title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Angeli in corporibus assumtis exerceant operationes convenientes potentiae sensitivae.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum Angeli in assumtis corporibus habeant operationes convenientes potentiae sensitivae; et quod sic, videtur.

1. «Idem est principium motus et sensus»[^1], sicut dicit Philosophus; sed Angelus corpori assumto dat motum: ergo et sensum.

2. Item, sicut Angelus assumit corpus habens organa apta ad motum, ita assumit corpus habens organa apta ad sensum — sicut enim illud corpus assumtum habet manus et pedes, ita habet oculos et aures — sed organa sentiendi sine sensu sunt inutilia: ergo si non frustra assumit illa organa, videtur, quod illa sensificet et per illa sentiat.

3. Item, quod habet operationem consequentem proprium speciei habet operationem consequentem proprium generis[^2]; sed sicut proprium hominis est risibile, ita proprium animalis est esse sensibile: ergo sicut Angelus in corpore assumto potest ridere et lugere, sic etiam potest videre et audire.

4. Item, aut Angelus de sua natura habet sensum, aut non habet. Si non; cum sensus sit cognitivus particularium[^3], non cognoscit particularia, quod plane falsum est. Si vero sensum habet; cum sensus sit potentia, qua mediante sensificantur organa corporalia, patet etc.

5. Item, Angelus existens in corpore assumto cognoscit haec sensibilia; aut igitur potentia *immateriali*, aut potentia, quae nata sit *alligari corpori*. Si potentia *immateriali*, ergo ita bene cognoscit distans, sicut propinquum — igitur Angelus, qui est Romae, audit nos loquentes Parisius — ergo non indigeret moveri et discurrere. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod illa cognoscit potentia, quae est *corpori proportionabilis* et concernit determinatam distantiam. Si ergo iste est sensus, patet etc.

6. Item, nihil patitur a corpore, nisi sensum habeat corpori proportionabilem; sed Angelus crematur ab igne: ergo si sensus eius potest pati a corpore, multo fortius potest per corpus sentire, cum per naturam magis sit natus in corpus agere quam a corpore poenam suscipere.

7. Item, Angelus, aspiciens me in assumto corpore, suscipit in oculo meam similitudinem, et[^4] cum oculus sit corpus pervium et tersum, ulterius de sua similitudine iudicat; hoc planum est: si ergo ad sensum nihil plus requiritur quam receptio et iudicium, videtur, quod sentiat per corpus assumtum.

*Ad oppositum* — *Fundamenta.*

1. Sensus praesupponit vitam; sed Angelus corpus assumtum non vivificat, sicut probatum est supra[^5]: ergo nec sensificat, ergo per ipsum non sentit.

2. Item, sensus praesupponit actum vegetativae[^6]; sed Angeli in corporibus assumtis non habent opera vegetativae: ergo nec opera sensitivae.

3. Item, si Angelus sentiret per corpus, cum sensus ille, qui fit mediante organo corporali, sit naturae corporeae alligatus, Angelus natus esset, sicut et anima, per naturam uniri corpori: ergo quando non haberet corpus, non haberet *esse* perfectum.

4. Item, si Angelus sentiret per corpus, cum sentire sit actio coniuncti, Angelus suas operationes ministeriales communicaret corpori: ergo deberet communicare poenam et gloriam, quod est falsum.

5. Item, *sentire* proprium est animalis: ergo nulli competit sentire, nisi cui competit *esse* animal; sed hoc nullo modo competit Angelo: ergo etc.

6. Item, si sentire est mediante organo corporeo, ergo non cognosceret hominem clauso oculo nec cognosceret hominem a tergo nec cognosceret hominem in obscuro; quae omnia cum sint falsa, restat, quod Angelus in corpore assumto non habeat opera competentia potentiae sensitivae.

*Quaestio connexa.* — Quaeritur igitur, quae opera conveniant vel exerceantur ab Angelo in corpore assumto.

### Conclusio.

> Angelus in corpore assumto opera potentiae sensitivae non exercet, quatenus sunt actus sentiendi per organa, sed quatenus sunt ab anima ut movente.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum anima uniatur corpori ut perfectio et ut motor, *triplex est genus operationum*: quaedam sunt operationes, quae consequuntur ipsam animam in corpore, ut est motor; quaedam, ut est perfectio; quaedam

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partim sic, et partim sic. *Triplex modus operandi.* — Differenti autem modo exercet anima in corpore operationes, quae consequuntur ipsam ut *motorem*, et ut *perfectionem*. Nam operationes, quae consequuntur animam ut *motorem*, sic exercet *per* corpus, quod illas easdem exercet *in* corpus, quia non solum movet alia corpora, sed etiam corpus proprium. Operationes vero, quae consequuntur animam in corpore, ut est *perfectio*, sic exercet anima in corpore per corpus, quod exercet eas *cum* corpore, sicut patet: anima clauso oculo corpus aliquod videre non potest. Tertias autem operationes exercet *in* corpore quasi utroque modo[^7]. Et ideo primae competunt animae, ut est *hoc aliquid* et *motor differens a mobili*, secundae vero, ut est *forma iuncta materiae*.

*Ad quaestionem connexam.* — Quoniam igitur Angelus unitur corpori assumto non ut *perfectio*, sed ut *motor*, ideo primas operationes exercet plene in eodem corpore, secundas minime, tertias vero quodammodo sic, quodammodo non. — Et hoc melius patet, si descendamus exemplificando. *Motus progressivus*, sive quicumque alius sit membrorum exteriorum, est ab anima in corpore, ut est *motor* vel *motrix*; et ideo competit Angelo. *Sentire* vero *per organa corporis* competit animae, ut est illorum organorum *perfectio* — sicut enim anima perficit totum corpus, ita visus sive potentia visiva perficit oculum — et hoc non convenit Angelo in corpore assumto. *Ridere* vero est operatio, quae partim competit animae, ut est *motor*, partim ut est *perfectio*. Ibi enim est quaedam *cordis exhilaratio*, et haec est ab anima, ut est *perfectio*; est ibi etiam quaedam *genarum motio*, et haec est ab anima, ut est *motor*. Ratione primi non convenit Angelo, sed solum ratione secundi.

*Conclusio bimembris.* — Ex hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Si enim vocentur opera potentiae sensitivae ipsi actus sentiendi *per organa*, sic breviter dicendum, quod Angelus non exercet ea per corpus assumtum. Si autem extendantur opera potentiae sensitivae ad ea quae sunt ab anima ut movente, sic communicat ea corpori. — Rationes igitur probantes, Angelum non sensificare corpus[^8] assumtum, concedendae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod idem est principium motus et sensus; dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de[^9] animalibus, in quibus vult, quod cor sit principium sensus, sicut et principium motus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus illud habet organa facta[^10] ad sentiendum; dicendum, quod Angelus non tantum assumit corpus humanum ut *instrumentum* ad operandum, sed etiam ut *signum* conveniens ad se ostendendum. Et quia corpus carens organis debitis homini non esset convenienter angelici spiritus ostensivum; ideo corpus habens omnia organa assumit, non ad ipsorum organorum sensificationem, sed potius ad sui ipsius ostensionem.

3. *Notandum.* — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod communicat corpori operationem consequentem speciem etc.; dicendum, quod *ridere* non est actus consequens speciem hominis, prout dicit motum solum genarum exteriorum, quia sic consequitur animam ut *motorem*, sed prout cum hoc dicit aliquem actum interiorem, qui consequitur existentiam animae in corpore, ut est *perfectio*[^11]; hoc autem modo non competit Angelo, sed solum primo.

4. *Sentire dicitur tripliciter.* — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angelus habet sensum, quia cognoscit singularia; dicendum, quod *sentire* potest accipi *communiter* et *proprie* et *magis proprie*. Communiter *sentire* idem est, quod rem ut praesentem cognoscere, secundum quem modum accipit Augustinus *ad Paulinam in libro de Videndo Deo*[^12]. Secundo modo *sentire* idem est, quod rem ut *hic et nunc* cognoscere; et sic accipit Boethius[^13], cum dicit, quod «sensus est particularium, et intellectus universalium». Tertio modo *sentire* idem est, quod speciem existentem in materia praeter materiam mediante organo corporeo suscipere: et sic accipit Philosophus *in secundo de Anima*[^14], cum dicit, quod «sensus est susceptivus specierum in materia praeter materiam». Primis duobus modis non differt sensus ab intellectu re, sed ratione tantum, et hoc modo bene ponitur in Angelo; Angelus enim per suam potentiam intellectivam cognoscit rem ut praesentem et ut *hic et nunc*, dirigendo aspectum super ipsam[^15]. Tertio vero modo differt potentia sensitiva ab intellectiva re et ratione, et illo tertio modo sensus est potentia alligata corpori; et hoc modo spiritui angelico non convenit.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si cognoscat potentia immateriali, tunc nihil facit ad hoc distantia; dicendum, quod dum singularia cognoscit et sentit, potentia immateriali cognoscit, aspectum tamen super rem cognitam dirigit; et ideo, si res illa non est ei praesens sive immediate coniuncta, necesse est, vel virtutem Angeli deferri usque ad ipsam, vel e converso. Et quoniam tam virtus Angeli quam obiecti est virtus finita, ideo nec cogno-

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scit nec potest cognoscere in quantacumque distantia. Hoc autem non est propter virtutis materialitatem, sicut est in sensu corporis, sed propter virtutis finitatem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod patitur ab igne; dicendum, quod illud non concludit, sicut melius ostendetur in quarto[^16]; sensus enim et affectus spiritualis sufficit ad sentiendum verum dolorem, sicut ostendetur ibidem.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod recipit et iudicat; dicendum, quod cum ista duo sint in sensu, videlicet *receptio* et *iudicium*; *receptio* est principaliter ratione organi, sed *iudicium* ratione virtutis. In sensu autem corporeo sic est *receptio* in organo, quod est *receptio* pariter et in virtute: et sic est *iudicium* virtutis illius in organo, quod non praeter organum: et ideo tam *receptio* quam *iudicium* est totius coniuncti. In oculo vero Angeli sic est *receptio* in organo, quod non est *receptio* in virtute aliqua illi organo alligata; et sic est *iudicium* a virtute in organo, quod etiam praeter organum. Unde Angelus ita bene perciperet aliquem clausis oculis, sicut apertis; et ideo nec est ibi *receptio* et *iudicium*, secundum quod competit sensui; ac per hoc non est ibi sensus exterior. Nec etiam oculus Angeli dicitur oculus nisi aequivoce; et tale[^17] corpus plus habet rationem *instrumenti* quam *organi*, licet *organicum* possit dici propter assimilationem, quam habet cum corpore naturali. Et sic patet totum[^18].

---

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### Question II. *Whether the Angels in assumed bodies exercise operations belonging to the sensitive power.*

Secondly it is asked on this point, whether Angels in assumed bodies have operations belonging to the sensitive power; and that they do so, seems clear.

1. "The same is the principle of motion and of sense"[^1], as the Philosopher says; but the Angel gives motion to the assumed body: therefore also sense.

2. Likewise, just as the Angel assumes a body having organs apt for motion, so he assumes a body having organs apt for sense — for just as that assumed body has hands and feet, so it has eyes and ears — but organs of sensing without sense are useless: therefore if he does not in vain assume those organs, it seems that he ensouls them with sense and senses through them.

3. Likewise, that which has an operation following on its specific property has an operation following on its generic property[^2]; but just as the property of man is to be risible, so the property of animal is to be sensible: therefore just as the Angel in an assumed body can laugh and weep, so also he can see and hear.

4. Likewise, either the Angel has sense by his own nature, or he does not. If he does not — since sense is cognitive of particulars[^3] — he does not know particulars, which is plainly false. But if he does have sense — since sense is a power by means of which corporeal organs are ensouled with sense — it is plain, etc.

5. Likewise, the Angel existing in an assumed body knows these sensible things; either, therefore, by a power *immaterial*, or by a power which is by nature *bound to a body*. If by an *immaterial* power, then he knows what is distant just as well as what is near — therefore the Angel who is at Rome hears us speaking at Paris — therefore he would not need to be moved and to go about. But if this is false, it remains that he knows by a power which is *proportioned to a body* and concerns a determinate distance. If, then, this is sense, it is plain, etc.

6. Likewise, nothing suffers from a body unless it have a sense proportioned to a body; but the Angel is burned by fire: therefore if his sense can suffer from a body, much more can he sense through a body, since by nature he is more apt to act upon a body than to suffer punishment from a body.

7. Likewise, the Angel, looking at me in an assumed body, receives in his eye my likeness, and[^4] since the eye is a transparent and polished body, he further passes judgment on his likeness; this is plain: if therefore nothing more is required for sense than reception and judgment, it seems that he senses through the assumed body.

*On the contrary* — *Foundations.*

1. Sense presupposes life; but the Angel does not vivify the assumed body, as was proved above[^5]: therefore neither does he ensoul it with sense, therefore he does not sense through it.

2. Likewise, sense presupposes an act of the vegetative power[^6]; but Angels in assumed bodies have no operations of the vegetative power: therefore neither operations of the sensitive.

3. Likewise, if the Angel were to sense through a body — since that sense which occurs by means of a corporeal organ is bound to corporeal nature — the Angel would be by nature, just as the soul is, united to a body: therefore when he had no body, he would not have perfect *being*.

4. Likewise, if the Angel were to sense through a body — since to sense is the action of what is conjoined — the Angel would communicate his ministerial operations to the body: therefore he ought to communicate punishment and glory, which is false.

5. Likewise, *to sense* is proper to the animal: therefore it belongs to none to sense except to him to whom it belongs to *be* an animal; but this in no way belongs to the Angel: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if to sense is by means of a corporeal organ, then he would not know a man with his eye closed, nor would he know a man from behind, nor would he know a man in the dark; all of which since they are false, it remains that the Angel in an assumed body does not have operations belonging to the sensitive power.

*A connected question.* — It is asked, therefore, what operations are fitting to, or are exercised by, the Angel in an assumed body.

### Conclusion.

> The Angel in an assumed body does not exercise operations of the sensitive power, insofar as these are acts of sensing through organs, but insofar as they are from the soul as mover.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since the soul is united to the body as perfection and as mover, *there is a threefold kind of operations*: some operations follow upon the soul itself in the body as it is mover; some, as it is perfection; some

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partly the one way, partly the other. *Threefold mode of operating.* — Now the soul exercises in the body in a different way those operations which follow upon it as *mover* and as *perfection*. For operations which follow upon the soul as *mover* it so exercises *through* the body that it exercises those same operations *upon* the body, because it moves not only other bodies but also its own body. But operations which follow upon the soul in the body as it is *perfection* — these the soul exercises in the body through the body in such a way that it exercises them *with* the body, as is clear: the soul with the eye closed cannot see any body. The third kind of operations it exercises *in* the body in both ways at once[^7]. And therefore the first belong to the soul as it is *something this* (*hoc aliquid*) and *a mover distinct from the moved*; the second, as it is *a form joined to matter*.

*To the connected question.* — Since therefore the Angel is united to the assumed body not as *perfection* but as *mover*, he exercises the first operations fully in that same body, the second by no means, and the third in some manner yes, in some manner not. — And this will be plainer if we come down to examples. *Progressive motion*, or any other motion of the outer members, is from the soul in the body as it is *mover* or *moving principle*; and therefore it belongs to the Angel. But *sensing through the organs of the body* belongs to the soul as it is the *perfection* of those organs — for just as the soul perfects the whole body, so vision or the visive power perfects the eye — and this does not belong to the Angel in an assumed body. But *to laugh* is an operation which belongs partly to the soul as it is *mover*, partly as it is *perfection*. For there is in it a certain *gladdening of the heart*, and this is from the soul as it is *perfection*; there is also in it a certain *motion of the cheeks*, and this is from the soul as it is *mover*. By reason of the first it does not belong to the Angel, but only by reason of the second.

*A two-membered conclusion.* — From this is plain the answer to the question proposed. For if by works of the sensitive power are called the acts themselves of sensing *through organs*, then it must be said briefly that the Angel does not exercise them through the assumed body. But if the works of the sensitive power are extended to those which are from the soul as mover, then he does communicate them to the body. — The reasons, therefore, proving that the Angel does not ensoul[^8] the assumed body with sense are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposed arguments.*

1. To the first thing brought forward to the contrary, that the same is the principle of motion and of sense; it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of[^9] animals, in which he holds that the heart is the principle of sense, just as it is the principle of motion.

2. To the objection that that body has organs made[^10] for sensing; it must be said that the Angel does not only assume the human body as an *instrument* for operating, but also as a *sign* fitting for showing himself. And since a body lacking the organs due to a man would not be fittingly indicative of an angelic spirit, therefore he assumes a body having all the organs, not for the ensouling-with-sense of those organs themselves, but rather for the showing of himself.

3. *To be noted.* — To the objection that he communicates to the body an operation following on the species, etc.; it must be said that *to laugh* is not an act following on the species of man insofar as it names only the motion of the outer cheeks, because thus it follows on the soul as *mover*; but insofar as together with this it names a certain inner act which follows on the existence of the soul in the body as it is *perfection*[^11]; and in this mode it does not belong to the Angel, but only in the first.

4. *Sense is said in three ways.* — To the objection that the Angel has sense, because he knows singulars; it must be said that *to sense* can be taken *commonly*, *properly*, and *more properly*. Commonly, *to sense* is the same as to know a thing as present, in which mode Augustine takes it *To Paulina in the book On Seeing God*[^12]. In the second mode, *to sense* is the same as to know a thing as *here and now*; and so Boethius[^13] takes it when he says that "sense is of particulars, intellect of universals". In the third mode, *to sense* is the same as to receive a species existing in matter apart from the matter by means of a corporeal organ; and so the Philosopher takes it *in the second book On the Soul*[^14], when he says that "sense is receptive of species in matter apart from matter". In the first two modes sense does not differ from intellect in reality but only in account; and in this mode it is well placed in the Angel; for the Angel by his intellective power knows a thing as present and as *here and now*, directing his gaze upon it[^15]. But in the third mode the sensitive power differs from the intellective in reality and in account, and in that third mode sense is a power bound to the body; and in this mode it does not belong to the angelic spirit.

5. To the objection that, if he knows by an immaterial power, then distance contributes nothing; it must be said that while he knows and senses singulars, he knows by an immaterial power, yet he directs his gaze upon the known thing; and therefore, if that thing is not present to him or immediately conjoined to him, it is necessary either that the power of the Angel be carried across to it, or conversely. And since both the power of the Angel and that of the object is a finite power, therefore he neither knows

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nor can know at any distance whatever. But this is not on account of the materiality of the power, as is the case in bodily sense, but on account of the finitude of the power.

6. To the objection that he suffers from fire; it must be said that this does not conclude, as will be better shown in the fourth book[^16]; for a spiritual sense and affection suffices for sensing true pain, as will be shown there.

7. To the objection that he receives and judges; it must be said that since these two things are present in sense, namely *reception* and *judgment*; *reception* is principally by reason of the organ, but *judgment* by reason of the power. In bodily sense the *reception* is in the organ in such a way that it is *reception* in the power likewise; and so the *judgment* of that power is in the organ in such a way that it is not apart from the organ; and therefore both *reception* and *judgment* are of the whole conjoined being. But in the eye of the Angel the *reception* is in the organ in such a way that it is not a reception in any power bound to that organ; and so the *judgment* is from the power in the organ in such a way that it is also apart from the organ. Hence the Angel would perceive someone as well with the eyes closed as with them open; and therefore there is not there *reception* and *judgment* in the way in which it belongs to sense; and through this there is not there an outer sense. Nor is the Angel's eye called an eye except equivocally; and such[^17] a body has more the character of an *instrument* than of an *organ*, although it may be called *organic* by reason of the likeness it has to a natural body. And so the whole[^18] is plain.

---

la: De Somno et vigilia, c. 3. (c. 2.); III. de Part. animal. c. 3. seq., ubi in animalibus cor ut principium motus et sensus statuitur.

en: Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 3 (c. 2); *On the Parts of Animals*, III, c. 3 sqq., where in animals the heart is established as principle of motion and of sense.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1. et V. c. 3. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics*, IV, c. 1, and V, c. 3 (c. 4).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, texts 14, 20, 24 (c. 18, 24, 31).

la: Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2. Vat. hic omittit *et*, quod dein post *tersum* addit; qua lectione propositio causalis: *cum oculus etc.*, rationem reddit, quare passiva receptio speciei in organo fieri possit. In nostra autem lectione ratio redditur, quare passiva illa receptio quasi progredi possit, ut active ab anima iudicetur. Ad rem cfr. hic ad 7. et infra d. 25. p. II. q. 6, ubi legitur: «In sentiendo receptio speciei est a corpore, sed iudicium est a virtute» (scil. sensitiva). S. Thom. (Quodl. 8. q. 2. a. 3.): «Sensus exteriores suscipiunt tantum a rebus per modum patiendi, sine hoc quod aliquid cooperetur ad sui formationem; quamvis iam formati habeant propriam operationem, quae est iudicium de propriis obiectis». Hic modus loquendi est sumtus ex Nemesii Episc. Emes., de Natura hominis c. 6.

en: So the codices with editions 1 and 2. The Vatican here omits *et*, which it then adds after *tersum*; on which reading the causal proposition *cum oculus, etc.* gives the reason why the passive reception of the species can occur in the organ. But in our reading the reason is given why that passive reception can, as it were, advance further, so as to be actively judged by the soul. On the matter cf. here ad 7, and below d. 25, p. II, q. 6, where one reads: "In sensing, the reception of the species is from the body, but the judgment is from the [sensitive] power". St. Thomas (*Quodl.* 8, q. 2, a. 3): "The outer senses receive only from things by way of being-acted-upon, without anything cooperating to their formation; although, once formed, they have their proper operation, which is judgment about their proper objects". This way of speaking is taken from Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, c. 6.

la: Quaest. praeced. et a. 2. q. 1.

en: The preceding question and a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 30. seqq. (c. 3.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, text 30 sqq. (c. 3).

la: Verba *anima clauso oculo* usque *utroque modo* desiderantur in antiquioribus mss.; exstant tamen in Vat., cod. cc et ed. 1. — Dictio *ut est hoc aliquid*, quae mox recurrit, significat idem ac *ut est substantia prima*; cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 3.

en: The words *anima clauso oculo* through *utroque modo* are wanting in the older manuscripts; they are however present in the Vatican, codex cc, and edition 1. — The phrase *ut est hoc aliquid*, which recurs presently, signifies the same as *ut est substantia prima*; cf. above page 197, note 3.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *non sentire per corpus* pro *non sensificare corpus*.

en: Several codices, together with edition 1, read *non sentire per corpus* in place of *non sensificare corpus*.

la: Ita codd. I aa; Vat. cum aliis edd. *in*.

en: So codices I and aa; the Vatican with the other editions reads *in*.

la: Vat. *apta*.

en: The Vatican reads *apta*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Part. animal. c. 10.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, III, c. 10.

la: Sive Epist. 147. c. 2. n. 7.

en: Or rather *Letter* 147, c. 2, n. 7.

la: Libr. I. Comment. in Porphyr. in fine et V. de Consol. prosa 4.

en: Book I of the *Commentary on Porphyry* at the end, and *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]*, V, prose 4.

la: Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, ubi etiam ea inveniuntur, quae serviunt pro solutione seq. obiectionis.

en: See above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, where also those things are found which serve for the solution of the following objection.

la: Dis. 14. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Nomine *sensus* non intelligas potentiam sensitivam, sed perceptionem animae, ut ibidem explicatur. — Fide cod. cc et ed. 1 bis substituimus *ostendetur* pro *ostenditur*.

en: [IV Sent.,] dist. 14, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — By the name of *sense* understand not the sensitive power, but the perception of the soul, as is there explained. — On the authority of codex cc and edition 1 we have twice substituted *ostendetur* for *ostenditur*.

la: Plures codd. *totale*.

en: Several codices read *totale*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion appended to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- Vol II convention: this quaestio has **no own scholion**. The shared editorial scholion for Article III appears in printed form at the close of Q.I (p. 220, SCHOLION I–IV), with SCHOLION III being a prospective preview of Q.II's *anima ut hoc aliquid / substantia prima* doctrine. The chunk's final apparatus entry (`[^18]: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) is Quaracchi's own cross-pointer to that block in q.1 and serves as the reader's pointer; it is not itself a scholion.
- Marginal labels preserved inline as italicized phrases (Vol II convention, locked d.1 sessions 8–12): *Ad oppositum / Fundamenta*, *Quaestio connexa*, *Triplex modus operandi*, *Ad quaestionem connexam*, *Conclusio bimembris*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Sentire dicitur tripliciter*. The phrase *Triplex genus operationum* (which the Quaracchi editors print marginally next to "*quaedam sunt operationes*" at the head of the Respondeo) is folded inline at the natural sentence-break to preserve column-pacing.
- Cross-chunk footer split (Vol II Override § 4): p. 220's footer belongs entirely to q.1 (SCHOLION IV doctor-list closed at "Biel, hic q. 1."). p. 221's footer (nn. 1–6) is fully internal to q.2. p. 222's footer (nn. 1–9) likewise fully internal. p. 223's footer is split: nn. 1, 2, 3 belong to q.2 (captured here as [^16]–[^18]); nn. 4, 5+ belong to the immediately-following DUB. I chunk and are NOT captured here.
- OCR garbles silently cleaned (selection): `Ulrum`→`Utrum`; `quaerunlur`→`quaeruntur`; `sensiiivae`→`sensitivae`; `polentiae`→`potentiae`; `lioc`→`hoc`; `Pliilosoplius`/`Pliilosophus`→`Philosophus`; `simihtudine`→`similitudine`; `niliil`→`nihil`; `Augelus`/`Angeius`→`Angelus`; `palitur`→`patitur`; `loquitnr`→`loquitur`; `coramunicare`/`corapetit`/`competil`→`communicare`/`competit`; `concinsio`→`conclusio`; `aniraa`→`anima`; `Boethins`→`Boethius`; `iudicitmi`/`iudicitm`→`iudicium`; `melins`→`melius`; `eiiim`→`enim`; `affeclus`/`spirilualis`→`affectus`/`spiritualis`; `princi-pabter`→`principaliter`; `oraania`/`orania`→`omnia`; `videiicet`→`videlicet`; `materiali-tatem`→`materialitatem`; `lale`→`tale`; `insirumenti`→`instrumenti`; `aequivoce` (OK).
- No `[?]` ambiguities parked. The OCR was clean enough across the q.2 body that PDF column-band consultation (pp. 221-R, 222-L/R, 223-L) resolved every cascade-fragmented passage cleanly. The cascade-shattered region around *sentire potest accipi communiter et proprie* (OCR lines 15989–15998, the "diagonal one-token-per-line" two-column-bleed signature) was reflowed from the PDF p. 222-R-1 column-band reading; the body and apparatus there are PDF-authoritative per Vol II Override § 1.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 224 -->

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.
### *De potestate daemonum respectu hominum.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum daemones habitare possint in corporibus humanis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod daemones in humanis corporibus possint habitare.

*Fundamenta.* 1. Nullus spiritus eiicitur de aliquo corpore vel habitaculo, in quo non est; sed daemones, sicut legitur in Evangeliis[^1], de obsessorum corporibus sunt eiecti a Christo et eius Apostolis: ergo aliquando habitaverunt in eis.

<!-- page 225 -->

2. Item, Augustinus de Divinatione daemonum[^2] loquens de daemonibus dicit: «Suadent miris et invisibilibus modis, per illam subtilitatem suorum corporum hominum corpora non sentientium penetrando»; sed si potest corpus penetrare, cum possit ibi quiescere, potest et inhabitare.

3. Item, constans est, quod aliqui a daemonibus obsidentur: ergo obsessi dicuntur, aut quia daemon habet in eis *effectum*, aut quia est in eis *secundum substantiam*. Si quia habent in eis effectum: ergo omnes peccatores essent obsessi a diabolo, quod falsum est: ergo quia sunt in eis secundum substantiam, obsessi dicuntur: ergo habitant in suis corporibus.

4. Item, nullum corpus potest praebere obstaculum spiritui: ergo si daemones spiritus sunt, nullum corpus est eis obstaculum: ergo sicut lumen penetrat aera usque in profundum et ibidem manet, sic spiritus daemoniacus corpus humanum subintrare potest per totum: ergo si non expellatur ab agente maioris potentiae, videtur, quod ibi possit inhabitare.

*Ad oppositum* arguitur sic. 1. Super illud Habacuc secundo[^3]: *Dominus in templo sancto suo*, Glossa: «Simulacris assidere potest immundus spiritus, intrinsecus esse non potest»: ergo si non potest in simulacris, multo minus nec in corporibus humanis.

2. Item, Beda dicit, et Magister adducit in littera[^4], super illud Actuum: *Cur tentavit satanas cor tuum*: «Implet satanas cor alicuius, non quidem ingrediens in eum nec in sensum eius»: ergo non videtur, quod daemon ingrediatur secundum substantiam corpus alicuius hominis.

3. Item, anima unitur corpori ut *motor* et ut *perfectio*; sed quia coniungitur ut *perfectio*, impossibile est, in eodem corpore esse aliam naturam perficientem: ergo cum coniungatur ut *motor*, impossibile est, in eodem corpore esse alium spiritum ut moventem. Si ergo daemon in corpore humano non potest esse nec ut *motor* nec ut *perfectio*: ergo nullo modo.

4. Item, sicut supra dictum est[^5], nullo modo competit, duos spiritus angelicos esse simul in eodem loco primo: ergo pari ratione non videtur, quod in eodem loco primo possit esse anima et Angelus; sed anima est in toto corpore suo, sicut vult Augustinus: ergo in nulla parte corporis potest esse daemon.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Deo permittente, daemones possunt corpora humana intrare et vexare.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut innuit textus evangelicus et Augustinus etiam in libro de Divinatione daemonum, daemones per naturam suae subtilitatis et spiritualitatis possunt quaecumque corpora penetrare et in eis sine aliquo obstaculo et impedimento subsistere; ratione vero suae potestatis possunt ea corpora, in quibus sunt, commovere et conturbare[^6]. Ideo daemones, *quantum est de potestate et subtilitate naturae, possunt corpora humana intrare, possunt etiam et vexare, nisi prohibeantur a superiori virtute*. Et cum permittuntur introire et vexare, tunc dicuntur corpora obsidere.

— Permittit autem hoc Dominus sive ad gloriae suae ostensionem, sive ad peccati punitionem, sive ad peccantis correctionem, sive ad nostram eruditionem. Sed ex qua istarum causarum determinate permittat, latet hoc humanam industriam, propter hoc quod occulta sunt Dei iudicia. Hoc tamen planum est, quod non sunt iniusta; et ideo non permittit talia sine causa. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quod daemones possunt humana corpora subintrare.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod intrinsecus esse non potest; dicendum, quod *esse intrinsecus in aliquo*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut sicut *contentum respectu continentis*, ut aqua respectu vasis; et sic daemon bene potest esse intrinsecus in simulacris. Alio modo *esse intrinsecus* dicitur aliquid, quod *influit in intima rei* et influendo conservat et perficit; et hoc modo non congruit daemoni nec respectu simulacri nec respectu hominis; et sic loquitur illa Glossa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Beda, quod non ingreditur in hominem; dicendum, quod non loquitur de ingressu in hominem, qui attenditur ex parte *corporis*, sed qui attenditur ex parte *spiritus rationalis*.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima[^7] comparatur ad corpus ut perfectio et motor etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile de comparatione per modum *motoris* et per modum *perfectionis*, quia *unius perfectibilis una sola est perfectio*[^8]; *perfectio* enim appropriat sibi perfectibile, et e converso; sed unius mobilis potest esse multiplex *motor*, et unus motor multa potest movere, maxime quando illa habent aliquem ordinem. Et quia divino iudicio anima peccatrix subiicitur daemoni obsidenti sicut tortori et affligenti, hinc est, quod simul in eodem corpore esse possunt.

— Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quod obiiciebatur de coexistentia duorum spirituum. Non enim est simile, pro eo quod illi, ut supra[^9] dictum fuit, repugnat ordo *universitatis*; huic autem consonat ordo *divinae aequitatis*, secundum quem anima peccatrix affligitur; nec repugnat ordo *universitatis*, quia diversimode ad illud habitaculum comparantur.

<!-- page 226 -->

english:
<!-- page 224 -->

### ARTICLE [the only article].
### *On the power of the demons with respect to men.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether the demons can dwell in human bodies.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the demons can dwell in human bodies.

*Foundations.* 1. No spirit is cast out of any body or dwelling-place in which it is not; but the demons, as one reads in the Gospels[^1], have been cast out by Christ and his Apostles from the bodies of the possessed: therefore they at some time dwelt in them.

<!-- page 225 -->

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Divination of Demons*[^2], speaking of the demons, says: «They persuade in wondrous and invisible modes, by that subtlety of their bodies penetrating the bodies of men, who do not perceive [it]»; but if [a demon] can penetrate a body, since it can also rest there, it can also dwell [in it].

3. Likewise, it is settled that some are possessed by demons: therefore they are called possessed either because the demon has its *effect* in them, or because it is in them *according to substance*. If because they have an effect in them: then all sinners would be possessed by the devil, which is false: therefore [it is] because they are in them according to substance [that] they are called possessed: therefore they dwell in their bodies.

4. Likewise, no body can offer an obstacle to a spirit: therefore if the demons are spirits, no body is an obstacle to them: therefore just as light penetrates the air down to the depths and remains there, so too a demonic spirit can enter the human body throughout: therefore if it is not expelled by an agent of greater power, it seems that it can dwell there.

*On the contrary,* one argues thus. 1. Upon that [text] of Habakkuk 2[^3]: *The Lord is in his holy temple*, the Gloss [says]: «The unclean spirit can sit beside idols, [but] cannot be within [them]»: therefore if it cannot [be] in idols, much less in human bodies.

2. Likewise, Bede says, and the Master adduces [him] in the text[^4], upon that [verse] from the Acts: *Why has Satan tempted thy heart?*: «Satan fills the heart of someone, [but] not indeed by entering into him nor into his sense»: therefore it does not seem that the demon enters according to substance into the body of any man.

3. Likewise, the soul is united to the body as *mover* and as *perfection*; but since it is conjoined as *perfection*, it is impossible that there be in the same body another nature perfecting [it]: therefore, since it is conjoined as *mover* [too], it is impossible that there be in the same body another spirit as moving [it]. If, then, a demon cannot be in the human body either as *mover* or as *perfection*: therefore in no way [at all].

4. Likewise, as has been said above[^5], in no way is it allowed that two angelic spirits be at the same time in the same primary place: therefore, by parity of reason, it does not seem that in the same primary place there can be a soul and an Angel; but the soul is in the whole of its body, as Augustine holds: therefore in no part of the body can a demon be.

### CONCLUSION.

> By God's permitting [it], the demons can enter human bodies and harass [them].

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Gospel text and also Augustine in the book *On the Divination of Demons* intimate, the demons by the nature of their subtlety and spirituality can penetrate any bodies whatever and subsist in them without any obstacle or impediment; but by reason of their power they can move and disturb[^6] those bodies in which they are. Therefore the demons, *as far as concerns the power and subtlety of [their] nature, can enter human bodies, and can also harass [them], unless they be prevented by a higher power*. And when they are permitted to enter and to harass, then they are said to possess bodies.

— And the Lord permits this either for the showing-forth of his own glory, or for the punishment of sin, or for the correction of the one sinning, or for our instruction. But from which of these causes determinately he permits [it], this lies hidden from human inquiry, on account of the fact that the judgments of God are hidden. This, however, is plain, that they are not unjust; and so he does not permit such things without a cause. — The reasons are therefore to be conceded, [namely] that the demons can enter human bodies.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].* 1. To that which is objected from the Gloss, that [a demon] cannot be within [a body]; it must be said that *to be within something* can [be taken] in two ways: either as *that which is contained with respect to the container*, as water with respect to a vessel; and in this way a demon can well be within idols. In another way, *to be within* is said of something which *flows into the inmost [recesses] of a thing* and by flowing-in conserves and perfects [it]; and in this way it befits a demon neither with respect to an idol nor with respect to a man; and so that Gloss is to be understood.

2. To that which is objected from Bede, that [the demon] does not enter into the man; it must be said that [Bede] does not speak of an entrance into man which is attended-to from the side of the *body*, but [of one] which is attended-to from the side of the *rational spirit*.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that the soul[^7] is compared to the body as perfection and mover etc.; it must be said that the comparison through the mode of *mover* and through the mode of *perfection* is not the same, because *of one perfectible there is only one perfection*[^8]; for *perfection* appropriates to itself its perfectible, and conversely; but of one mobile there can be multiple *movers*, and one mover can move many [mobiles], especially when these have some [common] order. And because by divine judgment the sinning soul is subjected to a possessing demon as to a torturer and afflicter, hence it is that they can be at the same time in the same body.

— And by this is made plain the response to the last [objection], which was objected concerning the coexistence of two spirits. For [the case] is not similar, by reason of the fact that *to them*, as has been said above[^9], the order of the *universe* is repugnant; but to *this* [pair, soul + demon] the order of *divine equity* is consonant, by which the sinning soul is afflicted; nor is the order of the *universe* repugnant [here], because [they] are compared in different ways to that habitation.

<!-- page 226 -->

la: Matth. 8, 16. et 32; Marc. 1, 34; Luc. 11, 14. — De Apostolis cfr. Matth. 10, 1; Marc. 3, 15.

en: Matth. 8:16 and 32; Mark 1:34; Luke 11:14. — On the Apostles cf. Matth. 10:1; Mark 3:15.

en: [Augustine, *On the Divination of Demons*], c. 5, n. 9.

la: Vers. 20. — Glossa inducta est Glossa interlinearis; cfr. Lyranus in hunc locum.

en: [Habakkuk 2,] verse 20. — The Gloss adduced is the Interlinear Gloss; cf. Lyra on this passage.

la: Hic c. 4. — Act. 8, 3.

en: Here at c. 4 [of Lombard's text]. — Acts 8:3.

la: Dist. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 4. — Augustini sententiam de modo, quo anima est in corpore, exposuit S. Bonav. in I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

en: [II Sent.] dist. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 4. — Bonaventure expounded Augustine's view on the manner in which the soul is in the body at I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 3.

la: In Vat. additur: *Sicut enim spiritus spiritui penetrabilis esse non potest, sic nec corpus potest resistere spiritui.*

en: In the Vatican edition is added: *For just as one spirit cannot be penetrable to another spirit, so neither can a body resist a spirit.*

la: Cod. bb *anima rationalis.*

en: Codex bb [reads] *the rational soul*.

la: Averroes, de Substantia orbis, c. 1: *Unum enim subiectum habere plus quam unam formam, est impossibile.*

en: Averroes, *On the Substance of the Heavenly Sphere*, c. 1: *For it is impossible that one subject have more than one form.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusiones fide certae sunt. — De variis tentationum generibus cfr. infra d. 21. dub. 3. et 4. Causa finalis, ob quam Deus vexationes daemonum permittit, magis explicatur I. Sent. d. 46. q. 3-6, d. 47. q. 3. et praecipue II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — In solut. ad ult. observanda est sententia: «Unius perfectibilis una sola est perfectio», quod respectu formae substantialis *completae* ab omnibus conceditur.

**II.** Alex. Hal., (quoad principia) S. p. II. q. 100. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic a. unicus, q. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 7. q. 29. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. et dub. lat. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusions are certain by faith. — On the various kinds of temptations see below, d. 21, dub. 3 and 4. The final cause on account of which God permits the harassings of the demons is more fully explained at I Sent. d. 46, q. 3–6, d. 47, q. 3, and especially II Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — In the solution to the last [objection] the sentence is to be observed: «Of one perfectible there is only one perfection», which, with respect to the *complete* substantial form, is granted by all.

**II.** Alex. Hal. (as to the principles), *Summa* p. II, q. 100, m. 1–2. — S. Thom., on this and the following question here, a. unicus, q. 5. — B. Albert., here, a. 6; *Summa* p. II, tr. 7, q. 29. — Petr. a Tar., here, q. unica, a. 5. — Richard. a Med., here, a. 2, q. 1. — Aegid. R., here, q. 2, a. 4, and *dub. lat.* 2. — Durand., here, q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following questions, here, q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following question, here, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is `bon-sent-II-d8-p2-a1-q1` (Pars II, the single ARTICULUS UNICUS, Quaestio I) — *Utrum daemones habitare possint in corporibus humanis*. It opens immediately below the preceding `bon-sent-II-d8-p2-divisio`'s TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM on p.224 R-col, with the short ARTICULUS UNICUS title (*De potestate daemonum respectu hominum*) + QUAESTIO I title folded into this q.1 per locked Vol II convention (no standalone article-divisio chunk for a single-article pars). The structure is the canonical 4 + 4 + Conclusio + Respondeo + grouped Solutio (1 / 2 / 3-4 / + *ad ultimum*) + a two-paragraph SCHOLION (I doctrinal/cross-ref; II doctor list).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** Transcribed from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 16152–16253) and re-set against the 450 dpi pp.224–226 column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 224-226 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 224`/`225`/`226`), read L column top→bottom then R column, body then footer. The Respondeo + Solutio diagonal-cascade OCR fragmentation (raw lines ~16190–16210 and ~16215–16245) was re-set column-by-column from the R-col crops; the SCHOLION I+II block on p.226 sits at L-col-0/R-col-0 above the QUAESTIO II opener.
- **Doctrinal core.** The Respondeo carries the **two-faculty mechanism** of demonic entry: (1) *natura suae subtilitatis et spiritualitatis* → penetration + subsistence without obstacle; (2) *ratio suae potestatis* → movement + disturbance (`commovere et conturbare`) of the body. The Vatican-edition footer addition (*Sicut enim spiritus spiritui penetrabilis esse non potest, sic nec corpus potest resistere spiritui* — [^6]) attached at this point makes the spirit/body asymmetry explicit. The four-cause *permission* enumeration (gloriae ostensionem / peccati punitionem / peccantis correctionem / nostram eruditionem) is the rhetorical pivot of the Respondeo and reappears in the SCHOLION's d.21/d.46/d.47/d.23 cross-references. The Solutio's **3-4 grouped reply** carries the *motor/perfectio* asymmetry maxim that defines Pars II's metaphysical foundation: *unius perfectibilis una sola est perfectio* (one perfection per perfectible) — but *unius mobilis potest esse multiplex motor* (multiple movers per mobile). The Averroes citation in [^8] (*Unum enim subiectum habere plus quam unam formam, est impossibile*) is the standard 13th-c. peripatetic anchor; SCHOLION I notes that this maxim *respectu formae substantialis completae ab omnibus conceditur* — the *completae* qualifier is the technical safety-valve for the soul+demon coexistence.
- **Scholion structure.** Single-question SCHOLION with **I** (doctrinal/cross-ref) + **II** (doctor list — Alex.Hal./S.Thom./B.Albert./Petr.aTar./Richard.aMed./Aegid.R./Durand./Dionys.Carth./Biel; *de hac et seq. q.* cross-pointer at Alex.Hal. (`quoad principia`), S.Thom., Dionys.Carth., and Biel signals that **q.2 will share this SCHOLION's doctor anchor** — per locked Vol II convention q.2 is therefore expected to have **no own SCHOLION doctor list**, matching the s55→s56 / s58→s58 pattern in d.8 Pars I).
- **Chunking convention (Vol II).** The short `ARTICULUS UNICUS.` opener (raw 16152) + title (*De potestate daemonum respectu hominum*) + `QUAESTIO I.` title (raw 16155) folds into this q.1 (locked Vol II convention — no standalone article-divisio chunk for a single-article pars).
- **Cross-chunk footer — INCOMING (clean, no backfill).** The committed `bon-sent-II-d8-p2-divisio` (session 58) already took p.224 footer ⁵ (*Vat. Magister quaerit. In secunda determinat per* etc.) as its [^1]. p.224 footer ⁶ (Matth./Marc./Luc. Evangelia citation) and ⁷ (*Cap. 5. n. 9.* for Aug. *de Divinatione daemonum*) are taken here as [^1] and [^2] (re-anchored at videtur 1 *legitur in Evangeliis*⁶ and videtur 2 *Augustinus de Divinatione daemonum*⁷). p.225 footer ¹–⁷ all anchor within this q.1 (Ad oppositum 1 *Habacuc secundo*¹ → [^3]; Ad opp. 2 *Magister adducit in littera*² → [^4]; Ad opp. 4 *supra dictum est*³ → [^5]; Respondeo *commovere et conturbare*⁴ → [^6]; Solutio 3-4 *quod anima*⁵ → [^7]; Solutio 3-4 *una sola est perfectio*⁶ → [^8]; Solutio ad ultimum *ut supra*⁷ → [^9]).
- **Cross-chunk footer — OUTGOING q.1 → q.2 split at p.226 (CLEAN).** SCHOLION II's terminal entry `Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.` is the last marker for q.1; `QUAESTIO II. — Utrum daemones illabantur animabus` opens immediately below on p.226 L-col with its own marker stream restarting at note ¹ (the OCR's `Lucae quarto¹: Ecce homo habens daemonium` on p.226-L-0 is the q.2 videtur 1 opener and belongs to **`bon-sent-II-d8-p2-a1-q2`**). Per the doctor-list *de hac et seq. q.* pattern noted above, q.2 is expected to carry no own SCHOLION — verify on p.226/227 PDF extract at q.2 build.
- **Apparatus crosswalk:** p.224 footer ⁶ → [^1]; p.224 footer ⁷ → [^2]; p.225 footer ¹ → [^3]; p.225 footer ² → [^4]; p.225 footer ³ → [^5]; p.225 footer ⁴ → [^6]; p.225 footer ⁵ → [^7]; p.225 footer ⁶ → [^8]; p.225 footer ⁷ → [^9]. **Total: 9 entries.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 9 superscript anchors + all 9 apparatus entries verified column-by-column against the 450 dpi crops (p.224-R-1 for videtur 1 + 2 anchors / p.224-R-2 for footers ⁶ ⁷ / p.225-L-1 for videtur 3-4 + ad-opp 1-4 anchors / p.225-L-2 for Conclusio + Respondeo start + footers ¹ ² ³ / p.225-R-1 for Respondeo continuation + Solutio 1/2/3-4/ultimum + anchors ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ / p.225-R-2 for footers ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ / p.226-L-0 for SCHOLION I + R-col-0 for SCHOLION II doctor list). Marker-pairing La==En exact 1–9.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** per Vol II convention: *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*, *Distinctio* (sidebar on Solutio 1), *Solutio oppositorum*, *Conclusio*, *Quibus de causis Deus hoc permittat* (sidebar on the four-cause permission enumeration).
- **OCR garbles cleaned silently.** `priraum` → primum; `NuIIus` → Nullus; `iu quo uou Bst` → in quo non est; `Fnndamenta` → Fundamenta; `legilur` → legitur; `obsessorura` → obsessorum; `niiris` → miris; `iiiodis` → modis; `senlientium` → sentientium; `peuetrando` → penetrando; `ahqui` → aliqui; `ejfeclum` → effectum; `qiiod` → quod; `sub.staniiam` → substantiam; `sub.stantiam` → substantiam; `nuUum` → nullum; `daeraones` → daemones; `eorpus` → corpus; `humanura` → humanum; `secimdo` → secundo; `simulacris` (OK); `intrinsecus` (OK); `nec in sensum` (OK); `inotor` → motor; `unius mobilis` (OK); `daemoniacus` (OK); `Concedendae` (OK); `ahcuius` → alicuius; `siraul` → simul; `niillo modo` → nullo modo; `daeraonum` → daemonum; `substilitatem` → subtilitatem; `qiiae` → quae; `coniturbare` → conturbare; `subiicitur` (OK); `mima` → anima; `ratioiuilis` → rationalis; `Sul3slantia` → Substantia; `inutabiUa` (= mutabilia, dubia chunk footer, not this); `daemoiium` → daemonum (in Respondeo).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum daemones animabus illabi possint.
Whether the demons can slip into souls.

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum daemones animabus illabi possint.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum daemones illabi possint animabus. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.* 1. Lucae quarto[^1]: *Ecce homo habens daemonium*, ibi Glossa: «Intraverat diabolus, unde exierat Christus»; sed Christus non exierat de corpore, sed de spiritu: ergo diabolus subintrat spiritum.

2. Item, si impartibile adiungatur impartibili, secundum totum applicatur ei[^2], et quod applicatur alicui secundum totum applicatur ei secundum suum intimum; sed illabi non est aliud quam secundum intimum profundari: ergo cum daemon sit impartibilis et obsidendo hominem animae applicetur, videtur, quod eidem necessario illabatur.

3. Item, sicut est ordo in corporibus, ita est ordo in spiritibus; sed in corporibus videmus, quod agens influit virtutem suam passo usque ad intimum, aliter enim non alteraret totum[^3]: ergo pari ratione et in spiritibus: ergo daemon potest influere virtutem suam usque ad intima animae. Sed virtus daemonis non est spiritualior quam substantia: ergo videtur, quod daemon usque ad intima animae illabi possit.

4. Item, sicut homo efficitur templum Dei per gratiam, ita efficitur templum diaboli per peccatum; sed omnino ibidem, ubi prius erat gratia, incipit esse culpa: ergo ubi prius habitabat Deus, potest habitare diabolus.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum[^4]: «Inest singulis spiritibus naturalis terminus, quo a se invicem distinguuntur, et unus in altero non est»; sed anima humana spiritus est: ergo non potest esse in daemone nec daemon in ea: ergo nec illabi: ergo etc.

2. Item, si unus spiritus illabitur, aut alter potest illabi, aut non. Si sic; pari ratione et tertius et quartus, et sic de aliis, et ita omnes spiritus mali possent illabi uni animae, quod plane falsum est. Si non potest; ergo unus spiritus implet totam animam. Sed hoc est falsum, quia *imaginem Dei nihil minus Deo implere potest*, sicut dicit Augustinus et Beda[^5].

3. Item, si daemon illaberetur animae, esset intimus animae: ergo per totum dominaretur ei, ergo posset pertrahere ad mala, quaecumque vellet, et ita anima liberum arbitrium non haberet. Quodsi anima liberum arbitrium non potest amittere: ergo nec daemon ei illabi potest.

4. Item, si illaberetur animae, nihil esset ita intimum in anima, in quo non esset et super quod non posset daemon; sed sicut Deus illabendo animam rectificat et conservat, sic daemon, quod potest, deordinat et depravat: ergo si daemon illaberetur animae, daemon posset *synderesim* vel *voluntatem naturalem* depravare et ad malum inclinare; quod est impossibile[^6].

### CONCLUSIO.

> Daemones animabus humanis illabi nequeunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *illabi aliquid alicui* importat, quod illud intimum sit ei et quod intime operetur in illo; nihil autem tale est respectu animae nisi solus Deus: ideo *solus divinus spiritus animae potest illabi*[^7]. — In anima namque humana idem est *intimum* et *supremum*; et hoc patet, quia secundum sui *supremum* maxime approximat Deo,

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similiter secundum sui *intimum*; unde quanto magis redit ad interiora, tanto magis ascendit et unitur aeternis. Et quia «solus Deus superior est mente humana»[^8] secundum sui *supremum*, solus Deus potest menti esse intimus; et ideo *illabi spiritui rationali est divinae substantiae proprium*. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod animabus humanis illabi non potest malignus spiritus.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Glossa, quod intravit diabolus etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur de ingressu secundum substantiam, sed secundum effectum sive conformitatis malitiam; unde non vult Glossa plus dicere, quam quod, ubi fuit[^9] gratia, ibi incipit esse malitia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *impartibile impartibili applicatur secundum totum*; dicendum, quod aut intelligitur de *iunctura situali*, aut de *iunctura virtuali*. Si de *situali*, sic potest habere veritatem; sic autem non est intelligere applicationem substantiarum spiritualium, quia non sunt *situales*. Si autem intelligatur de applicatione *virtuali*, sic sermo non habet veritatem; quoniam in simplici substantia reperitur magnitudo virtutis, et secundum illam considerari potest in anima maior et minor ratio dignitatis secundum accessum ad originem illius virtutis[^10].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut est ordo in corporibus, ita est in spiritibus; dicendum, quod etsi sit aliqua similitudo, non tamen omnimode perfecta, nec quantum ad *ordinem* nec quantum ad *intimitatem*. Non quantum ad *ordinem*, quia omnes substantiae rationales immediate sunt natae ferri in Deum, nec quantum ad hoc una praeest alteri; hoc autem non contingit in corporalibus inveniri. — Non est etiam simile quantum ad *intimitatem*, quia quod est intus et extra in re corporali est eiusdem naturae, non differens dignitate, sed magis partium positione; in anima vero quod est *intimum*, hoc est maxime *supremum* et Deo proximum. Ideo in rebus corporalibus quod potest influere exterius, magis et magis agendo, potest pervenire ad interius et ad intimum; non sic in spiritu, ubi idem dicitur esse *intimum*, quod est in eo *supremum* et *dignissimum*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ibidem est culpa, ubi fuit gratia; dicendum, quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod ibidem sit diabolus, ubi et Deus; quia aliter est *gratia* a Deo, aliter *culpa* a diabolo. *Gratia* enim est a Deo ut *praesente et influente et intime operante et medullas affectionis penetrante*, secundum quod innuit Apostolus ad Hebraeos quarto[^11]: *Vivus est sermo Dei et efficax* etc. Sed *culpa* dicitur esse a diabolo solum sicut *a suggerente et impellente, quodam modo quasi exterius instigante*; et ideo non oportet, diabolum habitare in intimo cordis peccatoris, quantumcumque medullitus adhaereat peccatum. Ulterius, peccatum non *ponit* aliquid, sed potius *privat*; ideo secundum ipsum non dicitur *aliquid illabi animae*, sed potius *ab eo aliquid corrumpi*. Et sic patet, quod non est simile de *culpa* et *gratia*, quamvis sint circa idem.

english:
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### QUESTION II.
### *Whether the demons can slip into souls.*

Secondly it is asked whether the demons can slip into souls. And that they can, it seems.

*Foundations.* 1. Luke 4[^1]: *Behold a man having a demon*, [where] the Gloss [says]: «The devil had entered, whence Christ had gone out»; but Christ had not gone out from the body, but from the spirit: therefore the devil enters the spirit.

2. Likewise, if a partless [thing] be joined to a partless [thing], it is applied to it according to the whole[^2], and what is applied to anything according to the whole is applied to it according to its inmost; but to slip-in [*illabi*] is nothing other than to be plunged according to the inmost: therefore, since a demon is partless and, by possessing a man, is applied to the soul, it seems that it of necessity slips into [the soul].

3. Likewise, just as there is an order in bodies, so is there an order in spirits; but in bodies we see that an agent infuses its power into the patient down to the inmost — otherwise it would not alter the whole[^3]: therefore by parity of reason also among spirits: therefore a demon can infuse its power to the inmost depths of the soul. But the power of a demon is not more spiritual than [its] substance: therefore it seems that the demon can slip down to the inmost [depths] of the soul.

4. Likewise, just as a man is made a temple of God by grace, so is he made a temple of the devil by sin; but in the very same [place] where there was grace, fault begins to be: therefore where God formerly dwelt, the devil can dwell.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in *On Faith, to Peter*[^4]: «There is in each spirit a natural boundary by which they are distinguished from one another, and one is not in another»; but the human soul is a spirit: therefore it cannot be in a demon, nor a demon in it: therefore neither can it slip in: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if one spirit slips in, either another can slip in, or it cannot. If yes: then by parity of reason also a third, and a fourth, and so for the rest, and so all evil spirits could slip into one soul — which is plainly false. If no: then one spirit fills the whole soul. But this is false, because *nothing less than God can fill the image of God*, as Augustine and Bede say[^5].

3. Likewise, if a demon were to slip into the soul, it would be the inmost of the soul: therefore it would dominate it throughout, therefore it could draw [the soul] to whatever evils it might wish, and so the soul would not have free will. And if the soul cannot lose free will: then neither can a demon slip into it.

4. Likewise, if it were to slip into the soul, there would be nothing so inmost in the soul that [the demon] would not be there and not have it under [its power]; but as God by slipping-in rectifies and conserves the soul, so the demon, [in] what it can [do], disorders and depraves [it]: therefore if the demon were to slip into the soul, the demon could deprave the *synderesis* or the *natural will* and incline [it] to evil — which is impossible[^6].

### CONCLUSION.

> The demons cannot slip into human souls.

**I respond:** It must be said that *for some thing to slip into another* imports that it be inmost to it and operate inmostly within it; but nothing of this sort exists with respect to the soul except God alone: therefore *only the divine spirit can slip into the soul*[^7]. — For in the human soul the *inmost* and the *supreme* are the same; and this is clear, because [the soul] most approaches God according to its *supreme*,

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likewise according to its *inmost*; whence the more it returns to interior [things], the more it ascends and is united to the eternal. And because «God alone is higher than the human mind»[^8] according to its *supreme*, God alone can be inmost to the mind; and therefore *to slip into the rational spirit is proper to the divine substance*. — The reasons showing that an evil spirit cannot slip into human souls are therefore to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].* 1. To that, then, which is first objected from the Gloss, that the devil entered etc.; it must be said that this is not said of an entry according to substance, but according to *effect* or the malice of conformity; whence the Gloss does not mean to say more than that, where there was[^9] grace, there malice begins to be.

2. To that which is objected, that *partless is applied to partless according to the whole*; it must be said that this is to be understood either of *positional joining* or of *virtual joining*. If of *positional* [joining], it can hold; but in this way one is not to understand the application of spiritual substances, because they are not *positional*. But if it be understood of *virtual* application, then the saying does not hold; for in a simple substance there is found a magnitude of power, and according to it can be considered in the soul a greater and lesser ratio of dignity according to access to the origin of that power[^10].

3. To that which is objected, that just as there is an order in bodies, so there is in spirits; it must be said that, although there is some similarity, it is not nevertheless every way perfect, neither as to *order* nor as to *intimacy*. Not as to *order*, because all rational substances are immediately born to be borne into God, nor in this respect does one stand above another; but this is not found to occur in bodily [things]. — Nor is [the case] similar as to *intimacy*, because what is within and without in a bodily thing is of the same nature, not differing in dignity but rather in position of parts; in the soul, however, what is *inmost*, that is most *supreme* and proximate to God. Therefore in bodily things what can flow-in outwardly, by acting more and more, can come through to the interior and to the inmost; not so in a spirit, where the same is said to be *inmost* which in it is the *supreme* and the *most worthy*.

4. To that which is objected, that there is fault in the very [place] where grace was; it must be said that it is true; but from this it does not follow that the devil is in the same [place] where also God is; because *grace* is otherwise from God, and otherwise *fault* from the devil. For *grace* is from God as *present and infusing and inmostly operating and penetrating the marrow of the affections*, in accordance with what the Apostle intimates to the Hebrews 4[^11]: *The word of God is living and effective* etc. But *fault* is said to be from the devil only as from *one suggesting and impelling, in a certain way as from without instigating*; and so it is not necessary that the devil dwell in the inmost of the sinner's heart, however medullarily sin clings [there]. Further, sin does not *posit* anything, but rather *privates*; therefore according to it nothing is said *to slip into the soul*, but rather *something to be corrupted by it*. And thus is it clear that *fault* and *grace* are not alike, although they are concerning the same [subject].

la: Vers. 33. — Glossa est ex Beda, in hunc locum, ubi textus originalis: *Introierat enim diabolus, unde Christus spiritualiter exierat.*

en: [Luke 4,] verse 33. — The Gloss is from Bede, on this passage, where the original text [reads]: *For the devil had entered, whence Christ had gone forth spiritually.*

la: Aristot., de Lineis insecabilibus, circa finem: «Res, quae partibus caret, tangit rem partibus carentem, tota totam». Idem dicit VI. Phys. text. 2. (c. 1.).

en: Aristotle, *On Indivisible Lines*, near the end: «A thing which lacks parts touches a thing lacking parts, whole against whole». He says the same at *Physics* VI, text 2 (c. 1).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 23. seqq. et 55. seqq. (c. 4. et 7. seq.). — Paulo inferius post *virtutem suam* Vat. subiungit *passo, videlicet animae*; et dein plures codd. substituunt *usque in* pro *usque ad.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 23 ff. and 55 ff. (c. 4 and 7 f.). — A little below, after *virtutem suam* the Vatican edition adds *passo, videlicet animae*; and thereafter several codices substitute *usque in* for *usque ad.*

la: Cap. 3. n. 30. Textus originalis ultimam partem sic exhibet: *quo a se invicem discernuntur, quia nullus eorum est in alio.*

en: [Augustine, *On Faith, to Peter*], c. 3, n. 30. The original text presents the last part thus: *by which they are discerned from one another, because none of them is in another.*

la: August., XII. De Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 3; XIV. de Trin. c. 14. n. 20; Tract. 23. in Ioan. n. 5; de Spiritu et anima, c. 27. et aliis multis locis, in quibus dicit, animam solo Deo posse beatificari. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, ubi allegatur Gennadii liber de Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus, olim Augustino tributus, et recitantur etiam verba Bedae. — Aliquanto superius nonnulli codd. cum Vat. verbis *pari ratione* praemittunt *ergo.*

en: Augustine, *City of God* XII, c. 1, n. 3; *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 14, n. 20; *Tract. 23 on John*, n. 5; *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 27, and in many other places, in which he says that the soul can be made blessed by God alone. Cf. also here Lombard's text, c. 4, where the book of Gennadius *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* — formerly ascribed to Augustine — is alleged, and the words of Bede also recited. — A little earlier, several codices with the Vatican edition prefix *ergo* to the words *pari ratione.*

la: De quo vide infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 2.

en: On which see below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 2.

la: August., VI. Musicae, c. 13. n. 40. ait: *Cum enim anima per se ipsam nihil sit (non enim aliter esset commutabilis et pateretur defectum ab essentia); cum ergo ipsa per se nihil sit, quidquid autem illi esse est, a Deo sit, in ordine suo manens ipsius Dei praesentia vegetatur in mente atque* ...

en: Augustine, *On Music* VI, c. 13, n. 40, says: *For since the soul is nothing through itself (for otherwise it would not be mutable and suffer defect from essence); since therefore it is itself nothing through itself, but whatever its being is is from God, [the soul] remaining in its own order is vivified by the very presence of God in the mind and* ...

en: As Augustine says. Cf. above, p. 45, note 5.

la: Vat. *finit.* Paulo ante cod. T in marg. *conformitatem malitiae.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *finit.* A little earlier codex T in the margin [has] *conformitatem malitiae.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. II, q. 2.

la: Vers. 12.

en: [Hebrews 4,] verse 12. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Constat apud omnes theologos, solum Deum essentialiter illabi posse substantiae animae humanae, quod egregie a S. Doctore explicatur (hic in corp. et ad 3. 4; I Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. in fine corp., d. 19. p. I. q. 4. ad 3.), quia scil. *supremo animae non est superior nisi Deus*. «Quamvis enim *supremum* Angeli sit superius supremo animae per naturam; tamen *possibile* ipsius Angeli non est superius supremo animae per naturam» etc. (Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.).

**II.** S. Thom. rem tantum tangit S. III. q. 8. a. 8. ad 1. et alibi. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** It is established among all theologians that God alone can essentially slip into the substance of the human soul, which is excellently explained by the holy Doctor (here in the body and in [the replies to] 3. 4; I Sent. d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, at the end of the body; d. 19, p. I, q. 4, ad 3) — namely because *nothing is higher than the supreme of the soul except God*. «For although the *supreme* of an Angel is higher than the supreme of the soul by nature; nevertheless the *possible* [power] of an Angel is not higher than the supreme of the soul by nature», etc. (Richard. a Med., here, a. 2, q. 2).

**II.** S. Thomas touches the matter only [briefly] at *Summa* III, q. 8, a. 8, ad 1, and elsewhere. — B. Albert., here, a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., here, q. unica, a. 6, *quaestiunc.* 1. — Richard. a Med., the place cited. — Aegid. R., here, q. 2, a. 3.

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is `bon-sent-II-d8-p2-a1-q2` (Pars II, the single ARTICULUS UNICUS, Quaestio II) — *Utrum daemones animabus illabi possint*. It is the **doctrinal centerpiece of d.8 Pars II**: the locked thesis *illabi spiritui rationali est divinae substantiae proprium* (slipping-in to the rational spirit is proper to the divine substance) and the *idem est intimum et supremum* in-anima maxim that grounds it. The Augustinian Trinitarian anchor (*solus Deus superior est mente humana*, with the *XII de Civ. Dei* + *XIV de Trin.* + *Tract. 23 in Ioan.* + *de Spir. et anima* sweep at [^5]) carries the *anima solo Deo posse beatificari* corollary; the *VI. Musicae* anchor at [^7] (*Cum enim anima per se ipsam nihil sit ... a Deo sit, in ordine suo manens ipsius Dei praesentia vegetatur in mente*) and the *ad Hebraeos quarto* anchor at [^11] (*Vivus est sermo Dei et efficax*) together define the *praesente + influente + intime operante + medullas affectionis penetrante* fourfold mode-of-grace which the Solutio uses to split *gratia* (= internal/intimate) from *culpa* (= external/instigating). The Solutio 3's twin asymmetry *Non quantum ad ordinem ... Non quantum ad intimitatem* is the structural pivot — in spiritibus *idem dicitur esse intimum, quod est in eo supremum et dignissimum*; in corporalibus intus/extra differs only by *partium positione*. The Solutio 4's *peccatum non ponit aliquid, sed potius privat* maxim is the Augustinian privation-of-being argument that closes the question.
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** Transcribed from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 16254–16350) and re-set against the 450 dpi pp.226–227 column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 226-227 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 226`/`227`), read L column top→bottom then R column, body then footer. The Respondeo's two-page bridge (p.226 R-col bottom *secundum sui supremum maxime approximat Deo,* → p.227 L-col top *similiter secundum sui intimum*) is rejoined as a single clause across the page break. The SCHOLION I + II block sits at p.227 L-col-2 and R-col-2 above the QUAESTIO III opener.
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- **Apparatus crosswalk:** p.226 footer ¹ → [^1]; p.226 footer ² → [^2]; p.226 footer ³ → [^3]; p.226 footer ⁴ → [^4]; p.226 footer ⁵ → [^5]; p.226 footer ⁶ → [^6]; p.226 footer ⁷ → [^7]; p.227 footer ¹ → [^8]; p.227 footer ² → [^9]; p.227 footer ³ → [^10]; p.227 footer ⁴ → [^11]. **Total: 11 entries.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 11 superscript anchors + all 11 apparatus entries verified column-by-column against the 450 dpi crops (p.226-L-1 for videtur 1–4 anchors + Contra 1 *Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum⁴* / p.226-L-2 for footer ¹ ² ³ ⁴ / p.226-R-1 for Contra 2–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo start + anchors ⁵ ⁶ / p.226-R-2 for Respondeo continuation + anchor ⁷ + footer ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ / p.227-L-1 for Respondeo p.227-side + Solutio 1/2/3 + anchors ¹ ² ³ / p.227-L-2 for footer ¹ ² ³ + SCHOLION I / p.227-R-1 for Solutio 4 + anchor ⁴ + SCHOLION I continuation / p.227-R-2 for SCHOLION II doctor list + footer ⁴ (= [^11] *Vers. 12.*)). Marker-pairing La==En exact 1–11.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** per Vol II convention: *Fundamenta* (sidebar on Contra 1); *Quid sit illabi* (sidebar on Respondeo opener *illabi aliquid alicui importat*); *Conclusio*; *Ratio notabilis* (sidebar on Respondeo *idem est intimum et supremum*); *Solutio oppositorum* (sidebar on Solutio 1); *Notandum* (twin sidebar, on Solutio 3 *etsi sit aliqua similitudo* + on Solutio 4 *aliter est gratia a Deo, aliter culpa a diabolo*).
- **OCR garbles cleaned silently.** Utruni→Utrum; iUabi→illabi; laemones→daemones; claemo-nium→daemonium; Itera→Item; intimura→intimum; sil→sit; illabatnr→illabatur; ila→ita; spintualior→spiritualior; aniiuae→animae; efficilur→efficitur; ibidein→ibidem; Uabitabat→habitabat; Pelrum→Petrum; slngulis→singulis; ituplet→implet; totain→totam; inliraus→intimus; raala→mala; quiuiecumque→quaecumque; arbitriura→arbitrium; daeraon→daemon; inliraum→intimum; aniraa→anima; rectiflcat→rectificat; daeiuon→daemon; aniraae→animae; synderesira→synderesim; voluntatem naturalera→voluntatem naturalem; raalum→malum; aliquicl→aliquid; uiide→unde; quaiito→quanto; soius→solus; supremuni→supremum; dicendam→dicendum; subslantiam→substantiam; conlbrmitatis→conformitatis; malilia→malitia; irapartibili→impartibili; secundum totuni→secundum totum; quantuin→quantum; intimilatem→intimitatem; veruni→verum; raedullas→medullas; quanlumicumque→quantumcumque; ponil→ponit; siraile→simile; giatia→gratia; qiiam-→quamvis.