site: bonaventure

collection: Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica

title: Quaest. 1

title_alt: De humilitate quoad actum ipsius, utrum scilicet christianae perfectionis sit se ipsum vilificare pro Christo

title_alt: On humility as to its act, namely whether it belongs to Christian perfection to make oneself vile for Christ

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica

Volentes[^p117-1] circa evangelicam perfectionem aliqua indagare, primo exordium inquisitionis nostrae sumendum est ab humilitate.

Et primo quaeramus de ipsa tanquam de totius perfectionis radice.

Secundo, de paupertate.

Tertio, de continentia.

Quarto, de obedientia.

### Quaestio I. *De humilitate quoad actum ipsius, utrum scilicet ch[r]istianae perfectionis sit se ipsum vilificare pro Christo.*

Et quoniam habitus cognoscitur per actus[^p117-2], ideo quaerendum est de humilitate quantum ad actum ipsius. Est igitur quaestio, utrum christianae perfectionis sit se ipsum vilificare pro Christo. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo *auctoritate ipsius Christi*, qui dicit Matthaei decimo octavo[^p117-3]: *Nisi conversi fueritis et efficiamini sicut parvuli, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum;* sed se ipsum parvificare non est aliud quam sibi vilescere et ab aliis vilem se reputatum velle: ergo etc.

2. Item, Matthaei vigesimo[^p117-4]: *Qui voluerit inter vos primus esse erit vester servus;* sed facere se ipsum servum aliorum, hoc est se ipsum vilificare vilificatione permaxima: ergo etc.

3. Item, Lucae decimo septimo[^p117-5]: *Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite: servi inutiles sumus;* sed qui recte aliquid dicit vult sibi credi, et credit, verum esse quod dicit: ergo ad hoc, quod aliquis sit perfectus discipulus Christi, necesse est, quod se vilem reputet et quod talis velit ab aliis reputari.

4. Item, Lucae vigesimo secundo[^p117-6]: *Qui maior est in vobis fiat sicut minor, et qui praecessor est, sicut ministrator;* sed si minimus faceret se sicut maximum, esset summa ambitio et elatio: ergo e converso, cum maior fit minor et praecessor sicut ministrator, erit summa ipsius abiectio; et hoc debet fieri secundum evangelicam doctrinam: ergo etc.

5. Item, Ioannis decimotertio[^p117-7]: *Vos vocatis me magister et domine* etc., usque ibi: *lavare pedes;* ex hac auctoritate ratiocinatione colligitur, quod Christi discipulus ratione magistri inclinare se debet usque ad humiliationis et abiectionis genus extremum.

6. Item, ad Philippenses secundo[^p117-8]: *Hoc sentite in vobis, quod et in Christo Iesu, qui cum in forma* etc.; sed semetipsum exinanire, nihil aliud est quam se ipsum vilificare: si igitur Christum in

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hoc debemus imitari, exinanitio sui et vilificatio convenit evangelicae perfectioni.

7. Item, super illud verbum dicit Bernardus in sermone de Nativitate Domini[^p118-1]: «Quae necessitas fuit, ut sic exinaniret se, sic humiliaret, sic abbreviaret Deus maiestatis, nisi ut vos similiter faciatis? Iam clamat exemplo quod praedicaturus est verbo». Et paulo post: «Intolerabilis impudentiae est, ut, ubi se exinanivit maiestas, infletur vermiculus et intumescat». Si ergo in huiusmodi exinanitione debemus Christum imitari, restat, quod ad perfectionem virtutis spectat vilificari.

8. Secundi Regum sexto[^p118-2] super illud: *Respiciens Michol, filia Saul, vidit regem David subsilientem et despexit eum in corde suo;* dicit Gregorius: «Ecce, quem Dominus ceteris singulariter praetulit, sese sub Domino exaequando minimis et abiecta exhibendo contemnit. Non potestas regni ad memoriam reducitur, non oculis subiectorum saltando vilescere metuit; quid de his factis ab aliis sentiatur, ignoro; ego David plus stupeo saltantem quam pugnantem; pugnando hostem vicit, saltando coram Domino se ipsum vicit». Si igitur semetipsum vincere opus est perfectae virtutis; et hoc fit in vilificatione sui: ergo etc.

9. Item, paulo post ibidem[^p118-3]: *Ludam et vilior fiam* etc.; super quae Gregorius dicit: «Ac si aperte dicat: vilescere coram hominibus appeto, quia servare me coram Deo ingenuum per humilitatem quaero». Si igitur esse coram Deo ingenuum nihil aliud est quam esse perfectum; et vilificatio sui ingenuum facit coram Deo: ergo ipsa est actus perfectae virtutis.

10. Item, Ionae tertio[^p118-4] super illud: *Operiantur saccis homines et iumenta;* Glossa: «Ecce, rex Ninive de solio surgit, purpuram sacco, unguenta luto, munda sordibus commutat»; sed hoc est maxime vilificare se ipsum, non solum interius, verum etiam exterius, et per hoc placatus fuit Deus iratus: ergo vilificatio sui est opus Deo maxime acceptum.

11. Item, Augustinus, de Vera Religione[^p118-5]: «Omnia, quae habere cupientes non recte vitabamus, Christus carendo vilia fecit; non enim ullum peccatum committi potest, nisi dum appetuntur quae ille contempsit, aut fugiendo quae ille sustinuit»; sed Christus sustinuit vilificationem non compulsus, sed voluntate, et refutavit honores: si ergo pro illo vilificari volumus, in disciplina morum ipsi conformemur.

12. Item, Gregorius in primo libro Dialogorum[^p118-6] dicit sic: «In laudibus Constantii pensandum, cuius apud se humilitatis fuerit, qui despicientem se rusticum amplius amavit; qualis enim quisque apud se lateat, contumelia illata probat. Nam sicut superbi honoribus, sic plerumque humiles sua despectione gratulantur; cumque se et in alienis oculis viles aspiciunt, idcirco gaudent, quia per hoc iudicium confirmari intelligunt, quod de se et ipsi apud semetipsos habuerunt». Ex hac auctoritate manifeste colligitur, quod non est vere humilis, nisi sit in oculis suis vilis et velit esse in oculis alienis.

13. Item, Bernardus super Cantica, homilia decima sexta[^p118-7]: «Verus humilis vult vilis reputari, non humilis praedicari»; sed non est humilitas virtuosa, nisi sit humilitas vera: ergo si humilitas vera non potest esse sine voluntaria sui vilificatione, pari ratione nec humilitas virtuosa.

14. Hoc ipsum ostenditur *ratione*. Sicut se habet superbia ad sublimitatem, sic se habet humilitas ad vilitatem; sed nunquam est superbia, quin cum ea sit appetitus sublimitatis[^p118-8]: ergo nunquam est humilitas vera sine appetitu vilitatis.

15. Item, sicut lascivia se habet ad austeritatem, sic superbia ad vilitatem; sed lascivia non eradicatur a nobis nisi per rigorem austeritatis: ergo nec superbia nisi per vilitatem abiectionis[^p118-9]: ergo vilificatio sui est actus exstinctivus superbiae, ac per hoc actus virtutis perfectae.

16. Item, nullus potest iustificari a culpa originali, nisi se ipsum subiiciat Sacramentis, quae sunt signa sensibilia; subiicere autem se ipsum signo

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sensibili non potest esse sine magna abiectione[^p119-1]; sed plus requiritur ad peccatum actuale amovendum: ergo ad hoc, quod aliquis iustificetur, requiritur non solum, ut interius, verum etiam, ut exterius humilietur.

17. Item, contemptor Dei est dignus summo opprobrio et contemptu; sed peccator est Dei contemptor, ergo est summe contemnendus: ergo qui se ipsum contemnit tanquam peccatorem facit quod debet et se ipsum iudicat iuste[^p119-2]. Sed hoc spectat ad virtutem perfectam: ergo etc.

18. Item, duo sunt in peccato, scilicet libido et contemptus Dei[^p119-3]; sed non potest homo iustificari a peccato, in quo fuit libido, nisi adsit dolor compunctionis: ergo pari ratione nec a superbia nec a contemptu Dei iustificari poterit nisi per contemptum et vilificationem sui.

19. Item, civitas Dei ex opposito se habet ad civitatem Babylonis; sed civitas Babylonis incipit ab amore sui et pervenit usque ad contemptum Dei: ergo e contrario civitas Dei incipit a contemptu sui et pervenit usque ad amorem Dei[^p119-4]. Si ergo se ipsum contemnere et vilificare spectat ad divinae civitatis fundationem: ergo est opus virtutis perfectae.

20. Item, nullus recte per viam virtutis incedit, nisi qui honorem debitum Deo persolvit; sed qui se ipsum propter Deum vilificat, ille est, qui Deum honorat: ergo etc. *Maior* manifesta est per se; *minor* probatur per illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastici tertio[^p119-5]: *Magna est potentia Dei solius et ab humilibus honoratur;* et Baruch secundo: *Anima, quae tristis est super magnitudine mali et incedit curva et infirma, et oculi deficientes, et anima esuriens dat tibi gloriam et iustitiam, Domine.*

21. Item, quanto quis ad exemplar virtutum magis configuratur, tanto est perfectior; sed Christus in cruce exemplar est virtutis perfectae, ubi fuit in abiectione summa[^p119-6]: ergo tanto quisque perfectior est, quanto magis ad illam accedit.

22. Item, nulla virtus est in vera perfectione virtutis, nisi approbet unumquodque, secundum quod est approbandum; sed, sicut dicitur in Psalmo[^p119-7], *universa vanitas omnis homo vivens:* ergo nullus est virtutis perfectae, nisi reputet se vanum et inutilem, et talem se velit reputari a quolibet.

23. Item, nulla est virtus perfecta, nisi, cum potest, exeat in opus extra[^p119-8]; sed opus exterius correspondens interiori abiectioni est exterior vilificatio sui: ergo nullus habet in se virtutem humilitatis perfectae, nisi velit exterius se vilem et abiectum ostendere, cum locus et tempus se offert.

24. Item, virtus humilitatis perfectae reformat quod deformavit vitium superbiae; sed superbia deordinat cognitionem per praesumtionem, affectionem per arrogantiam, locutionem per iactantiam, gestum per ostentationem et insolentiam: ergo nullus habet humilitatem perfectam, nisi habeat horum contraria in cogitatu, affectu, locutione et gestu.

25. Item, perfecta virtus non solum elongat[^p119-9] a vitiis, verum etiam a vitiorum fomentis; sed apparitio interiorum et honorificatio exterior sunt fomenta superbiae: ergo humilitas perfecta ab istis elongat. Elongari autem ab honorificatione est accedere ad vilitatem et ignominiam: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ 1.: «Virtus est habitus mentis in modum naturae rationi consentaneus[^p119-10]»; sed natura naturaliter appetit promoveri et non deiici: ergo contra dictamen naturae est vilificatio sui: ergo non est opus perfectae humilitatis.

2. Item, «virtus est ordo amoris», sicut dicitur in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae[^p119-11]; sed cum maior subiicit se inferiori, ibi est inordinatio et perversio ordinis: ergo non est opus virtutis.

3. Item, virtus est in medietate consistens[^p119-12]; sed qui semetipsum vilificat accedit ad extremum: ergo recedit ab actu virtutis perfectae.

4. Item, omnis virtus habet substramentum veritatis; ubi enim veritas deest, ibi virtus esse non

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potest; sed vir iustus et perfectus, reputans se aliis viliorem, dum tale quid cogitat, falsum iudicat: ergo si talis cogitatio repugnat veritati[^p120-1], necesse est, quod repugnet virtuti.

5. Item, qui vilificat facturam vilificat factorem; sed homo est factura Dei[^p120-2]: ergo qui vilificat se ipsum vilificat Deum. Vilificare autem Deum non est virtutis perfectae, sed culpa: ergo etc.

6. Item, inter ceteras creaturas homo est creatura nobilissima, ergo maxime honoranda et appretianda in tota rerum universitate: ergo qui vilificat se ipsum deordinat universum.

7. Item, vilificare alterum est peccatum; sed homo tenetur diligere se ipsum sicut et proximum[^p120-3]: ergo qui se contemptibilem reddit facit contra ordinem caritatis.

8. Item, cum alius putat te vilem, peccat: ergo si vis, quod alius te vilem reputet, tu vis, quod alius peccet; sed hoc est voluntas inordinata: ergo etc.

9. Item, anima est imago Dei, ergo naturaliter nata est configurari[^p120-4]; sed Deus est summe bonus, sapiens et excelsus: ergo appetitus excellentiae competit reformationi imaginis mentis nostrae: ergo e contrario appetitus vilificationis sui non est opus virtutis.

10. Item, tria sunt appetibilia, scilicet bonum, verum et arduum[^p120-5]; sed nulla virtus vel appetitus virtutis consistit in appetendo contrarium veri vel boni: ergo nec in appetendo contrarium ardui. Sed huiusmodi est vilificatio: quare etc.

11. Item, omnis virtus et actus virtutis habet exemplar in Deo[^p120-6]; sed vilificatio sui in Deo non habet exemplar, quia Deus nullo modo se ipsum vilificat.

12. Item, omnis virtus reddit hominem conformem ad statum gloriae, pro eo quod «ipsa est dispositio perfecti ad optimum[^p120-7]»; sed vilificatio sui directe repugnat glorificationi: ergo etc.

13. Item, obiicitur contra humiliationem *exteriorem:* quia illa est signum interioris; sed superbia est fateri verbo, se esse humilem; ergo superbia est hoc ipsum ostendere signo.

14. Item, tu, qui praetendis humilitatem in signo, aut reputas *te humilem*, aut *non;* si *sic:* ergo attribuis tibi virtutem nobilem, ergo superbis; si *non:* ergo cum habitus exterius ostendat te humilem, aliud geris in animo, et aliud ostendis in signo: ergo es hypocrita[^p120-8].

15. Item, turpis est omnis pars, quae suo non convenit universo; sed singularitates istae habituum deturpare videntur statum bonum ecclesiasticum: ergo non spectat ad virtutem perfectam seu perfectionem christianam.

> **Conclusio.** *Totius perfectionis christianae fundamentum est humilitas, cuius actus est interior et exterior vilificatio sui ipsius.*

Sᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod summa totius christianae perfectionis in humilitate consistit, cuius actus est *exterior* et *interior* vilificatio sui. Totius enim christianae perfectionis summa versatur circa tria, scilicet circa *gratiam*, *iustitiam* et *sapientiam*, secundum quae tria dicitur Christus esse *via, veritas et vita*[^p120-9]. Nam *donum gratiae* viam praebet ad *veritatem iustitiae*, in qua consistit exercitium actionis; *veritas iustitiae* perducit ad *gustum sapientiae*, in qua consistit solatium contemplationis; quibus perfecte adeptis, ad culmen conscenditur evangelicae perfectionis, quam verbo et exemplo docuit Christus Iesus, qui se magistrum humilitatis specialiter professus est, Matthaei undecimo[^p120-10]: *Discite a me* etc. Est enim humilitas *ostium sapientiae, fundamentum iustitiae et habitaculum gratiae.*

Est *ostium sapientiae:* quia sapientia est «cognitio causarum altissimarum et primarum[^p120-11]», non tantum per modum cognitionis speculativae et intellectualis, verum etiam saporativae et experimentalis. Quoniam ergo omnia, quaecumquae facta sunt, ab uno principio manant et de nihilo sunt producta; ille vere sapiens est, qui veraciter recognoscit suam et aliorum nihilitatem et primi principii sublimitatem. Unde orat Augustinus in secundo libro Soliloquiorum[^p120-12]: «Noverim te, noverim me». Nullus autem pervenit ad plenam notitiam Dei nisi per veram notitiam sui

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et rectam; nec recte se ipsum cognoscit qui suam ipsius nihilitatem non attendit; *nam qui se existimat aliquid esse, cum nihil sit, ipse se seducit*, ut dicit Apostolus ad Galatas ultimo[^p121-1]; sui autem nihilitatem cognoscere, hoc est se ipsum humiliare: est ergo humilitas *ostium sapientiae.* — Et hoc dicit Sapiens Proverbiorum undecimo: *Ubi humilitas, ibi et sapientia;* hoc est etiam quod dicit ipsa Sapientia Matthaei undecimo: *Revelasti ea parvulis* etc.; super quo Bernardus, de Gradibus humilitatis[^p121-2]: «Apparet, quod veritas, quae superbis absconditur, humilibus revelatur. Est autem humilitas virtus, qua homo vera cognitione sui ipse sibi vilescit; hoc autem convenit his qui, ascensionibus in corde dispositis, de gradu in gradum proficiunt, donec in culmen humilitatis perveniunt, in quo velut in Sion positi veritatem prospiciunt». Et paulo post: «Qui iussit humilitatem perducit ad veritatem»; unde et scala Iacob «quid nobis aliud innuit, nisi quod in culmine humilitatis consistit cognitio veritatis»? Et paulo post: «Bona via humilitatis, qua veritas reperitur, caritas acquiritur, generationes sapientiae participantur».

Est etiam *fundamentum iustitiae.* Nam iustitiae est «reddere unicuique quod suum est[^p121-3]», tam Deo quam sibi quam proximo. Deo autem principaliter debetur honor et reverentia; et ad hoc reddendum praecipue disponit humilitas, secundum illud Ecclesiastici tertio[^p121-4]: *Quam magna potentia Dei solius et ab humilibus honoratur.* Quoniam ergo initium totius iustitiae est cultus et honor divinus, et hic exhibetur Deo ab humilibus; hinc est, quod totius iustitiae radix et fundamentum est humilitas. — Unde super illud Matthaei tertio[^p121-5]: *Sic decet nos implere;* Glossa: «id est, omnem humilitatem, quae est omnis iustitia». Et Gregorius in Homilia[^p121-6]: «In ceteris, quae agitis, radicem bonae operationis humilitatem tenete. Nam etsi quaelibet adsint opera, nulla tamen sunt, nisi ex humilitate condiantur; miranda quippe actio cum elatione non elevat, sed gravat. Qui enim sine humilitate virtutes congregat in ventum pulverem portat; et unde videre cernitur, inde deterius excaecatur». Idem: «Totum ruinae crescit, quod aedificas, si ante molem fabricae humilitatis fundamenta non procuras».

Est nihilominus *habitaculum gratiae.* Nam gratia facit hominem Deo gratum; gratus autem est Deo qui cognoscit divinae dignationis et condescensionis donum; nullus autem hoc cognoscit nisi circumspector suae indignitatis; et talis est vere humilis: et hinc est, quod gratia Spiritus sancti super solos humiles requiescit. — Unde Isaiae ultimo[^p121-7]: *Super quem requiescit Spiritus meus nisi super humilem* etc.; Augustinus, libro tertio de Doctrina christiana: «Ad hoc peccata magnorum virorum scripta sunt, ut apostolica illa sententia ubique timenda sit: *Quapropter qui videtur stare videat, ne cadat.* Nulla enim pagina sanctorum librorum est, in qua non sonet: *Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam*». — Quia ergo humilitas est habitaculum gratiae, hinc est, quod in ipsa consistit *summa totius perfectionis evangelicae.* Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus ad Dioscorum[^p121-8]: «Non aliam tibi ad capessendam et obtinendam veritatem viam invenias, quam quae inventa est ab illo qui gressuum nostrorum tanquam Deus videt infirmitatem. Est autem prima humilitas, secunda humilitas, tertia humilitas; et quoties interrogares, hoc dicerem, non quod alia praecepta non sint, quae dicantur, sed nisi humilitas omnia, quaecumque bene facimus, et praecesserit et comitata et secuta fuerit, et proposita, quam intueamur, et apposita, cui adhaereamus et imposita, qua reprimamur; iam nobis de aliquo bono facto gaudentibus totum extorquet de manu superbia. Itaque, si interrogares et quoties interrogares de praeceptis

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christianae religionis, non me aliud respondere nisi humilitatem liberet; et si forte alia dicerem, necessitas cogeret».

Huiusmodi autem humilitatis actus est non tantum interior, verum etiam exterior humiliatio et vilificatio sui. Et ratio huius est: quia, cum duplex sit *esse*, scilicet naturae et gratiae, duplex est nihilitas: uno modo per oppositionem ad *esse naturae*, alio modo per oppositionem ad *esse moris et gratiae.* Et secundum hoc humilitas, quae est per considerationem vel quae est considerativa nostrae nihilitatis, duplex est: una quidem dici potest humilitas *veritatis*, quae consurgit ex consideratione nihilitatis per oppositionem ad *esse naturae;* et haec non tantum reperitur in hominibus, verum etiam in Angelis, non tantum in viatoribus, verum etiam in Beatis. Alia potest dici humilitas *severitatis*, quae consurgit ex consideratione *culpae;* qua, dum homo per elationem cogitat se esse demersum, severa quadam censura per humilitatem consurgit adversum semetipsum, se vilificando non tantum interius in oculis propriis, verum etiam exterius in oculis alienis. Unde vilificatio sui non tantum exterior, verum etiam interior actus est humilitatis-virtutis[^p122-1], evangelicae nihilominus perfectioni consonus, si attendatur in ea debitus *ortus* et *modus* et *fructus.* — *Originaliter* enim humiliatio exterior procedere debet ab humilitate interiori secundum dictamen et regulam muneris divini; et hoc potest fieri secundum legem divini *praecepti*, vel divini *complaciti*, vel divini *consilii. Praeceptum* universaliter omnes respicit; *complacitum* respicit eos quibus divina voluntas specialiter inspiratur; *consilium* vero eos qui ad culmen perfectionis ascendunt. Et de his tribus ad Romanos[^p122-2] dicitur, *ut probetis, quae sit voluntas Dei bona, beneplacens et perfecta.* Recte igitur se humiliat qui se voluntati divinae secundum aliquem trium modorum conformat, secundum quos diversos ad diversa humiliationum genera spiritus verae humilitatis inclinat.

*Modus* autem humiliationis exterior est, ut servetur in eo *virilitas, veritas* et *honestas; virilitas* contra pusillanimitatem, quae animum deiicit; *veritas* contra hypocrisim, quae homines fallit; *honestas* contra stoliditatem, quae homines dehonestat et stultizare[^p122-3] facit.

*Fructus* autem huius humiliationis est, quia valet ad humilitatem *acquirendam*, ad *exercendam* et ad *perficiendam.* Unde super illud Ioannis decimo tertio[^p122-4]: *Et vos debetis alter alterius lavare pedes;* Glossa: «Qui ad pedes inclinatur, ei in corde humilitas excitatur; vel si iam est in corde, confirmatur humilitatis affectus». Et Bernardus in quadam epistola ad Ogerium[^p122-5]: «Humilitas, ad quam utique ducit humiliatio, totius est fabricae spiritualis fundamentum; siquidem humiliatio via est ad humilitatem, sicut patientia ad pacem, sicut lectio ad scientiam. Si virtutem appetis humilitatis, viam non refugias humiliationis; nam si non potes humiliari, non poteris ad humilitatem provehi». Hanc autem humiliationem vocat *sui ipsius vilificationem;* unde et subdit[^p122-6]: «*Ludam et vilior fiam*, ludam scilicet, ut illudar. Bonus ludus, quo Michol irascitur, et Deus delectatur; bonus ludus, qui hominibus quidem ridiculum, sed Angelis spectaculum praebet; bonus, inquam, ludus, in quo efficimur *opprobrium abundantibus et despectio superbis.* Hoc casto et religioso ludo ludebat qui dicebat: *Spectaculum facti sumus huic mundo et Angelis et hominibus.* Hoc ludo etiam nos interim ludamus, ut illudamur et confundamur et humiliemur, donec veniat qui *potentes deponit et exaltat humiles*, qui nos laetificet, exaltet et glorificet in aeternum». — Ex his manifeste colligitur, quod se ipsum humiliare et vilificare pro Christo opus est virtutis perfectae et religioni et perfectioni consonans christianae. Unde rationes et auctoritates, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod virtus consonat naturae, et natura semper appetit promoveri; dicendum, quod etsi secundum exteriorem faciem actus humilitatis, qui est vilificatio sui, dissonare videatur ab instinctu naturae, secundum veritatem tamen et intrinsecam rationem plurimum ipsi naturae consonat et quantum ad *originem* et quantum ad *conservationem*, quantum etiam ad *profectum.* Nam natura omnis ex eo, quod de *nihilo* est, defectum aliquem in se habet et defectivam se clamat. — Natura etiam *conservatur* in hoc, quod unitatem in suis principiis componentibus et etiam in partibus quantitativis servat pro viribus suis; in hoc etiam, quod expellit omne illud, quod dispersionem inducit, quantum possibile sibi[^p122-7]. — *Proficit* autem in hoc, quod appetit suscipere influentiam a natura superiore, cui se subiicit, ut ab illa possit compleri. Quoniam ergo humilitatis est suum defectum

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recognoscere; ad quandam parvitatem unitivam se ipsum redigere, spiritum inflationis et superbiae tanquam dispersivum a se repellere; influentiae supernae gratiae se subiicere et offerre: hinc est, quod ipsa secundum veritatem consonat actui et instinctui naturali. Unde ratio illa falsum assumit, cum dicit, humilitatem dissonare ab instinctu naturae et actum eius, qui est vilificare se. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quod illa definitio est virtutis *moralis*, quae radicatur in naturali dictamine. Hic autem actus humilitatis fundatur in fide Iesu Christi, qui est actus super rationem et excedit terminos naturae. Et ideo ratio illa non valet[^p123-1].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est ordo amoris; dicendum, quod *ordo amoris*, qui attenditur in virtute, principaliter, radicaliter et essentialiter hoc respicit, quod Deus praeferatur creaturae; et omnis ordo alius annexus est et quasi ordinans ad istum ordinem tanquam ad ordinem principalem. Quoniam ergo, ut dicit Augustinus[^p123-2], ad hoc, quod Creator in corde dulcescat, opportunum est, quod creatura vilescat; et quia creatura illa, quae maxime huic obviat ordini, est persona propria et privatum bonum: ideo ad perfectum virtutis ordinem conservandum hoc maxime consonat, ut quis vilificet se ipsum; quod facit, cum se propter Deum alteri subiicit et alium sibi praeponit, salva tamen dignitate ordinis ecclesiastici, quem vera humilitas non pervertit nec negligit nec postponit, sed potius conservat, dum interius in corde servatur humilitas, et exterius auctoritas in suo gradu perdurat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est habitus in medietate consistens; dicendum, quod illud verbum intelligitur non de medietate quantum ad quantitatem ex parte obiecti, sed quantum ad elongationem a diminutione et excessu habente rationem vitii, et sic est vilificatio sui, quae est opus virtutis mediae inter pusillanimitatem et arrogantiam. Unde licet videatur declinare ad extremum, secundum veritatem tamen tenet medium[^p123-3]. — *Praeterea*, sicut tactum est, vilificatio sui non tantum est actus virtutis informantis naturam, sed exemplum etiam reparantis; unde plus tenet rationem *medicativi* quam *completivi;* et quia morbus corrumpens genus humanum maxime est superbiae et arrogantiae fastus, et medicativum debet esse per contrarium[^p123-4]: ideo declinando ad alterum extremum reducit ad medium; sicut per simile videri potest in arctatione ieiunii et abstinentiae contra morbum lasciviae.

4. Ad illud, quod virtus omnis habet substramentum veritatis; dicendum, quod hoc est verum et in humilitate habet locum: quia ipsa veritas legis divinae dictat, quod unusquisque de se ipso magis quam de alio debet humiliora sentire. Unde sicut unusquisque magis sentit morbum proprium afflictivum naturaliter quam alienum, sic unusquisque certius et proximius et frequentius recogitare debet suum defectum, et ob hoc se debet reputare aliis viliorem, non quia certus sit, se esse talem, sed quia magis certus est de sua quam de aliena vanitate vel vilitate. Ideo, sicut dicitur in Glossa ad Philippenses secundo[^p123-5]: *In humilitate superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes*, «non hoc ita debemus aestimare, ut nos aestimare fingamus, sed vere aestimemus, posse esse aliquid occultum in alio, quo nobis superior sit, etiam si bonum nostrum, quo illo videmur superiores, non sit occultum». Et sic apparet, quod vilificatio sui non fundatur super falsum, sed super verum, secundum scilicet *experimentalem* cognitionem defectus proprii, quam quilibet homo respectu alterius quasi singulariter habet; sicut et quilibet iustus respectu alterius aliquam singularem excellentiam habet, ratione cuius in laude cuiuslibet Confessoris dicitur[^p123-6]: *Non est inventus similis illi.*

5. Ad illud: qui vilificat facturam; dicendum, quod factura, quia a Deo facta est de nihilo et vitiata est in homine primo originali peccato, habet in se aliquid *deiformitatis*[^p123-7] ratione eius *a quo* est, et aliquid *defectibilitatis* ratione eius *de quo* est, et aliquid *deformitatis* ratione vitii, *sub quo* est; et sicut ratione *deiformitatis* est honoranda, quia relucet in ea vestigium, imago et similitudo divina; sic ratione *defectibilitatis* parvipendi potest, ratione *deformitatis* vilis reputari, non ad contumeliam, sed ad honorem Dei, cum auferatur honor solum per deformitatem vitii et peccati.

6. Ad illud, quod homo est creatura nobilissima; dicendum, quod ratione, qua habet in se *deiformitatem* imaginis, ceteris *praeponitur;* sed ratione, qua habet *defectibilitatem* et nihilitatem, aliis *aequatur;* quia vero habet *deformitatem* vitiositatis, ceteris *postponitur;* unde impii in *inferno*[^p123-8] ratione peccati ordinatissime collocantur, et ratione huius

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competit peccatori vilificatio sui, quae, cum voluntaria est, tenet rationem virtutis et medicamenti.

7. Ad illud, quod vilificare alterum est peccatum; dicendum, quod *alterum* vilificare est se alteri praeponere, vilificare autem *se* est se alteri subiicere; et primum est superbiae, secundum est humilitatis et reverentiae; et ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

8. Ad illud, quod qui vult ab alio vilis reputari vult, quod ille peccet; dicendum, quod istud argumentum dupliciter deficit: primo, quia passio potest esse bona, licet actio sit mala, sicut patet in passione Christi, in qua meritum fuit ex parte Christi sustinentis, et demeritum ex parte crucifixoris[^p124-1]; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi aliquis velit pati aliquid, in quo alter peccat, quod propter hoc velit, alterum peccare. — Praeterea, cum quis vult vilis reputari, non hoc vult ratione naturae vel personae, sed ratione culpae contra naturam; et qui illam despicit vel odit, sive in se, sive in altero, meritorie hoc potest facere et absque peccato.

9. Ad illud, quod anima appetit naturaliter Deo configurari; dicendum, quod quaedam sunt *propria divinae excellentiae*, sicut divinum iudicium et vindicta, honor[^p124-2] etc.; et in talibus qui appetit configurari inordinato modo appetit, sicut lucifer fecit. Quaedam autem sunt, quae *communicat creaturae*, sicut bonitatem, veritatem et virtutem, quae maxime ostenditur, cum quis potest dominari sibi; et ideo non sequitur, quod vilificatio sui repugnet imagini.

10. Ad illud, quod tria sunt appetibilia, scilicet verum, bonum et arduum; dicendum, quod sicut virtus consistit circa *verum bonum*, et vitium circa *bonum apparens;* sic superbia *arduitatem* respicit *apparentem*, quam valde difficile est et arduum contemnere; humilitas autem est vilificatio sui, quae *veram* includit *arduitatem*, licet repugnet *apparenti.* — Praeterea, nullus vere humilis se vilificat nisi propter hoc, quod vult aeternaliter exaltari.

11. 12. Ad illud, quod omnis virtus habet exemplar in Deo; dicendum, quod humilitas quantum ad hoc quod est completionis in ipsa, scilicet *non excedere metas suas*, exemplar habet in Deo; quantum ad hoc autem, quod respicit defectum et subiectionem ad alterum, non habet exemplar in Deo, qui nullum habet defectum, nullum habet superiorem. Ut tamen homo propter defectum exemplaris non negligeret humiliari, placuit Deo assumere *formam servi*[^p124-3] et in illa humiliari, contemni et vilificari, ut ceteri ex tanto exemplari inflammarentur ad vilificationem sui perfectam.

13. 14. Ad illud de humiliatione exteriori, quod est signum interioris; dicendum, quod humiliatio illa non est signum humilitatis iam acquisitae, sed voluntatis se exercendi ad acquirendam humilitatem; et hoc quidem debet esse et est in omni bono homine, qui religionem gerit in corde[^p124-4]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia per hoc non dicit homo nec iactat nec ostentat, se esse humilem, sed humilitatem se velle acquirere et habere.

15. Ad ultimo obieetum, quod turpis est omnis pars, quae non convenit etc.; dicendum, quod, ut dicit Augustinus[^p124-5], «si omnia essent aequalia, non essent omnia». Et ideo ordo, distinctio et multiformitas in professionibus et habitibus non deturpat, sed ornat ipsius Ecclesiae universum; unde sicut impugnator esset universitatis mundi qui nollet, has creaturas parvulas in universo esse; sic impugnator est universalis Ecclesiae, si quis de ipsa velit exstirpare habitus viles et abiectos.

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### Disputed Questions on Evangelical Perfection

Wishing[^p117-1] to investigate some things concerning evangelical perfection, we must take the first beginning of our inquiry from humility.

And first let us inquire about it as about the root of all perfection.

Second, about poverty.

Third, about continence.

Fourth, about obedience.

### Question I. *On humility as to its act, namely whether it belongs to Christian perfection to make oneself vile for Christ.*

And since a habit is known through its acts[^p117-2], therefore we must inquire about humility as to its act. The question therefore is whether it belongs to Christian perfection to make oneself vile for Christ. And that it does, is shown:

1. First *by the authority of Christ himself*, who says in Matthew, chapter 18[^p117-3]: *Unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven;* but to make oneself little is nothing other than to grow vile to oneself and to wish to be reputed vile by others: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Matthew, chapter 20[^p117-4]: *He that will be first among you shall be your servant;* but to make oneself the servant of others is to make oneself vile with the very greatest making-vile: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Luke, chapter 17[^p117-5]: *When you shall have done all things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants;* but whoever rightly says something wishes to be believed, and believes that what he says is true: therefore, for someone to be a perfect disciple of Christ, it is necessary that he repute himself vile and that he wish to be reputed such by others.

4. Likewise, Luke, chapter 22[^p117-6]: *He that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger, and he that is the leader, as he that serveth;* but if the least were to make himself as the greatest, it would be the height of ambition and elation: therefore conversely, when the greater becomes lesser and the leader as one who serves, it will be the height of his abjection; and this ought to be done according to the evangelical teaching: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, John, chapter 13[^p117-7]: *You call me Master and Lord* etc., up to: *to wash feet;* from this authority it is gathered by reasoning that the disciple of Christ, by reason of the Master, ought to bow himself down even to the uttermost kind of humiliation and abjection.

6. Likewise, Philippians, chapter 2[^p117-8]: *Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus, who being in the form* etc.; but to empty oneself is nothing other than to make oneself vile: if therefore we ought to imitate Christ in

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this, the emptying of oneself and the making of oneself vile befits evangelical perfection.

7. Likewise, on that word Bernard says in the sermon on the Nativity of the Lord[^p118-1]: «What necessity was there that the God of majesty should so empty himself, so humble himself, so shorten himself, unless that you should do likewise? Already he cries out by example what he is about to preach by word». And a little after: «It is a shamelessness not to be borne that, where majesty has emptied itself, a little worm should be puffed up and swell». If therefore in such an emptying we ought to imitate Christ, it remains that to be made vile pertains to the perfection of virtue.

8. In the second book of Kings, chapter 6[^p118-2], on that text: *Michol, the daughter of Saul, looking, saw king David leaping, and she despised him in her heart;* Gregory says: «Behold, he whom the Lord preferred singularly to the rest, by making himself equal to the least under the Lord and by displaying abject things, despises himself. The power of the kingdom is not called back to memory; he does not fear to grow vile in the eyes of his subjects by dancing; what is thought by others of these deeds, I do not know; I, for my part, am more amazed at David dancing than fighting; by fighting he conquered the enemy, by dancing before the Lord he conquered himself». If therefore to conquer oneself is a work of perfect virtue; and this is done in the making of oneself vile: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, a little after in the same place[^p118-3]: *I will play, and I will become viler* etc.; on which Gregory says: «As if he were saying openly: I seek to grow vile before men, because I seek to keep myself free-born before God through humility». If therefore to be free-born before God is nothing other than to be perfect; and the making of oneself vile makes one free-born before God: therefore it is an act of perfect virtue.

10. Likewise, Jonas, chapter 3[^p118-4], on that text: *Let men and beasts be covered with sackcloth;* the Gloss: «Behold, the king of Ninive rises from his throne, exchanges purple for sackcloth, ointments for mud, clean things for filth»; but this is in the highest degree to make oneself vile, not only inwardly but also outwardly, and by this God, who was angry, was appeased: therefore the making of oneself vile is a work most acceptable to God.

11. Likewise, Augustine, *On True Religion*[^p118-5]: «All the things which, desiring to have them, we were not rightly avoiding, Christ made vile by going without them; for no sin can be committed except while those things are sought which he despised, or by fleeing those things which he endured»; but Christ endured being made vile, not compelled but by will, and refused honours: if therefore we wish to be made vile for him, let us be conformed to him in the discipline of morals.

12. Likewise, Gregory in the first book of the *Dialogues*[^p118-6] speaks thus: «In the praises of Constantius it must be weighed how great his humility was within himself, who loved the more the rustic who despised him; for what each one secretly is within himself, an insult inflicted proves. For just as the proud rejoice in honours, so the humble for the most part rejoice in being despised; and when they see themselves vile in the eyes of others too, they are glad for this reason, that they understand the judgment to be confirmed by this which they themselves also held of themselves within themselves». From this authority it is manifestly gathered that one is not truly humble unless he is vile in his own eyes and wishes to be so in the eyes of others.

13. Likewise, Bernard on the Canticles, the sixteenth homily[^p118-7]: «The truly humble man wishes to be reputed vile, not to be proclaimed humble»; but humility is not virtuous unless it is true humility: therefore if true humility cannot be without the voluntary making of oneself vile, by equal reason neither can virtuous humility.

14. This same thing is shown *by reason*. As pride stands to loftiness, so humility stands to vileness; but there is never pride without there being with it an appetite for loftiness[^p118-8]: therefore there is never true humility without an appetite for vileness.

15. Likewise, as wantonness stands to austerity, so pride stands to vileness; but wantonness is not rooted out of us except by the rigour of austerity: therefore neither is pride, except by the vileness of abjection[^p118-9]: therefore the making of oneself vile is an act that extinguishes pride, and on this account an act of perfect virtue.

16. Likewise, no one can be justified from original guilt unless he subjects himself to the Sacraments, which are sensible signs; but to subject oneself to a

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sensible sign cannot be without great abjection[^p119-1]; but more is required for removing actual sin: therefore, for someone to be justified, it is required not only that he be humbled inwardly, but also that he be humbled outwardly.

17. Likewise, the despiser of God is worthy of the highest reproach and contempt; but the sinner is a despiser of God, therefore he is to be despised in the highest degree: therefore whoever despises himself as a sinner does what he ought and judges himself justly[^p119-2]. But this pertains to perfect virtue: therefore etc.

18. Likewise, there are two things in sin, namely lust and contempt of God[^p119-3]; but a man cannot be justified from a sin in which there was lust unless the sorrow of compunction be present: therefore by equal reason he can be justified neither from pride nor from contempt of God except through contempt and the making vile of himself.

19. Likewise, the city of God stands opposite to the city of Babylon; but the city of Babylon begins from love of self and reaches even to contempt of God: therefore, on the contrary, the city of God begins from contempt of self and reaches even to the love of God[^p119-4]. If therefore to despise oneself and to make oneself vile pertains to the founding of the divine city: therefore it is a work of perfect virtue.

20. Likewise, no one walks rightly along the way of virtue except one who pays the honour due to God; but whoever makes himself vile on account of God is the one who honours God: therefore etc. The *major* is manifest of itself; the *minor* is proved by what is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter 3[^p119-5]: *Great is the power of God alone, and he is honoured by the humble;* and Baruch, chapter 2: *The soul that is sorrowful for the greatness of evil, and goeth bowed down and feeble, and the eyes that fail, and the hungry soul give glory and justice to thee, O Lord.*

21. Likewise, the more someone is conformed to the exemplar of the virtues, the more perfect he is; but Christ on the cross is the exemplar of perfect virtue, where he was in the highest abjection[^p119-6]: therefore each one is the more perfect, the more he approaches it.

22. Likewise, no virtue is in the true perfection of virtue unless it approves each thing according as it is to be approved; but, as is said in the Psalm[^p119-7], *all things are vanity, every man living:* therefore no one is of perfect virtue unless he reputes himself vain and useless, and wishes to be reputed such by anyone whatever.

23. Likewise, no virtue is perfect unless, when it can, it goes out into outward work[^p119-8]; but the outward work corresponding to inward abjection is the outward making of oneself vile: therefore no one has in himself the virtue of perfect humility unless he wishes to show himself outwardly vile and abject, when place and time offer themselves.

24. Likewise, the virtue of perfect humility reforms what the vice of pride deformed; but pride disorders cognition through presumption, affection through arrogance, speech through boasting, bearing through ostentation and insolence: therefore no one has perfect humility unless he has the contraries of these in thought, affection, speech and bearing.

25. Likewise, perfect virtue removes one far[^p119-9] not only from vices, but also from the kindlings of vices; but the display of inward things and outward honouring are kindlings of pride: therefore perfect humility removes one far from these. But to be removed far from honouring is to approach vileness and ignominy: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ 1.: «Virtue is a habit of the mind in the manner of nature, in accord with reason[^p119-10]»; but nature naturally desires to be advanced and not to be cast down: therefore the making of oneself vile is against the dictate of nature: therefore it is not a work of perfect humility.

2. Likewise, «virtue is the order of love», as is said in the book *On the Morals of the Church*[^p119-11]; but when the greater subjects himself to an inferior, there is disorder and a perversion of order: therefore it is not a work of virtue.

3. Likewise, virtue is a thing consisting in the mean[^p119-12]; but whoever makes himself vile approaches an extreme: therefore he withdraws from the act of perfect virtue.

4. Likewise, every virtue has the underlay of truth; for where truth is lacking, there virtue cannot

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be; but a just and perfect man, reputing himself viler than others, while he thinks some such thing, judges falsely: therefore if such a thought is repugnant to truth[^p120-1], it is necessary that it be repugnant to virtue.

5. Likewise, whoever makes the handiwork vile makes the maker vile; but man is the handiwork of God[^p120-2]: therefore whoever makes himself vile makes God vile. But to make God vile is not a matter of perfect virtue, but a fault: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, among the other creatures man is the most noble creature, therefore most to be honoured and prized in the whole universe of things: therefore whoever makes himself vile disorders the universe.

7. Likewise, to make another vile is a sin; but a man is bound to love himself as also his neighbour[^p120-3]: therefore whoever renders himself contemptible acts against the order of charity.

8. Likewise, when another thinks you vile, he sins: therefore if you wish that another repute you vile, you wish that another sin; but this is a disordered will: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, the soul is the image of God, therefore it is naturally apt to be conformed to him[^p120-4]; but God is supremely good, wise and exalted: therefore the appetite for excellence befits the reforming of the image of our mind: therefore, on the contrary, the appetite for making oneself vile is not a work of virtue.

10. Likewise, there are three things desirable, namely the good, the true and the arduous[^p120-5]; but no virtue or appetite of virtue consists in desiring the contrary of the true or of the good: therefore neither in desiring the contrary of the arduous. But such is the making vile: wherefore etc.

11. Likewise, every virtue and act of virtue has an exemplar in God[^p120-6]; but the making of oneself vile has no exemplar in God, because God in no way makes himself vile.

12. Likewise, every virtue renders a man conformed to the state of glory, because «it is the disposition of the perfect to the best[^p120-7]»; but the making of oneself vile is directly repugnant to glorification: therefore etc.

13. Likewise, it is objected against *outward* humiliation: because it is a sign of the inward; but it is pride to confess in word that one is humble; therefore it is pride to show this very thing by a sign.

14. Likewise, you who put forward humility in a sign either repute *yourself humble*, or *not;* if *so:* then you attribute to yourself a noble virtue, therefore you are proud; if *not:* then, since your habit outwardly shows you humble, you bear one thing in your mind and show another in the sign: therefore you are a hypocrite[^p120-8].

15. Likewise, every part is unseemly which does not fit its whole; but these singularities of habits seem to disfigure the good ecclesiastical state: therefore it does not pertain to perfect virtue or to Christian perfection.

> **Conclusio.** *The foundation of all Christian perfection is humility, whose act is the inward and outward making vile of one's own self.*

Sᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏ: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the sum of all Christian perfection consists in humility, whose act is the *outward* and *inward* making vile of oneself. For the sum of all Christian perfection turns about three things, namely about *grace*, *justice* and *wisdom*, according to which three Christ is said to be *the way, the truth and the life*[^p120-9]. For the *gift of grace* affords the way to the *truth of justice*, in which consists the exercise of action; the *truth of justice* leads through to the *taste of wisdom*, in which consists the solace of contemplation; and when these have been perfectly attained, one ascends to the summit of evangelical perfection, which Christ Jesus taught by word and example, who professed himself especially the master of humility, Matthew, chapter 11[^p120-10]: *Learn of me* etc. For humility is *the door of wisdom, the foundation of justice and the dwelling-place of grace.*

It is *the door of wisdom:* because wisdom is «the cognition of the highest and first causes[^p120-11]», not only by the mode of speculative and intellectual cognition, but also of savouring and experiential cognition. Since, therefore, all things whatsoever that have been made flow from one principle and have been produced from nothing; he is truly wise who truthfully recognises his own and others' nothingness and the loftiness of the first principle. Whence Augustine prays in the second book of the *Soliloquies*[^p120-12]: «May I know thee, may I know myself». But no one arrives at a full knowledge of God except through a true

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and right knowledge of himself; nor does he rightly know himself who does not attend to his own nothingness; *for if any man think himself to be something, whereas he is nothing, he deceiveth himself*, as the Apostle says in the last chapter to the Galatians[^p121-1]; but to know one's own nothingness, this is to humble oneself: humility, therefore, is *the door of wisdom.* — And this is what the Wise Man says in Proverbs, chapter 11: *Where humility is, there also is wisdom;* this is also what Wisdom herself says in Matthew, chapter 11: *Thou hast revealed them to little ones* etc.; on which Bernard, *On the Degrees of Humility*[^p121-2]: «It is apparent that the truth which is hidden from the proud is revealed to the humble. Now humility is the virtue by which a man, through true knowledge of himself, grows vile to himself; and this befits those who, having disposed ascents in their heart, advance from degree to degree, until they arrive at the summit of humility, on which, set as on Sion, they look out upon the truth». And a little after: «He who commanded humility leads through to truth»; whence also the ladder of Jacob, «what else does it intimate to us, but that the cognition of truth consists in the summit of humility»? And a little after: «Good is the way of humility, by which truth is found, charity is acquired, the generations of wisdom are shared».

It is also *the foundation of justice.* For it belongs to justice «to render to each one what is his own[^p121-3]», to God as to oneself as to one's neighbour. Now to God is owed principally honour and reverence; and humility especially disposes one to render this, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 3[^p121-4]: *How great is the power of God alone, and he is honoured by the humble.* Since, therefore, the beginning of all justice is divine worship and honour, and this is shown to God by the humble; hence it is that the root and foundation of all justice is humility. — Whence on that text of Matthew, chapter 3[^p121-5]: *So it becometh us to fulfil;* the Gloss: «that is, all humility, which is all justice». And Gregory in a Homily[^p121-6]: «In the other things that you do, hold humility as the root of good working. For even if any works whatever be present, they are nothing unless they are seasoned with humility; for a marvellous action joined with elation does not lift up, but weighs down. For whoever gathers virtues without humility carries dust into the wind; and whence he is seen to see, thence he is the worse blinded». The same: «The whole of what you build grows into a ruin, if before the mass of the fabric you do not provide the foundations of humility».

It is nonetheless *the dwelling-place of grace.* For grace makes a man pleasing to God; and he is pleasing to God who recognises the gift of the divine deigning and condescension; but no one recognises this except one who looks carefully upon his own unworthiness; and such a one is truly humble: and hence it is that the grace of the Holy Spirit rests upon the humble alone. — Whence Isaias, the last chapter[^p121-7]: *Upon whom shall my Spirit rest, but upon the humble* etc.; Augustine, in the third book *On Christian Doctrine*: «To this end the sins of great men have been written, that that apostolic sentence may everywhere be feared: *Wherefore he that seemeth to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.* For there is no page of the holy books on which it does not sound: *God resisteth the proud, but to the humble he giveth grace*». — Since, therefore, humility is the dwelling-place of grace, hence it is that in it consists *the sum of all evangelical perfection.* And this is what Augustine says to Dioscorus[^p121-8]: «You will find no other way for grasping and obtaining the truth than that which was found by him who, as God, sees the infirmity of our steps. Now the first is humility, the second humility, the third humility; and as often as you should ask, I would say this, not that there are no other precepts that might be spoken of, but unless humility have gone before, accompanied and followed all things whatever that we do well, and been set before us for us to gaze upon, and set beside us for us to cling to, and set upon us to restrain us; pride wrests the whole from our hand even as we rejoice over some good deed. Therefore, if you should ask, and as often as you should ask, concerning the precepts

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of the Christian religion, it would please me to answer nothing other than humility; and if perhaps I were to say other things, necessity would compel».

Now the act of such humility is not only an inward, but also an outward humiliation and making vile of oneself. And the reason for this is: because, since *being* is twofold, namely of nature and of grace, nothingness is twofold: in one way by opposition to *the being of nature*, in another way by opposition to *the being of morals and of grace.* And according to this, humility, which is through consideration, or which is considerative of our nothingness, is twofold: one can indeed be called the humility of *truth*, which arises from the consideration of nothingness by opposition to *the being of nature;* and this is found not only in men but also in Angels, not only in wayfarers but also in the Blessed. The other can be called the humility of *severity*, which arises from the consideration of *guilt;* by which, when a man considers that he has been sunk down through elation, by a certain severe censure through humility he rises up against himself, making himself vile not only inwardly in his own eyes, but also outwardly in the eyes of others. Hence the making of oneself vile, not only outward but also inward, is an act of the humility-virtue[^p122-1], and none the less consonant with evangelical perfection, if in it there be attended to its due *origin* and *mode* and *fruit.* — For *in its origin* outward humiliation ought to proceed from inward humility according to the dictate and rule of the divine gift; and this can be done according to the law of the divine *precept*, or of the divine *good pleasure*, or of the divine *counsel.* The *precept* regards all universally; the *good pleasure* regards those to whom the divine will is specially inspired; but the *counsel* those who ascend to the summit of perfection. And of these three it is said to the Romans[^p122-2], *that you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God.* He therefore rightly humbles himself who conforms himself to the divine will according to any one of the three modes, according to which the spirit of true humility inclines diverse persons to diverse kinds of humiliations.

Now the *mode* of outward humiliation is that there be kept in it *manliness, truth* and *seemliness; manliness* against faintheartedness, which casts down the mind; *truth* against hypocrisy, which deceives men; *seemliness* against stolidity, which dishonours men and makes them play the fool[^p122-3].

And the *fruit* of this humiliation is that it avails for *acquiring* humility, for *exercising* it and for *perfecting* it. Whence on that text of John, chapter 13[^p122-4]: *You also ought to wash one another's feet;* the Gloss: «Whoever bows down to the feet, in him humility is stirred up in the heart; or if it is already in the heart, the affection of humility is confirmed». And Bernard in a certain letter to Ogerius[^p122-5]: «Humility, to which humiliation surely leads, is the foundation of the whole spiritual fabric; for humiliation is the way to humility, as patience to peace, as reading to knowledge. If you desire the virtue of humility, do not flee the way of humiliation; for if you cannot be humiliated, you will not be able to be advanced to humility». Now this humiliation he calls *the making vile of one's own self;* whence he also adds[^p122-6]: «*I will play, and I will become viler*, I will play, that is, that I may be mocked. A good play, at which Michol is angered and God delighted; a good play, which to men indeed offers a laughing-stock, but to Angels a spectacle; a good play, I say, in which we are made *a reproach to the rich and a contempt to the proud.* In this chaste and religious play he played who said: *We are made a spectacle to this world, and to Angels, and to men.* Let us too meanwhile play at this play, that we may be mocked and confounded and humbled, until he comes who *puts down the mighty and exalts the humble*, who may gladden us, exalt us and glorify us for ever». — From these things it is manifestly gathered that to humble oneself and to make oneself vile for Christ is a work of perfect virtue, and consonant both with religion and with Christian perfection. Hence the reasons and authorities which are brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that virtue is consonant with nature, and nature always desires to be advanced, it must be said that, although according to the outward face the act of humility, which is the making of oneself vile, seems to be dissonant from the instinct of nature, yet according to truth and its intrinsic reason it is in the highest degree consonant with nature itself, both as to *origin* and as to *conservation*, and also as to *advancement.* For every nature, by the fact that it is from *nothing*, has some defect in itself and proclaims itself defective. — Nature is also *conserved* in this, that it keeps unity in its composing principles and also in its quantitative parts as far as its powers allow; in this also, that it expels everything that induces dispersion, so far as is possible to it[^p122-7]. — And it *advances* in this, that it desires to receive influence from a superior nature, to which it subjects itself, so that it may be completed by it. Since, therefore, it belongs to humility to

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recognise its own defect; to bring itself back to a certain unitive littleness, to drive back from itself the spirit of inflation and of pride as something dispersive; to subject and offer itself to the influence of supernal grace: hence it is that according to truth it is consonant with natural act and instinct. Hence that argument assumes a falsehood when it says that humility and its act, which is to make oneself vile, are dissonant from the instinct of nature. — It could also be said otherwise, that that definition is of *moral* virtue, which is rooted in the natural dictate. But this act of humility is founded in the faith of Jesus Christ, which is an act above reason and exceeds the bounds of nature. And therefore that argument is not valid[^p123-1].

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is the order of love, it must be said that *the order of love* which is attended to in virtue regards principally, radically and essentially this, that God be preferred to the creature; and every other order is annexed and as it were ordering to this order as to the principal order. Since, therefore, as Augustine says[^p123-2], in order that the Creator may grow sweet in the heart, it is fitting that the creature grow vile; and since that creature which most of all opposes this order is one's own person and private good: therefore, for preserving the perfect order of virtue, this is most of all consonant, that one make oneself vile; which one does when on account of God one subjects oneself to another and puts another before oneself, saving, however, the dignity of the ecclesiastical order, which true humility does not pervert, nor neglect, nor set aside, but rather preserves, while inwardly in the heart humility is kept, and outwardly authority endures in its own degree.

3. To that which is objected, that virtue is a habit consisting in the mean, it must be said that that word is understood not of a mean as to quantity on the part of the object, but as to removal from the deficiency and the excess that have the character of vice; and thus is the making of oneself vile, which is the work of a virtue midway between faintheartedness and arrogance. Hence, although it seems to decline to an extreme, yet according to truth it holds the mean[^p123-3]. — *Moreover*, as has been touched on, the making of oneself vile is not only an act of virtue informing nature, but also an example of virtue repairing it; hence it holds more the character of the *medicinal* than of the *completive;* and because the disease corrupting the human race is most of all the haughtiness of pride and arrogance, and the medicinal ought to work through the contrary[^p123-4]: therefore by declining to the other extreme it brings back to the mean; as by a likeness can be seen in the constraint of fasting and abstinence against the disease of wantonness.

4. To that, that every virtue has the underlay of truth, it must be said that this is true and has place in humility: because the very truth of the divine law dictates that each one ought to think humbler things of himself than of another. Hence, as each one naturally feels his own afflicting disease more than another's, so each one ought to consider his own defect more certainly and more nearly and more frequently, and on this account ought to repute himself viler than others, not because he is certain that he is such, but because he is more certain of his own than of another's vanity or vileness. Therefore, as is said in the Gloss on Philippians, chapter 2[^p123-5]: *In humility, esteeming one another superior to themselves*, «we ought not so to esteem this as to pretend that we esteem it, but truly to esteem that there can be something hidden in another by which he is superior to us, even if our good, by which we seem superior to him, is not hidden». And thus it appears that the making of oneself vile is founded not upon the false but upon the true, namely according to the *experiential* cognition of one's own defect, which each man has as it were singularly with respect to another; just as also each just man has some singular excellence with respect to another, by reason of which it is said in the praise of every Confessor[^p123-6]: *There was not found the like to him.*

5. To that: whoever makes the handiwork vile, it must be said that the handiwork, because it was made by God from nothing and was vitiated in man by the first, original sin, has in itself something of *deiformity*[^p123-7] by reason of him *from whom* it is, and something of *defectibility* by reason of that *out of which* it is, and something of *deformity* by reason of the vice *under which* it is; and just as by reason of *deiformity* it is to be honoured, because there shines back in it the divine vestige, image and likeness; so by reason of *defectibility* it can be held of small account, and by reason of *deformity* be reputed vile, not to the insult but to the honour of God, since honour is taken away only through the deformity of vice and sin.

6. To that, that man is the most noble creature, it must be said that by reason of the fact that he has in himself the *deiformity* of the image, he is *set before* the others; but by reason of the fact that he has *defectibility* and nothingness, he is *made equal* to the others; but since he has the *deformity* of viciousness, he is *set after* the others; whence the impious are placed in *hell*[^p123-8] in the most ordered way by reason of sin, and by reason of this

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the making of oneself vile befits the sinner, which, when it is voluntary, holds the character of virtue and of medicine.

7. To that, that to make another vile is a sin, it must be said that to make *another* vile is to put oneself before another, but to make *oneself* vile is to subject oneself to another; and the first belongs to pride, the second to humility and reverence; and therefore it is not alike on the one side and on the other.

8. To that, that whoever wishes to be reputed vile by another wishes that the other sin, it must be said that this argument fails in two ways: first, because a passion can be good, although the action is evil, as is plain in the passion of Christ, in which there was merit on the part of Christ who endured, and demerit on the part of the crucifier[^p124-1]; and therefore it does not follow that, if someone wishes to suffer something in which another sins, he therefore wishes the other to sin. — Moreover, when someone wishes to be reputed vile, he does not wish this by reason of nature or of person, but by reason of the guilt that is against nature; and whoever despises or hates that, whether in himself or in another, can do this meritoriously and without sin.

9. To that, that the soul naturally desires to be conformed to God, it must be said that some things are *proper to the divine excellence*, such as divine judgment and vengeance, honour[^p124-2] etc.; and in such things whoever desires to be conformed desires in a disordered manner, as lucifer did. But there are some things which *he communicates to the creature*, such as goodness, truth and virtue, which is most of all shown when someone is able to be master of himself; and therefore it does not follow that the making of oneself vile is repugnant to the image.

10. To that, that there are three things desirable, namely the true, the good and the arduous, it must be said that, as virtue has to do with the *true good*, and vice with the *apparent good;* so pride regards an *apparent arduousness*, which it is very difficult and arduous to despise; but humility is the making of oneself vile, which includes a *true arduousness*, although it is repugnant to the *apparent.* — Moreover, no one who is truly humble makes himself vile except on account of this, that he wishes to be exalted eternally.

11. 12. To that, that every virtue has an exemplar in God, it must be said that humility, as to that which belongs to its completion, namely *not to exceed its own bounds*, has an exemplar in God; but as to that which regards defect and subjection to another, it has no exemplar in God, who has no defect and has no superior. Yet, so that man should not neglect to be humbled on account of the lack of an exemplar, it pleased God to take *the form of a servant*[^p124-3] and in it to be humbled, despised and made vile, so that the rest might be inflamed by so great an exemplar to the perfect making vile of themselves.

13. 14. To that concerning outward humiliation, that it is a sign of the inward, it must be said that that humiliation is not a sign of humility already acquired, but of a will to exercise oneself in acquiring humility; and this indeed ought to be and is in every good man who bears religion in his heart[^p124-4]. — And by this the answer is plain to the following objection, because by this a man does not say, nor boast, nor show off that he is humble, but that he wishes to acquire and to have humility.

15. To the last objection, that every part is unseemly which does not fit etc., it must be said that, as Augustine says[^p124-5], «if all things were equal, all things would not be». And therefore order, distinction and multiformity in professions and habits does not disfigure but adorns the universe of the Church itself; hence, just as he would be an assailant of the universe of the world who would not wish these little creatures to be in the universe; so he is an assailant of the universal Church, if anyone should wish to root out of it habits that are vile and abject.

---

la: Hanc quaestionem sumsimus ex codicibus E D I. Respectu cod. I notamus, quod in ipso plerumque scripta non sunt nisi *initia* locorum s. Scripturae; deinde quod non raro syllogismorum conclusiones omittit, substituens tantum *ergo etc.*, quod in solut. obiect. verba obiectionum non repetit, sed simpliciter dicit: *ad 1. dicendum;* demum, quod interdum etiam alia contrahere vel mutare solet. Unde fere constanter sequimur egregium et perantiquum codicem E, cui fere omnino convenit D, nisi quod hic plures librarii errores habeat.

en: We have taken this question from codices E, D, I. With respect to cod. I we note that in it for the most part only the *beginnings* of the passages of holy Scripture are written; next, that not rarely it omits the conclusions of syllogisms, substituting only *therefore etc.*; that in the solution of the objections it does not repeat the words of the objections, but simply says: *to 1. it must be said;* lastly, that at times it is also wont to contract or change other things. Hence we almost constantly follow the excellent and very ancient codex E, with which D agrees almost entirely, except that the latter has more copyists' errors.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.) et II. Ethic. c. 1. seq.

en: Compare Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text. 33 (c. 4), and II *Ethics*, c. 1 f.

la: Vers. 3. — Inferius pro *reputatum* I *reputari*.

en: Verse 3. — Below, for *reputatum* ("reputed"), I has *reputari* ("to be reputed").

la: Vers. 27.

en: Verse 27.

la: Vers. 10. — Finem arg. I sic exhibet: *quod velit vilem (vilis?) ab aliis reputari.*

en: Verse 10. — I gives the end of the argument thus: *quod velit vilem (vilis?) ab aliis reputari* ("that he wish vile [vile?] to be reputed by others").

la: Vers. 26.

en: Verse 26.

en: Verses 13 and 14.

la: Vers. 5. seqq.: Hoc enim sentite etc. — In fine arg. pro *si... debemus... evangelicae* I *cum... debeamus... christianae.*

en: Verse 5 ff.: For let this mind be in you etc. — At the end of the argument, for *si... debemus... evangelicae* ("if... we ought... evangelical"), I has *cum... debeamus... christianae* ("since... we ought... Christian").

la: Serm. 1. (de Fontibus Salvatoris) n. 1.

en: Sermon 1 (on the Fountains of the Saviour), n. 1.

la: Vers. 16: Michol, filia Saul, prospiciens per fenestram vidit etc. — Post *subsilientem* Vulgata addit: atque saltantem coram Domino. Verba Gregorii sunt in XXVII. Moral. c. 46. n. 77. Textus originalis, post *metuit* pluribus additis, subinde prosequitur: Quid de eius factis... pugnando quippe hostes subdidit, saltando autem coram Domino semetipsum vicit. — Codd. pro *Gregorius* perperam *Chrysostomus;* in ipso textu substituunt *contemnitur* pro *contemnit*, et *quae oculis* pro *non oculis*.

en: Verse 16: Michol, the daughter of Saul, looking out through a window, saw etc. — After *subsilientem* ("leaping") the Vulgate adds: and dancing before the Lord. Gregory's words are in XXVII *Morals*, c. 46, n. 77. The original text, after *metuit* ("fears"), with several things added, then continues: What of his deeds... for by fighting he subdued the enemies, but by dancing before the Lord he conquered himself. — The codices wrongly have *Chrysostomus* for *Gregorius;* in the text itself they substitute *contemnitur* ("is despised") for *contemnit* ("despises"), and *quae oculis* ("which to the eyes") for *non oculis* ("not in the eyes").

la: Vers. 22. (II. Reg. 6.): Et ludam etc. — Gregorii verba habentur loc. cit. in praeced. nota. — Pro *humilitatem* codd. *hilaritatem*.

en: Verse 22 (II Kings 6): And I will play etc. — Gregory's words are found at the place cited in the preceding note. — For *humilitatem* ("humility") the codices have *hilaritatem* ("cheerfulness").

la: Vers. 8: Et operiantur etc. — Glossa (*ordinaria* apud Lyranum) sumta est ex Hieron. in hunc loc., in eaque textus originalis substituit *munditias* pro *munda*. — Inferius respicitur Ion. 3, 10: Et vidit Deus opera eorum... et misertus est Deus super malitiam, quam locutus fuerat, ut faceret eis, et non fecit. — Vocibus *Deus iratus* I interserit *prius*.

en: Verse 8: And let them be covered etc. — The Gloss (the *ordinary* Gloss, in Lyra) is taken from Jerome on this place, and in it the original text substitutes *munditias* ("cleanliness") for *munda* ("clean things"). — Below, Jon. 3:10 is in view: And God saw their works... and God had mercy with regard to the evil which he had said that he would do to them, and he did it not. — Between the words *Deus iratus* ("God… angry") I inserts *prius* ("before").

la: Cap. 16. n. 31: Omnia, quae habere cupientes non recte vivebamus, carendo vilefecit [in ed. Maurin. in nota adiecta dicitur: «Ita in mss. At in editis, vilia fecit». D E legunt *Christo carendo vilescit* (vilescunt?)]. Omnia quae vitare cupientes a studio deviabamus veritatis, perpetiendo deiecit. Non enim... nisi aut dum... aut fugiuntur quae etc.

en: Chapter 16, n. 31: All the things by desiring to have which we were not living rightly, he made vile by going without [in the Maurist edition, in an appended note, it is said: «Thus in the manuscripts. But in the printed editions, *vilia fecit*». D E read *Christo carendo vilescit* ("grows vile to Christ by going without") (*vilescunt*, "grow vile"?)]. All the things by desiring to avoid which we were straying from the pursuit of truth, he cast down by enduring them. For not... except either while... or those things are fled which etc.

la: Cap. 5. Cum textu originali substituimus *aspiciunt* pro *ostendunt*, quod exhibent codd. Textus originalis pro *quia, per hoc iudicium* habet *quia hoc iudicium*.

en: Chapter 5. With the original text we have substituted *aspiciunt* ("they see") for *ostendunt* ("they show"), which the codices give. For *quia, per hoc iudicium* ("that by this the judgment") the original text has *quia hoc iudicium* ("that this judgment").

la: Sive Sermone 16. n. 10. — In D desideratur finis arg. *nisi... virtuosa*.

en: Or Sermon 16, n. 10. — In D the end of the argument, *nisi... virtuosa* ("unless... virtuous"), is lacking.

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18, ubi docet, quod «superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae».

en: Compare Augustine, XI *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 14, n. 18, where he teaches that «pride is the love of one's own excellence».

la: Vide Gaufrid., Declamation. ex S. Bernardi sermonibus (inter opera Bernard.), c. 36. seq. n. 42-44., qui ex his verbis Ps. 24, 18: *Vide humilitatem meam et laborem meum* elicit *duo latera* scalae ad caelum, quae sunt vilitas et asperitas (austeritas), quibus deinceps internae virtutis et gratiae gradus firmiter inserendae sunt. «Sane ubi sic stabilieris et firmaveris in corde tuo, asperitatem corporalis abstinentiae ac laboris amplecti et omni vilitate et extremitate esse contentus, bona sunt latera, securus iam insere gradus exercitii spiritualis etc.

en: See Geoffrey, *Declamations from the Sermons of St. Bernard* (among the works of Bernard), c. 36 f., n. 42–44, who from these words of Ps. 24:18, *See my humility and my labour*, draws out the *two sides* of the ladder to heaven, which are vileness and harshness (austerity), into which the rungs of inner virtue and grace are thereafter to be firmly fitted. «Truly, when you have so established and confirmed it in your heart to embrace the harshness of bodily abstinence and labour and to be content with all vileness and extremity, the sides are good; now fit in securely the rungs of spiritual exercise etc.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 5, et ibid. Commentar. p. I. q. 1. in corp. — D omittit *sensibilia*, et pro *sensibili* habet lacunam; E utroque loco habet lacunam.

en: Compare IV *Sentences*, the text of the Master, d. I, c. 5, and ibid., the Commentary, p. I, q. 1, in the body. — D omits *sensibilia* ("sensible"), and for *sensibili* ("sensible") has a gap; E has a gap in both places.

la: Quo sensu Bernard. Serm. 45. in Cantic. n. 2. docet, quod «in eo qui graviter peccavit, etsi amanda, non tamen *admiranda* humilitas». Cfr. ibid. Serm. 36. n. 5.

en: In which sense Bernard, Sermon 45 on the Canticles, n. 2, teaches that «in one who has sinned gravely humility is, though to be loved, yet not *to be admired*». Compare ibid., Sermon 36, n. 5.

la: Sive conversio ad creaturam et aversio a Deo; quae duo August., de Mendacio, c. 7. n. 10, nomine *libidinis* comprehendit dicens: Libido quoque ipsa recte definitur appetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponuntur. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 754, nota 9. et ibid. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2, nec non III. Sent. d. 38. dub. 2. — I prosequitur: *sed homo, in quo fuit libido, non potest iustificari a peccato, nisi adsit* etc.

en: That is, conversion to the creature and aversion from God; which two Augustine, *On Lying*, c. 7, n. 10, comprehends under the name of *lust*, saying: Lust itself also is rightly defined as the appetite of the mind by which any temporal things whatever are put before eternal goods. Compare tome II, p. 754, note 9, and ibid., d. 42, a. 3, q. 2, and also III *Sentences*, d. 38, dub. 2. — I continues: *but a man in whom there was lust cannot be justified from sin unless there be present* etc.

la: August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 28: Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet *amor sui* usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero *amor Dei* usque ad contemptum sui. Ibid. XVII. c. 16. n. 2: Civitas diaboli *Babylon*, quae confusio interpretatur... populus additus veris et carne et fide Israelitis civitas est Dei. Cfr. Apoc. 18, 2. seqq. — Inferius pro *spectat* I *pertinet*.

en: Augustine, XIV *On the City of God*, c. 28: Two loves, then, have made two cities, the earthly namely *love of self* even to contempt of God, the heavenly *love of God* even to contempt of self. Ibid. XVII, c. 16, n. 2: The city of the devil is *Babylon*, which is interpreted confusion... the people added to the true Israelites both in flesh and in faith is the city of God. Compare Apoc. 18:2 ff. — Below, for *spectat* ("pertains") I has *pertinet* ("belongs").

la: Vers. 21: Quoniam magna potentia Dei solius etc. — Seq. locus est Baruch 2, 18, ubi Vulgata *Domino* pro *Domine*.

en: Verse 21: For great is the power of God alone etc. — The following place is Baruch 2:18, where the Vulgate has *Domino* ("to the Lord") for *Domine* ("O Lord").

la: Cfr. August., Serm. 304. (alias 37. de Diversis) c. 3. seq. n. 3, ubi expendens haec verba Phil. 2, 6-8: *Qui cum in forma Dei... mortem autem crucis,* ait: Habemus tale humilitatis exemplum, superbiae medicamentum. Quid ergo intumescis, o homo? etc.

en: Compare Augustine, Sermon 304 (otherwise 37 *On Various Things*), c. 3 f., n. 3, where, weighing these words of Phil. 2:6–8, *Who being in the form of God... even the death of the cross,* he says: We have such an example of humility, a medicine for pride. Why then do you swell, O man? etc.

la: Psalm. 38, 6. — Subinde pro *ergo nullus est virtutis perfectae* I *ergo nemo perfectus est,* qui etiam pro *a quolibet* ponit *ab aliis*.

en: Psalm 38:6. — Next, for *ergo nullus est virtutis perfectae* ("therefore no one is of perfect virtue") I has *ergo nemo perfectus est* ("therefore no one is perfect"), and it also puts *ab aliis* ("by others") for *a quolibet* ("by anyone whatever").

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 4, tria ad virtutem requiruntur, scilicet scire, velle et impermutabiliter operari. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 924, nota 12.

en: According to Aristotle, II *Ethics*, c. 4, three things are required for virtue, namely to know, to will and to act unchangeably. Compare tome II, p. 924, note 12.

la: I *elongatur,* et subinde *apparitio exterior* pro *apparitio interiorum*.

en: I has *elongatur* ("is removed far"), and next *apparitio exterior* ("outward display") for *apparitio interiorum* ("display of inward things").

la: Ut dicit Cicero; cfr. supra pag. 53, nota 4. In fine legendum videtur *virtutis* pro *humilitatis*.

en: As Cicero says; compare above, p. 53, note 4. At the end it seems one should read *virtutis* ("of virtue") for *humilitatis* ("of humility").

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. Vide tom. II. pag. 672, nota 3. — I prosequitur: *sed cum maior subiicitur minori sive inferiori* etc.

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 25. See tome II, p. 672, note 3. — I continues: *but when the greater is subjected to the lesser or inferior* etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot. II. Ethic. c. 6; et tom. II. pag. 671. nota 9.

en: Compare Aristotle, II *Ethics*, c. 6; and tome II, p. 671, note 9.

la: August., de Natura et gratia contra Pelag. c. 34. n. 38, approbat dictum Pelagii, «ut in parte veritatis, non in parte falsitatis magis humilitas collocetur». Bernard., Epist. 201. n. 2: Nec humilitas praeter veritatem laudabilis.

en: Augustine, *On Nature and Grace against Pelagius*, c. 34, n. 38, approves the saying of Pelagius, «that humility should rather be placed on the side of truth, not on the side of falsehood». Bernard, Letter 201, n. 2: Nor is humility praiseworthy apart from truth.

la: Eph. 2, 10: Ipsius enim sumus factura etc.

en: Eph. 2:10: For we are his workmanship etc.

la: Cfr. Matth. 19, 19. et 22, 39. — Pro *sed homo* I *sed quilibet*.

en: Compare Matt. 19:19 and 22:39. — For *sed homo* ("but a man") I has *sed quilibet* ("but anyone").

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Inferius pro *appetitus vilificationis* I *appetere vilificationem*.

en: See II *Sentences*, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. — Below, for *appetitus vilificationis* ("the appetite for making vile") I has *appetere vilificationem* ("to desire making vile").

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 4. in corp.

en: Compare III *Sentences*, d. 26, a. 2, q. 4, in the body.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1.

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 36, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Haec virtutis definitio datur ab Aristot. VII. Phys. text. 17. (c. 3.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 671, nota 7.

en: This definition of virtue is given by Aristotle, VII *Physics*, text. 17 (c. 3). Compare tome II, p. 671, note 7.

la: Hieron., IV. Comment. in Isai. 9, 14. seqq.: Omnis hypocrita est aliud simulans et aliud agens; promittens castitatem et vivens luxuriose, praeferens paupertatem et replens marsupium. Ibid. VI. c. 16, 14: Si castum esse me simulo, et aliud est in conscientia mea; habeo non gloriam mercenarii, sed supplicia peccatoris. Et in comparatione duorum malorum levius malum est aperte peccare, quam simulare et fingere sanctitatem.

en: Jerome, IV *Commentary on Isaias*, 9:14 ff.: Every hypocrite is one who pretends one thing and does another; promising chastity and living luxuriously, displaying poverty and filling his purse. Ibid. VI, c. 16:14: If I pretend to be chaste, and there is something else in my conscience, I have not the glory of the hireling but the punishments of the sinner. And in the comparison of two evils it is a lighter evil to sin openly than to pretend and feign holiness.

la: Ioan. 14, 6: Ego sum via et veritas et vita. Cfr. Bernard., de Gradibus humilit. c. 1. seq. n. 1. seqq.

en: John 14:6: I am the way, and the truth, and the life. Compare Bernard, *On the Degrees of Humility*, c. 1 f., n. 1 ff.

la: Vers. 29.

en: Verse 29.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et III. text. 3. (II. c. 2.). Idem dicit VI. Ethic. c. 7, sapientiam esse «scientiam rerum praestantissimarum». Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Codd. non bene omittunt *Est ostium sapientiae*.

en: According to Aristotle, I *Metaphysics*, c. 1 ff., and III, text. 3 (II, c. 2). He says the same in VI *Ethics*, c. 7, that wisdom is «the science of the most excellent things». Compare III *Sentences*, d. 35, q. 1. — The codices not well omit *Est ostium sapientiae* ("It is the door of wisdom").

la: Cap. 1. n. 1. — Superius cum E posuimus *nihilitatem*, alii *vilitatem*. Inferius pro *qui... non attendit* I *nisi qui... attendit*.

en: Chapter 1, n. 1. — Above, with E, we have put *nihilitatem* ("nothingness"); the others have *vilitatem* ("vileness"). Below, for *qui... non attendit* ("who... does not attend") I has *nisi qui... attendit* ("unless one who... attends").

la: Vers. 3: Nam si quis existimat se aliquid etc. — Seq. locus est Prov. 11, 2: Ubi autem est humilitas etc.; tertius Matth. 11, 25.

en: Verse 3: For if any man think himself to be something etc. — The following place is Prov. 11:2: But where humility is etc.; the third, Matt. 11:25.

la: Cap. 1. n. 1. seq.: Et in hoc apparet... revelatur. Humilitatis vero talis potest esse definitio: humilitas est virtus, qua homo verissima sui agnitione sibi ipsi vilescit. Haec autem convenit his... in corde suo dispositis [Ps. 83, 6.], *de virtute in virtutem* [Ps. 83, 8.], id est de gradu... donec ad culmen humilitatis perveniant, in quo velut in Sion, id est in speculatione, positi veritatem prospiciant... Qui iussit humilitatem perducet ad veritatem. Ibid. c. 2. n. 3: Illud quoque, quod in scala illa, quae in typo humilitatis Iacob monstrata est, Dominus desuper innixus apparuit [Gen. 28, 12. seq.], quid nobis... humilitatis constituitur cognitio veritatis? Ibid. n. 5: Bona tamen via humilitatis, qua veritas inquiritur, caritas etc.

en: Chapter 1, n. 1 f.: And in this it is apparent... is revealed. Now of humility such a definition can be given: humility is the virtue by which a man, through the truest acknowledgment of himself, grows vile to himself. And this befits those... having disposed in their heart [Ps. 83:6], *from virtue to virtue* [Ps. 83:8], that is, from degree... until they arrive at the summit of humility, on which, set as on Sion, that is, in contemplation, they may look out upon the truth... He who commanded humility will lead through to truth. Ibid. c. 2, n. 3: That also, that on that ladder which was shown to Jacob as a figure of humility the Lord appeared leaning upon it from above [Gen. 28:12 f.], what to us... is the cognition of truth established of humility? Ibid. n. 5: Yet good is the way of humility, by which truth is sought, charity etc.

la: De hac definitione iustitiae cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 1. Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum in Matth. 5, 6: Iustitia est sua cuique tribuere, sibi et proximis et Deo.

en: On this definition of justice compare tome III, p. 728, note 1. The *ordinary* Gloss, in Strabo, on Matt. 5:6: Justice is to render to each his own, to oneself and to one's neighbours and to God.

la: Vers. 21: Quoniam magna etc.

en: Verse 21: For great etc.

la: Vers. 15: Sic enim decet etc. — Glossa est *ordinaria* apud Lyranum. Cfr. August., Serm. 292. (alias 23. de Sanctis) c. 4. n. 4; Bernard., Serm. in Octava Epiphan. n. 4.

en: Verse 15: For so it becometh etc. — The Gloss is the *ordinary* Gloss, in Lyra. Compare Augustine, Sermon 292 (otherwise 23 *On the Saints*), c. 4, n. 4; Bernard, Sermon on the Octave of the Epiphany, n. 4.

la: Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 7. n. 4. Textus originalis primam propos. *(In ceteris... tenete)* ut ultimam (post *excaecatur)* exhibet sic: Sed etsi quaelibet bona adsint... congregat, in ventum pulverem portat; et unde *aliquid ferre* cernitur, inde deterius caecatur. In *cunctis* ergo, quae agitis, fratres mei, radicem etc. — Codd. allegant *lib. XXVI.* vel *XXVII. Moralium,* sed perperam, etiam si referretur ad locum seq., quem Gregor. profert XXXIV. Moral. c. 23. n. 51; verba vide tom. IV. pag. 582, nota 7.

en: Book I of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 7, n. 4. The original text gives the first proposition *(In the other things... hold)* as the last (after *is blinded)*, thus: But even if any good things whatever be present... gathers, carries dust into the wind; and whence he is seen *to bear something*, thence he is the worse blinded. In *all* things, therefore, that you do, my brethren, the root etc. — The codices cite *book XXVI* or *XXVII of the Morals,* but wrongly, even if it were referred to the following place, which Gregory brings forward in XXXIV *Morals*, c. 23, n. 51; for the words see tome IV, p. 582, note 7.

la: Vers. 2: Ad quem autem respiciam, nisi ad pauperculum et contritum spiritu (Septuaginta interpretes: Et super quem respiciam nisi super humilem et quietum). I addit *et cap. undecimo* [v. 2.]: *Et requiescet super eum* etc. — Verba August. habentur III. de Doctr. christian. c. 23. n. 33. Primus locus Scripturae in hoc textu est I. Cor. 10, 12: Itaque qui se existimat stare etc.; secundus est Iac. 4, 6. et I. Petr. 5, 5. Pro *timenda* textus originalis *tremenda*. — Superius pro *Nam gratia* I *Nam humilitas*.

en: Verse 2: But to whom shall I have respect, but to him that is poor and little and of a contrite spirit (the Septuagint translators: And upon whom shall I look but upon the humble and quiet). I adds *and in chapter eleven* [v. 2]: *And shall rest upon him* etc. — Augustine's words are found in III *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 23, n. 33. The first place of Scripture in this text is I Cor. 10:12: Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand etc.; the second is Jas. 4:6 and I Pet. 5:5. For *timenda* ("to be feared") the original text has *tremenda* ("to be trembled at"). — Above, for *Nam gratia* ("For grace") I has *Nam humilitas* ("For humility").

la: Epist. 118. (alias 56.) c. 3. n. 22: Nec aliam... viam munias, quam quae munita est ab illo... et praecesserit et comitetur et consecuta fuerit etc. Post *superbia* textus originalis plura addit. Pro *quaecumque bene facimus* I *bona quae facimus,* et pro *bono facto* D E I contra textum originalem *beneficio*. In fine verborum textus originalis *dicere* pro *dicerem*.

en: Letter 118 (otherwise 56), c. 3, n. 22: Nor should you pave another way... than that which has been paved by him... and have gone before and accompany and have followed etc. After *superbia* ("pride") the original text adds more. For *quaecumque bene facimus* ("whatever we do well") I has *bona quae facimus* ("the good things that we do"), and for *bono facto* ("good deed") D E I, against the original text, have *beneficio* ("benefit"). At the end of the words the original text has *dicere* ("to say") for *dicerem* ("I would say").

la: I *Huiusmodi autem vilificatio tam exterior quam interior est actus humilitatis-virtutis.* Subinde I omittit *evangelicae*.

en: I has *Huiusmodi autem vilificatio tam exterior quam interior est actus humilitatis-virtutis* ("Now such making vile, outward as well as inward, is an act of the humility-virtue"). Next, I omits *evangelicae* ("evangelical").

la: Cap. 12, 2. — Superius pro *potest fieri* I *potest esse*.

en: Chapter 12:2. — Above, for *potest fieri* ("can be done") I has *potest esse* ("can be").

la: Secundum Du Cange, Glossarium etc., *stultizare* idem est ac *insanire, in furiam verti*.

en: According to Du Cange, *Glossarium* etc., *stultizare* is the same as *insanire, in furiam verti* ("to be mad, to be turned to frenzy").

la: Vers. 14. — Glossa est secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 58. n. 4: Cum enim ad pedes fratris inclinatur corpus, etiam in corde ipso vel excitatur, vel si iam inerat, confirmatur ipsius humilitatis affectus.

en: Verse 14. — The Gloss follows Augustine, *On the Gospel of John*, tract. 58, n. 4: For when the body is bowed down at the feet of a brother, in the heart itself too the affection of humility is either stirred up, or, if it was already there, confirmed.

la: Epist. 87. ad Ogerium [codd. nostri perperam *Rogerium*] canonicum regularem, n. 11: Putasne, parum hoc mihi conferat religionis emolumentum, cum humilitas, ad quam... totius sit spiritualis fabricae fundamentum? Siquidem... Nam si non pateris humiliari etc.

en: Letter 87, to Ogerius [our codices wrongly *Rogerius*], canon regular, n. 11: Do you think this confers little profit of religion on me, since humility, to which... is the foundation of the whole spiritual fabric? For indeed... For if you do not suffer yourself to be humiliated etc.

la: Ibid. n. 12. — Loci Scripturae sunt II. Reg. 6, 22 (cfr. supra fundam. 9.); Ps. 122, 4; I. Cor. 4, 9, ubi Vulgata omittit *huic;* Luc. 1, 52: Deposuit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles. — Textus originalis post *sed Angelis* addit *pulcherrimum* et post *despectio superbis* plures subiungit propositiones.

en: Ibid. n. 12. — The places of Scripture are II Kings 6:22 (compare above, fundamentum 9); Ps. 122:4; I Cor. 4:9, where the Vulgate omits *huic* ("this"); Luke 1:52: He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble. — The original text after *sed Angelis* ("but to Angels") adds *pulcherrimum* ("a most beautiful [spectacle]"), and after *despectio superbis* ("a contempt to the proud") joins on several more propositions.

la: Cfr. loci supra pag. 61, nota 4. ex Boethio allegati.

en: Compare the places from Boethius cited above, p. 61, note 4.

la: Vide supra Quaest. de mysterio Trin. q. 1. a. 2. ad 5.

en: See above, *Question on the Mystery of the Trinity*, q. 1, a. 2, reply to 5.

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 30. sermo 3. n. 8: Vilescat totum, quidquid praeter Deum est. Lib. Soliloq. animae ad Deum (inter opera August.), c. 22: Sed omnia mihi peto ut amarescant, ut tu solus dulcis appareas animae meae, qui es dulcedo inaestimabilis, per quam cuncta amara dulcorantur. De ipsa solut. cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. ad 1. — Inferius pro *persona propria* I *perfectio propria*.

en: *Expositions on the Psalms*, Ps. 30, sermon 3, n. 8: Let the whole grow vile, whatever is besides God. The *Book of the Soliloquies of the Soul to God* (among the works of Augustine), c. 22: But I ask that all things grow bitter to me, so that you alone may appear sweet to my soul, you who are the inestimable sweetness through which all bitter things are sweetened. On the solution itself compare III *Sentences*, d. 33, q. 2, reply to 1. — Below, for *persona propria* ("one's own person") I has *perfectio propria* ("one's own perfection").

en: See III *Sentences*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, reply to 2; d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, reply to 4; and IV *Sentences*, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, reply to 1.

la: Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 37, nota 4, ubi praeter Gregor. allata sunt verba Aristot. — Lib. II. Ethic. c. ult. tradens praecepta, quibus medium i. e. virtutem consequi possimus, Aristoteles in exemplum adducit eos «qui ligna distorta dirigunt», qui scil. ea, dum dirigere volunt, in partem oppositam torquent, quo facto ligna ad medium reducuntur. — Superius pro *genus humanum* I *naturam*.

en: Compare tome IV, p. 37, note 4, where besides Gregory the words of Aristotle are brought forward. — In book II of the *Ethics*, last chapter, handing down precepts by which we may attain the mean, that is, virtue, Aristotle brings forward as an example those «who straighten crooked timber», who namely, when they wish to straighten it, bend it to the opposite side, by which the timber is brought back to the middle. — Above, for *genus humanum* ("the human race") I has *naturam* ("nature").

la: Vers. 3. — Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum quaedam omittit; verbotenus apud Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum, et est sumta ex August., 83 Qq. q. 71. n. 5. — In principio solut. post *Ad illud quod* I legit *obiicitur de sustentamento*.

en: Verse 3. — The *ordinary* Gloss in Strabo omits some things; it stands word for word in Peter Lombard on this place, and is taken from Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 71, n. 5. — At the beginning of the solution, after *Ad illud quod* ("To that which"), I reads *obiicitur de sustentamento* ("is objected concerning the underlay").

la: Eccli. 44, 20. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 9. q. 8. in corp.

en: Ecclus. 44:20. Compare II *Sentences*, d. 9, q. 8, in the body.

la: Codd., ut ex subnexis colligitur, perperam *deformitatis*.

en: The codices, as is gathered from what follows, wrongly have *deformitatis* ("of deformity").

la: Id est in loco *infimo;* cfr. IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 1. et 2.

en: That is, in the *lowest* place; compare IV *Sentences*, d. 45, a. 1, q. 1 and 2.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et III. Sent. d. 20. dub. 3. seq. — Inferius pro *contra naturam* D *circa naturam*. August., Epist. 153. (alias 54.) c. 1. n. 3: In uno simul et culpam improbes et naturam approbes, ac propterea culpam iustius oderis, quod ea foedatur natura, quam diligis.

en: Compare II *Sentences*, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2, in the body, and III *Sentences*, d. 20, dub. 3 f. — Below, for *contra naturam* ("against nature") D has *circa naturam* ("about nature"). Augustine, Letter 153 (otherwise 54), c. 1, n. 3: In one and the same person you may at once disapprove the guilt and approve the nature, and on that account hate the guilt the more justly, because by it is befouled the nature which you love.

la: Rom. 12, 19: Mihi vindicta, ego retribuam, dicit Dominus [Eccli. 28, 1. seqq.]; Isai. 42, 8: Gloriam meam alteri non dabo; Malach. 1, 6: Ubi est honor meus?

en: Rom. 12:19: Revenge is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord [Ecclus. 28:1 ff.]; Isa. 42:8: I will not give my glory to another; Mal. 1:6: Where is my honour?

la: Phil. 2, 7. — Superius post *ad alterum* supplevimus *non habet exemplar in Deo,* exigente hoc contextu orationis.

en: Phil. 2:7. — Above, after *ad alterum* ("to another"), we have supplied *non habet exemplar in Deo* ("it has no exemplar in God"), the context of the sentence requiring this.

la: Bernard., Serm. 34. in Cantic. n. 3: Non humiliatis, sed *humilibus Deus dat gratiam* [Iac. 4, 6.]. Est autem humilis, qui humiliationem convertit in humilitatem, et ipse est qui dicit Deo: *Bonum mihi, quod humiliasti me* [Ps. 118, 71]. — Mox pro *ostentat* I *ostendit*.

en: Bernard, Sermon 34 on the Canticles, n. 3: Not to the humiliated, but *to the humble God gives grace* [Jas. 4:6]. And he is humble who turns humiliation into humility, and he it is who says to God: *It is good for me that thou hast humbled me* [Ps. 118:71]. — Presently, for *ostentat* ("shows off") I has *ostendit* ("shows").

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41: Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia; non enim essent multa rerum genera, quibus conficitur universitas, primas et secundas et deinceps usque ad ultimas ordinatas habens creaturas; et hoc est quod dicitur *omnia*. — Inferius pro *viles* I *humiles*.

en: Book of *83 Questions*, q. 41: Because all things would not be, if they were equal; for there would not be the many kinds of things of which the universe is made up, having creatures ordered first and second and so on down to the last; and this is what is meant by *all things*. — Below, for *viles* ("vile") I has *humiles* ("humble").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L26470–L27583**), with every heading, subtitle, italic, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-117..124.png`, 2571×3823). Body raw usable on pp. 117–120 and 124; **p. 121's and p. 123's body raw are badly degraded** (*liiiinilitas*, *(Iregorius*, *ascensionibus* shattered) and were re-read word for word on the plate; footers usable throughout, digits corrected below. **Italics come from the plate only** — the raw carries none. Fresh literal English translation. **Eight printed pages, 117–124; 69 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** p. 117 opens directly on the work's display heading `QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE` / `DE PERFECTIONE EVANGELICA` and an ornamental rule — **no half-title**, as the pilot fixed. Then the **proemium** in two short columns (*Volentes*¹ *circa evangelicam perfectionem…*, the four heads: humility as root, poverty, continence, obedience), which **folds into this chunk** under the frozen short-opener rule. ⭐ **The proemium IS ANCHORED** — p. 117 n. 1 is the work's textual note (*Hanc quaestionem sumsimus ex codicibus E D I…*: the edition follows codex **E** chiefly, with D and I) — the opposite of *mysterio*'s p. 45 proemium, as `bon-qmt-q8` reported. Then `QUAESTIO I.` full measure and its italic subtitle, **both unanchored** (read at ~1.6× on a full-width crop: nothing after `I.`, nothing after *Christo.*; the only mark is a centred speck below the subtitle) — **the fifth work running with no anchored division heading.** Then the quaestio's own opener *Et quoniam habitus cognoscitur per actus*² (anchored). Q. I is **undivided**. The body: **twenty-five arguments** that making oneself vile belongs to Christian perfection (marginale `Fundamenta.`; args 1–13 authorities, 14 *Hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione*, 15–25 reasons); a **`Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ 1.:` series of fifteen** (marginale `Ad oppositum.`), whose second run (13–15) is declared in-text, *Item, obiicitur contra humiliationem exteriorem*; **`CONCLUSIO.`** in-column, letter-spaced small caps with its italic sentence (rendered as the frozen `> **Conclusio.**` blockquote); a **`Sᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏ:`** — ⚠ **the print says *Solutio*, not *Respondeo*** (letter-spaced small caps, plate p. 120), kept as printed in both languages — in three movements (humility as *ostium sapientiae*, *fundamentum iustitiae*, *habitaculum gratiae*; then the twofold *nihilitas* and twofold humility, *veritatis* and *severitatis*; then *ortus*, *modus*, *fructus* of outward humiliation, closing on Bernard's *Ludam et vilior fiam* and the marginale `Epilogus.`); and **thirteen reply paragraphs for fifteen arguments** (`11. 12.` and `13. 14.` printed combined), which answer the **`Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` series** — checked from the replies' own lemmata, not assumed: reply 1 restates *virtus consonat naturae*, reply 4 *substramentum veritatis*, reply 15 *turpis est omnis pars*; the *Solutio* closes *rationes et auctoritates, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt*, conceding the opening series. ⚠ **p. 117 n. 1 itself warns that cod. I answers objections with a bare *ad 1. dicendum*** — which is why the replies' lemmata, not the numbers, were used to pair them.

### ⭐⭐ BOUNDARY 1 (p. 124) RE-DERIVED ON THE PLATE: FORWARDS IN THE BODY ONLY, split 5/0

p. 124 was read as a whole leaf and in bands. Replies 7–15 fill both columns to ~0.55 of the leaf, closing *…velit exstirpare habitus viles et abiectos.*; `QUAESTIO II.`, the italic *De paupertate.* and the two-line opener *Quaestio est de paupertate, et quaeruntur duo…* then stand **full measure below**, and belong to `bon-qpe-q2-a1`. **All five register entries are this chunk's, each paired with a body anchor:** n. 1 *crucifixoris*¹ (reply 8) · n. 2 *honor*² (reply 9) · n. 3 *servi*³ (reply 11.12) · n. 4 *corde*⁴ (reply 13.14) · n. 5 *Augustinus*⁵ (reply 15). The Q. II heading, subtitle and opener carry no mark with a seat — **five marks, five seats.** Ownership, position and column verified for all five. ▶ `q2-a1` inherits **body only** from p. 124 and **nothing from its register**.

### ⭐ *ch[r]istianae* — THE FLANKING-LETTER TEST: A FAILING IMPRESSION, RESTORED IN BRACKETS

The subtitle on p. 117 prints *ch istianae* with the *r* all but absent. **Settled by measurement, not by the index** (which spells the word in full) and not by the body opener (which prints *christianae* plainly two lines below). Per-4-px column minima across the word on rows 1605–1655: **the *h*'s right-hand stroke runs at min grey 86–102** against **17–40** for the *c*, the *h*'s stem, *istianae* and the neighbouring *scilicet* — **the flanking letter is lighter than the rest of its own line**, sloping off into the gap; and **inside the gap (x 1480–1487) there are traces at min 125** against clean inter-word paper at 194–236 — a ghost of the *r*, not bare paper. That is the ratified rule's **second branch** (the type was set; this copy failed to take it), so the letter is **restored in square brackets** in the Latin heading, `ch[r]istianae`, and the English gives the sense ("Christian"). ⚠ The frontmatter `title_la`, the H2 breadcrumb and the registry division label carry the word **plain** — the restoration is determinate and a bracket in a title field would travel into every index and link; the bracket, and this disclosure, stand where the plate is transcribed.

### ⭐⭐ *vilificare se ipsum* / *vilificatio sui* — THE WORKING RENDERING (carried to the shakedown gate)

**Chosen: *vilificare se* → "to make oneself vile"; *vilificatio sui* → "the making of oneself vile" (or "the making vile of oneself"); passive *vilificari* → "to be made vile"; *vilificare alterum* / *facturam* / *Deum* → "to make another / the handiwork / God vile".** Kept strictly apart from ***humiliare* → "to humble" / *humiliatio* → "humiliation"** (the reply to 13.14 and the whole *ortus–modus–fructus* movement turn on *humiliatio* as the way to *humilitas*, and Bernard's *Hanc autem humiliationem vocat sui ipsius vilificationem* equates the two only by naming — the English must let a reader see two words being equated). Reasons: (1) **modern "vilify" means to slander** — the one sense the Latin never has here, and argument 7 of the `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` (*vilificare alterum est peccatum*) would read as a prohibition of defamation; (2) **"make oneself vile" keeps the root audible across the whole family**, which the argument exploits: *vilis* → "vile", *vilior* → "viler", *vilescere* → "to grow vile", *vilitas* → "vileness", *Ludam et vilior fiam* → "I will play, and I will become viler" (the Douay-shaped rendering, adjusted to the Latin), so *vilitas abiectionis*, *appetitus vilitatis* and *vilificatio* stay visibly one family; (3) "to hold oneself cheap" was **rejected** because it names only the inward, self-estimating act, and the *Conclusio*'s point is that the act is **both** *interior et exterior* (dress, washing feet, David dancing); "self-abasement" was rejected because it collides with ***abiectio* → "abjection"**, which stands beside *vilificatio* in the same arguments (4, 5, 15, 16, 21, 23). Neighbouring terms fixed for the work: *abiectio* → abjection · *abiectus* → abject · *despectio* → being despised / (Ps. 122:4) contempt · *contemnere* / *contemptus* → despise / contempt · *exinanire se* / *exinanitio* → empty oneself / emptying · *parvificare* → make little · *parvipendere* → hold of small account. **A WORKING rendering, not a ruling**: the pilot's register table left it open for this chunk to settle; it goes to the shakedown gate at `q2-a1`'s close with the rest of the new register.

### ▶ RULINGS MET — STATED POSITIVELY

- **Ruling 5 MET ONCE, and the rendering is quoted:** p. 122 n. 6 `(cfr. supra fundam. 9.)` → ***"(compare above, fundamentum 9)"*** — an **internal** reference to this chunk's own argument 9 (*Ludam et vilior fiam*, II Reg. 6:22), which Bernard's letter quotes. No other `fundam.` in the 69 entries.
- ***intellect-*: one Latin site** (*cognitionis speculativae et intellectualis* → "speculative and intellectual cognition", an adjective); **zero bare "intellect"** in the English. *intelligunt* → "understand"; *Ad praedictorum intelligentiam* → "For the understanding of the foregoing" (house formula).
- **Ruling 2 UNREACHED: *lux*/*lumen* occur nowhere on pp. 117–124** (the only *luc-* string is *lucifer*, reply 9, printed lower-case and kept so). The Ps. 4:7 and Jas. 1:17 sites the pilot mapped lie in later chunks.
- ***pietas*: zero.** ***praeceptum* → "precept" / *consilium* → "counsel"**, with ***complacitum* → "good pleasure"**, at the *Solutio*'s threefold law (*divini praecepti, vel divini complaciti, vel divini consilii*), and *praecepta* → "precepts" in the Augustine quotation.
- ⛔ ***vaca-*: ZERO on a stem census over the Latin** — the open *vacare* question does not arise in Q. I. *contuit-*: zero.

### ⭐ PRINTING ANOMALIES — AS PRINTED, NOT COMPLETED

- **p. 124 reply 15 *Ad ultimo obieetum*** — at 5× the second of the two *e*-shaped letters carries a crossbar like the first, where a *c* has none; the raw independently gives `obieetum`. **An identifiable wrong sort (*e* for *c*) → transcribed as printed** (the `bon-qmt-q6-a1` rule); English "the last objection".
- **p. 120 *quaecumquae*** (Solutio, *omnia, quaecumquae facta sunt*) — a slip, as printed; the Augustine quotation on p. 121 prints *quaecumque* correctly.
- **Marginale p. 121 `Confirmator.`** — the third of p. 121's `Confirmatur.` glosses prints a closed *o* for the *u* at 5× (the first prints `Confirmatur.` cleanly; the raw reads `-ior` at the third, same ink). Listed as printed.
- **p. 124 n. 3 *non habet*** — the *b* has lost its bowl (a letter present minus a stroke) → **read plain**, per the `q4-a1` *sententia* precedent.
- **p. 123 n. 8 `q. 1. et 2.`** — an **ink smear** (ink added, the third defect class) lies across *q. 1.*; the digit is read through it (a bare upright with flag, no bowl) and the target confirms it (`IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 1.` = *De receptaculis animarum*, the note's *in loco infimo*).
- **p. 118 n. 9 `n. 42-44., qui`** — point and comma together, as printed; the quotation opened by « closes with *etc.* and **no »**, as printed.
- **p. 119 n. 12 `c. 6;`** — a semicolon at 2.2× (raw a comma); as read on the plate.
- **Specks, not transcribed:** p. 117 n. 1 a speck under *fere* (below the baseline, not a comma); p. 118 n. 7 a stroke over the *n* of *In D*; p. 120 n. 8 *noñ*; p. 119 n. 2 *dub:*; p. 121 *Sic decét*; p. 122 *cui sè subiicit*; p. 123 a tick before `Alia solutio.`
- **Raw marks with no seat (NOT anchors):** p. 119 arg. 23 *abiectioni*ʹ (twelve seats, twelve anchors without it); p. 121 *Idem*ʹ (n. 6 covers both Gregory loci; eight seats, eight anchors). The frozen rule: *a raw marker glyph is not evidence of an anchor.*

### ⭐ RAW-VS-PLATE DIGIT CORRECTIONS (each settled at ≥4× against a same-line control or by the target)

p. 117 n. 1 `ad 4.`→**`ad 1.`** (5×, against `(c. 4.)` in n. 2 — closed bowl vs bare upright) · p. 117 n. 2 `c. i.`→**`c. 1.`** · p. 118 n. 8 `c. I i.`→**`c. 14.`** (target: *De Gen. ad lit.* XI.14.18 is the *amor excellentiae propriae* definition) · p. 118 n. 9 `n. i-l-ii`→**`n. 42-44.`** (5×) · p. 119 n. 2 `Serm. 43.`→**`Serm. 45.`** (4×, flat-topped 5 beside a closed 4 — the 3/5 class) · p. 119 n. 3 `c< 7`→`c. 7` · p. 120 n. 11 `d. 3S`→**`d. 35.`** (target III *Sent.* d. 35 = the gift of wisdom, the note's subject) · p. 121 n. 5 `c. i. n. i`→**`c. 4. n. 4`** (5×) · p. 121 n. 7 `[v. Sl.]`→**`[v. 2.]`** (Isa. 11:2 *requiescet super eum*) · p. 123 n. 3 `d. 3i`→**`d. 34.`** · p. 123 n. 5 `n. 3`→**`n. 5`** (5×, against `83` on the same line) · p. 123 n. 6 `i4, 20`→**`44, 20`** (Ecclus. 44:20 *Non est inventus similis illi*, the body's own words).

### ⭐⭐ THE TARGETS — EVERY CITATION INTO A CHUNK WE HOLD WAS OPENED

- ⭐ **p. 119 n. 10 `supra pag. 53, nota 4`** → `bon-qmt-q1-a2` p. 53 n. 4: *Libr. II. Rhet. c. 54: Virtus est animi habitus, naturae modo, rationi consentaneus* — **the very definition `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` 1 quotes**, and that argument's body in `q1-a2` (*virtus consonat naturae*) is this chunk's objection.
- ⭐ **p. 123 n. 1 `Quaest. de mysterio Trin. q. 1. a. 2. ad 5.`** → `bon-qmt-q1-a2` reply `5. 6.`, *illud intelligitur de virtute politica* — exactly reply 1's *Alia solutio* (*illa definitio est virtutis moralis*). ⚠ **`build-citations.py` produces NO record for it** (under-capture: the `Quaest. de mysterio Trin.` form is not parsed) — for the gate, not edited.
- **p. 122 n. 7 `supra pag. 61, nota 4`** → `bon-qmt-q2-a1` p. 61 n. 4, Boethius *de Consol.* III pr. 11 and *de Unitate et uno* — reply 1's *natura conservatur… unitatem… servat*.
- **p. 119 n. 3 `ibid. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2`** → `bon-sent-II-d42-a3-q2` *Utrum peccatum habeat dividi per aversionem et conversionem* — the note's *conversio ad creaturam et aversio a Deo*, word for word. ⚠ The resolver returns it **unresolvable** (`ibid.` after a `tom. II. pag.` locus does not inherit the book) — a resolver class for the gate.
- **Vol I–IV targets, each on its note's subject:** II d. 16 a. 1 q. 1 *Utrum homo sit vere imago Dei* (Contra 9) · III d. 26 a. 2 q. 4 *Utrum spes sit in bonum sub ratione boni* (the *arduum*, Contra 10) · III d. 35 a. 1 q. 1 the gift of wisdom (Solutio's *sapientia*) · II d. 9 q. 8 *Utrum in eodem ordine Angelorum sit perfecta aequalitas* (reply 4's *singularem excellentiam*) · IV d. 45 a. 1 q. 1 *De receptaculis animarum* (reply 6's *inferno*) · II d. 36 a. 2 q. 2 *Utrum poena possit esse… sine culpa* (reply 8's passion/action) · III d. 20 dub. 3 (the crucifiers, reply 8).
- **Scripture fixed by the Vulgate wording:** Luke 17:10, 22:26; Matt. 18:3, 20:27, 11:29, 3:15; John 13:13–14, 14:6; Phil. 2:3, 2:5, 2:7; Ecclus. 3:21, 44:20; Bar. 2:18; Ps. 38:6, 24:18, 83:6/8, 118:71, 122:4; I Cor. 4:9, 10:12; Isa. 66:2, 11:2; Luke 1:52; Rom. 12:19.

### ▶ GUTTERS

117 **1164** *(default 1164 on 56 px; body rows 0.48–0.84 give band 1135–1192, rule 1160–1168 — the pilot's value confirmed)* · 118 **1378** *(default 1372/50 px; band 1348–1409 (62 px), centre rule 1379–1380 peak 517)* · 119 **1176** *(default sound, 61 px)* · 120 **1344** *(default 1344/56 px; band 1316–1372, rule 1339–1350)* · 121 **1185** *(default 1185/54 px; band 1157–1213, rule 1179–1192 peak 512)* · 122 **1366** *(default 1366/60 px; band 1336–1396)* · 123 **1153** *(default 1154/59 px; band 1124–1183, rule 1151–1160)* · 124 **1379** for Q. I's REGION *(the whole-leaf default gave 1389 on a **17 px** run — the Q. II heading stack below; rows 0.08–0.50 give band 1349–1409 (61 px), rule 1375–1380; skew screen's 331 px "drift" is the stacked region, as the tool warns)*. **The default was within 6 px on seven leaves and 10 px out on the shared leaf.**

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**Five gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** The head of every incoming register (pp. 118–124) was read before its first numeral; **every one opens numbered and indented at n. 1** — the page-crossing negative is established, not assumed.

- **p. 118 n. 5** — left block ends *…[in ed. Maurin. in nota adiecta*; right block opens **flush left** *dicitur: «Ita in mss.…*.
- **p. 120 n. 8** — left ends *…promittens castitatem*; right opens flush *et vivens luxuriose…*.
- **p. 121 n. 6** — left ends *Textus origi-*; right opens flush *nalis primam propos.* (the word joined, *originalis*). ⚠ The signature line `S. Bonav. — Tom. V.` under the left block and the gathering signature `16` under the right are **not apparatus**.
- **p. 122 n. 5** — left ends *…[codd. nostri perperam Rogerium]*; right opens flush *canonicum regularem…*.
- **p. 123 n. 4** — left ends *…tradens prae-*; right opens flush *cepta, quibus medium…* (joined, *praecepta*).

Ledger line: `bon-qpe-q1	p.118 n.5:gutter,p.120 n.8:gutter,p.121 n.6:gutter,p.122 n.5:gutter,p.123 n.4:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER

**p. 117** — `Fundamenta.`
**p. 118** — none
**p. 119** — `Ad oppositum.` (printed `Ad opposi-` / `tum.`)
**p. 120** — `Conclusio.` · `Perfectio est circa tria.` · `Humilitas continet tria.` · `De primo.`
**p. 121** — `Confirmatur.` · `De secundo.` · `Confirmator.` *(sic — see above)* · `De tertio.` · `Confirmatur.` · `Corollarium.`
**p. 122** — `De exteriore humiliatione.` (printed `humiliatio-` / `ne.`) · `Duplex nihil.` · `Duplex humilitas.` · `Tria attendenda.` · `De ortu.` · `Gradus 3 se humiliandi.` · `Modus requirit tria.` · `Fructus triplex.` · `Epilogus.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Vilificatio sui naturae consonat.` · `Ratio triplex notanda.`
**p. 123** — `Alia solutio.` · `De ordine amoris.` · `Notandum.` · `Ratio 1.` · `Ratio 2.` · `Humilis fundatur in veritate.` · `Notandum.` · `Tria in homine.` · `Triplex comparatio.`
**p. 124** — `Duplex defectus.` · `Distinctio.` · `Aliter.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.`

**Thirty-nine in all, none clipped** — checked on crops taken to the **full image width** on both edges (x = 0 on the rectos 117, 121, 123, where the left-column glosses stand ~15 px from the scan's dark edge band; x = 2571 on the versos). ⭐ **The solution-heavy split holds in a third QD work**: the forty arguments of the two series carry **two** glosses, one at the head of each; the *Conclusio*, *Solutio* and replies carry **thirty-seven**, and **p. 118 carries none at all**.

### ▶ PAGE MARKERS

**Both languages carry the same eight `<!-- page N -->` markers, 117–124, in the same order**, each at a word boundary: p. 118 after *si igitur Christum in* / *imitate Christ in*; p. 119 before *sensibili* (the page splitting *sen-* | *sibili*; the marker set before the split word) / before *sensible sign*; p. 120 after *ibi virtus esse non* / *virtue cannot*; p. 121 after *per veram notitiam sui* / *through a true*; p. 122 after *de praeceptis* / *concerning the precepts*; p. 123 before *recognoscere* (*reco-* | *gnoscere*) / before *recognise*; p. 124 after *et ratione huius* / *by reason of this*. **69 anchors in each language, same order, each defined once.** ⚠ The English carries chapter numerals the Latin spells out (*Matthaei decimo octavo* → "Matthew, chapter 18"), so the digit-multiset screen disagrees for that reason alone; the markers were compared directly.

### Translation choices

- ***Solutio* kept as the section label in both languages** (`Sᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏ:`), as printed; the frozen formula for *Respondeo* is not substituted. `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ 1.:` likewise as printed.
- ***humilitas veritatis* / *severitatis* → "the humility of truth / of severity"**; ***humilitatis-virtutis*** (Quaracchi's hyphen) → "the humility-virtue"; ***nihilitas* → "nothingness"**; ***ostium / fundamentum / habitaculum*** → "door / foundation / dwelling-place"; ***virilitas, veritas, honestas*** → "manliness, truth, seemliness"; ***stultizare*** → "play the fool" (the note glosses it *insanire*); ***deiformitas / defectibilitas / deformitas*** → "deiformity / defectibility / deformity"; ***substramentum veritatis*** → "the underlay of truth"; ***medicativum / completivum*** → "the medicinal / the completive"; ***ingenuus coram Deo*** → "free-born before God".
- **Scripture in the body** in the Douay register adjusted to Quaracchi's Latin where it differs (Luke 17:10 *omnia* → "all things", not Douay's "all these things"; Phil. 2:3 *superiores… arbitrantes* → "esteeming one another superior to themselves", because the Gloss argues from *superior*); **in the apparatus, Douay** where a verse is quoted as a verse.
- ***religio*** in reply 13.14 (*qui religionem gerit in corde*) → "religion", literally; ***habitus*** in Contra 14–15 and reply 15 → "habit" (dress), and in the opener → "habit" (disposition) — the same English word, as the Latin's own pun on it.

### Ledger

**69 entries**: p. 117 **8** · p. 118 **9** · p. 119 **12** · p. 120 **12** · p. 121 **8** · p. 122 **7** · p. 123 **8** · p. 124 **5** (all five this chunk's). **Zero `[?]` flags. Five gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** This chunk inherits **nothing** — it is the work's first — and forwards **body only**: `QUAESTIO II.`, *De paupertate.* and the opener on p. 124 go to `bon-qpe-q2-a1`, with **no register entry**.

### ⚠ CITATIONS — 74 RECORDS, ZERO QA FLAGS; NINE INBOUND LINES NOW RESOLVE HERE

`build-citations.py` returns **74 records from this chunk: 49 scripture (44 verse, 5 chapter-level body ordinals) · 25 crossref (20 `chunk`, 3 `page-multi`, 1 `work`, 1 `unresolvable`); ZERO dangling, ZERO QA lines.** Corpus QA stays at **201**. ⭐ **Nine inbound records that were `forward` now resolve to this chunk**, and each lands on its note's subject: `supra pag. 120, nota 11` (wisdom as *cognitio causarum altissimarum*) from `bon-brev-p1-c1`, `bon-hex-c5` (and its `ibid.`), `bon-red` (and its `ibid.`) and `bon-itin-scholion`'s `pag. 120`; `supra pag. 121, nota 3` (the definition of justice) from `bon-don-c1` and `bon-praec-c1`; `supra pag. 123, nota 4` (Aristotle's crooked timber and the mean) from `bon-brev-p4-c9`. **Resolver artefacts named for the work-close gate, none edited:**
- p. 119 nn. 1–2's `ibid.` (*ibid. Commentar.*, *ibid. Serm. 36*) are carried by **cross-note anaphora to p. 118 n. 9's Ps. 24:18** — wrong; the *mysterio* class, now in a fourth work.
- p. 118 n. 3's `loc. cit. in praeced. nota` (Gregory's *Moralia*) resolves to II Reg. 6 — wrong.
- p. 119 n. 3's `ibid. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2` is `unresolvable` though the target exists (above).
- p. 123 n. 1's `Quaest. de mysterio Trin. q. 1. a. 2.` produces **no record** (above).
- The work's display heading in the Latin body yields one `work:perfectione-evangelica` self-record under p. 117's n. 1 label — harmless, recorded so it is not re-found.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0