site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum praedestinatio et reprobatio habeant in Deo rationem motivam.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum praedestinatio et reprobatio habeant in Deo rationem motivam. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Canonem Genesis decimo octavo[^1]: *Dixit Dominus: Num celare potero Abraham quod gesturus sum, cum futurus sit in gentem magnam, et praecepturus domui suae, ut custodiat pactum meum?* Dominus ergo voluit revelare ipsi Abrahae propter considerationem bonorum futurorum: ergo cum illa ab aeterno praevideat, pari ratione praedestinat ex praescientia bonorum futurorum.

2. Item, Ambrosius super nonum Epistolae ad Romanos[^2]: «*Dabo gratiam ei, quem scivero toto corde ad me post errorem reversurum*»; loquitur in persona Domini: ergo ratio, quare Dominus proponit dare gratiam, est, quia aliquod futurum praevidit in homine.

3. Item, ratione ostenditur, quia omnis voluntas, eo ipso quod voluntas, est rationalis[^3]: ergo si hoc perfectionis est in voluntate, quod sit ex ratione, hoc maxime reperitur in voluntate divina: ergo cum praedestinatio dicat divinum propositum, erit ex ratione.

4. Item, omnis sapienter eligens eligit illos in famulos, in quibus videt meliores mores praeteritos, et similiter, quos novit fideliores fuisse; et si possit futura cognoscere, multo fortius eligeret et respueret propter praevisionem futurorum bonorum et malorum quam praeteritorum. Si ergo Deus est sapientissime eligens, ergo rationem eligendi sive reprobandi accipit a praevisione sive praescientia.

5. Item, nullus sapienter eligens praeeligit omnino indistantia[^4], maxime si possit accipere omnia aeque congrue; sed Deus praefert unum alteri in electione: ergo etc.

6. Item, si divinum propositum sive praedestinatio solum haberet rationem voluntatem Dei, et non aliam, tunc ergo videtur parcitas in divina vo-

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luntate — si enim vellet omnes salvare, omnes salvarentur, et non est alia ratio, nisi quia non vult — ergo voluntas eius non est liberalissima nec optima[^5].

7. Item, si non esset alia ratio quam voluntas[^6], ergo cum Deus reprobando proponit damnare, si sine omni ratione sola voluntate vellet damnare aliquem, ergo videtur crudelissimus, et quod fecisset homines ad supplicium.

8. Item, si sola voluntate praedestinat et reprobat, non praecognita ratione, videtur ergo secundum hoc, quod sit acceptor personarum; quod est contra illud quod dicitur Actuum decimo[^7]: *In veritate comperi, quod non est acceptor personarum Deus.*

**Sed contra:**

1. Exodi trigesimo tertio[^8]: *Miserebor cui misereor, et clemens ero super quem placuerit mihi*: ergo ratio prima et potissima divinae misericordiae et praedestinationis est Dei beneplacitum et voluntas.

2. Item, Matthaei undecimo[^9] dicit Filius: *Revelasti ea parvulis, et abscondisti haec a sapientibus; ita Pater, quoniam sic placitum fuit ante te*: ergo si Filius reddit optimam rationem, solum divinum beneplacitum est ratio.

3. Item, Apostolus ad Romanos nono[^10] super hac quaestione dicit: *Nunquid non habet figulus potestatem, de eadem massa facere alia quidem vasa in honorem, alia in contumeliam?* Si enim quaereretur ab artifice, quare de una parte massae facit vasa pulcra, et ex alia vilia, cum aeque sit bona tota massa, non est alia ratio, nisi quia placet: ita enim bene faceret, si faceret e contrario: ergo etc.

4. Item, Augustinus de Praedestinatione Sanctorum[^11]: «*Non quia tales nos futuros scivit, ideo elegit, sed ut tales essemus*».

5. Item, ratione videtur, quia voluntas Dei est causa causarum[^12], ergo ibi status est; sed ubi est status, non est ultra quaerere rationem: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Praedestinatio atque reprobatio quantum ad ordinationem voliti ad voluntatem divinam, licet non habeant causam meritoriam, habent tamen rationem in generali et in speciali, sed in speciali non nisi rationes congruentiae et nobis ignotas.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur utrum aeternum Dei propositum sive electio vel reprobatio rationem habeat, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad voluntatem divinam vel eius actum, qui Deus est, sed quantum ad ordinationem voliti ad eius voluntatem[^13]. Et si quaeratur ratio causalis vel meritoria, respondetur, quod non.

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Si autem quaeratur ratio congruitatis et decentiae, respondent quidam, quod ipsa Dei voluntas sibi ipsi est ratio, nec est alia ratio, quare istum elegit, nisi quia placet; et haec est sufficiens per omnem modum, quia est causa causarum, et ratio rationum; et eo ipso quod placet ideo rectum est propter summam ipsius voluntatis rectitudinem, quia non tantum est recta, sed etiam regula. — Sed cavendum est, ne, dum voluntatem Dei magnificare volumus, potius voluntati eius derogemus. Si enim non esset alia ratio, quare Deus istum elegit et illum non, nisi quia placet[^14], certe iam non occulta dicerentur divina iudicia, sed manifesta, cum quilibet hanc rationem capiat; nec dicerentur mirabilia, sed potius voluntaria.

Et propter hoc dicendum, quod propositum illud aeternum, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^15], et voluntas illa est rationabilissima et rationem habet; et sicut ab aeterno fuit, ab aeterno rationem habuit, non aliam propter essentiam, sed propter connotatum[^16]. Quid autem sit illud in electione hominum vel reprobatione, nobis non est omnino notum, nec omnino ignotum.

Propter hoc notandum, quod quaedam sunt opera, quae exeunt a divina voluntate cum alio ad hoc ordinato ordine necessitatis, sive necessitatem sumamus in causando[^17], sive in merendo vel disponendo, ut pluere et remunerare, sive damnare et salvare; et respectu talium divina voluntas habet rationem in generali et speciali. Unde si quaeratur: quare Deus vult pluere? respondetur: propter nostram utilitatem. Similiter si quaeratur: quare vult remunerare aliquos? respondetur: propter suam gloriam[^18]. — Similiter habet rationem in speciali, ut si quaeratur: quare vult Deus pluere in hieme, non in aestate? tunc respondetur: quia vapores aquosi magis in hieme abundant quam in aestate. Similiter si quaeratur: quare magis vult salvare Petrum quam Iudam? respondetur: quod iste habuit bona merita, ille vero mala. — Quaedam autem sunt opera, quae sunt a divina voluntate cum alio[^19] ad hoc ordinato ordine congruitatis, sicut est nostra gratificatio vel iustificatio, quae est a divina voluntate cum cooperatione et praeparatione liberi arbitrii; et hoc, quia *«qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te*[^20]*»*. Et hoc dictum est secundum congruentiam; *adiutores enim Dei sumus*. Attamen Deus sine praeparatione et cooperatione iustificat, ut patet de sanctificatis in utero, et ut dicunt de Paulo. Et respectu talium operum habet rationem voluntas[^21] in generali, et habet in speciali, sed in generali certam, in speciali occultam.

Si enim quaeritur: quare Deus vult iustificare? respondetur: ad misericordiae suae ostensionem. Et si quaeritur: quare non vult omnes homines iustificare voluntate beneplaciti? dicendum, quod hoc est propter iustitiae suae ostensionem. Unde Augustinus vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei[^22]: «*Si remanerent omnes in poena, non appareret misericordis gratia redimentis. Rursus, si omnes transferrentur de tenebris ad lucem, in nullo appareret severitas ultionis, in qua propterea plures quam in illa sunt, ut sic appareret, quid omnibus debebatur*». — Si quaeratur in speciali: quare magis vult iustificare unum quam alium, duobus similibus demonstratis? quia multae possunt esse rationes congruentiae, ideo non est certitudo a parte rei. Et ideo cum cognitio nostra pendeat a certitudine rei, nullus certam potest invenire rationem, nisi habeat per revelationem illius cui dubia sunt certa. Et quia non fuit nobis expediens ad salutem ista cognitio, sed occultatio fuit necessaria[^23] propter humilitatem; ideo Deus noluit revelare, et Apostolus non fuit ausus inquirere, sed ostendit defectum nostrae intelligentiae, cum exclamavit undecimo ad Romanos[^24]: *O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius etc!*

1. Ad illud ergo quod quaeritur, utrum praedestinatio habeat rationem; dicendum, quod habet in generali, similiter in speciali; et[^25] haec ratio nota est divinae praescientiae non nobis, ratione praedicta.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sacra Scriptura, quod assignat beneplacitum pro ratione; dicendum, quod quamvis assignet pro ratione et aliam

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non exprimat, non est concludendum, quod non sit alia, quia non sunt omnia scripta, sed nobis utilia[^26]. Utile autem fuit scire, quod divinum beneplacitum est causa et ratio, ut discamus eum timere et nihil meritorum nobis attribuere.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non elegit, quia praevidit tales; dicendum, quod Augustinus negat, secundum quod hoc quod est *quia* dicit causam, non secundum quod dicit *rationem*; quia quamvis divina voluntas possit habere rationem, ex qua dicitur congruenter operari, tamen non habet causam sive rationem causalem, cum sit causa causarum, et maxime respectu voliti, quod quidem est ex mera Dei liberalitate, ut puta est gratia iustificans impium. Et per hoc patet sequens de statu.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur: propter quorum praevisionem? dicendum, quod potest esse propter praevisionem bonorum, ut aliquo modo sunt a libero arbitrio; propter quorum tamen praevisionem determinate, non scio[^27] nec volo quaerere, nec est ratio nisi congruitatis. Unde et alia potest esse quam haec.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de mundi creatione, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia mundi creatio a divina voluntate et beneplacito est tanquam a tota causa. Et rursus, per creationem non praesupponitur aliquid.

Rationes vero ad oppositum probant, quod divina voluntas rationabiliter facit, et quod habet rationem congruitatis ratione voliti. Et quia hoc verum est, ideo concedendae sunt. Quamvis aliquae earum possint habere calumniam, tamen conclusio principalis non habet calumniam. Nam Augustinus dicit hoc in libro Retractationum[^28] post omnes retractationes, quod «*proponit et eligit et reprobat veritate certissima et a nostris sensibus remotissima*». Et quia a sensibus nostris est remotissima, ideo nullus debet ipsam inquirere, quia in hac vita non possumus pervenire[^29]. Et ideo in nostrae intelligentiae insufficientia sermo de praedestinatione claudendus est, *ut obstruatur omne os, et subditus fiat omnis mundus Deo*[^30], cuius iudicia non sunt scrutabilia, sed formidoloso silentio veneranda.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether predestination and reprobation have in God a motive ground.*

Secondly it is asked whether predestination and reprobation have in God a motive ground (*ratio motiva*). And that they do, seems [to be the case]:

1. By the canon of Genesis 18[^1]: *The Lord said: Can I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, since he is to become a great nation, and is to charge his household to keep my covenant?* Therefore the Lord wished to reveal [it] to Abraham himself on account of consideration of future goods: therefore, since he foresees those things from eternity, by parallel reasoning he predestines from the foreknowledge of future goods.

2. Likewise, Ambrose on the ninth [chapter] of the Epistle to the Romans[^2]: «*I will give grace to him whom I shall know to be about to return to me with all his heart after error*»; he speaks in the person of the Lord: therefore the reason why the Lord proposes to give grace is that he has foreseen some future [thing] in the man.

3. Likewise, it is shown by reason, because every will, by the very fact that it is a will, is rational[^3]: therefore if it belongs to perfection in a will that it be from reason, this is found most of all in the divine will: therefore since predestination states the divine proposal, it will be from reason.

4. Likewise, every one who chooses wisely chooses as his servants those in whom he sees better past character, and likewise those whom he has known to be more faithful; and if he could know future things, much more would he choose and reject on account of foreknowledge of future goods and evils than of past ones. If therefore God is most wisely choosing, therefore he takes the ground of choosing or reprobating from foresight or foreknowledge.

5. Likewise, no one choosing wisely pre-elects things that are altogether non-distant (*indistantia*)[^4], especially if he can take all things as equally fitting; but God prefers one to another in election: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if the divine proposal or predestination had as its ground only God's will, and no other [ground], then there seems to be miserliness in the divine

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will — for if he willed to save all, all would be saved, and there is no other ground except that he does not will [it] — therefore his will is not most liberal nor best[^5].

7. Likewise, if there were no other ground than will[^6], then since God in reprobating proposes to damn, if without any ground he willed by sheer will to damn someone, then he seems most cruel, and [it seems] that he made men for punishment.

8. Likewise, if he predestines and reprobates by sheer will, without any pre-known ground, then it seems according to this that he is a respecter of persons; which is contrary to what is said in Acts 10[^7]: *In truth I have found that God is no respecter of persons.*

**On the contrary:**

1. Exodus 33[^8]: *I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will be gracious to whomever it shall please me*: therefore the first and most powerful ground of the divine mercy and predestination is God's good-pleasure and will.

2. Likewise, Matthew 11[^9], the Son says: *Thou hast revealed these things to little ones, and hast hidden them from the wise; so, Father, because thus it was pleasing before thee*: therefore if the Son gives this as the best ground, the divine good-pleasure alone is the ground.

3. Likewise, the Apostle, in Romans 9[^10], on this question says: *Has not the potter power, from the same lump, to make some vessels indeed unto honor, and others unto contumely?* For if it were asked of a craftsman why from one part of the lump he makes beautiful vessels, and from another mean ones, when the whole lump is equally good, there is no other ground than that it pleases [him]: for he would do equally well if he did the opposite: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^11]: «*Not because he foreknew that we would be such did he choose [us], but [chose us] that we might be such*».

5. Likewise, it seems by reason, because God's will is the cause of causes[^12], therefore there is a stopping-point (*status*) there; but where there is a stopping-point, one is not to seek a ground further: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination and reprobation, as regards the ordering of the willed to the divine will, although they do not have a meritorious cause, nevertheless have a ground both in general and in particular, but in particular [they have] only grounds of fittingness, [and grounds] unknown to us.*

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether God's eternal proposal, that is, [his] election or reprobation, has a ground, this is not understood as regards the divine will or its act, which is God [himself], but as regards the ordering of the willed to his will[^13]. And if a causal or meritorious ground is asked for, the answer is that there is none.

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But if a ground of fittingness and seemliness is asked for, some respond that God's will is itself its own ground, and there is no other ground why he has chosen this one rather than that, except that it pleases [him]; and this [ground] is sufficient in every way, because [his will] is the cause of causes and the ground of grounds; and by the very fact that it pleases [him] it is therefore right on account of the supreme rectitude of his will, since [his will] is not only right but is even the rule. — But it must be guarded against that, while we wish to magnify God's will, we rather derogate from his will. For if there were no other ground why God chose this one and not that, except that it pleases [him][^14], certainly the divine judgments would no longer be called hidden but manifest, since anyone whatever could grasp this ground; nor would they be called marvelous, but rather voluntary.

And therefore it must be said that that eternal proposal, as Augustine says and as it stands in the [Master's] text[^15], is also a will [that is] most rational and has a ground; and as it has been from eternity, so from eternity it has had a ground — not a different ground on account of the essence, but on account of the connoted [object][^16]. What that [ground] is, however, in the election or reprobation of men, is not entirely known to us, nor entirely unknown.

Hence it should be noted that some are works which proceed from the divine will together with another [thing] ordained to this in an order of necessity, whether we take necessity in the causing[^17], or in the meriting or disposing — such as raining and rewarding, or damning and saving; and with respect to such things, the divine will has a ground in general and in particular. Hence if it is asked: why does God will to rain? the answer is: on account of our utility. Similarly if it is asked: why does he will to reward some? the answer is: on account of his own glory[^18]. — Similarly it has a ground in particular, e.g. if it is asked: why does God will to rain in winter and not in summer? then the answer is: because watery vapors are more abundant in winter than in summer. Similarly if it is asked: why does he will to save Peter rather than Judas? the answer is: because the one had good merits, and the other [had] bad. — And there are other works that come from the divine will together with another [thing][^19] ordained to this in an order of *fittingness*, as is our gratification or justification, which is from the divine will together with the cooperation and preparation of free choice; and this, because *«whoever created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee*[^20]*»*. And this is said according to fittingness; *for we are God's coadjutors*. Nevertheless God justifies without preparation and cooperation, as is plain from those sanctified in the womb, and as they say of Paul. And with respect to such works the will has a ground[^21] in general, and has [one] in particular, but in general [a ground that is] certain, in particular [one that is] hidden.

For if it is asked: why does God will to justify? the answer is: for the manifestation of his mercy. And if it is asked: why does he not will to justify all men by the will of [his] good-pleasure? it must be said that this is on account of the manifestation of his justice. Whence Augustine in *On the City of God*, book 21[^22]: «*If all remained in punishment, the grace of him who redeems with mercy would nowhere appear. Again, if all were transferred from darkness to light, the severity of vengeance would nowhere appear, in which [punishment] there are for that reason more than [there are] in [glory], so that thereby may appear what was owed to all*». — If it is asked in particular: why does he will to justify one rather than another, when two similar [persons] are presented? — because there can be many grounds of fittingness, therefore there is no certainty on the side of the thing [itself]. And therefore since our cognition depends on certainty of the thing, no one can find a certain ground unless he has [it] through the revelation of him to whom doubtful things are certain. And because that cognition was not expedient for our salvation, but concealment was necessary[^23] on account of humility; therefore God was unwilling to reveal [it], and the Apostle did not dare to inquire, but [rather] indicated the defect of our intelligence when he exclaimed in Romans 11[^24]: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God; how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!*

1. To that, then, which is asked, whether predestination has a ground; it must be said that it does have [one] in general and likewise in particular; and[^25] this ground is known to divine foreknowledge, [but] not to us, by the reason aforesaid.

2–3. To that which is objected from Sacred Scripture, that it assigns good-pleasure as the ground; it must be said that, although it assigns [this] as the ground and does not express another,

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it is not to be concluded that there is no other, because not all things are written, but [only] those useful to us[^26]. But it was useful to know that the divine good-pleasure is the cause and the ground, so that we may learn to fear him and to attribute none of our merits to ourselves.

4–5. To that which is objected, that he did not choose [them] because he foresaw [them as] such; it must be said that Augustine denies [it] in so far as the word *because* states the *cause*, [but] not in so far as it states a *ground*; for although the divine will can have a ground (from which it is said to operate fittingly), nevertheless it does not have a cause or causal ground, since it is the cause of causes, and especially with respect to a willed [object], which indeed is from the sheer liberality of God — for instance, the grace that justifies the impious. And through this is plain what follows regarding the *stopping-point* (*status*).

6. To that which is asked: on account of the foresight of which [goods]? — it must be said that it can be on account of the foresight of goods, inasmuch as in some way they are from free choice; though on account of the foresight of which [goods] determinately, I do not know[^27], nor do I will to ask, nor is there a ground other than that of fittingness. Hence another [ground] also can be [in play] than this.

7. To that which is objected concerning the creation of the world, it must be said that it is not similar, because the creation of the world is from the divine will and good-pleasure as from a whole cause. And again, nothing is presupposed for creation.

The reasons on the opposite side prove that the divine will acts rationally, and that it has a ground of fittingness by reason of the willed [object]. And since this is true, therefore they are to be conceded. Although some of them can be open to objection (*calumniam*), nevertheless the principal conclusion is not open to objection. For Augustine says this in the book of *Retractationes*[^28] after all his retractations: that «*he proposes and elects and reprobates by a truth most certain and most remote from our senses*». And since it is most remote from our senses, therefore no one ought to inquire into it, since in this life we cannot attain [to it][^29]. And therefore in the inadequacy of our intelligence the discourse on predestination must be closed off, *that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may become subject to God*[^30], whose judgments are not searchable, but to be revered with awe-filled silence.

la: Vers. 17-19, in quo textu vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 vocabulo Abraham praefigunt *ab*. In conclusione pro *praevideat* Vat. cum cod. cc *provideat*.

en: Verses 17–19, where the older codices, with edition 1, prefix *ab* to the word Abraham. In the conclusion, in place of *praevideat*, the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *provideat*.

la: Vers. 15. — Commentarius, qui hic ut Ambrosianus affertur, a criticis Ambrosio denegatur; cfr. supra pag. 337, nota 8. — In fine argumenti pro *praevidit* nonnulli codd., inter quos et cod. T, nec non ed. 1 *praevidet*.

en: Verse 15. — The commentary which is here cited as Ambrosian is denied by critics to be Ambrose's; cf. above p. 337, note 8. — At the end of the argument, in place of *praevidit*, some codices, among them codex T, as well as edition 1, [read] *praevidet*.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. et 50. (c. 9. et 10.), et Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. — S. Anselm., de Veritate c. 12. idem docet dicens: *Omnis voluntas sicut vult aliquid, ita vult propter aliquid*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, texts 42 and 50 (cc. 9 and 10), and John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 22. — St. Anselm, *On Truth* c. 12, teaches the same, saying: *Every will, just as it wills something, so wills [it] on account of something*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 714, nota 8. Pro interpretatione vocis *indistantia* affertur etiam illud Boeth., III. de Differentiis topic. c. 1: *De similibus idem est iudicium*. — Vat. post *indistantia* adiungit *seu indifferentia*.

en: Cf. above p. 714, note 8. For the interpretation of the word *indistantia* there is also brought forward the saying of Boethius, *On Topical Differences* III, c. 1: *Concerning similar [things] the judgment is the same*. — The Vatican [edition] after *indistantia* adds *or non-difference*.

la: De hoc et seq. argumento cfr. verba Damasceni, supra pag. 728, nota 2.

en: On this and the following argument, cf. the words of Damascene above, p. 728, note 2.

la: In cod. V hic additur: *Dei praedestinandi vel reprobandi*. In fine argumenti pro *et quod* Vat. *eo quod*, cod. F *quia*.

en: In codex V there is added here: *of God who predestines or reprobates*. At the end of the argument, in place of *et quod*, the Vatican [reads] *eo quod*, codex F *quia*.

la: Vers. 34, ubi Vulgata *quia* pro *quod*.

en: Verse 34, where the Vulgate has *quia* for *quod*.

la: Vers. 19. In textu cit. Vulgata *voluero* pro *misereor*, et *in quem* pro *super quem*. Cfr. Rom. 9, 15. — Dein pro *divinae misericordiae* non pauci codd. *Dei misericordiae*.

en: Verse 19. In the cited text the Vulgate has *voluero* for *misereor*, and *in quem* for *super quem*. Cf. Rom. 9:15. — Then in place of *divinae misericordiae* not a few codices [read] *Dei misericordiae*.

la: Vers. 25. seq., ubi Vulgata: *Abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus, et revelasti ea parvulis; ita Pater* etc.

en: Verses 25 ff., where the Vulgate reads: *Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones; so, Father,* etc.

la: Vers. 21. seq., ubi Vulgata post *figulus* adiungit *luti*, et dein pro *alia quidem vasa* etc. substituit: *aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam*.

en: Verses 21 ff., where the Vulgate, after *figulus*, adds *luti* ("of clay"), and then in place of *alia quidem vasa* etc. substitutes: *one indeed [a] vessel unto honor, but another unto contumely*.

en: Chapter 19, n. 38.

la: August., III. de Trin. c. 2. n. 7, et c. 4. n. 9. Cfr. infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. — In fine argumenti pro *et ita* ed. 1 *et ibi*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* III, c. 2, n. 7, and c. 4, n. 9. Cf. below d. 45, a. 2, q. 2. — At the end of the argument, in place of *et ita*, edition 1 [reads] *et ibi*.

la: Cfr. August., I. de Diversis Qq. ad Simplic. q. 2. n. 4. seqq., et de Praedest. Sanct. c. 17. n. 34. seqq. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 2. — Scilicet *produxit*, ut legitur in codd. aa bb. — August. libr. 83 Qq. q. 28: *Qui quaerit: quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei. Sed omnis causa efficiens est. Omnis autem efficiens maius est quam id quod efficitur. Nihil autem maius est voluntate Dei. Non ergo eius causa quaerenda est.* — *Volitum*, ut est effectus divinae voluntatis, realiter ordinatur ad ipsam, et e converso voluntas divina secundum rationem refertur ad volitum tanquam ad obiectum secundarium ipsius. Licet sub hoc respectu aeque bene dici posset, *volitum* ordinari ad divinam voluntatem, et divinam voluntatem ordinari ad volitum; melius tamen est primo dicendi modo uti, quem S. Doctor hic adhibet, tum quia non maius ad minus, sed e contra minus ad maius ordinatur, tum quia ex parte voliti est relatio realis, non ex parte Dei. Sed bene voluntas dicitur terminari ad volitum. — Paulo superius post *reprobatio* cod. R addit *in Deo*, Vat. *in Deo motivam*. Inferius post *Et si quaeratur* cod. Y subiicit *utrum sit ad hoc*, et post pauca pro *quod non* Vat. exhibet *quod dari non possit*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Various Questions to Simplicianus* book I, q. 2, n. 4 ff., and *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 17, n. 34 ff. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 1 and 2. — Namely *produxit*, as is read in codices aa and bb. — Augustine, *83 Quaestiones* q. 28: *Whoever asks why God willed to make the world, seeks a cause of God's will. But every cause is efficient. But every efficient [cause] is greater than what is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore the cause of [the divine will] is not to be sought.* — A *willed [object]*, as effect of the divine will, is really ordered to it; and conversely the divine will is by reason referred to the willed [object] as to its secondary object. Although under this respect it could equally well be said that the *willed [object]* is ordered to the divine will, and the divine will to the willed [object]; nevertheless it is better to use the first mode of speaking, which the Holy Doctor here employs — both because not the greater is ordered to the lesser, but on the contrary the lesser to the greater, and because on the side of the willed [object] there is a real relation, [but] not on the side of God. But the will is rightly said to be terminated at the willed [object]. — A little above, after *reprobatio*, codex R adds *in God*, the Vatican [adds] *motive in God*. Lower down, after *Et si quaeratur*, codex Y subjoins *whether it is for this*, and after a few words, in place of *quod non*, the Vatican has *that it cannot be given*.

la: Pro *placet* cod. Z *Dominus voluit*. Idem cod. cum pluribus aliis et cum ed. 1 paulo ante *eligit* pro *elegit*.

en: For *placet*, codex Z [reads] *the Lord willed*. The same codex, with several others and with edition 1, a little before [reads] *eligit* in place of *elegit*.

la: Pro *voluntas* Vat. *voluntatis*; perperam, ut ex contextu clare intelligitur. Cum nostra lectione concordat etiam cod. O. Cod. T pro *voluntas* exhibet *congruitatis*.

la: Sensus est: ab aeterno rationem habet et pro diverso volito aliam et aliam rationem, non quidem ex parte sua sive ex parte actus divinae voluntatis, sed ex parte voliti connotati.

en: The sense is: from eternity it has a ground, and for [each] different willed [object] another and another ground, not indeed on its own side, that is, on the side of the act of the divine will, but on the side of the connoted willed [object].

la: Ed. 1 cum aliquibus mss. sic: *sive necessitate in causando*. Mox post *pluere* codd. L bene inserunt *punire*.

en: Edition 1 with some manuscripts thus: *or in necessity in causing*. Soon afterward, codices L well insert *to punish* after *to rain*.

la: Fide praestantiorum codd. et ed. 1 restauravimus hanc ultimam propositionem, incipientem a *Similiter*, quae a Vat. abest.

en: On the faith of the more excellent codices and edition 1 we have restored this final proposition, beginning with *Similiter*, which is absent from the Vatican [edition].

la: Cod. T *aliquo*.

en: Codex T [reads] *aliquo* ("some [other thing]").

la: August., Serm. 169. c. 11. n. 13: *Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te*. — Locus s. Scripturae mox citatus est I. Cor. 3, 9; de S. Ioan. Baptista cfr. Luc. 1, 41, et de conversione Pauli vide Act. c. 9.

en: Augustine, *Sermon* 169, c. 11, n. 13: *Therefore he who made thee without thee does not justify thee without thee*. — The passage of sacred Scripture cited just after is 1 Cor. 3:9; on St. John the Baptist cf. Luke 1:41, and on the conversion of Paul see Acts c. 9.

en: In place of *voluntas* the Vatican [reads] *voluntatis*; wrongly, as is clearly understood from the context. With our reading also codex O agrees. Codex T in place of *voluntas* exhibits *congruitatis*. [Note: this apparatus entry duplicates an earlier note tying to the same Vatican variant; the Quaracchi footer at this point repeats the lemma at the second occurrence of *voluntas* in the chunk.]

la: Cap. 12. in textu originali testimonium hic allatum sic sonat: *Si omnes remanerent in poenis iustae damnationis, in nullo appareret misericors gratia redimentis... in qua propterea multo plures quam in illa sunt, ut sic ostendatur, quid omnibus deberetur*.

en: Chapter 12. In the original text the testimony here brought forward runs thus: *If all remained in the punishments of just damnation, in none would the merciful grace of the redeemer appear... in which [punishment] there are for that reason far more than [there are] in [glory], so that it may thus be shown what was owed to all*.

la: Lectionem *occultatio fuit necessaria* ex codd. A T desumpsimus. Cod. L his verbis praemittit *ulterior*. In bene multis codd. legitur sic: *ulterior fuit necessaria*; in Vat. et cod. bb nec non in ed. 1: *utilior fuit ignorantia* (cod. bb et ed. 1 *nescientia*).

en: The reading *occultatio fuit necessaria* we have taken from codices A and T. Codex L prefixes *ulterior* to these words. In quite many codices it is read thus: *ulterior fuit necessaria*; in the Vatican and in codex bb, as also in edition 1: *utilior fuit ignorantia* (codex bb and edition 1: *nescientia*).

la: Vers. 33.

en: Verse 33.

la: Cod. R *sed*.

en: Codex R [reads] *sed* ("but").

la: Vat. *praevisionem nec scio determinare*.

en: The Vatican [reads] *praevisionem nec scio determinare* ("foresight; nor do I know how to determine").

la: In ipso libro Retract. verba hic allata non reperiuntur; habetur tamen sententia, quae verbis illis exprimitur, in alio August. opusculo «*de Diversis Quaest. ad Simplicianum*» (lib. I. q. 2. n. 16.), in quo S. Doctor etiam aliqua prius dicta retractat. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa finem, et de Dono persever. c. 11. n. 25, c. 14. n. 35. et 37.

en: In the book of *Retractationes* itself the words here brought forward are not found; nevertheless the sentence expressed by those words is had in another opusculum of Augustine, *On Various Questions to Simplicianus* (book I, q. 2, n. 16), in which the Holy Doctor also retracts some things previously said. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2 near the end, and *On the Gift of Perseverance* c. 11, n. 25, c. 14, n. 35 and 37.

la: Intellige: ad illam. — Vat. *invenire* contra codd. et ed. 1.

en: Understand: [pervenire] *to that* [conclusion]. — The Vatican [reads] *invenire*, against the codices and edition 1.

la: Rom. 3, 19. Subnexa respiciunt illud Rom. 11, 33: *Quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius!*

en: Rom. 3:19. The words appended look back to Rom. 11:33: *How incomprehensible are his judgments!*

en: Besides the authors already cited: B. Albert, here nn. 3, 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2; q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio differt a praecedenti, in qua agitur de ordine effectuum praedestinationis ad invicem, et de causa meritoria, quae inter eosdem esse possit. Hic agitur de ipso divino proposito sive de praeordinatione in eligendo vel reprobando, non quidem de voluntate vel actu ipsius in se, cum sit essentia divina, sed «*quantum ad ordinationem voliti ad eius voluntatem*», sive aliis verbis, quatenus volitio divina terminatur ad effectum vel praedestinationis, vel reprobationis. Quod ne in hoc quidem sensu *causa meritoria* illius praeordinationis concedi possit, cum sententia tunc communi hic et in praecedenti quaestione explicite docetur. Sed quaeritur, utrum saltem ratio motiva aliqua «*congruitatis et decentiae*» assignanda sit. Praecipue autem discutitur haec difficultas non circa rationem praedestinationis in generali, sed in speciali et comparative. Quare Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) quaestionem sic proponit: «*Utrum in Deo sit aliqua ratio, quaecumque sit illa, quia praedestinavit aliquos et aliquos non*». — Iuvat praenotare quae sequuntur.

*1.* Haec res gravibus difficultatibus obstructa est. Ex una parte salvari debet Dei iustitia, aequitas et bonitas, nec non seria voluntas antecedens salvandi omnes homines; ex altera parte cavendum est, ne derogetur gratuitati donorum Dei, scil. gratiae, perseverantiae finalis et praedestinationis, nec non independentiae divinae voluntatis. Sicut enim intellectus divinus in suo actu non dependet ab aliqua ratione cognoscendi, quae sit extra Deum, licet terminetur ad res extra Deum existentes, cum cognitio Dei non sit a rebus, sed ad res; simili modo volitio voluntatis divinae, licet terminetur ad obiecta volita extra

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Deum, non potest excitari aliqua ratione motiva nec ab aliqua dependere, quae sit alia ab ipso, ut bene docetur infra d. 45. dub. 3.

*2.* Iam inter antiquos Scholasticos multum disputatum est, utrum et quomodo praescientia meritorum accipi possit ut ratio praedestinationis. Plures opiniones recitat Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 1. — Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 28. m. 3. a. 1.) recte dicit: «*Ex parte praedestinationis nec principale significatum est ex meritis, nec etiam primum connotatum, quod est infusio gratiae, sed collatio gloriae ex meritis est*». Sed ibid. a. 3. dicit (ad 2.): «*Collationis gratiae et gloriae potest esse ratio praescientiae meritorum*». Ad quae verba Dionys. Carth. hanc notam adiicit: «*Responsio ista tanti doctoris admirationem et timorem ingerit mihi*»; et probare nititur, ea esse contra intentionem S. Augustini et Patrum. Sed, si fallimur, sane exponi potest haec sententia Alexandri, ita ut non iis contradicat, quae in praecedenti articulo iam dixerat. Loquitur enim praecise de iustificatione, et verba *praescientia meritorum* intelligenda sunt de mera dispositione supernaturali ad infusionem gratiae habitualis, per gratias actuales acquisita. Sic intellecta sententia Alexandri idem dicit quod B. Albert. (loco infra n. II. relato) docet *de praeparatione ad gratiam*.

Henricus Gand. (Quodlib. 8. a. 19.) docet, quod praedestinatio, quatenus est a Deo agente, nullam rationem habeat nisi bonitatem et voluntatem Dei; sed quatenus est in subiecto recipiente, aliquam habeat rationem, scil. bonum usum liberi arbitrii praevisum. Hunc enim bonum usum sic distinguit, ut sit quidem effectus (non ratio) praedestinationis, quatenus est ex gratia, sed simul sit ratio motiva eiusdem (non autem meritoria), quatenus est ex libero arbitrio. Quae doctrina Scoto (hic q. unica, n. 8.) aliisque plurimis displicuit.

Nam Scotus cum S. Thoma rationem praedestinationis, ut est praedestinatio Dei, in ipsam divinam voluntatem tanquam in causam adaequatam referendam esse docet. Tamen Scotus (ibid. n. 13.) sapienter addit: «*De istis opinionibus omnibus, quia Apostolus videtur, disputans de ista materia ad Romanos, in fine quasi totum inscrutabile relinquere: altitudo (inquiens) divitiarum...*, *ideo ne scrutando de profundo, secundum dictum Magistri, eatur in profundum, eligatur quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina sine aliqua iniustitia, et alia quae salvanda sunt circa Deum, ut liberaliter eligentem*» etc. Antiqua igitur schola Scoti (Lyranus, Nicolaus de Nyse, Petrus ab Aquila, Alphonsus de Castro, Lychetus) et etiam posteriores plurimi (Mastrius, Rada, Macedo, Hauzeur, Schmising, Herincx, doctissimus Corbinianus Luydl etc.) negant, praevisa merita esse rationem efficacis praedestinationis. Totam fere scholam S. Thomae, et celeberrimos theologos Bellarminum, Toletum, Suarez, Ruiz, Molinam eandem sententiam profiteri, sed non eodem modo explicare, notissimum est. In favorem autem alterius sententiae scripserunt inter Scotistas Faber, Poncius et Frassenius.

*3.* Observandum est, quod in celebri controversia, quae a tribus saeculis in scholis catholicis agitatur, utrum scil. praedestinatio ad gloriam sit ex praevisis meritis, non est idem *status quaestionis*, secundum quem S. Bonav. et coaevi alii communiter rem tractabant, cum eo, secundum quem in nostris scholis disputatur. Illi quaerebant, utrum praedestinatio in genere, id est praeordinatio secundum omnes suos effectus collective sumtos habeat in Deo rationem aliquam motivam, sive in generali, sive in speciali i. e. comparative ad unum hominem prae altero; immo principaliter considerabant primos effectus praedestinationis, scil. vocationem et iustificationem, et praedestinationem in speciali. Sed nunc agitur praecise de ultimo effectu praedestinationis sive de praedestinatione ad gloriam, non quidem in ordine exsecutionis, sed intentionis. Ab omnibus enim conceditur, in ordine exsecutionis ultimum effectum de facto reddi adultis propter praecedentia merita; unde consecutio gloriae nec non decretum divinum, dandi in tempore «*coronam iustitiae*», praesupponunt in Deo praevisionem bonorum operum. In ordine autem intentionis est primum id quod est ultimum in exsecutione; unde intentio dandi gloriam concipitur ut antecedens voluntati dandi media. Itaque circa hanc intentionem, qua efficaciter et absolute eliguntur aliqui ad gloriam, duae exortae sunt sententiae, ex adverso sibi oppositae. Plurimae autem aliae cum quadam restrictione vel diversa expositione unam vel alteram partem sequuntur. Prima igitur sententia distinguit conditionalam intentionem dandi gloriam, et absolutam. Voluntate conditionata et antecedenti Deus omnes homines gratuito ad gloriam praedestinat sub conditione, quod gratiis dandis bene usuri sint. Voluntate vero absoluta et efficaci non omnes, sed electos nonnullos prae aliis ad gloriam absolute praeordinat. Haec discretio iuxta illam sententiam praesupponit praescientiam meritorum ut absolute futurorum, ita ut praedestinati secundum rationem prius eligantur ad gratiam et ad merita, et post vel etiam, ut multi volunt, propter praevisa merita voluntate consequenti et absoluta eligantur ad gloriam. Unde discretio salvandorum et reproborum etiam in ordine intentionis fit a Deo secundum praevisionem meritorum et ex motivo iustitiae. Ita cum Lessio, Vasquez, Becano, Wirceburgensibus plurimi posteriores. — Contraria etiam sententia distinguit inter ordinem intentionis et exsecutionis, sive inter primam electionem ad gloriam et ipsius gloriae consecutionem; sed aliter loquitur de ordine electionis et de motivo eiusdem. Ut huius sententiae defensores volunt, intentio non tantum conditionata, sed etiam absoluta, qua aliqui voluntate consequenti ordinantur ad gloriam, praecedit ratione praevisionem meritorum, ita ut haec volitio divina non habeat motivum nisi gratuitam divinam misericordiam; ordinatio autem ad gratiam et ad merita (quae sunt media ad finem, scil. gloriam) praesupponit electionem ad gloriam, cuius sunt effectus. Unde motivum intendendi gloriam est gratuitum, sed motivum dandi eam in exsecutione est ex iustitia; sive aliis verbis: Deus non propter merita, sed gratis vult primo ordinare ad gloriam, tamen vult dare eam propter merita. Haec sententia considerat bona opera sub ratione doni divini, quia Deus eorum est causa prima et principalis, et per consequens, quatenus ipsa sunt effectus praedestinationis; et inde infert: ergo non sunt causa seu ratio eiusdem praedestinationis. Prima autem sententia eadem bona opera considerat sub respectu meriti, quatenus procedunt etiam a libero arbitrio ut eius effectus.

Non est nostrum iudicare de veritate harum sententiarum, quas tantum proposuimus, ut facilius constet, S. Bonaventuram hic rem non tractare sub istis distinctionibus, cum non loquatur nec de ordine intentionis et exsecutionis (ut iam Scotus locutus est), nec praecise de electione ad gloriam, nec de ordine prioritatis et posterioritatis, qui inter decreta divina secundum nostrum modum intelligendi esse supponitur.

Hinc non est mirum, S. Bonaventuram et plerosque antiquos Scholasticos a diversis ad utramque partem trahi, et eadem S. Bonaventurae verba (in dd. 40. 41, et infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1.) diversimode intelligi, scil. vel de ordine intentionis, vel de ordine exsecutionis. Nam Trigosus (Sum. theol. q. 18. a. 6. dub. 1.) diffuse disputat ad probandum, S. Bonaventuram docere praedestinationem ad gloriam ante praevisa merita, cui consentiunt Hauzeur (Coll. L. col. 516.) aliique. Isti propositiones, quae loquuntur de praevisione meritorum, intelligunt non de ordine intentionis, sed exsecutionis. Sed econtra Barth. a Barberiis et Frassenius (de Deo, tract. 2. disp. 3. a. 2. sect. 2. q. 3.) cum plurimis aliis S. Bonaventuram omnino patronum alterius sententiae faciunt.

Manifestum autem est, S. Doctorem loqui secundum statum quaestionis sua aetate communem atque summa moderatione et sapientia suam sententiam proponere. Dum loquitur de ratione motiva respectu praedestinationis in generali (hic in corp.) non commemorat praevisionem meritorum, sed ostensionem misericordiae et iustitiae. Dum autem loquitur de praedestinatione in speciali et comparative (in corp. et ad 6.) non intendit probare nisi: *a)* supponendam esse aliquam rationem motivam quantum ad ordinationem voliti ad voluntatem divinam, cum ipsa congruenter operetur; *b)* hanc non esse causam meritoriam, sed tantum rationem congruentiae; *c)* eandem non esse nobis certam nec determinatam, «*quia multae possunt esse rationes congruentiae*»; *d)* possibile esse, quod praeter alias etiam praevisio bonorum sit ratio motiva, (quae autem sint haec bona, se ignorare confitetur S. Doctor); *e)* temeritatem quandam sapere assertionem, merita in Iacob esse rationem congruitatis suae electionis (hic dub. 1.); *f)* praeter conclusionem principalem (quod divina voluntas «*habet rationem congruitatis ratione voliti*») vult, alia non esse inquirenda, et concedit, argumenta ab ipso in fundam. allata ex parte posse habere calumniam (ad 7.). Vide etiam infra d. 46. q. 1, d. 47. q. 1.

*II.* Hinc patet, Doctorem Seraphicum cautissime sententiam sua aetate communem proponere, nec a S. Thoma etiam in modo loquendi discedere nisi in hoc, quod respectu praedestinationis in speciali ipse asserat, esse quidem rationem congruitatis, quae tamen propter nostram ignorantiam determinate non possit assignari. Attamen S. Thom. (S. I. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3.), quem in hoc sequitur Scotus, explicite dicit: «*Quare hos elegit in gloriam et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem*». Si haec verba intelliguntur in eo sensu, quem insinuat alia eiusdem formula (ibid. in corp.): «*Non est assignare (scil. a nobis) causam divinae voluntatis a parte actus volendi*»; tunc uterque S. Doctor idem aliis verbis dicit. Fortasse autem modus loquendi apud Angelicum procedit ex illo principio (S. 1. q. 19. a. 5.), quod velle finem tunc non possit esse causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, quando aliquis «*uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem*», ut est in Deo. — Ceterum S. Thom. non negat, quod «*voluntas Dei nun-*

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*quam est irrationabilis*» (S. Anselm., l. Cur Deus homo, c. 8.), sed ipse (hic q. 1. a. 3.) dicit: «*Praedestinatio causam non habet, sed habet rationem ex parte effectus, secundum quam imponens et iusta dicitur*». Quaeritur igitur tantum de *acceptatione rationis motivae*, quae non sit ipsa voluntas. Argumenta pro utraque parte exhibet Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2., licet ipse potius sequatur S. Thomam in modo loquendi. — Alexandrum Hal. convenire cum Seraphico, at non ita caute et moderate loqui, iam observavimus. — B. Albert. in Summa p. I. tr. 16. q. 65. saepius eodem fere modo loquendi utitur, quo S. Bonav. Dicit quidem (ibi q. incid. 5. ad 1.): «*Electio divina causa meriti est, et est causa respectus ad futura merita*»; sed etiam: «*Occultissima merita pro certo sunt in praescientia Dei merita, sed haec non possunt esse causa electionis aeternae, sed possunt esse ratio, propter quam electio sit rationabilis*»; et ibid. ad 2: «*Voluntatis enim divinae opus est electio, et nullam aliam habet causam, licet praescientia meritorum rationem ostendat rationabilem*». Insuper de ipsa *praescientia* loquitur tanquam unum *connotatum principale significatum praedestinationis* dicens: «*Causam habere non potest nisi voluntatem Dei; tamen quia praescientia meritorum secundum rationem intelligentiae informat voluntatem praeparantem gratiam... non video, quid prohibeat, quin praescientia meritorum ratio sit*» (ibid. q. 63. q. 1. incid.). Quae verba respondent potius modo, quo loquitur Alexander, quam quo utitur S. Bonaventura.

Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 1. in fine) concludit: «*Quamvis autem positio Thomae sit probabilis, attamen (si salva auctoritate Scripturae dici potest) rationabiliorem puto positionem Bonaventurae, quantum ad hoc, quod dicit, praedestinationem habere rationem in particulari seu singulari, sicut in communi, ita quod non sola Dei voluntas seu voluntas est ratio, cur isto praedestinatur magis quam ille, sed certa atque legitima ratio, ob quam voluntas sic agit, praesertim cum voluntas Dei essentialiter sit ipsa infinita sapientia ac iustitia, propter quod nec irrationalis nec iniusta consistere potest*»; quod ibi pluribus rationibus probat.

*III.* Verba in solut. ad 6: «*Propter quorum (bonorum) tamen praevisionem nec scio determinare*» etc. respicere videntur locum S. Augustini (83 Qq. q. 68. n. 4. apud Magistrum, hic c. 2.), de cuius sensu et tum temporis et magis a tribus saeculis plurimum disputatum est. Dicit igitur S. Augustinus quod voluntas Dei, qua *cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat*, «*venit de occultissimis meritis*». Magister putat, S. Augustinum hoc saltem in suo simili retractasse, quod etiam S. Thomas (de Verit. q. 6. a. 2. ad 10.) refert, sed addit: «*Vel si debent sustineri, referendum est ad effectum reprobationis vel praedestinationis, quod habet aliquam causam meritoriam vel dispositivam*». Matth. ab Aquasparta, qui in quinta anecdota quaestione disputata: utrum praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam, omnino sequitur S. Bonaventuram, eundem textum explicat «*non de electione aeterna, sed de vocatis ad poenitentiam*».

*IV.* Praeter iam citatos auctores: B. Albert., hic n. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2, q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2.[^31]

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question differs from the preceding, in which is treated the order of the effects of predestination to one another, and the meritorious cause that can be among them. Here is treated the divine proposal itself, that is, the pre-ordaining in choosing or reprobating — not indeed the will or its act in itself, since this is the divine essence, but «*as regards the ordering of the willed to his will*», or in other words, in so far as the divine volition terminates at the effect either of predestination or of reprobation. That not even in this sense can a *meritorious cause* of that pre-ordaining be conceded — which is the then-common opinion — is explicitly taught here and in the preceding question. But it is asked whether at least some motive ground «*of fittingness and seemliness*» is to be assigned. The difficulty is chiefly discussed, however, not concerning the ground of predestination in general, but [concerning it] in particular and comparatively. Whence Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 2) so proposes the question: «*Whether in God there is any ground — whatever it may be — why he has predestined some and not others*». — It helps to note in advance what follows.

*1.* This matter is beset with grave difficulties. On the one hand, the justice, equity and goodness of God must be safeguarded, as also the serious antecedent will of saving all men; on the other, care must be taken not to derogate from the gratuitous character of God's gifts, namely of grace, of final perseverance and of predestination, nor from the independence of the divine will. For just as the divine intellect in its act does not depend on any ground of knowing that is outside God — although it does terminate at things existing outside God, since the cognition of God is not from things, but [is directed] to things — in like manner the volition of the divine will, although it terminates at willed objects outside

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God, cannot be moved by any motive ground nor depend on any [ground] which is other than [God] himself, as is well taught below at d. 45, dub. 3.

*2.* Already among the ancient Scholastics there was much dispute as to whether and how foreknowledge of merits could be taken as a ground of predestination. Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 1, recites many opinions. — Alexander of Hales (*S.* p. I, q. 28, m. 3, a. 1) rightly says: «*On the side of predestination, neither the principal signified is from merits, nor even the first connoted [object], which is the infusion of grace; but the conferring of glory is from merits*». But ibid. a. 3, he says (ad 2): «*Of the conferring of grace and of glory the ground can be the foreknowledge of merits*». To which words Dionysius the Carthusian appends this note: «*This response of so great a doctor inspires admiration and fear in me*»; and he tries to prove that they are against the intention of St. Augustine and the Fathers. But, if we are not mistaken, this opinion of Alexander can certainly be so explained that it does not contradict what he had already said in the preceding article. For he speaks precisely of justification, and the words *foreknowledge of merits* are to be understood of the mere supernatural disposition for the infusion of habitual grace, acquired through actual graces. Thus understood, Alexander's opinion says the same as what B. Albert (in the place referred to below, n. II) teaches *concerning preparation for grace*.

Henry of Ghent (Quodlib. 8, a. 19) teaches that predestination, in so far as it is from God [as] agent, has no ground except God's goodness and will; but in so far as it is in the receiving subject, it has some ground — namely the foreseen good use of free choice. For he so distinguishes this good use that it is indeed an *effect* (not a ground) of predestination, in so far as it is from grace; but at the same time is the *motive ground* of [predestination] (though not meritorious) in so far as it is from free choice. This doctrine displeased Scotus (here q. *unica*, n. 8) and very many others.

For Scotus, with St. Thomas, teaches that the ground of predestination, in so far as it is the predestination of God, must be referred to the divine will itself as to an adequate cause. Yet Scotus (ibid. n. 13) wisely adds: «*Concerning all these opinions, since the Apostle seems, in disputing on this matter in [the letter] to the Romans, almost to leave the whole inscrutable at the end: «O the depth* (he says) *of the riches…», therefore, that we may not search the deep, according to the Master's saying, let us go into the deep; let what most pleases be chosen, provided that the divine freedom be preserved without any injustice, and the other things which must be safeguarded concerning God, [namely God] as freely choosing*». The ancient Scotist school, then (Lyranus, Nicholas of Nyse, Peter of Aquila, Alphonsus of Castro, Lychetus), and likewise very many later [Scotists] (Mastrius, Rada, Macedo, Hauzeur, Schmising, Herincx, the most learned Corbinianus Luydl, etc.), deny that foreseen merits are a ground of efficacious predestination. It is well known that nearly the whole school of St. Thomas, and most celebrated theologians — Bellarmine, Toletus, Suarez, Ruiz, Molina — profess the same opinion, though they do not explain it in the same way. In favor of the other opinion, however, among Scotists, Faber, Poncius and Frassenius wrote.

*3.* It should be observed that in the famous controversy which has been agitated in Catholic schools for three centuries — namely whether predestination to glory is from foreseen merits — the *state of the question* is not the same in the sense in which St. Bonaventure and his contemporaries commonly treated the matter, as in the sense in which it is now disputed in our schools. They asked whether predestination in general — that is, pre-ordaining as regards all its effects collectively taken — has in God some motive ground, whether in general or in particular, i.e. comparatively, [comparing] one man with another; indeed they principally considered the first effects of predestination, namely calling and justification, and predestination in particular. But now [the question] is treated precisely about the last effect of predestination, that is, of predestination to glory — not indeed in the order of execution, but of intention. For it is conceded by all that in the order of execution the last effect is in fact rendered to adults on account of preceding merits; whence the obtaining of glory, no less than the divine decree of granting in time the «*crown of justice*», presuppose in God the foresight of good works. But in the order of intention, the first [thing] is that which is last in execution; whence the intention of giving glory is conceived as antecedent to the will of giving the means [to it]. Therefore concerning this intention — by which some are efficaciously and absolutely chosen for glory — two opinions have arisen, opposed to each other. Very many other [opinions], however, with some restriction or different exposition, follow one or the other side. The first opinion, therefore, distinguishes a conditional intention of giving glory and an absolute one. By the conditional and antecedent will God gratuitously predestines all men to glory under the condition that they will make good use of the graces to be given. By the absolute and efficacious will, however, [he does so] not for all, but absolutely pre-ordains some, the elect, to glory in preference to others. According to that opinion this discrimination presupposes foreknowledge of merits as absolutely future, in such a way that the predestined are by reason first chosen for grace and for merits, and then — or even, as many will, on account of foreseen merits — are chosen by a consequent and absolute will for glory. Hence the discrimination of those-to-be-saved and the reprobate is, even in the order of intention, made by God according to foreknowledge of merits and from the motive of justice. So, with Lessius, Vasquez, Becanus, the Wirceburgenses, very many later [theologians hold]. — The contrary opinion also distinguishes between the order of intention and execution, that is, between the first election to glory and the obtaining of glory itself; but it speaks differently about the order of election and the motive of it. As the defenders of this opinion will have it, the intention — not only conditional but also absolute, by which some are by a consequent will ordained to glory — precedes in reason the foresight of merits, in such a way that this divine volition has no motive except gratuitous divine mercy; but the ordering to grace and to merits (which are the means to the end, namely glory) presupposes the election to glory, of which they are the effects. Hence the motive of intending glory is gratuitous, but the motive of giving it in execution is from justice; or in other words: God wills not on account of merits, but gratuitously, to order [men] *first* to glory, yet wills to give it [to them] on account of merits. This opinion considers good works under the ratio of a divine gift, because God is their first and principal cause, and consequently, in so far as they are effects of predestination — and from this it infers: therefore they are not the cause or ground of that same predestination. The first opinion, however, considers the same good works under the respect of merit, in so far as they proceed also from free choice as its effects.

It is not for us to judge concerning the truth of these opinions, which we have only set out so that it may more easily be evident that St. Bonaventure does not here treat the matter under these distinctions, since he speaks neither about the order of intention and execution (as Scotus has already spoken), nor precisely about election to glory, nor about the order of priority and posteriority which, according to our mode of understanding, is supposed to obtain among the divine decrees.

Hence it is not surprising that St. Bonaventure and very many ancient Scholastics are drawn by various [authors] to either side, and that the same words of St. Bonaventure (in dd. 40, 41, and below d. 46, a. 1, q. 1) are understood in different ways, namely either of the order of intention or of the order of execution. For Trigosus (*Summa theologica* q. 18, a. 6, dub. 1) disputes diffusely to prove that St. Bonaventure teaches predestination to glory before foreseen merits, with whom agree Hauzeur (Coll. L, col. 516) and others. These understand the propositions which speak of foresight of merits not of the order of intention, but of execution. On the contrary, Barth. a Barberiis and Frassenius (*De Deo*, tract. 2, disp. 3, a. 2, sect. 2, q. 3), with very many others, make St. Bonaventure the patron entirely of the other opinion.

It is, however, manifest that the Holy Doctor is speaking according to the state of the question common in his age and proposes his opinion with the greatest moderation and wisdom. When he speaks of a motive ground with respect to predestination in general (here, in the body), he does not commemorate foresight of merits but the manifestation of mercy and justice. When, however, he speaks of predestination in particular and comparatively (in the body and ad 6), he does not intend to prove anything except: *a)* that some motive ground is to be supposed as regards the ordering of the willed to the divine will, since [the divine will] operates fittingly; *b)* that this is not a meritorious cause, but only a ground of fittingness; *c)* that it is not certain to us nor determinate, «*because there can be many grounds of fittingness*»; *d)* that it is possible that, besides others, the foresight of goods also be a motive ground (which these goods are, however, the Holy Doctor confesses himself ignorant of); *e)* that a kind of rashness is implied in the assertion that merits in Jacob were the ground of fittingness of his election (here, dub. 1); *f)* besides the principal conclusion (that the divine will «*has a ground of fittingness by reason of the willed [object]*»), he holds that no other things are to be inquired after, and concedes that the arguments brought forward by him in the *fundamenta* can in part be open to objection (ad 7). See also below d. 46, q. 1, d. 47, q. 1.

*II.* Hence it is plain that the Seraphic Doctor most cautiously proposes the opinion common in his age, and does not depart from St. Thomas even in mode of speaking except in this, that with respect to predestination in particular he himself asserts that there is indeed a ground of fittingness, which, however, on account of our ignorance, cannot determinately be assigned. Yet St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3) — whom Scotus follows in this — explicitly says: «*Why he has chosen these for glory and reprobated those, has no ground except the divine will*». If these words be understood in that sense which another formula of his (ibid. in the body) insinuates: «*It cannot be assigned (namely by us) [as] a cause of the divine will on the side of the act of willing*»; then both Holy Doctors say the same thing in different words. Perhaps, however, the manner of speaking in the Angelic Doctor proceeds from that principle (*S.* I, q. 19, a. 5), that the willing of the end cannot then be the cause of willing those things that are to the end, when someone «*by one act wills the end and the things that are to the end*», as is the case in God. — Moreover, St. Thomas does not deny that «*God's will is never*

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*irrational*» (St. Anselm, book *Cur Deus homo*, c. 8), but he himself (here q. 1, a. 3) says: «*Predestination does not have a cause, but has a ground on the side of the effect, according to which it is called imposing and just*». It is asked, therefore, only concerning the *acceptance of a motive ground* which is not the will itself. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2, exhibits arguments for both sides, though he himself rather follows St. Thomas in mode of speaking. — That Alexander of Hales agrees with the Seraphic [Doctor], though does not speak so cautiously and moderately, we have already observed. — B. Albert, in the *Summa* p. I, tr. 16, q. 65, frequently uses almost the same mode of speaking as St. Bonaventure. He says indeed (there q. *incid.* 5, ad 1): «*Divine election is the cause of merit, and is the cause of [the] respect to future merits*»; but also: «*Most hidden merits are for certain among the merits in the foreknowledge of God, but these cannot be the cause of the eternal election, but can be a ground on account of which the election is rational*»; and ibid. ad 2: «*For the act of the divine will is election, and it has no other cause, although the foreknowledge of merits exhibits a rational ground*». Moreover, concerning *foreknowledge* itself he speaks as one *connoted principal signified of predestination*, saying: «*It cannot have a cause except the will of God; yet because the foreknowledge of merits, according to the ratio of understanding, informs the will that prepares grace... I do not see what prevents foreknowledge of merits from being a ground*» (ibid. q. 63, q. 1, *incid.*). These words correspond rather to the manner in which Alexander speaks than to that which St. Bonaventure uses.

Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 1, at the end) concludes: «*Although, however, Thomas's position is probable, nevertheless (if it can be said without prejudice to the authority of Scripture) I think the position of Bonaventure more rational, as regards what he says — that predestination has a ground in the particular or singular as in the common — so that not God's sole will, that is, [his] will, is the ground why this one is predestined rather than that, but [there is] a certain and legitimate ground by reason of which the will so acts; especially since the will of God essentially is itself infinite wisdom and justice, on account of which it cannot consist as irrational or unjust*»; which he there proves with many arguments.

*III.* The words in the solution ad 6: «*on account of the foresight of which (goods), however, I do not know how to determine*», etc., seem to regard the passage of St. Augustine (*83 Quaestiones* q. 68, n. 4, in the Master, here c. 2), of whose meaning much has been disputed both then and especially in [the last] three centuries. St. Augustine therefore says that the will of God, by which *he has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills*, «*comes from most hidden merits*». The Master thinks that St. Augustine retracted this at least in his similar [passage], which St. Thomas (*De Verit.* q. 6, a. 2, ad 10) also reports, but he adds: «*Or, if they must be sustained, [the words] are to be referred to the effect of reprobation or predestination, which has some meritorious or dispositive cause*». Matthew of Aquasparta, who in the fifth posthumously published disputed question — *Whether predestination has any cause* — entirely follows St. Bonaventure, explains that same passage «*not of the eternal election, but of those called to penitence*».

*IV.* Besides the authors already cited: B. Albert, here n. 3, 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2.[^31]

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
#### *De sempiternitate divinae cognitionis.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur secundo de interminabilitate divinae cognitionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, quia dubium habet per comparationem ad complexa[^1], quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat res per modum complexionis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum enuntiabilia sive complexa, quae Deus semel cognoscit, semper cognoscat.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus cognoscat res per modum complexionis.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Footnote numbering in the printed Quaracchi text restarts on every page; this chunk re-numbers continuously 1–12 across the two printed pages (736–737) where apparatus anchors fall.

Quod autem cognoscat Deus per modum complexionis, ostenditur sic.

1. Eandem rem, quam cognoscit sensus, cognoscit intellectus[^2], sed sensus per modum incomplexionis, intellectus vero per modum complexionis; sed intellectus est potentior in cognoscendo quam sensus; ergo cognoscere per modum complexionis est potentiae. Sed omne tale est Deo attribuendum: ergo etc.

2. Item, differenter significatur res per vocem incomplexam et per complexionem, quia per vocem incomplexam quantum ad esse simpliciter, per <!-- page 737 -->orationem sive complexionem quantum ad esse tale[^3] vel tale; sed Deus non tantum cognoscit res quantum ad esse simpliciter, sed etiam quantum ad esse tale vel tale: ergo cognoscit secundum complexionem.

3. Item, ordo unius rei ad alteram, cui coniungitur in re, facit compositionem in cognitione vel in sermone complexionem; sed Deus non tantum intelligit in se rem ipsam, sed etiam in ordine ad rem aliam, cui unitur: ergo non solum per modum simplicem[^4], sed compositionis.

4. Item, Deus intelligit nostrum intelligere et nostrum dicere; sed nos dicimus et intelligimus rem per modum complexionis: ergo Deus hoc modo intelligit.

**Sed contra:**

1. Dionysius *de Divinis nominibus*[^5]: «*Cognoscit Deus omnia immaterialiter materialia, impartite partita, uniformiter multa, immutabiliter mutabilia*». Si ergo partita cognoscit impartite, ergo composita per modum simplicem; sed modus simplicitatis et complexionis opponuntur: ergo non cognoscit per modum complexionis.

2. Item, cum intellectus cognoscat[^6] per modum complexionis, aut modus ille est in re, aut in intellectu. Non in re, quia cum sensus apprehendat eandem rem, apprehenderet eam per modum complexionis: ergo est in intellectu. Sed omnis talis intellectus, in quo est complexio, realiter est complexus et compositus; sed divinus intellectus non est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

3. Item, si cognoscit res per modum complexionis, cum modus divinae cognitionis sit ei coae[^7]ternus, ab aeterno cognovit per modum complexionis: ergo complexio fuit ab aeterno. Sed multa intellexit, ergo multae complexiones sunt ab aeterno; ergo verae, vel falsae; si verae: ergo plura sunt vera ab aeterno; si falsae: ergo plura sunt falsa ab aeterno.

4. Item, si cognoscit per modum complexionis, cum eadem res modo vere significetur sub ratione futuritionis, modo sub ratione praeteritionis, modo sub ratione praesentialitatis: ergo his omnibus modis Deus cognoscit. Sed contra: omnia cognoscit ut praesentia; unde *secunda Petri* ultimo[^8] dicitur: *Unus dies apud Deum sicut mille anni* etc.: ergo non cognoscit omnibus his modis.

### Conclusio.

> *Cognitio divina rerum non est per modum complexionis, prout complexio accipitur circa intellectum divinum, sed prout cadit circa res tum in se spectatas tum per nostrum intellectum expressas.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cognoscere res per modum complexionis potest intelligi tripliciter. Aut enim modus complexionis cadit circa rem; et sic est sensus: Deus cognoscit, res existere vel se habere per modum complexionis sive compositionis[^9]; et hoc est verum, cognoscit enim res esse, sicut sunt. Alio modo, ut modus complexionis cadat circa rem, ut est expressa per intellectum nostrum; et tunc est sensus, quod Deus cognoscit res non tantum ut sunt, sed etiam ut intellectus exprimit — cognoscit enim res et voces sive intellectus[^10] illas significantes — et hoc verum est. Tertio modo potest intelligi, ut modus complexionis cadat circa intellectum divinum; et hoc modo falsum est. Hoc enim conspectat ad intellectum, qui intelligit multa et per multa, quae oportet complecti; Deus autem multa intelligit uno et ita simplici[^11] modo, nec magis est simplex intellectus eius intelligendo unum quam multa. Unde intelligere multa per modum complexionis nec est omnino virtutis, nec omnino imperfectionis; et ideo non ponitur nec in cognitione infima, ut sensitiva, nec in cognitione suprema, ut in divina, et fortassis non etiam est in cognitione suprema ipsius animae, quae dicitur intellectiva prout est in suo summo: cognoscit enim per modum simplicis aspectus.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Rationes probantes, quod cognoscit Deus per modum complexionis, procedunt secundum primam et secundam viam; ideo verum concludunt praeter primum, ad quod iam solutum est.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod complexio non venit ab intellectu; dicendum, quod complexio dupliciter potest comparari ad intellectum: aut sicut ad causam, aut sicut ad subiectum. Si sicut ad subiectum, in quo et quod informat et denominat, sic comparatur ad intellectum humanum, a quo est complexio, qui etiam complectitur[^12]. Si sicut ad causam, sic comparatur ad intellectum divinum. <!-- page 738 -->Nam intellectus divinus cognoscit complexionem non circa se, sed circa nostrum intelligere; quoniam complexio non est ab intellectu nostro, nisi cooperante divino in intelligendo.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si cognoscit res per modum complexionis, quod tunc complexiones sunt aeternae; dicendum, quod ex primo vel secundo sensu non sequitur, quod complexiones sint aeternae, quia non est complexio circa Deum; sed bene sequitur, quod veritas significata per aliquam complexionem est aeterna, sicut veritas huius, *mundum esse futurum*; tamen propositio et complexio est ab intellectu nostro intelligente illam veritatem aeternam. Unde sicut vox temporalis significat rem aeternam, ut hoc nomen *Deus*, non tamen sequitur, quod sit aeterna; sic multa enuntiabilia significant veritatem aeternam, nec tamen sunt aeterna.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc cognoscit res sub ratione futuritionis et praeteritionis: dicendum, sicut tactum est, quod modus divinae cognitionis potest accipi *secundum se*, vel *a parte cogniti*. Si *a parte cogniti*; sic dicendum, quod omnino cognoscit, rem esse sicut est, et ita mutabiliter esse, et ita composito modo esse, sicut est, et sic de omnibus: et sic cognoscit, rem praeteritam esse praeteritam, et futuram esse futuram, et non praeteritam esse praesentem. Potest iterum accipi *a parte sui*; et sic, cum cognitio Dei sit omnino simplex, omnino praesens, omnia cognoscit per modum simplicitatis et per modum praesentialitatis. Unde, quod dicit: *omnia sunt praesentia apud Deum*, hoc dictum est quantum ad cognitionem, in qua nulla cadit successio, ideo nec novum nec vetus, nec praeteritum nec futurum. In arctata autem cognitionis angelicae et humanae cadit successio, et ideo praeteritum et futurum. Et propterea non ita dicuntur omnia praesentia animae cognoscenti, sicut Deo. Et hoc manifestum est, quia *nunc aeternitatis*, quod est semper praesens, complectitur omnia temporalia; et ideo patet, quomodo sit intelligendum.

english:
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### Article II.
#### *On the everlastingness of the divine cognition.*

Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked secondly concerning the *interminability* of the divine cognition. And on this two [things] are asked. First, since a doubt arises by comparison with [things] complex[^1], it is asked, whether God knows things by the mode of complexion. Secondly it is asked, whether *enuntiabilia* or *complexa*, which God once knows, he always knows.

### Question I.
#### *Whether God knows things by the mode of complexion.*

That God does know by the mode of complexion is shown thus.

1. The same thing which the sense knows, the intellect also knows[^2]; but the sense [knows it] by the mode of *incomplexion*, the intellect however by the mode of *complexion*; but the intellect is more powerful in knowing than the sense; therefore to know by the mode of complexion is [a mark] of power. But every such [perfection] is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a thing is differently signified by an *incomplex* utterance and by a *complexion*, since by an incomplex utterance [it is signified] as to being *simpliciter*, but by <!-- page 737 -->a statement or complexion as to such-and-such[^3] a being; but God knows things not only as to being *simpliciter*, but also as to such-and-such a being: therefore he knows them according to *complexion*.

3. Likewise, the order of one thing to another, to which it is joined in reality, produces composition in cognition or *complexion* in speech; but God not only understands the thing itself in itself, but also in relation to another thing, to which it is united: therefore [he understands it] not only by the *simple*[^4] mode, but [by the mode] of composition.

4. Likewise, God understands our understanding and our speaking; but we speak and understand the thing by the mode of complexion: therefore God in this mode understands [it].

**On the contrary:**

1. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^5]: "*God knows all things — material things immaterially, divided things undividedly, many things uniformly, mutable things immutably*". If, therefore, he knows divided things undividedly, then composite things by the simple mode; but the mode of simplicity and the [mode] of complexion are opposed: therefore he does not know by the mode of complexion.

2. Likewise, since the intellect knows[^6] by the mode of complexion, either that mode is in the thing, or in the intellect. Not in the thing, because, since the sense apprehends the same thing, it would apprehend it by the mode of complexion: therefore [the mode of complexion] is in the intellect. But every such intellect, in which there is complexion, is really complex and composite; but the divine intellect is not of this sort: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if he knows things by the mode of complexion, since the mode of divine cognition is coeternal[^7] with him, from eternity he has known by the mode of complexion: therefore complexion was from eternity. But he has understood many things, therefore many complexions are from eternity; therefore [they are] either true or false; if true: therefore many things are true from eternity; if false: therefore many things are false from eternity.

4. Likewise, if he knows by the mode of complexion, since the same thing now is truly signified under the *ratio* of future-being, now under the *ratio* of past-being, now under the *ratio* of present-being: therefore in all these modes God knows [it]. But on the contrary: he knows all things as present; whence in *Second Peter*, at the end[^8], it is said: *"One day with God [is] as a thousand years"* etc.: therefore he does not know in all these modes.

### Conclusio.

> *The divine cognition of things is not by the mode of complexion, insofar as complexion is taken with respect to the divine intellect; but [it is] insofar as it falls with respect to things, both considered in themselves and as expressed by our intellect.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *to know things by the mode of complexion* can be understood in three ways. For either the mode of complexion falls with respect to *the thing*; and thus the sense is: God knows that things exist or have themselves by the mode of complexion or composition[^9]; and this is true, for he knows the things to be, just as they are. In another way, [it is taken] so that the mode of complexion falls with respect to the thing, as it is expressed by our intellect; and then the sense is, that God knows things not only as they are, but also as the intellect expresses [them] — for he knows both the things and the utterances or intellections[^10] signifying them — and this is true. In the third way it can be understood [in such a way] that the mode of complexion falls with respect to *the divine intellect*; and in this mode it is false. For this regards the intellect, which understands many [things] and [understands them] through many [acts], which it must combine; but God understands many [things] by one and so simple[^11] a mode, and his intellect is not more simple in understanding one [thing] than [in understanding] many. Hence to understand many [things] by the mode of complexion is neither wholly [a mark] of power, nor wholly [a mark] of imperfection; and therefore it is set neither in the lowest cognition, as the sensitive [is], nor in the highest cognition, as the divine [is], and perhaps it is also not in the supreme cognition of the soul itself, which is called intellective insofar as it is at its summit: for it knows by the mode of *simple regard*.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* The reasonings proving that God knows by the mode of complexion proceed according to the first and the second way; therefore they truly conclude — except for the first [argument], to which it has now been resolved.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that complexion does not come from the intellect; it must be said that complexion can be compared to the intellect in two ways: either as to a cause, or as to a subject. If as to a subject, in which and which it informs and denominates, thus it is compared to the human intellect, from which the complexion [comes], which also combines [things][^12]. If as to a cause, thus it is compared to the divine intellect. <!-- page 738 -->For the divine intellect knows the complexion not regarding itself, but regarding our understanding; since complexion is not from our intellect, except with the divine [intellect] cooperating in understanding.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that if he knows things by the mode of complexion, then the complexions are eternal; it must be said that from the first or the second sense it does not follow, that the complexions are eternal, since there is no complexion regarding God; but it does well follow, that the truth signified by some complexion is eternal, just as the truth of this [proposition], *"the world is going to be"*; nevertheless the proposition and complexion is from our intellect understanding that eternal truth. Hence just as a temporal utterance signifies an eternal thing, as this name *God*, yet it does not follow that it is eternal; so many *enuntiabilia* signify an eternal truth, yet they are not eternal.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that then he knows things under the *ratio* of future-being and past-being: it must be said, as has been touched upon, that the mode of divine cognition can be taken *in itself*, or *on the side of the [thing] known*. If *on the side of the [thing] known*; then it must be said that he wholly knows the thing to be just as it is, and so [knows it] to be *mutably*, and so to be in a composite mode, just as it is, and so concerning all [things]: and thus he knows a past thing to be past, and a future [thing] to be future, and a non-past [thing] to be present. It can again be taken *on the side of himself*; and thus, since the cognition of God is wholly simple [and] wholly present, he knows all things by the mode of *simplicity* and by the mode of *presentiality*. Hence, what is said: *"all things are present to God"*, this is said as to the cognition, in which no succession falls, [and] therefore [there is] neither new nor old, neither past nor future. But in the constricted [scope] of the angelic and human cognition succession falls, and therefore [also] past and future. And for this reason all things are not so called *present* to the cognizing soul, as to God. And this is manifest, since the *now of eternity*, which is always present, embraces all temporal [things]; and therefore it is clear how [the saying] is to be understood.

la: Ita codd. L V. Vat. cum aliis edd. et codd. omittit *complexa*; cum autem habeant *sive*, istud verbum vix omitti potest.

en: Thus codices L, V. The Vatican [edition] with the other editions and codices omits *complexa*; but since they have *sive* ("or"), that word can scarcely be omitted.

la: Sic et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 9-12. et 21-40. (c. 4. et 6-9.); *de Sensu et Sens.*, et VII. *Metaph.* text. 53. seqq. nec non XIII. c. 5. seq. (VI. c. 15, et XII. c. 4. seq.), ubi Philosophus, ideas Platonicas impugnans, hoc quoque argumentum profert, quod, istis ideis admissis, non de rebus quae circum nos sunt, sed de omnino aliis scientia haberetur. Cfr. etiam Boeth., I. *Comment. in Porphyr.* (a se transl.), circa finem, ubi dicitur: *Singularitati et universalitati unum quidem subiectum est, sed alio modo universale est, cum cogitatur; alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his, in quibus habet esse suum.* Cfr. insuper Boeth., V. *de Consol.* prosa 4. — De propositione minori cfr. Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 21. seqq. (c. 6.).

en: So also Aristotle, III. *On the Soul*, text 9–12 and 21–40 (c. 4 and 6–9); *On Sense and Sensibles*, and VII. *Metaphysics* text 53 seqq.; likewise XIII, c. 5 seq. (VI, c. 15, and XII, c. 4 seq.), where the Philosopher, attacking the Platonic ideas, also brings forth this argument: that, with those ideas admitted, knowledge would be had not of the things which are around us, but of entirely other [things]. Cf. also Boethius, I. *Commentary on Porphyry* (in his own translation), near the end, where it is said: *"For singularity and universality there is one and the same subject, but it is universal in another mode, when it is thought; [it is] singular, when it is sensed in those things in which it has its being."* Cf. moreover Boethius, V. *On Consolation*, prose 4. — On the minor proposition cf. Aristotle, III. *On the Soul*, text 21 seqq. (c. 6).

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* in princ., ubi agitur de complexis et incomplexis, I. *Periherm.* c. 1. seqq., nec non Boeth., *Comment.* in hos locos. *Esse simpliciter* intellige rei essentiam sive quidditatem, cui respondet conceptus, qui voce exprimitur. — Pro *per orationem* ed. I *per coniunctionem*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Categories*, at the beginning, where complex and incomplex [terms] are treated; I. *Peri Hermeneias* c. 1 seqq.; likewise Boethius, *Commentary* on these places. By *esse simpliciter* understand the essence or quiddity of a thing, to which corresponds the concept, which is expressed by the utterance. — In place of *per orationem*, edition I [reads] *per coniunctionem*.

la: Ed. 1 *simplicis*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *simplicis* [in place of *simplicem*].

la: Cap. 7. § 2. Cfr. supra pag. 693, nota 6. — Paulo inferius pro *modus simplicitatis* ed. 1 *modus simplicis*.

en: Chapter 7, § 2. Cf. above p. 693, note 6. — A little lower down, for *modus simplicitatis* edition 1 [reads] *modus simplicis*.

la: Ed. 1 *cognoscit*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *cognoscit* [in place of *cognoscat*].

la: Codd. P Q V cum ed. 1 *Deo*. Mox pro *cognovit* codd. I X V *cognoscit*.

en: Codices P, Q, V with edition 1 [read] *Deo* [in place of *ei*]. Soon after, for *cognovit*, codices I, X, V [read] *cognoscit*.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8.

la: Cod. T *compositionis vel complexionis*.

en: Codex T [reads] *compositionis vel complexionis* [in place of *complexionis sive compositionis*].

la: Id est conceptus intellectuales, qui sunt similitudines et signa rerum. Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 1: *Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae... et quarum hae similitudines, res etiam eaedem.*

en: That is, intellectual concepts, which are likenesses and signs of things. Aristotle, I. *Peri Hermeneias* c. 1: *"Therefore those [things] which are in the utterance are signs of the passions which are in the soul... and of which these are the likenesses, the things [themselves] are also the same."*

la: Cfr. supra d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. ad ult., et a. 2. q. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, ad ult., and a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vel aliis verbis: qui etiam fit compositus coniungendo et dividendo suos conceptus. — In fine solutionis pro *in intelligendo* codd. I *intellectu*.

en: Or in other words: who also becomes composite by joining and dividing his concepts. — At the end of the solution, for *in intelligendo*, codex I [reads] *intellectu*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In tractanda scientia Dei circa enuntiabilia, S. Doctor redit ad tractandam scientiam divinam. Eadem quaestio ab Alexandro Hal. inscribitur: *Utrum Dei sit enuntiabilium*, et a S. Thoma aliisque simili modo. Idem P. Thom. (I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 1. a. 3.) etiam occasionem de hac re disputandi manifestat his verbis: «*Secundum positionem Avicennae et ex dictis Algazelis videtur sequi, quod Deus enuntiabilia nesciat*».

**II.** Verba: «*Fortassis non etiam est in cognitione suprema ipsius animae*» etc. tangunt doctrinam communem, quod in anima humana est quaedam participatio illius simplicis cognitionis, quae est in Angelis, secundum principium Dionysii (*de Div. Nom.* c. 7.), quod Deus fines inferiorum coniungit principiis superiorum. Plura de hoc vide II. *Sent.* d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.; *Brevilog.* p. II. c. 12. in fine; *Itiner. mentis in Deum*, c. 1; Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 69. m. 1. a. 3; S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 13. a. 3. ad 7, q. 13. a. 1; I. *Sent.* d. 3. q. 1. a. 1 ad 1; *S.* I. q. 79. a. 8. 9. — Notanda est sententia in fine solut. ad 2, quod intellectus divinus cooperatur nostro intellectui in intelligendo, quod est dictum secundum illam sententiam S. Doctoris, qua specialem cooperationem divinam ad actus nostros intellectuales statuit (cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 1. *Scholion*).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., *Report.* d. 38. q. 1. — B. Albert., 1. *Sent.* d. 39. a. 5; *S.* p. 1. tr. 15. q. 60. m. 3. q. incid. 6. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 36. q. 6. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 38. q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 39. q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In treating of the knowledge of God concerning *enuntiabilia*, the Holy Doctor returns to treating of the divine knowledge. The same question is titled by Alexander of Hales: *Whether [the knowledge] of God is of enuntiabilia*, and by St. Thomas and others in a similar way. The same Father Thomas (I. *Sent.* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) also manifests an occasion for disputing on this matter in these words: "*According to the position of Avicenna and from the sayings of Algazel, it seems to follow that God does not know enuntiabilia*".

**II.** The words: "*Perhaps it is also not in the supreme cognition of the soul itself*" etc. touch upon the common doctrine, that in the human soul there is a certain participation of that simple cognition which is in the Angels, according to the principle of Dionysius (*de Div. Nom.* c. 7), that God joins the *ends of inferior [things]* to the *principles of superior [things]*. On this see further: II. *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; *Breviloquium* p. II, c. 12, at the end; *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 1; Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II, q. 69, m. 1, a. 3; St. Thomas, *de Verit.* q. 13, a. 3, ad 7; q. 13, a. 1; I. *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; *S.* I, q. 79, a. 8. 9. — Note the sentence at the end of the solution *ad 2*, that the divine intellect cooperates with our intellect in understanding, which is said according to that opinion of the Holy Doctor by which he establishes a special divine cooperation for our intellectual acts (cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 1, *Scholion*).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 3. — Scotus, *Report.* d. 38, q. 1. — B. Albert., 1. *Sent.* d. 39, a. 5; *S.* p. 1, tr. 15, q. 60, m. 3, q. incid. 6. — Petr. a Tar., I. *Sent.* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, I. *Sent.* d. 38, q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 2 *princ.*, q. *unica*. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 36, q. 6. — Durand., I. *Sent.* d. 38, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 38, q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following question, I. *Sent.* d. 39, q. *unica*.

---

translators_notes: **J4 Class D/E audit (2026-07-17) — NOT a content defect; flagged to Wilson, not fixed.** Health scan reported `defs=12 la=14 en=12` (Latin appearing to have 2 extra/duplicate anchors, `1` and `12`). Content-verified: the file's 12 apparatus entries are complete and correctly anchored — the real `[^1]` (line 35, *complexa*) and real `[^12]` (line 72, *complectitur*) are each anchored exactly once in both Latin and English bodies, and every def matches its lemma by content. The apparent duplicates are **phantom anchors from the explanatory intro blockquote** at the top of Quaestio I (`> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers... this chunk re-numbers continuously [^1]–[^12] across the two printed pages...`), which cites the label range in **plain, un-fenced `[^N]` syntax** rather than backtick-quoted (`` `[^1]`–`[^12]` ``) as the corpus convention elsewhere requires (cf. e.g. `vol3/bon-sent-III-d33-dubia.md`'s own intro blockquote). This is the same bug class documented in `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2 (backtick-blockquote false positive / "literal `[^N]` in prose steals the binding"), **but this instance is worse**: because it lacks backtick protection, it is not merely a classifier miscounting artifact — per §2 the live site renderer (`site/src/app/browse/.../text-reader.tsx`) is also regex-based and will actually turn this un-fenced `[^1]` and `[^12]` in the intro sentence into live, clickable, spurious footnote superscripts inside the explanatory prose on the deployed page, colliding with the real `[^1]`/`[^12]` bindings. Per the handoff's explicit instruction, this corpus-wide notation issue is **not to be fixed chunk-by-chunk** — it needs Wilson's decision (either de-fence the convention everywhere by rewording, e.g. "notes 1–12" instead of `[^1]–[^12]`, or teach the classifier + renderer to skip backtick/plain code-spans). **No `[^N]` tokens or apparatus defs were changed in this chunk.** Recommend Wilson prioritize at minimum wrapping this specific instance in backticks (`` `[^1]`–`[^12]` ``) since, unlike the already-known backtick-quoted cases, it is a live rendering bug on the published Vol I site, not just a health-scan false positive.