title: Dist. 30, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXX — divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXX — division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
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### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX.

#### *De caritate quantum ad meriti perfectionem.*

*Hic solet quaeri, quid potius sit etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de caritate quantum ad essentiam et definitionem et quantum ad diligibilium distinctionem[^1] et quantum ad ordinem. Hic sequitur quarta pars, in qua agit de eadem quantum ad meriti perfectionem. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In quarum prima determinat de perfectione caritatis in merito quantum ad eius motus comparatos ad invicem, utpote de dilectione amicorum et inimicorum. In secunda vero agit de eadem in comparatione ad diligentem, ibi: *Illud vero, quod sequitur, magis nos movet* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in tres partes. In quarum prima movet quaestionem[^2]. In secunda vero introducit auctoritatem Augustini, quae suae responsioni videtur obviare, ibi: *Augustinus tamen sentire videtur.* In tertia vero praedictam auctoritatem explanat, ibi: *Ecce hic haberi videtur quod praelaxavimus.*

Similiter secunda pars tres habet partes. In quarum prima introducit quaestionem, quae ex auctoritatibus Augustini habet originem, qua quaeritur de dilectione inimicorum in comparatione ad diligentem. In secunda vero ponit determinationem quorundam, ibi: *Quidam vero quod hic dicitur simpliciter tenere volentes.* In tertia vero subiungit determinationem suam, ibi: *Sed melius est, ut intelligatur* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio de caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti. Et circa hoc sex breviter possunt quaeri.

Primum est, utrum quis ex quantulacumque caritate possit quantaecumque tentationi resistere, an hoc sit solius caritatis perfectae.

Secundum est, utrum homo, in quantulacumque caritate constitutus, teneatur mortem pro Christo subire.

Tertium est, utrum habens caritatem perfectam teneatur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere.

Quartum est, utrum omnes, tam perfecti quam imperfecti, teneantur inimicos diligere quantum ad affectum.

Quintum est, utrum omnes teneantur inimicos diligere quantum ad effectum.

Sextum est, quid sit melius et maioris meriti, utrum diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum.

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.

#### *De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.*

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXX.

#### *On charity as regards the perfection of merit.*

*Here it is wont to be asked which is rather to be preferred, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of charity as regards its essence and definition and as regards the distinction of the things to be loved[^1] and as regards the order. Here follows the fourth part, in which he treats of the same as regards the perfection of merit. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he determines concerning the perfection of charity in merit as regards its motions compared to one another, namely concerning the love of friends and of enemies. But in the second he treats of the same in comparison to the one who loves, there: *But that which follows moves us more,* etc.

The first part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he raises a question[^2]. But in the second he introduces an authority of Augustine, which seems to stand against his response, there: *Yet Augustine seems to hold.* And in the third he explains the aforesaid authority, there: *Behold, here there seems to be had what we have set forth before.*

Likewise the second part has three parts. In the first of these he introduces a question, which has its origin from the authorities of Augustine, by which it is asked concerning the love of enemies in comparison to the one who loves. But in the second he sets down the determination of certain men, there: *But certain men, wishing to hold simply what is here said.* And in the third he adds his own determination, there: *But it is better that it be understood,* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part there falls here a question concerning charity as regards the perfection of merit. And concerning this six things can briefly be asked.

The first is whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation, or whether this belongs to perfect charity alone.

The second is whether a man, established in however little charity, is bound to undergo death for Christ.

The third is whether one having perfect charity is bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection.

The fourth is whether all, both the perfect and the imperfect, are bound to love their enemies as to affection.

The fifth is whether all are bound to love their enemies as to effect.

The sixth is which is better and of greater merit, to love a friend, or to love an enemy.

### THE SOLE ARTICLE.

#### *On charity as regards the perfection of merit.*

---

la: Cod. *K numerum.*

en: The codex *K* reads *numerum* (the number).

la: Edd. hic addunt *et determinat secundum suam opinionem.* Paulo ante pro *in comparatione* cod. *Z per comparationem.*

en: The editions here add *et determinat secundum suam opinionem* (and he determines according to his own opinion). A little before, for *in comparatione* (in comparison) the codex *Z* reads *per comparationem* (through comparison).

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Promoted in place from the 2026-06-02 auto-chunked skeleton (`line_start: 45601`, `line_end: 45631`, which held only `DIVISIO TEXTUS` + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` and missed the COMMENTARIUS opener above it). Backed up to `_backup-d30-divisio-pre-promote-20260611/` before promotion. This chunk now holds the full front-matter of the distinction: the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX` head (subtitle *De caritate quantum ad meriti perfectionem*; incipit *Hic solet quaeri, quid potius sit etc.*) + `DIVISIO TEXTUS` + `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` + the `ARTICULUS UNICUS` opener. Re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p656-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 45596–45636) as the base for clean running prose; the two-column OCR is cascade-garbled here (Vol II/III override, offset pdf = printed + 22), so the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout. `type: divisio`, **`has_scholion: false`** — a divisio chunk carries no scholion; its apparatus is the editorial *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM*.

**ARTICULUS UNICUS opener — folded INTO this divisio.** Distinction XXX has a single article — **ARTICULUS UNICUS, *De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti*** — and the opener carries **no *Primo/Secundo… quaeritur* listing of its own** (the six-question listing is the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM above, *Primum… Sextum est…*). Per the locked Vol II/III chunking convention (a short ARTICULUS opener with no separate question-list folds into the divisio, not into a1-q1), only the `ARTICULUS UNICUS.` header + subtitle are folded here; `QUAESTIO I` and its body (*Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur…*) open the next chunk, d30-a1-q1. (This mirrors d.29, where the parallel ARTICULUS UNICUS opener carried no listing; there it happened to fall at the top of the next printed page with q1, but the semantic boundary is identical.)

**Question-listing alignment (TRACTATIO ↔ a1-q1..q6).** ALIGNED 1:1, no q-swap. The TRACTATIO lists six: **I.** *utrum quis ex quantulacumque caritate possit quantaecumque tentationi resistere, an hoc sit solius caritatis perfectae;* **II.** *utrum homo… teneatur mortem pro Christo subire;* **III.** *utrum habens caritatem perfectam teneatur ea quae sunt perfectionis implere;* **IV.** *utrum omnes… teneantur inimicos diligere quantum ad affectum;* **V.** *utrum omnes teneantur inimicos diligere quantum ad effectum;* **VI.** *quid sit melius et maioris meriti, utrum diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum.* QUAESTIO I body confirmed eyes-on: *Utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi* (= TRACTATIO Primum). The existing d30-a1-q1..q6 skeletons match this count (six). No misalignment — proceeding.

**Page-span / page-split map.** Chunk spans **printed p.656 only** (PDF 678). The `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX` head + subtitle + incipit span both columns at the **top of p.656** (running head `656 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`). The DIVISIO TEXTUS reflows L-column top→bottom (*Supra egit Magister… movet quaestionem².*) then continues R-column (*videtur obviare… ut intelligatur etc.*). Then `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.`: Primum/Secundum in L-column, Tertium–Sextum in R-column. Then the `ARTICULUS UNICUS.` opener + subtitle span both columns at the foot of p.656, immediately followed by `QUAESTIO I.` + its title + body opening (*Circa primum sic proceditur…*) — all on the **lower third of p.656**. The chunk ends at the `ARTICULUS UNICUS` subtitle; `QUAESTIO I` onward = d30-a1-q1.

**Apparatus (2 entries owned), NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart — p.656 footers 1–2:**
- **p.656** has a single continuous footer sequence 1–4. **Footers 1–2 are MINE** (markers in the DIVISIO): **n.1** (marker after *diligibilium distinctionem*) = *Cod. K numerum.*; **n.2** (marker after *movet quaestionem*) = *Edd. hic addunt et determinat secundum suam opinionem. Paulo ante pro in comparatione cod. Z per comparationem.* **Footers 3–4 are NOT mine** — they key to the QUAESTIO I body and belong to d30-a1-q1 (see hand-off): n.3 = *Psalm. 118, 72. — Verba August. habentur in eius Enarrat. super hunc Ps., serm 17. n. 10.* (marker on *Super illud Psalmi³*); n.4 = *Libr. V. Moral. c. 22. n. 63…* (marker on *Gregorius⁴*).

**Footer hand-off received.** NONE forwarded from d30-littera — the littera's 9 footers were all *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* on p.655; the COMMENTARIUS's *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* starts fresh on p.656. Confirmed: my p.656 footer 1 (*Cod. K numerum*) is the first *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* entry of the distinction.

**Seam status.** CLEAN at both ends.
- **Open seam (d30-littera → this chunk):** the littera (Cap. unicum) closes on p.655 mid-page; the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX` head opens fresh at the top of p.656 — seam clean, no leakage.
- **Close seam (this chunk → d30-a1-q1):** the `ARTICULUS UNICUS` subtitle (*De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.*) is the last line of this chunk; `QUAESTIO I. / Utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi. / Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur…* (raw ~45637) is the next chunk — the QUAESTIO header is a fresh question head, not a continuation of the TRACTATIO list — seam clean.

**`[?]` flags:** none. The COMMENTARIUS head, subtitle, incipit, all DIVISIO TEXTUS paragraphs, the full six-question TRACTATIO, the ARTICULUS UNICUS opener, and the two owned p.656 *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* footers were read eyes-on from the 450 dpi bands. No ambiguity survives.

**HAND-OFF TO d30-a1-q1 (forwarded):** the next chunk is **bon-sent-III-d30-a1-q1** — `ARTICULUS UNICUS. / De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti. / QUAESTIO I. / Utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi`. `type: quaestio`, `articulus: 1`, `quaestio: 1`. **Raw anchors:** QUAESTIO I header at raw **45637**; body opens *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi. Et quod sic, videtur.* on the lower L-column of **p.656** (PDF 678). **Page span:** opens at the foot of p.656 and runs onto p.657+ (PDF 679; running head OCR-garbled `637`, really 657, via +22 offset). **Footer split (p.656):** **p.656 footers 3 and 4 belong to a1-q1** — n.3 = *Psalm. 118, 72. — Verba August. habentur in eius Enarrat. super hunc Ps., serm 17. n. 10.* (marker *Super illud Psalmi³*, on argument 1, *Plus diligit caritas Deum quam cupiditas millia auri et argenti* — Augustine); n.4 = *Libr. V. Moral. c. 22. n. 63. De verbis ipsis vide tom. II. pag. 170, nota 2. Similis sententia… in Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. 68. n. 4.* (marker *Gregorius⁴*, on argument 2, *Debilis est hostis, qui non vincit nisi volentem*). **a1-q1's first two body footers are p.656 nn.3–4; do NOT re-claim nn.1–2 (those are the divisio's).** Then a fresh p.657 footer sequence. **quaeritur alignment:** TRACTATIO Primum (*utrum quis ex quantulacumque caritate possit quantaecumque tentationi resistere*) = QUAESTIO I body 1:1 — alignment passes, no q-swap. The d.30 chunk slate: **littera (DONE) · divisio (this chunk, DONE) · a1-q1 · q2 · q3 · q4 · q5 · q6 · dubia** = 9 chunks.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum cum quantulacumque caritate possit quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Bonum mihi lex oris tui* etc.; dicit Augustinus: « Plus diligit caritas Deum, quam cupiditas millia auri et argenti ». Hoc est verum de quantulacumque caritate; et si hoc, quantulacumque caritas excedit omnem cupiditatem sua virtute: si ergo magnitudo tentationis attenditur secundum magnitudinem cupiditatis, videtur, quod per quantulamcumque caritatem possumus maximae tentationi resistere.

2. Item, Gregorius[^2]: « Debilis est hostis, qui non vincit nisi volentem »; sed quantulamcumque habet homo caritatem, habet quo potens est non velle vinci: ergo si per nolle vinci resistit omni tentationi et tentatori, videtur, quod per quantulamcumque caritatem possit homo superare omnem tentationem.

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3. Item, potentior est caritas in bonum, quam sit culpa in malum[^3]; sed peccatum mortale quantumcumque parvum sufficit ad expellendam magnam gratiam: ergo caritas, quantumcumque parva sit, sufficiens est resistere tentationi maximae.

4. Item, caritas, quantumcumque parva sit, hominem facit diligere Deum propter se et super omnia et facit hominem in Deum confidere plus quam in se; sed qui Deum propter se et super omnia amat et in Deum confidit habet Deum adiutorem, et qui habet Deum adiutorem omni tentationi potest resistere[^4]: ergo homo ex quantulacumque caritate superare potest omnem tentationem.

5. Item, gratia, quantumcumque sit modica, potentior est et excellentior quam natura; sed homo in statu innocentiae, in puris naturalibus constitutus, poterat quantaecumque tentationi resistere[^5]: ergo existens in gratia potest quantaecumque tentationi resistere, quantulamcumque habeat caritatem.

6. Item, esto quod aliquis habeat modicam caritatem et tentetur magna tentatione, aut potest illi resistere, aut non potest. Si potest, habeo propositum. Si non potest; et nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest[^6]: ergo consentiendo tali tentationi non peccat. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo hoc sequitur: redit ergo idem quod prius.

**Sed contra:** 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo[^7]: *Fidelis Deus, qui non permittit vos tentari supra id quod potestis*; constat, quod loquitur habentibus caritatem: ergo si Deus permitteret, diabolus tentaret hominem habentem caritatem supra posse: ergo non videtur, quod cum quantulacumque caritate possit homo resistere tentationi maximae.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi[^8]: *Proba me, Domine, et tenta me*; dicit auctoritas: « Prius vires nostras inspice, et postea tentari permitte »; sed hoc non peteret, nisi posset tentari supra vires: ergo videtur, quod aliqua tentatio sit, cui non sufficit resistere virtus caritatis modicae et imperfectae.

3. Item, Ambrosius, in quodam sermone de Confessoribus[^9]: « Diversa sunt genera inimicorum, qui secundum virium nostrarum quantitatem compensato nobiscum agone luctantur »; sed maiores vires habet caritas perfecta quam imperfecta: ergo si illa habet luctam suis viribus proportionabilem, videtur, quod aliqua lucta sit supra vires caritatis imperfectae.

4. Item, virtus caritatis maxime relucet in pugna[^10] et tentationis victoria: ergo si quantulacumque caritas potest resistere maximae tentationi, videtur, quod modica caritas sit maximae virtutis et perfectionis; quod si est manifeste falsum, restat, quod et illud, ex quo sequitur.

5. Item, magnitudo coronae attenditur secundum magnitudinem pugnae: ergo si modica caritas resistere posset tentationi maximae, videtur, quod maxima corona deberetur caritati minimae. Sed hoc est falsum manifeste: ergo etc.

6. Item, quaedam est pugna, ex cuius victoria purificatur anima ab omnibus venialibus et statim evolat in caelum, sicut est, quando pro iustitia mors homini intentatur: ergo si modica caritas posset resistere quantaecumque tentationi, modica caritas posset omnia venialia delere et statim in caelum facere evolare. Quodsi hoc absurdum est, restat idem quod prius.

### Conclusio.

> Concedi potest, quod quantulacumque caritas possit resistere quantaecumque tentationi, si comparatio fit tum ad dispositionem divinae providentiae tentationisque exordium, tum ad libertatem voluntatis; sed negandum est de caritate per comparationem ad consummationem victoriae et ad defectum pronitatis et difficultatis in voluntate.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum quantulacumque caritas possit resistere quantaecumque tentationi, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut loquendo de potestate caritatis per comparationem ad adiutorium divinae providentiae gubernantis, aut per comparationem ad vires liberi arbitrii cooperantis. Secundum utrumque istorum modorum fuit hic duplex modus dicendi.

Si enim loquamur per comparationem ad dispositionem divini regiminis, sic dixerunt aliqui, quod ex quantulacumque caritate potest quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi; alii vero, quod non. Et

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utrique verum dicere potuerunt nec sibi contradicunt, si recte intelligantur.

Si enim loquamur quantum ad tentationis exordium, quantulacumque caritas potest resistere quantaecumque tentationi, quia Deus hominem habentem caritatem nunquam deserit, nisi ille voluntarie ab eo recedat; quin potius, secundum quod augetur tentationis bellum, operatur Deus caritatis augmentum. Unde quantumcumque sit modica caritas in homine, nunquam potest invitus ab adversario deici, quia, secundum quod crescit bellum, crescit adiutorium, si homo faciat quod in se est. — Si autem loquamur de tentatione quantum ad consummationem victoriae, sic non potest esse, quod homo ex modica caritate resistat tentationi maximae, quia non patitur ordo divinae iustitiae, quin ex victoria magni belli fiat amplificatio meriti. Unde sicut ista duo non contradicunt, sed simul vera sunt: possibile est, quod ex parva caritate in principio tentationis et magna in fine resistatur magnae tentationi; et iterum: possibile est, quod ex parva caritate in principio et in fine non resistatur magnae tentationi: sic non obviant sibi illae duae opiniones.

Similiter, si loquamur de potentia caritatis per comparationem ad vires liberi arbitrii cooperantis, duplex fuit opinio. Nam quidam dixerunt, quod ex quantulacumque caritate potest quis resistere quantaecumque tentationi; quidam, quod non. Et ratio huius est: quia de viribus liberi arbitrii adiuti a gratia est[^21] loqui dupliciter: vel quantum ad libertatem voluntatis, vel quantum ad vitium difficultatis ad bonum et pronitatis ad malum.

Si igitur loquamur de gratia per comparationem ad libertatem voluntatis, sic cum ipsa voluntas de se sit libera ad consentiendum, et per gratiam sit liberata a servitute peccati et cogi non possit[^24], potest quantaecumque tentationi resistere. — Si autem loquamur per comparationem ad vitium difficultatis et pronitatis, sic non potest resistere impulsui tentationis fortis, nisi caritas adeo fortis sit, quod suo vigore contra pronitatem refrenet a malo et contra difficultatem accendat ad bonum. Liberum enim arbitrium, ex una parte adiutum adiutorio gratiae, ex alia parte corruptum vitio concupiscentiae, quando excitatur in ipso per tentationem impetus concupiscentiae, secundum quod magis et magis fortiter excitatur, secundum hoc indiget maiori repressivo[^25]. — Et sic diversis considerationibus concedi adhuc potest de caritate per comparationem ad liberum arbitrium, quod quantulacumque caritas potest resistere quantaecumque tentationi, et quod non potest: potest quidem, si comparetur ad dominium libertatis; non potest, si comparetur ad vitium pronitatis et difficultatis. Et hoc melius patet, si quis consideret et attendat et experimento cognoscat statum et conflictum hominum tentatorum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam nihilominus responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae probant, quod quantulacumque caritas potest resistere quantaecumque tentationi, procedunt de ipsa caritate per comparationem ad Deum ipsam adiuvantem et promoventem, et per comparationem ad voluntatis libertatem, sicut intuenti apparet.

Verumtamen illa ratio, quam obiicit de peccato, non valet. Quod enim dicitur, quod quantumcumque parvum peccatum sufficit ad expellendam quantamcumque gratiam; hoc non est, quia peccatum agat in ipsam gratiam, sed quia facit liberum arbitrium deficere a gratiae complemento[^26]. Ex hoc autem non potest inferri, quod propter hoc quantulacumque gratia sufficiat ad vincendum omnem tentationis impulsum, quia facilius est deficere quam bene facere[^27]. Inferri tamen potest, quod quantulacumque gratia expellere potest omne peccatum.

Ad rationes vero, quae ad oppositum adducuntur, manifesta est similiter responsio; procedunt enim de ipsa caritate per comparationem ad defectum pronitatis et difficultatis; sicut patet de primis tribus rationibus; vel per comparationem ad terminum et consummationem victoriae, cui respondet[^28] perfectio meriti et magnitudo praemii quantum ad excellentiam victoriae et coronae; et hoc modo concessum est, quod non potest esse, quod modica caritas resistat tentationi magnae, quia non patitur hoc ordo divinae iustitiae, sicut praetactum est. — Et secundum hanc viam procedunt tres rationes ultimae; nec oportet amplius hic immorari, quia rationes illae per se satis manifestae sunt pertractanti[^29].

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english:
### Article unique. *On charity as regards the perfection of merit.*
### Question I. *Whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation. And that he can, seems [to be the case].

1. On that [verse] of the Psalm[^1]: *The law of thy mouth is good to me* etc.; Augustine says: "Charity loves God more than cupidity [loves] thousands of gold and silver." This is true of however little charity; and if this is so, however little charity exceeds all cupidity by its power: if therefore the magnitude of a temptation is reckoned according to the magnitude of cupidity, it seems that by however little charity we can resist the greatest temptation.

2. Likewise, Gregory[^2]: "Weak is the enemy who conquers none but the willing"; but however little charity a man has, he has that whereby he is able not to will to be conquered: therefore if by not-willing to be conquered he resists every temptation and tempter, it seems that by however little charity a man can overcome every temptation.

3. Likewise, charity is more powerful for good than fault is for evil[^3]; but a mortal sin, however small, suffices to expel a great grace: therefore charity, however small it be, suffices to resist the greatest temptation.

4. Likewise, charity, however small it be, makes a man love God for His own sake and above all things, and makes a man trust in God more than in himself; but he who loves God for His own sake and above all things and trusts in God has God for a helper, and he who has God for a helper can resist every temptation[^4]: therefore a man can by however little charity overcome every temptation.

5. Likewise, grace, however slight it be, is more powerful and more excellent than nature; but a man in the state of innocence, constituted in his pure natural [powers], was able to resist however great a temptation[^5]: therefore one existing in grace can resist however great a temptation, however little charity he have.

6. Likewise, suppose that someone has slight charity and is tempted by a great temptation, either he can resist it, or he cannot. If he can, I have my point. If he cannot; and no one sins in that which he cannot avoid[^6]: therefore by consenting to such a temptation he does not sin. But this is false: therefore so too is that from which it follows: thus the same conclusion as before returns.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the First [Letter] to the Corinthians, the tenth [chapter][^7]: *God is faithful, who does not permit you to be tempted above that which you are able [to bear]*; it is settled that he is speaking to those having charity: therefore if God were to permit, the devil would tempt a man having charity beyond his power: therefore it does not seem that by however little charity a man can resist the greatest temptation.

2. Likewise, on that [verse] of the Psalm[^8]: *Prove me, O Lord, and try me*; an authority says: "First inspect our powers, and afterward permit [us] to be tried"; but he would not ask this unless he could be tried above his powers: therefore it seems that there is some temptation which the power of slight and imperfect charity does not suffice to resist.

3. Likewise, Ambrose, in a certain sermon on the Confessors[^9]: "There are diverse kinds of enemies, who struggle with us in a contest measured to the quantity of our powers"; but perfect charity has greater powers than imperfect: therefore if the former has a struggle proportioned to its powers, it seems that there is some struggle above the powers of imperfect charity.

4. Likewise, the power of charity shines forth most in the fight[^10] and in the victory of temptation: therefore if however little charity can resist the greatest temptation, it seems that slight charity is of the greatest power and perfection; and since this is manifestly false, it remains that so too is that from which it follows.

5. Likewise, the magnitude of the crown is reckoned according to the magnitude of the fight: therefore if slight charity could resist the greatest temptation, it seems that the greatest crown would be owed to the least charity. But this is manifestly false: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, there is a certain fight from whose victory the soul is purified of all venial [sins] and at once flies up into heaven, as is the case when death is threatened upon a man for justice' sake: therefore if slight charity could resist however great a temptation, slight charity could blot out all venial [sins] and make [one] at once fly up into heaven. But if this is absurd, the same conclusion as before remains.

### Conclusion.

> It can be granted that however little charity can resist however great a temptation, if the comparison is made both to the disposition of divine providence and to the temptation's beginning, and to the freedom of the will; but it must be denied of charity by comparison to the consummation of the victory and to the defect of proneness [to evil] and of difficulty in the will.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, when it is asked whether however little charity can resist however great a temptation, this can be understood in two ways: either by speaking of the power of charity by comparison to the help of governing divine providence, or by comparison to the powers of the cooperating free choice. According to each of these ways there was here a twofold manner of speaking.

For if we speak by comparison to the disposition of the divine governance, then some said that by however little charity one can resist however great a temptation; others, however, that one cannot. And

both could speak truly and do not contradict one another, if they are rightly understood.

For if we speak as regards the temptation's beginning, however little charity can resist however great a temptation, because God never deserts a man having charity unless he voluntarily withdraws from Him; rather, according as the war of temptation is increased, God works an increase of charity. Hence however slight the charity in a man be, he can never be cast down unwillingly by the adversary, because, according as the war grows, the help grows, if a man does what is in him. — But if we speak of the temptation as regards the consummation of the victory, then it cannot be that a man by slight charity resist the greatest temptation, because the order of divine justice does not allow that an amplification of merit not arise from the victory of a great war. Hence, just as these two [statements] do not contradict but are at once true: it is possible that by charity small at the beginning of a temptation and great at the end a great temptation be resisted; and again: it is possible that by charity small at the beginning and at the end a great temptation be not resisted: thus those two opinions do not stand in each other's way.

Similarly, if we speak of the power of charity by comparison to the powers of the cooperating free choice, there was a twofold opinion. For some said that by however little charity one can resist however great a temptation; some, that one cannot. And the reason of this is: that of the powers of the free choice helped by grace[^21] one may speak in two ways: either as regards the freedom of the will, or as regards the vice of difficulty toward the good and proneness toward evil.

If therefore we speak of grace by comparison to the freedom of the will, then, since the will is of itself free to consent, and through grace is freed from the servitude of sin and cannot be compelled[^24], it can resist however great a temptation. — But if we speak by comparison to the vice of difficulty and proneness, then it cannot resist the impulse of a strong temptation, unless the charity be so strong that by its vigor it restrains from evil against proneness and kindles toward good against difficulty. For free choice, on the one part helped by the help of grace, on the other part corrupted by the vice of concupiscence, when in it through temptation the impulse of concupiscence is aroused, according as it is aroused more and more strongly, according to this it needs a greater restraint[^25]. — And thus by diverse considerations it can still be granted of charity, by comparison to free choice, that however little charity can resist however great a temptation, and that it cannot: it can indeed, if it be compared to the lordship of freedom; it cannot, if it be compared to the vice of proneness and difficulty. And this is better seen if one considers and attends and learns by experience the state and conflict of tempted men.

From these things the response to the proposed question is plain, and likewise plain is the response to the objections. For the reasons which prove that however little charity can resist however great a temptation proceed of charity itself by comparison to God Himself helping and promoting it, and by comparison to the freedom of the will, as appears to one who looks.

Nevertheless that reason which is objected concerning sin is not valid. For what is said, that however small a sin suffices to expel however great a grace; this is not because the sin acts upon the grace itself, but because it makes free choice fail from the completion of grace[^26]. From this, however, it cannot be inferred that on this account however little grace suffices to conquer every impulse of temptation, because it is easier to fail than to do well[^27]. Yet it can be inferred that however little grace can expel every sin.

To the reasons, however, which are adduced to the opposite, the response is likewise manifest; for they proceed of charity itself by comparison to the defect of proneness and difficulty, as is plain of the first three reasons; or by comparison to the term and consummation of the victory, to which corresponds[^28] the perfection of merit and the magnitude of the reward as regards the excellence of the victory and the crown; and in this way it was granted that it cannot be that slight charity resist a great temptation, because the order of divine justice does not allow this, as was touched on before. — And along this way the last three reasons proceed; nor is it necessary to linger here further, since those reasons are of themselves plain enough to one who works them through[^29].

la: Psalm. 118, 72. — Verba August. habentur in eius Enarrat. super hunc Ps., serm 17. n. 10.

en: Psalm 118:72. — Augustine's words are found in his *Enarratio* on this Psalm, sermon 17, n. 10.

la: Libr. V. Moral. c. 22. n. 63. De verbis ipsis vide tom. II. pag. 170, nota 2. Similis sententia invenitur in quodam sermone attributo Augustino, nunc in append. operum eius serm. 37. (alias 197. de temp.) n. 6; et in Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. 68. n. 4.

en: [Gregory,] *Moralia*, Book V, c. 22, n. 63. On the words themselves see vol. II, p. 170, note 2. A similar sentence is found in a certain sermon attributed to Augustine, now in the appendix of his works, sermon 37 (otherwise 197, *de tempore*), n. 6; and in Bernard, *Sermon on the Canticle* 68, n. 4.

la: Vide sententiam Anselmi, tom. II. pag. 920, nota 4. allatam.

en: See the sentence of Anselm cited at vol. II, p. 920, note 4.

la: Psalm. 117, 7: *Dominus mihi adiutor, et ego despiciam inimicos meos.*

en: Psalm 117:7: *The Lord is my helper, and I will despise my enemies.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. III. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. I, et Comment. ibid. p. I. dub. I. — Verbis *maioris* respondent illa verba Ambrosii, I. de offic. ministror. c. 7. n. 24: *Non enim vehementior est natura ad diligendum quam gratia.*

en: Cf. the Master's III [Book of] Sentences, d. XXIV, c. I, and the Commentary there, p. I, dub. I. — To the words of the major [premise] correspond those words of Ambrose, *de officiis ministrorum* I, c. 7, n. 24: *For nature is not more vehement toward loving than grace [is].*

la: August., l. Retract. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50: *Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest?*

en: Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 9, n. 5, and *On Free Choice* III, c. 18, n. 50: *For who sins in that which can in no way be avoided?*

la: Vers. 13, ubi Vulgata *patietur* pro *permittit*.

en: Verse 13, where the Vulgate reads *patietur* ("will suffer") for *permittit* ("permits").

la: Psalm. 25, 2. — Auctoritatem hic intellige Glossam ordinariam (apud Strabum et Lyranum).

en: Psalm 25:2. — Understand the "authority" here as the *Glossa ordinaria* (in Strabo and Lyra).

la: Pro *de Confessoribus* Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat 72. a. I. *de Confessione*, sed neque sub hoc neque sub illo titulo sermo reperitur in edd. operum Ambrosii, quas prae manu habemus, neque in aliis locis illa verba invenire potuimus.

en: For "on the Confessors" the Supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales [reads] collation 72, a. I, "on Confession"; but neither under this nor under that title is the sermon found in the editions of Ambrose's works which we have at hand, nor were we able to find those words in other places.

la: Cod. K *lucta.*

en: Codex K reads *lucta* ("struggle").

la: Codd. H I K N U *contingit.* Proxime ante pro *adiuti a gratia* edd. *et adiuti gratia*, codd. C D *adiuti et de gratia.*

en: Codices H I K N U read *contingit* ("it happens"). Just before, for *adiuti a gratia* ("helped by grace") the editions [read] *et adiuti gratia*, codices C D *adiuti et de gratia.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq.

en: See II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 4 and following.

la: Cod. W *praesidio*, edd. *repressione*, quae etiam mox omittunt *adhuc*. Deinde pro *per comparationem* cod. H *in comparatione*.

en: Codex W reads *praesidio* ("by a defense"), the editions *repressione* ("by a repression"), which also presently omit *adhuc* ("still"). Then for *per comparationem* codex H reads *in comparatione*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 4. ad 5. — Cod. ¥ *sed quia facit, ut liberum arbitrium deficiat* etc.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. 4, ad 5. — Codex Y reads *but because it makes free choice fail* etc.

la: Vide supra pag. 499, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 499, note 2.

la: Cod. A *respondent.* Inferius pro *magnae* cod. Z *maximae*, et circa finem solut. pro *hic immorari* cod. U *in hoc immorari.*

en: Codex A reads *respondent* ("they correspond"). Lower down, for *magnae* ("great") codex Z [reads] *maximae* ("greatest"), and near the end of the solution, for *hic immorari* codex U [reads] *in hoc immorari.*

la: Aliter solvit Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 6. c. 4: *Haec est igitur differentia inter primam opinionem et secundam, quia prima dicit, quod ex minima caritate, manente minima, potest aliquis resistere quantaelibet tentationi, sed non de facili. Secunda dicit, quod nullo modo. Sed prima magis placet nobis, quoniam dicitur in Cantico Deuter.: Dei perfecta sunt opera; ergo quaecumque Deus armat, perfecte armat. Virtutes autem non dantur tantum ad informandam animam, quantulaecumque sint, sed etiam ad armandum contra omnes tentationes: ergo quantulaecumque sint, sufficiunt ad resistendum quantaecumque tentationi.*

en: William of Auxerre solves [it] otherwise, *Summa* p. III, tr. 6, c. 4: *This, then, is the difference between the first opinion and the second, because the first says that by the least charity, while it remains least, anyone can resist any temptation whatever, but not easily. The second says that [he can] in no way. But the first pleases us more, because it is said in the Canticle of Deuteronomy: God's works are perfect; therefore whatever God arms, He arms perfectly. But the virtues are given not only to inform the soul, however slight they be, but also to arm [it] against all temptations: therefore however slight they be, they suffice to resist however great a temptation.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Praenotandum est, quod antiqui Scholastici, sicut et Ss. Patres, non ita distinguunt et separant gratiam habitualem et actualem, ut theologi recentiores passim faciunt. Ipsi enim habituali attribuunt non tantum effectum elevandi animam ad statum gratiae, quo quis efficitur Deo acceptus, sed etiam virtutem moventem, illuminantem et roborantem, ut iam observatum est II. Sent. d. 26. q. I. et 6. in scholiis (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 109. passim). Hinc etiam fit, ut S. Thom. (S. III. q. 62. a. 6. ad 3, q. 70. a. 4. in corp.) eundem effectum attribuat gratiae habituali, quem hic tribuit caritati i. e. habitui caritatis, qui inseparabiliter est connexus cum gratia habituali, vel, ut Scotistae volunt, non nisi ratione ab eo distinctus. Docet enim, quod « minima gratia potest resistere cuilibet concupiscentiae et vitare omne peccatum mortale ».

**II.** Pro more suo S. Bonav., duplici usus distinctione, aliqualiter conciliat duas sibi oppositas opiniones dicitque, utramque aliquid veritatis continere. Prima distinctione utitur etiam S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 31. q. I. a. 3.) et resolvit ad mentem nostri auctoris, quod virtute minimae gratiae possit quis resistere tentationi qualicumque, ut non vincatur, sive ut a bono proposito, oriente tentatione, non cadat, sed non ita, ut tentationem vincat « ex magnitudine virtutis »; cum caritas, quae in principio tentationis sit parva, in fine eiusdem fiat magna. « Si tamen ponatur, quod semper parva maneret, non posset per modum dictum tentationi resistere ». Similiter respondent Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 31. q. I. a. 4, et Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 31. a. I. q. 3. De opinione Guliel. Antissiod. vide pag. 658, nota 9.

**III.** Solutio seq. (2.) quaestionis non habet difficultatem nec eadem ab aliis commentatoribus Magistri tractatur. Tangitur autem ipsa a S. Thoma (III. Sent. d. 29. a. 8. quaestiunc. 2.) in quaestione: utrum omnes teneantur ad caritatem perfectam, praesertim in solutione ad 3. Similiter in eadem quaestione 13. Albert., III. Sent. d. 29. a. 8, et Petr. a Tar., de III. Sent. d. 29. a. 9. ad 3. breviter idem dicunt.

**IV.** Tertiam quaestionem sic proponit B. Albert. (loc. cit. a. 9.): An plus secundum actum tenetur diligere perfectus quam imperfectus; et resolvit, quod « perfectus tenetur secundum actum plus diligere ex commisso, non ex praecepto (cfr. Bonav., ibi ad 2.). Praeter hunc tractat eandem quaestionem solus S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 8. quaestiunc. 3. — De quinque perfectionis generibus vide pag. 662, nota 4. Videsis etiam praeclaram doctrinam de vera ratione perfectionis, quam S. Bonav. exhibet in opusculo *Apologia pauperum*, resp. I. c. 2. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** It must be noted beforehand that the ancient Scholastics, like the holy Fathers too, do not so distinguish and separate habitual and actual grace as the more recent theologians commonly do. For they attribute to habitual [grace] not only the effect of elevating the soul to the state of grace, by which one is made acceptable to God, but also a moving, illuminating, and strengthening power, as has already been observed at II Sent. d. 26, q. I and 6, in the scholia (cf. St. Thomas, S. I-II q. 109, throughout). Hence it also comes about that St. Thomas (S. III q. 62, a. 6, ad 3; q. 70, a. 4, in the body) attributes to habitual grace the same effect which here [Bonaventure] attributes to charity, i.e., to the habit of charity, which is inseparably connected with habitual grace, or, as the Scotists hold, distinct from it only by reason. For he teaches that "the least grace can resist any concupiscence and avoid every mortal sin."

**II.** After his manner St. Bonaventure, using a twofold distinction, somewhat reconciles two mutually opposed opinions and says that each contains something of truth. The first distinction St. Thomas also uses (III Sent. d. 31, q. I, a. 3) and resolves [it] to the mind of our author, namely, that by the power of the least grace one can resist any temptation whatever, so as not to be conquered, or so as not to fall from a good purpose when temptation arises, but not so as to conquer the temptation "by the magnitude of virtue"; since charity, which is small at the beginning of a temptation, becomes great at its end. "If, however, it be supposed that it always remained small, it could not in the said manner resist the temptation." Similarly answer Peter of Tarentaise, III Sent. d. 31, q. I, a. 4, and Richard of Mediavilla, III Sent. d. 31, a. I, q. 3. On the opinion of William of Auxerre see p. 658, note 9.

**III.** The solution of the following (2nd) question presents no difficulty, nor is it treated by the other commentators on the Master. It is, however, touched on by St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 29, a. 8, sub-question 2) in the question: whether all are bound to perfect charity, especially in the solution to [objection] 3. Similarly in the same question 13, Albert, III Sent. d. 29, a. 8, and Peter of Tarentaise, on III Sent. d. 29, a. 9, ad 3, briefly say the same.

**IV.** The third question Blessed Albert (loc. cit., a. 9) poses thus: Whether the perfect is bound to love more according to act than the imperfect; and he resolves that "the perfect is bound according to act to love more from what he has committed himself to, not from precept" (cf. Bonaventure, there, ad 2). Besides him, only St. Thomas treats the same question, loc. cit., a. 8, sub-question 3. — On the five kinds of perfection see p. 662, note 4. See also the splendid doctrine on the true account of perfection which St. Bonaventure sets forth in the opusculum *Apologia pauperum*, response I, c. 2, 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 45637–45824, QUAESTIO I header at 45637; upper boundary QUAESTIO II at 45825) and cross-checked column-by-column against the vol3 PDF bands (pp.656–659 = PDF 678–681; `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p65{6,7,8}-{L,R}-*.png`). Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied to the Respondeo, Conclusio, and footers (cascade-shattered in OCR). Offset pdf = printed + 22; running-head digits were OCR-mangled (`637`→657, `639`→659) and corrected by the +22 offset and running-head text.

**Page-split map.** p.656 (PDF 678): QUAESTIO I header + title (lower R-col, beneath the ARTICULUS UNICUS opener that belongs to d30-divisio) → body opens lower-L → affirmative args 1–2. p.657 (PDF 679): affirmative args 3–6, Sed contra 1–6, Conclusio, opening of Respondeo (running head `DIST. XXX ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I`). p.658 (PDF 680, verso `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`): remainder of Respondeo (the divine-providence and free-choice members, Conclusiones 1–4) + the Epilogus replies (Ad arg. pro parte affirm. + Ad arg. pro parte negat.) closing at *…pertractanti.* p.659 (PDF 681, running head `DIST. XXX ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II`): the SCHOLION §I–IV prints here even though it heads the *next* page's running head — it is the **article-master scholion attached to this q1 body** (it falls within q1's raw range before QUAESTIO II at 45825).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from d30-divisio (forwarded):* p.656 **nn.3–4** are this chunk's leading apparatus (n.3 = Psalm 118:72 / Augustine on *Super illud Psalmi³*, arg. 1; n.4 = Gregory *Moralia* V c.22 on *Gregorius⁴*, arg. 2). The divisio kept only p.656 nn.1–2; those were NOT re-claimed here.
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**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. The scholion is the **article-master scholion**, §I–IV, physically printed on p.659 under q1's body. §III explicitly forwards to the *following (2nd) question*; §IV forwards to the *third question*. Sibling chunks q2 and q3 therefore carry `has_scholion: false` and redirect here. Placed LAST in each language block per the parser requirement.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All readings confirmed against the PDF column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum homo, in quantulacumque caritate constitutus, teneatur mortem pro Christo subire.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo, in quantulacumque caritate constitutus, teneatur mortem pro Christo subire. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Lucae nono[^1]: *Qui me erubuerit et meos sermones, hunc filius hominis erubescet, cum venerit in maiestate sua*; sed Christus neminem erubescet, cum venerit in maiestate, nisi pro mortali peccato: si igitur sententia ista generalis est, videtur, quod omnes mortaliter peccent, qui in periculo mortis erubescunt ipsum Dominum confiteri: ergo omnes tenentur mortem pro Christo subire.

2. Item, primae Ioannis tertio[^2]: *Quoniam ille animam suam pro nobis posuit, et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere*: si ergo Christus pro omnibus animam posuit, videtur, quod omnes tenentur et debent mortem pro ipso et membris eius subire, cum se obtulerit opportunitas loci et temporis.

3. Item, quilibet tenetur plus diligere Deum quam omne creatum, quantumcumque sit imperfectus: ergo quilibet tenetur pro honore Dei et gloria parvipendere[^3] se et sua: cum igitur opportunitas temporis se offert, videtur, quod quilibet teneatur mortem pro Christo subire.

4. Item, incomparabiliter plus diligenda sunt bona aeterna quam temporalia, sicut incomparabiliter sunt meliora; sed unusquisque libenter dat illud quod minus diligit pro eo quod magis diligit: si ergo omnes tenentur ad diligendum plus vitam aeternam quam temporalem, videtur, quod omnes teneantur velle libenter morti exponere praesentem vitam, ut lucrentur aeternam. Sed quod homo tenetur velle, pro loco et tempore tenetur facere: ergo opportunitate se offerente, videtur, quod omnes tenentur mortem pro Christo subire.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ioannis decimo quinto[^4]: *Maiorem caritatem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis*: ergo mortem pro Christo subire videtur perfectionis maximae; sed homines imperfecti non tenentur ad opera perfectionis: ergo non omnes tenentur mortem pro Christo subire.

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2. Item, ad Romanos sexto[^5] super illud: *Humanum dico propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae*, Glossa: « Inveniuntur aliqui, qui praeponant iustitiae delectationem voluptatibus carnis, pro iustitia tamen poenas mortemque formidant »; sed constat, quod secundum auctoritatem Apostoli, ut dicit Glossa, tales sunt servi iustitiae: ergo cum tales mortem refugiant, videtur, quod non teneantur mortem pro Christo velle subire.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in fine praecedentis distinctionis[^6]: « Perfecta caritas haec est, ut quis paratus sit pro fratribus mori »; et hoc apparet per hoc, quod praelati tenentur ad maiorem perfectionem quam subditi; et summa perfectio, quae a praelato exigitur, est, ut ponat animam pro subditis, secundum illud Ioannis decimo: *Bonus pastor animam suam ponit pro ovibus suis*. Si ergo imperfecti non tenentur ad opera caritatis perfectae, videtur, quod non omnes teneantur pro Christo et eius membris mortem subire.

4. Item, maius est mortem pro Christo subire quam omnibus temporalibus abrenuntiare; sed non omnes tenentur terrena omnia relinquere: ergo non omnes tenentur mortem pro Christo subire. Quod autem maioris perfectionis sit, patet per illud quod dicit Gregorius[^7]: « Non magnum est abnegare quod habes, sed valde magnum est abnegare quod es »; et constans est, quod multo maius est abnegare se ipsum quam sua, et dare corporis vitam quam terrenam substantiam.

> ### Conclusio.
> Unusquisque tenetur pro Christo mori, sed tantummodo pro loco et tempore, quando adest necessitas vel deserendi iustitiam, vel amittendi vitam.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod subire mortem intentione placendi Deo hoc potest esse tripliciter: uno modo, quando adest necessitas vel deserendi iustitiam, vel amittendi vitam; alio modo, quando se offert opportunitas manifestandi divinam gloriam et aedificandi Ecclesiam; tertio modo solum ex hoc, quod vitam suam habet exosam. Primum est iustitiae et necessitatis; secundum est perfectionis et supererogationis; tertium est temeritatis et crudelitatis. Unde Augustinus[^8] illos, qui semetipsos praefocant et praecipitio collidunt propter vitae praesentis odium, dicit esse sceleratissimos et crudelissimos homicidas, tractans illud Ioannis duodecimo: *Qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo, in vitam aeternam custodit eam.*

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum omnes teneantur mortem pro Christo subire; dicendum, quod pro loco et tempore, ubi talis optio datur, vel quod iustitia deseratur, vel quod vita perdatur, ibi omnes, quantumcumque sint imperfecti, tenentur mortem subire[^9] et praeeligere magis, Deo dilecto, mori quam, ipso offenso, vivere. Ubi vero talis necessitas non imminet, nec datur optio, tamen offert se opportunitas manifestandi divinam gloriam et aedificandi Ecclesiam, si homo se morti exponat, mortem subire est perfectionis et supererogationis, ad quam non omnes tenentur pro Christo[^10]. — Et secundum istam viam procedunt rationes ostendentes, quod non omnes tenentur mortem pro Christo subire; et ideo sunt concedendae.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur* de abrenuntiatione substantiae temporalis et perpessione mortis, responderi potest, quod ita in casu necessitatis est[^11] omnia temporalia deserere cuilibet homini, sicut et mortem subire, immo multo fortius. Unde hoc datur intelligi per locum a minori; et ita ratio illa, sicut et aliae, non cogit, nisi prout simpliciter intelligitur, ita quod homo mera voluntate promptus est temporalia abnegare et mortem subire.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod debemus in periculo mortis nomen Christi confiteri; dicendum, quod verum est, si sumus in necessitate[^12] positi, quod confiteri oporteat, vel negare. Sed potest esse medium inter haec, quia imperfectus potest subterfugere et se ipsum occultare, nec ex hoc dicitur nomen Christi erubescere; sed tunc erubescere dicitur, quando timore mortis negat ipsum Christum. Ideo, quamvis omnes teneantur ad hoc, quod nullus neget, non tamen ex hoc potest concludi, quod omnes simpliciter teneantur ad perferendam mortem, nisi interveniente supra dicta necessitate.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quia posuit animam suam pro nobis, nos debemus pro fratribus animam ponere; dicendum, quod est debitum necessitatis et est debitum congruitatis, sive debitum, ad quod obligamur, et debitum, ad quod admonemur. Beatus autem Ioannes non intelligit de debito primo modo, sed de debito secundo modo[^13], quod magis spectat ad supererogationem quam ad necessariam et generalem obligationem.

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*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quilibet tenetur plus diligere Deum quam omne creatum; dicendum, quod verum est; verumtamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod homo[^14] teneatur pro Christo deserere omne creatum, quia potest simul habere Christum et creaturam, quam diligit. Potest enim homo simul servare corporis vitam et Dei amicitiam, quia non oportet, nec exigit hoc lex caritatis, quod propter Dei dilectionem sustineat quis mortem, nisi incidat in supra dictam necessitatem, qua scilicet oporteat, eum vel Christum negare, vel mortem sustinere.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod homo libenter dat illud, quod minus diligit, pro eo quod magis diligit; dicendum, quod verum est, si illud aliter adipisci non possit; et quoniam potest homo adipisci vitam aeternam etiam praeter martyrii tolerantiam: ideo non sequitur, quod omnes teneantur velle[^15] pro Christo mori simpliciter, sed sub conditione, videlicet si aliter ei placere non possint; et hoc solum est in articulo praedictae necessitatis[^16].

english:
### Article unique. *On charity with respect to the perfection of merit.*
### Question II. *Whether a man, constituted in however little charity, is bound to undergo death for Christ.*

Secondly it is asked whether a man, constituted in however little charity, is bound to undergo death for Christ. And that he is, seems [to follow].

1. Luke 9[^1]: *Whoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him shall the Son of Man be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty*; but Christ will be ashamed of no one, when he shall come in his majesty, except on account of mortal sin: if therefore that sentence is general, it seems that all sin mortally who, in the danger of death, are ashamed to confess the Lord himself: therefore all are bound to undergo death for Christ.

2. Likewise, 1 John 3[^2]: *Because he laid down his life for us, we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren*: if therefore Christ laid down his life for all, it seems that all are bound and ought to undergo death for him and for his members, when the opportunity of place and time presents itself.

3. Likewise, everyone is bound to love God more than every creature, however imperfect he may be: therefore everyone is bound, for the honor of God and his glory, to set little store[^3] by himself and his own: since therefore the opportunity of time presents itself, it seems that everyone is bound to undergo death for Christ.

4. Likewise, eternal goods are incomparably more to be loved than temporal ones, just as they are incomparably better; but everyone willingly gives that which he loves less for the sake of that which he loves more: if therefore all are bound to love eternal life more than temporal, it seems that all are bound to be willing to expose freely the present life to death, that they may gain the eternal. But what a man is bound to will, he is bound to do for place and time: therefore, when the opportunity presents itself, it seems that all are bound to undergo death for Christ.

**On the contrary:**
1. John 15[^4]: *Greater love has no one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends*: therefore to undergo death for Christ seems to be of the greatest perfection; but imperfect men are not bound to works of perfection: therefore not all are bound to undergo death for Christ.

2. Likewise, on Romans 6[^5], on that text: *I speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh*, the Gloss: « There are found some who prefer righteousness to the pleasures of the flesh, yet for righteousness they dread punishments and death »; but it is established that, according to the authority of the Apostle, as the Gloss says, such are servants of righteousness: therefore, since such shun death, it seems that they are not bound to be willing to undergo death for Christ.

3. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction[^6]: « This is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren »; and this appears from the fact that prelates are bound to a greater perfection than subjects; and the highest perfection which is required of a prelate is that he lay down his life for his subjects, according to that text of John 10: *The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep*. If therefore the imperfect are not bound to the works of perfect charity, it seems that not all are bound to undergo death for Christ and for his members.

4. Likewise, it is greater to undergo death for Christ than to renounce all temporal things; but not all are bound to leave all earthly things: therefore not all are bound to undergo death for Christ. And that it is of greater perfection is plain from that which Gregory says[^7]: « It is not a great thing to renounce what you have, but it is a very great thing to renounce what you are »; and it is established that it is much greater to renounce one's very self than one's goods, and to give the life of the body than earthly substance.

> ### Conclusion.
> Everyone is bound to die for Christ, but only for place and time, when the necessity is present either of deserting righteousness or of losing life.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that to undergo death with the intention of pleasing God can be threefold: in one way, when the necessity is present either of deserting righteousness or of losing life; in another way, when the opportunity presents itself of manifesting the divine glory and building up the Church; in a third way, solely from this, that one holds his life hateful. The first is of righteousness and necessity; the second is of perfection and supererogation; the third is of rashness and cruelty. Hence Augustine[^8] says that those who suffocate themselves and dash themselves down by a precipice out of hatred of the present life are most wicked and most cruel murderers, treating that text of John 12: *He who hates his life in this world keeps it unto life eternal.*

When therefore it is asked whether all are bound to undergo death for Christ; it must be said that for place and time, where such a choice is given — either that righteousness be deserted, or that life be lost — there all, however imperfect they may be, are bound to undergo death[^9] and to choose rather, with God beloved, to die than, with him offended, to live. But where such a necessity does not threaten, nor is the choice given, yet the opportunity presents itself of manifesting the divine glory and building up the Church, if a man expose himself to death, to undergo death is of perfection and supererogation, to which not all are bound for Christ[^10]. — And along this way proceed the arguments showing that not all are bound to undergo death for Christ; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

*To that which is objected last* concerning the renunciation of temporal substance and the suffering of death, it can be answered that it is so in the case of necessity[^11] for everyone to desert all temporal things, just as also to undergo death, indeed much more strongly. Hence this is given to be understood through the argument from the lesser; and so that argument, just as the others, does not compel except insofar as it is understood simply, namely that a man is by mere will ready to renounce temporal things and to undergo death.

*To 1.* But to that which is objected first to the contrary, that we ought in the danger of death to confess the name of Christ; it must be said that it is true, if we are placed in the necessity[^12] in which it is fitting either to confess or to deny. But there can be a middle between these, because the imperfect man can flee away and hide himself, nor is he on this account said to be ashamed of the name of Christ; but he is then said to be ashamed when out of fear of death he denies Christ himself. Therefore, although all are bound to this, that no one deny, yet from this it cannot be concluded that all are simply bound to endure death, except where the aforesaid necessity intervenes.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that because he laid down his life for us, we ought to lay down our life for the brethren; it must be said that there is a debt of necessity and there is a debt of fittingness, that is, a debt to which we are obliged, and a debt to which we are admonished. But blessed John does not understand it of a debt in the first way, but of a debt in the second way[^13], which pertains more to supererogation than to a necessary and general obligation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that everyone is bound to love God more than every creature; it must be said that it is true; nevertheless from this it does not follow that a man[^14] is bound for Christ to desert every creature, because he can at the same time have Christ and the creature which he loves. For a man can at the same time keep the life of the body and the friendship of God, because it is not necessary, nor does the law of charity require, that for the love of God one should endure death, unless he fall into the aforesaid necessity, namely in which it is fitting that he either deny Christ or undergo death.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that a man willingly gives that which he loves less for the sake of that which he loves more; it must be said that it is true, if he cannot otherwise attain it; and since a man can attain eternal life even apart from the endurance of martyrdom: therefore it does not follow that all are bound to be willing[^15] to die for Christ simply, but under condition, namely if they cannot otherwise please him; and this only is in the article of the aforesaid necessity[^16].

la: Vers. 26. — In *minori* codd. K U Z repetunt *sua* post *maiestate.*

en: Verse 26. — In the *minor* [edition] codices K U Z repeat *sua* after *maiestate.*

la: Vers. 16.

en: Verse 16.

la: Cod. V *impendere.*

en: Codex V [reads] *impendere.*

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13.

la: Vers. 19. — Pro *carnis vestrae* codd. et edd. contra Vulgatam *carnis nostrae.* Glossa *Inveniuntur* apud Petr. Lombardum, qui tamen verbo *formidant* praefixit *pati.* Conflata est ex verbis August., Serm. 159. (alias 17. de verbis Apostoli) c. 6. n. 7. seq.: *Parum est, ut contemnas quidquid te delectabat; contemne quidquid te terrebat… In utroque gradu amatores iustitiae vos probate. Invenimus forsitan aliquos qui praeponant iustitiae delectationem voluptatibus et delectationi corporis sui; qui autem pro illa poenas, dolores mortemque contemnat, putas est aliquid in vobis?* Cfr. Epist. 145. (alias 53.) n. 2. — In Glossa pro *delectationem* edd. cum multis codd. exhibent *dilectionem.* — Glossae adductae apud Petr. Lombardum haec praemittuntur: *Si ergo non plus servitur iustitiae, vel, id est saltem tantum serviatur, quantum tunc iniquitati serviebatur.*

en: Verse 19. — For *carnis vestrae* the codices and editions, against the Vulgate, [read] *carnis nostrae.* The Gloss *Inveniuntur* is found in Peter Lombard, who however prefixed *pati* to the word *formidant.* It is compiled from the words of Augustine, Serm. 159 (otherwise 17, on the words of the Apostle) c. 6, n. 7 ff.: *It is a small thing to despise whatever delighted you; despise whatever terrified you… In both degrees prove yourselves lovers of righteousness. We shall perhaps find some who prefer to righteousness the delight in pleasures and in the delight of their own body; but as for one who for her sake despises punishments, pains, and death, do you think there is something in you?* Cf. Epist. 145 (otherwise 53) n. 2. — In the Gloss, for *delectationem* the editions with many codices give *dilectionem.* — In Peter Lombard these are prefixed to the Gloss adduced: *If therefore righteousness is not served more, or, that is, at least let it be served as much as iniquity was then served.*

la: Cap. 3. — Locus Scripturae inferius occurrens est Ioan. 10, 11.

en: Chapter 3. — The passage of Scripture occurring below is John 10:11.

la: Libr. 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 32. n. 1. — Superius pro *terrena* edd. *temporalia.* Circa finem arg. pro *corporis vitam* codd. F G *corporalem vitam.*

en: Book 1, Homilies on the Gospel, homily 32, n. 1. — Above, for *terrena* the editions [read] *temporalia.* Near the end of the argument, for *corporis vitam* codices F G [read] *corporalem vitam.*

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 51. n. 10: *Sed vide, ne tibi subrepat, ut te ipsum velis interimere, sic intelligendo, quod debes odisse in hoc mundo animam tuam. Hinc enim quidam maligni atque perversi et in se ipsos crudeliores et sceleratiores homicidae flammis se donant, aquis praefocant, praecipitio colliduntur et pereunt etc.* — Locus Script. est Ioan. 12, 25. —

en: On John's Gospel, tract 51, n. 10: *But see lest it creep upon you to wish to kill yourself, understanding thus that you ought to hate your soul in this world. For hence certain malignant and perverse men, both crueler and more wicked toward themselves, give themselves to the flames, suffocate themselves in waters, dash themselves down by a precipice and perish, etc.* — The passage of Scripture is John 12:25. —

la: Codd. A U addunt *pro Christo.*

en: Codices A U add *pro Christo.*

la: Codd. E F omittunt *pro Christo*, quibus verbis cod. T adnectit *mortem subire.*

en: Codices E F omit *pro Christo*, to which words codex T appends *mortem subire.*

la: Verbo *est* cod. Z praemittit *necesse*, edd. *praeceptum.* — De loco *a minori* vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.

en: To the word *est* codex Z prefixes *necesse*, the editions *praeceptum.* — On the argument *from the lesser* see vol. I, p. 835, note 5.

la: Edd. *in ea necessitate.*

en: The editions [read] *in ea necessitate.*

la: Cod. Z adiungit *dicto.* Superius pro *animam ponere* cod. Z *animas ponere.*

en: Codex Z adds *dicto.* Above, for *animam ponere* codex Z [reads] *animas ponere.*

la: Pro *homo* Vat. *modo.* Inferius pro *hoc* codd. A T U *haec.*

en: For *homo* the Vatican [edition reads] *modo.* Below, for *hoc* codices A T U [read] *haec.*

la: In cod. K deest *velle.*

en: In codex K *velle* is lacking.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`raw/vision/vol3/p-{659,660,661}.png` → `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{659,660,661}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw 45823–45949) as the base for clean running prose and exact footnote-marker spacing. PDF authoritative in the two-column cascade-shattered Respondeo / Ad-replies / footer regions (Vol III PDF-priority inversion; offset pdf = printed + 22; running-head OCR digit-mangled `639`/`6S0`/`6Ği` trusted via the +22 offset and the running-head TEXT *DIST. XXX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II*).

**Alignment: PASS.** QUAESTIO II header raw 45821; opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo, in quantulacumque caritate constitutus, teneatur mortem pro Christo subire. Et quod sic, videtur.* (raw 45823) confirmed against the p.659-L column band — matches `title_la` and the divisio's TRACTATIO Secundum (*utrum homo… teneatur mortem pro Christo subire*). Upper boundary: QUAESTIO III at raw 45950 (*Utrum perfectam caritatem habentes teneantur implere ea quae sunt perfectionis*), confirmed via grep + p.661 band. No q-swap.

**Page span.** q2 opens lower in the **p.659** R-column (PDF 681), below q1's article-master SCHOLION §I–IV (the scholion §I–II prints in p.659 L-col top, §III–IV in p.659 R-col top; all of it is q1's). On p.659: QUAESTIO II header + full-width title, then the *videtur* objections print L-col (opener + args 1–3) and R-col (arg 4 + *Sed contra* 1–2-start). **p.660** (PDF 682): *Sed contra* 2 (Glossa)–4 (L-col), then CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + the *Cum ergo quaeritur* determination + *Et secundum istam viam* (R-col), and Ad-last (Ad to obj. 4) + Ad 1 + Ad 2 (R-col). **p.661** (PDF 683) top: Ad 3 (L-col) and Ad 4 (R-col), q2 ending at *…in articulo praedictae necessitatis* before QUAESTIO III opens (mid-p.661).

**Apparatus: 16 entries, per-page restart (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM).** **p.659 nn.1–5** → `[^1]`–`[^5]` (n.1 Luke 9:26 obj.1; n.2 1 John 3:16 obj.2; n.3 cod. V *impendere* obj.3 *parvipendere*; n.4 John 15:13 contra 1; n.5 = the long full-width Romans-6 Glossa/Augustine note, contra 2). **p.660 nn.1–8** → `[^6]`–`[^13]` (p.660 n.1 = `[^6]` Augustine cap.3 / John 10:11, contra 3; n.2 = `[^7]` Gregory *Homil. in Evang.* 32, contra 4; n.3 = `[^8]` Augustine *In Ioan.* tr.51 / John 12:25, in Respondeo; n.4 = `[^9]` codd. AU *pro Christo*; n.5 = `[^10]` codd. EF omit *pro Christo* + cod. T; n.6 = `[^11]` cod. Z *necesse* / *a minori* tom. I p.835; n.7 = `[^12]` edd. *in ea necessitate*; n.8 = `[^13]` cod. Z *dicto* / *animas ponere*). **p.661 nn.1–3** → `[^14]`–`[^16]` (n.1 = `[^14]` *homo*→Vat. *modo* / *hoc*→ATU *haec*, Ad 3; n.2 = `[^15]` cod. K deest *velle*, Ad 4; n.3 = `[^16]` *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, the scholion redirect anchored at Ad 4's closing *necessitatis*). Markers paired in both Latin and English bodies.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q1:* NONE — q1's per-page footers were all consumed within q1; QUAESTIO II opens its own fresh p.659 NOTAE sequence (p.659's L-col scholion notes nn.1–4 in q1's column belong to q1's scholion, captured in d30-a1-q1; q2's body footers are the separate p.659 nn.1–5 run read here).
- *Forwarded to q3 (d30-a1-q3):* on the shared **p.661**, q2 owns nn.1–3 (the last, n.3, is q2's scholion-redirect). **p.661 nn.4–6 belong to q3** — n.4 *Vers. 48.* (Matt. 5:48, q3 obj.1 *Estote perfecti*); n.5 *Libr. 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 9. n. 1. — Ad verba quae sequuntur: auctoritas… supple: in Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum in Luc. 12, 48; Cui multum datum est, multum quaeretur ab eo* (Gregory, q3 obj.2); n.6 *Bernard., Epist. 254. n. 5.: inter profectum et defectum in hoc statu mortalis vitae nihil medium inveniri; cfr. Epist. 91. n. 3; Serm. 35. de Diversis, n. 2. et Serm. 124. n. 1.* (q3 obj.3 *libertas spiritus*). q3 starts its NOTAE pickup at p.661 n.4 and continues on p.662+.

**Scholion: ABSENT — REDIRECT to q1 §III.** q2 has no own scholion. q1's article-master scholion (printed on p.659 under q1) §III explicitly forward-treats this q2: «Solutio seq. (2.) quaestionis non habet difficultatem nec eadem ab aliis commentatoribus Magistri tractatur…» — and q2's own apparatus note `[^16]` reads «Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.» `has_scholion: false`. (Mirrors the established sibling-redirect convention, e.g. d29-a1-q2 → q1 §III.)

**`[?]` flags: none.** All readings confirmed against the column-band crops; running-head digit-mangles (OCR `639` etc.) resolved via the +22 offset + running-head text; the editorial margin glosses (*Ad opposit.*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio*, *Triplex motivum ad mortem subeundam*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Duplex debitum*, etc.) trimmed per the OCR-cleanup rule — not Bonaventure's text.