title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II

*Utrum substantia sive essentia divina per generationem communicetur.*

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum substantia per generationem communicetur; et quod sic, ostenditur[^1] hoc modo.

**1.** Per illud res communicatur, per quod fit, ut sit in pluribus; sed substantia est in pluribus personis et non est nisi per generationem et per processionem: ergo per generationem communicatur.

**2.** Item, causa est, qua posita ponitur res et qua remota removetur[^2]; sed posita emanatione in divinis, ponitur communitas et distinctio; remota generatione vel emanatione, essentia est in uno solo, sicut hypostasis: ergo generatio est ratio communicandi essentiam.

**3.** Item, quod datur alicui et non desinit haberi a dante, per illud[^3] per quod datur, per illud communicatur; sed substantia a Patre datur Filio per generationem et non desinit haberi a Patre, dum datur Filio: ergo per generationem communicatur.

**4.** Item, generatio in his inferioribus est ratio communicandi substantiam sive naturam; sed in divinis natura est illis multo communicabilior[^4], quia simplicior: ergo in divinis per generationem substantia vel essentia communicatur.

*Contra:*

**1.** Generatio est principium distinguendi[^5]; sed non est idem principium distinguendi et communicandi: ergo per generationem non est ratio communicandi in divinis: ergo per generationem nihil communicatur.

**2.** Item, quod facit aliquid esse in hoc, non est ratio communicandi, sed appropriandi et individuandi; sed generatio facit esse substantiam in tali persona, utpote in persona Filii: ergo non est ratio communicandi, sed appropriandi.

**3.** Item, omne illud quod per generationem communicatur, per generationem est commune[^6]. Si ergo substantia per generationem communicatur, generatione circumscripta, non erit communis: ergo propria; sed proprium per generationem non potest communicari: ergo nec substantia.

**4.** Item, quod per generationem communicatur, per generationem datur et recipitur, et omne tale, si non est generationi accidentale, generatur; sed substantia non accidit generationi: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Essentia divina per generationem communicatur, quia per generationem fit, ut sit in pluribus una.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc intelligendum notandum, quod *commune*, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad actum et potentiam. *Commune* enim potest dici illud quod est *communicabile*, quamvis non sit in pluribus; sicut patet in multis universalibus, ut in sole et luna et huiusmodi. *Commune* etiam dicitur *communicatum*, quod est actu in pluribus.

Dico ergo, quod quemadmodum forma universalis, quantum est de se, est communicabilis; sed tamen actu communicatur per propagationem[^7] plurium,

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sic natura divina vel essentia de se quidem communicabilis est, sed quod actu communicetur, non est nisi per illud quod multiplicat vel plurificat supposita; haec autem est generatio[^8].

Quoniam igitur per generationem personae plurificantur, et substantia in illis non numeratur, hinc est, quod verissime substantia vel essentia per generationem communicatur, quia per generationem fit, ut sit una in pluribus.

**1.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio est principium distinguendi; dicendum, quod generatio per se est principium distinguendi suppositum a supposito, quia ad illud terminatur per se; etiam est principium communicandi naturam[^9] communem, quia similem ex simili. Sed quoniam natura in inferioribus numeratur in suppositis, ideo est principium distinguendi etiam commune, sed per accidens; in Deo autem nec est per se nec per accidens.

**2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *facere commune esse in hoc* est ratio appropriandi; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando commune est appropriabile vel appropriatum per *esse in hoc*. Divina autem essentia non est sic appropriabilis, vel appropriata per *esse in hoc*, quia non est appropriabilis quoad significatum nec quoad suppositum, quia idem significat et supponit, sicut supra ostensum est[^10]; significatum autem eius nulla additione distinguitur. Haec enim est vera: *essentia Patris et essentia, quae est in Patre, est Filius*.

Vel aliter potest dici, quod *facere esse in hoc* est dupliciter: aut absolute; et sic est ratio appropriandi; aut in comparatione, ut illud quod erat prius in uno, fiat postea in alio; et sic est ratio communicandi naturam. Sed quaedam natura est, quae distinguitur[^11] in suppositis, ut puta illa cui fit additio, quaedam non, ut divina; et in prima est ratio communicandi et distinguendi, in divina solum communicandi.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod, si per generationem communicatur, generatio substantiam facit communem[^12]; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *commune* dicitur secundum *actum*, quia in pluribus, sed non secundum *potentiam*. Unde circumscripta generatione, substantia est communis, quia communicabilis; sed non est communis, quia communicata.

**4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod per generationem datur, generatur; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia *generari* dicit productionem et distinctionem, sed *datio*[^13] dicit auctoritatem et communicationem; et quoniam per generationem substantia non distinguitur, quamvis communicetur: ergo etc.

english:
### Question II

*Whether the divine substance or essence is communicated through generation.*

Last, it is asked whether substance is communicated through generation; and that it is, is shown[^1] thus.

**1.** A thing is communicated through that by which it comes about that it is in many; but substance is in many persons, and is so only through generation and procession: therefore it is communicated through generation.

**2.** Likewise, the cause is that with which posited the thing is posited, and with which removed it is removed[^2]; but with emanation posited in God, commonality and distinction are posited; with generation or emanation removed, the essence is in only one, just as the hypostasis: therefore generation is the principle of communicating the essence.

**3.** Likewise, what is given to one and does not cease to be possessed by the giver is communicated through that[^3] through which it is given; but substance is given by the Father to the Son through generation, and does not cease to be possessed by the Father while it is given to the Son: therefore it is communicated through generation.

**4.** Likewise, generation in inferior beings is the principle of communicating substance or nature; but in God the nature is to them much more communicable[^4], because more simple: therefore in God substance or essence is communicated through generation.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Generation is the principle of distinguishing[^5]; but the principle of distinguishing and of communicating is not the same: therefore generation is not the principle of communicating in God: therefore through generation nothing is communicated.

**2.** Likewise, what makes something to be in this [supposit] is not the principle of communicating, but of appropriating and individuating; but generation makes substance to be in such a person — namely in the person of the Son: therefore it is not the principle of communicating, but of appropriating.

**3.** Likewise, all that is communicated through generation is, through generation, common[^6]. If therefore substance is communicated through generation, then with generation removed, it will not be common: therefore [it would be] proper; but the proper cannot be communicated through generation: therefore neither can substance.

**4.** Likewise, what is communicated through generation is given and received through generation, and every such thing — if it is not accidental to generation — is begotten; but substance is not accidental to generation: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *The divine essence is communicated through generation, because through generation it comes to be that one [essence] is in many.*

**I respond:** For understanding this it should be noted that *common*, considered in itself, is indifferently disposed to act and to potency. For *common* can be said of that which is *communicable*, although it not be in many — as is clear in many universals, such as the sun and the moon and the like. *Common* is also said of what is *communicated*, which is actually in many.

I say therefore that, just as the universal form, considered in itself, is communicable, but yet is actually communicated through the propagation[^7] of many,

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so the divine nature or essence is in itself indeed communicable, but its being actually communicated is only through that which multiplies or pluralizes the supposits — and this is generation[^8].

Since, therefore, through generation the persons are pluralized, and the substance in them is not numbered, hence it is that most truly substance or essence is communicated through generation, because through generation it comes to be that one [substance] is in many.

**1.** To the objection that generation is the principle of distinguishing: it must be said that generation is *per se* the principle of distinguishing one supposit from another, because it is *per se* terminated at it; it is also the principle of communicating the common nature[^9], because [it produces] the like from the like. But because the nature in inferior beings is numbered in supposits, therefore it is also the principle of distinguishing the common, but *per accidens*; in God, however, it is neither *per se* nor *per accidens*.

**2.** To the objection that *to make the common to be in this* is the principle of appropriating: it must be said that this is true when the common is appropriable or appropriated through *being in this*. But the divine essence is not thus appropriable, nor appropriated through *being in this*, because it is not appropriable as to its signified or as to its supposit, since it signifies and supposits the same, as was shown above[^10]; and its signified is not distinguished by any addition. For this is true: *the essence of the Father, and the essence which is in the Father, is the Son*.

Or it can be said otherwise: *to make to be in this* is in two ways — either absolutely, and in this way it is the principle of appropriating; or by comparison, that what was previously in one comes to be afterward in another, and in this way it is the principle of communicating the nature. But there is a certain nature which is distinguished[^11] in supposits — namely that to which addition is made — and a certain nature [which is] not, such as the divine; and in the first there is the principle of communicating and of distinguishing, in the divine [nature] only [the principle] of communicating.

**3.** To the objection that, if [substance] is communicated through generation, generation makes the substance common[^12]: it must be said that this is true according as *common* is said *in act*, because [it is] in many; but not according to *potency*. Hence with generation set aside, substance is common because *communicable*; but it is not common as *communicated*.

**4.** To the objection that what is given through generation is begotten: it must be said that this is false: because *to be begotten* expresses production and distinction, but *giving*[^13] expresses authority and communication; and since through generation substance is not distinguished, although it be communicated: therefore, etc.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, *videtur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *videtur* ["seems"].

la: Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 37. (c. 3.): *Operantes quidem (causae) et singulares simul sunt et non sunt cum iis, quorum sunt causae*. Cfr. S. Thom., *Comment. in hunc locum*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 37 (c. 3): «Operative (causes) and singular [causes] simultaneously are and are not [present] together with those of which they are causes». Cf. St. Thomas, *Commentary on this passage*.

la: Substituimus ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 *illud* pro *idem*.

en: We have substituted, on the authority of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, *illud* ["that"] for *idem* ["the same"].

la: Sensus est: natura est multo communicabilior quam in illis inferioribus. — Forte melius cum cod. T omitteretur *illis*.

en: The sense is: the nature is much more communicable than in those inferior [beings]. — Perhaps better, with codex T, *illis* ["to them"] would be omitted.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. q. 2. obiect. 1. — Mox post primum *ergo* Vat. planius quidem *generatio* loco *per generationem*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 4, q. 2, obj. 1. — Soon after the first *ergo*, the Vatican edition has *generatio* in place of *per generationem* — more straightforward, indeed, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. I: *Item per generationem communicatur omne illud quod per generationem est commune*, et paulo infra post *communicatur* addit: *per generationem est communis. Si ergo substantia per generationem communicatur*, qua transpositione et additione vis argumenti debilitatur.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads: *Likewise, through generation is communicated all that which through generation is common*; and a little below, after *communicatur*, it adds: *through generation is common. If therefore substance is communicated through generation*. By this transposition and addition the force of the argument is weakened.

la: Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. et cod. cc *actu non communicatur nisi per propagationem*. Vat. deinde contra mss. et ed. 1 addit *vel aggregationem*; sed aperte falsum. Paulo infra plerique codd. ut A F G K T etc. cum ed. 1 *communicatur* pro *communicetur*.

en: Thus the older codices with ed. 1, while the Vatican edition and codex cc read *actu non communicatur nisi per propagationem* ["actually is not communicated except through propagation"]. The Vatican then, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *vel aggregationem* ["or aggregation"] — but plainly falsely. A little below, most codices, such as A F G K T etc., with ed. 1 read *communicatur* in place of *communicetur*.

la: Cod. O addit *et processio*.

en: Codex O adds *et processio* ["and procession"].

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. adiecimus *etiam*, sicut et paulo infra fide mss. et ed. 1 *similem* substituimus loco *consimilem*.

en: From the older manuscripts we have added *etiam* ["also"], just as a little below, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *similem* ["like"] in place of *consimilem* ["very like"].

la: Vat. *dividitur*, sed absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1. — Paulo post cod. I *quaedam quae non distinguitur* loco *quaedam non*, et mox cod. W post *solum* repetit *ratio*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *dividitur* ["is divided"], but without the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1. — A little later, codex I has *quaedam quae non distinguitur* ["a certain one which is not distinguished"] in place of *quaedam non* ["a certain one not"], and soon after, codex W after *solum* repeats *ratio*.

la: Ita multi codd. ut C L O S V W X Y etc. cum ed. 1; alii vero ut A F G H I T Z etc. *quod si generatio communicat substantiam, et communem.* Vat. *communicatur substantia, fit per generationem communis substantia.*

en: So many codices, such as C L O S V W X Y etc., with ed. 1; but others, such as A F G H I T Z etc., read *quod si generatio communicat substantiam, et communem* ["that if generation communicates the substance, also the common"]. The Vatican edition reads *communicatur substantia, fit per generationem communis substantia* ["the substance is communicated, the common substance comes about through generation"].

la: Mendum Vat. *ratio* pro *datio* ex mss. correximus et paulo infra fide codd. B D F H I P Q T Y loco *quia* substituimus *quoniam*, licet alii antiqui codd. ut A E G K S W X Z et ff ed. 1 *solum habeant quoniam*, sed minus bene.

en: We have corrected the Vatican edition's error of *ratio* for *datio* on the authority of the manuscripts; and a little below, on the authority of codices B D F H I P Q T Y, we have substituted *quoniam* ["since"] in place of *quia* ["because"], although other older codices, such as A E G K S W X Z and ff ed. 1, *only have quoniam* — but less well.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Scot. (hic q. 2.) observat, quod aliud est aliquid per generationem *communicare*, aliud per eandem aliquid *producere*: productio enim infert realem distinctionem inter producentem et productum, non vero communicatio. Essentia igitur divina nec generatur nec producitur nec multiplicatur, tamen secundum omnes theologos *communicatur*. Terminus totalis generationis in Deo est Filius, et relatio inter generantem et generatum est realis cum reali distinctione. Sed inter communicantem et communicatum, quod est essentia divina, non est realis relatio, nec alia distinctio nisi secundum rationem. Cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. in corp. et ad 2; et d. 34. q. 2. ad 7, et ibid. q. 1.

**II.** Inter antiquos Scholasticos non invenimus, qui explicite hanc quaestionem tractent, praeter B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 1. n. 57. et seqq. — Petr. Aureolum, hic q. 5. — Eam tangit Scot., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Scotus (here q. 2) observes that one thing is *to communicate* something through generation, another *to produce* something through the same: for production infers a real distinction between producer and produced, but not communication. Therefore the divine essence is neither generated nor produced nor multiplied, yet according to all theologians it is *communicated*. The total term of generation in God is the Son, and the relation between begetter and begotten is real, with a real distinction. But between the communicator and the communicated — which is the divine essence — there is no real relation, nor any distinction except by account. Cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2 in corp. and ad 2; and d. 34, q. 2, ad 7, and ibid. q. 1.

**II.** Among the older Scholastics we do not find any who explicitly treat this question, except Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 60, q. 1, n. 57 ff. — Peter Aureolus, here q. 5. — Scotus touches on it here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 5, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts concerning the Master's text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima dubitatio est de rationibus Magistri.

#### Dub. I

Nam prima eius ratio ducit ad hoc inconveniens, scilicet quod, si essentia generaretur a Patre, essentia poneretur pro relativo; et haec ratio ponitur ibi: *Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam*. Sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens. Si enim magis convenit essentia cum supposito, quam universale cum singulari; si non est inconveniens, quod universale ponatur[^1] pro singulari, nec est inconveniens, quod essentia ponatur pro relativo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si essentia poneretur pro relativo, esset inconveniens, non a parte

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rei, sed a parte expressionis fidei. Tunc enim videretur et[^2] notaretur unitas essentiae in quadam distinctione. Esset etiam inconveniens, quia quod ponitur pro relativo in quantum huiusmodi, non indicat essentiam. Si ergo[^3] essentia poneretur pro relativo, essentia aliquando non indicaret essentiam, quod est omni rationi contrarium.

#### Dub. II

Item secundo dubitatur de secunda ratione, in qua ducit ad hoc inconveniens, quod eadem res gigneret se ipsam, et ponitur, ibi: *Item cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius quod ipse est, quia essentia dicit quid commune, sicut et hoc nomen Deus*; sed si dicatur: *homo*[^4] *Petrus generat hominem*, et ipse est homo: ergo generat se, argumentum istud nihil valet. Similiter videtur hic: *Pater generat Deum*: ergo etc., pari ratione nec in proposito.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *commune* dicitur quod est in multis; sed hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quod plurificatur in multis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad suppositum, ut hoc nomen *homo*; et tale habet unitatem rationis, quae admittit distinctionem et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum. Unde bene dicitur *homo esse ab homine*[^5], et: *duos esse homines*. Alio modo est commune quod plurificatur quantum ad suppositum, non quantum ad formam, ut hoc nomen *Deus*; et tale habet unitatem rei, secundum quod res nominat naturam cum multiplicatione suppositorum: et ideo recipit *distinctivum*[^6] quod importat distinctionem ut modum, non ut rem. Unde conceditur: *Deus de Deo*, sed non: *Deus est alius a Deo*. Est tertio modo commune secundum nomen, quod est in multis, nec tamen plurificatur quantum ad formam, quia est unum in multis, nec quantum ad supposita, quia pro illis non supponit, ut hoc nomen *essentia*. De tali communi verum est dicere, quod non recipit distinctionem nec quantum ad modum, nec quantum ad rem; tunc enim notaretur idem distingui a se. Et ita argumentum Magistri est bonum: *si Pater genuit essentiam, Pater genuit se*; et[^7] loquitur de communi a parte vocis significantis, non a parte rei, quia a parte rei eadem communitas est in hoc quod est *Deus* et in hoc quod est *essentia*.

#### Dub. III

Item tertio obiicitur contra tertiam rationem: *si Pater genuit divinam essentiam, tunc genitum gignenti causa est, ut sit et Deus sit*, et ponitur ibi: *Et si ita est, non genito gignens* etc. Sed haec ratio nihil videtur valere, quia ratio causae non cadit in divinis; «causa enim est cuius esse sequitur aliud»[^8]; sed in divinis non est aliud: ergo etc.

Item, non sequitur: *Pater genuit sapientiam*: ergo *est sapiens sapientia genita*: ergo pari ratione nec praedicta locutio[^9] valet.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sumendo nomen *causae* proprie, non cadit in divinis[^10], cadit tamen et recipitur ratio *principiantis* et ratio *informantis*, et pro his accipitur nomen *causae*. Quoniam igitur ratio essendi significatur per hoc nomen *essentia*: ideo essentia significat[^11] quodam modo in ratione causae respectu entis. Si ergo essentia esset genita ab ente, significaretur in ratione effectus sive principiati, et idem esset tunc principium et principiatum respectu eiusdem, quod est impossibile; et in hoc fundatur ratio Magistri.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia; dicendum, quod tactum est de ipsa in quaestionibus extra litteram[^12], quia nomen ita abstractum, sicut *essentia*, non supponit pro relativo, *sapientia* bene supponit pro relativo; et ita est ibi accidens: *Pater est sapiens sapientia et genuit sapientiam*: ergo *est sapiens sapientia quam genuit*, vel *sapientia genita*. In nomine autem *essentiae* non est accidens, quoniam idem significat et supponit.

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#### Dub. IV

*Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium.* Contra hoc obiicit Ioachim, tam contra positionem quam contra rationem. *Contra positionem*, quia si essentia non generat nec generatur nec procedit: ergo in divinis est res generans et genita et procedens, et res nec generans nec genita nec procedens; et ita est ibi[^13] quaternitas, si sunt quatuor res.

Item, irridet rationem Magistri: si essentia generat essentiam, et essentia est una res: ergo una res generat se ipsam. Similiter, inquit Ioachim, potuisti dicere, Petre: *Deus generat Deum, et*[^14] *unus est Deus*: ergo eadem res generat se ipsam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Ioachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia *res* non accipitur uniformiter, quia cum dicitur res primo modo, ibi accipitur *res pro re naturae*; sed cum dicitur[^15] secundo modo, accipitur pro ipsa natura divina. Praeterea, deficit ab insufficienti, quia non valet: *si aliquid dicitur de aliquo*[^16], *et non dicitur de alio, quod propter hoc illa faciant numerum*. Unde non valet: *Petrus est individuum: homo non est individuum: ergo Petrus et homo sunt duo*. Habere enim proprietatem et non habere non sufficit ad distinguendum.

Ad instantiam eius dicendum, quod non recte instat; quia *essentia est res una quantum ad suppositum et significatum*; non enim supponit personas; sed *Deus est res una quantum ad significatum, sed plures quantum ad suppositum*. Et ideo ignoranter Ioachim reprehendit Magistrum, et quia[^17], cum esset simplex, non est reveritus Magistrum, ideo iusto Dei iudicio damnatus fuit libellus eius in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magistri approbata[^18].

#### Dub. V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: *Nihil habet Filius, nisi quod nascendo accepit*. Quaeritur ergo de hoc verbo *accepit*, utrum dicat substantiam vel relationem. Si substantiam: ergo Pater similiter accepit; si relationem: ergo[^19] cum essentiam acceperit Filius, essentia est accepta: ergo essentia refertur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *accipere* dicit duo, scilicet *habere* et *esse ab alio*; quantum ad *habere* respicit essentiam; sed quantum ad hoc quod est *esse ab alio*, respicit personam: unde per verbum *accipiendi* significatur, quod essentia habetur a persona, quae est ab alio[^20].

#### Dub. VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Et ideo non refertur ad aliud, quod in uno subsistit ex uno*, quia videtur falsum; quoniam Filius subsistit a Patre, tamen refertur ad Spiritum sanctum[^21].

**Respondeo:** Hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quod Filius non habet respectum nisi ad unam personam; et hoc intelligitur in quantum Filius, quia in quantum spirans est, refertur ad alium; vel quod persona Filii non habet respectum nisi ad unam naturam; et hoc verum est, quia Filius non habet in se nisi naturam Patris.

#### Dub. VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus*. In divinis enim non est prius nec posterius, et ita nec praecedere nec sequi. Si tu dicas, quod est secundum rationem intelligendi; hoc nihil est, quia Deus gignens nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum sequitur aliquid[^22].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Hilarius improprie loquitur, et ideo addit determinationem: *ut ita dicam*; et tantum vult dicere *sequi*, quantum *inseparabiliter comitari*[^23] et *consociare* et ab illo non recedere, et hoc patet per sequens.

#### Dub. VIII

Item quaeritur de auctoritatibus Augustini, primo de hoc quod dicit, quod *Deus semel genuit Filium*. Videtur enim male dicere *semel*, quia *semel* dicit vicissitudinem; sed in generatione aeterna nulla cadit vicissitudo: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *semel* potest dicere *nunc temporis*, vel *nunc aeternitatis*. Et si dicat *nunc temporis*, cum tempus habeat diversa nunc,

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notat intercisionem; si autem *nunc aeternitatis*, et[^24] illud *nunc* semper est et invariabile et unum, *semel* dicit omnimodam invariabilitatem, perfectionem et unitatem.

#### Dub. IX

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Filii caritatis suae*, utrum *caritas* accipiatur ibi essentialiter, aut notionaliter. Si essentialiter: ergo Christus Filius est essentiae, quod non conceditur. Si tu dicas, quod est impropria locutio, et est sensus: *Filii essentiae*, id est, qui est essentia; tunc nullus videtur sensus, et pro nihilo additum[^25] hoc quod est *caritatis*. Et rursus Augustinus exponit, *Filii caritatis*, id est *Filii dilecti*; sed Pater diligit Filium Spiritu sancto: ergo etc. Si propter hoc dicas, quod tenetur notionaliter; tunc ergo Filius Dei est Filius Spiritus sancti, quod absurdum est omnino.

**Respondeo:** Ad[^26] hoc dicunt aliqui, quod ille genitivus nec proprie essentialiter nec proprie notionaliter, sed medio modo tenetur, id est *appropriate*. Licet enim caritas sit omnibus communis et proprium Spiritus sancti, uno tamen modo appropriate convenit Patri, quia caritas est *amor gratuitus*; et sic dicit Richardus, quia *amor gratuitus est, qui tantum dat et nihil accipit*[^27], et hoc est in persona Patris, ideo appropriatur Patri. Alio modo dici potest, quod *caritas* ibi tenetur essentialiter, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod[^28] nihil aliud est dicere *Filii caritatis* quam *Filii substantiae*; sed genitivus non construitur in ratione principii, sed ex vi declarationis essentiae[^29], et est sensus: *Filii caritatis*, id est *Filii cari*; et *Filii substantiae* vel *naturae*, hoc est *Filii consubstantialis* et *naturalis*.

#### Dub. X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius est de substantia Patris homoousion*, quia — cum filius naturalis partem substantiae trahat a patre, partem a matre in his inferioribus, et in Deo totam substantiam trahat a Patre — videtur quod Pater non tantum deberet dici *pater*, sed etiam *mater*, et multo fortius mater, quia mater plus dat quam pater. Item, Filius Dei vocat se *sapientiam et sapientiam, quae concipitur et parturitur*, Proverbiorum octavo[^30]. Ergo cum hoc proprium sit matris, videtur quod Pater proprius deberet dici *mater* quam *pater*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomen *matris* non transfertur ad divina. Et unam rationem assignat Anselmus in *Monologio*[^31]: quia principium maternum praeexigit aliud principium prius. Et ratio huius est, quia mater est principium *passivum*, et omne tale movetur ab alio: ergo ante ipsum est principium aliud. Quoniam igitur principium generationis Filii est *primum* et est *pure actuale*, ideo nullo modo transfertur maternum principium; transfertur tamen actus maternus, ut *concipere* et *parturire*, pro eo quod ibi agit unum principium quod[^32] hic duo.

#### Dub. XI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius et Spiritus sanctus non est de nihilo*. Videtur enim falsum, quia illud quod de nulla praeiacente materia est, de nihilo est; sed Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt de aliquo, ut de Patre; quaeritur tunc, utrum Pater sit ex nihilo; et videtur quod sic, quia *non aliquid* et *nihil* convertuntur; sed Pater non est ex[^33] aliquo: ergo est ex nihilo. Item, quia Pater non habet principium effectivum, ideo dicitur esse *a nullo*: ergo[^34] cum non habeat materiam, debet dici *de nihilo*. Si conceditur de Patre; contra: omne quod habet esse de nihilo, est creatum[^35]: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicitur *aliquid esse de nihilo*, secundum Anselmum in *Monologio*[^36] tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut *nihil* accipiatur simpliciter privative, ut cum dicitur de tacente: *iste loquitur de nihilo*; alio modo positive, ut si ita dicatur vel intelligatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, sicut *cultellus de ferro*; tertio modo partim positive, partim privative, ut si dicatur aliquid fieri *ex nihilo*, quia post nihil est aliquid, sicut dicitur: *de paupere fit dives*.

Dicendum ergo, quod secundum primum sensum Deus potest dici *de nihilo* esse, sive Pater sive divina essentia; tamen hic modus non est usitatus. Quantum ad secundum modum, omnino nihil fit ex nihilo, quia nihil nullius est materia. Quantum ad tertium modum, secundum quem loquitur Augustinus, quod sola creatura fit *de nihilo* sive est *de nihilo*, quia *de* notat ibi ordinem, ut habeat esse post non esse — hoc quod est *de nihilo* privat materiam praeiacentem. Quamvis ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non habeant materiam praeiacentem, quia tamen non habent esse post non esse, ideo non dicuntur esse *ex nihilo*. Et ideo non valet primum argumentum, quia procedit ab insufficienti.

Secundum vero et tertium argumentum, de Patre factum, procedit, secundum quod negatio eius quod est *nihil*, fertur extra ad verbum et facit orationem negativam; et secundum hunc sensum, sicut conceditur, quod Pater *a nullo* sit, ita *de nihilo*. Tamen, sicut dictum est, sensus iste non est usitatus; communiter enim utimur hac locutione, secundum quod negatio *de nihilo* sistit intra, et hoc quod est *de* accipitur ibi *ordinaliter*.

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### Doubts concerning the Master's text

In this part doubts arise concerning the text, and the first doubt is about the Master's reasonings.

#### Doubt I

For his first reasoning leads to this incongruity — namely that, if the essence were begotten by the Father, the essence would be set down for a relative; and this reasoning is set down at: *«Therefore it must not be said that the Father begot the divine essence»*. But this seems no incongruity. For if the essence agrees more with the supposit than the universal does with the singular; if it is no incongruity that the universal be set down[^1] for the singular, neither is it an incongruity that the essence be set down for a relative.

**I respond:** It must be said that if the essence were set down for a relative, it would be incongruous — not on the side of

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the thing, but on the side of the expression of the faith. For then the unity of the essence in a certain distinction would be seen and[^2] noted. It would also be incongruous, because what is set down for a relative as such does not indicate the essence. If, then[^3], the essence were set down for a relative, the essence sometimes would not indicate the essence — which is contrary to all reason.

#### Doubt II

Likewise, second, doubt is raised about the second reasoning, by which he leads to this incongruity — that the same thing would beget itself — and which is set down at: *«Likewise, since God the Father is the divine essence, if He were its begetter, He would surely be the begetter of that which He Himself is, because* essence *expresses something common, just as does this name* God *»*; but if it were said: *«*Man*[^4] Peter begets a man, and he himself is a man: therefore he begets himself»*, that argument has no force. The same seems to hold here: *«The Father begets God: therefore» etc.* — by parity of reason, neither does it [hold] in the case proposed.

**I respond:** It must be said that *common* is what is in many; but this can be in three ways: either what is multiplied in many both as to *form* and as to *supposit*, as the name *man*; and such has *unity of account* (*unitas rationis*), which admits distinction both as to thing and as to mode. Hence one rightly says: *man is from man*[^5], and: *there are two men*. In another way the common is what is multiplied as to supposit, not as to form, as the name *God*; and such has *unity of thing* (*unitas rei*), according as *thing* names the nature with a multiplication of supposits; and therefore it admits a *distinctive*[^6] which imports distinction as a mode, not as a thing. Hence is conceded: *God from God*, but not: *God is other than God*. There is, third, the common *according to name*, which is in many — yet is not multiplied as to form, because it is one in many, nor as to supposits, because it does not supposit for them, as the name *essence*. Of such a common it is true to say that it admits no distinction, neither as to mode nor as to thing; for then the same would be noted as distinguished from itself. And so the Master's argument is good: *«if the Father begot the essence, the Father begot Himself»*; and[^7] he speaks of the common on the side of the signifying word, not on the side of the thing — because on the side of the thing the same commonness is in *God* and in *essence*.

#### Doubt III

Likewise, third, an objection is made against the third reasoning: *«if the Father begot the divine essence, then the begotten is the cause to the begetter, that He should be and be God»*, which is set down at: *«And if it is so, the begetter is not [cause] to the begotten»* etc. But this reasoning seems to have no force, because the account of *cause* does not fall in God; «for *cause* is that whose being some other thing follows»[^8]; but in God there is no *other*: therefore, etc.

Likewise, it does not follow: *«The Father begot wisdom: therefore He is wise by a begotten wisdom»*: therefore by parity of reason neither does the said expression[^9] hold.

**I respond:** It must be said that, taking the name *cause* properly, it does not fall in God[^10]; yet the account of *that which gives a principle* (*principians*) and the account of *informing* (*informans*) do fall and are received [there], and under these the name of *cause* is taken. Since, then, the account of *being* (*ratio essendi*) is signified by this name *essence*, therefore essence signifies[^11] in some way in the account of cause with respect to *being* (*ens*). If, then, the essence were begotten by being, it would be signified in the account of effect or *principled* (*principiatum*), and the same would then be principle and principled with respect to the same — which is impossible; and on this is founded the Master's reasoning.

To that which is objected concerning wisdom, it must be said that this has been touched on concerning it in the questions outside the text[^12]; because a name so abstract as *essentia* does not supposit for a relative, [whereas] *sapientia* does indeed supposit for a relative; and so there is an accident there: *«The Father is wise by wisdom, and He begot wisdom; therefore He is wise by the wisdom which He begot, or by a begotten wisdom»*. But in the name *essentia* there is no accident, since the same thing signifies and supposits.

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#### Doubt IV

*«Likewise, it must not be said that the divine essence begot the Son»*. Against this, Joachim objects, both against the position and against the reasoning. *Against the position*: because if the essence neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, then in God there is a thing generating and generated and proceeding, and a thing neither generating nor generated nor proceeding; and so there is, there[^13], a *quaternity*, if there are four things.

Likewise, he ridicules the Master's reasoning: if essence generates essence, and essence is one thing — therefore one thing generates itself. Similarly, says Joachim, you could have said, Peter: *«God generates God, and*[^14] *one is God»*: therefore the same thing generates itself.

**I respond:** It must be said that Joachim does not argue rightly, and his reasoning fails — because *thing* (*res*) is not taken uniformly: when *thing* is said in the first way, *thing* is taken there for *thing of nature*; but when said[^15] in the second way, it is taken for the very divine nature itself. Furthermore, his argument fails *from the insufficient*, because it does not hold: *«if something is said of one thing*[^16], *and is not said of another, that on this account those should make a number»*. Hence it does not hold: *«Peter is an individual; man is not an individual; therefore Peter and man are two»*. For to have a property and not to have [it] does not suffice for distinguishing.

To his counter-instance it must be said that he does not press rightly; because *the essence is one thing as to supposit and signified* — for it does not supposit for the persons; but *God is one thing as to the signified, but several as to supposit*. And therefore Joachim ignorantly rebuked the Master, and because[^17], being a simple man, he did not revere the Master, therefore by the just judgment of God his book was condemned at the Lateran Council, and the Master's position was approved[^18].

#### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about that which Hilary says: *«The Son has nothing except what He received in being born»*. It is asked, then, about this verb *received*, whether it expresses substance or relation. If substance: then the Father similarly received; if relation: then[^19] since the Son received the essence, the essence is received: therefore the essence is referred.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to receive* says two things — namely *to have* and *to be from another*; as to *having* it regards the essence, but as to that which is *to be from another* it regards the person: hence by the verb *receiving* it is signified that the essence is had by a person who is from another[^20].

#### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *«And therefore He is not referred to another, who in one subsists from one»* — because this seems false, since the Son subsists from the Father, yet is referred to the Holy Spirit[^21].

**I respond:** This can be understood in two ways: in one way, that the Son does not have a respect except to one person; and this is understood insofar as He is *Son*, because insofar as He spirates, He is referred to another; or that the person of the Son does not have a respect except to one nature; and this is true, because the Son does not have in Himself anything except the Father's nature.

#### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *«And the unchangeable God, as it were, follows His own nature»*. For in God there is no *prior* or *posterior*, and so neither *to precede* nor *to follow*. If you say that this is according to the account of understanding — this is nothing, because God begetting follows nothing either in reality or in understanding[^22].

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary speaks improperly, and therefore he adds the qualifier *as it were*; and by *to follow* he wishes to say only as much as *inseparably to accompany*[^23] and *to consort with* and *not to depart from* it, and this is plain by what follows.

#### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about Augustine's authorities — first, about that which he says, that *«God begot the Son once»*. For *once* seems to be said badly, because *once* expresses succession; but in eternal generation no succession occurs: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *once* can express either *now of time* or *now of eternity*. And if it expresses *now of time*, since time has diverse *nows*,

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it denotes interruption; but if *now of eternity* — and[^24] that *now* is always invariable and one — *once* expresses every kind of invariability, perfection, and unity.

#### Doubt IX

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *«Of the Son of His charity»* — whether *charity* is taken there essentially or notionally. If essentially: then Christ the Son is *of the essence*, which is not conceded. If you say that it is an improper expression, and the sense is *Son of essence* — that is, who is essence — then no sense seems to remain, and *of charity* is added[^25] for nothing. And again Augustine expounds: *«Of the Son of charity»* — that is, *of the beloved Son*; but the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit: therefore, etc. If for this reason you say that it is taken notionally — then therefore the Son of God is the Son of the Holy Spirit, which is altogether absurd.

**I respond:** To[^26] this some say that this genitive is taken neither properly essentially nor properly notionally, but in an intermediate way — that is, *appropriately*. For although charity is common to all and proper to the Holy Spirit, yet in one mode it suitably belongs to the Father by appropriation, because charity is *gratuitous love*; and so Richard says, because *gratuitous love is that which only gives and receives nothing*[^27], and this is in the person of the Father — therefore it is appropriated to the Father. In another way it can be said that *charity* is there taken essentially, as Augustine says, that[^28] to say *«of the Son of charity»* is no other than *«of the Son of substance»*; but the genitive is not construed in the account of *principle*, but by force of declaration of essence[^29], and the sense is: *«of the Son of charity»* — that is, *of the dear Son*; and *«of the Son of substance»* or *«of nature»*, that is, *of the Son consubstantial* and *natural*.

#### Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *«the Son is of the substance of the Father, homoousion»* — because, since a natural son draws part of his substance from the father and part from the mother in these inferior things, and in God draws the whole substance from the Father, it seems that the Father should not only be called *father* but also *mother*, and much more *mother*, since the mother gives more than the father. Likewise, the Son of God calls Himself *wisdom, and wisdom which is conceived and brought forth*, in Proverbs 8[^30]. Therefore, since this is proper to a mother, it seems that the Father should more properly be called *mother* than *father*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name *mother* is not transferred to divine things. And one reason Anselm assigns in the *Monologion*[^31]: that the maternal principle pre-supposes another, prior, principle. And the reason for this is that the mother is a *passive principle*, and every such is moved by another: therefore there is another principle before it. Since, then, the principle of the generation of the Son is *first* and is *purely actual*, the maternal principle is in no way transferred [to God]; the maternal *act* is, however, transferred — as *to conceive* and *to bring forth* — for this reason, that there one principle does what[^32] here two [do].

#### Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *«the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing»*. For this seems false, because that which is from no pre-existing matter is *from nothing*; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are such: therefore, etc. If you say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from something — namely from the Father — it is then asked whether the Father is from nothing; and it seems so, because *not-something* and *nothing* are convertible; but the Father is not from[^33] something: therefore He is from nothing. Likewise, because the Father has no effective principle, He is therefore said to be *from no one*: therefore[^34], since He has no matter, He must be said to be *from nothing*. If this is conceded of the Father — on the contrary: everything that has being from nothing is *created*[^35]: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is said that *something is from nothing*, according to Anselm in the *Monologion*[^36] it can be understood in three ways. In one way, that *nothing* be taken simply *privatively*, as when it is said of one silent: *«he speaks of nothing»*; in another way *positively*, as if it be so said or understood that something is made from nothing — as *a knife from iron*; in a third way *partly positively, partly privatively*, as when it is said that something is made *from nothing* because *after nothing is something* — as is said: *«from a poor man comes a rich man»*.

It must therefore be said that according to the first sense God can be said to be *from nothing* — whether the Father or the divine essence; yet this mode is not customary. As to the second mode, nothing at all is made from nothing, because nothing is the matter of nothing. As to the third mode — according to which Augustine speaks, that only the creature is made *from nothing* or is *from nothing*, because *from* there denotes order, that it has being after non-being — this *from nothing* removes pre-existing matter. Although, then, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have pre-existing matter, yet because they do not have being after non-being, they are not said to be *from nothing*. And therefore the first argument has no force, because it proceeds from the insufficient.

But the second and third arguments, made about the Father, do hold according as the negation of that which is *nothing* is carried outside to the verb and makes a negative sentence; and according to this sense, just as it is conceded that the Father is *from no one*, so [also] *from nothing*. Yet, as has been said, this sense is not customary; for we commonly use this expression according as the negation *from nothing* stays within, and that *from* (*de*) is taken there *ordinally*.

---

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *cum universale ponitur*, sed minus bene et contra alios codd., quorum tamen aliqui, retenta particula *quod*, legunt *ponitur* loco *ponatur*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *cum universale ponitur* (*when the universal is set down*), but less well and against other codices — some of which, however, retaining the particle *quod*, read *ponitur* in place of *ponatur*.

la: Ed. 1 *quod* loco *et*; aliqui codd. ut GUdd *connotaretur* pro *notaretur*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *quod* in place of *et*; some codices, as G U dd, [read] *connotaretur* for *notaretur*.

la: Meliorem lectionem damus ex mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *ergo* pro *enim*.

en: We give a better reading from the manuscripts and edition 1, putting *ergo* in place of *enim*.

la: Vat. *hoc modo* pro *homo*, sed castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. Paulo infra Vat. contra multos codd. ut ACFGHISTW etc. *illud non* loco *istud nihil*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *hoc modo* in place of *homo*, but is corrected from the manuscripts and the first six editions. A little further on the Vatican edition, against many codices such as A C F G H I S T W etc., [reads] *illud non* in place of *istud nihil*.

la: Supple: *se habendi*. Vide supra d. 1. dub. 1. — Paulo post aliqui codd. ut ABDFGHK etc. cum Vat. ponunt *Homo est ab homine*. — De communi in Deo et creaturis cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2; d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 2.

en: Supply: *se habendi* (*of holding itself*). See above d. 1, dub. 1. — A little later some codices, as A B D F G H K etc., with the Vatican edition put *Homo est ab homine* (*Man is from man*). — On the common in God and in creatures cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2; d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 2.

la: Cod. T bene addit *secundum*; nonnulli codd. ut FGHK ee ff *distinctionem* loco *distinctivum*, in qua lectione *quod* cum cod. H sumendum esset pro *quia*. Paulo infra mss. cum ed. 1 *Deus esse alius* pro *Deus est alius*; cod. O post *a Deo* addit *vel duo dii*.

en: Codex T well adds *secundum*; some codices as F G H K ee ff [read] *distinctionem* in place of *distinctivum*, on which reading *quod* (with codex H) would have to be taken for *quia*. A little further on the manuscripts with edition 1 [read] *Deus esse alius* in place of *Deus est alius*; codex O after *a Deo* adds *vel duo dii* (*or two gods*).

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *quia* loco *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *quia* in place of *et*.

la: In hac communiter recepta causae definitione, quae ex Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28-38. (c. 3.), II. Metaph. text. 6. seq. (I. brevior. c. 2.), V. Metaph. text. 2-4. (IV. c. 2.) colligi potest, Vat. hic et alibi contra codd. ac ed. 1 *relativo* cuius praefigit praepositionem *ad*.

en: In this commonly received definition of cause, which can be gathered from Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 28–38 (c. 3); *Metaphysics* II, text 6ff. (I, shorter version, c. 2); *Metaphysics* V, text 2–4 (IV, c. 2) — the Vatican edition, here and elsewhere, against the codices and edition 1, prefixes the preposition *ad* to the relative *cuius*.

la: Substituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *locutio* pro *solutio*.

en: We have substituted, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, *locutio* in place of *solutio*.

la: Cfr. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo ante cod. K post *causae* addit *de se*.

en: Cf. d. 29, a. 1, q. 1. — A little before, codex K after *causae* adds *de se*.

la: Vat. contra multos codd. ut ACFGHKLOSTUY etc. et ed. 1 modo passivo *signatur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against many codices such as A C F G H K L O S T U Y etc. and edition 1, [reads] in the passive voice *signatur*.

la: Hic q. 1. — Plura de ista propositione: *sapiens sapientia genita*, vide d. 32. a. 2. q. 4. et dub. 1. ac 2. — Paulo infra ex cod. W adiecimus *sapientia bene supponit pro relativo*, quod certe supplendum et in aliis mss. forte omissum est propter huius et praecedentis propositionis communem desinentiam *pro relativo*; et mox ex eodem cod. W addidimus *ibi*.

en: Here [in] q. 1. — On more concerning this proposition *sapiens sapientia genita* (*wise by a begotten wisdom*), see d. 32, a. 2, q. 4, and dub. 1 and 2. — A little further on, from codex W, we have added *sapientia bene supponit pro relativo* — which certainly must be supplied, and was perhaps omitted in the other manuscripts on account of the common ending *pro relativo* of this and the preceding proposition; and shortly after, from the same codex W, we have added *ibi*.

la: Vat. refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit *ibi* post *si sunt*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, transposes *ibi* after *si sunt*.

la: Restituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.

en: We have restored, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, the particle *et*.

la: Substituimus fide nonnullorum codd. VXY et ed. 1 *dicitur* pro *accipitur*.

en: We have substituted, on the witness of some codices V X Y and edition 1, *dicitur* in place of *accipitur*.

la: Vat. minus bene et contra antiquos mss. ac ed. 1 *altero* pro *aliquo*.

en: The Vatican edition, less well and against the ancient manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *altero* in place of *aliquo*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 4 hic omittit *quia*, et paulo infra pro *ideo* ponit *et sic*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 4, here omits *quia*, and a little further on in place of *ideo* sets *et sic*.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. *Scholion*.

en: See above a. 1, q. 1, *Scholion*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *ergo*, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.

en: We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *ergo*, which the Vatican edition less well omits.

la: De eisdem Hilarii verbis cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 1. ad 8.

en: On the same words of Hilary cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, ad 8.

la: Fide mss. addidimus *sanctum*.

en: On the witness of the manuscripts we have added *sanctum*.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *aliud*, et paulo infra contra eosdem omittit *dicendum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many codices and edition 1, [reads] *aliud*, and a little further on, against the same, omits *dicendum*.

la: Vat. *communicare et consonare*; plurimi codd. *communicari et consonare*. Haec autem verba in codd. ob abbreviatam scripturam saepe vel sunt dubiae lectionis vel cum verbis in textum nostrum receptis confunduntur. Verbum *comitari* recepimus ex ed. 1 et *consociare* ex cod. Z. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. *et per hoc patet sequens*, sed minus bene.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *communicare et consonare*; very many codices [read] *communicari et consonare*. These words, however, in the codices, on account of the abbreviated script, are often either of doubtful reading or are confused with the words received into our text. The word *comitari* we have received from edition 1, and *consociare* from codex Z. Then the Vatican edition, without authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *et per hoc patet sequens* (*and through this the following is plain*) [in place of *et hoc patet per sequens*], but less well.

la: Vat. clarius *cum*, cui lectioni obstant omnes codd. et ed. 1 ac forma indicativi in verbo *est*. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 verbo *invariabile* praefixum *est* expunximus, et fide antiquiorum mss. ac ed. 1 substituimus *invariabilitatem* pro *invarietatem*; lectio mss. certe praeferenda.

en: The Vatican edition more clearly [reads] *cum*; against which reading all the codices and edition 1 are opposed, as is the indicative form in the verb *est*. A little further on, on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have expunged the *est* prefixed to the verb *invariabile*, and on the witness of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *invariabilitatem* for *invarietatem*; the reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be preferred.

la: Vat. adiungit *est*, sed contra antiquiores codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3. Codd. RX *additur*. Paulo infra post *id est* Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus codd., omittit *Filii*. Verba August., XV. *de Trin.* c. 19. n. 37. sunt: *Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intelligitur, quam Filii sui dilecti*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *est*, but against the older codices and editions 1, 2, 3. Codices R X [read] *additur*. A little further on, after *id est*, the Vatican edition, contradicting the older codices, omits *Filii*. The words of Augustine, *de Trin.* XV, c. 19, n. 37, are: *«By «of the Son of His charity» nothing else is understood than «of His beloved Son»»*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *quod propter* pro *Ad*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] *quod propter* in place of *Ad*.

la: Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc post *caritas* omittit *est* ac dein *et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus*; demum pro *nihil* ponit *non*. — Textum Richardi vide supra d. 2. q. 4.

en: Thus the ancient codices with edition 1, while the Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc after *caritas* omits *est*, and then *et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus*; finally in place of *nihil* sets *non*. — For Richard's text, see above d. 2, q. 4.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *quia* pro *quod*, sed obstant antiquiores [codd.].

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *quia* in place of *quod*, but the older [codices] are opposed.

la: De significatione genitivi vide supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post *sensus* addit *et* ac post *vel* adiicit *etiam*, quae particulae absunt a vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1.

en: On the signification of the genitive, see above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3. — Then the Vatican edition with codex cc after *sensus* adds *et*, and after *vel* adds *etiam* — which particles are absent from the older manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Vers. 24. 25. — Paulo ante Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *sapientia est, quae* pro *sapientiam, quae*.

en: [Proverbs 8,] verses 24–25. — A little before, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *sapientia est, quae* in place of *sapientiam, quae*.

la: Cap. 42: *Quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit: nimis est incongruum, ut illi parenti adaptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa aut sociatur aut praecedit*. — De proxime sequenti ratione vide Aristot., I. *de Generat. animal.* c. 19. 20. et ibid. II. c. 4. — Nonnulli codd. post *principium* omittunt *prius*, et Vat. cum nonnullis mss. omittit *et*, quod fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 voci *ratio* praefiximus.

en: [Anselm, *Monologion*] c. 42: *«Because the first and principal cause of the offspring is always in the father. For if the maternal cause is in any way always preceded by the paternal: it is exceedingly incongruous that the name of mother be applied to that parent for whom no other cause either is associated with [it] or precedes [it] in begetting offspring»*. — On the immediately following reason, see Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* I, c. 19–20, and ibid. II, c. 4. — Some codices after *principium* omit *prius*; and the Vatican edition with some manuscripts omits *et*, which on the witness of many manuscripts and edition 1 we have prefixed to the word *ratio*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *et* loco *quod*, sed minus bene et contra antiquiores codd. Sub *ibi* intellige: *in generatione Filii*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *et* in place of *quod*, but less well and against the older codices. Under *ibi* understand: *in generatione Filii* (*in the generation of the Son*).

la: Aliqui codd. ut aa bb dd ff cum ed. 1 hic et immediate post *de* loco *ex*.

en: Some codices as aa bb dd ff with edition 1, here and immediately after, [read] *de* in place of *ex*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *simili modo* pro *ergo*, quod tamen alii codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *simili modo* in place of *ergo*, which however the other codices with edition 1 exhibit.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *creatum* loco *creatura*. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 adiungit tale argumentum: *Item quod est ex nihilo, est vertibile in nihilum: ergo etc.*

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *creatum* in place of *creatura*. Then the Vatican edition, without authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, adds the following argument: *«Likewise, what is from nothing is convertible into nothing: therefore» etc.*

la: Cap. 8.

en: [Anselm, *Monologion*] c. 8.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 6

title_alt: Distinctio VI — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction VI — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO VI.

*Utrum Pater voluntate genuerit Filium, an necessitate; et an volens vel nolens sit Deus.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate, an necessitate. De hoc Orosius ad Augustinum[^1] ita ait: «Voluntate genuit Pater Filium, vel necessitate? Nec voluntate, nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est, praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest». «Quocirca, ut Augustinus ait in decimoquinto libro de Trinitate[^2], ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici orti sunt, qui cum non potuisset intelligere nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum Filium Dei esse natura, id est de substantia Patris genitum, non naturae vel[^3] substantiae dixit esse Filium, sed Filium voluntatis Dei, volens asserere accedentem[^4] Deo voluntatem, qua gigneret Filium, sicut nos aliquid aliquando volumus, quod antea non volebamus; propter quod[^5] mutabilis intelligitur nostra natura, quod absit, ut in Deo esse credamus»[^6]. Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate, ut docet Augustinus in libro decimoquinto de Trinitate[^7], ubi quendam catholicum haeretico respondentem commendat dicens: «Acute[^8] sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens, an nolens genuerit, ut si diceret nolens, absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem volens, continuo quod intendebat concluderet, scilicet non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis[^9]. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater[^10] volens, an nolens sit Deus, ut si responderet nolens, sequeretur grandis absurditas et miseria, quam de Deo credere magna est insania; si autem diceret volens, responderetur ei: ergo et ipse[^13] voluntate sua Deus est, non[^11] natura.

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Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videns»? Ex praedictis docetur, non esse concedendum, quod Deus voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens sit Deus; item, quod voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens genuerit Filium[^12].

*Sed contra hoc opponitur sic [obiectio]:* voluntas Dei est natura sive essentia Dei, quia non est aliud Deo esse, aliud velle; et[^14] ideo, sicut una est essentia trium personarum, ita et una voluntas. Si ergo Deus natura Deus est, et voluntate Deus est; et si Verbum Dei natura Filius Dei est, et voluntate Filius Dei est.

*Hoc autem facile est refellere [refellitur].* Nam et praescientia Dei sive scientia, qua scit vel praescit bona et mala, divina natura sive essentia est; et praedestinatio sive voluntas eius eadem divina essentia est, nec est aliud Deo scire vel[^15] velle quam esse. Et cum sit unum et idem scientia Dei vel voluntas, non tamen dicitur de voluntate, quidquid dicitur de scientia, et e converso. Nec omnia illa sua voluntate Deus vult, quae sua scientia scit, cum scientia sua noverit tam bona quam mala, voluntate autem non velit nisi bona. Scientia quippe Dei et praescientia de bonis est et malis, voluntas vero et praedestinatio de bonis est tantum; et tamen unum et idem est in Deo scientia et voluntas, et praescientia et praedestinatio. Ita cum unum sit natura Dei et voluntas, dicitur tamen Pater genuisse Filium natura, non voluntate, et esse Deus natura, non voluntate.

*Praedicta tamen verba [explanantur verba praedicta],* quibus prudenter dictum est, quod Deus Pater nec volens nec nolens est Deus, nec volens nec nolens genuit Filium, sive[^16] voluntate sive necessitate, ex tali sensu mihi videntur accipienda, ut voluntatem praecedentem vel accedentem intelligamus, qualiter Eunomius intelligebat. Non enim ipse est Deus[^17] voluntate praecedenti vel efficienti, vel volens, priusquam Deus; nec voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti genuit Filium, nec prius volens quam generans genuit Filium, nec prius generans quam volens genuit Filium. Volens tamen genuit, sicut potens genuit et bonus genuit et sapiens genuit et huiusmodi. Si enim Pater sapiens et bonus dicitur genuisse Filium, cur non et volens? cum ita sit Deo idem esse volentem, quod est esse Deum; sicut idem est esse sapientem, quod est esse Deum. Dicamus ergo, quia Pater sicut sapiens, ita volens genuit Filium, sed non voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti. Quem sensum aperit Hieronymus et confirmat, ita dicens super Epistolam ad Ephesios[^18]: «De Filio Dei, id est Domino Nostro Iesu Christo scriptum est, quia cum Patre semper fuit, et nunquam eum, ut esset, voluntas paterna praecessit; et ille quidem natura Filius est».

*Notula.* Hilarius in libro de Synodis[^19]: «Eos qui dicunt, de non exstantibus esse Filium Dei, similiter qui dicunt, quod neque consilio neque voluntate Pater genuit Filium, anathematizat sancta Ecclesia. Item si quis nolente Patre dicat natum Filium, anathema sit. Non enim, nolente Patre, coactus Pater vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium, sed mox ut voluit, sine tempore et impassibiliter ex se Unigenitum demonstravit».

> **Apparatus note.** The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Page 123 carries textual-variant notes (Vat. = Vatican edition; codd. = codices; ed. 1 = 1st edition) from the main band and source-citation notes from the *Notae ad librum Sententiarum* footer band; page 124 likewise. Numbering is sequential in reading order, one entry per raw OCR footer note.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION VI.

*Whether the Father begot the Son by will or by necessity; and whether He is God willingly or unwillingly.*

It is moreover customarily asked whether the Father begot the Son by will or by necessity. Concerning this, Orosius to Augustine[^1] says thus: "Did the Father beget the Son by will, or by necessity? Neither by will, nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, [and] will cannot precede wisdom." "Wherefore, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^2], the dialectic of Eunomius is to be derided — from whom the Eunomian heretics took their origin — who, since he could not understand and would not believe that the only-begotten Word of God was the Son of God by nature, that is, begotten of the substance of the Father, said that He was the Son not of nature or[^3] substance, but the Son of the will of God, wishing to assert in God an acceding[^4] will, by which He begot the Son, just as we sometimes will something which we did not previously will; on account of which[^5] our nature is understood to be mutable — far be it that we should believe this to be in God."[^6] Let us say, therefore, that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will, as Augustine teaches in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^7], where he commends a certain Catholic answering a heretic, saying: "Aptly[^8] indeed did a certain man answer a heretic who was most cunningly asking whether God begot the Son willingly or unwillingly, so that if he should say 'unwillingly,' the most absurd misery of God would follow; but if 'willingly,' he would at once conclude what he intended, namely that the Son is not of nature, but of will[^9]. But that man most vigilantly in turn asked of him whether God the Father[^10] is God willingly or unwillingly, so that if he should answer 'unwillingly,' great absurdity and misery would follow, which to believe of God is great madness; but if he should say 'willingly,' it would be answered him: therefore He Himself[^13] also is God by His own will, not[^11] by nature.

What then remained, except that he should fall silent, seeing himself bound by his own questioning in an insoluble bond?" From the foregoing it is taught that it must not be conceded that God is God by will or by necessity, willingly or unwillingly; likewise, that He begot the Son by will or by necessity, willingly or unwillingly[^12].

*But against this it is objected thus [objection]:* the will of God is the nature or essence of God, because for God to be is not other than to will; and[^14] therefore, just as there is one essence of the three persons, so also there is one will. If, then, God is God by nature, He is also God by will; and if the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, He is also the Son of God by will.

*This, however, is easy to refute [it is refuted].* For the foreknowledge of God, or knowledge by which He knows or foreknows good and evil things, is also the divine nature or essence; and predestination, or His will, is the same divine essence, nor is it other for God to know or[^15] to will than to be. And although the knowledge or will of God is one and the same, yet whatever is said of will is not said of knowledge, and conversely. Nor does God will by His will all those things which He knows by His knowledge, since by His knowledge He knows both good and evil things, but by His will He wills only good things. For the knowledge and foreknowledge of God is of good and evil things, but the will and predestination is of good things only; and yet in God knowledge and will, and foreknowledge and predestination, are one and the same. Thus, although the nature and will of God are one, the Father is nevertheless said to have begotten the Son by nature, not by will, and to be God by nature, not by will.

*Yet the foregoing words [the foregoing words are explained],* by which it has been prudently said that God the Father is God neither willingly nor unwillingly, and begot the Son neither willingly nor unwillingly, whether[^16] by will or by necessity, seem to me to be taken in such a sense that we understand a preceding or acceding will, in the manner in which Eunomius understood it. For He Himself is not God[^17] by a preceding or efficient will, nor willing before being God; nor did He beget the Son by a preceding or acceding will, nor was He willing before begetting when He begot the Son, nor was He begetting before willing when He begot the Son. He nevertheless begot willingly, just as He begot powerfully, and begot good, and begot wise, and the like. For if the Father is said to have begotten the Son wisely and good, why not also willingly? — since to be willing is the same thing for God as to be God, just as to be wise is the same as to be God. Let us say, therefore, that the Father, just as wise, so willing begot the Son, but not by a preceding or acceding will. This sense Jerome opens up and confirms, speaking thus on the Epistle to the Ephesians[^18]: "Concerning the Son of God, that is, Our Lord Jesus Christ, it is written, that He was always with the Father, and the paternal will never preceded Him, that He might be; and He indeed is the Son by nature."

*Notula.* Hilary in the book *On the Synods*[^19]: "Those who say that the Son of God is from non-existent things, likewise those who say that the Father begot the Son neither by counsel nor by will, holy Church anathematizes. Likewise if anyone should say that the Son was born with the Father unwilling, let him be anathema. For not, with the Father unwilling, did the Father, compelled or led by natural necessity, when He would not, beget the Son; but as soon as He willed, without time and impassibly He showed forth from Himself the Only-begotten."

---

la: Orosius ad August., *Quaest. 65 Dialog.* q. 7, in quo textu Vat. post primum *necessitate* addit *sed*, et in fine ponit *potuit* loco *potest*, at contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 8 et originale Augustini.

en: Orosius to Augustine, *Question 65, Dialogues*, q. 7; in which text the Vatican edition, after the first *necessitate*, adds *sed*, and at the end places *potuit* in place of *potest*, but against all codices and editions 1, 8 and the original of Augustine.

la: August., *de Trinit.* lib. XV, c. 20, n. 38, sed nonnullis additis; in hoc textu cod. D *antecedentem*; ed. operum Augustini *accidentem* pro *accedentem*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, bk. XV, c. 20, n. 38, but with some additions; in this text codex D reads *antecedentem*; the edition of the works of Augustine has *accidentem* for *accedentem*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *aut*, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* reads *aut*, but the older codices with ed. 1 stand against.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut *aa bb* cum ed. 1 *de*.

en: Several codices, such as *aa bb*, with ed. 1, read *de*.

la: Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc *vel extra ad verbum ferri* pro *vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri*, sed contra ed. 1 et ceteros codd., qui in eo tantum dissident inter se, quod pro *ferri* alii ut CLSUV *aa bb* ponunt *foras*, alii vero ut AW *extra*, cod. O *foras ferri*, alii tandem ut GHIKRTXZ *dd ee ff* cum ed. 1 exhibent textum nostrum.

en: From the ancient manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *quod* in place of *quia*. A little below, the Vatican edition with codex *cc* reads *vel extra ad verbum ferri* for *vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri*, but against ed. 1 and the other codices, which differ among themselves only in that, in place of *ferri*, some such as CLSUV *aa bb* place *foras*, others such as AW [place] *extra*, codex O [reads] *foras ferri*, and others again such as GHIKRTXZ *dd ee ff* with ed. 1 exhibit our text.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *hoc est* loco *est*, quod habet Vat.

en: Most codices with ed. 1 [read] *hoc est* in place of *est*, which the Vatican edition has.

la: August., *de Trinit.* lib. XV, ibidem. — Paulo ante sola Vat. post *non voluntate* adiungit *neque necessitate*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, bk. XV, the same place. — A little before, the Vatican edition alone, after *non voluntate*, adds *neque necessitate*.

la: Vat., repugnantibus mss. et ed. 1, *habetur* pro *est*. Mox plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *sicut* pro *ei sic* in Vat. posito.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *habetur* for *est*. Soon after, most codices with ed. 1 [read] *sicut* in place of *ei sic* found in the Vatican edition.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur haec verba *quia nihil nullius est materia*, quae tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habentur.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc* the words *quia nihil nullius est materia* are missing, which nevertheless are found in the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Cf. Libr. II *contra Maximin.* c. 14, n. 2, et II *de Actis cum Felice Manichaeo*, c. 18, et *de Natura boni advers. Manich.* c. 26.

en: Cf. Bk. II *Against Maximinus* c. 14, n. 2, and II *On the Acts with Felix the Manichee*, c. 18, and *On the Nature of the Good Against the Manichees*, c. 26.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit *esse* ante *non*, et paulo post contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 post *et* omittit *esse*. Mox post *ita* claritatis gratia addit sola Vat. *quod sit*.

en: The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and ed. 1 resisting, transposes *esse* before *non*, and a little later against the older codices and ed. 1 omits *esse* after *et*. Soon, after *ita*, for the sake of clarity, the Vatican edition alone adds *quod sit*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *ibi*. — Plura de hac re vide supra a. 1, q. 2. — Eandem doctrinam habet Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 4. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; et S. I. q. 41. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. de Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine.

en: We have supplied *ibi* from the manuscripts and ed. 1. — See further on this matter above, art. 1, q. 2. — The same doctrine is held by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 1. — Thomas Aquinas, here q. 2, a. 2; and *Summa* I, q. 41, a. 3. — Albert the Great, here a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2, at the end.

la: Codd. ABCD omittunt *et ipse*, quod tamen in ed. operum Augustini habetur. Paulo infra Vat. contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 8 et originale *indissolubili* pro *insolubili*.

en: Codices ABCD omit *et ipse*, which nevertheless is found in the edition of the works of Augustine. A little below, the Vatican edition, against all codices and editions 1, 8 and the original, [reads] *indissolubili* for *insolubili*.

la: In Vat., obnitentibus codd. et edd. 1, 8, *et*.

en: In the Vatican edition, with the codices and editions 1, 8 resisting, [it reads] *et*.

la: Codd. ABC et edd. 1, 8 *vel*. Mox edd. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 omittunt *mihi*. Dein post *ut* in cod. A additur *nec*, in cod. B *non*, sensu non mutato.

en: Codices ABC and editions 1, 8 [read] *vel*. Soon, editions 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 omit *mihi*. Then after *ut*, in codex A *nec* is added, in codex B *non*, the sense not being changed.

la: Vat. contra codd. BCDE et edd. 1, 8, transpositis verbis, minus bene *ipse Deus est*.

en: The Vatican edition, against codices BCDE and editions 1, 8, with the words transposed, less well [reads] *ipse Deus est*.

la: Edd. 1, 8 omittunt *genuit Filium*. Paulo infra post *bonus genuit* Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 addit *Filium*.

en: Editions 1, 8 omit *genuit Filium*. A little below, after *bonus genuit*, the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, adds *Filium*.

la: Hieron., *Super Epistolam ad Ephesios*, super cap. 1, 5. — Omnes codd. et edd. *Augustinus* pro *Hieronymus*. — In cuius textu Vat. sola cum originali post *id est* addit *de* et dein post *Christo* adiungit *in alio loco*, scil. Eccli. 1, 1.

en: Jerome, *On the Epistle to the Ephesians*, on c. 1, 5. — All codices and editions [read] *Augustinus* in place of *Hieronymus*. — In whose text the Vatican edition alone with the original, after *id est*, adds *de* and then after *Christo* adjoins *in alio loco*, namely Eccli. 1, 1.

la: Hilar., *de Synodis*, n. 39, 1 et n. 58, XXV. — In cod. A respectu huius notulae additur *et quia Magister non probaverat, Patrem genuisse Filium voluntate, ideo haec nota posita est*. Haec notula in Vat. et aliis edd. ad marginem, in edd. 5, 6 in textu posita est.

en: Hilary, *On the Synods*, n. 39, 1 and n. 58, XXV. — In codex A, with respect to this little note, is added: *and because the Master had not proved that the Father begot the Son by will, therefore this note has been placed [here]*. This little note is placed in the margin in the Vatican edition and other editions; in editions 5, 6 it is placed in the text.


title: Dist. 6, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem VI — Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction VI — Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem VI

*De comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam.*

> *Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate* etc.

### Divisio Textus

In parte ista ponit Magister dubitationes emergentes ex comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam. Et quoniam contingit comparare[^1] actum generandi ad potentiam, et potentiam generandi ad suppositum, et ex utraque comparatione incidit dubitatio circa essentiae unitatem: ideo *primo* ponit dubitationem ex comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam; *secundo* ponit dubitationem ex comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam, infra distinctione septima: *Hic solet quaeri a quibusdam, utrum Pater* etc.

Item, prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet quatuor particulas. In *prima* Magister[^2] proponit quaestionem, utrum potentia vel virtus generandi sit producens necessitate, vel voluntate, et determinat veritatem huius quaestionis. *Secundo* ad istam quaestionem respondet ad hominem

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contra arguendo, ibi: *Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei.* *Tertio* vero opponit contra praedictam solutionem et respondet, ibi: *Sed contra hoc opponitur sic: Voluntas Dei* etc. *Quarto et ultimo* redit ad explanationem primae solutionis, ibi: *Praedicta tamen verba, quibus prudenter dictum est*, ubi explanat solutionem praehabitam.

### Tractatio Quaestionum

#### Articulus Unicus.

*De generatione Filii secundum suas conditiones.*

Ad evidentiam huius partis tria principaliter quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum conditionem necessitatis.

*Secundo*, utrum sit secundum rationem voluntatis.

*Tertio*, utrum secundum conditionem exemplaritatis.

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english:
## Commentary on Distinction VI

*On the comparison of the act of generating to the power [of generating].*

> *"Furthermore it is wont to be asked, whether the Father generated the Son by will"* etc.

### Division of the Text

In this part the Master sets forth the doubts arising from the comparison of the act of generating to the power. And since it is possible to compare[^1] the act of generating to the power, and the power of generating to the supposit, and from each comparison a doubt falls upon the unity of the essence: therefore *first* he sets forth the doubt arising from the comparison of the act of generating to the power; *second* he sets forth the doubt arising from the comparison of the power of generating to the person, below in the seventh distinction: *"Here it is wont to be asked by some, whether the Father"* etc.

Likewise, the first part — which contains the present distinction — has four sub-particles. In the *first* the Master[^2] proposes the question whether the power or virtue of generating produces by necessity or by will, and determines the truth of this question. *Second*, he answers this question by arguing *ad hominem*

against [the adversary], at the words: *"Let us say therefore, that the Word of God is the Son of God."* *Third*, he raises an objection against the foregoing solution and replies, at the words: *"But against this it is objected thus: The will of God"* etc. *Fourth and last*, he returns to the explanation of the first solution, at the words: *"Nevertheless the foregoing words, by which it has been prudently said,"* where he explains the solution previously given.

### Treatment of the Questions

#### Sole Article.

*On the generation of the Son according to its conditions.*

For the elucidation of this part, three things are principally inquired.

*First*, it is asked whether the generation of the Son is according to the condition of necessity.

*Second*, whether it is according to the character of will.

*Third*, whether it is according to the condition of exemplarity.

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la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *comparari*.

en: The Vatican edition, with some manuscripts, reads *comparari* ["to be compared"].

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Magister*.

en: From the manuscripts and the first edition we have supplied *Magister* ["the Master"].