title: Proemium, Q. 1

title_alt: Quae sit materia quodve subiectum huius libri vel theologiae

title_alt: What is the matter or subject of this book or of theology

source_text:
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### QUAESTIO I.
#### *Quae sit materia quodve subiectum huius libri vel theologiae.*

Et[^p6-3] quod *Deus* sit subiectum, videtur.

1. Illud enim subiectum est in scientia, de quo et de cuius proprietatibus est scientia tota[^p6-4]; sed de Deo et eius operibus, utpote creatione et reparatione, est totus iste liber: ergo etc.

2. Item, videtur quod subiectum istius libri sint *res et signa.* Illud enim est subiectum in scientia, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur illa scientia, quia «scientiae secantur in res[^p6-5]», hoc est, dividuntur secundum divisionem subiectorum; sed hoc est res et signum, sicut manifestum est: ergo etc.

3. Item, videtur quod *credibile* sit subiectum huius libri. Illud enim est subiectum in libro, circa quod versatur auctoris intentio et tractatus; sed credibile est huiusmodi. Unde Magister dicit in Prologo, quod propositum suum est, «fidem nostram clypeis Davidicae turris munire», hoc est, ad probandum fidem rationes adducere, non, inquam, *fidem-habitum,* sed *creditum*[^p6-6]: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Subiectum in scientia debet complecti omne, quod determinatur in illa; sed in hoc libro non tantum determinatur de Deo, sed etiam de creaturis: ergo Deus non est subiectum totius istius[^p6-7] libri generaliter, sed solum primi libri.

2. Item, aliter ostenditur illud idem sic. Licet tres causae coincidant in unam, tamen materia non coincidit simul cum fine[^p6-8]; quia materia dicit quid incompletum, finis autem dicit totius operis complementum; sed Deus est finis totius istius operis, quia finis totius theologiae: ergo non est subiectum vel materia.

3. Item, quod *res et signa* non sint subiectum[^p6-9], videtur. Omnis enim scientia est de rebus vel de signis: ergo si res et signa sunt subiectum huius libri, liber iste est generalis ad omnes. Quodsi[^p6-10] specialis scientia et doctrina traditur in hoc libro, patet quod res et signa non debent assignari in eo pro subiecto.

4. Item, constat quod alia est scientia de rebus et alia de signis, ut patet; differt enim sermocinalis scientia a naturali; ergo scientia tradita in hoc libro aut[^p6-11] non est unius generis, aut non est simul de rebus et de signis; sed est unius generis: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod *credibile* non sit subiectum, videtur, quia scientia et virtus[^p6-12] sunt diversi habitus: ergo habent diversa obiecta; ergo cum credibile, in quantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum virtutis, non erit obiectum scientiae in quantum huiusmodi: ergo etc.

6. Item, sicut consideratio huius libri versatur

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circa fidem, ita etiam[^p7-1] circa spem et caritatem: ergo si sperandum vel diligendum sive diligibile non est subiectum huius libri, pari ratione nec credibile est subiectum in eo.

### Conclusio

> *Deus est subiectum theologiae radicale, Christus est subiectum integrale, res et signa sunt subiectum universale sive etiam credibile, prout transit in rationem intelligibilis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod subiectum in aliqua scientia vel doctrina tripliciter potest accipi. Uno modo dicitur subiectum in scientia[^p7-2], ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad *principium radicale;* alio modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad *totum integrale;* tertio modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad *totum universale.*

Exemplum huius manifeste patet in *grammatica.* Nam subiectum primo modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad principium elementare[^p7-3] vel radicale, est littera, quam ideo vocat Priscianus[^p7-4] *elementum,* quia est minimum, in quo stat resolutio grammatici. Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum integrale, est oratio congrua et perfecta. Subiectum vero, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale, est vox litterata, articulata[^p7-5] ordinabilis ad significandum aliquid in se vel in alio.

Per hunc modum est distinguere in *quadrivialibus.* Nam subiectum in geometria, ad quod omnia resolvuntur[^p7-6] ut ad principium, est punctus. Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad totum integrum, est corpus, quod continet in se omne genus dimensionis. Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad totum universale, est quantitas continua, immobilis.

Per hunc modum et in hoc libro est assignare subiectum secundum triplicem differentiam.

Nam subiectum, ad quod omnia[^p7-7] reducuntur ut ad *principium,* est ipse *Deus.*

Subiectum quoque, ad quod omnia reducuntur, quae determinantur in hoc libro, ut ad *totum integrum,* est *Christus,* prout comprehendit naturam divinam et humanam sive creatum et increatum[^p7-8], de quibus sunt duo primi libri; et caput et membra, de quibus sunt duo sequentes. Et accipio large[^p7-9] *totum integrum,* quod multa complectitur non solum per compositionem, sed per unionem et per ordinem.

Subiectum quoque, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad *totum universale,* possumus nominare per circumlocutionem[^p7-10] sive sub disiunctione; et sic est res vel signum; et vocatur hic *signum* Sacramentum. Possumus et unico vocabulo nominare; et sic est *credibile,* prout tamen credibile transit in rationem *intelligibilis,* et hoc per additionem rationis; et hoc modo, proprie loquendo, est[^p7-11] subiectum in hoc libro.

Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, et *Deum* esse subiectum et *res* et *signa,* et *credibile,* diversimode, sicut dictum est.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod non tantum de Deo[^p7-12] agitur in hoc libro; dicendum,

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quod, quamvis non agatur de Deo quantum ad substantiam tantum, agitur tamen de Deo quantum ad substantiam, vel quantum ad opera eius; et ideo non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod materia non coincidit in unum cum fine; dicendum, quod materia tripliciter dicitur: scilicet materia *ex qua,* materia *in qua* et materia *circa quam;* et haec ultima materia magis[^p8-1] dicitur obiectum quam materia. Quando ergo dicitur, quod materia non coincidit cum fine, verum est de materia *ex qua,* quae proprie est materia[^p8-2], sed non de materia *circa quam,* quae proprie est obiectum; nam idem potest esse obiectum habitus et finis; et tali modo accipitur materia in scientia pro obiecto virtutis[^p8-3] cognoscentis.

3. 4. Quod obiicitur de *rebus* et *signis,* quod sunt subiecta omnium scientiarum; dicendum, quod res et signum[^p8-4] possunt accipi *in sua generalitate;* et sic non pertinent ad scientiam specialem nec ad librum nec ad eandem scientiam. Possunt iterum accipi secundum quod induunt rationem *credibilis,* et sic, quemadmodum una est *virtus*[^p8-5] et unus est habitus de omnibus credibilibus, sive sint res sive sint signa, ut fides, sic una est *scientia* specialis de omnibus, in quantum induunt hanc rationem[^p8-6], sive sint res sive signa.

Aliter potest dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de rebus et signis, aut *absolute,* aut in *relatione* ad fruitionem sive ad illud, quo fruendum est. Primo quidem modo spectant ad speciales scientias et diversas; secundo modo ad unam scientiam sive doctrinam. Unde quemadmodum de omnibus entibus, in quantum reducuntur ad unum primum ens, est una scientia et[^p8-7] unus liber, sic de omnibus rebus et signis, in quantum reducuntur ad unum, quod est alpha et omega, est una scientia.

5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod *credibile* est obiectum virtutis[^p8-8] etc.; dicendum, quod alio modo est credibile obiectum virtutis, alio modo scientiae. Credibile enim, secundum quod habet in se rationem *primae veritatis,* cui fides assentit propter se et super omnia, pertinet ad habitum fidei; secundum quod super rationem veritatis addit rationem *auctoritatis,* pertinet ad doctrinam sacrae Scripturae, de qua dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram[^p8-9], quod «maior est eius auctoritas quam humani ingenii perspicacitas»; sed secundum quod supra rationem veritatis et auctoritatis addit rationem *probabilitatis,* pertinet ad considerationem praesentis libri, in quo ponuntur rationes probantes fidem nostram. Et sic patet, quomodo differenter est *fides* de credibili, et *libri* de canone sacrae Scripturae, et *praesens scriptura.* Et ideo non valet illa[^p8-10] obiectio, quoniam iste liber non est sic ad defensionem spei et caritatis, sicut fidei; et ideo non est simile.

english:
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### QUESTION I.
#### *What is the matter or subject of this book or of theology.*

And[^p6-3] that *God* is the subject, it seems.

1. For that is the subject in a science, concerning which and concerning whose properties the whole science is[^p6-4]; but this whole book is concerning God and his works, namely creation and restoration: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that the subject of this book is *things and signs.* For that is the subject in a science according to whose division that science is divided, since «the sciences are cut into things[^p6-5]», that is, they are divided according to the division of their subjects; but this is thing and sign, as is manifest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that *the credible* is the subject of this book. For that is the subject in a book about which the author's intention and treatment turn; but the credible is of this sort. Hence the Master says in the Prologue that his purpose is «to fortify our faith with the shields of the tower of David», that is, to bring forward reasons for proving the faith — not, I say, *faith-as-habit,* but *the thing believed*[^p6-6]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The subject in a science ought to embrace everything that is determined in it; but in this book not only is there a determination concerning God, but also concerning creatures: therefore God is not the subject of this whole[^p6-7] book generally, but only of the first book.

2. Likewise, the same thing is shown otherwise thus. Although three causes coincide in one, the matter nevertheless does not coincide together with the end[^p6-8]; because the matter states something incomplete, whereas the end states the completion of the whole work; but God is the end of this whole work, since he is the end of all theology: therefore he is not the subject or the matter.

3. Likewise, it seems that *things and signs* are not the subject[^p6-9]. For every science is concerning things or concerning signs: therefore if things and signs are the subject of this book, this book is general to them all. But if[^p6-10] a special science and doctrine is handed on in this book, it is plain that things and signs ought not to be assigned in it as the subject.

4. Likewise, it is agreed that the science of things is one and that of signs another, as is plain; for the science of discourse differs from the natural science: therefore the science handed on in this book either[^p6-11] is not of one genus, or is not at once concerning things and concerning signs; but it is of one genus: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems that *the credible* is not the subject, because science and virtue[^p6-12] are diverse habits: therefore they have diverse objects; therefore since the credible, insofar as it is such, is the object of a virtue, it will not be the object of a science insofar as it is such: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, just as the consideration of this book turns

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about faith, so also[^p7-1] about hope and charity: therefore if what is to be hoped for, or what is to be loved, or the lovable, is not the subject of this book, by parity of reasoning neither is the credible the subject in it.

### Conclusion

> *God is the radical subject of theology, Christ is the integral subject, things and signs are the universal subject — or also the credible, insofar as it passes over into the character of the intelligible.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the subject in any science or doctrine can be taken in three ways. In one way that is called the subject in a science[^p7-2] to which all things are reduced as to a *radical principle;* in another way, that to which all things are reduced as to an *integral whole;* in a third way, that to which all things are reduced as to a *universal whole.*

An example of this appears manifestly in *grammar.* For the subject in the first way, to which all things are reduced as to an elementary[^p7-3] or radical principle, is the letter, which for that reason Priscian calls[^p7-4] the *element,* because it is the least thing at which the grammarian's resolution comes to a stand. The subject to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole is congruous and complete speech. But the subject to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole is the lettered, articulate[^p7-5] utterance capable of being ordered to signify something either in itself or in another.

In this same way a distinction is to be made in *the quadrivial arts.* For the subject in geometry, to which all things are resolved[^p7-6] as to a principle, is the point. The subject to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole is body, which contains in itself every genus of dimension. The subject to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole is continuous, immobile quantity.

In this same way the subject is to be assigned in this book too, according to a threefold difference.

For the subject to which all things[^p7-7] are reduced as to a *principle* is *God* himself.

The subject also to which all the things determined in this book are reduced as to an *integral whole* is *Christ,* inasmuch as he comprehends the divine and the human nature, that is, the created and the uncreated[^p7-8], of which the first two books treat; and the head and the members, of which the two following treat. And I take *integral whole* broadly[^p7-9], as embracing many things not only by composition, but by union and by order.

The subject also to which all things are reduced as to a *universal whole* we can name by a circumlocution[^p7-10] or under a disjunction; and thus it is thing or sign — and the *sign* is here called a Sacrament. We can also name it by a single word; and thus it is *the credible,* provided, however, that the credible passes over into the character of the *intelligible,* and this by the addition of a rational ground; and in this way, properly speaking, it is[^p7-11] the subject in this book.

The reasons proving it are therefore to be granted, namely that *God* is the subject, and *things* and *signs,* and *the credible,* in diverse ways, as has been said.

1. As to what is objected on the contrary, that it is not only concerning God[^p7-12] that this book treats; it must be said

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that, although it is not concerning God as to his substance only that it treats, it nevertheless treats of God as to his substance, or as to his works; and therefore he is not the subject as a whole, but as a principle.

2. As to what is objected, that the matter does not coincide into one with the end; it must be said that matter is spoken of in three ways: namely the matter *out of which,* the matter *in which,* and the matter *about which;* and this last matter is called an object rather[^p8-1] than a matter. When therefore it is said that the matter does not coincide with the end, this is true of the matter *out of which,* which is properly matter[^p8-2], but not of the matter *about which,* which is properly the object; for the same thing can be the object of a habit and its end; and it is in this manner that matter is taken in a science for the object of the knowing power[^p8-3].

3. 4. As to what is objected concerning *things* and *signs,* that they are the subjects of all the sciences; it must be said that thing and sign[^p8-4] can be taken *in their generality;* and thus they do not pertain to a special science, nor to a book, nor to one and the same science. They can also be taken according as they put on the character of *the credible,* and thus, just as there is one *virtue*[^p8-5] and one habit concerning all credible things, whether they be things or signs — namely faith — so there is one special *science* concerning them all, insofar as they put on this character[^p8-6], whether they be things or signs.

It can also be said otherwise, that there are two ways of speaking of things and signs: either *absolutely,* or in *relation* to fruition, that is, to that which is to be enjoyed. In the first way indeed they belong to the special and diverse sciences; in the second way to one science or doctrine. Hence, just as concerning all beings, insofar as they are reduced to one first being, there is one science and[^p8-7] one book, so concerning all things and signs, insofar as they are reduced to one, who is alpha and omega, there is one science.

5. 6. As to what is objected, that *the credible* is the object of a virtue[^p8-8] etc.; it must be said that the credible is the object of a virtue in one way, and of a science in another. For the credible, according as it has in itself the character of *the first truth,* to which faith assents for its own sake and above all things, pertains to the habit of faith; according as, over and above the character of truth, it adds the character of *authority,* it pertains to the doctrine of sacred Scripture, of which Augustine says, on Genesis according to the letter[^p8-9], that «its authority is greater than the perspicacity of human wit»; but according as, over and above the character of truth and of authority, it adds the character of *probability,* it pertains to the consideration of the present book, in which are set down the reasons proving our faith. And thus it is plain in what different ways *faith* is concerned with the credible, and *the books* of the canon of sacred Scripture, and *the present writing.* And therefore that[^p8-10] objection is of no force, since this book is not for the defence of hope and charity in the way that it is for the defence of faith; and therefore the case is not alike.

la: Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam *Et.* Mox post verbum *videtur* cod. M adiungit *Probo.*

en: We have restored from the manuscripts and from edition 1 the particle *Et.* Presently, after the word *videtur,* codex M adds *Probo.*

la: Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7. et 8. — Mox sequimur codd. et ed. 1 ponendo *et* pro *de* ac dein *utpote* loco *ut puta.* Codd. F et S *operationibus* pro *operibus.*

en: See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, cc. 7 and 8. — Presently we follow the codices and edition 1 in putting *et* for *de,* and then *utpote* in place of *ut puta.* Codices F and S read *operationibus* for *operibus.*

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (in ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot c. 8.), ubi sic habetur: *Secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res.* Cum quibus verbis concordant antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 contra Vat. ac recentiorem cod. cc, qui habent *ut res* pro *in res.* Paulo ante Vat. post *scientia* addit *ab aliis;* sed mendose (agitur siquidem de divisione scientiae in se, uti ex subnexis colligitur) et praeter fidem mss. ac ed. 1. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, refragantibus tamen antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, ante *dividuntur* repetit particulam *quia,* sed male, eo quod proxime subnexa non sint nisi explicatio verborum *secantur in res.* Paulo post sub demonstrativo *hoc* intellige tale subiectum, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur theologia. Substituimus ex codd. A G H I M Y etc. et ed. 1 *hoc* pro *haec,* licet multi codd. cum Vat. habeant *haec,* quia in eorum lectione syllogismus perturbaretur.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 38 (in the Paris Firmin-Didot edition, c. 8), where it stands thus: *Science therefore, and sense, are cut into things.* With which words the more ancient codices and edition 1 agree, against the Vatican edition and the more recent codex cc, which have *ut res* for *in res.* A little before, the Vatican edition adds after *scientia* the words *ab aliis;* but erroneously (for what is at issue is the division of science in itself, as is gathered from what is subjoined) and against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1. Presently the Vatican edition with codex cc — the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 opposing it — repeats the particle *quia* before *dividuntur,* but badly, since what is subjoined immediately after is nothing but an explanation of the words *secantur in res.* A little later, under the demonstrative *hoc,* understand such a subject according to whose division theology is divided. We have substituted, from codices A G H I M Y etc. and from edition 1, *hoc* for *haec,* although many codices with the Vatican edition have *haec,* because on their reading the syllogism would be thrown into confusion.

la: Sensus est: non, inquam, fidem in quantum est habitus a Deo in animam infusus, sed in quantum est ipsum creditum, scil. veritates revelatae; sive aliis verbis, si recte tamen intelligantur: non fidem subiective, sed obiective sumtam. — Vat. *sed fide creditum;* edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 legunt: *fidem creditum secundum habitum, sed secundum creditum;* omnes vero codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent textum nostrum.

en: The sense is: not, I say, faith insofar as it is a habit infused by God into the soul, but insofar as it is the very thing believed, namely the revealed truths; or, in other words, provided they be rightly understood: faith taken not subjectively but objectively. — The Vatican edition reads *sed fide creditum;* editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read *fidem creditum secundum habitum, sed secundum creditum;* but all the codices with edition 1 present our text.

la: Vat. cum cod. recentiori cc *huius* contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc reads *huius,* against the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot c. 7.), ubi sic legitur: *Veniunt autem tres (causae) in unam plerumque.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 70 (Paris Firmin-Didot edition, c. 7), where it reads thus: *But three (causes) for the most part come together into one.*

la: Cod. V *materia seu subiectum.* Mox post *vel* restituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 omissam particulam *de.*

en: Codex V reads *materia seu subiectum.* Presently, after *vel,* we have restored from nearly all the manuscripts and from edition 1 the omitted particle *de.*

la: Lectio Vat., quae est et multorum codd., explicatur per sequentem cod. L: *Sed constat quod specialis;* codd. A C F R aa *Sed specialis;* cod. G *Sed si specialis.* Mox codd. S U ff post *patet* adiiciunt *igitur.* Dein fide mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *debent* pro *habent.*

en: The Vatican reading, which is also that of many codices, is explained by the following reading of codex L: *Sed constat quod specialis;* codices A C F R aa read *Sed specialis;* codex G *Sed si specialis.* Presently codices S U ff add *igitur* after *patet.* Then, on the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, we have put *debent* for *habent.*

la: Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc vitiose et contra antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 particulam *aut* transponit post *ergo.* Mox cod. V verbo *generis* adiungit *determinati.*

en: The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc, faultily and against the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, transposes the particle *aut* after *ergo.* Presently codex V adds *determinati* to the word *generis.*

la: Mendum Vat. *veritas* loco *virtus* et paulo infra *veritatis* pro *virtutis* castigavimus auctoritate mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition's error *veritas* in place of *virtus,* and a little below *veritatis* for *virtutis,* we have corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1.

la: In Vat. et recentiori cod. cc non bene deest *etiam,* quod tamen in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Mox cod. F *sicut* pro *si.* Dein fide omnium codd. et ed. 1 expunximus *sperabile vel,* quod Vat. praemittit verbo *diligibile.*

en: In the Vatican edition and in the more recent codex cc *etiam* is wanting, not rightly, since it is nevertheless found in the more ancient manuscripts and in edition 1. Presently codex F reads *sicut* for *si.* Then, on the witness of all the codices and of edition 1, we have struck out *sperabile vel,* which the Vatican edition prefixes to the word *diligibile.*

la: Cod. U hic satis bene addit *illud.* Mox, postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *alio* pro *secundo.*

en: Codex U here adds, well enough, *illud.* Presently, at the demand of nearly all the manuscripts and of edition 1, we have substituted *alio* for *secundo.*

la: Vat. *primum elementale.* Auctoritate codd. ee ff et ed. 1 in textum recepimus *principium,* utpote quod praecedentibus et subsequentibus magis correspondere videtur; multi codd. propter abbreviationem ambigui sunt; omnes tamen cum ed. 1 legunt *elementare.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *primum elementale.* On the authority of codices ee ff and of edition 1 we have received into the text *principium,* as being that which seems to correspond better with what precedes and with what follows; many codices are ambiguous on account of the abbreviation; all of them, however, with edition 1 read *elementare.*

la: Libr. I. Grammat. c. 2 (de Littera). — Non multo post cod. X *grammaticae* pro *grammatici.*

en: *Grammar,* book I, c. 2 (On the Letter). — Not much later codex X reads *grammaticae* for *grammatici.*

la: Explicationem horum verborum accipe a Prisciano, I. Grammat. c. 1: *Articulata est, quae coarctata, hoc est, copulata cum aliquo sensu mentis eius, qui loquitur, profertur... Litterata est, quae scribi potest.* — Unus alterve cod. ut aa haec duo adiectiva coniungit per particulam *et.*

en: Take the explanation of these words from Priscian, *Grammar* I, c. 1: *Articulate is that which is uttered constrained, that is, coupled with some meaning of the mind of him who is speaking... Lettered is that which can be written.* — One or another codex, as aa, joins these two adjectives by the particle *et.*

la: Codd. H I K *reducuntur.* Mox post *principium* codd. P Q X ff addunt, ut et supra in textu additum est, *radicale.* Paulo post codd. H Q *integrale* pro *integrum.*

en: Codices H I K read *reducuntur.* Presently, after *principium,* codices P Q X ff add — as was added above in the text also — *radicale.* A little later codices H Q read *integrale* for *integrum.*

la: Cod. D hic addit, sicuti et paulo post in textu reperitur, *quae determinantur in hoc libro;* codd. vero D K post *principium* adiiciunt *radicale vel initiale* et cod. ff tantum *radicale,* quae adiectiva cum praecedentibus correspondent textumque distinctiorem reddunt. Paulo post codd. K Q *integrale* loco *integrum.*

en: Codex D here adds, just as is found a little later in the text as well, *quae determinantur in hoc libro;* codices D K, however, add after *principium* the words *radicale vel initiale,* and codex ff only *radicale* — adjectives which correspond with what precedes and render the text more distinct. A little later codices K Q read *integrale* in place of *integrum.*

la: Lectio Vat. *sive creatam et increatam,* quae nimis arcta videtur, castigatur auctoritate mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican reading *sive creatam et increatam,* which seems too narrow, is corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1.

la: Consulto dicit *large,* quia *totum integrum* in sensu stricto dicit compositum ex partibus; sed duae naturae in Christo faciunt totum integrum secundum Scholasticos per unionem hypostaticam, non per strictam compositionem. — Vat. praemittit particulam *hic* et mox post *sed* addit *etiam,* quod hic et alibi saepius omnes mss. omittunt, licet minus congrue.

en: He says *broadly* advisedly, because an *integral whole* in the strict sense means something composed of parts; but the two natures in Christ make an integral whole, according to the Scholastics, by the hypostatic union, not by strict composition. — The Vatican edition prefixes the particle *hic,* and presently after *sed* adds *etiam,* which here and elsewhere all the manuscripts more often omit, though less fittingly.

la: Contra auctoritatem codd. et ed. 1 loco *per circumlocutionem* Vat. ponit *dupla nominatione,* fortasse propter maiorem oppositionem cum verbis paulo post sequentibus *unico vocabulo.*

en: Against the authority of the codices and of edition 1, in place of *per circumlocutionem* the Vatican edition puts *dupla nominatione,* perhaps for the sake of a greater opposition with the words that follow a little after, *unico vocabulo.*

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic Vat. *credibile,* quod certe in textu subintelligendum est. Mox codd. P Q cum edd. 4 et 5 post *diversimode* satis bene addunt *tamen.*

en: Against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1 the Vatican edition here repeats *credibile,* which is certainly to be understood in the text. Presently codices P Q, with editions 4 and 5, add after *diversimode,* well enough, *tamen.*

la: Vat. *quod de Deo non agitur per totum in hoc libro;* mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. in eo conveniunt, quod omittant *per totum;* codd. vero R T ee ff et ed. 1, transpositis verbis et addendo *tantum,* suppeditant lectionem, quam in textum recepimus, quae et in se clarior est et ad amussim correspondet propositioni minori supra in obiectione positae. Mox post *tamen* ex codd. T et ee supplevimus *de Deo,* quae verba certe subaudienda sunt. Dein cod. F post *substantiam* addit *et operationem.* Plures codd. ex repetitione vocis *substantiam* decepti propositionem mutile exhibent. Cod. K vero totam responsionem magis succincte ita proponit: *Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus non complectitur omnia, quae hic considerantur, dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deus non sit subiectum in hac scientia, sed tantum* (sic primitus, postea correctum in *tamen*) *sequitur, quod non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium.* Mentem suam S. Doctor hac de re in Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. ita aperit: *Cum s. Scriptura sive theologia sit scientia dans sufficientem notitiam de primo principio secundum statum viae... et Deus non tantum sit rerum primum principium et exemplar effectivum in creatione, sed etiam refectivum in redemptione et perfectivum in retributione; ideo non tantum agit de Deo creatore, sed etiam de creatione* (ita codd. contra edd., quae habent *creatore*) *et creatura.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *quod de Deo non agitur per totum in hoc libro;* the manuscripts with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, agree in this, that they omit *per totum;* but codices R T ee ff and edition 1, by transposing the words and adding *tantum,* supply the reading which we have received into the text — a reading which is both clearer in itself and corresponds exactly to the minor proposition set down above in the objection. Presently, after *tamen,* we have supplied from codices T and ee the words *de Deo,* which are certainly to be understood. Then codex F adds *et operationem* after *substantiam.* Several codices, deceived by the repetition of the word *substantiam,* present the proposition mutilated. Codex K, however, sets out the whole response more succinctly thus: *As to what is objected on the contrary, that God does not embrace all the things which are here considered, it must be said that from this it does not follow that God is not the subject in this science, but only* (so at first, afterwards corrected to *nevertheless*) *it follows that he is not the subject as a whole, but as a principle.* The holy Doctor lays open his mind on this matter in the *Breviloquium,* p. I, c. 1, thus: *Since sacred Scripture, or theology, is a science giving sufficient knowledge concerning the first principle according to the state of the wayfarer... and God is not only the first principle of things and their effective exemplar in creation, but also their restorative exemplar in redemption and their perfective exemplar in retribution; therefore it treats not only of God the creator, but also of creation* (so the codices, against the editions, which have *creatore*) *and of the creature.*

la: Cod. N addit *proprie.*

en: Codex N adds *proprie.*

la: Codd. aa adiungit *et similiter de materia in qua,* quae lectio in textum recipienda videretur, si sufficienti numero codicum fulciretur; certe tamen ipsa subintelligenda est.

en: Codex aa adds *et similiter de materia in qua,* a reading which would seem to deserve reception into the text if it were supported by a sufficient number of codices; certainly, however, it is to be understood.

la: Falsa lectio Vat. *veritatis* loco *virtutis* emendatur ex mss. et sex primis edd.

en: The Vatican edition's false reading *veritatis* in place of *virtutis* is emended from the manuscripts and from the first six editions.

la: Cod. aa satis bene *signa.* Mox codd. A T Y etc. ante *librum* non repetunt particulam *ad,* cod. I ponit *vel librum,* cod. X *nec ad librum unum.*

en: Codex aa, well enough, reads *signa.* Presently codices A T Y etc. do not repeat the particle *ad* before *librum;* codex I puts *vel librum,* codex X *nec ad librum unum.*

la: Vat., quae falso ponit *veritas,* corrigitur ex mss. et sex primis edd.

en: The Vatican edition, which falsely puts *veritas,* is corrected from the manuscripts and from the first six editions.

la: Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc superflue hic addit *scilicet credibilis,* quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc here superfluously adds *scilicet credibilis,* which is wanting in the more ancient manuscripts and in edition 1.

la: Ex codd. A F G H I K P R S T V Y etc. cum ed. 1 posuimus *et* loco *aut.* Deinde codd. I et T post *liber* bene addunt *scilicet metaphysica.* Mox, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. habet *ordinantur* pro *reducuntur;* cod. vero bb *reducuntur vel ordinantur.*

en: From codices A F G H I K P R S T V Y etc. with edition 1 we have put *et* in place of *aut.* Then codices I and T add, rightly, after *liber* the words *scilicet metaphysica.* Presently, nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 opposing it, the Vatican edition has *ordinantur* for *reducuntur;* codex bb, however, *reducuntur vel ordinantur.*

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 in hac propositione bis habet mendose *veritatis* loco *virtutis.*

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, has in this proposition twice, erroneously, *veritatis* in place of *virtutis.*

la: Libr. II. c. 5: *Maior est quippe Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas.* — Dein Vat. praeter fidem codd. voci *secundum* praemittit *sed;* ed. 1 addit *vero.*

en: Book II, c. 5: *For the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the capacity of human wit.* — Then the Vatican edition, against the witness of the codices, prefixes *sed* to the word *secundum;* edition 1 adds *vero.*

la: Magis placeret, si pro *illa* haberetur *alia.* Vat. autem absque ulla mss. auctoritate post *obiectio* adiungit *de sperabili vel diligibili.* Circa finem propositionis codd. inter se non conveniunt; Vat. cum cod. cc pro *et ideo* habet *unde;* multi codd. ut A C F G S V W X bb etc. nullam coniunctivam particulam ponunt; cod. D *nec* pro *et ideo non;* codd. autem B D K Q R exhibent lectionem nostram *et ideo;* codd. I T *ideo.*

en: It would please better if *alia* stood in place of *illa.* The Vatican edition, however, without any authority of the manuscripts, adds after *obiectio* the words *de sperabili vel diligibili.* Towards the end of the proposition the codices do not agree among themselves; the Vatican edition with codex cc has *unde* for *et ideo;* many codices, as A C F G S V W X bb etc., put no connective particle at all; codex D reads *nec* for *et ideo non;* but codices B D K Q R present our reading *et ideo;* codices I T read *ideo.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Supponit Doctor Seraphicus in his quaestionibus prooemialibus et alibi passim, quod theologia sit vera scientia; immo in Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. dicit: *Ipsa sola est scientia perfecta.* Quo sensu hoc dicatur, explicatur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et ibid. q. 4. — Scotus (Prolog. q. 4.) cum Nominalibus negat, theologiam in viatoribus esse *proprie* scientiam; S. Thomas (S. I. q. 1. a. 2.) vero hoc affirmat.

**II.** Non quaeritur hic de subiecto, *in quo* est scientia, quod est intellectus, sed de subiecto, *de quo* est scientia et *circa quod* immediate versatur. Dicitur subiectum, quia de illo ea praedicantur, de quibus agitur in illa scientia. Licet ab auctoribus non raro hi termini: *subiectum, obiectum* et *materia circa quam,* confundantur, tamen in sensu stricto obiectum scientiae est id *quod* scitur, subiectum vero eius est id *de quo* conclusiones praedicantur. S. Doctor accipit hic subiectum in sensu stricto.

**III.** Circa distinctionem, quam habet in solutione ad 2, hoc notandum. Materia *in qua* vocatur subiectum sive corporale sive spirituale, in quo recipitur aliquod accidens: sic intellectus dici potest materia, in qua recipitur scientia. Materia *ex qua* dicitur ea pars compositi, quae cum forma facit compositum. Materia *circa quam* dicitur in scientia ipsum subiectum, circa

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quod versatur scientia. Haec ultima sub diverso respectu potest esse tum obiectum habitus tum finis, ut patet in virtutibus theologicis: v. g. fidei obiectum et finis est prima Veritas; creditur enim summum verum propter summum verum. Cfr. Alexander Hal. Sum. p. I. q. 1. m. 3.

**IV.** In solutione ad 3. tangitur quaestio de *unitate scientiae theologicae.* Hanc Nominales ex suis falsis principiis impugnant; sed eam adstruunt S. Bonaventura, Breviloq. p. 1. c. 1. Alexander Halensis, p. I. q. 1. m. 3. ad 4. et 5. — Scotus, I. Report. Prolog. quaestiunc. 2. — S. Thomas, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 2; Sum. I. q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albertus M., Sum. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 2; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I. Sent. Prolog. a. 2. — Richardus a Mediavilla, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. Prolog. part. 1. principalis 2. q. 3. — Henricus Gandaviensis, Sum. a. 6. q. 3. — Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4.

**V.** In solutione principalis quaestionis antiqui scholastici valde saltem verbis dissentiunt. Nonnulli affirmant, Deum esse quidem subiectum theologiae, non autem sub ratione Deitatis, sed sub aliqua limitatione, v. g. quatenus est restaurator et glorificator (ita Aegidius R.) vel quatenus est perfectissimus (Dionys. Carth.). Haec vero limitatio ex parte subiecti non videtur probabilis. — Alexander Hal. ponit tria subiecta secundum tria, quae sunt in quolibet ente completo, scil. secundum substantiam, virtutem (potentiam) et operationem: primo modo subiectum est Deus, secundo modo est Christus, qui est virtus Patris, tertio modo sunt opera restaurationis facta per Christum. — Scoto attribuitur sententia, Deum sub ratione entis infiniti esse subiectum theologiae; attamen cum ipse (I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. n. 9.) dicat: *Deum sub ratione entis infiniti aut necessarii non legitime poni obiectum theologiae,* sententia eius a Frassenio (Scotus academicus, tom. I. disp. prooem. a. 2. q. 5.) et a Lycheto (ad loc. cit.) ita explicatur, ut in substantia cum S. Thoma conveniat, qui (S. I. q. 1. a. 7.) unum assignat subiectum, scil. Deum sub ratione Deitatis. Differentia tamen inter utrumque consistit in hoc, quod Scotus putat, hoc subiectum *Deus* intelligi *materialiter,* uti res est et causa omnium veritatum, quas virtualiter in se continet; S. Thomas vero intelligit Deum in ratione *formali,* id est, ut scibilis vel revelabilis, non autem in se et subiective. De hac differentia cfr. Caietanus in Comment. et Macedo (Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti, Coll. 2. diff. 4. sect. 4.).

Sententia nunc communior accuratius distinguit in qualibet scientia tria obiecta: obiectum *materiale* (quod in theologia est omne a Deo revelatum) et duplex obiectum *formale.* Horum alterum se tenet ex parte subiecti, de quo est scientia, et est res ipsa, quae primo cognoscitur; hoc vocatur obiectum formale *quod;* alterum se tenet ex parte potentiae ut ratio, sub qua intelligimus, et vocatur obiectum formale *quo.* Hac ultima ratione illae scientiae, quae idem obiectum materiale habent, proprie distinguntur et specificantur.

Uti ex textu patet, S. Bonaventura aliter et tripliciter distinguit subiectum theologiae et secundum hanc distinctionem convenienter triplex subiectum theologiae assignat; sic diversas thelogorum sententias nititur conciliare. Et notandum, quod *totum integrale* est compositum ex partibus, quae cum aliis constituunt totum, unde vocantur partes integrales. *Totum universale* vero est quodlibet superius substantiale sumtum ad suum inferius in linea praedicamentali, ut animal ad hominem et homo ad Socratem. Ita Petrus Hispanus, Bonaventurae coaevus, in sua Summula super librum Topicorum, de locis concomitantibus. Nec sententia Seraphici contradicit S. Thomae, qui unum tantum assignat subiectum, cum hic subiectum praecise sumat ut subiectum *formale quod.* Non tamen negat S. Thomas, quod sub diversis respectibus etiam alia subiecta theologiae rationabiliter assignari possint; immo hoc in utroque loco infra citato sufficienter innuit. Ipse autem S. Bonaventura dicit in corpore quaestionis, et *Deum* esse subiectum, et *Christum,* et *res* et *signa* et *credibile,* tamen diversimode. Unde sibi constans in 1. conclusione ipse cum S. Thoma dicit, Deum esse subiectum theologiae; sed hoc aliter explicat, scil. ut subiectum *radicale,* ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad principium. Hoc Trigosus intelligit de subiecto *formali adaequato* et sic Seraphicum omnino ad sententiam S. Thomae trahit. Ex contextu tamen patet, intelligendum esse potius de subiecto *materiali,* quatenus Deus est *principium,* a quo omnia derivantur sive, ut dicit in Breviloquio p. I. c. 1: *Subiectum, ut a quo omnia, est Deus.* In 2. conclus. sub alio respectu ponit Christum ut subiectum materiale adaequatum, per quod et de quo propinque omnia sciantur. In 3. conclus. ponit duplex subiectum, nempe *res* et *signa,* sed sub ratione *credibilis,* et ipsum *credibile,* quatenus veritates revelatae per rationes fiunt intelligibiles et probabiles. In hac ultima conclusione vocabula *totum universale* significant subiectum formale et attributionis. Trigosus, Sum. S. Bonav. q. 1. a. 2. dub. 2; Hauzeur, Collatio totius theologiae, tom. I. q. 1.

**VI.** Auctores antiqui de hac quaestione tractantes: Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. — Alexander Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 3. — Scotus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3; I. Report. Prolog. q. 1. — S. Thomas, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 4; Sum. I. q. 1. a. 7. — B. Albertus M., Sum. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 1; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I. Sent. Prolog. a. 3. — Richardus a Mediavilla, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 6. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. Prolog. p. 1, princip. q. 1. — Henricus Gandaviensis, Sum. a. 19. q. 1. — Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5. — Gabriel Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 9.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Seraphic Doctor supposes, in these proemial questions and elsewhere throughout, that theology is a true science; indeed in the *Breviloquium,* p. I, c. 1, he says: *It alone is a perfect science.* In what sense this is said is explained in III *Sent.,* d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and in the same place, q. 4. — Scotus (Prolog. q. 4) with the Nominalists denies that theology in wayfarers is *properly* a science; St. Thomas (S. I, q. 1, a. 2), on the other hand, affirms it.

**II.** The question here is not concerning the subject *in which* the science is, which is the intellect, but concerning the subject *concerning which* the science is and *about which* it immediately turns. It is called the subject because those things are predicated of it which are treated in that science. Although these terms — *subject, object* and *matter about which* — are not seldom confounded by authors, nevertheless in the strict sense the object of a science is that *which* is known, whereas its subject is that *concerning which* the conclusions are predicated. The holy Doctor here takes the subject in the strict sense.

**III.** Concerning the distinction which he has in the solution to the second objection, this is to be noted. The matter *in which* is the name for a subject, whether corporeal or spiritual, in which some accident is received: thus the intellect can be called the matter in which science is received. The matter *out of which* is the name for that part of a composite which together with the form makes the composite. The matter *about which* is the name, in a science, for the subject itself, about

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which the science turns. This last, under a different respect, can be both the object of a habit and its end, as appears in the theological virtues: for example, the object and the end of faith is the first Truth; for the highest true is believed on account of the highest true. Compare Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. I, q. 1, m. 3.

**IV.** In the solution to the third objection there is touched the question of the *unity of theological science.* The Nominalists impugn it out of their own false principles; but it is maintained by St. Bonaventure, *Breviloq.* p. 1, c. 1; Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 1, m. 3, ad 4 and 5. — Scotus, I *Report.,* Prolog., quaestiuncula 2. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 1, a. 3. — Blessed Albert the Great, *Summa,* p. I, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 2; I *Sent.,* d. 1, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, I *Sent.,* Prolog., a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 3. — Giles of Rome, I *Sent.,* Prolog., part 1, principal 2, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 6, q. 3. — Durandus, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 4.

**V.** In the solution of the principal question the old scholastics disagree greatly, at least in words. Some affirm that God is indeed the subject of theology, yet not under the character of Deity, but under some limitation — for example, insofar as he is restorer and glorifier (so Giles of Rome), or insofar as he is most perfect (Denis the Carthusian). But this limitation on the side of the subject does not seem probable. — Alexander of Hales posits three subjects according to the three things which are in any complete being, namely according to substance, power (potency) and operation: in the first way the subject is God; in the second way it is Christ, who is the power of the Father; in the third way it is the works of restoration wrought through Christ. — To Scotus is attributed the opinion that God under the character of infinite being is the subject of theology; yet since he himself (I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 3, n. 9) says: *that God under the character of infinite or necessary being is not legitimately set down as the object of theology,* his opinion is explained by Frassen (*Scotus academicus,* tom. I, disp. prooem., a. 2, q. 5) and by Lychetus (on the passage cited) in such a way that in substance it agrees with St. Thomas, who (S. I, q. 1, a. 7) assigns one subject, namely God under the character of Deity. The difference between the two nevertheless consists in this, that Scotus thinks this subject *God* is understood *materially,* as he is a thing and the cause of all the truths which he contains virtually in himself; whereas St. Thomas understands God under a *formal* character, that is, as knowable or revealable, and not in himself and subjectively. On this difference compare Cajetan in his Commentary, and Macedo (*Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti,* Coll. 2, diff. 4, sect. 4).

The opinion now more common distinguishes more accurately three objects in every science: the *material* object (which in theology is everything revealed by God) and a twofold *formal* object. Of these the one is held on the side of the subject concerning which the science is, and is the thing itself which is first known; this is called the formal object *which;* the other is held on the side of the power as the ground under which we understand, and is called the formal object *by which.* It is by this last ground that those sciences which have the same material object are properly distinguished and specified.

As appears from the text, St. Bonaventure distinguishes the subject of theology otherwise and in a threefold manner, and according to this distinction he suitably assigns a threefold subject of theology; thus he strives to reconcile the diverse opinions of the theologians. And it is to be noted that an *integral whole* is something composed of parts which together with others constitute the whole, whence they are called integral parts. But a *universal whole* is any substantial superior taken in relation to its inferior in the predicamental line, as animal in relation to man and man in relation to Socrates. So Peter of Spain, Bonaventure's contemporary, in his *Summula* on the book of the *Topics,* on concomitant places. Nor does the Seraphic Doctor's opinion contradict St. Thomas, who assigns only one subject, since he takes the subject precisely as the *formal subject which.* St. Thomas nevertheless does not deny that under diverse respects other subjects of theology can also reasonably be assigned; indeed he sufficiently intimates this in both the places cited below. But St. Bonaventure himself says in the body of the question that *God* is the subject, and *Christ,* and *things* and *signs* and *the credible,* yet in diverse ways. Hence, consistent with himself, in the first conclusion he says with St. Thomas that God is the subject of theology; but he explains this otherwise, namely as the *radical* subject, to which all things are reduced as to a principle. This Trigosus understands of the *adequate formal* subject, and so draws the Seraphic Doctor entirely over to St. Thomas's opinion. From the context, however, it is plain that it is rather to be understood of the *material* subject, inasmuch as God is the *principle* from which all things are derived — or, as he says in the *Breviloquium,* p. I, c. 1: *The subject, as that from which all things are, is God.* In the second conclusion, under another respect, he sets down Christ as the adequate material subject, through whom and concerning whom all things are proximately known. In the third conclusion he sets down a twofold subject, namely *things* and *signs,* but under the character of *the credible,* and the *credible* itself, inasmuch as revealed truths are made intelligible and probable through reasons. In this last conclusion the words *universal whole* signify the formal subject and the subject of attribution. Trigosus, *Sum. S. Bonav.,* q. 1, a. 2, dub. 2; Hauzeur, *Collatio totius theologiae,* tom. I, q. 1.

**VI.** Ancient authors treating of this question: *Breviloq.* p. I, c. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 1, m. 3. — Scotus, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 3; I *Report.,* Prolog., q. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 1, a. 4; *Summa* I, q. 1, a. 7. — Blessed Albert the Great, *Summa,* p. I, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 1; I *Sent.,* d. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, I *Sent.,* Prolog., a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 6. — Giles of Rome, I *Sent.,* Prolog., p. 1, princip. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 19, q. 1. — Durandus, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 5. — Gabriel Biel, I *Sent.,* Prolog., q. 9.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol1_raw.txt`, raw L9694–10233)
per the Vol I recipe, with **all four printed pages read at the plate at 450 dpi** as the arbiter of
the page span, every footnote-anchor position, the marginalia, and every apparatus digit. Offset
`pdf = printed + 102`. pp. 1–8 were already extracted; **p. 9 was extracted in this session**
(2028 × 2986 px, ~2.2 MB — the vol1 PDF's own raster caps 450 dpi at that size, and the pages are
readable whole, directly, under the API image cap; no `colcrop` was needed).

**Page span, fixed positively.** The chunk opens at the bare `QUAESTIO I.` heading partway down
p. 6's left column (raw L9694) and closes at the end of the work-level Scholion on p. 9, immediately
above the `QUAESTIO II.` display heading (raw L10234), which stands on **p. 9** — not on p. 10.
⚠ **The running head is not what fixes this.** p. 9's head already reads `PROOEMII QUAEST. II.`
because Quaestio II opens on that leaf; the `S. Bonav. — Tom. I.` signature line at the foot of
p. 9 and the printed page number `10` that follows it (raw L10272) are what put the boundary here.
A reader taking the running head at L10126 for a p. 10 head would have handed this chunk a page it
does not own.

**Apparatus — 32 entries across three registers, and the fourth page carries none.**
p. 6 nn. 3–12 (10, inherited) · p. 7 nn. 1–12 (12) · p. 8 nn. 1–10 (10) · **p. 9 nn. 1–4 are
Quaestio II's, not this chunk's.** Verified at the plate by anchor, not by block: p. 9's n. 1 glosses
Quaestio II's opening *Secundo quaeritur,* and nn. 2–4 are the `Vers.` notes on its three *sed
contra* citations. **The scholion carries no footnote anchors at all** — it cites its authorities
inline — so this chunk owns a printed page on which it has no apparatus whatever. That is the same
shape as `bon-itin-c7`/`bon-itin-scholion` in Vol V, arrived at from the other side: there a chunk
occupying the top of a leaf owned the leaf's whole register; here a chunk occupying the top of a
leaf owns none of it.

**Hand-off picked up, and re-derived.** `bon-sent-I-proem` forwarded p. 6 nn. 3–12 with ownership
verified and positions *not* verified. Ownership confirmed: n. 3 answers to `Et³ quod Deus sit
subiectum,` the question's first words; nn. 4–6 to the three *fundamentum* arguments in the left
column; nn. 7–12 to the six *sed contra* arguments in the right. **All ten positions and both
columns were fixed fresh on the plate**, per the standing rule that a hand-off tells you which notes
are yours and never where they land.

**One page-crossing runover, inherited within the chunk.** p. 7 n. 12 breaks at the foot of p. 7 and
continues **unnumbered at the head of p. 8's left footer block** (opening *ut totum, sed ut
principium. Mentem suam S. Doctor…*). It is rendered **joined** in `[^p7-12]`; p. 8's own register
opens numbered at n. 1 immediately below it. This is the second such runover in Book I's front, after
the proemium's p. 2 n. 19.

**Nothing forwarded.** No note of p. 9's belongs here, and p. 8's register closes numbered at n. 10
with no runover. `bon-sent-I-proem-q2` inherits nothing from this chunk.

**Digits settled on the plate — the 3/5 class, one correction.** Scholion VI's
`Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5.` prints **5** where the raw reads `q. 3`; settled at magnification
against the neighbouring `Sum. a. 19. q. 1.` and `Gabriel Biel … q. 9.` on the same three lines.
⚠ **Scholion IV's digit run, fourteen lines earlier, is entirely correct in the raw** — its five
threes are all genuine threes and its `Durandus … q. 4.` is a genuine four. This is the frozen
"don't calibrate on the previous paragraph, let alone the previous page" rule firing inside a single
column. Also confirmed against the raw's garbles: `III. de Anima` (raw `ni.`), `II. Phys.` (raw
`11.`), `Libr. I. Grammat.` (raw `Libr. 1.`), `Libr. II. c. 5` (raw `c. S`), Scholion I's
`ad 4, et ibid. q. 4.` (raw `q. i.`).

**⛔ TWO QUARACCHI MISPRINTS TRANSCRIBED AS PRINTED, NOT NORMALISED.** Both stand in Scholion V on
p. 9 and both were confirmed at 3× magnification, not inferred from the OCR:
**`proprie distinguntur et specificantur`** (for *distinguuntur*) and **`sic diversas thelogorum
sententias`** (for *theologorum*). Quaracchi print no note on either. Same discipline as the
Itinerarium's `EXPLICIT ITINERARIUM IN DEUM` colophon and the `est est` dittographies — the edition
is never silently emended, and a reader who "fixes" them is emending. The English renders the sense
in both places, since neither misprint is expressible in English.

**Marginalia, trimmed from the body and transcribed here in body order** (per the standing Vol I
convention). — p. 6: *Fundamentum.* (beside argument 1) · *Ad oppositum.* (beside the *sed contra*).
— p. 7: *Subiectum tripliciter accipitur.* · *Exemplum in grammatica.* · *Item in quadrivialibus.* ·
*Conclusio triplex.* · *Solutio oppositorum.* — p. 8: *Alia solutio.* — p. 9: **none** (the leaf's
upper half is scholion, which carries no glosses).

**Register set here (Book I's proemial questions are one continuous argument; reuse in qq. 2–4).**
*subiectum* → "subject" · *credibile* → **"the credible"** (never "what is believable": the word is
the question's technical term and must stay a substantive) · *res et signa* → "things and signs" ·
*principium radicale* → "radical principle" · *totum integrale / totum integrum* → **"integral
whole"** for both (Quaracchi's own Scholion V treats them as one term) · *totum universale* →
"universal whole" · *fidem-habitum* → "faith-as-habit" and *creditum* → "the thing believed" (the
Master's distinction; the apparatus at `[^p6-6]` glosses it as *subiective / obiective*) ·
*sermocinalis scientia* → **"the science of discourse"** (the trivium's language arts, set against
*naturalis*) · *vox litterata, articulata* → "the lettered, articulate utterance" · *oratio congrua
et perfecta* → "congruous and complete speech" · *quadrivialia* → "the quadrivial arts" ·
*ratio* → **"character"** throughout this question (*rationem credibilis, rationem auctoritatis,
rationem probabilitatis, in rationem intelligibilis*), except *per additionem rationis* → "by the
addition of a rational ground", where the word has swung back to the faculty's own act ·
*probabilitas* → "probability" · *perspicacitas* → "perspicacity" · *obiectum formale quod / quo* →
"the formal object *which* / *by which*" (Scholion V) · *viatores* → "wayfarers".

**⛔ THE THREE GUARD-RAIL AUDITS CANNOT SEE THIS CHUNK.** `audit-paraphrase.py`, `audit-headers.py`
and `audit-apparatus-count.py` all select on the filename regex `bon-sent-{I,II,III,IV}-d(\d+)-`; a
`distinctio: 0` front-matter chunk never matches, and all three print a clean verdict on **0 chunks
audited.** Never record such a run as audits-clean. This chunk was verified instead by marker
pairing in both languages (32 defs, 32 anchors each side, no duplicates, no orphans), structural
parity, per-page plate discipline for all three registers, and the decoupled full-corpus scripts.

**No `[?]` flags.**