site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 5, Art. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas.*

Deinde quaeritur, utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur sic.

1. Ubicumque est aeternitas, est omnimoda simultas[^p93-1]; ubi autem omnimoda simultas, ibi nullus ordo; ubi nullus ordo, nulla est emanatio; ubi non est emanatio, non potest esse personalis plurificatio: ergo *a primo*, si in divino *esse* est summa et vera aeternitas, impossibile est, quod sit vera trinitas sive personarum pluralitas.

2. Item, « causa est cuius esse sequitur aliud[^p93-2] », scilicet effectus; sed constat, quod effectus sequitur causam, non ratione diversitatis, quia haec possunt esse simul: ergo ratione productionis. Ubi ergo est productio, ibi est antecessio et consecutio; sed ubi haec sunt, non est vera aeternitas: ergo etc.

3. Item, si tres personae sunt in Trinitate, aut *sunt aeque primae*, aut *non sunt aeque primae*. Si *aeque primae*: ergo non est una ab alia, ac per hoc non possunt esse in eadem natura. Si vero *non sunt aeque primae*: ergo nec simpliciter et aequaliter coaeternae; ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, omnis corruptio necessario ponit terminum finalem[^p93-3], ergo omnis productio vel emanatio initialem; sed non potest esse trinitas sine emanatione sive productione; ergo nec sine alicuius inchoatione. Sed hoc non potest stare cum aeternitate: ergo etc.

5. Item, aeternitas est duratio interminabilis[^p93-4]: ergo si in divinis est trinitas aeterna, ergo et interminabilis personarum productio sive emanatio; sed productio sive emanatio interminata nunquam est perfecta, quia nunquam est in *productum esse*: aut ergo trinitas non est perfecta, aut non est aeterna.

6. Item, in Deo idem est omnino *esse* et *durare*, ergo idem est habere principium essendi et durandi; sed non potest esse vera trinitas, quin aliqua persona habeat ibi principium existendi per productionem: ergo non potest esse, quin habeat principium durandi. Sed hoc non compatitur aeternitatem[^p93-5]: ergo etc.

7. Item, non est maioris virtutis nec actualitatis persona quam essentia; sed divina essentia non potest producere aliam essentiam sibi coaeternam: ergo nec persona personam; aut ergo in divina essentia non est personarum trinitas, aut non est ibi summa aeternitas.

8. Item, omne ens aut est creatum, aut increatum; similiter omne ens aut est a se, aut ab alio; sed omne creatum est ens ab alio: ergo omne increatum est ens a se ipso. Sed omne aeternum est increatum: ergo omne aeternum est a se ipso, nihil igitur aeternum, quod sit ab alio. Sed non potest esse trinitas, quin aliqua persona ab aliqua procedat: ergo ubi est trinitas, non est aeternitas.

9. Item, quotiescumque aliqua virtus, sive finita sive infinita, secundum omnem potentiae suae totalitatem exserit se in aliquem actum, impossibile est, quod simul et semel exserat se in alium; sed virtus paterna in generando[^p93-6] omnino exserit totius suae virtutis immensitatem, cum tantus sit Filius, quantus est Pater: ergo simul et semel non potest aliam personam producere. Si ergo tertiam producit, hoc erit vel ante vel post; sed hoc non est in omnimoda aeternitate: aut igitur in divinis non est trinitas, aut non est vera aeternitas.

10. Item, ubicumque est productio, ibi est acceptio ab alio; sed nihil accipit quod iam habet: ergo si Filius producitur a Patre, accipit *esse* a Patre: ergo illud *esse* prius non habebat. Sed quod accipit *esse* prius non habitum accipit durandi initium; et nihil tale est aeternum: ergo non stat simul aeternitas cum productione, ergo nec cum trinitate.

11. Item, aeternitas dicit praesens; unde aeternum est semper praesens secundum suam propriam rationem; sed emanationes in divinis, et maxime generatio proprie insinuatur per praeteritum quam per praesens, quia melius dicitur *semper genitus, semper natus*, quam dicatur *generari et nasci*[^p93-7]: ergo videtur, quod haec duo simul stare non possint. Si igitur non potest esse trinitas sine vera productione, non ergo simul stare cum aeternitate.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ hoc sunt *auctoritates* innumerabiles tam in veteri quam in nova lege[^p93-8]; sed *ratione* ostenditur.

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1. « Relativa enim sunt simul natura[^p94-1] »; Pater et Filius sunt vere relativa, et Spirator et Spiritus; ergo simul natura: si ergo aliqua personarum est aeterna; cum aliae sint simul natura, necesse est, omnes esse aeternas. Et quod hoc sequatur, manifestum est, quia in Deo relatio non potest esse accidens nec aliunde adveniens propter summam simplicitatem: necesse est ergo, quod habeant omnimodam simultatem.

2. Item, mens paterna simul fuit et intellexit, quia suum *esse* est suum *intelligere* nec praecedit natura nec duratione aliqua; sed in mente *intelligere* est verbum ex se sumere: ergo simul fuit et Verbum genuit. Verbum autem non potest esse nisi placitum et amatum[^p94-2]; ergo et amanti connexum: ergo si divinum *intelligere* simul stat cum aeternitate, igitur et aeternitas cum trinitate.

3. Item, ad nobilitatem virtutis spectat cito producere; unde quaedam producunt in tempore imperceptibili[^p94-3], quaedam subito, quaedam simul duratione, licet posterius natura; et haec omnia est reperire in creatura: si ergo divina virtus est potentissima, omnino superexcedens virtutem creatam; ergo sic *potens producere* et producet, quod productus simul sit natura cum producente.

4. Item, Pater potest Filio communicare deitatem et omnipotentiam, alioquin non esset Filius; sed deitas est ipsa aeternitas, nec potest esse Deus, nisi sit aeternus: ergo prima persona potest aliis aeternitatem communicare: ergo trinitas et aeternitas simul possunt stare.

5. Item, potentior est lux increata ad producendum suum splendorem quam lux creata; sed lux creata nunquam est sine splendore, ergo nec lux increata: ergo si splendor est persona producta, patet etc.

6. Item, trinitas simul stat cum immensitate, et immensitas necessario ponit aeternitatem[^p94-4]: ergo *a primo*, vera et perfecta trinitas simul est, ubi est vera et perfecta aeternitas: ergo non habent aliquam repugnantiam.

7. Item, trinitas simul stat cum summa aequalitate[^p94-5]; sed aequalitas est non tantum secundum virtutem, sed etiam secundum durationem, in qua nihil aequari potest aeterno, nisi sit illi coaeternum: si ergo stat cum summa aequalitate, ergo et cum aeternitate.

8. Item, ubicumque idem est potentia et actus, si potentia potest esse aeterna, et actus, maxime cum nihil connotetur extrinsecum nec creatum; sed in persona Patris idem est *posse generare* et *generare*; similiter verum est de potentia spirandi: si ergo necessarium est, Patrem aeternaliter potuisse generare, ergo necessario ponitur aeternaliter genuisse[^p94-6].

9. Item, ubi idem prorsus est *esse* et *referri*, necessarium est illis eadem mensura mensurari; sed idem prorsus est in Patre *esse* et *referri* ad Filium, et e converso, quia nulla est ibi compositio[^p94-7]: si igitur *esse* est aeternum, ergo et respectus mutuus personarum.

10. Item, in imagine creata simul sunt essentia et potentia, et quaelibet trium potentiarum est alteri coaeva, sicut manifeste patet in anima: ergo cum maior sit convenientia inter divinas personas, multo fortius una erit alteri coaeterna — sicut enim se habet *perpetuitas* ad imaginem, sic *aeternitas* ad trinitatem creatricem; unde « ex perpetuitate rerum manifeste ostenditur Conditor aeternus[^p94-8] » — ergo ex perpetuitate imaginis infertur et ostenditur aeternitas trinitatis.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Trinitas personarum necessario simul stat cum aeternitate.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod trinitas et aeternitas necessario simul stant; et hoc quidem colligitur ex parte *conditionum essentialium* et ex parte *emanationum originalium* et ex parte *relationum personalium*.

Ex parte, inquam, *conditionum essentialium*: quia trinitas stat cum summa essentiae *unitate, simplicitate* et *immensitate*, sicut in praecedentibus[^p94-9] ostensum est; unde divinae personae habent *esse unum, simplicissimum* et *immensum*; aeternitas autem respicit ipsum *esse*, quod in trinitate nec habet *numerari* nec *componi* nec *limitari*; restat igitur, ut in tribus personis sit aeternitas *vera* propter immensitatem, sit aeternitas *summa* propter omnimodam simplicitatem, sit aeternitas *unica* propter essentiae unitatem; non igitur aeternitas excludit trinitatem, quia trinitas necessario includit aeternitatem.

Ex parte etiam *emanationum originalium* idem ipsum colligitur, tum ratione *producentis*, tum ratione *producti*, tum ratione *modi producendi*. *Producens* enim est in omnimoda virtutis actualitate propter summam perfectionem; *productus* vero in omnimoda aequalitate propter summam assimilationem; *productio* vero in omnimoda necessitate propter

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naturalem diffusionem sive communicationem. Si igitur persona *producens* est aeterna, necesse est, ut aeternus sit *producendi actus* et ipse *productus* et *producendi modus*. Patet igitur, quod aeternitas et trinitas non solum non repugnant, sed mirabiliter consonant et necessario simul stant.

Ex parte vero *relationum personalium* hoc ipsum colligitur. Nam personae divinae suis relationibus distinguuntur, relationibus, inquam, non extrinsecis, sed *intrinsecis*; non adventitiis, sed *mansivis*; non diminutis, sed *completissimis*[^p95-1]. Quoniam autem relatio *intrinseca*, non adventitia, sed perfecta simul coëxistit cum suo supposito; et relatio et sua correlatio sunt simul natura: necessario huiusmodi relationes ponunt in divinis personis summam simultatem nec introducunt terminabilitatem, quia stant cum summa infinitate. Quoniam ergo ad aeternitatem nihil plus requiritur quam simultas cum omnimoda interminabilitate et summa interminabilitas cum omnimoda simultate; necessario simul stant trinitas cum aeternitate, et aeternitas cum trinitate, quia trinitas non excludit, sed includit aeternitatem. Unde Augustinus, undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo vigesimo octavo[^p95-2]: « Deus, ad cuius imaginem sumus creati, est vera aeternitas, aeterna veritas, aeterna et vera caritas; estque ipse aeterna et vera et cara Trinitas ». Sicut igitur aeternitas non repugnat caritati et veritati, sic etiam non repugnat trinitati, nec e converso. — Et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ubi est aeternitas, ibi est omnimoda simultas; dicendum, quod simultas aeternitatis excludit ordinem prioris et posterioris, non tamen ordinem originis. Cum autem dicitur, quod trinitas ponit ordinem, non intelligitur de ordine prioritatis et posterioritatis, sed de ordine originis et emanationis naturalis, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus[^p95-3], quod « est ibi ordo, non quo alter prior, alter posterior, sed quo alter ex altero ».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod effectus sequitur causam non ratione diversitatis, sed productionis; dicendum, quod neutrum illorum est *tota* causa sufficiens et perfecta, sed unum cum alio; ideo enim sequitur causam effectus, quia ab ipsa manat, ita quod ab ipsa differt secundum essentiam; et propter hoc nec ita nobile est, sicut causa, nec aequatur ei in duratione nec in virtute aequalitate omnimoda. Secus autem est in productione divina, ubi producens et qui producitur unam habent essentiam et eandem, ac per hoc aequalitatem omnimodam in duratione pariter et virtute[^p95-4].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut personae sunt ibi aeque primae, aut non; dicendum, quod quantum ad *privationem prioris et posterioris* sunt aeque primae, quantum autem ad *ordinem originis* non sunt aeque primae[^p95-5]. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod non sint aequaliter coaeternae, quia, sicut supra ostensum est, nobilitas illarum emanationum perfectissimarum ratione simplicitatis et immensitatis coaeternitatem ponit producentium et productorum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de corruptione, quae ponit terminum finalem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia *corruptio* semper dicit defectum et processum a completo ad incompletum; *generatio* autem non sic: quia quaedam est per eductionem alicuius de potentia in actum, et ita ratione incompletionis necessario dicit terminum initialem; quaedam vero est per actualissimam communicationem secundum omnimodam completionem producentis et producti, et eius de quo producitur, et modi, secundum quem producitur. Et talis ponitur circa Deum, et haec, quia nullam dicit incompletionem, nullum ponit terminum initialem[^p95-6].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est duratio interminabilis; dicendum, quod terminus productionis dicitur dupliciter: unus *principalis*, scilicet productum esse, alius *coannexus*, scilicet iam non produci, et hic coannexus procedit in iis, in quibus differt produci et productum esse. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum generatio in divinis sit *terminata*, vel non; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de termino primo modo, terminata est, quia sic generat Filium Pater, quod Filius est genitus; si autem secundo modo, sic non habet veritatem, quia Filius semper est genitus et semper generatur, quia idem est in eo *produci* et *productum esse* propter perfectionem simplicitatis et actualitatis summae[^p95-7].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est in Deo *esse* et *durare*; dicendum, quod *principium durandi* dicitur dupliciter: uno modo per durationis productionem et communicationem, alio modo per durationis inchoationem. Si primo modo accipiatur principium; sicut Pater est principium essendi Filio, ita et durandi; sicut enim dat ei *esse*, sic dat ei *semper esse*. Si autem intelligatur secundo modo, sic non habet veritatem, nec concludit ratio illa propter diversam *principii* acceptionem[^p95-8].

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7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est maioris virtutis nec actualitatis persona quam essentia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia divina *essentia* non potest producere aliam essentiam de se ipsa nec de aliqua alia sibi coaeterna et aeque prima; ac per hoc necesse est, quod de nihilo producat: et hinc est, quod necesse est, illam essentiam sic productam habere *esse* post *non-esse*, et incipere esse, cum processerit de *non-esse* in *esse*. Secus autem est in productione *personae* a persona: quia persona producens et producta communicant in essentia et natura; ideo non oportet, quod sit ibi inceptio aliqua ratione productionis unius personae ab alia propter essentiam unicam et indivisam.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne ens aut est creatum, aut increatum, similiter omne ens aut est a se ipso, aut ab alio; dicendum, quod *esse ab alio* dupliciter dicitur: vel ab alio *essentialiter*, vel ab alio *personaliter*. Primo modo accipiendo secundum alietatem *essentialem*, correspondet alii divisioni, quae est *entis* per creatum et increatum, quae quidem sunt extrema essentialiter differentia. Secundo modo non correspondet, immo si procedatur ab una ad alteram, fit *figura dictionis*[^p96-1] ex commutatione modi praedicandi, quia *quid* mutatur in *quis*; et talis modus praedicandi non tenet in divinis.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quando virtus infinita secundum totalitatem suae potentiae exserit se in actum aliquem, non potest simul et semel exire in alium; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet, quando totaliter se exserit quantum ad *virtutem producentem* et quantum ad *modum producendi*; sed tunc assumtio[^p96-2] est falsa: quia, licet Pater Filium producat secundum virtutem suam immensam, ipsum tamen generat, non spirat; et ideo secundum alium modum producendi, qui est per spirationem, productio est simul cum Filio alterius personae, pro eo quod illae productiones non sunt repugnantes, sed naturaliter coannexae. Sicut patet in mente, quod actualis consideratio intellectus non impedit, sed potius inducit, quod affectus feratur in bonum cognitum et visum; sic nec generatio Verbi procedentis a mente impedit spirationem amoris complectentis utrumque[^p96-3].

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi est productio, ibi est acceptio ab alio; dicendum, quod sicut est *productio quaedam*, in qua differt *produci* et *productum esse*; *quaedam*, in qua omnino sunt idem; similiter et *acceptio* duplex: uno modo, in qua differt *accipere* et *accepisse*, alia, in qua omnino est idem; prima respondet productioni primae, secunda secundae. De prima habet veritatem quod obiicit, de secunda non; et hoc modo Filius a Patre accipit *esse*. Semper enim *accepit* et semper *accipit*, quia Pater eum semper generat et semper genuit, sicut manifeste colligitur ex praedictis.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas dicit praesens, et generatio melius explicatur per praeteritum; dicendum, quod generatio illa aeterna semper est actualissima et completissima; licet autem *actualitas* alicuius actus melius exprimatur per *praesens, completio* et perfectio actus maxime exprimitur per *praeteritum*. Unde generatio illa aeterna per nullum tempus potest sufficienter explicari, quin immo oportet ad eius expressionem diversis temporibus uti, pro eo quod ipsa est supra omne tempus et in se habet quidquid completionis significari potest per aliquod tempus. Unde ratione *completionis* competit ei *praeteritum*, ratione *actualitatis* competit ei *praesens*, ratione *continuationis* et indesitionis competit ei *futurum*[^p96-4]. — Ea vero ratione, qua omnia haec in ipsa unum sunt, per nullum vocabulum sufficienter explicatur: quia non est mirum, si strepitus verborum temporalium non sufficit ad explicandum illius aeternitatis et aeternae generationis silentium quietissimum, quod melius intelligitur, quam dicatur; melius creditur in praesenti, quam intelligatur; melius etiam videbitur in futuro, quam etiam nunc credatur: quia, ut dicit Salvator[^p96-5], *haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum*; ad quod nequaquam pervenire possumus, nisi intellectus noster supra variationes temporum et supra nubilositates phantasmatum in libertatem supercaelestis quietis plenius elevetur.

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english:
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and eternity stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and eternity stand together. And that they are incompossible seems thus.

1. Wherever there is eternity, there is simultaneity in every mode[^p93-1]; but where there is simultaneity in every mode, there is no order; where there is no order, there is no emanation; where there is no emanation, there cannot be a personal plurification: therefore *from the first*, if in the divine *being* there is supreme and true eternity, it is impossible that there be a true trinity or plurality of persons.

2. Likewise, "a cause is that whose being another follows[^p93-2]," namely the effect; but it is agreed that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity, since these can be together: therefore by reason of production. Where, then, there is production, there is antecedence and consequence; but where these are, there is not true eternity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if three persons are in the Trinity, either *they are equally first*, or *they are not equally first*. If *equally first*: therefore one is not from another, and through this they cannot be in the same nature. But if *they are not equally first*: therefore neither are they simply and equally coeternal; therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, every corruption necessarily posits a final term[^p93-3], therefore every production or emanation an initial one; but there cannot be a trinity without emanation or production; therefore neither without the inchoation of something. But this cannot stand together with eternity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, eternity is an interminable duration[^p93-4]: therefore if in the divine things there is an eternal trinity, therefore also an interminable production or emanation of the persons; but a production or emanation that is unterminated is never perfect, because it is never in *the state of having been produced*: either therefore the trinity is not perfect, or it is not eternal.

6. Likewise, in God *to be* and *to endure* are altogether the same, therefore to have a principle of being and of enduring is the same; but there cannot be a true trinity unless some person have there a principle of existing through production: therefore it cannot be but that it have a principle of enduring. But this is not compatible with eternity[^p93-5]: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, a person is not of greater power nor of greater actuality than the essence; but the divine essence cannot produce another essence coeternal with itself: therefore neither can a person produce a person; either therefore in the divine essence there is not a trinity of persons, or there is not there supreme eternity.

8. Likewise, every being is either created or uncreated; likewise every being is either from itself or from another; but every created thing is a being from another: therefore every uncreated thing is a being from itself. But everything eternal is uncreated: therefore everything eternal is from itself, and so nothing is eternal that is from another. But there cannot be a trinity unless some person proceed from some other: therefore where there is a trinity, there is not eternity.

9. Likewise, as often as any power, whether finite or infinite, puts itself forth into some act according to the whole totality of its potency, it is impossible that it put itself forth at once and at one time into another; but the paternal power in generating[^p93-6] puts forth altogether the immensity of its whole power, since the Son is as great as the Father is: therefore at once and at one time it cannot produce another person. If therefore it produces a third, this will be either before or after; but this is not in eternity in every mode: either therefore in the divine things there is not a trinity, or there is not true eternity.

10. Likewise, wherever there is production, there is a receiving from another; but nothing receives what it already has: therefore if the Son is produced by the Father, He receives *being* from the Father: therefore that *being* He did not previously have. But what receives *being* not previously had receives a beginning of enduring; and nothing of that kind is eternal: therefore eternity does not stand together with production, therefore neither with the trinity.

11. Likewise, eternity says the present; whence the eternal is always present according to its own proper account; but the emanations in the divine things, and especially generation, are more properly intimated by the past than by the present, since it is better said *always begotten, always born*, than that it be said *to be generated and to be born*[^p93-7]: therefore it seems that these two cannot stand together. If, then, there cannot be a trinity without true production, it cannot therefore stand together with eternity.

Bᴜᴛ ᴀɢᴀɪɴsᴛ this there are *authorities* innumerable both in the old and in the new law[^p93-8]; but it is shown also *by reason*.

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1. "For relatives are together by nature[^p94-1]"; the Father and the Son are truly relatives, and the Spirator and the Spirit; therefore they are together by nature: if therefore any of the persons is eternal, since the others are together with it by nature, it is necessary that all be eternal. And that this follows is manifest, because in God a relation cannot be an accident nor something coming from elsewhere, on account of supreme simplicity: it is necessary therefore that they have simultaneity in every mode.

2. Likewise, the paternal mind at once was and understood, because its *being* is its *understanding*, and neither precedes by nature nor by any duration; but in the mind *to understand* is to take a word from itself: therefore at once it was and begot the Word. But a word cannot be unless it be pleasing and loved[^p94-2]; therefore also connected with the lover: therefore if the divine *understanding* stands together with eternity, therefore also eternity with the trinity.

3. Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of a power to produce quickly; whence some things produce in an imperceptible time[^p94-3], some suddenly, some together in duration, though later by nature; and all these things are to be found in the creature: if therefore the divine power is most powerful, altogether exceeding created power; therefore it will be *able to produce* in such a way, and will produce, that the product be together by nature with the producer.

4. Likewise, the Father can communicate to the Son deity and omnipotence, otherwise He would not be the Son; but deity is eternity itself, nor can He be God unless He be eternal: therefore the first person can communicate eternity to the others: therefore trinity and eternity can stand together.

5. Likewise, the uncreated light is more powerful for producing its own splendour than the created light; but the created light is never without splendour, therefore neither is the uncreated light: therefore if the splendour is a produced person, it is plain, etc.

6. Likewise, the trinity stands together with immensity, and immensity necessarily posits eternity[^p94-4]: therefore *from the first*, a true and perfect trinity is together where there is a true and perfect eternity: therefore they have no repugnance.

7. Likewise, the trinity stands together with supreme equality[^p94-5]; but equality is not only according to power, but also according to duration, in which nothing can be made equal to the eternal unless it be coeternal with it: if therefore it stands with supreme equality, therefore also with eternity.

8. Likewise, wherever potency and act are the same, if the potency can be eternal, the act also can, especially when nothing extrinsic nor created is connoted; but in the person of the Father *to be able to generate* and *to generate* are the same; the like is true of the potency of spirating: if therefore it is necessary that the Father was eternally able to generate, therefore it is necessarily posited that He eternally begot[^p94-6].

9. Likewise, where *to be* and *to be referred* are altogether the same, it is necessary that they be measured by the same measure; but in the Father *to be* and *to be referred* to the Son are altogether the same, and conversely, because there is no composition there[^p94-7]: if therefore the *being* is eternal, therefore also the mutual regard of the persons.

10. Likewise, in the created image the essence and the potency are together, and each of the three potencies is coeval with the other, as manifestly appears in the soul: therefore since there is a greater agreement among the divine persons, much more strongly will one be coeternal with the other — for as *perpetuity* is to the image, so is *eternity* to the creating trinity; whence "from the perpetuity of things the eternal Founder is manifestly shown[^p94-8]" — therefore from the perpetuity of the image the eternity of the trinity is inferred and shown.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The trinity of persons necessarily stands together with eternity.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that trinity and eternity necessarily stand together; and this indeed is gathered from the side of the *essential conditions*, and from the side of the *original emanations*, and from the side of the *personal relations*.

From the side, I say, of the *essential conditions*: because the trinity stands together with the supreme *unity, simplicity* and *immensity* of the essence, as has been shown in the preceding[^p94-9]; whence the divine persons have a *being one, most simple* and *immense*; but eternity regards the *being* itself, which in the trinity has neither *to be numbered* nor *to be composed* nor *to be limited*; it remains, therefore, that in the three persons there be an eternity that is *true* on account of immensity, an eternity that is *supreme* on account of simplicity in every mode, an eternity that is *unique* on account of the unity of the essence; eternity therefore does not exclude the trinity, because the trinity necessarily includes eternity.

From the side also of the *original emanations* the same thing is gathered, both by reason of the *producer*, and by reason of the *product*, and by reason of the *mode of producing*. For the *producer* is in an actuality of power in every mode, on account of supreme perfection; the *product* in an equality in every mode, on account of supreme assimilation; the *production* in a necessity in every mode, on account of

<!-- page 95 -->

natural diffusion or communication. If therefore the *producing* person is eternal, it is necessary that the *act of producing* be eternal, and the *product* itself, and the *mode of producing*. It is plain, therefore, that eternity and trinity not only are not repugnant, but wonderfully harmonize and necessarily stand together.

But from the side of the *personal relations* this same thing is gathered. For the divine persons are distinguished by their relations — by relations, I say, not extrinsic but *intrinsic*; not adventitious but *abiding*; not diminished but *most complete*[^p95-1]. But since an *intrinsic* relation, not adventitious but perfect, coexists together with its supposit; and a relation and its correlation are together by nature: necessarily relations of this kind posit in the divine persons the highest simultaneity, and do not introduce terminability, because they stand together with supreme infinity. Since, therefore, for eternity nothing more is required than simultaneity with interminability in every mode, and supreme interminability with simultaneity in every mode; necessarily the trinity stands together with eternity, and eternity with the trinity, because the trinity does not exclude but includes eternity. Whence Augustine, in the eleventh book *On the City of God*, chapter twenty-eight[^p95-2]: "God, to whose image we are created, is true eternity, eternal truth, eternal and true charity; and He Himself is the eternal and true and dear Trinity." As therefore eternity is not repugnant to charity and to truth, so neither is it repugnant to the trinity, nor conversely. — And therefore the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first on the contrary, that where there is eternity, there is simultaneity in every mode; it must be said that the simultaneity of eternity excludes the order of prior and posterior, but not however the order of origin. But when it is said that the trinity posits an order, this is not understood of the order of priority and posteriority, but of the order of origin and of natural emanation, according to what Augustine says[^p95-3], that "there is there an order, not whereby one is prior and another posterior, but whereby one is from the other."

2. To that which is objected, that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity but of production; it must be said that neither of those is the *whole* sufficient and perfect cause, but the one with the other; for the effect follows the cause because it flows from it, in such a way that it differs from it according to essence; and on account of this it is neither so noble as the cause, nor is it equalled to it in duration nor in power by an equality in every mode. But it is otherwise in the divine production, where the producer and He who is produced have one and the same essence, and through this an equality in every mode in duration alike and in power[^p95-4].

3. To that which is objected, that either the persons are there equally first, or not; it must be said that as regards the *privation of prior and posterior* they are equally first, but as regards the *order of origin* they are not equally first[^p95-5]. But from this it does not follow that they are not equally coeternal, because, as has been shown above, the nobility of those most perfect emanations, by reason of simplicity and of immensity, posits the coeternity of the producers and of the products.

4. To that which is objected concerning corruption, which posits a final term; it must be said that it is not alike: because *corruption* always says a defect and a process from the complete to the incomplete; *generation*, however, is not so: because one kind is through the drawing out of something from potency into act, and so by reason of incompletion it necessarily says an initial term; but another kind is through a most actual communication according to the completion in every mode of the producer and of the product, and of that from which it is produced, and of the mode according to which it is produced. And such a one is posited concerning God, and this one, because it says no incompletion, posits no initial term[^p95-6].

5. To that which is objected, that eternity is an interminable duration; it must be said that the term of production is said in two ways: one *principal*, namely the being produced, the other *coannexed*, namely the now not being produced; and this coannexed one holds good in those things in which being produced and having been produced differ. When, therefore, it is asked whether generation in the divine things is *terminated* or not; it must be said that if it be understood of the term in the first way, it is terminated, because the Father so generates the Son that the Son is begotten; but if in the second way, so it does not hold true, because the Son is always begotten and is always generated, since in Him *to be produced* and *to have been produced* are the same, on account of the perfection of supreme simplicity and actuality[^p95-7].

6. To that which is objected, that in God *to be* and *to endure* are the same; it must be said that a *principle of enduring* is said in two ways: in one way through the production and communication of duration, in another way through the inchoation of duration. If the principle be taken in the first way; as the Father is the principle of being to the Son, so also of enduring; for as He gives Him *to be*, so He gives Him *always to be*. But if it be understood in the second way, so it does not hold true, nor does that reason conclude, on account of the diverse acceptation of *principle*[^p95-8].

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7. To that which is objected, that a person is not of greater power nor of greater actuality than the essence; it must be said that it is not alike: because the divine *essence* cannot produce another essence out of itself, nor out of any other coeternal with itself and equally first; and through this it is necessary that it produce out of nothing: and hence it is that it is necessary that that essence so produced have *being* after *non-being*, and begin to be, since it will have proceeded from *non-being* into *being*. But it is otherwise in the production of a *person* from a person: because the producing person and the produced communicate in essence and in nature; therefore it is not required that there be there any inception by reason of the production of one person from another, on account of the unique and undivided essence.

8. To that which is objected, that every being is either created or uncreated, likewise every being is either from itself or from another; it must be said that *to be from another* is said in two ways: either from another *essentially*, or from another *personally*. Taking it in the first way according to *essential* otherness, it corresponds to that other division which is of *being* into created and uncreated, which indeed are extremes essentially differing. In the second way it does not correspond; nay rather, if one proceed from the one to the other, there arises a *figure of speech*[^p96-1] from the exchange of the mode of predicating, because *what* is changed into *who*; and such a mode of predicating does not hold in the divine things.

9. To that which is objected, that when an infinite power puts itself forth into some act according to the totality of its potency, it cannot at once and at one time go out into another; it must be said that that holds true when it puts itself forth totally as regards the *producing power* and as regards the *mode of producing*; but then the assumption[^p96-2] is false: because, although the Father produces the Son according to His immense power, He nevertheless generates Him and does not spirate Him; and therefore according to another mode of producing, which is by spiration, the production of another person is together with the Son, for the reason that those productions are not repugnant but naturally coannexed. As appears in the mind, that the actual consideration of the understanding does not hinder but rather induces that the affection be borne into the good known and seen; so neither does the generation of the Word proceeding from the mind hinder the spiration of the love embracing both[^p96-3].

10. To that which is objected, that where there is production, there is a receiving from another; it must be said that just as there is *a certain production* in which *to be produced* and *to have been produced* differ, and *a certain one* in which they are altogether the same; so likewise *receiving* is twofold: in one way, in which *to receive* and *to have received* differ, another in which it is altogether the same; the first corresponds to the first production, the second to the second. Of the first what is objected holds true, of the second it does not; and in this way the Son receives *being* from the Father. For He always *has received* and always *receives*, because the Father always generates Him and always has begotten Him, as is manifestly gathered from what has been said.

11. To that which is objected, that eternity says the present, and that generation is better explained by the past; it must be said that that eternal generation is always most actual and most complete; but although the *actuality* of any act is better expressed by the *present*, the *completion* and perfection of an act is most expressed by the *past*. Whence that eternal generation cannot be sufficiently explained by any tense; nay rather it is necessary to use diverse tenses for its expression, for the reason that it is above all time and has in itself whatever of completion can be signified by any tense. Whence by reason of *completion* the *past* belongs to it, by reason of *actuality* the *present* belongs to it, by reason of *continuation* and of not ceasing the *future* belongs to it[^p96-4]. — But by that very reason by which all these are one in it, it is sufficiently explained by no word: for it is no wonder if the noise of temporal words does not suffice to explain the most quiet silence of that eternity and of that eternal generation, which is better understood than said; is better believed in the present than understood; will even be better seen in the future than it is now believed: because, as the Saviour says[^p96-5], *this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent*; to which we can in no way attain unless our understanding be more fully raised above the variations of times and above the cloudiness of phantasms into the freedom of the supercelestial rest.

---

la: Ex definitione aeternitatis a Boethio data; cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 1. — Haec quaestio tangitur I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.

en: From the definition of eternity given by Boethius; compare above, p. 89, note 1. — This question is touched on in I *Sentences,* d. 9, q. 3.

la: De hac definitione causae vide tom. I. pag. 118, nota 2; pag. 120, nota 7; tom. IV. pag. 102, nota 3; pag. 103, nota 10, ubi diversi loci ex Aristot. allati sunt; cfr. etiam Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 4. c. 1.

en: On this definition of a cause see tom. I, p. 118, note 2; p. 120, note 7; tom. IV, p. 102, note 3; p. 103, note 10, where various passages from Aristotle are adduced; compare also Avicenna, *Metaphysics,* tr. 4, c. 1.

la: Aristot. dicit V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.), quod mutatio « ex subiecto in non-subiectum corruptio est; simpliciter quidem, quae ex substantia ad ipsum non-esse etc. (et generatio ex non-subiecto in subiectum).

en: Aristotle says, V *Physics,* text 7 (c. 1), that a change "from a subject into a non-subject is *corruption*; simply so, that which is from substance to non-being itself," etc. (and *generation* from a non-subject into a subject).

la: Ut insinuat definitio aeternitatis a Boethio data; cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 1.

en: As the definition of eternity given by Boethius intimates; compare above, p. 89, note 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 79, nota 9. verba Richardi a S. Vict.

en: See above, p. 79, note 9, the words of Richard of St. Victor.

la: B E supplent *personam.*

en: B and E supply *personam.*

la: Gregor., XXIX. Moral. c. 1. n. 1: Dicamus verius *semper natus;* non autem possumus dicere *semper nascitur,* ne imperfectus videatur. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. IX. c. 4. — Superius ante *proprie* supple: magis. In fine arg. pro *stare* G *stat.*

en: Gregory, XXIX *Morals,* c. 1, n. 1: "Let us say more truly *always born;* but we cannot say *is always being born,* lest He seem imperfect." Compare I *Sentences,* the text of the Master, d. IX, c. 4. — Above, before *proprie,* supply: *magis.* At the end of the argument, for *stare* G reads *stat.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. a. 2, et I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 4. et 5.

en: Compare above, q. 1, a. 2, and I *Sentences,* the text of the Master, d. II, c. 4 and 5.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de His quae ad aliquid.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories,* the chapter *On those things which are toward something.*

la: Secundum August., IX. de Trin. c. 10, et 11. n. 15. seq. Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 6. in corp. — Superius pro *sumere* D H *generare.*

en: According to Augustine, IX *On the Trinity,* c. 10, and 11, n. 15 and following. See above, the *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ,* q. 6, in the body. — Above, for *sumere* D and H read *generare.*

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 127. (c. 14.): *Repente* autem [est], quod in insensibili tempore propter parvitatem remotum est (ἐκστάν. Ed. Firmin-Didot: *de statu dimovetur*). — Circa finem arg. cum G posuimus *quod,* alii *cum.*

en: Aristotle, IV *Physics,* text 127 (c. 14): "*Suddenly* [is] that which is removed in an imperceptible time on account of its smallness" (ἐκστάν; the Firmin-Didot edition: *is moved out of its state*). — Near the end of the argument, with G we have set *quod,* others *cum.*

la: Vide supra q. 4. a. 2. et hic a. 1.

en: See above, q. 4, a. 2, and here, a. 1.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. fundam. 10. — Inferius post *virtutem* B addit *illi coaeternam.*

en: Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, fundamentum 10. — Below, after *virtutem* B adds *illi coaeternam.*

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.): *Posse* enim ab ipso *esse* nihil differt in perpetuis.

en: Aristotle, III *Physics,* text 32 (c. 4): "For in perpetual things *to be able* differs in nothing from *to be.*"

la: Cfr. supra q. 3. a. 2.

en: Compare above, q. 3, a. 2.

la: Sicut dicitur I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1, posito *creaturarum intelligitur* pro *rerum manifeste ostenditur.* Expositionem huius verbi vide ibid. Comment. p. I. dub. 2.

en: As it is said in I *Sentences,* the text of the Master, d. III, c. 1, where *creaturarum intelligitur* is set for *rerum manifeste ostenditur.* For the exposition of this word see, in the same place, the Commentary, p. I, dub. 2.

la: Quaest. 2. 3. et 4.

en: Questions 2, 3 and 4.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. seqq. et d. 33. q. 1. seq.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 26, q. 1 and following, and d. 33, q. 1 and following.

la: Textus originalis: Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri Creatoris imaginem creati, cuius est vera aeternitas... caritas, estque ipsa [alias: *ipse*] aeterna... cara Trinitas, neque confusa neque separata.

en: The original text: "Since therefore we are men created to the image of our Creator, whose is true eternity... charity, and she herself [otherwise: *he himself*] is the eternal... dear Trinity, neither confused nor separated."

la: Libr. II. contra Maximinum Arian. c. 14. n. 8: Verum haec [missio Geniti a Genitore] non est inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae, non quod alter prior esset altero, sed quod alter esset ex altero. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XX. c. 3. in fine, et ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Book II *Against Maximinus the Arian,* c. 14, n. 8: "But this [the sending of the Begotten by the Begetter] is not an inequality of substance, but an order of nature, not that the one was prior to the other, but that the one was from the other." Compare I *Sentences,* the text of the Master, d. XX, c. 3, at the end, and, in the same place, the Commentary, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 20, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 20, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. et 3. ad 1.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 9, q. 1 and 3, ad 1.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 9, q. 4.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3. ad 3. Ibid. ad 2. tangitur seq. solut., in qua pro *producat* B *producatur.*

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 9, q. 3, ad 3. In the same place, ad 2, the following solution is touched on, in which for *producat* B reads *producatur.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 5. Vide etiam supra q. 2. a. 2. ad 7. — Post pauca pro *praedicandi* A B *arguendi,* E *argumentandi.*

en: Compare above, p. 14, note 5. See also above, q. 2, a. 2, ad 7. — A little after, for *praedicandi* A and B read *arguendi,* E *argumentandi.*

la: Sive *minor* argumenti (cfr. Boeth., I. de Syllogismo hypothetico). — Inferius pro *productio* B E *productus.*

en: That is, the *minor* of the argument (compare Boethius, I *On the Hypothetical Syllogism*). — Below, for *productio* B and E read *productus.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4. ad 1. et 2.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 2, q. 4, ad 1 and 2.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. dub. 7. et d. 9. dub. 5.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 8, p. I, dub. 7, and d. 9, dub. 5.

la: Ioan. 17, 3. — Paulo superius respicitur verbum August. supra pag. 71, nota 2. allatum. — Inferius ante *libertatem* posuimus fide A B *in,* pro quo E *et in,* alii *et.*

en: John 17:3. — A little above, the word of Augustine adduced above, p. 71, note 2, is looked to. — Below, before *libertatem* we have set, on the faith of A and B, *in,* for which E reads *et in,* others *et.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L23105–L23647**), with every heading, subtitle, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-093..096.png`). **p. 95's body raw is degraded** (*naluralein dilTusioneni*, *prodmcens*, *acliis*) and was re-set from the plate; pp. 93, 94 and 96 are clean in body and footer alike. Fresh literal English translation. **Four printed pages, 93–96; 30 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** **`ARTICULUS II.`** stands at the very head of p. 93 with its italic subtitle *Utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas* — **both unanchored**, the work's frozen heading rule holding for the sixth time. Then: **eleven arguments** that trinity and eternity are incompossible, under the single marginale `Ad oppositum.`; a **`Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` series of ten**, under the single marginale `Fundamenta`; **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column with its two-line italic conclusion; a **`Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ` in three declared moves** — *ex parte conditionum essentialium* (marginale `Ratio 1.`), *ex parte emanationum originalium* (`Ratio 2, trimembris.`, itself divided by *producens* / *productus* / *productio*), *ex parte relationum personalium* (`Ratio 3.`), closed by Augustine's *aeterna et vera et cara Trinitas* under `Confirmatur.`; and **eleven replies**, one to each of the eleven opening arguments, none combined.

### ⭐⭐⭐ THE *VACATIO* / *QUIES* QUESTION, RULED — AND ONE OF THE TWO PREDICTED SITES IS A HYPHENATION ARTEFACT

This is the first of the two chunks the pilot reserved as deciding for the question opened at `bon-praec-c4` and closed *untestable* on work 2: ***vacatio* / *vacare* → "leisure" / "to keep leisure", against *quies* / *requies* → "rest".** The pilot measured the noun *quietis* **twice** on this band, at raw **L23636** and **L23645**. Both were read on the plate.

⛔ **L23636 IS NOT AN OCCURRENCE OF THE NOUN.** It is the line *…aeternitatis et aeternae generationis silentium **quietis-*** — the first half of ***quietissimum***, the superlative adjective, broken across a line by Quaracchi's own hyphenation and completed at the head of the next line (*simum, quod melius intelligitur…*). The raw preserves the hyphen and a stem census on `quie` counts the fragment as a word. ▶ **A stem census over a two-column OCR counts line-broken half-words as hits, and the failure is silent because the fragment is a real Latin string.** The pilot's rule — *run a stem census on the STEM, never on a list of inflections* — stands; **this is its cost, and the cure is the same one: put the hit on the plate before believing it.**

▶ **The band therefore holds exactly ONE occurrence of the noun, L23645: *in libertatem supercaelestis quietis plenius elevetur*** — the article's, and Quaestio V's, last words. A stem census on `vaca` over the same band returns **zero**, as the pilot said it would: *vacando* and *vacabimus* are `q7-a2`'s.

⭐ **THE RULING, made with the plate in view.** ***quies* → "rest"** — *supercaelestis quietis* → "the supercelestial **rest**" — and ***quietissimum* → "most quiet"**, the adjective kept adjectival (*silentium quietissimum* → "the most quiet silence"), not levelled into the noun's English. **The distinction the question was opened to protect is intact here and costs nothing**, because *vacatio* is absent: nothing in this article is doing the work that *divina vacatio* does in `bon-praec-c4` ¶ 12, so "rest" carries the whole sense of the clause without absorbing a second Latin word.

⚠ **What this chunk can and cannot settle, stated exactly.** It settles the ***quies* side** — one clear site, rendered "rest", with no *vacatio* in view to be collapsed into it. It **cannot settle the pair**, because the two families do not meet on this band. ▶ **The pair meets in `q7-a2` and nowhere else in the corpus so far**: raw **L25824** holds both in one clause (*non **quiescit** nisi in summe amabili **vacando***) and **L25900** holds *vacabimus*. `q7-a2` is therefore the chunk that decides whether *vacatio* must diverge from *quies*, and it inherits from here a fixed "rest" for the *quies* side and a corrected count — **one noun site on this band, not two.**

### ⭐⭐ BOUNDARY 10 (p. 96): IT FORWARDS IN THE BODY ONLY, SPLIT 5/0 — AND THE INDEX WAS RIGHT AT BOTH ENDS

Article II runs to the foot of p. 96's right column, closing *— in libertatem supercaelestis quietis plenius elevetur.* **`QUAESTIO VI.` then stands full measure on the same leaf** with its italic subtitle *Utrum trinitas possit stare cum summa immutabilitate*, its short opener *Consequenter quaeritur…* and its two *praeambula*, all of which belong to `bon-qmt-q6-a1`. **All five of p. 96's register entries stay here**, because the opener is **unanchored** — read at 1.8× across both its columns, no raised mark stands after *quaeruntur*, after *immutabile* or after *immutabilitas* — and because all five notes pair with Article II's own replies (n. 1 → reply 8's *figura dictionis*¹, n. 2 → reply 9's *assumtio*², n. 3 → reply 9's *utrumque*³, n. 4 → reply 11's *futurum*⁴, n. 5 → reply 11's *Salvator*⁵, the John 17:3 note whose own second clause discusses the article's **last sentence** — *Inferius ante libertatem posuimus…*).

⭐ **This is the shape of BOUNDARY 6 (p. 78) exactly — body forwards, register does not — and it is the second 4/0-class split in the work** (there four entries stayed, here five). ▶ **Ten boundaries, and the count of shapes stands at EIGHT in ten:** 5/1 · **LEAF EDGE** · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0 · 1/6 · 3/2 · **LEAF EDGE** · 5/0. The work is now **8 forwarding / 2 leaf edges**.

⭐⭐ **AND THE INDEX LINE `q5-a2 93–96` IS RIGHT AT BOTH ENDS — the first in this work verified sound on both sides.** p. 93 opens the article at the very head of the leaf (`q5-a1`'s measured leaf edge) and p. 96 carries its close; the raw band `L23105 → L23647` is exact at both ends, `QUAESTIO VI.` opening at L23648. ⚠ **That the index was right is not a reason to stop measuring it.** The standing order was obeyed in full — **p. 96 was extracted ALONE and read before pp. 94–95 were pulled** — and it is only because of that read that "93–96" is a measurement rather than a repetition. ⛔ Two of the previous three index lines failed, one at its first page and one at its last; a line being right is a fact about that line.

### ⭐⭐ TWO FREE CONTROLS, BOTH INTERNAL, AND BOTH BEAT THE GLYPH

- ⭐⭐ **p. 96 n. 1 `Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 5`** — the raw gives `pag. 1i`. **`bon-qsc-q3` p. 14 n. 5 is `Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.)…`, the *Sophistici Elenchi* locus for the fallacy *figura dictionis*** — which is the very phrase this note is hung on (reply 8's *fit figura dictionis*¹). **The target is the note's subject, and the coordinate never had to be put to the type.** The reference is outbound into the deployed *QD de scientia Christi*.
- ⭐⭐ **p. 96 n. 5 `supra pag. 71, nota 2`** — **`bon-qmt-q3-a1` p. 71 n. 2 is Augustine, *de Trin.* VII. c. 4. n. 7: *Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur, et verius est, quam cogitatur*** — word for word the *verbum Augustini* that the body's *quod melius intelligitur, quam dicatur* is echoing, which is exactly what the note says it is looking to. ⭐ **A FOURTH internal cross-reference closes inside this work, in the fourth of five consecutive chunks, and both ends are ours.**

⚠ **The 1-vs-4 calibration was re-run on this span, not inherited, and it held every time.** p. 93 n. 2's `taph. tr. 4. c. 1.` sets a true `4` and a true `1` **four words apart on one line** at 6× — the `4` with a closed bowl and crossbar, the `1` a bare upright with a top flag — and p. 94 n. 4's `Vide supra q. 4. a. 2. et hic a. 1.` repeats the pair on a single line. Against those controls: p. 93 n. 3's `V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.)` is a `1` (raw `(c. 4.)`, corrected — and Phys. V c. 1 is where *mutatio ex subiecto in non-subiectum* is defined); p. 93 n. 7's `d. IX. c. 4.` and n. 8's `q. 1. a. 2` and `d. II. c. 4. et 5.` (raw `d. 11, c. i. et 5`) resolve **both ways inside two adjacent notes**. **Five raw-vs-plate digit defects in all, every one settled at 3× or better against a same-line control or a target.**

### ▶ GUTTERS — THE DEFAULT WAS WRONG ON THREE OF FOUR, AND p. 96 NEEDED THE REGION TREATMENT

93 **1188** · 94 **1338** · 95 **1138** · 96 **1391** *(Article II's region, above the full-measure `QUAESTIO VI.`)*.

⚠⚠ **`colcrop.py`'s default failed on three of the four leaves, and in every case the run width was the tell and nothing else.** p. 93 returned **1214 on a 4 px run** against a true band 1159–1217 (59 px) with the centre rule at 1184–1189, **peak 1242 — the most heavily inked rule the work has produced, beating p. 89's 991** — → **1188**, 26 px out. p. 95 returned **1163 on a 3 px run** against band 1108–1168 (61 px), rule 1137–1140 peak 643 → **1138**, 25 px out. p. 96's whole-leaf default returned **1381 on a 3 px run** and its window spread blew out to **203 px** (1222–1425) because the leaf stacks three regions — Article II's columns, the full-measure `QUAESTIO VI.` stack, and Quaestio VI's own two-column opener; **profiling Article II's region alone (rows 0.06–0.63) gives band 1361–1422 (62 px), rule 1389–1394 peak 1028, → 1391**, 10 px from the default and measured rather than guessed. ⭐ **p. 94 alone came back on a sound 61 px run** (band 1308–1368, rule 1337–1342 peaking at only **110**) **and the profile reproduced it exactly.** ▶ *Run width is the confidence signal, not the value* — and the two leaves whose rule inked hardest are precisely the two the default missed by ~25 px.

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**One gutter runover, ZERO page-crossing** — and the negative was **established, not assumed**: the head of every incoming register (pp. 94, 95, 96 **and 97**) was read before its first numeral, and each opens **numbered and indented** under a superscript, with no flush-left continuation.

- **p. 95 n. 3** runs over the gutter: the *contra Maximinum* note fills the left block and breaks mid-clause at *…non quod alter prior esset altero, sed quod*, completing **flush left at the head of the right block**, above n. 4 (*alter esset ex altero. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XX. c. 3. in fine…*). Rendered joined.
- **p. 97's register opens numbered at n. 1** (`Vers. 6: Ego enim Dominus et non mutor. — Glossa…`), so **p. 96 forwards nothing**; p. 96 n. 5 closes on a full stop (*alii et.*). The leaf was extracted for this check alone.

Ledger line: `bon-qmt-q5-a2	p.95 n.3:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER — AND THE SOLUTION-HEAVY SPLIT IS TOTAL A SEVENTH TIME

**p. 93** — `Ad oppositum.` · `Fundamenta`
**p. 94** — `Conclusio.` · `Ratio 1.` · `Ratio 2, trimembris.`
**p. 95** — `Ratio 3.` · `Confirmatur.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Notandum.` · `Distinctio.` · `Notandum.` · `Duplex terminus.` · `Distinctio.`
**p. 96** — `Notandum.` · `Distinctio.` · `Notandum.` · `Duplex productio et acceptio.` · `Ratio notabilis.` · `Corollarium notabile.`

**Nineteen in all, NONE clipped.** ⭐ **The solution-heavy split holds a seventh time and is again total in one direction:** the **twenty-one arguments** of the two series, filling pp. 93–94, carry **two** glosses between them, one at the head of each series; the *Conclusio*, the *Respondeo* and the eleven replies carry **seventeen**. ⚠ **p. 93's whole right margin holds one gloss and p. 94's whole left margin is empty.**

⚠ ***`Fundamenta` PRINTS WITHOUT ITS FINAL POINT***, alone among the span's nineteen glosses — read at 5× on a full-image-width strip, the final *a* is followed by clean paper and no mark. **Recorded as printed, not completed**, on the `bon-qmt-q2-a2` p. 66 `Alia solutio` precedent.

⭐ **Fifth scoping of the 69–73 marginalia clipping: pp. 93–96 are CLEAN, checked on full-image-width strips at the gutter-side margin of every leaf** — 93-L and 95-L for the rectos, 94-R and 96-R for the versos. Every gloss stands complete with ~60 px or more of clean paper before the scan's dark edge band.

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**The replies answer the OPENING series, and it is checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt* — conceding the ten `Sed contra` *fundamenta* — and reply 1 opens *Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur **in contrarium**, quod ubi est aeternitas, ibi est omnimoda simultas*, quoting opening argument 1 word for word; reply 11 answers opening argument 11's *generatio proprie insinuatur per praeteritum*. ⛔ **This is the reverse of `bon-qmt-q5-a1` immediately before it, inside a single quaestio — exactly what Quaestio IV did.** The pairing is taken from the replies' own quoted lemmata every time. · **The marginalia have swapped sides again inside one quaestio**: `Ad oppositum.` stands on the opening series and `Fundamenta` on the `Sed contra`, the reverse of `q5-a1` and the same as `q4-a2`. **Find the series by content; the marginale names the side, and the side changes.** · **Eleven arguments, eleven replies, none combined and none missing** — the first exact one-to-one reply series in this work since `q2-a2`; **it was still checked reply by reply, not counted.** · **`Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` here is neither a display heading nor a bare marker but the first two words of a running sentence** set in letter-spaced small caps in-column (*Sed contra hoc sunt auctoritates innumerabiles…*), a **sixth** shape for the opposing series in this work. The small caps are reproduced in both languages and the clause is **translated** in the English, on the `bon-qmt-q2-a2` running-formula precedent, rather than kept in Latin as `q5-a1`'s standalone `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` marker was. · **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.` printed correctly and in-column**, and was found by content, not by header grep. · **p. 94's `Conclusio.` marginale stands beside the *Respondeo*, not beside the `CONCLUSIO` heading** — the gloss list is in body order and records where the gloss stands, not what it names.

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

The multiset **agrees exactly** on this span — thirty-six numerals on each side, same values — because the Latin here writes its chapter numbers in numerals rather than spelled out, so `q4-a1`'s false-positive class does not fire. ▶ **The test itself was still run directly**: both sections carry **the same four `<!-- page N -->` markers, 93–96, in the same order**, and each falls at a word boundary in both languages (`ostenditur. | 1. « Relativa` · `propter | naturalem` · `acceptionem. | 7. Ad illud`), matched in the English at *by reason. | 1. "For relatives"*, *on account of | natural diffusion*, and *of principle. | 7. To that*. **The multiset is a SCREEN, not the test** — and a screen that agrees proves nothing on its own.

### Translation choices

- ⭐ ***quies* → "rest"** and ***quietissimus* → "most quiet"** — see the ruling above. This is the **first genuine datum the corpus has had on the *vacatio*/*quies* question since it was opened at `bon-praec-c4`**, and it is one half of a pair whose other half is `q7-a2`'s.
- ⭐ **Ruling 5 (`fundam. N` retained) IS MET, and the site is quoted**: **p. 94 n. 5 prints `Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. fundam. 10.` and the English reads "Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, fundamentum 10."** — the Latin term retained, not Englished as "foundation 10", on the ratification carried in from the *scientia Christi* work-close gate and repaired at `bon-qmt-q4-a2`. **Stated here because a chunk that MEETS a reserved site is the one likeliest to obey it silently and drop the tracking line.** It is the work's third such site (after `q3-a2` pp. 75 and 77 and `q4-a1` p. 79) and its first outside those two chunks.
- ⛔ **Ruling 2 is exercised on ONE SIDE ONLY, for the second time in the work:** ***lux* occurs FOUR times, *lumen* ZERO**, and all four stand in a single sentence — `Sed contra` argument 5's *lux increata* / *lux creata* twice each. All four go to **"light"** and nothing is transliterated. **Recorded, or a later reader finds four bare "light"s and takes them for a lapse.** The Ps. 4:7 and Ps. 35:10 sites are unreached.
- ⛔ ***intellect-* takes "understanding" at every occurrence, with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English.** The two nouns are p. 96's *actualis consideratio intellectus non impedit* → "the actual consideration of the understanding does not hinder" and *intellectus noster supra variationes temporum… elevetur* → "our understanding be raised above the variations of times"; the verbal forms are *intellexit* → "understood", *intelligere* → "to understand" (and the substantival *divinum intelligere* → "the divine understanding"), *intelligitur*/*intelligatur* → "is understood". ***intelligentia* does not occur on this span**, so the *intelligentia* → "intelligence" ruling is unexercised here; ***contuit-* is absent from the work**, so ruling 3 is not reached.
- ***simultas* → "simultaneity"** and ***interminabilitas* → "interminability"** / ***interminabilis* → "interminable"**, carried from `bon-qmt-q5-a1` — the same *Respondeo* hinge (*simultas cum omnimoda interminabilitate et summa interminabilitas cum omnimoda simultate*) recurring in the companion article, so the pair had to sound like a pair here for the same reason it did there.
- ***omnimoda* → "in every mode"** throughout (adjectival *omnimodam simultatem* → "simultaneity in every mode"), preserving the single Latin adjective that the whole *Respondeo* turns on.
- ***productum esse* → "the state of having been produced"** where it is the terminus, and **"to have been produced"** where it is paired with *produci* → "to be produced"; ***coannexus* → "coannexed"**, ***coaevus* → "coeval"**, ***plurificatio* → "plurification"**, ***alietas* → "otherness"**, ***indesitio* → "not ceasing"**, ***mansivus* → "abiding"** (carried from `q5-a1`) — coinages rendered by coinages.
- ***figura dictionis* → "figure of speech"**, the fallacy's received English, with the Latin kept in italics in the body; ***assumtio* → "assumption"**, spelling as printed (*assumtio*, not *assumptio*).
- **Scripture on the Douay base adjusted to Quaracchi's Latin:** John 17:3 *haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum* → "this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent".
- **Greek kept as printed:** p. 94 n. 3's *ἐκστάν* (the plate's κ prints with an x-shaped bowl in this Greek fount), glossed by Quaracchi's own parenthesis rather than by us.

### Ledger

**30 entries** (p. 93 all eight · p. 94 all nine · p. 95 all eight · p. 96 all five). **Zero `[?]` flags. One gutter runover (p. 95 n. 3), ZERO page-crossing — the negative established by reading the head of every incoming register before its first numeral, p. 97's included.** What this chunk inherits is **NOTHING** — p. 93 is a clean leaf edge in body and register alike, boundary 9 measured by `bon-qmt-q5-a1`, and p. 93's n. 1 (`Ex definitione aeternitatis a Boethio data; cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 1.`) is an **inbound** reference into that chunk, verified to land on its p. 89 n. 1, the Boethius definition. What it forwards to `bon-qmt-q6-a1` is **body only**: `QUAESTIO VI.`, its subtitle, its unanchored opener and its two *praeambula*, all standing on p. 96 below Article II's close, with **none** of that leaf's five register entries.

### ⚠ CITATIONS — 24 RECORDS, CLEAN, AND THREE RESOLVER ARTEFACTS WORTH NAMING

`build-citations.py` returns **24 records from this chunk: ZERO dangling, ZERO unresolvable, ZERO ambiguous** (18 resolve to a chunk, 1 page-multi, 1 verse, 2 work, 2 forward). ⚠ **The two `forward` records and one of the two `work` records are resolver artefacts, not defects in the register**, and they are named here so a later reader does not take them for readings:

- p. 93 n. 2 chains four coordinates under two tomes — *tom. I. pag. 118, nota 2; **pag. 120, nota 7**; tom. IV. pag. 102, nota 3; **pag. 103, nota 10*** — and the two **bare** `pag. N` coordinates are resolved as `tom5:p120` / `tom5:p103`, i.e. forward references inside Vol V. They are not: a bare `pag. N` inherits **the note's own last-named tome**, so they are tom. I p. 120 and tom. IV p. 103. The register is right; the resolver's volume default is what carries.
- p. 94 n. 8's `ibid.` is resolved to `work:scientia-christi`, carried by anaphora from p. 94 n. 2's *Quaest. de scientia Christi*. It in fact refers to **I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III**, named two clauses earlier in its own note. **Cross-note anaphora is the failure mode; within-note anaphora would have got it right.**

⛔ Neither is edited here — the chunk transcribes what Quaracchi printed, and the ledger is rebuilt by a tool. **Recorded for the work-close gate**, which is where a resolver change belongs.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0