title: Dist. 30, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum peccatum originale sit ignorantia
Whether original sin is ignorance

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum peccatum originale sit ignorantia.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum peccatum originale sit ignorantia. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Delicta iuventutis et ignorantiae meae* etc., Glossa: « *Ignorantiae meae*, id est originale peccatum, quod est in parvulis ». Et paulo ante: « *Delicta ignorantiae* dicit ea quae sunt in parvulis, qui peccato originali tenentur ».

2. Item, Hugo in libro *de Sacramentis* in septima parte[^2]: « Originale peccatum est vitium, quod nascendo contrahimus per ignorantiam in mente et concupiscentiam in carne »: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum sit ignorantia. Quodsi tu dicas, hoc esse dictum *per causam*; obviat illud quod consequenter dicit Hugo in eadem parte[^3]: « Ista quatuor mala in homine apparent: superbia, ignorantia, mortalitas et concupiscentia. Superbia mentis culpa est, mortalitas carnis poena tantum, ignorantia vero culpa et poena »; sed non est nisi culpa originalis: ergo etc.

3. Item, originale peccatum maxime habet deleri per fidei Sacramentum[^4]: ergo directius opponitur ipsi fidei, quae est in cognitiva, quam virtuti alicui existenti in affectiva. Si ergo ignorantia dicit privationem virtutis dirigentis cognitivam, videtur, quod peccatum originale sit proprie ignorantia.

4. Item, poena respondet culpae; sed originali peccato proprie debetur poena carentiae visionis Dei: ergo si hoc dicit privationem ex parte cognitivae, videtur, quod et ipsum originale; quod si hoc verum est, redit idem quod prius.

5. Item, sicut peccatum est in concupiscendo ea quae non sunt appetenda, sic peccatum est in discredendo ea quae sunt credenda: ergo sicut habere necessitatem ad *concupiscendum* est culpa, sic habere

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necessitatem ad *discredendum* est culpa. Sed parvulus utramque necessitatem habet; et non habet nisi originale: ergo sicut ponitur originale peccatum in parvulo esse *concupiscibilitas* sive concupiscentia, sic debet etiam poni[^5] esse ignorantia.

**Sed contra:**
1. Beda[^6] dicit, quod quatuor sunt nobis propter peccatum inflicta, scilicet ignorantia et infirmitas etc.: ergo cum peccatum originale non dicatur *infirmitas*, pari ratione nec *ignorantia*, quae est poena pro ipso inflicta.

2. Item, Augustinus *ad Valentinum*[^7]: « Ignorantia in his qui scire non potuerunt, poena peccati est ». Si ergo ignorantia in parvulis est invincibilis, videtur, quod sit *poena*, et non *culpa*; maxime cum videamus parvulos propter ignorantiam excusari ab omni culpa.

3. Item, originale peccatum deletur in baptismo; sed aeque bene est ignorans parvulus baptizatus, sicut non baptizatus: ergo ignorantia esse non potest originale peccatum.

4. Item, si aliquis ex aliquo actu suo cadat in furiam, illa furia non dicitur in eo esse *culpa*, sed *poena*: ergo pari ratione, si aliquis ex peccato primi parentis in ignorantiam cecidit, non debet dici *culpa* originalis, sed eius *poena*. Et potest hic esse locus *a maiori*[^8], quia magis debet imputari ignorantia in culpam, in quam incidit ex actu proprio, quam ex actu alieno.

5. Item, cum peccatum originale sit concupiscentia, ut probatum est supra[^9] et Augustinus dicit, si esset ignorantia, cum concupiscentia et ignorantia sint diversorum generum, tunc in quolibet esset pluralitas originalium peccatorum; quod ostendetur inferius esse falsum.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Concedi potest, peccatum originale esse ignorantiam, prout nempe coniuncta est concupiscentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut supra[^10] dictum fuit de ignorantia in adultis, ipsam videlicet peccatum non esse, nisi prout habet voluntatem comitantem; sic econtra cognitio non est virtus, nisi ei sit iuncta affectio. Sic per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito, quod ignorantia, si pure dicat *nescientiam*, sic tantum est poena; si vero dicat *nescientiam*, ut est *coniuncta concupiscentiae*, sic est culpa, pro eo quod talis ignorantia oppositionem habet cum virtute et gratia. Gratia enim, adveniens in animam, non solummodo rectificat affectionem per caritatem, sed etiam cognitivam per fidem. Non enim potest dirigi voluntas, nisi pariter dirigatur et ratio; et libertas arbitrii simul in ratione et voluntate consistit[^11]. — Hoc igitur modo concedi potest, peccatum originale esse ignorantiam; et sic intelligit magister Hugo et Glossa, et procedunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de carentia visionis Dei, dicendum, quod ratio illa dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia carentia visionis Dei non tantum debetur peccatis, quae respiciunt cognitivam, immo quae respiciunt affectivam, cum visio sit tota merces, quae redditur omnibus virtutibus et meritoriis operibus[^12]. Secundo vero, quia, cum dicimus, parvulos puniri carentia *visionis*, in hoc intelligitur per consequens, quod priventur et dote fruitionis et dote tentionis.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

Rationes autem quae ad oppositum inducuntur, procedunt de ipsa ignorantia, secundum quod dicit *puram nescientiam*, et sic est poena, non culpa. Secundum autem quod habet iunctam concupiscentiam, culpa est.

*Ad 5.* — Nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod in nobis sint plura peccata originalia, sicut concludit ratio ultima, pro eo quod ubi ponitur unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum[^13]. — Cum ergo dicimus, ignorantiam ratione concupiscentiae esse peccatum originale, non propter hoc ponimus in nobis plura originalia differentia per essentiam, sed hoc ponimus, quod cum originale sit unum, deordinat et vitiat totam animam non solum secundum *affectivam*, sed etiam secundum *cognitivam*, ita tamen, quod principalius affectivam. Unde magis proprie[^14] notificatur originale per *concupiscentiam* et *debitae iustitiae carentiam*, quam per *ignorantiam*, quia tam concupiscentia quam debitae iustitiae carentia

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notificant ipsum originale, secundum quod est culpa, et ideo praedicantur de ipso praedicatione *per essentiam*. Ignorantia autem notificat magis, secundum quod est vitium cognitivam deordinans; unde magis praedicatur de peccato originali, secundum quod ipsa ignorantia peccatum est, praedicatione *per causam* quam *per essentiam*. Et hoc insinuat ipsum verbum Hugonis, cum dicit, ipsum originale esse « vitium, quod contraximus per ignorantiam ».

Etiam declarat ipse Anselmus in libro *de Conceptu virginali*, ubi dicit, quod omne peccatum est iniustitia, et omnis iustitia et iniustitia in voluntate consistit. — ¶ Et sic patet, quid sit originale peccatum *per essentiam*, quoniam est concupiscentia et debitae iustitiae carentia; patet etiam, quomodo originale peccatum ab Hugone dicitur esse *ignorantia*, et per consequens ea quae ad utramque partem sunt adducta.

english:
### Question II. *Whether original sin is ignorance.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this, whether original sin is ignorance. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. On that passage of the Psalm[^1]: *The sins of my youth and of my ignorance* etc., the Gloss: « *Of my ignorance*, that is, original sin, which is in little ones ». And a little before: « *The sins of ignorance* designates those which are in little ones, who are held by original sin ».

2. Likewise, Hugh in his book *On the Sacraments*, in the seventh part[^2]: « Original sin is a vice which we contract by being born, through ignorance in the mind and concupiscence in the flesh »: therefore it seems that original sin is ignorance. But if you say that this is said *by way of cause*, there stands against it what Hugh consequently says in the same part[^3]: « These four evils appear in man: pride, ignorance, mortality, and concupiscence. Pride is a fault of the mind, mortality a penalty of the flesh only, but ignorance is both fault and penalty »; but it is nothing but the original fault: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, original sin is most of all to be blotted out by the Sacrament of faith[^4]: therefore it is more directly opposed to faith itself, which is in the cognitive [power], than to any virtue existing in the affective [power]. If therefore ignorance designates the privation of a virtue directing the cognitive [power], it seems that original sin is properly ignorance.

4. Likewise, the penalty corresponds to the fault; but to original sin there is properly owed the penalty of the privation of the vision of God: therefore if this designates a privation on the part of the cognitive [power], it seems that the original sin itself does too; and if this is true, the same returns as before.

5. Likewise, just as there is sin in coveting those things which are not to be desired, so there is sin in disbelieving those things which are to be believed: therefore just as to have a necessity toward *coveting* is a fault, so to have

a necessity toward *disbelieving* is a fault. But the little one has both necessities; and he has nothing but the original [sin]: therefore just as original sin is posited in the little one to be *concupiscibility* or concupiscence, so it ought also to be posited[^5] to be ignorance.

**On the contrary:**
1. Bede[^6] says that four things are inflicted upon us on account of sin, namely ignorance and infirmity etc.: therefore since original sin is not called *infirmity*, by like reasoning neither [is it called] *ignorance*, which is a penalty inflicted on account of it.

2. Likewise, Augustine *to Valentinus*[^7]: « Ignorance in those who could not know is the penalty of sin ». If therefore ignorance in little ones is invincible, it seems that it is a *penalty*, and not a *fault*; especially since we see little ones excused from all fault on account of ignorance.

3. Likewise, original sin is blotted out in baptism; but a baptized little one is just as ignorant as an unbaptized one: therefore ignorance cannot be original sin.

4. Likewise, if someone by some act of his own falls into madness, that madness is not said to be in him a *fault*, but a *penalty*: therefore by like reasoning, if someone has fallen into ignorance from the sin of the first parent, it ought not to be called the original *fault*, but its *penalty*. And here there can be a place for the argument *from the greater*[^8], since ignorance ought more to be imputed as fault when one falls into it by one's own act than by another's act.

5. Likewise, since original sin is concupiscence, as has been proved above[^9] and Augustine says, if it were ignorance, then since concupiscence and ignorance are of diverse genera, there would be in each person a plurality of original sins; which will be shown below to be false.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** It can be granted that original sin is ignorance, insofar namely as it is conjoined to concupiscence.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as it was said above[^10] concerning ignorance in adults — namely that it is not sin except insofar as it has a will accompanying it — so on the contrary cognition is not a virtue unless affection is joined to it. In this way it must be understood in the matter at hand, that ignorance, if it designates pure *nescience*, is thus only a penalty; but if it designates *nescience* as it is *conjoined to concupiscence*, it is thus a fault, for the reason that such ignorance has an opposition with virtue and grace. For grace, coming into the soul, not only rectifies the affection through charity, but also the cognitive [power] through faith. For the will cannot be directed unless reason too is equally directed; and the liberty of free choice consists at once in reason and in will[^11]. — In this way therefore it can be granted that original sin is ignorance; and thus master Hugh and the Gloss understand it, and the arguments which are brought for the first part proceed [correctly].

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

Yet as to that which is objected concerning the privation of the vision of God, it must be said that that argument fails in two ways. First indeed, because the privation of the vision of God is owed not only to sins which regard the cognitive [power], but rather to those which regard the affective [power], since the vision is the whole reward which is rendered to all virtues and meritorious works[^12]. Secondly, because, when we say that little ones are punished by the privation of the *vision*, this is to be understood consequently to mean that they are deprived both of the dowry of fruition and of the dowry of holding.

**To the arguments for the negative part:**

But the arguments which are brought for the opposite proceed concerning ignorance itself, insofar as it designates *pure nescience*, and thus it is a penalty, not a fault. But insofar as it has concupiscence joined to it, it is a fault.

*To 5.* — Nor yet does it follow from this that there are in us several original sins, as the last argument concludes, for the reason that where one thing is posited on account of another, there is only one thing[^13]. — When therefore we say that ignorance by reason of concupiscence is original sin, we do not on account of this posit in us several originals differing in essence, but we posit this: that since the original is one, it disorders and vitiates the whole soul not only according to the *affective* [power], but also according to the *cognitive* [power], yet in such a way that it does so principally to the affective. Hence more properly[^14] is the original made known through *concupiscence* and *the privation of due justice* than through *ignorance*, because both concupiscence and the privation of due justice

make known the original itself insofar as it is a fault, and therefore they are predicated of it by predication *per essence*. But ignorance makes it known more insofar as it is a vice disordering the cognitive [power]; hence it is predicated of original sin, insofar as ignorance itself is sin, more by predication *per cause* than *per essence*. And this the very word of Hugh insinuates, when he says that the original itself is « a vice which we have contracted through ignorance ».

Anselm himself also declares this in his book *On the Virginal Conception*, where he says that every sin is injustice, and all justice and injustice consist in the will. — ¶ And thus it is clear what original sin is *per essence*, since it is concupiscence and the privation of due justice; it is clear also how original sin is said by Hugh to be *ignorance*, and consequently those things which have been adduced for either part.

la: Psalm. 24, 7. Vulgata: *ignorantias meas.* — Glossa prima non habetur apud Lyranum neque apud Strabum, qui duo secundam Glossam sane exhibent; invenitur autem in Petri Lombardi expositione in Ps. cit., ubi post Glossam hic secundo loco signatam occurrit et sic sonat: *Et delicta ignorantiae meae, id est originale peccatum, quod in parvulis ne memineris,* id est, ne serves ad aeternam ultionem.

en: Psalm 24:7. The Vulgate: *my ignorances.* — The first Gloss is not found in Lyranus nor in Strabus, who indeed both present the second Gloss; but it is found in Peter Lombard's exposition on the cited Psalm, where after the Gloss noted here in the second place there occurs, and so reads: *And the sins of my ignorance, that is, original sin, which in little ones remember not,* that is, do not reserve for eternal punishment.

la: Libr. 1. c. 28: *Si ergo quaeritur, quid sit originale peccatum in nobis, intelligitur corruptio sive vitium, quod nascendo trahimus per ignorantiam in mente, per concupiscentiam in carne.* — Pro *contrahimus* non pauci codd. *contraximus*, cod. ee cum ed. 1 *acquirimus.*

en: Book 1, c. 28: *If therefore it is asked what original sin is in us, there is understood the corruption or vice which we draw by being born, through ignorance in the mind, through concupiscence in the flesh.* — For *contrahimus* (we contract) not a few codices have *contraximus* (we have contracted), codex ee with ed. 1 *acquirimus* (we acquire).

la: Cap. 31, ubi textus originalis verbis a S. Bonav. hoc loco abruptis addit: *in mente, concupiscentia poena et culpa in carne.*

en: Chapter 31, where the original text, with the words broken off by St. Bonaventure at this place, adds: *in the mind, concupiscence both penalty and fault in the flesh.*

la: Scil. per baptismum.

en: That is, through baptism.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *dici.*

en: The editions, except 1, [read] *dici* (to be said).

la: Vide supra pag. 528, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 528, note 2.

la: Sententia Augustini, quae hic affertur, habetur in eius Epist. 194. (alias 105.), directa ad Sixtum, c. 6. n. 27, ubi haec leguntur: « Et ipsa ignorantia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, sine dubitatione peccatum est; in eis autem qui non potuerunt, poena peccati ». Cum huius epistolae, quae in manus Valentini devenerat, sententia a quibusdam falso exponeretur, Augustinus per litteras appellavit Valentinum (Epist. 214, alias 46.), exponens atque confirmans quae in litteris ad Sixtum datis docuerat. Cfr. etiam supra d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 5, ubi haec sententia, ibi ex Prospero citata, sed revera ex Epist. ad Sixtum delibata, tam arcte copulata est cum verbis ex August. libro *de Gratia et lib. arb.* (ad Valentin.) allatis, ac si etiam huius libri esset. — Pro *qui scire non potuerunt* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *quae scire non poterunt* [ed. 1 *potuerunt*], Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quae sciri non poterunt* [ed. 3 *potuerant*]. Pro *Valentinum* Vat. erronee *Valentinianum.*

en: The opinion of Augustine which is here adduced is found in his Letter 194 (otherwise 105), directed to Sixtus, c. 6, n. 27, where these things are read: « And ignorance itself in those who were unwilling to understand is without doubt sin; but in those who could not [understand], it is the penalty of sin ». Since the opinion of this letter, which had come into the hands of Valentinus, was being falsely expounded by some, Augustine through a letter appealed to Valentinus (Letter 214, otherwise 46), expounding and confirming what he had taught in the letter given to Sixtus. Cf. also above, d. XXII, the Letter of the Master, c. 5, where this opinion, there cited from Prosper but really drawn from the Letter to Sixtus, is so closely joined with words adduced from Augustine's book *On Grace and Free Will* (to Valentinus), as if it were also from this book. — For *qui scire non potuerunt* not a few codices with edd. 1, 2 [read] *quae scire non poterunt* [ed. 1 *potuerunt*], the Vatican with edd. 3, 4 *quae sciri non poterunt* [ed. 3 *potuerant*]. For *Valentinum* the Vatican erroneously [reads] *Valentinianum.*

la: De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. — Mox pro *incidit* codd. F aa *cecidit.*

en: On this manner of arguing cf. vol. I, p. 835, note 5. — Presently, for *incidit* (falls into) codices F, aa [read] *cecidit* (fell into).

la: Quaest. praeced. — Verba Augustini vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 8. seqq. — Quod unum tantum sit peccatum originale, non plura, ostenditur infra d. 33. a. 2. q. 2.

en: The preceding question. — For the words of Augustine see here in the Letter of the Master, c. 8 ff. — That there is only one original sin, not several, is shown below, d. 33, a. 2, q. 2.

en: Distinction 22, a. 2, q. 2, following.

la: Ut probatum est supra d. 25. p. I. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo superius pro *affectionem* cod. aa *affectivam.*

en: As was proved above, d. 25, p. I, q. 2 ff. — A little above, for *affectionem* (affection) codex aa [reads] *affectivam* (affective).

la: Vide supra pag. 543, nota 6. — De ratione seq. cfr. infra d. 33. a. 2. q. 2.

en: See above, p. 543, note 6. — On the following argument cf. below, d. 33, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Secundum Aristotelem, de quo vide supra pag. 639, nota 2. — Aliquantulum superius post *Secundum* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 pro *autem* substituit *enim*; cod. aa ibi nec *autem* habet nec *enim* nec ullam aliam particulam.

en: According to Aristotle, concerning whom see above, p. 639, note 2. — A little above, after *Secundum*, the Vatican with edd. 2, 3, 4 substitutes *enim* for *autem*; codex aa there has neither *autem* nor *enim* nor any other particle.

la: Fide vetustorum codd. adiecimus *proprie*, quod ab edd. abest.

en: On the faith of the older codices we have added *proprie* (properly), which is absent from the editions.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Alii magistri de hac quaest. explicite non tractant, sed eam plerumque tangunt in praecedente, et volunt, quod proprie loquendo ignorantia non sit peccatum originale, cum omne peccatum pertineat ad facultatem appetitivam. Ita loquitur etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 5.), ubi addit: « Et si inveniatur ignorantia originale peccatum dici, intelligendum est de ignorantia privante illam scientiam, quae includitur in originali iustitia » (cfr. idem S. I. II. q. 82. a. 3. ad 3.). — Similia dicunt Petr. a Tar. (loc. cit.) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 1. ad 4.). In eundem autem sensum redit sententia S. Bonaventurae.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Other masters do not treat of this question explicitly, but for the most part touch upon it in the preceding [question], and hold that, properly speaking, ignorance is not original sin, since every sin pertains to the appetitive faculty. So speaks also St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 3, ad 5), where he adds: « And if ignorance is found to be called original sin, it must be understood of the ignorance privative of that knowledge which is included in original justice » (cf. the same, S. I-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad 3). — Peter of Tarentaise (loc. cit.) and Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 1, ad 4) say similar things. And the opinion of St. Bonaventure comes back to the same sense.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF, pp. 724–726 (PDF 746–748, offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw 50479–50601). Running heads verified on the page images: p.724 (top, garbled OCR digit but body confirms), p.725 *DIST. XXX. ART. II. QUAEST. II.*, p.726 *SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.* Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied throughout (Respondeo + scholion + footers all read from the column bands).

**Alignment.** Opener *Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum peccatum originale sit ignorantia* = ART II TRACTATIO item 2 (*utrum sit ignorantia*). Confirmed aligned. This is the LAST quaestio of ARTICULUS II (*De quidditate originalis peccati*).

**Page-split map.**
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- p.725: fundamentum 5 tail + Sed contra 1–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad-affirmativa + Ad-negativa (through *…debitae iustitiae carentia*). Footers 1–10 ([^5]–[^14]).
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**Hand-offs.**
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**has_scholion = true** — single SCHOLION (part I only), a doctrinal note placing Bonaventure's position alongside other masters (Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla). The ART II commentator-roll proper is at a2-q1's SCHOLION III (sibling); q2's scholion carries no numbered footers.

**Cascade-dropout check PASSED** — all 5 fundamenta + 5 Sed contra + Conclusio + full Respondeo + Ad-affirmativa + Ad-negativa + Anselm epilogue + SCHOLION read against both 450 dpi column bands pp.724–726; seams 724→725 (*…sic debet etiam poni ‖ esse ignorantia / necessitatem ad discredendum*) and 725→726 (*…debitae iustitiae carentia ‖ notificant ipsum originale*) grammatically continuous.

**ART III TRACTATIO sub-question list** (recorded for the next dispatch, raw ~50608, p.726):
- *Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquid transeat in veritatem humanae naturae per actum generativae.*
- *Secundo quaeritur, utrum aliquid transeat in veritatem humanae naturae per opus nutritivae.*

**[?] flags:** none.