title: Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *De definitione articuli, quam ponit Isidorus.*

Secundo quaeritur de notificatione Isidori[^p527-3], quae talis est: «Articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis tendens in ipsam». Contra partem *primam* definitionis opponitur sic.

1. Nulla veritas est sua perceptio; sed articulus est divina Veritas: ergo haec est falsa: articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis.

2. Item, fides est perceptio divinae Veritatis[^p527-4]: ergo si articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis, fides est articulus.

3. Item, visio gloriae est perceptio divinae Veritatis: ergo videtur, quod visio gloriae sit articulus fidei; quod simpliciter est absurdum.

4. Item, in articulis non tantum exprimitur divina Veritas, sed etiam divina Bonitas et Christi humanitas: ergo non videtur, quod primum membrum definitionis omni articulo generaliter[^p527-5] conveniat.

Contra *secundam* partem definitionis opponitur sic.

5. Nihil quod est ipsa divina Veritas, tendit in divinam Veritatem; sed articulus est ipsa Veritas divina: ergo non est tendens in ipsam Veritatem.

6. Item, articulus communis est respectu fidei bonorum et malorum; sed mali, quamvis percipiant primam Veritatem, non tamen tendunt in ipsam[^p527-6]: ergo tendere in divinam Veritatem non est commune omni articulo.

7. Item, aliqui philosophi habuerunt cognitionem de Deo cum quadam dilectione, ergo[^p527-7] habuerunt simul divinae Veritatis perceptionem cum quadam tendentia in ipsam; et tamen nec fidem nec fidei articulos habuerunt: ergo non videtur, quod praedicta notificatio de articulo recte assignetur.

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8. Item, cum unius rei una sit definitio[^p528-1], videtur, quod ad notificationem articuli sufficiat notificatio sive definitio Richardi: superfluit ergo ista Isidori. — Quaeritur ergo, quae sit diversitas inter utramque.

### Conclusio.

> Definitio articuli ab Isidoro assignata conveniens est, prout est fidei formatae.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ista descriptio in tribus differt a descriptione ipsius Richardi. Nam illa descriptio Richardi est quasi quaedam *nominis interpretatio*, haec autem est *realis notificatio*. — Secundo vero differt in hoc quod, cum *articulus* dupliciter habeat considerari: et prout est *in se* et prout est *apud animam*[^p528-2], notificatio ipsius Richardi respicit ipsum articulum, prout est *in se*; notificatio ipsius Isidori respicit ipsum articulum, prout est ens *apud animam*; ideo dicit, ipsum esse *perceptionem divinae Veritatis*. — Tertia differentia est: quia, cum dupliciter contingat loqui de *fide*, videlicet de fide in sua *generalitate* et de fide *formata*, dupliciter etiam contingat articulum considerari: aut prout est obiectum *fidei generaliter*, aut prout est[^p528-3] *fidei formatae*; Richardus definit articulum, prout est obiectum *fidei generaliter*, et ideo dicit, quod est «arctans nos ad credendum»; Isidorus autem definit ipsum, prout est obiectum *fidei formatae*; et ideo dicit, quod est «perceptio veritatis tendens in Deum». Et quoniam fides formata respicit intellectum pariter et affectum[^p528-4], quia intellectum illuminat ad credendum et affectum excitat ad tendendum in Deum; hinc est, quod Isidorus definit articulum primo per comparationem ad actum *intellectus*, cum dicit: «Articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis»; *secundo* per comparationem ad actum affectus, cum subiungit: «tendens in ipsam». Et quia[^p528-5] ad utrumque actum comparatur in ratione *motivi*, hinc est, quod praedicta definitio intelligenda est dari secundum praedicationem causalem, ut sit sensus: «articulus est perceptio» etc., id est, articulus est illud quod illuminat nos ad divinam Veritatem percipiendam, et quod excitat nos ad tendendum in ipsam. Unde dicitur *perceptio tendens*, quia facit nos *percipere* et *tendere*, et movet nos ad *percipiendum* et *tendendum*. — Et per hoc patet responsio fere ad omnia quae obiiciuntur[^p528-6].

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod nulla veritas est sua perceptio; patet responsio: quia verum est *praedicatione essentiali*[^p528-7], sed non est verum *praedicatione causali*.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est perceptio et etiam visio gloriae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia illud dicitur *praedicatione formali*, sed illud dicitur *praedicatione causali*. Fides enim et visio est perceptio sicut *habitus perceptivus*; sed articulus est perceptio sicut *obiectum motivum* virtutis percipientis. — Posset etiam dici, quod sicut *intellectus* aliquando nominat *potentiam*, aliquando *habitum*, aliquando *actum*, aliquando *obiectum*, sicut manifestum est in diversis auctoritatibus[^p528-8]; sic et *perceptionis* nomen potest extendi ad *habitum*, *actum* et *obiectum*. Ideo aliter dicitur de fide, aliter de articulo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod articuli non tantum spectant ad veritatem, sed etiam ad bonitatem, nec tantum ad Veritatem divinam, sed etiam ad humanam; dicendum, quod etsi articulus concernat aliquo modo *bonum*, concernat etiam aliquid *creatum*, secundum illud tamen non habet rationem *motivi*, sed eo ipso, quod habet in se rationem *veri* et *Veri summi*, cui fides propter se et super omnia assentit. Et quia definitur hic *articulus*, in quantum est motivus ipsius fidei, ideo sufficit tangere hic in eius notificatione Veritatem divinam, a qua est tota et principalis ratio movendi[^p528-9].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tendentia, patet responsio: quia praedicatio illa *causaliter* est intelligenda. Articulus enim *terminando*[^p528-10] facit tendere; terminat enim in quantum *finis*, et movet in quantum *obiectum*; et ideo facit *tendere*.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fide malorum, dicendum, quod hic definitur articulus in comparatione ad fidem *formatam*, licet etiam fides malorum

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in Deum actu non tendat, tamen reddit quodam modo habilem ad tendendum, licet semiplene[^p529-1].

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio philosophorum erat perceptio cum tendentia; dicendum, quod non erat illa tendentia, quae est ex *fide*; nunquam enim per illam cognitionem poterant pervenire ad salutem; ideo, ut verius loquamur, potius *iacebant*, quam *tenderent*[^p529-2].

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unius unica est definitio; dicendum, quod verum est secundum unicam comparationem et considerationem; sed secundum quod aliquid multipliciter habet considerari, multipliciter habet notificari. Ideo Richardus et Isidorus diversimode notificaverunt, quia diversimode consideraverunt; diversitas autem eorum fuit quantum ad tria, sicut ostensum est supra[^p529-3].

---

english:
### Question II. *On the definition of the article which Isidore sets down.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the notification of Isidore[^p527-3], which is this: «An article is a perception of divine Truth tending into it.» Against the *first* part of the definition objection is made thus.

1. No truth is its own perception; but an article is divine Truth: therefore this is false: an article is a perception of divine Truth.

2. Likewise, faith is a perception of divine Truth[^p527-4]: therefore if an article is a perception of divine Truth, faith is an article.

3. Likewise, the vision of glory is a perception of divine Truth: therefore it seems that the vision of glory is an article of faith; which is simply absurd.

4. Likewise, in the articles there is expressed not only divine Truth, but also divine Goodness and the humanity of Christ: therefore it does not seem that the first member of the definition fits every article generally[^p527-5].

Against the *second* part of the definition objection is made thus.

5. Nothing which is divine Truth itself tends into divine Truth; but an article is divine Truth itself: therefore it is not tending into Truth itself.

6. Likewise, an article is common with respect to the faith of the good and of the wicked; but the wicked, although they perceive the first Truth, nevertheless do not tend into it[^p527-6]: therefore to tend into divine Truth is not common to every article.

7. Likewise, certain philosophers had a cognition of God with a certain love, therefore[^p527-7] they had at once a perception of divine Truth with a certain tending into it; and yet they had neither faith nor the articles of faith: therefore it does not seem that the aforesaid notification is rightly assigned to the article.

8. Likewise, since of one thing there is one definition[^p528-1], it seems that for the notification of the article the notification or definition of Richard suffices: therefore this one of Isidore is superfluous. — It is asked, then, what is the difference between the two.

### Conclusion.

> The definition of the article assigned by Isidore is fitting, insofar as it is of formed faith.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that this description differs in three [respects] from the description of Richard himself. For that description of Richard is, as it were, a certain *interpretation of the name*, but this one is a *real notification*. — Secondly it differs in this, that since *an article* can be considered in two ways: both as it is *in itself* and as it is *with respect to the soul*[^p528-2], the notification of Richard regards the article itself as it is *in itself*; the notification of Isidore regards the article itself as it is a being *with respect to the soul*; therefore he says that it is a *perception of divine Truth*. — The third difference is: that, since one can speak of *faith* in two ways, namely of faith in its *generality* and of *formed* faith, the article too can be considered in two ways: either as it is the object of *faith generally*, or as it is[^p528-3] [the object] *of formed faith*; Richard defines the article as it is the object of *faith generally*, and therefore says that it is «constraining us to believe»; but Isidore defines it as it is the object of *formed faith*; and therefore says that it is a «perception of truth tending into God.» And since formed faith regards alike the intellect and the affect[^p528-4], because it illuminates the intellect to believe and excites the affect to tend into God; hence it is that Isidore defines the article first by comparison to the act of the *intellect*, when he says: «An article is a perception of divine Truth»; *secondly* by comparison to the act of the affect, when he subjoins: «tending into it.» And since[^p528-5] it is compared to each act under the account of a *moving cause*, hence it is that the aforesaid definition is to be understood as given according to a *causal predication*, so that the sense is: «an article is a perception» etc., that is, an article is that which illuminates us to perceive divine Truth, and which excites us to tend into it. Hence it is called a *tending perception*, because it makes us *perceive* and *tend*, and moves us to *perceiving* and *tending*. — And by this the answer is evident to almost all the things which are objected[^p528-6].

1. For to that which is objected first, that no truth is its own perception; the answer is evident: because it is true by *essential predication*[^p528-7], but it is not true by *causal predication*.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that faith is a perception and also the vision of glory; it must be said that it is not similar: because that is said by *formal predication*, but this is said by *causal predication*. For faith and vision are perception as a *perceptive habit*; but an article is perception as a *moving object* of the perceiving power. — It could also be said that, just as *intellect* sometimes names a *potency*, sometimes a *habit*, sometimes an *act*, sometimes an *object*, as is manifest in various authorities[^p528-8]; so too the name of *perception* can be extended to *habit*, *act*, and *object*. Therefore it is said in one way of faith, in another of the article.

4. To that which is objected, that the articles regard not only truth, but also goodness, and not only divine Truth, but also human; it must be said that even if an article concerns in some way the *good*, and concerns also something *created*, nevertheless according to that it does not have the account of a *moving [cause]*, but by this very thing, that it has in itself the account of the *true* and of the *highest True*, to which faith assents for its own sake and above all things. And since *an article* is here defined insofar as it is moving of faith itself, therefore it suffices here in its notification to touch upon divine Truth, from which is the whole and principal ground of moving[^p528-9].

5. To that which is objected concerning the tending, the answer is evident: because that predication is to be understood *causally*. For an article *by terminating*[^p528-10] makes [one] tend; for it terminates insofar as it is an *end*, and moves insofar as it is an *object*; and therefore it makes [one] *tend*.

6. To that which is objected concerning the faith of the wicked, it must be said that here the article is defined in comparison to *formed* faith, although even the faith of the wicked,

though it does not actually tend into God, nevertheless renders [one] in a certain way fit for tending, although half-fully[^p529-1].

7. To that which is objected, that the cognition of the philosophers was a perception with a tending; it must be said that it was not that tending which is from *faith*; for never through that cognition could they attain to salvation; therefore, to speak more truly, they rather *lay prostrate* than *tended*[^p529-2].

8. To that which is objected, that of one [thing] there is one definition; it must be said that this is true according to a single comparison and consideration; but according as a thing can be considered in many ways, it can be notified in many ways. Therefore Richard and Isidore notified it in diverse ways, because they considered it in diverse ways; and their diversity was in three [respects], as has been shown above[^p529-3].

---

la: Auctorem definitionis hic allatae invenire nequivimus. Dum Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 69. m. 1. hanc articuli definitionem *Hugoni* tribuit, B. Albert., hic a. 1. ait: «*Isidorus* autem *dicitur* sic definire: Articulus est perceptio etc. Quidam etiam magistrorum *Hugoni* attribuunt istam: ‹Articulus est natura cum gratia›, quae tamen, ut proponitur, in libro suo non invenitur (sententialiter continetur, ut ipse B. Albert. in fine art. dicit, in I. de Sacram. p. X. c. 5.).» P. Nicolai in ed. Comment. S. Thomae in lib. Sent., hic d. 25. a. 1, observat: «Quod *Isidori* nomine subiungitur, ut et paulo post ex *Hugone*, apud neutrum occurrit». Si rem spectas, non verba, ista definitio insinuata videtur a *Praepositivo*, qui, ut ex nota 6. supra pag. 515 adiecta liquet, illi sententiae adhaerebat, quae vult, articulos fidei esse *credere nativitatem* etc. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 75. seq. Guliel. Paris., de Fide c. 2. ait: *Manifestum igitur est, certas esse et determinatas numero apprehensiones de his quae pertinent ad fundamentum religionis. Quare et ipsa apprehensa. Haec autem sunt quae vocantur articuli fidei.*

en: We were unable to find the author of the definition here adduced. While Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 69, m. 1, ascribes this definition of the article to *Hugh*, B. Albert, here a. 1, says: «*Isidore*, however, *is said* to define thus: An article is a perception, etc. Certain of the masters also attribute this one to *Hugh*: ‹An article is nature with grace›, which, however, as it is set forth, is not found in his book (it is contained as to its sense, as B. Albert himself says at the end of the article, in I, *de Sacramentis* p. X, c. 5).» P. Nicolai, in his edition of the *Commentary* of St. Thomas on the *Sentences*, here d. 25, a. 1, observes: «What is subjoined under the name of *Isidore*, as also a little after from *Hugh*, occurs in neither.» If you regard the matter, not the words, this definition seems to have been suggested by *Praepositinus*, who, as is clear from note 6 added above on p. 515, adhered to that opinion which holds that the articles of faith are *to believe the nativity*, etc. Cf. Anselm, *Monologion* c. 75 f. William of Paris, *de Fide* c. 2, says: *It is therefore manifest that there are certain apprehensions, determinate in number, concerning those things which pertain to the foundation of religion. Wherefore the things apprehended themselves [are so]. And these are what are called the articles of faith.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Codd. A K *naturaliter*.

en: Codices A K [read] *naturally*.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 4, et Comment. a. 2. q. 1. ac dub. 3. — Pro *primam veritatem* cod. U *divinam veritatem*.

en: See above, the Master's text, d. XXIII, c. 4, and the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 3. — For *first truth* codex U [reads] *divine truth*.

la: Edd. *ergo si*.

en: The editions [read] *therefore if*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 501, nota 2. — De definitione articuli a Richardo data vide quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. above, p. 501, note 2. — On the definition of the article given by Richard, see the preceding question.

la: De duplici consideratione *entis*, prout est in anima (mente seu ratione) et extra animam, cfr. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.) — Pro *prout est* [codd. K Z subdunt *ens*] *in se* complures codd. *prout est in re*, Vat. hic et paulo post *prout est in se et in re*.

en: On the twofold consideration of *being*, as it is in the soul (mind or reason) and outside the soul, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, text 8 (V, c. 4). — For *as it is* [codices K Z subjoin *being*] *in itself* several codices [read] *as it is in the thing*, the Vatican [edition] here and a little after [reads] *as it is in itself and in the thing*.

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. repetunt *obiectum*. Paulo superius pro *etiam contingat* edd. *etiam contingit*.

en: The editions, with some codices, repeat *object*. A little above, for *also can it [be]* the editions [read] *also it does [happen]*.

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — Subinde pro *quia intellectum* edd. *et intellectum*.

en: See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — Thereupon, for *because the intellect* the editions [read] *and the intellect*.

la: Simul audi: *articulus*, vel etiam *Veritas divina*. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. — De praedicatione causali August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34. dicit: *Talibus locutionibus etiam abundat nostra consuetudo, cum dicimus laetum diem, quia nos laetos facit, et pigrum frigus, quia nos pigros facit* etc.

en: Understand together: *the article*, or also *divine Truth*. Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, in the body and ad 1. — On causal predication Augustine, I. *de Genesi contra Manichaeos* c. 22, n. 34, says: *Our usage also abounds in such locutions, as when we say a glad day, because it makes us glad, and a sluggish cold, because it makes us sluggish*, etc.

la: Complures codd. et edd. *abunde ad omnia obiecta, quae obiiciuntur*, nonnulli codd. *ad omnia obiecta tantum*.

en: Several codices and editions [read] *abundantly to all the objections which are objected*, some codices [read] *only to all the objections*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 171, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 171, note 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 214, nota 1.

en: See above, p. 214, note 1.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Codd. G I L V omittunt *movendi*, cui verbo cod. N adiicit *vel credendi*. Edd. 1, 2 pro *movendi* substituerunt *fidei*, Vat. *fidei, et credendi*.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2. — Codices G I L V omit *of moving*, to which word codex N adds *or of believing*. Editions 1, 2 substitute *of faith* for *of moving*, the Vatican [edition reads] *of faith, and of believing*.

la: Codd. A K *determinando*, et subinde cod. A etiam *determinat* pro *terminat*.

en: Codices A K [read] *by determining*, and thereupon codex A also [reads] *determines* for *terminates*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Cfr. Rom. 1, 21. seqq. — Edd. *tendebant*.

en: Cf. Romans 1, 21 ff. — The editions [read] *they were tending*.

la: Hic in corp. quaest. — In initio solut. pro *quod unius* edd. cum aliquot codd. *quod unius rei*. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Here in the body of the question. — At the beginning of the solution, for *that of one* the editions, with several codices, [read] *that of one thing*. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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**Page-split map.**
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**No scholion.** This question carries no scholion of its own. The printed two-section SCHOLION on p.527 between a3-q1's ad-7/8 and this QUAESTIO II (§I = the three definitions Richard/Isidore/Hugh + Thomas's Greek-vs-Latin *articulus* etymology; §II bibliographic *De hac et seq. quaestione*) belongs to a3-q1 and **explicitly covers both questions** ("seq. quaestione"). The redirect is confirmed in this chunk's apparatus footnote `[^p529-3]`: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 24, Dubia

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 529 -->

# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Haec est laus fidei, si quod creditur non videtur. Sed contra:* carere lumine potius est ad vituperium quam ad laudem, secundum illud Psalmi[^p529-4]: *Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est* etc.: ergo videtur, quod privatio visionis potius reddat fidem vituperabilem quam commendabilem. — Item, si in hoc consistit laus fidei, quia credit quod non videt; cum in gloria nihil credatur, nisi illud quod videtur, videtur, quod laudabilior sit fides in via, quam gloria in patria[^p529-5], quod absurdum est dicere. — Item, si in hoc consistit laus fidei, quia credit quod non videt; sed omnis, qui stulte et falso credit, credit quod non videt: ergo qui stulte credit, laudandus est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod privatio visionis facit ad laudem credulitatis, praesupposita tamen rectitudine in ipsa credulitate; et hoc ex duplici causa: primo, propter humiliationem et captivationem intellectus, quae admodum est laudanda, sicut superbia intellectus admodum est vituperanda; secundo, quia talis credulitas est a mera voluntate, non ab aliqua necessitate. Nullus enim cogitur credere quod non videt; et quia laus et vituperium consistunt circa opera voluntaria: hinc est, quod Augustinus[^p529-6] dicit, quod laus fidei est credere quod non vides: non propter privationem visionis tantum, sed propter positionem humilitatis et libertatis: humilitatis ex parte intellectus, et libertatis ex parte voluntatis. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur primo.

Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo de gloria, similiter patet responsio: quia[^p529-7] Augustinus non loquitur de laude quacumque, sed de laude *meriti*; et haec laus est in statu viae, non patriae, et circa actus viae, non circa actus patriae. — Similiter patet ultimum: quia hoc non dicitur de quacumque credulitate, sed de credulitate *recta* et *vera*, non *stulta* et *falsa*[^p529-8].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Cum fides sit ex auditu non modo exteriori, sed etiam interiori.* Videtur enim hoc inconvenienter dici, quia, cum sensus visus plurimas rerum differentias nobis ostendat et nobilior sit[^p529-9], videtur, quod magis fides debeat esse ex visu quam ex auditu. — Item, fides Apostolorum fuit ex visu ita, sicut ex auditu: ergo si omnis fides subsequentium derivata fuit a fide Apostolorum, videtur, quod magis debeat dici ex visu quam ex auditu. — Item, cum fides sit habitus infusus, videtur, quod nullo modo habeat ex auditu esse.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p529-10], dupliciter contingit aliquid addiscere, videlicet per inventionem et per doctrinam. Et sensus quidem visus maxime deservit illi modo addiscendi, qui est per inventionem; sensus vero auditus illi modo, qui est per doctrinam. Quoniam igitur ea quae fide novimus, non cognoscimus per inventionem, sed magis per doctrinam, per doctrinam, inquam, non solum praedicatoris loquentis per aurem corporis, sed etiam Spiritus sancti loquentis per aurem cordis; hinc est, quod in littera dicitur, quod fides non tantum est ex auditu exteriori, sed etiam interiori. Et quamvis Apostoli multa didicerint videndo Christum, multo tamen plura didicerunt audiendo ipsum qui[^p529-11] loqueretur exterius, et qui lo-

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queretur eis interius per Spiritum sanctum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum obiectum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod fides est per infusionem, non per auditum; dicendum, quod fides quantum ad suum *formale* per infusionem est, sed quantum ad *materiale*, videlicet quoad notitiam illam, qua cognoscitur, « quid est quod per nomen dicitur[^p530-1] », est per auditum, ita quod unum est per auditum cordis, et aliud per auditum corporis. Ideo generaliter dicit Apostolus, fidem ex auditu esse, magis principaliter ratione auditus interioris quam exterioris. Et sic dicit Gregorius[^p530-2], quod in vanum laborat sermo praedicatoris, nisi adsit illustratio doctoris interioris.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Alia sunt quae, nisi intelligamus, non credimus; alia quae, nisi credamus, non intelligimus.* Primo videtur, quod ista divisio sit insufficiens, quoniam ipse Augustinus in originali[^p530-3] addit tertium membrum, videlicet quod « quaedam sunt, quae creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur » : ergo videtur Magister insufficienter ponere divisionem credibilium. — Item, videtur implicare falsum, quod quaedam sunt, quae prius creduntur, quam intelligantur. Si enim « credere est cogitare cum assensione[^p530-4] », et cogitare est intelligere; videtur, quod omne credere praecedat intelligere. Si tu dicas, quod Augustinus intelligit de intellectu, qui innititur rationi; tunc videtur, quod falsum dicat, quod quaedam sunt, quae prius intelliguntur, quam credantur, quia dicitur Isaiae septimo[^p530-5] secundum aliam translationem: *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis:* ergo illud *intelligere* semper sequitur ipsum *credere*.

Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur, quae sunt illa credibilia, de quibus dicit Augustinus, quod « creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur », cum videamus, quod omnia credibilia per rationes satis probabiles affirmentur[^p530-6].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *intelligere* dicitur dupliciter, secundum quod Magister innuit in littera[^p530-7]. Uno modo *intelligere* dicitur large *nosse*, « quid est quod dicitur per nomen » ; et illud *intelligere* semper praecedit assensum fidei, nec aliquid creditur, quin isto modo prius intelligatur. Alio modo *intelligere*, hoc est ratione praevia cogitare; iuxta quod dicit Augustinus[^p530-8]: « Quod intelligimus, debemus rationi; quod credimus, auctoritati ». Et de isto intelligit Augustinus, cum dicit, quod quaedam sunt, quae prius creduntur et postea intelliguntur, sicut sunt articuli fidei, qui sunt supra rationem. Quaedam sunt, quae non prius creduntur, quam intelligantur, sicut sunt antecedentia ad fidem, et ea quae sunt de dictamine iuris naturalis, sicut Deum esse, Deum esse bonum. Quaedam sunt, quae creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur, quia non possunt ratione probari, « sicut est historia, humana gesta percurrens[^p530-9] ». Nemo enim probare potest per rationem, quod Abraham genuit Isaac, sed solum per auctoritatem. — Et sic patet, quod *intelligere* aliquando praecedit fidem, aliquando sequitur secundum istum modum accipiendi[^p530-10], quamvis secundum primum semper praecedat.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia quaesita. Nam quod primo obiicitur de insufficientia divisionis, dicendum, quod Magister non intendit hic dividere credibilia, sed ostendere, quomodo fides et intellectus circa idem possunt se compati, et qualiter circa idem habeant ordinari. — Ad aliud similiter patet responsio, quia procedit de *intelligere*, secundum quod primo modo accipitur. — Ultimum similiter patet[^p530-11].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quid est Deum scire, nisi eum mente conspicere firmiterque percipere?* Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia aut loquitur de conspectu mentis, qui est per *speciem*, aut de eo qui est per *speculum* et *in aenigmate*[^p530-12]. Si de eo qui est per *speculum*, videtur falsum, quia hoc non est *scire*, sed potius *credere*. Si de eo qui est per *speciem*, hoc videtur similiter falsum, quia tunc

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non sciretur Deus nisi in patria; Damascenus[^p531-1] autem dicit, quod cognitio existendi Deum omnibus est inserta. — Item dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate Dei[^p531-2], quod « quidquid scitur, scientis comprehensione finitur » : ergo si Deus nullo modo scientis comprehensione finitur, videtur, quod nullo modo possit sciri. — Item Dionysius[^p531-3] dicit, secundum illud Psalmi, quod *Deus posuit tenebras latibulum suum:* igitur videtur impossibile Deum mente conspicere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus hic loquitur de cognitione *experimentali*, quam quis habet de Deo sive in *patria*, sive in *via*: in patria quidem perfecte, sed in via imperfecte; neutra tamen habetur nisi a mundis corde. Unde haec scientia *sapientia* est, quia secum habet iunctum saporem; et per hanc illuminatur intellectus, et stabilitur affectus[^p531-4]. Et ideo dicit, quod Deum scire non est aliud quam *mente conspicere firmiterque percipere*.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non potest intelligi de cognitione viae nec de cognitione patriae[^p531-5]; dicendum, quod immo de cognitione viae intelligi potest. — Sed cognitio viae multos habet gradus. Cognoscitur enim Deus in *vestigio*, cognoscitur in *imagine*, cognoscitur et in *effectu gratiae*, cognoscitur etiam per *intimam unionem* Dei et animae, iuxta quod dicit Apostolus[^p531-6]: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est.* Et haec est cognitio excellentissima, quam docet Dionysius, quae quidem est in ecstatico amore et elevat supra cognitionem fidei secundum statum communem; et de hac intelligit hic Augustinus et Magister.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *scire* est *comprehendere*; dicendum, quod Augustinus definit ibi *scire*, secundum quod competit Deo: et Deus, quidquid scit, scit scientia comprehensionis, quia totam rem plene cognoscit; hoc autem modo non scitur Deus a nobis[^p531-7].

Ad illud Dionysii similiter patet responsio, quia vult dicere, quod Deus non conspiciatur in via in claritate suae essentiae, sed quod conspicitur in effectu gratiae et experientia suavitatis suae per ipsam anagogicam unitionem[^p531-8].

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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: *This is the praise of faith, if what is believed is not seen. But on the contrary:* to lack light is rather for blame than for praise, according to that verse of the Psalm[^p529-4]: *Man, when he was in honor, did not understand, he was compared* etc.: therefore it seems that the privation of vision rather renders faith blameworthy than commendable. — Likewise, if the praise of faith consists in this, that it believes what it does not see; since in glory nothing is believed except that which is seen, it seems that faith in the way is more praiseworthy than glory in the fatherland[^p529-5], which is absurd to say. — Likewise, if the praise of faith consists in this, that it believes what it does not see; but everyone who believes foolishly and falsely believes what he does not see: therefore he who believes foolishly is to be praised.

**I respond:** It must be said that the privation of vision contributes to the praise of belief, presupposing nevertheless rectitude in the belief itself; and this for a twofold cause: first, on account of the humiliation and captivation of the intellect, which is very much to be praised, as the pride of the intellect is very much to be blamed; secondly, because such belief is from mere will, not from any necessity. For no one is compelled to believe what he does not see; and because praise and blame consist about voluntary works: hence it is that Augustine[^p529-6] says that the praise of faith is to believe what you do not see: not on account of the privation of vision alone, but on account of the positing of humility and of liberty: of humility on the part of the intellect, and of liberty on the part of the will. — And through this the response to that which is objected first is clear.

To that which is objected secondly concerning glory, the response is likewise clear: because[^p529-7] Augustine does not speak of praise of any kind whatever, but of the praise of *merit*; and this praise is in the state of the way, not of the fatherland, and concerning the acts of the way, not concerning the acts of the fatherland. — Likewise the last point is clear: because this is not said of any belief whatever, but of belief that is *right* and *true*, not *foolish* and *false*[^p529-8].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Since faith is from hearing, not only exterior, but also interior.* For this seems to be said unfittingly, because, since the sense of sight shows us very many differences of things and is nobler[^p529-9], it seems that faith ought rather to be from sight than from hearing. — Likewise, the faith of the Apostles was from sight just as from hearing: therefore if all the faith of those who came after was derived from the faith of the Apostles, it seems that it ought rather to be said to be from sight than from hearing. — Likewise, since faith is an infused habit, it seems that in no way does it have being from hearing.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Philosopher says[^p529-10], a thing happens to be learned in two ways, namely by discovery and by teaching. And the sense of sight indeed serves most that mode of learning which is by discovery; but the sense of hearing serves that mode which is by teaching. Since, therefore, those things which we know by faith we do not know by discovery, but rather by teaching — by teaching, I say, not only of the preacher speaking through the ear of the body, but also of the Holy Spirit speaking through the ear of the heart; hence it is that in the text it is said that faith is not only from exterior hearing, but also interior. And although the Apostles learned much by seeing Christ, nevertheless they learned far more by hearing him who[^p529-11] would speak exteriorly, and who would

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speak to them interiorly through the Holy Spirit. — And through this the response to the first and second objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that faith is by infusion, not by hearing; it must be said that faith with respect to its *formal* element is by infusion, but with respect to its *material* element, namely as to that knowledge by which it is known « what it is that is said by the name[^p530-1] », it is by hearing, so that the one is by the hearing of the heart, and the other by the hearing of the body. Therefore the Apostle says generally that faith is from hearing, more principally by reason of interior hearing than exterior. And thus Gregory says[^p530-2] that the discourse of the preacher labors in vain, unless the illumination of the interior teacher is present.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Some things are such that, unless we understand them, we do not believe them; others such that, unless we believe, we do not understand.* First it seems that this division is insufficient, since Augustine himself in the original[^p530-3] adds a third member, namely that « some things are believed and never understood » : therefore it seems that the Master sets down the division of credible things insufficiently. — Likewise, it seems to imply something false, that there are certain things which are first believed before they are understood. For if « to believe is to think with assent[^p530-4] », and to think is to understand; it seems that all believing precedes understanding. If you say that Augustine understands it of the understanding which relies on reason; then it seems that he says something false, that there are certain things which are first understood before they are believed, because it is said in the seventh chapter of Isaiah[^p530-5] according to another translation: *Unless you believe, you will not understand:* therefore that *understanding* always follows the *believing* itself.

In connection with this it is also asked, what are those credible things of which Augustine says that they « are believed and never understood », since we see that all credible things are affirmed by sufficiently probable reasons[^p530-6].

**I respond:** It must be said that *to understand* is spoken of in two ways, according as the Master hints in the text[^p530-7]. In one way *to understand* is said broadly *to know* « what it is that is said by the name » ; and that *understanding* always precedes the assent of faith, nor is anything believed which is not in this way first understood. In another way *to understand* is to think with a prior reasoning; according to which Augustine says[^p530-8]: « What we understand we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority ». And of this Augustine understands, when he says that there are certain things which are first believed and afterward understood, as are the articles of faith, which are above reason. There are certain things which are not first believed before they are understood, as are the things antecedent to faith, and those things which are of the dictate of natural law, as that God exists, that God is good. There are certain things which are believed and never understood, because they cannot be proved by reason, « as is history, running through human deeds[^p530-9] ». For no one can prove by reason that Abraham begot Isaac, but only by authority. — And thus it is clear that *to understand* sometimes precedes faith, sometimes follows, according to that mode of taking it[^p530-10], although according to the first it always precedes.

And through this the response to all that was asked is clear. For as to what is objected first concerning the insufficiency of the division, it must be said that the Master does not intend here to divide credible things, but to show how faith and understanding can stand together about the same thing, and how about the same thing they are ordered. — To the other [objection] the response is likewise clear, because it proceeds concerning *to understand* according as it is taken in the first way. — The last point is likewise clear[^p530-11].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *What is it to know God, except to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly?* For this seems to be false, because either he speaks of the gaze of the mind which is through *species*, or of that which is through *a mirror* and *in an enigma*[^p530-12]. If of that which is through *a mirror*, it seems false, because this is not *to know*, but rather *to believe*. If of that which is through *species*, this seems likewise false, because then

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God would not be known except in the fatherland; but the Damascene[^p531-1] says that the knowledge of God's existing is implanted in all. — Likewise Augustine says, in the twelfth book of *On the City of God*[^p531-2], that « whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower » : therefore if God is in no way bounded by the comprehension of the knower, it seems that in no way can he be known. — Likewise Dionysius[^p531-3] says, according to that verse of the Psalm, that *God set darkness as his hiding-place:* therefore it seems impossible to behold God with the mind.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine here speaks of *experiential* cognition, which one has of God whether in the *fatherland* or in the *way*: in the fatherland indeed perfectly, but in the way imperfectly; yet neither is had except by the clean of heart. Hence this knowledge is *wisdom*, because it has joined with it a savor; and through this the intellect is illumined, and the affection is made stable[^p531-4]. And therefore he says that *to know* God is nothing other than *to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly*.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that it cannot be understood of the cognition of the way nor of the cognition of the fatherland[^p531-5]; it must be said that, on the contrary, it can be understood of the cognition of the way. — But the cognition of the way has many grades. For God is known in his *vestige*, he is known in his *image*, he is known also in the *effect of grace*, he is known too through the *intimate union* of God and the soul, according to what the Apostle says[^p531-6]: *He who cleaves to God is one spirit.* And this is the most excellent cognition, which Dionysius teaches, which indeed is in ecstatic love and elevates above the cognition of faith according to the common state; and of this Augustine and the Master here understand.

To that which is objected, that *to know* is *to comprehend*; it must be said that Augustine there defines *to know* according as it befits God: and God, whatever he knows, knows by the knowledge of comprehension, because he knows the whole thing fully; but in this manner God is not known by us[^p531-7].

To that of Dionysius the response is likewise clear, because he means to say that God is not beheld in the way in the clarity of his essence, but that he is beheld in the effect of grace and in the experience of his sweetness through the anagogical union itself[^p531-8].

la: Cod. aa *quam in gloria et in patria.*

en: Codex aa reads *quam in gloria et in patria* [than in glory and in the fatherland].

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 79. n. 1, unde et textus huius dubii sumtus est. — De duplici causa, ex qua privatio visionis facit ad laudem credulitatis, cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius pro *positionem* codd. A K (N a prima manu) U X Y aa *rationem.*

en: On the Gospel of John, tract 79, n. 1, whence also the text of this doubt is taken. — On the twofold cause from which the privation of vision contributes to the praise of belief, cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 f. — A little below, in place of *positionem* codices A K (N by the first hand) U X Y aa read *rationem.*

la: Codd. A K *nam.*

en: Codices A K read *nam* [for].

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. n. 6.

en: Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, n. 6.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 162, (III. c. 3.), de Sensu et sens. c. 1, I. Metaph. c. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *derivata fuit* codd. A K *derivata sit.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 162 (III, c. 3), *On Sense and the Sensible* c. 1, *Metaphysics* I, c. 1. — A little below, in place of *derivata fuit* codices A K read *derivata sit.*

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 8. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 206, nota 2. Quod sensus visus maxime deservit ad addiscendum per inventionem, insinuat Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 1, et I. Metaph. c. 1. — Pro verbo *addiscere* edd. hic et inferius substituerunt verbum *scire.*

en: Book III of *On the Soul*, text 8 (c. 4). Cf. vol. II, p. 206, note 2. That the sense of sight serves most for learning by discovery, Aristotle suggests, *On Sense and the Sensible* c. 1, and *Metaphysics* I, c. 1. — In place of the word *addiscere* [to learn] the editions, here and below, substitute the word *scire* [to know].

la: Hic et proxime post pro *qui* codd. A X exhibent *quid.*

en: Here and immediately after, in place of *qui* codices A X present *quid.*

la: De his verbis Aristot. cfr. supra pag. 491, nota 4. — Paulo superius post *per infusionem est* edd. subiungunt *non per auditum.* Inferius respicitur Rom. 10, 17.

en: On these words of Aristotle cf. above p. 491, note 4. — A little above, after *per infusionem est* the editions add *non per auditum* [not by hearing]. Below, Romans 10:17 is referred to.

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 3: Nisi idem Spiritus cordi adsit audientis, otiosus est sermo doctoris. Nemo ergo docenti homini tribuat quod ex ore docentis intelligit, quia, nisi intus sit qui doceat, doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborat. Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Book II of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 30, n. 3: Unless the same Spirit be present to the heart of the hearer, the discourse of the teacher is idle. Let no one, therefore, attribute to the man teaching what he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because, unless he who teaches be within, the tongue of the teacher labors exteriorly in vain. Cf. above p. 474, note 2. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 12; St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: B. Albert., hic a. 10: « Quia [ab Augustino] in originali, scilicet in libro 83 Qq. (q. 48.), ponitur adhuc unum credibile » etc. In textu originali legitur: Alia sunt quae semper creduntur etc.

en: Blessed Albert, here a. 10: « Because [by Augustine] in the original, namely in the book of 83 Questions (q. 48), there is set down yet one more credible thing » etc. In the original text is read: There are other things which are always believed, etc.

la: August., de Praedest. Sanct. c. 2. n. 5. Sicut supra, pag. 474, nota 1, ita et hic pro *assensione* multi codd. exhibent *assertione.* — Paulo superius pro *falsum, quod* Vat. perperam *falsum, quoniam* [edd. 1, 2 *quia*].

en: Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 2, n. 5. As above, p. 474, note 1, so here too in place of *assensione* many codices present *assertione.* — A little above, in place of *falsum, quod* the Vatican edition wrongly reads *falsum, quoniam* [editions 1, 2 *quia*].

la: Vers. 9; verba sunt secundum translationem factam a Septuaginta interpretibus. In Vulgata legitur: Si non credideritis, non permanebitis.

en: Verse 9; the words are according to the translation made by the Septuagint translators. In the Vulgate is read: Unless you believe, you will not remain.

la: Codd. K N W aa *asseruntur*; codd. A G T V *afferuntur*; nonnulli codd. *afferantur.*

en: Codices K N W aa read *asseruntur* [are asserted]; codices A G T V *afferuntur* [are brought forward]; some codices *afferantur.*

la: Hic c. 3. — De definitione nominali cfr. supra pag. 491, nota 4. Cfr. August., de Praedest. Sanct. c. 2. n. 5.

en: Here c. 3. — On the nominal definition cf. above p. 491, note 4. Cf. Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 2, n. 5.

la: De Utilitate credendi, c. 11. n. 25, et I. Retract. c. 14. n. 3. — Post *Alio modo* cod. Z supplet *dicitur.* Subinde pro *cogitare* codd. A K N aa bb *cognoscere.*

en: *On the Usefulness of Believing*, c. 11, n. 25, and I *Retractations*, c. 14, n. 3. — After *Alio modo* codex Z supplies *dicitur.* Thereupon, in place of *cogitare* codices A K N aa bb read *cognoscere.*

la: August., 83. Qq. q. 48: Sicut est omnis historia, temporalia et humana gesta percurrens.

en: Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 48: As is all history, running through temporal and human deeds.

la: Scil. quatenus importat ratione praevia cogitare.

en: Namely, insofar as it implies thinking with a prior reasoning.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 6; Blessed Albert, here a. 10; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12, ubi Vulgata et codd. Z bb post *per speculum* omittunt *et.*

en: 1 Cor. 13:12, where the Vulgate and codices Z bb omit *et* [and] after *per speculum* [through a mirror].

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 1. et 3. — Pro *inserta* edd. 1, 2 *incerta*, Vat. *certa.*

en: Book I of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 1 and 3. — In place of *inserta* [implanted] editions 1, 2 read *incerta* [uncertain], the Vatican edition *certa* [certain].

la: Cap. 18. Vide supra pag. 299, nota 8.

en: Chapter 18. See above p. 299, note 8.

la: De Mystica Theolog. c. 1. § 2. Sententia Davidica, quae affertur, habetur Ps. 17, 12.

en: *On Mystical Theology* c. 1, § 2. The Davidic statement which is brought forward is had in Psalm 17:12.

la: Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 1; I. Sent. prooem. q. 3. et d. 2. dub. 2. — Paulo superius post *sed in via* non pauci codd. incongrue subiiciunt *quidem*, cod. bb *autem.*

en: Cf. below, d. 35, q. 1; I *Sentences*, prooem. q. 3, and d. 2, doubt 2. — A little above, after *sed in via* not a few codices incongruously add *quidem*, codex bb *autem.*

la: Edd. *intelligi nec cognitione viae nec patriae.*

en: The editions read *intelligi nec cognitione viae nec patriae* [understood neither by the cognition of the way nor of the fatherland].

la: Epist. I. Cor. 6, 17. — De diversis gradibus cognitionis viae cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. et q. 3; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. et ad 6, nec non illud S. Bonav. opusc., quod intitulatur Itinerarium mentis in Deum, ubi isti diversi gradus miro modo explicantur, simulque (in ult. cap.) secundum Dionysium (de Mystica Theolog. c. 1; cfr. de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 13.) excessus mentalis et mysticus describitur.

en: 1 Cor. 6:17. — On the diverse grades of the cognition of the way cf. I *Sentences*, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, to 4, and q. 3; II *Sentences*, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, in the body and to 6, and also that little work of St. Bonaventure entitled *The Soul's Journey into God*, where these diverse grades are wonderfully explained, and at the same time (in the last chapter), according to Dionysius (*On Mystical Theology* c. 1; cf. *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 13), the mental and mystical excess is described.

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 1. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro *totam rem* cod. C *totum esse*, Vat. *totam rationem.*

en: Cf. above, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2, and I *Sentences*, d. 3, p. I, q. 1, to 1. — A little before, in place of *totam rem* codex C reads *totum esse*, the Vatican edition *totam rationem.*

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 543, nota 5. et pag. 546, nota 6. nec non Itinerar. mentis in Deum, c. 1. et 7. — In hac ultima propos. codd. minus recte particulam *non*, e loco suo ante *conspicitur* sublatam, transposuerunt ante *vult dicere* (quibus verbis nonnulli codd. adiungunt *Dionysius*, plurimi codd. perperam *Augustinus*). Deinde in Vat. legitur sic: *sed non vult dicere, quod non conspiciatur in effectu gratiae et experientia suavitatis suae per ipsam unionem.* — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 11.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 543, note 5, and p. 546, note 6, and also *The Soul's Journey into God*, c. 1 and 7. — In this last proposition the codices, less correctly, removing the particle *non* from its place before *conspicitur*, transposed it before *vult dicere* (to which words some codices add *Dionysius*, very many codices wrongly *Augustinus*). Then in the Vatican edition it is read thus: *but he does not mean to say that he is not beheld in the effect of grace and in the experience of his own sweetness through the union itself.* — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 11.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw lines 36764–36935) and collated column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{529,530,531}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (PDF pp.551–553; `pdf = printed + 22`). The IA OCR is high quality for clean running prose; the PDF was authoritative for the cascade-fragmented Respondeo bands and for all footer bands. English is a fresh literal translation per the CLAUDE.md formula/terminology tables. `type: dubia`, so **no scholion** (`has_scholion: false`).

**Dubia count — FOUR (Dub. I–IV), confirmed against PDF.** Hand-off forecast four; verified on the page. OCR garbled the markers (`Dun. I` = Dub. I, `Dun. II` = Dub. II; `Dub. III`/`Dub. IV` ungarbled in body; header `DURIA CIRCA UTTERAM MAC.ISTRI` = DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI). Lemmas (each "quaeritur de hoc quod dicit…"):
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- **Dub. III** (raw 36846, p.530): *Alia sunt quae, nisi intelligamus, non credimus; alia quae, nisi credamus, non intelligimus* — sufficiency of Augustine's division of credible things; *intelligere* taken broadly (= nosse) vs strictly (= ratione praevia cogitare).
- **Dub. IV** (raw 36864, p.530→531): *Quid est Deum scire, nisi eum mente conspicere firmiterque percipere?* — the *cognitio experimentalis* of God in via/in patria; contains a *quaestio incidens* on the credibilia; God known in vestigio/imagine/effectu gratiae and per anagogicam unitionem (Dionysian ecstatic love).

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25

title_alt: Distinctio XXV — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXV — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXV.

### Cap. I. *De fide antiquorum.*

Praedictis adiiciendum est de sufficientia fidei ad salutem. Illis[^p531-1] qui praecesserunt adventum Christi, et qui sequuntur, videtur profecisse fides secundum temporis processum, sicut profecit cognitio. Fides quippe magna dicitur cognitione et articulorum quantitate, vel constantia et devotione. Est autem quaedam fidei mensura, sine qua nunquam potuit esse salus. Unde Apostolus[^p531-2]: *Oportet, accedentem ad Deum credere, quia est, et quod remunerator est sperantium in se.* Sed quaeritur, utrum hoc credere ante adventum, vel ante Legem ad salutem suffecerit. Nam tempore gratiae constat certissime hoc non sufficere; oportet enim universa credi, quae in Symbolo continentur. Sed nec ante adventum nec ante Legem videtur hoc suffecisse, quia sine fide Mediatoris nullum hominem, vel ante, vel post fuisse salvum, Sanctorum auctoritates contestantur. Unde Augustinus ad Optatum[^p531-3]: «Illa fides sana est, qua credimus, nullum hominem, sive maioris sive parvulae aetatis, liberari a contagione mortis et obligatione peccati, quod prima nativitate contraxit, nisi per unum mediatorem Dei et hominum, Iesum Christum; cuius hominis eiusdemque Dei saluberrima fide etiam illi iusti salvi facti sunt, qui, priusquam veniret in carnem, crediderunt in carnem venturum. Eadem enim fides est et nostra et illorum». «Proinde, cum omnes iusti, sive ante incarnationem sive post, nec vixerint nec vivant nisi ex fide incarnationis Christi; profecto quod scriptum est, *non esse aliud nomen sub caelo, in quo oporteat salvari nos*, ex illo tempore valet ad salvandum genus humanum, ex quo in Adam vitiatum est».

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Idem[^p532-1]: «Nemo liberatur a damnatione, quae facta est per Adam, nisi per fidem Iesu Christi». Idem: «Eadem fides Mediatoris, quae nos salvat, salvos iustos faciebat antiquos, pusillos cum magnis, quia, sicut credimus, Christum in carne venisse, ita illi venturum; et sicut nos mortuum, ita illi moriturum; et sicut nos resurrexisse, ita illi resurrecturum; et nos et illi, ad iudicium vivorum et mortuorum venturum». Gregorius super Ezechielem[^p532-2]: «Et qui praeibant et qui sequebantur clamabant dicentes: *Hosanna filio David* etc., quia omnes electi, qui in Iudaea esse potuerunt, sive qui nunc in Ecclesia sunt, in Mediatorem Dei et hominum crediderunt et credunt». — His aliisque pluribus testimoniis perspicue docetur, nulli unquam salutem esse factam nisi per fidem Mediatoris. *Oportet ergo, accedentem ad Deum credere* quae supra dixit Apostolus, sed non sufficit.

### Cap. II. *De fide simplicium.*

Quid ergo dicetur de illis simplicibus, quibus non erat revelatum mysterium incarnationis, qui pie credebant quod eis traditum fuit? — Dici potest, nullum fuisse iustum vel salvum, cui non esset facta revelatio vel distincta, vel velata, vel in aperto, vel in mysterio: distincta, ut Abrahae vel Moysi[^p532-3] aliisque maioribus, qui distinctionem articulorum fidei habebant; velata, ut simplicibus, quibus revelatum erat, ea esse credenda, quae credebant illi maiores et docebant, sed eorum distinctionem apertam non habebant. Sicut et in Ecclesia aliqui minus capaces sunt, qui articulos Symboli distinguere et assignare non valent, omnia tamen credunt, quae in Symbolo continentur; credunt enim quae ignorant, habentes fidem velatam in mysterio: ita et tunc minus capaces ex revelatione sibi facta maioribus credendo inhaerebant, quibus fidem suam quasi committebant. Unde Iob[^p532-4]: *Boves arabant, et asinae pascebantur iuxta eos.* Simplices et minores sunt asinae pascentes iuxta boves, quia, humilitate maioribus adhaerendo, in mysterio credebant quae et illi in mysterio docebant, qualis forte fuit vidua Sareptana.

### Cap. III. *Quae ante adventum credere sufficiebat.*

Sed quaeritur, cum sine fide Mediatoris antiquis non fuerit salus, sicut nec modernis, utrum oportuerit illos credere omnia illa de Mediatore, quae nunc credimus. — Quibusdam videtur, quod suffecerit illis quatuor tantum credere, scilicet nativitatem, mortem, resurrectionem et adventum ad iudicium; quod ex praemissis verbis Augustini colligunt, ubi ista quatuor posuit. — Aliis autem videtur, habita fide Trinitatis, id de mysterio incarnationis fidei suffecisse, ut Dei Filius crederetur nasciturus de homine et iudicaturus; qui de Ioanne Baptista documentum huius rei assumunt, qui de morte Christi et descensu ad inferos in Evangelio dubitasse videtur, secundum expositionem Gregorii[^p532-5], quando interrogavit per discipulos: «*Tu es, qui venturus es, an alium exspectamus?* quasi: Es tu per te ipsum descensurus ad infernum, an alium ad haec sacramenta missurus es»? — Quidam tamen dicunt, eum non dubitasse de ignorantia, sed de pietate, id est, dubitare se ostendisse, non quia ignoraverit, sed pietatis affectu compassum esse Christo et eius humilitatem admirando insinuasse.

### Cap. IV. *De fide Cornelii.*

Solet etiam quaeri de Cornelio, utrum fidem incarnationis habuerit, cum dictum est ei per Angelum[^p532-6]: *Acceptae sunt eleemosynae tuae, et exauditae sunt orationes tuae.* Si enim fidem incarnationis non habebat; tunc ergo sine fide incarnationis erat ei iustitia, quia de illo scriptum est, quod *iustus erat et timens Deum.* Si vero fidem incarnationis habebat; ad quid ergo missus est ad eum Petrus? — Sane dici potest, eum, sicut fidem Trinitatis[^p532-7], ita et incarnationis habuisse Dei revelatione, sed incarnatum iam esse Dei Filium, ignorasse; et ideo missus est ad eum Petrus, ut iam natum Dei Filium ei annuntiaret et Sacramentum regenerationis ei conferret. Habebat igitur fidem incarnationis, sed an facta, an futura esset, non noverat; et ita per fidem venit ad opera, et per opera amplius solidatus est in fide. «Per fidem enim, ut ait Gregorius[^p532-8], venitur ad opera». Cornelius etiam per fidem venit ad opera; Deum enim unum credebat, sed Filium eius nesciebat incarnatum; per fidem placuerunt Deo opera eius: *Sine fide enim impossibile est placere Deo.* Augustinus[^p532-9] vero dicit, «Cornelio dictum esse per Angelum: *Acceptae sunt eleemosynae tuae et orationes tuae*, antequam in Christum crederet; nec tamen sine aliqua fide donabat et orabat. Nam quomodo invocabat in quem non credebat? sed si posset sine fide Christi esse salus, non ad eum mitteretur architectus Ecclesiae, Petrus». — Attende, quod ait, sine fide Christi non posse esse salutem, et tamen Cornelium exaudi-

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tum, antequam crederet in Christum; quod ita potest intelligi, scilicet antequam sciret Christum incarnatum, in quem credebat in mysterio.

### Cap. V. *De aequalitate fidei, spei, caritatis et operis.*

Illud etiam non est praetermittendum, quod fides, spes, caritas et operatio secundum aliquid aequalia sunt in praesenti. Unde Gregorius[^p533-1]: «Fidem, spem, caritatem atque operationem, dum in hac vita vivimus, aequales sibi esse apud nos invenimus, quia quantum credimus, tantum amamus; et quantum amamus, tantum de spe praesumimus. Quisque enim fidelis tantum credit, quantum sperat et amat; et tantum operatur, quantum credit et amat et sperat». «Sed tamen maior fide et spe caritas dicitur, quia, cum ad Dei speciem pervenitur, spes et fides transit, sed caritas permanet», et quia «caritas mater est omnium virtutum»; quae non ideo post fidem et spem ponitur, quod ex eis oriatur, sed quia post illa remanebit aucta; *caritas enim numquam excidit*[^p533-2]. Praemissa autem aequalitas proprie secundum interiorum actuum intentionem consideranda est. — Huic vero, quod hic et superius dictum est, scilicet quod caritas non est ex fide, spe, sed e converso, videtur obviare quod ait Apostolus[^p533-3]: *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta;* quod exponens Augustinus, *cor* accipit pro intellectu, et *conscientiam* pro spe. «Qualis, inquit, caritas est finis praecepti, procedens *de corde puro*, id est de puro intellectu, ut nihil nisi Deus diligatur; *et conscientia*, id est de spe bona, *et fide non ficta*, id est non simulata». — Non igitur caritas fidem vel spem, sed fides et spes caritatem praecedere videntur. Hoc ergo ea ratione traditum intellige, non quod fides et spes causa, vel tempore caritatem, omnium bonorum matrem, praecedant; sed quia caritas sine illis in aliquo esse non potest, sed illa sine caritate possunt esse, quamvis non sit pia fides vel spes sine caritate. Ideo igitur ex fide et spe procedere dicitur caritas, quia nulli provenit sine istis.

---

english:
### Cap. I. *On the faith of the ancients.*

To the foregoing it must be added concerning the sufficiency of faith for salvation. For those[^p531-1] who preceded the coming of Christ, and those who follow, faith seems to have advanced according to the process of time, just as knowledge advanced. For faith is called great by reason of knowledge and the quantity of the articles, or by constancy and devotion. There is, however, a certain measure of faith, without which there could never be salvation. Hence the Apostle[^p531-2]: *He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him.* But it is asked whether to believe this before the coming, or before the Law, sufficed for salvation. For in the time of grace it is most certainly established that this does not suffice; for all the things which are contained in the Creed must be believed. But neither before the coming nor before the Law does this seem to have sufficed, because the authorities of the Saints testify that no man, either before or after, was saved without faith in the Mediator. Hence Augustine to Optatus[^p531-3]: «That faith is sound by which we believe that no man, whether of greater or of tender age, is freed from the contagion of death and the obligation of sin, which he contracted by his first nativity, except through the one mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ; by the most salutary faith of whom, the same man and God, even those just men were saved who, before he came in the flesh, believed that he would come in the flesh. For their faith is the same as ours». «Accordingly, since all the just, whether before the incarnation or after, neither have lived nor live except by faith in the incarnation of Christ; assuredly that which is written, *that there is no other name under heaven, in which we must be saved*, avails to save the human race from that time in which it was vitiated in Adam».

The same[^p532-1]: «No one is freed from the damnation which was made through Adam, except through faith in Jesus Christ». The same: «The same faith in the Mediator, which saves us, made the ancients just and saved, the little ones together with the great, because, as we believe that Christ has come in the flesh, so they believed that he would come; and as we believe him dead, so they believed that he would die; and as we believe him risen, so they believed that he would rise; and both we and they believed that he would come to the judgment of the living and the dead». Gregory on Ezekiel[^p532-2]: «Both those who went before and those who followed cried out, saying: *Hosanna to the son of David* etc., because all the elect who could be in Judea, or who are now in the Church, have believed and do believe in the Mediator of God and men». — By these and many other testimonies it is plainly taught that salvation was never granted to anyone except through faith in the Mediator. *Therefore it is necessary that he who comes to God should believe* the things which the Apostle said above, but it does not suffice.

### Cap. II. *On the faith of the simple.*

What then shall be said of those simple ones, to whom the mystery of the incarnation was not revealed, who piously believed what was handed down to them? — It can be said that there was no just or saved person to whom a revelation was not made, whether distinct, or veiled, or open, or in mystery: distinct, as to Abraham or Moses[^p532-3] and the other elders, who had a distinction of the articles of faith; veiled, as to the simple, to whom it had been revealed that those things were to be believed which those elders believed and taught, but they did not have an open distinction of them. Just as in the Church also some are less capable, who are not able to distinguish and assign the articles of the Creed, yet believe all the things which are contained in the Creed; for they believe the things they do not know, having a veiled faith in mystery: so also then the less capable, by the revelation made to the elders, adhered by believing, to whom they as it were committed their faith. Hence Job[^p532-4]: *The oxen were plowing, and the asses feeding beside them.* The simple and lesser are the asses feeding beside the oxen, because, by humility adhering to the elders, they believed in mystery what those also taught in mystery, such as perhaps was the widow of Sarepta.

### Cap. III. *What it sufficed to believe before the coming.*

But it is asked, since for the ancients there was no salvation without faith in the Mediator, just as neither for the moderns, whether it behooved them to believe all those things concerning the Mediator which we now believe. — To some it seems that it sufficed for them to believe only four things, namely the nativity, the death, the resurrection, and the coming to judgment; which they gather from the foregoing words of Augustine, where he set down those four. — But to others it seems that, faith in the Trinity being had, this concerning the mystery of the incarnation sufficed for faith, namely that the Son of God should be believed to be about to be born of a man and to judge; and they take a proof of this matter from John the Baptist, who seems in the Gospel to have doubted concerning the death of Christ and his descent to hell, according to the exposition of Gregory[^p532-5], when he asked through his disciples: «*Art thou he that art to come, or look we for another?* as if to say: Art thou about to descend by thyself to hell, or to send another to these sacraments»? — Yet some say that he did not doubt out of ignorance, but out of piety, that is, that he showed himself to doubt, not because he was ignorant, but that by an affection of piety he had compassion on Christ and, admiring his humility, made it known.

### Cap. IV. *On the faith of Cornelius.*

It is also wont to be asked concerning Cornelius, whether he had faith in the incarnation, since it was said to him through the Angel[^p532-6]: *Thy alms are accepted, and thy prayers are heard.* For if he did not have faith in the incarnation; then therefore his justice was without faith in the incarnation, since it is written of him that *he was just and fearing God.* But if he did have faith in the incarnation; for what then was Peter sent to him? — It can rightly be said that he, as he had faith in the Trinity[^p532-7], so also had faith in the incarnation by a revelation of God, but that the Son of God was already incarnate he did not know; and therefore Peter was sent to him, that he might announce to him that the Son of God was already born and confer on him the Sacrament of regeneration. He had therefore faith in the incarnation, but whether it had been done or was to be done, he did not know; and thus through faith he came to works, and through works he was the more strengthened in faith. «For through faith, as Gregory says[^p532-8], one comes to works». Cornelius also through faith came to works; for he believed God to be one, but he did not know his Son to be incarnate; through faith his works pleased God: *For without faith it is impossible to please God.* But Augustine[^p532-9] says, «that it was said to Cornelius through the Angel: *Thy alms are accepted and thy prayers*, before he believed in Christ; nor yet did he give and pray without some faith. For how did he call upon him in whom he did not believe? but if salvation could be without faith in Christ, the architect of the Church, Peter, would not have been sent to him». — Notice that he says that there cannot be salvation without faith in Christ, and yet that Cornelius was heard,

before he believed in Christ; which can be so understood, namely before he knew Christ to be incarnate, in whom he believed in mystery.

### Cap. V. *On the equality of faith, hope, charity, and work.*

This also must not be passed over, that faith, hope, charity, and operation are in some respect equal in the present life. Hence Gregory[^p533-1]: «Faith, hope, charity, and operation, while we live in this life, we find to be equal among us, because as much as we believe, so much we love; and as much as we love, so much we presume from hope. For each faithful one believes as much as he hopes and loves; and operates as much as he believes and loves and hopes». «Yet charity is called greater than faith and hope, because, when one comes to the vision of God, hope and faith pass away, but charity remains», and because «charity is the mother of all virtues»; which is not for that reason placed after faith and hope, as though it arose from them, but because after them it will remain increased; *for charity never falls away*[^p533-2]. But the aforesaid equality is properly to be considered according to the intention of the interior acts. — But to this, which has been said here and above, namely that charity is not from faith and hope, but the reverse, that seems to be opposed which the Apostle says[^p533-3]: *The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith;* which Augustine, expounding, takes *heart* for the intellect, and *conscience* for hope. «Such, he says, is charity, the end of the commandment, proceeding *from a pure heart*, that is, from a pure intellect, so that nothing but God be loved; *and conscience*, that is, from good hope, *and an unfeigned faith*, that is, not simulated». — Therefore charity does not seem to precede faith or hope, but faith and hope to precede charity. Understand, then, that this is handed down for this reason, not because faith and hope precede charity, the mother of all good things, in cause or in time; but because charity cannot exist in anyone without them, while they can exist without charity, although there is not a pious faith or hope without charity. Therefore charity is said to proceed from faith and hope, because it comes to no one without them.

---

la: Edd., exceptis 1, 8, adiiciunt *enim.* — Duo prima capitula huius dist. Magister excerpsit ex Hugone a S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. 1. c. 3.

en: The editions, except 1 and 8, add *enim* (for). — The Master excerpted the first two chapters of this distinction from Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, tract 1, c. 3.

la: Epist. ad Hebr. 11, 6. Codd. et paucae edd. hic et infra omittunt *ad Deum.*

en: Epistle to the Hebrews 11:6. The codices and a few editions here and below omit *ad Deum* (to God).

la: Epist. 190. (alias 157.) c. 2. n. 5. 6, in quo textu respicitur 1. Tim. 2, 5. Seq. locus ibid. n. 8, ubi respicitur Act. 4, 12.

en: Letter 190 (formerly 157), c. 2, nn. 5–6, in which text 1 Tim. 2:5 is referred to. The following passage is in the same place, n. 8, where Acts 4:12 is referred to.

la: De Corrept. et gratia, c. 7. n. 11. Seq. locus est II. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 11. n. 24, et habetur etiam I. Sent. d. XLI. c. 3.

en: *On Rebuke and Grace*, c. 7, n. 11. The following passage is from Book II *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, c. 11, n. 24, and is also found in I Sent., d. XLI, c. 3.

la: Libr. II. hom. 5. n. 2. Locus Scripturae est Marc. 11, 9. 10.

en: Book II, homily 5, n. 2. The passage of Scripture is Mark 11:9–10.

la: Cap. 1, 14; de vidua Sareptana vide III. Reg. 17, 10. seqq. Similem expositionem loci Iob habet Gregor., II. Moral. c. 16. n. 72; et est etiam in Glossa (ibid.).

en: Chapter 1:14; concerning the widow of Sarepta see 3 Kings 17:10 and following. Gregory has a similar exposition of the passage of Job, *Morals* II, c. 16, n. 72; and it is also in the Gloss (in the same place).

la: Libr. I. in Ezech., hom. 1. n. 5, et I. in Evang. hom. 6. n. 1. Locus Scripturae est Matth. 11, 3; Luc. 7, 19. Seq. sententia insinuatur ab Ambros., V. in Luc. (c. 7, 19.) n. 98. — Post *quasi* Vat. cum pluribus edd. *diceret.*

en: Book I on Ezekiel, homily 1, n. 5, and Book I on the Gospel, homily 6, n. 1. The passage of Scripture is Matt. 11:3; Luke 7:19. The following thought is suggested by Ambrose, Book V on Luke (c. 7:19), n. 98. — After *quasi* (as if) the Vatican edition with several editions has *diceret* (he were to say).

la: Act. 10, 4, et seq. locus ibid. v. 22.

en: Acts 10:4, and the following passage is in the same place, v. 22.

la: Codd. et edd., exceptis 5, 6 et Vat., *Unitatis.* Cod. Erf. annotat: *Alii Unitatis.*

en: The codices and editions, except 5, 6 and the Vatican, have *Unitatis* (of the Unity). The Erfurt codex notes: *Others* (read) *Unitatis.*

la: Libr. II. in Ezech., hom. 7. n. 9. — Inferius respicitur Hebr. 11, 6.

en: Book II on Ezekiel, homily 7, n. 9. — Below, Heb. 11:6 is referred to.

la: De Praedest. Sanctor. c. 7. n. 12; ubi respicitur locus iam cit. Act. 10, 4, et Rom. 10; 14. — Pro *esse salus* ed. 1 cum originali *salvus.* Inferius pro *quod ait* Vat. cum pluribus edd. *quid ait.*

en: *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 7, n. 12; where the passage already cited, Acts 10:4, and Rom. 10:14 are referred to. — For *esse salus* (there be salvation) ed. 1 with the original has *salvus* (saved). Below, for *quod ait* (that he says) the Vatican with several editions has *quid ait* (what he says).

la: Libr. II. in Ezech. hom. 10. n. 17. Seq. locus ibid. paulo superius. Verba *caritas mater est* sumta sunt ex Hieron., Epist. 82. ad Theophilum, n. 11; cfr. supra pag. 467, nota 2.

en: Book II on Ezekiel, homily 10, n. 17. The following passage is in the same place a little above. The words *caritas mater est* (charity is the mother) are taken from Jerome, Letter 82 to Theophilus, n. 11; cf. above p. 467, note 2.

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 13. 8. Mox verbo *superius* citatur d. XXIII. c. ult.

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 13:8. Presently, by the word *above*, d. XXIII, last chapter, is cited.

la: Epist. 1. Tim. 1, 5; locus August. est I. de Doctr. christian. c. 40. n. 44, et Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32, et verbotenus in Glossa Lyrani in illum locum.

en: First Epistle to Timothy 1:5; the passage of Augustine is from Book I *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 40, n. 44, and the *Enchiridion*, c. 121, n. 32, and word for word in the Gloss of Lyra on that passage.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Lombard's text (*littera Magistri*) for Distinctio XXV, re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{531,532,533}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 36936–37077) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The OCR for this distinction is two-column interleaved; the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout, per the Vol II/III override (offset pdf = printed + 22). `type: littera`, **`has_scholion: false`** — the littera carries no scholion; its apparatus is the editorial *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM*. The marginal glosses `Dubium 1.`–`Dubium 4.` and the source-tags (`Augustinus.`, `Gregorius.`, `Resp.`, `Alia opinio.`, `Alia expositio.`) printed in the outer margins are editorial apparatus, not Lombard's text, and are omitted from the body.

**Cap. count + incipits (FIVE chapters, confirmed eyes-on):**
- **Cap. I** (p.531-L → R) — *De fide antiquorum.* (opener *Praedictis adiiciendum est de sufficientia fidei ad salutem. Illis qui praecesserunt adventum Christi…*)
- **Cap. II** (p.532-L) — *De fide simplicium.* (opener *Quid ergo dicetur de illis simplicibus, quibus non erat revelatum mysterium incarnationis…*)
- **Cap. III** (p.532-L bottom → R top) — *Quae ante adventum credere sufficiebat.* (opener *Sed quaeritur, cum sine fide Mediatoris antiquis non fuerit salus…*)
- **Cap. IV** (p.532-R → p.533-L top) — *De fide Cornelii.* (opener *Solet etiam quaeri de Cornelio, utrum fidem incarnationis habuerit…*)
- **Cap. V** (p.533-L → R) — *De aequalitate fidei, spei, caritatis et operis.* (opener *Illud etiam non est praetermittendum, quod fides, spes, caritas et operatio secundum aliquid aequalia sunt in praesenti…*)

**Reading-order note (two-column interleave).** On p.531 the DISTINCTIO XXV head spans both columns; Cap. I runs L-column (head + opener through *…Sed nec ante*) then continues R-column (*adventum nec ante Legem… ex quo in Adam vitiatum est».*). On p.532, L-column top is Cap. I's tail (*Idem… Gregorius super Ezechielem…*) then Cap. II + Cap. III opener; R-column top is Cap. III's tail (*Quibusdam videtur… Quidam tamen dicunt…*) then Cap. IV. On p.533, L-column top is Cap. IV's tail (*tum, antequam crederet…*) + Cap. V; Cap. V continues R-column (*…caritas enim numquam excidit²… quia nulli provenit sine istis.*), after which the COMMENTARIUS begins. True reading order was reconstructed from the column bands, not raw-line order.

**Page-split map.** Littera spans **printed pp.531–533** (PDF 553–555). p.531: DISTINCTIO XXV + Cap. I (the littera begins lower on p.531, immediately after the d24-dubia close *…per ipsam anagogicam unitionem⁸* in the R-column). **Page break p.531→532** mid-Cap. I (`…ex quo in Adam vitiatum est».` | `Idem: «Nemo liberatur…`). p.532: Cap. I tail + Cap. II + Cap. III + Cap. IV opener. **Page break p.532→533** mid-Cap. IV (`…et tamen Cornelium exaudi-` | `tum, antequam crederet in Christum`). p.533: Cap. IV tail + all of Cap. V, ending *…quia nulli provenit sine istis.* (raw 37074); the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV` begins at raw 37078 (the next chunk, d25-divisio). Note the page-top running heads `DIST. XXV. DIVISIO TEXTUS.` (over p.533) are running heads, NOT the real DIVISIO TEXTUS (which is at raw 37157 inside the COMMENTARIUS chunk).

**Apparatus (15 entries), NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM, per-page restart:**
- **p.531** → nn. 1–3 (the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* header appears at the bottom of p.531's R-column, beneath the d24-divisio L-column *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* and the R-column n.8): n.1 (Cap. I, *Illis* — *adiiciunt enim*; Hugh of St. Victor provenance), n.2 (Cap. I, *Apostolus* — Hebr. 11, 6), n.3 (Cap. I, *ad Optatum* — Epist. 190).
- **p.532** → nn. 1–9 (continues the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block — no new header — restarting at n.1): n.1 (Cap. I tail, *Idem* — De Corrept. et gratia), n.2 (Cap. I tail, *super Ezechielem* — Libr. II hom. 5), n.3 (Cap. II, *Moysi* — Gen. 22, 18), n.4 (Cap. II, *Iob* — Cap. 1, 14 / vidua Sareptana), n.5 (Cap. III, *Gregorii* — Libr. I in Ezech.), n.6 (Cap. IV, *Angelum* — Act. 10, 4), n.7 (Cap. IV, *Trinitatis* — *Unitatis* variant), n.8 (Cap. IV, *Gregorius* — Libr. II in Ezech. hom. 7), n.9 (Cap. IV, *Augustinus* — De Praedest. Sanctor.).
- **p.533** → nn. 1–3 (Cap. V; the footer continues the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block, restarting at n.1): n.1 (Cap. V, *Gregorius* — Libr. II in Ezech. hom. 10; *caritas mater est* from Jerome), n.2 (Cap. V, *excidit* — 1 Cor. 13, 8), n.3 (Cap. V, *Apostolus* — 1 Tim. 1, 5).

**Footer ownership.**
- **Footers IN:** the p.531 R-column *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* block (nn. 1–3) + the entire p.532 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM (nn. 1–9) + the p.533 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM (nn. 1–3) migrate IN to this littera chunk.
- **Footers OUT / NOT MINE:** the p.531 L-column footer (nn. 1–7) and the p.531 R-column n.8 are the *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* of the **d24 commentary block (DONE — d24-divisio/dubia)**, not the littera (note their content: *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, *Cfr. infra d. 35*, *Cfr. tom. II. pag. 543… B. Albert., hic a. 11.*). On p.533 the *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footer for the COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV (the next chunk, d25-divisio) is a SEPARATE block (raw ~37181, header `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`); do not touch it.

**Seam status.** CLEAN at both ends.
- **Open seam:** continuous after the d24-dubia close *…per ipsam anagogicam unitionem⁸* (p.531 R-col, raw 36935) → DISTINCTIO XXV / Cap. I opens at raw 36936. The page-top running head `DISTINCTLO XXV` on p.531 is NOT the semantic boundary; the real DISTINCTIO XXV head (spanning both columns, beneath the d24-dubia tail) is.
- **Close seam:** Cap. V ends *…quia nulli provenit sine istis.* (raw 37074); the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV` (raw 37078) is the next chunk (d25-divisio). Receiving chunk's opener (*De fidei sufficientia. … Praedictis adiiciendum est de sufficientia fidei etc.*) is grammatically a fresh COMMENTARIUS head, not a continuation of Cap. V — seam clean.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All five chapter rubrics, all incipits, and all 15 footers were read eyes-on from the 450 dpi bands without ambiguity.

**HAND-OFF TO d25-divisio (forwarded):** the next chunk is **bon-sent-III-d25-divisio** — `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV` + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`. `type: divisio`, OMIT `articulus`/`quaestio`, **`has_scholion: false`**, apparatus = `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`. **Raw anchors:** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV header at raw **37078** → `De fidei sufficientia.` (the COMMENTARIUS opener echoes the littera: *Praedictis adiiciendum est de sufficientia fidei etc.*); DIVISIO TEXTUS at raw **37157** (`Supra egit Magister de fidei essentia et de eius obiecto et materia. In hac tertia parte agit de eius sufficientia. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes…`); TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM at raw **37122** — **CAUTION:** the raw grep shows `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.` at raw 37122 which appears to sit *between* the COMMENTARIUS head (37078) and the DIVISIO TEXTUS body (37157) — verify the true print order eyes-on from p.533–534 bands before chunking (the running heads `DIST. XXV. DIVISIO TEXTUS.` complicate the OCR line order; in the actual print the COMMENTARIUS → DIVISIO TEXTUS → TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM sequence is standard). **Page span:** printed pp.533–534+ (PDF 555+). **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** footer block: header at raw ~**37181** (`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`), n.1 = *Libr. II. in Ezech. hom. 10. n. 17…* (p.533 footer); more NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM on p.534. **d.25 ARTICLE/QUESTION STRUCTURE:** read it from the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw ~37122 onward) eyes-on — the DIVISIO TEXTUS at raw 37157 sub-divides the *Prima pars* into *partes duas* (sufficiency in general / descending to special differences of persons, *ibi: Quid ergo dicetur de illis simplicibus*), and further into three (raw L-1 band of p.533 shows *Prima pars dividitur in tres partes…*). Use `vol3/bon-sent-III-d24-divisio.md` as the structural template for the divisio chunk.