title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec proprietas conveniat Deo in summo, id est, utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.

1. Et quod sic, videtur per Anselmum[^1], qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed maius est quod non potest cogitari non esse, quam quod potest: ergo cum Deo nihil maius cogitari possit[^2], divinum esse ita est, quod non potest cogitari non esse.

2. Item, Damascenus[^3] dicit, quod cognitio essendi Deum nobis naturaliter est impressa; sed naturales impressiones non relinquunt nec assuescunt in contrarium: ergo veritas Dei impressa menti humanae est inseparabilis ab ipsa: ergo non potest cogitari non esse.

3. Item, maior est veritas in esse divino quam in aliqua dignitate[^4]; sed aliqua dignitas ita est vera, quod non est ei contradicere corde, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia; unde non potest cogitari non esse: ergo multo fortius hoc erit verum dicere de prima veritate.

4. Item, intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem[^5], ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare, non esse primam lucem sive veritatem: ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare, primam veritatem non esse.

5. Item, quod contingit cogitare contingit enuntiare[^6]; sed non contingit enuntiare, primam veritatem non esse: ergo nec cogitare. Probatio: omnis sermo enuntiativus asserit, se esse verum; unde sequitur: si homo est asinus, hominem esse asinum est verum; sed omne quod ponit veritatem, ponit primam veritatem, quia omnis veritas infert illam: ergo omnis sermo asserit, primam veritatem esse: ergo etc.

6. Item, omnis sermo enuntiativus[^7] aut affirmativus est, aut negativus; sed affirmativus affirmat *hoc* de *hoc*; sed sequitur: si est ens quod est hoc, est ens quod non est hoc, quia cum dico ens hoc, dico ens limitatum, finitum et arctatum; et tali posito, ponitur ens summum: ergo omnis sermo affirmativus circa creaturam infert Deum.

7. Item, negativus similiter, quia nullus sermo est magis negativus quam iste: nulla est veritas. Sed Augustinus in *Soliloquiis*[^8] probat, quod sermo iste ponit, aliquam veritatem esse; quia si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse; et si hoc est verum, aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, aliqua veritas est: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Damascenus[^9]: «In tantum praevaluit perniciosa hominum malitia, ut dicat, Deum non esse, secundum illud Psalmi: *Dixit insipiens* etc.»

2. Item, idolatra dicit, quod non est alius Deus nisi idolum, et hoc credit et cogitat; sed constat idolum non esse Deum: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud, quo intellecto non esse, potest aliquid intelligi, potest cogitari non esse. Sed dicit Boethius in libro *de Hebdomadibus*[^10], quod in-

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tellecto esse impossibile, summum bonum non esse, adhuc potest aliquid intelligi rotundum et album: ergo similiter in summo vero, et sic poterit cogitari non esse.

4. Item, illud quod maxime nos latet, de facili potest cogitari non esse: sed veritas divini esse est huiusmodi, quia *Deus habitat lucem inaccessibilem*[^11]: ergo etc.

5. Item, quaero, quid est dicere, Deum non posse cogitari non esse? Si quia non potest aliquo modo cogitari[^12] nec *vero* nec *false*, illud est manifeste falsum: si quia non potest *vere*, similiter nec anima nec caelum et huiusmodi.

6. Item, quod contingit exprimere contingit[^13] et cogitare; sed contingit exprimere, divinum esse non esse: ergo et cogitare. Quod contingat, hoc patet, cum dicitur in speciali: Deus non est, et in generali: nihil est; et quod neutra istarum inferat, Deum esse, patet, quia oppositum non infert oppositum[^14], et quod nihil ponit nihil infert; quaelibet autem istarum nihil ponit.

### Conclusio.

> Tanta est veritas divini esse, ut non possit cum assensu cogitari non esse nisi propter defectum ex parte intelligentis, qui ignorat, quid sit Deus; ex parte vero intelligibilis non potest esse defectus nec praesentiae nec evidentiae, sive in se, sive in probando.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid cogitare[^15] non esse est dupliciter. Aut in ratione falsi, sicut cogito de hac: homo est asinus; et hoc cogitare nihil aliud est quam quid est, quod dicitur, intelligere. Hoc modo potest cogitari non esse veritas divini esse.

Alio modo est cogitare cum assensu, sicut cogito aliquid non esse, et credo non esse: et hoc modo aliquid cogitare non esse, quod est, potest venire aut ex defectu intelligentis, aut ex defectu intelligibilis.

Defectus autem *intelligentis* est caecitas vel ignorantia, ob quam, quia ignorat rem, cogitat[^16] ipsam non esse. Contingit autem dupliciter esse cogitationem de aliquo ente, videlicet *si est* et *quid est*[^17].

Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad cognitionem, *quid est*, tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem, *si est*. Unde Hugo[^18]: «Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam, *quid* esset, poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam, *quia* esset, poterat ignorari». Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei, *si est*, ideo nec potest ignorare, ipsum esse simpliciter[^19], nec cogitare non esse.

Quia vero deficit in cognitione, *quid est*, ideo frequenter cogitat, Deum esse quod non est, sicut idolum, vel non esse quod est, sicut Deum iustum[^20]. Et quia qui cogitat, Deum non esse quod est, ut iustum, per consequens cogitat, ipsum non esse: ideo ratione defectus intellectus Deus potest cogitari non esse sive summa veritas; non tamen simpliciter sive generaliter, sed ex consequenti, sicut qui negat, beatitudinem esse in Deo, negat eum[^21] esse.

Hoc autem modo procedunt rationes probantes, quod aliquis intellectus cogitat vel cogitare[^22] potest, divinum esse non esse.

Alio modo potest cogitari, aliquid non esse propter defectum a parte intelligibilis, et huiusmodi defectus potest esse dupliciter: aut defectus praesentiae, aut defectus evidentiae; defectus praesentiae, utpote quia non semper, non ubique[^23], non ubique totaliter. Quod non semper est, aliquando est, aliquando non: et ideo aliquando vere potest cogitari non esse. Similiter de eo quod non est ubique, quia eadem ratione, qua potest cogitari non esse hic, potest cogitari non esse alibi. Similiter de eo quod secundum partem adest, secundum partem abest.

Deus autem est semper et ubique et totus semper et ubique: ideo non potest cogitari non esse. Hanc rationem assignat Anselmus in libro contra in-

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Non solum propter defectum praesentiae[^24] potest cogitari aliquid non esse, sed etiam propter defectum evidentiae, quia non est evidens in se, nec est evidens in probando. Sed divini esse veritas est evidens et in se et in probando. In se, quia sicut principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos[^25], et quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, ideo se ipsis sunt evidentia; sic et in proposito. Nam Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest: ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto. Nec tantum habet evidentiam ex[^26] se, sed etiam ex probatione, quoniam divinam veritatem esse probat et concludit omnis veritas et natura creata, quia si est ens per participationem et ab alio, est ens per essentiam et non ab alio. Probat etiam ipsam et concludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae eius cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam. Probat iterum ipsam et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito ponitur veritas, quae est causa omnis veri[^27]. Propositio autem negativa non probat ipsam nisi sophistice, ut dicunt. Unde ex hoc quod est nihil, esse, vel nullam veritatem esse, non contingit concludere nec inferre, veritatem esse. Haec enim propositio: nihil esse[^28], destruit omnem veritatem. Et ideo ad ipsam non sequitur aliqua affirmatio, et haec est falsa: si nihil est, nihil esse est verum. Et si dicatur, quod omnis propositio infert dictum, verum est, sed si nihil est, nulla propositio est nec aliquid. Augustinus autem tale argumentum non facit approbando, sed inquirendo.

Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divini esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis, qui ignorat, quid est quod per nomen Dei[^29] dicitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae sint sophisticae.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: *In tantum praevaluit* etc.; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de cogitatione, quae venit ab excaecatione; quod patet ex ipso verbo eius, cum dicit *malitia*.

2. Similiter ad illud de idolo, dicendum, quod ideo errat[^30], quia ignorat, quid sit; unde non cogitat, Deum non esse in universali.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellecto Deo non esse, possunt alia[^31] intelligi; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de intellectu, quo per impossibile aliquid cogitamus, sed non assentimus.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maxime nos latet; patet responsio, quia[^32] maxime nos latet, *quid* est, sed tamen maxime patet, *si* est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quid est dicere, divinam veritatem non posse cogitari non esse? dicendum, quod hoc est dicere, quod[^33] aliquis non potest credere, quod Deus non sit, dummodo utatur ratione. Non sic de creaturis; quia etsi certum est, unam creaturam esse praesentem uni, non tamen omnibus, quia non est virtutis tantae, ut se omnibus offerat aequaliter, sicut prima veritas.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare; dicendum, quod potest accipi cogitare generaliter pro actu mentis sive errantis sive non, sive assentientis sive non; et tunc est illud verum; vel pro cogitatione cum assensu; et sic est falsum, quia dignitatibus contingit contradicere quantum ad exterius rationem, non tamen quantum ad interius, ut dicit Philosophus in libro *Posteriorum*[^34].

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### Question II. *Whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.*

Secondly it is asked whether this property belongs to God in the highest degree, that is, whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.

1. And that it is so, seems [proved] through Anselm[^1], who says that God, according to the common conception of the mind, is that than which nothing greater can be thought; but that which cannot be thought not to be is greater than that which can; therefore, since nothing greater than God can be thought[^2], the divine being is such that it cannot be thought not to be.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^3] says that the knowledge of God's existing is naturally impressed upon us; but natural impressions do not desert us nor grow accustomed to the contrary: therefore the truth of God impressed upon the human mind is inseparable from it: therefore it cannot be thought not to be.

3. Likewise, there is greater truth in the divine being than in any axiom[^4]; but some axiom is so true that one cannot contradict it in the heart, as, every whole is greater than its part, and the like; whence it cannot be thought not to be: therefore much more strongly will this be true to say of the first truth.

4. Likewise, our intellect understands nothing except through the first light and truth[^5]; therefore every action of the intellect, which consists in thinking something not to be, is through the first light; but through the first light it does not happen [one] to think the first light or truth not to be: therefore in no way does it happen [one] to think the first truth not to be.

5. Likewise, what it happens [one] to think, it happens [one] to enunciate[^6]; but it does not happen [one] to enunciate the first truth not to be: therefore neither to think it. Proof: every enunciative speech asserts itself to be true; whence it follows: if man is an ass, that man is an ass is true; but everything which posits truth posits the first truth, because every truth implies it: therefore every speech asserts that the first truth is: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every enunciative speech[^7] is either affirmative or negative; but the affirmative affirms *this* of *this*; but it follows: if there is a being which is this, there is a being which is not this, because when I say "this being," I say a being limited, finite, and constricted; and with such posited, the highest being is posited: therefore every affirmative speech concerning the creature implies God.

7. Likewise, the negative similarly, because no speech is more negative than this: there is no truth. But Augustine in the *Soliloquies*[^8] proves that this speech posits some truth to be; because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, some truth is: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene[^9]: «So far has the pernicious malice of men prevailed, that he says God is not, according to that of the Psalm: *The fool hath said* etc.»

2. Likewise, the idolater says that there is no other God except the idol, and this he believes and thinks; but it is established that the idol is not God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every such thing, with which understood not to be, something can be understood, can be thought not to be. But Boethius in the book *de Hebdomadibus*[^10] says that with [it] understood to be impossible that the highest good is not, something round and white can still be understood: therefore similarly in the highest true, and thus it will be able to be thought not to be.

4. Likewise, that which is most hidden from us can easily be thought not to be: but the truth of the divine being is of this sort, because *God dwells in inaccessible light*[^11]: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, I ask, what is it to say that God cannot be thought not to be? If because he cannot in any way be thought[^12] either *truly* or *falsely*, that is manifestly false; if because he cannot *truly*, similarly neither the soul nor the heaven and the like [can be thought not to be].

6. Likewise, what it happens [one] to express, it happens [one] also[^13] to think; but it happens [one] to express the divine being not to be: therefore also to think it. That it does so happen is clear, when it is said in particular: God is not, and in general: nothing is; and that neither of these implies God to be is clear, because the opposite does not imply the opposite[^14], and what posits nothing implies nothing; but each of these posits nothing.

### Conclusion.

> So great is the truth of the divine being, that it cannot be thought not to be with assent except on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding, who is ignorant of what God is; but on the part of the intelligible there can be no defect either of presence or of evidence, whether in itself or in proving.

**I respond:** It must be said that to think[^15] something not to be is twofold. Either in the manner of the false, as I think concerning this: man is an ass; and this thinking is nothing other than to understand what is said. In this way the truth of the divine being can be thought not to be.

In another way it is to think with assent, as I think something not to be, and I believe it not to be: and in this way to think something not to be which is, can come either from a defect of the one understanding, or from a defect of the intelligible.

Now the defect of the *one understanding* is blindness or ignorance, on account of which, because he is ignorant of the thing, he thinks[^16] it not to be. But it happens that the thinking concerning some being is twofold, namely *whether it is* and *what it is*[^17].

Our intellect, however, fails in the thinking of the divine truth as to the cognition of *what it is*, yet does not fail as to the cognition of *whether it is*. Whence Hugh[^18]: «God so from the beginning tempered the knowledge of himself in man, that just as never could *what* he is be comprehended, so never could *that* he is be ignored». Since therefore our intellect never fails in the cognition of God, *whether he is*, therefore neither can it be ignorant that he is simply[^19], nor think him not to be.

But because it fails in the cognition of *what he is*, therefore it frequently thinks God to be what he is not, as the idol, or not to be what he is, as a just God[^20]. And because he who thinks God not to be what he is, e.g. just, consequently thinks him not to be: therefore by reason of the defect of the intellect God can be thought not to be, or [thought to be] the highest truth [not to be]; not however simply or generally, but as a consequence, as he who denies blessedness to be in God denies him[^21] to be.

In this way proceed the reasons proving that some intellect thinks or can think[^22] the divine being not to be.

In another way it can be thought that something is not on account of a defect on the part of the intelligible, and a defect of this sort can be twofold: either a defect of presence, or a defect of evidence; a defect of presence, inasmuch as [a thing] is not always, not everywhere[^23], not everywhere wholly. What is not always, sometimes is, sometimes is not: and therefore sometimes truly can be thought not to be. Similarly concerning that which is not everywhere, because by the same reason by which it can be thought not to be here, it can be thought not to be elsewhere. Similarly concerning that which is present in part, is absent in part.

But God is always and everywhere and wholly always and everywhere: therefore he cannot be thought not to be. This reason Anselm assigns in the book against the [insipient]…

Not only on account of a defect of presence[^24] can something be thought not to be, but also on account of a defect of evidence, because it is not evident in itself, nor evident in being proved. But the truth of the divine being is evident both in itself and in being proved. In itself, because just as we know principles insofar as [we know] the terms[^25], and because the cause of the predicate is enclosed in the subject, therefore they are evident through themselves; so also in the matter at hand. For God or the highest truth is being itself, than which nothing better can be thought: therefore it cannot not be, nor be thought not to be. For the predicate is enclosed in the subject. Nor does it have evidence only from[^26] itself, but also from proof, since every truth and created nature proves and concludes the divine truth to be, because if there is a being by participation and from another, there is a being by essence and not from another. Every right understanding also proves and concludes the same, because the cognition of him is impressed upon every soul, and every cognition is through him. Again, every affirmative proposition proves and concludes the same; for every such posits something; and with something posited, the true is posited; and with the true posited, truth is posited, which is the cause of every true[^27]. The negative proposition, however, does not prove it except sophistically, as they say. Whence from this — that nothing is, or that no truth is — it does not happen to conclude or to infer that truth is. For this proposition: nothing is[^28], destroys all truth. And therefore no affirmation follows upon it, and this is false: if nothing is, "nothing is" is true. And if it be said that every proposition implies a *dictum*, this is true, but if nothing is, no proposition is, nor anything. Augustine, however, makes such an argument not by approving, but by inquiring.

It must therefore be granted, that so great is the truth of the divine being, that with assent it cannot be thought not to be except on account of the ignorance of the one thinking, who is ignorant of what that is which is said by the name of God[^29]. And the reasons to this effect must be granted, even though some are sophistical.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary: *So far has* etc.; it must be said that Damascene speaks of the thinking which comes from being blinded; which is clear from his own word, when he says *malice*.

2. Similarly to that about the idol, it must be said that [the idolater] errs[^30], because he is ignorant of what [God] is; whence he does not think God not to be universally.

3. To that which is objected, that with God understood not to be, other things[^31] can be understood; it must be said that Boethius speaks of the understanding by which we think something through the impossible, but do not assent.

4. To that which is objected, that [God] is most hidden from us; the response is clear, because[^32] *what* he is is most hidden from us, but yet *whether* he is is most manifest.

5. To that which is objected, what is it to say that the divine truth cannot be thought not to be? it must be said that this is to say that[^33] no one can believe that God is not, so long as he uses reason. Not so concerning creatures; because although it is certain that one creature is present to one [thing], not however to all, because it is not of such power that it offers itself equally to all, as the first truth does.

6. To that which is objected, that what it happens [one] to express, it happens [one] also to think; it must be said that "to think" can be taken generally for an act of the mind, whether erring or not, whether assenting or not; and then that [statement] is true; or for thinking with assent; and thus it is false, because to axioms it happens [one] to contradict as to the outer reasoning, not however as to the inner, as the Philosopher says in the book of the *Posteriora*[^34].

la: *Proslog.* c. 2. seqq.

en: Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 2 and following.

la: Aliqui codd. *possit*.

en: Some codices read *possit* ["may be able"].

la: Libr. 1. *de Fide orthod.* c. 1. et 3: *Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat.*

en: Book 1, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 1 and 3: "For there is no mortal in whom this has not been naturally implanted by him, that he should know God to be."

la: *Dignitas*, graece ἀξίωμα, hic et passim significat propositionem immediate sive per se notam, quam definit Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2, quod sit propositio indemonstrabilis, quam necesse est quemlibet docendum habere; et Boeth. *de Hebdomad.*, quod sit enuntiatio, quam quisque probat auditam.

en: *Dignitas*, in Greek ἀξίωμα ["axiom"], here and throughout signifies a proposition immediate or known *per se*, which Aristotle defines, I. Posterior c. 2, as an indemonstrable proposition which it is necessary that whoever is to be taught should have; and Boethius, *On the Hebdomads*, [defines it] as an enunciation which anyone, on hearing, approves.

la: De hac propositione, quae fundatur in doctrina S. Augustini, vide supra q. I. arg. 3. pro affirmativa parte, et d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. I. fundam. 2, ubi et in Scholio sensus ipsius explicatur. — Mox Vat. post *aliquid* omittit *non* et paulo infra post *cogitare* cum cod. cc omittit verba *non esse primam* usque *cogitare*, quae lectio mutila resarcitur ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1.

en: Concerning this proposition, which is founded in the doctrine of St. Augustine, see above q. I. arg. 3. for the affirmative side, and d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. I. fundam. 2, where its sense is also explained in the Scholion. — Shortly the Vatican edition after *aliquid* omits *non*, and a little further on after *cogitare*, together with codex cc, omits the words *non esse primam* down to *cogitare*; this mutilated reading is restored with the help of the other codices and ed. 1.

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 verba transponit *et modo negativo propositionem sic exhibet: quod non convenit enuntiare, hoc non convenit cogitare*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, transposes the words *and in the negative mode it exhibits the proposition thus: what is not fitting to enunciate, this is not fitting to think*.

la: De enuntiatione eiusque speciebus vide Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. de Enuntiatione. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *quia sequitur* pro *sed sequitur*.

en: Concerning the enunciation and its species see Aristotle, I. *Perihermeneias* c. On the Enunciation. — Shortly the Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *quia sequitur* ["because it follows"] for *sed sequitur* ["but it follows"].

la: Libr. II. c. 2. n. 2. et c. 15. n. 28. — Vat. cum cod. cc post *ponit* addit *primam*, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 nec non contra ed. operum Augustini.

en: Book II, c. 2, n. 2, and c. 15, n. 28. — The Vatican edition with codex cc after *ponit* adds *primam*, but against the other codices and ed. 1, and likewise against the edition of Augustine's works.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3.: *Quoniam vero Satanae improbitas tantum adversus hominum naturam valuit, ut et quosdam in stolidissimam et quovis malo peiorem exitii voraginem detruserit, ita ut Deum esse negarent, quorum insipientiam divinorum verborum interpres David palam faciens ait; Dixit insipiens in corde suo* (Psalm. 13, 1.) etc.

en: Book I, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3: "But since the wickedness of Satan has so prevailed against the nature of men, that it has thrust some into a most stupid, and worse than any evil, gulf of destruction, so that they should deny God to be, whose folly David, the interpreter of the divine words, openly disclosing, says: *The fool hath said in his heart* (Psalm 13:1) etc."

la: Seu in libro: *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint*, circa medium.

en: Or, in the book: *How substances, in that they are, are good*, near the middle.

la: 1. Tim. 6, 16; Vulgata: *lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem*.

en: 1 Tim. 6:16; the Vulgate: *he inhabits inaccessible light*.

la: Cod. W *potest cogitari aliquo modo non esse nec*.

en: Codex W [reads] *potest cogitari aliquo modo non esse nec*.

la: Plerique codd. ut ACSTVW etc. omittunt *contingit*.

en: Most codices, as ACSTVW etc., omit *contingit*.

la: Immo ipsum destruit, includendo negationem sui oppositi.

en: Rather it destroys it, by including the negation of its opposite.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *cogitari*, sed cum subnexis minus cohaerenter.

en: Very many codices with ed. 1 [read] *cogitari* ["to be thought"], but with what follows less coherently.

la: Codd. *aa bb* satis bene addunt *cum*.

en: Codices *aa bb* quite well add *cum*.

la: Fide vetustiorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus *ideo*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc praefigit verbo *cogitat*. Cod. V post *rem* addit *esse*.

en: On the authority of the older codices and ed. 1 we have expunged *ideo*, which the Vatican edition with codex cc prefixes to the verb *cogitat*. Codex V after *rem* adds *esse*.

la: Aristot., II. Poster. c. 1.

en: Aristotle, II. Posterior c. 1.

la: Libr. I. *de Sacram.* p. III. c. 1. in fine. Vat. sola in hoc textu post *poterat* addit *ab homine*.

en: Book I, *On the Sacraments*, p. III, c. 1, at the end. The Vatican edition alone in this text after *poterat* adds *ab homine*.

la: Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *simpliciter nec* (quod etiam paulo post occurrit) substituimus pro *similiter non*, quod, mutata insuper interpunctione, habet Vat. cum cod. cc; sed non ita distincta est ista lectio.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *simpliciter nec* (which also occurs a little after) for *similiter non*, which, with the punctuation moreover changed, the Vatican edition with codex cc has; but that reading is not so distinct.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus tamen aliis codd. et ed. 1, hic et paulo infra pro *iustum* minus bene substituit *non iustum*; lectionis utriusque unus sensus; in lectione siquidem codd. *iustum* refertur ad praecedens *non esse*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, the other codices and ed. 1 however resisting, here and a little below for *iustum* less well substitutes *non iustum*; the sense of both readings is one; for in the reading of the codices *iustum* refers to the preceding *non esse*.

la: Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut HPTY ee etc. *eum* pro *eam*, utpote quae distinctior est.

en: We prefer the reading of many manuscripts, as HPTY ee etc., *eum* for *eam*, inasmuch as it is more distinct.

la: Ita codd. cum ed. 1, quorum lectio hic praeferenda est lectioni Vat. *cogitari*. Paulo post etiam unus alterve cod. pro *cogitari* ponit *cogitare*.

en: Thus the codices with ed. 1, whose reading here is to be preferred to the Vatican's reading *cogitari*. A little after, even one or two codices in place of *cogitari* put *cogitare*.

la: Vat., post *semper* addito *quia*, hic adiungit *aut quia, quamvis semper et ubique*; sed obstat auctoritas mss., quorum plures ut ACFKLRSTUV propter repetitionem verborum *non ubique* semel haec verba omittunt, sed incongruenter, ut patet ex subnexis. Ed. 1 *non semper aut non ubique aut non ubique totaliter*. Immediate post Vat. cum cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1 minus bene *Quia* pro *Quod*, cui codd. *aa, bb* adiungunt *enim*.

en: The Vatican edition, after *semper* with *quia* added, here appends *aut quia, quamvis semper et ubique*; but the authority of the manuscripts stands in the way, very many of which, as ACFKLRSTUV, on account of the repetition of the words *non ubique* once, omit these words, but incongruously, as appears from what follows. Ed. 1 [has] *non semper aut non ubique aut non ubique totaliter*. Immediately after, the Vatican edition with codex cc, against the authority of the other manuscripts and ed. 1, less well [reads] *Quia* for *Quod*, to which codices *aa, bb* append *enim*.

la: Cap. 1.

en: Chapter 1.

la: Supple: *cognoscimus*. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3. (iuxta transl. Boethii): *Principium scientiae esse quoddam dicimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus*.

en: Supply: *cognoscimus* ["we know"]. Aristotle, I. Posterior c. 3 (according to Boethius's translation): "We say there is a certain principle of knowledge, insofar as we know the terms."

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ex* pro *in*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *ex* for *in*.

la: Quomodo haec ratio sit intelligenda, vide supra fundam. 5. et 6.

en: How this reasoning is to be understood, see above fundamenta 5 and 6.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, *est*. Proxime sequentem propositionem, quae a Vat. corrupte et mutile exhibetur, restauramus ope mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *affirmatio* loco *affirmativa*, dein *falsa* pro *vera*, et addendo verba *nihil esse* usque *si nihil est*. Codd. in eo tantum dissident, quod alii habent *dicatur*, alii cum ed. 1 *dicat*, alii *dicas*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, the other codices and ed. 1 contradicting, [has] *est*. The proposition immediately following, which is presented by the Vatican edition corruptly and mutilatedly, we restore with the aid of the manuscripts and ed. 1, placing *affirmatio* in place of *affirmativa*, then *falsa* for *vera*, and adding the words *nihil esse* down to *si nihil est*. The codices differ only in that some have *dicatur*, others with ed. 1 *dicat*, others *dicas*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *Dei*.

en: Very many codices with ed. 1 omit *Dei*.

la: Supple: *idolatra*.

en: Supply: *idolater*.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic non apte additum *esse*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have expunged the *esse* here not aptly added.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *quod*.

en: The Vatican edition against the manuscripts and ed. 1 [reads] *quod*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. D G H K T Y Z aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 verba *hoc est dicere quod*. Mox cod. X *cogitare* loco *credere*. Paulo infra ex cod. T adiecimus *praesentem*; deinde ex eodem codice loco *veritatis* posuimus *virtutis*, quae lectio et in se distinctior est et in corp. art. (de defectu praesentiae), insinuari videtur.

en: We have supplied from manuscripts D G H K T Y Z aa bb ee ff and ed. 1 the words *hoc est dicere quod*. Shortly codex X [has] *cogitare* in place of *credere*. A little below from codex T we have added *praesentem*; then from the same codex in place of *veritatis* we have put *virtutis*, which reading is both more distinct in itself and seems to be intimated in the body of the article (concerning the defect of presence).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec fere coincidit cum illa, quae communiter sic exprimitur, utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Nihilominus, ut bene intelligatur mens S. Doctoris, observare iuvat, quod status quaestionis, et consequenter etiam forma solutionis aliquatenus differunt a quaestione posita in forma supradicta et eius solutione. Sanctus enim loquitur hic directe de veritate divini esse et tantum indirecte de nostra cognitione huius divini esse; illa vero alia quaestio immediate est de nostra cognitione.

**II.** Circa quaestionem, utrum existentia Dei sit per se nota, antiqui Scholastici diverso modo loquuntur. Omnes tamen concedunt, existentiam esse de conceptu essentiali Dei. S. Anselmus docet, omni apprehendenti significationem vocabuli *Deus* per se notam esse eius existentiam; unde ex ipso conceptu Dei et entis, quo melius cogitari non potest, formavit argumentum ad probandum existentiam Dei. De valore huius argumenti disputatur. In favorem ipsius citantur Ægid. R., d. 3. p. 1. †. princ. q. 2. et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. Fortasse etiam hi duo viri discedunt a sententia communi Scholasticorum, qui efficaciam argumenti restringunt ad eos, qui iam *propriam* Dei rationem ut primi et necessarii entis habent et admittunt. Porro Nominales asserunt, nec nobis nec Beatis illam propositionem, *Deum esse*, per se notam esse. Scotus facit quasdam difficultates circa distinctionem inter propositionem per se notam *in se* et per se notam *quoad nos*; attamen quoad rem principalem concedit, dictam propositionem esse notam per se Deo et Beatis, non tamen nobis. S. Thomas simpliciter docet, dictam propositionem esse notam per se secundum se, non tamen nobis (S. I. q. 2. a. 1; I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. et quaestiunc. 2; de Verit. q. 10. a. 12; S. c. Gent. l. c. 10. 11.).

Omnes tamen antiqui Scholastici concedunt, in aliquo sensu existentiam Dei esse etiam nobis notam per se, scilicet non sub ratione propria, sed sub rationibus communibus, nempe entis, veri, boni, beatitudinis; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1. et 3; S. c. Gent. l. c. 11. ad 4; I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 3. m. 2. ad 3. rem sic explicat: «Cognitio alicuius potest esse duobus modis: in ratione communi et in ratione propria. Potest igitur aliquid cognosci in ratione communi, et tamen ignorari sub ratione propria, sicut cum aliquis cognoscit *mel* sub ratione communi, videlicet quod est corpus molle, rubeum, ignorat autem ipsum sub ratione propria; et ideo cum videt, *fel* esse corpus molle, rubeum, deceptus credit, ipsum esse *mel*. Similiter cognitio beatitudinis et appetitus ipsius nobis innatus est ratione communi, quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus; tamen in ratione propria ab aliquibus ignoratur. Unde diversi in diversis ponunt et aestimant beatitudinem... Similiter dicendum, quod idolatrae Deum in ratione communi non ignorant, quod est ens, principium, omnipotens, Dominus; tamen sub ratione propria ignorant» etc. Idem in solut. ad 4. affirmat, Deum cognitione *quid* est posse ignorari, non cognitione *quia* est. Eandem distinctionem et idem exemplum fellis et mellis habet B. Albert, S. tr. 3. q. 19. m. 2. Cfr. etiam Richard., hic p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Hoc posito, intelligitur doctrina illa communis, quod Deus implicite cognoscatur in omni actu intellectualis cognitionis. Ita S. Thom., de Verit. q. 22. a. 2. ad 1: «Dicendum, quod omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt implicite Deum in quolibet cognito. Sicut enim nihil habet rationem appetibilis nisi per similitudinem primae bonitatis, ita nihil est cognoscibile nisi per similitudinem primae veritatis»; S. Bonaventura *de Reductione artium ad Deum*: «In omni re, quae sentitur sive quae cognoscitur, interius latet ipse Deus»; Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2: «Cognoscendo enim quodcumque ens, ut hoc ens est, *indistinctissime concipitur Deus*».

Patet ergo, S. Bonaventuram non declinasse a via communi dicendo, intellectum nostrum non deficere quoad quaestionem, *si Deus est* (i. e. sub aliqua ratione communi), sed tantum quoad quaestionem, *quid Deus est* (i. e. sub ratione propria). Cfr. de hoc Trigosus, *Summa theol.* q. 2. a. 2. dub. 1. (qui tamen istam distinctionem non satis considerat). Quodsi Seraphicus argumentum notum Anselmi approbare videtur, observandum est, eum loqui vel de divino esse in se, vel de eo intellectu, qui Deum sub ratione propria iam cognoscit. Huic enim evidens esse debet, existentiam Dei includi in eius essentia. Excaecato vero intellectui et ignoranti, quid Deus est, manet absconditum id quod in se est evidens, ita ut Deum verum et vivum in stultitia sua negare praesumat.

**III.** Quoad ipsas conclusiones praeter iam citatos cfr. Bonav. *Itinerar.* c. 5; *Hexaem.* Serm. 5. et 10. — Scot., I. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. per totum, et a. 30. q. 3. — Durand., hic p. 1. q. 3. et 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question nearly coincides with that which is commonly expressed thus: whether [the proposition] that God is is known *per se*. Nonetheless, in order that the mind of the holy Doctor may be well understood, it helps to observe that the status of the question, and consequently also the form of the solution, differ somewhat from the question posed in the form above and its solution. For the Saint speaks here directly of the truth of the divine being, and only indirectly of our cognition of this divine being; that other question, however, is immediately about our cognition [of it].

**II.** Concerning the question whether the existence of God is known *per se*, the ancient Scholastics speak in diverse ways. All however concede that existence belongs to the essential concept of God. St. Anselm teaches that, to everyone apprehending the signification of the word *God*, his existence is known *per se*; whence from the concept itself of God and of being, than which nothing better can be thought, he formed an argument to prove the existence of God. The value of this argument is disputed. In its favor are cited Ægidius Romanus, d. 3. p. 1. †. princ. q. 2., and Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. Perhaps even these two men depart from the common opinion of the Scholastics, who restrict the efficacy of the argument to those who already hold and admit the *proper* account of God as the first and necessary being. Moreover the Nominalists assert that the proposition *God is* is known *per se* neither to us nor to the Blessed. Scotus raises certain difficulties concerning the distinction between a proposition known *per se* *in itself* and known *per se* *in relation to us*; nevertheless, as to the principal matter, he concedes that the said proposition is known *per se* to God and to the Blessed, not however to us. St. Thomas simply teaches that the said proposition is known *per se* in itself, not however to us (S. I. q. 2. a. 1; I. *Sent.* d. 3. q. 1. et quaestiunc. 2; *de Verit.* q. 10. a. 12; S. c. Gent. l. c. 10. 11.).

All the ancient Scholastics nevertheless concede that, in some sense, the existence of God is known *per se* also to us — not, namely, under his proper account, but under common accounts, namely those of being, the true, the good, blessedness; cf. St. Thomas, S. I. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1 and 3; S. c. Gent. l. c. 11. ad 4; I. *Sent.* d. 3. q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 3. m. 2. ad 3 explains the matter thus: «The cognition of something can be in two ways: in a common account and in a proper account. Therefore something can be known in a common account, and yet be unknown under its proper account, just as when someone knows *honey* under its common account, namely that it is a soft, red body, but is ignorant of it under its proper account; and therefore when he sees that *gall* is a soft, red body, deceived he believes it to be *honey*. Similarly the cognition of blessedness and the appetite for it is innate to us under its common account, that it is the state perfected by the aggregation of all goods; yet under its proper account it is ignored by some. Whence different people place and esteem blessedness in different things... Similarly it must be said that idolaters do not ignore God under his common account, namely that he is being, principle, omnipotent, Lord; yet they ignore him under his proper account» etc. The same author in his solution to objection 4 affirms that God can be ignored by the cognition of *what* he is, but not by the cognition of *that* he is. B. Albert holds the same distinction and the same example of gall and honey, S. tr. 3. q. 19. m. 2. Cf. also Richard, here p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 2. — This being posited, the common doctrine is understood, that God is implicitly known in every act of intellectual cognition. So St. Thomas, *de Verit.* q. 22. a. 2. ad 1: «It must be said that all cognizers cognize God implicitly in everything cognized. For just as nothing has the account of the appetible except by likeness to the first goodness, so nothing is cognizable except by likeness to the first truth»; St. Bonaventure, *de Reductione artium ad Deum*: «In every thing which is sensed or which is cognized, God himself lies hidden within»; Scotus, I. *Sent.* d. 3. q. 2: «For in cognizing any being whatsoever, insofar as it is this being, *God is most indistinctly conceived*».

It is clear therefore that St. Bonaventure has not departed from the common way in saying that our intellect does not fail as to the question, *whether God is* (i.e., under some common account), but only as to the question, *what God is* (i.e., under his proper account). Cf. on this Trigosus, *Summa theol.* q. 2. a. 2. dub. 1. (who however does not sufficiently consider this distinction). And if the Seraphic [Doctor] seems to approve the well-known argument of Anselm, it must be observed that he speaks either of the divine being in itself, or of that intellect which already knows God under his proper account. For to such an [intellect] it must be evident that the existence of God is included in his essence. But to the blinded intellect, ignorant of what God is, there remains hidden what in itself is evident, so that he presumes in his folly to deny the true and living God.

**III.** As to the conclusions themselves, besides those already cited cf. Bonav. *Itinerar.* c. 5; *Hexaem.* Sermons 5 and 10. — Scotus, I. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 2. — B. Albert, S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 4. — Henr. of Ghent, S. a. 22. throughout, and a. 30. q. 3. — Durandus, here p. 1. q. 3. and 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit immutabilis
Whether God is unchangeable

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De immutabilitate Dei.*

Consequenter secundo loco est quaestio de secunda proprietate divini esse, scilicet immutabilitate. De qua duo quaeruntur:

Primo quaeritur, utrum immutabilitas sit in Deo.
Secundo, utrum sit Dei proprietas.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus sit immutabilis.*

Quod immutabilitas sit in Deo, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Omnis mutatio aut est secundum substantiam, aut secundum accidens[^1]; sed Deus non mutatur secundum substantiam, quia omne tale est corruptibile, Deus autem sive divina substantia, cum non habeat principium, est incorruptibilis: ergo etc.

2. Item, nec secundum accidens, quia in Deo non est accidens: ergo nulla in eo est mutatio.

3. Item, omne quod mutatur, per prius est in potentia quam in actu[^2], et in tali differt actus a potentia; sed Deus est purus actus: ergo nullo modo mutatur.

4. Item, fiat deductio Richardi[^3]. «Omnis mu-

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tatio aut est in statum meliorem aut deteriorem aut parem»; sed nullo istorum modorum mutatur divina natura, quia non in meliorem, quia verissime est; non in deteriorem, quia a semetipsa est; non in aequalem, quia perfecta est: ergo nullo modo convenit divino esse mutabilitas.

**Contra:**

1. Sapientiae septimo[^4]: *Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia*: ergo etc. Si dicatur, quod sapientia dicitur mobilis per causam, eo quod facit alia moveri; contra: nihil dat quod non habet; sed Deus dat omnibus motum[^5]: ergo motus vel mutatio maxime est in Deo.

2. Item, omne quod nunc est aliquid, quod non prius, est mutatum[^6]: sed Filius Dei est homo, ab aeterno autem non fuit homo: ergo est mutatus. Si dicas, quod homo praedicatur de Filio Dei non per inhaerentiam, sed per unionem: et unio est relatio, et relatio advenit sine mutatione, ut de nummo fit pretium, ut dicit Augustinus in quinto de Trinitate[^7]; contra: Ambrosius[^8] ita arguit contra haereticum, qui posuit Filium ex tempore genitum a Patre, quia si hoc, tunc Pater factus est de non-Patre Pater, ergo mutatur: ergo similiter in proposito.

3. Item, quicumque de non agente fit agens, mutatur mutatione, quae est ab otio in actum[^9]; sed Deus de non creante factus est creans: ergo est mutatus. Si dicas, quod Deus de non agente fit agens non propter mutationem sui, sed propter mutationem effectus producti, sicut sol de non illuminante fit illuminans; contra: non quia creatura est, ideo Deus creat, sed quia Deus creat, creatura fit sive producitur. Per prius est ergo Deum agere, quam creaturam fieri: ergo cum posterius non sit causa prioris, non quia creatura fit de non ente ens, Deus fit de non creante creans, sed e converso; et ita mutatio est ratione agentis[^10], non effectus.

4. Item, Deus aliquid vult, quod prius non voluit, quia ex tempore voluit creare, quod non voluit ab aeterno; sed quicumque vult aliquid, quod non prius, mutatus est[^11]: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod ab aeterno voluit creare mundum in illo instanti[^12], sicut ego volo audire missam cras; contra: voluntas Dei est causa rerum proxima et immediata; sed posita causa proxima et immediata, ponitur effectus: ergo si ab aeterno voluit, ab aeterno mundus fuit.

### Conclusio.

> Deus est omnino immutabilis et secundum locum, quia immensus, et secundum tempus, quia aeternus, et secundum formam, quia simplex; et quia immutabilis, ideo omnia movet.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Boethius[^13], «Deus stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri». Unde divina essentia est immutabilis. Non enim mutatur loco, quia ubique est; non tempore, quia aeternitas simul est; non forma, quia pure actus est. Unde mutationem secundum formam tollit simplicitas, secundum tempus tollit aeternitas, secundum locum tollit immensitas.

Et ideo in Deo est summa stabilitas, et inde omnis motus causalitas; quia, sicut probat Augustinus[^14] et vult Philosophus, omnis motus procedit ab immobili; ut cum movetur manus, stat cubitus, et movetur cubitus, stante humero. Quia ergo Dei sapientia est stabilis[^15], ideo omnia movet.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Quod ergo obiicitur de sapientia, quod dicitur mobilis; dicendum, quod mobile dicitur active de ea, quia facit moveri[^16], non passive, sicut sensibile de animali.

Et ad illud quod obiicitur, nihil dat alteri quod non habet; dicendum, quod tripliciter est aliquid habere, scilicet formaliter, exemplariter, causaliter[^17]; et quolibet istorum modorum quod habet dare potest. Primo autem modo non habet Deus motum, sed secundo et tertio sic.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de relatione, dicendum, quod relatio, cum dicitur de novo[^18], de necessitate ponit mutationem in altero extremorum, nec oportet quod in utroque. Ideo ista relatio, quae est personae ad personam, ponit mutationem in altera personarum; et una mutata, mutatur et reliqua, quia eadem sunt essentia: ideo de necessitate, si[^19] de non-Patre fieret Pater, mutaretur. Relatio autem essentiae ad essentiam non de necessitate ponit mutationem, nisi in altero extremorum, quia cum diversae sint essentiae, potest unum mutari, altero non permutato[^20]: et ideo in relatione ad creaturam semper intelligitur in creatura facta mutatio, non in Deo. Tamen proprie loquendo, sicut alibi patebit[^21], Deus non refertur ad creaturam, nisi secundum dici et modum loquendi.

Posset tamen aliter dici, sicut supra tactum est[^22], quod non est simile: quia relatio personalis dat personae existere, non sic autem relatio ad creaturam; et ideo sequitur: si incipit esse Pater, incipit esse; non autem sequitur: si[^23] Deus incipit esse homo, incipit esse. Et ideo bene valet argumentum Ambrosii, quod si Pater incepisset gignere, quod esset mutatus, quia incepisset esse, non quia ab uno statu in alterum mutatus esset.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quando de non agente etc; dicendum, quod est agens, quod est sua actio, et est agens, quod non est sua actio, sed actio est ab ipso[^24]. Agens, quod non est sua actio, sic agit, quod inter ipsum et effectum cadit medium, quod disponit ipsum; et tale agens nunquam fit agens de non agente, quin mutetur, quia novum[^25] sibi advenit. Sed agens, quod est sua actio, agit se ipso; et ideo inter ipsum et effectum non cadit aliquod medium ipsum disponens; et ideo cum de non agente fit agens, quia nihil novum sibi accidit, ideo non mutatur. Tale agens Deus est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voluntate, dicendum, quod causa proxima et immediata dicitur tripliciter: aut respectu substantiae, aut dispositionis, aut actus; respectu substantiae, inter quam[^26] et effectum non cadit alia substantia media causans; respectu dispositionis, cui non additur nova dispositio ad effectum producendum; respectu actus, quando actui coniungitur. Dico ergo, quod Dei voluntas fuit causa proxima et immediata ab aeterno respectu substantiae et dispositionis, sed[^27] non respectu actus; quia actui non coniungitur voluntas nisi pro tempore, in quo vult agere, ut patet, cum dicitur: volo cras legere, voluntas non copulatur actui nisi pro tempore crastino.

### Scholion.

**I.** Quoad diversas species mutationis et immutabilitatis cfr. q. seq., et quoad solut. ad 1. S. Thom., S. 1. q. 9. a. 1. ad 2.

**II.** Immutabilitas Dei iam in Nicaeno Concilio definita est. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 4. m. 1. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 5; Report., hic q. 2. de rerum principio q. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 16. seqq.; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 21. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q.; S. a. 30. — Durand., de hac et seq. q.; hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q.; hic q. 4. — Biel, de hac et seq. q.; hic q. 7.

---

english:
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### Article II. *On the immutability of God.*

Consequently, in the second place, there is a question concerning the second property of the divine being, namely immutability. Concerning which two things are asked:

First it is asked, whether immutability is in God.
Second, whether it is a property of God.

### Question I. *Whether God is unchangeable.*

That immutability is in God, is shown in this way.

1. Every change is either according to substance, or according to accident[^1]; but God is not changed according to substance, because every such thing is corruptible, but God, or the divine substance, since it has no beginning, is incorruptible: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nor according to accident, because in God there is no accident: therefore there is no change in him.

3. Likewise, everything that is changed is prior in potency than in act[^2], and in such a thing act differs from potency; but God is pure act: therefore he is in no way changed.

4. Likewise, let Richard's deduction be made[^3]: "Every change

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is either into a better state, or worse, or equal"; but the divine nature is changed in none of these ways, because not into a better, because it is most truly; not into a worse, because it is from itself; not into an equal, because it is perfect: therefore mutability in no way befits the divine being.

**On the contrary:**

1. Wisdom, chapter seven[^4]: *Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things*: therefore etc. If it be said that wisdom is called mobile by way of cause, in that it makes other things to be moved; on the contrary: nothing gives what it does not have; but God gives motion to all things[^5]: therefore motion or change is most of all in God.

2. Likewise, everything which is now something which it was not before, has been changed[^6]: but the Son of God is man, and from eternity was not man: therefore he has been changed. If you say that "man" is predicated of the Son of God not by inherence, but by union: and union is a relation, and relation comes about without change, as a coin becomes a price, as Augustine says in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^7]; on the contrary: Ambrose[^8] thus argues against the heretic, who held that the Son was begotten by the Father in time, because if so, then the Father was made Father out of non-Father, therefore he is changed: therefore likewise in the case proposed.

3. Likewise, whoever from non-agent becomes agent, is changed by the change which is from rest into act[^9]; but God from non-creating became creating: therefore he has been changed. If you say that God from non-agent becomes agent not on account of a change of himself, but on account of a change of the effect produced, just as the sun from non-illuminating becomes illuminating; on the contrary: it is not because the creature is, that therefore God creates, but because God creates, the creature comes to be or is produced. Therefore for God to act is prior to the creature's coming to be: therefore since the posterior is not the cause of the prior, it is not because the creature comes to be from non-being into being, that God comes to be from non-creating into creating, but the converse; and thus the change is by reason of the agent[^10], not of the effect.

4. Likewise, God wills something which he did not previously will, because in time he willed to create, which he did not will from eternity; but whoever wills something which he did not previously, has been changed[^11]: therefore etc. If you say that from eternity he willed to create the world at that instant[^12], as I will to hear Mass tomorrow; on the contrary: the will of God is the proximate and immediate cause of things; but when the proximate and immediate cause is posited, the effect is posited: therefore if from eternity he willed, from eternity the world was.

### Conclusion.

> God is wholly unchangeable, both as regards place, because he is immense, and as regards time, because he is eternal, and as regards form, because he is simple; and because he is unchangeable, therefore he moves all things.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Boethius says[^13], "God, remaining stable, gives all things to be moved." Hence the divine essence is unchangeable. For it is not changed in place, because he is everywhere; not in time, because eternity is all at once; not in form, because he is purely act. Hence simplicity removes change according to form, eternity removes it according to time, immensity removes it according to place.

And therefore in God is the highest stability, and thence the causality of all motion; because, as Augustine proves[^14] and the Philosopher holds, all motion proceeds from the immobile; as when the hand is moved, the elbow stands still, and the elbow is moved while the shoulder stands. Therefore because the wisdom of God is stable[^15], therefore it moves all things.

**Replies:**

1. To that which is objected concerning wisdom, that it is called mobile; it must be said that "mobile" is said of it actively, because it makes [things] to be moved[^16], not passively, as "sensible" is said of an animal.

And to that which is objected, that nothing gives to another what it does not have; it must be said that something is "had" in three ways, namely formally, exemplarily, causally[^17]; and in any of these modes that which one has, one can give. In the first mode God does not have motion, but in the second and third he does.

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2. To that which is objected concerning relation, it must be said that relation, when it is said anew[^18], necessarily posits change in one of the extremes, but it is not necessary that in both. Therefore that relation which is of person to person posits change in one of the persons; and one being changed, the other is also changed, because they are the same essence: therefore necessarily, if[^19] from non-Father he became Father, he would be changed. But a relation of essence to essence does not necessarily posit change, except in one of the extremes, because since the essences are diverse, one can be changed while the other is not changed[^20]: and therefore in the relation toward the creature the change is always understood as made in the creature, not in God. Yet properly speaking, as will appear elsewhere[^21], God is not related to the creature, except according to manner of speaking.

It could however be said otherwise, as was touched on above[^22], that it is not similar: because a personal relation gives existence to the person, whereas a relation to a creature does not so; and therefore it follows: if he begins to be Father, he begins to be; but it does not follow: if[^23] God begins to be man, he begins to be. And therefore Ambrose's argument is valid, that if the Father had begun to beget, he would have been changed, because he would have begun to be, not because he would have been changed from one state into another.

3. To that which is objected, when "from non-agent" etc.; it must be said that there is an agent which is its own action, and there is an agent which is not its own action, but the action is from it[^24]. The agent which is not its own action so acts that between itself and the effect there falls a medium which disposes it; and such an agent never becomes agent from non-agent without being changed, because something new[^25] comes to it. But the agent which is its own action acts by itself; and therefore between itself and the effect there does not fall any medium disposing it; and therefore when from non-agent it becomes agent, because nothing new accrues to it, therefore it is not changed. Such an agent is God.

4. To that which is objected concerning the will, it must be said that "proximate and immediate cause" is said in three ways: either with respect to substance, or to disposition, or to act; with respect to substance, between which[^26] and the effect there falls no other substance as mediating cause; with respect to disposition, to which no new disposition is added for producing the effect; with respect to act, when it is joined to the act. I say therefore that the will of God was the proximate and immediate cause from eternity with respect to substance and disposition, but[^27] not with respect to act; because the will is not joined to act except for the time in which it wills to act, as is plain, when one says: "I will to read tomorrow," the will is not coupled to the act except for tomorrow's time.

### Scholion.

**I.** Concerning the diverse species of change and immutability, see the following question, and concerning the solution to argument 1, S. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.

**II.** The immutability of God was already defined in the Council of Nicaea. Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 5; *Reportata*, here q. 2; *De rerum principio* q. 5. — S. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1; *Summa* loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 16 ff.; *Summa* p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 3. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question; *Summa* a. 30. — Durandus, on this and the following question; here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question; here q. 4. — Biel, on this and the following question; here q. 7.

---

la: Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 1. seqq. ac XI. Metaph. c. 10. (X. c. 11.).

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 1 ff., and *Metaphysics* XI, c. 10 (X, c. 11).

la: Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 8. (XI. c. 2.): *Omne [movetur] ex potentia ente in actu ens.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, text 8 (XI, c. 2): "Everything [is moved] from being in potency into being in act."

la: Libr. II. de Trin. c. 3: *Sciendum itaque, quia [omnis] mutatio est aut de statu in statum meliorem, aut de statu in statum deteriorem, aut de statu in statum priori aequalem; ubi autem nihil horum esse potest, vera incommutabilitas inest.* — Mox ed. 1 *optima* pro *verissime*, et cod. K in fine argumenti *divinae essentiae* pro *divini esse*.

en: Book II *On the Trinity*, c. 3: "It must therefore be known that [every] change is either from a state into a better state, or from a state into a worse state, or from a state into a state equal to the prior; but where none of these can be, there is true incommutability." — Just below, ed. 1 reads *optima* for *verissime*, and codex K at the end of the argument reads *divinae essentiae* for *divini esse*. <!-- p. 157 -->

la: Vers. 24.

en: Verse 24.

la: Ed. 1 *moveri*, quo alluditur ad illud Boethii, III. de Consol. Metro 9: *Stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.*

en: Edition 1 reads *moveri*, by which is alluded that of Boethius, *On the Consolation* III, Metre 9: "And remaining stable you give all things to be moved."

la: Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. et VI. text. 32. et 73. (c. 3. et 8.).

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 7, and VI, text 32 and 73 (cc. 3 and 8).

la: Cap. 16. n. 17: *Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur nec tamen mutatus est, cum esse coepit pretium.* — Nota tamen, quod relatio pretii in nummo est tantum accidentalis, relatio vero, quae est in unione hypostatica, est substantialis. Explicationem huius exempli vide infra d. 30. dub. 3.

en: Chapter 16, n. 17: "A coin, however, when it is called a price, is so called relatively, nor is it changed when it began to be a price." — Note, however, that the relation of price in a coin is only accidental, but the relation which is in the hypostatic union is substantial. For an explanation of this example see below d. 30, dub. 3.

la: Libr. 1. de Fide, c. 9: *Nam si Pater esse coepit, Deus ergo primo erat, postea Pater factus est.* — Vat. cum cod. cc post *tunc* contra alios codd. et ed. 1 omittit *Pater*. Ed. 1 post *si hoc* addit *esset*.

en: Book 1 *On the Faith*, c. 9: "For if the Father began to be, then God first was, and afterwards became Father." — The Vatican edition with codex cc, after *tunc*, against the other codices and ed. 1, omits *Pater*. Edition 1 after *si hoc* adds *esset*.

la: Simile habetur Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 7, et II. de Anima, text. 43. (c. 4.), ubi sic: *Faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio.*

en: A similar passage is found in Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 7, and *On the Soul* II, text 43 (c. 4), where thus: "The craftsman, however, is changed only into act from rest."

la: Aliqui codd. ut KV *efficientis*.

en: Some codices, such as K and V, read *efficientis* [of the efficient].

la: Averroes in libro *Destructio Destructionum*, disput. 1. dub. 1. et in Comment. super VIII. Physic. text. 15. ex hac propositione impossibilitatem creationis deducere conatur. — Paulo ante post *ex tempore voluit* codd. aa bb satis bene addunt *mundum*.

en: Averroes in the book *Destruction of the Destruction*, disputation 1, dub. 1, and in his Commentary on *Physics* VIII, text 15, from this proposition attempts to deduce the impossibility of creation. — A little before, after *ex tempore voluit*, codices aa and bb add, well enough, *mundum*.

la: Cod. W addit *in quo creatus est*.

en: Codex W adds *in quo creatus est* [in which it was created].

la: Libr. III. de Consol. Metro 9, post quem textum cod. Z addit Psalmus (101, 28.): *mutabis res et mutabuntur* etc. Paulo infra cum plerisque codd. ut ASTVW etc. et ed. 1 legimus *pure* loco *purus*, quod habet Vat.

en: Book III *On the Consolation*, Metre 9, after which text codex Z adds the Psalm (101:28): "You shall change things and they shall be changed," etc. A little below, with most codices such as A, S, T, V, W etc. and ed. 1 we read *pure* in place of *purus*, which the Vatican edition has.

la: Libr. VIII. de Genes. ad lit. c. 21. — Verba Aristotelis in libro de Motu animalium c. 1. haec sunt: *Verumtamen principium, in quantum principium, quiescit, mota particula, quae subest: veluti brachio moto, cubitus, toto autem membro, humerus* (ed. Ven. 1584).

en: Book VIII *On Genesis literally*, c. 21. — The words of Aristotle in the book *On the Motion of Animals*, c. 1, are these: "Nevertheless the principle, insofar as it is principle, rests, the part beneath being moved: as, the arm being moved, the elbow [rests]; but, the whole limb [moved], the shoulder [rests]" (Venice ed. 1584).

la: Cod. W addit *et immobilis*. Mox cod. F *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur*.

en: Codex W adds *et immobilis* [and immobile]. Just after, codex F reads *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur* [To that, therefore, which is objected].

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *motum*, sed contra ceteros mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *motum*, but against the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. — Mox codd. inter se dissentiunt; alii siquidem habent *quodlibet* pro *quolibet*, alii cum ed. 1 *dari* loco *dare*, alii ut A T bb cc ponunt *quodlibet* et *dari*; melius legeretur *et quod quolibet istorum modorum habet, dare potest*.

en: Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 5. — Just after, the codices disagree among themselves; some have *quodlibet* for *quolibet*, others with ed. 1 *dari* in place of *dare*, others such as A, T, bb, cc place *quodlibet* and *dari*; it would better be read *et quod quolibet istorum modorum habet, dare potest*. <!-- p. 158 -->

la: Plures codd. ut ACLRUVX omittunt *de novo*, sed male. Cod. W *de duobus* et ed. 1 *de persona divina* loco *de novo*, sed inepte. Cod. G *cum de novo advenit*.

en: Several codices, such as A, C, L, R, U, V, X, omit *de novo*, but wrongly. Codex W reads *de duobus* and ed. 1 *de persona divina* in place of *de novo*, but ineptly. Codex G reads *cum de novo advenit*.

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *Deus*.

en: Codices aa and bb add *Deus*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *una mutari, altera non permutata*, ac immediate post omittit *et*; aliqui codd. ut A aa bb cum ed. 1 *mutato* pro *permutato*.

en: The Vatican edition, contrary to the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *una mutari, altera non permutata*, and immediately after omits *et*; some codices such as A, aa, bb, with ed. 1 read *mutato* for *permutato*.

la: Infra d. 30. q. 3. — Mox post *dici* ed. 1 *vel secundum modum loquendi*.

en: Below, d. 30, q. 3. — Just after *dici*, ed. 1 reads *vel secundum modum loquendi* [or according to the manner of speaking].

la: Dist. 7. dub. 4. Vide etiam infra d. 26. q. 3. — Immediate post Vat. omittit *quod non est*, quae lectio corrupta resarcitur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

en: Distinction 7, dub. 4. See also below d. 26, q. 3. — Immediately after, the Vatican edition omits *quod non est*, a corrupt reading restored by the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *hic* loco *si*, et post *homo* addit *igitur*, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *hic* in place of *si*, and after *homo* adds *igitur*, but the authority of the other manuscripts and ed. 1 stands against it.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 omittit *non bene sed actio est ab ipso*, pro quo cod. Q *sed actio est aliquid ab ipso*. Paulo ante post *obiicitur* in cod. V et ed. 1 deest *quando*.

en: The Vatican edition, against nearly all codices and ed. 1, omits *non bene sed actio est ab ipso*; for which codex Q reads *sed actio est aliquid ab ipso*. A little before, after *obiicitur*, in codex V and ed. 1, *quando* is missing.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *quid*.

en: By the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here expunged the added *quid*.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 hic substituimus *inter quam* loco *cum inter eam* et paulo infra *cui* pro *cum*.

en: From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here substituted *inter quam* in place of *cum inter eam*, and a little below *cui* for *cum*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 minus clare *et* pro *sed*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, less clearly reads *et* in place of *sed*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0