title: Dist. 42, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XLII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XLII)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *peccatum interdum est in aliquo reatu, postquam transit actu*[^7]. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum. Aut enim reatus sive obligatio peccati fundatur super actum peccati, aut super pronitatem, aut super deformitatem. Si super actum; ergo transeunte actu, necesse est ipsum transire: ergo non manet peccatum quantum ad reatum, postquam transit quantum ad actum[^8]. Si super pronitatem; ergo cum pronitas remaneat in homine post gratiae susceptionem, videtur, quod reatus remaneat post peccatum, etiam post

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gratiam susceptam; quod est plane falsum. Si super deformitatem; sed *contra*: deformitas dicit privationem, et privatio nihil est[^1]: ergo fundatur reatus peccati super nihil: ergo pro nihilo obligatur homo ad poenam. Si ergo nihil est plus in peccato nisi ista tria, non videtur, quod peccatum possit remanere reatu et transire actu.

Quaeritur igitur, super quid fundetur reatus sive obligatio ad poenam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum quod tria sunt in peccato, videlicet *actus* peccandi, et *habitus* pronitatis sive macula peccati, et tertio *defectus* sive boni privatio, quae *deformitas* dicitur; secundum hoc triplex fuit hic modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod reatus peccati fundatur super *actum*; nec tamen sequitur, quod[^2] transeat cum actu, pro eo quod pro actu praeterito potest homo manere obligatus ad poenam futuram. Cum enim quis ex pravitate actionis suae reus poenae efficitur; etsi actus ille pertranseat, reatus sive obligatio non pertransit, sicut patet in latrone, vel in eo qui aliquod facinus perpetravit. — Sed huic modo dicendi obviat possibilitas[^3] absolutionis a reatu. Si enim reatus fundaretur super actum praeteritum; cum actum praeteritum necesse sit esse praeteritum, cum est reus, non potest non esse reus, quod manifeste falsum est.

Alius modus dicendi fuit, quod reatus fundatur super *pronitatem*, quae quidem pronitas dicitur esse macula peccati; et illa macula est quasi quaedam dispositio reddens animam cremabilem; et ratione amotionis illius maculae dicimur *lavari in sanguine Christi a peccatis nostris*[^4]. — Sed huic modo dicendi obviat possibilitas amotionis illius pronitatis absque infusione gratiae; sicut patet: quando de avaro fit prodigus, aufertur ab eo pronitas ad avaritiam. Si ergo reatus fundaretur super illam pronitatem, cum aliquis de avaro fieret prodigus, absque gratia esset a reatu peccati absolutus, quod plane falsum est.

Tertius modus dicendi est, quod reatus fundatur super *deformitatem*[^5]. Deformitas autem non tantum dicit *boni privationem*, sed etiam *debitum habendi*; et quia peccator debet Deo iustitiam et honorem; et, dum illis privatur per peccatum, deformatur, et ex hoc obligatur ad sustinendam poenam. Quia enim debitor erat et non poterat solvere in operibus, necesse erat, ut persolveret in passionibus[^6]. — Sed huic modo dicendi obviat reatuum multiplicitas. Quot enim peccata homo actualiter perpetravit, tot poenis reus est; ex multis autem peccatis eiusdem speciei una resultat in anima deformitas. *Praeterea*, carentia boni in homine obligat ad carentiam summi boni, non ad passionem supplicii, sicut patet in originali peccato[^7b]. *Praeterea*, remota deformitate per gratiam, adhuc remanet obligatio ad poenam.

Et propterea dici potest, quod reatus sive obligatio ad poenam duplex est: quaedam scilicet respectu poenae *aeternae*, et quaedam respectu poenae *temporalis*. Obligatio vero respectu poenae temporalis non semper requirit culpam praesentem, sed sufficit ad illam obligationem, quod culpa fuerit praeterita, et quod non subsecuta fuerit plena emenda[^8b]. Obligatio autem ad poenam *aeternam* fundatur super ipsam culpam. Culpa autem, proprie loquendo, non est ipsa pronitas, sed ipsa deordinatio, sive quae est in *actu*, sive quae est in *anima*. Deordinatio autem in *actu* consistebat ex conversione et aversione; et secundum hanc duplicem comparationem anima deordinatur, cum peccat[^9]; et illa deordinatio in anima ratione aversionis dicitur *deformitas*, ratione vero conversionis dicitur *macula*. — Dico ergo, quod reatus poenae aeternae fundatur super peccatum, et in quantum est *deformitas*, et in quantum est *macula*; sed differenter, quia ratione *aversionis* dignus est privari bono aeterno[^10], ratione vero *conversionis* dignus est supplicio. Fundatur autem reatus super *maculam*, et *deformitatem*, quae est in anima per comparationem ad *actum*, per quem illa macula vel deformitas est introducta; et ideo plurificantur reatus, secundum quod plurificantur peccata commissa[^11].

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam dico, quod reatus poenae aeternae non simpliciter[^12] fundatur super *maculam*, secundum quod dicitur pronitas vel positio aliqua, sed potius secundum quod dicitur *deordinatio* et *privatio*. Dico etiam,

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quod non fundatur super deformitatem solum ratione *privationis*, sed etiam ratione *debiti*; nec solum ratione *aversionis*, sed etiam ratione *conversionis*; nec solum super peccatum, secundum quod est deformitas, sed secundum quod est *macula*. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera[^1b]: « Reatu remanet peccatum in homine, cum pro eo, sive transierit, sive adsit, mens hominis polluta est et corrupta, totusque homo suppliciis est obligatus perpetuis »; et loquitur hic Magister, sicut patet, de reatu poenae *aeternae*, non *temporalis*; reatus enim poenae temporalis bene fundatur super illud quod pertransiit[^2b].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Modi peccatorum varias in Scriptura habent distinctiones*. Videtur enim, quod non solummodo varias habeant, immo etiam infinitas; quia, sicut vult Philosophus[^3b], « bonum est uno modo, malum autem multifariam ». Et ipse etiam Dionysius dicit, quod « malum est infinitum »: ergo videtur, quod in Scriptura non possit habere distinctiones determinatas.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de numero et sufficientia harum distinctionum, quas Magister ponit in littera[^4b]. Videtur enim, quod aliquae inconvenienter assignentur; quia, cum omne peccatum sit in voluntate ex libidine mota[^5b], male distinguitur peccatum in peccatum, quod est ex amore, et quod est ex timore. — Item, cum omne peccatum sit in cogitatione et voluntate, male distinguitur peccatum per peccatum in cogitatione et verbo et opere. — Item, cum omne peccatum sit in Deum, male distinguitur peccatum per istas differentias: in *Deum* et in *se* et in *proximum*. — Item, cum in omni peccato sit defectus alicuius circumstantiae, omne peccatum videtur esse omissio: ergo male distinguitur per commissum et omissum. — Postremo videtur, cum omnis peccati initium sit superbia, quod male distinguatur peccatum per septem capitalia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister in hac parte septem innuit divisiones peccati[^6b] secundum septemplicem ipsius comparationem.

Primo namque peccatum comparatur ad *causam* suam, ex qua habet ortum; et sic est illa divisio peccati in *actuale* et *originale*.

Secundo vero comparatur ad *poenam*, ad quam terminatur; et sic est illa divisio peccati in *mortale* et *veniale*. Has duas divisiones Magister praemisit supra[^7c].

Tertio peccatum comparari habet ad *motivum*; et hoc quidem vel est ad *bonum* assequendum, vel ad *malum* fugiendum; et sic est tertia divisio, quam Magister ponit in peccatum ex *amore* et peccatum ex *timore*.

Quarto peccatum habet comparari ad *actum substratum*; et sic est quarta divisio peccati in peccatum *cogitationis*, *verbi* et *operis*, secundum triplicem potentiam, scilicet affectivam, interpretativam et operativam; *cogitatio* enim pro *affectione* ibi accipitur[^8c].

Quinto comparatur peccatum ad *personam*, quam offendit; et sic est quinta divisio peccati in *Deum* et in *se* et in *proximum*.

Sexto comparatur peccatum ad *mandatum*, cui opponitur; et sic est illa divisio in *delictum* et *commissum*, quia *delictum* est contra praeceptum affirmativum, et *commissum* contra negativum[^9b].

Septimo comparatur ad *vitia*, quae ex ipso oriuntur; et sic est illa divisio peccati in septem differentias *capitalium*.

Et sic Magister ponit septem divisiones secundum septem peccati comparationes. Quamvis tamen aliae divisiones reperiantur, ad aliquam harum reduci possunt, pro eo quod sumuntur secundum aliquam istarum comparationum; sicut illa divisio, qua beatus Ioannes in Canonica sua[^10b] dividit peccatum in *superbiam vitae* et *concupiscentiam oculorum* et *concupiscentiam carnis*, reducitur ad illam, quae est ex parte motivi. — Similiter et illa divisio, qua Isidorus[^11b] dividit peccatum in peccatum, quod est « ex *malitia* et *infirmitate* et *ignorantia* ». Similiter illa divisio, qua Gregorius dividit in peccata *carnalia* et *spiritualia*, quam sumit ex illo verbo Apostoli secundae ad Corinthios septimo: *Mundemus nos ab omni inquinamento carnis et spiritus*, reducitur ad illam, qua peccatum dividitur per comparationem

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ad actus substratos. — Et sic patet sufficientia, numerus et ordo istarum divisionum.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malum est infinitis modis; dicendum, quod si hoc verum est[^1c] ex parte ipsius mali, et etiam per comparationes, quas habet ad particularia bona et ad particulares personas; verumtamen ratione boni sibi oppositi et ratione comparationum generalium modis finitis, quamvis variis, habet distingui.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divisiones illae, quae hic assignantur, non recte sumuntur, maxime quia in illis tribus primis divisionibus primum membrum generale est ad omne peccatum; dicendum, quod in illis tribus divisionibus primum membrum accipiendum est *cum praecisione*, ut sit sensus, quod peccatum aliud est ex *amore* tantum, aliud ex *amore* pariter et *timore*; similiter et in aliis duabus. — Vel dic, quod dividit peccatum penes *motivum* et *actum* et *obiectum*, prout haec accipiuntur[^2c] proprie et immediate. — Illud vero, quod obiicit contra illam divisionem, quae est in *delictum* et *commissum*, non valet; quia non quaecumque omissio cuiusque bonae circumstantiae dicitur *delictum*, sed illa quae est omissio actus debiti.

Ad ultimum dicendum, quod *superbia* dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout omnis contemptus et erectio mentis nomine superbiae continetur; et sic est *initium omnis peccati*[^3c]; in omni enim peccato homo superbit et se erigit contra Deum. Alio modo dicitur superbia *appetitus dignitatis et honoris*; et hoc modo est speciale peccatum, distinctum ab aliis peccatis.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, *septem esse vitia capitalia vel principalia*; quia super illud Proverbiorum sexto[^4c]: *Sex sunt, quae odit Dominus*; Glossa « sex capitalia vitia enumerat, quae in comparatione septimi minora sunt »; et ista non continentur sub illis: ergo videntur esse quatuordecim. — Item, Isidorus super Deuteronomium[^5c] enumerat *octo* capitalia, scilicet « gastrimargiam, fornicationem, philargyriam, tristitiam, iram, cenodoxiam, acidiam, superbiam »; et ita videtur, vel quod ista divisio sit *diminuta*, vel alia *superflua*. — Item, cum vitia opponantur virtutibus, et nos habeamus habitus virtutum, donorum et beatitudinum; videtur, quod deberent esse capitalia vitia saltem *viginti unum*. — Item, cum virtus habeat sibi vitium oppositum penes *superabundantiam* et *defectum*[^6c]; videtur, quod secundum numerum habituum bonorum debet duplari numerus capitalium vitiorum, ut sint *quadraginta duo*.

Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur: cum habeamus capitale vitium penes gulam, quare non habemus alios penes luxuriam, vitium sensus tactus et gustus? — Quaeritur etiam[^7d], pro quanto dicatur aliquid *capitale* peccatum; et de *numero* et *sufficientia* istius divisionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *capitale* vitium dupliciter potest dici: aut quia *praecipuum* est et *magnum* in genere vitioso, aut quia *caput* est et *principium* aliorum. Primo modo accipitur in Glossa Proverbiorum sexto, ubi vocantur illa vitia capitalia, quia *magna* sunt, et homo dignus est magna poena. Secundo modo accipitur hic *capitale*; dicitur enim hic vitium capitale illud quod est ratio principiandi multa peccata; unde Gregorius[^8d] cuilibet capitali vitio assignat *filias*. Peccatum autem hoc ipso ponitur esse *caput* et principium alterius, quo eius motivum adeo cadit in animae appetitum, quod potest praestare fomentum et motum, adeo ut ex ipso consurgat quoddam peccati corpus quodam modo metaphoricum, continens varietatem ramorum et membrorum, filiorum et filiarum[^9c]. — Et hinc est, quod *infidelitas*, quae opponitur fidei, non ponitur esse capitale peccatum, quia error non cadit primo in animae appetitum; similiter nec *prodigalitas*, quae est opposita avaritiae. *Inanis* autem *gloria* uno modo est *capitale vitium*, alio modo est *filia*. Nam prout inanis gloria dicit *appetitum dignitatis et excellentiae*, sic est idem cum superbia et est capitale vitium. Et sic accipit Magister in littera[^10c], quia animus directe movetur ad excellentiam et dignitatem appetendam. Prout autem inanis gloria

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dicitur *appetitus laudis*; sic est *filia*, quia non desideratur laus humana nisi propter excellentiam. — Et sic patet, quod non est controversia inter istam assignationem et illam Isidori. Isidorus enim accipit cenodoxiam sive inanem gloriam pro superbia proprie dicta, et ultimo superaddit *superbiam* septem capitalibus quasi omnium vitiorum reginam[^1d].

Sufficientia autem capitalium et numerus multipliciter potest accipi.

Uno modo sic. Cum peccatum capitale sit corruptio sive *pronitas* respectu eius, ad quod natura prona est ex corruptione primaria, multiplicari habet, sicut habet multiplicari illa *pronitas*. Pronitas autem illa potest multiplicari ex parte *obiecti* sic: quia aut attenditur quantum ad *appetitum* apparentis boni, aut quantum ad *fugam* apparentis mali. — Si primo modo, aut respectu boni *interioris*, et sic est superbia; aut *exterioris*, et sic est[^2d] avaritia; aut *inferioris*, prout spectat ad conservationem propriae carnis, et sic est gula; aut conservationem speciei, et sic est luxuria. — Si respectu apparentis *mali*; hoc potest tripliciter esse: aut mali *interioris*, et sic est invidia; aut *exterioris*, et sic est ira; aut *inferioris*, et sic est acidia, quae refugit malum carnis. — Sed iste modus sumendi non videtur usquequaque conveniens. Omnis enim pronitas directe est respectu apparentis boni.

Et ideo est alius modus multiplicandi hanc *pronitatem* secundum diversitatem virium[^3d] animae, quoniam pronitas aut attenditur in ipsa voluntate rationali secundum se, aut per coniunctionem ad sensibilem, aut per coniunctionem ad vegetabilem. — Si secundum se; sic potest esse tripliciter: aut in comparatione ad Deum, et sic est superbia; aut ad proximum, et sic est invidia; aut ad se ipsum, et sic est acidia. — Si per coniunctionem ad sensibilem; sic potest esse[^4d] dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est motiva sensibilis, videlicet concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Si per coniunctionem ad concupiscibilem, sic est avaritia; si ad irascibilem, sic est ira. — Si attendatur per coniunctionem cum vegetabili; sic potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad generativam, et sic est luxuria; aut quantum ad nutritivam, et sic est gula. — Quantum ad augmentativam nulla est, quia illa est pure naturalis. — Sed quoniam ira ita est spirituale peccatum, sicut invidia et acidia, adhuc videtur, quod iste modus assignandi aliquam habeat inconvenientiam.

Propterea tertio modo potest dici, quod *pronitas* ad aliquod apparens bonum aut est respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum *secundum se*, aut respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum *in carne*. — Si respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum *secundum se*, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter secundum quatuor conditiones boni, ad quas pronus est appetitus noster. Appetit enim quis bonum sub ratione *dignitatis*, et hoc per superbiam; sub ratione *proprietatis*, et sic est invidia; sub ratione *securitatis*[^5d], et sic est ira; sub ratione *quietis*, et sic est acidia.

Si vero sit haec pronitas respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum *in carne*, hoc potest tripliciter esse secundum triplicem conditionem, sub qua spiritus carnalis bonum appetit. Aut enim appetit bonum sub ratione *sufficientis*, et sic est avaritia; aut sub ratione *demulcentis*, et sic est luxuria; aut sub ratione *reficientis*, et sic est gula.

Ex his patet sufficientia et numerus vitiorum capitalium. Non enim accipiuntur per oppositionem ad virtutes nec ad dona nec ad beatitudines, sed secundum *pronitates* respicientes conditiones boni apparentis. — Patet etiam, quare penes alios sensus non habemus capitalia vitia, sicut penes gustum et tactum, quia in his regnat pronitas amplior quam in aliis sensibus. Unde si delectationes quaeruntur in aliis sensibus, ad has reducuntur, utpote si aliquis velit aspicere mulierem pulcram, ut in ea delectetur et concupiscat, reducitur talis delectatio ad luxuriam. Similiter, si quis velit aspicere pulcrum equum vel librum, ut ipsum habeat, talis delectatio reducitur ad avaritiam. Sicut enim appetitus spiritus secundum se quodam modo quietatur, si habeat bonum excellens cum proprietate et securitate et quiete; sic appetitus carnalis quietatur, dum habet bonum *sufficiens*, *demulcens*, et *reficiens*, nec aliquid quaerit[^6d] nisi propter haec tria.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Initium sive radix omnis peccati superbia est*; quia dicit Chrysostomus super illud Psalmi[^7e]: *A facie insipientiae*: « Omnis peccati initium insipientia est »: ergo, cum

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non possint esse plura eiusdem initia prima et principalia, videtur, quod superbia non sit initium omnis peccati. — Item obiicitur, secundum quod Magister obiicit in littera[^1e], quia primae ad Timotheum ultimo: *Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas*. Si tu *dicas*, quod haec duo sunt radices peccatorum secundum diversam comparationem; *quaeritur* tunc de *diversitate radicum*; et quid intelligatur nomine *radicis*; et quae differentia sit inter *capitale vitium* et *radicem*; item, quae differentia sit inter *initium* et *radicem*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod differt dicere *initium* et *radicem*. Nam *initium* proprie dicit illud, a quo inchoat motus; *radix* vero dicit illud, unde trahit[^2e] fomentum et nutrimentum. Et ideo, cum peccatum trahat fomentum ex parte appetibilis et dicat recessum a Deo, hinc est, quod *initium* attenditur ex parte *aversionis*, et *radix* ex parte *conversionis*, proprie loquendo. Et quoniam aversio est ratione[^3e] *contemptus*, et conversio est ratione *cupiditatis* sive *libidinis*; hinc est, quod *superbia*, proprie loquendo, dicitur *initium*, et *cupiditas* dicitur esse *radix*. Et quoniam in omni peccato est aversio et conversio; hinc est, quod *superbia* dicitur *initium omnium peccatorum*, et *cupiditas radix omnium malorum*. Et simul possunt stare illa duo; accipitur tamen aliquando nomen *radicis* pro nomine *initii*, et e converso.

*Capitale* autem vitium differt a *radice* in hoc, quod sicut caput dicit principale membrum et membrum completum, et quod est principium aliorum quantum ad *motum* et *sensum*[^4e]; sic *capitale* vitium nominat peccatum completum, a quo alia vitia oriuntur; *radix* vero dicit aliquid sub maiori incompletione: et ideo, proprie loquendo, *radix* non nominat genus peccati determinatum, sed *pronitatem libidinis*, quae concurrit ad omne peccatum.

Unde nota, quod *radix* aliquando accipitur *generalissime*, aliquando *generaliter*, aliquando vero *minus generaliter*. Generalissime, ut cum dicitur *libido* sive *cupiditas* esse[^5e] *radix omnium malorum*. Generaliter vero, ut cum dicitur, quod duplex est radix: *amor male accendens* et *timor male humilians*. Amor enim accipitur respectu boni, et timor respectu mali. Minus vero generaliter, ut cum dicitur, quod triplex est radix, scilicet *concupiscentia carnis*, *concupiscentia oculorum* et *superbia vitae*, per comparationem ad triplex bonum, videlicet ad bonum *inferius*, *exterius* et *interius*.

Similiter *initium* peccati tripliciter accipi potest sive nominari: aut prout dicit recessum liberi arbitrii a *lege maiestatis*, et sic dicitur *superbia* sive *contemptus*; aut a *lege veritatis*, et sic dicitur *error*; aut a *lege bonitatis*, et sic dicitur *insipientia*, quae est contraria sapientiae.

Et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas, quando dicitur, quod *initium omnis peccati est superbia*; et quando idem dicitur de *errore* et *insipientia*. — Patet etiam, quod non est contrarietas in hoc, quod aliquando dicitur, quod *una* est radix, aliquando, quod *duae*, aliquando, quod *tres*. — Patet etiam differentia *initii* et *radicis*[^6e], et ipsius *radicis* et *vitii capitalis*. — Et haec de generali divisione peccatorum dicta sufficiant.

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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is asked about what he says, namely that *sin sometimes remains in a certain liability after it has passed away in act*[^7]. For this seems to be false. For the liability or obligation of sin is founded either upon the act of the sin, or upon the proneness, or upon the deformity. If upon the act; then, when the act passes away, that liability must necessarily pass away too: therefore the sin does not remain as to liability after it passes away as to act[^8]. If upon the proneness; then, since the proneness remains in a man after the reception of grace, it seems that the liability remains after sin, even after

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grace has been received; which is plainly false. If upon the deformity; but, *on the contrary*: deformity bespeaks privation, and a privation is nothing[^1]: therefore the liability of sin is founded upon nothing: therefore for nothing is man obliged to punishment. If, then, there is nothing more in sin than these three, it does not seem that sin can remain in liability and pass away in act.

It is asked, therefore, upon what the liability or obligation to punishment is founded.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as there are three things in sin — namely the *act* of sinning, the *habit* of proneness or stain of sin, and thirdly the *defect* or privation of good, which is called *deformity* — accordingly there have been here three ways of speaking.

For some have said that the liability of sin is founded upon the *act*; nor yet does it follow that[^2] it passes away with the act, because for a past act a man can remain obliged to a future punishment. For when someone is made liable to punishment by the depravity of his action; although that act passes away, the liability or obligation does not pass away, as is plain in the case of a robber, or of one who has perpetrated some crime. — But against this way of speaking stands the possibility[^3] of absolution from the liability. For if the liability were founded upon the past act; since a past act must necessarily be past, when he is liable, he cannot not be liable, which is manifestly false.

Another way of speaking was that the liability is founded upon the *proneness*, which proneness indeed is said to be the stain of sin; and that stain is, as it were, a certain disposition rendering the soul combustible; and by reason of the removal of that stain we are said to *be washed from our sins in the blood of Christ*[^4]. — But against this way of speaking stands the possibility of the removal of that proneness without the infusion of grace; as is plain: when from a miser a man becomes a spendthrift, the proneness to avarice is taken away from him. If, then, the liability were founded upon that proneness, when someone became from a miser a spendthrift, he would be absolved from the liability of sin without grace, which is plainly false.

The third way of speaking is that the liability is founded upon the *deformity*[^5]. Now deformity bespeaks not only the *privation of good*, but also the *debt of having it*; and because the sinner owes God justice and honor; and, while he is deprived of these through sin, he is deformed, and on this account he is obliged to undergo punishment. For because he was a debtor and could not pay in works, it was necessary that he should pay in sufferings[^6]. — But against this way of speaking stands the multiplicity of liabilities. For as many sins as a man has actually perpetrated, to so many punishments he is liable; but from many sins of the same species one deformity results in the soul. *Moreover*, the lack of good in a man obliges to the lack of the highest good, not to the suffering of punishment, as is plain in original sin[^7b]. *Moreover*, when the deformity is removed by grace, there still remains an obligation to punishment.

And therefore it can be said that the liability or obligation to punishment is twofold: one, namely, in respect of *eternal* punishment, and another in respect of *temporal* punishment. Now the obligation in respect of temporal punishment does not always require present guilt, but it suffices for that obligation that the guilt was past, and that full amendment did not follow[^8b]. But the obligation to *eternal* punishment is founded upon the guilt itself. Now guilt, properly speaking, is not the proneness itself, but the disorder itself, whether it is in the *act*, or whether it is in the *soul*. Now the disorder in the *act* consisted in conversion and aversion; and according to this twofold relation the soul is disordered when it sins[^9]; and that disorder in the soul, by reason of aversion, is called *deformity*, and by reason of conversion is called *stain*. — I say therefore that the liability of eternal punishment is founded upon sin, both insofar as it is *deformity* and insofar as it is *stain*; but differently, because by reason of *aversion* he is worthy to be deprived of the eternal good[^10], whereas by reason of *conversion* he is worthy of torment. Now the liability is founded upon the *stain* and *deformity* which is in the soul by relation to the *act* by which that stain or deformity was introduced; and therefore the liabilities are multiplied according as the sins committed are multiplied[^11].

And through this the response to the objections is plain. For I say that the liability of eternal punishment is not founded simply[^12] upon the *stain*, according as it is called a proneness or some disposition, but rather according as it is called *disorder* and *privation*. I say also,

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that it is founded upon the deformity not only by reason of *privation*, but also by reason of *debt*; nor only by reason of *aversion*, but also by reason of *conversion*; nor only upon sin according as it is deformity, but according as it is *stain*. And this is what the Master says in the text[^1b]: « By liability sin remains in a man, since on its account, whether it has passed or is present, the mind of the man is polluted and corrupted, and the whole man is obliged to perpetual punishments »; and the Master here speaks, as is plain, of the liability of *eternal* punishment, not of *temporal*; for the liability of temporal punishment is indeed founded upon that which has passed away[^2b].

### Doubt II.

Likewise there is asked about what he says: *The modes of sins have various distinctions in Scripture*. For it seems that they have not only various but even infinite distinctions; because, as the Philosopher holds[^3b], « the good is in one way, but the evil in manifold ways ». And Dionysius himself also says that « evil is infinite »: therefore it seems that in Scripture it cannot have determinate distinctions.

In connection with this there is asked about the number and sufficiency of these distinctions, which the Master sets down in the text[^4b]. For it seems that some are assigned unsuitably; because, since every sin is in the will moved by desire[^5b], sin is ill distinguished into the sin which is from love and that which is from fear. — Likewise, since every sin is in thought and will, sin is ill distinguished through sin of thought and of word and of deed. — Likewise, since every sin is against God, sin is ill distinguished through these differences: against *God* and against *self* and against *neighbor*. — Likewise, since in every sin there is a defect of some circumstance, every sin seems to be an omission: therefore it is ill distinguished through commission and omission. — Finally it seems, since the beginning of every sin is pride, that sin is ill distinguished through the seven capital sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master in this part intimates seven divisions of sin[^6b] according to its sevenfold relation.

For first sin is compared to its *cause*, from which it has its origin; and thus there is that division of sin into *actual* and *original*.

Secondly it is compared to the *punishment* to which it is ordered; and thus there is that division of sin into *mortal* and *venial*. These two divisions the Master set down above[^7c].

Thirdly sin has to be compared to its *motive*; and this indeed is either toward attaining a *good* or toward fleeing an *evil*; and thus there is the third division, which the Master sets down into sin from *love* and sin from *fear*.

Fourthly sin has to be compared to the *underlying act*; and thus there is the fourth division of sin into sin of *thought*, of *word*, and of *deed*, according to the threefold power, namely the affective, the interpretative, and the operative; for *thought* is there taken for *affection*[^8c].

Fifthly sin is compared to the *person* whom it offends; and thus there is the fifth division of sin into [sin] against *God* and against *self* and against *neighbor*.

Sixthly sin is compared to the *commandment* to which it is opposed; and thus there is that division into *transgression* and *commission*, because *transgression* is against an affirmative precept, and *commission* against a negative one[^9b].

Seventhly it is compared to the *vices* which arise from it; and thus there is that division of sin into the seven differences of the *capital* sins.

And thus the Master sets down seven divisions according to the seven relations of sin. Yet although other divisions may be found, they can be reduced to one of these, because they are taken according to one of these relations; as that division by which blessed John in his Canonical Epistle[^10b] divides sin into the *pride of life* and the *concupiscence of the eyes* and the *concupiscence of the flesh*, is reduced to that one which is on the side of the motive. — Likewise also that division by which Isidore[^11b] divides sin into the sin which is « from *malice* and *infirmity* and *ignorance* ». Likewise that division by which Gregory divides into *carnal* and *spiritual* sins, which he draws from that word of the Apostle in the second to the Corinthians, chapter seven: *Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit*, is reduced to that one by which sin is divided through relation

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to the underlying acts. — And thus the sufficiency, number, and order of these divisions is plain.

To that, then, which is objected, that evil is in infinite modes; it must be said that, if this is true[^1c] on the side of evil itself, and also through the relations which it has to particular goods and to particular persons; nevertheless by reason of the good opposed to it and by reason of the general relations, it has to be distinguished in finite modes, though various ones.

To that which is objected, that those divisions which are here assigned are not rightly taken, chiefly because in those first three divisions the first member is general to every sin; it must be said that in those three divisions the first member is to be taken *with precision*, so that the sense is that one sin is from *love* alone, another from *love* together with *fear*; and likewise in the other two. — Or say that he divides sin by way of *motive* and *act* and *object*, as these are taken[^2c] properly and immediately. — But that which is objected against the division which is into *transgression* and *commission*, is of no force; because not just any omission of any good circumstance is called a *transgression*, but that which is the omission of a due act.

To the last it must be said that *pride* is spoken of in two ways: in one way, insofar as every contempt and elevation of the mind is contained under the name of pride; and thus it is the *beginning of every sin*[^3c]; for in every sin a man becomes proud and exalts himself against God. In another way pride is called the *appetite for dignity and honor*; and in this way it is a special sin, distinct from the other sins.

### Doubt III.

Likewise there is asked about what he says, that *there are seven capital or principal vices*; because upon that text of Proverbs, chapter six[^4c]: *There are six things which the Lord hates*; the Gloss « enumerates six capital vices, which in comparison with the seventh are lesser »; and these are not contained under those: therefore they seem to be fourteen. — Likewise, Isidore upon Deuteronomy[^5c] enumerates *eight* capital vices, namely « gluttony, fornication, avarice, sadness, wrath, vainglory, sloth, pride »; and so it seems either that this division is *deficient*, or the other *superfluous*. — Likewise, since vices are opposed to virtues, and we have the habits of virtues, of gifts, and of beatitudes; it seems that there should be at least *twenty-one* capital vices. — Likewise, since a virtue has a vice opposed to it on the side of *excess* and *defect*[^6c]; it seems that according to the number of the good habits the number of capital vices ought to be doubled, so that there are *forty-two*.

In connection with this it is also asked: since we have a capital vice on the side of gluttony, why do we not have others on the side of lust, the vice of the sense of touch and of taste? — It is also asked[^7d], in what sense something is called a *capital* sin; and about the *number* and *sufficiency* of this division.

**I respond:** It must be said that a *capital* vice can be spoken of in two ways: either because it is *chief* and *great* in the genus of vice, or because it is a *head* and *principle* of the others. In the first way it is taken in the Gloss on Proverbs six, where those vices are called capital because they are *great*, and a man is worthy of great punishment. In the second way *capital* is taken here; for a capital vice is here said to be that which is the ground of giving rise to many sins; whence Gregory[^8d] assigns to each capital vice its *daughters*. For sin is by this very fact held to be the *head* and principle of another, in that its motive so falls into the soul's appetite that it can furnish fomentation and movement, so that from it there arises a certain body of sin, in a manner metaphorical, containing a variety of branches and members, of sons and daughters[^9c]. — And hence it is that *unbelief*, which is opposed to faith, is not held to be a capital sin, because error does not fall first into the soul's appetite; likewise neither is *prodigality*, which is opposed to avarice. But *vainglory* is in one way a *capital vice*, in another way a *daughter*. For insofar as vainglory bespeaks the *appetite for dignity and excellence*, thus it is the same as pride and is a capital vice. And so the Master takes it in the text[^10c], because the mind is directly moved to the seeking of excellence and dignity. But insofar as vainglory

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is called the *appetite for praise*; thus it is a *daughter*, because human praise is not desired except for the sake of excellence. — And thus it is plain that there is no controversy between this assignment and that of Isidore. For Isidore takes vainglory or vainglory for pride properly so called, and lastly superadds *pride* to the seven capital vices as, so to speak, the queen of all vices[^1d].

The sufficiency of the capital vices and their number can be taken in many ways.

In one way thus. Since a capital sin is a corruption or *proneness* in respect of that to which nature is prone by reason of the primary corruption, it has to be multiplied as that *proneness* has to be multiplied. Now that proneness can be multiplied on the side of the *object* thus: because it is regarded either as to the *appetite* for an apparent good, or as to the *flight* from an apparent evil. — If in the first way, either in respect of an *interior* good, and thus it is pride; or of an *exterior* good, and thus it is[^2d] avarice; or of an *inferior* good, insofar as it pertains to the conservation of one's own flesh, and thus it is gluttony; or to the conservation of the species, and thus it is lust. — If in respect of an apparent *evil*; this can be in three ways: either of an *interior* evil, and thus it is envy; or of an *exterior* evil, and thus it is wrath; or of an *inferior* evil, and thus it is sloth, which flees the evil of the flesh. — But this manner of taking it does not seem altogether suitable. For every proneness is directly in respect of an apparent good.

And therefore there is another mode of multiplying this *proneness* according to the diversity of the powers[^3d] of the soul, since the proneness is regarded either in the rational will itself in itself, or by conjunction with the sensible, or by conjunction with the vegetative. — If in itself; thus it can be in three ways: either in comparison to God, and thus it is pride; or to the neighbor, and thus it is envy; or to oneself, and thus it is sloth. — If by conjunction with the sensible; thus it can be[^4d] in two ways, according as the sensible motive power is twofold, namely the concupiscible and the irascible. If by conjunction with the concupiscible, thus it is avarice; if with the irascible, thus it is wrath. — If it is regarded by conjunction with the vegetative; thus it can be in two ways: either as to the generative, and thus it is lust; or as to the nutritive, and thus it is gluttony. — As to the augmentative there is none, because that is purely natural. — But since wrath is a spiritual sin just as envy and sloth are, it still seems that this manner of assigning has some unsuitability.

Therefore in a third way it can be said that the *proneness* toward some apparent good is either in respect of a good which regards the spirit *in itself*, or in respect of a good which regards the spirit *in the flesh*. — If in respect of the good which regards the spirit *in itself*, this can be in four ways according to the four conditions of the good to which our appetite is prone. For one desires the good under the ratio of *dignity*, and this through pride; under the ratio of *propriety*, and thus it is envy; under the ratio of *security*[^5d], and thus it is wrath; under the ratio of *rest*, and thus it is sloth.

But if this proneness is in respect of the good which regards the spirit *in the flesh*, this can be in three ways according to the threefold condition under which the carnal spirit desires the good. For it desires the good either under the ratio of the *sufficient*, and thus it is avarice; or under the ratio of the *soothing*, and thus it is lust; or under the ratio of the *refreshing*, and thus it is gluttony.

From these the sufficiency and number of the capital vices is plain. For they are not taken by opposition to the virtues, nor to the gifts, nor to the beatitudes, but according to the *pronenesses* regarding the conditions of the apparent good. — It is also plain why we do not have capital vices on the side of the other senses, as on the side of taste and touch, because in these there reigns a greater proneness than in the other senses. Hence, if pleasures are sought in the other senses, they are reduced to these, as for instance if someone wishes to behold a beautiful woman, that he may delight in her and lust, such delight is reduced to lust. Likewise, if someone wishes to behold a beautiful horse or book, that he may have it, such delight is reduced to avarice. For just as the appetite of the spirit in itself is in a certain way quieted, if it has an excellent good with propriety and security and rest; so the carnal appetite is quieted while it has a good that is *sufficient*, *soothing*, and *refreshing*, and seeks nothing[^6d] except for the sake of these three.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise there is asked about what he says: *The beginning or root of every sin is pride*; because Chrysostom says, upon that text of the Psalm[^7e]: *From the presence of folly*: « The beginning of every sin is folly »: therefore, since

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there cannot be several first and principal beginnings of the same thing, it seems that pride is not the beginning of every sin. — Likewise it is objected, according as the Master objects in the text[^1e], because in the first to Timothy, the last chapter: *The root of all evils is covetousness*. If you should *say* that these two are roots of sins according to a diverse relation; then it is *asked* about the *diversity of roots*; and what is understood by the name of *root*; and what difference there is between a *capital vice* and a *root*; likewise, what difference there is between a *beginning* and a *root*.

**I respond:** It must be said that to say *beginning* and *root* differ. For *beginning* properly bespeaks that from which motion starts; but *root* bespeaks that whence it draws[^2e] its fomentation and nourishment. And therefore, since sin draws its fomentation from the side of the desirable and bespeaks a withdrawal from God, hence it is that the *beginning* is regarded on the side of *aversion*, and the *root* on the side of *conversion*, properly speaking. And since aversion is by reason of[^3e] *contempt*, and conversion is by reason of *covetousness* or *desire*; hence it is that *pride*, properly speaking, is called the *beginning*, and *covetousness* is said to be the *root*. And since in every sin there is aversion and conversion; hence it is that *pride* is called the *beginning of all sins*, and *covetousness the root of all evils*. And those two can stand together; yet sometimes the name of *root* is taken for the name of *beginning*, and conversely.

A *capital* vice, moreover, differs from a *root* in this, that as a head bespeaks a principal member and a complete member, and that which is the principle of the others as to *motion* and *sense*[^4e]; so a *capital* vice names a complete sin, from which other vices arise; but a *root* bespeaks something under greater incompleteness: and therefore, properly speaking, the *root* does not name a determinate genus of sin, but the *proneness of desire*, which concurs in every sin.

Whence note that *root* is sometimes taken *most generally*, sometimes *generally*, sometimes *less generally*. Most generally, as when *desire* or *covetousness* is said to be[^5e] the *root of all evils*. But generally, as when it is said that the root is twofold: *love evilly kindling* and *fear evilly humbling*. For love is taken in respect of good, and fear in respect of evil. But less generally, as when it is said that the root is threefold, namely the *concupiscence of the flesh*, the *concupiscence of the eyes*, and the *pride of life*, by relation to the threefold good, namely to the *inferior*, the *exterior*, and the *interior* good.

Likewise the *beginning* of sin can be taken or named in three ways: either insofar as it bespeaks the withdrawal of free choice from the *law of majesty*, and thus it is called *pride* or *contempt*; or from the *law of truth*, and thus it is called *error*; or from the *law of goodness*, and thus it is called *folly*, which is contrary to wisdom.

And thus it is plain that there is no contrariety, when it is said that the *beginning of every sin is pride*; and when the same is said of *error* and *folly*. — It is also plain that there is no contrariety in the fact that sometimes it is said that the root is *one*, sometimes that it is *two*, sometimes that it is *three*. — It is also plain the difference of *beginning* and *root*[^6e], and of *root* itself and the *capital vice*. — And let these things said about the general division of sins suffice.

---

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Quod insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Omnes edd. et Magistri et Comment. cum codd. habent *postquam transit* pro *postquam transiit*. Unde nihil immutavimus.

en: Which is implied here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — All the editions both of the Master and of the Commentary, together with the codices, have *postquam transit* (after it passes) for *postquam transiit* (after it has passed). Hence we have changed nothing.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3. — Pro *sed contra: deformitas dicit* edd. cum paucis codd. *et illa dicit*.

en: Cf. above p. 111, note 3. — For *sed contra: deformitas dicit* the editions, with a few codices, read *et illa dicit*.

la: Edd. hic repetunt *reatus*.

en: The editions here repeat *reatus*.

la: Edd., omisso verbo *dicendi*, pro *possibilitas* substituunt *potestas* et mox *fundatur* pro *fundaretur*.

en: The editions, omitting the word *dicendi*, substitute *potestas* for *possibilitas* and soon *fundatur* for *fundaretur*.

la: Apoc. 1, 5: Qui [Christus] dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo. — Paulo superius pro *cremabilem* cod. bb melius, ut videtur, *criminalem*.

en: Apoc. 1:5: He [Christ] who loved us and washed us from our sins in his blood. — A little above, for *cremabilem*, codex bb reads, better as it seems, *criminalem*.

la: Non pauci codd., F K (T a prima manu) W Y bb ce etc., *deformitates*.

en: Not a few codices — F, K, T (in the first hand), W, Y, bb, ce, etc. — read *deformitates*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., l. Cur Deus homo, c. 14. et 23. seq. — Paulo ante edd. contra codd. voculam *et* ante *ex hoc obligatur* omittunt, et Vat. etiam interpunctionem mutat transponendo comma, quod ante *deformatur* habetur, ante *per peccatum*. Mox pro *reatuum* edd. *reatus* et post pauca *reus erit* pro *reus est*.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, cc. 14 and 23 ff. — A little before, the editions, against the codices, omit the particle *et* before *ex hoc obligatur*, and the Vatican edition also changes the punctuation by transposing the comma, which stands before *deformatur*, to before *per peccatum*. Soon, for *reatuum*, the editions read *reatus*, and a little after *reus erit* for *reus est*.

la: Vide supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Subinde edd. 1, 2 omittunt *Praeterea*, pro quo vocabulo Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substituunt *quia*.

en: See above d. 33, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Thereafter editions 1 and 2 omit *Praeterea*, in place of which word the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 substitute *quia*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. — In edd. desideratur *non* ante *subsecuta*, et paulo inferius pro *ipsam culpam* habetur *illam culpam*.

en: Cf. above d. 36, a. 2, q. 2. — In the editions *non* is wanting before *subsecuta*, and a little lower, for *ipsam culpam*, *illam culpam* is found.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Cod. I *summo*; Vat. *dignus est privatione summi boni*; edd. 1, 2, 3 nec non pauci codd., perperam omissis verbis *privari bono aeterno* etc., breviter exhibent *dignus est supplicio*. Voci *supplicio* cod. II adiungit *aeterno*. Deinde pro *Fundatur autem* Vat. *Fundatur etiam*.

en: Codex I reads *summo*; the Vatican edition *dignus est privatione summi boni*; editions 1, 2, 3, as well as a few codices, wrongly omitting the words *privari bono aeterno* etc., briefly present *dignus est supplicio*. To the word *supplicio* codex II adds *aeterno*. Then, for *Fundatur autem*, the Vatican edition reads *Fundatur etiam*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Codd. F Y hic interiiciunt: *fundatur super actum praeteritum, et ideo non transit cum illo. Dico etiam, quod non*.

en: Codices F and Y here insert: *it is founded upon the past act, and therefore does not pass away with it. I say also, that not*.

la: Hic c. 2. In dicto Magistri, *contra originale* et Vat. aliae edd. et codd. *quousque* pro *totusque*. Mox pro *non temporalis* codd. H T bb et alii cum edd. 1, 2 exhibent *non temporali*. In fine solut. edd. et nonnulli codd. pro *pertransiit* habent *pertransit*.

en: Here c. 2. In the saying of the Master, *contra originale*; and the Vatican and other editions and codices read *quousque* for *totusque*. Soon, for *non temporalis*, codices H, T, bb and others, together with editions 1 and 2, present *non temporali*. At the end of the solution the editions and several codices read *pertransit* for *pertransiit*.

la: De hoc dub. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 6, q. 108. m. 1. a. 1. et q. III. m. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. I; Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 2.

en: On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 106, m. 6, q. 108, m. 1, a. 1, and q. III, m. 7; Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 2 and around the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. I; Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 638, nota 3. — De verbo Dionysii cfr. supra pag. 811, nota 1.

en: See above p. 638, note 3. — On the word of Dionysius cf. above p. 811, note 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 845, nota 5. et pag. 952, nota 6. — In propos. seq. edd. cum aliquibus codd. omittunt *in* post *peccatum*.

en: Cf. above p. 845, note 5, and p. 952, note 6. — In the following proposition the editions, with some codices, omit *in* after *peccatum*.

la: Hic c. 2. seq. et supra d. XXXV. c. 1. nec non d. XXXVI. c. 3. — Pro *divisiones* edd. *differentias*.

en: Here c. 2 f. and above d. XXXV, c. 1, as also d. XXXVI, c. 3. — For *divisiones* the editions read *differentias*.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. dub. I.

en: Cf. above d. 35, dub. I.

la: Divisionem peccati in *delictum* et *commissum* Scholastici derivarunt ex illo dicto, quod habetur in August. opere de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 5. n. 11, quodque ex libro Definitionum, Caelestio tributo, sumtum est: Quaerendum est, quot modis constet omne peccatum; duobus, ni fallor: si aut illa fiant, quae prohibentur, aut illa non fiant, quae iubentur. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 112. m. 2.

en: The division of sin into *transgression* and *commission* the Scholastics derived from that saying which is found in Augustine's work *On the Perfection of Man's Justice*, c. 5, n. 11, and which was taken from the *Book of Definitions* attributed to Caelestius: It must be asked in how many ways every sin consists; in two, if I am not mistaken: either if those things be done which are forbidden, or those things be not done which are commanded. Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 112, m. 2.

la: Libr. II. Sent. c. 17. n. 3. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XLI. c. 4. in fine, et ibid. Comment. dub. 2.

en: [Isidore,] *Sentences* II, c. 17, n. 3. See above the text of the Master, d. XLI, c. 4 at the end, and there the Commentary, dub. 2.

la: Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 88, ubi recensitis septem vitiis capitalibus, ait: Ex quibus videlicet septem, quinque spiritualia duoque carnalia sunt. — Verba s. Script. habentur loc. cit. v. 1.

en: [Gregory,] *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88, where, having reviewed the seven capital vices, he says: Of which seven, namely, five are spiritual and two carnal. — The words of holy Scripture are found in the place cited, v. 1.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quod etsi hoc verum sit*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads *quod etsi hoc verum sit*.

la: Vat. *prout accipitur*, ceterae edd. *prout hic accipitur*. Pro *haec etiam* codd. F L O V W X Z et alii habent *hic*. Paulo superius pro *similiter et in aliis duabus* edd. *sic et in aliis duobus*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *prout accipitur*, the other editions *prout hic accipitur*. For *haec etiam* codices F, L, O, V, W, X, Z and others read *hic*. A little above, for *similiter et in aliis duabus*, the editions read *sic et in aliis duobus*.

la: Eccli. 10, 15: Quoniam initium omnis peccati est superbia. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 107. m. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. seq.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I; Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 2.

en: Ecclus. 10:15: For pride is the beginning of all sin. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 107, m. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 5; *Summa* p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1 f.; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3 and around the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. I, q. I; Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. 2.

la: Vers. 16. — Glossa, quae habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum, ex verbis Rabani super hunc locum Script. formata est. Rabanus dicit: Sex... quae tamen comparatione discordias seminantis quasi minora deponit.

en: Verse 16. — The Gloss, which is found in Strabo and in Lyra, was formed from the words of Rabanus upon this passage of Scripture. Rabanus says: Six... which however, in comparison with the one that sows discord, it sets down as, so to speak, lesser.

la: Quaest. sive Comment. in Deut. c. 16, quo loco licet exponat, septem illos gentes, quas Dominus filiis Israel exstirpandas tradidit (Deut. 7, 1.), septem intelligi vitia principalia, tamen expositione procedente octo capitalia enumerat eaque eodem fere ordine, quo hic in testimonio exhibentur. Item Ioan. Cassianus, Collationes, coll. 5. c. 17. seqq. octo enumerat.

en: *Questions* or *Commentary on Deuteronomy* c. 16, where, although he expounds that the seven nations which the Lord delivered to the children of Israel to be rooted out (Deut. 7:1) are to be understood as the seven principal vices, yet as the exposition proceeds he enumerates eight capital vices, and these in nearly the same order in which they are presented here in the testimony. Likewise John Cassian, *Conferences*, coll. 5, c. 17 ff., enumerates eight.

la: Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro *duplari* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit *duplicari* et subinde pro *numerus capitalium vitiorum* cum omnibus edd. *habitus capitalium vitiorum*.

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6 ff. — A little lower, for *duplari*, the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 substitutes *duplicari*, and thereupon, for *numerus capitalium vitiorum*, with all the editions, *habitus capitalium vitiorum*.

la: Cod. T *Quaeritur ergo*.

en: Codex T reads *Quaeritur ergo*.

la: Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 88. — Praecedentem propos. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 sic contrahunt: Secundo modo hoc dicitur vitium capitale, quod est etc. Paulo inferius pro *Peccatum autem* edd. *Peccatum enim*.

en: [Gregory,] *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88. — The preceding proposition the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 contract thus: In the second way that is called a capital vice, which is etc. A little lower, for *Peccatum autem*, the editions read *Peccatum enim*.

la: Cfr. S. Bonav. opusculum, quod inscribitur Speculum animae, in quo arbor vitiorum eiusque rami describuntur.

en: Cf. St. Bonaventure's opusculum entitled *Speculum animae* (Mirror of the Soul), in which the tree of vices and its branches are described.

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here c. 6.

la: Pariter S. Gregor., XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 87. de superbia loquitur: Ipsa namque vitiorum regina superbia, cum devictum plene cor coeperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis quasi quibusdam suis ducibus devastandum tradit.

en: Likewise St. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87, speaks of pride: For pride herself, the queen of vices, when she has fully taken possession of the conquered heart, soon hands it over to the seven principal vices, as it were to certain of her own captains, to be laid waste.

la: Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *hic* et etiam pluries in seqq. *est*.

en: Many codices and editions 1, 2 omit *hic*, and likewise several times in what follows *est*.

la: Codd. D F R X Z ce et primae edd. *vitiorum*.

en: Codices D, F, R, X, Z, ce and the first editions read *vitiorum*.

la: Codd. F K W Y bb ee et alii nec non edd. 1, 2 omittunt *potest esse*; cod. T pro *sic potest esse* substituit *hoc est*.

en: Codices F, K, W, Y, bb, ee and others, as well as editions 1, 2, omit *potest esse*; codex T substitutes *hoc est* for *sic potest esse*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *severitatis*; sed vide finem solutionis, ubi haec lectio corrigitur verbo *securitatis*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads *severitatis*; but see the end of the solution, where this reading is corrected by the word *securitatis*.

la: ita cod. T (cod. bb a secunda manu), in aliis codd. et edd. *nec acquirit*. Codd. C K L O S (T a prima manu) V et edd. 1, 2, priore huius propositionis enuntiatione omissa, verbis *Sicut enim* (edd. 1, 2 et nonnulli codd. *Sic enim*) immediate annectunt *appetitus carnalis quietatur* etc. — De hoc dub. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 136. m. 1-3; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 116. seqq.; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2.

en: So codex T (codex bb in the second hand); in the other codices and editions *nec acquirit*. Codices C, K, L, O, S (T in the first hand), V and editions 1, 2, omitting the former enunciation of this proposition, attach immediately, after the words *Sicut enim* (editions 1, 2 and several codices *Sic enim*), *appetitus carnalis quietatur* etc. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 136, m. 1-3; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; *Summa* p. II, tr. 18, q. 116 ff.; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here around the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, 2.

la: Psalm. 37, 6. — Testimonium Chrysost. habetur in eius Homil. 11. in Ioan. n. 3. Post quod testim. edd. 1, 2 omittunt *ergo*, cuius loco Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ponit *sed*, et subinde pro *possint* cod. T substituit *possunt*.

en: Psalm 37:6. — The testimony of Chrysostom is found in his *Homily* 11 *on John*, n. 3. After this testimony editions 1, 2 omit *ergo*, in place of which the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 puts *sed*, and thereupon, for *possint*, codex T substitutes *possunt*.

la: Hic c. 7. — Locus ex I. ad Timoth. ultim. allatus est v. 10.

en: Here c. 7. — The passage cited from the first to Timothy, the last chapter, is v. 10.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *trahitur*. Paulo superius pro *inchoat* cod. bb substituit *inchoatur*; paulo inferius post *trahat* cod. T subiicit *nutrimentum et*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, reads *trahitur*. A little above, for *inchoat*, codex bb substitutes *inchoatur*; a little lower, after *trahat*, codex T adds *nutrimentum et*.

la: Edd. hic et paulo post *ex ratione*.

en: The editions here and a little after read *ex ratione*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Partib. animal. c. 10. — Aliquanto superius pro *aliquando* cod. T habet *quandoque*, et deinde cum codd. F V W etc. *Capitale autem initium* pro *Capitale autem vitium*. Iidem codd. etiam paulo inferius pro *vitium* exhibent *initium*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals* II, c. 10. — Somewhat above, for *aliquando*, codex T reads *quandoque*, and then, with codices F, V, W etc., *Capitale autem initium* for *Capitale autem vitium*. The same codices also, a little lower, present *initium* for *vitium*.

la: Cod. T *est*. Mox post *duplex est radix* cod. O adiicit *peccati*. De hac duplici radice peccati vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Codex T reads *est*. Soon, after *duplex est radix*, codex O adds *peccati*. On this twofold root of sin see here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt *et radicis*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 136. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 118. m. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 7; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lit. 7.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit *et radicis*. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 136, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 8; *Summa* p. II, tr. 18, q. 118, m. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, ad 7; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here around the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1 and dub. on the text 7.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (pp.974–979, PDF 996–1001; Vol II PDF-priority inversion), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 67684–68023. Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus built from the printed-page footers directly. No scholion (dubia block). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; printed_pages confirmed by low-dpi render of running heads (`DIST. XLII. DUBIA. 975`, … `978`; `DISTINCTIO XLIII. 979`) — the OCR running-head digits (`97S`, `97i`) are mangled and were not trusted.

**Block contents.** Four doubts (DUB. I–IV), the *Dubia circa litteram Magistri* closing Distinctio XLII:
- DUB. I — whether sin remains in liability after it passes in act (foundation of the *reatus*: act / proneness / deformity; opinio auctoris = twofold obligation, eternal vs temporal).
- DUB. II — the number and sufficiency of the seven divisions of sin set down by the Master.
- DUB. III — the seven capital vices (capital = chief vs head/principle; three modes of multiplying the *pronitas*).
- DUB. IV — *initium* vs *radix* of sin; pride vs covetousness; the threefold sense of *radix* and of *initium*.

**Page-split map (per-page footer restart; 48 entries total):**
- **p.974** (bottom; shared with d.42 a.3 q.2): footers **7–8** PICKED UP here → markers `[^7]`, `[^8]`. a.3 q.2 consumed p.974 footers 1–6 (rendered there as `[^10]`–`[^15]`); not re-claimed.
- **p.975** (DUB. I body): footers 1–12 → `[^1]`–`[^12]`.
- **p.976** (DUB. I tail + DUB. II): footers 1–11 → `[^1b]`, `[^2b]` (DUB. I tail) then `[^3b]`–`[^11b]` (DUB. II).
- **p.977** (DUB. II tail + DUB. III): footers 1–10 → `[^1c]`–`[^3c]` (DUB. II tail) then `[^4c]`–`[^10c]` (DUB. III).
- **p.978** (DUB. III tail + DUB. IV): footers 1–7 → `[^1d]`–`[^6d]` (DUB. III tail) then `[^7e]` (DUB. IV opener, Psalm 37:6 / Chrysostom).
- **p.979** (DUB. IV body, ending top-left of the page before DISTINCTIO XLIII): footers 1–6 → `[^1e]`–`[^6e]`.

**Hand-offs.** Picked up p.974 footers 7–8 from d.42 a.3 q.2 (commit 1713aee), as forwarded. **d.42 is COMPLETE with this chunk.**

**Hand-off forwarded to `d43-littera`:** DISTINCTIO XLIII (`CAP. UNICUM. De peccato in Spiritum sanctum.`) begins in the **left column of printed p.979** (PDF 1001), immediately after the dubia tail `…dicta sufficiant.` — raw line **68026**. The dubia ends and d.43 begins on the *same printed page (979)*: the p.979 LEFT-column footer block (footers 1–6) all belong to the DUB. IV dubia (rendered here as `[^1e]`–`[^6e]`); the d.43 footers begin at the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` divider (Matth. 12:32; Glossa Rom. 2:5; Gen. 4:13). Do NOT re-claim the p.979 left-column footers for d.43 — they are this dubia's. The seam is grammatically clean (the dubia's closing sentence is complete; DISTINCTIO XLIII opens a fresh `Est praeterea quoddam peccati genus…`).

**No `[?]` flags** — all readings resolved against the 450 dpi PDF.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 43

title_alt: De peccato in Spiritum sanctum (Littera Magistri)

title_alt: On the sin against the Holy Spirit (the text of the Master)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XLIII.
### *Cap. unicum. De peccato in Spiritum sanctum.*

Est praeterea quoddam peccati genus ceteris gravius et abominabilius, quod dicitur peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, de quo in Evangelio[^1] Veritas ait: *Qui peccaverit in Spiritum sanctum, non remittetur ei, neque hic neque in futuro.* Et Ioannes in Epistola canonica: *Est peccatum ad mortem; non pro eo dico, ut quis oret. Qui enim peccat in Patrem, remittetur ei; et qui peccat in Filium, remittetur ei; qui autem blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum, non remittetur ei, neque hic neque in futuro.* — Sed quaeritur, quid sit illud peccatum in Spiritum sanctum vel ad mortem. — « Quidam dicunt, illud esse peccatum *desperationis*, vel *obstinationis*. Obstinatio est induratae in malitia mentis pertinacia, per quam homo fit impoenitens. Desperatio est, qua quis penitus diffidit de Dei bonitate, aestimans, suam malitiam divinae bonitatis magnitudinem excedere[^2] », sicut Cain, qui dixit[^3]: *Maior est iniquitas mea, quam ut veniam merear.* Utrumque

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vero dicitur peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia Spiritus sanctus amor est Patris et Filii, et benignitas, qua se invicem et nos diligunt, quae tanta est, cuius finis non est. Recte ergo in Spiritum sanctum delinquere dicuntur, qui sua malitia Dei bonitatem superare putant, et ideo poenitentiam non assumunt, et qui iniquitati tam pertinaci mente inhaerent, ut eam nunquam relinquere proponant et ad bonitatem Spiritus sancti nunquam redire, patientia Dei abutentes et de misericordia Dei nimis praesumentes; quibus placet malitia propter se, sicut piis bonitas. *Isti* nimia *pertinacia* et *praesumptione* peccant, autumantes, Deum non esse iustum; *illi desperatione* Deum non bonum existimant, tollentes in hoc turbulentissimo iniquitatum mari portum divinae indulgentiae, quo se recipiant fluctuantes. Atque ipsa desperatione addunt peccata peccatis dicentes: Misericordia nulla est, et super peccatores necessaria damnatio debetur.

Sed quaeritur, utrum omnis *obstinatio* mentis in malitia obduratae, omnisque *desperatio* sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. — Quidam dicunt, *omnem* obstinationem et omnem desperationem esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Quod si est, aliquando illud peccatum remittitur, quia multi etiam obstinatissimi et desperatissimi convertuntur, ut Augustinus ait super illum locum Psalmi[^4]: *Convertam in profundum maris,* id est, eos « qui erant desperatissimi », et ibi: *Mittit crystallum suam sicut buccellas,* id est, « obstinatos facit aliorum doctores ». Talium conversio ibi etiam evidenter ostenditur, ubi ait: *Qui educit vinctos in fortitudine; similiter eos qui exasperant, qui habitant in sepulcris.* Secundum istos illud peccatum dicitur irremissibile, non quin aliquando remittatur, sed quia vix et raro et difficulter dimittitur. Non enim solvitur crystallus, nisi vehementi spiritus impetu. — Alii vero tradunt, non quamlibet obstinationem vel desperationem appellari peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, sed illam tantum, quam comitatur impoenitentia; qui etiam *impoenitentiam* dicunt peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Sed quia Augustinus dicit, *impoenitentiam* esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, cum sic obstinatus est aliquis, ut non poeniteat; discuti oportet, an aliud[^5] obstinatio, aliud impoenitentia sit in eo peccatum, an idem, sed diversis modis commissum. Secundum istos peccatum illud dicitur irremissibile, eo quod nunquam dimittatur. Unde Augustinus[^6] etiam dicit, quod hoc solum peccatum veniam mereri non potest; et Hieronymus super Marcum, quod taliter peccans digne poenitere non potest. Et ideo recte Ioannes dicit, *ut non pro eo oret quis;* quia qui sic peccat orationibus Ecclesiae hic, vel in futuro iuvari non potest, habens cor induratum tanquam lapis, sicut de diabolo legitur[^7]. Post hanc vitam qui valde mali sunt meritis Ecclesiae iuvari non possunt.

Est etiam alia huius peccati assignatio. Hoc enim peccatum Augustinus definiens in libro de Sermone Domini in monte[^8] ait: « *Peccatum ad mortem* est, cum post agnitionem Dei per gratiam Christi oppugnat aliquis fraternitatem, et adversus ipsam gratiam, qua reconciliatus est Deo, invidentiae facibus agitatur »; « quod fortasse est peccare in Spiritum sanctum, quod peccatum dicitur *non remitti* », « non quia non sit ignoscendum peccanti, si poeniteat, sed quia tanta labes est peccati illius, ut deprecandi humilitatem subire non possit, etiamsi peccatum suum mala conscientia agnoscere et enuntiare cogatur; ut Iudas, cum dixit *peccavi,* facilius desperans cucurrit ad laqueum, quam humilitate veniam peteret; quod propter magnitudinem peccati iam ex damnatione peccati tales habere credendum est ». — Ecce, quaedam assignatio peccati in *Spiritum sanctum* vel *ad mortem* hic posita est, qua illud peccatum esse traditur oppugnatio fraternitatis post agnitionem, et *invidentia gratiae* post reconciliationem; quod species quaedam *obstinationis* intelligi potest. — Illam tamen definitionem Augustinus in libro Retractationum[^9] rememorans, aliquid adiiciendum ibi fore, nec asserendo se dixisse aperit, ita dicens: « *Quod quidem non confirmavi, quoniam hoc putare me dixi. Sed tamen addendum fuit: si in hac scelerata mentis perversitate finierit hanc vitam,* quoniam de quocumque pessimo, in hac vita constituto, non est desperandum; nec pro illo imprudenter oratur, de quo non desperatur ». — His verbis insinuatur, peccatum praemissa definitione descriptum tunc solum debere dici ad mortem, vel in Spiritum sanctum, cum non habet comitem poenitentiam, nec de aliquo peccatore in hac vita desperandum esse, et ideo pro omni esse orandum. Unde illud Ioannis: *Non pro eo dico, ut quis oret,* sic accipiendum videtur, ut pro aliquo peccante ad mortem vel in Spiritum sanctum, postquam finierit hanc vitam, non oremus. Dum autem in hac vita est, nec peccatum illius iudicare nec de illo desperare, sed pro illo orare debemus. Unde Augustinus, de Verbis Domini[^10] de impoenitentia, quae est blasphemia in Spiritum sanctum, sic ait: « Ista impoenitentia vel cor impoenitens, quamdiu quisque in hac carne vivit, non potest iudicari. De nullo enim desperandum est, quamdiu patientia Dei ad poenitentiam adducit. Paganus est hodie, Iudaeus, infidelis est hodie, haereticus est hodie, schismaticus est hodie, quid si cras amplectatur catholicam pacem et sequatur catholicam veritatem? Quid si isti, quos in quocumque genere erroris notas et tanquam desperatissimos damnas, antequam finiant istam vitam, agant poenitentiam et inveniant veram requiem et vitam in futuro? *Nolite ergo ante tempus iudicare quidquam* ». — Ex his ostenditur, pro singulis peccatoribus in hac vita esse orandum, nec de aliquo esse diffidendum, quia converti potest, dum in

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hac vita est; quia non potest sciri de aliquo, utrum peccaverit ad mortem vel in Spiritum sanctum, nisi cum ab hac vita discesserit, nisi forte alicui per Spiritum sanctum mirabiliter revelatum fuerit. Ex praedictis aliquatenus capi potest, quomodo accipiatur peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, scilicet *invidentia* gratiae fraternitatem impoenitenter oppugnans, quae utique obstinatio esse videtur, et omnis impoenitentis *obstinatio* atque *desperatio.* Notandum vero est, quod non omnis qui non poenitet, *impoenitens* dici potest, quia *impoenitentia* proprie obstinati est, et, ut quidam volunt, etiam desperati.

De hoc quoque peccato in Spiritum sanctum Ambrosius in libro de Spiritu sancto disserens, definitam assignationem tradit dicens: « Cur Dominus dixerit: *Qui blasphemaverit in Filium hominis, remittetur ei; qui autem blasphemaverit in Spiritum sanctum, neque hic neque in futuro remittetur ei,* diligenter adverte. Nunquid alia est offensio Filii, alia Spiritus sancti? Sicut una dignitas, sic una iniuria. Sed si quis, corporis specie deceptus, humani remissius aliquid sentit de Christi carne, quam dignum est, habet culpam, non est tamen exclusus a venia. Si quis vero sancti Spiritus dignitatem, maiestatem et potestatem abneget sempiternam et putet, *non in spiritu Dei eici daemonia, sed in Beelzebub,* non potest ibi exhortatio esse veniae, ubi sacrilegii plenitudo est ». — Satis aperte hic explicatur, quid sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Quod illi Augustini descriptioni congruere videtur, qua illud peccatum dicitur esse *invidentia gratiae* oppugnans *fraternitatem.* Qui enim post cognitionem veritatis sancti Spiritus veritatem negat, eiusque opera dicit esse Beelzebub, potestati, bonitati et gratiae Dei invidere non dubitatur. — Non itaque distinctio illa verborum sic accipienda est, quasi trium personarum divisae sint offensae, sed ibi genera peccatorum distincta sunt. Peccatum enim in Patrem id intelligitur, quod fit per infirmitatem, quia Patri Scriptura frequenter attribuit potentiam; peccatum in Filium, quod fit per ignorantiam, quia sapientia Filio attribuitur; tertium expositum est. Qui ergo peccat per infirmitatem, vel per ignorantiam, facile veniam adipiscitur, sed non ille qui peccat in Spiritum sanctum. Cum autem una sit potentia, sapientia, bonitas trium, quare Patri potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui sancto bonitas saepius assignetur, superius dictum est.

---

english:
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### Distinction XLIII.
### *Single chapter. On the sin against the Holy Spirit.*

There is, besides, a certain kind of sin graver and more abominable than the rest, which is called the sin against the Holy Spirit, of which the Truth says in the Gospel[^1]: *Whoever shall sin against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither here nor in the world to come.* And John in his Canonical Epistle: *There is a sin unto death; I do not say that for it one should pray. For he who sins against the Father, it shall be forgiven him; and he who sins against the Son, it shall be forgiven him; but he who shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither here nor in the world to come.* — But it is asked what that sin against the Holy Spirit or unto death is. — « Some say it is the sin of *despair* or of *obstinacy.* Obstinacy is the stubbornness of a mind hardened in wickedness, by which a man becomes impenitent. Despair is that by which someone utterly distrusts the goodness of God, judging that his own wickedness exceeds[^2] the greatness of the divine goodness », like Cain, who said[^3]: *My iniquity is greater than that I should deserve pardon.* But each

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is said to be a sin against the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son, and the benignity by which they love each other and us, which is so great that it has no end. Rightly, therefore, are those said to offend against the Holy Spirit who by their own wickedness think to overcome the goodness of God, and therefore do not take up penance, and who cling to iniquity with a mind so stubborn that they purpose never to abandon it and never to return to the goodness of the Holy Spirit, abusing the patience of God and presuming too much upon the mercy of God; to whom wickedness is pleasing for its own sake, as goodness is to the pious. *These* sin by excessive *stubbornness* and *presumption,* supposing that God is not just; *those,* by *despair,* deem God not good, removing in this most turbulent sea of iniquities the harbor of the divine indulgence to which, tossed about, they might betake themselves. And by that very despair they add sins to sins, saying: There is no mercy, and condemnation is owed to sinners as a necessity.

But it is asked whether every *obstinacy* of a mind hardened in wickedness, and every *despair,* is a sin against the Holy Spirit. — Some say that *every* obstinacy and every despair is a sin against the Holy Spirit. But if this be so, that sin is sometimes forgiven, since many even of the most obstinate and most despairing are converted, as Augustine says upon that passage of the Psalm[^4]: *I will turn into the depth of the sea,* that is, those « who were most despairing », and there: *He sends his crystal like morsels,* that is, « he makes the obstinate teachers of others ». The conversion of such is also evidently shown there where he says: *He who leads out the bound in strength; likewise those who provoke, who dwell in tombs.* According to these, that sin is called irremissible, not because it is never remitted, but because it is remitted scarcely and rarely and with difficulty. For the crystal is not dissolved except by a vehement onset of the spirit. — But others hand down that not just any obstinacy or despair is called a sin against the Holy Spirit, but only that which impenitence accompanies; and these also call *impenitence* the sin against the Holy Spirit. But since Augustine says that *impenitence* is the sin against the Holy Spirit, when someone is so obstinate that he does not repent, it must be examined whether obstinacy is one[^5] sin in him and impenitence another, or whether it is the same sin committed in different ways. According to these, that sin is called irremissible because it is never remitted. Hence Augustine[^6] also says that this sin alone cannot merit pardon; and Jerome on Mark, that one who sins in such a way cannot worthily repent. And therefore John rightly says, *that no one should pray for it;* because he who sins thus cannot be helped here or in the world to come by the prayers of the Church, having a heart hardened like a stone, as is read of the devil[^7]. After this life, those who are gravely wicked cannot be helped by the merits of the Church.

There is also another assignation of this sin. For Augustine, defining this sin in the book *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount*[^8], says: « The *sin unto death* is when, after the acknowledgment of God through the grace of Christ, someone assails brotherhood, and against that very grace, by which he was reconciled to God, is driven by the firebrands of envy »; « which perhaps is to sin against the Holy Spirit, which sin is said *not to be remitted* », « not because it ought not to be forgiven to the sinner, if he should repent, but because so great is the stain of that sin that it cannot submit to the humility of entreating, even if it should be compelled by an evil conscience to acknowledge and confess its sin; as Judas, when he said *I have sinned,* despairing, ran more readily to the noose than ask pardon in humility; which, on account of the magnitude of the sin, it must be believed that such ones have already from the condemnation of the sin ». — Behold, a certain assignation of the sin against the *Holy Spirit* or *unto death* is here set down, by which that sin is handed down to be the assailing of brotherhood after acknowledgment, and *envy of grace* after reconciliation; which can be understood as a certain species of *obstinacy.* — Yet Augustine, recalling that definition in the book of the *Retractations*[^9], discloses, not by asserting that he had said it, that something is to be added there, saying thus: « *This indeed I did not affirm, since I said that I supposed this. But yet it had to be added: if he should end this life in this wicked perversity of mind,* since one must not despair of anyone, however utterly wicked, while he is constituted in this life; nor is prayer imprudently made for one of whom there is no despair ». — By these words it is intimated that the sin described by the foregoing definition ought to be called unto death, or against the Holy Spirit, only then when it has impenitence as its companion, and that one must not despair of any sinner in this life, and therefore one must pray for everyone. Hence that saying of John: *I do not say that one should pray for it,* seems to be taken thus, that we should not pray for someone sinning unto death or against the Holy Spirit after he has ended this life. But while he is in this life, we must neither judge his sin nor despair of him, but pray for him. Hence Augustine, *On the Words of the Lord*[^10], concerning impenitence, which is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, speaks thus: « This impenitence, or impenitent heart, so long as anyone lives in this flesh, cannot be judged. For one must despair of no one, so long as the patience of God leads to penance. He is a pagan today, a Jew, an unbeliever today, a heretic today, a schismatic today — what if tomorrow he should embrace catholic peace and follow catholic truth? What if those whom in any kind of error you brand and condemn as utterly desperate should, before they end this life, do penance and find true rest and life in the world to come? *Do not, therefore, judge anything before the time* ». — From these things it is shown that one must pray for each of the sinners in this life, and one must not distrust of anyone, because he can be converted, while in

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this life he is; because it cannot be known of anyone whether he has sinned unto death or against the Holy Spirit, except when he has departed from this life, unless perchance it be revealed to someone marvelously through the Holy Spirit. From the foregoing it can be grasped in some measure how the sin against the Holy Spirit is to be understood, namely, *envy* impenitently assailing the brotherhood of grace, which surely seems to be obstinacy, and the *obstinacy* and *despair* of every impenitent person. But it must be noted that not everyone who does not repent can be called *impenitent,* because *impenitence* properly belongs to the obstinate, and, as some hold, also to the despairing.

Concerning this sin against the Holy Spirit Ambrose also, discoursing in the book *On the Holy Spirit,* hands down a definite assignation, saying: « Why the Lord said: *Whoever shall blaspheme against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, neither here nor in the world to come shall it be forgiven him,* attend diligently. Is the offense against the Son one thing, and against the Holy Spirit another? As there is one dignity, so there is one injury. But if anyone, deceived by the appearance of the body, feels somewhat too remissly about the flesh of Christ, less than is fitting, he has fault, yet is not excluded from pardon. But if anyone should deny the eternal dignity, majesty, and power of the Holy Spirit, and suppose that *demons are cast out not in the Spirit of God, but in Beelzebub,* there can be no exhortation to pardon, where there is the fullness of sacrilege ». — Quite plainly it is here explained what the sin against the Holy Spirit is. And this seems to agree with that description of Augustine, by which that sin is said to be *envy of grace* assailing *brotherhood.* For he who, after the knowledge of the truth of the Holy Spirit, denies the truth, and says his works are of Beelzebub, is not doubted to envy the power, goodness, and grace of God. — Therefore that distinction of words is not to be taken as though the offenses of the three persons were divided, but there the kinds of sins are distinguished. For sin against the Father is understood to be that which is done through weakness, because Scripture frequently attributes power to the Father; sin against the Son, that which is done through ignorance, because wisdom is attributed to the Son; the third has been expounded. He, therefore, who sins through weakness or through ignorance easily obtains pardon, but not he who sins against the Holy Spirit. But since the power, wisdom, and goodness of the three is one, why power is more often assigned to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit, has been said above.

---

la: Matth. 12, 32; deinde I. Ioan. 5, 16; Marc. 3, 29, et Luc. 12, 10, sed verba aliquatenus inter se commixta sunt.

en: Matthew 12:32; then 1 John 5:16; Mark 3:29, and Luke 12:10, but the words are to some extent intermixed with one another.

la: Glossa in Rom. 2, 5, ex qua etiam multa, quae sequuntur, excerpta sunt, interdum verbotenus.

en: Gloss on Romans 2:5, from which also many of the things that follow are excerpted, sometimes word for word.

en: Genesis 4:13.

la: Edd. 1, 2 *aestimant,* et paulo superius *derelinquunt* pro *relinquunt.* — Enarrat. in Ps. 67, 23, n. 31. Deinde Glossa interlinearis in Ps. 147, 17, ex Enarrat. n. 23 in hunc Ps. Tertius locus est Ps. 67, 7.

en: Editions 1, 2 read *aestimant,* and a little above *derelinquunt* for *relinquunt.* — *Commentary on Psalm 67* [68]:23, n. 31. Then the interlinear Gloss on Psalm 147:17, from the *Commentary* n. 23 on this Psalm. The third passage is Psalm 67 [68]:7.

la: Serm. 71 (alias *de Verbis Dom.* 11) c. 12, n. 20.

en: Augustine, *Sermon* 71 (otherwise *On the Words of the Lord* 11) c. 12, n. 20.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd. addunt *sit,* refragantibus codd. B C et edd. 1, 8.

en: The Vatican and other editions add *sit,* against codices B, C and editions 1, 8.

la: Loc. cit., sed quod sequitur dicit Hieronymus secundum sensum in Marc. 3, 29 et Matth. 27, 4, sed verbotenus est in Glossa interlineari.

en: At the place cited; but what follows Jerome says according to the sense on Mark 3:29 and Matthew 27:4, though word for word it is in the interlinear Gloss.

la: Iob 41, 1-5, ubi S. Gregor., XXXIV. Moral. c. 7, n. 15, ad nomen Leviathan ista dicit.

en: Job 41:1–5, where St. Gregory, *Morals* book XXXIV, c. 7, n. 15, says these things on the name Leviathan.

la: Libr. I. c. 22, n. 73; seq. locus ibid. n. 75; tertius ibid. n. 74.

en: [*On the Sermon on the Mount,*] book I, c. 22, n. 73; the following passage ibid. n. 75; the third ibid. n. 74.

en: [*On the Sermon on the Mount,*] book I, c. 19, n. 7. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 979–981 (PDF 1001–1003, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, raw lines ~68026–68155). The IA OCR cascade-shattered the two-column body and footers; the PDF column bands are authoritative per the Vol II override. Running heads confirm the page numbers (`…TIO XLIII. 979` on p.979 R; `980 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II` on p.980; `DIST. XLIII. DIVISIO TEXTUS. 981` on p.981).

**Page span / structure.** d.43 has a single Lombard chapter (CAP. UNICUM, *De peccato in Spiritum sanctum*). The littera runs from the lower-left column of p.979 (immediately after the d.42-dubia tail `…dicta sufficiant.`) through both columns of p.980 and the top of both columns of p.981, ending at `…superius dictum est.` immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIII` / `DIVISIO TEXTUS` (raw 68158). No commentary leaked into the littera.

**Page-split / footer map.**
- **p.979 (shared with d.42-dubia):** the p.979 LEFT-column footer block (footers 1–5: *radix omnium malorum* / *trahitur* / *ex ratione* / Aristot. *de Partib. animal.* / *duplex est radix*) and RIGHT-column footer 6 (*Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt et radicis…* with the cross-references to Alex. Hal., Albert, Thomas, etc.) ALL belong to **d.42-dubia (DUB. IV)** and were already consumed there — **not re-claimed here.** The d.43 littera footers begin only **after the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` divider**: footer 1 = Matth. 12:32 cluster (`[^1]`), footer 2 = Glossa in Rom. 2:5 (`[^2]`), footer 3 = Gen. 4:13 (`[^3]`).
- **p.980:** full littera page; *Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum* footers 1–10 (1–5 in the left column foot, 6–10 in the right column foot), all littera notes → rendered `[^4]`–`[^10]`. (`[^4]`=Ps. 67/147 cluster, `[^5]`=Serm. 71, `[^6]`=*sit* variant, `[^7]`=Jerome on Mark, `[^8]`=Iob 41/Gregory Leviathan, `[^9]`=Retract. book I, `[^10]`=Serm. 71 c.19.)
- **p.981:** the littera ends near the top; the ONLY footer block on p.981 is `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` (commentary footers 1–3 left + 1–3 right) — these belong to **d.43-divisio**, NOT to the littera, and are NOT rendered here.

**p.981 littera-tail markers — RESOLVED (600 dpi, decade polish 2026-06-01).** The p.981 littera fragment carries three superscript markers in the printed text (¹ after *de Spiritu sancto,* ² after *qui peccat in Spiritum sanctum,* ³ after *superius … dictum est*). The earlier `[?]` speculated these were unannotated (or a stray Ambrose note). A 600 dpi read of p.981 (PDF 1003), left + right footer bands, shows the page foot holds a **single** footer block headed `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` (NOT a `Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum` block) split across the two columns. The **left column** of that block annotates exactly these three littera-tail superscripts: ¹ `Libr. I. c. 3. n. 54…` (Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* Lib. I c. 3 n. 54 — the *de Spiritu sancto* source) `— Pro definitam Bonav. legit definitivam`; ² `Codd., excepto D, peccant` (on *qui peccat in Spiritum sanctum*); ³ `Libr. I. d. XXXIV. c. 4` (the *superius dictum est* cross-reference). These three notes are rendered in **`bon-sent-II-d43-divisio` as `[^4]`–`[^6]`** (Quaracchi grouped the littera-tail notes into the commentary's single NOTAE block on the shared page p.981). They are therefore NOT re-anchored here (the defs live in d43-divisio); the three superscripts remain as plain text in the littera body to avoid orphan markers. No apparatus entry is fabricated and no `[?]` remains. The two chunks now agree: 3 markers on the littera tail ↔ defs `[^4]`–`[^6]` in d43-divisio.

**Hand-off forwarded → d43-divisio.** The `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIII` / `De peccato in Spiritum sanctum` lemma + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` begin at raw 68158, in the lower half of printed **p.981** (PDF 1003), immediately after the littera tail `…superius dictum est.` The seam is grammatically clean (littera ends a complete sentence; commentary opens `Supra egit Magister de distinctione peccatorum in generali…`). **The p.981 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footers (left: ¹ `Libr. I. c. 3. n. 54. Locus Scripturae est Matth. 12, 32. Inferius respicitur ibid. v. 24, 28. — Pro definitam Bonav. legit definitivam`; ² `Codd., excepto D, peccant`; ³ `Libr. I. d. XXXIV. c. 4`; right: ¹ `Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 sic: quid sit secundum aliorum assignationem et etiam secundum propriam`; ² `Edd. ipsius`; ³ `Cod. T declarationem`) all belong to d43-divisio** — the divisio agent should claim these as its first p.981 footer sequence. The TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM lists: ARTICULUS I (de comparatione ad alia peccatorum genera) with q1 (`utrum peccatum in Spiritum sanctum dicat genus peccati distinctum`) + q2 (`utrum … semper habeat aliud peccatum actuale praeambulum`); ARTICULUS II/III follow on p.982 (de conditionibus propriis; de speciebus et differentiis).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0