title: Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 3

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### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum malum sit in bono tanquam aliquis habitus, an sit pura privatio.*

Utrum malum sit in bono tanquam aliquis habitus[^1], an sit pura privatio. Et quod non sit ibi tanquam habitus et potentia aliqua, sed ut pura privatio, videtur:

1. Primo per illud Ioannis primo[^2]: *Sine ipso factum est nihil*; Glossa: « Nihil, id est peccatum »: ergo peccatum nihil est.

2. Item, Augustinus[^3]: « Malum non est natura aliqua, sed defectus circa naturam mali nomen accepit »: ergo malum non est aliqua potentia, sed defectus et privatio.

3. Item, Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*, capitulo quinto: « Iniustitia omnino nihil est, sicut caecitas. Non enim aliud est caecitas quam absentia visus, ubi debet esse, quae non magis est quid in oculo, ubi debet esse visus, quam in ligno, ubi non debet esse ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: « Bonum et ens convertuntur[^4] »: ergo de quocumque praedicatur ens, praedicatur et bonum. Si igitur peccatum vel malitia esset ens, malitia, secundum quod huiusmodi, haberet aliquid de bonitate: si ergo non habet aliquid de bonitate, non habet igitur aliquid de entitate.

5. Item, omne ens a summo ente procedit, nec est aliqua essentia, quae non sit in Dei potentia, ut illam producat; sed Deus non potest peccare nec facere culpam[^5]: ergo peccatum, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet aliquid de entitate: ergo nihil est, et privatio pura.

6. Item, omne quod est ens, habet aliquam formam; omne autem, quod habet aliquam formam, habet pulcritudinem; sed peccatum non habet pulcritudinem, cum sit deformitas animae: ergo nihil habet de entitate: ergo puram dicit privationem[^6].

**Sed contra:**

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Augustinus[^7]: « Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei »; sed omne dictum, vel factum est aliquid: ergo peccatum sive malum est aliquid, non ergo privatio pura.

2. Item, virtus et vitium sunt contraria; sed « contraria sunt in eodem genere[^8] »; et quaecumque sub eodem genere sunt, utrumque eorum est aliquid et non privatio pura: ergo vitium aliquid est: igitur malum sive peccatum non est omnino nihil.

3. Item, sive accipiatur concrete, sive abstracte, verum est dicere, quod peccatum est in aliquo; et omne quod est in aliquo[^9], est ens, sicut omne quod legit, est legens, et omne quod amat, est amans; et omne quod est ens, est aliquid et non est privatio pura: ergo peccatum sive malum, sive accipiatur concrete, sive abstracte, non est omnino nihil.

4. Item, nihil quod est pura privatio, intenditur et remittitur[^10]; sed malum vel peccatum intenditur et remittitur, quia unum peccatum est maius alio, et una malitia est maior altera: ergo peccatum sive malitia non est privatio pura.

5. Item, omne ordinatum praesupponit esse; sed malum culpae, secundum quod malum, ordinatur ad malum poenae: si igitur, secundum quod malum, est ordinatum in poena; videtur, quod secundum quod malum, habeat aliquod esse[^11].

6. Item, aut peccatum est *aliquid*, secundum quod peccatum, aut *nihil*. Si *aliquid*, habeo propositum; si *nihil*, et Deus punit hominem pro peccato: ergo Deus punit hominem pro nihilo. Sed qui punit alium pro nihilo iniuste punit: ergo si Deus punit hominem pro culpa, videtur, quod in puniendo iniuste faciat.

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### Conclusio.

> Malum, licet in concreto sit alicuius ut oppositi et ut subiecti, tamen in abstracto non est nisi boni privatio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod malum sive peccatum dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo abstractive, alio modo concretive. — Secundum autem quod malum dicitur concretive, sic concernit illud quod deformat, vel aliquam actionem, vel aliquam substantiam; et sic dicitur malum res mala, utpote actio mala, vel anima mala. Et hoc modo malum aliquid est et habet esse naturae. Si autem aliquando dicatur ipsa res mala sive peccator nihil esse, hoc dicitur quantum ad bene esse, quod quidem est esse ordinatum. Unde cum dicuntur homines nihil fieri, cum peccant, hoc non dicitur, quia omni esse priventur, sed quia privantur esse ordinato, quod quidem est esse completum, et de quo dicit Boethius[^12], quod « esse est, quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam ».

Contingit iterum loqui de malo sive de peccato abstractive; et hoc modo malum sive peccatum in recto sive praedicatione formali non est aliquid, sed nihil, quia non est ens nec bonum, sed privatio boni. Quamvis autem malitia vel peccatum nihil sit in recto, in obliquo tamen alicuius est: et alicuius ut oppositi, et alicuius ut subiecti. — Alicuius ut oppositi, utpote boni; malum enim est privatio boni; et quia sic est privatio boni, ut tamen non sit omnimoda boni annihilatio, sic privat bonum, quod relinquit bonum. Unde sic privat bonum gratiae, quod relinquit[^13] bonum naturae; sic privat actum, ut relinquat aptitudinem; sic privat bonum, quantum ad effectum, ut tamen in subiecto relinquat debitum; et ideo malum abstractive sumtum, formaliter loquendo, privatio est: et ideo nihil est. — Est etiam alicuius entis ut subiecti, quia est in aliquo ente; non enim est omnimoda privatio sive annihilatio.

— Et quia secundum hanc viam auctoritates et rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, malum sive peccatum nihil esse, ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod peccatum est dictum, vel factum etc.; dicendum, quod ibi accipitur peccatum sive malum concretive, prout concernit actionem substratam; et hoc modo aliquid est, nec hoc repugnat, sed consonat eis quae dicta sunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus et vitium sunt contraria; dicendum, quod vitium, secundum quod contrariatur virtuti, utpote luxuria castitati, non tantum dicit privationem, sed etiam dicit aliquem habitum substratum, quo quis redditur facilis ad perpetrandum illud peccati genus; et hoc modo accipiendo vitium, vitium non omnino nihil est. Alio modo accipiendo vitium, prout est privatio boni tantum, sic non contrariatur virtuti secundum rem, immo opponitur sicut privatio et habitus. — Si autem dicatur alicubi, hoc modo vitium contrariari virtuti; accipitur largo modo contrarium pro qualibet oppositione et repugnantia. Vel hoc dicitur, quia, etsi secundum veritatem vitium opponatur virtuti ut privatio, habent tamen virtus et vitium quodam modo legem contrariorum in hoc, quod mutuo se expellunt, et ab uno fit regressus ad alterum; in qua conditione opposita, ut privatio et habitus, ab his quae opponuntur sicut contraria, distinguuntur. Et pro tanto dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio[^14], quod in hoc fallit regula dialecticorum, vocans bonum et malum contraria; et hoc ex causa praedicta. Nihilominus tamen dicendum est, quod malum est in eodem genere cum bono, sed hoc non proprie et secundum rectam ordinationem, sed hoc est per quandam reductionem[^15]. Et ex hoc non sequitur, quod malum sit aliquid. Nam privationes ad idem genus cum suis habitibus reducuntur, et tamen ipsae, formaliter loquendo, nihil sunt.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum est in aliquo, ergo est; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur; nam, sicut dicit Philosophus[^16], « quaedam sunt entia, quaedam sunt entium »; et quamvis privationes possint dici entium, non tamen dicuntur entia. Cum autem dico, malitiam esse in aliquo, dico, eam esse

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entis; sed cum dico, malitiam esse ens, attribuo ei entitatem in se; et primum esse est esse secundum quid, secundum est esse simpliciter; et ideo est ibi sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter[^17].

Si vero quaeratur de hac: malitia est, utrum sit concedenda, vel non; dicendum, quod hoc verbum est, sicut vult Philosophus[^18], dupliciter potest praedicari. Aliquando accipitur ut compositio media inter duo extrema, et sic dicitur tertium adiacens, ut cum dicitur: homo est albus. Aliquando vero sic praedicatur, ut res importata per ipsum sit attributum sive alterum extremorum. Quando ergo sic dicitur: malitia est; si hoc verbum est accipiatur ut praedicatum, sicut accipiuntur alia verba, ut legit et huiusmodi; tunc locutio est falsa. Est enim sensus: malitia est, id est, malitia est ens, id est essentia aliqua; hoc enim verbum est significat essentiam vel substantiam uniuscuiusque. Alio modo potest intelligi praedicari vel accipi in huiusmodi locutione sicut copula, et est oratio quodam modo defectiva; et tunc est sensus: malitia est, id est, malitia alicui inest, ita quod ipsa malitia potius intelligitur ut alteri inhaerens quam alteri substans, sicut cum dicitur malum[^19], et intelligitur, aliquid esse malum. Et hoc modo accipiendo non valet: malitia est: ergo est ens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pura privatio non intenditur nec remittitur; dicendum, quod si dicatur pura privatio, hoc est privatio nihil ponens nec in recto nec in obliquo; hoc modo verum est dicere, quod non recipit magis et minus[^20], sicut chimaera nihil est, et hircocervus nihil est[^21], nec est unum magis nihil quam reliquum. Alio modo dicitur pura privatio, quia nihil ponit in recto, ponit tamen in obliquo; et hoc modo malitia posset dici pura privatio; sed de hac non est verum, quod non recipiat magis et minus. Potest enim magis et minus recipere ratione eius entis, quod respicit quasi in obliquo. Unde dicitur maior privatio, in qua est maioris[^22] boni corruptio, et in qua minus de bono relinquitur; minor vero, in qua minus de bono corrumpitur et plus relinquitur. Et sic patet, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod peccatum, abstractive loquendo, sit aliqua positio.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod esse ordinatum praesupponit esse; dicendum, quod verum est, quod in his quae per se ordinantur, ordinatum praesupponit esse; in his autem, quae ordinantur per accidens, non praesupponit esse in se, sed ratione illius, in quo vel per quod ordinantur. Et hoc modo malum dicitur ordinari, non quia sit in se ordinatum, cum sit privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, sed quia ordinabilitatem habet in poena ratione ipsius punibilis. Hoc autem melius determinatum est in libro primo, distinctione quadragesima sexta[^23].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si peccatum nihil est, quod Deus punit hominem pro nihilo; dicendum, quod sicut praetactum est, etsi peccatum nihil sit in recto, nihilominus tamen in obliquo est alicuius entis ut oppositi, et alicuius ut subiecti, circa quod relinquit debitum respectu boni privati. Dico igitur, quod peccatum est meritum poenae, non solum ratione privationis, sed[^24] ratione debiti relicti et boni privati; unde non est homo dignus puniri solum, quia bono caret, sed quia caret et debet habere. Et licet carentia illa nihil sit, debitum tamen habendi aliquid est; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deus puniat hominem pro nihilo, quamvis peccatum nihil sit. Hoc autem apertum est, si quis consideret in sensibili exemplo, scilicet cum rex incarcerat servum, quia non reddidit tributum, vel cum aliquis creditor incarcerat aliquem, quia non solvit sibi pecuniam mutuatam; privatio enim non per se, sed cum debito est in causa[^25].

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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether evil is in the good as some habit, or whether it is pure privation.*

Whether evil is in the good as some habit[^1], or whether it is pure privation. And that it is not there as a habit and some power, but as a pure privation, it seems:

1. First, by that [text] of John, first [chapter][^2]: *Without him was made nothing*; the Gloss: « Nothing, that is, sin »: therefore sin is nothing.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^3]: « Evil is not any nature, but a defect concerning a nature took the name of evil »: therefore evil is not any power, but a defect and privation.

3. Likewise, Anselm *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter five: « Injustice is wholly nothing, just as blindness. For blindness is nothing other than the absence of sight where it ought to be, which is no more a something in the eye, where sight ought to be, than in wood, where it ought not to be ».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *reason*: « The good and being are convertible[^4] »: therefore of whatever being is predicated, the good is also predicated. If therefore sin or malice were a being, malice, insofar as it is such, would have something of goodness: if therefore it does not have anything of goodness, it does not then have anything of entity.

5. Likewise, every being proceeds from the highest being, nor is there any essence which is not in the power of God to produce it; but God cannot sin nor commit fault[^5]: therefore sin, insofar as it is such, does not have anything of entity: therefore it is nothing, and a pure privation.

6. Likewise, everything that is a being has some form; but everything that has some form has beauty; but sin does not have beauty, since it is a deformity of the soul: therefore it has nothing of entity: therefore it states pure privation[^6].

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Augustine[^7]: « Sin is something said, or done, or desired against the law of God »; but everything said, or done, is something: therefore sin or evil is something, therefore not a pure privation.

2. Likewise, virtue and vice are contraries; but « contraries are in the same genus[^8] »; and whatever are under the same genus, each of them is something and not a pure privation: therefore vice is something: therefore evil or sin is not wholly nothing.

3. Likewise, whether it be taken concretely or abstractly, it is true to say that sin is in something; and everything that is in something[^9] is a being, just as everything that reads is reading, and everything that loves is loving; and everything that is a being is something and is not a pure privation: therefore sin or evil, whether it be taken concretely or abstractly, is not wholly nothing.

4. Likewise, nothing that is a pure privation is intensified and remitted[^10]; but evil or sin is intensified and remitted, because one sin is greater than another, and one malice is greater than another: therefore sin or malice is not a pure privation.

5. Likewise, everything ordained presupposes being; but the evil of fault, insofar as it is evil, is ordained to the evil of punishment: if therefore, insofar as it is evil, it is ordained in punishment; it seems that, insofar as it is evil, it has some being[^11].

6. Likewise, either sin is *something*, insofar as it is sin, or *nothing*. If *something*, I have my thesis; if *nothing*, and yet God punishes the human for sin: therefore God punishes the human for nothing. But he who punishes another for nothing punishes unjustly: therefore if God punishes the human for fault, it seems that in punishing he acts unjustly.

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### Conclusion.

> Evil, although in the concrete it belongs to something as its opposite and as its subject, yet in the abstract is nothing but the privation of the good.

**I respond:** It must be said that evil or sin can be taken in two ways: in one way abstractly, in another way concretely. — But insofar as evil is said concretely, it thus concerns that which it deforms, whether some action or some substance; and thus a bad thing is called evil, such as a bad action, or a bad soul. And in this way evil is something and has the being of nature. But if sometimes the bad thing itself or the sinner is said to be nothing, this is said as to the well-being, which indeed is ordered being. Whence when humans are said to become nothing when they sin, this is not said because they are deprived of all being, but because they are deprived of ordered being, which indeed is complete being, and of which Boethius says[^12], that « being is that which retains order and preserves nature ».

It happens again to speak of evil or sin abstractly; and in this way evil or sin in the direct [predication] or formal predication is not something, but nothing, because it is not a being nor a good, but the privation of the good. But although malice or sin is nothing in the direct [predication], yet in the oblique it belongs to something: both to something as its opposite, and to something as its subject. — To something as its opposite, namely the good; for evil is the privation of the good; and because it is thus the privation of the good, yet so that it is not an utter annihilation of the good, it so privates the good that it leaves the good. Whence it so privates the good of grace that it leaves[^13] the good of nature; it so privates the act that it leaves the aptitude; it so privates the good as to its effect that nevertheless it leaves the obligation in the subject; and therefore evil taken abstractly, formally speaking, is a privation: and therefore it is nothing. — It also belongs to some being as its subject, because it is in some being; for it is not an utter privation or annihilation.

— And because according to this way the authorities and reasons adduced for the first part show that evil or sin is nothing, therefore they are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that sin is something said, or done, etc.; it must be said that there sin or evil is taken concretely, insofar as it concerns the underlying action; and in this way it is something, nor does this conflict, but is consonant with the things which have been said.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue and vice are contraries; it must be said that vice, insofar as it is contrary to virtue, such as lust to chastity, not only states a privation, but also states some underlying habit, by which someone is rendered prone to perpetrating that kind of sin; and taking vice in this way, vice is not wholly nothing. Taking vice in another way, insofar as it is the privation of the good only, thus it is not contrary to virtue according to the thing, but rather is opposed as privation and habit. — But if it be said somewhere that in this way vice is contrary to virtue; the contrary is taken in the broad sense for any opposition and incompatibility. Or this is said because, even if according to truth vice is opposed to virtue as a privation, yet virtue and vice have in a certain way the law of contraries in this, that they mutually expel one another, and from one there is a return to the other; in which condition the opposites, as privation and habit, are distinguished from those which are opposed as contraries. And to that extent Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^14], that in this the rule of the dialecticians fails, calling the good and evil contraries; and this for the aforesaid reason. Nevertheless it must be said that evil is in the same genus with the good, but this not properly and according to the right ordering, but this is by a certain reduction[^15]. And from this it does not follow that evil is something. For privations are reduced to the same genus with their habits, and yet they themselves, formally speaking, are nothing.

3. To that which is objected, that evil is in something, therefore it is; it must be said that this does not follow; for, as the Philosopher says[^16], « certain things are beings, certain are of beings »; and although privations can be called of beings, yet they are not called beings. But when I say that malice is in something, I say that it is

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of a being; but when I say that malice is a being, I attribute entity to it in itself; and the first being is being in a certain respect, the second is being simply; and therefore there is there a sophism of [what is true] in a certain respect and [what is true] simply[^17].

But if it be asked about this [proposition]: malice is — whether it is to be granted, or not; it must be said that this word *is*, as the Philosopher wills[^18], can be predicated in two ways. Sometimes it is taken as a composition intermediate between two extremes, and thus it is called the third adjacent, as when it is said: the human is white. But sometimes it is so predicated that the thing imported by it is the attribute or one of the extremes. When therefore it is thus said: malice is; if this word *is* is taken as a predicate, just as other verbs are taken, such as *reads* and the like; then the statement is false. For the sense is: malice is, that is, malice is a being, that is, some essence; for this word *is* signifies the essence or substance of each thing. In another way it can be understood to be predicated or taken in such a statement as a copula, and it is a sentence in a certain way defective; and then the sense is: malice is, that is, malice is in something, so that malice itself is understood rather as inhering in another than as standing under another, as when it is said *evil*[^19], and it is understood that something is evil. And taking it in this way it does not hold: malice is: therefore it is a being.

4. To that which is objected, that pure privation is neither intensified nor remitted; it must be said that if pure privation is so called, this is a privation positing nothing either in the direct or in the oblique; in this way it is true to say that it does not admit more and less[^20], just as a chimera is nothing, and a goat-stag is nothing[^21], nor is the one more nothing than the other. In another way it is called pure privation, because it posits nothing in the direct, but does posit in the oblique; and in this way malice could be called pure privation; but of this it is not true that it does not admit more and less. For it can admit more and less by reason of that being which it regards as if in the oblique. Whence that is called a greater privation in which there is the corruption of a greater[^22] good, and in which less of the good is left; but the lesser, in which less of the good is corrupted and more is left. And thus it is clear that from this it does not follow that sin, speaking abstractly, is some positing.

5. To that which is objected, that ordered being presupposes being; it must be said that it is true that in those things which are ordered through themselves, the ordered presupposes being; but in those things which are ordered through accident, it does not presuppose being in itself, but by reason of that in which or through which they are ordered. And in this way evil is said to be ordered, not because it is ordered in itself, since it is the privation of mode, species, and order, but because it has orderability in punishment by reason of the punishable thing itself. But this is better determined in the first book, distinction forty-six[^23].

6. To that which is objected, that if sin is nothing, that God punishes the human for nothing; it must be said that, as was touched on before, even if sin is nothing in the direct, nevertheless in the oblique it belongs to some being as its opposite, and to something as its subject, concerning which it leaves an obligation with respect to the good privated. I say therefore that sin is the merit of punishment, not only by reason of the privation, but[^24] by reason of the obligation left over and the good privated; whence the human is not worthy of being punished only because he lacks the good, but because he lacks [it] and ought to have [it]. And although that lack is nothing, yet the obligation of having something is something; and therefore from this it does not follow that God punishes the human for nothing, although sin is nothing. But this is plain, if one considers it in a sensible example, namely when a king imprisons a servant because he did not render the tribute, or when some creditor imprisons someone because he did not pay him the money lent; for the privation is not by itself, but together with the debt, in the cause[^25].

la: Vat. addit *et potentia aliqua: et.*

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *et potentia aliqua: et* ("and some power: and").

la: Vers. 3. — Glossa sumta est, sed non ad verbum, ex August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 1. n. 13, de quo vide supra pag. 640, nota 8. Cfr. etiam Prosperi, Lib. sent., sent. 228, quae innititur August., Enarrat. in Ps. 68. serm. 1. n. 5.

en: Verse 3. — The Gloss is taken, but not word for word, from Augustine, *On the Gospel of John* tract. 1. n. 13, on which see above p. 640, note 8. Cfr. also Prosper, *Book of Sentences*, sent. 228, which rests upon Augustine, *Commentary on Ps.* 68. serm. 1. n. 5.

la: Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 9: *Mali enim nulla natura est, sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit.* Ibid. c. 22: *Cum omnino natura nulla sit malum, nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis boni.* Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq.

en: Book XI. *On the City of God*, c. 9: *For of evil there is no nature, but the loss of good took the name of evil.* Ibid. c. 22: *Since wholly no nature is evil, and this name is nothing but [the name] of the privation of good.* Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 4. seq.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 805, nota 4.

en: Cfr. above p. 805, note 4.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2, et infra d. 37. a. 1. et 2. — Paulo superius pro *nec est* cod. aa *quia non est.* Versus finem arg. pro *de entitate* plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *de ente.*

en: See I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2, and below d. 37. a. 1. and 2. — A little above, for *nec est* cod. aa [reads] *quia non est.* Toward the end of the argument, for *de entitate* very many codices with edd. 1, 2 [read] *de ente.*

la: De hoc arg. cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seqq. — In hoc arg. pro *omne autem*, quod cum Vat. retinuimus, codd. cum primis edd. minus sincere *omne enim.*

en: On this argument cfr. Augustine, *On True Religion* c. 18. n. 35. seqq. — In this argument, for *omne autem*, which with the Vatican [edition] we have retained, the codices with the first editions less faithfully [read] *omne enim.*

la: Libr. XXII. contra Faustum, c. 27, ubi textus originalis: *Peccatum... vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem.*

en: Book XXII. *Against Faustus*, c. 27, where the original text [reads]: *Sin... or desired, something against the eternal law.*

la: Aristot., III. Rhetor. c. 4. (c. 2.); de Praedicam. c. de *Oppositis*; X. Metaph. text. 24. (IX. c. 8.). Cfr. etiam de Praedicam. c. de Quanto; V. Metaph. text. 16. et X. text. 14. (IV. c. 10. et IX. c. 4.), ubi contraria dicuntur ea quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt. — De propos. seq. cfr. illud Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4: « Aut enim simpliciter in nullo genere eodem privatio, aut non in ultimo, ut si visus in ultimo genere est sensu, caecitas non erit sensus ». Ratio haec est: quia suprema rerum generum sive praedicamenta exhibent quid positionis, idcirco, quia species sub iis collocatae ipsa participare i. e. rationem participati suscipere (Aristot., loc. cit. c. 1.) debent, necesse est, etiam species vocare quid positivum et non esse puram privationem.

en: Aristotle, III. *Rhetoric* c. 4. (c. 2.); *On the Categories* c. on *Opposites*; X. *Metaphysics* text. 24. (IX. c. 8.). Cfr. also *On the Categories* c. on Quantity; V. *Metaphysics* text. 16. and X. text. 14. (IV. c. 10. and IX. c. 4.), where those things are called contraries which differ the most in the same genus. — On the following proposition cfr. that [text] of Aristotle, IV. *Topics* c. 4: « For either there is simply no privation in the same genus, or not in the ultimate, as if sight is in the ultimate genus of sense, blindness will not be a sense ». The reason is this: because the highest genera of things or the categories exhibit something of position, therefore, since the species placed under them must participate in them, that is, take on the character of the participated (Aristotle, in the cited place, c. 1.), it is necessary that the species also be called something positive and not be a pure privation.

la: Codd. F K T Y ee et alii nec non ed. 1 omittunt *in aliquo.* — De maiori cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Codd. F K T Y ee and others, and also ed. 1, omit *in aliquo* ("in something"). — On the major cfr. the preceding question.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3. — Mox pro *vel* non pauci codd., ut F K W Y bb ee, cum ed. 1 *et.*

en: Cfr. above p. 111, note 3. — Then, for *vel* not a few codices, such as F K W Y bb ee, with ed. 1 [read] *et.*

la: Vide August., II. de Morib. Manich. c. 6. n. 8. seq. — In principio propos. pro *omne ordinatum* codd. K T cc et alii cum ed. 1 exhibent *esse ordinatum*, quae lectio commendatur verbis solutionis postea datae; ibi enim fere omnes codd. et edd. legunt *esse ordinatum.* Mox post *si igitur* cod. bb bene interiicit *malum*, et in cod. T legitur: *si igitur, secundum quod malum est, ordinatum est in poena* etc. Pro *in poena* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substituunt *ad poenam*, Vat. insuper transformavit *est ordinatum* in *ordinatur.*

en: See Augustine, II. *On the Morals of the Manichees* c. 6. n. 8. seq. — At the beginning of the proposition, for *omne ordinatum* codd. K T cc and others with ed. 1 exhibit *esse ordinatum*, which reading is commended by the words of the solution given afterward; for there nearly all the codices and editions read *esse ordinatum.* Then after *si igitur* cod. bb rightly inserts *malum*, and in cod. T is read: *si igitur, secundum quod malum est, ordinatum est in poena* etc. For *in poena* the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 substitute *ad poenam*, and the Vatican [edition] moreover transformed *est ordinatum* into *ordinatur.*

la: Eandem obiectionem profert Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 6.

en: Anselm proffers the same objection, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 6.

la: Libr. IV. de Consol. prosa 2. — Mox pro *abstractive* edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. *abstracte.*

en: Book IV. *On Consolation*, prose 2. — Then, for *abstractive* the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] *abstracte.*

la: Cod. T *relinquat.*

en: Cod. T [reads] *relinquat.*

la: Cap. 14. n. 4. Vide quaest. praeced. fundam. 2. et corp. quaest. — De praecedentibus cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, ubi etiam differentiae signantur, quae habentur inter ea quae sibi opponuntur secundum habitum ac privationem, et quae sibi opponuntur ut contraria. Inter quas differentias etiam haec est, quod unum contrarium (nisi alicui insit per naturam) mutari possit in alterum, quod in privatione autem et habitu impossibile sit ad invicem mutationem fieri; ex habitu enim in privationem mutatio fit, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est; neque enim caecus factus aliquis rursus vidit » etc. Inter exempla pro contrariis illud quoque affertur, quod S. Bonav., supra d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. circa initium corp. quaest. in exemplum subiecit, quando ex studioso fit pravus et ex pravo studiosus: « Pravus enim ad meliores exercitationes deductus et doctrinas... si certe semel, quamvis modicum, incrementum sumserit, palam est, quia aut perfecte mutabitur, aut satis multum incrementum sumet ».

en: Chapter 14. n. 4. See the preceding question, fundamentum 2. and the body of the question. — On the preceding cfr. Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. on Opposites, where the differences also are marked which are had between those things which are opposed to one another according to habit and privation, and those which are opposed to one another as contraries. Among which differences this also is, that one contrary (unless it be present to something by nature) can be changed into the other, but that in privation and habit it is impossible for a mutual change to be made; for from habit into privation change is made, but from privation into habit it is impossible; « for neither does anyone made blind see again » etc. Among the examples for contraries that is also adduced which S. Bonaventure, above d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. near the beginning of the body of the question, set down as an example, when from the studious one becomes depraved and from the depraved studious: « For the depraved, led to better exercises and doctrines... if certainly once, however little, he takes an increase, it is plain that either he will be perfectly changed, or he will take an increase fairly great ».

la: Cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1.

en: Cfr. above p. 48, note 1.

la: Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), ubi docet, substantiam proprie dici ens, cetera vero entia dici, « eo quod vere « entis » [substantiae] sint vel qualitates » etc. Cfr. XI. c. 3. (X. c. 3.), ubi idem specialiter de privatione docetur. — Paulo superius non pauci codd., ut F H K T Y etc., cum edd. 1, 2 *alio* pro *aliquo.*

en: Book VII. *Metaphysics* text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), where he teaches that substance is properly called a being, but the rest are called beings, « in that they are truly of a "being" [i.e. of substance], whether qualities » etc. Cfr. XI. c. 3. (X. c. 3.), where the same is taught specifically of privation. — A little above, not a few codices, such as F H K T Y etc., with edd. 1, 2 [read] *alio* for *aliquo.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, I. *Sophistical Refutations* c. 4. (c. 5.).

la: Libr. II. Periherm. c. 1. Vide tom. I. pag. 136, nota 7.

en: Book II. *On Interpretation* c. 1. See vol. I. p. 136, note 7.

la: Cod. F addit *est.*

en: Cod. F adds *est.*

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 1. (c. 1.): *Etenim quae sunt omnes existimant alicubi esse, quod vero non est, nusquam esse. Ubi enim est hircocervus, aut sphinx?*

en: Aristotle, IV. *Physics* text. 1. (c. 1.): *For all suppose that the things which are, are somewhere, but that which is not, is nowhere. For where is a goat-stag, or a sphinx?*

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *maior.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *maior.*

la: Quaest. 5. — Pro *determinatum est* Vat. *determinabitur*, reliqua propos. verba deinde omittens.

en: Question 5. — For *determinatum est* the Vatican [edition] [reads] *determinabitur*, then omitting the remaining words of the proposition.

la: Vat. adiicit *etiam.* — Superius *meritum* accipe active.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *etiam* ("also"). — Above, take *meritum* ("merit") actively.

la: Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 6: *Licet pariter nihil sit absentia iustitiae, et ubi debet esse iustitia, et ubi non debet esse; punit tamen Deus recte peccatores non pro nihilo, sed propter aliquid, quia... et debitum sibi honorem, quem sponte reddere noluerunt, ab invitis exigit, et ne quid inordinatum sit in regno eius, eos separatim a iustis ordine competenti disponit. Creaturas autem, in quibus iustitia non debet esse, non punit pro absentia iustitiae, hoc est pro nihilo, quia non est aliquid, quod ab illis exigat, nec ordo congruus universitatis rerum hoc postulat* etc.

en: Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 6: *Although equally the absence of justice is nothing, both where justice ought to be and where it ought not to be; yet God rightly punishes sinners not for nothing, but on account of something, because... and the honor due to himself, which they were unwilling to render of their own accord, he exacts from them unwilling, and lest anything be disordered in his kingdom, he disposes them apart from the just in fitting order. But creatures in which justice ought not to be, he does not punish for the absence of justice, that is, for nothing, because there is not anything which he might exact from them, nor does the fitting order of the universe of things demand this* etc.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum distinguatur malum tripliciter, scil. naturale, artificiale et morale, prout est in rebus naturalibus, in artificialibus et in actibus liberis; hic agitur de malo morali sive de malo culpae. Ad quaestionem solvendam necessaria et communis est distinctio hic adhibita inter malum in concreto et malum in abstracto et formaliter accepto. Quod malum in peccatis omissionis formaliter sit privatio, facile intelligitur; sed difficultas est respectu peccatorum commissionis, in quibus non tantum est simplex aversio et privatio debitae rectitudinis in actibus, sed etiam est conversio ad obiectum a rectitudine debita dissonum. Sunt autem aliqui actus ex ipso obiecto et intrinsecus mali, ut odium Dei, quibus nulla inesse videtur aptitudo ad bonum, quae locum dare possit privationi rectitudinis debitae. Hinc orta est intricata controversia inter posteriores theologos de ratione formali et constitutiva peccatorum commissionis. Multi et insignes theologi, duce Caietano (Comment. in S. I. II. q. 71. a. 6, q. 72. a. 1.), putant, istam rationem formalem ponendam esse in conversione, quae concipiatur ut aliquid contrarium rectitudini, non ut pura privatio. Secundum hos igitur tale peccatum non tantum in ratione actus, sed etiam in ratione deformitatis continet aliquam positivam inordinationem et malitiam. — Alia autem sententia hanc positivam malitiam non admittit, sed docet, rationem formalem peccati etiam commissionis in sola consistere privatione debitae iustitiae. Pro qua parte stet S. Thomas, disceptatur inter ipsos eiusdem discipulos. Scotus cum suis, excepto Pontio, omnino sustinet secundam sententiam, quam etiam S. Bonaventura sequitur. Hoc apparet non tantum inde, quia constanter et sine distinctione asserit, formale peccati esse privationem, sed etiam, quia plerisque satis subtilibus difficultatibus, a defensoribus primae sententiae obiectis, iam solvendo praevenit. Praeter hic dicta vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim ad 5, d. 41. a. 1. q. 2, ubi bene distinguitur triplex relatio malitiae ad actionem, et in primis d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 2. 3; cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 36. dub.

**2.** Quo sensu peccatum dicatur vel res vel nihil, vide etiam infra d. 37. dub. 1. et 3. — Etiam alii antiqui Scholastici, saltem si verba attendas, sententiam secundam profitentur. — De verbo S. Augustini (solut. ad 2.), quod hic fallit regula dialecticorum, vide Magistrum, hic c. 5, et S. Thom., de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 10.

**II.** Alex. Hal., p. II. q. 94. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica, d. 37. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. q. 48. a. 1. 2; I. II. q. 18. a. 1, q. 71. a. 6; de Malo, q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1; p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since evil is distinguished in three ways, namely natural, artificial, and moral, insofar as it is in natural things, in artificial things, and in free acts; here the discussion is of moral evil or the evil of fault. For solving the question, the distinction here employed is necessary and common: between evil in the concrete and evil in the abstract and formally taken. That evil in sins of omission is formally a privation is easily understood; but the difficulty is with respect to sins of commission, in which there is not only a simple turning-away and privation of the due rectitude in the acts, but there is also a turning-toward an object dissonant from the due rectitude. But there are certain acts evil from the object itself and intrinsically, such as the hatred of God, in which no aptitude toward the good seems to be present, which could give place to a privation of the due rectitude. Hence has arisen an intricate controversy among the later theologians concerning the formal and constitutive character of sins of commission. Many and distinguished theologians, with Cajetan as their leader (Commentary on the *Summa* I. II. q. 71. a. 6, q. 72. a. 1.), think that this formal character is to be placed in the conversion, which is conceived as something contrary to rectitude, not as a pure privation. According to these, therefore, such a sin contains, not only in the character of act, but also in the character of deformity, some positive disorder and malice. — But another opinion does not admit this positive malice, but teaches that the formal character of sin, even of commission, consists in the privation alone of the due justice. On which side St. Thomas stands is disputed among his own disciples. Scotus with his followers, with the exception of Pontius, wholly maintains the second opinion, which S. Bonaventure also follows. This appears not only from the fact that he constantly and without distinction asserts the formal [element] of sin to be a privation, but also because he anticipates by his solution most of the rather subtle difficulties objected by the defenders of the first opinion. Besides the things said here, see below d. 37. a. 1. q. 1, especially ad 5, d. 41. a. 1. q. 2, where the threefold relation of malice to action is well distinguished, and especially d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. and dub. 2. 3; cfr. also III. Sent. d. 36. dub.

**2.** In what sense sin is called either a thing or nothing, see also below d. 37. dub. 1. and 3. — Other ancient Scholastics also, at least if you attend to the words, profess the second opinion. — On the word of St. Augustine (in the solution to 2.), that here the rule of the dialecticians fails, see the Master, here c. 5, and St. Thomas, *On Evil*, q. 2. a. 11. ad 10.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, p. II. q. 94. m. 2. — Scotus, in each *Scriptum*, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica, d. 37. q. 1. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; *Summa* I. q. 48. a. 1. 2; I. II. q. 18. a. 1, q. 71. a. 6; *On Evil*, q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 5; *Summa* p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1; p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 34, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXXIV)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXIV)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 817 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

**Dub. I.** In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *mala voluntas angeli vel hominis causa est malorum subsequentium.* Sed *contra*: Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^1] dicit, quod « nullo alio auctore potest homo fieri deterior »: ergo mala voluntas angeli vel hominis non potest malas voluntates in aliis causare. — *Item*, si omne malum debet imputari ei qui est causa prima, et mala voluntas angeli vel hominis est causa omnium malorum: ergo omnia mala sunt eis imputanda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est causa *vere efficiens* et producens, et est causa quodam modo *disponens* et *inducens.* Cum ergo dicitur, quod *mala voluntas angeli vel hominis est causa malarum voluntatum subsequentium*, dicitur per quandam *dispositionem* et *inductionem.* Diabolus enim inducit et disponit suggerendo; homo vero corrumpendo naturam et malum exemplum praebendo. Cum autem dicit Augustinus, quod «nullo auctore fit homo deterior», hoc intelligitur tanquam auctore principali. — *Aliter.* Posset tamen dici, quod littera ista intelligitur de malis subsequentibus primam malam voluntatem hominis et angeli, non respectu diversarum personarum, sed respectu *eiusdem*, ita quod prima mala voluntas eius est causa omnium malorum, quae ipse facit[^2].

**Dub. II.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in eodem capitulo[^3]: *Voluntas hominis causa est tam peccatorum quam poenarum;* quia poena est passio involuntaria[^4]; sed quod causatur a voluntate est voluntarium: ergo poena non causatur a voluntate. — *Item*, si causatur a voluntate, aut a *bona*, aut a *mala.* A *bona* non; hoc constat, quia nemo punitur pro bona voluntate. A *mala* non; quia mala voluntas non est causa iusti, in quantum huiusmodi; sed omnis poena iusta est: ergo nulla poena est causata a voluntate.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod voluntas dupliciter dicitur esse causa alicuius; vel per modum *merentis*, vel per modum *efficientis.* Cum ergo dicitur voluntas esse causa poenae, hoc non dicitur per modum *efficientis*, sed potius dicitur per modum *merentis.* Voluntas enim, causando culpam efficiendo sive deficiendo, meretur poenam, et ita dicitur esse causa poenarum et peccatorum, licet aliter et aliter. Et per hoc patet solutio obiectorum[^5].

**Dub. III.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Bonum, omnino carens malo, integrum bonum est.* Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia integrum bonum est illud cui nihil deest de bono; et hoc est bonum, in quo est omne bonum: ergo solum illud est integrum bonum, quod est summum bonum. Sed multa creata sunt carentia omni malo, ut beati Angeli et animae beatae: ergo si hoc verum esset, quod dicit, multa essent summe bona. — Propter hoc est quaestio, utrum aliquod creatum mereatur dici bonum integrum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut *perfectum* dicitur multipliciter: et quantum ad perfectionem *sufficientiae*, et quantum ad perfectionem *superabundantiae*[^6]; sic etiam et integrum bonum potest dici multipliciter: et quantum ad integritatem *sufficientiae*, et sic dicitur integrum bonum, quod caret omni malo culpae et poenae; et quantum ad integritatem *superabundantiae*, et sic dicitur integrum bonum, in quo est omne bonum. Et primo modo bonum integrum non dicitur esse summum bonum, sed bonum *purum*, quia nihil habet de malo admixtum. Secundo vero modo dicitur esse summum bonum, et est in solo Deo per *essentiam*, in creatura autem per *participationem*, quae bona[^7] dicitur in <!-- page 818 -->hoc, quod participat summum bonum, ex cuius participatione habere dicitur omne bonum. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod *summum* dicitur per impermixtionem cum contrario[^8], et ita bonum, quod omnino est impermixtum malo, est summum bonum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in his contrariis, quorum utrumque est natura aliqua; in his autem, quorum unum est natura, et alterum privatio, sicut est in bono et malo, luce et tenebra, non habet veritatem. Unde sicut non dicitur magis luminosum, quia minus habeat de tenebra, sic non dicitur magis bonum, quia minus habeat de malo; sed quemadmodum una stella dicitur maior altera, quia magis accedit ad perfectionem lucis; sic magis bonum dicitur, quod magis accedit ad perfectionem bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen omnino carens malo non potest dici nisi solus Deus, ut fiat vis in hoc, quod dico *omnino*, ut careat omni malo secundum *actum* et secundum *potentiam* et secundum *aptitudinem* sive secundum primam naturae possibilitatem[^9].

**Dub. IV.** Item quaeritur de verbo illo Augustini, quod dicit in expositione illius verbi: *Vae! his qui dicunt malum bonum* etc.; *id quod dictum est in prophetia, intelligendum est de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus.* Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia, sicut peccat ille qui dicit, adulterium esse bonum vel homicidium, ita peccat qui dicit, impium esse iustum. Unde et maledicitur ille qui iustificat impium pro muneribus[^10]: ergo non tantum de rebus, sed etiam de hominibus habet intelligi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dico *hominem malum*, et dico *hominem*, et dico *malitiam.* Potest igitur attribui bonitas ei, aut bonitas naturae secundum quod *homo*, aut bonitas moris ratione *malitiae.* Et *primo* quidem modo attribuere ei bonitatem veritatis est, non detestationis propheticae. *Secundo* modo, meretur maledictionem; sed hoc est, non quia laudat hominem, secundum quod *homo*, sed quia laudat eum, secundum quod *malus.* Et hoc non est aliud quam laudare malitiam. Cum enim dicit Augustinus, quod hoc non intelligitur de *hominibus*, sed de *rebus*; non negat, quin peccatum sit in commendando hominem malum; sed hoc vult dicere, quod non est peccatum, si commendetur *natura*, sed peccatum est, si commendetur *malitia*[^11].

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says, that *the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of the evils that follow.* But on the *contrary*: Augustine in the book *Eighty-three Questions*[^1] says that « by no other author can a man be made worse »: therefore the evil will of an angel or of a man cannot cause evil wills in others. — *Likewise*, if every evil ought to be imputed to him who is the first cause, and the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of all evils: therefore all evils are to be imputed to them.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a cause *truly efficient* and producing, and there is a cause that is in a certain manner *disposing* and *inducing.* When therefore it is said that *the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of the evil wills that follow*, this is said by way of a certain *disposition* and *inducement.* For the devil induces and disposes by suggesting; but man [does so] by corrupting nature and by furnishing a bad example. But when Augustine says that «by no author is a man made worse», this is understood as [no] *principal* author. — *Otherwise.* Yet it could be said that this text is understood of the evils following the first evil will of man and of the angel, not with respect to diverse persons, but with respect to the *same* [person], so that his first evil will is the cause of all the evils which he himself does[^2].

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says in the same chapter[^3]: *The will of man is the cause both of sins and of punishments;* because punishment is an involuntary passion[^4]; but what is caused by the will is voluntary: therefore punishment is not caused by the will. — *Likewise*, if it is caused by the will, [it is caused] either by a *good* one, or by an *evil* one. Not by a *good* one; this is clear, because no one is punished for a good will. Not by an *evil* one; because an evil will is not the cause of what is just, insofar as it is such; but every punishment is just: therefore no punishment is caused by the will.

**I respond:** It must be said that the will is said to be the cause of something in two ways; either by way of *meriting*, or by way of *efficiency.* When therefore it is said that the will is the cause of punishment, this is not said by way of *efficiency*, but rather it is said by way of *meriting.* For the will, by causing fault either by acting or by failing, merits punishment, and so it is said to be the cause of punishments and of sins, although in one way and in another. And by this the solution of the objections is plain[^5].

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The good, entirely lacking evil, is an integral good.* For this seems to be false, because an integral good is that to which nothing of good is lacking; and this is the good in which is every good: therefore that alone is an integral good which is the highest good. But many created things are lacking all evil, as the blessed Angels and the blessed souls: therefore if what he says were true, many things would be supremely good. — On account of this there is a question, whether anything created merits to be called an integral good.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *perfect* is said in many ways: both with regard to the perfection of *sufficiency*, and with regard to the perfection of *superabundance*[^6]; so also integral good can be said in many ways: both with regard to the integrity of *sufficiency*, and thus that is called integral good which lacks all evil of fault and of punishment; and with regard to the integrity of *superabundance*, and thus that is called integral good in which is every good. And in the first manner integral good is not said to be the highest good, but a *pure* good, because it has nothing of evil admixed. But in the second manner it is said to be the highest good, and it is in God alone by *essence*, but in a creature by *participation*, which is called good[^7] in <!-- page 818 -->this, that it participates in the highest good, from whose participation it is said to have every good. And *if you object* that *highest* is said by the unmixedness with the contrary[^8], and thus the good which is entirely unmixed with evil is the highest good; it must be said that this is true in those contraries, of which each is some nature; but in those of which one is a nature, and the other a privation, as is the case with good and evil, light and darkness, it does not hold true. Hence just as a thing is not said to be more luminous because it has less of darkness, so a thing is not said to be more good because it has less of evil; but just as one star is said to be greater than another because it approaches more to the perfection of light; so that is said to be more good which approaches more to the perfection of goodness. Nevertheless, entirely lacking evil cannot be said [of any] except God alone, so that emphasis be placed on this, that I say *entirely*, so that it lack all evil according to *act* and according to *potency* and according to *aptitude*, or according to the first possibility of nature[^9].

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that word of Augustine, which he says in the exposition of that saying: *Woe to those who call evil good* etc.; *that which was said in the prophecy is to be understood of the things themselves, by which men are evil, not of the men.* For this seems to be false, because, just as he sins who says that adultery or homicide is good, so he sins who says that the impious man is just. Hence also he is cursed who justifies the impious for bribes[^10]: therefore it has to be understood not only of things, but also of men.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *an evil man*, I also say *man*, and I say *malice.* Goodness therefore can be attributed to him, either the goodness of nature according as he is *man*, or the goodness of morals by reason of *malice.* And in the *first* manner indeed, to attribute goodness to him is [an act] of truth, not of the prophetic detestation. In the *second* manner, he merits a curse; but this is so, not because he praises the man, according as he is *man*, but because he praises him, according as he is *evil.* And this is nothing else than to praise malice. For when Augustine says that this is not understood of *men*, but of *things*; he does not deny that there is sin in commending an evil man; but he wishes to say this, that there is no sin if *nature* be commended, but there is sin if *malice* be commended[^11].

---

la: Quaest. 3. seq.

en: Question 3 and following.

la: Codd. T bb *fecit.* — Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 6; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.

en: Codices T, bb read *fecit.* — Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 98, m. 6; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 2.

la: Scil. c. 3.

en: Namely, c. 3.

la: Verba Anselmi allata sunt supra pag. 714, nota 1.

en: The words of Anselm were cited above, p. 714, note 1.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).

la: Codd. F I K X cc etc. nec non ed. 1 *beata.* — Cfr. Boeth., de Hebdomadibus sive Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint etc.

en: Codices F, I, K, X, cc etc., and likewise edition 1, read *beata.* — Cf. Boethius, *On the Hebdomads*, or *How Substances Are Good in That They Are*, etc.

la: Vide supra pag. 664, nota 4, ubi etiam codd. signavimus, qui pro *per impermixtionem* substituunt *per immixtionem.* Iidem codd. cum ed. 1 et hic *per immixtionem* habent. Pro *quod summum* cod. cc et ed. 1 exhibent *quod bonum.*

en: See above, p. 664, note 4, where we also noted the codices which for *per impermixtionem* substitute *per immixtionem.* The same codices with edition 1 here too read *per immixtionem.* For *quod summum* codex cc and edition 1 give *quod bonum.*

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 7.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. I, q. 18, m. 7.

la: Isai. 5, 22, seq.: *Vae! qui potentes estis... Qui iustificatis impium pro muneribus, et iustitiam iusti aufertis ab eo.* — Pro *maledicitur* cod. O *dicitur Vae*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *malus dicitur.*

en: Isaiah 5:22 f.: *Woe to you who are mighty... Who justify the impious for bribes, and take away the justice of the just man from him.* — For *maledicitur* codex O reads *dicitur Vae*; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 *malus dicitur.*

la: De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: On this doubt cf. St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 817–818 (PDF pp. 839–840, offset +22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 56896–56972). FINAL unit of DISTINCTIO XXXIV — after this chunk **d.34 is fully Tier-2** (all 9 units: littera + divisio + a1-q1/q2/q3 + a2-q1/q2/q3 + dubia). The DUBIA opens in the L-col of p.817 (header `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` immediately after a2-q3's tail on *deformitatis*/*privationem*) and closes at the top of p.818 R-col (*…si commendetur malitia.*) immediately before DISTINCTIO XXXV / Cap. I (*Quid sit peccatum.*).

**ALIGNMENT-CHECK CORRECTION.** The dispatch brief specified TWO dubia (DUB. I–II). The page is **two-column**, and the IA djvu OCR interleaves the columns: DUB. III (`Bonum, omnino carens malo, integrum bonum est`) and DUB. IV (`Vae! his qui dicunt malum bonum`) sit in the RIGHT column of p.817 and the top of p.818, and were verified at 450 dpi. **Actual DUB count = 4 (I–IV)**, all promoted here:
- DUB. I — *mala voluntas angeli vel hominis causa est malorum subsequentium* (whether the evil will causes evils in others; resolved: cause by *dispositio/inductio* not *efficiens*; Augustine's «nullo auctore» = no *principal* author).
- DUB. II — *Voluntas hominis causa est tam peccatorum quam poenarum* (whether the will causes punishment, since punishment is involuntary; resolved: will causes poena *per modum merentis*, not *efficientis*).
- DUB. III — *Bonum, omnino carens malo, integrum bonum est* (whether any creature is an *integrum bonum*; resolved by the *integritas sufficientiae* / *superabundantiae* distinction; only God *omnino carens malo* per *actum/potentiam/aptitudinem*).
- DUB. IV — *Vae! his qui dicunt malum bonum* (whether Augustine's gloss applies only to things not men; resolved by *bonitas naturae* / *bonitas moris* — praising the *homo* is truth, praising the *malus* is praising *malitia*).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.817** (L-col: DUB. I full + DUB. II opener; R-col: DUB. II *contra* tail + Respondeo + DUB. III opener + Respondeo running into p.818). Footers 1–7 → [^1]–[^7] (DUB. I = [^1]–[^2]; DUB. II = [^3]–[^5]; DUB. III = [^6]–[^7]). The top-of-R-col footer block *Quo sensu peccatum dicatur… Biel* is a wrapped p.816 footer belonging to a2-q3 — NOT claimed here.
- **p.818** (L-col: DUB. III Respondeo tail + DUB. IV opener, then DISTINCTIO XXXV / Cap. I begins; R-col top: DUB. IV Respondeo *…si commendetur malitia.*). Dubia footers 1–4 → [^8]–[^11] (DUB. III tail = [^8]–[^9]; DUB. IV = [^10]–[^11]). The p.818 **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** block (footers 1–5) belongs to DISTINCTIO XXXV littera — NOT claimed here.
- Body seams grammatically continuous: 817 L→R (DUB. II: *…A mala non; quia mala volun-‖tas non est causa iusti*); 817 R→818 L (DUB. III: *…in creatura autem per participationem, quae bona dicitur in ‖ hoc, quod participat summum bonum*); 818 L→R (DUB. IV: *…malum bonum etc.; ‖ id quod dictum est in prophetia*).

**Apparatus = 11 entries** ([^1]–[^11]), 1:1 with printed-page dubia footers in print order. N La = N En = N defs = 11.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q3: the entire p.817 footer block (footers 1–7) belongs to this dubia, as flagged (a2-q3 claimed no p.817 footer; its own footers wrapped to the top of the p.817 R-col as the *Quo sensu… Biel* block and stay with a2-q3). FORWARDED: none — the DUBIA closes the distinction; DISTINCTIO XXXV opens fresh on p.818 with its own littera + NOTAE block.

**Cascade-dropout check.** Both column seams on p.817 and the 817→818 page seam read against the 450 dpi column bands and confirmed grammatically continuous with no mid-paragraph splice. The IA djvu OCR interleaved the two columns and fragmented the DUB. II Respondeo and DUB. III/IV bodies; the body was reconstructed column-by-column from the PDF. No body text or footnote lost at the seams.

**has_scholion = false** — DUBIA chunks carry no scholion.

**[?] flags:** none. All four DUB bodies, the three Respondeo solutions, and the full p.817 (f1–7) and p.818-dubia (f1–4) footer blocks were read against the 450 dpi column bands and parse cleanly.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0