title: Pars 1, Cap. 4

source_text:
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### Capitulum IV. *De istius fidei expressione catholica.*

Ad istius etiam fidei expressionem catholicam tenendum est secundum sanctorum Doctorum documenta, quod in divinis sunt duo modi *praedicandi*, scilicet per modum substantiae et relationis; tres modi *supponendi*, scilicet essentiae, personae et notionis; quatuor modi *significandi substantiam*, scilicet nomine essentiae, substantiae, personae et hypostasis; quinque modi *dicendi*, scilicet *quis, qui, quae, quod* et *quid*; et tres modi *differendi*, scilicet secundum differentem modum *existendi*, secundum differentem modum *se habendi* et secundum differentem modum *intelligendi*[^p212-5].

Ratio praedictorum haec est: quia, cum primum principium sit perfectissimum simul et simplicissimum, omnia, quae perfectionis sunt, de ipso dicuntur proprie et vere; quae autem imperfectionis sunt aut non dicuntur, aut si dicuntur, secundum assumtionem humanae naturae dicuntur, vel translative. Cum igitur decem sint praedicamenta, scilicet *substantia, quantitas, relatio, qualitas, actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs* et *habere*[^p212-6]; quinque ultima proprie spectant ad corporalia seu mutabilia; ideo non attribuuntur Deo nisi transsumtivo modo et figurativo. Alia vero quinque praecedentia Deo attribuuntur, secundum id quod completionem dicunt, ita tamen, quod divinam simplicitatem non impediunt. Omnia ergo haec praedicamenta sunt id ipsum, quod est illud, de quo praedicantur; et ita per comparationem ad subiectum, in quo sunt, omnia dicuntur transire in substantiam, *relatione* tamen excepta; quae, cum duplicem habeat comparationem, scilicet ut ad *subiectum in quo*, et ut ad *terminum ad quem*, primo modo transit, ne faciat compositionem, secundo modo manet, ut faciat distinctionem. Et hinc est, quod « substantia continet unitatem, et relatio multiplicat trinitatem[^p212-7] »; et ideo manent ibi hi tantum duo modi praedicandi differentes. — De quibus talis datur regula, quod quae dicuntur secundum *substantiam* de *omnibus* dicuntur et *singillatim et simul et singulariter*; quae vero secundum

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*relationem* aut non de *omnibus* dicuntur, aut si de pluribus, *pluraliter*, ut *relati, distincti, similes, aequales*, propter relationem intrinsecam. Nomen autem trinitatis comprehendit utrumque.

Et quoniam plures possunt esse relationes in una persona[^p213-1], sicut sunt plures personae in una natura; ideo distinctio in *notione* non infert diversificationem personae, nec distinctio *personae* plurificationem naturae. Et propterea non quidquid convenit essentiae convenit *notioni*, vel *personae*, nec e converso. Et hinc est, quod sunt ibi tres modi *supponendi*; de quibus talis consuevit dari regula: supposita *essentia*, non supponitur notio nec persona; et supposita *notione*, non supponitur essentia nec persona; et supposita *persona*, non supponitur essentia nec notio, sicut patet per exempla[^p213-2].

Et quoniam vera distinctio est in suppositis substantiae, manente essentia una; ideo necesse est, ibi multipliciter significari substantiam, scilicet ut *communicabilem* et *incommunicabilem*. Ut *communicabilem*, per modum *abstractionis* per nomen *essentiae*, et per modum *concretionis* per nomen *substantiae*; ut *incommunicabilem* vero, vel ut distinguibilem per nomen *hypostasis*, vel ut distinctam per nomen *personae*. — Vel aliter, scilicet ut *distinctam qualitercumque*, et sic *hypostasis*; vel *notabiliter et perfecte*, et sic *persona*[^p213-3]. — Exempla horum quatuor sunt in creatura: *humanitas, homo, aliquis homo, Petrus*; primum *essentiam*, secundum *substantiam*, tertium *hypostasim*, et quartum *personam* dicit.

Et quia in persona, quae distinguitur, non solum est considerare eum *qui* distinguitur, sed etiam illud *quo* distinguitur; et hoc est *proprietas* sive notio: ideo necesse est, quod in divinis sint quinque modi dicendi pariter et quaerendi, scilicet *quis*, ratione personae; *qui*, ratione hypostasis, quia dicit suppositum substantiae indistincte[^p213-4]; *quae*, ratione notionis; *quod*, ratione substantiae; *quid* sive *quo*, ratione essentiae.

Et quoniam omnes hi modi in unitate essentiae radicantur, quia quidquid est in Deo est ipse Deus unus et solus; ideo non ponunt ibi differentiam, nec secundum essentiam nec secundum *esse*. Et propterea sunt ibi tantum tres modi *differendi*, scilicet secundum modos *essendi* sive emanandi, sicut differt persona a persona; secundum modos *se habendi*, sicut differt persona et essentia — quia una *persona* ad alteram refertur, et ideo distinguitur[^p213-5], *essentia* vero non refertur ad alteram, et ideo non distinguitur — secundum modos etiam *intelligendi*, sicut differt una proprietas substantialis ab altera, ut bonitas et sapientia. — Prima differentia est maior, quae possit reperiri in divinis; est enim in suppositis, ita quod unum non dicitur de altero. — Secunda differentia est *minor*, quia est in attributis; licet enim unum possit dici de alio, ut persona de essentia, aliquid tamen dicitur de uno, quod non de altero, ut: persona distinguitur et refertur, essentia vero non. — Tertia vero differentia est *minima*, quia est in connotatis. Licet enim unum de altero dicatur ad invicem, et idem possit dici de utrisque[^p213-6]; non tamen idem *connotatur* utrobique, nec per idem intelligi datur utrumque. — Ex primo modo differendi oritur pluralitas personarum; ex secundo modo pluralitas praedicationum substantialium et relativarum; ex tertio pluralitas proprietatum essentialium et notionum, sive ab aeterno, sive ex tempore; sive proprie, sive transsumtive; sive communiter, sive appropriate[^p213-7]. Dictorum exempla manifesta sunt. — His intellectis, satis claret, et quid sentiendum, et qualiter loquendum sit de summa trinitate divinarum personarum.

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english:
### Chapter IV. *On the catholic expression of this faith.*

For the catholic expression of this faith also it must be held, according to the teachings of the holy Doctors, that in the divine there are two modes of *predicating*, namely by way of substance and of relation; three modes of *suppositing*, namely of essence, of person, and of notion; four modes of *signifying substance*, namely by the name of essence, of substance, of person, and of hypostasis; five modes of *saying*, namely *who* [*quis*], *which* [*qui*], *what things* [*quae*], *that which* [*quod*], and *what* [*quid*]; and three modes of *differing*, namely according to a different mode of *existing*, according to a different mode of *being disposed*, and according to a different mode of *understanding*[^p212-5].

The reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle is at once most perfect and most simple, all things that belong to perfection are said of it properly and truly; but the things that belong to imperfection either are not said of it, or, if they are said, are said according to the assumption of human nature, or transferredly. Since, then, there are ten categories — namely *substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, when, position*, and *having*[^p212-6] — the last five properly regard corporeal or mutable things; therefore they are not attributed to God except in a transsumptive and figurative mode. But the other five preceding are attributed to God according to that which they express of completion, yet in such a way that they do not impede the divine simplicity. All these categories, therefore, are that very thing which is that of which they are predicated; and thus, by comparison to the subject in which they are, all are said to pass over into substance — *relation* alone excepted; which, since it has a twofold comparison, namely as to the *subject in which* and as to the *term toward which*, in the first mode passes over, lest it produce composition, and in the second mode remains, that it may produce distinction. And hence it is that « substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity[^p212-7] »; and therefore there remain in it only these two differing modes of predicating. — Concerning which this rule is given: that the things said according to *substance* are said of *all* and *severally and together and singularly*; but the things said according to *relation* either are not said of *all*, or, if of several, are said *plurally* — as *related, distinct, alike, equal* — on account of the intrinsic relation. But the name of trinity comprehends both.

And since there can be several relations in one person[^p213-1], just as there are several persons in one nature; therefore distinction in *notion* does not entail a diversification of person, nor does distinction of *person* entail a plurification of nature. And for that reason not whatever belongs to the essence belongs to the *notion* or to the *person*, nor conversely. And hence it is that there are in it three modes of *suppositing*; concerning which this rule is customarily given: the *essence* being supposited, neither notion nor person is supposited; and the *notion* being supposited, neither essence nor person is supposited; and the *person* being supposited, neither essence nor notion is supposited, as is clear from examples[^p213-2].

And since true distinction is in the supposits of substance, the essence remaining one; therefore it is necessary that substance be signified there in several ways, namely as *communicable* and *incommunicable*. As *communicable*, by way of *abstraction* through the name of *essence*, and by way of *concretion* through the name of *substance*; but as *incommunicable*, either as distinguishable through the name of *hypostasis*, or as distinct through the name of *person*. — Or otherwise, namely as *distinct in whatever way*, and thus *hypostasis*; or *notably and perfectly*, and thus *person*[^p213-3]. — Examples of these four are found in the creature: *humanity, man, some man, Peter*; the first says *essence*, the second *substance*, the third *hypostasis*, and the fourth *person*.

And because in the person which is distinguished there is to be considered not only him *who* is distinguished, but also that *by which* he is distinguished — and this is the *property* or notion — therefore it is necessary that in the divine there be five modes of saying and likewise of asking: namely *who*, by reason of person; *which*, by reason of hypostasis, because it says a supposit of substance indistinctly[^p213-4]; *what things*, by reason of notion; *that which*, by reason of substance; *what* or *by what*, by reason of essence.

And since all these modes are rooted in the unity of the essence, because whatever is in God is God himself, one and alone; therefore they do not posit a difference there, neither according to essence nor according to *being*. And for that reason there are in it only three modes of *differing*: namely according to modes of *being* or of emanating, as person differs from person; according to modes of *being disposed*, as person and essence differ — because one *person* is referred to another, and therefore is distinguished[^p213-5], whereas the *essence* is not referred to another, and therefore is not distinguished — and according to modes also of *understanding*, as one substantial property differs from another, as goodness and wisdom. — The first difference is the greatest that can be found in the divine; for it is in the supposits, so that one is not said of the other. — The second difference is *lesser*, because it is in the attributes; for although one can be said of the other, as person of essence, yet something is said of the one which is not said of the other — as: the person is distinguished and referred, but the essence is not. — But the third difference is the *least*, because it is in the connoted. For although one may be said of the other reciprocally, and the same may be said of both[^p213-6], yet the same is not connoted in both, nor is each given to be understood through the same. — From the first mode of differing arises the plurality of persons; from the second mode the plurality of substantial and relative predications; from the third the plurality of essential properties and of notions — whether from eternity or from time; whether properly or transsumptively; whether commonly or by appropriation[^p213-7]. The examples of what has been said are manifest. — These things being understood, it is sufficiently clear both what is to be thought and how one must speak concerning the supreme trinity of the divine persons.

---

la: De duobus modis praedicandi cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. q. 4; de modis supponendi vide I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1; d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 33. q. 2. ad 5; de modis significandi substantiam cfr. I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3, ubi etiam tanguntur modi dicendi, de quibus et de modis differendi vide etiam d. 26. q. 1. — Mox post *Ratio* edd. cum pluribus codd. addunt *autem ad intelligentiam*. Inferius edd., 2 excepta, *vel transsumtive* pro *vel translative* (cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. q. 3.).

en: On the two modes of predicating, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 22, q. 4; on the modes of suppositing, see Book I of the Sentences, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3; and d. 33, q. 2, ad 5; on the modes of signifying substance, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, where the modes of saying are also touched on — concerning which, and concerning the modes of differing, see also d. 26, q. 1. — Shortly after, following *Ratio*, the editions together with several codices add *autem ad intelligentiam*. Further below the editions, 2 excepted, have *vel transsumtive* for *vel translative* (cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 22, q. 3).

la: Ex Aristot., de Praedicam. (Edd., excepta 2, *habitus*; Aristot.: ἔχειν i. e. *habere*). Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 4. seqq., ubi ostendit, quaenam praedicamenta sint in Deo etc. — Inferius voci *ideo* B H K S praefigunt *et*, ac post *nisi* V addit *tantum*.

en: From Aristotle, *On the Categories* (the editions, 2 excepted, have *habitus*; Aristotle: ἔχειν, i.e. *habere*). Cf. Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 4 ff., where he shows which categories are in God, etc. — Further below, before the word *ideo* B H K S prefix *et*, and after *nisi* V adds *tantum*.

la: Boeth., de Trin. c. 6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 2; d. 27. p. I. q. 3. ad 1-3. et d. 33. q. 1. De seq. regula cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. dub. 2; d. 31. p. I. q. 2. (ubi de terminis *relati, distincti, similes* etc.) et d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. seq. (ubi de nomine *trinitatis*). Propositio: *Nomen autem trinitatis comprehendit utrumque*, in multis codd. omittitur.

en: Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 6. Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 26, q. 2; d. 27, p. I, q. 3, ad 1–3; and d. 33, q. 1. On the following rule, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 22, dub. 2; d. 31, p. I, q. 2 (where the terms *relati, distincti, similes*, etc. are treated); and d. 24, a. 3, q. 1 f. (where the name *trinitatis* is treated). The proposition *Nomen autem trinitatis comprehendit utrumque* is omitted in many codices.

la: Ut paternitas et spiratio activa in Patre.

en: As paternity and active spiration in the Father.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 5. in corp. explicat sensum, quem hoc loco habet vocabulum *supponendi*: Illud dicitur *supponi*, altero supposito, quod est in intentione [conceptu] eius in rectitudine, ut, supposito homine, supponitur animal, et supposito Petro, supponitur homo; essentia autem in ratione personae non est secundum rectitudinem, sed oblique; similiter, supposita notione, non supponitur persona. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 576, nota 1.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. I, q. 56, m. 5, in the body, explains the sense which the word *supponendi* has in this place: That is said to be *supposited*, when something else has been supposited, which is in the intention [concept] of the latter in direct line — as, man being supposited, animal is supposited, and Peter being supposited, man is supposited; but the essence is not in the account of the person in direct line, but obliquely; likewise, the notion being supposited, the person is not supposited. Cf. tom. I, p. 576, note 1.

en: See Book I of the Sentences, d. 23, a. 1, qq. 1–3, and d. 25, a. 1 and 2.

la: I M bene *indefinite*. Edd. scribunt *indistinctae*, non falso (cfr. praecedentia); sed adverbium *(indistincte dicit)* clarius rem exprimit. Codd. nunquam habent diphtongum *ae*.

en: I M rightly have *indefinite*. The editions write *indistinctae*, not falsely (cf. what precedes); but the adverb *(indistincte dicit)* expresses the matter more clearly. The codices never have the diphthong *ae*.

la: B addit *persona*. Inferius post *distinguitur* A subiungit *essentia*. Pro *secundum modos*, quod ter hoc loco occurrit, T *secundum differentem modum*. Subinde pro *maior*, quod praebent S V, A E L O Q *maior* (H *maior perfecta*) *et summa*, alii codd. et 2 *perfecta et summa*, Vat., 1, 3 *perfectissima et summa*.

en: B adds *persona*. Further below, after *distinguitur* A subjoins *essentia*. For *secundum modos*, which occurs three times in this place, T has *secundum differentem modum*. Thereupon, for *maior*, which S V offer, A E L O Q have *maior* (H *maior perfecta*) *et summa*; other codices and 2 have *perfecta et summa*; the Vatican edition, 1, 3 have *perfectissima et summa*.

la: B *utroque*.

en: B has *utroque*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq., ubi de proprietatibus ex respectu ad tempus; d. 22. q. 3, ubi de propriis et translativis; d. 34. q. 3, ubi de appropriatis, de quibus vide etiam infra c. 6. — Pro *et notionum* D *et connotatarum* (F G *et connotatorum*). Inferius pro *sentiendum* A B S *sciendum*, D F *sentiendum vel sciendum*.

en: Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 30, q. 1 ff., where properties in respect to time are treated; d. 22, q. 3, where the proper and the transferred are treated; d. 34, q. 3, where appropriations are treated — on which see also below, c. 6. — For *et notionum* D has *et connotatarum* (F G *et connotatorum*). Further below, for *sentiendum* A B S have *sciendum*, D F *sentiendum vel sciendum*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin base from the IA djvu raw, verified against 450 dpi column bands of pp.212–213. Splits: p.212 x≈1335, **p.213 x≈1126** (measured from a combined gutter span of 1097–1155).

**Page span.** Cap. IV opens in p.212's **right** column and closes in p.213's **right** column at `...de summa trinitate divinarum personarum.`; `Cap. V.` (*De unitate divinae naturae in multiformitate apparitionum*) follows immediately below it on the same column. This is the first chunk in the Breviloquium to occupy three consecutive column-runs (p.212 R → p.213 L → p.213 R).

**Apparatus (10 entries).** p.212 nn. 5–7 picked up from `bon-brev-p1-c3`'s forwarded hand-off; p.213 nn. 1–7 read fresh off both p.213 footer bands. **All seven of p.213's notes belong to this chunk** — Cap. V's opening paragraph on p.213 carries no anchors, so nothing is forwarded from this page.

**⚠⚠ TWO gutter/page runovers in one chunk** — both would have been truncated by a naive column-order read:
1. **p.212 n. 7 runs over onto the NEXT PAGE.** It breaks mid-citation at `De seq. regula cfr. I. Sent.` at the foot of p.212's right footer and continues as an *unnumbered* block at the head of **p.213's left** footer (`d. 22. dub. 2; d. 31. p. I. q. 2. ... in multis codd. omittitur.`). Rendered joined. This is a *page*-crossing runover, not merely a column one — the first of its kind seen in Vol V.
2. **p.213 n. 4 runs over p.213's own gutter.** It breaks at `Edd. scribunt indistinctae, non falso` in the left footer and continues at the head of the **right** footer (`(cfr. praecedentia); sed adverbium (indistincte dicit) clarius rem exprimit...`). Rendered joined.

Running tally: **three runovers in four chunks** (p.211 n.4, p.212 n.7, p.213 n.4). In the Breviloquium these are not rare events — treat every footer's last entry as *presumed incomplete* until its continuation is located or positively excluded.

**Hand-off forwarded.** **No apparatus is forwarded to `bon-brev-p1-c5`** — p.213's footer is fully consumed here. But c5 *does* inherit body text: **Cap. V's opening paragraph sits on p.213's right column** (`Secundo autem de pluralitate apparitionum docet divina doctrina hoc esse tenendum, quod cum Deus sit incircumscriptibilis, invisibilis et incommutabilis; nihilominus tamen habitat specialiter in sanctis viris, apparuit Patriarchis et Prophetis, descendit de caelis, misit etiam Filium et Spiritum sanctum ad salutem humani generis. — Et licet in Deo sint indivisa natura, virtus et operatio Trinitatis; missio tamen vel apparitio unius personae non est` — breaking mid-sentence at the foot of the column), so c5's `printed_pages` must begin at **213**, not 214.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from body, body order): p.212 R — "Theses quinque." · "Ratio." · "Modi duo praedicandi." · "Regula." p.213 L — "Modi tres supponendi." · "Regula." · "Modi quatuor significandi." · "Aliter." · "Exempla." · "Modi quinque dicendi." · "Modi tres differendi." p.213 R — "De differentia prima." · "De secunda." · "De tertia." · "Quid ex his oriatur."

**Readings settled off the bands.** `transsumtivo` / `transsumtive` — Quaracchi's spelling throughout (single *m*, no *p*); preserved, not normalized to *transsumptive*. `assumtionem` likewise. `singillatim` (raw garbles the doubled *l*). `indistincte` in the body against the editions' *indistinctae* — the note itself adjudicates this, and the band confirms Quaracchi printed the adverb. Greek ἔχειν in n. 6 read directly off the band. Note 5's siglum run `S V, A E L O Q` re-read twice (the `O`/`Q` pair is easily confused at this size); stable. No `[?]` flags.


site: bonaventure

collection: Breviloquium

title: Pars 1, Cap. 5

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Capitulum V. *De unitate divinae naturae in multiformitate apparitionum.*

Secundo autem de pluralitate *apparitionum* docet divina doctrina hoc esse tenendum, quod cum Deus sit incircumscriptibilis, invisibilis et incommutabilis; nihilominus tamen *habitat specialiter* in sanctis viris, *apparuit* Patriarchis et Prophetis, *descendit* de caelis, *misit* etiam Filium et Spiritum sanctum ad salutem humani generis. — Et licet in Deo sint indivisa natura, virtus et operatio Trinitatis; *missio* tamen vel *apparitio* unius personae non est

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missio vel apparitio alterius. Licet etiam sit ibi summa aequalitas, solius tamen Patris est *mittere* et *non mitti*; Spiritus sancti est tantummodo *mitti* respectu divinarum personarum, nisi forte dicatur mittere hominem assumtum; Filii autem est *mittere* et *mitti*, sicut ex Scripturis potest colligi[^p214-1].

Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est: quia, licet primum principium sit immensum et incircumscriptibile, sit incorporeum et invisibile, sit aeternum et incommutabile; principium tamen est rerum spiritualium et corporalium, naturalium et gratuitarum, ac per hoc rerum etiam mutabilium, sensibilium et circumscriptarum, per quas, licet ipse sit immutabilis, insensibilis, incircumscriptibilis[^p214-2], se ipsum reddit manifestum et notum. Reddit autem se manifestum et notum *generaliter* per universitatem suorum effectuum ab ipso emanantium, in quibus dicitur esse per *essentiam, potentiam* et *praesentiam*[^p214-3], quod se extendit ad omnia creata. — Reddit etiam se *specialiter* notum per aliquos effectus, qui in ipsum specialiter ducunt, ratione quorum dicitur *habitare, apparere, descendere, mitti* et *mittere*. — *Habitare* namque dicit effectum *spiritualem*[^p214-4] cum acceptatione, sicut est effectus gratiae gratum facientis, quae est deiformis et in Deum reducit et Deum facit nos habere, et haberi a nobis, ac per hoc et inhabitare in nobis. Et quia gratiae effectus communis est omnibus personis; ideo una persona non inhabitat sine alia, immo simul tota Trinitas[^p214-5].

*Apparere* vero dicit effectum *sensibilem* cum expressa significatione, sicut Spiritus sanctus apparuit in columba. Et quoniam, sicut personae divinae distinctae sunt, sic distincte significari possunt et signis et nominibus; ideo *quaelibet persona* potest *per se apparere*, et *apparitio* potest *omnibus competere*, sive insimul, sive cuilibet per se. Unde quod Spiritus sanctus dicitur in linguis igneis et in columba apparuisse, hoc non est propter *novum vinculum*, vel *effectum* specialem; sed propter unionem, quae est inter *signatum* et *signum* sibi specialiter et modo et origine deputatum[^p214-6].

*Descendere* autem dicit utrumlibet effectuum praedictorum cum *inchoatione*. Deus enim beatissimis Angelis semper est praesens in caelis, quia in eis semper *inhabitat* et *apparet*. Peccatoribus autem in terris est modo ut absens et quantum ad *gratiam* et quantum ad *notitiam*; et ideo, cum *incipit* apparere vel inhabitare, de praesente caelis[^p214-7] et quasi absente nobis fit praesens terris: et ideo, licet in se non mutetur, nobis tamen *descendere* dicitur.

*Mitti* vero dicit effectus praedictos cum *aeterna productione*. Tunc enim Pater mittit Filium, quando, faciendo eum nobis praesentem per notitiam vel gratiam, insinuat, quod ab ipso procedit. Et quia Pater a nullo procedit, ideo nusquam dicitur *mitti*[^p214-8]. Quia vero Filius et producit et producitur, ideo *mittit* et *mittitur*. Quia vero Spiritus sanctus aeternaliter producitur, sed non producit nisi ex tempore; ideo ipsius est proprie *mitti*, *mittere* vero non competit sibi nisi respectu creaturae. — Ex quo apparet, quod hae sunt impropriae et exponendae: Spiritus sanctus mittit se; Spiritus sanctus mittit Filium; Filius mittit se ipsum, nisi intelligatur: in quantum est de Virgine natus. — Patet etiam, quare *mittere* et *mitti* non competit omnibus: quia, licet dicat effectum in creatura, dicit tamen relationem intrinsecam, ita quod *mittere* dicit auctoritatem, *mitti* subauctoritatem, ratione productionis aeternae interius importatae.

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english:
### Chapter V. *On the unity of the divine nature amid the multiformity of apparitions.*

Second, concerning the plurality of *apparitions*, divine doctrine teaches that this is to be held: that although God is uncircumscribable, invisible, and unchangeable, nevertheless he *dwells in a special way* in holy men, *appeared* to the Patriarchs and the Prophets, *came down* from the heavens, and also *sent* the Son and the Holy Spirit for the salvation of the human race. — And although in God the nature, power, and operation of the Trinity are undivided, yet the *mission* or *apparition* of one person is not

the mission or apparition of another. And although there is in them the highest equality, yet it belongs to the Father alone *to send* and *not to be sent*; to the Holy Spirit belongs only *to be sent* in respect of the divine persons, unless perhaps he be said to send the assumed man; but to the Son belongs both *to send* and *to be sent*, as can be gathered from the Scriptures[^p214-1].

Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this: although the first principle is immense and uncircumscribable, is incorporeal and invisible, is eternal and unchangeable, nevertheless it is the principle of things spiritual and corporeal, natural and gratuitous, and through this of things also mutable, sensible, and circumscribed — through which, although he himself is unchangeable, insensible, and uncircumscribable[^p214-2], he renders himself manifest and known. Now he renders himself manifest and known *generally* through the totality of his effects emanating from him, in which he is said to be by *essence, power*, and *presence*[^p214-3], which extends to all created things. — He renders himself known also *specially* through certain effects which lead specially to him, by reason of which he is said *to dwell, to appear, to descend, to be sent*, and *to send*. — For *to dwell* says a *spiritual* effect[^p214-4] with acceptance, such as is the effect of sanctifying grace, which is deiform and leads back to God, and makes us have God, and be had by God, and through this also makes him indwell in us. And because the effect of grace is common to all the persons, therefore one person does not indwell without another, but rather the whole Trinity together[^p214-5].

But *to appear* says a *sensible* effect with an express signification, as the Holy Spirit appeared in the dove. And since, just as the divine persons are distinct, so they can be distinctly signified both by signs and by names; therefore *any person whatever* can *appear by himself*, and *apparition* can *belong to all*, whether together or to each by himself. Hence, that the Holy Spirit is said to have appeared in fiery tongues and in the dove is not on account of a *new bond* or a special *effect*, but on account of the union which exists between the *thing signified* and the *sign* specially assigned to it, both in manner and in origin[^p214-6].

But *to descend* says either of the aforesaid effects with an *inception*. For God is always present to the most blessed Angels in the heavens, because in them he always *indwells* and *appears*. But to sinners on earth he is at present as it were absent, both as to *grace* and as to *knowledge*; and therefore, when he *begins* to appear or to indwell, from being present to the heavens[^p214-7] and as it were absent to us, he becomes present to the earth: and therefore, although in himself he is not changed, he is nevertheless said to *descend* with respect to us.

But *to be sent* says the aforesaid effects with an *eternal production*. For the Father then sends the Son, when, by making him present to us through knowledge or grace, he conveys that he proceeds from himself. And because the Father proceeds from none, therefore he is nowhere said *to be sent*[^p214-8]. But because the Son both produces and is produced, therefore he *sends* and *is sent*. But because the Holy Spirit is eternally produced, yet does not produce except in time; therefore it belongs to him properly *to be sent*, whereas *to send* does not belong to him except in respect of the creature. — From which it appears that these statements are improper and require exposition: the Holy Spirit sends himself; the Holy Spirit sends the Son; the Son sends himself — unless it be understood as: insofar as he is born of the Virgin. — It is also clear why *to send* and *to be sent* do not belong to all: because, although it says an effect in the creature, it nevertheless says an intrinsic relation, such that *to send* says authority, and *to be sent* sub-authority, by reason of the eternal production interiorly implied.

---

la: De habitatione Dei in viris sanctis cfr. I. Sent. d. 21. dub. 2; vide etiam ibid. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 15. p. II. q. 1. seqq. De apparitione et missione visibili cfr. ibid. d. 16. per totam. De missione in genere, et cui competat mittere vel mitti, vide ibid. d. 15. p. I. q. 1-4, ubi etiam loci Scripturae afferuntur. — Plurimi codd. *ex Scripturis apparet*. Aliquanto superius post *ad salutem* B addit *nostram vel*. E L O T V hic prosequuntur: *Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est* etc.

en: On the indwelling of God in holy men, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 21, dub. 2; see also ibid., d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 15, p. II, q. 1 ff. On visible apparition and mission, cf. ibid., d. 16, throughout. On mission in general, and to whom it belongs to send or to be sent, see ibid., d. 15, p. I, qq. 1–4, where the scriptural passages are also adduced. — Very many codices have *ex Scripturis apparet*. Somewhat above, after *ad salutem* B adds *nostram vel*. E L O T V continue here: *Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est*, etc.

la: C I M O P Q *incircumscriptus*, B *incircumscriptibilis in se*. Pro *sensibilium* O V *visibilium*, et Q *invisibilis* pro *insensibilis*.

en: C I M O P Q have *incircumscriptus*, B *incircumscriptibilis in se*. For *sensibilium* O V have *visibilium*, and Q has *invisibilis* for *insensibilis*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *quod* H *qua*. Inferius pro *ducunt* B *diriguntur*, et pro *dicitur habitare* E F H T *dicitur inhabitare*.

en: See Book I of the Sentences, d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2. — Shortly after, for *quod* H has *qua*. Further below, for *ducunt* B has *diriguntur*, and for *dicitur habitare* E F H T have *dicitur inhabitare*.

la: Vat., 1 et 3 addunt *et specialem*.

en: The Vatican edition, 1 and 3 add *et specialem*.

la: Cfr. Ioan. 14, 23: Et ad eum veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Inferius respicitur Ioan. 1, 32, ubi de apparitione Spiritus sancti in columba, et subinde Act. 2, 3, ubi de ipsius apparitione in linguis igneis.

en: Cf. John 14:23: *And we will come to him and make our dwelling with him.* Further below, reference is made to John 1:32, where the apparition of the Holy Spirit in the dove is treated, and thereupon to Acts 2:3, where his apparition in fiery tongues is treated.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 16. q. 3. — Mox pro *utrumlibet* B I *utrumque*.

en: See Book I of the Sentences, d. 16, q. 3. — Shortly after, for *utrumlibet* B I have *utrumque*.

la: B *in caelis*, et post pauca cum C D F *in terris*. Inferius post *nobis tamen* I addit *cum praesens est*.

en: B has *in caelis*, and shortly after, together with C D F, *in terris*. Further below, after *nobis tamen* I adds *cum praesens est*.

la: August., II. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8: Pater enim solus nusquam legitur missus. — Superius post *Tunc enim* L M V addunt *Deus*. Inferius pro *mittere vero non competit sibi* edd. cum aliquot codd., inter quos est M, *et non mittere*, et pro *apparet* A S *patet*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* II, c. 5, n. 8: *For the Father alone is nowhere read to have been sent.* — Above, after *Tunc enim* L M V add *Deus*. Further below, for *mittere vero non competit sibi* the editions, together with some codices, among which is M, have *et non mittere*; and for *apparet* A S have *patet*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin base from the IA djvu raw, verified against 450 dpi column bands of pp.213–214. Splits: p.213 x≈1126, **p.214 x≈1397** (combined gutter span 1367–1427). Running measurements: 1350 / 1175 / 1335 / 1126 / 1397 — the even-page cluster is itself drifting, so measuring is not optional even once the parity is known.

**Page span.** Cap. V opens in p.213's **right** column (inherited per c4's hand-off — that opening paragraph breaks mid-sentence at `...unius personae non est`), runs through all of p.214's left column, and closes in p.214's right column at `...ratione productionis aeternae interius importatae.` `Cap. VI.` follows on the same column.

**Apparatus (8 entries).** All from p.214 — **p.213's footer was fully consumed by c4**, so this chunk inherited body text but no notes, exactly as c4 predicted. p.214 nn. 1–6 sit in the left footer, nn. 7–9 in the right.

**⚠ Gutter runover (fourth in five chunks).** p.214 n. 5 breaks at `...ubi de ap-` at the foot of the **left** footer and continues unnumbered at the head of the **right** footer (`paritione Spiritus sancti in columba, et subinde Act. 2, 3, ubi de ipsius apparitione in linguis igneis.`) — it even breaks mid-word (*ap-|paritione*). Rendered joined.

**Hand-off forwarded.** **p.214 n. 9 belongs to `bon-brev-p1-c6`** (Cap. VI, *De unitate divinae naturae in multiplicitate appropriatorum*, opening in p.214's right column, anchored on *appropriatio Hilarii*): "Libr. II. de Trin. n. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. De aliis appropriationibus vide ibid. a. 2. q. 3; d. 34. q. 4. et d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. et 4. — Superius pro *sacra Scriptura* plures codd. *Scriptura divina*, K *sacra fides*, M S legunt *appropriatorum docet Scriptura*. Subinde pro *omnibus* R *tribus*." c6 also inherits body text: Cap. VI's opening runs from `Tertio vero de pluralitate appropriatorum...` to `— Iuxta hanc sumitur tertia, scilicet in` at the foot of p.214's right column, continuing onto p.215.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from body, body order): p.213 R — "Quatuor speciales effectus." · "Tribuuntur diversis personis." p.214 L — "De generali manifestatione." · "De specialibus effectibus." · "Quid sit habitare." · "Notandum." · "Quid apparere." · "Notandum." p.214 R — "Quid descendere." · "Quid mitti." · "Notandum." · "Impropriae locutiones."

**Readings settled off the bands.** `assumtum` — Quaracchi's spelling (cf. *assumtionem* in c4); preserved. `insimul` (one word, as printed). `utrumlibet` in the body against B I's *utrumque*, per n. 6. **`Ioan. 1, 32` in n. 5:** the band's glyph reads ambiguously as `4`, but the reference is to the dove descending at the baptism, which is John **1**:32 — the serif-`1`/`4` confusion flagged since c1, here resolved on content rather than glyph shape. Note the same note's `Ioan. 14, 23` is genuinely 14. `de praesente caelis` (n. 7 records B's *in caelis*), so the body's *de praesente* is correct as printed. No `[?]` flags.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Pars 1, Cap. 6

source_text:
<!-- page 214 -->

### Capitulum VI. *De unitate divinae naturae in multiplicitate appropriatorum.*

Tertio vero de pluralitate *appropriatorum* hoc docet sacra Scriptura esse tenendum, quod licet omnia essentialia omnibus personis aequaliter et indifferenter conveniant; tamen Patri dicitur appropriari *unitas*, Filio *veritas*, Spiritui sancto *bonitas*. — Et iuxta hanc sumitur secunda appropriatio Hilarii[^p214-9], scilicet « *aeternitas* in Patre, *species* in Imagine, *usus* in Munere ». — Iuxta hanc sumitur tertia, scilicet in

<!-- page 215 -->

Patre *ratio principiandi*, in Filio *ratio exemplandi*, in Spiritu sancto *ratio finiendi*. — Et iuxta hanc sumitur quarta, scilicet *omnipotentia* Patri, *omniscientia* Filio, *voluntas* seu benevolentia Spiritui sancto. — Haec autem dicuntur *appropriari*, non quia fiant *propria*, cum semper sint *communia*; sed quia ducunt ad intelligentiam et notitiam propriorum, videlicet trium personarum.

Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est. Quia enim primum principium est nobilissimum et perfectissimum, ideo conditiones entis nobilissimae et generalissimae in eo reperiuntur in summo. Hae autem sunt *unum, verum, bonum*, quae non contrahunt ens secundum *supposita*, sed secundum *rationem*. Nam *unum* nominat ens ut *connumerabile*, et hoc habet per indivisionem sui in se; *verum*, secundum quod *cognoscibile*, et hoc habet per indivisionem sui a propria specie; *bonum*, secundum quod *communicabile*, et hoc habet per indivisionem sui a propria operatione[^p215-1]. Et quia haec triplex indivisio se habet secundum ordinem quantum ad rationem intelligendi, ita quod *verum* praesupponit *unum*, et *bonum* praesupponit *unum* et *verum*: hinc est, quod haec attribuuntur primo principio in summo, quia *perfecta* et *generalia*; et appropriantur tribus personis, quia *ordinata*; et ideo *summe unum* Patri, qui est origo personarum; *summe verum* Filio, qui est a Patre ut verbum; *summe bonum* Spiritui sancto, qui est ab utroque ut amor et donum.

Et quia summe *unum* est summe primum, quia caret omni inceptione; et quia summe *verum* est summe aequale et pulcrum; et quia summe *bonum* est summe utile et proficuum: hinc oritur secunda appropriatio Hilarii, quae est *aeternitas* in Patre, quia non habet initium, sed est omnino primum; *species* in Imagine, id est in Verbo, quia summe pulcrum; *usus* in Munere, id est in Spiritu sancto, quia summe proficuum et communicativum. Quod per alia verba sic insinuat Augustinus[^p215-2]: « In Patre *unitas*, in Filio *aequalitas*, in Spiritu sancto *unitatis aequalitatisque concordia* ».

Rursus, quia summe *unum et primum* tenet *rationem principiandi* et originandi; summe *pulcrum et speciosum* tenet *rationem exprimendi* et exemplandi; summe *proficuum et bonum* tenet *rationem finiendi*, quia « bonum et finis idem[^p215-3] »: hinc oritur tertia ratio appropriandi *efficientiam* Patri, *exemplaritatem* Filio, *finalitatem* Spiritui sancto.

Rursus, quia a primo et summo principio fluit omne *posse*, a primo et summo exemplari omne *scire*, ad summum finem tendit omne *velle*[^p215-4]; ideo necesse est, primum esse omnipotentissimum, omnisapientissimum et benevolentissimum. Unitas autem prima et summa, rediens supra se ipsam reditione completa et perfecta, est omnipotentissima, sic et veritas sapientissima, et bonitas benevolentissima; et haec appropriantur, quia ordinem insinuant. Voluntas enim dat praeintelligere cognitionem, et voluntas et cognitio praesupponunt potentiam et virtutem, quia « *posse scire* est aliquid *posse*[^p215-5] ».

Ex his apparet, *quae* sint appropriata et *quibus* et *qua de causa*. Haec tamen ultima, scilicet *potentia, sapientia* et *voluntas*, sunt potissime illa, ex quibus in Scripturis laudatur Trinitas summa. Et ideo de his aliquid dicendum est breviter et summatim.

---

english:
### Chapter VI. *On the unity of the divine nature amid the multiplicity of appropriations.*

Third, concerning the plurality of *appropriations*, sacred Scripture teaches that this is to be held: that although all essential attributes belong to all the persons equally and indifferently, nevertheless *unity* is said to be appropriated to the Father, *truth* to the Son, *goodness* to the Holy Spirit. — And in accordance with this is taken the second appropriation of Hilary[^p214-9], namely, « *eternity* in the Father, *beauty* in the Image, *enjoyment* in the Gift ». — In accordance with this is taken the third, namely, in

the Father the *ground of originating*, in the Son the *ground of exemplifying*, in the Holy Spirit the *ground of finalizing*. — And in accordance with this is taken the fourth, namely, *omnipotence* to the Father, *omniscience* to the Son, *will* or benevolence to the Holy Spirit. — Now these are said to be *appropriated*, not because they become *proper*, since they are always *common*, but because they lead to the understanding and the knowledge of what is proper, namely of the three persons.

Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this. For since the first principle is most noble and most perfect, therefore the noblest and most general conditions of being are found in it in the highest degree. Now these are *the one, the true, the good*, which do not contract being according to *supposits*, but according to *account*. For *one* names being as *countable*, and it has this through its undividedness in itself; *true*, according as it is *knowable*, and it has this through its undividedness from its proper species; *good*, according as it is *communicable*, and it has this through its undividedness from its proper operation[^p215-1]. And because this threefold undividedness stands in an order as regards the account of understanding, such that *the true* presupposes *the one*, and *the good* presupposes *the one* and *the true*: hence it is that these are attributed to the first principle in the highest degree, because they are *perfect* and *general*; and they are appropriated to the three persons, because they are *ordered*; and therefore *the highest one* to the Father, who is the origin of the persons; *the highest true* to the Son, who is from the Father as Word; *the highest good* to the Holy Spirit, who is from both as love and gift.

And because the highest *one* is the highest first, since it lacks all inception; and because the highest *true* is highest equality and beauty; and because the highest *good* is highest usefulness and profit: hence arises the second appropriation of Hilary, which is *eternity* in the Father, because he has no beginning, but is altogether first; *beauty* in the Image, that is, in the Word, because he is highest beauty; *enjoyment* in the Gift, that is, in the Holy Spirit, because he is highest profit and most communicative. Which Augustine conveys in other words thus[^p215-2]: « In the Father *unity*, in the Son *equality*, in the Holy Spirit *the concord of unity and equality* ».

Again, because the highest *one and first* holds the *ground of originating* and of giving origin; the highest *beautiful and comely* holds the *ground of expressing* and of exemplifying; the highest *profitable and good* holds the *ground of finalizing*, since « the good and the end are the same[^p215-3] »: hence arises the third ground for appropriating *efficiency* to the Father, *exemplarity* to the Son, *finality* to the Holy Spirit.

Again, because from the first and highest principle flows all *power-to-be-able*, from the first and highest exemplar all *knowing*, and to the highest end tends all *willing*[^p215-4]; therefore the first being must be most omnipotent, most all-wise, and most benevolent. Now the first and highest unity, returning upon itself by a complete and perfect return, is most omnipotent; and so truth is most wise, and goodness most benevolent; and these are appropriated, because they convey an order. For will gives us to understand cognition beforehand, and will and cognition presuppose power and strength, since « *to be able to know* is to be able for something[^p215-5] ».

From these things it appears *what* things are appropriated, and *to whom*, and *for what reason*. These last, however — namely *power, wisdom*, and *will* — are chiefly those from which the highest Trinity is praised in the Scriptures. And therefore something must be said of these briefly and summarily.

---

la: Libr. II. de Trin. n. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. De aliis appropriationibus vide ibid. a. 2. q. 3; d. 34. q. 4. et d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. et 4. — Superius pro *sacra Scriptura* plures codd. *Scriptura divina*, K *sacra fides*, M S legunt *appropriatorum docet Scriptura*. Subinde pro *omnibus* R *tribus*.

en: Book II of *On the Trinity*, n. 1. Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 3. On the other appropriations see ibid., a. 2, q. 3; d. 34, q. 4; and d. 3, p. I, dub. 3 and 4. — Above, for *sacra Scriptura* very many codices have *Scriptura divina*, K *sacra fides*, M S read *appropriatorum docet Scriptura*. Thereupon, for *omnibus* R has *tribus*.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Vide August., de Vera Relig. c. 7. n. 13; 83 Qq. q. 18; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 28. et VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 12. — Pro seq. propositione Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 13. m. 2. in fine hanc affert rationem: Absolutior [est] intentio *unius*, quae est entis, in quantum consideratur absolutum, quam intentiones *veri* et *boni*, quae sunt entis comparati. Item, intentio *veri* absolutior est intentione *boni*, sicut *esse* rei consideratum sine sua utilitate vel ordine, et *esse* rei cum sua utilitate et ordine.

en: Cf. Book IV of the Sentences, d. 14, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. See Augustine, *On True Religion* c. 7, n. 13; *83 Questions* q. 18; *City of God* XI, c. 28; and *On the Trinity* VI, c. 10, n. 12. — For the following proposition Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 13, m. 2, at the end brings forward this reason: The intention of *the one*, which belongs to being insofar as it is considered absolutely, is more absolute than the intentions of *the true* and *the good*, which belong to being as compared. Likewise, the intention of *the true* is more absolute than the intention of *the good*, as the *being* of a thing considered without its usefulness or order, and the *being* of a thing with its usefulness and order.

la: Libr. I. de Doctr. christiana, c. 5. n. 5.

en: Book I of *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 5, n. 5.

la: Secundum Aristot.; vide tom. II. pag. 808, nota 5. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3; d. 6. q. 3; d. 27. p. II. q. 2; d. 35. q. 1; d. 36. dub. 4. et Hexaëm. serm. 1. — Superius ante *summe pulcrum* et *summe proficuum* edd., excepta 2, repetunt *quia*.

en: According to Aristotle; see vol. II, p. 808, note 5. — Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3; d. 6, q. 3; d. 27, p. II, q. 2; d. 35, q. 1; d. 36, dub. 4; and the *Hexaëmeron*, sermon 1. — Above, before *summe pulcrum* and *summe proficuum* the editions, except 2, repeat *quia*.

la: Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2, loquens de fine ultimo seu summo bono, ait, quod sit ille, « quem propter ipsum et propter quem alia volumus ». — Paulo inferius respicitur Lib. de Causis, propos. 15: Omnis sciens, qui scit essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam *reditione completa*... et hoc non est ita, nisi quia sciens et scitum sunt res una etc. Cfr. ibid. propos. 17: Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam multiplicata [i. e. divisa]... Quod est quia virtus quando incipit multiplicari, tunc destruitur unitas eius, et quando destruitur eius unitas, destruitur eius infinitas... Virtus, quanto plus approximat uni puro et vero, fit vehementior eius unitas, et quanto vehementior fit eius unitas, est infinitas in ea magis apparens etc. — Huius loci rationem habentes, retinuimus lectionem Vat. (confirmatam ab edd. 1, 3 et Brixiana an. 1497), *reditione* [K *reditio*] pro *reductione*, quod plurimi codd. et 2 exhibent.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 2, speaking of the ultimate end or highest good, says that it is that « which we will for its own sake and for the sake of which we will other things ». — A little below, reference is made to the *Book of Causes*, prop. 15: Every knower who knows his own essence is one returning to his own essence *by a complete return*… and this is not so except because the knower and the known are one thing, etc. Cf. ibid., prop. 17: Every unified power is more infinite than a multiplied [i.e. divided] one… And this is because when a power begins to be multiplied, then its unity is destroyed, and when its unity is destroyed, its infinity is destroyed… A power, the more it approaches the pure and true one, the more vehement its unity becomes; and the more vehement its unity becomes, the more its infinity appears in it, etc. — Taking account of the sense of this passage, we have retained the reading of the Vatican edition (confirmed by editions 1 and 3 and the Brescia edition of the year 1497), *reditione* [K *reditio*] for *reductione*, which very many codices and edition 2 exhibit.

la: Ut dicit Richard. a S. Vict. supra pag. 39, nota 7. allegatus. Vide etiam Hexaëm. serm. 21. — Inferius pro *Haec tamen* C I L O et 1 *Haec enim*, et pro *summatim* B E T *in summa*.

en: As Richard of St. Victor says, cited above at p. 39, note 7. See also the *Hexaëmeron*, sermon 21. — Below, for *Haec tamen* C I L O and 1 have *Haec enim*, and for *summatim* B E T have *in summa*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin base from the IA djvu raw (L40800–40952), verified against the 450 dpi column bands of pp.214–215. Splits used: p.214 x≈1397 (c5's measurement), **p.215 x≈1163**. Running series 1350 / 1175 / 1335 / 1126 / 1397 / 1163 — the odd-page cluster (1175, 1126, 1163) continues to drift, so measuring stays mandatory.

**Page span.** Cap. VI opens in p.214's **right** column (inherited verbatim per c5's hand-off) and breaks at the column foot mid-phrase on `— Iuxta hanc sumitur tertia, scilicet in`; p.215's left column resumes `Patre ratio principiandi…` The chapter closes in p.215's **right** column at `…breviter et summatim.`, and `Cap. VII. De omnipotentia Dei.` follows immediately on the same column — positive evidence, read off the band, that c6 ends on p.215 and c7 begins there.

Note p.215's running head reads `PARS I. C. VII.` although Cap. VI occupies its whole left column and most of the right — the third confirmation of the rule that the running head names a page's **last** capitulum.

**Apparatus (6 entries).** p.214 n. 9 inherited from c5 (anchored on *appropriatio Hilarii*), which was p.214's last footer entry; p.215 nn. 1–5 read off the bands. p.215's left footer carries nn. 1–4, the right footer the tail of n. 4 plus nn. 5–6. **p.215 holds exactly six footer entries; n. 6 (Anselm, Cur Deus homo I c. 20) is Cap. VII's and forwards to c7.**

**⚠ Gutter runover (fifth in six chunks).** p.215 n. 4 breaks at `…est re-` at the foot of the **left** footer and continues unnumbered at the head of the **right** footer (`diens ad essentiam suam reditione completa…`) — again mid-word (*re-|diens*). Rendered joined. That makes runovers five-for-six; the presumption of incompleteness at every footer's last entry is now simply the rule.

**A raw-side anchor that does not exist.** The djvu raw prints `et ideo ■mmme unumVa.tri',` at p.215 L, whose stray `'` reads like a superscript. The band shows plainly that there is **no anchor** at *summe unum Patri* — n. 2 is anchored two sentences later on *insinuat Augustinus*, and the note itself (*de Doctr. christiana* I, c. 5, n. 5) is the source of the *In Patre unitas…* quotation, which confirms the placement on content as well as on the glyph. A column-order transcription that trusted the raw would have produced a phantom anchor and shifted every subsequent number on the page.

**Hand-off forwarded.** **p.215 n. 6 belongs to `bon-brev-p1-c7`** (Cap. VII, *De omnipotentia Dei*, opening in p.215's right column), anchored on *ut dicit Anselmus*: "Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20. et de Fide Trin. c. 5. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 52, nota 4. — Vide de his I. Sent. d. 42. (praecipue q. 2.) et d. 43. — Superius pro *male velle* A *malum velle*, et pro *metuere* B *tristari*. Inferius post *hoc* [F M V *haec*] R supplet *facere*." c7 also inherits body text: Cap. VII's opening runs from `De omnipotentia Dei secundum doctrinam sacram haec tenenda sunt…` to `…est tamen omnipotens vere, proprie et perfecte:` at the foot of p.215's right column, continuing onto p.216 with `Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est: quia primum principium est potens potentia…`. Marginalia on that inherited run: "Excluduntur quatuor actus."

**Marginalia** (trimmed from body, body order): p.214 R — "Appropriatio prima." · "Secunda." · "Tertia." p.215 L — "Quarta." · "Quid sit appropriari." · "Ratio." · "De appropriatione prima." · "Notandum." · "De secunda." p.215 R — "De tertia." · "De quarta." · "De ultima infra agitur specialiter."

**Readings settled off the bands.** `transsumtive` (Cap. VII, forwarded) and `reditione` against `reductione` — the latter is Quaracchi's own deliberate choice, argued in n. 4, so the body keeps *reditione*. `pulcrum` throughout, as printed (not *pulchrum*). n. 3's `d. 35. q. 1` — the raw's `d. 3o. q. 1'` is a serif artifact; the band reads 35, and the trailing mark is the note's own punctuation, not a digit. n. 4's `propos. 15` and `propos. 17` both cross-checked against their quoted content (the *reditio completa* proposition is *Liber de Causis* 15). No `[?]` flags.


title: Pars 1, Cap. 7

title_alt:
De omnipotentia Dei
On the omnipotence of God

source_text:
<!-- page 215 -->

### Capitulum VII. *De omnipotentia Dei.*

De *omnipotentia* Dei secundum doctrinam sacram haec tenenda sunt; quod Deus est omnipotens, ita tamen, quod ei non attribuuntur actus *culpabiles*, utpote mentiri et male velle; nec actus *poenales*, ut metuere et dolere; nec actus *corporales* sive materiales, ut dormire et ambulare, nisi forte transsumtive; nec actus *inconvenientes*, ut posse facere maiorem se, vel alium Deum sibi aequalem, vel infinitum actu, et consimilia: « quia, ut dicit Anselmus[^p215-6], quodlibet inconveniens, etiam minimum, apud Deum est impossibile ». Licet autem haec non possit, est tamen omnipotens vere, proprie et perfecte:

<!-- page 216 -->

Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est: quia primum principium est potens potentia, quae est potentia *simpliciter*; et ideo distributio addita ei[^p216-1] distribuit pro his quae *posse* est *posse simpliciter*. Haec autem *sunt*, quae egrediuntur a potentia *completa* et *ordinata*. — Potentiam autem *completam* dico, quae non potest *deficere* nec potest *succumbere* nec potest *indigere*. Potentia autem in peccando *deficit*, in patiendo *succumbit*, in corporalibus actionibus *indigentiam includit*. Divina vero potentia, quia potentia summa et perfectissima, ideo nec est de nihilo nec est sub aliquo nec eget aliquo alio, ac per hoc nec *culpabilia* nec *poenalia* nec *materialia* potest; et hoc, quia omnipotens est potentia *completa*.

Potentiam autem *ordinatam* contingit tripliciter dici: vel[^p216-2] secundum *actum*, vel secundum *aptitudinem* ex parte *creaturae*, vel secundum *aptitudinem* ex parte solius *virtutis increatae*. Quod possibile est potentiae primo modo dictae est non tantum *possibile*, sed etiam *actuale*; quod secundo modo et non primo, est *possibile simpliciter*, licet non actuale; quod autem tertio modo, non primo vel secundo, est *possibile Deo*, sed impossibile creaturae. Quod autem nullo praedictorum modorum est possibile, sicut illud quod directe repugnat ordini secundum rationes et causas primordiales[^p216-3] et aeternas, *simpliciter est impossibile*: sicut quod Deus faciat aliquod actu infinitum, quod simul faciat aliquid esse et nullo modo esse, quod faciat id quod fuit, non fuisse, et cetera talia; quae *posse* est contra ordinem et complementum divinae potentiae. — Ex his patet, respectu quorum est divina potentia; patet etiam, quae debent dici *simpliciter possibilia*, et quae *simpliciter impossibilia*, et quod aliquorum impossibilitas simul stet cum vera omnipotentia.

---

english:
### Chapter VII. *On the omnipotence of God.*

Concerning the *omnipotence* of God, according to sacred doctrine these things are to be held: that God is omnipotent, yet in such a way that there are not attributed to him *culpable* acts, such as to lie and to will evil; nor *penal* acts, such as to fear and to grieve; nor *corporeal* or material acts, such as to sleep and to walk, except perhaps by transferred speech; nor *unfitting* acts, such as to be able to make something greater than himself, or another God equal to himself, or something actually infinite, and the like: « because, as Anselm says[^p215-6], anything unfitting, even the least, is impossible with God ». But although he cannot do these things, he is nevertheless omnipotent truly, properly, and perfectly:

Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this: because the first principle is powerful with a power which is power *simply*; and therefore the distributive sign added to it[^p216-1] distributes over those things for which *to be able* is *to be able simply*. Now these *are* the things which issue from a power that is *complete* and *ordered*. — And I call that power *complete* which cannot *fail*, nor *give way*, nor *be in need*. But a power fails in sinning, gives way in suffering, and includes neediness in corporeal actions. But the divine power, because it is the highest and most perfect power, is therefore neither from nothing, nor under anything, nor does it need anything else; and through this it is capable neither of *culpable* nor of *penal* nor of *material* things; and this because the Omnipotent is a *complete* power.

But an *ordered* power happens to be spoken of in three ways: either[^p216-2] according to *act*, or according to *aptitude* on the part of the *creature*, or according to *aptitude* on the part of the *uncreated power* alone. What is possible to power taken in the first way is not only *possible*, but also *actual*; what is possible in the second way and not the first is *possible simply*, though not actual; but what is possible in the third way, not in the first or the second, is *possible to God*, but impossible to the creature. But what is possible in none of the aforesaid ways — as that which directly conflicts with the order according to the primordial[^p216-3] and eternal reasons and causes — is *simply impossible*: as that God should make something actually infinite, that he should at once make something to be and in no way to be, that he should make what has been not to have been, and other such things; and *to be able* for these is against the order and the completeness of the divine power. — From these things it is clear with respect to what the divine power is; it is also clear what things ought to be called *simply possible* and what *simply impossible*, and that the impossibility of certain things stands together with true omnipotence.

---

la: Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20. et de Fide Trin. c. 5. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 52, nota 4. — Vide de his I. Sent. d. 42. (praecipue q. 2.) et d. 43. — Superius pro *male velle* A *malum velle*, et pro *metuere* B *tristari*. Inferius post *hoc* [F M V *haec*] R supplet *facere*.

en: Book I of *Why God Became Man*, c. 20, and *On the Faith of the Trinity* c. 5. Cf. vol. I, p. 52, note 4. — See on these matters Book I of the Sentences, d. 42 (especially q. 2) and d. 43. — Above, for *male velle* A has *malum velle*, and for *metuere* B has *tristari*. Below, after *hoc* [F M V *haec*] R supplies *facere*.

la: Scil. signum distributivum *omne* (cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. scholion.), quod intrat in nomen *omnipotentia*. — Inferius post *Potentia autem* [A D F H Q S *Sed potentia*] edd., 2 excepta, addunt *incompleta*.

en: Namely the distributive sign *all* (cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 4, q. 1, scholion), which enters into the name *omnipotence*. — Below, after *Potentia autem* [A D F H Q S *Sed potentia*] the editions, except 2, add *incompleta*.

la: E F H S *scilicet vel*.

en: E F H S have *scilicet vel*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., ubi dicitur, quod causae primordiales dicuntur *primordiales* « per privationem prioris... (et) in quantum respiciunt Deum ut principium primum ». — Plures codd. *primordialissimas*.

en: Cf. Book II of the Sentences, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, in the body, where it is said that primordial causes are called *primordial* « through the privation of anything prior… (and) insofar as they regard God as the first principle ». — Very many codices have *primordialissimas*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin base from the IA djvu raw (L40953–41080), verified against the 450 dpi column bands of pp.215–216. Splits used: p.215 x≈1163 (c6's measurement), **p.216 x≈1385**. Running series 1350 / 1175 / 1335 / 1126 / 1397 / 1163 / 1385.

**Page span.** Cap. VII opens in p.215's **right** column (inherited verbatim per c6's hand-off) and breaks at the column foot on `…est tamen omnipotens vere, proprie et perfecte:` — the colon is Quaracchi's, and the sentence it introduces begins the next page. The chapter runs through p.216's **left** column and closes there at `…simul stet cum vera omnipotentia.`, with `Cap. VIII. De Dei sapientia, praedestinatione et praescientia.` following immediately in the same column. So the whole chapter is contained in two column-runs and **never touches p.216's right column** — a two-run chunk, against c4's three.

**Apparatus (4 entries).** p.215 n. 6 inherited from c6 (anchored on *ut dicit Anselmus*), which was p.215's last footer entry; p.216 nn. 1–3 read off the **left** footer band. **p.216 holds exactly six footer entries** — nn. 1–5 in the left footer, the tail of n. 5 plus n. 6 in the right. **nn. 4, 5 and 6 are Cap. VIII's** (their anchors stand in p.216's right column, or at the very foot of the left) and forward to c8.

**Runover check — negative, and positively so.** p.216 n. 3 is not the left footer's last entry (nn. 4 and 5 follow it), so it is bounded on both sides and complete as printed; it ends cleanly at `Plures codd. primordialissimas.` The left footer's genuinely last entry, n. 5, **does** run over — it breaks at `— Alex. Hal.,` and continues in the right footer — but it belongs to c8, which will reassemble it. This is the first chunk in Pars I whose own last note is not a runover, and the reason is structural, not lucky: c7's notes all sit in the interior of a footer register.

**Hand-off forwarded.** **p.216 nn. 4, 5 and 6 belong to `bon-brev-p1-c8`** (Cap. VIII, *De Dei sapientia, praedestinatione et praescientia*, opening at the foot of p.216's left column). n. 4: "Cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3; d. 36. dub. 3. et d. 38-42. — Pro *fienda* A F *facienda*." n. 5 begins "Vide IV. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1-3. De seqq. vide I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 3. seq.; d. 35. q. 1. seqq.; d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. et supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seqq. — Alex. Hal.," **and continues unnumbered at the head of p.216's right footer, where the join is `— Alex. Hal., | S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1: Ratio respicit finem, idea formam…` — c8 must read that band and render it joined.** n. 6 (the right footer's own entry, anchored on *alia a se in se et per se*) begins "Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1-3." c8 also inherits body text: Cap. VIII's opening runs from `De sapientia vero Dei haec tenenda sunt, scilicet quod ipsa divina sapientia limpidissime cognoscit` at the foot of p.216's left column, continuing in the right column with `omnia bona et mala, praeterita, praesentia et futura, actualia et possibilia…`.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from body, body order): p.215 R — "Excluduntur quatuor actus." p.216 L — "Ratio." · "Potentia Dei est completa et ordinata." · "Completa potentia excludit tria." · "Ordinata dicitur tripliciter." · "Notandum de possibilibus."

**Readings settled off the bands.** `transsumtive` — Quaracchi's spelling (single *m*, no *p*), preserved, as with *assumtum* in c5. `causas primordiales` in the body against *primordialissimas* in very many codices, per n. 3. n. 1's `I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1.` — the raw's `d. 4. q. 4.` is the serif-`1`-reads-as-`4` artifact flagged since c1; the band reads `q. 1.` and the surrounding digits on the same line (`d. 4.`) give the contrast that settles it. n. 3's `d. 18. a. 1. q. 2.` likewise: the raw's `a. 4.` is the same artifact. No `[?]` flags.


title: Pars 1, Cap. 8

source_text:
<!-- page 216 -->

### Capitulum VIII. *De Dei sapientia, praedestinatione et praescientia.*

De *sapientia* vero Dei haec tenenda sunt, scilicet quod ipsa divina sapientia limpidissime cognoscit omnia bona et mala, praeterita, praesentia et futura, actualia et possibilia, ac per hoc incomprehensibilia nobis et infinita; ita tamen, quod ipsa in se nullo modo diversificatur, licet diversa nomina sortiatur. — In quantum enim est cognoscitiva omnium possibilium, dicitur *scientia* sive cognitio; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium, quae in universo fiunt, dicitur *visio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium, quae bene fiunt, dicitur *approbatio*; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae futura sunt, dicitur *praescientia* sive praevisio; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae ab ipso Deo fienda sunt, dicitur *dispositio*: in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae praemianda sunt, dicitur *praedestinatio*; in quantum vero est cognoscitiva eorum quae damnanda sunt, dicitur *reprobatio*[^p216-4].

Et quia ipsa non tantum est *cognoscitiva*, sed est etiam *ratio cognoscendi*; ideo, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi omnia cognita, dicitur *lux*; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi visa et approbata, dicitur *speculum*; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi praevisa et disposita, dicitur *exemplar*; in quantum vero est ratio cognoscendi praedestinata et reprobata, dicitur *liber vitae*. — Est igitur *liber vitae* respectu rerum, ut redeuntium; *exemplar*, ut exeuntium; *speculum*, ut euntium; *lux* vero respectu omnium[^p216-5]. — Ad *exemplar* autem spectat *idea, verbum, ars* et *ratio*: *idea*, secundum actum praevidendi; *verbum*, secundum actum proponendi; *ars*, secundum actum prosequendi; *ratio*, secundum actum perficiendi, quia superaddit intentionem finis. — Quia vero haec omnia unum sunt in Deo, ideo unum frequenter accipitur pro alio.

Et licet divina sapientia ratione diversitatis scitorum et connotatorum diversa sortiatur vocabula, non tamen diversificatur secundum rationem intrinsecam. Cognoscit enim *contingentia* infallibiliter, *mutabilia* immutabiliter, *futura* praesentialiter, *temporalia* aeternaliter, *dependentia* independenter, *creata* increate, *alia a se* in se et per se[^p216-6]. — Et cum infallibiliter contingentia cognoscat, simul stat libertas et vertibilitas voluntatis cum praedestinatione et praescientia.

<!-- page 217 -->

Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est: quoniam primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum et summum, cognitionem habet simul *simplicissimam* et *perfectissimam*: quia *perfectissimam*, ideo cognoscit omnia[^p217-1] distinctissime sub omnibus conditionibus, quas res habent vel habere possunt; et propterea futura scit esse futura, et praesentia praesentia; et bona scit approbanda, et mala reprobanda: hinc est, quod diversa sortitur vocabula, secundum quod dictum est supra.

Sed quia simul stat *perfectio* sapientiae cum *summa simplicitate*, hinc est, quod omnia *alia a se* cognoscit in se et per se; ex quo sequitur secundum, quod *creata* cognoscit increate; ex quo sequitur tertium, quod *dependentia* cognoscit independenter; ex quo oritur quartum, quod *temporalia* cognoscit aeternaliter; ex quo quintum, quod *futura* cognoscit praesentialiter; ex quo sextum, quod *mutabilia* cognoscit immutabiliter; ex quo septimum, quod *contingentia* cognoscit infallibiliter.

Et ita *contingentia*, manentia contingentia, sunt divinae sapientiae prorsus infallibilia, tam in contingentibus, quae subiacent naturae, quam libertati voluntatis humanae. — Unde qui vult hoc verum[^p217-2] intelligere, quomodo simul stet libertas voluntatis creatae cum infallibilitate praedestinationis aeternae, resolvendo ab hoc ultimo procedat per illos septem gradus usque ad primum, quod primum principium perfectissime cognoscit omnia per se ipsum, quod est verum certissimum; ex quo cetera praedicta ratiocinando infallibiliter concluduntur.

Sicut autem divinae cognitionis *certitudo* simul stat cum contingentia rerum cognitarum, quia simul est *simplicissima* et *perfectissima* divina sapientia; sic *unitas* simul stat cum multiformitate rationum et idearum ex eadem causa. Quia enim *perfectissima* est, ideo distinctissime[^p217-3] cognoscit universa et singula et illa omnia distinctissime et perfectissime repraesentat; et ideo singulorum dicitur habere rationes et ideas tanquam rerum similitudines perfectissime expressivas. — Quia vero *simplicissima* est, ideo omnes similitudines illae sunt unum in ipsa. Unde sicut Deus *una virtute* omnia producit ex tempore secundum omnimodam rerum integritatem, sic *una veritate*[^p217-4] omnia exprimit sempiternaliter. Et sicut una est in Deo altissimo, omnipotente *operatio activa* secundum rem, dicuntur tamen plures rerum productiones ratione pluralitatis productorum; sic una est *veritas* unius actus intelligentiae in Deo; dicuntur tamen plures similitudines, ideae et rationes ratione pluralitatis ideatorum vel *existentium*, vel *futurorum*, vel *possibilium*. Hae autem rationes vel ideae, licet sint una *veritas* et *lux* et *essentia*[^p217-5], non tamen dicuntur esse *una ratio* vel idea. *Ratio* enim vel idea dicitur ut *ad alterum* secundum rationem intelligendi. Nominat enim similitudinem cogniti, quae realiter tenet se ex parte Dei, licet secundum rationem intelligendi dicere videatur aliquid ex parte ideati.

Si autem huius simile in creatura requiratur, dicendum, quod hoc est illius exemplaris *proprium*; quia, sicut dictum est, simul est *simplex* et *infinitum* et *perfectissimum*, quo praeintellecto, cetera consequenter innotescunt. Quia enim exemplar illud est *simplicissimum et perfectissimum*, ideo actus purus; quia vero *infinitum et immensum*, ideo extra omne genus[^p217-6]. Et hinc est, quod existens unum, potest esse similitudo expressiva multorum.

---

english:
### Chapter VIII. *On God's wisdom, predestination, and foreknowledge.*

Concerning the *wisdom* of God these things are to be held: namely, that the divine wisdom itself most clearly knows all things good and evil, past, present, and future, actual and possible, and through this things incomprehensible to us and infinite; yet in such a way that it is in no way diversified in itself, although it obtains diverse names. — For insofar as it is knowing of all possible things, it is called *knowledge* or cognition; insofar as it is knowing of all things which come to be in the universe, it is called *vision*; insofar as it is knowing of all things which come to be well, it is called *approval*; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are future, it is called *foreknowledge* or foresight; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be done by God himself, it is called *disposition*; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be rewarded, it is called *predestination*; but insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be damned, it is called *reprobation*[^p216-4].

And because it is not only *knowing*, but is also the *ground of knowing*, therefore, insofar as it is the ground of knowing all things known, it is called *light*; insofar as it is the ground of knowing things seen and approved, it is called *mirror*; insofar as it is the ground of knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called *exemplar*; but insofar as it is the ground of knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called the *book of life*. — It is therefore the *book of life* with respect to things as returning; *exemplar*, as going forth; *mirror*, as going; but *light* with respect to all[^p216-5]. — Now to the *exemplar* pertain *idea, word, art*, and *account*: *idea*, according to the act of foreseeing; *word*, according to the act of proposing; *art*, according to the act of carrying through; *account*, according to the act of perfecting, because it adds the intention of the end. — But because all these are one in God, therefore one is frequently taken for another.

And although the divine wisdom obtains diverse words by reason of the diversity of the things known and connoted, it is nevertheless not diversified according to its intrinsic character. For it knows *contingent* things infallibly, *mutable* things immutably, *future* things presentially, *temporal* things eternally, *dependent* things independently, *created* things uncreatedly, *things other than itself* in itself and through itself[^p216-6]. — And since it knows contingent things infallibly, the freedom and changeableness of the will stands together with predestination and foreknowledge.

Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle, by this very fact that it is first and highest, has a cognition at once *most simple* and *most perfect*: because *most perfect*, therefore it knows all things[^p217-1] most distinctly under all the conditions which things have or can have; and on that account it knows future things to be future, and present things present; and it knows good things as to be approved, and evil things as to be reprobated: hence it is that it obtains diverse words, according to what has been said above.

But because the *perfection* of wisdom stands together with the *highest simplicity*, hence it is that it knows all things *other than itself* in itself and through itself; from which follows the second, that it knows *created* things uncreatedly; from which follows the third, that it knows *dependent* things independently; from which arises the fourth, that it knows *temporal* things eternally; from which the fifth, that it knows *future* things presentially; from which the sixth, that it knows *mutable* things immutably; from which the seventh, that it knows *contingent* things infallibly.

And thus *contingent* things, remaining contingent, are altogether infallible to the divine wisdom, both in contingents which lie under nature and in those which lie under the freedom of the human will. — Hence he who wishes to understand this truth[^p217-2] — how the freedom of the created will stands together with the infallibility of eternal predestination — should proceed by resolution from this last through those seven degrees up to the first, namely that the first principle most perfectly knows all things through itself, which is the most certain truth; from which the rest of the aforesaid are infallibly concluded by reasoning.

Now just as the *certitude* of the divine cognition stands together with the contingency of the things known, because the divine wisdom is at once *most simple* and *most perfect*; so *unity* stands together with the multiformity of the accounts and ideas from the same cause. For because it is *most perfect*, therefore it knows universals and singulars most distinctly[^p217-3], and represents all those things most distinctly and most perfectly; and therefore it is said to have the accounts and ideas of individuals as likenesses expressing things most perfectly. — But because it is *most simple*, therefore all those likenesses are one in it. Hence, just as God produces all things in time *by one power* according to the entire integrity of things, so *by one truth*[^p217-4] he expresses all things everlastingly. And just as in God most high and omnipotent the *active operation* is one according to the thing itself, yet several productions of things are spoken of by reason of the plurality of things produced; so the *truth* of the one act of understanding in God is one, yet several likenesses, ideas, and accounts are spoken of by reason of the plurality of things ideated, whether *existing*, or *future*, or *possible*. But these accounts or ideas, although they are one *truth* and *light* and *essence*[^p217-5], are nevertheless not said to be *one account* or idea. For *account* or idea is so called as being *toward another* according to the character of understanding. For it names the likeness of the thing known, which really stands on the side of God, although according to the character of understanding it seems to say something on the side of the thing ideated.

But if a likeness of this be sought in the creature, it must be said that this is *proper* to that exemplar; because, as has been said, it is at once *simple* and *infinite* and *most perfect*, and when this is understood beforehand, the rest become known consequently. For because that exemplar is *most simple and most perfect*, therefore it is pure act; but because it is *infinite and immense*, therefore it is outside every genus[^p217-6]. And hence it is that, being one, it can be a likeness expressive of many.

---

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3; d. 36. dub. 3. et d. 38-42. — Pro *fienda* A F *facienda*.

en: Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 35, dub. 3; d. 36, dub. 3; and dd. 38–42. — For *fienda* A F have *facienda*.

la: Vide IV. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1-3. De seqq. vide I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 3. seq.; d. 35. q. 1. seqq.; d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. et supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seqq. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1: Ratio respicit finem, idea formam, exemplar efficientem, sapientia cognitionem, sicut ars operationem. Unde in quantum efficiens, scit, qualiter debeat operari; secundum exemplar dicitur sapiens; in quantum vero potest operari, cum vult, dicitur artifex. — Superius post *sed est etiam ratio cognoscendi* cum plurimis codd. et 2 omisimus *omnia*. Pro *cognita* I M O U V substituunt *condita*. Pro *euntium* multi codd. *entium*.

en: See Book IV of the Sentences, d. 43, a. 2, qq. 1–3. On what follows see Book I of the Sentences, d. 27, p. II, q. 3 f.; d. 35, q. 1 ff.; d. 36, a. 2, q. 1; and above, the *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 2 ff. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1: *Account* regards the end, *idea* the form, *exemplar* the efficient cause, *wisdom* cognition, as *art* regards operation. Hence insofar as he is efficient, he knows how he ought to operate; according to the exemplar he is called wise; but insofar as he can operate when he wills, he is called artificer. — Above, after *sed est etiam ratio cognoscendi*, together with very many codices and edition 2, we have omitted *omnia*. For *cognita* I M O U V substitute *condita*. For *euntium* many codices have *entium*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1-3. De seq. propositione vide ibid. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1; et d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. — Inferius pro *voluntatis* A *arbitrii*, R *libertatis*, S *libertatis vel rationis*. Subinde I L V legunt *Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est* etc.

en: Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 39, a. 2, qq. 1–3. On the following proposition see ibid., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1; and d. 40, a. 2, q. 1. — Below, for *voluntatis* A has *arbitrii*, R *libertatis*, S *libertatis vel rationis*. Thereupon I L V read *Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est*, etc.

la: A addit *simul et*, B H L O Q S *simul*. Subinde pro *possunt* B F H S *valent*, M *valeant*, et post *hinc est* A B E H M S ac 2 addunt *igitur*.

en: A adds *simul et*, B H L O Q S *simul*. Thereupon, for *possunt* B F H S have *valent*, M *valeant*; and after *hinc est* A B E H M S and edition 2 add *igitur*.

la: A *hoc ultimum*. Inferius vocibus *ex quo* A B S praefigunt *et*.

en: A has *hoc ultimum*. Below, A B S prefix *et* to the words *ex quo*.

la: Edd., excepta 2, addunt *et perfectissime*.

en: The editions, except 2, add *et perfectissime*.

la: Fide plurimorum codd. et 2 substituimus *veritate* pro *virtute*, quod contextui repugnat. Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2 et 3; I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. Mox post *altissimo* ex E H L M S supplevimus *omnipotente*, quod substituit A pro *altissimo*. Subinde pro *unius* B C G H K M O P Q T *unus*.

en: On the authority of very many codices and edition 2 we have substituted *veritate* for *virtute*, which conflicts with the context. Cf. above, the *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, qq. 2 and 3; Book I of the Sentences, d. 35, q. 2. Shortly after *altissimo* we have supplied *omnipotente* from E H L M S, which A substitutes for *altissimo*. Thereupon, for *unius* B C G H K M O P Q T have *unus*.

la: Edd., excepta 2, *lux in essentia*. Inferius pro *dicitur*, post quod B H addunt *esse*, A *dicit respectum*, et pro *ideati* M *cogitati*, B *ideati connotati*.

en: The editions, except 2, have *lux in essentia*. Below, for *dicitur* — after which B H add *esse* — A has *dicit respectum*; and for *ideati* M has *cogitati*, B *ideati connotati*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4.

en: Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 4. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin base from the IA djvu raw (L41081–41290), verified against the 450 dpi column bands of pp.216–217. Splits used: p.216 x≈1385 (c7's measurement), **p.217 x≈1180**. Running series 1350 / 1175 / 1335 / 1126 / 1397 / 1163 / 1385 / 1180.

**Page span — four column-runs.** Cap. VIII opens at the **foot of p.216's left column** (that opening clause inherited verbatim per c7's hand-off), runs through p.216's **right** column, then p.217's **left**, and closes in p.217's **right** at `…potest esse similitudo expressiva multorum.`, with `Cap. IX. De voluntate Dei et providentia.` following immediately in the same column. Four runs beats c4's three and is the longest chunk in Pars I so far — the only capitulum yet to occupy two full pages.

**Apparatus (9 entries).** p.216 nn. 4–6 inherited from c7 (n. 4 anchored on *dicitur reprobatio*, n. 5 on *lux vero respectu omnium*, n. 6 on *alia a se in se et per se*); p.217 nn. 1–6 read off both footer bands. p.217's left footer carries nn. 1–5, the right footer the tail of n. 5 plus nn. 6–7. **p.217 holds exactly seven footer entries; n. 7 (Augustine, III de Trin. c. 4 n. 9) is Cap. IX's** — it is anchored on *gratiarum et retributionum* inside the Augustine quotation that opens Cap. IX — **and forwards to c9.**

**⚠ Two gutter runovers in one chunk — a first.** Both pages' last-numbered left-footer entries break across the gutter and continue unnumbered at the head of the right footer:
- p.216 n. 5 breaks at `— Alex. Hal.,` and resumes `S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1: Ratio respicit finem, idea formam…`
- p.217 n. 5 breaks at `Inferius pro dicitur,` and resumes `post quod B H addunt esse, A dicit respectum…`

Neither breaks mid-word, but both break mid-clause, and in each case the fragment left in the left footer is a grammatically complete-looking sentence — p.217 n. 5's `Inferius pro dicitur,` would read as a truncated-but-plausible entry to anyone who stopped at the column foot. Rendered joined. That is **seven runovers in eight chunks.**

**A printer's signature line, not text.** The foot of p.217's left footer carries `S. Bonav. — Tom. V.` and the right footer's foot carries `28`. These are the gathering signature and folio mark, not apparatus; they are not transcribed. Worth flagging because `S. Bonav.` sits flush with the note text and could be mistaken for the opening of an entry.

**Hand-off forwarded.** **p.217 n. 7 belongs to `bon-brev-p1-c9`** (Cap. IX, *De voluntate Dei et providentia*, opening in p.217's right column): "August., III. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9. Textus originalis et B vocibus *omnium specierum* interserunt *corporalium*, I *temporalium*. Vat., quam sequuntur 1, 3: *Est enim… fit visibile aut intelligibile in ista… quadam universaque republica, quod non de illa imperiali aula* etc. Post *sensibiliter* A H addunt *vel intelligibiliter*. — De voluntate Dei cfr. I. Sent. d. 45-48, ubi etiam quaedam de *providentia* divina tanguntur; plenius autem de ipsa agit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 26. per totam. — Post pauca verbis *ratione regulata* E H R interserunt *gubernata vel*." c9 also inherits body text: Cap. IX's opening runs from `De voluntate autem Dei haec tenenda sunt, quod ipsa sic est recta, ut nullo modo possit obliquari…` through the Augustine quotation ending `…gratiarum et retributionum ».` at the foot of p.217's right column, continuing on p.218. Marginalia on that inherited run: "Tres proprietates." · "Una voluntas cum quinque signis."

**Marginalia** (trimmed from body, body order): p.216 R — "De sapientia in se." · "Sex nomina, quatenus ipsa est cognoscitiva." · "Quatuor nomina, quatenus est ratio cognoscendi." · "Aliter." · "Ad exemplar spectant alia quatuor." · "Non diversificatur in se." · "Notandum." · "Simul stat libertas." · "Ratio." p.217 L — "De excellentia divinae scientiae." · "Primo, propter perfectionem." · "Secundo, propter simplicitatem sequuntur septem." · "Corollarium primum." · "Secundum." · "De unitate eiusdem in multiplicitate rationum." · "Primo." · "Secundo." p.217 R — "Notandum." · "Quid ratio." · "Non est simile in creatura."

**Readings settled off the bands.** **`una veritate` in the body, not `una virtute`** — this is a Quaracchi emendation against the majority of codices, argued in n. 4, and the sentence's own logic (`omnia exprimit sempiternaliter`, against the preceding `una virtute omnia producit`) requires it; the raw's `r<eril.ate` garble is resolved by the note, not against it. Likewise `omnipotente` after `altissimo` is Quaracchi's supplement from E H L M S, printed in the text and recorded in the same note. n. 6's `d. 8. p. II. q. 4.` and n. 4 of p.216's `d. 35. dub. 3` — the raw's `d. 3o.` is the serif artifact; the band reads 35. `increate` (adverb) in `creata cognoscit increate`, against the raw's `increata`, confirmed on the band and by the parallel adverbs surrounding it. No `[?]` flags.