title: Dist. 7

title_alt: Distinctio VII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction VII — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO VII.

### Cap. I. *Deinde quae singulis sententiis adversari videntur, ponit.*

(*Locutiones ambiguae secundum 1. opinionem.*) Secundum primam vero dicitur: *Deus factus homo*, et *homo factus Deus*, quia Deus coepit esse quaedam substantia rationalis, quae ante non fuerat; et illa substantia coepit esse Deus, et hoc gratia, non natura, vel meritis habuit. Unde recte dicitur Christus, (*Obiicitur.*) in quantum homo, *praedestinatus esse Filius Dei*[^1]. — Huic autem sententiae opponitur: si illa substantia coepit esse Deus, et Deus illa; quaedam igitur substantia est Deus, quae non *semper* fuit Deus; et quaedam substantia est Deus, quae non est *divina substantia*; (*Conceditur.*) et Deus est *aliquid*, quod non semper fuit. — Quod et illi concedunt, Origenis[^2] testimonio innitentes, qui ait: «Factus est sine dubio id quod prius non erat; sed addidit: secundum *carnem*; secundum *Deum* vero erat prius, et non erat quando non erat». — Aliis quoque pluribus modis illi sententiae potest opponi; quibus supersedemus, exercitationis studium lectori relinquentes et ad alia properantes.

(*Secundum 2. opinionem.*) In secunda vero sententia huius dictionis[^3] talis videtur ratio, ut, cum dicitur: *Deus factus est homo*, intelligatur coepisse esse subsistens ex duabus naturis, vel tribus substantiis; et e converso, *homo factus est Deus*, quia subsistens in duabus naturis coepit esse Deus; vel potius homo factus est Deus, et e converso dicitur, quia Deus assumsit hominem, et homo assumtus est a Deo. Unde Augustinus dicit in libro *de Trinitate*[^4]: «Talis fuit illa susceptio, quae hominem faceret Deum, et Deum hominem». Variatur autem intelligentia, cum dicitur: *Deus est homo*, et *homo est Deus*. Dicitur enim *Deus* esse persona subsistens in duabus et *ex* duabus naturis, et *persona subsistens in* duabus et *ex* duabus naturis dicitur esse Deus, id est Verbum, vel natura divina. Potest enim praedicari persona simplex, vel[^5] natura de persona composita. Non (*Damascenus.*) est autem, ut ait Ioannes Damascenus[^6], idem dicere *naturam*, vel *personam*. Determinant etiam auctoritates, quae *primae* (*Determinant auctoritates 1. opinionis.*) conveniunt sententiae et *huic* videntur contradicere, ut, cum legitur[^7]: homo ille assumtus a Verbo in singularitate personae, vel, factus una persona cum Verbo, de natura *humana* intelligatur, quae Verbo unita est in singularitate personae, id est, ita quod eadem persona, quae prius erat et simplex erat, sine incremento numeri[^8] et immutata permansit, licet *composita*. Compositionis vero huius ratio non alia dicitur quam ratione, quam sit in aliis hominibus, quia huius ex *tribus*, aliorum ex *duabus* substantiis est compositio. Negant quoque, naturam humanam esse personam, vel Dei Filium; et sicut unum eundemque dicunt esse hominem et Deum, et filium hominis et Filium Dei; ita *unum* et *idem*, non *aliud* et *aliud*, sicut nec *alium* et *alium*.

(*Opposita auctoritates Augustini.*) Sed his videntur adversari quae subditis continentur capitulis. Ait enim Augustinus *super Ioannem*[^9]: «Aliud est Verbum, aliud homo; sed Verbum caro factum est, id est homo; non itaque alia Verbi, alia est hominis persona, quoniam utrumque est Christus et una persona». Idem ad Felicianum[^10]: «Aliud Dei Filius, aliud hominis filius; sed non alius». Item: «Dei Filius aliud de Patre, aliud de Matre». Idem in libro primo *de Trinitate*[^11]: «Cum Filius sit et Deus et homo, alia substantia Deus, alia homo». (*Explicantur.*) Haec autem in hunc modum determinant: quia, cum dicitur: aliud Verbum Dei, aliud homo, sive alia substantia Deus, alia homo; *alterius naturae* significatur Christus esse, in quantum est *homo*, et alterius,

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(*Damascenus.*) in quantum est *Deus*; et *aliud* natura, qua est homo, *aliud* natura, qua est Deus. Ut enim ait Ioannes Damascenus[^1b]: «Inconverse et inalterabiliter unitae sunt ad invicem naturae, neque divina distante a propria simplicitate, neque humana aut conversa in deitatis naturam, aut in non-existentiam conversa[^2b], neque ex duabus una facta *composita natura*. Composita enim natura neutri earum, ex quibus componitur naturis, homousia, id est consubstantialis, esse potest, ex alteris perficiens alterum, ut corpus ex quatuor elementis compositum nec *ignis* nominatur nec *aër* nec *terra* nec *aqua*, nec horum alicui *homousion* dicitur. Si igitur secundum haereticos Christus unius compositae naturae post unionem exstitit, ex simplici natura conversus est in compositam, et neque Patri simplicis naturae existenti neque Matri est homousios; et neque *Deus* neque *homo* denominabitur[^3b], sed Christus solum; et erit hoc nomen, scilicet *Christus*, non personae ipsius nomen, sed unius secundum ipsos compositae naturae. Nos autem Christum non unius compositae naturae dogmatizamus, et hoc nomen, scilicet *Christus*, personae[^4b] dicimus non *monotropos*, id est uno modo dictum, sed duarum naturarum esse significativum, scilicet deitatis et humanitatis. Ex deitate autem et humanitate Deum perfectum et hominem perfectum eundem et esse et dici ex duabus et *in* duabus naturis, confitemur». — Sic ergo dicitur *aliud* esse Filius Dei, *aliud* filius hominis, quia *alterius* est *substantiae* vel naturae, in quantum est Filius Dei, et *alterius*, in quantum est filius hominis, non quod ipse Filius Dei et hominis sit duo illa diversa, id est duae diversae naturae.

(*Hilarius.*) Aperte enim Hilarius in libro nono *de Trinitate*[^5b] ait: «Cum non *aliud* sit filius hominis, neque *aliud* Filius Dei — *Verbum enim caro factum est* — et cum ille qui Filius Dei est, ipse et hominis sit filius; requiro, quis in hoc filio hominis glorificatus sit». — Evidenter dicit, non *aliud* esse Filium Dei et *aliud* filium hominis. Ex quo praemissa roboratur et approbatur determinatio.

(*Iterum Augustinus opponitur.*) Quod etiam dictum est: utrumque est Christus et una persona, movere potest lectorem; sicut et illud quod Augustinus dicit in libro primo *de Trinitate*[^6b]: «Quia forma Dei formam servi accepit, utrumque *Deus*, utrumque *homo*. Sed utrumque *Deus* propter accipientem Deum, et utrumque *homo* propter acceptum hominem». Et illud quod idem ait in libro *de Bono perseverantiae*[^7b]: «Qui fidelis est eo veram naturam humanam credit, suscipiente Deo Verbo, ita sublimatam, ut *qui* suscepit et *quod* suscepit una esset in Trinitate persona, assumtione illa ineffabiliter faciente illa unius in Deo et homine veritatem». Si autem *qui* suscepit et *quod* suscepit una est persona: ergo natura humana cum Verbo una est persona. — Sed haec omnia (*Respondent.*) ex tali sensu dicta fore tradunt, ut utrumque dicatur esse Christus et una persona, quia in utroque unus Christus et una persona subsistit. Ita etiam *susceptum* cum *suscipiente* dicitur una persona, quia susceptum suscipienti est sociatum in unitate personae, id est ita, quod unitas personae permansit, non ita, ut caro et anima sint Deus, quia, ut ait Hieronymus[^8b], (*Hieronym. et Ambros.*) «Verbum est Deus, et non caro assumta». Et Ambrosius in libro tertio *de Spiritu sancto*[^9b] ait: «*Aliud* est quod assumsit, et *aliud* quod assumtum est».

(*Aliud dictum dicitur.*) Est autem et aliud, quod huic sententiae plurimum videtur obviare. Ait enim Augustinus in libro (*August. obiicitur.*) contra Maximinum[^10b]: «Christus una persona est geminae substantiae, quia et Deus et homo est. Nec tamen Deus, vel homo pars huius personae dici potest; alioquin Filius Dei Deus, antequam susciperet formam servi, non erat totus et crevit, cum homo divinitati eius accessit». — Ecce, Deum dicit non esse partem illius personae. Unde videtur illa persona non constare ex Deo et homine. — Ad quod etiam illi dicunt, illam (*Respondent.*) personam non ita constare ex Deo et homine, quasi *totum ex partibus*. Ita enim partes alicuius totius conveniunt, ut ex illis quod non erat constituatur. Non autem sic humana et divina natura in Christo uniuntur. (*Dubium 1.*) Inexplicabilis enim est istius unionis, quae non est partium, ratio. — Quidam tamen nomine *Dei* ibi personam significari putant, quia de tribus agebat personis, quarum nullam Trinitatis esse partem dicebat; sicut pars istius personae non est Deus. Quod si de persona intelligitur, manifestum est, quia persona non est pars personae. — Posita est diligenter sententia secunda et eius explanatio, cui in nullo vel in modico obviant auctoritates in tertia sententia inductae, quae nunc consideranda est.

(*Secundum 3. opinionem.*) In hac igitur sententia sic dicitur: *Deus factus homo*, quia hominem *accepit*, et[^11b] sic dicitur *esse homo*, quia *homo habet*; vel quia est habens hominem; et *homo factus est Deus*, quia assumtus est a Deo; et *homo esse Deus*, quia habens hominem est Deus. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, vel *habitus* praedicatur, vel *persona*, sed humanata. Et quod *persona humanata* praedicetur, Cassiodorus[^12b] ostendere videtur, dicens: «Factus est, ut ita dixerim, humanatus Deus, qui etiam in assumtione carnis Deus esse non destitit». Quod tamen varie accipi potest, ut dicatur: *Deus* factus humanatus, vel *Christus* factus Deus humanatus; utrumque enim sane dici potest. Cum ergo

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dicitur: factus est Deus homo, multiplex secundum istos fit intelligentia, ut naturam humanam accepisse, vel humanatum Verbum esse incepisse intelligatur. Nec tamen, si incepit esse *humanatum Verbum*, ideo sequitur, quod inceperit esse *Verbum*; nec si Deus factus est *humanatum Verbum*, sequitur, quod factus sit *Verbum*; sicut de aliquo dicitur: hodie iste coepit esse *bonus homo*, vel factus est *bonus homo*; nec tamen hodie coepit esse *homo*, vel factus est *homo*.

(*Quoad esse praedestinatum.*) Secundum istos dicitur Christus, secundum quod homo, *praedestinatus esse Filius Dei*, quia est praedestinatum a Deo ab aeterno, et in tempore collatum est ei per gratiam, ut ipse ens homo sit Filius Dei. Hoc enim non semper habuit, sed in tempore per gratiam accepit. Quod videtur Augustinus notasse in libro (*Augustinus.*) ad Prosperum et Hilarium[^1c] dicens: «Praedestinatus est Iesus, ut, qui futurus erat secundum carnem filius David, esset in virtute Filius Dei». Hi etiam, cum dicitur: Christus minor Patre, secundum quod homo, secundum *habitum* hoc intelligunt dictum, id est, in quantum habet hominem sibi unitum. Unde Augustinus in libro primo *de Trinitate*[^2c]: «Deus Filius Deo Patri natura est aequalis, habitu minor. In forma enim servi minor est Patre, in forma Dei aequalis est Patri». Et quia secundum *habitum* accipienda est incarnationis ratio, ideo *Deum humanatum*, non *hominem deificatum* (*Dubium 2.*) dici tradunt. Unde Ioannes Damascenus[^3c]: «Non hominem deificatum dicimus, sed Deum hominem factum».

### Cap. III. *Quod non debet dici homo dominicus.*

Et licet dicatur *homo Deus*, non tamen congrue (*Dubium 3.*) dicitur *homo dominicus*. Unde Augustinus in libro *Retractationum*[^4c]: «Non video, utrum recte dicatur *homo dominicus* qui est mediator Dei et hominum, Christus Iesus, cum sit utique *Dominus*; et hoc quidem ut dicerem, apud quosdam legi tractatores catholicos. Sed ubicumque hoc dixi, dixisse me nollem. Postea quippe vidi, non esse dicendum, quamvis nonnulla possit ratione defendi». — Secundum istos etiam dicitur persona Filii *in* duabus et *ex* duabus existere naturis, secundum *adhaerentiam* et *inhaerentiam*. Altera enim adhaeret ei, altera inest.

(*Magister suspendit iudicium.*) Satis diligenter iuxta diversorum sententias supra positas[^5c] absque assertione et praeiudicio tractavi quaestionem. Verumtamen nolo, in tanta re tamque ad dignoscendum difficili putare lectorem, istam sibi nostram debere sufficere disputationem; sed legat et alia forte melius considerata atque tractata, et ea quae hic movere possunt, vigilantiore atque intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat, hoc firmiter tenens, quod «Deus hominem assumsit, homo in Deum transivit, non naturae versibilitate, sed Dei dignatione; ut nec Deus mutaretur in humanam substantiam assumendo hominem, nec homo in divinam, glorificatus in Deum; quia mutatio vel versibilitas naturae diminutionem et abolitionem substantiae facit[^6c]».

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### DISTINCTION VII.

### Chap. I. *Then he sets down the things which seem to be opposed to each of the opinions.*

(*The ambiguous locutions according to the first opinion.*) According to the first, then, it is said: *God was made man*, and *man was made God*, because God began to be a certain rational substance which had not been before; and that substance began to be God, and this it had by grace, not by nature or by merits. Hence Christ is rightly said, (*An objection is raised.*) insofar as he is man, *to be predestined to be the Son of God*[^1]. — But against this opinion it is objected: if that substance began to be God, and God [began to be] it; then a certain substance is God which was not *always* God; and a certain substance is God which is not the *divine substance*; (*It is conceded.*) and God is *something* which was not always. — Which they too concede, relying on the testimony of Origen[^2], who says: «He was made, without doubt, that which he was not before; but he added: according to the *flesh*; according to *God*, however, he was before, and there was not [a time] when he was not». — In several other ways too this opinion can be opposed; but we forbear these, leaving the zeal of the exercise to the reader and hastening on to other matters.

(*According to the second opinion.*) In the second opinion, however, the account of this statement[^3] seems to be such, that, when it is said: *God was made man*, it is understood that he began to be a subsistent [being] out of two natures, or three substances; and conversely, *man was made God*, because a subsistent [being] in two natures began to be God; or rather man was made God, and the converse is said, because God assumed a man, and the man was assumed by God. Hence Augustine says in the book *On the Trinity*[^4]: «Such was that assumption, which made the man God, and God man». But the understanding varies when it is said: *God is man*, and *man is God*. For *God* is said to be the person subsisting in two and *out of* two natures, and *the person subsisting in* two and *out of* two natures is said to be God, that is, the Word, or the divine nature. For a simple person, or[^5] a nature, can be predicated of a composite person. But it is not, (*Damascene.*) as John Damascene[^6] says, the same to say *nature* or *person*. The authorities also which belong to the *first* (*The authorities of the first opinion are determined.*) opinion and seem to contradict *this* one determine [the matter]: so that, when one reads[^7] that the man was assumed by the Word in the singularity of the person, or made one person with the Word, it should be understood of the *human* nature, which is united to the Word in the singularity of the person, that is, in such a way that the same person, which was before and was simple, remained without increase of number[^8] and unchanged, although *composite*. But the account of this composition is said to be none other than the account by which there is [composition] in other men, because in his case the composition is out of *three*, in theirs out of *two* substances. They also deny that the human nature is a person, or the Son of God; and just as they say that one and the same is man and God, and the son of man and the Son of God, so [they say he is] *one* and *the same*, not *one thing* and *another*, as neither *one* and *another*.

(*The opposed authorities of Augustine.*) But to these seem opposed the things contained in the chapters subjoined. For Augustine says *on John*[^9]: «The Word is one thing, the man another; but the Word was made flesh, that is, man; therefore the person of the Word is not one and the person of the man another, since each is Christ and one person». The same, to Felician[^10]: «The Son of God is one thing, the son of man another; but [he is] not another [one]». Likewise: «The Son of God [is] one thing from the Father, another from the Mother». The same, in the first book *On the Trinity*[^11]: «Since the Son is both God and man, the substance God is one, man another». (*They are explained.*) But these they determine in this manner: that, when it is said, the Word of God is one thing, the man another, or the substance God one thing, the man another; Christ is signified to be of one nature insofar as he is *man*, and of another,

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(*Damascene.*) insofar as he is *God*; and *one thing* is the nature by which he is man, *another* the nature by which he is God. For as John Damascene[^1b] says: «Unconvertibly and unalterably are the natures united to one another, neither the divine standing apart from its proper simplicity, nor the human either converted into the nature of deity, or converted[^2b] into non-existence, nor made out of two one *composite nature*. For a composite nature cannot be consubstantial — that is, *homoousion* — with either of the natures out of which it is composed, perfecting the one out of the others, just as a body composed out of the four elements is called neither *fire* nor *air* nor *earth* nor *water*, nor is said to be *homoousion* with any of these. If therefore, according to the heretics, Christ existed after the union as of one composite nature, he was converted from a simple nature into a composite one, and is consubstantial neither with the Father, who exists of simple nature, nor with the Mother; and he will be called neither *God* nor *man*[^3b], but Christ alone; and this name, namely *Christ*, will not be the name of his person, but of one composite nature according to them. But we do not dogmatize that Christ is of one composite nature, and we say that this name, namely *Christ*, [is] of the person[^4b], not *monotropos*, that is, said in one way, but signifying two natures, namely of deity and of humanity. And we confess that out of deity and humanity one and the same is and is called perfect God and perfect man, out of two and *in* two natures». — So therefore the Son of God is said to be *one thing*, the son of man *another*, because he is of *another substance* or nature insofar as he is the Son of God, and of *another* insofar as he is the son of man, not that the Son of God and of man is those two diverse things, that is, two diverse natures.

(*Hilary.*) For Hilary plainly says, in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^5b]: «Since the son of man is not *one thing*, nor the Son of God *another* — for *the Word was made flesh* — and since he who is the Son of God is himself also the son of man; I ask, who has been glorified in this son of man». — He plainly says that the Son of God is not *one thing* and the son of man *another*. Whereby the foregoing determination is strengthened and approved.

(*Augustine is again brought as an objection.*) That too which was said — each is Christ and one person — can move the reader; as also that which Augustine says in the first book *On the Trinity*[^6b]: «Because the form of God took the form of a servant, each [is] *God*, each [is] *man*. But each [is] *God* on account of the God who takes, and each [is] *man* on account of the man taken». And that which the same says in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*[^7b]: «He who is faithful believes that the true human nature, the God-Word assuming it, was so exalted that *he who* assumed and *that which* was assumed were one person in the Trinity, that assumption ineffably making the truth of the one [person] in God and man». But if *he who* assumed and *that which* was assumed are one person: therefore the human nature is one person with the Word. — But all these they hand down to have been said in such a sense (*They answer.*) that each is said to be Christ and one person, because in each one Christ and one person subsists. So too the *thing assumed* with the *one assuming* is said to be one person, because the thing assumed is associated to the one assuming in the unity of the person, that is, in such a way that the unity of the person remained, not in such a way that the flesh and soul are God, because, as Jerome[^8b] says, (*Jerome and Ambrose.*) «The Word is God, and not the assumed flesh». And Ambrose, in the third book *On the Holy Spirit*[^9b], says: «*One thing* is that which assumed, and *another* that which was assumed».

(*Another saying is adduced.*) But there is also another thing which seems very much to stand in the way of this opinion. For Augustine says in the book (*Augustine is brought as an objection.*) against Maximinus[^10b]: «Christ is one person of a twofold substance, because he is both God and man. Yet neither God nor man can be called a part of this person; otherwise the Son of God, [who is] God, before he took the form of a servant, was not whole and grew, when the man acceded to his divinity». — Behold, he says that God is not a part of that person. Whence it seems that that person does not consist of God and man. — To which these too answer that that (*They answer.*) person does not so consist of God and man as a *whole out of parts*. For the parts of any whole come together in such a way that out of them what was not is constituted. But the human and divine nature are not united in Christ in this way. (*Doubt 1.*) For the account of this union, which is not [a union] of parts, is inexplicable. — Some, however, think that by the name *God* the person is there signified, because he was treating of three persons, of whom he said none was a part of the Trinity; just as a part of this person is not God. But if it is understood of the person, it is manifest that a person is not a part of a person. — The second opinion and its explanation have been carefully set down, against which the authorities adduced in the third opinion stand in nothing or in little, which [third opinion] must now be considered.

(*According to the third opinion.*) In this opinion, then, it is said thus: *God was made man*, because he *took* a man, and[^11b] thus he is said *to be man*, because *he has a man*; or because he is one having a man; and *man was made God*, because he was assumed by God; and *man to be God*, because the one having a man is God. When therefore it is said: God is man, either *a habit* is predicated, or *a person*, but a humanated one. And that *a humanated person* is predicated, Cassiodorus[^12b] seems to show, saying: «He was made, so to say, a humanated God, who even in the assumption of the flesh did not cease to be God». Which nevertheless can be taken in various ways, so that it is said: *God* was made humanated, or *Christ* was made a humanated God; for each can soundly be said. When therefore

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it is said: God was made man, the understanding becomes manifold according to them, so that it is understood [either] that he took a human nature, or that he began to be a humanated Word. Yet if he began to be a *humanated Word*, it does not on that account follow that he began to be the *Word*; nor if God was made a *humanated Word* does it follow that he was made the *Word*; just as it is said of someone: today this man began to be a *good man*, or was made a *good man*; yet he did not today begin to be a *man*, or was made a *man*.

(*As to being predestined.*) According to them Christ, insofar as he is man, is said to be *predestined to be the Son of God*, because it was predestined by God from eternity, and in time conferred on him by grace, that he, being man, should be the Son of God. For this he did not always have, but in time received by grace. Which Augustine seems to have noted in the book (*Augustine.*) to Prosper and Hilary[^1c], saying: «Jesus was predestined, that he who was to be according to the flesh the son of David, should be in power the Son of God». These too, when it is said: Christ is less than the Father, insofar as he is man, understand this said according to *habit*, that is, insofar as he has a man united to himself. Hence Augustine, in the first book *On the Trinity*[^2c]: «God the Son is by nature equal to God the Father, by habit less. For in the form of a servant he is less than the Father, in the form of God he is equal to the Father». And because the account of the incarnation is to be taken according to *habit*, therefore they hand down that he is to be called *a humanated God*, not *a deified man*. (*Doubt 2.*) Hence John Damascene[^3c]: «We do not say a deified man, but God made man».

### Chap. III. *That he ought not to be called a Lordly man.*

And although *man God* is said, it is nevertheless not fittingly (*Doubt 3.*) said *a Lordly man*. Hence Augustine in the book of *Retractations*[^4c]: «I do not see whether he who is the mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, is rightly called *a Lordly man*, since he is assuredly *Lord*; and this indeed, that I should say it, I read among certain catholic writers. But wherever I said this, I would I had not said it. For afterward I saw that it ought not to be said, although it can be defended with some reason». — According to them too the person of the Son is said to exist *in* two and *out of* two natures, according to *adherence* and *inherence*. For the one adheres to him, the other is in him.

(*The Master suspends judgment.*) Diligently enough, in accordance with the opinions of diverse [writers] set down above[^5c], I have treated the question without assertion and without prejudgment. Yet I would not have the reader, in so great a matter and one so difficult to discern, think that this our disputation ought to suffice him; but let him read also other things perhaps better considered and treated, and let him examine, with a more vigilant and more understanding mind, if he can, the things which here can move [him], holding this firmly, that «God assumed a man, the man passed over into God, not by a mutability of nature, but by the condescension of God; so that neither was God changed into a human substance by assuming a man, nor the man into a divine [substance], being glorified into God; because a change or mutability of nature works the diminution and abolition of the substance[^6c]».

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la: In Epist. ad Rom. 1, 3. n. 5. (Patrolog. Graec. t. 14. col. 848.).

en: On the Epistle to the Romans 1:3, n. 5 (Patrologia Graeca, vol. 14, col. 848).

la: Ita codd., ed. 2 *traditionis*, aliae edd. *distinctionis*.

en: Thus the codices; edition 2 reads *traditionis*, other editions *distinctionis*.

en: Editions 1, 5, 8 read *ut*.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 3. circa medium.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3, near the middle.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd., exceptis 1, 5, 8, et codd. AD omittunt *esse*, scilicet personam illam, quae verba a codd. BCE transponuntur post *Christum*.

en: The Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1, 5, 8, and codices AD omit *esse*, namely *personam illam*, which words are transposed by codices BCE after *Christum*.

la: Dist. VI. c. 5.

en: Distinction VI, c. 5.

la: Vat. cum ceteris edd., exceptis 1, 8, addit *personarum* et ponit *etiam* pro *et*, refragantibus codd.

en: The Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, 8, adds *personarum* and puts *etiam* for *et*, the codices contradicting.

la: Tract. 69. n. 3. — In quo textu codd. et plurimae edd. ante *Christus* omittunt *est*; Vat. cum originali omittit *et* ante *una persona*.

en: Tractate 69, n. 3. — In which text the codices and most editions omit *est* before *Christus*; the Vatican edition, with the original, omits *et* before *una persona*.

la: Potius contra Felicianum, Arianum, de Unit. Trinit. c. 11. 12; seq. locus ibid. et cfr. supra pag. 148, nota 3.

en: Rather, against Felician the Arian, *On the Unity of the Trinity*, c. 11–12; the following passage [is] in the same place, and cf. above, p. 148, note 3.

en: Chapter 10, n. 20.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 3. in initio. Prima pars huius textus habetur etiam in Glossa Lyrani, Rom. 1, 3.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3, at the beginning. The first part of this text is found also in the Gloss of Lyranus, Rom. 1:3.

la: Ita ed. 8 iuxta textum Graecum (συμφυρεῖσα); Vat. mutata, in ceteris edd. et codd. *divisa*. Infra post *perficiens* cod. E, Vat. et ed. 4 *alteram* pro *alterum* (ἕτερον).

en: Thus edition 8, according to the Greek text (*sumphyreisa*); the Vatican edition altered, in the other editions and codices *divisa*. Below, after *perficiens*, codex E, the Vatican edition and edition 4 read *alteram* for *alterum* (*heteron*).

la: Codd. A B C et edd. 2, 6 *denominalur*.

en: Codices A B C and editions 2, 6 read *denominalur*.

la: Edd. 1, 5, 8 praefigunt *nomen*.

en: Editions 1, 5, 8 prefix *nomen*.

en: Number 40.

la: Cap. 7. n. 14. in fine.

en: Chapter 7, n. 14, at the end.

la: Sive *Dono persev.* c. 24. n. 67.

en: Or *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 24, n. 67.

la: Serm. (non genuinus) de Assumtione ad Paulam et Eustoch. c. 13. — Paulo superius ante *Deus* edd., exceptis 1, 8, addunt *unus*.

en: Sermon (not genuine) *On the Assumption*, to Paula and Eustochium, c. 13. — A little above, before *Deus*, the editions, except 1, 8, add *unus*.

la: Ita codd. et edd., excepta 8, quae recte substituit *de Incarnationis dominicae sacramento* (c. 6. n. 61.).

en: Thus the codices and editions, except 8, which rightly substitutes *On the sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation* (c. 6, n. 61).

en: Book II, c. 10, n. 2.

la: In codd. et edd., exceptis 1, 8, omittitur *et*.

en: In the codices and editions, except 1, 8, *et* is omitted.

la: Cfr. Glossa Lyrani ad Rom. 1, 3. (sub nomine Origenis). — Paulo inferius post *Christus factus* edd. 1, 8 et cod. E addunt *est*.

en: Cf. the Gloss of Lyranus on Rom. 1:3 (under the name of Origen). — A little below, after *Christus factus*, editions 1, 8 and codex E add *est*.

la: Id est *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 15. n. 31.

en: That is, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 15, n. 31.

en: Chapter 7, n. 14.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 2.

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 2.

la: Libr. I. c. 19. n. 8. — Pro *possit* codd. ABD et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 *posset*, et pro *adhaeret* omnes codd. et edd. eaedem *inhaeret*.

en: Book I, c. 19, n. 8. — For *possit* codices ABD and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 read *posset*, and for *adhaeret* all the same codices and editions read *inhaeret*.

la: Ita codd. BCE; Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 *sententiam supra positam*, edd. 1, 8 et codd. AD *sententias supra positam* (scil. quaestionem); deinde cum codd. ADE et edd. 1, 5, 8 posuimus *tractavi* pro *tractavimus*; denique pro *tamque ad dignoscendum* pleraeque edd. cum Vat. *tanquam ad cognoscendum*.

en: Thus codices BCE; the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 read *sententiam supra positam*, editions 1, 8 and codices AD *sententias supra positam* (namely, the question); then with codices ADE and editions 1, 5, 8 we have put *tractavi* for *tractavimus*; finally, for *tamque ad dignoscendum* most editions with the Vatican read *tanquam ad cognoscendum*.

la: Gennad., *de Ecclesiast. Dogm.* c. 2.

en: Gennadius, *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, c. 2. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p166..168-{L,R}-*.png`, read Left column top→bottom then Right) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 11982–12162). The OCR is clean here (single near-perfect ABBYY layer); the PDF bands were used to confirm footnote-marker placement and to disambiguate the per-page footer blocks. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.166** (PDF 188): DISTINCTIO VII header + Cap. I opener (raw 11982). Cap. I runs the three "opinions on the ambiguous locutions" (1st opinion *Deus factus homo* / *homo factus Deus* per gratiam; objection + Origen reply; 2nd opinion *subsistens ex duabus naturis*; Augustine/Damascene; the authorities of the first opinion; the opposed authorities of Augustine), spanning p.166-L→R and onto p.167. Footer block *Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum* notes 1–11 → `[^1]`–`[^11]`.
- **p.167** (PDF 189): continuation of Cap. I (Damascene's long *de Fide orthod.* text on the composite nature; Hilary; Augustine *de Trin.* / *de Bono persev.* objections + replies; the *susceptum/suscipiens* resolution; Augustine *contra Maximinum*; Doubt 1 on the union not being of parts; the 3rd opinion *secundum habitum* opens at p.167-R foot, *In hac igitur sententia*). Footer block notes 1–12 → `[^1b]`–`[^12b]`.
- **p.168** (PDF 190): tail of Cap. II content (the *humanatum Verbum* / *praedestinatus* discussion, *Quoad esse praedestinatum*) at p.168-L; **Cap. III** *Quod non debet dici homo dominicus* opens at p.168-R; the Master's closing suspension of judgment (*Satis diligenter… tractavi*) ends Cap. III at *…substantiae facit⁶*. Footer block notes 1–6 → `[^1c]`–`[^6c]`. Immediately below the rule comes the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII (raw 12163) — that belongs to **d7-divisio**.

**Chapter structure.** The printed edition labels the Lombard littera *Cap. I*, *Cap. II*, *Cap. III*. The two-column OCR/PDF prints the *Cap. II* header in the right column of p.166 ("Ex quo sensu dicitur Christus praedestinatus"), but its body (the *praedestinatus*/second-opinion material) is interwoven and continues to p.168-L; the running flow as set above reflects the printed reading order (L then R, page by page). *Cap. III* (*Quod non debet dici homo dominicus*) prints in the p.168 right column. The Master's three marginal "Dubium 1/2/3" labels are his own internal flags within the chapters (rendered inline in parentheses), distinct from Bonaventure's later DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI block (raw 13108).

**Footer hand-off.**
- **NONE received.** D.6's dubia footers were exhausted in `d6-dubia`; the d.7 littera footers print under their own *Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum* sequences (per-page restarts on pp.166/167/168).
- **NONE forwarded to d7-divisio.** The p.168 littera footer sequence ends at note 6 (`[^6c]`, Gennad.). The *Notae ad Commentarium* block (note 1 = "Codd. *praemissae*…") that begins immediately below the same rule belongs to **d7-divisio**, not the littera.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses: *Locutiones ambiguae secundum 1. opinionem, Obiicitur, Conceditur, Secundum 2. opinionem, Damascenus, Determinant auctoritates 1. opinionis, Opposita auctoritates Augustini, Explicantur, Hilarius, Iterum Augustinus opponitur, Respondent, Hieronym. et Ambros., Aliud dictum dicitur, August. obiicitur, Dubium 1, Secundum 3. opinionem, Quoad esse praedestinatum, Augustinus, Dubium 2, Dubium 3, Magister suspendit iudicium*.

**`[?]` flags:** none. The OCR is clean throughout this span and the column bands confirmed every footnote anchor.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 7, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem VII — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction VII — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 168 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

*Explicantur ambiguae locutiones.*

*Secundum primam vero dicitur Deus factus* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra narravit Magister multorum opiniones. In hac parte applicat ad principale propositum, videlicet ad explicandas ambiguas locutiones. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes tres secundum illas tres opiniones. In quarum prima explicat locutiones ambiguas secundum opinionem primam. In secunda vero secundum opinionem secundam, ibi: *In secunda vero sententia huius traditionis.* In tertia vero secundum tertiam, ibi: *In hac igitur sententia sic dicitur: Deus factus homo* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima iuxta primam sententiam ambiguas locutiones exponit. In secunda vero ea quae praedictae opinioni videntur contraria, dissolvit, ibi: *Huic autem sententiae opponitur.*

Secunda vero pars principalis dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima locutiones praemissas explanat. In secunda vero auctoritates prius positas explanat, ibi: *Determinant autem auctoritates, quae primae*[^1] etc. In tertia vero alias auctoritates, quae videntur adversari, reducit ad concordiam, ibi: *Sed his videntur adversari* etc. Et illa pars in multas posset dividi partes secundum multas auctoritates, sicut in littera patet.

<!-- page 169 -->

Similiter tertia pars principalis dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima explicat locutiones praemissas secundum tertiam sententiam. In secunda vero elicit ex praemissis, quandam aliam[^1b] locutionem non esse recipiendam, ibi: *Et licet dicatur homo Deus* etc. In tertia vero et ultima ostendit, se in praecedentibus opinionibus suspensam tenuisse sententiam, ita quod ad nullam praedictarum opinionum declinaverit magis quam ad alteram, ibi: *Satis diligenter iuxta diversorum sententias* etc. — Et ex hoc patet, quod non est imponendum Magistro, quod fuerit ex opinione tertia[^2b].

### PRAENOTATA.

Nota igitur, quod in tota parte ista has duas locutiones explanat: *homo factus est Deus*; et: *Christus praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei*.

Prima enim opinio concedit, quod *Deus factus est homo*, et e converso; quia homo in Christo est quaedam substantia[^3b], quae coepit esse Deus per gratiam. — Secunda vero opinio concedit, quod *Deus factus est homo*, et e converso; quia Deus coepit esse subsistens in duabus naturis, et ex hoc factum est, ut subsistens in duabus naturis sit Deus. — Secundum tertiam opinionem dicitur: *Deus factus est homo*, et e converso; quia Deus accepit hominem, et ex hoc factum est, quod habens[^4b] hominem est Deus.

Similiter prima opinio concedit, quod *Christus praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei*; quia ille homo est Filius Dei non per naturam, sed per gratiam, et hoc quidem ab aeterno fuit praevisum. — Secunda vero opinio dicit, quod *Christus est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei*; quia persona illa, in quantum homo, id est in quantum subsistens in duabus naturis, scilicet anima et carne, praedestinatus est, et ita ratione humanitatis, non divinitatis. — Tertia vero opinio dicit, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus, non quia homo ille sit praedestinatus, nec quia persona illa subsistens in duabus naturis sit praedestinata, sed quia quod praedestinatum est ei ab aeterno collatum est ei in tempore per gratiam; non enim humanitatem habuit[^5b] ab aeterno, sed per gratiam accepit ex tempore, secundum quod Deus praeviderat aeternaliter.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo secundum duo genera locutionum, quae in littera exponuntur.

Primo quaeritur de locutionibus exprimentibus ipsam unionem.

Secundo quaeritur de locutionibus exprimentibus unionis praedestinationem.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de hac locutione: *Deus est homo*, et *homo est Deus*.

Secundo vero quaeritur de hac: *Deus factus est homo*.

Tertio quaeritur de hac: *homo factus est Deus*.

---

english:
<!-- page 168 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII.

*The ambiguous locutions are explained.*

*But according to the first it is said that God was made* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master related the opinions of many. In this part he applies [them] to the principal proposition, namely to explaining the ambiguous locutions. Now this part is divided into three parts according to those three opinions. In the first of these he explains the ambiguous locutions according to the first opinion. But in the second according to the second opinion, there: *But in the second [account] of this tradition.* But in the third according to the third, there: *In this account therefore it is said thus: God made man* etc.

The first part is divided into two. In the first of these he sets forth the ambiguous locutions according to the first account. But in the second he resolves those things which seem contrary to the aforesaid opinion, there: *But against this account it is objected.*

But the second principal part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he explains the locutions set forth earlier. But in the second he explains the authorities set down before, there: *But the authorities determine, which first*[^1] etc. But in the third he reduces to concord the other authorities which seem to be adverse, there: *But to these [authorities] some seem to be adverse* etc. And that part could be divided into many parts according to the many authorities, as is plain in the text.

<!-- page 169 -->

Likewise the third principal part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he explains the locutions set forth according to the third account. But in the second he draws out from the foregoing that a certain other[^1b] locution is not to be received, there: *And although man be called God* etc. But in the third and last he shows that he held his judgment in suspense among the preceding opinions, in such a way that he inclined to none of the aforesaid opinions more than to another, there: *Diligently enough, according to the judgments of various men* etc. — And from this it is plain that it is not to be imputed to the Master that he was of the third opinion[^2b].

### PREFATORY REMARKS.

Note therefore that in this whole part he explains these two locutions: *man was made God*; and: *Christ was predestined to be the Son of God*.

For the first opinion concedes that *God was made man*, and conversely; because the man in Christ is a certain substance[^3b], which began to be God by grace. — But the second opinion concedes that *God was made man*, and conversely; because God began to be subsisting in two natures, and from this it came about that the one subsisting in two natures is God. — According to the third opinion it is said: *God was made man*, and conversely; because God took a man, and from this it came about that the one having[^4b] a man is God.

Likewise the first opinion concedes that *Christ was predestined to be the Son of God*; because that man is the Son of God not by nature, but by grace, and this indeed was foreseen from eternity. — But the second opinion says that *Christ is predestined to be the Son of God*; because that person, insofar as he is man, that is, insofar as he is subsisting in two natures, namely soul and flesh, is predestined, and so by reason of the humanity, not of the divinity. — But the third opinion says that Christ, insofar as he is man, is predestined, not because that man is predestined, nor because that person subsisting in two natures is predestined, but because what was predestined for him from eternity was conferred on him in time by grace; for he did not have[^5b] the humanity from eternity, but received [it] by grace from time, according as God had foreseen eternally.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

But for the understanding of this part a question falls here concerning two things according to the two kinds of locutions which are set forth in the text.

First it is asked concerning the locutions expressing the union itself.

Secondly it is asked concerning the locutions expressing the predestination of the union.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked concerning this locution: *God is man*, and *man is God*.

But secondly it is asked concerning this: *God was made man*.

Thirdly it is asked concerning this: *man was made God*.

---

la: Codd. *praemissae*. Paulo inferius Vat. omittit *secundum multas auctoritates*.

en: The codices [read] *praemissae* [premised]. A little below the Vatican edition omits *secundum multas auctoritates* [according to the many authorities].

la: Cod. K *ambiguam*.

en: Codex K [reads] *ambiguam* [ambiguous].

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. dub. 2.

en: Cf. above, distinction 6, doubt 2.

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. addunt *per naturam*.

en: The editions and some codices add *per naturam* [by nature].

la: Pro *quod habens* edd. *quod secundum hunc*.

en: For *quod habens* [that the one having] the editions [read] *quod secundum hunc* [that according to this one].

la: Ita codd. Q U (K a secunda manu); in reliquis et edd. minus congrue *hominis*. Mox pro *aeternaliter* cod. A *ab aeterno*.

en: So codices Q U (K by a second hand); in the others and the editions, less fittingly, *hominis* [of the man]. Soon after, for *aeternaliter* [eternally] codex A [reads] *ab aeterno* [from eternity]. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 168–169 (PDF 190–191; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 12163–12237). This is the COMMENTARIUS divisio chunk for Distinction VII: it holds the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII` opener (with the rubric *Explicantur ambiguae locutiones* and the catchword-lemma *Secundum primam vero dicitur Deus factus* etc. that links to the littera), the `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, the `PRAENOTATA` (Bonaventure's pre-summary of how each of the three opinions reads the two locutions *Deus factus est homo* and *Christus praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei*), and the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the article- and question-list). `ARTICULUS I` (*De locutionibus exprimentibus ipsam unionem*) + `QUAESTIO I` (*Utrum vera sit locutio: Deus est homo*) print immediately after the TRACTATIO on p.169 and belong to the next chunk (`d7-a1-q1`). No scholion — this is a commentary divisio (`has_scholion: false`).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.168** (col L bottom → col R, running head `168 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): the LITTERA Cap. III tail (*dicitur: factus est Deus homo… Deum hominem factum* on p.168-L top, and *Quod non debet dici homo dominicus* through *…substantiae facit⁶* on p.168-R) belongs to `d7-littera` and is NOT in this chunk. The COMMENTARIUS divisio begins at the bottom of p.168-L: COMMENTARIUS header + *Explicantur ambiguae locutiones* + *Secundum primam vero dicitur Deus factus* etc. + DIVISIO TEXTUS header + the first two DIVISIO paragraphs, continuing into the right divisio column (*Secunda vero pars principalis…*). Footer: the LITTERA's `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` notes 1–6 (de Praedest. Sanctor. / Cap. 7 / de Fide orthod. / possit-posset variant / sententiam supra positam variant / Gennad. de Eccl. Dogm.) print at the foot of p.168 and were exhausted in `d7-littera`. The divisio's own footer note prints below them under `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`: note 1 = `[^1]` (the *primae¹* marker, `Codd. praemissae`).
- **p.169** (running head `DIST. VII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.`): the DIVISIO TEXTUS tail (*Similiter tertia pars principalis…* through *…ex opinione tertia*), all of PRAENOTATA, and all of TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM through *Tertio quaeritur de hac: homo factus est Deus.* Footer `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` notes 1–5 = `[^1b]`–`[^5b]` (markers *aliam¹ᵇ, tertia²ᵇ, substantia³ᵇ, habens⁴ᵇ, habuit⁵ᵇ*). p.169 footer notes 6–7 (*Athanasiano⁶*, *Sive de Consider. c. 9. n. 21⁷*) belong to `d7-a1-q1`: they key the QUAESTIO I Fundamenta markers (*in Symbolo⁶*, *Bernardus in quinto ad Eugenium⁷*), whose body opens *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de hac locutione: Deus est homo* immediately after the TRACTATIO on p.169.

**Footer hand-off.**
- *Received from `d7-littera`:* the p.168 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` note 1 (`Codd. praemissae…` = `[^1]`). Per the d7-littera hand-off, the littera's p.168 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` ended at note 6 (Gennad.), and the COMMENTARIUS footer block begins immediately below the same rule with note 1 = *Codd. praemissae* — correctly placed here.
- *Forwarded to `d7-a1-q1`:* p.169 footer notes **6–7** (*Athanasiano* / *Sive de Consider. c. 9. n. 21*) — these key the QUAESTIO I body markers (*in Symbolo⁶*, *ad Eugenium⁷*), NOT the divisio. The divisio owns only p.169 notes **1–5** (`[^1b]`–`[^5b]`). `d7-a1-q1` opens `ARTICULUS I. De locutionibus exprimentibus ipsam unionem. QUAESTIO I. Utrum vera sit locutio: Deus est homo. Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de hac locutione: Deus est homo. Et quod sit vera, videtur. 1. Per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo⁶…` on p.169-R bottom, continuing onto p.170.

**Apparatus count:** 6 marker entries: p.168 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note 1 = `[^1]`; p.169 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM notes 1–5 = `[^1b]`–`[^5b]`. The per-page Quaracchi restart on p.169 would collide with p.168's note 1, so p.169's notes carry the `b` suffix.

**[?] flags:** NONE. All readings confirmed eyes-on against the 450 dpi PDF column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0