title: Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 306 -->

## ARTICULUS II.
### *De cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo.*

Consequenter quaeritur de cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum eodem[^p306-3] habitu cognoscat Verbum et alia in Verbo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi cognoscat actu in Verbo quae cognoscit habitu.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in Verbo noscat omnia, quaecumque novit Verbum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum anima Christi eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscat alias res in Verbo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima Christi eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscat alias res in Verbo. Et quod eadem, videtur.

1. Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^p306-4] dicit, quod Angeli tripliciter cognoverunt res, videlicet in Verbo, in se ipsis, in proprio genere: ergo cognitio, quam Angelus habet in Verbo de re, distincta est a cognitione, quam Angelus habet de re in se ipso; sed Angelus in se ipso cognoscit res per speciem aliquam sibi datam: ergo videtur, quod ea cognitione, quae est in Verbo, cognoscat res non mediante aliqua similitudine ipsius rei, praeter illam quae est in Verbo: ergo eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit rem aliam in Verbo.

2. Item, Verbum est sufficiens ratio cognoscendi omnia alia a Verbo[^p307-1] — tanquam exemplar est ratio cognoscendi exemplatum — sed cognoscere sufficientem rationem alterius, hoc non est aliud quam cognoscere ipsam rem; eadem enim est cognitio rationis cognoscendi et ipsius rei cognitae: ergo eadem cognitione, qua anima cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit res alias a Verbo.

<!-- page 307 -->

3. Item, melius cognoscitur res in divino exemplari, quam cognoscatur in se, melius etiam cognoscitur per divinum exemplar, quam cognoscatur per propriam similitudinem[^p307-2]; sed eadem cognitione, qua quis cognoscit similitudinem rei, cognoscit ipsam rem: ergo etc.

4. Item, si similitudo rei in speculo nullo modo differret ab ipso speculo, eadem cognitione, qua cognosceretur ipsum speculum, cognosceretur ipsa similitudo rei et ipsa res: ergo cum in Verbo aeterno non differat similitudo rei ab ipso — nam ipsum est exemplar et ratio cognoscendi — videtur, quod eadem cognitione, qua quis novit Verbum, cognoscit et res in Verbo: igitur anima Christi per eundem habitum cognitionis cognoscit Verbum et alia in ipso.

5. Item, si anima Christi cognosceret rem in Verbo per alium habitum et aliam similitudinem, quam cognoscat ipsum Verbum; aut illa similitudo esset una, aut multae. Una non potest esse, quia unaquaeque res creata habet similitudinem sibi propriam in genere creaturae. Si multae: ergo cum non sit status in multis, sed in uno[^p307-3], cognitio aliarum rerum a Verbo in ipso Verbo non spectaret ad cognitionem gloriae, in qua est status et quies: igitur si hoc est inconveniens, restat, quod eodem habitu cognitionis, quo cognoscitur ipsum Verbum, cognoscantur et alia in Verbo, tam ab anima Christi quam ab alia anima beata.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut materia se habet ad formam, ita intellectus possibilis se habet ad res, quas cognoscit[^p307-4]; sed impossibile est, quod summum ens det *esse* ipsi materiae nisi imprimendo aliquam formam creatam ipsi materiae, diversam a se: ergo impossibile est, quod summum lumen faciat, intellectum possibilem aliquid actu intelligere, nisi imprimat ei speciem et similitudinem ipsius rei cognitae: ergo cognitio aliarum rerum a Verbo in ipso Verbo aliquid plus exigit quam cognitionem ipsius Verbi, et est per aliam rationem cognoscendi, quam sit cognitio ipsius Verbi.

2. Item, ad hoc, quod intellectus aliquid intelligat, necesse est, ipsum assimilari rei cognitae[^p307-5]: ergo cum cognoscit alia a Verbo, necesse est, ipsum assimilari non solum ipsi Verbo, sed etiam aliis a Verbo; sed aliis a Verbo non potest assimilari nisi per susceptionem similitudinum aliarum: ergo ad hoc, quod intellectus aliquis creatus, sive Christi, sive alius, cognoscat alias res in Verbo, non sufficit cognoscere ipsum Verbum.

3. Item, si aspicerem ad aliquam rem, aggeneraretur in me similitudo illius rei: similiter, si aspicerem ad speculum, non solum aggeneraretur in me similitudo speculi, sed etiam similitudo rei[^p307-6]: ergo si Verbum aeternum continet in se ideas rerum omnium, ita generabuntur similitudines rerum in anima aspiciente ipsum, sicut si anima contueretur ipsas res: ergo videtur, quod res in Verbo non tantum cognoscitur ab intellectu creato per ipsum Verbum, sed etiam per similitudines impressas: ergo per cognitionem aliam et aliam.

4. Item[^p307-7], contingit cognoscere ipsum Verbum ut lucem, et contingit cognoscere ipsum ut exemplar — tunc autem cognoscitur Verbum ut *lux*, quando cognoscitur in se; tunc autem cognoscitur ut *exemplar*, quando in ipso cognoscuntur alia — sed impossibile est cognoscere ipsum Verbum — lucem, quin infundatur nobis lumen, quod facit nos conformes ipsi luci: ergo impossibile est ipsum cognoscere ut exemplar, quin infundatur nobis cognitio, quae facit nos conformes ipsis aeternis ideis et rationibus: ergo nec anima Christi alio modo quam isto cognovit. Si tu dicas, quod idem est et[^p307-8] quod assimilatur ipsi Verbo ut luci, et Verbo ut exemplari; contra: possibile est cognoscere ipsum Verbum, et tamen non cognosceretur res, cuius Verbum est exemplar: ergo videtur, quod alia sit ratio, per quam quis conformatur ipsi Verbo ut luci, et ipsi Verbo ut exemplari.

5. Item, intelligamus, quod aliquis in Verbo cognoscat rem aliquam videndo ipsum Verbum, et post desinat videre, sicut fuit in raptu Pauli[^p308-1]; possibile est, talem, postquam desiit videre ipsam Verbi essentiam, habere memoriam eius quod vidit in Verbo; hoc autem non esset, nisi res in Verbo cognosceretur alia cognitione quam ipsum Verbum: ergo anima Christi et omnis alia anima, si cognoscit res in Verbo, hoc non est per eandem cognitionem, sed per cognitionem aliam et aliam.

<!-- page 308 -->

### Conclusio.

> Anima Christi eodem habitu, quo cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit res in Verbo, existente sola differentia quoad respectum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod habitus cognitionis numerari habet penes rationem cognoscendi[^p308-2]. Quoniam ergo Verbum aeternum est sufficientissima ratio cognoscendi omnia alia a se — quod patet, quia se ipso cognoscit omnia — ad hoc[^p308-3], quod aliquis cognoscat res in Verbo, non oportet in ipso esse geminam cognitionem ipsius Verbi et ipsius rei cognitae; geminam, dico, quantum ad habitum cognoscendi, propter hoc, quod habens deiformitatem gloriae, per quam cognoscit ipsum Verbum, habet unde assimiletur ipsi Verbo, quod est perfecta ratio cognoscendi omnia alia, et ita, cognoscendo Verbum, habet habitum, quo possit cognoscere alia, ita quod habitus ille, prout dicitur esse Verbi et aliorum a Verbo, non differt nisi sola comparatione. — Per idem enim, quod ipsum Verbum aeternum est *lux* et *veritas* in se, est *exemplar* aliarum rerum; et ideo, qui habet unde conformetur ipsi summae veritati, habet unde conformetur rationi cognoscendi omnia. Quoniam ergo Verbum aeternum per idem est ratio cognoscendi se et alia; ideo dico, quod anima Christi eodem habitu, quo cognoscit ipsum Verbum, cognoscit res in Verbo, existente sola differentia quantum ad comparationem sive respectum. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod necesse est, intellectum possibilem formari ad similitudinem rei intellectae etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, quamvis Deus nullius possit esse forma *perfectiva*, potest tamen esse forma *exemplaris* et ratio cognoscendi; ideo, quamvis non perficiat materiam per se ipsum[^p308-4], dando ei *esse* et complementum, potest tamen per se ipsum intellectum facere cognoscere aliud quodcumque creatum. Et si tu obiicias, quod necesse est adhuc, intellectum possibilem aliquo modo formari, ad hoc quod aliquid intelligat in actu; dicendum, quod sic est in proposito. Formatur enim ab aliquo, sed hoc non est aliud quam ipsa influentia luminis aeterni, per quam efficitur deiformis et conformis ipsi Verbo, quod est ratio cognoscendi alia; et ideo per consequens efficitur in actu respectu aliorum cognoscibilium a Verbo, et per similitudinem Verbi, quod quidem Verbum est similitudo omnium, efficitur quodam modo similis omnibus. Ideo non oportet, ei dari novum habitum ad cognoscendum.

2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicit, quod necesse est, cognoscens assimilari cognoscibili; quoniam assimilatio, quae sufficit ad cognitionem, non tantum est per speciem acceptam a re[^p308-5], vel etiam per speciem appropriatam ipsi rei, verum etiam per assimilationem ad illud quod est ratio cognoscendi cetera.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aspicerem ad rem, aggeneraretur in me similitudo rei, et similiter, si ad speculum, aggeneraretur in me similitudo speculi et ipsius rei; dicendum, quod si in speculo non differret similitudo rei ab ipsa forma speculi, non oporteret, quod in me aggeneraretur alia similitudo cognoscendi respectu ipsius speculi et respectu ipsius rei relucentis in speculo; et sic intelligendum est in proposito, quoniam idea in Deo nihil aliud est quam ipsa veritas aeterna, sicut ostensum fuit in primo libro[^p308-6].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impossibile est, me lucem cognoscere aeternam, quin fiam ei conformis per influentiam luminis; dicendum, quod hoc verum est; sed quia Deus per idem ipsum, quod est[^p308-7] *lux* in se, est *exemplar* aliarum rerum; ideo non oportet, quod per aliud et aliud fiam conformis ipsi, ut est lux, et ut est exemplar, sed per idem alio modo se habens. Idem enim lumen gloriae habilitat ipsam animam ad cognoscendum ipsum Verbum aeternum, in quantum lumen comparatur ad ipsum Verbum sub ratione lucis; idem etiam habilitat ipsam animam ad cognoscendum alia a Verbo in ipso Verbo, in quantum comparatur ad ipsum Verbum, ut est exemplar aliorum. — Et quia Verbum est exemplar voluntarie repraesentans, ideo lumen illud non comparatur nisi ad illa quae ipsum divinum exemplar repraesentat voluntarie; hinc est, quod per illud lumen, etsi[^p308-8] cognoscat Verbum, non oportet, quod cognoscat omnia alia a Verbo, quorum ipsum Verbum est exemplar. — Et si tu obiicias, quod quamvis in Deo idem sit sapientia et bonitas, tamen aliud et aliud est in me, per quod ego conformor divinae sapientiae et bonitati: ergo pari ratione aliud[^p308-9] erit, per quod conformatur intellectus ipsi Verbo, secundum quod *lux*, et secundum quod *exemplar*;

<!-- page 309 -->

dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam ratio veritatis et exemplaritatis in eodem est differens sola comparatione. Ipsum enim exemplar non est aliud quam veritas aeterna, ut est ratio cognoscendi alia.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de memoria, quae remanet; dicendum, quod si aliquis intellectus videt[^p309-1] aliqua in Verbo cognitione gloriae et desinat videre Verbum, non memoratur de cognitione illarum rerum, nisi eatenus, quatenus memoratur de cognitione Verbi, nisi alias habuerit[^p309-2] cognitionem illarum rerum impressam, vel nisi Deus ei dispensative imprimeret; tunc hoc non esset opportunum. Sed, sicut dictum est, ad hoc, quod aliquis intellectus creatus cognoscat res in Verbo, sive Christi, sive alius, sufficit, quod habeat deiformitatem gloriae, per quam sit similis ipsi Verbo; nec oportet, ei dari rerum similitudines, aut habitus particulares, quia magis sibi sufficit ipsa summa veritas ad cognoscendum omnia, quam omnes rerum similitudines speciales. Unde limpidius cognoscit Angelus, et etiam anima Christi, res in Verbo, quam cognoscat in se, vel in proprio genere.

english:
## ARTICLE II.
### *On the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word.*

Consequently inquiry is made concerning the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether by the same[^p306-3] habit it knows the Word and other things in the Word.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul knows in act, in the Word, what it knows in habit.

Thirdly it is asked whether in the Word it knows all things, whatsoever the Word knows.

### Question I. *Whether Christ's soul, by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, knows other things in the Word.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ's soul, by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, knows other things in the Word. And that [it knows them] by the same [knowledge], it seems.

1. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter*[^p306-4], says that the angels knew things in a threefold way, namely in the Word, in themselves, in their proper genus: therefore the knowledge which an angel has of a thing in the Word is distinct from the knowledge which an angel has of a thing in itself; but an angel in itself knows things through some species given to it: therefore it seems that by that knowledge which is in the Word it knows things without the mediation of any likeness of the thing, besides that which is in the Word: therefore by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, it knows another thing in the Word.

2. Likewise, the Word is the sufficient ground for knowing all things other than the Word[^p307-1] — as an exemplar is the ground for knowing what is exemplified — but to know the sufficient ground of something else is nothing other than to know the thing itself; for the knowledge of the ground-of-knowing and of the known thing itself is the same: therefore by the same knowledge by which the soul knows the Word, it knows things other than the Word.

3. Likewise, a thing is better known in the divine exemplar than it is known in itself, and it is also better known through the divine exemplar than it is known through its proper likeness[^p307-2]; but by the same knowledge by which one knows the likeness of a thing, one knows the thing itself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if the likeness of a thing in a mirror in no way differed from the mirror itself, then by the same knowledge by which the mirror itself would be known, the likeness of the thing itself and the thing itself would be known: therefore since in the eternal Word the likeness of a thing does not differ from itself — for it is the exemplar and ground of knowing — it seems that by the same knowledge by which one knows the Word, one knows also things in the Word: therefore Christ's soul, by the same habit of knowledge, knows the Word and other things in it.

5. Likewise, if Christ's soul knew a thing in the Word through another habit and another likeness than that by which it knows the Word itself; either that likeness would be one, or [there would be] many. It cannot be one, because each created thing has its own proper likeness in the genus of creature. If [there are] many: then, since there is no rest in many but in one[^p307-3], the knowledge of things other than the Word in the Word itself would not pertain to the knowledge of glory, in which there is rest and repose: therefore if this is unfitting, it remains that by the same habit of knowledge by which the Word itself is known, other things too are known in the Word, both by Christ's soul and by any other beatified soul.

**On the contrary:** 1. As matter is related to form, so the possible intellect is related to the things which it knows[^p307-4]; but it is impossible that the highest being give *being* to matter itself except by impressing on the matter some created form, distinct from itself: therefore it is impossible that the highest light make the possible intellect actually understand anything, except by impressing on it the species and likeness of the known thing itself: therefore the knowledge of things other than the Word, in the Word itself, demands something more than the knowledge of the Word itself, and is through a ground of knowing other than is the knowledge of the Word itself.

2. Likewise, in order that the intellect understand something, it is necessary that it be assimilated to the known thing[^p307-5]: therefore when it knows things other than the Word, it is necessary that it be assimilated not only to the Word itself, but also to things other than the Word; but it cannot be assimilated to things other than the Word except through the reception of other likenesses: therefore in order that some created intellect, whether Christ's or another's, know other things in the Word, it does not suffice to know the Word itself.

3. Likewise, if I were to gaze upon some thing, the likeness of that thing would be generated in me: likewise, if I were to gaze upon a mirror, not only would the likeness of the mirror be generated in me, but also the likeness of the thing[^p307-6]: therefore if the eternal Word contains in itself the ideas of all things, the likenesses of things will be generated in the soul gazing upon it, just as if the soul beheld the things themselves: therefore it seems that a thing in the Word is known by a created intellect not only through the Word itself, but also through impressed likenesses: therefore through one knowledge and another.

4. Likewise[^p307-7], it happens that the Word itself is known as light, and it happens that it is known as exemplar — now the Word is known as *light* when it is known in itself; and it is known as *exemplar* when other things are known in it — but it is impossible to know the Word itself as light without a light being infused into us which makes us conformed to that light: therefore it is impossible to know it as exemplar without a knowledge being infused into us which makes us conformed to those eternal ideas and grounds: therefore neither did Christ's soul know in any other mode than this. If you should say that that which is assimilated to the Word as light, and to the Word as exemplar, is the same[^p307-8]; on the contrary: it is possible to know the Word itself, and yet the thing whose exemplar the Word is would not be known: therefore it seems that the ground by which one is conformed to the Word as light, and to the Word as exemplar, is different.

5. Likewise, let us suppose that someone in the Word knows some thing by seeing the Word itself, and afterward ceases to see, as was the case in the rapture of Paul[^p308-1]; it is possible that such a one, after he has ceased to see the essence of the Word itself, has a memory of what he saw in the Word; but this would not be, unless the thing in the Word were known by a knowledge other than the Word itself: therefore Christ's soul and every other soul, if it knows things in the Word, [knows them] not through the same knowledge, but through one knowledge and another.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul, by the same habit by which it knows the Word, knows things in the Word, there being only a difference as to relation.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the habit of knowledge is to be enumerated according to the ground of knowing[^p308-2]. Since therefore the eternal Word is the most sufficient ground of knowing all things other than itself — which is clear, because by itself it knows all things — for this[^p308-3], that someone know things in the Word, there need not be in him a twofold knowledge, of the Word itself and of the known thing itself; twofold, I say, as to the habit of knowing, on account of this, that one having the deiformity of glory, by which he knows the Word itself, has that whereby he is assimilated to the Word itself, which is the perfect ground of knowing all other things, and so, in knowing the Word, he has the habit by which he can know other things, so that that habit, insofar as it is said to be of the Word and of things other than the Word, differs only by relation. — For by the same thing by which the eternal Word is *light* and *truth* in itself, it is the *exemplar* of other things; and therefore he who has that whereby he is conformed to the highest truth itself has that whereby he is conformed to the ground of knowing all things. Since therefore the eternal Word is by the same [thing] the ground of knowing itself and other things; therefore I say that Christ's soul, by the same habit by which it knows the Word itself, knows things in the Word, there being only a difference as to comparison or relation. — The arguments which show this are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that it is necessary that the possible intellect be formed to the likeness of the understood thing, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because, although God can be the *perfecting* form of nothing, he can nevertheless be the *exemplary* form and the ground of knowing; therefore, although he does not perfect matter through himself[^p308-4], by giving it *being* and completion, he can nevertheless through himself make the intellect know any other created thing. And if you object that it is still necessary that the possible intellect be in some way formed, in order that it understand something in act; it must be said that thus it is in the matter proposed. For it is formed by something, but this is nothing other than the very influx of the eternal light, through which it becomes deiform and conformed to the Word itself, which is the ground of knowing other things; and therefore consequently it becomes in act with respect to the other things knowable by the Word, and through the likeness of the Word — which Word indeed is the likeness of all things — it becomes in a certain way similar to all things. Therefore there is no need that a new habit be given to it for knowing.

2. And through this is clear the answer to the following [objection], which objects that it is necessary that the knower be assimilated to the knowable; for the assimilation which suffices for knowledge is not only through a species received from the thing[^p308-5], or even through a species appropriated to the thing itself, but also through an assimilation to that which is the ground of knowing the rest.

3. To that which is objected, that if I were to gaze upon a thing, the likeness of the thing would be generated in me, and likewise, if [I gazed] upon a mirror, the likeness of the mirror and of the thing itself would be generated in me; it must be said that if in the mirror the likeness of the thing did not differ from the very form of the mirror, there would be no need that another likeness of knowing be generated in me with respect to the mirror itself and with respect to the thing itself shining in the mirror; and thus it must be understood in the matter proposed, for the idea in God is nothing other than the eternal truth itself, as was shown in the first book[^p308-6].

4. To that which is objected, that it is impossible for me to know the eternal light without my being made conformed to it through the influx of light; it must be said that this is true; but because God, by the very same [thing] by which he is[^p308-7] *light* in himself, is the *exemplar* of other things; therefore there is no need that I be made conformed to him by one thing and another, as he is light and as he is exemplar, but by the same [thing] standing in another mode. For the same light of glory enables the soul itself to know the eternal Word itself, insofar as the light is compared to the Word itself under the formal character of light; the same also enables the soul itself to know things other than the Word in the Word itself, insofar as it is compared to the Word itself, as it is the exemplar of other things. — And because the Word is an exemplar representing voluntarily, therefore that light is not compared except to those things which the divine exemplar itself voluntarily represents; hence it is that through that light, although[^p308-8] it knows the Word, there is no need that it know all other things than the Word, of which the Word itself is the exemplar. — And if you object that, although in God wisdom and goodness are the same, yet that by which I am conformed to the divine wisdom and goodness is in me one thing and another: therefore by parity of reasoning there will be another[^p308-9] [thing] by which the intellect is conformed to the Word itself, according as it is *light*, and according as it is *exemplar*;

it must be said that it is not alike, because the formal character of truth and of exemplarity in the same [thing] differs only by comparison. For the exemplar itself is nothing other than the eternal truth, as it is the ground of knowing other things.

5. To that which is objected last concerning the memory which remains; it must be said that if some intellect sees[^p309-1] certain things in the Word by the knowledge of glory and ceases to see the Word, he does not remember the knowledge of those things, except insofar as he remembers the knowledge of the Word, unless he had otherwise[^p309-2] an impressed knowledge of those things, or unless God should impress [it] on him dispensatively; [but] then this would not be fitting. But, as has been said, in order that some created intellect, whether Christ's or another's, know things in the Word, it suffices that it have the deiformity of glory, by which it is similar to the Word itself; nor is it necessary that likenesses of things, or particular habits, be given to it, because the highest truth itself suffices it more for knowing all things than all the special likenesses of things. Hence the angel, and also Christ's soul, knows things more limpidly in the Word than it knows [them] in themselves, or in their proper genus.

la: Non pauci codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 voculae *eodem* praefigunt *in*, et mox omittunt *Christi.* Deinde iidem codd. etiam voci *actu* praemittunt *in*, et cod. U pro *noscat* exhibet *cognoscat.*

en: Not a few codices, as well as editions 1 and 2, prefix *in* to the word *eodem*, and shortly after omit *Christi.* Then the same codices also place *in* before the word *actu*, and codex U gives *cognoscat* for *noscat.*

la: Libr. II. c. 8. n. 16. seqq., IV. c. 23. n. 40. seq. et c. 29. n. 46. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, ubi quaestio solvitur de Angelorum cognitione per species innatas; et d. 4. a. 3. q. 1. seq., ubi agitur de eorum cognitione in Verbo et de relatione, quae est inter cognitionem matutinam et vespertinam.

en: Book II c. 8 n. 16 ff., IV c. 23 n. 40 f. and c. 29 n. 46. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, where the question of the angels' knowledge through innate species is resolved; and d. 4. a. 3. q. 1 f., where their knowledge in the Word is treated, and the relation which is between the morning and the evening knowledge.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 6. q. 3, d. 27. p. II. q. 2. De propositione subnexa cfr. ibid. d. 35. q. 1. seqq. et d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. seq., ubi etiam principia argg. seqq. insinuantur. — Vat. ante *tanquam* interiicit *et.* In fine arg. pro *a Verbo* cod. R *in Verbo.*

en: See I. Sent. d. 6. q. 3, d. 27. p. II. q. 2. Concerning the proposition subjoined, cfr. ibid. d. 35. q. 1. ff. and d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. f., where also the principles of the following arguments are insinuated. — The Vatican [edition] inserts *et* before *tanquam.* At the end of the argument, for *a Verbo* (from the Word) codex R [reads] *in Verbo* (in the Word).

la: Cod. O addit *sicut melius cognoscitur res per speculum quam per propriam similitudinem.*

en: Codex O adds *just as a thing is better known through a mirror than through its proper likeness.*

la: Nam, ut Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 22. (c. 4.) ait, «prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis, et simplex composito».

en: For, as Aristotle says, *On the Heavens and the World* II, text 22 (c. 4), «prior in nature in each genus is the one to the many, and the simple to the composite».

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 17. seq. (c. 3.). Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. De *minori* vide ibid. d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. — Aliquanto inferius pro *et similitudinem* codd. E I L N U V X Z aa *in similitudinem.*

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 17 f. (c. 3). Cfr. also II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. On the *minor* [premise] see ibid. d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. — Somewhat below, for *et similitudinem* codices E I L N U V X Z aa [read] *in similitudinem.*

la: Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 1: *Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis* (scil. potentiis animae). Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16. — Paulo inferius post *similitudinum aliarum* cod. A supplet *rerum.* Subinde pro *alias res* cod. U *alia.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* VI c. 1: *if indeed from a certain likeness and affinity knowledge arises in them* (namely, in the powers of the soul). Cfr. Augustine, *On the Trinity* IX c. 11 n. 16. — A little below, after *similitudinum aliarum* codex A supplies *rerum.* Thereafter, for *alias res* codex U [reads] *alia.*

la: Simul audi: *in speculo repraesentatae.* — Subinde pro *ergo* cod. U *ergo sicut.*

en: At the same time understand: *represented in the mirror.* — Thereafter, for *ergo* codex U [reads] *ergo sicut.*

la: Codd. M O T Z *Item Gregorius.*

en: Codices M O T Z [read] *Likewise Gregory.*

la: Codd. M O omittunt *et*, pro quo Vat. cum cod. cc substituit *per.* Mox pro *et tamen* edd. *etsi.* Mallemus *ut tamen.*

en: Codices M O omit *et*, for which the Vatican [edition] with codex cc substitutes *per.* Shortly, for *et tamen* the editions [read] *etsi.* We should prefer *ut tamen.*

la: Epist. II. Cor. 12, 2. seqq. — Circa finem arg. pro *si cognoscit* edd. *si cognoscat.*

en: Epistle 2 Cor. 12:2 ff. — Toward the end of the argument, for *si cognoscit* the editions [read] *si cognoscat.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3. seqq.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *Ethics* VI c. 3 ff.

la: Edd. *ideo ad hoc.* Paulo superius pro *Quoniam ergo* codd. F G I L N Z aa *Unde ergo.*

en: The editions [read] *ideo ad hoc.* A little above, for *Quoniam ergo* codices F G I L N Z aa [read] *Unde ergo.*

la: Non pauci codd. non recte *se ipsam.* Paulo inferius pro *aliud* edd. cum cod. cc substituunt *aliquod* et mox omittunt *adhuc.* Subinde pro *in actu* cod. K *actu.*

en: Not a few codices, incorrectly, [read] *se ipsam.* A little below, for *aliud* the editions with codex cc substitute *aliquod* and shortly omit *adhuc.* Thereafter, for *in actu* codex K [reads] *actu.*

la: Cod. K *ab ipsa re.*

en: Codex K [reads] *ab ipsa re* (from the thing itself).

en: Distinction 35, q. 1.

la: Edd. 1, 2 *per ideam ipsam, quae est.*

en: Editions 1 and 2 [read] *per ideam ipsam, quae est* (through the idea itself, which is).

la: Supple: *anima.*

en: Supply: *anima* (the soul).

la: Cod. F *aliud et aliud.*

en: Codex F [reads] *aliud et aliud* (one and another).

la: Codd. F U *videret.*

en: Codices F U [read] *videret* (would see).

la: Ita codd. C H N T bb, in aliis et edd. *habuit.* Mox post *vel* cod. U subiicit *etiam.* Deinde pro *tunc hoc non esset opportunum* [i. e. tunc non oporteret memorari de cognitione Verbi] non pauci codd. *tunc hoc* [cod. A *tunc hoc tamen*] *non est opportunum.* Paulo inferius substituimus ex codd. G H I L V Z aa bb *Christi* pro *Christus.* Demum pro *per quam sit* cod. G et edd. 1, 2 *per quam fit*, et pro *ei dari* cod. G solus *ei dare.*

en: Thus codices C H N T bb; in the others and the editions, *habuit.* Shortly, after *vel* codex U adds *etiam.* Then, for *tunc hoc non esset opportunum* [i.e. then there would be no need to remember the knowledge of the Word] not a few codices [read] *tunc hoc* [codex A: *tunc hoc tamen*] *non est opportunum.* A little below, we substitute from codices G H I L V Z aa bb *Christi* for *Christus.* Finally, for *per quam sit* codex G and editions 1 and 2 [read] *per quam fit*, and for *ei dari* codex G alone [reads] *ei dare.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Secundum communem doctrinam res, quae in proprio genere habent *esse* creatum et limitatum, modo eminentissimo dicuntur esse in Deo, in quo «tripliciter sunt, videlicet ut in *principio producente*, et sic sunt in ratione potentiae; ut in *exemplari exprimente*, et sic sunt in ratione notitiae; et ut in *fine conservante*, in ratione voluntatis» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 4; cfr. ibid. q. 2.). Hoc rerum *esse eminens*, quatenus idem est ac *esse divinum*, sine dubio videtur ab eo qui videt immediate essentiam divinam. Hic autem quaeritur de creaturis secundum earum esse *formale* et *proprium*, et communiter conceditur, quod etiam ad hoc terminetur scientia Beatorum, quam habent in Verbo. Quoad *modum* autem huius cognitionis Occam cum suis Nominalibus recedit a communi aliorum doctorum sententia docens, res cognosci a Beatis in Deo non *immediate*, sed *causaliter*, cum actus has videndi totaliter causetur a Deo, intellectus se habeat pure passive, et visio utriusque obiecti sit alia et alia (explicationem vide apud Biel, hic q. unica). — Sed alii magistri in hoc consentiunt, quod Beati eodem *lumine vel habitu et actu* in essentia divina vel (appropriate loquendo) in Verbo ut in primo obiecto cognito cognoscant etiam res creatas. Assertionem tamen, quod *eodem actu* obiectum primarium et secundarium videatur, S. Bonav. restringit docens, quod actualis visio seu *consideratio* creaturarum non se extendat ad *omnia* creata et possibilia nisi *successive*; unde secundum ipsum actus videndi horum aliqua separari potest ab unico et permanente actu videndi divinam essentiam; tamen si actu haec videntur, tunc videntur non alio et distincto actu ab eo, quo videtur ipsa essentia (cfr. hic q. 2. ad 4. et explicatio fundamenti ultimi et scholion ad seq. quaest.). — Haec cognitio rerum in Deo vocatur ab Augustino *matutina*, quae distinguitur a *vespertina* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3.). — Doctrina communis nititur duobus fundamentis, scilicet quod ipsa essentia divina Beatis sit ratio cognoscendi, et quod eadem ut prima et summa veritas non tantum exprimat *se ipsam*, sed etiam perfectissime *omnia alia* omnemque veritatem participatam, sicut bene explanatur hic, praesertim in solutionibus oppositorum. Supponuntur autem hic plura, quae in 1. libro Sent. dicta sunt de *veritate* (d. 8. p. I. q. 1.), de *ideis* (d. 35. per totam), de *scientia divina* (d. 39.); haec principia, ex multis locis contracta, leguntur in scholio ad d. 35. q. 1. Hic tria tantum observamus.

**1.** «Unaquaeque res creata habet similitudinem sibi propriam in genere creaturae» (hic 5. fundam.), quae intellectui est ratio intelligendi eam. Nam res, sicut habet *esse* a Deo, ita etiam *virtutem se ipsam exprimendi* ut veritas quaedam participata. Haec tamen proprietas duplicem limitationem vel imperfectionem habet annexam, nempe quod proprie non nisi *se ipsam* ad notitiam pariendam exprimere potest, et quod ne hoc quidem totaliter et perfecte praestare valet.

**2.** Haec limitatio et imperfectio prorsus removenda est a modo, quo divina essentia se sibi exprimit; unde tenendum est, quod ipsa ut summa et increata Veritas infinito et perfectissimo modo se sibi manifestat, simulque exemplar est omnis veritatis participatae, in ipsa relucentis et expressae.

**3.** Hinc eadem divina essentia, quae est *lux* et *veritas* in se, est etiam perfectissima et illimitata ratio cognoscendi tum Deum tum omnia alia a Deo, quae secundum triplicem causalitatem (ut supra loc. cit. dictum est) in ipso sunt (hic solut. ad 4.). Quia enim essentia divina *eminentissime* continet omne *esse creatum*, ideo etiam eminenter continet *rationem formalem* cognoscendi illud; unde altiore modo est ratio motiva intellectus ad cognoscendum, quam esse possit propria rei ratio sive species impressa. Nam divinum exemplar importat «assimilationem *extra genus*» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 2.), scilicet supra causam universalem et particularem, et supra similitudinem communem et propriam, ita ut minime arctata se extendat una ad omnia, et tamen distinctissime exprimat quemlibet effectum quoad omnes conditiones. Hoc praeclare docetur 1. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2. 3. 4.

**II.** Pro intelligentia duarum seqq. quaestionum praecipue notanda sunt quae hic (solut. ad 2.) dicuntur de triplici modo, quo cognoscens assimilari potest cognoscibili; item (ad 3.), de differentia speculi increati a speculo creato (cfr. etiam 1. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. 3.); denique (ad 4.), quod Verbum est speculum voluntarie repraesentans.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 13. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 4; S. III. q. 10. a. 2; de Verit. q. 20. a. 4, q. 8. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et seqq. qq. hic a. 1.2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Biel, loc. cit.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** According to the common teaching, things which in their proper genus have created and limited *being* are said to be in God in a most eminent mode, in whom they «are in a threefold way, namely as in the *producing principle*, and thus they are under the character of power; as in the *expressing exemplar*, and thus they are under the character of knowledge; and as in the *conserving end*, under the character of will» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 4; cfr. ibid. q. 2.). This *eminent being* of things, inasmuch as it is the same as the *divine being*, is without doubt seen by him who immediately sees the divine essence. But here inquiry is made concerning creatures according to their *formal* and *proper* being, and it is commonly conceded that the knowledge of the Blessed, which they have in the Word, is terminated at this too. As to the *mode* of this knowledge, however, Ockham with his Nominalists departs from the common opinion of the other doctors, teaching that things are known by the Blessed in God not *immediately*, but *causally*, since the act of seeing these is wholly caused by God, the intellect being purely passive, and the vision of each object being one and another (see the explanation in Biel, here the single question). — But the other masters agree in this, that the Blessed by the same *light or habit and act* in the divine essence, or (speaking by appropriation) in the Word as in the first known object, know also created things. The assertion, however, that *by the same act* the primary and secondary object is seen, St. Bonaventure restricts, teaching that the actual vision or *consideration* of creatures does not extend to *all* created and possible things except *successively*; hence according to him the act of seeing some of these can be separated from the single and permanent act of seeing the divine essence; yet if these are seen in act, then they are seen by no other and distinct act than that by which the essence itself is seen (cfr. here q. 2 ad 4 and the explanation of the last fundamentum and the scholion to the following question). — This knowledge of things in God is called by Augustine *morning* [knowledge], which is distinguished from *evening* [knowledge] (cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3.). — The common doctrine rests on two fundamenta, namely that the divine essence itself is for the Blessed the ground of knowing, and that the same, as the first and highest truth, not only expresses *itself*, but also most perfectly *all other things* and every participated truth, as is well explained here, especially in the solutions of the opposing [arguments]. But many things are supposed here which were said in the first book of the Sentences concerning *truth* (d. 8. p. I. q. 1.), concerning the *ideas* (d. 35 throughout), concerning the *divine knowledge* (d. 39.); these principles, drawn together from many places, are read in the scholion to d. 35. q. 1. Here we observe only three things.

**1.** «Each created thing has its own proper likeness in the genus of creature» (here, the 5th fundamentum), which is for the intellect the ground of understanding it. For a thing, just as it has *being* from God, so also [has] the *power of expressing itself* as a certain participated truth. This property, however, has a twofold limitation or imperfection annexed, namely that properly it can express nothing but *itself* for the bringing-forth of knowledge, and that it cannot supply even this totally and perfectly.

**2.** This limitation and imperfection must be wholly removed from the mode by which the divine essence expresses itself to itself; hence it must be held that it, as the highest and uncreated Truth, manifests itself to itself in an infinite and most perfect mode, and is at once the exemplar of every participated truth, shining and expressed in it.

**3.** Hence the same divine essence, which is *light* and *truth* in itself, is also the most perfect and unlimited ground of knowing both God and all things other than God, which according to a threefold causality (as was said above in the cited place) are in it (here, the solution to [objection] 4). For since the divine essence *most eminently* contains all created *being*, therefore it also eminently contains the *formal character* of knowing it; hence in a higher mode it is the moving ground of the intellect for knowing than the thing's own character or impressed species could be. For the divine exemplar imports an «assimilation *outside the genus*» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 2.), namely above the universal and particular cause, and above the common and proper likeness, so that, being in no way constrained, it extends one [exemplar] to all things, and yet most distinctly expresses each effect as to all its conditions. This is admirably taught in 1. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2. 3. 4.

**II.** For the understanding of the two following questions, what is here said (in the solution to [objection] 2) concerning the threefold mode by which the knower can be assimilated to the knowable is especially to be noted; likewise (at [objection] 3), concerning the difference of the uncreated mirror from the created mirror (cfr. also 1. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. 3.); finally (at [objection] 4), that the Word is a mirror representing voluntarily.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 13. m. 5. a. 1. — Scotus, concerning this and the 2 following questions, in both *Scripta*, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 1. quaestiuncula 4; *Summa* III. q. 10. a. 2; *de Veritate* q. 20. a. 4, q. 8. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, concerning this and the following questions, here a. 1.2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Durandus, concerning this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, concerning this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Biel, in the cited place.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p30{6,7,8,9}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`), printed pp.306–309 (PDF 328–331; offset pdf = printed + 22), Left col top→bottom then Right col, body then footers, two-column reflow over the IA djvu cascade-fragmented OCR. The skeleton's inline raw (raw 21536–21756, the QUAESTIO I opener through the p.309/310 footers) was the OCR base for clean running prose + marker spacing; the PDF is authoritative for the Respondeo/Solutio and ALL footers. Fresh literal English. Raw span: ARTICULUS II header (raw 21525) + QUAESTIO I (raw 21536) → just before QUAESTIO II (raw 21757). `type: quaestio`.

**Running heads** (confirmed eyes-on via low-dpi renders `raw/vision/vol3/p-30{6..9,10}.png`, never OCR'd digits): p.306 top-right `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` + `306`; p.307 `DIST. XIV. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` + `307`; p.308 `308` + `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.309 `DIST. XIV. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` + `309`. The `310 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` running head in the inline raw is the page-top of the NEXT chunk (QUAESTIO II opens at the top of p.310, confirmed via `vol3-p310-L-0.png`) — it is only the boundary sentinel here. **q1 ends at the bottom of p.309.**

**Alignment.** PASS. ART. II opener: *Consequenter quaeritur de cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum eodem habitu cognoscat Verbum et alia in Verbo.* QUAESTIO I opener: *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima Christi eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscat alias res in Verbo* — this is ART. II q1 (*eadem cognitione / Verbum + alia*), NOT q2 (*actu vs habitu*, raw 21757) nor q3 (*omnia quaecumque*), and NOT ART. I or ART. III material.

**Page-split / footer map** (per-page restart, page-suffixed markers):
- **p.306**: ART. II header + subtitle + QUAESTIO I opener + args 1 (start of 2). Footers: nn. 1–2 belong to d14-a1-q3 (its conclusion/scholion region — already held there); **nn. 3–4 picked up here** as `[^p306-3]` (anchors *eodem³* in the ART. II opener) and `[^p306-4]` (anchors *super Genesim ad litteram⁴* in arg 1). HAND-OFF PICKED UP.
- **p.307**: args 2–5 + Sed contra 1 (start). Footers 1–8 → `[^p307-1]`–`[^p307-8]`.
- **p.308**: Sed contra continued, CONCLUSIO, RESPONDEO, Solutio ad 1–3 (+ start of ad 4). Footers 1–9 → `[^p308-1]`–`[^p308-9]`.
- **p.309**: Solutio ad 4 (end) + ad 5 (de memoria) + SCHOLION I–III. Footers 1–2 → `[^p309-1]`–`[^p309-2]` (these are body-footers, distinct from the unnumbered Scholion editorial notes). **q1 consumed ALL p.309 footers (1–2).**

**Apparatus count: 21 entries** (p.306: 2 [nn.3–4]; p.307: 8; p.308: 9; p.309: 2). Marker pairing 21/21 clean in both Latin and English bodies.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* ARTICULUS II header + subtitle (*De cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo*) folded into this q1 per the locked convention; p.306 footers nn. 3–4 (a1-q3 took nn. 1–2 only — confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p306-{L,R}-2.png`).
- *Forwarded to d14-a2-q2:* QUAESTIO II (*Utrum anima Christi actu cognoscat in Verbo omnia quae habitu cognoscit*) opens at the top of printed p.310 (PDF 332), raw line **21757**, immediately after this q1's Scholion. **No q1 footer migrates forward** — q1 consumed all p.309 footers; q2's first body-footer is the fresh p.310 footer sequence.

**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: true`. Scholion **I** (+ its sub-notes 1–3) is q1's own. Scholion **II** is explicitly forward-looking — *"Pro intelligentia duarum seqq. quaestionum praecipue notanda sunt…"* (it prepares q2 and q3, cross-referencing *hic solut. ad 2/3/4*), but it is printed and held here under q1. Scholion **III** is the parallel-authors list for the whole article. Per the sibling-check convention, a2-q2 and a2-q3 may legitimately have lighter/forwarded scholia (Scholion II covers them); set their `has_scholion` per what is printed at each.

**`[?]` flags:** none. OCR for this region is clean and was confirmed line-by-line against the 450 dpi bands; the cascade-fragmented Respondeo/Solutio and all footers were re-set directly from the PDF.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 310 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum anima Christi actu cognoscat in Verbo omnia quae habitu cognoscit.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi cognoscat in Verbo actu omnia quae cognoscit in habitu. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, secundum quod vult Augustinus in libro decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^p310-1], « in Beatis non erunt volubiles cogitationes »: si ergo anima Christi inter ceteras animas beatas beatissima est, non ergo habet cogitationes volubiles : ergo si aliquid semel in actu cogitat vel cognoscit, semper illud cogitat vel cognoscit : ergo quidquid cogitat in habitu, cognoscit in actu.

2. Item, gloria est habitus in actu — impossibile enim est, hominem esse beatum et aliquando cessare ab actu visionis divinae[^p310-2] — si ergo cognitio, qua cognoscit anima Christi res in Verbo, est cognitio gloriosa; videtur, quod cognitio illa semper habeat habitum coniunctum actui : ergo quidquid cognoscit in habitu, cognoscit in actu.

3. Item, perfectior est habitus coniunctus actui quam separatus, pro eo quod actus est complementum habitus[^p310-3]; sed anima Christi cognoscit res in Verbo cognitione perfectissima : ergo quidquid cognoscit ibi in habitu, cognoscit in actu.

4. Item, una et eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit anima Christi ipsum Verbum, cognoscit alia a Verbo[^p310-4]; sed nihil de ipso Verbo cognoscit in habitu, quod non cognoscat in actu : ergo nihil de aliis rebus cognoscit in habitu, quod non cognoscat in actu.

**Sed contra:**

1. Sicut vult Philosophus[^p310-5]: « Scimus plura, sed intelligimus unum solum »; hoc autem ob aliud non est, nisi quia *scire* nominat cognitionem in habitu, sed *intelligere* in actu : ergo ad plura se extendit habitus quam actus per naturam ; et si hoc, non est necesse, quod in Christo habitus parificetur actui : igitur non est necesse, quod quidquid anima Christi habitu cognoscit in Verbo, quod cognoscat in actu.

2. Item, sicut perfecta est cognitio animae Christi, ita perfectum est eius gaudium; sed anima Christi non gaudet de omni eo in actu, de quo gaudet in habitu — gaudet enim super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente[^p310-6], licet non actualiter in eo laetaretur, quando peccabat — ergo pari ratione non est opportunum, quod omne quod cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu.

3. Item, actualis consideratio rerum cognitarum in Verbo in Christo subiacet voluntati : ergo potest modo considerare aliquid[^p310-7] creatum, quod non sit de essentia gloriae, modo etiam non considerare : ergo si habet illius rei habitum, non necesse est, quod habitus semper sit coniunctus actui respectu cuiuscumque cognoscibilis.

4. Item, aut anima Christi actu considerat omne quod Verbum aeternum natum est ei repraesentare, aut non. Si actu considerat omne quod Verbum aeternum natum est ei repraesentare; cum illa sint infinita, videtur, quod anima Christi in considerando actu pertransit infinita, quod est impossibile virtuti finitae[^p310-8]. Si non actu considerat omne quod Verbum sibi unitum natum est ei repraesentare; ergo aliquam habet aptitudinem anima Christi ad aliquid, respectu cuius non semper est in actu ; sed omnis eius aptitudo est completa per habitum gloriosum : igitur aliquid cognoscit in habitu, quod non cognoscit in actu.

5. Item, quando aliquid se extendit ad infinita, impossibile est, quod ipsum totaliter sit in actu, si differat in eo actus a potentia ; sed habitus cognitionis in Christo se extendit ad infinita : ergo impossibile est, ut omne quod cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu. Maior manifesta est, quia, cum continuum sit divisibile in infinitum, impossibile est, ipsum totaliter divisum esse in actu[^p310-9]. Minor probatur per hoc, quod Christus in Verbo aeterno scit, omnes species numeri paris divisibiles esse in duo aequalia, et hoc novit in habitu de qualibet eius specie : si ergo species numeri sunt infinitae, ergo novit habitu infinita.

6. Item, nihil novit anima Christi in actu, super quod non convertat se actualiter ; sed intellectus eius et aspectus simplex est et finitus ; sed simplex et finitum ad quod se convertit totaliter se convertit[^p311-1]: ergo si actu se convertit ad unum, impossibile est, quod simul et semel actu se convertat ad illud quod sit ab illo disparatum : igitur anima Christi non omnia cognoscit in actu, quae cognoscit in habitu.

<!-- page 311 -->

### Conclusio.

> Anima Christi quoad ea quae sunt essentialia gloriae, omnia quae cognoscit in habitu, cognoscit in actu, quod non est necesse quoad ea quae non sunt essentialia gloriae.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod anima Christi beata habet cognitionem aliquorum, quae sunt essentialia gloriae, et aliquorum, quae non sunt de essentia gloriae. — Si ergo loquamur de cognitione eorum quae sunt essentialia gloriae, dico, quod anima Christi omnia quae cognoscit in habitu, cognoscit in actu, quia gloria est habitus in actu. Unde sicut non potest anima eius non esse gloriosa, sic impossibile est, actualem considerationem eorum quae sunt de essentia gloriae, in ipso interrumpi. — Si autem loquamur de cognitione eorum quae non sunt essentialia gloriae, sic non est necesse, quod omnia quae cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu. — Et huius signum est, quod Deus Beatis existentibus in gloria, hoc est sanctis Angelis, aliquid de novo revelat et ostendit in se, quod prius tamen non ostendebat[^p311-2]. Et ideo statui gloriae non repugnat considerare aliquid nunc, quod prius non considerabatur. — Nec repugnat etiam perfectioni creaturae, quoniam creaturam perfici hoc est eius capacitatem impleri ; creatura autem plurium est capax secundum cognitionem habitualem quam secundum considerationem actualem, sicut in opponendo[^p311-3] monstratum est. Et ideo non solum in Angelis, verum etiam in anima Christi hoc verum est, quod plura cognoscit in habitu, quam consideret in actu; et ideo concedendum est, quod non omnia considerat in actu, quae habet in habitu, quantum ad ea quae non sunt de substantia gloriae. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

Ad ultimam tamen rationem potest responderi, ne det occasionem deviandi. Quod enim dicitur, quod intellectus simplex et finitus ad quod se convertit totaliter se convertit, non cogit, quia intellectus animae beatae et maxime animae Christi dilatatur per gratiam[^p311-4]; et quod plus est, in Verbo per unum et idem cognoscit distincte multa, et ideo intellectus glorificatus cognoscendo multa in Verbo non dividitur, sed unitur, quia non applicatur ad hoc, vel ad illud primo et immediate, sed mediante Verbo aeterno, quod, cum sit unum, ducit in multa cognoscenda. Aliae vero rationes, quae ad hanc partem inductae sunt, concedi possunt.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod in Beatis non sunt cogitationes[^p311-5] volubiles nec considerationes; dicendum, quod verbum illud intelligitur de his quae sunt de essentia gloriae, quia illa semper erunt in actuali cognitione atque consideratione; de his autem, quorum cognitio non est de essentia gloriae, non oportet habere veritatem. — Potest etiam aliter dici, quod volubilitas cogitationis duplex est: quaedam per inquisitionem et intimationem sive decursum[^p311-6], quo quis venit in cognitionem rei incognitae; et talis volubilitas non erit in Beatis. Est etiam alia volubilitas per transitum considerationis unius rei in considerationem alterius; et talis volubilitas non auferetur a Beatis. Augustini igitur auctoritas intelligitur de prima volubilitate, non de secunda ; et ideo tali auctoritate non potest concludi, quod anima beata quidquid cognoscit in habitu, cognoscat in actu.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gloria est habitus in actu; dicendum, quod[^p311-7] verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod omnis cognitio, quae est in gloria, sit in actu continuo, sed de illa solum, quae est de essentia gloriae; et quoniam multa cognoscit anima Christi in Verbo, et aliae animae, quae non sunt de essentia gloriae: hinc est, quod non oportet, ipsam omnia considerare in actu, quae novit in habitu.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus in actu est perfectior quam habitus praeter actum; dicendum, quod verum est, quando est in actu nobilissimo, qui debetur ipsi habitui; actus autem nobilissimus, qui debetur ipsi gloriae, est actualis consideratio summi veri, non autem actualis consideratio cuiuscumque veri creabilis vel creati[^p311-8]. Ideo ad hoc, quod anima Christi habeat habitum cognitionis perfectum, non oportet, quod actualiter consideret omne verum, sed sufficit, quod actu consideret verum summum.

<!-- page 312 -->

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit alia a Verbo etc. ; dicendum, quod illud verum est de cognitione quantum ad habitum, sed non est opportunum de cognitione quantum ad actum. Actualis enim cognitio et consideratio Verbi aeterni est ipsi gloriae essentialis, non sic autem actualis cognitio aliorum a Verbo; et ideo non oportet, quod sic alia consideret actualiter, secundum quod actualiter consideret ipsum Verbum, sed habitualiter. Habitus enim ille essentialiorem habet comparationem respectu Verbi, quod est cognitum principale, quam respectu aliorum cognitorum in Verbo, quae sunt cognita quasi ex consequenti et secundario.

english:
### Question II. *Whether Christ's soul actually knows in the Word all that it knows in habit.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul knows in the Word in act all that it knows in habit. And that it does, seems to be the case:

1. Because, according to what Augustine holds in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^p310-1], « in the Blessed there will be no fluctuating thoughts »: if therefore Christ's soul, among the other blessed souls, is the most blessed, it does not then have fluctuating thoughts : therefore if it once thinks or knows something in act, it always thinks or knows that thing : therefore whatever it thinks in habit, it knows in act.

2. Likewise, glory is a habit in act — for it is impossible that a man be blessed and at some time cease from the act of the divine vision[^p310-2] — if therefore the knowledge by which Christ's soul knows things in the Word is a glorious knowledge; it seems that that knowledge always has its habit joined to act : therefore whatever it knows in habit, it knows in act.

3. Likewise, a habit joined to act is more perfect than one separated, for the reason that act is the completion of a habit[^p310-3]; but Christ's soul knows things in the Word by a most perfect knowledge : therefore whatever it knows there in habit, it knows in act.

4. Likewise, by one and the same knowledge by which Christ's soul knows the Word itself, it knows things other than the Word[^p310-4]; but it knows nothing of the Word itself in habit which it does not know in act : therefore it knows nothing of other things in habit which it does not know in act.

**On the contrary:**

1. As the Philosopher holds[^p310-5]: « We know many things, but we understand one only »; and this is for no other reason than that *to know* (*scire*) names knowledge in habit, but *to understand* (*intelligere*) names it in act : therefore habit extends to more things than act by nature ; and if this is so, it is not necessary that in Christ habit be made equal to act : therefore it is not necessary that whatever Christ's soul knows in the Word in habit, it know in act.

2. Likewise, as Christ's soul's knowledge is perfect, so is its joy perfect; but Christ's soul does not rejoice in act over everything in which it rejoices in habit — for it rejoices over one sinner doing penance[^p310-6], although it did not actually rejoice in him when he was sinning — therefore by parity of reasoning it is not fitting that everything it knows in habit, it know in act.

3. Likewise, the actual consideration of things known in the Word is, in Christ, subject to the will : therefore it can now consider some[^p310-7] created thing which is not of the essence of glory, and now also not consider it : therefore if it has the habit of that thing, it is not necessary that the habit always be joined to act with respect to any knowable thing whatever.

4. Likewise, either Christ's soul actually considers everything the eternal Word is fitted to represent to it, or it does not. If it actually considers everything the eternal Word is fitted to represent to it; since those things are infinite, it seems that Christ's soul in considering passes in act through infinite things, which is impossible for a finite power[^p310-8]. If it does not actually consider everything the Word united to it is fitted to represent to it; then Christ's soul has some aptitude toward something with respect to which it is not always in act ; but its every aptitude is completed by the glorious habit : therefore it knows something in habit which it does not know in act.

5. Likewise, when something extends to infinite things, it is impossible that it be wholly in act, if act differs in it from potency ; but the habit of knowledge in Christ extends to infinite things : therefore it is impossible that everything it knows in habit, it know in act. The major is manifest, because, since the continuum is divisible to infinity, it is impossible that it be wholly divided in act[^p310-9]. The minor is proved by this, that Christ in the eternal Word knows that all the species of even number are divisible into two equal parts, and this he knows in habit of each of its species : if therefore the species of number are infinite, then he knows infinite things in habit.

6. Likewise, Christ's soul knows nothing in act upon which it does not actually turn itself ; but its intellect and gaze is simple and finite ; but a simple and finite thing turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself[^p311-1]: therefore if it actually turns itself to one thing, it is impossible that simultaneously and at once it actually turn itself to that which is disparate from it : therefore Christ's soul does not know in act all that it knows in habit.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul, as to those things which are essential to glory, knows in act all that it knows in habit, which is not necessary as to those things which are not essential to glory.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that Christ's blessed soul has knowledge of some things which are essential to glory, and of some which are not of the essence of glory. — If therefore we speak of the knowledge of those things which are essential to glory, I say that Christ's soul knows in act all that it knows in habit, because glory is a habit in act. Hence just as its soul cannot fail to be glorious, so it is impossible that the actual consideration of those things which are of the essence of glory be interrupted in it. — But if we speak of the knowledge of those things which are not essential to glory, then it is not necessary that all that it knows in habit, it know in act. — And a sign of this is that God, to the Blessed existing in glory, that is, to the holy Angels, reveals and shows in himself something anew which nevertheless he did not show before[^p311-2]. And therefore it is not repugnant to the state of glory to consider now something which was not considered before. — Nor is it repugnant to the perfection of the creature, since for a creature to be perfected is for its capacity to be filled ; but a creature is capable of more according to habitual knowledge than according to actual consideration, as was shown in the objections[^p311-3]. And therefore not only in the Angels, but also in Christ's soul this is true, that it knows more in habit than it considers in act; and therefore it must be conceded that it does not consider in act all that it has in habit, as to those things which are not of the substance of glory. — And the reasonings which make for this side are to be conceded.

To the last reasoning, however, an answer can be given, lest it give occasion for going astray. For what is said, that a simple and finite intellect turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself, does not compel the conclusion, because the intellect of a blessed soul, and most of all of Christ's soul, is dilated through grace[^p311-4]; and, what is more, in the Word, through one and the same thing, it knows many things distinctly, and therefore the glorified intellect, in knowing many things in the Word, is not divided but united, because it is not applied to this or that first and immediately, but by means of the eternal Word, which, since it is one, leads to many things to be known. The other reasonings, which were brought forward for this side, can be conceded.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary, that in the Blessed there are no fluctuating thoughts[^p311-5] or considerations; it must be said that that statement is to be understood of those things which are of the essence of glory, because those will always be in actual knowledge and consideration; but of those whose knowledge is not of the essence of glory, it is not necessary to have the truth in act. — It can also be said otherwise, that fluctuation of thought is twofold: one through inquiry and intimation or discursive course[^p311-6], by which one comes into the knowledge of an unknown thing; and such fluctuation will not be in the Blessed. There is also another fluctuation through the passage of consideration from one thing into the consideration of another; and such fluctuation will not be taken away from the Blessed. Augustine's authority therefore is understood of the first fluctuation, not of the second ; and therefore by that authority it cannot be concluded that a blessed soul knows in act whatever it knows in habit.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that glory is a habit in act; it must be said that[^p311-7] it is true; but from this it does not follow that all knowledge which is in glory is in continuous act, but only that which is of the essence of glory; and since Christ's soul knows many things in the Word, and other souls too, which are not of the essence of glory: hence it is that it is not necessary for it to consider in act all that it knows in habit.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that a habit in act is more perfect than a habit apart from act; it must be said that it is true, when it is in the noblest act, which is owed to that very habit; but the noblest act, which is owed to glory itself, is the actual consideration of the highest truth, not the actual consideration of any creatable or created truth whatever[^p311-8]. Therefore, for Christ's soul to have a perfect habit of knowledge, it is not necessary that it actually consider every truth, but it suffices that it actually consider the highest truth.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, it knows things other than the Word, etc. ; it must be said that this is true of the knowledge as to habit, but it is not fitting as to the knowledge in act. For the actual knowledge and consideration of the eternal Word is essential to glory itself, but not so the actual knowledge of things other than the Word; and therefore it is not necessary that it so consider other things actually, in the way it actually considers the Word itself, but rather habitually. For that habit has a more essential relation with respect to the Word, which is the principal thing known, than with respect to the other things known in the Word, which are known as it were consequently and secondarily.

la: Cap. 16. n. 26: *Fortassis etiam volubiles non erunt nostrae cogitationes ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus.* — In fine arg. pro *quidquid cogitat* cod. A *quidquid cognoscit.*

en: Ch. 16, n. 26: *Perhaps our thoughts too will not be fluctuating, going from some things to others and returning, but we shall see our whole knowledge in one simultaneous glance.* — At the end of the argument, for *whatever it thinks* codex A reads *whatever it knows.*

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 5. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 13. et X. c. 7. docet, animae felicitatem consistere in operatione, et quidem in optima.

en: Cf. IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, q. 5. Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 13, and X, c. 7, teaches that the soul's felicity consists in operation, and indeed in the best operation.

la: Aristot., VII. Ethic. c. 12, finem habitus reponit in operatione. Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 15. (VIII. c. 8.).

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* VII, c. 12, places the end of habit in operation. Cf. *Metaphysics* IX, text 15 (VIII, c. 8).

la: Vide quaest. praeced. — Mox pro *quod non* cod. Z *quin.*

en: See the preceding question. — Shortly after, for *which not* codex Z reads *but that.*

la: Libr. II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.). Cfr. supra pag. 114, nota 5. — Aliquanto inferius pro *et si hoc... parificetur actui* edd. perperam *sed... perficiatur ab actu.*

en: Book II of the *Topics*, c. 4 (c. 10). Cf. above p. 114, note 5. — Somewhat further down, for *and if this... be made equal to act* the editions wrongly read *but... be perfected by act.*

la: Codd. A K L Z aa bb *aliquod*, codd. T V *aliud.* In fine arg. pro *cuiuscumque* codd. I L Z aa *cuiuslibet.*

en: Codices A K L Z aa bb read *some* (*aliquod*), codices T V read *another* (*aliud*). At the end of the argument, for *of whatever* (*cuiuscumque*) codices I L Z aa read *of any* (*cuiuslibet*).

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *Si actu considerat* non pauci codd. *Si actu consideret.*

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for *If it actually considers* (indicative) not a few codices read *If it should actually consider* (subjunctive).

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 6. — De infinitate numeri cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 68. seqq. (c. 7.), et August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. — Circa finem arg. pro *sunt* codd. A G i L T Z aa *sint.*

en: See I Sent., d. 43, q. 3, ad 6. — On the infinity of number cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 68 ff. (c. 7), and Augustine, *City of God* XII, c. 18. — Near the end of the argument, for *are* (*sunt*, indicative) codices A G i L T Z aa read *should be* (*sint*, subjunctive).

la: Aristot., III. de Anima. text. 36. (c. 7.) ait: *Omnino autem intellectus, qui secundum actum intelligit, res ipsae est.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 36 (c. 7), says: *But in general the intellect, which understands according to act, is the things themselves.*

la: Vide etiam supra pag. 57, nota 7. Etiam S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 67. a. 5.) ait de Angelis: *Hac visione [in Verbo] cognoscunt mysteria gratiae, non quidem omnia, nec aequaliter omnes, sed secundum quod Deus voluerit eis revelare.*

en: See also above p. 57, note 7. St. Thomas too (Summa I, q. 67, a. 5) says of the Angels: *By this vision [in the Word] they know the mysteries of grace, not indeed all of them, nor all equally, but according as God has willed to reveal to them.*

la: Id est in fundamentis. — Mox pro *quod plura*, *quod habent* edd. cum aliquot codd., in aliis codd. *quum plura*; quae lectio explicari posset, si demonstrativum *hoc* referatur ad verba: *capacitatem impleri.* Nostra lectio congruentior est. Subinde pro *consideret* codd. I K T V z hii *considerat*, cod. N *cognoscat.*

en: That is, in the [foregoing] arguments [*in fundamentis*]. — Shortly, for *that more*, the editions with some codices read *that they have*, in other codices *since more*; which reading could be explained if the demonstrative *this* be referred to the words *its capacity be filled.* Our reading is more fitting. Then, for *it should consider* codices I K T V z hii read *it considers*, codex N *it knows.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 13. a. I. q. 3. ad 6. — Pro *gratiam* cod. *gloriam.* Paulo inferius pro *et ideo* edd. *et idem*; et circa finem solut. *cognoscibilia* pro *cognoscenda.*

en: Cf. above d. 13, a. I, q. 3, ad 6. — For *grace* one codex reads *glory.* A little below, for *and therefore* the editions read *and the same*; and near the end of the solution *knowable things* (*cognoscibilia*) for *things to be known* (*cognoscenda*).

la: Pro voce *cogitationes* codd. F H V Z et alii in hac solut. constanter exhibent vocem *cognitionis*, dum cod. aa ubique ponit vocem *cogitationis.*

en: For the word *thoughts* (*cogitationes*) codices F H V Z and others in this solution consistently exhibit the word *of knowledge* (*cognitionis*), while codex aa everywhere puts the word *of thought* (*cogitationis*).

la: Edd. *sive ratiocinationem et discursum.* Pro *intimationem* [*intimare* idem significat ac *demonstrare*, cfr. Du Cange, Glossar. etc.] cod. A *ratiocinationem.*

en: The editions read *or reasoning and discursive process.* For *intimation* [*intimare* means the same as *to demonstrate*, cf. Du Cange, *Glossary*, etc.] codex A reads *reasoning.*

la: Codd. F N U *quod hoc.*

en: Codices F N U read *that this.*

la: Pro *creabilis vel creati* edd. cum paucis codd. *causabilis vel causati.*

en: For *creatable or created* the editions with a few codices read *causable or caused.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione S. Bonav. nihil intendit nisi fundamentum iacere pro solvenda difficillima quaestione sequenti, et concludit, quod anima Christi (sicut omnes Beati) plura cognoscit in habitu, quam consideret in actu. Haec conclusio nititur principio philosophico in rebus naturalibus evidenti, quod « ad plura se extendit habitus quam actus », et quod intellectus creatus « plurium est capax secundum cognitionem habitualem quam secundum considerationem actualem ». Quoad statum gloriae tamen hoc principium valde restringendum est et minime valet quoad habitualem cognitionem primarii obiecti visionis beatificae, de qua communiter tenetur, quod « gloria est habitus in actu » (hic ad 2.) ; quoad secundarium vero obiectum S. Bonav. et Scotus conclusionem praedictam defendunt. Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 13. m. 5.), S. Thom. (cfr. tamen pag. 311, nota 2.) cum plurimis aliis ne hoc quidem admittunt (cfr. q. seq.). — Tria tantum hoc loco observamus.

    1. Vocabulum *habitus* vel *habitualiter* a S. Bonav. hic non sumitur pro qualitate vel habitu praedicamentali, ut videtur sensisse Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 14.), qui refellitur a Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 13. seqq.), sed sicut explicant ipse Bonav. et Scot. (ibi n. 20.), scilicet in hoc sensu, quod adest animae aliquid, quo informata constituitur in actu primo ad facile cognoscendum omnia quae Verbum cognoscit, dummodo illud ut speculum *voluntarium* revelare velit (cfr. infra q. 3. in corp. circa finem ; Mastrius in III. Sent. disp. 5. a. 2.). Unde plures Scotistae solent pro *habitualiter* dicere *quasi habitualiter*.

    2. S. Bonav. ideo praefert hanc positionem, ut explicet, quomodo cognitio se extendere possit successive ad infinita, ita ut non ponatur infinitas nec in potentia cognoscente nec in habitu seu lumine gloriae, sed solum in ratione cognoscendi visa ut obiecto primario, quod in se habet infinitas comparationes ad creaturas et res possibiles. Ab hoc obiecto primario specificatur talis visio, simulque et ex consequenti recipit aptitudinem extendendi se ad infinitos illos respectus sive obiecta, quae relucent in obiecto primario (cfr. hic solut. ad 4. et q. seq., praesertim ad 7. 8. 9.).

    3. Quae profunda et satis difficilis doctrina ut melius intelligatur, observamus, quod actus intellectus, qui in se dicit quid absolutum, connotando importat respectum sive relationem ad obiectum, qui quidem respectus, si est ad obiectum primarium, realiter identificatur cum ipso actu intelligendi. Hinc, mutato obiecto primario, alius requiritur actus ad illud intelligendum. Hanc variationem actus essentialem experimur in omnibus intellectus nostri actibus tendentibus in obiecta disparata, quorum unumquodque habet propriam suam rationem cognoscendi. — Aliter potest esse in visione beatifica, in qua unum obiectum visum est per se ratio cognoscendi et se et omnia alia. In obiecto quidem primario videndo, quod ipsum actum specificat, non potest esse variatio nec successio. Sicut autem ipsum obiectum primarium secundario exprimit omnem veritatem participatam, ita etiam intellectui illud clare videnti praebere potest fundamentum extendendi se ad obiectum secundarium, et hoc quidem absque novo habitu et vi eiusdem actus, qui secundum aptitudinem iam continet respectus omnes ad qualescumque veritates (hic ad ult. fundam.). Nec aliud requiritur ad actu eas cognoscendas, nisi ut addantur novae relationes ad obiecta secundaria. — Hinc auctor noster (hic ad 4.) concludit, quod alia sit comparatio habitus ad obiectum primarium, alia ad secundarium, et quod actus visionis aliter dependeat ab illo, aliter ab hoc: ab illo quidem essentialiter, ab hoc quasi per accidens « et ex consequenti ». — Porro in eadem visione isti respectus ad creata vel creabilia realiter distinguuntur ab ipso actu essentiali, qui per se respectu secundarii obiecti non nisi inchoatam quandam repraesentationem habet. Hinc intelligitur, tum quod idem actus videndi essentialem gloriam absque intrinseca sua variatione possit modo plura, modo pauciora obiecta praesentare, supposito, quod speculum illud increatum repraesentat voluntarie; tum quod extensio intellectus ad varia obiecta secundaria fiat vi eiusdem actus essentialis, ita ut variatio non sit ex parte ipsius actus, sed ex parte terminationis ad obiecta accidentalia gloriae.

**II.** Solus Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4, similem quaestionem specialem habet, scilicet, utrum anima Christi de novo possit actu videre aliquid in Verbo, et utramque sententiam tanquam probabilem defendit, ut etiam Scot., loc. cit. Alii in seq. quaest. plerumque rem tangunt.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In this question St. Bonaventure intends nothing but to lay a foundation for solving the most difficult following question, and concludes that Christ's soul (like all the Blessed) knows more in habit than it considers in act. This conclusion rests on a principle evident in natural things in philosophy, namely that « habit extends to more things than act », and that the created intellect « is capable of more according to habitual knowledge than according to actual consideration ». As regards the state of glory, however, this principle must be greatly restricted and is by no means valid as regards the habitual knowledge of the primary object of the beatific vision, of which it is commonly held that « glory is a habit in act » (here, in the reply to 2); but as regards the secondary object, St. Bonaventure and Scotus defend the aforesaid conclusion. But Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 13. m. 5.), St. Thomas (cf. however p. 311, note 2.), together with very many others, do not admit even this (cf. the following question). — We observe only three things in this place.

    1. The word *habit* or *habitually* is not taken here by St. Bonaventure for a quality or predicamental habit, as Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 5. q. 14.) seems to have understood, who is refuted by Scotus (here q. 2. n. 13. ff.), but, as Bonaventure himself and Scotus explain (there n. 20.), namely in this sense, that something is present to the soul by which, being informed, it is constituted in first act for easily knowing all that the Word knows, provided that the Word, as a *voluntary* mirror, wills to reveal it (cf. below q. 3. in the body, near the end ; Mastrius in III. Sent. disp. 5. a. 2.). Hence many Scotists are accustomed to say, in place of *habitually*, *quasi habitually*.

    2. St. Bonaventure therefore prefers this position, in order to explain how knowledge can extend itself successively to infinite things, in such a way that infinity is posited neither in the knowing power nor in the habit or light of glory, but only in the ground of knowing seen as primary object, which has in itself infinite relations to creatures and possible things. From this primary object such a vision is specified, and at the same time and consequently it receives an aptitude for extending itself to those infinite relations or objects which shine forth in the primary object (cf. here the reply to 4 and the following question, especially the replies to 7, 8, 9).

    3. That this profound and sufficiently difficult doctrine may be better understood, we observe that the act of the intellect, which in itself states something absolute, by connotation implies a respect or relation to an object, which respect, if it is to a primary object, is really identified with the act of understanding itself. Hence, when the primary object is changed, another act is required for understanding it. We experience this essential variation of act in all the acts of our intellect tending toward disparate objects, each of which has its own proper ground of knowing. — It can be otherwise in the beatific vision, in which one object seen is of itself the ground of knowing both itself and all other things. In seeing the primary object indeed, which specifies the act itself, there can be no variation nor succession. But just as the primary object itself secondarily expresses every participated truth, so also it can furnish to the intellect clearly seeing it a foundation for extending itself to a secondary object, and this indeed without a new habit and by the power of the same act, which according to its aptitude already contains all the respects to truths of whatever kind (here, the reply to the last argument). Nor is anything else required for knowing them in act, except that new relations to secondary objects be added. — Hence our author (here, in the reply to 4) concludes that the comparison of the habit to the primary object is one thing, and to the secondary another, and that the act of vision depends on the former in one way, on the latter in another: on the former essentially, on the latter as it were accidentally « and consequently ». — Further, in the same vision these respects to created or creatable things are really distinguished from the essential act itself, which of itself, with respect to the secondary object, has only a certain inchoate representation. Hence it is understood, both that the same act of seeing the essential glory, without any intrinsic variation of its own, can present now more, now fewer objects, granted that that uncreated mirror represents them voluntarily; and that the extension of the intellect to various secondary objects comes about by the power of the same essential act, so that the variation is not on the part of the act itself, but on the part of the termination to the accidental objects of glory.

**II.** Richard of Mediavilla alone, here a. 2. q. 4, has a similar special question, namely, whether Christ's soul can newly see something in the Word in act, and defends both opinions as probable, as also does Scotus, in the place cited. Others in the following question for the most part touch upon the matter.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p31{0,1,2}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` (Vol III PDF-priority inversion for two-column IA OCR), Left column top→bottom then Right column, body then footers. Raw OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines **21757–21941**) used as base for clean prose and footnote-marker spacing. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Editorial marginal glosses bleeding into the OCR (*Ad opposi-tum*, *Fundamenta*, *Duplex obiectum visionis*, *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Non repugnat statui gloriae*, *Non perfectioni creaturae*, *Notandum*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Alia solutio*, etc.) trimmed out as Quaracchi side-notes, not Bonaventure's text.

**Printed pages / page-split map.**
- **p.310** (PDF 332): QUAESTIO II title + the *pro* arguments 1–4, *Sed contra* 1–6 (arg 6 wraps to p.311). Footers **1–9** → `[^p310-1]`–`[^p310-9]`.
- **p.311** (PDF 333): tail of *Sed contra* 6, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, replies *Ad 1–3* (Ad 4 wraps to p.312). Footers **1–8** → `[^p311-1]`–`[^p311-8]`.
- **p.312** (PDF 334): reply *Ad 4*, then the SCHOLION (§I with three sub-notes + §II). q3 (QUAESTIO III) opens at the foot of this page across both columns. **The two p.312 footers (nn.1–2) anchor q3's opener (`sic¹`, `Ioannis tertio²`), NOT q2 body — they FORWARD to a2-q3 and are not rendered here.** The SCHOLION carries no numbered apparatus.

Running heads confirmed eyes-on against the bands (never OCR'd digits): p.310 `310 SENTENTIARUM [LIB. III.]`; p.311 L `DIST. XIV. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` + R `QUAEST. II. 311`; p.312 `312 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`

**Scholion status.** `has_scholion: true`. **This corrects the hand-off prediction** (from a2-q1, which expected `has_scholion: false`): the raw + PDF bands print q2's **own** SCHOLION I–II on p.312 («In hac quaestione S. Bonav. nihil intendit nisi fundamentum iacere pro solvenda difficillima quaestione sequenti…»), §I with three numbered sub-observations + §II (Richard of Mediavilla parallel). This is distinct from, and additional to, **a2-q1's forward-looking Scholion §II** («Pro intelligentia duarum seqq. quaestionum») which prepares q2 AND q3 from within a2-q1; both coexist. The q2 Scholion carries no numbered apparatus.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up* — NONE. a2-q1 consumed all p.309 footers; q2 opens a fresh p.310 footer sequence (verified: q2's first body footer = p.310 n.1).
- *Forwarded to a2-q3* — **p.312 footers 1 and 2** (footer 1 = `Edd. cum multis codd. perperam et ideo non sic oportet…` anchoring q3's `sic¹`; footer 2 = `Vers. 34. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.` anchoring q3's `Ioannis tertio²`). q2 holds NO p.312 footer.

**`[?]` flags.** None — region fully legible at 450 dpi; Respondeo/Solutio + all footers re-set column-by-column from the PDF bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0