title: Dist. 10, Art. 3, Q. 1

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### Articulus III. *Qualiter Angeli officium suum exsequantur.*

Consequenter quaeritur de tertio articulo, scilicet qualiter iniunctum sibi officium exsequantur; et cum hoc faciant discurrendo et denuntiando, incideret hic quaestio de Angeli motu et de locutione. Sed quia de motu dictum est in primo libro distinctione trigesima septima[^1], nunc quaerendum est de locutione angelica. Et supposito, quod competat Angelis loqui absque assumto corpore, sicut dicunt plures auctoritates Scripturae, locutione spirituali, quae quidem est sine voce, circa modum loquendi duo quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum locutio Angeli idem sit quod eius cogitatio. Secundum est, utrum eadem locutio possit esse a Deo et Angelo.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Angeli locutio sit idem quod eius cogitatio.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod spiritualis Angeli locutio non est idem quod eius cogitatio:

*Fundamenta.* 1. Primo per illud quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^2]: *Si linguis hominum loquar* etc.; ibi Glossa: « Angeli praepositi significant minoribus quod de Dei voluntate primi sentiunt, quod fit aliquibus nutibus aut signis »; si ergo nutus cogitationis aliud est quam cogitatio, ergo cogitatio aliud est quam locutio.

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2. Item, differt in Angelo actus virtutis intellectivae et operativae: ergo pari ratione differt actus virtutis cogitativae[^3] et interpretativae; si ergo cogitare est actus virtutis intellectivae, et loqui actus virtutis interpretativae: ergo non sunt idem.

3. Item, non est eadem conversio, qua intellectus convertitur ad se, et qua convertitur ad alterum: si ergo cogitando intellectus convertitur ad se, et loquendo convertitur ad alterum: ergo cogitare et loqui in Angelo non est idem, sed diversum.

4. Item, per locutionem est manifestatio cogitatus angelici: ergo si idem esset loqui et cogitare, quidquid cogitaret, alteri manifestaret: ergo nihil, quod est in uno Angelo, lateret, quin[^4] esset in alio: ergo quidquid sciret Angelus superioris ordinis, sciret ille qui est inferioris; quod est plane falsum: ergo etc.

**Contra:** *Ad oppositum.* 1. Gregorius in Moralibus[^5] definiens vocem Angelorum dicit: « Vox Angelorum in laude Conditoris est admiratio intimae contemplationis »: si ergo admiratio sive contemplatio non est actus differens a cogitatione, ergo nec locutio sive vociferatio.

2. Item, Damascenus[^6]: « Non lingua et auditu indigent Angeli, nam sine sermone voce prolato tradunt sibi suas illuminationes »: ergo videtur, quod aut locutio angelica nihil sit, aut si aliquid est, non sit aliud quam cogitare.

3. Item, locutio non est aliud quam conceptus manifestatio, Angelus autem, in quantum est substantia cognitiva, habet naturam luminis et speculi[^7]; sed lux corporalis per hoc, quod lucet, se manifestat, et speculum per hoc, quod speciem recipit et retinet, speciem repraesentat: ergo videtur, quod Angelus hoc ipso, quod intelligit, cogitationes suas declarat: ergo cum cogitationis declaratio sit locutio, idem est in eo cogitatio et locutio.

4. Item, loqui non est aliud quam dicere, et dicere non est aliud quam verbum gignere sive formare; sed cogitatio nihil aliud est quam verbi formatio sive verbi conceptio, sicut vult Anselmus et Augustinus[^8]: ergo cogitatio nihil aliud est quam interior locutio; sed locutio, quae convenit Angelo, secundum se est tantum interior: ergo idem est quod cogitatio.

5. Item, si locutio differt a cogitatione, cum praesupponat eam, quaero, quid addit supra ipsam? Si tu dicas mihi, quod addit manifestationem, quae fit per quandam speciei oblationem et transfusionem in alterum quasi in audientem; tunc videtur, cum Angelus superioris ordinis nihil recipiat ab Angelo inferioris, quod Angelus inferioris ordinis non possit loqui alicui Angelo superioris ordinis: quod plane falsum est. Si enim potest Angelus loqui Deo, multo magis potest loqui alteri Angelo.

6. Item, locutio, quae differt a cogitatione, addit aliquod signum exprimens: si ergo Angelus vult speciem intelligibilem, quam habet in se, alteri Angelo manifestare loquendo; et in ipso differt locutio et cogitatio: oportet ergo, quod differat species, qua intelligit, et signum, quo exprimit. Tunc igitur quaero de illo signo: aut est species, aut res. Si species: ergo pari ratione indiget alio signo, et similiter quaeretur de illo alio tertio; nec erit ibi status, sicut nec in primo. Si autem est res; aut sensibilis, aut intelligibilis. Sensibilis non, quia quidquid est in Angelo, est spirituale. Si intelligibilis; quaero, quare illam magis apprehendit Angelus, cui fit sermo, quam ipsam speciem, quae est in intellectu angelico? Et iterum, illa res, quae est in uno Angelo, non potest fieri in veritate in alio Angelo: ergo oportet, quod fiat secundum similitudinem; et tunc pari ratione species existens in intellectu unius Angeli potest generare sui similem in alio. Aut si non; quare non?

*Quaestiones incidentes.* Item[^9], quomodo potest illud intelligi? et quid est ibi medium deferens, et quae est ibi lux abstrahens, et quae est ibi vis vel virtus excitans et imprimens? Omnia enim haec videntur esse necessaria, si differt in Angelo locutio et cogitatio.

### Conclusio

> Angelorum locutio non est idem quod cogitatio, quia locutio addit cogitationi respectum ad alterum et actum novum, non autem signum.

**Respondeo:** *Loqui dicitur dupliciter.* Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod loqui dupliciter est: uno modo loqui actum in se sive intrinsecum; alio modo actum ad alterum sive quodam modo extrinsecum[^10]. Primo modo loqui idem est quod verbum formare sive gignere; secundo modo idem est quod verbum formatum depromere sive exprimere. Primo modo locutio sive in Deo, sive in homine, sive in Angelo non est aliud quam cogitatio. Secundo modo plus dicit quam cogitationem, sed differenter in diversis.

*Loqui in Deo addit effectum.* In Deo enim loqui ad alterum supra intellectum notat[^11] effectum, videlicet revelationem. Non

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enim dicitur Deus nobis loqui solum, quia intelligit, sed etiam quia revelando aliquam illustrationem in nobis efficit. Unde Gregorius in Moralibus[^12]: « Dei locutio, ad nos intrinsecus facta, videtur potius, quam auditur: quia, dum semetipsum sine mora sermonis insinuat, repentina luce tenebras nostrae ignorantiae illustrat ».

*In homine addit effectum, actum et signum.* In homine vero non solum addit effectum in alterum, sed etiam actum et signum medium. Cum enim unus homo loquitur alteri, non solum cogitat, sed cogitationem suam, formando vocem sensibilem, alii interpretatur et explicat. — Ratio autem, quare locutio in hominibus non solum addit actum, sed etiam signum medium, haec est: quia in anima alius est actus conversionis supra se, et alius actus conversionis ad alterum; et in cogitatione[^13] convertitur anima supra id quod habet in se, in locutione vero offert alteri: et ita oportet, quod alius actus sit cogitare et loqui, et ita addit actum locutio supra cogitationem in homine. Addit etiam signum, quia anima, quamdiu est cum corpore, non est nata suscipere, nisi mediante vi sensitiva; unde « qui amittunt unum sensum, necesse habent amittere unam scientiam[^14] ». Ideo ad hoc, quod anima conceptum suum alteri exprimat, oportet, quod ipsum voci sensibili per organa formatae, mediante vi imaginaria, coniungat, et sic similitudo intelligibilis sive signatum intelligibile per illud suum signum sensibile, mediantibus virtutibus sensitivis, ad intellectum alterius animae ascendat. — Et hoc conveniens est, ut, sicut homo compositus est ex anima et corpore, ita eius locutio aliquid habeat spirituale, aliquid corporale.

*Conclusio 1.* In spiritualibus autem substantiis medio modo est; nam locutio supra cogitationem addit effectum sive respectum, sed non addit sensibile signum. Respectum quidem et effectum addit propter hoc, quod cogitatio, quantum est de sui natura, est secreta; et ideo nunquam fit manifesta, nisi ipse cogitans aliquid tanquam audienti offerat, et aperiendo se, quodam quasi nutu mediante, quod in se habet ad intellectum alterius quasi ad aurem pertingere faciat. Necessarius est etiam actus novus, quia non eadem conversione[^15] se supra se convertit et supra alterum vel ad alterum. — Sed tamen non est necessarium sensibile signum nec deferens medium, quia, cum ipse intellectus angelicus sine potentiis sensitivis natus sit suscipere, Angelus loquens sine sensibili medio natus est similiter offerre; *Conclusio 2.* et ideo ad loquendum sufficit ipsi Angelo ipsa species intelligibilis, quae ex virtute intellectiva ipsius Angeli ad imperium[^16] voluntatis potest ad alterum protendi. Et sicut illa species, dum eam sibi et in se contuebatur intellectus, erat verbum interius; sic, dum eam protendit ad alterum, efficitur quasi nutus et verbum exterius. Et quia tam illa species quam virtus protendens illam ad alterum et ipsa protensio spiritualis est; ideo non indiget corporali medio deferente. — *Corollarium.* Sed quia virtus illa finita est, necesse est ad hoc, quod unus Angelus intellectum alterius Angeli loquendo, hoc est illam speciem protendendo, excitet, quod finita distantia ad invicem distent.

Ex his igitur patet, quod etsi non tantum differat in Angelo locutio et cogitatio, quantum differt in homine, differt tamen aliquo modo. Ideo rationes inductae ad hanc partem concedendae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Gregorio, dicendum, quod Gregorius loquitur de locutione Angeli in comparatione ad Deum, apud quem loqui Angeli cogitare est, quia aurem[^17] eius nihil latet.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod quamvis locutio Angeli non differat a cogitatione propter hoc, quod ultra cogitationem dicat vocem sensibilem; *Notandum.* nihilominus tamen non est omnino indifferens, quia, etsi non addat ultra cogitationem aliquod signum, addit tamen ulteriorem actum atque respectum, ratione cuius concernit finitam distantiam, quamvis cogitatio et intellectus ab omni distantia abstrahat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de manifestatione lucis et speculi, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lucis vel speculi manifestatio est naturalis. Unde nec lux potest lucere, nec speculum suscipere, quin etiam se manifestent; sed non sic est in angelica cogitatione, cuius manifestatio est voluntaria, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram[^18]: « Dum ipsi Angeli cogitationes suas ad nutum voluntatis modo occultant, modo communicant, quibusdam spiritualibus obstaculis positis, vel remotis, sicut sensibiliter videmus circa corpora ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil aliud est loqui quam dicere; dicendum, quod sicut loqui est dupliciter: in se, et ad alterum, sic etiam et[^19] dicere; et quamvis dicere in se idem sit quod cogitare vel cogitando intelligere, tamen dicere ad alterum ulteriorem habet actum.

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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi locutio addit aliquid supra cogitationem, quod tunc non poterit Angelus inferioris ordinis loqui ad Angelum superioris; dicendum, quod verum est, si loqui adderet influentiam veram in alterum; sed actus locutionis, superadditus actui cogitationis, *Notandum.* non dicit nisi quandam speciei protensionem ad alterum, quae quidem protensio non est illius speciei impressiva, sed potius excitativa intellectus audientis, ut propria virtute suscipiat et in se ipso faciat[^20]. Unde locutio ex parte loquentis non ponit nisi excitationem activam, ex parte audientis non nisi excitationem passivam. — *Quid auditus Angeli.* Et ex hoc patet, quid sit auditus Angeli, et quomodo differat audire et videre; nam tam audire quam videre est in Angelo intelligere[^21]. Sed tunc videt, cum ex proprio motu intelligit aliquid; tunc audit, quando per oblationem speciei intelligibilis, ab alio intelligente excitatus, ipsum quod offertur intelligit. Et sic competit Angelo non solum respectu superioris, sed etiam respectu paris vel inferioris; quia sic audit supremus Angelus ab infimo, sicut magister audire potest a discipulo, non quia ab eo suscipiat doctrinam sive illuminationem, sed quia melius cognoscit eius defectus per sui ipsius detectionem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi locutio differt a cogitatione, quod nutus differt a specie; dicendum, quod illud non oportet, quod differat re, sed sufficit, quod differat comparatione. *Ad quaestiones incidentes.* Eadem enim species est, quae consideratur in se, et quae potest protendi ad alterum, relatione differens. Sed actus considerandi eam in se, qui quidem est cogitatio, et actus protendendi ad alterum, qui est locutio, actus est alius et alius; nam his actibus intellectus angelicus eadem similitudine diversimode utitur, ita quod in uno illa similitudo et intelligibilis species dicitur species tantum et verbum; in altero vero non tantum species, sed etiam nutus. — *Alia solutio.* Verumtamen posset dici, quod sicut species, quae est in speculo, dum protendit se ad oculum, non est omnino eadem, sed se multiplicat; sic etiam potest intelligi spirituali modo de specie, quae est in intellectu angelico. — *Non requiritur medium.* Si autem quaeratur de medio, dicendum, quod nulla est quaestio, quia, cum sit actio spiritualis et intellectualis, non indiget medio corporali. — *De virtute et luce.* Si vero quaeratur de virtute, per quam fit[^22], sive de luce spirituali; dicendum, quod concurrit ibi lux intellectus angelici offerentis et lux etiam supernae veritatis, *Notandum.* ut, sicut in luce corporali ad immutandum visum videmus concurrere et lucem incorporatam et lucem insuper influentem et absolutam, utpote lucem solis; sic etiam in spirituali cognitione duplicem lucem concurrere intelligamus, secundum quod in pluribus locis innuit Augustinus[^23].

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### Article III. *In what manner the Angels carry out their office.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the third article, namely, in what manner [the Angels] carry out the office enjoined upon them; and since they do this by going about and by announcing, there would here arise a question concerning the Angel's motion and concerning [his] locution. But because of motion it has been treated in the first book, distinction thirty-seven[^1], now inquiry must be made concerning angelic locution. And, it being supposed that it belongs to the Angels to speak without an assumed body — as many authorities of Scripture say — by a spiritual locution, which indeed is without voice, two things are asked concerning the manner of speaking.

The first is whether the locution of an Angel is the same as his thought. The second is whether the same locution can be from God and from an Angel.

### Question I. *Whether the locution of an Angel is the same as his thought.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the spiritual locution of an Angel is not the same as his thought:

*The grounds.* 1. First, through that which is said in the first [Epistle] to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen[^2]: *If I should speak with the tongues of men* etc.; there the Gloss [says]: «The Angels set over [others] signify to the lesser ones what they themselves first perceive of God's will, which comes about by certain nods or signs»; if, then, the nod of a thought is something other than the thought, then the thought is something other than the locution.

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2. Likewise, in an Angel the act of the intellective power and [the act] of the operative [power] differ: therefore, by parity of reasoning, the act of the cogitative power[^3] and [the act] of the interpretative [power] differ; if, then, to think is the act of the intellective power, and to speak the act of the interpretative power: therefore they are not the same.

3. Likewise, the conversion by which the intellect is turned toward itself and [the conversion] by which it is turned toward another are not the same: if, then, in thinking the intellect is turned toward itself, and in speaking is turned toward another: therefore to think and to speak in an Angel are not the same, but diverse.

4. Likewise, through locution there is the manifestation of an angelic thought: therefore, if to speak and to think were the same, whatever [an Angel] thought, he would manifest to another: therefore nothing that is in one Angel would lie hidden but that[^4] it would be in another: therefore whatever the Angel of a higher order knew, he who is of a lower [order] would know; which is plainly false: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** *To the opposite.* 1. Gregory in the *Morals*[^5], defining the voice of the Angels, says: «The voice of the Angels in the praise of the Creator is the wonder of the inmost contemplation»: if, then, wonder or contemplation is not an act differing from thought, then neither [is] locution or vociferation.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^6]: «The Angels do not need tongue and hearing, for without a word uttered by voice they hand over their illuminations to one another»: therefore it seems that either angelic locution is nothing, or, if it is something, it is nothing other than to think.

3. Likewise, locution is nothing other than the manifestation of a concept; but an Angel, inasmuch as he is a cognitive substance, has the nature of a light and of a mirror[^7]; but corporeal light, by the fact that it shines, manifests itself, and a mirror, by the fact that it receives and retains a species, represents the species: therefore it seems that an Angel, by this very fact that he understands, declares his thoughts: therefore, since the declaration of a thought is locution, in him thought and locution are the same.

4. Likewise, to speak is nothing other than to say, and to say is nothing other than to beget or form a word; but thought is nothing other than the formation of a word or the conception of a word, as Anselm and Augustine hold[^8]: therefore thought is nothing other than interior locution; but the locution which befits an Angel is, in itself, only interior: therefore it is the same as thought.

5. Likewise, if locution differs from thought — since it presupposes it — I ask, what does it add over it? If you say to me that it adds a manifestation, which comes about by a certain offering and transfusion of a species into another as into a hearer; then it seems — since an Angel of a higher order receives nothing from an Angel of a lower [order] — that an Angel of a lower order could not speak to any Angel of a higher order: which is plainly false. For if an Angel can speak to God, much more can he speak to another Angel.

6. Likewise, locution, which differs from thought, adds some expressing sign: if, then, an Angel wishes to manifest to another Angel, by speaking, an intelligible species which he has in himself, and in him locution and thought differ: it must be, then, that the species by which he understands and the sign by which he expresses differ. Then, therefore, I ask concerning that sign: it is either a species or a thing. If a species: then by parity of reasoning it needs another sign, and similarly inquiry will be made concerning that other third one; nor will there be a stopping-point there, just as neither in the first. But if it is a thing: [it is] either sensible or intelligible. Sensible [it is] not, because whatever is in an Angel is spiritual. If intelligible: I ask, why does the Angel to whom the discourse is made apprehend that [thing] rather than the very species which is in the angelic intellect? And again, that thing which is in one Angel cannot come to be in truth in another Angel: therefore it must be that it come to be according to a likeness; and then by parity of reasoning a species existing in the intellect of one Angel can generate its like in another. Or if not, why not?

*Incidental questions.* Likewise[^9], how can that be understood? and what is the conveying medium there, and what is the abstracting light there, and what is the stirring and impressing force or power there? For all these seem to be necessary, if in an Angel locution and thought differ.

### Conclusion

> The locution of the Angels is not the same as thought, because locution adds to thought a relation to another and a new act, but not a sign.

**I respond:** *"To speak" is said in two ways.* For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to speak is [taken] in two ways: in one way, to speak [as] an act in itself, or intrinsic; in another way, [as] an act toward another, or in a certain way extrinsic[^10]. In the first way, to speak is the same as to form or beget a word; in the second way, it is the same as to bring forth or express a word [already] formed. In the first way, locution — whether in God, or in man, or in an Angel — is nothing other than thought. In the second way it says more than thought, but differently in different [cases].

*"To speak" in God adds an effect.* For in God, to speak to another, beyond [the act of] understanding, marks[^11] an effect, namely revelation. For

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God is not said to speak to us merely because he understands, but also because by revealing he effects some illumination in us. Hence Gregory in the *Morals*[^12]: «God's locution, made to us inwardly, is seen rather than heard: because, while he insinuates his very self without the delay of speech, he illumines the darkness of our ignorance with a sudden light».

*In man it adds an effect, an act, and a sign.* But in man it adds not only an effect upon another, but also an act and an intermediate sign. For when one man speaks to another, he not only thinks, but also, by forming a sensible voice, interprets and explains his thought to the other. — Now the reason why locution in men adds not only an act but also an intermediate sign is this: that in the soul the act of conversion upon itself is one thing, and the act of conversion toward another is another; and in thought[^13] the soul is turned upon what it has within itself, but in locution it offers [it] to another: and so it must be that to think and to speak are a different act, and so locution adds an act over thought in man. It also adds a sign, because the soul, so long as it is with the body, is not fitted by nature to receive [anything] except by the mediation of the sensitive power; whence «those who lose one sense necessarily lose one [branch of] knowledge[^14]». Therefore, in order that the soul may express its concept to another, it must join it to a voice formed by sensible organs, by the mediation of the imaginative power, and so the intelligible likeness, or the intelligible thing signified, ascends, through that sensible sign of his, by the mediation of the sensitive powers, to the intellect of the other soul. — And this is fitting, that, as man is composed of soul and body, so his locution should have something spiritual, something corporeal.

*Conclusion 1.* But in spiritual substances it is in a middle way; for locution adds over thought an effect or relation, but does not add a sensible sign. It adds a relation and an effect for this reason: that thought, as far as is of its own nature, is secret; and therefore it never becomes manifest unless the one thinking offer something as it were to a hearer, and, by opening himself, by a certain quasi-nod as a medium, cause what he has within himself to reach, as it were to the ear, to the intellect of another. A new act also is necessary, because not by the same conversion[^15] does he turn himself upon himself and upon another or toward another. — But nevertheless a sensible sign is not necessary, nor a conveying medium, because, since the angelic intellect itself is fitted by nature to receive without sensitive powers, the speaking Angel is likewise fitted by nature to offer without a sensible medium; *Conclusion 2.* and therefore for speaking the intelligible species itself suffices for the Angel, [a species] which, from the intellective power of the Angel himself, at the command[^16] of the will, can be extended toward another. And just as that species, while the intellect beheld it for itself and in itself, was an interior word; so, while it extends it toward another, it becomes as it were a nod and an exterior word. And because both that species and the power extending it toward another, and the extension itself, are spiritual, therefore it does not need a corporeal conveying medium. — *A corollary.* But because that power is finite, it is necessary, for this — that one Angel by speaking, that is, by extending that species, should stir up the intellect of another Angel — that they be distant from one another by a finite distance.

From these things, then, it is plain that, although locution and thought do not differ in an Angel as much as they differ in man, they do nevertheless differ in some way. Therefore the arguments adduced for this side are to be conceded.

*The solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. To that which is objected from Gregory, it must be said that Gregory is speaking of the Angel's locution in comparison to God, with whom for an Angel to speak is to think, because nothing lies hidden from his ear[^17].

2. To that which is objected from Damascene, it must be said that, although the locution of an Angel does not differ from thought by the fact that it utters a sensible voice beyond the thought, *Note.* nevertheless it is not altogether without difference; because, even if it does not add any sign beyond the thought, it nevertheless adds a further act and relation, by reason of which it concerns a finite distance, although thought and intellect abstract from all distance.

3. To that which is objected concerning the manifestation of light and of a mirror, it must be said that the case is not alike, because the manifestation of light or of a mirror is natural. Whence light cannot shine, nor a mirror receive [a species], without also manifesting themselves; but it is not so in angelic thought, whose manifestation is voluntary, as Augustine says upon Genesis according to the letter[^18]: «While the Angels themselves, at the nod of [their] will, now conceal, now communicate their thoughts — certain spiritual obstacles being set up or removed — as we see sensibly with regard to bodies».

4. To that which is objected — that to speak is nothing other than to say — it must be said that, just as to speak is [taken] in two ways, in itself and toward another, so also is to say[^19]; and although to say in oneself is the same as to think, or by thinking to understand, nevertheless to say toward another has a further act.

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5. To that which is objected — that if locution adds something over thought, then an Angel of a lower order will not be able to speak to an Angel of a higher [order] — it must be said that this is true if to speak were to add a true influence upon another; but the act of locution, superadded to the act of thought, *Note.* says nothing but a certain extension of a species toward another, which extension indeed is not impressive of that species, but rather is excitative of the intellect of the hearer, so that by its own power it may receive [it] and make [it] in itself[^20]. Hence locution, on the part of the speaker, posits nothing but an active stirring-up; on the part of the hearer, nothing but a passive stirring-up. — *What the hearing of an Angel is.* And from this it is plain what the hearing of an Angel is, and how to hear and to see differ; for both to hear and to see is, in an Angel, to understand[^21]. But he sees when by his own motion he understands something; he hears when, by the offering of an intelligible species, stirred up by another that understands, he understands the very [thing] which is offered. And so this befits an Angel not only with respect to a higher [Angel], but also with respect to an equal or a lower one; for thus the highest Angel hears from the lowest, as a master can hear from a disciple — not because he receives doctrine or illumination from him, but because he better knows his defects through the [disciple's] disclosure of himself.

6. To that which is objected — that if locution differs from thought, [then] a nod differs from a species — it must be said that this is not necessary, that it differ in [its] thing, but it suffices that it differ in relation. *To the incidental questions.* For the species is the same which is considered in itself and which can be extended toward another, differing [only] in relation. But the act of considering it in itself, which indeed is thought, and the act of extending [it] toward another, which is locution, are a different and different act; for by these acts the angelic intellect uses the same likeness in diverse ways, so that in the one [act] that likeness and intelligible species is called a species only, and a word; but in the other not only a species, but also a nod. — *Another solution.* Nevertheless it could be said that, just as the species which is in a mirror, while it extends itself to the eye, is not altogether the same, but multiplies itself, so too can it be understood, in a spiritual manner, of the species which is in the angelic intellect. — *No medium is required.* But if inquiry be made concerning a medium, it must be said that there is no question, because, since it is a spiritual and intellectual action, it does not need a corporeal medium. — *On the power and the light.* But if inquiry be made concerning the power by which it comes about[^22], or concerning the spiritual light, it must be said that there concur there the light of the offering Angel's intellect and also the light of the supernal truth, *Note.* so that — just as in corporeal light we see concur, for the altering of sight, both the incorporated light and, besides, the light flowing in and absolute, namely the light of the sun — so too in spiritual cognition we understand a twofold light to concur, according as Augustine intimates in many places[^23].

la: Parte II. a. 2. — Aliquanto inferius codd. antiquiores *auctoritates et Scripturae* [codd. R U *Scriptura*] pro *auctoritates Scripturae*. Cfr. Zachar. 1, 9: *Et dixit ad me Angelus, qui loquebatur in me*.

en: [I Sent. d. 37,] part II, a. 2. — A little below, the more ancient codices [read] *auctoritates et Scripturae* [codices R, U: *Scriptura*] for *auctoritates Scripturae*. Cf. Zechariah 1, 9: *And the Angel who spoke in me said to me*.

la: Vers. 1. — In Glossa ordinaria, apud Petrum Lombardum et Lyranum super hunc locum, textus originalis cum multis nostrorum codd. habet *primi* [Petrus Lomb. *primum*] *sentiunt* pro *praesentiunt*, quod habent alii codd. cum Vat. — Plures codd. cum Vat. hic et deinde saepius minus bene substituunt nomen *cognitio* pro *cogitatio*.

en: [1 Corinthians 13,] v. 1. — In the ordinary Gloss, in Peter Lombard and Lyra upon this place, the original text, with many of our codices, has *primi* [Peter Lombard: *primum*] *sentiunt* for *praesentiunt*, which other codices, with the Vatican edition, have. — Several codices, with the Vatican edition, here and thereafter often less rightly substitute the word *cognitio* for *cogitatio*.

la: Multi codd. cum Vat. *cognitivae*, contra codd. B E F K P T bb ee.

en: Many codices, with the Vatican edition, [read] *cognitivae*, against codices B, E, F, K, P, T, bb, ee.

la: Ex cod. P substituimus *quin* pro *quod*.

en: From codex P we have substituted *quin* for *quod*.

la: Libr. II. c. 7. n. 10. Cfr. supra pag. 85, nota 2.

en: [*Morals*,] book II, c. 7, n. 10. Cf. above, p. 85, note 2.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 3. — Vat. *intentiones* pro *illuminationes*. Cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 4.

en: [Damascene,] *On the Orthodox Faith*, book II, c. 3. — The Vatican edition [reads] *intentiones* for *illuminationes*. Cf. above, p. 84, note 4.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 81, nota 3. — Cod. F K *substantia cogitativa* pro *substantia cognitiva*, et paulo superius post *conceptus* in cod. T additur *mentis*.

en: Cf. above, p. 81, note 3. — Codices F, K [read] *substantia cogitativa* for *substantia cognitiva*, and a little above, after *conceptus*, in codex T is added *mentis*.

la: Anselm., Monol. c. 10. — August., XIV. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8. seqq. et XV. c. 10. n. 17. seqq. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1.

en: Anselm, *Monologion* c. 10. — Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 6, n. 8 ff., and XV, c. 10, n. 17 ff. Cf. also I Sent. d. 27, part II, q. 1.

la: Cod. aa *Item quaero*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *Item quaero*.

la: Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 21.

en: Cf. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 21.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *addit*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *addit* [for *notat*].

la: Libr. XXVIII. c. 1. n. 2.

en: [*Morals*,] book XXVIII, c. 1, n. 2.

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 *et in conversione prima*.

en: Codex cc, with edition 1, [reads] *et in conversione prima*.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 14. (c. 18.). — De formatione vocis eiusque relatione ad imaginativam vim cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 87-91. (c. 8.) et August., de Magistro, c. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius auctoritate codd. L W aa cc et ed. 1 posuimus *mediante vi* pro *mediante via*, quod habet Vat. cum aliis codd. et edd.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 14 (c. 18). — On the formation of the voice and its relation to the imaginative power cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 87–91 (c. 8), and Augustine, *On the Teacher*, c. 1 ff. — A little below, on the authority of codices L, W, aa, cc and edition 1, we have set *mediante vi* for *mediante via*, which the Vatican edition has with other codices and editions.

la: Cod. I supplet *intellectus angelicus*.

en: Codex I supplies *intellectus angelicus*.

la: Vat. *per vim*. Paulo inferius codd. K aa *continebat* pro *contuebatur*, cod. cc et ed. 1 vero legunt *continet intellectus, dicitur verbum interius*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *per vim*. A little below, codices K, aa [read] *continebat* for *contuebatur*, but codex cc and edition 1 read *continet intellectus, dicitur verbum interius*.

la: Cod. Y *mentem*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *mentem*.

la: Libr. XII. c. 22. n. 48: *Verum hoc intersit, quod illi [Angeli] nostras [cogitationes] etiamsi nolimus, noverunt, nos autem ipsorum, nisi ostendantur, nosse non possumus; quia sic eas, ut opinor, habent in potestate occultare spiritualibus modis, quemadmodum nos, quibusdam interiectis obstaculis, nostra corpora, ne aliorum oculis videantur, abscondimus.*

en: [*On Genesis according to the Letter*,] book XII, c. 22, n. 48: *But let this difference hold: that they [the Angels] know our [thoughts] even if we are unwilling, but we cannot know theirs unless they be shown; because thus, as I think, they have it in their power to conceal them by spiritual means, just as we, by certain interposed obstacles, hide our bodies, lest they be seen by the eyes of others.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *est*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *est*.

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 *et se ipso faciat*.

en: Codex cc, with edition 1, [reads] *et se ipso faciat*.

la: August., XV. de Trin. c. 10. n. 18: *Foris enim, cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio; intus autem, cum cogitamus, utrumque unum est. Sicut auditio et visio duo quaedam sunt inter se distantia in sensibus corporis, in animo autem non est aliud atque aliud videre et audire... Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re, quam scimus, verbum est, quod in corde dicimus, quod nec Graecum est, nec Latinum, nec linguae alicuius alterius; sed cum id opus est in eorum* [...] *quibus loquimur perferre notitiam, aliquod signum, quo significetur, assumitur. Et plerumque sonus, aliquando etiam nutus, ille auribus, ille oculis exhibetur, ut per signa corporalia etiam corporis sensibus verbum, quod mente gerimus, innotescat. Nam et innuere quid est, nisi quodam modo visibiliter dicere?*

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV, c. 10, n. 18: *For outwardly, when these things come about through the body, locution is one thing, vision another; but inwardly, when we think, the two are one. Just as hearing and seeing are two things distant from each other in the senses of the body, but in the soul to see and to hear are not one thing and another... For a thought formed from the thing which we know is a word which we say in the heart, which is neither Greek nor Latin nor of any other tongue; but when there is need to convey it to the knowledge of those with whom we speak, some sign is taken up by which it may be signified. And for the most part a sound, sometimes also a nod, the one is presented to the ears, the other to the eyes, so that by corporeal signs the word which we bear in the mind may become known also to the senses of the body. For to nod — what is it, but in a certain way to say [something] visibly?*

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. *sit*.

en: The Vatican edition, with several codices, [reads] *sit*.

la: Cfr. Opusculum a nobis editum de Humanae Cognitionis ratione, in quo a S. Bonav. eiusque discipulis haec Augustini doctrina diffuse exponitur.

en: Cf. the little work published by us, *On the Manner of Human Knowledge*, in which this doctrine of Augustine is set forth at length by S. Bonaventure and his disciples. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Locutio est interni conceptus expressio ad alterum (I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1.). Differt autem ab illuminatione, « quia illuminatio fit solum a superioribus, locutio ab omnibus; secundo, illuminatio est de re per se non cognoscibili, locutio vero etiam de re per se cognoscibili; tertio, illuminatio fit per aliquam formationem intellectus illuminati, sed locutio non » (ita Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 11. q. 2. a. 4.). — Quod Angeli inter se loquantur, constat ex s. Scriptura (Is. 6, 3, Apoc. 7, 2.). Difficile autem homini est explicare modum, quo loquantur, sive determinare, quid locutio in Angelis addat super cogitationem (cfr. hic argg. ultima ad oppos.). Hinc S. Bonav., dum alii Scholastici eandem quaestionem inscribunt: « de modo, quo Angeli loquantur », totus est in determinanda hac additione. Variae sunt Scholasticorum de hac re sententiae; quae tamen in hoc conveniunt, quod praeter cognitionem requiratur actus voluntatis, quo Angelus vult manifestare alteri suum conceptum sive ordinare eum ad alterum. Durandus (II. Sent. d. 11. q. 2.), reiectis tribus aliis sententiis, affirmat, requiri etiam « signum, in quantum est signum », nec excludit etiam signum sensibile. Hoc ultimum autem communiter ab aliis reprobatur. — Aegid. R. (hic q. 3. a. 1. et dub. lit. 5.) improbat sententiam S. Thomae et vult, quod « possunt (Angeli) formare aliqua signa intellectualia, exprimentia, quid cogitent ». Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. 2.) putat, Angelum loquentem causare in audiente immediate conceptum obiecti, de quo loquitur; quae sententia diffuse declaratur a Lycheto (ad hunc locum) et Hier. de Montefortino (t. II. q. 107. a. 1.). — Ad eandem fere sententiam accedere videtur Richard. a Med. (II. Sent. d. 9. a. 2. q. 1.), qui multum loquitur de « quibusdam radiis spiritualibus », a loquente Angelo ad audientem transmissis, quibus « educit de potentia ad actum sui conceptus similitudinem, quam mediante illo radio usque ad intellectum alterius Angeli protendit ». — Secundum Petrum a Tar. (loc. cit.) ad propositum manifestandi accedit « applicatio ad aliquod signum naturale, uni Angelo in altero cognoscibile naturaliter, in quo manifestatur ». — Sed S. Thom. nihil requirit, nisi « quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri per voluntatem ipsius Angeli » (S. I. q. 107. a. 1; cfr. II. Sent. d. 11. q. 2. a. 3.); unde audiens « nihil recipit a loquente, sed per speciem, quam penes se habet, et alium Angelum et locutionem eius cognoscit » (de Verit. q. 9. a. 6. ad 1.). Attamen (Sum. loc. cit. ad 3.) dicit: « Sicut per

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signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum ».

**II.** S. Bonav. convenit cum S. Thoma, quod loqui « non addit influentiam veram in alterum », et quod « protensio (speciei) non est illius speciei impressiva, sed potius excitativa intellectus audientis, ut propria virtute suscipiat et in se ipso faciat » etc. (hic ad 5. et cfr. ad 6. et hic a. 2. q. 2. ad 3.). Pro meliore intelligentia huius doctrinae cfr. infra d. 21. dub. 1, ubi docetur, ad locutionis formationem tria requiri, et I. Sent. d. 9. dub. 4, ubi aptum exemplum ponitur: « Simile est de duobus speculis sibi oppositis, si voluntarie possent abscondere aliis et offerre quae in se relucent ». Qui loci si attente ponderantur, vix aliqua in doctrina differentia inter utrumque S. Doctorem deprehenditur. Etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 27. m. 1. 2. et praecipue 6.), licet paulo aliter loquatur, fere eandem doctrinam profitetur. — Dissentiunt autem Ss. Bonav. et Thom. quoad illud corollarium (hic in fine corp.), quod finita distantia esse debeat inter Angelos colloquentes. Hoc S. Thom. secundum principia, quae habet de relatione Angelorum ad locum, non approbat, quia « nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci » (S. loc. cit. a. 4.). Ceterum opportune monet Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.), modum angelicae locutionis nobis pro maxima parte esse ignotum; nec sapientiae esse de talibus multum assertorie loqui, sed potius Deo et Angelis ipsorum secreta committere. — Citatis auctoribus addimus Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 16, satis obscure loquentem; nec non Biel, II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Locution is the expression of an interior concept to another (I Sent. d. 27, part II, q. 1). It differs from illumination, «because illumination comes about only from superiors, locution from all; secondly, illumination is of a thing not knowable through itself, but locution [is] also of a thing knowable through itself; thirdly, illumination comes about through a certain formation of the illuminated intellect, but locution [does] not» (so Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 11, q. 2, a. 4). — That the Angels speak among themselves is established from sacred Scripture (Is. 6, 3; Apoc. 7, 2). But it is difficult for a man to explain the manner in which they speak, or to determine what locution in the Angels adds over thought (cf. here the last arguments *ad oppositum*). Hence S. Bonaventure — while other Scholastics inscribe the same question: «on the manner in which the Angels speak» — is wholly [engaged] in determining this addition. The opinions of the Scholastics on this matter are various; which nonetheless agree in this, that besides cognition there is required an act of will, by which the Angel wills to manifest his concept to another, or to order it toward another. Durandus (II Sent. d. 11, q. 2), the three other opinions being rejected, affirms that there is also required «a sign, inasmuch as it is a sign», nor does he exclude even a sensible sign. But this last is commonly disapproved by the others. — Giles of Rome (here, q. 3, a. 1, and lettered doubt 5) disproves the opinion of S. Thomas and holds that «[the Angels] can form certain intellectual signs, expressing what they think». Scotus (in each Writing, here, q. 2) thinks that the speaking Angel causes in the hearer immediately the concept of the object of which he speaks; which opinion is set forth at length by Lychetus (on this place) and Hieronymus de Montefortino (vol. II, q. 107, a. 1). — To nearly the same opinion Richard of Middleton seems to come near (II Sent. d. 9, a. 2, q. 1), who speaks much of «certain spiritual rays» transmitted from the speaking Angel to the hearer, by which «he educes from potency into act a likeness of his concept, which by the mediation of that ray he extends as far as the intellect of the other Angel». — According to Peter of Tarentaise (in the place cited), to the purpose of manifesting there comes «an application to some natural sign, naturally knowable to one Angel in another, in which [the concept] is manifested». — But S. Thomas requires nothing except «that the concept of the angelic mind be ordered to manifesting [itself] to another through the will of the Angel himself» (*Summa* I, q. 107, a. 1; cf. II Sent. d. 11, q. 2, a. 3); whence the hearer «receives nothing from the speaker, but through the species which he has in his keeping, he knows both the other Angel and his locution» (*On Truth* q. 9, a. 6, ad 1). And yet (*Summa*, in the place cited, ad 3) he says: «Just as

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by a sensible sign the sense is stirred up, so by some intelligible power the mind of an Angel can be stirred up to attend».

**II.** S. Bonaventure agrees with S. Thomas that to speak «does not add a true influence upon another», and that «the extension (of a species) is not impressive of that species, but rather excitative of the intellect of the hearer, so that by its own power it may receive [it] and make [it] in itself» etc. (here, ad 5, and cf. ad 6, and here, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3). For a better understanding of this doctrine cf. below, d. 21, doubt 1, where it is taught that for the formation of locution three things are required, and I Sent. d. 9, doubt 4, where an apt example is set down: «It is like two mirrors set opposite each other, if they could voluntarily hide from others, and offer [to them], the things that shine forth in themselves». If these places be carefully weighed, scarcely any difference in doctrine between the two holy Doctors is detected. Alexander of Hales also (*Summa* part II, q. 27, m. 1, 2, and especially 6), although he speaks a little otherwise, professes nearly the same doctrine. — But Ss. Bonaventure and Thomas disagree concerning that corollary (here, at the end of the body) — that there must be a finite distance between Angels conversing. This S. Thomas, according to the principles which he holds concerning the relation of Angels to place, does not approve, because «distance of place causes no impediment» (*Summa*, in the place cited, a. 4). For the rest, Dionysius the Carthusian (here, q. 2) opportunely warns that the manner of angelic locution is for the greatest part unknown to us; and that it is not [a part] of wisdom to speak too assertively of such things, but rather to commit their secrets to God and to the Angels themselves. — To the authors cited we add Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5, q. 16, speaking quite obscurely; and also Biel, II Sent. d. 9, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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- No `[?]` flags.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 10, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum eadem locutio possit esse a Deo et ab Angelo.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum eadem locutio possit esse a Deo et Angelo. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.* 1. Apocalypsis primo[^1]: *Loquens per Angelum suum servo suo Ioanni* etc.; sed quandocumque aliquis artifex agit per instrumentum, eadem est actio agentis et instrumenti, sicut cum quis incidit per securim, eadem est incisio: ergo eadem est locutio Dei et Angeli.

2. Item, cum loquitur Deus nobis per prophetam, locutio illa dicitur esse Dei et Spiritus sancti, et similiter locutio illa est ipsius prophetae; sed constat, quod non est nisi unica: ergo pari ratione, cum Deus loquitur nobis per Angelos.

3. Item, quando audita fuit vox illa: *Hic est Filius meus dilectus*, Lucae tertio[^2], constat, quod illa fuit locutio Dei, quia nullus poterat hoc vere dicere nisi Deus; sed illa locutio successionem habuit et variationem: ergo fuit ab aliqua creatura spirituali: ergo videtur, quod una et eadem locutio possit esse Dei et Angeli.

4. Item, videtur, quod nulla locutio sensibilis possit esse Dei, quin etiam sit Angeli. Locutio enim sensibilis fit mediantibus organis; ergo sicut Deus per se non potest currere, quia cursus fit mediantibus organis corporalibus, quae non habet Deus, ergo similiter nec per se ipsum sensibiliter loqui: ergo saltem locutio sensibilis Dei sic est Dei, quod Angeli[^3].

**Contra:** *Ad oppositum.* 1. Diversarum substantiarum agentium diversi sunt actus[^4]; sed Deus et Angelus omnino sunt diversi agentes: ergo diversas faciunt locutiones.

2. Item, locutio Dei non est aliud quam Verbum Dei; sed Verbum Dei et verbum Angeli est omnino aliud et aliud: ergo locutio Dei et locutio Angeli est omnino alia et alia.

3. Item, nullus actus, qui per se et proprie convenit Deo ut subiecto, si dicatur de creatura, est idem, prout dicitur de Deo et creatura — sicut patet; aliud enim est intelligere hominis, aliud intelligere Dei — ergo pari ratione alia erit locutio Angeli, et alia locutio Dei.

4. Item, cum Deus loquitur mentibus nostris, loquitur animae quantum ad supremam partem; cum vero Angelus loquitur, suggerit ab inferiori[^5]: ergo non videtur, quod eadem possit esse locutio Dei et Angeli.

*Quaestio incidens 1.* Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum Angelus appareat et loquatur in persona Dei, utrum similiter possit adorari in persona Dei. — *Quaestio incidens 2.* Quaeritur etiam, utrum apparitiones omnes in subiecta creatura, quibus Deus apparuit, et locutiones etiam factae sint mediantibus Angelis.

### Conclusio

> Locutio intellectualis ad mentem est solius Dei, locutiones per signum sensibile vel etiam imaginarium possunt esse et Angeli et Dei, sed Dei ut imperantis, Angeli ut exsequentis.

**Respondeo:** *Triplex visio, auditio et locutio.* Dicendum, quod sicut tripliciter dicimur videre Deum, videlicet visione corporali, imaginaria et intellectuali[^6] — et visione intellectuali videtur Deus in se ipso lucens, visione autem imaginaria et corporali videtur Deus in subiecta creatura apparens — sic etiam tripliciter dicimur audire[^7]: aut per aliquod signum, exterioribus auribus oblatum, sicut pluries auditus fuit et in veteri et in novo Testamento; aut per aliquod signum, in interiori sensu vel in interiori imaginatione formatum,

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aut per aliquod inspirationis verbum, nostris mentibus instillatum. Et sicut tripliciter auditur, ita etiam tripliciter loqui dicitur, secundum quod in nobis triplicem excitat auditum. Sicut igitur sensum nostrum ad sui ipsius apprehensionem excitat mediante signo sensibili, in quo apparet Angelus ex persona Dei, vel Deus apparet ex ministerio Angeli, mentem autem nostram per semetipsum informat, ut ipsum videat et cognoscat; sic in locutione intelligendum est.

*Quis triplicis locutionis auctor.* Nam locutio illa, qua Deus nobis loquitur per signum sensibile, sive exterius sive interius, aut semper aut frequenter fit per Angelum, sicut dicit Gregorius in Moralibus[^8]. Ait enim: « Cum loquitur Deus nobis per Angelum, aliquando voluntatem suam rebus indicat, aliquando imaginibus oculis cordis ostensis, aliquando imaginibus ante corporeos oculos ex aere assumtis, aliquando substantiis caelestibus, aliquando terrenis, aliquando simul caelestibus et terrenis »; et de omnibus exemplificat. — Locutio vero, qua Deus inspirat aliquid mentibus nostris, etsi possit fieri per Angelum excitantem ab inferiori, sicut dicit Gregorius[^9], quod « nonnunquam Deus humanis cordibus ita per Angelum loquitur, ut ipse mentis obtutibus praesentetur »: fit tamen principaliter ab ipso Deo.

*Conclusio 1.* Primus igitur et secundus loquendi modus et Angeli est et Dei, sed Dei tanquam imperantis, Angeli vero tanquam exsequentis, ita quod sermo exsequentis referatur ad personam imperantis. Hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel cum Angelus loquitur in persona Dei, sicut cum formavit illam vocem, Lucae tertio[^10]: *Hic est Filius meus dilectus*; sive sicut locutus est ad Moysen, Exodi tertio; vel cum loquitur ut nuntius Dei, proferens illud verbum quasi a Deo, per quem etiam modum dicitur Dominus loqui per Prophetas. *Conclusio 2.* Tertius vero loquendi modus est proprius ipsius Dei; et ita non potest eadem esse locutio Dei et Angeli secundum modum illum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem, et pro magna parte ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae probant, quod eadem locutio possit esse Dei et Angeli, procedunt secundum eum modum loquendi, secundum quem Deus loquitur per ministerium Angeli; et tunc eadem est locutio, sicut eadem est operatio et principaliter[^11] moventis et instrumenti, quamvis sit ibi diversa relatio; et omnes illae rationes hac via procedunt, ut patet, et ideo concedendae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod diversarum substantiarum agentium diversi sunt actus; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de actu primo et immediato respectu virtutis agentis[^12]. *Notandum.* Si enim intelligatur de opere operato, sic non habet veritatem simpliciter, maxime, quando plura agentia nata sunt concurrere ad unum effectum; et sic est in proposito. Nam locutio Angeli sic est ab Angelo, ut non excludat, sed includat operationem Dei; actio tamen Dei, quae est idem quod ipse Deus, non potest esse eadem cum locutione Angeli; sed istius locutionis effectus et Dei et Angeli esse potest.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod locutio Dei non est aliud quam Verbum Dei; dicendum, quod sicut prius dictum est, sicut est loqui interius et exterius, ita est sermo interior et exterior. Et sermo sive Verbum interius non potest esse idem cum sermone vel verbo Angeli, sed sermo exterior potest. Sermo enim interior Dei sive Verbum eius est ipse Deus, sermo vero exterior est illius Verbi effectus.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod loqui, prout Deus dicitur loqui per Angelum, non comparatur ad Deum sicut ad subiectum, sed sicut ad causam. Non enim dicitur illa locutio esse Dei, quia sit Dei dispositio, sed quia est ab eius imperio. Ipse autem obiicit de locutione interna et increata, de qua nihil ad propositum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ex alia et alia parte loquitur Deus et Angelus; dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de locutione secundum tertium modum.

*Ad quaest. incid. 1.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum similiter debeat adorari ex persona Dei, sicut competit ei ex persona Dei apparere et loqui; dicendum, quod sicut sermo, quem format Angelus in subiecta creatura, dupliciter potest referri ad Deum: aut mediate, aut immediate — immediate, cum Angelus pronuntiat, tanquam si Deus pronuntiaret; mediate, quando Angelus pronuntiat ut nuntius Dei — sic intelligendum est in apparitione sensibili, quia forma illa aut principaliter ducit in Angelum, qui est nuntius Dei, aut principaliter ducit in Deum; et primo modo potest adorari dulia, et secundo modo potest adorari latria, sicut adoravit Abraham[^13].

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*Ad quaest. incid. 2.* Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum huiusmodi apparitiones et locutiones sensibiles fiant semper mediante ministerio Angeli; de hoc dubie respondet Augustinus in libro tertio de Trinitate[^14]; magis tamen hanc partem innuit, quod omnes fiant mediante angelico ministerio, sive fuerint in veteri Testamento, sive in novo. Sed Gregorius expressius hoc affirmat, quod omnes fiant mediante rationali aliqua creatura. Ait enim sic in Moralibus[^15]: « Per Angelum loquitur Dominus, cum supernae revelationis verba audiuntur, sicut dicitur Ioannis duodecimo: *Clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo*. Neque enim Deus, qui sine tempore, vi intimae impulsionis clamat, in tempore vocem suam per substantiam edidit, quam circumscriptam tempore per humana verba distinxit; sed de caelestibus loquens, verba sua, quae audiri ab hominibus voluit, rationali administrante creatura formavit ». De his autem apertius habitum est in primo libro, distinctione decima sexta[^16], ubi habitum est de apparitione sive visibili missione.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the same locution can be from God and from an Angel.*

Secondly it is asked whether the same locution can be from God and from an Angel. And that [it can], thus it seems.

*The grounds.* 1. The Apocalypse, chapter one[^1]: *Speaking through his Angel to his servant John* etc.; but whenever some craftsman acts through an instrument, the action of the agent and of the instrument is the same — just as, when one cuts with an axe, the cutting is the same: therefore the locution of God and of the Angel is the same.

2. Likewise, when God speaks to us through a prophet, that locution is said to be of God and of the Holy Spirit, and likewise that locution is the prophet's own; but it is established that it is only a single one: therefore by parity of reasoning [it is so] when God speaks to us through the Angels.

3. Likewise, when that voice was heard, *This is my beloved Son*, in Luke chapter three[^2], it is established that that was the locution of God, because no one could say this truly except God; but that locution had succession and variation: therefore it was from some spiritual creature: therefore it seems that one and the same locution can be of God and of an Angel.

4. Likewise, it seems that no sensible locution can be of God without being also of an Angel. For a sensible locution comes about by the mediation of organs; therefore, just as God cannot of himself run, because running comes about by the mediation of corporeal organs, which God does not have — so likewise neither [can he] of himself speak sensibly: therefore at least a sensible locution of God is so [a locution] of God that [it is] also [a locution] of an Angel[^3].

**On the contrary:** *To the opposite.* 1. The acts of diverse acting substances are diverse[^4]; but God and an Angel are altogether diverse agents: therefore they make diverse locutions.

2. Likewise, the locution of God is nothing other than the Word of God; but the Word of God and the word of an Angel are altogether one thing and another: therefore the locution of God and the locution of an Angel are altogether one and another.

3. Likewise, no act which belongs through itself and properly to God as to a subject is, if it be said of a creature, the same insofar as it is said of God and of a creature — as is plain; for the understanding of a man is one thing, the understanding of God another — therefore by parity of reasoning the locution of an Angel will be one thing, and the locution of God another.

4. Likewise, when God speaks to our minds, he speaks to the soul as to its highest part; but when an Angel speaks, he suggests from below[^5]: therefore it does not seem that the locution of God and of an Angel can be the same.

*Incidental question 1.* Alongside this it is asked: since an Angel appears and speaks in the person of God, whether he can likewise be adored in the person of God. — *Incidental question 2.* It is also asked whether all the apparitions in a subject creature by which God appeared, and the locutions also, were made by the mediation of Angels.

### Conclusion

> Intellectual locution to the mind is of God alone; locutions through a sensible or even an imaginary sign can be both of an Angel and of God — but of God as the one commanding, of the Angel as the one carrying out.

**I respond:** *A threefold seeing, hearing, and locution.* It must be said that, just as we are said to see God in three ways — namely by corporeal, by imaginary, and by intellectual vision[^6] (and by intellectual vision God is seen shining in himself, but by imaginary and corporeal vision God is seen appearing in a subject creature) — so too we are said to hear in three ways[^7]: either through some sign offered to the exterior ears, as [a voice] was many times heard both in the Old and in the New Testament; or through some sign formed in the interior sense or in the interior imagination;

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or through some word of inspiration instilled into our minds. And just as one hears in three ways, so also is one said to speak in three ways, according as he stirs up a threefold hearing in us. As, therefore, he stirs up our sense to the apprehension of itself by the mediation of a sensible sign — in which an Angel appears in the person of God, or God appears through the ministry of an Angel — but informs our mind through his very self, that it may see and know him: so it is to be understood in locution.

*Who is the author of the threefold locution.* For that locution by which God speaks to us through a sensible sign, whether exterior or interior, comes about either always or frequently through an Angel, as Gregory says in the *Morals*[^8]. For he says: «When God speaks to us through an Angel, he sometimes indicates his will by things, sometimes by images shown to the eyes of the heart, sometimes by images taken from the air before the bodily eyes, sometimes by heavenly substances, sometimes by earthly, sometimes by heavenly and earthly together»; and he gives examples of all [these]. — But the locution by which God inspires something into our minds — although it can come about through an Angel stirring [it] up from below, as Gregory says[^9], that «sometimes God so speaks to human hearts through an Angel that [the Angel] himself is presented to the gaze of the mind» — nevertheless comes about principally from God himself.

*Conclusion 1.* The first and the second manner of speaking, therefore, is both of an Angel and of God — but of God as the one commanding, of the Angel as the one carrying out, so that the speech of the one carrying out is referred to the person of the one commanding. And this can be in two ways: either when an Angel speaks in the person of God, as when he formed that voice, in Luke chapter three[^10]: *This is my beloved Son*; or as he spoke to Moses, in Exodus chapter three; or when he speaks as a messenger of God, bringing forth that word as it were from God — in which manner also the Lord is said to speak through the Prophets. *Conclusion 2.* But the third manner of speaking is proper to God himself; and so the locution of God and of an Angel cannot be the same according to that manner.

From these things the reply to the question is plain, and for the most part to the objections. For the arguments which prove that the same locution can be of God and of an Angel proceed according to that manner of speaking by which God speaks through the ministry of an Angel; and then the locution is the same, just as the operation of the principal mover and of the instrument is the same[^11], although there is there a diverse relation; and all those arguments proceed by this way, as is plain, and therefore are to be conceded.

*The solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. But to that which is objected on the contrary — that the acts of diverse acting substances are diverse — it must be said that this is understood of the first and immediate act with respect to the acting power[^12]. *Note.* For if it be understood of the work done, then it does not hold true simply — especially when several agents are fitted by nature to concur to one effect; and so it is in the matter at hand. For the locution of the Angel is so from the Angel as not to exclude, but to include, the operation of God; the action of God, however, which is the same as God himself, cannot be the same as the locution of the Angel; but the effect of that locution can be both of God and of the Angel.

2. To that which is objected — that the locution of God is nothing other than the Word of God — it must be said that, as was said before, just as there is a speaking interior and exterior, so there is a speech interior and exterior. And the interior speech, or Word, cannot be the same as the speech or word of an Angel, but the exterior speech can. For the interior speech of God, or his Word, is God himself, but the exterior speech is the effect of that Word.

3. To the other [argument] it must be said that to speak, insofar as God is said to speak through an Angel, is not compared to God as to a subject, but as to a cause. For that locution is not said to be God's because it is a disposition of God, but because it is from his command. But [the objector] objects concerning the internal and uncreated locution, of which nothing [pertains] to the matter at hand.

4. To that which is objected — that God and an Angel speak from one side and another — it must be said that that objection proceeds concerning locution according to the third manner.

*To incidental question 1.* To that which is asked — whether [an Angel] ought likewise to be adored in the person of God, just as it befits him to appear and to speak in the person of God — it must be said that, just as the speech which an Angel forms in a subject creature can be referred to God in two ways, either mediately or immediately (immediately, when the Angel pronounces [it] as though God were pronouncing [it]; mediately, when the Angel pronounces [it] as a messenger of God), so it is to be understood in a sensible apparition, because that form either leads principally to the Angel, who is the messenger of God, or leads principally to God; and in the first way *dulia* can be adored, and in the second way *latria* can be adored, as Abraham adored[^13].

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*To incidental question 2.* To that which is asked last — whether apparitions and sensible locutions of this kind always come about by the mediation of an Angel's ministry — to this Augustine responds doubtfully in the third book *On the Trinity*[^14]; he nonetheless rather intimates this side: that all come about by the mediation of angelic ministry, whether they were in the Old Testament or in the New. But Gregory affirms this more expressly — that all come about by the mediation of some rational creature. For he says thus in the *Morals*[^15]: «The Lord speaks through an Angel when the words of a supernal revelation are heard, as it is said in John chapter twelve: *I have glorified [it], and again I will glorify [it]*. For God, who without time cries out by the force of an inmost impulsion, did not in time put forth his voice through a substance which he marked off, circumscribed by time, by means of human words; but, speaking of heavenly things, he formed his words, which he willed to be heard by men, by the administration of a rational creature». But of these things it has been treated more openly in the first book, distinction sixteen[^16], where treatment was made of apparition or visible mission.

la: Vers. 1. Vulgata: *Mittens* pro *Loquens*. — De relatione artificis ad instrumentum cfr. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 11. (c. 9.) et II. de Anima, text. 10. (c. 1.).

en: [Apocalypse 1,] v. 1. The Vulgate [reads] *Mittens* ["sending"] for *Loquens* ["speaking"]. — On the relation of a craftsman to an instrument cf. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* VII, c. 11 (c. 9), and *On the Soul* II, text 10 (c. 1).

la: Vers. 22. — De ipsa probatione cfr. supra pag. 53, nota 7.

en: [Luke 3,] v. 22. — On the proof itself cf. above, p. 53, note 7.

la: Codd. Y aa bene *quod et Angeli*.

en: Codices Y, aa rightly [read] *quod et Angeli* ["that [it is] also of an Angel"].

la: Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 81, nota 14.

en: Cf. volume 1, p. 81, note 14.

la: Vide August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. et supra a. 2. q. 2. et d. 8. p. II. q. 2.

en: See Augustine, *On the City of God* XI, c. 2, and above, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 8, part II, q. 2.

la: De hac triplici visione agit August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 33. n. 43. et ibid. XII. per totum.

en: Of this threefold vision Augustine treats, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XI, c. 33, n. 43, and the same [work], XII, throughout.

la: Cod. M *dicimur Deum audire*, cod. bb *eum dicimur audire*. Mox Vat. *auditum fuit* pro *auditus fuit*.

en: Codex M [reads] *dicimur Deum audire*, codex bb *eum dicimur audire*. Soon after, the Vatican edition [reads] *auditum fuit* for *auditus fuit*.

la: Libr. XXVIII. c. 1. n. 2: *Cum vero per Angelum voluntatem suam Dominus indicat, aliquando eam verbis, aliquando rebus demonstrat, aliquando simul verbis et rebus, aliquando imaginibus cordis oculis ostensis, aliquando imaginibus et ante corporeos oculos ad tempus ex aere assumtis* etc.

en: [*Morals*,] book XXVIII, c. 1, n. 2: *But when the Lord indicates his will through an Angel, he sometimes demonstrates it by words, sometimes by things, sometimes by words and things together, sometimes by images shown to the eyes of the heart, sometimes by images taken for a time from the air, even before the bodily eyes* etc.

la: Loc. cit.: *Nonnunquam vero etiam per Angelum humanis cordibus ita loquitur Deus, ut ipse quoque Angelus mentis obtutibus praesentetur.* — Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *quod si nunquam* pro *quod non nunquam*.

en: In the place cited: *But not infrequently God so speaks to human hearts through an Angel that the Angel himself also is presented to the gaze of the mind.* — Not a few codices, with edition 1, [read] *quod si nunquam* for *quod non nunquam*.

la: Vers. 22. — Sequens textus est Exodi 3, 2. seqq., ubi agitur de apparitione Domini in rubo ardente.

en: [Luke 3,] v. 22. — The following text is Exodus 3, 2 ff., where there is treatment of the apparition of the Lord in the burning bush.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 *principalis*.

en: Several codices, with edition 1, [read] *principalis*.

la: Sive de actu, prout convenit virtuti agenti sicut subiecto, non autem de actu, prout idem est ac effectus (opus operatum).

en: That is, of the act insofar as it belongs to the acting power as to a subject — but not of the act insofar as it is the same as the effect (the work done).

la: Gen. 18, 2. — Paulo superius post *in Deum* cod. I subiungit *auctorem*.

en: Genesis 18, 2. — A little above, after *in Deum*, codex I adds *auctorem*.

la: Cap. 10. seq. Cfr. etiam ibid. IV. c. 21. n. 30. seq.

en: [*On the Trinity* III,] c. 10 and following. Cf. also the same [work], IV, c. 21, n. 30 ff.

la: Libr. XXVIII. c. 1. n. 4, ubi post *audiuntur* textus originalis prosequitur: *sicut dicente Domino: Pater, clarifica Filium tuum, ut et Filius tuus clarificet te* (Ioan. 17, 1.); *protinus respondetur: Clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo* (Ioan. 12, 28.).

en: [*Morals*,] book XXVIII, c. 1, n. 4, where after *audiuntur* the original text continues: *as, when the Lord said: Father, glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee* (John 17, 1); *forthwith the answer is given: I have glorified [it], and again I will glorify [it]* (John 12, 28).

la: Quaest. 1.

en: [I Sent. d. 16,] question 1. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio servit, ut recte intelligantur locutiones et apparitiones Dei, quae in s. Scriptura commemorantur (cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. I. dub. 1.). Quoad principia hic adhibita vide I. Sent. d. 16. de missione visibili et apparitionibus, et ibid. d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. 2, infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. de causalitate Dei ad actiones creaturarum concurrente. Alii Scholastici plerumque in genere loquuntur de apparitionibus Dei in corporalibus formis, quin de hac speciali quaestione explicite tractent. Apud solum Alexandrum Hal. eandem praecise quaestionem invenimus.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 27. m. 2. a. 2. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 8. q. unica, a. 6; S. I. q. 43. a. 7. ad 5. 6. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 8. q. unica, a. 4. — Richard. a Med. (ex parte), hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 8. q. 2. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question serves toward the right understanding of the locutions and apparitions of God which are commemorated in sacred Scripture (cf. also above, d. 8, part I, doubt 1). As to the principles employed here, see I Sent. d. 16, on visible mission and apparitions, and the same [book], d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, 2, [and] below, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, on the causality of God concurring to the actions of creatures. The other Scholastics for the most part speak in general of the apparitions of God in corporeal forms, without treating explicitly of this special question. In Alexander of Hales alone do we find precisely the same question.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, q. 27, m. 2, a. 2. — S. Thomas, II Sent. d. 8, the sole question, a. 6; *Summa* I, q. 43, a. 7, ad 5, 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 8, the sole question, a. 4. — Richard of Middleton (in part), here, a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 8, q. 2, a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
- Three printed pages (pp.271–273 = PDF 293–295). Two-column. Built from IA djvu OCR base over 450 dpi PDF column-band crops.
- Structure: 4 *Fundamenta* arguments (the locution can be the same) + 4 *Ad oppositum* arguments (it cannot) + two incidental questions (whether an Angel speaking in God's person may be adored as God; whether all the scriptural apparitions and locutions were made through Angels) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (the threefold seeing/hearing/locution — corporeal, imaginary, intellectual; the first two modes are of God *as commanding* and of the Angel *as carrying out*, the third proper to God alone) + Solutio oppositorum 1–4 + replies to the two incidental questions + 2-paragraph SCHOLION (I–II).
- **Apparatus crosswalk.** p.271 footer ¹–⁷ = [^1]–[^7]. p.272 footer ¹–⁶ = [^8]–[^13]. p.273 footer ¹–³ = [^14]–[^16]; p.273 footer ⁴+ anchor the body of `d10-dubia` (DUB. I, which opens lower on p.273) and are reserved for that chunk. The SCHOLION (full-width) carries no footnote markers — its citations are inline.
- Boundary: incoming from `d10-a3-q1` CLEAN (QUAESTIO II opens at the head of p.271). Outgoing CLEAN — SCHOLION II closes p.273 with `...Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.`; `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. — DUB. I.` opens immediately below and belongs to `bon-sent-II-d10-dubia`.
- OCR garbles cleaned silently: `Seciindo`→Secundo, `loculio`→locutio, `locntio`→locutio, `inslrumentum`→instrumentum, `clilectus`→dilectus, `videlur`→videtur, `agentiuiii`→agentium, `aniraae`→animae, `iripliciter`→tripliciter, `axulitur`→auditur, `exeitantem`→excitantem, `secnndum`→secundum, `principaMter`→principaliter, `Augelus`→Angelus.
- No `[?]` flags.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 10, Dubia

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: *Qui natura sunt spiritus aliquando angeli, id est nuntii fiunt.* Cum enim non sint tantum boni Angeli, sed etiam mali, videtur, quod Deus non tantummodo mittat bonos spiritus, immo etiam malos. Et hoc videtur per illud quod dicitur tertii Regum ultimo[^1], ubi Dominus dixit ad spiritum mendacii: *Egredere, et fac ita*; videtur enim, quod Deus miserit angelum malum. Et expressius in Psalmo[^2] super illud: *Immissiones per angelos malos*; ibi dicit Glossa, quod « angeli mali mittuntur ». Et expressissime Matthaei octavo[^3]: *Mitte nos in porcos.* — Ad oppositum est: quia, cum intentio malorum angelorum sit perdere omnes, et Dei intentio sit salvare; non videtur, quod debeat eos aliquo modo mittere, immo potius impedire. — Item, si hos mittit, tunc ergo sunt nuntii Domini: ergo debent dici angeli Domini; quod tamen non dicit Scriptura.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in exercitio, quo nos diabolus exercitat, duo considerantur: et potestas et usus. Potestas a Deo ei collata est, usus vero potestatis non est a Deo praecipiente, sed potius permittente. Quoniam igitur missio proprie dicit imperium et auctoritatem, ideo daemones non dicuntur proprie mitti a Deo, nec angeli[^4], sed potius dicuntur angeli diaboli, quia a suo principe diriguntur et ei obedire intendunt. — Ad omnes autem illas auctoritates respondendum est, quod intelliguntur non imperative, sed potius permissive.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod medii ordines praeceptum divinum a superioribus accipiunt et referunt ad inferiores. Ex hoc enim videtur, quod unus Angelus mittat alterum, cui concordat expositio Gregorii in Moralibus[^5], arguens ex eo quod legitur in Zacharia, quod unus Angelus dixit ad alium: *Loquere ad puerum istum*, ubi dicit ipse Gregorius: « Ad Prophetam Angelus Angelum mittit, et quem secum gaudere de Deo communiter conspicit, et docet et erudit ». — Hoc etiam per simile probatur tam in daemonibus quam in hominibus, ubi superiores mittunt inferiores. — Ad oppositum est: quia si Angeli mittuntur ab Angelis, ergo Angeli sunt nuntii Angelorum, et Angelus est minister Angeli, et Angelus habet auctoritatem super Angelum. Si ergo solus Deus est, penes quem residet auctoritas, et solius Dei dicuntur Angeli ministri et nuntii, sicut dicitur in Psalmo[^6]: *Qui facit Angelos suos spiritus*, videtur, quod a solo Deo debeant mitti.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mittere dicit auctoritatem; potest igitur dicere auctoritatem[^7] principalem; vel potest dicere potestatem aliquo modo vel auctoritatem subiectam auctoritati principali. Si mittere dicat primam et praecipuam auctoritatem: sic solius Dei est mittere Angelos, tam superiores quam inferiores; totum enim ministerium Angelorum ad divinam auctoritatem et eius complendam voluntatem refertur; et ideo dicuntur nuntii et ministri solius Dei. Si autem mittere dicat auctoritatem secundo modo; sic unus Angelus ab altero potest mitti, sicut dicit Gregorius, et ostendunt sequentes auctoritates[^8]; et sic intelligitur illud verbum Magistri in littera.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Hi spiritus, qui mittuntur, percipiunt horum vocabulum, quorum gerunt officium*; quod est verbum Dionysii[^9]. Aut enim spiritus mittitur ad suum officium, aut ad non suum. Si ad suum, ergo cum denominetur a suo, non debet sortiri aliud nomen quam proprium. Si ad non suum, ergo usurpat sibi quod est alienum; et hoc est inordinatum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mitti ad suum officium est dupliciter: aut suum per veritatem, quia ad hoc deputatus est; aut suum per appropriationem. Primo modo omnis qui mittitur, mittitur ad suum officium, id est ad id ad quod est idoneus. Secundo modo mittitur aliquando Angelus ad perficiendum illius doni usum, quod sibi non appropriatur; ideo nec ab illo secundum primam impositionem nominis denominatur; nihilominus tamen sortitur nomen competens illi dono, ut ostendatur, ad quid mittatur[^10].

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is inquiry concerning that which he says in the text: *Those who by nature are spirits become at times angels, that is, messengers.* For since there are not only good Angels, but also evil ones, it seems that God sends not only good spirits, but even evil ones. And this seems [so] through that which is said in the third [book] of Kings, the last [chapter][^1], where the Lord said to the spirit of lying: *Go forth, and do so*; for it seems that God sent an evil angel. And more expressly in the Psalm[^2], upon that [verse]: *Sendings-in through evil angels*; there the Gloss says that «evil angels are sent». And most expressly in Matthew, chapter eight[^3]: *Send us into the swine.* — To the opposite: because, since the intention of the evil angels is to destroy all, and God's intention is to save, it does not seem that he ought in any way to send them, but rather to hinder [them]. — Likewise, if he sends these, then they are messengers of the Lord: therefore they ought to be called angels of the Lord; which, however, Scripture does not say.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the exercising by which the devil exercises us, two things are considered: both the power and the use. The power has been conferred upon him by God, but the use of the power is not from God commanding, but rather permitting. Since, therefore, mission properly bespeaks command and authority, therefore the demons are not properly said to be sent by God, nor [are they called] angels[^4], but rather are called angels of the devil, because they are directed by their own prince and intend to obey him. — But to all those authorities the answer must be given that they are understood not imperatively, but rather permissively.

### Doubt II.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning that which he says — that the middle orders receive the divine command from the higher ones and convey [it] to the lower. For from this it seems that one Angel sends another, with which the exposition of Gregory in the *Morals*[^5] agrees, arguing from that which is read in Zechariah, that one Angel said to another: *Speak to that boy* — where Gregory himself says: «An Angel sends an Angel to the Prophet, and him whom he beholds rejoicing in God in common with himself, [him] he both teaches and instructs». — This also is proved by a likeness, both in the demons and in men, where the higher send the lower. — To the opposite: because, if Angels are sent by Angels, then Angels are messengers of Angels, and an Angel is the minister of an Angel, and an Angel has authority over an Angel. If, then, God alone is [the one] with whom authority resides, and the Angels are said to be ministers and messengers of God alone — as it is said in the Psalm[^6]: *Who makes his Angels spirits* — it seems that they ought to be sent by God alone.

<!-- page 274 -->

**I respond:** It must be said that "to send" bespeaks authority; it can therefore bespeak the principal authority[^7]; or it can bespeak a power in some way, or an authority subject to the principal authority. If "to send" bespeak the first and chief authority: then it belongs to God alone to send the Angels, both the higher and the lower; for the whole ministry of the Angels is referred to the divine authority and to the fulfilling of its will; and therefore they are called messengers and ministers of God alone. But if "to send" bespeak authority in the second way: then one Angel can be sent by another, as Gregory says, and as the following authorities show[^8]; and so that word of the Master in the text is understood.

### Doubt III.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning that which he says: *These spirits who are sent receive the appellation of those whose office they perform*; which is a word of Dionysius[^9]. For a spirit is sent either to his own office, or to one not his own. If to his own, then, since he is denominated from his own, he ought not to be allotted any name other than his proper one. If to one not his own, then he usurps for himself what is another's; and this is disordered.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be sent to one's own office is [taken] in two ways: either [an office] one's own through truth, because one has been appointed for this; or one's own through appropriation. In the first way, everyone who is sent is sent to his own office, that is, to that for which he is suited. In the second way, an Angel is sometimes sent to perfect the use of that gift which is not appropriated to him; therefore he is not denominated from it according to the first imposition of the name; nevertheless he is allotted a name befitting that gift, that it may be shown to what he is sent[^10].

---

la: Vers. 22.

la: Psalm. 77, 49. — Glossam vide apud Lyranum ibid.

en: Psalm 77, 49. — For the Gloss see in Lyra, at the same place.

la: Vers. 31. Vulgata: *Mitte nos in gregem porcorum*.

en: [Matthew 8,] v. 31. The Vulgate [reads] *Mitte nos in gregem porcorum* ["Send us into the herd of swine"].

la: Supple: *dicuntur*. Vat. *ut Angeli eius*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 36. m. 2; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 9. q. 34. m. 2.

en: Supply: *dicuntur* ["are said"]. The Vatican edition [reads] *ut Angeli eius* ["as his Angels"]. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, q. 36, m. 2; B. Albert, *Summa* part II, tr. 9, q. 34, m. 2.

la: Libr. XXVIII. c. 1. n. 9, ubi textus originalis substituit *ei dirigit* pro *et erudit*. — Textus s. Scripturae est Zachar. 2, 4.

en: [*Morals*,] book XXVIII, c. 1, n. 9, where the original text substitutes *ei dirigit* for *et erudit*. — The text of sacred Scripture is Zechariah 2, 4.

la: Cod. aa *potestatem*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *potestatem* [for *auctoritatem*].

la: Cod. bb *rationes*. Vat. omittit *sequentes*. — Idem dubium solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 36. m. 1; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 9. q. 34. m. 1.

en: Codex bb [reads] *rationes* [for *auctoritates*]. The Vatican edition omits *sequentes*. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, q. 36, m. 1; B. Albert, *Summa* part II, tr. 9, q. 34, m. 1.

la: De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 13. § 3. Cfr. supra pag. 258, nota 10. et pag. 262, nota 5.

en: [Dionysius,] *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 13, § 3. Cf. above, p. 258, note 10, and p. 262, note 5.

la: Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 36. m. 5; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 9. q. 34. m. 5.

en: See Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, q. 36, m. 5; B. Albert, *Summa* part II, tr. 9, q. 34, m. 5. ---

translators_notes:
- Two printed pages (pp.273–274 = PDF 295–296). Two-column. Three doubts (DUB. I–III) on the Lombard text concerning the ministry of the Angels.
- Structure: DUB. I (whether God sends evil spirits — resolved by the *potestas*/*usus* distinction: God confers the power, permits but does not command the use) + DUB. II (whether one Angel sends another — resolved by the twofold sense of *mittere*: principal authority = God alone, subordinate authority = Angel to Angel) + DUB. III (whether a spirit takes the name of an office not its own — resolved by *suum per veritatem* vs *suum per appropriationem*).
- **Apparatus crosswalk.** p.273 footer block runs ¹–⁹; notes ¹–³ belong to `d10-a3-q2`, so this chunk's [^1]–[^6] = p.273 footer ⁴–⁹. p.274 footer ¹–⁴ = [^7]–[^10].
- Boundary: incoming from `d10-a3-q2` CLEAN (DUBIA opens on p.273 below the q2 SCHOLION). Outgoing CLEAN — DUB. III closes p.274; `DISTINCTIO XI` opens immediately below on p.274 and belongs to the next distinction.
- OCR garbles cleaned silently: `litlera`→littera, `oinnes`→omnes, `anctoritatem`→auctoritatem, `Angelurn`→Angelum, `Dens`→Deus, `nunlii`→nuntii, `raittere`→mittere, `raodo`→modo, `prirao`→primo, `corapetens`→competens, `inordinatura`→inordinatum.
- No `[?]` flags.