title: Dist. 1, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the text of the Master

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de ordine istius libri ad praecedentem. Cum enim nos cognoscamus Creatorem per creaturas, quia *videmus per speculum*[^1]; et «scientia debeat inchoari a notioribus nobis»: ergo prius debuit agere de creaturis quam de Creatore: ergo liber iste primus, non secundus debet esse.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod supra, cum actum est de Creatore, actum est etiam de creaturis, prout sunt via ad perveniendum in cognitionem Creatoris[^2]; nunc autem agitur de cognitione rerum, prout cognitio de Creatore adminiculatur ei, quia agitur *de conditione et lapsu*. Non potest autem cognosci conditio, nisi prius cognoscatur eius principium; principium autem huius conditionis solus Deus est: ideo oportet, doctrinam huius libri sequi doctrinam praecedentis; et patet obiectum.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc, quod dicit: *In uno principio a Deo creatore mundum factum refert.* Quaero, pro quo supponat ille terminus *principio*: aut pro creato, aut pro increato. Non pro increato, quia praepositiones sunt transitivae[^3]. Non pro creato, quia nihil creatum erat, in quo fieret.

Item, ab aeterno fuerunt res in principio suo, scilicet Deo: si ergo productio respicit egressum a Deo, nullo modo potest stare pro principio increato; nec pro creato, quia nondum erat aliquid; ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praepositio[^4] cum suo casuali tripliciter potest accipi. Uno modo ut dicat pure ordinem, sicut idem est *facere in principio* quod *facere ante alia*, ita quod connotet privationem respectu alicuius temporalis prioris, et connotet positionem posterioris. Alio modo potest importare *habitudinem mensurae*; et tunc *in principio* idem est, quod *in primo instanti temporis*. Tertio modo potest importare *habitudinem causae*; et tunc sensus est, *in principio*, id est *in Filio*. In Filio enim dicitur creasse, secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo[^5]: *Omnia in sapientia fecisti, Domine*, ut sic notetur non tantum causa efficiens, sed etiam exemplaris.

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Omnes istae expositiones verae sunt et catholicae, et per eas eliduntur tres errores circa mundi productionem. Ex prima eliditur error quorundam modernorum philosophantium[^6], qui dixerunt, mundum ex tempore factum, sed mediante Intelligentia, ita quod Deus primo fecit Angelos et cum illis condidit mundum; contra quos est prima expositio. Si enim Deus *in principio conditionis* creavit mundum, non ergo *post Angelos* vel *Intelligentias*, ita quod per illos condiderit mundum; et hic error ortum habet ex illo verbo: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*[^7], quasi Deus loquatur Angelis. — Ex secunda expositione eliditur error Aristotelicorum[^8], qui dixerunt, mundum conditum ab aeterno. Si enim *in principio temporis* factus est ex nihilo, non ergo fuit sine principio; et hic error ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt videre, qualiter mundus inceperit, et quare tunc et non ante. — Ex tertia expositione eliditur error tertius Platonicorum[^9], qui dixerunt, principia mundi tria esse aeterna, scilicet Deum, materiam et exemplar. Si enim Deus in Filio sicut per exemplar aeternum condidit de nihilo mundum, non ergo requiritur secundum principium, quod est exemplar, nec tertium, quod sit materia; et hic ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt intelligere omnino, quomodo aliquid fiat ex nihilo. — Ex omnibus his eliditur error Manichaeorum, qui posuerunt principia mundi effectiva duo; et iste eliditur per subiectum dictae locutionis: *Creavit Deus caelum et terram*[^10], lucem et tenebras; et hic error est omnibus vilior.

Et habent se gradatim. Nam primus solum errat *in eo a quo*. Secundus errat *in eo de quo* et *quando*[^11], quia *ex aliquo* et *ab aeterno*. Tertius errat *in eo de quo*, quia dicit factum esse de materia, non ex nihilo; et *in eo per quod*, scilicet circa exemplar, quod posuit aliud a Deo, ut apparet; et *in quando*, quia posuit materiam ab aeterno imperfectam. Et iste error est multo vilior quam error Aristotelis, qui posuit, ab aeterno materiam fuisse perfectam sua forma. Quartus error Manichaeorum omnibus est abominabilior, quia deficit *in primo principio*, in quo philosophi communiter concordaverunt, ponens prima duo principia, ac per hoc auferens ordinem et decorem universi, et bonitatem et Dei potestatem. Et hunc errorem inter ceteros non humanam malitiam, sed diabolicam astutiam credo adinvenisse, ut se alterum Deum esse persuadeat[^12] mentibus peccatorum.

Ex dictis igitur patet, pro quo supponat hoc nomen *principium*. Potest enim supponere pro Filio, et *Deus* pro Patre; et ex modo[^13] construendi fit talis appropriatio. Potest etiam supponere pro creatura, utpote pro principio temporis; sed non dicit tunc ordinem, sed concomitantiam mensurae ad mensuratum, scilicet quod caelum et terra cum principio temporis esse coeperunt. Et sic patet illud.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Aristoteles tria posuit esse principia, duo etc.*, quare distinguit illa duo a tertio? Et iterum, videtur illud non esse verum perscrutanti libros Philosophi, quia ipse non ponit nisi ista tria, *materiam, formam et privationem*, in principio novae *Metaphysicae*[^14] et in libro primo *Physicorum*: non ergo ista quae ponit Magister.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ideo duo distinguit a tertio, quia duo sunt intrinseca tanquam elementa, et unum est extrinsecum. Ubi autem Philosophus ista tria ponit, si quaeratur, expresse invenitur in secundo *de Generatione* circa finem[^15].

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Sed tunc est quaestio, quia videtur non sufficienter principia in *Physicis*[^16] assignasse; immo si ibi assignavit tria praeter *operatorium*, tunc ergo sunt quatuor. — Et dicendum ad hoc, quod *privatio non differt a forma*[^17] vel a materia. Sive enim privatio nominet appetitum formae cum eius carentia, sive nominet ipsam formae essentiam, prout est in materia in potentia, non differt ab his duobus, scilicet materia et specie[^18]. Nam appetitus ad materiam reducitur nec est aliud; et essentia formae ad speciem secundum rem. Et haec duo principia determinat in primo[^19]. Postmodum adiungit tertium, *operatorium*, dum omnia reducit ad motorem primum, in octavo. Et sic patet, quod Magister vere et proprie loquitur.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In principio temporum mundum creasse*. Si enim tempus coepit cum primo mobili, et illud coepit in secundo die[^20]: non ergo *in principio temporis*, sed ante.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *tempus* dicitur tripliciter: *communissime*, *communiter* et *proprie*. Communissime dicitur mensura exitus de non-esse in esse. Communiter dicitur tempus mensura cuiuslibet mutationis, maxime illius quae fuit ante primum mobile. Tertio modo dicitur proprie mensura motus primi mobilis, ut communiter consuevit distingui. Et quia primo modo dictum est *primum* omnium, et in illo conditum est saeculum: ideo dicit: *in principio temporum*.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Omnipotentissimi est nocere non posse.*

Contra: Omnis poena affligit et laedit, et si laedit, nocet: ergo si Deus non potest nocere, non potest punire.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut duplex est malum, scilicet *culpae* et *poenae*, sic etiam duplex est nocumentum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod non potest nocere, non intelligitur quantum ad nocumentum, quod facit malum poenae, sed quod facit malum culpae[^21].

---

english:
### Doubts on the text of the Master.

### Dub. I.

In this part are doubts on the *littera*, and the question is asked first about the order of this book in relation to the preceding. For since we know the Creator through creatures — for *we see through a mirror*[^1] — and «knowledge ought to begin from what is more known to us»: therefore [the Master] ought to have treated of creatures before the Creator: therefore this book should be the first, not the second.

**I respond:** It must be said that above, when the Creator was treated, the creatures too were treated, insofar as they are a way of arriving at the knowledge of the Creator[^2]; but now things are treated according to that aspect under which knowledge of the Creator aids it, because the topic is *the foundation and the fall*. But the foundation cannot be known unless its principle is first known; and the principle of this foundation is God alone: therefore the teaching of this book must follow the teaching of the preceding one; and the objection is plain.

### Dub. II.

Likewise the question is asked about what he says: *He relates that the world was made by God the Creator in one principle.* I ask what the term *principle* stands for: either for something created, or for something uncreated. Not for something uncreated, because prepositions are transitive[^3]. Not for something created, because nothing created existed in which it could come to be.

Likewise, from eternity things were *in their principle*, namely God: therefore if production regards a going-out from God, in no way can *in principle* stand for an uncreated principle; nor for a created one, because nothing yet was; therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that a preposition[^4] together with its case-noun can be taken in three ways. In one way, so as to say purely *order* — as *to do in the beginning* is the same as *to do before other things*, in such a way that it connotes a privation with respect to some prior temporal thing, and connotes the position of what is posterior. In another way, it can import *the relation of measure*; and then *in the beginning* is the same as *in the first instant of time*. In a third way, it can import *the relation of cause*; and then the sense is *in the beginning*, that is, *in the Son*. For God is said to have created in the Son, according to what is said in the Psalm[^5]: *Thou hast made all things in wisdom, O Lord*, so as to indicate not only the efficient cause but also the exemplar.

All these expositions are true and catholic, and by them three errors concerning the production of the world are knocked down. By the first is knocked down the error of certain modern philosophizers[^6], who said that the world was made *in time*, but by the mediation of an Intelligence, so that God first made the Angels and with them founded the world; against whom the first exposition stands. For if God *in the beginning of the foundation* created the world, then [he did] not [create it] *after the Angels* or *Intelligences*, such that he founded the world through them; and this error has its rise from the word *Let us make man in our image and likeness*[^7], as if God were speaking to the Angels. — By the second exposition the error of the Aristotelians[^8] is knocked down, who said that the world was founded *from eternity*. For if it was made *in the first instant of time* from nothing, then it was not without a beginning; and this error has its rise from the fact that they could not see how the world began, and why then and not before. — By the third exposition the third error of the Platonists[^9] is knocked down, who said that there are three eternal principles of the world: namely God, matter, and the exemplar. For if God in the Son, as through an eternal exemplar, founded the world from nothing, then no second principle (which is the exemplar) is required, nor a third (which would be matter); and this error has its rise from the fact that they could not understand at all how anything can come-to-be from nothing. — From all of these the error of the Manichaeans is knocked down, who posited two effective principles of the world; and this is knocked down by the subject of the said utterance: *God created heaven and earth*[^10], light and darkness; and this error is the basest of all.

And they stand in a gradient. For the first errs only *in the by whom*. The second errs *in the from what* and *when*[^11], because [it says] *from something* and *from eternity*. The third errs *in the from what*, because it says [the world] was made from matter, not from nothing; and *in the through which* — namely about the exemplar, which it posited as other than God, as appears; and *in the when*, because it posited matter as imperfect from eternity. And this error is much baser than the error of Aristotle, who posited that from eternity matter was perfect in its form. The fourth error, that of the Manichaeans, is the most abominable of all, because it fails *in the first principle*, on which the philosophers commonly agreed, positing two first principles, and through this taking away the order and beauty of the universe, and the goodness and power of God. And this error among the rest, I believe, was invented not by human malice but by diabolical cunning, that [the devil] might persuade[^12] the minds of sinners that he is a second God.

From what has been said, then, it is plain what this name *principle* stands for. For it can stand for the Son, and *God* for the Father; and from the mode[^13] of construction such an appropriation comes about. It can also stand for a creature, namely for the beginning of time; but then it does not say order, but a concomitance of measure with the measured — namely that heaven and earth began to be along with the beginning of time. And so that is plain.

### Dub. III.

Likewise the question is asked about what he says: *Aristotle posited three principles, two etc.*, why does he distinguish those two from the third? And again, this does not seem true to one searching the books of the Philosopher, because he does not posit anything but these three — *matter, form, and privation* — at the beginning of the new *Metaphysics*[^14] and in the first book of the *Physics*: therefore not those which the Master posits.

**I respond:** It must be said that he distinguishes the two from the third for this reason: that two are intrinsic, like elements, and one is extrinsic. Where the Philosopher posits these three, if it be asked, is expressly found in the second book *On Generation*, near the end[^15].

But then there is a question, because he seems not to have sufficiently assigned principles in the *Physics*[^16]; indeed, if there he assigned three besides the *operatory* [principle], then there are four. — And it must be said to this that *privation does not differ from form*[^17] or from matter. For whether privation names the appetite of form along with the lack of it, or names the very essence of form insofar as it is in matter in potency, it does not differ from these two — namely matter and species[^18]. For appetite is reduced to matter and is nothing else; and the essence of form to species, according to reality. And these two principles he determines in the first [book][^19]. Afterward he adjoins a third, the *operatory*, when he reduces all things to a first mover, in the eighth. And so it is plain that the Master speaks truly and properly.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise the question is asked about what he says: *He created the world in the beginning of times*. For if time began with the first movable, and that began on the second day[^20], then [it was created] not *in the beginning of time* but before.

**I respond:** It must be said that *time* is said in three ways: *most commonly*, *commonly*, and *properly*. Most commonly it is said to be the measure of the going-out from non-being into being. Commonly time is said to be the measure of any mutation whatever — especially of that which was before the first movable. In the third way it is said properly to be the measure of the motion of the first movable, as it is commonly distinguished. And because in the first sense it was called the *first* of all, and in it the age was founded: therefore he says *in the beginning of times*.

### Dub. V.

Likewise the question is asked about what he says: *It belongs to the most omnipotent not to be able to do harm.*

To the contrary: Every penalty afflicts and injures, and if it injures, it harms: therefore if God cannot harm, he cannot punish.

**I respond:** It must be said that as evil is twofold, namely *of fault* and *of penalty*, so likewise harm is twofold. When therefore it is said that he cannot harm, it is not understood with regard to the harm which makes the evil of *penalty*, but to that which makes the evil of *fault*[^21].

---

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12: *Videmus nunc per speculum.* Cfr. de his I. *Sent.* d. 3. p. I. q. 2. — Seq. propositio est Aristotelis, I. *Phys.* text. 2: *Innata autem est ex notioribus nobis via ac manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora; non enim sunt eadem et nobis nota et simpliciter. Quapropter necesse est ad hunc modum procedere ex immanifestioribus quidem naturae, nobis autem manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora.*

en: 1 Corinthians 13:12: *Now we see through a mirror.* Cf. on these I *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, q. 2. — The following proposition is from Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 2: *The way is innate from what is more known to us and more manifest, to what is more manifest in nature and more known; for the same things are not known both to us and absolutely. Wherefore it is necessary to proceed in this way from what is less manifest in nature, but more manifest to us, to what is more manifest in nature and more known.*

la: Ex cod. Y (cod. Q in marg.) supplevimus *Creatoris*, pro quo cod. V ponit *Dei*. Paulo inferius plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *prius*.

en: From codex Y (codex Q in the margin) we supplied *Creatoris* ("of the Creator"), for which codex V puts *Dei* ("of God"). A little below, several codices with ed. 1 omit *prius*.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 116, Scholion I.

en: Cf. tom. I, p. 116, Scholion I.

la: Cod. V *quod haec praepositio in cum*.

en: Codex V reads *quod haec praepositio in cum* ("that this preposition *in* with").

la: Psalm. 103, 24. — Paulo superius fide plurium codd. ut H K M N T W *aa* adiecimus *In Filio enim*; particulam *enim* exhibent tantum codd. W *aa*, quorum posterior insuper post *dicitur* bene supplet *Deus*.

en: Psalm 103:24. — A little above, on the faith of several codices (H, K, M, N, T, W, *aa*) we added *In Filio enim* ("For in the Son"); the particle *enim* is exhibited only by codices W and *aa*, the latter of which moreover after *dicitur* rightly supplies *Deus*.

la: Vide supra a. 2. q. 2. — Aliquanto inferius codd. K U *prius Angelos*, cod. Q *per Angelos*, cod. *bb* cum Vat. *primo Angelos* pro *post Angelos*.

en: See above a. 2, q. 2. — A little below codices K, U read *prius Angelos* ("the Angels first"); codex Q *per Angelos* ("through the Angels"); codex *bb* with the Vatican ms. *primo Angelos* ("first the Angels") for *post Angelos* ("after the Angels").

en: Genesis 1:26.

la: Plures codd. *aliquorum*; cod. A *antiquorum*; non pauci cum ed. 1 *aliorum*, forte propter abbreviationem seducti. — Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1 et 2.

en: Several codices read *aliquorum* ("of some"); codex A *antiquorum* ("of the ancients"); not a few with ed. 1 *aliorum* ("of others"), perhaps misled by an abbreviation. — Cf. above a. 1, q. 1 and 2.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 1.

la: Gen. 1, 1. — De errore Manichaeorum vide supra a. 2. q. 1.

en: Genesis 1:1. — On the error of the Manichaeans see above a. 2, q. 1.

la: Supple cum cod. M *error*.

en: Supply with codex M the word *error*.

la: Codd. A X *persuaderet*.

en: Codices A, X read *persuaderet* (subjunctive imperfect).

la: Cod. *cc* et ed. 1 *et ex hoc modo*. Aliquanto inferius cod. F post *concomitantiam* addit *sive convenientiam*. — Idem dubium resolvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1 et S. p. II. tract. 12. q. 41; S. Thom., hic a. 6; Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic *circa lit.*; Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. 3.

en: Codex *cc* and ed. 1 read *et ex hoc modo*. A little below codex F after *concomitantiam* adds *sive convenientiam* ("or agreement"). — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 43, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 1 and *Summa* p. II, tract. 12, q. 41; St Thomas, here a. 6; Peter of Tarantasia and Richard of Mediavilla, here *circa litteram*; Giles of Rome, here q. 4, a. 3.

la: Aetate media duae versiones librorum *Metaphysicorum* Aristotelis vulgo in usu erant, nempe Graeco-latina et Arabico-latina, quae inter se non parum discrepant, etiam in librorum huius operis divisione et ordine et numero. Sic v. g. in versione Arabico-latina deest prima pars primi libri (quam Arabes non Aristoteli, sed Theophrasto adiudicabant) et liber undecimus; liber vero duodecimus in mss. invenitur primo loco positus. Versio Graeco-latina in multis mss. intitulatur *translatio nova* sive *nova Metaphysica*, in aliis autem mss. hoc nomine insignitur versio Arabico-latina, versio autem Graeco-latina vocatur *Metaphysica vetus*. Cfr. *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, par Charles Jourdain, Paris 1843, pag. 177 et 370, qui etiam ostendit, quod Vincentius Bellovacensis († 1264) in suo libro *Speculum doctrinale* nomine *Metaphysica nova* intellexerit versionem Arabico-latinam. Huic assertioni suffragantur S. Bonaventurae verba hic posita *in principio novae Metaphysicae*. Nam in principio libri duodecimi, relatis opinionibus antiquorum philosophorum de substantiis, Aristoteles ait, text. 12 (XI. c. 2.): «*Tres itaque causae et tria principia; duo quidem ipsa contrarietas, cuius hoc quidem ratio et forma, hoc vero privatio; tertium vero materia*». — Vat. cum ceteris edd. legit *in principio noni Metaphysicorum*, quae lectio quidem non est falsa, quia etiam ibi Aristoteles haec tria principia nominat, cum loquatur de potentia activa et passiva nec non de potentia et actu, sed haec lectio est contra codd. antiquiores. — De I. *Phys.* cfr. text. 73. seqq. (c. 8. seq.).

en: In the Middle Ages two versions of the books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* were commonly in use — namely the Greek-Latin and the Arabic-Latin — which differ from each other in no small measure, even in the division, order, and number of the books of this work. Thus, e.g., in the Arabic-Latin version the first part of the first book is missing (which the Arabs assigned not to Aristotle but to Theophrastus), and also the eleventh book; the twelfth book, however, is found in the manuscripts placed in the first position. The Greek-Latin version is in many manuscripts entitled *translatio nova* or *nova Metaphysica*; in other manuscripts, however, the Arabic-Latin version is marked with this name, and the Greek-Latin is called *Metaphysica vetus*. Cf. *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, by Charles Jourdain, Paris 1843, pp. 177 and 370, who also shows that Vincent of Beauvais († 1264), in his book *Speculum doctrinale*, understood by *Metaphysica nova* the Arabic-Latin version. To this assertion the words of St Bonaventure here placed, *in the beginning of the new Metaphysics*, lend support. For at the beginning of the twelfth book, after relating the opinions of the ancient philosophers on substances, Aristotle says, text 12 (XI, c. 2): «*Therefore three are the causes and three the principles; two indeed are contrariety itself — one of which is the account and form, the other privation; the third is matter.*» — The Vatican ms. with the other editions reads *in the beginning of the ninth book of the Metaphysics*, which reading is not false, for there too Aristotle names these three principles when he speaks of active and passive potency and likewise of potency and act; but this reading is against the older codices. — On *Physics* I cf. text 73ff. (c. 8f.).

la: Text. 51. seqq. (c. 9.), ubi de causis et principiis generationis et corruptionis inquirens ait: «*Illud enim ut materia est, hoc autem ut forma; oportet autem et tertium adhuc adesse*», scil. principium efficiens, ut deinceps probatur.

en: Text 51ff. (c. 9), where, inquiring concerning the causes and principles of generation and corruption, he says: «*For this is as matter, that as form; but it is necessary that a third still be present*», namely the efficient principle, as is proved in what follows.

la: Intellige secundum obiectionem, libro primo *Physicorum*, quod etiam Vat. ponit. Paulo inferius et circa finem solutionis plurimi codd. cum primis edd. *operationem* pro *operatorum*, sed contra textum Ambrosii a Magistro, hic c. 3, relatum. — Pro intelligentia eorum, quae sequuntur, observandum, quod secundum Aristotelem res naturales, si considerantur in statu constitutionis seu in *facto esse*, duo habent principia intrinseca, nempe materiam et formam; si vero considerantur in statu generationis seu in *fieri*, tria, scil. materiam, formam et privationem. Privatio, cum generatim sit carentia formae in subiecto apto ad formam, sumi potest tum respectu materiae, tum respectu formae. Si sumitur respectu materiae, tunc privatio erit ipsa materia, quatenus forma caret, apta tamen est (inclinatur, appetitum habet) ad illam, sive, ut S. Bonav. ait: «*Appetitus formae* (i. e. appetitus materiae ad formam) *cum carentia eius*». Si sumitur respectu formae, cum ipsa secundum Aristotelem ex materia sive ex potentia materiae sit educenda, privatio erit forma ex materia educenda.

en: Understand [it] according to the objection, in the first book of the *Physics*, which the Vatican ms. also places [there]. A little below and near the end of the solution very many codices, with the first editions, read *operationem* for *operatorum*, but against the text of Ambrose as reported by the Master here, c. 3. — For the understanding of what follows, it is to be observed that, according to Aristotle, natural things, if they are considered in the state of constitution, that is, in *being-made* (*in facto esse*), have two intrinsic principles, namely matter and form; but if they are considered in the state of generation, that is, in *becoming* (*in fieri*), three — namely matter, form, and privation. Privation, since generally it is the lack of form in a subject apt for form, can be taken either with respect to matter or with respect to form. If it is taken with respect to matter, then privation will be the matter itself, insofar as it lacks form yet is apt for it (is inclined toward it, has an appetite for it) — or, as St Bonaventure says: «*the appetite of form* (i.e. the appetite of matter for form) *together with the lack of it*». If it is taken with respect to form, since according to Aristotle form is to be drawn out of matter or out of the potency of matter, privation will be the form to be drawn out of matter.

la: Text. 4-5. seqq. (c. 6.). — Notandum, quod in determinatione, quae sit vera de hac re sententia Aristotelis, nec recentiores nec antiqui eiusdem interpretes conveniunt. S. Bonav. hic approbat sententiam Magistri, sed B. Albertus, *II. Sent.* d. 1. a. 11, asserit: Aristoteles in veritate non dicit hoc, quod tria vel duo sint principia mundi; sed ipse probat, duo non incepisse per motum, scilicet materiam primam et motorem primum; et ideo imponitur ei, quod duo dixerit esse ab aeterno. Et quando dicuntur duo, tunc tanguntur principia naturae essentialiter constituentia naturam, ut materia et forma, quia privatio non constituit, sed abiicitur per motum ad formam. Quando autem dicitur tertium, tunc dicitur seu tangitur primum movens. Cfr. idem, *S.* p. II. tr. I. q. 4. m. 2. a. 3. et 4; et S. Thomas, *II. Sent.* d. 1, qui B. Alberto consentit. Cfr. etiam Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aeg. R., hic in exposit. textus. Idem dissensus est circa sententiam Platonis, de qua re diffuse disputat Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

en: Text 4–5ff. (c. 6). — It is to be noted that, as to what is the true opinion of Aristotle in this matter, neither the more recent nor the ancient interpreters of him agree. St Bonaventure here approves the opinion of the Master, but Bl. Albert, *II Sent.* d. 1, a. 11, asserts: Aristotle in truth does not say this, that there are three or two principles of the world; rather he proves that two did not begin through motion, namely first matter and the first mover; and therefore it is imputed to him that he said two [principles] are from eternity. And when two are spoken of, then the principles essentially constituting nature are touched on, as matter and form, because privation does not constitute [nature] but is cast off by motion toward form. But when a third is spoken of, then the first mover is meant or touched on. Cf. the same author, *Summa* p. II, tr. I, q. 4, m. 2, a. 3 and 4; and St Thomas, *II Sent.* d. 1, who agrees with Bl. Albert. Cf. also Peter of Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, and Giles of Rome, here in the exposition of the text. The same disagreement is found concerning the opinion of Plato, on which matter Denis the Carthusian disputes at length, here q. 3.

la: Graece μορφή, quod latine vertitur modo *forma*, modo *species*. — Cod. L addit aliter: quod privatio non est principium secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem. Dein cod. *cc* et ed. 1 post *appetitus* supplent *materiae*.

en: In Greek μορφή, which in Latin is rendered now *forma*, now *species*. — Codex L adds otherwise: that privation is not a principle according to reality, but only according to reason. Then codex *cc* and ed. 1 after *appetitus* supply *materiae*.

la: Subaudi: *libro Physicorum*, de quo in ipsa obiectione.

en: Supply: *in the book of the Physics*, concerning which [book] [is spoken] in the objection itself.

la: Gen. 1, 6-8: *Dixit quoque Deus: Fiat firmamentum... et factum est vespere et mane, dies secundus.*

en: Genesis 1:6–8: *And God also said: Let there be a firmament... and there was evening and morning, the second day.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.

translators_notes:
**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk uses a single sequence 1–21 spanning pp. 36–38. Page-by-page assignment is approximate where the OCR linearization is ambiguous; content match against the body anchors was the controlling rule.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Dubia

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 51 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera[^1]: *Quia bonus est Deus, sumus*. Videtur enim *falsum dicere*. Nam si consequentia est bona: ergo, si non essemus, Deus non esset bonus. Si dicas, quod non est consequentia necessaria, et[^2] *quia* non dicit ibi *consequentiam*, sed *causam*; obiicitur contra hoc, quia bonitas Dei aut est causa *sufficiens*, aut *non*. Si *sufficiens*, ergo ponit effectum eo modo, quo inest; sed necessarium est, Deum esse bonum: ergo necessarium fuit, creaturas exire in esse, ergo non voluntarium; cuius oppositum monstratum est in libro primo in tractatu de voluntate[^3]. — Item, videtur *male appropriare*. In vestigio enim est correspondentia causae ad effectum, ita quod essentia creaturae repraesentat essentiam Creatoris, potentia potentiam, veritas veritatem et bonitas bonitatem: ergo deberet dicere: quia Deus est, sumus. Propter hoc est quaestio: cum ad nostrum esse concurrat potentia, sapientia, bonitas, quare causalitas nostri esse potius attribuitur bonitati quam aliis?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod causa in actu est ex concursu efficientis et finis, quia finis movet efficientem in his inferioribus. Et quoniam *voluntas* dicit illud quo efficiens iungitur fini in habentibus intellectum, hinc est, quod voluntas est causa immediata; et ita dictum est et ostensum in primo libro[^4]. Quoniam ergo *bonum* dicit rationem duplicis causae, scilicet efficientis et finis, hinc est, quod bonum est ratio, quare voluntas est in actu, et ita potissima ratio productionis effectuum. Et ideo nostrum *esse* attribuitur bonitati, non per modum repraesentandi, vel *appropriationis* in repraesentando, sed rationis in *causando*. Unde prima consequentia includit hanc, scilicet: quia bonus est Deus, vult se diffundere; et quia vult se diffundere, vult creaturam producere; et quia Deus vult creaturam producere, vult creaturam esse; et ita, quia bonus est, sumus[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hac propositione: *In quantum sumus, boni sumus*. Ergo videtur, quod nos boni simus *per essentiam*, quod est contra Boethium in libro de Hebdomadibus[^6], qui dicit, quod sumus boni *participatione*. — Item, si in quantum sumus, boni sumus: ergo non est intelligere *esse*, abstracta bonitate; quod falsum est, cum intelligatur veritas, bonitate abstracta.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod bonitas est duplex in creatura: una quae est ex forma dante *esse*, alia quae est ex forma dante *bene esse*. Prima est bonitas substantialis, quae non addit supra formam novam essentiam[^7], sed solum relationem ad finalem

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causam, ex qua comparatione omne aliud a Deo habet esse bonum. Et quia illa comparatio ad causam essentialem sive finalem est essentialis, nec unquam *esse* relinquit nec potest relinquere; hinc est, quod Augustinus dicit: «In quantum sumus, boni sumus». — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Boethio, dicendum, quod ipse vocat bonum *per essentiam* illud bonum, quod est absolute bonum, non ex dependentia ad aliud. Hoc autem modo nulla creatura bona est, immo ex comparatione, et ideo *participatione*. Nec sequitur, quod *accidentaliter*; quia participatio non est accidentalis respectu primae bonitatis, quae est ex forma dante *esse*, quamvis sit accidentalis, secundum quod est ex forma dante *bene esse*[^8].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est intelligere *esse* etc.; dicendum, quod illud quod attribuitur alicui secundum *quod ipsum*, potest dupliciter attribui: aut enim *consequitur*, aut *praecedit*. Si *praecedit*, sic est ita essentiale, quod sine ipso nec est nec potest intelligi. Sed si aliquo modo *consequitur*, non tamen cadit in aliud genus, potest quidem intelligi intellectu apprehendente et intellectu semiplene resolvente; sed intellectu *plene* ad causas comparante non potest intelligi, non intellecto illo, maxime cum illud dicit habitudinem necessariam et relationem ad causam, sicut verum et bonum[^9].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de his causis, quas assignat Magister circa unionem animae rationalis. Dicit enim primo, quod causa est Dei voluntas; secundo, quod est causa instructio nostra. Et videtur, quod utraque sit inartificialis. Prima enim responsio potest ad omnia dari; in secunda videtur principium peti, quia, si non esset unita, limpide videret Deum nec indigeret exemplo[^10]: ergo si exemplo indiguit, non fuit nisi propter minorationem suae cognitionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister respondet *sufficienter* et *bene*. *Sufficienter* quidem, quia cum sit duplex via cognoscendi opera Dei, scilicet *fide* et *intelligentia*, ad soliditatem *fidei* sufficit scire, quod Deus voluit, quem credit nihil velle nisi rationabile; unde in prima responsione satisfacit fidei, et haec responsio in omnibus fideli[^11], ut fidelis est, plene sufficit. — Ad soliditatem *intelligentiae* redditur ratio; et cum non possit reddi ratio vel causa ex parte Dei, redditur ex parte creaturae. Et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, in quo debet se manifestare non solum propter nostram indigentiam, verum etiam ad suam gloriam[^12]; et sic patent obiecta. Respondetur etiam hic causa efficiens et finalis, et sic sufficienter et plene.

---

english:
### Doubts on the text of the Master.

### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and it is asked, first, about that which Augustine says and which is contained in the *littera*[^1]: *Because God is good, we are*. For it seems *false to say [this]*. For if the consequence is valid: then, if we were not, God would not be good. If you say that it is not a necessary consequence, and[^2] that it does not there state a *consequence* but a *cause*; it is objected against this, that the goodness of God either is a *sufficient* cause, or *not*. If *sufficient*, then it posits the effect in the manner in which it is present [in the cause]; but it is necessary that God be good: therefore it was necessary that creatures go forth into being, therefore not voluntary; the opposite of which was demonstrated in the first book, in the treatise on the will[^3]. — Likewise, it seems to *appropriate badly*. For in a vestige there is a correspondence of the cause to the effect, so that the essence of the creature represents the essence of the Creator, power [represents] power, truth truth, and goodness goodness: therefore he ought to say: *because God is, we are*. On account of this there is a question: since to our being there concur power, wisdom, [and] goodness, why is the causality of our being attributed rather to goodness than to the others?

**I respond:** It must be said that the cause in act is from the concurrence of the efficient [cause] and the end, because the end moves the efficient [cause] in these lower things. And since *will* states that by which the efficient [cause] is joined to the end in [beings] having intellect, hence it is that the will is the immediate cause; and so it has been said and shown in the first book[^4]. Since therefore *the good* states the account of a twofold cause, namely of the efficient and of the end, hence it is that the good is the reason why the will is in act, and so the most powerful reason of the production of effects. And therefore our *being* is attributed to goodness, not by way of representing, or of *appropriation* in representing, but of [its] account in causing. Whence the first consequence includes this, namely: because God is good, he wills to diffuse himself; and because he wills to diffuse himself, he wills to produce a creature; and because God wills to produce a creature, he wills the creature to be; and so, *because he is good, we are*[^5].

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this proposition: *Inasmuch as we are, we are good*. Therefore it seems that we are good *by essence*, which is against Boethius in the book *On the Hebdomads*[^6], who says that we are good *by participation*. — Likewise, if inasmuch as we are, we are good: then it is not [possible] to understand *being* with goodness abstracted [from it]; which is false, since truth is understood with goodness abstracted.

**I respond:** It must be said that goodness is twofold in a creature: one which is from the form giving *being*, another which is from the form giving *well-being*. The first is substantial goodness, which does not add a new essence over the form[^7], but only a relation to the final

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cause, by which comparison everything other than God has being good. And because that comparison to the essential or final cause is essential, and never relinquishes being nor can relinquish [it]; hence it is that Augustine says: «Inasmuch as we are, we are good». — To that, then, which is objected concerning Boethius, it must be said that he calls good *by essence* that good which is absolutely good, not from dependence on another. But in this way no creature is good — rather [it is good] from comparison, and therefore by *participation*. Nor does it follow that [it is good] *accidentally*; because participation is not accidental in respect of the first goodness, which is from the form giving *being*, although it is accidental according as it is from the form giving *well-being*[^8].

To that which is objected, that it is not [possible] to understand *being* etc.; it must be said that what is attributed to something *according to itself* can be attributed in two ways: for it either *follows* or *precedes*. If it *precedes*, then it is so essential that without it [the thing] neither is nor can be understood. But if in some way it *follows*, yet does not fall into another genus, it can indeed be understood by an apprehending intellect and by an intellect resolving half-fully; but by an intellect *fully* comparing [things] to their causes it cannot be understood, that [other] not being understood — especially since it states a necessary relation and a reference to the cause, like *the true* and *the good*[^9].

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning those causes which the Master assigns regarding the union of the rational soul. For he says, first, that the cause is the will of God; secondly, that the cause is our instruction. And it seems that each is unskillful [as an answer]. For the first response can be given to everything; in the second the question seems to be begged, because, if [the soul] were not united, it would see God clearly and would not need an exemplar[^10]: therefore, if it needed an exemplar, it was only on account of the diminishing of its knowledge.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master responds *sufficiently* and *well*. *Sufficiently* indeed, because, since there is a twofold way of knowing the works of God, namely by *faith* and by *understanding*, for the firmness of *faith* it suffices to know that God willed [it], whom [the faithful one] believes to will nothing except what is reasonable; whence in the first response he satisfies faith, and this response, for everyone faithful[^11], inasmuch as he is faithful, fully suffices. — For the firmness of *understanding* a reason is rendered; and since a reason or cause cannot be rendered on the part of God, it is rendered on the part of the creature. And this is the manifestation of the divine goodness in its work, in which [God] ought to manifest himself not only on account of our need, but also for his own glory[^12]; and so the objections are clear. There is also answered here the efficient and final cause, and so [it is answered] sufficiently and fully.

---

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4 [of the Master's *littera*].

la: Sequimur cod. bb addendo *et*, quod contextus requirit. Cod. I *quia haec conditio* i. e. particula conditionalis *quia*.

en: We follow codex bb in adding *et*, which the context requires. Codex I [reads] *quia haec conditio*, i.e. the conditional particle *quia*.

la: Dist. 43.

en: [Book I,] distinction 43.

en: [Book I,] distinction 43, a. 2, q. 1 and 2.

la: De hoc dubio vide I. *Sent.* d. 1. dub. 13. seq.; Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 17. m. 9, et p. II. q. 4. m. 2. et q. 5. m. 2; B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tract. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. et 2; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. dub. 4; Aegid. R., hic circa lit. dub. 4. seqq.

en: On this doubt see I *Sent.* d. 1, dub. 13 seq.; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 17, m. 9, and p. II, q. 4, m. 2, and q. 5, m. 2; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tract. 6, q. 26, m. 2, a. 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 3, q. 1 and 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the text, dub. 4; Giles of Rome, here, on the text, dub. 4 seqq.

la: Sive: «Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bona sint, cum non sint substantialia bona».

en: Or [titled]: «How substances are good in that they are, although they are not substantial goods» [the alternative title of Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*].

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *novum esse*.

en: The Vatican ms. with one or two codices [reads] *novum esse* ("a new being").

la: In hac responsione continetur summa Boethiani opusculi, cuius finis est: *bonum esse essentiam, iustum vero esse actum* respicit... Amplius, bonum quidem generale est, iustum vero speciale, nec species descendit in omnia; idcirco alia quidem iusta, alia aliud, omnia vero bona.

en: In this response is contained the sum of the Boethian opusculum, whose end is: it regards *the good to be essence, but the just to be act*... Further, the good indeed is general, but the just is special, nor does the species descend into all things; therefore some things are just, others [are] something else, but all things are good.

la: Cfr. de hoc I. *Sent.* d. 28. dub. 1; Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 17. m. 4; B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tract. 6. q. 26. m. 1. a. partic. 1; Aegid. R., hic circa lit. dub. 7.

en: Cf. on this I *Sent.* d. 28, dub. 1; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 17, m. 4; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tract. 6, q. 26, m. 1, a. partic. 1; Giles of Rome, here, on the text, dub. 7.

la: Alluditur ad verba Magistri, hic c. 6: *Pro exemplo erit futurae societatis, quae inter Deum et spiritum rationalem glorificatione eiusdem perficienda; animam corporeis indumentis et terrenis mansionibus copulavit* etc.

en: Allusion is made to the words of the Master, here c. 6: *It will serve as an exemplar of the future fellowship which, between God and the rational spirit, is to be perfected by the glorification of the same; he coupled the soul to bodily garments and earthly dwellings* etc.

la: Plures codd. ut H K P Q cc et ed. 1 *in omni fideli*, nonnulli ut F M *in omnibus fidelibus*. Paulo inferius fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 3 *respondetur* pro *redditur*, et dein plurimi codd. cum ed. 3 *responderi* pro *reddi*.

en: Several codices such as H, K, P, Q, cc and ed. 1 [read] *in omni fideli*, some such as F, M *in omnibus fidelibus*. A little below, almost all codices with editions 1, 3 [read] *respondetur* for *redditur*, and then very many codices with ed. 3 *responderi* for *reddi*.

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. — Idem dubium solvit B. Albert., hic a. 14.

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1. — Bl. Albert solves the same doubt, here, a. 14.

translators_notes:
**Final chunk of distinction 1.** With this dubia, distinction 1 (pars 1 + pars 2) is fully Tier-2. The next chunk is `DISTINCTIO II` (raw 4264, OCR-garbled `DISTmCTIO 11.`), a fresh distinction requiring its own re-chunk pass.

**No scholion.** The Quaracchi text has no scholion for this dubia block; `has_scholion: false`.

**Three doubts.** The block contains exactly three numbered doubts (DUB. I, II, III) under the section rubric *Dubia circa litteram Magistri* — verified against the raw OCR (DUB. 1 raw 4189; DUB. II raw 4203; DUB. III raw 4236) and the 450 dpi PDF. DUB I concerns Augustine's *«Quia bonus est Deus, sumus»* and why being is appropriated to goodness; DUB II concerns *«In quantum sumus, boni sumus»* against Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*; DUB III concerns the Master's two causes (God's will; our instruction) for the soul's union with the body.

**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page. This chunk uses a single sequence 1–12: notes 1–7 = the page-51 footer's notes 5–11 (DUB I: *littera* [^1], *et/quia* [^2], *de voluntate* [^3], *in primo libro* [^4], *quia bonus est sumus* [^5]; DUB II: Boethius *de Hebdom.* [^6], *novam essentiam* [^7]); notes 8–12 = the page-52 footer's notes 1–5 (DUB II: *bene esse* [^8], *verum et bonum* [^9]; DUB III: *exemplo* [^10], *in omnibus fideli* [^11], *ad suam gloriam* [^12]).

**Cross-chunk footer splits.**
- *Page-51 footer:* its **notes 1–4** (plus the runover continuation of a3-q2's note 16) anchor in the preceding chunk **a3-q2** (reply 4) and are already captured there as its [^17]–[^20]. This dubia's notes begin at the page-51 footer's **note 5** (`Hic c. 4.`, → DUB I's *littera*). Verified against a3-q2's committed crosswalk; no backfill required.
- *Page-52 footer:* its **notes 1–5** anchor this dubia (DUB II tail + DUB III). The page-52 footer's subsequent **`NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM`** block (notes `Praecedentia codd. nostri non numerant tanquam capitulum...`; `Isidorus, I. Sentent. (sive de Summo Bono) c. 10. n. 4...`; `Gen. 1, 1...`) belongs to the **following** chunk, `DISTINCTIO II` (*De Angelis, quando facti sunt*), whose body begins at the bottom of printed p. 52 (raw 4264). Those are left for that chunk.

**PDF verification (whole chunk).** The IA djvu OCR two-column-bled the DUB I / DUB II Respondeo (raw 4189–4217 interleaved DUB I's *videtur* left column with its Respondeo continuation right column, and scattered the *Notandum* / *Distinctio* marginal glosses inline). The chunk was verified against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 51–52 = PDF pp. 73–74) via PIL column-band crops (`tools/colcrop.py`), reading each page left column then right column, body bands then footer bands. Confirmed reconstructions: the DUB I Respondeo bridge (*voluntas est causa im-* | *-mediata; et ita dictum est et ostensum in primo libro*); the DUB II Respondeo page-51↔52 bridge (*relationem ad finalem* | *causam, ex qua comparatione*); the chunk's terminus (*et sic sufficienter et plene*) immediately before `DISTINCTIO II. Pars I.` on p. 52.

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Editorial side-glosses bleeding inline per CLAUDE.md are not rendered: *Notandum* (×2), *Distinctio*. The section rubric `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` is rendered as the `### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.` heading and the per-doubt rubrics `DUB. I/II/III` as `### Dub. I/II/III.` (same convention as `d1-p1-dubia`).

**Page breaks.** Chunk opens on printed p. 51 (it begins after a3-q2's reply 4; the p. 51 running head at raw 4170 falls within a3-q2's territory). p. 51 ↔ p. 52 placed within DUB II's Respondeo, after *quae non addit supra formam novam essentiam, sed solum relationem ad finalem* (running head `52 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` at raw 4234; the printed break falls between *finalem* and *causam*).

**Open [?] for d.10 polish-blocker.** None blocking — the 450 dpi PDF cleared the genuine garbles. Low-confidence residuals to re-confirm at 600 dpi:
- [^3] / [^4] (DUB I *in tractatu de voluntate* / *ostensum in primo libro*): both are terse I-*Sent.* self-references mapped to the consecutive page-51 footer notes `Dist. 43.` and `Dist. 43. a. 2. q. 1. et 2.`; content-order is secure (videtur ref before Respondeo ref) but the bare loci warrant an eyes-on.
- [^8] (DUB II *bene esse*): page-52 footer note 1 is the long Boethian-*opusculum* summary (`In hac responsione continetur summa Boethiani opusculi...`); the anchor on *ex forma dante bene esse* rests on content match in the cascade-bled p.52 left column — re-confirm at 600 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 2

title_alt: Distinctio II. Magistri Sententiarum (Pars I et II).

title_alt: Distinction 2. The text of the Master of the Sentences (Parts I and II).

source_text:
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### *Distinctio II.*

### *Pars I.*

De Angelica itaque natura haec primo consideranda sunt: quando creata fuerit, et ubi, et qualis facta sit, dum primum conderetur: deinde qualis effecta aversione quorundam et conversione quorundam. De excellentia quoque et ordinibus et donorum differentia, et de officiis ac nominibus aliisque pluribus aliqua dicenda sunt[^1].

### Cap. I. *De Angelis, quando facti sunt.*

Quaedam auctoritates[^2] innuere videntur, «quod ante omnem creaturam creati sunt Angeli». Primo omnium creata est sapientia, quod intelligitur de angelica natura, quae in Scriptura saepe vita, sapientia et lux dicitur. Nam sapientia illa, quae Deus est, creata non est. Filius enim, sapientia Patris, est genita, non facta nec creata; et tota Trinitas una sapientia est, quae nec facta nec creata est, nec genita vel procedens. De angelica ergo vita illud accipiendum est, de qua dicit Scriptura, quando facta est, scilicet primo omnium. — Sed rursus alia Scriptura dicit[^3]: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*. Et in Propheta: *Initio tu, Domine, terram fundasti, et opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli*. Et videtur contrarietas quaedam oriri ex assertionibus istis. Nam si primo

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omnium creata est sapientia, omnia post ipsam facta videntur, et ita post ipsam facta videntur caelum et terra, et ipsa facta ante caelum et terram. Iterum, si in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, nihil factum est ante caelum et terram; nec ipsa sapientia facta est ante caelum et terram. Cum igitur haec contraria videantur, nec in divina Scriptura fas sit sentire aliquid esse contrarietatis, requiramus intelligentiam veritatis. — Videtur itaque hoc esse tenendum, quod simul creata est spiritualis creatura, id est angelica, et corporalis, secundum quod potest accipi illud Salomonis[^4]: *Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul*, id est spiritualem et corporalem naturam; et ita non prius tempore creati sunt Angeli quam illa corporalis materia quatuor elementorum. Et tamen primo omnium creata est sapientia, quia etsi non tempore, praecedit tamen dignitate. Quod autem simul creata fuerit spiritualis corporalisque creatura, Augustinus super Genesim[^5] aperte ostendit dicens, per caelum et terram spiritualem corporalemque creaturam intelligi. Et haec creata sunt in principio, scilicet temporis, vel in principio, quia primo facta sunt.

### Cap. II. *Quod nihil factum est ante caelum et terram.*

Antea enim nihil factum est, nec etiam tempus factum est ante spiritualem, scilicet angelicam naturam, et ante corporalem, scilicet materiam illam quatuor elementorum confusam. Illa enim cum tempore creata sunt, nec ex tempore nec in tempore; sicut nec tempus in tempore creatum est, quia non fuit tempus[^6], antequam esset caelum et terra. Unde Augustinus in libro de Trinitate[^7] dicit, quod Deus fuit dominus, antequam esset tempus, et non in tempore coepit esse dominus, quia fuit dominus temporis, quando coepit esse tempus, nec utique tempus coepit esse in tempore, quia non erat tempus, antequam inciperet tempus.

### Cap. III. *Quod simul cum tempore et cum mundo coepit spiritualis creatura et corporalis.*

Simul ergo cum tempore facta est corporalis et spiritualis creatura, et simul cum mundo; nec fuit ante angelica creatura quam mundus, quia, ut Augustinus[^8] ait, «nulla creatura est ante saecula, sed a saeculis, cum quibus coepit». — Hieronymus tamen super Epistolam ad Titum aliud videtur sentire dicens: «Sex millia necdum nostri temporis implentur annorum, et quantas prius aeternitates, quanta tempora, quantas saeculorum origines fuisse arbitrandum est, in quibus Angeli, Throni, Dominationes ceterique Ordines servierunt Deo absque temporum vicibus atque mensuris, et Deo iubente, substiterunt»! His verbis quidam adhaerentes dixerunt[^9], cum mundo coepisse tempus saeculare, sed ante mundum exstitisse tempus aeternum sine mutabilitate, et in eo immutabiliter et intemporaliter astruunt Angelos, Deo iubente, substitisse eique servisse. — Nos autem[^10] quod prius dictum est, pro captu intelligentiae nostrae magis approbamus, salva tamen reverentia secretorum, in quibus nihil temere asserendum est; et illud Hieronymum dixisse non ita sentiendo, sed aliorum opinionem referendo, arbitramur.

### *Pars II.*

### Cap. IV. *Ubi Angeli mox creati fuerint.*

Iam est ostensum, quando creata fuerit angelica natura. Nunc autem attendendum est, ubi facta fuerit. Testimoniis quarundam auctoritatum evidenter monstratur, Angelos ante casum fuisse in caelo, et inde corruisse quosdam propter superbiam, alios vero, qui non peccaverunt, illic perstitisse. Unde Dominus in Evangelio[^11] ait: *Videbam satanam sicut fulgur de caelo cadentem*. Nec appellatur hic caelum firmamentum, quod secunda die factum est, sed caelum splendidum, quod dicitur empyreum, id est igneum a splendore, non a calore, quod statim factum Angelis est repletum, quod est supra firmamentum. Et illud empyreum quidam expositorum sacrae Scripturae nomine caeli intelligi volunt, ubi Scriptura[^12] dicit: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*. «Caelum, inquit Strabus, non visibile firmamentum hic appellat, sed empyreum, id est igneum vel intellectuale, quod non ab ardore, sed a splendore dicitur, quod statim factum repletum est sanctis Angelis. Unde Iob: *Ubi eras, cum me laudarent astra matutina?* etc.» De hoc quoque Beda[^13] ita ait: «Hoc superius caelum, quod a volubilitate mundi secretum est, mox ut creatum est, sanctis Angelis repletum est, quos in principio cum caelo et terra conditos testatur Dominus dicens: *Ubi eras, cum me laudarent astra matutina, et iubilarent omnes filii Dei?* Astra matutina et filios Dei eosdem Angelos vocat. Caelum enim, in quo posita sunt luminaria, non in principio, sed secunda die factum est». Ex his liquet,

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quod in empyreo omnes Angeli fuerunt ante quorundam ruinam, simulque creati sunt Angeli cum caelo empyreo et cum informi materia omnium corporalium.

### Cap. V. *Quod simul creata est visibilium materia et invisibilium natura, et utraque informis.*

Simul ergo visibilium rerum materia et invisibilium natura condita est, et utraque *informis* fuit secundum aliquid, et *formata* secundum aliquid. Sicut enim corporalium materia confusa et permixta, quae secundum Graecos chaos dicta est, in illo exordio conditionis[^14] primariae et formam confusionis habuit, et non habuit formam distinctionis et discretionis, donec postea formaretur atque distinctas reciperet species; ita spiritualis et angelica natura in sua conditione secundum naturae habitum formata fuit, et tamen illam, quam postea per amorem et conversionem ad Creatorem suum acceptura erat, formam non habuit, sed erat informis sine illa. Unde Augustinus[^15], multipliciter exponens praemissa verba Genesis, per caelum dicit intelligi informem naturam spiritualis vitae, sicut in se potest existere non conversa ad Creatorem, in quo formatur; per terram, corporalem materiam sine omni qualitate, quae apparet in materia formata.

### Cap. VI. *Quomodo dixerit lucifer: Ascendam in caelum.*

Hic quaeri solet, si in caelo empyreo fuerunt Angeli, statim ubi facti sunt, quomodo, ut legitur in Isaia[^16], dicit lucifer: *Ascendam in caelum et exaltabo solium meum, et ero similis Altissimo?* — Sed ibi caelum vocat Dei celsitudinem, cui parificari volebat, et est tale: *Ascendam in caelum*, id est ad aequalitatem Dei.

---

english:
### *Distinction II.*

### *Part I.*

Concerning the angelic nature, then, these things must first be considered: when it was created, and where, and of what kind it was made when it was first founded; then of what kind it became by the turning-away of some and the turning-toward [God] of others. Concerning also [their] excellence and the orders and the difference of gifts, and concerning [their] offices and names and several other matters, some things must be said[^1].

### Chapter I. *On the angels: when they were made.*

Certain authorities[^2] seem to suggest «that the angels were created before all creation». First of all was created wisdom, which is understood of the angelic nature, which in Scripture is often called *life*, *wisdom*, and *light*. For that wisdom which God is, is not created. For the Son, the wisdom of the Father, is begotten, not made nor created; and the whole Trinity is one wisdom, which is neither made nor created, neither begotten nor proceeding. Of the angelic life, therefore, that [text] is to be taken which Scripture speaks of when it [says] it was made, namely *first of all*. — But again another Scripture says[^3]: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*. And in the Prophet: *In the beginning, Lord, thou didst found the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands*. And a certain contrariety seems to arise from these assertions. For if first

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of all wisdom was created, all things seem to have been made after it, and thus heaven and earth seem to have been made after it, and it [seems] made before heaven and earth. Again, if in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, nothing was made before heaven and earth; nor was wisdom itself made before heaven and earth. Since therefore these things seem contrary, and since in divine Scripture it is not lawful to suppose that there is anything of contrariety, let us seek the understanding of the truth. — It seems, therefore, that this is to be held: that the spiritual creature, that is the angelic, and the corporeal were created together, according as that [saying] of Solomon[^4] can be taken: *He that liveth for ever created all things together*, that is, the spiritual and the corporeal nature; and thus the angels were not created prior in time to that corporeal matter of the four elements. And yet first of all wisdom was created, because, although not in time, it nevertheless precedes in dignity. That the spiritual and corporeal creature were created together, Augustine on Genesis[^5] plainly shows, saying that by *heaven and earth* the spiritual and corporeal creature are understood. And these were created *in the beginning*, namely of time, or *in the beginning* because they were made first.

### Chapter II. *That nothing was made before heaven and earth.*

For before this nothing was made, nor was even time made before the spiritual — namely the angelic — nature, and before the corporeal — namely that confused matter of the four elements. For these were created with time, not from time nor in time; just as neither was time created in time, because there was no time[^6] before heaven and earth were. Whence Augustine in the book *On the Trinity*[^7] says that God was Lord before there was time, and did not begin to be Lord in time, because he was the Lord of time when time began to be; nor indeed did time begin to be in time, because there was no time before time began.

### Chapter III. *That the spiritual and the corporeal creature began together with time and with the world.*

Together therefore with time the corporeal and the spiritual creature was made, and together with the world; nor was the angelic creature before the world, because, as Augustine[^8] says, «no creature is before the ages, but from the ages, with which it began». — Jerome, however, on the Epistle to Titus seems to think otherwise, saying: «Six thousand years of our time are not yet fulfilled, and how many eternities before, how many times, how many origins of ages must we suppose there to have been, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the rest of the Orders served God without the alternations and measures of times, and, at God's bidding, subsisted»! Certain men, adhering to these words, said[^9] that secular time began with the world, but that before the world there existed an eternal time without mutability, and they assert that in it the Angels, immutably and outside time, at God's bidding, subsisted and served him. — But we[^10] rather approve, according to the capacity of our understanding, what was said before, saving nevertheless reverence for the secret things, in which nothing is to be rashly asserted; and we judge that Jerome said that not in the sense of [his own] opinion, but reporting the opinion of others.

### *Part II.*

### Chapter IV. *Where the angels were created at first.*

It has already been shown when the angelic nature was created. Now, however, it must be attended to where it was made. By the testimonies of certain authorities it is evidently shown that the angels were in heaven before the fall, and that thence some fell through pride, while others, who did not sin, stood fast there. Whence the Lord in the Gospel[^11] says: *I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven*. Nor is heaven here called the firmament, which was made on the second day, but the splendid heaven, which is called *empyrean*, that is, fiery from splendor, not from heat, which as soon as it was made was filled with angels, which is above the firmament. And that empyrean some of the expositors of sacred Scripture wish to be understood by the name of *heaven* where Scripture[^12] says: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*. «Heaven», says Strabus, «here does not name the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual [heaven], which is so called not from burning but from splendor, which as soon as it was made was filled with the holy angels. Whence Job: *Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me?* etc.» Of this too Bede[^13] thus says: «This higher heaven, which is set apart from the revolving of the world, as soon as it was created was filled with the holy angels, whom the Lord testifies to have been founded in the beginning with heaven and earth, saying: *Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God rejoiced?* By *the morning stars* and *the sons of God* he calls the same angels. For the heaven in which the luminaries are placed was made not in the beginning, but on the second day». From these things it is clear

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that in the empyrean all the angels were before the ruin of some, and that the angels were created together with the empyrean heaven and with the unformed matter of all corporeal things.

### Chapter V. *That the matter of visible things and the nature of invisible things were created together, and both unformed.*

Together therefore the matter of visible things and the nature of invisible things was founded, and each was *unformed* in some respect, and *formed* in some respect. For just as the confused and commingled matter of corporeal things — which according to the Greeks is called *chaos* — in that beginning of [its] primary founding[^14] both had the form of confusion and did not have the form of distinction and discretion, until afterward it should be formed and receive distinct species; so the spiritual and angelic nature in its founding was formed according to the habit of [its] nature, and yet it did not have that form which it was afterward, through love and conversion to its Creator, to receive, but was unformed without it. Whence Augustine[^15], expounding the foregoing words of Genesis in many ways, says that by *heaven* is understood the unformed nature of spiritual life, as it can exist in itself not [yet] converted to the Creator, in whom it is formed; by *earth*, the corporeal matter without any quality, such as appears in formed matter.

### Chapter VI. *How Lucifer said: I will ascend into heaven.*

Here it is customarily asked: if the angels were in the empyrean heaven as soon as they were made, how, as is read in Isaiah[^16], does Lucifer say: *I will ascend into heaven and exalt my throne, and I will be like the Most High?* — But there he calls *heaven* the loftiness of God, to which he wished to make himself equal; and it amounts to this: *I will ascend into heaven*, that is, to equality with God.

---

la: Praecedentia codd. nostri non numerant tanquam capitulum. Iam cod. Erf. in margine notulam habet, quae dicit: *Aliqui non connumerant hoc pro capitulo, sed incipiunt primum capitulum sequenti capitulo, et hinc est diversitas in illa parte*.

en: Our codices do not number the preceding [matter] as a chapter. Already codex Erf. has in the margin a little note which says: *Some do not count this as a chapter, but begin the first chapter with the following chapter, and hence there is divergence in that part*.

la: Isidorus, *I. Sentent.* (sive *de Summo Bono*) c. 10. n. 4: «Ante omnem creaturam Angeli facti sunt, dum dictum est: *Fiat lux*. De ipsis enim dicit Scriptura: *Prior omnium creata est sapientia*» (*Eccli.* 1, 4.). — Magister haec sumsit ex Hugone, *I. de Sacram.* p. V. c. 2, et *Sent.* tr. 2. c. 1. — Cfr. August., *XII. Confess.* c. 15.

en: Isidore, *Sentences* I (or *On the Highest Good*) c. 10, n. 4: «Before all creation the angels were made, when it was said: *Let there be light*. For of them Scripture says: *Wisdom was created before all things*» (*Ecclesiasticus* [Sirach] 1:4). — The Master took this from Hugh, *On the Sacraments* I, part V, c. 2, and *Sentences* tr. 2, c. 1. — Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* XII, c. 15.

en: *Genesis* 1:1; the following locus is *Psalm* 101:26.

en: *Ecclesiasticus* (Sirach) 18:1.

la: Nempe *Gen. ad lit.* l. c. 1. n. 2. 3, c. 3. n. 7. 8, c. 4. n. 9; et *XI. de Civ. Dei*, c. 33. in fine.

en: Namely *On Genesis according to the Letter* I, c. 1, nn. 2–3; c. 3, nn. 7–8; c. 4, n. 9; and *City of God* XI, c. 33, at the end.

la: Cfr. *I. Sent.* d. XXX. c. 1, et ibid. *Comment. S. Bonav.* dub. 2. — Subinde pro *antequam* codd. *priusquam*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* Book I, distinction 30, c. 1, and there the *Commentary of St. Bonaventure*, dubium 2. — Thereafter, in place of *antequam* the codices [read] *priusquam*.

en: [*On the Trinity*] Book V, c. 16, n. 17.

la: *De Gen. ad lit.* V. c. 19. n. 38. — Codd., excepto D, et edd., exc. 1, 8, post *creatura* addunt *creata*. — Sequens locus Hieronymi est in eius *Comment. ad* c. 1. v. 3.

en: *On Genesis according to the Letter* V, c. 19, n. 38. — The codices, except D, and the editions, except 1 and 8, after *creatura* add *creata*. — The following passage of Jerome is in his *Commentary on* [Titus], c. 1, v. 3.

la: Cfr. August., *XI. de Civ. Dei*, c. 6.

en: Cf. Augustine, *City of God* XI, c. 6.

la: Cod. A hic interserit *Hugo*, et revera Magister haec et antecedentia sumsit ex Hugone, *I. de Sacram.* p. V. c. 1, et *Sent.* tr. 2. c. 1.

en: Codex A here inserts [the name] *Hugh*, and indeed the Master took these and the preceding [words] from Hugh, *On the Sacraments* I, part V, c. 1, and *Sentences* tr. 2, c. 1.

la: *Luc.* 10, 18. — Paulo post pro *hic* nonnullae edd. cum Vat. *hoc*.

en: *Luke* 10:18. — Shortly after, in place of *hic* some editions with the Vatican [edition read] *hoc*.

la: *Gen.* 1, 1. — Verba Walafridi Strabi (et Strabonis † 849) inveniuntur in *Glossa ordin.* in hunc locum. Cfr. August., *XI. de Civ. Dei*, c. 33. Deinde locus ex *Iob* est 38, 7.

en: *Genesis* 1:1. — The words of Walafrid Strabo (and of Strabo, †849) are found in the *Ordinary Gloss* on this place. Cf. Augustine, *City of God* XI, c. 33. Then the passage from *Job* is 38:7.

la: *Hexaem.* 1. ad *Gen.* 1, 2, nonnullis interpolatis. (Convenit fere ad verbum Strabus, loc. cit.). — Mox pro *repletum* edd. cum Vat. *impletum*, quae et paulo inferius cum aliquibus edd. post *eosdem Angelos* adiungit *Dei*.

en: *Hexaemeron* I, on *Genesis* 1:2, with some interpolations. (It agrees almost word for word with Strabus, at the place cited.) — Soon, in place of *repletum* the editions with the Vatican [edition read] *impletum*, which also a little below, with some editions, after *eosdem Angelos* adds *Dei*.

la: Vat. sola *ordinationis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *ordinationis* [in place of *conditionis*].

la: *De Gen. ad lit.* I. c. 10. seqq. et *XII. Confess.* c. 9. — Post verbum *Genesis* edd. 1 et 8 interserunt verba Scripturae: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram* etc.

en: *On Genesis according to the Letter* I, c. 10 and following, and *Confessions* XII, c. 9. — After the word *Genesis* editions 1 and 8 insert the words of Scripture: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth* etc. *[The book numeral in the Latin locus reads as a single mark in the cropped p.54 footer; rendered* I. *by Quaracchi convention for the De Gen. ad lit. angelology citation — `[?]` low-confidence, parked for the d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker.]*

en: *[Isaiah]* chapter 14, [v.] 13.

translators_notes:
- This chunk is Lombard's *littera* for Book II, Distinction II, covering printed pp. 52–54. **Pars I** = the distinction-preamble + Cap. I–III (when and whence the angelic nature was created; whether anything preceded heaven and earth; that the spiritual and corporeal creature began together with time and the world). **Pars II** = Cap. IV–VI (where the angels were first created — the empyrean; that visible matter and invisible nature were created together and both unformed; how Lucifer's «*Ascendam in caelum*» is to be read). Bonaventure's commentary on the distinction follows in its own divisio + questions + dubia chunks (`d2-p1-divisio` onward).
- **One littera chunk for the whole distinction** (no `-p1-`/`-p2-` infix), following the `bon-sent-II-d1-littera` precedent: Lombard's d.2 text prints Pars I and Pars II together at the top of pp. 52–54; the «*Pars II.*» divider falls between Cap. III and Cap. IV within the continuous littera block, and Bonaventure's `COMMENTARIUS … Pars I` begins only afterward (mid-p.54, raw 4418 = `d2-p1-divisio`).
- **Page layout (verified against the 450 dpi PDF column bands, pp. 52–54 = PDF pp. 74–76).** The littera is two-column at the top of each page. The chunk opens mid-left-column on p.52 (the upper-left + entire right column of p.52 above it is the already-committed `d1-p2-dubia` DUB I–III). p.52→p.53 break falls within Cap. I at *Nam si primo | omnium creata est sapientia*. p.53→p.54 break falls within Cap. IV at *Ex his liquet, | quod in empyreo omnes Angeli*. On p.54 the littera (Cap. IV tail → Cap. V → Cap. VI) occupies the two-column top; the full-width `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II. Pars I.` begins below it and belongs to the next chunk.
- **Apparatus crosswalk (chunk-internal renumber 1–16; Quaracchi restarts per printed page):**
  - **p.52** — the littera uses the dedicated `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block (right-column footer), notes 1–3 → **[^1]–[^3]** ([^1] = the chapter-numbering note at the preamble's *…dicenda sunt¹*; [^2] = Isidore/Hugh at *auctoritates²*; [^3] = Gen 1:1 + Ps 101:26 at *Scriptura dicit³*). The p.52 **main-stream** footer notes 1–5 are *not* littera apparatus — they anchor the preceding `d1-p2-dubia` and are already its [^8]–[^12] (confirmed by reading the committed chunk: its [^9] = the `Cfr. de hoc I. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1…` note that the session-13 resume had tentatively mis-assigned to this littera's *auctoritates²*). No backfill of `d1-p2-dubia` required; its Notes already defer the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block here.
  - **p.53** — footer left-column notes 1–7 → **[^4]–[^10]**; right-column notes 8–10 → **[^11]–[^13]** (note 7 = `Cod. A hic interserit Hugo…`, runover continued at the head of the right-column footer, anchored at Cap. III's *Nos autem¹⁰*).
  - **p.54** — littera footer notes 1–3 → **[^14]–[^16]** ([^14] at Cap. V *conditionis¹⁴*; [^15] at Cap. V *Augustinus¹⁵* / *verba Genesis*; [^16] at Cap. VI *in Isaia¹⁶*, = Isaiah 14:13). The subsequent **`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`** sub-block (note 1 `In Vat. additur ex auctoritatibus.` …) anchors the `COMMENTARIUS` divisio and is deferred to `d2-p1-divisio` — the exact mirror of `d1-littera` deferring its `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` to `d1-p1-divisio`.
- **No scholion.** Lombard's littera has no scholion; `has_scholion: false`.
- **Marginal glosses trimmed** per CLAUDE.md (not rendered as text): *Auctoritates pro opinione 1*, *pro opinione 2*, *Resp. Magistri*, *Augustinus* (×3), *Hieronymus*, *Aliorum opinio*, *Sententia Magistri*, *Strabus*, *Beda*, *Dub. 1/2/4*.
- **Open [?] for the d.10 polish-blocker** (none blocking; the 450 dpi PDF cleared the genuine garbles):
  1. **[^15] book numeral** — the Quaracchi locus `De Gen. ad lit. ?. c. 10. seqq.` shows the book number as a single mark in the cropped p.54 left-column footer; rendered `I.` by convention for Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* angelology citation. Re-confirm the numeral at 600 dpi.
  2. **[^3] anchor placement** — `Gen. 1, 1; seq. locus est Ps. 101, 26` covers a citation pair; marker placed at *Sed rursus alia Scriptura dicit³* (Quaracchi habit: one marker, the note naming the *seq. locus*). The two-column p.52→p.53 cascade made the exact glyph position ambiguous; content match is secure. Re-confirm at 600 dpi.


title: Dist. 2, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem II. Pars I — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction 2. Part I — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions.

source_text:
<!-- page 54 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

### *Pars I.*

*Quando creati sunt Angeli et de mensura durationis eorum.*

**De angelica itaque natura etc.**

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de rerum productione in generali. In hac parte agit de productione rerum in speciali. Et quoniam triplex est differentia creaturae, scilicet spiritualis et corporalis et composita ex utraque, ideo haec pars habet tres. In prima agit de conditione spiritualis creaturae. In secunda de conditione corporalis creaturae, infra distinctione duodecima: *Haec de angelicae naturae* etc. In tertia de conditione naturae ex utrisque compositae, scilicet humanae, infra distinctione decima sexta: *His excursis, quae supra de homine*. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quales facti sunt Angeli ex prima conditione. In secunda determinat, quales facti sunt ex aversione et conversione, infra distinctione quinta: *Post haec consideratio adducit* etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quando et ubi creati sunt Angeli. In secunda vero, quales creati sunt, infra distinctione tertia: *Ecce ostensum est, ubi Angeli* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. Primo enim determinat, *quando* Angeli creati fuerunt; in secunda, *ubi*, infra distinctione eadem: *Iam ostensum est* etc. Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima praemittit prooemium, in quo aperit suam intentionem. In secunda vero movet[^1] dubitationem circa durationem sive initium vel mensuram angelicae conditionis, ibi: *Quaedam auctoritates videntur*. In tertia determinat veritatem et confirmat, ibi: *Videtur itaque, hoc esse tenendum*. Quarto vero et ultimo veritatem praedeterminatam et probatam concludit, et auctoritatem in oppositum determinat, ibi: *Simul ergo cum tempore* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua quaeritur de mensura conditionis angelicae naturae, duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo de mensura eius in se.

Secundo per comparationem ad mensuram esse corporalis naturae.

Circa primum tria quaeruntur.

Primo, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram propriam.

Secundo, utrum habeant mensuram unicam.

Tertio, utrum habeant mensuram simplicem aut compositam, sive stantem vel successivam.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION 2.

### *Part I.*

*When the angels were created, and on the measure of their duration.*

**"As to the angelic nature," etc.**

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the production of things in general. In this part he treats of the production of things in particular. And since the difference of creatures is threefold — namely spiritual, corporeal, and composite of both — therefore this part has three [subdivisions]. In the first he treats of the condition of the spiritual creature. In the second, of the condition of the corporeal creature, below at distinction 12: *"These things concerning the angelic nature,"* etc. In the third, of the condition of the nature composed of both — namely the human — below at distinction 16: *"These things having been surveyed, which [were said] above concerning man."* The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he determines of what kind the angels were made from [their] first condition. In the second he determines of what kind they became by the turning-away and the turning-toward [God], below at distinction 5: *"After these things consideration leads on,"* etc. The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he determines *when* and *where* the angels were created. In the second, of what kind they were created, below at distinction 3: *"Behold, it has been shown where the angels [are],"* etc.

The first part has two [subdivisions]. For first he determines *when* the angels were created; in the second, *where*, below at the same distinction: *"It has already been shown,"* etc. The first part has four particles. In the first he sets forth a proem, in which he opens his intention. In the second he raises[^1] a doubt concerning the duration — or the beginning, or the measure — of the angelic condition, at: *"Certain authorities seem [to suggest]."* In the third he determines the truth and confirms [it], at: *"It seems, therefore, that this is to be held."* In the fourth and last he concludes the truth thus predetermined and proved, and determines the authority [adduced] to the contrary, at: *"Together therefore with time,"* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, in which it is asked concerning the measure of the condition of the angelic nature, two things are principally asked.

First, concerning its measure in itself.

Second, by comparison to the measure of the being of corporeal nature.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First, whether spiritual things have a measure proper [to them].

Second, whether they have a single measure.

Third, whether they have a simple or a composite measure — that is, a standing or a successive [one].

---

la: In Vat. additur *ex auctoritatibus*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] is added: *ex auctoritatibus* ["from [the] authorities"].

translators_notes:
- This chunk is Bonaventure's prologue-and-divisio for Distinction II, Part I. It opens with the COMMENTARIUS heading, the *Pars I* subtitle, the topic line (*Quando creati sunt Angeli et de mensura durationis eorum*), and the Lombard incipit being commented (*De angelica itaque natura etc.*); then the formal *Divisio textus* lays out the nested division of Lombard's d.II littera (three-fold creature difference → spiritual / corporeal / composite; the spiritual part's *quando* / *ubi* split; the four particles of the *quando* part); then the *Tractatio quaestionum* enumerates the two angles of approach (measure in itself / by comparison to corporeal being) and the three questions on a proper, single, simple-or-composite measure.
- **One printed page.** The entire divisio (full-width COMMENTARIUS header + two-column DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM) sits below the two-column littera on printed p.54 (= PDF p.76); p.55 opens the next chunk `bon-sent-II-d2-p1-a1-q1` at the running head `DIST. II. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. 1.` Verified against the 450 dpi column-band crops (`vol2-p054-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), reading left column then right column.
- **ARTICULUS I opener folds into a1-q1** (Vol II chunking convention, CLAUDE.md override step 5): there is no standalone `d2-p1-a1-divisio` chunk; the short *Circa primum tria quaeruntur* article-opener is the tail of this divisio's TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, and ARTICULUS I's sub-divisio (if any) belongs to `d2-p1-a1-q1`.
- **No scholion.** A divisio chunk has no scholion; `has_scholion: false`.
- **Single apparatus entry / cross-chunk footer.** The p.54 footer carries two streams: the *littera* notes 1–3 (`Vat. sola ordinationis.` / `De Gen. ad lit. I. c. 10. seqq. et XII. Confess. c. 9. — Post verbum Genesis…` / `Cap. 14, 13.`) and, after the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM.` rubric, the *commentary* note 1 (`In Vat. additur ex auctoritatibus.`). The three littera notes anchor Cap. V/VI of Lombard's text and were already taken into `d2-littera` as its [^14]–[^16] (session 14); this divisio holds only the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` note 1, anchored at the DIVISIO TEXTUS's sole body marker *movet¹ dubitationem* (the Vatican edition inserts *ex auctoritatibus* after *movet dubitationem*). No backfill of `d2-littera` required; this exactly mirrors `d1-p1-divisio` taking the p.13 `Notae ad Commentarium` note while `d1-littera` kept the page's littera notes.
- **No [?] flags.** The single note and its anchor are unambiguous in the 450 dpi crop; nothing parked for the d.10 polish-blocker from this chunk.
- **Marginal glosses:** none in this divisio's raw range (the body is the formal text-division and question list; no editorial side-glosses to trim).


title: Dist. 2, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem II. Pars II — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction 2. Part II — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions.

source_text:
<!-- page 70 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

### *Pars II.*

*De loco, ubi fuerunt Angeli creati.*

**Iam est ostensum, quando etc.**

*(Textum Magistri vide supra pag. 53.)*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, *quando* Angeli fuerunt creati; in hac parte ostendit, *ubi* fuerunt creati, quia scilicet in empyreo. Et dividitur pars ista in tres partes. In prima determinat, ubi creati fuerunt. In secunda vero repetit, quando creati fuerunt, ibi: *Simul ergo visibilium* etc. In tertia vero removet dubitationem, ibi: *Hic quaeri solet, si in caelo empyreo* etc. Sic circa duo versatur intentio partis praesentis, scilicet circa loci angelici *quidditatem*, et quantum ad *actum locandi*, sive officium, quod dicitur habere caelum empyreum respectu Angelorum.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, quae est de loco creationis Angelorum, cuiusmodi est empyreum caelum, circa duo incidit dubitatio.

Primo, circa naturam empyrei in se.

Secundo, in quantum habet locare spiritus sublimes.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primum est quantum ad qualitatem[^1] naturae.

Secundum quantum ad virtutem influentiae.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION 2.

### *Part II.*

*On the place where the angels were created.*

**"It has already been shown when," etc.**

*(For the text of the Master see above, p. 53.)*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed *when* the angels were created; in this part he shows *where* they were created — namely, in the empyrean. And this part is divided into three parts. In the first he determines where they were created. In the second he repeats when they were created, at: *"Together therefore with the visible [things],"* etc. In the third he removes a doubt, at: *"Here it is wont to be asked, whether in the empyrean heaven,"* etc. So the intention of the present part turns upon two [things], namely upon the *quiddity* of the angelic place, and as to the *act of locating* — or the office — which the empyrean heaven is said to have with respect to the angels.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, which is about the place of the creation of the angels — of what kind the empyrean heaven is — a doubt falls upon two [things].

First, concerning the nature of the empyrean in itself.

Second, in so far as it has [the office] of locating sublime spirits.

Concerning the first, two things are asked.

The first is as to the *quality*[^1] of [its] nature.

The second, as to the power of [its] influence.

---

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. hic et in principio principalis quaestionis *quidditatem*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] *quidditatem* ["quiddity"] here and at the beginning of the principal question [in place of *qualitatem*, "quality"].

translators_notes:
- This chunk is Bonaventure's prologue-and-divisio for Distinction II, **Part II** (on the *place* where the angels were created — the empyrean). It opens with the COMMENTARIUS heading, the *Pars II* subtitle, the topic line (*De loco, ubi fuerunt Angeli creati*), the Lombard incipit being commented (*Iam est ostensum, quando etc.*), and the editorial cross-reference *Textum Magistri vide supra pag. 53* (the Master's d.II littera was printed in full with Pars I, p. 53); then the formal *Divisio textus* lays out the three-fold division of Lombard's text (where created / repeats when, *Simul ergo visibilium* / removes a doubt, *Hic quaeri solet*) and the two-fold focus of the present part (the place's *quidditas*; the *actus locandi*); then the *Tractatio quaestionum* enumerates the two angles (nature of the empyrean in itself / its office of locating spirits) and, under the first, the two questions (quality of [its] nature; power of [its] influence).
- **One printed page (p.70).** The whole divisio sits in the lower portion of printed p.70 (= PDF p.92), below DUB II's Respondeo tail of the preceding `bon-sent-II-d2-p1-dubia`. Verified against the 450 dpi column-band crops (`vol2-p070-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), reading left column then right column. The `ARTICULUS I.` header + `De natura caeli empyrei in se.` + `QUAESTIO I. Utrum caelum empyreum sit, et cuiusmodi sit.` also begin on p.70 but **fold into the next chunk** `d2-p2-a1-q1` (Vol II chunking convention, CLAUDE.md override step 5): there is no standalone `d2-p2-a1-divisio` chunk.
- **No scholion.** A divisio chunk has no scholion; `has_scholion: false`.
- **Single apparatus entry / three-way cross-chunk footer split at p.70.** Printed p.70's footer carries four notes; they split by body anchor across **three** chunks:
  - **note 1** (`Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq.`) → preceding `bon-sent-II-d2-p1-dubia`, anchored at DUB II's terminal *in suo correlativo* — already committed as that chunk's `[^13]` (session 22). **No backfill.**
  - **note 2** (`Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. hic et in principio principalis quaestionis quidditatem.`) → **this chunk**, `[^1]`, anchored at the TRACTATIO's *Primum est quantum ad qualitatem¹ naturae* (the marker sits at the first of the two places the note describes — *hic*; the second, *in principio principalis quaestionis*, is QUAESTIO I's opener in the next chunk).
  - **notes 3–4** (`Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 78, nota 2. et pag. 157, nota 11. Paulo superius Vat. cuiusmodi naturae pro cuiusmodi.`; `Vide Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 76. (c. 9.), ubi probat, motum circularem…`) → following `bon-sent-II-d2-p2-a1-q1`, anchored in QUAESTIO I's opener and fundamentum 1. When `d2-p2-a1-q1` is built (session 24), **start its apparatus at p.70 footer note 3**, by body anchor, and verify this chunk captured p.70 note 2. Same convention as the `d2-p1-divisio`/`d2-littera` and a2-q1↔a2-q2 splits.
- **No [?] flags.** The single note and its anchor are unambiguous in the 450 dpi crop (the colcrop L/R splitter showed `qualitatem` with a clear superscript and the footer note in the p.70 left-column footer band); nothing parked for the d.10 polish-blocker from this chunk. (The editorial cross-ref reads `VIDE SUPRA PAG. 53` in the 450 dpi crop; the IA OCR garbled it to `PAG. 93` — the crop value `53` is used, consistent with Lombard's d.II littera being printed on p.53.)
- **Marginal glosses:** none in this divisio's raw range (the body is the formal text-division and question list; no editorial side-glosses to trim).