title: Dist. 16, Part 1

title_alt: De ordine eorum quae concurrunt ad poenitentiam (pars II — pp. 381–382)

title_alt: On the order of those things which concur to penance (part two — pp. 381–382)

source_text:
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retur in singulis istis et sentiat modum criminis, purgans lacrymis omnem qualitatem vitii, defleat virtutem, qua interim caruit. Dolendum est enim, non solum quod peccavit, sed quia se virtute privavit. Defleat etiam, quoniam *offendens in uno factus est omnium reus*[^1]. Ingratus enim exstitit qui plenus virtutibus Deum omnino non timuit. In hoc enim quisque peccator fit culpabilior, quo est Deo *acceptior*; ideo enim Adam plus peccavit, quia omni bono abundavit. Alio etiam modo offendens in uno factus est omnium reus: quia omnis *virtus* patitur detrimentum ab uno vitio ».

« Ponat se omnino in iudicio et potestate sacerdotis, nihil sui reservans sibi, ut omnia, eo iubente, paratus sit facere pro recipienda vita animae, quae faceret pro evitanda corporis morte, et hoc cum desiderio, quia vitam recuperat infinitam. Cum gaudio enim facere debet immortalis futurus quae faceret pro differenda morte moriturus: semper deprecetur Deum, offerat Deo mentem et cordis contritionem, deinde et quod potest de possessione; tunc, si quid offeret, securus offerat: *Respexit Dominus ad Abel et ad munera eius*[^2]; prius dicit ad *Abel* quam ad *munera* eius. In iudicio igitur cordis conferenda est eleemosyna tribuentis; nec considerandum est *quantum,* sed *qua mente, qua affectione* dat quod potest. Qui igitur sua peccata redimere vult temporalium oblatione prius offerat mentem. Caveat, ne ductus verecundia dividat apud se confessionem, ut diversa diversis velit sacerdotibus manifestare. Quidam enim uni celant quae alteri manifestanda conservant; quod est se laudare et ad hypocrisim tendere et semper venia carere, ad quam per *frusta* putant pervenire. Caveat etiam, ne prius ad dominicum corpus accedat, quam confortet bona conscientia; et doleat, quod nondum audeat sumere quem multum desiderat cibum salutarem. Cohibeat etiam se a ludis, a spectaculis saeculi qui perfectam vult consequi remissionis gratiam. Isti sunt digni fructus poenitentiae, animam captivam elaqueantes et in libertate servantes ». Et infra[^3]: « Quaerat anima *dignos fructus,* etsi non dignos poenitentiae. Sunt enim digni fructus virtutum, qui non sufficiunt poenitentibus. Poenitentia enim graviores postulat, ut dolore et gemitibus mortuus impetret vitam ». — Ex his ostenditur, qui sint *digni fructus* poenitentiae, quibus vera satisfactio expletur, et quod non omnes *digni fructus* sunt *digni fructus* poenitentiae; quod de illa poenitentia intelligitur, quae maiorum est criminum. Non enim sufficiunt graviter delinquentibus quae sufficiunt minus vel parum peccantibus.

### Cap. III. *Quae sit satisfactio falsa.*

Et sicut sunt *digni* fructus poenitentiae ac *vera* satisfactio, ita et *indigni* fructus et *falsa* satisfactio, id est falsa poenitentia. Unde Gregorius[^4]: « Falsas poenitentias dicimus, quae non secundum auctoritates Sanctorum pro qualitate criminum imponuntur. Ideoque miles, vel negotiator, vel alicui officio deditus, quod sine peccato exerceri non possit, si culpis gravioribus irretitus ad poenitentiam venerit, vel qui bona alterius iniuste detinet, vel qui odium in corde gerit, recognoscat, se veram poenitentiam non posse peragere, nisi negotium relinquat, vel officium deserat, et odium ex corde dimittat, et bona, quae iniuste abstulit, restituat. Ne tamen desperet; interim quidquid boni facere potest, hortamur, ut faciat, ut Deus cor illius illustret ad poenitentiam ». Cum sit poenitentia interior et exterior, de utraque per praemissa satis apparet, quae sit vera, et quae sit falsa.

### Pars II.

### Cap. IV. *De tribus actionibus poenitentiae.*

Praedictis vero adiiciendum est, quod tribus modis agitur poenitentia: ante baptismum scilicet de prioribus peccatis; post baptismum de gravioribus, quae post committuntur; est etiam poenitentia *venialium* quotidiana, quae etiam humilium est et perfectorum. Unde Augustinus[^5]: « Tres sunt actiones poenitentiae, quas mecum vestra eruditio recognoscit. Una est, quae novum hominem parturit, donec per baptismum omnium praeteritorum fiat ablutio peccatorum; quia nullus suae voluntatis arbiter, nisi poeniteat eum veteris vitae, novam inchoare potest; a qua parvuli sunt immunes, cum baptizantur, quia nondum possunt uti libero arbitrio, quibus tamen ad remissionem originalis peccati prodest eorum fides, a quibus offeruntur ». « Altera est actio poenitentiae postbaptismum, quae fit pro illis peccatis, quae Legis decalogus continet ». « Agunt ergo homines poenitentiam ante baptismum de peccatis prioribus, ita tamen, ut etiam baptizentur, sicut Petrus ait: *Agite poenitentiam, et baptizetur unusquisque vestrum in nomine Domini* etc. Agunt etiam poenitentiam, si post baptismum ita peccaverint, ut excommunicari et reconciliari post mereantur ». « Est etiam poenitentia bonorum et humilium fidelium pene quotidiana, in qua pectora tundimus dicentes: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos* etc. Neque enim et nobis dimitti volumus quae dimissa in baptismo non dubitamus »,

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### Cap. V. *De multitudine venialium, quae gravat ut unum grande peccatum.*

« Sed illa quae humanae fragilitati, quamvis parva, tamen crebra subrepunt, quae, si collecta contra nos fuerint, ita nos gravabunt et oppriment, sicut unum aliquod grande peccatum. Quid enim interest ad naufragium, an uno grandi fluctu navis operiatur et obruatur, an paulatim subrepens aqua in sentinam per negligentium culpam impleat navim, et submergatur? Ideo ieiunium et eleemosynae et orationes invigilent, in quibus cum dicimus: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra* etc., manifestamus, nos habere quod nobis dimittatur; et in his verbis humiliantes animas nostras, quotidianam agere poenitentiam non cessamus ».

### Cap. VI. *De satisfactione venialium.*

Quae autem pro venialibus sit satisfactio sufficiens, Augustinus insinuat, ita inquiens in Enchiridio[^6]: « De quotidianis et brevibus levibusque peccatis, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur, quotidiana oratio fidelium satisfacit. Eorum enim est dicere: *Pater noster, qui es in caelis* etc. Delet omnino haec oratio minima et quotidiana peccata; delet et illa, a quibus vita fidelium etiam scelerate gesta, sed poenitendo in melius commutata, discedit, si[^7], ut veraciter dicitur: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra*; ita et veraciter dicatur: *sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris,* id est, si fiat quod dicitur; quia et ipsa eleemosyna est veniam petentibus omnino ignoscere ». — Ex his aliisque praemissis iam facile est intelligere, quae pro venialibus sit exhibenda satisfactio. Sufficit enim dominica oratio cum ieiunio aliquo et eleemosynis, sic tamen, ut praecedat contritio aliquantula, et addatur confessio, si adsit facultas; de qua confessione post[^8] tractabitur. Pro gravioribus vero peccatis haec etiam in satisfactione adhibenda sunt, sed multo vehementius atque districtius, quia, ut ait Augustinus[^9], ad agendam poenitentiam « non sufficit mores in melius commutare et a malis factis recedere, nisi et de his quae facta sunt, satisfiat Domino per poenitentiae dolorem, per humilitatis gemitum, per contriti cordis sacrificium, cooperantibus eleemosynis ».

---

english:
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— …in each of these things, and let him perceive the measure of the crime, purging with tears every quality of the vice; let him bewail the virtue which in the meantime he lacked. For one must grieve, not only that he sinned, but that he deprived himself of virtue. Let him bewail also, since *offending in one he is made guilty of all*[^1]. For ungrateful he showed himself who, full of virtues, feared not God at all. For in this each sinner is made the more culpable, by which he is the more *acceptable* to God; for so Adam sinned the more, because he abounded in every good. In another way too, offending in one he is made guilty of all: because every *virtue* suffers detriment from a single vice ».

« Let him place himself wholly in the judgment and power of the priest, reserving nothing of himself to himself, so that, at his bidding, he be ready to do all things for the recovery of the life of the soul which he would do for avoiding the death of the body, and this with desire, because he recovers an infinite life. For with joy ought he to do, being about to be immortal, what he would do, being about to die, for the deferring of death: let him ever beseech God, let him offer to God his mind and the contrition of his heart, and then also what he can of his possession; then, if he offers anything, let him offer it secure: *The Lord had respect to Abel and to his gifts*[^2]; he says first to *Abel* than to his *gifts.* In the judgment of the heart, therefore, the alms of the giver are to be weighed; nor is it to be considered *how much,* but *with what mind, with what affection* he gives what he can. He therefore who wishes to redeem his sins by the offering of temporal things, let him first offer his mind. Let him beware, lest, led by shame, he divide his confession with himself, so as to wish to manifest different things to different priests. For some conceal from one what they keep to be manifested to another; which is to praise oneself and to tend to hypocrisy and ever to lack pardon, to which by *scraps* they think to attain. Let him beware also, lest he approach the Lord's body before a good conscience strengthen him; and let him grieve that he does not yet dare to take the saving food which he much desires. Let him also restrain himself from games, from the spectacles of the world, who wishes to obtain the perfect grace of remission. These are the worthy fruits of penance, snaring the captive soul and keeping it in freedom ». And below[^3]: « Let the soul seek *worthy fruits,* even if not worthy of penance. For there are worthy fruits of the virtues which do not suffice for penitents. For penance demands graver ones, that by grief and groans the dead may obtain life ». — From these things it is shown what are the *worthy fruits* of penance, by which true satisfaction is fulfilled, and that not all *worthy fruits* are *worthy fruits* of penance; which is understood of that penance which is of greater crimes. For those things do not suffice for those grievously offending which suffice for those sinning less or little.

### Chap. III. *What false satisfaction is.*

And just as there are *worthy* fruits of penance and *true* satisfaction, so also *unworthy* fruits and *false* satisfaction, that is false penance. Whence Gregory[^4]: « We call those penances false which are not imposed according to the authorities of the Saints in proportion to the quality of the crimes. And therefore a soldier, or a merchant, or one given over to some office which cannot be exercised without sin, if entangled in graver faults he comes to penance, or one who unjustly detains the goods of another, or one who bears hatred in his heart, let him recognize that he cannot accomplish true penance, unless he leave the business, or forsake the office, and dismiss the hatred from his heart, and restore the goods which he unjustly took away. Yet let him not despair; meanwhile, whatever good he can do, we exhort that he do it, that God may enlighten his heart to penance ». Since penance is interior and exterior, concerning each it sufficiently appears from the foregoing which is true, and which is false.

### Part II.

### Chap. IV. *On the three actions of penance.*

But to the foregoing it is to be added that penance is done in three ways: before baptism, namely, concerning prior sins; after baptism, concerning the graver sins which are committed afterward; there is also a daily penance of *venial* sins, which is even of the humble and of the perfect. Whence Augustine[^5]: « There are three actions of penance, which your learning recognizes along with me. One is that which brings forth the new man, until through baptism there be made the washing of all past sins; because no one, the arbiter of his own will, can begin a new life unless he repent of the old; from which infants are exempt when they are baptized, because they cannot yet use free will, to whom however for the remission of original sin the faith of those by whom they are offered profits ». « The second is the action of penance after baptism, which is made for those sins which the decalogue of the Law contains ». « Men therefore do penance before baptism concerning prior sins, yet so that they also be baptized, as Peter says: *Do penance, and let every one of you be baptized in the name of the Lord* etc. They do penance also, if after baptism they have so sinned that they deserve afterward to be excommunicated and reconciled ». « There is also a penance of the good and humble faithful, almost daily, in which we beat our breasts saying: *Forgive us our debts, as we also* etc. For neither do we wish those things to be forgiven us which we do not doubt were forgiven in baptism »,

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### Chap. V. *On the multitude of venial sins, which weighs as one great sin.*

« But those which, though small, yet frequently creep upon human frailty, which, if they be gathered against us, will so weigh down and oppress us, as one single great sin. For what does it matter, as to shipwreck, whether the ship be covered and overwhelmed by one great wave, or whether water gradually creeping in fill the hold through the fault of the negligent, and it be submerged? Therefore let fasting and alms and prayers keep watch, in which, when we say: *Forgive us our debts* etc., we declare that we have something to be forgiven us; and in these words humbling our souls, we cease not to do daily penance ».

### Chap. VI. *On the satisfaction for venial sins.*

But what satisfaction is sufficient for venial sins, Augustine intimates, thus saying in the Enchiridion[^6]: « For the daily and brief and light sins, without which this life is not led, the daily prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction. For it is theirs to say: *Our Father, who art in heaven* etc. This prayer wholly blots out the least and daily sins; it blots out also those from which the life of the faithful, though wickedly led but by penitence changed for the better, departs, if[^7], as it is truly said: *Forgive us our debts*; so also it be truly said: *as we also forgive our debtors,* that is, if there be done what is said; because alms itself is wholly to pardon those asking forgiveness ». — From these and the other foregoing things it is now easy to understand what satisfaction is to be exhibited for venial sins. For the Lord's prayer with some fasting and alms suffices, yet so that some little contrition precede, and confession be added, if there be opportunity; concerning which confession it will be treated afterward[^8]. But for graver sins these things also are to be applied in satisfaction, but much more vehemently and strictly, because, as Augustine says[^9], for doing penance « it does not suffice to change one's morals for the better and to withdraw from evil deeds, unless also for those things which have been done satisfaction be made to the Lord by the grief of penance, by the groan of humility, by the sacrifice of a contrite heart, alms cooperating ».

---

la: Iac. 2, 10. Ed. 8 post *omnium* addit *per ingratitudinem,* et superius pro *etiam, quoniam* cod. D *ergo quod.* — Seq. locus est cit. libro *de Vera* etc. c. 10. n. 30. 31, et can. cit.

en: Jas. 2:10. Ed. 8 after *omnium* adds *per ingratitudinem,* and above, for *etiam, quoniam,* cod. D has *ergo quod.* — The following passage is the cited book *On True [and False Penance]* etc., c. 10, nn. 30–31, and the cited canon.

la: Gen. 4, 4. — Superius edd., excepta 1, ante *de possessione* adiiciunt *det,* refragantibus codd. et originali; et infra post *frusta putant* (plurimae edd. *putat*) originale et can. addunt *totam,* deinde pro *confortet,* quod habent codd., plures edd. et originale, Vat. et can. *confortetur.*

en: Gen. 4:4. — Above, the editions, except 1, before *de possessione* add *det,* against the codices and the original; and below, after *frusta putant* (most editions *putat*) the original and the canon add *totam,* then for *confortet,* which the codices have, several editions and the original, the Vatican edition, and the canon have *confortetur.*

la: Loc. cit.

en: The place cited [above].

la: Gregor. VII., Concil. Rom. V. n. 5; C. *Falsas poenitentias* (6.), ibid. d. 3.

en: Gregory VII, Roman Council V, n. 5; the canon *Falsas poenitentias* (6), ibid., d. 3.

la: Sermo 351. (alias 30. inter 30 Homil.) c. 2. n. 2; C. *Tres sunt* (81.), ibid. d. 1. Seq. locus ibid. c. 4. n. 7, et in eodem can.; tertius est August., Epist. 263. (alias 108.) ad Seleucianam, n. 7; C. *Agunt homines* (97.), de Consecrat. d. 4, in quo citatur Act. 2, 38. Quartus ibid. n. 8; C. *Tres sunt,* supra cit., qui locus se extendit usque in seq. capitulum, ipsa propositione per divisionem capitulorum interrupta.

en: Sermon 351 (otherwise hom. 30 among the 30 Homilies), c. 2, n. 2; the canon *Tres sunt* (81), ibid., d. 1. The following passage is ibid., c. 4, n. 7, and in the same canon; the third is Augustine, Letter 263 (otherwise 108) to Seleuciana, n. 7; the canon *Agunt homines* (97), de Consecratione, d. 4, in which Acts 2:38 is cited. The fourth is ibid., n. 8; the canon *Tres sunt,* cited above, which passage extends into the following chapter, the very proposition being interrupted by the division of the chapters.

la: Cap. 71. n. 19; C. *De quotidianis* (20.), de Poenitentia.

en: [Enchiridion] c. 71, n. 19; the canon *De quotidianis* (20), de Poenitentia.

la: Edd., exceptis 1, 8, *ut sicut,* et inferius *sic fiat* pro *si fiat,* refragantibus codd. et originali.

en: The editions, except 1 and 8, have *ut sicut,* and below *sic fiat* for *si fiat,* against the codices and the original.

la: Dist. XVII.

en: Distinction XVII.

la: Serm. cit. pag. 381, nota 5. c. 5. n. 12.

en: The sermon cited on p. 381, note 5, c. 5, n. 12. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** This chunk is the **second half** of the Lombard littera of Distinction XVI (Pars I Caps. continuing from p.380 through Cap. VI; the chunk picks up mid-word at p.380→p.381 — *Immo-/retur in singulis istis* — and runs through the end of the littera, stopping just before the *COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.* on p.382). Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 43355–43578) under the **Vol II OVERRIDE** PDF-priority inversion for the cascade-fragmented two-column body and footers. PDF column bands read for pp. 381–382 (vol4 column split x=1880, offset `pdf = printed + 20`); running heads verified: *DISTINCTIO XVI.* / 381 (recto) and 382 / *SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.* (verso).

**Page-split map (footer notes).** p.381 carries 5 littera footnotes (`[^1]–[^5]`) in the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* block, spanning both columns: `¹–³` under the left column, `⁴–⁵` under the right. p.382 carries 4 littera footnotes (`[^6]–[^9]`) in the left-column footer. The p.382 right-column footer block — *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* (`¹ Sive de iis…`; `² Non pauci codd. constituit…`) — belongs to the **COMMENTARIUS** and is **forwarded** to the `bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-divisio` chunk, not captured here.

**Hand-offs.** Picked up: the opening fragment *retur* continues *Immo-* from the tail of the prior littera segment (p.380). Forwarded: the *COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI. / Pars I / DIVISIO TEXTUS* and its *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footer begin immediately after this chunk on p.382 and belong to the divisio chunk.

**[?] flags.** None. Body and all 9 footer notes resolved against the PDF column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum (Pars I)

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions (Part I)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 382 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.

#### Pars I.

*De partibus integralibus Sacramenti poenitentiae.*

> In perfectione autem poenitentiae tria observanda sunt etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de poenitentia in sua generalitate. In hac parte agit de eius partibus. Et quoniam principalis pars poenitentiae, ut est Sacramentum Ecclesiae, est confessio; ideo primo assignat partes poenitentiae. Secundo vero principaliter et specialiter agit de confessione, et de his quae spectant ad eam, infra distinctione decima septima: *Hic oritur quaestio multiplex* etc.

Prima pars duas habet secundum duo genera partium: quaedam enim sunt partes integrales, quaedam subiectivae. Ideo primo agit de integralibus, ex quibus constat poenitentia perfecta. Secundo de subiectivis[^1], ibi: *Praedictis adiiciendum est, quod tribus modis agitur poenitentia.*

Prima pars habet tres. In prima assignat illas partes, ex quibus poenitentia integratur, confirmans auctoritate Chrysostomi et Augustini. In secunda tradit modum, secundum quem veram constituunt[^2] poenitentiam, ibi: *Ideo discretio necessaria est poenitenti.* In tertia determinat modum, quomodo non veram poenitentiam faciunt, sed falsam, ibi: *Et sicut sunt digni fructus poenitentiae* etc.

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### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeritur de contritione; et circa hoc principaliter quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de contritione quantum ad quidditatem.

Secundo, quantum ad quantitatem.

Tertio, quantum ad durationem.

Quarto, quantum ad intensionem.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur de contritione, quid sit quantum ad suam substantiam.

Secundo, quid sit in genere moris.

### ARTICULUS I.

#### *De contritione quantum ad quidditatem.*

### QUAESTIO I.

#### *Quid sit contritio quoad suam substantiam.*

---

english:
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### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI.

#### Part I.

*On the integral parts of the Sacrament of penance.*

> Now in the perfection of penance three things are to be observed, etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of penance in its generality. In this part he treats of its parts. And since the principal part of penance, as it is a Sacrament of the Church, is confession; therefore he first assigns the parts of penance. Second he treats principally and specially of confession, and of the things which pertain to it, below in the seventeenth distinction: *Here a manifold question arises,* etc.

The first part has two [members] according to the two kinds of parts: for some are integral parts, some subjective. Therefore he first treats of the integral ones, of which perfect penance consists. Second of the subjective ones[^1], there: *To the foregoing it must be added, that penance is carried out in three ways.*

The first part has three [members]. In the first he assigns those parts of which penance is integrated, confirming [them] by the authority of Chrysostom and Augustine. In the second he hands down the manner according to which they constitute[^2] true penance, there: *Therefore discretion is necessary for the penitent.* In the third he determines the manner in which they make not true penance, but false, there: *And as they are worthy fruits of penance,* etc.

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### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part inquiry is made concerning contrition; and concerning this four things are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning contrition with respect to its quiddity.

Second, with respect to its quantity.

Third, with respect to its duration.

Fourth, with respect to its intensity.

With respect to the first, two things are asked.

First it is asked concerning contrition, what it is with respect to its substance.

Second, what it is in the genus of morals.

### ARTICLE I.

#### *On contrition with respect to its quiddity.*

### QUESTION I.

#### *What contrition is with respect to its substance.*

---

la: Sive de iis, quae ut inferiora sub poenitentia continentur; cfr. infra p. II. dub. I.

en: Or concerning those which, as inferior, are contained under penance; cf. below part II, dubium I.

la: Non pauci codd. *constituit,* incongrue, ut videtur; hinc edd. legunt *secundum quem vera poenitentia constituitur.*

en: Not a few codices [read] *constituit,* incongruously, as it seems; hence the editions read *according to which true penance is constituted.*

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR raw lines 43579–43642 (the *Pars I* header through the QUAESTIO I title) with the PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p382-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol4-p383-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) authoritative in the two-column cascade-fragmented regions (the OCR splices left- and right-column lines together throughout). Offset pdf = printed + 20. Running head on p.383 confirmed: **DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. I.** and printed page number 383. The QUAESTIO I body (*Circa primum proceditur sic. Magistri dicunt, quod contritio est dolor voluntarie pro peccatis assumtus…* / Fundamenta, p.383 left col, raw L43643+) is excluded; it opens the next chunk `d16-p1-a1-q1`.
- **Structure confirmed — FOUR articles, two questions each:** The TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM partitions Pars I "quatuor principaliter" (contrition under four aspects, each = one article): **Art I** *De contritione quantum ad quidditatem* (p.383, "Primo quaeritur de contritione quantum ad quidditatem"); **Art II** *De contritione quantum ad quantitatem* ("Secundo, quantum ad quantitatem"); **Art III** *De contritione quantum ad durationem* ("Tertio, quantum ad durationem"); **Art IV** *De contritione quantum ad intensionem* ("Quarto, quantum ad intensionem"). Art I's two questions are listed verbatim under "Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo" (p.383 right col): q1 *quid sit [contritio] quantum ad suam substantiam*; q2 *quid sit in genere moris*. Per the divisio-chunk convention the ARTICULUS I opener (heading + sub-title) folds in here, along with the QUAESTIO I heading + title; the q1 body is left to `d16-p1-a1-q1`. (The two-question listings for Art II–IV print at the head of each later article, not in this opening TRACTATIO.)
- **Page-split map:** the chunk straddles printed pages 382–383 (page break `<!-- page 383 -->` placed before TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM). p.382 carries the COMMENTARIUS title (printed right-column, below Lombard's Cap. V/VI littera which is NOT part of this chunk), the *Pars I* subtitle/argumentum, the full DIVISIO TEXTUS (left-column body + right-column continuation), and the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM heading with its first lines (the quatuor partition begins at p.382 foot and continues to p.383). p.383 carries the remainder of the TRACTATIO (Tertio/Quarto + the "Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo" two-question listing, right col), the ARTICULUS I opener, and the QUAESTIO I title.
- **Footer ownership (corrected 2026-07-13):** printed page **382** has two footer blocks — a left-column block of 4 Lombard/littera source-notes and a right-column **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** pair. This chunk owns only the right-column pair (now `[^1]`–`[^2]`), which anchor in the DIVISIO TEXTUS body (`[^1]` at *de subiectivis*; `[^2]` at *constituunt*). The left-column block was previously duplicated here as `[^1]`–`[^4]` (unanchored, "for completeness") but is in fact the **same physical footer notes** already captured and owned by `bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-littera` as its `[^6]`–`[^9]` (that chunk's own page-split map states it captured "4 littera footnotes ([^6]–[^9]) in the left-column footer" of p.382 and forwards only the right-column NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM to this chunk). Content diff confirmed near-verbatim/verbatim match: former divisio `[^1]`=littera `[^6]` (verbatim, "Cap. 71. n. 19..."), divisio `[^2]`=littera `[^7]` (verbatim, "Edd., exceptis 1, 8..."), divisio `[^3]`=littera `[^8]` (verbatim, "Dist. XVII."), divisio `[^4]`≈littera `[^9]` (near-verbatim, "Serm. cit. pag. 381, nota 5" — chapter digit differs, "c. 8" here vs "c. 5" there, a pre-existing transcription variance between the two chunks' independent OCR/PDF reads of the same note, not a distinct footnote). Per the corpus's trap-3c precedent (d13-divisio), the duplicates were **deleted** from this chunk rather than given invented anchors; the surviving `[^5]`/`[^6]` were renumbered `[^1]`/`[^2]` in both body and apparatus.
- **No `[?]` flags** — the divisio body, the quatuor-articulorum partition, and the two owned footers read cleanly once reflowed from the column bands (OCR raw is column-spliced but the PDF bands disambiguate every line). The Pars-I subtitle reads *De partibus integralibus Sacramenti poenitentiae* and the argumentum *In perfectione autem poenitentiae tria observanda sunt etc.*; both confirmed against the bands.
- No scholion in this divisio chunk.
- **Hand-off to `d16-p1-a1-q1`:** that chunk opens at raw L43643 / p.383 left col (*Circa primum proceditur sic. Magistri dicunt…*), QUAESTIO I title already set here; it owns all p.383 footers (Magistri/Ambrosius/Augustinus source notes).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt:
Divisio textus
Division of the text

source_text:
<!-- page 403 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.

### Pars II.

#### *De partibus subiectivis poenitentiae.*

*Praedictis vero adiiciendum est, quod tribus modis agitur poenitentia.*

TEXTUM MAGISTRI VIDE SUPRA PAG. 381.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de partibus poenitentiae integralibus. Hic agit de subiectivis, quae sunt poenitentiae[^1] ante baptismum, et post baptismum de mortalibus, et tertio de venialibus. Dividitur autem haec pars in duas partes secundum duo capitula. In prima dividit poenitentiam per trimembrem differentiam. In secunda vero specialiter tradit modum poenitentiae de venialibus, ibi: *Quae autem pro venialibus sit satisfactio sufficiens.*

Prima pars duas habet. In prima ponit divisionem. In secunda confirmat per auctoritates, ibi: *Tres sunt actiones poenitentiae* etc.

Similiter secunda pars dividitur in duas. In prima assignat sufficientem satisfactionem. In secunda vero epilogat, ibi: *Ex his aliisque praemissis* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis secundum triplicem poenitentiam, quam distinguit Magister in littera[^2], tria principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de poenitentia ante baptismum.

Secundo, de poenitentia post baptismum, quae est de mortalibus.

Tertio, de poenitentia, quae est de venialibus.

### ARTICULUS I.

#### *De poenitentia ante baptismum.*

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum oporteat poenitere et dolere pro originali peccato.

Secundo, utrum accedentem ad baptismum cum actuali necesse sit ante Sacramentum poenitentiae accipere.

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI.

### Part II.

#### *On the subjective parts of penance.*

*But to the things already said it must be added that penance is performed in three ways.*

FOR THE TEXT OF THE MASTER SEE ABOVE, PAGE 381.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the integral parts of penance. Here he treats of the subjective parts, which are: the penance[^1] before baptism, and after baptism the penance for mortal sins, and thirdly the penance for venial sins. Now this part is divided into two parts according to two chapters. In the first he divides penance by a threefold distinction. In the second he specifically sets forth the mode of penance for venial sins, there: *But what satisfaction for venial sins is sufficient.*

The first part has two [sections]. In the first he sets down the division. In the second he confirms it by authorities, there: *There are three actions of penance,* etc.

Likewise the second part is divided into two. In the first he assigns sufficient satisfaction. In the second he sums up, there: *From these and the other things premised,* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part according to the threefold penance which the Master distinguishes in the text[^2], three things are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning the penance before baptism.

Second, concerning the penance after baptism, which is for mortal sins.

Third, concerning the penance which is for venial sins.

### ARTICLE I.

#### *On penance before baptism.*

Concerning the first, two things are asked.

First it is asked whether one ought to repent and grieve for original sin.

Second, whether one approaching baptism with an actual [sin] must, before the Sacrament of penance, receive [it].

la: Codd. F G *poenitentia*.

en: Codices F G read *poenitentia* [penance].

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 45719–45769) and cross-checked against the PDF page-403 column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p403-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; pdf = printed + 20 → p.423). Page-verify PASSED: running head reads `DIST. XVI. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` with printed page `403`. The entire Pars II COMMENTARIUS opener (subtitle + Magister-text incipit + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + ARTICULUS I sub-divisio) sits on printed page 403; printed page 402 holds Pars I Dub. XIV, which is a separate chunk.

**Three-article map (confirmed against raw, subtitles verbatim):**
- **Articulus I** — *De poenitentia ante baptismum* (2 quaestiones): q1 *Utrum oporteat poenitere de originali peccato*; q2 (whether one approaching baptism with an actual sin must first receive the Sacrament of penance). Sub-divisio folded here per the Vol II chunking convention.
- **Articulus II** — *De poenitentia post baptismum, quae est de mortalibus* (2 quaestiones): q1 *Utrum necesse sit poenitere de peccatis commissis per ignorantiam* (sins of ignorance); q2 *Utrum necesse sit conteri de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis* (sins knowingly committed then forgotten).
- **Articulus III** — *De poenitentia post baptismum, quae est de venialibus* (2 quaestiones): q1 *Utrum veniale peccatum possit fieri mortale* (venial → mortal); q2 (per the divisio's brief listing the two are framed as "de periculo morbi" / "de necessitate remedii").

**Apparatus split.** This chunk carries only footers 1 and 2 of printed page 403. Footers 3 (*Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 3.*), 4 (*Vide pro hoc et seqq. argg. supra d. 14. p. I. dub. 4. … definitiones poenitentiae.*) and 5 (*Ut ostensum est supra d. 4. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1.*) belong to ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I, which begins lower on p.403 and is a separate chunk (hand-off below).

**Hand-off to a1-q1** (`bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a1-q1`): Quaestio I (*Utrum oporteat poenitere de originali peccato*) begins on printed page 403, right column, and runs onto p.404. Its footers on p.403 are notes 3–5 listed above — pick them up when building a1-q1. The shared page-403 footer block is fully accounted for: notes 1–2 here, notes 3–5 in a1-q1.

**J2 apparatus-anchor fix (2026-07-13).** English body was missing `[^1]` (Latin: "quae sunt poenitentiae[^1] ante baptismum"); inserted after "the penance" in the English DIVISION OF THE TEXT paragraph to restore Tier-2 dual-body anchoring.

**[?] flags.** None. The OCR garbles (`DI8TINCTI0NEM`, `baplismum`, `Simiiiter`, `sulBcientem`, `TRAGTATIO`, `aulem`, `differenliam`) were silently corrected against the clean PDF bands; no genuinely ambiguous readings remain.


title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 383 -->

### Articulus I. *De contritione quantum ad quidditatem.*
### Quaestio I. *Quid sit contritio quoad suam substantiam.*

Circa primum proceditur sic. Magistri[^1] dicunt, quod contritio est dolor voluntarie pro peccatis assumtus; et quod ita sit, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut dicit Ambrosius[^2] « poenitentia est commissa deflere »; et iterum: « Poenitentia est dolor et amaritudo mentis pro peccatis, quae quisque commisit »; sed hoc non est confessio neque satisfactio: ergo contritio.

2. Item, Augustinus[^3]: « Dolendum est et dolore purgandum »; sed contritio est illud in poenitentia, quod peccata depurgat: ergo contritio est dolor.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia primum, quod est in poenitentia, est dissentire a peccato facto; sed quod factum est necesse est esse factum; sed cum aliquid displicet alicui vehementer, quod tamen non potest facere, quin fuerit, generat dolorem: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Sicut vere poenitentem necesse est dolere, ita etiam pudere[^4]: ergo pudor est de poenitentia; et non est confessio nec satisfactio: ergo contritio, et sic etc.

2. Item, in poenitentia non tantum est dolere, verum etiam gaudere — unde in praecedenti distinctione[^5]: « Doleat et de dolore gaudeat » — ergo quemadmodum contritio dicitur dolor, ita etiam debet dici gaudium.

3. Item, videtur, quod non sit dolor: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate Dei[^6] « dolor est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt »; sed contritio est dissensus a peccatis, quae nobis volentibus accidunt: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod peccata prius sunt placita et volita, post autem displicent et non sunt volita, et pro illo tempore est dolor; contra: dolor est ex coniunctione disconvenientis, ergo ab oppositis ex dissensu a disconvenienti non est dolor, sed gaudium: ergo si peccata displicent, et per contritionem dissentit quis a peccatis; videtur, quod non dolor, sed gaudium est contritio.

4. Item, contritus dolet de peccato facto, aut ergo quia vult, ipsum non esse factum, aut quia vult. Si quia vult; cum factum sit, tunc evenit quod vult. Si quia non vult; sed omnis voluntas est indiscreta, quae appetit impossibile et refugit necessarium: ergo cum voluntas contriti non sit talis, patet etc. — Si dicas quod verum est de voluntate absoluta, sed non de velleitate, et talis est contritio; contra: contritus habet voluntatem a virtute et gratia informatam[^7]; sed omnis talis consistit in pleno consensu: ergo voluntas contriti non est velleitas, sed plena voluntas; et ita nulla est illa responsio.

5. Item, differt dolor et timor, quia dolor est affectio de praesenti malo, sed timor de futuro[^8]; sed peccatum est praeteritum, et de eo est contritio: ergo non est dolor. Si dicas, quod non est praesens secundum affectum[^9], sed secundum aspectum; similiter et futurum est praesens secundum aspectum: ergo sicut est dolor de praeterito, ita etiam de futuro.

Item, cum contritio sit dolor, ut quid magis denominatur nomine contritionis quam doloris?

> **Conclusio.** Contritio est dolor per essentiam, quatenus dolor sumitur pro dissensu voluntatis, non pro passione sensibili.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut peccatum perpetratur per consensum, sic econtra deletur et destruitur per dissensum voluntatis rationalis; et quia dissensus ab ea re, quam impossibile est non esse, generat dolorem, sicut dicit Augustinus[^10]: ideo dicendum, quod contritio est dolor per essentiam. — Sed attendendum, quod dolor dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ipse dissensus voluntatis, alio modo passio resultans in sentientem ex illo dissensu, per

<!-- page 384 -->

quam prorumpit homo in lacrymas[^11]; et ille dissensus est de essentia contritionis, sed illa passio est effectus eius.

1. 2. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod sit pudor et gaudium, sicut et dolor; dicendum, quod pudor consequitur ad illum dissensum, secundum quod dissentit a peccato tanquam a turpi. Consequitur etiam gaudium, secundum quod ex illo dissensu sentit se elongari a peccato[^12]; immediatius autem consequitur passio, quae est dolor. Nam ipse dissensus vehemens a re, quam nolumus esse, et tamen est, immediate dolorem generat, quia dissensus; sed quia a turpi, pudorem; et quia ab illo elongat, gaudium.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum nobis volentibus accidit; dicendum[^13], quod peccatum est voluntarium quoad delectationem, sed non voluntarium ratione malitiae et deformitatis et poenae. Sed illud non solvit, quia dolor non tantum est de deformitate, immo etiam de delectatione. — Ideo dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod doleat, sufficit, quod illud de quo dolet, sit nolitum pro tempore, in quo dolet; tamen non oportet, quod omni[^14] tempore. Et quod in contrarium adducit, quod dissensus a re disconvenienti generat gaudium; verum est, quando est tantum dissensus, ut puta, cum refugit, ne faciat peccatum, non dolet, sed gaudet; sed quando est dissensus cum coniunctione, tunc est dolor; et ita est in contritione, quia nollet peccasse, et tamen necessarium est, ipsum peccasse.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contritus vult impossibile; dicendum, quod velleitate vult, non voluntate absoluta; sicut aliquis ex pietate de illo qui mortuus est, vellet, quod viveret[^15].

Et quod obiicit, quod virtus est in pleno consensu; dicendum, quod consensus semiplenus aut est propter defectum voluntatis, sicut piger vult et non vult[^16], non est gratiae, sed pigritiae; et talis velleitas aut est propter defectum voliti, quia non est natum eligi, cum sit impossibile, et talis bene est a virtute, ut patet in pietate; et hic est plenus consensus a parte voluntatis, quia reflectitur voluntas supra se et vult, se sic velle.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dolor est de praesenti; dicendum, sicut dictum fuit[^17], quod est de praesenti secundum aspectum. — Quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non sufficit, quod sit praesens secundum aspectum; respondent aliqui, quod est praesens secundum reputationem, quia pro tali reputat se vere contritus, ac si esset infectus peccato prius facto. — Sed illud non solvit, quia, esto quod constaret sibi de iustitia praesenti, tamen adhuc doleret de praeterito[^18]. — Ideo dicunt alii, quod est praesens secundum effectum, quia remanent reliquiae. — Sed tunc esto, quod nullae reliquiae remanerent, adhuc tamen doleret homo de malo, quod fecit.

Ideo dicendum, quod ad dolorem faciendum sufficit, quod res, quae displicet voluntati, sit praesens aspectui, non secundum coniecturam, sed secundum certitudinem, quia ita est et non potest aliter esse; et tunc est dolor, sive illud, de quo gemitus[^19] est, sit praesens, sive praeteritum, sive futurum. Unde cum dicitur mihi certitudinaliter, quod aliquis, quem diligo, morietur, generat in me dolorem; multo magis de praeterito, in quo est perfecta certitudo.

Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare magis denominatur nomine contritionis; et quae convenientia doloris ad contritionem? dicunt aliqui, quod ideo hoc nomine censetur, quia, sicut unguentum sanativum conficitur ex multis herbis in mortario contritis, sic unguentum compunctionis conficitur ex herbis peccatorum, quae natae sunt in terra nostra, dum conteruntur in mortariolo conscientiae; ita videtur Bernardus super Cantica[^20] dicere. — Sed tunc ab hac contritione non diceretur homo contritus, sed conterens.

Ideo addendum, quod in hac contritione tria sunt attendenda: quod conteritur, a quo conteritur, et ad quid contritio terminatur. Quod conteritur est cor peccatoris, quod est tanquam vas fictile repletum veneno peccati, iuxta illud Deuteronomii trigesimo secundo[^21]: *Fel draconum vinum eorum* etc. — A quo conteritur est duplex mola: una superius sursum elevans, et haec est spes

<!-- page 385 -->

veniae ex consideratione misericordiae; alia mola, deorsum deprimens, est timor poenae, veniens ex consideratione divinae iustitiae. Et de his molis dicitur Deuteronomii vigesimo quarto: *Non accipies loco pignoris inferiorem et superiorem molam.* — Istud vas hic conteritur, quia durum est, ut emollescat — cor enim durum male habebit in novissimo — vel melius, ut peccati delectatio totaliter effundatur. Ideo dicitur contritio, non fractio, « quia fractio est in maiores partes », contritio in minores; et quando in maiores partes est fractio, sapor aliquo modo remanet; ut autem non remaneat nec sapor nec veritas, ideo in partes minimas conteritur. — Et haec delectatio totaliter removetur per poenam aeternam et removetur per gratiam; et ideo utrobique contritio, et in poena aeterna, secundum illud Ecclesiastici vigesimo septimo: *Conteretur cum delinquente delictum*; et per gratiam, Psalmo: *Cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despicies*; sed aliter: quia ibi conteritur in pulverem, non ut aliud vas fiat, quia de impiis dicitur: *Non sic impii, non sic, sed tanquam pulvis* etc.; sed in contritione gratiae est contritio ad generandum vas novum et solidum per humorem gratiae et lacrymarum; et ideo recte dicitur contritio, non attritio, quia partium tritarum est unio, ut fiat vas in honorem, secundum illud de Paulo: *Vas electionis est mihi*, Actuum nono; et secundae ad Timotheum secundo: *Si quis emundaverit se ab his*, erit vas etc. Et sic patet ratio dicti.

english:
### Article I. *On contrition with respect to its quiddity.*
### Question I. *What contrition is according to its substance.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus. The Masters[^1] say that contrition is a sorrow voluntarily taken up for sins; and that it is so, it seems:

1. Because, as Ambrose says[^2], "penitence is to bewail things committed"; and again: "Penitence is a sorrow and bitterness of mind for the sins which each one has committed"; but this is neither confession nor satisfaction: therefore [it is] contrition.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^3]: "One must grieve and be purged by grief"; but contrition is that in penitence which purges away sins: therefore contrition is a sorrow.

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because the first thing which is in penitence is to dissent from the sin committed; but what has been done is necessarily done; but when something displeases someone vehemently, which nevertheless he cannot bring about that it should not have been, it generates sorrow: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Just as it is necessary for one truly penitent to grieve, so also to feel shame[^4]: therefore shame belongs to penitence; and it is neither confession nor satisfaction: therefore [it is] contrition, and so etc.

2. Likewise, in penitence there is not only grieving, but also rejoicing — whence in the preceding distinction[^5]: "Let him grieve and rejoice over the grief" — therefore just as contrition is called sorrow, so also it ought to be called joy.

3. Likewise, it seems that it is not sorrow: because, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the City of God*[^6], "sorrow is a dissent from those things which befall us unwillingly"; but contrition is a dissent from sins, which befell us willingly: therefore etc. If you say that sins were first pleasing and willed, but afterward displease and are not willed, and for that time there is sorrow; on the contrary: sorrow is from the conjunction of something disagreeing, therefore from opposites, from a dissent from what disagrees there is not sorrow, but joy: therefore if sins displease, and through contrition one dissents from sins; it seems that contrition is not sorrow, but joy.

4. Likewise, the contrite one grieves over the sin committed, either therefore because he wills it not to have been done, or because he wills [it]. If because he wills [it]; since it has been done, then what he wills comes about. If because he does not will [it]; but every will which seeks the impossible and shuns the necessary is indiscreet: therefore since the will of the contrite one is not such, it is clear etc. — If you say that this is true of an absolute will, but not of a velleity, and such is contrition; on the contrary: the contrite one has a will informed by virtue and grace[^7]; but every such [will] consists in full consent: therefore the will of the contrite one is not a velleity, but a full will; and so that reply is null.

5. Likewise, sorrow and fear differ, because sorrow is an affection concerning a present evil, but fear concerning a future one[^8]; but the sin is past, and contrition is over it: therefore it is not sorrow. If you say that it is not present according to affection[^9], but according to regard; likewise the future too is present according to regard: therefore just as there is sorrow over the past, so also over the future.

Likewise, since contrition is sorrow, why is it rather named by the name of contrition than of sorrow?

> **Conclusion.** Contrition is sorrow by essence, insofar as sorrow is taken for the dissent of the will, not for a sensible passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as sin is perpetrated through consent, so on the contrary it is deleted and destroyed through the dissent of the rational will; and since dissent from a thing which it is impossible should not be generates sorrow, as Augustine says[^10]: therefore it must be said that contrition is sorrow by essence. — But it must be noted that sorrow is said in two ways: in one way [it is] the dissent of the will itself, in another way the passion resulting in the one perceiving from that dissent, through

<!-- page 384 -->

which a man bursts into tears[^11]; and that dissent is of the essence of contrition, but that passion is its effect.

1. 2. As to what is objected, then, that there is shame and joy, just as also sorrow; it must be said that shame follows upon that dissent, insofar as he dissents from the sin as from something base. Joy too follows, insofar as from that dissent he perceives himself to be removed from the sin[^12]; but the passion which is sorrow follows more immediately. For the vehement dissent itself from a thing which we do not will to be, and yet is, immediately generates sorrow, because [it is] dissent; but because [it is] from something base, [it generates] shame; and because it removes from it, joy.

3. To that which is objected, that the sin befell us willingly; it must be said[^13] that sin is voluntary as to the delight, but not voluntary by reason of the malice and the deformity and the penalty. But that does not solve [it], because sorrow is not only concerning the deformity, but also concerning the delight. — Therefore it must be said that for him to grieve it suffices that that over which he grieves be unwilled for the time in which he grieves; yet it is not necessary that [it be unwilled] at every time[^14]. And as to what it adduces to the contrary, that dissent from a disagreeing thing generates joy; it is true, when there is only dissent, as for instance when he shuns lest he commit a sin, he does not grieve, but rejoices; but when there is dissent with conjunction, then there is sorrow; and so it is in contrition, because he would not have wished to sin, and yet it is necessary that he sinned.

4. To that which is objected, that the contrite one wills the impossible; it must be said that he wills by velleity, not by absolute will; just as someone out of piety, concerning him who has died, would wish that he were alive[^15].

And as to what it objects, that virtue is in full consent; it must be said that semifull consent is either on account of a defect of the will, as the slothful man wills and does not will[^16], [and such] is not of grace, but of sloth; and such a velleity is either on account of a defect of the thing willed, because it is not apt to be chosen, since it is impossible, and such [consent] is well from virtue, as is clear in piety; and this is full consent on the part of the will, because the will is reflected upon itself and wills that it so will.

5. To that which is objected, that sorrow is concerning the present; it must be said, as was said[^17], that it is concerning the present according to regard. — As to what is objected to the contrary, that it does not suffice that it be present according to regard; some reply that it is present according to reputation, because for such [present] the truly contrite one reckons himself, as if he were infected with the sin previously committed. — But that does not solve [it], because, granted that it were established to him concerning his present justice, nevertheless he would still grieve over the past[^18]. — Therefore others say that it is present according to effect, because remnants remain. — But then, granted that no remnants remained, nevertheless a man would still grieve over the evil which he did.

Therefore it must be said that for making sorrow it suffices that the thing which displeases the will be present to regard, not according to conjecture, but according to certitude, because it is so and cannot be otherwise; and then there is sorrow, whether that over which there is groaning[^19] be present, or past, or future. Whence when it is told me with certitude that someone whom I love will die, it generates sorrow in me; much more concerning the past, in which there is perfect certitude.

To that which is asked: why is it rather named by the name of contrition; and what is the suitability of sorrow to contrition? some say that it is reckoned by this name because, just as a healing ointment is made from many herbs ground in a mortar, so the ointment of compunction is made from the herbs of sins, which were born in our land, while they are ground in the little mortar of conscience; thus Bernard seems to say upon the Canticle[^20]. — But then from this [grinding] a man would not be called contrite, but grinding.

Therefore it must be added that in this contrition three things are to be attended to: what is ground, by what it is ground, and to what the contrition is terminated. What is ground is the heart of the sinner, which is as an earthen vessel filled with the venom of sin, according to that of Deuteronomy the thirty-second[^21]: *Their wine is the gall of dragons* etc. — That by which it is ground is a twofold millstone: one raising upward from above, and this is the hope

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of pardon from the consideration of mercy; the other millstone, pressing downward, is the fear of penalty, coming from the consideration of divine justice. And concerning these millstones it is said in Deuteronomy the twenty-fourth: *You shall not take the lower and the upper millstone in pledge.* — This vessel is here ground, because it is hard, that it may be softened — for the hard heart will fare ill in the last day — or better, that the delight of sin may be totally poured out. Therefore it is called contrition, not fracture, "because fracture is into larger parts," contrition into smaller; and when the fracture is into larger parts, the flavor in some way remains; but that neither flavor nor truth may remain, therefore it is ground into the smallest parts. — And this delight is totally removed through eternal penalty and is removed through grace; and therefore in both ways [there is] contrition, both in eternal penalty, according to that of Ecclesiasticus the twenty-seventh: *The offense shall be ground together with the offender*; and through grace, in the Psalm: *A contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise*; but otherwise: because there [in eternal penalty] it is ground into dust, not that another vessel may be made, because of the impious it is said: *Not so the impious, not so, but like dust* etc.; but in the contrition of grace there is contrition for generating a new and solid vessel through the moisture of grace and of tears; and therefore it is rightly called contrition, not attrition, because of the ground parts there is a union, that a vessel may be made unto honor, according to that of Paul: *He is a vessel of election to me*, Acts the ninth; and to the Second to Timothy the second: *If anyone shall cleanse himself from these*, he shall be a vessel etc. And thus the reason of the saying is clear.

la: Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. IV. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 1, iam referebat: « Contritio est, ut dicunt magistri, idem quod et dolor de peccatis ». Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Contritio est dolor pro peccatis assumtus cum proposito confitendi et satisfaciendi.

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. IV. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 1, already reported: "Contrition is, as the Masters say, the same as sorrow for sins." Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Contrition is a sorrow taken up for sins with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.

la: Serm. 25. (9. de s. Quadragesima) n. 1. Ibid. habetur etiam seq. definitio. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIV. c. 2, et Comment. p. I. dub. 4.

en: Sermon 25 (9th on holy Lent) n. 1. There the following definition is also had. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. XIV. c. 2, and the Commentary p. I. dub. 4.

la: De Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 14. n. 29. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: *On True and False Penitence* (among the works of Augustine), c. 14. n. 29. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Bernard., Serm. in Cant. 16. n. 4: Cogitantem, quod patrem offenderim, est certe quod pudeat... Pudet indigna gessisse genere meo, pudet, tanto patre vixisse degenerem.

en: Bernard, *Sermon on the Canticle* 16. n. 4: For one thinking that I have offended the Father, there is certainly that which should shame... It shames [me] to have done unworthy things to my race, it shames [me] to have lived degenerate from so great a Father.

la: Scilicet d. XIV. lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa finem.

en: Namely d. XIV, the text of the Master, c. 2, near the end.

la: Cap. 15. n. 2: Animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his... acciderunt.

en: Chapter 15. n. 2: The sorrow of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissent from those things... [which] have befallen.

la: Cod. O *informativa*.

en: Codex O [reads] *informativa* [informing].

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 569, nota 4. verba Damasceni.

en: See vol. III. p. 569, note 4, the words of Damascene.

la: Ita codd. et ed. 1, Vat. *effectum*; cfr. infra a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.

en: Thus the codices and ed. 1; the Vatican [edition reads] *effectum* [effect]; cf. below a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.

la: Vide supra nota 6.

en: See above note 6.

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: Passio est sensibilis motus appetitivae virtutis ex imaginatione boni vel mali. Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2. — Post *sentientem* Vat. addit *vel sensualitatem*.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II. c. 22: A passion is a sensible movement of the appetitive power from the imagination of good or evil. Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV. c. 15. n. 2. — After *sentientem* the Vatican [edition] adds *vel sensualitatem* [or sensuality].

la: Cfr. infra dub. 10. et supra d. II. p. II. dub. 7. — Circa finem solut. pro *pudorem* codd. H aa *pudor est*.

en: Cf. below dub. 10, and above d. II. p. II. dub. 7. — Near the end of the solution, for *pudorem* codices H aa [read] *pudor est* [there is shame].

la: Videtur esse legendum (ut ex subnexis colligitur) *aliqui dicunt*. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Aliter dicunt aliqui, quod cum perpetratione peccati multa accidunt peccantibus nolentibus, ut offensa Dei, laesio naturalium, privatio gratuitorum et alia huiusmodi, de quibus dolendum est. Unde Augustinus: Dolendum est, non solum quia peccavit, sed quia virtute se privavit (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.).

en: It seems that one should read (as is gathered from what is appended) *some say*. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Some say otherwise, that with the perpetration of sin many things befall sinners unwillingly, such as the offense of God, the injury of natural [goods], the privation of gratuitous [goods], and others of this kind, over which one must grieve. Whence Augustine: One must grieve, not only because he sinned, but because he deprived himself of virtue (cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.).

la: Plurimi codd. pro *omni*, qui etiam post *tamen* perperam omittunt *non*.

en: Very many codices [read thus] for *omni*, which also after *tamen* wrongly omit *non*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. ad 3: Voluntas conditionata, quae et velleitas dicitur, esse potest de impossibilibus.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. and dub. 4. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 1. ad 3: A conditioned will, which is also called velleity, can be concerning impossible things.

en: Proverbs 13, 4.

la: In ipsa obiectione.

en: In the objection itself.

la: Cod. bb *doleret homo de malo praeterito, quod fecit*. Superius pro *tali* cod. R *talis*. Inferius post *Sed tunc* multi codd. et ed. 1 addunt *adhuc*, incongrue.

en: Codex bb [reads] *a man would grieve over the past evil which he did*. Above, for *tali* codex R [reads] *talis*. Below, after *Sed tunc* many codices and ed. 1 add *adhuc*, incongruously.

la: Ita plurimi codd., edd. *genitus*; cod. Y *certus*; lectio nostra convenit modo loquendi Magistri. Inferius verbo *morietur* edd. cum pluribus codd. praemittunt *cras*.

en: Thus very many codices; the editions [read] *genitus*; codex Y *certus*; our reading agrees with the Master's manner of speaking. Below, before the word *morietur* the editions with several codices place *cras* [tomorrow].

la: Serm. 10. n. 5: Est ergo unguentum, quod sibi conficit anima multis irretita criminibus, si, cum incipit cogitare vias suas, colligat, congerat conteratque in mortariolo conscientiae multas ac varias species peccatorum suorum et intra aestuantis pectoris ollam simul omnia coquat igne quodam poenitentiae et doloris etc.

en: Sermon 10. n. 5: There is therefore an ointment which the soul, ensnared by many crimes, makes for itself, if, when it begins to think upon its ways, it gathers, heaps up, and grinds in the little mortar of conscience the many and various kinds of its sins, and within the pot of the seething breast cooks them all together with a certain fire of penitence and of sorrow etc.

la: Vers. 33. — Mox pro *A quo* codd. *Quo*.

en: Verse 33. — Presently, for *A quo* the codices [read] *Quo*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De nomine contritionis vide hic q. incid. et dub. 3. De distinctione inter contritionem proprie dictam et attritionem cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. dub. 1, d. 14. p. II. dub. 1, sed praecipue infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. Quomodo attritio fiat contritio, docetur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. De attritione naturali vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6. — Ut autem plura, quae in hac et seq. dist. occurrunt, recte intelligantur, hic observamus, antiquos Scholasticos de contritione passim loqui non eadem prorsus ratione, qua rem considerant recentiores; et haec differentia est duplex. Primo quidem in definitione contritionis et attritionis illi non tam motivorum differentiam ut recentes theologi, considerabant, quam informationem a gratia habituali procedentem, vel eiusdem defectum. Hinc omnem actum doloris tempore gratiae infusionem praecedentem vocabant attritionem, cum sit informis; econtra quemcumque actum formatum dicebant esse contritionem. Hoc explicite cum Alexandro Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 3. a. 3.) docet S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 28. a. 8.): « Omnis dolor de peccato in habente gratiam est contritio », sicut omnis actus fidei gratiae habituali coniunctus est formatus. — Secundo, supponebant communiter, habitum gratiae non dari adultis sine actu istius contritionis, non quidem tempore gratiae infusionem praecedente (quod, ista definitione supposita, est impossibile), sed in eodem instanti cum infusione gratiae formato. Et de hoc actu ac de ordine naturae, quem habet respectu infusionis gratiae et expulsionis culpae, subtiliter disputabant, ut patet infra d. 17. p. 1. a. 2. Quare autem iste actus contritionis in adultis sit semper connexus cum iustificatione, docet S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 28. a. 3. ad 10.), quia scil. « in hoc ostenditur perfectior communicatio divinae bonitatis, quod simul facit in homine actum iustitiae, quam si faceret habitum tantum ». Cfr. Bonav., loc. cit. a. 1. q. 3, et de actibus praeparatoriis tempore iustificationem praecedentibus ibid. q. 2. a. 2. q. 3.

**II.** Quaestionis 1. conclusio manifesta est. — De gaudio quod arg. 2. ad oppos. in contritione esse dicitur, cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. et dub. 10. — De hac et pluribus seqq. qq. plurimi commentatores Lombardi agunt infra d. 17. De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 6; cfr. d. 14. q. 2. — S. Thom., d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6-9. — Petr. a Tar., d. 17. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., d. 17. q. 1. n. 7. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. d. 17. q. 4.

**III.** Quaestionis 2. conclusio rite sequitur ex doctrina de virtute poenitentiae, supra d. 14. p. I. a. 1. exposita. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3. et a. 1. § 2. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 14. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the name of contrition see here the incidental question and dub. 3. Concerning the distinction between contrition properly so called and attrition cf. above d. 4. p. I. dub. 1, d. 14. p. II. dub. 1, but especially below d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. How attrition becomes contrition is taught below d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. Concerning natural attrition see II Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6. — But that the many things which occur in this and the following distinction may be rightly understood, here we observe that the ancient Scholastics speak of contrition variously, not by exactly the same account by which the more recent [theologians] consider the matter; and this difference is twofold. First indeed, in the definition of contrition and attrition those [ancients] considered not so much the difference of motives, as the more recent theologians [do], as the information proceeding from habitual grace, or the defect of the same. Hence they called every act of sorrow preceding the infusion of grace in time attrition, since it is unformed; on the contrary, whatever formed act they called contrition. This St. Thomas (*On Truth* q. 28. a. 8.) teaches explicitly with Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. IV. q. 17. m. 3. a. 3.): "Every sorrow concerning sin in one having grace is contrition," just as every act of faith joined to habitual grace is formed. — Second, they commonly supposed that the habit of grace is not given to adults without an act of this contrition, not indeed at a time preceding the infusion of grace (which, that definition being supposed, is impossible), but in the same instant with the infusion of grace, [the act being] formed. And concerning this act and concerning the order of nature which it has with respect to the infusion of grace and the expulsion of guilt, they disputed subtly, as is clear below d. 17. p. 1. a. 2. But why this act of contrition in adults is always connected with justification, St. Thomas teaches (*On Truth* q. 28. a. 3. ad 10.), namely because "in this is shown a more perfect communication of divine goodness, that it makes at once in man an act of justice, than if it made a habit only." Cf. Bonaventure, loc. cit. a. 1. q. 3, and concerning the preparatory acts preceding justification in time, ibid. q. 2. a. 2. q. 3.

**II.** The conclusion of the 1st question is manifest. — Concerning the joy which the 2nd argument to the contrary says to be in contrition, cf. also below a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. and dub. 10. — Concerning this and many of the following questions very many commentators of Lombard treat below d. 17. On the same question: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. n. 6; cf. d. 14. q. 2. — St. Thomas, d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 1; *Suppl.* q. 1. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 6-9. — Peter of Tarentaise, d. 17. q. 1. a. 1. subquestion 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Durandus, d. 17. q. 1. n. 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, d. 17. q. 4.

**III.** The conclusion of the 2nd question rightly follows from the doctrine concerning the virtue of penitence, set forth above d. 14. p. I. a. 1. — On the same question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 3. and a. 1. § 2. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 14. ff. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. subquestion 2; *Suppl.* q. 1. a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. subquestion 2.

---

translators_notes:
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**Alignment.** Page-verify PASSES: p.383 recto running head reads **"DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 383"** above ARTICULUS I, *De contritione quantum ad quidditatem*, QUAESTIO I, *Quid sit contritio quoad suam substantiam*. The opener (`Circa primum proceditur sic. Magistri dicunt, quod contritio est dolor...`) matches Art I q1 on the quiddity/substance of contrition. Aligned. (The pars-level DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM and the short ARTICULUS opener precede raw line 43643 and are held by the d.16-p1-divisio chunk.)

**Running heads.** p.383 recto = "DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 383". p.384 verso = "384 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." (no DIST line). p.385 recto running head text reads "DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 385" — the head advances to QUAEST. II because QUAESTIO II opens in the lower portion of p.385, but the upper portion of p.385 still carries q1's millstone-exposition tail and the Articulus I scholion.

**Page span.** Body (videtur 1–5 + contra 1–3 + the "ut quid magis" incidental + Conclusio + Respondeo opening) on p.383; Respondeo overflow + replies 1.2/3/4/5 + the contrition/attrition millstone exposition run through p.384 and finish at the top of p.385 ("...Et sic patet ratio dicti."). The Articulus I scholion (I–III) follows on p.385, ending just before QUAESTIO II's body. printed_pages = [383, 384, 385].

**Apparatus / footer-ownership.** 21 footnotes, all paired in both bodies. Page 383 (per-page restart) notes 1–10 → [^1]–[^10] (n1=Magistri/Guliel.Antissiod., n2=Ambrosius, n3=Augustinus De Vera et falsa Poen., n4=pudere/Bernard., n5=praecedenti distinctione, n6=Civitate Dei, n7=gratia informatam/Cod.O, n8=timor de futuro/Damasc., n9=secundum affectum/Vat.effectum, n10=Augustinus in Respondeo/Vide supra nota 6). Page 384 (per-page restart) notes 1–11 → [^11]–[^21] (n1=lacrymas/Damasc., n2=elongari a peccato, n3=dicendum/aliqui dicunt, n4=omni tempore, n5=viveret/I.Sent.d.48, n6=non vult/Prov.13, n7=dictum fuit/In ipsa obiectione, n8=praeterito/Cod.bb, n9=gemitus/genitus, n10=Bernardus super Cantica/Serm.10, n11=Deuteronomii/Vers.33). Page 385's numbered footers (Vers.6/Gregor., Aristot. Meteor., Vers.3, Psalm, Vers.13/II Tim., Vide supra pag.318, Pro speculis Vat.) anchor in QUAESTIO II's body and are owned by the q2 chunk, NOT here. The scholion uses inline back-references only (no numbered footers).

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**`[?]` flags.** None — all readings resolved against the PDF bands. OCR garbles silently corrected per CLAUDE.md (e.g. `conlritio`/`contrilio`→`contritio`, `procedilur`→`proceditur`, `Magislri`→`Magistri`, `assumlus`→`assumtus`, `lioc`/`Ilem`→`hoc`/`Item`, `peccala`→`peccata`, `nolenlibus`/`volenlibus`→`nolentibus`/`volentibus`, `babet`→`habet`, `affeclio`→`affectio`, `disconvenienlis`→`disconvenientis`, `Anlissiod.`→`Antissiod.`).


title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum contritio sit actus virtutis specialis, scilicet poenitentiae

title_alt: Whether contrition is the act of a special virtue, namely of penitence

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Quid sit contritio in genere moris.*

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit contritio in genere moris. Et quod sit actus virtutis, videtur:

1. Quia omnis actus difficilis et meritorius est actus virtutis, vel doni, vel beatitudinis; sed contritio est huiusmodi et non est doni nec beatitudinis: ergo est virtutis.

2. Item, omnis actus meritorius specialis, qui egreditur a potentia determinata, est virtutis specialis; sed contritio est huiusmodi: ergo contritio est virtutis specialis[^1].

3. Item, poenitentia est dolor et amaritudo mentis; sed constat, illud esse dictum per causam,

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quia poenitentia, ut dicit Ambrosius[^2], facit dolere: ergo si contritio est dolor, contritio est actus virtutis poenitentiae: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Contritio est dolor; sed dolor est passio, et passio non est actus virtutis nec gratiae: ergo nec contritio. Quod dolor sit passio, patet, quia dolor opponitur delectationi[^3].

2. Item, contritio est expulsiva peccati; sed peccatum expellere est ipsius gratiae: ergo contritio est gratiae actus. Si tu dicas, hoc esse virtutis[^4]; contra: aut hoc est virtutis per gratiam, aut e converso. Constat, quod virtutis ratione gratiae, quae est vita, et ideo expellit mortem: cum ergo contritio per se sit expulsiva peccati, patet, quod contritio est actus gratiae.

3. Item, contritione omnia peccata expelluntur; sed omne tale est commune ad omnem animae potentiam et habitum: ergo contritio non est actus virtutis, aut si est, non est virtutis specialis.

> **Conclusio.** Contritio est motus specialis virtutis, scilicet poenitentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex fuit opinio: quaedam, quod contritio est motus liberi arbitrii informati gratia, non virtute, propter quod est expulsiva peccati; alia, quod motus omnium virtutum, quia contra omnia peccata; tertia, quod motus virtutis specialis, scilicet poenitentiae. Et habent istae tres opiniones ortum ab opinionibus de poenitentia: quidam dicebant, quod poenitentia esset gratia; quidam, quod virtus generalis; quidam, quod specialis. Sed cum supra[^5] ostensum sit, ipsam esse virtutem specialem, cuius motus est peccatum detestari commissum ad emendam; et hoc est conteri: dicendum, quod contritio est motus specialis virtutis, scilicet poenitentiae.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est passio; dicendum, quod dolor dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dissensus voluntatis rationalis, alio modo passio redundans in sentientem[^6]. Primo modo est motus voluntatis, et sic contritio est dolor per essentiam; alio modo passio, et sic contritio est dolor per concomitantiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod delere culpam est gratiae; dicendum, quod etsi delere culpam sit gratiae, tamen in adulto, qui praeparat se per usum liberi arbitrii, infunditur gratia, ut in tali usu est[^7]; deletio culpae in illo fit per gratiam, ut induit rationem virtutis, et ideo per poenitentiam, quae concernit gratiam et habitum virtutis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia expellit; dicendum, quod expellit per modum detestantis; et unius virtutis est omne malum detestari sub ea ratione, qua est Dei offensivum, et quia commissum est contra Deum; et sic contritio detestatur et expellit et est virtus poenitentiae. Unde sicut obedientia opera omnium virtutum respicit sub ratione mandati, nec propter hoc est virtus generalis, quia licet illa differant per essentiam, tamen ratio formalis est una secundum speciem; sic et in proposito. — Et est simile de visu, qui videt hominem et plantam, quae non tantum differunt specie, sed etiam genere; videt tamen, quia sunt colorata; videt etiam album et nigrum, quae sunt obiecta per se et differunt specie; et tamen ipse non differt, quia videt per naturam lucis[^8]: sic contritio detestatur superbiam et luxuriam in quantum malum contra Deum perpetratum ab ipso qui conteritur. Et si tu obiicias, quod contritio est vis concupiscibilis, et poenitentia est in irascibili; supra[^9] solutum est. Nam dolor et odium cum insurrectione consistit in irascibili; nihilominus tamen cum illo est dolor quidam in concupiscibili, et iste est imperatus a poenitentia et coniunctus cum illo dolore; et sic non est contrarium praedictis, quia utrumque concurrit ad contritionem, sed primus dolor est praecipuus et principalis[^10].

---

english:
### Question II. *What contrition is in the moral genus.*

Secondly it is asked what contrition is in the moral genus. And that it is the act of a virtue seems to be the case:

1. Because every act that is difficult and meritorious is the act either of a virtue, or of a gift, or of beatitude; but contrition is of this kind and is not of a gift nor of beatitude: therefore it is of a virtue.

2. Likewise, every special meritorious act, which issues from a determinate power, is the act of a special virtue; but contrition is of this kind: therefore contrition is the act of a special virtue[^1].

3. Likewise, penitence is grief and bitterness of mind; but it is agreed that this is said by way of cause,

quia penitence, as Ambrose says[^2], causes one to grieve: therefore, if contrition is grief, contrition is the act of the virtue of penitence: therefore, and so on.

**On the contrary:**
1. Contrition is grief; but grief is a passion, and a passion is not the act of a virtue nor of grace: therefore neither is contrition. That grief is a passion is plain, because grief is opposed to delight[^3].

2. Likewise, contrition is expulsive of sin; but to expel sin belongs to grace itself: therefore contrition is an act of grace. And if you say that this belongs to a virtue[^4]; on the contrary: either this belongs to a virtue through grace, or the reverse. It is agreed that it belongs to a virtue by reason of grace, which is life, and therefore expels death: since, then, contrition is of itself expulsive of sin, it is plain that contrition is an act of grace.

3. Likewise, by contrition all sins are expelled; but everything of this kind is common to every power and habit of the soul: therefore contrition is not the act of a virtue, or if it is, it is not the act of a special virtue.

> **Conclusion.** Contrition is the motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there were three opinions: one, that contrition is a motion of free choice informed by grace, not by virtue, on account of which it is expulsive of sin; another, that it is a motion of all the virtues, because it is against all sins; the third, that it is a motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence. And these three opinions take their origin from the opinions about penitence: for some said that penitence was grace; some, that it was a general virtue; some, that it was a special one. But since it was shown above[^5] that it is a special virtue, whose motion is to detest the sin committed in order to amend it — and this is to be contrite — it must be said that contrition is the motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence.

1. To that which is objected, that it is a passion; it must be said that grief is spoken of in two ways: in one way, as the dissent of the rational will, in another way, as a passion overflowing into the sentient being[^6]. In the first way it is a motion of the will, and thus contrition is grief by essence; in the other way it is a passion, and thus contrition is grief by concomitance.

2. To that which is objected, that to blot out fault belongs to grace; it must be said that although to blot out fault belongs to grace, nevertheless in an adult, who prepares himself through the use of free choice, grace is infused, as it is in such a use[^7]; the blotting out of fault in him comes about through grace, inasmuch as it puts on the character of a virtue, and therefore through penitence, which has to do with grace and the habit of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that it expels all things; it must be said that it expels by way of detesting; and it belongs to one virtue to detest every evil under that account by which it is offensive to God, and because it was committed against God; and thus contrition detests and expels and is the virtue of penitence. Hence, just as obedience regards the works of all the virtues under the account of a command, and is not for that reason a general virtue — because, although they differ by essence, nevertheless the formal account is one according to species — so also in the case proposed. — And it is similar with sight, which sees a man and a plant, which differ not only in species but even in genus; yet it sees them, because they are colored; it sees also white and black, which are objects in themselves and differ in species; and yet it does not itself differ, because it sees by the nature of light[^8]: thus contrition detests pride and lust insofar as they are an evil perpetrated against God by the one who is contrite. And if you object that contrition is a power of the concupiscible part, and penitence is in the irascible; it was resolved above[^9]. For grief and hatred with an uprising consist in the irascible; nevertheless together with that there is a certain grief in the concupiscible, and this is commanded by penitence and joined with that grief; and thus it is not contrary to the things said before, because both concur in contrition, but the first grief is the chief and principal one[^10].

---

la: Pro *specialis* Vat. perperam substituit ter *spiritualis*.

en: For *specialis* (special) the Vatican edition wrongly substitutes, three times, *spiritualis* (spiritual).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 384, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 384, note 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 318, nota 7.

en: See above, p. 318, note 7.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 318, nota 4.

en: Cf. above, p. 318, note 4.

la: Dist. 14. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Ibid. q. 1. exposita invenitur praeced. propositio. — Superius pro *esset gratia* codd. *erat gratia*. Inferius pro *et hoc est conteri* Vat. *et haec est arbor* (?), ed. 1 *et hoc est confiteri*.

en: Distinction 14, part I, article 1, question 2. — In the same place, question 1, the preceding proposition is found expounded. — Above, for *esset gratia* (it would be grace) the codices read *erat gratia* (it was grace). Below, for *et hoc est conteri* (and this is to be contrite) the Vatican edition reads *et haec est arbor* (?), edition 1 *et hoc est confiteri* (and this is to confess).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 384, nota 1. — Codd. L OR T (?) *sensualitatem*, Vat. *sentientem* vel *sensualitatem*.

en: Cf. above, p. 384, note 1. — Codices L, OR, T (?) read *sensualitatem* (the sensuality), the Vatican edition *sentientem* (the sentient being) or *sensualitatem* (the sensuality).

la: Ut ostenditur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et 3. — Edd. addunt *et*.

en: As is shown below, distinction 17, part I, article 1, questions 2 and 3. — The editions add *et* (and).

la: Vide III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. — Post *ipse* cod. X addit *in se*.

en: See III Sentences, distinction 23, article 1, question 3, in the body. — After *ipse* (it itself) codex X adds *in se* (in itself).

la: Dist. 14. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — Pro *in irascibili* cod. II *irascibilis* (vis).

en: Distinction 14, part I, article 2, question 1. Cf. also III Sentences, distinction 26, article 2, question 5. — For *in irascibili* (in the irascible) codex II reads *irascibilis* (the irascible [power]).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 43929–44064), with the 450 dpi column bands of printed pp. 385–386 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p385-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `p386-…`) authoritative for the cascade-shattered Respondeo, replies, and page footers per the VOL II OVERRIDE. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (pp. 405–406). Running heads verified: p. 385 = "DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. II.", p. 386 likewise. The quaestio opens "Secundo quaeritur, quid sit contritio in genere moris" (Art. I's second question) and closes immediately before ARTICULUS II ("De contritione quoad quantitatem", raw 44065) — alignment confirmed.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. The Article I scholion (numbered I–II) covers questions 1 AND 2 jointly and is printed at the top of p. 385 with QUAESTIO I; it is rendered in full with the sibling chunk `bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a1-q1`. Footnote [^10] of this question (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is the editors' own cross-reference back to that scholion. No distinct SCHOLION header falls within this question's raw range.

**Apparatus / page-footer split.** Printed page 385 carries footer notes 1–7; of these, notes 1–6 belong to QUAESTIO I (textus citations: Vers. 6/Gregor., Aristot. Meteor., Ps. 30,19, Psalm 1,4, II Tim 2,21, pag. 318) and are rendered with q1. Only note 7 (*Pro specialis Vat. … spiritualis*) attaches to a q2 marker (arg. 2, "virtutis specialis"), so it is rendered here as [^1]. Printed page 386 carries footer notes 1–9, all belonging to q2; they are rendered here as [^2]–[^10]. Total q2 apparatus = 10 entries.

**[?] flags.** None. Two minor editor-glosses left interrogative as the Quaracchi text itself prints them: [^5] *et haec est arbor* (?) and [^6] the codex sigla L OR T (?) — both carry the editors' own "(?)" and are not new ambiguities.

**Hand-off to Article II.** ARTICULUS II ("De contritione quoad quantitatem") opens at raw 44065 / bottom of printed p. 386 ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de contritione quantum ad quantitatem. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum. Secundo, utrum possibile sit, in illo dolore cadere excessum…"). Per the Vol II/IV chunking convention this short article opener folds into Art. II's q1 chunk (`bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a2-q1`), not a standalone divisio. No p. 386 footer migrates to Art. II — all nine notes are consumed by this q2.