title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 6

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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum liberum arbitrium propter ineptitudinem corporis ligari possit quoad usum.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad corpus coniunctum, et est quaestio, utrum propter ineptitudinem corporis ligari habeat quantum ad usum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Bernardus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^1]: «Insanis et infantibus et dormientibus nihil quod agant, imputatur»: sed hoc non est, nisi quia carent usu liberi arbitrii, et hoc non est nisi propter aliquod impedimentum a parte corporis: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur exemplo, quia vir sanctus et castus, cuius castitas est magna, frequenter in somnis consentit operi peccati[^2], quod nullo modo faceret tempore vigiliae: ergo in somnis ligatur actus liberi arbitrii; sed hoc non est nisi per lassitudinem et ineptitudinem ex parte corporis: ergo etc.

3. Item, deficiente priori, deficit id quod posterius est: si ergo impeditur aliquis actus, qui praeambulus est ad usum liberi arbitrii, per ineptitudinem corporis; necesse est, et usum liberi arbitrii impediri. Sed actus praeambulus ad liberum arbitrium est operatio intellectus, quae per ineptitudinem corporis impeditur; sicut patet in dormientibus et in phreneticis, et Philosophus[^3] dicit, quod «intellectus corrumpitur, quodam interius corrupto», et hoc docet ipsa experientia: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut homo lassatur in sentiendo, ita etiam lassatur in cogitando et in meditando; sed quia corpus lassatur in sentiendo, ideo indiget quiete somni, in quo impeditur ab operationibus sensuum: ergo pari ratione necesse est, liberum arbitrium propter lassitudinem corporis ab actu et usu proprio impediri.

**Sed contra:**
1. Tertio Regum tertio[^4] refert historia, quod Dominus in somnis apparuit Salomoni, et merito petitionis, quam fecit, Dominus dedit ei sapientiam multam nimis. Si ergo mereri aliquid apud Deum et sapientiam suscipere, hoc est usus liberi arbitrii et rationis; videtur, quod propter lassitudinem et ineptitudinem corporis et quietem in somnis liberum arbitrium ab actu suo non habeat impediri.

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2. Item, Gregorius super illud Iob[^5]: *Terrebis me per somnia*, loquens de nocturnis illusionibus: «Haec malignos spiritus agere, superna dispensatio benigne permittit in electorum cordibus, ne ipse saltem a passionis praemio somnus vacet»: ergo contingit in somnis mereri: ergo propter ineptitudinem corporis liberum arbitrium non amittit usum proprium.

3. Item, anima quantum ad propriam operationem intellectivam sive liberum arbitrium nullius partis corporis est actus, nec illam operationem exercet per aliquod organum[^6]: ergo quantumcumque corporale organum vel laedatur, vel fiat ineptum, liberum arbitrium non perdet usum suum.

4. Item, quanto magis anima recolligitur ab exterioribus ad interiora, tanto magis viget operatio interior[^7]; sed cum ligantur organa sensuum exteriorum, recolliguntur vires animae ab exterioribus ad interiora: ergo tunc maxime debet vigere operatio interior. Sed penes hanc attenditur liberi arbitrii usus: ergo quando corpus efficitur ad sentiendum ineptum, utpote per somnum, liberum arbitrium tunc debet habere potissime usum proprium.

5. Item, videre futura, hoc est rationis maxime elevatae; sed in somnis potissime fit revelatio et praevisio futurorum: ergo altissimus[^8] actus rationis viget in somnis, dum est ineptitudo ex parte corporis; pari ratione et usus liberi arbitrii.

6. Item, multo magis pendet ex corpore vis phantastica et imaginativa quam rationalis virtus et intellectiva: ergo si propter ineptitudinem a parte corporis, quae quidem est in phreneticis vel etiam in somnis, non impeditur operatio phantastica, immo etiam viget; videtur, quod non debeat impediri operatio intellectiva.

Est igitur quaestio, cum operatio liberi arbitrii vel etiam intellectus nullo modo pendeat ex corpore: unde est hoc, quod impeditur et ligatur propter aliquam ineptitudinem factam circa corporale organum? — Et iterum, si impeditur, cum minus pendeat ex corpore quam virtus phantastica: unde est hoc, quod magis perdit usum suum ratio in somnis quam phantasia vel imaginatio? — Et iterum, cum ratio quantum ad actum liberi arbitrii maxime sit potens et libera: unde est hoc, quod propter ineptitudinem ex parte corporis facilius tollitur usus liberi arbitrii quam aliquis actus rationis? In somnis enim homo aliquos habet rationales motus, et in furiosis similiter hoc videmus, quod multa dicunt, quae non possent dicere, nisi rationem haberent, cum ad interrogata respondent; in neutris tamen dicitur usus liberi arbitrii esse. — Omnia haec difficilem faciunt quaestionem.

### Conclusio

> Liberum arbitrium propter corporis ineptitudinem potest impediri quoad usum.

**Respondeo:** Quod[^9] etsi ad hanc quaestionem facile sit respondere, cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium ligetur per corporis ineptitudinem quantum ad usum; quoniam ipsa experientia hoc plane docet et manifestat, quod ligatur in parvulis et dormientibus et furiosis; ad illam tamen quaestionem, quae hanc subsequitur, videlicet, quare ligatur liberum arbitrium ex corporis ineptitudine, cum non sit potentia alligata organo; valde difficile est respondere et eius assignare causam. Intelligendum tamen est, quod est quadruplex modus satisfaciendi huic quaestioni.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod usus rationis vel etiam liberi arbitrii[^10] impeditur et ligatur ex corporis ineptitudine propter animae conversionem; quidam vero, propter obsequii corporalis privationem; tertius vero est modus dicendi, quod propter operationis rationalis quandam communicationem; quartus autem modus est, propter corporis et animae unionem ad tertii constitutionem.

Primo, propter *conversionem* dixerunt aliqui animam impediri ab actu rationis, existente ineptitudine ex parte corporis. Aut enim est corpus ineptum ex aliqua laesione interiori, sicut est in furiosis et phreneticis; et tunc anima cessat ab operatione intelligendi propter hoc, quod nimia compassione convertitur ad corpus ratione nobilis organi laesi. Aut est ineptum ex imperfectione, quae est in membris et organis, sicut est in parvulis; et tunc anima adeo est intenta gubernationi corporis et rebus, quas per sensus corporis percipit, quod quasi obliviscitur sui. Et ideo ex nimia conversione ad corpus suum, quae est ex organorum laesione, sive ex imperfectione, contingit, usum rationis et liberi arbitrii impediri. — Sed hic modus dicendi non plene satisfacit. Videmus enim, quod vehemens dolor, ex parte corporis in extremitatibus factus, rationis usum non impedit, et tamen anima illum dolorem multum refugit. Item, in somnis non magis convertitur ad corporalia quam in vigilia; si ergo conversio, quae est in vigilia, usum rationis non tollit, pari ratione videtur, quod nec conversio, quae est in somnis circa regimen corporis[^11].

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Et ideo est secundus modus dicendi, videlicet quod liberum arbitrium a proprio usu habet impediri propter privationem obsequii corporalis. Etsi enim operatio intellectus non fiat per organum, nihilominus tamen virtutes sensitivae ipsi intellectivae faciunt aliquod obsequium ad hoc, quod exerceat suum actum. Dupliciter enim obsequitur vis phantastica intellectui in actu intelligendi, in hoc videlicet, quod offert illa phantasmata intellectui possibili, sicut obiectum offert speciem oculo; et in hoc etiam, quod intellectus noster excitari habet ab inferiori, quamdiu est coniunctus corpori[^12]. Et ideo, quando laesio est et ineptitudo ex parte organi potentiae sensitivae, et fit perturbatio phantasmatum; impeditur usus liberi arbitrii et intellectus propter hoc, quod aufertur sibi debitum obsequium; sicut oculus meus potest impediri ab actu videndi propter obscurationem aliquam factam in re visibili, quae habet mihi speciem offerre et visum meum excitare. — Sed iste modus dicendi adhuc non plene satisfacit, pro eo quod nos videmus, operationem intellectus impediri, non facto impedimento in opere interioris[^13] virtutis sensitivae, utpote imaginationis et phantasiae. Et iterum, cum intellectus et memoria intelligibilis aliquas species in se habeat abstractas, quas in se et penes se conservat, quas anima secum trahit, cum a corpore separatur; videtur[^14], quod omni obsequio phantasiae et phantasmatum circumscripto, intellectus usum habere debeat respectu eorum quorum habet in se habitum. Et hoc plane falsum est, quia ita homo impeditur in somnis[^15] a consideratione eorum quae novit, sicut ab inquisitione eorum quae non novit.

Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod operatio liberi arbitrii et rationis ex corporis ineptitudine habet impediri propter quandam communicationem operationis. Communicat autem quodam modo potentia intellectiva operationem suam corpori coniuncto, cum communicet ei esse, et ex eis fiat unum per essentiam, non solum in quantum anima est vegetabilis et sensibilis, sed etiam in quantum rationalis[^16]. Anima enim rationalis, adveniens corpori humano, sicut ex sua unione facit ipsum esse animal et animatum, ita facit esse *hominem*; et ideo, sicut aliquam operationem communicat corpori, in quantum facit *vivum* et in quantum facit *animal*, sic etiam aliquam communicat, in quantum facit *hominem*, licet non omnino uniformiter. Differenti enim modo communicat anima corpori operationes[^17], quae respiciunt potentiam vegetativam et sensitivam, et operationes potentiae intellectivae. Nam operatio sensitivae et vegetativae sic communicatur corpori, ut sit in corpore et per corpus, sit etiam in corpore et non sine corpore; non enim nutrit anima, nisi mediante organo corporeo, nec nutrit, nisi quamdiu est in corpore. Intelligere autem sic communicat anima corpori, ut sic intelligat cum corpore aliquo modo agente[^18], ut tamen non intelligat per corpus; sic intelligat etiam in corpore, ut tamen etiam intelligat, cum est separata a corpore. Quia vero, dum est in corpore, communicat ei rationalem operationem, ideo, facta inordinatione ex parte corporis, habet illa operatio impediri. — Sed iste modus dicendi calumniam habet in hoc quod dicit, quod operatio intellectus aliquo modo communicatur corpori, cum non videatur verum, et Philosophus contradicere videatur expresse in decimo sexto *Animalium*[^19], ubi dicit, quod «intellectus est ab extrinseco» propter hoc, quod nullo modo est immixtus corpori. Et hoc ipsum dicit in tertio *de Anima*. Et iterum, etsi concedatur, quod homo intelligat, nullo tamen modo conceditur nec de toto corpore nec de parte, quod intelligat. Unde videtur, quod hoc dicatur de toto coniuncto ratione partis, scilicet animae; sicut, cum dicitur: homo est albus, hoc dicitur solum ratione corporis[^20].

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Et propterea est quartus modus dicendi, quod scilicet operatio animae in corpore impediri habet propter corporis ineptitudinem. Et huius ratio est unio animae et corporis ad unius tertii constitutionem, quod est unum per essentiam, et cui debetur propria operatio, secundum quod est unum. Haec autem operatio non est vivere tantum nec sentire sive movere, sed ratiocinari et intelligere. Et propter ipsam unionem non tantum pendet anima ex corpore quantum ad actum sentiendi, sed etiam aliquo modo quantum ad actum intelligendi, quamdiu est in corpore, sed longe aliter et aliter. Nam quantum ad actum vegetandi et sentiendi sic pendet, ut nullo modo possit illos exercere nisi in corpore — non autem sic de actu intelligendi — sic etiam pendet, ut illos actus exerceat per corpus et per organum corporeum — non sic[^21] est de actu intelligendi — et ideo actum sentiendi dicitur communicare anima corpori. Unde non absurde omnino dicitur: oculus videt: non sic autem dicitur de actu intelligendi. Dicitur autem anima sentire per corpus, et non intelligere per corpus, quia, cum duo concurrant ad actum intelligendi et sentiendi, videlicet recipere et iudicare, in sentiendo receptio speciei est a corpore, sed iudicium est a virtute[^22]; sed in intelligendo utrumque est a virtute intellectiva, videlicet ab intellectu possibili et agente. Et propterea intellectus dicitur vis non alligata materiae, et operationem hanc potest habere, cum est separata a corpore; quamdiu autem est in corpore, non omnino intelligit praeter corpus. Sicut enim esse animae in corpore aliquo modo pendet ex corpore, quamvis non pendeat esse ipsius animae in se — ideo ad hoc, quod anima sit in corpore, necesse est, corpus debite complexionatum esse; et ad illius complexionis corruptionem contingit animam amplius non esse in corpore — sic, quamdiu anima est in corpore, intelligere suum non est sine corpore et sine aliqua dispositione ex parte corporis, cuius actualitas communicat[^23] actui intelligendi, sicut congrua dispositio correspondebat existentiae animae in corpore et perfectioni eiusdem. Illa autem actualitas attenditur secundum illud quod est supremum in corpore, et quantum ad nobilissimos spiritus, qui locum habent in nobilissimis organis corporis. Et quoniam, cum aliquid aufertur ab aliquo, prius aufertur ab eo illud quod est in eo excellentissimum; et cum aliqua virtus debilitatur, prius aufertur ab ea summum, quam illud quod est citra summum: hinc est, quod in laesione corporis citius tollitur[^24] illud, secundum quod corpus conformabatur operationi *intellectivae*, quam illud, secundum quod conformabatur operationi sensitivae. Et ideo fumositates ascendentes ad cerebrum, quae perturbant spiritus in somnis vel in pueris vel in phreneticis, vel quaecumque alia laesio organorum, in quibus resident spiritus subtilissimi et nobilissimi corporales, facilius impedit usum rationis quam imaginationis. — Et sic patet ratio, quare impeditur ex ineptitudine corporis usus rationis, et quare magis impeditur quam usus inferioris virtutis.

Ex hac eadem ratione colligitur, quare magis impeditur ratio quantum ad usum liberi arbitrii quam quantum ad alios actus rationales, quos in somnis et furiosis aliquando dignoscitur habere. Actus enim liberi arbitrii respicit potentiam rationalem, prout est in omnimoda et plena libertate. Liberum enim arbitrium dicit dominium potentiae respectu actus, sicut supra[^25] determinatum est. Et quoniam, cum impeditur aliqua virtus operativa, primo aufertur ei actus ille, qui ei inerat secundum suam plenitudinem — sicut patet, cum aliquis infirmatur in pede, facilius ei aufertur potentia velociter currendi quam potentia ambulandi, sive facilius impeditur hic actus quam ille — sic et in proposito facilius et frequentius contingit auferri usum libertatis quam quemcumque actum potentiae intelligendi. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod liberum arbitrium ex ineptitudine ex parte corporis habet impediri quantum ad suum usum, sicut impeditur in infantibus et furiosis et dormientibus.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**
1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de petitione Salomonis, quae fuit in somnis; dicendum, quod illud fuit aut gratiae specialis et privilegii, non legis communis, quod in somnis potuit mereri, et dignus fuit exaudiri; aut certe hoc dicitur, non quia Deo placuerit dormiendo, sed quia ante vigilando et[^26] illud praecogitando Deo placuit, et quod in vigilia placuerat, Dominus per revelationem manifestare voluit in somnis; frequentius enim in somnis quam in vigilia apparere consuevit.

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2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens verbum Gregorii. Quod enim dicit, sanctos viros in somnis mereri; hoc dictum est, quia occasione sumta ab eo, quod patiuntur in somnis, postmodum merentur in vigilia; sicut vir peccator demereri dicitur in pollutione nocturna, quam sua cogitatione[^27] provocavit, vel de cuius recordatione postmodum delectatur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima secundum operationem intellectivam non est actus alicuius partis corporis; iam patet responsio ex praedictis. Quamvis enim non operetur per organum corporale, nihilominus tamen ad hoc, quod anima operetur in corpore, necesse est, corpus secundum nobiles spiritus et nobilia organa in debita actualitate et dispositione esse, sicut prius ostensum est. Et quoniam haec dispositio tollitur per corporis ineptitudinem, ideo per consequens actus rationis et usus liberi arbitrii impeditur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima in somnis revocatur ab exterioribus ad interiora; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non quantum ad omnes operationes interiores, sed quantum ad operationes naturales. Nam somnus est quies virtutum animalium cum intensione naturalium[^28]; et ideo non sequitur, quod usus rationis vel liberi arbitrii in somnis intendatur, cum haec potius contineantur sub viribus animalibus quam naturalibus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in somnis anima videt futura; dicendum, quod, sicut determinatum est supra distinctione septima[^29], in somnis non est praevisio futurorum, nisi visitatio emittatur ab Altissimo, sicut dicitur Ecclesiastici trigesimo quarto. Magis autem Dominus visitat in somnis quam in vigilia in revelando futura, tum propter hoc, quod anima in vigilia est dispersa ad exteriora sensibilia comprehendenda; tum etiam, quia Dominus, qui *posuit tenebras latibulum suum*[^30], ad sui ipsius occultationem magis vult in somnis quam in vigilia revelationes emittere; tum etiam, quia in somnis magis agitur homo, quam agat, et in revelatione divina plus se habet homo per modum suscipientis quam agentis; tum, quia etiam in somnis medium tenet homo inter mortuum et viventem, et ita quodam modo a vita huius mundi recedit, de qua Dominus Exodi trigesimo tertio[^31] dicit: *Non videbit me homo, et vivet.* Ex hoc ergo non potest concludi, quod usus liberi arbitrii sit in somnis, quamvis ibi contingat revelationes fieri, quoniam in somnis magis agitur anima, quam agat; sed in usu liberi arbitrii magis agit, quam agatur.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vis phantastica non impeditur in somnis; dicendum, quod etsi videatur phantasia magis in somnis quam in vigilia vigere, nihilominus tamen aliquo modo impediri habet. Potentior est enim homo in vigilia ad imaginandum omne quod vult, quam in somnis; licet motus imaginativae non ita appareat in vigilia propter conversionem animae ad exteriora, et in somnis modici motus sentiantur propter animae quietationem. — Et si obiiciat, quod non sic impeditur, quin aliquo modo habeat usum suum phantasia, ergo nec debet impediri potentia superior; iam patet responsio ex his quae supra dicta sunt; facilius enim aufertur omnis potentia in summo quam citra summum. Et praeterea, in somnis plus quietantur virtutes animales quam naturales; motus autem et decursus illorum phantasmatum naturalis est: et ideo non sic impeditur usus phantasiae, sicut usus potentiae intellectivae. — Ad quaestiones autem, quae sequuntur, plana est responsio ex his quae praedicta sunt.

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### Question VI. *Whether free choice can be bound as to its use on account of the unfitness of the body.*

In the sixth and last place, inquiry is made about free choice in comparison with the conjoined body, and the question is whether on account of the unfitness of the body it is bound as to its use. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*[^1]: "To the insane and to infants and to those asleep nothing that they do is imputed": but this is so only because they lack the use of free choice, and this is so only on account of some impediment on the part of the body: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, this same [point] is seen from an example, because a holy and chaste man, whose chastity is great, frequently in his sleep consents to a work of sin[^2], which he would in no way do at the time of waking: therefore in sleep the act of free choice is bound; but this is so only through the weariness and unfitness on the part of the body: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, when what is prior fails, that which is posterior fails: if therefore some act, which is preliminary to the use of free choice, is impeded through the unfitness of the body, it is necessary that the use of free choice also be impeded. But the act preliminary to free choice is the operation of the intellect, which is impeded through the unfitness of the body; as is evident in those asleep and in the frenzied, and the Philosopher[^3] says that "the intellect is corrupted when something interior is corrupted," and experience itself teaches this: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, just as a man grows weary in sensing, so too he grows weary in thinking and in meditating; but because the body grows weary in sensing, it therefore needs the rest of sleep, in which it is impeded from the operations of the senses: therefore by parity of reasoning it is necessary that free choice, on account of the weariness of the body, be impeded from its own act and use.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Third [Book] of Kings, chapter three[^4], the history relates that the Lord appeared to Solomon in his sleep, and by the merit of the petition which he made, the Lord gave him exceeding great wisdom. If therefore to merit something before God and to receive wisdom is [an act of] the use of free choice and of reason; it seems that on account of the weariness and unfitness of the body and the quiet in sleep, free choice ought not to be impeded from its own act.

2. Likewise, Gregory, on that passage of Job[^5]: *Thou wilt terrify me with dreams*, speaking of nocturnal illusions: "That malignant spirits do these things, the supernal dispensation kindly permits in the hearts of the elect, lest sleep at least be free from the reward of passion": therefore it happens that one merits in sleep: therefore on account of the unfitness of the body free choice does not lose its own use.

3. Likewise, the soul as to its proper intellective operation, that is, free choice, is the act of no part of the body, nor does it exercise that operation through any organ[^6]: therefore however much the bodily organ may be injured or made unfit, free choice will not lose its use.

4. Likewise, the more the soul is recollected from exterior to interior things, the more the interior operation thrives[^7]; but when the organs of the exterior senses are bound, the powers of the soul are recollected from exterior to interior things: therefore then most of all the interior operation ought to thrive. But the use of free choice is regarded according to this [interior operation]: therefore when the body is made unfit for sensing, as through sleep, free choice ought then to have its proper use most especially.

5. Likewise, to see future things is [the act] of reason most highly elevated; but in sleep especially does the revelation and foresight of future things occur: therefore the highest[^8] act of reason thrives in sleep, while there is unfitness on the part of the body; and by parity of reasoning the use of free choice [thrives] also.

6. Likewise, the phantastic and imaginative power depends much more on the body than the rational and intellective power: therefore if, on account of unfitness on the part of the body, which indeed exists in the frenzied or even in those asleep, the phantastic operation is not impeded but rather even thrives; it seems that the intellective operation ought not to be impeded.

It is therefore a question: since the operation of free choice or even of the intellect in no way depends on the body, whence comes this, that it is impeded and bound on account of some unfitness arising about a bodily organ? — And again, if it is impeded, although it depends less on the body than the phantastic power, whence comes this, that reason loses its use more in sleep than phantasy or imagination? — And again, since reason as to the act of free choice is most of all potent and free, whence comes this, that on account of unfitness on the part of the body the use of free choice is more easily taken away than some act of reason? For in sleep a man has some rational motions, and in the frenzied likewise we see this, that they say many things which they could not say unless they had reason, when they answer questions put to them; yet in neither is the use of free choice said to be present. — All these things make the question difficult.

### Conclusion

> Free choice can, on account of the unfitness of the body, be impeded as to its use.

**I respond:** That[^9] although it is easy to answer this question, when it is asked whether free choice is bound through the unfitness of the body as to its use — since experience itself plainly teaches and shows this, that it is bound in little ones and in those asleep and in the frenzied — yet to that question which follows upon this, namely, why free choice is bound from the unfitness of the body, since it is not a power tied to an organ, it is very difficult to respond and to assign its cause. Nevertheless it must be understood that there is a fourfold mode of satisfying this question.

For some have wished to say that the use of reason or even of free choice[^10] is impeded and bound from the unfitness of the body on account of the soul's *conversion* [to the body]; others, on account of the privation of bodily service; the third mode of speaking is, on account of a certain *communication* of the rational operation; while the fourth mode is, on account of the *union* of body and soul unto the constitution of a third [thing].

In the first place, on account of *conversion* some have said that the soul is impeded from the act of reason when there is unfitness on the part of the body. For the body is either unfit from some interior injury, as is the case in the frenzied and in the phrenetic; and then the soul ceases from the operation of understanding because, by excessive compassion, it is turned toward the body by reason of the noble organ injured. Or it is unfit from imperfection, which is in the members and organs, as is the case in little ones; and then the soul is so intent on the governance of the body and on the things which it perceives through the senses of the body, that it almost forgets itself. And therefore from excessive conversion to its own body, which is from the injury of the organs, or from imperfection, it happens that the use of reason and of free choice is impeded. — But this mode of speaking does not fully satisfy. For we see that a vehement pain, occurring on the part of the body in the extremities, does not impede the use of reason, and yet the soul much flees that pain. Likewise, in sleep [the soul] is not more turned to bodily things than in waking; if therefore the conversion which is in waking does not take away the use of reason, by parity of reasoning it seems that neither does the conversion which is in sleep concerning the governance of the body[^11].

And therefore there is a second mode of speaking, namely, that free choice is impeded from its proper use on account of the privation of bodily service. For although the operation of the intellect is not done through an organ, nevertheless the sensitive powers render some service to the intellective power so that it may exercise its act. For the phantastic power serves the intellect in two ways in the act of understanding, namely, in this, that it offers those phantasms to the possible intellect, just as the object offers a species to the eye; and also in this, that our intellect has to be excited by what is lower, as long as it is conjoined to the body[^12]. And therefore, when there is injury and unfitness on the part of the organ of the sensitive power, and a disturbance of the phantasms arises, the use of free choice and of the intellect is impeded for this reason, that the service due to it is taken away; just as my eye can be impeded from the act of seeing on account of some darkening arising in the visible thing, which is to offer me a species and to excite my sight. — But this mode of speaking still does not fully satisfy, for the reason that we see the operation of the intellect impeded, when no impediment has been made in the work of the interior[^13] sensitive power, such as imagination and phantasy. And again, since the intellect and the intelligible memory has some species abstracted in itself, which it conserves in itself and within itself, which the soul draws with itself when it is separated from the body; it seems[^14] that, every service of phantasy and of phantasms being set aside, the intellect ought to have its use with respect to those things of which it has the habit in itself. And this is plainly false, because a man is thus impeded in sleep[^15] from the consideration of the things he knows, just as from the inquiry into the things he does not know.

And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that the operation of free choice and of reason is impeded from the unfitness of the body on account of a certain communication of operation. For the intellective power communicates in a certain way its operation to the conjoined body, since it communicates being to it, and from these there comes to be one [thing] by essence, not only insofar as the soul is vegetative and sensible, but also insofar as it is rational[^16]. For the rational soul, coming to the human body, just as by its union it makes it to be an *animal* and an *animate* [thing], so it makes it to be *man*; and therefore, just as it communicates some operation to the body insofar as it makes it *living* and insofar as it makes it *animal*, so too it communicates some [operation] insofar as it makes it *man*, although not altogether uniformly. For the soul communicates to the body in a different way the operations[^17] which regard the vegetative and sensitive power, and the operations of the intellective power. For the operation of the sensitive and vegetative [power] is so communicated to the body that it is in the body and through the body, and also that it is in the body and not without the body; for the soul does not nourish except by means of a bodily organ, nor does it nourish except as long as it is in the body. But understanding the soul so communicates to the body that it understands with the body acting in some way[^18], yet so that it does not understand through the body; so that it understands also in the body, yet so that it also understands when it is separated from the body. But because, while it is in the body, it communicates the rational operation to it, therefore, when disorder has been made on the part of the body, that operation has to be impeded. — But this mode of speaking is open to objection in this, that it says that the operation of the intellect is in some way communicated to the body, since this does not seem true, and the Philosopher seems expressly to contradict it in the sixteenth [book] *On Animals*[^19], where he says that "the intellect is from without" because it is in no way mixed with the body. And he says this same thing in the third [book] *On the Soul*. And again, even if it be conceded that man understands, it is in no way conceded either of the whole body or of a part that it understands. Whence it seems that this is said of the whole composite by reason of a part, namely the soul; just as, when it is said "man is white," this is said only by reason of the body[^20].

And therefore there is a fourth mode of speaking, namely, that the operation of the soul in the body has to be impeded on account of the unfitness of the body. And the ground of this is the union of soul and body unto the constitution of one third [thing], which is one by essence, and to which a proper operation is owed insofar as it is one. But this operation is not merely to live, nor to sense or to move, but to reason and to understand. And on account of this very union the soul depends on the body not only as to the act of sensing, but also in some way as to the act of understanding, as long as it is in the body, but in very different ways. For as to the act of vegetating and sensing it so depends that it can in no way exercise those acts except in the body — but not so as to the act of understanding — and it so depends that it exercises those acts through the body and through a bodily organ — not so[^21] is it as to the act of understanding — and therefore the soul is said to communicate the act of sensing to the body. Whence it is not altogether absurdly said: the eye sees; but it is not so said of the act of understanding. And the soul is said to sense through the body, and not to understand through the body, because, since two things concur in the act of understanding and of sensing, namely to receive and to judge, in sensing the reception of the species is from the body, but the judgment is from the power[^22]; whereas in understanding both are from the intellective power, namely from the possible and the agent intellect. And therefore the intellect is called a power not tied to matter, and it can have this operation when it is separated from the body; but as long as it is in the body, it does not altogether understand apart from the body. For just as the being of the soul in the body in some way depends on the body, although the being of the soul itself in itself does not depend [on it] — therefore for the soul to be in the body it is necessary that the body be duly disposed in temperament; and upon the corruption of that temperament it happens that the soul is no longer in the body — so, as long as the soul is in the body, its understanding is not without the body and without some disposition on the part of the body, whose actuality communicates[^23] with the act of understanding, just as a congruous disposition corresponded to the existence of the soul in the body and to its perfection. But that actuality is regarded according to that which is supreme in the body, and according to the noblest spirits, which have their place in the noblest organs of the body. And since, when something is taken away from something, that which is most excellent in it is first taken away; and when some power is weakened, the highest is first taken away from it, before that which is below the highest: hence it is that in an injury of the body that is more quickly taken away[^24] according to which the body was conformed to the *intellective* operation, than that according to which it was conformed to the sensitive operation. And therefore the fumes ascending to the brain, which disturb the spirits in sleep or in children or in the phrenetic, or any other injury of the organs in which reside the subtlest and noblest bodily spirits, more easily impede the use of reason than that of imagination. — And thus is evident the reason why the use of reason is impeded from the unfitness of the body, and why it is impeded more than the use of the lower power.

From this same reason it is gathered why reason is more impeded as to the use of free choice than as to the other rational acts, which it is sometimes recognized to have in sleep and in the frenzied. For the act of free choice regards the rational power insofar as it is in complete and full liberty. For free choice bespeaks the dominion of the power with respect to the act, as was determined above[^25]. And since, when some operative power is impeded, that act is first taken away from it which was in it according to its fullness — as is evident, when someone is sick in the foot, the power of running swiftly is more easily taken from him than the power of walking, or rather this act is more easily impeded than that — so too in the matter at hand it happens more easily and more frequently that the use of liberty is taken away than any act of the power of understanding. — The arguments, therefore, that show free choice to be impeded as to its use from the unfitness on the part of the body must be conceded, just as it is impeded in infants and in the frenzied and in those asleep.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the petition of Solomon, which was in sleep; it must be said that it was [a matter] either of special grace and privilege, not of common law, that he could merit in sleep and was worthy to be heard; or else this is said, not because it pleased God [that he merit] while sleeping, but because beforehand, while waking and[^26] pondering that thing, it pleased God, and what had pleased [Him] in waking, the Lord willed to manifest through revelation in sleep; for [He] was more accustomed to appear in sleep than in waking.

2. And by this is evident the response to the following word of Gregory. For as to what he says, that holy men merit in sleep; this is said because, an occasion being taken from what they suffer in sleep, they afterward merit in waking; just as a sinful man is said to demerit in a nocturnal pollution, which he provoked by his thought[^27], or from the recollection of which he afterward takes delight.

3. To that which is objected, that the soul according to its intellective operation is not the act of any part of the body; the response is already evident from what has been said. For although it does not operate through a bodily organ, nevertheless, for the soul to operate in the body, it is necessary that the body, as to its noble spirits and noble organs, be in due actuality and disposition, as was shown before. And since this disposition is taken away through the unfitness of the body, therefore consequently the act of reason and the use of free choice is impeded.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul in sleep is recalled from exterior to interior things; it must be said that this is true, but not as to all the interior operations, but as to the natural operations. For sleep is the rest of the animal powers together with the intensification of the natural [powers][^28]; and therefore it does not follow that the use of reason or of free choice is intensified in sleep, since these are rather contained under the animal powers than the natural.

5. To that which is objected, that in sleep the soul sees future things; it must be said that, as was determined above in the seventh distinction[^29], in sleep there is no foresight of future things unless a visitation is sent from the Most High, as is said in Ecclesiasticus, the thirty-fourth [chapter]. But the Lord visits more in sleep than in waking in revealing future things, both because the soul in waking is dispersed to grasping exterior sensible things; and also because the Lord, who *made darkness his covert*[^30], for the concealment of Himself wishes to send forth revelations more in sleep than in waking; and also because in sleep a man is acted upon more than he acts, and in divine revelation a man stands more in the manner of one receiving than of one acting; and because also in sleep a man holds a mean between the dead and the living, and so in a certain way withdraws from the life of this world, of which the Lord says in Exodus, the thirty-third [chapter][^31]: *Man shall not see me, and live.* From this, therefore, it cannot be concluded that the use of free choice is present in sleep, although it happens that revelations are made there, since in sleep the soul is acted upon more than it acts; but in the use of free choice it acts more than it is acted upon.

6. To that which is objected, that the phantastic power is not impeded in sleep; it must be said that although phantasy seems to thrive more in sleep than in waking, nevertheless it too has to be impeded in some way. For a man is more powerful in waking to imagine everything that he wills than in sleep; although the motion of the imaginative [power] does not so appear in waking on account of the soul's conversion to exterior things, and in sleep slight motions are felt on account of the soul's quietude. — And if one should object that it is not so impeded but that phantasy in some way has its use, therefore neither ought the higher power to be impeded; the response is already evident from what has been said above; for every power is more easily taken away in the highest than below the highest. And besides, in sleep the animal powers are quieted more than the natural; but the motion and course of those phantasms is natural: and therefore the use of phantasy is not impeded as the use of the intellective power [is]. — And to the questions that follow, the response is plain from what has been said before.

la: Cap. 2. n. 5. Verba ipsa vide supra pag. 523, nota 6. — Pro *Insanis* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Vesanis*, refragantibus codd., edd. 1, 2 et textu originali.

en: Chapter 2, n. 5. See the words themselves above, p. 523, note 6. — For *Insanis* the Vatican [edition], with editions 3 and 4, [reads] *Vesanis*, against the codices, editions 1 and 2, and the original text.

la: Cod. O *bravo*. Paulo inferius pro *per lassitudinem* codd. T aa bb ee et alii *propter lassitudinem*. — Cfr. de hoc arg. August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 31.

en: Codex O [reads] *bravo*. A little below, for *per lassitudinem* codices T, aa, bb, ee and others [read] *propter lassitudinem*. — Cf. on this argument Augustine, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* XII, c. 13, n. 31.

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 66. (c. 4.). Cfr. etiam ibid. II. text. 162. (III. c. 3.), ubi docet, «obrui [ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι] aliquando intellectum passione aut aegritudine aut somno». De *maiori* cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 11.) et supra pag. 93, nota 2. — Pro *per ineptitudinem* codd. Y cc cum ed. 1 *propter ineptitudinem*.

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 66 (c. 4). Cf. also ibid. II, text 162 (III, c. 3), where he teaches that "the intellect is sometimes overwhelmed [ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι] by passion or sickness or sleep." On the *major* [premise] cf. Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 16 (IV, c. 11), and above, p. 93, note 2. — For *per ineptitudinem* codices Y, cc, with edition 1, [read] *propter ineptitudinem*.

la: Vers. 5. seqq. Cfr. August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 31: Nam etiam *dormiens* Salomon sapientiam praeposuit omnibus rebus eamque, neglectis ceteris, est precatus a Domino etc. — Mox post *quam fecit* pro *Dominus* codd. C F L O aa exhibent *in somnis*; codd. T V haec verba *in somnis* addunt, retento *Dominus*. Paulo inferius pro *usus liberi arbitrii et rationis* Vat. cum ed. 3 *usus liberi arbitrii in somnis*, codd. A B I K P Q T W cum ed. 2 *in bonis*; nostra lectio innititur codd. C D E F L N O Y etc. et ed. 1.

en: Verse 5 ff. Cf. Augustine, XII *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, c. 15, n. 31: "For even *while sleeping* Solomon preferred wisdom to all things and, neglecting the rest, prayed for it from the Lord," etc. — Then after *quam fecit*, for *Dominus* codices C, F, L, O, aa give *in somnis*; codices T, V add these words *in somnis*, retaining *Dominus*. A little below, for *usus liberi arbitrii et rationis* the Vatican [edition] with edition 3 [reads] *usus liberi arbitrii in somnis*; codices A, B, I, K, P, Q, T, W with edition 2 [read] *in bonis*; our reading rests on codices C, D, E, F, L, N, O, Y, etc. and edition 1.

la: Cap. 7, 14. Verba, quibus Gregorius in VIII. Moral. c. 24. n. 43, hunc locum exponit, haec sunt: Quem [malignum spiritum] tamen haec maligne agere, superna dispensatio benigne permittit, ne in electorum cordibus ipse saltem etc.

en: Chapter 7, [verse] 14. The words by which Gregory expounds this passage in VIII *Morals*, c. 24, n. 43, are these: "Yet that he [the malignant spirit] does these things malignantly, the supernal dispensation kindly permits, lest in the hearts of the elect he at least," etc.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. text. 6. (c. 4.). Cfr. supra pag. 458, nota 3. — Plures codd., ut C F R S bb ee, in hac proposit. omittunt *propriam*.

en: According to Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 11 (c. 1) and III, text 6 (c. 4). Cf. above, p. 458, note 3. — Several codices, such as C, F, R, S, bb, ee, in this proposition omit *propriam*.

la: Vide supra pag. 459, nota 4. Paulo inferius edd. *tunc magis* pro *tunc maxime*.

en: See above, p. 459, note 4. A little below, the editions [read] *tunc magis* for *tunc maxime*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *potissimus*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with editions 3 and 4 [reads] *potissimus*.

la: Codd. aliqui praefigunt *dicendum*.

en: Some codices prefix *dicendum*.

la: Vat. *liberum arbitrium*. In multis codd. nec non in primis edd. lectio horum verborum dubia est, cum sint abbreviata.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *liberum arbitrium*. In many codices, as well as in the early editions, the reading of these words is doubtful, since they are abbreviated.

la: Secundum Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 4. (c. 3.). — Paulo superius versus init. solut. Vat. omittit *ab exterioribus*, quae verba exstant in codd. C F L X Y aa bb ee. In fine solutionis cod. F *hic potius contineatur* pro *haec potius contineantur*.

en: According to Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 4 (c. 3). — A little above, toward the beginning of the solution, the Vatican [edition] omits *ab exterioribus*, which words are present in codices C, F, L, X, Y, aa, bb, ee. At the end of the solution codex F [reads] *hic potius contineatur* for *haec potius contineantur*.

la: Sic cod. aa et Vat., dum fere omnes alii codd. cum primis edd. perperam legunt *exterioris*, cod. cc cum ed. 1 *inferioris*. Paulo inferius pro *memoria intelligibilis* Vat., modernorum modo loquendi se commodans, *memoria intellectualis*.

en: Thus codex aa and the Vatican [edition], while almost all the other codices with the early editions wrongly read *exterioris*, and codex cc with edition 1 [reads] *inferioris*. A little below, for *memoria intelligibilis* the Vatican [edition], accommodating itself to the modern manner of speaking, [reads] *memoria intellectualis*.

la: Simul audi: ex praedicta opinione sequi.

en: Hear at the same time: [this is said to] follow from the aforesaid opinion.

la: Verba *ita* et *in somnis* ex codd. C F H L T U aa cc et ed. 1 in textum recepimus. Paulo inferius pro *inquisitione* codd. T aa *acquisitione*.

en: The words *ita* and *in somnis* we have received into the text from codices C, F, H, L, T, U, aa, cc and edition 1. A little below, for *inquisitione* codices T, aa [read] *acquisitione*.

la: Has duas rationes, quae praedictae opinionis principalia momenta impugnant, Gulielm. Mara, hic q. 9, sic litteris mandat: Primum non potest stare, quia ubi maior fuga passionis, ibi maior compassio; sed in multis habentibus usum rationis est maior fuga passionis quam in phreneticis et furiosis. Secundum similiter non videtur verum, quia, si anima ex nimia attentione administrationis impediretur in actu intellectus, ergo magis deberet impediri in sobriis quam in ebriis. Nam secundum August., VI. Musicae (c. 5. n. 10.): Sentire animae in corpore est cum attentione agere; sed in ebriis est minor sensualitas quam in sobriis: ergo minor attentio.

en: These two arguments, which assail the principal points of the aforesaid opinion, William of la Mare, here q. 9, thus commits to writing: "The first cannot stand, because where there is greater flight from passion, there is greater compassion; but in many who have the use of reason there is greater flight from passion than in the phrenetic and the frenzied. The second likewise does not seem true, because, if the soul were impeded in the act of the intellect from excessive attention to administration [of the body], then it ought to be impeded more in the sober than in the drunken. For according to Augustine, VI *On Music* (c. 5, n. 10): To sense for the soul is to act in the body with attention; but in the drunken there is less sensuality than in the sober: therefore less attention."

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 18. 30. 39. (c. 5. 7. 8.). — Paulo ante vocula *noster*, quam ex codd. F H I K T V W aa bb ee voci *intellectus* adiecimus, deest in Vat.

en: Cf. Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 18, 30, 39 (c. 5, 7, 8). — A little before, the little word *noster*, which we have added to the word *intellectus* from codices F, H, I, K, T, V, W, aa, bb, ee, is lacking in the Vatican [edition].

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. seq. et text. 24. seqq. (c. 1. seq.). — Paulo inferius post *ita facit* cod. X adiungit *ipsum*, cod. aa *etiam*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 6 f. and text 24 ff. (c. 1 f.). — A little below, after *ita facit* codex X adds *ipsum*, codex aa *etiam*.

la: Ex codd. A Q X cc et ed. 1 adiecimus *operationes*, quae vox a Vat. abest. In propositione seq. sequimur codd. F aa bb ee. Alii codd. cum edd. sic eam exhibent: Nam *opera sensitivae... sic communicat corpori, ut sint in corpore... sint* (Vat. *sic*) *etiam in corpore et* (Vat. *id*) *non sine corpore*. Tamen, sicut nos, etiam codd. C K R S V W legunt *communicatur* pro *communicat*.

en: From codices A, Q, X, cc and edition 1 we have added *operationes*, which word is absent from the Vatican [edition]. In the following proposition we follow codices F, aa, bb, ee. Other codices with the editions give it thus: "For *the works of the sensitive [power]... it so communicates to the body that they be in the body... that they be* (Vat. *so*) *also in the body and* (Vat. *that*) *not without the body*." Yet, like us, codices C, K, R, S, V, W also read *communicatur* for *communicat*.

la: Ed. 1 *coagente*. Paulo inferius pro *Quia vero* codd. F V W X Z aa et alii *Quia ergo*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *coagente*. A little below, for *Quia vero* codices F, V, W, X, Z, aa and others [read] *Quia ergo*.

la: Sive II. de Generat. animal. c. 3: Restat igitur, ut mens sola extrinsecus accedat eaque sola divina sit; nihil enim cum eius actione communicat actio corporalis. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 4. (c. 4.) docet, intellectum immixtum esse corpori. Cfr. supra pag. 446, nota 4. et pag. 438, nota 3, ubi etiam alii loci indicantur.

en: Or II *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 3: "It remains, therefore, that mind alone come in from without and that it alone be divine; for bodily action shares nothing with its action." Book III *On the Soul*, text 4 (c. 4), teaches that the intellect is unmixed with the body. Cf. above, p. 446, note 4, and p. 438, note 3, where other passages too are indicated.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 64. seqq. (c. 4.) et II. text. 11. (c. 1.). — Paulo superius post *nec de parte* Vat. subiicit *corporis*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 64 ff. (c. 4) and II, text 11 (c. 1). — A little above, after *nec de parte* the Vatican [edition] subjoins *corporis*.

la: Codd. F P Q V W et edd. 2, 4 agglutinant *autem*.

en: Codices F, P, Q, V, W and editions 2, 4 attach *autem*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 221, nota 4.

en: Cf. above, p. 221, note 4.

la: Vat. *conveniat*, codd. V Z cum ed. 1 *communicatur*; nostra lectio sumta est ex codd. A K T aa bb ee et ed. 1. Immediate ante cod. X voculae *cuius* adiungit *corporalis dispositionis*, et mox post *congrua dispositio* addit *sive congruae dispositionis actualitas*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *conveniat*; codices V, Z with edition 1 [read] *communicatur*; our reading is taken from codices A, K, T, aa, bb, ee and edition 1. Immediately before the little word *cuius* codex X adds *corporalis dispositionis*, and soon after *congrua dispositio* adds *sive congruae dispositionis actualitas*.

la: Cod. Y *colliditur*, non incongrue; codd. C H I S cum ed. 2 *colligitur*, perperam. Paulo inferius pro *conformatur* cod. bb *conformabatur*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *colliditur*, not incongruously; codices C, H, I, S with edition 2 [read] *colligitur*, wrongly. A little below, for *conformatur* codex bb [reads] *conformabatur*.

la: Huius dist. part. I. q. 1. et 3.

en: Of this distinction, part I, q. 1 and 3.

la: Cod. H *sed quia aut vigilando aut*. Mox pro *placuit* codd. T bb et alii *placuerit*.

en: Codex H [reads] *sed quia aut vigilando aut*. Soon, for *placuit* codices T, bb and others [read] *placuerit*.

la: Codd. Y bb cc ee cum ed. 1 *praecogitatione*.

en: Codices Y, bb, cc, ee with edition 1 [read] *praecogitatione*.

la: Parte II. a. 1. q. 3. ad 3. Cfr. etiam d. 23. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. — Seq. text. est Eccli. 34, 6. — Dein pro *in revelando* cod. I *in indicando*, cod. T *in ostendendo*. — Mox: Psalm. 17, 12; Vers. 20 [Exod. 33]. — Vat. vocabulum *modici*, quod secundum codd. A C E F L M Q X aa ee primitus legebatur, transformavit in *medii*. Mox pro *impeditur* eadem Vat. *impedit*, et dein cum edd. 2, 3 pessime *somno* et *somnum* pro *summo* et *summum*. Similiter peccant paulo post codd. C O R S et alii, ponentes *in summis* pro *in somnis*.

en: Part II, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3. Cf. also d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4. — The following text is Ecclesiasticus 34:6. — Then for *in revelando* codex I [reads] *in indicando*, codex T *in ostendendo*. — Soon: Psalm 17:12; verse 20 [Exodus 33]. — The Vatican [edition] transformed the word *modici*, which according to codices A, C, E, F, L, M, Q, X, aa, ee was originally read, into *medii*. Soon, for *impeditur* the same Vatican [edition reads] *impedit*, and then, with editions 2, 3, very badly *somno* and *somnum* for *summo* and *summum*. Codices C, O, R, S and others sin similarly a little after, putting *in summis* for *in somnis*.

latin_scholion:
Postquam S. Doctor duabus quaestionibus posuit, quod liberum arbitrium possit *induci* a creatura, *immutari* a Deo, *cogi* a nullo, hic etiam subtiliter inquirit de via et ratione, qua possit *impediri* seu ligari ex parte corporis; quae est quaestio non exigui momenti. Alii Lombardi commentatores de hac quaestione tacent, si excipias Petrum a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2, et aliquatenus Richardum a Med. (hic a. 5. q. 2.), qui quaerit, utrum per naturam possimus in somnis habere usum liberi arbitrii. Plura ad rem habet etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1. a. 1. § 2.

Principia autem S. Doctoris communiter approbantur. Praeter gravissima documenta, quae ad rationem cognitionis humanae spectant, notanda est doctrina (in corp. opin. 3. et 4.) de animae et corporis unione, qua constituitur tertium aliquod, quod est unum per essentiam. In opinione tertia dicitur, quod anima communicat corpori *esse*, *esse vivum*, *esse humanum*, et quod etiam aliquo modo ei communicat *rationalem operationem*. Hoc ultimum tantum non probatur a S. Doctore. — S. Thom. autem docet, quod anima materiae dat, praeter *esse animale* et *humanum*, etiam *esse corporeum* (non autem essentiam sive realitatem materiae). — Quomodo *anima rationalis* sit forma substantialis corporis, docetur a S. Bonav. etiam I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1; supra d. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. 3, d. 8. p. I. a. 3. q. 2., ibid. p. II. q. 1. ad 3. 4, infra d. 26. q. 3, III. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 1; Breviloq. p. II. c. 9. et alibi passim. — De *unitate* formae substantialis cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3, et praecipue d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. schol.

---

english_scholion:
After the Holy Doctor had laid down in two questions that free choice can be *induced* by a creature, *changed* by God, *compelled* by none, here too he subtly inquires about the way and the ground by which it can be *impeded* or bound on the part of the body; which is a question of no slight moment. The other commentators on Lombard are silent about this question, if you except Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2, and to some extent Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 5, q. 2), who asks whether by nature we can have the use of free choice in sleep. Alexander of Hales, too, has much pertaining to the matter, Summa, part III, q. 61, m. 1, a. 1, § 2.

But the principles of the Holy Doctor are commonly approved. Besides the most weighty teachings which pertain to the account of human cognition, the doctrine (in the body [of the article], opinions 3 and 4) on the union of soul and body, by which some third [thing] is constituted, which is one by essence, is to be noted. In the third opinion it is said that the soul communicates to the body *being*, *being alive*, *being human*, and that it also in some way communicates to it *rational operation*. Only this last [point] is not proved by the Holy Doctor. — But St. Thomas teaches that the soul gives to matter, besides *animal* and *human being*, also *corporeal being* (but not the essence or reality of matter). — In what way the *rational soul* is the substantial form of the body is taught by St. Bonaventure also in I Sent. d. 8, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1; above, d. 1, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2 and 3; d. 8, p. I, a. 3, q. 2; ibid. p. II, q. 1, ad 3 and 4; below, d. 26, q. 3; III Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1; Breviloquium, p. II, c. 9, and elsewhere passim. — On the *unity* of the substantial form, cf. above, d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, and especially d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, scholion.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 620–624, pdf 642–646; Vol II PDF-priority inversion — the IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the Respondeo *Quatuor solutiones* I–IV, the *communicatio operationis* analysis, and every page footer). English freshly translated literally. Apparatus built from the PDF column-band footers, page by page. OCR raw range 43375–43694.

**Alignment confirmed.** Opener "Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad corpus coniunctum, et est quaestio, utrum propter ineptitudinem corporis ligari habeat quantum ad usum" = Pars II Articulus unicus sub-question 6, *ad corpus coniunctum*, the last quaestio of Pars II.

**Page-split map (31 apparatus entries).**
- p.620 = q5 tail (concludit⁵) + QUAESTIO VI title + opener + args 1–4 + Sed contra 1 → q6's own footers are p.620 ff. **6–7** (received from a1-q5) = [^1]–[^2] (Bernardus *Insanis* Cap.2 n.5; *per lassitudinem*/August. XII Gen.ad lit.).
- p.621 = Sed contra 2–6 + the threefold *unde est hoc* aporia + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo opening (fourfold division + opinion 1 *conversio*) → ff. 1–6 = [^3]–[^8].
- p.622 = opinion 1 tail + opinion 2 *obsequium* + opinion 3 *communicatio operationis* (de Anima / Animalium "intellectus ab extrinseco") → ff. 1–10 = [^9]–[^18].
- p.623 = opinion 3 tail + opinion 4 *unio ad tertii constitutionem* + the *summum/citra summum* corollary + replies 1–2 → ff. 1–7 = [^19]–[^25].
- p.624 = replies 2 tail–6 + SCHOLION → ff. 1–5 = [^26]–[^31] (note [^31] absorbs the multi-clause p.624 ff. 2+3+4+5 footer that bundles Eccli. 34:6, Psalm 17:12, Exod. 33:20, and the *modici/medii* + *in summis/in somnis* variants — Quaracchi printed these as a chained footer block across the L and R column bands).

**Hand-offs.**
- RECEIVED from a1-q5: p.620 footers 6–7 (q5 consumed footers 1–5 as its [^17]–[^21]; q5's own Notes forwarded ff. 6–7 to this q6). Led the apparatus with them as [^1]–[^2].
- FORWARDED: NONE. QUAESTIO VI closes clean with the SCHOLION at the bottom of p.624 before the running head "DIST. XXV. P. II. DUBIA." and the "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI" header (raw 43693). The p2-dubia owns its own p.625-ff. footers.

**has_scholion: TRUE.** A genuine closing SCHOLION for the Pars II Articulus unicus: it situates q6 as the fourth of the induci/immutari/cogi/impediri series, names the sparse commentator tradition (Petrus a Tar., Richardus a Med., Alex. Hal.), and contrasts Bonaventure's opinions 3–4 on the anima/corpus *unum per essentiam* with St. Thomas on *esse corporeum*. The SCHOLION carries no footnote markers (per corpus convention).

**[?] flags:** NONE. All 31 marker digits verified eyes-on against the p.620–624 L+R column bands; the cascade-shattered Respondeo and footers were reflowed column-by-column.

**Pars II structure remaining:** p2-dubia (DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI, Pars II) = **three DUB** (DUB. I raw ~43695, DUB. II ~43728, DUB. III ~43793) — verify count at PDF. d.25→d.26 boundary "DISTINCTIO XXVI" at raw ~43831. With q6 done, the Pars II Articulus unicus (q1–q6) is complete; only p2-dubia remains before d.25 closes.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part I)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod philosophi, definientes liberum arbitrium, dixerunt, esse liberum de voluntate iudicium. Videtur enim, quod talis definitio, a philosophis assignata, nec sit bona nec sit secundum artem philosophicam assignata. Philosophus in sexto Topicorum[^1] reprehendit definitionem aequicolam, in qua sunt tot vocabula ex

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parte definitionis, quot ex parte definiti, utpote si quis definiens tunicam nigram, dicat, eam esse colobium atrum. Sed sic est in proposito. Si tu dicas, quod non est definitio, sed nominis[^2] interpretatio; tunc est quaestio: quare liberum arbitrium potius vocatur sic, quam dicatur liberum iudicium? — Item videtur, quod ad philosophos non pertineat definire liberum arbitrium, quia, cum anima sit imago Dei secundum liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Richardus[^3], et mediante libero arbitrio mereatur, philosophi autem non cognoverunt, animam esse Dei imaginem nec meriti originem: videtur, quod liberum arbitrium nec sciverunt nec potuerunt definire.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut praedictum est[^4], praedicta notificatio potius est nominis interpretatio quam definitio. Magis autem facultas illa censetur hoc nomine, ut dicatur *liberum arbitrium* quam *liberum iudicium*, pro eo quod *iudicium* importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis: *arbitrium* vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntatis. Unde ille dicitur *iudex*, cuius est secundum iura causam terminare; ille autem dicitur *arbiter*, qui ad proprium voluntatis nutum causam terminare habet[^5]. Et quoniam liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, decernere habet de agendis iuxta voluntatis nutum magis quam iuxta iuris praeceptum; hinc est, quod magis proprie nominatur per nomen *arbitrii* quam per nomen *iudicii*.

Ex hoc igitur et ex praedictis colligitur, quod magna fuit sapientia in eis qui imposuerunt nomina. Non enim sine causa haec facultas duplici nomine censetur; nec sine causa vocabulum spectans ad *rationem* significatur substantive, vocabulum spectans ad *voluntatem* vocatur adiective; nec sine causa vocabulum spectans ad *rationem* potius dicitur esse *arbitrium* quam *iudicium*. Est enim liberum arbitrium facultas duarum potentiarum, ita quod ratio se habet in ratione materialis et decernere[^6] habet ad nutum et imperium voluntatis.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod philosophorum non est liberum arbitrium cognoscere; dicendum, quod de libero arbitrio est loqui dupliciter: aut secundum quod est principium operum moralium, aut secundum quod est principium operum gratuitorum. Et primo modo est de consideratione philosophorum, illorum maxime, qui versati sunt circa mores componendos, quorum liberum arbitrium est principium secundum regulam et dictamen iuris naturalis, quod est unicuique impressum[^7]. Secundo modo est de consideratione theologorum, quia sic habet aspectum ad divinam gratiam, cuius gratiae cognitio est per fidem catholicam, sine qua omnia opera hominum vana sunt, etsi etiam videantur laudabilia; et in hac consideratione defecit[^8] philosophorum peritia. — Et per hoc patent obiecta.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod secundum praedictam assignationem in his tantum videtur esse liberum arbitrium, qui voluntatem mutare possunt. Si enim liberum arbitrium non tantummodo est in homine secundum statum viatoris, immo etiam secundum statum comprehensionis et beatitudinis, sicut determinatum fuit supra distinctione septima[^9], praedicta assignatio sive definitio non videtur esse congrua. Praeterea, non solummodo hi qui habent voluntatem vertibilem, sed etiam hi qui habent voluntatem invertibilem, habent «liberum de voluntate iudicium»: ergo falsum dicit Magister, qui dicit, quod praedicta assignatio solum his convenit, qui habent voluntatem vertibilem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum diversae assignationes liberi arbitrii ponantur a Sanctis, et unius rei unica est definitio, quae sit illarum assignationum

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differentia. Augustinus enim definit, sicut habitum est in distinctione praecedenti[^10], sic: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur» etc. Anselmus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^11] definit sic: «Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se ipsam». Bernardus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^12] sic: «Liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium». — Quaeritur igitur, quae sit istarum rationum differentia; de singulis enim disputare parum est utile et parum facit ad propositum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum Magistri propositum non refertur ad illam notificationem philosophorum in hac distinctione propositam: «Liberum arbitrium est liberum de voluntate iudicium», sed ad illam refertur, quae posita fuit in praecedenti distinctione: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur» etc. Et quantum ad illam dicit Magister, quod non convenit liberum arbitrium alicui[^13] nisi solum secundum statum mutabilitatis.

Unde nota, quod liberum arbitrium potest tripliciter considerari: aut in sui *generalitate*, secundum quod convenit creaturae et Creatori; et sic definitur ab Anselmo, cum dicitur: Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem etc. Aut secundum *esse*, quod habet in creatura, non concernendo statum; et sic est definitio illa Bernardi: Liberum arbitrium est consensus etc. Aut quantum ad *statum viatoris*; et sic est illa Augustini: Liberum arbitrium est facultas etc.

Possunt tamen nihilominus praedictae notificationes aliter distingui ab invicem. Liberum enim arbitrium habet comparationem ad *actum*, habet comparari ad *actum et*[^14] *obiectum*, habet tertio comparari ad *actum et obiectum et finem ultimum*. Quantum ad primam considerationem definitur a Bernardo; quantum ad secundam ab Augustino; quantum ad tertiam ab Anselmo; et hoc patet consideranti ipsas notificationes. Unde Anselmus definiens liberum arbitrium, non solum dicit, ipsum esse potentiam servandi rectitudinem, sed etiam addit *propter se*; *propter* enim dicit causam finalem et refertur hoc quod est *se* ad rectitudinem, ut sit sensus, *propter se*, id est propter ipsam rectitudinem[^15]. — Sed hic attendendum est, quod alia est rectitudo, quae *servatur*, et alia, *propter quam servanda est*. Haec[^16] enim est creata, illa increata. Quia tamen una intelligitur in altera, hoc relativum *se*, cum refertur ad rectitudinem creatam, potest supponere pro rectitudine increata, in ipsa[^17] creata rectitudine intellecta, sicut prima veritas in omni veritate, et prima bonitas in omni bonitate.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sed aliter accipitur liberum arbitrium in Creatore quam in creaturis*. Sed contra hoc est quod Anselmus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^18] dicit, quod eadem debet esse definitio liberi arbitrii in homine et in Deo, sicut eadem est ratio hominis et asini in animali. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quam ipse[^19] assignat, quod «liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem», quae non tantum convenit Creatori, immo etiam creaturae. Item, si anima secundum liberum arbitrium maxime Deo assimilatur[^20]; videtur, quod liberum arbitrium in Deo et in homine sit conformiter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de libero arbitrio secundum generales conditiones et secundum speciales[^21]. Si loquamur secundum generales conditiones, sic liberum arbitrium dicit facultatem liberam a coactione et ordinatam ad rectitudinis conservationem[^22]. Et hoc modo reperitur in creatura et Deo conformiter et secundum eandem rationem, non conformitate et unitate univocationis, sed potius analogiae et consimilis habitudinis, quae inter Deum et creaturam esse potest, sicut in primo libro in pluribus locis[^23] ostensum fuit. — Alio modo est loqui de libero arbitrio secundum proprietates speciales; et sic liberum arbitrium est facultas, quae quidem non est substantia rei, sed quaedam habilitas. Sic etiam est potestas servandi rectitudinem,

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quod[^24] non est ipsa rectitudo; et ideo potest a rectitudine obliquari, quantum est de se, in creatura. In Deo autem liberum arbitrium est ipsa divina essentia, est etiam ipsa iustitia, ideo nec obliquari potest nec mutari[^25]. Et quantum ad has conditiones speciales dicit Magister in littera, liberum arbitrium aliter in Deo, aliter in creaturis reperiri.

---

english:
### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, namely that the philosophers, in defining freedom of choice, said it was "free judgment about the will." For it seems that such a definition, assigned by the philosophers, is neither good nor assigned according to philosophical art. The Philosopher in the sixth book of the *Topics*[^1] reproves an "equimembered" definition, in which there are as many words on the side of the definition as on the side of the thing defined — as, for instance, if someone defining a black tunic should say that it is a dark cloak. But so it is in the matter at hand. If you should say that it is not a definition, but an interpretation of the name[^2]; then there is a question: why is freedom of choice rather called this, than called "free judgment"? — Likewise it seems that it does not pertain to the philosophers to define freedom of choice, because, since the soul is the image of God according to freedom of choice, as Richard says[^3], and merits by means of freedom of choice, but the philosophers did not know that the soul is the image of God nor the origin of merit: it seems that they neither knew nor could define freedom of choice.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been said before[^4], the aforesaid notification is rather an interpretation of the name than a definition. But that faculty is more reckoned by this name, so as to be called *freedom of choice* (*liberum arbitrium*) than *free judgment* (*liberum iudicium*), for the reason that *judgment* (*iudicium*) implies an act of reason regulated according to the rules of truth or of the higher law: but *choice* (*arbitrium*) implies an act of reason regulated according to the command of the will. Hence he is called a *judge* (*iudex*) whose office is to settle a case according to the laws; but he is called an *arbiter* (*arbiter*) who has to settle a case at the proper nod of the will[^5]. And since freedom of choice, as far as it is of itself, has to decide about things to be done according to the nod of the will more than according to the precept of law; hence it is that it is more properly named by the name of *choice* than by the name of *judgment*.

From this, therefore, and from what has been said, it is gathered that there was great wisdom in those who imposed the names. For not without cause is this faculty reckoned by a double name; nor without cause is the word pertaining to *reason* signified substantively, while the word pertaining to *will* is named adjectivally; nor without cause is the word pertaining to *reason* rather said to be *choice* than *judgment*. For freedom of choice is the faculty of two powers, so that reason stands in the character of what is material, and the deciding[^6] belongs to the nod and command of the will.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that it is not for the philosophers to know freedom of choice; it must be said that freedom of choice can be spoken of in two ways: either insofar as it is the principle of moral works, or insofar as it is the principle of gratuitous works. And in the first way it is of the consideration of the philosophers, especially of those who were occupied about the composing of morals, whose freedom of choice is a principle according to the rule and dictate of the natural law, which is impressed upon each one[^7]. In the second way it is of the consideration of the theologians, because thus it has regard to divine grace, the knowledge of which grace is through the Catholic faith, without which all the works of men are vain, even if they should also seem praiseworthy; and in this consideration the skill[^8] of the philosophers failed. — And by this the objections are clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, namely that according to the aforesaid assignation freedom of choice seems to be only in those who can change their will. For if freedom of choice is not only in man according to the state of the wayfarer, but also according to the state of comprehension and beatitude, as was determined above in the seventh distinction[^9], the aforesaid assignation or definition does not seem to be fitting. Moreover, not only those who have a changeable will, but also those who have an unchangeable will, have "free judgment about the will": therefore the Master says falsely, who says that the aforesaid assignation befits only those who have a changeable will.

In connection with this it is asked — since diverse assignations of freedom of choice are set down by the Saints, and of one thing there is one definition — what is the difference of those assignations.

Augustine indeed defines, as was had in the preceding distinction[^10], thus: "Freedom of choice is the faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen," etc. Anselm in the book *on Freedom of Choice*[^11] defines thus: "Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake." Bernard in the book *on Freedom of Choice*[^12] thus: "Freedom of choice is consent on account of the inamissible liberty of the will and the indeclinable judgment of reason." — It is asked, therefore, what is the difference of these accounts; for to dispute about each one is of little use and contributes little to the matter at hand.

**I respond:** It must be said that the word of the Master here proposed does not refer to that notification of the philosophers proposed in this distinction: "Freedom of choice is free judgment about the will," but refers to that which was set down in the preceding distinction: "Freedom of choice is the faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen," etc. And with respect to that the Master says that freedom of choice befits no one[^13] except only according to the state of mutability.

Hence note that freedom of choice can be considered in three ways: either in its *generality*, insofar as it befits the creature and the Creator; and thus it is defined by Anselm, when it is said: Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude, etc. Or according to the *being* which it has in the creature, not regarding the state; and thus is that definition of Bernard: Freedom of choice is consent, etc. Or with respect to the *state of the wayfarer*; and thus is that of Augustine: Freedom of choice is the faculty, etc.

Nevertheless the aforesaid notifications can also be distinguished from one another in another way. For freedom of choice has a comparison to the *act*, has to be compared to the *act and*[^14] the *object*, has thirdly to be compared to the *act and the object and the ultimate end*. With respect to the first consideration it is defined by Bernard; with respect to the second, by Augustine; with respect to the third, by Anselm; and this is clear to one considering the notifications themselves. Hence Anselm, defining freedom of choice, not only says that it is the power of preserving rectitude, but also adds *for its own sake*; for *for the sake of* states the final cause, and this word *self* (*se*) is referred to rectitude, so that the sense is, *for its own sake*, that is, for the sake of rectitude itself[^15]. — But here it must be attended to that the rectitude which is *preserved* is one thing, and that *for the sake of which it is to be preserved* is another. For the former[^16] is created, the latter uncreated. Yet because the one is understood in the other, this relative *self* (*se*), when it is referred to created rectitude, can stand for uncreated rectitude, understood within the created rectitude itself[^17], just as the first truth in every truth, and the first goodness in every goodness.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *But freedom of choice is taken otherwise in the Creator than in creatures*. But against this is what Anselm *on Freedom of Choice*[^18] says, namely that the definition of freedom of choice ought to be the same in man and in God, just as the account of man and of an ass is the same in "animal." Likewise, this seems to be so by the reason which he himself[^19] assigns, namely that "freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude," which not only befits the Creator, but also the creature. Likewise, if the soul is most assimilated[^20] to God according to freedom of choice; it seems that freedom of choice in God and in man is in conformity.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of freedom of choice according to general conditions and according to special[^21] ones. If we speak according to general conditions, thus freedom of choice states a faculty free from coercion and ordered to the preservation of rectitude[^22]. And in this way it is found in the creature and in God in conformity and according to the same account — not by conformity and unity of univocation, but rather of analogy and of a similar relation, which can exist between God and the creature, as was shown in the first book in many places[^23]. — In another way one may speak of freedom of choice according to special properties; and thus freedom of choice is a faculty which indeed is not the substance of the thing, but a certain aptitude. Thus also it is the power of preserving rectitude,

which[^24] is not rectitude itself; and therefore it can deviate from rectitude, as far as it is of itself, in the creature. But in God freedom of choice is the divine essence itself, is also justice itself, and therefore it can neither deviate nor be changed[^25]. And with respect to these special conditions the Master says in the text that freedom of choice is found otherwise in God, otherwise in creatures.

---

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 5. (c. 11.): «Amplius [videndum est], si, cum sit compositum, quod definitur, aequimembris [aequicola, in Graeco idiomate ἰσόκωλος] oratio assignetur definitio. Aequimembris autem dicitur oratio esse, quando quot fuerint composita, tot et in oratione nomina et verba fuerint… sic enim et in simplicibus qui nomen commutat non definiturus est, ut pro tunica vestem. Amplius autem maius peccatum, si et per ignotiora nomina commutationem fecerit, ut pro homine albo terrigenam candentem; neque enim definivit, cum minus sit clarum quod sic dicitur». Averroes in suo Comment. in hunc loc. haec exempla affert: «ut qui definiret in lingua Arabica leonem furentem, quod sit leo pravus, sive Latine tunicam nigram, quod sit colobium atrum [voce κολόβιον Graeci significabant, ut in veteribus lexicis e. g. Suidas, Hesychius (Etymologica), Photius docent, tunicam brevem sine manicis]. — Pro *philosophicam* Vat. et ed. 1 *physicam*. Paulo inferius Vat. et nonnulli codd. vocem *aequicolam* transformarunt in *aequivocam*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 5 (c. 11): "Further [it must be considered], whether, when that which is defined is a compound, an equimembered phrase is assigned as the definition. A phrase is called equimembered when there are as many nouns and verbs in the phrase as there were components… for so also in simple cases one who exchanges the name will not be defining, as 'garment' for 'tunic.' And it is a still greater fault if he should make the exchange by means of more unfamiliar names, as 'a glowing earthborn one' for 'a white man'; for he has not defined, since what is so stated is less clear." Averroes in his Commentary on this passage adduces these examples: "as one who should define, in the Arabic tongue, a raging lion as a 'savage lion,' or in Latin a black tunic as a 'dark cloak'" [by the word κολόβιον the Greeks signified, as the old lexicographers — e.g. Suidas, Hesychius (*Etymologica*), Photius — teach, a short sleeveless tunic]. — For *philosophicam* the Vatican edition and ed. 1 read *physicam*. A little below, the Vatican edition and several codices transformed the word *aequicolam* into *aequivocam*.

la: Multi codd., ut F H I K T W X Y Z etc., cum ed. 1 *rationis*, sed non recte, ut patet ex ipsa solutione. Fortasse primitus legebatur *rationis nominis interpretatio*, ut huius propos. sententia haec esset: hoc non est definitio, sed indicatur tantummodo, quare liberum arbitrium vocetur liberum arbitrium.

en: Many codices, such as F H I K T W X Y Z etc., with ed. 1 read *rationis* ("of reason"), but not rightly, as is clear from the solution itself. Perhaps it was originally read as *rationis nominis interpretatio* ("an interpretation of the name of reason"), so that the sense of this proposition would be this: this is not a definition, but it is only indicated why freedom of choice is called freedom of choice.

la: Richard. a S. Vict., *De Statu hominis interioris*, tr. 1. c. 3: *Quid dignius inveniri potest [in homine] quam illud, in quo ad imaginem Dei creatus est? Habet sane libertas arbitrii imaginem non solum aeternitatis, sed et divinae maiestatis.*

en: Richard of St. Victor, *On the State of the Interior Man*, tr. 1, c. 3: "What can be found more worthy [in man] than that in which he was created to the image of God? The liberty of choice indeed has the image not only of eternity, but also of the divine majesty."

la: Paulo superius in fine primae obiectionis. Cfr. etiam supra q. 3. et 6. in corp. — Mox pro *potius est* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *potius dicitur*.

en: A little above, at the end of the first objection. Cf. also above, q. 3 and 6, in the body. — Presently, for *potius est* ("is rather"), the Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 read *potius dicitur* ("is rather said").

la: Isidor., I. *de Differentiis*, sub lit. A. n. 33: *Inter arbitrum et iudicem [differentia est]; arbiter ex voluntate fit, iudex ex lege.* Cfr. XVIII. *Etymol.* c. 15. n. 6. — Paulo inferius pro *decernere* cod. A et ed. 1 substituunt *determinare*, et deinde pro *proprie* codd. F Y exhibent *et prius*, cod. aa *et principatius*, codd. T V W bb ee cum ed. 2 *proprius*.

en: Isidore, *on Differences* I, under letter A, n. 33: "[There is a difference] between an arbiter and a judge; an arbiter is made from will, a judge from law." Cf. *Etymologies* XVIII, c. 15, n. 6. — A little below, for *decernere* ("to decide") cod. A and ed. 1 substitute *determinare*, and then for *proprie* ("properly") codd. F Y exhibit *et prius*, cod. aa *et principatius*, codd. T V W bb ee with ed. 2 *proprius*.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus codd. et edd. 2, 3 subiungit *se*. — Cfr. supra q. 6. in corp.

en: The Vatican edition with some codices and edd. 2, 3 subjoins *se* ("itself"). — Cf. above, q. 6, in the body.

la: Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et ad 5.

en: Cf. below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, in the body and to objection 5.

la: Codd. F I T aa cc etc. nec non ed. 1 *deficit*. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 3. § 4. seq.; B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: Codd. F I T aa cc etc., and also ed. 1, read *deficit* (present tense, "fails"). — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 3, § 4 ff.; Bl. Albert, here a. 1; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here dub. on the text 1.

la: Part. I. a. 2. q. 1. et 3. — Libertatis definitio, de qua hic sermo est, invenitur in dub. 1., scilicet: *liberum de voluntate iudicium*.

en: [Above, d. 7] Part I, a. 2, q. 1 and 3. — The definition of liberty here spoken of is found in doubt 1, namely: "free judgment about the will."

la: *Cap. 3. lit. Magistri.* Cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 6. — Quod unius rei unica sit definitio, docet Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 4.). — Pro *qua bonum* codd. F X T V etc. cum edd. 1, 2 *qua malum*.

en: [Augustine's definition:] *Chapter 3 of the text of the Master.* Cf. above, p. 592, note 6. — That of one thing there is one definition, Aristotle teaches, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4). — For *qua bonum* ("by which the good") codd. F X T V etc. with edd. 1, 2 read *qua malum* ("by which evil").

la: *Cap. 1*: *Quamvis differat liberum arbitrium hominum a libero arbitrio Dei et Angelorum bonorum, definitio tamen huius libertatis in utrisque secundum hoc nomen eadem debet esse; licet enim animal differat ab animali sive substantialiter sive accidentaliter, definitio tamen secundum nomen animalis omnibus animalibus est eadem.*

en: Anselm, *On Freedom of Choice*, c. 1: "Although the freedom of choice of men differs from the freedom of choice of God and of the good Angels, nevertheless the definition of this liberty in both, according to this name, ought to be the same; for although an animal differs from an animal whether substantially or accidentally, nevertheless the definition according to the name 'animal' is the same for all animals."

la: *Cap. 2. n. 4.* Vide supra pag. 598, nota 1.

en: Bernard, *On Freedom of Choice*, c. 2, n. 4. See above, p. 598, note 1.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 sic: *quod non contingit liberum arbitrium aliter*. Paulo superius eaedem edd. in hac definitione *in hac definitione* pro *in hac distinctione*. Paulo inferius pro *sui generalitate* cod. aa *sua generalitate*.

en: The Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 read thus: *quod non contingit liberum arbitrium aliter* ("that freedom of choice does not occur otherwise"). A little above the same editions read, in this definition, *in hac definitione* for *in hac distinctione*. A little below, for *sui generalitate* cod. aa reads *sua generalitate*.

la: Vat. omittit *actum et*, ac deinde post *ad primam* cum edd. 2, 3, 4 interserit *definitionem sive*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *actum et* ("act and"), and then after *ad primam* ("to the first") inserts, with edd. 2, 3, 4, *definitionem sive* ("the definition, or").

la: In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 desunt verba sequentia *ut sit sensus… rectitudinem*. Immediate post haec verba non pauci codd., inter quos K M P T W, cum ed. 2 *Sed hoc* pro *Sed hic*.

en: In the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 the following words are wanting: *ut sit sensus… rectitudinem* ("so that the sense is… rectitude"). Immediately after these words not a few codices, among which K M P T W, with ed. 2 read *Sed hoc* for *Sed hic*.

la: Scilicet rectitudo, quae servatur.

en: That is, the rectitude which is preserved.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *ut in ipsa*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 read *ut in ipsa* ("as in the very"). — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 3; *Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 2; St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: Anselm., *de Lib. Arb.* c. 1: *Quamvis differat liberum arbitrium hominum a libero arbitrio Dei et Angelorum bonorum, definitio tamen huius libertatis in utrisque secundum hoc nomen eadem debet esse; licet enim animal differat ab animali sive substantialiter sive accidentaliter, definitio tamen secundum nomen animalis omnibus animalibus est eadem.*

la: *Ibid. c. 3*: *Ergo quoniam omnis libertas est potestas, illa libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem* etc.

en: *Ibid.*, c. 3: "Therefore, since all liberty is a power, that liberty of choice is the power of preserving rectitude," etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 115, note 6.

la: In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 desiderantur verba *et secundum speciales* et etiam sequentia *Si loquamur secundum generales conditiones*. Deinde eaedem edd. pro *conservationem* habent *observationem*, et codd. B D E K legunt *ordinatam ad rectitudinem et conservationem*.

en: In the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 the words *and according to special ones* are wanting, and also the following words *If we speak according to general conditions*. Then the same editions have *observationem* for *conservationem* ("observance" for "preservation"), and codd. B D E K read *ordered to rectitude and preservation*.

la: Vide infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1. et 3.

en: See below, Part II of this distinction, q. 1 and 3.

la: Codd. A K *quae*; sensus utriusque lectionis est idem. In principio huius propos. pro *Sic etiam* ed. 1 *sicut etiam*.

en: Codd. A K read *quae* ("which," feminine); the sense of either reading is the same. At the beginning of this proposition, for *Sic etiam* ("Thus also") ed. 1 reads *sicut etiam* ("just as also").

la: Cfr. infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 3. et 4; B. Albert., hic a. 4. seq.; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 16. m. 3. seq. et tr. 15. q. 94. m. 2. seq.; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.

en: Cf. below, Part II of this distinction, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 72, m. 3 and 4; Bl. Albert, here a. 4 ff.; *Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 16, m. 3 ff. and tr. 15, q. 94, m. 2 ff.; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here dub. on the text 2.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 606–609 = pdf 628–631; raw OCR lines 42449–42607). The IA djvu OCR is two-column cascade-fragmented here; the PDF column bands are authoritative for body order, the OCR for footnote text. **Three DUBIA verified at PDF** (DUB. I p.606→607; DUB. II p.607→608; DUB. III p.608→609) — the prior resume note's "single DUB. I" was incorrect; the auto-chunked skeleton body already carried DUB. II and DUB. III. Last chunk of d.25 Pars I; the Pars II COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV begins immediately after on p.609 (raw ~42603) and belongs to `d25-p2-divisio`.

**Page-split / footer map (25 entries).**
- **p.606 (lower):** DUB. I opener ("In parte ista… Philosophus in sexto Topicorum"). Footers 1–2 → owned by q6 ([^15]–[^16] there); **footer 3 (Aristot. VI Topic. c. 5) → this chunk [^1]** (received hand-off). Footer 3's long Averroes/aequicola tail is printed at the foot of p.607 L but belongs to footnote 3 → folded into [^1].
- **p.607:** rest of DUB. I (body + Respondeo) + DUB. II opener. Footers 1–8 → [^2]–[^9].
- **p.608:** DUB. II body (Augustine/Anselm/Bernard definitions + Respondeo + tail) on L col, DUB. III opener + Respondeo on R col. L-col footers 1–8 → [^10]–[^17]; R-col footers 9–14 → [^18]–[^23].
- **p.609 (upper):** DUB. III tail ("quod non est ipsa rectitudo… aliter in creaturis reperiri"). Footers 1–2 → [^24]–[^25]. p.609 footers 3–6 and the Pars II COMMENTARIUS belong to `d25-p2-divisio`.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from `d25-p1-a1-q6`: p.606 footer 3 (the *Philosophus in sexto Topicorum* / Aristot. VI Topic. anchor) → [^1]. FORWARDED to `d25-p2-divisio`: none — DUB. III closes cleanly on p.609 before the Pars II COMMENTARIUS; p.609 footers 3–6 are Pars-II divisio's own.

**Dup cleanup.** None — no `d25-p1-dubia-dup2` stray existed (`ls` confirmed a single file).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR + 450 dpi PDF column bands agreed throughout. OCR garbles silently corrected per CLAUDE.md (`Cap. 3.`→`Cap. 5.` in [^1] per PDF; `laoxcolo;`→ἰσόκωλος; `C07`/`SENTE…` running-head digit-mangle ignored in favour of the +22 offset). The variant `aequicolam`/`aequivocam` is itself recorded inside [^1].

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0