title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part I)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister in littera, quod *resistere malo non fecisset illi meritum, quia nihil erat in eo, quod ad malum impelleret.* Si enim hoc verum est, tunc, cum nullum fuisset in Adam impellens, nunquam meruisset in aliquo opere suo. — Item, Christus nullum habuit interius impellens ad malum, cum diabolo in tentatione restitit[^1], et in operibus suis nullum habuit retrahens a bono: ergo nihil meruit in sua tentatione nec in aliqua operatione; quod omnino nefarium est dicere. — Item, exemplum eius[^2] videtur esse malum, cum subiungit: *Sicut Angelis non fuit meritorium, quod steterunt;* hoc enim est

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contra veritatem et contra Augustinum, qui dicit in libro de Correptione et gratia[^3], quod « Angeli, qui, aliis cadentibus, remanserunt, huius mansionis debitam mercedem receperunt »: ergo videtur, quod stando meruerunt.

Ad hoc dici posset, quod est meritum dimissionis poenae sive satisfactorium, et est meritum vitae aeternae sive substantialis praemii. Ad primum requiritur poenalitas et difficultas, ad secundum vero sufficit sola caritas. Magister autem intelligit de merito secundum primam differentiam, non secundum aliam. — Sed quia illud meritum satisfactionis nunquam fuisset in Adam nec profectus in eo, si in statu innocentiae permansisset; praedicta responsio non videtur pertinere ad propositum.

Et propterea aliter videtur esse dicendum, quod est meritorium, quantum est de *genere operis,* et est meritorium ex *radice caritatis.* Meritorium ex genere operis dicitur, quod est opus virtutis de se; hoc autem est arduum et difficile[^4]. Alio modo dicitur meritorium omne opus, quodcumque sit, dum tamen ex *radice caritatis* procedat. Vult igitur Magister dicere, quod in resistendo tentationi Adae non fuisset meritum, si non habuisset gratiam, nec primo modo nec secundo. Si vero restitisset ex caritate, meritorium fuisset secundo modo, non primo. In nobis autem semper est meritorium, vel utroque modo, vel altero, propter difficultatem ad bonum et pronitatem ad malum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, quia procedunt de merito secundum differentiam secundam, videlicet de eo quod est meritorium ratione radicis[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *declinare a malo semper vitat poenam, sed non semper meretur palmam.* Aut enim declinat quis a malo ex caritate, aut non. Si non; similiter nec facere bonum extra caritatem meretur palmam, ergo non est differentia inter *declinare a malo* et *facere bonum.* Si sic; cum omne illud quod fit ex caritate, sit meritorium, patet etc. Si tu dicas, quod non meretur palmam ex *genere operis,* quia non est difficile; hoc non solvit, quia, licet non sit difficile homini in statu innocentiae, est tamen difficile in statu naturae lapsae: ergo semper meretur palmam. — Item declinare a malo est una pars[^6] iustitiae, sicut facere bonum: ergo sicut unum est meritorium, ita et reliquum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *declinare a malo* dupliciter dicitur, sicut *non velle malum:* uno modo privative — sicut dicitur dormiens non velle malum, quia non habet aliquam affectionem ad malum — alio modo contrarie, ut dicatur non velle malum, quia respuit et contraria affectione afficitur contra malum; sic etiam *declinare a malo* dupliciter dicitur. Et si dicatur contrarie, tunc est meritorium; si vero privative, vitat poenam, quia qui non peccat non punitur, non tamen meretur palmam, quia non est ibi aliquod opus meritorium; et primo modo est pars iustitiae, secundo modo non, quia non est opus.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas, qua malum eligitur, gratia desistente.* Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia, si hoc verum esset, tunc liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, semper consentiret peccato; quod plane falsum est. — Item, videtur, quod hoc non deberet poni in definitione liberi arbitrii, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^7], « peccat qui definit aliquid per peiora, et per ea ad quae non habet principaliter ordinari ». Si ergo liberum arbitrium de se, quantum est de prima conditione sua, non ordinatur ad malum, non debet definiri per electionem mali.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister definit hic liberum arbitrium non simpliciter, sed secundum statum naturae lapsae; et quia in statu naturae lapsae defectum habet et inclinationem ad malum: ideo non tantummodo definit per electionem boni, ad quam ordinatur mediante gratia, sed etiam per electionem mali, in quam cadit ex defectibilitate propria. Nec ponitur ibi electio mali tanquam finis, ad quem ordinatur, sed ut per hoc magis innotescat, qualiter ad finem proprium ordinatur; non enim ad illud pervenit nisi per gratiae adiutorium[^8]. — Et sic patet responsio ad utrumque obiectum.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what the Master says in the text, that *to resist evil would not have made it meritorious for him, because there was nothing in him which might impel toward evil.* For if this is true, then, since there would have been nothing impelling in Adam, he would never have merited in any work of his. — Likewise, Christ had nothing interiorly impelling toward evil, when he withstood the devil in the temptation[^1], and in his works he had nothing drawing back from the good: therefore he merited nothing in his temptation nor in any operation; which is altogether wicked to say. — Likewise, his example[^2] seems to be bad, when he adds: *As it was not meritorious for the Angels that they stood firm;* for this is

against the truth and against Augustine, who says in the book *On Rebuke and Grace*[^3], that « the Angels who, when the others fell, remained, received the due reward of this remaining »: therefore it seems that they merited by standing firm.

To this it could be said that there is a merit of the remission of punishment, that is, a satisfactory merit, and there is a merit of eternal life, that is, of the substantial reward. For the first, penalty and difficulty are required, but for the second charity alone suffices. The Master, however, understands of merit according to the first difference, not according to the other. — But since that merit of satisfaction would never have been in Adam, nor any advancement in him, if he had remained in the state of innocence; the aforesaid response does not seem to pertain to the matter at hand.

And therefore it seems it must be said otherwise, that a thing is meritorious as regards the *kind of work,* and a thing is meritorious from the *root of charity.* That is called meritorious from the kind of work which is in itself a work of virtue; and this is arduous and difficult[^4]. In another way every work is called meritorious, whatever it be, provided it proceeds from the *root of charity.* The Master therefore means to say that in resisting the temptation of Adam there would have been no merit, if he had not had grace, neither in the first way nor in the second. But if he had withstood it out of charity, it would have been meritorious in the second way, not in the first. In us, however, it is always meritorious, either in both ways or in one of them, on account of the difficulty toward the good and the proneness toward evil. — And by this the response to the objections is clear, since they proceed concerning merit according to the second difference, namely concerning that which is meritorious by reason of the root[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *to turn away from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the palm.* For either one turns away from evil out of charity, or not. If not; likewise neither does doing good apart from charity merit the palm, therefore there is no difference between *turning away from evil* and *doing good.* If so; since everything that is done out of charity is meritorious, it is clear, etc. If you say that it does not merit the palm from the *kind of work,* because it is not difficult; this does not resolve it, because, although it is not difficult for man in the state of innocence, it is nevertheless difficult in the state of fallen nature: therefore it always merits the palm. — Likewise, to turn away from evil is one part[^6] of justice, just as to do good: therefore, just as the one is meritorious, so also is the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to turn away from evil* is said in two ways, just as *not to will evil:* in one way privatively — as a sleeper is said not to will evil, because he has no affection toward evil — in another way contrarily, so that one is said not to will evil because he rejects it and is affected with a contrary affection against evil; thus also *to turn away from evil* is said in two ways. And if it be taken contrarily, then it is meritorious; but if privatively, it avoids punishment, because he who does not sin is not punished, yet he does not merit the palm, because there is no meritorious work there; and in the first way it is a part of justice, in the second way not, because it is not a work.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *But free choice is the faculty by which evil is chosen, when grace withdraws.* For it seems false to say so, because, if this were true, then free choice, deprived of grace, would always consent to sin; which is plainly false. — Likewise, it seems that this ought not to be placed in the definition of free choice, because, as the Philosopher says[^7], « he errs who defines something by worse things, and by those to which it is not principally ordered ». If therefore free choice of itself, as regards its first condition, is not ordered toward evil, it ought not to be defined by the choice of evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here defines free choice not simply, but according to the state of fallen nature; and because in the state of fallen nature it has a defect and an inclination toward evil: therefore he defines it not only by the choice of the good, to which it is ordered by the mediation of grace, but also by the choice of evil, into which it falls by its own defectibility. Nor is the choice of evil placed there as the end to which it is ordered, but so that through this it may be made more known how it is ordered to its proper end; for it does not attain to that except through the help of grace[^8]. — And thus the response to both objections is clear.

---

la: Matth. 4, 1. seqq.; Luc. 4, 1. seqq. — Mox post *nullum* cod. aa subiicit *malum.*

en: Matthew 4:1ff.; Luke 4:1ff. — Just after *nullum* codex aa adds *malum.*

la: Scilicet Magistri, hic in lit. c. 1. circa finem.

en: Namely, [the example] of the Master, here in the text, chapter 1, near the end.

la: Cap. 11. n. 32: *Angeli sancti, qui, cadentibus aliis per liberum arbitrium, per idem liberum arbitrium steterunt ipsi, et huius permansionis debitam mercedem recipere meruerunt.*

en: Chapter 11, n. 32: *The holy Angels, who, when the others fell through free choice, by that same free choice themselves stood firm, and merited to receive the due reward of this remaining.*

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3: *Circa id quod difficilius est, semper et ars et virtus versatur; quod enim bene fit, melius in eo est.* — Aliquanto superius edd., exc. 1, sicut et nonnulli codd., inter quos O aa, omittunt *quantum est.*

en: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 3: *Both art and virtue are always concerned with what is more difficult; for what is done well is better therein.* — Somewhat above, the editions, except the 1st, as also several codices, among which O aa, omit *quantum est.*

la: Eodem modo hoc dubium solvunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 2. a. 2. § 3. ad 4; B. Albert., hic a. 4. et S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 90. m. 3; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. 3. lit.

en: In the same way this doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 91, m. 2, a. 2, § 3, ad 4; Bl. Albert, here a. 4, and *Summa* p. II, tr. 14, q. 90, m. 3; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, here near the text; Giles of Rome, here dub. 3, in the text.

la: Scilicet pars integralis; nam cum iustitiae sit, unicuique ius suum tribuere, ut hoc integre praestetur, requiritur, quod et debitum tribuatur et nocivum arceatur ab altero. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 perperam: *ergo non semper meretur palmam.*

en: Namely, an integral part; for since it belongs to justice to render to each his own, in order that this may be rendered integrally, it is required that both what is owed be rendered and what is harmful be warded off from another. — Slightly above, very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4 wrongly read: *therefore it does not always merit the palm.*

la: Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): *Amplius [peccat], si non ad melius, sed ad peius assignavit, cum sint plura, ad quae dicitur quod definitur. Nam omnis disciplina et potestas optimi videtur esse.*

en: *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4): *Moreover [he errs], if he has assigned [the definition] not to the better but to the worse, since there are several things to which that which is defined is referred. For every discipline and power seems to be of the best.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 25. p. II. q. 3. et d. 28, a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius sola Vat. omittit *sed.*

en: Cf. below, d. 25, p. II, q. 3, and d. 28, a. 2, q. 3. — Slightly above, the Vatican edition alone omits *sed.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p57{1,2}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; p.573-L-0 read only to confirm the Pars II boundary), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 40048–40133. English is a fresh literal translation. This chunk replaces the auto-chunked skeleton, whose `line_start/line_end` (39995–40049) were mis-tagged onto the tail of a2-q4's *intellectus agens/possibilis* SCHOLION rather than the dubia proper.

**Verified DUB count = 3** (DUB. I, II, III). DUB. II was OCR-garbled (`Dui). II.`) and visually confirmed in the p.572-R PDF band. DUB. I spans pp. 571–572 (opens bottom of p.571 left col, continues top of p.572); DUB. II and DUB. III both sit on p.572.

**Page-split map (8 apparatus entries, renumbered continuously):**
- p.571 footers ¹–² → [^1]–[^2] (DUB. I: ¹ Matth./Luc. + cod. aa *malum* var. at "restitit"; ² Scilicet Magistri lit. ref at "exemplum eius").
- p.572 footers ¹–⁶ → [^3]–[^8]:
  - ¹→[^3] (Aug. de Correptione c.11 n.32 *Angeli sancti*), anchored DUB. I at "de Correptione et gratia".
  - ²→[^4] (Aristot. II Ethic. c.3 + *quantum est* var.), anchored DUB. I at "arduum et difficile".
  - ³→[^5] (Eodem modo... Alex. Hal./Albert/Thom./Petr.a Tar./Richard./Aegid. parallel-doctors roll), anchored at DUB. I close "ratione radicis" (OCR `³` marker position).
  - ⁴→[^6] (Scilicet pars integralis + *non semper meretur palmam* var.), anchored DUB. II at "una pars iustitiae".
  - ⁵→[^7] (Aristot. VI Topic. c.3), anchored DUB. III at "Philosophus".
  - ⁶→[^8] (Cfr. infra d.25 p.II q.3 + d.28 + *sed* var.), anchored DUB. III at "gratiae adiutorium" (OCR `°` marker).

  Footer body-anchor reconciliation: Quaracchi restarts footer numbering on each printed page. The raw p.572 footer block is laid out in two columns — left column ¹–³ (under DUB. I body), right column ⁴–⁶ (under DUB. II/III body). All 6 markers map to body anchors at their OCR positions.

**Hand-offs:** RECEIVED none (a2-q4 closed self-contained at raw 40047, with its own SCHOLION I–III on p.571 top; the dubia open fresh lower on p.571). FORWARDED none — the dubia close cleanly at the foot of p.572; Pars II's COMMENTARIUS opens fresh at the top of p.573 (raw 40134) with its own footer sequence.

**`[?]` flags:** none. OCR garbles silently corrected against the PDF (`Dui). II.`→`Dub. II.`, `decli-nare`→`declinare`, `qit,od`→`quod`, `t-esistere`→`resistere`, `iw num`→`bonum`, marginal side-glosses `Responsio 1 / Non satisfacit / Resp. auctoris cum distinctione / Distinctio / Notandum` trimmed as editorial marginalia).

**After this chunk, Distinctio XXIV Pars I is fully Tier-2** (littera, divisio, a1-q1, a1-q2, a2-q1, a2-q2, a2-q3, a2-q4, p1-dubia).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part II)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si peccatum non diu teneatur in delectatione, veniale est; si vero diu in delectatione cogitationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, mortale est.* Ex hoc enim videtur, quod sola mora de veniali faciat mortale. **Sed contra:** circumstantia non mutat genus peccati: ergo si mora temporis est circumstantia[^1], nunquam faciet de eo quod erat veniale, esse mortale. — Item, mortale excedit veniale in infinitum; sed circumstantia non aggravat in infinitum: ergo si mora temporis circumstantia est, videtur etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quanta mora temporis faciat, quod erat veniale esse mortale — et utrum hoc sit in aliis generibus peccatorum, sicut in peccato carnis — et iterum, quando quis dubitat, utrum mortaliter vel venialiter peccaverit, qualiter sit ei consulendum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mora temporis, quantum est de se, non facit, ut quod prius erat veniale fiat mortale, sed solum occasionaliter, videlicet, quia inducit consensum verum, vel interpretativum. Tunc autem inducit consensum verum, quando ex diuturnitate delectationis crescit libido adeo, ut homo velit omnino in interiori delectatione persistere et morari. Tunc vero inducit consensum interpretativum, quando homo, advertens periculum delectationis retentae, negligit eam reprimere; hoc enim non est absque contemptu salutis propriae, pro eo quod discrimini se exponit. Illa enim delectatio subintrat sicut serpens et venena diffundit, per quae rationalis spiritus interit morte culpae. Sicut igitur salutem suam corporalem negligeret qui serpentem iuxta se scienter collocaret, sic in tali delectatione advertens periculum, vel debens advertere, voluntarie versatur et[^2] exponit se discrimini, quando negligit repellere; et pro tanto dicit Magister, ipsum peccare mortaliter. — Et patet responsio ad obiecta, quia hoc non facit mora de se, sed ratione consensus vel contemptus.

Ad illud vero, quod quaeritur, quanta mora hoc faciat; dicendum, quod in generali determinatur, quod tanta mora hoc facit, in qua adeo crescit delectatio et libido, quod supervenit consensus; vel adeo est repellendi negligentia et propriae salutis incuria[^3], quod supervenit contemptus et consensus interpretativus. — Si autem in speciali quaeratur, quanta sit ista mora, utrum sit unius horae, vel dimidiae, vel amplioris spatii; non potest una responsio dari, quia aliquando est maioris, aliquando minoris secundum diversos status et conditiones personarum; unde hoc non determinat scientia vel lectio, sed potius conscientia recta et unctio[^4]. Bene autem advertit conscientia recta, se non modicum laedi, quando ex morosa delectatione consensus supervenit, vel contemptus. — Quod si non advertat aliquando propter tenebras et involutiones affectionum nostrarum, securiorem partem debet eligere et confiteri pure, sic etiam dolere, quasi peccaret mortaliter.

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Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum ita sit in omnibus generibus peccatorum; respondendum est, quod in omnibus peccatis delectatio morosa vigilanter et strenue vitanda est. Tamen verbum Augustini[^5] praecipue videtur intelligi in peccato carnis, quod habet ex carnis incentivo delectationem magis sibi coniunctam, et ad quam homo facilius incurvatur; et ideo cum magna diligentia est vitanda, non solum autem hoc, sed etiam omne peccatum. Multa enim frequenter creduntur esse venialia, quae sunt mortalia, et difficillimum est in talibus discernere; et ideo quasi *a facie colubri* necesse habet homo, qui vult salvari, peccatum fugere[^6].

#### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *quaedam sunt, quae, si tantum semel fiunt, damnant; quaedam vero non, nisi saepius fiant.* **Sed contra:** multiplicatio actuum non mutat genus: ergo si primum peccatum est veniale, et secundum et tertium: ergo nunquam faciunt unum mortale. — Praeterea, quodlibet veniale stat cum gratia: ergo si nullum aufert gratiam, nullum aufert vitam[^7]: ergo nunquam damnant venialia, quantumcumque multiplicentur.

Ad hoc breviter respondendum est ad praesens, quod ista quaestio determinatur in libro quarto, distinctione decima sexta[^8]; ideo ad praesens tantum dixisse sufficiat, quod plura venialia non damnant nec faciunt mortale, quantum est de se, sed solum dispositive; ex frequenti enim iteratione venialium augetur libido, et frequenter intervenit contemptus; et pro tanto intelligendum est verbum Magistri esse dictum.

#### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ultimo capitulo: *Saepe in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis inferior portio rationis intelligitur.* Hoc enim non videtur rationabiliter dictum, quia, cum rationalis portio dividatur contra sensibilem[^9], nullo modo videtur, quod ratio sensualitatis nomine debeat censeri. — Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod saepe in Scriptura hoc reperitur. Cum enim philosophi de viribus animae sufficienter tractaverint et nullam mentionem faciant de sensualitate; unde est hoc, quod sacra Scriptura et doctores sacrae Scripturae hoc nomine utuntur?

Iuxta hoc est quaestio, utrum nomine sensualitatis intelligatur una vis vel plures, et utrum intelligatur vis cognitiva, aut motiva. Quod enim intelligatur vis cognitiva, videtur per hoc, quod dicitur a sensu; sensus enim vis cognitiva est. Quod autem dicatur motiva, videtur per hoc, quod in ea habet esse peccatum et ad malum habet inclinare.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Scriptura distinguit hominem interiorem et exteriorem, sicut habetur secundae ad Corinthios quarto[^10]: *Etsi is, qui exterior est noster homo corrumpitur; interior tamen renovatur de die in diem.* Exteriorem autem hominem vocat non ipsum corpus tantum, sed corpus cum viribus animae, per quas habet his sensibus[^11] intendere et eis inhaerere. Interiorem autem hominem vocat ipsum spiritum rationalem, secundum quod habet circa caelestia se ipsum occupare. Secundum hoc intelligendum est, quod homo habet potentias animae, per quas convertitur ad spiritualia; et habet potentias, per quas convertitur ad sensibilia. Et illae virtutes, per quas convertitur ad spiritualia, insimul collectae unum posse perfectum animae integrant; et quaedam potestas resultat interioris hominis regitiva, quae quidem vocatur arbitrii libertas, in qua consistit principaliter[^12] meritum et laus et vituperium. Secundum autem quod homo habet converti ad haec sensibilia, similiter habet et suas potentias, quae similiter in unum concurrentes integrant quasi unum perfectum posse, per quod intenditur circa ista sensibilia; et hoc nomine sensualitatis censetur in Scriptura, quae simul comprehendit sensibiles cognitivas et motivas, sicut et arbitrii libertas, ut videbitur infra[^13]. Et hoc est quod habitum est supra, eadem distinctione, quod *sensualitas est quaedam vis animae inferior, ex qua est motus, qui intenditur in corporis exterioris sensus atque appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium*; et ita comprehendit de sua propria acceptione sensitivam et motivam brutalem[^14]. Et

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quoniam inferior portio rationis per peccatum multum trahitur a sensualitate, et homo *comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis*[^15]; ideo inferior portio rationis aliquando in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis censetur propter nimiam conversionem sui ad sensibilia. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta.

Ad illud tamen quod quaeritur, quare philosophi non hoc nomine utuntur: dicendum, quod sensualitas non tantum nominat ipsam potentiam sensibilem quantum ad propriam naturam, sed etiam in quantum respectu rationalis habet quandam rebellionem, quae ex peccato originali in homine traducitur. Et quoniam non pervenerunt ad cognitionem originalis peccati nec lapsus hominis, ideo non utuntur hoc nomine, sicut sacra Scriptura[^16].

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: *If a sin is not held long in delight, it is venial; but if it is held long in the delight of thought, even though the will to carry it out is absent, it is mortal.* For from this it seems that delay alone makes a venial sin into a mortal one. **On the contrary:** a circumstance does not change the kind of a sin: therefore if delay of time is a circumstance[^1], it will never make that which was venial to be mortal. — Likewise, the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely; but a circumstance does not aggravate infinitely: therefore if delay of time is a circumstance, it seems, etc.

In connection with this it is asked, how great a delay of time makes that which was venial to be mortal — and whether this holds in other kinds of sins, as in the sin of the flesh — and again, when someone doubts whether he has sinned mortally or venially, how he is to be counseled.

**I respond:** It must be said that delay of time, as far as it is of itself, does not make that which was previously venial become mortal, but only occasionally, namely, because it induces consent, true or interpretative. Now it induces true consent when, from the long duration of the delight, desire grows so much that a man wishes utterly to persist and tarry in the inner delight. But it induces interpretative consent when a man, perceiving the danger of the retained delight, neglects to repress it; for this is not without contempt of his own salvation, inasmuch as he exposes himself to peril. For that delight slips in like a serpent and pours out venom, by which the rational spirit perishes by the death of guilt. As, therefore, a man would be neglecting his bodily safety who knowingly placed a serpent beside himself, so in such delight one who perceives the danger, or ought to perceive it, willingly tarries and[^2] exposes himself to peril when he neglects to drive it off; and to that extent the Master says that he sins mortally. — And the answer to the objections is clear, because delay does not do this of itself, but by reason of the consent or the contempt.

But to that which is asked, how great a delay does this; it must be said that in general it is determined that so great a delay does this, in which the delight and desire grow so much that consent supervenes; or there is such negligence in repelling and such carelessness of one's own salvation[^3], that contempt and interpretative consent supervene. — But if it be asked in particular how great this delay is, whether of one hour, or of half an hour, or of a longer span; no single answer can be given, because sometimes it is greater, sometimes less according to the diverse states and conditions of persons; whence neither knowledge nor learning determines this, but rather an upright conscience and the anointing[^4]. And an upright conscience well perceives that it is not slightly harmed when, from morose delight, consent or contempt supervenes. — But if it does not perceive this at times, on account of the darkness and the entanglements of our affections, it ought to choose the safer part and confess purely, and likewise grieve as though it had sinned mortally.

To that which is asked, whether it is so in all kinds of sins; it must be answered that in all sins morose delight is to be vigilantly and strenuously avoided. Nevertheless the saying of Augustine[^5] seems chiefly to be understood of the sin of the flesh, which from the incitement of the flesh has a delight more closely joined to itself, and toward which a man is more easily bent down; and therefore it is to be avoided with great diligence, yet not this alone, but every sin. For many things are frequently believed to be venial which are mortal, and it is most difficult to discern in such matters; and therefore, as it were *from the face of the serpent*, the man who wishes to be saved must flee sin[^6].

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *there are certain things which, if they are done but once, condemn; and certain others which do not, unless they are done more often.* **On the contrary:** the multiplication of acts does not change the kind: therefore if the first sin is venial, so also the second and the third: therefore they never make one mortal sin. — Furthermore, every venial sin stands with grace: therefore if none takes away grace, none takes away life[^7]: therefore venial sins never condemn, however much they are multiplied.

To this it must be briefly answered for the present that this question is determined in the fourth book, distinction sixteen[^8]; therefore for the present let it suffice to have said that many venial sins do not condemn nor make a mortal sin, as far as it is of itself, but only dispositively; for from the frequent repetition of venial sins desire is increased, and contempt frequently intervenes; and to that extent the saying of the Master is to be understood as having been said.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says in the last chapter: *Often in Scripture by the name of sensuality the lower portion of reason is understood.* For this does not seem to be reasonably said, because, since the rational portion is divided against the sensible[^9], in no way does it seem that the account of sensuality ought to be reckoned under that name. — Likewise it is asked about what he says, that this is often found in Scripture. For since the philosophers have treated sufficiently of the powers of the soul and make no mention of sensuality; how is it that sacred Scripture and the doctors of sacred Scripture use this name?

In connection with this there is a question, whether by the name of sensuality one power is understood or several, and whether a cognitive or a motive power is understood. For that a cognitive power is understood seems to follow from this, that it is called from *sense*; for sense is a cognitive power. But that it is called motive seems to follow from this, that in it sin has its being and it inclines to evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that Scripture distinguishes the interior and the exterior man, as is had in the second to the Corinthians, the fourth chapter[^10]: *Though our exterior man is corrupted, the interior is nevertheless renewed from day to day.* Now by the exterior man it calls not the body alone, but the body together with the powers of the soul, by which it has to attend to these senses and to cling to them[^11]. But by the interior man it calls the rational spirit itself, according as it has to occupy itself about heavenly things. According to this it must be understood that man has powers of the soul by which he is turned to spiritual things; and he has powers by which he is turned to sensible things. And those powers by which he is turned to spiritual things, gathered together at once, make up one perfect capacity of the soul; and there results a certain power governing the interior man, which indeed is called the freedom of choice, in which merit and praise and blame principally[^12] consist. But according as man has to be turned to these sensible things, he likewise has also his powers, which likewise concurring into one make up as it were one perfect capacity, by which there is an attending about these sensible things; and this is reckoned under the name of sensuality in Scripture, which together comprehends the sensible cognitive and motive powers, as also the freedom of choice does, as will be seen below[^13]. And this is what was had above, in the same distinction, that *sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which arises the motion that is directed to the senses of the exterior body and to the appetite for things pertaining to the body*; and so by its own proper acceptation it comprehends the sensitive and the brute motive power[^14]. And

since the lower portion of reason is much drawn by sin toward sensuality, and man *is compared to the senseless beasts and is made like to them*[^15]; therefore the lower portion of reason is sometimes reckoned in Scripture under the name of sensuality on account of the excessive turning of itself toward sensible things. And by this the answer to all the objections is clear.

But to that which is asked, why the philosophers do not use this name: it must be said that sensuality names not only the sensible power itself as to its proper nature, but also inasmuch as, with respect to the rational, it has a certain rebellion, which is transmitted into man from original sin. And since they did not arrive at the knowledge of original sin nor of the fall of man, therefore they do not use this name, as sacred Scripture does[^16].

---

la: Cod. O addit *non mutat genus peccati: ergo*.

en: Codex O adds *does not change the kind of the sin: therefore*.

la: Particulam *et*, quae deest in Vat., restituimus ex cod. cc et ed. 1; aliter supplendum *qui* post *sic*. Paulo inferius pro *Et patet* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Et per hoc patet*.

en: The particle *et* (and), which is lacking in the Vatican edition, we have restored from codex cc and edition 1; otherwise *qui* (who) is to be supplied after *sic*. A little below, for *Et patet* (And the answer is clear) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *Et per hoc patet* (And by this it is clear).

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *vitiorum*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *of the vices*.

la: Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 27: *Et vos unctionem, quam accepistis ab eo, maneat in vobis. Et non necesse habetis, ut aliquis doceat vos; sed sicut unctio eius docet vos de omnibus, et verum est, et non est mendacium.* — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *unctio*. Paulo inferius eadem Vat. omittit *vel* ante *contemptus*, et dein post *affectionum* cum edd. 3, 4 *nostrarum*.

en: First Epistle of John 2:27: *And let the anointing which you have received from him abide in you. And you have no need that any man teach you; but as his anointing teaches you concerning all things, and it is true, and is no lie.* — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *the anointing*. A little below the same Vatican edition omits *or* before *contempt*, and then after *of the affections* reads, with editions 3, 4, *of our*.

la: De quo hoc dubium tractat.

en: Concerning which this doubt treats.

la: Eccli. 21, 2. — Idem dubium solvitur a Petro a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Ecclesiasticus 21:2. — The same doubt is resolved by Peter of Tarentaise here, on the text.

la: Edd., excepta 2, sic: *ergo si nullam aufert gratiam, nullam aufert vitam*.

en: The editions, except the second, read thus: *therefore if it takes away no grace, it takes away no life*.

la: Parte II. a. 3. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *quod ista quaestio* edd. F Y aa *quia ista quaestio*. Mox pro *damnant* Vat. et codd. 3, 4 *determinant*.

en: Part II, article 3, question 1. — A little above, for *that this question* editions F Y aa read *because this question*. Soon, for *condemn* the Vatican edition and codices 3, 4 read *determine*.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 113. m. 4. a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 6; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, part II, q. 108, member 3; Blessed Albert, *Summa*, part II, treatise 18, q. 113, member 4, article 4; St. Thomas, here, q. 3, article 6; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here, on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, article 3.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd. *sensualitatem* et infra *sensualia*, refragantibus antiquioribus codd., ut F Iv T W Y aa etc.

en: The Vatican and the other editions read *sensuality* and below *sensible things*, against the more ancient codices, such as F Iv T W Y aa etc.

la: Vers. 16: *Sed licet is, qui foris est, noster homo corrumpatur; tamen is qui intus est, renovatur de die in diem.*

en: Verse 16: *But though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed from day to day.*

la: Mallemus *sensibilibus*. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *secundum quem* pro *secundum quod*.

en: We should prefer *to the sensible powers*. — A little below the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads *according to whom* for *according as*.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt *principaliter*; deinde in seq. propos. pro *similiter* substituunt *sic*, ac paulo post concordantes pro *concurrentes*; demum paulo inferius supprimunt *per quod intenditur*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit *principally*; then in the following clause for *likewise* they substitute *thus*, and a little after *agreeing* for *concurring*; finally a little below they suppress *by which there is an attending*.

la: Dist. 2-3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seqq. — Seq. propos. est Magistri hic c. 4. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Post *sicut et arbitrii libertas* cod. aa bene addit *rationem et voluntatem*.

en: Distinctions 2–3, part I, article 1, question 2 and following. — The following clause is from the Master here, chapter 4. Cf. above, article 2, question 1, in the body. — After *as also the freedom of choice* codex aa rightly adds *reason and will*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 voci *brutalem* praemittit *et*; perperam, quia brutalis non est specialis potentia animae, sed tantum subiectum potentiae sensitivae et motivae.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 prefixes *et* (and) to the word *brute*; wrongly, because the brute power is not a special power of the soul, but only the subject of the sensitive and motive power.

la: Psalm. 48, 13: *Et homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est* etc. — Pro *et homo* codd. aa *quia homo*. Vat. substituit numerum pluralem, scil. *sacrae Scripturae*, multis codd. contradicentibus, cod. N *tractatores sacrae Scripturae*. S. Thom., hic circa lit., annotat: Hic per scripturas non canonem Bibliae, sed dicta Sanctorum significat. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 68. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 8, et S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 92. m. 1. seqq.; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic n. 2. q. 8; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lit. 1.

en: Psalm 48:13: *And man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared* etc. — For *and man* codices aa read *because man*. The Vatican edition substitutes the plural number, namely *of sacred Scriptures*, with many codices contradicting; codex N reads *the treatise-writers of sacred Scripture*. St. Thomas, here on the text, notes: Here by "Scriptures" he signifies not the canon of the Bible, but the sayings of the Saints. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, part II, q. 68, throughout; Blessed Albert, here, article 8, and *Summa*, part II, treatise 13, q. 92, member 1 and following; St. Thomas, here, q. 3, article 1, and on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the text; Richard of Middleton, here, n. 2, q. 8; Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, article 1, and doubt on the text 1. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of the Quaracchi printed text (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p586-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p587-*`, `vol2-p588-*`), two-column reflow (Left column top→bottom, then Right), body bands then footer bands. Cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines ~41032–41154 (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). English is a fresh literal translation. This is the **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** for Distinctio XXIV, Pars II — the **final chunk of d.24**.

**Verified DUB count = 3** (DUB. I, DUB. II, DUB. III), confirmed at 450 dpi against the PDF. The OCR shows 3 and the PDF confirms 3; no hidden fourth DUB (the cross-page splice was checked — DUB. III runs continuously from p.587 to p.588 and ends with *…sicut sacra Scriptura* immediately above DISTINCTIO XXV). Note: DUB. I carries an internal cluster of *quaestiones incidentes* (*Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quanta mora…*) handled within the same DUB., not as separate dubia; the side-glosses *Quaestiones 3 incidentes*, *Ad quaest. incid.*, *Ad quaesti. — i. — q. incid.*, *Quaestio i*, *Notandum*, *Ad quaest. i*, *Resp.* are editorial marginalia, trimmed.

**Page-split map (footers, restart per printed page):**
- **p.586** footer block ¹–¹⁰: ¹–⁴ belong to the prior chunk (a3-q2, already promoted); ⁵–¹⁰ are this chunk's DUB I body → renumbered [^1] (⁵ *non mutat genus peccati: ergo*), [^2] (⁸ *et* particle), [^3] (⁷ *vitiorum*), [^4] (¹⁰ Epist. I Ioan. unctio). (⁶ *peccatum* supplement and ⁹ *inducia* were minor variant-supplement footers on the *quanta mora* incidental clause; folded into the relevant body readings — see hand-off note below.)
- **p.587** footer block ¹–¹¹ → [^5]–[^15]: ¹–² DUB I tail ([^5] Augustini, [^6] Eccli. 21,2); ³–⁵ DUB II ([^7], [^8], [^9]); ⁶–¹¹ DUB III ([^10]–[^15]).
- **p.588** footer ¹ → [^16] (Psalm 48,13 + the *sacrae Scripturae*/Alex.Hal. dub-reference block; footer ² on p.588 begins the d.25 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM and belongs to d.25, NOT here).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a3-q2: p.586 footers ⁵+ attach to DUB I's body — apparatus leads with them as [^1]–[^4]. FORWARDED: none — DUB III ends immediately above DISTINCTIO XXV on p.588; the d.25 littera opens fresh with its own footer sequence (NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM).

**has_scholion: false** — the DUBIA section carries no scholion (the per-page DUB references point to parallel-author rolls in the apparatus, e.g. [^9], [^16]).

**[?] flags:** none. All readings confirmed at 450 dpi.

**Dup-cleanup:** none — `ls vol2/ | grep d24-p2-dubia` returns exactly one file.

**d.24 now FULLY Tier-2** (both Pars I and Pars II complete). Next distinction = d.25 (DISTINCTIO XXV at raw 41154).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25, Part 1

title_alt: Distinctio XXV, Pars I — Littera Magistri

title_alt: Distinction XXV, Part I — The Text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 588 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXV.

#### Pars I.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Definitio liberi arbitrii secundum philosophos.*

Iam vero ad propositum redeamus, scilicet ad liberi arbitrii tractatum; quod philosophi[^1] definientes dixerunt *liberum de voluntate iudicium*, quia potestas ipsa et habilitas voluntatis et rationis, quam supra[^2] diximus esse liberum arbitrium, libera est ad utrumlibet, quia libere potest moveri ad hoc, vel ad illud. Liberum ergo dicitur arbitrium quantum ad *voluntatem*, quia voluntarie moveri et spontaneo appetitu ferri potest ad ea quae bona vel mala iudicat, vel iudicare valet.

Hoc autem sciendum est, quod liberum arbitrium ad praesens, vel ad praeteritum non refertur, sed ad futura contingentia. Quod enim in praesenti est determinatum est nec in potestate nostra est, ut tunc sit, vel non sit, quando est. Potest enim non esse, vel aliud esse postea; sed non potest non esse, *dum est*, vel aliud esse, dum *id est*, quod est; sed in *futuro* an hoc sit, vel illud, ad potestatem liberi arbitrii spectat. Nec tamen omnia futura sub potestate liberi arbitrii veniunt, sed ea tantum, quae per liberum arbitrium possunt fieri, vel non fieri. Si quis enim tale quid velit ac disponat facere, quod in eius nullatenus sit potestate, vel quod sine ipsius dispositione aeque fieret, in hoc ipse liberum non habet arbitrium.

Et quidem, secundum praedictam assignationem, in his tantum videtur esse liberum arbitrium, qui voluntatem mutare et in *contraria* possunt deflectere, in quorum videlicet potestate est eligere bonum, vel malum, et utrumlibet secundum electionem facere, vel dimittere; secundum quod nec in Deo nec in his omnibus, qui tanta beatitudinis gratia sunt roborati, ut iam peccare nequeant, liberum arbitrium esse nequit. — Sed quod Deus liberum arbitrium habeat, Augustinus docet in libro vigesimo secundo de Civitate Dei[^3], ita inquiens: « Certe Deus ipse nunquid, quoniam peccare non potest, ideo liberum arbitrium habere negandus est »? Ambrosius quoque in libro de Trinitate ait: « Paulus dicit: *Quia omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult*, id est, pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio ».

#### Cap. II.

#### *Qualiter in Deo accipitur liberum arbitrium.*

Sed aliter accipitur liberum arbitrium in Creatore quam in creaturis. Dei etenim liberum arbitrium dicitur eius sapientissima et omnipotens voluntas, quae non necessitate, sed libera bonitate[^4] omnia facit, prout vult. Ideoque Hieronymus attendens, non ita esse liberum arbitrium in Deo, sicut est in creaturis, ab ipso videtur liberum arbitrium excludere, in homilia quadam de filio prodigo[^5] dicens: « Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt ». Dum ait *cetera*, indicat liberum arbitrium, sicut est in ceteris, non esse in Deo.

#### Cap. III.

#### *Quod Angeli et Sancti habent liberum arbitrium.*

Angeli vero et Sancti, qui iam cum Domino feliciter vivunt, atque ita gratia beatitudinis confirmati sunt, ut ad malum flecti nec velint nec possint, libero arbitrio non carent; unde Augustinus in libro vigesimo secundo de Civitate Dei[^6] ait: « Sicut prima immortalitas fuit, quam peccando Adam perdidit, *posse non mori*; ita primum liberum arbitrium *posse non peccare*, novissimum *non posse peccare* ». Idem in Enchiridio: « Sic oportebat prius hominem fieri, ut bene velle posset et male; postea vero sic erit, ut male velle non possit, nec ideo carebit libero arbitrio ».

<!-- page 589 -->

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quod liberius erit liberum arbitrium, quando peccare non poterit.*

« Multo quippe liberius erit arbitrium, quod omnino non poterit servire peccato. Neque aut *voluntas* non est, aut *libera* dicenda non est, qua beati sic esse volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus. Sicut ergo anima nostra nunc habet *nolle infelicitatem*, ita *nolle iniquitatem* semper habitura est. Sed ordo servandus fuit, quo Deus voluit ostendere, quam bonum sit animal rationale, quod etiam *peccare possit*, quamvis sit melius, quod *peccare non possit* ». — Ecce his verbis evidenter astruitur, quod post beatitudinis confirmationem erit in homine liberum arbitrium, quo peccare non poterit; et nunc in Angelis est et in Sanctis, qui cum Domino sunt, et tanto utique liberius, quanto a peccato immunius et ad bonum pronius. Quo enim quisque ab illa peccati servitute, de qua scriptum est: *Qui facit peccatum servus est peccati*[^7], longius absistit, tanto in eligendo bonum liberius habet iudicium. Unde si diligenter inspiciatur, liberum videtur dici arbitrium, quia sine coactione et necessitate valet appetere vel eligere quod ex ratione decreverit.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXV.

#### Part I.

#### Chapter I.

#### *The definition of free choice according to the philosophers.*

Now let us return to our purpose, namely to the treatise on free choice; which the philosophers[^1], defining it, called *a judgment of the will concerning the free*, because that power and aptitude of will and reason, which we said above[^2] to be free choice, is free with respect to either alternative, because it can freely be moved to this or to that. Choice is therefore called *free* with respect to the *will*, because it can be moved voluntarily and borne by spontaneous appetite to those things which it judges, or is able to judge, to be good or evil.

But this must be known, that free choice is not referred to the present or to the past, but to future contingents. For what is in the present is determined, nor is it in our power that it should then be, or not be, when it is. For it can later not be, or be otherwise; but it cannot not-be, *while it is*, or be otherwise, while *that is* which is; but in the *future*, whether this be, or that, pertains to the power of free choice. Yet not all future things come under the power of free choice, but only those which through free choice can be done, or not done. For if anyone should will and dispose to do such a thing as is in no way in his power, or which would equally come to pass without his disposing of it, in this he himself does not have free choice.

And indeed, according to the aforesaid assignment, free choice seems to be only in those who can change the will and bend it to *contrary* things, in whose power, namely, it is to choose good or evil, and to do or to forgo either according to election; according to which there can be no free choice either in God or in all those who are so strengthened by the grace of beatitude that they can no longer sin. — But that God has free choice, Augustine teaches in the twenty-second book *On the City of God*[^3], saying thus: « Surely is God himself, because he cannot sin, on that account to be denied to have free choice »? Ambrose also in the book *On the Trinity* says: « Paul says: *Because one and the same Spirit works all things, dividing to each as he wills*, that is, according to the choice of free will, not according to the obedience of necessity ».

#### Chapter II.

#### *How free choice is taken in God.*

But free choice is taken otherwise in the Creator than in creatures. For God's free choice is said to be his most wise and omnipotent will, which not by necessity, but by free goodness[^4], does all things as it wills. And therefore Jerome, attending to the fact that free choice is not in God as it is in creatures, seems to exclude free choice from him, saying in a certain homily *on the prodigal son*[^5]: « God alone is the one into whom sin does not fall nor can fall; the rest, since they are of free choice, can be bent to either side ». When he says *the rest*, he indicates that free choice, as it is in the rest, is not in God.

#### Chapter III.

#### *That the Angels and the Saints have free choice.*

But the Angels and the Saints, who now live happily with the Lord, and are so confirmed by the grace of beatitude that they neither will nor are able to be bent to evil, do not lack free choice; whence Augustine in the twenty-second book *On the City of God*[^6] says: « Just as the first immortality was *to be able not to die*, which Adam lost by sinning; so the first free choice was *to be able not to sin*, the last *to be unable to sin* ». The same in the *Enchiridion*: « Thus it was fitting that man should first be made, so that he could will both well and ill; but afterward it will be so, that he cannot will ill, nor on that account will he lack free choice ».

<!-- page 589 -->

#### Chapter IV.

#### *That free choice will be more free, when it will be unable to sin.*

« For much more free will the choice be that will not at all be able to serve sin. Nor is it either that the *will* does not exist, or that it is not to be called *free*, by which we so will to be blessed that we not only will not to be wretched, but are utterly unable to will it. Just as therefore our soul now has *to be unwilling for unhappiness*, so it will always be about *to be unwilling for iniquity*. But an order had to be kept, by which God willed to show how good is a rational creature, which *can even sin*, although it is better that it *cannot sin* ». — Behold, by these words it is evidently established that after the confirmation of beatitude there will be in man a free choice by which he will be unable to sin; and it is now in the Angels and in the Saints who are with the Lord, and so much the more free indeed, the more it is immune from sin and prone to good. For the further anyone stands from that servitude of sin, of which it is written: *He who commits sin is the servant of sin*[^7], the more freely he has judgment in choosing the good. Hence, if it be diligently examined, choice seems to be called free because without coercion and necessity it is able to seek or to choose what it has decreed by reason.

---

la: Boeth., III. super libr. Periherm. (ed. 2.) — De hac distinctione, teste cod. Erf., conferendus est Gandolph., II. Sent. c. 193. Praecipue autem Magister usus est Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. V. c. 20, et Sent. tr. 3. c. 9.

en: Boethius, on Book III of the *Peri Hermeneias* (2nd edition). — On this distinction, according to codex Erfurt, Gandulph is to be compared, *Sentences* II, c. 193. But the Master chiefly made use of Hugh, *On the Sacraments*, part V, chapter 20, and *Sentences*, treatise 3, chapter 9.

la: Dist. praeced. c. 3.

en: The preceding distinction, chapter 3.

la: Cap. 30. n. 3. — Locus Ambrosii est II. de Fide, c. 6. n. 48; et locus Scripturae I. Cor. 12, 11.

en: Chapter 30, n. 3. — The passage of Ambrose is in *On the Faith* II, chapter 6, n. 48; and the scriptural passage is 1 Cor. 12:11.

la: Ita codd. B C E et edd. 2, 3, 7, 9 et originale Hugonis; in aliis edd. et codd. *voluntate*.

en: Thus codices B, C, E and editions 2, 3, 7, 9 and the original of Hugh; in other editions and codices, *voluntate* (by will).

la: Est in Epist. 21. ad Damasum n. 40. — In fine capituli ante *esse in Deo* Vat. ceteraeque edd., excepta 1, non apte addunt *ita*.

en: It is in Letter 21 to Damasus, n. 40. — At the end of the chapter, before *esse in Deo*, the Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1, unsuitably add *ita*.

la: Cap. 30. n. 3. Textus Enchiridii est c. 105. n. 28, qui excurrit usque in c. 4.

en: Chapter 30, n. 3. The text of the *Enchiridion* is chapter 105, n. 28, which runs on into chapter 4.

la: Ioan. 8, 34. — Quod sequitur est ex Hugone, Sent. tr. III. c. 8; sed seq. capitulum ex eodem, l. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 16. Deinde alia iterum ex Sent. tr. III. c. 9. 8.

en: John 8:34. — What follows is from Hugh, *Sentences*, treatise III, chapter 8; but the following chapter [is] from the same, *On the Sacraments*, part VI, chapter 16. Then again other things from *Sentences*, treatise III, chapters 9 and 8.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p588-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p589-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, split_x=1820 for p.588); cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines ~41154–41250, two-column cascade-shattered). The chunk is the **Littera Magistri** for Distinctio XXV, Pars I, Capitula I–IV (Lombard's text), theme *de libero arbitrio*.

**Chapter count = FOUR (Cap. I–IV).** Headings: I *Definitio liberi arbitrii secundum philosophos*; II *Qualiter in Deo accipitur liberum arbitrium*; III *Quod Angeli et Sancti habent liberum arbitrium*; IV *Quod liberius erit liberum arbitrium, quando peccare non poterit*. Cap. V (*De differentia libertatis arbitrii secundum diversa tempora*) opens **Pars II** and is the first chapter of the separate `d25-p2-littera` chunk.

**Boundaries.** Cap. I opens lower-left on p.588 ("Iam vero ad propositum redeamus…"), below the d.24-p1-divisio COMMENTARIUS tail (the "DISTINCTIO XXV." at the top of p.588 with the preceding "Ad illud tamen quod quaeritur, quare philosophi…" is the close of the d.24 COMMENTARIUS, NOT this chunk). Cap. I–III run L→R on p.588. On p.589 the Pars I material (Cap. III tail + Cap. IV) runs L-top → R-top, ending at "…quod ex ratione decreverit." immediately before Cap. V (Pars II) which opens lower in the p.589 L column. The Pars II COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV (Pars I commentary) begins at raw ~41383 and belongs to `d25-p1-divisio`.

**Page-split map (printed pages; Quaracchi restarts footers per page):**
- **p.588** — Cap. I (L→R), Cap. II, Cap. III (to p.589). The page carries TWO footer sequences: (a) the regular body footers 1–2 (Psalm 48,13 = *et homo comparatus est*; Vat. *sacrae Scripturae*) which serve the d.24 COMMENTARIUS tail and were claimed by `d24-p2-dubia` ([^16]); (b) the **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** sequence 1–6 = the Lombard-littera footers → [^1]–[^6] here. Body markers: "philosophi¹"→[^1] (Boeth.); "supra²"→[^2] (Dist. praeced. c.3); "de Civitate Dei³"→[^3] (Cap.30 n.3 + Ambros. II de Fide); "libera bonitate⁴"→[^4] (Ita codd. *voluntate*); "de filio prodigo⁵"→[^5] (Epist.21 ad Damasum); "de Civitate Dei⁶"→[^6] (Cap.30 n.3 Enchiridii).
- **p.589** — Cap. III tail + Cap. IV (L-top→R-top), then Pars II (Cap. V–VIII) fills the rest of both columns. Footer ¹ (Ioan. 8,34 + Hugone source-notes) serves Cap. IV's "Qui facit peccatum servus est peccati¹" → [^7]; the remaining p.589 footers 2–5 (Ita in codd.; Luc. 10,30; Cap. 30 n.9; Bernard. de Gratia et lib. arbitrio) serve Pars II content and belong to `d25-p2-littera`.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from `d24-p2-dubia`: confirmation that the p.588 regular body footers 1–2 (Psalm 48,13; *sacrae Scripturae*) are fully owned upstream (merged into d.24's [^16]); this chunk's apparatus therefore begins with the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM sequence. FORWARDED to `d25-p2-littera`: the p.589 footers 2–5 (Ita in codd. *plene*; Luc. 10,30 + Ambr./Beda; Cap. 30 n.9; Bernard., de Gratia et lib. arbitrio c. 3. n. 7) serving Cap. V–VIII, and the Hugone source-note tail of the p.589 footer ¹ that refers to the following capitula.

**[?] flags:** none. Body is clean Lombard running prose; Quaracchi side-glosses bleeding into the OCR ("Dubia 1/2/3", "Liberum arbitrium refertur ad contingens", "In Deo liberum arbitrium", "Libertas a necessitate") were trimmed as marginalia, not Lombard's text.

**has_scholion: false** — Littera chunks carry no scholion.


title: Dist. 25, Part 2

title_alt: Distinctio XXV, Pars II — Littera Magistri

title_alt: Distinction XXV, Part II — The Text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 589 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXV.

#### Pars II.

#### Cap. V.

#### *De differentia libertatis arbitrii secundum diversa tempora.*

Ex praedictis perspicuum fit, quod maior fuit libertas arbitrii *prima* quam *secunda*, et *tertia* multo maior quam *secunda* vel *prima*. Prima enim libertas arbitrii fuit, in qua poterat peccare et non peccare; *ultima* vero erit, in qua poterit non peccare et non poterit peccare; *media* vero, in qua potest peccare et non potest non peccare, ante reparationem etiam mortaliter, post reparationem vero saltem venialiter.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *De quatuor statibus liberi arbitrii.*

Et possunt notari in homine quatuor status liberi arbitrii. *Ante* peccatum enim ad bonum nil impediebat, ad malum nil impellebat. Non habuit infirmitatem ad malum et habuit adiutorium ad bonum. Tunc sine errore ratio iudicare, et voluntas sine difficultate bonum appetere poterat. *Post* peccatum vero, *ante* reparationem gratiae, premitur a concupiscentia et vincitur et habet infirmitatem in malo, sed non habet gratiam in bono; et ideo *potest peccare* et *non potest non peccare*, etiam damnabiliter. *Post* reparationem vero, *ante* confirmationem, premitur a concupiscentia, sed non vincitur, et habet quidem infirmitatem in malo, sed gratiam in bono, ut *possit peccare* propter libertatem et infirmitatem, et *possit non peccare* ad mortem propter libertatem et gratiam adiuvantem; nondum tamen habet *posse omnino non peccare*, vel *non posse peccare*, propter infirmitatem nondum perfecte absorptam et propter gratiam nondum perfecte[^1] consummatam. *Post* confirmationem vero, infirmitate penitus consumta et gratia consummata, nec vinci poterit nec premi, et tunc habebit *non posse peccare*.

#### Cap. VII.

#### *De corruptione liberi arbitrii per peccatum.*

Unde manifestum est, quod praeter alias poenalitates pro peccato illo incurrit homo poenam in corruptione et depressione liberi arbitrii. Per illud namque peccatum naturalia bona in homine corrupta sunt et gratuita detracta. Hic est enim ille qui a *latronibus* vulneratus et spoliatus[^2]: *vulneratus* quidem in naturalibus bonis, quibus non est privatus, alioquin non posset fieri reparatio; *spoliatus* vero gratuitis, quae naturalibus addita fuerant. Haec sunt *data optima, et dona perfecta*, quorum alia sunt *corrupta* per peccatum, id est naturalia, ut ingenium, memoria, intellectus; alia *subtracta*, id est gratuita, quamquam et naturalia ex gratia sint; ad *generalem* quippe *genus* refertur. Corrupta est ergo libertas arbitrii per peccatum et ex parte perdita. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^3]: « Libero arbitrio male utens, homo et se perdidit et ipsum. Cum enim libero arbitrio peccaretur, victore peccato amissum est et liberum arbitrium. *A quo enim quis devictus est, huic servus addictus est* ». — Ecce liberum arbitrium dicit hominem amisisse, non quia post peccatum non habuerit *liberum arbitrium*, sed quia *libertatem arbitrii* perdidit, non quidem *omnem*, sed libertatem a *miseria* et a *peccato*.

#### Cap. VIII.

#### *De tribus modis libertatis liberi arbitrii: a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria.*

Est namque libertas triplex, scilicet a *necessitate*, a peccato, a *miseria*[^4]. — A necessitate et ante peccatum et post aeque liberum est arbitrium. Sicut enim tunc cogi non poterat, ita nec modo. Ideoque *voluntas* merito apud Deum iudicatur, quae semper a necessitate libera est et nunquam cogi potest. Ubi necessitas, ibi non est libertas, ubi non est libertas[^5], nec voluntas, et ideo nec meritum. Haec libertas in omnibus est, tam in malis quam in bonis. — Est et alia libertas, a peccato scilicet, de qua dicit Apostolus[^6]: *Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas*; et Veritas in Evangelio: *Si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis*. Haec libertas a servitute peccati liberat et servos iustitiae facit, sicut e converso servitus peccati liberos iustitiae facit. Unde Apostolus: *Liberati a peccato, servi facti estis iustitiae*. Et item: *Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae*. Hanc libertatem homo peccando amisit; ideoque Augustinus[^7] dicit, quod homo, male utens libero arbitrio, et se perdidit et ipsum, quia perdita est per peccatum libertas, non a necessitate, sed a peccato. *Qui enim facit peccatum servus est peccati*.

Istam libertatem, quae est a peccato, illi soli nunc habent, quos Filius per gratiam liberat et reparat, non ita, quod penitus sint sine peccato in hac mortali carne, sed ut in eis peccatum non dominetur neque regnet. Et haec est vera et bona libertas, quae bonam parit servitutem, scilicet iustitiae. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^8] ait: « Ad iustitiam faciendam non erit aliquis liber, nisi, a peccato liberatus, esse iustitiae coeperit servus, et ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti obedientiam ». — Est alia libertas *non vera*, malae servituti adiuncta, quae est ad malum faciendum, ubi ratio dissentit a voluntate, iudicans, non esse faciendum quod voluntas appetit; ad bonum vero faciendum concordat ratio voluntati, et ideo vera libertas est et pia. De libertate autem ad malum et servitute mala ait Augustinus in Enchiridio[^9]: « Servi addicti peccato quae potest esse libertas, nisi quando eum peccare delectat? Liberaliter enim servit, qui sui Domini voluntatem libenter facit; ac per hoc ad *peccandum liber* est qui *peccati servus* est ».

Hic quaeri potest, utrum haec libertas, qua quis liber est ad malum, sit libertas arbitrii. Si enim libertas arbitrii est, bonum quidem est, quia libertas arbitrii bonum naturale est. — Quibusdam videtur, quod sit ipsa libertas arbitrii, quae semper bona est, sed propter peccati servitutem ad malum sit liberior et pronior; et ideo dicitur non vera esse libertas, quia ad malum est. — Aliis autem videtur, quod haec libertas[^10] ad malum, quam supra commemoravit Augustinus, non sit ipsa libertas arbitrii, sed sit quaedam pronitas peccandi et curvitas, quae ex peccato est et mala est.

Similiter etiam quaeri solet, utrum illa libertas vera, quae est ad iustitiam faciendam, sit ipsa libertas arbitrii. — Quidam dicunt, illam eandem esse, sed reparatam per gratiam, qua iuvante libera est ad bonum, sine gratia vero non est libera ad bonum. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^11]: « Ista libertas ad bene faciendum unde erit homini addicto et vendito, nisi eum redimat ille qui dicit: *Si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis*? Quod antequam fieri in homine incipiat, quomodo quisquam de libero arbitrio gloriatur, qui nondum est liber ad operandum bene »? — Ecce aperte ostendit, liberum arbitrium per gratiam liberari, ut per illud bene operetur quis. Ideoque dicunt, illam libertatem veram, quae est ad bene faciendum, cuius supra meminit Augustinus, esse libertatem ipsam arbitrii, gratia Dei liberatam et adiutam. — Alii vero putant, non esse ipsam arbitrii libertatem, sed aliam quandam, quae ex gratia et libero arbitrio in mente hominis, Deo operante, incipit esse, cum reparatur[^12].

Verum nobis magis placet, ut ipsa libertas arbitrii sit et illa qua quis liber est ad malum, et illa qua quis liber est ad bonum faciendum. Ex causis enim variis sortitur diversa vocabula. Dicitur enim libertas ad malum faciendum, antequam per gratiam sit reparata; sed cum per gratiam fuerit reparata, dicitur libertas ad bonum faciendum, quia ante gratiam libera est voluntas ad malum, per gratiam vero libera fit ad bonum. Semper igitur voluntas hominis aliquo modo libera est, sed non semper bona est. Non enim est bona nisi a peccato liberata, est tamen a necessitate libera. Unde Augustinus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio[^13]: « Semper in nobis voluntas libera est, sed non semper bona est. Aut enim libera est iustitiae, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala; aut a peccato libera est, quando servit iustitiae, et tunc est bona ».

Est iterum libertas a *miseria*, de qua Apostolus[^14] ait: *Et ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei*. Hanc libertatem habuit homo ante peccatum, quia omni carebat miseria et nulla tangebatur molestia, et plenius habebit in futura beatitudine, ubi miser esse non poterit. Sed in hac vita, quae est inter primum peccatum et ultimam confirmationem, nemo a miseria liber est, quia poena peccati non caret.

Ex praedictis iam apparet, in quo per peccatum sit imminutum et corruptum liberum arbitrium, quia ante peccatum nulla erat homini difficultas nullumque impedimentum de lege membrorum ad bonum, nulla impulsio vel instigatio ad malum. Nunc autem per legem carnis ad bonum impeditur et ad malum instigatur, ut non possit velle et perficere bonum, nisi per gratiam liberetur et adiuvetur, quia, ut ait Apostolus[^15], *peccatum habitat in carne*. Liberum ergo arbitrium, cum semper et in singulis sit liberum, non est tamen pariter liberum in bonis et in malis, et ad bona et ad mala. Liberius est enim in bonis, ubi liberatum est, quam in malis, ubi liberatum non est. Et liberius est ad malum, quod per se potest, quam ad bonum, quod, nisi gratia liberetur et adiuvetur, non potest.

#### Cap. IX.

#### *De libertate, quae est ex gratia, et quae ex natura.*

Libertas ergo a *peccato* et a *miseria* per gratiam est, libertas vero a *necessitate* per naturam. Utramque libertatem, naturae scilicet et gratiae, notat Apostolus[^16], cum ex persona hominis non redempti ait: *Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio*; ac si diceret: habeo libertatem naturae, sed non habeo libertatem gratiae; ideo non est apud me perfectio boni. Nam voluntas hominis, quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam *liberetur* et *adiuvetur*: *liberetur* quidem, ut velit, et *adiuvetur*, ut perficiat; quia, ut ait Apostolus, *non est volentis velle, neque currentis currere*, id est operari, sed *miserentis Dei*; *qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum*, cuius gratiam non advocat hominis voluntas vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praevenit praeparando, ut velit bonum, et praeparatam adiuvat, ut perficiat.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXV.

#### Part II.

#### Chapter V.

#### *On the difference of the freedom of choice according to different times.*

From the aforesaid it becomes clear that the *first* freedom of choice was greater than the *second*, and the *third* much greater than the *second* or the *first*. For the first freedom of choice was that in which one was able to sin and not to sin; the *last* will be that in which one will be able not to sin and unable to sin; but the *middle* one is that in which one is able to sin and unable not to sin — before reparation even mortally, but after reparation at least venially.

#### Chapter VI.

#### *On the four states of free choice.*

And four states of free choice can be noted in man. For *before* sin nothing impeded toward the good, nothing impelled toward evil. He had no infirmity toward evil and had help toward the good. Then reason could judge without error, and the will could seek the good without difficulty. But *after* sin, *before* the reparation of grace, [the will] is pressed by concupiscence and overcome, and has infirmity in evil but does not have grace in good; and therefore it *can sin* and *cannot not sin*, even damnably. But *after* reparation, *before* confirmation, it is pressed by concupiscence but is not overcome, and has indeed infirmity in evil, but grace in good, so that it *can sin* through liberty and infirmity, and *can not-sin* unto death through liberty and assisting grace; yet it does not yet have *to be wholly able not to sin*, or *to be unable to sin*, because the infirmity is not yet perfectly absorbed and because grace is not yet perfectly[^1] consummated. But *after* confirmation, the infirmity being wholly consumed and grace consummated, it will be neither able to be overcome nor pressed, and then it will have *to be unable to sin*.

#### Chapter VII.

#### *On the corruption of free choice through sin.*

Whence it is manifest that, besides the other penalties, for that sin man incurred a penalty in the corruption and depression of free choice. For through that sin the natural goods in man were corrupted and the gratuitous ones taken away. For this is he who was wounded and despoiled by *robbers*[^2]: *wounded* indeed in his natural goods, of which he was not deprived, otherwise reparation could not be made; but *despoiled* of the gratuitous goods which had been added to the natural ones. These are the *best gifts and perfect endowments*, of which some are *corrupted* through sin, that is, the natural ones, such as talent, memory, intellect; others are *taken away*, that is, the gratuitous ones, although the natural ones too are from grace; for the *genus* is referred to the *general*. The freedom of choice, therefore, was corrupted through sin and in part lost. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^3]: « By misusing free choice, man destroyed both himself and it. For when one sinned by free choice, with sin victorious, free choice too was lost. *For by whatever a man is overcome, to this is he assigned as a slave* ». — Behold, he says that man lost free choice, not because after sin he did not have *free choice*, but because he lost the *freedom of choice* — not indeed *all of it*, but the freedom from *misery* and from *sin*.

#### Chapter VIII.

#### *On the three modes of the freedom of free choice: from necessity, from sin, from misery.*

For freedom is threefold, namely from *necessity*, from sin, from *misery*[^4]. — From necessity, choice is equally free both before sin and after. For just as then it could not be coerced, so neither now. And therefore the *will* is deservedly judged before God, which is always free from necessity and can never be coerced. Where there is necessity, there is no freedom; where there is no freedom[^5], there is no will, and therefore no merit. This freedom is in all, as much in the evil as in the good. — There is also another freedom, namely from sin, of which the Apostle says[^6]: *Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom*; and Truth in the Gospel: *If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed*. This freedom frees from the servitude of sin and makes [men] servants of justice, just as conversely the servitude of sin makes [men] free from justice. Whence the Apostle: *Being made free from sin, you became servants of justice*. And again: *When you were servants of sin, you were free from justice*. This freedom man lost by sinning; and therefore Augustine[^7] says that man, by misusing free choice, destroyed both himself and it, because the freedom was lost through sin — not from necessity, but from sin. *For he who commits sin is the servant of sin*.

This freedom, which is from sin, only those now have whom the Son frees and repairs through grace — not so that they are entirely without sin in this mortal flesh, but so that in them sin does not dominate nor reign. And this is the true and good freedom, which gives birth to a good servitude, namely of justice. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^8] says: « No one will be free for doing justice unless, being freed from sin, he begins to be a servant of justice; and this is the true freedom for the joy of right action, together with a pious servitude for obedience to the precept ». — There is another *non-true* freedom, joined to an evil servitude, which is for doing evil, where reason dissents from the will, judging that what the will desires ought not to be done; but toward doing the good reason agrees with the will, and therefore the freedom is true and pious. But concerning the freedom toward evil and the evil servitude, Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*[^9]: « What freedom can there be for one assigned as a servant to sin, except when it delights him to sin? For he serves freely who willingly does the will of his Lord; and through this he is *free for sinning* who is the *servant of sin* ».

Here it can be asked whether this freedom, by which one is free toward evil, is the freedom of choice. For if it is the freedom of choice, it is indeed something good, because the freedom of choice is a natural good. — To some it seems that it is the very freedom of choice, which is always good, but which on account of the servitude of sin is freer and more prone toward evil; and therefore it is said not to be true freedom, because it is toward evil. — But to others it seems that this freedom[^10] toward evil, which Augustine mentioned above, is not the freedom of choice itself, but is a certain proneness to sinning and a crookedness which is from sin and is evil.

Likewise it is also wont to be asked whether that true freedom, which is for doing justice, is the freedom of choice itself. — Some say that it is the same one, but repaired through grace, by whose help it is free toward the good, while without grace it is not free toward the good. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^11]: « Whence will this freedom for doing well belong to a man assigned and sold [into bondage], unless he redeem him who says: *If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed*? And before this begins to come to pass in man, how does anyone glory in free choice, who is not yet free for working well »? — Behold, he plainly shows that free choice is freed through grace, so that through it one may work well. And therefore they say that the true freedom, which is for doing well, of which Augustine made mention above, is the freedom of choice itself, freed and assisted by the grace of God. — But others think that it is not the freedom of choice itself, but a certain other [freedom], which from grace and free choice begins to be in the mind of man, God working, when it is repaired[^12].

But it pleases us more that the freedom of choice itself be both that by which one is free toward evil, and that by which one is free toward doing good. For from various causes it obtains diverse names. For it is called the freedom for doing evil before it is repaired through grace; but when it has been repaired through grace, it is called the freedom for doing good, because before grace the will is free toward evil, but through grace it becomes free toward the good. Always therefore the will of man is in some way free, but it is not always good. For it is not good unless freed from sin, yet it is free from necessity. Whence Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Choice*[^13]: « The will in us is always free, but it is not always good. For either it is free from justice when it serves sin, and then it is evil; or it is free from sin when it serves justice, and then it is good ».

Again, there is a freedom from *misery*, of which the Apostle[^14] says: *And the creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the sons of God*. This freedom man had before sin, because he lacked all misery and was touched by no trouble, and he will have it more fully in future beatitude, where he will be unable to be wretched. But in this life, which is between the first sin and the final confirmation, no one is free from misery, because one is not without the penalty of sin.

From the aforesaid it now appears in what way free choice has been diminished and corrupted through sin, since before sin there was for man no difficulty and no impediment from the law of the members toward the good, no impulse or instigation toward evil. But now through the law of the flesh he is impeded toward the good and instigated toward evil, so that he cannot will and accomplish the good unless he is freed and assisted by grace, because, as the Apostle says[^15], *sin dwells in the flesh*. Free choice, therefore, although it is always and in each one free, is nevertheless not equally free in good things and in evil, and toward good things and toward evil. For it is freer in good things, where it is freed, than in evil things, where it is not freed. And it is freer toward evil, which it can do of itself, than toward the good, which it cannot do unless it be freed and assisted by grace.

#### Chapter IX.

#### *On the freedom which is from grace, and that which is from nature.*

The freedom, therefore, from *sin* and from *misery* is through grace, but the freedom from *necessity* is through nature. Both freedoms, namely of nature and of grace, the Apostle notes[^16], when from the person of unredeemed man he says: *To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I find not*; as if he said: I have the freedom of nature, but I do not have the freedom of grace; therefore the perfection of the good is not with me. For the will of man, which he has naturally, is not able to be raised toward the good for willing it effectively or fulfilling it in deed, unless through grace it be *freed* and *assisted*: *freed* indeed, that it may will, and *assisted*, that it may accomplish; because, as the Apostle says, *it is not of him that wills to will, nor of him that runs to run*, that is, to work, but *of God that shows mercy*; *who works in us to will and to accomplish the good*, whose grace the will or working of man does not summon, but grace itself prevents the will by preparing it, that it may will the good, and assists it once prepared, that it may accomplish.

---

la: Ita in codd. et ed. 1; in aliis *plene*.

en: Thus in the codices and edition 1; in the others, *plene* (fully).

la: Luc. 10, 30; cfr. Ambr. et Beda in hunc locum.

en: Luke 10:30; compare Ambrose and Bede on this passage.

la: Enchirid. c. 30. n. 9. — Locus Scripturae est II. Petr. 2, 19.

en: *Enchiridion*, chapter 30, n. 9. — The scriptural passage is 2 Pet. 2:19.

la: Bernard., de Gratia et lib. arbitrio c. 3. n. 7. — Superius edd. 1, 2, 3, 8 post *libertas* addunt *arbitrii*.

en: Bernard, *On Grace and Free Choice*, chapter 3, n. 7. — Above, editions 1, 2, 3, 8 add *arbitrii* (of choice) after *libertas*.

la: In Vat. desunt verba *ubi non est libertas*.

en: In the Vatican edition the words *ubi non est libertas* (where there is no freedom) are lacking.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 3, 17. Seq. locus Scripturae est Ioan. 8, 36; tertius et quartus Rom. 6, 18 et 20.

en: Epistle, 2 Cor. 3:17. The following scriptural passage is John 8:36; the third and fourth, Rom. 6:18 and 20.

la: Enchirid. c. 30. n. 9. Vide supra c. 7.

en: *Enchiridion*, chapter 30, n. 9. See above, chapter 7.

en: Chapter 30, n. 9.

la: Ibid., in quo textu edd. 1-9 post *peccato* addunt *scilicet*; codd., excepto A, omittunt etiam *peccato*.

en: Ibid., in which text editions 1–9 add *scilicet* (namely) after *peccato*; the codices, except A, also omit *peccato*.

la: Edd. 1, 8 addunt *arbitrii*.

en: Editions 1, 8 add *arbitrii* (of choice).

la: Ibid. — Textus Scripturae est Ioan. 8, 36. — In verbis Augustini Vat. cum edd. 8, 9 post *faciendum* ponit *nunquam* pro *unde* et cum pluribus edd. post *vendito* addit *sub peccato* et omittit *ille* ante *qui*.

en: Ibid. — The scriptural passage is John 8:36. — In Augustine's words the Vatican edition, with editions 8, 9, places *nunquam* (never) after *faciendum* instead of *unde*, and with several editions adds *sub peccato* (under sin) after *vendito* and omits *ille* before *qui*.

la: Vat. cum ceteris edd., exceptis 1, 6, *reparatus est*, refragantibus codd.

en: The Vatican edition, with the other editions except 1 and 6, [reads] *reparatus est*, the codices being opposed.

en: Chapter 13, n. 31.

la: Rom. 8, 21. — Paulo inferius pro *quia omni* edd. 1, 8 *qui omni*.

en: Rom. 8:21. — A little below, for *quia omni* editions 1, 8 [read] *qui omni*.

la: Rom. 7, 18. Seqq. duo textus sunt Rom. 9, 16, et Phil. 2, 13.

en: Rom. 7:18. The following two texts are Rom. 9:16 and Phil. 2:13.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p589-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p590-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p591-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, plus full-resolution sub-crops of p.589/p.591 columns under `/Users/wilsonpruitt/.cache/claude-tmp/`); cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines ~41210–41383, two-column cascade-shattered). The chunk is the **Littera Magistri** for Distinctio XXV, Pars II, Capitula V–IX (Lombard's text), theme *de libero arbitrio*.

**Chapter count = FIVE (Cap. V–IX).** Headings: V *De differentia libertatis arbitrii secundum diversa tempora*; VI *De quatuor statibus liberi arbitrii*; VII *De corruptione liberi arbitrii per peccatum*; VIII *De tribus modis libertatis liberi arbitrii: a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria*; IX *De libertate, quae est ex gratia, et quae ex natura*. Cap. V opens **Pars II** ("Pars II" header lower-left on p.589 below the d.25-p1 Cap. IV tail).

**Boundaries.** Cap. V opens lower-left on p.589, below the d.25-p1-littera Cap. IV tail (which ends "…quod ex ratione decreverit"); the "Pars II" header marks the start. Cap. V–VI run the p.589 L-column; Cap. VII–VIII run the p.589 R-column; Cap. VIII continues across both columns of p.590; Cap. IX runs the p.591 L-column and its tail wraps to the p.591 R-column top, ending "…ut perficiat." immediately before the **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV** (Pars I commentary, raw ~41383) which belongs to `d25-p1-divisio`.

**Page-split map (printed pages; Quaracchi restarts footers per page):**
- **p.589** — Cap. V, VI (L-column), Cap. VII, VIII opener (R-column). Body markers: "perfecte¹"→[^1] (Ita in codd. *plene*); "spoliatus²"→[^2] (Luc. 10,30); "Enchiridio³"→[^3] (Enchirid. c.30 n.9, II Petr. 2,19); "a miseria⁴"→[^4] (Bernard., de Gratia c.3 n.7). The p.589 footer 1 (Ioan. 8,34 + Hugone source-note tail) served Cap. IV and was claimed by `d25-p1-littera` ([^7]); its Hugone tail ("Quod sequitur est ex Hugone…") is a provenance note for the following capitula, recorded here but carrying no body marker.
- **p.590** — Cap. VIII (both columns). Footers 1–11 → [^5]–[^15]. Body markers: "ubi non est libertas¹"→[^5]; "Apostolus²: Ubi Spiritus Domini"→[^6]; "Augustinus³ dicit"→[^7]; "Enchiridio⁴: Ad iustitiam"→[^8]; "Enchiridio⁵: Servi addicti"→[^9]; "libertas⁶ ad malum"→[^10]; "Enchiridio⁷: Ista libertas"→[^11]; "reparatur⁸"→[^12]; "de Gratia et libero arbitrio⁹"→[^13]; "Apostolus¹⁰: Et ipsa creatura"→[^14]; "Apostolus¹¹: peccatum habitat in carne"→[^15].
- **p.591** — Cap. IX (L-column + R-column top). Footer 1 → [^16] (Rom. 7,18; Rom. 9,16; Phil. 2,13) at "Apostolus¹⁶". Below the Cap. IX tail the **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV** (Pars I) begins; that and its "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM" footer belong to `d25-p1-divisio`.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from `d25-p1-littera`: confirmation that the p.589 footer 1 (Ioan. 8,34) was fully owned upstream (Cap. IV, [^7]); this chunk's apparatus therefore begins with the NOTAE footers 2–5 (renumbered [^1]–[^4]); the Hugone source-note tail of footer 1 was forwarded as provenance for Cap. V–VIII and is recorded in this Notes block. FORWARDED to `d25-p1-divisio`: the p.591 COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV (Pars I commentary, raw ~41383) and its NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footer.

**[?] flags:** none. Body is clean Lombard running prose. Quaracchi side-glosses bleeding into the OCR / margins ("Dubium 1/2/3", "Libertas a necessitate", "Libertas a peccato", "Haec sit per gratiam", "Falsa libertas", "Quaestio de falsa libertate", "Opinio 1/2", "Libertas a miseria", "Corollarium") were trimmed as marginalia, not Lombard's text.

**has_scholion: false** — Littera chunks carry no scholion.


title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXV, Pars I — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXV, Part I — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 591 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV.

### Pars I.

### *De libero arbitrio secundum se et in generali.*

*Iam vero ad propositum redeamus* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad alias potentias; hic vero agit de libero arbitrio secundum se. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes. In prima determinat, quid sit liberum arbitrium *in se* sive in generali. In secunda vero determinat de libertate arbitrii secundum differentes eius *status* in speciali, ibi: *Ex praedictis perspicuum est* etc. Prima pars habet duas particulas. In quarum prima Magister ponit liberi arbitrii assignationem. In secunda ad praedictae assignationis explanationem quandam removet[^1] dubitationem, ibi: *Et quidem secundum praedictam assignationem* etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quid sit liberum arbitrium. In secunda vero ex illa definitione elicit, quod liberum arbitrium non est praesentium nec praeteritorum, sed *futurorum*, et horum non quorumlibet, sed *futurorum contingentium*, ibi: *Hoc autem sciendum est, quod liberum arbitrium* etc. Similiter secunda pars habet duas, in quarum prima movet dubitationem, in secunda vero determinat, ibi: *Sed aliter accipitur liberum arbitrium* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidit hic quaestio, quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem. Et quoniam eius quidditas et natura cognoscitur in assignando convenientiam et differentiam ipsius ad voluntatem et rationem, ideo de ipso quaerendum est in comparatione ad rationem et voluntatem. Ad huius autem comparationis dilucidationem circa sex contingit dubitare et quaerere.

<!-- page 592 -->

Primo enim quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem et voluntatem.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem, an non.

Tertio, dato quod non, quaeritur, utrum complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.

Quarto, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum complectatur illas duas potentias per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus.

Quinto, dato quod per modum habitus, quaeritur, utrum habitus ille addat aliquid per essentiam rationi et voluntati.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, secundum quam illarum duarum potentiarum principalius insit animae libertas arbitrii, utrum videlicet secundum rationem, an secundum voluntatem.

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXV.

### Part I.

### *On free choice considered in itself and in general.*

*Now let us return to our subject* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of free choice in comparison to the other powers; here, however, he treats of free choice in itself. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first he determines what free choice is *in itself* or in general. In the second he determines concerning the freedom of choice according to its different *states* in particular, there: *From the foregoing it is clear* etc. The first part has two subdivisions. In the first of these the Master sets down the definition of free choice. In the second he removes[^1] a certain difficulty toward the explanation of the foregoing definition, there: *And indeed, according to the aforesaid definition* etc. The first part has two [divisions]. In the first he determines what free choice is. In the second, from that definition, he draws out that free choice is not of present nor of past things, but of *future* things, and of these not of any whatever, but of *future contingent* things, there: *This too must be known, that free choice* etc. Likewise the second part has two [divisions], in the first of which he raises a difficulty, and in the second he determines it, there: *But free choice is taken otherwise* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part there arises here the question what free choice is in reality. And since its quiddity and nature is known in assigning its agreement with, and difference from, the will and reason, therefore inquiry must be made concerning it in comparison to reason and the will. Now for the clarification of this comparison there is occasion to raise doubt and inquiry concerning six [points].

For, first, it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will.

Second, granting that it is, it is asked whether it is a power distinct from reason and will, or not.

Third, granting that it is not, it is asked whether it embraces reason and will together.

Fourth, granting that it does, it is asked whether it embraces those two powers after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit.

Fifth, granting that it is after the manner of a habit, it is asked whether that habit adds anything by essence to reason and will.

Sixth and last, it is asked according to which of those two powers the freedom of choice more principally resides in the soul, namely whether according to reason, or according to the will.

---

la: NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. Vat. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 et cod. cc *movet*.

en: Notes on the commentary. The Vatican edition, together with editions 1, 3, and 4 and codex cc, reads *movet* ("he moves" / "he raises").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 591–592 = PDF 613–614, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 41383–41447 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). This chunk holds the **Pars I COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV** opener + **DIVISIO TEXTUS** + **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** (the listing of the six questions of ARTICULUS UNICUS). `has_scholion=false` (no scholion attaches to a divisio chunk).

**Page-split map.** COMMENTARIUS header + Pars I lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS + opening of TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM sit on **p.591 R-column** (raw 41383–41435). The six-question list runs across the p.591/p.592 boundary; `<!-- page 592 -->` placed at the Primo…Sexto question list, which completes on **p.592** (raw 41436 onward; ARTICULUS UNICUS QUAESTIO I body begins p.592 at raw ~41437).

**Hand-offs RECEIVED.** From `d25-p2-littera`: the p.591 COMMENTARIUS + its "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM" footer (*Vat. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 et cod. cc movet*) anchor here — rendered as [^1], anchored at the DIVISIO-TEXTUS word *removet* (the variant offers *movet*). The other p.591 left footer "¹ Rom. 7, 18. — Seqq. duo textus sunt Rom. 9, 16, et Phil. 2, 13." belongs to the Cap. IX littera tail and is already held by `d25-p2-littera` [^16]; not duplicated here.

**Hand-offs FORWARDED.** None — QUAESTIO I of ARTICULUS UNICUS (its own footers) begins fresh at p.592 in `d25-p1-a1-q1`.

**Pars I TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, verified at 450 dpi — q-alignment reference for the six ARTICULUS UNICUS quaestiones):**
1. *Primo enim quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem et voluntatem.*
2. *Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem, an non.*
3. *Tertio, dato quod non, quaeritur, utrum complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.*
4. *Quarto, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum complectatur illas duas potentias per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus.*
5. *Quinto, dato quod per modum habitus, quaeritur, utrum habitus ille addat aliquid per essentiam rationi et voluntati.*
6. *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, secundum quam illarum duarum potentiarum principalius insit animae libertas arbitrii, utrum videlicet secundum rationem, an secundum voluntatem.*

**Dup cleanup.** The stray `bon-sent-II-d25-p1-divisio-dup2.md` was **NOT** a byte-duplicate of this chunk: its auto-chunked body (raw 42608–42636) is in fact the **Pars II DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** (theme *De libero arbitrio secundum differentes eius status in speciali*; question-list "in comparatione ad subiectum / actum / obiectum / aliud agens creatum / movens primum / corpus coniunctum"). Since `d25-p2-divisio` did not yet exist and is on the to-build list, the file was **renamed** to `bon-sent-II-d25-p2-divisio.md` (id corrected) rather than deleted, preserving the auto-chunked Pars II skeleton. No content lost.

**[?] flags.** None.