title: Dist. 34, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum furia impediat matrimonium
Whether madness impedes marriage

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De defectu ex parte liberi arbitrii.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de defectu sive impedimento, qui venit ex parte liberi arbitrii. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de perversitate rationis, quae est in furiosis. Secundo, de subversione[^p774-1] voluntatis in incestuosis.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum furia impediat matrimonium.*

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum furia impediat matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia matrimonium est tantum consentientium, et consensus est ratione utentium; sed furiosi non utuntur ratione: ergo etc.

2. Item, plus tollit consensum stultitia quam error; sed error impedit matrimonium[^p774-2]: ergo multo magis furia.

3. Item, furiosus non potest stare in iudicio nec testificari, ergo nec contractum facere; sed plus est contractum facere ratione sui corporis quam rerum: ergo si matrimonium est contractus respectu proprii corporis, patet etc.

4. Item, furiosus non meretur nec demeretur; sed omnis qui suscipit Sacramentum, suscipit ad meritum, vel demeritum, vel digne, vel indigne: ergo furiosus non potest suscipere Sacramentum, et sic nec matrimonium.

**Contra:**
1. Matrimonium est ad procreandam prolem ad cultum Dei, ergo qui potest hoc facere potest matrimonium contrahere; sed furiosus potest generare: ergo etc.

2. Item, furia provenit accidentaliter; sed matrimonium est vinculum insolubile: ergo furia non impedit matrimonium.

3. Item, si a furia potest quis liberari, et nemo potest scire, utrum sit perpetua; sed impotentia coeundi non impedit, nisi sit perpetua secundum veritatem, vel probabiliter coniiciatur[^p774-3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, furiosus potest baptizari et recipit Sacramentum baptismi: ergo consimili ratione potest matrimonium contrahere.

### Conclusio.

> Furia concomitans actu contractionem matrimonii impedit matrimonium, non vero si tantum habitu praecedit, vel si sequatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc distinguendum est, quia furia aut *concomitatur*, aut *praecedit*, vel *sequitur*. Si *concomitatur*; tunc, quia furiosus non habet potestatem consentiendi, et impedit matrimonium et nullum est; si autem *praecedit*, et ille habet lucida intervalla, vel *sequitur*; matrimonium non impedit[^p774-4]. — Rationes ergo probantes, quod impedit, procedunt ea via, qua furia est *tempore consensus* et secundum *actum*; si vero non esset *actu* furiosus, sed *habitu*; etiam si haberet lucidum intervallum, non deberet contrahere propter periculum, quia talis prolem nescit educare nec cum uxore debite cohabitare; tamen si contraheret, contractum esset.

**Ad obiecta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod potest procreare prolem; dicendum, quod secundum statum furiae[^p774-5] non potest, quia nescit, quis sit Dei cultus; nescit etiam filios educare. *Praeterea*, si hoc posset, non sequeretur, quia hoc non dicit totum *esse* matrimonii.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidentaliter venit et recedit; dicendum, quod etsi matrimonium sit contractum per furiam, non[^p774-6] solvitur, sed impediri potest, ut non contrahatur; et si etiam contrahatur, nihil fit, nisi postmodum consentiat, cum habuit intervalla lucida.

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*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest liberari a furia; dicendum, quod non est simile de *furia* et de *impotentia* coeundi: quia *furia* impedit ratione *consensus*, et consensus est in uno actu et in modico tempore; et ideo, si tunc sit furia, cum tollat consensum, impedit matrimonium. Sed *impotentia* coeundi est contra matrimonii *usum*, non contra consensum; et quia usus totum tempus vitae concernit, ideo non est impedimentum, nisi protendatur per totam vitam. Et sic patet illud.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de baptismo, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia baptismus est Sacramentum contra originale, quod quia aliunde contractum est, sufficit alienus consensus, nec oportet intervenire proprium; non sic in proposito, immo oportet, quod contrahens consentiat[^p775-1].

english:
### Article III. *On the defect on the part of free choice.*

Next, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning the defect or impediment that comes on the part of free choice. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked concerning the perversity of the reason, which is in the mad. Secondly, concerning the subversion[^p774-1] of the will in the incestuous.

### Question I. *Whether madness impedes marriage.*

As, then, to the first, it is asked whether madness impedes marriage. And that it does, seems [to be shown]:

1. Because marriage belongs only to those consenting, and consent belongs to those using reason; but the mad do not use reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, folly takes away consent more than error [does]; but error impedes marriage[^p774-2]: therefore much more [does] madness.

3. Likewise, a madman cannot stand in judgment nor give testimony, therefore neither make a contract; but it is a greater thing to make a contract by reason of one's own body than [by reason] of things: therefore if marriage is a contract with respect to one's own body, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, a madman neither merits nor demerits; but everyone who receives a Sacrament receives [it] unto merit, or demerit, either worthily or unworthily: therefore a madman cannot receive a Sacrament, and thus neither marriage.

**On the contrary:**
1. Marriage is for procreating offspring for the worship of God, therefore he who can do this can contract marriage; but a madman can beget: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, madness comes about accidentally; but marriage is an indissoluble bond: therefore madness does not impede marriage.

3. Likewise, if someone can be freed from madness, and no one can know whether it be perpetual; but impotence of intercourse does not impede unless it be perpetual in truth, or be conjectured probably [to be so][^p774-3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a madman can be baptized and receives the Sacrament of baptism: therefore for a like reason he can contract marriage.

### Conclusion.

> Madness accompanying in act the contracting of marriage impedes marriage, but not if it only precedes [it] in disposition, or if it follows [after].

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made, since madness either *accompanies*, or *precedes*, or *follows*. If it *accompanies*; then, because the madman does not have the power of consenting, it both impedes the marriage and it is null; but if it *precedes*, and that man has lucid intervals, or if it *follows*; it does not impede the marriage[^p774-4]. — The reasons, therefore, proving that it impedes proceed by that way in which the madness is *at the time of consent* and according to *act*; but if he were not mad *in act*, but *in disposition*; even if he were to have a lucid interval, he ought not to contract [marriage] on account of the danger, because such a person does not know how to raise offspring nor to cohabit duly with a wife; nevertheless, if he did contract, it would be contracted [validly].

**To the objections on the contrary side:**

*To 1.* As to that indeed which is objected on the contrary, that he can procreate offspring; it must be said that according to the state of madness[^p774-5] he cannot, because he does not know what the worship of God is; he does not know, moreover, how to raise children. *Besides*, if he could do this, it would not follow, because this does not state the whole *being* of marriage.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that it comes and recedes accidentally; it must be said that although a marriage be contracted through madness, it is not[^p774-6] dissolved, but it can be impeded, so that it is not contracted; and even if it be contracted, nothing comes about, unless afterward he consent, when he has had lucid intervals.

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*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that one can be freed from madness; it must be said that the case is not alike as to *madness* and as to *impotence* of intercourse: because *madness* impedes by reason of *consent*, and consent is in a single act and in a brief time; and therefore, if there be madness then, since it takes away consent, it impedes the marriage. But *impotence* of intercourse is against the *use* of marriage, not against consent; and because the use concerns the whole time of life, therefore it is not an impediment unless it extend through the whole of life. And thus that [argument] is clear.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected concerning baptism, it must be said that the case is not alike: because baptism is a Sacrament against original [sin], which, since it was contracted from elsewhere, another's consent suffices, nor is it necessary that one's own intervene; not so in the case at hand, but rather it is necessary that the one contracting consent[^p775-1].

la: Cod. G *perversitate*, quod etiam infra in ipsa quaest. idem cod. pro *perversione* substituit.

en: Cod. G [reads] *perversitate*, which reading the same codex also substitutes below, in the question itself, for *perversione*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 30. q. 1.

en: Cf. above, d. 30, q. 1.

la: Ut ostensum est supra a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — In *maiori* secunda manus in codd. E I delevit *si*.

en: As was shown above, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — In the *major* [premise] a second hand in codd. E I deleted *si*.

la: Vide *Glossam* in C. *Neque furiosus* (26.), C. 32. q. 7. — Post *vel* cod. U repetit *si*.

en: See the *Gloss* on the canon *Neque furiosus* (c. 26), Causa 32, q. 7. — After *vel* cod. U repeats *si*.

la: Pro *furiae*, quod alii codd. et ed. 1 omittunt, codd. IK *illum*. Subinde pro *quis* codd. A G K *quid*.

en: For *furiae*, which other codices and the first edition omit, codd. IK [read] *illum*. Thereupon, for *quis*, codd. A G K [read] *quid*.

la: Edd. *non tamen*. Mox pro *fit* cod. A *facit*.

en: The editions [read] *non tamen*. Presently, for *fit*, cod. A [reads] *facit*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. pro parte affirm. — Cod. aa supplet *actu propriae voluntatis*. Superius pro *aliunde*, quod habent codd. E G L U, codd. I K *aliene*, cod. O *per consensum alienum*, alii codd. *alienum*, edd. *per alium*.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, on the affirmative side. — Cod. aa supplies *actu propriae voluntatis* [by the act of one's own will]. Above, for *aliunde*, which codd. E G L U have, codd. I K [read] *aliene*, cod. O *per consensum alienum*, other codices *alienum*, the editions *per alium*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ad 1. quaestionem communiter respondetur cum eisdem distinctionibus: S. Thom., hic a. 4; Suppl. q. 58. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

**II.** Seq. (2.) quaestio spectat ad impedimentum affinitatis, de quo infra d. 41. a. 1. plura dicuntur. Cum autem, matrimonio iam contracto, incestuosa copula cum consanguineis coniugis primi et secundi gradus puniatur speciali poena, scilicet ut reus iure petendi debitum privetur; ideo hic specialiter de hac poena agitur. Communiter docetur, nescientem hanc Ecclesiae legem poenalem non subiacere poenae memoratae. De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 5. et 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** To the first question the common response is given with the same distinctions: St. Thomas, here a. 4; Supplement q. 58, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 1.

**II.** The following (second) question pertains to the impediment of affinity, concerning which more is said below at d. 41, a. 1. But since, when matrimony has already been contracted, incestuous intercourse with blood-relatives of the spouse of the first and second degree is punished by a special penalty — namely that the guilty party be deprived of the right of demanding the debt — therefore this penalty is here treated of specifically. It is commonly taught that one ignorant of this penal law of the Church is not subject to the aforesaid penalty. On the second question: St. Thomas, at the cited places, a. 5 and 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the cited place, a. 6. — Richard of Middleton, at the cited place, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF page-image bands (printed pp. 774–775 = pdf pp. 794–795, offset +20), per the VOL II OVERRIDE two-column discipline. The IA djvu OCR (raw L83050–83162) is cascade-shattered across the two-column body and footers and was used only as a cross-check. Left columns regenerated with `colcrop.py vol4 <page> 2120`, right columns with `1780`.

**Running heads verified.** p.774 (bare "774" top-left; header "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." — verso); p.775 running head "DIST. XXXIV. ART. III. QUAEST. II." with "775". Confirms `printed_pages` [774, 775] as scaffolded; no correction needed. (The p.775 running head reads QUAEST. II because Question II opens near the foot of that page; the top of p.775 is still Question I's replies.)

**Opener alignment (verified).** The Article III opener "Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de defectu… Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de perversitate rationis, quae est in furiosis. Secundo, de subversione voluntatis in incestuosis" aligns correctly: Primo → this q1 (*Utrum furia impediat matrimonium*, on the mad/furiosi); Secundo → a3-q2 (*Utrum crimen incestus…*, on the incestuous). No q-swap. Per the locked chunking convention, the short Article III opener is folded into a3-q1 (no standalone divisio chunk); QUAESTIO I title at raw L83073.

**Scholion.** Fully rendered here (both languages) as the Article III scholion (OCR header garbled "SCHOLIOK"; PDF band reads "SCHOLION"). It has **two numbered sections (§ I, § II)** and covers **both** Article III questions: § I gives the doctor-list for Question 1, § II treats Question 2 (the affinity/incest impediment) and closes with its own doctor-list ("De 2. quaestione…"). Sibling a3-q2 renders **no** scholion. Placed as the last subsection of both the Latin and English blocks per the parser requirement.

**Page-boundary hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* none. Article III opens at the very top of p.774 (immediately after the "774 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." running head), so a2-q2 ends on p.773 and forwards no p.774 footer. The p.773 footers seen just above the raw range ("Cfr. supra pag. 19, nota 7."; "Vide scholion ad … praecedentis articuli quaes[tionem]") belong to the Article II material.
- *Forwarded:* this chunk shares p.775 with a3-q2. QUAESTIO II ("Utrum crimen incestus impediat matrimonium et faciat personam illegitimam") begins in the mid/lower region of p.775 and continues onto p.776; its body, its Conclusio, and its footer sequence (p.775 fn 2–7: *littera*², *torquendus est*³, *affinitas*⁴, *tremo*⁵, *contractionem*⁶, *amittit*⁷) belong to a3-q2. This chunk claims only p.775 fn 1 (*consentiat*, in reply *Ad 4* — the note discussing the *aliunde/alienus* variants of Question I's baptism-reply).

**Apparatus count:** 7 entries — p.774: 6 (fn 1–6, all Question I); p.775: 1 (fn 1). Per-page restart forced `[^pNNN-M]` labels (both pages have a fn 1).

**Editorial marginalia dropped** (per corpus convention): the printed side-labels *Fundamenta* (beside Question I arg. 1), *Ad oppositum* (beside the Contra block), and the running conclusion-side label *Conclusio* are editorial glosses rendered structurally (the `### Conclusio` heading), not part of Bonaventure's running text. The single-letter line markers in the right margin of the Respondeo (D, c, A, c) are Quaracchi line-reference sigla, likewise omitted.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 34, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum crimen incestus impediat matrimonium et faciat personam illegitimam.*

Secundo quaeritur de perversione voluntatis in incestuosis, ut puta cum quis iacet cum uxoris sorore; quaeritur ergo, utrum tale crimen impediat matrimonium et faciat personam illegitimam. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per auctoritates, quas adducit Magister in littera[^p775-2].

2. Item, hoc ipsum probatur *ratione*: quia, in quo quis peccat, in hoc torquendus est[^p775-3]; sed incestus iste fuit contra bonum matrimonii: ergo in eo debet puniri.

3. Item, affinitas[^p775-4] contrahitur in copula carnali; sed affinitas impedit matrimonium contrahendum et dirimit iam contractum, sicut et consanguinitas, vel cognatio: ergo si factus est affinis uxori, iam non manet matrimonium.

4. Item, quod saltem non debeat *reddere* debitum, videtur: quia quicumque coit cum consanguinea, vel affine, peccat mortaliter; sed nullus tenetur peccare mortaliter: ergo non tenetur reddere debitum.

**Contra:** 1. Uxor non debet puniri in peccato viri, ergo non privatur viro; et si hoc: ergo iste est vir, et potest ab eo petere debitum: ergo si matrimonium est vinculum relationis in utroque extremo[^p775-5]: ergo et ista est uxor, et ille vir.

2. Item, quod mortua uxore, possit contrahere cum alia, videtur, quia omne crimen potest deleri per poenitentiam: ergo si, omnino deleto crimine, non debet durare poena; videtur, quod talis possit contrahere.

3. Item, esto quod contrahat, nunquid Ecclesia separabit? Constat, quod non: ergo incestus non impedit matrimonium.

### Conclusio.

> Incestuosa copula cum sorore uxoris impedit tantum ius petendi debitum, si fit post contractionem matrimonii; si vero ante eandem, est impedimentum dirimens.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquis potest committere incestum cognoscendo sororem uxoris suae dupliciter: aut *antequam* contrahat matrimonium cum sorore, aut *post* contractionem[^p775-6]. Si post contractionem matrimonii; matrimonium illud non solvitur, amittit[^p775-7] tamen ius *petendi* debitum, non tamen *reddendi*, quia non potuit peccatum eius praeiudicare uxori, nisi fuerit conscia sceleris. *Interdicitur* etiam tali ab Ecclesia, ut non contrahat cum *alia*, etiam priori mortua; dispensatur tamen cum eo, maxime si timetur de fornicatione, quia est iuvenis. Si vero contrahat sine dispensatione, non debet
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separari omnino, sed ad tempus ad poenitentiam faciendam: peccat tamen contrahendo sine Ecclesiae licentia[^p776-1]. — Si autem cognovit sororem *ante* matrimonii contractionem, etiam post sponsalia de futuro, nullum est matrimonium contractum ratione affinitatis; unde separandi sunt iudicio Ecclesiae, et mulier potest nubere, vir autem, quantum est de rigore iuris, nubere non potest.

1. Et in hoc casu intelliguntur auctoritates a Magistro inductae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *crimine*, dicendum, quod quamvis sit homo puniendus pro crimine, quantum est de rigore[^p776-2]; dispensatur tamen, ubi timetur periculum, et detrahitur severitati.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *affinitate*, dicendum, quod affinitas superveniens non dissolvit matrimonium iam contractum, quia quod firmum est non potest infirmari aliquo casuali vel accidentali superveniente.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *debito*, dicendum, quod ipse in *petendo* cognoscit *affinem*, sed in *reddendo* cognoscit *uxorem*, quia illa petit affectu uxorio et petit ius, quod habet in eo; et ideo tenetur ille reddere[^p776-3].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether the crime of incest impedes marriage and makes the person illegitimate.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning the perversion of the will in the incestuous — as, for instance, when someone lies with his wife's sister; the question therefore is whether such a crime impedes marriage and makes the person illegitimate. And that it does, is shown thus:

1. By the authorities which the Master adduces in the text[^p775-2].

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by *reason*: because, in the matter in which one sins, in that he ought to be tormented[^p775-3]; but that incest was against the good of marriage: therefore he ought to be punished in it.

3. Likewise, affinity[^p775-4] is contracted in carnal union; but affinity impedes marriage from being contracted and dissolves one already contracted, just as consanguinity too, or kinship: therefore if he has become an affine of his wife, the marriage no longer remains.

4. Likewise, that he ought at least not to *render* the debt is shown: because whoever has intercourse with a kinswoman, or an affine, sins mortally; but no one is bound to sin mortally: therefore he is not bound to render the debt.

**On the contrary:** 1. A wife ought not to be punished for her husband's sin, therefore she is not deprived of her husband; and if this: therefore he is her husband, and she can demand the debt from him: therefore if marriage is a bond of relation in each extreme[^p775-5]: therefore this woman too is a wife, and he a husband.

2. Likewise, that, his wife being dead, he can contract with another, is shown, because every crime can be blotted out by penance: therefore if, the crime being wholly blotted out, the penalty ought not to last; it seems that such a man can contract.

3. Likewise, granted that he contracts, will the Church perhaps separate them? It is established that it will not: therefore incest does not impede marriage.

### Conclusion.

> Incestuous union with a wife's sister impedes only the right of demanding the debt, if it takes place after the contracting of the marriage; but if before it, it is a diriment impediment.

**I respond:** It must be said that someone can commit incest by knowing his wife's sister in two ways: either *before* he contracts marriage with the sister, or *after* the contracting[^p775-6]. If after the contracting of the marriage: that marriage is not dissolved, yet he loses[^p775-7] the right of *demanding* the debt, but not of *rendering* it, because his sin could not prejudice the wife, unless she was aware of the crime. Such a man is also *forbidden* by the Church to contract with *another*, even the first being dead; yet a dispensation is granted him, especially if there is fear of fornication, because he is young. But if he contracts without a dispensation, he ought not to be
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separated altogether, but for a time, for the doing of penance: he nevertheless sins by contracting without the Church's license[^p776-1]. — But if he knew the sister *before* the contracting of the marriage, even after a betrothal for the future, no marriage is contracted, by reason of affinity; whence they are to be separated by the judgment of the Church, and the woman can marry, but the man, so far as the rigor of the law is concerned, cannot marry.

1. And in this case are understood the authorities adduced by the Master.

2. To that which is objected concerning the *crime*, it must be said that, although a man is to be punished for the crime, so far as the rigor is concerned[^p776-2]; yet a dispensation is granted where danger is feared, and something is subtracted from the severity.

3. To that which is objected concerning *affinity*, it must be said that supervening affinity does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, because what is firm cannot be invalidated by anything casual or accidental supervening.

4. To that which is objected concerning the *debt*, it must be said that in *demanding* he knows an *affine*, but in *rendering* he knows a *wife*, because she demands with wifely affection and demands a right which she has in him; and therefore he is bound to render it[^p776-3].

---

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, c. 5.

la: Respicitur Sap. 11, 17.

en: Reference is made to Wisdom 11:17.

la: Non pauci codd. *Item, si affinitas*.

en: Not a few codices [read] *Likewise, if affinity*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 4. et pag. 727, nota 2. — Pro *matrimonium est* edd. *manet*. Superius voci *vir* cod. G praemittit *suus*.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, argument 4, and p. 727, note 2. — For *matrimonium est* the editions [read] *manet*. Above, to the word *vir* codex G prefixes *suus*.

la: Cod. F supplet *matrimonii*.

en: Codex F supplements *matrimonii* [yielding *post contractionem matrimonii*].

la: Vel supple: *incestuosus*, vel lege *amittitur*.

en: Either supply *incestuosus* [the incestuous man], or read *amittitur* [it is lost].

la: Cfr. *Qui dormierit* (30.), C. 27. q. 2. et Glossa in C. 32. q. 7. (ubi idem canon recurrit); C. *Si quis* (I.) c. 21. et C. *Transmissae* (I.), X. de Eo qui cognovit consanguineam etc. (lib. IV. tit. 13.). Vide etiam infra d. 41. q. 1. et 3, ubi de affinitate.

en: Cf. *Qui dormierit* (30), C. 27, q. 2, and the Gloss on C. 32, q. 7 (where the same canon recurs); C. *Si quis* (1), c. 21, and C. *Transmissae* (1), X, *On him who has known a kinswoman*, etc. (Book IV, tit. 13). See also below, d. 41, q. 1 and 3, where affinity is treated.

la: Cod. bb supplet *iuris*. Mox pro *ubi* cod. E *si*.

en: Codex bb supplements *iuris* [yielding *de rigore iuris*]. Soon, for *ubi* codex E [reads] *si*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF colcrop bands for printed pp. 775–776 (pdf 795–796), per the Vol II/IV two-column PDF-priority override; raw OCR L83163–83238 used only for alignment and footnote-marker positions. Left column read top→bottom, then right column, for each page. Marginal editorial glosses printed in the outer margin (*Conclusio 1.*, *Conclusio 2.*, *Notandum.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Distinctio.*) were trimmed as marginalia, not body text.

**"Secundo quaeritur" alignment — VERIFIED.** The raw opener "Secundo quaeritur de perversione voluntatis in incestuosis…" (raw L83168) aligns with the auto-chunker's line_start and with the QUAESTIO II heading on the PDF band (p.775). This is correctly the second/last question of Articulus III (the a3 divisio in a3-q1 announces "Secundo, de subversione voluntatis in incestuosis"). No misalignment.

**Scholion.** has_scholion = false. Per dispatch, the Articulus III scholion (which covers both a3 questions) lives in a3-q1; the SCHOLION printed at the top of p.775 left column belongs to a3-q1 and is NOT rendered here.

**Page-break.** The Respondeo sentence "non debet se-|parari omnino" breaks across the p.775/776 boundary mid-word; the `<!-- page 776 -->` marker is placed at that word-break, with *separari* kept whole on the 776 side.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- p.775 note 1 (*Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. … Superius pro* aliunde…) anchors on the word *aliunde* at raw L83139, which lies in the preceding question a3-q1's body (top-right of p.775, its Respondeo continuation). It is therefore NOT claimed here; a3-q1 should claim it. My body's first p.775 marker is note 2.
- p.776 notes 4–8 (Vide tom. III p. 802; Cfr. B. Albert. hic a. I; Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 2; Cod. F sed velit …; Codd. communiter possunt …) anchor in the DUBIA content that begins lower on p.776 (DUB. I–III). They are NOT claimed here; the d34-dubia chunk should claim them. My body's p.776 markers are notes 1–3 only.

**Shared-page boundaries.** p.775 is shared with a3-q1 (a3-q1 ends, then SCHOLION, then QUAESTIO II begins near the bottom of the left column). p.776 is shared with the DUBIA chunk (my Respondeo replies end at "…tenetur ille reddere"; then the full-width header DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI and DUB. I begin — not mine).

**No [?] flags.** All readings confirmed from the PDF bands; no illegible or ambiguous spots.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 776 -->

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; markers are labelled by printed page and page-note number. Footnotes 1–3 of p. 776 anchor in the preceding chunk (a3-q2) and are not repeated here.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Plene legitimae sunt, quibus non obviat votum* etc. Videtur enim falsum dicere: quia legitimitas est habitus, illegitimitas est privatio; sed « per habitus cognoscuntur privationes, non per privationes habitus[^p776-4] »: ergo male definitur legitimitas per privationem illegitimam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut *solutio* uno modo dicit habitum respectu ligationis, alio modo privationem; sic in proposito. Si enim comparentur solutum et ligatum respectu actus, quantum ad quem est expeditio, solutio dicit *habitum*; si vero comparentur respectu vinculi, solutio dicit *privationem vinculi*; et sic dupliciter potest definiri. Per hunc modum de *legitimitate* oportet intelligi[^p776-5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Volo esse mater et filios procreare* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia propter sterilitatem uxoris non potest vir allegare contra uxorem, quod velit esse *pater*: ergo nec propter frigiditatem viri mulier, quod velit esse *mater*. — Item, matrimonium stat sine bono prolis: ergo propter hoc, quod velit esse mater, non debet dividi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Sancti[^p776-6] curialiter loquuntur, secundum quod ipsae mulieres sunt verecundae; mulier enim non potest separari a viro propter defectum potentiae *generandi*, sed potentiae *coeundi*; et in illa circumlocutione curialiter intelligitur, quod vult cognosci a viro. Et ita patet, quod non est simile de *sterilitate*, sed bene est simile de *arctitudine*. Si enim adeo arcta est, quod cognosci non potest; vir potest allegare et dicere, quod velit esse *pater*, id est, nolit continere, si potest[^p776-7] coire. Et sic patet illud.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si retinaculum coniugale voluerint rescindere, maneant innupti utrique*. Videtur enim utrumque esse falsum, primum scilicet de *retinaculo coniugali*; quia, si est ibi retinaculum, cum sit vinculum insolubile, solvi non potest[^p776-8], si vero non, quomodo rescinditur? — *Rursus*, videtur falsum dicere et male praecipere, quia, cum alter eorum non habeat impedimentum aliquod, posset licite cum altero contrahere.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum, si ille qui est frigidus vere, divortium petat, utrum audiendus sit. Et quod non, videtur: quia fornicans non potest petere divortium, quia fit ob culpam suam: ergo nec talis frigidus, cum ipse sit in causa. — Sed *contra* hoc est, quia, cum non sit ibi matrimonium, videtur, quod neuter teneatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod divortium propter impotentiam coeundi aliquando fit propter hoc, quod impotentia est in altero; aliquando propter hoc, quod impotentia est in utroque. Si propter hoc, quod sit in utroque, uterque debet sine spe coniugii remanere. Si propter hoc, quod sit in altero, sive in viro <!-- page 777 --> sive in muliere, post divortium ille, in quo est causa, debet remanere sine spe coniugii tanquam persona illegitima; quodsi contrahat et possit, tunc oportet redire ad priora vota.

Quod ergo dicit, quod maneant innupti, refertur ad eum, in quo reperitur causa illegitimitatis, sive in viro, sive in muliere.

Quod obiicitur de *retinaculo*, dicendum, quod etsi secundum *veritatem* non sit ibi retinaculum coniugale, tamen secundum *apparentiam* vel aestimationem ibi est; vel etiam quaedam *sponsio et obligatio*, quia affectu maritali invicem cohabitare possunt; unde valde laudandum[^p777-1] est eis, quod insimul permaneant, nisi velint transire ad arctiorem vitam.

Quod quaeritur, si, viro petente, debeat fieri; dicendum, quod sic, si probare possit; attamen, quia contra se et contra matrimonium vadit, suspicio mala de viro colligitur. Et ideo abundans probatio tali viro indicitur, maxime si mulier dicat, se cognitam esse ab ipso; quod si mulier confiteatur; aut oportet evidenter probare, aut debent ambo innupti remanere, vel etiam nunquam separari; pro quo Ecclesia debet diligentiam quam potest adhibere[^p777-2].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Septima manu propinquorum, tactis sacrosanctis reliquiis, iurando dicat* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nullus debet iurare nisi de eo, de quo certus est; sed nullus propinquorum certus est, pro eo quod actus ille latebras requirit: ergo videtur, quod nullus possit iurare. — Item, esto quod nullus sit propinquus, vel pauci; nunquid poterunt separari? — Item, quare magis hoc debet fieri manu propinquorum quam aliorum?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis de actu illo vix aut nunquam habeatur certitudo per facti evidentiam; habetur tamen ut plurimum per signa probabilia et per coniecturas, quae, quamvis non sufficiant ad generandam *scientiam*, sufficiunt tamen ad generandam *fidem* sive credulitatem, quae aliquod robur praestat. Dico igitur, quod ad hoc, quod divortium fiat, uterque debet iurare, quod nunquam carnaliter convenerint nec convenire potuerint, et quod operam dederint, et unusquisque, quod per se non steterit; et propinqui debent iurare, quod ita credunt; et tunc, ex quo simul cohabitaverunt per tempus sufficiens, dividi possunt. Si autem alter eorum, utpote mulier, dicat, quod non sit cognita, et vir dicat, quod sic; standum est viro, quia *vir est caput mulieris*[^p777-3], et quia etiam loquitur pro causa matrimoniali, quae est maxime favorabilis. Si autem mulier velit offerre et replicare, ipsum esse mentitum, per ostensionem claustrorum; standum est probationi mulieris. Si vero vir petat divisionem et dicat, se non cognovisse, et mulier dicat, se fuisse cognitam; quamvis *vir sit caput mulieris*, tamen non standum iuramento viri, pro eo quod ipse contra matrimonium agit, et multi relinquunt uxores suas. Unde si aliae probationes non sunt, non est standum pro eo, sed pro matrimonio.

Quod quaeritur, quare manu propinquorum; dicendum, quod hoc est ex duplici ratione: tum quia eis magis constat, tum etiam, quia probabile est, quod magis pro matrimonio stent[^p777-4].

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Tunc qui iuraverant periurii crimine rei teneantur*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia iuraverunt, se ita credere; sed quamvis ita non sit, non propter hoc iuraverunt falsum nec contra mentem: ergo non sunt periuri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo. Non enim dicit, quod *sint periuri*, sed quod *rei teneantur*, quia ita retractanda est sententia divortii lata per illa iuramenta, sicut si lata esset per iuramenta falsa, pro eo quod facti evidentia ostendit, illa iuramenta fuisse nulla quantum ad illam sententiam fortificandam[^p777-5], nec praebuerunt fortificationem, sed potius errandi occasionem.

### Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *prioribus reconciliari nequibunt* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, si copulentur aliis et coeunt invicem, tunc apertum est, quod solutum est maleficium: ergo videtur, quod non fuerit perpetuum: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod non possunt reconciliari; hoc intelligitur, quando praesumitur, maleficium illud fuisse *personale*; et tunc valet uterque coniungi alii, quia non habet ille illegitimitatem nisi respectu *huius*; et ideo, cum alii coniungitur, vere coniungitur, et ideo non potest redire ad primam. Si autem maleficium illud fuisset *universaliter*, ut nullam posset cognoscere mulierem; tunc, si rediret potentia cognoscendi, et vellent redire; possent et deberent se invicem reconciliare. <!-- page 778 --> Sed quis potest hoc experiri, vel dare licentiam probandi? Tamen haec et multo maiora quotidie eveniunt et contingunt[^p778-1].

### Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Fabianus: *Neque furiosus neque furiosa matrimonium contrahere possunt; sed si contractum fuerit, non separentur*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, si non separantur, contrahunt; et si contrahunt, possunt contrahere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod furiosus in actu non potest contrahere, nec *de iure* nec *de facto*. Furiosus vero in *habitu* non potest *de iure* contrahere, quia prolem nescit educare; sed tamen, si sit sanae mentis in actu, potest *de facto* contrahere; et si contrahat, contractum est. Unde negatio prima non privat potentiam *simpliciter*, sed solum *de iure*; vel si privat potentiam *simpliciter*, tunc intelligitur de furia *in actu*. Et sic intelligitur verbum Magistri, et verbum sequens[^p778-2] adversative intelligitur de furiosis *in habitu*, sanae mentis *in actu*, qui possunt contrahere saltem *de facto*.

### Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nec propriae uxori sibi liceat debitum reddere* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia non potest eam iure suo privare.

Respondeo: Istud non tenetur nunc, sed debet intelligi illud: quia non licet ei *petere* nec *reddere* etiam, ut *satisfaciat suae concupiscentiae*; sed tamen tenetur debitum *reddere uxori*, ex quo peccatum supervenit post matrimonium legitime contractum. Unde quamvis matrimonium non claudicet quantum ad *vinculum*, tamen quantum ad *debitum reddendum* claudicare potest; sicut patet de eo qui intrat religionem sine licentia uxoris et emittit votum solemne[^p778-3]; sic in proposito intellige. Unde ista decreta, quae hic allegantur, abrogata sunt.

### Dub. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *pro aliqua infirmitate corporali non licet viro uxorem dimittere*. Videtur enim male dicere: quia magis potest sustineri ut plurimum *fornicationis culpa*, in qua potest esse usus coniugii, quam *illa infirmitas*, in qua non potest esse usus: ergo si propter fornicationem dimittitur[^p778-4], videtur, quod et propter talem infirmitatem possit dimitti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non fit separatio post coniugii consummationem, nisi fiat in poenam alterius; et quoniam nemo punitur nisi pro culpa, et afflicto[^p778-5] afflictio addenda non est; hinc est, quod pro qualicumque poena, vel infirmitate non est uxor reiicienda.

---

english:
<!-- page 776 -->

### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: *They are fully legitimate whom no vow bars* etc. For it seems to be false to say [this]: because legitimacy is a habit, illegitimacy is a privation; but "privations are known through habits, not habits through privations[^p776-4]": therefore legitimacy is ill-defined through illegitimate privation.

I respond: It must be said that, just as *loosing* in one way names a habit with respect to binding, in another way a privation; so in the matter at hand. For if the loosed and the bound are compared with respect to the act, in regard to which there is a freeing, the loosing names a *habit*; but if they are compared with respect to the bond, the loosing names *the privation of the bond*; and thus it can be defined in two ways. In this manner must *legitimacy* be understood[^p776-5].

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *I wish to be a mother and to bear children* etc. For it seems to be badly said, because on account of the sterility of the wife the husband cannot allege against the wife that he wishes to be a *father*: therefore neither, on account of the frigidity of the husband, [can] the wife [allege] that she wishes to be a *mother*. — Likewise, marriage stands without the good of offspring: therefore, on account of this, that she wishes to be a mother, it ought not to be dissolved.

I respond: It must be said that the Saints[^p776-6] speak courteously, insofar as women themselves are modest; for a woman cannot be separated from her husband on account of a defect of the power of *generating*, but of the power of *intercourse*; and in that circumlocution it is courteously understood that she wishes to be known by a man. And so it is clear that it is not similar in the case of *sterility*, but it is indeed similar in the case of *narrowness*. For if she is so narrow that she cannot be known, the husband can allege and say that he wishes to be a *father*, that is, that he does not wish to be continent, if he can have intercourse[^p776-7]. And thus that is clear.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *If they should wish to sever the conjugal bond, let both remain unmarried*. For it seems that each is false: first, namely, concerning the *conjugal bond*; because, if there is a bond there, since it is an insoluble bond, it cannot be loosed[^p776-8]; but if there is not, how is it severed? — *Again*, it seems false to say and ill to command, because, since one of them has no impediment whatever, he could licitly contract with another.

Alongside this it is asked whether, if he who is truly frigid seeks a divorce, he ought to be heard. And that he ought not, it seems: because a fornicator cannot seek a divorce, since it comes about through his own fault: therefore neither can such a frigid man, since he himself is the cause. — But *against* this is that, since there is no marriage there, it seems that neither is bound.

I respond: It must be said that divorce on account of impotence for intercourse sometimes comes about because the impotence is in one party; sometimes because the impotence is in both. If because it is in both, each ought to remain without hope of marriage. If because it is in one, whether in the husband <!-- page 777 --> or in the wife, after the divorce that one, in whom the cause lies, ought to remain without hope of marriage as an illegitimate person; but if he should contract and be able, then he must return to his former vows.

That, then, which he says—that they should remain unmarried—refers to the one in whom the cause of illegitimacy is found, whether in the husband or in the wife.

As to what is objected concerning the *bond*, it must be said that although according to *truth* there is no conjugal bond there, nevertheless according to *appearance* or estimation it is there; or even a certain *betrothal and obligation*, since they can dwell together with marital affection; whence it is greatly to be praised[^p777-1] in them that they remain together, unless they wish to pass over to a stricter life.

As to what is asked—whether, at the husband's petition, it ought to be done—it must be said that yes, if he can prove it; nevertheless, because he goes against himself and against the marriage, an evil suspicion is gathered concerning the husband. And therefore abundant proof is enjoined on such a husband, especially if the wife says that she was known by him; but if the wife should confess [it]; either it is necessary to prove it evidently, or they must both remain unmarried, or even never be separated; for which the Church ought to apply what diligence it can[^p777-2].

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *By the hand of seven kinsmen, the holy relics being touched, let him say on oath* etc. For it seems to be badly said, because no one ought to swear except concerning that of which he is certain; but no one of the kinsmen is certain, because that act requires concealment: therefore it seems that no one can swear. — Likewise, suppose that there is no kinsman, or few; will they not be able to be separated? — Likewise, why ought this rather to be done by the hand of kinsmen than of others?

I respond: It must be said that although concerning that act certainty is scarcely ever had through the evidence of the fact, nevertheless it is had for the most part through probable signs and through conjectures, which, although they do not suffice to generate *knowledge*, nevertheless suffice to generate *faith* or belief, which affords some strength. I say therefore that, for this—that a divorce be granted—each ought to swear that they have never come together carnally nor have been able to come together, and that they have taken pains, and that each has not, by his own part, stood in the way; and the kinsmen ought to swear that they so believe; and then, since they have dwelt together for a sufficient time, they can be divided. But if one of them, namely the wife, says that she was not known, and the husband says that she was; one must stand by the husband, because *the man is the head of the woman*[^p777-3], and because he also speaks for the matrimonial cause, which is most favorable. But if the wife wishes to offer and to reply that he has lied, by the showing of [her intact] enclosures; one must stand by the wife's proof. But if the husband seeks division and says that he did not know [her], and the wife says that she was known; although *the man is the head of the woman*, nevertheless one must not stand by the husband's oath, because he himself acts against the marriage, and many abandon their wives. Whence, if there are no other proofs, one must not stand by him, but by the marriage.

As to what is asked—why by the hand of kinsmen—it must be said that this is for a twofold reason: both because it is more evident to them, and also because it is probable that they stand rather for the marriage[^p777-4].

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Then let those who had sworn be held guilty of the crime of perjury*. For it seems to be badly said, because they swore that they so believed; but although it is not so, they did not on that account swear falsely nor against their mind: therefore they are not perjurers.

I respond: It must be said that stress must be laid on the word. For he does not say that *they are perjurers*, but that *they are held guilty*, because the sentence of divorce passed through those oaths must be retracted just as if it had been passed through false oaths, because the evidence of the fact shows those oaths to have been null as regards the strengthening of that sentence[^p777-5]; nor did they furnish strengthening, but rather an occasion of erring.

### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *they will not be able to be reconciled to their former [spouses]* etc. For it seems to be badly said, because, if they are joined to others and come together with one another, then it is clear that the bewitchment has been dissolved; therefore it seems that it was not perpetual: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that when it is said that they cannot be reconciled, this is understood when it is presumed that that bewitchment was *personal*; and then each is able to be joined to another, because that one does not have illegitimacy except with respect to *this one*; and therefore, when he is joined to another, he is truly joined, and therefore he cannot return to the first. But if that bewitchment had been *universal*, so that he could know no woman; then, if the power of knowing should return, and they should wish to return, they could and ought to be reconciled to one another. <!-- page 778 --> But who can test this, or grant license for proving it? Nevertheless these things and much greater happen and occur daily[^p778-1].

### Dub. VII.

Likewise it is asked about this which Fabianus says: *Neither a madman nor a madwoman can contract marriage; but if it has been contracted, let them not be separated*. For it seems to be badly said, because, if they are not separated, they contract; and if they contract, they can contract.

I respond: It must be said that a madman in act cannot contract, neither *by right* nor *in fact*. But a madman in *habit* cannot contract *by right*, because he does not know how to rear offspring; but nevertheless, if he is of sound mind in act, he can contract *in fact*; and if he contracts, it is contracted. Whence the first negation does not deprive [him] of the power *absolutely*, but only *by right*; or if it deprives [him] of the power *absolutely*, then it is understood of madness *in act*. And thus the word of the Master is understood, and the following word[^p778-2] is understood adversatively of the mad *in habit*, of sound mind *in act*, who can contract at least *in fact*.

### Dub. VIII.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Nor let it be permitted to render the debt to his own wife* etc. For it seems to be badly said, because he cannot deprive her of her own right.

I respond: This does not hold now, but that [saying] must be understood [thus]: that it is not permitted him to *ask* nor even to *render* [the debt], so as to *satisfy his own concupiscence*; but nevertheless he is bound to *render the debt to his wife*, since the sin supervened after the marriage was legitimately contracted. Whence, although the marriage does not limp as regards the *bond*, nevertheless as regards the *rendering of the debt* it can limp; just as is clear in the case of one who enters religion without his wife's license and makes solemn vow[^p778-3]; understand it so in the matter at hand. Whence those decrees which are here alleged have been abrogated.

### Dub. IX.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *for some bodily infirmity it is not permitted a man to dismiss his wife*. For it seems to be badly said: because for the most part the fault of *fornication* can rather be endured, in which there can be the use of marriage, than *that infirmity*, in which the use cannot exist: therefore if [a wife] is dismissed on account of fornication[^p778-4], it seems that she may also be dismissed on account of such an infirmity.

I respond: It must be said that separation is not made after the consummation of the marriage, unless it be made as a penalty on the other party; and since no one is punished except for fault, and affliction is not to be added to one afflicted[^p778-5], hence it is that for any penalty whatever, or for infirmity, the wife is not to be cast off.

---

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 802, nota 8.

en: See tom. III, p. 802, note 8.

la: Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4, ubi positive describitur persona legitima, quae secundum leges libertatem habet contrahendi matrimonium cum quocumque voluerit.

en: Cf. B. Albert, here a. 4, where the legitimate person is positively described, who according to the laws has the liberty of contracting marriage with whomsoever she wishes.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cod. F sed velit. — Vide de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic a. 2. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. seq. (ubi etiam de duobus seqq. dubiis).

en: Cod. F [reads] *sed velit*. — On this doubt see B. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here a. 2 and on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2 and on the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1 and following (where also concerning the two following doubts).

la: Codd. communiter possunt, et inferius post praecipere omittunt quia.

en: The codices commonly [read] *possunt*, and below, after *praecipere*, they omit *quia*.

la: Secunda manus in cod. bb substituit consulendum, et infra post debeat supplevit divortium.

en: A second hand in cod. bb substituted *consulendum*, and below, after *debeat*, supplied *divortium*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, et X. de Frigidis etc. (lib. IV. tit. 15.) per totum. — Idem dub. solvit Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2, and X, *de Frigidis* etc. (bk. IV, tit. 15) throughout. — Richard of Middleton resolves the same doubt, here on the text.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 11, 3. et Eph. 5, 23, allegatum etiam in C. Accepisti (1.), X. de Frigidis etc. (lib. IV. tit. 15.). — Inferius ante velit offerre cod. bb addit se.

en: Epistle, 1 Cor. 11:3 and Eph. 5:23, cited also in the canon *Accepisti* (1), X, *de Frigidis* etc. (bk. IV, tit. 15). — Below, before *velit offerre*, cod. bb adds *se*.

la: Vide B. Albert., hic a. 5-7; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: See B. Albert, here a. 5–7; St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: Cod. bb formandam. — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cod. bb [reads] *formandam*. — St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton resolve the same doubt, here on the text.

la: Edd. probandi, cum haec... eveniant et contingant. — Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2, ubi etiam in scholio allegantur auctores, qui de hac re tractant, praeter quos vide Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: The editions [read] *probandi, cum haec... eveniant et contingant*. — Cf. above a. 2, q. 2, where in the scholion too are cited authors who treat of this matter; besides whom see Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text.

la: Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1; in scholio annexo citantur alii auctores hoc dubium solventes.

en: Here in the text of the Master, c. 4. — Cf. above a. 3, q. 1; in the appended scholion other authors resolving this doubt are cited.

la: Vide supra d. 27. dub. 4. — De ipso dubio cfr. supra a. 3. q. 2. et praeter auctores ibid. in scholio notatos S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: See above d. 27, dub. 4. — On this doubt cf. above a. 3, q. 2, and, besides the authors noted there in the scholion, St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Cfr. infra d. 38. q. 1. seqq. — Pro si propter quod habent codd. GL, alii et edd. si per. Superius pro plurimum codd. IK in plurimis, nonnulli codd. plurimis.

en: Cf. below d. 38, q. 1 ff. — For *si propter*, which codd. GL, others, and the editions have *si per*. Above, for *plurimum*, codd. IK [read] *in plurimis*, some codices *plurimis*.

la: Pro afflicto, quod Vat. omittit, codd. LY afflictis. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 14; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: For *afflicto*, which the Vatican edition omits, codd. LY [read] *afflictis*. — B. Albert, here a. 14, and Richard of Middleton, here on the text, resolve the same doubt. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol. IV PDF page-bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{776,777,778}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, offset pdf = printed + 20), which are authoritative for this cascade-shattered two-column OCR region; raw OCR L83239–83447 used only as a cross-check. Printed pages 776–778 confirmed from running heads ("DIST. XXXIV. DUBIA. 777"; "778 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.").

**Dubia count.** Nine dubia (Dub. I–IX), each opening `Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit…` with a `Respondeo`. All present and complete.

**Seam verification (d.34→d.35).** The final dubium (Dub. IX) is complete: its Respondeo ends `…pro qualicumque poena, vel infirmitate non est uxor reiicienda.` (raw L83447, verified on band p778-R-1). Immediately after, `DISTINCTIO XXXV.` / `Cap. I. De iure viri et mulieris.` begins (raw L83448) — d.35 littera, NOT claimed here. The p. 778 footer block headed `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` (Epist. 77 ad Oceanum; C. Praecepit Dominus; Can. Christiana Religio) belongs to the d.35 littera and is likewise not claimed.

**Apparatus (15 entries).** Per-page footer split, each note anchored by body position:
- **p. 776 (5 mine, notes 4–8):** 4 → Dub. I (`habitus`); 5 → Dub. I (`intelligi`); 6 → Dub. II (`Sancti`); 7 → Dub. II (`potest` coire); 8 → Dub. III (`non potest`).
- **p. 777 (5, notes 1–5):** 1 → Dub. III (`laudandum`); 2 → Dub. III (`adhibere`); 3 → Dub. IV (`caput mulieris`); 4 → Dub. IV (`stent`); 5 → Dub. V (`fortificandam`).
- **p. 778 (5, notes 1–5):** 1 → Dub. VI (`contingunt`); 2 → Dub. VII (`sequens`); 3 → Dub. VIII (`solemne`); 4 → Dub. IX (`dimittitur`); 5 → Dub. IX (`afflicto`).

**Hand-offs.**
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- *Forwarded:* p. 778's d.35 littera opener (`DISTINCTIO XXXV. Cap. I.`) and its `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footnotes are forwarded to the d.35 littera chunk — not claimed here.

**Band corrections to raw OCR** (band authoritative): p. 777 note 2 reads `lib. IV. tit. 15` (raw OCR garbled to `tit. 13`); p. 778 note 3 reads `d. 27. dub. 4` (raw OCR garbled to `dub. i`).

**[?] flags.** None. All body prose and all 15 footers were legible on the bands.


title: Dist. 35

title_alt: Littera Magistri (Lombard), Distinctio XXXV

title_alt: The text of the Master (Lombard), Distinction XXXV

source_text:
<!-- page 778 -->

### Cap. I. *De iure viri et mulieris.*

Hoc etiam notandum est, quod cum Dominus concedat uxorem dimitti causa fornicationis viro, eadem licentia non tollitur feminis. Unde Hieronymus[^p778-1]: «Praecepit Dominus, uxorem non dimitti, excepta causa fornicationis, et si dimissa fuerit, manere innuptam. Quidquid viris praecipitur, hoc consequenter redundat ad feminas. Non enim adultera uxor dimittenda est, et vir moechus tenendus». Item: «Apud nos quod non licet feminis aeque non licet viris, et eadem servitus pari conditione censetur». — Ex his ostenditur, quod mulier potest super fornicatione virum convenire, ut vir mulierem. Unde Innocentius Papa[^p778-2]: «Christiana religio adulterium in utroque sexu pari ratione condemnat; sed viros suos mulieres non facile de adulterio accusant, viri autem liberius uxores suas adulteras apud sacerdotes deferre consueverunt. Et ideo mulieribus, prodito earum crimine, communio negatur; virorum autem latente commisso, non facile quisquam ex suspicionibus arcetur, qui submovebitur, si eius flagitium detegatur».

<!-- page 779 -->

### Cap. II. *Quod fornicariam nequit dimittere vir, nisi ipse expers fuerit fornicationis, et e converso.*

Si vero quaeritur, an adulter adulteram possit dimittere causa fornicationis; dicimus, quia nequit adultera uxor dimitti a viro, nisi et ipse expers fornicationis existat, et e converso. Unde Augustinus[^p779-1]: «Nihil iniquius est quam causa fornicationis dimittere uxorem, si et ipse convincitur fornicari. Occurrit enim illud: *In quo alterum iudicas, te ipsum condemnas.* Quapropter quisquis fornicationis causa vult abiicere uxorem, prior debet esse a fornicatione purgatus; quod similiter et de femina dixerim». Idem[^p779-2]: «Indignantur mariti, si audiant, adulteros viros pendere similes adulteris feminis poenas; cum tanto gravius eos puniri oportuerit, quanto magis ad eos pertinet et virtute vincere et exemplo regere feminas». — Ex his apparet, quod adulter adulteram dimittere non valet, et e converso.

### Cap. III. *De reconciliatione eorum qui propter fornicationem separantur.*

Si quis autem fornicationis expers fornicariam dimiserit, alii copulari non potest, sed continere oportet, vel ad dimissam redire; sic et de femina. Unde Apostolus[^p779-3]: *His qui matrimonio iuncti sunt, praecipio non ego, sed Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere; quodsi discesserit, manere innuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari;* et de viro addit: *Et vir uxorem non dimittat.* Sed Ambrosius[^p779-4] ait: «Ideo non subdit de viro sicut de muliere, quia licet viro aliam ducere». Sed hoc a falsariis in Ambrosii libro positum creditur; supplendum enim esse in viro quod de uxore praemisit, aperte dicit Augustinus[^p779-5] sic: «Quare non addit de muliere quod praemisit de viro, nisi quod similem formam vult intelligi, ut, si dimiserit, quod causa fornicationis permittitur, maneat sine uxore, aut reconcilietur uxori». Idem: «Si nec illi nubere conceditur, vivo viro, a quo recessit, nec huic alteram ducere, viva uxore, quam dimisit; multo minus fas est illicita cum quibuslibet stupra committere». Idem: «Ut non facile dimittatur uxor, Dominus solam fornicationis causam excepit; ceteras vero universas molestias, si quae exstiterint, iubet pro fide coniugali et pro castitate fortiter sustineri; et *moechum* dixit qui a viro solutam duxit». — Ex his ostenditur, quod si causa fornicationis fit separatio, non potest vir vel mulier in aliam transire copulam; possunt autem reconciliari et cohabitare, sicut prius, si dimissum alter revocare voluerit. Dicit tamen Ioannes Chrysostomus[^p779-6]: «Sicut crudelis et iniquus est qui castam dimittit, sic fatuus est et iniquus qui retinet meretricem. Patronus enim turpitudinis est qui celat crimen uxoris». Item Hieronymus[^p779-7]: «Cum mulier unam carnem in aliam diviserit et se fornicatione a marito separaverit; non debet teneri, ne virum quoque sub maledicto faciat, dicente Scriptura: *Qui tenet adulteram stultus est et insipiens*». Idem ad Amandum presbyterum scribens de quadam, quae, viro suo vivente, alii nupserat, sic ait: «Rem novam loquor, immo non novam, sed veterem, quae veteris testamenti auctoritate confirmatur: si reliquerit secundum virum mulier et reconciliari voluerit priori, non potest». Sed haec omnia intelligenda sunt de illa quae ab adulterio recedere noluit nec per poenitentiam peccatum delere; quod si vir scienter patitur, consentire videtur. «Si enim in adulterio perseverare elegit, patronus turpitudinis et lenocinii reus maritus habebitur, nisi eam adulterii ream facere voluerit[^p779-8]». Si autem a peccato recesserit et per poenitentiam illud purgaverit; poterit viro reconciliari. Unde Augustinus[^p779-9]: «Quod tibi durum videtur, ut post adulterium reconcilietur coniux, si fides adsit, non erit durum. Cur enim adhuc deputamus adulteros quos credimus poenitentia esse sanatos»? Idem: «Non erit turpis nec difficilis, etiam post patrata et purgata adulteria, reconciliatio coniugii, ubi per claves regni caelorum non dubitatur fieri remissio peccatorum; non ut post viri divortium adultera revocetur, sed ut post Christi consortium adultera non vocetur». Item Gregorius[^p779-10]: «Debet recipere peccatricem, quae poenitentiam egit, sed non saepe». Item Hermas: «Si vir scierit, uxorem suam deliquisse, et non egerit poenitentiam mulier, sed permanet in fornicatione sua, et vivit cum illa vir; reus erit et particeps peccati eius. Quodsi mulier dimissa egerit poenitentiam et voluerit ad virum reverti; debet recipere peccatricem, quae poenitentiam egit, sed non saepe».

### Cap. IV. *De illis qui ante coniunctionem se polluerunt per adulterium.*

Solet etiam quaeri, an valeat duci in coniugium quae prius est polluta per adulterium. De hoc Leo Papa[^p779-11] ait: «Nullus ducat in matrimonium quam prius <!-- page 780 --> polluit adulterio». Item: «Relatum est auribus sanctorum sacerdotum, quendam alterius uxorem stupro violasse et insuper moechae iuramentum dedisse, quod post legitimi mariti mortem, si superviveret, duceret eam uxorem; quod et factum est. Tale ergo connubium prohibemus et anathematizamus». His aliisque auctoritatibus vetantur in coniugium copulari qui se prius adulterio maculaverunt. Sed econtra Augustinus[^p780-1] testatur dicens: «Denique mortuo eo, cum quo fuit verum connubium, fieri potest coniugium cum qua praecessit adulterium». Idem: «Posse fieri sane licitas nuptias ex personis illicite coniunctis, honesto placito subsequente, manifestum est». Sed haec ultima auctoritas de concubinis loquitur, perhibens, concubinas posse transire ad honestum placitum nuptiarum, si castitatem et fidem servare velint. Prima vero auctoritas Augustini de illis agit, qui de peccato poenituerunt et nihil in mortem viri machinati sunt, nec vivente viro, fidem adulterae dedit moechus, quod eam in coniugio duceret, si superviveret. Qui vero haec faciunt aliis praemissis auctoritatibus prohibentur copulari.

---

english:
### Chapter I. *On the right of the man and the woman.*

This too must be noted, that although the Lord grants to the man that a wife be dismissed for the cause of fornication, the same license is not taken away from women. Hence Jerome[^p778-1]: «The Lord commanded that a wife not be dismissed, except for the cause of fornication, and that, if she has been dismissed, she remain unmarried. Whatever is prescribed to men, this consequently redounds to women. For neither is an adulterous wife to be dismissed, nor an adulterous husband to be kept». Likewise: «Among us, what is not permitted to women is equally not permitted to men, and the same servitude is reckoned by an equal condition». — From these things it is shown that a woman can bring her husband to court over fornication, just as a man his wife. Hence Pope Innocent[^p778-2]: «The Christian religion condemns adultery in each sex by an equal reasoning; but women do not easily accuse their husbands of adultery, whereas men have been accustomed more freely to bring their adulterous wives before the priests. And therefore, when their crime has been disclosed, communion is denied to women; but when men's offense lies hidden, scarcely anyone is barred on suspicions—one who would be removed if his disgrace were exposed».

### Chapter II. *That a man cannot dismiss an adulteress unless he himself be free of fornication, and conversely.*

But if it is asked whether an adulterer can dismiss an adulteress for the cause of fornication, we say that an adulterous wife cannot be dismissed by her husband unless he himself also be free of fornication, and conversely. Hence Augustine[^p779-1]: «Nothing is more iniquitous than to dismiss a wife for the cause of fornication if he himself is convicted of fornicating. For that saying meets him: *In that wherein you judge another, you condemn yourself.* Wherefore whoever wishes to cast off his wife for the cause of fornication ought first to be purged of fornication; and I would say the same likewise of the woman». The same[^p779-2]: «Husbands are indignant if they hear that adulterous men pay penalties like those of adulterous women; whereas they ought to be punished so much the more gravely, the more it pertains to them both to conquer by virtue and to govern women by example». — From these things it appears that an adulterer cannot dismiss an adulteress, and conversely.

### Chapter III. *On the reconciliation of those who are separated on account of fornication.*

But if anyone free of fornication has dismissed an adulteress, he cannot be joined to another, but must remain continent, or return to the one dismissed; and so too concerning the woman. Hence the Apostle[^p779-3]: *To those who are joined in matrimony, I command—not I, but the Lord—that a wife not depart from her husband; but if she has departed, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband;* and concerning the husband he adds: *And let not a husband dismiss his wife.* But Ambrose[^p779-4] says: «For this reason he does not add concerning the husband as he does concerning the wife, because it is permitted to a husband to marry another». But this is believed to have been inserted into Ambrose's book by forgers; for that what he set forth about the wife must be supplied about the husband, Augustine[^p779-5] says plainly thus: «Why does he not add concerning the woman what he set forth concerning the man, except that he wishes a like form to be understood, so that, if he has dismissed her—which for the cause of fornication is permitted—he remain without a wife, or be reconciled to his wife». The same: «If it is granted neither to her to marry, while the husband from whom she departed is living, nor to him to marry another, while the wife whom he dismissed is living; much less is it lawful to commit illicit debaucheries with any persons whatever». The same: «That a wife not be dismissed lightly, the Lord excepted the cause of fornication alone; but all other troubles, if any should arise, He commands to be borne bravely for the sake of conjugal faith and of chastity; and He called him an adulterer who married a woman released from her husband». — From these things it is shown that if separation occurs for the cause of fornication, neither the man nor the woman can pass over into another union; but they can be reconciled and dwell together, as before, if the one who dismissed should be willing to recall the other. Yet John Chrysostom[^p779-6] says: «Just as he is cruel and iniquitous who dismisses a chaste woman, so he is foolish and iniquitous who retains a harlot. For he is a patron of foulness who conceals his wife's crime». Likewise Jerome[^p779-7]: «When a woman has divided one flesh into another and has separated herself from her husband by fornication, she ought not to be kept, lest she make her husband too fall under a curse, since Scripture says: *He who keeps an adulteress is foolish and senseless*». The same, writing to the presbyter Amandus concerning a certain woman who, while her husband was living, had married another, says thus: «I speak a new thing, nay not new but old, which is confirmed by the authority of the Old Testament: if a woman has left her second husband and wishes to be reconciled to the first, she cannot». But all these things are to be understood of her who was unwilling to withdraw from adultery nor to blot out her sin by penance; and if the husband knowingly permits this, he seems to consent. «For if she has chosen to persevere in adultery, the husband will be held guilty of foulness and pandering, unless he shall have willed to make her a defendant of the adultery[^p779-8]». But if she has withdrawn from sin and purged it by penance, she will be able to be reconciled to her husband. Hence Augustine[^p779-9]: «What seems hard to you—that after adultery a spouse be reconciled—if faith be present, will not be hard. For why do we still reckon as adulterers those whom we believe to have been healed by penance»? The same: «There will be neither disgrace nor difficulty, even after adulteries committed and purged, in the reconciliation of the marriage, where through the keys of the kingdom of heaven remission of sins is not doubted to take place; not that after the husband's divorce the adulteress be recalled, but that after fellowship with Christ she be not called an adulteress». Likewise Gregory[^p779-10]: «He ought to receive back the sinful woman who has done penance, but not often». Likewise Hermas: «If a husband shall know that his wife has transgressed, and the woman does not do penance but remains in her fornication, and the husband lives with her; he too will be guilty and a partaker of her sin. But if the dismissed wife has done penance and wishes to return to her husband; he ought to receive back the sinful woman who has done penance, but not often».

### Chapter IV. *On those who before their union defiled themselves through adultery.*

It is also wont to be asked whether she who was previously defiled through adultery may be taken in marriage. On this Pope Leo[^p779-11] says: «Let no one take in marriage her whom he previously defiled by adultery». Likewise: «It has been reported to the ears of the holy priests that a certain man violated another's wife by debauchery and moreover gave to the adulteress an oath that, after the death of her lawful husband, if he survived, he would take her as wife; and this indeed was done. Such a marriage therefore we forbid and anathematize». By these and other authorities those are prohibited from being joined in marriage who have previously stained themselves with adultery. But on the contrary Augustine[^p780-1] testifies, saying: «Finally, when he is dead with whom there was a true marriage, a marriage can take place with her with whom adultery preceded». The same: «That lawful nuptials can indeed take place from persons illicitly joined, an honorable agreement following after, is manifest». But this last authority speaks of concubines, declaring that concubines can pass over to the honorable agreement of nuptials, if they are willing to preserve chastity and faith. But the first authority of Augustine treats of those who repented of the sin and contrived nothing toward the death of the husband, nor, while the husband was living, did the adulterer give faith to the adulteress that he would take her in marriage if he survived. But those who do these things are, by the other authorities set forth above, prohibited from being joined.

---

la: Epist. 77. (alias 30.) ad Oceanum de morte Fabiolae, n. 3; C. *Praecepit Dominus* (19.), C. 32. q. 5, ubi respicitur Matth. 19, 9. Seq. locus ibid. et C. *Apud nos* (20.), ibid.

en: [Jerome,] Letter 77 (alias 30) to Oceanus on the death of Fabiola, n. 3; canon *Praecepit Dominus* (19), C. 32, q. 5, where Matt. 19:9 is referred to. The following passage [is] in the same place, and [in] canon *Apud nos* (20), ibid.

la: Can. *Christiana Religio* (23.), ibid.

en: Canon *Christiana Religio* (23), ibid.

la: Libr. I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 16. n. 47; C. *Nihil iniquius* (1.), C. 32. q. 6, ubi citatur Rom. 2, 1.

en: [Augustine,] Book I On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, c. 16, n. 47; canon *Nihil iniquius* (1), C. 32, q. 6, where Rom. 2:1 is cited.

la: Libr. II. de Adulterinis Coniugiis, c. 8. n. 7; C. *Indignantur mariti* (4.), ibid.

en: [Augustine,] Book II On Adulterous Marriages, c. 8, n. 7; canon *Indignantur mariti* (4), ibid.

la: Epist. I. ad Cor. 7, 10. 11; cfr. C. *Apostolus dicit* (3.), C. 32. q. 7.

en: First [Letter] to the Corinthians 7:10–11; cf. canon *Apostolus dicit* (3), C. 32, q. 7.

la: Comment. in 1. Cor. 7, 11, et apud Lyran. ibid.; cfr. Gratian. super C. *Quod proposuisti* (18.), ibid. Sed liber ille spurius est et pertinet ad Hilarium diaconum.

en: Commentary on 1 Cor. 7:11, and in Lyra at the same place; cf. Gratian on canon *Quod proposuisti* (18), ibid. But that book is spurious and belongs to Hilary the deacon.

la: Libr. I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 16. n. 43; Can. cit. *Apostolus dicit.* Seq. locus ibid. c. 14. n. 39; C. *Fieri potest* (4.), C. 32. q. 7. Tertius ibid.; C. *Dominus ad illud* (6.), ibid.

en: [Augustine,] Book I On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, c. 16, n. 43; the cited canon *Apostolus dicit.* The following passage [is] in the same place, c. 14, n. 39; canon *Fieri potest* (4), C. 32, q. 7. The third [is] in the same place; canon *Dominus ad illud* (6), ibid.

la: Opus imperf. in Matth. hom. 32. circa med.; C. *Sicut crudelis* (1.), C. 32. q. 1.

en: Unfinished Work on Matthew, homily 32, about the middle; canon *Sicut crudelis* (1), C. 32, q. 1.

la: Libr. III. in Matth. 19, 9; C. *Dixit Dominus* (2.), ibid.; ibi citatur Prov. 18, 22. (ubi codd. et ed. 1 cum S. Hieron. pro *insipiens* habent *impius*). Seq. locus eiusdem Epist. 55. (alias 147.) ad Amandum, n. 4, et respicitur Deut. 24, 1. seq.

en: [Jerome,] Book III on Matthew 19:9; canon *Dixit Dominus* (2), ibid.; there Prov. 18:22 is cited (where the codices and ed. 1, with St. Jerome, have *impius* for *insipiens*). The following passage [is] from the same author's Letter 55 (alias 147) to Amandus, n. 4, and Deut. 24:1f. is referred to.

la: Gratian. super C. *Apud misericordem* (10.), ibid.

en: Gratian on canon *Apud misericordem* (10), ibid.

la: Libr. II. de Adulterinis Coniugiis, c. 6. n. 5; C. *Quod autem* (7.), ibid. Seq. locus ibid. c. 9. n. 8; C. *Non erit* (8.), ibid.

en: [Augustine,] Book II On Adulterous Marriages, c. 6, n. 5; canon *Quod autem* (7), ibid. The following passage [is] in the same place, c. 9, n. 8; canon *Non erit* (8), ibid.

la: Non invenitur in Gregor., sed in seq. loco Hermae [codd. et edd. scribunt *Hermes*], II. Pastor, mandato 4. c. 1; cfr. August., 11 de Adulterin. Coniugiis, c. 13. n. 13. Invenitur etiam in C. *Si vir sciens* (3.), X. de Adulteriis etc. (lib. V. tit. 16.).

en: It is not found in Gregory, but in the following passage of Hermas [the codices and editions write *Hermes*], The Shepherd II, mandate 4, c. 1; cf. Augustine, On Adulterous Marriages [book] II, c. 13, n. 13. It is also found in canon *Si vir sciens* (3), X [Decretals] On Adulteries etc. (book V, title 16).

la: Can. *Nullus* (1.), C. 31. q. 1; et seq. locus C. *Relatum est* (4.), ibid.

en: Canon *Nullus* (1), C. 31, q. 1; and the following passage [in] canon *Relatum est* (4), ibid.

la: Libr. I. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 10. n. 11; C. *Denique* (2.), ibid. Seq. locus est de Bono coniugali, c. 15. n. 17; Can. cit. § 1. Cfr. etiam Gratian. super C. *Illud vero* (3.), ibid.

en: [Augustine,] Book I On Marriage and Concupiscence, c. 10, n. 11; canon *Denique* (2), ibid. The following passage is from On the Good of Marriage, c. 15, n. 17; the cited canon § 1. Cf. also Gratian on canon *Illud vero* (3), ibid. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from vol4 PDF bands (offset pdf = printed + 20; pages verified from running heads: `778 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV`, `DISTINCTIO XXXV. 779`, `780 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV`). Raw OCR L83448–83596 used as reference only; the two-column cascade-shattered OCR was superseded by the band reads per the Vol II/IV override.

**Page layout.** On p.778 the top block of both columns is d.34's Dub. VII–IX; a full-width `DISTINCTIO XXXV.` header divides the page, and Cap. I begins in the bottom block (L col → R col). Cap. I text reflows L-col tail → R-col tail. Cap. II–III fill p.779 L; Cap. III tail + Cap. IV opener fill p.779 R; Cap. IV concludes at the top of p.780 (`...prohibentur copulari.`), after which `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV / DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM / ARTICULUS UNICUS` begins — all belonging to the **divisio** chunk, not this one.

**Apparatus split (14 entries).** p.778 = 2 (`p778-1`, `p778-2`, from the "Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum" block below the d.34 footer); p.779 = 11 (`p779-1`…`p779-11`, footnotes 1–6 in the L-col footer, 7–11 in the R-col footer); p.780 = 1 (`p780-1`, the single left-side "Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum" note; the right-side "Notae ad Commentarium" ¹²… on p.780 belong to the divisio/commentarius chunk and are NOT claimed here). Every claimed footer is anchored in this body.

**Hand-offs.** Picked up from the d.34-dubia agent: the p.778 tail d.35-littera NOTAE — claimed as `p778-1` (Hieronymus) and `p778-2` (Innocentius/Christiana Religio), both anchored in Cap. I. Forwarded to the divisio agent: the p.780 `COMMENTARIUS`/`DIVISIO`/`TRACTATIO`/`ARTICULUS` body and its `Notae ad Commentarium` footer block (Cod. aa; Matth. 19,9) are the divisio's.

**Editorial marginalia trimmed.** Quaracchi's outer-margin author labels (Hieronymus, Augustinus, Chrysostomus, Gratianus, Canon, Hermas, Leo) and dubium cross-references (Dubium 3–5) are redundant with the inline attributions and were omitted from the body per the marginal-gloss rule.

**Ambiguities.** No `[?]` flags — all readings resolved cleanly from the bands. Note: footnote `p779-7` (Dixit Dominus **(2.)**) and `p779-9` (Adulterinis Coniugiis c. 6. n. **5**) follow the band reads where the raw OCR digit-mangled them to `(1.)` and `n. 3` respectively.


title: Dist. 35, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 780 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.
#### *De divortio, quod fit propter adulterium.*

*Hoc etiam notandum est, quod cum Dominus concedat uxorem dimitti* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de triplici impedimento matrimonii. Hic agit de divortio, quod ortum habet ex culpa et peccato. Et quoniam adulterium potest praecedere matrimonium, vel sequi; et secundum quod praecedit, causat divortium, et secundum quod sequitur, similiter: ideo haec pars duas habet. In prima agit de divortio, quod fit propter adulterium, quod sequitur matrimonium. In secunda agit de adulterio[^1], quod antecedit matrimonium, ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri, an valeat duci* etc.

Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima ostendit Magister, quod vir innocens potest fornicariam dimittere, et e converso. In secunda ostendit, quod si ambo fornicantur, unus non potest alterum invitum dimittere, ibi: *Si vero quaeritur, an adulter adulteram* etc. In tertia ostendit, quod post divortium, coniuge vivente, neuter potest nubere, ibi: *Si quis autem fornicationis expers* etc. In quarta, quod possunt invicem reconciliari, ibi: *Possunt autem reconciliari* etc. — In secunda vero parte principali primo opponit, deinde solvit.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de divortio. Et circa hoc sex quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum liceat uxorem dimittere ex causa fornicationis.

Secundo, utrum dimittere uxorem fornicariam sit in praecepto.

Tertio, utrum possit quis fornicantem dimittere propria auctoritate.

Quarto, utrum, divortio celebrato, possit aliam uxorem ducere.

Quinto, utrum post divortium possint invicem reconciliari.

Sexto, utrum divortium, nullo peccato praecedente, possit sine culpa fieri.

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.
#### *De divortio.*

> The numbered footnote below corresponds to a marker in both the Latin body above and the English translation below.

---

english:
<!-- page 780 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXV.
#### *On divorce, which occurs on account of adultery.*

*This too is to be noted, that since the Lord grants that a wife may be dismissed* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the threefold impediment of matrimony. Here he treats of divorce, which takes its origin from fault and sin. And since adultery can precede matrimony, or follow it; and inasmuch as it precedes, it causes divorce, and inasmuch as it follows, likewise: therefore this part has two [sections]. In the first he treats of divorce, which occurs on account of the adultery that follows matrimony. In the second he treats of adultery[^1] which precedes matrimony, there: *It is also wont to be asked whether she may be married* etc.

The first part has four particulae. In the first the Master shows that an innocent husband can dismiss a fornicating [wife], and conversely. In the second he shows that, if both commit fornication, the one cannot dismiss the other against his will, there: *But if it is asked whether an adulterer [may dismiss] an adulteress* etc. In the third he shows that after divorce, while the spouse lives, neither can marry, there: *But if anyone free from fornication* etc. In the fourth, that they can be reconciled to one another, there: *But they can be reconciled* etc. — In the second principal part he first objects, then resolves.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of the present distinction, inquiry is made concerning divorce. And concerning this, six [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether it is licit to dismiss a wife by reason of fornication.

Second, whether to dismiss a fornicating wife is a matter of precept.

Third, whether one may dismiss a fornicating [spouse] on one's own authority.

Fourth, whether, once the divorce has been carried out, he may marry another wife.

Fifth, whether after divorce they can be reconciled to one another.

Sixth, whether divorce, with no sin preceding, can occur without fault.

### SOLE ARTICLE.
#### *On divorce.*

---

en: Codex aa [reads] *on the divorce which occurs on account of adultery.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from vol4 PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p780-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (offset pdf = printed + 20 → pdf p.800), cross-checked against raw OCR L83597–83633. All content lies on printed page 780 (running head "780 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." verified).

**Chunk scope.** This chunk was re-set to open at **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV** (the skeleton began only at DIVISIO TEXTUS). It carries: the COMMENTARIUS header + theme subtitle *De divortio, quod fit propter adulterium* + the opening lemma *Hoc etiam notandum est…* + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + the ARTICULUS UNICUS opener (header + *De divortio* subtitle). QUAESTIO I. and its body begin the next chunk (a1-q1).

**Footer hand-offs (shared page 780).** Page 780 has two distinct footer streams:
- *Left column, un-headed source-note* (marker at "Augustinus¹" in the littera top block): `¹ Libr. 1. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 10. n. 11; C. Denique (2.), ibid. Seq. locus est de Bono coniugali, c. 15. n. 17; Can. cit. § 1. Cfr. etiam Gratian. super C. Illud vero (3.), ibid.` — **belongs to the littera chunk (Master-caps footer), NOT claimed here.**
- *Right column, "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM"*: `¹` (the codex-aa variant, anchored to "de adulterio¹" in the DIVISIO body) — **claimed here as [^1].** `² Vers. 9: Dico autem vobis, quia, quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam nisi ob fornicationem etc. Cfr. ibid. 5, 32.` — anchored to "Matthaei decimo nono²" in the QUAESTIO I body → **handed off to a1-q1, NOT claimed here.**

**[?] flags.**
- Marker placement of `[^1]` — **RESOLVED (600 dpi, p. 780, `raw/vision/vol4/p-hires-780-r600-0800.png`; crops y 0.05–0.45 and y 0.45–0.95, full width).** The printed superscript ¹ sits in the DIVISIO body at "*In secunda agit de adul-|terio¹, quod antecedit matrimonium, ibi: Solet etiam quaeri…*" (left column, first lines of the p. 780 bottom block). The COMMENTARIUS subtitle "*De divortio, quod fit propter adulterium.*" carries **no** superscript. The chunk's existing marker position is therefore **confirmed**; no marker was moved and the marker count is unchanged. (The NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note ¹ — "Cod. aa *de divortio, quod fit propter adulterium.*" — records the codex-aa substitution at that body lemma.)