title: Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 1006 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Secundum quid beatitudo insit in anima.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: notes 3–9 and 10–12 of page 1006, and notes 1–4 of page 1007. Notes 1–2 of page 1006 anchor in the preceding quaestio (q. 3) and are rendered there; the whole footer register of page 1008 anchors in the following quaestio (q. 5) and is rendered there.

Quarto quaeritur, secundum quid insit beatitudo, utrum sit in anima primo secundum *substantiam*, an secundum *potentiam*. Et quod secundum *substantiam*, videtur:

1. Quia beatitudo est vita; unde Augustinus[^p1006-3] vult, quod esse beatum est vivere in Deo et Deo; sed prius naturaliter vivit anima quam potentiae: ergo prius vivificatur a Deo.

2. Item, beatitudo in anima est una[^p1006-4], sed potentiae sunt plures; sed multiplicato subiecto primo, necesse est, multiplicari perfectionem: ergo etc.

3. Item, Deus est intimus ipsi animae[^p1006-5]: ergo cum beatitudo sit in anima per influentiam a Deo, illa influentia procedit ab intimo; sed substantia rei creatae interior est quam potentia: ergo beatitudo prius influitur in substantiam.

**Contra:** 1. Beatitudo inest animae, secundum quod « capax est Dei et particeps esse potest[^p1006-6] »; sed capax est secundum imaginem, et imago secundum mentem, et mens est oculus et potentia animae: ergo beatitudo inest primo animae secundum *potentiam*.

2. Item, beatitudo inest animae secundum modum specialem[^p1006-7] unionis Dei et animae; sed modus specialis non est nisi per cognitionem perfectam et amorem, et hic est per potentias: ergo etc.

3. Item, beatitudo est habitus secundus et perfectio secunda; sed omnis secundus habitus et perfectio secunda inest secundum aliquam potentiam recipiendi, quae differt a substantia: ergo beatitudo non inest animae per substantiam immediate.

4. Item, si immediate et primo per substantiam, ergo abstractis potentiis, poterit intelligi anima gloriosa: ergo abstracto, quod Deum non videat nec amet, erit gloriosa; quod stultum est dicere et contra Sanctos[^p1006-8].

### Conclusio

> *Beatitudo est in anima primo secundum potentiam, et quidem una in pluribus potentiis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod opinio quorundam est, sicut de gratia, ita de gloria, quod sicut differt *gratia* et *virtus*[^p1006-9], ita et *beatitudo* et *dos*. Et sicut *gratia* respicit animae substantiam, et ideo est una; *virtus* vero *potentiam*, et ideo plures: sic et *gloria*, quae animae *substantiam* respicit, ideo est una; sed *dotes potentias*, ideo plures. Et exemplum naturale est in anima humana, perficiente corpus, quae in quantum *vivificans* respicit *complexionem*, quae est una in toto corpore; in quantum *motor* respicit *organa diversa*[^p1006-10]. — Sed credo, hic esse magis *appropriationem* quam *proprietatem* et veritatem. Corpus enim nunquam dispositum est ad vitam, qualemcumque habeat *complexionem*, nisi etiam habeat *organizationem*; unde nec influentia vitae nec motus est ab anima in corpus, nisi naturaliter praeexistat *dispositio organizationis*[^p1006-11]. Similiter credo in *gratia* et *gloria*, quod anima non est capax gratiae nec gloriae nisi *per mentem*. Unde credo, quod tam *gratia* quam *gloria* primo est in *potentia*. — Sed *esse aliquid in potentia*, hoc est dupliciter: aut secundum dispositionem et habilitationem eius ad *actum proprium*, quia sic potentiae distinguuntur[^p1006-12]; et quod sic est in potentia *multiplicatur* et est in potentia secundum *rationem potentiae*. Aliquid vero est in potentia secundum conformationem ipsius ad *aliquod unum* et unionem ad illud; et quod sic est in potentia non multiplicatur in potentiis, immo *esse in potentia* dicitur, secundum quod habet rationem *substantiae*; et sic[^p1007-1] *gratia* et *gloria*, quarum unaquaeque est deiformitas et conformitas ad Deum. Et quia uni et eidem conformatur et reformatur ipsa anima; ideo una est gratia et gloria in pluribus potentiis, sicut una anima in pluribus organis, et una sanitas in pluribus membris. Et hoc clarius in secundo disputatum est in distinctione vigesima sexta[^p1007-2] de gratia.

<!-- page 1007 -->

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est vivificari animam quam potentias; dicendum, quod verum est de vita, quae est *actus primus*; sed non de vita, quae est *actus secundus*.

*Ad 2.* Ad aliud iam patet responsio: quia non est gloria in potentiis secundum id, in quo *distinguuntur*, sed secundum quod *uniuntur* in ratione imaginis, per quam capaces[^p1007-3] sunt unius deiformitatis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est intimus animae, ergo procedit ab intimo; dicendum, quod influentia ista ab intimo procedit; sed non procedit, secundum quod *intimum conservans in esse naturae*, sed secundum quod *obiectum consummans in esse gloriae*; et ideo secundum hanc viam magis est intimus et immediatus potentiae quam essentiae. Unde non sequitur, quodsi divina essentia est intima, quod quaelibet eius influentia[^p1007-4].

english:
### Question IV. *According to what beatitude is present in the soul.*

Fourthly it is asked, according to what beatitude is present — whether it is in the soul first according to *substance*, or according to *power*. And that it is according to *substance*, it seems:

1. Because beatitude is life; whence Augustine[^p1006-3] holds that to be blessed is to live in God and by God; but the soul naturally lives prior to the powers: therefore it is first vivified by God.

2. Likewise, beatitude in the soul is one[^p1006-4], but the powers are many; but when the first subject is multiplied, the perfection must necessarily be multiplied: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, God is most inward to the soul itself[^p1006-5]: therefore, since beatitude is in the soul through an influence from God, that influence proceeds from what is inmost; but the substance of a created thing is more interior than its power: therefore beatitude is first infused into the substance.

**On the contrary:** 1. Beatitude is present in the soul according to the fact that "it is capable of God and can be a partaker[^p1006-6]"; but it is capable according to the image, and the image is according to the mind, and the mind is the eye and a power of the soul: therefore beatitude is present in the soul first according to *power*.

2. Likewise, beatitude is present in the soul according to a special mode[^p1006-7] of the union of God and the soul; but the special mode is only through perfect knowledge and love, and this is through the powers: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, beatitude is a second habit and a second perfection; but every second habit and second perfection is present according to some power of receiving, which differs from the substance: therefore beatitude is not present in the soul through the substance immediately.

4. Likewise, if it is present immediately and first through the substance, then, with the powers abstracted, the soul could be understood as glorious: therefore, with it abstracted that it neither sees nor loves God, it will be glorious; which is foolish to say and against the Saints[^p1006-8].

### Conclusion

> *Beatitude is in the soul first according to power, and indeed one in many powers.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the opinion of certain men is that, as with grace, so with glory: that just as *grace* and *virtue* differ[^p1006-9], so also do *beatitude* and *dowry*. And just as *grace* regards the substance of the soul, and therefore is one, whereas *virtue* regards *power*, and therefore they are many: so also *glory*, which regards the *substance* of the soul, is therefore one; but the *dowries* regard the *powers*, and therefore they are many. And the natural example is in the human soul perfecting the body, which, insofar as it is *vivifying*, regards the *complexion*, which is one in the whole body; insofar as it is *mover*, it regards *diverse organs*[^p1006-10]. — But I believe that here there is rather an *appropriation* than a *property* and truth. For the body is never disposed to life, whatever complexion it may have, unless it also has *organization*; whence neither the influence of life nor motion is from the soul into the body, unless the *disposition of organization*[^p1006-11] naturally pre-exists. Likewise I believe concerning *grace* and *glory*, that the soul is not capable of grace nor of glory except *through the mind*. Whence I believe that both *grace* and *glory* are first in the *power*. — But *for something to be in a power* is twofold: either according to the disposition and fitting of that power to its *proper act*, since it is in this way that powers are distinguished[^p1006-12]; and what is in a power in this way *is multiplied* and is in the power according to the *account of the power*. But something is in a power according to its conformation to *some one thing* and its union to that; and what is in a power in this way is not multiplied in the powers, but rather is said to be *in a power* according as it has the account of *substance*; and thus[^p1007-1] are *grace* and *glory*, each of which is a deiformity and conformity to God. And because the soul itself is conformed and reformed to one and the same thing, therefore grace and glory are one in many powers, just as one soul is in many organs, and one health in many members. And this was disputed more clearly in the second book, in the twenty-sixth distinction[^p1007-2], concerning grace.

<!-- page 1007 -->

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that the soul is vivified prior to the powers, it must be said that this is true of the life which is *first act*; but not of the life which is *second act*.

*To 2.* To the other the answer is already clear: because glory is not in the powers according to that in which they *are distinguished*, but according as they *are united* in the account of the image, through which they are capable[^p1007-3] of one deiformity.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that God is most inward to the soul, therefore [the influence] proceeds from what is inmost, it must be said that this influence does proceed from what is inmost; but it does not proceed according as He is the *inmost thing conserving in the being of nature*, but according as He is the *object consummating in the being of glory*; and therefore along this path He is more inward and immediate to the power than to the essence. Whence it does not follow that, if the divine essence is inmost, then any influence of His whatever [is so][^p1007-4].

la: Epist. 130. (alias 121.) c. 7. n. 14: *Ad illam ergo unam vitam, qua cum Deo et de Deo vivitur, cetera... referenda sunt.* Serm. 114. n. 2, ubi docet, secundum divina promissa nos in caelo fore Angelis aequales, « ut cum illo [Deo] et in illo et de illo sine fine vivamus ». — Pro *et Deo* codd. G K (I a secunda manu) *et a Deo*.

en: Letter 130 (otherwise 121) c. 7. n. 14: *To that one life, therefore, by which one lives with God and from God, all else... is to be referred.* Sermon 114. n. 2, where he teaches that according to the divine promises we shall be equal to the Angels in heaven, "that with Him [God] and in Him and from Him we may live without end." — For *et Deo* codices G K (I by a second hand) read *et a Deo*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, *unam gratiam* esse in anima.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, where it is shown that there is *one grace* in the soul.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 226, nota 7.

en: See vol. II, p. 226, note 7.

la: Secundum August.; vide supra pag. 1000, nota 5. — Superius codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *animae*.

en: According to Augustine; see above, p. 1000, note 5. — Above, the codices and edition 1 omit *animae*.

la: Multi codd. *spiritualem* et mox *spiritualis*.

en: Many codices read *spiritualem*, and shortly after *spiritualis*.

la: Vide quaest. seq. Idem arg. recurrit II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5. fundam. 5, ubi solvitur quaestio, utrum gratia primo insit substantiae animae, vel potentiis. — Post *abstracto* Vat. addit *vel esto*.

en: See the following question. The same argument recurs in II Sent. d. 26. q. 5. fundamentum 5, where the question is resolved whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul or in the powers. — After *abstracto* the Vatican edition adds *vel esto*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. — Inferius pro *gloria, quae* cod. L *gloria, quia*.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. — Below, for *gloria, quae* codex L reads *gloria, quia*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. — Subinde pro *hic esse magis* edd. *hoc esse magis per*.

en: See I Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. — Thereupon, for *hic esse magis* the editions read *hoc esse magis per*.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 1.): *Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici, potentia vitam habentis.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 6 (c. 1): *The soul is the first act of a physical, organic body having life in potency.*

la: Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. — Codd. E G L clarius legunt: *proprium, et quia sic potentiae distinguuntur, quod sic* etc.

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4). Cf. vol. II, p. 561, note 3. — Codices E G L read more clearly: *proprium, et quia sic potentiae distinguuntur, quod sic* etc.

la: Cod. P addit *est de*.

en: Codex P adds *est de*.

la: Quaest. 5, ubi etiam solut. ad 1. et 2. habetur. Cfr. ibid. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Exemplum de *una sanitate*, sumtum ex August., refertur I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3, ubi ostenditur, animam rationalem esse totam in toto corpore etc.

en: Question 5, where the solutions to 1 and 2 are also found. Cf. ibid. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — The example of *one health*, taken from Augustine, is reported in I Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3, where it is shown that the rational soul is whole in the whole body, etc.

la: Plures codd. et edd. *capacitatem*. Vat. voci *imaginis* praemittit *unius*.

en: Several codices and editions read *capacitatem*. The Vatican edition prefixes *unius* to the word *imaginis*.

la: Vat. addit *sic sit intima*. Superius pro *immediatus* non pauci codd. *immediatius*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *sic sit intima*. Above, for *immediatus* not a few codices read *immediatius*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio magis explicat quae dicta sunt in 1. huius articuli quaestione, simulque refellit opinionem illam Henrici Gand., quam in scholio ad 1. q. commemoravimus. Unitatem *gloriae* S. Doctor eodem modo tradit, quo unitatem *gratiae* explicat, II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5, ubi cfr. etiam scholion. — Alii auctores, qui beatitudinem ponunt in *actu secundo*, simul improbant positionem Henrici, quin de hac 4. quaestione specialiter tractent; cfr. Scot., hic q. 2. n. 25. seqq.; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. (praesertim ad 1.) et 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**II.** In 5. quaestione S. Doctor proprie agit de perfectione *status* gloriosi et de *dotibus* animae; unde vix tangit celebrem illam controversiam scholasticam, in quo scilicet actu sive operatione *formaliter* consistat actus beatificus, utrum simul in *plurium* potentiarum actibus, an in *unius* potentiae actu (quod Scoto, S. Thomae pluribusque aliis placuit); et hoc supposito, utrum in actu *intellectus* (in visione), quod strenue docet S. Thomas, an in actu *voluntatis* (in fruitione per amorem amicitiae), pro quo certat Scotus cum non paucis etiam extra suam scholam. — De tribus dotibus animae S. Bonav. non agit specialiter (quod tamen faciunt alii), sed de quatuor dotibus corporis tractat infra p. II. sect. 1. et 2.

**III.** Praenotandum est, esse extra controversiam, 1. quod *beatitudo patriae* complectitur plures perfectiones et operationes, speciatim *fruitionem* voluntatis et *visionem* immediatam intellectus. Explicite hoc docet Constitutio Benedicti XII. (*Benedictus Deus*), ubi inter alia habetur, « quod ex tali *visione et fruitione* eorum animae... sunt vere beatae ». Item, Catechismus Roman. (p. 1. c. 13. n. 7.) beatitudinem illam in eo sitam esse dicit, « ut Deum *videamus* eiusque pulcritudine *fruamur* ».

2. Item, non est dubium, beatitudinem esse in voluntate sicut *obiectum*. Hoc concedit S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.), ubi dicit: Beatitudinem esse in voluntate « dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ita, quod sit voluntatis *obiectum*; et sic beatitudo, cum sit ultimus finis, et ex fine sit ratio boni, quod est voluntatis obiectum, oportet ponere, beatitudinem in voluntate esse. Alio modo ita, quod sit aliquis *actus* voluntatis; et sic beatitudo in voluntate esse non potest ».

3. Denique patet, quod in via *generationis* prius natura est Deus obiectum immediatum *visionis* quam immediatum obiectum *fruitionis*. — Controvertitur autem, utrum hoc verum sit etiam in via *perfectionis*; immo Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 6. ad 5.) ex illa propositione contrarium arguere vult, quia prioritas in via generationis est « prioritas, qua *imperfectum* est prius perfecto... quia ut in pluribus videmus, quod actuum coordinatorum inter se *prior* ordine naturae in *via generationis* minus est perfectus quam posterior. Nec hoc dicens intendo dicere, quod illa visio sit imperfecta in *genere visionis*, sed volo dicere, quod ipsa fruitio est actus perfectior, sicut declarabitur in quaestione sequenti ».

**IV.** Richard. a Med., (locis citt.), adductis multis argumentis pro utraque parte, concludit, quod beatitudo consistat tam in actu intellectus quam in actu voluntatis; principalius tamen in *voluntate*, « quia in visione inchoatur et in fruitione consummatur » (q. 6. ad 8.). Hanc opinionem etiam Scot. (hic q. 3. n. 5.) non improbat, si intelligatur, beatitudinem *praecise* et pro *ultimo complemento* optime essendi consistere in *unica* operatione, si vero pro unione *vitali immediata ad obiectum* beatificum, in *duplici* operatione intellectus et voluntatis.

Quoad sententiam S. Bonaventurae patet iam ex 1. solut. ad oppos., eum hic non tenere sententiam S. Thomae. Cum autem hoc loco proprie tractet *generaliter* de tribus *dotibus*, recurrendum est ad alios locos, praecipue ad I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica et a. 3. q. 2; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3; d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4; Breviloq. p. VII. c. 7, ubi satis declaratur, eum convenire potius cum praedicta opinione Richardi; quam etiam Petr. a Tar. tenet (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3.), docens, illam beatitudinem consistere « in actu intellectus *originaliter*, in actu vero voluntatis *completive* ».

Quoad *trium dotium* actus, de quibus in hac quaestione agitur, supponendum, quod S. Bonav. ipsam voluntatem *rationalem* dividat in concupiscibilem et irascibilem (cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. scholion), unde etiam in patria *irascibili* tribuit actum, scil. tentionis, quae interdum non proprie, sed *per appropriationem* vocatur *fruitio*. Hanc enim proprie et essentialiter in actu *amoris amicitiae* consistere, dicitur I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2. Tamen de fruitionis ratione, sicut de quibusdam connexis, iterum doctores secundum principia diversa, quae ponunt de essentia beatitudinis, diversa sentiunt, ut notatum est in scholio ad ultimo cit. locum.

**V.** Hae controversiae scholarum antiquae aliquo certo et omnibus explorato principio determinari non possunt, cum ipsa argumenta ab utraque parte copiose in medium prolata plerumque innitantur principiis non concessis ab adversariis; v. g. schola S. Thomae (cfr. S. 1. q. 82. a. 3.) in subsidium suae sententiae affert, quod *intellectus* sit potentia animae omnium nobilissima, dum Scot. (hic q. 4. later.) diffuse certat pro principatu *voluntatis*, cui suffragatur Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 1. q. 14), et favet etiam S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal., Richardo a Med., aliisque, ut dictum est II. Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 6. in scholio.

<!-- page 1008 -->

Hinc Estius (hic § 3.), licet praeferat sententiam S. Thomae, adductis duodecim argumentis pro sententia Scoti, pensatis omnibus, concludit, pleraque eorum « non esse ita levia, ut *temere* Scotum aliosque quosdam in diversam adduxerint sententiam, ut proinde non immerito inter problemata theologica numeretur haec quaestio ».

**VI.** De ipsa 5. quaestione praeter locos citt.: S. Thom., hic q. 1. et etiam 3. (de delectatione); S. I. II. q. 3. a. 4. 5. 8, q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 4. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**VII.** Conclusio 6. quaestionis, quam negavit Iovinianus, refutatus a S. Hieronymo, confirmatur Decreto Eugen. IV. contra Graecos, ubi dicitur, Deum videre Beatos, « pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius ».

De eadem: Scot., infra d. 50. q. 5. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 5. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question explains more fully what was said in the 1st question of this article, and at the same time it refutes that opinion of Henry of Ghent which we recalled in the scholion to q. 1. The unity of *glory* the holy Doctor hands down in the same way in which he explains the unity of *grace*, II Sent. d. 26. q. 5, where see also the scholion. — Other authors, who place beatitude in the *second act*, likewise disprove Henry's position, though they do not treat specially of this 4th question; cf. Scotus, here q. 2. n. 25. ff.; St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. (especially ad 1.) and 2; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**II.** In the 5th question the holy Doctor properly treats of the perfection of the glorious *state* and of the *dowries* of the soul; whence he scarcely touches that celebrated scholastic controversy, namely in what act or operation the beatific act *formally* consists — whether at once in the acts of *several* powers, or in the act of *one* power (which pleased Scotus, St. Thomas and many others); and, this being supposed, whether in the act of the *intellect* (in vision), which St. Thomas strenuously teaches, or in the act of the *will* (in fruition through the love of friendship), for which Scotus contends together with not a few even outside his own school. — Of the three dowries of the soul St. Bonaventure does not treat specially (which others nevertheless do), but he treats of the four dowries of the body below, p. II. sect. 1 and 2.

**III.** It must be premised that it is beyond controversy, 1. that the *beatitude of the fatherland* embraces several perfections and operations, especially the *fruition* of the will and the immediate *vision* of the intellect. Explicitly the Constitution of Benedict XII (*Benedictus Deus*) teaches this, where among other things it is held that "from such *vision and fruition* their souls... are truly blessed." Likewise the Roman Catechism (p. 1. c. 13. n. 7.) says that that beatitude is situated in this, "that we may *see* God and *enjoy* His beauty."

2. Likewise, there is no doubt that beatitude is in the will as its *object*. St. Thomas concedes this (here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiuncula 2.), where he says: That beatitude is in the will "can be understood in two ways: in one way, that it is the *object* of the will; and thus beatitude, since it is the ultimate end, and since from the end comes the account of the good, which is the object of the will, one must hold that beatitude is in the will. In another way, that it is some *act* of the will; and thus beatitude cannot be in the will."

3. Finally it is clear that in the way of *generation* God is by nature prior as the immediate object of *vision* than as the immediate object of *fruition*. — But it is disputed whether this is true also in the way of *perfection*; indeed Richard of Middleton (here a. 1. q. 6. ad 5.) wishes to argue the contrary from that proposition, because priority in the way of generation is "a priority by which the *imperfect* is prior to the perfect... because for the most part we see that, of acts coordinated among themselves, the one *prior* in the order of nature in the *way of generation* is less perfect than the later one. Nor in saying this do I intend to say that that vision is imperfect in the *genus of vision*, but I wish to say that fruition itself is the more perfect act, as will be declared in the following question."

**IV.** Richard of Middleton (in the passages cited), having adduced many arguments on both sides, concludes that beatitude consists both in the act of the intellect and in the act of the will; yet principally in the *will*, "because it is begun in vision and consummated in fruition" (q. 6. ad 8.). This opinion Scotus also (here q. 3. n. 5.) does not disprove, if it be understood that beatitude *precisely* and as the *ultimate complement* of best being consists in a *single* operation, but if [taken] for the *vital immediate union to the beatific object*, in a *twofold* operation of intellect and will.

As to the mind of St. Bonaventure, it is already clear from the 1st solution to the opposing arguments that he does not here hold St. Thomas's opinion. But since in this place he properly treats *generally* of the three *dowries*, one must have recourse to other passages, especially to I Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica and a. 3. q. 2; II Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2; III Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3; d. 31. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4; Breviloquium p. VII. c. 7, where it is sufficiently declared that he agrees rather with the aforesaid opinion of Richard; which Peter of Tarentaise also holds (here q. 1. a. 1. quaestiuncula 3.), teaching that that beatitude consists "in the act of the intellect *originally*, but in the act of the will *completively*."

As to the acts of the *three dowries*, of which this question treats, it must be supposed that St. Bonaventure divides the *rational* will itself into the concupiscible and the irascible (cf. III Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. scholion), whence also in the fatherland he attributes an act to the *irascible*, namely of holding, which sometimes is called *fruition* not properly but *by appropriation*. For that fruition properly and essentially consists in the act of the *love of friendship* is stated in I Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. unica ad 2. Yet concerning the account of fruition, as concerning certain connected matters, the doctors again think diversely according to the diverse principles which they lay down concerning the essence of beatitude, as was noted in the scholion to the last-cited passage.

**V.** These ancient controversies of the schools cannot be determined by any certain principle explored by all, since the very arguments copiously brought forward on both sides for the most part rest upon principles not conceded by their adversaries; for example, the school of St. Thomas (cf. *Summa* I. q. 82. a. 3.) brings forward in support of its own opinion that the *intellect* is the noblest of all the powers of the soul, while Scotus (here q. 4. later) contends at length for the primacy of the *will*, whom Henry of Ghent supports (Quodl. 1. q. 14), and St. Bonaventure also favours, together with Alexander of Hales, Richard of Middleton and others, as was said in II Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 6. in the scholion.

<!-- page 1008 -->

Hence Estius (here § 3.), although he prefers St. Thomas's opinion, having adduced twelve arguments for Scotus's opinion, all things weighed, concludes that most of them are "not so slight that they *rashly* led Scotus and certain others into a different opinion, so that consequently this question is not undeservedly numbered among the theological problems."

**VI.** On the 5th question itself, besides the passages cited: St. Thomas, here q. 1. and also 3. (on delight); *Summa* I-II. q. 3. a. 4. 5. 8, q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 4. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**VII.** The conclusion of the 6th question, which Jovinian denied and for which he was refuted by St. Jerome, is confirmed by the Decree of Eugene IV against the Greeks, where it is said that the Blessed see God, "yet according to the diversity of merits one more perfectly than another."

On the same: Scotus, below d. 50. q. 5. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 4; *Summa* I-II. q. 5. a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L107078–107274, with every page verified against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1006,1007,1008}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands used as given — gutters 1006:2052, 1007:1634, 1008:2077; **no bands regenerated**). Per the Vol II/IV override, the band read is authoritative in the cascade-shattered Respondeo, solutions, scholion and every footer; the OCR supplied clean running prose and marker spacing. Editorial marginal glosses bleeding inline in the OCR (*Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Opinio quorundam*, *Exemplum*, *Non probatur*, *Conclusio*, *Distinctio notanda*, *Conclusio 2*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*) were trimmed as marginalia.

**Page span.** `printed_pages: [1006, 1007, 1008]` confirmed, no narrowing. p.1008 is genuinely in range: the scholion's tail (the close of §V, then §§VI–VII) prints across the top of both columns of p.1008 before `QUAESTIO V.` begins.

**Alignment.** Opener reads *Quarto quaeritur, secundum quid insit beatitudo…* — correct for q. 4, no chunker q-swap. The title on the line after the `QUAESTIO IV.` header reads *Secundum quid beatitudo insit in anima.*, matching `title_la` exactly.

**Apparatus split map (14 entries rendered).**
- **p.1006 — 12 notes total, straight reading order** (left column top→bottom, then right column). Notes **1–2** anchor in q. 3's tail (note 1 at *sicut dicitur in Psalmo*, left col.; note 2 at *nisi inexpertus*, which continues at the **top of the right column** before the `QUAESTIO IV.` header) — **rendered by q. 3, not here**. Notes **3–12** are mine.
- **p.1007 — 4 notes, straight reading order**, all four mine (1–2 anchor in the left body column, 3–4 in the right).
- **p.1008 — 0 notes claimed.** My only content on this page is the scholion tail, which carries no numbered anchors. The entire p.1008 footer register belongs to q. 5.

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
- **To `d49-p1-a1-q3` (p.1006):** the page carries **12** notes, not fewer. q. 3 owns **notes 1 and 2**. Note 2 (*Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*) anchors at *…nemo dubitat nisi inexpertus²* at the **top of the right column** — q. 3's text crosses the gutter before Quaestio IV starts, so a reader working only the left column would miss it.
- **To `d49-p1-a1-q5` (p.1008):** ⚠ **the raw OCR is missing p.1008's entire footer block** — it runs from the body straight on with no apparatus, exactly the d.47/d.48 failure. Read off the band, p.1008's left footer column alone carries **notes 1–7** (1 Aristot. II de Caelo text. 17; 2 III Sent. d. 33. q. 1; 3 III Sent. d. 33. q. 6; 4 I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; 5 In Cantic. serm. 11. n. 5; 6 III Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5; 7 Vers. 13 / August. de Doctr. christ.), continuing into the right footer column. **All of them are q. 5's.** Also: q. 5's body begins mid-page on p.1008 *after* my scholion tail — its opener is *Quinto quaeritur, de actu gloriae sive operatione, cui insit…* under the title *Quibus potentiis insit actus sive operatio gloriae.*

**`[?]` flags.** None. Every OCR garble in range resolved cleanly at band time. Resolved OCR-vs-band disagreements, silently corrected: `SCHOLIOK` → `SCHOLION`; `nota S` → `nota 5` (p.1006 n. 6); `fiiiidam. S` → `fundam. 5` (p.1006 n. 8); `pag. S61` → `pag. 561` (p.1006 n. 12); `q. 6. ad 8.` and `q. 3. n. 5.` confirmed against the band (OCR had `n. 2S.`/`n. S.`); `Iractent` → `tractent`; `beatiludo`/`bealitudo` → `beatitudo` throughout.

**Unmapped.** Nothing. No dubia fall in this range (the distinction continues into q. 5), and my chunk's opening and closing sentences both parse and are continuous with their neighbours.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 5

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 1008 -->

### Quaestio V. *Quibus potentiis insit actus sive operatio gloriae.*

Quinto quaeritur, de actu gloriae sive operatione, cui insit, et ostenditur, quod actus eius sit omnium potentiarum.

1. Quia gloria est perfectio plena et ultima. Quia plena, ideo perficit totam animam: ergo omnem eius spiritualem potentiam. Quia ultima, ultra quam non est alia; cum ultimata perfectio sit coniuncta actui, quia actus perficit habitum[^p1008-1]: ergo omnes potentiae ponuntur in actu.

2. Item, gloria totum perficit, quod gratia disponebat; sed gratia disponit et perficit actus animae non tantum qui sunt in Deum, sed etiam qui sunt in bonum creatum, per virtutes cardinales[^p1008-2]: ergo gloriosi actus non tantum erunt in Deum, sed etiam in creaturam.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur: quia virtutes cardinales manebunt in patria in statu perfecto[^p1008-3], ergo in actu; sed actus earum est in his quae sunt ad finem, et penes eas consistit actus gloriae, quia, sicut earum actus nunc sunt gratuiti, ita tunc erunt gloriosi: ergo etc.

Item, quaeritur, utrum sit ibi actus perficiens memoriam. Et quod sic, videtur:

4. *Per rationem*: quia, si gloria reformat imaginem, et imago attenditur quantum ad *memoriam*, *intelligentiam* et *voluntatem*[^p1008-4]: ergo oportet, quod memoria sit in actu.

5. Item, hoc ipsum dicit Bernardus[^p1008-5]: « Deus futurus est intellectui plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis ».

Item, ostenditur, quod sit ibi actus irascibilis:

6. Quia quod est perfectibile virtute est perfectibile gloria; sed irascibilis perficitur spe[^p1008-6]: ergo etc.

7. Item, super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p1008-7]: *Nunc autem manent* etc.; Ambrosius dicit, quod « spei succedet beatitudo »: et Augustinus similiter hoc dicit *de Doctrina christiana*; ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** Quod non sit actus gloriae secundum omnes potentias, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi[^p1008-8]: *Ostendam illi salutare meum*; Glossa dicit, quod « visio est tota merces »: ergo tota ratio beatitudinis consistit in actu intelligentiae. — Si dicas quod hoc dictum est per quandam concomitantiam; eadem ratione debet dici, quod fides est totum meritum.

2. Item, quaeritur: quare non[^p1008-9] magis dicit de unione quam de visione?

3. Item, Augustinus *de Moribus Ecclesiae*[^p1008-10]: « Beatus est qui amat optimum, et cum habet optimum, quod amat »:

<!-- page 1009 -->

ergo videtur, quod tantum sit in actu motivae.

4. Item, Augustinus, ultimo *de Civitate Dei*[^p1009-1]: « Videbimus, amabimus, laudabimus », isti sunt actus gloriae; quodsi sufficienter eos numerat Augustinus, et hic est nullus actus memoriae nec potentiae irascibilis; patet etc.

5. Item, dotes distinguuntur penes actus gloriae; sed duae assignantur penes actum rationalis et concupiscibilis, scilicet visio et dilectio: ergo si distinguuntur aliquae penes actus memoriae et irascibilis, tunc erunt quatuor dotes; quod est contra omnium[^p1009-2] opinionem; non enim ponuntur nisi tres.

6. Similiter opponitur, quodsi ponantur actus gloriae secundum omnes virtutes, quod tunc erunt septem[^p1009-3].

Quaeritur ergo, quare actus gloriosi appellantur *dotes*; et quare tantum *tres* sint; et penes quid accipiantur et distinguantur; et cum *laus* sit actus maxime gloriosus, secundum quod dicitur super illud Psalmi[^p1009-4]: *Laudate Dominum, quoniam bonus est psalmus*; propter quid non est dos?

### Conclusio

> *Secundum tres actus gloriae, scilicet visionem potentiae rationalis, amorem concupiscibilis, comprehensionem sive tentionem irascibilis assignantur tres tantum dotes animae.*

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam obiectorum[^p1009-5] notandum, quod actus gloriosi non tantum sunt in *Deum* ut in obiectum, sed etiam in *bona creata*; gaudebit enim homo et diliget proximum. Sed quia *substantiale* praemium beatitudinis in *Deo* consistit, ideo actus gloriae principales sunt, secundum quos anima convertitur in Deum. Et secundum hos actus *dotes* assignantur, quia secundum hos anima unitur Deo tanquam sponsa sponso; et in his ditatur et repletur, non solum vigoratur. Et ideo dicuntur *dotes* quasi divitiae animae desponsatae.

Hos autem actus quidam dicunt esse *tres*, quia tria requiruntur ad hoc, quod anima perfecte gaudeat de Deo, scilicet perfecta *visio*, perfecta *dilectio* et perfecta ipsius *fruitio*. Et fruitionem dicunt non esse secundum aliam potentiam quam *rationalem* et *concupiscibilem*. Nam *irascibilis* non habet ibi actum in *Deum*, habet tamen aliquem actum, scilicet *gloriari* per virtutes, quae manent in *ipsa*[^p1009-6]; manet enim amor et fortitudo. — Sed ista positio dupliciter videtur incompetens: primum quidem, quia tunc tertia dos non differt a prima et secunda nisi *secundum rationem*; et hoc stultum est dicere. Alia via videtur inconveniens, scilicet quod *irascibilis* non habeat in gloria actum tendentem in Deum, cum in via habeat *spem*, per cuius actum tendit in Deum.

Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod omnes vires, quae habent per gratiam actum in Deum, habebunt per gloriam actus perfectos, evacuatis imperfectis. Unde *rationalis*, cuius est modo credere per fidem, tunc videbit aperte; *concupiscibilis*, cuius est amare, diliget tunc perfecte; *irascibilis*, cuius est erigi et inniti per spem, tunc tenebit continue et certe. Unde secundum hos tres actus distinguuntur tres dotes, scilicet visio, dilectio, comprehensio sive tentio sive *fruitio* per *appropriationem*; nam fruitio ista tria complectitur[^p1009-7].

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod actus gloriae sunt plures, quia secundum omnes virtutes; patet responsio: quia, etsi secundum omnes *virtutes* sint, non tamen secundum omnes *dotes*[^p1009-8] accipiuntur, sed secundum eas quae tendunt immediate in Deum.

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod visio est tota merces, et huiusmodi; dicendum, quod isti tres actus sunt omnino *coniuncti et connexi*; unde qui perfecte videt perfecte amat et habet; et ideo in Sanctorum verbis per connexionem, quod est omnium, attribuitur *uni*; magis autem *visioni* attribuitur propter hoc, quod in visione distinguitur *status patriae* a *statu viae*; non sic in *dilectione*, quia utrobique dilectio, sed in patria est visio, non in via, sed credulitas de non viso[^p1009-9].

*Ad 4. 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: quare non est unus actus penes *memoriam*? dicendum, quod *memoria* non reformatur *primo*, sed *ex consequenti* per reformationem irascibilis; ipsa enim minime subiacet libero arbitrio, et ideo actus eius reformatur per reformationem irascibilis in reformatione *gratiae*[^p1009-10]; sic et in perfectione *gloriae*. Et ratio huius est, quia

<!-- page 1010 -->

quodam modo conveniunt in actu; utriusque enim est *continue tenere*.

Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de laude, dicendum, quod aut intelligitur de laude *vocali*, et sic non est actus principalis nec debet esse dos; aut de laude *mentali*, et ita comprehendit actus trium potentiarum interiorum; et ideo non est distinguenda ab aliis, immo dicitur *tota merces*[^p1010-1].

> Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The labels below are therefore page-qualified: notes 1–10 of page 1008, notes 1–10 of page 1009, and note 1 of page 1010.

---

english:
### Question V. *In which powers the act or operation of glory resides.*

Fifthly it is asked, concerning the act or operation of glory, in what it resides; and it is shown that its act belongs to all the powers.

1. Because glory is a full and ultimate perfection. Because it is full, it therefore perfects the whole soul: therefore every spiritual power of it. Because it is ultimate, beyond which there is no other; since an ultimate perfection is conjoined to act, because act perfects a habit[^p1008-1]: therefore all the powers are placed in act.

2. Likewise, glory perfects the whole of what grace was disposing; but grace disposes and perfects the acts of the soul, not only those which are toward God, but also those which are toward a created good, through the cardinal virtues[^p1008-2]: therefore glorious acts will be not only toward God, but also toward the creature.

3. Likewise, this is shown: because the cardinal virtues will remain in the fatherland in a perfect state[^p1008-3], therefore in act; but their act is in those things which are toward the end, and in them the act of glory consists, because, just as their acts are now gratuitous, so then they will be glorious: therefore etc.

Likewise, it is asked whether there is there an act perfecting the memory. And that there is, seems so:

4. *By reason*: because, if glory reforms the image, and the image is regarded with respect to *memory*, *intelligence*, and *will*[^p1008-4]: therefore it must be that memory is in act.

5. Likewise, Bernard says this very thing[^p1008-5]: « God will be to the intellect a fullness of light, to the will a multitude of peace, to the memory a continuation of eternity ».

Likewise, it is shown that there is there an act of the irascible:

6. Because that which is perfectible by virtue is perfectible by glory; but the irascible is perfected by hope[^p1008-6]: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, upon that text of First Corinthians thirteen[^p1008-7]: *But now there remain* etc.; Ambrose says that « beatitude will succeed to hope »: and Augustine likewise says this in *On Christian Doctrine*; therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** That there is not an act of glory according to all the powers, seems so.

1. Upon that text of the Psalm[^p1008-8]: *I will show him my salvation*; the Gloss says that « vision is the whole reward »: therefore the whole account of beatitude consists in the act of the intelligence. — If you say that this is said by a certain concomitance; by the same reasoning it would have to be said that faith is the whole merit.

2. Likewise, it is asked: why does he not[^p1008-9] rather speak of union than of vision?

3. Likewise, Augustine *On the Morals of the Church*[^p1008-10]: « He is blessed who loves the best, and when he has the best, which he loves »:

therefore it seems that it lies only in the act of the motive power.

4. Likewise, Augustine, in the last book *On the City of God*[^p1009-1]: « We shall see, we shall love, we shall praise » — these are the acts of glory; and if Augustine enumerates them sufficiently, then here there is no act of memory nor of the irascible power; it is clear etc.

5. Likewise, the dowries are distinguished according to the acts of glory; but two are assigned according to the act of the rational and of the concupiscible, namely vision and love: therefore if any are distinguished according to the acts of memory and of the irascible, then there will be four dowries; which is against everyone's[^p1009-2] opinion; for only three are posited.

6. Similarly it is objected, that if acts of glory are posited according to all the virtues, then there will be seven[^p1009-3].

It is asked therefore why the glorious acts are called *dowries*; and why they are only *three*; and according to what they are taken and distinguished; and since *praise* is the most glorious act, according to what is said upon that text of the Psalm[^p1009-4]: *Praise ye the Lord, for a psalm is good*; on what account is it not a dowry?

### Conclusio

> *According to the three acts of glory — namely the vision of the rational power, the love of the concupiscible, the comprehension or holding of the irascible — only three dowries of the soul are assigned.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the objections[^p1009-5] it must be noted that glorious acts are not only toward *God* as toward an object, but also toward *created goods*; for man will rejoice and will love his neighbour. But because the *substantial* reward of beatitude consists in *God*, therefore the principal acts of glory are those according to which the soul is turned toward God. And according to these acts the *dowries* are assigned, because according to these the soul is united to God as a bride to a bridegroom; and in these she is enriched and filled, not merely invigorated. And therefore they are called *dowries*, as it were the riches of a betrothed soul.

But some say that these acts are *three*, because three things are required for the soul to rejoice perfectly in God, namely perfect *vision*, perfect *love*, and perfect *fruition* of him. And they say that fruition is not according to any other power than the *rational* and the *concupiscible*. For the *irascible* does not have there an act toward *God*, yet it has some act, namely to *glory* through the virtues which remain in *it*[^p1009-6]; for love and fortitude remain. — But this position seems incompetent in two ways: first indeed, because then the third dowry does not differ from the first and the second except *in account*; and it is foolish to say this. The other way seems unfitting, namely that the *irascible* should not have in glory an act tending toward God, since on the way it has *hope*, by whose act it tends toward God.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that all the powers which have through grace an act toward God will have through glory perfect acts, the imperfect ones being done away. Hence the *rational*, whose office it is now to believe through faith, will then see openly; the *concupiscible*, whose office it is to love, will then love perfectly; the *irascible*, whose office it is to be raised up and to lean by hope, will then hold continuously and certainly. Hence according to these three acts three dowries are distinguished, namely vision, love, comprehension or holding or *fruition* by *appropriation*; for fruition embraces these three[^p1009-7].

To that, therefore, which is objected, that the acts of glory are many, because according to all the virtues; the response is clear: because, even if they are according to all the *virtues*, they are nevertheless not taken according to all the *dowries*[^p1009-8], but according to those which tend immediately toward God.

*To 1, 2, 3.* To that which is objected, that vision is the whole reward, and the like; it must be said that these three acts are altogether *conjoined and connected*; hence he who sees perfectly loves perfectly and possesses; and therefore in the words of the Saints, by that connection, what belongs to all is attributed to *one*; but it is rather attributed to *vision* on account of this, that in vision the *state of the fatherland* is distinguished from the *state of the way*; not so in *love*, because in both there is love, but in the fatherland there is vision, not on the way, but rather belief concerning what is not seen[^p1009-9].

*To 4, 5.* To that which is objected: why is there not one act according to *memory*? it must be said that *memory* is not reformed *first*, but *as a consequence*, through the reformation of the irascible; for it is least of all subject to free choice, and therefore its act is reformed through the reformation of the irascible in the reformation of *grace*[^p1009-10]; and so too in the perfection of *glory*. And the reason for this is, that

in a certain way they agree in act; for it belongs to both *to hold continuously*.

To that which is objected last concerning praise, it must be said that either it is understood of *vocal* praise, and thus it is not a principal act nor ought it to be a dowry; or of *mental* praise, and thus it comprehends the acts of the three interior powers; and therefore it is not to be distinguished from the others, but rather is called *the whole reward*[^p1010-1].

---

la: Quia, ut dicit Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 17. (c. 3.), eorum unumquodque, quorum est opus [i. e. operatio], est gratia operis. Cfr. II. de Anima, text. 5. (c. 1.).

en: Because, as Aristotle says, *On the Heavens and the World* II, text 17 (c. 3), each of those things whose work [i.e. operation] there is, is for the sake of the work. Cf. *On the Soul* II, text 5 (c. 1).

la: Ut ostensum est III. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. — Pro *et perficit* plures codd. et ed. 1 *ergo perficit*, codd. K V *ergo et*.

en: As was shown in III *Sent.* d. 33, q. 1. — For *et perficit* several codices and ed. 1 read *ergo perficit*; codices K V, *ergo et*.

la: Vide III. Sent. d. 33. q. 6; ibid. in solut. ad 3 ostenditur, eas remanere, licet actus earum sint circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Infra edd. et plurimi codd. *actus eorum*.

en: See III *Sent.* d. 33, q. 6; there, in the solution to 3, it is shown that they remain, although their acts are concerned with those things which are toward the end. Below, the editions and most codices read *actus eorum*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. (praecipue ad 4, ubi de *memoria*).

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 (especially at the reply to 4, where the *memory* is treated).

la: In Cantic. serm. 11. n. 5.

en: *On the Canticle*, sermon 11, n. 5.

la: Ut ostensum est III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — Cod. aa addit: *sicut rationalis fide et concupiscibilis caritate*.

en: As was shown in III *Sent.* d. 26, a. 2, q. 5. — Codex aa adds: *just as the rational by faith and the concupiscible by charity*.

la: Vers. 13. — Expositio huius loci, quae sequitur, est August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 38. n. 42, et exhibetur a Petro Lombardo in I. Cor. 13, 13. Ambros., II. de Officiis ministr. c. 5. n. 18: *Vita enim beata fructus praesentium, vita autem aeterna spes futurorum est.* Cfr. Epist. 35. n. 13. seqq., et in Rom. (inter opera Ambros.) 5, 4.

en: Verse 13. — The exposition of this passage, which follows, is Augustine's, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 38, n. 42, and is set out by Peter Lombard on I Cor. 13, 13. Ambrose, *On the Duties of Ministers* II, c. 5, n. 18: *For the blessed life is the fruit of present things, but eternal life is the hope of things to come.* Cf. *Letter* 35, n. 13 ff., and on Romans (among the works of Ambrose) 5, 4.

la: Psalm. 90, 16. — Glossa, quam exhibet Petr. Lombard. in hunc loc., sumta est ex August. (Serm. 2. in Ps. 90. n. 13.), cuius verba vide tom. II. pag. 543, nota 6.

en: Psalm 90, 16. — The Gloss, which Peter Lombard sets out on this passage, is taken from Augustine (*Sermon* 2 on Ps. 90, n. 13), whose words see in tome II, p. 543, note 6.

la: Ex cod. F supplevimus *non*, sensu hoc exigente. Subinde pro *visione* Vat. *dilectione*.

en: From codex F we have supplied *non*, the sense requiring it. Thereupon, for *visione* the Vatican edition reads *dilectione*.

la: Libr. I. c. 3. n. 4: *Beatus autem, quantum existimo, neque ille dici potest, qui non habet quod amat, qualecumque sit; neque qui habet quod amat, si noxium sit; neque qui non amat quod habet, etiam si optimum sit... Quartum restat, ut video, ubi beata vita inveniri queat, cum id quod est hominis optimum, et amatur et habetur.* — Pro *habet*, quod praebent codd. E L O P S Y, alii codd. et edd. *amat*. Cod. aa brevius: *Beatus est, cum amans obtinuit optimum, quod amat.*

en: Book I, c. 3, n. 4: *But blessed, so far as I judge, can neither he be called who does not have what he loves, whatever it may be; nor he who has what he loves, if it be harmful; nor he who does not love what he has, even if it be the best... A fourth case remains, as I see, in which the blessed life can be found, when that which is man's best is both loved and possessed.* — For *habet*, which codices E L O P S Y give, other codices and editions read *amat*. Codex aa, more briefly: *He is blessed, when loving he has obtained the best, which he loves.*

la: Cap. 30. n. 5: *Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus.* — Inferius post *Augustinus* cod. E addit *et Hugo*, qui II. de Sacram. p. XVIII. c. 22. eadem verba exhibet.

en: Chapter 30, n. 5: *There we shall be at leisure and shall see, we shall see and shall love, we shall love and shall praise.* — Below, after *Augustinus*, codex E adds *and Hugh*, who in *On the Sacraments* II, p. XVIII, c. 22, sets out the same words.

la: Codd. E G I L *communem*.

en: Codices E G I L read *communem*.

la: Cod. aa addit: *penes tres virtutes theologicas et quatuor cardinales*.

en: Codex aa adds: *according to the three theological virtues and the four cardinal ones*.

la: Psalm. 146, 1, ubi Petr. Lombard. Glossam hanc secundum August. (in hunc loc.) refert: *Quasi dicat: ideo laudate, quoniam bonum est laudare; ipsa enim laus Dei est nostra beatitudo... Bonus ergo est psalmus, quia bona est laus Dei. In laude namque Dei ipse actus est merces, quae et in futuro erit.*

en: Psalm 146, 1, where Peter Lombard reports this Gloss according to Augustine (on this passage): *As if he were to say: praise for this reason, because it is good to praise; for the very praise of God is our beatitude... Therefore the psalm is good, because the praise of God is good. For in the praise of God the act itself is the reward, which will be also in the future.*

la: Cod. bb *praedictorum*.

en: Codex bb reads *praedictorum*.

la: In cod. A recentior manus addidit *patria*.

en: In codex A a later hand has added *patria*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1, ubi etiam in solut. ad 3. tangitur solut., quae habetur hic ad 1.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, where also in the solution to 3 that solution is touched upon which is given here at the reply to 1.

la: Cod. bb *actus*, Vat. *actus dotes*. Inferius pro *eas quae*, quod habet cod. K, in aliis et edd. *eos qui*.

en: Codex bb reads *actus*; the Vatican edition, *actus dotes*. Below, for *eas quae*, which codex K has, in the others and in the editions *eos qui*.

la: Cfr. I. Cor. 13, 8. seqq. — Cod. K (I a secunda manu) *non in via, secundum quod fides esse dicitur de non viso*. Superius pro *et habet* cod. S *et tenet vel habet*.

en: Cf. I Cor. 13, 8 ff. — Codex K (I, by a second hand) reads *not on the way, according as faith is said to be of what is not seen*. Above, for *et habet* codex S reads *et tenet vel habet*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Multi codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *sic et in perfectione gloriae*; cod. G legit: *sicut et in perfectione gloriae*.

en: See I *Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, at the reply to 4. — Many codices and ed. 1 omit *sic et in perfectione gloriae*; codex G reads: *sicut et in perfectione gloriae*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 1009, nota 4. — Superius post *principalis* cod. aa addit *quia actus corporis*. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Cf. above, p. 1009, note 4. — Above, after *principalis*, codex aa adds *because it is an act of the body*. — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L107275–107472, verified throughout against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1008,1009,1010}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands used as given; none regenerated). Footers read entirely off the bands. English translated literally, paragraph-for-paragraph.

**Page span corrected.** Skeleton had `printed_pages: [1008, 1009]`. The chunk's final two paragraphs (`quodam modo conveniunt in actu…` through `…dicitur tota merces`) print at the head of **p.1010**, above `QUAESTIO VI.` — widened to `[1008, 1009, 1010]` (pdf 1028–1030). This is a widening, not the usual narrowing.

**Apparatus split map (21 entries).**
- **p.1008 — notes 1–10, all claimed here.** q5 begins at the top of p.1008; the material above it on that page is q4's *scholion* (raw L107253–107270), which carries no numbered register. Binding: left footer prints 1–7 (note 7 **overflows** across the gutter into the right footer), right footer continues 7 and prints 8, 9, 10. All ten anchors fall in reading order, 1–7 in the left body column and 8–10 in the right.
- **p.1009 — notes 1–10, all claimed here.** q6 does not begin until p.1010, so none carry over. Binding: left footer 1–4, right footer 5–10. **Note 5's anchor sits in the LEFT body column** (`Ad intelligentiam obiectorum⁵`, in the Respondeo) while its note prints in the RIGHT footer — a sixth distinct binding behaviour for d.49. Bound by content (`Cod. bb praedictorum` = variant for *obiectorum*), not by position.
- **p.1010 — note 1 only.** Confirmed mine by content on both limbs: *Cfr. supra pag. 1009, nota 4* matches `dicitur tota merces`, and *Superius post principalis cod. aa addit quia actus corporis* matches `non est actus principalis`. Notes 2–10 of p.1010 belong to `p1-a1-q6`.

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
- To `d49-p1-a1-q4`: I claim **all ten** notes of p.1008. Nothing on p.1008's numbered register is left for q4; if q4's account differs, the bands (p1008-L-2, p1008-R-2) show exactly ten entries, 1–7 left with 7 spilling right, then 8–10 right.
- To `d49-p1-a1-q6`: I claim **all ten** notes of p.1009 and **note 1 only** of p.1010. p.1010 notes **2–10 are yours** (note 2 = *Vers. 9. seqq. — Seq. locus est I. Cor. 15, 41…*, which anchors your arg. 1). Your body begins at `QUAESTIO VI.` after my closing paragraph on p.1010.

**Verification.** Ordinal opener aligns: *Quinto quaeritur, de actu gloriae sive operatione…* — no q-swap. The title printed under the `QUAESTIO V.` header (*Quibus potentiis insit actus sive operatio gloriae*) agrees with the frontmatter; no correction needed. Latin `[^` anchors = 21; English `[^` anchors = 21. No scholion of q5's own (p.1010 note 1 explicitly refers the reader to the scholion of the *preceding* question) — `has_scholion: false` retained. The boxed full-width `CONCLUSIO` on p.1009-L is the ordinary conclusio, not a scholion, and is rendered as a blockquote in body position.

**Marginalia trimmed** (editorial side-labels, not text): *Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Quaestio 4.*, *Notandum.*, *1. 3. quaest.*, *Non probatur.*, *Opinio 2.*, *Conclusio.*, *Ad 2. 3. fundam. et 6. ad oppos.*, *Ad 1. 2. 3. ad oppos.*, *Ad 4. 5. fundam.*, *Ad 4. quaest.*

**Nothing unmapped. No `[?]` flags** — every band read was legible; OCR garbles (`aclus`, `qiiaeritur`, `imione`, `ViuAq rationalis` → *Unde rationalis*, `AxcenAxim` → *dicendum*, `oinm?` → *omnes*, `palet` → *patet*) were all resolved directly against the bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 6

source_text:
<!-- page 1010 -->

### Quaestio VI. *De differenti participatione beatitudinis, utrum scilicet omnes habeant aequalem beatitudinem.*

Sexto quaeritur, de differenti participatione beatitudinis; et quaeritur, utrum omnes habeant aequalem beatitudinem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ex textu Matthaei vigesimo[^p1010-2]; ibi dicitur, quod omnes acceperunt singulos denarios, et quod Dominus tantum dedit novissimo, quantum primo. Et Glossa dicit primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto super illud: *Stella differt a stella*: « Eundem denarium Paterfamilias dedit omnibus, qui operati sunt in vinea; quo utique aliquid significatur, quod omnes communiter habebunt »; sed illud non est nisi beatitudo: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus[^p1010-3]: « In dispari claritate erit par gaudium »; sed beatitudo est gaudium per essentiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia beatitudo consistit in Deo, qui est bonum summum in fine[^p1010-4] et omnino invariabile, non recipiens magis et minus: ergo nec beatitudo recipit magis et minus. — *Si dicas*, quod consistit in Dei participatione, quae magis et minus recipit; *contra*: unusquisque tantum participabit Deum in gloria, quod non volet nec poterit plus participare: ergo unusquisque in summo; sed quod summum est est in termino, et quod est in termino non recipit magis et minus[^p1010-5]: ergo etc.

4. Item, tantum diliget unusquisque homo proximum, sicut se ipsum: ergo tantum gaudebit Linus de gloria Petri et tantum volet eam Petro, quantum sibi; et si hoc, tantum gaudebit de gloria Petri, quantum si eam haberet; sed si haberet, tantum gauderet, quantum Petrus gaudet[^p1010-6]: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Ioannis decimo quarto[^p1010-7]: *In domo Patris mei mansiones multae sunt*; Augustinus: « Multae mansiones in una vita erunt, quia variae praemiorum dignitates ».

2. Item, Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^p1010-8]: *Stella differt a stella in claritate*: si ergo claritas cognitionis generat gaudium et delectationem et differens est, ergo differens erit gaudium.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia praemium respondet merito; sed constat, aliquos esse maioris meriti: ergo et praemii[^p1010-9].

4. Item, Augustinus[^p1010-10]: « Si essent aequalia, non essent omnia »: ordo ergo facit ad perfectionem; sed superna civitas est perfectissima: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Sicut beatitudo, sic praemium, sumtum ut obiectum, omnino unum est, sumtum vero formaliter, est unum unitate conformitatis et connexionis, differens vero quantitate gaudii et remunerationis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod diversitas et distinctio est in *praemiis* secundum maius et minus, sicut fuit in *meritis*.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod sicut *beatitudo*, ut dictum est supra[^p1010-11], dicitur dupliciter: vel satians *effective* sicut *obiectum*, vel satians *informative* sicut *perfectio*; sic et *praemium* sive *donum*. Nam si dicatur sicut *obiectum*, <!-- page 1011 --> omnino una est merces, unus Deus, una beatitudo, unum praemium. Si autem *formaliter* dicitur, beatitudo *una* est unitate conformitatis et unitate connexionis, sed tamen *differens* est quantitate gaudii et remunerationis. Unus enim alio clarius videt Deum et magis de illo gaudet et strictius tenet.

*1. 2.* Et sic patet primum de denario. Patet etiam secundum, quomodo gaudium *par* dicitur, non, inquam, *intensive*, sed *extensive*, quia de eisdem et tot gaudet unus, de quibus et quot gaudet alter.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quilibet participat Deum in summo; dicendum, quod est summum *simpliciter* et summum *huic*. Nullus participat[^p1011-1] in summo *simpliciter*, sed in summo *sibi*; quilibet enim tantum participat, non quin possit participari plus, sed non plus *ab ipso*, quia non potest ultra proficere et contentus est omnino eo statu, quem habet.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum gaudet de bono proximi, quantum de suo; dicendum, quod verum est; unde Petrus plus gaudet de bono Lini quam ipse Linus; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod tantum gaudeat, quantum si haberet illud[^p1011-2], quia, si haberet illud bonum, haberet maiorem caritatem et potestatem intensius gaudendi. — His visis, satis patent ea quae possent dici circa litteram[^p1011-3].

> The numbered footnotes below are Quaracchi's, and Quaracchi restarts its numbering on every printed page. The labels here are therefore page-qualified: notes 2–11 of page 1010 and notes 1–3 of page 1011. Note 1 of page 1010 anchors in the preceding question (q.5), and note 4 of page 1011 anchors in the Pars II divisio that follows; neither is rendered here.

---

english:
### Question VI. *On the differing participation in beatitude, namely whether all have equal beatitude.*

Sixth, the question is asked concerning the differing participation in beatitude; and it is asked whether all have equal beatitude. And that they do, it seems:

1. From the text of Matthew, chapter twenty[^p1010-2]; for there it is said that all received their several denarii, and that the Lord gave as much to the last as to the first. And the Gloss says, on First Corinthians fifteen, upon that text: *Star differs from star*: « The same denarius the Householder gave to all who worked in the vineyard; by which surely something is signified that all will have in common »; but that is nothing other than beatitude: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^p1010-3]: « In unequal brightness there will be equal joy »; but beatitude is joy by essence: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because beatitude consists in God, who is the highest good in the end[^p1010-4] and altogether invariable, not admitting of more and less: therefore neither does beatitude admit of more and less. — *If you say* that it consists in participation of God, which does admit of more and less; *on the contrary*: each one will participate God in glory to just such a degree that he will neither will nor be able to participate more: therefore each one is at the highest; but what is highest is at the term, and what is at the term does not admit of more and less[^p1010-5]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, each man will love his neighbour as much as himself: therefore Linus will rejoice as much over Peter's glory, and will will it for Peter as much, as for himself; and if this is so, he will rejoice as much over Peter's glory as if he had it himself; but if he had it, he would rejoice as much as Peter rejoices[^p1010-6]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. John, chapter fourteen[^p1010-7]: *In my Father's house there are many mansions*; Augustine: « There will be many mansions in one life, because the dignities of the rewards are various ».

2. Likewise, the Apostle, First Corinthians fifteen[^p1010-8]: *Star differs from star in brightness*: if therefore the brightness of knowledge generates joy and delight, and is differing, then the joy will be differing.

3. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because the reward answers to the merit; but it is established that some are of greater merit: therefore also of greater reward[^p1010-9].

4. Likewise, Augustine[^p1010-10]: « If they were equal, they would not be all things »: order therefore makes for perfection; but the heavenly city is most perfect: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *As beatitude, so the reward: taken as object, it is altogether one; but taken formally, it is one by the unity of conformity and of connexion, yet differing in the quantity of joy and of remuneration.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is diversity and distinction in the *rewards* according to more and less, just as there was in the *merits*.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that, just as *beatitude*, as was said above[^p1010-11], is spoken of in two ways — either as satisfying *effectively*, like an *object*, or as satisfying *informatively*, like a *perfection* — so also is the *reward* or *gift*. For if it be spoken of as *object*, <!-- page 1011 --> the wage is altogether one, one God, one beatitude, one reward. But if it is spoken of *formally*, beatitude is *one* by the unity of conformity and by the unity of connexion, yet is nevertheless *differing* in the quantity of joy and of remuneration. For one sees God more clearly than another, and rejoices more over him, and holds him more closely.

*To 1 and 2.* And thus the first, about the denarius, is clear. The second is also clear, namely in what way the joy is called *equal*: not, I say, *intensively*, but *extensively*, because one rejoices over the same things and over as many things as the other rejoices over.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that each one participates God at the highest; it must be said that there is a highest *simply* and a highest *for this one*. No one participates[^p1011-1] at the highest *simply*, but at the highest *for himself*; for each participates only so much — not that it could not be participated more, but not more *by him*, because he cannot advance further and is altogether content with the state he has.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he rejoices as much over his neighbour's good as over his own; it must be said that this is true; whence Peter rejoices more over Linus's good than Linus himself does; but from this it does not follow that he rejoices as much as if he had it[^p1011-2], because, if he had that good, he would have a greater charity and a greater power of rejoicing more intensely. — These things being seen, what could be said concerning the letter is sufficiently clear[^p1011-3].

---

la: Vers. 9. seqq. — Seq. locus est I. Cor. 15, 41. — Glossam integram exhibet Petr. Lombard. (in hunc loc.), et sumta est ex August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 67. n. 2. Cfr. de Sancta Virginitate, c. 26. n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Verses 9 ff. — The following passage is I Cor. 15, 41. — Peter Lombard gives the Gloss entire (on this passage), and it is taken from Augustine, *On the Gospel of John*, tr. 67, n. 2. Compare *On Holy Virginity*, c. 26, n. 26. See here the letter of the Master, c. 1.

la: Potius Prosper, Lib. sententiarum ex Augustino, n. 362. (alias 360.), ubi edd. nostrae Augustini (ex Ioan. Evang. tr. 67. n. 2.) sic habent: *Sed ut Deus omnia in omnibus erit* [I. Cor. 15, 28.], *fiet etiam in dispari claritate per gaudium, ut quod habent singuli commune sit omnibus*. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi cum ed. Prosperi (Venetiis 1744) ponitur: *par gaudium*. — Fide codd. BCGLNQSY aa hoc arg. supplevimus.

en: Rather Prosper, *Book of Sentences from Augustine*, n. 362 (otherwise 360), where our editions of Augustine (from *On the Gospel of John*, tr. 67, n. 2) read thus: *But as God will be all in all* [I Cor. 15, 28], *it will also come about, in unequal brightness, through joy, that what individuals have should be common to all*. Compare here the letter of the Master, c. 3, where, with the Prosper edition (Venice 1744), it is given as: *equal joy*. — On the authority of codices BCGLNQSY aa we have supplied this argument.

la: Vat. *infinitum*, sed cfr. tom. I. pag. 806, nota 6. — Plurimi codd. omittunt inferius *ergo nec... et minus*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *infinite*, but compare tom. I, p. 806, note 6. — Very many codices omit the following *therefore neither... and less*.

la: Secundum modum loquendi Gilberti Porretani; cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 4. scholion; tom. II. pag. 111, nota 9. et pag. 787, nota 6.

en: According to the manner of speaking of Gilbert of Poitiers; compare I *Sent.*, d. 17, p. II, q. 4, scholion; tom. II, p. 111, note 9, and p. 787, note 6.

la: Hoc arg. est secundum Anselm., Proslog. c. 25, quod etiam auctor libri de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.) c. 64. refert. Cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 67. n. 2, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: This argument is according to Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 25, which the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among Augustine's works), c. 64, also reports. Compare Augustine, *On the Gospel of John*, tr. 67, n. 2, and here the letter of the Master, c. 3.

la: Vers. 2. — August., in hunc loc. (tr. 67. n. 2.): *Sed multae mansiones diversas meritorum in una vita aeterna significant dignitates.*

en: Verse 2. — Augustine, on this passage (tr. 67, n. 2): *But the many mansions signify the diverse dignities of merits within one eternal life.*

la: Vers. 41. — Anselm., Proslog. c. 26: *Utique tantum gaudebunt* [Beati], *quantum amabunt; tantum amabunt, quantum cognoscent.*

en: Verse 41. — Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 26: *Assuredly they* [the Blessed] *will rejoice as much as they love; they will love as much as they know.*

la: Vide August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. n. 2.

en: See Augustine, *On the City of God* XXII, c. 30, n. 2.

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41. Cfr. supra pag. 961, nota 8. — Inferius pro *sed* multi codd. *ergo*, cod. K (I a secunda manu) *ergo si*.

en: *Book of 83 Questions*, q. 41. Compare above, p. 961, note 8. — Below, in place of *but* many codices have *therefore*, and codex K (I by a second hand) *therefore if*.

la: Quaest. I.

en: Question I.

la: In Vat. additur *Deum*.

en: In the Vatican edition *God* is added.

la: Codd. IK aa supplent *bonum*. — De hac sententia cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 3.

en: Codices IK aa supply *good*. — On this opinion compare III *Sent.*, d. 31, a. 3, q. 3.

la: Vide scholion ad 4. huius articuli quaest.

en: See the scholion on the 4th question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` L107473–107629, verified against the 450 dpi column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{1010,1011}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (bands used as given; none regenerated). English translated literally, paragraph-for-paragraph. No scholion in this question — Quaracchi's own p.1011 note 3 redirects the reader to the scholion on q.4 of this article, so the absence is expected, not a dropout.

**Printed-page correction.** Skeleton said `printed_pages: [1009, 1010, 1011]`; **narrowed to [1010, 1011]** (pdf 1030–1031). The p.1010 running head sits at raw L107464, i.e. *before* this chunk's `line_start` of 107473 — `QUAESTIO VI.` is printed on p.1010, and no part of this question's body or apparatus falls on p.1009. Page 1009 belongs wholly to q.5.

**Page → apparatus split map** (13 entries rendered here):

| Page | Register | This chunk | Elsewhere |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1010 | notes 1–11 (single register) | **2–11** (10 entries) | note 1 → `p1-a1-q5` (*"Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."*, *quia actus corporis*, on the *laus/dos* reply) |
| 1011 | notes 1–4 (single register) | **1–3** (3 entries) | note 4 → `p2-divisio` (*"Auctor hic duo, quae principaliter quaeruntur, iterum distribuit… primae divisioni nomen sectionis superscripsimus"* — the editors' own justification of SECTIO) |

**Marker binding order — p.1010 and p.1011 both bind in straight reading order, but p.1010's register OVERFLOWS the gutter.** On p.1010 the left footer column carries notes 1–5 and note 5 breaks mid-sentence at the column edge (`…cfr. I.` | `Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 4. scholion; tom. II. pag. 111, nota 9. et pag. 787, nota 6.`), its second half printing at the head of the right footer column ahead of note 6. Rendered as one entry. p.1011's four notes print 1–3 left, 4 right, all in reading order. Bindings were made by content, not position.

**Pars I → Pars II boundary is CLEAN.** This chunk's last sentence — *"— His visis, satis patent ea quae possent dici circa litteram."* — parses and is the natural close of Pars I. Raw L107630 opens `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIX. / Pars II. / De gloria corporis sive de stola secunda.`; nothing of the Pars II divisio, of the `SECTIO I` header, or of its prologue is trapped in this range. Confirmed on the p.1011-L bands, where the `COMMENTARIUS` display head is visibly separated from the body above it by the footer rule.

**Ordinal opener aligned.** `Sexto quaeritur, de differenti participatione beatitudinis…` — correct for q.6, and it is the sixth and last of the six the Pars I TRACTATIO promises. No q-swap. The title taken from the line after the `QUAESTIO VI.` header matches the skeleton's `title_la` exactly (band-confirmed on p.1010-R-0); no correction needed.

**Dubia — ABSENT, and positively so.** The right margin of p.1011, beside the closing sentence, carries the printed editorial gloss **`Dubia circa lit. desunt.`** ("the dubia concerning the letter are lacking"). This is direct printed testimony that d.49 Pars I has no dubia section — not merely an un-greppable one. Trimmed from the body as marginalia; recorded here because the brief asked. (Pars II's own end, at p.1032–1033, is outside this chunk and unchecked.)

**Hand-offs forwarded.**
- → `p1-a1-q5`: p.1010 note 1 is yours; this chunk claims 2–11. p.1009 is entirely yours — this chunk touches no part of it.
- → `p2-divisio`: p.1011 note 4 is yours; this chunk claims 1–3. Your body begins at the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIX. / Pars II.` display head in the lower left column of p.1011, immediately below this chunk's close.
- → `p2-s1-a1-q1`: p.1011 carries no notes beyond 4, so nothing from that page is owed to you.

**Marginalia trimmed** (editorial side-glosses, not Bonaventure's text): p.1010 `Ad oppositum.`, `Fundam.`, `Conclusio` (×2); p.1011 `Ad opp.`, `Solutio.`, `Notandum.`, `Dubia circa lit. desunt.`

**`[?]` flags:** none. Every band read was legible; no reading required a guess. Nothing in the range is unmapped.