title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi.*

Tertio quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum, et est quaestio, utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per auctoritatem Augustini et Ambrosii in littera[^1], qui immediate post dilectionem Dei ordinant dilectionem sui.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo quarto[^2]: *Qui sibi nequam est, cui alii bonus erit?* Per hoc videtur, quod non potest aliquis alium ordinate diligere, nisi prius ordinate diligat se.

3. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridio[^3], tractans illud verbum: *Date eleemosynam, et omnia munda sunt vobis*: « Qui vult ordinate eleemosynam dare a se debet incipere et eam sibi primo dare. Est enim eleemosyna opus misericordiae, verissimeque dictum est: *Miserere animae tuae, placens Deo* ». Si ergo prius debet homo sibi misereri quam alii, videtur, quod secundum ordinem caritatis amor sui sit amori proximi praeponendus.

4. Item, sicut natura appetit suam conservationem, sic caritas suam perfectionem; sed natura magis appetit conservationem sui in se quam in suo simili[^4]: ergo et caritas plus appetit perfici in se ipsa et in anima, in qua est, quam caritatem aliam appetat perfici in anima aliena: ergo secundum rectum ordinem caritatis amor sui praemitti debet amori ipsius proximi.

**Sed contra:**
1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^5]: *Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt*; et iterum alibi: *Nullus quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius*: ergo videtur, quod caritas secundum suam perfectionem magis inclinet ad amandum alterum quam ad amandum se ipsum.

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2. Item, Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^6]: *Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum*; hoc quod est *sicut* aut est nota similitudinis, aut aequalitatis. Si similitudinis tantum, eadem ratione posset dicere: diliges proximum tuum sicut Deum. Si aequalitatis: ergo non videtur, quod sit ordo dilectionis respectu nostri ad dilectionem respectu proximi.

3. Item, Gregorius in quadam homilia[^7]: « Nemo ad se ipsum habere caritatem dicitur. Ad hoc enim, quod caritas sit, necesse est, ut dilectio in alterum tendat »: ergo caritas per prius ordinat hominem ad alterum quam ad se ipsum: ergo in ordine caritatis videtur quod nobis praemitti debeat proximus.

4. Item, caritas est amor liberalis[^8]; sed liberalitas magis attenditur respectu alterius quam respectu sui: ergo amor caritatis magis consistit in amando alterum quam in amando se ipsum.

5. Item, amor caritatis superveniens tollit curvitatem ipsi naturae[^9], sicut patet: quia, cum homo plus diligat se quam Deum *ante* caritatem, *post* adventum caritatis vertitur ordo, ut plus diligat Deum quam se ipsum: si ergo mutat ordinem quantum ad dilectionem Dei, pari ratione quantum ad dilectionem proximi: videtur ergo, quod dilectio proximi praemittenda sit secundum ordinem caritatis dilectioni respectu nostri.

6. Item, caritas facit, nos conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae; sed Deus non magis diligit nos quam proximos nostros, immo magis diligit proximos nostros, si sint meliores nobis: ergo videtur, quod secundum ordinem caritatis plus debeo diligere proximum quam me ipsum. *Si tu dicas*, quod Deus non vult, quod conformemus voluntatem nostram sibi in hoc[^10]; *obiicitur* contra hoc, quia Deus vult, quod nos magis desideremus honorem suum quam commodum proprium; vult etiam, quod magis amemus et appretiemur illud quod magis est amandum et appretiandum; sed salus centum animarum magis facit ad honorem Dei et magis appretianda est quam salus unius animae: si ergo « nomine proximi intelligitur omnis homo[^11] », videtur, quod amor proximi praeponendus sit amori sui. Et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos: *Optabam enim ego ipse anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis.*

> ### Conclusio.
> Amor salutis propriae praeferendus est amori salutis alienae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum ordinem caritatis amor salutis propriae praeponendus est amori salutis alienae, secundum quod auctoritates Sanctorum innuunt manifeste, et secundum etiam quod consonat et dictat iudicium rationis rectae et instinctus naturae. — Ratio enim huius est: quoniam unumquodque plus appetit perfectionem in se ipso quam in suo simili; et quodlibet pondus plus trahit corpus, in quo est, ad situm sibi debitum, quam trahat aliud corpus illi annexum: hinc est, quod caritas per prius desiderat, Deum nobis uniri et in nobis habitare, et nos in ipsum Deum tendere et in ipso quiescere, quam appetat in aliquo alio, qui nobiscum habeat aliquam similitudinem[^12].

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod in ordine caritatis praefertur dilectio sui dilectioni ipsius proximi. Et huius signum est, quia illi dupliciter reprehenduntur et stulti reputantur, qui salutem propriam negligunt, ut procurent alienam[^13]. Huius etiam signum est, quia, si homo ex caritate deberet diligere proximum quantum se ipsum, ita quod esset ibi omnimoda aequalitas, iam duos proximos deberet diligere duplo quam se ipsum, et tres in triplo, et sic ulterius ascendendo; quod in nullo habente caritatem reperiri contingit, quantumcumque perfecto.

**Ad oppositorum solutionem:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; dicendum, quod *suum* idem est quod *proprium*. *Proprium* autem quaerere hoc est dupliciter: uno modo, prout *proprium* dicitur cum praecisione; et sic excludit bonum *commune*, et isto modo sonat in vitium, et secundum istam acceptionem consuevit dici, quod libido est amor boni proprii; et quantum ad hunc modum dicit Apostolus, quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt[^14]. Alio modo dicitur *bonum proprium* bonum, quod pertinet ad se, ita quod in appetitu illius boni voluntas nec repugnat divinae voluntati nec praeiudicat communi utilitati, sicut est appetitus salutis propriae; et isto modo diligit quis se ex caritate;

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et sic accipiendo non negat Apostolus, quin homo per caritatem debeat quod suum est quaerere, cum ipsemet cuperet *dissolvi et esse cum Christo*, sicut dicitur ad Philippenses primo[^15].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum divinum mandatum debet homo diligere proximum sicut semetipsum; dicendum, quod *sicut* non est nota perfectae aequalitatis sive commensurationis, sed expressae similitudinis, quae in hoc attenditur, quod homo debet diligere proximum ad illud bonum, ad quod diligit se ipsum, et post salutem propriam nihil tantum debet desiderare, sicut salutem alienam: et ideo non valet illud quod obiicit, quod similiter deberet dici in mandato illo, quod diligat proximum sicut Deum[^16].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod caritas magis proprie ordinat ad proximum quam ad se ipsum; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur, quod caritas per prius respiciat ordinem hominis ad proximum quam ad se ipsum, sed quia non sufficit, quod aliquis amor sit caritas, ut homo amet se ipsum; licet enim amor caritatis a se ipso incipiat, debet tamen[^17] in alterum protendi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est amor liberalis; dicendum, quod quamvis liberalitas quantum ad suam *completionem* respiciat alterum, tamen quantum ad suum *initium* prius respicit ipsum, qui liberalitatem impendit, sicut et misericordia, de qua dictum est[^18], quod primo debet homo sui ipsius misereri.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis superveniens tollit curvitatem naturae; dicendum, quod quaedam est curvitas naturae, quae sonat in vitium et corruptionem; quaedam, quae respicit ipsius naturae intrinsecam inclinationem. Prima est, qua quis diligit se plus quam Deum; secunda est, qua quis diligit se plus quam proximum. Gratia autem superveniens primam corrigit et tollit, secundam vero dirigit et cum ea currit; et sic ratio illa non valet, quoniam non est simile hinc inde.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod debemus voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare; dicendum, quod Deus cum dicitur alterum altero magis diligere, hoc non est, quia intensius diligat unum quam reliquum, cum circa amorem ipsius nec cadat intensio nec remissio; sed hoc dicitur, quia unum ordinat ad maius bonum quam reliquum[^19]; et hoc bene potest concedi, quod quis magis debet diligere proximum quam se, cum proximus ipsum excedat in merito; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod amor proximi melioris praeponderet amori sui. Ordo enim caritatis non attenditur penes magnitudinem boni optabilis, sed penes praeponderationem affectionis diligentis. — Et si tu obiicias, quod Deus vult, quod magis amemus honorem suum quam commodum nostrum, et magis appretiemur quod est magis appretiandum; dicendum, quod verum est, quod Dei honor plus debet in corde nostro praeponderare quam nostrum commodum; tamen caritas nunquam separat honorem Dei a commodo nostro spirituali; nec est voluntatis divinae, ut nos appetamus aliquid, quod sit in detrimentum salutis nostrae, propter honorem suum. Sicut enim essentiale est naturae appetere esse, sic essentiale est gratiae appetere Deo placere et Deo adhaerere; ideo Deus nunquam illud a nobis exigit, ut magis salutem alienam quam propriam diligamus. — Et quod dicit Apostolus, quod optabat anathema a Christo esse pro fratribus, illud intelligitur *ad tempus*, vel *sub conditione*, videlicet si optabile esset[^20].

english:
### Question III. *Whether according to the order of charity one's own good is to be preferred to the good of one's neighbor.*

Thirdly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of ourselves to our neighbor, and the question is whether according to the order of charity one's own good is to be preferred to the good of one's neighbor. And that it is so, seems [the case]:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine and Ambrose in the littera[^1], who immediately after the love of God set in order the love of self.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus fourteen[^2]: *He who is wicked to himself, to whom will he be good?* By this it seems that one cannot love another in an ordered way unless he first love himself in an ordered way.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridion[^3], treating that word: *Give alms, and all things are clean unto you*: « He who wishes to give alms in an ordered way ought to begin from himself and give to himself first. For almsgiving is a work of mercy, and most truly it has been said: *Have mercy on your soul, pleasing God* ». If therefore a man ought to have mercy on himself before another, it seems that according to the order of charity the love of self is to be preferred to the love of neighbor.

4. Likewise, just as nature desires its own conservation, so charity [desires] its own perfection; but nature more desires the conservation of itself in itself than in its like[^4]: therefore charity too more desires to be perfected in itself and in the soul in which it is, than it desires another charity to be perfected in another's soul: therefore according to the right order of charity the love of self ought to be set before the love of one's neighbor.

**On the contrary:**
1. First to the Corinthians thirteen[^5]: *Charity seeks not the things that are its own*; and again elsewhere: *Let no one seek what is his own, but what is another's*: therefore it seems that charity according to its perfection inclines more to loving another than to loving itself.

2. Likewise, Matthew twenty-two[^6]: *You shall love your neighbor as yourself*; this *as* is either a mark of likeness or of equality. If of likeness only, by the same reasoning he could say: you shall love your neighbor as God. If of equality: then it does not seem that there is an order of love in respect to ourselves over against love in respect to our neighbor.

3. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily[^7]: « No one is said to have charity toward himself. For in order that there be charity, it is necessary that love tend toward another »: therefore charity orders man first toward another rather than toward himself: therefore in the order of charity it seems that the neighbor ought to be set before us.

4. Likewise, charity is a liberal love[^8]; but liberality is regarded rather in respect to another than in respect to oneself: therefore the love of charity consists more in loving another than in loving oneself.

5. Likewise, the love of charity, when it supervenes, takes away the curvature in nature[^9], as is evident: because, since a man loves himself more than God *before* charity, *after* the coming of charity the order is reversed, so that he loves God more than himself: if therefore it changes the order as regards the love of God, by parity of reasoning [it does so] as regards the love of neighbor: therefore it seems that the love of neighbor is to be set, according to the order of charity, before love in respect to ourselves.

6. Likewise, charity makes us conform our will to the divine will; but God does not love us more than our neighbors, nay rather he loves our neighbors more, if they are better than we: therefore it seems that according to the order of charity I ought to love my neighbor more than myself. *If you say* that God does not will that we conform our will to his in this[^10]; *it is objected* against this, that God wills that we desire his honor more than our own advantage; he wills also that we love and esteem more that which is more to be loved and esteemed; but the salvation of a hundred souls makes more for the honor of God and is more to be esteemed than the salvation of one soul: if therefore « by the name of neighbor every man is understood[^11] », it seems that the love of neighbor is to be preferred to the love of self. And this is confirmed by what the Apostle says to the Romans: *For I myself wished to be anathema from Christ for my brethren.*

> ### Conclusion.
> The love of one's own salvation is to be preferred to the love of another's salvation.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the order of charity the love of one's own salvation is to be preferred to the love of another's salvation, according as the authorities of the Saints manifestly intimate, and according also as the judgment of right reason and the instinct of nature agree and dictate. — For the ground of this is: that each thing more desires perfection in itself than in its like; and any weight draws the body in which it is more toward the place owed to it than it draws another body annexed to it: hence it is that charity first desires that God be united to us and dwell in us, and that we tend toward God himself and rest in him, more than it desires [the same] in any other who may have some likeness with us[^12].

The reasons showing that in the order of charity the love of self is preferred to the love of one's neighbor are therefore to be granted. And a sign of this is that those are doubly reprehended and reputed foolish who neglect their own salvation in order to procure another's[^13]. A sign of this is also that, if a man ought out of charity to love his neighbor as much as himself, so that there were complete equality there, then he ought to love two neighbors twice as much as himself, and three threefold, and so ascending further; which is found in no one having charity, however perfect.

**To the solution of the objections:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected, that charity seeks not the things that are its own; it must be said that *one's own* is the same as *proper*. But to seek *what is proper* is twofold: in one way, as *proper* is said with exclusion; and thus it excludes the *common* good, and in this way it tends to vice, and according to this acceptation it is wont to be said that lust is the love of one's own good; and as regards this mode the Apostle says that charity seeks not the things that are its own[^14]. In another way a *proper good* is called a good which pertains to oneself, in such a way that in the desire of that good the will neither resists the divine will nor prejudices the common utility, as is the desire of one's own salvation; and in this way one loves oneself out of charity;

and taking it so the Apostle does not deny that man through charity ought to seek what is his own, since he himself desired to be *dissolved and to be with Christ*, as is said to the Philippians one[^15].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that according to the divine commandment man ought to love his neighbor as himself; it must be said that *as* is not a mark of perfect equality or commensuration, but of express likeness, which is attended to in this: that a man ought to love his neighbor unto that good unto which he loves himself, and after his own salvation he ought to desire nothing so much as another's salvation: and therefore that which he objects has no force, namely that it would similarly have to be said in that commandment that he love his neighbor as God[^16].

*To 3.* To that which is objected from the authority of Gregory, that charity more properly orders [one] to the neighbor than to oneself; it must be said that this is not stated to mean that charity first regards the order of man to his neighbor rather than to himself, but because it does not suffice that some love be charity in order that a man love himself; for although the love of charity begins from oneself, it ought nevertheless[^17] to extend to another.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that charity is a liberal love; it must be said that although liberality as regards its *completion* regards another, nevertheless as regards its *beginning* it first regards the one himself who bestows the liberality, just as also mercy, of which it has been said[^18] that a man ought first to have mercy on himself.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the love of charity, when it supervenes, takes away the curvature of nature; it must be said that there is a certain curvature of nature which tends to vice and corruption; and a certain one which regards the intrinsic inclination of nature itself. The first is that by which one loves himself more than God; the second is that by which one loves himself more than his neighbor. But supervening grace corrects and takes away the first, while it directs the second and runs along with it; and thus that argument has no force, since the case is not alike on both sides.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that we ought to conform our will to the divine will; it must be said that when God is said to love one [thing] more than another, this is not because he loves one more intensely than the other, since concerning his love there falls neither intension nor remission; but it is said for this reason, that he orders one to a greater good than the other[^19]; and this can well be granted, that one ought to love his neighbor more than himself, when the neighbor exceeds him in merit; but from this it does not follow that the love of a better neighbor outweighs the love of self. For the order of charity is not regarded according to the magnitude of the desirable good, but according to the preponderance of the affection of the one loving. — And if you object that God wills that we love his honor more than our own advantage, and esteem more what is more to be esteemed; it must be said that it is true that the honor of God ought to preponderate in our heart more than our own advantage; nevertheless charity never separates the honor of God from our spiritual advantage; nor is it of the divine will that we desire anything which is to the detriment of our salvation for the sake of his honor. For just as it is essential to nature to desire to be, so it is essential to grace to desire to please God and to cleave to God; therefore God never demands this of us, that we love another's salvation more than our own. — And as for what the Apostle says, that he wished to be anathema from Christ for his brethren, that is understood *for a time*, or *under a condition*, namely if it were desirable[^20].

la: Hic c. 1. et 2.

en: Here c. 1 and 2.

la: Vers. 5. — Paulo post pro *videtur* cod. Z *patet*.

en: Verse 5. — A little after, for *videtur* codex Z reads *patet*.

la: Cap. 76. n. 20. — Primum Scripturae testimonium, in quo cod. Z cum Vulgata pro *et omnia* exhibet *et ecce omnia*, est Luc. 11, 41; secundum est Eccli. 30, 24. — In conclus. pro *alii* cod. A *alteri*.

en: Chapter 76, n. 20. — The first scriptural testimony, in which codex Z with the Vulgate reads *et ecce omnia* for *et omnia*, is Luke 11:41; the second is Ecclesiasticus 30:24. — In the conclusion, for *alii* codex A reads *alteri*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 39. (c. 10.), I. de Anima, text. 34. seq. (c. 4.) et IX. Ethic. c. 4. Cfr. etiam Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 39 (c. 10), *On the Soul* I, text 34 ff. (c. 4), and *Ethics* IX, c. 4. Cf. also Boethius, *Consolation [of Philosophy]* III, prose 11.

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. Scripturae locus ibid. 10, 21. ubi cod. Z cum Vulgata *Nemo* pro *Nullus*. — In fine arg. pro *se ipsum* non pauci codd. perperam *se ipsam*.

en: Verse 5. — The following scriptural passage [is] ibid. 10:21, where codex Z with the Vulgate [reads] *Nemo* for *Nullus*. — At the end of the argument, for *se ipsum* not a few codices wrongly [read] *se ipsam*.

la: Vers. 39. — Pro *quod est* cod. Z *quod dicit*. In fine arg. ante *proximi* cod. A et Supplement Alex. Hal. omittunt *respectu*.

en: Verse 39. — For *quod est* codex Z [reads] *quod dicit*. At the end of the argument, before *proximi*, codex A and the *Supplement* of Alexander of Hales omit *respectu*.

la: Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 17. n. 1, qui locus in textu origin. sic sonat: *Nemo... dicitur, sed dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse possit.* Pro *quod caritas sit* codd. A K *ut caritas sit*.

en: Book I, *Homilies on the Gospel*, homily 17, n. 1, which passage in the original text runs thus: *No one... is said [to have charity], but love tends toward another, that charity may be able to exist.* For *quod caritas sit* codices A K [read] *ut caritas sit*.

la: Cfr. 1. Ioan. 3, 17. seq.

en: Cf. 1 John 3:17 ff.

la: De curvitate naturae vide verba Bernardi, tom. II. pag. 124, nota 3. allata. Vide etiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 50. n. 15. et serm. 2. in Ps. 68. n. 8. — Edd. *ipsius naturae*. In initio arg. pro *amor caritatis* cod. bb *caritas*.

en: On the curvature of nature, see the words of Bernard, vol. II, p. 124, note 3, cited [there]. See also Augustine, *Expositions of the Psalms*, on Ps. 50, n. 15, and sermon 2 on Ps. 68, n. 8. — The editions [read] *ipsius naturae*. At the beginning of the argument, for *amor caritatis* codex bb [reads] *caritas*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2: *Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare in volito.* — Paulo superius pro *si sint meliores* codd. A H K *si sunt meliores*; paulo inferius pro *proprium* cod. Z *nostrum*.

en: Cf. I *Sent.*, d. 48, a. 2, q. 2: *Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed.* — A little above, for *si sint meliores* codices A H K [read] *si sunt meliores*; a little below, for *proprium* codex Z [reads] *nostrum*.

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 11. n. 3, et de Disciplina christ. c. 3. n. 3. — Locus Scripturae est Rom. 9, 3.

en: Augustine, *Expositions of the Psalms*, on Ps. 11, n. 3, and *On Christian Discipline*, c. 3, n. 3. — The scriptural passage is Rom. 9:3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 638, nota 3, — Aliquanto superius pro *Ratio enim* edd. *Ratio autem*.

en: Cf. above, p. 638, note 3. — Somewhat above, for *Ratio enim* the editions [read] *Ratio autem*.

la: Cfr. I. Cor. 9, 27, et Bernard., I. de Consider. c. 5. n. 6.

en: Cf. 1 Cor. 9:27, and Bernard, *On Consideration* I, c. 5, n. 6.

la: Vide supra pag. 607, nota 2. — Paulo superius pro *excludit* cod. G *excluditur*.

en: See above, p. 607, note 2. — A little above, for *excludit* codex G [reads] *excluditur*.

la: Vers. 23. — Quantum ad verbum Apostoli, Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 18. n. 3. ait: *Sed caritas, inquis, non quaerit quae sua sunt. Et tu scis, quam ob rem? Non quaerit quae sunt sua, profecto quia non desunt. Quisnam quaerat quod habet? Caritas quae sua sunt, id est propriae saluti necessaria, nunquam non habet; nec modo habet, sed etiam abundat. Vult abundare sibi, ut possit et omnibus; servat sibi, quantum sufficiat, ut nulli deficiat. Alioquin si plena non est, perfecta non est.*

en: Verse 23. — As regards the word of the Apostle, Bernard, *Sermons on the Canticle*, sermon 18, n. 3, says: *But charity, you say, seeks not the things that are its own. And do you know why? It seeks not the things that are its own, surely because they are not lacking. Who would seek what he has? Charity never fails to have the things that are its own, that is, the things necessary for its own salvation; nor does it merely have them, but even abounds. It wishes to abound for itself, that it may be able [to serve] all also; it keeps for itself as much as suffices, that it may be lacking to none. Otherwise, if it is not full, it is not perfect.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro *diligat* cod. A *diligeret*, cod. W *debet diligere*.

en: Cf. here the Master's littera, c. 2. — For *diligat* codex A [reads] *diligeret*, codex W *debet diligere*.

la: Plurimi codd. et Supplement. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. a. 3. omittunt *tamen*.

en: Most codices and the *Supplement* of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, a. 3, omit *tamen*.

la: Hic in fundam. 3. — Superius pro *quamvis liberalitas* cod. Y *quamvis amor liberalis*.

en: Here in fundamentum 3. — Above, for *quamvis liberalitas* codex Y [reads] *quamvis amor liberalis*.

la: Vide infra d. 32. q. 3.

en: See below, d. 32, q. 3.

la: In Comment. super hunc loc. (Rom. 9, 3.), Ambrosio olim ascripto, haec observantur: *Optabam ait, non opto: quia scit fieri non posse, ut tam honestum membrum, nullo praecedente vitio, abscinderetur a corpore christiano, affectum tamen et dilectionem circa genus suum ostendit.*

en: In the Commentary on this passage (Rom. 9:3), formerly ascribed to Ambrose, these things are observed: *"I wished," he says, "not I wish": because he knows it cannot come to pass that so honorable a member, with no preceding vice, should be cut off from the Christian body; nevertheless he shows his affection and love toward his own kindred.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio est manifesta et communis; est intelligi debet de bonis, quae pertinent ad interiorem hominem. Quoad bona vero exteriora saepe virtutis est, ut quis ea sibi subtrahat aliisque impendat, ut infra q. 6. explicatur (cfr. etiam infra dub. 5.); immo si salus proximi collidit cum meis bonis exterioribus, ordo caritatis vult, ut, per se loquendo, praeponam superius bonum proximi inferiori bono proprio. Hoc S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 26. a. 5.) cum Richardo a Med. (hic q. 4.) speciali quaestione probat respectu ipsius vitae corporalis, ita concludens: « Et ideo proximum quantum ad salutem animae magis debemus diligere quam proprium corpus ». Sed quod quis proprium corpus morti exponat pro salute proximi, non urget ut praeceptum nisi vel in casu necessitatis, vel in casu, quo quis tenetur saluti proximi providere, sicut ibid. ad 3. docetur. — De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. loc. cit. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is manifest and common; but it must be understood of the goods which pertain to the interior man. As to exterior goods, however, it is often [a mark] of virtue that one withdraw them from himself and bestow them on others, as is explained below in q. 6 (cf. also below, dub. 5); nay, if the salvation of one's neighbor collides with my exterior goods, the order of charity wills that, speaking in itself, I prefer the higher good of my neighbor to the lower good of my own. This St. Thomas (S. II–II, q. 26, a. 5), together with Richard of Mediavilla (here, q. 4), proves by a special question in respect to bodily life itself, concluding thus: « And therefore we ought to love our neighbor, as regards the salvation of the soul, more than our own body ». But that one should expose his own body to death for the salvation of his neighbor is not binding as a precept except either in a case of necessity, or in a case in which one is bound to provide for the salvation of his neighbor, as is taught there, ad 3. — On this question: St. Thomas, here a. 5; the same, loc. cit. a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi two-column PDF (`vol3-p64{3,4,5}-{L,R}-*` colcrop bands), with the Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the Respondeo, Ad-replies, and footers (IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters these regions). English freshly translated literally.

**Page span.** Opens mid-p.643 L-col (PDF 665) at `QUAESTIO III. … Tertio quaeritur … nostri ad proximum`; runs through p.644 (CONCLUSIO + Respondeo) and p.645 (Ad-replies 1–6 + SCHOLION §I). q4 (*Quarto quaeritur … patris ad filium*) opens at the top of p.646 L-col (raw line 44908) — the q3/q4 boundary is the printed-page break at 645/646, so q3 ends cleanly with the scholion at the foot of p.645.

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**Hand-off received (from q2).** q2 captured p.643 footer nn.1–5; this chunk picks up nn.6–10. Verified the split by body anchor: q3's first p.643 markers are `in littera` (n.6), `Ecclesiastici` (n.7), `Enchiridio` (n.8), `suo simili` (n.9), `decimo tertio` (n.10).

**Alignment verified.** Opener reads *Tertio quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum* — correctly q3 (no auto-chunker q-swap). Title verified verbatim: *Utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi.*

**Scholion.** Present — one paragraph (§I) plus the bibliographic tail (S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Dionys. Carth.), at the foot of p.645. Placed LAST in both `## Latin` and `## English` per the parser gotcha.

**Margin labels.** Quaracchi prints marginal tags (Solutio 1/2, Ratio notabilis, Ad oppositum, Conclusio, Confirmatur dupliciter, Solutio oppositorum, Proprium quaerere dupliciter, Notandum, Axioma, Duplex curvitas naturae) which are editorial side-notes, not body text; omitted from the reflow.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 646 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum magis diligendi sint parentes quam filii, an e converso.*

Quarto quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem patris ad filium, et quaeritur, utrum magis sint diligendi parentes quam filii, an e converso. Et quod primo[^1] sint diligendi parentes, videtur:

1. *Primo* per mandatum Domini; praecipit enim honorare parentes, Exodi vigesimo[^2]: *Honora patrem tuum* etc.: si ergo mandata Dei tradita sunt secundum ordinem caritatis, videtur, quod amor caritatis principalius ad parentes quam ad filios habet ordinare.

2. Item, auctoritate Ambrosii, quae habetur in littera[^3]; dicit enim, quod « primo diligendus est Deus, secundo parentes, deinde filii ».

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione:* quoniam secundum legem caritatis grati debemus esse de beneficiis acceptis[^4]; sed plura beneficia accipimus a parentibus quam a filiis: ergo magis debemus eis esse grati. Sed qui magis est gratus alii magis ipsum diligit: ergo parentes in ordine caritatis sunt filiis praeponendi.

4. Item, principiatum plus pendet a principio quam e converso; sed ubi est maior dependentia, ibi est maior inclinatio; et ubi maior inclinatio, ibi maior amoris conversio: cum ergo habens patrem et filium ad patrem comparatur[^5] sicut principiatum ad principium, ad filium vero sicut principium ad principiatum; videtur, quod secundum regulam amoris magis debet converti ad patrem quam ad filium.

**Sed contra:**
1. Secundae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^6]: *Non debent filii thesaurizare parentibus, sed parentes filiis;* sed nemo debet thesaurizare nisi ei quem debet diligere: si ergo magis debent thesaurizare parentes filiis quam e converso, magis debent secundum caritatis ordinem parentes filios diligere, quam filii parentes.

2. Item, secundum ordinem naturae humor procedit a radice ad ramos, non e converso: si ergo conversio amoris in rationalibus similis est derivationi humoris in vegetabilibus, et pater comparatur ad filios, sicut radix ad ramos[^7]; videtur, quod secundum rectum ordinem amplius sint diligendi filii quam parentes.

3. Item, caritas respicit boni communicationem secundum convenientiam et conformitatem; sed plus boni communicant parentes filiis quam e converso[^8]: ergo videtur, quod amor caritatis secundum rectum ordinem prius et abundantius reddat habilem ad diligendum filios quam parentes.

4. Item, gratia est perfectio naturae; sed videmus, quod naturaliter homines plus diligunt filios quam parentes[^9]: ergo videtur, quod consimilis ordo debeat esse in amore gratuito.

> ### Conclusio.
> Secundum ordinem caritatis parentes plus diligendi sunt quam filii, ceteris paribus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Ambrosius, secundum ordinem caritatis parentes praeponendi sunt filiis; et hoc intelligendum est ceteris paribus, sicut infra[^10] manifestabitur. — Ratio enim huius est: quia amor *gratuitus* facit memorem esse perceptorum beneficiorum — propter quod et sacra Scriptura[^11] praecipiendo et admonendo inducit nos ad paterna beneficia recolenda — et quia plura beneficia percipimus a parentibus quam a filiis: ideo secundum ius divinum plus eis tenemur et magis eorum salutem diligere et procurare debemus. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad rationes autem, quae ad oppositum adducuntur, respondendum est, quod illae rationes currunt de dilectione *naturali,* secundum quam magis inclinatur affectus hominis ad filios quam ad patrem. Et ratio huius est, quia *natura* appetit conservari in suo simili[^12] et magis diligit illud, in quo habet principalius salvari; et quoniam pater habet salvari in filio secundum ordinem naturae, non e converso: hinc est, quod secundum *naturae* ordinem maiorem habet ad filium inclinationem, quia magis vult ipsum quam patrem habere superstitem. Dilectio autem *gra-*

<!-- page 647 -->

*tuita* magis respicit beneficiorum collationem et supernorum civium completionem, ad quam indifferenter parentes et filii comparantur.

1. 2. 3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa tria, quae primo obiiciebantur.

4. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod gratia debet esse conformis naturae; dicendum, quod natura in quibusdam currit via *consona* cum gratia, in quibusdam currit via *opposita,* in quibusdam currit via *disparata.* In hoc enim quod homo plus diligit se quam proximum, natura gratiae *concordat,* sicut supra[^13] ostensum est; in hoc quod diligit se plus quam Deum, ipsi gratiae *repugnat;* in hoc autem quod diligit filium plus quam patrem, quia intendit salvari in illo, procedit quasi via *diversa.* Et ideo gratia superveniens ordinem in primo affectu *salvat et perficit,* in secundo simpliciter *mutat,* in tertio vero *novum ordinem dat,* ita tamen, quod affectum illum non exterminat. Unde aestimo, quod homo habens caritatem et habens parentes et filios; dum movetur affectu *gratuitae* dilectionis, magis desiderat parentum salutem; dum movetur affectu *naturae,* magis desiderat filii sanitatem. Nec est hic oppositio dilectionis naturalis ad gratuitam propter considerationem diversam.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether parents are more to be loved than children, or conversely.*

Fourthly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of father to son, and it is asked whether parents are more to be loved than children, or conversely. And that parents are first[^1] to be loved, seems [the case]:

1. *First*, by the commandment of the Lord; for he commands [us] to honor parents, Exodus twenty[^2]: *Honor your father* etc.: if therefore the commandments of God have been handed down according to the order of charity, it seems that the love of charity has principally to set in order [the love] toward parents rather than toward children.

2. Likewise, by the authority of Ambrose, which is had in the littera[^3]; for he says that « first God is to be loved, secondly parents, then children ».

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by *reason*: for according to the law of charity we ought to be grateful for benefits received[^4]; but we receive more benefits from parents than from children: therefore we ought to be more grateful to them. But he who is more grateful to another loves him more: therefore parents are to be preferred to children in the order of charity.

4. Likewise, that which proceeds from a principle depends on the principle more than conversely; but where there is greater dependence, there is greater inclination; and where there is greater inclination, there is greater conversion of love: since therefore one having a father and a son is compared to the father[^5] as that-which-proceeds-from-a-principle to the principle, but to the son as the principle to that-which-proceeds-from-it; it seems that according to the rule of love one ought to be turned more toward the father than toward the son.

**On the contrary:**
1. Second to the Corinthians twelve[^6]: *Children ought not to lay up treasure for their parents, but parents for their children;* but no one ought to lay up treasure except for him whom he ought to love: if therefore parents ought to lay up treasure for children more than conversely, they ought according to the order of charity to love children more, than children [love] parents.

2. Likewise, according to the order of nature the sap proceeds from the root to the branches, not conversely: if therefore the conversion of love in rational beings is like the derivation of sap in vegetative things, and the father is compared to the children as the root to the branches[^7]; it seems that according to the right order children are to be loved more than parents.

3. Likewise, charity regards the communication of good according to fittingness and conformity; but parents communicate more good to children than conversely[^8]: therefore it seems that the love of charity according to the right order first and more abundantly renders [one] apt to love children than parents.

4. Likewise, grace is the perfection of nature; but we see that naturally men love children more than parents[^9]: therefore it seems that a like order ought to be in gratuitous love.

> ### Conclusion.
> According to the order of charity parents are to be loved more than children, other things being equal.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Ambrose says, according to the order of charity parents are to be preferred to children; and this is to be understood other things being equal, as will be made clear below[^10]. — For the ground of this is: that *gratuitous* love makes [one] mindful of benefits received — on account of which sacred Scripture[^11] too, by commanding and admonishing, induces us to recall the paternal benefits — and because we receive more benefits from parents than from children: therefore according to the divine law we are more bound to them and ought to love and procure their salvation more. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

But to the reasons which are adduced to the opposite, it must be answered that those reasons run [their course] concerning *natural* love, according to which the affection of man is inclined more toward children than toward the father. And the ground of this is that *nature* desires to be conserved in its like[^12] and loves more that in which it has principally to be preserved; and since the father has to be preserved in the son according to the order of nature, not conversely: hence it is that according to the order of *nature* he has a greater inclination toward the son, because he wills rather that [the son] than the father survive him. But *gratuitous* love

regards rather the conferring of benefits and the completion of the heavenly citizens, to which parents and children are compared indifferently.

1. 2. 3. And by this is evident the response to those three [objections] which were objected first.

4. But to that which is objected last, that grace ought to be conformed to nature; it must be said that nature in some [cases] runs a way *consonant* with grace, in some runs a way *opposed,* in some runs a way *disparate.* For in this, that a man loves himself more than his neighbor, nature *agrees* with grace, as was shown above[^13]; in this, that he loves himself more than God, it *resists* grace; but in this, that he loves the son more than the father, because he intends to be preserved in him, it proceeds as it were by a *diverse* way. And therefore supervening grace, in the first affection, *preserves and perfects* the order; in the second, simply *changes* [it]; in the third, however, *gives a new order,* yet in such a way that it does not destroy that affection. Hence I judge that a man having charity and having parents and children, while he is moved by the affection of *gratuitous* love, more desires the salvation of his parents; while he is moved by the affection of *nature,* more desires the health of his son. Nor is there here an opposition of natural love to gratuitous [love], on account of the diverse consideration.

la: Cod. M *plus*.

en: Codex M [reads] *plus*.

la: Vers. 12. — In fine arg. pro *ordinare* edd. et *Supplement.* Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. a. 4. *ordinari*.

en: Verse 12. — At the end of the argument, for *ordinare* the editions and the *Supplement* of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, a. 4, [read] *ordinari*.

la: Hic c. 2; sed verba sunt Origenis, non Ambrosii.

en: Here c. 2; but the words are Origen's, not Ambrose's.

la: Coloss. 3, 14. seq.: *Super omnia autem haec caritatem habete... et grati estote.* Cfr. etiam Aristot., Rhetor. ad Alexandrum, c. 1, et VIII. Ethic. c. 12. et 14, ubi et de seq. arg. videsis. — Mox pro *accipimus* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *accepimus*.

en: Colossians 3:14 f.: *But above all these have charity... and be thankful.* Cf. also Aristotle, *Rhetoric to Alexander*, c. 1, and *Ethics* VIII, c. 12 and 14, where you may also look as to the following argument. — A little after, for *accipimus* the editions with some codices [read] *accepimus*.

la: Cod. Z *comparetur*. Paulo inferius pro *debet* codd. A U *oportet*.

en: Codex Z [reads] *comparetur*. A little below, for *debet* codices A U [read] *oportet*.

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 12. loquens de fratribus, ait: *Unde inquiunt eundem sanguinem eandemque radicem.* — Pro *sicut* codd. A K *tanquam*.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 12, speaking of brothers, says: *Whence they say [there is] the same blood and the same root.* — For *sicut* codices A K [read] *tanquam*.

la: Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 14: *Quidquid fecerit filius, nihil dignum collatis beneficiis fecit.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 14: *Whatever the son may have done, he has done nothing worthy of the benefits conferred.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 7.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* IX, c. 7.

la: Quaest. 6.

en: Question 6.

la: Tob. 4, 3. seqq.; Eccli. 3, 7. seqq. et 7, 29. seq.

en: Tobit 4:3 ff.; Ecclesiasticus 3:7 ff. and 7:29 f.

la: Vide Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.), et II. de Anima, text. 34. seq. (c. 4.).

en: See Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 59 (c. 10), and *On the Soul* II, text 34 f. (c. 4).

la: [p.647, footer 1, q4-portion] Mox post *in hoc* omisimus cum edd. 1, 2 *enim*, quod habent codd., pro quo Vat. substituit *autem*. Subinde pro *ipsi gratiae repugnat* cod. F *currit via opposita*.

en: [p.647, footer 1, q4-portion] A little after, post *in hoc* we have omitted, with editions 1 and 2, *enim*, which the codices have, in place of which the Vatican [edition] substituted *autem*. Then for *ipsi gratiae repugnat* codex F [reads] *currit via opposita*. (The head of p.647 footer 1 — *Quaest. 3. — De propos. seq. vide supra q. 2 ad 1.* — pertains to q5's opening fundamentum and is rendered with q5.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione solvenda S. Thom. (hic a. 7; S. II–II. q. 26. a. 9.) dupliciter recedit a nostro auctore. Hic enim *sine distinctione* cum Origene (non Ambrosio) resolvit, quod secundum ordinem *caritatis* parentes praeponendi sint filiis; tamen in solut. ad 1. 2. 3. et ad 4. contrarium dicit de inclinatione *naturalis* dilectionis. Sed S. Thomas quoad primum respondet *distinguendo,* ut infra dicetur; secundo vero non admittit, quod *naturalis dilectio* aliter inclinet ac *caritas.* Hinc de illa assertione, quod magis amantur filii affectu *naturali,* in suo Comment. dicit: « Sed hoc non placet mihi, quia nihil naturalium inordinatum est; esset autem inclinatio inordinata, si inclinaret in diligendum magis quod minus diligendum est » etc. Concludit autem: « Unde constat, quod etiam secundum *naturalem* inclinationem et secundum caritatis *distinctione* opus est ». Hinc distinguit (in Sum. loc. cit.) gradus dilectionis tum ex parte *obiecti,* tum ex parte ipsius *diligentis,* et asserit, quod sub primo respectu pater magis diligendus quam filius, sub secundo vero respectu « magis diligitur quod est coniunctius, et secundum hoc filius est magis diligendus quam pater ». Hinc idem (loc. cit. ad 1.) docet, quod « parentibus a filiis magis debetur honor, filiis autem debetur magis cura provisionis »; « quamvis in articulo necessitatis filius obligatus sit ex beneficiis susceptis, ut *parentibus* magis provideat » (ibid. ad 3.). — Porro Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 6.) quoad dictam obligationem cum S. Bonav. docet, quod magis tenetur filius ad dilectionem patris, quam pater filii; etiam quoad *inclinationem naturae,* alia ac S. Thom. usus distinctione, dicit: « Secundum considerationem naturae *specialis* homo plus ad diligendum patrem ex ratione inclinatur; sed secundum considerationem naturae *generalis* e contrario »; quod convenit cum doctrina nostri auctoris in solut. ad 4. — Richard. a Med. (hic q. 7.) e illa solutione S. Thomae censet, quod « non satisfacit quaestioni, quia per hoc non clare ostenditur, quem homo magis debeat diligere, omnibus computatis ». Ipse autem Richardus pro solvenda quaestione, quem duorum hominum homo magis debeat diligere, censet, respiciendam esse « non tantum eorum bonitatem et eorum ad diligentem propinquitatem, sed etiam eorum ad diligentem dilectionem, et ad beneficia, quae recepit diligens per eorum procreationem et operationem ». Idem cum S. Bonav. simpliciter determinat, in dilectione praeferendum esse patrem. — Denique Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) aliorum refert solutiones, nihil determinans.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In solving this question St. Thomas (here a. 7; S. II–II, q. 26, a. 9) departs in two [respects] from our author. For here [Bonaventure] resolves *without distinction,* with Origen (not Ambrose), that according to the order of *charity* parents are to be preferred to children; yet in the solution to 1, 2, 3 and to 4 he says the contrary concerning the inclination of *natural* love. But St. Thomas, as to the first, responds by *distinguishing,* as will be said below; while as to the second he does not admit that *natural love* inclines otherwise than *charity*. Hence concerning that assertion, that children are loved more by *natural* affection, in his Commentary he says: « But this does not please me, because nothing natural is inordinate; but the inclination would be inordinate, if it inclined to loving more that which is less to be loved » etc. And he concludes: « Whence it is established that even according to *natural* inclination and according to charity there is need of *distinction* ». Hence he distinguishes (in the Summa, loc. cit.) the degrees of love both on the part of the *object* and on the part of the *one loving* himself, and asserts that under the first respect the father is more to be loved than the son, but under the second respect « that which is more closely joined is loved more, and according to this the son is more to be loved than the father ». Hence the same [author] (loc. cit. ad 1) teaches that « to parents more honor is owed by children, but to children more is owed the care of provision »; « although in a case of necessity the son is bound by the benefits received to provide more for *his parents* » (ibid. ad 3). — Moreover Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 6), as to the said obligation, teaches with St. Bonaventure that the son is more bound to the love of the father than the father to [the love] of the son; and even as to the *inclination of nature,* using a distinction other than St. Thomas's, he says: « According to the consideration of *special* nature man is by reason inclined more to loving the father; but according to the consideration of *general* nature, the contrary »; which agrees with the doctrine of our author in the solution to 4. — Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 7), from that solution of St. Thomas, judges that « it does not satisfy the question, because by it there is not clearly shown whom a man ought to love more, all things computed ». But Richard himself, for solving the question of which of two men a man ought to love more, judges that one must regard « not only their goodness and their nearness to the one loving, but also their love toward the one loving, and the benefits which the one loving has received through their procreation and operation ». He too, with St. Bonaventure, simply determines that the father is to be preferred in love. — Finally Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2) reports the solutions of others, determining nothing.

---

translators_notes:
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**Alignment verified (PASS).** Opener reads *Quarto quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem patris ad filium* / *Quarto quaeritur* — correctly q4 (no auto-chunker q-swap). Title verified verbatim from p.646 running band: *Utrum magis diligendi sint parentes quam filii, an e converso.*

**Scholion.** PRESENT — own printed `SCHOLION.` (single §I, full-width small-type block at the foot of p.647, between q4's Ad-replies and the QUAESTIO V opener). It is a single continuous §I (no §II); bibliographic spine S. Thom. / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Dionys. Carth. No *Vide scholion ad…* sibling-redirect (the q2 pattern does not apply here). `has_scholion: true`. Placed LAST in both `## Latin` and `## English` per the parser gotcha.

**q4 → q5 footer hand-off (forwarded).** Printed p.647 carries a single shared footer sequence nn.1–4, sitting under q5's column. **q5 owns the fresh p.647 footer sequence nn.1–4.** The HEAD of n.1 (*Quaest. 3. — De propos. seq. vide supra q. 2 ad 1.*) belongs to q5's fundamentum 1; nn.2 (*Vers. 10. — Deinde I. Tim. 5, 8*), n.3 (*Hic c. 2; sed dictum est Origenis…*), n.4 (*August., in I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 8…*) are entirely q5's. Only the TAIL of n.1 (the *in hoc enim*/*ipsi gratiae repugnat cod. F currit via opposita* variant) addresses q4's Ad-4 body and is claimed here as `[^13]`; do NOT re-claim it in q5 — q5 renders n.1's head (and may cross-note the tail already taken here).

**Margin labels.** Quaracchi prints marginal tags (Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Conclusio, Ratio, De dilectione naturali, Solutio oppositorum, Doctrina notabilis) which are editorial side-notes, not body text; omitted from the reflow.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum domesticus sit extraneo praeponendus.*

Quinto quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem domestici ad extraneum, et est quaestio, utrum domesticus sit extraneo praeponendus. Et quod sic, videtur[^1]:

1. Per illud quod dicitur ad Galatas ultimo[^2]: *Operemur bonum ad omnes, maxime autem ad domesticos fidei;* et primae ad Timotheum quinto: *Si quis suorum et maxime domesticorum curam non habet, fidem negavit et est infideli deterior.* Ex utraque istarum auctoritatum ostendi potest, quod domesticus extraneo debeat praeferri; per unam ostenditur positive et per aliam destructive.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritate Ambrosii, quae ponitur in littera[^3], qui dicit, domesticos collocandos esse quinto loco in ordine caritatis, extraneos vero in sexto.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per rationem. Diffusio caloris corporalis prius est ad loca propinquiora quam ad remotiora: ergo a simili, communicatio amoris spiritualis prius respicit naturaliter quod est propinquum, quam quod est remotum: si ergo domestici sunt propinquiores nobis quam extranei, vel inimici; videtur, quod in ordine caritatis primo sint collocandi[^4].

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4. Item, ad illos prius et principalius caritas ordinat, quibus magis astringimur et ligamur — ordo enim caritatis consonat legi iustitiae[^5] — sed secundum legem iustitiae magis obligamur domesticis quam extraneis: ergo domestici praeferri debent extraneis in ordine caritatis.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Colossenses tertio[^6]: *Renovamini secundum novum hominem, ubi non est masculus et femina, gentilis et Iudaeus, sed omnia in omnibus Christus:* ergo secundum hoc homini habenti caritatem nemo est extraneus: ergo secundum legem caritatis nulla est distinctio, nullus ordo inter domesticum et extraneum.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Vera Religione*[^7]: « Non sic homo ab homine diligendus est, ut diliguntur carnales fratres vel filii vel coniuges vel cognati vel affines aut cives; nam ista dilectio est temporalis. Non enim tales necessitates haberemus, quae nascendo et moriendo contingunt, si nostra natura, in praeceptis et imagine Dei manens, in istam corruptionem non relegaretur »: ergo videtur, quod ordo caritatis penes extraneum et domesticum et propinquum nullatenus attendatur.

3. Item, ratio diligendi proximum ex caritate est ipsa imago Dei[^8]: si ergo domesticus et extraneus aequaliter sunt imago Dei, videtur, quod ex caritate aequaliter sunt diligendi.

4. Item, caritas diligit bonum, quia bonum: ergo ille qui est magis bonus, magis est ex caritate diligendus, sive sit domesticus sive extraneus[^9]: ergo propinquitas et familiaritas, vel extraneitas nihil videntur facere ad ordinem caritatis.

> ### Conclusio.
> Secundum ordinem caritatis domestici praeponendi sunt extraneis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod praedictus ordo, qui assignatur secundum has differentias, quae sunt propinquum et remotum, domesticum et extraneum, a quibusdam dicitur esse ipsius dilectionis naturalis, caritatis autem non est nisi tolerantis; sustinet enim caritas in via, cum sit imperfecta, imperfectionem ipsius naturae. Unde hi voluerunt dicere, quod ordo caritatis, qui competit ei secundum se, attenditur penes maius bonum et minus bonum, non autem secundum propinquum et remotum. — Sed hic modus dicendi non videtur concordare verbis Ambrosii nec verbis Magistri. Nam Ambrosius hunc ordinem assignat in ipsa dilectione gratuita, de qua dicit sponsa in Canticis[^10]: *Introduxit me rex in cellam vinariam, ordinavit in me caritatem.* Et Magister in principio distinctionis dicit, quod « peccat qui praepostere agit » et hunc ordinem pervertit; quod non esset, si talis ordo solummodo esset caritatis sicut tolerantis.

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod ordo, qui attenditur penes praedictas differentias, non tantum est ipsius caritatis sicut tolerantis, sed etiam est ipsius sicut regulantis naturam et ei consonantis. Quod enim primo diligantur propinqui quam extranei, hoc non est naturae inordinatae, sed potius de ordinatione[^11] naturae. — Sicut enim prius tactum est, rectus ordo diffusionis est, ut prius communicetur propinquiori et deinde remotiori. Quoniam ergo caritas rectum ordinem a natura non aufert; hinc est, quod caritas superveniens illum ordinem naturae perficit, et perficiendo dicitur eodem ordine ordinari, non quia ordo ille competat sibi secundum se, sed quia competit ei ratione naturae, in qua est.

Propter quod attendendum est, quod duplex ordo attenditur in caritate: unus, qui ei competit secundum se ipsam; et iste ordo attenditur penes bonum et magis bonum et maxime bonum. Unde caritas de se magis movet ad amandum spiritum quam corpus, et Deum summum quam spiritum creatum. Alius vero est ordo, qui competit ei ratione naturae substratae; et hic attenditur secundum has differentias, quae sunt proprium et alienum, propinquum et extraneum. Affectus enim caritatis substernit sibi affectum naturae et illum perficit et regit secundum id quod habet in se rectitudinis. — Concedendum est ergo, quod secundum ordinem caritatis domestici praeponendi sunt extraneis; rationes etiam, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

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1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Christo Iesu non est distinctio masculi et feminae, immo omnes unum in Christo; dicendum, quod Apostolus per hoc non vult excludere distinctionem et gradum et ordinem in membris Christi, sed hoc vult ostendere, quod in omni sexu et aetate et de omni conditione quisque potest per Christum pervenire ad salutem, ita quod nullus excludendus est a fide. Et propterea ex hoc non habetur, quod caritas in diligendo membra Christi non servet ordinem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini *de Vera Religione*[^12], responderi potest, quod illam auctoritatem ipse retractat in primo Retractationum[^13]. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod Augustinus non vult removere a caritate considerationem illarum conditionum simpliciter; sed hoc vult dicere, quod caritas illas conditiones non considerat primo et principaliter, secundum quod amor naturalis et carnalis. Et hoc patet per illud quod subiungit: « Amare enim in homine quod filius est, hoc non est in eo amare quod ad *Deum pertinet,* sed quod pertinet *ad se* »; constat, quod de eo intelligit, qui diligit filium *principaliter,* quia est ab eo genitus, non quia est ad Dei imaginem factus. Et propterea ex auctoritate illa non habetur, quod penes illas conditiones non attendatur ordo caritatis, sed quod non sunt principales rationes diligendi ex caritate. Quamvis autem non sint principales, possunt tamen esse annexae et concomitantes, et ex hoc ad caritatis ordinem facientes.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio diligendi proximum est imago; dicendum, quod ista est ratio communis et generalis, sed praeter hanc possunt esse aliae speciales. Ordo autem et distinctio, quamvis non attendatur penes conditiones[^14] generales, attendi potest penes speciales. Et propterea, quamvis domesticus et extraneus sint uniformiter ad imaginem Dei, non tamen sequitur, quod sint uniformiter diligendi.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod caritas diligit bonum, quia bonum; dicendum, quod verum est de ipsa caritate secundum se. Sicut enim praetactum est, ordo eius in se attenditur penes bonitatem maiorem, vel minorem; sed in caritate non tantum attenditur ordo secundum se, sed etiam ratione naturae substratae; et ratione illius assignatur ordo inter domesticum et extraneum. Et sic patet, quod ratio illa non repugnat ordini caritatis.

english:
### Question V. *Whether a member of one's household is to be preferred to a stranger.*

Fifthly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of the member of the household to the stranger, and the question is whether a member of one's household is to be preferred to a stranger. And that [it is] so, seems [the case][^1]:

1. By that which is said to the Galatians at the last[^2]: *Let us work good toward all, but most of all toward those of the household of faith;* and First to Timothy five: *If anyone has not care of his own and most of all of those of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.* From each of these authorities it can be shown that a member of one's household ought to be preferred to a stranger; by the one it is shown positively and by the other destructively.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the authority of Ambrose, which is set down in the littera[^3], who says that those of the household are to be placed in the fifth rank in the order of charity, but strangers in the sixth.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason. The diffusion of bodily heat is sooner to nearer places than to more remote ones: therefore from a like [case], the communication of spiritual love naturally regards sooner that which is near, than that which is remote: if therefore those of the household are nearer to us than strangers, or enemies; it seems that in the order of charity they are to be placed first[^4].

4. Likewise, charity sets in order [its love] sooner and more principally toward those to whom we are more bound and tied — for the order of charity is consonant with the law of justice[^5] — but according to the law of justice we are more obligated to those of our household than to strangers: therefore those of the household ought to be preferred to strangers in the order of charity.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Colossians three[^6]: *Be renewed according to the new man, where there is not male and female, gentile and Jew, but all things in all is Christ:* therefore according to this, to a man having charity no one is a stranger: therefore according to the law of charity there is no distinction, no order between a member of one's household and a stranger.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On True Religion*[^7]: « A man is not to be loved by a man as carnal brothers or sons or spouses or kinsmen or relations or fellow-citizens are loved; for that love is temporal. For we would not have such necessities, which befall by being born and by dying, if our nature, remaining in the precepts and image of God, had not been relegated to this corruption »: therefore it seems that the order of charity is in no way to be attended to in respect to stranger and member-of-household and neighbor.

3. Likewise, the ground of loving one's neighbor out of charity is the image of God itself[^8]: if therefore a member of one's household and a stranger are equally the image of God, it seems that out of charity they are equally to be loved.

4. Likewise, charity loves the good, because [it is] good: therefore he who is more good is more to be loved out of charity, whether he be a member of one's household or a stranger[^9]: therefore nearness and familiarity, or strangeness, seem to do nothing toward the order of charity.

> ### Conclusion.
> According to the order of charity those of the household are to be preferred to strangers.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the aforesaid order, which is assigned according to these differences, which are near and remote, of-the-household and stranger, is said by some to be [a matter] of natural love itself, but it is not of charity except as [charity is] tolerating; for charity, being on the way [and] imperfect, bears with the imperfection of nature itself. Whence these [men] wished to say that the order of charity which belongs to it in itself is attended to in respect to greater good and lesser good, but not according to near and remote. — But this manner of speaking does not seem to agree with the words of Ambrose nor with the words of the Master. For Ambrose assigns this order in gratuitous love itself, of which the spouse says in the Canticle[^10]: *The king brought me into the wine-cellar, he set charity in order in me.* And the Master at the beginning of the distinction says that « he sins who acts preposterously » and perverts this order; which would not be [so], if such an order belonged only to charity as tolerating.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that the order which is attended to in respect to the aforesaid differences is not only [a matter] of charity as tolerating, but is also [a matter] of it as regulating nature and being consonant with it. For that those who are near are loved sooner than strangers — this is not [a matter] of disordered nature, but rather of the ordering[^11] of nature. — For as was touched on earlier, the right order of diffusion is that there be communicated sooner to the nearer and then to the more remote. Since therefore charity does not take away from nature the right order; hence it is that supervening charity perfects that order of nature, and in perfecting it is said to be ordered by the same order, not because that order belongs to it in itself, but because it belongs to it by reason of the nature in which it is.

On account of which it must be attended to that a twofold order is attended to in charity: one, which belongs to it in respect to itself; and this order is attended to in respect to good and more good and most good. Whence charity of itself moves more to loving the spirit than the body, and the highest God than a created spirit. But there is another order, which belongs to it by reason of the underlying nature; and this is attended to according to these differences, which are own and another's, near and stranger. For the affection of charity makes the affection of nature subordinate to itself and perfects and rules it according to that of rectitude which it has in itself. — It must therefore be granted that according to the order of charity those of the household are to be preferred to strangers; the reasons also, which show this, are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that in Christ Jesus there is no distinction of male and female, nay all are one in Christ; it must be said that the Apostle by this does not wish to exclude distinction and degree and order in the members of Christ, but wishes to show this, that in every sex and age and of every condition everyone can through Christ attain to salvation, in such a way that no one is to be excluded from the faith. And therefore from this it is not had that charity, in loving the members of Christ, does not keep order.

2. To that which is objected concerning the authority of Augustine *On True Religion*[^12], it can be answered that he retracts that authority in the first [book] of the Retractations[^13]. — It can also be said otherwise, that Augustine does not wish to remove from charity the consideration of those conditions simply; but he wishes to say this, that charity does not consider those conditions first and principally, as does natural and carnal love. And this is evident from that which he subjoins: « For to love in a man that he is a *son*, this is not in him to love that which pertains *to God,* but that which pertains *to oneself* »; it is established that he understands it of him who loves a son *principally,* because he is begotten from him, not because he is made to the image of God. And therefore from that authority it is not had that the order of charity is not attended to in respect to those conditions, but that they are not the principal grounds of loving out of charity. But although they are not principal, they can nevertheless be annexed and concomitant, and from this contributing to the order of charity.

3. To that which is objected, that the ground of loving one's neighbor is the image; it must be said that this is the common and general ground, but besides this there can be other special [grounds]. But order and distinction, although it be not attended to in respect to general conditions[^14], can be attended to in respect to special ones. And therefore, although a member of one's household and a stranger are uniformly [made] to the image of God, it does not yet follow that they are uniformly to be loved.

4. To that which is objected last, that charity loves the good, because [it is] good; it must be said that [this] is true of charity itself in itself. For as was touched on before, its order in itself is attended to in respect to greater or lesser goodness; but in charity not only is the order attended to in respect to itself, but also by reason of the underlying nature; and by reason of that the order between a member of one's household and a stranger is assigned. And thus it is evident that that reason is not repugnant to the order of charity.

la: [p.647, footer 1, head] Quaest. 3. — De propos. seq. vide supra q. 2 ad 1.

en: [p.647, footer 1, head] Question 3. — Concerning the proposition that follows, see above, question 2, [reply] to 1. (The tail of this footer — the *in hoc enim* / *ipsi gratiae repugnat cod. F currit via opposita* variant — addresses q4's Ad-4 and was rendered with q4.)

la: [p.647, footer 2] Vers. 10. — Deinde I. Tim. 5, 8.

en: [p.647, footer 2] Verse 10. — Then First Timothy 5:8.

la: [p.647, footer 3] Hic c. 2; sed dictum est Origenis. — Pro *qui dicit* codd. G H V Z *quae dicit*.

en: [p.647, footer 3] Here c. 2; but it was said by Origen. — For *qui dicit* codices G H V Z [read] *quae dicit*.

la: [p.647, footer 4] August., in I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 8, n. 4: *Qui usque ad inimicos pervenit non transilit fratres. Necesse est, sicut ignis prius occupet proxima, et sic se in longinquiora distendat. Propinquior est tibi frater quam nescio quis homo... Extende dilectionem in proximos, nec voces illam extensionem. Prope enim tu diligis* etc. — In maiori pro *corporalis* cod. W *naturalis*.

en: [p.647, footer 4] Augustine, on the First Epistle of John, tractate 8, n. 4: *He who has reached even to enemies does not pass over brothers. It is necessary, as fire first occupies what is near, and so extends itself into more distant things. A brother is nearer to you than some man I know not whom... Extend love toward those near, and do not call it an extension. For nearby you love,* etc. — In the major [premise], for *corporalis* codex W [reads] *naturalis*.

la: [p.648, footer 1] Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 9.

en: [p.648, footer 1] Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 9.

la: [p.648, footer 2] Vers. 10. seq.: *Et induentes novum [hominem]... ubi non est gentilis et Iudaeus, circumcisio et praeputium, barbarus et Scytha, servus et liber, sed omnia et in omnibus Christus.* Cfr. Eph. 4, 23. seq., et Gal. 3, 28. — Inferius ante *ergo secundum legem* cod. A ponit *si*.

en: [p.648, footer 2] Verse 10 f.: *And putting on the new [man]... where there is not gentile and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian and Scythian, slave and free, but Christ [is] all and in all.* Cf. Ephesians 4:23 f., and Galatians 3:28. — Below, before *ergo secundum legem* codex A places *si*.

la: [p.648, footer 3] Cap. 46. n. 88. — In testimonio allato pro *temporalis* edd. exhibent *corporalis*, refragantibus codd. et textu origin. Deinde pro *si nostra* multi codd. perperam substituerunt *sed nostra*.

en: [p.648, footer 3] Chapter 46, n. 88. — In the testimony adduced, for *temporalis* the editions exhibit *corporalis*, against the codices and the original text. Then for *si nostra* many codices have wrongly substituted *sed nostra*.

la: [p.648, footer 4] Cfr. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 20. seq.

en: [p.648, footer 4] Cf. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 22, n. 20 f.

la: [p.648, footer 5] Similiter et Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 7. docet, eum qui melior sit et maiorem afferat utilitatem, magis esse amandum.

en: [p.648, footer 5] Likewise also Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 7, teaches that he who is better and brings greater usefulness is more to be loved.

la: [p.648, footer 6] Cap. 2, 4. — Verba Ambrosii (Origenis) vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: [p.648, footer 6] Chapter 2:4. — For the words of Ambrose (Origen) see here in the littera of the Master, c. 2.

la: [p.648, footer 7] Sic codd. A G K V; alii codd. et edd. *ordine*.

en: [p.648, footer 7] So codices A G K V; other codices and the editions [read] *ordine*. — [The intervening p.648 footers, namely n. 8 (*Codd. A K bb ei*), n. 9 (*Vide supra d. 28. q. 4. in corp. Praedictam distinctionem S. Thom. — S. II. II. q. 26. a. 7. et passim — aliis verbis exprimit, scilicet per comparationem ad obiectum et ad diligentem*), n. 10 (*Vide supra q. 1. ad 1, q. 3. ad 5. et q. 4. ad 4. — Paulo inferius pro* rationes etiam *— sic codd. A K bb — edd. cum aliis codd.* rationes autem), and n. 11 (*Codd. A K bene supplent* sumus. *Inferius pro* sed hoc *cod. O* sed in his, *Vat.* sed per hoc. *In fine solut. pro* membra Christi *codd. A G K* membrum Christi), attach to the Respondeo's later clauses (*competat sibi secundum se*, *spiritum creatum*, *rectitudinis*) and to Solutio 1 (*omnes... unum in Christo*); they are critical-apparatus variants without further substantive content and are grouped with this note to preserve the per-page sequence.]

en: [p.649, footer 1] Chapter 13, n. 8.

la: [p.649, footer 2] De Vera Relig. c. 46. n. 88. — Inferius pro *sed quod* cod. K *secundum quod*.

en: [p.649, footer 2] *On True Religion*, c. 46, n. 88. — Below, for *sed quod* codex K [reads] *secundum quod*.

la: [p.649, footer 3] In edd. deest *conditiones* et post *attendi* subiunctum est *tamen*.

en: [p.649, footer 3] In the editions *conditiones* is wanting and after *attendi* *tamen* is subjoined.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Huic quaestioni, utrum ordo caritatis respiciat etiam *affectum,* de qua plura refert Magister (hic c. 2.), fomentum fortasse praebuerunt verba S. Bernardi (Serm. in Cantic. serm. 50. n. 3.), quae affirmare videntur, ipsum *praeceptum* caritatis respicere potius *effectum* quam *affectum,* sive, ut ipse loquitur, caritatem *actualem* quam *affectualem.* Sed ipse minime voluit excludere *affectum,* cum dicat (ibid. n. 4.): « Neque hoc dico, ut sine affectione simus et corde arido solas moveamus manus ad opera » etc.

**II.** Iam Gulielm. Antissiodorensis (Sum. III. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 2.) primam opinionem reprobavit; item posteriores Scholastici communiter tenent, quod licet ordo caritatis primo et principaliter attendat gradum similitudinis sive propinquitatis, quem dilectus habet ad ipsum *Deum,* secundario tamen etiam respiciat « *naturam substratam* », scilicet gradum similitudinis et propinquitatis, quem dilectus in ordine naturae habet cum *diligente.* In communicatione autem vitae naturalis et socialis inter homines plures sunt « differentiae » (cfr. infra dub. 3.), quarum quatuor cum S. Thoma sic distinguit Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 7.): « Est quaedam communicatio... *naturalis* in origine naturali, qua communicant propinqui; quaedam *oeconomica* in officiis domesticis, qua communicant domestici; quaedam *politica* in uno corpore civitatis unius, vel populi, qua communicant omnes cives; quaedam *divina* in operibus gratiae, qua communicant omnes homines [saltem potentia]. Et super quamlibet harum communicationum fundatur amicitia quaedam: super primam amicitia propinquorum, super secundam domesticorum, super tertiam extraneorum, super quartam omnium hominum, etiam inimicorum. Quanto vero plures includuntur modi communicandi, tanto est maior communicatio, et tanto debet esse maior dilectio; et ideo cum modus primus omnes alios contineat, maiorem importat communicationem, et ideo maiorem dilectionem simpliciter, quamvis *secundum quid,* ratione alicuius communicantiae maioris specialis, aliter contingat » etc. — Quae principia ut melius intelligantur et applicari possint, observanda est doctrina de triplici *affectu* et *effectu,* in sequenti quaestione explicata. De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: S. Thom., hic a. 6; S. II. II. q. 26. a. 7. 8; Qq. disp. de Caritate, a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Durand., hic q. 4.

**III.** Conclusio sequentis (6.) quaestionis conformis est principiis communiter approbatis. Notatu dignae sunt observationes de triplici *affectu* et *effectu.* De eadem quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** To this question, whether the order of charity regards also the *affect,* concerning which the Master reports many things (here c. 2), occasion was perhaps furnished by the words of St. Bernard (Sermons on the Canticle, sermon 50, n. 3), which seem to affirm that the *precept* of charity regards rather the *effect* than the *affect,* or, as he himself speaks, *actual* charity rather than *affectual.* But he by no means wished to exclude the *affect,* since he says (ibid. n. 4): « Nor do I say this, that we should be without affection and with a dry heart move only our hands to works » etc.

**II.** Already William of Auxerre (Summa III, tr. 6, c. 2, q. 2) reproved the first opinion; likewise the later Scholastics commonly hold that, although the order of charity primarily and principally attends to the degree of likeness or nearness which the one loved has to *God* himself, secondarily it nevertheless also regards « the *underlying nature* », namely the degree of likeness and nearness which the one loved has in the order of nature with the *one loving.* And in the communication of natural and social life among men there are several « differences » (cf. below, dub. 3), four of which, with St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 7) thus distinguishes: « There is a certain *natural* communication in natural origin, by which the near commune; a certain *economic* one in domestic offices, by which those of the household commune; a certain *political* one in the one body of one city, or people, by which all fellow-citizens commune; a certain *divine* one in the works of grace, by which all men commune [at least in potency]. And upon each of these communications a certain friendship is founded: upon the first the friendship of the near, upon the second of those of the household, upon the third of strangers, upon the fourth of all men, even of enemies. But the more modes of communicating are included, the greater is the communication, and the greater ought the love to be; and therefore since the first mode contains all the others, it imports a greater communication, and therefore a greater love simply, although *in a certain respect,* by reason of some greater special communicatedness, it happen otherwise » etc. — That these principles may be the better understood and able to be applied, the doctrine concerning the threefold *affect* and *effect,* explained in the following question, must be observed. On this question, besides those praised: St. Thomas, here a. 6; S. II–II, q. 26, a. 7, 8; *Disputed Questions on Charity*, a. 9. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Durandus, here q. 4.

**III.** The conclusion of the following (6th) question is conformable to the commonly approved principles. Worthy of note are the observations concerning the threefold *affect* and *effect.* On the same question: St. Thomas, here a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi two-column PDF (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p647-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p648-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p649-{L,R}-*.png`), with the Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum, scholion, and footers (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters these regions). IA djvu OCR (raw 45017–45161) used as base only for the clean running fundamenta/contra prose and exact footnote-marker spacing. English freshly translated literally.

**Page span.** q5 opens at the FOOT of printed p.647 L-col (PDF 669), BELOW q4's scholion — the q4/q5 boundary falls inside printed p.647. Runs p.647 (opener + fundamenta 1–3) → p.648 (fund. 4, contra 1–4, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo) → p.649 (Solutio oppositorum 1–4 + SCHOLION §I–III). q6 (*Utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum* / *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur*, raw 45162) opens lower in p.649 R-col, below q5's scholion → the q5/q6 boundary falls INSIDE printed p.649.

**Apparatus split (18 printed footers → 14 body-anchored markers, numbered 1–14 in body order).** Per-page Quaracchi footer numbers are bracketed in every apparatus entry; some p.648 critical-variant footers (nn.8–11) carry no fresh body anchor and are grouped into one marker, so the 18 printed footers map to 14 markers.
- p.647 footer nn.1–4 → markers 1–4. Footer n.1 HEAD only (the *Quaest. 3.* cross-ref on q5's opening fundamentum); its TAIL (the *in hoc enim* / *cod. F currit via opposita* variant) was rendered with q4 and is NOT re-claimed here. n.2 = Gal/1 Tim on fund.1, n.3 = *in littera* on fund.2, n.4 = August. on fund.3.
- p.648 footer nn.1–11 → markers 5–11 (5 body-anchored footers nn.1–5 on fund.4 + contra 1–4 = markers 5–9; n.6 *in Canticis* + n.7 *de ordinatione* = markers 10/11; nn.8–11 = the Respondeo/Solutio-1 critical variants, grouped under marker 11's entry to preserve the per-page sequence without orphaning markerless footers).
- p.649 footer nn.1–3 → markers 12–14 (n.1 *Retractationum* on Sol.2, n.2 *de Vera Relig.* re-citation on Sol.2's *de Vera Religione* mention, n.3 *conditiones* on Sol.3).

**Alignment verified (PASS).** Opener reads *Quinto quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem domestici ad extraneum* / *Quinto quaeritur* — correctly q5 (no auto-chunker q-swap). Title verified verbatim from p.647 running band: *Utrum domesticus sit extraneo praeponendus.*

**Scholion.** PRESENT — own printed `SCHOLION.` (full-width small-type block on p.649, below the two body columns, between q5's Sol.4 and the QUAESTIO VI opener). THREE sections §I–III (NOT a single §I as in q4; NOT a *Vide scholion ad…* redirect). §I = the *affectus/effectus* question + S. Bernard; §II = William of Auxerre + Peter of Tarentaise's four communications/friendships + bibliographic spine (S. Thom./B. Albert./Richard. a Med./Durand.); §III = a forward-looking note on the conclusion of q6 + bibliographic tail (S. Thom./B. Albert./Petr. a Tar.). `has_scholion: true`. Placed LAST in both `## Latin` and `## English` per the parser gotcha.

**q4 → q5 footer hand-off (RECEIVED + consumed).** q4 forwarded p.647's fresh footer sequence nn.1–4. q5 claims footer n.1 HEAD (marker 1), n.2 (marker 2), n.3 (marker 3), n.4 (marker 4); q4 retained only n.1's TAIL (rendered as q4's last apparatus marker). Consumed in full.

**q5 → q6 footer hand-off (FORWARDED).** The q5/q6 boundary falls inside printed p.649. q5 owns p.649 footers nn.1–3. **p.649 footers nn.4, 5 (and the per-page restart that follows) belong to q6** — n.4 (*Vers. 18. — Proxime ante pro effectum tantum, codd. et edd. affectum tantum, sed minus bene...*) attaches to q6's fund.1 (*Diligamus non verbo neque lingua, sed opere et veritate*, 1 John 3:18), n.5 (*Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 1.*) to q6's fund.2 (Gregory's homily). q6 opens *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum* (raw 45162).

**[?] flags.** None outstanding (450 dpi legible throughout; running heads OCR digit-mangled 648/649 — trusted via +22 offset + running-head text *DIST. XXIX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V/VI*). The p.648 critical-variant footers nn.8–11 are grouped under `[^11]`'s entry (markerless variants) — a deliberate disposition, not an ambiguity.