title: Dist. 38, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (d. XXXVIII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (d. 38)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Voluntas ex fine suo cognoscitur, utrum sit recta, aut prava.* Finis autem voluntatis est beatitudo. Sed contra: beatitudo est bonum nobis ignotum; unde hoc est illud, *quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit*[^1] etc.: ergo si per ignotum non possumus aliud cognoscere, videtur, quod voluntas non possit cognosci, utrum sit bona, vel prava ex illo fine. — Item, certius est nobis quod est praesens nobis ipsis, quam quod est absens[^2]; sed voluntas nostra est nobis praesens, beatitudo est absens: si ergo non cognoscimus praesentia per absentia, sed magis e converso; videtur, quod per beatitudinem non fiat cognitio bonitatis in voluntate.

*(Duplex cognitio beatitudinis.)* **Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cognitio beatitudinis duplex est, videlicet in universali et in particulari. Cognitio beatitudinis in universali omnibus est innata; cognitio vero in particulari, videlicet ubi sit beatitudo ponenda, habetur a nobis per habitum fidei aliquo modo, et aliquo modo exspectatur habenda per deiformitatem gloriae. Nunc enim cognoscimus quasi speculando et a remotis et semiplene; tunc autem cognoscemus experiendo perfecte[^3]. Licet autem nunc non cognoscamus perfecte, cognoscimus tamen certitudinaliter certitudine fidei, quod beatitudo est magnum et verum bonum. De voluntate nostra, utrum sit recta, vel prava, nos nescimus nisi per coniecturam; et ideo sicut certum est ratio veniendi[^4] in cognitionem dubii, sic cognitio beatitudinis facit venire in cognitionem bonitatis voluntatis, dum quis videt voluntatem suam ad beatitudinem tendere.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod beatitudo nobis ignota est; iam patet[^5]. Verum est enim, quod non est nobis nota per experientiam, est tamen nobis nota per fidem.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rectitudo voluntatis est nobis praesens; dicendum, quod, sicut in primo libro[^6] fuit ostensum, licet caritas et gratia sint nobis praesentia, sunt tamen nobis ignota, in quantum gratuita, quia de eis nulla potest haberi experientia. Unde etsi certissimus sim de affectione mea, secundum quod est affectio, valde tamen dubius sum de affectione mea, utrum sit ordinata vel gratuita; et ita acquiro mihi probabilitatem per aliqua signa[^7].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Apostoli, quod Magister ponit in littera: *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta.* Quoniam praecepta directius sunt ordinata ad obediendum quam ad amandum, ergo potius debuit dicere[^8]: obedientia est finis praecepti, quam caritas. — Item, cum finis, quem assequimur ex observantia mandatorum, est ipsa vita aeterna, potius deberet dici: finis praecepti est vita aeterna quam caritas.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de numero et differentia illarum conditionum appositarum, scilicet de corde

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puro etc. Cum enim caritas non sit de fide nec de conscientia, sed potius de affectione, non videtur recte notificari per illas conditiones.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum quod doctores exponunt, Apostolus hic definit caritatem. *(Expositio 1.)* Sed quidam sic exponunt, ut illae determinationes de corde puro etc. sint determinationes ex parte subiecti; et hoc quod dicitur finis praecepti, sit ipsa notificatio, ut sit sensus: caritas procedens de corde puro etc. est finis praecepti. — *(Expositio 2, probabilior.)* Alio modo exponitur, ut hoc totum sit notificatio finis praecepti de corde puro etc. Hic modus dicendi videtur congruentior. Et secundum hunc modum dicendi notandum, quod caritas hic definitur per actum suum. Actus autem caritatis, qui est amare, dupliciter habet notificari: et per comparationem ad illud a quo procedit tanquam a principio efficiente, et per comparationem ad illud quod ad ipsam caritatem terminatur sicut ad quietantem; et ideo in illa eius notificatione tangitur eius duplex comparatio, videlicet ad cor purum et ad ipsum praeceptum. Et quia puritas cordis, a qua immediate procedit actus dilectionis, praesupponit fiduciam fidei et certitudinem spei tanquam dispositiones praeambulas; ideo, ut manifestaret Apostolus, quod actus caritatis praesupponit actus aliarum virtutum theologicarum tanquam disponentes ad ipsum; hinc est, quod[^9] ista tria dicit: *de corde puro*, in quo tangit caritatis sanctitatem; *conscientia bona*, in quo tangit spei fiduciam; et *fide non ficta*, in quo tangit fidei constantiam. Et in his duobus Apostolus caritatem perfectissime commendat, in hoc quod ostendit, quod in actu caritatis consistit complementum omnis virtutis et finis omnis bonae operationis, quae intelligitur in nomine praecepti. Unde intellectus praedictae definitionis est iste: caritas est finis praecepti etc., id est, caritas est illud, in quo consistit omnis mandati adimpletio et omnium virtutum perfectio. Et hinc est, quod Scriptura adeo nobis commendat caritatem, et maxime Scriptura novi Testamenti, et Apostolus[^10] eam laudat elegantissime.

Quod ergo obiicitur de obedientia et vita aeterna, quod debeant dici finis praecepti; dicendum, quod obedientia ordinata est ad caritatem habendam, et vita aeterna non est aliud quam caritas consummata[^11].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod finis est *Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, neque hi tres sunt tres fines.* Sed contra: finis est res, qua fruendum est; sed «hi tres sunt tres res, quibus fruendum est», sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana[^12]: ergo sunt tres fines. — Item, intentio finis dirigitur per fidem[^13]; sed fides ponit tres articulos in credendo Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum: ergo pari ratione intentio intendit in eum, statuens sibi tres fines.

*(Quaestio incidens.)* Quaeritur ergo, quare non sit diversitas finium, sicut pluralitas articulorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod rationis est distinguere, et voluntatis unire. Rursus, sicut dicit Damascenus[^14], «personae distinguuntur ratione et conveniunt re et natura». Secundum hoc ergo intelligendum est, quod nomina illa, quae sunt communia ad rem et rationem, illa possunt plurificari; illa vero, quae sunt *realia*, plurificari non possunt. Ideo potest dici, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres res; non tamen potest dici, quod sint tres bonitates. — Rursus, quia articulus dicit quod est in mente *(Ad quaest. incidentem.)* ex parte rationis, finis vero dicit quod respicit voluntatem; ideo possumus dicere plures articulos, non tamen possumus dicere plures fines. Licet tamen plures sint articuli, una tamen est in eis veritas, quia, cum veritas complexa, secundum quod aliquid ponit, reducatur ad veritatem incomplexam; et una sit veritas incomplexa in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, secundum quod sunt una entitas et una veritas: illi tres articuli super unam veritatem realem fundari habent[^15].

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sunt tres res: dicendum, quod ratio illa non valet: sunt tres res: ergo tres fines; quia proceditur a pluralitate personali ad pluralitatem essentialem; et differenter accipitur res, cum dicitur: finis est res, et cum dicitur: tres sunt res[^16].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides distinguit; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod intentio distinguat plures fines, sicut fides plures articulos; nam cum intentio in caritate consummetur, et caritatis sit unire, plus habet intentio rationem uniendi quam rationem distinguendi[^17].

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### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de quaestione ultimo proposita in littera, quam Magister non determinat in partem alteram, utrum scilicet voluntas finis et eius quod est ad finem sint duae voluntates, vel una. Nam quod duae sint, videtur per hoc, quod una est creati et alia increati, una temporalis et alia aeterni. Quod autem una sit, videtur per hoc, quod ibi est unum propter alterum; ubi autem hoc est, ibi tantum unum est[^18], ut cum diligo vinum dulce, non diligo duo, sed unum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister hic ponit duas responsiones, nec tamen aliquam earum reprobat nec aliquam magis approbat. — Et ratio huius est, quia secundum diversas considerationes verum dicit utraque, et utrumque oportet dicere. Una enim dicit, quod sunt voluntates duae; alia dicit, quod est voluntas una. *(Notanda distinctio.)* Hoc autem dixerunt aspicientes ad diversa. Voluntas enim finis dupliciter potest esse: aut sicut obiecti, aut sicut finis in ratione finis. Si sit voluntas finis sicut obiecti, sic cum aliud sit obiectum creatum, et aliud increatum, alia est voluntas, qua volo finem, et alia, qua volo id quod est ad finem, sicut alius est motus affectionis, quo amo Deum in se, et alius motus, quo amo creaturam. Si autem sit voluntas finis sub ratione finis, in quantum scilicet aliud habet ad ipsum ordinari, sic una voluntate et uno decursu volo utrumque, quamvis voluntas simul et semel non possit ferri super utrumque, sed successive; ut patet, cum amo comestionem propter salutem, quia in amore comestionis includo amorem salutis. — Et secundum has duas vias duo sunt modi dicendi probabiles et veri, si recte fuerint intellecti[^19].

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: *The will is known from its end, whether it be right or perverse.* Now the end of the will is beatitude. On the contrary: beatitude is a good unknown to us; whence this is that *which neither eye has seen nor ear heard*[^1] etc.: therefore, if through what is unknown we cannot know anything else, it seems that the will cannot be known, whether it be good or perverse, from that end. — Likewise, what is present to ourselves is more certain to us than what is absent[^2]; but our will is present to us, beatitude is absent: if therefore we do not know things present through things absent, but rather the converse; it seems that through beatitude there comes about no knowledge of goodness in the will.

*(Twofold knowledge of beatitude.)* **I respond:** It must be said that the knowledge of beatitude is twofold, namely in the universal and in the particular. The knowledge of beatitude in the universal is innate in all; but the knowledge in the particular, namely where beatitude is to be placed, is had by us through the habit of faith in some way, and in some way is awaited to be had through the deiformity of glory. For now we know as it were by speculation and from afar and half-fully; but then we shall know by experience perfectly[^3]. Although now we do not know perfectly, we nevertheless know with certitude, by the certitude of faith, that beatitude is a great and true good. Concerning our will, whether it be right or perverse, we know nothing except by conjecture; and therefore, just as a certain thing is a ground of coming[^4] into the knowledge of a doubtful thing, so the knowledge of beatitude brings one into the knowledge of the goodness of the will, when one sees his will tending toward beatitude.

As for what is objected, that beatitude is unknown to us; this is now clear[^5]. For it is true that it is not known to us by experience, yet it is known to us by faith.

To that which is objected, that the rightness of the will is present to us; it must be said that, as was shown in the first book[^6], although charity and grace are present to us, they are nevertheless unknown to us, insofar as they are gratuitous, because no experience can be had of them. Hence, even though I am most certain of my affection, insofar as it is an affection, I am nevertheless very doubtful concerning my affection, whether it be ordered or gratuitous; and so I acquire for myself probability through certain signs[^7].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of the Apostle, which the Master sets down in the text: *The end of the precept is charity, from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned.* Since precepts are more directly ordered to obeying than to loving, therefore he ought rather to have said[^8]: obedience is the end of the precept, than charity. — Likewise, since the end which we attain from the observance of the commandments is eternal life itself, it ought rather to be said: the end of the precept is eternal life than charity.

In connection with this it is asked concerning the number and difference of those conditions appended, namely concerning a pure

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heart etc. For since charity is not of faith nor of conscience, but rather of affection, it does not seem rightly described by those conditions.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to how the doctors expound it, the Apostle here defines charity. *(Exposition 1.)* But some so expound it that those determinations *from a pure heart* etc. are determinations on the part of the subject; and that what is called the end of the precept is the description itself, so that the sense is: charity proceeding from a pure heart etc. is the end of the precept. — *(Exposition 2, more probable.)* In another way it is expounded, so that this whole is the description of the end of the precept, from a pure heart etc. This manner of speaking seems more fitting. And according to this manner of speaking it must be noted that charity is here defined through its act. Now the act of charity, which is to love, has to be described in two ways: both by comparison to that from which it proceeds as from an efficient principle, and by comparison to that in which charity itself is terminated as in what brings rest; and therefore in that description of it its twofold comparison is touched upon, namely to the pure heart and to the precept itself. And because purity of heart, from which the act of love immediately proceeds, presupposes the confidence of faith and the certitude of hope as preambular dispositions; therefore, that the Apostle might manifest that the act of charity presupposes the acts of the other theological virtues as disposing toward it; hence it is that[^9] he says these three things: *from a pure heart*, in which he touches the sanctity of charity; *a good conscience*, in which he touches the confidence of hope; and *faith unfeigned*, in which he touches the constancy of faith. And in these two the Apostle most perfectly commends charity, in this, that he shows that in the act of charity consists the completion of every virtue and the end of every good operation, which is understood in the name of the precept. Hence the meaning of the aforesaid definition is this: charity is the end of the precept etc., that is, charity is that in which consists the fulfillment of every commandment and the perfection of all the virtues. And hence it is that Scripture so commends charity to us, and especially the Scripture of the New Testament, and the Apostle[^10] praises it most elegantly.

As for what is objected concerning obedience and eternal life, that they ought to be called the end of the precept; it must be said that obedience is ordered to the having of charity, and eternal life is nothing other than charity consummated[^11].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the end is *God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and yet these three are not three ends.* On the contrary: the end is a thing to be enjoyed; but «these three are three things to be enjoyed», as Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^12]: therefore they are three ends. — Likewise, the intention of the end is directed by faith[^13]; but faith posits three articles in believing in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore by parity of reason the intention is directed toward Him, setting up for itself three ends.

*(Incidental question.)* It is asked therefore why there is not a diversity of ends, just as there is a plurality of articles.

**I respond:** It must be said that it belongs to reason to distinguish, and to the will to unite. Again, as Damascene says[^14], «the persons are distinguished by reason and agree in reality and nature». According to this, then, it must be understood that those names which are common to reality and reason, those can be pluralized; but those which are *real*, cannot be pluralized. Therefore it can be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three things; yet it cannot be said that they are three goodnesses. — Again, because an article states what is in the mind *(To the incidental question.)* on the part of reason, whereas the end states what regards the will; therefore we can say several articles, yet we cannot say several ends. Although, however, there are several articles, there is nevertheless one truth in them, because, since complex truth, insofar as it posits something, is reduced to incomplex truth; and there is one incomplex truth in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, insofar as they are one entity and one truth: those three articles have to be founded upon one real truth[^15].

To that, then, which is objected, that they are three things: it must be said that that argument is not valid: they are three things: therefore three ends; because it proceeds from a personal plurality to an essential plurality; and *thing* is taken differently when it is said: the end is a thing, and when it is said: they are three things[^16].

To that which is objected, that faith distinguishes; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the intention distinguishes several ends, just as faith distinguishes several articles; for since the intention is consummated in charity, and it belongs to charity to unite, the intention has more the character of uniting than the character of distinguishing[^17].

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### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the question last proposed in the text, which the Master does not determine in either direction, namely whether the will of the end and of that which is toward the end are two wills, or one. For that they are two seems to be the case from this, that one is of the created and the other of the uncreated, one temporal and the other of the eternal. But that it is one seems to be the case from this, that there one thing is for the sake of another; and where this is so, there only one thing is willed[^18], as when I love sweet wine, I do not love two things, but one.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here sets down two responses, yet does not reject either of them nor approve the one more than the other. — And the reason for this is that according to diverse considerations each says what is true, and both must be said. For one says that there are two wills; the other says that there is one will. *(A distinction to be noted.)* Now they said this looking to different things. For the will of the end can be in two ways: either as of an object, or as of an end in the character of an end. If it be the will of the end as of an object, then, since the object created is one thing and the uncreated another, the will by which I will the end is one, and that by which I will what is toward the end is another, just as the motion of affection by which I love God in Himself is one, and the motion by which I love a creature is another. But if it be the will of the end under the character of an end, namely insofar as something else has to be ordered to it, then by one will and one course I will both, although the will cannot at one and the same time be borne upon both, but successively; as is clear, when I love eating for the sake of health, because in the love of eating I include the love of health. — And according to these two ways there are two manners of speaking that are probable and true, if they be rightly understood[^19].

---

la: Isai. 64, 4; I. Cor. 2, 9. — De proposit. seq. cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 1; VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.); I. Phys. text. 2. (c. 1.), iam supra pag. 441, nota 1. allatus. — Paulo ante pro *unde* ed. 1 substituit *nam*, et deinde pro *ergo si* posito *sed*, ante *videtur* exhibet *ergo*.

en: Isaiah 64:4; 1 Corinthians 2:9. — On the proposition that follows cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 1; *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4); *Physics* I, text 2 (c. 1), already adduced above on p. 441, note 1. — A little before, for *unde* (whence) edition 1 substitutes *nam* (for), and then, with *sed* placed for *ergo si*, exhibits *ergo* before *videtur*.

la: Vide supra pag. 194, nota 2. — In edd., excepta 1, desideratur proposit. minor: *sed voluntas... est absens.*

en: See above p. 194, note 2. — In the editions, except 1, the minor proposition is wanting: *but the will... is absent.*

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 13, 12: *Videmus nunc per speculum* etc. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 2.

en: Epistle 1 Corinthians 13:12: *We see now through a glass* etc. Cf. IV *Sentences* d. 49, p. 1, q. 2.

la: Codd. N. Z *deveniendi*.

en: Codices N and Z read *deveniendi* (of arriving).

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 adiiciunt *responsio*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 add *responsio* (response).

en: Distinction 17, p. 1, q. 3.

la: De hoc dubio cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. I.

en: On this doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text I.

la: Cod. K *dici*. In seq. proposit. pro *dici*, quae lectio est multorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, Vat. substituit *ftere*. In eodem arg. pro *est ipsa* cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. *sit ipsa*.

en: Codex K reads *dici*. In the following proposition, for *dici*, which is the reading of many codices and of editions 1, 2, the Vatican edition substitutes *ftere*. In the same argument, for *est ipsa* codex cc, edition 1 and the Vatican edition read *sit ipsa*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit *hinc est, quod.* Cod. dd et ed. 1 *ad ipsam* pro *ad ipsum*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 omits *hinc est, quod* (hence it is, that). Codex dd and edition 1 read *ad ipsam* for *ad ipsum*.

en: Epistle 1 Corinthians 13:1 ff. Cf. Galatians 5:6; Ephesians 3:17 ff.; Colossians 3:14; 1 Peter 1:22; 1 John 4:16.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. cfr. etiam Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 2; cf. also Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Libr. I. c. 5. n. 5. Vide etiam lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. 1. c. 2. seq.

en: Book I, c. 5, n. 5. See also the text of the Master, I *Sentences* d. 1, c. 2 f.

la: Cfr. infra lit. Magistri d. XLI. c. 1. 2.

en: Cf. below the text of the Master, d. 41, c. 1, 2.

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. — De ratione praeced. cfr. supra pag. 655, nota 5. et pag. 124, nota 4.

en: Book I, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 8. Cf. I *Sentences* d. 26, q. 1, ad 2. — On the preceding argument cf. above p. 655, note 5, and p. 124, note 4.

la: Plura de *articulis* fidei habentur III. Sent. d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Aliquanto superius pro *Licet tamen* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Licet enim*, et postea eaedem edd. nec non ed. 2 *una caritas* pro *una entitas*.

en: More on the *articles* of faith is found in III *Sentences* d. 24, a. 3, q. 1 f. — Somewhat above, for *Licet tamen* (although however) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *Licet enim* (although for), and afterwards the same editions, as well as edition 2, read *una caritas* (one charity) for *una entitas* (one entity).

la: Haec obiectio solvitur etiam I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 7. et d. 25. dub. 3.

en: This objection is also solved in I *Sentences* d. 1, dub. 7, and d. 25, dub. 3.

en: On this doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Vide supra pag. 639, nota 2. De exemplo allato cfr. supra pag. 614, nota 3. — Post *vinum* Vat. interiicit *quia*.

en: See above p. 639, note 2. On the example adduced cf. above p. 614, note 3. — After *vinum* (wine) the Vatican edition inserts *quia* (because).

la: Eandem solutionem exhibet S. Thom., hic a. 4. et circa lit. Cfr. etiam Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 6.

en: S. Thomas presents the same solution, here a. 4 and on the text. Cf. also Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 6. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion for the cascade-shattered Respondeo/footer regions), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 62182–62325, `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Fresh literal English. No scholion (dubia have none). Closes d.38.

**Structure: 4 dubia.**
- Dub. I — whether the will is known from its end (beatitude); knowledge of beatitude in universali vs. in particulari.
- Dub. II — the Apostle's *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro* (1 Tim. 1:5): why charity, not obedience/eternal life; the two expositions of the three conditions.
- Dub. III — the end is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, yet not three ends; distinguendi/uniendi, real vs. rational plurality; incidental question on articles vs. ends.
- Dub. IV — whether the will of the end and of what is toward the end are one will or two; the Master leaves it undetermined — Bonaventure's distinction (object vs. end *sub ratione finis*).

**Page-split map (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each printed page; here renumbered continuously `[^1]`–`[^19]`).** The printed marker digits were read directly from the 450 dpi body bands.
- p. 894 (printed footers nn. 1–12; only nn. 5–12 belong to this chunk — nn. 1–4 belong to the d.38-a3 tail that occupies the top of p.894). Dub. I markers carry printed nn. 5–11 → chunk `[^1]`–`[^7]`: n.5 Isai./I Cor. (`[^1]`), n.6 *sed voluntas...absens* variant (`[^2]`), n.7 *Videmus per speculum* (`[^3]`), n.8 *deveniendi* (`[^4]`), n.9 *responsio* (`[^5]`), n.10 Dist.17 (`[^6]`), n.11 De hoc dubio (`[^7]`). Dub. II opener carries printed n.12 → `[^8]`.
- p. 895 (printed footers nn. 1–9). Dub. II body printed nn. 1–3 → `[^9]`–`[^11]`; Dub. III printed nn. 4–9 → `[^12]`–`[^17]`.
- p. 896 (dubia printed footers nn. 1–2). Dub. IV printed nn. 1–2 → `[^18]`–`[^19]`. (p.896 R-column footer n.4, margin *Dubium 4.*, belongs to DISTINCTIO XXXIX, not this chunk.)

**Hand-off picked up from d.38-a2-q2.** Confirmed: p.894 footers nn. 5–6 belong to THIS dubia's Dub. I body. Verified against the p.894 L-column footer band: n.5 = the `Isai. 64,4 / I Cor. 2,9` proposition-sequel note (Aristotle xref p.441) → chunk `[^1]`; n.6 = the `Vide supra pag. 194` note carrying the *sed voluntas... est absens* minor-proposition variant → chunk `[^2]`. Both rendered.

**Hand-off forwarded.** None — this CLOSES d.38. Next unit is d.39 (littera). p.896 R-column footer n.4 (`Praeter Vat. et ed. 6, aliae edd. admittendum...`, margin *Dubium 4.*) belongs to DISTINCTIO XXXIX and was NOT consumed here.

**[?] flags.** None. The cascade-shattered Respondeo and footer regions were all resolved cleanly against the 450 dpi column bands of pp. 894–896.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 39

title_alt: Distinctio XXXIX — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXXIX — text of the Master of the Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXIX.

### Cap. I. *Quare voluntas dicitur peccatum, cum sit de naturalibus, quorum nullum aliud peccatum est.*

Hic autem oritur quaestio satis necessaria, ex superioribus causam trahens. Dictum est enim supra[^1] voluntatem inesse naturaliter homini, sicut intellectus et memoria. Quae autem homini naturalia sunt, quantumcumque vitientur, bona tamen esse non desinunt, quia non valet vitium bonitatem, in qua Deus eam fecit, penitus consumere, ut, verbi gratia, intellectus vel ratio et ingenium ac memoria, etsi vitiis et peccatis obnubilentur et corrumpantur, bona tamen sunt nec peccata nominantur, sicut Augustinus de ratione, quae est imago Dei, in qua facti sumus, evidenter ostendit in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Haec est, inquit, imago, in qua homines sunt creati, qua ceteris animalibus praesunt; quae creatura, in rebus creatis excellentissima, cum a Deo iustificatur, a deformi forma in formosam mutatur formam. Erat enim etiam inter vitia natura bona». Haec autem imago ratio est vel intellectus. Cum ergo voluntas de naturalibus sit, quare ipsa non semper bonum est, etsi aliquando vitiis subiaceat? — Ad hoc facile respondent qui dicunt, omnia quae sunt, in quantum sunt, bona esse, quia et ipsam voluntatem, in quantum est, vel in quantum voluntas est, ut supra[^3] posuimus, bonum esse asserunt, sed in quantum inordinata est, mala est et peccatum. — Ubi potest ab eis rationabiliter quaeri: si voluntas, in quantum inordinata est, peccatum est, quare ergo intellectus, ratio et ingenium et huiusmodi, cum inordinata sunt, peccata non sunt? Inordinata vero sunt, sicut voluntas, cum ad rectum finem non tendunt, eorumque actus praevaricationes existunt. — Ad quod illi dicunt, voluntatis nomine aliquando vim, scilicet naturalem potentiam volendi, aliquando *actum* ipsius vis significari. Vis autem ipsa, naturaliter animae insita, nunquam peccatum est, sicut nec vis memorandi vel intelligendi; sed *actus* huius vis, qui et *voluntas* dicitur, tunc peccatum est, quando inordinatus est.

### Cap. II. *Quare actus voluntatis sit peccatum, si actus aliarum potentiarum non sunt peccata.*

Sed adhuc quaeritur, quare huius naturalis potentiae actus peccatum sit, si aliarum potentiarum actus peccata non sunt, scilicet potentiae memorandi, cuius actus est memorare, et potentiae intelligendi, cuius actus est intelligere. — Ad quod et ipsi dicunt, quia alterius generis est actus ille voluntatis quam actus memoriae vel intellectus. Hic enim actus est ad aliquid adipiscendum, vel non amittendum[^4], qui non potest esse de malis, quin sit malus. *Velle* enim mala malum est, sed *intelligere* vel *memorare* mala malum non est; quamvis eorum quidam etiam hos actus esse malos interdum non improbe asserant. Memorat enim interdum quis malum, ut faciat, et quaerit intelligere verum, ut sciat impugnare. — Ecce qualiter solvitur praemissa quaestio ab his, qui tradunt, omnia esse bona, in quantum sunt. Qui vero dicunt, voluntates malas peccata esse et nullo modo bona; brevius respondent dicentes, actum voluntatis non esse de naturalibus, sed vim ipsam et potentiam volendi, quae semper bonum

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est et in omnibus est, etiam in parvulis, in quibus nondum est eius actus.

### Cap. III. *Ex quo sensu dicitur naturaliter omnis homo velle bonum.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, quomodo intelligendum sit quod ait Ambrosius, exponens illud verbum Apostoli[^5]: *Non enim quod volo, illud ago, sed quod nolo, illud facio.* Dicit enim, quod «homo, subiectus peccato, facit quod non vult, quia naturaliter vult bonum. Sed voluntas haec semper caret effectu, nisi gratia Dei adiuvet et liberet». Si homo subiectus est peccato, vult quidem malum et operatur, quia servus est peccati et eius voluntatem, sicut supra[^6] dixit Augustinus, libenter facit; quomodo ergo naturaliter vult bonum? An est eadem voluntas, id est idem motus, qua libenter peccato servit, et qua naturaliter vult bonum? Si non est eadem voluntas, quae ergo istarum est, quae, cum homo iustificatur, a servitute peccati liberatur? Ut enim superius[^7] disseruimus, gratia Dei voluntatem hominis liberat et adiuvat, quae voluntatem hominis praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam. Sed quae est illa voluntas? An illa quae naturaliter vult bonum, an quae libenter servit peccato, si tamen duae sunt voluntates? — Proposita est quaestio profunda, quae varia a diversis expositione determinatur. — Alii enim dicunt, duos esse motus: unum, quo vult bonum naturaliter. Quare naturaliter et quare naturalis dicitur? Quia talis fuit motus naturae humanae in prima conditione, in qua creati sine vitio sumus, quae proprie natura dicitur. Fuit enim homo creatus in voluntate rectus. Unde in *Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*[^8] scriptum est: «Firmissime tene, primos homines bonos et rectos esse creatos cum libero arbitrio, quo possent, si vellent, propria voluntate peccare; eosque non necessitate, sed propria voluntate peccasse». Recte igitur dicitur homo naturaliter velle bonum, quia in recta et bona voluntate conditus est. Superior enim *scintilla rationis*, quae etiam, ut ait Hieronymus[^9], «in Cain non potuit exstingui», bonum semper vult et malum odit. — *Alium* autem dicunt esse motum mentis, quo mens, relicta superiorum lege, subiicit se peccatis eisque oblectatur. Iste motus, ut aiunt, antequam alicui adsit gratia, dominatur in homine et regnat alterumque deprimit motum; uterque tamen ex libero arbitrio est. Veniente autem gratia, ille malus motus eliditur, et alter naturaliter bonus liberatur et adiuvatur, ut efficaciter bonum velit. Ante gratiam vero, licet naturaliter velit homo bonum, non tamen absolute concedi oportet, bonam habere voluntatem, sed potius malam. — Alii autem dicunt, unam esse voluntatem, id est unum motum, quo naturaliter vult homo bonum et ex vitio vult malum eoque delectatur; et in quantum vult bonum, naturaliter bonus est, in quantum malum vult, malus est.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXIX.

### Chap. I. *Why the will is called sin, since it is among the natural things, of which none other is sin.*

But here arises a question quite necessary, drawing its cause from the foregoing. For it has been said above[^1] that the will is in man naturally, just as intellect and memory are. But the things which are natural to man, however much they may be vitiated, nevertheless do not cease to be good, because vice is not able utterly to consume the goodness in which God made it; so that, for example, the intellect or reason and natural disposition and memory, even if they be obscured and corrupted by vices and sins, are nevertheless good, nor are they called sins; as Augustine clearly shows concerning reason, which is the image of God, in which we were made, in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^2]: «This, he says, is the image in which men were created, by which they are set over the other animals; which creature, the most excellent among created things, when it is justified by God, is changed from a deformed form into a comely form. For even among vices the nature was good». But this image is reason or intellect. Since, therefore, the will is among the natural things, why is it not always good, even though it sometimes is subject to vices? — To this they easily respond who say that all things which are, insofar as they are, are good; because they assert that the will itself also, insofar as it is, or insofar as it is will, as we set down above[^3], is good, but insofar as it is disordered, is evil and sin. — Here it can reasonably be asked of them: if the will, insofar as it is disordered, is sin, why then are intellect, reason, and natural disposition and the like, when they are disordered, not sins? And they are disordered, just as the will is, when they do not tend to the right end, and their acts become transgressions. — To which they say that by the name of *will* sometimes is signified the power, namely the natural power of willing, sometimes the *act* of that power. But the power itself, naturally implanted in the soul, is never sin, just as neither is the power of remembering or of understanding; but the *act* of this power, which is also called *will*, is then sin, when it is disordered.

### Chap. II. *Why the act of the will is sin, if the acts of the other powers are not sins.*

But it is still asked why the act of this natural power is sin, if the acts of the other powers are not sins, namely of the power of remembering, whose act is to remember, and of the power of understanding, whose act is to understand. — To which they themselves also say that that act of the will is of another kind than the act of memory or of intellect. For this act is for the obtaining, or not losing, of something[^4], which cannot be concerned with evils without being evil. For *to will* evils is evil, but *to understand* or *to remember* evils is not evil; although some of them not without reason sometimes assert that even these acts are evil. For sometimes one remembers an evil in order to do it, and seeks to understand the truth in order to know how to attack it. — Behold how the foregoing question is solved by those who hold that all things are good insofar as they are. But those who say that evil wills are sins and in no way good, respond more briefly, saying that the act of the will is not among the natural things, but the power itself and the faculty of willing, which is always good

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and is in all, even in little ones, in whom there is not yet its act.

### Chap. III. *In what sense it is said that every man naturally wills the good.*

Moreover it is wont to be asked how that is to be understood which Ambrose says, expounding that word of the Apostle[^5]: *For the good which I will, I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do.* For he says that «man, subject to sin, does what he wills not, because he naturally wills the good. But this will is always without effect, unless the grace of God assist and free». If man is subject to sin, he indeed wills and works evil, because he is a servant of sin and willingly does its will, as Augustine said above[^6]; how then does he naturally will the good? Is it the same will, that is the same motion, by which he willingly serves sin, and by which he naturally wills the good? If it is not the same will, which then of these is it which, when man is justified, is freed from the servitude of sin? For as we discussed above[^7], the grace of God frees and assists the will of man, which prepares the will of man to be assisted and assists it once prepared. But which is that will? Is it that which naturally wills the good, or that which willingly serves sin, if indeed there are two wills? — A profound question has been proposed, which is determined by various ones with a varied exposition. — For some say that there are two motions: one, by which he wills the good naturally. Why is it called naturally and why natural? Because such was the motion of human nature in the first condition, in which we were created without vice, which is properly called nature. For man was created upright in will. Hence in the *Ecclesiastical Dogmas*[^8] it is written: «Hold most firmly that the first men were created good and upright with free choice, by which they could, if they willed, sin by their own will; and that they sinned not by necessity, but by their own will». Rightly therefore is man said naturally to will the good, because he was established in a right and good will. For the higher *spark of reason*, which also, as Jerome says[^9], «could not be extinguished in Cain», always wills the good and hates the evil. — But they say there is *another* motion of the mind, by which the mind, having abandoned the law of the higher [part], subjects itself to sins and delights in them. This motion, as they say, before grace is present to anyone, dominates in man and reigns and depresses the other motion; yet each is from free choice. But when grace comes, that evil motion is struck down, and the other, naturally good, is freed and assisted, that it may efficaciously will the good. But before grace, although man naturally wills the good, nevertheless it ought not absolutely to be conceded that he has a good will, but rather an evil one. — But others say that there is one will, that is one motion, by which man naturally wills the good and from vice wills the evil and delights in it; and insofar as he wills the good, he is naturally good, insofar as he wills the evil, he is evil.

---

la: Dist. XXXVII. c. 1.

en: Distinction XXXVII, c. 1.

en: Chapter 8, n. 14.

la: Dist. XXXV. c. 3.

en: Distinction XXXV, c. 3.

la: Praeter Vat. et ed. 6, aliae edd. *admittendum*, quod etiam nos supra d. XXVI. c. 2. recepimus. Cum autem in ed. Maurina S. Augustinus, de Duabus Animabus, c. 10. n. 14, et 1. Retract. c. 15. n. 3, constanter utatur voce *amittendum* atque dicat: Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum; hic sequimur istam lectionem, quam etiam Nicolai in sua edit. Magistri 1659 rectam esse iudicat. Quoad rem cfr. d. XXXV. c. 3, et de eo quod sequitur d. XXXVII. c. 1.

en: Besides the Vatican edition and edition 6, the other editions read *admittendum* ["to be admitted"], which we too adopted above at d. XXVI, c. 2. But since in the Maurist edition St. Augustine, *On the Two Souls*, c. 10, n. 14, and Retractations I, c. 15, n. 3, consistently uses the word *amittendum* ["to be lost"] and says: The will is a motion of the soul, with no one compelling, toward either not losing or obtaining something; here we follow that reading, which Nicolai too in his edition of the Master, 1659, judges to be correct. As to the matter, cf. d. XXXV, c. 3, and concerning what follows, d. XXXVII, c. 1.

la: Rom. 7, 19. Verbotenus legitur in Glossa, quae incipit v. 15. et sumta est ex Comment. in Epistolas S. Pauli, qui falso tribuitur S. Ambrosio (inter Opera Ambros. in hunc locum).

en: Rom. 7:19. It is read word for word in the Gloss, which begins at v. 15 and is taken from the *Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul*, which is falsely attributed to St. Ambrose (among the works of Ambrose, on this passage).

la: Dist. XXV. c. 7. — Paulo inferius post *idem motus* et *servit, et* Vat. et plures edd. bis ponunt *quo* pro *qua*, et iterum post *istarum est* ponunt *qua* pro *quae*, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.

en: Distinction XXV, c. 7. — A little below, after *idem motus* and *servit, et*, the Vatican edition and several editions twice put *quo* for *qua*, and again after *istarum est* put *qua* for *quae*, against the codices and edition 1.

la: Dist. XXVI. c. 1.

en: Distinction XXVI, c. 1.

la: Vat. cum paucis edd., refragantibus codd. et ceteris edd., habet *libro de Fide ad Petrum*; et revera in hoc (c. 21. n. 68.), non in illo, locus cit. invenitur.

en: The Vatican edition with a few editions, against the codices and the rest of the editions, reads *in the book On Faith, to Peter*; and in fact in this (c. 21, n. 68), not in that, the cited passage is found.

la: Super Ezech. 1, 7, et est etiam in Glossa ordinaria. — Inferius Vat. cum paucis edd. post *malum* addit *semper*, et post *motum* omittit *mentis*.

en: On Ezekiel 1:7, and it is also in the *Ordinary Gloss*. — Below, the Vatican edition with a few editions adds *semper* after *malum*, and after *motum* omits *mentis*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 918–919 = printed pp. 896–897) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 62326–62409). This is the LITTERA MAGISTRI (Peter Lombard's text), printed above Bonaventure's commentary at the head of Distinction XXXIX. Lombard's text has three chapters: Cap. I (*Quare voluntas dicitur peccatum...*), Cap. II (*Quare actus voluntatis sit peccatum...*), Cap. III (*Ex quo sensu dicitur naturaliter omnis homo velle bonum*). Littera chunks carry no scholion.

**Page-split map.** The littera begins mid-page on printed p.896 (the upper part of p.896, both columns, is the tail of the d.38 commentary — Dub. IV / Respondeo). DISTINCTIO XXXIX + Cap. I–II sit on p.896; Cap. II's last clause ("quae semper bonum") runs over to p.897, and Cap. III spans the top of p.897, concluding at "in quantum malum vult, malus est." immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX` (the divisio chunk). Page breaks placed at running-head boundaries: `<!-- page 897 -->` before "est et in omnibus est, etiam in parvulis".

**Apparatus map.** 9 entries total, with Quaracchi's per-page restart under each `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` subheader:
- p.896 footer: notes 1–4 → `[^1]`–`[^4]`. (The two unnumbered/numbered notes *above* the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM header — "Vide supra pag. 639..." and "Eandem solutionem exhibet S. Thom..." — are footnotes of the d.38 commentary Dub. IV at the top of p.896, NOT littera notes, and are excluded.)
- p.897 footer: notes 1–5 → `[^5]`–`[^9]`. (The `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block on p.897 — notes "Edd., excepta 1, privationis", "Edd., excepta 1, voluntatis", "Codd. CLRST ee et alii scientiae" — belongs to the divisio chunk and is forwarded.)

**Hand-off picked up.** The d.38-dubia agent flagged that the p.896 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footer block belongs to this d.39 littera (Lombard's-text footnotes). Confirmed and captured here as `[^1]`–`[^4]`. (Note: the prior agent's note referred to "n.4 *Dubium 4.*" — the marginal "Dubium" labels on these pages are running side-glosses of the commentary below the littera, not footnote numbers; the actual littera footer notes are the four under NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.)

**Hand-off forwarded.** The p.897 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block (3 notes) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d39-divisio` (COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS, raw 62410–62455).

**[?] flags.** None. All body markers (`supra¹`, `de Trinitate²`, `supra³` on p.896 Cap. I; `non amittendum⁴` on p.896 Cap. II; `Apostoli⁵`, `supra⁶`, `superius⁷`, `Dogmatibus⁸`, `Hieronymus⁹` on p.897 Cap. III) resolved cleanly against the printed footers.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIX — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXIX — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
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## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX.

*Quare voluntas magis depravetur in suo actu quam aliqua alia potentia.*

*Hic autem oritur quaestio satis necessaria etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, unde voluntas habeat rectificari et depravari. In hac parte inquirit, quare voluntas magis depravetur in suo actu quam aliqua alia potentia. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes, in quarum prima inquirit de causa depravationis[^1][^5] voluntatis deliberativae. In secunda vero inquirit de rectitudine voluntatis humanae, secundum quod movetur per modum naturae, ibi: *Praeterea quaeri solet, quomodo intelligendum sit* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in partes duas, in quarum prima movet quaestionem et determinat; in secunda vero opponit contra praedictam solutionem ad maiorem veritatis[^2][^6] explanationem, ibi: *Sed adhuc quaeritur, quare huiusmodi naturalis* etc.

Similiter secunda pars principalis dividitur in duas partes; in quarum prima movet dubitationem et opponit; in secunda parte eam dissolvit secundum diversorum opiniones, ibi: *Proposita est quaestio profunda* etc. — Et sic principaliter duo determinat Magister in parte ista, qualiter videlicet voluntas depravari possit, cum sit naturalis animae potentia, et qualiter homo naturaliter bonum velit et appetat, videlicet ratione naturalis iudicatorii, quod quidem est conscientia, quae semper bonum dictat, et ratione scintillae rationis vel conscientiae[^3][^7], quae quidem est synderesis, quae semper ad bonum inclinat et contra malum recalcitrat[^4].

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### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam igitur huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Et primo quaeritur de ipsa conscientia, quae est voluntatis quaedam regula directiva.

Secundo quaeritur de synderesi, quae dicitur ipsius conscientiae scintilla.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de ipsa conscientia in comparatione ad subiectum, utrum scilicet sit ex parte cognitivae, vel ex parte affectivae.

Secundo quaeritur in comparatione ad originem, utrum scilicet sit a natura, vel ab acquisitione.

Tertio quaeritur in comparatione ad effectum, videlicet utrum omnis conscientia habeat obligare.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXIX.

*Why the will is more depraved in its act than any other power.*

*But here arises a question sufficiently necessary, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed whence the will has it to be set right and to be depraved. In this part he inquires why the will is more depraved in its act than any other power. Now this part is divided into two parts: in the first of which he inquires about the cause of the depravation[^1][^5] of the deliberative will; but in the second he inquires about the rectitude of the human will, insofar as it is moved after the manner of nature, there: *Furthermore, it is wont to be asked how it is to be understood*, etc.

The first part is divided into two parts, in the first of which he raises the question and determines it; but in the second he raises objections against the aforesaid solution, for the fuller explanation of the truth[^2][^6], there: *But still it is asked, why a natural [appetite] of this kind*, etc.

Likewise the second principal part is divided into two parts; in the first of which he raises a doubt and objects; in the second part he resolves it according to the opinions of various [authorities], there: *A profound question is proposed*, etc. — And so the Master principally determines two things in this part: namely, in what way the will can be depraved, since it is a natural power of the soul, and how a human being naturally wills and desires the good, namely by reason of a natural faculty of judgment, which indeed is conscience, which always dictates the good, and by reason of the spark of reason or conscience[^3][^7], which indeed is synderesis, which always inclines toward the good and kicks back against evil[^4].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Therefore, for the understanding of this part, a question arises here concerning two things.

And first it is asked about conscience itself, which is a certain directive rule of the will.

Secondly it is asked about synderesis, which is called the spark of conscience itself.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked about conscience itself in comparison to its subject, namely whether it is on the side of the cognitive [power], or on the side of the affective.

Secondly it is asked in comparison to its origin, namely whether it is from nature, or from acquisition.

Thirdly it is asked in comparison to its effect, namely whether every conscience has [the power] to oblige.

---

la: Rom. 7, 19. Verbotenus legitur in Glossa, quae incipit v. 13. et sumta est ex Comment. in Epistolas S. Pauli, qui falso tribuitur S. Ambrosio (inter Opera Ambros. in hunc locum).

en: Rom. 7:19. It is read word-for-word in the Gloss, which begins at v. 13 and is taken from the *Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul*, which is falsely attributed to St. Ambrose (among the Works of Ambrose, at this passage).

la: Dist. XXV. c. 7. — Paulo inferius post *idem motus et servit, et* Vat. et plures edd. bis ponunt *quo* pro *qua*, et iterum post *istarum est* ponunt *qua* pro *quae*, refragantibus codd. et ed. I.

en: Dist. XXV, c. 7. — A little further below, after *idem motus et servit, et*, the Vatican edition and several editions twice put *quo* for *qua*, and again after *istarum est* they put *qua* for *quae*, against the codices and edition I.

la: Dist. XXVI. c. I. — Vat. cum paucis edd., refragantibus codd. et ceteris edd., habet *libro de Fide ad Petrum*; et revera in hoc (c. 2.5. n. 68.), non in illo, locus cit. invenitur.

en: Dist. XXVI, c. 1. — The Vatican edition with a few editions, against the codices and the other editions, has *in the book On Faith to Peter*; and in fact the cited passage is found in this work (c. 25, n. 68), not in that one.

en: *On Ezekiel* 1, 7, and it is also in the ordinary Gloss. — Below, the Vatican edition with a few editions adds *semper* after *malum*, and omits *mentis* after *motum*.

la: NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. — Edd., excepta 1, *privationis*. — Supra ante *aliqua alia* cod. Y perperam inserit *in*.

en: NOTES TO THE COMMENTARY. — The editions, except edition 1, read *privationis*. — Above, before *aliqua alia*, codex Y wrongly inserts *in*.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *voluntatis*.

en: The editions, except edition 1, read *voluntatis*.

la: Codd. C L R S T ee et alii *scientiae*.

en: Codices C, L, R, S, T, ee and others read *scientiae*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR, raw lines 62410–62455 (`COMMENTARIUS` at 62410, `DIVISIO TEXTUS` at 62415, page break 897→898 before `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`), cross-checked column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 897–898 = pdf pp. 919–920; offset +22). This chunk holds the COMMENTARIUS opener (header + lemma *Hic autem oritur quaestio satis necessaria etc.*), the DIVISIO TEXTUS, and the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (per CLAUDE.md rule #4 the question-listing belongs in the divisio chunk).

**Page-split map.** p.897 carries the COMMENTARIUS header + DIVISIO TEXTUS body + the printed-page footer (Commentarius notes 1–5 and the NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM block). p.898 carries the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM. ARTICULUS I begins on p.898 (raw line 62456) and is **not** in this chunk — it opens the sibling `bon-sent-II-d39-a1-q1`.

**Hand-off picked up.** The p.897 "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM" footer block (3 notes: *privationis*, *voluntatis*, *scientiae*) was flagged in `d39-littera` as belonging here; it is captured as apparatus entries [^5]–[^7]. The Commentarius footnotes proper ([^1]–[^4]: Rom. 7:19 Gloss; Dist. XXV c.7; Dist. XXVI c.1; Super Ezech.) are the per-page footer for the DIVISIO body and are placed at OCR-marker positions. [^4] (Super Ezech., the Glossa source for the synderesis clause) is anchored at its closing-clause lemma *contra malum recalcitrat* / *kicks back against evil* in both languages. The three NOTAE textual-variant notes [^5]–[^7] are anchored at their lemma words: [^5] (*privationis* var.) at *depravationis* (co-located with [^1]); [^6] (*voluntatis* var.) at *veritatis* (co-located with [^2]); [^7] (*scientiae* var.) at *conscientiae* (co-located with [^3]). **Polish pass 2026-05-31: all 4 formerly-unanchored defs ([^4]–[^7]) now carry matching La+En body anchors.**

**Apparatus note.** The first footnote group restarts numbering at the NOTAE block (raw shows `1 privationis / 2 voluntatis / 3 scientiae` as a distinct series). They are renumbered here as [^5]–[^7] for unique in-file markers; the original Quaracchi page-footer numbering is preserved verbatim inside each entry text.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings confirmed against the 450 dpi PDF column bands (OCR garbles silently corrected: `dividifur`→*dividitur*, `secuoda`→*secunda*, `diversoriira`→*diversorum*, `terrainat`→*determinat*, `ratipne`→*ratione*, `appelat`→*appetat*, `seraper`→*semper*, `malura`→*malum*, `quaeriuitur`→*quaeruntur*, `coraparatione`→*comparatione*).

**Structure of d.39.** Two articles, each with three questions, then Dubia:
- Articulus I — *De conscientia* (q.1 utrum conscientia teneat se ex parte intellectus an affectus; q.2 utrum sit a natura vel ab acquisitione; q.3 utrum omnis conscientia obliget).
- Articulus II — *De synderesi* (q.1 utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis vel affectionis; q.2 utrum per peccatum possit exstingui; q.3 utrum per peccatum possit depravari).
- Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dub. I–III at raw 63639+).


title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De conscientia.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum conscientia teneat se ex parte intellectus, an ex parte affectus.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum conscientia teneat se ex parte intellectus, an ex parte affectus. Et quod ex parte intellectus, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud Ecclesiastis septimo[^1]: *Scit conscientia tua, quia et tu crebro maledixisti aliis;* sed *scire* est actus proprius potentiae cognitivae: si ergo conscientiae est scire, conscientia se tenet ex parte cognitivae.

2. Item, Damascenus[^2] dicit, quod «conscientia est lex intellectus nostri»; sed lex intellectus non dicitur nisi Scriptura, quae directe respicit intellectum: ergo conscientia tenet se ex parte potentiae intellectivae.

3. Item, omnis scientia est ex parte intellectus; omnis conscientia est scientia: ergo omnis conscientia est ex parte intellectus. Maior propositio per se manifesta est[^3]; minor probatur, quia omnis conscius alicuius rei est sciens illam rem: ergo a coniugatis, omnis conscientia est scientia.

4. Item, conscientia dividitur per rectam et erroneam; sed erroneum respicit habitum, vel actum intellectivum[^4]: si ergo divisum et dividentia spectant ad eandem potentiam animae, videtur, quod conscientia teneat se ex parte potentiae cognitivae.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per actum. Legere enim et iudicare et dirigere et testificari et arguere, omnes sunt actus spectantes ad cognitionem; sed omnes hi actus attribuuntur conscientiae; nam conscientia est liber, in quo *legimus,* conscientia etiam interius *iudicat,* conscientia *testificatur,* conscientia *arguit,* conscientia etiam *regit et dirigit*[^5]. Ergo videtur, quod conscientia totaliter se teneat ex parte cognitivae, cum actus et habitus sint eiusdem potentiae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Si conscientia tenet se ex parte cognitivae, aut ergo sicut *potentia,* aut sicut *passio,* aut sicut *habitus*[^6]. Non sicut passio, quia passiones maxime respiciunt affectivam; non sicut habitus, quia conscientia modo est munda, modo immunda, et nullus habitus transmutatur a munditia in immunditiam, et e converso. Restat igitur, quod si conscientia tenet se ex parte cognitivae, non erit aliud quam potentia cognitiva: ergo si potentia cognitiva est de omnibus, non solum de operabilibus, sed etiam de speculabilibus[^7]; videtur, quod conscientia non tantum attendatur circa ea quae sunt morum, sed etiam circa ea quae sunt disciplinarum; quod manifeste falsum est.

2. Item, sicut intellectus se habet ad verum, ita affectus se habet ad bonum: ergo si quid est, cuius perfectio consistit in bonitate, illud magis spectat ad bonum affectum quam ad intellectum; sed conscientia est huiusmodi — dicit enim Apostolus primae ad Timotheum primo[^8]: *Caritas est de corde*

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*puro et conscientia bona;* et iterum in eadem Epistola: *Milites in illis bonam militiam, habens fidem et bonam conscientiam* — ergo etc.

3. Item, «lex carnis repugnat legi mentis», secundum quod Damascenus[^9] dicit; sed lex carnis se tenet ex parte motivae: ergo et lex mentis tenet se ex eadem parte. Sed «conscientia est lex mentis», sicut supra dixit Damascenus: ergo conscientia tenet se ex parte *affectivae.*

4. Item, remorsus est actio potentiae affectivae, ubicumque enim est remorsio, ibi est quidam dolor et passio; sed conscientiae est remordere, sicut dicitur super illud primae ad Corinthios quarto[^10]: *Nihil mihi conscius sum;* Glossa: «In nullo me remordet conscientia mea»: ergo videtur, quod conscientia ex parte *affectivae* se teneat.

5. Item, delectabile et poenale se tenet ex parte potentiae affectivae[^11]; sed in nobis est poena et laetitia ex parte conscientiae — unde vermis conscientiae erit magna poena in damnatis — ergo videtur, quod conscientia teneat se ex parte potentiae *affectivae,* non ex parte cognitivae.

### Conclusio

> Conscientia est habitus potentiae cognitivae, prout est practica, non prout est speculativa.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod sicut nomen *intellectus* aliquando accipitur pro potentia intelligendi, aliquando pro habitu, aliquando pro ipso principio intellecto[^12]; sic nomen *conscientiae* tripliciter consuevit accipi a doctoribus sacrae Scripturae. Aliquando enim accipitur conscientia pro ipso conscito; et sic dicit Ioannes Damascenus, quod «conscientia est lex intellectus nostri»; lex enim est illud quod per conscientiam novimus. Aliquando vero accipitur conscientia pro eo quo[^13] conscii sumus, scilicet pro habitu, sicut scientia accipitur pro habitu, scilicet cognoscentis. Aliquando autem accipitur conscientia pro ipsa potentia consciente, ut ita dicam, secundum quod dicitur, quod lex naturalis scripta est in conscientiis nostris[^14]. Cum igitur tribus modis accipi soleat conscientiae nomen, *usitatiori* tamen modo nomen conscientiae pro *habitu* accipitur, sicut et nomen scientiae, a quo componitur.

Si ergo quaeratur, cuius potentiae sit habitus; dicendum, quod est habitus potentiae *cognitivae,* aliter tamen, quam sit ipsa speculativa scientia: quia scientia speculativa est perfectio intellectus nostri, in quantum est speculativus; conscientia vero est habitus perficiens intellectum nostrum, in quantum est *practicus,* sive in quantum dirigit in opere. Et sic intellectus habet quodam modo rationem *motivi,* non quia efficiat motum, sed quia dictat et inclinat ad motum. — Et propterea talis habitus non simpliciter nominatur *scientia,* sed *conscientia,* ut in hoc significetur, quod habitus iste non perficit ipsam potentiam speculativam *in se,* sed prout est quodam modo *iuncta affectioni et operationi.* Propter quod nos non dicimus, quod dictamen conscientiae sit ad hoc principium: omne totum est maius sua parte, et ad consimilia; sed bene dicimus, quod conscientia dictat, Deum esse honorandum, et consimilia principia, quae sunt sicut regulae agendorum. — Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt, quod conscientia se tenet ex parte potentiae *cognitivae,* licet non se teneat, secundum quod est *speculativa,* sed secundum quod est *practica.* «Intellectus enim speculativus et practicus eandem potentiam dicunt, sola extensione differentem», sicut dicit Philosophus[^15]: nec est aliquo modo intelligendum, quod intellectus practicus sit appetitus vel voluntas; hoc enim negat ipse Philosophus.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod conscientia non potest esse potentia nec passio nec habitus ex parte cognitivae; dicendum, quod

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immo nominare potest et *potentiam* et *habitum.* Et cum nominat *potentiam,* non nominat universaliter potentiam cognitivam, sed prout se extendit ad cognoscenda ea quae sunt *moris* sive ad moralia. Cum autem nominat *habitum,* non solum nominat habitum naturalem, immo etiam potest nominare habitum *acquisitum*[^16]. Et quia habitus *acquisitus* potest purificare et foedare animam, hinc est, quod conscientia dicitur munda et immunda, recta et non recta. Verumtamen istae differentiae plus respiciunt conscientiam, secundum quod stat pro nomine *potentiae,* quam secundum quod stat pro nomine *habitus.*

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia dicitur esse bona et mala; dicendum, quod bonitas et malitia non tantummodo respiciunt affectum, immo etiam intellectum practicum et eius habitum, pro eo quod intellectus practicus non tantum consistit in vero, sed etiam se extendit ad bonum. Et propterea iudicatorium illud, quod quidem est conscientia, bonum est, quando bonum dictat et ad bonum inclinat et a malo retrahit et ipsum refugit; et ideo non sequitur, quod conscientia sit in potentia affectiva. Ad hoc enim, quod dicatur bona, non oportet, quod sit affectio per essentiam, sed sufficit, quod cum ipsa voluntate et affectione habeat quandam concomitantiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lex carnis opponitur legi mentis; dicendum, quod sicut dicit magister Hugo de sancto Victore[^17] in sensualitate sive in homine exteriori non tantum est corruptio quantum ad potentiam motivam et inclinativam, sed etiam quantum ad sensitivam; et ideo, quamvis lex carnis principaliter consistat in concupiscentia ad malum inclinante, nihilominus tamen praesupponit phantasticam et cognitivam sibi carnalia inordinate repraesentantem. Et similiter in lege mentis est ista duo considerare. Conscientia autem, quantum est de se, magis directe opponitur legi carnis ratione cognitionis praeambulae quam ratione concupiscentiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de remorsu, dicendum, quod conscientia dicitur remordere, propter hoc quod, dum ipsa monstrat aliquod malum ipsi affectui habenti rectitudinem, superinducit remorsum, pro eo quod ille affectus recalcitrat. Unde remorsus non est a conscientia principaliter movente, sed sicut a dictante; a scintilla autem conscientiae, quae quidem est synderesis, est sicut a movente, ut melius iam patebit[^18].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poenale et delectabile est ex parte conscientiae; dicendum, quod non est a conscientia, nec in conscientia nisi sicut in disponente et dictante. Gaudere enim et dolere proprie affectionis est. Sed cum conscientia, quae est rectus testis, testificatur de bono facto, quod est bonum, et de malo facto, quod est malum, generat ex hoc dolorem, vel gaudium in affectu. Unde et Apostolus[^19] dicit: *Gloria nostra haec est, testimonium conscientiae nostrae;* non attribuendo ipsi conscientiae principaliter passionem laetandi, sed actum testificandi.

english:
### Article I. *On conscience.*
### Question I. *Whether conscience belongs to the intellect or to the affective power.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether conscience belongs to the intellect or to the affective power. And that it belongs to the intellect, it seems:

1. *First*, through that text of Ecclesiastes 7[^1]: *Thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others;* but *to know* is the act proper to the cognitive power: if therefore it belongs to conscience to know, conscience belongs to the cognitive power.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^2] says that «conscience is the law of our intellect»; but only Scripture is called the law of the intellect, which directly regards the intellect: therefore conscience belongs to the intellective power.

3. Likewise, all knowledge is on the side of the intellect; all conscience is knowledge: therefore all conscience is on the side of the intellect. The major proposition is manifest of itself[^3]; the minor is proved, because everyone conscious of some thing is one knowing that thing: therefore, by conjugates, all conscience is knowledge.

4. Likewise, conscience is divided into right and erroneous; but the erroneous regards an intellective habit or act[^4]: if therefore the thing divided and the dividing members pertain to the same power of the soul, it seems that conscience belongs to the cognitive power.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the act. For to read and to judge and to direct and to testify and to accuse are all acts pertaining to cognition; but all these acts are attributed to conscience; for conscience is a book in which we *read,* conscience also inwardly *judges,* conscience *testifies,* conscience *accuses,* conscience also *rules and directs*[^5]. Therefore it seems that conscience belongs wholly to the cognitive power, since act and habit are of the same power.

**On the contrary:** 1. If conscience belongs to the cognitive power, then either as a *power,* or as a *passion,* or as a *habit*[^6]. Not as a passion, because passions most of all regard the affective power; not as a habit, because conscience is now clean, now unclean, and no habit is changed from cleanness into uncleanness, and conversely. It remains therefore that, if conscience belongs to the cognitive power, it will be nothing other than the cognitive power: therefore if the cognitive power is about all things, not only about things to be done, but also about things to be speculated[^7]; it seems that conscience would attend not only to things of morals, but also to things of the disciplines; which is manifestly false.

2. Likewise, as the intellect is related to the true, so the affective power is related to the good: therefore if there is something whose perfection consists in goodness, that pertains more to the good of the affection than to the intellect; but conscience is of this kind — for the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 1[^8]: *Charity is from a pure*

*heart and a good conscience;* and again in the same Epistle: *Maintaining the good warfare among them, having faith and a good conscience* — therefore etc.

3. Likewise, «the law of the flesh fights against the law of the mind», according to what Damascene[^9] says; but the law of the flesh belongs to the motive power: therefore also the law of the mind belongs to the same part. But «conscience is the law of the mind», as Damascene said above: therefore conscience belongs to the *affective* power.

4. Likewise, remorse is an action of the affective power, for wherever there is remorse, there is a certain pain and passion; but it belongs to conscience to bite back, as is said upon that text of 1 Corinthians 4[^10]: *I am not conscious to myself of anything;* Gloss: «In nothing does my conscience bite me»: therefore it seems that conscience belongs to the *affective* power.

5. Likewise, the delightful and the painful belong to the affective power[^11]; but in us there is pain and gladness on the side of conscience — whence the worm of conscience will be a great pain in the damned — therefore it seems that conscience belongs to the *affective* power, not to the cognitive.

### Conclusion

> Conscience is a habit of the cognitive power, insofar as it is practical, not insofar as it is speculative.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, just as the name *intellect* is taken sometimes for the power of understanding, sometimes for a habit, sometimes for the very principle understood[^12]; so the name *conscience* is wont to be taken in three ways by the doctors of sacred Scripture. For sometimes conscience is taken for the very thing of which we are conscious; and thus John Damascene says that «conscience is the law of our intellect»; for the law is that which we know through conscience. But sometimes conscience is taken for that by which[^13] we are conscious, namely for a habit, as knowledge is taken for a habit, namely of the one knowing. But sometimes conscience is taken for the very power that is conscious, so to speak, according to which it is said that the natural law is written in our consciences[^14]. Since therefore the name of conscience is wont to be taken in three ways, yet in the *more usual* way the name of conscience is taken for a *habit,* as also the name of knowledge, from which it is compounded.

If therefore it be asked, of which power it is the habit; it must be said that it is a habit of the *cognitive* power, yet otherwise than speculative knowledge itself is: because speculative knowledge is the perfection of our intellect, insofar as it is speculative; but conscience is a habit perfecting our intellect, insofar as it is *practical,* or insofar as it directs in action. And thus the intellect has in a certain way the character of a *mover,* not because it effects motion, but because it dictates and inclines to motion. — And therefore such a habit is not simply named *knowledge,* but *conscience,* so that by this it may be signified that this habit does not perfect the speculative power *in itself,* but insofar as it is in a certain way *joined to affection and operation.* On account of which we do not say that the dictate of conscience is directed to this principle: every whole is greater than its part, and to such like; but we do well say that conscience dictates that God is to be honored, and like principles, which are as rules of things to be done. — It must therefore be granted, as the reasons show, that conscience belongs to the *cognitive* power, although it does not belong to it insofar as it is *speculative,* but insofar as it is *practical.* «For the speculative and practical intellect name the same power, differing only by extension», as the Philosopher says[^15]: nor is it in any way to be understood that the practical intellect is appetite or will; for the Philosopher himself denies this.

1. To that therefore which is objected on the contrary, that conscience cannot be a power nor a passion nor a habit on the side of the cognitive power; it must be said that

on the contrary it can name both a *power* and a *habit.* And when it names a *power,* it does not name the cognitive power universally, but insofar as it extends to knowing the things that are of *morals* or to moral matters. But when it names a *habit,* it names not only a natural habit, but rather it can also name an *acquired*[^16] habit. And because an *acquired* habit can purify and defile the soul, hence it is that conscience is called clean and unclean, right and not right. Yet these differences regard conscience more insofar as it stands for the name of the *power,* than insofar as it stands for the name of the *habit.*

2. To that which is objected, that conscience is called good and bad; it must be said that goodness and malice regard not only the affection, but rather also the practical intellect and its habit, for the reason that the practical intellect does not consist only in the true, but also extends itself to the good. And therefore that judicatory faculty, which indeed is conscience, is good when it dictates the good and inclines to the good and draws back from evil and shuns it; and therefore it does not follow that conscience is in the affective power. For for it to be called good, it is not required that it be an affection by its essence, but it suffices that with the will and affection itself it have a certain concomitance.

3. To that which is objected, that the law of the flesh is opposed to the law of the mind; it must be said that, as master Hugh of St. Victor[^17] says, in sensuality or in the exterior man there is corruption not only as to the motive and inclinative power, but also as to the sensitive; and therefore, although the law of the flesh consists principally in the concupiscence inclining to evil, nevertheless it presupposes the imaginative and cognitive power representing carnal things to it inordinately. And likewise in the law of the mind these two things are to be considered. But conscience, as far as concerns itself, is more directly opposed to the law of the flesh by reason of the preceding cognition than by reason of concupiscence.

4. To that which is objected about remorse, it must be said that conscience is said to bite back, for this reason: that, while it itself shows some evil to the affection having rectitude, it brings on remorse, for the reason that that affection kicks back. Whence remorse is not from conscience as principally moving, but as from one dictating; but from the spark of conscience, which indeed is synderesis, it is as from one moving, as will better appear hereafter[^18].

5. To that which is objected, that the painful and the delightful are on the side of conscience; it must be said that it is not from conscience, nor in conscience except as in one disposing and dictating. For to rejoice and to grieve belongs properly to the affection. But when conscience, which is a right witness, testifies concerning a good deed, that it is good, and concerning an evil deed, that it is evil, it generates from this grief, or gladness in the affection. Whence also the Apostle[^19] says: *Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience;* not attributing to conscience itself principally the passion of rejoicing, but the act of testifying.

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 22.

en: Book IV, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3. — In minori respicitur illud 1. Cor. 8, 1: *Nihil enim mihi conscius sum.* — Quid sibi velit locutio a *coniugatis,* intelligitur ex illo Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 9.): *Videntur autem et quae sunt secundum casus coniugata esse, ut iuste iustitiae et fortiter fortitudini.* Coniugata autem dicuntur secundum eandem coniugationem omnia, ut iustitia, iustus, iustum, iuste. Cfr. supra pag. 472, nota 6.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VI Ethics c. 3. — In the minor there is regarded that text of 1 Cor. 8:1: *For I am not conscious to myself of anything.* — What the expression *from conjugates* means is understood from that text of Aristotle, II Topics c. 3 (c. 9): *Things that are according to grammatical cases also seem to be conjugates, as "justly" to "justice" and "bravely" to "bravery."* But all those are called conjugates according to the same conjugation, as justice, just (person), just (thing), justly. Cf. above p. 472, note 6.

la: Aristot., de Longitud. et brev. vitae, c. 2. dicit, oblivionem et errorem sive deceptionem (ἀπάτη) corruptionem esse scientiae. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Aristotle, On Length and Shortness of Life, c. 2, says that forgetting and error or deception (*apatē*) is a corruption of knowledge. Cf. above d. 23, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Cfr. Rom. 2, 15. et 14, 23. — De ratione conclusioni addita dicit Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 1: Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.

en: Cf. Rom. 2:15 and 14:23. — On the reason added to the conclusion Aristotle says, On Sleep and Waking, c. 1: For whose the power is, his is also the act.

la: De hac distinctione vide supra pag. 893, nota 6. — Quod habitus non transmutetur, expositum est supra pag. 815, nota 4.

en: On this distinction see above p. 893, note 6. — That a habit is not changed, has been expounded above p. 815, note 4.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 558, nota 2. et pag. 563, nota 9.

en: Cf. above p. 558, note 2, and p. 563, note 9.

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. Script. locus est ibid. v. 18. seq., quem locum non pauci codd., ut H I K T W Y ee, et edd. 1, 2 sic exhibent: *Milites in bona militia habent* [nonnulli codd. *habens*] *fidem et* [aliqui *bonam*] *conscientiam.* — Paulo superius pro *ad bonum affectum* Val. et edd. 3, 4 *ad bonum tantum,* codd. A I L O K X Y bb et ed. 1 *ad effectum,* omisso apposito *bonum.*

en: Verse 5. — The following Scripture passage is ibid. v. 18 ff., which passage not a few codices, as H I K T W Y ee, and edd. 1, 2 give thus: *Soldiers in good warfare have* [some codd. *having*] *faith and a* [some *good*] *conscience.* — A little above, for *toward the good affection* the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 read *toward the good only,* codices A I L O K X Y bb and ed. 1 *toward the effect,* the apposition *good* being omitted.

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 74. m. 3. sic legitur: Conscientia est lex nostri intellectus; sed immissio perniciosi, hoc est lex peccati, superveniens membris carnis, per eam se nobis immittit... Conscientia congratulatur legi Dei, scil. mandato... lex autem peccati, scil. immissio per legem, quae est in membris, scil. per corporis surrectionem et motum et irrationalem partem animae, repugnat legi intellectus nostri etc. — In Val. pro *Damascenus* legitur *Apostolus* et ad marginem habetur Rom. 7.

en: Book IV, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22, where according to Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 74, m. 3, it reads thus: Conscience is the law of our intellect; but the introduction of the destructive, that is the law of sin, supervening on the members of the flesh, introduces itself to us through it... Conscience congratulates the law of God, namely the commandment... but the law of sin, namely the introduction through the law which is in the members, namely through the uprising and motion of the body and the irrational part of the soul, fights against the law of our intellect, etc. — In the Vatican edition, for *Damascene* is read *the Apostle,* and in the margin is noted Rom. 7.

la: Vers. 4. — Glossa habetur apud Petr. Lombardum in hunc locum; Lyranus eam exhibet ut interlinearem.

en: Verse 4. — The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard on this place; Lyranus presents it as interlinear.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 29. et 36. (c. 7. et 11.); cfr. etiam supra pag. 174, nota 2. et pag. 714, nota 1. — Quod in minori dicitur, id Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum super illud II. Cor. 1, 12: *Nam gloria nostra haec est, testimonium conscientiae nostrae* etc., sic exprimit: *Sicut impiis est magna poena conscientia, ita piis gaudium.* — Post pauca pro *unde vermis* cod. 1 *vermis enim,* cod. O *et vermis,* codd. F H K T U Y Z ee *vermis* tantum.

en: Cf. Aristotle, III On the Soul, text. 29 and 36 (c. 7 and 11); cf. also above p. 174, note 2, and p. 714, note 1. — What is said in the minor, the Ordinary Gloss in Strabus upon that text of 2 Cor. 1:12: *For our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience* etc., expresses thus: *As to the impious conscience is a great punishment, so to the pious it is joy.* — A little after, for *whence the worm* cod. 1 has *for the worm,* cod. O *and the worm,* codd. F H K T U Y Z ee *the worm* only.

la: Complures codd., ut I K T X Z bb ee, *pro quo.* Mox pro *sicut scientia* codd. K X Y Z ee et alii nec non edd. 1, 2 *sicut conscientia,* cod. bb et ed. 3 sic *conscientia;* H *scilicet* pro *scilicet cognoscentis,* quod habent plures codd., ut 1 W et bb (a secunda manu), codd. C K L O P R S ee etc. *sicut cognoscentis,* cod. D sic *cognoscentis.* In cod. F sic legitur: *sicut conscientia accipitur, ut cum dicitur: haec est conscientia mea, pro habitu sicut cognoscentis;* in cod. T textus sic abbreviatus exhibetur: *scilicet pro habitu sicut cognoscentis.* Edd. *scientiae cognoscentis.* Paulo inferius pro *potentia consciente* Val. cum edd. 3, 4 *potentia conscientiae.*

en: Several codices, as I K T X Z bb ee, read *for which.* Soon, for *as knowledge* codices K X Y Z ee and others as well as edd. 1, 2 read *as conscience,* cod. bb and ed. 3 thus *conscience;* H reads *namely* for *namely of the one knowing,* which several codices have, as 1 W and bb (in a second hand), codices C K L O P R S ee etc. *as of the one knowing,* cod. D thus *of the one knowing.* In cod. F it reads thus: *as conscience is taken, as when it is said: this is my conscience, for a habit as of the one knowing;* in cod. T the text is given thus abbreviated: *namely for a habit as of the one knowing.* The editions read *of the one knowing the knowledge.* A little below, for *the conscious power* the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads *the power of conscience.*

la: Cfr. Rom. 2, 14. seq., ad quem locum Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum annotat: *Etsi* [gentilis] *non habeat scriptam legem, habet tamen naturalem, qua intelligit et sibi conscius est, quid sit bonum et quid sit malum. Vitium quippe contra naturam est.* Vide infra a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. — Aliquanto inferius post *Si ergo quaeratur* Val. et ed. 3, 4 adiungunt *conscientia.*

en: Cf. Rom. 2:14 ff., on which place the Ordinary Gloss in Strabus and Lyranus notes: *Even if the gentile have no written law, he yet has the natural one, by which he understands and is conscious to himself what is good and what is evil. For vice is against nature.* See below a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — Somewhat below, after *If therefore it be asked,* the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 add *conscience.*

la: Vide supra pag. 588, nota 2. — De explicatione, quae dicto Philosophi adnectitur, cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.

en: See above p. 588, note 2. — On the explanation which is attached to the saying of the Philosopher, cf. above d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2.

la: Quod in seq. quaest. explicatur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 74. m. 2. ait: *Prout ergo* [conscientia] *accipitur secundum habitum, bene concedimus, quod est habitus naturalis, sed prout secundum actum, acquisitus. Unde bene concedimus, quod huiusmodi differentiae mundum et immundum, et sic de aliis differentiis, non sunt differentiae conscientiae, prout est habitus naturalis, sed prout dicit acceptionem iuxta habitum naturalem, et hoc prout se tenet ex parte rationis.* Paulo superius pro *ad moralia* cod. T *moralia.*

en: Which is explained in the following question. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 74, m. 2, says: *Insofar therefore as* [conscience] *is taken according to a habit, we well grant that it is a natural habit, but insofar as according to an act, an acquired one. Whence we well grant that differences of this kind, clean and unclean, and so of the other differences, are not differences of conscience insofar as it is a natural habit, but insofar as it expresses a taking-up alongside a natural habit, and this insofar as it belongs to reason.* A little above, for *to moral matters* cod. T reads *moral matters.*

la: Cfr. I. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 34, ubi inter alia: *In carne igitur mortali ex sensualitate corrupta nascitur vitium concupiscentiae, ex sensu corrupto vitium ignorantiae: ibi, quia appetitus quaerendae necessitatis ultra mensuram se extendit, hic autem, quia instrumentum concipiendae veritatis ab integritatis vigore deficit.* Cfr. supra d. 30. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Cf. I On the Sacraments, p. VII, c. 34, where among other things: *In mortal flesh, therefore, from corrupted sensuality is born the vice of concupiscence, from corrupted sense the vice of ignorance: there, because the appetite of seeking what is necessary extends itself beyond measure, here, because the instrument of conceiving truth fails from the vigor of its integrity.* Cf. above d. 30, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Art. seq. — Supra pro *superinducit* cod. T *semper inducit.*

en: The following article. — Above, for *brings on* cod. T reads *always brings in.*

la: Epist. II. Cor. 1, 12. — Cod. T ante *Apostolus* interiicit *Augustinus et.*

en: 2 Cor. 1:12. — Cod. T before *the Apostle* inserts *Augustine and.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro hac et seqq. quaestionibus intelligendis supponenda est frequenter usitata distinctio inter potentiam, habitum et actum. De potentiis animae cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. 3, et II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. I. — De multis modis, quibus dicitur habitus, III. Sent. d. 6. dub. 3. et a. I. q. 3. De relatione, quae est inter habitum et dispositionem II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2, et IV. Sent. d. 6. p. I. q. 1, q. 3. ad 2. i. De habitu acquisito, infuso et innato II. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; IV. Sent. d. 4. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 6. p. I. q. I. et 5; III. Sent. d. 33. q. 5. ad 4. De triplici naturali habitu, scilicet, qui est ab acquisitione, ab innata dispositione, ab animae origine cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. I. ad I. De habitu in sensu largo et stricto vide supra d. 23. p. I. q. 4. 5, et schol.

**II.** Henr. Gand. (Quodl. I. q. 18.) docet, quod «conscientia ad partem animae cognitivam non pertinet, sed ad affectivam». Rationem principalem ipse affert hanc, «quoniam videmus saepius habentes maiorem operandorum notitiam, minorem habere operandi conscientiam; unde econtra ratio erronea non est idem cum erronea conscientia». Hinc idem conscientiam et synderesim ita distinguit, ut haec sit in voluntate sicut «quidam universalis motor, stimulans ad opus secundum regulas universales legis naturae»; conscientia autem ut «quidam particularis motor, stimulans ad opus secundum dictamen rectae rationis», et quidem voluntate deliberativa. Contra ipsum pluribus arguit Scot., hic q. 2. n. 2. Durandus autem (hic q. 4.) vult probare, quod conscientia spectet et ad intellectum et ad voluntatem. Communiter autem Scholastici cum S. Thoma et Bonav. docent, conscientiam pertinere ad intellectum practicum. — Attamen hi iterum inter se dissident quoad quaestionem, utrum conscientia proprie significet habitum, vel actum intellectivae potentiae. Diximus proprie, quia omnes cum nostro Doctore concedunt, in usu loquendi vocem conscientiae usurpari et pro potentia et pro habitu et pro actu et pro ipso obiecto conscito (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 74. m. 1, et S. Thom., de Verit. q. 17. a. 1.). — S. Thom. (S. I. q. 79. a. 13.) cum aliis vult, conscientiam proprie significare actum, non habitum, cum sit iudicium intellectus, quo quis applicat scientiam practicam sive dictamen rationis ad aliquid agendum; talem actum autem informari posse multis habilibus, qui tamen efficaciam habent ab uno primo principio, quod sit synderesis (ibid. ad 3.). Synderesis igitur, secundum eundem, est ille habitus intellectus practici, qui proponit principia prima practica. — Aliter accipit S. Bonav. et conscientiam et synderesim (de qua agit a. 2. q. I.), et conscientiam quidem dicit esse habitum perficientem intellectum practicum; quod magis determinat hic ad I, q. 2, a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. Eundem modum loquendi adhibent Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R. et cum quadam restrictione Richard. a Med. et Scotus. — Observat autem Durand. (loc. cit.), hanc quaestionem esse «de significato, in quo non esset magna vis facienda, dummodo constaret de re... Tamen circa eam invenitur diversitas opinionum» etc.

**III.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. loc. cit. et Report. hic q. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 3. q. incid. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 7. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** For the understanding of this and the following questions, the frequently used distinction among power, habit, and act must be presupposed. On the powers of the soul cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — On the many ways in which habit is said, III Sent. d. 6, dub. 3, and a. 1, q. 3. On the relation between habit and disposition, II Sent. d. 24, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2, and IV Sent. d. 6, p. I, q. 1, q. 3, ad 2, i. On acquired, infused, and innate habit, II Sent. d. 28, dub. 1; IV Sent. d. 4, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, d. 6, p. I, q. 1 and 5; III Sent. d. 33, q. 5, ad 4. On the threefold natural habit, namely that which is from acquisition, from innate disposition, from the soul's origin, cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1. On habit in the broad and strict sense see above d. 23, p. I, q. 4, 5, and the scholion.

**II.** Henry of Ghent (Quodl. I, q. 18) teaches that «conscience does not pertain to the cognitive part of the soul, but to the affective». He brings forward this as his principal reason: «because we often see those having a greater knowledge of things to be done having a lesser conscience for doing them; whence, conversely, an erroneous reason is not the same as an erroneous conscience». Hence the same author so distinguishes conscience and synderesis that the latter is in the will as «a certain universal mover, stimulating to work according to the universal rules of natural law»; but conscience as «a certain particular mover, stimulating to work according to the dictate of right reason», and indeed of the deliberative will. Against him Scotus argues at length, here q. 2, n. 2. But Durandus (here q. 4) wishes to prove that conscience pertains both to the intellect and to the will. But commonly the Scholastics with St. Thomas and Bonaventure teach that conscience pertains to the practical intellect. — Yet these in turn disagree among themselves on the question whether conscience properly signifies a habit, or an act of the intellective power. We said *properly,* because all with our Doctor grant that, in the usage of speaking, the word conscience is used both for a power and for a habit and for an act and for the very object of which one is conscious (cf. Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 74, m. 1, and St. Thomas, de Verit. q. 17, a. 1). — St. Thomas (S. I, q. 79, a. 13) with others wishes conscience properly to signify an act, not a habit, since it is a judgment of the intellect, by which one applies practical knowledge or the dictate of reason to something to be done; but that such an act can be informed by many habits, which nevertheless have their efficacy from one first principle, which is synderesis (ibid. ad 3). Synderesis therefore, according to the same author, is that habit of the practical intellect which proposes the first practical principles. — Otherwise St. Bonaventure takes both conscience and synderesis (of which he treats a. 2, q. 1), and conscience indeed he says to be a habit perfecting the practical intellect; which he determines more here at I, q. 2, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4. The same manner of speaking is used by Alex. of Hales, Peter of Tarentaise, Giles of Rome, and with a certain restriction Richard of Mediavilla and Scotus. — But Durandus (loc. cit.) observes that this question is «about the thing signified, in which there would be no great force to be exerted, provided the matter were settled... Yet about it there is found a diversity of opinions» etc.

**III.** Besides the places cited: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 3. — Scotus, on this and the following q. loc. cit. and Report. here q. 2. — B. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 3, q. incid. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 3, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 24, q. 7. — Biel, on this and the following q. here q. unica.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR, raw lines 62456–62654 (`ARTICULUS I.` at 62456, `QUAESTIO I.` at 62460, scholion `SOHOLIOK` at 62617, ending at `silas opinionum » etc.` line 62654 immediately before `QU.\ESTIO II.` at 62657). Cross-checked column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 898–900 = pdf pp. 920–922; offset +22). OCR for this chunk is unusually clean (PDF-confirmed throughout the body, Respondeo, and replies); no `[?]` flags.

**Page-split map.** p.898 carries the ARTICULUS I opener (`De conscientia`), QUAESTIO I title, the 5 fundamenta pro intellectu, and the first 2 sed-contra arguments through `Caritas est de corde`; its footer has 8 numbered notes (markers [^1]–[^8]). p.899 carries the remaining sed-contra (3–5), the CONCLUSIO, and the Respondeo through `Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium... dicendum, quod`; its footer has 7 notes ([^9]–[^15]). p.900 carries the 5 numbered replies and the start of the article-level SCHOLION (which continues onto p.901); its footer has 4 body notes ([^16]–[^19]). The p.900 body footnotes are printed alongside the scholion in the shared page-bottom; the scholion itself carries no numbered apparatus on these pages.

**Scholion disposition.** This q1 holds the **article-level** SCHOLION (§§ I–III) covering this and all following questions of Art. I (`Pro hac et seqq. quaestionibus intelligendis`). Sibling chunks `d39-a1-q2` and `d39-a1-q3` therefore have `has_scholion: false` — vide scholion ad primam huius art. quaest.

**Hand-offs.** Picked up: NONE (d39-divisio's p.897 footers were the COMMENTARIUS notes + NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM; q1's footers start fresh at p.898 note 1). Forwarded to q2: NONE — QUAESTIO II opens cleanly at the top of a fresh footer sequence (p.901 onward, raw 62657); q1's scholion ends fully within p.900–901 shared with q2's apparatus, but the q1/q2 body boundary at line 62654/62657 is a clean header break, not a mid-page splice.

**Apparatus count:** 19 entries (p.898 ×8, p.899 ×7, p.900 ×4). No scholion-internal footnotes.