title: Dist. 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem II: Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction II: Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
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### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

*De Unitate et Trinitate secundum quod creditur.*

**Hoc itaque vera ac pia fide tenendum est etc.**

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Haec est secunda pars, in qua, primi libri materia indagata, incipit Magister prosequi; dividitur autem haec pars[^1] in duas partes, quoniam dupliciter est considerare res, quibus fruendum, scilicet in se, et in comparatione ad creaturas: in se ratione trinitatis et unitatis; in comparatione ad creaturas ratione scientiae, potentiae et voluntatis. Primo ergo agit[^2] de sancta Trinitate et Unitate; secundo de scientia et potentia et voluntate, infra distinctione trigesima quinta: *Cumque supra disseruerimus.*

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De ipsa autem sacratissima Trinitate tripliciter contingit tractare, quoniam primo contingit ipsam credere, secundo creditam intelligere, tertio intellectam dicere sive enuntiare. Credere autem est per auctoritatem, intelligere per rationem, dicere per catholicam et rationabilem[^3] locutionem. Ideo primo de ipsa Trinitate et Unitate agit, secundum quod creditur; secundo de ipsa, secundum quod credita per rationem intelligitur, ibi, distinctione tertia: *Apostolus namque ait;* tertio, secundum quod credita et intellecta rationabiliter et catholice exprimitur, infra, distinctione vigesima secunda: *Post praedicta disserendum nobis videtur de nominum diversitate.* Et patet ordo. Prius enim et verius est eam credere quam intelligere; multi enim credunt, qui non intelligunt; et prius similiter est intelligere quam sermone exprimere.

Prima pars, scilicet secundum quod creditur, continet praesentem distinctionem; et quoniam materia est difficillima, *primo* ponit modum procedendi; *secundo* vero exsequitur, ibi: *Proponamus ergo in medium.*

Item, prima pars secundum tria capitula[^4] habet tres partes. In prima tangit modum agendi, quoniam debet esse cum modestia, timore et diligentia, praemittens materiam, circa quam agere intendit. In secunda subiungit intentionem scribentium de Trinitate, ibi, secundo capitulo: *Omnes autem catholici tractatores.* Tertio tangit ordinem, ibi: *Ceterum, ut in libro primo.*

Modus scribendi de Trinitate debet esse fundatus supra intellectum fidei et cum modestia et timore propter periculum. Intentio scribentium de Trinitate est ostendere[^5], quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae et unus Deus. Ordo scribendi est, primo per auctoritates ostendere veritatem, deinde per rationes et congruas similitudines.

*Proponamus ergo in medium.* Haec est secunda pars, in qua Magister auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae intendit ostendere Trinitatem et Unitatem; et quoniam[^6] sacra Scriptura habet duas partes, scilicet novum et vetus Testamentum, ideo primo ostendit hoc per auctoritates veteris Testamenti, deinde per auctoritates novi, ibi: *Nunc vero post*[^7] *testimonia* etc. Et quoniam vetus Testamentum duas habet partes, scilicet Legem et Prophetas, in quibus fides explicatur, ideo ostendit primo per testimonia Legis, secundo per testimonia Prophetarum, ibi: *Ille etiam maximus Prophetarum.* Prima iterum pars, in qua probat per testimonia Legis, duas habet partes: primo enim probat essentiae unitatem; secundo unitatem simul et trinitatem, ibi: *Personarum quoque pluralitatem.* Similiter illa[^8] de testimoniis Prophetarum habet duas: in prima probat essentiae unitatem et personarum pluralitatem in communi; in secunda vero in speciali ostendit Filii generationem et Spiritus sancti processionem, ibi: *David quoque aeternam Filii generationem.* Similiter illa pars, in qua probat per auctoritates novi Testamenti, habet duas partes: primo enim probat per auctoritates sive per testimonia Iesu Christi; secundo per auctoritates Apostolorum, ibi: *Ioannes quoque in Epistola canonica.* Auctoritates et earum explanationes et numerus et diversitates satis patent in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad declarationem eorum quae de sacra Trinitate et Unitate dicit Magister, quatuor possunt quaeri circa partem istam.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit ponere essentiae sive naturae unitatem.

Secundo, utrum in Deo sit ponere personarum pluralitatem.

Tertio, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere infinitatem.

Quarto et ultimo, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere trinitatem.

---

english:
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### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II.

*On the Unity and Trinity insofar as it is believed.*

**This therefore must be held by a true and pious faith, etc.**

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

This is the second part, in which, the matter of the first book having been investigated, the Master begins to proceed further; and this part[^1] is divided into two parts, since the things to be enjoyed can be considered in two ways, namely in themselves, and in comparison to creatures: in themselves by reason of trinity and unity; in comparison to creatures by reason of knowledge, power, and will. First therefore he treats[^2] of the holy Trinity and Unity; secondly of knowledge and power and will, below at distinction thirty-five: *And whereas we have above discussed.*

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Now concerning the most sacred Trinity itself it happens that one treats in three ways, since first it happens that one believes it, secondly that one understands what is believed, thirdly that one expresses or enunciates what has been understood. Now to believe is by authority, to understand is by reason, to express is by catholic and reasonable[^3] discourse. Therefore first he treats of the Trinity and Unity itself, insofar as it is believed; secondly of the same, insofar as having been believed it is understood by reason, in distinction three: *For the Apostle says;* thirdly, insofar as having been believed and understood it is expressed reasonably and catholicly, below, at distinction twenty-two: *After what has been said it seems to us that we must discuss the diversity of names.* And the order is clear. For prior and truer is it to believe than to understand; for many believe who do not understand; and likewise it is prior to understand than to express in speech.

The first part, namely insofar as it is believed, contains the present distinction; and since the matter is most difficult, *first* he sets forth the manner of proceeding; *secondly* he carries it out, there: *Let us therefore propose in the midst.*

Likewise, the first part according to the three chapters[^4] has three parts. In the first he touches upon the manner of treating, since it ought to be with modesty, fear, and diligence, premising the matter concerning which he intends to treat. In the second he adjoins the intention of those who write concerning the Trinity, there, in the second chapter: *Now all catholic treatise-writers.* Thirdly he touches upon the order, there: *Moreover, as in the first book.*

The manner of writing concerning the Trinity ought to be founded upon the understanding of faith and to be with modesty and fear on account of the danger. The intention of those writing concerning the Trinity is to show[^5] that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons and one God. The order of writing is, first to show the truth by authorities, then by reasons and fitting likenesses.

*Let us therefore propose in the midst.* This is the second part, in which the Master intends to show the Trinity and Unity by authorities of sacred Scripture; and since[^6] sacred Scripture has two parts, namely the New and the Old Testament, therefore he shows this first by authorities of the Old Testament, then by authorities of the New, there: *But now after*[^7] *testimonies* etc. And since the Old Testament has two parts, namely the Law and the Prophets, in which faith is set forth, therefore he shows it first by testimonies of the Law, secondly by testimonies of the Prophets, there: *That likewise greatest of the Prophets.* The first part again, in which he proves by testimonies of the Law, has two parts: for first he proves the unity of essence; secondly the unity together with the trinity, there: *The plurality of persons also.* Similarly that part[^8] concerning the testimonies of the Prophets has two: in the first he proves the unity of essence and the plurality of persons in common; in the second indeed in particular he shows the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, there: *David also the eternal generation of the Son.* Similarly that part, in which he proves by authorities of the New Testament, has two parts: for first he proves by authorities or by testimonies of Jesus Christ; secondly by authorities of the Apostles, there: *John also in his canonical Epistle.* The authorities and their explanations and number and varieties are sufficiently clear in the letter [of the text].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the clarification of those things which the Master says concerning the holy Trinity and Unity, four things can be asked concerning that part.

First it is asked, whether in God there is to be posited a unity of essence or nature.

Secondly, whether in God there is to be posited a plurality of persons.

Thirdly, whether in the divine persons there is to be posited infinity.

Fourthly and lastly, whether in the divine persons there is to be posited trinity.

---

la: Nulla freta auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 Vat. textum exhibet sic perturbatum: *Secunda pars Primi Libri, in qua materia.... dividitur praesertim in.*

en: Relying on no authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1, the Vatican edition presents the text thus disturbed: *The second part of the First Book, in which the matter.... is divided especially into.*

la: Codd. VW *agitur*.

en: Codices VW [read] *agitur* [it is treated].

la: Codd. 1 cc *rationalem*.

en: Codices 1 cc [read] *rationalem* [rational].

la: Praeter fidem omnium codd. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. *secundum tria capitula*; mox post *prima* addit *praemisso prooemio de mysterio Trinitatis et Unitatis*, et infra post *Trinitate* ibi omittit *secundo capitulo*.

en: Against the testimony of all codices and of edition 1, the Vatican edition omits *secundum tria capitula* [according to the three chapters]; soon after *prima* it adds *praemisso prooemio de mysterio Trinitatis et Unitatis* [a proem on the mystery of the Trinity and Unity having been premised], and below after *Trinitate* it there omits *secundo capitulo* [in the second chapter].

la: Adiecimus ex cod. I *ostendere*, quod sane subintelligendum est.

en: We have added from codex I the word *ostendere* [to show], which is certainly to be understood.

la: Vat., nullo suffragante cod. nec ed. 1, omittendo verba Magistri: *Proponamus ergo in medium*, constructionem sequentis propositionis invertit ponendo *Similiter* pro *Haec est* ac *habet duas partes* secundum quod loco *et quoniam.*

en: The Vatican edition, with no codex nor edition 1 supporting it, omitting the Master's words *Proponamus ergo in medium* [Let us therefore propose in the midst], inverts the construction of the following sentence by placing *Similiter* [Similarly] for *Haec est* [This is] and *habet duas partes secundum quod* [has two parts according as] in place of *et quoniam* [and since].

la: Codd. *aa bb cc per*.

en: Codices *aa bb cc* [read] *per*.

la: Supple cum Vat. *pars*, quod codd. et ed. 1 omittunt. Paulo infra Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post *communi* minus correcte ponit *Secundo vero specialiter.*

en: Supply with the Vatican edition the word *pars* [part], which the codices and edition 1 omit. A little below, the Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and of edition 1, after *communi* less correctly places *Secundo vero specialiter* [Secondly indeed especially].


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum sit unus tantum Deus
Whether there is only one God

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De unitate divinae essentiae et pluralitate personarum.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum sit unus tantum Deus.*

Circa primum, quod in Deo sit ponere essentiae sive naturae unitatem, videtur ratione ostensiva, triplici habita suppositione, quam oportet poni, tum propter eius simplicitatem, tum propter communem animi conceptionem, quae est, quod Deus est quo maius excogitari non potest; tum ratione status, qui non est nisi in summo et primo.

**Fundamenta.**

1. *Suppositio prima est*, quod Deus est simplicissimus.

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Ex hac arguitur, quod cum nullo alio diverso possit communicare aliquid[^1], quia, si communicat, et differt: ergo non secundum idem; ergo est ibi compositio. Si nihil potest communicare, ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ergo si sunt duo dii, cum unus sit ens, alter non est ens, si unus est Deus, alter non est Deus: ergo si duo sunt dii, non sunt duo dii[^2].

2. *Item, secunda suppositio est*, quod Deus est omnipotentissimus[^3]. Ex hac arguitur: igitur poterit facere, quod omnis alia potentia a sua nihil possit: ergo si sunt duo dii diversi in natura, hoc potest facere unus de altero, quod alter nihil possit, et e converso. Sed cui potest potentia auferri, non est Deus: ergo si sunt duo dii, nullus est Deus.

3. *Item, tertia suppositio est*, quod Deus est simpliciter summum[^4]. Ex hac arguitur: ergo omnia sunt infra ipsum: ergo omnia alia ab ipso et ad ipsum. Si ergo sunt duo dii, unus est infra alterum, et e converso; unus est ab alio secundum naturam diversam, et e converso; unus ad alterum, et e converso; sed quod est infra aliud in natura et ab alio et ad aliud, non est Deus: ergo etc.

**Argumenta indirecta.**

4. Item, hoc potest probari per deductionem ad impossibile. Si sunt duo dii, aut unus est ubi alius, aut non. Si unus ubi alter: ergo unus in altero, cum sint eodem modo essendi: ergo unus est alteri materialis: ergo alter non est Deus. Si unus non est ubi alter: ergo uterque limitatus, ergo neuter infinitus.

5. Item, si plures sunt dii boni[^5], aut unus intelligit alterum, aut non. Si non; ergo uterque est ignorans. Si intelligit; aut ergo per praesentiam, aut per speciem, aut per se ipsum ut per illius exemplar[^6]. Si per praesentiam: ergo unus in altero, ergo Deus illabitur Deo et perficit Deum; si per speciem: ergo compositus; si per exemplar: ergo unus est exemplar alterius, ergo et principium.

6. Item, si sunt duo dii diversi, quorum uterque est summum bonum; aut unus diligit alterum, ut diligendus est, aut non. Si sic, cum uterque sit summum bonum, uterque est diligendus amore fruitionis: ergo uterque fruitur altero; sed qui fruitur alio bono a se, illo indiget: ergo unus indiget alio: ergo uterque est indigens, ergo neuter Deus.

**Sed contra:**

1. Plus potest Deus facere, quam intellectus noster possit cogitare. Sed intellectus humanus, utpote gentium[^7], intelligit plures deos omnipotentes: ergo Deus potest hoc facere. Sed quidquid potest esse in divina natura, est ibi, quia aeterna[^8]: ergo etc.

2. Item, plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; sed plures dii sunt plura bona: ergo melius aliquid erunt duo quam unus. Sed secundum Anselmum[^9] omne, quod melius est, circa Deum est ponendum: ergo est ponere plures deos.

3. Item, quorum diversa est operatio, diversa est virtus et diversa est natura[^10]; sed operatio trium personarum est diversa, quia apparitio in columba fuit solius Spiritus sancti, et solus Filius assumsit humanam naturam: ergo sunt diversi in substantia: ergo sunt plures dii.

4. Item, magna potentia est, quae potest magnum, et maior, quae maius, et maxima, quae

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maximum; sed Deus super omnia est summe potens: ergo potest producere summum[^11]; sed hoc est Deus: ergo cum « in aeternis sit idem esse et posse », ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Plures esse deos est impossibile, immo si recte intelligatur, quid sit Deus, non est intelligibile.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod impossibile est esse plures deos, et si recte accipiatur significatum huius nominis *Deus*, non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile. *Deus* enim dicit simpliciter summum et in re et in opinione cogitantis. Quia in re, ideo omnia ab ipso et in ipso et ad ipsum, et in ipso omnino est status[^12]; ideo impossibile est intelligere, salvo hoc intellectu, quod aliquid sibi parificetur aliud ab ipso. Item, nihil maius Deo cogitari potest nec etiam aequale, quia summum in opinione. Ideo impossibile et non intelligibile est ponere plures deos.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de gentibus; dicendum, quod non fuit intellectus, sed fictio[^13]; praeterea non intelligebant Deum secundum nobilitatem divinam: ideo non valet.

Et ad illud: *plus potest Deus facere* etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est intellectus, scilicet rationalis et phantasticus. De primo verum est, sed de secundo non; quia multa possumus cogitare secundum phantasiam, quae Deus non potest facere, quia non convenit illi, « in quo inconveniens est impossibile »[^14].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in bono creato et finito, quod ratione suae finitatis recipit bonitatis augmentum per additionem alterius boni; non autem habet veritatem in bono infinito, quia, quantumcumque addas bonum infinitum infinito, semper ego intelligo de bonitate tantum in uno, quantum tu[^15] in pluribus.

3. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de diversitate operationum; dicendum, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus in omni operatione conveniunt, sed in relatione differunt. Unde in incarnatione est operatio productionis illius naturae et est unio; in primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo non. — Similiter in columba est columbae formatio et eius significatio[^16]; in primo conveniunt, in secundo non. Exemplum Augustini[^17] de Trinitate est, quod ad formationem huius nominis *memoria* concurrit memoria, intelligentia et voluntas; tamen hoc nomen *memoria* significat alteram potentiarum; simili modo est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magna potentia, etc.; dicendum, quod producere aliquem[^18] est tripliciter: vel de se ipso, vel de aliquo creato, vel de nihilo. De se ipso potest Deus producere summum simpliciter, sed ille non erit alius in natura propter naturae simplicitatem. De alio vel de nihilo non potest producere summum simpliciter, sed in genere, non propter defectum potentiae agentis, sed propter defectum creaturae, quam necesse est esse limitatam; et ita non potest producere alium Deum.

### Scholion.

**I.** Argumentum primum in fundam. diffusius proponitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 14. m. 2. et a Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. — Contra secundum argumentum, sumtum ex omnipotentia, Scot. (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3.) movet difficultatem, quia ipse contra communem sententiam supponit, Dei omnipotentiam non nisi ex fide certo sciri posse.

**II.** Contra doctrinam in solut. ad 2. traditam opponit Durand. (I. Sent. d. 44. q. 3.), quod Deus et mundus simul sint maius bonum quam Deus solus. Sed haec assertio merito ab omnibus theologis classicis ut falsa reprobatur; cfr. infra d. 43. q. 2. fundam. 5; *Itiner. mentis* c. 5. — In solut. ad 3. quoad propositionem: « In primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo (scil. unione) non », notandum est, quod *unio* in duplici sensu accipi potest, vel ut *actio unitiva*, vel ut *relatio unionis*. Illa est communis tribus Trinitatis personis, haec vero spectat ad solam Filii personam; et de hac loquitur hic S. Doctor.

**III.** Unitas Dei definita est a Concilio Lateranensi IV. c. 1. *Firmiter*, nec non a Vaticano, *Const. de Fide*, tit. *de Deo creatore*. Plura circa hanc quaestionem S. Bonav. docet infra d. 4. q. 3; d. 23. a. 2. q. 3; II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1; *Breviloq*. p. 1. c. 2. 5. 6; *Itiner. mentis* c. 5. — Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 14. m. 2. — Scot., hic q. 3; *de Rerum Principio* q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. hic q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 11. a. 3; et praecipue S. c. Gent. 1. c. 42. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 21; S. p. 1. tr. 6. q. 29. a. 1. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 25. q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english:
### Sole article. *On the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of persons.*
### Question I. *Whether there is only one God.*

Concerning the first point, namely that one must posit in God the unity of essence or nature, the matter is shown by a demonstrative argument, when three suppositions are first laid down — suppositions that must be posited both because of his simplicity, and because of the common conception of the mind, which is that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought; and because of the rational ground of the *terminus*, which exists only in what is highest and first.

**Fundamenta.**

1. *The first supposition* is that God is most simple.

Ex hac arguitur, From this it is argued: since [he] cannot share anything in common with any other diverse [being][^1] — because, if he shares it, he also differs: therefore not according to the same; therefore there is composition there. If he can share nothing, therefore neither deity nor entity; therefore if there are two gods, since the one is a being, the other is not a being; if the one is God, the other is not God: therefore if there are two gods, there are not two gods[^2].

2. *Likewise, the second supposition* is that God is most omnipotent[^3]. From this it is argued: therefore he will be able to bring it about that every other power except his own can do nothing; therefore if there are two gods diverse in nature, the one can do this concerning the other, namely that the other can do nothing, and conversely. But that from which power can be taken away is not God: therefore if there are two gods, none is God.

3. *Likewise, the third supposition* is that God is simply the highest[^4]. From this it is argued: therefore all things are below him; therefore all other things are from him and toward him. If therefore there are two gods, the one is below the other, and conversely; the one is from the other according to a diverse nature, and conversely; the one toward the other, and conversely; but that which is below another in nature, and from another and toward another, is not God: therefore etc.

**Indirect arguments.**

4. Likewise, this can be proved by *reductio ad impossibile*. If there are two gods, either the one is where the other is, or not. If the one is where the other is: therefore the one is in the other, since they are of the same mode of being: therefore the one is material to the other: therefore the other is not God. If the one is not where the other is: therefore each is limited, therefore neither is infinite.

5. Likewise, if there are several good gods[^5], either the one understands the other, or not. If not; therefore each is ignorant. If he understands; then either through presence, or through species, or through himself as through an exemplar of the other[^6]. If through presence: therefore the one is in the other, therefore God flows into God and perfects God; if through species: therefore he is composite; if through exemplar: therefore the one is the exemplar of the other, therefore also the principle.

6. Likewise, if there are two diverse gods, of whom each is the highest good; either the one loves the other as he ought to be loved, or not. If so, since each is the highest good, each ought to be loved with a love of fruition: therefore each enjoys the other; but he who enjoys another good apart from himself is in need of it: therefore the one is in need of the other: therefore each is in need, therefore neither is God.

**On the contrary:**

1. God can do more than our intellect can think. But the human intellect — namely, that of the gentiles[^7] — understands several omnipotent gods: therefore God can do this. But whatever can be in the divine nature, is there, because it is eternal[^8]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, more goods are better than fewer; but several gods are several goods: therefore two will be something better than one. But according to Anselm[^9], whatever is better must be posited with regard to God: therefore one must posit several gods.

3. Likewise, of those things whose operation is diverse, the power is diverse and the nature is diverse[^10]; but the operation of the three Persons is diverse, since the appearance in the dove was of the Holy Spirit alone, and the Son alone assumed human nature: therefore they are diverse in substance: therefore they are several gods.

4. Likewise, that is a great power which can [produce] something great, and a greater [power] which [can produce] something greater, and the greatest, which [can produce] the greatest; but God above all things is supremely powerful: therefore he can produce the highest[^11]; but this is God: therefore since « in eternal things to-be and to-be-able are the same », therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** That there should be several gods is impossible; nay rather, if it be rightly understood what God is, it is not even intelligible.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is impossible that there be several gods, and if the signification of this name *God* be rightly taken, not only is it impossible, but it is also not intelligible. For *God* signifies simply the highest both in reality and in the opinion of the one thinking. Because [he is highest] in reality, therefore all things are from him and in him and toward him, and in him entirely is the *status* (the term)[^12]; therefore it is impossible to understand, while preserving this very understanding, that anything other than him be made equal to him. Likewise, nothing greater than God can be thought, nor even anything equal, because [he is] the highest in opinion. Therefore it is impossible and not intelligible to posit several gods.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the gentiles: it must be said that it was not understanding, but a fiction[^13]; moreover, they did not understand God according to divine nobility: therefore [the argument] is not valid.

And to that other: *God can do more* etc.; it must be said that the intellect is twofold, namely the rational and the phantastic. Concerning the first it is true, but concerning the second not; because we can think many things according to phantasy which God cannot do, since they do not befit him, « in whom what is unfitting is impossible »[^14].

2. To that which is objected, that more goods are better than fewer; it must be said that this holds true in a created and finite good, which by reason of its finitude receives an increase of goodness through the addition of another good; but it does not hold true in an infinite good, because, however much you add an infinite good to an infinite good, I always understand as much goodness in the one alone as you[^15] [understand] in the many.

3. To the other, which is objected concerning the diversity of operations; it must be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in every operation, but differ in relation. Hence in the Incarnation there is an operation of producing that nature and there is the union; in the first the three Persons agree, in the second not. — Similarly in [the appearance of] the dove there is the formation of the dove and its signification[^16]; in the first they agree, in the second not. The example of Augustine[^17] in *On the Trinity* is that to the formation of this name *memory* there concur memory, intelligence, and will; yet this name *memory* signifies one of those powers; in like manner is the case here.

4. To that which is objected, that great power, etc.; it must be said that to produce someone[^18] is threefold: either out of himself, or out of something created, or out of nothing. Out of himself God can produce the highest simply, but that one will not be other in nature, on account of the simplicity of nature. Out of another, or out of nothing, he cannot produce the highest simply, but [only] in [some] genus, not on account of any defect of the agent's power, but on account of the defect of the creature, which must necessarily be limited; and so he cannot produce another God.

### Scholion.

**I.** The first argument in the *fundamenta* is more amply set forth by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 14, m. 2, and by Richard de Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 3. — Against the second argument, drawn from omnipotence, Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 3) raises a difficulty, because he supposes — against the common opinion — that God's omnipotence cannot be known with certainty except by faith.

**II.** Against the doctrine handed down in the solution to objection 2, Durandus (I *Sent.* d. 44, q. 3) objects that God and the world together are a greater good than God alone. But this assertion is rightly rejected as false by all classical theologians; cf. below d. 43, q. 2, fundam. 5; *Itinerarium mentis* c. 5. — In the solution to objection 3, regarding the proposition: « In the first the three Persons agree, in the second (namely the union) not », it must be noted that *union* can be taken in a twofold sense: either as a *unitive action*, or as a *relation of union*. The former is common to the three Persons of the Trinity, the latter belongs to the Person of the Son alone; and it is of this that the Holy Doctor here speaks.

**III.** The unity of God was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. 1, *Firmiter*, and also by the [Council of the] Vatican, *Constitutio de Fide*, title *de Deo creatore*. St. Bonaventure teaches more on this question below at d. 4, q. 3; d. 23, a. 2, q. 3; II *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1; *Breviloquium* p. 1, c. 2, 5, 6; *Itinerarium mentis* c. 5. — Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. 1, q. 14, m. 2. — Scot., here q. 3; *de Rerum Principio* q. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 11, a. 3; and especially *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 42. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2, 21; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 6, q. 29, a. 1, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.* q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 25, q. 2, 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

la: Haec phrasis: *communicare aliquid cum aliquo* hic et alibi significat: habere aliquid cum aliquo commune, sive: convenire cum aliquo in aliqua re. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 hic omittit *aliquid* et mox, ponendo *sunt* loco *secundum*, vim argumenti elidit. Deinde codd. XYZ legunt *unum* pro *idem*. — Cfr. Aristot., X. *Metaph*. text. 12. (ed. Paris. IX. c. 3.).

en: This phrase, *to share something with someone*, here and elsewhere signifies: to have something in common with another, or: to agree with another in some matter. — The Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, here omits *aliquid*, and shortly afterwards, by putting *sunt* in place of *secundum*, weakens the force of the argument. Further, codd. XYZ read *unum* for *idem*. — Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 12 (Paris ed., IX, c. 3).

la: Argumentum hoc a S. Doctore paucis exhibitum sic explicari potest. Primo: si Deus est simplex, non potest habere aliquid commune cum alio Deo, qui supponitur esse. Probatur: si unus Deus aliquid haberet commune cum alio sive si communicaret in aliquo, v. g. in deitate, cum alio, deberet etiam differre, ut sit alius Deus; cum idem secundum idem nequeat cum alio simul communicare seu convenire et differre: ergo alio convenirent, alio differrent seu distinguerentur: ergo uterque esset compositus. Secundo: si autem nihil habent commune: ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ex quo sequitur absurdum in littera notatum.

en: This argument, set forth briefly by the Holy Doctor, can be explained thus. First: if God is simple, he cannot have anything in common with another God who is supposed to be. Proof: if one God had anything in common with another, or if he shared in something, e.g. in deity, with another, he would also have to differ, in order that he be another God; since the same according to the same cannot at once share or agree with another and differ: therefore they would agree by one [aspect] and differ or be distinguished by another: therefore each would be composite. Second: if, however, they have nothing in common: therefore neither deity nor entity; from which follows the absurdity noted in the text.

la: Plures codd. ut ACGLORSU etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 *omnipotentissimum*. Paulo infra post *duo* ex cod. T adiecimus *certe* supplendum *Dii*.

en: Several codices, such as ACGLORSU etc., together with eds. 1, 2, 3, 6, [read] *omnipotentissimum*. A little below, after *duo*, we have added from cod. T *certe*, supplying *Dii*.

la: Ad normam multorum mss. ut ACGLORSTUWaa bb cc ff et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 loco *summus* posuimus *summum*.

en: Following many manuscripts, such as ACGLORSTUWaa bb cc ff, and eds. 1, 2, 3, 6, in place of *summus* we have placed *summum*.

la: Codd. OYZ omittunt *boni*, quae lectio magis placeret, si maiore numero codd. fulciretur.

en: Codd. OYZ omit *boni*; this reading would be more pleasing if it were supported by a greater number of codices.

la: Adiecimus ex cod. I *ut per illius exemplar*, quae verba ultimum disiunctionis membrum exprimunt clarius necnon formam totius argumenti reddunt perfectiorem, quia infra omnes mss. et edd. 1, 3, 6 habent *per exemplar* loco *per se ipsum*, quod Vat. ponit. Codd. T cc etiam prima vice pro *per se ipsum* ponunt *per exemplar*, sed a secunda manu scriptum.

en: We have added from cod. I *ut per illius exemplar*, which words express the last member of the disjunction more clearly and render the form of the whole argument more perfect, since below all the mss. and eds. 1, 3, 6 have *per exemplar* in place of *per se ipsum*, which the Vatican edition prints. Codd. T cc, also at the first occurrence, in place of *per se ipsum* read *per exemplar*, but written by a second hand.

la: Codd. F aa bb *gentilium*.

en: Codd. F aa bb [read] *gentilium*.

la: Aristot., III. *Phys*. text. 32: *Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis*. — Idem textus recurrit infra in 4. arg. ad opp.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 32: « For in eternal things, to-be-able and to-be from itself differ in nothing. » — The same text recurs below in the 4th argument *ad oppositum*.

la: *Monolog*. c. 15: *Sicut nefas est putare, quod substantia summae naturae sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquo modo non-ipsum: sic necesse est, ut sit quidquid omnino melius est, quam non-ipsum. Illa enim sola est, qua penitus nihil est melius; et quae melior est omnibus, quae non sunt quod est ipsa.* Cfr. etiam *Proslog*. c. 8. Convenit Aristot., XII. *Metaph*. text. 39. (ed. Paris. XI. c. 7.): *Dicimus itaque, Deum sempiternum optimumque vivens esse, quare vita et aevum continuum et aeternum Deo inest, hoc enim est Deus.* Cfr. et Boeth., III. *de Consol*. Prosa 10.

en: Anselm, *Monologion* c. 15: « Just as it is unlawful to think that the substance of the highest nature is something than which what is not itself is in some way better, so it is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better than what is not itself. For that alone is such that nothing whatever is better than it; and it is better than all things which are not what it itself is. » Cf. also *Proslogion* c. 8. Aristotle agrees, *Metaphysics* XII, text 39 (Paris ed., XI, c. 7): « We say therefore that God is the eternal and best living being, wherefore life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God; for this is God. » Cf. also Boethius, *de Consolatione* III, prose 10.

la: Averroes, XII. *Metaph*. text. 26: *Activa diversificantur in potentia et actu per diversitatem formarum et materiarum*. Boeth., III. *de Consol*. Prosa 11. conversam huius propositionis exhibet: *Eadem namque substantia est eorum, quorum naturaliter non est diversus effectus*. Utraque propositio fundatur in illo axiomate: *operari sequitur esse*, seu: *idem est principium essendi et operandi*. — In conclusione huius argumenti cod. O habet *natura* pro *substantia*. — B. Albert., S. 1. tract. 6. q. 29. m. 1. a. 1. idem argumentum profert, dein adiungit: *Et haec fuit fortior obiectio Arianorum et Nestorianorum et Eutychianorum et Paulisamosalenorum*.

en: Averroes, *Metaphysics* XII, text 26: « Active things are diversified in potency and act through the diversity of forms and matters. » Boethius, *de Consolatione* III, prose 11, presents the converse of this proposition: « For the substance of those things is the same whose effect is not naturally diverse. » Each proposition is founded on this axiom: *acting follows upon being*, or: *the same is the principle of being and of acting*. — In the conclusion of this argument cod. O has *natura* in place of *substantia*. — Bl. Albert, *Summa* I, tract. 6, q. 29, m. 1, a. 1, sets forth the same argument and then adds: « And this was the stronger objection of the Arians and Nestorians and Eutychians and Paul-of-Samosata-ites. »

la: Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc contra omnes antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 indebite adiungit *bonum*.

en: The Vatican edition, together with the more recent cod. cc, against all the older codices and ed. 1, improperly adds *bonum*.

la: Respicitur illud ad Rom. 11, 36: *Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*. Sensus est: a Deo omnia procedunt, in Deo omnia conservantur, ad Deum omnia referuntur. Cfr. infra d. 36. dub. 4. — *In ipso omnino est status* i. e. Deus est principium, ultra quod in resolvendo seu causas quaerendo nullo modo possumus transire. — Paulo infra ed. 1 *ei* loco *sibi*.

en: This refers to Rom. 11:36: « For from him and through him and in him are all things. » The sense is: from God all things proceed, in God all things are conserved, to God all things are referred. Cf. below d. 36, dub. 4. — *In ipso omnino est status*, that is: God is the principle, beyond which, in resolving or in seeking causes, we can in no way pass. — A little below, ed. 1 has *ei* in place of *sibi*.

la: Cod. U non male: *fictio potius; non enim intelligebant*. Cod. T *veritatem* pro *nobilitatem*.

en: Cod. U, not badly: « rather a fiction; for they did not understand. » Cod. T [reads] *veritatem* in place of *nobilitatem*.

la: Anselm., I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 20: *Sed hoc est praestitutum, quia quamlibet (quodlibet) parvum inconveniens in Deo impossibile est*. — Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 post *inconveniens* addit *minimum*. Paulo ante cod. I *phantastica* loco *secundum phantasiam*.

en: Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 20: « But this is laid down, that however small (whatever) unfitting thing is impossible in God. » — The Vatican edition, against the mss. and eds. 1, 2, 3, after *inconveniens* adds *minimum*. A little earlier cod. I [has] *phantastica* in place of *secundum phantasiam*.

la: Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. ut ACFGHKLOPST etc. adiecimus *tu*. Paulo ante codd. SX post *bonum* omittunt *infinitum*; lectio haud spernenda.

en: From a great many older manuscripts, such as ACFGHKLOPST etc., we have added *tu*. A little earlier codd. SX, after *bonum*, omit *infinitum*; a reading not to be despised.

la: Sic plures codd. ut KRXYZ ff cum ed. 1; alii sunt dubiae lectionis; codd. I aa *figuratio*; sed Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *significatio*.

en: Thus several codices, such as KRXYZ ff, with ed. 1; others are of doubtful reading; codd. I aa [have] *figuratio*; but the Vatican edition, with some codices, [reads] *significatio*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin*. c. 21. n. 30: *Quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt etc.* Sensus est: ad formationem vocabuli *memoria* omnes tres animi potentiae active concurrunt, tamen significatio eiusdem refertur ad unam solam potentiam.

en: [Augustine], *de Trinitate* IV, c. 21, n. 30: « Just as when I name my memory and understanding and will, the individual names refer to individual things, yet each is brought about by all three together, etc. » The sense is: to the formation of the word *memory* all three powers of the soul actively concur, yet the signification of that same word refers to one single power.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. ut ACFGHLORSTUZ etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquem* pro *aliquid*. Agitur enim de productione Dei, et in subnexis habetur genus masculinum *ille*, quod refertur ad *summum simpliciter* absque dubio pro eodem genere sumendum, scil. *summum aliquem* etc. Cod. H habet *Deum producere aliquem*.

en: On the testimony of very many manuscripts, such as ACFGHLORSTUZ etc., and of ed. 1, we have substituted *aliquem* for *aliquid*. For the matter concerns the production of God, and in what follows the masculine *ille* is used, which refers to *summum simpliciter* and is without doubt to be taken in the same gender, namely *summum aliquem* etc. Cod. H has *Deum producere aliquem*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in Deo ponenda sit personarum pluralitas.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in Deo personarum pluralitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur supponendo de Deo quatuor: primum est, quod in ipso sit summa beatitudo; secundum est, summa perfectio; tertium est, summa simplicitas; quartum est, summa primitas.

1. Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: si[^1] est ibi summa beatitudo; sed ubicumque est summa beatitudo, est summa bonitas, summa caritas et summa iucunditas. Sed si est summa bonitas, cum bonitatis sit summe se communicare[^2], et hoc est maxime in producendo ex se aequalem et dando esse suum: ergo etc. Si summa caritas, cum caritas non sit amor privatus, sed ad alterum: ergo requirit pluralitatem. Item, si summa iucunditas, cum « nullius boni sine socio sit iucunda possessio[^3] », ergo ad summam iucunditatem requiritur societas et ita pluralitas.

2. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio; sed « perfectionis est producere talem, qualis ipse est in natura[^4] »: ergo necesse est, ibi esse multiplicationem; sed hoc non potest esse secundum aliam essentiam: ergo oportet, quod sit secundum aliam personam sive suppositum.

3. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas; sed simplicitatis est, quod aliqua natura sit in pluribus, ut patet in universali, sed ex defectu simplicitatis est, quod numeretur in illis[^5]: ergo si in Deo est simplicitas in nullo deficiens, erit in pluribus non numerata essentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, ex quarta suppositione sic: si est ibi summa primitas; sed quanto aliquid prius, tanto fecundius est et aliorum principium[^6]: ergo sicut essentia divina, quia prima, est principium aliarum essentiarum, sic persona Patris, cum sit prima, quia a nullo, est principium et habet[^7] fecunditatem respectu personarum; sed fecunditas in Deo respectu Dei non potest esse nisi actui coniuncta: ergo necesse est, plures esse personas.

**Sed contra:**

1. Videtur, quod ex eisdem suppositionibus posset argui contrarium, et ita destruuntur rationes et conclusio[^8]. Si enim ibi est summa beatitudo, cum beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficiat ad beatitudinem: ergo non est necesse ponere aliam personam ad beatitudinem sive iucunditatem.

2. Item, contra secundam suppositionem sic obiicitur[^9]: si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo aeque plene et perfecte est essentia in una persona et in pluribus. Si ergo ultra perfectionem additio est superflua, pluralitas est superflua; et si hoc, cum in divinis nihil sit superfluum, pluralitas non est[^10] in divinis.

3. Item, contra tertiam rationem sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, cum pluralitas opponatur simplicitati, et « opposita non possunt esse circa idem[^11] »: ergo si Deus est unus et in eo est simplicitas, non ergo pluralitas, cum per omnia sit simplex.

4. Item, contra quartam suppositionem sic: si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio, et status est in unitate: ergo primitas non ponit pluralitatem, sed unitatem: ergo videtur, quod una tantum sit persona.

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### Conclusio.

> Personarum pluralitatem in divinis esse ponendam, et fides docet et argumentis congruentiae suadetur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis est ponere personarum pluralitatem, sicut fides dicit et rationes praedictae ostendunt, si quis sine contradictione consideret. Nam ratione simplicitatis essentia est communicabilis et potens esse[^12] in pluribus. Ratione *primitatis* persona nata est ex se aliam producere; et voco hic primitatem innascibilitatem, ratione cuius, ut dicit antiqua opinio, est fontalis plenitudo in Patre ad omnem emanationem; et hoc infra patebit[^13]. Ratione *perfectionis* ad hoc est apta et prompta; ratione *beatitudinis et caritatis* voluntaria. Quibus conditionibus positis, necesse est ponere personarum pluralitatem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficit, ergo non indiget etc; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non indiget; nec ponitur[^14] alius propter indigentiam neque tanquam beatificans, sed in beatitudine communicans.

2. Similiter ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deitas aeque plene est in uno et in pluribus[^15]; dicendum, quod etsi sit aeque plene, non tamen ita plene declaratur. Et *praeterea*, eo ipso quo plene est in Patre, redundat in alias personas redundantia perfectionis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluralitas repugnat simplicitati; dicendum, quod est quaedam pluralitas per *additionem*; et haec repugnat; quaedam per *originem*; et haec non addit nec componit nec repugnat simplicitati, sed potius solitudini; et sic est in divinis, ut infra patebit[^16].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in primo est status; dicendum, quod sicut in essentiis una est essentia prima, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam, sic et[^17] in personis est una persona, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam; et in illa est status originis, quia illa a nullo, et haec est persona Patris. Unde Augustinus[^18] illi personae appropriat unitatem, dicens: « In Patre unitas » etc.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God.*

Secondly it is asked whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God. And that it is so, is shown by supposing four things concerning God: the first is, that in him there is the highest beatitude; the second, the highest perfection; the third, the highest simplicity; the fourth, the highest primacy.

1. From the first supposition it is argued thus: if[^1] there is the highest beatitude; but wherever there is the highest beatitude, there is the highest goodness, the highest charity, and the highest joy. But if there is the highest goodness, since it belongs to goodness to communicate itself in the highest degree[^2], and this is most of all in producing from itself an equal and giving its being: therefore etc. If the highest charity, since charity is not a private love but [is directed] to another: therefore it requires plurality. Likewise, if the highest joy, since "of no good is the possession joyful without a companion[^3]," therefore for the highest joy a society and so a plurality is required.

2. Likewise, from the second supposition thus: if there is the highest perfection; but "it belongs to perfection to produce one such as it itself is in nature[^4]": therefore it is necessary that there be multiplication there; but this cannot be according to another essence: therefore it must be according to another person or supposit.

3. Likewise, from the third supposition thus: if there is the highest simplicity; but it belongs to simplicity that some nature be in many, as is clear in the universal, but it is from a defect of simplicity that it is numbered in those[^5]: therefore if in God there is simplicity deficient in nothing, there will be in many an essence not numbered: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, from the fourth supposition thus: if there is the highest primacy; but the prior something is, the more fecund it is and a principle of others[^6]: therefore just as the divine essence, because it is first, is the principle of other essences, so the person of the Father, since he is first, because from no one, is a principle and has[^7] fecundity in respect of the [other] persons; but fecundity in God in respect of God cannot be except joined to act: therefore it is necessary that there be several persons.

**On the contrary:**

1. It seems that from the same suppositions the contrary could be argued, and so the reasons and the conclusion are destroyed[^8]. For if there is the highest beatitude, since the blessed by essence is sufficient unto itself for beatitude: therefore it is not necessary to posit another person for beatitude or joy.

2. Likewise, against the second supposition it is objected[^9] thus: if there is the highest perfection: therefore the essence is equally fully and perfectly in one person and in many. If therefore beyond perfection any addition is superfluous, plurality is superfluous; and if this, since in divine matters nothing is superfluous, plurality is not[^10] in divine matters.

3. Likewise, against the third reason thus: if there is the highest simplicity, since plurality is opposed to simplicity, and "opposites cannot be about the same thing[^11]": therefore if God is one and in him is simplicity, then not plurality, since he is in all respects simple.

4. Likewise, against the fourth supposition thus: if there is the highest primacy; therefore since rest is in the first principle, and rest is in unity: therefore primacy does not posit plurality but unity: therefore it seems that there is only one person.

### Conclusion.

> That a plurality of persons is to be posited in divine matters, both faith teaches and is persuaded by arguments of congruence.

**I respond:** It must be said that in divine matters a plurality of persons is to be posited, as faith says and the foregoing reasons show, if one considers without contradiction. For by reason of *simplicity* the essence is communicable and able to be[^12] in many. By reason of *primacy* the person is born to produce another from itself; and I here call primacy innascibility, by reason of which, as the ancient opinion says, there is in the Father a fontal fullness toward every emanation; and this will be made clear below[^13]. By reason of *perfection* it is fit and prompt for this; by reason of *beatitude and charity*, voluntary. With these conditions posited, it is necessary to posit a plurality of persons.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that the blessed by essence is sufficient unto itself, therefore does not need [another] etc; it must be said that it is true that it does not need; nor is another posited[^14] on account of need, nor as one beatifying, but as communicating in beatitude.

2. Similarly to that which is objected, that the deity is equally fully in one and in many[^15]; it must be said that although it is equally fully, yet it is not so fully declared. And *moreover*, by the very fact that it is fully in the Father, it overflows into the other persons by an overflowing of perfection.

3. To that which is objected, that plurality is repugnant to simplicity; it must be said that there is a certain plurality by *addition*; and this is repugnant; another by *origin*; and this neither adds nor composes nor is repugnant to simplicity, but rather to solitude; and so it is in divine matters, as will be clear below[^16].

4. To that which is objected, that rest is in the first; it must be said that just as among essences there is one first essence, from which the others are and toward which, so also[^17] among the persons there is one person, from which the others are and toward which; and in him is the rest of origin, because he is from no one, and this is the person of the Father. Hence Augustine[^18] appropriates to that person unity, saying: "In the Father is unity," etc.

---

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. hic et in aliis tribus arg. particulam *si*.

en: Against the faithfulness of the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican [edition] omits here and in the other three arguments the particle *si*.

la: Vat. *bonitatis summae sit se communicare*, sed minus apte et contra auctoritatem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3; melius sane foret, si lectio Vat. et mss. inveniretur coniuncta, ita ut legeretur: *bonitatis summae sit summe se communicare*. Hanc lectionem confirmant verba Richardi, hic a. 2. q. 1: ad summam bonitatem pertinet se summe communicare. — Haec ratio fundatur in ista propositione ex Dionys., de Cael. Hierarch. c. 4. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. sumta: *Bonum est diffusivum sui*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *it belongs to the highest goodness to communicate itself*, but less aptly and against the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3; it would surely be better if the Vatican reading and the manuscripts' were found joined, so that one would read: *it belongs to the highest goodness to communicate itself in the highest degree*. This reading is confirmed by Richard's words, here a. 2 q. 1: "to the highest goodness it pertains to communicate itself in the highest degree." — This reasoning is founded on this proposition taken from Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 4 and *On the Divine Names* c. 4: *The Good is diffusive of itself*.

la: Seneca, I. *Epist. ad Lucilium*, epist. 6.

en: Seneca, Book I of the *Letters to Lucilius*, letter 6.

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 34. (c. 4.). — In principio huius et sequentis argumenti Vat. omittit particulam *Item* et post *suppositione* addit *arguitur*; sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* book II, text 34 (c. 4). — At the beginning of this and the following argument the Vatican [edition] omits the particle *Item* and after *suppositione* adds *arguitur*; but the manuscripts and edition 1 stand against [this].

la: Aristot., VIII. *Metaph.* text. 45. (VI. c. 13.): *Hoc enim dicitur universale, quod pluribus inesse natum est*. Et I. *Poster.* c. 20. (c. 24.): *Quantocumque utique magis secundum partes (seu particularis) est, in infinita cadit; universale autem in simplex et in finem*. — Mox Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *nihilo* pro *nullo* et *est* pro *erit*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* book VIII, text 45 (VI c. 13): *For that is called universal which is born to be in many*. And *Posterior [Analytics]* book I, c. 20 (c. 24): *In however much something is rather according to parts (or particular), it falls into the infinite; the universal, however, [resolves] into the simple and into the end*. — Soon after, the Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] *nihilo* for *nullo* and *est* for *erit*.

la: Cfr. libr. *de Causis*, prop. 1. et 17. — Cod. K *nobilius vel fecundius*.

en: Cf. the book *On Causes*, propositions 1 and 17. — Codex K [reads] *nobilius vel fecundius* ["more noble or more fecund"].

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, interpunctione mutata, ponit *a nullo est principio, habet*; quae lectio vim dictis detrahit.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, with the punctuation altered, puts *a nullo est principio, habet*; which reading detracts from the force of what is said.

la: Maior pars codd. ut AFGHLOTVWXYZ etc. cum ed. 1 refragatur Vat. ponenti *conclusiones iam positae*, et quidem iure, cum tantum una omnium rationum positarum sit *conclusio*. Aliqui mss. ut CS (AT a prima manu) etc. *convictio* loco *conclusio*. Cod. R omittit *et conclusio*. Paulo post auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. *beatum* substituimus loco *beatus*; idem infra in solutione huius obiectionis recurrit.

en: The greater part of the codices such as AFGHLOTVWXYZ etc., together with edition 1, opposes the Vatican [edition] which puts *conclusiones iam positae* ["the conclusions already posited"], and rightly so, since of all the reasons posited there is only one *conclusio*. Some manuscripts such as CS (AT by the first hand) etc. [have] *convictio* in place of *conclusio*. Codex R omits *et conclusio*. A little later, on the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, we have substituted *beatum* for *beatus*; the same recurs below in the solution to this objection.

la: Cod. cc *arguitur*. Paulo post Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, *aeque plena et perfecta... ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra*.

en: Codex cc [reads] *arguitur*. A little later the Vatican [edition], with the older manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, [reads] *aeque plena et perfecta... ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra*.

la: Ex mss. et sex primis edd. substituimus *est* pro *erit*.

en: From the manuscripts and the first six editions we have substituted *est* for *erit*.

la: Aristot., II. *Elench.* c. 5. (c. 25.) et XI. *Metaph.* c. 4. (X. c. 5.). — Paulo ante cod. X sibi constans habet *suppositionem* pro *rationem*.

en: Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations* book II, c. 5 (c. 25), and *Metaphysics* book XI, c. 4 (X c. 5). — A little before, codex X, consistent with itself, has *suppositionem* for *rationem*. <!-- page 54 -->

la: Cod. K *et potest esse*. Cod. O *ut potens esse*.

en: Codex K [reads] *et potest esse*. Codex O [reads] *ut potens esse*.

la: Disc. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. — Mox post *caritatis* additur in Vat. *eadem essentia divina est*, quod abest a mss. et ed. 1. Cod. R verbo *beatitudinis* praemittit *bonitatis*.

en: Distinction 27, part I, q. 2, ad 3. — Soon after *caritatis* the Vatican [edition] adds *eadem essentia divina est* ["the same divine essence is"], which is absent from the manuscripts and edition 1. Codex R prefixes *bonitatis* to the word *beatitudinis*.

la: Restituimus lectionem fere omnium antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 substituendo *ponitur* loco *ponendus est* et addendo *neque*, quod Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc indebite omittit.

en: We have restored the reading of nearly all the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 by substituting *ponitur* for *ponendus est* and adding *neque*, which the Vatican [edition], together with the more recent codex cc, unduly omits.

la: Vat. hic, sicut supra, contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *aeque plena et perfecta est in uno ut in pluribus*, licet ipsa in sequentibus semper adhibeat adverbium *plene*.

en: The Vatican [edition] here, as above, against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] *aeque plena et perfecta est in uno ut in pluribus*, although it itself in what follows always uses the adverb *plene*.

la: Disc. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — Paulo ante cod. X *solum* loco *potius*.

en: Distinction 8, part II, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — A little before, codex X [reads] *solum* in place of *potius*.

la: In Vat. et recentiore cod. cc deest *et*, quod tamen in antiquis mss. et ed. 1 habetur, et quidem bene. Paulo post cod. X *nulla* pro *nullo*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and the more recent codex cc *et* is missing, which however is found in the ancient manuscripts and edition 1, and rightly so. A little later codex X [reads] *nulla* for *nullo*.

la: Libr. I. *de Doctr. christ.* c. 5. n. 5: *In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu S. unitatis aequalitatisque concordia*.

en: Book I, *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 5, n. 5: *In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality*.


title: Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum numerus divinarum personarum sit infinitus.*

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere infinitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quia creatura est[^1] finita, et quidquid est in ipsa, est actu finitum: ergo ab oppositis, quia divina essentia est infinita, quidquid est in ipsa, est infinite; ergo cum in Deo sit numerus personarum, erit infinitus; et ita erunt personae infinitae.

2. Item, cum duplex sit infinitas, virtualis et numeralis[^2], infinitas virtualis est in Deo: ergo pari ratione infinitas numeralis: ergo in Deo sunt infinitae personae.

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3. Item, infinita virtus, cum emanat[^3] secundum suam totam infinitatem, non tantum producit infinitum intensive, sed etiam extensive; sed virtus Patris in productione personarum emanat secundum omnimodam sui potestatem: ergo non tantum producit personas infinitas in virtute, immo etiam[^4] infinitas in numero.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur sic: multiplicatio personarum aut est virtutis, aut non. Si non; ergo non debet in divinis poni; si est virtutis per se: ergo maior multiplicatio erit maioris virtutis, et summae virtutis infinita multiplicatio: ergo etc.

**Contra** hoc ostenditur quadruplici conditione, quae sumitur ab hoc quod semper Deo est attribuendum quod nobilius est, quod necesse est ponere finitatem personarum. Prima est distinctio, secunda ordo, tertia connexio, quarta summa completio[^5].

1. Ex prima conditione ostenditur sic: si est ibi distinctio, non ergo confusio; sed ubi est infinitas, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.

2. Item, ex secunda sic: ubi est ordo, ibi est terminatio, quia ubi deficit terminatio, deficit et[^6] mediatio et per consequens ordo; sed ubi est terminatio, non est infinitas: ergo si in personis divinis est ordo, non est infinitas.

3. Item, ex tertia sic: ubi est connexio, necesse est, quod omnes personae procedant ab una; nam si una ab alia et ita consequenter, tunc est infinita distantia inter primam et ultimam; sed[^7] hoc est inconveniens: ergo omnes ab una: aut ergo eisdem modis, aut diversis. Si eisdem: ergo nulla distinctio; si diversis, sed diversi modi emanandi sunt finiti: ergo etc.

4. Item, ex quarta sic: si est ibi summa completio, ergo nata est divinitas alia complere: ergo cum completio personarum sit in beatitudine, nata est beatificare[^8]. Sed si essent personae infinitae, impossibile esset aliquem beatificari a Deo; cognitio enim cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis, cum tota bonitas, quae est substantiale praemium, sit in qualibet personarum; ergo aut anima omnes cognosceret, aut non esset beata; sed impossibile esset[^9] omnes cognoscere, cum virtus eius sit finita: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Numerum divinarum personarum esse finitum, et fides tenet et ratio suadet.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis personis quantum ad numerum non est ponere infinitatem, sed finitatem.

Ratio autem huius est, quia infinitas numeralis repugnat perfectioni et ordini, quia est per recessum ab unitate sive ab origine sua. Similiter et[^10] infinitas molis; et ideo neutrum est in Deo. Infinitas autem virtutis est per accessum ad unitatem et originem; et ideo, cum ista sit perfectionis, ponenda est in Deo, alia non.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est in Deo, est infinite; dicendum, quod verum est infinite, sed non qualicumque[^11] infinitate, sed illa qua Deus est infinitus; et haec est infinitas immensitatis, et tali modo est Trinitas infinita, non infinitate numerali, quae non congruit Deo[^12].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinita virtus, infinite[^13] emanans, producit infinita; dicendum, quod divinae virtuti non convenit productio nisi perfecti; et ideo non convenit ei productio alicuius infinitatis nisi illius, quae stat cum summa perfectione. Haec autem non est infinitas numeralis, et ideo non est in Deo.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum quod obiicitur, quod potentiae est se multiplicare; dicendum, quod non omni modo[^14] est potentiae, sed perfecte multiplicare se potentiae est; et ideo non sequitur: ergo magis se multiplicare est maior perfectio, nisi intelligatur perfecte; sed infinite se multiplicare secundum numerum est imperfecte; et ideo non convenit Deo.

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english:
### Question III. *Whether the number of divine persons is infinite.*

In the third place, consequently, it is asked whether infinity is to be posited in the divine persons. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. Because the creature is[^1] finite, and whatever is in it is actually finite: therefore from the opposites, since the divine essence is infinite, whatever is in it is infinite; therefore since in God there is a number of persons, it will be infinite; and so the persons will be infinite.

2. Likewise, since infinity is twofold, virtual and numerical[^2], virtual infinity is in God: therefore by parity of reasoning numerical infinity also: therefore in God there are infinite persons.

3. Likewise, an infinite power, when it emanates[^3] according to its whole infinity, produces an infinite not only intensively but also extensively; but the power of the Father in the production of persons emanates according to its all-encompassing potency: therefore it produces persons not only infinite in power, but rather even[^4] infinite in number.

4. Likewise, this very point is shown thus: the multiplication of persons either belongs to power, or it does not. If not, then it ought not to be posited in the divine; if it belongs to power *per se*: therefore a greater multiplication will belong to a greater power, and an infinite multiplication to the highest power: therefore etc.

**On the contrary**, this is shown by a fourfold condition, which is taken from this, that there must always be attributed to God what is more noble, namely that it is necessary to posit a finitude of persons. The first is distinction, the second order, the third connection, the fourth supreme completion[^5].

1. From the first condition it is shown thus: if there is distinction there, then there is no confusion; but where there is infinity, there is confusion: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, from the second thus: where there is order, there is termination, since where termination is lacking, mediation also[^6] is lacking, and consequently order; but where there is termination, there is no infinity: therefore if in the divine persons there is order, there is no infinity.

3. Likewise, from the third thus: where there is connection, it is necessary that all persons proceed from one; for if one proceeds from another and so on consequently, then there is an infinite distance between the first and the last; but[^7] this is inconvenient: therefore all proceed from one: either, then, by the same modes, or by diverse. If by the same: therefore no distinction; if by diverse, but the diverse modes of emanating are finite: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, from the fourth thus: if there is supreme completion there, then divinity is fitted to complete other things: therefore since the completion of persons consists in beatitude, it is fitted to beatify[^8]. But if there were infinite persons, it would be impossible for anyone to be beatified by God; for the cognition of every person belongs to the substance of beatitude, since the whole goodness, which is the substantial reward, is in each of the persons; therefore either the soul would know all of them, or it would not be blessed; but it would be impossible[^9] to know all of them, since its power is finite: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** That the number of divine persons is finite, both faith holds and reason persuades.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the divine persons, with respect to number, infinity is not to be posited but finitude.

The reason for this is that numerical infinity is repugnant to perfection and to order, because it is by recession from unity or from its origin. Likewise also[^10] infinity of mass; and therefore neither is in God. But the infinity of power is by access to unity and origin; and therefore, since this belongs to perfection, it is to be posited in God, but the others are not.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected, that whatever is in God is infinitely; it must be said that it is true that it is infinite, but not by any kind[^11] of infinity, but by that by which God is infinite; and this is the infinity of immensity, and in this way the Trinity is infinite, not by numerical infinity, which does not befit God[^12].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that infinite power, infinitely[^13] emanating, produces infinite things; it must be said that to the divine power no production befits except of a perfect thing; and therefore there does not befit it the production of any infinity except that which stands together with supreme perfection. But this is not numerical infinity, and therefore it is not in God.

*To 4.* To the last objection, that it belongs to power to multiply itself; it must be said that not in every way[^14] does it belong to power, but to multiply oneself perfectly belongs to power; and therefore it does not follow: therefore to multiply oneself more is a greater perfection, unless it be understood perfectly; but to multiply oneself infinitely according to number is imperfectly; and therefore it does not befit God.

la: Ita codd. et ed. I, dum Vat. *creatura cum sit finita*. Paulo post cod. cc *infinitum* pro *infinite*. Mox codd. A W loco *infinitus* habent *infinite*; aliqui autem codd. ut M T V X cum ed. I minus apte *erunt infinitae* pro *erit infinitus*; sed nihil mutandum duximus.

en: Thus the codices and ed. I, while the Vatican has *creatura cum sit finita* ["since the creature is finite"]. A little later cod. cc has *infinitum* for *infinite*. Soon afterward codices A W have *infinite* in place of *infinitus*; some codices, however, such as M T V X with ed. I, less aptly have *erunt infinitae* in place of *erit infinitus*; but we have judged that nothing should be changed.

la: Cfr. August., *de Quant. animae* c. 3. et seqq. — Cod. R hic non male addit *si*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 3 and following. — Cod. R here not unsuitably adds *si*.

la: Sensu et mss. cum ed. I ita exigentibus, mutavimus *emanet*, quod habet Vat.

en: Since the sense and the manuscripts together with ed. I demanded it, we have changed *emanet* ["should emanate"], which the Vatican has [to *emanat*].

la: Faventibus antiquioribus codd. et ed. I, supplevimus *etiam*.

en: With the older codices and ed. I in favor, we have supplied *etiam* ["even"].

la: Id est, plenitudo perfectionis.

en: That is, the plenitude of perfection.

la: Auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. I hic adiecimus *et* ac paulo infra *personis* a Vat. et cod. cc minus recte omissa.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. I we have added here *et* ["also"] and a little below *personis*, which were less correctly omitted by the Vatican and cod. cc.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. I. hic et circa finem argumenti post *si diversis* ponit *et* loco *sed*.

en: The Vatican, against the manuscripts and ed. I, here and near the end of the argument, after *si diversis* ["if by diverse"] places *et* in place of *sed* ["but"].

la: Sensus videtur esse: Deus omnia complet sive perfecta facit; sed personas, i. e. intellectuales naturas sive supposita, beatificando complet: ergo proprium Dei est beatificare. — Vat. *illas complere* pro *beatificare* et paulo ante *personas complere* et loco *alia complere*; ergo, quae lectio omnibus codd. et ed. I contraria est et progressum argumentationis aufert. Paulo post cod. A cum ed. I loco *aliquem* habet *aliquam*, supple *personam*.

en: The sense seems to be: God completes all things, that is, makes them perfect; but persons, i.e. intellectual natures or supposits, he completes by beatifying: therefore it is proper to God to beatify. — The Vatican has *illas complere* ["to complete those"] for *beatificare* ["to beatify"], and a little before *personas complere* ["to complete the persons"] in place of *alia complere* ["to complete other things"]; therefore this reading is contrary to all the codices and ed. I and removes the progress of the argumentation. A little later cod. A with ed. I in place of *aliquem* has *aliquam*, supplying *personam*.

la: Plures codd. ut T Y *est* et forte melius.

en: Several codices such as T Y have *est* ["is"], and perhaps better.

la: Desideratur hic in Vat. *et*, quod mss. et ed. I exhibent. Paulo post ex codd. et ed. I adiecimus verba *et originem* ac *alia non*, quae Vat. prave omittit. Item codd. et ed. I *neutrum* loco *neutra*, quod habet Vat.

en: Here in the Vatican is wanting *et* ["also"], which the manuscripts and ed. I exhibit. A little later, from the codices and ed. I, we have added the words *et originem* ["and origin"] and *alia non* ["the others not"], which the Vatican depravedly omits. Likewise the codices and ed. I read *neutrum* in place of *neutra*, which the Vatican has.

la: Codd. A T aliique cum ed. I *pro qualibet*, quod exstat in Vat., exhibent distinctius *qualicumque*.

en: Codices A T and others with ed. I, against *pro qualibet* ["for whatsoever"], which stands in the Vatican, exhibit more distinctly *qualicumque* ["whatsoever-kind"].

la: Fide omnium mss. et ed. I expunximus propositionem sequentem: *Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum, scilicet quare infinitas numeralis non est ponenda in Deo, sicut virtualis*, quae hic a Vat. ad ordinem solutionum servandum additur. Sed semel pro semper notandum, quod saepe saepius specialis responsio ad obiectionem a S. Doctore omittitur, quando ipsa iam in praecedentibus, sicuti v. g. hic in corp. articuli, clare continetur.

en: On the authority of all the manuscripts and ed. I we have expunged the following proposition: *And by this is clear the response to the second, namely why numerical infinity is not to be posited in God, as virtual is*, which is here added by the Vatican to preserve the order of solutions. But once for all it is to be noted that very often a special response to an objection is omitted by the Holy Doctor when it is already clearly contained in the preceding, as for example here in the body of the article.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. I, *in infinitate* pro *infinite*.

en: The Vatican, against the manuscripts and ed. I, has *in infinitate* ["in infinity"] for *infinite* ["infinitely"].

la: Codd. cum edd. I, 2, 3 omittunt hic in Vat. additum *multiplicare se*, quod facile suppletur. Paulo infra Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc, contrariantibus aliis mss. et ed. I, interpunctione mutata ac posito *convenit Deo* loco *ideo*, habet *et convenit Deo: non sequitur ergo, magis*. Dein circa finem responsionis ex mss. et ed. I ante *ideo* adiecimus particulam *et*.

en: The codices with editions 1, 2, 3 omit here what is added in the Vatican, *multiplicare se* ["to multiply itself"], which is easily supplied. A little below, the Vatican with the more recent cod. cc, against the other manuscripts and ed. I, with the punctuation changed and *convenit Deo* placed in place of *ideo*, has *et convenit Deo: non sequitur ergo, magis*. Then near the end of the response, from the manuscripts and ed. I, we have added before *ideo* the particle *et*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter triplex distinguitur infinitas, scil. numeralis, quae est in quantitate discreta, molis, quae est in quantitate continua, et virtutis sive immensitatis; cfr. infra d. 19. p. I. a. I. q. I. et 2. — Pro faciliore intelligentia quatuor argumentorum in fundam. haec notamus. Istae quatuor proprietates divinitatis, saltem tres primae, ita inter se connexae sunt, ut secunda (ordo) supponat primam (distinctionem) et tertia (connexio) utramque. Primum arg. ex distinctione sumtum sic procedit: si Deo attribuendum quod nobilius est, et si ibi est distinctio, ipsa distinctio debet esse sine confusione, cum confusio sit imperfectionis; sed ubi infinita multitudo, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.; cfr. infra d. 43. a. I. q. 3. Secundum arg. procedit ex hoc axiomate, quod, ubi est ordo, ibi necessario est primum et ultimum (terminus) et medium. Tertium arg. est satis perspicuum. In quarto arg., quod sumitur ex summa completione, i. e. plenitudine perfectionis, S. Doctor supponit cum sententia communi, quod « cognitio cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis ». De hoc tamen Scot. (I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) dubitat et opinatur, non esse, absolute loquendo, impossibile, quod in caelo aliquis fruatur essentia Dei, non vero personis. De qua sententia videri potest Macedo, *Collationes doctrinae S. Thom. et Scoti*, collat. 3. differ. 3.

**II.** Circa ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 6., ubi latius fund. 1. et 2. explicantur. — Scot., hic q. 5. et 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. quaest. S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 41. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 9. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Commonly infinity is distinguished into three kinds, namely numerical, which is in discrete quantity; of mass, which is in continuous quantity; and of power or immensity; cf. below d. 19, p. I, a. I, q. 1 and 2. — For an easier understanding of the four arguments in the *fundamenta* we note these things. These four properties of divinity, at least the first three, are so connected with one another that the second (order) presupposes the first (distinction) and the third (connection) presupposes both. The first argument, taken from distinction, proceeds thus: if to God is to be attributed what is more noble, and if there is distinction there, the distinction itself ought to be without confusion, since confusion belongs to imperfection; but where there is infinite multitude, there is confusion: therefore etc.; cf. below d. 43, a. I, q. 3. The second argument proceeds from this axiom, that where there is order, there is necessarily a first and a last (term) and a middle. The third argument is sufficiently clear. In the fourth argument, which is taken from supreme completion, i.e. the plenitude of perfection, the Holy Doctor supposes, with the common opinion, that "the cognition of any person belongs to the substance of beatitude." Concerning this, however, Scotus (I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) doubts and is of the opinion that it is not, absolutely speaking, impossible that someone in heaven should enjoy the essence of God but not the persons. On this opinion one may consult Macedo, *Collationes doctrinae S. Thom. et Scoti*, collat. 3, differ. 3.

**II.** Concerning the question itself: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 43, m. 6, where *fundamenta* 1 and 2 are more fully explained. — Scotus, here q. 5 and 7. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 30, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 53, q. 9. — Durandus, I. Sent. d. 10, q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 10, q. 1.

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