title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXV, Pars II)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXV, Part II)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *libertas arbitrii per peccatum ex parte est perdita*, in illo capitulo: *Unde manifestum est* etc. Hoc enim est contra Bernardum, qui dicit in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^1], quod «liberum arbitrium nec miseria amittitur nec culpa minuitur». Item, in eodem libro loquens de libero arbitrio: «Sui omnino diminutionem vel defectum non patitur». Et iterum, ipse ibidem dicit: «Libertas arbitrii de ipso quo condita est statu aliquatenus non mutatur, sed aequaliter, quantum in se est, a caelis et terris et inferis possidetur»: ergo male assignat Magister diversos gradus[^2] libertatis. Item, si libertas arbitrii potest per peccatum diminui, cum non sit infinita, aliquando poterit amitti: ergo si impossibile est, creaturam rationalem absque libertate arbitrii esse, impossibile est, ipsum per peccatum diminui.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicendum, quod est loqui de libertate arbitrii[^3] quantum ad *esse* et quantum ad *bene esse*. Si loquamur quantum ad *esse*, sic liberum arbitrium non potest diminui per peccatum. Si autem loquamur quantum ad *bene esse*, sic excludit malum duplex, videlicet *culpae* et *poenae*; et quantum ad hanc[^4] liberum arbitrium potest diminui, et haec libertas per peccatum tolli potest, sicut in damnatis, qui necessario subiecti sunt malo culpae et malo poenae. Et per hoc patent obiecta contra hoc, quia procedunt de libertate, intelligendo quantum ad *esse*[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Est namque libertas arbitrii triplex, scilicet a necessitate, a culpa et a miseria.* Videtur, quod ista divisio sit superflua. Cum enim non sit nisi duplex malum, scilicet culpae et poenae, videtur, quod non sit nisi duplex libertas. Cum ergo libertas dicat ereptionem ab aliquo malo, videtur, quod non debeat esse nisi duplex libertatis differentia. — Item, cum non sit tantum malum culpae et poenae, sed etiam tentationis, videtur praedicta divisio esse diminuta, quae omittit unam differentiam, quae est libertas arbitrii a malo tentationis. *Si tu dicas*, eam contineri sub libertate a miseria; tunc ego *quaero*: quare similiter libertas a culpa non continetur sub libertate a miseria[^6]? — Item, cum Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^7] dividat libertatem liberi arbitrii in libertatem arbitrii et consilii et complaciti; quaeritur, quae sit inter has divisiones differentia, et penes quid sumantur harum divisionum membra.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut ex praecedentibus[^8] colligi potest, arbitrii libertas et *privative* dicitur et *positive*. *Privative* dicitur per comparationem ad illud, respectu cuius dicitur libertas ut *a quo*; *positive* per comparationem ad illud, respectu cuius dicitur libertas ut *ad quod*. — Libertas autem opponitur servituti. Servitus autem duplex est, videlicet servitus coactionis et servitus subiectionis. Servitus autem subiectionis potest esse sub duplici differentia, secundum quod duplex est malum, scilicet malum, quod patimur, et hoc est malum miseriae, et in hoc attenditur libertas a miseria; et malum quod facimus, et hoc est malum culpae, et in hoc attenditur tertia libertatis differentia[^9]. Et sic patet, quod libertas, secundum quod consideratur per comparationem ad illud *a quo* liberat, habet dividi in tres differentias, quae sunt libertas a necessitate, a culpa et a miseria. — Si autem consideretur libertas per comparationem ad illud *ad quod*, scilicet ad actum, in quem exit, hoc potest esse tripliciter[^10]: aut prout *simpliciter* consideratur respectu actus volendi, et sic dicitur libertas arbitrii; aut prout consideratur respectu actus volendi ad *finem* relati, qui dicitur *usus* vel *uti*, et sic attenditur libertas consilii; aut respectu actus volendi quietati[^11], qui quidem dicitur actus fruitionis, et penes hunc attenditur libertas complaciti. — Et sic patet sufficientia utriusque divisionis, et diversi modi, secundum quos praedictae divisiones habent assignari.

Possent tamen ad unam communem rationem dividendi reduci sic. Est enim considerare libertatem arbitrii quantum ad *esse* et quantum ad *bene*

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*esse*. Si quantum ad *esse*, sic vocatur a Magistro libertas a coactione, et a Bernardo libertas arbitrii, ab uno positive, ab altero privative. — Si quantum ad *bene esse*, cum ad *bene esse* concurrat duplex bonum, videlicet bonum *rectificans* et bonum *delectans*, sive bonum *ordinans* et bonum *quietans*; et per oppositum excludatur duplex malum, videlicet malum *deformans* et malum *affligens*: sic est duplex differentia, quarum una sumitur respectu boni *dirigentis*, et haec dicitur libertas consilii a Bernardo, et a Magistro libertas a culpa; alia vero sumitur respectu boni *quietantis*, et haec a Bernardo vocatur libertas complaciti, a Magistro libertas a miseria. Idem enim ipsum, quod Bernardus nominat positive sive per comparationem ad *terminum ad quem*, Magister nominat privative sive per comparationem ad terminum *a quo*.

Et sic patet divisionum sufficientia. Patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Praeter enim malum culpae et poenae est assignare tertiam differentiam libertatis arbitrii, quae non sumitur respectu mali, utpote illa, quae attenditur quantum ad *esse*. Et malum *tentationis* quodam modo habet reduci ad malum *culpae*, quodam modo ad malum *poenae*: ad malum *culpae*, in quantum subintrat interius; ad malum vero *poenae*, in quantum affligit exterius; et sic non[^12] facit quartum membrum ab illis tribus diversum.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Verum nobis magis placet, ut illa sit libertas arbitrii, qua quis liber est ad malum, et illa, qua quis liber est ad bonum.* Hoc enim est contra Anselmum[^13], qui dicit, quod «potestas peccandi non est libertas nec pars libertatis». — Item, etiam videtur esse contra rationem, quia unumquodque debet denominari a suo optimo; et libertas, quae est ab omni miseria et culpa, haec est ab omni miseria[^14]; ergo liberum arbitrium debet denominari ab illa. — Item, si libertas arbitrii dicitur non solum, quia est in bonum, sed etiam, quia potest in malum; cum in Beatis non possit in malum: videtur, quod aequivoce dicatur libertas arbitrii in viatoribus et in Beatis. Sed contra hoc est, quia comparatio secundum maius et minus est respectu solius univoci[^15]. Si ergo aequivoce diceretur liberum arbitrium in Beatis et in nobis, non esset maior libertas in Beatis quam in nobis; quod est contra Magistrum in littera, qui differenter gradus libertatis assignat.

Propter hoc est quaestio, utrum libertas a coactione et a culpa et a miseria dicatur aequivoce, vel univoce; et cui primo nomen libertatis imponatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum nomen imponatur rei a proprietate, quae est sibi inhaerens inseparabiliter et essentialiter; et libertas essentialis liberi arbitrii[^16] non sit libertas a culpa, vel a miseria, sed libertas a coactione: ab illa liberum arbitrium habet denominari. Et quoniam haec in creaturis, quantum est de se, indifferens est ad bonum et ad malum; ideo Magister, de hac intelligens, dicit in littera, quod libertas, a qua liberum arbitrium denominatur liberum, non est libertas ad bonum tantum, sed etiam ad malum; non quod principaliter respiciat malum, sed quia de generali nominis significatione non determinatur ad bonum, licet principalius respiciat bonum quam malum[^17]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod denominatio debet fieri ab optimo; dicendum, quod illud verum est de optimo non quocumque, sed essentiali et inseparabili.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum dicatur libertas aequivoce, vel univoce; dicendum, quod nec sic nec sic, sed secundum quandam *analogiam*, quae propter convenientiam cum univoco recipit comparationem secundum magis et minus; propter convenientiam cum aequivoco recipit quandam distinctionem multiplicitatis; analogum enim medium tenet inter univocum et aequivocum[^18]. — Et sic patent ea quae quaesita sunt.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, that *the freedom of choice has in part been lost through sin*, in that chapter: *Whence it is manifest* etc. For this is against Bernard, who says in his book *On Free Choice*[^1] that «free choice is neither lost through misery nor diminished through fault». Likewise, in the same book, speaking of free choice: «It suffers no diminution or defect whatsoever of itself». And again, the same author there says: «The freedom of choice is in no way changed from that state in which it was created, but equally, so far as in it lies, it is possessed by the heavens and the earth and the realms below»: therefore the Master wrongly assigns diverse degrees[^2] of freedom. Likewise, if the freedom of choice can be diminished through sin, since it is not infinite, at some point it could be lost: therefore if it is impossible for a rational creature to be without freedom of choice, it is impossible for that freedom to be diminished through sin.

**I respond:** To this it must be said that freedom of choice[^3] may be spoken of in respect of *being* and in respect of *well-being*. If we speak of it in respect of *being*, then free choice cannot be diminished through sin. But if we speak of it in respect of *well-being*, then it excludes a twofold evil, namely that of *fault* and that of *punishment*; and in respect of this[^4] free choice can be diminished, and this freedom can be taken away through sin, as in the damned, who are necessarily subject to the evil of fault and the evil of punishment. And through this the objections against this are clear, because they proceed concerning freedom understood in respect of *being*[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *For the freedom of choice is threefold, namely from necessity, from fault, and from misery.* It seems that this division is superfluous. For since there is only a twofold evil, namely of fault and of punishment, it seems that there should be only a twofold freedom. Since therefore freedom denotes a deliverance from some evil, it seems that there ought to be only a twofold differentia of freedom. — Likewise, since there is not only the evil of fault and of punishment, but also that of temptation, it seems that the aforesaid division is deficient, since it omits one differentia, namely the freedom of choice from the evil of temptation. *If you say* that this is contained under freedom from misery; then I *ask*: why is freedom from fault likewise not contained under freedom from misery[^6]? — Likewise, since Bernard in his book *On Free Choice*[^7] divides the freedom of free choice into the freedom of choice, of counsel, and of complacency; it is asked what is the difference among these divisions, and according to what the members of these divisions are taken.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as can be gathered from what precedes[^8], the freedom of choice is spoken of both *privatively* and *positively*. It is spoken of *privatively* by comparison to that with respect to which freedom is called freedom as *from which*; *positively* by comparison to that with respect to which freedom is called freedom as *toward which*. — Now freedom is opposed to servitude. But servitude is twofold, namely the servitude of coercion and the servitude of subjection. And the servitude of subjection can fall under a twofold differentia, according as evil is twofold, namely the evil which we suffer, and this is the evil of misery, and in this freedom from misery is regarded; and the evil which we do, and this is the evil of fault, and in this the third differentia of freedom is regarded[^9]. And thus it is clear that freedom, insofar as it is considered by comparison to that *from which* it delivers, must be divided into three differentiae, which are freedom from necessity, from fault, and from misery. — But if freedom be considered by comparison to that *toward which*, namely toward the act into which it goes forth, this can be in a threefold way[^10]: either as it is considered *simply* with respect to the act of willing, and so it is called the freedom of choice; or as it is considered with respect to the act of willing related to an *end*, which is called *use* or *to use*, and so the freedom of counsel is regarded; or with respect to the act of willing at rest[^11], which indeed is called the act of fruition, and according to this the freedom of complacency is regarded. — And thus the sufficiency of each division is clear, and the diverse modes according to which the aforesaid divisions are to be assigned.

They could, however, be reduced to one common ground of dividing in this way. For freedom of choice may be considered in respect of *being* and in respect of *well-

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being*. If in respect of *being*, then it is called by the Master freedom from coercion, and by Bernard freedom of choice, by the one positively, by the other privatively. — If in respect of *well-being*, since to *well-being* there concur a twofold good, namely the good that *rectifies* and the good that *delights*, that is, the good that *orders* and the good that *brings rest*; and conversely there is excluded a twofold evil, namely the evil that *deforms* and the evil that *afflicts*: thus there is a twofold differentia, of which one is taken with respect to the *directing* good, and this is called by Bernard the freedom of counsel, and by the Master freedom from fault; while the other is taken with respect to the *quieting* good, and this is called by Bernard the freedom of complacency, by the Master freedom from misery. For the very same thing which Bernard names positively, that is, by comparison to the *term toward which*, the Master names privatively, that is, by comparison to the term *from which*.

And thus the sufficiency of the divisions is clear. The reply to the objections is also clear. For besides the evil of fault and of punishment there is to be assigned a third differentia of the freedom of choice, which is not taken with respect to an evil, such as that one which is regarded in respect of *being*. And the evil of *temptation* must be reduced in one way to the evil of *fault*, in another way to the evil of *punishment*: to the evil of *fault*, insofar as it enters within; to the evil of *punishment*, insofar as it afflicts without; and thus it does not[^12] constitute a fourth member distinct from those three.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *But it is more pleasing to us that that be the freedom of choice whereby one is free toward evil, and that whereby one is free toward good.* For this is against Anselm[^13], who says that «the power of sinning is not freedom nor a part of freedom». — Likewise, it also seems to be against reason, because each thing ought to be named from its best; and the freedom which is from all misery and fault, this is from all misery[^14]; therefore free choice ought to be named from it. — Likewise, if the freedom of choice is so called not only because it is toward good, but also because it can incline toward evil; since in the Blessed it cannot incline toward evil: it seems that the freedom of choice is spoken of equivocally in wayfarers and in the Blessed. But against this is the fact that comparison according to greater and lesser is with respect to the univocal alone[^15]. If therefore free choice were spoken of equivocally in the Blessed and in us, there would not be a greater freedom in the Blessed than in us; which is against the Master in the text, who assigns the degrees of freedom differently.

On account of this there is the question, whether freedom from coercion and from fault and from misery is spoken of equivocally or univocally; and to which the name of freedom is first applied.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since a name is imposed on a thing from a property which inheres in it inseparably and essentially; and the essential freedom of free choice[^16] is not freedom from fault, or from misery, but freedom from coercion: from this free choice is to be named. And since this, in creatures, of itself is indifferent toward good and toward evil; therefore the Master, understanding it of this, says in the text that the freedom from which free choice is named free is not freedom toward good only, but also toward evil; not that it principally regards evil, but because by the general signification of the name it is not determined to good, although it more principally regards good than evil[^17]. — And through this the reply to the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that naming ought to be done from the best; it must be said that this is true of the best not in any sense whatever, but of the essential and inseparable best.

To that which is asked, whether freedom is spoken of equivocally or univocally; it must be said that it is neither thus nor thus, but according to a certain *analogy*, which, on account of its agreement with the univocal, admits of comparison according to greater and lesser; on account of its agreement with the equivocal, admits of a certain distinction of multiplicity; for the analogous holds a middle place between the univocal and the equivocal[^18]. — And thus the things which were asked are clear.

---

la: Cap. 4. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 610, nota 2, ubi et seq. locus, qui ex c. 9. n. 28 sumtus est, integer affertur. Locus tertio citatus sumtus est ex c. 9. n. 30, in quo loco text. orig. post *aequaliter* insertum exhibet *semper*.

en: [Bernard, *On Free Choice*] c. 4, n. 9. Compare above, p. 610, note 2, where also the following passage, which is taken from c. 9, n. 28, is given in full. The passage cited in the third place is taken from c. 9, n. 30, in which place the original text exhibits, inserted after *equally*, the word *always*.

la: Cod. aa *status*. In codd. V X Z et aliis nec non in ed. 2 legitur *assignat Magister arbitrium libertatis*. Voci *libertatis* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt *arbitrii*.

en: Codex aa reads *of the state*. In codices V X Z and others, and also in ed. 2, is read *the Master assigns the choice of freedom*. To the word *of freedom* the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add *of choice*.

la: Cod. T adiicit *dupliciter*.

en: Codex T adds *in a twofold way*.

la: Scilicet *libertatem*. Pro *hanc* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *hoc*.

en: That is, *the freedom*. For *this* (fem.) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *this* (neut.).

la: Cfr. supra q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 5; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 95; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. et q. 4. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 8.

en: Compare above, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 72, m. 5; Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 15, q. 95; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text and q. 4, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2; Giles of Rome, here on the doubt concerning the text, 8.

la: Verba *tunc ego quaero, quare... a miseria* desunt in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4. Subinde pro *Item* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit *Contra*.

en: The words *then I ask: why ... from misery* are absent in the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4. Shortly after, for *Likewise* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 substitutes *On the contrary*.

en: [Bernard, *On Free Choice*] c. 4, n. 11, and c. 7, n. 21.

la: Quaest. 1.

en: Question 1 [of this part].

la: August., Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, c. 26: *Dupliciter enim appellatur malum; unum, quod homo facit; alterum, quod patitur; quod facit, peccatum est; quod patitur, poena.* — In seq. propos. pro *liberat*, quod fide codd. F aa bb ee posuimus, cum contextus hanc lect. exigat, Vat. *est libertas*, aliqui codd. cum primis edd. *libertas tantum*.

en: Augustine, *Against Adimantus, Disciple of Mani*, c. 26: *For evil is called in a twofold way; one, which a man does; the other, which he suffers; what he does is sin; what he suffers is punishment.* — In the following clause, for *delivers*, which on the authority of codices F aa bb ee we have set down, since the context requires this reading, the Vatican edition has *is freedom*, while some codices with the earliest editions have *freedom* only.

la: Maior pars codd. falso *dupliciter*.

en: The greater part of the codices falsely [read] *in a twofold way*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *quietativi*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *of the quieting [act]*.

la: Codd. C H I K R S T V aa bb et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt *non*; perperam. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 96; S. Thom., hic a. 5; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 7. et dub. lit. 9.

en: Codices C H I K R S T V aa bb and others, with editions 2, 3, 4, omit *not*; wrongly. — On this doubt compare Blessed Albert, here a. 7; *Summa* p. II, tr. 15, q. 96; St. Thomas, here a. 5; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 7, and on the doubt concerning the text, 9.

la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 613, nota 9.

en: [Anselm,] *Dialogue on Free Choice*, c. 1. Compare above, p. 613, note 9.

la: Et ideo est optima; sed locus est corruptus. — Pro *haec est* plures codd. *hoc est*, et pro *ab omni miseria et culpa* Vat. *ab omni culpa* tantum. Paulo ante cod. C pro *a suo optimo* legit *a suo fine vel optimo*. De maiori cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 49. (c. 4.), ubi haec: *A fine appellare omnia iustum est.* Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 14, nota 7.

en: And therefore it is best; but the passage is corrupt. — For *this is* several codices [read] *this is* [neut.], and for *from all misery and fault* the Vatican edition has *from all fault* only. A little before, codex C for *from its own best* reads *from its own end or best*. On the major premise compare Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 49 (c. 4), where these words occur: *It is right to name all things from their end.* Compare also tom. I, p. 14, note 7.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.), ubi de iis quae ad comparationem faciendam requiruntur, agitur et inter alia legitur: *Sed non solum oportet, comparabilia non aequivoca esse, sed et non habere differentiam* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *quam in nobis* codd. F H T W bb ee cum ed. 1 *et in nobis*. — De sententia Magistri cfr. hic lit. ipsius c. 3. seqq.

en: Compare Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 24 ff. (c. 4), where there is treatment of the things which are required for making a comparison, and among other things it is read: *But it is necessary not only that the comparables be not equivocal, but also that they not have a difference* etc. — A little below, for *than in us* codices F H T W bb ee with ed. 1 [read] *and in us*. — On the opinion of the Master compare here his own text, c. 3 ff.

la: Codd. W aa et alii cum ed. 1 *libero arbitrio*; plurimorum codd. lectio hic dubia est propter abbreviationem verborum. Mox pro *ab illa liberum arbitrium* Vat. *ab illa libertate arbitrium*.

en: Codices W aa and others with ed. 1 [read] *to free choice*; the reading of most codices is here doubtful on account of the abbreviation of the words. Shortly after, for *from it free choice* the Vatican edition [reads] *from that freedom the choice*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 3. — Paulo inferius pro *denominatio* codd. F K T W bb cc et alii cum ed. 1 *nominatio*.

en: Compare above, q. 3. — A little below, for *denomination* codices F K T W bb cc and others with ed. 1 [read] *naming*.

la: Ut dicit Averroes, IV. Metaph. text. 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 3. § 3; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: As Averroes says, *Metaphysics* IV, text 2. — On this doubt compare Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 3, § 3; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 625–626, L+R column bands) per the Vol II Override, because the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the DUB. II Respondeo and the page footers (two-column bleed). English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus drawn from the printed page footers, cross-checked against raw OCR (raw lines 43693–43830).

**Page span.** pp. 625–626 (PDF 647–648). Running head confirms `DIST. XXV. P. II. DUBIA. 625` and `626 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` (The earlier resume note's tentative "pp. 623/625" was off; the chunk sits on 625–626, signature folio "79" appears at the foot of p. 625.)

**Verified DUB count: THREE (DUB. I, II, III).** Confirmed eyes-on at 450 dpi. DUB. III contains an embedded *quaestio incidens* ("utrum libertas a coactione et a culpa et a miseria dicatur aequivoce, vel univoce") with its own Respondeo — this is part of DUB. III, not a fourth dubium. Block ends cleanly before `DISTINCTIO XXVI` (raw ~43831).

**Page-split map.**
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- p. 626: DUB. II Respondeo tail ("*esse*. Si quantum ad esse...") + DUB. III (whole, incl. *quaestio incidens*); footers 1–7 → [^12]–[^18].
- Body break at the 625→626 seam falls mid-word ("bene / esse") and is grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**Apparatus count: 18 entries** (p.625 ff.1–11 = [^1]–[^11]; p.626 ff.1–7 = [^12]–[^18]).

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**has_scholion = false** (dubia carry no scholion).

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**Dup cleanup:** none — `bon-sent-II-d25-p2-dubia.md` is the only file matching; no stray dup.

**Status:** with this chunk promoted, **all of d.25 (Pars I + Pars II) is Tier-2 complete.**


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 26

title_alt: Distinction XXVI — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 627 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXVI.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De gratia operante et cooperante.*

Haec est gratia operans et cooperans; operans enim gratia praeparat hominis voluntatem, ut velit bonum, gratia cooperans adiuvat, ne frustra velit. Unde Augustinus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio[^1]: « Cooperando Deus in nobis perficit quod operando incipit, quia ipse, ut velimus, operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens ». « Ut ergo velimus, operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus, ut perficiamus, nobis cooperatur, tamen sine illo vel operante, ut velimus, vel cooperante, cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus ». — Ecce his verbis satis aperitur, quae sit *operans* gratia, et quae *cooperans*. Operans enim gratia est quae praevenit voluntatem bonam; ea enim liberatur et praeparatur hominis voluntas, ut sit bona bonumque efficaciter velit. Cooperans vero gratia voluntatem iam bonam sequitur adiuvando. Unde Augustinus contra Iulianum haereticum[^2], qui bonam voluntatem ex libero arbitrio tantum esse dicebat, atque hominem per liberum arbitrium posse bonum velle et operari sine gratia asserebat, ait: Apertam de commendatione gratiae Apostolus sententiam protulit, cum ait: *Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis*. « Hoc si attenderes, Iuliane, non extenderes contra gratiam merita voluntatis humanae. Non enim ideo miseretur Deus alicuius, quia voluit et cucurrit; sed ideo voluit et cucurrit, quia misertus est[^3] Deus. Paratur enim voluntas hominis a Deo, et a Domino gressus hominis diriguntur. Ideoque congrue ait: *Non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei* »; « non quia hoc sine voluntate nostra agatur, sed quia voluntas nostra nil boni agit, nisi divinitus adiuvetur ». Unde alibi: « Apostolus ait: *Non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum*. Non ideo dicit, quia nihil boni agebat; sed quia nihil boni ageret, si illa non adiuvaret ». — His testimoniis aperte insinuatur, quia voluntas hominis gratia Dei praevenitur atque praeparatur, ut fiat *bona*, non ut fiat *voluntas*, quia et ante gratiam voluntas erat, sed non erat bona et recta voluntas.

#### Cap. II.

#### *Quid sit voluntas.*

Voluntatem ipsam Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus[^4] ita definit: « Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid non admittendum, vel adipiscendum ». Haec autem, ut non admittat malum et adipiscatur bonum, praevenitur et praeparatur Dei gratia. Unde Apostolus gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem commendans, id est, operantem et cooperantem, vigilanter dixit: « *Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis*; et non e converso, non est miserentis Dei, sed volentis et currentis. Nam si, ut quibusdam placuit, quod dictum est ita accipiatur: Non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei, tanquam diceretur: non sufficit sola voluntas hominis, si non sit etiam misericordia Dei; contra dicitur, non sufficit etiam misericordia Dei, si non sit voluntas[^5] hominis. Ac per hoc, si recte dictum est illud, quia id voluntas hominis sola non implet, cur non etiam a contrario recte dicitur: non miserentis est Dei, sed volentis est hominis, cum id misericordia Dei sola non impleat[^6] »? « Homo enim credere vel sperare non poterit, nisi velit, nec pervenire ad palmam, nisi voluntate currat ». « Restat ergo, ut ideo ita recte dictum intelligatur, ut totum detur Deo, qui hominis voluntatem bonam praevenit et praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam, nolentem praevenit, ut velit, volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit ». — Ecce his verbis et aliis praemissis evidenter traditur, quia voluntas hominis praeparatur et praevenitur gratia Dei, ut velit bonum, et adiuvatur, ne frustra velit.

Itaque bona voluntas comitatur gratiam, non gratia voluntatem. Unde Augustinus[^7] ad Bonifacium Papam scribens contra Pelagianos, inquit: « Cum fides impetrat iustificationem, sicut unicuique Deus partitus est mensuram fidei, non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed ipsa meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici, voluntate comitante, non ducente, pedissequa, non praevia ». — Ecce hic expresse[^8] habes, quod gratia praevenit bonae voluntatis meritum, et ipsa bona voluntas pedissequa est gratiae, non praevia.

#### Cap. III.

#### *Quae sit gratia voluntatem bonam praeveniens.*

Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi monstratur, quae sit ipsa gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans, scilicet fides cum dilectione. Ideoque Augustinus in eodem[^9], tractans, quomodo iustificati sumus ex fide, et tamen gratis — utrumque enim dicit Apostolus, qui dicit: *Iustificati ex fide*, alibi ait: *Iustificati gratis per gratiam* — hoc, inquit[^10], ideo dixit, « ne fides ipsa superba sit, ne dicat sibi: si ex fide iustificati,

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quomodo gratis? Quod enim fides meretur[^11], cur non potius redditur, quam donatur? Non dicat ista homo fidelis, quia cum dixerit: habeo fidem, ut merear iustificationem, respondetur ei: *Quid habes, quod non accepisti*[^12] »? Fides enim, qua iustificatus es, gratis tibi data est. — Hic aperte ostenditur, quod fides est causa iustificationis, et ipsa est gratia et beneficium, quo hominis praevenitur voluntas et praeparatur. Unde Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum[^13]: « Voluntas est, qua et peccatur et recte vivitur. Voluntas vero ipsa nisi Dei gratia liberetur a servitute, qua peccati serva facta est, et ut vitia superet, adiuvetur; recte pieque vivi a mortalibus non potest; et hoc beneficium, quo liberatur, nisi eam praeveniret, iam meritis daretur et non esset gratia, quae utique gratis datur ». — Praevenitur ergo bona hominis voluntas illo gratiae beneficio, quo liberatur et praeparatur. Et illud beneficium recte fides Christi intelligitur, sicut Augustinus in Enchiridio[^14] evidenter ostendit dicens: « Ipsum arbitrium liberandum est post illam ruinam a servitute peccati. Nec omnino per se ipsum, sed per solam Dei gratiam, quae in fide Christi posita est, liberatur, ut voluntas ipsa praeparetur ». — Ecce aperte dicit, gratiam, per quam liberatur arbitrium et praeparatur voluntas, positam esse in fide Christi. « Fides enim Christi, ut in eodem ait, impetrat quod lex imperat ».

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quod bona voluntas, quae praevenitur gratia, quaedam Dei dona praevenit.*

Ipsa tamen eadem voluntas quaedam gratiae dona praevenit. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^15]: « Praecedit bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia; quae autem non praecedit ipsa, in eis est et ipsa iuvat; nam utrumque legitur in sanctis Eloquiis: *Et misericordia eius praeveniet me* — *Et misericordia eius subsequetur me*. Nolentem quippe praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit. Cur enim admonemur orare pro inimicis nostris nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus in eis operetur et velle? Itemque, cur admonemur petere, ut accipiamus, nisi ut ab illo fiat quod volumus, a quo factum est, ut velimus »? « Inde Apostolus ait: *Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis* ». — Ex his apparet, quod bona hominis voluntas quaedam dona Dei praevenit, quia eam comitatur gratia adiuvans; et quibusdam praevenitur, quia eam praevenit gratia operans, scilicet fides cum caritate.

Non est tamen ignorandum, quod alibi Augustinus[^16] significare videtur, quod ex voluntate sit fides, de illo verbo Apostoli, scilicet: *Corde creditur ad iustitiam*, ita super Ioannem[^17] tractans: « Ideo non simpliciter Apostolus ait *creditur*, sed *corde creditur*, quia cetera potest homo nolens, credere non nisi volens; intrare ecclesiam et accedere ad altare potest nolens, sed non credere ». Item super Genesim[^18], ubi Laban et Bathuel dixerunt: *Vocemus puellam et quaeramus eius voluntatem*, dicit expositor: « Quia fides est voluntatis, non necessitatis ». — Ad quod respondentes dicimus, non haec ita accipienda fore, ut ex voluntate hominis fides intelligatur provenire, cum ipsa sit proprie *Dei donum*, ut ait Apostolus[^19] et ex ea bona hominis merita incipiant. Per hanc enim, ut ait Augustinus super Psalmum sexagesimum septimum[^20], « iustificatur impius, id est, fit de impio pius, ut deinde ipsa fides incipiat per dilectionem operari; unde omnia bona merita incipiunt ». Sed potius haec ideo ita dicta sunt, quia non est fides, nisi in eo qui vult credere, cuius bonam voluntatem fides praevenit, non tempore, sed causa et natura. Unde Augustinus supra congruenter dixit, quod bona voluntas in eis donis est, quae non praecedit, et ipsa iuvat; quia ea iuvat, quibus praevenitur, dum eis consentit ad effectum boni, et in eis est, quia tempore ab eis non praeceditur.

Ceterum hanc quaestionem magis acuunt et urgent verba Augustini, quibus in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum[^21] utitur, pertractans illud verbum Apostoli: « *Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis*. Attendant, inquit, hic et verba ista perpendant qui putant, ex nobis esse fidei coeptum, et ex Deo esse fidei supplementum. Commendans enim istam gratiam, quae non datur secundum aliqua merita, sed efficit omnia bona merita, inquit: *Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid boni*, scilicet ex nobis. Quis autem non videat, prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius cogitaverit, esse credendum. Si ergo cogitare bonum non est ex nobis, ut hic Apostolus tradit, nec credere; quamquam et ipsum credere nihil est aliud quam cum assensione mentis cogitare ». — Hic videtur insinuare, quod cogitatio bona praecedat fidem, et ita bona voluntas praeveniat fidem, non praeveniatur; quod praedictis adversari videtur. — Ad hoc autem dicimus, quod aliquando cogitatio bona sive voluntas praevenit fidem, sed non est illa bona voluntas, vel cogitatio, qua recte vivitur. Illa enim sine fide et caritate non est. Nam ut ait Augustinus ad Anastasium[^22], « sine spiritu non est voluntas hominis libera, cum cupiditatibus vincatur », « non est libera ad bonum, nisi liberata fuerit ». Non autem liberatur, nisi per *Spiritum sanctum* diffundatur caritas in cordibus. Non est libera voluntas, nisi eam liberet gratia *per legem fidei*, id est, non est libera

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sine fide operante per dilectionem; et illa sufficienter et vere bona est[^23]. « Non est enim fructus bonus, qui de caritatis radice non surgit. Si vero adsit fides operans per dilectionem, fit delectatio boni ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *Quod cogitatio boni praecedit fidem.*

Illa autem cogitatio sive voluntas, quae fidem et caritatem aliasque iustificationes praecedit, non sufficit ad salutem, nec recte ea vivitur. Hac voluntate concupiscitur illa bona voluntas, quae est magnum bonum, ista vero non. Alia est ergo illa voluntas sive cogitatio, alia ista.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *Quod intellectus et cogitationem boni et delectationem praevenit.*

Et sicut illa istam praecedit, ita illam praevenit intellectus. Unde Augustinus, ista distinguens, super illum locum Psalmi centesimi decimi octavi[^24] *Concupivit anima mea desiderare iustificationes*, ait: « *Concupivit desiderare*, inquit, *non desideravit* ». « Videmus enim ratione nonnunquam, quam utiles sint iustificationes Dei; sed infirmitate praepediti, aliquando non desideramus. Praevolat ergo intellectus, sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus; scimus bonum, nec delectat agere, et cupimus, ut delectet. Sic iste olim desiderare concupiscebat quae bona esse cernebat, cupiens eorum habere delectationem, quorum potuit videre rationem ». « Ostendit itaque, quibus quasi gradibus ad eas perveniatur: prius enim est, ut *videantur*, quam sint utiles et honestae; deinde, ut earum desiderium *concupiscatur*; postremo, ut, proficiente gratia, *delectet* earum operatio, quarum sola ratio delectabat ». — Attende hunc ordinem gratiarum, quem hic distincte assignat Augustinus, qualiter scilicet intellectus bonorum praecedit concupiscentiam eorundem, et ipsa concupiscentia delectationem, quae fit per fidem et caritatem; qua habita, vere bona est voluntas, qua recte vivitur, ipsaque fidei comes est, non praevia.

#### Cap. VII.

#### *An per liberum arbitrium operetur homo bonum sine gratia.*

Qui verba Augustini praemissa[^25] secundum hanc distinctionem considerat, nullam ibi repugnantiam fore animadvertit, non ignorans, etiam ante gratiam praevenientem et operantem, qua voluntas bona praeparatur in homine, praecedere quaedam bona ex Dei gratia et libero arbitrio, quaedam etiam ex solo libero arbitrio, quibus tamen vitam non meretur nec gratiam, qua iustificatur. « *Illius enim gratiae percipiendae, quae voluntatem hominis sanat, ut sanata legem impleat, nulla merita praecedunt*[^26] ». Ipsa est enim, qua iustificatur impius, id est, fit iustus, qui prius erat impius; « meritis autem impii non gratia, sed poena debetur; nec ista esset gratia, si non daretur gratuita ». Datur autem gratuita, quia nil boni ante feceramus, unde hoc mereremur. Non negamus tamen, multa ante hanc gratiam et praeter hanc gratiam ab homine fieri bona per liberum arbitrium, ut tradit Augustinus in Responsionibus contra Pelagianos[^27], ubi dicit, homines per liberum arbitrium agros colere, domos aedificare et alia plura bona facere sine gratia cooperante.

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### DISTINCTION XXVI.

#### Cap. I.

#### *On operating and cooperating grace.*

This is operating and cooperating grace; for operating grace prepares the will of man, that he may will the good, while cooperating grace assists, lest he will in vain. Hence Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Choice*[^1]: « By cooperating, God perfects in us what He begins by operating, since He Himself, that we may will, operates as the one beginning, who cooperates with those willing as the one perfecting ». « Therefore that we may will, He operates; but when we will, and so will that we may bring it to perfection, He cooperates with us; yet without Him, whether operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing toward the good works of piety ». — Behold, by these words it is sufficiently disclosed what *operating* grace is, and what *cooperating* grace is. For operating grace is that which precedes the good will; for by it the will of man is freed and prepared, that it may be good and may effectively will the good. But cooperating grace follows the will already good by assisting it. Hence Augustine against the heretic Julian[^2], who said that good will is from free choice alone, and asserted that man through free choice can will and work the good without grace, says: The Apostle put forth a manifest sentence concerning the commendation of grace, when he said: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy*. « If you had attended to this, Julian, you would not have extended the merits of the human will against grace. For God does not show mercy to anyone because he willed and ran; but he willed and ran because God showed mercy[^3]. For the will of man is prepared by God, and the steps of man are directed by the Lord. And therefore he fittingly says: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy* »; « not because this is done without our will, but because our will does nothing good unless it is divinely assisted ». Hence elsewhere: « The Apostle says: *Not I, however, but the grace of God with me*. He does not say this because he was doing no good; but because he would do no good if it did not assist him ». — By these testimonies it is openly intimated that the will of man is preceded and prepared by the grace of God, that it may become *good*, not that it may become *will*, since the will existed even before grace, but it was not a good and right will.

#### Cap. II.

#### *What the will is.*

Augustine in the book *On the Two Souls*[^4] defines the will itself thus: « The will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, toward not admitting something, or toward attaining it ». But this, that it may not admit evil and may attain the good, is preceded and prepared by the grace of God. Hence the Apostle, commending preceding and subsequent grace, that is, operating and cooperating, said watchfully: « *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy*; and not conversely, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of him who wills and runs. For if, as it pleased some, what is said be taken thus: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, as if it were said: the will of man alone does not suffice, if there be not also the mercy of God; on the contrary it is said, neither does the mercy of God suffice, if there be not the will[^5] of man. And through this, if that was rightly said, that the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why is it not also conversely rightly said: it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, since the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it[^6] »? « For man will not be able to believe or to hope, unless he wills, nor to attain the palm, unless he runs by his will ». « It remains therefore that it be rightly understood thus, that the whole be given to God, who precedes and prepares the good will of man to be assisted, and assists it when prepared, precedes the unwilling that he may will, follows the willing, lest he will in vain ». — Behold, by these words and the others set forth before, it is evidently handed down that the will of man is prepared and preceded by the grace of God, that it may will the good, and is assisted, lest it will in vain.

And so good will accompanies grace, not grace the will. Hence Augustine[^7], writing to Pope Boniface against the Pelagians, says: « When faith obtains justification, just as God has apportioned to each one the measure of faith, no human merit precedes the grace of God, but it itself merits to be increased, that increased it may merit also to be perfected, with the will accompanying, not leading, following at heel, not going before ». — Behold, here you have it expressly[^8] that grace precedes the merit of the good will, and the good will itself follows at the heel of grace, not before it.

#### Cap. III.

#### *What the grace is that precedes the good will.*

And if you attend diligently, there is nonetheless shown to you what this grace is that precedes and prepares the will, namely faith with love. And therefore Augustine in the same place[^9], treating how we are justified by faith and yet freely — for the Apostle says both, who says: *Justified by faith*, and elsewhere says: *Justified freely by grace* — said this, he says[^10], for this reason, « lest faith itself be proud, lest it say to itself: if we are justified by faith,

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how freely? For what faith merits[^11], why is it not rather repaid than given? Let not the faithful man say this, for when he has said: I have faith, that I may merit justification, it is answered to him: *What have you that you have not received*[^12] »? For the faith by which you are justified was given to you freely. — Here it is openly shown that faith is the cause of justification, and it itself is the grace and benefit by which the will of man is preceded and prepared. Hence Augustine in the first book of the *Retractations*[^13]: « The will is that by which both one sins and one lives rightly. But the will itself, unless it is freed by the grace of God from the servitude by which it has been made the servant of sin, and is assisted that it may overcome vices, cannot be made to live rightly and piously by mortals; and this benefit, by which it is freed, unless it preceded it, would already be given to merits and would not be grace, which surely is given freely ». — Therefore the good will of man is preceded by that benefit of grace, by which it is freed and prepared. And that benefit is rightly understood to be the faith of Christ, as Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^14] evidently shows, saying: « Choice itself must be freed after that ruin from the servitude of sin. And not at all by itself, but by the grace of God alone, which is placed in the faith of Christ, is it freed, that the will itself may be prepared ». — Behold, he says openly that the grace by which choice is freed and the will is prepared is placed in the faith of Christ. « For the faith of Christ, as he says in the same place, obtains what the law commands ».

#### Cap. IV.

#### *That the good will, which is preceded by grace, precedes certain gifts of God.*

Yet that same will precedes certain gifts of grace. Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^15]: « The good will of man precedes many gifts of God, but not all; but those which it does not itself precede, in these it both is and itself assists; for both are read in the holy Scriptures: *And his mercy will go before me* — *And his mercy will follow me*. For it precedes the unwilling, that he may will; it follows the willing, lest he will in vain. For why are we admonished to pray for our enemies who are unwilling to live piously, except that God may work in them also the willing? And likewise, why are we admonished to ask, that we may receive, except that by Him from whom it was made that we will, may be made that which we will »? « Hence the Apostle says: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy* ». — From these it appears that the good will of man precedes certain gifts of God, because assisting grace accompanies it; and by certain ones it is preceded, because operating grace precedes it, namely faith with love.

Yet it must not be ignored that elsewhere Augustine[^16] seems to signify that faith is from the will, concerning that word of the Apostle, namely: *With the heart it is believed unto justice*, treating thus upon John[^17]: « For this reason the Apostle does not say simply *it is believed*, but *with the heart it is believed*, because other things a man can do unwilling, but believe only willing; to enter the church and to approach the altar he can do unwilling, but not to believe ». Likewise upon Genesis[^18], where Laban and Bathuel said: *Let us call the girl and ask her will*, the expositor says: « Because faith is of the will, not of necessity ». — Responding to which we say that these are not to be so taken that faith be understood to come forth from the will of man, since it itself is properly *the gift of God*, as the Apostle says[^19], and from it the good merits of man begin. For through it, as Augustine says upon the sixty-seventh Psalm[^20], « the impious is justified, that is, from impious he is made pious, that thereafter faith itself may begin to work through love; whence all good merits begin ». But rather these things were said thus because there is no faith except in him who wills to believe, whose good will faith precedes, not in time, but in cause and nature. Hence Augustine above fittingly said that the good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and itself assists; because it assists those by whom it is preceded, while it consents with them to the effect of the good, and is in them, because in time it is not preceded by them.

Furthermore, the words of Augustine which he uses in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^21], treating that word of the Apostle, sharpen and press this question more: « *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves*. Let them attend, he says, here, and let them weigh these words, who think that the beginning of faith is of us, and the supplement of faith is of God. For, commending that grace which is not given according to any merits, but effects all good merits, he says: *Not that we are sufficient to think anything good*, namely of ourselves. But who does not see that to think is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it must be believed. If therefore to think the good is not of us, as the Apostle here hands down, neither is to believe; although to believe itself is nothing other than to think with the assent of the mind ». — Here he seems to intimate that good thought precedes faith, and so that good will precedes faith, and is not preceded; which seems to be opposed to what was said before. — To this, however, we say that sometimes good thought or will precedes faith, but that is not the good will or thought by which one lives rightly. For that does not exist without faith and love. For as Augustine says to Anastasius[^22], « without the Spirit the will of man is not free, since it is overcome by desires », « it is not free toward the good, unless it has been freed ». But it is not freed unless through the *Holy Spirit* love is poured forth in hearts. The will is not free unless grace frees it *through the law of faith*, that is, it is not free

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without faith working through love; and that will is sufficiently and truly good[^23]. « For there is no good fruit which does not rise from the root of love. But if there is present faith working through love, the delight of the good comes about ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *That thought of the good precedes faith.*

But that thought or will which precedes faith and love and the other justifications does not suffice for salvation, nor is one made to live rightly by it. By this will is desired that good will which is a great good, but this latter is not. Therefore that will or thought is one thing, this is another.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *That the intellect precedes both thought of the good and delight.*

And just as that precedes this, so the intellect precedes that. Hence Augustine, distinguishing these, treating upon that place of the one hundred eighteenth Psalm[^24] *My soul has desired to long for thy justifications*, says: « *It has desired to long for*, he says, *it has not longed for* ». « For we sometimes see by reason how useful the justifications of God are; but hindered by infirmity, sometimes we do not long for them. Therefore the intellect flies ahead, there follows a slow affection or none; we know the good, and it does not delight to do it, and we desire that it may delight. So this one once longed to desire the things which he discerned to be good, desiring to have the delight of those things whose ground he could see ». « It shows therefore by what steps, as it were, one arrives at them: for first it is, that they be *seen* how useful and honorable they are; then, that their desire be *longed for*; lastly, that, grace advancing, the working of those things *delight*, whose ground alone used to delight ». — Attend to this order of graces, which Augustine here distinctly assigns, namely how the intellect of good things precedes the longing for them, and the longing itself the delight, which comes about through faith and love; which once had, the will is truly good, by which one lives rightly, and is itself the companion of faith, not its forerunner.

#### Cap. VII.

#### *Whether through free choice man works the good without grace.*

He who considers the aforementioned words of Augustine[^25] according to this distinction observes that there will be no contradiction there, not being ignorant that, even before preceding and operating grace, by which good will is prepared in man, there precede certain goods from the grace of God and free choice, and certain ones also from free choice alone, by which, however, he merits neither life nor the grace by which he is justified. « *For of that grace which is to be received, which heals the will of man, that healed it may fulfill the law, no merits precede*[^26] ». For it is that by which the impious is justified, that is, made just, who before was impious; « but to the merits of the impious not grace, but punishment is owed; nor would this be grace, if it were not given gratuitously ». But it is given gratuitously, because we had done nothing good beforehand whereby we might merit this. We do not deny, however, that many goods are done by man before this grace and apart from this grace through free choice, as Augustine hands down in the *Responses against the Pelagians*[^27], where he says that men through free choice till fields, build houses, and do many other goods without cooperating grace.

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la: Cap. 17. n. 33., ubi paulo inferius etiam seq. locus. — Cfr. Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 2. c. 3. et tr. 3. c. 7.

en: Ch. 17, n. 33, where the following passage is also a little below. — Cf. Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 2, c. 3 and tr. 3, c. 7.

la: Libr. I. Operis imperfecti c. 141, nonnullis a Magistro mutatis. Locus Scripturae est Rom. 9, 16.

en: Book I of the *Unfinished Work* c. 141, with some things changed by the Master. The Scripture passage is Rom. 9:16.

la: Codd. BC *miseretur*, cod. E *prius est misertus*. — Locus Scripturae est Prov. 16, 9 et Ps. 36, 23.

en: Codices BC read *miseretur*, codex E *prius est misertus*. — The Scripture passage is Prov. 16:9 and Ps. 36:23.

la: August., de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 19. n. 40. Seq. locus est Epist. 186. ad Paulinum, c. 10. n. 36. — Locus Scripturae est 1. Cor. 15, 10.

en: Augustine, *On the Perfection of Man's Justice*, c. 19, n. 40. The following passage is *Letter* 186 to Paulinus, c. 10, n. 36. — The Scripture passage is 1 Cor. 15:10.

la: Vat. *praefigit etiam*, refragantibus codd. ABCE, ed. 1 et originali.

en: The Vatican edition *prefixes etiam*, against codices ABCE, edition 1, and the original.

la: August., Enchirid. c. 32. n. 9, ubi etiam duo seqq. loci.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 32, n. 9, where also the following two passages occur.

la: Vel potius Epist. 186. ad Paulinum, c. 3. n. 10, et est in Glossa ad Rom. 5, 1.

en: Or rather *Letter* 186 to Paulinus, c. 3, n. 10, and it is in the Gloss on Rom. 5:1.

la: Vat. *aperte*, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.

en: The Vatican edition reads *aperte*, against the codices and editions 1, 8.

la: Epist. cit. c. 3. n. 9. — Loci Scripturae sunt Rom. 5, 1. et 3, 24.

en: The cited *Letter*, c. 3, n. 9. — The Scripture passages are Rom. 5:1 and 3:24.

la: Ita ed. 8; in aliis edd. et in codd. *enim* pro *impiit* [impetrat], qua lectione oratio fit incongrua.

en: So edition 8; in the other editions and in the codices *enim* stands for *impetrat*, by which reading the sentence becomes incongruous.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *meruit*.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *meruit*.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 4. 7.

en: *Letter*; 1 Cor. 4:7.

la: Cap. 106. n. 28. — In quo textu post *voluntas* Vat. cum paucis edd. et codd. ACE omittit *ipsa*. — Verba in fine capituli sunt ibid. c. 117. n. 31.

en: Ch. 106, n. 28. — In which text, after *voluntas*, the Vatican edition with a few editions and codices ACE omits *ipsa*. — The words at the end of the chapter are *ibidem* c. 117, n. 31.

la: Cap. 32. n. 9, ubi et seq. locus. — Respicitur ibi ad Ps. 58, 11; Ps. 22, 6; Matth. 5, 44; Luc. 11, 9, et Rom. 9, 16.

en: Ch. 32, n. 9, where also the following passage. — Reference is made there to Ps. 58:11; Ps. 22:6; Matt. 5:44; Luke 11:9; and Rom. 9:16.

la: Tract. 26. in Ioan. n. 2, multis omissis. Locus praecedens Apostoli est Rom. 10, 10. In verbis Augustini post *credere* cod. B et edd. 1, 8 addunt *autem*; codd. DE legunt *non potest* nisi.

en: *Tractate* 26 on John, n. 2, with many things omitted. The preceding passage of the Apostle is Rom. 10:10. In the words of Augustine, after *credere*, codex B and editions 1, 8 add *autem*; codices DE read *non potest* nisi.

la: Cap. 24. v. 36, ubi in Glossa interlin. sunt verba citata.

en: Ch. 24, v. 36, where the cited words are in the interlinear Gloss.

la: Ephes. 2, 8.

la: Vers. 33; Enarrat. n. 41.

en: Verse 33; *Enarration* n. 41.

la: Cap. 2. n. 5. — Locus Apostoli est II. Cor. 3, 5, in quo codd. BCDE et ed. 8 habent *ex nobis* pro *a nobis*, quod cum Vulgata habent edd. 1, 8; aliae edd. haec verba omittunt.

en: Ch. 2, n. 5. — The passage of the Apostle is 2 Cor. 3:5, in which codices BCDE and edition 8 have *ex nobis* for *a nobis*, which with the Vulgate editions 1, 8 have; other editions omit these words.

la: Epist. 145. n. 2. Locus sequens est in Glossa ad II. Cor. 3, 6. Inferius respicitur Rom. 5, 5; denique Rom. 3, 27.

en: *Letter* 145, n. 2. The following passage is in the Gloss on 2 Cor. 3:6. Below, reference is made to Rom. 5:5; finally Rom. 3:27.

la: Edd. 1, 8 legunt *et illam sufficienter habere bonum est*. — Locus, qui sequitur, est August., de Spiritu et lit. c. 14. n. 26. et Gregor., Homil. 27.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *et illam sufficienter habere bonum est*. — The passage that follows is Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 14, n. 26, and Gregory, *Homily* 27.

la: Vers. 20. August., Serm. 8. in hunc Ps. n. 5. et deinde n. 4. et tertio iterum n. 5.

en: Verse 20. Augustine, *Sermon* 8 on this Psalm, n. 5, and then n. 4, and a third time n. 5.

la: Scil. in c. 4, sumta ex August., de Praedest. c. 2. n. 5.

en: Namely in c. 4, taken from Augustine, *On Predestination* c. 2, n. 5.

la: Sunt verba August. de Spiritu et lit. c. 9. n. 5; seq. locus est in Glossa ad Rom. 3, 24, apud Lyranum. — Pro verbis *iustificatur impius, id est fit*, Vat. aliaeque edd. perperam habent *iustificatus impius fit*, refragantibus codd. ABDE et edd. 1, 8.

en: These are the words of Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 9, n. 5; the following passage is in the Gloss on Rom. 3:24, in Lyra. — For the words *iustificatur impius, id est fit*, the Vatican and other editions wrongly have *iustificatus impius fit*, against codices ABDE and editions 1, 8.

la: Libr. III. Hypognosticon, c. 4. — In codd. et edd. communiter haec d. XXVI. comprehendit adhuc prima quatuor capitula sequentis distinctionis, nempe cc. VIII.—XI, quae sunt in indice Magistri (supra pag. 9), et excurrit usque ad verba: *Hic videndum est*. Satis constat, Magistrum ipsum tantum distinxisse capitula sui libri, non distinctiones, quae in scholis postea a magistris additae sunt. Quoad hunc locum ipse S. Bonav. in divisione textus d. 27. manifestat, ante ipsam distinctionem XXVII. incepisse a verbis *Hic videndum est*.

en: Book III of the *Hypognosticon*, c. 4. — In the codices and editions this distinction XXVI commonly comprehends still the first four chapters of the following distinction, namely cc. VIII–XI, which are in the Master's index (above, p. 9), and it runs as far as the words: *Here it must be considered*. It is sufficiently clear that the Master himself distinguished only the chapters of his book, not the distinctions, which were afterwards added by the masters in the schools. As regards this passage, St. Bonaventure himself in the division of the text of d. 27 shows that before distinction XXVII itself it began from the words *Here it must be considered*.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 627–629 (PDF 649–651, offset +22) per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion; the IA djvu OCR (raw 43831–44009) is cascade-fragmented across the two columns (running heads `628 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II`, `DIST. XXVI. DIVISIO TEXTUS 629`). English is a fresh literal translation.
- **Capitula (7):** Cap. I *De gratia operante et cooperante*; Cap. II *Quid sit voluntas*; Cap. III *Quae sit gratia voluntatem bonam praeveniens*; Cap. IV *Quod bona voluntas, quae praevenitur gratia, quaedam Dei dona praevenit*; Cap. V *Quod cogitatio boni praecedit fidem*; Cap. VI *Quod intellectus et cogitationem boni et delectationem praevenit*; Cap. VII *An per liberum arbitrium operetur homo bonum sine gratia*.
- **Page-split map.** p.627 = DISTINCTIO XXVI head + Cap. I (L-col) + Cap. II (L-col→R-col) + Cap. III opener (R-col, ends "…si ex fide iustificati,"); p.628 = Cap. III tail ("quomodo gratis?…") + Cap. IV (ends mid-clause "…non est libera"); p.629 = Cap. IV tail ("sine fide operante…") + Cap. V + Cap. VI + Cap. VII (ends "…sine gratia cooperante"), immediately before COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVI. Body seams at 627→628 ("si ex fide iustificati, | quomodo gratis?") and 628→629 ("non est libera | sine fide operante") are grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).
- **Apparatus split map.** 27 entries renumbered continuously: p.627 NOTAE footers 1–11 → [^1]–[^11]; p.628 NOTAE footers 1–11 → [^12]–[^22]; p.629 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers 1–5 → [^23]–[^27]. The p.629 right-column NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footer block (the divisio's `Multi codd. comparato…`) is NOT part of the littera and is forwarded to the d26-divisio chunk.
- **Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none (d25-p2-dubia closed clean before DISTINCTIO XXVI at raw 43831). FORWARDED: none — the littera closes clean at "sine gratia cooperante" (raw 44009); the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS opens fresh at raw 44010 and owns its own NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footers.
- **has_scholion = false** (Littera Magistri; Lombard's running prose, no Bonaventure scholion).
- **[?] flags:** none. OCR garbles silently corrected against the PDF (e.g. *piscendum→adipiscendum*, *praeveiutur→praevenitur*, *vigllanter→vigilanter*, *misertus*, *Retractationum*, *Hypognosticon*).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 26, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVI — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXVI — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 629 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVI.

### *De libero arbitrio cum adiutorio gratiae.*

*Haec est gratia operans et cooperans* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de libero arbitrio sive de adiutorio homini collato[^1] in se. In hac vero parte agit de ipso comparato ad auxilium gratiae. Dividitur autem ista pars in duas partes. In prima determinat, quantum possit liberum arbitrium cum gratia. In secunda, quantum possit circumscripta gratia, infra distinctione vigesima octava: *Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter teneamus* etc.

<!-- page 630 -->

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de adiutorio gratiae operantis et cooperantis collato libero arbitrio, prout illud adiutorium comparatur ad liberum arbitrium. In secunda, prout comparatur ad habitum gratuitum et usum sibi debitum, infra distinctione vigesima septima: *Hic considerandum est, cum praedictum sit*. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quid sit, sive cuius efficaciae sit illud adiutorium gratiae, quod libero arbitrio superadditur. In secunda vero determinat, qualiter[^2] ad voluntatem sive ad liberum arbitrium ordinatur, ibi: *Ipsa tamen eadem voluntas quaedam gratiae dona praevenit*. Prima pars habet tres particulas. In prima determinat, quid sit illud adiutorium libero arbitrio superadditum quantum ad actum sive effectum. In secunda vero quantum ad subiectum, ibi: *Voluntatem ipsam Augustinus in libro* etc. In tertia vero quantum ad ipsum donum gratuitum, ibi: *Et si diligenter intendas* etc. Similiter secunda pars principalis tres habet partes. In prima determinat veritatem, ibi: *Ipsa tamen eadem* etc. In secunda vero removet dubitationem, ibi: *Non est tamen ignorandum* etc. In tertia vero parte subiungit veritatis recapitulationem, ibi: *Illius enim gratiae percipiendae* etc. Harum autem partium subdivisiones manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, supposita gratiae entitate et necessitate, quia hoc infra[^3] quaeretur suo loco, quaeritur hic de gratiae quidditate. Hoc enim inquirit Magister in littera, et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.

Primo quaeritur, utrum gratia sit aliquid circa acceptantem, vel circa acceptatum.

Secundo, dato quod gratia sit aliquid circa acceptatum, quaeritur, utrum sit donum creatum vel increatum.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit in genere substantiae, vel accidentis.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, vel incorruptibilis.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum primo insit essentiae animae, aut potentiis.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum insit ad modum perfectionis tantum, an etiam per modum motoris.

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXVI.

### *On free choice with the help of grace.*

*This is operating and cooperating grace* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of free choice, that is, of the help granted to man[^1], in itself. In this part, however, he treats of it as compared to the help of grace. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first he determines how much free choice can do with grace. In the second, how much it can do when grace is set aside, below in distinction twenty-eight: *But let us hold this unshaken and without hesitation* etc.

Now the first part has two [divisions]. In the first he determines concerning the help of operating and cooperating grace granted to free choice, insofar as that help is compared to free choice. In the second, insofar as it is compared to the gratuitous habit and to the use due to it, below in distinction twenty-seven: *Here it must be considered, since it has been said before*. The first part has two [divisions]. In the first he determines what that help of grace is, which is superadded to free choice, or of what efficacy it is. In the second he determines how[^2] it is ordered to the will or to free choice, there: *Yet that same will anticipates certain gifts of grace*. The first part has three subdivisions. In the first he determines what that help superadded to free choice is, as to act or effect. In the second, as to subject, there: *Augustine in his book [calls] the will itself* etc. In the third, as to the gratuitous gift itself, there: *And if you attend diligently* etc. Likewise the second principal part has three parts. In the first he determines the truth, there: *Yet that same* etc. In the second he removes a difficulty, there: *Yet it must not be unknown* etc. In the third part he adds a recapitulation of the truth, there: *For of that grace which is to be received* etc. Now the subdivisions of these parts are manifest in the text.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part, the entity and necessity of grace being supposed — since this will be asked below[^3] in its own place — inquiry is made here concerning the quiddity of grace. For this is what the Master inquires into in the text, and concerning it six [questions] are asked.

First, it is asked whether grace is something with respect to the one accepting, or with respect to the one accepted.

Second, granting that grace is something with respect to the one accepted, it is asked whether it is a created or an uncreated gift.

Third, it is asked whether it is in the genus of substance, or of accident.

Fourth, it is asked whether it is in the genus of corruptible accident, or of incorruptible.

Fifth, it is asked whether it is first in the essence of the soul, or in the powers.

Sixth and last, it is asked whether it is present after the manner of a perfection only, or also after the manner of a mover.

---

la: NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. Multi codd. *comparato*, sed Vat. cum codd. aa ee et aliis *collato*, quod codd. X Y aa bb ee etiam in seq. propos. habent.

en: Notes on the commentary. Many codices read *comparato* ("compared"), but the Vatican edition with codices aa ee and others reads *collato* ("granted"), which codices X Y aa bb ee have also in the following proposition.

la: Edd. *quantum*, cui voci Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 praemittit *de eodem adiutorio*. Verba Magistri, quae sequuntur, codd. cum edd. 1, 2 sic reddunt: *Ipsa eadem quaedam tamen* etc.

en: The editions read *quantum* ("how much"), to which word the Vatican edition together with editions 3 and 4 prefixes *de eodem adiutorio* ("concerning the same help"). The words of the Master which follow, the codices together with editions 1 and 2 render thus: *Ipsa eadem quaedam tamen* etc.

la: Dist. 28. per totam et d. 29. a. 1.

en: Distinction 28 throughout, and distinction 29, article 1.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 629–630 = PDF 651–652, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 44010–44067 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). This chunk holds the **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVI** opener (lemma *Haec est gratia operans et cooperans*) + **DIVISIO TEXTUS** + **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** (the listing of the six questions of ARTICULUS UNICUS *De gratiae quidditate*). `has_scholion=false` (no scholion attaches to a divisio chunk). The Vol II PDF-priority inversion applies: OCR cascade-shattered the two-column DIVISIO TEXTUS, so the Latin was reflowed from the 450 dpi column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p629-{L,R}-*`, `vol2-p630-{L,R}-*`).

**Page-split map.** The COMMENTARIUS header + lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS opener (down through "…*Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter teneamus* etc.") sit on **p.629** (running head `DIST. XXVL DIVISIO TEXTUS 629`; raw 44010–44025). `<!-- page 630 -->` placed at "Prima pars habet duas…", which continues on **p.630** (running head `630 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): the rest of the DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + six-question list, ending immediately before **ARTICULUS UNICUS / De gratiae quidditate / QUAESTIO I / Utrum gratia ponat aliquid circa gratificatum** (raw 44064–44069). QUAESTIO I body begins at raw ~44070 (p.630, R-col lower) and is held by the `d26-a1-q1` chunk.

**Apparatus split map (3 entries).** The divisio carries 3 body markers and their footers:
- [^1] = the **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** footer on **p.629 R-col** ("Multi codd. *comparato*…*collato*…"), anchored at the DIVISIO-TEXTUS word *collato* (the editions' variant). **RECEIVED via hand-off from `d26-littera`** (the resume note + the littera's own apparatus split-map forwarded this block — it is NOT a NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM littera footer).
- [^2] = **p.630 footer 1** ("Edd. *quantum*… *Ipsa eadem quaedam tamen* etc."), anchored at *qualiter* (the variant; the Master's lemma *Ipsa tamen eadem voluntas quaedam gratiae dona praevenit* is the next clause).
- [^3] = **p.630 footer 2** ("Dist. 28. per totam et d. 29. a. 1."), anchored at the TRACTATIO word *infra* ("quia hoc *infra* quaeretur suo loco").
The remaining **p.630 footers 3 ("Pro *gratia sit* cod. F…") and 4 ("Vers. 16: De plenitudine…")** anchor in the QUAESTIO I body and belong to `d26-a1-q1` — NOT duplicated here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: from `d26-littera`, the p.629 R-col NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footer ("Multi codd. comparato/collato") = [^1]. (During this build the littera's [^27] was corrected: it had wrongly merged the divisio's "comparato/collato" text and dropped its own continuation; [^27] now carries the true NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footer 5 text — "Libr. III. Hypognosticon, c. 4. — …communiter haec d. XXVI. comprehendit adhuc prima quatuor capitula sequentis distinctionis…".) FORWARDED: none — the divisio closes clean at the end of the TRACTATIO question-list (raw 44063), immediately before ARTICULUS UNICUS QUAESTIO I (raw 44064–44069); `d26-a1-q1` owns the QUAESTIO I body + its p.630 footers 3–4 onward.

**TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, verified at 450 dpi — q-alignment reference for the six ARTICULUS UNICUS quaestiones; theme *De gratiae quidditate*):**
1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum gratia sit aliquid circa acceptantem, vel circa acceptatum.*
2. *Secundo, dato quod gratia sit aliquid circa acceptatum, quaeritur, utrum sit donum creatum vel increatum.*
3. *Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit in genere substantiae, vel accidentis.*
4. *Quarto quaeritur, utrum sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, vel incorruptibilis.*
5. *Quinto quaeritur, utrum primo insit essentiae animae, aut potentiis.*
6. *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum insit ad modum perfectionis tantum, an etiam per modum motoris.*

**Dup resolution.** The auto-chunker created two strays. The canonical `bon-sent-II-d26-divisio.md` had `line_start: 43971` — too early, swallowing the littera Cap. V–VII tail (wrong range, NO COMMENTARIUS body). The stray `bon-sent-II-d26-divisio-dup2.md` (raw 44015–44063) sat at the **true** DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO body. The correct COMMENTARIUS+DIVISIO+TRACTATIO content (raw 44010–44067) was re-set from the PDF into THIS canonical file, and `bon-sent-II-d26-divisio-dup2.md` was `git rm`'d. No content lost.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. *Siipra→Supra*, *l)et→habet*, *priraa→prima*, *arbifrium→arbitrium*, *efQcaciae→efficaciae*, *Hbero→libero*, *hal3et→habet*, *inteUigentiam→intelligentiam*, *cjuidditate→quiditate→quidditate*, *quaeruntur sex*, *utrnm→utrum*, *QUAESTIONUiM→QUAESTIONUM*).