title: Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 4

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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni.*

Quarto quaeritur de ipsa spe per comparationem ad obiectum, et est quaestio, utrum spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per rationem virtutis in communi: quia, sicut scientia est respectu veri, sic virtus respectu boni[^1]; sed omnis scientia est in verum sub ratione veri: ergo omnis virtus est in bonum sub ratione boni: si ergo spes est virtus, ergo est in bonum sub ratione boni.

2. *Item*, hoc ipsum videtur ratione magis propria, quae sumitur ex proprietate virtutis theologicae: virtus enim theologica idem habet pro obiecto et pro fine; sed « bonum et finis idem sunt[^2] »: ergo cum spes sit virtus theologica, et bonum sub ratione boni sit eius finis, ergo bonum sub ratione boni erit eius obiectum.

3. *Item*, hoc ipsum ostenditur adhuc ratione magis speciali per comparationem ad alia genera affectionum: quia, sicut se habet gaudium respectu praesentis, sic spes respectu futuri; sed gaudium est de bono praesenti sub ratione boni: ergo spes est de futuro bono sub ratione boni[^3].

4. *Item*, hoc ipsum ostenditur adhuc specialiori ratione per comparationem ad aliam speciem virtutis: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^4], in hoc differt fides a spe, quia fides est respectu boni et mali, spes est respectu boni tantum. Si enim fides simul poterat esse boni et mali, pro eo quod non respiciebat bonum sub ratione boni, sed magis sub ratione veri; spes autem determinat sibi bonum, ita quod nullo modo est in eius oppositum: videtur ergo, quod ipsa spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni.

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5. *Item*, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione magis propria per definitionem ipsius spei[^5]: « Spes enim est exspectatio futurae beatitudinis »: si ergo beatitudo nominat bonum sub ratione boni, videtur ergo, quod bonum sub ratione boni sit obiectum ipsius spei.

**Sed contra:** 1. Virtutes theologicae distinguuntur per obiecta, secundum quod habent propriam rationem; sed caritas est in bonum sub ratione boni[^6]: ergo si spes distinguitur a caritate, bonum sub ratione boni non erit obiectum spei.

2. *Item*, circumscripta ratione boni et mali, adhuc contingit timere, sicut in patria Deum timebimus[^7], non quidem sub ratione mali nec sub ratione boni, quia sub illa ratione amabimus — bonum enim sub ratione boni magis generat amorem quam timorem — si ergo contingit timere, circumscripta ratione boni et mali, igitur et contingit sperare: ergo obiectum spei non est bonum sub ratione boni, neque malum sub ratione mali.

3. *Item*, nullus timet malum, quod est subiectum suae potestati; sed quicumque timet malum, timet sub ratione excellentis[^8]: si ergo spes sic est in bonum, sicut timor in malum; videtur, quod spes non sit in bonum sub ratione boni, sed magis sub ratione ardui.

4. *Item*, sicut homo naturaliter appetit illuminari et delectari, ita etiam naturaliter appetit gloriari, et hoc dico secundum ipsius animae supremum[^9]: ergo sicut in nobis est reperire aliquas virtutes perficientes et dirigentes ipsam animam respectu veri illuminantis et respectu boni delectantis, utpote fidem et caritatem; ita erit respectu ardui et excellentis; hanc autem non est dare nisi spem: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, licet omnes virtutes gratuitae quodam modo elevent mentem, et hoc maxime faciant virtutes theologicae; elevatio tamen et erectio ipsius animi propriissime competit ipsi spei: ergo si virtus spei maxime consistit in erigendo et elevando ipsum animum, cum animus noster magnus sit nec sit natus erigere se nisi ad magna et ardua[^10]; videtur ergo, quod obiectum spei quantum ad efficaciam movendi teneat rationem ardui: non ergo obiectum spei est bonum sub ratione boni.

> ### Conclusio.
> Obiectum spei est bonum sub ratione magni et ardui, vel etiam bonum sub ratione gloriosi et aeterni.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quidam dicere voluerunt, obiectum spei esse bonum sub ratione futuri. Dixerunt enim, quod omnes affectiones animae vel sunt respectu boni, vel sunt respectu mali; et sicut gaudium est respectu boni praesentis, dolor vero, qui est affectio sibi opposita, est respectu praesentis mali; sic spes est respectu futuri boni, timor vero respectu futuri mali. Quod autem movit eos hoc ponere fuit, quia posuerunt, quod duplex sit tantum obiectum, in quod tendit anima: unum scilicet verum, in quod tendit intellectus, alterum scilicet bonum, in quod tendit affectus; et ideo cum spes non sit in verum sub ratione veri, voluerunt dicere, quod sit in bonum sub ratione boni. In hoc tamen differt a caritate: quia caritas est in bonum sub ratione boni simpliciter, non considerando praesens nec futurum; et quia bonum sub ratione boni est amandum, ideo actus ipsius caritatis est amare. Spes autem est in bonum non tantum sub ratione boni, sed etiam sub ratione futuri; et quia bonum futurum, in quantum futurum, est exspectandum, ideo actus ipsius spei est exspectare; et quia exspectare et amare sunt actus diversi: hinc est, quod spes et caritas diversae sunt virtutes, non principaliter ratione diversitatis obiectorum, sed ratione diversitatis actuum propriorum.

Licet autem hic modus dicendi videatur aliquid probabilitatis habere, interius tamen consideranti non satisfacit dubitationi nec consonat veritati. Nam quod dicitur, quod non est aliud obiectum motivum potentiarum animae nisi verum sub ratione veri et bonum sub ratione boni, simpliciter non habet veritatem,

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pro eo quod, sicut in opponendo[^11] tactum est, quemadmodum rationalis tendit in verum, et concupiscibilis in bonum, sic etiam irascibilis nostra tendit in arduum et magnum. — *Rursus*, quod dicit, bonum sub ratione boni futuri esse motivum alterius affectionis quam bonum sub ratione boni; non habet veritatem, pro eo quod bonum sub ratione futuri desideratur, et desiderium non est spes, sed magis quaedam differentia amoris, et ad ipsam caritatem pertinet desiderare[^12]. — *Amplius*, quod dicit, timorem esse respectu mali sub ratione mali; non habet veritatem; contingit enim timere, sicut in opponendo[^13] ostensum est, abstracta ratione mali; sicut timebitur Deus in patria. — *Praeterea*, si quando malum timetur, non timetur, nisi quia excellens; si ergo affectio, quae est timor, in suo obiecto magis concernit excellentiam quam malitiam sub ratione motivi: restat similiter, quod et affectio sibi correspondens, videlicet spes.

Est igitur obiectum spei bonum quidem, sed non sub ratione boni, sed magis sub ratione ardui sive magni. — Et hoc quidem sic habet manifestari. Spei enim duplex est actus, quorum unus est principium et origo alterius; spes enim facit confidere, et faciendo confidere facit exspectare[^14]. Nullus autem recte confidens confidit et innititur nisi in eo qui nec possit nec velit sibi deficere; talis autem non est nisi ille qui est potentissimus in virtute et munificentissimus in liberalitate; et hoc non habet, nisi habeat excellentiam virtutis et largitatis. Cum autem quis totam fiduciam suam in eum posuit, qui excellentissimae virtutis est et liberalitatis; magna ab eo exspectat se assecuturum[^15]. Quoniam ergo spes habet obiectum magnum et arduum in confidendo; hinc est, quod habet pro obiecto magnum et arduum in exspectando. Et hinc est, quod ipse Dominus, in quo speramus, magna promittit nobis in consolationem spei nostrae, iuxta quod dicit Abrahae, Genesis decimo quinto[^16]: *Noli timere, Abraham, ego protector tuus sum et merces tua magna nimis*; quasi dicat: Ego protector, in quo debes confidere, et merces tua magna, quam debes exspectare.

Concedendum est igitur, quod obiectum spei est bonum sub ratione magni vel ardui. — Et quia gloriosum nominat magnum sublimitate, aeternum nominat magnum diuturnitate, illud intensive, istud extensive[^17]; ideo concedi potest etiam, quod obiectum spei sit bonum sub ratione gloriosi et sub ratione aeterni, hoc est sub ratione excellentis et indeficientis, quia haec duo concurrunt ad perfectam rationem magnitudinis ipsius boni. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet scientia ad verum, ita virtus ad bonum: dicendum, quod hoc non est omnino simile: quia cognitiva non habet obiectum nisi unius rationis, scilicet verum; sed affectiva, cum duplicetur in duas vires, videlicet in concupiscibilem et irascibilem, obiectum habet duplicis rationis, videlicet bonum, quod concupiscit, et arduum, ad quod se erigit[^18].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus theologica idem habet pro obiecto et pro fine; dicendum, quod si hoc intelligatur de identitate quantum ad substantiam, sic verum est, quia ipse Deus est finis et obiectum earum. Si autem loquamur quantum ad rationem movendi, sic non habet veritatem nisi in sola virtute, quae est caritas; ipsa enim habet bonum sub ratione boni et pro obiecto et pro fine; ideo principatum tenet inter ceteras virtutes, sicut infra[^19] manifestabitur. In fide autem et spe non habet veritatem; et quoniam in illa ratione procedit ab identitate secundum substantiam ad identitatem secundum rationem: ideo in processu illo est peccatum secundum accidens.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sic se habet spes respectu futuri, sicut gaudium respectu praesentis: dicendum, quod similitudo bona est quantum ad differentiam futuritionis[^20] et praesentialitatis, sed quantum ad rationem boni motivi non est similitudo. Bonum enim sub ratione boni, quando praesens est, delectat et reficit ipsam concupiscibilem; sed sub hac ratione non habet elevare et erigere, immo potius sub ratione excellentis. Delectatio enim, quae est in gaudio, respicit convenientiam; sed erectio, quae est in spe, respicit excellentiam.

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*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes est respectu boni tantum, ergo habet obiectum bonum sub ratione boni; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur, pro eo quod ista non est sola ratio, propter quam aliquid tendat solummodo in bonum, quia motivum eius est bonum sub ratione boni, sed etiam propter hoc, quod illud quod est motivum eius, habet semper bonum sibi substratum. Et hoc modo intelligendum est se habere in spe. Illud enim arduum et excellens, ad quod assequendum erigitur anima, non potest esse nisi bonum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes est exspectatio futurae beatitudinis; dicendum, quod spes non exspectat beatitudinem, nisi in quantum tenet rationem magni et ardui, hoc est rationem excellentis et indeficientis. Et quia ista duo importat beatitudo de sua prima ratione; hinc est, quod spes magis habet definiri per beatitudinem quam alia virtus: unde in ratione illa est peccatum secundum accidens. Quamvis enim beatitudo habeat rationem boni, tamen non cadit principaliter sub exspectatione spei sub illa ratione, sed in quantum habet rationem ardui.

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### Question IV. *Whether hope is toward the good under the formal character of the good.*

Fourth, there is inquiry concerning hope itself by comparison to its object, and the question is whether hope is toward the good under the formal character of the good. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. *First*, by reason of virtue in general: because, just as knowledge is with respect to the true, so virtue is with respect to the good[^1]; but all knowledge is toward the true under the formal character of the true: therefore all virtue is toward the good under the formal character of the good: if then hope is a virtue, therefore it is toward the good under the formal character of the good.

2. *Likewise*, this same thing seems to follow by a more proper reason, which is taken from the property of a theological virtue: for a theological virtue has the same thing for its object and for its end; but « the good and the end are the same[^2] »: therefore since hope is a theological virtue, and the good under the formal character of the good is its end, therefore the good under the formal character of the good will be its object.

3. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown further by a more special reason, by comparison to the other kinds of affections: because, as joy stands with respect to the present, so hope stands with respect to the future; but joy is concerning the present good under the formal character of the good: therefore hope is concerning the future good under the formal character of the good[^3].

4. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown by a yet more special reason, by comparison to another species of virtue: because, as Augustine says[^4], faith differs from hope in this, that faith is with respect to good and evil, hope is with respect to good alone. For if faith could be at once of good and of evil, on the ground that it did not regard the good under the formal character of the good, but rather under the formal character of the true; hope, however, determines the good for itself, in such a way that it is in no way toward its opposite: it seems therefore that hope itself is toward the good under the formal character of the good.

5. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown by a more proper reason, through the definition of hope itself[^5]: « For hope is the expectation of future beatitude »: if then beatitude names the good under the formal character of the good, it seems therefore that the good under the formal character of the good is the object of hope itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. The theological virtues are distinguished through their objects, insofar as they have a proper formal character; but charity is toward the good under the formal character of the good[^6]: therefore if hope is distinguished from charity, the good under the formal character of the good will not be the object of hope.

2. *Likewise*, with the formal character of good and evil set aside, it still happens that one fears, just as in the fatherland we shall fear God[^7], not indeed under the formal character of evil nor under the formal character of the good, since under that formal character we shall love — for the good under the formal character of the good generates love rather than fear — if then it happens that one fears with the formal character of good and evil set aside, therefore it also happens that one hopes: therefore the object of hope is not the good under the formal character of the good, nor evil under the formal character of evil.

3. *Likewise*, no one fears an evil that is subject to his own power; but whoever fears an evil, fears it under the formal character of what is surpassing[^8]: if then hope is toward the good in the way that fear is toward evil; it seems that hope is not toward the good under the formal character of the good, but rather under the formal character of the arduous.

4. *Likewise*, just as a man naturally desires to be illumined and to be delighted, so also he naturally desires to be glorified, and I say this according to the highest part of the soul itself[^9]: therefore just as there is to be found in us certain virtues perfecting and directing the soul itself with respect to the illuminating true and with respect to the delighting good, namely faith and charity; so there will be one with respect to the arduous and the surpassing; but this is not to be assigned to anything except hope: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, although all gratuitous virtues in a certain manner elevate the mind, and the theological virtues do this most of all; nevertheless the elevation and erecting of the spirit itself most properly belongs to hope itself: therefore if the virtue of hope consists most of all in erecting and elevating the spirit itself, since our spirit is great and is not born to raise itself except to great and arduous things[^10]; it seems therefore that the object of hope, as to the efficacy of moving, holds the formal character of the arduous: therefore the object of hope is not the good under the formal character of the good.

> ### Conclusion.
> The object of hope is the good under the formal character of the great and the arduous, or also the good under the formal character of the glorious and the eternal.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that some have wished to say that the object of hope is the good under the formal character of the future. For they said that all the affections of the soul are either with respect to the good, or with respect to evil; and just as joy is with respect to the present good, while sorrow, which is the affection opposed to it, is with respect to present evil; so hope is with respect to the future good, and fear with respect to future evil. Now what moved them to posit this was that they held there to be only a twofold object toward which the soul tends: one, namely, the true, toward which the intellect tends, the other, namely, the good, toward which the affect tends; and therefore, since hope is not toward the true under the formal character of the true, they wished to say that it is toward the good under the formal character of the good. In this, however, it differs from charity: because charity is toward the good under the formal character of the good simply, without considering the present or the future; and because the good under the formal character of the good is to be loved, therefore the act of charity itself is to love. Hope, however, is toward the good not only under the formal character of the good, but also under the formal character of the future; and because the future good, insofar as it is future, is to be expected, therefore the act of hope itself is to expect; and because to expect and to love are diverse acts: hence it is that hope and charity are diverse virtues, not principally by reason of a diversity of objects, but by reason of the diversity of their proper acts.

But although this manner of speaking may seem to have something of probability, nevertheless to one considering it more inwardly it does not satisfy the difficulty nor accord with the truth. For what is said, that there is no other moving object of the powers of the soul than the true under the formal character of the true and the good under the formal character of the good, simply does not hold true,

because, as was touched upon in the opposing arguments[^11], just as the rational tends toward the true, and the concupiscible toward the good, so also our irascible tends toward the arduous and the great. — *Again*, what it says, that the good under the formal character of the future good is the motive of a different affection than the good under the formal character of the good; does not hold true, on the ground that the good under the formal character of the future is desired, and desire is not hope, but rather a certain differentiation of love, and to desire belongs to charity itself[^12]. — *Furthermore*, what it says, that fear is with respect to evil under the formal character of evil; does not hold true; for it happens that one fears, as was shown in the opposing arguments[^13], with the formal character of evil abstracted; just as God will be feared in the fatherland. — *Moreover*, if at any time an evil is feared, it is not feared except because it is surpassing; if then the affection which is fear regards in its object the surpassing more than the malice under the formal character of the motive: it remains likewise that the affection corresponding to it, namely hope, does too.

The object of hope is therefore the good indeed, but not under the formal character of the good, but rather under the formal character of the arduous or the great. — And this can be made manifest thus. For hope has a twofold act, of which one is the principle and origin of the other; for hope makes one confident, and by making one confident it makes one expect[^14]. But no one who is rightly confident is confident and relies except on him who can neither fail him nor wishes to; and such a one is none but he who is most powerful in might and most munificent in liberality; and one does not have this unless he have excellence of might and of bounty. But when someone has placed his whole trust in him who is of most excellent might and liberality; he expects to obtain great things from him[^15]. Since therefore hope has a great and arduous object in being confident; hence it is that it has for its object the great and arduous in expecting. And hence it is that the Lord himself, in whom we hope, promises us great things for the consolation of our hope, according to what he says to Abraham, Genesis the fifteenth[^16]: *Fear not, Abraham, I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great*; as if to say: I am the protector, in whom thou oughtest to be confident, and thy reward is great, which thou oughtest to expect.

It must therefore be granted that the object of hope is the good under the formal character of the great or the arduous. — And because the glorious names the great by loftiness, the eternal names the great by lastingness, the former intensively, the latter extensively[^17]; therefore it can also be granted that the object of hope is the good under the formal character of the glorious and under the formal character of the eternal, that is, under the formal character of the surpassing and the unfailing, since these two concur toward the perfect formal character of the magnitude of the good itself. — Therefore the arguments which are for this side are to be granted.

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that as knowledge stands to the true, so virtue stands to the good: it must be said that this is not entirely similar: because the cognitive power has an object of only one formal character, namely the true; but the affective power, since it is doubled into two forces, namely the concupiscible and the irascible, has an object of a twofold formal character, namely the good, which it desires, and the arduous, toward which it raises itself[^18].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a theological virtue has the same thing for its object and for its end; it must be said that if this be understood of identity as to substance, thus it is true, because God himself is the end and object of them. But if we speak as to the formal character of moving, thus it does not hold true except in the one virtue which is charity; for it alone has the good under the formal character of the good both for object and for end; therefore it holds the primacy among the other virtues, as will be made manifest below[^19]. In faith, however, and in hope it does not hold true; and since in that formal character it proceeds from identity according to substance to identity according to formal character: therefore in that process there is sin according to accident.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that hope stands with respect to the future as joy stands with respect to the present: it must be said that the likeness is good as to the difference of futurity[^20] and presentness, but as to the formal character of the moving good there is no likeness. For the good under the formal character of the good, when it is present, delights and refreshes the concupiscible itself; but under this formal character it does not elevate and erect, but rather under the formal character of the surpassing. For the delight which is in joy regards fittingness; but the erecting which is in hope regards excellence.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that hope is with respect to the good alone, therefore it has the good for its object under the formal character of the good; it must be said that this does not follow, on the ground that this is not the only formal character on account of which something tends solely toward the good, because its motive is the good under the formal character of the good, but also on account of this, that that which is its motive always has a good underlying it. And in this way it must be understood to hold in hope. For that arduous and surpassing thing, for the attaining of which the soul is raised up, cannot be other than a good.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that hope is the expectation of future beatitude; it must be said that hope does not expect beatitude except insofar as it holds the formal character of the great and the arduous, that is, the formal character of the surpassing and the unfailing. And because beatitude implies these two from its first formal character; hence it is that hope is more to be defined by beatitude than another virtue: whence in that formal character there is sin according to accident. For although beatitude has the formal character of the good, nevertheless it does not fall principally under the expectation of hope under that formal character, but insofar as it has the formal character of the arduous.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 3. — Quod spes sit virtus, ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1. *(P. 575, n. 5.)*

en: Cf. above p. 470, note 3. — That hope is a virtue was shown above a. 1, q. 1.

la: Secundum Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 3. (II. c. 2.). Cfr. ibid. II. text. 8. (I. brevior, c. 2.): Qui faciunt infinitum, latet eos, quod boni naturam auferunt. — De obiecto et fine virtutis theologicae cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. praecipue ad 3. — Quod spes sit virtus theologica, vide supra a. 1. q. 3. — Multi codd. omittunt *sunt*. *(P. 575, n. 6.)*

en: According to Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 3 (II, c. 2). Cf. ibid. II, text 8 (I, shorter, c. 2): Those who make the infinite fail to notice that they take away the nature of the good. — On the object and end of a theological virtue cf. below d. 33, q. 1, especially ad 3. — That hope is a theological virtue, see above a. 1, q. 3. — Many codices omit *sunt* ["are"].

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas. — De aequalitate virtutum cfr. infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 36. q. 5. — De vi irascibili infra q. 5; et de dotibus I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, nec non IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 3. *(P. 575, n. 3.)*

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 13:13: But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. — On the equality of the virtues cf. below d. 27, a. 2, q. 1 and d. 36, q. 5. — On the irascible power below q. 5; and on the dowries Book I of the Sentences d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1, and also Book IV of the Sentences d. 49, p. I, q. 3.

la: Enchirid. c. 8. n. 2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. *(P. 575, n. 8.)*

en: Enchiridion c. 8, n. 2. See here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Cfr. infra dub. 2. *(P. 576, n. 1.)*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 1. Cf. below dub. 2.

en: See below d. 34, p. II, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 6: Timemus autem ea scilicet, quae terribilia sunt; ea vero sunt, ut simpliciter dicamus, mala; unde etiam timorem exspectationem mali esse definiunt. Ac timemus quidem mala omnia, ut infamiam, paupertatem, morbum, solitudinem amicorum, mortem. Non circa omnia tamen esse vir fortis videtur etc. Ibid. c. 7: Id autem quod terrorem incutit, non omnibus est idem, dicimusque aliquid supra hominem esse, quod quidem unicuique sanae mentis homini terribile est etc. — In fine arg. pro *ardui* codd. G W Y aa et edd. 1, 2 *mali*, Vat. *magni et excellentis*. *(P. 576, n. 4.)*

en: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 6: Now we fear those things which are terrible; and these are, to put it simply, evils; whence they also define fear as the expectation of evil. And we fear indeed all evils, such as disgrace, poverty, disease, lack of friends, death. The brave man, however, does not seem to be concerned with all of these, etc. Ibid. c. 7: But that which strikes terror is not the same for all, and we say that something is above man, which indeed is terrible to anyone of sound mind, etc. — At the end of the argument, for *ardui* ["of the arduous"] codices G W Y aa and editions 1, 2 read *mali* ["of evil"], the Vatican edition *magni et excellentis* ["of the great and surpassing"].

la: Bernard., Serm. 7. de Diversis n. 1, disserens de illo Apostoli (II. Cor. 10, 17. seq.): Qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur, ait: Sed consideravit [Apostolus], rationalem creaturam adeo affectare gloriam, ut aut vix aut nunquam ab hoc compesci desiderio possit, quippe quae ad imaginem facta est Creatoris [in qua imagine consistit supremum animae]; propterea secundum datam sibi a Deo sapientiam, saluberrimum adinvenit consilium, dicens: Quando quidem persuaderi nobis non potest non gloriari, saltem qui gloriatur in Domino glorietur. Cfr. de hoc arg. lib. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini) c. 3. et 4. *(P. 576, n. 5.)*

en: Bernard, Sermon 7 on Diverse Topics n. 1, discoursing on that text of the Apostle (2 Cor 10:17 ff.): He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord, says: But [the Apostle] considered that the rational creature so craves glory that it can scarcely or never be restrained from this desire, since indeed it was made to the image of the Creator [in which image the highest part of the soul consists]; therefore, according to the wisdom given to him by God, he found out a most salutary counsel, saying: Since indeed we cannot be persuaded not to glory, at least let him who glories glory in the Lord. Cf. on this topic the book On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine) c. 3 and 4.

la: Bernard., Serm. 80. in Cantic. n. 3: Si enim, ut supra docui, eo anima magna est, quo capax aeternorum, eo recta, quo appetens supernorum; quae non quaerit nec sapit quae sursum sunt, sed quae super terram, non plane est recta, sed curva, cum tamen pro huiusmodi magna esse non desinat, manens utique etiam sic aeternitatis capax... si desinat magna esse, et capax, quippe de capacitate, ut dixi, aestimatur animae magnitudo. Quid vero sperare posset, cuius capax non foret? Cfr. Serm. 108. in append. sermon. August. (alias 53. de Tempore) n. 2. *(P. 576, n. 6.)*

en: Bernard, Sermon 80 on the Canticle n. 3: For if, as I taught above, the soul is great by that whereby it is capable of eternal things, upright by that whereby it desires things above; whereas the soul that seeks not nor savors the things that are above, but the things that are upon the earth, is plainly not upright, but bent, though even so it does not cease to be great for things of this kind, remaining indeed capable even thus of eternity... if it should cease to be great, it would also cease to be capable, since, as I said, the magnitude of the soul is estimated by its capacity. But what could it hope for, if it were not capable of it? Cf. Sermon 108 in the appendix of Augustine's sermons (otherwise 53 On the Season) n. 2.

la: Scil. in fundam. 3. seqq. — Paulo inferius edd. cum uno alteroque cod. omittunt *nostra*. *(P. 577, n. 1.)*

en: Namely in the third and following fundamental arguments. — A little below, the editions with one or another codex omit *nostra* ["our"].

la: Cfr. infra d. 27. dub. 1. definitio caritatis, quam August. dat I. Soliloq. c. 7. n. 14. Avicenna, de Anima, p. IV. c. 3. ait: Spes autem aliud est quam desiderium. Spes enim est imaginatio alicuius rei cum affirmatione aut opinione, quia erit; desiderium vero est imaginatio rei et concupiscentia eius et iudicare, quod delectabitur in illa, si adfuerit; timor autem est oppositus spei ad modum contrarietatis; sed diffidentia vel desperatio est eius privatio. — Paulo superius pro *sub ratione futuri desideratur* codd. A K Z *sub ratione futuri boni desideratur*. *(P. 577, n. 2.)*

en: Cf. below d. 27, dub. 1, the definition of charity which Augustine gives in Soliloquies I, c. 7, n. 14. Avicenna, On the Soul, p. IV, c. 3, says: But hope is something other than desire. For hope is the imagination of some thing with affirmation or opinion that it will be; but desire is the imagination of a thing and the longing for it and the judging that one will be delighted in it, if it be present; but fear is opposed to hope in the manner of contrariety; while diffidence or despair is its privation. — A little above, for *sub ratione futuri desideratur* ["is desired under the formal character of the future"] codices A K Z read *sub ratione futuri boni desideratur* ["is desired under the formal character of the future good"].

en: Namely in the second fundamental argument.

en: Cf. above p. 561, note 7.

la: Codd. W X Y *magnam ab eo exspectat* [cod. X *habet*] *securitatem* [codd. X V *securationem*]. *(P. 577, n. 5.)*

en: Codices W X Y read *magnam ab eo exspectat* ["he expects great"] [cod. X *habet*, "has"] *securitatem* ["security"] [codices X V *securationem*].

la: Vers. 1. Bernard., Serm. 83. in Cantic. n. 5: Quidni omnia possibilia sint innitenti super eum qui omnia potest? Quantae fiduciae vox: Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat (Phil. 4, 13.)! Nil omnipotentiam Verbi clariorem reddit, quam quod omnipotentes facit omnes, qui in se sperant. — Paulo ante pro *in consolationem* edd. cum paucis codd. *in consolatione*. *(P. 577, n. 6.)*

en: Verse 1. Bernard, Sermon 83 on the Canticle n. 5: Why should not all things be possible to one who relies upon him who can do all things? What a voice of confidence: I can do all things in him who strengthens me (Phil 4:13)! Nothing renders the omnipotence of the Word more manifest than that it makes all-powerful all who hope in it. — A little before, for *in consolationem* the editions with a few codices read *in consolatione*.

la: Respicitur praecipuum obiectum spei, scil. beatitudo (cfr. infra ad 5.), ad quam secundum August., de Moribus Eccles. cath. c. 3. n. 3, requiritur optimum et inamissibile bonum. Idem S. Doctor ait in Enarrat. in Ps. 102. n. 8: Erige spem tuam ad bonum bonorum omnium. Ipse erit bonum tuum, a quo (tu) in tuo genere factus es bonus etc. Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2, et Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. — Paulo ante Vat. legit *quae duo*, sed codd. et edd. 1, 2 *quia duo*, nos recepimus meliorem lectionem cod. Z *quia haec duo*. *(P. 577, n. 7.)*

en: Reference is made to the principal object of hope, namely beatitude (cf. below ad 5), for which, according to Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church c. 3, n. 3, the best and inamissible good is required. The same holy Doctor says in his Exposition on Psalm 102, n. 8: Lift up thy hope to the good of all goods. He himself will be thy good, by whom thou hast been made good in thy own kind, etc. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 2, and Boethius, On Consolation III, prose 2. — A little before, the Vatican edition reads *quae duo* ["which two"], but the codices and editions 1, 2 read *quia duo* ["because two"]; we have received the better reading of codex Z, *quia haec duo* ["because these two"].

en: Cf. the following question.

la: Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5, a. 2. q. 1, dub. 1; d. 31. a. 3. q. 1, et d. 36. q. 6. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — De peccato secundum accidens (cod. Z *fallacia accidentis*) vide supra pag. 179, nota 1. *(P. 577, n. 9.)*

en: Dist. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5; a. 2, q. 1, dub. 1; d. 31, a. 3, q. 1, and d. 36, q. 6. Cf. above a. 1, q. 2. — On sin according to accident (cod. Z *fallacia accidentis*, "the fallacy of accident") see above p. 179, note 1.

la: Cod. Z *futuri temporis*. Subinde pro *praesentialitatis* cod. W *praesentiae*. *(P. 577, n. 10.)*

en: Cod. Z reads *futuri temporis* ["of future time"]. Then for *praesentialitatis* ["of presentness"] cod. W reads *praesentiae* ["of presence"].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Spes, ut est passio, importat motum appetitus in aliquod bonum, commensuratum quidem appetenti, sed arduum (S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Terminus *arduum* « addit quandam specialem rationem bonitatis, scilicet pretiositatis » (ibid. ad 1.). Hinc S. Bonav. docet, bonum sub ratione *ardui* (*magni*, *excellentis*, vel etiam *gloriosi* et *aeterni*) esse spei obiectum formale et rationem motivam: bonum quidem, quia in spe est protensio appetitus, qui non est nisi ad bonum (ad 4.), quod exspectat; ardui autem et excellentis, quia erigit animum confidentem et innitentem summae et immensae largitati (supra a. 1. q. 1.); nam bonum sub ratione excellentis erigit (hic ad 3.). Duo enim actus implicantur in spe, quorum primus est *exspectare*; et « qui exspectat adventum desiderat exspectati » (infra dub. 2.), nempe boni convenientis. Sed hoc desiderium « se habet ad spem sicut commune ad proprium, in quantum spes addit certitudinem circa exspectationem » (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3. ad 1.). « Motus appetitus incipit in desiderio... Desiderium est quaedam inchoatio amoris » (Ibid. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.). — Secundus actus est *confidere*, quod est principium et origo *exspectationis*, quia spes « faciendo confidere facit exspectare » (hic in corp.). Sed haec ipsa confidentia rationem motivam habet « in eo qui nec potest nec vult sibi deficere; talis autem non est nisi ille, qui est potentissimus in virtute et munificentissimus in liberalitate; et hoc non habet, nisi habeat excellentiam virtutis et largitatis » (ibid.). — Attamen hi duo actus, scilicet confidere et exspectare, licet in se sint actus formaliter differentes, unum tantum requirunt habitum, quia inter se habent « ordinem et connexionem et consequentiam naturalem... Ideo enim spes exspectat magna bona promissa, quia confidit de immensa largitate promittentis; unde quia unus istorum actuum est ratio alterius, hinc est, quod non pertinent ad diversos habitus, sed ad unum » (supra a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.). — Concluditur (hic in corp.): « Quoniam spes habet obiectum magnum et arduum in confidendo » [scilicet excellentiam virtutis et largitatis divinae]; hinc est, quod habet pro obiecto magnum et arduum in exspectando, scilicet bonum aeternum, quod est ipsa immensa Bonitas, divina, et bonum perpetuum, quod est beatitudo creata, ut egregie explicatur infra dub. 1. Cfr. scholion ad q. 5.

In substantia huius doctrinae praeter Petrum a Tar. et Richardum a Med. consentit etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1.). Postquam enim (ibid. in corp.) dixit: « Oportet, quod voluntas ad hoc, quod operari incipiat, tendat in illud [appetibile] sicut in possibile; et haec inclinatio voluntatis tendentis in bonum aeternum quasi possibile sibi per gratiam est actus spei »; deinde (ad 1.) addit: « Idem secundum rem est obiectum omnium virtutum theologicarum, sed differt secundum rationem, quia, in quantum est summum verum, est obiectum fidei; in quantum est summum bonum, est obiectum caritatis; in quantum est altissimum arduum, est obiectum spei. Et quia beatitudo nominat maxime arduum... ideo in definitione spei praecipue ponitur beatitudo » (cfr. S. II. II. q. 17. a. 6, et Bonav. hic ad 5. et infra dub. 2, ubi ratio exhibetur, quare beatitudo approprietur spei). Ibid. ad 4: « Tendere in appetibile est tam irascibilis quam concupiscibilis, sed differenter: quia tendere in aliquod bonum, ut est bonum simpliciter, est concupiscibilis, sed tendere in aliquod, ut est arduum et difficile, est irascibilis ». In Sum. autem (II. II. q. 17. a. 2.) idem dicit, quod spes « attingit Deum, innitens eius auxilio ad consequendum bonum speratum... Hoc autem bonum est vita aeterna, quae in fruitione ipsius Dei consistit... Et ideo proprium et principale obiectum spei est beatitudo aeterna ». — Ibid. a. 6. ad 3: « Spes facit tendere in Deum sicut in quoddam bonum finaliter adipiscendum et sicut in quoddam adiutorium efficax ad subveniendum ».

**II.** Posteriores theologi in assignando spei obiecto formali *quo* (sive *ratione motiva*) valde dissident. Nam praeter opinionem in corp. primo relatam et opinionem auctoris (contra quam arguit Scotus, hic n. 7.), nonnulli cum Gotti multisque aliis discipulis S. Thomae dicunt, illud esse omnipotentiam Dei ut auxiliantem; amorem autem concupiscentiae, quo amatur beatitudo ut bonum nostrum, se habere ad spem ut antecedens; alii vero volunt, esse Dei bonitatem ut nobis convenientem et amabilem amore concupiscentiae (quae opinio a multis tribuitur Scoto); alii, esse divinam promissionem; denique (secundum Scotum, ut eius sententiam interpretantur Frassenius et Henno), esse bonitatem Dei respectivam, nobis infallibiliter promissam, ita ut bonitas et promissio infallibilis ingrediantur rationem obiecti motivi.

**III.** Praeter locos citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med. hic a. 4. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Hope, as it is a passion, implies a motion of the appetite toward some good, commensurate indeed to the one desiring, but arduous (St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2). The term *arduous* « adds a certain special formal character of goodness, namely of preciousness » (ibid. ad 1). Hence St. Bonaventure teaches that the good under the formal character of the *arduous* (*great*, *surpassing*, or also *glorious* and *eternal*) is the formal object of hope and its motive character: a good indeed, since in hope there is a stretching forth of the appetite, which is only toward the good (ad 4), which it expects; but of the arduous and surpassing, since it erects the spirit that is confident and that relies on the supreme and immense bounty (above a. 1, q. 1); for the good under the formal character of the surpassing erects (here ad 3). For two acts are implied in hope, of which the first is *to expect*; and « he who expects an arrival desires the thing expected » (below dub. 2), namely a fitting good. But this desire « stands to hope as the common to the proper, insofar as hope adds certitude regarding the expectation » (St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 3, ad 1). « The motion of the appetite begins in desire... Desire is a certain inchoation of love » (Ibid. q. 2, a. 3, quaestiunc. 2). — The second act is *to be confident*, which is the principle and origin of *expectation*, because hope « by making one confident makes one expect » (here in the body). But this confidence itself has its motive character « in him who can neither fail nor wishes to fail; and such a one is none but he who is most powerful in might and most munificent in liberality; and one does not have this unless he have excellence of might and of bounty » (ibid.). — Yet these two acts, namely to be confident and to expect, although in themselves they are acts formally differing, require only one habit, because they have among themselves « order and connection and natural consequence... For hope expects the great goods promised precisely because it is confident of the immense bounty of the one promising; whence because one of these acts is the ground of the other, hence it is that they do not pertain to diverse habits, but to one » (above a. 1, q. 2, ad 1). — It is concluded (here in the body): « Since hope has a great and arduous object in being confident » [namely the excellence of the divine might and bounty]; hence it is that it has for its object the great and arduous in expecting, namely the eternal good, which is the immense divine Goodness itself, and the perpetual good, which is created beatitude, as is excellently set forth below in dub. 1. Cf. the scholion on q. 5.

In the substance of this doctrine, besides Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, St. Thomas also agrees (here q. 2, a. 3, quaestiunc. 1). For after he has said (ibid. in the body): « It is necessary that the will, in order that it may begin to operate, should tend toward that [appetible] as toward something possible; and this inclination of the will tending toward the eternal good as possible for itself through grace is the act of hope »; he then (ad 1) adds: « The same thing according to the reality is the object of all the theological virtues, but it differs according to formal character, because, insofar as it is the highest true, it is the object of faith; insofar as it is the highest good, it is the object of charity; insofar as it is the loftiest arduous, it is the object of hope. And because beatitude names what is most of all arduous... therefore in the definition of hope beatitude is principally posited » (cf. Summa II-II, q. 17, a. 6, and Bonaventure here ad 5 and below dub. 2, where the reason is given why beatitude is appropriated to hope). Ibid. ad 4: « To tend toward an appetible belongs both to the irascible and to the concupiscible, but differently: because to tend toward some good, as it is good simply, belongs to the concupiscible, but to tend toward something, as it is arduous and difficult, belongs to the irascible ». In the Summa, however (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), the same one says that hope « attains God, relying on his help for obtaining the hoped-for good... Now this good is eternal life, which consists in the fruition of God himself... And therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatitude ». — Ibid. a. 6, ad 3: « Hope makes one tend toward God as toward a certain good to be finally obtained and as toward a certain efficacious help for coming to one's aid ».

**II.** Later theologians disagree greatly in assigning the formal object *whereby* (or the *motive formal character*) of hope. For besides the opinion first related in the body and the opinion of the author (against which Scotus argues, here n. 7), some, with Gotti and many other disciples of St. Thomas, say that it is the omnipotence of God as helping; and that the love of concupiscence, by which beatitude is loved as our good, stands to hope as antecedent; while others hold it to be God's goodness as fitting and lovable to us with the love of concupiscence (which opinion is by many ascribed to Scotus); others, the divine promise; finally (according to Scotus, as Frassen and Henno interpret his view), the relative goodness of God, infallibly promised to us, so that the goodness and the infallible promise enter into the formal character of the motive object.

**III.** Besides the places cited: Blessed Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1.

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translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 5

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum spes sit in parte animae cognitiva, an affectiva.*

Quinto quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad subiectum, et est quaestio, utrum spes sit in parte animae cognitiva, vel affectiva. Et quod sit in cognitiva, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur primae ad Timotheum primo[^1] super illud: *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona*; Glossa: *de conscientia bona*, id est de spe[^2]: si ergo spes est conscientia, et conscientia se tenet ex parte cognitivae; videtur quod et ipsa spes.

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2. Item, Bernardus in quadam homilia super Cantica[^1b]: «Deus futurus est rationi plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis et memoriae continuatio aeternitatis»: sed continuatio aeternitatis est dos correspondens exspectationi ipsius spei: ergo si illa respicit ipsam memoriam, videtur, quod ipsa exspectatio spei in via esse in memoria habeat. Sed haec est potentia cognitiva: ergo etc.

3. Item, Augustinus, definiens spem, in libro de Civitate Dei[^2b] dicit, quod «spes est virtus, qua quis se ad illud quod credit, perventurum praesumit». Ex hac definitione videtur, quod nihil aliud sit sperare quam firmiter credere, se perventurum ad aliquod arduum et excellens; sed tam credere quam firmiter credere est potentiae cognitivae: igitur sperare spectat ad potentiam cognitivam. Sed «cuius est actus, eius est et habitus»: ergo idem redit, quod prius.

4. Item, imago creationis reformatur per imaginem recreationis, quae quidem consistit in gratia et tribus virtutibus theologicis: ergo si virtutes reformantes sunt in potentiis, quas reformant; necesse est, esse virtutes theologicas in illis potentiis, in quibus attenditur integritas imaginis. Si ergo illae potentiae sunt intelligentia, memoria et voluntas[^3b], et caritas respicit voluntatem, fides intelligentiam; videtur ergo, quod spes respiciat memoriam: ergo est in potentia cognitiva.

5. Item, *certitudo* respicit potentiam cognitivam: ergo cum «spes sit certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis[^4b]», spes est in potentia cognitiva tanquam in subiecto.

**Sed contra:** 1. Quatuor genera affectionum distinguuntur a Sanctis et a philosophis[^5b], videlicet *gaudium* et *dolor*, *spes* et *timor*: ergo si omnis affectio et habitus regulativus affectionis est in potentia affectiva, cum spes vel nominet affectionem, vel habitum directivum affectionis; videtur ergo generaliter, quod spes sit in potentia affectiva.

2. Item, eiusdem potentiae est *sperare*, cuius est et *timere*; sed *timere* non est nisi potentiae affectivae[^6b]: ergo nec *sperare*. Sed «cuius est actus, eius est et habitus»: ergo etc.

3. Item, «opposita nata sunt fieri circa eandem vim[^7b]»; sed spes et desperatio sunt opposita: si ergo desperatio est in potentia affectiva, videtur similiter, quod et ipsa spes.

4. Item, sicut contingit, potentiam rationalem et concupiscibilem obliquari et dirigi, ita etiam irascibilem: ergo sicut est aliqua virtus theologica in rationali et aliqua in concupiscibili, ita aliqua debet esse in irascibili; sed haec non est nisi spes: ergo spes est in irascibili: ergo spes est in potentia affectiva.

5. Item, obiectum spei est magnum et arduum, sicut supra[^8b] fuit ostensum; sed arduum est obiectum potentiae irascibilis: ergo si idem est obiectum habitus et potentiae substratae, in qua est habitus, spes est in potentia irascibili; et haec est affectiva: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Spes est in potentia animae affectiva, et quidem in parte irascibili.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio spes est in potentia affectiva; est enim in ipsa irascibili, quae est pars potentiae affectivae. Potentiae enim irascibilis non tantum est detestari mala culpae et perpeti mala poenae, sed etiam aggredi terribilia et erigi ad magna et ardua[^9b]. Et propterea non tantum

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ponimus in ipsa esse iram et patientiam, sed etiam fortitudinem et spem, fortitudinem, inquam, in quantum negotiatur circa ea quae sunt ad finem; spem autem, secundum quod se erigit ad excellentiam ipsius finis.

Hoc autem satis potest aperte colligi, tum ex parte affectionis substratae, tum ex parte conditionis adiunctae, tum ex parte dotis subsecuturae. Ex parte affectionis substratae: quia, cum quatuor sint affectiones, videlicet gaudium et dolor, spes et timor, sicut gaudium et dolor sunt circa eandem potentiam, ita etiam spes et timor[^1c]. Cum igitur planum sit, timorem esse ipsius potentiae irascibilis, non est dubium, quin affectio spei ad potentiam irascibilem pertineat, ac per hoc habitus virtutis spei dirigens affectionem illam. — Ex parte similiter conditionis et proprietatis annexae hoc ipsum potest satis aperte videri. Spei enim est *stabilire* et quodam modo *assecurare* de assequenda futura beatitudine; *stabilitio* autem et *confirmatio* pertinet ad potentiam irascibilem. Sicut enim rationalis se habet ad claritatem, et concupiscibilis ad voluptatem; sic etiam irascibilis ad securitatem[^2c]. Quia ergo assecuratio est conditio concomitans ipsam spem, indubitanter verum est, virtutem spei ad irascibilem pertinere. — Ex parte *dotis futurae* hoc ipsum potest haberi. Sicut enim ad fidem subsequitur visio, ita ad spem subsequitur perfecta tentio[^3c]. Firmiter autem tenere hoc est illius potentiae, cuius est habitum defendere; hanc autem non est dubium esse potentiam irascibilem. — Et ideo concedendum est, habitum spei esse in irascibili potentia, ac per hoc in virtute animi affectiva, sicut rationes concludunt, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod spes dicitur conscientia; dicendum, quod in processu illo est peccatum secundum aequivocationem[^4c]: quia conscientia potest nominare ipsam spem, et potest nominare lumen directivum ad bene agendum; et hoc ultimo modo spectat ad potentiam cognitivam, alio modo non: ideo non sequitur, quod virtus spei sit in potentia animae cognitiva. Praeterea, alius defectus est ibi: quia nomine conscientiae intelligitur spes, non quia spes sit conscientia, sed quia spes est certa exspectatio, consurgens ex gratia et meritis[^5c]; merita autem esse non possunt, nisi ubi est conscientia bona.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus futurus est memoriae continuatio aeternitatis; dicendum, quod illud verbum Bernardi intelligitur mediate et non primo. Nam continuatio aeternitatis respicit illam virtutem, cuius est perpetuo tenere; et hoc est potentiae irascibilis, cuius est in praesenti exspectare: et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod spes sit primo in potentia memorativa, sed quod aliquo modo ipsam respiciat, vel principaliter, vel ex consequenti[^6c].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sperare non est aliud quam firmiter credere, se habiturum aliquid; dicendum, quod spes dicitur et large et proprie. Large accipiendo spem, sic dicit credulitatem quodam modo firmatam respectu alicuius boni assequendi sive a se, sive ab alio; quemadmodum, cum quis videt alium bonae indolis, dicit, quod sperat, ipsum esse futurum bonum hominem; ibi sperare idem est quod probabiliter credere; et sic sumitur large et improprie et bene potest pertinere ad virtutem cognitivam[^7c]. — Alio modo sperare, secundum quod dicitur proprie, idem est quod *confidere* et ex illa confidentia cum quadam securitate *tendere* ad habendum illud quod speratur; et hoc modo pertinet ad virtutem affectivam. Et haec duo, videlicet confidentiam illam et securam tendentiam, comprehendit Augustinus sub verbo *praesumendi*, quod quamvis sequatur credulitatem cognitionis, tenet tamen se ex parte affectionis. Et ideo ex illa ratione non potest concludi, quod potentia cognitiva sit subiectum spei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago recreationis respondet imagini creationis; dicendum, quod verum est, quod respondet; nihilominus tamen imago creationis plus se tenet ex parte cognitivae, imago vero recreationis plus se tenet ex parte affectivae, secundum quod dicit Augustinus[^8c], quod «imago est in potentia cognoscendi, et similitudo in potentia diligendi». Et quia imago recreationis plus se tenet ex parte affectivae, ideo duae virtutes sunt in parte affectiva totaliter et principaliter, videlicet spes et caritas. Et virtus spei reformando potentiam irascibilem, quae est potentia affectiva,

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per consequens reformat ipsam memoriam, quae in actu communicat cum ea, videlicet in actu tenendi. Et ideo non oportet, quod spes reponatur in memoria sicut in proprio subiecto. Sed haec planius determinata sunt in libro secundo, distinctione decima sexta[^1d].

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de certitudine, patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt supra[^2d], pro eo quod certitudo spei non est pertinens ad potentiam cognitivam, sed magis ad potentiam affectivam, quae quidem certitudo est quaedam assecuratio tenens se ex parte potentiae irascibilis. — Patet igitur, quid sit subiectum spei quantum ad animae potentiam.

Ulterius etiam posset esse hic inquisitio de subiecto spei quantum ad substantiam, et circa hoc possent quaeri plura dubitabilia. Primo quaeritur, utrum spes sit in Angelis bonis. — Secundo, utrum sit in animabus beatis. — Tertio, utrum aliquo modo sit in angelis malis. — Quarto, utrum fuerit in his qui fuerunt in limbo. — Quinto, utrum sit in his qui sunt in purgatorio. — Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum fuerit in Christo. — Sed quoniam omnes hae quaestiones pro magna parte pendent ab illa quaestione, qua dicitur de evacuatione spei, et illa visa, cetera sunt facilia; ideo quaestiones istae ad praesens omittuntur, quia quaedam ex eis determinabuntur infra[^3d], quaedam ex eis tanguntur in littera, ut sic vitetur superfluitas, quae est memoriae inimica.

english:
### Question V. *Whether hope is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul.*

Fifthly, hope is inquired into by comparison to its subject, and the question is whether hope is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul. And that it is in the cognitive part is shown:

1. First, by that which is said in 1 Timothy 1[^1] on the text: *The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience*; the Gloss: *from a good conscience*, that is, from hope[^2]: if therefore hope is conscience, and conscience holds itself on the side of the cognitive, it seems that hope likewise does.

2. Likewise, Bernard in a certain homily on the Canticle[^1b]: «To the reason God-to-come is fullness of light, to the will multitude of peace, and to the memory the continuation of eternity»: but the continuation of eternity is the dowry corresponding to the expectation of hope itself: therefore if that regards the memory, it seems that the expectation of hope in this life has its being in the memory. But this is a cognitive power: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine, defining hope, in the book *On the City of God*[^2b] says that «hope is a virtue by which one presumes that he will attain to that which he believes». From this definition it seems that to hope is nothing other than firmly to believe that one will attain to some arduous and excellent thing; but both to believe and firmly to believe belongs to the cognitive power: therefore to hope pertains to the cognitive power. But «whose the act is, his also is the habit»: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, the image of creation is reformed by the image of re-creation, which consists in grace and the three theological virtues: therefore if the reforming virtues are in the powers which they reform, it is necessary that the theological virtues be in those powers in which the integrity of the image is regarded. If therefore those powers are intelligence, memory, and will[^3b], and charity regards the will, faith the intelligence; it seems therefore that hope regards the memory: therefore it is in the cognitive power.

5. Likewise, *certitude* regards the cognitive power: therefore since «hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude[^4b]», hope is in the cognitive power as in its subject.

**On the contrary:** 1. Four kinds of affection are distinguished by the Saints and by the philosophers[^5b], namely *joy* and *sorrow*, *hope* and *fear*: therefore if every affection and habit regulative of affection is in the affective power, since hope either names an affection, or a habit directive of affection; it seems therefore generally that hope is in the affective power.

2. Likewise, it belongs to the same power to *hope* whose it is also to *fear*; but to *fear* belongs only to the affective power[^6b]: therefore neither does to *hope*. But «whose the act is, his also is the habit»: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, «opposites are by nature brought about about the same faculty[^7b]»; but hope and despair are opposites: if therefore despair is in the affective power, it seems likewise that hope too is.

4. Likewise, just as it happens that the rational and the concupiscible power may be deflected and directed, so too the irascible: therefore just as there is some theological virtue in the rational and some in the concupiscible, so some ought to be in the irascible; but this is none other than hope: therefore hope is in the irascible: therefore hope is in the affective power.

5. Likewise, the object of hope is great and arduous, as was shown above[^8b]; but the arduous is the object of the irascible power: therefore if the object of the habit and of the underlying power, in which the habit is, is the same, hope is in the irascible power; and this is affective: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Hope is in the affective power of the soul, and indeed in the irascible part.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt hope is in the affective power; for it is in the irascible itself, which is a part of the affective power. For it belongs to the irascible power not only to detest the evils of fault and to endure the evils of punishment, but also to attack terrible things and to raise itself up to great and arduous things[^9b]. And therefore not only

do we place in it anger and patience, but also fortitude and hope: fortitude, I say, insofar as it is engaged about the things that are toward the end; hope, insofar as it raises itself up to the excellence of the end itself.

This, moreover, can be quite clearly gathered, both from the side of the underlying affection, and from the side of the adjoined condition, and from the side of the dowry to follow. From the side of the underlying affection: because, since there are four affections, namely joy and sorrow, hope and fear, just as joy and sorrow are about the same power, so too are hope and fear[^1c]. Since therefore it is plain that fear belongs to the irascible power itself, there is no doubt that the affection of hope pertains to the irascible power, and through this the habit of the virtue of hope directing that affection. — From the side likewise of the annexed condition and property the same can be quite clearly seen. For it belongs to hope to *stabilize* and in a certain way to *make secure* concerning the attainment of future beatitude; but *stabilization* and *confirmation* pertain to the irascible power. For just as the rational is related to clarity, and the concupiscible to pleasure; so too the irascible to security[^2c]. Since therefore making-secure is a condition accompanying hope itself, it is undoubtedly true that the virtue of hope pertains to the irascible. — From the side of the *future dowry* the same can be had. For just as vision follows upon faith, so perfect holding follows upon hope[^3c]. But firmly to hold belongs to that power whose it is to defend the habit; and there is no doubt that this is the irascible power. — And therefore it must be granted that the habit of hope is in the irascible power, and through this in the affective virtue of the soul, as the arguments conclude which are for this side.

1. To that which is first objected, that hope is called conscience; it must be said that in that process there is a fallacy by equivocation[^4c]: because conscience can name hope itself, and can name the light directive toward acting well; and in this latter way it pertains to the cognitive power, in the other way not: therefore it does not follow that the virtue of hope is in the cognitive power of the soul. Besides, there is another defect there: because by the name of conscience hope is understood, not because hope is conscience, but because hope is a certain expectation, arising from grace and merits[^5c]; but merits cannot exist except where there is a good conscience.

2. To that which is objected, that God-to-come is the continuation of eternity for the memory; it must be said that that word of Bernard is to be understood mediately and not primarily. For the continuation of eternity regards that virtue whose it is perpetually to hold; and this belongs to the irascible power, whose it is in the present to expect: and therefore from this it does not follow that hope is primarily in the memorative power, but that it regards it in some way, either principally or consequently[^6c].

3. To that which is objected, that to hope is nothing other than firmly to believe that one will have something; it must be said that hope is spoken of both broadly and properly. Taking hope broadly, it thus says a credulity in some way confirmed with respect to some good to be attained either by oneself or by another; just as, when one sees another of good disposition, he says that he hopes him to be a good man in the future; there to hope is the same as probably to believe; and thus it is taken broadly and improperly and can well pertain to the cognitive virtue[^7c]. — In another way to hope, according as it is said properly, is the same as to *trust* and from that trust with a certain security to *tend* toward having that which is hoped for; and in this way it pertains to the affective virtue. And these two, namely that trust and the secure tending, Augustine comprehends under the word *presuming*, which, although it follows the credulity of cognition, nevertheless holds itself on the side of affection. And therefore from that argument it cannot be concluded that the cognitive power is the subject of hope.

4. To that which is objected, that the image of re-creation corresponds to the image of creation; it must be said that it is true that it corresponds; nevertheless the image of creation holds itself more on the side of the cognitive, whereas the image of re-creation holds itself more on the side of the affective, according as Augustine says[^8c], that «the image is in the power of knowing, and the likeness in the power of loving». And because the image of re-creation holds itself more on the side of the affective, therefore two virtues are in the affective part totally and principally, namely hope and charity. And the virtue of hope, by reforming the irascible power, which is the affective power,

consequently reforms the memory itself, which communicates with it in act, namely in the act of holding. And therefore it is not necessary that hope be placed in the memory as in its proper subject. But these things have been more plainly determined in the second book, distinction sixteen[^1d].

5. To that which is objected last concerning certitude, the response is clear from the things which have been said above[^2d], because the certitude of hope does not pertain to the cognitive power, but rather to the affective power, which certitude is a certain making-secure holding itself on the side of the irascible power. — It is clear therefore what is the subject of hope as regards the power of the soul.

Furthermore there could also be here an inquiry concerning the subject of hope as regards substance, and about this many things doubtful could be inquired. First it is asked whether hope is in the good Angels. — Second, whether it is in the blessed souls. — Third, whether it is in any way in the evil angels. — Fourth, whether it was in those who were in limbo. — Fifth, whether it is in those who are in purgatory. — Sixth and last it is asked whether it was in Christ. — But since all these questions for the most part depend on that question by which it is said concerning the emptying-out of hope, and, that having been seen, the rest are easy; therefore these questions are for the present omitted, because some of them will be determined below[^3d], some of them are touched on in the text, that so superfluity, which is the enemy of the memory, may be avoided.

la: Codd. AK *propria*.

en: Codices AK read *propria* (one's own).

la: Vers. 5. — Glossa (ordinaria) sumta est ex August., I. de Doctr. christiana, c. 40. n. 44, eiusque verba integra apud Strabum et Lyranum haec sunt: *Conscientia bona*; conscientia pro spe. *Ille enim ad id quod diligit se perventurum* [Augustinus: *Ille enim se ad id quod credit et diligit perventurum esse*].

en: Verse 5. — The (Ordinary) Gloss is taken from Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 40, n. 44, and his entire words, in Strabus and Lyra, are these: *A good conscience*; conscience for hope. *For he, to that which he loves, [presuming] himself to attain* [Augustine: *For he [presuming] himself to attain to that which he believes and loves*]. ### Page 579

la: Homil. II. n. 5. — In conclusione codd. et edd. 1, 2 repetunt *ergo* ante *videtur*, et codd. GIKLTZbb nec non Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 49. a. I. pro *memoria* substituunt *memorativa*, ut infra ad 2. Deinde Vat. et edd. 1, 2 verbis *potentia cognitiva* praefigit *in*.

en: Homily II, n. 5. — In the conclusion, the codices and editions 1, 2 repeat *therefore* before *it seems*, and codices GIKLTZbb as well as the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 49, a. I, substitute *memorative* for *memory*, as below at ad 2. Then the Vatican edition and editions 1, 2 prefix *in* to the words *cognitive power*.

la: Vide infra pag. 583, nota 4. Quod *credere* sit actus potentiae cognitivae, ostensum est supra d. 23. a. I. q. 2. — In fine arg. respicitur illud Aristot., de Somno et vigil. c. I: *Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus*.

en: See below p. 583, note 4. That *to believe* is an act of the cognitive power was shown above at d. 23, a. I, q. 2. — At the end of the argument that of Aristotle is regarded, *On Sleep and Waking* c. I: *For whose the power is, his also is the act*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. I.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. I, q. I.

la: Ut Magister dicit hic in lit. c. I.

en: As the Master says here in the text, c. I.

la: Vide supra pag. 555, nota 7. et pag. 556, nota 5.

en: See above p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5: *Verecundia* quidem in rationali, *timor* in irascibili, at *tristitia* in concupiscibili; nam in hoc et *voluptas*, *ira* autem in irascibili. — In Vat. arg. terminatur sic: *videtur ergo, quod spes sit in potentia affectiva*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 5: *shame* indeed in the rational, *fear* in the irascible, but *sadness* in the concupiscible; for in this too is *pleasure*, *anger* however in the irascible. — In the Vatican edition the argument terminates thus: *it seems therefore that hope is in the affective power*.

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.), ubi simile exemplum affertur, scil. de odio, et docetur, ad cognoscendum, utrum odium cohaereat irae, an sit in concupiscibili, inspiciendum esse quod ei contrarium sit, amorem scilicet; cum autem amor non sit in irascibili, sed in concupiscibili, odium quoque non esse in irascibili, sed in concupiscibili.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7), where a similar example is brought forward, namely concerning hatred, and it is taught that, in order to know whether hatred coheres with anger, or is in the concupiscible, one must inspect what is contrary to it, namely love; but since love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible, hatred too is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible.

la: Quaest. praeced. — De obiecto vero irascibilis dicit Avicenna, de Anima p. I. c. 5, haec: «Vis concupiscibilis, quae est vis imperans moveri, ut appropinquatur ad ea quae putantur necessaria aut utilia appetitui delectamenti... irascibilis, quae est vis imperans moveri ad repellendum id quod putatur nocivum aut corrumpens appetitum vincendi». Et etiam sequentia (p. IV. c. 4.): «Illa autem [virtus], quae vult delectabile et quod putatur utile ad acquirendum, est concupiscibilis; quae vero vult vincere et id quod putatur nocivum repellere, est irascibilis». Sed cfr. infra scholion. — Circa finem arg. pro *haec est affectiva* cod. A *haec est in potentia affectiva*. Deinde Vat. concludit sic: *ergo spes est in potentia affectiva*.

en: The preceding question. — Concerning the object of the irascible Avicenna, *On the Soul* p. I, c. 5, says this: «The concupiscible faculty, which is the faculty commanding movement, that approach be made to the things thought necessary or useful to the appetite of delight... the irascible, which is the faculty commanding movement to repel that which is thought harmful or corruptive, with the appetite of conquering». And also the following (p. IV, c. 4): «That [virtue], moreover, which wills the delectable and what is thought useful for acquiring, is concupiscible; but that which wills to conquer and to repel what is thought harmful, is irascible». But cf. the scholion below. — Toward the end of the argument, for *this is affective* codex A reads *this is in the affective power*. Then the Vatican edition concludes thus: *therefore hope is in the affective power*.

la: Prima huius propos. pars illustratur verbis, quae habentur in libro de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 13: *Rationalis siquidem est anima nostra, ut sciat discernere inter bonum et malum. Est etiam concupiscibilis atque irascibilis, ut possit amare bonum et odire malum. De concupiscibilitate nascitur amor, et de amore desiderium et gaudium. Amor est delectatio cordis alicuius ad aliquid propter aliquid, per desiderium currens atque per gaudium requiescens, per desiderium in appetendo, et per gaudium in perfruendo... De irascibilitate nascitur odium.* Ira enim generat odium, et de odio dolor et timor. Cum enim contra peccata nostra irascimur et ea odire incipimus, dolemus, quia peccavimus et poenas pro peccatis timemus. — Quoad secundam propos. partem videsis verba Damasceni, tom. II. pag. 560, nota 12. allata (de quibus agit Ioan. de Rupella, Sum. de Anima, p. II. c. 10. et 30.); cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 197, nota 6. — De patientia (quae pertinet ad fortitudinem) vide supra pag. 561, nota 7; de dono fortitudinis infra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. I; de spe quaest. praeced. in fine corp. et ad 5.

en: The first part of this proposition is illustrated by the words found in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 13: *Our soul indeed is rational, that it may know to discern between good and evil. It is also concupiscible and irascible, that it may be able to love good and hate evil. From concupiscibility is born love, and from love desire and joy. Love is a delight of someone's heart toward something for the sake of something, running through desire and resting through joy, through desire in seeking, and through joy in fully enjoying... From irascibility is born hatred.* For anger generates hatred, and from hatred sorrow and fear. For when we are angry against our sins and begin to hate them, we grieve, because we have sinned and fear punishments for our sins. — As to the second part of the proposition, see the words of Damascene, vol. II, p. 560, note 12, adduced there (of which John of La Rochelle treats, *Summa de Anima*, p. II, c. 10 and 30); cf. also vol. I, p. 197, note 6. — Concerning patience (which pertains to fortitude) see above p. 561, note 7; concerning the gift of fortitude below d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. I; concerning hope, the preceding question at the end of the corpus and at ad 5. ### Page 580

la: Cfr. supra pag. 569, nota 4. — Paulo inferius pro *dirigens* codd. AKTU minus bene *dirigentis*.

en: Cf. above p. 569, note 4. — A little below, for *directing* codices AKTU read, less well, *of the one directing*.

la: Ut facile cognosci potest ex annotatione penultima. — De propos. seq. cfr. supra a. I. q. 5. — Paulo superius pro *claritatem* codd. MO (bb a secunda manu) substituunt *veritatem*, edd. perperam *caritatem*; et subinde post *ad voluptatem* Vat. adiicit *id est delectationem, honestam tamen*.

en: As can easily be known from the penultimate annotation. — On the following proposition cf. above a. I, q. 5. — A little above, for *clarity* codices MO (bb by a second hand) substitute *truth*, the editions wrongly *charity*; and thereupon after *to pleasure* the Vatican edition adds *that is, delight, yet an honorable one*.

la: Cfr. supra a. I. q. 3. in corp. — In Vat. desunt verba *subsequitur visio, ita ad spem*.

en: Cf. above a. I, q. 3, in the corpus. — In the Vatican edition the words *vision follows, so upon hope* are lacking.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.). — De conscientia cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. I. q. I. — Cod. S *quod ibi est aequivocatio*. Paulo inferius pro *ad bene agendum* codd. AKW *ad bonum agendum*.

en: See Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 3 (c. 4). — On conscience cf. II Sent. d. 39, a. I, q. I. — Codex S reads *that there is an equivocation there*. A little below, for *toward acting well* codices AKW read *toward doing good*.

la: Respicitur definitio spei hic in lit. Magistri, c. I. posita. Cfr. etiam supra q. 2.

en: The definition of hope set down here in the text of the Master, c. I, is regarded. Cf. also above q. 2.

en: See I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. I, q. I, ad 4.

la: Cfr. infra dub. 4.

en: Cf. below dub. 4.

la: De Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 10.

en: *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 10. ### Page 581 (Scholion / Commentarius)

la: Art. I. q. 5. — Post pauca pro *assecuratio* bene multi codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 49. a. I. *assecutio*.

en: Art. I, q. 5. — After a few words, for *making-secure* many codices and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 49, a. I, rightly read *attainment*.

la: Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 2, ubi de evacuatione spei agitur. — De spe in purgatorio cfr. IV. Sent. d. 20. p. 1. q. I. Aliae ex quaestionibus hic propositis tanguntur infra dub. 5. seq. — Pro *tanguntur* multi codd. *tangentur*.

en: Dist. 31, a. 2, q. 2, where the emptying-out of hope is treated. — On hope in purgatory cf. IV Sent. d. 20, p. 1, q. I. Other of the questions here proposed are touched on below at dub. 5 ff. — For *are touched on* many codices read *will be touched on*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter docetur, subiectum virtutis theologicae, huius est spes, esse voluntatem rationalem; a qua doctrina auctor noster non discedit, licet doceat, eandem esse in vi irascibili. Ut autem eiusdem modus loquendi differens ab eo, quem s. Thomas, Scotus aliique posteriores communiter sequuntur, intelligatur, duo breviter discutere debemus, scilicet, utrum in voluntate rationali, simili modo ut in sensibili, admittenda sit distinctio aliqua inter vim concupiscibilem et irascibilem; tum, hoc concesso, utrum spes speciali modo sit in irascibili.

1. Quoad 1. quaestionem non defuerunt qui in superiori parte animae distinguerent irascibilem tanquam potentiam diversam a potentia concupiscibili. Alii vero cum Henrico Gandav. (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) in una potentia voluntatis rationalis duplicem vim, scilicet concupiscibilem et irascibilem, distinxerunt. Contra hunc Henrici modum loquendi arguit Scot. (hic n. 6. seqq.); et communiter posteriores Scholastici cum S. Thoma (cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. q. 2. a. 3.) non admittunt in voluntate rationali irascibilem proprie dictam, tamen aliquid simile eidem attribuunt. Quod etiam Scot. (III. Sent. d. 31. n. 13.) minime negat dicens: «In parte autem rationali possunt habere similem distinctionem obiectorum, sicut in parte sensitiva: nam voluntati est aliquid primo *delectabile*, puta bonum sibi conveniens secundum se, vel conveniens appetitui sensitivo, cui coniungitur in eodem supposito. Potest etiam habere voluntas obiectum offendens ei secundum rectam rationem et contra rectam rationem, et respicere illud ut offendens actu nolendi repulsivo et imperioso. Non tamen est tanta distinctio horum in voluntate, quanta est in appetitu sensitivo... nec oportet dicere magis, quod alterum istorum est vis, et alterum potentia, quam e converso... De vi autem nescio quid oporteat loqui; est enim verbum superfluum» etc. — Aliter loquitur S. Bonav., qui (II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. I. in corp. circa finem et cfr. ibi q. 3.) de concupiscibili et irascibili in voluntate affirmat, quod «potius dicuntur diversae vires quam diversae potentiae»; quod etiam expressius repetit infra d. 33. q. 3. in corp. et etiam ad I. Idem (II. Sent. d. 23. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.): «Voluntas autem non dicit aliam potentiam per essentiam a concupiscibili et irascibili, sed nominat ipsum appetitum ut ratiocinatum sive rationi coniunctum, et sic eius regere est et imperare. Concupiscibilis autem et irascibilis eandem potentiam affectivam nominant, in quantum tamen habent regi; et ita dicuntur inferiores, non quantum ad naturam potentiae, sed quantum ad officium» etc. Praescindendo a modo loquendi, reapse sententia Seraphici et Alexandri Hal. quoad hanc distinctionem vix differt a communiore opinione, secundum quam Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 7.) dicit, quod in parte rationali animae probabilius irascibilis non sit «secundum proprietatem, sed secundum aliquam aequivalentem similitudinem». Quidquid enim potest virtus inferior, potest superior, et non econverso; unde sicut a parte cognitivae ratio recompensat sensus interioris et exterioris apprehensionem, sic a parte motivae voluntas, tanquam superior, habet in se concupiscibilis et irascibilis actum et virtutem modo nobiliori. Spes ergo est in voluntate, in quantum ipsa habet actum irascibili similem (cfr. s. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 10. a. I. q. 2. ad 4. et scholion).

In hoc unico Scot. recedit a nostro auctore, quod ille irascibili tribuit non nisi actum nolendi et vindicandi obiectum offendens, ita dicens (hic d. 34. n. 11.): «Irascibilis igitur habet pro obiecto *arduum* sive *appetibile*, quod est obiectum concupiscibilis, sed ipsum offendens, ita quod actus eius adaequatus est rem vindicare, vel nolle offendens» etc. Una posita opinione, iam sequitur, quod spes non possit esse in irascibili, et quod spes et caritas solummodo perficiant concupiscibilem, quia Deus, quem habent pro obiecto, «est tantum volibilis, non nollibilis» (ibid. n. 11.). — Sed S. Bonav. irascibili praeter illum actum respuendi malum, tribuit etiam alium actum, scilicet erigendi se ad arduum. Dicit enim (II. Sent. d. 10. a. I. q. 2. ad 5, et passim hic et q. praeced.), quod actus irascibilis «vel consistit respectu disconvenientis vincendi, vel respectu ardui aggrediendi, et ita vel arduum, vel disconvenientiam dicit». Quo supposito, etiam Beatis qualiscumque actus irascibilis non disconvenit (infra d. 33. q. 3. ad I.).

2. Quaestio 2. a S. Thoma, Scoto, Richardo aliisque posterioribus solvitur responsione negativa, a S. Bonav. vero, Alexandro Hal. et B. Alberto (qui tamen rem aliter explicat) affirmativa; quae differentia ex praedictis, praesertim ex verbis Petri a Tar., fere componi potest. Unde S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2. ad I.) ad mentem S. Bonaventurae responsionem negativam sic limitat: «nisi forte ipsam Voluntatem, in quantum habet actus similes actibus irascibilis, dicamus irascibilem. Sed tunc irascibilis et concupiscibilis non erunt diversae potentiae, sed nominabunt eandem potentiam, scilicet voluntatem, secundum diversos actus». Quando autem S. Bonav. cum Alexandro

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approbat effatum, «quod consuevit dici, quod tres virtutes theologicae sunt in rationali et concupiscibili et irascibili» (II. Sent. d. 23. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.); non in eo sensu vult distinguere spem a caritate, quasi spes sit primo et per se in sola irascibili, qualem ipse attribuit voluntati; caritas vero in concupiscibili; sed, ni fallimur, ideo asserit, caritatem (quae habet pro obiecto proprio solam Dei bonitatem in se) solam concupiscibilem perficere, quia ipsa praescindit a quocumque respectu ad malum, sive illud sit oppositum ipsi summo bono, quod est cavendum, sive sit minus conveniens subiecto deficienti, id est ipsi speranti ut aliquod arduum, quod vires eius excedit; spem autem ita docet perficere concupiscibilem, ut etiam irascibilem erigat ad arduum summum superandum (cfr. scholion ad praecedentem quaest.). Simili explicatione Matth. Hauzeur (Collatio totius theol. t. II. col. 566.) ipsius Scot. verba in concordiam cum doctrina Alexandri Hal. et Bonaventurae redigere conatur.

**II.** Praeter locos citatos: S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 18. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** It is commonly taught that the subject of the theological virtue—of which kind is hope—is the rational will; from which doctrine our author does not depart, although he teaches that the same is in the irascible faculty. But in order that his manner of speaking, differing from that which St. Thomas, Scotus, and other later writers commonly follow, may be understood, we must briefly discuss two things, namely, whether in the rational will, in a manner similar to that in the sensible, some distinction is to be admitted between the concupiscible and the irascible faculty; then, this being granted, whether hope is in a special way in the irascible.

1. As to the 1st question, there were not lacking those who, in the superior part of the soul, distinguished the irascible as a power diverse from the concupiscible power. Others, however, with Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8, q. 15), distinguished in the one power of the rational will a twofold faculty, namely concupiscible and irascible. Against this manner of speaking of Henry, Scotus argues (here n. 6 ff.); and the later Scholastics commonly, with St. Thomas (cf. III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 3), do not admit in the rational will an irascible properly so called, yet they attribute something similar to it. Which Scotus too (III Sent. d. 31, n. 13) by no means denies, saying: «In the rational part, moreover, they can have a similar distinction of objects, as in the sensitive part: for to the will there is something first *delectable*, namely a good agreeable to itself in itself, or agreeable to the sensitive appetite, to which it is joined in the same supposit. The will can also have an object offending it according to right reason and against right reason, and regard it as offending by an act of repulsive and imperious refusal. Yet there is not so great a distinction of these in the will as there is in the sensitive appetite... nor is it necessary to say rather that one of these is a faculty, and the other a power, than conversely... Concerning the faculty, moreover, I know not what one ought to say; for it is a superfluous word» etc. — Otherwise speaks St. Bonaventure, who (II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. I, in corp. near the end, and cf. there q. 3) concerning the concupiscible and irascible in the will affirms that «they are rather called diverse faculties than diverse powers»; which he also more expressly repeats below at d. 33, q. 3, in corp. and also ad I. The same (II Sent. d. 23, p. I, q. 6, ad 2): «The will, moreover, does not name another power essentially distinct from the concupiscible and irascible, but names the appetite itself as reasoned or conjoined to reason, and thus its to-rule is also to-command. The concupiscible and irascible, moreover, name the same affective power, insofar however as they have to be ruled; and so they are called inferior, not as regards the nature of the power, but as regards office» etc. Prescinding from the manner of speaking, in fact the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor and of Alexander of Hales, as regards this distinction, scarcely differs from the more common opinion, according to which Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 7) says that in the rational part of the soul it is more probable that the irascible is not «according to property, but according to some equivalent likeness». For whatever the inferior virtue can do, the superior can, and not conversely; whence just as on the side of the cognitive reason compensates for the apprehension of the interior and exterior sense, so on the side of the motive the will, as superior, has in itself the act and virtue of the concupiscible and irascible in a nobler manner. Hope therefore is in the will, insofar as it has an act similar to the irascible (cf. St. Bonav., I Sent. d. 10, a. I, q. 2, ad 4 and scholion).

In this one thing Scotus recedes from our author, that he attributes to the irascible only the act of refusing and avenging an offending object, thus saying (here d. 34, n. 11): «The irascible therefore has for its object the *arduous* or *appetible*, which is the object of the concupiscible, but as offending it, so that its adequate act is to avenge a thing, or to nill an offending thing» etc. With the one opinion posited, it now follows that hope cannot be in the irascible, and that hope and charity perfect only the concupiscible, because God, whom they have for object, «is only willable, not nillable» (ibid. n. 11). — But St. Bonaventure attributes to the irascible, besides that act of rejecting evil, also another act, namely of raising itself to the arduous. For he says (II Sent. d. 10, a. I, q. 2, ad 5, and passim here and in the preceding q.) that the act of the irascible «either consists in respect of a disagreeable thing to be conquered, or in respect of an arduous thing to be attacked, and thus says either the arduous or disagreeableness». Which being supposed, even to the Blessed an act of the irascible of whatever kind is not unfitting (below d. 33, q. 3, ad I).

2. Question 2 is solved by St. Thomas, Scotus, Richard, and other later writers by a negative response, but by St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, and Bl. Albert (who however explains the matter otherwise) by an affirmative one; which difference can, from the foregoing, especially from the words of Peter of Tarentaise, almost be composed. Whence St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 2, ad I) thus limits the negative response to the mind of St. Bonaventure: «unless perhaps we call the Will itself irascible insofar as it has acts similar to the acts of the irascible. But then the irascible and the concupiscible will not be diverse powers, but will name the same power, namely the will, according to diverse acts». But when St. Bonaventure with Alexander

approves the dictum «which it is customary to say, that the three theological virtues are in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible» (II Sent. d. 23, p. I, q. 6, ad 2); he does not in that sense wish to distinguish hope from charity, as if hope were primarily and per se in the irascible alone, such as he attributes to the will; but charity in the concupiscible; rather, unless we are mistaken, he asserts that charity (which has for its proper object the goodness of God alone in itself) perfects the concupiscible alone, because it prescinds from every respect to evil, whether that be opposed to the supreme good itself, which is to be avoided, or be less agreeable to the deficient subject, that is, to the one hoping, as some arduous thing which exceeds his powers; but hope he so teaches to perfect the concupiscible, that it also raises the irascible to overcoming the supreme arduous thing (cf. the scholion to the preceding question). By a similar explanation Matthew Hauzeur (Collatio totius theol. t. II, col. 566) endeavors to reduce the words of Scotus himself into concord with the doctrine of Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure.

**II.** Besides the places cited: St. Thomas, S. II–II, q. 18, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 3.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands for printed pp.578–582 (PDF 600–604) per the Vol III PDF-priority override; the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 40205–40509) is cascade-fragmented (two-column bleed) throughout the Respondeo, replies, scholion, and every page footer. Title verified eyes-on at raw line 40206 / PDF p.578-L: *Utrum spes sit in parte animae cognitiva, an affectiva.* Opener verified at raw line 40208: *Quinto quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad subiectum, et est quaestio, utrum spes sit in parte animae cognitiva, vel affectiva* — **alignment correct**, no q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- p.578: bottom of the left/right columns only — the QUAESTIO V heading + opener + arg 1 (the top of p.578 belongs to a2-q4's corpus tail + q4 scholion §I–III). q5 owns p.578 footers **nn.1–2**.
- p.579: args 2–5 + Sed Contra 1–5 + Conclusio + start of Respondeo. Footers **nn.1–9** (per-page restart). p.579 n.9's Damascenus tail (*Ira enim generat odium...*) prints across the column foot — captured in [^9].
- p.580: Respondeo body (threefold reason) + replies ad 1–4 (ad 4 incomplete at foot). Footers **nn.1–8**.
- p.581: ad 4 tail + ad 5 + the "Ulterius...sex quaestiones" recensio (body ends) + SCHOLION §I begins. The p.581 footer block holds the **scholion/commentarius notes nn.1–3** (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM convention); the body cross-refs on this page (decima sexta / supra / infra) share those three footer lines.
- p.582: SCHOLION §2 conclusion + §II citation list (left + right-column top); after the scholion comes the d.26 **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** block — that is the next chunk (d26-dubia), NOT this one. q5 stops at scholion §II.

**Hand-off picked up (from d26-a2-q4):** q4 retained its share of p.577 (last footer p.577 n.10) and the top of p.578 (q4 corpus tail + scholion §I–III); p.578 has no q4 footer — q5 cleanly owns p.578 nn.1–2. Verified continuous at the seam: q4 closes with its scholion, q5 opens with the QUAESTIO V heading.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d26-dubia):** q5 ends with scholion §II at p.582 left/right-column top. The next chunk begins at the **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** header (raw line 40510, PDF p.582 right column). Dubia apparatus = NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM (dubia footers restart per page beginning p.582 nn.1–4).

**Scholion:** present. Structure = §I (intro on rational-will subject) → **1.** Quoad 1. quaestionem (Henry of Ghent / Scotus / S. Thomas on irascible-in-will) → **2.** Quaestio 2 (negative vs affirmative response, Hauzeur reconciliation) → §II (citation list). No `[?]` flags — all readings resolved against the PDF bands.

**J4 apparatus reconciliation (2026-07-17), Class A — duplicate defs, body partition proven against printed pages 579–581 (450 dpi bands, `colcrop.py vol3 <page> 1660`):**
- p.579: body anchors were off by one from arg 5 onward. `«spes sit certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis»` (arg 5) had **no marker at all** in the working copy though the printed page carries a superscript `⁴` there (footer def `[^4]`: "Ut Magister dicit hic in lit. c. I." — a citation for the Master's own definition being quoted, confirms the placement) — **added**. All following p.579 anchors were consequently mislabeled one low and are **relabeled**: *philosophis* 4→5, *affectivae* (Sed Contra 2) 5→6, *vim* (Sed Contra 3) 6→7, *supra* (Sed Contra 5) 7→8, *ardua* (Respondeo tail) 8→9. Content of each footer def was verified against its printed anchor (e.g. def `[^9]`'s "Prima huius propositionis pars illustratur..." explicitly glosses the *detestari/aggredi terribilia/erigi ad magna et ardua* clause it now anchors).
- p.580: the reply ad 2 (`...vel principaliter, vel ex consequenti.`) was **missing its marker** — the printed page carries `⁶` there (footer def `[^6]`: "Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. I. ad 4." — a cross-reference, consistent with "principaliter vel ex consequenti") — **added**. Ad 3's *cognitivam* relabeled 6→7 (def `[^7]`: "Cfr. infra dub. 4."), ad 4's *Augustinus* relabeled 7→8 (def `[^8]`: "De Spiritu et anima... c. 10." — the exact source of the Augustine quotation on that line, confirms placement).
- p.581 scholion §I: `actum irascibili similem[^1]` was a **spurious extra anchor** — verified against the printed page (450 dpi band) that no superscript follows *similem* there; the sentence's citation is carried entirely by the inline parenthetical `(cfr. s. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 10...)`, not a footnote. **Removed** in both languages. (The genuine p.581 group — *decima sexta*¹, *supra*², *infra*³ — was already correctly anchored and unchanged.)
- After these fixes the Latin/English body partitions into exactly 4 per-page groups matching the 4 apparatus def groups (p.578 [1–2], p.579 [1–9], p.580 [1–8], p.581 [1–3]), so `tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py` could then prove the partition and mechanically apply the final continuous page-qualified relabel (`[^p578-1]` etc.) — see status string / apparatus block for the result.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0