title: Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De bonitate, quam opera ab intentione recipiunt.*

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de bonitate operum quantum ad qualitatem, utrum videlicet qualitas operum qualitati intentionis generaliter correspondeat.

Secundo quaeritur quantum ad quantitatem, videlicet utrum quantum quisque intendit, tantum faciat.

Tertio quaeritur quantum ad necessitatem, utrum scilicet bona intentio absque operibus ad salutem sufficiat.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum qualitas operum semper respondeat qualitati intentionis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum qualitas operum semper respondeat qualitati intentionis; et hoc est quaerere, utrum omne opus, quod fit bona intentione, sit bonum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Ambrosii, quam Magister adducit in littera[^1]: « Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit »: si ergo denominatio operis est a qualitate, et intentio sive affectus opus denominat; videtur etiam, quod informet qualitate sua.

2. *Item*, arbor bona, quae operatur, secundum quod bona, facit semper fructum bonum; sed voluntas, quae est arbor, cum bona intentione operatur, operatur secundum quod bona: ergo videtur, quod faciat opus bonum[^2].

3. *Item*, actus non est meritorius nec demeritorius, nisi quia voluntarius; et voluntas nec est bona nec est mala nisi ex intentione, sicut supra[^3] ostensum est: si ergo bonitas voluntatis facit bonitatem in opere, et bonitas intentionis facit bonitatem in voluntate: ergo *a primo*, qualitas operis causatur a qualitate intentionis.

4. *Item*, potentius est bonum respectu boni, quam malum respectu mali; sed qualecumque sit opus et quantumcumque sit bonum, depravari potest per malam intentionem: ergo multo fortius qualecumque sit opus et quantumcumque malum, rectificari potest ex bona intentione. Et potest huius argumenti illatio confirmari quasi *a minori* et *a simili* et *per consequentiam in ipso*[^5], « quia si oppositum est causa oppositi, et propositum[^4] propositi ».

5. *Item*, esto quod aliquis faciat opus malum bono fine, ita quod malitia sit in opere, et bonitas in intentione; aut intentio permanet bona, opere existente malo; aut intentio fit mala ex opere malo; aut intentio facit opus bonum. Si primo modo: ergo simul et semel merebitur quis et demerebitur, quod est impossibile. Si secundo modo; sed contra: opus est effectus intentionis; sed effectus non influit in causam, sed potius e converso[^6]: ergo potius intentio communicat suam proprietatem operi, quam opus intentioni: ergo si intentio est bona, necesse est, opus esse bonum, quod ex ipsa procedit.

6. *Item*, quantumcumque opus de se sit malum; si tamen fiat ab eo qui operatur omnino praeter intentionem, sicut ab eo qui omnino caret usu rationis, non est aliquo modo culpabile[^7]: ergo si privatio intentionis opus quantumcumque de se malum potest privare malitia et facere, quod non sit malum malitia moris; pari ratione videtur, quod rectificatio intentionis opus quantumcumque de se malum potest facere bonum et rectum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Hugo de sancto Victore[^8]: « Amor transformat amantem in amatum »; hoc autem non dicitur e converso: ergo qualiscumque sit intentio, si voluntas velit malum, necesse est, eam effici malam: ergo non videtur, quod qualitas operis correspondeat qualitati intentionis.

2. *Item*, Philosophus[^9] dicit, quod « aliqua sunt quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo », et talia dicunt theologi esse mala secundum se: si igitur in talibus actibus inseparabiliter adhaeret malitia, videtur, quod huiusmodi actus non possint fieri boni ex intentione nostra.

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3. *Item*, aliquid est malum, quod est contra Dei mandatum; sed intentio nostra non potest divinum mandatum infringere: ergo non potest facere, quod homo faciendo contra Dei mandatum non peccet: igitur quantumcumque bonum intendat, si contra Dei mandatum faciat, non erit bonum, sed malum: ergo non est generaliter verum, quod qualitas operis a qualitate intentionis causetur.

4. *Item*, bonum absolutum[^10] praesupponit bonum[^11] ex circumstantia; nihil enim est simpliciter et absolute bonum, nisi vestiatur debitis conditionibus et circumstantiis. Sed aliqua sunt opera, quae semper dicunt carentiam debitae circumstantiae, sicut interficere innocentem, aut dicere falsum scienter, et consimilia: ergo videtur, quod quantumcumque aliquis talia bona intentione faciat, non erunt simpliciter bona: ergo non videtur, quod qualitas operis semper respondeat qualitati intentionis.

### Conclusio

> Qualitas operum semper respondet qualitati intentionis, dummodo intentio bona accipitur non tantum respectu ipsius finis intenti, sed etiam respectu boni ordinis mediorum ad finem; sola autem intenti bonitas non sufficit, ut opus reddat bonum, sicut malitia reddit malum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc ab antiquo duplex fuit opinio, sicut Magister in littera explicat.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod generaliter verum est, quod opera bona vel mala pensantur ex intentione. Alii vero dixerunt, quod opera non pensantur generaliter bona vel mala, sed solum illa quae indifferentia sunt ad hoc, quod fiant bene vel male. Illa autem opera, quae sunt mala secundum se, ex intentione pensari non possunt, quia, quacumque intentione fiant, semper mala sunt.

Quaelibet autem harum opinionum verum dicit, si recte intelligatur. Intentionis enim qualitas dupliciter potest accipi, secundum quod intentio dupliciter[^12] dicitur. Uno enim modo intentio dicit voluntatem finis; alio vero modo non tantum dicit voluntatem finis, sed etiam ordinationem eius quod est ad finem ad ipsum finem, quem appetit. Et secundum hoc dupliciter potest dici intentio bona vel mala. — Uno modo dicitur intentio bona, in qua est perfecta et bona ordinatio operis ad finem intentum; et econtra dicitur mala, in qua est ordinatio indirecta[^13]. Et hoc modo bonitas intentionis non tantummodo respicit bonitatem finis, sed etiam rectum ordinem eius quod est ad finem ad ipsum finem. Haec enim duo necessario requiruntur ad hoc, quod oculus sit simplex, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium[^14], videlicet, quod « veritas sit in electione, et caritas in intentione ». Et hoc est dicere, quod tunc est oculus mentis simplex sive intentio bona, quando hoc amat finaliter, quod est amandum, et eligit quod est eligendum. Et hoc modo qualitas operis semper respondet qualitati intentionis nec habet instantiam, immo si oculus est simplex, totum corpus est luminosum[^15]; et si oculus est tenebrosus, hoc est intentio mala, et opus iudicatur malum.

Alio modo dicitur intentio bona, quia illud quod finaliter intendit, est bonum, et mala, quia illud quod finaliter intendit, est malum. Et hoc modo non est generaliter verum, quod qualitas operis causetur a qualitate intentionis; et hoc dico quantum ad qualitatem, quae est bonitas. Si quis enim mentitur, utpote ad liberationem innocentis, vel furatur, ut pascat pauperem, non dicitur bene facere, sicut dicit Augustinus[^16], et etiam Apostolus: *Non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona.* — Quantum autem ad qualitatem malitiae, non habet instantiam; immo necessario malitia operis correspondet intentioni male intendenti. Qualecumque enim sit opus, dum faciat illud homo mala intentione, Deus, *qui scrutatur corda*[^17], malum reputat. Cum enim ad bonitatem operis necessario requiratur intentio boni finis, sola illa desistente, opus iudicatur esse malum; non tamen, illa sola assistente, iudicatur esse bonum, quia plura exiguntur ad construendum quam ad destruendum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, et etiam ad obiecta pro magna parte. Nam obiecta, quae probant, quod veritas[^19] operis non correspondet bonitati intentionis, loquuntur de bonitate intentionis, prout respicit ipsum finem; et sic verum concludunt, quia ad hoc, quod opus sit bonum, non sufficit, quod homo intendat bonum, sed etiam exigitur, quod recta via tendat ad bonum. — Argumenta vero ad oppositum pro magna parte procedunt alia via, videlicet prout intentio dicitur esse bona, non solum quia intentum est bonum, sed etiam quia ordinatio est bona.

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Et sic intelligitur auctoritas Ambrosii, qua dicitur: « Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit », et ratio secunda et tertia. Nam voluntas non dicitur esse bona in se nec etiam bona arbor ex bonitate intentionis, nisi secundum quod intentio dicitur esse bona, quia bono modo ad bonum finem tendit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mala intentio sufficit ad faciendum opus malum; dicendum, quod non sequitur ex hoc, quod similiter intentio boni sufficiat ad bonum. « Facilius[^18] enim est destruere quam construere ». Et quia bonum attenditur secundum constitutionem ex concursu multarum circumstantiarum, malum vero attenditur ex cuiuscumque privatione; hinc est, quod « malum est omnifariam, et bonum uno modo »; et ideo non sequitur, quod si defectus alicuius rei sufficit ad faciendum malum, quod positio eius sufficit ad faciendum bonum; plura enim exiguntur ad bonum; nec est ibi locus *a simili* nec *a minori*. Rursus, quia malum est privatio boni, in talibus non tenet consequentia *in ipso*, sed potius consequentia *e contrario*.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intentio potius debet influere in opus, quam e converso; dicendum, quod opus non facit intentionem malam aliquid influendo, sed potius deficiendo. Quia enim opus de se inordinatum est, et intentio non potest illud ordinare; hinc est, quod dum illi operi se applicat, se ipsam deordinat.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod privatio intentionis privat malitiam ab actu; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod privatio intentionis dicitur privare malitiam ab actu, non quia aliquid intentionis conferat ipsi actui, sed potius, quia trahit actum illum extra genus moris; quia non est opus morale, nisi quod fit ex intentione. Et ideo consimilis est modus arguendi in ista ratione et in praecedenti, qua arguebatur ex comparatione mali ad bonum. Non enim valet: sufficit ad destruendum: ergo sufficit ad ponendum.

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### Article I. *On the goodness which works receive from intention.*

Concerning the first there are three questions.

First, it is asked concerning the goodness of works with respect to quality, namely whether the quality of works generally corresponds to the quality of intention.

Second, it is asked with respect to quantity, namely whether a man does as much as he intends.

Third, it is asked with respect to necessity, namely whether a good intention without works suffices for salvation.

### Question I. *Whether the quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention; and this is to ask whether every work that is done with a good intention is good. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Ambrose, which the Master adduces in the text[^1]: « Your affection imposes a name on your work »: if therefore the denomination of the work is from its quality, and the intention or affection denominates the work; it seems also that it informs it with its own quality.

2. *Likewise*, a good tree, which operates insofar as it is good, always makes good fruit; but the will, which is the tree, when it operates with a good intention, operates insofar as it is good: therefore it seems that it makes a good work[^2].

3. *Likewise*, an act is neither meritorious nor demeritorious except because it is voluntary; and the will is neither good nor evil except from intention, as was shown above[^3]: if therefore the goodness of the will makes goodness in the work, and the goodness of intention makes goodness in the will: therefore *from the first*, the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention.

4. *Likewise*, the good is more powerful with respect to the good than the evil with respect to the evil; but however a work may be and however good it is, it can be depraved by an evil intention: therefore much more strongly, however a work may be and however evil it is, it can be rectified by a good intention. And the inference of this argument can be confirmed as it were *from the lesser* and *from the like* and *by consequence in itself*[^5], « because if the opposite is the cause of the opposite, so too is the thing proposed of what is proposed[^4] ».

5. *Likewise*, suppose that someone does an evil work with a good end, such that the malice is in the work and the goodness in the intention; either the intention remains good while the work is evil; or the intention becomes evil from the evil work; or the intention makes the work good. If in the first way: then a man will at one and the same time merit and demerit, which is impossible. If in the second way; but on the contrary: the work is the effect of the intention; but the effect does not flow back into the cause, but rather the reverse[^6]: therefore the intention rather communicates its own property to the work than the work to the intention: therefore if the intention is good, the work which proceeds from it must be good.

6. *Likewise*, however much a work is in itself evil; if nevertheless it is done by one who operates wholly apart from intention, as by one who wholly lacks the use of reason, it is in no way culpable[^7]: therefore if the privation of intention can deprive a work, however much in itself evil, of malice, and make it not be evil with the malice of conduct; by parity of reasoning it seems that the rectification of intention can make a work, however much in itself evil, good and right.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hugh of Saint Victor[^8]: « Love transforms the lover into the beloved »; but this is not said in reverse: therefore whatever the intention may be, if the will wills evil, it must become evil: therefore it does not seem that the quality of the work corresponds to the quality of intention.

2. *Likewise*, the Philosopher[^9] says that « there are some things which, the moment they are named, are conjoined with evil », and the theologians say that such things are evil in themselves: if therefore in such acts malice inseparably adheres, it seems that acts of this kind cannot be made good by our intention.

3. *Likewise*, something is evil which is against God's commandment; but our intention cannot infringe the divine commandment: therefore it cannot make a man, by acting against God's commandment, not sin: therefore however good a thing he intends, if he acts against God's commandment, it will not be good but evil: therefore it is not generally true that the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention.

4. *Likewise*, the absolute good[^10] presupposes the good[^11] from circumstance; for nothing is simply and absolutely good unless it is clothed with the due conditions and circumstances. But there are some works which always bespeak the lack of a due circumstance, such as killing the innocent, or knowingly speaking falsehood, and the like: therefore it seems that however much someone does such things with a good intention, they will not be simply good: therefore it does not seem that the quality of the work always corresponds to the quality of intention.

### Conclusio

> The quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention, provided the good intention is taken not only with respect to the end intended itself, but also with respect to the good ordering of the means to the end; but the goodness of the thing intended alone does not suffice to render the work good, as malice renders it evil.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that concerning this there was from of old a twofold opinion, as the Master explains in the text.

For some said that it is generally true that works are weighed as good or evil from intention. But others said that works are not generally weighed as good or evil, but only those which are indifferent as to whether they are done well or ill. But those works which are evil in themselves cannot be weighed from intention, because, with whatever intention they are done, they are always evil.

But each of these opinions speaks truly, if it is rightly understood. For the quality of intention can be taken in two ways, according as intention is twofold[^12]. For in one way intention bespeaks the will of the end; in another way it bespeaks not only the will of the end, but also the ordering of that which is toward the end to the end itself, which it desires. And according to this, intention can be called good or evil in two ways. — In one way an intention is called good, in which there is a perfect and good ordering of the work to the end intended; and on the contrary it is called evil, in which there is an indirect ordering[^13]. And in this way the goodness of intention regards not only the goodness of the end, but also the right ordering of that which is toward the end to the end itself. For these two are necessarily required for the eye to be simple, as Bernard says to Eugene[^14], namely, that « truth be in the choice, and charity in the intention ». And this is to say that the eye of the mind is then simple, or the intention good, when it loves finally what is to be loved, and chooses what is to be chosen. And in this way the quality of the work always corresponds to the quality of intention and admits no instance against it; rather, if the eye is simple, the whole body is luminous[^15]; and if the eye is dark, this is the evil intention, and the work is judged evil.

In another way an intention is called good because that which it finally intends is good, and evil because that which it finally intends is evil. And in this way it is not generally true that the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention; and this I say with respect to the quality which is goodness. For if someone lies, for instance to free an innocent man, or steals to feed the poor, he is not said to do well, as Augustine says[^16], and also the Apostle: *Evil things are not to be done, that good things may come about.* — But with respect to the quality of malice, there is no instance against it; rather, the malice of the work necessarily corresponds to one intending evilly. For whatever the work may be, while a man does it with an evil intention, God, *who searches hearts*[^17], reckons it evil. For since the intention of a good end is necessarily required for the goodness of the work, when that alone is wanting, the work is judged to be evil; yet not, when that alone is present, is it judged to be good, because more is required for building up than for tearing down.

From these things appears the response to the proposed question, and also to the objections for the most part. For the objections which prove that the truth[^19] of the work does not correspond to the goodness of intention speak of the goodness of intention insofar as it regards the end itself; and thus they conclude truly, because for the work to be good, it does not suffice that a man intend the good, but it is also required that he tend toward the good by the right way. — But the arguments to the contrary for the most part proceed by another way, namely insofar as intention is said to be good not only because the thing intended is good, but also because the ordering is good.

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus is understood the authority of Ambrose, by which it is said: « Your affection imposes a name on your work », and the second and third reasons. For the will is not said to be good in itself, nor a good tree, from the goodness of intention, except insofar as the intention is said to be good, because in a good manner it tends toward a good end.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that an evil intention suffices to make a work evil; it must be said that it does not follow from this that likewise the intention of the good suffices for the good. « For it is easier to destroy than to build[^18] ». And because the good is attended to according to its constitution from the concurrence of many circumstances, while evil is attended to from any privation whatever; hence it is that « evil is in every way, and good in one way »; and therefore it does not follow that if the defect of some thing suffices to make evil, that the positing of it suffices to make good; for more is required for the good; nor is there place there *for the like* nor *for the lesser*. Again, since evil is the privation of good, in such cases the consequence does not hold *in itself*, but rather the consequence *from the contrary*.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the intention ought rather to influence the work than the reverse; it must be said that the work does not make the intention evil by influencing anything, but rather by being deficient. For because the work is in itself disordered, and the intention cannot order it; hence it is that, while it applies itself to that work, it disorders itself.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the privation of intention removes malice from the act; it must be said that it is not alike, in that the privation of intention is said to remove malice from the act not because it confers anything of intention upon the act itself, but rather because it draws that act outside the genus of conduct; because there is no moral work except what is done from intention. And therefore the manner of arguing is alike in this reason and in the preceding, in which it was argued from the comparison of evil to good. For it does not hold: it suffices to destroy: therefore it suffices to posit.

la: Hic, circa initium. — In ipso Ambros. testimonio plures codd. cum edd. omittunt *tuus*. Paulo inferius post *est a qualitate* cod. V supplet *intentionis*. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate generaliter dicit: « Qualitatem vero dico, secundum quam quales quidam esse dicuntur ». Et post pauca: *Qualia vero sunt, quae secundum has [qualitates] denominative dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ab his.*

en: Here, near the beginning. — In the testimony of Ambrose itself many codices with the editions omit *tuus*. A little below, after *est a qualitate*, codex V supplies *intentionis*. Aristotle, in the *Categories*, in the chapter on Quality, says generally: « By quality I mean that according to which certain things are said to be of such a kind ». And shortly after: *Things of such a kind are those which are denominatively named according to these [qualities], or in any other way derived from them.*

la: Hoc arg. insinuatur in lit. Magistri, circa initium. Exemplum de arbore bona respicit illud Matth. 7, 18: *Sic omnis arbor bona fructus bonos facit* etc.

en: This argument is intimated in the Master's text, near the beginning. The example of the good tree regards that of Matthew 7:18: *So every good tree makes good fruits*, etc.

la: Dist. 38. a. 1, q. I. — De *maiori* vide supra pag. 892, nota 2. — Versus finem arg. Vat. post *a primo* addit *ad ultimum*.

en: Distinction 38, a. 1, q. I. — On the *major* see above p. 892, note 2. — Toward the end of the argument the Vatican edition, after *a primo*, adds *ad ultimum*.

la: Anselm., I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 18: *Quis enim audeat dicere, plus valere iniustitiam ad alligandum in servitute hominem in prima suasione sibi consentientem, quam valeret iustitia ad confirmandum eum in libertate, sibi in eadem prima tentatione adhaerentem?* Cfr. supra pag. 684, nota 2, ubi verba Dionysii de hac re invenies.

en: Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 18: *For who would dare to say that injustice avails more for binding into servitude a man consenting to it at the first persuasion, than justice would avail for confirming in liberty one cleaving to it at the same first temptation?* Cf. above p. 684, note 2, where you will find the words of Dionysius on this matter.

la: Verba Aristot. vide supra pag. 763, nota 2. — De primo ex modis argumentandi hic propositis vide tom. 1. pag. 835, nota 5; de secundo supra pag. 781, nota 1; de tertio tom. 1. pag. 822, nota 1, ubi etiam quid sit consequentia *e contrario* exponitur, quae dictio in solut. huius obiectionis occurrit.

en: For the words of Aristotle see above p. 763, note 2. — On the first of the modes of arguing here proposed see vol. 1, p. 835, note 5; on the second above p. 781, note 1; on the third vol. 1, p. 822, note 1, where it is also explained what the consequence *from the contrary* is, which expression occurs in the solution of this objection.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 27. seqq. (c. 3.) et V. *Metaph.* text. 2. seq. (IV. c. 2.). — Aliquanto superius pro *fit mala ex opere malo* cod. H *fit mala, opere existente malo*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 27 ff. (c. 3) and *Metaphysics* V, text 2 f. (IV, c. 2). — Somewhat above, for *becomes evil from the evil work* codex H reads *becomes evil while the work exists as evil*.

la: Vide supra pag. 325, nota 6. — In fine arg. cod. B verbo *potest* addit *de se*.

en: See above p. 325, note 6. — At the end of the argument codex B adds to the word *potest* the words *de se*.

la: Ipsa eius verba habentur supra pag. 1, nota 8.

en: His very words are found above on p. 1, note 8.

la: Libr. II. *Ethic.* c. 6. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 32, nota 6. — In fine arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 pro *nostra* exhibent *bona*.

en: Book II of the *Ethics*, c. 6. Cf. vol. 1, p. 32, note 6. — At the end of the argument codex cc and edition 1, for *nostra*, read *bona*.

la: *Sive integrum.* — Cfr. de hoc arg. hic lit. Magistri, circa medium.

en: *Or whole.* — Cf. on this argument the Master's text here, near the middle.

la: Codd. L O bene supplent *ex intentione*.

en: Codices L and O well supply *from intention*.

la: De hac duplici vi vocis *intentionis* vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 4. — Pro *voluntatem finis* Vat. bis exhibet *bonitatem finis*, et dein cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et aliquibus codd. omittit *ad ipsum finem*.

en: On this twofold force of the word *intention* see above the Master's text, d. XXXVIII, c. 4. — For *the will of the end* the Vatican edition twice reads *the goodness of the end*, and then with editions 2, 3, 4 and some codices omits *to the end itself*.

la: Id est non directa, ut August., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 67. n. 10, ubi distinguit cor directum, et non directum.

en: That is, not direct, as Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 67, n. 10, where he distinguishes the heart that is direct and the one that is not direct.

la: Sicut iam supra pag. 891, nota 4. diximus, haec Bernardi verba habentur in eius libro *de Praecepto et dispens.* c. 14. n. 36. — Paulo superius post *quod est* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt *ad finem*. Paulo inferius pro *quando hoc* cod. Y substituit *quando homo*.

en: As we have already said above on p. 891, note 4, these words of Bernard are found in his book *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 14, n. 36. — A little above, after *which is*, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 omit *to the end*. A little below, for *when this* codex Y substitutes *when a man*.

la: Matth. 6, 22. 23: *Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit. Si autem oculus tuus fuerit nequam, totum corpus tuum tenebrosum erit.*

en: Matthew 6:22–23: *If your eye is simple, your whole body will be bright. But if your eye is wicked, your whole body will be dark.*

la: Eius orationem videsis hic in lit. Magistri, circa medium. — Verba Apostoli habentur Rom. 3, 8: *Et non... faciamus mala, ut veniant bona.* Infra cod. bb *male intendentis* pro *male intendenti*.

en: You may see his statement here in the Master's text, near the middle. — The words of the Apostle are found in Romans 3:8: *And let us not... do evil, that good may come.* Below, codex bb reads *of one intending evilly* for *to one intending evilly*.

en: Romans 8:27.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 155, nota 9. et d. 38. a. I. q. I. in corp.

en: Cf. above p. 155, note 9, and d. 38, a. I, q. I, in the body.

la: Codd. F I L Y *bonitas*, Vat. *qualitas*, quae et immediate post pro *bonitati* substituit *qualitati*.

en: Codices F, I, L, Y read *goodness*, the Vatican edition *quality*, which also immediately after substitutes *to the quality* for *to the goodness*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio est de bonitate, quam intentio vel bona voluntas communicare possit operibus sive actibus exterioribus. De bonitate, quam voluntas ipsa habet ex fine, cfr. supra d. 38. a. I. q. I. — Duae opiniones, quas S. Bonav. ex Magistro hic refert, apta distinctione conciliantur. Nam manifestum est, quod si intentio sumitur pro motu voluntatis ordinantis opus in finem, ille motus non potest esse bonus, « nisi ordo sit rectus, nec ordo rectus, nisi extrema convenienter ordinentur » (Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.). Alex. Hal., 96. m. 3. a. I. § 2. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 7, q. 20. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 138. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

**II.** De seq. (2.) quaestione pauci distincte disputant, scilicet S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 19. a. 8; B. Albert., loc. cit. m. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The question is of the goodness which intention or a good will can communicate to works or external acts. Of the goodness which the will itself has from the end, cf. above d. 38, a. I, q. I. — The two opinions which St. Bonaventure reports here from the Master are reconciled by an apt distinction. For it is manifest that if intention is taken for the motion of the will ordering the work to the end, that motion cannot be good, « unless the order is right, nor the order right, unless the extremes are suitably ordered » (Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1). Alexander of Hales, 96, m. 3, a. I, § 2. — Scotus, here q. unica, n. 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; S. I-II, q. 19, a. 7, q. 20, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 138, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. — Richard of Middleton, here a. I, q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. I. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

**II.** On the following (2nd) question few dispute distinctly, namely St. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 19, a. 8; Bl. Albert, loc. cit., m. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 942–944 = printed pp. 920–922), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 63986–64155). This is ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I of Distinction XL. Per the Vol II chunking convention (CLAUDE.md Override §5), the short ARTICULUS I opener (`Circa primum quaeruntur tria` + the three sub-questions: qualitas / quantitas / necessitas) is folded into this q1 chunk, with the `ARTICULUS I` heading. It follows `bon-sent-II-d40-divisio` (the COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, which ends at raw 63991 and explicitly forwarded this opener) and precedes `bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q2`.

**Folded ARTICULUS I opener.** The `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` listing (raw 63986–63991, top of p.920) is held here, NOT in the divisio chunk — confirmed by the divisio chunk's hand-off note. The `ARTICULUS I. De bonitate, quam opera ab intentione recipiunt.` title sits between the opener listing and QUAESTIO I in the source.

**Scholion disposition.** This q1 carries the ARTICULUS I article-level SCHOLION (items I–II), printed on p.922 after the solutions. Item I treats q1; item II forward-references q2 ("De seq. (2.) quaestione") but is printed as part of this scholion block and stays here. **Each later question (q2, q3) and ARTICULUS II must be checked independently for its own scholion** — in d.39 Art. I later questions also carried their own scholia.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.920** (raw 63986–64047): article opener; QUAESTIO I title; fundamenta 1–6 (L col) + fundamenta 5–6 cont. + Sed contra 1–2 (R col). Footer = 9 notes → apparatus [^1]–[^9].
- **p.921** (raw 64048–64138): Sed contra 3–4; Conclusio; Respondeo; Ad 1–6 solutions begin. Footer = 10 notes → apparatus [^10]–[^19].
- **p.922** (raw 64139–64155): tail of Ad 6 solution; SCHOLION (I–II). **The p.922 footer (notes 1, 2, 3...) belongs ENTIRELY to QUAESTIO II** ("Codd. X Z... intendat" glosses q2's opener "utrum quantum quis intendat"), which begins immediately after the scholion at raw 64157 — so q1 has NO apparatus on p.922.

**Hand-offs forwarded to q2.** None of q1's footers spill into q2. But q2 begins on **p.922** (raw 64157), so q2 will pick up the **p.922 footer sequence** (notes 1 = "Codd. X Z... intendat"; 2 = "Edd. excepta 1, intendit"; 3 = Aristot. VII Topic.; etc.) plus the p.923 footer. q2 opener: "Secundo quaeritur, utrum quantum quis intendat, tantum faciat" (bonitas/quantitas — quantity). q2 has NO scholion of its own per scholion item II's framing (it is treated under this article-level scholion), but verify against the PDF before assuming.

**[?] flags.** None. Body, apparatus, and scholion all read cleanly against the 450 dpi PDF; OCR garbles (`Utrurn`, `raala`, `mahtia`, `qiian-titatem`, etc.) were silently corrected per the OCR-cleanup rules where context made the intent unambiguous.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 922 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum quantum quis intendit, tantum faciat.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum quantum quis intendit[^1][^2], tantum faciat, ut sicut opus ab intentione recipit aliquo modo qualitatem, ita etiam recipiat quantitatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Matthaei duodecimo[^6]: *Bonus homo de bono thesauro* etc.; Glossa: «Quantum bonum intendis, tantum facis».

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione[^3]. Omne agens per intentionem praefigit sibi finem, ad quem opus suum mensurat[^7]: ergo si omne opus morale est ab agente per intentionem, omnis operis moralis mensuratio attenditur in comparatione eius ad finem. Sed comparatio ad finem est intentio[^4]: ergo quantitas omnis operis moralis penes intentionem attenditur[^5].

3. Item, secundum quantitatem caritatis attenditur meritum exterioris operis, et secundum magnitudinem libidinis attenditur magnitudo exterioris peccati. Si ergo caritas, ut dicit Bernardus[^8], respicit intentionem, et similiter libido, quae dicit quietationem in bono creato; ergo videtur, quod quantitas omnis operis moralis secundum intentionem mensuretur[^9].

<!-- page 923 -->

4. Item, si aliquod opus de natura sui generis est veniale peccatum, nihilominus ille qui facit illud, mortaliter peccat, si intendit peccare mortaliter; hoc autem non esset, nisi opus reciperet quantitatem in genere moris ab intentione: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Si «quantum quis intendit, tantum facit»: ergo si Linus sive aliquis alius parvus sanctus intenderet mereri gloriam Petri, mereretur gloriam Petri, et si amplius intenderet, amplius mereretur: ergo habenti minorem caritatem redderetur maius praemium, quod est plane falsum.

2. Item, si «quantum quis intendit, tantum facit»: ergo si aliquis adulterans intendit peccare venialiter, peccat venialiter: si igitur hoc est plane falsum, manifestum est, quod quantitas operis non causatur ex quantitate intentionis.

3. Item, quanto aliquis est humilior, tanto minus boni credit se facere; sed intentio sequitur credulitatem, quia «fides dirigit intentionem»: ergo quanto quis humilior est, tanto minus bonum intendit facere. Si ergo bonitas operis mensuraretur penes quantitatem intentionis, videtur, quod quanto quis esset humilior, tanto opus eius esset minus bonum; sed hoc est plane falsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, unus simplex, cum facit parvum peccatum, credit esse gravissimum peccatum; alius impius et iniquus, cum facit maximum peccatum, credit[^10] valde parum peccare: si ergo opus mensuratur penes intentionem, videtur, quod iniquus et malitiosus minus peccet in enormi genere peccati, quam unus simplex in genere peccati quantumcumque levi. Si igitur hoc est plane falsum, ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod quantitas operis correspondeat quantitati intentionis.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Quantitas bonitatis et malitiae in opere correspondet quantitati bonitatis et malitiae in intentione, sed in bonis tunc solummodo, si quantitas intentionis attenditur respectu actus intendendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut in praecedenti problemate duplex distinguitur qualitas intentionis, sic et in hoc intelligendum est, quod quantitas intentionis dupliciter potest intelligi, videlicet aut ratione actus intendendi, aut ratione ipsius intenti. Et secundum hoc distinguitur ista locutio dupliciter: «quantum intendis, tantum facis», quia *tantum* et *quantum* possunt esse nomina, vel adverbia[^11]. Si *tantum* et *quantum* sint adverbia, tunc dicunt quantitatem actus intendendi; et tunc est locutio vera generaliter, sive respectu bonorum, sive respectu malorum; quia quantum actus intendendi est intensus in bonitate et malitia, tantum operatio exterior est bona vel mala. Omne enim meritum et demeritum ad actum voluntatis reducitur, licet circumstantiae exteriores aliquo modo faciant ad maiorem voluntatis depravationem. — Si autem *tantum* et *quantum* sint nomina, tunc dicunt quantitatem ex parte intenti; et sic non est generaliter verus ille sermo, quia opus exterius factum non semper commensuratur ei quod intentio intendit. Frequenter enim intendit homo facere magnum bonum, et facit parvum, quia modicam habet caritatem. Habet tamen aliquo modo veritatem in malis, videlicet intendendo, licet non diminuendo, et prout *tantum* et *quantum* dicunt quandam comparationem proportionalitatis[^12], non commensurationem aequalitatis. Unde qui intendit multum peccare, multum peccat, qualecumque opus faciat; non tamen qui intendit parum peccare parum peccat, maxime si opus facit, quod multum habet de deformitate.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedo enim, quod quantitas bonitatis et

<!-- page 924 -->

malitiae in opere correspondet[^13] quantitati bonitatis et malitiae in intentione, secundum quod quantitas intentionis attenditur quantum ad actum intendendi, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt. Concedo etiam nihilominus, quod quantitas operis non semper correspondet quantitati intentionis, secundum quod quantitas intentionis attenditur ex parte intenti[^14], sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 3, 4.* Ad alias tamen duas rationes, quae ultimo inducuntur, responderi potest, quod non cogunt, pro eo quod non est idem dicere de aliquo, quod credit facere magnum, vel parvum bonum sive malum, et[^15] quod intendit. Aliud enim est aestimatio, aliud est intentio; et quamvis opus sequatur aestimationem, non tamen sequitur intentionem. Praeterea, illae duae rationes, sicut et aliae, procedunt de quantitate intentionis a parte intenti. Quamvis enim humilis homo parum intendat facere, nihilominus tamen magnae bonitatis est eius intentio, dum ex magna virtute movetur ad illud faciendum. Similiter, cum iniquus homo intendit modicum malum facere, tamen, quia ex magna libidine facit, multum seu valde prava est eius intentio, dum nimium adhaeret bono creato; et ideo non sequitur, quod minus peccet ille qui est magis malitiosus.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether one does as much as one intends.*

Secondly it is asked whether one does as much as one intends[^1][^2], so that just as a work receives in some way its quality from the intention, so too it might receive its quantity. And that it is so seems to be the case.

1. Upon that text of Matthew, chapter twelve[^6]: *A good man out of a good treasure* etc.; the Gloss: «As much good as you intend, that much you do».

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason[^3]. Every agent acting through intention sets before itself an end, to which it measures its work[^7]: therefore if every moral work proceeds from the agent through intention, the measurement of every moral work is regarded in its comparison to the end. But comparison to the end is intention[^4]: therefore the quantity of every moral work is regarded according to the intention[^5].

3. Likewise, the merit of an exterior work is regarded according to the quantity of charity, and the magnitude of an exterior sin is regarded according to the magnitude of concupiscence. If therefore charity, as Bernard says[^8], regards the intention, and likewise concupiscence, which means a coming-to-rest in a created good; therefore it seems that the quantity of every moral work is measured according to the intention[^9].

4. Likewise, if some work is of the nature of its kind a venial sin, nonetheless the one who does it sins mortally, if he intends to sin mortally; but this would not be, unless the work received its quantity in the genus of morals from the intention: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. If «one does as much as one intends»: therefore if Linus or some other minor saint were to intend to merit the glory of Peter, he would merit the glory of Peter, and if he intended more, he would merit more: therefore to one having less charity a greater reward would be rendered, which is plainly false.

2. Likewise, if «one does as much as one intends»: therefore if someone committing adultery intends to sin venially, he sins venially: if therefore this is plainly false, it is manifest that the quantity of the work is not caused by the quantity of the intention.

3. Likewise, the more humble someone is, the less good he believes himself to do; but intention follows belief, since «faith directs the intention»: therefore the more humble one is, the less good he intends to do. If therefore the goodness of a work were measured according to the quantity of the intention, it seems that the more humble someone were, the less good his work would be; but this is plainly false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a simple man, when he does a small sin, believes it to be a most grave sin; another, impious and wicked, when he does the greatest sin, believes[^10] himself to sin very little: if therefore a work is measured according to the intention, it seems that the wicked and malicious man would sin less in an enormous kind of sin than a simple man in a kind of sin however slight. If therefore this is plainly false, then so too is that from which it follows, namely that the quantity of the work corresponds to the quantity of the intention.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The quantity of goodness and malice in the work corresponds to the quantity of goodness and malice in the intention, but in good works only then, if the quantity of the intention is regarded with respect to the act of intending.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as in the preceding problem a twofold quality of intention is distinguished, so too here it must be understood that the quantity of the intention can be understood in two ways, namely either by reason of the act of intending, or by reason of the thing intended itself. And according to this, that locution is distinguished in two ways: «as much as you intend, that much you do», because *that-much* and *as-much* can be nouns, or adverbs[^11]. If *that-much* and *as-much* are adverbs, then they signify the quantity of the act of intending; and then the locution is true generally, whether with respect to good works or with respect to evil ones; because as much as the act of intending is intense in goodness and in malice, that much the exterior operation is good or evil. For all merit and demerit is reduced to the act of the will, although exterior circumstances in some way contribute to a greater depravation of the will. — But if *that-much* and *as-much* are nouns, then they signify the quantity on the part of the thing intended; and thus that statement is not generally true, because the exterior work done is not always commensurate with that which the intention intends. For frequently a man intends to do a great good, and does a small one, because he has little charity. It has nonetheless in some way truth in evils, namely by way of intending, though not by way of lessening, and insofar as *that-much* and *as-much* signify a certain comparison of proportionality[^12], not a commensuration of equality. Hence whoever intends to sin much, sins much, whatever work he may do; but not so one who intends to sin little — he does not sin little, especially if he does a work which has much of deformity.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear. For I concede that the quantity of goodness and

malice in the work corresponds[^13] to the quantity of goodness and malice in the intention, according as the quantity of the intention is regarded as to the act of intending, as the reasons adduced for the first part show. I concede also nonetheless that the quantity of the work does not always correspond to the quantity of the intention, according as the quantity of the intention is regarded on the part of the thing intended[^14], as the reasons show which are adduced for the second part.

**To the arguments:**
*To 3, 4.* To the other two reasons, however, which are adduced last, it can be replied that they are not compelling, for the reason that it is not the same thing to say of someone that he believes himself to do a great or a small good or evil, and[^15] what he intends. For estimation is one thing, intention another; and although the work follows the estimation, it does not however follow the intention. Moreover, those two reasons, like the others, proceed from the quantity of the intention on the part of the thing intended. For although a humble man intends to do little, nonetheless his intention is of great goodness, since he is moved to do it out of great virtue. Likewise, when a wicked man intends to do a modest evil, yet, because he does it out of great concupiscence, his intention is much, that is, very depraved, since he clings too much to a created good; and therefore it does not follow that the one who is more malicious sins less.

---

la: Codd. X Z cc et ed. 1 *intendat.*

en: Codices X Z cc and edition 1 read *intendat* (subjunctive).

la: Edd., excepta 1, *intendit.* Pro *ad bonum finem* cod. H *ad ultimum finem.*

en: The editions, except 1, read *intendit.* For *ad bonum finem* (to a good end) codex H reads *ad ultimum finem* (to a final end).

la: Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 1.). — De altero Aristot. testimonio, in quo pro *omnifariam* edd., excepta 1, et nonnulli codd. legunt *omnifarie* et cod. bb substituit *multifarie,* vide supra pag. 655, nota 3. — Paulo superius pro *intentio boni* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *intentio bona,* et mox pro *secundum constitutionem* codd. bb cc et ed. 1 *secundum constructionem.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 3 (c. 1). — Concerning the other testimony of Aristotle, in which for *omnifariam* the editions, except 1, and several codices read *omnifarie* and codex bb substitutes *multifarie,* see above p. 655, note 3. — A little above, for *intentio boni* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *intentio bona,* and shortly after, for *secundum constitutionem* codices bb cc and edition 1 read *secundum constructionem.*

la: Non pauci codd., ut B D E K P Q T bb ee etc., cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *potentia;* perperam. In fine arg. edd., excepta 1, et pauci codd. falso commutarunt *se ipsam* in *se ipsum.*

en: Not a few codices, as B D E K P Q T bb ee etc., with editions 2, 3, 4 read *potentia;* wrongly. At the end of the argument the editions, except 1, and a few codices falsely changed *se ipsam* into *se ipsum.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 subiiciunt *ipsa privatio,* cod. V pro *intentionis* substituit *intentio.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 add *ipsa privatio,* codex V for *intentionis* substitutes *intentio.*

la: Vers. 35. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum; recurrit infra in argg. 1. et 2. ad oppos.

en: Verse 35. — The Gloss is interlinear and is found in Lyra; it recurs below in arguments 1 and 2 *ad oppositum.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 29. et 49. (c. 3. et 5.); V. Metaph. text. 2. (IV. c. 2.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, texts 29 and 49 (c. 3 and 5); *Metaphysics* V, text 2 (IV, c. 2).

la: Ipsa Bernardi verba vide supra pag. 891, nota 4. De definitione libidinis cfr. supra pag. 734, nota 9. — De maiori vide supra d. 29. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et verba Bedae, supra pag. 906, nota 6. allata.

en: For Bernard's own words see above p. 891, note 4. On the definition of concupiscence cf. above p. 734, note 9. — On the major premiss see above d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, in the body, and the words of Bede adduced above p. 906, note 6.

la: Ut dicit Magister infra in lit. d. XLI. c. 1. Cfr. ibid. dub. 1. — Post pauca pro *mensuraretur* in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 exhibetur *mensuratur,* in codd. Y bb *mensuretur.*

en: As the Master says below in the text, d. 41, c. 1. Cf. ibid. dubium 1. — A little after, for *mensuraretur* the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 give *mensuratur,* in codices Y bb *mensuretur.*

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 subiungunt *se.*

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add *se.*

la: Secundum B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 41. a. 3, etiam Antissiodorensis hac distinctione usus est ad solvendam quaestionem, de qua hic agitur. Ait enim Albertus loc. cit.: Antissiodorensis distinguit hic dicendo... possunt sumi *nominaliter* et *adverbialiter.* Si *nominaliter,* tunc sunt in activo casu, et est sensus: *quantam rem intendis, tantam facis;* et tunc in bonis non tenet, quia bonum causatur ex una tota et sola causa et non a sola intentione; in malis autem comparatione habita ad peius, tenet ex parte reatus, licet non teneat ex parte conversionis ad bonum commutabile...: sed descendendo respectu minus mali non tenet, quia non sequitur, si intendis fornicando peccare venialiter, quod pecces venialiter. Si autem sumitur *adverbialiter,* tunc possunt notare intentionem in genere et similitudinem, vel in specie in aequalitate. Primo modo vera est: *quantum intendis, tantum facis,* i. e. si multum, multum; si secundo modo, falsa est, quia non ad aequalitatem intentionis semper commensuratur opus. — Paulo superius pro *locutio dupliciter* multi codd. et ed. 1 *locutio duplex.*

en: According to B. Albert, II Sent. d. 41, a. 3, William of Auxerre too used this distinction for solving the question here treated. For Albert says, loc. cit.: William of Auxerre distinguishes here, saying... they can be taken *as nouns* and *as adverbs.* If *as nouns,* then they are in the active case, and the sense is: *whatever thing you intend, that thing you do;* and then it does not hold in good works, because the good is caused by one whole and sole cause and not by intention alone; but in evils, comparison being made to the worse, it holds on the side of guilt, although it does not hold on the side of conversion to a changeable good...: but descending with respect to the lesser evil it does not hold, because it does not follow, if you intend in fornicating to sin venially, that you sin venially. But if it is taken *as an adverb,* then they can denote the intention in genus and likeness, or in species in equality. In the first way it is true: *as much as you intend, that much you do,* i.e. if much, much; if in the second way, it is false, because the work is not always commensurate to the equality of the intention. — A little above, for *locutio dupliciter* many codices and edition 1 read *locutio duplex.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, *proportionis.* Subinde post *non* Vat. inserit *tamen.*

en: The editions, except 1, read *proportionis.* Then after *non* the Vatican edition inserts *tamen.*

la: Codd. bb cc et ed. 1 *correspondeant,* ceterae edd. *correspondeat.*

en: Codices bb cc and edition 1 read *correspondeant,* the other editions *correspondeat.*

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest *et.* Circa finem solut. Vat. omisit verba *multum seu.*

en: In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 *et* is lacking. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition omitted the words *multum seu.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the PDF column bands of printed pp. 922–924 (pdf 944–946, offset +22) per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 64157–64260). English is a fresh literal translation. Marginal editorial notes (*Argg. pro parte affirm.*, *Pro parte negativa*, *Duplex quantitas intentionis*, *Duplex sensus locutionis*, *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Ad argg. pro parte negativa*, *Notandum*) are Quaracchi marginalia and are not part of the body.

**Scholion disposition.** This quaestio has **no question-level scholion**. The Scholion printed on p. 922 belongs to a. 1, q. 1; its section **II** ("De seq. (2.) quaestione pauci distincte disputant...") explicitly treats this q. 2. The p. 924 footer note 3 (q. 2's own) reads "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." — rendered here as apparatus [^15]'s source for the reply text. `has_scholion: false`; vide scholion ad primam huius art. quaest.

**Page-split map (footnotes restart per printed page):**
- p. 922 footer nn. 1–7 → here [^1] (intendat var.), [^2] (intendit var.), [^3] (Aristot. Topic.), [^4] (potentia var. / se ipsam), [^5] (ipsa privatio var.), [^6] (Matth. Glossa Vers. 35), [^7] (Aristot. II Phys.). Body anchors: opener (1,2), arg. 2 (3,4,5,7), arg. 1 (6) — all on p. 922.
- p. 923 footer nn. 1–5 → here [^8] (Bernardus / def. libidinis), [^9] (Magister d. 41 / mensuraretur var.), [^10] (subiungunt *se*), [^11] (B. Albert. / Antissiodorensis longer note), [^12] (proportionis var. / tamen ins.). Body anchors: arg. 3 (8,9), sed-contra 4 (10), respondeo (11,12) — all on p. 923.
- p. 924 footer nn. 1–3 → here [^13] (correspondeant var.), [^14] (deest *et* / omit *multum seu*), [^15] (Vide scholion ad praec. quaest.). Body anchors: p. 924 tail (concedo / solution). The p. 924 footer **also carries nn. 4–12, which belong to a. 1, q. 3** (q. 3 begins on p. 924 R column) and are forwarded to that chunk.

**Hand-off picked up (from a. 1, q. 1).** The entire p. 922 footer sequence glosses this q. 2's opener and body; received and placed as [^1]–[^7].

**Hand-off forwarded (to a. 1, q. 3).** p. 924 footer nn. 4–12 (Glossa interlin. Ps. 125; *pendent/dependent* var.; Vers. 42; Vers. 26; Gregor. Hom. 30; Aristot. *Ethic.* II c. 4; etc.) gloss q. 3's arguments (opener "Tertio quaeritur de bonitate operum quantum ad necessitatem...").

**[?] flags.** None. The p. 923 footer note 3 (Vat. et edd. 3, 4 subiungunt *se*) is physically smudged/over-inked in the source even at 600 dpi but is unambiguous from the IA OCR; rendered as [^10].

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum intentio absque bonis operibus sufficiat ad merendum vitam aeternam.*

Tertio quaeritur de bonitate operum quantum ad necessitatem, utrum videlicet intentio absque bonis operibus sufficiat ad merendum vitam aeternam.

Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Bernardus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^1]: « Intentio sufficit ad meritum, bona actio requiritur ad exemplum »: ergo videtur, quod quantum ad meritum vitae aeternae non sit necessaria bonitas actionis exterioris.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi: *Dixi, confitebor*; Glossa[^2]: « Votum pro operatione iudicatur »: ergo tantum valet *bene velle*, quantum velle et operari: ergo etc.

3. Item, Gregorius in quadam Homilia[^3]: « Non est vacua manus a munere, cum arca cordis repleta fuerit bona voluntate »: ergo plenitudo intentionis et voluntatis aequivalet plenitudini operationis: igitur sine illa potest sufficere ad salutem.

4. Item, mereri vitam aeternam est in potestate nostra; sed opera exteriora non sunt in potestate nostra: ergo videtur, quod opera exteriora non sint necessaria ad merendum vitam aeternam: igitur ad meritum vitae aeternae videtur sufficere intentio sola[^4].

5. Item, intentio et voluntas non pendent ex opere[^5]: ergo opere non existente, potest esse bonitas tam in voluntate quam in intentione; sed qui habet bonam voluntatem et intentionem est iustus, et omnis talis habet quod sufficit ei ad vitam aeternam: igitur ad meritum vitae aeternae videtur intentio sufficere absque exteriori operatione.

**Sed contra:** 1. Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^6]: *Esurivi, et non dedistis mihi manducare*; ita Dominus dicet reprobis, et propter hoc feret sententiam damnationis contra eos: si ergo propter defectum bonorum operum quis damnatur, exercitium bonorum operum est ad salutem necessarium: ergo intentio sine operibus non sufficit ad meritum.

2. Item, in Canonicae Iacobi secundo[^7]: *Fides sine operibus mortua est*; sed non est efficacior ad merendum intentio quam fides: ergo si fides non sufficit ad meritum sine operibus, pari ratione nec intentio.

3. Item, Gregorius in quadam Homilia[^8]: « Amor Dei nunquam est otiosus; operatur enim magna, si est; si autem operari negligit, amor non est »: ergo si opera non adsunt, non adest veritas amoris. Sed nihil est meritorium vitae aeternae absque vero amore caritatis: ergo circumscriptis operibus, intentio non sufficit ad meritum.

4. Item, Philosophus[^9] dicit, quod ad virtutem
<!-- page 925 -->
tria requiruntur, videlicet « scire et velle et impermutabiliter operari »: ergo si non est operatio, non est salva virtutis ratio. Sed ubi non salvatur virtutis ratio, nec poterit salvari sufficientia meriti: ergo videtur, quod absque operatione vitam aeternam non condigne sufficienter meremur.

5. Item, si sola intentio vel voluntas interior sufficeret ad meritum; sed habenti gratiam facillimum est velle bonum: ergo facillimum esset mereri vitam aeternam; cuius contrarium dicit Dominus Matthaei septimo[^10], cum dicit, quod *arcta est via, quae ducit ad vitam*.

### Conclusio.

> Ad meritum vitae aeternae in eo qui habet facultatem bene operandi, non sufficit bonitas intentionis absque bonitate operis exterioris.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum intentio et voluntas interior sufficit ad meritum absque opere exteriori; distinguendum est. Aut enim ille qui habet intentionem, habet facultatem bene operandi, aut non. Si non habet facultatem; cum nemo obligetur ad impossibile, si bonam habet voluntatem et directam intentionem, tunc sola plenitudo voluntatis internae sufficit ei ad meritum vitae aeternae absque exteriori operatione[^11]. Si autem adsit facultas, et se offert opportunitas; intentio non potest ad meritum sufficere absque opere.

Ratio autem huius est divini mandati obligatio et virtutis perfectio et voluntatis plenitudo. Divini mandati obligatio facit, ut intentio sine operibus non sufficiat, cum se offert opportunitas et facultas. Mandata enim Dei non solum obligant ad *volendum*, sed etiam ad *faciendum*; et ideo qui non implet divina mandata, cum possit, potius meretur iram, quam mereatur gloriam[^12]. — Virtutis etiam perfectio est ratio, quare non sufficit sola intentio, quoniam « virtus est ultimum potentiae[^13] », et ideo elevat potentiam ad aliquod magnum et arduum. Potentiae autem animae non habent suam utilitatem sive perfectionem completam, nisi exeant in opera sibi debita, quando adest facultas et opportunitas. Et ideo illa intentio, qua quis vult et intendit bonum, et tamen non facit, cum possit, non est intentio virtuosa, ac per hoc nec meritoria. — Voluntatis etiam plenitudo ratio est, quare non sufficit sola intentio: quoniam plena voluntas ponit effectum, si adsit facultas; alioquin non dicitur homo plene aliquid velle, si non facit, cum possit facere; sed semiplene et pigre vult, sicut *piger*, qui *vult et non vult*[^14]. Et propterea dicit Gregorius, quod « nemo debet sibi blandiri de bona voluntate, immo de dilectione Conditoris lingua, mens et manus debet requiri », et, sicut hortatur nos beatus Ioannes primae Canonicae tertio, diligere debemus non solum *verbo et lingua, sed opere et veritate*. — Quoniam igitur, cum adest facultas et se offert opportunitas, absque operibus exterioribus[^15] nec est *mandatorum Dei impletio*, nec *virtutis perfectio*, nec *voluntatis plenitudo*; et absque his non est sufficientia meriti: hinc est, quod ad meritum vitae aeternae non sufficit bonitas intentionis absque bonitate operis exterioris. Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt[^16].

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Bernardo, quod bona intentio sufficit ad meritum; dicendum, quod loquitur de intentione illorum operum, quae non sunt in praecepto, non ratione aliorum[^17], quae in praecepto sunt. — Vel dicendum, quod loquitur in eo casu, quando scilicet non adest facultas bene operandi exterius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *voluntas pro facto reputatur*; dicendum, quod verum est, quando non se offert bene operandi opportunitas et facultas.

3. Ad illud vero Gregorii, quod *non est vacua manus a munere* etc.; dicendum, quod facienda est vis in hoc quod dicit: « cum arca cordis repleta fuerit bona voluntate »; nunquam enim, sicut dictum est prius, plene bonam voluntatem habet qui potest facere bonum illud, cuius habet voluntatem, et ad fructum non pervenit[^18].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod opera non sunt in potestate nostra; dicendum, quod hoc solum concludit, quod in eo casu sufficit intentio, quando deest facultas ad perficiendum operationem bonam[^19].
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bona voluntas non pendet ex opere; dicendum, quod verum est; attamen, cum adest facultas, plena voluntas necessario ponit bonum opus, ita quod, si bonum opus non ponitur, aut nunquam voluntas fuit plena, aut desinit esse plena. Quod ergo sine operibus non sufficiat, hoc non est, quia plenitudo bonae voluntatis ex operibus pendeat, sed quia bona voluntas, si plena est, necessario in bona opera redundat, offerente se facultate et opportunitate.

english:
### Question III. *Whether intention without good works suffices to merit eternal life.*

Thirdly inquiry is made about the goodness of works as to necessity, namely whether intention without good works suffices to merit eternal life.

And that it does so, seems [the case].

1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*[^1]: "Intention suffices for merit, a good action is required for example": therefore it seems that, as regards the merit of eternal life, the goodness of the exterior action is not necessary.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm: *I said, I will confess*; the Gloss[^2]: "The vow is judged in place of the work": therefore *to will well* is worth as much as to will and to work: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Gregory in a certain Homily[^3]: "The hand is not empty of a gift, when the ark of the heart has been filled with good will": therefore the fullness of intention and of will is equivalent to the fullness of operation: therefore without that [operation] it can suffice for salvation.

4. Likewise, to merit eternal life is in our power; but exterior works are not in our power: therefore it seems that exterior works are not necessary for meriting eternal life: therefore for the merit of eternal life intention alone seems to suffice[^4].

5. Likewise, intention and will do not depend on the work[^5]: therefore, the work not existing, there can be goodness both in the will and in the intention; but he who has a good will and intention is just, and every such person has what suffices him for eternal life: therefore for the merit of eternal life intention seems to suffice without exterior operation.

**On the contrary:** 1. Matthew, chapter twenty-five[^6]: *I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat*; thus the Lord will say to the reprobate, and on account of this he will bring the sentence of damnation against them: if therefore a person is damned on account of the lack of good works, the exercise of good works is necessary for salvation: therefore intention without works does not suffice for merit.

2. Likewise, in the Canonical [Epistle] of James, chapter two[^7]: *Faith without works is dead*; but intention is not more efficacious for meriting than faith: therefore if faith does not suffice for merit without works, by parity of reasoning neither does intention.

3. Likewise, Gregory in a certain Homily[^8]: "The love of God is never idle; for it works great things, if it is present; but if it neglects to work, love is not present": therefore if works are not present, the truth of love is not present. But nothing is meritorious of eternal life without the true love of charity: therefore, works being removed, intention does not suffice for merit.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher[^9] says that for virtue
three things are required, namely "to know and to will and to work unchangeably": therefore if there is no operation, the account of virtue is not preserved. But where the account of virtue is not preserved, neither will the sufficiency of merit be able to be preserved: therefore it seems that without operation we do not condignly and sufficiently merit eternal life.

5. Likewise, if intention alone or the interior will were to suffice for merit; but for one having grace it is most easy to will the good: therefore it would be most easy to merit eternal life; the contrary of which the Lord says in Matthew, chapter seven[^10], when he says that *narrow is the way that leads to life*.

### Conclusion.

> For the merit of eternal life in him who has the faculty of acting well, the goodness of intention does not suffice without the goodness of the exterior work.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked whether intention and the interior will suffice for merit without the exterior work, a distinction must be made. For either he who has the intention has the faculty of acting well, or not. If he does not have the faculty: since no one is obligated to the impossible, if he has a good will and a direct intention, then the fullness of the internal will alone suffices him for the merit of eternal life without exterior operation[^11]. But if the faculty be present, and the opportunity offers itself, intention cannot suffice for merit without the work.

Now the reason for this is the obligation of the divine command, and the perfection of virtue, and the fullness of the will. The obligation of the divine command brings it about that intention without works does not suffice, when the opportunity and faculty offer themselves. For the commands of God oblige not only to *willing*, but also to *doing*; and therefore he who does not fulfill the divine commands, when he can, rather merits wrath than merits glory[^12]. — The perfection of virtue too is the reason why intention alone does not suffice, since "virtue is the utmost of a power[^13]," and therefore it elevates the power to something great and arduous. But the powers of the soul do not have their utility or complete perfection unless they go forth into the works due to them, when the faculty and opportunity are present. And therefore that intention, by which one wills and intends the good, and yet does not do it, though he can, is not a virtuous intention, and through this not meritorious either. — The fullness of the will too is the reason why intention alone does not suffice: since a full will posits the effect, if the faculty be present; otherwise a man is not said to will something fully, if he does not do it, though he can do it; but he wills half-fully and lazily, like *the sluggard*, who *wills and wills not*[^14]. And therefore Gregory says that "no one ought to flatter himself about a good will; rather, for the love of the Creator, tongue, mind, and hand must be required," and, as blessed John exhorts us in the first Canonical [Epistle], chapter three, we ought to love not only *in word and tongue, but in deed and in truth*. — Since therefore, when the faculty is present and the opportunity offers itself, without exterior works[^15] there is neither *the fulfillment of God's commands*, nor *the perfection of virtue*, nor *the fullness of the will*; and without these there is no sufficiency of merit: hence it is that for the merit of eternal life the goodness of intention does not suffice without the goodness of the exterior work. And the reasons which show this are to be conceded[^16].

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, from Bernard, that good intention suffices for merit; it must be said that he speaks of the intention of those works which are not under precept, not by reason of the others[^17] which are under precept. — Or it must be said that he speaks in that case when, namely, the faculty of acting well exteriorly is not present.

2. To that which is objected, that *the will is reckoned for the deed*; it must be said that this is true when the opportunity and faculty of acting well do not offer themselves.

3. But to that [text] of Gregory, that *the hand is not empty of a gift* etc.; it must be said that force is to be made on this, that he says: "when the ark of the heart has been filled with good will"; for never, as was said before, does he fully have a good will who can do that good of which he has the will, and does not arrive at the fruit[^18].

4. To that which is objected, that works are not in our power; it must be said that this concludes only that, in that case, intention suffices when the faculty for completing the good operation is lacking[^19].

5. To that which is objected, that a good will does not depend on the work; it must be said that it is true; nevertheless, when the faculty is present, a full will necessarily posits the good work, so that, if the good work is not posited, either the will was never full, or it ceases to be full. Therefore that it does not suffice without works—this is not because the fullness of the good will depends on works, but because a good will, if it is full, necessarily overflows into good works, the faculty and opportunity offering themselves.

la: Cap. 14. n. 46: *Valet itaque intentio ad meritum, actio ad exemplum.* — Paulo superius edd. praeter I omittunt *merendum*.

en: Ch. 14, n. 46: *And so intention avails for merit, action for example.* — A little above, the editions except I omit *merendum* ["to merit"].

la: Psalm. 31, 5. — Verba Glossae, quae habetur apud Lyranum, sumta sunt ex Cassiodoro, qui in hunc Script. locum dicit: *Sic iudicat [pietas Divinitatis] pium votum quemadmodum operationis effectum.* — Mox pro *bene velle* cod. cc et ed. I *bonum velle*.

en: Psalm 31:5. — The words of the Gloss, which is found in Lyra, are taken from Cassiodorus, who on this passage of Scripture says: *Thus [the piety of the Godhead] judges the pious vow just as the effect of the operation.* — Presently, for *bene velle* ["to will well"] codex cc and ed. I read *bonum velle* ["to will the good"].

la: Libr. I. in Evang. homil. 5. n. 3: *Ante Dei namque oculos nunquam est vacua manus a munere, si fuerit arca cordis repleta bona voluntate.* — Paulo inferius pro *operationis* codd. F K bb ee et alii *operis*.

en: Book I of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 5, n. 3: *For before the eyes of God the hand is never empty of a gift, if the ark of the heart has been filled with good will.* — A little below, for *operationis* codices F K bb ee and others read *operis*.

la: Glossa interlinearis apud Lyranum super Ps. 125, 5: *Qui seminant in lacrymis* etc, dicit: *Opera misericordiae, ad quae sufficit voluntas, si desit facultas.* — Cod. T, verbis transpositis, *vitae aeternae sufficit intentio sola, ut videtur.*

en: The interlinear Gloss in Lyra on Ps. 125:5: *They that sow in tears* etc., says: *The works of mercy, for which the will suffices, if the faculty be lacking.* — Codex T, with the words transposed, reads *intention alone suffices for eternal life, as it seems.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. arg. 5. ad oppos., ubi hoc ratione probatur. — Pro *pendent* cod. W *dependent*, codd. F bb ee et ed. I *pendet*. In fine arg. pro *operatione* codd. X bb *opere*.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, arg. 5 to the opposite, where this is proved by reason. — For *pendent* ["depend"] codex W reads *dependent*, codices F bb ee and ed. I *pendet* ["depends"]. At the end of the argument, for *operatione* codices X bb read *opere*.

la: Vers. 42.

en: Verse 42.

la: Vers. 26.

en: Verse 26.

la: Libr. II. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 2, ubi textus originalis: *si vero operari renuit, amor non est.*

en: Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 30, n. 2, where the original text reads: *but if it refuses to work, love is not present.*

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 4: *Primum quidem, si [agat] sciens; deinde si eligens, atque eligens propter ipsa; tertio si stabili atque immutabili affectu praeditus agat.* Cfr. ibid. X. c. 9. — Circa finem arg. edd. et nonnulli codd. post *condigne* subiiciunt *nec*.

en: Book II of the *Ethics*, c. 4: *First indeed, if [he act] knowingly; then if choosing, and choosing for the sake of the things themselves; thirdly, if he act endowed with a stable and unchangeable disposition.* Cf. ibid. X, c. 9. — Near the end of the argument, after *condigne* ["condignly"] the editions and some codices insert *nec* ["not"].

la: Vers. 14. — Aliqui codd. et Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittunt *cum dicit*, pro quo ed. 2 *quod ratio dicit*. Paulo ante pro *facillimum esset* edd., excepta I, *facillimum est*.

en: Verse 14. — Some codices and the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 omit *cum dicit* ["when he says"], for which ed. 2 reads *quod ratio dicit* ["which reason says"]. A little before, for *facillimum esset* ["it would be most easy"] the editions, except I, read *facillimum est* ["it is most easy"].

la: Codd. X bb *opere*. Paulo inferius post *ad meritum* cod. S repetit *vitae aeternae*, et subinde pro *absque opere* cod. cc et ed. I exhibent *absque operatione*.

en: Codices X bb read *opere*. A little below, after *ad meritum* ["for merit"] codex S repeats *vitae aeternae* ["of eternal life"], and thereupon for *absque opere* ["without the work"] codex cc and ed. I exhibit *absque operatione* ["without operation"].

la: Matth. 7, 21: *Non omnis qui dicit mihi: Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum* etc.

en: Matthew 7:21: *Not everyone who says to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven*, etc.

la: De hac definitione, quam Aristot., 1. de Caelo et mundo, text. 116. (c. 11.) proponit, vide supra pag. 671, nota 6. — Paulo inferius pro *utilitatem*, quae vox in cod. Q a secunda manu mutata est in *ultimitatem*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *virtutem*, cod. cc et ed. I *virtutem sive utilitatem*. Secundum contextum vox exotica *ultimitas*, quae teste Du Cange (*Glossarium* etc.) pro *extremitate* in libris medicis illa aetate usurpabatur, genuina lectio esse videtur.

en: On this definition, which Aristotle proposes in *On the Heavens*, bk. 1, text 116 (c. 11), see above, p. 671, note 6. — A little below, for *utilitatem* ["utility"], which word in codex Q was changed by a second hand into *ultimitatem*, the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 read *virtutem* ["virtue"], codex cc and ed. I *virtutem sive utilitatem* ["virtue or utility"]. According to the context the exotic word *ultimitas*, which on the testimony of Du Cange (*Glossarium* etc.) was used for *extremitas* ["extremity"] in medical books of that age, seems to be the genuine reading.

la: Prov. 13, 4. — Verba Gregorii, II. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 2, haec sunt: *Nec tamen sibi aliquis credat, quidquid sibi animus sine operis attestatione responderit. De dilectione Conditoris lingua, mens et vita requiratur.* — Seq. loc. Script. est loc. cit. v. 18. Cfr. August., VIII. Confess. c. 8. seq. — In testimonio Gregorii Vat. et edd. 3, 4 pro *de dilectione... manus debet requiri* exhibent *ad dilectionem... manus requiritur.*

en: Proverbs 13:4. — The words of Gregory, Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 30, n. 2, are these: *Yet let no one believe himself on whatever his mind answers him without the attestation of work. For the love of the Creator let tongue, mind, and life be required.* — The following passage of Scripture is the cited place, v. 18. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* VIII, c. 8 and following. — In the testimony of Gregory the Vatican [edition] and editions 3, 4, for *de dilectione... manus debet requiri* exhibit *ad dilectionem... manus requiritur.*

la: In Vat. desideratur *exterioribus*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *exterioribus* ["exterior"] is lacking.

la: Cod. T *bonae sunt et concedendae.*

en: Codex T reads *bonae sunt et concedendae* ["are good and to be conceded"].

la: Vat. et ed. I *illorum*. Paulo superius pro *illorum* edd. 1, 2 cum codd. K T V W ee et aliis *aliorum*, cod. H *aliquorum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and ed. I read *illorum* ["of those"]. A little above, for *illorum* editions 1, 2 with codices K T V W ee and others read *aliorum* ["of the others"], codex H *aliquorum* ["of some"].

la: Alluditur ad illud Matth. 7, 19: *Omnis arbor, quae non facit fructum bonum, excidetur* etc. — Pro *ad fructum* Vat. *ad factum.*

en: Allusion is made to that text of Matthew 7:19: *Every tree that makes not good fruit shall be cut down*, etc. — For *ad fructum* ["to the fruit"] the Vatican [edition] reads *ad factum* ["to the deed"].

la: Cfr. supra d. 28. dub. 4.

latin_scholion:
In hac quaestione refutatur error Abaelardi, a Concilio Senonensi an. 1140 cum aliis eiusdem « capitulis » condemnatus. Est autem ibi n. 13 et sonat: « Quod propter opera nec melior nec peior efficiatur homo » (Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbol. et definit.*). Eadem quaestio militat etiam contra quosdam errores Quietistarum (cfr. prop. 40. Michaelis de Molinos, cuius 68 propositiones ab Innocentio XI. 1687 sunt condemnatae). Multo magis hic reprobatur systema novatorum saec. XVI, qui solam *fidem* ad salutem sufficere praedicabant.

Praeter Alexandrum Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 1. § 3. de hac quaestione alii auctores in hoc tractatu non agunt, sed in aliis locis (ut de praeceptis) eadem principia profitentur; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 108. a. 1. 2.

---

english_scholion:
In this question is refuted the error of Abelard, condemned by the Council of Sens in the year 1140 together with others of his "chapters." It is there n. 13 and runs thus: "That a man is made neither better nor worse on account of works" (Denzinger, *Enchiridion of symbols and definitions*). The same question contends also against certain errors of the Quietists (cf. proposition 40 of Michael de Molinos, whose 68 propositions were condemned by Innocent XI in 1687). Much more is here reproved the system of the innovators of the sixteenth century, who preached that *faith* alone suffices for salvation.

Besides Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 96, m. 3, a. 1, § 3, other authors in this tract do not treat of this question, but in other places (as on the precepts) they profess the same principles; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I-II, q. 108, a. 1, 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (Vol II PDF-priority inversion): the quaestio begins on printed p.924 right column, continues full p.925, and concludes on p.926 left column. Cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 64261–64395 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`) for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page-split map (Quaracchi per-page footer restart):**
- **p.924** footer nn. 4–12 → body markers [^1]–[^9] (args 1–5 + Sed contra 1–4). p.924 footer nn. 1–3 belong to the preceding q.2 (handed off; n.3 = "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.").
- **p.925** footer nn. 1–10 → body markers [^10]–[^19] (Sed contra 5, Respondeo, replies 1–4).
- **p.926** carries no footer note for q.3 (the scholion has no footnotes); p.926 footer n. 4 ("Die 11. Novembr. ... de beato Martino") belongs to ART. II q.1 and is handed off below.

**Scholion.** Present (printed p.926, after reply 5). Re-set from PDF; no footnote markers in the scholion. has_scholion: true.

**Hand-off picked up (from a1-q2):** p.924 footer nn. 4–12 (Glossa super Ps. 125,5; the pendent/dependent variant; Gregor. Hom. 30; Aristot. Ethic. II c. 4; etc.) confirmed against the p.924 PDF footer band and placed as [^1]–[^9] here.

**Hand-off forwarded (to a2-q1 = ART. II):** ART. II opener begins at raw line 64396 (printed p.926 bottom L-col): "*Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum principale de bonitate, quam opera superaddunt bonitati intentionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.*" (titulus: *De bonitate, quam opera superaddunt bonitati intentionis*). The three sub-questions: (1) utrum aliquid addant opera bonitatis vel meriti supra bonam intentionem ratione praerogativae dignitatis; (2) utrum addant ratione quantitatis ex parte dati; (3) utrum aliquid addant ratione numerositatis. ART. II q.1 opener (raw line 64407, p.926 R-col): "*Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum opera exteriora aliquid addant supra bonam intentionem ratione suae excellentiae et dignitatis, sicut sunt opera privilegiata.*" Per Override §5, fold the short ART. II opener into a2-q1; the ART. II scholion likely sits with a2-q1. **Footer hand-off:** printed p.926 footer n. 4 ("Die 11. Novembr. in II. Vesp. ad Magnificat. — Cyprian., de Mortalitate, n. 17 ...") anchors ART. II q.1 Sed contra 1 (de beato Martino) — it migrates to a2-q1's body.

**[?] flags:** none. All readings resolved against the PDF column bands.