title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum imago in divinis proprie de Filio dicatur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum imago sit proprium Filii. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Hilarium[^1] in proposita appropriatione: «Aeternitas in Patre, species in Imagine, usus in Munere». Pater dicitur proprie, similiter Munus: ergo si recte ponuntur, ex aequo imago dicitur proprie de Filio.

2. Item, Augustinus sexto *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Solus Filius est imago Patris», et expressius: «Eo filius, quo imago et verbum»: ergo secundum hoc, cum filius dicat personalem relationem, patet etc.

3. Item, imago est similitudo expressa, et in divinis similitudo expressissima[^3]; sed similitudo expressissima non potest esse plurium distinctorum: si ergo Filius est ab uno, Spiritus sanctus aequaliter a duobus, ergo non poterit esse imago.

4. Item, imago in divinis attenditur secundum imitationem personae, non essentiae[^4], quia non est imago essentiae, sed personae: ergo ad hoc, quod una persona sit imago alterius, necesse est, quod illam imitetur in eo quod respicit personam ut personam; sed emanatio vel productio personae respicit personam ut personam; nam productio creaturae respicit substantiam. Cum ergo solus Filius imitetur Patrem in productione personae, solus Filius est imago.

**Sed contra:**

1. Damascenus[^5] dicit, quod «Spiritus sanctus est imago Filii»: ergo non est Filii proprium esse imaginem.

2. Item, hoc videtur per utramque definitionem Hilarii[^6]. Et prima est: «Imago est eius rei, ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens»; sed hoc convenit Spiritui sancto: ergo et imago. Secunda est: «Imago est rei ad rem coaequandam imaginata et indiscreta similitudo»; sed hoc convenit Spiritui sancto: ergo etc.

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3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia ad imaginem ista duo sufficiunt, scilicet imitatio secundum similitudinem, et secundum aequalitatem[^7]; sed haec duo est reperire in persona Spiritus sancti: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut Filius procedit a Patre, ut exprimens Patrem, ita Spiritus sanctus a Filio, ut exprimens Filium: ergo quemadmodum Filius est imago Patris, ita Spiritus sanctus est imago Filii.

### Conclusio.

> *Solus Filius, proprie loquendo, est imago.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod imago in divinis non tantum dicit expressionem personae, sed etiam in summo. Expressio autem duo ponit, scilicet quod sit unius ad unum, et in summo, quod sit secundum omnem modum. Quod sit unius ad unum, ponit per hoc, quod «illud quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit»[^8]; et si sit essentiale, essentiae; si personale, personae. Nam unum in summo non potest exprimere plura vel plures[^9], unum inquam, in quo nulla est diversitas. Similiter unum summe non potest exprimi a pluribus, ut plures sunt, quia tunc omnino indifferentes essent. — Ponit etiam aliud, videlicet, ut sit expressio secundum omnem modum. Nam si ex aliquo respectu non habet exprimere, non exprimeret summe.

Propter primam rationem solus Filius est imago, quia solus ab uno procedit, Spiritus autem sanctus a duobus, et ideo aequaliter utrumque exprimit, et ideo neutrum in summo. Propter secundam rationem solus Filius est imago, quia secundum omnem respectum habet rationem exprimendi[^10], et in quantum comparatur ad illum a quo est, et in quantum comparatur ad illum qui ex ipso est. In quantum comparatur ad illum a quo est, quia exit per modum naturae, et ita per modum verbi et speciei et per modum similitudinis expressae. In quantum comparatur ad illum qui est ex eo, quia per omnia et eodem modo spirat Filius, ut Pater[^11]. Spiritus sanctus autem in nullo horum convenit; ideo ratio imaginis est in solo Filio, quia ab uno tantum procedit, et quia per modum naturae, quia etiam consimiliter producit Spiritum sanctum. — Media tamen ratio, quia per modum naturae, est ratio propria, aliae vero faciunt ad congruitatem.

Concedendum igitur, quod solus Filius, loquendo proprie, est imago, et eo quo filius, eo est imago, et eo ipso verbum. Sed filius dicit solum respectum ad Patrem, imago principaliter ad Patrem sed consequenter respectum ad aliam personam, verbum principaliter respectum ad Patrem, et consequenter respectum ad creaturam. Unde eadem notio sunt ipsius Filii, tamen alio et alio modo significata. Unde non est superfluitas.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod Damascenus fuit Graecus; Graeci autem non ita proprie accipiunt rationem imaginis, ut Latini, quia nec de origine personarum sic sane intelligunt. — Vel potest dici, quod sermo Augustini et Damasceni intelligitur causaliter, quia reformat nos ad imaginem Christi[^12].

*2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod utraque definitio imaginis convenit Spiritui sancto; dicendum, sicut infra patebit[^13], quod species et similitudo, ut ibi accipitur, convenit soli Filio.

*3. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de assimilatione et aequalitate, dicendum, quod Filius non dicitur imago propter assimilationem in substantia, sed propter modum emanandi; et in hoc non habet Spiritus sanctus expressissimam similitudinem nec cum Filio nec cum Patre, ideo nullius est imago.

english:
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### Question II. *Whether 'image' is said properly of the Son in divine matters.*

Secondly, it is asked whether *image* is proper to the Son. And that it is, seems [to follow]:

1. By Hilary[^1], in the appropriation set forth: "Eternity in the Father, beauty in the Image, use in the Gift." *Father* is said properly, likewise *Gift*: therefore if they are rightly assigned, equally *image* is said properly of the Son.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^2]: "The Son alone is the image of the Father," and more expressly: "He is *Son* by that whereby he is *image* and *word*": therefore on this account, since *son* expresses a personal relation, the matter is plain.

3. Likewise, an image is an expressed likeness, and in the divine [it is] a most expressive likeness[^3]; but a most expressive likeness cannot belong to several distinct [entities]: if therefore the Son is from one [principle], and the Holy Spirit equally from two, therefore [the Holy Spirit] cannot be image.

4. Likewise, *image* in the divine is considered according to the imitation of a person, not of essence[^4], since it is not the image of essence but of a person: therefore in order that one person be the image of another, it is necessary that it imitate that [person] in that which regards the person *as* person; but the emanation or production of a person regards the person as person; for the production of a creature regards substance. Since, therefore, only the Son imitates the Father in the production of a person, only the Son is image.

**On the contrary:**

1. Damascene[^5] says that "the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son": therefore to be image is not proper to the Son.

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by both definitions of Hilary[^6]. And the first is: "An image is, of that thing toward which it is imaged, an undifferentiated species"; but this applies to the Holy Spirit: therefore [he is] also image. The second is: "An image is, of a thing for the equating of a thing, an imaged and undivided likeness"; but this applies to the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

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3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason, since for there to be an image these two suffice, namely imitation according to likeness and according to equality[^7]; but these two are found in the person of the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as the Son proceeds from the Father as expressing the Father, so the Holy Spirit [proceeds] from the Son as expressing the Son: therefore just as the Son is the image of the Father, so the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son.

### Conclusion.

> *The Son alone, properly speaking, is image.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *image* in the divine expresses not only the expression of a person, but also [an expression] in the highest [degree]. Now expression posits two things, namely that it be of one to one, and, in the highest [degree], that it be according to every mode. That it be of one to one is established by this, that "what is said by superabundance applies to one alone"[^8]; and if it be essential, [it applies] to the essence; if personal, to the person. For the *one* in the highest [degree] cannot express many or several[^9] — the *one*, I say, in which there is no diversity. Likewise the supremely *one* cannot be expressed by several, insofar as they are several, since then they would be entirely undifferentiated. — He posits also another [requirement], namely that it be expression according to every mode. For if from some respect it does not [serve] to express, it would not express in the highest [degree].

By the first reason, only the Son is image, since he alone proceeds from one, but the Holy Spirit from two, and therefore expresses each equally, and therefore [expresses] neither in the highest [degree]. By the second reason, only the Son is image, since according to every respect he has the account of expressing[^10], both insofar as he is compared to him from whom he is, and insofar as he is compared to him who is from him. Insofar as he is compared to him from whom he is, [it is] because he goes forth by way of nature, and so by way of *word* and *species* and by way of expressed likeness. Insofar as he is compared to him who is from him, [it is] because the Son spirates in all things and in the same mode as the Father[^11]. But the Holy Spirit agrees in none of these; therefore the account of *image* is in the Son alone, since he proceeds from one alone, and since [he proceeds] by way of nature, since likewise he produces the Holy Spirit. — Yet the middle reason, namely that [he proceeds] by way of nature, is the proper reason; the others contribute to the fittingness.

It must therefore be conceded that only the Son, speaking properly, is image; and by that whereby he is *son*, by the same he is *image*, and by the very same he is *word*. But *son* expresses only a regard to the Father; *image* [expresses] principally [a regard] to the Father but consequently a regard to another person; *word* [expresses] principally a regard to the Father, and consequently a regard to a creature. Whence they are the same notion of the Son himself, yet signified in one mode and another. Whence there is no superfluity.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*1.* To that which is objected from Damascene, it must be said that Damascene was a Greek; but the Greeks do not take the account of *image* as properly as the Latins, since neither do they understand the origin of the persons in the same sound way. — Or it can be said that the discourse of Augustine and of Damascene is understood causally, since [Christ] reforms us toward the image of Christ[^12].

*2.* To that which is objected, that both definitions of *image* apply to the Holy Spirit; it must be said, as will appear below[^13], that *species* and *likeness*, as taken there, apply to the Son alone.

*3. 4.* To that which is objected concerning assimilation and equality, it must be said that the Son is not called *image* on account of assimilation in substance, but on account of the mode of emanating; and in this the Holy Spirit has neither with the Son nor with the Father a most expressive likeness, and therefore is the image of nothing.

la: Lib. II. *de Trin.* n. 1, ubi in originali sic legitur: *In Patre... infinitas, in aeterno, species* etc. Vide hic *lit. Magistri*, c. 2, ubi et haec appropriata exponuntur.

en: Book II *On the Trinity*, n. 1, where in the original the text reads thus: "In the Father... infinity; in the eternal, beauty" etc. See here the *Master's text*, c. 2, where these appropriations are also expounded.

la: Cap. 2. n. 3. — Textus subsequens habetur ibid. libr. VII. c. 2. n. 3: *Eo quippe Filius quo Verbum, et eo Verbum quo Filius... Et haec duo cum dicuntur, id est nata sapientia, in uno eorum, eo quod est nata, et verbum et imago et filius intelligatur, et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia, quia relative dicuntur* etc. Cfr. supra d. XXVII. c. 4. circa finem.

en: Chapter 2, n. 3. — The text following is found at the same place, book VII, c. 2, n. 3: "He is Son indeed by that whereby he is Word, and Word by that whereby he is Son... And when these two are said — that is, *born wisdom* — in one of them (namely, in that he is born) Word and Image and Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not shown, since they are said relatively" etc. Cf. above d. XXVII, c. 4, near the end.

la: Cfr. August., libr. *83 Qq.* q. 74. Quomodo propositio immediate sequens intelligenda sit, explicatur in corp. quaest. — Plures codd. ut AH LM (Q T in marg.) Z cum ed. 1 post *potest esse* interserunt *nisi*; mendose.

en: Cf. Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 74. How the immediately following proposition is to be understood is explained in the body of the question. — Several codices, such as AH LM (Q T in margin) Z, with edition 1, insert *nisi* after *potest esse*; erroneously.

la: Vat. addit *persona*.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *persona*.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 13: *Imago Patris est Filius, ac Filii Spiritus.*

en: Book I, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13: "The image of the Father is the Son, and [the image] of the Son [is] the Spirit."

la: Libr. *de Synod.* n. 13. Vide hic *lit. Magistri*, c. 2. Secundam definitionem, a Vat. et plurimis codd. nec non ab ed. 1 indebite omissam, supplevimus ex codd. PQ; cod. T eam in margine exhibet.

en: Book *On the Synods*, n. 13. See here the *Master's text*, c. 2. The second definition, unduly omitted by the Vatican [edition] and by very many codices, and also by edition 1, we have supplied from codices PQ; codex T exhibits it in the margin.

la: Cfr. August., lib. *83 Qq.* q. 74, ubi conceptus imaginis, aequalitatis et similitudinis exponuntur et inter se comparantur.

en: Cf. Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 74, where the concepts of *image*, *equality* and *likeness* are expounded and compared among themselves.

la: Aristot., V. *Topic.* c. 2. et 3. (c. 5.): τὸ γὰρ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἑνὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει [?]. Verba *καθ' ὑπερβολήν*, quae a Boethio Latine redduntur *per superabundantiam*, ab aliis *in excellentia*, habent eandem vim, quae a grammaticis superlativo vindicatur.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* V, c. 2 and 3 (c. 5): "For what is according to superabundance belongs to one alone." [?] The words *kath' hyperbolēn*, which by Boethius are rendered into Latin as *per superabundantiam*, by others as *in excellentia*, have the same force which by the grammarians is claimed for the superlative.

la: Sic Vat. cum ed. 1. Codd. cum ceteris edd. post *plures* adiungunt *unum*, qua voce adiuncta, propositio fit disiunctiva, et ponitur illud membrum divisionis, quod in constructione passiva exprimitur verbis *Similiter unum* etc. Tunc autem necessario supplendum esset: *Non unum plura* (in summo exprimere potest); quae verba fortasse a librariis omissa sunt. — Paulo inferius pro *differentes*, quod Vat. exhibet, ex codd. FI P Q T X restituimus *indifferentes*, contextu hanc vocem requirente.

en: So the Vatican [edition] with edition 1. The codices with the other editions add *unum* after *plures*; with this word added, the proposition becomes disjunctive, and that member of the division is set down which in the passive construction is expressed by the words *Similiter unum* etc. But then this would need to be supplied: "*Not one* [can express] *many* (in the highest [degree])"; which words perhaps were omitted by the copyists. — A little below, in place of *differentes*, which the Vatican [edition] exhibits, we have restored *indifferentes* from codices FI P Q T X, the context requiring this word.

la: Cod. K sic prosequitur: *Exprimit enim, in quantum comparatur ad Patrem, a quo est, et in quantum comparatur ad Spiritum sanctum, qui ex ipso est, et in quantum comparatur ad illum a quo, quia exit* etc.

en: Codex K continues thus: "For he expresses, both insofar as he is compared to the Father, from whom he is, and insofar as he is compared to the Holy Spirit, who is from him, and insofar as he is compared to him from whom [he is], since he goes forth" etc.

la: Cod. K adiicit *ut Pater*.

en: Codex K adds *ut Pater*.

la: Quam sententiam Damascenus verbis, quae supra in prima obiectione citantur, subnexis sic exprimit: *Per quem Christus, in homine habitans, ad imaginem Dei esse eidem impertit.* — Paulo superius consentiens omnium codd. et edd. lectio, quam et nos cum Vat. retinuimus, est *quod sermo Augustini et Damasceni* etc. At cum S. Doctor in prima ex praecedentibus obiectionibus mentionem Augustini non faciat, sed tantum Damasceni, non intelligitur, cur hic etiam Augustinum appellet. Quare recte coniciendum videtur, verba illa *sermo Augustini* per errorem librariorum irrepsisse, loco quorum verborum in originali fortasse verba exstabant: *quod secundum Augustinum verbum Damasceni* etc. Huic coniecturae favet illud Alexandri Hal., *S.* q. 61. m. 3. a. 2: «Ad illud Damasc., quod: *Spiritus sanctus est imago Filii*; dicendum, quod Filius dicitur esse imago Patris multipliciter. Uno modo quasi effective; sicut enim artifex, habens imaginem Herculis in mente, per illam facit eam in materia; sic Pater per Filium imaginem dicitur operari imaginem creatam. Unde August. ad Ianuarium: *Imago invisibilis Patris Salvator noster est: quantum ad Patrem veritas est, quantum ad nos, quibus revelat, imago est.* Sed sicut Pater per Filium imaginem operatur imaginem creationis, ita per Spiritum sanctum imaginem recreationis; et ita Spiritus sanctus imago est, sicut Filius, scil. quasi effective. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum de Spiritu sancto, quod dicitur imago non simpliciter, sed quasi effective, scilicet respectu imaginis recreationis. Unde imago de Spiritu sancto duo importat: quod est a Filio, et quod est ab ipso donum, secundum quod in nobis est imago recreationis; sed absolute non est imago, sicut Filius, quia non est a Patre ut habens conformationem in productione personae ex se».

en: Damascene expresses this judgment in the words cited above in the first objection, with these subjoined: "Through whom Christ, dwelling in man, imparts to him being toward the image of God." — A little above, the reading on which all codices and editions agree, which we too with the Vatican [edition] have retained, is *quod sermo Augustini et Damasceni* etc. But since the Holy Doctor in the first of the preceding objections makes no mention of Augustine, but only of Damascene, it is not intelligible why he here also names Augustine. Wherefore it seems rightly to be conjectured that those words *sermo Augustini* crept in by error of the copyists, in place of which words there were perhaps in the original the words: *quod secundum Augustinum verbum Damasceni* etc. To this conjecture is favorable that [passage] of Alexander of Hales, *S.* q. 61, m. 3, a. 2: "To that of Damascene, that *the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son*; it must be said that the Son is said to be the image of the Father in many ways. In one way as it were *effectively*; for as the artisan, having the image of Hercules in mind, by it makes it in matter, so the Father is said through the Son to work the created image. Whence Augustine *to Januarius*: *The image of the invisible Father is our Savior: as regards the Father he is the truth; as regards us to whom he reveals, he is the image.* But just as the Father through the Son works the image of creation as image, so through the Holy Spirit [he works] the image of re-creation; and so the Holy Spirit is image, as the Son [is], namely as it were effectively. According to this, then, it must be said of the Holy Spirit that he is called *image* not simply, but as it were effectively, namely with respect to the image of re-creation. Whence *image* with respect to the Holy Spirit imports two things: that he is from the Son, and that he is from him as gift, according to which there is in us the image of re-creation; but absolutely he is not *image*, as the Son [is], since he is not from the Father as having conformation in the production of the person from himself."

la: *In quaest. seq.* — Vat., quae in ipsa obiectione plura omisit, hic cum plerisque codd. omittit *utraque* ante *definitio*, nec non et *similitudo* ante *ut ibi*. Suppressa verba supplevimus ex codd. PQ.

en: *In the following question.* — The Vatican [edition], which in the objection itself omitted several things, here with most of the codices omits *utraque* before *definitio*, and likewise *similitudo* before *ut ibi*. We have supplied the suppressed words from codices PQ.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod nomen *imago* de Filio recte dicatur, constat ex sacra Scriptura (Col. 1, 15; II *Cor.* 4, 4; *Hebr.* 1, 3); quod sit proprium eiusdem nomen, contra Durandum et paucos alios a Latinis doctoribus communiter docetur, dum Graeci etiam Spiritui S. hoc nomen attribuunt. — Attamen de rationibus assignandis, quare hoc nomen proprie de Filio dicatur, doctores nostri non conveniunt. S. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 38. a. 2.) solummodo hanc approbat, quod «Filius procedit ut verbum, de cuius ratione est similitudo speciei ad id a quo procedit, non autem de ratione amoris» etc. Eandem rationem, quam immerito Aureolus aliique impugnant, etiam S. Bonav. affert tanquam rationem «propriam», et alias plures, quae ad duas reduci possunt, ut congruas adiungit (fund. 3. 4. et in corp.). Prima est: Filius est ab uno, et imago summe expressiva non potest esse nisi unius ad unum, vel (ut paulo aliter dicunt Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petrus a Tar.) imaginis non est imago. Hanc rationem S. Thom. (loc. cit.) nihil valere asserit. Secunda est, quia Filius convenit cum Patre in una spiratione, non vero Spiritus S., de qua ratione S. Thom. dicit: «Sed hoc non videtur sufficere». Hoc facile ex mente S. Bonaventurae concedi potest. Monet autem Dionys. Carth. (d. 28. q. 4.), etiam has duas rationes, ut congruas auctoritate Richardi a S. Victore, Alexandri, Alberti et aliorum commendatas, non penitus negligendas esse. — Quomodo differant *filius*, *verbum*, *imago*, in fine respons. tangitur; cfr. d. 27. p. II. dub. 2, et q. 2.

**II.** De quaestione ipsa: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 61. m. 3. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 2. a. 3; *S.* loc. cit. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., I. *Sent.* d. 28. princ. 2. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 69. q. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** That the name *image* is rightly said of the Son is established from sacred Scripture (Col. 1:15; II *Cor.* 4:4; *Heb.* 1:3); that it is the proper name of the same [Son] is taught commonly by the Latin doctors, against Durandus and a few others, while the Greeks attribute this name also to the Holy Spirit. — Yet concerning the reasons to be assigned why this name is said properly of the Son, our doctors do not agree. St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 38, a. 2) approves only this: that "the Son proceeds as a *word*, of whose account is the likeness of species to that from which it proceeds, but [this is] not of the account of love" etc. The same reason, which Aureolus and others undeservedly attack, St. Bonaventure also brings forward as the "proper" reason, and several others, which can be reduced to two, he adjoins as fitting (*fund.* 3, 4, and in the body). The first is: the Son is from one, and a supremely expressive image cannot be except of one to one, or (as Alex. Hal., B. Albert, Peter a Tarantasia put it a little differently) [there] is not an image of an image. This reason St. Thomas (loc. cit.) asserts to have no value. The second is that the Son agrees with the Father in one spiration, but the Holy Spirit not, of which reason St. Thomas says: "But this does not seem to suffice." This can readily be conceded according to the mind of St. Bonaventure. But Dionysius Carthusianus (d. 28, q. 4) warns that these two reasons also, as fitting [reasons] commended by the authority of Richard of St. Victor, Alexander, Albert and others, are not entirely to be neglected. — How *son*, *word*, *image* differ is touched on at the end of the response; cf. d. 27, p. II, dub. 2, and q. 2.

**II.** On the question itself: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 61, m. 3. — St. Thom., I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 2, a. 3; *S.* at the place cited. — Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 3, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 28, a. 3, q. 2. — Ægid. R., I *Sent.* d. 28, *princ.* 2, q. 3. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 69, q. 4.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Quare aeternitas approprietur Patri, species Imagini, et usus Muneri.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, quare aeternitas approprietur Patri, species Imagini et usus Muneri. Videtur, quod non sit bona appropriatio Hilarii[^1]:

1. Quia omnes divinae personae simul aeternae et coaequales sunt, et aeternitas abstrahit ab actu personae: ergo non est appropriabilis.

2. Item, quaeritur, quare species appropriatur imagini? Aut enim sumitur ibi *species*, ut species dicitur *forma*, aut *pulcritudo*: si forma; sed sicut natura nulli[^2] est appropriabilis, sic nec species. Si autem pulcritudo; sed pulcritudo imaginis refertur ad prototypum: ergo ad Patrem; ergo illi debet appropriari.

3. Item, Dionysius[^3] dicit, quod «bonum et pulcrum idem est»: ergo cum bonitas sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto, ergo et pulcritudo.

4. Item, Hilarius[^4] dicit, quod «oportet imaginem habere essentiam et naturam et speciem auctoris». Quare ergo magis definit imaginem per speciem quam aliquod aliorum?

5. Item, non est utendum Deo, sed solum creatura[^5]: ergo usus nulli personae est appropriabilis; ergo nec Spiritui sancto.

### Conclusio.

> *Congrue appropriatur aeternitas Patri propter carentiam principii; usus, ut dicit generaliter actum voluntatis, Spiritui sancto propter modum emanationis, id est secundum voluntatem; Filio autem species, quia species dicit similitudinem, rationem cognoscendi, et pulcritudinem: quae omnia illi congruunt, quia emanat per modum naturae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista appropriatio Hilarii fuit ad explicandam personarum originem sive emanationem. Quoniam igitur persona Patris emanatione et origine caret, ideo illud debuit ei appropriari, quod importat privationem principii. Tale autem est hoc nomen *aeternitas*. Aeternum enim est quod principio caret[^6]. Et licet de suo nomine non dicat nisi privationem initii durationis, per appropriationem tamen dicit privationem omnis principii.

1. Et sic patet prima obiectio.

Spiritus vero sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis et amoris; et ita debuit ei appropriari nomen, quod actum exprimit voluntatis; hoc autem est hoc nomen *usus*. «Nam uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis»[^7], sive ad utendum sive ad fruendum. Quoniam ergo assumtio ad fruendum est per amorem, similiter ad utendum, quia amor est pondus et ordo[^8]: ideo *usus* recte appropriatur Spiritui sancto.

5. Et sic patet ultimo quaesitum, scilicet quod *usus* accipitur hic, non prout dividitur contra fruitionem, sed prout dicit amoris complexum et[^9] actum liberum.

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Filius vero emanat per modum naturae; et quia emanat per modum naturae[^10], ideo emanat per modum perfectae et expressae similitudinis. Nam natura producit sibi simile et aequale. Et quia habet rationem expressae similitudinis, ideo et cognitionis, quia expressa similitudo est ratio cognoscendi[^11]. Et quia per modum perfectae similitudinis et rationis habet in se rationem et exemplar omnium, inde est, quod habet rationem perfectae pulcritudinis. Quia enim est perfecta et expressa similitudo, ideo pulcher est in comparatione ad eum quem exprimit. Quia vero rationem cognoscendi habet, et non unius tantum, sed totius universitatis; ideo «pulcrum *pulcherrimus* ipse mundum mente gerens»[^12], pulcritudinem habet in comparatione ad omnem pulcritudinem exemplatam. Ex his duobus relinquitur perfectissima pulcritudo. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus[^13]: «Pulcritudo non est aliud quam aequalitas numerosa». Quoniam igitur in comparatione ad Patrem habet pulcritudinem aequalitatis, quia perfecte exprimit, sicut pulcra imago; in comparatione vero ad res habet omnes rationes, secundum quod dicit Augustinus[^14], quod «est ars plena omnium rationum viventium»: ideo patet, quod in Filio recte reperitur ratio omnis pulcritudinis. — Eo igitur quo Filius per modum naturae emanat, habet rationem perfectae et expressae similitudinis; eo quod habet rationem perfectae similitudinis, habet rationem cognitionis; et ratione utriusque habet rationem pulcritudinis. Quoniam igitur nomen *speciei* importat similitudinem et importat cognoscendi rationem, importat etiam pulcritudinem — ut «species quidem Priami digna est imperio»[^15] — ideo elegantissime appropriatur Filio.

2. 4. Patet ergo, quare illud nomen magis appropriat Hilarius Filio quam aliud, quare etiam magis definit imaginem per illud nomen quam per aliquod aliud.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod pulcritudo imaginis refertur ad prototypum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen aliter refertur honor, aliter pulcritudo: quia honor imaginis sive picturae ita refertur ad prototypum, quod in ipsa non est secundum se honor, sicut patet, si honoretur iconia beati Nicolai[^16]; sed pulcritudo ita refertur ad prototypum, quod nihilominus est in imagine pulcritudo, non solum in eo cuius est imago. Et potest ibi reperiri duplex ratio pulcritudinis, quamvis in eo cuius est, non nisi una inveniatur. Quod patet, quia imago dicitur pulcra, quando bene protracta est, dicitur etiam pulcra, quando bene repraesentat illum, ad quem est. Et quod ista sit alia ratio pulcritudinis, patet, quia contingit unam esse sine alia: quemadmodum dicitur imago diaboli pulcra, quando

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bene repraesentat foeditatem diaboli, et tunc foeda est. Et ideo Hilarius, approprians speciem sive pulcritudinem Filio, magis appropriat sub nomine imaginis quam sub nomine filii.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est bonum et pulcrum: dicendum, quod Dionysius non vult dicere, quod sint unum ratione, sed quod sint unum re. Sed quoniam ratione differunt, ideo potest alicui appropriari unum, quod non appropriatur alterum.

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### Question III. *Why eternity is appropriated to the Father, species to the Image, and use to the Gift.*

Thirdly, it is asked why eternity is appropriated to the Father, *species* (beauty) to the Image, and *use* to the Gift. It seems that Hilary's appropriation[^1] is not a good one:

1. Because all the divine persons are equally eternal and coequal, and *eternity* abstracts from the act of a person: therefore it is not appropriable.

2. Likewise, it is asked: why is *species* appropriated to the Image? For there *species* is taken either as *species* is called *form*, or as *beauty*: if as form — but just as *nature* is appropriable to none[^2], so neither is *species*. If as beauty — but the beauty of the image is referred to the prototype: therefore to the Father; therefore it ought to be appropriated to him.

3. Likewise, Dionysius[^3] says that "the good and the beautiful are the same": therefore, since *goodness* is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, so also is *beauty*.

4. Likewise, Hilary[^4] says that "an image must have the essence and nature and species of the author." Why then does he define an image more by *species* than by any of the others?

5. Likewise, God is not to be *used*, but only the creature[^5]: therefore *use* is appropriable to no person; therefore not even to the Holy Spirit.

### Conclusion.

> *Eternity is fittingly appropriated to the Father on account of his lack of a principle; use, as it generally signifies the act of will, [is appropriated] to the Holy Spirit on account of the mode of emanation, that is, according to will; but species [is appropriated] to the Son, since species expresses likeness, the ground of knowing, and beauty: all of which fit him, since he emanates by way of nature.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this appropriation of Hilary was made for the sake of explaining the origin or emanation of the persons. Since therefore the person of the Father lacks emanation and origin, that ought to be appropriated to him which imports the privation of a principle. And such is this name *eternity*. For the eternal is what lacks a principle[^6]. And although by its own meaning it expresses only the privation of a beginning of duration, by appropriation it nonetheless expresses the privation of every principle.

1. And thus the first objection is answered.

Now the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will and love; and so there had to be appropriated to him a name which expresses the act of will; and this is the name *use*. For "to use is to take something up into the resource of the will"[^7], whether for using or for enjoying. Since therefore the assumption [of something] for enjoying is through love, likewise [assumption] for using, since love is weight and order[^8]: therefore *use* is rightly appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

5. And thus the last [point] inquired about is plain, namely that *use* is taken here, not as it is divided over against *enjoyment*, but as it expresses the embrace of love and[^9] the free act.

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But the Son emanates by way of nature; and since he emanates by way of nature[^10], therefore he emanates by way of perfect and expressed likeness. For nature produces what is like and equal to itself. And since he has the account of an expressed likeness, therefore [he has] also [the account] of cognition, since an expressed likeness is the ground of knowing[^11]. And since by way of perfect likeness and ground he has in himself the account and exemplar of all things, hence it is that he has the account of perfect beauty. For since he is a perfect and expressed likeness, therefore he is *beautiful* in comparison to him whom he expresses. Since indeed he has the ground of knowing, and not only of one [thing] but of the whole universe, therefore "the most beautiful, bearing the world beautifully in his mind"[^12], he has beauty in comparison to all exemplified beauty. From these two there results most perfect beauty. For as Augustine says[^13]: "Beauty is nothing other than numerical equality." Since therefore in comparison to the Father he has the beauty of equality, since he expresses [him] perfectly, as a beautiful image; but in comparison to things he has all the accounts [or "reasons"], according as Augustine says[^14] that "he is the art full of all the living reasons": therefore it is plain that in the Son the account of every beauty is rightly found. — Therefore by the same fact that the Son emanates by way of nature, he has the account of perfect and expressed likeness; by the fact that he has the account of perfect likeness, he has the account of cognition; and by reason of both he has the account of beauty. Since therefore the name *species* imports likeness, and imports the ground of knowing, it imports also beauty — as in "the species (beauty) of Priam, indeed, is worthy of empire"[^15] — therefore [*species*] is most elegantly appropriated to the Son.

2. 4. It is plain therefore why Hilary appropriates that name to the Son rather than another, and why too he defines an image by that name rather than by any other.

To that, then, which is objected, that the beauty of an image is referred to the prototype, it must be said that this is true, but yet *honor* is referred [to the prototype] in one way, and *beauty* in another: for the honor of an image or picture is so referred to the prototype that in the [image] itself there is not honor in itself, as is plain if the icon of blessed Nicholas is honored[^16]; but beauty is so referred to the prototype that nonetheless beauty is in the image [as well], not only in him whose image it is. And there can be found there a twofold account of beauty, although in him whose [image] it is, only one is found. Which is plain, since an image is called *beautiful* when it is well drawn, and is also called *beautiful* when it well represents him toward whom it is. And that this is another account of beauty is plain, since it happens that the one is without the other: just as an image of the devil is said to be *beautiful* when

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it well represents the foulness of the devil, and is then itself foul. And therefore Hilary, when appropriating *species* or beauty to the Son, appropriates it more under the name of *image* than under the name of *son*.

3. To that which is objected, that *the good* and *the beautiful* are the same: it must be said that Dionysius does not mean that they are one in account, but that they are one in reality. But since they differ in account, therefore the one can be appropriated to someone, while the other is not appropriated.

la: Verba Hilarii invenies pag. 541, nota 1. — Paulo superius post *Videtur* codd. XZ inserunt *enim*. Post hoc argumentum in cod. K sequens invenitur interpositum: *Item, appropriatio est ad excludendum errorem: ergo cum magis possunt homines errare circa aeternitatem Filii quam Patris, magis Filio debet appropriari.*

en: The words of Hilary are to be found on p. 541, note 1. — A little above, after *Videtur*, codices XZ insert *enim*. After this argument, in codex K, the following is found inserted: "Likewise, appropriation is for excluding error: therefore since men can err more concerning the eternity of the Son than of the Father, [eternity] ought rather to be appropriated to the Son."

la: Pro *nulli*, quod auctoritate codd. QY et ed. 1 posuimus, Vat. *nulla*. Paulo superius post *ut species dicitur forma* codd. aa bb addunt *vel essentia*.

en: In place of *nulli*, which we have set down on the authority of codices QY and edition 1, the Vatican [edition] reads *nulla*. A little above, after *ut species dicitur forma*, codices aa bb add *vel essentia*.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 7: *ταὐτόν ἐστι τἀγαθὸν τῷ καλόν.* — Post *idem* codd. aa bb adiungunt *est conseguuntur* vel *se*. — Hoc argumentum, hoc Vat. loco positum, auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 ultimo loco posuimus.

en: *On the Divine Names*, c. 4, § 7: "The Good is the same as the Beautiful." — After *idem* codices aa bb add *est consequuntur* or *se*. — This argument, placed by the Vatican [edition] in this position, on the authority of the codices and of edition 1 we have placed in the last position.

la: Libr. *de Synod.* n. 13: *Ut rei imago sit, speciem necesse est et naturam et essentiam, secundum quod imago est, in se habeat auctoris.*

en: Book *On the Synods*, n. 13: "That something be the image of a thing, it is necessary that, according as it is image, it have in itself the species and nature and essence of its author."

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum aliquibus mss. perperam *Spiritus sanctus*.

en: Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 3. — At the end of the argument the Vatican [edition], with some manuscripts, wrongly reads *Spiritus sanctus*.

la: Richardus de S. Victore, II. *de Trin.* c. 4: *Sempiternum namque esse videtur, quod caret initio et fine; aeternum, quod caret utroque et omni mutabilitate.*

en: Richard of St. Victor, *On the Trinity* II, c. 4: "For *sempiternal* seems to be that which lacks beginning and end; *eternal*, that which lacks both and [lacks] all mutability."

la: August., X. *de Trin.* c. 11. n. 17. Vide supra d. 1. c. 3, et explicationem S. Doctoris ibi a. 1. q. 1.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* X, c. 11, n. 17. See above d. 1, c. 3, and the explanation of the Holy Doctor there at a. 1, q. 1.

la: August., XIII. *Confess.* c. 9. n. 10: *Pondus meum amor meus, eo feror quocumque feror.* Cfr. etiam XI. *de Civ. Dei* c. 28, et XV. c. 22, ubi et docetur, in amore requiri ordinem.

en: Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, c. 9, n. 10: "My weight is my love; by it I am borne wherever I am borne." Cf. also *On the City of God* XI, c. 28, and XV, c. 22, where it is also taught that in love an order is required.

la: Codd. K V X subiiciunt *ita*.

en: Codices K V X add *ita*.

la: Verba *et quia emanat per modum naturae*, quae in plurimis codd. et ed. 1 exstant, in Vat. et aliquibus codd. desiderantur. — De ratione mox addita vide supra pag. 134, nota 10.

en: The words *et quia emanat per modum naturae*, which are found in very many codices and in edition 1, are wanting in the Vatican [edition] and in some codices. — On the reason added shortly afterward, see above p. 134, note 10.

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. q. 3. ad 4, et infra d. 33. q. 1. in corp., et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 38. (c. 8.), ac libr. *de Memoria et Reminisc.* c. 2. (c. 1.). — Paulo inferius post *rationem* Vat. repetit *cognoscendi*, neque codd. neque edd. 1, 2, 3 suffragantibus.

en: Cf. above d. 6, q. 3, ad 4, and below d. 33, q. 1, in the body, and Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 38 (c. 8), and the book *On Memory and Reminiscence*, c. 2 (c. 1). — A little below, after *rationem*, the Vatican [edition] repeats *cognoscendi*, with neither the codices nor editions 1, 2, 3 supporting [the repetition].

la: Boeth., III. *de Consol.* metr. 9. — Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 addit *ut ait Boethius*, et mox pro *exemplatam* substituit *extraneam*, paucis tantum suffulta codd. Cod. R *exemplati* pro *exemplatam*.

en: Boethius, *On Consolation* III, *metrum* 9. — The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and of edition 1, adds *ut ait Boethius*, and shortly afterward in place of *exemplatam* substitutes *extraneam*, supported by only a few codices. Codex R reads *exemplati* in place of *exemplatam*.

la: Libr. VI. *de Musica* c. 13. n. 38: *An aliud quam aequalitatem numerosam esse arbitraris (pulcritudinem)?* Cfr. et XXII. *de Civ. Dei* c. 19. n. 2. et 3.

en: Book VI *On Music*, c. 13, n. 38: "Or do you judge beauty to be anything other than numerical equality?" Cf. also XXII *On the City of God*, c. 19, nn. 2 and 3.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 11.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity*, c. 10, n. 11.

la: Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Specie*, iuxta mendosam translationem antiquam, qua usi sunt Scholastici (etiam Averroes sic legit). Verba *species Priami* B. Albertus, qui nomen *Priami* librariorum errore ortum esse non suspicabatur, sic explicare tentat in suo Commentario super Porphyrium: «Secundum quod dicimus, quod species Priami, Troiani regis (qui forma elegantissima fuit), digna est imperio; quia ex elegantia formae demonstratur dispositio ad virtutes» etc. At Boëthius (ed. Migne), Porphyrii textum Graecum recte Latine reddens, pro *Priami* legit *primum* (alii interpretes *prima*), quae vox et in Euripide habetur, ex quo verba illa citata sumta sunt. Euripidis verba in Latinum translata sunt: *Corpus habere, quod res pulcra mereatur.*

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. *On Species*, according to the faulty old translation which the Scholastics used (even Averroes reads it thus). The words *species Priami* (Priam's species), B. Albert, who did not suspect that the name *Priami* arose from a copyists' error, attempts to explain thus in his Commentary on Porphyry: "According as we say that the species [beauty] of Priam, the Trojan king (who was of most elegant form), is worthy of empire; because from the elegance of the form is shown the disposition toward the virtues" etc. But Boethius (ed. Migne), rightly rendering Porphyry's Greek text into Latin, in place of *Priami* reads *primum* (other translators *prima*), which word is also found in Euripides, from whom those cited words were taken. Euripides' words translated into Latin are: *To have a body which a beautiful thing would deserve.*

la: Sola Vat. hic addit *iconia beati Nicolai pulcra, quia decorem illius repraesentat, et inde placida est, et*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone here adds *the icon of blessed Nicholas is beautiful, because it represents his comeliness, and on that account is pleasing, and*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De ipsa ratione appropriationis et de duplici eius radice cfr. infra d. 34. q. 3, ubi etiam sermo est de appropriatione qua Patri tribuitur potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui S. bonitas; tertiam appropriationem vide hic a. 2. q. 3. (cfr. *Breviloq.* p. 1. c. 6.). In hac quaestione egregie exponitur appropriatio ex S. Hilario sumta.

Notandum est, quod in Filio sit ratio summae *pulcritudinis* ex duplice capite: ex parte Patris, quem perfectissima similitudine exprimit, et ex parte exemplatorum. Plura de ratione pulcritudinis vide II. *Sent.* d. 9. q. 8; IV. *Sent.* d. 49. p. II. a. 2. q. [?] in fundam.; *Itiner. mentis in Deum* c. 2; *Hexaem.* Serm. 6. 20. — Mentione digna est etiam doctrina in solut. ad. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 67. m. 1. — Scot., I. *Report.* d. 34. q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2 [?]; *S.* I. q. 39. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. 6. 7; *S.* p. I. tr. 12. q. 48. m. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic [?]. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., [?] 71. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. [?]. — Biel, hic q. [?].

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the very nature of *appropriation* and its twofold root, cf. below d. 34, q. 3, where there is also discussion of the appropriation by which *power* is attributed to the Father, *wisdom* to the Son, *goodness* to the Holy Spirit; for the third appropriation see here a. 2, q. 3 (cf. *Breviloquium* p. 1, c. 6). In this question the appropriation drawn from St. Hilary is excellently expounded.

It must be noted that in the Son the account of supreme *beauty* is found from a twofold source: from the side of the Father, whom he expresses with the most perfect likeness, and from the side of the things exemplified. For more on the account of beauty see II *Sent.* d. 9, q. 8; IV *Sent.* d. 49, p. II, a. 2, q. [?] in *fundam.*; *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* c. 2; *Hexaemeron* Sermo 6, n. 20. — Worthy of mention also is the doctrine in the solution to [obj.] 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 67, m. 1. — Scotus, I *Report.* d. 34, q. 3. — St. Thom., here q. 2 [?]; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 8. — B. Albert, here a. 8, 6, 7; *S.* p. I, tr. 12, q. 48, m. 2. — Ægid. R., here 2. *princ.* q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here [?]. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2, q. 1. — Henr. Gand., [?] 71, q. 4. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. [?]. — Biel, here q. [?].

---

translators_notes: [Notes pending]

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
#### *De appropriatione Augustini.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Consequenter est quaestio principalis de appropriatione Augustini[^1], quae est: «In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia». Et circa haec quaeruntur alia tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit dici esse unum cum creatura.

Secundo, utrum creatura possit dici unum cum creatura.

Tertio, de ratione appropriationis illorum trium.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus unum cum creatura dici possit.*

Quod autem Deus possit dici unum cum creatura, ostenditur:

1. Per auctoritatem Apostoli primae ad Corinthios sexto[^2]: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est.* Si unus spiritus[^3]: ergo unum ens et una res; et si hoc: ergo unum.

2. Item, homo qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est: aut ergo creatus, aut increatus; non creatus, quia Deus non est creatura: ergo unus increatus. Sed spiritus increatus est omnino unus: ergo homo adhaerens Deo est simpliciter unum cum Deo.

3. Item, magis unitur medium extremo quam extremum extremo; sed Spiritus sanctus est medium uniens viros iustos, et viri iusti, per ipsum uniti, sunt unum — Ioannis decimo septimo[^4]: *Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus* — ergo vir iustus cum Spiritu sancto potest dici unum.

4. Item, magis unitur membrum capiti quam membrum cum membro: ergo cum membra Christi sint unum in Christo, multo fortius membrum est idem capiti. Sed Christus est caput non tantum secundum humanitatem, sed etiam secundum divinitatem: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ex illo verbo, quod dicitur Ioannis decimo[^5]: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*, impugnant Sancti haeresim Arianam, et maxime Augustinus, ex hoc concludens, Arium errare, qui dicit, Filium

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aliam habere naturam. Si ergo ratio Augustini bona est, *unum* dicit unitatem in natura; sed tali modo non est unum Creator cum creatura: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc videtur alia ratione, quia quae maxime distant minimo sunt unum; sed Creator et creatura maxime distant: ergo non possunt simpliciter dici unum.

3. Item, si sunt unum, ergo aliquod unum; sed si aliquod unum sunt, ergo Deus et creatura habent aliquod commune; et si hoc, univocantur in aliquo. Ergo cum univocum simplicius sit, quam quae univocantur in ipso, aliquid est simplicius Deo.

4. Item, si Deus et creatura sunt unum, cum in infinitum distet a qualibet, qua ratione dicitur unum cum una, et cum qualibet. Sed quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem: ergo secundum hoc omnia sunt unum.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus non potest dici simpliciter unum cum creatura; sed cum quadam determinatione, ut* unus spiritus*, haec locutio recte usurpatur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus, ad hoc, quod aliqua sint unum, non sufficit conformitas voluntatis, sed necesse est praesupponi convenientiam in natura. Quoniam ergo Deus et creatura summe differunt in natura, ideo non debent dici unum, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae.

Quia vero vir iustus conformatur per caritatem voluntati divinae et ei adhaeret magis quam alicui alii, recte dicitur unum cum determinatione, ut puta *unus spiritus*. Spiritus enim voluntas dicitur et amor, unde *qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est*, quia unius et conformis voluntatis est.

**Ad argumenta:**

*1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur: *est unus spiritus, ergo una res*; dicendum, quod ibi est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Nam *unus* distrahitur a ratione sua per hoc quod est *spiritus*, et dicit ibi unitatem non per indivisionem sive unitatem naturae, sed per conformitatem voluntatis.

*2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: *aut unus spiritus creatus, aut increatus* etc.; dicendum, quod nec creatus, nec increatus. Nam *spiritus* non stat ibi pro substantia, sed pro actu voluntatis; et *unus* non importat nisi conformitatem affectus humani ad divinam voluntatem sive ad divinum amorem, quia amor transformat amantem in amatum.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur quod Spiritus est medium uniens; dicendum, quod unit quantum ad voluntatem, sed non quantum ad conformitatem naturae; et non dicuntur unum ratione conformitatis voluntatis solum. Ideo non valet, quia ligamen Spiritus non est tota causa quare sint unum.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod membra Christi sunt unum; dici potest, quod membra Christi non dicuntur unum simpliciter, sed unum corpus; et sic etiam Christus est unum cum membris, sed hoc est ratione humanitatis assumtae.

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### Article II. *On the appropriation of Augustine.*

Next there is the principal question concerning the appropriation of Augustine[^1], which is: "In the Father, unity; in the Son, equality; in the Holy Spirit, the concord of unity and equality." And concerning these, three further matters are inquired into.

First, it is asked whether God can be said to be one with a creature.

Second, whether a creature can be said to be one with [another] creature.

Third, concerning the account of the appropriation of those three.

### Question I. *Whether God can be said to be one with a creature.*

That God can be said to be one with a creature is shown:

1. By the authority of the Apostle, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] six[^2]: *He who adheres to God is one spirit.* If [he is] one spirit[^3]: therefore one being and one thing; and if this: therefore one.

2. Likewise, the man who adheres to God is one spirit: either, then, created or uncreated; not created, since God is not a creature: therefore one uncreated [spirit]. But the uncreated Spirit is altogether one: therefore the man adhering to God is simply one with God.

3. Likewise, the middle is more united to the extreme than extreme to extreme; but the Holy Spirit is the middle uniting just men, and just men, united through him, are one — John seventeen[^4]: *That they may be one, as we also are one* — therefore the just man with the Holy Spirit can be said to be one.

4. Likewise, the member is more united to the head than member to member: therefore, since the members of Christ are one in Christ, much more strongly is the member one with the head. But Christ is head not only according to humanity, but also according to divinity: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. From that word which is said in John ten[^5]: *I and the Father are one*, the holy [doctors] attack the Arian heresy, and especially Augustine, concluding from this that Arius errs, who says that the Son has

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another nature. If, then, Augustine's reasoning is good, *one* expresses unity in nature; but in this manner the Creator is not one with a creature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown by another reason, since those things which are most distant are least one; but the Creator and the creature are most distant: therefore they cannot be said simply to be one.

3. Likewise, if they are one, therefore some [unity is] one; but if they are some one [thing], therefore God and the creature have something in common; and if this, they are univocally [predicated] in something. Therefore, since the univocal is simpler than those things which are univocally [predicated] in it, something is simpler than God.

4. Likewise, if God and the creature are one — since he is infinitely distant from each one — by what reason is he said to be one with one [creature], rather than with any [creature]? But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another: therefore according to this all things are one.

### Conclusion.

> *God cannot be said simply to be one with a creature; but with a certain qualification, as* one spirit*, this manner of speaking is rightly employed.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as Augustine says, for some things to be one, conformity of will does not suffice, but it is necessary that an agreement in nature be presupposed. Since therefore God and the creature differ supremely in nature, on that account they ought not to be said to be one, as the reasons adduced for this prove.

But since the just man is conformed by charity to the divine will and adheres to it more than to anything else, he is rightly said to be one [with God] with a qualification, namely *one spirit*. For *spirit* is said [to be] will and love, whence *he who adheres to God is one spirit*, since he is of one and conformed will.

**To the arguments:**

*1.* To that which is objected: *he is one spirit, therefore one thing*; it must be said that there is here a fallacy of *secundum quid* and *simpliciter*. For *one* is drawn off from its [proper] account by [the addition of] the [word] *spirit*, and there expresses unity not by indivision or unity of nature, but by conformity of will.

*2.* To that which is objected: *either one spirit created or uncreated* etc.; it must be said: neither created nor uncreated. For *spirit* does not stand there for substance, but for the act of will; and *one* implies nothing but the conformity of human affection to the divine will or to divine love, since love transforms the lover into the beloved.

*3.* To that which is objected, that the Spirit is the uniting middle; it must be said that he unites with respect to the will, but not with respect to conformity of nature; and they are not said to be one by reason of conformity of will alone. Therefore [the argument] does not hold, since the bond of the Spirit is not the whole cause why they are one.

*4.* To that which is objected, that the members of Christ are one; it can be said that the members of Christ are not said to be one simply, but one body; and thus also Christ is one with [his] members, but this is by reason of the humanity assumed.

la: Libr. I. *de Doctr. christ.* c. 3. n. 3.

en: Book I, *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 3, n. 3.

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: Pro *unus* Vat. cum cod. cc ad minus, et paulo inferius adhaerendo pro adhaerens. Aliquanto superius ante non creatus codd. WX interiiciunt sed.

en: In place of *unus*, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc [reads] *ad minus*, and a little below *adhaerendo* for *adhaerens*. Somewhat earlier, before *non creatus*, codices W X insert *sed*.

la: Vers. 22. — Pro *sunt unum* — *Ioannis decimo septimo* — aliquibus mss. *sunt*. Unde *Ioannes*.

en: Verse 22. — In place of *sunt unum* — *John seventeen* — in some manuscripts *sunt*. Hence *John*.

la: Vers. 30. — Rationem Augustini, quae hic respicitur, vides hic in *lit. Magistri*, c. 4. Cfr. etiam IV. *de Trin.* c. 9, et II. *contra Maximin.* c. 20. n. 1.

en: Verse 30. — The reasoning of Augustine which is here referred to, you will see here in the *Master's text*, c. 4. Cf. also IV *On the Trinity*, c. 9, and II *Against Maximinus*, c. 20, n. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Antequam tractatur unitas, quatenus appropriatur Patri, praemittuntur duae quaestiones de unitate, quae esse potest inter Deum et creaturas, et inter creaturam et creaturam. — De Christo, quatenus est caput Ecclesiae, de quo fit mentio in solut. ad 4, cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1. § 1. — B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Ægid. R., I. *Sent.* d. 8. p. I. princ. 1. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. solummodo P. Bonaventuram exscribit.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Before unity is treated, insofar as it is appropriated to the Father, two questions are sent ahead concerning the unity that can exist between God and creatures, and between creature and creature. — Concerning Christ, insofar as he is head of the Church, of whom mention is made in the solution to [argument] 4, cf. III *Sent.* d. 13, a. 2, q. 1, 2, 3.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 1, a. 1, § 1. — B. Albert., *S.* p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, m. 1, a. 2, ad 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 1. — Ægid. R., I *Sent.* d. 8, p. I, *princ.* 1, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question here q. 2 transcribes only Bonaventure.

---


title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum una creatura cum alia simpliciter unum dici possit.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum una creatura possit dici unum cum alia; et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Apostolus primae ad Corinthios tertio[^1]: *Qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt*; sed alius erat plantans, ut Paulus, alius rigans, ut Apollo: ergo secundum hoc patet, quod una creatura potest dici unum cum alia.

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2. Item, Augustinus dicit et Magister ponit in littera[^2], quod recte dicuntur unum quae conveniunt in natura et voluntate; sed hoc habet una creatura cum alia: ergo etc.

3. Item, Dominus Matthaei decimo nono[^3]: *Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro*; hoc dixit de viro et uxore; sed si sunt, et non sunt duo, ergo sunt unum: ergo vir cum uxore potest dici unum, et sic etc.

4. Item, ab unitate principii materialis venit unitas simpliciter, quae est unitas numero[^4]; sed corpus est materiale principium in homine — qui autem adhaeret meretrici, unum corpus efficitur, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios sexto — ergo unum simpliciter, et sic etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Idem, simpliciter dictum, stat pro eodem numero[^5]: ergo unum, simpliciter dictum, stat pro uno numero; sed duae creaturae non sunt unum numero, quantumcumque conveniant: ergo non debent dici unum.

2. Item, si aliqua dicuntur unum propter convenientiam in natura, tunc ergo, cum homo et asinus conveniant in natura, sunt unum; quod non conceditur. Si dicas, quod ultra requiritur conformitas voluntatis[^6]; cum ergo viri peccatores conveniant et in natura et in voluntate, ergo debent dici unum: quod cum non dicantur, non sufficit ergo conformitas naturae et voluntatis.

3. Item, si homo ex coniunctione meretricis efficitur unum, cum omnis unitas sit a prima unitate[^7], haec unitas erit a prima unitate; sed talis unitas est detestabilis: ergo prima unitas facit unitatem detestabilem, ergo ipsa est vituperabilis.

### Conclusio.

> *Illa quae naturae, voluntatis et operationis conformitatem retinent, simpliciter unum possunt congrue dici; aliqua tamen istarum conditionum deficiente, non nisi unum secundum quid dicuntur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duae creaturae distinctae non possunt habere unitatem nisi per conformitatem; quaelibet autem conformitas non facit dici unum simpliciter, sed illa quae est conformitas simpliciter, non secundum quid. Ad plenam autem conformitatem requiritur triplex conformitas, scilicet in natura, in voluntate et in operatione; et quando illa tria concurrunt ad aliqua duo, tunc illa duo[^8] dicuntur unum: sicut Paulus et Apollo in natura erant conformes, quia uterque homo; in voluntate similiter, quia uterque salutem fidelium cupiebat; in actione similiter, quia uterque ad eam procurandam se exercebat, ille plantando et hic rigando, et utraque actio conformis, quia utraque erat per divini verbi praedicationem. Verbum enim divinum primo iactatum est semen, deinde accipit irrigationem pluviae. — Si autem sit conformitas in natura solum, non debent[^9] dici unum nisi secundum quid, scilicet cum determinatione diminuente, ut unum genere vel specie. Si solum in voluntate, tunc sunt unus spiritus, qui dicit amorem. Si unum in natura et voluntate, tunc unum corpus et una anima. Si unum in natura et actione, possunt dici unum cum determinatione, ut fornicator cum meretrice potest dici unum corpus; tamen non potest dici unum simpliciter, sicut vir et uxor. Nec viri mali ita unum, sicut viri boni, quia disconveniunt in volitis principaliter intentis. Quilibet enim malus bonum proprium quaerit et non commune.

Ex his patent quaesita. Concedendum enim est, aliqua duo dici unum simpliciter[^10], si habeant conformitatem, sicut dictum est, sicut probant primae rationes.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*1.* Ad illud autem quod quarto obiicitur, dicendum, quod non concludit, quia fornicator et meretrix non dicuntur unum corpus ratione substantiae corporalis, sed ratione operis carnalis, in quo uniuntur: et ideo non sequitur, quod debeant dici unum simpliciter.

*2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de uno in numero, dicendum, quod duplex est unitas, scilicet indivisionis et conformitatis. Unitas indivisionis attenditur in uno numero, et haec unitas est simpliciter; unitas vero conformitatis non est in uno numero, sed in his quibus contingit aliis conformari, ut dictum est.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, si propter conformitatem in natura dicuntur unum etc.; dicendum, quod propter conformitatem in natura et voluntate; et in natura non solum, secundum quod est rei essentia, sed ex qua pullulat pullulam[^11], hoc est in quantum est operationis principium; sic patet, quod homo et asinus non dicuntur unum. Patet etiam, quod mali homines non dicuntur unum, quia etsi

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concordant in fine propinquo et in opere, differunt tamen in remoto, quia quilibet quaerit quod suum est. Iusti autem e contrario; si enim aliquando dissentiant voluntates eorum in fine propinquo, conveniunt in remoto.

*4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas meretricis nullo modo est a Deo; dicendum, quod sicut in peccato est substantia actionis — et haec est a Deo — et deformitas — et haec non est a Deo: sic in unitate tali intelligendum est.

english:
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### Question II. *Whether one creature can be said simply to be one with another.*

Second, it is asked whether one creature can be said to be one with another; and that it can be, is shown in this way.

1. The Apostle, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] three[^1]: *He who plants and he who waters are one*; but Paul was one planting, and Apollos another watering: therefore from this it appears that one creature can be said to be one with another.

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2. Likewise, Augustine says, and the Master sets down in [his] text[^2], that those things are rightly said to be one which agree in nature and will; but one creature has this with another: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the Lord, [in] Matthew nineteen[^3]: *And so they are now not two, but one flesh*; this he said of husband and wife; but if they are, and are not two, therefore they are one: therefore husband with wife can be said to be one, and so etc.

4. Likewise, from the unity of the material principle there comes unity simply, which is unity in number[^4]; but the body is the material principle in man — and he who adheres to a harlot is made one body, as is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] six — therefore one simply, and so etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *The same*, said simply, stands for the same thing in number[^5]: therefore *one*, said simply, stands for one in number; but two creatures are not one in number, however much they agree: therefore they ought not to be said to be one.

2. Likewise, if certain things are said to be one on account of an agreement in nature, then, since man and ass agree in nature, they are one; which is not granted. If you should say that conformity of will is further required[^6], — since, then, sinful men agree both in nature and in will, they ought therefore to be said to be one: which, since they are not so said, conformity of nature and of will therefore does not suffice.

3. Likewise, if a man, by union with a harlot, is made one, since every unity is from the first unity[^7], this unity will be from the first unity; but such a unity is detestable: therefore the first unity makes a detestable unity, therefore it is itself blameworthy.

### Conclusion.

> *Those things which retain conformity of nature, of will, and of operation can fittingly be said simply to be one; yet, with any one of these conditions failing, they are said to be one only in a qualified sense.*

**I respond:** It must be said that two distinct creatures cannot have unity except by conformity; yet not every conformity makes [things] said to be one simply, but [only] that which is conformity simply, not in a qualified sense. For full conformity, however, a threefold conformity is required, namely in nature, in will, and in operation; and when those three concur in some two [things], then those two[^8] are said to be one: as Paul and Apollos were conformed in nature, since each was a man; in will likewise, since each desired the salvation of the faithful; in action likewise, since each exerted himself to procure it, the one by planting and the other by watering, and each action conformed [to the other], since each was through the preaching of the divine word. For the divine word, first cast forth, is the seed; thereafter it receives the watering of rain. — But if there is conformity in nature alone, they ought not[^9] to be said to be one except in a qualified sense, namely with a diminishing qualification, as one in genus or species. If [conformity is] in will alone, then they are *one spirit*, which expresses love. If [they are] one in nature and in will, then [they are] one body and one soul. If [they are] one in nature and in action, they can be said to be one with a qualification, as the fornicator with the harlot can be said to be one body; yet they cannot be said to be one simply, as husband and wife [can]. Nor are evil men one in the same way as good men, since they disagree in the things willed as principally intended. For every evil man seeks his own good and not the common [good].

From these things the points inquired into are clear. For it is to be granted that some two things are said to be one simply[^10], if they have conformity, as has been said, as the first reasons prove.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*1.* But to that which is objected fourthly, it must be said that it does not conclude, since the fornicator and the harlot are not said to be one body by reason of corporeal substance, but by reason of the carnal act, in which they are united: and therefore it does not follow that they ought to be said to be one simply.

*2.* To that which is objected concerning [being] one in number, it must be said that unity is twofold, namely [the unity] of indivision and [the unity] of conformity. The unity of indivision is regarded in [being] one in number, and this unity is [unity] simply; but the unity of conformity is not in [being] one in number, but in those things to which it happens to be conformed to others, as has been said.

*3.* To that which is objected, if on account of conformity in nature [some things] are said to be one etc.; it must be said: on account of conformity in nature and in will; and [conformity] in nature, not only insofar as it is the essence of the thing, but [in nature] from which [the essence] sprouts forth a sprout[^11], that is, insofar as [the nature] is the principle of operation; thus it is clear that man and ass are not said to be one. It is also clear that evil men are not said to be one, since although

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they agree in the proximate end and in the work, they nevertheless differ in the remote [end], since each seeks what is his own. The just, however, [are] on the contrary; for if at some time their wills should disagree in the proximate end, they agree in the remote [end].

*4.* To that which is objected, that the unity of the harlot is in no way from God; it must be said that, just as in sin there is the substance of the action — and this is from God — and the deformity — and this is not from God: so it is to be understood in such a unity.

la: Vers. 8. De verbis seqq. cfr. ibid. v. 6. — Mox pro *una* Val. *omnis*.

en: Verse 8. On the following words, cf. *ibid.* v. 6. — Soon, in place of *una*, the Vatican [edition reads] *omnis*.

la: *Hic*, c. 1. — In fine argumenti pro *creatura*, quam vocem ex codd. K Q T (ee u secunda manu) restituimus, Vat. *natura*.

en: *Here*, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, in place of *creatura*, which word we have restored from codices K Q T (ee u in a second hand), the Vatican [edition reads] *natura*.

la: Vers. 6.

en: Verse 6.

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 12. (IV. c. 6.): *Numero quidem (sunt unum), quorum materia una.* — Textus s. Scripturae hic citatus invenitur loc. cit. vers. 16.

en: Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 12 (IV, c. 6): *They are one in number whose matter is one.* — The text of holy Scripture here cited is found in the place cited, verse 16.

la: Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 6. (c. 3.): *Maxime autem indubitanter, quod unum est numero, idem ab omnibus videtur dici.*

en: Aristotle, I *Topics*, c. 6 (c. 3): *Most indubitably of all, what is one in number is seen by all to be called the same.*

la: Supple cum Vat. *contra*.

en: Supply, with the Vatican [edition], *contra* ["against this"].

la: Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 13. § 1. seq., et Boeth., *de Unitate ut uno*.

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 13, § 1ff., and Boethius, *On Unity as One*.

la: Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *tunc illa duo*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc omit *tunc illa duo* ["then those two"].

la: Aliqui codd. ut F H K Y Z *deberet* (*deberent*?).

en: Some codices, such as F H K Y Z, [read] *deberet* (*deberent*?).

la: Vat. cum cod. cc addit *tres*.

en: The Vatican [edition], together with codex cc, adds *tres* ["three"].

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 8. (IV. c. 4.) ait: «Natura vero dicitur uno quidem modo nascentium generatio... alio vero ex quo primo inexistente generatur quod gignitur». Haec verba in versione Arabico-latina sic redduntur: «Et dicitur natura uno modo de omnibus pullulantibus; et etiam dicitur natura illud, cum...» [Quaracchi quotation truncated mid-clause; remainder continues in printed apparatus but is not transcribed in this chunk.]

en: Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 8 (IV, c. 4), says: "But *nature* is said in one way [of] the generation of things being born... in another way [of] that from which, primarily inexisting, what is begotten is begotten." These words in the Arabic-Latin version are rendered thus: "And *nature* is said in one way of all things sprouting forth; and *nature* is also said [of] that, when..." [Quaracchi quotation truncated mid-clause; remainder not transcribed in this chunk.]

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro distinctione, posita in solutione sive ulteriori determinatione 1. argumenti ad oppositum, et in quaest. seq. ad 1, aliquid est indistinctum in se, distinctum a quolibet alio; unitas conformitatis, quae conformitas potest esse triplex, ut exponitur in textu. In sensu rigoroso solummodo unitas indivisionis est unitas simpliciter. Nihilominus in sensu largiore interdum, etiam deficiente unitate indivisionis, unitas conformitatis dici potest unitas simpliciter, scilicet quando conformitas est perfecta in natura, in voluntate, in actione, ut explicatur in corp. Ita apte exponuntur varii loci s. Scripturae. — Quoad solutionem ad ult., quod substantia actionis, quae est quasi substratum deformitatis, sit a Deo, cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.

**II.** Ipsa quaestio explicite tractatur tantum a B. Alberto, hic a. 13.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** As for the distinction set down in the solution, or rather in the further determination of the 1. argument on the opposite side, and in the following question, ad 1: something is undivided in itself, [yet] distinct from anything else; the unity of conformity, which conformity can be threefold, as is expounded in the text. In the strict sense, only the unity of indivision is unity simply. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, sometimes — even with the unity of indivision failing — the unity of conformity can be called unity simply, namely when the conformity is perfect in nature, in will, in action, as is explained in the body [of the question]. Thus the various passages of holy Scripture are aptly expounded. — As for the solution to the last [argument], that the substance of the action, which is as it were the substrate of the deformity, is from God, cf. II *Sent.* d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.

**II.** The question itself is treated explicitly only by B. Albert, here a. 13.

---


title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Qua ratione unitas approprietur Patri, aequalitas Filio, concordia Spiritui sancto.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur de ratione appropriationis trium nominum praedictorum.

1. Et primo de unitate. Et quod non sit appropriabilis, videtur, quia *unum et ens convertuntur*[^1]; ergo unitas et essentia; sed essentia nulli est appropriabilis: ergo nec unitas.

2. Item, si appropriatur, cum Spiritus sanctus sit amborum unitas, ut dicit Augustinus[^2], videtur, quod debeat appropriari personae Spiritus sancti.

3. Item, obiicitur de aequalitate, quae appropriatur Filio. Nihil enim magis est indifferens in rebus aequalibus quam ipsa aequalitas; sed indifferens non est appropriabile: ergo nec aequalitas est appropriabilis.

4. Item, si appropriatur, debet appropriari Patri, quia aequalitas non est aliud quam unum sive unitas in quantitate[^3]; sed unitas appropriatur Patri: ergo et aequalitas.

5. Item, obiicitur de concordia, quae appropriatur Spiritui sancto. Si enim concordia plures reducit ad unitatem, videtur potius de proprio facere commune quam de communi proprium: ergo si appropriare est de communi facere proprium, concordia nulli est appropriabilis.

6. Item, videtur quod debeat appropriari Filio, quoniam Filius est *pax nostra, qui fecit utraque unum*, ad Ephesios secundo[^4]. Item, ad Colossenses primo[^5]: *Pacificans per sanguinem crucis eius, sive quae in terris, sive quae in caelis sunt.*

7. Item, obiicitur contra rationem Augustini[^6]: «Omnia aequalia propter Filium etc.», ergo Pater est aequalis propter Filium: ergo habet aliquid a Filio, quod falsum est. Item quaero, quam causam dicit *propter*, utrum efficientem, aut finalem? Quamcumque harum dicat, cum tota Trinitas sit efficiens et finis omnis rei, tam unitas quam aequalitas, quam concordia est propter Patrem, similiter propter Filium: ergo nulla est ratio appropriandi.

### Conclusio.

> *Ad explicandum personarum ordinem appropriatur unitas Patri, aequalitas Filio, concordia Spiritui sancto.*

**Respondeo:** Intelligendum est, quod sicut appropriatio Hilarii fuit ad explicandam personarum originem, sic ista est ad explicandum ordinem.

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Quoniam igitur persona Patris est prima, ante quam non est alia, et quae non est ex alia; ideo appropriatur ei unitas, quae est prima in numero, et ante quam nihil est in numero[^7].

**Ad argumenta:**

*1. 2.* Ex hoc patet responsio ad duo prima, quia accipitur hic unitas secundum eam rationem qua dicit primitatem, non essentiae indivisionem — quia[^8] sic convertitur cum ente — aut voluntatis conformitatem, — quia sic appropriatur Spiritui sancto. Ut prima autem Patri appropriatur.

Similiter[^9], quia persona Filii secundum rationem intelligendi est secunda et perfecte exprimens Patrem, et hoc facit aequalitatem: ideo aequalitas ratione ordinis primo reperitur in Filio. Tunc enim primo intelligitur, cum Filius intelligitur nasci.

*3. 4.* Et ex hoc patet obiectum. Quod enim aequalitas approprietur, hoc non est ratione unitatis, sed ratione primae associationis et perfectae. Aequalitas enim tunc primo intelligitur, quando intelligitur associatio; et haec intelligitur primo in Filio, qui est secunda persona.

Similiter, persona Spiritus sancti secundum rationem intelligendi est tertia; concordia autem ponit duos concordabiles et etiam concordantem: ideo primo incipit concordia, ubi primo intelligitur oriri persona tertia.

*5. 6.* Et sic patet illud, quod concordia appropriatur alicui non quia de communi faciat proprium[^10], sed quia distinctos connectit, et hoc secundum rationem suae emanationis; quod non convenit Filio ratione emanationis, sed ratione mediationis, quia *mediator Dei et hominum*[^11]. Ex his patent omnia obiecta.

*7.* Ad illud vero quod ultimo quaeritur: «omnia sunt unum propter Patrem, omnia aequalia propter Filium[^12]»; dicendum, quod si *omnia* distribuat pro creatis, tunc *propter* dicit causam formalem exemplarem secundum rem et appropriationem, quia omnis aequalitas habet exemplar in aequalitate Filii et sic de aliis[^13]. Si autem distribuat pro creatis et increatis, tunc *propter* dicit causam formalem exemplarem secundum rationem intelligendi appropriatam; quia intellectus noster non intelligit aequalitatem in Patre nisi propter hoc, quod habet Filium per omnia exprimentem eius naturam et potentiam: similiter de aliis. Et tunc *propter* non dicit causam exemplaritatis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem intelligendi. Et sic non notatur, quod Pater habet aliquid a Filio, sed quod intellectus noster aliquid cognoscit de Patre per hoc, quod cognoscit Filium.

english:
<!-- page 548 -->

### Question III. *By what reason unity is appropriated to the Father, equality to the Son, concord to the Holy Spirit.*

Third, it is asked concerning the reason for the appropriation of the three aforesaid names.

1. And first concerning unity. And that it is not appropriable, it seems, since *one and being are convertible*[^1]; therefore [also] unity and essence; but essence is appropriable to none [of the persons]: therefore neither is unity.

2. Likewise, if it is appropriated, since the Holy Spirit is the unity of both, as Augustine says[^2], it seems that it ought to be appropriated to the person of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, [the same] is objected concerning equality, which is appropriated to the Son. For nothing is more indifferent in equal things than equality itself; but what is indifferent is not appropriable: therefore neither is equality appropriable.

4. Likewise, if it is appropriated, it ought to be appropriated to the Father, since equality is nothing other than the *one* or unity in quantity[^3]; but unity is appropriated to the Father: therefore equality also.

5. Likewise, [the same] is objected concerning concord, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. For if concord reduces many to unity, it seems rather to make of what is proper [something] common than of what is common [something] proper: therefore, if to appropriate is to make of what is common [something] proper, concord is appropriable to none.

6. Likewise, it seems that it ought to be appropriated to the Son, since the Son is *our peace, who has made both one*, [as is said] in [the letter] to the Ephesians, [chapter] two[^4]. Likewise, [in the letter] to the Colossians, [chapter] one[^5]: *Making peace through the blood of his cross, whether the things on earth or the things in heaven.*

7. Likewise, [the contrary] is objected against the reasoning of Augustine[^6]: "All things equal on account of the Son etc."; therefore the Father is equal on account of the Son: therefore he has something from the Son, which is false. Likewise I ask: which cause does he mean by *on account of [propter]* — the efficient, or the final? Whichever of these he should mean, since the whole Trinity is the efficient [cause] and end of every thing, both unity, equality, and concord is on account of the Father, similarly on account of the Son: therefore there is no reason for appropriating.

### Conclusion.

> *To unfold the order of the persons, unity is appropriated to the Father, equality to the Son, concord to the Holy Spirit.*

**I respond:** It must be understood that, just as the appropriation of Hilary was for unfolding the origin of the persons, so this [other appropriation] is for unfolding [their] order.

<!-- page 549 -->

Since therefore the person of the Father is first, before whom is no other, and which is not from another; therefore unity is appropriated to him, which is first in number, and before which there is nothing in number[^7].

**To the arguments:**

*1. 2.* From this is plain the response to the first two [arguments], since unity is here taken according to that account by which it expresses primacy, not the indivision of essence — since[^8] thus it is convertible with being — nor conformity of will — since thus it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But [it is appropriated to the Father] as first.

Likewise[^9], since the person of the Son according to the account of intellection is second and perfectly expressing the Father, and this makes equality: therefore equality, by reason of order, is first found in the Son. For then [equality] is first understood, when the Son is understood to be born.

*3. 4.* And from this the objection is plain. For that equality is appropriated [to the Son], this is not by reason of unity, but by reason of the first and perfect association. For equality is then first understood, when association is understood; and this is first understood in the Son, who is the second person.

Likewise, the person of the Holy Spirit according to the account of intellection is third; and concord posits two [things] that can be in concord, and also one that brings them into concord: therefore concord first begins where the third person is first understood to arise.

*5. 6.* And so is plain that [point], that concord is appropriated to someone not because it makes of what is common [something] proper[^10], but because it connects distinct [persons], and this according to the account of its emanation; which does not belong to the Son by reason of emanation, but by reason of mediation, since [he is] *the mediator of God and of men*[^11]. From these things all the objections are plain.

*7.* But to that which is asked last: "all things are one on account of the Father, all things equal on account of the Son[^12]"; it must be said that, if *all things* be distributed for created things, then *on account of [propter]* expresses the formal exemplar cause according to reality and appropriation, since every equality has its exemplar in the equality of the Son, and so of the others[^13]. But if it be distributed for created and uncreated [things], then *on account of* expresses the formal exemplar cause according to the account of intellection [as] appropriated; since our intellect does not understand equality in the Father except on account of this, that he has the Son expressing through all things his nature and power: similarly of the others. And then *on account of* does not express the cause of exemplarity according to reality, but according to the account of intellection. And thus it is not noted that the Father has something from the Son, but that our intellect knows something of the Father by this, that it knows the Son.

la: Vide supra pag. 423, nota 1. — In conclusione subsequenti supple: *convertuntur*.

en: See above p. 423, note 1. — In the following conclusion, supply: *convertuntur* ["are convertible"].

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 5. n. 7. Cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity*, c. 5, n. 7. Cf. above d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 6. — Paulo superius pro *debet* cod. M *videtur*.

en: Cf. above p. 342, note 6. — A little above, in place of *debet*, codex M [reads] *videtur*.

la: Vers. 14. — Paulo ante pro *quoniam* codd. aa l. ih [?] *concordia et pax idem*.

en: Verse 14. — A little before, in place of *quoniam*, codices aa l. ih[?] [read] *concordia et pax idem*.

la: Vers. 20.

en: Verse 20.

la: Libr. I. *de Doctr. christ.* c. 5. n. 8.

en: Book I *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 5, n. 8.

la: Cod. D hic addit *et a qua fluit, omnis numerus; unde in unitate est primitas respectu omnium numerorum et fecunditas.*

en: Codex D here adds: *and from which flows every number; whence in unity is primacy in regard to all numbers, and fecundity.*

la: Multi codd. cum ed. 1 hic, alii paulo inferius, pro *quia* substituunt *et*; non bene. Pro *aut voluntatis* codd. L O *non prout dicit voluntatis*; cod. Y, retenta particula *aut*, adiungit *secundum quod dicit*. Paulo post codd. T Y omittunt *Ut ante prima*.

en: Many codices, with edition 1, here — others a little below — substitute *et* for *quia*; not well. In place of *aut voluntatis*, codices L O [read] *non prout dicit voluntatis*; codex Y, retaining the particle *aut*, adds *secundum quod dicit*. A little after, codices T Y omit *Ut ante prima*.

la: Sola Vat. hic interiicit *quia*.

en: Only the Vatican [edition] here inserts *quia*.

la: Codd. L O, sensu inverso, sic: *quia de proprio commune aliquid faciat.* — Vat. cum paucis codd. post *communi* interponit *aliquid*.

en: Codices L O, in the inverse sense, [read] thus: *because it makes something common out of what is proper.* — The Vatican [edition], with a few codices, after *communi* interposes *aliquid*.

la: Epist. I. Tim. 2, 5.

en: First Letter to Timothy 2:5.

la: In sola Vat. desiderantur verba *omnia propter Patrem*, at in omnibus ferme codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 verba subsequentia *aequalia propter Filium*; in ed. 1 verba *propter Patrem, omnia aequalia*. Lectio integra, quam restituimus, invenitur in cod. Z. Proxime post pro *omnia* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *unum*; perperam.

en: Only in the Vatican [edition] are the words *omnia propter Patrem* lacking, but in nearly all the codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 the subsequent words *aequalia propter Filium* [are lacking]; in edition 1 the words *propter Patrem, omnia aequalia* [are lacking]. The complete reading, which we have restored, is found in codex Z. Just after, in place of *omnia*, many codices with edition 1 [read] *unum*; wrongly.

la: Intellige: *unitate et concordia*.

en: Understand: *of unity and of concord*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Sicut appropriatio S. Hilarii (hic a. 1. q. 3.) servit ad originem et productionem personarum explicandam, ita haec altera S. Augustini ad intelligendum ordinem trium personarum. — Bene distinguitur hic (ad 1. 2.) triplex unitas. De ratione unitatis in divinis cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. — Concordia hic idem significat ac *nexus*, de quo vide supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 2. — Scot., I. Report. d. 31. q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3; S. 1. q. 39. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 10. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard. Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. n. 71. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Just as the appropriation of S. Hilary (here a. 1, q. 3) serves to unfold the origin and production of the persons, so this other [appropriation] of S. Augustine [serves] for understanding the order of the three persons. — Threefold unity is well distinguished here (ad 1, 2). On the account of unity in [the] divine [persons], cf. above d. 24, a. 1. — Concord here signifies the same as *nexus* ["bond"], on which see above d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 67, m. 2. — Scot., I *Report.* d. 31, q. 3. — S. Thom., here q. 3, a. 3; S. 1, q. 39, a. 8. — B. Albert., here a. 9, 10, 11. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 1, 2, 3. — Richard. Med., here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegid. R., here 2 *princ.* q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. n. 71, q. 1. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

---


title: Dist. 31, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Pars I)

source_text:
<!-- page 540 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo dubitatur de situ huius partis, quia cum supra distinctione decima nona actum est de aequalitate, videtur hic Magister superflue repetere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de aequalitate et similitudine est loqui dupliciter, scilicet a parte rei, vel a parte nominis. Et primo modo agitur de aequalitate et similitudine in praecedentibus, secundo modo hic.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod nihil est sibi simile. Videtur enim falsum, quia aliquis differt a se, sicut Socrates senex a se puero: ergo pari ratione aliquid potest esse simile sibi. — Item Christus homo est sibi similis, quia nullus est beatus, nisi sit Deo assimilatus; sed Christus est maxime Deo assimilatus: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut differentia aliquando notat alietatem suppositi a supposito, ut cum dicitur: Petrus est alius a Paulo; aliquando alietatem in natura, ut cum dicitur: Christus secundum quod homo differt a se Deo; aliquando alietatem status a statu, ut Petrus senex differt a se puero: per hunc modum intelligendum est de similitudine. Quando igitur similis dicit similitudinem suppositi ad suppositum, non potest idem esse similis sibi; quando vero dicit similitudinem *naturae* ad *naturam*, vel status ad statum, potest idem esse sibi similis, quia haec concurrunt in eadem persona; et ita intelligit Magister.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *aequalitas Patris et Filii non est relatio vel notio*, quia statim praedixit, quod simile et aequale est relativum: ergo similitudo est relatio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister intelligit de notione, quae est *personae proprietas*, non de relatione communiter intellecta. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod verbum Magistri est causaliter intelligendum, sicut patet ex praecedentibus, quia aequalitas non consistit in proprietatibus personalibus, sed magis in essentialibus, quae supra ostensae sunt.

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is a doubt concerning the place of this part, because since above, in the nineteenth distinction, equality has already been treated, the Master here seems to repeat superfluously.

**I respond:** It must be said that equality and likeness can be spoken of in two ways, namely on the side of the thing, or on the side of the name. And in the first way they are treated in what precedes; in the second way, here.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *nothing is like itself*. For this seems false, because someone differs from himself, as Socrates as an old man from himself as a boy: therefore by parity of reasoning something can be like itself. — Likewise, Christ as man is like himself, because no one is blessed unless he be made like to God; but Christ is in the highest degree made like to God: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *difference* sometimes denotes an otherness of supposit from supposit, as when it is said: Peter is other than Paul; sometimes an otherness in nature, as when it is said: Christ, insofar as he is man, differs from himself, [insofar as he is] God; sometimes an otherness of state from state, as Peter as an old man differs from himself as a boy — in this way is *likeness* to be understood. When therefore "like" expresses a likeness of supposit to supposit, the same thing cannot be like itself; but when it expresses a likeness of *nature* to *nature*, or of state to state, the same thing can be like itself, because these come together in the same person; and so the Master understands it.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the equality of Father and Son is not a relation or a notion*, because he had just said before that "like" and "equal" are relative: therefore likeness is a relation.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master understands [it] of a notion which is a *property of a person*, not of relation commonly understood. — Or it must be said otherwise, that the word of the Master is to be understood causally, as is clear from what precedes, since equality does not consist in personal properties, but rather in essential ones, which have been shown above.

---

translators_notes:
- The OCR-visible glyph after `se` in `differt a se Deo` (DUB II respondeo) is the printed Quaracchi footnote-7 anchor on p. 540 col. b: fn 7 = "Cod. W *adiicit* Deo" (= codex W adds *Deo*). The chunk currently does not carry apparatus on this page; the body word reads as printed, codex-W variant documented in the d.31–d.40 polish-resolution log (2026-05-07).
- Marginal glosses present in the OCR — `Differentia triplex` (next to the threefold-difference passage in DUB II) and `Alii` (mis-OCR'd `Aiii`, next to "Vel aliter dicendum" in DUB III) — have been stripped as Quaracchi-editor marginalia, per project convention.