title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum innascibilitas et paternitas important eandem relationem.*

Secundo, supposito quod hoc nomen *ingenitus* dicatur secundum relationem, quaeritur, utrum importet eandem relationem, quam hoc nomen *Pater*, utrum scilicet eadem relatio sit innascibilitas et paternitas. Et quod non, ostenditur sic.

1. Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Aliud est dicere esse patrem, et aliud ingenitum»; sed non differt secundum essentiam: ergo secundum relationem.

2. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia possibile est, aliquem intelligi esse ingenitum et non esse patrem, ut in Adam[^2], et e converso, ut in Cain. Si ergo una relatio potest intelligi, altera non intellecta, et e converso; et poni, altera non posita: ergo sunt diversae relationes.

3. Item, relationes diversificantur penes terminos, quia relatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, ad alterum est[^3]; sed *ingenitus* dicitur per privationem prioris, scilicet patris, et *pater* secundum positionem germinis sive filii: ergo dicunt respectum secundum aliam et aliam partem: ergo etc.

4. Item, plus differt generatio et ingeneratio quam generatio et spiratio — nam hic est oppositio propria, ibi autem solum disparatio — sed alia relatio est generatio et spiratio: ergo et generatio et ingeneratio. Sed generatio et paternitas est eadem, ut supra ostensum est[^4]: ergo innascibilitas et paternitas non sunt eaedem relationes.

**Contra:**

1. Omnis relatio in divinis est perso-

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nae ad personam; si ergo *ingenitus* dicit relationem, aut ergo ad Filium, aut ad Spiritum sanctum, aut ad utrumque. Non ad utrumque, quia Pater non comparatur unica relatione, sed diversis ad Filium et Spiritum sanctum; non ad personam Spiritus sancti — hoc constat — ergo ad Filium. Si ergo relatio ad Filium est paternitas: ergo innascibilitas est eadem relatio.

2. Item, relationes in divinis personis non accidunt, sed esse tribuunt personae[^5]: ergo si unius personae unicum est esse, unica erit eius relatio. Sed Pater est una persona, et convenit ei innascibilitas et paternitas: ergo etc.

3. Item, sicut se habet nascibilitas in Filio ad filiationem, ita innascibilitas in Patre ad paternitatem; sed in Filio eadem est relatio nascibilitas et filiatio: ergo etc.

4. Item, Philosophus[^6]: «Primum et principium idem dico»; sed *innascibilis* dicit illud quod dicit in ratione primi, *pater* in ratione principii: ergo dicunt eandem habitudinem et relationem: non ergo sunt duae relationes, sed una tantum.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Innascibilitas est alia notio ac paternitas, cum utraque aliam relationem importet tum secundum intellectum principalem, tum secundum intellectum consequentem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc quod est *innascibilis*[^7] aliam relationem importat, quam hoc quod est *pater*, sive quantum ad principalem intellectum, sive quantum ad consequentem. Quantum ad principalem, manifestum est, quia[^8] importat respectum ad principium per modum privationis, *pater* autem importat respectum ad principiatum per modum positionis et generationis; et ita dicunt diversas habitudines, quarum una est vera habitudo, altera privatio habitudinis. — Quantum ad consequentem intellectum similiter differunt, licet non tantum. Nam *pater* dicit relationem principii solum respectu Filii et per modum generationis, sed *innascibilis* universalem dicit principalitatem sive fontalem plenitudinem in producendo, non tantum quantum ad generationem, sed etiam quantum ad spirationem, non tantum respectu Filii, sed etiam respectu Spiritus sancti. Et hoc patet, quia *innascibilis* dicitur, eo quod non generatur nec generationem consequitur: ergo in nomine *innascibilis* aufertur ratio nascendi et procedendi; et si hoc, ponitur ratio omnimodae principalitatis, et ideo fontalis plenitudinis.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod dicit respectum personae ad personam; dicendum, quod privative sive negative non dicit respectum ad personam. Et quod dicit, quod omnis relatio dicit respectum ad personam, intelligitur de illa quae dicit positionem. Secundum autem quod accipitur quantum ad consequentem intellectum, dicit respectum ad utramque personam. — Quod obiicitur, quod non est una communis relatio; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad principalem intellectum, tamen bene potest esse quantum ad consequentem, ut aliquod nomen dicat plenitudinem respectu utriusque.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio dat personae existere; dicendum, quod non quaecumque, sed quae est relatio personalis. Quae autem sit illa, infra patebit[^9].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Filio idem est nascibilitas et filiatio: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia non opponuntur eodem genere oppositionis; quia paternitas et filiatio opponuntur relative, non sic nascibilitas et innascibilitas, immo magis contradictorie vel contrarie.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primum et principium est idem; dicendum, quod *primum* dicitur dupliciter: aut per privationem prioris; et sic primum et principium idem sunt re, et non ratione. Alio modo *primum* dicitur respectu secundi; et sic primum et principium idem sunt re et ratione, et sic non significatur primum per hoc nomen *innascibilis*. Importat enim primitatem per privationem prioris, ut patet ex ipsa nominis impositione.

english:
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### QUESTION II. *Whether unbegottenness and paternity import the same relation.*

Secondly, having supposed that this name *unbegotten* is said according to relation, it is asked whether it imports the same relation as this name *Father* — that is, whether unbegottenness and paternity are the same relation. And that they are not, is shown thus.

1. Augustine, fifth book *On the Trinity*[^1]: «It is one thing to say [a person] is Father, and another [to say a person is] unbegotten»; but [they] do not differ according to essence: therefore according to relation.

2. Likewise, this is seen by reason, since it is possible for someone to be understood to be unbegotten and not to be a father, as in Adam[^2], and conversely, as in Cain. If, therefore, one relation can be understood, the other not being understood, and conversely; and one posited, the other not posited: therefore they are diverse relations.

3. Likewise, relations are diversified according to their terms, since a relation, as such, is to another[^3]; but *unbegotten* is said by privation of a prior, namely of a father, and *father* by the position of an offspring or son: therefore they say a respect according to one part and another part: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, generation and ingeneration differ more than generation and spiration — for here there is proper opposition, but there only disparation — but generation and spiration are different relations: therefore generation and ingeneration are also [different relations]. But generation and paternity are the same, as was shown above[^4]: therefore unbegottenness and paternity are not the same relations.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every relation in divine things is of a person

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to a person; if therefore *unbegotten* names a relation, [it is] either to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to both. Not to both, since the Father is not compared by a single relation, but by diverse [relations] to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; not to the person of the Holy Spirit — this is clear — therefore to the Son. If, then, the relation to the Son is paternity: therefore unbegottenness is the same relation.

2. Likewise, relations in the divine persons are not accidents, but bestow being on the person[^5]: therefore if of one person there is one being, there will be one relation of it. But the Father is one person, and unbegottenness and paternity belong to him: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, just as begottenness in the Son stands to filiation, so unbegottenness in the Father stands to paternity; but in the Son begottenness and filiation are the same relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher[^6]: «I call *first* and *principle* the same»; but *unbegotten* names that which it names under the account of *first*, *father* under the account of *principle*: therefore they name the same disposition and relation: therefore they are not two relations, but one only.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Unbegottenness is a notion other than paternity, since each imports a different relation, both according to the principal understanding and according to the consequent understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said that what *unbegotten*[^7] is imports a different relation from what *father* is, whether as to the principal understanding, or as to the consequent. As to the principal, it is manifest, since[^8] *unbegotten* imports a respect to a principle by way of privation, while *father* imports a respect to a principiate by way of position and generation; and so they name diverse dispositions, of which one is a true disposition, the other a privation of a disposition. — As to the consequent understanding they likewise differ, although not as much. For *father* names the relation of principle only with respect to the Son and by way of generation, but *unbegotten* names a universal principality or fontal fullness in producing, not only as to generation, but also as to spiration, not only with respect to the Son, but also with respect to the Holy Spirit. And this is clear, since one is called *unbegotten* on the ground that he is not generated nor follows generation: therefore in the name *unbegotten* the account of being-born and proceeding is taken away; and if so, the account of every-mode principality is posited, and therefore of fontal fullness.

**To the opposite [arguments]:**

1. To that, then, which is objected, that [unbegottenness] names a respect of person to person; it must be said that, privatively or negatively, it does not name a respect to a person. And as to what is said — that every relation names a respect to a person — this is to be understood of that [relation] which names a position. But according as it is taken as to the consequent understanding, it does name a respect to each [other] person. — As to what is objected, that there is not one common relation; it must be said that this is true as to the principal understanding, yet it can well be [so] as to the consequent, so that some name names a fullness with respect to both.

2. To that which is objected, that a relation gives existing to a person; it must be said that not just any [relation does so], but [the one] which is a personal relation. What that is, will appear below[^9].

3. To that which is objected, that in the Son begottenness and filiation are the same: therefore etc.; it must be said that this does not follow, since [these pairs] are not opposed by the same kind of opposition; for paternity and filiation are opposed relatively, but not so begottenness and unbegottenness, but rather contradictorily or contrarily.

4. To that which is objected, that *first* and *principle* are the same; it must be said that *first* is said in two ways: either by the privation of a prior; and so *first* and *principle* are the same in reality, and not in account. In another way *first* is said with respect to a second; and thus *first* and *principle* are the same in reality and in account, and so the *first* is not signified by this name *unbegotten*. For [the name *unbegotten*] imports primacy by privation of a prior, as is plain from the very imposition of the name.

la: Cap. 6, n. 7. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Chapter 6, n. 7. Cf. here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cod. Y *quod Adam in paradiso*. Mox Vat. *Abel* pro *Cain*; mendose.

en: Cod. Y [reads] *quod Adam in paradiso* ("that Adam in paradise"). Soon, the Vatican [reads] *Abel* for *Cain*; erroneously.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Relatione, et V. *Metaph.* text. 20 (IV. c. 15.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Categories*, chapter on Relation, and V *Metaphysics*, text 20 (IV, c. 15).

la: Dist. 27. p. 1. q. 1. — In principio argumenti ed. 1 *differunt* pro *differt*; in fine verba *non sunt eaedem relationes* in multis codd. omittuntur, cod. T pro eis substituit *sunt diversae relationes*.

en: Distinction 27, p. 1, q. 1. — At the beginning of the argument ed. 1 [reads] *differunt* in place of *differt*; at the end the words *non sunt eaedem relationes* are omitted in many codices, [and] cod. T substitutes for them *sunt diversae relationes* ("are diverse relations").

la: Plura de hoc vide supra d. 26. q. 3.

en: See more on this above d. 26, q. 3.

la: Libr. 1. *Poster.* c. 2. — Circa finem argumenti multi codd. voci *relationem* praefigunt *non*, pro qua particula codd. L O *non nisi*.

en: Book 1 *Posterior [Analytics]*, c. 2. — Around the end of the argument many codices prefix to the word *relationem* the [particle] *non*, for which particle codices L O [read] *non nisi*.

la: Permulti codd. cum sex primis edd. *innascibilitas*.

en: Very many codices, with the first six editions, [read] *innascibilitas*.

la: Ita plurimi codd. ut A C L N P Q R S T U V Y Vat.; cod. F adiicit *innascibilis*. — Mox plures codd. *innascibilitas* pro *innascibilis*. — Cod. W addit *non positive secundum principalem intellectum*.

en: Thus very many codices such as A C L N P Q R S T U V Y [and] the Vatican; cod. F adds *innascibilis* ("the unbegotten"). — Soon, several codices [read] *innascibilitas* in place of *innascibilis*. — Cod. W adds *non positive secundum principalem intellectum* ("not positively, according to the principal understanding").

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

latin_scholion:
Haec quaestio explicatur ex praecedenti. Auctores, qui intellectum consequentem, in ista notione connotatum et in praeced. declaratum, non admittunt, etiam hic solummodo primam partem responsionis approbant.

Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 59. m. 1. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 33. q. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., a. 37. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
This question is explained from the preceding. The authors who do not admit the consequent understanding — connoted in this notion and declared in the preceding [question] — here likewise approve only the first part of the response.

Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 59, m. 1. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 33, q. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, a. 37, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
OCR garbles flagged with `[?]`:
- `differunt` in arg. 1: OCR shows `(jjcepe cssB` (column-break artifact / marginal `Fundamenta` bleed); restored from context — the sense is "they do not differ" and Augustine *de Trin.* V.6.7 standardly reads "Aliud est patrem esse, aliud ingenitum, et tamen non secundum substantiam differunt."
- `nisi` in apparatus n. 6: raw OCR ends `mn nisi` after a column break; reading is presumed but flagged.

**Apparatus repair (2026-07-17, J4 Class D/E pass):** Health scan flagged `defs=9 la=10 en=10` (a duplicate `[^4]` anchor in both bodies). Diagnosis via printed p.499 (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-499.png`, 400 dpi, offset `pdf = printed − 410`): the printed page carries exactly **one** superscript "⁴", at the end of argument 4 ("…ut supra ostensum est⁴: ergo innascibilitas et paternitas non sunt eaedem relationes"). Def `[^4]`'s content ("In principio argumenti ed. 1 *differunt* pro *differt*… in fine verba *non sunt eaedem relationes*…") describes two textual variants both located within argument 4 (its opening word `differt` and its closing clause) and binds to that single printed marker. The `[^4]` anchor previously also appearing in argument 1 (attached to the editorially-restored word `differt`, see the OCR-garble note above) has **no printed counterpart anywhere on p.499** — it was a phantom marker introduced alongside the word restoration, not a real Quaracchi footnote reference. Removed the stray `[^4]` anchor from argument 1 in both Latin and English bodies (the word `differt`/`differ` itself is unchanged — it remains the editorially-restored reading, just without an erroneous footnote binding). No def content, Latin wording, or English wording was altered. Post-fix: `defs=9 la=9 en=9`, all label sets match exactly.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III. *Utrum innascibilitas, an paternitas sit proprietas personalis Patris.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum innascibilitas sit proprietas sive relatio personalis personae[^1] Patris, an paternitas. Et quod sit paternitas, videtur:

1. Quia illa est proprietas personalis, per quam persona ab omnibus separatur; sed talis est haec relatio paternitas: ergo etc.

2. Item, illa est proprietas personalis, per quam persona propriissime nominatur et exprimitur; sed persona Patris propriissime exprimitur per paternitatem: ergo etc.

3. Item, sicut filiatio se habet ad Filium, sic paternitas ad Patrem; sed filiatio est personalis relatio personae Filii: ergo et paternitas Patris.

4. Item, illa est proprietas personae, quae dicit[^2] per modum positionis et propriae habitudinis; sed inter omnes relationes, quae dicuntur de Patre, sola paternitas est talis: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Proprietas sive relatio personalis dat esse personae; sed paternitas non dat esse personae Patris, quia nihil habet esse ex hoc, quod alteri dat esse; sed persona Patris dicitur pater, quia alteri dat esse: ergo etc.

2. Item, non intellecta proprietate personali, impossibile est intelligere personam; sed non intellecta paternitate, est intelligere habentem deitatem et innascibilitatem: ergo cum innascibilitas sit proprietas personae Patris, ergo etc.

3. Item, proprietas personalis debet dicere totum esse personae; sed paternitas non nominat personam Patris secundum omnem plenitudinem fecunditatis, sed innascibilitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, Damascenus[^3]: «In divinis omnia sunt unum praeter generationem, ingenerationem et processionem»; constat quod non nominat omnes proprietates, ergo solum personales: ergo ingeneratio est proprietas personalis, et non nisi Patris: ergo etc.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Proprietas personalis Patris est paternitas, non innascibilitas nec spiratio activa.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit communis opinio et habetur ex verbis Magistri[^4] et Sanctorum, scilicet Hilarii et Augustini, paternitas est notio personalis Patris. Ad hoc enim, quod aliqua relatio sit personalis, oportet quod dicat illius personae primam et propriam habitudinem, et per modum positionis et completionis; sed constat, quod innascibilitas quantum ad primum intellectum non dicit positionem, quantum ad consequentem intellectum non dicit specialem relationem, sed fontalem plenitudinem. Similiter spiratio non dicit propriam relationem Patris[^5]; et ideo necesse est, quod paternitas dicat. Unde et rationes ad hoc inductae concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod proprietas dat esse personae: dicendum, quod illud non est intelligendum de esse simpliciter, sed de esse personali sive de esse distincto[^6]: et ipsa paternitatis auctoritas in divinis non accidit illi hypostasi, immo dicit illius personae complementum, ratione cuius est hoc. Quamvis ergo Pater non habeat esse ex hoc, quod dat alteri esse, tamen nihil impedit, ipsum ex hoc esse personam distinctam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est intelligere personam Patris etc.; dicendum, quod intellectu plene apprehendente et rationabiliter procedente, non est intelligere personam Patris vel hypostasim sine paternitate[^7]; quia si intelligatur innascibilis, ita quod non adsit paternitas, innascibilis dicit privationem nec aliquid dicit circa Patrem, quod non dicat etiam circa essentiam; et ideo non intelligitur ut proprietas personalis nec est alia[^8], et ideo non

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intelligitur persona Patris ut distincta sive hypostasis illa. Nam proprietas innascibilitatis, ut proprietas, includit proprietates et relationes respectu principiati; alioquin, ut supra ostensum est, non est proprietas.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas personalis dicit totum esse personae; dicendum, quod si dicatur totum esse, id est perfectum, completum et proprium, sic habet veritatem. Si autem intelligatur, quod dicat totum esse, id est omnem habitudinem; sic falsum est, quia non debet dicere omnem, sed necesse est, quod dicat unam determinatam, aut nullam determinate diceret, et ita non erit notio personalis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod non enumerat omnes proprietates personales, secundum quod personales, sed intendit relationes sub illis comprehendere: et sub generatione duas personales comprehendit, sub processione duas, unam personalem, aliam non personalem; sed in ingeneratione dicit solum innascibilitatem, quae proprietas est, licet non personalis.

english:
### QUESTION III. *Whether unbegottenness or paternity is the personal property of the Father.*

Thirdly it is asked whether unbegottenness is the personal property or relation of the person[^1] of the Father, or paternity. And that it is paternity, [it is shown] thus:

1. Because that is the personal property by which the person is separated from all others; but such is this relation paternity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that is the personal property by which the person is most properly named and expressed; but the person of the Father is most properly expressed through paternity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, just as filiation stands to the Son, so paternity to the Father; but filiation is the personal relation of the person of the Son: therefore also paternity [is the personal relation] of the Father.

4. Likewise, that is the property of the person which is said[^2] by way of position and proper relation; but among all the relations which are said of the Father, paternity alone is such: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The personal property or relation gives being to the person; but paternity does not give being to the person of the Father, since nothing has being from the fact that it gives being to another; but the person of the Father is called *father* because he gives being to another: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, with the personal property not being understood, it is impossible to understand the person; but with paternity not being understood, [one is still able] to understand [the person] as having the deity and unbegottenness: therefore since unbegottenness is a property of the person of the Father, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the personal property ought to express the whole being of the person; but paternity does not name the person of the Father according to all the plenitude of fecundity, but unbegottenness [does]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, [the] Damascene[^3]: «In divine [things] all are one except generation, ingeneration, and procession»; it is established that he does not name all the properties, therefore [he names] only the personal ones: therefore ingeneration is a personal property, and of none but the Father: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The personal property of the Father is paternity, not unbegottenness nor active spiration.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the common opinion says and is held from the words of the Master[^4] and of the Saints, namely Hilary and Augustine, paternity is the personal notion of the Father. For in order that any relation be personal, it is required that it express that person's primary and proper relation, and by way of position and completion; but it is established that unbegottenness, as to its first sense, does not express position, [and] as to its consequent sense, does not express a special relation, but rather a fontal plenitude. Likewise spiration does not express the proper relation of the Father[^5]; and therefore it is necessary that paternity express [it]. Hence the reasons brought forward to this effect are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, then, that the property gives being to the person: it must be said that this is not to be understood of being absolutely, but of personal being or of distinct being[^6]: and the very authority of paternity in divine things does not befall that hypostasis [accidentally], rather it expresses the completion of that person, by reason of which it is this [person]. Although therefore the Father does not have being from the fact that he gives being to another, yet nothing prevents that, from this, he be a distinct person.

2. To that which is objected, that one can [still] understand the person of the Father, etc.; it must be said that, with the intellect fully apprehending and proceeding rationally, one cannot understand the person of the Father or [his] hypostasis without paternity[^7]; for if [the Father] be understood as unbegotten in such a way that paternity is not present, "unbegotten" expresses a privation and does not express anything around the Father which it does not also express around the essence; and therefore it is not understood as a personal property, nor is it any other [property][^8], and therefore

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the person of the Father is not understood as distinct or as that hypostasis. For the property of unbegottenness, as a property, includes properties and relations with respect to the principled [persons]; otherwise, as was shown above, it is not a property.

3. To that which is objected, that the personal property expresses the whole being of the person; it must be said that if [by] *whole being* is meant the perfect, complete, and proper [being], then it holds true. But if it be understood that [the personal property] expresses the whole being, that is, every relation; then it is false, because it ought not to express every [relation], but it is necessary that it express one determinate [relation], or it would express none determinately, and so it will not be a personal notion.

4. To that which is objected concerning [the] Damascene, it must be said that he does not enumerate all the personal properties, insofar as personal, but rather he intends to comprehend the relations under them: and under generation he comprehends two personal [relations], under procession two, one personal, the other not personal; but in [the term] *ingeneration* he expresses only unbegottenness, which is a property, although not a personal one.

la: Codd. PQ omittunt vocem *personae*, alii codd. cum edd. vocem *personalis*. — Principia, quae in seqq. argumentis adhibentur, deducenda sunt ex d. 26. q. 1-4.

en: Codd. PQ omit the word *personae*; other codices with the [printed] editions [omit] the word *personalis*. — The principles which are employed in the following arguments are to be derived from d. 26, q. 1-4.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] *dicitur* ("is said").

la: Lib. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Vide supra d. 26. q. 1. arg. 4. ad opp.

en: Bk. I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 8. See above d. 26, q. 1, arg. 4 *ad oppositum*.

la: Dist. 26. c. 2. seq., et hic c. 1-3, ubi etiam verba Hilarii et Augustini habentur.

en: Distinction 26, c. 2 ff., and here c. 1-3, where the words of Hilary and Augustine are also found.

la: In Vat. et solo cod. cc deest *Patris*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and only cod. cc, *Patris* is missing.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 3. in corp. — De propositione subsequenti vide supra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 1. et 3, et hic dub. 1. — Paulo inferius post *non habeat* plurimi codd. parum congrue omittunt *esse*.

en: Cf. above d. 26, q. 3, in the body. — On the following proposition see above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 1 and 3, and here dub. 1. — A little below, after *non habeat*, very many codices, somewhat incongruously, omit *esse*.

la: Plurimi codd. omittunt *vel hypostasim sine paternitate*; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 solummodo verba *vel hypostasim*; ed. 1 pro *sine paternitate* exhibet *nisi intellecta paternitate*. — De intellectu apprehendente consule infra dub. 1.

en: Very many codices omit *vel hypostasim sine paternitate*; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [omit] only the words *vel hypostasim*; ed. 1, in place of *sine paternitate*, exhibits *nisi intellecta paternitate*. — On the apprehending intellect consult below, dub. 1.

la: Vat. et ed. 1 hic addunt *immo sunt proprietates naturales*, quae verba, quia contextui non respondent et in omnibus codd. et edd., except. 1, desunt, in textum non recepimus.

en: The Vatican [edition] and ed. 1 here add *immo sunt proprietates naturales* ("rather they are natural properties"); these words, because they do not correspond to the context and are missing in all codices and editions except [ed.] 1, we have not received into the text.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In respons. explicatur, quod quatuor requiruntur, ut proprietas sit personalis, scil. quod sit proprietas prima, quia primo distinguit, propria, non communis (qualis est spiratio activa), per modum positionis, et completionis, qua persona perfecte constituitur in esse personali. Duae ultimae differentiae non conveniunt innascibilitati; unde est quidem proprietas, sed non personalis (cfr. supra d. 26. q. 4.). — Solutio ad 1. supponit, quod esse personale in Deo est esse relativum, quia sola relatio in Deo distinguit personas. Unde relatio paternitatis resultat ex genito Filio (cfr. hic dub. 1.).

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 69. m. 2. 5. — Scot., hic q. 2; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 33. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 57. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the response it is explained that four [conditions] are required for a property to be personal, namely that it be a primary property, since it primarily distinguishes; proper, not common (such as is active spiration); by way of position; and of completion, by which the person is perfectly constituted in personal being. The last two differences do not belong to unbegottenness; whence it is indeed a property, but not a personal one (cf. above d. 26, q. 4). — The solution to [objection] 1 supposes that personal being in God is relative being, since relation alone in God distinguishes the persons. Whence the relation of paternity results from the begotten Son (cf. here, dub. 1).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 69, m. 2, 5. — Scotus, here q. 2; *Reportata* here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 33, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here I, *princ.* q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 57, q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1, at the end.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 502 -->

### QUAESTIO IV. *Utrum etiam improcessibilitas sicut innascibilitas notionem dicat in Patre.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum improcessibilitas[^1] sit notio Patris, sicut innascibilitas. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut Pater differt a Filio per innascibilitatem, ita a Spiritu sancto per improcessibilitatem: ergo sicut innascibilitas est notio Patris, similiter videtur, quod improcessibilitas.

2. Item, sicut nobilitatis est Patris non generari, ita etiam non spirari[^2]: ergo si propter rationem nobilitatis ponitur innascibilitas eius notio, similiter debet poni improcessibilitas.

3. Item, sicut generare convenit Patri per hoc quod innascibilis, ita et spirare per hoc quod improcessibilis sive inspirabilis: ergo sicut innascibilitas notio est, quia non tantum dicit privationem, sed[^3] etiam positionem, ita videtur, quod improcessibilitas. Si tu dicas[^4], quod improcessibilitas clauditur sub innascibilitate; obiicitur: quia Filio convenit improcessibilitas, et tamen nunquam innascibilitas: ergo est alia notio saltem in Filio, ergo saltem in eo debet esse notio. Si tu dicas[^5], quod non dicit nobilitatem; contra: omne quod dicitur in divinis, ad nobilitatem pertinet, alioquin non dicitur ibi: ergo si dicitur improcessibilitas de Filio, videtur sonare in nobilitatem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum Pater communicet alicui[^6] improcessibilitatem sive inspirabilitatem, quare non similiter communicat innascibilitatem?

**Contra:**

1. Si improcessibilitas est notio: ergo notiones plures sunt quam quinque, quod est contra communem opinionem[^7].

2. Item, si improcessibilitas est notio, aut hoc est quia simpliciter privat esse ab aliquo, aut quia privat[^8] spirationem. Si primo modo, non differt ab innascibilitate; si secundo modo, tunc non differt a spiratione activa, quia enim non spiratur, spirat qui spirat.

<!-- page 503 -->

3. Item, si non procedere esset notio, eadem ratione non producere; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc. Si dicas[^9], quod non est simile, quia non producere non dicit nobilitatem; contra: non producere personam dicit statum emanationis; et sicut ratio principii, ante quod non est aliquid, dicit nobilitatem, similiter ratio status, ultra quem[^10] non est procedere: ergo nobilitatem dicit: si ergo non est aliud, quare non dicatur notionaliter, videtur, quod non producere sit notio, sicut et non spirari.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Improcessibilitas non est notio Patris.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod nihil potest esse notio in divinis, nisi dicat respectum positivum vel ex primo intellectu, vel ex consequenti. Si enim solum privat relationem, ita dicitur de essentia sicut de persona. Unde sicut dicitur, quod Pater non producitur, nec Spiritus sanctus personam producit; ita etiam essentia produci non dicitur, et etiam personam non producere. Et sicut non potest esse notio hoc quod est ingenitus, nisi ponat respectum positivum ex consequenti — et hunc ponit sicut visum est — similiter nec hoc quod est inspirabilis[^11] potest esse notio, nisi ponat respectum positivum. Hunc autem non ponit, nisi secundum quod ponit primitatem respectu spirationis, sicut innascibilitas respectu generationis, ut, sicut innascibilis dicitur qui nec generatur nec generationem consequitur, ita improcessibilis qui nec procedit nec processionem consequitur.

Et quoniam omnis emanatio vel est generatio, vel ad generationem consequitur, quia generatio dicit primam emanationem; ideo innascibilis privat omnem emanationem, et ideo dicit fontalem plenitudinem, non tantum respectu generationis, sed etiam spirationis; et ideo innascibilitas nec generatio est nec spiratio. Sed improcessibilis dicitur, quia nec spiratur nec spirationem consequitur, et sic non excluditur Filius sive generatus. Filius enim generatur, et tamen non spiratur nec spirationem consequitur. Improcessibilis igitur non privat nisi unam solam emanationem, et ideo dicit solum partem istius fontalis plenitudinis; et ideo improcessibilitas non potest esse notio distincta in Patre ab innascibilitate, nec in Filio a spiratione, nec importat fontalem plenitudinem, sed solum in spirando. Quamvis igitur improcessibilitas possit dicere nobilitatem, tamen quia non distinguitur[^12] ab aliis assignatis, ideo non ponit in numerum cum aliis.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Et sic patent tria prima obiecta, quod improcessibilitas distinguit, et dicit nobilitatem, et dicit fecunditatem; quia rationes non valent, eo quod hoc totum in aliis rationibus assignatis clauditur, ideo contra alias non distinguitur.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare non communicatur innascibilitas, sicut improcessibilitas; dicendum, quod, sicut patet, quia improcessibilitas non claudit in suo intellectu non esse ab alio, sicut facit innascibilitas, sed solum dicit non spirari. Pater autem nulli potest communicare, quod non sit ab alio[^13]; potest tamen communicare alii, quod non spiretur.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare non producere non est notio; dicendum, quod non est nobilitatis; et esto, quod esset — quia illud non videtur principaliter considerari in ratione notionis[^14] — dicendum, quod illud est ratio, quia non dicit respectum positivum, quantum est de ratione sui nominis; et ideo simpliciter potest convenire essentiae, et ideo non est notio. Non sic autem est de innascibilitate, ut in praecedentibus visum est[^15].

english:
### QUESTION IV. *Whether improcessibility, like unbegottenness, also names a notion in the Father.*

Fourthly it is asked whether improcessibility[^1] is a notion of the Father, just as unbegottenness is. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because, just as the Father differs from the Son through unbegottenness, so [does he differ] from the Holy Spirit through improcessibility: therefore, just as unbegottenness is a notion of the Father, similarly it seems that improcessibility [is].

2. Likewise, just as it pertains to the Father's nobility not to be begotten, so also not to be spirated[^2]: therefore, if on account of the ground of nobility unbegottenness is posited as his notion, similarly improcessibility ought to be posited.

3. Likewise, just as begetting belongs to the Father by reason of his being unbegotten, so also spirating [belongs to him] by reason of his being improcessible or unspirable: therefore, just as unbegottenness is a notion because it does not only signify a privation, but[^3] also a position, so it seems that improcessibility [is]. If you should say[^4] that improcessibility is included under unbegottenness, it is objected: because improcessibility belongs to the Son, and yet [in him there is] never unbegottenness: therefore it is another notion at least in the Son, therefore at least in him there ought to be a notion. If you should say[^5] that it does not signify nobility, on the contrary: everything which is said in divine matters pertains to nobility, otherwise it is not said there: therefore if improcessibility is said of the Son, it seems to imply nobility.

In addition to this it is asked: since the Father communicates to someone[^6] improcessibility or inspirability, why does he not similarly communicate unbegottenness?

**On the contrary:**

1. If improcessibility is a notion, then the notions are more than five, which is contrary to common opinion[^7].

2. Likewise, if improcessibility is a notion, then this is either because it simply deprives [a person of] being-from-another, or because it deprives[^8] [a person of] spiration. If in the first way, it does not differ from unbegottenness; if in the second way, then it does not differ from active spiration, since [the one] who is not spirated is the one who spirates, [the one] who spirates.

3. Likewise, if not-to-proceed were a notion, by the same reasoning [also] not-to-produce; but this is false: therefore etc. If you should say[^9] that this is not similar, since not-to-produce does not signify nobility, on the contrary: not-to-produce a person signifies the status of emanation; and just as the formal character of a principle, before which there is nothing, signifies nobility, so likewise the formal character of a status, beyond which[^10] there is no proceeding [signifies nobility]: therefore it does signify nobility: if then there is nothing else, why it should not be predicated notionally, it seems that not-to-produce is a notion, just as also not-to-be-spirated.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Improcessibility is not a notion of the Father.*

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that nothing can be a notion in divine matters unless it signify a positive relation either by primary signification, or as a consequence. For if it only deprives [of] a relation, it is said of the essence in the same way as of a person. Whence just as it is said that the Father is not produced, nor does the Holy Spirit produce a person; so likewise the essence is not said to be produced, and likewise [is said] not to produce a person. And just as that which is "unbegotten" cannot be a notion unless it set down a positive relation as a consequence — and it does set this down as has been seen — similarly neither can that which is "unspirable"[^11] be a notion unless it set down a positive relation. But it does not set this down except according as it sets down primacy in respect of spiration, just as unbegottenness [does] in respect of generation, so that, just as he is called *unbegotten* who is neither generated nor follows upon generation, so [is one called] *improcessible* who neither proceeds nor follows upon procession.

And since every emanation either is a generation, or follows upon a generation — because generation names the first emanation — therefore *unbegotten* deprives [of] every emanation, and therefore signifies fontal plenitude, not only with respect to generation, but also of spiration; and therefore unbegottenness is neither generation nor spiration. But [one] is called *improcessible* because he is neither spirated nor follows upon spiration, and thus the Son or the begotten is not excluded. For the Son is begotten, and yet is not spirated nor follows upon spiration. Therefore *improcessible* deprives only one single emanation, and therefore signifies only a part of that fontal plenitude; and therefore improcessibility cannot be a notion distinct in the Father from unbegottenness, nor in the Son from spiration, nor does it bring fontal plenitude, but only [a partiality] in spirating. Therefore although improcessibility can signify nobility, nevertheless because it is not distinguished[^12] from the others assigned, therefore it is not placed in the count with the others.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus the first three objections are clear, [namely] that improcessibility distinguishes, and signifies nobility, and signifies fecundity; because the reasonings are not valid, since this whole [character] is included in the other reasonings already assigned, therefore it is not distinguished against the others.

To that which is asked, why unbegottenness is not communicated as improcessibility [is]; it must be said that, as is plain, [it is] because improcessibility does not include in its meaning *not-to-be-from-another*, as unbegottenness does, but only signifies *not-to-be-spirated*. The Father, however, can communicate to no one [the property] of not being from another[^13]; he can however communicate to another [the property] of not being spirated.

To that which is asked, why not-to-produce is not a notion; it must be said that it is not [a property] of nobility; and granted that it were — since this does not seem to be principally considered in the formal character of a notion[^14] — it must be said that this is the reason: because it does not signify a positive relation, so far as belongs to the formal character of its name; and therefore it can simply belong to the essence, and therefore it is not a notion. It is not, however, so concerning unbegottenness, as has been seen in the preceding [questions][^15].

la: Quaest. 1. — Paulo ante pro *Nam proprietas innascibilitatis* ed. 1 *Nam innascibilitas*.

en: Question 1. — A little before, in place of *Nam proprietas innascibilitatis*, ed. 1 [reads] *Nam innascibilitas*.

la: Codd. I S W Y bb (T a secunda manu) *dicet*; ed. 1 *aut si... diceret*. Proxime post pro *erit aliqui* codd. cum ed. 1 *est*.

en: Codices I S W Y bb (T by a second hand) [read] *dicet*; ed. 1 *aut si... diceret*. Immediately afterwards, in place of *erit aliqui*, the codices with ed. 1 [read] *est*.

la: In pluribus codd. ut A T Z cc deest *sed*.

en: In several codices such as A T Z cc the word *sed* is missing.

la: Supervacaneum et inutile est additamentum, quod Vat. hic exhibet, nullo cod. (exc. cc) suffragante: *ergo si propter rationem nobilitatis est Patris non generari, ita est non spirari*. Paulo ante eadem Vat. *nobilitas* pro *nobilitatis*.

en: It is a superfluous and useless addition which the Vatican [edition] exhibits here, with no codex (except cc) supporting: *ergo si propter rationem nobilitatis est Patris non generari, ita est non spirari*. A little before, the same Vatican [edition] [reads] *nobilitas* in place of *nobilitatis*.

la: Codd. S V W Z *quod*. Paulo inferius pro *debet aliqui* codd. ut I T Z *deberet*.

en: Codices S V W Z [read] *quod*. A little below, in place of *debet*, several codices such as I T Z [read] *deberet*.

la: Cod. Y *alteri*.

en: Cod. Y [reads] *alteri*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 4.

en: Cf. above d. 26, q. 4.

la: Sic et Vat.; in codd. et edd. pro *privat* incongrue exstat *quod*, verbum contextui non respondet. Paulo inferius a Vat. textus genuinus, quem habent codd. et sex primae edd., sic est mutatus: *quia non spiratur qui spirat*.

en: Thus also the Vatican [edition]; in the codices and editions, in place of *privat*, *quod* incongruously stands, a word which does not correspond to the context. A little below, by the Vatican [edition] the genuine text, which the codices and the first six editions have, has been altered thus: *quia non spiratur qui spirat*.

la: Plures codd. ut I S V cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *quod*.

en: Several codices such as I S V with edd. 1, 2, 3 [read] *quod*.

la: Quaest. 1.

en: Question 1.

la: Codd. et edd. *improcessibilis*, sed [legendum *inspirabilis*].

en: The codices and editions [read] *improcessibilis*, but [it should be read *inspirabilis*] (editor's emendation, signalled by square brackets in the Quaracchi text).

la: Vat. cum cod. cc perperam *distinguit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc wrongly [reads] *distinguit*.

la: Vide supra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. circa finem.

en: See above d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3, near the end.

la: Pro *notionis* Vat. praeter fidem praestantiorum codd. *sui nominis*.

en: In place of *notionis* the Vatican [edition], without the support of the more reliable codices, [reads] *sui nominis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ex principiis a S. Bonaventura stabilitis facile eruitur, improcessibilitatem non esse notionem Patris. Quando autem tenetur alia sententia, scil. eandem consistere in pura negatione de eo, dubitari poterit, et revera Scot. in *Comment. Oxon.* (hic q. 2. ad 3.) dubius fuit, utrum forte admittenda sit haec sexta notio. Sed in scripto posteriore sive in *Report.* (hic q. 1.) ipse adhaeret communi doctrinae (cfr. Macedo, coll. 8. diff. 3. sect. 8.). — Post solutionem ad opposita sequitur solutio quaestionis incidentis in fine argumentorum ad opposit., et deinde respondetur ad quaest. in ultimo fund. implicite positam.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 69. m. 3. ad ult. — Scot., hic q. 2. ad 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 33. a. 4. ad 5, et q. 32. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. collat. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 10. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. circa medium.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** From the principles established by St. Bonaventure it is easily drawn that improcessibility is not a notion of the Father. When, however, the other opinion is held, namely that it consists in a pure negation concerning him, it can be doubted, and indeed Scotus in the *Oxford Commentary* (here q. 2, ad 3) was doubtful whether perhaps this sixth notion ought to be admitted. But in his later writing, namely in the *Reportata* (here q. 1) he himself adheres to the common doctrine (cf. Macedo, coll. 8, diff. 3, sect. 8). — After the solution of the opposing arguments there follows the solution of the question incidentally raised at the end of the arguments *ad oppositum*, and then a reply is given to the question implicitly posed in the last fundament.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 69, m. 3, ad ult. — Scotus, here q. 2, ad 3. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 5, and q. 32, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1, *princ.* q. 1, *collat.* 1. — Henricus of Ghent, *Summa* a. 60, q. 10. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1, near the middle.

---


title: Dist. 28, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod, si Filium non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum dicere ingenitum. Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod accidat personae Ingeniti[^1] generare et ita esse patrem. — Item, ex hoc videtur sequi, quod remota paternitate, adhuc remaneat persona Patris; et ita paternitas non est proprietas personalis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de intentione huius nominis *ingenitus* et *pater* vel simpliciter, vel prout ponuntur in persona divina. Si loquamur simpliciter, sic diversae sunt intentiones, et una praeter aliam est intelligibilis et separabilis secundum rem[^2], sicut patet in generatione hominum.

Alio modo est loqui de his, prout ponuntur circa personam divinam, et sic dicunt aliam et aliam rationem innotescendi; et illae duae secundum rem omnino sunt inseparabiles, tamen secundum intellectum una potest accipi praeter alteram. Et sic loquitur Augustinus, non quod re separari possint, sed quantum ad intelligere[^3] nostrum.

Sed quod possit intelligi aliquid praeter alterum, hoc potest esse multipliciter: aut quantum ad intellectum apprehendentem, aut quantum ad intellectum resolventem. Si primo modo, sic non potest intelligi aliquid sine aliquo, quod est ei ratio intelligendi, sicut Deus praeter deitatem et homo praeter humanitatem; potest tamen intelligi effectus, non intellecta causa, et inferius, non intellecto superiori, quia potest quis apprehendere hominem, non intellecto aliquo superiorum. Et sic dicit Philosophus[^4], quod qui unum dicit, quodam modo multa dicit, non simpliciter, sed quodam modo, quia implicite.

Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligere praeter alterum, intellectu resolvente; et iste intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia, sicut potest intelligi subiectum sine propria passione. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut intellectu resolvente plene et perfecte, aut intellectu deficiente et resolvente semiplene[^5]. Intellectu resolvente semiplene, potest intelligi aliquid esse, non intellecto primo ente. Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non intellecto.

Secundum hunc triplicem intellectum de comparatione Patris et Ingeniti contingit loqui tripliciter. Si enim loquamur de intellectu apprehendente, possibile est haec duo[^6] intelligi, altero non apprehenso, eo quod aliud est significatum unius, aliud alterius. Si loquamur de intellectu resolvente, adhuc si semiplene resolvat[^7], accipiendo intellectum huius nominis *ingenitus* solum privative, sicut accipiunt gentiles; sic potest intelligi unum sine altero. Si loquamur de intellectu plene resolvente, cum *ingenitus*, secundum quod est proprietas Patris, non dicatur solum privative, immo ponat respectum positivum, de necessitate ponit paternitatem. Et sic verum est, quod, dicendo aliquid[^8] esse ingenitum, necessario ponitur esse pater, cum ponatur plenitudo fontalis per ipsum tantum.

Quando ergo dicit Augustinus, quod non ideo dicitur pater, quia ingenitus, ipse loquitur de intellectu apprehendente, quia unum non est propria ratio et prima intelligendi alterum, immo utrumque, scilicet *ingenitus* et *pater*, dicunt aliam rationem innotescendi; tamen secundum plenam[^9] resolutionem una ponit aliam necessario. Unde distinctio personae Patris quasi inchoatur in innascibilitate et consummatur in paternitate; et ideo, non intellecta paternitate, non potest intelligi persona illa complete distincta. Et ideo paternitas est notio personalis, quamvis in ratione intelligendi prius cadat innascibilitas[^10].

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### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Negativa porro particula non id efficit, ut quod sine illa* etc. Videtur enim falsum, quia homo dicitur secundum substantiam, tamen albedo potest dici *non-homo*: ergo, quia *homo* et *non-homo* contradictorie opponuntur, et de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio[^11]: ergo albedo est *non-homo*, et albedo est qualitas, ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod Augustinus loquitur, secundum quod facit negationem in genere[^12]; tunc obiicitur de hoc quod est *non-substantia*; constat, quod non potest facere negationem in genere: ergo, cum *non-substantia* non dicatur nisi de aliis generibus, patet etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod modus dicendi *secundum substantiam* circa terminum negatum[^13] sive infinitum dupliciter est accipere: aut quantum ad significatum, aut quantum ad suppositum. Si quantum ad significatum, quia terminus negatus trahit significationem ab affirmato, idem est modus dicendi quantum ad significationem in termino negato et affirmato. Unde sicut homo dicitur secundum substantiam quantum ad significationem, ita et *non-homo*. Quando enim dico: *hic est homo*, substantiam praedico; quando dico: *hic est non-homo*, substantiam removeo. Si autem loquamur quantum ad suppositum, tunc pro alio supponit terminus negatus et affirmatus. Sic opponit, et sic non intelligit Augustinus[^14].

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *non-genitus* refertur ad *non-genitorem*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia omnis relatio ponit duo extrema: ergo si *non-genitus* refertur ad *non-genitorem*, necesse est, ad hoc quod aliquis sit ingenitus, quod sint duo, quorum unus sit non-genitus, alter non-genitor[^15]. Contra: esto per impossibile, quod nullus esset nisi unus solus, ille utique esset non-genitor.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod referri ad aliquem hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum rationem existendi, aut secundum rationem intelligendi; secundum rationem existendi, quando importatur habitudo realis; secundum rationem intelligendi, quando privatur habitudo realis. Ad hoc enim, quod intelligatur privatio habitudinis, necesse est intelligere habitudinem; et ad hoc, quod habitudo intelligatur, necesse est intelligi duo extrema ut affirmata; et ita ad hoc, ut intelligatur privatio habitudinis sive relationis, necesse est intelligi duo extrema negata. Et quantum ad hoc dicit Augustinus, *non-genitum* referri ad *non-genitorem*, quia non potest capi intellectus eius nisi per intellectum illius; et ita quantum ad rationem dicendi dicitur secundum relationem, sicut *non-homo* dicitur secundum substantiam.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod, cum dicitur *nata sapientia*, *sapientia* essentiam significat. Ergo secundum hoc licebit loco *sapientiae* ponere *essentiam*, cum faciat eius intellectum; quod falsum est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de nomine *sapientiae* quantum ad significatum, vel quantum ad suppositum. Quantum ad significatum dicit essentiam, sed tamen supponit personam; et ita adiectivum respicit ipsum ratione suppositi, cum dicitur *sapientia nata*, non ratione significati. Nec sequitur propter hoc, quod loco *sapientiae* poni possit *essentia*, quia cum *sapientia* sit de nominibus mediis, potest supponere pro persona et trahi ad suppositum; sed *essentia*, cum sit nomen abstractissimum, non[^16].

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *imago* aliquando intelligentiam essentiae facit, et tunc ad se dicitur. Videtur enim falsum, quia *imago* semper connotat imaginatum; sed non potest esse idem imago et imaginatum: ergo semper dicitur relative.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *imago* semper dicit respectum vel ad creatum, vel ad increatum; et quando dicit respectum ad increatum, dicitur personaliter et relative secundum rem; quando autem respectum creaturae, essentialiter dicitur et ad se, non quantum ad modum dicendi, sed quia toti Trinitati convenit[^17].

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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what Augustine says: that, if [the Father] had not begotten the Son, nothing would have prevented him from being called *unbegotten*. For according to this it seems that it would befall the person of the Unbegotten[^1] to beget and so to be Father. — Likewise, from this it seems to follow that, paternity having been removed, the person of the Father would still remain; and so paternity is not a personal property.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the meaning of the names *unbegotten* and *father* either simply, or insofar as they are placed in [reference to] a divine person. If we speak simply, then the meanings are diverse, and the one apart from the other is intelligible and separable in reality[^2], as is plain in the generation of human beings.

In another way one can speak of these [names] insofar as they are placed concerning a divine person, and so they state different and different accounts of being made known; and those two are altogether inseparable in reality, yet according to the intellect one can be taken apart from the other. And so Augustine speaks, not [in the sense] that they could be separated in reality, but with regard to our manner of understanding[^3].

But that something can be understood apart from another can occur in many ways: either with regard to the apprehensive intellect, or with regard to the resolving intellect. If in the first way, then something cannot be understood without [that which] is its ground of being understood, as God [cannot be understood] apart from deity, and man apart from humanity; yet an effect can be understood without the cause being understood, and an inferior without the superior being understood, because someone can apprehend a man without understanding any of the superiors. And thus the Philosopher says[^4] that he who says one [thing] in some way says many — not simply, but in some way, because implicitly.

In another way it happens that something is understood apart from another, by the resolving intellect; and this intellect considers the things which are essential to the thing, just as a subject can be understood without [understanding] its proper attribute. And this can be in two ways: either by an intellect resolving fully and perfectly, or by an intellect deficient and resolving half-fully[^5]. By an intellect resolving half-fully, something can be understood to be, the first being not [yet] understood. But by an intellect resolving perfectly, something cannot be understood without the first being having been understood.

According to this threefold understanding it happens to speak in three ways concerning the comparison of the Father and the Unbegotten. For if we speak of the apprehensive intellect, it is possible for these two[^6] [names] to be understood with the other not having been apprehended, because the [thing] signified by the one is one [thing] and that of the other is another. If we speak of the resolving intellect, still, if it resolves half-fully[^7], taking the meaning of this name *unbegotten* only privatively, as the gentiles take it, in this way one can be understood without the other. If we speak of the fully resolving intellect, then since *unbegotten*, insofar as it is a property of the Father, is not said only privatively, but rather posits a positive relation, it of necessity posits paternity. And so it is true that, in saying that something[^8] is unbegotten, it is necessarily posited to be father, since fontal fullness is posited through him alone.

When therefore Augustine says that [the Father] is not for that reason called *father* because [he is] *unbegotten*, he is speaking of the apprehensive intellect, because the one is not the proper and primary ground for understanding the other; rather, both — namely, *unbegotten* and *father* — state different accounts of being made known; yet according to a full[^9] resolution the one of necessity posits the other. Whence the distinction of the person of the Father is, as it were, begun in unbegottenness and consummated in paternity; and therefore, paternity not being understood, that person cannot be understood as completely distinct. And therefore paternity is a personal notion, although in the order of understanding unbegottenness[^10] falls first.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Furthermore, the negative particle does not effect this, that what without it* etc. For it seems false, because man is said with regard to substance, yet whiteness can be called *not-man*: therefore, since *man* and *not-man* are contradictorily opposed, and of any [given thing] there is [either] affirmation or negation[^11]: therefore whiteness is *not-man*, and whiteness is a quality, therefore etc. If you say that Augustine is speaking insofar as he makes a negation within a genus[^12], then it is objected concerning that which is *not-substance*; it is plain that it cannot make a negation within a genus: therefore, since *not-substance* is said only of other genera, it is plain etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the manner of speaking *with regard to substance* concerning a negated[^13] or infinite term is to be taken in two ways: either with regard to the [thing] signified, or with regard to the supposit. If with regard to the [thing] signified, then because a negated term draws its signification from the affirmed [term], the manner of speaking with regard to signification is the same in the negated term and the affirmed [term]. Hence just as *man* is said with regard to substance as far as signification, so also *not-man*. For when I say: *this is a man*, I predicate substance; when I say: *this is a not-man*, I remove substance. But if we speak with regard to the supposit, then the negated and affirmed terms supposit for different [things]. So [the term] is opposed [to its contradictory], and so Augustine[^14] does not [intend it differently].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *not-begotten* is referred to *not-begetter*. For it seems to say what is false, because every relation posits two extremes: therefore if *not-begotten* is referred to *not-begetter*, it is necessary, in order that someone be unbegotten, that there be two, of whom one is not-begotten and the other not-begetter[^15]. On the contrary: suppose by the impossible that there were no one but one alone, he would certainly still be not-begetter.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be referred to someone can be in two ways: either according to the account of existing, or according to the account of understanding; according to the account of existing, when a real relation is imported; according to the account of understanding, when a real relation is denied. For in order that the privation of a relation be understood, it is necessary to understand the relation; and in order that the relation be understood, it is necessary that the two extremes be understood as affirmed; and so in order that the privation of a relation or relationship be understood, it is necessary that the two extremes be understood as negated. And as far as this Augustine says that *not-begotten* is referred to *not-begetter*, because the understanding of the one cannot be grasped except through the understanding of the other; and so as far as the manner of speaking it is said according to relation, just as *not-man* is said according to substance.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that, when it is said *born wisdom*, *wisdom* signifies the essence. Therefore according to this it will be permitted to put *essence* in place of *wisdom*, since [*wisdom*] makes the understanding of [the essence] — which is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the name *wisdom* with regard to the [thing] signified, or with regard to the supposit. With regard to the [thing] signified it states the essence, but yet it supposits for the person; and so the adjective regards [the wisdom] by reason of the supposit, when it is said *born wisdom* — not by reason of the [thing] signified. Nor does it follow on this account that *essence* can be put in place of *wisdom*, because, since *wisdom* is among the middle names, it can supposit for the person and be drawn to the supposit; but *essence*, since it is a most abstract name, [can]not[^16].

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *image* sometimes makes [us] understand the essence, and then it is said as toward itself. For it seems false, because *image* always connotes [that] of which [it is] the image; but the image and that of which it is the image cannot be the same: therefore it is always said relatively.

**I respond:** It must be said that *image* always states a relation either to a created [thing] or to an uncreated [thing]; and when it states a relation to an uncreated [thing], it is said personally and relatively in reality; but when [it states] a relation to a creature, it is said essentially and as toward itself — not with regard to the manner of speaking, but because it belongs to the whole Trinity[^17].

---

la: Vat. *ingenitae*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *ingenitae*.

la: Fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. *rationem* pro *rem*; sed perperam, ut ex subnexis patet. Cfr. supra q. 2. fundam. 2.

en: Nearly all the codices, together with the first six editions, [read] *rationem* in place of *rem*; but wrongly, as is plain from what follows. Cf. above q. 2, fundamentum 2.

la: Ita codd. A C F G H R S T U Y ee fi cum ed. 1; Vat. cum paucis codd. *intellectum*.

en: Thus codices A, C, F, G, H, R, S, T, U, Y, ee, fi, with edition 1; the Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] *intellectum*.

la: Libr. I. *Phys.* text. 21. (c. 2.). — Proxime superius pro *Et sic* plures codd. et edd. *et sicut*, Vat. *sicut*, et codd. P Q S V W *superiori* pro *aliquo superiorum*.

en: Book I, *Physics*, text 21 (c. 2). — Just before, in place of *Et sic* very many codices and editions [read] *et sicut*, the Vatican edition [reads] *sicut*, and codices P, Q, S, V, W [read] *superiori* in place of *aliquo superiorum*.

la: Sic cod. (cod. L in marg.); ceteri codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt *et perfecte*, et dein *et resolvente semiplene*. Idem facit Vat., quae tamen interiicit post *intellectu* verba *semipleno et*. Paulo superius post *essentialia* Vat. cum cod. cc *sic* pro *sicut*. Paulo inferius verbo *resolvente* antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 praemittunt particulam *autem*. Dein post *non intellecto primo ente* codd. S T addunt *esse*, quod verbum, scil. *esse*, ed. 1 paulo post voci *aliquid* adiungit. — Notamus, quod haec divisio intellectus habetur etiam in S. Doctoris *Itinerario mentis in Deum*, c. 3. et 5.

en: Thus a codex (codex L in the margin); the other codices with editions 1, 2, 3 omit *et perfecte*, and then *et resolvente semiplene*. The Vatican edition does the same, although it inserts after *intellectu* the words *semipleno et*. A little above, after *essentialia*, the Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *sic* in place of *sicut*. A little below, the older codices with edition 1 prefix the particle *autem* to the word *resolvente*. Then after *non intellecto primo ente* codices S and T add *esse*, which word, namely *esse*, edition 1 attaches a little later to the word *aliquid*. — We note that this division of the intellect is also found in the Holy Doctor's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 3 and 5.

la: Sola Vat. *unum istorum* pro *haec duo*.

en: The Vatican edition alone [reads] *unum istorum* in place of *haec duo*.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, omissa vocula *si*, pro *resolvat* habet *resolvit*.

en: The Vatican edition, the manuscripts and edition 1 dissenting, with the little word *si* omitted, has *resolvit* in place of *resolvat*.

la: Pro *dicendo aliquid*, quod auctoritate codd. I dd posuimus, sola Vat. *ad*; maior pars codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *dicit aliquid*; verius cod. R *quando dicit aliquid*, et cod. T *cum dicit aliquid*; codd. V Y solummodo *aliquid*; demum codd. L *dicit secundum quod ad*. Mox pro *fontalis* multi codd. ut F G I K P Q T Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 *fontalitatis*, et subinde pro *tantum* codd. P Q *terminum*.

en: In place of *dicendo aliquid*, which we have placed on the authority of codices I and dd, the Vatican edition alone [has] *ad*; the greater part of the codices with edition 1 incongruously [read] *dicit aliquid*; more truly codex R [reads] *quando dicit aliquid*, and codex T *cum dicit aliquid*; codices V and Y [read] only *aliquid*; finally codices L [read] *dicit secundum quod ad*. Soon, in place of *fontalis*, many codices such as F, G, I, K, P, Q, T, Y, Z, etc., with edition 1, [read] *fontalitatis*, and thereafter in place of *tantum* codices P and Q [read] *terminum*.

la: Verbum *plenam* in antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 omittitur.

en: The word *plenam* is omitted in the older codices and edition 1.

la: Plura de hoc invenies in tribus primis quaest. huius dist., et d. 27. p. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et 3.

en: You will find more on this in the first three questions of this distinction, and in d. 27, p. 1, q. 2, ad 1 and 3.

la: Aristot., IV. *Metaph.* text. 13. (III. c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 13 (III, c. 4).

la: Cfr. hic q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. here q. 1 in the body.

la: Aliqui codd., in quibus cod. T, cum ed. 1 *negativum*.

en: Some codices, among which is codex T, with edition 1 [read] *negativum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 496, nota 3.

en: Cf. above p. 496, note 3.

la: Huius dubii solutionem invenis etiam apud B. Albertum, [hic]. — Ed. 1 *quod*. Paulo inferius codd. S V W aa *ingenitum* pro *genitum*.

en: You will find the solution of this doubt also in B. Albert, [here]. — Edition 1 [reads] *quod*. A little below, codices S, V, W, aa [read] *ingenitum* in place of *genitum*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 8. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi triplex genus nominum significantium essentiam proponitur, scil. quae significant ipsam in concretione, in omnimoda abstractione et medio modo.

en: Cf. above d. 8, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, where a threefold genus of names signifying the essence is proposed, namely those which signify it in concretion, in every-way abstraction, and in the middle mode.

la: Fusius hoc exponitur infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo ante pro *respectum creaturae* multi codd. ut P G H I K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 *respectu creaturae*; lectio incongrua.

en: This is more fully expounded below in d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — A little before, in place of *respectum creaturae* many codices such as P, G, H, I, K, S, T, Y, etc., with edition 1, [read] *respectu creaturae*; an incongruous reading.


title: Dist. 29

title_alt: Distinctio XXIX littera Magistri (capp. I — IV) — De principio

title_alt: Lombard's text on Distinction XXIX (chapters I — IV) — On the [name] principle

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXIX.

#### Cap. I. *De principio.*

Est praeterea aliud nomen, multiplicem notans relationem, scilicet *principium*. Dicitur enim principium semper ad aliquid. Et dicitur Pater principium, et Filius principium, et Spiritus sanctus principium; sed differenter. Nam Pater dicitur principium ad Filium et ad Spiritum sanctum. Unde Augustinus in libro quarto *de Trinitate*[^1] ait: «Pater est principium totius divinitatis, vel si melius dicitur, deitatis, quia ipse est a nullo. Non enim habet de quo sit vel de quo procedat»; sed ab eo et Filius est genitus, et Spiritus sanctus procedit. Non igitur dicitur principium totius deitatis, quod vel sui vel divinae essentiae principium sit, sed quia principium est Filii et Spiritus sancti, in quibus singulis tota divinitas est. Filius ad Spiritum sanctum dicitur principium. Spiritus vero sanctus non dicitur principium nisi ad creaturas, ad quas etiam Pater dicitur principium et Filius et Trinitas ipsa simul, et singula persona[^2] principium dicitur creaturarum. «Pater ergo principium est sine principio, Filius principium de principio, Spiritus sanctus principium de utroque, id est de Patre et Filio[^3]».

#### Cap. II. *Quod ab aeterno Pater est principium et Filii, sed non Spiritus sanctus.*

Et Pater ab aeterno principium est Filii, et Pater et Filius principium Spiritus sancti, quia Filius est a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Spiritus vero sanctus non ab aeterno principium est, sed esse coepit, quia non dicitur principium nisi ad creaturas. Cum ergo creaturae esse coeperunt, et Spiritus sanctus esse coepit principium earum. Ita etiam Pater et Filius esse coepit cum Spiritu sancto unum principium creaturarum, quia creaturae coeperunt esse a Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto; et dicuntur hi tres non tria, sed unum principium omnium creaturarum, quia uno eodemque modo principium rerum sunt. Non enim aliter sunt res a Patre et aliter a Filio, sed penitus eodem modo. Ideo Apostolus intelligens, hanc Trinitatem esse unum principium rerum, ait[^4]: *Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia.* «Cum vero audimus, omnia esse ex Deo, ut ait Augustinus *de Natura boni*[^5], omnes utique naturas intelligere debemus, et omnia quae naturaliter[^6] sunt. Non enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant, sed vitiant, quae ex voluntate peccantium nascuntur». Omnium ergo, quae naturaliter sunt, unum principium est Pater cum Filio et Spiritu sancto, et hoc esse coepit. Ab aeterno autem Pater principium est Filii generatione, et Pater et Filius unum principium Spiritus sancti. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^7] ita ait: «Dicitur relative Pater, idemque relative dicitur principium. Sed Pater ad Filium dicitur, principium vero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Et principium dicitur Filius. Cum enim diceretur ei[^8]: *Tu quis es?* respondit: *Principium, qui et loquor vobis.* Sed nunquid Patris principium est? Immo creatorem se voluit ostendere, cum se dixit esse principium, sicut et Pater principium est creaturae, quia ab ipso sunt omnia. Cum vero dicimus et Patrem principium et Filium principium, non duo principia creaturae dicimus, quia Pater et Filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est, sicut unus creator. Si autem quidquid in se manet et gignit vel operatur aliquid, principium est eius rei, quam gignit, vel eius, quam operatur; non possumus negare, etiam Spiritum sanctum[^9] recte dici principium, quia non eum separamus ab appellatione creatoris: quia scriptum est[^10] de illo, quod operetur, et utique in se manens operatur. Non enim in aliquid eorum quae operatur, ipse mutatur et vertitur. Unum ergo principium ad creaturam cum Patre et Filio est Spiritus sanctus, non duo vel tria principia». Ecce aperte ostendit Augustinus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse unum principium rerum creatarum, id est, uno eodemque modo esse principium; et illum modum satis aperuit, quia scilicet operantur omnia, et quia similiter[^11] operantur hi tres, ideo unum principium esse dicuntur.

#### Cap. III. *Quomodo Pater principium Filii, et ipse cum Filio Spiritus sancti.*

Deinde in eodem libro continue ostendit, quomodo Pater dicatur principium ad Filium, et ad Spiritum sanctum ipse et Filius dicens, ideo Patrem esse principium Filii, quia genuit eum, et Patrem et Filium esse principium Spiritus sancti, quia Spiritus sanctus procedit vel datur ab utroque. Ait enim ita[^12]: «Si gignens ad id quod gignitur principium est, Pater ad

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Filium principium est, quia genuit eum. Utrum autem et ad Spiritum sanctum principium sit Pater, quia dictum est: *De Patre procedit*, non parva quaestio est. Quod si ita est, non iam principium ei[^13] tantum rei erit, quam gignit vel facit, sed et ei, quam dat et quae procedit ab ipso. Si ergo quod datur vel quod procedit principium habet, a quo datur vel procedit, fatendum est, Patrem et Filium principium esse Spiritus sancti, non duo principia. Sed sicut Pater et Filius ad creaturam relative unus creator et unus dominus dicitur, sic relative ad Spiritum sanctum unum principium. Ad creaturam vero Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unum principium sunt, sicut unus creator et unus dominus». Ecce habes, quod Pater principium Filii dicitur, quia genuit eum. Qua ergo notione est Pater, ea principium Filii dicitur, id est generatione, secundum quam etiam dicitur auctor Filii. Unde Hilarius in quarto libro *de Trinitate*[^14] ait: «Ipso quo Pater dicitur, eius quem genuit auctor ostenditur, id nomen habens, quod neque ex alio profectum intelligatur, et ex quo is qui genitus est substitisse doceatur», «Novit Ecclesia unum innascibilem Deum, novit unigenitum Dei Filium. Confitetur Patrem ab origine liberum, confitetur et Filii originem ab initio non ipsum ab initio, sed ab ininitiabili non per se ipsum, sed ab eo qui a nemine est, natum ab aeterno, nativitatem scilicet ex paterna aeternitate sumentem. Edita est hic fidei professio, sed professionis ratio nondum exposita est»; et ideo quaerenda, scilicet quomodo intelligendum sit quod ait, Filii originem esse ab initio, et non ipsum esse ab initio, sed ab ininitiabili. Hoc utique subdens determinavit, quomodo acceperit *initium*, inquiens, originem Filii esse ab initio, ac si diceret: non ita intelligas, originem Filii esse ab initio, quasi ipse Filius habeat initium, sed quia ipse est ab ininitiabili, id est a Patre, a quo sunt omnia. Nam licet Filius sit principium de principio, non est tamen concedendum, quod Filius habeat principium. Cumque Filius sit principium de principio et Pater principium, non de principio, non est principium de principio principium sine principio, sicut Filius non est Pater; neque duo tamen principia, sed unum, sicut Pater et Filius non duo creatores, sed unus creator.

#### Cap. IV. *An eadem notione Pater et Filius sint principium Spiritus sancti.*

Unum autem principium sunt Pater et Filius non tantum creaturarum, ut dictum est supra, sed etiam Spiritus sancti; ideo quaeri solet, utrum eadem notione Pater sit principium Spiritus sancti et Filius, an sit alia notio, qua Pater dicatur principium Spiritus sancti, et alia, qua Filius. — *Ad quod dicimus*, cum Pater dicatur principium Spiritus sancti et Filius — quia Spiritus sanctus procedit vel datur ab utroque, nec aliter procedit vel datur a Patre quam a Filio — sane intelligi potest, Patrem et Filium eadem relatione vel notione dici principium Spiritus sancti. — Si vero quaeritur, quae sit illa notio quam ibi notat principium, nomen eius non habemus[^15], sed non est ipsa paternitas vel filiatio, immo notio quaedam, quae[^16] Patris est et Filii, qua ab aeterno Pater et Filius unum principium sunt Spiritus sancti. Donator autem, ut praedictum est[^17], dicitur Pater vel Filius ex tempore, sicut Spiritus sanctus datum vel donatum.

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### DISTINCTION XXIX.

#### Cap. I. *On the [name] principle.*

There is, moreover, another name noting a manifold relation, namely *principle*. For *principle* is always said in relation to something. And the Father is called principle, and the Son principle, and the Holy Spirit principle; but in different ways. For the Father is called principle in relation to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Whence Augustine in the fourth book *On the Trinity*[^1] says: "The Father is the principle of the whole divinity, or, if it is better said, of the deity, because He Himself is from no one. For He has nothing from which He is or from which He proceeds"; but from Him both the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeds. He is therefore not called the principle of the whole deity in the sense that He is the principle either of Himself or of the divine essence, but because He is the principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in each of whom the whole divinity is. The Son is called principle in relation to the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit is not called principle except in relation to creatures; in relation to which also the Father is called principle, and the Son, and the Trinity itself together, and each single person[^2] is called the principle of creatures. "The Father therefore is principle without principle; the Son [is] principle from a principle; the Holy Spirit [is] principle from both, that is, from the Father and the Son[^3]."

#### Cap. II. *That the Father is from eternity the principle also of the Son, but the Holy Spirit is not [eternally principle].*

And the Father from eternity is the principle of the Son, and the Father and the Son [are] the principle of the Holy Spirit, since the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. But the Holy Spirit is not from eternity a principle, but began to be [principle], because He is not called principle except in relation to creatures. When therefore creatures began to be, the Holy Spirit also began to be the principle of them. Likewise also the Father and the Son began to be, with the Holy Spirit, one principle of creatures, since creatures began to be from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; and these three are called not three, but one principle of all creatures, because they are the principle of things in one and the same way. For things are not from the Father in one way and from the Son in another, but altogether in the same way. And so the Apostle, understanding that this Trinity is one principle of things, says[^4]: *From Him and through Him and in Him are all things.* "But when we hear that all things are from God," as Augustine says in *On the Nature of the Good*[^5], "we ought to understand all natures whatever, and all things which are naturally[^6]. For from Him are not the sins, which do not preserve nature but vitiate it, [and] which are born from the will of those who sin." Of all things therefore which are naturally, the one principle is the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit, and this began to be. But from eternity the Father is the principle of the Son by generation, and the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^7] thus says: "He is called *Father* relatively, and likewise He is called *principle* relatively. But *Father* is said in relation to the Son, but *principle* in relation to all things which are from Him. And the Son also is called principle. For when it was said to Him[^8], *Who art Thou?*, He answered: *The Principle, who also speak unto you.* But is He then a principle of the Father? Rather, He wished to show Himself to be Creator, when He said that He was a principle, just as the Father is a principle of the creature, since from Him are all things. But when we say both that the Father is a principle and that the Son is a principle, we do not say two principles of the creature, since the Father and the Son together are one principle in relation to the creature, just as [they are] one Creator. But if whatever remains in itself and begets or works something is the principle of that thing which it begets or of that which it works, we cannot deny that even the Holy Spirit[^9] is rightly called a principle, since we do not separate Him from the appellation of *Creator*: for it is written[^10] of Him that He works, and certainly remaining in Himself He works. For He is not changed and turned into any one of the things which He works. The Holy Spirit therefore is one principle in relation to the creature with the Father and the Son, not two or three principles." Behold, Augustine plainly shows that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle of created things, that is, that they are principle in one and the same way; and he sufficiently set forth that way, since namely they all work, and since these three work in like manner[^11], they are therefore called one principle.

#### Cap. III. *How the Father [is] principle of the Son, and He with the Son [is principle] of the Holy Spirit.*

Then in the same book he continuously shows how the Father is called principle in relation to the Son, and He Himself with the Son in relation to the Holy Spirit, saying that the Father is therefore the principle of the Son because He begot Him, and that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit proceeds or is given from both. For he speaks thus[^12]: "If the begetter is principle in relation to that which is begotten, the Father is principle in relation to

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the Son, since He begot Him. But whether the Father is also principle in relation to the Holy Spirit, since it is said: *He proceeds from the Father*, is no small question. For if it is so, He will now be principle not only of that thing[^13] which He begets or makes, but also of that which He gives and which proceeds from Him. If therefore that which is given or which proceeds has a principle from which it is given or proceeds, it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles. But just as the Father and the Son are called, in relation to the creature, relatively one Creator and one Lord, so relatively in relation to the Holy Spirit [they are] one principle. But in relation to the creature the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle, just as [they are] one Creator and one Lord." Behold, you have it that the Father is called the principle of the Son because He begot Him. By that notion therefore by which He is Father, by that He is called principle of the Son, that is, by generation, according to which He is also called the *author* of the Son. Whence Hilary in the fourth book *On the Trinity*[^14] says: "By the very [fact] by which He is called *Father*, He is shown the author of Him whom He begot, having that name [such] that it may be understood neither to have proceeded from another, and from which He who has been begotten is taught to have subsisted," "The Church knows one unbegotten God; she knows the only-begotten Son of God. She confesses the Father free from origin; she confesses also the origin of the Son [to be] from a beginning — not Himself from a beginning, but from One without beginning; not through Himself, but from Him who is from no one — born from eternity, taking, namely, His nativity from the paternal eternity. The profession of faith is here set forth, but the rationale of the profession is not yet expounded"; and therefore [it is] to be sought, namely how it is to be understood, what he says, that the origin of the Son is *from a beginning*, and that He Himself is not *from a beginning*, but from One without beginning. Adding this, he in any case determined how he meant *beginning*, saying that the origin of the Son is from a beginning, as if he said: do not understand it thus, that the origin of the Son is from a beginning, as though the Son Himself has a beginning, but [it means] that He Himself is from One without beginning, that is, from the Father, from whom are all things. For although the Son is principle from a principle, it is nevertheless not to be conceded that the Son has a principle. And although the Son is principle from a principle and the Father is principle, not from a principle, the principle from a principle is not a principle without principle, just as the Son is not the Father; nor yet two principles, but one, just as the Father and the Son [are] not two creators, but one Creator.

#### Cap. IV. *Whether the Father and the Son are principle of the Holy Spirit by the same notion.*

Now the Father and the Son are one principle not only of creatures, as has been said above, but also of the Holy Spirit; therefore it is wont to be asked whether the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit by the same notion as the Son, or whether there is one notion by which the Father is called principle of the Holy Spirit, and another by which the Son [is]. — *To which we say*: since the Father is called principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Son [also is] — because the Holy Spirit proceeds or is given from both, nor does He proceed or is given from the Father otherwise than from the Son — it can soundly be understood that the Father and the Son are called principle of the Holy Spirit by the same relation or notion. — But if it is asked what that notion is which *principle* there denotes, we have no name for it[^15], but it is not paternity itself or filiation, but rather a certain notion which[^16] is of the Father and of the Son, by which from eternity the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. But *donor*, as has been said before[^17], is said of the Father or of the Son in time, just as the Holy Spirit [is called] *gift* or *donated*.

---

la: Cap. 20. n. 29. Verba: *ipse est a nullo* etc. sunt ex n. 28.

en: Chapter 20, n. 29. The words *ipse est a nullo* ("He is from no one") etc. are from n. 28.

la: Vat. cum aliis edd. *personarum* contra codd. ABDE et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican with the other editions [reads] *personarum*, against codices ABDE and edition 1.

la: August., l. contra Maxim. c. 17. n. 4.

en: Augustine, book *Against Maximinus*, c. 17, n. 4.

la: Cap. 28. Etiam ea quae praecedunt, secundum sensum dicta sunt ab August., V. *de Trin.* c. 13. n. 14.

en: Chapter 28. Also the things which precede are said, according to sense, by Augustine, book V *On the Trinity*, c. 13, n. 14.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, *naturalia*, sed contra codd. 1, 2, 3 et originale.

en: The Vatican and the other editions, except edition 1, [read] *naturalia*, but against codices 1, 2, 3 and the original.

la: Cap. 13. n. 14. Vide etiam *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 109. n. 13.

en: Chapter 13, n. 14. See also *Expositions on the Psalms*, Ps. 109, n. 13.

la: Cod. D adiungit *esse principium et*. Paulo inferius ed. 9 cum originali post *creatoris* habet *et* pro *quia*.

en: Codex D adds *esse principium et*. A little further on, edition 9 with the original, after *creatoris*, has *et* in place of *quia*.

la: *1. Cor.* 12, 11: *Haec autem omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus.*

en: *1 Cor.* 12:11: *But all these things one and the same Spirit works.*

la: Codd. A D, ed. 1 et 5 (in margine) *simul*.

en: Codices A, D, edition 1 and edition 5 (in the margin) [read] *simul*.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 14. n. 13. In principio textus codd. 1, 2, 3 cum originali *ad id quod gignit* pro *ad id quod gignitur*. — Locus s. Scripturae est *Ioan.* 15, 26.

en: Book V *On the Trinity*, c. 14, n. 13. At the beginning of the text codices 1, 2, 3 with the original [read] *ad id quod gignit* in place of *ad id quod gignitur*. — The passage of Holy Scripture is *John* 15:26.

la: Ita hic et paulo inferius omnes codd. cum originali; sed omnes edd. bis habent *eius* pro *ei*. Deinde post *Patrem et Filium* omnes edd., excepta 1, addunt *unum*, sed contra originale et codd. Denique plures codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 cum originali omittunt *sunt* ante *sicut unus creator*.

en: So here and a little further on read all the codices with the original; but all editions read twice *eius* in place of *ei*. Then, after *Patrem et Filium*, all editions except 1 add *unum*, but against the original and the codices. Finally, several codices and editions 2, 3, 4 with the original omit *sunt* before *sicut unus creator*.

la: *N.* 9. Alius locus est ibid. n. 6.

en: *N.* 9. The other passage is in the same place, n. 6.

la: Receptum est nomen *spiratio*, consecratum a Concilio Lugdunensi II. (an. 1274): «Spiritus sanctus... non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit».

en: The name *spiration* has been received, consecrated by the Second Council of Lyon (A.D. 1274): "The Holy Spirit... proceeds not by two spirations, but by a single spiration."

la: Vat. sola omittit *quae*; paulo inferius eadem cum cod. C et aliis edd., excepta 1, *est* pro *sunt*.

en: The Vatican alone omits *quae*; a little further on the same [Vatican], with codex C and the other editions, except edition 1, [reads] *est* in place of *sunt*.

la: Dist. XIV, XV, XVIII.

en: Distinctions XIV, XV, XVIII.


title: Dist. 29, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXIX — De proprietate non personali, quae est communis spiratio, significata per nomen principium. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXIX — On the non-personal property, which is common spiration, signified by the name principle. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXIX.

#### *De proprietate non[^1] personali, quae est communis spiratio, significata per nomen principium.*

> *Est praeterea aliud nomen, multiplicem notans relationem.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de proprietate non personali, quae est innascibilitas. Hic secundo agit de proprietate sive notione non personali, quae est communis spiratio, significata per hoc nomen *principium*. Et quoniam illud nomen non tantum notionaliter accipitur, immo etiam essentialiter, ideo distinguit primo huius nominis multiplicitatem, secundo manifestat huius nominis unitatem, secundum quod dicitur de Patre et Filio respectu Spiritus sancti, ostendens quod sunt unum principium[^2] Spiritus sancti; et hoc ibi: *Deinde in eodem libro continue.*

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Prima pars habet duas. In prima distinguit huius nominis multiplicitatem; in secunda vero membra suae distinctionis explanat ostendens per auctoritates, quod *principium* habet omnes illas acceptiones, et hoc ibi: *Et Pater ab aeterno principium est Filii.*

*Deinde in eodem libro etc.* Haec est secunda pars, in qua agit de hoc nomine *principium* specialiter, prout dicitur notionaliter et essentialiter. Et primo ostendit, quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti; secundo, qua unitate sunt unum, scilicet unitate notionis, ultimo capitulo: *Unum autem principium sunt etc.*, ubi ostendit, quod eadem notione sunt principium, et quod illa notio est spiratio.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad evidentiam[^3] eorum quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione de hoc nomine *principium*, duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de ipso quantum ad multiplicitatem. Secundo, quantum ad unitatem. Et quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur.

Primo, supposito quod hoc nomen *principium* accipiatur essentialiter, quaeritur, utrum possit accipi personaliter sive notionaliter.

Secundo, dato quod essentialiter et notionaliter, quaeritur, utrum de illis duobus modis accipiatur univoce, vel aequivoce.

### Articulus I.

#### *De principio quantum ad multiplicitatem.*

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XXIX.

#### *On the non[^1]-personal property, which is common spiration, signified by the name principle.*

> *"There is, moreover, another name, denoting a manifold relation."*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of the non-personal property which is unbegottenness. Here, in the second place, he treats of the non-personal property or notion which is common spiration, signified by this name *principle*. And since this name is taken not only notionally but also essentially, therefore he first distinguishes the manifold meaning of this name; second, he sets forth the unity of this name, according as it is said of the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit, showing that they are one principle[^2] of the Holy Spirit; and this there: *"Then in the same book, continuing on."*

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The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he distinguishes the manifold meaning of this name; in the second, however, he explains the members of his distinction, showing through authorities that *principle* has all those meanings, and this there: *"And the Father is from eternity the principle of the Son."*

*"Then in the same book etc."* This is the second part, in which he treats of this name *principle* specifically, as it is said notionally and essentially. And first he shows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit; second, by what unity they are one, namely by unity of notion, in the last chapter: *"And they are one principle etc."*, where he shows that they are principle by the same notion, and that that notion is spiration.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding[^3] of the things said in the present distinction concerning this name *principle*, two [questions] are asked. First it is asked about the name itself with regard to its manifold meaning. Second, with regard to its unity. And concerning the first, two [questions] are asked.

First, supposing that this name *principle* is taken essentially, it is asked whether it can be taken personally or notionally.

Second, granted that [it is taken] both essentially and notionally, it is asked whether on those two modes it is taken univocally or equivocally.

### Article I.

#### *On the principle with regard to its manifold meaning.*

---

la: In non paucis mss. et ed. 1 desideratur *non*.

en: In not a few manuscripts and in edition 1, the word *non* ("not") is missing.

la: Plures codd. ut K S V W cum ed. 6 voci *principium* praefigunt *unum*.

en: Many codices such as K, S, V, W, with edition 6, prefix the word *unum* to *principium*.

la: Cod. T *intelligentiam*.

en: Codex T reads *intelligentiam* ("understanding") [in place of *evidentiam*].