title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
### *Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima.*[^1]

Tertio loco quaeritur de comparatione istarum potentiarum ad animam sive ad subiectum, utrum videlicet sint idem in essentia cum anima. Et videtur quod sic.

1. Augustinus dicit in decimo *de Trinitate*[^2]: « Haec tria, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una vita, una essentia, ac per hoc una substantia ».

2. Item, Bernardus *super Cantica*[^3]: « Tria quaedam in anima intueor, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, et haec tria ipsam ». Si tu dicas, quod hoc dicitur per causam; hoc nihil est, quia Augustinus *de Spiritu et anima*[^4] dicit, quod anima « est quaedam sua, ut potentiae, et quaedam non sua, ut virtutes »; quod si per causam esset dictum, utrumque posset dici.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur velle dicere Philosophus[^5], quia idem dicit esse principium essendi et operandi: ergo cum principium essendi sit ipsa forma substantialis, principium operandi erit ipsa; sed principium operandi est potentia: ergo potentia est principium essendi; sed non est principium essendi nisi forma substantialis in homine: ergo potentia et forma substantialis sunt idem in substantia.

4. Item, ratione ostenditur: Sicut materia prima nata est recipere omnia per veritatem, sic anima secundum similitudinem[^6]; sed potentia materiae primae respectu formarum suscipiendarum non differt per essentiam ab ipsa[^7]: ergo similiter videtur, quod potentia animae. Probatio: si enim per essentiam differret, aut esset substantia, aut accidens. Non accidens, quia antecedit omnem formam et omne

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accidens; si *substantia*, aut ergo materia, aut forma. Praeterea, si differret, illius esset materia capax[^8].

5. Item, forma accidentalis non est simplicior forma substantiali; sed potentia operandi non differt a forma accidentali, utpote potentia calefaciendi non differt per essentiam a caliditate, nec potentia illuminandi ab ipsa luce: ergo similiter videtur, quod nec potentia animae ab ipsa anima.

6. Item, quod est accidens, nulli substantiae est substantiale[^9]; sed potentiae istae sunt substantiales: ergo animae non sunt accidentia[^10]: ergo sunt substantia; constat quod non alia quam anima. Probatio minoris: quia anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis in homine non dicit diversitatem substantiarum, sed potentiarum: ergo constat, quod in homine istae differentiae: vegetabile, sensibile, rationale, accipiuntur a potentiis; sed[^11] huiusmodi differentiae sunt substantiales: ergo et potentiae: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^12] assignat differentiam imaginis creatae ad Trinitatem illam, scilicet increatam, quia in illa Trinitate est habens id quod habetur, hic autem habens non est id quod habetur: ergo si anima habet tres potentias, ergo essentialiter non est illae.

2. Item, Dionysius[^13] dicit, quod in quolibet creato differunt haec tria: substantia, virtus et operatio: ergo et in anima differunt substantia et potentiae.

3. Item, Boethius[^14]: « In quolibet creato differunt *quo est* et *quod est*, sive *quid est* et *esse* »: ergo similiter, immo multo fortius, *quod potest* et *quo potest*.

4. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: quae differunt genere, differunt essentia, et unum de altero non praedicatur essentialiter[^15]; sed potentiae et anima sunt huiusmodi, quia anima est in genere substantiae, sed potentiae eius sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, scilicet naturalis potentiae vel impotentiae: ergo etc.

5. Item, illa quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt essentialiter et substantialiter; sed virtus egreditur substantiam[^16], quia operatur in obiectum, quod est extra; sed impossibile est, quod operetur ubi non est; si ergo virtus est ubi operatur, et operatur extra substantiam cuiuslibet: ergo egreditur extra substantiam: ergo etc.

6. Item, ad hoc est alia ratio, quia si eadem per essentiam essent anima et potentiae, ergo[^17] unum non multiplicaretur nisi secundum multiplicationem alterius; et sic, cum una tantum sit anima, haberet tantum unam potentiam; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa omnino idem per essentiam.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod potentia naturalis dicitur dupliciter[^18]. Uno modo, prout dicit modum existendi naturalis potentiae in subiecto, secundum quem dicitur subiectum facile vel difficile ad aliquid agendum; et sic naturalis potentia dicit modum qualitatis et est generaliter in secunda specie qualitatis, ut patet, cum dicitur cursor et pugillator, quorum utrumque dicit facilitatem, quae consequitur[^19] modum existendi potentiae gradiendi vel resistendi sive agendi in subiecto. Alio modo potentia naturalis dicitur potentia naturaliter egrediens a subiecto[^20]. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter. Nam aliqua potentia egreditur a substantia cum accidente, ut

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potentia calefaciendi. Ignis enim per suam substantiam non calefacit sine caliditate; et haec potentia non est alterius generis quam sit qualitas, a qua egreditur; unde potentia[^21] calefaciendi est in eodem genere cum caliditate. Alio modo dicitur naturalis potentia, quae naturaliter egreditur a[^22] substantia et immediate, sicut potentia generandi quantum ad inductionem ultimae formae; et haec quidem non est alterius generis quam substantia, sed reducitur ad genus substantiae tanquam substantialis differentia. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in potentiis animae. Nam uno modo contingit nominare potentias animae secundum primum modum, ut dicunt facilitatem, quae dicit modum potentiae existendi in subiecto, sicut ingeniositas et tarditas; et haec quidem sunt in secunda specie qualitatis. Alio modo contingit nominare potentias, prout dicunt ordinem substantiae ad actum, qui est mediante aliqua proprietate accidentali, ut potentia syllogizandi, quae est in anima, cum habet habitum syllogizandi; et haec est in eodem genere, in quo est scientia syllogizandi, ut[^23] in prima specie qualitatis. Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia, ut per[^24] haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto[^25], intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se[^27]. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales[^26] et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima — potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis — non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem.

Et potest satis manifestum exemplum dari in re et in similitudine eius. Nam res non habet tantam identitatem cum sua similitudine, ut sint unum numero, nec tantam diversitatem, ut differant genere[^29]. Similitudo enim Martini non adeo distat a Martino, ut penitus differat ab eo. Et ita similitudo rei in eodem genere est per reductionem cum eo, cuius est similitudo. Quia enim egreditur, ideo differt, sed non transit in aliud genus. Et loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis, id est, prout a subiecto[^28] exit et non recedit, ut splendor a luce. Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, quod anima non est suae potentiae per essentiam.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Augustino et Bernardo, quod anima est suae potentiae; dicendum, quod non est ibi praedicatio accidentis de subiecto, nec eiusdem per essentiam, sed substantialis vel essentialis.

Propter quod notandum, quod essentiale dicitur quatuor modis. Primo modo essentiale dicitur[^31] quod dicit rei essentiam totam, sicut species singularis. Secundo modo dicitur essentiale quod est de essentia et constitutione rei, ut materia et forma. Tertio modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest esse nec potest intelligi esse, ut sunt illa in quibus attenditur ratio vestigii, ut unitas, veritas, bonitas. Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus[^32]: ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae[^30].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum, quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impos-

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sibile. Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum, tunc idem esset in re esse et operari. Similiter, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper habeat esse, semper haberet operari. Quoniam igitur[^33] forma dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, potentia vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod impossibile est esse omnino idem.

*Ad 4.* Ad aliud quod obiicitur de potentia materiae, dicendum, quod materia non est sua potentia per essentiam, quoniam non est ipsa ordinatio ad formam[^34]; est tamen ipsa potentia materiae essentialis ipsi materiae, sicut potentia activa ipsi substantiae. Et minus quidem elongatur potentia materiae a materia quam potentia activa a substantia; quoniam potentia materiae est potentia passiva, quae dicit ordinem ad aliud cum privatione, sed potentia activa dicit ordinem cum positione: et ideo minus addit potentia materiae supra materiam, quam potentia activa supra substantiam. Et hinc est, quod non ita distinguuntur diversae potentiae in eadem materia, sicut in eadem substantia.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de forma accidentali, dicendum, quod forma accidentalis non est sua potentia. Nam potentia eius est, in quantum influit in alterum; attamen potentia illa non tantum addit quantum potentia formae substantialis, quoniam potentia formae accidentalis dicit ordinationem ad actum, sed non sufficientem per se, sed per virtutem substantiae. Sicut enim accidens non est per se, ita non habet virtutem operandi per se, sed per virtutem substantiae; et ita hoc patet.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, dicendum est[^35], quod potentiae animae non sunt accidentales. Tamen argumentum non valet, quia fortassis rationale, sensibile, vegetabile non accipiuntur a potentiis, sed a diversis naturis repertis in anima.

Illud autem argumentum, quod factum est ad oppositum, quod differunt, quia sunt in diversis generibus, solvendum est per interemptionem[^36], quia non sunt in diversis generibus, sed in eodem per reductionem.

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### Question III.
### *Whether memory, understanding, and will are the same in essence as the soul.*[^1]

In the third place there is asked, concerning the comparison of these powers to the soul or to the subject, namely whether they are the same in essence as the soul. And it seems that they are.

1. Augustine says in book ten *On the Trinity*[^2]: "These three, memory, understanding, and will, are one mind, one life, one essence, and through this one substance."

2. Likewise, Bernard *on the Song of Songs*[^3]: "I behold three things in the soul: memory, understanding, and will; and these three are the soul itself." If you should say that this is said by causation, this is nothing, because Augustine *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^4] says that the soul "is in a certain way its own [properties], as powers, and in a certain way not its own, as virtues"; but if it had been said by causation, both could be said.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher seems to wish to say this same thing[^5], because he says that the principle of being and of operating is the same: therefore since the principle of being is the substantial form itself, the principle of operating will be the same; but the principle of operating is a power: therefore a power is a principle of being; but there is no principle of being except the substantial form in man: therefore the power and the substantial form are the same in substance.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reason: As prime matter is by nature fitted to receive all things in truth, so is the soul according to likeness[^6]; but the power of prime matter with respect to forms to be received does not differ in essence from it[^7]: therefore likewise it seems concerning the power of the soul. Proof: for if it differed in essence, it would either be a substance or an accident. Not an accident, because it precedes every form and every

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accident; if a *substance*, then either matter or form. Furthermore, if it differed, matter would be capable of receiving it[^8].

5. Likewise, an accidental form is not simpler than a substantial form; but the power of operating does not differ from the accidental form, just as the power of heating does not differ in essence from heat, nor the power of illuminating from light itself: therefore likewise it seems that neither does the power of the soul differ from the soul itself.

6. Likewise, what is an accident is substantial to no substance[^9]; but these powers are substantial: therefore they are not accidents of the soul[^10]: therefore they are substance; it is clear that [they are] none other than the soul. Proof of the minor: because rational, sensible, and vegetable soul in man do not denote a diversity of substances, but of powers: therefore it is clear that in man these differences — vegetable, sensible, rational — are taken from powers; but[^11] differences of this kind are substantial: therefore the powers also [are substantial]: therefore etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustine in book fifteen *On the Trinity*[^12] assigns the difference of the created image from that uncreated Trinity, namely that in that Trinity the haver is that which is had, but here the haver is not that which is had: therefore if the soul has three powers, then essentially it is not them.

2. Likewise, Dionysius[^13] says that in every creature these three differ: substance, power, and operation: therefore in the soul also substance and powers differ.

3. Likewise, Boethius[^14]: "In every creature *that by which it is* (quo est) and *that which is* (quod est), or *what it is* (quid est) and *to be* (esse), differ": therefore likewise — indeed much more strongly — *what can [act]* and *that by which it can*.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reasons thus: things which differ in genus differ in essence, and one is not essentially predicated of the other[^15]; but the powers and the soul are of this kind, because the soul is in the genus of substance, but its powers are in the second species of quality, namely of natural potency or impotency: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, those things one of which is outside the other differ essentially and substantially; but power goes out from the substance[^16], because it operates upon an object which is outside; but it is impossible that it should operate where it is not; if therefore power is where it operates, and operates outside the substance of any thing: therefore it goes out beyond substance: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, there is another reason to this point: that if the soul and its powers were the same in essence, therefore[^17] one would not be multiplied except according to the multiplication of the other; and thus, since the soul is only one, it would have only one power; but this is false: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> The powers of the soul are substantial and are in the same genus by reduction as the soul; nevertheless they are not altogether the same with it in essence.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that natural power is said in two ways[^18]. In one way, insofar as it denotes the mode of existence of a natural power in a subject, according to which a subject is said to be easy or difficult for doing something; and thus natural power denotes a mode of quality and is generally in the second species of quality, as is clear when one says "runner" and "boxer," each of which denotes a facility which follows[^19] the mode of existence of the power of stepping or resisting or acting in the subject. In another way, natural power is said to be a power naturally going forth from the subject[^20]. And this can be in two ways. For one power goes forth from the substance with an accident, as

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the power of heating. For fire does not heat through its own substance without heat; and this power is not of another genus than the quality from which it goes forth; hence the power[^21] of heating is in the same genus as heat. In another way natural power is said [to be] that which naturally goes forth from[^22] the substance and immediately, like the power of generating with respect to the induction of the ultimate form; and this indeed is not of another genus than substance, but is reduced to the genus of substance as a substantial difference. According to this mode it must be understood with respect to the powers of the soul. For in one way it happens to name the powers of the soul according to the first mode, as they denote a facility which denotes the mode of a power of existing in the subject, like cleverness and slowness; and these indeed are in the second species of quality. In another way it happens to name the powers insofar as they denote the order of substance toward act, which is by the mediation of some accidental property, like the power of syllogizing which is in the soul when it has the habit of syllogizing; and this is in the same genus as the knowledge of syllogizing, namely[^23] in the first species of quality. Again it happens to name the powers of the soul insofar as they go forth immediately from substance, as by[^24] these three: memory, understanding, and will. And this is clear, because, with every accident set aside[^25], it being understood that the soul is a spiritual substance, by the very fact that it is present to itself and conjoined to itself, it has the power of remembering and understanding and loving itself[^27]. Hence these powers are consubstantial[^26] with the soul, and are in the same genus by reduction as the soul. Yet, since they go forth from the soul — for power has the manner of one going forth — they are not altogether the same in essence, nor however do they so differ as to be of another genus, but they are in the same genus by reduction.

And an example sufficiently clear can be given in a thing and its likeness. For a thing does not have so great an identity with its likeness that they are one in number, nor so great a diversity that they should differ in genus[^29]. For the likeness of Martin is not so distant from Martin that it utterly differs from him. And so the likeness of a thing is in the same genus by reduction with that of which it is the likeness. For because it goes forth, therefore it differs, but it does not pass over into another genus. And I speak of likeness according to the formal character of likeness, not of intention, that is, insofar as it goes out from a subject[^28] and does not recede, as splendor from light. Therefore the reasons proving that the soul is not its own powers in essence are to be conceded.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Augustine and Bernard, that the soul is its own powers; it must be said that there is there not the predication of an accident of a subject, nor of the same in essence, but a substantial or essential [predication].

For which reason it must be noted that "essential" is said in four ways. In the first way "essential" is said[^31] [of] what denotes the whole essence of a thing, as the singular species [does]. In the second way "essential" is said [of] what is of the essence and constitution of a thing, like matter and form. In the third way "essential" is said [of] that without which a thing cannot be nor can it be understood to be, as are those things in which the character of a vestige is regarded, like unity, truth, goodness. In the fourth way "essential" is said [of] that without which a thing cannot be thought to have perfect being, as the powers in the soul are, in which the image is regarded; and this is in the least degree substantial or essential; nevertheless it does not pass over into another genus[^32]: therefore the soul is said [to be] its own powers[^30].

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the principle of being and of operating is the same; it must be said that this is true of the remote principle, but of the proximate principle it is impos-

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sible. For if the proximate principle were altogether the same, then in the thing to-be and to-operate would be the same. Likewise, if the proximate principle were the same, since the thing always has being, it would always have operation. Since therefore[^33] form denotes the proximate and immediate principle of being, while power [denotes] the proximate and immediate principle of operating, it is clear that it is impossible [for them] to be altogether the same.

*Ad 4.* To the other [objection] which is brought concerning the power of matter, it must be said that matter is not its own power in essence, since it is not itself the ordering toward form[^34]; nevertheless the power of matter is itself essential to matter, just as active power [is essential] to substance. And indeed the power of matter is less far removed from matter than active power [is] from substance; for the power of matter is a passive power, which denotes an order toward another with privation, whereas active power denotes an order with positing: and therefore the power of matter adds less above matter than active power [adds] above substance. And hence it is that diverse powers are not so distinguished in the same matter as in the same substance.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected concerning the accidental form, it must be said that the accidental form is not its own power. For its power [exists] insofar as it flows into another; nevertheless that power does not add as much as the power of the substantial form, since the power of the accidental form denotes an ordering toward act, but not sufficient through itself, but through the power of substance. For as an accident is not through itself, so it does not have the virtue of operating through itself, but through the virtue of substance; and so this is clear.

*Ad 6.* To that which is objected last, it must be said[^35] that the powers of the soul are not accidental. Nevertheless the argument is not valid, because perhaps rational, sensible, vegetable are not taken from powers, but from diverse natures found in the soul.

But that argument which was made for the opposite side, that they differ because they are in diverse genera, is to be solved by *negation* (interemptio)[^36], because they are not in diverse genera, but in the same one by reduction.

la: De prima assignatione vide IX. *de Trin.* per totum; de secunda ibid. X. c. 11. et 12; de completissima imaginis ratione ibid. XIV. c. 8. ac 12. seqq.

en: On the first assignment see *On the Trinity* IX throughout; on the second, ibid. X, cc. 11 and 12; on the most complete formal character of the image, ibid. XIV, cc. 8 and 12 and following.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, reads *respondeo*.

la: Cap. II. n. 18. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in initio.

en: Chapter II, n. 18. See also here the *littera Magistri*, c. 2, at the beginning.

la: Serm. 11. In fine textus citati supple cum ed. operum Bernardi *animam esse*. Vat. in initio huius textus omittit *Tria* et circa finem legit *haec tria ipsa est*.

en: Sermon 11. At the end of the cited text supply, with the edition of Bernard's works, *animam esse* ["the soul to be"]. The Vatican edition at the beginning of this text omits *Tria* and near the end reads *haec tria ipsa est*.

la: Cap. 13: *Deus est omnia sua, et anima quaedam sua. Habet siquidem naturalia et ipsa omnia est. Potentiae namque eius et vires idem sunt quod ipsa. Habet accidentalia, et ipsa non est. Suae vires est, suae virtutes non est.* — In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *dictum*.

en: Chapter 13: "God is all His own, and the soul [is] in a certain way its own. For it has natural things and is itself all [of them]. For its powers and strengths are the same as itself. It has accidental things, and is not [those]. It is its own strengths, it is not its own virtues." — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, omits *dictum*.

la: Vide Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 28. (c. 3.); VII. *Metaph.* text. 59. 60. (VI. c. 17.) et VIII. *Metaph.* text. 8. (VII. c. 3.) ac II. *de Anima*, text. 2, ubi docet, formam substantialem esse principium essendi, in quantum scil. sua actualitate dat esse rei remque in certa specie constituit; II. *Phys.* text. 11. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi asserit, formam substantialem esse naturam i. e. principium motus et quietis; II. *de Anima*, text. 24. (c. 2.), ubi animam ut formam substantialem describit: *id quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo*.

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 28 (c. 3); *Metaphysics* VII, texts 59–60 (VI, c. 17), and *Metaphysics* VIII, text 8 (VII, c. 3), and *De Anima* II, text 2, where he teaches that the substantial form is the principle of being insofar as by its actuality it gives being to the thing and constitutes the thing in a definite species; *Physics* II, text 11 ff. (c. 1), where he asserts that the substantial form is a nature, i.e., a principle of motion and rest; *De Anima* II, text 24 (c. 2), where he describes the soul as a substantial form: "that by which we primarily live, sense, are moved, and understand."

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *de Anima* text. 17. et 37. seqq. (c. 5. et 8.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 17 and 37 ff. (cc. 5 and 8).

la: Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 81. seq. (c. ult.); VIII. *Metaph.* text. 3. seqq. et XII. text. 26. (VII. c. 1. et XI. c. 5.). Ita docet Averroes, in libr. *de Substantia orbis*. — Mox post *quod* substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *potentia* loco *potentiae*. Dein post *Probatio* Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit *minoris*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 ff. (last chapter); *Metaphysics* VIII, text 3 ff., and *Metaphysics* XII, text 26 (VII, c. 1, and XI, c. 5). Averroes likewise teaches this in his book *On the Substance of the Orb*. — Soon after *quod* we substituted, from the manuscripts and the first edition, *potentia* for *potentiae*. Then after *Probatio* the Vatican edition, against the older codices and the first edition, adds *minoris*. <!-- page 86 -->

la: Ed. 1 *illius esset incapax*.

en: The first edition: *illius esset incapax* ["it would be incapable of it"].

la: Est simpliciter conversa huius propositionis: *Quod vere est* (i. e. substantia) *nulli accidit*, quam ponit Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 27. (c. 3.).

en: It is the simple converse of this proposition: *What truly is* (i.e., substance) *is accidental to nothing*, which Aristotle states, *Physics* I, text 27 (c. 3).

la: Interpolatam Vat. lectionem *quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentia*, castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1, qui et mox post *constat* omittunt a Vat. additum *autem*.

en: We corrected, from the manuscripts and the first edition, the Vatican edition's interpolated reading *quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentia*; the same [witnesses] also omit, soon after *constat*, the *autem* added by the Vatican.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, *et* loco *sed*. Paulo ante cod. M *potentiis* praemittit *istis*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition [which resist], [reads] *et* in place of *sed*. A little earlier codex M prefixes *istis* to *potentiis*.

la: Textum vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. in initio.

en: See the text above in the *littera Magistri*, c. 3, at the beginning.

la: *De Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 11. Cfr. supra p. I. huius d. dub. 3. — Fide codd. et ed. 1 paulo infra post *ergo* adiecimus *et*.

en: *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 11. Cf. above, p. I of this distinction, dub. 3. — On the authority of the codices and the first edition, a little below after *ergo* we added *et*.

la: In libro, *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint*, sive *de Hebdomadibus* ait: *Diversum est esse et id quod est*. Et paulo post: *Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est*. In huius propositionis explicatione Gilbertus Porretan. ait: *Aliud est quod est, aliud quo est*. Vide etiam libr. *de Trin.* c. 2. — Plures codd. ut AES VWX post *sive* legunt *quid est esse*, cod. Y *quidquid erat esse*.

en: In the book *How Substances Are Good in That They Are*, or *De Hebdomadibus*, he says: "*Esse* (to be) and *id quod est* (that which is) are diverse." And a little after: "In every composite thing, *esse* (to be) is one thing, and *ipsum est* (the thing itself which is) is another." In the explanation of this proposition Gilbert Porretanus says: "*Quod est* (that which is) is one thing, *quo est* (that by which it is) is another." See also the book *De Trinitate*, c. 2. — Several codices, like AES VWX, after *sive* read *quid est esse*; codex Y *quidquid erat esse*.

la: Aristot., X. *Metaph.* text. 12. (IX. c. 3.): *Genere (differunt) quidem, quorum non est communis materia nec generatio ad invicem, quorumcumque alia figura categoriae (praedicationis)*. — Paulo infra post *sed potentiae* restituimus lectionem mss. et ed. 1 addendo *eius* et paulo post *vel impotentiae*. Paulo ante cod. X *sed potentiae animae et anima*. — De quatuor qualitatum speciebus vide Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Quali.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 12 (IX, c. 3): "Things differ in genus when their matter is not common nor is there generation from one to the other; whatever things have a different figure of category (predication)." — A little below after *sed potentiae* we restored the reading of the manuscripts and the first edition by adding *eius*; and a little further on, *vel impotentiae*. A little before, codex X [reads] *sed potentiae animae et anima*. — On the four species of quality, see Aristotle, *De Praedicamentis*, ch. *On Quality*.

la: Hoc est, extra substantiam; sic Tacitus pluries dicit terminos egredi. — Paulo post verbo *operetur* cod. X praemittit *ibi*. Mox cod. M loco *cuiuslibet* habet *cuius est*, cod. T vero *cuiusque*.

en: That is, outside the substance; thus Tacitus several times says *terminos egredi*. — A little after, before the word *operetur*, codex X prefixes *ibi*. Soon, codex M in place of *cuiuslibet* has *cuius est*, while codex T has *cuiusque*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ergo* et paulo infra ex codd. BDHNPQVWX aa ee pro *unum* substituimus *una*. Cod. F *sicut anima est una tantum*, cum quo concordant codd. IO, eo excepto, quod pro *una* legunt *unum* ac dein post *tantum* addunt *sic anima*. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 63. m. 1. idem argumentum refert addit que principium, in quo fundatur, scil.: *Quaecumque enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition we supplied *ergo*, and a little below from codices BDHNPQVWX aa ee we substituted *una* for *unum*. Codex F [reads] *sicut anima est una tantum*, with which codices IO agree, except that in place of *una* they read *unum* and then after *tantum* they add *sic anima*. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 63, m. 1, reports the same argument and adds the principle on which it is founded, namely: "For whatever things are the same as one and the same, are the same as each other."

la: Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus correcte *tripliciter*. Mox, postulantibus mss., substituimus *Uno* et paulo infra *Alio modo* loco *Primo* et *Secundo modo*.

en: The Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, less correctly [reads] *tripliciter*. Soon, at the demand of the manuscripts, we substituted *Uno* and a little below *Alio modo* for *Primo* and *Secundo modo*.

la: Vat. *sequitur* et paulo post *et* loco *vel*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *sequitur* and a little later *et* in place of *vel*, but the manuscripts and the first edition oppose this.

la: Vat., minus stricte exhibet oppositionem cum primo divisionis membro ponendo *a substantia* loco *a subiecto*, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1; mox pro *Nam* habet *Uno modo*.

en: The Vatican edition, less strictly, shows the opposition with the first member of the division by putting *a substantia* in place of *a subiecto*, against the resistance of the manuscripts and the first edition; soon, in place of *Nam* it has *Uno modo*. <!-- page 87 -->

la: Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additum *quae est*. Paulo post cod. Y *Secundo modo* loco *Alio modo*, pro quo multi codd. ut ABDEINST etc. cum ed. 1 minus apte *Tertio loco*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts and the first edition we expunged here the ill-added *quae est*. A little later codex Y [reads] *Secundo modo* in place of *Alio modo*, for which many codices, like ABDEINST etc., with the first edition, less aptly [read] *Tertio loco*.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, *de loco a* et immediate post minus bene omittit *et*. Paulo infra eadem auctoritate post *genere* posuimus *quam* pro *cum*, utpote grammatice melius ac praecedentibus magis conforme.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, [reads] *de loco a*, and immediately after, less well, omits *et*. A little below, on the same authority, after *genere* we placed *quam* instead of *cum*, as being grammatically better and more conformable to what precedes.

la: Edd. 1, 5 *videlicet* loco *ut*. Mox cod. X *Ultra tertio modo contingit* pro *Contingit iterum*.

en: Editions 1 and 5 [read] *videlicet* in place of *ut*. Soon codex X [reads] *Ultra tertio modo contingit* for *Contingit iterum*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit *per*. — Immediate egredi potentias a substantia docet etiam S. Thom., S. I. q. 77. a. 6. Cfr. insuper Dionys. Carth., hic q. 14.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits *per*. — That the powers go forth immediately from the substance is taught also by St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 77, a. 6. Cf. moreover Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 14.

la: Hoc est, excluso sive praescindendo ab ipso. — In fine huius propositionis in Vat. omittitur *et diligendum*, in plurimis vero codd. *et intelligendum*, sed contra contextum et alios codd. ut IT aa cum ed. 1.

en: That is, with [it] excluded, or by abstracting from it. — At the end of this proposition the Vatican edition omits *et diligendum*; in very many codices, *et intelligendum*; but [this is] against the context and other codices such as IT aa with the first edition.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *consubstantiales* pro *substantiales*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition we placed *consubstantiales* in place of *substantiales*.

la: In plurimis mss. et Vat. manifeste falso habetur *numero* pro *genere*, quod tamen exhibet cod. Z. Mox plerique codd. cum ed. 1 mendose *Petrus differt* loco *penitus differat*. Ioan. Damasc., Orat. 3. *de Imag.* dicit: *Nam aliud est imago, et aliud id quod imagine repraesentatur; ac necesse est, ut nonnihil inter utrumque discriminis animadvertatur; siquidem nec istud alia res esset, nec illud alia*. — Paulo infra, postulantibus mss., substituimus *ita* pro *ideo*.

en: In very many manuscripts and the Vatican edition there is manifestly falsely *numero* for *genere*, which however codex Z exhibits. Soon most codices with the first edition wrongly [read] *Petrus differt* in place of *penitus differat*. John Damascene, *Oration* 3, *On Images*, says: "For the image is one thing, and that which is represented by the image is another; and it is necessary that some difference be observed between them; otherwise neither would the latter be another thing, nor the former." — A little below, at the demand of the manuscripts, we substituted *ita* for *ideo*.

la: Cod. A *substantia*. In fine responsionis cod. aa addit haec: *Vel potest dici, quod anima consideratur aut secundum essentiam ut essentiam, aut secundum essentiam ut substantiam, aut secundum essentiam ut subiectum. Si primo modo, sic consistit ex suis principiis, et sic non est idipsum anima quod suae potentiae, sed consequenter se habent ad eam, eo quod fundantur super vigorem existentiae ipsius secundum sua principia. Si secundo modo, tunc est anima et suae potentiae, quia anima subsistit in suis potentiis. Si tertio modo secundum essentiam ut in ratione subiecti, sic subiicitur ipsa anima suis virtutibus, et sic non est idem cum potentiis*. Glossema ad mentem Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1. ad. 2. et q. 65. m. 1.

en: Codex A [reads] *substantia*. At the end of the response codex aa adds these [words]: "Or it can be said that the soul is considered either according to essence as essence, or according to essence as substance, or according to essence as subject. If in the first way, thus it consists of its principles, and thus the soul is not the very same as its powers, but [the powers] follow upon it, because they are founded upon the vigor of its existence according to its principles. If in the second way, then the soul is its powers, because the soul subsists in its powers. If in the third way, according to essence as in the character of subject, thus the soul is itself subjected to its strengths, and thus it is not the same as the powers." A gloss in the mind of Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 21, m. 1, Ad 2, and q. 65, m. 1.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus *dicitur*. Mox mss. sunt dubiae lectionis; legi enim potest *totam* et *tantum*; quamvis ed. 1 ponat *tantum*, retinemus tamen *totam* propter contextum. Et confirmatur a B. Alberto, S. I. tract. 3. q. 13. m. 5. dicente: *Dicit enim Boethius, quod species est totum esse individuorum*. (Boeth., III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de specie ait: *Homo vero Socratis aut Ciceronis tota substantia est*.) — Dein post *species* claritatis gratia Vat. addit *dicit totam essentiam*, licet desit in mss.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we supplied *dicitur*. Soon the manuscripts are of doubtful reading; for one can read *totam* and *tantum*; although the first edition has *tantum*, we nevertheless retain *totam* on account of the context. And it is confirmed by Blessed Albert, S. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 5, saying: "For Boethius says that the species is the whole being of individuals." (Boethius, III *Comment. on Porphyry*, treating of species, says: "But man is the whole substance of Socrates or Cicero.") — Then after *species*, for clarity's sake the Vatican edition adds *dicit totam essentiam*, although it is absent from the manuscripts.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic *quia non transit in aliud genus*.

en: The Vatican edition, beyond the witness of the manuscripts and the first edition, here repeats *quia non transit in aliud genus*. <!-- page 88 -->

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *Quia ergo*.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many codices and the first edition, [reads] *Quia ergo*.

la: Cod. O addit *formam aut*.

en: Codex O adds *formam aut*.

la: Ex codd. et ed. 1 addidimus *est*. Plures codd. ut A T etc. paulo ante habent *quaeritur* loco *obiicitur*.

en: From the codices and the first edition we added *est*. Several codices, like A T etc., a little before, have *quaeritur* in place of *obiicitur*.

la: Petrus Hispan., *Summula*, tract. *de Syll. soph.* seu *de Fallaciis*, in fine *de fall. aequivocationis* ait: *Recta solutio est manifestatio syllogismi falsi et propter quid est falsus. Et contingit dupliciter, scil. vel distinguendo vel aliquam praemissarum interimendo; et hoc secundo modo respondendum est ad omnes peccantes in materia* (i. e. propositiones falsas). Aristot., II. *Elench.* c. 3. (c. 18.) duplicem hunc solutionis speciem proponendo usus est verbis διαιρεῖν et ἀναιρεῖν, quae Boethius lingua latina reddidit per verba *distinguere* et *interimere* (i. e. negando auferre.). — Paulo supra aliqui codd. ut A G H K T etc. cum ed. 1 *differant* pro *differunt*.

en: Peter of Spain, *Summula*, treatise *On Sophistical Syllogisms* or *On Fallacies*, at the end of the [section] *On the Fallacy of Equivocation*, says: "Correct solution is the manifestation of the false syllogism and on account of what it is false. And it happens in two ways, namely either by distinguishing or by negating one of the premises; and in this second way one must respond to all those erring in matter" (i.e., to false propositions). Aristotle, *Elenchi* II, c. 3 (c. 18), in proposing this twofold kind of solution, used the words διαιρεῖν and ἀναιρεῖν, which Boethius rendered in the Latin tongue by the words *distinguere* and *interimere* (i.e., to negate). — A little above, some codices such as A G H K T etc., with the first edition, [read] *differant* in place of *differunt*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Circa principalem quaestionem illis temporibus tres sententiae defendebantur, quas S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.) accurate explicat. Prima sententia ibi posita non admittit inter essentiam animae et potentias nisi distinctionem rationis. Ita Gulielmus Paris., Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.), Henr. Gand. (Quodl. IV. q. 7.), insuper omnes Nominales. — Secunda docet distinctionem realem, et quidem talem, ut potentiae nec in genere cum substantia conveniant, cum ad genus accidentium trahantur. Illi S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 54. a. 3. et q. 77. a. 1. et 3; de Spirit. Creaturis a. 11; de Anima q. 12.); B. Albert. (hic a. 34.); Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 2.). — Tertia sententia praecedenti valde appropinquat, quam docet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 65. m. 4. et q. 21. m. 1.). Huic etiam S. Bonav. magis favet; tamen dicit: « Quaelibet autem dictarum positionum suos habet defensores, nec est facile rationibus cogentibus earum aliquam improbare ». Haec igitur ultima sententia admittit quidem inter animae substantiam et potentias eius connaturales et consubstantiales distinctionem quandam realem, quae tamen non trahat potentias ad diversum genus praedicamenti, nempe accidentis (tamen habitus acquisiti, quibus alia extra animam cognoscuntur et amantur, certe cadunt sub genere accidentium). Immo si potentiae non essent animae consubstantiales, nunquam anima sciret et amaret aliquid ad extra, quia, ut dicit S. Augustinus, nullum accidens excedit subiectum, scil. sua virtute. Nam accidens, sicut non est nisi virtute substantiae, sic nec operari potest nisi virtute substantiae, et nisi aliquid substantiale ei substernatur. Unde nec habitus acquisiti agere possunt nisi virtute habituum vel potentiarum substantialium, cfr. hic ad 5. et art. 2. q. 2. ad 4. et S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 4. — Videtur autem, quod S. Bonav. et Alex. conceptum *accidentis* sumant pro accidente logico, S. Thom. pro accidente metaphysico, ita ut in re conveniant. En verba Alexandri (S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1.): « Dicendum, quod anima est quodammodo sua potentia, ut fiat distinctio inter potentias substantiales sive vires ex una parte et accidentia ex alia, quantum ad hoc, quod potentiae et vires substantialiter inhaerent et unum sunt cum anima quantum ad substantiam, non dico quantum ad essentiam; potentiis enim substantialibus subsistit anima. Accidentia vero, ut prudentia, fortitudo et huiusmodi, non adhaerent substantialiter, quia haec accidentaliter adsunt. Unde potentiae et vires substantiales dicuntur idem quod anima ratione indivisionis et adhaerentiae substantialis, accidentia vero non, quia substantialiter non adhaerent ». Fere idem est quod S. Thom. (S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.) docet. Hic enim distinguit duplicem sensum vocabuli *accidentis*, et in secundo sensu, sive « secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium », concedit, quod « aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens », et quod « potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales ».

Quartam sententiam adiunxit Scot. (II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica I *Dico igitur*), qui hic applicat suam distinctionem formalem; in re autem a S. Bonav. vix discedit, ut vult Brulifer in Comment. ad hunc locum.

De quaestione hac cfr. praeter iam citatos B. Albert., S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. subp. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic p. II. q. 2. et seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 13. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 24. et 25.

**II.** Ut facilius intelligantur verba Doctoris in fine conclusionis posita: « Loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis », haec notamus. Praeter similitudinem *accidentalem*, quae est v. g. in figura exteriori, et essentialem, quae est in convenientia in natura et specie, aliam similitudinem duplicem distinguit S. Doctor, scil. similitudinem secundum rationem, qua aliqua sunt similia in ratione quadam essentiali, ut splendor respectu lucis, et similitudinem secundum intentionem, quae est inter aliqua, quorum unum est factum ad imitationem alterius. Ex hoc patet, quod splendor, qui est similitudo lucis, licet exeat a luce, tamen non recedit ab ea, manens in eodem genere lucis.

**III.** In solut. ad 1. et 2. distinguit S. Doctor *triplicem* praedicationem. Praedicatio per essentiam tunc fit, quando praedicatum est de intrinseca ratione subiecti. Haec est iterum duplex, nempe secundum duplicem sensum vocabuli *essentialis*, a S. Doctore hic distinctum. Etenim tum essentia metaphysica, quam moderni vocant (scil. genus et differentia), tum partes constitutivae physicae (scil. forma et materia) sunt de essentia rei et de subiecto essentialiter praedicantur. Huic opponitur praedicatio accidentalis, quando praedicatum subiecto tantum accidentaliter convenit, ut, homo est sapiens. — Circa tertiam praedicationem, quae hic distinguitur, notandum est, quod aliud est « esse de essentia alicuius rei », aliud « esse idem in essentia cum aliquo ». « *Proprium* enim alicuius rei non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens » (S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.). Etiam potentiae animae non sunt de essentia animae, nec praedicantur de ea in primo dicendi modo per se, sicut genus praedicatur de specie. Nihilominus participant potentiae eandem naturam cum essentia animae, sive sunt « idem in essentia cum ipsa ». De quo cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 2. et B. Albert., hic q. 34.

Notatu digna est doctrina Seraphici in solut. ad 4. de potentia materiae. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1.; Scot., libr. I. Physicor. q. 20; de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 2; I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 12. q. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2. ad 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 6. ad. 8.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the principal question, in those times three opinions were defended, which St. Bonaventure (II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1) carefully sets forth. The first opinion there proposed admits only a distinction of reason between the essence of the soul and the powers. So William of Paris, Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1), Henry of Ghent (Quodl. IV, q. 7), and moreover all the Nominalists. — The second teaches a real distinction, and indeed such that the powers do not agree even in genus with the substance, since they are drawn to the genus of accidents. To this [belong] St. Thomas (here q. 4, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 54, a. 3, and q. 77, a. 1 and 3; *De Spiritualibus Creaturis* a. 11; *De Anima* q. 12); Blessed Albert (here a. 34); Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 5, a. 2). — The third opinion comes very close to the preceding, which Alexander of Hales teaches (S. p. II, q. 65, m. 4, and q. 21, m. 1). To this also St. Bonaventure more favors; nevertheless he says: "But any of the said positions has its defenders, nor is it easy to refute any of them by compelling reasons." This last opinion therefore admits indeed between the substance of the soul and its connatural and consubstantial powers a certain real distinction, which nevertheless does not draw the powers to a different genus of category, namely of accident (though acquired habits, by which other things outside the soul are known and loved, certainly fall under the genus of accidents). Indeed, if the powers were not consubstantial with the soul, never would the soul know and love anything externally, because, as St. Augustine says, no accident exceeds its subject, namely by its own virtue. For an accident, as it is not [present] except by the virtue of substance, so it cannot operate except by the virtue of substance, and unless something substantial underlies it. Hence neither can acquired habits act except by the virtue of substantial habits or powers; cf. here Ad 5 and a. 2, q. 2, Ad 4, and St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 77, a. 1, Ad 4. — But it seems that St. Bonaventure and Alexander take the concept of *accident* for logical accident, St. Thomas for metaphysical accident, so that in fact they agree. Behold the words of Alexander (S. p. II, q. 21, m. 1): "It must be said that the soul is in a certain way its own power, so that there be made a distinction between substantial powers or strengths on the one side and accidents on the other, inasmuch as the powers and strengths substantially inhere and are one with the soul as to substance, I do not say as to essence; for the soul subsists by its substantial powers. But accidents, like prudence, fortitude, and the like, do not adhere substantially, because these are present accidentally. Hence substantial powers and strengths are said to be the same as the soul by reason of indivision and substantial adherence, but accidents are not, because they do not adhere substantially." Almost the same is what St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 77, a. 1, Ad 5) teaches. For he there distinguishes a twofold sense of the word *accident*, and in the second sense, namely "according to which it is posited as one of the five universals," he concedes that "there is something intermediate between substance and accident," and that "the powers of the soul can be called intermediate between substance and accident, as it were natural properties of the soul."

A fourth opinion Scotus added (II Sent. d. 16, q. unica I, *Dico igitur*), who here applies his formal distinction; but in fact he scarcely departs from St. Bonaventure, as Brulifer claims in his Commentary on this passage.

On this question, beyond those already cited, see Blessed Albert, S. p. 1, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, subp. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 3 princ., q. 1, a. 2. — Durandus, here p. II, q. 2 and following. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 13. — Biel, II Sent. d. 24 and 25.

**II.** That the words of the Doctor placed at the end of the conclusion may be more easily understood — "I speak of likeness according to the formal character of likeness, not of intention" — we note these things. Besides *accidental* likeness, which is e.g. in external figure, and the essential, which is in agreement in nature and species, the Holy Doctor distinguishes another twofold likeness, namely likeness according to formal character, by which some things are alike in a certain essential character, like splendor with respect to light, and likeness according to intention, which is between things one of which is made in imitation of the other. From this it is clear that splendor, which is a likeness of light, although it goes out from light, nevertheless does not recede from it, remaining in the same genus of light.

**III.** In the solution to 1 and 2 the Holy Doctor distinguishes a *threefold* predication. Predication by essence occurs when the predicate is from the intrinsic character of the subject. This is again twofold, namely according to the twofold sense of the word *essential*, distinguished here by the Holy Doctor. For both the metaphysical essence, as the moderns call it (namely genus and difference), and the constitutive physical parts (namely form and matter) are of the essence of the thing and are predicated essentially of the subject. To this is opposed accidental predication, when the predicate belongs to the subject only accidentally, as in "the man is wise." — Concerning the third predication which is here distinguished, it must be noted that "to be of the essence of some thing" is one thing, and "to be the same in essence with something" is another. "For the *proper* of some thing is not of the essence of the thing, but is caused from the essential principles of the species, whence it is intermediate between essence and accident" (St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 77, a. 1, Ad 5). Likewise the powers of the soul are not of the essence of the soul, nor are they predicated of it in the first mode of predication *per se*, as the genus is predicated of the species. Nevertheless the powers participate the same nature with the essence of the soul, or are "the same in essence with it." Concerning which cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 18, m. 2, and Blessed Albert, here q. 34.

The doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor] in the solution to 4 concerning the power of matter is worthy of note. Alexander of Hales teaches the same, S. p. II, q. 65, m. 1; Scotus, lib. I Physic. q. 20; *De Rerum Principio* q. 8, a. 2; I Sent. d. 12, q. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, II Sent. d. 12, q. 10. — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 2, Ad 4. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 26, a. 6, Ad 8.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum imago attendatur in mente, notitia et amore ut in potentiis, aut in habitibus, aut in substantia et habitibus

title_alt: Whether the image is found in mind, knowledge, and love as in powers, or in habits, or in substance and habits

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 88 -->

### Articulus II. *De secunda assignatione imaginis.*

Consequenter est quaestio de secunda assignatione imaginis per mentem, notitiam et amorem. Et[^1] circa hanc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est de istis absolute, utrum videlicet imago attendatur in istis ut in potentiis, aut in habitibus, aut in potentiis simul et habitibus, aut in substantia et habitibus.

Secundum est de istis in comparatione ad invicem.

Tertium, utrum haec trinitas imaginis ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum imago attendatur in mente, notitia et amore ut in potentiis, aut ut in habitibus, aut in utrisque simul, aut secundum substantiam et habitus.*

Circa primum sic proceditur.

1. Ostenditur primo, quod non in his ut in potentiis attendatur imago, quia praedicta assignatio[^2] fuit in potentiis: ergo si haec etiam esset in potentiis, non esset nisi inculcatio verborum.

Praeterea, notitia et amor non dicunt potentiam, sed habitus, licet mens possit dicere potentiam: ergo praedicta tria non possunt poni sub ratione potentiarum.

2. Item ostenditur, quod non dicunt habitus, quia Augustinus[^3] dicit in imaginis assignatione et approbatione: «Mens novit se, diligit se»; sed nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare: ergo etc.

Item, si mens stat pro habitu, quaero, pro quo habitu? Si pro habitu memoriae, de quo magis videtur, quia non est alium dare; sed actus huius habitus est meminisse, non alius; sed Augustinus[^4] assignat menti hos actus, scilicet nosse et amare: ergo etc.

3. Item ostenditur, quod non[^5] in potentiis et habitibus. Cum enim potentiae sint tres, et habitus tres, tunc non esset ternarius, sed senarius.

4. Item quaero, pro qua potentia stat ibi mens? aut enim stat pro omnibus, aut pro duabus, aut pro una. Si pro omnibus, tunc non est ibi trinitas; si pro duabus, tunc est ibi quaternitas, cum duo sint habitus; si pro una, non potest habere istos duos actus, nosse et amare: ergo non sumitur trinitas secundum habitus et potentias simul.

**Ad oppositum confusionis:**

1. Item ostenditur, quod non secundum animae substantiam et habitus[^6]. Cum enim habitus cognoscendi et amandi consequantur ipsam substantiam tempore, et substantia etiam possit esse sine his, ratio autem imaginis sit ipsi animae perpetua et inseparabilis et concreata: ergo non est in habitibus et substantia simul.

2. Item, si substantia connumeratur habitibus, cum[^7] habitus sint tres, et substantia una: ergo erit

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ibi quaternitas. Si tu dicas, quod non differt notitia, secundum quod est habitus intelligentiae[^8] et memoriae; contra: habitus sunt dispositiones potentiarum; cum ergo sint tres potentiae, erunt tres habitus.

3. Item, Magister dicit in littera[^9], quod mens accipitur non pro animae substantia, sed pro eo quod est in ea eminentius.

### Conclusio

> In hac secunda assignatione imaginis, quae est mens, notitia, amor, trinitas attenditur quantum ad substantiam animae et quantum ad duos habitus notitiae et amoris.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod differt secundum quosdam assignatio haec a praecedenti, quia prior fuit in potentiis, haec est in habitibus. Et respondent obiectionibus per distinctionem mentis. Mens enim secundum quadruplicem modum accipiendi diversificatur. Dicitur enim uno modo a *mene*, quod est luna sive defectus: et sic dicitur de tota animae substantia propter transmutationes, quas habet[^10]. Secundo modo dicitur a *metiendo*; et sic stat pro iudicativa vi, et sic accipit eam Damascenus[^11], ponens ipsam in potentiis cognitivis. Tertio modo dicitur ab *eminendo*; et sic stat pro superiori parte rationis, et sic accipit eam Augustinus frequenter[^12]. Quarto modo dicitur a *meminisse*; et sic stat pro memoria et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum[^13]. Dicunt ergo, quod in assignatione huius trinitatis mens stat pro habitu memoriae; sed in adaptatione, cum dicit Augustinus[^14]: «Mens novit se et diligit», stat pro potentia memorandi.

Sed istud non videtur convenienter dictum, quia adaptatio debet respondere assignationi. Et praeterea, cum actus proprius mentis, ut stat pro memoria, sit meminisse, ille[^15] deberet tangi; sed Augustinus in hac assignatione nunquam facit mentionem nisi de duobus actibus, scilicet nosse et amare, qui non sunt memoriae, sed aliarum potentiarum.

Respondendum igitur, quod trinitas illa non est in potentiis; quia amor et notitia non dicunt potentias[^16]; nec in habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro habitu, cum ipsa accipiatur ut agens; nec potest esse in potentiis et habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro una potentia, cum assignentur ei actus duarum potentiarum; nec potest similiter[^17] stare pro pluribus potentiis, quia non esset trinitas. Restat ergo, quod necesse est ponere, quod trinitas ista attendatur quantum ad substantiam animae, ratione mentis se noscentis et amantis, et quantum ad habitus, ratione notitiae et amoris; et sic est trinitas, cum substantia sit una, et habitus sint duo.

Differt ergo haec assignatio a praecedenti: quia praecedens fuit per uniformitatem in potentiis per comparationem ad habitus et[^18] actus, sed haec est in substantia et habitibus. Differt iterum in hoc, quia praecedens fuit per conversionem animae ad Deum, haec est per conversionem animae supra se; et pluribus modis non attenditur imago in homine, ut supra dictum fuit[^19]. Differt etiam, quia praecedens assignatio imaginis magis est propria et conveniens quam haec. Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et[^20] virtutibus theologicis. Unde Augustinus hanc assignationem primo ponit investigando, ut per hanc deveniat ad illam, in qua finit speculationem suam[^21]. Unde haec assignatio non est propria, sicut alia; unde Magister eam secundo ponit tanquam non principalem.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod habitus non sunt coaevi etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est habitus. Quendam enim habitum habet animae potentia ab acquisitione, quendam ab innata dispositione, tertium habet a sui ipsius origine. Hoc autem patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, affectus noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum alienum per acquisitam dispositio-

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nem, ut per virtutem; ad diligendum vero bonum suum[^22] per innatam dispositionem; et ad diligendum se ipsum per sui naturalem originem. Cum enim sit sibi indistanter unitus, semper est habilis ad se amandum. Similiter, cum intellectus noster semper sit sibi praesens, semper est habilis sibi ad se cognoscendum. Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur de coaevitate; nam quoad tales habitus est bene coaevitas.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tres debent[^23] esse habitus secundum tres potentias; dicendum, quod in hac trinitate non cadit nec habet locum habitus memoriae, quia attenditur[^24] in ipsa anima secundum quod convertitur supra se: et ideo ipsa animae substantia tenet locum memoriae, et ipsa praesentia et oblatio, qua anima offert se semper suae intelligentiae, tenet locum habitus et actus memoriae. Et ita patet, quod ibi cadunt tantum habitus duarum potentiarum; et ideo est ibi trinitas.

3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de verbo Magistri; dicendum, quod intelligitur non pro animae substantia tota[^25]; quod si aliter intelligatur, non habet veritatem verbum Magistri. Quod patet per Augustinum, qui occasione huius imaginis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam habere cognitionem sui innatam, quae est cognitio[^26] suae substantiae. Et praeterea, nihil unum in anima cognoscit et diligit nisi substantia: ergo si mens staret pro una potentia, non haberet illos duos actus, scilicet nosse et amare.

english:
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### Article II. *On the second assignation of the image.*

Consequently there is a question on the second assignation of the image through mind, knowledge, and love. And[^1] concerning this three things are asked.

The first is about these absolutely: namely, whether the image is found in them as in powers, or in habits, or in powers and habits at once, or in substance and habits.

The second is about these in comparison to one another.

The third, whether this trinity of the image necessarily leads to knowledge of the Trinity with respect to the persons.

### Question I. *Whether the image is found in mind, knowledge, and love as in powers, or as in habits, or in both at once, or according to substance and habits.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus.

1. It is shown first, that the image is not found in these as in powers, because the aforesaid assignation[^2] was in powers: therefore if this also were in powers, it would be nothing but a reiteration of words.

Likewise, knowledge and love do not bespeak a power, but habits, although mind can bespeak a power: therefore the aforesaid three cannot be placed under the formal character of powers.

2. Likewise it is shown that they do not bespeak habits, because Augustine[^3] says in the assignation and approbation of the image: «The mind knows itself, loves itself»; but it belongs to no habit to know or love itself: therefore etc.

Likewise, if mind stands for a habit, I ask, for which habit? If for the habit of memory, of which it more seems so, because there is no other to assign; but the act of this habit is to remember, not another; but Augustine[^4] assigns to mind these acts, namely to know and to love: therefore etc.

3. Likewise it is shown, that not[^5] in powers and habits. For since the powers are three, and the habits three, then there would not be a ternary, but a senary.

4. Likewise I ask, for which power does mind there stand? for either it stands for all, or for two, or for one. If for all, then there is no trinity there; if for two, then there is a quaternity there, since two are habits; if for one, it cannot have those two acts, to know and to love: therefore the trinity is not taken according to habits and powers at once.

**To the opposite of the confusion:**

1. Likewise it is shown, that not according to the substance of the soul and habits[^6]. For since the habits of knowing and loving follow the substance itself in time, and substance can also be without them, but the formal character of the image is to the soul itself perpetual and inseparable and co-created: therefore it is not in habits and substance at once.

2. Likewise, if substance is counted together with the habits, since[^7] the habits are three, and the substance one: therefore there will be

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a quaternity there. If you say that knowledge does not differ insofar as it is a habit of understanding[^8] and of memory; on the contrary: habits are dispositions of powers; since therefore there are three powers, there will be three habits.

3. Likewise, the Master says in the text[^9], that mind is taken not for the substance of the soul, but for that which is more eminent in it.

### Conclusion

> In this second assignation of the image, which is mind, knowledge, love, the trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul and with respect to the two habits of knowledge and love.

**I respond:** It must be said, that according to certain men this assignation differs from the preceding, because the prior was in powers, this is in habits. And they answer the objections through a distinction of "mind." For *mens* is diversified according to a fourfold mode of being taken. For in one mode it is said from *mene*, which is moon or defect: and so it is said of the whole substance of the soul on account of the transmutations which it has[^10]. In a second mode it is said from *metiri* (to measure); and so it stands for the judicative power, and so Damascene[^11] takes it, placing it among the cognitive powers. In a third mode it is said from *eminere* (to be eminent); and so it stands for the superior part of reason, and so Augustine often takes it[^12]. In a fourth mode it is said from *meminisse* (to remember); and so it stands for memory both with respect to act and with respect to habit[^13]. They say therefore, that in the assignation of this trinity mind stands for the habit of memory; but in the adaptation, when Augustine says[^14]: «The mind knows itself and loves [itself]», it stands for the power of remembering.

But this does not seem fittingly said, because the adaptation ought to correspond to the assignation. And further, since the proper act of mind, as it stands for memory, is to remember, that[^15] would have to be touched on; but Augustine in this assignation never makes mention except of two acts, namely to know and to love, which are not of memory, but of the other powers.

It must therefore be answered, that that trinity is not in powers; because love and knowledge do not bespeak powers[^16]; nor in habits, because mind cannot stand for a habit, since it is taken as agent; nor can it be in powers and habits, because mind cannot stand for one power, since the acts of two powers are assigned to it; nor likewise[^17] can it stand for several powers, because there would not be a trinity. It remains therefore, that it is necessary to hold, that this trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul, by reason of the mind knowing and loving itself, and with respect to the habits, by reason of knowledge and love; and thus there is a trinity, since the substance is one, and the habits are two.

This assignation therefore differs from the preceding: because the preceding was through uniformity in powers in comparison to habits and[^18] acts, but this is in substance and habits. It differs again in this, that the preceding was through a turning of the soul to God, this is through a turning of the soul upon itself; and the image is not found in man in more modes, as was said above[^19]. It differs also, because the preceding assignation of the image is more proper and fitting than this one. For properly speaking, the image consists in unity of essence and trinity of powers, according to which the soul is born to be sealed by that highest Trinity with the image of likeness, which consists in grace and[^20] the theological virtues. Whence Augustine sets down this assignation first by way of investigation, in order that through this he may arrive at that one, in which he ends his speculation[^21]. Whence this assignation is not proper, as the other is; whence the Master places it second, as not principal.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that therefore which is objected, that habits are not coeval etc.; it must be said, that habit is threefold. For the power of the soul has one habit by acquisition, another by innate disposition, a third it has from its own origin. This is clear, because a habit is that by which a power is facile in act; but a power is facile in these three modes, for example, our affect has facility for loving another's good through acquired disposi-

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tion, as through virtue; for loving one's own[^22] good through innate disposition; and for loving oneself through one's natural origin. For since [the soul] is undividedly united to itself, it is always apt to loving itself. Likewise, since our intellect is always present to itself, it is always apt to itself for knowing itself. And so that is clear which is objected concerning coevality; for as regards such habits there is indeed coevality.

2. To that which is objected, that there ought[^23] to be three habits according to the three powers; it must be said, that in this trinity the habit of memory does not fall in nor has it place, because [the trinity] is found[^24] in the soul itself according as it turns upon itself: and therefore the substance of the soul itself holds the place of memory, and the very presence and offering, by which the soul always offers itself to its understanding, holds the place of the habit and act of memory. And so it is clear, that there fall in there only the habits of two powers; and therefore there is a trinity there.

3. To that which is last objected concerning the word of the Master; it must be said, that it is understood not for the whole substance of the soul[^25]; for if it be understood otherwise, the word of the Master does not have truth. Which is clear through Augustine, who on the occasion of this image, through almost the whole tenth [book] *On the Trinity*, shows that the soul has an innate knowledge of itself, which is the knowledge[^26] of its substance. And besides, nothing one in the soul knows and loves except the substance: therefore if mind stood for one power, it would not have those two acts, namely to know and to love.

la: Vat. omittit *Et*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra post *Tertium* ed. 1 addit *est*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *Et*, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1. A little below, after *Tertium*, ed. 1 adds *est*.

la: Scilicet memoria, intellectus et voluntas, de qua supra in a. 1. — Mox substituimus ex mss. *hae*c loco *hic*.

en: Namely memory, intellect, and will, on which see above in a. 1. — Shortly after we have substituted *haec* in place of *hic* from the manuscripts.

la: Textum Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Vat. paulo ante loco *dicunt habitus* ponit *ut in habitibus*, et paulo post omittit *et approbatione*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. — Mox ex cod. X cum ed. 1 post *est* supplevimus, rei veritate exigente, *se*.

en: For Augustine's text see above in the Master's text, c. 3, near the middle. — The Vatican edition shortly before, in place of *dicunt habitus* places *ut in habitibus*, and shortly after omits *et approbatione*, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1. — Shortly after, from codex X with ed. 1, after *est* we have supplied, the truth of the matter requiring it, *se*.

la: Verba Augustini inveniuntur supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Paulo supra post *meminisse* auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 expunximus *et*, quod Vat. addit.

en: Augustine's words are found above in the Master's text, c. 3, near the middle. — A little above, after *meminisse*, on the authority of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 we have struck out *et*, which the Vatican edition adds.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et sex primis edd., addit *ut*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, adds *ut*.

la: Ita codd. et sex primae edd. contra Vat., quae habet *Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul* et paulo post *sequantur* pro *consequantur*.

en: Thus the codices and the first six editions, against the Vatican edition, which has *Contra. It is shown, that not as in substance and habits at once* and shortly after *sequantur* for *consequantur*.

la: Codd. X Y addunt *scilicet*.

en: Codices X and Y add *scilicet*.

la: Substituimus ope mss. et ed. 1 hic *cum* loco *et* ac paulo infra *intelligentiae* pro *intellectivae*.

en: We have substituted, by means of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here *cum* in place of *et* and a little below *intelligentiae* for *intellectivae*.

la: Cap. 3. circa medium, quem tamen textum plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. hic mutarunt, pro *anima* ponendo *animae substantia tota*; codd. vero T X *animae substantia*, quos sequimur, quia eorum lectio correspondet sensui obiicientium. Cfr. Scholion.

en: Chap. 3, near the middle; which text however many manuscripts with the first six editions have here altered, putting in place of *anima* the words *animae substantia tota*; but codices T X read *animae substantia*, which we follow, because their reading corresponds to the sense of those objecting. Cf. the Scholion.

la: De hac mentis acceptione vide libr. *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 11.

en: On this acceptation of *mens* see the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 11.

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22: «Vires in cognitione positae sunt mens, cogitatio, opinio, sensus». Et singula perpendens de mente dicit: *quod verum est iudicat (considerat, discernit; sive, ut refert Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69. in princ.: mens a metiendo dicitur.).*

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22: "The powers placed in cognition are mind, thought, opinion, sense." And weighing each, he says of mind: *that it judges what is true (considers, discerns; or, as Alexander of Hales reports, S. p. II. q. 69. at the beginning: mind is so called from measuring [a metiendo]).*

la: Cfr. *Enarratio in Psalm.* 3. n. 3; XV. *de Trin.* c. 7. n. 11. Vide etiam libr. *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 11. et 34. Consentit Isidor., XI. *Etymolog.* c. 1.

en: Cf. *Exposition on Psalm* 3. n. 3; XV. *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 11. See also the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 11 and 34. Isidore concurs, XI. *Etymologies*, c. 1.

la: Cfr. Isidor. loc. cit. et libr. *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 34. — De his quatuor etymologiis, quae ex more illius aetatis iudicari debent, vide Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. circa finem (in aliis edd. q. 55.).

en: Cf. Isidore loc. cit. and the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 34. — On these four etymologies, which should be judged according to the custom of that age, see Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. near the end (in other editions q. 55).

la: Codd. sunt inter se divisi; plures siquidem ut G O T bb habent *Augustinus*, quos sequimur, alii vero ut A C L S Z etc. *ecce*; omnes tamen contra Vat. *dicit* loco *dicitur*. Ed. 1 *dicit Magister et Augustinus: ecce mens*.

en: The codices are divided among themselves; for many, as G O T bb, have *Augustinus*, which we follow, but others, as A C L S Z etc., *ecce*; all however against the Vatican edition's *dicit* in place of *dicitur*. Ed. 1: *the Master and Augustine say: behold the mind*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *ibi* pro *ille*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1, has *ibi* in place of *ille*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus bene *dicuntur potentiae*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, less well [reads] *dicuntur potentiae*.

la: Plures codd. ut A F G H K T Y bb *simul* pro *similiter*.

en: Many codices, as A F G H K T Y bb, [read] *simul* in place of *similiter*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, repetit hic *ad*. Paulo infra post *Differt* ex pluribus codd. ut H P Q X Z ee posuimus *iterum* loco *etiam*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, repeats here *ad*. A little below, after *Differt*, from many codices, as H P Q X Z ee, we have placed *iterum* in place of *etiam*.

la: Hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

en: Here a. 1. q. 2. in the body [of the article].

la: Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 indebite omittit *gratia et*. Nam distinguitur gratia sanctificans a virtutibus.

en: The Vatican edition, without any authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, unduly omits *gratia et*. For sanctifying grace is distinguished from the virtues.

la: Vide IX. *de Trin.* c. 2. n. 2. et ibid. X. c. 11. n. 17; XIV. ac XV. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. — Sub vocabulo *hanc* intellige secundam assignationem.

en: See IX. *On the Trinity*, c. 2, n. 2 and ibid. X, c. 11, n. 17; XIV and XV, c. 3, n. 5 and following. — Under the word *hanc* understand the second assignation.

la: Codd. L O *summum* loco *suum*; sed non bene. Mox cod. T post *sibi* addit *ipsi* et paulo infra incongrue cum aliis omittit *intellectus noster*.

en: Codices L O [read] *summum* in place of *suum*; but not well. Shortly after, codex T after *sibi* adds *ipsi* and a little below incongruously with the others omits *intellectus noster*.

la: Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *debent* pro *dicuntur*.

en: By means of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *debent* for *dicuntur*.

la: Supple: *trinitas*.

en: Supply: *trinitas* (trinity).

la: Cod. Z addit *sed parte superiori scilicet*, ed. 1 autem: *sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum*.

en: Codex Z adds *but namely by the superior part*, while ed. 1: *but supply for a turning of the soul to God or a reflection upon consideration of itself toward God*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *agnitio*; et immediate post *propterea* loco *praeterea*, sed falso, quia revera novum [printed entry ends here at the bottom of p.90; ACCEPT-AS-TRUNCATED-IN-SOURCE].

en: The Vatican edition, against the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *agnitio*; and immediately after, *propterea* in place of *praeterea*, but falsely, because in truth a new [printed footer entry ends here at the bottom of p.90; ACCEPT-AS-TRUNCATED-IN-SOURCE — the next page begins a fresh footer-note sequence with no continuation].

latin_scholion:
**I.** De hac quaestione audiendus est ipse S. Doctor, qui in anecdoto primo Prologo ad II. Sententiarum (cuius initium iam dedimus in Prolegomenis c. 1. § 2.) dicit: «Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magistri Sententiarum maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod cum Magister parte secunda distinctionis tertiae in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in mente, notitia et amore, dicat, mentem accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. Rursus, cum Magister dicat d. 7., quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse propter relationem. Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi, in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia, si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae nosse et amare, sicut videbitur infra (cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.), iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. Iterum, potentiae proprie non est agere, sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit, mens novit etc., mens ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. Postremo, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint omnino consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipiatur pro tota anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi».

**II.** Verba in 2. fund., quod «nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare», sic intelliguntur: se intelligere et amare non sunt actus alicuius habitus acquisiti, sed potentiae animae concreatae et consubstantialis, licet ad hos actus etiam habitus dispositive concurrere possint. Unde etiam B. Albert. (hic a. 36.) de eodem textu Augustini dicit: «Habitus non est nosse se et amare se, sed potius habentis habitum secundum ipsum habitum vel per ipsum habitum est nosse se et amare se». Item Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 7. a. 1.) ait: «Ad cognoscendum vero se ipsam mens nullo habitu utitur». Cfr. etiam Bonav. hic q. 2. ad 4.

**III.** In solut. ad 1. triplex habitus distinguitur, scil. ab acquisitione, ab innata dispositione, a sui ipsius origine. Differentia secundi et tertii in hoc consistit, quod secundus habitus non est proprie animae concreatus et coaevus, licet dispositio ad hunc habitum sit concreata et coaeva. Sic anima cognoscit et diligit ex innata dispositione proprium bonum (commodum). Tertius vero habitus, quo anima se ipsam cognoscit et diligit, est proprie ipsi concreatus, cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — In eadem solut. tangitur quaestio, quo sensu intellectus noster semper se intelligat. Doctrina Seraphici de hoc omnino concordat cum S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 7. ad 4.), Scot. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 8. n. 13.), et Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 2.). Hi negant, animam actualem sui intellectionem habere, praesertim talem qua se discernat ab aliis; concedunt tamen, quod propter praesentiam obiecti «nihil deficit actui primo... ad quem debet sequi actus secundus, qui est intellectio. Et forte propter hoc dicit frequenter Augustinus, quod anima novit semper se, propter istam propinquitatem ad actum noscendi, ubi nulla est imperfectio in actu primo. Hoc autem modo anima non semper novit lapidem» etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Alii tamen doctores, ut Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 3.) et Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 7.) docent, animam semper se nosse et amare, non tantum habitualiter, sed etiam actualiter, quin tamen advertat hos intimos actus. Cfr. etiam Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 12.), qui in hac quaestione anceps haeret.

**IV.** De ipsa conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 5; S. 1. q. 93. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 36; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1. et q. 7. a. unic. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 10.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning this question the holy Doctor himself is to be heard, who in the unpublished first Prologue to Book II of the *Sentences* (whose beginning we have already given in the Prolegomena, c. 1, § 2) says: "But perhaps it will seem to someone that I have departed from the positions of the Master of the Sentences chiefly in two things: namely in this, that whereas the Master in the second part of the third distinction in the second assignation of the trinity, which he says consists in mind, knowledge, and love, says that mind is taken not for the soul but for the superior portion, by me it is found said that mind there stands for the substance of the soul. Again, since the Master says in d. 7 that the power of generating is common to the three persons, as a name signifying the essence, I have rather adhered to that opinion which says that the power of generating is so called on account of relation. But if anyone rightly examines, in neither of the aforesaid will he find me to have departed either from the Master's position or from the path of truth. For when I said that in that assignation of the trinity mind is taken for the substance of the soul by reason of the superior part, this was said because, if mind stood there for the superior portion, since that is a power of the soul, and to know and to love are not [the act] of one power, as will be seen below (cf. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.), there would not now be a trinity there, but a quaternity. Again, to act is not properly of the power, but of the substance through the power; and therefore, if Augustine speaks properly and truly, when he says, the mind knows etc., mind there stands for the substance of the soul. And this again Augustine intimates when later, on the occasion of this trinity, through almost the whole tenth [book] *On the Trinity*, he shows that the soul knows itself. Finally, since those habits of knowledge and love are altogether consubstantial, they do not add a new essence over the power, but the powers are apt by themselves, and so they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves or with the superior part of reason. And therefore the Master does not deny that mind is taken for the soul itself, but that it is not taken for the whole soul according to all the powers, but for the substance itself by reason of the superior portion. In this therefore I have not contradicted the Master, but rather, as I judge, explained his word according to the rule of truth."

**II.** The words in the 2nd fundament, that "it belongs to no habit to know or love itself," are thus understood: to understand and to love oneself are not acts of any acquired habit, but of a power of the soul that is concreated and consubstantial, although habits can also dispositively concur in these acts. Whence also Blessed Albert (here a. 36) on the same text of Augustine says: "It is not the habit that knows itself and loves itself, but rather it belongs to the one having the habit, according to that habit or through that habit, to know oneself and love oneself." Likewise Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 7. a. 1.) says: "For knowing itself, however, the mind uses no habit." Cf. also Bonav. here q. 2. ad 4.

**III.** In the solution to 1, a threefold habit is distinguished, namely from acquisition, from innate disposition, from its own origin. The difference of the second and third consists in this, that the second habit is not properly concreated and coeval to the soul, although the disposition to this habit is concreated and coeval. Thus the soul knows and loves from innate disposition its own good (advantage). The third habit, however, by which the soul knows and loves itself, is properly concreated to it; cf. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — In the same solution there is touched the question, in what sense our intellect always understands itself. The Seraphic Doctor's doctrine on this fully agrees with St. Thomas (here q. 4. a. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 7. ad 4.), Scotus (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 8. n. 13.), and Richard (here a. 2. q. 2.). These deny that the soul has actual intellection of itself, especially such as to discern itself from others; they concede, however, that on account of the presence of the object "nothing is lacking to the first act... to which a second act ought to follow, which is intellection. And perhaps on account of this Augustine frequently says that the soul always knows itself, on account of that proximity to the act of knowing, where there is no imperfection in the first act. In this mode, however, the soul does not always know a stone" etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Other doctors, however, such as Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 5. a. 3.) and Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4. q. 7.) teach that the soul always knows and loves itself, not only habitually but also actually, although it does not advert to these intimate acts. Cf. also Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 12.), who in this question remains uncertain.

**IV.** On the conclusion itself: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., here q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., here q. 5; S. 1. q. 93. a. 6. — B. Albert., here a. 36; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 6. a. 1. and q. 7. a. unic. — Aegid. R., here 2. princ. q. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3. q. 1. — Biel, here q. 10.

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