title: Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De augmento caritatis.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum caritas secundum substantiam augeri possit.*

Quantum ad primum ostenditur, quod caritas possit augeri secundum substantiam:

1. Per Augustinum ad Bonifacium[^1]: «Caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: caritas viae secundum substantiam minor est caritate patriae; sed a caritate viae ad caritatem patriae contingit devenire, ipsa salvata in esse, quoniam *caritas viae numquam excidit*[^2]; sed motus a minori ad maius, re salva, est augmentum[^3]: ergo contingit caritatem augmentari.

3. Item, constat, quod diversis maiora et minora praemia tribuuntur; unde Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^4]: *Alia claritas solis, alia claritas lunae* etc.; et constat, quod uni et eidem secundum diversos status debetur diversum praemium, scilicet maius et minus; sed magnitudo praemii substantialis respondet quantitati caritatis, non secundum fervorem, sed secundum substantiam: ergo si contingit, maius praemium alicui deberi, ergo et caritatem substantialiter augeri.

4. Item, contingit caritatem meliorari, cum non sit summum bonum; sed caritas est bona substantialiter: ergo contingit, caritatem secundum suam substantiam fieri meliorem. Sed ut dicit Augustinus in sexto *de Trinitate*, octavo capitulo[^5]: «In spiritualibus idem est maius et melius»: ergo cum caritas sit quid spirituale, possibile est, secundum substantiam ipsam effici maiorem.

5. Item, constat quod in uno et eodem caritas potest in maiorem effectum et actum: ergo cum maioritas effectus veniat a magnitudine virtutis, possibile est, caritatem maiorem effici secundum virtutem. Tunc quaero: aut caritas est sua virtus, aut non: si sic: ergo augmentata virtute, necesse est, augeri essentiam caritatis; si non, tunc quaero de illa virtute: aut habet essentiam, aut non; si sic, similiter quaero de illa: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel necesse est poni, quod aliquid augeatur secundum substantiam; sed qua ratione alia virtus, et caritas.

**Sed contra:** 1. Caritas est forma; sed omnis forma consistit in essentia invariabili[^6]: ergo et caritas; sed nihil invariabile secundum essentiam augetur secundum essentiam: ergo nec caritas.

2. Item, ubi augmentum, ibi maius et minus[^7]; sed ubi est simplicitas, ibi non est maius et minus: si ergo caritas est forma simplex et non extensa, in caritate non erit augmentum.

3. Item, augmentum in corporalibus est secundum accidens, et non secundum substantiam[^8]: ergo pari ratione et in spiritualibus: ergo si caritas augetur, hoc est solum secundum accidens, non secundum substantiam.

4. Item, quod augetur mutatur[^9], et quod augetur secundum substantiam mutatur secundum substantiam; sed quod substantialiter mutatur est aliud nunc quam prius: ergo quod augetur secundum substantiam non manet: si ergo *caritas numquam excidit*[^10] nisi per peccatum, sed semper manet, ergo non augetur.

> **Conclusio.** Caritas secundum substantiam sive secundum quantitatem virtutis augeri potest.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum communem opinionem verum est, caritatem substantialiter augeri.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum distinguunt quidam augmentum secundum duplicem differentiam. Augmentum enim est, quando minori succedit maius; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel ita, quod illud idem, quod prius fuit minus, postea fiat maius, sicut homo dicitur augeri vel aliquod aliud quantum, et hoc modo[^11] caritas non augetur, ut dicunt; vel ideo, quod minori succedat maius, non idem numero, sed consimile in forma, sicut dies dicuntur augeri, non quia idem dies primo[^12] sit minor et postea maior, sed quia minori succedit maior; sic dicunt augeri caritatem, ac per hoc posse evadere oppositiones.

Sed positio ista, ut supra probatum est[^13], non potest stare. Ostensum est enim, quod caritate manente eadem, contingit, circa eandem fieri crementum et perfectionem.

Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod augmentum sequitur quantitatem. Quantitas autem dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et metaphorice: proprie dicitur quantitas molis, et haec est in corporalibus; metaphorice quantitas virtutis, et haec est[^14] in spiritualibus. Sic et augmentum dicitur dupliciter: proprie, scilicet secundum magnitudinem molis, et metaphorice secundum quantitatem virtutis. Cum ergo in caritate sit quantitas virtutis, et non in summo, constans est, caritatem augeri posse. Rursus, cum virtus sit idem quod substantia caritatis, et sit[^15] quantitas virtutis, hinc est, quod de necessitate sequitur, caritatem augeri secundum substantiam; cum enim sit virtus, eius substantia non est alia a virtute.

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1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod essentia formae est invariabilis; dicendum, quod verum est de forma universali; si autem dicatur de forma singulari, verum est in se considerata, sed non prout in alio[^16].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicitas non admittit magnitudinem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non admittit magnitudinem molis, admittit tamen magnitudinem virtutis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augmentum[^17] in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, patet responsio. Nam quantitas molis est accidens, essentialiter differens a quanto; non autem sic est in quantis quantitate virtutis, immo quantitas virtutis essentialis est, ut in opponendo probatum est[^18].

Potest tamen dici, quod cum dicitur, quod[^19] motus augmenti in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, dupliciter potest accipi hoc quod est *secundum*: aut quod dicat habitudinem termini per se sive termini formalis, et sic utique terminus augmenti est quantitas perfecta; aut ita, quod dicat terminum per accidens, et hoc modo augmentum per accidens[^20] respicit substantiam. Quod patet. Cum enim additur quantitas maior minori, nisi fiat per rarefactionem vel per protensionem[^21], oportet quod addatur substantia, in qua sit illa quantitas; et ita augmentum plus habet de substantia, et ita per consequens ad substantiam terminatur etiam in corporalibus.

4. Et per hoc patet quod obiicitur: quod mutatur secundum substantiam est aliud et aliud[^22]; verum est, si dicat terminum formalem; sed non sic dicit.

Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod augmentatur secundum substantiam et mutatur secundum substantiam; dicendum, quia[^23] rei non tantum est esse substantiale, sed etiam perfectum esse. Mutari ergo secundum substantiam hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel respectu esse simpliciter, et sic mutatum est aliud et aliud; vel respectu esse perfecti, et sic est idem[^24], quia cum de imperfecto fit perfectum, non est aliud, sed idem. Hinc est, quod caritas, quamvis substantialiter augeatur, non est alia, sed eadem secundum substantiam; unde non valet obiectio.

english:
### Article Unique. *On the augmentation of charity.*
### Question I. *Whether charity can be augmented according to substance.*

As to the first [question], it is shown that charity can be augmented according to substance:

1. By Augustine to Boniface[^1]: «Charity merits to be augmented, that, having been augmented, it may merit to be perfected».

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason: the charity of the way is according to substance lesser than the charity of the homeland; but from the charity of the way it happens that one comes to the charity of the homeland, the same being preserved in being, since *the charity of the way never falls away*[^2]; but motion from a lesser to a greater, with the thing preserved, is augmentation[^3]: therefore it happens that charity is augmented.

3. Likewise, it is established that to different [persons] greater and lesser rewards are given; whence the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 15[^4]: *One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon* etc.; and it is established that to one and the same [person] according to different states a different reward — namely greater and lesser — is owed; but the magnitude of the substantial reward corresponds to the quantity of charity, not according to fervor, but according to substance: therefore if it happens that a greater reward is owed to someone, then also that charity is augmented substantially.

4. Likewise, it happens that charity is bettered, since it is not the highest good; but charity is good substantially: therefore it happens that charity becomes better according to its own substance. But, as Augustine says in the sixth book *On the Trinity*, chapter eight[^5]: «In spiritual things the same thing is greater and better»: therefore, since charity is something spiritual, it is possible that it itself be made greater according to substance.

5. Likewise, it is established that in one and the same [subject] charity can [tend] to a greater effect and act: therefore, since the greaterness of the effect comes from the magnitude of the virtue [or power], it is possible that charity be made greater according to virtue. Then I ask: either charity is its own virtue, or not: if so, then with the virtue augmented, it is necessary that the essence of charity be augmented; if not, then I ask about that virtue: either it has an essence, or not; if so, similarly I ask about it: therefore there will either be a regress to infinity, or it is necessary to posit that something is augmented according to substance; but for whatever reason another virtue [is so augmented], so also is charity.

**On the contrary:** 1. Charity is a form; but every form consists in an invariable essence[^6]: therefore so does charity also; but nothing invariable according to essence is augmented according to essence: therefore neither is charity.

2. Likewise, where there is augmentation, there is greater and lesser[^7]; but where there is simplicity, there is no greater and lesser: if therefore charity is a simple form and not extended, in charity there will be no augmentation.

3. Likewise, augmentation in bodily things is according to accident, and not according to substance[^8]: therefore by parity of reasoning so also in spiritual things: therefore if charity is augmented, this is only according to accident, not according to substance.

4. Likewise, what is augmented is changed[^9], and what is augmented according to substance is changed according to substance; but what is substantially changed is other now than before: therefore what is augmented according to substance does not remain: if then *charity never falls away*[^10] except through sin, but always remains, therefore it is not augmented.

> **Conclusio.** Charity can be augmented according to substance, that is, according to the quantity of virtue.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that according to the common opinion it is true that charity is augmented substantially.

For the understanding of the objections, however, certain people distinguish augmentation according to a twofold difference. For augmentation occurs when greater succeeds lesser; this, however, can be in two ways: either thus, that the very same thing which earlier was lesser, afterward becomes greater, as a man is said to be augmented, or any other quantum, and in this mode[^11] charity is not augmented, as they say; or in the sense that greater succeeds lesser, not the same in number, but similar in form, as the days are said to be augmented — not because the same day is first[^12] lesser and afterward greater, but because greater succeeds lesser; and thus they say charity is augmented, and through this they can evade the objections.

But this position, as has been proved above[^13], cannot stand. For it has been shown that, with charity remaining the same, it happens that increase and perfection occur with respect to the same.

And therefore it must rather be said that augmentation follows quantity. But quantity is said in two ways, namely properly and metaphorically: properly the quantity of mass is so called, and this is in bodily things; metaphorically the quantity of virtue, and this is[^14] in spiritual things. Likewise also augmentation is said in two ways: properly, namely according to magnitude of mass, and metaphorically according to quantity of virtue. Since therefore in charity there is quantity of virtue, and not at the highest [degree], it is constant that charity can be augmented. Again, since virtue is the same as the substance of charity, and the[^15] quantity of virtue is [there], hence it is that of necessity it follows that charity is augmented according to substance; for since it is a virtue, its substance is not other than the virtue.

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1. To that which therefore is objected to the contrary, that the essence of a form is invariable; it must be said that this is true of a *universal* form; but if it be said of a *singular* form, it is true considered in itself, but not as it is in another[^16].

2. To that which is objected, that simplicity does not admit magnitude; it must be said that this is true: it does not admit magnitude of mass, but it does admit magnitude of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that augmentation[^17] in bodily things is motion according to accident, the response is plain. For quantity of mass is an accident, essentially differing from the [thing] quantified; but it is not so in things quantified by quantity of virtue — rather, the quantity of virtue is essential, as has been proved in the objection[^18].

It can however be said that when it is said that[^19] the motion of augmentation in bodily things is motion according to accident, this [word] *according to* can be taken in two ways: either as expressing the relation of the term *per se*, or of the formal term — and thus indeed the term of augmentation is the perfected quantity; or in such a way that it expresses the term *per accidens*, and in this mode augmentation *per accidens*[^20] regards substance. Which is plain. For when a greater quantity is added to a lesser, unless this happens through rarefaction or through extension[^21], it is necessary that substance be added, in which that quantity may be; and so augmentation has more of substance, and so consequently it terminates at substance even in bodily things.

4. And through this is plain what is objected: that what is changed according to substance is one thing and another[^22]; this is true, if it expresses the formal term; but it does not so express it.

To that which is objected: that what is augmented according to substance is also changed according to substance; it must be said, since[^23] for a thing there is not only substantial being, but also perfect being. To be changed therefore according to substance can be in two ways: either with respect to being simply, and thus the changed thing is one thing and another; or with respect to perfect being, and thus it is the same[^24], because when from imperfect there comes-to-be perfect, it is not another, but the same. Hence it is that charity, although it is substantially augmented, is not other, but the same according to substance; whence the objection has no force.

la: *Epist.* 189. n. 2. secundum sensum, sed verbotenus *Epist.* 186. ad Paulinum c. 3. n. 10. In hoc textu ed. 1 cum uno alterove codice ut I post *mereatur* addit *et*.

en: *Letter* 189, n. 2, according to the sense; but verbatim in *Letter* 186 to Paulinus, c. 3, n. 10. In this text ed. 1, with one or two codices such as I, after *mereatur* adds *et*.

en: 1 Corinthians 13:8.

la: Aristot., I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 33. (c. 5.).

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 33 (ch. 5).

la: Vers. 41.

en: Verse 41.

la: Num. 9: *In his enim, quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse.* — Mox cod. I *unde* pro *ergo*.

en: Number 9: *For in those things which are not great by mass, this is to-be-greater, which is to-be-better.* — Next cod. I reads *unde* for *ergo*.

la: Libr. *de Sex princip.*, qui est Gilberti Porretani: *Ratio sive forma est id quod superveniens composito, simplici constans et invariabili essentia.* Cfr. Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 28. et VIII. text. 10. (VI. c. 8. in fine, et VII. c. 3.). In primo loco cit. ait: «*Indivisibilis namque forma est*»; in secundo comparat substantiam (essentiam) numeris, in quibus quaelibet additio vel diminutio inducit mutationem specificam. — Mox post *invariabile* codd. K V omittunt *secundum essentiam*, dein nomini *essentiam* praemittunt *substantiam vel*.

en: *Book of the Six Principles*, by Gilbert of Poitiers: *The account or form is that which, supervening upon the composite, consists of simple and invariable essence.* Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 28, and VIII, text 10 (VI, c. 8, at the end, and VII, c. 3). In the first place cited he says: «*For the form is indivisible*»; in the second he compares substance (essence) to numbers, in which any addition or diminution introduces specific change. — Next, after *invariabile*, codices K V omit *secundum essentiam*, then prefix *substantiam vel* to the noun *essentiam*.

la: Aristot., I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 31. seqq. (c. 5.).

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 31 ff. (ch. 5).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 30. seqq. (c. 5.) et V. *Phys.* text. 7–20. (c. 2. et 3.) — Mox in Vat. et cod. cc minus apte, et aliis codd. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, omittitur *solum*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 30 ff. (ch. 5) and *Physics* V, text 7–20 (chs. 2 and 3). — Next, in the Vatican and cod. cc, less aptly, and with other codices and ed. 1 resisting, *solum* is omitted.

la: Vide Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 32. (c. 4.) et VIII. *Phys.* text. 55. (c. 7.).

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 32 (ch. 4), and *Physics* VIII, text 55 (ch. 7).

la: Cod. X, variata interpunctione et positione, *vel aliquod, aliud, et quantum ad hoc caritas*, cum quo concordat cod. R, qui tamen omittit particulam *et* ac ponit *ad hunc modum* pro *ad hoc*. Paulo infra codd. P Q *ita* loco *ideo*; ac dein fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus voci *numero* praefixam particulam *in*.

en: Cod. X, with altered punctuation and position, [reads] *vel aliquod, aliud, et quantum ad hoc caritas*; with which cod. R agrees, which however omits the particle *et* and puts *ad hunc modum* for *ad hoc*. A little below, codices P Q [read] *ita* in place of *ideo*; and then on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we struck out the particle *in* prefixed to the word *numero*.

la: Cod. T *prius* loco *primo*, et cod. K *possit esse* pro *sit*.

en: Cod. T reads *prius* in place of *primo*, and cod. K *possit esse* for *sit*.

la: Hic, in *fundamentis*, praesertim in ultimo.

en: Here, in the *fundamenta*, especially in the last [one].

la: E vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *est*.

la: Plures codd. ut A G I S T W X Y ee ff omittunt *id*, quod alii ut H cc cum ed. 1 transponunt post *quantitas*. Codd. L O Z paulo ante post *virtus* addunt *caritatis*, quod vel supplendum est, vel nomen *virtus* referendum ad sequens *caritatis*; dein codd. L O *et quantitas virtutis*, quod *quantitas substantiae* substituunt loco *et sit quantitas virtutis*. Quomodo hoc argumentum intelligendum, accipe ex *fundam.* 5. supra posito, et infra ex resp. ad 3. Mox aliqui codd. ut D V X bb minus apte omittunt *enim*, loco cuius cod. G habet *ipsa*; cod. T deinde post *virtus* adiungit *necessario sequitur, quod*.

en: Several codices (A G I S T W X Y ee ff) omit *id*, which others (H cc) with ed. 1 transpose after *quantitas*. Codices L O Z, a little before, after *virtus* add *caritatis* — which either must be supplied, or the noun *virtus* must be referred to the following *caritatis*; then codices L O substitute *et quantitas virtutis*, which is *quantitas substantiae*, in place of *et sit quantitas virtutis*. How this argument is to be understood, take from *fundamentum* 5 set above, and below from the response to [obj.] 3. Next, some codices (D V X bb), less aptly, omit *enim*, in place of which cod. G has *ipsa*; cod. T then after *virtus* adds *necessario sequitur, quod*.

la: De hac solutione cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. Idem dicit Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2: «*Quamvis forma non sit variabilis secundum suum esse absolutum, proprie loquendo de variabilitate, tamen quia naturalem habet aptitudinem, ut sit in materia, in qua potest recipere variabilitatem, simpliciter invariabilis dici non debet.*»

en: On this solution cf. above, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. Richard of Mediavilla says the same, I *Sent.* d. 8, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2: «*Although a form is not variable according to its absolute being, properly speaking of variability, nevertheless because it has a natural aptitude to be in matter, in which it can receive variability, it ought not be called simply invariable.*»

la: Ex aliquibus mss. ut I T supplevimus *augmentum*, pro quo Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 renitentibus, mox post *motus* ponit *augmenti*.

en: From some manuscripts (I T) we supplied *augmentum*, in place of which the Vatican with cod. cc — though other codices and ed. 1 resist — places *augmenti* a little after *motus*.

la: In *fundamentis*, praecipue in ultimo et in corp. quaest. circa finem. — Paulo supra post *essentialis* cod. M habet *caritati*.

en: In the *fundamenta*, especially in the last, and in the body of the question near the end. — A little above, after *essentialis*, cod. M has *caritati*.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 omittit *quod*. Mox in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *augmenti*, certe tamen supplendum.

en: The Vatican, against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, omits *quod*. Next, in very many manuscripts and ed. 1 *augmenti* is missing, but it is certainly to be supplied.

la: Sequimur antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addendo *per accidens*.

en: We follow the older codices and ed. 1 in adding *per accidens*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Qualitate*, et IV. *Phys.* text. 79. seqq. (c. 9.) ac III. *de Caelo* text. 10, ubi definitio rarefactionis indicatur, scil. quod sit motus, quo corpus, manente eadem entitate et quantitate, maiorem acquirit localem extensionem. Quodsi rarefactio et protensio ad invicem conferuntur, secundum mentem S. Doctoris infra d. 18. dub. 4. dici potest, quod rarefactio sit processus naturalis, protensio vero processus artificialis; priori opponeretur condensatio, posteriori compressio.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* ch. *On Quality*, and *Physics* IV, text 79 ff. (c. 9), and *On the Heavens* III, text 10, where the definition of rarefaction is indicated — namely that it is a motion by which a body, the same entity and quantity remaining, acquires a greater local extension. And if rarefaction and extension be compared with one another, according to the mind of the holy Doctor below, d. 18, dub. 4, it can be said that rarefaction is a natural process, but extension an artificial process; to the former condensation would be opposed, to the latter compression.

la: Vat. male omittit *hic est aliud et aliud*; paulo supra minus distincte ponit *non augetur* loco *mutatur*, deinde in fine responsionis *si dicit terminum per accidens* pro *sic dicit*, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et sex primarum edd. — Nota insuper, quod Vat. cum multis codd. praemissam propositionem *Et per hoc patet* etc. coniungit cum responsione ad tertiam obiectionem; sed non bene, quia revera pertinet cum sequenti responsione ad quartum obiectum. Pauci codd. ad connexionem harum responsionum stabiliendam post *non sic dicit* addunt *tamen potest aliter dici*.

en: The Vatican wrongly omits *hic est aliud et aliud*; a little above, less distinctly, it puts *non augetur* in place of *mutatur*; then at the end of the response *si dicit terminum per accidens* for *sic dicit* — but the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions stands against [this]. Note, moreover, that the Vatican with many codices joins the foregoing proposition *Et per hoc patet* etc. with the response to the third objection; but not well, since it really belongs with the following response to the fourth objection. A few codices, to establish the connection of these responses, after *non sic dicit* add *tamen potest aliter dici*.

la: Unus alterque codex ut I Q *quod* loco *quia*.

en: One or another codex (I Q) reads *quod* in place of *quia*.

la: Contextu exigente, supplevimus *et sic est idem*, licet haec verba in paucis mss. ut I T et quidem in margine (a manu suppari) inveniantur. Mox fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 *Hinc est, quod* substituimus loco *Et hinc est, quia*.

en: As the context required, we supplied *et sic est idem*, although these words are found in a few manuscripts (I T) and indeed in the margin (by a contemporary hand). Next, on the authority of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted *Hinc est, quod* in place of *Et hinc est, quia*.

la: Lectio Gilberti in scholion-textu paulo corrupta; legendum vid. *ab alia ea invenire*. (Cfr. *Liber de Sex principiis* c. ult.)

en: The reading of Gilbert in the scholion text is slightly corrupt; one should read *ab alia ea invenire*. (Cf. *Liber de Sex principiis*, last chapter.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum sententia communi quaestio resolvitur affirmative. Deinde circa modum huius augmenti S. Doctor affert opinionem aliquorum insufficientem; denique propriam suam sententiam proponit eamque probat adhibito isto axiomate, quod *augmentum sequitur quantitatem*. Quantitas autem communiter distinguitur in propriam sive molis, et metaphoricam sive virtutis; unde sequitur, quod etiam duplex augmentatio admitti debeat, et inde, quod caritas augeri possit, et quod augmentatio fiat secundum essentiam. — Ut rationes et difficultates ad philosophiam spectantes, quae in hac et seq. quaest. tanguntur, facilius intelligantur, iuvat aliqua excerpere circa varias in antiquis scholis vigentes opiniones de augmento et diminutione formarum. Teste Boethio (III. *in Categorias seu Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, c. *de Qualitate*) tres opiniones iam apud antiquos

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philosophos extiterunt de intensione formarum seu de magis et minus. «Quidam namque dicebant, in omnibus secundum materiae habitudinem reperiri posse magis et minus. Proprium namque esse materiae corporumque intensione crescere et minui relaxatione, quae quorundam Platonicorum sententia fuit». Quae Boethii verba a B. Alberto, *Comment. in libr. de Sex principiis Gilberti Porretani*, tract. 8. c. 1. ita exponuntur: «Eorum quidem una (opinio), qui dicebant, quod in omni, in quo invenitur magis et minus, invenitur aliquo modo materia, cuius quantitas, ut dicunt, ex indivisibilibus consistit: ubi plura similia in uno conveniunt, id dicunt intendi, et ubi pauciora sunt, illud dicunt remitti, et ideo albissima sunt in quibus plura indivisibilia concurrunt albedinis; remitti autem, ubi conveniunt pauciora. Et haec quidem opinio, ut dicit Boethius, fuit Platonis. Videtur autem ab antiquo Anaxagora derivata, qui dixit, simile simili generari, et omnia esse in omnibus, sed latenter; et ideo etiam intendi et remitti quodcumque secundum plus et minus apparet de ipso simili». — «Alia vero, quae secundum certissimas verissimasque artes atque virtutes non liceret esse magis et minus, secundum autem medias dici posse, ut haec ipsa grammatica atque iustitia non dicitur magis grammatica neque magis iustitia. Esse autem quasdam alias mediocres artes, in quibus id ipsum posset evenire (sicut de dispositione fit habitus medius, ut B. Albertus adiungit). Tertia est, de qua Aristoteles loquitur, quod ipsas quidem habitudines nulla intensione crescere nec diminutione decrescere putat, sed eorum participantes (seu subiecta) posse sub examine compositionis venire, ut de his magis minusve dicatur. Sanitatem namque ipsam et iustitiam alteram altera magis minusve non esse; neque enim quisquam dicit, magis esse sanitatem alia sanitate. Sed hoc solum dicere possumus, magis habere sanitatem aliquem, i.e. esse saniorem, et magis sanum et minus sanum. Dicimus ergo, quod ipsae qualitates non suscipiunt magis et minus; qui vero secundum eas quales dicuntur, ipsi sub comparatione cadunt, ut iustior et sanior et grammaticior». — Gilbertus Porretanus (*de Sex principiis*, c. ult.), tres sententias hac de re affert, quae suo tempore a diversis defendebantur et triplici antiquorum opinioni [respondere] videntur. «Aiunt enim quidam secundum crementum vel diminutionem eorum quae suscipiunt subiectorum. Aliter autem et alii ipsa quidem quae suscipiuntur in suscipiente diminui et crescere annuntiant. Alii autem secundum utrumque amborum diminutionem et augmentationem». Pluribus rationibus contra triplicem hanc sententiam adductis, concludit: «Patet itaque nihil secundum magis et minus praedicari neque secundum subiecti solum augmentum vel diminutionem neque secundum accidentis; quare neque secundum utrumque. Oportet igitur ab alia ea[^25] invenire, quae cum magis et minus dicantur. Huiusmodi vero sunt ea, quae sunt in voce eorum quae adveniunt, et non secundum subiecti vel mobilis crementum vel diminutionem, sed quoniam eorum, quae sunt in voce, impositioni propinquiora sunt, sive ab eadem remotiora. De his etenim cum magis dicuntur quae proximiora sunt ei quae in ipsa voce est impositioni, cum minus autem de his quae remotiora consistunt, ut album dicitur illud, in quo pura albedo est; quanto igitur ad vocis impositionem accedens puriori inficitur albedine, tanto et candidior assignabitur... Dubitabit autem aliquis, quare haec quidem cum magis et minus dicantur, substantiae vero minime? Hoc autem contingit, quoniam substantiarum impositio quidem in termino est, ultra quem transgredi impossibile est. Additur autem et de accidentibus quibusdam, quae sine magis et minus dicuntur, ut quadrangulus et triangulus et similia; non enim triangulus magis unus altero dicitur».

**II.** In solut. ad 1. tangitur quaestio inter Scholasticos in utramque partem disputata, utrum ipsae formae substantiales eiusdem speciei, praesertim animae intellectuales, recipiant magis et minus, sive esse possint inaequalis perfectionis. Quod intelligendum est non de perfectione *specifica*, quae certo est eadem in individuis eiusdem speciei, sed de perfectione *individuali*, nec de perfectione *accidentali*, quae rursus diversa est in diversis, sed de *substantiali*, secundum gradum perfectionis consequentem naturam individui. Utraque sententia, i.e. affirmativa et negativa, est probabilis. Fautores sententiae, quod sint inaequales, pro se citant decretum aliquod doctorum Parisiensium, ab Henrico Gandav. (*Quodl.* 3. q. 3.) et a Durando (II. *Sent.* d. 32. q. 3.) relatum: «Si quis dicat, omnes animas ab origine esse aequales, errat, quoniam alias anima Christi non esset perfectior anima Iudae». Durand. hoc decretum ad perfectionem potentiarum sensitivarum et vegetivarum restringere conatur, licet parum probabiliter; alii id non habere irrefragabilem auctoritatem dicunt. De sententia S. Thom. disputatur, licet Caietan. (ad S. I. q. 83. a. 7.) dicat, caecos esse, qui dubitent, ipsum stare pro inaequalitate. Sotus autem cum aliis pluribus ex talibus caecis unum se esse profitetur. Interpretationi Caietani favent multa testimonia S. Thom., ut S. I, q. 50. a. 4. q. 85. a. 7; II. *Sent.* d. 32. q. 2. a. 3; I. *Sent.* d. 8. q. 5. a. 2. ad 6. — Sententiae neganti paritatem perfectionis adhaeret etiam S. Bonav., II. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. dub. 2, et d. 32. dub. 6. — Sententia autem Scoti dubia est, licet magis favere videtur huic ultimae sententiae, ut patet ex eius testimoniis collectis in Summ. Hieronymi a Montefortino t. II. p. 1. q. 85. a. 7. incident.

In solut. ad 3. duplex datur responsio. Prima est: etiamsi concedatur, quod in rebus corporalibus augmentum sit solummodo secundum accidens non secundum substantiam, tamen hoc non valet in augmento virtutum. Secunda vero responsio negat, quod motus augmenti in corporalibus sit tantum secundum accidens, quod est quantitas, quin addatur ipsi substantiae. Ad hoc probandum distinguitur duplex terminus augmenti: formalis sive per se, et hic est ipsa quantitas, et accidentalis, et hic est ipsa substantia.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — Scot., de hac et seq. hic q. 4. et seqq.; *Report.*, hic q. 3. et seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 24. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et duabus seqq. hic a. 10, et III. *Sent.* d. 29. a. 10; et IV. *Sent.* d. 7. a. 5. quaestiunc. 3; S. I. p. II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 2, et q. 102. m. 1. — Gulielmus Paris., *de Virtut.* c. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *Quodlib.* 5. q. 19. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** With the common opinion the question is resolved affirmatively. Then concerning the mode of this augmentation the holy Doctor brings forward the insufficient opinion of certain ones; finally he proposes his own opinion and proves it by employing this axiom, that *augmentation follows quantity*. Quantity, however, is commonly distinguished into the proper, or [quantity] of mass, and the metaphorical, or [quantity] of virtue; whence it follows that a twofold augmentation also must be admitted, and from that, that charity can be augmented, and that the augmentation occurs according to essence. — That the reasonings and difficulties pertaining to philosophy which are touched in this and the following question may be more easily understood, it is helpful to excerpt some things concerning various opinions which were current in the ancient schools concerning the augmentation and diminution of forms. According to Boethius (III. *in Categorias seu Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ch. *de Qualitate*) three opinions already existed among the ancient

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philosophers concerning the intension of forms, or concerning more and less. «For some said that in all things, according to the disposition of matter, more and less can be found. For it is proper to matter, and to bodies, to grow by intension and to be diminished by relaxation — which was the view of certain Platonists». These words of Boethius are expounded by Bl. Albert, *Commentary on the Book of the Six Principles of Gilbert of Poitiers*, tract. 8, ch. 1, thus: «One of these (opinions), namely those who said that in everything in which more and less is found, matter is found in some way, whose quantity, as they say, consists of indivisibles: where many similars come together in one [subject], they say it is *intended*; and where there are fewer, they say it is *remitted*; and so the whitest things are those in which more indivisibles of whiteness concur; but it is remitted where fewer come together. And this opinion, as Boethius says, was Plato's. It seems, however, to have been derived from the ancient Anaxagoras, who said that like is generated from like, and that all things are in all things, but latently; and so also that intension and remission of any [quality] appears according to more and less of the like itself». — «Another [opinion was], that according to the most certain and most true arts and virtues there is no more and less; but according to those that are middle ones it can be said — as this very grammar and justice is not said to be more grammar nor more justice. But there are certain other middle arts, in which this very thing could happen (just as from a disposition there comes-to-be a middle habit, as Bl. Albert adds). The third [opinion] is the one of which Aristotle speaks, namely that he reckons that the dispositions themselves grow by no intension nor decrease by [any] diminution, but that the [things] participating in them (or the subjects) can come under the examination of comparison, so that of these it may be said *more* or *less*. For he holds that health itself, and justice — the one is not more or less than the other; nor does anyone say that one health is greater than another health. But this only can we say: that someone has health more, that is, that he is more healthy, and more sound and less sound. We say therefore that the qualities themselves do not admit more and less; but those who are called *qualified* according to them, they themselves fall under comparison, as more just and more healthy and more grammatical». — Gilbert of Poitiers (*On the Six Principles*, last chapter) brings forward three opinions on this matter, which in his time were defended by various [authors] and seem to [correspond to] the threefold opinion of the ancients. «For some say [that] *more and less* [is to be predicated] according to the increase or diminution of the subjects which receive [the qualities]. Others, however, otherwise: they declare that the very things which are received in the receiving [subject] are diminished and grow. Others again [say it is to be predicated] according to both — both diminution and augmentation». Many reasons being adduced against this threefold view, he concludes: «It is plain therefore that nothing is predicated *according to more and less* either according to the increase or diminution of the subject alone, nor according to that of the accident; therefore neither according to both. We must therefore find from elsewhere those things[^25] which are said with *more and less*. But of this kind are those things which are in the [meaning of the] word of the things which come up, and not according to the increase or diminution of the subject or movable thing, but because they are nearer to the imposition of those [terms] which are in the word, or further from the same. For of these, those are said *more* which are nearer to that [meaning] which is in the imposition of the word itself, and *less* of those which stand further off, as that is called *white* in which there is pure whiteness; the more, therefore, that approaches in attaining to the imposition of the word, [and] the more it is dyed with a purer whiteness, so much the more white-shining will it be assigned... Someone, however, will doubt: why are these said with *more and less*, but substances not at all? This happens because the imposition of substances is in a fixed term, beyond which it is impossible to pass over. It is added also of certain accidents, which are said without *more and less*, as quadrangle and triangle and the like; for one triangle is not said to be more [a triangle] than another».

**II.** In the solution to the 1st [objection] there is touched the question disputed by the Scholastics on either side, whether substantial forms themselves of the same species — especially intellectual souls — admit *more and less*, or can be of unequal perfection. Which is to be understood not of *specific* perfection, which is certainly the same in individuals of the same species, but of *individual* perfection; nor of *accidental* perfection, which again is diverse in diverse [individuals], but of *substantial* [perfection], according to the degree of perfection following the nature of the individual. Each opinion — the affirmative and the negative — is probable. The supporters of the opinion that they are unequal cite for themselves a certain decree of the doctors of Paris, reported by Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* 3, q. 3) and by Durandus (II *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 3): «If anyone say that all souls are from origin equal, he errs, since otherwise the soul of Christ would not be more perfect than the soul of Judas». Durandus tries to restrict this decree to the perfection of the sensitive and vegetative powers, though scarcely probably; others say that it does not have irrefragable authority. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas there is dispute — although Cajetan (on *Summa* I, q. 83, a. 7) says that those are blind who doubt that he stands for inequality. Soto, however, with several others, professes himself to be one of such blind ones. Many testimonies of St. Thomas favor the interpretation of Cajetan, as *Summa* I, q. 50, a. 4; q. 85, a. 7; II *Sent.* d. 32, q. 2, a. 3; I *Sent.* d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 ad 6. — To the opinion denying the parity of perfection St. Bonaventure also adheres, II *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, dub. 2, and d. 32, dub. 6. — But the opinion of Scotus is doubtful, although he seems rather to favor this last view, as is plain from his testimonies collected in the *Summa* of Hieronymus of Montefortino, t. II, p. 1, q. 85, a. 7, *incident.*

In the solution to the 3rd [objection] a twofold response is given. The first is: even if it be conceded that in bodily things augmentation is only according to accident not according to substance, nevertheless this does not hold in the augmentation of virtues. But the second response denies that the motion of augmentation in bodily things is only according to accident, which is quantity, without something being added to substance itself. To prove this is distinguished a twofold term of augmentation: the *formal* or *per se*, and this is quantity itself, and the *accidental*, and this is substance itself.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. IV, q. 9, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. — Scotus, on this and the following [question], here q. 4 ff.; *Reportata*, here q. 3 ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; *Summa* II–II, q. 24, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, on this and the two following, here a. 10, and III *Sent.*, d. 29, a. 10; and IV *Sent.*, d. 7, a. 5, *quaestiuncula* 3; *Summa* I, p. II, tr. 16, q. 101, m. 2, and q. 102, m. 1. — William of Paris, *On the Virtues* c. 22. — Petrus a Tar[antasia], here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius R[omanus], here, 1st *principium*, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlib.* 5, q. 19. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 4.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Quomodo caritas augeatur
How charity is augmented

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Quomodo caritas augeatur.*

Secundo quaeritur de modo augmenti ipsius caritatis. Et quod augmentum eius sit aliunde, ostenditur:

1. Per Augustinum[^1], qui dicit, quod «caritas meretur augeri»: sed quod aliquis meretur habet ab alio quam a se: ergo si caritas meretur augmentum, habet ipsum aliunde.

2. Item, quod augmentetur per appositionem, videtur per rationem augmenti[^2]: «augmentum enim est praeexistentis quantitatis additamentum»: ergo ubi est augmentum, ibi est appositio alicuius eiusdem generis, et ubi appositio, ibi additio: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur posse ostendi per simile, quia[^3] caritas est in anima, sicut lux in aere; sed lux in aere augetur per additionem novi luminis, ut patet, si uni candelae illuminanti supervenit alia: ergo et in caritate erit similiter respectu animae.

4. Item, hoc videtur per principium augmenti, quia ex eisdem est unumquodque et nutritur et augetur[^4]: ergo per consimilem modum habet caritas generari, conservari et augeri; sed generatur in nobis per divinam influentiam: ergo et per eandem maiorem augetur; sed ubi maior influentia, aliquid plus influit[^5] quam prius; et ubi hoc, ibi est additio: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Maioris virtutis est calor amoris spiritualis quam ignis materialis; sed ignis se ipso augetur[^6]: ergo et caritas, quae est ignis spiritualis.

2. Item, quod non per appositionem, videtur, quia si simplex simplici addatur, nihil maius efficitur, nec mole nec virtute, ut si punctus puncto[^7]: ergo nec si caritas addatur caritati, erit maior.

3. Item, si additur aliquid, cum additionem sequatur compositio, et ad maiorem compositionem virtutis diminutio[^8]: ergo quanto maior fit additio, tanto efficitur caritas impotentior, et quanto impotentior, tanto minor: ergo cum augmentum caritatis sit quantum ad virtutem, caritas non augetur per additionem.

4. Item, si aliquid addatur priori caritati, aut additum est caritas, aut non; si non: ergo non auget caritatem; si vero est caritas; sed caritas non est materialis respectu caritatis: ergo cum ex aliquibus duobus non fiat unum, nisi unum sit materiale respectu alterius[^9], ex caritate praeexistente et superaddita non fit unum; sed ad augmentum necesse est fieri unum ex augente et aucto: ergo nullo modo per additionem augetur[^10].

> **Conclusio.** *Caritas augetur virtute divina per appositionem vel incrementum maioris influentiae.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam[^11] notandum, quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Una est, quod augmentum caritatis est per depurationem sive per impermixtionem cum contrario. Contrarium autem amoris casti[^12] est amor concupiscentiae; unde quanto magis in nobis extinguitur concupiscentia, tanto magis depuratur caritas; et quanto magis depuratur, tanto magis assimilatur Deo et accedit ad terminum; et quanto magis accedit, tanto magis augetur. Et isti posuerunt, caritatem posse per se augeri per assuefactionem in bono et debilitationem concupiscentiae. Ratio autem, quae istos movit, fuit auctoritas Philosophi[^13], qui dicit, formas intendi per accessum ad terminum et impermixtionem cum contrario. Fuit etiam cum hoc auctoritas Augustini, qui dicit in libro octoginta trium *Quaestionum*[^14], quod sicut minuitur concupiscentia, sic crescit caritas; et tale augmentum per maiorem depurationem simplici non repugnat.

Sed ista positio non est conveniens, quoniam[^15] constans est, caritatem maiorem et minorem esse, omni sublata concupiscentia, sicut in primo homine et etiam in Angelis; ergo cum omnino sit ibi impermixta, in quolibet Angelo et etiam in statu innocentiae esset in summo, quod stultum est dicere. Unde non est dicendum, quantum ad remissionem concupiscentiae augeri[^16] secundum substantiam; concedendum est tamen, quantum ad remissionem concupiscentiae intendi per fervorem. Et hoc modo intelligit Augustinus; et hoc modo loquitur etiam Philosophus de formis quantum ad intensionem, non quantum ad augmentum.

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Alia positio est, quod caritas augetur per appositionem; et huius simile habetur in lumine[^17], quod expresse caritati assimilatur. Unde sicut maius lumen, additum minori, ipsum auget, sic caritas superaddita auget minorem. Et haec positio ponit, caritatem non augeri virtute propria, sed divina. Idem enim est principium augendi et generandi[^18]. Unde sicut a solo Deo habet ortum, ita et augmentum.

1. Ex hoc patet illud quod obiicitur per simile in igne. Ignis enim habet potestatem faciendi se in alio et augendi, non sic caritas.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod caritas est simplex[^19]; dicendum, quod quamvis caritas sit simplex, quia non habet partes quantitativas quantitate molis, habet tamen quantitate virtutis, et quantum ad illam[^20] potest augeri. Si obiiciatur de puncto, quod habet quantitatem virtutis et tamen non augetur; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit natum augeri per appositionem consimilis quantitatis, duo sunt necessaria, scilicet quantitas et unibilitas. Unibilitas autem venit ex imperfectione; perfecto enim in quantum huiusmodi non est possibilis additio[^21]: ideo puncto non potest fieri additio. Licet igitur punctus habeat quantitatem virtutis, non tamen habet unibilitatem, quia quoddam perfectum est in suo genere.

Aliter potest dici, quod punctus est simplicissimum in genere quanti molis[^22], et ideo est infinitum virtute; caritas autem nulla est simplicissima in genere quanti virtualis nisi divina, et ideo illa est infinita; et quoniam illa non potest augeri per additionem, ita nec virtus puncti. Et si obiicias mihi, quod virtus puncti est creata, ergo non est infinita; dicendum, quod quia punctus est[^23] simplicissimum in genere, non simpliciter, ideo non habet infinitam virtutem simpliciter, sed in genere respectu linearum. Praeterea, punctus non est omnino actus, sed terminus respectu linearum; ideo non habet potentiam activam infinitam, sed passivam, quia non proprie dicitur punctus posse lineas producere, sed potest statui terminus lineae; et hoc non est inconveniens ponere in creatura: ideo virtus puncti non est augmentabilis, ut virtus caritatis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid est magis compositum, tanto est impotentius[^24]; dicendum, quod illud, generaliter intellectum, est falsum. Propter hoc distinguendum, quod sunt partes materiales, et sunt partes formales, quae dant actum et virtutem toti. Simplex igitur magis potest dici per privationem partium materialium; et tunc habet propositio veritatem, quia tales partes potius dant pati quam agere; unde quanto aliquid magis elongatur a materia, tanto potentius. Si autem dicatur magis simplex, quia pauciores habet partes formales sive activas, falsum est, quia tunc ignis minor potentior esset quam maior. Tunc etiam[^25] sirupus, compositus ex paucis, virtuosior esset quam ille qui constat ex multis; quorum utrumque falsum est: et ideo et praedicta propositio[^26], quoniam tam caritas praeexistens quam adveniens, utraque habet rationem activi.

Potest tamen et aliter responderi secundum veritatem, quod caritas augmentata non est magis composita, immo magis simplex; et hoc patet sic: quia contrario modo est in quanto molis et[^27] quanto virtutis. In quanto molis simplicissimum est minimum, ut punctus; et ideo in hoc genere quanti accessus ad simplicitatem est per diminutionem, recessus[^28] e contrario per additionem. In quanto vero virtutis simplicissimum est maximum; et ideo accessus ad simplicitatem est per additionem; et hinc est, quod caritas augmentata est purior et simplicior et Deo similior. Nec videatur[^29] hoc inconveniens, quia addere puritatem et simplicitatem et spiritualitatem alicui non facit recessum a simplicitate, sed magis accessum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum ex eis[^30] fiat unum; dicunt quidam, quod — sicut diversa lumina sunt in aere distincta et inconfusa, attamen unum maius lumen reddunt propter concursum in unum susceptibile, sic in lumine spirituali, quod est gratia vel caritas — quod[^31] distincta sunt essentialiter tamen unum maius efficiunt movendo virtutem liberi arbitrii.

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Sed tamen illud non est simile, quia distinctio luminarium in aere venit a parte originum diversarum, ut puta quando plura sunt lucentia; non sic est in gratia. Et ideo dicendum, quod ex eis[^32] fit unum.

Quod quaeritur[^33], quod se habet in ratione materialis; dicendum, quod augmentum contingit dupliciter fieri: aut per virtutem ipsius augmentabilis, ut patet in animali; et tunc augmentabile habet se in ratione formalis et activi, augmentans in ratione materialis et passivi. Contingit et[^34] augmentum fieri per virtutem extrinsecam, possibilitate sola et unibilitate existente in augmentabili; et tunc augmentabile, quia imperfectum, se habet in ratione passivi[^35], augmentans, quia perficiens, in ratione formalis et completivi, quia dat quantitatem perfectam.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod unum non est in potentia ad aliud; dicendum, quod non est in potentia ad conversionem, sed est in potentia ad unionem; et potentia ista est in caritate ratione suae imperfectionis; quia enim imperfecta est, ideo possibilis perfici et ideo unibilis rei perficienti. Unde non habet possibilitatem ad illud quod additur in quantum caritas, sed in quantum imperfecta; et sic patet illud.

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *How charity is augmented.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning the mode of the augmentation of charity itself. And that its augmentation is from elsewhere is shown:

1. Through Augustine[^1], who says that "charity merits to be augmented": but what someone merits, he has from another rather than from himself: therefore if charity merits augmentation, it has it from elsewhere.

2. Likewise, that it is augmented through apposition is seen through the definition of augmentation[^2]: "for augmentation is the addition to a pre-existing quantity": therefore where there is augmentation, there is the apposition of something of the same kind, and where there is apposition, there is addition: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this is seen to be demonstrable through a likeness, since[^3] charity is in the soul as light is in the air; but light in the air is augmented by the addition of new light, as is evident if to one illuminating candle another supervenes: therefore likewise it will be in charity with respect to the soul.

4. Likewise, this is seen through the principle of augmentation, since each thing both is, is nourished, and is augmented from the same things[^4]: therefore in like manner charity has its being generated, conserved, and augmented; but it is generated in us by divine influence: therefore also by the same, when greater, it is augmented; but where there is greater influence, something more flows in[^5] than before; and where this is the case, there is addition: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The heat of spiritual love is of greater power than material fire; but fire is augmented by itself[^6]: therefore so also is charity, which is spiritual fire.

2. Likewise, that it is not by apposition is seen, because if a simple is added to a simple, nothing greater is produced, neither in mass nor in power, as if a point [were added] to a point[^7]: therefore neither, if charity be added to charity, will it be greater.

3. Likewise, if something is added, since composition follows upon addition, and upon greater composition the diminution of power[^8]: therefore the greater the addition becomes, the more impotent charity is made, and the more impotent, the less: therefore since the augmentation of charity is in respect to power, charity is not augmented through addition.

4. Likewise, if something is added to a prior charity, either what is added is charity, or it is not; if not: therefore it does not augment charity; but if it is charity; charity, however, is not material with respect to charity: therefore since from any two things one is not made, unless one be material with respect to the other[^9], from a pre-existing charity and a superadded one no one is made; but for augmentation it is necessary that one be made from the augmenting and the augmented: therefore in no way is it augmented through addition[^10].

> **Conclusion.** *Charity is augmented by divine power through apposition or the increase of greater influence.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted[^11] that on this matter there were two opinions. One is, that the augmentation of charity is through purification or through the lack of admixture with its contrary. Now the contrary of chaste love[^12] is the love of concupiscence; whence the more concupiscence is extinguished in us, the more charity is purified; and the more it is purified, the more it is assimilated to God and approaches its term; and the more it approaches, the more it is augmented. And these have posited that charity can be augmented of itself through habituation in the good and the weakening of concupiscence. The reason that moved them was the authority of the Philosopher[^13], who says that forms are intensified through approach to their term and lack of admixture with the contrary. There was also together with this the authority of Augustine, who says in the book of the Eighty-three *Questions*[^14], that as concupiscence is diminished, so charity grows; and such an augmentation through greater purification is not repugnant to a simple thing.

But this position is not fitting, since[^15] it is constant that charity is greater and lesser, with all concupiscence removed, as in the first man and also in the Angels; therefore since it is wholly without admixture there, in any Angel and even in the state of innocence it would be at its highest, which it is foolish to say. Hence it is not to be said that according to the remission of concupiscence it is augmented[^16] according to substance; it must be conceded, however, that according to the remission of concupiscence it is intensified through fervor. And in this way Augustine understands [it]; and in this way the Philosopher also speaks of forms with respect to intensification, not with respect to augmentation.

Another position is, that charity is augmented through apposition; and a likeness of this is had in light[^17], which is expressly assimilated to charity. Hence as a greater light, added to a lesser, augments it, so charity superadded augments a lesser one. And this position holds that charity is not augmented by its own power, but by divine [power]. For the principle of augmenting and of generating is the same[^18]. Hence as it has its origin from God alone, so also its augmentation.

1. From this is evident what is objected through the likeness in fire. For fire has the power of producing itself in another and of augmenting; not so charity.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that charity is simple[^19]; it must be said that although charity is simple, since it does not have quantitative parts in the quantity of mass, yet it has [parts] in the quantity of power, and with respect to that[^20] it can be augmented. If it be objected concerning a point, that it has quantity of power and yet is not augmented; it must be said that for something to be apt to be augmented through the apposition of a similar quantity, two things are necessary, namely quantity and unibility. Now unibility comes from imperfection; for to a perfect [thing] as such no addition[^21] is possible: therefore no addition can be made to a point. Although, then, a point may have quantity of power, yet it does not have unibility, since it is something perfect in its kind.

It can be said otherwise, that a point is the most simple in the kind of quantity of mass[^22], and therefore it is infinite in power; but no charity is most simple in the kind of virtual quantity except the divine, and therefore that is infinite; and since that cannot be augmented through addition, neither can the power of a point. And if you object to me that the power of a point is created, therefore it is not infinite; it must be said that since a point is[^23] most simple in its kind, not absolutely, therefore it does not have infinite power absolutely, but in [its] kind in respect of lines. Moreover, a point is not wholly act, but a terminus in respect of lines; therefore it does not have infinite active power, but passive, since a point is not properly said to be able to produce lines, but it can be set as the terminus of a line; and this is not unfitting to posit in a creature: therefore the power of a point is not augmentable, as the power of charity is.

3. To that which is objected, that the more something is composed, the more impotent it is[^24]; it must be said that this, taken generally, is false. On account of this it must be distinguished, that there are material parts, and there are formal parts, which give act and power to the whole. "Simple" therefore can rather be said by the privation of material parts; and then the proposition has its truth, since such parts give being-acted-upon rather than acting; whence the more something is removed from matter, the more powerful. But if it is called more simple because it has fewer formal or active parts, it is false, since then a smaller fire would be more powerful than a greater one. Then likewise[^25] a syrup composed of few [ingredients] would be more potent than one which consists of many; both of which are false: and therefore also the aforesaid proposition[^26] [is false], since both pre-existing charity and the supervening one each have the character of an active [principle].

It can however be answered otherwise according to truth, that augmented charity is not more composite, but rather more simple; and this is evident thus: because it is in a contrary mode in the quantity of mass and[^27] [in] the quantity of power. In the quantity of mass the most simple is the least, as a point; and therefore in this kind of quantity the approach to simplicity is through diminution, and recession[^28] on the contrary through addition. In the quantity of power, however, the most simple is the greatest; and therefore the approach to simplicity is through addition; and hence it is, that augmented charity is purer and simpler and more like to God. Nor let it seem[^29] that this is unfitting, since to add purity and simplicity and spirituality to something does not cause recession from simplicity, but rather approach.

4. To that which is objected, whether one[^30] is made from them; some say that — as different lights in the air are distinct and unconfused, and yet render one greater light on account of their concurrence in one receptacle, so in spiritual light, which is grace or charity — that[^31] they are essentially distinct yet make one greater [light] by moving the power of free choice.

But yet that is not similar, since the distinction of luminaries in the air comes from the part of diverse origins, as for instance when there are several luminous bodies; not so is it in grace. And therefore it must be said, that from them[^32] one is made.

To what is asked[^33], [namely] that which has the character of a material; it must be said that augmentation occurs to be made in two ways: either through the power of the augmentable itself, as is evident in an animal; and then the augmentable has itself in the character of formal and active, the augmenter in the character of material and passive. It also occurs[^34] that augmentation is made through an extrinsic power, with mere possibility and unibility existing in the augmentable; and then the augmentable, since imperfect, has itself in the character of passive[^35], the augmenter, since perfecting, in the character of formal and completive, since it gives the perfect quantity.

To that, then, which is objected, that one is not in potency to another; it must be said, that it is not in potency to conversion, but is in potency to union; and this potency is in charity by reason of its imperfection; for since it is imperfect, therefore it is capable of being perfected and therefore unible to the thing perfecting [it]. Hence it does not have a possibility for that which is added insofar as it is charity, but insofar as it is imperfect; and thus that is evident.

la: *Epist. ad Bonifacium*, CIV, q. praeced. fundam. 1.

en: *Letter to Boniface*, [Epist.] 104; [cited in] the preceding question, fundamentum 1.

la: Fide plurium mss. ut F G H I O ff adiecimus *augmenti*, loco cuius in multis mss. et sex primis edd. falso habetur *Augustini*. Ratio seu definitio augmenti allegata invenitur in Aristot., I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 31. (c. 5.): *Augmentatio enim est existentis magnitudinis additamentum*.

en: On the testimony of several manuscripts such as F G H I O ff we have inserted *augmenti*, in place of which in many manuscripts and the first six editions *Augustini* is falsely found. The reason or definition of augmentation alleged is found in Aristotle, I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 31 (c. 5): *For augmentation is the addition to an existing magnitude*.

la: Vat. minus distincte et contra plurimos mss. *quod* loco *quia*, et mox perperam et contra codd. ac ed. 1 *non augetur* pro *augetur*, et *illuminatae* loco *illuminanti*.

en: The Vatican edition, less distinctly and against most manuscripts, [reads] *quod* in place of *quia*, and shortly after, wrongly and against the codices and edition 1, [reads] *non augetur* in place of *augetur*, and *illuminatae* in place of *illuminanti*.

la: Aristot., II. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 50. (c. 8.): *Omnia enim nutriuntur ex eisdem, ex quibus sunt*. In illa propositione Vat. perperam et contra mss. ac ed. 1 omittit *est*.

en: Aristotle, II. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 50 (c. 8): *For all things are nourished from the same things from which they are*. In that proposition the Vatican edition wrongly and against the manuscripts and edition 1 omits *est*.

la: Cod. O usitatiore modo *influitur*.

en: Codex O, in a more usual mode, [reads] *influitur*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., 1. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 39. (c. 8): *Nam ignem ad hunc facere modum contingit, videlicet iniectis in eum qui iam est lignis. Verum ita quidem accretio (augmentatio) est; at cum ligna ipsa accenduntur, generatio* (ed. Firmin-Didot.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 39 (c. 8): *For fire happens to act in this way, namely when wood is thrown into that which already is. Truly thus indeed there is accretion (augmentation); but when the wood itself is kindled, [there is] generation* (Firmin-Didot ed.).

la: Est Aristotelis, I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 8. (c. 2.), ubi ostendit, quod puncta addita punctis non faciant magnitudinem sive neque maius neque minus. — Mox cod. T *est* loco *erit*.

en: It is from Aristotle, I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 8 (c. 2), where he shows that points added to points do not make a magnitude nor anything either greater or less. — Shortly after, codex T [reads] *est* in place of *erit*.

la: Auctor libr. *de Causis*, propos. 17: *Omnis vis unita plus est infinita, quam virtus multiplicata*. Cfr. etiam Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 5.

en: The author of the book *de Causis*, proposition 17: *Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power*. Cf. also Dionysius, *de Div. Nom.* c. 5.

la: Vide Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): *Impossibile enim est, substantiam ex substantiis esse, quae sic insunt ut actu; quae enim duo sic actu sunt, nunquam unum actu sunt; sed si potentia duo sunt, erunt unum, ut duplum ex duobus dimidiis potentia; actus namque separat*.

en: See Aristotle, VII. *Metaph.* text. 49 (VI. c. 13): *For it is impossible that a substance be from substances which are present thus as in act; for whichever two are thus in act, are never one in act; but if they are two in potency, they will be one, as the double from two halves [is] in potency; for act separates*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *potest augeri*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G H R T U V Z ee ff cum ed. 1 *augmentato*, aliqui autem perperam *augmento* pro *aucto*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] *potest augeri*. A little before, several codices such as A G H R T U V Z ee ff with edition 1 [read] *augmentato*, while some wrongly [read] *augmento* in place of *aucto*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut T X addunt *est*.

en: Some codices such as T X add *est*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *Christi* pro *casti*, sed obstat auctoritas antiquiorum codd. cum ed. 1 et contextus nec non usus loquendi S. Doctoris, de quo vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. quaest.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] *Christi* in place of *casti*, but the authority of the older codices together with edition 1, and the context and the manner of speaking of the Holy Doctor, oppose this; concerning which see above, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body of the question.

la: Libr. V. *Phys.* text. 19. (c. 2.): *Magis autem et minus est ex eo, quia plus aut minus contrarii inest, et non*. Et III. *Top.* c. 4. circa medium (c. 5.): *Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius*.

en: Book V *Phys.* text. 19 (c. 2): *Now the more and the less is from this, that more or less of the contrary is present, or not*. And III. *Top.* c. 4, near the middle (c. 5): *And those things which are less mixed with their contraries are more such; as the whiter [is] less mixed with black*.

la: Quaest. 36: *Nutrimentum eius (caritatis) est imminutio cupiditatis: perfectio, nulla cupiditas*. — Et paulo post: *Quisquis igitur eam nutrire vult, instet minuendis cupiditatibus*. Cfr. etiam Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32, ubi dicit: *Minuitur autem cupiditas, caritate crescente*.

en: Question 36: *Its (charity's) nourishment is the diminution of cupidity: its perfection, no cupidity at all*. — And shortly after: *Whoever therefore wishes to nourish it, let him press on by diminishing his cupidities*. Cf. also *Enchirid.* c. 121, n. 32, where he says: *Now cupidity is diminished as charity grows*.

la: Plurimis mss. cum ed. 1 postulantibus, posuimus *quoniam* loco *quia*.

en: With most manuscripts together with edition 1 demanding [it], we have placed *quoniam* in place of *quia*.

la: Supple cum cod. V *veritatem*.

en: Supply, with codex V, *veritatem*.

la: August., *Epist.* 140. seu libr. *de Gratia Novi Testam.* c. 22. n. 54: *Qualis enim lux est ipsa caritas, quis verbis explicet?... An forte lux non est caritas? Audi Apostolum Ioannem; ipse quippe dixit quod modo commemoravi: Quoniam Deus lux est... Deus caritas est. Ac per hoc, si Deus lux est, et Deus caritas est, profecto caritas lux ipsa est, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum* etc.

en: Augustine, *Letter* 140, or the book *On the Grace of the New Testament* c. 22, n. 54: *For of what kind a light charity itself is, who could explain in words?... Or perhaps light is not charity? Listen to the Apostle John; for he himself said what I have just recalled: Since God is light... God is charity. And by this, if God is light, and God is charity, surely charity is itself the light which is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit*, etc.

la: Vide supra fundam. 4. Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. *de Anima* text. 34–50. (c. 4.).

en: See above, fundamentum 4. Cf. also Aristotle, II. *de Anima* text. 34–50 (c. 4).

la: Vat. omittit praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 indebite verba *caritas est simplex; dicendum, quod quamvis*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, unduly omits the words *caritas est simplex; dicendum, quod quamvis*.

la: Scil. *quantitatem virtutis*, pro quo plures codd. ut A C L O P Q R S T Y bb cum ed. 1 minus apte hic addunt *partem*, sicut et aliqui codd. ut A C R S mox minus bene omittunt *potest*; codd. L O *augetur* loco *potest augeri*, cod. Y *augeri dicitur*.

en: Namely *quantitatem virtutis*, in place of which several codices such as A C L O P Q R S T Y bb with edition 1 less aptly here add *partem*, just as some codices like A C R S shortly after less well omit *potest*; codices L O [read] *augetur* in place of *potest augeri*, codex Y [reads] *augeri dicitur*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 21, et X. text. 13. (IV. c. 16. et IX. c. 4.), ac II. *de Caelo* text. 23. (c. 4.), ubi *perfectum* definitur id, extra quod nihil eorum quae ipsius sunt, possibile est accipere. — Paulo ante ed. 1 cum uno alteroque cod. ut I *perfectioni* pro *perfecto*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, V. *Metaph.* text. 21, and X. text. 13 (IV. c. 16 and IX. c. 4), and II. *de Caelo* text. 23 (c. 4), where *the perfect* is defined as that, outside of which it is not possible to receive anything of the things which are its own. — A little before, edition 1 together with one or another codex such as I [reads] *perfectioni* in place of *perfecto*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut B V X Z aa bb *quantitatis molis*. Mox post *virtute* in cod. O explicative additur *quanti* et in cod. Z *in genere quanti*. Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut B X *quantitatis virtualis* loco *quanti virtualis*.

en: Some codices such as B V X Z aa bb [read] *quantitatis molis*. Shortly after, after *virtute*, codex O explicatively adds *quanti*, and codex Z adds *in genere quanti*. A little below, some codices such as B X [read] *quantitatis virtualis* in place of *quanti virtualis*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. adiungit *quid*. Mox in pluribus codd. ut A H I S T X Y Z bb ee ff et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus bene deest adiectivum *infinitam*. Paulo infra post *sed in genere* in cod. B bene additur *scilicet*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, adds *quid*. Shortly after, in several codices such as A H I S T X Y Z bb ee ff and editions 1, 2, 3, the adjective *infinitam* is less well missing. A little below, after *sed in genere*, codex B well adds *scilicet*.

la: In pluribus codd. ut S cc deest *quanto est* et dein *tanto*; in ed. 1 omittuntur primum *est* et *tanto*.

en: In several codices such as S cc, *quanto est* and then *tanto* are missing; in edition 1 the first *est* and *tanto* are omitted.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Tunc etiam*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *Tunc etiam*.

la: Ita codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. *et ideo praedicta propositio est similiter falsa*.

en: Thus the codices with edition 1; the Vatican edition [reads] *et ideo praedicta propositio est similiter falsa*.

la: In cod. T hic repetitur *in*.

en: In codex T, *in* is here repeated.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *est*.

en: On the testimony of most manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged *est* added here.

la: Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 *videtur*.

en: Some codices such as V Y with edition 1 [read] *videtur*.

la: Cod. T *his*.

en: Codex T [reads] *his*.

la: Supple: *lumina spiritualia*, scil. gratia gratiae addita. — Vat. praeomittit *dicendum* contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1. Mox pauci codd. ut V X *efficitur* loco *efficiunt*.

en: Supply: *lumina spiritualia*, namely grace added to grace. — The Vatican edition pre-omits *dicendum* against most codices and edition 1. Shortly after, a few codices such as V X [read] *efficitur* in place of *efficiunt*.

la: Vat. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, *quae* et mox post *se* addit *non*, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1. Notetur insuper, quod Vat. praefigendo numerum 5 exhibeat ea quae sequuntur tanquam responsionem ad quintam obiectionem, cum revera sint responsio ad aliquam propositionem quartae obiectionis. — Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *augmentum* pro *augmentationem*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, *quae* and shortly after *se* it adds *non*, but the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 opposes [this]. Note moreover that the Vatican edition, by prefixing the number 5, presents what follows as the response to a fifth objection, when in reality it is the response to some proposition of the fourth objection. — A little below, from the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *augmentum* for *augmentationem*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut K V X ee non male *aut contingit*.

en: Some codices such as K V X ee not badly [read] *aut contingit*.

la: In cod. M additur *et*. Mox post *formalis* in codd. M Y (in H ir in margine) adiungitur *activi*, proprie tamen loquendo, illud quod augmentat finaliter quantum ad terminum ipsius augmentationis se habet in ratione formalis.

en: In codex M, *et* is added. Shortly after, after *formalis*, in codices M Y (in H ir [a hand] in the margin) *activi* is added; properly speaking, however, that which augments finally with respect to the term of the augmentation itself stands in the character of formal.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Circa quaestionem de modo speciali, quo caritas augeatur, observamus, quod praeter duas opiniones in textu positas S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 5; I. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2.) defendit tertiam sententiam, scil. caritatem augeri non per additionem, sed per maiorem radicationem in subiecto, cui consentiunt Durand. (hic q. 6. 7.) et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 6.). — S. Bonav. suam sententiam magis explicat II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2., ubi praeter tres improbabiles modos tres alios probabiles affert et sapienter concludit: «Quocumque horum modorum trium sequentium dicatur, non est magna vis facienda, sed pro certo habentes, gratiam Dei in nobis augeri posse, laborare debemus taliter, ut in nobis augeatur per bona opera». Sententiam, cui Seraphicus plus favet, defendunt etiam Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand., et prae ceteris Scot. et posteriorum doctorum plurimi. Videsis de hac controversia Rada, Contr. 18., et Franc. Macedo, Collationes, coll. 7. different. 3. Hic sufficiat dicere, S. Bonav. additionem novorum graduum minime intelligere in eo sensu, quod nova qualitas differat numero ab ea cui advenit, et quod ipsa retineat distinctionem numericam, sed ita, ut omnes gradus eandem numero caritatem contineant.

**II.** Distinctio partium materialium et formalium in solut. ad 3. sumta est ex libro Aristotelis I. *de Gener.* text. 33. seq. (ed. Paris. c. 3.). Vocantur autem hic partes materiales, non quod sint sine forma, sed quia potius passivae quam activae sunt; aliae vero dicuntur formales, quia sunt maxime activae.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 4. a. 2. § 1. 2; et IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — S. Thom., locis citt. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodlib. 5. q. 19; 4. q. 13. — Biel, hic q. 3. et seq.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the question on the special mode by which charity is augmented, we observe that, besides the two opinions placed in the text, St. Thomas (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 5; I. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2.) defends a third opinion, namely that charity is augmented not through addition, but through a greater rooting in the subject, with which Durandus (here q. 6. 7.) and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 6.) agree. — St. Bonaventure explains his own opinion more in II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2., where, besides three improbable modes, he advances three other probable ones and wisely concludes: "By whichever of the three following modes it be said, no great force is to be made [of the choice]; but, holding it for certain that the grace of God can be augmented in us, we ought to labor in such a way that it be augmented in us through good works." The opinion which the Seraphic Doctor more favors is defended also by Alex. of Hales, B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Henry of Ghent, and above all by Scotus and very many of the later doctors. See on this controversy Rada, *Contr.* 18, and Franciscus Macedo, *Collationes*, coll. 7. different. 3. Here let it suffice to say that St. Bonaventure does not at all understand the addition of new degrees in that sense, that the new quality differs in number from that to which it accedes, and that it [the new quality] retains numerical distinction, but rather thus, that all the degrees contain the same charity in number.

**II.** The distinction of material and formal parts in the solution to [obj.] 3 is taken from Aristotle's book I. *de Gener.* text. 33 ff. (Paris ed. c. 3). Now they are here called "material" parts, not because they are without form, but because they are passive rather than active; the others are called "formal" because they are most active.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 61. m. 4. a. 2. § 1. 2; and IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — St. Thomas, in the places cited. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlib.* 5. q. 19; 4. q. 13. — Biel, here q. 3. et seq.

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