title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Quid convenientius dicatur de Spiritu sancto, donum scilicet, an datum.

title_alt: Which is more fittingly said of the Holy Spirit, gift or given

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.

#### *Utrum convenientius de Spiritu sancto dicatur donum quam datum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum convenientius dicatur de Spiritu sancto donum quam datum. Et quod tam convenienter dicatur datum ut[^1] donum, videtur:

1. Quia Iacobi primo[^2]: *Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est*; ergo a Spiritu sancto ita sunt data, sicut et dona[^3]: ergo sicut ad ipsum transfertur ratio doni, ita et dati.

2. Item, mobilis et moti est eadem ratio[^4]: ergo similiter dati et donabilis: ergo si donum dicitur in ratione donabilis, datum vero in ratione actualiter dati, ergo eadem est ratio doni et dati, ergo etc.

3. Item, in quolibet genere perfectior est actus quam potentia[^5]: ergo cum datum dicat in actu, donum in potentia, perfectius exprimitur aliquid cum dicitur datum quam donum; sed quod maioris est perfectionis magis proprie convenit Deo: ergo etc.

4. Item, quando aliqua duo dicuntur de aliquo, quorum unum est ratio dicendi alterum de eodem, illud convenientius dicitur, quod est ratio dicendi[^6]; sed datum et donum dicuntur de Spiritu sancto, et, ut vult Augustinus[^7], «eo donum dicitur, quia datur»: ergo magis proprie dicitur datum.

**Contra:**
1. Datum convenit Spiritui sancto solum

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ex tempore, sed donum aeternaliter: ergo magis proprie dicitur donum.

2. Item, si nunquam actu daretur, donum esset et spiritus esset: ergo videtur, quod magis proprie convenit ei donum[^8].

3. Item, Glossa super illud Iacobi primo[^9]: *Omne datum optimum* etc. dicit, quod «datum dicitur quoad naturalia, donum quoad gratuita». Si ergo gratuita aptius appropriantur Spiritui sancto, qui sanctificat, quam naturalia: ergo melius in divinis dicitur de Spiritu sancto donum quam datum.

4. Item, «donum est datio irreddibilis»[^10]; sed quidquid Deus dat, irreddibiliter dat, quia cum det, nihil potest recipere: ergo in divinis datum rationem habet doni et induit eius rationem: ergo convenientius ibi dicitur donum quam datum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Spiritus sanctus convenientius dicitur donum quam datum, quod duplici ratione probatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis in divinis utrumque dicatur, et datum et donum, tamen convenientius dicitur donum. Et huius duplex est ratio. Una quidem est, quia datum, cum sit vel[^11] participium vel nomen verbale, concernit tempus; donum autem a tempore subtrahit; et ideo, quia omnia divina[^12] supra tempus sunt, convenientius dicitur in divinis donum quam datum. Alia ratio est, quia donum supra rationem dati addit conditionem liberalitatis sive irreddibilitatis, quae est conditio magnae nobilitatis; et ideo maxime competit[^13] divinis. Et haec est ratio, quare donum appropriatur gratuitis donis, non tantum ipsi Spiritui sancto, qui est principium gratuitorum donorum.

**Ad 1.** Et ex hoc patet responsio ad illud de auctoritate beati Iacobi.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[^14] mobilis et moti eadem est ratio; dicendum, quod non est simile de mobili et moto, et de dono et dato: quia motum esse addit supra mobile actum[^15] et dicit totum, quod dicit mobile. Sed datum non dicit totum, quod dicit donum, quantum est de generali intellectu[^16] nominis, nisi approprietur; «donum enim est datio irreddibilis», et hoc melius patebit in quarto problemate.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus est perfectio potentiae; dicendum, quod aliquid est in potentia ad actum dupliciter: aut propter imperfectionem agentis, aut propter defectum suscipientis. Si sit potentia primo modo, tunc actus est perfectio potentiae; si autem secundo modo, non est perfectio[^17]. Unde si dicatur, quod sol actu lucens, potest domum illuminare, quae non est aperta, et domum apertam illuminat, nulla omnino maior notatur perfectio[^18] quam ante. Sic intelligendum est de donabilitate et actuali donatione.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[^19] datum est ratio dicendi donum, quia ideo donum, quia datur; dicendum, quod non est tota ratio, sicut dicitur in littera[^20], sed solum in comparatione ad eum cui datur. — Vel potest dici quantum a parte nostri intellectus: ideo donum dicitur, quia datur; sed tamen a parte veritatis[^21] rei est e converso, quia ideo datur, quia donum est.

english:
### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether it is more fittingly said of the Holy Spirit gift than given.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether it is more fittingly said of the Holy Spirit *gift* than *given*. And that *given* is said as fittingly as[^1] *gift*, it seems:

1. Because in James 1[^2]: *Every best gift and every perfect donation is from above*; therefore from the Holy Spirit things have been *given* just as also they are *gifts*[^3]: therefore just as the account of *gift* is transferred to him, so also that of *given*.

2. Likewise, of the movable and the moved there is the same account[^4]: therefore similarly of *given* and *donatable*: therefore if *gift* is said in the account of *donatable*, but *given* in the account of what is actually *given*, then the account of *gift* and of *given* is the same, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in any genus actuality is more perfect than potency[^5]: therefore since *given* expresses [something] in act, *gift* in potency, something is more perfectly expressed when it is called *given* than *gift*; but what is of greater perfection more properly belongs to God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when any two things are said of something, of which one is the reason for saying the other of the same, that one is more fittingly said which is the reason for saying[^6]; but *given* and *gift* are said of the Holy Spirit, and, as Augustine wills[^7], «He is called *gift* because he is given»: therefore *given* is more properly said.

**On the contrary:**
1. *Given* belongs to the Holy Spirit only from time, but *gift* eternally: therefore *gift* is more properly said.

2. Likewise, if he were never actually given, *gift* he would still be and *spirit* he would be: therefore it seems that *gift* more properly belongs to him[^8].

3. Likewise, the Gloss on that text of James 1[^9]: *Every best gift* etc. says, that «*given* is said with respect to natural [things], *gift* with respect to gratuitous [things]». If therefore gratuitous [things] are more aptly appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies, than natural [things]: therefore in divine [matters] it is better said of the Holy Spirit *gift* than *given*.

4. Likewise, «a *gift* is a donation that is not to be returned»[^10]; but whatever God gives, he gives irretrievably, because when he gives, he can receive nothing: therefore in divine [matters] *given* has the account of *gift* and takes on its account: therefore there it is more fittingly called *gift* than *given*.

### CONCLUSION.

> The Holy Spirit is more fittingly called *gift* than *given*, which is proven by a twofold reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that although in divine [matters] each is said, both *given* and *gift*, nevertheless *gift* is more fittingly said. And of this there is a twofold reason. One indeed is, because *given*, since it is either[^11] a participle or a verbal noun, concerns time; but *gift* withdraws from time; and therefore, since all divine [things][^12] are above time, *gift* is more fittingly said in divine [matters] than *given*. Another reason is, because *gift* adds beyond the account of *given* the condition of liberality or irretrievability, which is a condition of great nobility; and therefore it most belongs[^13] to divine [matters]. And this is the reason why *gift* is appropriated to gratuitous gifts, not only to the Holy Spirit himself, who is the principle of gratuitous gifts.

**To 1.** And from this is clear the response to that [argument] from the authority of blessed James.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that[^14] of the movable and the moved the account is the same; it must be said, that the case of the movable and the moved is not similar to that of *gift* and *given*: because to be moved adds beyond the movable an act[^15] and expresses the whole that the movable expresses. But *given* does not express the whole that *gift* expresses, as far as concerns the general meaning[^16] of the term, unless it be appropriated; «for a *gift* is a donation that is not to be returned», and this will appear better in the fourth problem.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that act is the perfection of potency; it must be said, that something is in potency to act in two ways: either on account of the imperfection of the agent, or on account of the defect of the recipient. If it be in potency in the first way, then act is the perfection of potency; but if in the second way, it is not a perfection[^17]. Hence if it be said that the sun, actually shining, can illuminate a house which is not open, and illuminates a house which is opened, no greater perfection at all[^18] is noted than before. Thus it must be understood concerning donatability and actual donation.

**To 4.** To that which is objected, that[^19] *given* is the reason for saying *gift*, because [it is] therefore *gift*, because it is given; it must be said, that this is not the whole reason, as it is said in the [Master's] text[^20], but only in comparison to him to whom it is given. — Or it can be said, as far as concerns our intellect: it is therefore called *gift* because it is given; but yet on the side of the truth[^21] of the matter it is the reverse, because it is therefore given because it is *gift*.

la: Cod. A *quam* loco *ut*.

en: Codex A [reads] *quam* in place of *ut*.

la: Vers. 17. — Paulo infra post *sancto* ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ita*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit.

en: Verse 17. — A little below, after *sancto*, from older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *ita*, which the Vatican edition with codex cc less well omits.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *dono*. Soon after, after *sic*, codex M adds *donum*.

la: B. Albert., hic a. 2. eandem propos. ita exhibet: *Mobilis et moti una ratio substantiae est, non differens nisi per actum et potentiam.* — Paulo post nonnulli codd. ut T V *dicit* pro *dicitur*. Dein Vat. cum cod. cc minus apte et praeter fidem aliorum codd. cum ed. 1 *actualitatis* pro *actualiter*.

en: Bl. Albert, here a. 2, presents the same proposition thus: *Of the movable and the moved there is one account of substance, not differing except by act and potency.* — A little after, several codices such as T, V [read] *dicit* for *dicitur*. Then the Vatican edition with codex cc, less aptly and contrary to the testimony of the other codices with edition 1, [reads] *actualitatis* for *actualiter*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IX. *Metaph.* text. 15. (VIII. c. 8.), ubi probatur, actum esse priorem substantia (i. e. perfectione) quam potentia.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 15 (VIII, c. 8), where it is proven that act is prior in substance (i.e., in perfection) to potency.

la: Simile est dictum Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2: *Propter quod est unumquodque, et illud magis.* Et II. *Metaph.* text. 4. (I. brev. c. 1.): *Unumquodque vero idipsum maxime aliorum est, secundum quod aliis univocatio inest.* — Mox fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *dicuntur* loco *dicitur*.

en: A similar saying of Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 2: *That on account of which each thing is, that itself [is so] more.* And *Metaphysics* II, text 4 (I, abbrev., c. 1): *But each thing is itself most of all of the others, according as univocity is in them.* — Soon after, on the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *dicuntur* in place of *dicitur*.

la: Libr. XV. *de Trin.* c. 19. n. 36; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Book XV, *On the Trinity*, c. 19, n. 36; see here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: In cod. I additur hic aliud argumentum: *Item* (donum) *dicit comparationem personae ad personam, datum vero personae ad creaturam; sed magis proprie comparatur persona ad personam quam persona ad creaturam: ergo convenientius dicitur donum de Spiritu sancto quam donum (datum).*

en: In codex I there is added here another argument: *Likewise, gift expresses a relation of person to person, but given of person to creature; but more properly is a person related to a person than a person to a creature: therefore it is more fittingly said gift of the Holy Spirit than gift (given).*

la: Vers. 17, apud Lyranum: *Datum refertur ad naturam, donum ad gratiam.*

en: Verse 17, in Lyra: *Given refers to nature, gift to grace.*

la: Aristot., IV. *Top.* c. 1. Vide supra q. 2. arg. 4. ad opp. — Mox cod. S *cum dat* loco *cum det*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 1. See above, q. 2, arg. 4 to the contrary. — Soon after, codex S [reads] *cum dat* in place of *cum det*.

la: Ex multis mss. ut AFGISTX etc. et ed. 1 adiecimus *vel*. Haec ratio explicatur verbis B. Alberti, hic a. 2: *Datum, quod est participium et consignificat tempus, similiter datio et donatio nomina sunt verbalia et ita actus temporales consignificantia, licet non consignificent tempus.*

en: From many manuscripts such as AFGISTX etc. and edition 1 we have added *vel*. This reason is explained in the words of Bl. Albert, here a. 2: *Given, which is a participle and co-signifies time, likewise donation and donating are verbal nouns and thus co-signify temporal acts, although they do not co-signify time.*

la: Multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *dona* pro *divina*, et ed. 1 *dona* loco *omnia*, sed minus apte, ut per se patet; error codicum forsan ex abbreviatione verbi *divina* ortus est. S. Thomas a. 2. allerens ait: *Inde est, quod donum competit magis divinis, quae sine tempore sunt, quam datum.* — Paulo ante codd. L O cum ed. 1 *abstrahit* loco *subtrahit*, quae lectio communi loquendi modo magis congruit.

en: Many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *dona* for *divina*, and edition 1 [reads] *dona* in place of *omnia*, but less aptly, as is clear of itself; the error of the codices perhaps arose from an abbreviation of the word *divina*. St. Thomas, alleging a. 2, says: *Hence it is that gift belongs more to divine [things], which are without time, than given.* — A little before, codices L, O with edition 1 [read] *abstrahit* in place of *subtrahit*, which reading is more congruent with the common manner of speaking.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut I W *convenit*.

en: Several codices such as I, W [read] *convenit*.

la: In pluribus mss. ut A T V et ed. 1 deest *quod*. Paulo infra plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. *donato* pro *dato*, quod minus congruit subnexis.

en: In several manuscripts such as A, T, V and edition 1, *quod* is missing. A little below, most manuscripts with the first six editions [read] *donato* for *dato*, which agrees less with what follows.

la: Multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *actum*, pluresque ut ACSVW aa bb dein cum edd. 3, 6 ponunt *motum* loco *mobile*; cod. cc vero cum ed. 2. habet *mobile motum*.

en: Many codices with edition 1 omit *actum*, and several such as ACSVW, aa, bb, then with editions 3, 6 put *motum* in place of *mobile*; codex cc, however, with edition 2 has *mobile motum*.

la: Cod. V *intentione*. Paulo infra cod. Z *sed* pro *et*.

en: Codex V [reads] *intentione*. A little below, codex Z [reads] *sed* for *et*.

la: In cod. V additur *potentiae*.

en: In codex V *potentiae* is added.

la: Aliqui codd. ut LOZ addunt bene *in sole*.

en: Some codices such as L, O, Z rightly add *in sole*.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quod*.

en: From most manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *quod*.

la: Cap. 2.

en: Chapter 2.

la: Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 omittit *veritatis*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *veritatis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio ad ult. servire potest ad magis illustrandam solutionem ad 3. Nos quidem res creatas ex donato seu actu donationis nominamus donum, sed hoc non valet de infinito et aeterno dono, quod est Spiritus sanctus, qui minime unquam est in potentia, ut sit donum, et dum donatur, non reducitur ad actum doni, sed tantum donati. Donatum autem, cum donatio fiat in tempore, est ratio tantum extrinseca doni aeterni.

**II.** In conclusione omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 64. m. 2. ad 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 38. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. I. ad. 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et duabus seqq. S. a. 61. q. 3. n. 19. 20, et q. 8. n. 9[?]. seqq.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution to the last [objection] can serve to illustrate further the solution to the third. We indeed name created things *gift* from the *given* or from the act of donation, but this does not hold of the infinite and eternal Gift, who is the Holy Spirit, who is by no means ever in potency to be a Gift, and while he is given, he is not reduced to the act of *gift*, but only of *given*. *Given*, however, since donation comes about in time, is only an extrinsic account of the eternal Gift.

**II.** In the conclusion all agree. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 64, m. 2, ad 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 38, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, little question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1, ad 2. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the two following, *Summa* a. 61, q. 3, nn. 19, 20, and q. 8, n. 9[?] ff.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO IV.

#### *Utrum donum sit nomen essentiale, an personale et proprium Spiritus sancti.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum donum *proprie* conveniat Spiritui sancto. Et quod sic videtur.

1. Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Sicut in Trinitate non est verbum nisi Filius, ita nec donum nisi Spiritus sanctus».

2. Item, donum dicit emanationem per modum liberalitatis; hoc autem est proprium solius Spiritus sancti: ergo etc.

3. Item, donum[^2] dicitur relative ad donantem; sed donans non tantum est Pater, immo etiam Filius, quia uterque est mittens: ergo donum dicitur relative ad Patrem et Filium: et si hoc, ergo[^3] distinguitur ab utroque: ergo nec Pater nec Filius, sed solum Spiritus sanctus dicitur proprie donum.

**Contra:** 1. Donum dicitur in habitu, sed datum dicitur in actu, ergo datum addit supra donum: ergo cui convenit esse datum convenit[^4] et ratio doni. Sed datum convenit toti Trinitati, quia tota Trinitas dat se, ergo et donum: non ergo proprie Spiritui sancto.

2. Item, donum dicit respectum ad dantem et ad eum cui datur: si ergo est proprium Spiritus sancti, aut propter respectum ad *dantem*, aut[^5] *recipientem*. Non propter respectum ad *recipientem*, quia similiter Filius datus est nobis[^6], et magis etiam datus quam Spiritus sanctus. Si vero ad *dantem*; *contra*: Filius dicitur procedere a dante, scilicet a Patre: ergo videtur secundum communem[^7] rationem Filio convenire. *Si dicas*, quod Filius non procedit per modum donabilis, neque «quomodo datus est, sed quomodo natus[^8]»; *contra*: Filius sic ab aeterno processit, ut temporaliter esset missibilis, quia «eo mittitur Filius, quo generatur[^9]»; sed missio non est aliud quam donatio: ergo Filius processit ut donabilis.

3. Item, si datus est Filius ex tempore, aut erat ad hoc habilis ab aeterno, aut non. Si sic: ergo processit ut donabilis; si non: ergo aliquid convenit ex tempore Filio, quod repugnat aeternae emanationi, quod est inconveniens.

4. Item, regula est, quod omne nomen dicens respectum vel effectum ad creaturas est commune tribus[^10]; sed donum est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Donum est nomen personale et proprium Spiritus sancti; datum vero potest dici et essentialiter de tribus personis, et personaliter de Filio et Spiritu sancto, et proprie de Spiritu sancto.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut patet ex verbis Augustini, donum dicitur in divinis proprie sive personaliter, non essentialiter, sicut verbum proprie dicitur de Filio; datum autem potest accipi et essentialiter et personaliter, sive proprie et communiter. Tota enim Trinitas dat se, et tamen Pater et Filius proprie dant Spiritum sanctum[^11].

Propter hoc notandum, quod datum de sui ratione idem est quod communicatum. Potest igitur hoc quod est *datum* dici communicatum ex liberalitate[^12], et sic commune est toti Trinitati; vel ex liberalitate et auctoritate, et sic convenit Spiritui sancto et Filio, qui habent subauctoritatem respectu Patris; vel potest dici *datum* ex liberalitate et auctoritate non tantum communicatum, sed etiam productum, et hoc modo proprium est Spiritus sancti, cuius proprium est procedere secundum rationem liberalitatis, et ita secundum rationem doni vel donabilis. Et hoc modo *donum* et[^13] *datum* aequivalent; differunt tamen, quia *datum* dicit communicationem in actu, sed *donum* in habitu. Et ita[^14] concedendum est, quod *donum* proprie dicitur in divinis de Spiritu sancto.

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**Ad 1.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *datum* addit supra *donum*: dicendum, quod secundum communem acceptionem *dati* et *doni*, *donum* aliquid dicit ultra quam *datum*, et *datum* ultra quam *donum*. *Donum*[^15] ultra quam *datum* importat emanationem per modum liberalitatis; *datum* vero ultra quam *donum* importat actum communicationis, quia *donum* dicit habitum. Et ideo, quia illud quod addit *donum* supra *datum*, est personale, ideo *donum* proprie[^16] est personae Spiritus sancti.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod quaeritur, ratione cuius respectus dicatur *donum* proprie: iam patet responsio[^17], quia ratione respectus ad *dantem*, non inquam ratione respectus simpliciter, sed ratione talis respectus, quia emanat per modum donabilis, quod est proprium Spiritus sancti.

**Ad 3.** Quod ergo obiicitur, quod emanat per modum donabilis Filius; dicendum, quod falsum est. Quamvis enim donabilitas sive liberalitas communicetur Filii generationi[^18], non tamen est ratio emanandi; et quia communicatur aeternaliter, ideo datur temporaliter; sed quia non est ratio emanandi, ideo non emanat Filius ut donum, sed solum Spiritus sanctus.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de respectu ad creaturam[^19], dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de illo nomine, quod importat solum respectum ad creaturam, non personae ad personam; donum autem utrumque importat; ideo non habet hic illa[^20] regula locum.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Quaestionis est, utrum hoc nomen *donum* in genere conveniat Spiritui sancto, sed *sub qua collatione* ipsi conveniat, utrum scilicet sit nomen *personale* sive proprietas personae, an *essentiale*. — Ut solutio melius intelligatur, sciendum est, in dono divino duos respectus notari, alterum cum relatione reali ad *dantem*, alterum cum relatione rationis ad eum *cui datur*. Respectus ad *dantem*, id est Patrem et Filium, importat, ut Spiritus sanctus emanet per modum *donabilis*; et ratione huius respectus nomen *doni* est *proprium* sive *personale*. Nam recte observat Richard. a Med. (loc. infra cit.): «Donum, prout accipitur in divinis, est res procedens, cui ex suo modo procedendi convenit prima ratio doni. Prima namque ratio doni *amor* est... Proprium autem Spiritui sancto est, quod procedat ut amor». Altera ratio importat respectum rationis *ad creaturas*. — Nec tamen, ut bene observat S. Thomas (S. I. q. 38. a. 1. ad 4.) per hoc, quod in dono importatur respectus ad creaturam, oportet, quod sit essentiale, sed quod aliquid essentiale in suo intellectu includatur, sicut essentia includitur in intellectu personae».

**II.** Antiqui magistri hic cum Scriptura concordant, excepto Durando, qui singularem viam tenens docet, hoc nomen Spiritui sancto tantum appropriari, quod bene reprobat Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.). — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 64. m. 1. — Scot. de hac et seqq. in utroque scripto hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1, 2; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 2. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 1.

---

english:
### QUESTION IV.

#### *Whether 'gift' is an essential name, or personal and proper to the Holy Spirit.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether *gift* properly belongs to the Holy Spirit. And that it does, it seems:

1. Augustine, *On the Trinity* book fifteen[^1]: «Just as in the Trinity there is no *Word* except the Son, so neither is there a *Gift* except the Holy Spirit».

2. Likewise, *gift* expresses an emanation by mode of liberality; but this is proper to the Holy Spirit alone: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, *gift*[^2] is said relatively to the giver; but the giver is not only the Father, but also the Son, since each is one who sends: therefore *gift* is said relatively to the Father and to the Son: and if so, then[^3] it is distinguished from each: therefore neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Holy Spirit, is properly called *gift*.

**On the contrary:** 1. *Gift* is said in habit, but *given* is said in act, therefore *given* adds beyond *gift*: therefore to that to which *given* belongs, the account of *gift* also belongs[^4]. But *given* belongs to the whole Trinity, since the whole Trinity gives itself, therefore so does *gift*: therefore not properly to the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, *gift* expresses a relation to the giver and to him to whom it is given: if therefore it is proper to the Holy Spirit, [it is so] either on account of the relation to the *giver*, or[^5] to the *recipient*. Not on account of the relation to the *recipient*, since the Son likewise has been given to us[^6], and indeed has been given even more than the Holy Spirit. But if [on account of the relation] to the *giver*; on the contrary: the Son is said to proceed from a giver, namely from the Father: therefore by a common[^7] account he seems to belong to the Son. *If you say* that the Son does not proceed by mode of *donatable*, nor «in the manner in which he was given, but in the manner in which he was born[^8]»; on the contrary: the Son so proceeded from eternity that he should be missible in time, since «by that by which the Son is begotten, by that he is sent[^9]»; but mission is nothing other than donation: therefore the Son proceeded as donatable.

3. Likewise, if the Son is given in time, either he was apt for this from eternity, or not. If so: therefore he proceeded as donatable; if not: therefore something belongs to the Son in time which is repugnant to the eternal emanation, which is inconvenient.

4. Likewise, it is a rule that every name expressing a relation or effect to creatures is common to the three[^10]; but *gift* is of this kind: therefore etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> *Gift is a personal name and proper to the Holy Spirit; but* given *can be said both essentially of the three persons, and personally of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and properly of the Holy Spirit.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is plain from the words of Augustine, *gift* is said in divine [matters] properly or personally, not essentially, just as *Word* is said properly of the Son; but *given* can be taken both essentially and personally, that is to say, properly and commonly. For the whole Trinity gives itself, and yet the Father and the Son properly give the Holy Spirit[^11].

On account of this it must be noted that *given*, by its account, is the same as *communicated*. Therefore this which is *given* can be called communicated out of liberality[^12], and thus is common to the whole Trinity; or out of liberality and authority, and thus belongs to the Holy Spirit and to the Son, who have sub-authority with respect to the Father; or *given* can be called not only communicated but also produced out of liberality and authority, and in this mode it is proper to the Holy Spirit, whose property is to proceed according to the account of liberality, and thus according to the account of *gift* or *donatable*. And in this mode *gift* and[^13] *given* are equivalent; they differ, however, in that *given* expresses communication in act, but *gift* in habit. And thus[^14] it must be conceded that *gift* is said properly in divine [matters] of the Holy Spirit.

**To 1.** To that which is objected, that *given* adds beyond *gift*: it must be said that, according to the common acceptation of *given* and *gift*, *gift* expresses something beyond *given*, and *given* something beyond *gift*. *Gift*[^15] beyond *given* implies an emanation by mode of liberality; but *given* beyond *gift* implies an act of communication, since *gift* expresses habit. And therefore, since that which *gift* adds beyond *given* is personal, therefore *gift* properly[^16] belongs to the person of the Holy Spirit.

**To 2.** To that which is asked, by reason of which relation *gift* is properly said: the response[^17] is now plain, because [it is so said] by reason of the relation to the *giver*, not, I say, by reason of the relation simply, but by reason of such a relation, since [the Spirit] emanates by mode of *donatable*, which is proper to the Holy Spirit.

**To 3.** As to what is objected, that the Son emanates by mode of *donatable*; it must be said that this is false. For although donatability or liberality is communicated to the Son in his generation[^18], yet it is not the reason of his emanating; and because it is communicated eternally, therefore he is given in time; but because it is not the reason of his emanating, therefore the Son does not emanate as *gift*, but only the Holy Spirit.

**To 4.** To what is lastly objected concerning relation to the creature[^19], it must be said that this is to be understood of that name which implies only a relation to the creature, not [a relation] of person to person; but *gift* implies both; therefore that rule does not have a place here[^20].

la: Cap. 17. n. 29: *Et tamen non frustra in hac Trinitate non dicitur verbum Dei nisi Filius, nec donum Dei nisi Spiritus sanctus.*

en: Chapter 17, n. 29: *And yet not without reason in this Trinity is the Word of God said only of the Son, nor the Gift of God only of the Holy Spirit.*

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *Dei*.

en: On the authority of older manuscripts and edition 1 we have here expunged the added *Dei*.

la: In Vat. deest *ergo*, quod tamen in plurimis mss. habetur.

en: In the Vatican edition *ergo* is missing, which however is found in most manuscripts.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *convenit* et mox *toti*.

en: From older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *convenit* and, soon after, *toti*.

la: In nonnullis mss. ut HK MU et ed. 1 repetitur *ad*.

en: In several manuscripts such as HK, MU, and edition 1, *ad* is repeated.

la: Isai. 9, 6. — Paulo infra post *Spiritus* ex aliquibus mss. ut H K V X adiecimus *sanctus*.

en: Isaiah 9:6. — A little below, after *Spiritus*, from some manuscripts such as H, K, V, X we have added *sanctus*.

la: Ed. 1 cum cod. Z *omnem* loco *communem*. Mox cod. X *procedat* loco *procedit*, ubi in codd. LO additur *ab aeterno*.

en: Edition 1, with codex Z, [reads] *omnem* in place of *communem*. Soon after, codex X [reads] *procedat* in place of *procedit*, where in codices L, O *ab aeterno* is added.

la: August., V. *de Trin.* c. 14. n. 15. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc *procedit* loco *processit*, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, c. 14, n. 15. — Soon after, the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *procedit* in place of *processit*, but against the other codices and edition 1.

la: Est Gregorii; vide supra pag. 261. nota 1.

en: It is from Gregory; see above page 261, note 1.

la: Codd. O Z adiungunt: *quia quidquid facit una persona, et omnes; indivisa enim sunt opera Trinitatis. Similiter in quacumque habitudine se habet una persona, et omnes; ut in una persona Dominus, et omnes; in una refugium, et omnes.*

en: Codices O and Z add: *because whatever one person does, all do; for the works of the Trinity are undivided. Likewise in whatever relation one person stands, all do; as in one person Lord, [so] all; in one refuge, [so] all.*

la: Vide supra d. 13. p. I. q. 4.

en: See above d. 13, p. I, q. 4.

la: In cod. O additur *sola*, qui et mox loco *convenit* habet *est commune tantum*. Aliqui codd. ut FHXZ in secundo disiunctionis membro et cod. T etiam in tertio *subauctoritate* pro *auctoritate*, sed incongrue; nam utraque persona, licet se ipsam det ex liberalitate, a Patre datur ex auctoritate, non subauctoritate; unde *datum* (in sensu passivo) utrique convenit, quia auctoritas Patris dat Filium et Spiritum sanctum.

en: In codex O *sola* is added, which [codex] also soon after, in place of *convenit*, has *est commune tantum*. Some codices such as FHXZ in the second member of the disjunction, and codex T also in the third, [read] *subauctoritate* in place of *auctoritate*, but incongruously; for each person, although he gives himself out of liberality, is given by the Father out of authority, not sub-authority; whence *given* (in the passive sense) belongs to each, since the authority of the Father gives the Son and the Holy Spirit.

la: Plurimi codd. cum Vat. minus apte *vel*; cod. H cum ed. 1 exhibet lectionem a nobis receptam.

en: Most codices with the Vatican edition less aptly [read] *vel*; codex H with edition 1 exhibits the reading received by us.

la: Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ita*.

en: From older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *ita*.

la: Cod. I addit *enim*. Mox cod. W *dicit* loco *importat*.

en: Codex I adds *enim*. Soon after, codex W [reads] *dicit* in place of *importat*.

la: Ed. V *proprium*.

en: Edition V [reads] *proprium*.

la: In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *responsio*.

en: In most manuscripts and edition 1, *responsio* is missing.

la: Aliqui codd. ut T aa etc. et ed. 1 *concomitetur Filii generationem*, qui et paulo infra ponunt *concomitatur* loco *communicatur*. Vat. *commuvicetur Filio in generatione*[?]; alii codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *communicetur Filii generationi*. In fine responsionis fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *emanat* pro *emanavit*. Dein aliqui codd. ut I S aa cum ed. 1 *solus* loco *solum*.

en: Some codices such as T, aa etc. and edition 1 [read] *concomitetur Filii generationem*, which [codices] also a little below put *concomitatur* in place of *communicatur*. The Vatican edition [reads] *commuvicetur Filio in generatione*[?]; other codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *communicetur Filii generationi*. At the end of the response, on the authority of older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *emanat* for *emanavit*. Then some codices such as I, S, aa with edition 1 [read] *solus* in place of *solum*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut S Z hic *creaturas*, quod etiam multo plures codd. cum ed. 1 paulo infra loco *creaturam* exhibent.

en: Some codices such as S, Z [read] here *creaturas*, which also many more codices with edition 1 a little below exhibit in place of *creaturam*.

la: Codd. sunt inter se divisi: alii ut F G K M V Z omittunt *illa*, alii cum Vat. et ed. 1 ponunt *haec* pro *hic illa*, alii ut T et quidem melius praestant lectionem in textum receptam.

en: The codices are divided among themselves: some such as F, G, K, M, V, Z omit *illa*; others with the Vatican edition and edition 1 put *haec* in place of *hic illa*; others such as T, and indeed better, present the reading received in the text.

english_scholion:
**I.** The question is not whether this name *gift* in general belongs to the Holy Spirit, but *under what relation* it belongs to him, namely whether it is a *personal* name or property of a person, or *essential*. — That the solution may be better understood, it must be known that in the divine Gift two relations are noted: one with a real relation to the *giver*, the other with a relation of reason to him *to whom it is given*. The relation to the *giver*, that is to the Father and the Son, implies that the Holy Spirit emanates by mode of *donatable*; and by reason of this relation the name *gift* is *proper* or *personal*. For Richard of Mediavilla rightly observes (in the place cited below): «*Gift*, as it is taken in divine [matters], is a thing proceeding, to which by reason of its mode of proceeding belongs the first account of *gift*. For the first account of *gift* is *love*... But it is proper to the Holy Spirit, that he proceeds as *love*». The other relation implies a relation of reason *to creatures*. — Yet, as St. Thomas well observes (*Summa* I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 4), it is not the case that, by the fact that in *gift* a relation to the creature is implied, it must be essential, but [only] that something essential is included in its meaning, just as essence is included in the meaning of person.

**II.** The ancient masters here agree with Scripture, with the exception of Durandus, who, holding a singular path, teaches that this name is only appropriated to the Holy Spirit, which Dionysius Carthusianus rightly rejects (here q. 2). — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 64, m. 1. — Scotus, on this and the following [questions] in both writings here, q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 2; *Summa* in the place cited. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; *Summa* p. tr. 8, q. 36, m. 2, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, little question 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here, prologue q. 1. — On this and the following question, Durandus, here q. 1.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 5

title_alt: Whether 'gift' is a distinctive property of the Holy Spirit

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO V.

#### *Utrum donum sive donabilitas sit proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum donabilitas sive donum sit proprietas distinctiva personae[^1] Spiritus sancti. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Dicit enim[^2] Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Eo est donum, quo spiritus»; sed spiritus est proprietas distinctiva: ergo et donum.

2. Item, Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate*[^4], assignans differentiam processionis Filii et Spiritus sancti, hanc ponit, quod ille procedit per modum nati, sed iste per modum doni; ergo si haec differentia attenditur penes proprietates distinctivas, ut patet, quia nativitas est proprietas Filii: ergo et donabilitas sive donum est proprietas Spiritus sancti.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur[^5] ratione, quia omnis proprietas, secundum quam persona differt ab omnibus aliis, est personae proprietas distinctiva: sed donum inest soli personae[^6] Spiritus sancti et semper[^7]: ergo est proprietas eius personalis[^8].

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4. Item, proprietates in divinis sunt relationes; sed Augustinus dicit in quinto *de Trinitate*[^9], quod «relatio, secundum quam refertur Spiritus sanctus[^10] ad Patrem et Filium, magis apparet in hoc nomine *donum* quam in hoc nomine *spiritus*»: ergo utraque est personalis.

**Contra:**

1. Nihil dicens respectum ad creaturas est proprietas distinctiva personae, quia, omni respectu ad creaturam circumscripto, tenet distinctio personalis; sed donum dicit respectum ad eum cui datur: ergo etc. Si dicebat[^11], quod non est proprietas secundum comparationem, quam habet ad creaturas, sed ad dantem: pari ratione missio Spiritus sancti[^12] erit proprietas distinctiva, cum dicat respectum ad mittentem.

2. Item, omnis proprietas distinctiva dicitur ab actu, non ab habitu. Unde Pater dicitur, quia generat, Filius, quia generatur, Spiritus vero sanctus, quia spiratur; sed donum non dicitur ab actu donandi, sed ab habitu, alioquin non diceretur ab aeterno[^13]: ergo etc.

3. Item, nullius alterius personae proprietas distinctiva accipitur in relatione ad creaturas[^14] vel dicit respectum; sed donum dicit hoc: ergo non est proprietas distinctiva.

4. Item, si donum est proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti et eius notio, tunc ergo *spiritus sanctus* et *amor* non est proprietas: quodsi[^15] *spiritus sanctus* et *amor* est proprietas, ergo sunt septem notiones, quod est contra communem opinionem omnium. Si dicas, quod eadem notio[^16] importatur per haec tria nomina, ergo videntur nomina synonyma, ut Marcus, Tullius, quod aeque magnum inconveniens est: ergo etc.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Donum est proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti secundum*[^17] *respectum ad dantem, quin tamen excludatur ratio donabilitatis sive respectus secundum aptitudinem ad eum cui datur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod donum dupliciter est in divinis considerare: uno modo, prout dicit respectum solum ad donatorem; et hoc modo dicit Augustinus[^18], quod «eo dicitur donum, quo procedit»; et sic dicunt, quod donum est proprietas distinctiva Spiritus sancti. Alio modo accipitur[^19] donum, prout dicit respectum ad eum cui datur: et sic non dicit proprietatem distinctivam, sed consequens ad proprietatem distinctivam.

Sed illud non videtur posse stare. Nam donum semper aliquam comparationem dicit ad eum cui datur; intellecto enim, quod non sit donabilis alicui, impossibile est intelligere, quod sit donum.

Et propter hoc aliter dicendum, sicut prius tactum est[^20], quod donum praeter respectum, quem importat ad dantem, importat respectum ad eum cui datur. Sed hoc potest esse tripliciter: vel secundum actum, ut quia datus[^21]; vel secundum habitum, ut quia dandus; vel secundum aptitudinem, ut quia donabilis. Et iste respectus[^22] adeo coniunctus est primo, ut primus sine hoc non possit esse nec intelligi, immo de necessitate sequitur, si procedit per modum doni, quod sit donabilis: et ideo sequens respectus non aufert primo, quin sit proprietas distinctiva[^23]. Dicendum ergo, quod est proprietas distinctiva ratione primi respectus, secundo respectu non repugnante, sed consonante.

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**Ad 1.** Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum, quia ille respectus talis est, quod non potest circumscribi secundum aptitudinem ob emanationem per modum liberalitatis. Et patet quod non est simile de missione, quia dicit respectum secundum actum, non secundum aptitudinem.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas distinctiva debet dicere actum; dicendum, quod donum dicit duplicem respectum[^24], et ratione huius dicit comparationem ad duplicem actum. Ratione primi respectus dicit actum processionis, ratione secundi dicit actum communicationis. Primum actum importat in actu, secundum in habitu; et ratione primi est proprietas distinctiva, non ratione secundi.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in alia persona hoc non est; respondent[^25] quidam, quod Spiritus sanctus est tertia persona; ideo nobis secundum rationem intelligendi immediatior, et ideo proprietas eius sumitur in comparatione ad nos, non sic in aliis.

Aliter potest solvi per interemptionem, quia, sicut donum respectum dicit ad creaturas, ita et alia[^26] haec proprietas, quae est *verbum*, ut infra patebit[^27].

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de pluralitate notionum; dicendum, quod *spiritus*, *amor* et *donum* eandem proprietatem dicunt, ratione differentem. Eandem, inquam, notionem dicunt, quia dicunt comparationem ad idem et dicunt eandem emanationem, sed tamen differenter eam nominant. Nam *spiritus* dicit eam principaliter per comparationem ad vim producentem, quae est vis spirativa; *amor* principaliter quantum ad modum emanandi, quia ut nexus; *donum* vero quantum ad respectum[^28] consequentem. Et similiter emanationem Verbi contingit tripliciter significare, scilicet per hoc nomen *filius*, *imago* et *verbum*. Quia enim[^29] a vi naturae, *filius*; quia per modum expressum, *imago*; quia aliis expressivum, ideo *verbum*. Similiter, quia a vi spirativa, *spiritus*; quia per modum nexus, *amor*; quia nos natus connectere, *donum*. Et sic patet, quod una est notio aliter et aliter nominata secundum rationes consequentes[^30], ideo non est ibi synonymia.

english:
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### QUESTION V.

#### *Whether gift, or donability, is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether donability or *gift* is the distinctive property of the person[^1] of the Holy Spirit. And that it is, it seems.

1. For Augustine says[^2], in *On the Trinity* V[^3]: «He is *Gift* by that by which He is *Spirit*»; but *spirit* is a distinctive property: therefore also *gift*.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* V[^4], assigning the difference between the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, sets down this, that the former proceeds in the manner of one born, but the latter in the manner of *gift*; therefore if this difference is reckoned in terms of distinctive properties, as is plain, since *nativity* is the property of the Son: therefore also *donability* or *gift* is the property of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow][^5] by reason, because every property according to which a person differs from all others is the distinctive property of that person: but *gift* belongs to the person[^6] of the Holy Spirit alone and always[^7]: therefore it is His personal property[^8].

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4. Likewise, properties in divine [matters] are relations; but Augustine says, in *On the Trinity* V[^9], that «the relation according to which the Holy Spirit[^10] is referred to the Father and the Son appears more in this name *gift* than in this name *spirit*»: therefore each is personal.

**On the contrary:**

1. Nothing expressing a relation to creatures is a distinctive property of a person, because, every relation to creature being set aside, the personal distinction [still] holds; but *gift* expresses a relation to him to whom it is given: therefore etc. If he were saying[^11], that it is not a property according to the comparison which it has to creatures, but to the giver: by parity of reason the *mission* of the Holy Spirit[^12] would be a distinctive property, since it expresses a relation to the sender.

2. Likewise, every distinctive property is named from an act, not from a habit. Hence the Father is so called because He generates, the Son because He is generated, the Holy Spirit indeed because He is breathed; but *gift* is not named from the act of giving, but from a habit, otherwise He would not be called [Gift] from eternity[^13]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the distinctive property of no other person is taken in relation to creatures[^14] or expresses a relation; but *gift* expresses this: therefore it is not a distinctive property.

4. Likewise, if *gift* is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit and His notion, then therefore *holy spirit* and *love* is not a property: but if[^15] *holy spirit* and *love* is a property, then there are seven notions, which is contrary to the common opinion of all. If you say that the same notion[^16] is conveyed by these three names, then the names appear synonymous, like *Marcus*, *Tullius*, which is an equally great absurdity: therefore etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> *Gift is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit according to*[^17] *the relation to the giver, without however the account of donability or relation according to aptitude toward him to whom it is given being excluded.*

**I respond:** It must be said that on this matter some have said that *gift* in divine [matters] is to be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as it expresses a relation to the giver alone; and in this way Augustine says[^18] that «He is therefore called *gift* because He proceeds»; and so they say that *gift* is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit. In another way *gift* is taken[^19] insofar as it expresses a relation to him to whom it is given: and thus it does not express a distinctive property, but [something] consequent upon a distinctive property.

But that does not seem able to stand. For *gift* always expresses some comparison to him to whom it is given; for, given the understanding that He is not donatable to anyone, it is impossible to understand that He is *gift*.

And on account of this it must be said otherwise, as was touched upon before[^20], that *gift*, beyond the relation which it conveys to the giver, conveys a relation to him to whom it is given. But this can be in three ways: either according to *act*, as because [He has been] given[^21]; or according to *habit*, as because [He is] to be given; or according to *aptitude*, as because [He is] *donatable*. And this [last] relation[^22] is so joined to the first that the first cannot exist nor be understood without it; rather, of necessity it follows, if He proceeds in the manner of *gift*, that He is donatable: and therefore the consequent relation does not take from the first that it be a distinctive property[^23]. It must be said, therefore, that it is a distinctive property by reason of the first relation, the second relation not opposing but consonant.

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**To 1.** From this is plain the response to the first, because that relation is such that it cannot be set aside as to aptitude, on account of the emanation by way of liberality. And it is plain that the case is not similar concerning *mission*, because it expresses a relation according to *act*, not according to *aptitude*.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that a distinctive property must express an act; it must be said, that *gift* expresses a twofold relation[^24], and by reason of this expresses a comparison to a twofold act. By reason of the first relation it expresses the act of *procession*, by reason of the second it expresses the act of *communication*. The first act it conveys *in act*, the second *in habit*; and by reason of the first it is a distinctive property, not by reason of the second.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that in another person this is not [the case]; some respond[^25], that the Holy Spirit is the third person; therefore [He is] more immediate to us according to the manner of understanding, and therefore His property is taken in comparison to us, not so in the others.

It can otherwise be solved by *interemption* [refutation], because, just as *gift* expresses a relation to creatures, so also[^26] this other property, which is *Word*, as will appear below[^27].

**To 4.** To that which is objected concerning the plurality of notions; it must be said, that *spirit*, *love* and *gift* express the same property, differing in account. They express the same notion, I say, because they express a comparison to the same [thing] and express the same emanation, but yet they name it differently. For *spirit* expresses it principally through comparison to the producing power, which is the spirative power; *love* principally as to the manner of emanating, because [it is] as a bond; but *gift* as to the consequent relation[^28]. And similarly the emanation of the Word it happens to signify in three ways, namely through this name *son*, *image*, and *word*. For because[^29] from the power of nature, *son*; because in an *expressed* manner, *image*; because *expressive* of others, therefore *word*. Similarly, because from the spirative power, *spirit*; because in the manner of a bond, *love*; because born to connect us, *gift*. And so it is plain, that one is the notion otherwise and otherwise named according to the consequent accounts[^30], therefore there is no synonymity here.

la: Cod. I addit *enim*. Mox cod. W *istud* loco *importat*. — Vat. propriam.

en: Codex I adds *enim*. Soon after, codex W [reads] *istud* in place of *importat*. — The Vatican edition [reads] *propriam*.

la: Vat. *propriam*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *propriam*.

la: Vat. cum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *personae*.

en: The Vatican edition with the manuscripts and edition 1 omits *personae*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut T aa etc. et ed. 1 *enuntiabitur Filii generationem*, qui et paulo infra ponunt *communicabitur* loco *communicatur*; Vat. *communicabitur Filio in operatione*, alii codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *communicabitur Filii generationi*. In hac responsionis fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *emanat* pro *emanavit*. Dein aliqui codd. ut I S et ed. 1 differentia insinuatur. — Paulo infra in multis mss. *tantum* loco *solum*.

en: Some codices such as T, aa etc. and edition 1 [read] *enuntiabitur Filii generationem*, and a little below put *communicabitur* in place of *communicatur*; the Vatican [reads] *communicabitur Filio in operatione*, other codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *communicabitur Filii generationi*. In this response, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *emanat* for *emanavit*. Then some codices such as I, S and edition 1 [read] differentia insinuatur. — A little below in many manuscripts *tantum* in place of *solum*.

la: Cap. 11, 12 et IV. c. 20. n. 29, Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 2, ex quo haec verba sumpta sunt.

en: Chs. 11, 12, and IV, c. 20, n. 29; see here the text of the Master, c. 2, from which these words are taken.

la: Cap. 11, et 14, et 16; cfr. hic lit. Magistri c. 3, in princ. — Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 decimo loco quinto.

en: Cc. 11, and 14, and 16; cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, in the beginning. — Some codices with edition 1 [read] *decimo* in place of *quinto*.

en: Some codices such as S, Z here [read] *creaturas*, which also many more codices with edition 1 a little below exhibit in place of *creaturam*.

la: Codd. sunt inter se divisi; alii ut F G K M V Z omittunt *illa*, alii cum Vat. et ed. 1 ponunt *haec* pro *hic illa*, alii ut S. Bonac. — Tom. 1.

en: The codices are divided among themselves; some such as F, G, K, M, V, Z omit *illa*; others with the Vatican and edition 1 put *haec* for *hic illa*; others as Tom. I of S. Bonaventure.

la: Cod. V *ostenditur*. Paulo infra cod. A *distinguitur* loco *differt*.

en: Codex V [reads] *ostenditur*. A little below codex A reads *distinguitur* in place of *differt*.

la: In hoc argumento secundum illud enuntiari, quod proprietas rei est distinctivum ipsius, et vice versa, promiscue adhibemus termini *proprietas*, *secundum quam persona differt ab omnibus aliis*, et *inest soli personae et semper* (cfr. Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. de Proprio), ac *proprietas personae distinctiva* et *proprietas personalis*, ideoque a parte rei ipsum argumentum ex pluribus contractum exhibetur. Vel dic, quod loco minoris iuxta formam syllogisticam ponendae; *sed donum est proprietas, secundum quam persona Spiritus sancti differt ab omnibus aliis*, ponitur ratio ipsius.

en: In this argument, according to that statement, that the property of a thing is the distinctive of itself, and vice versa, we apply indiscriminately the terms *property*, *according to which a person differs from all others*, and *belongs to the person alone and always* (cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. on the Proper), and *distinctive property of a person* and *personal property*; and therefore on the side of the thing itself the argument is presented as contracted from several. Or say that, in the place of the minor [premise] which would be set down in syllogistic form — *but gift is the property according to which the person of the Holy Spirit differs from all others* — there is set down its reason.

la: Cod. A addit *sanctus*; cod. O autem *ergo hoc nomen donum magis dicit proprietatem distinctivam quam hoc nomen spiritus sanctus*.

en: Codex A adds *sanctus*; codex O however [reads] *therefore this name gift more expresses the distinctive property than this name holy spirit*.

la: In Vat. deest *Spiritus sancti*, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 invenitur.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *Spiritus sancti* is missing, which however is found in the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Ed. 1 *aeternaliter* pro *ab aeterno*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *aeternaliter* for *ab aeterno*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *creaturam*. Mox post *respectum* supple cum cod. B (in margine) *ad creaturas*. In fine argumenti codd. L O addunt *Spiritus sancti*, certe subaudiendum.

en: The Vatican, against the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *creaturam*. Soon after *respectum* supply with codex B (in the margin) *ad creaturas*. At the end of the argument codices L, O add *Spiritus sancti*, certainly to be understood.

la: Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. *quia*.

en: Thus most codices with edition 1; Vatican [reads] *quia*.

la: Ex pluribus mss. ut T H M Q T Z supplevimus *notio*, pro quo cod. O habet *proprietas*, alii autem codd. cum ed. 1, verbis incongrue transpositis, *quod eadem importantur nomina per haec tria*. Paulo infra post *Marcus* ope mss. et sex primarum edd. expunximus *et*.

en: From several manuscripts such as T, H, M, Q, T, Z we have supplied *notio*, in place of which codex O has *proprietas*, but other codices with edition 1, with the words incongruously transposed, [read] *quod eadem importantur nomina per haec tria*. A little below, after *Marcus*, by aid of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have expunged *et*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* c. 20. n. 29, et V. c. 11. n. 12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Book IV, *On the Trinity*, c. 20, n. 29, and Book V, c. 11, n. 12. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican with some manuscripts [reads] *dicitur*.

la: Hic q. 2.

en: Here q. 2.

la: Subintellige hic et in sequentibus distinctionis membris: *Spiritus sanctus*. — Vat., referendo participia ad *donum*, praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 ponit *datum*, *dandum*, *donabile*.

en: Understand here and in the following members of the distinction: *the Holy Spirit*. — The Vatican, referring the participles to *donum*, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, puts *datum*, *dandum*, *donabile*.

la: Id est tertius modus secundi respectus. — Mox post *primo* ed. 1 explicative addit *scilicet qui est ad dantem*, et cod. T in margine *qui est per respectum ad dantem*. Mox plures codd. ut M I K UU V post *primus* perperam adiungunt *ita quod*. Item plures mss. ut C F G H K S V Z habent *nec* pro *non*, et paulo infra cod. V *qui* loco *si*.

en: That is, the third mode of the second relation. — Soon after *primo* edition 1 explicatively adds *namely the one which is toward the giver*, and codex T in the margin *which is by relation to the giver*. Soon after, several codices such as M, I, K, UU, V after *primus* wrongly add *ita quod*. Likewise several manuscripts such as C, F, G, H, K, S, V, Z have *nec* for *non*, and a little below codex V [reads] *qui* in place of *si*.

la: In cod. R additur *ratione primi respectus*. Mox aliqui codd. ut H P Q Y *Unde dicendum* pro *Dicendum ergo*. Paulo infra mendum Vat. ponentis *respectui* pro *respectu* correximus fide mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.

en: In codex R is added *by reason of the first relation*. Soon after some codices such as H, P, Q, Y [read] *Unde dicendum* for *Dicendum ergo*. A little below we have corrected the error of the Vatican which puts *respectui* for *respectu*, on the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.

la: In cod. T adiungitur *scilicet ad dantem et ad recipientem*.

en: In codex T is added *namely to the giver and to the receiver*.

la: Vat., reluctantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, *respondet*. Paulo infra post *immediatior* cod. I addit *est*.

en: The Vatican, contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, [reads] *respondet*. A little below after *immediatior* codex I adds *est*.

en: Distinction 27, p. II, q. 2.

la: Ed. 1 adiungit *communem*. Mox ex plurimis codd. posuimus *significare* pro *significari*.

en: Edition 1 adds *communem*. Soon after, from most codices we have put *significare* for *significari*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *enim*, quod in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 exstat. Dein Vat. post *modum* falso et praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *expressivum* loco *expressum*. Cfr. verba S. Doctoris ex d. 27. p. II. q. 3: *Nam sapientia vel notitia dicit primum in intelligendo; deinde filius, qui dicit ipsam emanationem sive conceptionem; deinde imago, quae dicit modum expressum emanandi; et tertio loco verbum, quod dicit haec omnia et superaddit rationem exprimendi et manifestandi*. — Paulo infra post *Similiter* ex aliquibus mss. ut X Z et ed. 1 adiecimus *quia*, quod in multis mss. et Vat. minus bene deest.

en: The Vatican with codex cc omits *enim*, which exists in the older manuscripts and edition 1. Then the Vatican, after *modum*, falsely and contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *expressivum* in place of *expressum*. Cf. the words of the Holy Doctor from d. 27, p. II, q. 3: *For wisdom or knowledge expresses the first in understanding; then son, which expresses the very emanation or conception; then image, which expresses the expressed manner of emanating; and in the third place word, which expresses all these and superadds the account of expressing and manifesting*. — A little below after *Similiter* from some manuscripts such as X, Z and edition 1 we have added *quia*, which in many manuscripts and the Vatican is less aptly missing.

la: Cod. Y *differentes*, sed minus distincte, ut patet ex verbis d. 27. p. II. q. 3. modo citatis.

en: Codex Y [reads] *differentes*, but less distinctly, as is plain from the words of d. 27, p. II, q. 3, just cited.

la: Bibliographic continuation of Scholion II at the head of p. 332; the OCR of this fragment is heavily garbled (apparent reference to Bonaventure d. 27. p. II. q. 2., Alex. Hal. *S.* p. I. q. 64. m. 1., S. Thom. I. q. 38., B. Albert hic a. 3., Petr. a Tar. hic q. 2., Richard. a Med. hic q. 1.). No dedicated footer note on p. 332 belongs to the q. 5 section; the page footers serve q. 6.

en: This footnote marks the bibliographic continuation of Scholion II at the top of p. 332. The Quaracchi printed text is here heavily garbled in the IA djvu OCR; readings are reconstructed conjecturally and the citations preserved as best they can be made out.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Postquam in praeced. quaestione S. Doctor probavit, donum esse nomen personale Spiritus sancti, non essentiale, in hac duplicem resolvit quaestionem. Prima est, utrum donum non tantum significet proprietatem in Spiritu sancto, sed proprietatem *distinctivam*. Duplicis enim generis sunt proprietates in divinis: aliae sunt quidem personarum, sed non *personales* in stricto sensu, i. e. personarum *distinctivae* vel etiam *constitutivae*; sic est spiratio activa in Patre et Filio, quae neutram personam nec constituit nec distinguit, cum sit duabus personis communis. Aliae simul personam *distinguunt et constituunt*, ut Paternitas, Filiatio et Spiratio passiva. Unde dicit S. Bonaventura (infra d. 28. q. 3.): «Ad hoc, quod aliqua relatio sit *personalis*, oportet quod dicat illius personae primam et propriam habitudinem et per modum positionis et completionis»; cfr. etiam d. 26. q. 2. et 3. — Prima haec quaestio resolvitur cum sententia communi affirmative et probatur argumentis in fundam. Inter auctores est tamen differentia opinionis circa incidentem quaestionem, utrum haec proprietas sit non tantum *distinctiva*, sed etiam *constitutiva*. Hoc videtur affirmare Magister docendo, quod donum sit formaliter ipsa processio Spiritus sancti. Scotus vero (hic q. unica) hoc negat, cum iuxta ipsum donum primo et principaliter significet respectum ad creaturas et tantum ex consequenti aliquid notionale. Sed quod ex consequenti tantum ad aliquam rem pertinet, non potest esse eiusdem *constitutivum*, sed ad summum *distinctivum*. At S. Bonav. et Richard. a Med. (hic q. 2.) docent, donum significare per se relationem ad dantem, sed cum respectu superaddito donabilitatis, et ratione primi esse proprietatem distinctivam *per se*, et non tantum ex consequenti, ut vult Scotus: ergo etiam *constitutivam*.

De altera quaestione agitur in ipsa responsione, quae est haec: si donum est proprietas Spiritus sancti, et si in dono sunt duo respectus, et ad dantem et ad eum cui datur: iterum quaeritur, utrum sit proprietas distinctiva solummodo secundum primum respectum, qui importat originem, an etiam aliquo modo secundum respectum ad creaturas. Hic respectus ad creaturas triplici modo potest intelligi, nempe vel secundum *actum* (ut *datum*), vel secundum *habitum* (ut *dandum*), vel secundum *aptitudinem* (ut *donabile*). Si respectus ad creaturas primo et secundo modo intelligitur, ipse manifeste non potest esse proprietas personarum distinctiva. Si tertio modo, tunc controvertitur, et ponuntur illae sententiae, quae in *resp.* exponuntur. Prima opinio hanc Spiritus sancti aptitudinem, ut creaturis donetur, omnino *excludit* a proprietate eius distinctiva, hac praesertim innixa ratione, quod haec donabilitas sit aliquid proprietatem distinctivam consequens. Secunda opinio, quam approbat S. Bonav. cum Richardo, asserit, donabilitatem non posse penitus excludi a proprietate distinctiva Spiritus sancti, licet donum sit primario proprietas distinctiva propter respectum ad dantem. Quoad rationem adductam concedit Sanctus (ad 1.), donabilitatem dicere respectum *consequentem*; tamen putat, hunc respectum esse ita coniunctum alteri ad dantem, ut donum sine donabilitate nequeat intelligi, sive aliis verbis, esse quidem consequens, sed ut aliquid *intrinsece proprium*, simili modo ut ratio *risibilis* propria est homini.

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— Eandem sententiam S. Bonaventura etiam quoad nomen *Verbi* tuetur et clarius explicat infra d. 27. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. Ceteri antiqui magistri vel scolastici primam opinionem [tenent], vel non ita accurate distinguunt, sicut Seraphicus. Sententiam S. Thomae Cajetanus (ad S. I. q. 38. a. 2.) secundum primam opinionem exponit; tamen verba S. Thomae in *Summa* loc. cit. a. 1. ad 4. et 1. *Sent.* d. 18. q. 1. a. 2. parum a sententia S. Bonaventurae discedunt, immo Forestus (*de Trinit.* p. 486. col. 2.) vult, utrumque idem docere. Ceterum subtilissima haec quaestio non est magni momenti. — Quoad solut. ad 4. et explicationem *notionis* cfr. infra d. 26. q. 5.[^31]

**II.** Cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 64. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4 ; *S.* p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 2. partic. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** After in the preceding question the Holy Doctor proved that *gift* is a personal name of the Holy Spirit, not essential, in this [question] he resolves a twofold question. The first is whether *gift* not only signifies a property in the Holy Spirit, but a *distinctive* property. For there are properties of two kinds in divine [matters]: some are indeed *of* the persons, but not *personal* in the strict sense — i.e., *distinctive* of persons or even *constitutive*; such is active spiration in the Father and the Son, which neither constitutes nor distinguishes either person, since it is common to two persons. Others *distinguish and constitute* the person at once, such as Paternity, Filiation and passive Spiration. Hence St. Bonaventure says (below d. 28, q. 3): «For some relation to be *personal*, it must express the first and proper habitude of that person and in the manner of position and completion»; cf. also d. 26, qq. 2 and 3. — This first question is resolved, with the common opinion, in the affirmative, and is proven by the arguments in the *fundamenta*. Among the authors, however, there is a difference of opinion regarding the incidental question, whether this property is not only *distinctive* but also *constitutive*. The Master seems to affirm this by teaching that *gift* is formally the very procession of the Holy Spirit. But Scotus (here, the single question) denies this, since according to him *gift* primarily and principally signifies a relation to creatures and only consequently something notional. But what pertains only consequently to some thing cannot be the *constitutive* of the same, but at most *distinctive*. But St. Bonaventure and Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 2) teach that *gift* signifies *per se* the relation to the giver, but with the added relation of donability, and that by reason of the first it is a distinctive property *per se*, and not only consequently, as Scotus holds: therefore also *constitutive*.

The other question is treated in the response itself, which is this: if *gift* is the property of the Holy Spirit, and if in *gift* there are two relations, both to the giver and to him to whom it is given: it is again asked whether it is a distinctive property only according to the first relation, which conveys origin, or also in some way according to the relation to creatures. This relation to creatures can be understood in three ways, namely either according to *act* (as *given*), or according to *habit* (as *to-be-given*), or according to *aptitude* (as *donatable*). If the relation to creatures is understood in the first and second ways, it manifestly cannot be a property distinctive of persons. If in the third way, then it is controverted, and there are set down those opinions which are expounded in the *response* (*resp.*). The first opinion *excludes* this aptitude of the Holy Spirit — namely, that He be given to creatures — entirely from His distinctive property, relying especially on this reason, that this donability is something consequent upon the distinctive property. The second opinion, which St. Bonaventure approves, with Richard, asserts that donability cannot be wholly excluded from the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit, although *gift* is primarily a distinctive property on account of the relation to the giver. As to the reason adduced, the Saint concedes (to 1) that donability expresses a *consequent* relation; nevertheless (*tamen*) he holds that this relation is so joined to the other one toward the giver that *gift* cannot be understood without donability, or in other words, that it is indeed consequent, but as something *intrinsically proper*, in a manner similar to that in which the account *risible* is proper to man.

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— St. Bonaventure also defends and more clearly explains the same opinion as regards the name *Word* below in d. 27, p. II, a. 1, q. 2. The other ancient masters or scholastics either [hold] the first opinion, or do not distinguish so accurately as the Seraphic [Doctor]. Cajetan ([commenting] on *Summa* I, q. 38, a. 2) expounds the opinion of St. Thomas according to the first opinion; nevertheless the words of St. Thomas in the *Summa*, loc. cit., a. 1, ad 4, and in *1 Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, depart only slightly from St. Bonaventure's opinion — indeed, Forestus (*On the Trinity*, p. 486, col. 2) holds that both teach the same thing. For the rest, this most subtle question is of no great moment. — On the solution to *ad 4* and on the explanation of *notion*, cf. below d. 26, q. 5.[^31]

**II.** Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 64, m. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; *Summa* p. I, tr. 8, q. 36, m. 2, partic. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 6

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO VI.

#### *Utrum Spiritus sanctus ratione donabilitatis dici possit Spiritus noster.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum ratione donabilitatis dicatur *Spiritus noster*. Et quod sic videtur:

1. Quia *noster* dicit possessionem; sed nos non habemus[^1] aliquid divinum nisi per largitionem et donationem: ergo cum Spiritus sanctus dicat quid divinum, quod dicitur *noster*, hoc est ratione donabilitatis.

2. Item, hoc etiam videtur, quia[^2] dicitur Spiritus noster, non autem dicitur Filius vel Pater noster: ergo propter aliquam proprietatem, quae est in Spiritu sancto et non in Patre et Filio; sed haec non est nisi donabilitas: ergo etc.

3. Item, antequam Spiritus sanctus habitet in nobis, non dicitur *noster*; sed inhabitat per donationem: ergo dicitur *noster* ratione donabilitatis.

**Contra:**

1. Si ratione donabilitatis: ergo cum donabilitas sit proprietas personalis, non essentialis, videtur[^3] solum dici de persona Spiritus sancti: hoc autem falsum, quia dicitur *Deus noster*.

2. Item, si ratione donabilitatis: ergo constat, quod non per comparationem ad dantem, sed ad eum cui datur; sed *Filius datus est nobis*[^4] [^5] etiam magis quam Spiritus sanctus: ergo etc.

3. Item, si ratione donabilitatis: ergo debet convenienter[^6] dici *donum nostrum*.

4. Item, si ratione donabilitatis: ergo cum donabilis sit nobis magis in quantum *sanctus* quam in quantum *spiritus*, melius deberet[^7] dici *Spiritus sanctus noster*: quod tamen non dicitur.

Quaeritur ergo generaliter, de quibus possit dici *noster*.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Pronomen possessivum* meus *vel* noster *cum copula est propriissime de Spiritu sancto ratione donabilitatis et per appropriationem dicitur; idem pronomen sine copula iis tantum adiungitur nominibus divinis, quae exprimunt respectum ad nos secundum rationem causae vel correlationis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *meum* et *nostrum* dupliciter possunt[^8] attribui alicui: vel mediante compositione, vel immediate. Si mediante compositione, sic de se ponunt propriam habitudinem circa terminum, scilicet habitudinem *possessionis*[^9], ut cum dicitur: hoc est meum: et hoc modo, quia omnis qui habet spiritum Dei, habet Deum et omnia quae sunt Dei, hoc modo *meum* vel *nostrum* et *tuum*[^10] potest dici de omni, quod in Deo est communiter, sed magis proprie de Filio, qui[^11] datus est nobis per incarnationem, maxime autem de Spiritu sancto, *qui est pignus aeternae hereditatis*[^12]. Unde concedendum, quod ratione donabilitatis potest inter alias personas ratio possidendi appropriari Spiritui sancto.

Potest etiam hoc quod est *nostrum* attribui alicui *immediate*, et sic non dicit habitudinem[^13], sed rationem habitudinis importatae per terminum, cui unitur. Sic enim nulli unitur, nisi quod importat respectum *explicite*, ut pater noster vel meus, vel *implicite*, ut liber meus[^14], ut est possessio mea.

Secundum hoc notandum, quod non dicitur

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*meus* vel *noster* de aliquo nisi secundum illud nomen, secundum quod dicitur *hoc esse huius*; hoc autem esse *huius* potest dici secundum triplicem habitudinem: aut *informationis*, ut albedo Petri; et hanc habitudinem important nomina, quae significant in abstractione; et quia nihil divinum comparatur ad nos secundum habitudinem informationis, ideo non potest dici de nominibus abstractivis *noster*: ideo non dicitur *deitas nostra* nec *aeternitas nostra*.

Potest etiam *secundo* dici *hoc esse huius* secundum habitudinem *causalitatis*; et hanc habitudinem important nomina, quae dicunt actum, ut *creator*; et quia hanc habitudinem omnino habent divina ad nos, pene de omnibus talibus nominibus dicitur *nostrum*.

Potest etiam *tertio* modo dici *hoc esse huius* secundum habitudinem *correlationis*; et hanc habitudinem important nomina relativa. Sed haec sunt dupliciter: quia quaedam dicunt respectum personae ad personam, quaedam autem respectum ad creaturam. De his quae dicunt respectum ad personam, non dicitur *meus* vel *noster*. De his autem quae ad nos, ut *dominus*, *magister*, recte dicitur *noster*.

Dicendum ergo, quod donabilitas quantum ad istum modum dicendi *nostrum* nihil facit, sicut probant rationes secundo inductae; sed hoc facit respectus, quia *spiritus* dicit respectum ad illum cui inspiratur, et hoc sumus nos; ideo dicitur *Spiritus noster*. Similiter *Deus*, quia imponitur ab actu, quem habet circa nos, ut dicit Damascenus[?]; ideo dicitur *Deus noster*.

Est ergo regula, quod de his dicitur *noster*, quae dicunt respectum ad nos secundum habitudinem *causalitatis* vel *correlationis*: et sic patent omnia obiecta.

english:
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### QUESTION VI.

#### *Whether the Holy Spirit by reason of donability can be called our Spirit.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked, whether by reason of donability He is called *our Spirit*. And that it is so, it seems:

1. Because *ours* expresses possession; but we do not have[^1] anything divine except through largesse and donation: therefore since the Holy Spirit expresses something divine, which is called *ours*, this is by reason of donability.

2. Likewise, this also seems [the case], because[^2] He is called *our Spirit*, but the Son or the Father is not called *ours*: therefore on account of some property which is in the Holy Spirit and not in the Father and the Son; but this is nothing other than donability: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, before the Holy Spirit dwells in us, He is not called *ours*; but He inhabits through donation: therefore He is called *ours* by reason of donability.

**On the contrary:**

1. If by reason of donability: therefore since donability is a personal, not essential property, it seems[^3] to be said only of the person of the Holy Spirit: but this is false, because we say *our God*.

2. Likewise, if by reason of donability: therefore it is established that not by comparison to the giver, but to him to whom He is given; but *the Son was given to us*[^4] [^5] even more than the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if by reason of donability: therefore He ought fittingly[^6] to be called *our gift*.

4. Likewise, if by reason of donability: therefore since He is donatable to us more in that He is *holy* than in that He is *spirit*, it would be better to say[^7] *our Holy Spirit* — which however is not said.

It is asked therefore generally, of what things *ours* can be said.

### CONCLUSION.

> *The possessive pronoun* mine *or* ours *with a copula is most properly said of the Holy Spirit by reason of donability and through appropriation; the same pronoun without a copula is joined only to those divine names which express a relation to us according to the account of cause or of correlation.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *mine* and *ours* can in two ways[^8] be attributed to someone: either by means of composition, or immediately. If by means of composition, then of themselves they posit a proper relation toward the term — namely, the relation of *possession*[^9] — as when it is said: this is mine. And in this way, because everyone who has the Spirit of God has God and all things which are God's, in this way *mine* or *ours* and *thine*[^10] can be said of everything that is in God commonly, but more properly of the Son, who[^11] was given to us through the incarnation, and most of all of the Holy Spirit, *who is the pledge of eternal inheritance*[^12]. Hence it must be conceded that by reason of donability, among the other persons, the account of possessing can be appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

That which is *ours* can also be attributed to someone *immediately*, and thus it does not express a relation[^13] [as such], but the account of the relation conveyed by the term to which it is joined. For thus it is joined to nothing except what conveys a relation *explicitly*, as *our* or *my* father, or *implicitly*, as *my* book[^14], as it is my possession.

According to this it must be noted that one is not said

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[to be] *mine* or *ours* with respect to anything except according to that name according to which it is said *this is of him*; but this *being of him* can be said according to a threefold relation: either of *information*, as the whiteness of Peter; and this relation is conveyed by names which signify in abstraction; and because nothing divine is compared to us according to a relation of *information*, therefore *ours* cannot be said of abstract names: therefore it is not said *our deity* nor *our eternity*.

It can also *secondly* be said *this is of him* according to a relation of *causality*; and this relation is conveyed by names which express an act, as *creator*; and because divine [things] altogether have this relation to us, of nearly all such names *ours* is said.

It can also be said in a *third* way *this is of him* according to a relation of *correlation*; and this relation is conveyed by relative names. But these are of two kinds: because some express a relation of person to person, others a relation to a creature. Of those which express a relation to a person, *mine* or *ours* is not said. But of those which [express a relation] to us, as *lord*, *master*, *ours* is rightly said.

It must be said therefore that donability has nothing to do with this manner of saying *ours*, as the second-adduced reasons prove; but this is done by relation, because *spirit* expresses a relation to him to whom it is breathed in, and this is we ourselves; therefore He is called *our Spirit*. Similarly *God*, because [the name] is imposed from an act which He has toward us, as Damascene says[?]; therefore He is called *our God*.

The rule, therefore, is that *ours* is said of those [names] which express a relation to us according to the relation of *causality* or of *correlation*: and thus all the objections are clear.

la: Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum codd. [?] *habuimus*. Paulo infra Vat. *dicatur* loco *dicitur*.

en: Thus the older codices with edition 1, while the Vatican with [some] codices [reads] *habuimus*. A little below the Vatican [reads] *dicatur* in place of *dicitur*.

la: In plurimis mss. et Vat. hic additur *etiam*, quod tamen deest in cod. X et ed. 1 nec non superfluum esse videtur. Mox post *Spiritus* aliqui codd. ut SVX addunt *sanctus*, sed incongrue, ut ex corp. quaest. patet.

en: In most manuscripts and the Vatican here is added *etiam*, which however is missing in codex X and edition 1 and seems to be superfluous. Soon after, after *Spiritus*, some codices such as S, V, X add *sanctus*, but inappropriately, as is plain from the body of the question.

la: Videtur supplendum *personaliter*; cf. Alex. loc. cit. ad [?].

en: It seems that *personaliter* should be supplied; cf. Alexander, at the cited place ad [?].

la: Supple: *noster*, vel lege cum cod. Y *noster solum dicitur*. Paulo infra post *falsum* unus alterque codex ut bb addit *est*.

en: Supply: *noster*, or read with codex Y *noster solum dicitur*. A little below, after *falsum*, one or another codex such as bb adds *est*.

en: Isaiah 9:6.

la: Plures codd. ut AHITVWXcc ff cum ed. 1 *debet congruenter*.

en: Several codices such as A, H, I, T, V, W, X, cc, ff with edition 1 [read] *debet congruenter*.

la: Vat. contra plurimos mss. et ed. 1 *debet*.

en: The Vatican, against most manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *debet*.

la: Ed. 1 cum uno alteroque cod. ut X hic *potest*, et paulo infra cum pluribus codd. ut AISTYZ *ponit* loco *ponunt*.

en: Edition 1 with one or another codex such as X here [reads] *potest*, and a little below with several codices such as A, I, S, T, Y, Z [reads] *ponit* in place of *ponunt*.

la: Aliis verbis: relationem rei habitae ad habentem. Vide Aristot., *de Praedicam.* in fine, ubi de *Habere* agitur, et V. *Metaph.* text. 29. (IV. c. 23.).

en: In other words: the relation of the thing possessed to the possessor. See Aristotle, *On the Categories*, at the end, where he treats of *Having*, and *Metaphysics* V, text 29 (IV, c. 23).

la: Ita maior pars mss. cum ed. 1, dum aliqui cum Vat. particulas *vel ac et* transponunt, aliqui autem ut I et ff pro *et* ponunt *vel*; cod. A tandem *vel suum* loco *et tuum*. Mox cod. G post *omni* addit *eo*.

en: Thus the greater part of the manuscripts with edition 1, while some with the Vatican transpose the particles *vel ac et*, but others such as I and ff in place of *et* put *vel*; codex A finally [reads] *vel suum* in place of *et tuum*. Soon after, codex G after *omni* adds *eo*.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *quia*, et cod. I *in eo quod*.

en: The Vatican with some manuscripts [reads] *quia*, and codex I [reads] *in eo quod*.

la: Ephes. 1, 14, ubi Vulgata *nostrae* loco *aeternae*. — Paulo ante cod. M post *autem* addit *proprie*.

en: Ephesians 1:14, where the Vulgate [reads] *nostrae* in place of *aeternae*. — A little before, codex M after *autem* adds *proprie*.

la: Supple: *propriam*, vel cum Vat. *possessionis*, quae et post *sed* cum aliquibus mss. et sex primis edd. adiungit *tantum*.

en: Supply: *propriam*, or with the Vatican *possessionis*, which also after *sed* with some manuscripts and the first six editions adds *tantum*.

la: Unus alterve cod. ut G cum ed. 1 *noster*. Mox in multis mss. et ed. 1 omittitur *mea*.

en: One or another codex such as G with edition 1 [reads] *noster*. Soon after, in many manuscripts and edition 1, *mea* is omitted.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Secundum titulum in principio positum quaestio esset tantum specialis de hac locutione, utrum Spiritus sanctus ratione donabilitatis dici possit *Spiritus noster*; sed in fine argumentorum ad opposit. ponitur quaestio *generalis*, nempe haec, cum quibus divinis nominibus possit coniungi possessivum *noster* vel *meus*; et fere tota responsio ad hanc generalem quaestionem pertinet. Acute distinguitur duplex modus, quo pronomina possessiva alicui possunt attribui, scil. vel mediante compositione sive copula (ut per verbum *est*, quin determinetur per aliquod adiunctum, v. g. *liber est meus*), vel sine copula v. g. *amicus noster*. In primo casu ratione possessionis divina possunt dici *nostra*, et quidem tum communia tum etiam propria, quae nobis speciali modo sunt data; quod maxime verificatur de tertia persona. Sic ratione donabilitatis propriissime dici potest: Spiritus sanctus est noster. In secundo casu ratio donabilitatis non est ad propositum, sive ut textus dicit: «Nihil facit, sicut probant rationes secundo inductae»: sed potius attendi debet, qualem habitudinem habeat ad nos ipse terminus, cui coniungitur possessivum. Haec habitudo ad nos secundum S. Doctorem potest esse triplex. Si haec habitudo est *causalitatis* vel *correlationis* (sub ultima intellige etiam rationem *finis*), tum possessivum illud recte his nominibus divinis uniri potest. Cum autem *spiritus* dicat respectum ad effectum spiritualem, nempe inspirationem, ideo non inepte dici potest *Spiritus noster*. Sed non bene dicitur: *Spiritus sanctus noster*; de quo cfr. Alex. Hal. et Richard. locis citt.

**II.** Idem docent Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 63. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. 1. q. 36. a. 1. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. p. 1. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 2. partic. 3. i. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 59. q. 5. n. 16. 17. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** According to the title set down at the beginning, the question would be only a special one about this expression — whether the Holy Spirit by reason of donability can be called *our Spirit*; but at the end of the arguments to the opposite [side] a *general* question is set down, namely this: with which divine names can the possessive *ours* or *mine* be joined; and almost the whole response pertains to this general question. Acutely is distinguished the twofold mode by which possessive pronouns can be attributed to someone, namely either by means of composition or copula (as through the verb *est*, without it being determined by some adjunct — e.g., *the book is mine*), or without a copula, e.g. *our friend*. In the first case, by reason of possession, divine [things] can be called *ours* — and indeed both the common ones and also the proper ones, which are given to us in a special manner; which is most of all verified of the third person. Thus by reason of donability it can most properly be said: the Holy Spirit is ours. In the second case, the account of donability is not to the point, or, as the text says: «It does nothing, as the second-adduced reasons prove»: but rather what must be attended to is what kind of relation the term itself, to which the possessive is joined, has toward us. This relation toward us, according to the Holy Doctor, can be threefold. If this relation is of *causality* or of *correlation* (under the latter understand also the account of *end*), then that possessive can rightly be united to those divine names. But since *spirit* expresses a relation to a spiritual effect, namely *inspiration*, therefore not ineptly can it be said *our Spirit*. But it is not well said: *our Holy Spirit*; concerning which cf. Alex. of Hales and Richard at the cited places.

**II.** The same is taught by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 63, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *Summa* I, q. 36, a. 1, ad 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 8, q. 36, m. 2, partic. 3, i. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Giles of Rome, here 3. princ. q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 59, q. 5, n. 16, 17. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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