title: Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De charactere.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Quid sit character secundum essentiam.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur primo, quod character sit habitus:

1. « Quia tria sunt in anima, scilicet *potentiae*, *passiones* et *habitus*[^1] »; sed character non est *potentia*, quia non est in omnibus; nec *passio*, quia secundum ipsum anima non patitur: ergo est *habitus*.

2. Item, constat, characterem esse aliquam qualitatem spiritualem animae; sed « nihil est in genere aliquo determinato, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie[^2] »: cum ergo qualitas spiritualis sit in prima specie qualitatis, et illa est *habitus*, vel *dispositio*: ergo character est *habitus*, vel *dispositio*. Sed non est *dispositio*, quia non est facile mobilis: ergo *habitus*.

3. Item, si character est *habitus*, aut est *naturalis* sive innatus, aut *acquisitus*, aut *infusus*. Non innatus, hoc constat: ergo *acquisitus*, vel *infusus*; sed omnis talis habitus, cum sit in anima per modum perfectionis, est *scientia*, vel *virtus*[^4]; character autem nihil horum est: ergo non est habitus.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus *de Bono coniugali*[^3]: Habitus est, per quem aliquis aliquid agit; sed charactere non agit homo aliquid: ergo character non est habitus.

> ### Conclusio.
> Character est habitus large sumtus, scilicet quaedam qualitas spiritualis, animam non omnino perficiens, sed disponens ad ulteriorem perfectionem.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod characteristicatio non est aliud quam *consignatio*, et character idem est quod *signum*; et hoc signum nihil addit supra potentias animae, quod sit quid absolutum, sicut nec signatio in circulo[^5]; sed fundatur supra potentias animae nudas et est ibi secundum institutionem et actum consignantis, nulla facta mutatione; unde est pura *relatio*, ut paternitas. Et dicunt, quod verbum Philosophi[^6] intelligitur de illis quae dicunt aliquid *absolutum*. Et ponunt exemplum, quod character est in anima sicut consecratio in Ecclesia, in qua consecratione Ecclesiae non datur nova qualitas, sed solum ordinatio ab eo qui potest, ad sacra ibidem celebranda; sic dicunt, quod character est quoddam animae signaculum, in quo dicitur anima sanctificari, ut Deus in ea habitet ut in templo. Et hoc dicunt sensisse Dionysium

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in libro *de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*[^7], ubi dicit: Character est signum sanctum cognitionis vel communicationis fidei et sacrae ordinationis, datum accedenti ab hierarcha. — Sed illud non potest stare: quia character dicit aliquam *assimilationem* et configurationem ad Christum, sicut character bestiae ad diabolum, de quo Apocalypsis decimo quarto[^8]; sed assimilatio fundatur super qualitatem: ergo si de novo fit similis Deo, et non fit mutatio ex parte alterius extremi secundum qualitatem; videtur, quod necesse sit dare animae aliquam qualitatem.

Propterea dixerunt aliqui, quod etsi character dicat *relationem*, dicit nihilominus *qualitatem* aliquam, super quam fundatur; et illa qualitas est sicut dispositio ad recipiendum lumen et calorem gratiae, sicut siccitas in ligno ad calorem, et pervietas in vitro ad lumen. Et ideo posuerunt characterem in *secunda specie qualitatis*[^9]. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia illa est naturalis potentia, vel impotentia, quae consequitur naturam. Et praeterea, siccitas et pervietas sunt *impotentiae* resistendi: ergo character esset *impotentia*; quod stultum est dicere.

Propterea alii dixerunt, quod character non tantum est ad *disponendum*, sed etiam ad *distinguendum*; et est sicut quaedam qualitas animam fidelem decorans et ornans, per quam ab infideli distinguitur[^10]; unde infert sensui spirituali *passionem mulcebrem*, et ideo est *passibilis qualitas* et in *tertia specie* qualitatis. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia non dicitur *passibilis qualitas*, quae infert passionem sensui *interiori* vel intellectui. Cum enim omnis veritas sit obiectum intellectus, tunc omnia essent in tertia specie qualitatis[^11]; quod stultum est dicere: ergo similiter est de charactere.

Propterea alii dixerunt, quod character, quantum est de suo nomine, importat *configurationem* — unde ubi nos habemus, ad Hebraeos primo[^12], *figura substantiae*, alia translatio dicit *character substantiae* — et ideo character est in quarta specie, quae « est *forma* et circa aliquid constans *figura* ». — Et si tu obiicias, quod figura est in quantitate et quantitas in corpore; dicunt, quod sicut duplex est *quantitas*, scilicet spiritualis et corporalis sive molis[^13]; sic duplex est *figura*. — Sed istud non videtur posse stare, quia figura est clausio terminorum, secundum quod est quarta species. Sed in spiritualibus configuratio non est similis terminorum clausioni, sed est similitudinis impressio sive assimilatio. Item, si figura ponatur in spiritualibus, non est nisi translative; sicut ergo quantitas virtutis non ponitur in genere quantitatis naturae[^14], sic nec figura in specie figurae. Et iterum, quomodo secundum qualitatem virtutis actu dicitur clausio terminorum? Et iterum, super quid fundatur illa clausio? Si super virtutem datam, vel innatam, oportet ad aliam speciem recurrere: ergo cum figura spiritualis non habeat convenientiam cum illa, videtur, quod character non dicat figuram sive configurationem in quarta specie.

Propterea alii se extendentes dicunt, quod non est in aliqua specie qualitatis a Philosopho assignata, quia ipse non assignat nisi solum species qualitatis innatae, vel acquisitae, non infusae; et

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hoc etiam ipse Philosophus innuit, cum dicit[^15]: « Fortassis et alii apparebunt qualitatis modi ». Et dicunt, characterem sub alia specie contineri, ut scilicet una species qualitatis sit *qualitas infusa*. — Sed illud videtur quaerere fugam, quia nos *virtutes* theologicas et alias virtutes, quae sunt infusae, in *prima specie qualitatis*[^16] collocamus; quare ergo non similiter *characterem*?

Et ideo dicendum, quod character, cum sit in anima et sit *qualitas spiritualis*, *quod est habitus*, non *passio* nec *potentia*. — Sed notandum, quod *habitus* accipitur dupliciter: uno modo *proprie*, prout distinguitur contra *dispositionem* per perfectum et imperfectum; alio modo *communiter*, prout *utrumque* comprehendit, scilicet omnem qualitatem animam disponentem, sive facile mobilem sive difficile, sive perfectam sive imperfectam[^17]. Et sic accipitur, cum dicitur: tria sunt in anima: *potentia*, *passio* et *habitus*; nam dispositio est in anima et non est *potentia* nec *passio*.

Dicendum igitur, quod si accipiatur habitus *large*, sic character est *habitus*; si autem *stricte* sic, quia character est perpetuus, ideo *habitus*; sed quia non perficit, sed disponit ad ulteriorem perfectionem, scilicet gratiae, quantum ad hoc est *dispositio*. — Similiter est in oculo corporali, quia ibi est *lumen* connaturale, inseparabile, sed insufficiens ad videndum, nisi veniat spiritus visibilis a nervo optico[^18]. Similiter in intellectu est *lumen* connaturale, inseparabile, non sufficiens ad dirigendam cognitionem, nisi superveniat *habitus scientiae*. — Secundum rem igitur character est quaedam qualitas animam non omnino perficiens, sed disponens ad ulteriorem perfectionem, scilicet gratiae. Unde potest esse, quod sit quoddam *lumen spirituale* semiplenum et quidam *calor* gratis datus; et illud lumen dicitur *signaculum* animae vel *signari* in anima, secundum illud quod dicitur in Psalmo[^19]: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*; signatum, inquam, per *naturam*, sed specialius per *Sacramenta* divina, specialissime per *dona* Spiritus sancti gratuita.

Duo igitur obiecta solvuntur, quia intelliguntur de habitu *perfecto*, qui plene rationem habitus habet. Nam ille habilitat ad opus aliquod de se, et sic vel habilitat *cognitivam*, et est *scientia*; vel *motivam*, et est *virtus*; non autem est verum de habitu, qui est *imperfectus*, disponens ad aliud, sicut *lumen naturale* ad scientiam et *lumen oculi* ad habitum videndi. Sic intelligendum est in charactere: nihilominus et aliquem actum habet, sicut patebit in sequenti problemate.

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### SOLE ARTICLE. *On the character.*
### QUESTION I. *What the character is according to its essence.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown first that the character is a habit:

1. « Because there are three things in the soul, namely *powers*, *passions*, and *habits*[^1] »; but the character is not a *power*, since it is not in all [souls]; nor a *passion*, since according to it the soul does not undergo anything: therefore it is a *habit*.

2. Likewise, it is established that the character is some spiritual quality of the soul; but « nothing is in any determinate genus that is not in some species of it[^2] »: since therefore a spiritual quality is in the first species of quality, and that is a *habit* or a *disposition*: therefore the character is a *habit* or a *disposition*. But it is not a *disposition*, since it is not easily movable: therefore a *habit*.

3. Likewise, if the character is a *habit*, it is either *natural* or innate, or *acquired*, or *infused*. That it is not innate, this is established: therefore [it is] *acquired* or *infused*; but every such habit, since it is in the soul by way of perfection, is *knowledge* or *virtue*[^4]; but the character is none of these: therefore it is not a habit.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Good of Marriage*[^3]: A habit is that by which someone does something; but by the character a man does not do anything: therefore the character is not a habit.

> ### Conclusion.
> The character is a habit taken broadly, namely a certain spiritual quality, not perfecting the soul entirely, but disposing it toward a further perfection.

**I respond:** To this some have said that the imprinting-of-a-character is nothing other than a *consigning*, and the character is the same as a *sign*; and this sign adds nothing over the powers of the soul that would be something absolute, just as neither does the marking on a circle[^5]; but it is founded upon the bare powers of the soul and is there according to the institution and act of the one consigning, with no change made; whence it is a pure *relation*, like paternity. And they say that the saying of the Philosopher[^6] is to be understood of those things which signify something *absolute*. And they offer the example that the character is in the soul as the consecration in a church, in which consecration of a church no new quality is given, but only an ordination by him who has the power, for celebrating sacred things therein; thus they say that the character is a certain seal of the soul, in which the soul is said to be sanctified, so that God may dwell in it as in a temple. And they say that Dionysius held this

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in the book *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*[^7], where he says: The character is a holy sign of the knowledge or communication of faith and of sacred ordination, given to one approaching from the hierarch. — But that cannot stand: because the character implies some *assimilation* and configuration to Christ, as the character of the beast [implies configuration] to the devil, concerning which Apocalypse fourteen[^8]; but assimilation is founded upon a quality: therefore if [a soul] becomes anew similar to God, and no change is made on the part of the other extreme according to quality; it seems that it is necessary to give to the soul some quality.

Therefore some have said that, although the character implies a *relation*, it nevertheless implies some *quality* upon which it is founded; and that quality is like a disposition for receiving the light and warmth of grace, as dryness in wood for warmth, and transparency in glass for light. And therefore they placed the character in the *second species of quality*[^9]. — But that cannot stand, because that [second species] is a natural power, or impotence, which follows upon nature. And besides, dryness and transparency are *impotences* of resisting: therefore the character would be an *impotence*; which is foolish to say.

Therefore others have said that the character is not only for *disposing*, but also for *distinguishing*; and it is like a certain quality adorning and ornamenting the faithful soul, by which it is distinguished from the unfaithful[^10]; whence it brings to the spiritual sense a *soothing passion*, and therefore is a *passible quality* and in the *third species* of quality. — But that cannot stand, because that is not called a *passible quality* which brings a passion to the *interior* sense or to the intellect. For since every truth is the object of the intellect, then all things would be in the third species of quality[^11]; which is foolish to say: therefore it is likewise concerning the character.

Therefore others have said that the character, as far as concerns its name, implies *configuration* — whence where we have, to the Hebrews chapter one[^12], *the figure of the substance*, another translation says *the character of the substance* — and therefore the character is in the fourth species, which « is *form* and *figure* constant about something ». — And if you object that figure is in quantity and quantity is in body; they say that just as *quantity* is twofold, namely spiritual and corporeal or of mass[^13]; so *figure* is twofold. — But that does not seem able to stand, because figure is the enclosure of boundaries, insofar as it is the fourth species. But in spiritual things configuration is not similar to an enclosure of boundaries, but is an impression of likeness or an assimilation. Likewise, if figure be placed in spiritual things, it is only transferredly; therefore just as the quantity of virtue is not placed in the genus of quantity of nature[^14], so neither is figure in the species of figure. And again, in what manner is an enclosure of boundaries said according to the quality of virtue in act? And again, upon what is that enclosure founded? If upon a given or innate virtue, it is necessary to have recourse to another species: therefore since spiritual figure has no agreement with that [fourth species], it seems that the character does not imply figure or configuration in the fourth species.

Therefore others, extending themselves further, say that it is not in any species of quality assigned by the Philosopher, because he does not assign except only the species of quality that is innate or acquired, not infused; and

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this too the Philosopher himself intimates, when he says[^15]: « Perhaps other modes of quality also will appear ». And they say that the character is contained under another species, namely so that one species of quality be *infused quality*. — But that seems to seek an escape, because we place the theological *virtues* and other virtues, which are infused, in the *first species of quality*[^16]; why therefore not likewise the *character*?

And therefore it must be said that the character, since it is in the soul and is a *spiritual quality*, *is a habit* (*quod est habitus*), not a *passion* nor a *power*. — But it must be noted that *habit* is taken in two ways: in one way *properly*, insofar as it is distinguished against *disposition* by the perfect and the imperfect; in another way *commonly*, insofar as it comprehends *both*, namely every quality disposing the soul, whether easily movable or with difficulty, whether perfect or imperfect[^17]. And it is taken thus, when it is said: there are three things in the soul: *power*, *passion*, and *habit*; for a disposition is in the soul and is not a *power* nor a *passion*.

It must be said therefore that if habit be taken *broadly*, then the character is a *habit*; but if [taken] *strictly* thus, then, because the character is perpetual, therefore [it is] a *habit*; but because it does not perfect, but disposes toward a further perfection, namely of grace, with respect to this it is a *disposition*. — It is likewise in the bodily eye, because there is there a connatural, inseparable *light*, but insufficient for seeing, unless the visible spirit come from the optic nerve[^18]. Likewise in the intellect there is a connatural, inseparable *light*, not sufficient for directing cognition, unless the *habit of knowledge* supervene. — According to the thing, therefore, the character is a certain quality not perfecting the soul entirely, but disposing it toward a further perfection, namely of grace. Whence it can be that it is a certain *spiritual light* half-full and a certain *warmth* freely given; and that light is called the *seal* of the soul or to be *signed* in the soul, according to that which is said in the Psalm[^19]: *The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord*; signed, I say, through *nature*, but more specially through the divine *Sacraments*, most specially through the gratuitous *gifts* of the Holy Spirit.

The two objections, therefore, are resolved, because they are understood of a *perfect* habit, which fully has the account of a habit. For that one enables [the soul] toward some work of itself, and thus either it enables the *cognitive* [power], and is *knowledge*; or the *motive* [power], and is *virtue*; but it is not true of a habit which is *imperfect*, disposing toward something else, as *natural light* [disposes] toward knowledge and the *light of the eye* toward the habit of seeing. So it must be understood in the case of the character: nonetheless it does have some act, as will be evident in the following problem.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5.

en: According to Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 5.

la: Ut docet Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 4.) et IV. c. 1. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 299, nota 6. — Multa, quae sequuntur, supponunt doctrinam Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, qui quatuor species qualitatis distinguit, scil. habitum et dispositionem, potentiam et impotentiam, passionem et patibilem qualitatem, figuram et formam. Differt habitus a dispositione, quod haec quidem facile mobilis sit, ille vero diuturnior et difficilius mobilis... Aliud vero genus qualitatis est, secundum quod... quaecumque secundum potentiam naturalem vel impotentiam dicuntur... Tertium vero genus qualitatis est passibiles qualitates et passiones; sunt autem huiusmodi, ut dulcedo et amaritudo et austeritas et omnia his cognata, amplius et calor et frigus et albedo et nigredo... Passibiles vero qualitates dicuntur, non quod ea quae illas susceperint qualitates, aliquid patiantur, neque enim mel, quoniam aliquid passum sit, dicitur dulce... sed quoniam secundum sensus unaquaeque dictarum qualitatum passionis effectiva est, passibiles qualitates dicuntur; dulcedo enim passionem quandam secundum gustum efficit... Quartum vero genus qualitatis est figura, et circa unumquodque constans forma. In fine arg. codd. M R U supplent *est*.

en: As Aristotle teaches, *Topics* II, c. 2 (c. 4) and IV, c. 1. Cfr. vol. II, p. 299, note 6. — Many things that follow presuppose Aristotle's doctrine, *Categories*, chapter On Quality, where he distinguishes four species of quality, namely habit and disposition, power and impotence, passion and passible quality, figure and form. Habit differs from disposition in that the latter is indeed easily movable, while the former is more lasting and moved with more difficulty... But another genus of quality is that according to which... whatever things are said according to natural power or impotence... But the third genus of quality is passible qualities and passions; and such are, as sweetness and bitterness and sourness and all things akin to these, further also heat and cold and whiteness and blackness... But they are called passible qualities, not because the things that have received those qualities undergo anything, for honey is not called sweet because it has undergone something... but because each of the said qualities is effective of a passion according to the senses, they are called passible qualities; for sweetness produces a certain passion according to taste... But the fourth genus of quality is figure, and the form constant about each thing. At the end of the argument codices M R U supply *est*.

la: Cap. 21. n. 25, ubi habitum definit: « quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est. » Cfr. tom. III. pag. 796, nota 4.

en: Chapter 21, n. 25, where he defines habit: « that by which something is done, when there is need; but when it is not done, it can be done, but there is no need. » Cfr. vol. III, p. 796, note 4.

la: Duplex hic habitus respondet duplici potentiae animae; scil. rationi et voluntati. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. I.

en: This twofold habit corresponds to the twofold power of the soul, namely to reason and to will. Cfr. II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. I.

la: Vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in fine corp. — Superius pro *characteristicatio* ed. 1 cum pluribus codd. *characteris institutio*, Vat. *characterificatio*.

en: See above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, at the end of the body. — Above, for *characteristicatio*, edition 1 with several codices [has] *characteris institutio*, the Vatican [edition] *characterificatio*.

la: Hic in fundam. 2. allatum. — Paulo ante pro *consignantis* Vat. *consignandi*.

en: Adduced here in fundamentum 2. — A little before, for *consignantis*, the Vatican [edition has] *consignandi*.

la: Cap. 2. p. II. § 4. Edd. in fine definitionis *accedenti ad hierarchiam*. B. Albert., hic a. 4, ait: « Dicunt autem quidam, beatum Dionysium in Ecclesiastica Hierarchia cap. 2. ita definire: Character est signum sanctum communionis fidei et sacrae ordinationis datum accedenti ab hierarcha. Licet autem ita dicant, tamen in nulla Dionysii translatione invenitur haec definitio, nec per verbum nec per sensum. Et hoc scit bene, quicumque litteram Dionysii inspicit ». Quod diffusius prosequitur ibid.

en: Chapter 2, part II, § 4. The editions [read] at the end of the definition *to one approaching to the hierarchy*. B. Albert, here a. 4, says: « But some say that the blessed Dionysius in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, chapter 2, defines [it] thus: The character is a holy sign of the communion of faith and of sacred ordination given to one approaching from the hierarch. But although they say so, nevertheless this definition is found in no translation of Dionysius, neither by word nor by sense. And whoever inspects the letter of Dionysius knows this well ». Which he pursues more diffusely in the same place.

la: Vers. 9. et 11. — De assimilatione sive similitudine cfr. quaest. seq. et supra pag. 29, nota 7. — Inferius pro *non fit* cod. F *non fuit*. Subinde pro *aliquam qualitatem*, quod habent codd. O T X (F a secunda manu), in aliis et edd. *aliam qualitatem*.

en: Verses 9 and 11. — On assimilation or likeness cfr. the following question and above p. 29, note 7. — Below, for *non fit* codex F [has] *non fuit*. Thereupon, for *aliquam qualitatem*, which codices O T X have (F by a second hand), in the others and the editions *aliam qualitatem*.

la: Cfr. quaest. seq.

en: Cfr. the following question.

la: B. Albert., hic a. 4. et S. Thom., d. 4. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, hanc magistralem definitionem characteris afferunt: Character est distinctio a charactere aeterno impressa animae rationali secundum imaginem, consignans trinitatem creatam Trinitati creanti et recreanti, et distinguens a non consignatis secundum statum fidei. Cfr. quaest. seq., ubi allegatur Damasc.

en: B. Albert, here a. 4, and St. Thomas, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, adduce this magisterial definition of the character: The character is a distinction impressed from the eternal Character upon the rational soul according to the image, consigning the created trinity to the Trinity creating and re-creating, and distinguishing [it] from the non-consigned according to the state of faith. Cfr. the following question, where Damascene is alleged.

la: De passione mulcebri vide tom. III. pag. 651, nota 3. Sub hoc respectu passionem laetitiae definit Cassiodor. in Ps. 31,16: Laetari est enim tacitae mentis suavitate mulceri, exsultare est concitati animi fervore gaudere.

en: On the soothing passion see vol. III, p. 651, note 3. Under this respect Cassiodorus defines the passion of gladness, on Ps. 31:16: For to rejoice [*laetari*] is to be soothed by the sweetness of a silent mind, to exult [*exsultare*] is to delight in the fervor of an aroused spirit.

la: Vers. 3. Petr. Lombard., in hunc locum: Et est figura vel character substantiae eius. — Seq. testimonium est Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, superius iam a nobis relatum.

en: Verse 3. Peter Lombard, on this passage: And it is the figure or character of his substance. — The following testimony is Aristotle's, *Categories*, chapter On Quality, already related by us above.

la: Secundum August., de Quantitate animae, c. 3. n. 4. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. I. in corp.

en: According to Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 3, n. 4. Cfr. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. I, in the body.

la: Boeth. haec verba Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto: « Propriae autem quantitates hae solae dicuntur, quas diximus, alia vero omnia secundum accidens », exponens ait: Haec enim omnia quae dicta sunt, id est linea, superficies, corpus, numerus, oratio, tempus, per se et secundum propriam naturam quantitates dicuntur; si qua vero alia dicuntur secundum aliquam quantitatem, non per se, sed secundum accidens nominantur etc. — Vat. cum aliquot codd. *quantitatis vere*.

en: Boethius, expounding these words of Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter On Quantity: « But these alone are called proper quantities, which we have named, while all others [are quantities] according to accident », says: For all these things which have been named, that is line, surface, body, number, speech, time, are called quantities through themselves and according to their proper nature; but if any others are said according to some quantity, they are named not through themselves, but according to accident etc. — The Vatican [edition], with several codices, [reads] *quantitatis vere*.

la: De Praedicam. c. de Quali: Fortasse quidem igitur alius quispiam modus apparuerit qualitatis, sed fere qui maxime dicuntur, hi sunt. — Inferius pro *una species* codd. A E G K M U S [supra ?] *alia species*.

en: *Categories*, chapter On Quality: Perhaps then some other mode of quality may appear, but the ones that are spoken of most are nearly these. — Below, for *una species* codices A E G K M U S [read] *alia species*.

la: Scil. habitus. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3, nec non III. Sent. d. 23. seqq., ubi de virtutibus theologicis, et d. 33, in qua de cardinalibus agitur.

en: Namely habit. Cfr. II Sent., d. 27, dub. 3, and also III Sent., d. 23 ff., where [it treats] of the theological virtues, and d. 33, in which it treats of the cardinal [virtues].

la: Sub primo respectu de habitu agit Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali (cfr. supra), sub secundo autem in V. Metaph. text. 25. (IV. c. 20.) dicens: Alio modo habitus dicitur dispositio, secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se, aut ad aliud, ut sanitas quidam habitus est; dispositio etenim talis est. Item habitus dicitur, si particula talis dispositionis sit; quare partium quoque virtus quidam habitus est.

en: Under the first respect Aristotle treats of habit, *Categories*, chapter On Quality (cfr. above), but under the second in *Metaphysics* V, text 25 (IV, c. 20), saying: In another way habit is called a disposition, according to which the disposed thing is well or ill disposed, either in itself or in relation to something else, as health is a certain habit; for such is a disposition. Likewise it is called a habit if it be a part of such a disposition; wherefore the virtue of the parts also is a certain habit.

la: In libr. de Differentia animae et spiritus, auctore Costa-Ben-Lucae (ed. a Barach, Innsbruck 1878), datur in cap. 1. haec definitio spiritus: « Spiritus est quoddam corpus subtile, quod in humano corpore oritur ex corde et fertur... in venis pulsus ad vivificandum corpus... Et similiter oritur ex cerebro et nervis, et operatur sensum et motum »; quae in cap. 2. fusius explicantur. — Inferius pro *rem* codd. R S *hoc*.

en: In the book *On the Difference between Soul and Spirit*, by Costa ben Luca (ed. by Barach, Innsbruck 1878), this definition of spirit is given in chapter 1: « Spirit is a certain subtle body, which in the human body arises from the heart and is carried... in the veins of the pulse to vivify the body... And it likewise arises from the brain and the nerves, and produces sensation and motion »; which are explained more fully in chapter 2. — Below, for *rem* codices R S [read] *hoc*.

la: Psalm. 4, 7. — Inferius verbis *per naturam* cod. X praemittit *specialiter*, Alex. Hal., loc. cit., *generaliter*.

en: Psalm 4:7. — Below, to the words *per naturam*, codex X prefixes *specialiter*, Alexander of Hales, in the cited place, *generaliter*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Contra errorem a Wikleff et posterioribus haereticis sparsum, quod nullatenus per quaedam Sacramenta imprimatur character, antiqua Ecclesiae doctrina, explicata a Concil. Florent., postea definita est a Concil. Trident. (Sess. VII. de Sacram. in genere can. 9.) sic: « Si quis dixerit, in tribus Sacramentis, baptismo scilicet, confirmatione et ordine, non imprimi characterem in anima, hoc est signum quoddam spirituale et indelebile, unde ea iterari non possunt, a. s. ». — Totam de charactere doctrinam miro modo exhibet *Breviloq.* p. VI. c. 6. — Quid autem proprie sit character, in scholis antiquitus dubium esse videbatur. Primam opinionem hic relatam secutus est Guliel. Parisiensis (*De Sacram.* c. 3.), qui dicit, eundem esse sanctitatem quandam, « cuius exemplum et figura est sanctitas basilicarum consecratarum et vasorum ». Cui fere consentit Durand. (IV. Sent. d. 4. q. I.), qui, postquam multa contra positiones S. Thomae arguit, concludit, quod « character non est aliqua natura absoluta, sed est sola relatio rationis, per quam ex institutione vel pactione divina deputatur aliquis ad sacras actiones ». De hac autem opinione, quod character non sit aliqua entitas realis, iam Thom. de Argentina

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recte pronuntiavit, quod « a nullo Catholico videtur esse tenenda »; de quo post Concilia Florent. et Trident. non potest esse dubium. — Scot., qui « propter solam auctoritatem Ecclesiae » ponendum esse dicit, characterem imprimi (hic q. 9. n. 14.), resolvit, eum esse quidem *reale* aliquid (hic q. 10. n. 13.), et vel *realem relationem*, vel *aliquid absolutum*; tamen ibi non determinat, quid duorum proprie sit; praestantiores tamen et plures eius discipuli docent, eum magis propendere in *formam absolutam*, quae plures involvat respectus, quatenus est *signum* et *configurativum* et *distinctivum*. Quod autem character sit *aliquid reale et absolutum*, et quidem *in genere qualitatis*, est sententia communissima; licet doctores non conveniant, in qua sit specie qualitatum ab Aristotele positarum (cfr. pag. 136. nota 3). S. Thom. (S. III. q. 63. a. 2; cfr. IV. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. 2.) docet, eundem non esse proprie in genere vel specie, sed reduci ad *secundam speciem qualitatis*, scilicet *potentiam*, cum importet quandam potentiam spiritualem, ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus; hanc autem potentiam esse *instrumentalem* et quiddam *fluens et incompletum* (sicut est virtus physica, quae secundum ipsum est in Sacramentis; cfr. supra d. 1.) — Alex. Hal., quem sequuntur S. Bonav. et B. Albert., eum reducit ad *primam* speciem qualitatis, (scilicet *habitum*); Scotus ad primam simul et secundam. Petr. a Tar. dubius inter opinionem S. Thomae et Bonaventurae haeret; quod etiam de Richardo a Med. dici potest. — In 2. quaest. ad 1. 2. docetur, characterem non sua sola natura, ut quidam putant, sed ex institutione Dei esse signum traditae potestatis.

De hac 1. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., p. IV. q. 8. m. 8. a. 1. § 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., IV. Sent. d. 5. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., IV. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., omnes de charactere quaestiones in fine d. 6. q. 4. simul tractat.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Against the error spread by Wycliffe and later heretics, that in no way is a character imprinted through certain Sacraments, the ancient doctrine of the Church, explained at the Council of Florence, was afterward defined at the Council of Trent (Session VII, on the Sacraments in general, canon 9) thus: « If anyone shall say that in the three Sacraments, namely baptism, confirmation, and order, a character is not imprinted in the soul, that is a certain spiritual and indelible sign, whence they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema ». — The whole doctrine concerning the character the *Breviloquium*, p. VI, c. 6, sets forth in a wonderful manner. — But what the character properly is, in the schools of old seemed to be a matter of doubt. The first opinion related here was followed by William of Paris (*On the Sacraments* c. 3), who says that it is a certain holiness, « of which an exemplar and figure is the holiness of consecrated basilicas and vessels ». With him Durandus nearly agrees (IV Sent., d. 4, q. I), who, after arguing much against the positions of St. Thomas, concludes that « the character is not any absolute nature, but is solely a relation of reason, by which, from divine institution or compact, someone is deputed to sacred actions ». But concerning this opinion, that the character is not any real entity, already Thomas of Strasbourg

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rightly declared that « it seems to be held by no Catholic »; concerning which, after the Councils of Florence and Trent, there can be no doubt. — Scotus, who says that it must be posited « on account of the sole authority of the Church » that a character is imprinted (here q. 9, n. 14), resolves that it is indeed something *real* (here q. 10, n. 13), and either a *real relation* or *something absolute*; yet there he does not determine which of the two it properly is; the more eminent and the majority of his disciples, however, teach that he inclines rather to an *absolute form*, which involves several respects, insofar as it is a *sign* and *configurative* and *distinctive*. But that the character is *something real and absolute*, and indeed *in the genus of quality*, is the most common opinion; although the doctors do not agree on which species of the qualities posited by Aristotle it is in (cfr. p. 136, note 3). St. Thomas (*Summa* III, q. 63, a. 2; cfr. IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1. 2) teaches that it is not properly in a genus or species, but is reduced to the *second species of quality*, namely *power*, since it implies a certain spiritual power, ordered toward the things that pertain to divine worship; and that this power is *instrumental* and something *flowing and incomplete* (as is physical virtue, which according to him is in the Sacraments; cfr. above d. 1). — Alexander of Hales, whom St. Bonaventure and B. Albert follow, reduces it to the *first* species of quality (namely *habit*); Scotus to the first and the second at once. Peter of Tarentaise hesitates in doubt between the opinion of St. Thomas and of Bonaventure; which can also be said of Richard of Mediavilla. — In the 2nd question, ad 1. 2, it is taught that the character is a sign of a transmitted power, not by its own nature alone, as some suppose, but from the institution of God.

Concerning this 1st question, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, p. IV, q. 8, m. 8, a. 1, § 1. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, IV Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, IV Sent., d. 5, a. 2, q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian treats all the questions concerning the character together at the end of d. 6, q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 15452–15791), collated column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.136–139 (PDF pp.156–159; Vol IV offset `pdf = printed + 20`) under the VOL II OVERRIDE: the OCR cascade-shatters this two-column region (the Respondeo's *opiniones* cascade, the Conclusio, the scholion, and every page footer fragment diagonally with two-column bleed), so the PDF column bands are authoritative for the reflow and the footers. Each page was read Left column top→bottom, then Right column, body bands then footer bands. This is the **Articulus unicus (De charactere), Quaestio I** — single-pars (the chunk id carries no `pars` field, matching `d6-divisio`). Apparatus = 19 entries; scholion section I rendered here.

**Question-alignment confirmation.** The q1 opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur primo, quod character sit habitus* ("concerning the first [question]…") aligns with the `d6-divisio` *Tractatio*'s first sub-question, *de charactere, quid sit secundum essentiam*. Confirmed eyes-on against the p.136 R-band banner (*ARTICULUS UNICUS / De charactere / QUAESTIO I. / Quid sit character secundum essentiam*) — no q-swap. The next-question boundary (QUAESTIO II, *Ad quid sit character*) is at raw L15792 / p.139 L (read eyes-on) and is **excluded**.

**Page-split map (running heads verified eyes-on):**
- **p.136** (PDF 156): banner (ARTICULUS UNICUS / De charactere / QUAESTIO I) + opener + *Fundamenta* 1–3 + *Contra* (Augustinus) + **CONCLUSIO** + start of *Respondeo* opinio 1. Footers (Quaracchi restart at 1): note 1 = *Dist. praeced.* (divisio's; not re-claimed); notes **2–5** anchor here → rendered [^1]–[^4] (keyed to *habitus*, *specie*, Augustinus *de Bono coniugali*, *virtus*).
- **p.137** (running head "DIST. VI. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 137"; PDF 157): opinio 1 tail + opiniones 2, 3, 4, start of opinio 5. Footers 1–10 → [^5]–[^14].
- **p.138** (running head "138 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."; PDF 158): opinio 5 tail + Bonaventure's determination (Conclusio 1, *distinctio* of *habitus*, Conclusio 2, the eye-simile + *Definitio*) + the *Duo igitur obiecta solvuntur* replies + start of **SCHOLION I**. Footers 1–5 → [^15]–[^19].
- **p.139** (running head "DIST. VI. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II. 139" — appears mid-scholion because the article-level scholion column overflows; PDF 159): the **tail of scholion I** only (the doctores-survey from *recte pronuntiavit…* through *…signum traditae potestatis*, plus the *De hac 1. quaestione praeter laudatos* reference paragraph). Scholion **II** (*De seq. (2.) quaestione*) and **III** (*Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem*) print here next, then the **QUAESTIO II** banner + Q.II body — all excluded from this chunk.

**Hand-offs PICKED UP (from `d6-divisio`).** p.136 footer notes 2–5 (which the divisio explicitly forwarded as q1's): note 2 *Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5* → [^1]; note 3 *Ut docet Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2…de Praedicam. c. de Quali…* → [^2]; note 4 *Cap. 21. n. 25, ubi habitum definit…* → [^3]; note 5 *Duplex hic habitus respondet duplici potentiae animae…* → [^4]. **Digit corrections verified eyes-on against the p.136 R-2 footer band:** note 4 reads **n. 25** (not "n. 23" as the divisio hand-off tentatively rendered) and **nota 4** (not "nota 1"); note 5 reads **II. Sent. d. 24** (not the raw-OCR-garbled "d. 21"). Divisio's note 1 (*Dist. praeced.*) stayed with the divisio and is not duplicated here.

**Hand-offs FORWARDED to `bon-sent-IV-d6-a1-q2`** (and to q3/q4 via the article-level scholion): (a) **Scholion II** *De seq. (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — Scot., hic q. 10. n. 12. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 2…* (p.139 L, between scholion I's *De hac 1. quaestione* paragraph and the QUAESTIO II banner) belongs to **q2** and is rendered there, not here. (b) **Scholion III** *Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem negari non potest, radicale…* belongs to **q3**; a scholion IV (if printed) belongs to **q4**. (c) No q1 page-footer note bleeds past the boundary: every p.136/137/138 footer anchors to q1 body markers (claimed as [^1]–[^19]); the p.139 region this chunk touches is the scholion column only and carries no further numbered q1 footers. Q.II's own footers begin with its body (raw L15792+) and are q2's.

**Scholion disposition.** This article carries a single **article-level scholion** numbered I, II, III, IV…, printed as a block at the end of q1's column on pp.138–139 before the QUAESTIO II banner. Section **I** treats THIS question (q1: the nature/essence of the character — the Trent/Florence definition, the survey of opinions on its species) and is rendered here. Sections **II** (*De seq. (2.) quaestione*), **III** (*Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem*), and any **IV** explicitly say they treat the FOLLOWING questions, so they are forwarded to q2/q3/q4 and are **not** duplicated here (matches the CLAUDE.md "art-level scholion that covers several questions / pro quaest. seq." pattern).

**`[?]` flags:** one. In [^15] (p.138 footer note 1) the codex sigla list for the *una species → alia species* variant reads, in the OCR, `A E G K M U S` followed by a stray `1`; the PDF p.138 L-2 band confirms the letters but the trailing token is ambiguous (possibly a footnote-reference superscript or `S` doubled) — rendered `A E G K M U S [supra ?]` and flagged. All other body reflows, the full *opiniones* cascade, the Conclusio, scholion I, and the 19 footers are legible in the 450 dpi bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Ad quid sit character
To what end the character is

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 139 -->

### Quaestio II. *Ad quid sit character.*

Secundo quaeritur de charactere quantum ad utilitatem, ad quid videlicet character sit utilis. Et cum sit signum sacramentale, dicitur, quod est ad *signandum*, nec tantum ad hoc, sed etiam ad *disponendum*; est etiam ad *assimilandum* et *distinguendum*.

Quaeritur ergo primo de *signatione*.

1. Et cum signum sit « *quod se offert sensibus*[^1] », videtur, quod character non sit signum, cum sensibus se non offerat.

2. Item, si est signum, aut ergo est *naturale*, aut *voluntarium*[^2]. Si *voluntarium*: ergo diversificatur apud diversos; quod stultum est. Si *naturale*: ergo habet esse a natura; quod est stultum similiter dicere.

Item, si est signum, quaeritur: quid significat? Si *gratiam*; *contra*: multi habent characterem, qui nec habent nec habuerunt nec habebunt gratiam.

De secundo actu, qui est *disponere*, quaeritur similiter; et quod non sit ad disponendum, videtur:

3. Quia, cum Deus sit agens potentiae infinitae, non indiget dispositione praevia ad imprimendam formam: ergo non est necesse, quod character, vel aliquid aliud disponat ad gratiam.

4. Item, si est ad disponendum, quaeritur ergo: ad quid disponit? Si ad *gratiam*; *contra*: gratia habetur in baptismo flaminis sine charactere[^3]: ergo non indigemus dispositione media.

5. Item, gratia unitur gloriae sine dispositione media[^4]: ergo videtur similiter, quod natura uniatur gratiae: ergo non est necessaria alia dispositio.

De tertio actu, qui est *assimilare*, quaeritur: cui character assimilat? et constat, quod si alicui, quod ei, a quo imprimitur: ergo assimilat Deo.

6. *Sed contra*: « Similitudo est rerum differentium eadem qualitas[^5] »; sed Creatori et creaturae nihil est commune: ergo etc.

7. Item, character stat cum culpa, quae omnino est Deo dissimilis; sed similitudo expellitur per dissimilitudinem: ergo culpa expelleret sive deleret characterem; quod falsum est: ergo etc.

Item, cum assimilet toti Trinitati — quia quidquid assimilat uni personae, et omnibus — quaeritur: cui per *appropriationem*? Et quod *Patri*, videtur: quia est Sacramentum regenerationis[^6]; sed eius est regenerare, cuius est generare: cum ergo generare sit proprium Patris, patet etc. — Et quod *Filio*, videtur: quia Filius dicitur esse character aeternus[^7]. — Sed quod *Spiritui sancto*, videtur: quia character signum est praeparans ad gratiam et donum gratuitum gratis datum; sed gratia appropriatur Spiritui sancto: ergo etc.

De quarto etiam actu, scilicet de *distinctione*, quaeritur: quos distinguit? Et dicit Damascenus[^8], quod character baptismalis distinguit fidelem ab infideli.

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8. *Sed contra*: Multi sunt fideles, qui non habent characterem, et multi infideles, qui habent: ergo etc.

9. Item, si distinguit, quaeritur: cui? aut enim Deo, aut nobis: Deo non, quia ipse non indiget; nobis non, quia non videmus, utrum aliquis habeat characterem; quodsi Angelis vel Beatis, superfluit, quia bene sine hoc cognoscunt.

### Conclusio

> Character est ad signandum, disponendum, configurandum et distinguendum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod character est signaculum sacramentale a Deo impressum. Quia signaculum sacramentale, ideo *gratiam* significat et non tantum significat, immo aliquo modo praeparat; quia usus Sacramentorum non tantum est in significando[^9]. Et quia gratiam significat et ad gratiam disponit: ideo habet aliquam similitudinem cum gratia, quae est similitudo Dei; ideo aliquo modo configurat Deo. Et quia omnes configurat uni, assimilat etiam *gregem Domini inter se*; et per hoc *distinguit* ab his qui non sunt de grege, vel etiam distinctionem facit in eodem grege secundum aliam et aliam rationem assimilandi[^10].

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod character non est visibile: dicendum, quod character cum exteriori signo facit unum Sacramentum; unde non est in eo ratio significandi per se tantum, sed per coniunctionem cum exteriori elemento; et ratione illius est visibile et unum, sicut elementum unum. Et ratione eius est *voluntarium*, sicut elementum significat ex institutione; nec est tamen diversum apud diversos, quia instituitur auctoritate magistri universalis[^11].

*Ad illud* quod quaeritur, quid significet: dicendum, quod gratiam; et quod ibi non sit, ut supra[^12] habitum est, hoc est ex defectu suscipientis tantum.

*Ad illud* quod quaeritur de *secundo* actu, dicendum, quod *disponit* sicut quoddam lumen et calor datus[^13]. Dispositio autem illa non est *necessitatis*, quod agens non possit aliter agere, vel suscipiens capere, sed tantum *congruitatis*. Quia enim natura corrupta est per peccatum et indisposita ad gratiam, congruum fuit, quod intercidat dispositio media; non sic gratia ad gloriam.

*Ad 3. 4. 5.* Et sic patet responsio ad tria obiecta: ad primum, quia non est dispositio propter agentis indigentiam; ad secundum, quia non est dispositio necessaria; ad tertium, quia non est similis dispositio in natura peccatrice ad gratiam, sicut gratiae ad gloriam.

*Ad illud* quod quaeritur de *assimilatione*, dicendum, quod est assimilatio per unius qualitatis participationem, vel imitationem, vel omnimodam indivisionem[^14]. Prima est creaturae ad creaturam; secunda est creaturae ad Deum; tertia est Dei ad Deum sive unius personae ad alteram. Assimilatio autem creaturae ad Deum vel est *perfecta*, vel *sufficiens*, vel *ad sufficientem disponens*. Prima est in *gloria*, et haec non compatitur dissimilitudinem aliquam nec culpae nec miseriae; secunda in *gratia*, et haec compatitur dissimilitudinem miseriae, sed non culpae; tertia in *charactere*, et haec compatitur utramque, quia solum est gratiae gratis datae, et multum longinqua.

*Ad 6. 7.* Et sic patet responsio ad duo de assimilatione.

*Ad illud* quod quaeritur: cui *principaliter* assimilat? dicendum, quod *appropriate* ipsi *Filio*, qui *character* dicitur; vel etiam, quia baptizati dicuntur induere Christum[^15], quia ipse est caput et dux exercitus; et quia, sicut patebit, character per *appropriationem* respicit fidem.

8. De *distinctione* solvunt quidam, quod character distinguit eos qui sunt de Ecclesia[^16], numero ab his qui non sunt numero quantum ad meritum. — Sed hoc nihil est, quia haereticus praecisus habet characterem, nec tamen est de Ecclesia.

Alii dicunt, quod character distinguit percipientes Sacramenta ab his qui perceperunt tantum signum comparticipationis Sacramentorum, et per consequens distinctionis quantum ad non participantes[^17]. — Sed tunc videtur, quod idem esset signum sui ipsius.

Et propterea dicendum, quod ratio *distinguendi* in charactere venit ex ratione *significandi*; character autem significat gratiam fidei secundum

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aliquem statum, unde distinguit vel fidelem ab infideli, vel fidelem a fideli; et quod permiscentur, hoc non est ex vitio *signi*, sed *signatorum*.

9. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia signum est nobis non *per se*, sed ratione *coniunctionis cum elemento*. — Et est exemplum, si aliquis assumeret arma regis, signum esset, quod esset de exercitu regis; potest tamen nihilominus esse ex parte contraria, et arma semper significarent, quod sit ex parte alia[^18]; et non est falsitas in *signo*, sed in *accipiente*. Sic in proposito intelligendum: quoniam, sicut arma fiunt ad distinguendum exercitus, et tamen ut plurimum confunduntur, quando sunt in bello; sic etiam est in nobis, quamdiu sumus in conflictu huius vitae praesentis miseriae. — Exemplum est de habitu religionis, qui est signum bonitatis; tamen communicant etiam[^19] boni cum malis, et carnales cum spiritualibus, et amantes mundum cum contemnentibus[^20].

english:
### Question II. *To what end the character is.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the character with respect to its utility, namely to what end the character is useful. And since it is a sacramental sign, it is said to be for *signifying*, and not only for this, but also for *disposing*; it is also for *assimilating* and *distinguishing*.

It is asked, therefore, first concerning *signification*.

1. And since a sign is « *that which offers itself to the senses*[^1] », it seems that the character is not a sign, since it does not offer itself to the senses.

2. Likewise, if it is a sign, then it is either *natural* or *voluntary*[^2]. If *voluntary*: then it is diversified among different people; which is foolish. If *natural*: then it has being from nature; which is foolish to say likewise.

Likewise, if it is a sign, it is asked: what does it signify? If *grace*; *on the contrary*: many have a character who neither have nor have had nor will have grace.

Concerning the second act, which is *to dispose*, it is asked likewise; and that it is not for disposing, it seems:

3. Because, since God is an agent of infinite power, He has no need of a prior disposition for impressing a form: therefore it is not necessary that the character, or anything else, dispose to grace.

4. Likewise, if it is for disposing, it is then asked: to what does it dispose? If to *grace*; *on the contrary*: grace is had in the baptism of the Spirit without a character[^3]: therefore we have no need of an intermediate disposition.

5. Likewise, grace is united to glory without an intermediate disposition[^4]: therefore it seems likewise that nature is united to grace: therefore no other disposition is necessary.

Concerning the third act, which is *to assimilate*, it is asked: to whom does the character assimilate? And it is agreed that, if to anyone, then to Him by whom it is impressed: therefore it assimilates to God.

6. *On the contrary*: « A likeness is the same quality of differing things[^5] »; but between the Creator and the creature there is nothing common: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, the character stands together with fault, which is wholly unlike God; but a likeness is driven out through unlikeness: therefore fault would drive out or delete the character; which is false: therefore etc.

Likewise, since it assimilates to the whole Trinity — because whatever assimilates to one person, [assimilates] also to all — it is asked: to whom by *appropriation*? And that it is to the *Father*, it seems: because it is the Sacrament of regeneration[^6]; but to him belongs to regenerate, to whom belongs to generate: since therefore to generate is proper to the Father, it is clear etc. — And that it is to the *Son*, it seems: because the Son is called the eternal character[^7]. — But that it is to the *Holy Spirit*, it seems: because the character is a sign preparing for grace and a freely-given gratuitous gift; but grace is appropriated to the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

Concerning the fourth act also, namely concerning *distinction*, it is asked: whom does it distinguish? And Damascene[^8] says that the baptismal character distinguishes the faithful one from the unfaithful.

8. *On the contrary*: Many are faithful who do not have a character, and many unfaithful who have one: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, if it distinguishes, it is asked: for whom? for either for God or for us: not for God, because He has no need; not for us, because we do not see whether anyone has a character; but if for the Angels or the Blessed, it is superfluous, because they know well enough without this.

### Conclusio

> The character is for signifying, disposing, configuring, and distinguishing.

**I respond:** It must be said that the character is a sacramental seal impressed by God. Because it is a sacramental seal, therefore it *signifies* grace, and not only signifies but in some way prepares [for it]; because the use of the Sacraments does not consist in signifying alone[^9]. And because it signifies grace and disposes to grace, therefore it has some likeness to grace, which is a likeness of God; therefore it in some way configures to God. And because it configures all to one, it also assimilates *the flock of the Lord among themselves*; and through this it *distinguishes* [them] from those who are not of the flock, or even makes a distinction within the same flock according to one and another ground of assimilating[^10].

**To the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected first, that the character is not visible: it must be said that the character together with the exterior sign makes one Sacrament; whence there is not in it the ground of signifying through itself alone, but through its conjunction with the exterior element; and by reason of that it is visible and one, just as the element is one. And by reason of it it is *voluntary*, just as the element signifies from institution; nor is it diverse among different people, because it is instituted by the authority of the universal master[^11].

*To that* which is asked, what it signifies: it must be said that [it signifies] grace; and that it is not there, as was held above[^12], this is from the defect of the recipient alone.

*To that* which is asked concerning the *second* act, it must be said that it *disposes* like a certain light and given heat[^13]. But that disposition is not one of *necessity*, as though the agent could not act otherwise, or the recipient receive [otherwise], but only one of *fittingness*. For since nature is corrupted through sin and indisposed to grace, it was fitting that an intermediate disposition intervene; not so grace to glory.

*To 3, 4, 5.* And thus the response to the three objections is clear: to the first, because the disposition is not on account of the agent's need; to the second, because it is not a necessary disposition; to the third, because there is not a like disposition in sinful nature to grace, as of grace to glory.

*To that* which is asked concerning *assimilation*, it must be said that there is assimilation through the participation of one quality, or through imitation, or through total indivision[^14]. The first is of creature to creature; the second is of creature to God; the third is of God to God, that is, of one person to another. But the assimilation of creature to God is either *perfect*, or *sufficient*, or *disposing toward the sufficient*. The first is in *glory*, and this admits no dissimilarity either of fault or of misery; the second [is] in *grace*, and this admits the dissimilarity of misery but not of fault; the third [is] in the *character*, and this admits both, because it is only of freely-given grace, and far distant.

*To 6 and 7.* And thus the response to the two [objections] concerning assimilation is clear.

*To that* which is asked: to whom does it assimilate *principally*? it must be said that [it assimilates] by appropriation to the *Son* Himself, who is called the *character*; or also, because the baptized are said to put on Christ[^15], because He is the head and leader of the army; and because, as will be shown, the character by *appropriation* regards faith.

8. Concerning *distinction* some resolve it by saying that the character distinguishes those who are of the Church[^16] in number from those who are not in number with respect to merit. — But this is nothing, because a cut-off heretic has a character, yet is not of the Church.

Others say that the character distinguishes those receiving the Sacraments from those who have received only the sign of participation in the Sacraments, and consequently [the sign] of distinction with respect to those not participating[^17]. — But then it seems that the same would be the sign of itself.

And therefore it must be said that the ground of *distinguishing* in the character comes from the ground of *signifying*; but the character signifies the grace of faith according to

aliquem statum, whence it distinguishes either the faithful one from the unfaithful, or the faithful one from the faithful; and that they are mingled, this is not from a defect of the *sign*, but of the *things signified*.

9. And through this the following is clear, that it is a sign to us not *through itself*, but by reason of its *conjunction with the element*. — And there is an example: if someone took up the arms of the king, it would be a sign that he was of the king's army; yet it can nonetheless be on the contrary side, and the arms would always signify that he was on the other side[^18]; and there is no falsity in the *sign*, but in the *receiver*. So is it to be understood in the matter at hand: for, just as arms are made to distinguish armies, and yet for the most part are confused when they are in battle; so also is it with us, as long as we are in the conflict of this present miserable life. — There is an example in the habit of religion, which is a sign of goodness; yet the good also share it[^19] with the wicked, and the carnal with the spiritual, and those loving the world with those despising it[^20].

la: Cfr. supra in lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 3, ex August. allata definitio signi.

en: Cf. above in the Master's text, d. I, c. 3, the definition of a sign drawn from Augustine.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 4. — Inferius post *stultum est* in cod. aa additur *dicere*, et subinde pro *habet esse* cod. F *debet esse*.

en: Cf. above the Master's text, d. I, c. 4. — Below, after *stultum est*, the word *dicere* is added in codex aa, and thereupon, for *habet esse*, codex F reads *debet esse*.

la: Vide supra d. 4. p. II. a. I. q. 2. in corp.

en: See above, d. 4, p. II, a. I, q. 2, in the body.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Mox post *gratiae* Vat. supplet *sine dispositione praevia*.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — Just after *gratiae* the Vatican edition supplies *sine dispositione praevia* ("without a prior disposition").

la: Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quali*; V. Metaph. text. 16. et 20. (IV. c. 9. et 15.). Boeth., III. de Differentiis topicis, hanc definitionem iisdem verbis exhibet. Cfr. in II. Topic. Cicer.: *Similitudo est unitas qualitatis*.

en: According to Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quality*; *Metaphysics* V, texts 16 and 20 (IV, c. 9 and 15). Boethius, *On Topical Differences* III, presents this definition in the same words. Cf. in Cicero's *Topics* II: *A likeness is a unity of quality*.

la: Tit. 3, 5: *Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis* etc. — De *minori* cfr. supra pag. 30, nota 5. — Superius pro *uni personae* plurimi codd. *uni perfecte*.

en: Titus 3:5: *He saved us through the washing of regeneration*, etc. — On the *minor* [premise] cf. above p. 30, note 5. — Above, for *uni personae* ("to one person") very many codices [read] *uni perfecte* ("to one perfectly").

la: Hebr. I, 3: *Qui cum sit splendor gloriae et figura* [*character*] *substantiae eius* etc.

en: Hebrews 1:3: *Who, since He is the brightness of glory and the figure* [*character*] *of His substance*, etc.

la: Supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. I. ad 4 hanc baptismi definitionem ex Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 9, sumtam: « Baptismus est vitae spiritualis principium, *sigillum* » etc., exponens ait S. Bonav.: « Quia distinguit gregem dominicum, sic sigillum ». Damasc. loc. cit. c. 11. de *cruce* dicit: Haec nobis signi loco in fronte data est, haud secus ac circumcisio Israeli. Per hanc nos fideles ab infidelibus distinguimur atque agnoscimur etc. (ed. Migne). Cfr. Basil., Homil. 13. in s. baptism. n. 2. et 4; August., Enarrat. in Ps. 39. n. 1. et VI. de Baptismo contra Donatistas, c. 1. n. 1.

en: Above, d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. I, ad 4, this definition of baptism, taken from Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* IV, c. 9: « Baptism is the principle of the spiritual life, a *seal* », etc., St. Bonaventure expounding says: « Because it distinguishes the Lord's flock, thus a seal ». Damascene, in the place cited, c. 11, says of the *cross*: This is given to us in place of a sign on the forehead, just as circumcision [was given] to Israel. By this we the faithful are distinguished from the unfaithful and recognized, etc. (ed. Migne). Cf. Basil, *Homily 13 on Holy Baptism*, nn. 2 and 4; Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm 39*, n. 1, and *On Baptism against the Donatists* VI, c. 1, n. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. et 4. — Cod. O (X a secunda manu) addit *sed etiam ad gratiam disponendo*, edd. cum Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 8. m. 8. a. 1. § 2, *sed in efficiendo quodam modo*.

en: Cf. above, d. 1, p. 1, q. 2 and 4. — Codex O (X by a second hand) adds *sed etiam ad gratiam disponendo* ("but also by disposing to grace"); the editions, with Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 8, m. 8, a. 1, § 2, [read] *sed in efficiendo quodam modo* ("but in effecting in a certain way").

la: Vide infra q. 4. — Superius verbis *configurat uni* cod. F praemittit *Deo*, et post *Domini* cod. Z addit *ad Dominum, assimilat et gregem Domini*.

en: See below, q. 4. — Above, to the words *configurat uni* ("configures to one") codex F prefixes *Deo* ("to God"), and after *Domini* codex Z adds *ad Dominum, assimilat et gregem Domini* ("to the Lord, it assimilates also the flock of the Lord").

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1. ad 4. et infra p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — De seqq. vide supra d. 1. p. I. q. 2. ad 5. — In fine solut. pro *instituitur* edd. *institutum est*.

en: Cf. above, d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1, ad 4, and below, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. — On the following matters see above, d. 1, p. I, q. 2, ad 5. — At the end of the solution, for *instituitur* the editions [read] *institutum est*.

en: Distinction 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. Cf. there, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4.

la: Ut dictum est quaest. praeced. circa finem corp.

en: As was said in the preceding question, near the end of the body.

la: Gal. 3, 27: *Quicumque enim in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis*. Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. dub. 4. — Quod character respicit fidem, ostenditur paulo inferius et infra q. 4.

en: Galatians 3:27: *For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ*. Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, dub. 4. — That the character regards faith is shown a little below and below, q. 4.

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *Ecclesiae*.

en: The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, [reads] *Ecclesiae* ("of the Church").

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. IV. c. 3, et ibid. Comment. p. I. dub. 4. — Vat. *percipientes*.

en: See above the Master's text, d. IV, c. 3, and there the Commentary, p. I, dub. 4. — The Vatican edition [reads] *percipientes* ("those receiving").

la: Edd. *quamvis arma significent, quod sit ex parte illa*. August., Serm. ad Caesar. Ecclesiae plebem, Emerito praesente (ed. Migne tom. IX. pag. 689 sequ.), n. 2: *In errante et deserente milite crimen est desertoris, character autem non est desertoris, sed imperatoris*.

en: The editions [read] *quamvis arma significent, quod sit ex parte illa* ("although the arms signify that he is on that side"). Augustine, *Sermon to the people of the Church of Caesarea, in the presence of Emeritus* (ed. Migne, tom. IX, p. 689 sqq.), n. 2: *In a soldier who errs and deserts, the crime is the deserter's, but the character is not the deserter's, but the commander's*.

la: Edd. addunt *in hoc*, pro quo secunda manus in cod. I substituit *in eo*; Alex. Hal., loc. cit., legit: *Exemplum etiam est de... tamen illum etiam communicant et boni cum malis*. Superius substituimus ex codd. F G I Z *in nobis* pro *nobis*; subinde post *huius vitae* cod. I addit *et*.

en: The editions add *in hoc* ("in this"), for which the second hand in codex I substitutes *in eo* ("in it"); Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, reads: *There is also an example of... yet even the good share it with the wicked*. Above, we have substituted from codices F G I Z *in nobis* ("in us") for *nobis* ("to us"); thereupon, after *huius vitae* codex I adds *et*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

latin_scholion:
**II.** De seq. (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — Scot., hic q. 10. n. 12. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 8. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit.

---

english_scholion:
**II.** On the following (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, § 2. — Scotus, here, q. 10, n. 12. — St. Thomas, in the place cited, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 4, 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, in the place cited, quaestiuncula 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, in the place cited.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Vol IV is two-column; the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters this Respondeo/Solutio/scholion/footer region. Per the CLAUDE.md VOL II OVERRIDE, the PDF column bands are authoritative for the reflow; the OCR (raw lines 15792–16066, offset pdf = printed + 20) is the base only for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Latin re-set column-by-column from `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{139,140,141}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`. Printed span pp.139–141 confirmed via running-head text: PDF p.159 = printed 139 ("…CUS QUAEST. II. 139"), p.160 = printed 140, p.161 = printed 141 ("DIST. VI. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III. 141").

**Opener alignment (verified, no q-swap).** The q2 body opener "Secundo quaeritur de charactere quantum ad utilitatem, ad quid videlicet character sit utilis" aligns with the divisio's TRACTATIO sub-question (2) "ad quid sit," and with the PDF banner on p.139 ("Ad quid sit character"). Title set accordingly.

**Apparatus / per-page footer→marker map (Quaracchi restarts numbering each printed page; one running [^1]…[^20] in this file, so the file marker = printed-page note + page-offset):**
- **p.139** — printed nn.1–8 → file [^1]–[^8]. Left col 1–5: [^1] signum/sensus; [^2] naturale/voluntarium; [^3] baptism. flaminis; [^4] gratia–gloria; [^5] Similitudo (Aristot.). Right col 6–8: [^6] regenerationis (Tit. 3,5); [^7] character aeternus (Hebr. 1,3); [^8] Damascenus (long baptism note; its tail "…ptismus est vitae spiritualis…" wraps into the p.140 left-col footer band).
- **p.140** — printed nn.1–9 → file [^9]–[^17]. Left col: n.1→[^9] (significando), n.2→[^10] (assimilandi/configurat uni). Right col: n.3→[^11] (instituitur/universalis), n.4→[^12] (ut supra habitum est), n.5→[^13] (lumen et calor datus), n.6→[^14] (omnimodam indivisionem), n.7→[^15] (induere Christum, Gal 3,27), n.8→[^16] (de Ecclesia, Vat. variant), n.9→[^17] (non participantes, percipientes variant).
- **p.141** — printed nn.1–12. **The q2 share is printed nn.1–3 only → file [^18]–[^20]** (anchored to the q2 tail in the p.141 right-column top): n.1→[^18] (arma significent / ex parte illa, August. Serm. ad Caesar.), n.2→[^19] (Edd. addunt in hoc / Alex. Hal. variant), n.3→[^20] (Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.). **Printed nn.4–12 on p.141 belong to q3** (q3 body begins at the QUAESTIO III banner, raw L16067).

**Scholion disposition (hand-off PICKED UP from d6-a1-q1).** The article-level scholion has sections I/II/III/IV. **Section I → q1** (rendered there). **Section II → THIS q2** — rendered above as the scholion (last subsection of both the Latin and English blocks, body-then-scholion per the parser rule). Sections **III ("Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem negari non potest, radicale…") → q3** and **IV → q4** are NOT included here. No q1 page-footer bleeds into q2.

**Hand-off FORWARDED to `bon-sent-IV-d6-a1-q3`:**
1. The **QUAESTIO III banner is at raw L16067 (printed p.141)** — that is the q2/q3 boundary; everything from there is q3.
2. **p.141 footer split:** q2 takes printed nn.1–3 (rendered here). **q3's body takes printed nn.4–12** on p.141 (n.4 = Cfr. supra pag. 139 nota 8; n.5 = II Sent. d.31 a.1 q.2; n.6 Cfr. quaest. praeced.; n.7 Aristot. Ethic.; n.8 Cfr. supra q.1 et 2; n.9 Vide I Sent. d.3…reformationem/convertuntur variants; n.10 Vat. variant *principaliter*; n.11 Cap. 10 / II Sent. d.16; n.12 Aristot. VII Phys.). Read the p.141 L-2 and R-2 footer bands for q3.
3. **Scholion section III ("Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem negari non potest, radicale…") is q3's** — render it in q3, not here. (Section IV → q4.)

**Scholion ordering (parser rule).** Per CLAUDE.md, `### Scholion` must be the LAST subsection of both the `## Latin` and `## English` blocks (body-then-scholion), regardless of the source's print layout — done here.

**[?] flags.** None unresolved. One readability note (not an ambiguity): the word read as "comparticipationis" (p.140 R-col, Solutio 2) is faint in the band — low-risk, flagged for the decade-polish 600 dpi pass.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 141 -->

### Quaestio III. *In quo sit character sicut in subiecto.*

Tertio quaeritur, in quo sit character sicut in subiecto. Et quod in *tota anima*, videtur:

1. Quia character distinguit ovem Christi a non ove, et membrum Christi a non membro[^1]; sed anima non dicitur ovis nec membrum secundum potentiam, sed secundum substantiam: ergo character secundum substantiam distinguit.

2. Item, cuius est dispositio, et habitus; sed character disponit ad gratiam et remissionem originalis, quod respicit totam animam[^2]: ergo character est in animae substantia.

Sed quod sit tantum in *potentia cognitiva*, videtur:

3. Quia omne quod est in anima pertinens ad cognitionem, est in potentia cognitiva; sed character pertinet ad cognitionem, cum sit signum[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, in una anima est unus character per unum Sacramentum; sed omnis habitus est in potentia ut in subiecto[^4]: ergo cum accidens sit in uno subiecto, character est in una potentia. Sed potentia, quae maxime huic convenit, est cognitiva: ergo etc.

Sed quod sit in *tota imagine*, videtur:

1. Character est quaedam configuratio[^5]; sed configurari dicitur anima Trinitati secundum tres potentias, non unam tantum: ergo etc.

2. Item, character disponit principaliter ad imaginis reformationem; sed reformatio imaginis attenditur quantum ad informationem ipsarum potentiarum, ut convertuntur ad Deum[^6]: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Character est in anima secundum totam imaginem, appropriatur tamen potentiae cognitivae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex fuit opinio.

Quidam dixerunt, quod character est in *tota anima* propter rationes praedictas, quia distinguit ovem ab ove, vel ab ea quae non est ovis: et hoc respicit animae substantiam.

Quidam, quod in *cognitiva* propter rationem signandi, et quoniam signum, quod est ratio cognoscendi, respicit potentiam cognitivam.

Quidam, quod in *tota imagine* propter rationem configurandi. Et quia actus characteris, a quo nomen accepit, et principalis[^7] est *configurare*: ideo haec tertia melior est, quod sit in anima secundum *imaginem* secundum *proprietatem* et *veritatem*. Sed quia imago, etsi sit in tribus, tamen *appropriatur cognitivae*, secundum quod dicitur in libro *de Spiritu et anima*[^8], quod « *imago* est in potentia cognoscendi, *similitudo* in potentia diligendi »: ideo per *appropriationem* est in potentia cognitiva.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. *Ad illud* ergo quod obiicitur, quod distinguit animam: ergo est in anima; verum est, sed non oportet, quod sit in *tota* anima, sicut color non tingit corpus, sed tamen primo modo est in superficie[^9].

<!-- page 142 -->

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur: cuius est dispositio, et habitus; dicendum, quod verum est de illa dispositione, quae fit habitus; sed de alia non sic, quia habitus unius potentiae disponit ad habitum alterius, ut habitus fidei ad habitum caritatis[^10].

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod spectat ad cognitionem; dicendum, quod verum est, si sit *habitus* cognoscendi. Et *praeterea*, non tantum[^11] ad cognitionem spectat, sed etiam ad gratiam reformantem totam imaginem.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod est unum in anima una; dici potest dupliciter: quod unum accidens est in pluribus, sicut una gratia in pluribus potentiis, et una sanitas in pluribus membris[^12], quando accidens non respicit determinate unam potentiam, sed eas secundum quod fundantur in uno. — Vel aliter: imago una est, et tamen in tribus potentiis, quia dicit relationem ad unum; similiter dici potest in charactere. Quia enim imago importat distinctionem, ideo comparatur ad plura sicut ad unum subiectum. Et exemplum est in numero: ternarius enim unus est in tribus hominibus, et unus est, quamvis illi sint plures in se, qui sunt unum subiectum ternarii, et nullus eorum per se tantum est subiectum. Ita et in charactere intelligendum est, quod dicit, sicut praetactum est[^13], quandam configurationem animae ad beatam Trinitatem, mediam inter configurationem animae quantum ad naturam, et configurationem eiusdem quantum ad gratiam gratum facientem[^14].

english:
### Question III. *In what the character is as in a subject.*

Thirdly it is asked, in what the character is as in a subject. And that it is in the *whole soul*, it seems:

1. Because the character distinguishes the sheep of Christ from the non-sheep, and the member of Christ from the non-member[^1]; but the soul is not called a sheep nor a member with respect to a power, but with respect to substance: therefore the character distinguishes with respect to substance.

2. Likewise, that to which a disposition belongs, also a habit; but the character disposes to grace and to the remission of original [sin], which regards the whole soul[^2]: therefore the character is in the substance of the soul.

But that it is only in the *cognitive power*, it seems:

3. Because everything in the soul pertaining to cognition is in the cognitive power; but the character pertains to cognition, since it is a sign[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in one soul there is one character through one Sacrament; but every habit is in a power as in a subject[^4]: therefore, since an accident is in one subject, the character is in one power. But the power to which this most belongs is the cognitive: therefore etc.

But that it is in the *whole image*, it seems:

1. The character is a certain configuration[^5]; but the soul is said to be configured to the Trinity according to the three powers, not one alone: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the character disposes principally to the reformation of the image; but the reformation of the image is observed with respect to the information of the powers themselves, as they are turned toward God[^6]: therefore etc.

### Conclusio

> The character is in the soul according to the whole image, yet it is appropriated to the cognitive power.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there have been three opinions.

Some have said that the character is in the *whole soul* for the aforesaid reasons, because it distinguishes the sheep from the [other] sheep, or from that which is not a sheep: and this regards the substance of the soul.

Some [have said] that it is in the *cognitive* [power] by reason of signifying, and because a sign, which is a ground of knowing, regards the cognitive power.

Some [have said] that it is in the *whole image* by reason of configuring. And because the act of the character, from which it takes its name, and its principal [act][^7], is *to configure*: therefore this third [opinion] is better, that it is in the soul according to the *image*, according to *property* and *truth*. But because the image, although it is in the three, nevertheless *is appropriated to the cognitive* [power], according to what is said in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^8], that « the *image* is in the power of knowing, the *likeness* in the power of loving »: therefore by *appropriation* it is in the cognitive power.

**To the arguments:**

1. *To that* therefore which is objected, that it distinguishes the soul: therefore it is in the soul; it is true, but it is not necessary that it be in the *whole* soul, just as color does not tinge the [whole] body, yet in the primary mode it is in the surface[^9].

2. *To that* which is objected: that to which a disposition belongs, also a habit; it must be said that this is true of that disposition which becomes a habit; but not so of another, because the habit of one power disposes to the habit of another, as the habit of faith [disposes] to the habit of charity[^10].

3. *To that* which is objected, that it regards cognition; it must be said that this is true, if it be a *habit* of knowing. And *moreover*, it regards not only[^11] cognition, but also grace reforming the whole image.

4. *To that* which is objected, that it is one thing in one soul; it can be said in two ways: that one accident is in many [things], as one grace [is] in many powers, and one health in many members[^12], when an accident does not regard determinately one power, but [regards] them according as they are founded in one. — Or otherwise: the image is one, and yet [is] in the three powers, because it bespeaks a relation to one; likewise it can be said of the character. For since the image implies distinction, therefore it is compared to many [things] as to one subject. And there is an example in number: for the number three is one in three men, and is one, although those [men] are several in themselves, who are the one subject of the three, and none of them by itself alone is the subject. So also in the character it must be understood that it bespeaks, as was touched on before[^13], a certain configuration of the soul to the blessed Trinity, intermediate between the configuration of the soul with respect to nature, and the configuration of the same with respect to grace making [one] pleasing[^14].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 139, nota 8.

en: Cf. above, p. 139, note 8.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. — Quod character disponit ad gratiam, probatum est duabus quaest. praeced. Cfr. etiam supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et d. 4. p. I. dub. 4. — *Maior* colligitur ex Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quali*.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 2. — That the character disposes to grace was proved in the two preceding questions. Cf. also above, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and d. 4, p. I, dub. 4. — The *major* [premise] is gathered from Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quality*.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Ethic. c. ult.; II. c. 5. et VI. c. 1. seqq. — De eo, quod accidens sit in uno subiecto, cfr. tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8.

en: See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, last chapter; II, c. 5, and VI, c. 1 sqq. — On the point that an accident is in one subject, cf. tom. II, p. 119, note 8.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. et 2.

en: Cf. above, q. 1 and 2.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et q. 2. — Pro *informationem* Vat. *reformationem*, et pro *convertuntur* cod. G *convertantur*.

en: See I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and q. 2. — For *informationem* the Vatican edition [reads] *reformationem*, and for *convertuntur* codex G [reads] *convertantur*.

la: Vat., omisso cum paucis codd. *et*, substituit *principaliter*. Superius ante *quoniam* codd. E F (a secunda manu) omittunt *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, omitting *et* with a few codices, substitutes *principaliter* ("principally"). Above, before *quoniam*, codices E and F (by a second hand) omit *et*.

la: Cap. 10. Cfr. ibid. c. 39. Vide II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Chapter 10. Cf. there, c. 39. See II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 27. (c. 4.); V. Metaph. text. 23. (IV. c. 18.): *Secundum quod* multipliciter dicitur: uno modo, forma et substantia cuiuscunque rei; ... alio, in quo primo fieri aptum est, ut color in superficie. Cfr. ibid. VII. text. 11. (VII. c. 4.). — Edd. omittunt *modo*, et Vat. superius post *quod sit* addit *primo*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 27 (c. 4); *Metaphysics* V, text 23 (IV, c. 18): *In which* is said in many ways: in one way, the form and substance of any thing; ... in another, that in which something is first apt to come to be, as color in a surface. Cf. there, *Physics* VII, text 11 (VII, c. 4). — The editions omit *modo*, and the Vatican edition above, after *quod sit*, adds *primo*.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. seq., d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *quia* cod. F *quando*.

en: Cf. III Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 sq., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — For *quia* codex F [reads] *quando*.

la: Edd. *character non tantum*.

en: The editions [read] *character non tantum* ("the character not only").

la: Secundum August., Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 4. n. 13. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 171, nota 10. De *una gratia* vide II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq., et III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 8. a. 1. § 3: Dicendum, quod nihil impedit, unum accidens esse in pluribus, quando illa radicantur sive fundantur in uno, sicut una gratia in pluribus potentiis, et una sanitas in pluribus membris. Potest ergo unum accidens esse in pluribus potentiis, quando illud accidens non respicit unam potentiam, sed eas, secundum quod fundantur sive uniuntur in uno. — Superius pro *quod unum* codd. F H *aut unum*, Vat. *primo quod unum*.

en: According to Augustine, *Letter* 187 (alias 57), c. 4, n. 13. Cf. tom. I, p. 171, note 10. On *one grace* see II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1 sq., and III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 8, a. 1, § 3: It must be said that nothing prevents one accident from being in many [things], when they are rooted or founded in one, as one grace in many powers, and one health in many members. Therefore one accident can be in many powers, when that accident does not regard one power, but [regards] them, according as they are founded or united in one. — Above, for *quod unum* codices F H [read] *aut unum*, the Vatican edition *primo quod unum*.

la: Quaest. 1. et 2.

en: Questions 1 and 2.

en: See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---

latin_scholion:
**III.** Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem negari non potest, *radicale* subiectum characteris esse animam; sed quaestio remanet, quid sit *immediatum* et *proximum* eiusdem subiectum. Quod non ipsa *essentia* animae, sed eius *potentiae*, quatenus in eis est imago Dei, sint proximum characteris subiectum, antiqui Scholastici concorditer resolvunt. Iterum autem quaeritur, in *qua* principaliter sit potentia. S. Thom., cui favent B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et Richard., docet, eum esse in potentia cognitiva, « quia ex memoria et intelligentia oritur voluntas; unde tota imago est in intellectiva parte sicut in radice » (Comment. loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.); Scot. vero pro eo assignat *voluntatem*; S. Bonav. cum Alexandro vult, eum esse in tribus animae potentiis, quatenus sunt imago, et per *appropriationem* tantum specialiter tribui potentiae *cognitivae*. De hac 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 3. — Scot., hic q. 11; Report. hic q. 10. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**III.** As to the following (3rd) question, it cannot be denied that the *radical* subject of the character is the soul; but the question remains, what is its *immediate* and *proximate* subject. That not the *essence* itself of the soul, but its *powers*, insofar as the image of God is in them, are the proximate subject of the character, the ancient Scholastics resolve in concord. Again, however, it is asked, in *which* [power] it is principally. St. Thomas, whom Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard favor, teaches that it is in the cognitive power, « because from memory and understanding will arises; whence the whole image is in the intellective part as in a root » (Commentary, in the place cited, a. 3, quaestiuncula 3); but Scotus assigns the *will* for it; St. Bonaventure, with Alexander, holds that it is in the three powers of the soul, insofar as they are the image, and that by *appropriation* alone it is specially attributed to the *cognitive* power. On this 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, § 3. — Scotus, here, q. 11; Reportatio, here, q. 10. — St. Thomas, in the place cited, a. 3; St. [Bonaventure], in the place cited, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 4, quaestiuncula 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, in the place cited, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, in the place cited, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Vol IV is two-column; the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters this region (Respondeo, Solutio, scholion, footers). Per the CLAUDE.md VOL II OVERRIDE, the PDF column bands are authoritative for the reflow; the OCR (raw lines 16067–16184, offset pdf = printed + 20) is the base only for clean running prose (the videtur arguments) and footnote-marker spacing. Latin re-set column-by-column from `raw/vision/vol4/p-141.png` and `p-142.png` (read via on-the-fly crops, since the colcrop default split at 1880 captured the body bands and dedicated footer crops captured the per-page apparatus). The scholion section III was read from `p-139.png` (the article-level scholion is printed as a small-print block at the TOP of p.139, spanning both columns). Printed span pp.141–142 confirmed via running-head text: p.141 = "…CUS QUAEST. III. 141"; p.142 = "142 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." Scholion source page p.139 = "…UNICUS QUAEST. II. 139".

**Opener alignment (verified, no q-swap).** The q3 body opener "Tertio quaeritur, in quo sit character sicut in subiecto" (raw L16067/16070) aligns with the divisio's TRACTATIO sub-question (3) and with the PDF banner on p.141 ("In quo sit character sicut in subiecto"). Title set accordingly. The q3/q4 boundary is the QUAESTIO IV banner at raw L16185 (printed p.142, "Per quid character imprimatur") — excluded here.

**Page-split / body map.** q3 body begins on p.141 (QUAESTIO III banner, raw L16067) with the *videtur* arguments (in tota anima 1–2; in potentia cognitiva 3–4; in tota imagine 1–2), Conclusio, Respondeo (triplex opinio), and the start of the Solutio (Ad 1). It continues on p.142 with Solutio Ad 2, Ad 3, and Ad 4 (the "Vel aliter / Alia solutio" with the *ternarius* example), ending just before the QUAESTIO IV banner. The `<!-- page 142 -->` break falls between Solutio Ad 1 and Ad 2.

**Apparatus / per-page footer→marker map (Quaracchi restarts numbering each printed page; one running [^1]…[^14] in this file):**
- **p.141** — printed nn.4–12 → file [^1]–[^9] (the q3 share; q2 took p.141 nn.1–3). Left-col footer: n.4→[^1] (supra pag.139 nota 8); n.5→[^2] (II Sent. d.31 / Maior ex Aristot. de Praedicam.) — n.5 wraps from the left footer column into the right footer column. Right-col footer: n.6→[^3] (Cfr. quaest. praeced.); n.7→[^4] (Aristot. I Ethic. / tom. II pag. 119); n.8→[^5] (Cfr. supra q.1 et 2); n.9→[^6] (I Sent. d.3 / informationem-reformationem Vat. variant); n.10→[^7] (Vat. principaliter variant); n.11→[^8] (Cap. 10 / II Sent. d.16); n.12→[^9] (Aristot. VII Phys. / V Metaph. — this long note overflows and its tail "…(c. 4.). — Edd. omittunt modo…" prints at the TOP of p.142's footer block; rendered in full under [^9]).
- **p.142** — printed nn.1–5 → file [^10]–[^14] (the q3 share; p.142 n.6 = Aristot. VII Ethic., the "anima Deo" marker, belongs to q4). n.1→[^10] (III Sent. d.23 / quia-quando variant); n.2→[^11] (Edd. character non tantum); n.3→[^12] (August. Epist. 187 / Alex. Hal. long note); n.4→[^13] (Quaest. 1 et 2); n.5→[^14] (Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.).

**Scholion disposition (hand-off PICKED UP from d6-a1-q2).** The article-level scholion (printed p.139) has sections I/II/III/IV. **Section I → q1**, **Section II → q2** (rendered in those files). **Section III ("Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem negari non potest, radicale…") → THIS q3** — rendered above as the scholion (last subsection of both the Latin and English blocks, body-then-scholion per the parser rule). **Section IV → q4** (forwarded, not included here). The scholion section III is internally self-consistent with q3's conclusion (radical subject = soul; proximate subject = the powers as image; appropriated to the cognitive).

**Hand-off FORWARDED to `bon-sent-IV-d6-a1-q4`:**
1. The **QUAESTIO IV banner is at raw L16185 (printed p.142, "Per quid character imprimatur")** — that is the q3/q4 boundary; everything from there is q4. q4's body opens "Quarto quaeritur, per quid character imprimatur, et quaeritur, utrum imprimatur per virtutes…" and runs onto p.143 (running head shows p.143 for Q.IV).
2. **p.142 footer split:** q3 takes printed nn.1–5 (rendered here as [^10]–[^14]). **q4's body takes printed n.6 onward** on p.142 — n.6 = "Aristot., VII. Ethic. c. 1: Ex hominibus, sicut dicunt, ob virtutis excellentiam divini efficiuntur" (the "configurati anima Deo⁶" marker in q4's first *videtur*); n.7 (visible in the p.142 left footer) = "Apoc. 1, 5. — Act. 1, 5: Vos autem baptizabimini Spiritu sancto non post multos hos dies. Cfr. … Pro *in Paschate* codd. A O R T V *in passione*… ed. I *in baptismate*" (q4 marker ⁷, "Sacramenta⁷"). Read the p.142 right footer column + p.143 footers for the rest of q4.
3. **Scholion section IV ("De seq. (4.) quaestione…") on p.139 is q4's** — render it in q4, not here. (Section III is q3's, rendered above.)

**Scholion ordering (parser rule).** Per CLAUDE.md, `### Scholion` is the LAST subsection of both the `## Latin` and `## English` blocks (body-then-scholion), regardless of the source's print layout — done here.

**[?] flags.** None unresolved. The body, apparatus, and scholion were all read directly from the page images at sufficient resolution; the only OCR-vs-PDF discrepancies were the routine cascade-fragmentation that the PDF read resolved cleanly.