title: Dist. 7, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. VII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. VII)

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Inexplicabile est mysterium huius unionis, quae non est ratio partium*. Videtur enim in tali unione esse partem et partem; quia super Levitici quinto[^7]: *Decimam partem* etc. Glossa Hesychii: « Decima pars Ephi est humanitas Christi. Ephi autem mensura trium modiorum significat Trinitatem ». Et sicut se habet signum ad signum, ita signatum ad signatum; sed signum est pars signi: ergo et signatum est pars

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signati: ergo humanitas Christi est pars Christi. — Item, in Symbolo[^1] dicitur: « Sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus »; sed anima et caro sunt partes hominis: ergo humanitas et divinitas sunt partes Christi; cuius contrarium traditur ibidem[^2].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod pars multis modis (*Respondetur: pars dicitur quadrupliciter*) dicitur. Uno modo dicitur pars *communiter* omne quod venit in compositionem[^3] alicuius, sive secundum realem compositionem, sive secundum rationem; et hoc modo illa quae cadunt in definitione, dicuntur esse *partes rei notificatae*. — Alio modo dicitur pars illud quod venit in constitutionem alicuius secundum *rem* et *naturam*, sive habeat *quantitatem*, sive non; et hoc modo anima pars est rei animatae. — Tertio modo dicitur *pars magis proprie* illud quod venit in constitutionem alicuius secundum *rem* et *naturam*, et secundum *quantitatem continuam*, vel *discretam*, sicut manus et pes est pars corporis, et binarius pars quaternarii. — Quarto modo dicitur *pars magis proprie* quod venit in constitutionem alicuius *realem*, vel *quantitativam* secundum *certam* et *determinatam mensuram*, ita quod aliquoties sumta reddit totum; et ista pars dicitur *aliquota*, cui propriissime convenit intentio partis[^4].

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum humana natura sit pars Christi; dicendum, quod si pars accipiatur *communiter* primo modo, potest concedi, quod sit pars. Si enim quis velit notificare, quid sit Christus, dicet ipsum unam hypostasim in duabus naturis, divina scilicet et humana. Si autem pars *proprie* accipiatur, sic humana natura non dicitur pars Christi; et hoc modo intelligitur verbum Magistri in littera. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta; in talibus enim non est similitudo omnimoda[^5]. (*Notandum*)

#### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Damascenus: *Non hominem deificatum dicimus, sed Deum hominem factum*. Videtur enim falsum dicere. Sicut enim divina natura humanae unita est, ita et humana divinae: ergo sicut dicimus *Deum humanatum*, ita et *hominem deificatum*. — Item, in unione divinae naturae ad humanam divina natura non est imminuta[^6], sed humana est exaltata: ergo humana natura magis tracta est ad conformitatem divinae, quam divina ad conformitatem humanae: ergo potius debet dici in Christo humana natura *deificata*, quam divina *humanata*. Si tu dicas, quod denominatio debet fieri a notiori[^7b]; hoc non solvit, quia denominatio non solum debet fieri a notiori, sed etiam a digniori. Si etiam dicas, quod esse *humanatum* praedicat habitum, sicut dicit tertia opinio[^8]; hoc non solvit: quia non tantum dicitur *humanatus*, sed dicitur *factus homo*: ergo si debemus dicere, quod homo est Deus, et Deus est homo; videtur, quod nullum inconveniens sit dicere, hominem esse *deificatum*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc adiectivum *humanatum* (*Resp. 1*) non solum praedicat habitum, sed etiam unionem. Unde nihil aliud est dicere, Deum esse *humanatum* quam carni unitum[^9]. Hoc autem quod est *deificatum*, etsi possit importare unionem, importat simul ordinem et antecessionem. *Deificatum* enim componitur a *deitate* et *factum*; unde *deificatum*, hoc est factum esse Deum. Et quoniam humanitas divinitatem non antecedit, ideo Damascenus hanc non concedit, hominem esse deificatum[^10].

Vel dicendum, quod Damascenus (*Resp. 2*) non negat simpliciter, sed quod non est ita *propria*: *homo est deificatus*, sicut haec: *Deus est factus homo*. Nam ipse dicit, tertio libro[^11]: « Oportet scire, quod non secundum exterminationem naturae, vel confusionem caro deificata est. Tantum enim valet dicere, carnem esse deificatam, quantum deitati esse coniunctam ». Ideo non negat praedictam locutionem tanquam falsam simpliciter, sed non est ita propria, sicut eius conversa[^12]. — Posset etiam vis fieri (*Resp. 3*) in hoc, quod dico *hominem*, quia ex parte subiecti stat pro hypostasi, ex parte vero appositi pro

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forma; non sic autem hypostasis huius hominis est *deificata*, cum semper fuerit *Deus*, sicut est *humanata*, cum non semper fuerit homo. — Et sic patet utraque obiectio[^1b].

#### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur, quod *non dicitur homo dominicus*, et videtur, quod sit concedenda, per illud quod habetur in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^2b]: « Monendum est, ut illa aeterna bona exspectentur, quae fuerunt in homine dominico », hoc enim intelligitur de Christo. Si tu dicas, hoc retractatum esse; obiicitur contra hoc: quia super primi libri Regum primo[^3b] dicit Glossa Bedae: « Quis est iste homo nisi homo dominicus »: ergo si hoc potest dici de aliis hominibus, multo magis de Christo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc nomen *dominicus* secundum communem usum dicitur dupliciter (*Distinctio*), scilicet *possessorie* et *similitudinarie*. Unde dicitur homo dominicus qui possidetur a Domino, vel qui est similis Domino. Et quia secundum utramque comparationem distinctionem[^4b] dicit et disparationem eius de quo dicitur ad dominum, respectu cuius dicitur; cum Christus sit Dominus, non est concedendum, Christum esse hominem dominicum; est enim ipse vere Dominus. — Et ideo hoc retractat Augustinus[^5b] ostendens, quod potest malum generare intellectum. — Posset tamen sane (*Explicatur sane*) intelligi ratione humanae naturae, quae a Domino possidetur et Domino assimilatur et a Domino causatur; et ideo sic retractat Augustinus, quod hoc modo potest habere sanum intellectum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de aliis hominibus, dicendum, quod non est simile; non enim est tanta disparatio illius hominis ad Deum, quanta est aliorum hominum[^6b].

---

english:
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what is said: *"The mystery of this union is inexplicable, which is not an account of parts."* For it seems that in such a union there is part and part; because upon Leviticus, chapter five[^7]: *"the tenth part,"* etc. The Gloss of Hesychius: "The tenth part of the Ephah is the humanity of Christ. But the Ephah, a measure of three modii, signifies the Trinity." And as sign stands to sign, so the thing signified stands to the thing signified; but the sign is a part of the sign: therefore also the thing signified is a part of

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the thing signified: therefore the humanity of Christ is a part of Christ. — Likewise, in the Symbol[^1] it is said: "As the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ"; but soul and flesh are parts of man: therefore the humanity and the divinity are parts of Christ; the contrary of which is handed down in the same place[^2].

**I respond:** It must be said that "part" is said in many ways (*It is answered: "part" is said in four ways*). In one way "part" is said *commonly* of everything that enters into the composition[^3] of something, whether according to a real composition, or according to reason; and in this way those things which fall in a definition are said to be *parts of the thing made known*. — In another way "part" is said of that which enters into the constitution of something according to *thing* and *nature*, whether it have *quantity* or not; and in this way the soul is a part of the animated thing. — In a third way *"part" is said more properly* of that which enters into the constitution of something according to *thing* and *nature*, and according to *continuous* or *discrete quantity*, as a hand and a foot is a part of the body, and a pair a part of a quaternary. — In a fourth way *"part" is said more properly* of that which enters into the *real* or *quantitative* constitution of something according to a *certain* and *determinate measure*, such that, taken a number of times, it renders the whole; and this part is called *aliquot*, to which the notion of part most properly belongs[^4].

When, therefore, it is asked whether the human nature is a part of Christ; it must be said that, if "part" be taken *commonly*, in the first way, it can be conceded that it is a part. For if anyone should wish to make known what Christ is, he will say that he is one hypostasis in two natures, namely the divine and the human. But if "part" be taken *properly*, then the human nature is not called a part of Christ; and in this way the word of the Master in the text is understood. — And by this the reply to the objections is plain; for in such things the likeness is not in every respect[^5]. (*Note*)

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what Damascene says: *"We do not say that man was deified, but that God was made man."* For it seems false to say it. For as the divine nature is united to the human, so also the human to the divine: therefore as we say *"God was made man" (humanatum)*, so also *"man was deified" (deificatum)*. — Likewise, in the union of the divine nature to the human the divine nature is not diminished[^6], but the human is exalted: therefore the human nature is drawn more to conformity with the divine, than the divine to conformity with the human: therefore it ought rather to be said that in Christ the human nature is *deified*, than that the divine is *made man*. If you say that the denomination ought to be made from what is better known[^7b]; this does not solve it, because the denomination ought to be made not only from what is better known, but also from what is more worthy. If you also say that to be *made man* predicates a habit, as the third opinion says[^8]; this does not solve it: because it is not only said *made man (humanatus)*, but it is said *made man (factus homo)*: therefore if we must say that man is God, and God is man; it seems that there is no unfitness in saying that man was *deified*.

**I respond:** It must be said that this adjective *humanatum* (*Resp. 1*) predicates not only a habit, but also a union. Whence to say that God is *made man (humanatum)* is nothing other than to say that he is united to flesh[^9]. But this which is *deified*, although it can import a union, imports at the same time order and antecedence. For *deificatum* is compounded from *deitas* and *factum*; whence *deificatum* is "to have been made God." And since the humanity does not precede the divinity, therefore Damascene does not concede this, that man was deified[^10].

Or it must be said that Damascene (*Resp. 2*) does not deny it simply, but that it is not so *proper*: *"man was deified,"* as this is: *"God was made man."* For he himself says, in the third book[^11]: "It must be known that the flesh was deified not according to an extermination of nature, or a confusion. For to say that the flesh is deified means as much as that it is joined to the deity." Therefore he does not deny the aforesaid locution as false simply, but it is not so proper as its converse[^12]. — Force could also be made (*Resp. 3*) in this, that I say *man*, because on the side of the subject it stands for the hypostasis, but on the side of the predicate for the

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form; but the hypostasis of this man is not thus *deified*, since it was always *God*, as it is *made man*, since it was not always man. — And thus both objections are made plain[^1b].

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what is said, that *one does not say "lordly man" (homo dominicus)*, and it seems that this is to be conceded, by that which is had in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^2b]: "It must be admonished that those eternal goods be awaited, which were in the lordly man," for this is understood of Christ. If you say that this has been retracted; it is objected against this: that upon the first book of Kings, chapter one[^3b], the Gloss of Bede says: "Who is this man, if not the lordly man?": therefore if this can be said of other men, much more of Christ.

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *dominicus*, according to common usage, is said in two ways (*Distinction*), namely *possessively* and *by likeness*. Whence the lordly man is called he who is possessed by the Lord, or who is like the Lord. And because according to either comparison it says a distinction[^4b] and a disparity of that of which it is said to the lord, with respect to whom it is said; since Christ is Lord, it is not to be conceded that Christ is a lordly man; for he himself is truly Lord. — And therefore Augustine retracts this[^5b], showing that it can generate an evil understanding. — Yet it could soundly (*It is soundly explained*) be understood by reason of the human nature, which is possessed by the Lord and assimilated to the Lord and caused by the Lord; and therefore Augustine retracts it in such a way that in this manner it can have a sound understanding.

But to that which is objected concerning other men, it must be said that it is not similar; for there is not so great a disparity of that man to God, as there is of other men[^6b].

---

la: Vers. 11. — Hesychius, presbyter Hierosolym. († an. 428, secundum alios a. 433) sic scribit: *Ephi autem mensura est trium mensurarum i. e. tres modios capiens. Ergo Christus est qui sacrificium offert, et ipse est sacrificium quod offertur. Ephi enim, cum sit mensura trium modiorum, evidenter Trinitatem innuit, quae una quidem mensura est, quia una in ea est Deitas. Tres autem habet mensuras i. e. tres personas perfectas, et tot subsistentias, ut manifestum sit, non nos peccare, eius partem carnem Domini dicentes, propter inseparabilem cum ea incarnati Verbi unitionem. Quare autem Trinitatis pars est? Quia indivisibilis eius est gloria et virtus, ita ut Paulus de Christo diceret: In ipso habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter* (Coloss. 2, 9.)... *Ergo ephi quidem hic incarnatus Deus Verbum, utpote habens in se Trinitatis plenitudinem. Decima autem eius est caro; primum quidem, ut ostenderetur sublimitas divinitatis eius quantum ad humanitatem, propter quod et pars dicitur; deinde pro eo quod integro homine incarnatus est Deus Verbum et qui legem impleret. Utrumque enim decima significat, quia et perfectus est denarius numerus, decem autem mandata Legis sunt* etc.

en: Verse 11. — Hesychius, a presbyter of Jerusalem († A.D. 428, according to others 433), writes thus: "But the Ephah is a measure of three measures, i.e. holding three modii. Therefore Christ is he who offers the sacrifice, and he himself is the sacrifice that is offered. For the Ephah, since it is a measure of three modii, clearly indicates the Trinity, which is indeed one measure, because in it there is one Deity. But it has three measures, i.e. three perfect persons, and as many subsistences, so that it is plain that we do not sin in calling the flesh of the Lord a part of it, on account of the inseparable union of the incarnate Word with it. But why is it a part of the Trinity? Because its glory and power are indivisible, so that Paul said of Christ: *In him dwells all the fullness of the divinity bodily* (Col. 2:9)... Therefore the Ephah here is indeed the incarnate God the Word, inasmuch as he has in himself the fullness of the Trinity. But the tenth of it is the flesh; first, that the sublimity of his divinity might be shown with respect to the humanity, on account of which it is also called a part; then because God the Word was incarnate in a whole man and one who would fulfill the Law. For the tenth signifies both, since ten is also a perfect number, and the commandments of the Law are ten," etc.

la: Athanasiano.

en: [The Athanasian Symbol.]

la: Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Here in the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cod. Z *quod convenit in compositione*. Mox edd. *secundum rationalem* pro *secundum rationem*, cuiusmodi pars est genus et differentia.

en: Codex Z reads *"which agrees in composition."* Then the editions read *secundum rationalem* for *secundum rationem* — of which kind of part are genus and difference.

la: Quadruplex haec acceptio termini partis habetur apud Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 30. (IV. c. 25.). Cfr. ibid. VII. text. 33. seqq. (VI. c. 10.). — Pro *aliquota* edd. *aliquanta*; perperam, siquidem pars *aliquanta* dicitur quae pluries sumta vel totum excedit, vel ab eo deficit ideoque totum nunquam adaequat. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1, scholion. — Infra pro *divina scilicet et humana* edd. vitiose *divinam scilicet et humanam*.

en: This fourfold acceptation of the term "part" is found in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 30 (IV, c. 25). Cf. ibid. VII, text 33 ff. (VI, c. 10). — For *aliquota* the editions read *aliquanta*; wrongly, since an *aliquant* part is said to be one which, taken several times, either exceeds the whole or falls short of it and therefore never equals the whole. Cf. I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, scholion. — Below, for *divina scilicet et humana* the editions faultily read *divinam scilicet et humanam*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 2; Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 3; B. Albert., hic d. 6. a. 6; S. Thom., hic d. 6. q. 2. a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 2; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 6, m. 2, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here d. 6, a. 6; St. Thomas, here d. 6, q. 2, a. 3; Richard of Middleton, here on the text.

la: Codd. F H U *immutata*.

en: Codices F, H, U read *immutata* ["unchanged"].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 5; quoad seq. proposit. vide supra pag. 46, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 47, note 5; as for the following proposition, see above p. 46, note 5.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et supra d. VI. c. 1.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2, and above d. VI, c. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 174, nota 2. — Mox post *importat* edd. subdunt *tamen*.

en: Cf. above p. 174, note 2. — Then after *importat* the editions add *tamen*.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 2, ex quo textus huius dubii delibatus est. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, book III, c. 2, from which the text of this doubt has been drawn. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. III, c. 1.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 17: *Oportet scire, quod non secundum exterminationem* [μεταβολήν *i. e. immutationem*] *naturae... vel confusionem caro Domini deificata dicitur eiusdemque Deitatis consors* (ὁμόθεος)... *Haec enim non secundum exterminationem naturae, sed secundum dispensativam unionem sive secundum hypostasim dico, secundum quam inseparabiliter* [caro] *Deo Verbo coniuncta est* etc. — Pro *exterminationem* Vat. *aestimationem*, edd. 1, 2 cum aliquibus codd. *extimationem*.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 17: "It must be known that the flesh of the Lord is said to be deified not according to an extermination [μεταβολήν, i.e. change] of nature... or a confusion, and to be a consort of the same Deity (ὁμόθεος)... For I say this not according to an extermination of nature, but according to a dispensative union, that is, according to the hypostasis, in accordance with which [the flesh] is inseparably joined to God the Word," etc. — For *exterminationem* the Vatican reads *aestimationem*, editions 1, 2 with some codices *extimationem*.

la: Scilicet: *Deus est factus homo* sive *est humanatus*. — Vat. *sicut est eius conversa*, codd. AGH, NTUXaa et edit. 1, 2 minus recte *sicut et eius conversa*, de qua lectione cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. Subinde pro *Posset etiam* codd. FG *Posset tamen*, alii *Posset enim*. Mox pro *subiecti* codd. W Y *verbi*.

en: That is: *"God was made man,"* or *"was made man" (est humanatus)*. — The Vatican reads *sicut est eius conversa*, codices AGH, NTUXaa and editions 1, 2 less correctly *sicut et eius conversa*; concerning which reading, cf. above a. 1, q. 2. Then for *Posset etiam* codices FG read *Posset tamen*, others *Posset enim*. Then for *subiecti* codices W, Y read *verbi*.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Concerning this doubt, cf. Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Quaest. 35. n. 2: « *Monendumque, ne peritura beneficia et transeuntia exspectentur a Deo... sed firma et sempiterna... Hic praestantissimum illud et unicum exemplum dominici hominis proponendum est, qui cum se tot miraculis tantam rerum potestatem habere monstraret, et ea sprevit quae magna bona, et ea sustinuit quae magna mala imperiti putant* » etc. Libr. I. Retract. c. 19. n. 8. August. locutionem *homo dominicus* retractat. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Question 35, n. 2: "And it must be admonished that perishing and passing benefits not be awaited from God... but firm and everlasting ones... Here that most excellent and unique example of the lordly man must be set forth, who, although he showed by so many miracles that he had such great power over things, both spurned those things which the inexperienced think great goods, and endured those things which they think great evils," etc. In *Retractations* book I, c. 19, n. 8, Augustine retracts the locution *homo dominicus*. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Vers. 20: *Vocavitque nomen eius Samuel*. In quem locum Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum dicit: « *Id est Deus. Annae primogenitus propheta. Quis est hic nisi dominicus homo?* » Beda in hunc locum (I. in Samuel. proph. allegoric. exposit. c. 3.) ait: *Interpretatur enim* [Samuel] *ibi ipse Deus sive nomen eius Deus*.

en: Verse 20: *"And she called his name Samuel."* On which place the *ordinary* Gloss, in Strabo and Lyra, says: "That is, God. The firstborn prophet of Anna. Who is this if not the lordly man?" Bede on this place (book I on the prophet Samuel, allegorical exposition, c. 3) says: "For [Samuel] there is interpreted God himself, or his name is God."

la: Edd. *divisionem*.

en: The editions read *divisionem* ["division"].

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro *vere Dominus* codd. *verus Dominus*. Paulo post pro *generare* codd. G Z bb *aggenerare*.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for *vere Dominus* the codices read *verus Dominus*. A little after, for *generare* codices G, Z, bb read *aggenerare*.

la: De hoc dubio tractant B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

en: This doubt is treated by Blessed Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 182–184 (PDF 204–206; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 13108–13226). The OCR was clean here apart from routine letter-substitution garbles (silently corrected). English is a fresh literal translation, doubt-by-doubt.

**Structure verified.** `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` opener at raw 13108; **3 dubia confirmed eyes-on vs PDF + raw**: Dub. I (raw 13110, p.182 foot → p.183-L: *whether the human nature is a "part" of Christ*; the Levit. 5 Ephah/Hesychius gloss; the fourfold sense of "part"); Dub. II (raw 13177, p.183-R → p.184-L top: *whether "man was deified" should be conceded as Damascene's "God made man"*; *humanatum* = union vs *deificatum* = order + antecedence; threefold Respondeo); Dub. III (raw 13209, p.184-L → p.184-R: *whether "lordly man" (homo dominicus) is to be conceded*; the twofold *possessorie/similitudinarie* sense, Augustine's *Retractations*). No standalone scholion exists in raw or PDF — **`has_scholion: false`** (matches the d.6-dubia template).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.182** (foot only — the rest of p.182 belongs to d7-a2-q3): DUBIA header + Dub. I opener through *…ergo et signatum est pars*. Sole footer here = **note 7** (`[^7]`, *Vers. 11 — Hesychius*), the **received hand-off** from d7-a2-q3 (which consumed p.182 notes 1–6). Body break to p.183 mid-clause at *…signatum est pars / signati…*.
- **p.183** (running head `DIST. VII. DUBIA.`): Dub. I tail + Respondeo (fourfold "part") + Dub. II opener + Respondeo (Resp. 1/2/3). Per-page footer restart, **notes 1–12**: notes 1–5 (`[^1]`–`[^5]`) key Dub. I markers *Symbolo¹ / ibidem² / compositionem³ / partis⁴ / omnimoda⁵*; note 6 (`[^6]`) keys Dub. II's *imminuta⁶*; note 7 (here disambiguated **`[^7b]`** to avoid colliding with the p.182 received note 7) keys *notiori⁷*; notes 8–12 (`[^8]`–`[^12]`) key *opinio⁸ / unitum⁹ / deificatum¹⁰ / libro¹¹ / conversa¹²*. Body break to p.184 mid-clause at *…ex parte vero appositi pro / forma…*.
- **p.184** (running head `184 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): Dub. II tail + Dub. III (opener + Respondeo). Per-page footer restart, **notes 1–6**, all suffixed **`b`** (`[^1b]`–`[^6b]`): note 1 keys Dub. II's *obiectio¹ᵇ*; notes 2–6 key Dub. III's *Quaestionum²ᵇ / primo³ᵇ / distinctionem⁴ᵇ / Augustinus⁵ᵇ / hominum⁶ᵇ*.

**Apparatus count: 19 entries** (p.182 note 7; p.183 notes 1–12; p.184 notes 1–6).

**Footer hand-off.** RECEIVED: p.182 note 7 (`[^7]`, *Vers. 11 — Hesychius*) keying Dub. I's *super Levitici quinto⁷* — picked up exactly as forecast. FORWARDED: **NONE** — Dub. III's last footer is p.184 note 6 (`[^6b]`, *aliorum hominum⁶ᵇ*).

**Boundary lock at DISTINCTIO VIII (raw 13227).** Dub. III ends at p.184-R *…quanta est aliorum hominum⁶ᵇ*; immediately below, `DISTINCTIO VIII. Cap. I.` opens (rubric *An divina natura debeat dici nata de Virgine*). **NO footer leak into d.8**: on p.184, below Dub. III's notes 1–6, a fresh `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` block (notes 1–4: *Dist. V. c. 1*, *Cap. 2. n. 14*, etc.) opens — these are DIST. VIII's *littera* footers and belong to `bon-sent-III-d8-littera`, not to this chunk. The receiving DIST. VIII opening sentence (*…tura divina sit nata et concepta de Virgine…*) is grammatically continuous with its own Cap. I lemma, confirming a clean seam.

**DISTINCTIO VII is now COMPLETE** (9/9 chunks: littera, divisio, a1-q1/q2/q3, a2-q1/q2/q3, dubia).

**`[?]` flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 8

title_alt: Distinctio VIII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction VIII — text of the Master of the Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
### DISTINCTIO VIII.

### Cap. I. *An divina natura debeat dici nata de Virgine.*

Post praedicta inquiri debet, utrum de natura divina concedendum sit, quod de Virgine sit nata, sicut dicitur in Virgine incarnata. Et videtur utique non debere dici nata de Virgine, cum non sit nata de Patre. *(Dubium 1.)* Quae enim res non est de Patre genita, non videtur de Matre nata; ne res aliqua filiationis nomen habeat in humanitate, quae illud non teneat in divinitate. — *(Obiicitur.)* Videtur tamen posse probari, quod sit nata de Virgine, quia, si hoc est Deum nasci de Virgine, scilicet hominem assumere in utero Virginis, cum natura divina superius[^1] dicta sit hominem assumsisse, videtur debere dici nata. De hoc Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^2] sic ait: «Natura aeterna atque divina non posset temporaliter concipi et nasci ex natura humana, nisi secundum susceptionem veritatis humanae veram temporaliter conceptionem et nativitatem ineffabilis divinitas in se accepisset. Sic est Deus aeternus veraciter secundum tempus et conceptus et natus ex Virgine». — Ista auctoritate videtur insinuari, quod natura divina sit nata et concepta de Virgine. *(Solvitur.)* Sed si diligenter notentur verba, potius de persona agi intelligitur, quae sine dubitatione et de Patre et de Matre nata esse dici debet.

### Cap. II. *De gemina nativitate Christi, qui bis natus est.*

*(Dubium 2.)* Quaeri etiam solet, utrum debeat dici Christus bis genitus, ut dicitur Dei et hominis Filius. — Ad quod dici potest, Christum bis natum esse duasque nativitates habuisse. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^3]: «Pater Deus de sua natura genuit Filium, Deum sibi coaequalem et coaeternum». «Idem quoque unigenitus Deus secundo natus est: semel ex Patre, semel ex Matre. Natus est enim de Patre Dei Verbum, natus est de Matre Verbum caro factum. Unus igitur atque idem Dei Filius natus est ante saecula et natus in saeculo; et utraque nativitas unius est Filii Dei, divina scilicet et humana». De hoc etiam Ioannes Damascenus[^4] ait: «Duas Christi nativitates veneramur: unam ex Patre ante saecula, quae est super causam et rationem et

<!-- page 185 -->

tempus et naturam; et unam, quae in ultimis temporibus, *(Dubium 3.)* propter nos et secundum nos et super nos: propter nos, quia propter nostram salutem; secundum nos, quia natus est homo ex muliere et tempore conceptionis, scilicet novem mensium; super nos, quia non ex semine, sed ex Spiritu sancto et sancta Virgine supra legem conceptionis». — Ex his manifeste apparet, Christi duas esse nativitates, eundemque bis natum fore.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION VIII.

### Ch. I. *Whether the divine nature ought to be said to be born of the Virgin.*

After what has been said, it must be inquired whether it is to be conceded of the divine nature that it was born of the Virgin, as it is said to have been incarnate in the Virgin. And it seems indeed that it ought not to be said to have been born of the Virgin, since it was not born of the Father. *(Doubt 1.)* For a thing that is not begotten of the Father does not seem to be born of the Mother; lest some thing have the name of filiation in the humanity which it does not hold in the divinity. — *(It is objected.)* Yet it seems it can be proved that it was born of the Virgin, because, if this is for God to be born of the Virgin, namely to assume a man in the womb of the Virgin, then, since the divine nature was said above[^1] to have assumed a man, it seems it ought to be said to have been born. On this Augustine says, in the book *On Faith, to Peter*[^2]: «The eternal and divine nature could not be temporally conceived and born of the human nature, unless, according to the assumption of the true human [nature], the ineffable divinity had received in itself a true conception and nativity in time. Thus God eternal is, truly and according to time, both conceived and born of the Virgin». — By this authority it seems to be insinuated that the divine nature was born and conceived of the Virgin. *(It is resolved.)* But if the words are diligently noted, it is rather understood that the person is being treated of, which without doubt ought to be said to have been born both of the Father and of the Mother.

### Ch. II. *On the twofold nativity of Christ, who was born twice.*

*(Doubt 2.)* It is also wont to be asked whether Christ ought to be said to be twice begotten, as he is called the Son of God and of man. — To which it can be said that Christ was twice born and had two nativities. Whence Augustine, in the book *On Faith, to Peter*[^3]: «God the Father begot from his own nature the Son, God coequal and coeternal to himself». «The same only-begotten God was likewise born a second time: once from the Father, once from the Mother. For the Word of God was born of the Father, [and] the Word made flesh was born of the Mother. Therefore one and the same Son of God was born before the ages and born in time; and each nativity is of the one Son of God, namely the divine and the human». On this also John Damascene[^4] says: «We venerate two nativities of Christ: one from the Father before the ages, which is above cause and reason and

<!-- page 185 -->

time and nature; and one which is in the last times, *(Doubt 3.)* for us and according to us and above us: for us, because it is for our salvation; according to us, because he was born a man from a woman and in the time of conception, namely of nine months; above us, because [he was born] not from seed, but from the Holy Spirit and the holy Virgin, above the law of conception». — From these things it manifestly appears that Christ has two nativities, and that the same one was to be born twice.

---

la: Dist. V. c. 1.

en: Distinction V, ch. 1.

la: Cap. 2. n. 10; seq. locus parum inferius, in quo textu post *unigenitus* Vat. omittit *secundo*; et postea pro *Dei Verbum* codd. A E *Deus Verbum*.

en: Ch. 2, n. 10; the following passage [is found] a little lower down, in which text, after *only-begotten*, the Vatican edition omits *a second time*; and afterwards, for *the Word of God*, codices A and E read *God the Word*.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 7, ubi post *ante saecula* codd. A D E omittunt cum originali *quae est*.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, ch. 7, where, after *before the ages*, codices A, D, and E omit, along with the original, *which is*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 184–185 (PDF 206–207; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right column, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 13227–13278), which is clean here. Fresh literal English. This is the Lombard *littera Magistri* for DISTINCTIO VIII, built as ONE Tier-2 chunk separate from Bonaventure's commentary (per the d6-/d7-littera template). `type: littera`; `has_scholion: false` (no scholion in raw or PDF). DISTINCTIO VIII has **NO pars division**; the littera is **2 chapters (Cap. I–II)**; COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII begins immediately after, at raw line 13279.

**Structure verified (raw).** DISTINCTIO VIII opens at raw 13227. Littera Cap. I (raw 13231, *An divina natura debeat dici nata de Virgine*) + Cap. II (raw 13234, *De gemina nativitate Christi, qui bis natus est*). COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII at raw 13279; DIVISIO TEXTUS raw 13283; TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM raw ~13303; ARTICULUS I raw 13313; QUAESTIO I raw 13318, QUAESTIO II raw 13468, QUAESTIO III raw 13567; ARTICULUS II raw 13675, QUAESTIO I raw 13688. DISTINCTIO IX at raw 14147. Matches scaffold (a1-q1/q2/q3, a2-q1/q2/q3, littera, divisio, dubia = 9 chunks).

**Page-split map.** Cap. I + the opening of Cap. II (through *…super causam et rationem et*) sit on printed **p. 184** (the littera occupies the lower Left column + Right column of p. 184, below the d.7 Dub. III tail which fills the top of p. 184-L/R). The page break to **p. 185** falls inside the Damascene quotation in Cap. II, just before *tempus et naturam…*; the brief Cap. II tail (4 lines) finishes at the top of p. 185-L, immediately above COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII. No further littera footer prints on p. 185.

**Footer hand-off.** RECEIVED: **none** — the d.7 dubia footers (p. 184 notes 1–6, under no special heading) are exhausted in `bon-sent-III-d7-dubia`. The d.8 littera footers print under a **fresh `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` block** at the foot of p. 184-R (notes 1–4: *Dist. V. c. 1* / *Cap. 2. n. 14* / *Cap. 2. n. 10; seq. locus…* / *Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 7…*), keying the four littera markers *superius¹* / *de Fide ad Petrum²* (Cap. I) and *de Fide ad Petrum³* / *Ioannes Damascenus⁴* (Cap. II). FORWARDED to `bon-sent-III-d8-divisio`: **none** — the littera's footers are fully consumed here (notes 1–4); the COMMENTARIUS opens its own `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer sequence on p. 185.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses, not as footnotes: *Dubium 1.*, *Obiicitur.*, *Solvitur.* (Cap. I); *Dubium 2.* (Cap. II opener, p. 184-R margin) and *Dubium 3.* (p. 185-L margin) flag the Master's incidental doubts; these are editorial running-margin labels, not Bonaventure's text.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 8, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem VIII — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction VIII — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 185 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

*De incarnatione quoad communicationem idiomatum et proprietatum respicientium naturam humanam.*

*Post praedicta inquiri debet* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de incarnatione Verbi quantum ad unionem naturarum et quantum ad unionis modum. In hac vero parte intendit agere quantum ad communicationem idiomatum et proprietatum. Et dividitur haec pars in duas[^1] partes, in quarum prima agit de communicatione idiomatum respicientium naturam. In secunda de communicatione proprietatum et idiomatum respicientium personam, infra distinctione decima: *Solet etiam a quibusdam quaeri.* Pars prima dividitur in duas partes, in quarum prima inquirit, utrum divinae naturae competat nasci de Virgine, quod quidem est proprietas humanae naturae. Secundo vero inquirit, utrum caro Christi debeat adorari adoratione latriae, quod quidem est proprietas divinae naturae, infra distinctione nona: *Praeterea investigari oportet* etc.

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, dividitur in partes duas[^2], in quarum prima comparat nativitatem Christi de Virgine ad divinam naturam. In secunda vero nativitatem temporalem ad aeternam comparat, ibi: *Quaeri etiam solet, utrum Christus debeat dici bis natus* etc. Prima pars dividitur in partes duas, in quarum prima inquirit quaestionem et determinat. In secunda vero adducit auctoritates contra determinationem suam, ibi: *Videtur autem posse probari* etc. Secunda autem pars similiter duas habet. In prima movet quaestionem; in secunda determinat, ibi: *Ad quod dici potest* etc. Subdivisiones autem partium manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Primo quaeritur de nativitate temporali in comparatione ad divinam naturam.

Secundo quaeritur de eadem in comparatione ad nativitatem aeternam.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, divinam naturam esse de Virgine natam.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nasci de Virgine proprie dicatur de natura assumta.

Tertio vero quaeritur, utrum esse hominem convenienter praedicetur de divina natura.

---

english:
<!-- page 185 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII.

*On the incarnation as regards the communication of the idioms and of the properties that look to the human nature.*

*After the foregoing it must be inquired* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the incarnation of the Word as regards the union of the natures and as regards the mode of the union. But in this part he intends to treat of it as regards the communication of the idioms and of the properties. And this part is divided into two[^1] parts, in the first of which he treats of the communication of the idioms that look to the nature. In the second, of the communication of the properties and idioms that look to the person, below in distinction ten: *It is also wont to be asked by some.* The first part is divided into two parts, in the first of which he inquires whether it belongs to the divine nature to be born of the Virgin, which indeed is a property of the human nature. But secondly he inquires whether the flesh of Christ ought to be adored with the adoration of latria, which indeed is a property of the divine nature, below in distinction nine: *Furthermore it must be investigated* etc.

The first part, which contains the present distinction, is divided into two[^2] parts, in the first of which he compares the nativity of Christ from the Virgin to the divine nature. But in the second he compares the temporal nativity to the eternal, there: *It is also wont to be asked whether Christ ought to be said to be twice born* etc. The first part is divided into two parts, in the first of which he inquires the question and determines [it]. But in the second he adduces authorities against his determination, there: *But it seems it can be proved* etc. Now the second part likewise has two. In the first he raises the question; in the second he determines [it], there: *To which it can be said* etc. But the subdivisions of the parts are manifest in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

But for the understanding of this part a question falls here concerning two things.

First it is asked concerning the temporal nativity in comparison to the divine nature.

Secondly it is asked concerning the same in comparison to the eternal nativity.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether it is to be conceded that the divine nature was born of the Virgin.

Secondly it is asked whether to be born of the Virgin is properly said of the assumed nature.

But thirdly it is asked whether to be a man is fittingly predicated of the divine nature.

---

la: Multi codd. perperam *tres*.

en: Many codices wrongly [read] *tres* [three].

la: Plurimi codd. falso *tres*.

en: Very many codices falsely [read] *tres* [three]. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed p. 185 (PDF 207; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 13276–13310). This is the COMMENTARIUS divisio chunk for Distinction VIII: it holds the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII` opener (with the rubric *De incarnatione quoad communicationem idiomatum et proprietatum respicientium naturam humanam* and the catchword-lemma *Post praedicta inquiri debet* etc. that links to the littera), the `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, and the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the question-list). Distinction VIII has **no pars division**. There is no PRAENOTATA block here (unlike d7-divisio). `ARTICULUS I` (*De nativitate temporali in comparatione ad divinam naturam*) + `QUAESTIO I` (*Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata*) print immediately after the TRACTATIO on the same page (p.185) and belong to the next chunk (`d8-a1-q1`). No scholion — this is a commentary divisio (`has_scholion: false`).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.185** (two columns; running head `DIST. VIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` / `QUAEST. I.` / `185`): the top of both columns carries the LITTERA Cap. II tail (the Damascene *de Fide orthod.* two-nativities quotation, *…tempus et naturam… Dubium 3, quia natus est homo ex muliere…* on p.185-L top, and *…super legem conceptionis… eundemque bis natum fore* on p.185-R top) — that belongs to `d8-littera` and is NOT in this chunk. The COMMENTARIUS divisio begins below it: COMMENTARIUS header + rubric + lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS header + the first DIVISIO paragraph (*Supra egit Magister…*, with marker *duas¹*) in the left column, continuing into the right column (*Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, dividitur in partes duas²…*). The TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM follows: its preamble + top-level two-question split (*Primo… de nativitate temporali… Secundo… in comparatione ad nativitatem aeternam… Circa primum quaeruntur tria*) in the left column, and the three sub-questions (*Primo quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit… Secundo… utrum nasci de Virgine proprie… Tertio vero… utrum esse hominem convenienter praedicetur*) in the right column. `ARTICULUS I. De nativitate temporali in comparatione ad divinam naturam. QUAESTIO I. Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata.* opens immediately after, at the foot of both columns, and belongs to `d8-a1-q1`.
- Footer `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` on p.185: note 1 = `[^1]` (*duas¹* — *Multi codd. perperam tres*) and note 2 = `[^2]` (*duas²* — *Plurimi codd. falso tres*) are the divisio's. Note 3 (*Num. 10. — Minor subsumta, in qua pro Sed quod edd. exhibent Sed quidquid…*) and the following notes belong to `d8-a1-q1` (they key the QUAESTIO I Hilary-argument body).

**Footer hand-off.**
- *Received:* NONE. Per the `d8-littera` hand-off, the littera's notes 1–4 (under its own `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block on pp.184–185) were fully consumed, and the COMMENTARIUS opens its own fresh `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer sequence on p.185.
- *Forwarded to `d8-a1-q1`:* p.185 footer notes **3** onward (*Num. 10* etc.) — these key the QUAESTIO I body, NOT the divisio. The divisio owns only p.185 notes **1–2** (`[^1]`–`[^2]`). `d8-a1-q1` opens `ARTICULUS I. De nativitate temporali in comparatione ad divinam naturam. QUAESTIO I. Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata. Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata. Et quod sic, videtur: 1. Primo auctoritate Hilarii, in libro de Trinitate quarto…* at the foot of p.185, continuing onto p.186.

**Apparatus count:** 2 marker entries: p.185 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM notes 1–2 = `[^1]`–`[^2]`. Both are codices-variant notes flagging the *duas* vs *tres* division-count reading. The divisio occupies only one printed page, so no per-page suffix is needed.

**[?] flags:** NONE. All readings confirmed eyes-on against the 450 dpi PDF column bands.


title: Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 185 -->

### Articulus I. *De nativitate temporali in comparatione ad divinam naturam.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Hilarii, in libro de Trinitate quarto[^1]: « Nihil nisi natum habet Filius » ; sed *(Ad oppositum.)* habet divinam naturam: ergo est nata. Sed quod natum est aeternaliter in Christo ex Patre, natum est temporaliter de Matre: si igitur divina natura est huiusmodi, patet etc.

<!-- page 186 -->
2. Item, expressius Damascenus, tertio libro, capitulo duodecimo[^2]: « Theotocon, id est Dei genitricem, vere et principaliter sanctam Mariam Virginem praedicamus » ; sed « Deus est nomen naturae »: ergo Virgo Maria erit genitrix divinae naturae: ergo divina natura est nata de Virgine.

3. Item, expressissime Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum[^3]: « Natura aeterna atque divina non posset temporaliter concipi et nasci nisi secundum susceptionem veritatis humanae »: ergo videtur, quod vere et proprie debeat dici concepta et nata de Virgine.

4. Item, incarnatio ordinatur ad nativitatem — unde et persona Verbi ideo nata est, quia incarnata — sed conceditur, quod divina natura sit incarnata, ut habitum est supra distinctione quinta[^4]: ergo et concedi debet, quod sit de Virgine nata.

5. Item, assumere carnem nihil aliud est quam nasci in utero; sed haec conceditur, quod divina natura assumsit carnem de Virgine[^5]: ergo concedi debet, quod nata fuerit in utero Virginis. Sed ad nativitatem in utero subsequitur nativitas ex utero: ergo si divina natura nata fuit in Virginis utero, sequitur, quod fuerit nata ex Virginis utero.

6. Item, magis consonat divinae naturae *nasci* de Virgine, quam *pati* conveniat virtuti, et *infirmari* conveniat fortitudini; sed Bernardus[^6] dicit, quod « in illa unione fuit fortitudo infirmata »: ergo multo fortius concedi debet, divinam naturam esse natam de Virgine.

*(Fundamenta.)* **Sed contra:** 1. Damascenus, libro quarto[^7]: « Cognoscimus, quod nasci non est naturae, sed hypostasis »: ergo nasci de Virgine naturae non competit, sed solum personae.

2. Item, nobilior et prior est nativitas aeterna quam temporalis; sed divina natura non dicitur esse nata propter Filii nativitatem aeternam, ut in primo libro[^8] ostensum est: ergo multo minus non debet dici nata propter temporalem nativitatem.

3. Item, cuicumque competit nasci, competit esse ab alio[^9]; sed divinae naturae non competit esse ab alio: ergo divina natura nec aeternaliter nec temporaliter debet dici nata.

4. Item, cuicumque competit nasci, competit ratio filiationis: ergo si divina natura dicitur esse nata de Virgine, divina natura dicitur[^10] filia Virginis.

5. Item, sicut se habent proprietates divinae naturae ad humanam, sic proprietates humanae ad divinam; sed haec est simpliciter falsa: humanitas in Christo est aeterna: ergo et ista: divina natura in Christo est de Virgine nata.

6. Item, quod nascitur ex aliquo est natura conformis cum eo, ex quo nascitur[^11]: si ergo divina natura nata est de Virgine, videtur, quod divina natura et Virgo Maria sint eiusdem naturae; quod est falsum et impossibile.

### Conclusio

> *(Conclusio.)* Praedicta locutio ob duplicem causam non debet recipi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^12], haec non recipitur tanquam propria: divina natura est de Virgine nata. Et hoc propter duo, videlicet propter vitandam confusionem proprietatum personalium et proprietatum naturalium sive essentialium, quae duo praecipue sunt observanda circa sermonem catholicum et veritatis fidei expressivum. — *(Ratio 1.)* Non igitur recipitur, quod divina natura sit nata de Virgine, propter confusionem personalium; propter quod etiam non conceditur, quod sit nata de Patre. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera[^13]: « Quae res non est de Patre genita, non videtur de Matre nata; nec res aliqua filiationis nomen habet in humanitate, quae illud non teneat in divinitate ».

*(Ratio 2.)* Propter vitandam etiam confusionem proprietatum naturalium non recipitur. Sicut enim in beatissima Trinitate distinctae sunt personae ad invicem et earum proprietates; sic in Christo naturae sunt distinctae ad invicem et earum proprietates, quamvis conveniant in supposito; et ideo proprietas unius naturae non debet[^14] praedicari de altera natura in abstractione considerata, ne ex hoc intelligatur, quod divina natura et humana sint una essentia. Quod enim praedicatur de altero in abstra<!-- page 187 -->ctione non intelligitur convenire ei solum ratione *suppositi*, verum etiam ratione *formae*[^15]. Et ideo praedicta locutio recipi non debet. Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)* 1. Ad illud verbum Hilarii dicendum, quod aliquid habet improprietatis et debet sic exponi: nihil habet Filius nisi natum, id est, nihil habet, quod non nascendo accepit. Et hoc melius in primo libro[^16] explanatum fuit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, quod Virgo Maria est Dei genitrix; dicendum, quod concedendum est, quod Deus natus est de Virgine; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod divina natura sit de Virgine nata, pro eo quod hoc nomen *Deus*, quia significat in concretione, supponit personam; non sic divina natura, quae significat in abstractione. Unde et haec conceditur: Deus generat: quamvis haec non concedatur: divina natura vel essentia generat. Unde in omnibus talibus processibus est sophisma *secundum accidens*. Aliter enim et aliter significatur divina natura per hoc nomen *Deus*, et aliter per hoc nomen *natura*; ideo in nullo cogit auctoritas illa.

3. *(Nota.)* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina natura dicitur concipi et nasci; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^17], Augustinus ibi extendit nomen *naturae*, ut stet loco *personae*; et hoc quidem multoties facit. Sed communis usus talem modum loquendi non admittit; ideo ex tali auctoritate non debet argui, immo potius debet exponi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnatio est via ad nativitatem; dicendum, quod verum est: ad nativitatem *personae*, quae est suppositum naturae assumtae; sed non oportet, quod sit via ad nativitatem *naturae*. Incarnatio enim non facit communicationem idiomatum ratione convenientiae in *natura*, sed potius ratione convenientiae in *persona*.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod assumere carnem est nasci in utero; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *assumere* idem est quod *in unitatem sui accipere*, et hoc modo proprium est personae. Secundum autem quod *assumere* dicitur de divina natura, accipitur *largius*; et hoc modo *assumere* non est idem quod *in utero nasci*, sed potius *carni uniri*.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fortitudo est infirmata, et sic de aliis; dicendum, quod verba illa non sunt trahenda ad consequentiam. Conceditur enim[^18] aliquid dicere ei qui vult excitare devotionem et elevare in admirationem, quod tamen reprehenderetur in eo qui sermonis catholici proprietatem et veritatem inquirit. — *(Alia solutio.)* Posset etiam et aliter responderi, quod non est simile. Quamvis enim hoc nomen *essentia* vel *natura* non supponat pro persona; nomina tamen *appropriata*, ut *virtus et sapientia*, pro persona supponunt et locutionem veram reddunt. Unde sensus est: fortitudo est infirmata, id est persona, cui appropriatur fortitudo, Christus videlicet, qui est *Dei virtus et Dei sapientia*[^19], Verbum scilicet Patris, cui competit esse Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Et ideo, quamvis talia praedicata conveniant et attribuantur nominibus appropriatis, non tamen sequitur, quod attribui possint essentiae vel naturae proprie et vere.

english:
### Article I. *On the temporal nativity in comparison to the divine nature.*
### Question I. *Whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is born of the Virgin.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is born of the Virgin. And that it is so, seems [provable]:

1. First, by the authority of Hilary, in the fourth book *On the Trinity*[^1]: « The Son has nothing except what is born » ; but *(On the contrary.)* he has the divine nature: therefore it is born. But what is born eternally in Christ from the Father, is born temporally of the Mother: if therefore the divine nature is of this sort, it is evident, and so on.

2. Likewise, more expressly Damascene, in the third book, chapter twelve[^2]: « We proclaim the *Theotokos*, that is, the God-bearer, to be truly and principally holy Mary the Virgin » ; but « God is a name of the nature »: therefore the Virgin Mary will be the bearer of the divine nature: therefore the divine nature is born of the Virgin.

3. Likewise, most expressly Augustine, *On the Faith, to Peter*[^3]: « The eternal and divine nature could not be temporally conceived and born except by the taking up of human truth [reality] »: therefore it seems that it ought truly and properly to be said to be conceived and born of the Virgin.

4. Likewise, the incarnation is ordered to the nativity — whence the person of the Word too was born because incarnate — but it is conceded that the divine nature is incarnate, as was held above in the fifth distinction[^4]: therefore it must also be conceded that it is born of the Virgin.

5. Likewise, to assume flesh is nothing other than to be born in the womb; but this is conceded, that the divine nature assumed flesh from the Virgin[^5]: therefore it must be conceded that it was born in the womb of the Virgin. But upon nativity in the womb there follows nativity from the womb: therefore if the divine nature was born in the Virgin's womb, it follows that it was born from the Virgin's womb.

6. Likewise, it is more fitting to the divine nature *to be born* of the Virgin than it is fitting for power *to suffer*, and for fortitude *to be weakened*; but Bernard[^6] says that « in that union fortitude was weakened »: therefore much more strongly must it be conceded that the divine nature is born of the Virgin.

*(Fundamenta.)* **On the contrary:** 1. Damascene, in the fourth book[^7]: « We acknowledge that to be born does not belong to the nature, but to the hypostasis »: therefore to be born of the Virgin does not belong to the nature, but only to the person.

2. Likewise, the eternal nativity is nobler and prior than the temporal; but the divine nature is not said to be born on account of the Son's eternal nativity, as was shown in the first book[^8]: therefore much less ought it to be said to be born on account of the temporal nativity.

3. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be born, to it belongs to be from another[^9]; but it does not belong to the divine nature to be from another: therefore the divine nature ought to be said to be born neither eternally nor temporally.

4. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be born, to it belongs the formal character of sonship: therefore if the divine nature is said to be born of the Virgin, the divine nature is said[^10] to be the daughter of the Virgin.

5. Likewise, as the properties of the divine nature stand to the human, so the human properties [stand] to the divine; but this is simply false: the humanity in Christ is eternal: therefore this also [is false]: the divine nature in Christ is born of the Virgin.

6. Likewise, what is born from something is a nature conformable with that from which it is born[^11]: if therefore the divine nature is born of the Virgin, it seems that the divine nature and the Virgin Mary are of the same nature; which is false and impossible.

### Conclusion

> *(Conclusion.)* The aforesaid locution, for a twofold cause, ought not to be received.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^12], this is not received as proper: the divine nature is born of the Virgin. And this on account of two things, namely on account of avoiding a confusion of the personal properties and of the natural or essential properties, which two things are especially to be observed regarding catholic speech and what expresses the truth of the faith. — *(Reason 1.)* Therefore it is not received that the divine nature is born of the Virgin, on account of the confusion of personal properties; for which reason it is also not conceded that it is born of the Father. And this is what the Master says in the text[^13]: « What is not begotten of the Father does not seem to be born of the Mother; nor does any reality have the name of sonship in the humanity which it does not hold in the divinity ».

*(Reason 2.)* Also on account of avoiding a confusion of the natural properties it is not received. For just as in the most blessed Trinity the persons and their properties are distinct from one another; so in Christ the natures are distinct from one another and their properties, although they coincide in the supposit; and therefore the property of one nature ought not[^14] to be predicated of the other nature considered in abstraction, lest from this it be understood that the divine and human nature are one essence. For what is predicated of another in abstrac<!-- page 187 -->tion is not understood to belong to it only by reason of the *supposit*, but also by reason of the *form*[^15]. And therefore the aforesaid locution ought not to be received. And the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.

*(Solution of the contrary arguments.)* 1. To that word of Hilary it must be said that it has something of impropriety and ought to be expounded thus: the Son has nothing except what is born, that is, he has nothing which he did not receive by being born. And this was better explained in the first book[^16].

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Damascene, that the Virgin Mary is the God-bearer; it must be said that it must be conceded that God was born of the Virgin; yet from this it does not follow that the divine nature is born of the Virgin, for the reason that this name *God*, because it signifies in concretion, supposits for the person; not so the divine nature, which signifies in abstraction. Whence this too is conceded: God begets; although this is not conceded: the divine nature or essence begets. Whence in all such processes there is a fallacy *of accident*. For the divine nature is signified in one way by this name *God*, and in another by this name *nature*; therefore that authority compels nothing.

3. *(Note.)* To that which is objected, that the divine nature is said to be conceived and born; it must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^17], Augustine there extends the name *nature* so that it stands in place of *person*; and this indeed he does many times. But common usage does not admit such a manner of speaking; therefore from such an authority one ought not to argue, but rather it ought to be expounded.

4. To that which is objected, that the incarnation is the way to the nativity; it must be said that it is true: to the nativity of the *person*, which is the supposit of the assumed nature; but it is not necessary that it be the way to the nativity of the *nature*. For the incarnation does not effect a communication of idioms by reason of a coinciding in *nature*, but rather by reason of a coinciding in *person*.

5. To that which is objected, that to assume flesh is to be born in the womb; it must be said that it is true, insofar as *to assume* is the same as *to receive into the unity of oneself*, and in this way it is proper to the person. But insofar as *to assume* is said of the divine nature, it is taken *more broadly*; and in this way *to assume* is not the same as *to be born in the womb*, but rather *to be united to flesh*.

6. To that which is objected, that fortitude was weakened, and so of the others; it must be said that those words are not to be drawn into a consequence. For it is conceded[^18] that something is said by one who wishes to excite devotion and to lift up into admiration, which nevertheless would be censured in one who inquires into the propriety and truth of catholic speech. — *(Another solution.)* It could also be answered otherwise, that it is not similar. For although this name *essence* or *nature* does not supposit for the person; nevertheless *appropriated* names, such as *power and wisdom*, supposit for the person and render the locution true. Whence the sense is: fortitude was weakened, that is, the person to whom fortitude is appropriated, namely Christ, who is *the power of God and the wisdom of God*[^19], namely the Word of the Father, to whom it belongs to be the power of God and the wisdom of God. And therefore, although such predicates befit and are attributed to appropriated names, it nevertheless does not follow that they can be attributed to the essence or nature properly and truly.

la: Num. 10. — Minor subsumta, in qua pro *Sed quod* edd. exhibent *Sed quidquid*, sententialiter convenit cum dicto Fulgentii, de Fide ad Petrum, c. 2. n. 14: *Illa enim natura, quae semper genita manet ex Patre, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit, ut nasceretur ex Virgine.* Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1.

en: No. 10. — The minor premise subsumed, in which for *Sed quod* ("But what") the editions present *Sed quidquid* ("But whatever"), agrees in meaning with the statement of Fulgentius, *On the Faith, to Peter*, c. 2, n. 14: *For that nature, which always remains begotten of the Father, took up our nature without sin, that it might be born of the Virgin.* Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 1.

la: De Fide orthod. — Verba *Deus est nomen naturae* sunt secundum Ambros. (l. de Fide ad Gratian. c. 1. n. 7.), ut in lit. Magistri, l. Sent. d. II. c. 4. refertur.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith.* — The words *God is a name of the nature* are according to Ambrose (*On the Faith, to Gratian*, bk. 1, c. 1, n. 7), as is reported in the text of the Master, Sentences bk. I, d. II, c. 4.

la: Cap. 2. n. 14. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine testimonii allati codd. K Z voci *humanae* praemittunt *naturae*.

en: Ch. 2, n. 14. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the cited testimony codices K Z prefix *naturae* to the word *humanae*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. De distinctione nativitatis *in utero* et *ex utero* vide supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Edd. omittunt *de Virgine*.

en: Cf. above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1. On the distinction of the nativity *in the womb* and *from the womb* see above, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and following. — The editions omit *of the Virgin*.

la: Homil. 2. super *Missus est*, n. 9: *Videas, si attendas, potentiam regi, sapientiam instrui... fortitudinem infirmari.* — Pro *Bernardus* codd. W X *Gregorius*. Post *fortitudo* edd. subiiciunt *divina*.

en: Homily 2 on *Missus est*, n. 9: *You may see, if you attend, power ruled, wisdom instructed... fortitude weakened.* — For *Bernardus* codices W X read *Gregorius*. After *fortitudo* the editions add *divina*.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 7.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 7.

la: Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1. — In maiori Vat. *melior* pro *nobilior*.

en: Dist. 5, a. 2, q. 1. — In the major premise the Vatican edition reads *melior* ("better") for *nobilior* ("nobler").

la: Nam, ut Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.) dicit, « generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum ». — In fine arg. pro *debet* cod. A substituit *oportet*.

en: For, as Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 47 (c. 4), says, « nothing whatever begets its very self ». — At the end of the argument, for *debet* codex A substitutes *oportet*.

la: Cod. U subiicit *esse*. — Cfr. de hoc arg. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Codex U adds *esse*. — Cf. on this argument the text of the Master here, c. 1.

la: Generare enim, ut Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.) docet, « est facere aliud quale ipsum ». Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et dub. 2.

en: For to beget, as Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 34 (c. 4), teaches, « is to make another such as itself ». Cf. above, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1 and following, and dub. 2.

la: Hic c. 1. — Mox pro *tanquam propria* Vat. cum non paucis codd. erronee *tanquam impropria*.

en: Here, c. 1. — Shortly after, for *tanquam propria* ("as proper") the Vatican edition with not a few codices erroneously [reads] *tanquam impropria* ("as improper").

la: Hic c. 1, ubi textus origin. et Vat. pro *nec res... habet* exhibent *ne res... habeat.* Subinde pro *teneat* cod. G *tenet.* — Paulo superius post *de Virgine* ex solo cod. bb, contextu exigente, supplevimus *propter confusionem personalium* (proprietatum vitandam).

en: Here, c. 1, where the original text and the Vatican edition, for *nec res... habet*, present *ne res... habeat.* Thereafter, for *teneat* codex G [reads] *tenet.* — A little above, after *de Virgine*, from codex bb alone, the context requiring it, we supplied *propter confusionem personalium* (to avoid the confusion of properties).

la: Cod. K *et ideo proprietates... non debent.*

en: Codex K [reads] *and therefore the properties... ought not.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. et 6, nec non d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 and 6, as also d. 7, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.

la: Dist. V. lit. Magistri, c. 1. et Comment. a. 2. q. 1. ac dub. 5.

en: Dist. V, the text of the Master, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 5.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. et 4. atque d. 3. a. 1. q. 1. De sophismate *secundum accidens* cfr. supra pag. 179, nota 1. — In fine solut. pro *in nullo* cod. G *nullo modo.*

en: Cf. Sentences bk. I, d. 4, q. 1 and 4, and d. 3, a. 1, q. 1. On the fallacy *of accident* cf. above, p. 179, note 1. — At the end of the solution, for *in nullo* codex G [reads] *nullo modo.*

la: Hic c. 1. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1, ubi similis sententia ex eodem libro de Fide ad Petrum affertur, et l. Sent. d. V. c. 1.

en: Here, c. 1. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 1, where a similar opinion is adduced from the same book *On the Faith, to Peter*, and Sentences bk. I, d. V, c. 1.

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 1, 24. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. in fine et d. 34. q. 3.

en: 1 Cor. 1:24 is referred to. — Cf. Sentences bk. I, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, at the end, and d. 34, q. 3. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro conclusione, quae est doctrina communis, plures a diversis rationes afferuntur, praesertim haec, quod divina natura per temporalem nativitatem nec producitur nec accipitur. — Illud principium in solutionibus tactum, quod *nativitas* proprie et primo tribuitur *personae*, naturae autem tantum ex consequenti, negat Scot. (hic q. unica n. 10. seqq.); cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2, ubi agitur de *filiatione*. — De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 10. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. III. q. 35. a. 1. ad 1. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Quoad sequentem (2.) quaestionem patet, quod si *nasci* proprie dicitur de supposito, non refertur ad *naturam* nisi minus proprie et ex consequenti. Conclusio tamen ab antiquis conceditur cum quadam determinatione limitante. De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.

**III.** Quaestio 3. a plerisque tangitur in quaestionibus 5. distinctionis, praesertim in quaestione (a. 1. q. 5.), utrum divina natura sit incarnata, vel in altera, utrum divinae naturae conveniat assumere. Specialiter de eadem tractant Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3, qui eodem loquendi modo cum S. Bonav. utitur, et Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3, qui tamen negative ad quaestionem respondet. Sed haec differentia non est nisi de modo loquendi.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the conclusion, which is the common doctrine, several reasons are brought forward by various [authors], especially this, that the divine nature is neither produced nor received through the temporal nativity. — The principle touched upon in the solutions, that *nativity* is properly and primarily attributed to the *person*, but to the nature only consequently, Scotus denies (here, the single question, n. 10 ff.); cf. below, a. 2, q. 2, where *filiation* is treated. — On this first question: Alexander of Hales, Part III, q. 10, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *Summa* III, q. 35, a. 1, ad 1. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following q. here, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here, q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following q. here, q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following qq. here, the single question.

**II.** As regards the following (second) question, it is evident that if *to be born* is properly said of the supposit, it is not referred to the *nature* except less properly and consequently. The conclusion is nevertheless conceded by the ancients with a certain limiting determination. On this question: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1.

**III.** The third question is touched by most [authors] in the questions of the fifth distinction, especially in the question (a. 1, q. 5) whether the divine nature is incarnate, or in the other [question] whether to assume befits the divine nature. Richard of Mediavilla treats specially of the same, here a. 1, q. 3, who uses the same manner of speaking as St. Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3, who nevertheless answers the question negatively. But this difference is only as to the manner of speaking.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.185–187 (PDF 207–209; offset pdf = printed + 22), read left column top→bottom then right column, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 13311–13467), which is clean here. Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus drawn directly from the Quaracchi per-page footer blocks.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.185** (foot, running head `ARTICULUS I.` opening the article): ART. I + QUAEST. I headers + opener + Fundamenta arg. 1 (Hilary, *Ad oppositum* marginal) + start of arg. 2 (Damascene). Footers: note 1 *Multi codd. perperam tres* + note 2 *Plurimi codd. falso tres* (both belong to `d8-divisio` — the *tres* codices-variants on the division-count), then **note 3** (`[^1]`, *Num. 10. — Minor subsumta…*), q1's first footer, **received as hand-off from `d8-divisio`**.
- **p.186** (running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): arg. 2 (cont.) + args 3–6 + Sed contra (*Fundamenta*) args 1–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo opening (Ratio 1, Ratio 2 start). Footers: notes 1–13 (`[^2]`–`[^14]`).
- **p.187** (running head `DIST. VIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`): Respondeo tail (the page break falls mid-clause at *de altero in abstra-|ctione*) + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–6 + SCHOLION I–III. Footers: notes 1–8 (mapped below).

**Footnote numbering.** Markers are renumbered `[^1]`–`[^19]` continuously for the chunk (the per-page Quaracchi restart is documented in the page-split map; no page-collision suffix was used because the renumber is monotonic). Body-marker → printed-footer map: `[^1]`=p.185 n.3; `[^2]`–`[^14]`=p.186 n.1–13; `[^15]`=p.187 n.1, `[^16]`=p.187 n.2, `[^17]`=p.187 n.3, `[^18]`=p.187 n.7, `[^19]`=p.187 n.8. The p.187 footer also prints notes 4–6 (*Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.* / *Ut ostensum est supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.* / and a *Quandoque enim conceditur* variant note keying the ad-6 *Conceditur enim*) — these are bare cross-reference / variant footers on the Solutio ad-4/ad-5/ad-6 clauses and were absorbed inline rather than given separate markers, matching the corpus convention for pure cross-reference footers (the substantive content of p.187 n.6/n.7 is captured in `[^18]`).

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED from `d8-divisio`:** p.185 footer note 3 (`[^1]`, *Num. 10. — Minor subsumta…*), keying arg. 1's Hilary minor premise — exactly as forecast. The divisio consumed only p.185 notes 1–2.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to `d8-a1-q2`:** NONE. q1's p.185 note 3 + p.186 notes 1–13 + p.187 notes 1–8 are fully exhausted at q1's SCHOLION tail. QUAESTIO II (*Utrum nasci de Virgine vere dicatur de natura assumta*, raw 13468) opens fresh on p.188 with its own per-page footer sequence.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. A standalone, markerless (cross-reference-only) **article-level SCHOLION I–III** prints at q1's tail on p.187. §I states q1's conclusion (the common doctrine; Scotus's dissent on whether nativity is primarily of the person noted) + lists parallel commentators for q1 (*De hac 1. quaestione*); **§II forward-covers q2** (*Quoad sequentem (2.) quaestionem*, with q2's commentator list); **§III forward-covers q3** (*Quaestio 3. a plerisque tangitur…*, with q3's commentators). **Forward-coverage:** because this scholion surveys all three quaestiones of Art. I, expect `d8-a1-q2` and `d8-a1-q3` to have `has_scholion: false` (their commentator source-lists are absorbed here, §II and §III) — verify for a redirect note (*Vide scholion ad…*) when building them.

**Boundary integrity.** The q1 opener is continuous with the `d8-divisio` TRACTATIO tail (q1 opens fresh with its ART. I + QUAEST. I headers at the foot of p.185). The p.186→p.187 internal page break falls mid-word in the Respondeo (*…praedicatur de altero in abstra-|ctione…*) and was rejoined. The q1/q2 seam at the foot of p.187 is clean: the SCHOLION closes with §III "...Sed haec differentia non est nisi de modo loquendi." and QUAESTIO II opens immediately afterward.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All readings were resolvable from the 450 dpi column bands cross-checked against the OCR.


title: Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 188 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum nasci de Virgine vere dicatur de natura assumta.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nasci de Virgine vere dicatur de natura assumta. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *(Fundamenta)* Eius est generari cuius est generare, licet non eiusdem numero; sed generare est actus ipsius naturae[^1]: ergo et generari. Sed cuius est generari, eius est nasci: ergo si generari competit naturae assumtae, convenit ei nasci de Virgine.

2. Item, bene sequitur: iste generat hunc hominem, ergo hominem; sed hunc hominem dicere est dicere personam, hominem vero naturam: ergo bene sequitur, si persona est nata, quod natura est nata.

3. Item, omne quod incipit esse, aliquo genere mutationis incipit esse; sed humana natura in Christo incipit esse; nec est dare aliud genus mutationis quam generationis[^2]: ergo fuit concepta et nata.

4. Item, Christus natus est de Virgine aut ratione suppositi, aut ratione naturae; sed non ratione suppositi, quia illud est aeternum: ergo ratione naturae: ergo natura humana proprie dicitur nata de Virgine.

**Sed contra:** 1. *(Ad oppositum)* Sicut se habet divina natura ad nativitatem aeternam, sic natura humana ad nativitatem temporalem; sed divina natura non est nata nativitate aeterna[^3]: ergo nec humana natura in Christo nativitate temporali.

2. Item, nativitas ad nihil terminatur nisi ad ens completum; sed ens completum dicit personam[^4]: ergo generatio non terminatur ad naturam, sed ad personam.

3. Item, actus et operatio non terminatur nisi ad hoc aliquid[^5]: ergo si hoc aliquid non dicit naturam, sed potius hypostasim; videtur, quod humana natura in Christo non debeat dici nata nec concepta.

4. Item, humana natura dicit simul carnem et animam; sed sicut caro est per propagationem, ita et anima per creationem: ergo sicut haec non recipitur, quod humana natura in Christo exeat in esse per creationem, ita non debet concedi, quod exeat per generationem: ergo non videtur haec admittenda: humana natura est nata.

### *(Conclusio)*

> Concedendum est, humanam naturam in Christo esse natam de Virgine.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod humana natura dupliciter potest accipi (*Distinctio*): uno modo ratione partium constituentium, alio modo ratione formae communis, consequentis totum compositum. Et utroque modo est verum dicere (*Conclusio praevia*). Verum est enim, quod humana natura assumta a Verbo assumsit carnem et animam; verum est etiam, quod assumsit formam consequentem compositionem, videlicet humanitatem[^6].

Utroque etiam praedictorum modorum contingit dicere humanam naturam natam de Virgine (*Conclusio generalis*). Nam si humana natura dicatur compositum, hoc modo potest concedi, quod sit nata de Virgine, non ratione totius, sed partis, scilicet carnis, quae in utero Virginis concepta fuit et ex utero Virginis prodiit[^7] (*Membrum 1*). — Si vero natura humana dicatur forma communis, consequens totum compositum, sic concedi potest, quod adhuc fuit nata in Christo, non ratione sui, sed ratione suppositi, in quo habet existere, et etiam in quo habet multiplicari (*Membrum 2*). Propter quod etiam dicit Philosophus[^8], quod « natura in productione talis formae occulte habet operari »; generando enim
<!-- page 189 -->
hunc hominem, generat hominem. — Sic igitur concedendum est, humanam naturam in Christo natam esse de Virgine utrolibet praedictorum modorum. Sed uno modo dicitur esse nata ratione partis constitutivae per synecdochen[^9] (*Corollarium*); alio modo ratione partis subiectivae; et sic quodam modo per accidens. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ad hanc partem inductae, licet aliquae earum procedant sophistice (*Nota*).

1. *(Solutio oppositorum)* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina natura in Christo non est nata, ergo nec humana; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia divina natura non multiplicatur in suppositis, sed est una in generante et genito; et ideo non recipit vocabulum distinctivum. Natura vero humana multiplicari habet et plurificari in parente et in prole. Hinc est, quod generatio in divinis terminatur ad personam; in creaturis non solum ad personam, verum etiam ad naturam[^10] (*Notandum*).

2. 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod generatio terminatur ad ens completum; dicendum[^11], quod verum est per se et primum; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod ad naturam non possit terminari, sed quod non terminatur ad naturam, circumscripta hypostasi; et hoc quidem verum est. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens (*Notandum*).

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod anima exit in esse per creationem; dicendum, quod etsi sola pars hominis traducatur, videlicet caro, nihilominus tamen totus homo dicitur nasci et generari, pro eo quod intentio naturae non terminatur ad alteram partem per se, sed prout habet coniungi et perfici ex altera. Et ideo totus homo dicitur natus, quamvis tantum ex altera parte traducatur; non enim intendit homo generare carnem, sed hominem[^4b]. — Si vero quaeritur, quare non dicitur exire in esse per creationem, sicut per generationem (*Quaestio incidens solvitur*); dicendum, quod generatio non excludit creationem praeambulam; creatio vero, cum sit ex nihilo, aliam excludit productionem, secundum quod dicit proximam creaturae et immediatam eductionem[^5b].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether to be born of the Virgin is truly said of the assumed nature.*

Secondly it is asked whether to be born of the Virgin is truly said of the assumed [human] nature. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. *(Foundations)* That which it belongs to to beget, it belongs to to be begotten, though not as the same in number; but to beget is an act of the nature itself[^1]: therefore also to be begotten. But that which it belongs to to be begotten, it belongs to to be born: therefore if to be begotten befits the assumed nature, it befits it to be born of the Virgin.

2. Likewise, it follows well: this one begets this man, therefore [begets] a man; but to say "this man" is to say a person, whereas "man" [says] a nature: therefore it follows well that, if the person is born, the nature is born.

3. Likewise, everything that begins to be begins to be by some kind of change; but the human nature in Christ begins to be; nor is there any kind of change to be assigned other than that of generation[^2]: therefore it was conceived and born.

4. Likewise, Christ was born of the Virgin either by reason of the supposit or by reason of the nature; but not by reason of the supposit, because that is eternal: therefore by reason of the nature: therefore the human nature is properly said to be born of the Virgin.

**On the contrary:** 1. *(To the opposite)* As the divine nature is related to the eternal nativity, so the human nature [is related] to the temporal nativity; but the divine nature is not born by an eternal nativity[^3]: therefore neither is the human nature in Christ [born] by a temporal nativity.

2. Likewise, a nativity is terminated at nothing except a complete being; but a complete being says a person[^4]: therefore generation is not terminated at a nature, but at a person.

3. Likewise, an act and operation is terminated only at a "this something"[^5]: therefore if a "this something" does not say a nature, but rather a hypostasis, it seems that the human nature in Christ ought not to be said to be born or conceived.

4. Likewise, the human nature says at once flesh and soul; but just as the flesh is by propagation, so also the soul is by creation: therefore just as this is not admitted, that the human nature in Christ comes into being by creation, so it ought not to be conceded that it comes into being by generation: therefore this does not seem to be admissible: the human nature is born.

### *(Conclusion)*

> It must be conceded that the human nature in Christ was born of the Virgin.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the human nature can be taken in two ways (*Distinction*): in one way by reason of its constituent parts, in another way by reason of the common form following upon the whole composite. And in both ways it is true to say [it] (*Prior conclusion*). For it is true that the human nature assumed by the Word assumed flesh and soul; it is also true that it assumed the form following upon the composition, namely humanity[^6].

In each of the aforesaid ways also it occurs to say that the human nature is born of the Virgin (*General conclusion*). For if the human nature be called the composite, in this way it can be conceded that it is born of the Virgin, not by reason of the whole, but of a part, namely of the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin and came forth from the womb of the Virgin[^7] (*Member 1*). — But if the human nature be called the common form, following upon the whole composite, in this way it can be conceded that it was furthermore born in Christ, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the supposit, in which it has to exist, and also in which it has to be multiplied (*Member 2*). On account of which the Philosopher also says[^8] that "in the production of such a form nature has to work hiddenly"; for in begetting
this man, it begets a man. — Thus, therefore, it must be conceded that the human nature in Christ was born of the Virgin in either of the aforesaid ways. But in one way it is said to be born by reason of the constitutive part, by synecdoche[^9] (*Corollary*); in another way by reason of the subjective part; and thus in a certain manner per accidens. — Therefore the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded, although some of them proceed sophistically (*Note*).

1. *(Solution of the opposing arguments)* To that which is objected, that the divine nature in Christ is not born, therefore neither is the human; it must be said that it is not alike, because the divine nature is not multiplied in supposits, but is one in the one begetting and the one begotten; and therefore it does not receive a distinguishing term. But the human nature has to be multiplied and pluralized in parent and in offspring. Hence it is that generation in divine things is terminated at a person; in creatures not only at a person, but also at a nature[^10] (*Note*).

2. 3. But to that which is objected, that generation is terminated at a complete being; it must be said[^11] that it is true per se and primarily; yet from this it does not follow that it cannot be terminated at a nature, but that it is not terminated at a nature with the hypostasis set aside; and this indeed is true. — And by this the reply to the next [objection] is clear (*Note*).

4. To that which is objected last, that the soul comes into being by creation; it must be said that, although only a part of the man is propagated, namely the flesh, nevertheless the whole man is said to be born and begotten, for the reason that the intention of nature is not terminated at the one part per se, but inasmuch as it has to be joined and perfected from the other. And therefore the whole man is said to be born, although he is propagated only from the one part; for a man does not intend to beget flesh, but a man[^4b]. — But if it be asked why it is not said to come into being by creation, as [it does] by generation (*An incidental question is solved*); it must be said that generation does not exclude a preceding creation; but creation, since it is from nothing, excludes another production, inasmuch as it says the proximate and immediate eduction of the creature[^5b].

---

la: Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.) ait: *Natura vero dicitur uno quidem modo nascentium generatio... alio vero, ex quo primo inexistente generatur quod gignitur.* Cfr. tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10, ubi plura retulimus de illa quae etiam apud Hugonem a S. Vict. (Qq. in Epist. ad Rom. q. 119.) habetur naturae definitione: *natura est vis insita rebus, similia ex similibus procreans.* — Quoad maiorem animadverte illud Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.): *Generans tale est, quale quod generatur, non tamen idem nec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut in naturalibus; homo namque hominem generat.* Cfr. ibid. text. 22. (VI. c. 7.). — In fine arg. pro *convenit* codd. F H I bb et edd. 1, 2 *competit*, Vat. *videtur, quod competit*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 5 (IV c. 4), says: "Nature is said in one way [to be] the generation of growing things... in another, that out of which, as first present in [a thing], is generated what is engendered." Cf. vol. I, p. 134, note 10, where we reported more on the definition of nature found also in Hugh of St. Victor (*Questions on the Epistle to the Romans*, q. 119): "nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like from like." — As to the major premise, note that of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 28 (VI c. 8): "The begetter is such as that which is begotten, yet not the same nor one in number, but one in species, as in natural things; for man begets man." Cf. ibid., text 22 (VI c. 7). — At the end of the argument, for *convenit* codices F H I bb and editions 1, 2 [read] *competit*, the Vatican [edition] *videtur, quod competit*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 11. — In minori, de qua infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 1, pro *incipit* cod. K *incepit*.

en: Cf. above, p. 111, note 11. — In the minor [premise], on which see below, d. 11, a. 2, q. 1, for *incipit* codex K [reads] *incepit*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* I, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 26. seqq. (VI. c. 8.), ubi neque formam neque materiam proprie generari docetur, sed compositum: « totum autem hoc Kallias aut Socrates est ». — In cod. K post verba *sed ens completum* a secunda manu non incongrue additum est *in rationalibus*.

en: See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3. — On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 26 ff. (VI c. 8), where it is taught that neither form nor matter properly is generated, but the composite: "but this whole is Callias or Socrates." — In codex K, after the words *sed ens completum*, by a second hand there is not incongruously added *in rationalibus* ["in rational things"].

la: Id est primam vel singularem substantiam. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 109, nota 7; pag. 197, nota 3; pag. 373, nota 6. — Aristot., VII. Methaph. text. 26. (VI. c. 8.) dicit: *Hoc aliquid enim facere ex omnino subiecto, hoc facere est* (vide notam praeced.). Et 1. Metaph. c. 1. Philosophus docet: *Actiones autem ac generationes omnes circa singulare sunt; non enim hominem nisi per accidens sanat qui medetur, sed Kalliam aut Socratem aut alium quempiam eorum qui sic dicuntur, cui accidit hominem esse.* Cfr. XII. Metaph. text. 18. (XI. c. 3.). — Pro *terminatur* cod. K *terminantur*.

en: That is, a primary or singular substance. Cf. vol. II, p. 109, note 7; p. 197, note 3; p. 373, note 6. — Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 26 (VI c. 8), says: "For to make a 'this something' out of a wholly [particular] subject, this is to make [it]" (see the preceding note). And [in] *Metaphysics* I, c. 1, the Philosopher teaches: "But all actions and generations are concerned with the singular; for the one who heals does not heal man except per accidens, but Callias or Socrates or some other of those who are so named, to whom it happens to be a man." Cf. *Metaphysics* XII, text 18 (XI c. 3). — For *terminatur* codex K [reads] *terminantur*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. nec non d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. et 5.

en: Cf. above, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ff., and also d. 5, a. 2, q. 1 and 5.

la: Vide supra d. 4. a. 3. q. 1. seqq. — Pro *prodiit* edd. *producta*.

en: See above, d. 4, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — For *prodiit* the editions [read] *producta*.

la: Scil. Gilbertus Porret., qui in libro de Sex Principiis, c. 1. tractans quaestionem illam: utrum universalia i. e. quae sunt in pluribus, ideoque potentiam agentium singularium excedere videntur, sint a natura, an ab arte, ait: « Natura igitur in his occulte operatur ». Quae verba B. Albert., Comment. super praedictum librum, tr. 1. c. 5, sic explicat: « Natura, inquit, particularis in agente quidem et patiente intendit *hunc* et producit; universalis autem, quae *hunc* ordinat ad *esse* divinum, intendit simplex et *universale*. Et quia natura universalis operatur in particulari, ideo, quoniam natura particularis producit *hunc*, et quia hic est *homo*, natura universalis producit *hunc* in *homine*; et sic de aliis. Et hoc modo per consequens producitur id quod est universale, quamvis non sit universale, secundum quod est in isto » etc. Deinde ostendit, duplici de causa naturam in his dici *operari occulte*, quia scil. tum ex parte operantis, tum ex parte operati, quamvis universalis tamen sumta *non nisi intellectu* considerari possit.

en: Namely Gilbert of Poitiers, who in the book *On the Six Principles*, c. 1, treating that question — whether universals, i.e. those which are in many and therefore seem to exceed the power of singular agents, are from nature or from art — says: "Nature, therefore, works hiddenly in these." Which words Blessed Albert, *Commentary* on the aforesaid book, tr. 1 c. 5, explains thus: "Particular nature, he says, intends *this* in the agent and patient and produces [it]; but universal nature, which orders *this* to divine *being*, intends the simple and the *universal*. And because universal nature works in the particular, therefore, since particular nature produces *this*, and because this is *man*, universal nature produces *this* in *man*; and so of the rest. And in this way, consequently, that which is universal is produced, although it is not universal, insofar as it is in this [thing]," etc. Then he shows that for a twofold cause nature is said in these [things] to *work hiddenly*, namely both on the side of the worker and on the side of the work, although the universal, taken as such, can be considered *only by the intellect*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 4. — Pars *subiectiva* intelligitur quodlibet inferius sub toto universali contentum, v. gr. individuum sive singulare. Cfr. tom. II. p. 598, nota 9. — Paulo superius pro *utrolibet* codd. G K bb *utroque*.

en: Cf. above, p. 47, note 4. — A *subjective* part is understood as any inferior contained under the universal whole, e.g. an individual or singular. Cf. vol. II, p. 598, note 9. — A little above, for *utrolibet* codices G K bb [read] *utroque*.

la: Quod accuratius explicatum est I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. — Aliquanto superius pro *et genito* codd. F G X bb *et generato*, et subinde pro *distinctivum* (plures codd. *distinctum*) cod. aa *distinctionis*.

en: Which is more accurately explained [in] *Sentences* I, d. 9, q. 1. — Somewhat above, for *et genito* codices F G X bb [read] *et generato*, and thereupon for *distinctivum* (several codices *distinctum*) codex aa [reads] *distinctionis*.

la: In plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur *dicendum, quod*.

en: In very many codices and in editions 1, 2 the words *dicendum, quod* are wanting.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 32. a. 3. q. 2. ad 4. — Seqq. vide ibid. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. in corp., ubi de ordinatione operationum Dei, naturae et artis agitur. — Paulo superius ante *et alterum* edd. repetunt *praedicatur*. Pro *et alterum* codd. K X habent *et reliquum*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3 and d. 32, a. 3, q. 2 ad 4. — For what follows see ibid., d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 2 in the body, where the ordering of the operations of God, nature, and art is treated. — A little above, before *et alterum* the editions repeat *praedicatur*. For *et alterum* codices K X have *et reliquum*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.188–189 (PDF 210–211), read Left column top→bottom then Right column, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw 13466–13564). The OCR was heavily cascade-shattered in the Respondeo and Solutio (two-column bleed and one-token-per-line fragmentation, e.g. raw 13489–13491, 13553–13559); the PDF column bands are authoritative there per the Vol II/III override. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.188** (running head `188 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): QUAESTIO II header + title + opener + *Fundamenta* args 1–4 + *Sed contra* (*Ad oppositum*) args 1–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (*Distinctio*, *Conclusio praevia*, *Conclusio generalis*, *Membrum 1*, *Membrum 2*), breaking mid-sentence at *generando enim |* (foot of p.188-R).
- **p.189** (running head OCR-mangled `DIST. VIII. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` / `QUAEST. III. 189` — digit unreliable; body content is still QUAEST. II): Respondeo tail (*hunc hominem, generat hominem*) + *Corollarium* + *Nota* + Solutio oppositorum *Ad 1* (*Notandum*) + *Ad 2.3* (*Notandum*) + *Ad 4* (*Quaestio incidens solvitur*), ending *…immediatam eductionem⁵*. QUAESTIO III opens at the foot of p.189-L (right column).

**Apparatus (13 entries).** Continuous per printed page, p.188 notes 1–8 (`[^1]`–`[^8]`) + p.189 notes 1–5 (`[^9]`,`[^10]`,`[^11]`,`[^4b]`,`[^5b]`). Page 189's per-page restart is suffixed `b` to avoid colliding with p.188's markers; markers `[^9]`/`[^10]`/`[^11]` are p.189 notes 1/2/3 (kept un-suffixed since 9–11 do not collide with 1–8), and `[^4b]`/`[^5b]` are p.189 notes 4/5. Marker map: p.188 — naturae¹, generationis², aeterna³, ens completum⁴, hoc aliquid⁵, humanitatem⁶, prodiit⁷, Philosophus⁸; p.189 — synecdochen¹(`^9`), naturam²(`^10`), dicendum³/quod(`^11`), hominem⁴(`^4b`), eductionem⁵(`^5b`). The OCR body marker `eductionem 6` is an OCR error; the PDF reads `5`.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false` — confirmed: q3 (*Utrum homo veraciter dicatur de divina natura*) opens immediately after q2's Solutio tail with no intervening SCHOLION block. q1's article-level SCHOLION §II already forward-covers q2, and q2's own note 5 (`[^5b]`) explicitly redirects *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question") — exactly the forecast.

**Footer hand-off.** RECEIVED from d8-a1-q1: NONE (q1's footers exhausted at its SCHOLION tail on p.187; q2 opened fresh on p.188). FORWARDED to d8-a1-q3: NONE — q2's p.188 n.1–8 + p.189 n.1–5 are fully exhausted at the foot of p.189-R (note 5 *Vide scholion…*). q3 opens its own per-page footer sequence; p.189-R footer notes 6–9 (*Quia ut supra d.7…* / *Vide supra pag.175 nota 10* / *Cfr. supra d.7 a.1 q.1* / *Prophyr. de Praedicab.*) belong to QUAESTIO III, not q2.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses, not as anchors: *Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Conclusio, Distinctio, Conclusio praevia, Conclusio generalis, Membrum 1, Membrum 2, Corollarium, Nota, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum (×2), Quaestio incidens solvitur*.

**`[?]` flags:** none.