title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus.
#### *De comparatione personae ad naturam et de appropriatione et translatione.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum in divinis res naturae addat supra naturam.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in divinis additionem, utrum scilicet res naturae addat supra naturam. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Hilarius *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Aliud est natura, aliud res naturae»; sed intellectus naturae clauditur in re naturae: ergo si est aliud, necesse est, quod in ratione alicuius additi.

2. Item, Boethius *de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi*[^2]: «Natura et persona distinguenda sunt et propriis rationibus separanda»: sed quorum definitiones sunt diversae, ipsa sunt diversa: cum ergo natura cadat in definitione personae, necesse est, quod diversitas veniat a ratione additi, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod definitiones naturae et personae non sunt diversae re, sed secundum rationem intelligendi; tunc concluditur, quod intellectus ille cassus est et vanus, cum in re nihil sibi respondeat.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia quanto aliquid in pluribus invenitur, tanto simplicius est[^3]: sed essentia vel natura est in pluribus, persona vero in uno solo: ergo natura simplicior. Sed non est aliquid minus simplex quam aliud nisi per aliquam additionem: ergo etc.

4. Item, quanto aliquid est maioris abstractionis, tanto simplicius est[^4]; sed natura est maioris abstractionis quam persona, quoniam abstractis proprietatibus est intelligere naturam, sed non personam: ergo persona addit aliquid supra naturam; ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc est principium per se notum: «De nullo eodem et secundum idem vera est affirmatio et negatio»[^5]; sed aliquid vere affirmatur de persona, ut distingui, quod negatur de natura, ergo non secundum idem; ergo in persona aliquid est, quod non est in natura, vel e converso. Et si hoc, ergo unum addit supra alterum.

6. Item, hoc est principium per se notum: «Quaecumque sunt eadem uni et eidem secundum omnimodam indifferentiam, etiam inter se sunt eadem»[^6]: cum ergo natura sit una et eadem, si personae omnino idem sunt cum natura et nihil addunt, ergo personae ad invicem sunt eaedem; et sic redit error Sabellii, quod una persona secundum rem sit alia, ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus septimo *de Trinitate*[^7]: «Non est aliud Deo esse, et aliud personam esse»: ergo persona nihil addit supra esse, ergo nec supra naturam.

2. Item, in[^8] summe simplici nulla potest esse additio; sed divina persona sive res naturae est summe simplex: ergo etc.

3. Item, quaecumque duo sic se habent, quod quidquid est in uno, est alterum per essentiam, unum nihil addit super reliquum; sed quidquid est in persona, est deitas: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est, minor patet sic: in persona non est nisi substantia et proprietas, et substantia illa est deitas, quia est Deus, et Deus non alio quam se ipso — quia tunc[^9] esset per participationem — ergo se ipso est Deus et deitate est Deus; et substantia, quae est de intellectu personae, est ipsa natura per essentiam, et similiter proprietas est essentia, ut supra[^10] probatum est. Restat ergo primum, quod nihil addit.

4. Item, si addit, aut addit aliud, aut idem. Addere idem sibi non est intelligibile. Si aliud, aut ergo aliud substantialiter, aut accidentaliter: non accidentaliter, quia non est accidens in divinis; nec substantialiter, quia tunc essent ibi diversae substantiae. Ergo natura secundum essentiam non differt a persona, et hoc est manifestum.

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5. Item, si addit aliquid, aut illud est materiale, aut formale: non materiale, quia Deus est purus actus; non formale, quia formale non est nisi respectu materialis. Ergo cum in Deo non sit aliquid materiale, non poterit addi aliquid formale: ergo nullo modo.

6. Item, si aliquid addit supra divinam naturam, aut est melius divina natura, aut aequale, aut minus: non melius, constat; constat etiam, quod non peius, quia tunc esset creatura; non aequale, quia nihil potest aequari divinae naturae: ergo omnino nihil.

### Conclusio.

> *Persona sive res naturae secundum rem nihil addit supra naturam, tamen ab ipsa differt secundum rationem, quia persona habet relationem ad aliam, non autem natura.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum persona sive res naturae addat aliquid supra naturam, respondendum est, quod est loqui de additione dupliciter: aut quantum ad rem, aut quantum ad intellectum.

Si quantum ad intellectum, cum intellectus huius nominis *persona* sive *hypostasis* sive *res naturae* includat intellectum naturae et adhuc det intelligere aliquid; sic dicendum[^11], quod necessario est compositio circa intellectum et additio. Et hoc patet. Persona enim dicitur *suppositum rationalis naturae distinctum proprietate*. Ecce intellectus personae ex pluribus intellectibus componitur; et cadit ibi intellectus naturae: ergo constans est, quod quantum ad intellectum addit persona supra naturam. — Iste autem intellectus falsus non est, quia nec naturam per illam additionem distinguit, nec componit personam. Non distinguit naturam, quoniam, etsi addat supra intellectum naturae proprietatem, non addit[^12] in recto, ut intelligas, personam esse naturam proprietate distinctam; sed in obliquo est intelligendum, personam esse suppositum rationalis naturae distinctum, sive quod est hypostasis distincta; et ideo non ponit distinctionem circa naturam nec intelligit eam distingui. — Rursus, personam non componit nec aliquid ei, quod non sit in ipsa, imponit. Et hoc patet, quia intellectus sanus et fidelis intelligit et credit, personam[^13] esse simplicissimam; intelligit eam nihilominus esse perfectissimam. Unde sicut circa essentiam, propter hoc quod perfectissima est, intelligit omnes conditiones nobilitatis et vere, quia ibi sunt; et tamen illas conditiones quamvis intelligat ut multas, scilicet potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem, cum credat et sciat omnia haec in Deo unum esse; intellectus nec est falsus nec vanus, quia non ponit in Deo quod non sit, nec componit Deum: per hunc modum se habet circa intellectum personae. Unde ipsam dicit simplicem, quia, quamvis in ipsa dicat naturam esse et vere naturam, et suppositum, quod vere est suppositum, et proprietatem, quae vere est proprietas: tamen dicit, haec omnia esse unum, et unum esse alterum. Re igitur existente simplicissima, vere est additio et compositio circa intellectum, sine vanitate et falsitate.

Si autem loquamur a parte rei, sic dicendum, quod cum additio ex parte rei ponat compositionem, et divina persona simplicissima sit, quod impossibile est omnino, quod ibi sit aliqua additio, et ita secundum rem nihil addit res naturae supra naturam.

Sed tunc videtur illud non intelligibile, quod persona sit distincta secundum rem, et natura non, et tamen nulla est additio et nulla differentia secundum rem inter personam et naturam. Et ad hoc qualitercumque intelligendum, cum hoc sit supra vires humani intellectus, notandum, sicut vult Richardus[^14], quod est distinctio per qualitatem, et distinctio per originem. Distinctio per qualitatem est in creaturis, nec potest esse sine additione, quia haec distinctio habet ortum ex additione materiae ad formam. Distinctio autem per qualitatem dicitur, quando unus distinguitur ab alio per proprietates absolutas, ut patet, cum unus est albus, et alter niger. Distinctio per originem est, cum unus producit, et alter producitur. Et quemadmodum distinctio per qualitatem vera distinctio est et secundum rem, ita distinctio per veram originem vera est distinctio. Sicut enim unus non potest simul esse albus et niger, ita non potest unus et idem producere se ipsum.

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Quoniam igitur in divinis intelligitur esse vera origo, ideo intelligitur ibi esse vera distinctio. — Rursus, cum intelligo, Patrem producere, intelligo, ipsum se ipso producere; sicut cum intelligo, divinam substantiam agere, intelligo, ipsam se ipsa[^15] agere, pari ratione et Filium se ipso produci: ergo productio nihil addit. — Similiter non ponit aliquam compositionem circa Filium. Ergo cum ubi est vera origo, ibi sit vera distinctio, et origo intelligitur ibi esse sine additione; et distinctio sine additione intelligitur ibi esse.

Quamvis autem persona sive res naturae non se habeat ad naturam per additionem, tamen nihilominus differt secundum rationem; alioquin non esset intelligibile, quod plurificaretur persona, natura existente unica. Differentia autem secundum rationem est, quia essentia non oritur ab essentia nec se habet ad aliam essentiam; sed persona bene oritur a persona et se habet ad illam. — Si tu quaeras rationem huius, respondeo, quia unitas et nobilitas divini esse non admittit circa essentiam plurificationem, sicut circa personam; et huius ratio dicta est supra, distinctione nona. Quoniam igitur modus se habendi ad alium et oriendi ab alio non ponit compositionem in persona secundum rem, sed distinctionem realem ab alia persona: ideo modus ille comparatus ad essentiam vel personam, cuius est, modus tantum est; comparatus vero ad illum, ad quem est, cum faciat distinctionem secundum rem, vere res est; et ita uno modo facit differre re, alio modo ratione. Hinc est quod quamvis una persona non sit alia, tamen res naturae est natura. Patet igitur, quod ista sunt compossibilia, quod persona sit simplex et nihil addat supra naturam, nec differant nisi ratione; et tamen haec est communicabilis, scilicet natura, illa incommunicabilis, scilicet persona; haec distincta, illa indistincta.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod persona sive res naturae nihil omnino addat secundum rem supra naturam.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. 2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod aliud est res naturae, aliud natura, et similiter aliam habent rationem persona et natura: potest dici, quod Boethius et Hilarius loquuntur — in creaturis. Si autem intelligamus in Deo, tunc dicemus, quod est diversitas rationis, quae fundatur non super absolutum, sed super respectivum, quod[^16] nullam inducit compositionem. Nam essentia non refertur, persona autem refertur et oritur, nec tamen est composita, quia ipsa est suus respectus.

3. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod simplicius est quod in pluribus reperitur; dicendum, quod reperiri in pluribus, hoc est dupliciter: aut ita quod unum illorum alicubi potest esse, ubi non est alterum, ut homo est in pluribus hominibus, et sic habet propositio veritatem; aut ita in pluribus, quod unum non est sine alio, et sic est in personis — nam una non est sine alia — et sic non habet veritatem. Nam sicut natura est semper et ubique, ita et persona; et sic patet, quod nihil addit, a quo arctetur.

4. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod maioris est abstractionis etc.; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem ubi illud, a quo abstrahitur, aliquam facit compositionem cum eo quod abstrahitur; sic autem non est in Deo.

5. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod affirmatio et negatio non est simul vera de eodem; dicendum, quod quantulacumque differentia rationis sufficit ad affirmationem et negationem. Unde intelligenda est propositio de eodem re et ratione; et persona aliquo modo differt a natura, licet non per additionem realem.

6. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod quaecumque sunt eadem uni et eidem inter se sunt eadem etc.; dicendum, quod illud fallit, ubi est convenientia plurium tanquam in communi, ut differentiarum in genere. Fallit etiam, ubi aliqua plura distinguuntur per suas origines, ut radii diversarum stellarum in uno puncto aeris uniuntur, et tamen ad invicem distinguuntur. Quoniam igitur divinae personae in natura conveniunt tanquam in uno communi et praeterea distinguuntur ad invicem per originem; ideo patens est, quod non valet. — Potest tamen dici, quod regula ubique vera est, si sane intelligatur. Propter quod notandum, quod quaedam sunt absoluta, quaedam respectiva. Diversitas autem in respectivis venit non tantum a parte subiecti, verum etiam termini; in his non tenet regula, nisi intelligatur ad idem. Quoniam ergo personae per suas proprietates referuntur, quamvis unum sint in natura, quia tamen non sunt ad unum, ideo non sequitur, quod sint idem. Et sic patet illud.

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### Article Unique.
#### *On the comparison of person to nature, and on appropriation and translation.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether in the divine the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature.*

So as to the first, it is asked whether addition is to be posited in the divine, that is, whether the *thing of the nature* adds anything beyond the nature. And that it does, appears in this way.

1. Hilary *On the Trinity*[^1]: "Nature is one thing, the thing of the nature is another"; but the understanding of nature is enclosed in the thing of the nature: therefore if it is something other, it is necessary that it be in the account of something added.

2. Likewise, Boethius *On the Two Natures and the One Person of Christ*[^2]: "Nature and person must be distinguished and separated by their proper accounts": but those whose definitions are diverse, are themselves diverse: since therefore nature falls in the definition of person, it is necessary that the diversity come from the account of something added; therefore etc. If you say that the definitions of nature and person are not diverse in the thing, but according to the mode of understanding; then it is concluded that that understanding is empty and vain, since in the thing nothing corresponds to it.

3. Likewise, this same point appears by reason, since the more something is found in many, the simpler it is[^3]: but essence or nature is in many, while person is in one only: therefore nature is simpler. But nothing is less simple than another except through some addition: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more something is of greater abstraction, the simpler it is[^4]; but nature is of greater abstraction than person, since with the properties abstracted away one can understand the nature, but not the person: therefore person adds something beyond the nature; therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is a *per se* known principle: "Of no same and according to the same is affirmation and negation true [together]"[^5]; but something is truly affirmed of the person, as to be distinguished, which is denied of the nature, therefore not according to the same; therefore in the person there is something which is not in the nature, or vice versa. And if so, then one adds something beyond the other.

6. Likewise, this is a *per se* known principle: "Whatever things are the same as one and the same according to every kind of indifference, are also the same among themselves"[^6]: since therefore the nature is one and the same, if the persons are altogether the same as the nature and add nothing, therefore the persons are the same among themselves; and thus the error of Sabellius returns, [or else] one person according to the thing is another, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book seven[^7]: "It is not one thing for God *to be*, and another for [him] *to be a person*": therefore person adds nothing beyond *to be*, therefore nor beyond nature.

2. Likewise, in[^8] what is supremely simple there can be no addition; but the divine person, or thing of the nature, is supremely simple: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, whatever two so behave that whatever is in one is the other by essence, the one adds nothing over the rest; but whatever is in the person is deity: therefore etc. The major is manifest; the minor is clear thus: in the person there is nothing but substance and property, and that substance is deity, since it is God, and God [is so] not by anything other than himself — for then[^9] he would be [God] by participation — therefore by himself he is God and by deity he is God; and the substance, which is of the understanding of the person, is the very nature by essence, and likewise the property is the essence, as has been proved above[^10]. There remains therefore the first [point], that it adds nothing.

4. Likewise, if it adds, it either adds something other or the same. To add the same to itself is not intelligible. If something other, then either substantially other or accidentally other: not accidentally, since there is no accident in the divine; nor substantially, since then there would be diverse substances there. Therefore nature according to essence does not differ from person, and this is manifest.

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5. Likewise, if it adds something, that thing is either material or formal: not material, since God is pure act; not formal, since formal is only with respect to material. Therefore since in God there is nothing material, nothing formal can be added: therefore in no way [can anything be added].

6. Likewise, if it adds something beyond the divine nature, [that thing] is either better than the divine nature, or equal, or less: not better, that is established; it is also established that not worse, since then it would be a creature; not equal, since nothing can be equated to the divine nature: therefore altogether nothing.

### Conclusion.

> *Person, or the thing of the nature, according to the thing adds nothing beyond the nature, yet differs from it according to reason, since the person has a relation to another, but the nature does not.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked whether person or the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature, the response is that one can speak of addition in two ways: either as to the thing, or as to the understanding.

If as to the understanding, since the understanding of this name *person* or *hypostasis* or *thing of the nature* includes the understanding of the nature, and gives still further to understand something else; thus it must be said[^11] that necessarily there is composition and addition with respect to the understanding. And this is clear. For person is called *a supposit of rational nature distinguished by a property*. Behold, the understanding of person is composed out of several understandings; and there falls within it the understanding of nature: therefore it is constant that as to the understanding the person adds [something] beyond the nature. — But this understanding is not false, since it neither distinguishes the nature by that addition, nor composes the person. It does not distinguish the nature, since, even if it adds the property beyond the understanding of the nature, it does not add[^12] in the direct case [*in recto*], so that you understand the person to be the nature distinguished by a property; but it must be understood in the oblique case, [namely] that the person is a *supposit* of rational nature [that is] distinguished, or that which is a distinct hypostasis; and therefore it does not posit a distinction concerning the nature, nor does it understand the nature to be distinguished. — Again, it does not compose the person, nor does it impose on it anything which is not in it. And this is clear, because a sound and faithful understanding understands and believes the person[^13] to be most simple; it nonetheless understands it to be most perfect. Whence just as concerning the essence, on account of this, that it is most perfect, it understands all the conditions of nobility, and truly, since they are there; and yet, although it understands those conditions as many, namely power, wisdom, goodness, since it believes and knows all these to be one in God; the understanding is neither false nor vain, since it does not posit in God what is not [there], nor does it compose God: in this way the understanding stands with respect to the person. Whence it calls the person simple, since, although in it [the understanding] says nature to be [there] and truly nature, and supposit, which is truly a supposit, and property, which is truly a property: nevertheless it says all these to be one, and one to be the other. Therefore, the thing being most simple, there is truly addition and composition with respect to the understanding, without vanity and falsity.

But if we speak from the side of the thing, thus it must be said that, since addition from the side of the thing posits composition, and the divine person is most simple, it is altogether impossible that there be any addition there, and so according to the thing the thing of the nature adds nothing beyond the nature.

But then it seems unintelligible that the person be distinct according to the thing, and the nature not, and yet there be no addition and no difference according to the thing between the person and the nature. And to understand this in any way at all, since this is above the powers of the human understanding, it must be noted, as Richard wishes[^14], that there is a distinction by quality, and a distinction by origin. The distinction by quality is in creatures, nor can it be without addition, since this distinction takes its rise from the addition of matter to form. The distinction by quality is so called when one is distinguished from another by absolute properties, as is clear, when one is white, and another black. The distinction by origin is when one produces, and another is produced. And just as the distinction by quality is a true distinction and according to the thing, so the distinction by true origin is a true distinction. For just as one cannot be at the same time white and black, so one and the same cannot produce itself.

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Therefore since in the divine there is understood to be a true origin, therefore there is understood to be there a true distinction. — Again, when I understand the Father to produce, I understand him to produce by himself; just as when I understand the divine substance to act, I understand it to act by itself[^15], by parity of reason also the Son to be produced by himself: therefore production adds nothing. — Likewise it does not posit any composition with respect to the Son. Therefore since where there is true origin, there is true distinction, and origin is understood to be there without addition; the distinction also is understood to be there without addition.

But although person, or the thing of the nature, does not stand to nature by addition, nevertheless it differs according to reason; otherwise it would not be intelligible that the person be plurified, the nature being unique. The difference according to reason is, that the essence does not arise from an essence, nor stand to another essence; but the person well arises from a person and stands to it. — If you ask the reason for this, I respond, that the unity and nobility of the divine being does not admit a plurification with respect to the essence, as with respect to the person; and the reason of this has been said above, in the ninth distinction. Since therefore the mode of standing-to-another and of arising-from-another does not posit composition in the person according to the thing, but a real distinction from another person: therefore that mode, compared to the essence or to the person whose [mode] it is, is mode only; but compared to that to which it is, since it makes a distinction according to the thing, it is truly a thing; and so in one way it makes [them] differ in reality, in another way in reason. Hence it is that, although one person is not another, yet the thing of the nature is the nature. It is clear therefore that these are compossible: that the person be simple and add nothing beyond the nature, nor differ except in reason; and yet that this — namely the nature — be communicable, that — namely the person — incommunicable; this be distinct, that be undistinct.

The reasons proving that the person, or thing of the nature, adds nothing whatever according to the thing beyond the nature must therefore be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

1. 2. *To that which is objected*, that the thing of the nature is one thing, the nature another, and likewise that person and nature have another account: it can be said that Boethius and Hilary speak — in creatures. But if we understand [the matter] in God, then we shall say that there is a diversity of reason, which is founded not on something absolute, but on something relative, which[^16] introduces no composition. For the essence is not referred [to another], but the person is referred and arises, nor however is it composite, since it itself is its own respect.

3. *To that which is objected*, that what is found in many is simpler; it must be said that to be found in many is twofold: either so that one of those can sometimes be where the other is not, as man is in many men, and thus the proposition has truth; or so in many, that one is not without the other, and thus it is in the persons — for one is not without another — and thus it does not have truth. For just as the nature is always and everywhere, so also the person; and thus it is clear that it adds nothing by which it might be straitened.

4. *To that which is objected*, that it is of greater abstraction etc.; it must be said that this has truth where that from which one abstracts makes some composition with that which is abstracted; but it is not so in God.

5. *To that which is objected*, that affirmation and negation are not at the same time true of the same; it must be said that any difference of reason, however small, suffices for affirmation and negation. Whence the proposition must be understood of the same in thing and in reason; and the person in some way differs from the nature, although not by a real addition.

6. *To that which is objected*, that whatever things are the same as one and the same are also the same among themselves etc.; it must be said that this fails where there is a coming-together of several as in something common, as of differentiae in a genus. It also fails where several things are distinguished by their origins, as the rays of various stars are united in one point of air, and yet are distinguished from one another. Since therefore the divine persons come together in nature as in one common [thing], and besides are distinguished from one another by origin; therefore it is clear that [the rule] does not hold. — It can however be said that the rule is everywhere true, if it be soundly understood. On account of which it must be noted that some things are absolute, some relative. But diversity in relatives comes not only from the side of the subject, but also of the term; in these the rule does not hold, unless it be understood with reference to the same. Since therefore the persons are referred by their properties, although they are one in nature, since nevertheless they are not [referred] to one [thing], therefore it does not follow that they are the same. And so that is clear.

la: Libr. VIII. n. 22. Vide hic *lit. Magistri*, c. 1.

en: Book VIII, n. 22. See here the *text of the Master*, c. 1.

la: In *Prooemio*: «Quoniam vero in tota quaestione contrariarum sibimet haereseon de personis atque naturis dubitatur, haec primitus definienda sunt et propriis differentiis segreganda». — In textu pro *rationibus*, quod auctoritate codd. B D T X et ed. 1 posuimus, Vat. *nominibus*. — De propositione minori cfr. Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 4.): *Haec autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae*.

en: In the *Prologue*: "Since indeed in the whole question of the heresies that are mutually contrary concerning the persons and natures there is doubt, these things must first be defined and segregated by their proper differences." — In the text, in place of *rationibus*, which on the authority of codices B D T X and edition 1 we have placed, the Vatican [reads] *nominibus*. — Concerning the minor proposition, cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4): "But these are not the same, because the definitions are diverse."

la: In cod. additur *secundum Boethium, de Consolatione* (libr. III. *Prosa* 10.).

en: In a codex is added *according to Boethius, On the Consolation* (book III, *Prose* 10).

la: Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. *ad* 1.

en: Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 1, *ad* 1.

la: Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 6. (c. 7.), et IV. *Metaph.* text. 9–19. (III. c. 3–5.), ubi hoc principium fusius probatur.

en: Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 6 (c. 7), and *Metaphysics* IV, text 9–19 (III, c. 3–5), where this principle is more fully proved.

la: Vide Aristot., XI. *Metaph.* (X. c. 1.), et supra d. 27. p. I. q. 3. *fundam.* 2, et de ratione addita propositioni minori cfr. d. 26. q. 3. *in corp.*

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI (X, c. 1), and above d. 27, p. I, q. 3, *fundamentum* 2; and on the ground added to the minor proposition, cf. d. 26, q. 3, *in the body*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 546, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 546, n. 2.

la: Cod. T et nonnulli alii omittunt *in*.

en: Codex T and several others omit *in*.

la: Intellige: si alio quam se ipso Deus esset.

en: Understand: if God were [God] by something other than himself.

la: Dist. 33. q. 2. — Paulo superius post *et similiter* codd. A G T X cum ed. 1 subiiciunt *et*.

en: Distinction 33, q. 2. — A little earlier, after *et similiter*, codices A G T X with edition 1 add *et*.

la: Vat. omittit *non*, et subinde pro *manifestum* substituit *manifeste*; unde tertio evidenter falsa est, cum, ea retenta, conclusio propositionibus non respondeat praemissis. Particula *non* invenitur in codd. praestantissimis L T, et verbum *manifestum* in multis aliis. In codd. I aa bb pro *Ergo natura secundum essentiam* legitur *Ergo natura vel essentia secundum substantiam*. — Verba *sic dicendum*, in Vat. desiderata, restauravimus ex codd. I X (cod. Z *dicendum*). Paulo ante Vat. pro verbis *et adhuc det*, absque fide codd., substituit *adhuc tamen dat*, quo sententia propositionis depravatur.

en: The Vatican [edition] omits *non*, and shortly thereafter substitutes *manifeste* for *manifestum*; whence the third [argument] is evidently false, since, with that retained, the conclusion does not answer to the premised propositions. The particle *non* is found in the most excellent codices L T, and the word *manifestum* in many others. In codices I aa bb, in place of *Ergo natura secundum essentiam* is read *Ergo natura vel essentia secundum substantiam*. — The words *sic dicendum*, missing in the Vatican, we have restored from codices I X (codex Z [reads] *dicendum*). A little earlier, the Vatican, in place of the words *et adhuc det*, without the support of the codices, substituted *adhuc tamen dat*, by which the sense of the proposition is corrupted.

la: Codd. L *cadit*. Vat. verbo *addit* praemittit *cum* codd. B bb et ed. I. Supple *divinam*.

en: Codices L [read] *cadit*. The Vatican prefixes *cum* to the verb *addit* with codices B bb and edition I. Supply *divinam*.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. *essentiam*, codd. B I X *naturam*, alii pauci perperam *increatam*. Immediate tamen Vat. praeter fidem codd. *immutabilem*. — Paulo superius pro *tunc* ponit *tamen*.

en: Several codices with the Vatican [read] *essentiam*, codices B I X [read] *naturam*, a few others wrongly *increatam*. Immediately however the Vatican, against the support of the codices, [reads] *immutabilem*. — A little earlier, in place of *tunc* it puts *tamen*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* c. 13, ubi tria membra distinguuntur: *Variari namque potest (existentia) aut sola rei qualitate, aut secundum solam rei originem, aut secundum utriusque concursionem*.

en: Book IV *On the Trinity*, c. 13, where three members are distinguished: "For (existence) can be varied either by the quality of the thing alone, or according to the origin of the thing alone, or according to the concurrence of both."

la: *ipsam se ipsa*; cod. X post *ipsam* interiicit *esse et*.

en: *ipsam se ipsa*; codex X after *ipsam* interjects *esse et*.

la: Codd. W X *super respectivum, qui*; codd. A V *quae* (refertur ad verba praecedentia *diversitas rationis*); alii codd. non pauci cum edd. 1, 2, 3 incongrue *qui*. Mox post *nec tamen* cod. W repetit *persona*. — Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. *ad* 1. — Eodem fere modo solvitur haec difficultas supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. *ad* 1; sed diffusius quaestio tractatur supra d. 27. p. I. q. 3. — Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 14. (c. 16.): *Invenientes enim differentiam propositorum quamlibet, ostendentes erimus, quoniam non idem*. — Pro *praeterea* plures codd. cum Vat. *personae*. — Ex cod. I (T in marg.) et ed. I restituimus *termini* pro quo alii codd. *rei*, Vat. autem cum cod. cc *rei, ad quam referuntur*.

en: Codices W X [read] *super respectivum, qui*; codices A V *quae* (referring to the preceding words *diversitas rationis*); other codices, not few, with editions 1, 2, 3, incongruously *qui*. Soon after *nec tamen*, codex W repeats *persona*. — Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 1, *ad* 1. — In nearly the same way this difficulty is solved above at d. 8, p. II, q. 1, *ad* 1; but the question is treated more diffusely above at d. 27, p. I, q. 3. — Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 14 (c. 16): "For finding any difference whatever of the things proposed, we shall be showing that they are not the same." — In place of *praeterea*, several codices with the Vatican [read] *personae*. — From codex I (T in the margin) and edition I we have restored *termini*, in place of which other codices [read] *rei*, but the Vatican with codex cc [reads] *rei, ad quam referuntur* ("of the thing, to which they are referred").

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Natura* hic dicitur ipsa essentia divina, quatenus est communicabilis tribus personis; *res naturae* secundum S. Hilarium a Scholasticis dicitur *hypostasis* sive *suppositum* (cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. *Scholion*). — De additione ad naturam, quam ratio personae importat, cfr. supra d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. *Scholion*. — Sub duplici respectu hoc loco quaestionem solvi, ex ipso textu patet. Sub secundo respectu (a parte rei) nullam differentiam secundum rem inter naturam et personam poni posse, manifestum est. Sed tunc oritur dubium, ab intellectu humano, saltem adaequate, non solvendum, quomodo cum tali suppositione stare possit realis distinctio personarum. Ad hoc dubium aliquatenus solvendum S. Doctor recurrit ad hoc principium, quod persona creata valde differt ab increata, quod pluribus rationibus evincitur. Principalis tamen differentia haec est (ad 1.), quod hypostasis creata a natura differt per aliquid absolutum, divina autem hypostasis differt a natura per aliquid relativum, quod nullam inducit compositionem. Hoc Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.) sic explanat: «Differt persona ab essentia secundum rationem, non sicut dicimus attributa secundum rationem differre, sed propter differentem modum se habendi, quia in modo se habendi ad alterum differunt secundum affirmationem et negationem, quia persona se habet ad alium, essentia vero non, et essentia se habet absolute, persona vero non». Tota hac quaestione, praesertim solutione ad 6, et isto loco Richardi ea quae supra (d. 26. q. 1. *Scholion*) de distinctione attributionis diximus, confirmantur.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 56. m. 7. a. 1. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 39. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2; *S.* p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 4, et q. 43. m. 2. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. *princ.* q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2, et d. 33. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** *Nature* is here said [to be] the divine essence itself, insofar as it is communicable to the three persons; *thing of the nature*, according to St. Hilary, is called by the Scholastics *hypostasis* or *supposit* (cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, *Scholion*). — Concerning the addition to nature which the account of person imports, cf. above d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, *Scholion*. — Under a twofold respect, that the question is here resolved, is clear from the text itself. Under the second respect (from the side of the thing) it is manifest that no difference according to the thing can be posited between nature and person. But then a doubt arises, not to be solved by the human intellect, at least adequately, [namely] how with such a supposition the real distinction of the persons can stand. To resolve this doubt to some extent, the Holy Doctor has recourse to this principle, that the created person differs greatly from the uncreated, which is shown by several reasons. The principal difference, however, is this (*ad* 1), that a created hypostasis differs from the nature by something absolute, but the divine hypostasis differs from the nature by something relative, which introduces no composition. This Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 1) explains thus: "The person differs from the essence according to reason, not in the way we say the attributes differ according to reason, but on account of the differing mode of having-itself, since in the mode of having-itself toward another they differ according to affirmation and negation, since the person stands to another, but the essence does not, and the essence stands absolutely, but the person does not." By this whole question, especially by the solution to [argument] 6, and by this place of Richard, what we said above (d. 26, q. 1, *Scholion*) on the distinction of attribution is confirmed.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 56, m. 7, a. 1, 2. — Scot., in each *Scriptum* here q. 1. — St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 1, 2; *S.* p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 4, and q. 43, m. 2, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1, 2. — Ægid. R., here 1, *princ.* q. 1. — Durand., here q. 1, 2, and d. 33, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum in divinis persona praedicetur de natura, et natura de persona.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere praedicationem, scilicet ut res naturae sive persona praedicetur de natura, vel e converso. Et quod non videtur.

1. Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Deus est forma sine subiecto»; sed ubi non est subiectum, non est praedicatum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Dionysius[^2] dicit, quod «negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes vero incompactae»; sed ubi est vere aliquid de aliquo praedicare, est etiam vere affirmare; sed in Deo non contingit vere affirmare: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia ubicumque est praedicatio, ibi est complexio et compositio[^3]; sed in Deo nulla est complexio, ergo et nulla compositio: ergo et nulla praedicatio.

4. Item, in omni praedicatione subiectum se habet ad modum materiae; sed in divinis nec est reperire materiam nec modum materiae: ergo nec praedicationem.

5. Item, si est ibi praedicatio, aut praedicatur idem de eodem, aut aliud de alio. Si idem de eodem, nullus ex hoc capitur intellectus alius, quam si non esset praedicatio, ut patet cum dicitur: *homo est homo*. Si aliud de alio: ergo in divinis est aliud et aliud, ergo compositio.

6. Item, si est ibi praedicatio, aut praedicatur res naturae de natura, aut e converso. Res naturae non potest praedicari de natura, quia res naturae se habet per modum suppositi: ergo eius est subiici, non praedicari: ergo si praedicatur, tunc ergo natura de re naturae. Sed contra: natura est forma; sed omnis forma dicitur relative ad informatum, nullum autem relativum dicitur de alio[^4]: ergo natura non praedicatur de re naturae: ergo non est praedicatio.

7. Item, quae habent oppositas proprietates, unum non praedicatur de altero; sed essentiae vel naturae proprietas est communicabilitas, personae vero incommunicabilitas: ergo unum de altero non praedicatur, nec una persona de altera: constat ergo ibi nullam esse praedicationem[^5].

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**Contra:**

1. Damascenus[^6]: «Substantia de hypostasibus praedicatur».

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia fides habet obiectum verum et habet obiectum Deum, ergo verum est ponere in divinis; sed veritas et falsitas circa compositionem[^7], veritas, inquam, circa quam est credulitas vel opinio: ergo in divinis est ponere compositionem, ergo et praedicationem.

3. Item, ubicumque est vere[^8] commune et proprium, ibi est vere ponere praedicationem; sed in divinis est vere reperire commune et proprium, quia natura vere est communis, et persona proprium sive incommunicabile: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc verbum *est* est nota identitatis[^9]; sed omnis praedicatio est mediante hoc verbo *est*: ergo omnis praedicatio signum est identitatis. Sed ubi vere est significatum, vere est et signum; sed in Deo propriissime et verissime est identitas, sicut probatum est[^10], quia *res naturae* non addit supra naturam: ergo propriissime praedicatio. Et hoc est quod dicit Boethius, quod «nulla verior praedicatio illa, in qua idem de se praedicatur»: si ergo hoc est in divinis, ergo omnes praedicationes in divinis sunt verissimae.

### Conclusio.

> *Persona praedicatur de natura et e converso praedicatione per identitatem; sed praedicatione per modum inhaerentiae tantum commune praedicatur de proprio.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est praedicatio *per inhaerentiam*, et est praedicatio *per identitatem*, et utramque est in Deo reperire: per inhaerentiam, ut cum dicitur: *Pater generat*, vel *Deus creat*; per identitatem, ut cum dicitur: *Pater est generatio*, vel *Deus est creatio*. Praedicationem autem per identitatem est reperire in Deo propriissime, propter ipsius rei qualitatem[^11], quoniam ibi est summa identitas: unde omnes locutiones importantes unitatem, ibi sunt verissimae. Praedicationem autem per inhaerentiam est ibi reperire propter intellectus nostri defectibilitatem[^12], quoniam, licet actus in divinis sit Dei substantia et ipsa proprietas etiam, tamen, quia intellectus noster intelligit per res inferiores, et enuntiat per vocabula rerum inferiorum, tenet modum enuntiandi, quem habet circa inferiora; et ideo praedicat per modum inhaerentiae, quamvis omnia quae in Deo sunt, realiter habeant modum substantiae.

Intellectus tamen iste non est falsus: quoniam, quemadmodum intellectus abstrahens lineam a materia non est falsus[^13], quia modum illum non ponit circa rem, sed circa suum intelligere, similiter intellectus noster in divinis complexionem non ponit circa rem, sed circa suum intelligere et suum exprimere. Quamvis enim in Deo sit summa simplicitas, tamen exprimi non potest nisi per complexionem. Et ideo bene dicit Augustinus[^14], «quod verius est Deus quam cogitatur, et verius cogitatur quam dicitur». Nam etsi intellectus aliquo modo per intelligentiam ascendat ad contuitum simplicitatis, non tamen potest hoc exprimere voce simplici, sed composita.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in Deo non est subiectum; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum ad rem; est tamen[^15] quantum ad modum intelligendi vel enuntiandi.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affirmationes sunt incompactae; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur, quia nullum nomen exprimit divinam essentiam, sicut est, omnino. — Vel dic, quod in affirmatione notatur identitas, et haec vere est in Deo a parte rei;

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et est compositio[^16], et respectu huius est incompactio, quia nulla est ibi realis compositio.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de complexione, dicendum, quod illa complexio in sermone significat compositionem in intellectu, sed unitatem in re.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod modus materiae in Deo non cadit; dicendum, quod verum est, quia[^17] non cadit modus materiae ut *ex qua*; modus autem ut *de quo* et *in quo* bene cadit.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: *Aut idem praedicatur de eodem* etc.; dicendum, quod aliquando idem est re, diversum tamen secundum rationem intelligendi et dicendi, ut *bonitas est[^18] substantia*; aliquando idem secundum substantiam, diversum secundum modum se habendi, ut *persona est substantia*, sive *relatio est substantia*, et *Deus generat*: et ideo aliquis intellectus capitur ex complexione, qui non capitur ex simplici voce.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum res naturae praedicetur de natura; dicendum, quod praedicatione per identitatem utrumque de altero praedicatur, nec est compositio[^19] in ratione formae nec in ratione materiae; si autem per inhaerentiam, tunc commune praedicatur de proprio, ut *Pater est Deus*.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod natura est forma; respondendum est dupliciter[^20]: quod forma uno modo dicitur relative ad informatum, et sic non est accipere in Deo; alio modo absolute, quod caret materia, et sic est in Deo; et sic patet illud. — Aliter potest dici, quod *dici relative* est dupliciter: vel secundum esse, vel secundum dici; secundum dici, ut videns ad visum, et intelligens ad intellectum, et sic unum de altero praedicatur; secundum esse, ut Pater ad Filium, et sic non praedicatur. Natura enim non dicit respectum ad personam secundum esse, sed secundum dici; et talis respectus importatur, cum dicitur, quod natura est forma respectu rei naturae. Hinc est, quod dicitur ratione illius respectus: *tres personae unius essentiae* vel *naturae*, et *una natura trium personarum*; non tamen dicitur *tres personae unius Dei*. Nam hoc nomen *Deus* non importat respectum secundum dici ad personam, sed solum ad creaturam. Ideo dicitur *Deus Abraham, Isaac et Iacob*[^21].

*Ad 7.* Ad ultimum dicendum, quod communicabilitas et incommunicabilitas non sunt oppositae proprietates, sed sic differunt, sicut habere proprietatem et non habere[^22]. Quia enim persona habet proprietatem relativam, ideo distinguitur et est incommunicabilis; sed quia essentia caret illa proprietate, ideo communis est, et communicabilis pluribus; et ideo non distinguuntur ad invicem. — Vel potest dici, quod *communicabilitas*[^23] non est proprietas distinguens etiam in creaturis: unde quamvis homo sit commune, et Petrus proprium, non tamen impeditur, quin homo dicatur in Petro; quanto magis in Deo[^24]. Illa autem propositio intelligitur de proprietatibus separantibus et distinguentibus illa, in quibus sunt, ad invicem.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether in divine matters person is predicated of nature, and nature of person.*

Second, inquiry is made whether in divine matters predication is to be posited, namely so that the *res naturae* or person is predicated of nature, or conversely. And that it is not so seems to be shown:

1. Boethius in his book *On the Trinity*[^1]: «God is form without subject»; but where there is no subject, there is no predicate: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Dionysius[^2] says that «negations concerning God are true, but affirmations are unfitting»; but where there is truly something to be predicated of something, there is also truly to affirm; but in God it does not happen to affirm truly: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems by reason: because wherever there is predication, there is conjunction and composition[^3]; but in God there is no conjunction, therefore neither any composition: therefore neither any predication.

4. Likewise, in every predication the subject stands in the manner of matter; but in divine matters there is to be found neither matter nor the manner of matter: therefore neither predication.

5. Likewise, if there is predication there, then either the same is predicated of the same, or another of another. If the same of the same, no other understanding is grasped from this than if there were no predication, as is plain when one says: *man is man*. If another of another: then in divine matters there is one and another, therefore composition.

6. Likewise, if there is predication there, then either *res naturae* is predicated of nature, or conversely. *Res naturae* cannot be predicated of nature, because *res naturae* stands in the manner of a supposit: therefore its [office] is to be the subject, not to be predicated: therefore if it is predicated, then nature is predicated of *res naturae*. But on the contrary: nature is form; but every form is said relatively to that which is informed, and no relative is said of another[^4]: therefore nature is not predicated of *res naturae*: therefore there is no predication.

7. Likewise, [things] which have opposite properties, the one is not predicated of the other; but the property of essence or nature is communicability, that of person incommunicability: therefore the one is not predicated of the other, nor is one person predicated of another: it is established, therefore, that there is no predication there[^5].

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**On the contrary:**

1. Damascene[^6]: «Substance is predicated of the hypostases».

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because faith has a true object, and has God as its object, therefore it is true to posit [predication] in divine matters; but truth and falsity concern composition[^7] — truth, I say, concerning which there is belief or opinion: therefore in divine matters composition is to be posited, therefore also predication.

3. Likewise, wherever there is truly[^8] common and proper, there predication is truly to be posited; but in divine matters common and proper are truly to be found, because nature is truly common, and person proper or incommunicable: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this verb *is* is the mark of identity[^9]; but every predication is by means of this verb *is*: therefore every predication is a sign of identity. But where there is truly the signified, there is also truly the sign; but in God there is most properly and most truly identity, as has been proved[^10], because *res naturae* does not add anything beyond nature: therefore most properly predication. And this is what Boethius says: «no predication is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself»: if therefore this is in divine matters, therefore all predications in divine matters are most true.

### Conclusion.

> *Person is predicated of nature and conversely by predication of identity; but by predication in the mode of inherence only the common is predicated of the proper.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is predication *by inherence*, and there is predication *by identity*, and both are to be found in God: by inherence, as when one says: *the Father generates*, or *God creates*; by identity, as when one says: *the Father is generation*, or *God is creation*. Predication by identity is to be found in God most properly, on account of the very quality of the thing[^11], because there is the highest identity there: whence all locutions importing unity are there most true. Predication by inherence is to be found there on account of the defectibility[^12] of our intellect, because, although the act in divine matters is the very substance of God and the property itself as well, nevertheless, since our intellect understands through inferior things and announces through the words of inferior things, it keeps the manner of announcing which it has concerning inferior things; and therefore it predicates in the mode of inherence, although all the things which are in God really have the mode of substance.

This understanding, however, is not false: for, just as the intellect abstracting a line from matter is not false[^13], because it does not place that mode in the thing, but in its own understanding, similarly our intellect in divine matters does not place conjunction in the thing, but in its own understanding and its own expressing. For although in God there is the highest simplicity, nevertheless it cannot be expressed except through conjunction. And therefore Augustine[^14] well says: «that God is more truly than he is thought, and is more truly thought than spoken». For even if the intellect in some way through intelligence ascends to the contemplation of simplicity, nevertheless it cannot express this in a simple voice, but only in a composite one.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that in God there is no subject; it must be said that this is true as to the thing; nevertheless it is so [a subject][^15] as to the manner of understanding or announcing.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that affirmations are unfitting; it must be said that this is said because no name expresses the divine essence as it is, altogether. — Or say that in affirmation identity is noted, and this is truly in God on the side of the thing;

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and there is composition[^16], and with respect to this there is unfittingness, because there is no real composition there.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning conjunction, it must be said that this conjunction in speech signifies a composition in the intellect, but a unity in the thing.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the mode of matter does not fall in God; it must be said that this is true, because[^17] the mode of matter as *that out of which* does not fall there; but the mode as *that of which* and *that in which* does indeed fall.

*To 5.* To that which is objected: *Either the same is predicated of the same* etc.; it must be said that sometimes [there is] the same as to the thing, but diverse according to the manner of understanding and speaking, as *goodness is[^18] substance*; sometimes the same according to substance, but diverse according to the manner of being-toward, as *person is substance*, or *relation is substance*, and *God generates*: and therefore some understanding is grasped from the conjunction which is not grasped from the simple word.

*To 6.* To that which is asked, whether *res naturae* is predicated of nature; it must be said that by predication of identity each is predicated of the other, and there is no composition[^19] in the account of form nor in the account of matter; but if by inherence, then the common is predicated of the proper, as *the Father is God*.

That, then, which is objected, that nature is form; the response must be made in two ways[^20]: that form in one way is said relatively to that which is informed, and so it is not to be admitted in God; in another way absolutely, that which lacks matter, and so it is in God; and so that point is plain. — Otherwise it can be said that *to be said relatively* is twofold: either according to being, or according to being-said; according to being-said, as *seeing* with respect to *the seen*, and *understanding* with respect to *the understood*, and so the one is predicated of the other; according to being, as the Father with respect to the Son, and so it is not predicated. For nature does not state a relation toward person according to being, but according to being-said; and such a relation is imported when it is said that nature is form with respect to *res naturae*. Hence it is that, by reason of that relation, it is said: *three persons of one essence* or *of one nature*, and *one nature of three persons*; nevertheless it is not said *three persons of one God*. For this name *God* does not import a relation according to being-said toward person, but only toward the creature. Therefore it is said: *the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*[^21].

*To 7.* To the last [objection] it must be said that communicability and incommunicability are not opposite properties, but they differ thus, as having a property and not having[^22]. For because the person has a relative property, therefore it is distinguished and is incommunicable; but because the essence lacks that property, therefore it is common and communicable to many; and therefore they are not distinguished from one another. — Or it can be said that *communicability*[^23] is not a distinguishing property even in creatures: whence although *man* is common and *Peter* proper, still it is not prevented that *man* is said in *Peter*; how much more in God[^24]. But that proposition is to be understood of properties separating and distinguishing those things in which they are from one another.

la: Cap. 2: *Divina substantia sine materia forma est... forma enim est; formae vero subiectae esse non possunt.*

en: Chapter 2: «The divine substance is form without matter... for it is form; but forms cannot be subject to [anything]».

la: Libr. *de Caelest. Hier.* c. 2. § 3: Αἱ μὲν ἀποφάσεις ἐπὶ τῶν θείων ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ καταφάσεις ἀνάρμοστοι. In textu pro *incompactae*, quod est versionis Scoti Erigenae, Corderius substituit *incongruae*.

en: Book *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 2, § 3: «Negations concerning divine things are true, but affirmations [are] unfitting». In the text, for *incompactae* (unfitting), which is from the version of Scotus Eriugena, Corderius substitutes *incongruae* (incongruous).

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* circa initium, ubi agitur de complexis et incomplexis; ac 1. *Periherm.* c. 3. seq., ubi agitur de verbo et enuntiatione. — Vat. cum cod. cc post *ibi est complexio* interiicit *ergo*. In multis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur ultima conclusio: *ergo et nulla praedicatio*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, near the beginning, where complex and non-complex are treated; and 1 *On Interpretation*, c. 3 seq., where the verb and the enunciation are treated. — The Vatican edition with codex cc, after *ibi est complexio* (there is conjunction there), interjects *ergo* (therefore). In many codices and the first edition the final conclusion is missing: *therefore neither any predication*.

la: Pro *alio* Vat. et cod. cc clarius *sine correlativo*, de quo cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis*. Mox post *ergo non est* codd. B D bb cum ed. 1 bene interserunt *ibi*.

en: For *alio* (another) the Vatican edition and codex cc more clearly read *sine correlativo* (without a correlative), concerning which see Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Opposites*. Soon after *ergo non est* (therefore there is no), codices B D bb with the first edition rightly insert *ibi* (there).

la: Codd. P Q W, omisso verbo *constat*, brevius: *ergo nulla est ibi praedicatio*.

en: Codices P Q W, omitting the word *constat* (it is established), more briefly: *therefore there is no predication there*.

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 6: Κατηγορεῖται δὲ ἡ οὐσία τῆς ὑποστάσεως, i. e. praedicatur itaque essentia de persona (hypostasi).

en: Book III, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 6: «Substance is predicated of the hypostasis», that is, essence is therefore predicated of the person (hypostasis).

la: Aristot., VI. *Metaph.* text. 8. (V. c. 4.): «Verum etenim affirmationem in compositis habet, negationem vero in divisis; falsum vero huius partitionis contradictionem». Et postea ostendit, quod verum et falsum non sint in rebus, sicut bonum et malum, sed in intellectu, non omni, sed componente vel dividente. Cfr. etiam I. *Periherm.* c. 1. seqq., ubi docetur neque in nominibus neque in verbis esse veritatem et falsitatem (quia sine compositione et divisione sunt), sed solum in enuntiatione. — Vat. cum cod. cc voci *compositionem* adiungit *sunt*. Prima huius argumenti propositio in cod. T (a prima manu) sic sonat: *quia fides habet obiectum Deum ut verum*.

en: Aristotle, VI *Metaph.* text 8 (V c. 4): «For truth has its affirmation in things composed, but its negation in things divided; but the false is the contradiction of this division». And afterward he shows that the true and the false are not in things, like good and evil, but in the intellect — not every intellect, but one composing or dividing. Cf. also 1 *On Interpretation*, c. 1 seq., where it is taught that neither in nouns nor in verbs is there truth and falsity (because they are without composition and division), but only in the enunciation. — The Vatican edition with codex cc adjoins *sunt* (are) to the word *compositionem*. The first proposition of this argument in codex T (in a first hand) reads thus: *because faith has God as a true object*.

la: Ed. 1 addit *reperire*, quod etiam in minori habetur.

en: The first edition adds *reperire* (to be found), which is also held in the minor [premise].

la: Aristot., 1. *Periherm.* c. 3.

en: Aristotle, 1 *On Interpretation*, c. 3.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo ante pro *vere est et* ed. 1 *ibi est vere*. — Praedicatio Boethii, quae mox commemoratur, invenitur in eius Comment. in libr. *de Interpretatione*, ed. prima, lib. II. circa finem, ubi auctor, agens de hac propositione *bonum, quoniam bonum, et eius opposita*, ait: «*Bonum*, inquit, *et bonum est, et non malum, quorum unum secundum se et proxime et naturaliter est, hoc scilicet, quod bonum est; alterum vero est accidentaliter*, i. e. *quod malum non est... Quod si hoc est, verior est ea propositio, quae affirmat, quod secundum se est*». Haec praedicatio vocari solet *naturalis* sive *formaliter identica* ad distinguendam eam ab alia, quae *realiter* vel *materialiter identica* nominatur, v. g. *animalitas est rationalitas*. Cfr. Mastrius, *Cursus philos.* tom. I. disp. 5. n. 107, et disp. 10. n. 63.

en: The preceding question. — A little before, for *vere est et* (truly is also) the first edition reads *ibi est vere* (is there truly). — The predication of Boethius which is recalled shortly is found in his commentary on the book *On Interpretation*, first edition, book II near the end, where the author, treating this proposition *good, because good, and its opposites*, says: «*Good*, he says, *both is good and not bad, of which the one is according to itself and immediately and naturally — namely, that which is good; the other, however, is accidentally* — that is, *that which is not bad... If this is so, then the proposition is truer which affirms what is according to itself*». This predication is usually called *natural* or *formally identical*, to distinguish it from another, which is named *really* or *materially identical*, e.g. *animality is rationality*. Cf. Mastrius, *Cursus philos.* tom. I, disp. 5, n. 107, and disp. 10, n. 63.

la: Cod. V *aequalitatem*.

en: Codex V reads *aequalitatem* (equality).

la: Cod. R *defectum*.

en: Codex R reads *defectum* (defect).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 18. (c. 2.), ubi Philosophus agens de abstractione mathematica dicit: «neque fit mendacium abstrahentium». Vide etiam III. *de Anima*, text. 35. (c. 7.). — Paulo inferius pro *complexionem* (ed. 1 *complexionem illam*) cod. T *complexionis*, Vat. *compositionem*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Physics*, text 18 (c. 2), where the Philosopher, treating mathematical abstraction, says: «nor does any falsehood of the abstractors arise». See also III *On the Soul*, text 35 (c. 7). — A little below, for *complexionem* (conjunction) (the first edition: *complexionem illam* — that conjunction) codex T reads *complexionis*, the Vatican edition *compositionem*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 7. Cfr. supra d. XXIII. c. 2, et in Comment. dub. 2. — Immediate ante pro *nisi per complexionem* codd. S T *ibi per incomplexionem*.

en: Book VII, *On the Trinity*, c. 4, n. 7. Cf. above d. 23, c. 2, and in the Commentary, dub. 2. — Immediately before, for *nisi per complexionem* (except through conjunction) codices S T read *ibi per incomplexionem* (there through non-conjunction).

la: Supple: *subiectum*.

en: Supply: *subiectum* (a subject).

la: Ed. 1 *et non est compositio*; cod. I *non etiam compositio*, in qua lectione verba immediate coniungenda sunt cum praecedentibus absque interpunctionis signo. Paulo ante pro *et haec vere est* codd. H T *et hoc verum est*.

en: The first edition reads *et non est compositio* (and there is no composition); codex I *non etiam compositio* (nor even composition), in which reading the words are to be joined immediately to the preceding without a punctuation sign. A little before, for *et haec vere est* (and this is truly) codices H T read *et hoc verum est* (and this is true).

la: Cod. T cum nonnullis aliis et ed. 1 *quod*. Subinde post *modus* in pluribus codd. et ed. 1 desideratur *materiae*.

en: Codex T with several others and the first edition reads *quod* (that). Soon after *modus* (mode), in many codices and the first edition the word *materiae* (of matter) is missing.

la: Contra Vat., quae hic ponit *et*, cum codd. L T X legendum duximus *est*, quia verbum *est* respondet illi alteri *est* in subsequenti propositione: *ut persona est substantia*. Paulo superius pro *idem est re* aliqui codd. ut T V cum ed. 1 *idem re*. Si quis malit illam lectionem *idem re* etc., suppleat ex praecedentibus *praedicatur* pro suppresso verbo *est*.

en: Against the Vatican edition, which here puts *et* (and), with codices L T X we have considered *est* (is) the proper reading, because the verb *est* corresponds to that other *est* in the following proposition: *as person is substance*. A little above, for *idem est re* (the same in thing) some codices, such as T V with the first edition, read *idem re*. If anyone prefers that reading *idem re* etc., let him supply *praedicatur* (is predicated) from the preceding for the suppressed verb *est*.

la: Pro voce *compositio*, quae in plerisque codd. invenitur, Vat. *praedicatio*; codd. F G P R S U cc ce ff cum ed. 1 *comparatio*.

en: For the word *compositio* (composition), which is found in most codices, the Vatican edition reads *praedicatio* (predication); codices F G P R S U cc ce ff with the first edition read *comparatio* (comparison).

la: Plures codd. *responsio est duplex*; Vat. solummodo *respondeo*; cod. X (cod. L in marg.) sic: *respondendum est, quod forma dicitur dupliciter: uno modo* etc.

en: Several codices read *responsio est duplex* (the response is twofold); the Vatican edition only *respondeo* (I respond); codex X (codex L in the margin) thus: *it must be answered that form is said in two ways: in one way* etc.

en: Exodus 3:6; Matthew 22:32.

la: Cod. bb (T in marg.) cum ed. 1 *proprietas communicabilitatis*.

en: Codex bb (T in the margin) with the first edition reads *proprietas communicabilitatis* (property of communicability).

la: Intellige: *communicabilitas non est proprietas distinguens*.

en: Understand: *communicability is not a distinguishing property*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De speciebus praedicationis cfr. d. 30. q. 1. et d. 33. q. 3. — Observandum est, quod prima quinque argumenta ad oppositum probare nituntur, nullam prorsus in divinis admittendam esse praedicationem; sextum vero et septimum excludunt tantum praedicationem, de qua est quaestio. Quapropter etiam in responsione plura et egregia dicuntur de praedicatione generatim in divinis admittenda (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 13. a. 2. 4. 12.); solutio vero specialis quaestionis, in titulo indicatae, explicite tantum exhibetur in solut. ad 6, in qua notatu digna est responsio ad id quod replicatur in arg. 6. ad oppositum. S. Doctor dupliciter respondet, primo negans, formam in Deo dici relative ad informatum, secundo distinguens illud *dici relative*. Si hoc intelligitur de relatione reali, certe non est relatio realis inter naturam et hypostasim in Deo, sed tantum inter personam et personam; si autem intelligitur de relatione *secundum dici*, concedi potest, quod natura sit forma respectu personae, et quod ratione illius respectus concedi possit locutio: *tres personae unius essentiae* (de qua propositione vide hic dub. 3, et supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3, et S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 2. aliosque communiter). — Quoad solut. ad 7. cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 7. a. 3. — Scot., 1. Sent. d. 4. q. 2; Report. hic q. 2, et d. 4. q. 2. — S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 4. q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 6. — B. Albert., 1. Sent. d. 4. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 75. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the species of predication see d. 30, q. 1, and d. 33, q. 3. — It is to be observed that the first five arguments to the opposite [side] strive to prove that no predication whatever is to be admitted in divine matters; but the sixth and seventh exclude only the predication concerning which the question is. Wherefore also in the response many and excellent things are said about predication generally to be admitted in divine matters (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 13, a. 2, 4, 12); but the special solution of the question, indicated in the title, is explicitly given only in the solution to the sixth, in which a noteworthy response is made to that which is replied in arg. 6 to the opposite side. The Holy Doctor responds in two ways, first denying that form in God is said relatively to that which is informed, second distinguishing that *to be said relatively*. If this is understood of a real relation, certainly there is no real relation between nature and hypostasis in God, but only between person and person; if, however, it is understood of relation *according to being-said*, it can be conceded that nature is form with respect to person, and that by reason of that relation the locution can be conceded: *three persons of one essence* (concerning which proposition see here dub. 3, and above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3, and St. Thomas, here q. 2; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 2, and others commonly). — As to the solution to the seventh, cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *S.* pt. I, q. 56, m. 7, a. 3. — Scotus, 1 *Sent.* d. 4, q. 2; *Report.* here q. 2, and d. 4, q. 2. — St. Thomas, 1 *Sent.* d. 4, q. 2, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 6. — B. Albert, 1 *Sent.* d. 4, a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *S.* a. 75, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum in divinis sit ponere appropriationem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere appropriationem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia per communia est devenire in intellectum propriorum, sicut patet, quod per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem venitur in cognitionem Trinitatis; similiter per unitatem, per veritatem et bonitatem, in quibus consistit ratio vestigii[^1]; sed non devenitur a communibus ad propria, nisi communia aliquo modo approprientur: cum ergo sit devenire in divinis per communia ad cognitionem proprii, est ibi appropriatio.

2. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae appropriat communia personis, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio et bonitatem Spiritui sancto[^2].

**Sed contra:**

1. Sicut se habet proprium ad commune, ita commune ad proprium; sed proprium non potest communicari nisi falso: ergo nec commune appropriari. Sicut ergo proprium Patris numquam aliis fit commune, sic nec commune proprium.

2. Item, si est appropriatio in divinis, aut est secundum rem, aut secundum intellectum: si secundum rem; sed ubi[^3] est appropriatio secundum rem, aliquid per prius dicitur de illo cui appropriatur: ergo in divinis est prius et posterius quantum ad essentialia, quod est inconveniens. Si secundum intellectum, sed intellectus illi appropriat, cui magis iudicat convenire: ergo cum magis iudicet intellectus inesse sapientiam Patri tanquam antiquiori, illi debet appropriari. Sed appropriatur in contrarium: ergo appropriatio est contra intellectum: non ergo attenditur secundum intellectum.

3. Item, ubi est appropriatio, prius[^4] est secundum rationem intelligendi proprium quam appropriatum — ratio enim appropriationis prius est in proprio — ergo cum appropriatum commune sit, secundum rationem intelligendi prius erit proprium quam commune; quod est inconveniens.

### Conclusio.

> *Communia, quae aliquatenus connotant originem personarum, habent rationem appropriandi a parte rei; quatenus non connotant originem, non sunt appropriabilia, nisi forte propter errorem intellectus nostri amovendum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de appropriatis est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad id quod significant, aut quantum ad ordinem, quem connotant. Si quantum ad significatum, cum illud sit commune, et omnino conveniat per indifferentiam[^5], non contingit appropriari ratione sumta a parte rei, appropriatur tamen ratione sumta a parte intellectus nostri propter errorem amovendum. Quoniam enim intellectus carnalis in patre carnali videt defectum potentiae, et in filio defectum sapientiae et in spiritu intelligit furorem iracundiae; ideo spiritualis intellectus, ut elevet[^6] a carnalitate, potentiam Patri attribuit, quamvis non magis conveniat ei, sed ne minus videatur convenire; et sic[^7] de aliis.

Si autem loquamur quantum ad ordinem vel originem quem connotant, sic appropriantur a parte rei propter convenientiam cum propriis personarum. Unde quia Pater a nullo est, et Filius a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque, et huiusmodi ordo attenditur in potentia, sapientia et bonitate; ideo patet ratio appropriandi. Unde illa quae non connotant aliquo modo ordinem vel originem, non sunt appropriabilia.

1. *Ad illud ergo* quod obiicitur, quod proprium non communicatur, ergo etc., dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ex hoc, quod commune appropriatur, non attribuitur nisi ei cui convenit; sed si proprium fiat commune, tunc attribuitur ei cui non convenit: et ideo non est simile.

2. *Ad illud quod quaeritur*, utrum appropriatio sit secundum rem vel secundum intellectum;

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dicendum, quod per hoc quod est *secundum* potest dici vis appropriativa sive principium approprians, vel potest hoc quod est *secundum* importare rationem appropriandi. Si primo modo, sic cum appropriare sit virtutis cognoscentis, sic appropriatio est secundum intellectum nostrum. Si autem secundum dicat rationem appropriandi, sic uno modo est secundum rem, scilicet quantum ad ordinem connotatum; alio modo secundum intellectum quantum ad significatum. Unde intellectus appropriat[^8] propter intellectum, sed non idem intellectus propter se, sed intellectus sanus et fidelis propter intellectum carnalem, non ut cum eo concordet, sed ut ei obviet. Et ideo cum intellectus carnalis credat parum de potentia in Patre, spiritualis appropriat ei potentiam. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus, quia non intelligit plus esse de potentia in Patre, sed non minus quam[^9] in Filio. Si autem potentiam appropriaret Filio, tunc intellectus carnalis plus crederet esse in Filio, et ideo falsus esset; et sic patet illud.

3. *Ad ultimum dicendum*, quod appropriatum, secundum id quod est, prius est secundum rationem intelligendi quam proprium; appropriatum autem sub hac intentione[^10] consequitur rationem proprii, et hoc nullum est inconveniens.

english:
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### Question III.
#### *Whether appropriation is to be posited in the divine.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether appropriation is to be posited in the divine. And that it is so, appears thus:

1. Because by way of the common things one comes to the understanding of the proper, just as it is clear, that by memory, intelligence and will one comes to the knowledge of the Trinity; likewise by unity, by truth and goodness, in which consists the account of the *vestige*[^1]; but one does not come from the common to the proper, unless the common things are in some way appropriated: since therefore in the divine one comes through common things to the knowledge of the proper, there is appropriation there.

2. Likewise, for this there is the authority of sacred Scripture, which appropriates common things to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son and goodness to the Holy Spirit[^2].

**On the contrary:**

1. As the proper stands to the common, so the common to the proper; but the proper cannot be communicated except falsely: therefore neither can the common be appropriated. As, therefore, what is proper to the Father is never made common to the others, so neither is the common [made] proper.

2. Likewise, if there is appropriation in the divine, either it is according to the thing, or according to the understanding: if according to the thing; but where[^3] there is appropriation according to the thing, something is said of that to which it is appropriated by way of priority: therefore in the divine there is a prior and a posterior as to the essentials, which is unfitting. If according to the understanding, but the understanding appropriates [a thing] to that to which it judges it more to befit: therefore since the understanding more judges that wisdom is in the Father as in the more ancient, to him it ought to be appropriated. But it is appropriated to the contrary: therefore appropriation is against the understanding: therefore it is not taken according to the understanding.

3. Likewise, where there is appropriation, the proper is prior[^4] according to the account of understanding to the appropriated — for the account of appropriation is prior in the proper — therefore since the appropriated is common, according to the account of understanding the proper will be prior to the common; which is unfitting.

### Conclusion.

> *Common things, which in some way connote the origin of the persons, have a ground for being appropriated on the side of the thing; insofar as they do not connote origin, they are not appropriable, except perhaps for the sake of removing an error of our understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said, that of appropriated things one may speak in two ways: either as to that which they signify, or as to the order which they connote. If as to the signified, since that is common and altogether befits [each person] indifferently[^5], it does not happen to be appropriated by reason taken on the side of the thing; nevertheless it is appropriated by reason taken on the side of our understanding, for the sake of removing error. For since the carnal understanding sees in a carnal father a defect of power, and in a son a defect of wisdom, and in a [breath/]spirit understands the fury of wrath; therefore the spiritual understanding, in order that it may raise [us] up[^6] from carnality, attributes power to the Father, although it does not befit him more, but lest it seem to befit him less; and so[^7] of the others.

But if we speak as to the order or origin which they connote, then they are appropriated on the side of the thing on account of a fittingness with the propers of the persons. Whence since the Father is from no one, and the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, and an order of this sort is regarded in power, wisdom and goodness; therefore the ground of appropriating is clear. Whence those things which do not in some way connote order or origin are not appropriable.

1. *To that, then,* which is objected, that the proper is not communicated, therefore etc., it must be said that the case is not similar, since from the fact that the common is appropriated, it is not attributed except to him to whom it befits; but if the proper were made common, then it would be attributed to him to whom it does not befit: and therefore the case is not similar.

2. *To that which is asked*, whether appropriation is according to the thing or according to the understanding;

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it must be said, that by this [word] which is *according to* there can be meant the appropriative power or the principle which appropriates, or this [word] which is *according to* can convey the ground of appropriating. If in the first way, then since to appropriate belongs to a knowing power, in this way appropriation is according to our understanding. But if *according to* states the ground of appropriating, then in one way it is according to the thing, namely as to the connoted order; in another way according to the understanding as to the signified. Whence the understanding appropriates[^8] on account of [the] understanding, but not the same understanding on account of itself, but the sound and faithful understanding on account of the carnal understanding, not that it may agree with it, but that it may go to meet it. And therefore since the carnal understanding believes [there to be] little of power in the Father, the spiritual [understanding] appropriates power to him. Nor however is the understanding false, because it does not understand more of power to be in the Father, but not less than[^9] in the Son. But if it appropriated power to the Son, then the carnal understanding would believe there to be more in the Son, and therefore would be false; and so this is clear.

3. *To the last it must be said*, that the appropriated, according to that which it is, is prior according to the account of understanding to the proper; but the appropriated under this intention[^10] follows the account of the proper, and this is no inconvenience.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 1, et q. 4, ac dub. 3, nec non ibid. p. II. q. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2, *ad* 1, and q. 4, and dub. 3, also *ibid.* p. II, q. 1 ff.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: See here the *text of the Master*, c. 3.

la: Cod. T *ubicumque*.

en: Codex T [reads] *ubicumque*.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 voculae *prius* praefigunt *ibi*.

en: Several codices with edition 1 prefix *ibi* to the little word *prius*.

la: Pro *omnino conveniat* sola Vat. *omnibus conveniat personis*. Mox pro *nostri* codd. R V *tantum*.

en: In place of *omnino conveniat*, the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *omnibus conveniat personis*. Soon, in place of *nostri*, codices R V [read] *tantum*.

la: Simul audi: *mentem*; vel lege cum cod. Y *elevetur*, pro quo cod. K *elevatus*. Paulo superius vocabulo *spiritu* multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam adiungunt *sancto*. — Ratio, quam S. Doctor hic affert, est Hugonis a S. Vict. et invenitur supra in lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: At the same time understand *mentem* ("the mind"); or read with codex Y *elevetur*, in place of which codex K [has] *elevatus*. A little above, to the word *spiritu* many codices with editions 2, 3 wrongly add *sancto*. — The reasoning which the Holy Doctor here brings forward is from Hugh of St. Victor, and is found above in the *text of the Master*, c. 1.

la: In non paucis codd. desideratur *tum*.

en: In not a few codices *tum* is missing.

la: Auctoritate codd. emendavimus falsam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc *appropriatur*.

en: On the authority of the codices we have emended the false reading of the Vatican [edition] and of codex cc, *appropriatur*.

la: Pro *sed non minus quam* Vat. *et minus*.

en: In place of *sed non minus quam*, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *et minus*.

la: Intellige: quatenus est appropriatum seu appropriatum *formaliter* acceptum, cui opponitur *materialiter* acceptum, scilicet id quod appropriatur, nempe attributum essentiale.

en: Understand: insofar as it is the appropriated, or the appropriated taken *formally*, to which is opposed [the appropriated] taken *materially*, namely that which is appropriated, that is, the essential attribute.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Appropriata in Deo sunt «attributa essentialia considerata in personis» (ita S. Doctor infra d. 36. a. 1.); ipsa semper dicunt «relationem et res et significant Deum ut causam» (ibid.). — Duplex ratio pro appropriatione facienda proponitur: altera est tota ex parte intellectus nostri imperfectissimi, scilicet propter errorem amovendum; et haec procedit «per modum dissimilitudinis» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 7.); haec ratio magis explanatur hic in solut. ad 2. Altera est ex parte rei propter quandam convenientiam ad propria personarum, scilicet ratione ordinis, quem attributa connotant. — De variis modis appropriatorum cfr. supra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. et Scholion.

**II.** Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 67. praecipue m. 3. a. 1. — Scot., Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 7. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 31. a. 2, d. 34. a. 5; S. p. I. tr. 12. q. 48. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., I. Sent. d. 31. princ. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 1. seqq. Durand., d. 31. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The appropriated [things] in God are "essential attributes considered in the persons" (so the Holy Doctor below at d. 36, a. 1); they themselves always state "a relation and things, and signify God as cause" (*ibid.*). — A twofold reason for making appropriation is proposed: one is wholly on the side of our most imperfect understanding, namely for the sake of removing error; and this proceeds "by way of dissimilitude" (St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 39, a. 7); this reason is more explained here in the solution to [argument] 2. The other is on the side of the thing on account of a certain fittingness to the propers of the persons, namely by reason of the order which the attributes connote. — On the various modes of appropriated things cf. above d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 3 and Scholion.

**II.** Alex. Hal., p. I, q. 67, especially m. 3, a. 1. — Scot., *Report.* here q. 2. — St. Thom., I *Sent.* d. 31, q. 1, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 7. — B. Albert., I *Sent.* d. 31, a. 2, d. 34, a. 5; *S.* p. I, tr. 12, q. 48, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Ægid. R., I *Sent.* d. 31, *princ.* 2, q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 72, q. 1 ff. Durand., d. 31, q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 31, q. 1, 2.

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translators_notes: [Notes pending]