Thereafter the same author employs this distinction to show that divine providence does not damage created liberty. — The Holy Doctor employs the same distinction below d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 47. q. 1. and elsewhere.

**II.** The solutions to 2 and 3 are founded on the distinction of the actually existing thing and the future thing. As to the existing thing, the saying of Aristotle is true, that *everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be* — by a necessity, namely, that follows from the supposition that the subject now exists (whence it is called by the Holy Doctor "necessity as-of-now"), since existence excludes non-existence; but this is not true of that which does not yet exist, but is future, because for now it posits nothing in reality about the subject. — In argument 5 *ad oppositum* it is supposed that something is foreknown by God and yet is not future. To elude the sophism of the opponents the Holy Doctor uses the celebrated distinction of *composite* and *divided* sense, as is clear from the text. The same objection St. Thomas (here a. 5. ad 3.) solves in the same sense, employing the distinction "that the proposition can be *de dicto* or *de re*; and if it be *de dicto*, it is true (namely, that everything known by God must necessarily be), and if it be *de re*, it is false."

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. 1. q. 24. m. 4. 5. — Scotus, *I Sent.* d. 39. q. unica; *On the Principle of Things*, q. 4. a. 2. section 5. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 5; *Summa* I. q. 14. a. 13; *Summa contra Gentiles* I. c. 67; *On Truth* q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert, here a. 4; *Summa* p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. n. 19 ff. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here [q. unica?].

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