title: Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether a universal whole is to be posited

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum in divinis possit poni totum universale.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere totum universale. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Damascenum[^1], qui dicit, «quod in divinis commune est, ut substantia, particulare, ut atomus»: ergo si est ibi commune et particulare, ergo universale, quia particulari non respondet aliud commune quam universale.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem[^2] universalis et particularis. «Universale enim est quod praedicatur de pluribus; particulare de uno solo»; sed has rationes est invenire in divinis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod est in plus et est univocum, est universale ad illa, respectu quorum est in plus[^3]; sed essentia sive substantia est in plus quam persona, et in plus univocum, quia[^4] dicit unam naturam repertam in illis secundum identitatem: ergo etc.

4. Item, in divinis est communicabile et incommunicabile; aut ergo eodem, aut alio et alio. Non eodem; quia illud non est intelligibile, quod ex eodem veniat communitas et proprietas, convenientia et differentia formaliter[^5]: ergo alio et alio: ergo si alio est communicabile, alio incommunicabile, ergo cum communicabile sit ratione eius *quo est*, incommunicabile ratione eius *quod est*, ergo *quo est* et *quod est* in divinis sunt per differentiam; sed ubi haec sunt per differentiam, ibi est universale et particulare: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto universalius[^6]; sed divina essentia est simplicissima: ergo ibi maxime est ratio universalis.

**Contra:** 1. Boethius[^7] dicit, quod nec est universale nec particulare.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia ubicumque est universale, ibi est una forma multiplicabilis vel multiplicata[^8]; in cuius rei signum omne,

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quod significat *quoniam universaliter*, potest addi omni universali; sed in Deo non est una forma vel natura multiplicabilis nec multiplicata nec recipit signum universale, ut dicatur *omnis Deus*: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubi est particulare, ibi est forma vel natura ut *hic* et *nunc*[^9]; sed divina natura sive in se, sive in hypostasibus non est *hic* et *nunc*, sed semper et ubique: ergo nec in se nec in hypostasibus est ibi particulare.

4. Item, ubi est particulare et universale, universale est simplicius particulari[^10]: ergo cum in Deo non sit simplicior essentia quam persona, quia in persona nullum est accidens, nullum principium constitutivum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis natura, in qua est universale et particulare, est in genere determinato; et omnis talis est limitata[^11]: ergo cum divina natura sit infinita, patet etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Licet in divinis sit ratio communis et proprii, communicabilis et incommunicabilis, minime tamen ibi est ratio universalis et particularis.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, cum fides nostra[^12] ponat trinitatem et unitatem in divinis, necessario ponit convenientiam et distinctionem. Et quia convenientia non est nisi in communicabili a pluribus[^13] et communi, distinctio autem non est nisi in proprio et incommunicabili, necessario in divinis ponitur ratio *communis* et *proprii*, *communicabilis* et *incommunicabilis*.

Sed cum in Deo et[^14] creaturis sit distinctio suppositorum, aliter est in Deo quam in creaturis. Distinctio enim suppositorum maior est quam distinctio accidentalis; unde quamvis innotescat per accidentia[^15], tamen non fit per accidentia. Accidentibus enim circumscriptis, adhuc est intelligere supposita differre; et cum non fiat per accidentia consequentia[^16], oportet quod fiat ab origine vel ab originali principio. Ab origine est, quando unum differt ab altero, quia emanat ab eo; idem enim a se emanare non potest. Talis distinctio suppositorum est in Deo, sed haec[^17] non potest esse in creatura, scilicet distinctio solum per originem; nam nulla creatura potest alteri totam suam essentiam dare. Si ergo dat partem, necesse est, quod alia differentia sit ibi quam originis; et ideo est differentia ab originali principio. Haec autem non est forma in se, quia dicit quid communicabile[^18], nec materia in se, quia dicit quid indistinctum[^19]: ergo hoc facit forma, ut adveniens materiae. Quia enim adveniens materiae accipit partem, non totam[^20] materiam, hinc est, quod ipsam distinguit, et ipsam distinguendo trahi-

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tur in partem et limitatur et fit *hic* et *nunc* et unum numero et particulare.

Quoniam igitur in divinis non est additio ad materiam nec tractio in[^21] partem, ideo non cadit in divinis universale nec particulare, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae in opponendo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod improprie *Damascenus* posuit *particulare* pro *incommunicabili*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod universale est quod praedicatur de pluribus; dicendum, quod ista est ratio communicabilis; universalis autem non est, nisi secundum quod realiter intelligitur multiplicari[^22] in illis. Similiter solvendum de particulari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est in plus et est univocum etc.; dicendum, quod universale est in plus, ita quod simplicius, et fit in[^23] minus per additionem ad illud; non autem sic in Deo.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum eodem sit[^24] communicabile et incommunicabile; dicendum, quod alio et alio; quia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^25], «alio est Deus, et alio Pater»; sed non alio et alio secundum *rem*, sed secundum *rationem*: quia deitate est Deus, paternitate Pater, et paternitas non est aliud re ab essentia, quoniam paternitas est essentia; est tamen aliud ratione. Et quia ablativus dicit rationem, ideo non eodem est Deus, quo Pater[^26]. — Et si obiicias: aut rationi illi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; dicendum, quod ratio illa per comparationem ad essentiam non est nisi modus, sed per comparationem ad aliam personam est res. Et hoc patet, quoniam habere essentiam ab alio et non habere non dicit rem aliam, sed solum modum; habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio dicit realem differentiam, quia nulla res est a se et ab alio[^27].

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de simplici, dicendum, quod est simplex possibile ad additionem, et tali modo universale est simplex; alio modo simplex, quia privat compositionem et additionem, et haec repugnantia non consonat universalitati: et tali modo divina essentia est simplex, quae nullo modo trahibilis est in partem per additionem, sicut trahitur universale: et ideo non est universale.

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english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in the divine [persons] a universal whole can be posited.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] a universal whole is to be posited. And that it is, is seen [thus]:

1. Through the Damascene[^1], who says that "in the divine [persons] the common is, as substance, the particular, as an atom [individual]": therefore if there is there the common and the particular, therefore [there is] a universal, since to the particular there corresponds no other common than the universal.

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen through the definition[^2] of the universal and the particular. "For the universal is what is predicated of many; the particular of one alone"; but these accounts are to be found in the divine [persons]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is "in more" and is univocal, is universal with respect to those things, in regard to which it is "in more"[^3]; but the essence or substance is "in more" than person, and "in more" univocally, since[^4] it expresses one nature found in them according to identity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in the divine [persons] there is the communicable and the incommunicable; therefore either by the same [thing], or by one [thing] and another. Not by the same; because that is not intelligible, that out of the same there should formally come community and property, agreement and difference[^5]: therefore by one and another: therefore if by one [thing it is] communicable, by another incommunicable, then since the communicable is by reason of *that by which it is*, [and] the incommunicable by reason of *that which it is*, therefore *that by which it is* and *that which it is* in the divine [persons] are [there] through difference; but where these are through difference, there is universal and particular: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more universal[^6] [it is]; but the divine essence is the most simple: therefore there most of all is the account of the universal.

**On the contrary:** 1. Boethius[^7] says, that there is neither universal nor particular [there].

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, since wherever there is universal, there is one form multipliable or multiplied[^8]; in token of which everything,

which signifies *as though universally*, can be added to every universal; but in God there is not one form or nature multipliable nor multiplied, nor does it receive a universal sign, so that it might be said *every God*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, where there is particular, there is form or nature as *here* and *now*[^9]; but the divine nature, whether in itself, or in the hypostases, is not *here* and *now*, but always and everywhere: therefore neither in itself nor in the hypostases is there particular there.

4. Likewise, where there is particular and universal, the universal is simpler than the particular[^10]: therefore since in God the essence is not simpler than the person, because in person there is no accident, no constitutive principle: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every nature in which there is universal and particular is in a determinate genus; and every such [nature] is limited[^11]: therefore since the divine nature is infinite, it is plain etc.

> **Conclusion.** *Although in the divine [persons] there is the account of common and proper, of communicable and incommunicable, nevertheless there is by no means there the account of universal and particular.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted, that, since our faith[^12] posits trinity and unity in the divine [persons], it necessarily posits agreement and distinction. And since agreement is only in what is communicable to many[^13] and common, but distinction is only in what is proper and incommunicable, necessarily in the divine [persons] there is posited the account of *common* and *proper*, of *communicable* and *incommunicable*.

But since in God and[^14] creatures there is distinction of supposits, it is otherwise in God than in creatures. For the distinction of supposits is greater than accidental distinction; whence although it is made known through accidents[^15], nevertheless it is not made through accidents. For when accidents have been removed, it is still possible to understand supposits to differ; and since it is not made through consequent accidents[^16], it is necessary that it be made from origin or from an originative principle. From origin it is, when one differs from another, because it emanates from it; for the same cannot emanate from itself. Such distinction of supposits is in God, but this[^17] cannot be in a creature, namely distinction only through origin; for no creature can give to another its whole essence. If therefore it gives a part, it is necessary that there be there another difference than that of origin; and therefore there is difference from an originative principle. But this is not form in itself, since it expresses something communicable[^18], nor matter in itself, since it expresses something undistinguished[^19]: therefore this form does as coming to matter. For since the [form] coming to matter receives a part, not the whole[^20] matter, hence it is, that it distinguishes it [the matter], and by distinguishing it [the form] is drawn

into a part and is limited and becomes *here* and *now* and one in number and particular.

Since therefore in the divine [persons] there is no addition to matter nor drawing into[^21] a part, therefore in the divine [persons] there falls neither universal nor particular, as the reasons brought forward in the opposing arguments show.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from the Damascene, it must be said, that the *Damascene* improperly posited *particular* for *incommunicable*.

2. To that which is objected, that the universal is what is predicated of many; it must be said, that this is the account of the communicable; but it is not [the account] of the universal, except according as it is really understood to be multiplied[^22] in them. Similarly is to be solved [the question] of the particular.

3. To that which is objected, that [it] is "in more" and univocal etc.; it must be said, that the universal is "in more", in such a way that [it is] simpler, and becomes "in"[^23] less by addition to it; but not so in God.

4. To that which is asked, whether by the same [thing][^24] [there is] communicable and incommunicable; it must be said, that by one and another; because, as Augustine says[^25], "by one [thing] he is God, and by another Father"; but not by one and another according to *thing*, but according to *reason*: because by deity he is God, by paternity Father, and paternity is not a thing other than the essence, since paternity is the essence; nevertheless it is other in reason. And since the ablative expresses reason, therefore he is not God by the same [thing] as he is Father[^26]. — And if you object: either to that reason there corresponds something in reality, or nothing; it must be said, that that reason by comparison to the essence is only a mode, but by comparison to another person is a thing. And this is plain, since to have essence from another and not to have [it from another] does not express a different thing, but only a mode; but to have from another and not to have from another does express a real difference, since no thing is from itself and from another[^27].

5. To that which is last objected concerning the simple, it must be said, that there is a simple [that is] open to addition, and in this way the universal is simple; in another way [there is] a simple, because it excludes composition and addition, and this incompatibility is not consonant with universality: and in this way the divine essence is simple, which in no way is drawable into a part by addition, as the universal is drawn: and therefore it is not universal.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 6. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 9. In quo textu Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 habet *Antonius* pro *atomus*.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6. See here in the text of the Master, c. 9. In which text the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, has *Antonius* in place of *atomus*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc distinctionem*, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 exhibentibus *definitionem*, quae sumta est ex Aristot., 1. *Periherm.* c. 5. (c. 7.).

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *distinctionem* ("distinction"), with the other codices and edition 1 however exhibiting *definitionem* ("definition"), which is taken from Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 5 (c. 7).

la: Haec definitio universalis colligitur ex Aristot., II. *Poster.* c. 14. (c. 12.). Vide supra p. I. huius d. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opp.

en: This definition of the universal is gathered from Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* II, c. 14 (c. 12). See above, p. I of this distinction, q. 4, arg. 1 on the opposite side.

la: Fide codd. K T Z substituimus *quia* pro ambiguo *quod*.

en: On the authority of codices K, T, Z we have substituted *quia* in place of the ambiguous *quod*.

la: Antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 lectionem *formaliter* pro *personalis* restituimus, quae certe melior est.

en: We have restored the reading of the older manuscripts and of edition 1, *formaliter* in place of *personalis*, which is certainly the better.

la: Cfr. Libr. *de Causis*, prop. 4. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum uno alteroque codice minus bene *maxima*; plures codd. ut *A F H cc ff* omittunt *est*.

en: Cf. the book *On Causes*, proposition 4. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with one or another codex less well [reads] *maxima*; several codices such as *A, F, H, cc, ff* omit *est*.

la: Libr. *de Trin.* c. 1. et 2, ubi haec propositio sententialiter sive tanquam conclusio continetur; ostendit siquidem ibi Boethius, quod propter summam substantialem Dei indifferentiam seu unitatem et simplicitatem «nulla in eo sit diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo, atque idcirco nec numerus», ex quibus praedicta propositio consequitur. Vide Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 1. — Mox codd. F G post *quod* satis bene addunt *in divinis*, codd. H M vero *Deus*.

en: Book *On the Trinity*, c. 1 and 2, where this proposition is contained in substance or as a conclusion; for Boethius shows there that on account of the supreme substantial indifference of God, that is, his unity and simplicity, "there is in him no diversity, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents, and therefore not even number," from which the aforesaid proposition follows. See Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 1. — Soon after, codices F, G after *quod* fittingly add *in divinis*, but codices H, M [add] *Deus*.

la: Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 43. (VI. c. 13.) universale definit: *quod pluribus natura inesse natum est*. — Mox addendo coniunctionem *quoniam* praestamus lectionem mss. et ed. 1, quam genuinam iudicamus, quia respondet verbis Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 5. (c. 7.) et ibid. II. c. 1. (c. 10): οὐ γὰρ πᾶν καθόλου σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ὅτι καθόλου, et versioni a Boethio factae (qua et schola et in specie S. Doctor uti solebant): *Omne enim non universale significat, sed quoniam universaliter* (ed. Migne, *Patrol. lat.* tom. 64. col. 322 et 348). Vide Nicolaum de Orbellis O. Min. (floruit circa 1480) in *Expositione logicae* supra textum Mag. Petri Hispani, c. *de Propositione*.

en: In this respect Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 43 (VI, c. 13) defines the universal: *that which is by nature apt to be in many*. — Soon after, by adding the conjunction *quoniam* we offer the reading of the manuscripts and of edition 1, which we judge genuine, because it corresponds to the words of Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 5 (c. 7) and *ibid.* II, c. 1 (c. 10): *ou gar pan katholou sēmainei, all' hoti katholou*, and to the version made by Boethius (which both the Schools and St. [Bonaventure] in particular were accustomed to use): *For not every [sign] signifies the universal, but [the] "as though universally"* (ed. Migne, *Patrol. lat.* tome 64, col. 322 and 348). See Nicholas of Orbellis O.F.M. (flourished about 1480) in his *Exposition of Logic* on the text of Master Peter of Spain, c. *On the Proposition*.

la: Porphyr., *de Praedicab.*, individuum seu particulare definit: «Cuius collectio proprietatum nunquam in alio quolibet eadem erit». Inter has proprietates principatum obtinent locus et tempus. Cfr. Boeth., *de Trin.* c. 1, qui loco principatum dat, et Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 24. (c. 31.), qui et loci et temporis mentionem facit ac de universali per oppositionem ad particulare iuxta translationem Boethii haec adiungit: *Universale autem, quod est in omnibus, impossibile est sentire; neque enim hoc aliquid est neque nunc neque ubi* (οὐ γὰρ τόδε οὐδὲ νῦν); *neque enim utique esset universale; quod enim semper est et ubique, universale dicimus esse.* — Ultima verba intelligas de perpetuitate et ubiquitate negativa i. e. illa quae abstrahit ab omni determinato tempore et loco; non autem de positiva i. e. illa quae se extendit ad omnia tempora et loca, et quae soli divinae naturae per se singulari (neutiquam universali) convenit, de qua in hoc agitur argumento. — Codd. L O *ibi est materia et forma* loco *ibi est forma vel natura*.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, defines the individual or particular: "Whose collection of properties will never be the same in any other whatsoever." Among these properties place and time hold the chief place. Cf. Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 1, who gives the chief place to *place*, and Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 24 (c. 31), who makes mention of both place and time, and concerning the universal in opposition to the particular, according to Boethius's translation, adds these words: *But it is impossible to perceive the universal, which is in all things; for it is not this *something* nor *now* nor *where* (*ou gar tode oude nun*); nor would it indeed be universal; for what always is and everywhere, we call universal.* — The last words you are to understand of negative perpetuity and ubiquity, i.e., that which abstracts from every determinate time and place; not however of positive [perpetuity and ubiquity], i.e., that which extends itself to all times and places, and which befits the divine nature alone, [as] of itself singular (and by no means universal), about which there is question in the present argument. — Codices L, O [read] *ibi est materia et forma* in place of *ibi est forma vel natura*.

la: Vide Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. de Specie et Differentia, et Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 20. (c. 24.), ubi ex hoc deducit, demonstrationem universalem esse praestantiorem particulari.

en: See Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. on Species and Difference, and Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 20 (c. 24), where from this he deduces that universal demonstration is more excellent than particular.

la: Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 4.

en: Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 4.

la: Ed. 1 *vera* pro *nostra*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *vera* in place of *nostra*.

la: Intellige haec verba in sensu passivo, ita ut sensus sit: nisi in aliquo, quod aptum est communicari seu haberi a pluribus. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit *a*.

en: Understand these words in the passive sense, so that the sense is: only in something which is apt to be communicated or to be had by many. — The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, omits *a*.

la: Vat. repetit hic *in*, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition repeats here *in*, which is missing in the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Alluditur ad supra in 3. fundam. a nobis allatam definitionem individui. Collectio accidentalium proprietatum, quibus individuum nobis innotescit, hoc versu continetur: *Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen.*

en: Allusion is made to the definition of the individual brought forward by us above in the 3rd fundamentum. The collection of accidental properties, by which the individual becomes known to us, is contained in this verse: *Form, figure, place, time, stock, fatherland, name.*

la: Ed. 1 *consequenter*, in qua lectione interpunctionem mutes necesse est. Paulo infra post *ab altero* in ed. 1 additur *solum*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *consequenter*, in which reading it is necessary that you change the punctuation. A little below, after *ab altero*, in edition 1 *solum* is added.

la: Ex pluribus mss. ut A T Y etc. substituimus *haec* pro *hoc*. — De ratione, quam S. Doctor hic affert, plura vide supra d. 9. q. 1.

en: From several manuscripts such as A, T, Y etc. we have substituted *haec* in place of *hoc*. — Concerning the reason which the Holy Doctor here brings forward, see more above d. 9, q. 1.

la: Sensum istorum verborum accipe a S. Doctore, II. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., ubi fusius de principio individuationis agit: «Rursus, quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinctionis, valde difficile est capere; cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam sibi similem, sicut et ipse Philosophus (VII. *Metaph.* text. 35. — ed. Paris., VI. c. 13.) dicit, etiam in sole et luna esse». — Idem dicit S. Thomas de formis materialibus seu per se non subsistentibus, in *Comment. super VII. Metaph.* lect. 13. et in opusculo *de Individuatione*. — Ex mss. et edd. 1. 2. 3. ante *communicabile* supplevimus *quid*.

en: Take the sense of these words from the Holy Doctor, II *Sentences*, d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, in the body [of the article], where he treats more fully of the principle of individuation: "Again, how form is the total and chief cause of numerical distinction, is very difficult to grasp; since every created form, as far as its nature is concerned, is born to have another like itself, as also the Philosopher himself (*Metaphysics* VII, text 35 — ed. Paris, VI, c. 13) says, [exists] also in the sun and moon." — The same St. Thomas says of material forms or [forms] not per se subsistent, in his *Commentary on Metaphysics* VII, lect. 13, and in the opusculum *On Individuation*. — From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied *quid* before *communicabile*.

la: Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 8. (VI. c. 3.) materiam describit: *Dico autem materiam, quae per se ipsam neque quid neque quantum nec aliquid aliud quippiam dicitur, quibus ens determinatur.* Vide etiam I. *Metaph.* text. 17. (c. 8.), ubi ait: *Quando namque nihil erat discretum* (translat. arabico-latina: *Quoniam autem in fundamento naturae non est aliquid distinctum*), *palam quia nihil erat verum dicere de substantia illa... nec enim quale aliquid id possibile esse nec quantum nec quid.*

en: In this respect Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3) describes matter: *I call matter that which through itself is said to be neither what nor how much nor anything else of those by which being is determined.* See also *Metaphysics* I, text 17 (c. 8), where he says: *For when nothing was discrete* (Arabic-Latin translation: *But since in the foundation of nature there is nothing distinguished*), *it is plain that there was nothing true to say about that substance... for it was not possible that it be either of some quality or of some quantity or some what.*

la: In Vat. malo omittitur *totam*, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1, a quibus etiam, uno alterove tantum codice excepto, paulo infra lectio Vat. *trahit* loco *trahitur* emendatur.

en: In the Vatican edition *totam* is wrongly omitted, which nevertheless stands in the manuscripts and in edition 1, by which also, with only one or another codex excepted, a little below the Vatican reading *trahit* is corrected in place of *trahitur*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 hic *ad* pro *in* et mox *vel* loco *nec*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and of edition 1, [reads] here *ad* in place of *in*, and soon after *vel* in place of *nec*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 *multiplicatum*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the codices and of edition 1, [reads] *multiplicatum*.

la: Plurimi mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent verbum *fit* loco *sic* et particulam *in*, quam Vat. omittit. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 male substituit *sicut* pro *sic*, post quam particulam plures codd. ut G H K T etc. adiiciunt *est*.

en: Most manuscripts with edition 1 exhibit the verb *fit* in place of *sic* and the particle *in*, which the Vatican edition omits. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and edition 1, badly substitutes *sicut* for *sic*, after which particle several codices such as G, H, K, T etc. add *est*.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *sit*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and of edition 1 we have supplied *sit*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11: *Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est.* Cfr. etiam supra d. 6. dub. 2. et infra d. XXXIII lit. Magistri circa finem, ubi August. *Serm.* I. in *Psalm.* 68. n. 3. affertur.

en: Book VII, *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 11: *Wherefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, [it is] not [that] by which he is Father, but [that] by which he is.* Cf. also above d. 6, dub. 2 and below d. XXXIII, in the text of the Master near the end, where Augustine, *Sermon* 1 on *Psalm* 68, n. 3 is brought forward.

la: Plura de hoc vide infra d. 33. q. 2. et dub. 4. — Mox post *primum aut* in Vat. et cod. cc additur *tunc*, quod deest in aliis mss. et ed. 1.

en: See more on this below d. 33, q. 2 and dub. 4. — Soon after, after *primum aut* in the Vatican edition and codex *cc* there is added *tunc*, which is missing in the other manuscripts and in edition 1.

la: Ad pleniorem praedictorum intelligentiam vide ea quae S. Doctor supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. dicit. Cfr. etiam infra d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 2. ad 7. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. incongrue *haberi essentiam ab alio et non haberi* loco *habere essentiam ab alio et non habere* et mox *nullum* pro *nulla*[?] *res*. Cod. T *esse autem ab alio et non esse ab alio* loco *habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio*, in qua propositione multi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene *et non habere ab alio*. Dein aliqui codd. *sed ab alio* pro *et ab alio*.

en: For a fuller understanding of the foregoing see what the Holy Doctor says above d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. Cf. also below d. 26, q. 1, ad 2 and d. 34, q. 2, ad 7. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, incongruously [reads] *haberi essentiam ab alio et non haberi* in place of *habere essentiam ab alio et non habere*, and soon after *nullum*[?] in place of *nulla res*. Codex T [reads] *esse autem ab alio et non esse ab alio* in place of *habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio*, in which proposition many codices with edition 1 less well [read] *et non habere ab alio*. Then some codices [read] *sed ab alio* pro *et ab alio*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Sententia communis affirmat, in divinis esse quidem rationem communis et proprii, minime vero rationem universalis et particularis, sive speciei et individui. Unde notanda est differentia inter *universale* et *commune*, *particulare* et *proprium* sive *incommunicabile*. Licet enim omne universale sit commune, non tamen omne commune est universale. Universale enim praedicabile, de quo est hic sermo, opponitur particulari, «quod, ut dicit Alex. Hal., eo dicitur, quod *partem capiat communis naturae*», et est aliquod superius, quod per differentias contrahi potest ad sua inferiora, ita ut in eis realiter multiplicetur. Commune vero in genere est unum in pluribus; quod dupliciter potest esse, scil. vel multiplicatum in pluribus, et tunc idem est ac universale; vel non multiplicatum, ut essentia divina, quae una est in tribus personis (cfr. supra d. 5. dub. 2.). In hoc sensu speciali commune retinet nomen genericum et distinguitur ab *universali*.

**II.** Pro explicatione ampliore haec referimus ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.): «In Deo non est ponere esse universale, nec esse singulare vel particulare; habet tamen esse divinum de utroque quod est perfectionis. *Universale* enim est in multis et dicitur de multis, quia non est totum, quod sunt singularia, sicut homo non dicit totum, quod est Socrates, sicut quantitatem et qualitatem et operationem, quae tamen sunt in esse Socratis... Sed cum dicitur Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus, dicitur esse divinum in multis, sed non de multis. Cum enim dico Deus, dico totum esse Patris, totum esse Filii. Esse ergo de multis imperfectionis est in esse universali, unde non convenit esse divino; sed esse in multis convenit, quia hoc est virtutis et nobilitatis».

«Similiter *particulare* dicitur quod est in uno solo; non tamen est de multis. Quod non sit de multis perfectionis est, quia dicit totum esse; sed esse in uno solo imperfectionis est, quia nobilius est esse in multis quam in uno. Ideo esse divinum est in multis, non in uno solo, esse, inquam, in multis non multiplicatum, sed unum. — Item est loqui de particulari sive individuo tribus modis: uno modo secundum quod dicitur esse a materia; alio modo secundum quod ab accidentibus; tertio modo secundum quod a forma signata et singulari». Deinde probat, quod nullo istorum modorum esse possit singulare in Deo, et concludit: «Cum igitur Deitas nullo modo plurificetur in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, non se habet Deitas ad Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ut universale ad singulare». Bene autem monet Dionys. Carth. (loc. cit.), illa verba *esse de multis* sensum habere, *esse partem sive aliquid eorum, quae sunt multa vel in multis*. Hoc patet ex tota Alexandri argumentatione. Ipse non negat divinam essentiam praedicari de tribus personis analogo modo, sicut omne universale, quod est in multis, praedicatur de multis.

**III.** Fundamentum solutionis ad 4. est distinctio inter *essentiam* et *proprietatem*, de quo cfr. supra d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion; d. 8. p. II. q. 2; d. 33. q. 2, et praecipue d. 26. q. 1. et Scholion. — Quaestio de principio individuationis in fine responsionis tangitur, de qua in II. Sent. d. 3. plura dicenda.

**IV.** De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 48. m. 1. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 3. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. 13; *S.* p. I. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 43. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The common opinion affirms that in the divine [persons] there is indeed the account of common and proper, but by no means the account of universal and particular, or of species and individual. Whence is to be noted the difference between *universal* and *common*, *particular* and *proper* or *incommunicable*. For although every universal is common, nevertheless not every common is universal. For the universal predicable, of which is the present discourse, is opposed to the particular, "which, as Alex. of Hales says, is so called because it *takes a part of the common nature*", and is something superior, which through differences can be contracted to its inferiors, in such a way that in them it is really multiplied. But the common in genus is one in many; which can be in two ways, namely either multiplied in the many, and then it is the same as universal; or not multiplied, as the divine essence, which is one in three persons (cf. above d. 5, dub. 2). In this special sense the common retains the generic name and is distinguished from the *universal*.

**II.** For a fuller explanation we report these things from Alex. of Hales (place cited below): "In God there is not to be posited universal being, nor singular or particular being; nevertheless divine being has of each [whatever] is of perfection. For the *universal* is in many and is said of many, since it is not the whole that the singulars are, just as man does not express the whole that Socrates is, such as the quantity and quality and operation, which nevertheless are in Socrates' being... But when it is said *God Father, God Son, God Holy Spirit*, divine being is said to be in many, but not of many. For when I say *God*, I express the whole being of the Father, the whole being of the Son. To be *of* many therefore is of imperfection in universal being, whence it does not befit divine being; but to be *in* many befits [it], because this is of power and nobility."

"Similarly the *particular* is said to be that which is in one alone; nevertheless it is not of many. That it is not of many is of perfection, because it expresses the whole being; but to be in one alone is of imperfection, because it is more noble to be in many than in one. Therefore divine being is in many, not in one alone, being, I say, in many not multiplied, but one. — Likewise one can speak of the particular or individual in three modes: in one mode according as it is said to be from matter; in another mode according as [it is] from accidents; in a third mode according as [it is] from a determined and singular form." Then he proves that in none of these modes can there be the singular in God, and concludes: "Since therefore the Deity is in no way pluralized in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Deity does not stand to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit as the universal to the singular." But Dionys. Carth. (place cited) well notes, that those words *to be of many* have the sense of *to be a part or some one of those things, which are many or in many*. This is plain from the whole argumentation of Alexander. He himself does not deny that the divine essence is predicated of the three persons in an analogous way, just as every universal, which is in many, is predicated of many.

**III.** The foundation of the solution to [argument] 4 is the distinction between *essence* and *property*, concerning which cf. above d. 13, q. 3 and Scholion; d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 33, q. 2; and especially d. 26, q. 1 and Scholion. — The question of the principle of individuation is touched on at the end of the response, concerning which more must be said in II Sent., d. 3.

**IV.** On the question itself: Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 1, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 3, a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 12, 13; *S.* p. I, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *S.* a. 43, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum in divinis personis sit principium materiale.

title_alt: Whether there is a material principle in the divine persons

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.

#### *Utrum in divinis personis poni possit principium materiale.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere principium materiale. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quandocumque aliquis vel aliquid est de aliquo, ita quod ipsum est distinctum, et illud, de quo est, indistinctum, est de illo tanquam de materiali principio[^1]; sed persona Filii est de substantia Patris, et persona distinguitur, substantia dicit quid indistinctum: ergo est sicut materiale principium.

2. Item, sicut efficiens et finis sunt causae correlativae, ita forma et materia[^2] — forma enim dicitur respectu materiae — sed in Deo est ponere causam formalem, «ipse enim est forma», ut dicit Boethius[^3]: ergo in Deo est ponere materiam.

3. Item, videtur quod causa materialis magis competat Deo quam aliquod genus causarum, quia materia in his inferioribus dat existentiam et permanentiam propter sui incorruptionem, unde fundamentum est existentiae creatae[^4]: si ergo Deus sive divinum esse habet existentiam sive permanentiam per fundamentum incorruptibile, videtur quod Deo maxime competat ratio materialis principii, ergo etc.

4. Item, in rebus creatis finitas a forma venit, sed infinitas a materia[^5]; sed omne quod est in Deo, est infinitum: ergo cum Deo maxime conveniat passio consequens principium materiale, maxime competit et ipsum.

5. Item, quamvis in Deo sit summa et omnimoda simplicitas, tamen nos ponimus in Deo *quod est* et *quo est* vere, sed tamen[^6] per indifferentiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod in Deo possit poni materia et forma, tamen per indifferentiam.

6. Item, omnis distinctio est a forma[^7], ergo circumscripta omni forma creata, materia non distinguitur, ergo non est aliud a Deo, ergo est Deus, quia omne quod est et non distinguitur a Deo, est Deus: videtur ergo, quod materiale principium sit ipse Deus, et ita competere divinis personis[^8].

**Contra:**
1. Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^9]: «Forma sine materia non potest esse subiectum», et loquitur de Deo: ergo in Deo non erit ratio principii materialis.

2. Item, materia inter omnia entia est imperfectissimum, unde et Augustinus dicit in libro *Confessionum*[^10], quod prope nihil est; sed Deus est omnino perfectissimus: ergo omnino in eo nihil invenitur imperfectionis: ergo nec quod est materiae.

3. Item, materia est principium patiendi[^11], unde pati est a materia. Omne igitur, in quo est materia, est natum pati et recipere; sed nihil tale est omnipotens; in hoc enim, quod pati potest, deficit a posse: ergo in omnipotente nullo modo est materiale principium.

4. Item, si materia est in Deo, aut respectu

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sui[^12], aut aliorum. Si respectu aliorum: cum ergo materia sit ens in potentia ad alia nec distinguatur ab aliis rebus, sed per eas perficiatur, tunc Deus reciperet complementum a creatura nec ab ea distingueretur, quod absurdum est. Si autem materia est[^13] in Deo respectu sui, aut pure est materia, aut aliquid aliud. Si pure materia: ergo non est ens[^14]. Et praeterea, nihil est materia sui ipsius: ergo oportet, quod ibi sit aliquid cum materia: et si hoc, ergo divinum esse est compositum et mixtum: ergo nec Deus habet esse simplex ac per hoc nec esse primum, et ita non est Deus.

### CONCLUSIO.

> In Deo nullo modo, nec proprie nec transumtive, poni potest materiale principium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in Deo nullo modo, nec proprie, nec transumtive recipitur materiale principium. Et ratio huius est, quoniam materia dicit principium passivum et ita incompletum; et quoniam a divino esse[^15] omnis incompletio et omnis passio penitus removenda est, ideo nullo modo genus materialis principii in Deo esse ponitur.

**Ad 1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod persona est de substantia, et ipsa est distincta, et substantia non; dicendum, quod hic est defectus quantum ad utramque conditionem. Nam primo haec non recipitur, quod persona sit de substantia, sicut vult Augustinus[^16], quia «non dicimus tres personas ex eadem essentia»; licet haec communiter recipiatur, quod Filius est de substantia Patris, ubi non materia, sed originis consubstantialitas designatur, sicut supra ostensum est distinctione quinta[^17]. Alia est conditio, quae deficit: nam materia est distincta[^18] et possibilis ad distinctionem per formam; sed substantia vel essentia nullo modo distinguitur nec per se nec per accidens; et ita patet, quod non convenit ei ratio materiae.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod efficiens refertur ad finem et forma ad materiam; dicendum, quod nullius causae habitudo cadit in Deo[^19] respectu sui, sed respectu creaturarum; et aliarum causarum habitudines in Deo recipiuntur, circumscripta dependentia, propter hoc, quod sonant in perfectionem[^20]; sed materia sonat omnino in imperfectionem. Et quod obiicitur, quod forma dicitur ad materiam; dicendum, quod est forma constitutiva et exemplaris. Et forma constitutiva dicitur ad materiam; et haec non cadit in Deo, sed forma exemplaris sic[^21]. Et si dicatur, quod Deus est forma in se, hoc est dictum, quia est actus purus non dependens a possibili. Nec tamen simile est de correspondentia formae et materiae, et efficientis et finis[^22]. Efficiens enim et finis possunt incidere in idem numero; sed forma et materia nunquam. Forma vero[^23] constitutiva incidit cum efficiente et fine in idem specie, non numero; forma vero exemplaris in idem numero.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia est fundamentum existentiae; dicendum, quod modus illius fundamenti Deo non competit, quia[^24] est fundamentum esse quod recipit aliunde, scilicet a forma; Deus autem a nullo recipit: ideo non cadit in eo materia.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinitate, dicendum, quod est infinitas ex defectu perfectionis, et haec competit materiae, sed non Deo; et est infi-

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nitas ex termino limitationis, et haec Deo et formae liberrimae, non materiae competit: et ita patet illud.

**Ad 5.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quare materia et forma non ponantur per indifferentiam: dicendum, quod ista duo, *quo est* et *quod est*, de ratione sua nullam important imperfectionem, sed ratione eius quod differunt. Unde, sublata eorum differentia, manet completio, et tunc in divinis recipiuntur. Sed materia, non tantum quia differt a forma, dicit incompletionem, sed etiam quia materia est: et ideo nullo modo ponitur in Deo.

**Ad 6.** Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod circumscripta omni forma, materia non distinguitur: dicendum, quod ista propositio: *omnis distinctio est a forma*, non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur de distinctione perfecta — quod enim habet esse distinctum habet esse completum — de distinctione autem qualicumque falsum est. Materia enim differt a forma, et constat quod se ipsa differt ab ea. Sic potest dici et in proposito, quod materia differt a Deo se ipsa: tamen ex parte sua, quia non est perfecta, non cadit perfecta distinctio: sed ex parte Dei, quia perfectissimus est, perfecta cadit distinctio. Causa enim distinguitur a causato, ens actu ab ente in potentia; et istae sunt primae differentiae et summae.

english:
### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether in the divine persons a material principle can be posited.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether in the divine persons a material principle is to be posited. And that there is, is shown in this manner.

1. Whenever someone or something is of something, in such wise that it itself is distinct and that of which it is is undistinct, it is of that as of a material principle[^1]; but the person of the Son is of the substance of the Father, and the person is distinct, [whereas] substance expresses something undistinct: therefore it is as a material principle.

2. Likewise, just as efficient [cause] and end are correlative causes, so [are] form and matter[^2] — for form is said with respect to matter — but in God a formal cause is to be posited, «for he himself is form», as Boethius says[^3]: therefore in God matter is to be posited.

3. Likewise, it seems that material cause belongs to God more than any other genus of causes, because matter in these lower things gives existence and permanence on account of its incorruption, whence it is the foundation of created existence[^4]: if therefore God or the divine being has existence or permanence through an incorruptible foundation, it seems that the account of a material principle most of all belongs to God, therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in created things finitude comes from form, but infinity from matter[^5]; but everything that is in God is infinite: therefore since the affection consequent upon a material principle most of all befits God, [matter] itself also most of all belongs [to him].

5. Likewise, although in God there is the highest and altogether complete simplicity, nevertheless we posit in God *that which is* and *that by which it is* truly, but yet[^6] by way of indifference: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that in God matter and form can be posited, yet by way of indifference.

6. Likewise, every distinction is from form[^7], therefore, every created form being set aside, matter is not distinguished, therefore it is not other than God, therefore it is God, because everything that is and is not distinguished from God is God: it seems therefore that the material principle is God himself, and so [it seems] to belong to the divine persons[^8].

**On the contrary:**
1. Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*[^9]: «Form without matter cannot be a subject», and he speaks of God: therefore in God there will not be the account of a material principle.

2. Likewise, matter among all beings is the most imperfect, whence also Augustine says in the book of *Confessions*[^10] that it is near to nothing; but God is altogether most perfect: therefore in him nothing of imperfection is found at all: therefore neither what belongs to matter.

3. Likewise, matter is the principle of being acted upon[^11], whence to be acted upon is from matter. Everything therefore in which matter is, is born to be acted upon and to receive; but nothing such is omnipotent; for in this, that it can be acted upon, it falls short of [full] capacity: therefore in the omnipotent there is in no way a material principle.

4. Likewise, if matter is in God, either with respect to

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itself[^12], or with respect to other things. If with respect to other things: since therefore matter is a being in potency to others nor is distinguished from other things, but is perfected through them, then God would receive completion from a creature, nor would he be distinguished from it, which is absurd. But if matter is[^13] in God with respect to itself, either it is purely matter, or something else. If purely matter: therefore it is not a being[^14]. And besides, nothing is matter of itself: therefore it is necessary that there be there something with the matter: and if so, then the divine being is composed and mixed: therefore neither does God have simple being, and consequently not first being either, and so he is not God.

### CONCLUSION.

> In God in no way, neither properly nor by transumption, can a material principle be posited.

**I respond:** It must be said that in God in no way, neither properly nor by transumption, is a material principle received. And the reason for this is that matter expresses a passive principle and so an incomplete one; and because from the divine being[^15] every incompletion and every passion must be utterly removed, therefore in no way is the genus of material principle posited to be in God.

**To 1.** To that, then, which is objected — that the person is of the substance, and itself is distinct, while the substance is not [distinct]; it must be said that here there is a defect with respect to either condition. For first this is not received, that the person be *of* the substance, as Augustine wishes[^16], because «we do not say three persons *out of* the same essence»; although this is commonly received, that the Son is of the substance of the Father, where not matter, but the consubstantiality of origin is designated, as was shown above in the fifth distinction[^17]. The other condition that fails: for matter is distinct[^18] and capable of distinction through form; but substance or essence is in no way distinguished, neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; and so it is plain that the account of matter does not belong to it.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that efficient is referred to end and form to matter; it must be said that the relation of no [created] cause occurs in God[^19] with respect to himself, but with respect to creatures; and the relations of the other causes are received in God, with dependence set aside, on account of this, that they sound toward perfection[^20]; but matter sounds altogether toward imperfection. And as to what is objected, that form is said in relation to matter; it must be said that there is constitutive form and exemplar form. And constitutive form is said in relation to matter; and this does not occur in God, but exemplar form does[^21]. And if it be said that God is form in himself, this is said because he is pure act not depending on the possible. Nor however is the case similar concerning the correspondence of form and matter, and of efficient and end[^22]. For efficient and end can coincide in the same in number; but form and matter never. Constitutive form indeed[^23] coincides with efficient and end in the same in species, not in number; but exemplar form [coincides with them] in the same in number.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that matter is the foundation of existence; it must be said that the mode of that foundation does not belong to God, because[^24] it is a foundation receiving being from elsewhere, namely from form; but God receives from no one: therefore matter does not occur in him.

**To 4.** To that which is objected concerning infinity, it must be said that there is infinity from defect of perfection, and this belongs to matter, but not to God; and there is infi-

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nity from the term of limitation, and this belongs to God and to most-free form, not to matter: and so that [argument] is plain.

**To 5.** To that which is objected, why matter and form are not posited by way of indifference: it must be said that those two, *that by which it is* and *that which is*, of their own account import no imperfection, but [import imperfection] by reason of that wherein they differ. Hence, with their difference removed, completion remains, and then they are received in divine matters. But matter, not only because it differs from form expresses incompletion, but also because it is matter: and therefore in no way is it posited in God.

**To 6.** To that which is objected last, that, every form being set aside, matter is not distinguished: it must be said that this proposition: *every distinction is from form*, does not have truth, unless it is understood of perfect distinction — for what has distinct being has complete being — but of distinction of any sort whatsoever it is false. For matter differs from form, and it is plain that it differs from it by itself. So it can also be said in the present case, that matter differs from God by itself: yet on its own side, because it is not perfect, no perfect distinction occurs: but on the side of God, because he is most perfect, perfect distinction occurs. For cause is distinguished from caused, being in act from being in potency; and these are the first and highest differences.

la: Haec propositio fundatur in Aristotelis sententia de materia et forma, quae se habent ad invicem ut potentia (indistinctum) et actus (distinctum), et secundum quam forma substantialis rerum genitarum (excepta anima rationali) educitur e potentia materiae.

en: This proposition is founded on Aristotle's teaching concerning matter and form, which are related to one another as potency (the undistinct) and act (the distinct), and according to which the substantial form of generated things (excepting the rational soul) is educed from the potency of matter.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 28-31. (c. 3.) et V. *Metaph.* text. 2. et 3. (IV. c. 2.), ubi hoc colligi potest tum ex definitione causarum, tum ex eo, quod efficiens et finis etc. ponuntur esse sibi invicem causa. Vide S. Thomae et Scoti commentaria in hos locos. — Ex plurimis mss. substituimus *correlativae* loco *corollariae*, pro quo ed. 1 *corrolate*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text. 28–31 (c. 3) and *Metaphysics* V, text. 2 and 3 (IV, c. 2), where this can be gathered both from the definition of causes, and from the fact that efficient and end etc. are posited to be each other's cause. See the commentaries of St. Thomas and Scotus on these passages. — From most of the manuscripts we have substituted *correlativae* in place of *corollariae*, for which edition 1 [reads] *corrolate*.

la: Libr. *de Trin.* c. 2.

en: Book *On the Trinity*, c. 2.

la: Videsis Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 82. (c. 9.), ubi incorruptibilitas materiae monstratur, et VII. *Metaph.* text. 8. (VI. c. 3), ubi materia tanquam ultimum sive fundamentum substantiae exhibetur. — Ope plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *creatae* loco *creaturae*. Mox Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice ponit *cum* loco *si* et *Deum* pro *divinum* ac *habeat* loco *habet*.

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* I, text. 82 (c. 9), where the incorruptibility of matter is shown, and *Metaphysics* VII, text. 8 (VI, c. 3), where matter is exhibited as the ultimate or foundation of substance. — By the help of most of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *creatae* in place of *creaturae*. Next the Vatican edition, with only one or two codices, puts *cum* in place of *si*, and *Deum* in place of *divinum*, and *habeat* in place of *habet*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 59-72. (c. 6. et 7.) et Averroes, in *Comment.* super praedictos textus. — Paulo infra post *passio* fide fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 expunximus repetitum *passio* quod codd. *cc* hoc loco ponunt, ipso tamen omisso post *Deo*. Dein cod. *Z* post *competit* addit *ei*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text. 59–72 (cc. 6 and 7) and Averroes in his *Commentary* on the foregoing texts. — A little below, after *passio*, on the testimony of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out a repeated *passio* which codices *cc* put in this place, with the same omitted however after *Deo*. Then codex *Z* after *competit* adds *ei*.

la: Vat., refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, *tantum*. Mox plures codd. cum Vat. *posset* loco *possit*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the resistance of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] *tantum*. Next several codices with the Vatican edition [read] *posset* in place of *possit*.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaphys.* text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): *Actus namque separat* (ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ χωρίζει). — De indistinctione materiae vide q. praec. in corp.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text. 49 (VI, c. 13): *For act separates* (ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ χωρίζει). — On the indistinction of matter see the preceding question in the body.

la: In Vat. desiderantur verba *et ita competere divinis personis*, quae tamen exstant in omnibus mss. et sex primis edd.

en: In the Vatican edition the words *et ita competere divinis personis* ("and so [it seems] to belong to the divine persons") are wanting, which nevertheless are extant in all the manuscripts and the first six editions.

la: Cap. 2: *Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum.*

en: Chapter 2: *But the form which is without matter will not be able to be a subject.*

la: Libr. XII. c. 7. n. 7: *Tu eras et aliud nihil, unde fecisti caelum et terram, duo quaedam; unum prope te, alterum prope nihil.* — Ex multis mss. ut *A F G K T Y Z* etc. et sex primis edd. post *unde* supplevimus *et*, ac paulo infra fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *perfectissimus* loco *perfectissimum*. In fine argumenti cod. *A* *materia* pro *materiae*.

en: Book XII, c. 7, n. 7: *Thou wert and nothing else, whence thou madest heaven and earth, two certain things; the one near to thee, the other near to nothing.* — From many manuscripts such as *A F G K T Y Z* etc. and the first six editions, after *unde* we have supplied *et*, and a little below, on the testimony of most of the codices and edition 1, we have substituted *perfectissimus* in place of *perfectissimum*. At the end of the argument codex *A* [reads] *materia* in place of *materiae*.

la: Aristot., I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 33. (c. 7.): *Materia, ut materia, passiva est.* Et ibid. II. text. 53. (c. 9.): *Materiae enim est pati.* — Mox Vat. cum cod. *cc*, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *Unde omne* loco *Omne igitur*.

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text. 33 (c. 7): *Matter, as matter, is passive.* And the same II, text. 53 (c. 9): *For it belongs to matter to suffer.* — Next the Vatican edition with codex *cc*, with the other codices and edition 1 nevertheless resisting, [reads] *Unde omne* in place of *Omne igitur*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut *YZ* cum ed. 1 repetunt hic *respectu*.

en: Some codices such as *YZ* with edition 1 here repeat *respectu*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *est* pro *sit*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut *AGHISWZ* cum ed. 1 *absurdissimum* loco *absurdum*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *est* in place of *sit*. A little earlier several codices such as *AGHISWZ* with edition 1 [read] *absurdissimum* in place of *absurdum*.

la: Vide a nobis ex Aristotele allatam definitionem materiae q. praec. pag. 358 nota 11. — Mox Vat. cum cod. *cc* omittit *divinum esse*, quod exhibetur ab aliis mss., licet plures eorum cum ed. 1 incongrue *Deum* loco *divinum* ponant.

en: See the definition of matter brought forward by us from Aristotle in the preceding question, p. 358, note 11. — Next the Vatican edition with codex *cc* omits *divinum esse*, which is exhibited by the other manuscripts, although several of them with edition 1 incongruously put *Deum* in place of *divinum*.

la: Pauci codd. ut *SW* *a divinis* loco *a divino esse*. Mox ed. 1 *remota* pro *removenda*.

en: A few codices such as *SW* [read] *a divinis* in place of *a divino esse*. Next edition 1 [reads] *remota* in place of *removenda*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11: *Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias, unam essentiam et unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant... tamen tres personas eiusdem essentiae vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus; tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona.* — Paulo infra post *licet* plures codd. ut *A T X Y* cum ed. 1 omittunt *haec*.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 11: *Nor therefore do we so call the Trinity three persons or substances, one essence and one God, as though three certain things should subsist out of one matter... yet we say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as though there were there one thing which is essence, another which is person.* — A little below, after *licet*, several codices such as *A T X Y* with edition 1 omit *haec*.

en: Article 1, question 2.

la: Exhibemus lectionem plurimorum mss., quae cum subnexis magis convenit, dum Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus codd. habet *indistincta*, cui cod. *I* adiungit *de se*.

en: We exhibit the reading of most of the manuscripts, which agrees better with what follows, while the Vatican edition with edition 1 and some codices has *indistincta*, to which codex *I* adds *de se*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Deum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *Deum*.

la: Mendum Vat. et ed. 1 nec non aliquorum mss. *sonant imperfectionem* ex aliis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 correximus; cod. *Y* sanat *imperfectionem scil. dependentia*, non false, sed minus ad rem. Mox multi codd. cum Vat. et ed. 1 post *omnino* omittunt *in*, quod tamen in aliis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 6 invenitur.

en: The blunder of the Vatican edition and edition 1, and also of some manuscripts, *sonant imperfectionem* ("they sound imperfection"), we have corrected from the other manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; codex *Y* heals it [as] *imperfectionem scil. dependentia* ("imperfection, namely, dependence"), not falsely, but less to the point. Next many codices with the Vatican edition and edition 1, after *omnino*, omit *in*, which nevertheless is found in the other manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 6.

la: Ita multi codd. ut *ANORTVWXY* etc. cum ed. 1; Vat. cum aliquibus mss., interpunctione variata, incongrue *exemplaris, sicut si*; codd. *AZ* omittunt *sic*. Mox, postulantibus mss. et sex primis edd., substituimus *dictum* pro *dictu*. Immediate post legunt plures codd. ut *FGHKLOY ee* *quod* loco *quia*.

en: Thus many codices such as *ANORTVWXY* etc. with edition 1; the Vatican edition with some manuscripts, with the punctuation varied, incongruously [reads] *exemplaris, sicut si*; codices *AZ* omit *sic*. Next, at the request of the manuscripts and the first six editions, we have substituted *dictum* in place of *dictu*. Immediately after, several codices such as *FGHKLOY ee* read *quod* in place of *quia*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut *SWX* hic et paulo post *finalis*.

en: Some codices such as *SWX* [read] here and a little after *finalis* ("final").

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 delevimus hic additum *tantum*. — Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 70. (c. 7.) ait: *Veniunt autem tres (causae) in unam plerumque; ipsum enim quid est (causa formalis) et id cuius gratia (causa finalis) una est; ipsum vero unde motus primum (causa efficiens) specie eadem est his; homo enim hominem generat.*

en: On the testimony of most of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted an added *tantum* here. — Aristotle, *Physics* II, text. 70 (c. 7), says: *But for the most part the three (causes) come into one; for the very what-it-is (formal cause) and that for the sake of which (final cause) is one; while the very whence-the-motion-first (efficient cause) is the same in species with these; for man generates man.*

la: Supple: *materia*. In proxime sequentibus praestamus fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 lectionem, quae et cum sententia S. Doctoris de essentiali dependentia materiae a forma congruit (cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 12. a. 1. q. 1). Cod. *F*, transpositis verbis, *quia est fundamentum, quod recipit esse aliunde* etc.; Vat. vero cum edd. 4, 5, 6 *quia esse fundamentum est esse quod recipit aliud, et aliunde perficitur, scilicet a forma*; unde cod. *cc* cum edd. 2, 3 quoad primam propositionis partem cum Vat., quoad secundam partem, omissis scil. *aliud* et *ac perficitur*, cum aliis mss. consentit. — Paulo ante cod. *Y* *in Deo non reperitur* pro *Deo non competit*.

en: Supply: *matter*. In what immediately follows we present the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, which also agrees with the teaching of the Holy Doctor concerning the essential dependence of matter on form (cf. II *Sent.* d. 12, a. 1, q. 1). Codex *F*, with the words transposed, [reads] *quia est fundamentum, quod recipit esse aliunde* etc.; while the Vatican edition with editions 4, 5, 6 [reads] *quia esse fundamentum est esse quod recipit aliud, et aliunde perficitur, scilicet a forma*; whence codex *cc* with editions 2, 3, with respect to the first part of the proposition agrees with the Vatican edition, with respect to the second part — namely with *aliud* and *ac perficitur* omitted — agrees with the other manuscripts. — A little before, codex *Y* [reads] *in Deo non reperitur* in place of *Deo non competit*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec militat contra pantheismum seu potius materialismum, a Concilio Vaticano (const. I. *de Deo creatore*, can. 2.) his verbis notatum: *Si quis praeter materiam nihil esse affirmare non erubuerit: a. s.* In specie eadem confundit insaniam Davidis de Dinanto, cuius principale argumentum fuit illud quod ultimo inter ad oppos. legitur, scil. hoc; si Deus non esset aliud quod prima materia, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent simplicia. Nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit. Ita S. Thom. (*S. c. Gent.* 1. c. 17.) hoc Davidis argumentum refert, et deinde ad mentem S. Bonav. sic solvit: «Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia, qua nescivit, quid inter differentiam et diversitatem intersit. Differens enim, ut in decimo *Metaphysicorum* (text. comm. 12.) determinatur, dicitur ad aliquid; nam omne differens, aliquo est differens. Diversum autem aliquid absolute dicitur ex hoc, quod non est idem. Differentia igitur in his quaerenda est, quae in aliquo conveniunt: oportet enim aliquid in his assignari, secundum quod differant, sicut duae species conveniunt in genere, unde oportet, quod differentiis distinguantur. In his autem, quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quaerendum, quo differant: sed se ipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur; non enim participant generis quasi partem suae essentiae; et ideo non est quaerendum, quibus differant; se ipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unum est actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo convenientiam habentes». Idem argumentum Davidis B. Albert. simili modo solvit (*S.* p. I. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 2. q. incid.) — In eadem solut. ad 6. a S. Bonav. duplex ponitur species distinctionis, scil. altera perfecta et specifica per formam, altera imperfecta per propriam entitatem materiae.

**II.** Praeter citatos cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 3. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., I. *Sent.* d. 20. a. 1, ubi refert et solvit plura argumenta «Alexandri, cuiusdam Graeci, et David de Dinanto, Latini»; et S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 2. et a. 29. q. 2. — Ceteri doctores hanc quaest. tangunt tractando de simplicitate Dei, in specie de illo problemate, utrum Deus sit in aliquo genere determinato, de quo agit Magister d. 8. p. II.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question militates against pantheism or rather materialism, marked by the Vatican Council (const. I, *On God the Creator*, can. 2) with these words: *If anyone shall not have blushed to affirm that nothing exists besides matter: let him be anathema.* In particular it confounds the same madness of David of Dinant, whose principal argument was that which is read last among the [arguments] *ad oppositum*, namely this: if God were nothing other than prime matter, [the two] would have to differ by some differences, and so they would not be simple. For in that whereby a thing differs from another by a difference, the difference itself makes composition. Thus St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 17) reports this argument of David, and then in line with the mind of St. Bonaventure resolves it thus: «But this proceeded from the ignorance with which he did not know what stands between *difference* and *diversity*. For *different*, as is determined in the tenth book of the *Metaphysics* (text. comm. 12), is said *with reference to something*; for everything different is different by something. But something is called *diverse* absolutely from this, that it is not the same. Difference therefore must be sought in those things which agree in something: for it is necessary to assign in them something, according to which they differ, just as two species agree in a genus, whence it is necessary that they be distinguished by differences. But in those things which agree in nothing, it is not to be sought, by what they differ: but they are diverse by themselves. For thus also opposite differences are distinguished from one another; for they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence; and therefore it is not to be sought by what they differ; for they are diverse by themselves. So also God and prime matter are distinguished, of which the one is pure act, the other pure potency, having no commonality in anything». Bl. Albert resolves the same argument of David in a similar manner (*Summa* p. I, tr. 4, q. 20, m. 2, q. incid.) — In the same solution to [argument] 6, by St. Bonaventure a twofold species of distinction is posited, namely one perfect and specific through form, the other imperfect through the proper entity of matter.

**II.** Besides those cited cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 1. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 3, aa. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 20, a. 1, where he reports and resolves several arguments of «Alexander, a certain Greek, and David of Dinant, a Latin»; and *Summa* p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, aa. 3, 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 28, q. 2 and a. 29, q. 2. — The other doctors touch on this question in treating of the simplicity of God, especially of that problem, whether God is in any determinate genus, on which the Master treats in d. 8, p. II.

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