title: Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De productione animae Evae aliorumque hominum.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce.*

Tertio quaeritur, supposito, quod animae producantur successive, utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce. Et quod sic, videtur.

***Ad oppositum.***

1. Genesis quadragesimo sexto[^1]: *Omnes animae, quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob, sunt septuaginta duo.* Si tu dicas, quod anima non stat ibi pro substantia rationali, sed pro vita carnali sive homine exteriori; obiicitur de Genesis secundo[^2]: in formatione mulieris nunquam dicitur, quod Deus inspiraverit in eam spiraculum vitae: ergo videtur, quod tota mulier de Adam producta fuerit quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus.

2. Item, ad Ephesios secundo[^3]: *Nascimur omnes natura filii irae;* sed non sumus filii irae ex parte carnis, sed ex parte animae, nec sumus filii irae, nisi quia sumus filii Adae: ergo anima nostra procedit ex anima Adae.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Actus generandi est entis completi — tunc enim unumquodque completum est, cum potest generare tale, quale ipsum est[^4] — sed anima humana inter omnes formas naturales est perfectissima: ergo si alia forma naturalis habet potentiam multiplicandi se in diversis materiis, sicut una flamma in diversis candelis, multo fortius hoc videtur esse in anima rationali.

4. Item, vis generativa principaliter residet penes animam: ergo si «*homo generat hominem*»[^5], cum generatio consistat in productione similis, principalius producit animam quam carnem: ergo si caro est ex carne, multo fortius anima est ex traduce.

5. Item, aeque magna vel maior congruentia est hominis ad hominem, quam sit bruti ad brutum; et perfectior est vis generativa in homine, quam sit in aliquo bruto animali. Si ergo brutum totaliter potest producere brutum, et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, et non est necesse, animam brutorum creari: multo fortius videtur, quod anima rationalis possit traduci et per coitum seminari.

6. Item, hoc videtur per *deductionem ad inconveniens:* aut enim anima rationalis est per *propagationem,* aut per *creationem.* Si per propagationem, habeo propositum, scilicet quod sit ex
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traduce. Si per creationem, cum Deus, cuius est creare, nihil possit vel debeat inordinate facere; videtur, quod sicut adultero non dat gratiam, quae immediate procedit ab ipso, sic etiam corpori per adulterium generato non debeat infundere animam. Quodsi infundat, videtur esse reprehensibilis et acceptare coitum adulterii[^6].

**Contra:**

***Fundamenta.***

1. Isaiae quinquagesimo septimo[^7]: *Omnem flatum ego feci;* constat, quod de flatu corporali non intelligit, ergo de flatu spirituali, qui est anima rationalis: ergo sicut solus Deus insufflavit in faciem Adae spiraculum vitae, ita creat animam cuiuslibet hominis.

2. Item, Philosophus in decimo sexto de Animalibus[^8]: «*Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco*»; sed si traduceretur, non intraret ab extrinseco: ergo anima rationalis non est ex traduce.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur. Omne quod est per naturam propagabile, est per naturam corruptibile; sed anima rationalis, secundum philosophos et secundum etiam omnes leges et sectas, est incorruptibilis[^9]: ergo non est per naturam propagabilis: ergo non est ex traduce.

4. Item, si anima est ex traduce, aut ergo anima est ex carne, aut anima ex anima. Ex carne esse non potest, quoniam impossibile est, ex corpore fieri non-corpus: anima autem est non-corpus, sicut multipliciter probat Philosophus et Augustinus[^10]. Si ex anima; aut ergo ex toto, aut ex parte. Ex parte non, quia anima est simplex; si ex toto: ergo cum aliquis generat aliquem, cum det ei totam animam suam, desinit habere animam, et sic desinit vivere. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, patet etc.

5. Item, anima rationalis, cum sit substantia per se existens et incorruptibilis, habet materiam et formam, sicut probatum est supra[^11]. Cum ergo producitur, aut producitur ex materia praeiacente, aut simul cum ipsa producitur sua materia. Si simul cum ipso producitur sua materia, ergo necesse est, quod producatur ex nihilo: ergo a solo Deo. Si producitur ex materia praeiacente: quaero de illa materia: aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis. Si corporalis, ex ea non potest fieri anima. Si spiritualis, aut habet formam, aut non. Si non, quomodo potest esse in rerum natura sine forma, cum «*omne esse sit a forma*»[^12]? Si habet: ergo vel erit Angelus, vel anima. Non Angelus, constat: ergo anima; sed ex eodem non fit idem numero: ergo ex ea non potest fieri anima.

6. Item, si anima rationalis esset ex traduce, necessario oporteret tunc discindi[^13], quando deciditur semen; sed multa semina sunt, quae nunquam perveniunt ad organizationem, immo plura effunduntur, quam ad formam producantur[^14]: ergo vel essent animae rationales sine corporibus, vel periret tam nobilis forma; quorum utrumque absurdum est dicere et impium.

### Conclusio.

> Animae rationales non sunt ex traduce, sed per creationem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi.

***Opinio 1.*** Quidam namque dixerunt, quod animarum productio est mediante *Intelligentia,* ut, sicut corpus caeleste ad productionem facit corporis humani, sic etiam Intelligentia ad productionem animae; et hoc plures senserunt philosophi, et sensisse videtur auctor in libro de Causis[^15]. — ***Ratio.*** Ratio autem, quae movit eos ad hoc ponendum, fuit et divina *unitas,* quae non patiebatur, ut Deus immediate produceret multa, et divina *immutabilitas,* quae non patiebatur, ut Deus produceret nova. — ***Reprobatur.*** Sed haec tanquam haeretica abiicienda sunt et ostensa sunt esse falsa, supra distinctione prima[^16]. Unde verbum illud de Causis tanquam haereticum est respuendum, nisi quis intelligat, quod anima dicitur creari ab Intelligentia in hoc, quod aliquam illuminationem
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suscipit mediante illa. Intelligentia enim, secundum Philosophum[^17], excedit animam in claritate cognitionis; et ideo dicit quidam philosophus, quod «*anima rationalis creatur in umbra intelligentiae, et sensibilis in umbra rationalis*». Hoc autem dictum est, quia una deficit a perfectione alterius, non quia una producatur ab altera.

***Opinio 2.*** Est et alius modus dicendi, quod animarum productio est per *traductionem,* ut anima traducatur ex anima, sicut caro ex carne; et sicut ab una candela accenduntur multae, sic ab una anima per sui multiplicationem absque diminutione vivificentur multa corpora. Et de hoc aliquando dubitaverunt catholici tractatores, et Augustinus maxime, sicut patet in libro super Genesim ad litteram[^18], et in libro de Libero Arbitrio, et in libro Retractationum, ubi etiam dicit, quod non potuit pervenire ad certitudinem istius quaestionis. Ratio autem, quae potissime fecit eum dubitare, fuit transfusio originalis peccati. — ***Non probatur.*** Verumtamen ipse Augustinus hanc positionem expresse reprehendit in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, cuius auctoritatem Magister ponit in littera[^19], et ipse istum eundem modum improbat super Genesim ad litteram: quoniam, si propter originale peccatum anima transfunditur ex anima, aut anima Christi non esset de genere aliarum animarum, aut habuisset originale peccatum, quorum utrumque falsum est et impium.

***Opinio 3.*** Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi catholicus et verus, quod animae non seminantur, sed formatis corporibus a Deo creantur et creando infunduntur et infundendo producuntur. — ***Duplex ratio.*** Animarum enim creationem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare, tum propter earum *dignitatem,* tum propter earum *immortalitatem.* Propter animarum *dignitatem,* quia, cum anima sit imago Dei et nata immediate ferri in Deum et beatificari in ipso diligendo eum ex toto corde, totum suum esse immediate debuit ab ipso habere, ut ipsum ex toto corde teneretur diligere[^20]. — Decuit etiam hoc propter animarum *immortalitatem.* Cum enim solus Deus sit, qui habeat vitam in semetipso et vitam indeficientem[^21]; solus est, qui potest producere principium vitae perpetuum. Cum igitur res incorruptibilis substantificari non possit in materia transmutabili, et operatio creaturae sit super materiam transmutabilem; impossibile est, aliquam creaturam animam rationalem producere: et ***Conclusio.*** ideo eius productionem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare.

***Solutio oppositorum.*** Concedendae sunt ergo rationes probantes, quod animae rationales non sint ex traduce, sed a creatione.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de textu Genesis, dicendum, quod anima ibi accipitur pro homine, et homo dicitur egressus de corpore ratione partis corporalis. — Nec valet illud quod contra hoc obiicit, quod non dicitur in productione animae Evae: *inspiravit in faciem eius* etc., quia, cum idem modus producendi esset animam Evae et animam Adae, non oportuit iterari[^22].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes nascimur natura filii irae; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia anima, cum unitur carni infectae, statim inficitur et contrahit culpam originalem; non quia ipsa traducatur, sed quia traducitur caro, cui unitur. Quomodo autem hoc fieri possit, infra[^23] determinabitur, cum agetur de peccato originali.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus generandi est entis completi; dicendum, quod non est cuiuslibet entis completi, sed eius rei, quae habet materiam transmutabilem, ex qua potest produci. Et quia anima non habet talem materiam, non potest aliam similem producere, quamvis sit forma completa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vis generativa principaliter residet penes animam; dicendum, quod etsi principaliter respiciat animam per modum *moventis et agentis,* principaliter tamen respicit corpus tanquam illud, *ex quo* producit. Et quoniam decisio potest fieri a corpore, non ab anima, hinc est, quod ordinatur ad productionem corporis humani, non ad productionem animae rationalis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod brutum potest producere brutum; dicendum, quod non est
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simile, quia anima bruti, cum sit forma tantum et forma corruptibilis, potest de potentia materiae educi; anima vero rationalis cum sit *hoc aliquid* et incorruptibilis nec educatur de materia praeiacente, necesse est, eam ex nihilo educi et ita creari. Quod autem non possit produci ex materia praeiacente, multipliciter ostendit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro septimo[^24], quod illa materia praeexistens nec possit esse corporalis nec spiritualis.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de generato per adulterium, dicendum, quod in hoc ostenditur potius laus divinae bonitatis quam reprehensio; quia beneficium, quod disposuit servare sive continuare, propter peccata hominum non immutat vel interrumpit; unde, cum animam infundit, non considerat vitium, sed considerat naturam[^25]. Nec est simile de gratia, quae non respicit naturam, secundum quod natura est, sed magis, secundum quod ad Deum conversa est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Patent etiam ea quae dicuntur in littera.

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### Article II. *On the production of the soul of Eve and of other human beings.*
### Question III. *Whether the rational soul is by traduction.*

Thirdly it is asked, supposing that souls are produced successively, whether the rational soul is by traduction. And that this is so, it seems thus.

***For the opposite side.***

1. Genesis forty-six[^1]: *All the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy-two.* If you say that *soul* there does not stand for the rational substance but for the carnal life or the outer man; it is objected from Genesis chapter two[^2]: in the formation of woman it is never said that God breathed into her the breath of life: therefore it seems that the whole woman was produced from Adam as to soul as well as to body.

2. Likewise, to the Ephesians chapter two[^3]: *We are all by nature children of wrath;* but we are not children of wrath on the side of the flesh, but on the side of the soul, nor are we children of wrath save because we are children of Adam: therefore our soul proceeds from the soul of Adam.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. The act of generating belongs to a complete being — for then is each thing complete, when it can generate such as it itself is[^4] — but the human soul among all natural forms is the most perfect: therefore if another natural form has the power of multiplying itself in diverse matters, as one flame in diverse candles, much more does this seem to be in the rational soul.

4. Likewise, the generative power principally resides in the soul: therefore if «*man generates man*»[^5], since generation consists in the production of like by like, it produces the soul more principally than the flesh: therefore if flesh is from flesh, much more is soul by traduction.

5. Likewise, an equally great or greater congruence is of man to man than is of brute to brute; and the generative power is more perfect in man than in any brute animal. If therefore a brute can produce a brute wholly, both as to soul and as to body, and it is not necessary that the soul of brutes be created: much more does it seem that the rational soul can be transmitted and sown by intercourse.

6. Likewise, this seems so by *reduction to the absurd:* for either the rational soul is by *propagation,* or by *creation.* If by propagation, I have what I propose, namely that it is by
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traduction. If by creation, since God, whose office it is to create, can or ought to do nothing inordinately; it seems that just as he does not give to an adulterer the grace that proceeds immediately from himself, so neither ought he infuse the soul into a body generated through adultery. But if he do infuse it, he seems to be reprehensible and to accept the intercourse of adultery[^6].

**On the contrary:**

***Foundations.***

1. Isaiah fifty-seven[^7]: *Every breath have I made;* it is settled that he does not understand it of bodily breath, therefore of spiritual breath, which is the rational soul: therefore just as God alone breathed into Adam's face the breath of life, so he creates the soul of every man.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the sixteenth book *On Animals*[^8]: «*The intellect alone enters from without*»; but if it were transmitted, it would not enter from without: therefore the rational soul is not by traduction.

3. Likewise, by *reason* it seems so. Everything which is by nature propagable is by nature corruptible; but the rational soul, according to the philosophers and even according to all laws and sects, is incorruptible[^9]: therefore it is not by nature propagable: therefore it is not by traduction.

4. Likewise, if the soul is by traduction, either then the soul is from the flesh, or the soul from the soul. From the flesh it cannot be, since it is impossible that from a body there come to be a non-body: but the soul is non-body, as the Philosopher and Augustine prove in many ways[^10]. If from the soul; then either from the whole, or from a part. Not from a part, because the soul is simple; if from the whole: then when one generates another, since he gives him his whole soul, he ceases to have a soul, and so ceases to live. But since this is manifestly false, it is clear etc.

5. Likewise, the rational soul, since it is a substance existing through itself and incorruptible, has matter and form, as has been proved above[^11]. When therefore it is produced, either it is produced from pre-existing matter, or its matter is produced together with it. If its matter is produced together with it, then it is necessary that it be produced from nothing: therefore by God alone. If it is produced from pre-existing matter: I ask of that matter: either it is bodily, or spiritual. If bodily, from it the soul cannot come to be. If spiritual, either it has a form, or not. If not, how can it be in the nature of things without a form, since «*all being is from form*»[^12]? If it has: then it will be either an Angel, or a soul. Not an Angel, that is clear: therefore a soul; but from the same thing the same numerically does not come to be: therefore from it a soul cannot come to be.

6. Likewise, if the rational soul were by traduction, it would necessarily have to be cut off[^13] then, when the semen is shed; but there are many seeds which never attain to organization, indeed more are poured out than are brought forth to form[^14]: therefore either there would be rational souls without bodies, or so noble a form would perish; both of which it is absurd and impious to say.

### Conclusion.

> Rational souls are not by traduction, but through creation.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking.

***Opinion 1.*** For certain ones said that the production of souls is mediated by an *Intelligence,* so that, just as the heavenly body contributes to the production of the human body, so also an Intelligence to the production of the soul; and many philosophers held this, and the author in the book *de Causis*[^15] seems to have held it. — ***Reason.*** The reason which moved them to posit this was both the divine *unity,* which did not allow that God should immediately produce many things, and the divine *immutability,* which did not allow that God should produce new things. — ***It is refuted.*** But these things are to be cast out as heretical and have been shown to be false above, in distinction one[^16]. Hence that saying of the *de Causis* is to be rejected as heretical, unless one understands that the soul is said to be created by an Intelligence in this, that it receives some illumination
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through it. For an Intelligence, according to the Philosopher[^17], exceeds the soul in clarity of cognition; and therefore a certain philosopher says, that «*the rational soul is created in the shadow of an intelligence, and the sensitive in the shadow of the rational*». But this is said because the one falls short of the perfection of the other, not because the one is produced by the other.

***Opinion 2.*** There is also another mode of speaking, namely that the production of souls is by *traduction,* so that the soul is transmitted from a soul, as flesh from flesh; and as from one candle many are lit, so from one soul, by its multiplication without diminution, many bodies are vivified. And concerning this the Catholic discussants sometimes doubted, and Augustine especially, as is clear in the book *On Genesis according to the letter*[^18], and in the book *On Free Choice,* and in the book *Retractations,* where he also says that he could not arrive at certainty about this question. The reason which most strongly made him doubt was the transmission of original sin. — ***It is not proved.*** Nevertheless Augustine himself expressly reproves this position in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas,* whose authority the Master sets down in the text[^19], and he himself reproves this same mode in *On Genesis according to the letter:* because if on account of original sin the soul is transfused from a soul, then either the soul of Christ would not be of the kind of other souls, or it would have had original sin, both of which are false and impious.

***Opinion 3.*** And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, catholic and true, namely that souls are not sown but, the bodies being formed, are created by God and by being created are infused and by being infused are produced. — ***Twofold reason.*** For the creation of souls God ought to have reserved to himself alone, both on account of their *dignity* and on account of their *immortality.* On account of the *dignity* of souls, because, since the soul is the image of God and born to be borne immediately to God and to be beatified in him by loving him with the whole heart, its whole being it ought to have immediately from him, so that it would be bound to love him with the whole heart[^20]. — It was fitting also on account of the *immortality* of souls. For since God alone is he who has life in himself and life that does not fail[^21]; he alone is who can produce a perpetual principle of life. Since therefore an incorruptible thing cannot be substantified in transmutable matter, and the operation of the creature is over transmutable matter; it is impossible that any creature produce a rational soul: and ***Conclusion.*** therefore God ought to have reserved its production to himself alone.

***Solution of the opposing arguments.*** The reasons proving that rational souls are not by traduction but by creation are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary about the text of Genesis, it must be said that *soul* is there taken for *man,* and a man is said to have come out from the body by reason of the bodily part. — Nor is that valid which is objected against this, that it is not said in the production of the soul of Eve: *he breathed into her face* etc., because, since the mode of producing the soul of Eve and the soul of Adam was the same, it was not necessary to repeat it[^22].

2. To that which is objected, that all are born by nature children of wrath; it must be said that this is because the soul, when it is united to infected flesh, is immediately infected and contracts original guilt; not because it itself is transmitted, but because the flesh to which it is united is transmitted. But how this can come to be will be determined below[^23], when original sin is treated.

3. To that which is objected, that the act of generating belongs to a complete being; it must be said that it does not belong to just any complete being, but to that thing which has transmutable matter from which it can be produced. And since the soul does not have such matter, it cannot produce another like itself, although it is a complete form.

4. To that which is objected, that the generative power principally resides in the soul; it must be said that although it principally regards the soul by way of *mover and agent,* nevertheless it principally regards the body as that *from which* it produces. And since decision can be made from the body, not from the soul, hence it is that it is ordained to the production of the human body, not to the production of the rational soul.

5. To that which is objected, that a brute can produce a brute; it must be said that it is not
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similar, because the soul of a brute, since it is a form only and a corruptible form, can be educed from the potency of matter; but the rational soul, since it is a *this something* and incorruptible and is not educed from pre-existing matter, must necessarily be educed from nothing and so created. That it cannot be produced from pre-existing matter, Augustine shows in many ways on *Genesis according to the letter,* book seven[^24], namely that that pre-existing matter can be neither bodily nor spiritual.

6. To that which is objected concerning what is generated by adultery, it must be said that in this is shown rather the praise of the divine goodness than reprehension; because the benefit which he has disposed to preserve or continue, on account of the sins of men he does not change or interrupt; hence, when he infuses the soul, he does not consider the vice but considers the nature[^25]. Nor is it the same with grace, which does not regard nature insofar as it is nature, but rather insofar as it is converted to God. And through this is clear the response to the objections. Clear also are the things which are said in the text.

la: Vers. 26. seq., ubi Vulgata: *Cunctae animae, quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum, et egressae sunt de femore illius, absque uxoribus filiorum eius, sexaginta sex. Filii autem Ioseph, qui nati sunt ei in terra Aegypti, animae duae. Omnes animae domus Iacob, quae ingressae sunt in Aegyptum, fuere septuaginta.* — Codd. cum primis edd., contra Vat., quae ponit *sexaginta sex,* exhibent lectionem in textu receptam, de qua cfr. Hieronym., *Qq. hebraic. in Gen.,* et August., 1. *Qq. in Gen.* q. 152, ubi ait: «*Quod legitur, sexaginta sex animas intrasse cum Iacob in Aegyptum, exceptis videlicet filiis Ioseph, et deinde illis annumeratis, infertur: septuaginta quinque animae erant, cum quibus Iacob intravit in Aegyptum, sic accipiendum est, qui erant in domo Iacob, quando intravit in Aegyptum. Nam utique quos ibi invenit, non cum eis intravit*» etc. Idem dicit XVI. *de Civ. Dei,* c. 40.

en: Verse 26 and following, where the Vulgate reads: *All the souls that came in with Jacob into Egypt and came out of his loins, apart from the wives of his sons, were sixty-six. But the sons of Joseph, who were born to him in the land of Egypt, were two souls. All the souls of the house of Jacob that came into Egypt were seventy.* — The codices, with the first editions, against the Vatican edition (which puts *sixty-six*), exhibit the reading received in the text; concerning which cf. Jerome, *Hebrew Questions on Genesis,* and Augustine, *Questions on Genesis,* bk. 1, q. 152, where he says: «*That it is read, sixty-six souls entered with Jacob into Egypt, the sons of Joseph being excepted; and then, those being added, it is inferred: there were seventy-five souls with whom Jacob entered into Egypt — this must be taken thus, those who were in the house of Jacob when he entered into Egypt. For surely those whom he found there did not enter with them,*» etc. He says the same in *City of God* XVI, c. 40.

la: Vers. 22.

en: Verse 22.

la: Vers. 3: *Eramus natura filii irae.*

en: Verse 3: *We were by nature children of wrath.*

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima,* text. 34. (c. 4.): «*Naturalissimum enim operum, quae in viventibus, quaecunque perfecta et non mutilata sunt, aut generationem spontaneam habent, est facere aliud, quale ipsum.*» Idem dicit IV. *Meteor.* text. 19. (c. 3.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 34 (c. 4): «*For the most natural of works in living things, whichever are perfect and not mutilated, or have spontaneous generation, is to make another such as itself.*» He says the same in *Meteor.* IV, text 19 (c. 3).

la: Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 26. (c. 2.) et VII. *Metaph.* text. 22. (VI. c. 7.), ubi etiam seq. prop. insinuatur.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 26 (c. 2), and *Metaphysics* VII, text 22 (VI, c. 7), where also the following proposition is intimated.

la: Cfr. August., Epist. 166. (alias 28.) ad Hieronym. c. 3. n. 15, ubi dicitur, quod, teste Hieronymo (III. contra Rufinum, n. 28.), quidam hoc arg. usi sint ad inferendam praeexistentiam animarum. Verba Hieronymi sunt: «*Et si dixero illud Ecclesiasticum: Quotidie Deus operatur animas et in corpore eas mittit nascentium, illico magistri tendiculas proferas: et ubi est iustitia Dei, ut de adulterio incestuque nascentibus animas largiatur? Ergo cooperator est malorum hominum et adulteris seminantibus corpora ipse fabricatur animas*»? Vide etiam Greg. Nyssen., *de Anima.*

en: Cf. Augustine, Epistle 166 (otherwise 28) to Jerome, c. 3, n. 15, where it is said that, according to Jerome's witness (*Against Rufinus* III, n. 28), certain ones used this argument to infer the pre-existence of souls. Jerome's words are: «*And if I say that ecclesiastical saying: Daily God works on souls and sends them into the bodies of those being born, you straightway bring forth the master's snares: where is the justice of God, that he should bestow souls on those being born from adultery and incest? Therefore he is a cooperator of evil men, and for adulterers sowing bodies he himself fashions souls?*» See also Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul.*

la: Vers. 16; iuxta translationem Septuaginta, cfr. supra in lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 2. — Text. seq. est Gen. 2, 7.

en: Verse 16; according to the Septuagint translation, cf. above in the Master's text, d. XVII, c. 2. — The following text is Gen. 2, 7.

la: Sive II. *de Generat. animal.* c. 3.

en: Or II *On the Generation of Animals,* c. 3.

la: Vide infra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1.

en: See below d. 19, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Aristot., I. *de Anima,* text. 46–90. (c. 3. seqq.) ostendit, quod anima non sit magnitudo neque corpus mixtum (harmonia) neque subtilissimum corpus. Idem probat August., *de Immort. animae,* c. 10. n. 17. seqq.; *de Quant. animae,* c. 18. n. 32. seqq.; 1. *de Anima et eius origine,* c. 3. n. 3. et IV. c. 12. n. 18. seqq.; VII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 12. n. 18. seqq. et X. c. 24. n. 40. seqq., ubi impugnat Tertullianum, qui putabat, Deum et animam esse corpus. — Paulo superius post *fieri* retinuimus cum Vat. *non-corpus* pro *nisi corpus,* quod in plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam habetur; vel lege: *fieri aliquid aliud, nisi corpus.* Mox plures codd. bis *ex tota* pro *ex toto.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 46–90 (c. 3 and following) shows that the soul is neither magnitude nor a mixed body (harmony) nor a most subtle body. Augustine proves the same in *On the Immortality of the Soul,* c. 10, n. 17 ff.; *On the Quantity of the Soul,* c. 18, n. 32 ff.; *On the Soul and its Origin* book 1, c. 3, n. 3, and book IV, c. 12, n. 18 ff.; *On Genesis according to the letter* VII, c. 12, n. 18 ff., and X, c. 24, n. 40 ff., where he attacks Tertullian, who thought that God and the soul are body. — A little above, after *fieri,* we have retained with the Vatican edition *non-corpus* in place of *nisi corpus,* which in many codices and editions 1, 2, 3 is wrongly held; or read: *fieri aliquid aliud, nisi corpus.* Shortly after, several codices have twice *ex tota* in place of *ex toto.*

en: Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Ut dicit Boeth., *de Unitate et uno.* Cfr. supra pag. 445. nota 5. — Simili arg. usus est August., VII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 7. n. 10. seq., in solutione quaestionis: utrum in prima creatione praecesserit animam aliqua materia, ex qua facta sit. — In plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desiderantur verba *Non Angelus* usque *numero.*

en: As Boethius says, *On Unity and the One.* Cf. above p. 445, note 5. — Augustine uses a similar argument in *On Genesis according to the letter* VII, c. 7, n. 10 and following, in the solution of the question: whether in the first creation any matter preceded the soul, from which it was made. — In most codices and editions 1, 2 the words *Non Angelus* through *numero* are lacking.

la: Codd. scribunt *descindi.*

en: The codices write *descindi.*

la: Ed. 1. cum paucis codd. *producuntur.* Magis placeret *perducuntur.*

en: Edition 1 with a few codices reads *producuntur.* More fitting would be *perducuntur.*

la: Prop. 5. 9. et 19. Cfr. supra pag. 29, nota 3.

en: Propositions 5, 9, and 19. Cf. above p. 29, note 3.

la: Cfr. XII. *Metaph.* text. 39. seqq. (XI. c. 7. seq.), ubi agit de intellectu divino et dein de aliis Intelligentiis. Vide etiam librum *de Causis,* prop. 10, 18, 23. — Verba, quae mox sequuntur, sumta sunt, ut iam cod. F notavit, ex Isaac, *de Definitionibus,* et continent summam eorum quae ibi dicuntur de speciebus animarum. Nam secundum cod. lat. 8001 bibl. Regiae Monacensis ibi legitur: *Restat scire, quod animarum sunt ordines tres, anima rationalis, bestialis, vegetalis. Omnibus autem excellentior est ratio, eo quod ipsa creata est ex intelligentia et de natura eius, et ob hoc factus est homo rationalis perceptibilis disciplinae, discernens inter bonum et malum et inter ea, per quae sit salvandus, vel damnandus. Inferior autem ea claritate et ordine est anima bestialis, quoniam* [eo quod?] *ex anima rationali creata est, et ideo elongata est a splendore, integre manens in tenebris, expers discretionis... Anima vero vegetalis, quae est desiderativa, est inferior omnibus animabus dignitate et ordine, eo quod creata est ex umbra animae bestialis, et propter hoc obtenebratur, procul remota a splendore intelligentiae propter multitudinem suarum tenebrarum privata sensu et motu... Ipsum* [caelum] *enim in horizonte animae vegetalis generatum est etc.*

en: Cf. *Metaphysics* XII, text 39 and following (XI, c. 7 ff.), where he treats of the divine intellect and then of the other Intelligences. See also the book *de Causis,* propositions 10, 18, 23. — The words which follow next are taken, as already codex F noted, from Isaac, *On Definitions,* and contain the sum of what is there said about the species of souls. For according to the Latin codex 8001 of the Royal Library of Munich it is there read: *It remains to know that there are three orders of souls: the rational soul, the bestial, the vegetative. More excellent than all is reason, because it itself was created out of the intelligence and from its nature; and on this account man was made rational, capable of receiving instruction, discerning between good and evil and between those things through which he is to be saved or condemned. Lower in clarity and order than this is the bestial soul, because* [in that?] *it has been created from the rational soul, and therefore has been removed from the splendor, abiding entirely in shadows, devoid of discrimination... But the vegetative soul, which is appetitive, is lower than all souls in dignity and order, because it has been created from the shadow of the bestial soul, and on this account it is darkened, far removed from the splendor of the intelligence on account of the multitude of its shadows, deprived of sense and motion... For it* [heaven] *itself was generated on the horizon of the vegetative soul,* etc.

la: Libr. X. c. 6. n. 9. seqq. — Libr. III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 21. n. 59. et 62; — Libr. I. *Retract.* c. 1. n. 3. — Cfr. etiam Epist. 166. (alias 28.) et 190. (alias 157.); III. *de Peccatorum meritis et remiss.* c. 10. n. 18.

en: Book X, c. 6, n. 9 and following. — Book III *On Free Choice,* c. 21, nn. 59 and 62; — Book I *Retractations,* c. 1, n. 3. — Cf. also Epistles 166 (otherwise 28) and 190 (otherwise 157); III *On the Merits and Remission of Sins,* c. 10, n. 18.

la: Hic c. 7. — August., X. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 18. n. 32. seqq. — Liber *de Ecclesiast. Dogm.* est Gennadii.

en: Here c. 7. — Augustine, X *On Genesis according to the letter,* c. 18, n. 32 and following. — The book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* is by Gennadius.

la: Alluditur ad Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37. — Hoc arg. utitur August., *de Quantit. animae,* c. 34. n. 77. seq. Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Alluded to are Deut. 6:5; Matt. 22:37. — Augustine uses this argument in *On the Quantity of the Soul,* c. 34, n. 77 and following. Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Ioan. 5, 26: *Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio* etc. — Paulo inferius aliqui codd. *sustentari,* plures *sustentificari* pro *substantificari.* In fine articuli Vat. cum aliis edd., exc. 1, *Creatore* pro *creatione.*

en: John 5:26: *For as the Father has life in himself, so has he given to the Son* etc. — A little below some codices have *sustentari,* several have *sustentificari* in place of *substantificari.* At the end of the article the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, has *Creatore* in place of *creatione.*

la: Cfr. August., X. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 1. n. 2.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* X, c. 1, n. 2.

en: Distinction 31, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cap. 6. n. 9. seqq. — Codd. et edd. allegant librum X, in quo tamen, c. 1. n. 7. seq., pauca tantum de hac re habentur. — Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut aa ee *ex nihilo produci* pro *ex nihilo educi,* et dein cod. V *educi ex materia* pro *produci ex materia.*

en: Chapter 6, n. 9 and following. — The codices and editions allege book X, in which however, c. 1, n. 7 and following, only a few things on this matter are had. — Cf. below d. 31, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above some codices, such as aa ee, have *ex nihilo produci* in place of *ex nihilo educi,* and then codex V *educi ex materia* in place of *produci ex materia.*

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* X, c. 13, n. 23; Epistle 166 (otherwise 28), c. 5, n. 15; Epistle 180 (otherwise 261), n. 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De celebri circa hanc quaestionem controversia dicit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2.): «Circa quaestionem hanc egregius Doctor Augustinus diu inter opiniones quatuor fluctuavit, ut ipse in fine libri de Libero Arbitrio ait: Harum quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibuscumque nascentibus novae fiant, an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes impellantur, vel sponte illabantur, nullam temere affirmare oportebit. Ipse idem tamen postmodum unam ex iis, scil. eas in singulis corporibus nascentium novas creari, elegit et tenendam definivit, ut patet in littera». — Notandum autem, quod liber de Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus (inter opera S. August. ed. Maurina t. 8.), cuius testimonio tanquam auctoritate Augustini Magister innititur, est Gennadii, presbyteri Massiliensis. Sententia autem Traducianismi iam a Scholasticis communiter reprobata est.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 118. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86–89; de Potent. q. 3. a. 9; Quodlib. 12. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. q. 1. a. 3. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the celebrated controversy around this question Petr. a Tar. says (here q. 2. a. 2.): «Around this question the Doctor of distinction Augustine for a long time fluctuated among four opinions, as he himself says at the end of the book *On Free Choice:* Of these four opinions about the soul — whether they come by propagation, or are newly made in each one being born, or, already existing somewhere, are driven into the bodies of those being born, or slip in spontaneously — it will not behoove one rashly to affirm any. Yet he himself afterwards chose and defined as to be held one of them, namely that they are newly created in each body of those being born, as is clear in the text». — But it is to be noted that the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* (among the works of S. Augustine, Maurist ed., t. 8), on whose testimony as on the authority of Augustine the Master relies, is by Gennadius, presbyter of Marseilles. The opinion of Traducianism, however, has by now been commonly reproved by the Scholastics.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., *de Rerum princip.* q. 10. a. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 118. a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* II. c. 86–89; *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 9; *Quodlib.* 12. a. 10. — B. Albert., here a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. *Sent.* d. 19. q. 1. a. 3. et 2. — Durand., here q. 3. — Biel, II. *Sent.* d. 17. q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 18, Dubia

title_alt: Dubium circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XVIII)

title_alt: Doubt concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XVIII)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 454 -->

### DUBIUM CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Posset tamen aliquis dubitare de hoc quod dicit, quod *mulier de costa facta est eo miraculo, quo de quinque panibus* etc. Videtur enim dicere, quod formatio mulieris fuerit miraculosa; et gratia huius posset introduci quaestio *de miraculis*. Sed propter suam prolixitatem, et quia parum pertinet ad propositum, omittenda est ad praesens[^1]. Hoc solum dixisse sufficiat, quod ideo dictum est, mulierem de costa *miraculo* esse factam, non quia factum sit *contra* solitum cursum naturae vel contra naturam, sed quia factum est virtute divina operante *supra* naturam.

*Adiungitur quaestio.* Si quis autem quaerat, utrum hoc opus *supra* naturam fecerit, ministrante sibi virtute angelica; respondet Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro nono[^2], ita inquiens: «Quale ministerium exhibuere Angeli in illa mulieris formatione, quis audeat assignare? Certissime tamen dixerim, supplementum illud carnis in costae loco, ipsiusque feminae corpus et animam configurationemque membrorum, omnia viscera, sensus omnes et quidquid erat, quo illa et *creatura* et *homo* et *femina* erat, non nisi illo opere Dei factum, quod Deus non per Angelos, sed per se ipsum operatus est»[^4]. — *Rationes 6 pro unitate generis humani.* Ratio autem potissima, quare Deus ita formavit, est, tum quia modus ille formandi erat supra potestatem naturae; tum etiam, ut homo in utroque sexu immediate in eum tenderet et ex se toto eum diligeret, a quo se nosset immediate esse factum.

Ratio autem[^6], quare ex uno homine Deus omnes producere voluerit, licet in aliis generibus animalium hoc non fecerit, sumi potest ex *ordine* et *connexione* et *significatione*. — Ex *ordine* vero dupliciter: *Ratio 1. et 2.* primo, ex ordine *corporis ad animam*, ut, sicut omnes animae rationales immediate procedunt ab uno principio, sic omnia corpora humana immediate exirent ab uno[^3]; secundo vero, ex ordine *totius coniuncti ad alias creaturas*. Quia enim homo medium tenet inter naturam angelicam et brutalem, cum Angeli *singillatim* a Deo producti sint, et creaturae brutales in *duplici sexu*, in masculino scilicet et feminino: homo debuit produci *medio modo*, et sic femina ex viro[^5].

Ex *connexione* similiter duplex sumitur ratio: *Ratio 3. et 4.* primo, respectu totius *speciei universaliter*, ut omnis homo diligat omnem hominem tanquam fratrem; secundo vero, respectu *uxoris specialiter*, propter quod *vinculum relinquit homo patrem*

<!-- page 455 -->

*et matrem, et adhaeret uxori, et sunt duo in carne una*[^7].

Ex *significatione* etiam duplex sumitur ratio: *Ratio 5. et 6.* primo ex significatione *allegorica*, qua intelligimus per virum et mulierem Christum et Ecclesiam; secundo, per *anagogicam*, qua per virum, qui fuit principium omnium hominum, intelligimus Deum, qui fuit principium omnium rerum[^8].

---

english:
### DOUBT CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Someone might however wish to raise a doubt about what he says, namely that *the woman was made from the rib by that miracle by which [the multiplication occurred] of the five loaves*, and so on. For he seems to say that the formation of the woman was miraculous; and on this occasion the question *concerning miracles* might be introduced. But because of its prolixity, and because it pertains little to our present purpose, it must be omitted for the present[^1]. Let it suffice to have said only this: that the woman is said to have been made from the rib *miraculously* not because it was done *contrary* to the customary course of nature or against nature, but because it was done by divine power operating *above* nature.

*An incidental question is appended.* If anyone, however, should ask whether He performed this work *above* nature with angelic power ministering to Him, Augustine on Genesis according to the letter, book nine[^2], replies as follows: «What ministry the Angels performed in that formation of the woman, who would dare to assign? Most certainly, however, I would say that the supplementing of that flesh in the place of the rib, and the body of the woman herself and her soul and the configuration of her members, all her viscera, all her senses, and whatever it was by which she was both *a creature* and a *human being* and a *female* — none of this was done save by that work of God which God performed not through Angels but through Himself»[^4]. — *Six reasons for the unity of the human race.* But the most weighty reason why God formed [the woman] in this way is, first, because that mode of forming was above the power of nature; and second, that man in either sex might directly turn toward Him and love with his whole self Him by whom he knew himself to have been immediately made.

Now the reason[^6] why God willed to produce all from one man, even though He did not do so in other kinds of animals, can be drawn from *order* and *connection* and *signification*. — From *order*, indeed, in two ways: *Reason 1 and 2.* first, from the order of *the body to the soul*, so that just as all rational souls proceed immediately from one principle, so all human bodies might come forth immediately from one[^3]; secondly, from the order of *the whole composite to other creatures*. For since man holds a middle place between the angelic nature and the brutal, and since the Angels were produced by God *singly*, and brute creatures in *a twofold sex*, namely in male and female: man had to be produced in *a middle way*, and so the female from the male[^5].

From *connection*, likewise, a twofold reason is taken: *Reason 3 and 4.* first, with respect to the whole *species universally*, that every man may love every man as a brother; secondly, with respect to *his wife specially*, on account of which *a man leaves his father*

*and mother, and clings to his wife, and they are two in one flesh*[^7].

From *signification*, too, a twofold reason is taken: *Reason 5 and 6.* first, from *allegorical* signification, by which we understand through the man and the woman Christ and the Church; secondly, by *anagogical* [signification], by which through the man, who was the principle of all men, we understand God, who was the principle of all things[^8].

---

la: Cap. 6. n. 9. seqq. — Codd. et edd. allegant librum X, in quo tamen, c. 1. n. 7. seq., pauca tantum de hac re habentur. — Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut aa ee *ex nihilo produci* pro *ex nihilo educi*, et dein cod. V *educi ex materia* pro *produci ex materia*.

en: Chapter 6, no. 9 and following. — The codices and editions cite book X, in which however, c. 1, n. 7 seq., only a little is found on this matter. — Cfr. below, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1. — A little earlier some codices, such as aa ee, read *ex nihilo produci* for *ex nihilo educi*, and likewise codex V reads *educi ex materia* for *produci ex materia*.

la: Cfr. August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 23; Epist. 166. (alias 28.) c. 5. n. 15; Epist. 180. (alias 261.) n. 2.

en: Cfr. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* X, c. 13, n. 23; Letter 166 (alias 28), c. 5, n. 15; Letter 180 (alias 261), n. 2.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1, q. 2. ad 3. et d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6.

en: Cfr. above, a. 1, q. 2, reply to 3, and d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, reply to 6.

la: Cap. 15. n. 28. Finem verborum textus originalis sic exhibet: *non nisi in illo opere Dei... sed per semetipsum non operatus est et dimisit, sed ita continuanter operatur, ut nec ullarum aliarum rerum, nec ipsorum Angelorum natura subsistat, si non operetur.*

en: Chapter 15, n. 28. The original text exhibits the end of the words thus: *not save by that work of God... but He did not operate through Himself and then leave off; rather He operates continuously, so that neither the nature of any other things, nor that of the Angels themselves, would subsist if He did not operate.*

la: De hac ratione cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: On this reason, see here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Hanc rationem affert August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. — Duae seqq. rationes insinuantur ibid. c. 27.

en: Augustine adduces this reason in *On the City of God* XII, c. 1. — The two following reasons are intimated in the same place, c. 27.

la: Gen. 2, 24, ubi Vulgata: *Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una.*

en: Genesis 2:24, where the Vulgate reads: *For this reason a man shall leave his father and his mother and shall cling to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 79. m. 1. et q. 85. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 2. seqq. S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 80. et q. 81; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 17. seq. — Vat. omittit *qui fuit principium omnium hominum*.

en: Cfr. above, a. 1, q. 1 in the corpus; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 79, m. 1 and q. 85, m. 3; B. Albert, here a. 2 ff., *Summa* p. II, tr. 13, q. 80 and q. 81; S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3 and on the text; Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 4 and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Aegidius Romanus, here dub. on the text 17 ff. — The Vatican edition omits *qui fuit principium omnium hominum*. ---

translators_notes:
**Manual-rescue outcome (2026-05-25):** This was the d.11–d.20 boundary-sweep audit's flagged manual-rescue chunk — the original auto-chunker run on 2026-05-13 dropped the entire `DUBIUM CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` block, and a manual rescue on 2026-05-23 derived a provisional raw line range of 31978–32016. **The skeleton's `line_end: 32016` proved too short:** the dubium body actually continues to raw 32046 (the line immediately before `DISTINCTIO XIX.` second occurrence at raw 32047, which is the genuine d.19 header — the earlier occurrence at line 32016 is a page-top running head). The actual span is **31978–32046**, capturing the full 6-reason tripartite block (ex *ordine* / ex *connexione* / ex *significatione*, each with 2 sub-reasons) closing at *qui fuit principium omnium rerum* on p.455 R-0. Body was re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops; apparatus walked page-by-page from p.454 L-2/R-2 (6 footers ¹–⁶) + p.455 L-2 (2 footers ¹–²; the third NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block starts d.19 littera and stays there). **8 apparatus entries total.** No `[?]` flags — all anchors crisp at 450 dpi.

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**Marginal labels** preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Adiungitur quaestio.*, *Rationes 6 pro unitate generis humani.*, *Ratio 1. et 2.*, *Ratio 3. et 4.*, *Ratio 5. et 6.*

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 19

title_alt: Distinction XIX — The Text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 455 -->

# DISTINCTIO XIX.

### Cap. I.
### *De statu hominis ante peccatum, qualis fuit secundum corpus, et qualis post peccatum.*

Solent quaeri plura de primo hominis statu ante peccatum, scilicet qualis fuerit homo, priusquam peccaret, et in corpore et in anima, mortalis, an immortalis, passibilis, an impassibilis; de termino inferioris vitae et de transitu ad superiorem; de modo propagationis filiorum, et alia multa, quae non inutiliter sciuntur, licet aliquando curiositate quaerantur. Et priusquam ad animi qualitatem pertinentia prosequamur, de qualitate eius secundum corpus et modo propagationis filiorum et de aliis quibusdam inspiciamus.

« Primus igitur homo secundum naturam corporis *Duplex sensus mortalis et immortalis.* terreni et immortalis fuit quodam modo secundum aliquid, quia potuit non mori, et mortalis quodam modo, quia potuit mori. In illo namque primo statu habuit *posse mori* et *posse non mori*. Et haec fuit prima humani corporis immortalitas, scilicet *posse non mori*. In secundo vero statu post peccatum habuit *posse mori* et *non posse non mori*, quia in hoc statu moriendi est necessitas. In tertio statu habebit *posse non mori* et *non posse mori*, quia ad illum statum pertinet moriendi impossibilitas, quod ex gratia erit, non ex natura[^1] ».

### Cap. II.
### *Quomodo dicitur homo factus in animam viventem.*

In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale, *Dubium 1.* id est egens alimoniis ciborum; unde et *homo factus dicitur in animam viventem*, non spiritualem, id est in animam corpus sensificantem, quod adhuc erat animale, non spirituale, quod egebat cibis, ut per animam viveret. Factus est igitur *in animam viventem*, id est vitam corpori dantem, tamen per sustentamenta ciborum; et tunc erat corpus mortale et immortale, quia poterat mori et poterat non mori. — « Post peccatum *Dubium 2. Aliter post peccatum et in resurrectione.* vero factum est *mortuum*, sicut dicit Apostolus[^2]: *Corpus propter peccatum mortuum est*, id est, necessitatem moriendi in se habet. — In resurrectione vero erit *Dubium 3.* spirituale, scilicet agile et cibis non egens, et immortale, non sicut in statu primo tantum fuit, scilicet quod possit non mori, sed etiam quod non poterit mori. Unde Augustinus super Genesim[^3]: « Apostolus *Augustinus.* ait: *Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum*, etc. Prius de limo terrae formatum est corpus animale, non spirituale, cum quali resurgemus et renovabimur a vetustate, non in corpus animale, quale fuit, sed in melius, id est spirituale, cum hoc mortale induet immortalitatem[^4], in quam mutandus erat Adam, nisi mortem corporis animalis peccando meruisset. Non ait Apostolus: *corpus mortale* est propter peccatum, sed: *mortuum* ».

### Cap. III.
### *Corpus hominis ante peccatum mortale et immortale erat, post peccatum mortuum.*

« Illud enim ante peccatum mortale et immortale erat, quia poterat mori et non mori. Aliud autem est *non posse mori*, aliud *posse non mori*. Ideo factum est per peccatum non *mortale*, quod erat, sed *mortuum*, quod non fieret, nisi peccaret. Animale enim est et hoc corpus, sicut primi hominis fuit, sed iam deterius est; habet enim necessitatem moriendi ». — Ecce hic evidenter aperit Augustinus, quod corpus hominis ante peccatum mortale et immortale fuit, sed non qualiter fiet in resurrectione. De hoc eodem Beda[^5] *Beda.* super Genesim ait: « Non est credendum, ante peccatum ita fuisse mortua corpora, sicut modo. Ait enim Apostolus: *Corpus propter peccatum mortuum est*, sed licet fuissent animalia nondum spiritualia, non tamen mortua, quae scilicet necesse esset mori ».

<!-- page 456 -->

### Cap. IV.
### *Utrum immortalitas, quam tunc habuit, fuerit de conditione naturae, an ex gratiae beneficio.*

Solet hic quaeri, cum homo primus mortale et immortale corpus habuerit, utrum ex conditione naturae ipsius corporis habuerit utrumque, an alterum beneficium esset gratiae, scilicet immortalitas, id est, *posse non mori*. — Ad quod dici potest, quia alterum habebat in natura corporis, id est *posse mori*; alterum vero, scilicet *posse non mori*, erat ei ex ligno vitae, scilicet ex dono gratiae. Unde Augustinus super Genesim[^6]: « Quodam *Augustinus.* modo creatus est homo immortalis, quod erat ei de ligno vitae, non de conditione naturae. Mortalis erat conditione corporis animalis, immortalis beneficio Conditoris. Non enim immortale erat, quod omnino mori non posset; quod non erit, nisi cum fuerit spirituale »: — Aperte dicit, quod non ex natura, sed ex ligno vitae habebat *posse non mori*. Propter hoc aliqui dicunt, *Opinio quorundam.* quod nisi illo ligno vitae uteretur, non semper viveret, quia peccaret. Peccaret enim, si illo ligno non uteretur, quia praeceptum erat ei, ut comederet de omni ligno paradisi, nisi de ligno scientiae boni et mali. Sicut ergo peccavit comedendo quod erat prohibitum, ita etiam peccaret, si non comederet quod erat iussum.

### Cap. V.
### *Si posset homo semper vivere, utens aliis lignis et non ligno vitae, Deo non mandante, ut de illo ederet.*

Sed adhuc quaeritur, si non esset praeceptum, ut de ligno vitae ederet, et aliis et non illo vesceretur, nunquid posset non mori? Si semper viveret, non utens illo ligno, non erat ei ex illo ligno *posse non mori*. Si vero non posset semper vivere, id erat ei ex illo ligno. — Aliqui dicunt, *Opinio 1.* quod si non fuisset ei praeceptum vesci illo ligno, et aliis et non illo vesceretur, viveret semper; sic determinantes illud quod supra dixit Augustinus, scilicet: « Erat ei de ligno vitae, non de conditione naturae » tantum, scilicet quasi non ex conditione naturae solummodo erat ei, sed etiam ex illo ligno. — Aliis autem videtur, *Opinio 2.* quod ex ligno vitae erat ei *posse non mori*, non ex natura. Ideo enim dicitur potuisse non mori, quia poterat uti illo ligno, de quo edens non moreretur.

### Cap. VI.
### *De immortalitate corporis prima et secunda.*

De hac vero hominis immortalitate, qualis fuerit, Augustinus super Genesim[^7] quaestionem movens sic ait: « Quaeritur, quomodo immortalis factus sit homo prae aliis animantibus; et quomodo cum illis communem acceperit alimoniam. Sed alia est immortalitas carnis, quam in Adam accepimus; alia, quam in resurrectione speramus per Christum. Ille factus est homo immortalis, ut non posset mori[^8], si non peccaret, moreretur autem, si peccaret; filii vero resurrectionis nec poterunt ultra peccare nec mori. Caro nostra non tunc egebit refectione ciborum, quia nulla poterit esse defectio. Caro Adae ante peccatum ita immortalis creata est, ut per alimoniam adiuta, esset mortis et doloris expers. Sic ergo immortalis et incorruptibilis condita est caro hominis, ut suam immortalitatem et incorruptionem per observantiam mandatorum Dei custodiret. In quibus mandatis hoc continebatur, ut de illis lignis concessis manducaret et ab interdicto abstineret; per horum edulium immortalitatis dona conservaret, donec corporalibus incrementis perductus ad aetatem, quae Conditori placeret, multiplicata progenie, ipso iubente, sumeret de ligno vitae, quo perfecte immortalis factus cibi alimenta non ulterius requireret ». — Ecce his verbis videtur Augustinus tradere, quod caro primi hominis immortalitatem in se habuerit, quae per alimoniam ciborum conservaretur usque ad tempus suae translationis in melius, quando de ligno vitae comederet et fieret omnino immortalis, ita ut non posset mori.

Ideo aliqui dicunt, quod immortalitatem de natura *Opinio quorundam.* habebat, qua poterat non mori, quae aliorum lignorum esu poterat conservari; sed non poterat consummari nisi per assumtionem ligni vitae. Quod videtur Augustinus sentire super Genesim[^9] dicens: « Hoc quoque *Augustinus.* addo, talem cibum illam arborem praestitisse, quo corpus hominis stabili sanitate firmaretur, non sicut ex alio cibo, sed inspiratione salubritatis occulta ». Hic innuere videtur, quod cum aliis cibis posset corpus sustentari, hoc cibo indeficente sanitate firmaretur. Ex quo consequi videtur, quod sicut in natura sua habuit mortalitatem quandam, scilicet aptitudinem moriendi; ita aliquam immortalitatem in natura sua habuit, id est aptitudinem, qua poterat non mori, cibis adiutus; sed si perstitisset, immortalitatis perfectio esset ei de ligno vitae. — Sed qui hoc tradunt, quomodo *Non apparet.* superiora Augustini verba[^10], quibus dicit, quod erat immortalis ex ligno vitae, huic sententiae non contradicant, diligenter inquirant.

---

english:
# DISTINCTION XIX.

### Chapter I.
### *On the state of man before sin — what it was according to the body, and what it was after sin.*

Many things are customarily inquired into concerning the first state of man before sin: namely, what sort of man he was, before he sinned, both in body and in soul — whether mortal or immortal, passible or impassible; concerning the term of his lower life and the transition to the higher; concerning the manner of the propagation of his children, and many other things which are not unprofitably known, although they are sometimes asked out of curiosity. And before we go on to what pertains to the quality of his soul, let us look at the quality of his body, and the manner of the propagation of his children, and certain other things.

« The first man, then, according to the nature of his earthly body, *Twofold sense of "mortal" and "immortal."* was also immortal in a certain way according to one respect — because he could not die — and mortal in a certain way, because he could die. For in that first state he had *the power to die* and *the power not to die*. And this was the first immortality of the human body, namely the *power not to die*. But in the second state, after sin, he had *the power to die* and *not the power not to die*, because in this state there is a necessity of dying. In the third state he will have *the power not to die* and *not the power to die*, because to that state belongs the impossibility of dying — which will be from grace, not from nature[^1] ».

### Chapter II.
### *How man is said to have been made into a living soul.*

In the first state, the body of man was animal, *Doubt 1.* that is, in need of the nourishments of food; whence also *man is said to have been made into a living soul* — not a spiritual one — that is, into a soul giving sense to the body, which was as yet animal, not spiritual, which needed foods, that it might live through the soul. He was made therefore *into a living soul*, that is, into one giving life to the body, but by means of the supports of food; and at that time the body was both mortal and immortal, because it could die and could not die. — « After sin, however, *Doubt 2. Differently after sin and in the resurrection.* it was made *dead*, as the Apostle says[^2]: *The body is dead because of sin* — that is, it has in itself the necessity of dying. — But in the resurrection it will be *Doubt 3.* spiritual, that is, agile and not needing food, and immortal, not as it was in the first state only, namely that it *could* not die, but also that it *will not be able* to die. Whence Augustine on Genesis[^3]: « The Apostle *Augustine.* says: *Indeed the body is dead because of sin*, etc. First the animal body — not the spiritual — was formed from the slime of the earth, with which we shall rise and shall be renewed from oldness, not into an animal body such as it was, but into something better — that is, spiritual — when this mortal shall put on immortality[^4]; into which Adam was to be changed, had he not by sinning merited the death of his animal body. The Apostle does not say: *the mortal body* is because of sin, but: *the dead* one ».

### Chapter III.
### *The body of man before sin was both mortal and immortal; after sin, dead.*

« For that [body] before sin was both mortal and immortal, because it could die and could not die. But it is one thing *not to be able to die*, and another thing *to be able not to die*. Therefore by sin it was made not *mortal*, which it already was, but *dead* — which would not have come about, had he not sinned. For this body too is animal, just as the first man's was, but now it is worse; for it has the necessity of dying ». — Behold, here Augustine clearly discloses that the body of man before sin was mortal and immortal, but not in the manner in which it shall be in the resurrection. On the same subject Bede[^5] *Bede.* on Genesis says: « It is not to be believed that bodies, before sin, were dead in the way they are now. For the Apostle says: *The body is dead because of sin*; but, although they were animal and not yet spiritual, still they were not dead — they would, however, necessarily have to die ».

### Chapter IV.
### *Whether the immortality which he then had was from the condition of nature, or from the gift of grace.*

It is customarily asked here, since the first man had a body both mortal and immortal, whether he had both from the condition of the body's nature, or whether one of them — namely immortality, that is, *the power not to die* — was a benefit of grace. — To which it can be said that one of them he had in the nature of the body, namely *the power to die*; the other, however — namely *the power not to die* — was his from the tree of life, that is, from the gift of grace. Whence Augustine on Genesis[^6]: « In a certain *Augustine.* way man was created immortal — which belonged to him from the tree of life, not from the condition of nature. He was mortal in the condition of his animal body, immortal by the gift of the Creator. For he was not immortal in such a way as to be wholly incapable of dying; which will not be the case until he has become spiritual »: — He plainly says that not from nature, but from the tree of life, he had *the power not to die*. On account of this, some say *Opinion of certain ones.* that, had he not used that tree of life, he would not have lived for ever, because he would have sinned. For he would have sinned, had he not used that tree, since it was commanded him to eat of every tree of paradise, except the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. As, therefore, he sinned by eating what was forbidden, so likewise he would have sinned, had he not eaten what was commanded.

### Chapter V.
### *Whether the man could have lived for ever using the other trees and not the tree of life, with God not commanding him to eat of it.*

But it is still asked, if there had been no precept that he eat of the tree of life, and he were to feed on the others and not on it, could he have lived without dying? If he were to live always, not using that tree, *the power not to die* would not have been his from that tree. But if he could not live always, that power was his from that tree. — Some say *Opinion 1.* that, if it had not been commanded him to feed on that tree, and he were to feed on the others and not on it, he would have lived always; thus determining what Augustine said above, namely: « It was his from the tree of life, not from the condition of nature » — only [as restrictive], that is, as though it were not his from the condition of nature alone, but also from that tree. — But to others it seems *Opinion 2.* that *the power not to die* was his from the tree of life, not from nature. For he is said to have been able not to die because he was able to use that tree, by eating of which he would not die.

### Chapter VI.
### *On the first and second immortality of the body.*

Concerning this immortality of man, of what sort it was, Augustine on Genesis[^7] raising the question speaks thus: « It is asked how man was made immortal beyond the other animals; and how with them he received a common food. But there is one immortality of the flesh which we received in Adam; another, which in the resurrection we hope for through Christ. He was made an immortal man, so as not to be able to die[^8], if he did not sin, but so as to die if he did sin; but the children of the resurrection neither shall be able to sin further nor to die. Our flesh will then not be in need of the refreshment of food, because there will be no failing of it possible. The flesh of Adam before sin was so created immortal that, aided by nourishment, it would be free of death and pain. Thus, therefore, was the flesh of man founded immortal and incorruptible, in order that it might guard its immortality and incorruption by the observance of God's commandments. Among which commandments this was contained: that he should eat of those trees which were granted, and abstain from the forbidden one; that by the eating of these he might preserve the gifts of immortality, until, brought by bodily growth to the age that should please the Creator, his progeny having been multiplied, he should at the Creator's bidding take of the tree of life, by which, made perfectly immortal, he would no longer require the nourishments of food ». — Behold, by these words Augustine seems to hand down that the flesh of the first man had immortality in itself, which was to be preserved by the nourishment of food until the time of its translation into something better, when he would eat of the tree of life and become wholly immortal, so that he could not die.

Hence some say that he had immortality from nature *Opinion of certain ones.* — by which he was able not to die — which could be preserved by the eating of the other trees; but it could not be brought to completion except by the taking of the tree of life. Which Augustine seems to mean on Genesis[^9], saying: *Augustine.* « This too I add: that this tree provided such a food whereby the body of man might be strengthened in steady health, not as by other food, but by a hidden inspiration of wholesomeness ». Here he seems to hint that, while the body could be sustained by the other foods, it would be strengthened by this food in unfailing health. From which it seems to follow that, just as in his own nature he had a certain mortality — namely an aptitude for dying — so too in his own nature he had a certain immortality, that is, an aptitude by which he was able not to die, aided by foods; but if he had stood firm, the perfection of immortality would have been his from the tree of life. — But those who hand down this view should diligently inquire how the *Not apparent.* preceding words of Augustine[^10], by which he says that he was immortal from the tree of life, do not contradict this position.

---

la: Hugo, de Sacram. I. p. 6. c. 18. Cfr. August., VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 25. 26. Paulo inferius respicitur Gen. 2, 7. et 1. Cor. 15, 45. Cfr. Glossa interlin. ad ultimum locum.

en: Hugh, *De Sacramentis*, book I, part 6, ch. 18. Compare Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book VI, chs. 25, 26. A little below, reference is made to Genesis 2:7 and 1 Corinthians 15:45. Compare the interlinear Gloss at the last passage.

en: Romans 8:10.

la: Libr. VI. c. 22, ubi et quae praecedunt. Quae hic sequuntur et in cap. seq. habentur ibid. c. 24. 25. 26, multis omissis et mutatis.

en: Book VI, ch. 22, where what precedes is also found. What follows here, and in the following chapter, is contained in the same place, chs. 24, 25, 26, with many things omitted and altered.

la: Cfr. I. Cor. 15, 44-54. Paulo ante auctoritate codd. BDE et edd. 1, 8 correximus lectionem Vat., quae, omissa vocula *et*, pro *renovabimur* substituit *Renovabitur*, et subinde adiungit *enim*.

en: Compare 1 Corinthians 15:44–54. A little above, on the authority of codices BDE and editions 1, 8, we have corrected the reading of the Vatican edition, which, omitting the particle *et*, substitutes *Renovabitur* (it shall be renewed) for *renovabimur* (we shall be renewed), and immediately adds *enim* (for).

la: Libr. I. Hexaem. ad Gen. 2, 17, et habetur in Glossa ord.

en: Book I of the *Hexaemeron* on Genesis 2:17, and it is contained in the *Glossa ordinaria*.

en: *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book VI, ch. 25, n. 36.

la: Libr. III. c. 21. n. 33, et Quaest. veter. et nov. Test. q. 19, et alibi, sententialiter; sed fere ad verbum, paucis a Magistro mutatis et transpositis, apud Bedam, Hexaem. l. et in Glossa ord. ad Gen. 1, 26.

en: Book III, ch. 21, n. 33, and *Questions on the Old and New Testaments*, q. 19, and elsewhere, substantially; but almost verbatim — with a few things changed and transposed by the Master — in Bede, *Hexaemeron* book I, and in the *Glossa ordinaria* on Genesis 1:26.

la: Ed. 1: *ut posset non mori*; est quidem bona lectio, sed non convenit cum lect. codd. et aliarum edd. nec non cum Glossa.

en: Edition 1 reads *ut posset non mori* (so as to be able not to die); it is indeed a good reading, but it does not agree with the reading of the codices and the other editions, nor with the *Gloss*.

la: Libr. VIII. c. 3. n. 11, nonnullis omissis et transpositis.

en: *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book VIII, ch. 3, n. 11, with several things omitted and transposed.

la: Cfr. c. IV. huius dist.

en: Compare ch. IV of this distinction.

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title: Dist. 19, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XIX. — De hominis immortalitate.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XIX. — On the immortality of man.

source_text:
<!-- page 457 -->

# COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

## *De hominis immortalitate.*

*Solent quaeri plura de primo hominis statu etc.*

### Divisio textus.

Supra egit Magister de hominis productione; in hac parte agit de hominis duratione et conservatione. Et quoniam homo dupliciter habet in esse conservari, scilicet in se et in suo simili, in se per vitam et diuturnitatem, in simili vero per filiorum procreationem[^1]; ideo pars ista habet duas. In prima determinat de hominis immortalitate. In secunda determinat de filiorum procreatione, infra distinctione vigesima: *Post haec videndum est, qualiter etc.*

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat veritatem. In secunda dissolvit dubitationes, ibi: *Solet hic quaeri, cum primus homo etc.*

Prima pars habet duas. In prima parte veritatem narrat. In secunda veritatem explanat, ibi: *In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale etc.*

Similiter secunda pars habet duas. In prima movet determinandam quaestionem circa hominis immortalitatem. In secunda vero movet aliam dubitationem, quae habet ortum ex illa, et illam determinat secundum opiniones diversas, ibi: *Sed adhuc quaeritur, si non esset praeceptum etc.*

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua agitur de hominis immortalitate secundum statum innocentiae, circa tria consistit dubitatio. Et primo quaeritur de immortalitate hominis, quantum est ex parte animae. Secundo vero, quantum est ex parte corporis. Tertio vero, ex parte coniuncti.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis per naturam sit immortalis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis anima, quantum est de prima constitutione naturae, fuerit incorruptibilis.

### Articulus I. *De hominis immortalitate ex parte animae.*

#### Quaestio I. *Utrum anima humana per naturam sit immortalis.*

---

english:
<!-- page 457 -->

# Commentary on Distinction XIX.

## *On the immortality of man.*

*Many things are wont to be asked concerning the first state of man, etc.*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of the production of man; in this part he treats of the duration and conservation of man. And since man has being conserved in two ways, namely in himself and in his like — in himself by life and by length of days, but in his like by the procreation of children[^1] — therefore this part has two [sub-parts]. In the first he determines concerning the immortality of man. In the second he determines concerning the procreation of children, below at distinction twenty: *After these things it must be seen, how etc.*

The first part has two [sub-parts]. In the first he determines the truth. In the second he dissolves doubts, there: *It is here asked, since the first man, etc.*

The first part [in turn] has two. In the first part he narrates the truth. In the second he explains the truth, there: *In the first state the body of man was animal, etc.*

Likewise the second part has two. In the first he raises the question to be determined concerning the immortality of man. In the second he raises another doubt, which has its origin from that one, and he determines it according to diverse opinions, there: *But still it is asked, whether, if the precept had not been given, etc.*

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part, in which it is treated of the immortality of man according to the state of innocence, doubt arises about three points. And first it is asked concerning the immortality of man, as regards the soul. Second, as regards the body. Third, as regards the conjoint [composite of soul and body].

Concerning the first, two questions are asked. First, it is asked whether the rational soul by nature is immortal. Second, it is asked whether every soul, so far as belongs to the first constitution of nature, was incorruptible.

### Article I. *On the immortality of man as regards the soul.*

#### Question I. *Whether the human soul by nature is immortal.*

---

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *creationem*.

en: Not a few codices, together with the first edition, read *creationem* [creation, in place of *procreationem* — procreation]. ---

translators_notes:
- **Span.** Raw OCR lines 32179–32214; printed p.457 (PDF p.479). Opens at `COMMENTAmUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.` (OCR has m/RI ligature mangle for *Commentarius*) + subtitle *De hominis immortalitate.* + lemma *Solent quaeri plura de primo hominis statu etc.* immediately after d19-littera's close at *diligenter inquirant* (raw 32178). Closes at the QUAESTIO I header + italic title *Utrum anima humana per naturam sit immortalis.* immediately before the Q1 body opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima rationalis non sit naturaliter immortalis.* at raw 32215.
- **Vol II Override step 5 applied.** d.19 has no pars division; this is the distinctio-level divisio chunk and it holds the DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + ARTICULUS I header (with subtitle) + Q1 sub-header (with title), but no Q1 body. The ARTICULUS I sub-divisio (*Circa primum quaeruntur duo* + the two question stems) sits inside the TRACTATIO block per Quaracchi's layout for d.19.
- **Apparatus split — p.457.** Five footers on p.457 total (L-2: ¹ *creationem* variant, ² *Vers. 16*, ³ *Libr. I de Fide orthod.*; R-2: ⁴ *Cap. 30 + cod. 0 anima rationalis*, ⁵ *Libr. I de Anima text. 66 + cod. 1 phreneticis*). Only **¹** anchors in this chunk (DIVISIO body at *procreationem¹*); it is folded as [^1] here. Footers **²–⁵** all anchor in Q1's body (args 1, 2, 3 — *Qui solus habet immortalitatem², …Damascenus³…, Augustini, septimo de Civitate Dei⁴…, Philosophi⁵…*) and migrate forward to **d19-a1-q1** as its first four apparatus entries.
- **No SCHOLION** by design — divisio chunks carry no SCHOLION.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All anchors crisp at 450 dpi. OCR opener mangled as `COMMENTAmUS` (Quaracchi capital R hooked into an `m` ligature in the IA scan); standard Vol II OCR-cosmetic — silently corrected to `COMMENTARIUS`. The Damascenus opener on the printed page reads `Damascenns` (OCR ligature `nn` for `nu`) — likewise silently regularized at the Q1 boundary (this is forward d19-a1-q1's concern, not ours).
- **Cross-chunk hand-off.** Received nothing from d19-littera (its p.456 R-2 footer block closes at *diligenter inquirant*; the NOTAE block on p.455 L-2 stayed with d19-littera per the prior session's hand-off ledger). Forward hand-off to **d19-a1-q1**: p.457 L-2 footers ²–³ + p.457 R-2 footers ⁴–⁵ migrate forward as that chunk's [^1]–[^4].
- **Running head.** p.457 running head text reads `DIST. XIX. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` + page-number `457` (crisp digits at 450 dpi); trust the printed digits this page.