title: Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 216 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum latria sit virtus cardinalis, vel theologica.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica. Et quod theologica, videtur.

1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Augustinus, decimi *de Civitate Dei* capitulo tertio[^1]: « Sacrificamus Deo hostiam humilitatis et laudis in ara cordis igne fervidae caritatis ». Et post: « Hic est Dei cultus, haec vera religio, haec recta pietas et tantum Deo debita servitus »: ergo videtur, quod si haec omnia circumloquuntur latriam, nihil aliud est latria quam ipsa caritas: ergo latria est virtus theologica.

2. Item, Augustinus, decimo quarto *de Trinitate*[^2]: « Sapientia vera est verus ac praecipuus Dei cultus, quae uno nomine Graece *theosebia* appellatur, quod nomen nostri *pietatem* dixerunt, cum *pietas* apud Graecos usitatius *eusebia* nuncupetur ». Sed *latria*, ut dicit Augustinus decimo *de Civitate Dei*, non est aliud quam *theosebia*, et *theosebia* non est aliud quam *sapientia*; *sapientia* autem se tenet ex parte virtutum theologicarum, non cardinalium: ergo et ipsa latria.

3. Item, latria est virtus, per quam Deus colitur eo cultu, qui est adoratio; sed virtus dictans nobis, Deum esse adorandum, est ipsa fides, vel etiam caritas: quia, sicut dicit Rabanus *super Genesim*[^3], « adorare est eum qui adorandus est tota mentis intentione quaerere »: ergo videtur, quod latria sit virtus theologica, scilicet fides, vel caritas.

4. Item, in latria est impletio primi praecepti;

<!-- page 217 -->

sed praecepta primae tabulae implentur virtutibus theologicis[^4], sicut patet de secundo, quod impletur per fidem, et de tertio, quod impletur per caritatem: ergo videtur, quod si primum impletur per latriam, quod sit virtus theologica.

5. Item, haec est differentia inter virtutes cardinales et theologicas, quod cardinales consistunt in medio circa superfluum et diminutum[^5], in theologicis autem non est reperire superfluum; sed circa latriam, qua est Deum colere, non est superfluum invenire: ergo videtur, quod latria non sit in genere virtutum cardinalium, sed theologicarum.

6. Item, virtus theologica dicitur, quia habet Deum pro obiecto; sed latria habet Deum pro obiecto — sicut enim fides credit primam veritatem, et caritas diligit summam bonitatem, sic latria reveretur et colit summam maiestatem — videtur igitur, quod latria sit virtus theologica.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) « Religio est virtus, qua colitur ille qui est superioris naturae », sicut vult Augustinus decimo *de Civitate Dei*, et Tullius in secundo *Rhetoricae*[^6]; sed religio est species iustitiae, ut dicit Tullius ibidem, et iustitia est virtus cardinalis: si ergo latria continetur sub specie religionis, latria est de genere virtutis cardinalis.

2. Item, sicut obedientia respicit debitum mandati, sic latria respicit debitum honoris divini, « est enim latria cultus Deo debitus[^7] »; sed obedientia, quia respicit debitum praecepti, est virtus cardinalis contenta sub debita iustitia, non theologica: ergo pari ratione et ipsa latria.

3. Item, nullius virtutis theologicae actus cadit sub coactione — credere enim non potest quis non volens[^8] — sed actus latriae cadit sub coactione, ut adorare et thura ponere: ergo latria non continetur sub genere virtutis theologicae.

4. Item, omnis virtus theologica vel est fides, vel spes, vel caritas; sed latria non est fides, pro eo quod non considerat summam veritatem secundum se; nec caritas, quia non considerat summam bonitatem, sed magis summam maiestatem; nec spes, hoc constat: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Latria, proprie dicta, est virtus cardinalis, in genere propinquo iustitiae et proximo religionis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod licet latria notificetur per cultum, sive per servitutem, ut dicatur latria esse[^9] servitus, sive cultus Deo debitus, et ista duo quasi pro eodem accipiantur; differunt tamen secundum propriam acceptionem. (*Differunt cultus et servitus.*) Cultus enim Dei respicit actum interiorem et exteriorem, et magis interiorem quam exteriorem; servitus vero proprie respicit actum exteriorem. Et ideo cum latria de ratione sui vocabuli idem sit quod servitus, secundum quod exponit Augustinus in libro *de Trinitate*[^10], latria proprie respicit actum exteriorem (*Quid sit latria*); *theosebia* vero, vel *eusebia* idem est quod cultus divinus, sive bonus cultus, et ideo proprie respicit actum interiorem. Et quoniam virtus, quae respicit actum exteriorem, versatur quodam modo circa actionem et est in genere virtutis cardinalis[^11]; hinc est, quod latria est virtus cardinalis (*Conclusio 1*). Et quia considerat actum exteriorem sub ratione debiti et in comparatione ad alterum, et hoc est ipsius iustitiae; ideo latria continetur sub virtute cardinali, quae quidem est iustitia (*Conclusio 2*). — Rursus, quia species iustitiae, secundum quam ordinatur[^12] ad venerandam naturam superiorem, est ipsa religio, sicut dicit Tullius; hinc est, quod latria non solum est in genere virtutis tanquam in genere remoto, sed in genere virtutis cardinalis tanquam in genere subalterno; in genere vero iustitiae, sicut in genere propinquo: in genere vero religionis, sicut in genere proximo (*Conclusio 3, generalis*).

Et hoc est quod innuit Augustinus *de Civitate* (*Confirmatur*)

<!-- page 218 -->

*Dei* decimi capitulo primo[^13], ubi dicit, quod idem est apud Graecos *latria*, quod apud nos *religio*, excepto quod nomen religionis est in plus. Unde (*Corollaria*) ibidem dicit, quod cultus Deo debitus quatuor nominibus nuncupatur: duobus apud Graecos, et duobus apud nos. Apud Graecos namque dicitur *latria* et *theosebia* sive[^14] *eusebia*. Apud nos vero dicitur *pietas* et *religio*, ita quod ista duo nomina respondent illis duobus, licet quodam modo sint in plus quantum ad modum consuetum. — Differunt autem *latria* et *theosebia* secundum propriam acceptionem, licet aliquando accipiantur pro eodem, quia *theosebia* dicit cultum interiorem, qui proprie spectat ad virtutes theologicas, sed *latria* servitutem exteriorem, quae spectat ad iustitiam, scilicet virtutem cardinalem. — Concedendum est ergo, latriam esse virtutem cardinalem. Concedenda sunt etiam argumenta hoc probantia.

**Ad argumenta pro parte theologica:**

(*Solutio oppositorum.*) *Ad 1, 2.* Ad duas autem auctoritates Augustini patet responsio per iam dicta. Cum enim dicit Augustinus, quod cultus Deo debitus est ipsa dilectio, vel sapientia, loquitur de cultu interiori; cum autem dicimus, latriam esse cultum, intelligimus de cultu exteriori, nisi[^15] vocabulo abutimur. Et hoc patet per oppositum, quia non dicitur idololatra, qui credit, idolum esse Deum, vel amat ipsum sicut Deum, sed infidelis. Tunc autem dicitur idololatrare, cum exterius colit; et sic per oppositum intelligimus in proposito.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus, per quam adoratur Deus, est fides et caritas; dicendum, quod sicut est cultus interior et exterior, sic et adoratio interior et exterior. (*Adoratio interna et externa.*) « Adorare interius est tota mente in Deum tendere », sicut dicit Rabanus[^1b]; adorare exterius est aliquam reverentiam corporaliter exhibere. Cum ergo dicitur, quod per fidem et caritatem adoratur Deus; dicendum, quod verum est de adoratione interiori, quae incipit in fide et terminatur in caritate, sed non habet veritatem de adoratione exteriori, quae ortum habet a virtute cardinali. Et si tu obiicias: tam fides quam caritas dictat tam interius quam exterius adorandum; (*Notandum.*) dicendum breviter, quod aliquis actus potest esse alicuius virtutis multipliciter: aut sicut imperantis, aut sicut elicientis. Licet autem exterior adoratio sit ipsius fidei et caritatis sicut imperantis, et maxime fidei, quae dictat Deum adorandum; alterius tamen est ut elicientis, scilicet latriae, quae, quoniam elicit actum sub ratione debiti, ideo continetur sub iustitia, quae est virtus cardinalis[^5b].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impletio primi praecepti spectat ad virtutem theologicam, sicut impletio secundi; dicendum, quod impletio secundi, videlicet: *Non assumas tibi nomen Dei tui in vanum*[^6b] (*Notandum*), quantum ad actum exteriorem est virtutis cardinalis, quantum ad actum interiorem impletur virtute theologica, quae quidem est fides. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in primo praecepto; et quia per latriam impletur per actum exteriorem, ideo non necesse est, eam esse virtutem theologicam.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circa actum latriae non consistit superfluum, vel diminutum; responderi potest, quod falsum est, quia, licet quantum ad actum interiorem non contingat excedere in colendo Deum; tamen quantum ad actum exteriorem et modum contingit reperire excessum, utpote sicut si aliquis sacerdos vellet decem Missas in uno die cantare ad laudem Dei, non servaret modum.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod latria habet obiectum Deum; (*Notandum.*) dicendum, quod si[^8b] latria habeat obiectum Deum, aliquo modo tamen cum hoc respicit aliquod creatum. Unde sicut obedientia, qua quis obedit Deo, respicit ipsum Deum, ut cui obediendum est, ipsum autem mandatum et eius obligationem respicit sicut illud quod implendum est; sic et ipsa latria respicit Deum, ut[^9b] cui honor exhibendus est; respicit etiam cultum exteriorem exhibendum; respicit etiam rationem exhibendi, videlicet rationem debiti; et haec est quasi ratio formalis ipsius et est quid creatum. Hinc est, quod cum virtus ponatur in specie, vel in genere formali ex parte obiecti, quod habet rationem formalis et motivi; quod[^10b] latria est in genere virtutis cardinalis, sicut obedientia. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod virtus theologica est illa quae respicit obiectum increatum; dicendum, quod obiectum principale virtutis theologicae non est aliquid creatum, sed est bonum increatum sub conditionibus increatis, quae

<!-- page 219 -->

quidem sunt summa bonitas et summa veritas[^1c]. Hoc autem non est reperire in proposito; et ideo non tenet ratio illa.

Haec autem dicta sunt de latria, secundum quod proprie accipitur pro habitu dirigente ad cultum exteriorem, qui proprie dicitur servitus Dei et adoratio. (*De latria non proprie dicta.*) Et hoc modo non est idem latria et theosebia, ut a principio dictum est. Si autem latria dicatur cultus interior, cum ille consistat in credendo et diligendo et sperando Deum, sicut dicit Augustinus in *Enchiridio*[^2c]; sic non ponitur esse virtus cardinalis, sed theologica, non, inquam, ab aliis distincta, sed consequens ad omnes illas. Sed hoc modo non accipitur ita proprie, sicut modo praedicto, cum latria, proprie loquendo, sit species religionis, sicut dulia; et nomen eius impositum fuit a servitute, sicut dictum fuit a principio. (*Notandum.*) Utroque tamen modo contingit reperiri eam dici, et secundum hoc doctorum positiones diversificari, ut quidam ponunt[^3c] eam speciem virtutis cardinalis, scilicet iustitiae, quidam vero tres theologicas circumplecti. Et utrumque vere potest dici sine contrarietate propter diversum modum accipiendi[^4c].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether latria is a cardinal virtue, or a theological one.*

Thirdly it is asked whether latria is a cardinal virtue, or a theological one. And that it is theological seems [to be the case].

1. (*To the opposite.*) Augustine, *On the City of God*, book ten, chapter three[^1]: "We sacrifice to God a victim of humility and of praise upon the altar of the heart, in the fire of fervent charity." And afterward: "This is the worship of God, this is true religion, this is right piety and the service owed to God alone": therefore it seems that, if all these phrases circumscribe latria, latria is nothing other than charity itself: therefore latria is a theological virtue.

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book fourteen[^2]: "True wisdom is the true and chief worship of God, which by one name in Greek is called *theosebia*, which name our [writers] rendered *piety*, although among the Greeks *piety* is more usually called *eusebia*." But *latria*, as Augustine says in the tenth [book] *On the City of God*, is nothing other than *theosebia*, and *theosebia* is nothing other than *wisdom*; but *wisdom* belongs on the side of the theological virtues, not the cardinal ones: therefore latria too [does].

3. Likewise, latria is a virtue by which God is worshipped with that worship which is adoration; but the virtue dictating to us that God is to be adored is faith itself, or even charity: for, as Rabanus says *on Genesis*[^3], "to adore is to seek with the whole intention of the mind him who is to be adored": therefore it seems that latria is a theological virtue, namely faith, or charity.

4. Likewise, in latria there is the fulfillment of the first precept; but the precepts of the first tablet are fulfilled by the theological virtues[^4], as is clear concerning the second, which is fulfilled by faith, and concerning the third, which is fulfilled by charity: therefore it seems that, if the first is fulfilled by latria, it is a theological virtue.

5. Likewise, this is the difference between the cardinal and the theological virtues, that the cardinal ones consist in a mean concerning the excessive and the deficient[^5], whereas in the theological ones no excess is to be found; but concerning latria, which is to worship God, no excess is to be found: therefore it seems that latria is not in the genus of the cardinal virtues, but of the theological ones.

6. Likewise, a virtue is called theological because it has God for its object; but latria has God for its object — for just as faith believes the first truth, and charity loves the highest goodness, so latria reveres and worships the highest majesty — therefore it seems that latria is a theological virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*The grounds.*) "Religion is the virtue by which he who is of a higher nature is worshipped," as Augustine holds in the tenth [book] *On the City of God*, and Tully in the second [book] of the *Rhetoric*[^6]; but religion is a species of justice, as Tully says in the same place, and justice is a cardinal virtue: if therefore latria is contained under the species of religion, latria is of the genus of cardinal virtue.

2. Likewise, just as obedience regards the debt of a command, so latria regards the debt of divine honor, "for latria is the worship owed to God[^7]"; but obedience, because it regards the debt of a precept, is a cardinal virtue contained under owed justice, not a theological one: therefore by parity of reasoning latria too [is].

3. Likewise, the act of no theological virtue falls under compulsion — for no one can believe unwillingly[^8] — but the act of latria falls under compulsion, such as to adore and to offer incense: therefore latria is not contained under the genus of theological virtue.

4. Likewise, every theological virtue is either faith, or hope, or charity; but latria is not faith, because it does not consider the highest truth in itself; nor charity, because it does not consider the highest goodness, but rather the highest majesty; nor hope, this is established: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Latria, properly speaking, is a cardinal virtue, in the proximate genus of justice and the nearest genus of religion.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, although latria is made known through worship, or through service — so that latria is said to be[^9] service, or the worship owed to God, and these two are taken as though for the same thing — nevertheless they differ according to their proper acceptation. (*Worship and service differ.*) For the worship of God regards the interior and the exterior act, and more the interior than the exterior; but service properly regards the exterior act. And therefore, since latria, by the very meaning of its word, is the same as service, according as Augustine explains in the book *On the Trinity*[^10], latria properly regards the exterior act (*What latria is*); but *theosebia*, or *eusebia*, is the same as divine worship, or good worship, and therefore properly regards the interior act. And since a virtue that regards the exterior act is concerned in a certain way with action and is in the genus of cardinal virtue[^11]; hence it is that latria is a cardinal virtue (*Conclusion 1*). And because it considers the exterior act under the account of what is owed and in comparison to another, and this belongs to justice itself; therefore latria is contained under a cardinal virtue, which indeed is justice (*Conclusion 2*). — Again, because the species of justice according to which one is ordered[^12] to venerating a higher nature is religion itself, as Tully says; hence it is that latria is not only in the genus of virtue as in a remote genus, but in the genus of cardinal virtue as in a subaltern genus; in the genus of justice, as in a proximate genus; and in the genus of religion, as in the nearest genus (*Conclusion 3, general*).

And this is what Augustine intimates *On the City of* (*Confirmed*)

*God*, book ten, chapter one[^13], where he says that *latria* among the Greeks is the same as *religion* among us, except that the name "religion" is wider in extent. Hence (*Corollaries*) in the same place he says that the worship owed to God is named by four names: two among the Greeks, and two among us. For among the Greeks it is called *latria* and *theosebia* or[^14] *eusebia*. But among us it is called *piety* and *religion*, so that these two names correspond to those two, although in a certain way they are wider in extent as to customary usage. — But *latria* and *theosebia* differ according to their proper acceptation, although sometimes they are taken for the same thing, because *theosebia* signifies interior worship, which properly pertains to the theological virtues, but *latria* exterior service, which pertains to justice, namely the cardinal virtue. — It must therefore be conceded that latria is a cardinal virtue. The arguments proving this must also be conceded.

**To the arguments for the theological side:**

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) *To 1, 2.* To the two authorities of Augustine the response is clear from what has already been said. For when Augustine says that the worship owed to God is love itself, or wisdom, he is speaking of interior worship; but when we say that latria is worship, we understand it of exterior worship, unless[^15] we are misusing the word. And this is clear by the opposite, because one who believes an idol to be God, or loves it as God, is not called an idolater, but an unbeliever. But one is said to commit idolatry when he worships exteriorly; and so by the opposite we understand it in the matter at hand.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the virtue by which God is adored is faith and charity; it must be said that just as there is interior and exterior worship, so also there is interior and exterior adoration. (*Interior and exterior adoration.*) "To adore interiorly is to tend toward God with the whole mind," as Rabanus says[^1b]; to adore exteriorly is to render some reverence bodily. When therefore it is said that God is adored by faith and charity; it must be said that this is true of interior adoration, which begins in faith and is terminated in charity, but it does not hold true of exterior adoration, which has its origin from a cardinal virtue. And if you object: both faith and charity dictate adoring both interiorly and exteriorly; (*Note.*) it must be said briefly that an act can belong to some virtue in many ways: either as commanding, or as eliciting. Now although exterior adoration belongs to faith and charity as commanding, and especially to faith, which dictates that God is to be adored; yet it belongs to another as eliciting, namely to latria, which, since it elicits an act under the account of what is owed, is therefore contained under justice, which is a cardinal virtue[^5b].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the fulfillment of the first precept pertains to a theological virtue, just as the fulfillment of the second; it must be said that the fulfillment of the second, namely: *Thou shalt not take to thyself the name of the Lord thy God in vain*[^6b] (*Note*), as to the exterior act belongs to a cardinal virtue, and as to the interior act is fulfilled by a theological virtue, which indeed is faith. In this way it is to be understood in the first precept; and because by latria [it] is fulfilled through the exterior act, therefore it is not necessary that it be a theological virtue.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that concerning the act of latria there is no excess, or defect; it can be answered that this is false, because, although as to the interior act it does not happen that one exceed in worshipping God, nevertheless as to the exterior act and manner it does happen that excess is found, as for instance if some priest wished to sing ten Masses in one day to the praise of God, he would not observe due measure.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that latria has God for its object; (*Note.*) it must be said that, even if[^8b] latria has God for its object, nevertheless in some way along with this it regards something created. Hence just as obedience, by which one obeys God, regards God himself, as the one to be obeyed, but regards the command itself and its obligation as that which is to be fulfilled; so also latria itself regards God, as[^9b] the one to whom honor is to be shown; it also regards the exterior worship to be shown; it also regards the account of showing [it], namely the account of what is owed; and this is, as it were, its formal account and is something created. Hence it is that, since a virtue is placed in a species, or in a formal genus, on the part of the object which has the character of the formal and motive element; [it follows] that[^10b] latria is in the genus of cardinal virtue, like obedience. — As for what is objected, that a theological virtue is that which regards an uncreated object; it must be said that the principal object of a theological virtue is not something created, but is the uncreated good under uncreated conditions, which

indeed are the highest goodness and the highest truth[^1c]. But this is not to be found in the matter at hand; and therefore that argument does not hold.

Now these things have been said of latria according as it is properly taken for the habit directing toward exterior worship, which is properly called the service of God and adoration. (*On latria not properly so called.*) And in this way latria and theosebia are not the same, as was said from the beginning. But if latria is said [to be] interior worship, since that consists in believing and loving and hoping in God, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^2c]; so it is not held to be a cardinal virtue, but a theological one — not, I say, distinct from the others, but consequent upon all of them. But in this way it is not taken so properly as in the aforesaid way, since latria, properly speaking, is a species of religion, like dulia; and its name was imposed from service, as was said from the beginning. (*Note.*) Yet in both ways it happens that it is found to be spoken of, and according to this the positions of the doctors are diversified, so that some place[^3c] it [as] a species of cardinal virtue, namely of justice, while others [hold it to] embrace the three theological [virtues]. And both can truly be said without contradiction on account of the different manner of taking [the term][^4c].

---

la: *Num. 2.* (alias c. 4.) [X. de Civ. Dei]. — Vat. addit *ibi ab Augustino*; cfr. supra pag. 99, nota 7.

en: [On the City of God, bk. X] no. 2 (otherwise c. 4). — The Vatican edition adds *there, by Augustine*; cf. above, p. 99, note 7.

la: Cap. I. n. I. — De altero Augusl. testimonio, quod habetur X. de Civ. Dei, c. I. n. 3, vide supra pag. 213, nota 9; de tertio Enchirid. c. I. n. I. et XIV. de Trin. c. I. n. I.

en: [On the Trinity, bk. XIV] c. 1, n. 1. — On the other testimony of Augustine, which is found in *On the City of God* X, c. 1, n. 3, see above, p. 213, note 9; on the third [testimony, from the] *Enchiridion* c. 1, n. 1, and *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 1, n. 1.

la: Libr. III. Comment. in Gen. (23, 7.) c. 4. Rabanus dicit tantum, latriam esse servitutem, quae soli Deo debeatur. Sed VIII. Enarrat. in Epist. ad Rom. c. 15, Origenem secutus (X. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. 15, 30. n. 15), de oratione (quae spectat ad adorationem) ait: « Et ideo agon magnus est orationis, ut obsistentibus inimicis et orantis sensum in diversa rapientibus, fixa semper ad Deum mens stabili intentione contendat, ut merito possit etiam ipse dicere: Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi » (II. Tim. 4, 7.). Et XXIII. in I. Epist. ad Tim. c. 2. ait: « Oramus, cum... spondemus, nos... tota cordis intentione Domino servituros ». Tum propter ipsam obiectionem hic propositam, tum propter solutionem, quae infra habetur, adiungenda duximus quae idem Rabanus in I. Comment. in libr. Iudic. c. 7. profert, ubi observato, quod nos vocati simus non ad hoc, ut serviamus peccato et iterum flectamus genua diabolo, sed ut flectamus genua in nomine Iesu (Phil. 2, 10.) et ad Patrem Domini nostri Iesu Christi (Eph. 3, 14.), sic prosequitur: « Sed et quid mihi prodest, si genua corporis mei ad orationem veniens flectam Deo, et genua cordis mei flectam diabolo? Si enim non stetero firmus adversum astutias diaboli, flexi genua mea diabolo... Non igitur putemus, quod videamur simulacra non colere, propterea haec non etiam ad nostrorum aliquos pertinere. Unusquisque quod prae ceteris colit, quod super omnia miratur et diligit, hoc ei Deus est. Denique hoc est quod ante omnia et super omnia per mandatum suum Deus deposcit ab homine: Diliges, inquit, Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, et ex tota anima tua, et ex totis viribus tuis (Deuter. 6, 5.), praeoccupare quodam modo erga se cupiens totos humanae mentis affectus, et sciens, quia quod ex toto dilexerit quis et ex tota anima atque ex totis viribus, hoc ei Deus est. Cfr. I. Enarrat. in Epist. ad Rom. c. 1, 9; VIII. c. 14.

en: Bk. III, *Commentary on Genesis* (23, 7), c. 4. Rabanus says only that latria is the service owed to God alone. But in *Enarrationes on the Epistle to the Romans* VIII, c. 15, following Origen (*Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* X, 15, 30, n. 15), he says of prayer (which pertains to adoration): "And therefore the contest of prayer is great, so that, with enemies resisting and snatching the sense of the one praying off into diverse things, the mind, fixed ever upon God with steadfast intention, may strive, so that it may deservedly say even itself: I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course" (2 Tim. 4, 7). And in *Commentary on 1 Timothy* XXIII, c. 2, he says: "We pray, when... we promise that we... will serve the Lord with the whole intention of the heart." Both on account of the very objection here proposed, and on account of the solution which is given below, we have judged it proper to add what the same Rabanus brings forward in *Commentary on the Book of Judges* I, c. 7, where, having observed that we have been called not to this — that we should serve sin and again bend the knee to the devil — but that we should bend the knee in the name of Jesus (Phil. 2, 10) and to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (Eph. 3, 14), he continues thus: "But what does it profit me, if, coming to prayer, I bend the knees of my body to God, and bend the knees of my heart to the devil? For if I do not stand firm against the wiles of the devil, I have bent my knees to the devil... Let us not therefore think that, because we seem not to worship images, these things do not also pertain to some of us. Whatever each one worships above the rest, whatever he admires and loves above all things, that is his god. Finally, this is what God before all and above all things demands of man by his command: Thou shalt love, he says, the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength (Deut. 6, 5), desiring in a certain way to lay claim beforehand to all the affections of the human mind, and knowing that whatever a man has loved with his whole [heart] and with his whole soul and with all his strength, that is his god. Cf. *Enarrationes on the Epistle to the Romans* I, c. 1, 9; VIII, c. 14.

la: 1. et XIX. in Epist. ad Phil. c. 3, 3. — Hadrian. I. in Epist. ad Carolum Magnum pro Nicaena synodo pluries allegat Epist. 52. (alias 54.) Gregor. M. ad Secundinum, in cuius fine agitur de adoratione imaginum: Unde valde nobis tua postulatio placuit, quia illum toto corde, tota intentione quaeris, cuius imaginem prae oculis habere desideras... illum adoramus, quem per imaginem aut natum, aut passum... recordamur. — Pro adorare est eum edd. cum nonnullis codd. adorare est Deum.

en: [Cf.] 1 and XIX, *on the Epistle to the Philippians* c. 3, 3. — Hadrian I, in the *Letter to Charlemagne* on behalf of the Council of Nicaea, repeatedly cites Letter 52 (otherwise 54) of Gregory the Great to Secundinus, at the end of which the adoration of images is treated: "Hence your request greatly pleased us, because you seek with whole heart, with whole intention, him whose image you desire to have before your eyes... we adore him whom, through the image, we remember as born, or as having suffered." — For *to adore is him* the editions, with some codices, read *to adore is God*.

la: Ut docet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. cfr. infra d. 26. a. I. q. 3. — Mox pro qua est edd. quae est.

en: As Aristotle teaches, *Ethics* II, c. 6; cf. below, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3. — Shortly after, for *which is* (qua est) the editions [read] *which is* (quae est).

la: Cap. 54: Iustitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate conservata, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem... Natura ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam innata vis inseruit, ut religionem, pietatem... Religio est quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert. — Idem dicit Augusl., loc. cit. c. I. n. I. et 3. et c. 3. n. 2, Deum verum respici.

en: [Rhetoric II] c. 54: "Justice is a habit of mind, the common good being preserved, assigning to each his own dignity... Natural right is that which not opinion has begotten, but a certain innate force has implanted, such as religion, piety... Religion is that which brings care and ceremony toward a certain higher nature which they call divine." — Augustine says the same, in the place cited, c. 1, n. 1 and 3, and c. 3, n. 2, that the true God is regarded.

la: Secundum Augusl., X. de Civ. Dei, c. I. n. 2. Libr. II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 21. n. 35. idem s. Doctor dicit, primos parentes Deo serviisse « pietate obedientiae, qua una colitur Deus ». — Pro mandati Vat. substituit mandatum. Mox pro quia codd. lv U exhibent quae, et subinde voci praecepti solus cod. U praemittit mandati vel.

en: According to Augustine, *On the City of God* X, c. 1, n. 2. In *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* II, c. 21, n. 35, the same holy Doctor says that the first parents served God "by the piety of obedience, by which alone God is worshipped." — For *of a command* (mandati) the Vatican edition substitutes *a command* (mandatum). Shortly after, for *because* (quia) the codices lv U present *which* (quae), and then to the word *precept* codex U alone prefixes *of a command* (mandati) or.

la: Augusl., I. Retract. c. 23. n. 3: Utrumque [credere et velle] nostrum [est], quia non fit, nisi volentibus nobis. — Pro non volens codd. U (K o secunda manu) nisi volens, cod. bb nolens.

en: Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 23, n. 3: "Each [to believe and to will] is ours, because it does not happen unless we are willing." — For *not willing* the codices U (K, by a second hand) [read] *unless willing*, codex bb *unwilling*.

la: Multi codd. *est*. Post *Respondeo* codd. A T bb addunt *dicendum*.

en: Many codices [read] *is*. After *I respond* the codices A T bb add *it must be said*.

la: Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13. Cfr. XV. contra Faustum, c. 9. et supra pag. 200, nota 2.

en: [On the Trinity] bk. I, c. 6, n. 13. Cf. *Against Faustus* XV, c. 9, and above, p. 200, note 2.

la: Vide supra q. I. fundam. et infra d. 33. q. I. ad 1. Ibid. dub. I. agitur de iustitia. Augusl., de Natura et gratia, contra Pelag. c. 62. n. 72 ex Pelagii libro affert hanc Hilarii sententiam: Deum autem colere iustitiae proprium officium est.

en: See above, q. 1, the grounds, and below, d. 33, q. 1, to 1. In the same place, dub. 1, justice is treated. Augustine, *On Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians* c. 62, n. 72, brings forward from Pelagius's book this sentence of Hilary: "But to worship God is the proper office of justice."

la: Edd. *secundum quod*. Subinde post *ordinatur* cod. Q supplet *homo*.

en: The editions [read] *according as*. Then after *is ordered* codex Q supplies *man*.

la: Num. 3: Nam et ipsa religio quamvis distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare videatur... tamen, quia Latina loquendi consuetudine non imperitorum, verum etiam doctissimorum et cognationibus humanis atque affinitatibus et quibusque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio, non eo vocabulo vitatur ambiguum, cum de cultu deitatis vertitur quaestio etc.

en: [X. de Civ. Dei, c. 1] n. 3: "For although religion itself seems more distinctly to signify not just any [worship], but the worship of God... nevertheless, because in the Latin manner of speaking, not of the unlearned, but indeed of the most learned, religion is said to be owed to human kinships and affinities and to any close ties whatever, the ambiguity is not avoided by that word when the question turns on the worship of the deity," etc.

la: Pro *sive* codd. G L N T V X *sicut*.

en: For *or* (sive) the codices G L N T V X [read] *just as* (sicut).

la: Pro *nisi* codd. A I K L N T aa et edd. 1, 2 *ubi*, Vat. *nec*; nostram lectionem habent codd. E G I l U V X Z bb. Mox pro *qui credit* edd. et nonnulli codd. *quia credit*.

en: For *unless* (nisi) the codices A I K L N T aa and editions 1, 2 [read] *where* (ubi), the Vatican edition *nor* (nec); our reading is held by the codices E G I l U V X Z bb. Shortly after, for *who believes* the editions and some codices [read] *because he believes*.

la: Vide supra pag. 216, nota 5. Hugo a S. Vict. Instit. in Decal. Legis dominicae, c. 1. ait: Deum autem adorare est ei totam mentem per humilitatem ac devotionem substernere et ipsum principium ac finem omnis boni credere. — Pro tota mente cod. K tota intentione. Pro Rabanus cod. G Augustinus.

en: See above, p. 216, note 5. Hugh of St. Victor, *Instruction on the Decalogue of the Lord's Law*, c. 1, says: "But to adore God is to subject the whole mind to him through humility and devotion, and to believe him the beginning and the end of all good." — For *with the whole mind* codex K [reads] *with the whole intention*. For *Rabanus* codex G [reads] *Augustine*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2, ubi principia huius distinctionis proponuntur.

en: Cf. below, d. 33, q. 2, where the principles of this distinction are set forth.

la: Exod. 20, 7. — Paulo inferius pro *per latriam* edd. cum cod. cc *latria*.

en: Exod. 20, 7. — A little below, for *by latria* the editions, with codex cc, [read] *latria*.

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. *etsi*.

en: The editions, with a few codices, [read] *even though* (etsi).

la: Cod. A *prout*.

en: Codex A [reads] *according as* (prout).

la: A Vat. abest *quod*; plurimi codd. habent *et quod*. Proxime ante cod. K omittit *et* ante *motivi*.

en: From the Vatican edition *that* (quod) is absent; very many codices have *and that* (et quod). Just before, codex K omits *and* before *motive*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 1. q. 3; d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro *Hoc autem* cod. T *Hoc modo*, cod. A *Hoc* tantum.

en: Cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2; d. 26, a. 1, q. 3; d. 27, a. 1, q. 1. — Then for *Hoc autem* (but this) codex T [reads] *Hoc modo* (in this way), codex A *Hoc* only.

la: Cap. 2. n. 1. seq. Vide q. praeced. arg. 1. ad oppos. — Paulo ante codd. F K U *sperando in Deum*. Paulo inferius pro *inquam* codd. A G H K N Z *in quantum*, et pro *omnes illas* codd. K M O *omnes alias*.

en: [Enchiridion] c. 2, n. 1 and following. See the preceding question, argument 1 to the opposite. — A little before, the codices F K U [read] *hoping in God*. A little below, for *I say* (inquam) the codices A G H K N Z [read] *insofar as* (in quantum), and for *all those* (omnes illas) the codices K M O [read] *all others* (omnes alias).

la: Edd. *ponant*. Cod. bb *unde* [cod. Z *inde*] *quidam ponunt*.

en: The editions [read] *ponant*. Codex bb [reads] *whence* (unde) [codex Z *thence* (inde)] *quidam ponunt*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from raw OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 15382–15585) cross-checked against 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{216–219}-{L,R}-*.png`; PDF = printed + 22, so printed pp. 216–219 = PDF 238–241). English is a fresh literal translation. The OCR for this quaestio was comparatively clean (clean running prose throughout); the PDF column bands confirmed the Respondeo/Conclusio and the marginal-label placements (cascade fragmentation in the OCR around the Respondeo splice and the p.218–219 marginalia was reflowed column-by-column).

**Alignment.** VERIFIED. q3 opener (raw 15382) reads *Tertio quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica. Et quod theologica, videtur* — exactly *whether latria is a cardinal or a theological virtue*. NOT q2 (*generalis/specialis*, raw 15288) nor q4 (*diversa a dulia*, raw 15586). Conclusion: latria, properly speaking, is a CARDINAL virtue (proximate genus justice, nearest genus religion).

**Page-split map (printed → body):**
- **p.216** — q3 opener + title + args 1–4 (args 1–4 begin here; arg 4 breaks mid-sentence at the foot). Page-216 footer notes 3–5 (received from q2 per hand-off) key args 1 (note 3 = *Num. 2.*), 2 (note 4 = *Cap. I. n. I.*), 3 (note 5 = Rabanus/Origen). Page-216 notes 1–2 were consumed by q2 (its scholion + replies, confirmed on the L-0/R-0/R-1 bands: q2's SCHOLION I–II occupies the lower half of p.216).
- **p.217** — arg 4 continues; args 5–6; Sed contra 1–4; Conclusio; Respondeo through *Conclusio 3, generalis* + *Confirmatur*. Page-217 footers 1–9 → apparatus [^4],[^5],[^6],[^7],[^8],[^9],[^10],[^11],[^12].
- **p.218** — Respondeo continues (Augustine *de Civ. Dei* corollaries) through replies *Ad 1,2 / Ad 3 / Ad 4 / Ad 5 / Ad 6* (Ad 6 breaks mid-sentence at the foot). Page-218 footers 1–10 → apparatus [^13],[^14],[^15],[^1b],[^5b],[^6b],[^8b],[^9b],[^10b] (footer 2 = sive-variant [^14] is the p.218 left-column note; per-page markers suffixed `b`).
- **p.219** — Ad 6 concludes; closing *De latria non proprie dicta* paragraph. q3 ends at *...propter diversum modum accipiendi⁴* (raw 15585). QUAESTIO IV (*Utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia*) begins immediately after on p.219 R-col (clean boundary, verified eyes-on 600 dpi). Page-219 **left-column** footer notes 1–4 are the q3-closing sequence → [^1c] (superscript ¹ on *summa veritas*), [^2c] (² on *Enchiridio*), [^3c] (³ on *quidam ponunt*), [^4c] (⁴ on *propter diversum modum accipiendi*, the q3 terminal word). Page-219 footer notes 5+ ("Psalm. 7, 1. — Glossa…", and the R-column notes 7–9) belong to q4's footer sequence and are NOT consumed here.

**Per-page footnote numbering.** Quaracchi restarts numbering each page. Markers are disambiguated by suffix: no suffix = p.216–217 sequence, `b` = p.218 sequence, `c` = p.219 sequence. (p.216's 3–5 and p.217's 1–9 do not collide, so the first nine markers run unsuffixed [^1]–[^15]; the p.218 page footers reuse small numbers, hence `b`.)

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED:** p.216 footers 3 (*Num. 2.*), 4 (*Cap. I. n. I.*), 5 (Rabanus/Origen) from d9-a2-q2 (commit 0e00b7f) — rendered here as [^1],[^2],[^3].

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to d9-a2-q4:** NONE. q4 begins on p.219 L (raw 15586) and the p.219 footer block sits below q4's opening args; the p.219 notes that key q4 (its Psalm/Glossa arg etc.) belong to q4's own footer sequence and are NOT consumed here. q3 closes cleanly with its own p.216–219 footer material.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. There is NO distinct q3 SCHOLION. The SCHOLION printed on p.216 (§I–II, "In conclusione omnes consentiunt..." / "In conclusionibus sequentis (3.) quaestionis antiqui magistri consentiunt...") belongs to **q2** — confirmed on the p.216 R-0/R-1 column bands (it follows q2's replies and explicitly forecasts "the following (3rd) question"). q3 itself ends with its Respondeo + replies and no scholion block. (Consistent with the article pattern: q1 had its scholion, q2 had its own; q3 carries none.)

**[?] flags — RESOLVED 2026-06-03 (decade-polish 600 dpi pass).** The p.219 q3-closing footers were verified eyes-on at 600 dpi (PDF 241, left-column footer notes 1–4). The Pass-1 reconstruction was WRONG and has been corrected to the printed text verbatim:
- **[^1c]** (was "[Vide supra; cfr.] de bonitate et veritate increata") → actual printed note 1: *Cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 1. q. 3; d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro Hoc autem cod. T Hoc modo, cod. A Hoc tantum.* (cross-refs + a *Hoc autem* variant, NOT a *summa bonitas/veritas* gloss). Superscript ¹ sits on *summa veritas*.
- **[^2c]** (was "[Augusl.,] Enchirid. c. I. — Vide supra pag. 213, nota 9") → actual printed note 2: *Cap. 2. n. 1. seq. Vide q. praeced. arg. 1. ad oppos. — Paulo ante codd. F K U sperando in Deum. Paulo inferius pro inquam codd. A G H K N Z in quantum, et pro omnes illas codd. K M O omnes alias.* (Enchiridion c. 2 n. 1 + codd. variants; NOT the c. 1 / p.213 n.9 back-reference). Superscript ² sits on *Enchiridio*.
- **[^3c]** (was "Vide infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 5. — …in colendo Deum/Dno") → actual printed note 3: *Edd. ponant. Cod. bb unde [cod. Z inde] quidam ponunt.* (a *ponant/ponunt* variant on the *quidam ponunt* lemma; NOT a d.27 cross-reference). Superscript ³ sits on *quidam ponunt*.
- **[^4c]** (NEW — was MISSING) → printed note 4: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* Superscript ⁴ sits on the q3 terminal word *accipiendi*; anchor added to both bodies.

No body-text `[?]` flags remain. **q3/q4 boundary CLEAN**: q3 ends at *…propter diversum modum accipiendi⁴* and QUAESTIO IV (*Utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia*) opens immediately after (*Quarto quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus distincta…*) — verified on the p.219 600 dpi body bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 219 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia. Et quod non, videtur.

1. (*Ad oppositum.*) Super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Domine Deus meus, in te speravi*; Glossa: « Domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia; Deus omnium per creationem, cui debetur latria »: ergo si Domino Deo non debetur nisi unica species adorationis, videlicet latria: ergo latria et dulia non sunt diversae species virtutis.

2. Item, eadem est species virtutis, qua creditur omne credendum, scilicet ipsa fides[^2]: ergo eadem est species virtutis, qua colitur omne colendum; sed huiusmodi sunt latria et dulia: ergo etc.

3. Item, eadem est species virtutis, qua amatur omne amandum, videlicet ipsa caritas[^3]: ergo eadem ratione eadem est species virtutis, qua adoratur omne adorandum; sed huiusmodi est latria et dulia: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia non sic est una ratio adorabilium, sicut amabilium; obiicitur contra: quia, sicut proximus non est amandus, nisi in quantum imago Dei, sic etiam non est adorandus, nisi in quantum est Dei imago: ergo sicut est unus amor sui et suae imaginis secundum speciem, sic et unus honor.

4. Item, « magis et minus non diversificant speciem[^4] »; sed latria et dulia differunt, sicut maior honor et minor honor: ergo videtur, quod non sint diversae species virtutis.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) Super illud Psalmi[^5]: *Adorate scabellum pedum eius* etc.; « Latria est adoratio, quae soli Deo debetur; dulia est adoratio, quae etiam creaturae exhibetur. Quae duas habet species: unam, quae omnibus indifferenter, alteram, quae exhibetur soli humanitati Christi ». Si ergo dulia habet duas species adorationis, quae creaturae debetur, multo fortius latria et dulia, quae sunt species virtutis diversae.

2. Item, « habitus diversificantur per actus, et actus per obiecta[^6] »: ergo si latria est cultus, qui debetur Deo ut Deo, et dulia, qui debetur creaturae, ut creatura est; videtur, quod latria sit species virtutis distincta a dulia.

3. Item, sapientia et scientia sunt diversa dona, secundum quae dirigimur ad temporalia et aeterna[^7]: si ergo latria est cultus debitus aeternae maiestati, et dulia honor et reverentia debita creaturae temporali; videtur, quod sint diversi habitus in genere virtutis.

<!-- page 220 -->

4. Item, si per eum[^8] modum fiat honor creaturae, quo fit Creatori; iam non erit actus virtutis, sed potius vitii — si quis enim sacrificaret homini, crimen idololatriae committeret et vituperaretur potius de idololatria, quam commendaretur de actu latriae, vel duliae — ergo si diversitas modorum in actibus virtutum introducit diversitatem in habitibus, videtur, quod latria et dulia differant specifica differentia.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Latria et dulia secundum propriam significationem sunt species virtutis diversae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum ad praedictorum intelligentiam, quod si nomen latriae secundum Augustinum, decimo *de Civitate Dei*[^9], importet cultum debitum maiestati divinae, nomen tamen duliae (*Dulia dicitur tripliciter.*) tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo dicitur dulia secundum quandam analogiam; alio modo secundum antonomasiam[^10]; et tertio modo secundum significationem propriam. Cum autem dicitur (*Dulia secundum analogiam.*) secundum analogiam, tunc importat cultum debitum naturae superiori, sive creaturae, sive Creatori, secundum aliquam rationem, secundum quam Creator communicat creaturae, utpote secundum rationem dominii; et hoc modo accipitur in Glossa super illud Psalmi[^11]: *In ecclesiis benedicite Deo Domino*, Glossa: « Deo, cui debetur latria; Domino, cui debetur dulia ». — Cum autem accipitur (*Dulia secundum antonomasiam.*) secundum antonomasiam, sic dicit debitam reverentiam creaturae unitae vel assumptae; per quem modum accipitur super illud Psalmi[^12]: *Adorate scabellum pedum eius*, ubi dicitur, quod dulia maior debetur solum humanitati Christi. — Cum autem accipitur dulia secundum (*Dulia proprie.*) significationem propriam, sic dicitur dulia honor vel reverentia debita rationali creaturae et exhibita[^13]; et illo modo consuevit dulia accipi secundum communem usum.

Et hoc modo est quaestio, utrum latria et dulia sint diversae species virtutis; et ad hoc (*Conclusio.*) communiter respondetur, quod sic. — Et ratio huius est, (*Ratio.*) quia latria et dulia considerant exteriores cultus, qui

<!-- page 221 -->

formalem habent differentiam, secundum quod creaturae et Creatori exhibentur. Alius enim est modus adorandi Creatorem, et alius adorandi creaturam, et alia ratio motiva; et ideo alia virtus directiva in hac et in illa. Et ideo concedendum est, quod latria et dulia sunt diversae virtutes. — Concedendae sunt etiam rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

1. (*Solutio oppositorum.*) Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa, dicendum, quod dulia accipitur ibi secundum generalem significationem et analogiam, secundum quam communis est ad latriam et ad duliam proprie dictam. — Et si tu quaeras, (*Quaestio incidens solvitur.*) quare magis dicit, latriam deberi Deo, et duliam Domino, cum idem sit Deus et Dominus; dicendum, quod dominus communicatur creaturae et de Creatore et de creatura dicitur analogice. Deus autem non ita communicatur; sed si dicatur de Creatore et creatura, dicitur aequivoce. Et propterea dicit, latriam deberi Deo, et duliam Domino[^14], ut non significetur, quod alia specie adorationis adorandus sit, in quantum Deus, et alia, in quantum Dominus, sed ut innotescat differentia horum vocabulorum, et simul cum differentia innuit convenientiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una est virtus, qua creduntur omnia credenda; dicendum, (*Notandum.*) quod verum est de credendis, quae habent unam rationem moventem ad credendum se, utpote veritatem summam, cuiusmodi sunt articuli fidei[^15]. Sed si credenda haberent rationes diversas, utpote cum credo homini, quia verax est, et Deo, quia verax est; haec fides et illa non sunt necessario eiusdem rationis nec speciei. Una enim est fides, quae est virtus theologica; alia, quae magis spectat ad genus virtutis cardinalis, quae quidem magis proprie appellanda est fidelitas quam fides. Et quia latria et dulia diversas considerant rationes honorandi in Creatore et creatura; hinc est, quod potius, si bene attendatur, sunt diversae virtutes[^16] quam una.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem caritate diliguntur omnia diligibilia[^17]; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia caritas habet unum obiectum principale, videlicet summum bonum, quod quidem amat, sive diligendo Deum in se, sive optando bonum proximo, qui est Dei imago. Latria autem et dulia alium et alium respiciunt cultum et modum; et ideo non est simile de dilectione et adoratione, nec de ratione imaginis hinc et inde. Et illud melius manifestabitur infra, cum agetur de caritate.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem; dicendum, quod illud habet instantiam, et non habet veritatem quantum ad speciem in genere moris. Praeterea, non habet veritatem, nisi quando non est alia differentia quam per magis et minus; sic autem non est in proposito; quia latria et dulia non differunt solum quantum ad intensionem et remissionem, sed etiam quantum ad alium et alium colendi modum. — De quo, inquam, modo plura possent adhuc quaeri; sed ista sufficiant, ne nimis elongemus nos ab intentione Magistri; in omnibus enim praedictis satis potest sumi ratio discutiendi ex his quae dicuntur in littera.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether latria is a virtue distinct from dulia.*

Fourthly it is asked whether latria is a virtue distinct from dulia. And that it is not, it seems.

1. (*For the opposite.*) On that verse of the Psalm[^1]: *O Lord my God, in thee have I hoped*; the Gloss: « Lord of all by power, to whom dulia is owed; God of all by creation, to whom latria is owed »: therefore if to the Lord God only a single species of adoration is owed, namely latria: therefore latria and dulia are not diverse species of virtue.

2. Likewise, it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be believed is believed, namely faith itself[^2]: therefore it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be venerated is venerated; but latria and dulia are of this kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be loved is loved, namely charity itself[^3]: therefore by the same reasoning it is the same species of virtue by which everything to be adored is adored; but latria and dulia are of this kind: therefore etc. If you should say that the case is not alike, because there is not one account of things adorable as of things lovable; it is objected on the contrary: that, just as one's neighbor is not to be loved except insofar as he is the image of God, so too he is not to be adored except insofar as he is the image of God: therefore, just as there is one love of oneself and of one's image according to species, so too there is one honor.

4. Likewise, « more and less do not diversify the species[^4] »; but latria and dulia differ as greater honor and lesser honor: therefore it seems that they are not diverse species of virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Foundations.*) On that verse of the Psalm[^5]: *Adore his footstool* etc.; « Latria is the adoration which is owed to God alone; dulia is the adoration which is offered even to a creature. This has two species: one which is offered to all indifferently, the other which is offered to the humanity of Christ alone ». If therefore dulia, which is owed to a creature, has two species of adoration, much more strongly are latria and dulia diverse species of virtue.

2. Likewise, « habits are diversified by acts, and acts by objects[^6] »: therefore if latria is the worship owed to God as God, and dulia the worship owed to a creature as it is a creature; it seems that latria is a species of virtue distinct from dulia.

3. Likewise, wisdom and knowledge are diverse gifts, according to which we are directed to temporal and eternal things[^7]: if therefore latria is the worship owed to the eternal majesty, and dulia the honor and reverence owed to a temporal creature; it seems that they are diverse habits in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, if honor were rendered to a creature by the same[^8] mode by which it is rendered to the Creator; it would then no longer be an act of virtue, but rather of vice — for if anyone sacrificed to a man, he would commit the crime of idolatry and would be reproached for idolatry rather than commended for an act of latria or of dulia — therefore if a diversity of modes in the acts of the virtues introduces a diversity in the habits, it seems that latria and dulia differ by a specific difference.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Latria and dulia, according to their proper signification, are diverse species of virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that although the name latria, according to Augustine in *On the City of God*, book ten[^9], signifies the worship owed to the divine majesty, the name dulia nevertheless (*Dulia is said in three ways.*) is said in three ways. In one way dulia is said according to a certain analogy; in another way according to antonomasia[^10]; and in a third way according to its proper signification. When it is said (*Dulia according to analogy.*) according to analogy, it then signifies the worship owed to a superior nature, whether creature or Creator, according to some account by which the Creator communicates with a creature, namely according to the account of lordship; and in this way it is taken in the Gloss on that verse of the Psalm[^11]: *In the churches bless God the Lord*, the Gloss: « God, to whom latria is owed; Lord, to whom dulia is owed ». — When, however, it is taken (*Dulia according to antonomasia.*) according to antonomasia, then it signifies the due reverence to a united or assumed creature; in which manner it is taken on that verse of the Psalm[^12]: *Adore his footstool*, where it is said that a greater dulia is owed to the humanity of Christ alone. — When, however, dulia is taken according to (*Dulia properly.*) its proper signification, then dulia is said to be the honor or reverence owed to a rational creature and offered to it[^13]; and in that way dulia is wont to be taken according to common usage.

And in this way the question is whether latria and dulia are diverse species of virtue; and to this it is (*Conclusion.*) commonly answered that they are. — And the reason for this is (*Reason.*) that latria and dulia regard exterior worships, which

have a formal difference, according as they are offered to a creature and to the Creator. For there is one mode of adoring the Creator, and another of adoring a creature, and another motive account; and therefore another directive virtue in the one and in the other. And therefore it must be conceded that latria and dulia are diverse virtues. — The reasons adduced for this are also to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

1. (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) To that which is objected on the contrary from the Gloss, it must be said that dulia is there taken according to its general signification and analogy, according to which it is common to latria and to dulia properly so called. — And if you ask (*An incidental question is resolved.*) why it says rather that latria is owed to God and dulia to the Lord, since God and Lord are the same; it must be said that "lord" is communicated to a creature and is said of the Creator and of a creature analogically. God, however, is not so communicated; but if it be said of the Creator and a creature, it is said equivocally. And for this reason it says that latria is owed to God, and dulia to the Lord[^14], not so as to signify that He is to be adored by one species of adoration insofar as He is God, and by another insofar as He is Lord, but so that the difference of these terms may be known, and at the same time, along with the difference, it suggests their agreement.

2. To that which is objected, that there is one virtue by which all things to be believed are believed; it must be said (*Note.*) that this is true of things to be believed which have one account moving to belief in itself, namely the highest truth, of which kind are the articles of faith[^15]. But if the things to be believed had diverse accounts — as when I believe a man because he is truthful, and God because He is truthful — these faiths are not necessarily of the same account nor species. For one is the faith which is a theological virtue; another, which pertains rather to the genus of cardinal virtue, which indeed is more properly to be called fidelity than faith. And since latria and dulia consider diverse accounts of honoring in the Creator and in a creature; hence it is that rather, if one attends well, they are diverse virtues[^16] than one.

3. To that which is objected, that all things lovable are loved by the same charity[^17]; it must be said that this is because charity has one principal object, namely the highest good, which indeed it loves, whether by loving God in Himself or by wishing good to a neighbor, who is the image of God. Latria and dulia, however, regard one worship and mode and another; and therefore the case is not alike concerning love and adoration, nor concerning the account of the image on the one side and the other. And that will be better made manifest below, when charity is treated.

4. To that which is objected, that more and less do not diversify the species; it must be said that this has an exception, and does not hold true as regards species in the genus of morals. Moreover, it does not hold true except when there is no other difference than by more and less; but it is not so in the present case; for latria and dulia do not differ only as to intensity and remission, but also as to one mode of worship and another. — Concerning which mode, I say, many more things could still be asked; but let these suffice, lest we stray too far from the intention of the Master; for in all the foregoing the ground of discussion can sufficiently be drawn from the things said in the text.

la: Psalm. 7, 1. — Glossa, quae apud Lyranum est interlinearis, apud Petrum Lombardum, in hunc loc., sic sonat: « Domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia, qui es omnium per recreationem Deus, cui debetur latria ». August., II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 94, ad illud Exod. 23, 33: *Si servieris diis eorum* etc. observat: Hic Graecus δουλεύσῃς habet, non λατρεύσῃς. Unde intelligitur, quia et δουλεία debetur Deo tanquam Domino, λατρεία vero nonnisi Deo tanquam Deo.

en: Psalm 7:1. — The Gloss, which in Lyra is interlinear, in Peter Lombard, on this passage, reads thus: « Lord of all by power, to whom dulia is owed, thou who art God of all by re-creation, to whom latria is owed ». Augustine, *Questions on the Pentateuch* II, q. 94, on that verse of Exod. 23:33: *If thou shalt serve their gods* etc., observes: Here the Greek has δουλεύσῃς, not λατρεύσῃς. Whence it is understood that δουλεία too is owed to God as Lord, but λατρεία only to God as God.

la: Ut ostenditur infra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. — In hoc et in seq. arg. plures codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 pro *omne* constanter exhibent *esse*.

en: As is shown below at d. 23, a. I, q. 3. — In this and in the following argument several codices, as well as editions 1 and 2, consistently read *esse* for *omne*.

la: Vide infra d. 27. a. I. q. 2.

en: See below at d. 27, a. I, q. 2.

la: Haec propositio supponitur ab Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 21–35. (c. 4.) et II. *de General. et corrupt.* text. 37. (c. 6.). Cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 659, nota 7. — Mox pro *non sint* multi codd. *non sunt*.

en: This proposition is presupposed by Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 21–35 (c. 4) and *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 37 (c. 6). Cf. also vol. II, p. 659, note 7. — Shortly after, for *non sint* many codices have *non sunt*.

la: Psalm. 98, 5. — De Glossa allegata vide supra pag. 200, nota 4. — In textu origin. Glossae, nec non in codd. A Q pro *quae soli Deo* legitur *quae soli Creatori*, et in eodem textu contradicentibus originali, edd. et nonnullis codd. pro *unam... alteram* [edd. *aliam*], plurimi codd. *una... altera*; minus congrue. Circa finem arg. Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et edd. 1, 2 pro *debetur* substituit *debentur*, et dein sola post *et dulia*, quae interserit *Creatori et creaturae debentur*.

en: Psalm 98:5. — On the Gloss cited, see above, p. 200, note 4. — In the original text of the Gloss, and in codices A Q, for *quae soli Deo* is read *quae soli Creatori*, and in the same text, against the original, the editions and some codices, for *unam... alteram* [editions *aliam*], most codices *una... altera*; less fittingly. Toward the end of the argument the Vatican edition, with some codices and editions 1 and 2, substitutes *debentur* for *debetur*, and then alone, after *et dulia*, inserts *Creatori et creaturae debentur*.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 361, nota 3; pag. 638, nota 5. et pag. 653, nota 6. — Mox post *debetur Deo* codd. A P Q bb subiiciunt *ut Deo*, quod in textum recepimus. Subinde post *et dulia* Vat. cum aliquot codd. repetit *cultus*, et pro *qui debetur* bene multi codd. habent *quae debetur*.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 361, note 3; p. 638, note 5; and p. 653, note 6. — Shortly after, following *debetur Deo*, codices A P Q bb add *ut Deo*, which we have received into the text. Then after *et dulia* the Vatican edition with several codices repeats *cultus*, and for *qui debetur* a good many codices have *quae debetur*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. I. et d. 35. q. I. seq.

en: Cf. below at d. 34, pt. I, a. 2, q. I, and d. 35, q. I and following.

la: Cod. K *eundem*.

en: Codex K reads *eundem*.

la: Cap. I. n. 2. seq. — Post *praedictorum intelligentiam* cod. U adiicit *est notandum*, et subinde pro *quod si* edd. cum pluribus codd. exhibent *quod etsi*. Deinde pro *tripliciter* codd. A G H I L T U V X Z bb substituunt *multipliciter*, et pro *dicitur* codd. A F U bb *accipitur*.

en: *On the City of God* book X, c. I, n. 2 and following. — After *praedictorum intelligentiam* codex U adds *est notandum*, and then for *quod si* the editions, with several codices, give *quod etsi*. Next, for *tripliciter* codices A G H I L T U V X Z bb substitute *multipliciter*, and for *dicitur* codices A F U bb read *accipitur*.

la: Voce *antonomasiae*, quae e Graeco (ἀντονομασία i. e. pronominatio) in linguam Latinam est introducta, significatur ille tropus rhetoricus, in quo nomen, quod multis commune est, uni propter excellentiam tanquam proprium adaptatur.

en: By the word *antonomasia*, which has been introduced into the Latin language from the Greek (ἀντονομασία, i.e. pronomination), is signified that rhetorical trope in which a name common to many is adapted to one, on account of his excellence, as though it were proper to him.

la: Psalm. 67, 27. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Petrum Lombardum et Lyranum in hunc loc. Cfr. verba Augustini, supra pag. 219, nota 5. allata.

en: Psalm 67:27. — The Gloss is interlinear and is found in Peter Lombard and Lyra on this passage. Cf. the words of Augustine cited above, p. 219, note 5.

la: Psalm. 98, 5. Vide hic fundam. I. — Mox pro *dulia maior* codd. A G H I (I C a prima manu) N T V et edd. 1, 2 *hyperdulia maior*. Cfr. supra pag. 206, nota 3.

en: Psalm 98:5. See here the first foundation. — Shortly after, for *dulia maior* codices A G H I (I C from the first hand) N T V and editions 1, 2 have *hyperdulia maior*. Cf. above, p. 206, note 3.

la: Alan. ab Insulis in *Distinct. dictionum theolog.*, ubi de Dulia agit, ait: *Stricte* [*dulia accepta*] *dicitur servitus, quae tantum debetur rationabili creaturae, ut episcopis, praelatis et aliis, et secundum hoc dicitur a* δοῦλον, *quod est servitus. Et haec est quasi positiva, quam maioribus debemus, quae consistit in dilectione, in servitio, in obedientia et huiusmodi.* — Paulo inferius pro *communiter*, quam lectionem in cod. A invenimus, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 *convenienter*, Vat. *consequenter*.

en: Alan of Lille in *On the Distinctions of Theological Terms*, where he treats of Dulia, says: *Strictly* [*dulia taken*] *is called the servitude which is owed only to a rational creature, as to bishops, prelates and others, and according to this it is named from* δοῦλον, *which is servitude. And this is, as it were, positive, which we owe to our superiors, consisting in love, in service, in obedience and the like.* — A little below, for *communiter*, which reading we found in codex A, other codices and editions 1, 2 have *convenienter*, the Vatican edition *consequenter*.

la: Pro *Domino*, quod cum Vat. etiam cod. K (a secunda manu) habet, plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam *creaturae*.

en: For *Domino*, which, with the Vatican edition, codex K (from a second hand) also has, most codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly read *creaturae*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 23. a. I. q. 3.

en: Cf. below at d. 23, a. I, q. 3.

la: Pro *virtutes* codd. N U X Z *species*.

en: For *virtutes* codices N U X Z read *species*.

la: Cod. W *diligenda*. Paulo inferius pro *optando bonum proximo* cod. X *operando bonum pro proximo*.

en: Codex W reads *diligenda*. A little below, for *optando bonum proximo* codex X has *operando bonum pro proximo*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio ab omnibus recepta innititur duobus principiis per se manifestis, scilicet quod honor alicui debetur ratione excellentiae, quae in ipso est, et quod excellentia, quae in Deo est, non est eiusdem rationis cum excellentia creaturae rationalis. — Difficultas sumta ex Glossa in Psalmum 7. (arg. 1. ad oppos.) etiam a S. Thoma aliisque solvitur eodem modo, sicut a S. Bonav., cuius solutionis fundamentum est, quod in Deo sit aliqua excellentia, quae communicari possit creaturae, scilicet excellentia dominii. Haec competere potest Deo et creaturae, sed ita, ut sit diversae rationis in creatura, et per consequens etiam importet aliam duliam, quae non nisi secundum analogiam conveniat cum ea, quae fundatur super dominium essentialiter Deo proprium, et quae proprie est latria. Quod autem aliae excellentiae Dei essentiales sint incommunicabiles, per se patet. — Ipsam duliam plures species habere distinctas, praesertim hyperduliam, docet S. Thom. cum aliis, nonnullis contradicentibus.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 30. m. I. a. I. § 2. — Scot. rem tangit in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. I; S. II. II. q. 103. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. I. — Durand., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion, received by all, rests on two self-evident principles, namely that honor is owed to someone by reason of the excellence which is in him, and that the excellence which is in God is not of the same account as the excellence of a rational creature. — The difficulty drawn from the Gloss on Psalm 7 (arg. 1 for the opposite) is also resolved by St. Thomas and others in the same way as by St. Bonaventure, the foundation of whose solution is that in God there is some excellence which can be communicated to a creature, namely the excellence of lordship. This can belong to God and to a creature, but in such a way that it is of a diverse account in the creature, and consequently also implies another dulia, which agrees only according to analogy with that which is founded upon the lordship essentially proper to God, and which is properly latria. That the other essential excellences of God are incommunicable is self-evident. — That dulia itself has several distinct species, especially hyperdulia, St. Thomas teaches along with others, some contradicting.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, pt. III, q. 30, m. I, a. I, § 2. — Scotus touches the matter in each of his Writings, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. I; *Summa* II–II, q. 103, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. I, quaestiuncula I. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. 4, a. I. — Durandus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from raw OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 15586–15735) cross-checked against 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{219,220,221}-{L,R}-*.png` (offset pdf = printed + 22 → PDF pp. 241–243). Running heads confirmed: `QUAEST. IV.` (p.219), `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (p.220), `DIST. IX. DUBIA.` (p.221).

**Alignment VERIFIED.** Opener raw 15586/15587 `QUAESTIO IV. / Utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia` + `Quarto quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus distincta a dulia. Et quod non, videtur.` — concerns whether latria is a virtue DISTINCT from dulia. NOT q3 (cardinal-vs-theological, raw 15382). CONCLUSION: latria and dulia, in their proper signification, ARE diverse species of virtue (formal difference in the exterior worship offered to Creator vs creature).

**Page-split map.**
- p.219 (L mid → R): opener + obj. 1–4 + Sed contra 1–3 (Sed contra 3 partial). Footers 5–11 (7 entries) → [^1]–[^7]. (p.219 footers 1–4/* keyed q3's tail and were consumed by q3 — see footer hand-off below.)
- p.220: Sed contra 4 + Conclusio + Respondeo + replies Ad 1, 2, 3 (Ad 3 partial). Footers 1–11 (11 entries) → [^8]–[^18, here [^8]–[^17]]. (Markers: arg. 8 → [^8]; Respondeo/replies → [^9]–[^17].)
- p.221: reply Ad 3 tail + Ad 4 + full-width SCHOLION (I–II). No numbered apparatus on p.221 (the scholion replaces the footer block; the p.221 footer block belongs to the following d9-dubia chunk).

**Footer hand-off — received.** p.219 footers 1–4/* were NOT consumed here: they key q3's closing text (`Hoc autem` / `Vide q. praeced.` / `quidam ponunt` / `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) and belong to q3 (commit 9609713). q4 takes only p.219 footers 5–11.

**Footer hand-off — forwarded to d9-dubia.** NONE. q4 closes mid-p.221 (after Ad 4 + scholion). The p.221 numbered footer block (note 1 `Dist. 27. a. I. q. 2`, note 2 `Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30...`, note 3 `Hoc testimonium...`, etc., visible in the p.221 L-2 / R-2 bands) keys the DUBIA body, NOT q4. d9-dubia (raw 15736, OCR `DUBIA CIRCA UTTERAM / q. 3. MAGISTRI.`, `Dub. I.` at raw 15740) consumes the entire p.221 footer block.

**Scholion disposition.** SCHOLION present (raw 15722, p.221 full-width). §I (the conclusion rests on two self-evident principles; the Gloss-on-Psalm-7 difficulty; dulia's distinct species incl. hyperdulia) + §II (parallel-loci source list: Alex. Hal., Scot., S. Thom., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Durand.). `has_scholion: true`. The scholion carries no numbered footnote markers (standard for Vol III scholia).

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not anchors: *Ad oppositum.* (obj. 1), *Fundamenta.* (Sed contra block), *Dulia dicitur tripliciter. / Dulia secundum analogiam. / Dulia secundum antonomasiam. / Dulia proprie.* (Respondeo), *Conclusio. / Ratio.* (Respondeo close), *Solutio oppositorum. / Quaestio incidens solvitur.* (Ad 1), *Notandum.* (Ad 2).

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 9, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio IX)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction IX)

source_text:
<!-- page 221 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod cultus divinitatis consistit *in dilectione et sacrificii exhibitione et reverentia.* Quaeritur, qualiter distinguuntur ista tria. Et videtur, quod insufficienter dicat, quia magis videtur consistere *in adoratione.* Ait enim Rabanus sic: «Caro Christi adoranda est latria, sicut Verbum, sed non omni specie latriae; quoniam non adoramus eam prostrati in terra sic, ut credamus, quod nos creavit ex nihilo»[^p221-3]: ergo videtur, quod potius prostratio in terra pertineat ad cultum Dei quam praedicta. — Item, videtur *diminutio,* quia non tantum colitur Deus dilectione, sed etiam fide.

*(Quaestio.)* Quaeritur igitur, qualiter distinguuntur ista tria praedicta?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut praehabitum est supra[^p221-4], Deus colitur cultu *interiori* et *exteriori*; ut autem Magister exprimeret utrumque cultum, dicit, quod consistit *in dilectione,* quantum scilicet ad cultum interiorem, ita quod in dilectione intelligimus tres theologicas virtutes, scilicet caritatem et alias duas praeambulas. *Ergo*[^p221-5] quantum ad cultum exteriorem dicit, quod colitur *sacrificio,* ita quod sub sacrificio comprehendat omnem reverentiam, quae exterius exhibetur soli Deo. — *(Ad quaestionem.)* Per hoc autem, quod subdit *reverentiam,* comprehendit utrumque; et sic patet differentia horum trium, quia dilectio refertur ad cultum interiorem, sacrificium ad exteriorem, reverentia ad utrumque. — *(Aliter.)* Vel aliter: dilectio refertur ad principium motivum, sacrificium refertur ad actum, reverentia ad formam et modum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de adoratione et prostratione, dicendum, quod illa potest comprehendi nomine sacrificii; potest etiam dici, quod illam non nominat, quia non est cultus soli Deo debitus. Non tantum enim prosternimur coram Deo, sed etiam coram homine. Unde non est intelligendum, quod Rabanus velit dicere, quod non debemus nos coram humanitate prosternere, sed quod prosternendo nos coram humanitate[^p221-6], non debemus profiteri, nos esse creatos ratione humanitatis, sed divinitatis. — *(Aliter.)* Dici etiam posset, quod adoratio comprehenditur sub

<!-- page 222 -->

hoc quod dicitur *reverentia,* sicut et fides intelligitur per dilectionem. Et sic patet responsio ad sequens[^p222-1].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Damasceni: *Christum adoramus cum Patre et Spiritu sancto una adoratione.* Sed *contra:* Pater et Spiritus sanctus sunt personae distinctae; et cuilibet earum debetur una adoratio per se: ergo si ad multiplicationem obiecti sequitur multiplicatio actus[^p222-2], videtur, quod illae personae sunt multiplici, non unica adoratione adorandae. — Item, adoratio subsequitur directionem fidei; sed fides distinguit inter personas: ergo et adorans, secundum quod huiusmodi, distinguit inter personas; et si hoc, redit idem quod prius.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tres personae unica et simplici adoratione sunt adorandae. — *(Ratio.)* Et ratio huius est, quia illud, secundum quod competit adorari, videlicet summa maiestas, est unicum, nullo modo multiplicatum; et ita, sicut unica dilectione diliguntur, quia in eis est una summa bonitas, sic unica adoratione adorantur.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illae personae distinguuntur; dicendum, quod si[^p222-3] distinguuntur ratione *emanationis et originis,* non tamen ratione *adorationis;* ideo non sequitur, quod respectu harum habeant diversas *adorationes,* sed quod habeant diversas *relationes;* et hoc quidem dictat fides sana, quam consequitur adoratio. — Et per hoc patet sequens obiectio. Adoratio[^p222-4] sequitur fidem, non in quantum distinguit tres personas per relationum pluralitatem, sed in quantum unit per maiestatis unitatem.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ego dominicam carnem in Christo ideo adoro, quod a divinitate suscepta est.* Si enim in Christo adoratur divinitas et humanitas, et in aliis personis divinitas; videtur, quod magis sit adorandus Christus quam aliae personae. — Item, plus tenemur gratias Christo agere post incarnationem quam ante: ergo magis debemus ipsum[^p222-5] adorare et venerari: ergo si hoc, magis tenemur adorare Filium incarnatum quam non incarnatum; et si hoc, magis Filium quam Patrem vel Spiritum sanctum. Si tu dicas, quod magis debemus adorare Verbum non intensive, sed extensive; *contra:* «plura bona paucioribus bonis magis sunt appetenda[^p222-6]»: ergo plura honorabilia magis sunt veneranda et honoranda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non magis adorandus[^p222-7] est Christus quam Pater vel Spiritus sanctus; nec Verbum incarnatum plus debet adorari post incarnationem quam ante. — *(Ratio.)* Et huius ratio est, quia adoratio respicit maiestatem et dignitatem; et quoniam Verbo nulla crevit[^p222-8] dignitas ex humanae naturae assumtione, ideo non debet adorari maiori adoratione. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod plura bona paucioribus sunt praeeligenda; hoc autem habet multiplicem instantiam. *(Instantia 1.)* Una est, «quando unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum[^p222-9]». Unde sicut tenere equum et frenum non est plus tenere quam equum; sic adorare Deum et carnem non est plus quam adorare Deum. — *(Instantia 2.)* Alia instantia est, quando unum illorum bonorum est improportionabile ad aliud; tunc enim non addit, ut faciat ipsum maius, sicut nec punctus addit ad lineam, ut faciat eam maiorem[^p222-10]; et hoc modo creatura habet se ad Creatorem.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenemur ad maiorem gratiarum actionem; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia gratiarum actio non tantum respicit excellentiam *dantis,* sed etiam excellentiam *muneris;* non sic autem est de adoratione[^p222-11].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nemo carnem eius manducat, nisi prius adoret.* Sed *contra:* Ioannis sexto[^p222-12]: *Spiritus est qui vivificat, caro non prodest quidquam:* ergo si non prodest, non est manducanda nec adoranda. — Item, caro Christi vere est sub Sacramento, ergo vere manducatur, cum sub Sacramento suscipitur; sed absque adoratione praeambula potest esse Sacramenti susceptio: ergo et vera manducatio.

<!-- page 223 -->

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum illud intelligitur de manducatione *spirituali,* quae dicitur manducatio *vera,* quia veram habet efficaciam. Unde manducare *veraciter,* hoc est manducare *efficaciter;* et hoc modo nemo bene manducat, nisi qui adorat, quia non manducat *efficaciter,* nisi manducet *reverenter.* — Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum: obiicit enim de manducatione sacramentali, et illud intelligitur de manducatione spirituali.

*(Notandum.)* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caro non prodest quidquam; dicendum, quod *caro* dicitur carnalis intelligentia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p223-1]: «Caro non prodest quidquam per se, si a spiritu separetur; sed prodest, in quantum est unita Verbo et deificata». Et hoc modo est adoranda adoratione latriae, non duliae. De hoc autem plenius habetur in quarto libro[^p223-2].

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says, that the worship of the divinity consists *in love and in the offering of sacrifice and in reverence.* It is asked how these three are distinguished. And it seems that he speaks insufficiently, because it seems rather to consist *in adoration.* For Rabanus says thus: «The flesh of Christ is to be adored with latria, as the Word is, yet not with every species of latria; since we do not adore it prostrate on the ground in such a way that we believe that it created us from nothing»[^p221-3]: therefore it seems that prostration on the ground pertains to the worship of God rather than the aforesaid things. — Likewise, it seems a *diminution,* because God is worshiped not only by love, but also by faith.

*(Question.)* It is asked, then, how these three aforesaid things are distinguished?

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was treated above[^p221-4], God is worshiped with an *interior* and an *exterior* worship; but that the Master might express both kinds of worship, he says that it consists *in love,* namely as regards the interior worship, in such a way that under love we understand the three theological virtues, namely charity and the other two that are preliminary to it. *Therefore*[^p221-5] as regards the exterior worship he says that he is worshiped *by sacrifice,* so that under sacrifice he may comprehend all the reverence which is shown outwardly to God alone. — *(To the question.)* But by the fact that he adds *reverence,* he comprehends both; and thus the difference of these three is clear, because love refers to the interior worship, sacrifice to the exterior, reverence to both. — *(Otherwise.)* Or otherwise: love refers to the motive principle, sacrifice refers to the act, reverence to the form and the manner.

To that which is objected concerning adoration and prostration, it must be said that this can be comprehended under the name of sacrifice; it can also be said that he does not name it, because it is not a worship owed to God alone. For we are prostrated not only before God, but also before man. Hence it is not to be understood that Rabanus means to say that we ought not prostrate ourselves before the humanity, but that, in prostrating ourselves before the humanity[^p221-6], we ought not profess that we were created by reason of the humanity, but of the divinity. — *(Otherwise.)* It could also be said that adoration is comprehended under

this which is called *reverence,* just as faith too is understood through love. And thus the response to what follows is clear[^p222-1].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that saying of the Damascene: *We adore Christ with the Father and the Holy Spirit by one adoration.* But *on the contrary:* the Father and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons; and to each of them one adoration is owed of itself: therefore if to the multiplication of the object there follows a multiplication of the act[^p222-2], it seems that those persons are to be adored by a multiple, not by a single adoration. — Likewise, adoration follows upon the directing of faith; but faith distinguishes between the persons: therefore the one adoring also, as such, distinguishes between the persons; and if this is so, the same thing returns as before.

**I respond:** It must be said that the three persons are to be adored by one and simple adoration. — *(The ground.)* And the ground of this is that that according to which it belongs to be adored, namely the supreme majesty, is one, in no way multiplied; and so, just as they are loved by one love, because in them there is one supreme goodness, so they are adored by one adoration.

To that which is objected, that those persons are distinguished; it must be said that if[^p222-3] they are distinguished by reason of *emanation and origin,* yet they are not distinguished by reason of *adoration;* therefore it does not follow that with respect to these they have diverse *adorations,* but that they have diverse *relations;* and this indeed sound faith dictates, upon which adoration follows. — And by this the following objection is clear. Adoration[^p222-4] follows upon faith, not insofar as it distinguishes the three persons by the plurality of the relations, but insofar as it unites them by the unity of the majesty.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *I adore the Lord's flesh in Christ for this reason, that it was assumed by the divinity.* For if in Christ both the divinity and the humanity are adored, and in the other persons the divinity, it seems that Christ is to be adored more than the other persons. — Likewise, we are bound to give thanks to Christ more after the incarnation than before: therefore we ought to adore and venerate him[^p222-5] more: therefore if this is so, we are bound to adore the incarnate Son more than the non-incarnate; and if this is so, the Son more than the Father or the Holy Spirit. If you say that we ought to adore the Word more not intensively, but extensively; *on the contrary:* «more goods are more to be sought than fewer goods[^p222-6]»: therefore more honorable things are more to be venerated and honored.

**I respond:** It must be said that Christ is not to be adored[^p222-7] more than the Father or the Holy Spirit; nor ought the incarnate Word to be adored more after the incarnation than before. — *(The ground.)* And the ground of this is that adoration regards majesty and dignity; and since no dignity accrued[^p222-8] to the Word from the assumption of the human nature, therefore he ought not be adored by a greater adoration. — Nor does it avail what he objects, that more goods are to be preferred to fewer; this, however, admits of many counter-instances. *(Counter-instance 1.)* One is, «when one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one thing there[^p222-9]». Hence just as to hold a horse and the bridle is not to hold more than the horse; so to adore God and the flesh is not more than to adore God. — *(Counter-instance 2.)* Another counter-instance is, when one of those goods is incommensurable with the other; for then it does not add anything so as to make it greater, just as a point does not add to a line so as to make it greater[^p222-10]; and in this way the creature stands toward the Creator.

To that which is objected, that we are bound to a greater giving of thanks; it must be said that it is not similar, because the giving of thanks regards not only the excellence of the *giver,* but also the excellence of the *gift;* but it is not so concerning adoration[^p222-11].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *No one eats his flesh unless he first adore.* But *on the contrary:* in the sixth chapter of John[^p222-12]: *It is the Spirit that gives life, the flesh profits nothing:* therefore if it profits nothing, it is not to be eaten nor adored. — Likewise, the flesh of Christ is truly under the Sacrament, therefore it is truly eaten, since it is received under the Sacrament; but the reception of the Sacrament can occur without a preceding adoration: therefore so too can true eating.

**I respond:** It must be said that that word is understood of *spiritual* eating, which is called *true* eating, because it has a true efficacy. Hence to eat *truly* is to eat *efficaciously;* and in this way no one eats well unless he adores, because he does not eat *efficaciously* unless he eats *reverently.* — And by this the response to the last [objection] is clear: for he objects concerning sacramental eating, and that is understood of spiritual eating.

*(To be noted.)* To that which is objected, that the flesh profits nothing; it must be said that *flesh* means a carnal understanding, as Augustine says[^p223-1]: «The flesh profits nothing of itself, if it be separated from the spirit; but it profits insofar as it is united to the Word and deified». And in this way it is to be adored with the adoration of latria, not of dulia. But concerning this more fully is treated in the fourth book[^p223-2].

---

la: Hoc testimonium, quod etiam ab aliis Scholasticis Rabano adscribitur, sententialiter habetur in eius V. Enarrat. in Epist. ad Rom. 9, 5, ubi sic legitur: *Sed quid mirum, si in hoc loco Christum Deum super omnia aperta voce loqueretur, de quo alia in Epistola hunc sensum tali sermone firmavit dicens: Ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum* (Phil. 2, 10.). *Haec sunt omnia, super quae Deus Christus est. Neque enim, exceptis his, sunt aliqua, ut non super omnia Deus Christus sit, nec potest genu flecti omni creaturae* [in Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. olim Ambrosio tributo, ex quo Rabanus hunc loc. delibavit, legitur: *nec potest genu flectere omnis creatura*] *nisi Deo* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *prostratio in terra* edd. cum pluribus codd. *prostratio in terram.*

en: This testimony, which is also ascribed to Rabanus by other Scholastics, is found in substance in his V. *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* 9, 5, where it is read thus: *But what wonder, if in this place he were to speak with open voice of Christ as God over all things, concerning whom in another Epistle he confirmed this sense with such a saying, saying: That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, on earth, and under the earth* (Phil. 2, 10.). *These are all things over which Christ is God. For, these excepted, there are none such that Christ as God is not over all things, nor can a knee be bent to any creature* [in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans formerly attributed to Ambrose, from which Rabanus drew this passage, it reads: *nor can every creature bend the knee*] *except to God,* etc. — A little below, for *prostratio in terra* the editions, with several codices, read *prostratio in terram.*

en: Here, article 2, question 3.

la: Codd. A G bb omittunt *Ergo.* Paulo superius pro *intelligimus* codd. U bb *intelligamus;* paulo inferius pro *comprehendat* codd. A G N T X Z *comprehendit.*

en: Codices A, G, bb omit *Ergo.* A little above, for *intelligimus* codices U, bb read *intelligamus;* a little below, for *comprehendat* codices A, G, N, T, X, Z read *comprehendit.*

la: Cod. G subdit *Christi.*

en: Codex G adds *Christi.*

la: Cfr. de hoc dub. S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: Cf. on this doubt S. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here concerning the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1.

la: Pro *sequitur multiplicatio actus* codd. G N *multiplicatur actus.* Pro *obiecti* codd. I L aa *subiecti.*

en: For *sequitur multiplicatio actus* codices G, N read *multiplicatur actus.* For *obiecti* codices I, L, aa read *subiecti.*

la: Edd. *etsi.*

en: The editions read *etsi.*

la: Cod. K hic annectit *enim.* In cod. bb voci *adoratio* praemittitur *quia,* in edd. *quod scilicet.* — De hoc dubio tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 30. m. 1. a. 3. § 1; B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic q. 3. a. 2. et dub. lit. 2.

en: Codex K here annexes *enim.* In codex bb the word *adoratio* is preceded by *quia,* in the editions by *quod scilicet.* — This doubt is treated by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 30. m. 1. a. 3. § 1; B. Albert, here a. 13; S. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. little-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here concerning the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 3. a. 2. and doubt on the text 2.

la: Edd. hic inserunt *honorare.*

en: The editions here insert *honorare.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III. c. 2.

la: Codd. G K *honorandus.*

en: Codices G, K read *honorandus.*

la: Edd. *accrevit.*

en: The editions read *accrevit.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 639, nota 2. — Pro *ibi* cod. G *utrobique.* Post *ibi* Vat. addit *enim est.* Paulo superius pro *praeeligenda* multi codd. *eligenda,* codd. F U *magis eligenda.* Paulo inferius post *et carnem non est plus* cod. K repetit *adorare.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III. c. 2. Cf. tom. II. p. 639, note 2. — For *ibi* codex G reads *utrobique.* After *ibi* the Vatican edition adds *enim est.* A little above, for *praeeligenda* many codices read *eligenda,* codices F, U *magis eligenda.* A little below, after *et carnem non est plus* codex K repeats *adorare.*

la: Haec instantia etiam loc. cit. ab Aristot. insinuari videtur docente, aliquando etiam non-bona pluribus bonis eligibiliora esse, pro quo in exemplum adducit felicitatem, quam, etiamsi nondum habeatur, eligibiliorem significat quam iustitiam et fortitudinem. Et merito; nam, ut B. Albert. in III. Topic. tr. 1. c. 4. exponit, «beatitudo praeponderat bonis illorum, et non-bonum beatitudini adiunctum non diminuit bonum ipsius».

en: This counter-instance too seems to be intimated by Aristotle in the cited place, teaching that sometimes even non-goods are more choiceworthy than several goods, for which he adduces as an example happiness, which, even if it be not yet possessed, he signifies to be more choiceworthy than justice and fortitude. And rightly; for, as B. Albert explains in *Topics* III. tract 1. c. 4., «beatitude outweighs their goods, and a non-good joined to beatitude does not diminish the good of it».

la: Vide de hoc dub. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 30. m. 2. in fine; B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: See on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 30. m. 2. at the end; B. Albert, here a. 12; S. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here concerning the text.

la: Vers. 64.

en: Verse 64.

la: Tract. 27. in Ioan. Evang. (6, 64.) n. 5: *Caro non prodest quidquam, sed sola caro; accedit spiritus ad carnem, quomodo accedit caritas ad scientiam, et prodest plurimum. Nam si caro nihil prodesset, Verbum caro non fieret, ut inhabitaret in nobis. Si per carnem nobis multum profuit Christus, quomodo caro nihil prodest?* Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 98. n. 9. et supra a. 1. q. 1.

en: *Tractate* 27 on the Gospel of John (6, 64.) n. 5: *The flesh profits nothing, but the flesh alone; the spirit accedes to the flesh, as charity accedes to knowledge, and profits very much. For if the flesh profited nothing, the Word would not have become flesh, that it might dwell in us. If through the flesh Christ profited us much, how does the flesh profit nothing?* Cf. *Commentary on Psalm* 98. n. 9, and above, a. 1. q. 1.

la: Dist. 9. a. I. q. I. seqq., ubi de modis manducandi agitur. Edd. allegant *dist. 10.* — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.

en: Distinction 9, article 1, question 1 and following, where the modes of eating are treated. The editions cite *dist. 10.* — This doubt is also resolved by S. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here concerning the text; Giles of Rome, here doubt on the text 3. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{221,222,223}-{L,R}-*.png`, read Left column top→bottom then Right, body bands then footer bands) per the VOL II OVERRIDE / Vol III column-band discipline, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` raw lines 15736–15848). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (printed pp.221–223 = PDF pp.243–245). Running heads: *DIST. IX. DUBIA.* (verso) / *DUBIA. ... SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.* (recto). `has_scholion: false` — the dubia carry no scholion.

**Structure.** Four dubia (Dub. I–IV), each a quaestio-style doubt on Lombard's *littera*:
- Dub. I — the threefold worship (love / sacrifice / reverence) and the place of adoration/prostration.
- Dub. II — whether the three persons are adored by one adoration (Damascene).
- Dub. III — whether Christ is to be adored more than the other persons, and the giving of thanks after the incarnation.
- Dub. IV — "No one eats his flesh unless he first adore" (spiritual vs sacramental eating).

**Page-split map.**
- p.221 (PDF 243) — opener *DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI* + Dub. I (obj. + Respondeo + replies), ending mid-sentence "...adoratio comprehenditur sub". Footer notes 1–6; notes 1–2 belong to the preceding chunk d9-a2-q4's markerless scholion region (received hand-off) and are NOT re-keyed here, so the dubia's first body marker is note 3 (Rabanus testimonium). Notes 3–6 → `[^p221-3]`–`[^p221-6]`.
- p.222 (PDF 244) — Dub. I tail + Dub. II (full) + Dub. III (begins) + Dub. IV (begins, ends "...ergo et vera manducatio"). Footer notes 1–12 → `[^p222-1]`–`[^p222-12]`.
- p.223 (PDF 245) — Dub. IV Respondeo + *Notandum* reply, ending "...De hoc autem plenius habetur in quarto libro²." Footer notes 1–2 → `[^p223-1]`–`[^p223-2]`.

**Per-page footer restart.** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page, so markers are disambiguated with a per-page prefix (p221-/p222-/p223-). The p.221 received-footer hand-off from d9-a2-q4 is honored: notes 1 (*Dist. 27. a. I. q. 2.*) and 2 (*Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. ...*) on p.221 belong to the q4 scholion's markerless region and are NOT re-keyed here; the dubia body begins its apparatus at p.221 note 3.

**Boundary lock — DISTINCTIO X.** The dubia chunk ends at raw 15848 ("...in quarto libro²."). The semantic `DISTINCTIO X.` header (`Cap. I. / An Christus, secundum quod homo, sit persona, vel aliquid.`) begins at raw 15853 (a page-top running-head copy of *DISTINCTIO X.* sits at raw 15841 above the p.223 / PDF-245 page number 223). **CONFIRMED no footer leaks into d.10:** on p.223 the dubia's two footer notes (1–2) are immediately followed by a fresh heading `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` whose own note 1 (*Cod. C cum Vat. et pluribus edd. praefigit huius.*) opens the d.10 littera apparatus — a clean break, verified eyes-on in `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p223-L-2.png`.

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parens, not as anchors: *(Quaestio)*, *(Ad quaestionem)*, *(Aliter)* ×3, *(Ratio)* ×2, *(Instantia 1)*, *(Instantia 2)*, *(Notandum)*.

**`[?]` flags:** none — all four dubia, the 17-note apparatus, and the DIST X boundary read cleanly from the column bands.

**DISTINCTIO IX is now COMPLETE** (littera, divisio, a1-q1/q2/q3, a2-q1/q2/q3/q4, and these dubia all Tier-2).