title: Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De efficacia voluntatis divinae.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum voluntas beneplaciti Dei possit impediri.*

Et quod voluntas beneplaciti non possit impediri, ostenditur primo auctoritate.

1. *Genesis* ultimo[^1]: *Numquid Dei possumus resistere voluntati?* Quasi dicat: non.

2. Item, ad *Romanos* nono[^2]: *Voluntati eius quis resistit?*

3. Item, super illud primae ad *Timotheum* secundo[^3]: *Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri*, Glossa: « Rogandus est, ut velit, quod si vult, necesse est fieri ».

4. Item, super illud Psalmi[^4]: *Iustus Dominus in omnibus operibus suis*, Glossa: « Apud Deum hoc est velle, quod facere »; sed non potest impediri ne velit, quia libere vult quod vult: ergo non potest impediri, ne fiat.

5. Item, omnis voluntas, quae potest impediri, potest superari; sed divina voluntas superari non potest, cum sit suprema: ergo divina voluntas non potest impediri.

6. Item, omnis causa, quae impeditur a prosecutione sui effectus, aut deficit, aut mutatur; sed divina voluntas nec deficit nec mutatur nec potest deficere nec mutari: ergo etc.

7. Item, nobilius agens est et nobilior causa, quae non potest impediri, quam quae potest; sed divina voluntas est summa et suprema causa omnium, ut supra[^5] monstratum est: ergo etc.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Omnis causa, cuius effectus contingenter evenit, potest impediri — nam si non potest, tunc effectus evenit necessario — sed divina voluntas est huiusmodi, quia est multorum contingentium — alioquin aut nihil esset contingens, quod est contra arbitrii libertatem et consilium et casum, aut Deus non esset illius causa, quorum utrumque absurdum est — ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis causa, quae per aliam agentem expletur, si expletur[^6], potest per illam deficientem impediri, si illa possit deficere — haec propositio per se nota est — sed divina voluntas est huiusmodi — nam Deus vult multa fieri per causas creatas, quae non facit sine ipsis, sicut generare hominem, asinum, et similia; similiter de his quae sunt ab opere nostro; et haec possunt deficere — ergo divina voluntas potest impediri.

3. Item, omnis causa, cuius virtus se extendit ad contrarium voluntatis, potest aliud velle, quam velit[^7]; sed divina essentia est huiusmodi — aliquid enim vult Deus, ut istum damnari, cuius oppositum

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potest; hoc certum est, alioquin non esset omnipotens — potest ergo facere oppositum eius quod vult. Sed omne possibile ponibile: ponatur ergo, quod Deus faciat oppositum eius quod voluit; si hoc, voluntas Dei est frustra et impedita: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas vult aliquid, quod Deus vult ipsam velle; aut ergo potest velle contrarium, aut non potest. Si potest: ergo divina voluntas potest impediri; si non potest: ergo necesse est libertatem eius arctari.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Dei voluntas consequens non potest nec superari nec cassari nec impediri; antecedens vero potest impediri, sed non superari nec cassari; tamen necessitas, qua voluntas consequens connotat eventum, est necessitas *consequentiae*, non *consequentis*.

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum, quod secundum Ioannem Damascenum[^8] voluntas beneplaciti duplex est, scilicet *antecedens* et *consequens*: antecedens sive conditionalis, qua vult quantum in se est, omnium salutem, et absoluta, qua determinate vult aliquid, quod novit certitudinaliter evenire.

Intelligendum est ergo, quod nullam Dei voluntatem possibile est superari; nullam possibile est cassari; aliquam tamen, ut antecedentem, possibile est non impleri; aliquam, ut consequentem, necesse est impleri, et impossibile est impediri.

Nullam, inquam, est possibile superari. Nam si homo non faciat quod Deus vult, quantum in se est, sive voluntate antecedente, Deus facit de ipso, quod vult voluntate consequente; et ita semper impletur vel de homine vel ab homine, et sic numquam vincitur vel superatur.

Non etiam possibile est, voluntatem Dei cassari. Nam cassum dicitur aliquid, dum privatur effectu proprio, ad quem est: voluntas autem nulla privatur effectu, ad quem est proprie. Nam quod dicitur, quod Deus vult, omnes homines salvos fieri, quantum in se est, haec voluntas non connotat salutem, nec proprie est ad effectum salutis, sed connotat ordinationem naturae sive naturam ordinabilem ad salutem. Unde nihil plus est dicere: Deus vult istum salvum fieri, quantum in se est, quam[^9] Deo placuit dare isti naturam, per quam posset pervenire ad salutem, et quod Deus paratus esset iuvare, ita quod salus non deficit propter defectum a parte Dei. Unde non cassatur, quia habet proprium effectum. De voluntate autem absoluta planum est, quod non potest cassari, quia omnem effectum suum ponit nec unquam remanet inexpleta.

Cum itaque verum sit, voluntatem Dei nullo modo posse superari nec cassari, tamen voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri, conditionalem vero minime.

Sed attendendum quod est necessitas *consequentis* et necessitas *consequentiae*, sicut supra[^10] dictum est de praescientia, quia ipsa non habet necessitatem consequentis, sed consequentiae, quia necessario infert, et sequitur: Deus praescit hoc, ergo hoc erit; sed tamen non necessario praescit, quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens. — Sic in voluntate intelligendum, quod voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei; et ideo est ibi necessitas *consequentiae*, sed non *consequentis*, quia non mutat eventum rei, immo vult Deus, quod eveniat consequens contingens[^11]. Unde sicut praescientia, quia necessario infert effectum, non potest falli, sic nec voluntas absoluta, quia necessario infert, non potest impediri, immo eam necessarium est impleri. Voluntatem vero conditionatam non necessarium est omnino impleri, nec necessitate consequentis nec necessitate consequentiae, quia non connotat eventum rei, sed connotat illud quod est ordinabile ad eventum, ut praedictum est[^12]. Unde bene sequitur: vult istum salvari voluntate absoluta: ergo iste salvabitur; nunquam enim vellet, nisi pariter praesciret, eum esse salvandum. De voluntate vero conditionata, ut visum est[^13], non sequitur.

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Si ergo obiiciatur, quod voluntas Dei est necessaria in se, et necessario infert effectum, ergo omnimodam ponit circa ipsum necessitatem; dicendum, quod quamvis necesse sit, Deum velle et voluntatem eius esse in actu, tamen comparatio eius est ad futurum contingens, et ideo effectus evenit contingenter.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potest impediri, cum sit causa contingens; dicendum, sicut tactum est[^14], quod quamvis comparatio divinae voluntatis sit ad futurum contingens, tamen comparatio divinae voluntatis ad volitum et eventus voliti se necessario concomitantur, sicut unum contingens aliud; et ideo non potest impediri. Tunc enim impeditur causa, quando, manente comparatione et ordinatione eius ad effectum, effectus non evenit. Quod ergo proponitur: omnis causa, cuius effectus est contingens, potest impediri; falsa est propositio et habet instantiam, si effectus necessario concomitetur et consequatur ad causam; et haec est instantia in proposito.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest impediri propter defectum causae cooperantis; dicendum, quod sicut divina voluntas sive divinum velle connotat effectum, ita connotat existentiam causae particularis. Cum enim dicitur: Deus vult istum salvari, non est sensus, quod velit in omnem eventum, sed quod vult istum salvari, et vult istum velle. Unde sicut divina voluntas connotat istum effectum evenire, et ideo necessario sequitur effectus ad ipsam, ita connotat causam creatam concurrere. Et ideo necessario sequitur, si Deus vult istum salvari, quod iste etiam velit; et ita nunquam deficit, sicut nec effectus, et ita nunquam impeditur.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus potest oppositum eius quod vult; dicendum, quod divina voluntas non arctat potentiam in possendo, unde plura potest quam velit; arctat tamen potentiam in agendo — nunquam enim potentia agit aliquid, nisi quod vult — et impossibile est, quod actio superexcedat voluntatem. Unde nihil potest facere, nisi quod potest velle[^15]. — Quando ergo dicitur, quod potest contrarium suae voluntatis; potest intelligi dupliciter: aut voluntate movente ad contrarium, et sic notatur repugnantia voluntatis ad potentiam, et hoc est impossibile; aut voluntate non movente, et sic non notatur impedimentum nec repugnantia, sed voluntas libere potest, quae ita potest hoc, quod eius oppositum. Ita enim vult hoc, quod potest velle eius oppositum absque sui mutatione, sicut supra[^16] dictum est de praescientia. Et ratio huius est, quia uno et eodem vult quaecumque vult.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei secundum convenientiam ad praescientiam vult illa quae vult. Unde sicut praescientia ambit totum velle et posse et agere, et non potest falli aliquid non subtrahendo contingentiae rei evenientis; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum.

english:
### Article Unique. *On the efficacy of the divine will.*
### Question I. *Whether the will of good-pleasure of God can be impeded.*

That the will of good-pleasure cannot be impeded is shown, first, from authority.

1. *Genesis*, last chapter[^1]: *Can we resist the will of God?* As if to say: no.

2. Likewise, to the *Romans*, ninth chapter[^2]: *Who resists his will?*

3. Likewise, on that text of first *Timothy*, chapter two[^3]: *Who wills all men to be saved*, the Gloss: « He is to be entreated to will it, because if he wills, it must necessarily come to pass ».

4. Likewise, on that of the Psalm[^4]: *The Lord is just in all his works*, the Gloss: « With God, to will is the same as to do »; but he cannot be impeded from willing, because he freely wills what he wills: therefore he cannot be impeded from bringing it about.

5. Likewise, every will that can be impeded can be overcome; but the divine will cannot be overcome, since it is supreme: therefore the divine will cannot be impeded.

6. Likewise, every cause that is impeded from the prosecution of its effect either fails or is changed; but the divine will neither fails nor changes, nor can it fail or change: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, that is the nobler agent and the nobler cause which cannot be impeded, rather than that which can; but the divine will is the highest and supreme cause of all things, as has been shown above[^5]: therefore etc.

**On the opposite side:**

1. Every cause whose effect comes about contingently can be impeded — for if it cannot, then the effect comes about of necessity — but the divine will is of this sort, because it is the cause of many contingent things — otherwise, either nothing would be contingent, which is contrary to freedom of choice and counsel and chance, or God would not be the cause of it, both of which are absurd — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every cause that is fulfilled through another acting agent, if it is so fulfilled[^6], can be impeded through that agent's failing, if it is able to fail — this proposition is known per se — but the divine will is of this kind — for God wills many things to be done through created causes, which he does not do without them, such as to beget a man, a donkey, and the like; likewise concerning those things which are from our own action; and these can fail — therefore the divine will can be impeded.

3. Likewise, every cause whose power extends to the contrary of [its] will can will something other than it wills[^7]; but the divine essence is of this kind — for God wills something, such as that this man be damned, the opposite of which

he can [will]; this is certain, otherwise he would not be omnipotent — he is therefore able to do the opposite of what he wills. But every possibility is positable: let it then be posited that God does the opposite of what he willed; if this is so, the will of God is frustrated and impeded: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the will wills something, which God wills the will itself to will; either, then, it can will the contrary, or it cannot. If it can: therefore the divine will can be impeded; if it cannot: therefore his liberty must necessarily be constrained.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The consequent will of God cannot be overcome nor frustrated nor impeded; the antecedent, however, can be impeded, but cannot be overcome nor frustrated; nevertheless the necessity, by which the consequent will connotes the outcome, is the necessity *of consequence*, not *of the consequent*.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, according to John Damascene[^8], the will of good-pleasure is twofold, namely *antecedent* and *consequent*: the antecedent or conditional, by which he wills, so far as in him lies, the salvation of all, and the absolute, by which he wills determinately something which he knows will certainly come to pass.

It must therefore be understood that no will of God is it possible to overcome; none is it possible to frustrate; some, however, namely the antecedent, it is possible not to fulfill; some, namely the consequent, it is necessary to fulfill, and impossible to impede.

None, I say, is it possible to overcome. For if a man does not do what God wills, so far as in him lies, that is, by his antecedent will, God brings it about concerning him that he wills by the consequent will; and so it is always fulfilled either concerning the man or by the man, and thus is never conquered nor overcome.

Nor is it possible for the will of God to be frustrated. For something is called frustrated when it is deprived of its proper effect to which it is [directed]: but no will is deprived of the effect to which it is properly [directed]. For what is said — that God wills all men to be saved, so far as in him lies — this will does not connote salvation, nor is it properly directed to the effect of salvation, but it connotes the ordination of nature, or nature as ordinable to salvation. Whence it is no more to say: God wills this man to be saved, so far as in him lies, than[^9] it pleased God to give to this man a nature through which he could attain salvation, and that God was ready to help, in such a way that salvation does not fail through any defect on God's part. Whence it is not frustrated, because it has its proper effect. — Concerning the absolute will, however, it is plain that it cannot be frustrated, because it puts forth every one of its effects, nor does it ever remain unfulfilled.

Since therefore it is true that the will of God can in no way be overcome nor frustrated, yet the absolute will must necessarily be fulfilled, while the conditional [must] not at all.

But it must be noted that there is a necessity *of the consequent* and a necessity *of consequence*, as was said above[^10] concerning foreknowledge, because foreknowledge does not have the necessity of the consequent, but of consequence, because it necessarily infers, and it follows: God foreknows this, therefore this will be; but nevertheless he does not necessarily foreknow, because in the act of foreknowing a contingent effect is frequently noted. — So in the will it is to be understood, that the absolute will of God connotes the outcome of the thing; and therefore there is in it a necessity *of consequence*, but not *of the consequent*, because it does not change the outcome of the thing, but rather God wills that a contingent consequent come about[^11]. Whence, just as foreknowledge, because it necessarily infers the effect, cannot fail, so neither can the absolute will, because it necessarily infers, be impeded; on the contrary, it is necessary that it be fulfilled. The conditioned will, however, is not necessarily fulfilled in every respect, neither by the necessity of the consequent nor by the necessity of consequence, because it does not connote the outcome of the thing, but connotes that which is ordinable to the outcome, as was said before[^12]. Whence it well follows: he wills this man to be saved with absolute will: therefore this man will be saved; for he would never will it unless he likewise foreknew that he was to be saved. Concerning the conditioned will, however, as has been seen[^13], it does not so follow.

If, therefore, it be objected that the will of God is necessary in itself, and necessarily infers its effect, therefore it sets every kind of necessity around it; it must be said, that although it is necessary that God will, and that his will be in act, nevertheless its relation is to a contingent future, and therefore the effect comes about contingently.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that it can be impeded because it is a contingent cause; it must be said, as has been touched upon[^14], that although the comparison of the divine will is to a contingent future, nevertheless the comparison of the divine will to the willed object and the outcome of the willed object necessarily accompany each other, as one contingent [does] another; and therefore it cannot be impeded. For a cause is impeded when, the relation and ordering of it to the effect remaining, the effect does not come about. Therefore what is proposed — that every cause whose effect is contingent can be impeded — the proposition is false and has an instance against it, namely when the effect necessarily accompanies and follows from the cause; and this is the instance in our case.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it can be impeded through the defect of the cooperating cause; it must be said, that just as the divine will or divine willing connotes the effect, so it connotes the existence of the particular cause. For when it is said: God wills this man to be saved, the sense is not, that he wills it in every event, but that he wills this man to be saved, and wills this man to will [it]. Whence, just as the divine will connotes this effect to come about, and therefore the effect necessarily follows from it, so it connotes the created cause to concur. And therefore it necessarily follows: if God wills this man to be saved, that he also wills [it]; and so it never fails, just as neither does the effect, and so it is never impeded.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that God can [will] the opposite of what he wills; it must be said, that the divine will does not constrain the power in respect of being-able, whence it is able to do more than it wills; yet it does constrain the power in acting — for the power never does anything except what is willed — and it is impossible that the action exceed the will. Whence it can do nothing except what it can will[^15]. — When therefore it is said, that he can [will] the contrary of his will; it can be understood in two ways: either by a will moving toward the contrary, and so a repugnance of the will to the power is signified, and this is impossible; or by a will not moving, and so neither impediment nor repugnance is signified, but the will is freely able, [a will] which thus is able to [will] this in such a way that [it can also will] its opposite. For it wills this in such a way that it can will its opposite without any change in itself, as was said above[^16] concerning foreknowledge. And the reason for this is that he wills by one and the same [act] whatever he wills.

*To 4.* To the last [argument] it must be said, that the will of God, in accordance with [its] correspondence to foreknowledge, wills those things which it wills. Whence, just as foreknowledge embraces the whole of willing and being-able and acting, and cannot fail without thereby withdrawing something from the contingency of the thing that comes about; so likewise it must be understood in our case.

en: *Verse* 19.

la: *Vers.* 4. — Verba integra Glossae ordinariae hic citata haec sunt: *Rogandus est, ut velit, quia necesse est fieri, si ipse voluerit*.

en: *Verse* 4. — The complete words of the Ordinary Gloss here cited are: *He is to be entreated to will, because it is necessary that it be done, if he himself wills it*.

la: Psalm. cxliv, 17: *Iustus Dominus in omnibus viis suis, et sanctus in omnibus operibus suis*. — Pro *Apud Deum* in ed. Gloss. legitur *Apud illum*.

en: Psalm 144:17: *The Lord is just in all his ways, and holy in all his works*. — For *With God* the edition of the Gloss reads *With him*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et August., II. *de Gen. contra Manichaeos*, c. 29. n. 44, ait: *Cuius enim voluntas superat omnia, nulla ex parte quidquam sentit invitus*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1; and Augustine, II *On Genesis against the Manichees*, c. 29, n. 44, says: *He whose will surpasses all things, suffers nothing against his will in any respect*.

la: In Vat. desideratur *si expletur*.

en: In the Vatican edition *si expletur* is wanting.

la: Aristot., IX. *Metaph.* text. 3 (VIII. c. 2.) distinguit potentias, quae cum ratione sunt, ab irrationalibus et dein addit: *Et quae quidem cum ratione omnes, eaedem contrariorum sunt; irrationales vero, una unius, ut calidum ipsius calefaciendi solius: medicandi vero potentia infirmitatis et sanitatis*. — Vat. hanc propositionem sic depravavit: *Omnis causa... ad contrarium, voluntate potest* etc. Eadem Vat. cum cod. cc aliquanto inferius post *si hoc* interiicit *ergo*.

en: Aristotle, IX *Metaphysics* text 3 (VIII, c. 2), distinguishes rational from irrational potencies, then adds: *And all those that go with reason are themselves potencies of contraries; but the irrational, one of one only, as the hot of heating only; the potency of medicine, however, [is] of sickness and health*. — The Vatican edition has corrupted this proposition thus: *Every cause... to the contrary, can by will* etc. The same Vatican edition with cod. cc, somewhat further down after *si hoc*, inserts *ergo*.

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthodoxa* c. 29. Ipsa Damasceni verba iam allata sunt pag. 728, nota 2. — Mox post *scilicet antecedens et consequens* vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 perperam non repetunt *antecedens*, quod contextu exigente adiecimus; Vat. etiam omittit hoc verbum *antecedens* simul cum praecedentibus *et consequens*, sed deinde post *et absoluta* ponit *sive consequens*, et ita Vat. lectio non est vituperanda. Cfr. supra d. 16. q. I. in corp.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 29. The very words of Damascene have already been cited at p. 728, note 2. — Just after *scilicet antecedens et consequens*, the older codices and ed. 1 wrongly do not repeat *antecedens*, which we have added since the context demands it; the Vatican edition also omits this word *antecedens* together with the preceding *et consequens*, but later after *et absoluta* it puts *sive consequens*, and so the Vatican reading is not to be censured. Cf. above d. 16, q. 1, *in corp.*

la: Post *quam* cod. H (T a secunda manu) subiicit *hoc*, cod. W *scilicet*, codd. AGIV ff subiiciunt *id est*. — De doctrina hic proposita cfr. supra d. 16. q. I, et August., *de Spiritu et littera*, c. 33. n. 37. seq.

en: After *quam* cod. H (T, by a second hand) adds *hoc*; cod. W *scilicet*; codd. AGIV ff add *id est*. — Concerning the doctrine here proposed, cf. above d. 16, q. 1, and Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 33, n. 37 ff.

la: Dist. 38. a. 2. q. I. — Paulo ante Vat. omittit *necessitas consequentis et*, ac paulo inferius post *de praescientia* particulam *quia*.

en: Distinction 38, a. 2, q. 1. — A little before, the Vatican edition omits *necessitas consequentis et*; and a little further down, after *de praescientia*, the particle *quia*.

la: Ed. 1 *contingenter*. Post pauca pro *sic nec* Vat. *sic*. Revera *nec* rectius omitteretur, sed exstat in omnibus codd.

en: Edition 1 reads *contingenter*. A little further on, for *sic nec* the Vatican edition has *sic*. In truth *nec* would more rightly be omitted, but it stands in all the codices.

la: Dist. 46. q. 1. — Vat. hanc propositionem sic incipit: *Voluntatem autem antecedentem vel conditionatam non est necesse impleri* etc., et dein pro *connotat eventum* exhibet *connotat effectum*.

en: Distinction 46, q. 1. — The Vatican edition begins this proposition thus: *The antecedent or conditional will, however, is not necessarily fulfilled* etc., and then for *connotat eventum* it gives *connotat effectum*.

la: Paulo ante, et supra d. 46. q. I. — Post pauca Vat. omittit verba *in se*.

en: A little before, and above d. 46, q. 1. — A little further on the Vatican edition omits the words *in se*.

la: Hic in corp. — Verba immediate sequentia *quod, quamvis comparatio divinae voluntatis sit ad futurum contingens, tamen* Vat. suppressit, eorum loco ponens voculam *cum*, et dein pro *sicut unum contingens aliud* substituit *sicut unum est contingens, ita et aliud*. In fine huius propos. pro *evenit* codd. V G P S T W cc ee ff et ed. 1 *eveniet*. — Verba quae in media hac propositione habentur: *se necessario comitentur*, respiciunt necessitatem *consequentiae*, non *consequentis*, cum qua stat contingentia effectus.

en: Here, in the *corpus*. — The words immediately following *quod, quamvis comparatio divinae voluntatis sit ad futurum contingens, tamen* the Vatican edition has suppressed, putting in their place the little word *cum*, and then for *sicut unum contingens aliud* it substitutes *sicut unum est contingens, ita et aliud*. At the end of this proposition, for *evenit*, the codices V G P S T W cc ee ff and ed. 1 have *eveniet*. — The words which appear in the middle of this proposition, *se necessario comitentur*, regard the necessity *of consequence*, not *of the consequent*, with which the contingency of the effect stands.

la: Id est praescindendo ab omni conditione. — Paulo superius pro *existentiam causae* Vat. sola *efficientiam causae*, codd. LO *coexistentiam causae*. Paulo inferius pro *et vult* cod. O *id est vult*, non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *tantummodo vult*.

en: That is, by setting aside every condition. — A little higher up, for *existentiam causae* the Vatican edition alone has *efficientiam causae*; codices L and O [read] *coexistentiam causae*. A little further down, for *et vult*, cod. O [reads] *id est vult*; not a few codices with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read *tantummodo vult*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 2. in fine. — Dist. 38. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *sed voluntas libere potest, quae* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *sed quod voluntas libere potest, quia*.

en: Cf. above d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, at the end. — Distinction 38, a. 2, q. 2. — A little higher up, for *sed voluntas libere potest, quae* the Vatican edition with one or two codices [reads] *sed quod voluntas libere potest, quia*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hac quaestione confirmantur et explicantur ea quae dicta sunt supra d. 16. q. I. de voluntate antecedente et consequente, et d. 38. a. 2. q. 1, et d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2. de contingentia rerum, quae nec Dei praescientia nec praedestinatione tollitur. — Notanda est hic differentia inter *superari*, *cassari*, *non impleri*, uti bene a Seraphico explicatur; item in solutione ad 2. doctrina gravis momenti quod in voluntate consequente connotetur non tantum effectus salutis, sed etiam efficientia causae secundae (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1. ad 3; S. I. q. 19. a. 6 ad 3; Richard. a Med., hic q. I. ad 3.). — Quoad solutionem ad 3. cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2, ubi similis difficultas quoad praescientiam divinam discutitur.

**II.** *Auctores:* Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 36. m. 2, et q. 40. m. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. *Sent.* d. 46. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 19. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 46. a. 1; S. p. 1. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. 2. — Richard. Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. unica. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 46. q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 46. q. 1. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** By this question are confirmed and explained those things said above in d. 16, q. 1, concerning the antecedent and consequent will, and in d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 40, a. 1, q. 1–2, concerning the contingency of things, which is not taken away by God's foreknowledge nor by predestination. — Notable here is the difference between *being overcome*, *being frustrated*, *not being fulfilled*, as the Seraphic [Doctor] explains well; likewise in the solution *Ad 2*, a doctrine of grave moment, namely that in the consequent will is connoted not only the effect of salvation, but also the efficiency of the secondary cause (cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3; Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 1, ad 3). — As to the solution *Ad 3*, cf. above d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, where a similar difficulty concerning divine foreknowledge is discussed.

**II.** *Authors:* Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 36, m. 2, and q. 40, m. 4. — Scotus, in both *Scripta*, I *Sent.*, d. 46, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 46, a. 1; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 20, q. 79, m. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1, 2. — Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.*, q. unica. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.*, d. 46, q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, I *Sent.*, d. 46, q. 1, 2.

---

translators_notes: **2026-07-17 apparatus repair (J4 Class D/E).** Health-scan flagged `defs=16 la=17 en=17` — both languages elevated equally. Checked for the §2 backtick-blockquote false positive first (none present — this file's Apparatus intro note is plain prose, not a fenced numeric-range example) and confirmed a genuine mislabel cluster instead. Diagnosis, page-verified against printed p.840 (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-840.png`, pdf p.430, vol1-pt2 offset `pdf = printed − 410`): the printed page shows exactly two footnote superscripts in the "Voluntatem vero conditionatam ... ut praedictum est⁸ ... ut visum est⁹" sentence — **⁸ after "praedictum est"** and **⁹ after "visum est"** — with **no superscript at all after "conditionatam."** The chunk had `[^12]` phantom-anchored at "conditionatam" (no printed counterpart), and `[^13]` duplicated at both "praedictum est" and "visum est." Content-matched def `[^12]` ("Vat. hanc propositionem sic incipit: Voluntatem autem antecedentem vel conditionatam... et dein pro *connotat eventum* exhibet *connotat effectum*") to printed footnote 8, which describes the *connotat eventum* clause immediately preceding "praedictum est⁸" — not the "conditionatam" clause where it was previously anchored. Def `[^13]` ("Paulo ante, et supra d. 46. q. I. — Post pauca Vat. omittit verba in se") matches printed footnote 9 at "visum est⁹," which was already correct. **Fix:** removed the phantom `[^12]` anchor at "conditionatam" (both languages); relabeled the first `[^13]` occurrence (at "praedictum est" / "as was said before") to `[^12]`; left the second `[^13]` (at "visum est" / "as has been seen") unchanged. No def prose, Latin wording, or English wording was altered — only marker tokens. Post-fix: `defs=16 la=16 en=16`, all label sets match exactly, no dupes.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 842 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum aliquis possit facere contra voluntatem signi.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit facere contra voluntatem signi. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Quia signum et signatum conformari debent[^1]: ergo quod fit contra unum, fit contra reliquum: ergo si non potest contra signatum, nec contra signum. Alioquin, si non fit contra signatum, et fit contra signum, tunc signum est falsum. Si enim signum ducit in signatum, significat, quod fit contra ipsum fieri contra signatum.

2. Item, minimum inter omnia signa est permissio, cum sit respectu mali, ad quod minime ordinatur beneplacitum Dei: ergo si minime accedit ad voluntatem beneplaciti, si non potest fieri contra permissionem, multo minus contra alia. Sed non potest fieri contra permissionem, sicut dicit Magister in littera et Augustinus *de Civitate* vigesimo[^2]: « Sicut nullus hominum agit recte, nisi adiutus divino auxilio; sic nullus hominum atque daemonum agit inique, nisi eodem divino atque iustissimo permittatur iudicio ».

3. Item, potentior est voluntas, cui non potest resisti nec in re[^3] nec in signo, quam cui potest in signo saltem, etsi non in re; sed Deus est potentissimus: ergo videtur, quod nec voluntati eius nec signo voluntatis possit resisti, et sic etc.

**Contra:**

1. Inter omnia signa voluntatis praeceptio sive imperium videtur esse potentissimum; sed fieri potest et fit tota die contra divinum mandatum: ergo contra omnia alia.

2. Item, videtur quod specialiter contra permissionem, quia permissio non est nisi mali culpae; sed malum culpae non est malum, nisi voluntarie fiat; et si voluntarie fit, potest non fieri; ergo permittente Deo aliquem male facere, potest non facere: ergo potest facere contra permissionem.

3. Item, super illud Psalmi[^4]: *Eduxit eos cum argento et auro*, Glossa dicit, quod idem fuit praeceptum et permissum, scilicet asportatio vasorum: ergo cum possit fieri contra praeceptum, pari ratione et contra permissionem et contra alia per consequens: ergo contra omnem voluntatem signi.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Contra tria signa divinae voluntatis aliquid fieri potest, contra duo vero non, quod duplici ratione probatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod contra aliquod signum divinae voluntatis potest fieri, contra aliquod non.

Et ratio huius duplex est, ex duplici modo distinguendi signa. Quaedam enim sunt signa respectu praesentis, ut impletio et permissio; quaedam respectu futuri, ut praeceptio et consilium et prohibitio. Et quoniam de praesenti quod fit impossibile est in praesenti non fieri, quoniam « omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse »[^5], ideo respectu signorum de praesenti non potest esse resistentia; quia si sit resistentia, iam non sunt praesentia. Quia vero futura vel facienda possunt non fieri, ideo quantum ad signa tria sequentia resistentia potest esse.

Alia ratio sumitur secundum alium modum distinguendi: quia[^6] quaedam sunt signa divinae voluntatis absolutae, quaedam conditionatae. Dico igitur, quod quia contra voluntatem absolutam non potest fieri, non potest etiam fieri contra signa voluntatis absolutae, ut puta sunt impletio et permissio. Quia vero contra voluntatem antecedentem sive conditionatam potest fieri, quia potest homo divertere ab ordine, ad quem ex sui institutione[^7] conditus est: hinc est, quod potest fieri contra voluntatem signi, quae illam significat, scilicet contra prohibitionem, praeceptionem et consilium.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod contra nullum potest fieri; patet solutio, quod non sunt falsa[^8].

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*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minimum est permissio; dicendum, quod maior significatio vel minor nihil facit ad hoc, sed praesentialitas effectus, vel etiam, quia significat voluntatem absolutam, quae[^9] aliquid connotat absolute.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentius est illud, contra cuius signum non potest fieri; dicendum, quod[^10] verum est, quando voluntas vult omnino, quod nihil fiat, nisi quod ostendit se velle; sed divina voluntas non est talis, immo vult, quod unusquisque habeat propriam libertatem et faciat quod vult. Unde et potentia faciendi contra divinam voluntatem est a divina voluntate; et ideo non esset potentior propter hoc. Unde distinguendum, quod posse facere contra signum voluntatis alicuius aut est contra voluntatem, et sic attestatur impotentiae; aut illud posse est a voluntate, cuius est signum, et sic non attestatur impotentiae, sed magis potentiae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contra omnia, quia fit contra praeceptionem, quae est maximum signum; solvendum est per interemptionem, quod non est maximum signum. Praeterea, hoc nihil facit ad propositum, sed praesentialitas in effectu et absolutio in signato[^11].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fit contra permissionem, quia peccator potest non peccare; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur permittere peccare nisi eum qui actualiter peccat, dum peccat; et tunc impossibile est, eum non peccare.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod idem fuit ibi praeceptum et permissum; dicendum, quod permittit mala, quia non cohibet; et hoc modo est signum voluntatis divinae distinctum contra praeceptum[^12]. Alio modo, non punire temporaliter; et sic dicitur libellus repudii permitti, *Matthaei* decimo nono[^13]: *Moyses ad duritiam vestram permisit*. Tertio modo, non prohibere, *Psalmus*[^14]: *Irascimini et nolite peccare*, Glossa: « permittit quod necessitatis est », id est, non prohibet. Quarto modo permittere est minus bonum indulgere, super illud primae ad *Corinthios* septimo[^15]: *Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam* etc., Glossa: permittit.

english:
### Question II. *Whether anyone can act against the will of sign.*

Secondly it is asked, whether anyone can act against the will of sign. And that he cannot, is shown thus.

1. Because sign and thing-signified ought to be conformed[^1]: therefore what is done against one is done against the other: therefore if it cannot [be done] against the thing-signified, neither can it [be done] against the sign. Otherwise, if it is not done against the thing-signified, and it is done against the sign, then the sign is false. For if the sign leads to the thing-signified, it signifies that what is done against it is done against the thing-signified.

2. Likewise, the least among all signs is permission, since it is in respect of evil, to which the good-pleasure of God is in no way ordered: therefore if it least approaches the will of good-pleasure, [then] if it cannot be done against permission, much less against the others. But it cannot be done against permission, as the Master says in the letter [of the text] and Augustine *On the City* book twenty[^2]: « Just as no human acts rightly except aided by divine help; so no human or demon acts iniquitously, except by that same divine and most just judgment being permitted ».

3. Likewise, that will is more powerful which can be resisted neither in fact[^3] nor in sign, than that which can [be resisted] in sign at least, even if not in fact; but God is most powerful: therefore it seems that neither his will nor the sign of his will can be resisted, and so on.

**On the contrary:**

1. Among all signs of will, *praeceptio* or command seems to be the most powerful; but it can be done and is done all day long against the divine commandment: therefore against all the others [as well].

2. Likewise, it seems that especially against permission, because permission is only of the evil of fault; but the evil of fault is not evil unless it is done voluntarily; and if it is done voluntarily, it can not be done; therefore, when God permits someone to act badly, he can not act [so]: therefore he can act against permission.

3. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm[^4]: *He brought them forth with silver and gold*, the Gloss says that the same thing was both commanded and permitted, namely the carrying-off of the vessels: therefore, since it can be done against precept, by parallel reason also against permission, and against the others by consequence: therefore against every will of sign.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Against three signs of the divine will something can be done; against two, however, not — which is proved by a twofold reason.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that against some sign of the divine will it can be done, against some it cannot.

And the reason for this is twofold, from the twofold mode of distinguishing signs. For some are signs in respect of the present, as fulfillment and permission; some in respect of the future, as precept, counsel, and prohibition. And since concerning what is being done in the present it is impossible for it not to be in the present, because « whatever is, when it is, must necessarily be »[^5], therefore in respect of signs of the present there cannot be resistance; because if there were resistance, they would no longer be present. But because things future or to-be-done can fail to be done, therefore as regards the three following signs there can be resistance.

Another reason is taken according to another mode of distinguishing: because[^6] some signs are of absolute divine will, others of conditioned [will]. I say therefore, that because against the absolute will it cannot be done, neither can it be done against the signs of absolute will, as for instance fulfillment and permission. But because against the antecedent or conditioned will it can be done, since man can turn aside from the order to which by his constitution[^7] he was made fit: hence it is that it can be done against the will of sign which signifies that [conditioned will], namely against prohibition, precept, and counsel.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, that against none can it be done; the solution is plain, that [those premises] are not false[^8].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that permission is the least; it must be said, that greater or lesser signification has nothing to do with this matter, but the presentness of the effect, or also, because it signifies the absolute will, which[^9] connotes something absolutely.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that that is more powerful against whose sign it cannot be done; it must be said, that[^10] this is true when a will wills altogether that nothing be done except what it shows itself to will; but the divine will is not such, but rather wills that each one have his own liberty and do what he wills. Whence also the power of acting against the divine will is from the divine will; and therefore [the divine will] would not be more powerful on that account. Whence it must be distinguished, that to be able to act against the sign of someone's will either is against that will, and so attests impotence; or that being-able is from the will, of which it is the sign, and so it attests not impotence but rather power.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that [it is done] against all [signs] because it is done against precept, which is the greatest sign; it must be solved by interception, [namely] that it is not the greatest sign. Furthermore, this is nothing to the purpose, but [what matters is] the presentness in the effect and the absoluteness in the thing-signified[^11].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is done against permission, because the sinner can refrain from sinning; it must be said, that God is not said to permit to sin except him who actually sins, while he sins; and then it is impossible that he not sin.

*To 3.* To that which is objected last, that there [in the Psalm] the same was both precept and permission; it must be said, that he permits evils because he does not restrain [them]; and in this mode it is a sign of the divine will distinct against precept[^12]. In another mode, not to punish in time; and so the bill of divorce is said to be permitted, *Matthew* nineteen[^13]: *Moses, on account of your hardness, permitted [it]*. In a third mode, not to prohibit, *Psalm*[^14]: *Be angry, and sin not*, Gloss: « he permits what is of necessity », that is, he does not prohibit. In a fourth mode, to permit is to indulge a lesser good, on that text of first *Corinthians* seven[^15]: *I say this, however, by way of indulgence*, etc., Gloss: he permits.

la: Vide supra pag. 282, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius post *reliquum* Vat. cum aliquot codd. *et* pro *ergo*. Dein post *Alioquin si* complures codd. et ed. 1 perperam omittunt *non*; et mox pro *et contra* Vat. habet *sed contra*.

en: See above p. 282, note 2. — A little higher up, after *reliquum*, the Vatican edition with several codices has *et* in place of *ergo*. Then after *Alioquin si*, several codices and ed. 1 wrongly omit *non*; and shortly thereafter, for *et contra*, the Vatican edition has *sed contra*.

la: Hic c. 2. — Locus *de Civ. Dei* mox citatus, est c. 1, n. 2, ubi in textu originali pro *Sicut* habetur *Quamvis et*, omissa vocula *sic*, bis legitur *agat* pro *agit*.

en: Here c. 2. — The passage of *de Civitate Dei* shortly cited is c. 1, n. 2, where in the original text, in place of *Sicut*, stands *Quamvis et*, and with the little word *sic* omitted, *agat* is read twice for *agit*.

la: Pro *re* Vat. cum cod. cc *se*.

en: For *re* the Vatican edition with cod. cc has *se*.

la: Psalm. 104, 37. — Glossa ordinaria hic tantum ad sensum, non ad verbum citatur.

en: Psalm 104:37. — The Ordinary Gloss is cited here only as to sense, not verbatim.

la: Hanc propositionem Aristotelis integram exhibuimus supra pag. 674, nota 3. In ipsa propositione hic allata pro *omne* edd. 1, 2, 3 cum textu originali habent *esse*. Post pauca pro *si sit resistentia* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *si fit resistentia*.

en: This proposition of Aristotle we have given in full above p. 674, note 3. In the very proposition here cited, for *omne* edd. 1, 2, 3 with the original text have *esse*. A little further on, for *si sit resistentia*, the Vatican edition with some codices has *si fit resistentia*.

la: Pro *quia* cod. Z *sicut*.

en: For *quia* cod. Z has *sicut*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *constitutione*. — De voluntate antecedente et consequente cfr. q. praeced. et d. 46. q. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc reads *constitutione*. — On the antecedent and consequent will, cf. the preceding question and d. 46, q. 1.

la: Supple cum cod. T *signa*. Pro *quod non sunt falsa* in Vat. legitur *quod est falsum*.

en: Supply with cod. T *signa*. For *quod non sunt falsa*, the Vatican edition reads *quod est falsum*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *qua*.

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc has *qua*.

la: In codd. PQ (T in marg.) et ed. 1 additur *hoc*. Paulo inferius post *Unde* Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *et*.

en: In codd. PQ (T in margin) and ed. 1 *hoc* is added. A little lower, after *Unde*, the Vatican edition with cod. cc omits *et*.

la: Sive, ut supra in solut. ad 2 dicebatur, quia significat voluntatem absolutam, quae aliquid connotat absolute. — Pro *signato* Vat. *significato*, quae et paulo superius post *maximum signum*, paucis suffragantibus codd., addit *quia impletio maius est*. — De solutione per interemptionem cfr. supra pag. 87, nota 4.

en: Or, as was said above in the solution *Ad 2*, because it signifies the absolute will, which connotes something absolutely. — For *signato* the Vatican edition has *significato*, which also a little higher up after *maximum signum*, with few codices supporting, adds *quia impletio maius est*. — On solution by interception cf. above p. 87, note 4.

la: Nam praeceptum respicit bona, mala autem a Deo tantum permittuntur, non praecipiuntur; et sic in hoc sensu idem opus non potest simul esse praeceptum et permissum; attamen potest esse, ut permissio in uno ex sequentibus modis sumatur. — Paulo superius pro *cohibere* non pauci codd. *prohibere*.

en: For precept regards goods, but evils are only permitted by God, not commanded; and so in this sense the same work cannot at once be both commanded and permitted; yet it can be that the permission is taken in one of the following modes. — A little higher up, for *cohibere*, not a few codices [read] *prohibere*.

en: *Matthew* 19:8.

en: *1 Corinthians* 7:6.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Notanda est distinctio inter *facere contra voluntatem Dei* et *facere praeter voluntatem Dei*, ut observat S. Bonav., hic dub. 2. In illo est *actus absolutus voluntatis de opposito*; in hoc vero talis actus non est nec de uno volito nec de opposito. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. (S. p. 1, q. 40, m. 1, ad 1), et S. Thom. (hic q. 1, a. 2).

**II.** *Auctores:* Alex. Hal., S. p. 1, q. 40, m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Egid. R., hic q. 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. *Sent.* d. 46, q. 3, circa finem.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Note the distinction between *to act against the will of God* and *to act besides the will of God*, as St. Bonaventure observes here in dub. 2. In the former there is an *absolute act of the will concerning the opposite*; in the latter no such act exists either concerning one willed [object] or concerning the opposite. Alex. of Hales (*Summa* p. 1, q. 40, m. 1, ad 1) and St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2) agree.

**II.** *Authors:* Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 40, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 *princ.* q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 46, q. 3, near the end.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
Utrum Deus debeat mala permittere
Whether God ought to permit evils

source_text:
<!-- page 843 -->

### Articulus Unicus.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum Deus debeat mala permittere.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus debeat mala permittere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Iob* duodecimo[^1]: *Abundant tabernacula praedonum* etc., Gregorius[^2]: « Omnipotens Deus quod fieri prohibet, iustum est, ut fieri sinat ».

2. Item, Deus debet conservare ordinem quem instituit; sed cum Deus creavit hominem, dedit ei liberam voluntatem; sed libera voluntas dicitur, eo quod libere potest quidquid vult: ergo si vult malum, potest in malum: ergo cum non debeat auferre homini potentiam, quam dedit, debet ipsum permittere peccare[^3].

<!-- page 844 -->

3. Item, malum frequenter est occasio maioris boni, quod non fieret, nisi malum praecessisset, ut patet in passione Christi; sed decet Deum facere et permittere illud quod est via ad melius: ergo cum non possit malum facere, saltem[^4] debet permittere.

4. Item, Deus omnia facit propter laudem suam; sed in malis manifestatur laus divinae iustitiae et misericordiae: ergo si non debet facere contra ampliationem suae laudis, non debet impedire, ne mala fiant: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. *Ad Romanos* primo[^5]: *Non solum qui talia agunt digni sunt morte, sed qui consentiunt*, Glossa: « Consentire est tacere, cum possis arguere »: ergo cum Deus possit corrigere et impedire malum, si permittit et tacet, consentit; sed qui consentiunt, digni sunt morte: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo nono *de Civitate Dei*, capitulo decimo sexto: « Ad innocentis officium pertinet non solum nemini malum inferre, sed etiam a peccato cohibere »: ergo si Deus non cohibet, cum possit, Deus non est innocens.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omnes virtutes nostrae debent habere exemplar in Deo; sed in nobis est virtus zeli: ergo et in Deo. Sed zelus, quantum potest, obviat peccato[^6]: ergo si Deus habet zelum, quantum potest, obviat: ergo etc.

4. Item, *universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas*[^7]: si ergo permittit iustum peccare, aut est misericordiae aut iustitiae. Non misericordiae, constat; nec iustitiae, quia iustus non meruit cadere: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Deus ordinatissime permittit mala fieri, tum propter ordinem in universo, tum propter ordinem in finem, sive hic sit ultimus, qui est gloria divina, sive intermedius, qui est salus electorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus permittit mala fieri, et hoc ordinatissime.

Duplex enim est ordo rerum: unus *in universo*, alter *in finem*[^8]; et uterque exigit, quod Deus permittat mala fieri.

Ordo quippe *in universo* exigit, quia ad perfectionem universitatis necesse fuit, fieri creaturam arbitrio liberam et peccare potentem; sed administratio universitatis est, ut « Deus sic res conditas administret, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat », sicut dicit Augustinus septimo *de Civitate Dei*[^9]. Ideo cum debuerit dare potentiam peccandi et debuerit regere, salvo ordine suae conditionis; si voluit peccare, debuit permittere, et si noluit peccare, debuit conservare: et ita debet permittere mala.

Ordo *ad finem* hoc exigit quia duplicem finem contingit reperire[^10] in universo: unus est *salus electorum*, alius *divina laus*. — Quoniam ergo permissio malorum reddit *electos gloriosiores* per occasionem, et Deus non curat, utrum per causam, vel per occasionem electorum gloria augeatur; ideo Deus permittit recte. Unde Augustinus undecimo *de Civitate Dei*[^11] dicit, « quod nullum faceret, quem malum praesciret, nisi pariter nosset, quibus *bonorum usibus* accommodaret ». Prosunt autem eis exercitando. Et ideo dicit[^12] *de lapsu mundi*, quod permisit plures esse malos, quia si pauci essent, non auderent exercere bonos. — Divina etiam laus hoc exigit, quia occasione mali summe manifestatur divina *misericordia* in electis, in Filii unigeniti donatione pro inimicis *secundum tempus*[^13]. Summe etiam manifestatur Dei *iustitia* in aeterna punitione reproborum. Unde Augustinus vigesimo primo *de Civitate Dei*[^14]: « Si omnes remanerent in poena, in nullo appareret misericordis gratia redimentis. Rursus, si omnes transferrentur ad lucem, in nullo appareret severitas ultionis ».

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod permittere est consentire; dicendum, quod *permittere malum* est dupliciter: aut non cohibendo manum[^15] vel animum nec in facto nec in retributione, et sic consentire est; vel non cohibendo manum, sed tamen puniendo transgressorem et arguendo continue, et sic non consentit; et hoc modo Deus permittit, et non consentit.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad innocentem pertinet cohibere; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de cohibitione quantum ad arguitionem et punitionem, non quantum ad voluntatis coactionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod zelus obviat peccato; dicendum, quod verum est, salvo iure iustitiae; et iustitia, prout est ordo universi, hoc exigit, Deus permittat, ut homo ire[^16] secundum imperium suae voluntatis.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio; quia *permittere aliquem peccare* est opus iustitiae, non, inquam, iustitiae, quae sit exigentia meritorum, sed condecentia divinae sapientiae et bonitatis.

english:
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### Sole Article.
### Question III. *Whether God ought to permit evils.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether God ought to permit evils. And that he should, appears thus:

1. *Job* 12[^1]: *The tents of robbers abound* etc.; Gregory[^2]: « The Almighty God, what he forbids to be done, it is just that he should allow to be done ».

2. Likewise, God ought to preserve the order which he has instituted; but when God created man, he gave him free will; and free will is so called because it can freely [do] whatever it wills: therefore if it wills evil, it can [proceed] into evil: therefore since he ought not to take away from man the power which he has given, he ought to permit him to sin[^3].

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3. Likewise, evil is frequently the occasion of a greater good, which would not come about unless evil had preceded — as is plain in the passion of Christ; but it befits God to do and to permit that which is a way to the better: therefore, since he cannot do evil, he ought at least[^4] to permit [it].

4. Likewise, God does all things for the sake of his praise; but in evils the praise of divine justice and mercy is made manifest: therefore, if he ought not to act against the amplification of his praise, he ought not to impede [evils] from happening: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Romans* 1[^5]: *Not only those who do such things are worthy of death, but [also] those who consent*, [the] Gloss: « To consent is to be silent when you can rebuke »: therefore since God can correct and impede evil, if he permits and is silent, he consents; but those who consent are worthy of death: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, 19 *On the City of God*, chapter 16: « It belongs to the office of an innocent [person] not only to inflict evil on no one, but also to restrain [him] from sin »: therefore if God does not restrain, when he can, God is not innocent.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears: because all our virtues ought to have an exemplar in God; but in us there is the virtue of zeal: therefore also in God. But zeal, so far as it can, withstands sin[^6]: therefore if God has zeal, so far as he can, he withstands [sin]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*[^7]: if therefore he permits the just to sin, [it is] either of mercy or of justice. Not of mercy, it is plain; nor of justice, since the just one has not deserved to fall: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God most ordinately permits evils to come about, both on account of the order in the universe, and on account of the order to the end — whether this be the ultimate [end], which is divine glory, or the intermediate [end], which is the salvation of the elect.

**I respond:** It must be said that God permits evils to come about, and this most ordinately.

For there is a twofold order of things: one *in the universe*, the other *to the end*[^8]; and each requires that God permit evils to come about.

For the order *in the universe* requires [this], because for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there come to be a creature free in choice and able to sin; but the administration of the universe is that « God so administers the things he has founded, that he lets them act their own proper motions », as Augustine says in book seven *On the City of God*[^9]. Therefore, since he had to give the power of sinning and had to govern, with the order of his constitution safe, if [the creature] willed to sin, he had to permit, and if it did not will to sin, he had to preserve [it]: and so he ought to permit evils.

The order *to the end* requires this, because it is possible to find[^10] a twofold end in the universe: one is *the salvation of the elect*, the other *divine praise*. — Since therefore the permission of evils renders *the elect more glorious* by occasion, and God does not care whether the glory of the elect is increased through cause or through occasion; therefore God permits rightly. Hence Augustine in 11 *On the City of God*[^11] says, « that he would make no one whom he foreknew to be evil, unless he likewise knew to *what uses for good* he would accommodate [him] ». For [the evil] profit [the good] by exercising [them]. And therefore he says[^12] *On the lapse of the world*, that he permitted more to be evil because, if they were few, they would not dare to exercise the good. — Divine praise also requires this, because by occasion of evil divine *mercy* is in the highest degree manifested in the elect, in the giving of the only-begotten Son for [his] enemies *according to the time*[^13]. In the highest degree also God's *justice* is manifested in the eternal punishment of the reprobate. Hence Augustine in 21 *On the City of God*[^14]: « If all remained in punishment, in no one would the grace of the redeeming Merciful One appear. Again, if all were translated into the light, in no one would the severity of vengeance appear ».

**Replies to the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is objected — that to permit is to consent — it must be said that *to permit evil* [happens] in two ways: either by not restraining the hand[^15] or the spirit, neither in the deed nor in the requital, and thus it is to consent; or by not restraining the hand, but nevertheless punishing the transgressor and rebuking [him] continually, and thus it does not consent; and in this way God permits, and does not consent.

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2. To that which is objected — that it belongs to the innocent [one] to restrain — it must be said that this is understood of restraint as regards rebuke and punishment, not as regards coercion of the will.

3. To that which is objected — that zeal withstands sin — it must be said that it is true, the right of justice being safe; and justice, inasmuch as it is the order of the universe, requires this — that God permit, that man go[^16] according to the rule of his will.

4. To that which is finally objected, the response is plain; for *to permit someone to sin* is a work of justice — not, I say, of [the] justice which is an exigency of merits, but of the becomingness of divine wisdom and goodness.

la: Vers. 8. [?: Vulg. *Iob* 12, 6 legitur *Abundant tabernacula praedonum*; editio Quaracchi tamen "Vers. 8" allegat — fortasse ad Vetus Latinam aut ad versionem alternam respicit.]

en: Verse 8. [?: The Vulgate of *Job* 12:6 reads *Abundant tabernacula praedonum*; the Quaracchi edition nonetheless cites "Verse 8" — perhaps referring to the Vetus Latina or to an alternate versification.]

la: Dictum Gregorii habetur eius in libro XI. *Moral.* c. 2. n. 3, in quod dictum Vat. ante *prohibet* immisit *non*.

en: Gregory's saying is found in his book XI *Morals* c. 2 n. 3; into which saying the Vatican [edition] inserted *non* ("not") before *prohibet*.

la: Hic afferantur, quae August. VII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 30. ait: *Sic itaque (Deus) administrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat.*

en: Here let there be adduced what Augustine says, *On the City of God* VII c. 30: *Thus, then, (God) administers all the things which he has created, that he lets even them themselves exercise and carry out their own motions.*

la: Pro *quod* Vat. cum cod. cc *sed*, et in fine argumenti solum pro *saltem*.

en: For *quod* the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *sed*, and at the end of the argument *solum* ("only") for *saltem* ("at least").

la: Vers. 32, ubi Vulgata: *Qui talia agunt digni sunt morte, et non solum qui ea faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus*. — In Glossa mox citata Vat. pro *tacere* substituit *facere*, contradicente Lyrano nec non refragantibus codd. PQT, quorum auctoritate verbum *tacere* restituimus; attamen cum Vat. et nonnullis codd. nec non consentiente textu originali retinuimus *possis* pro *possit*.

en: Verse 32, where the Vulgate [reads]: *Those who do such things are worthy of death; and not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those doing [them]*. — In the Gloss soon afterward cited, the Vatican [edition] substituted *facere* ("to do") for *tacere* ("to be silent"), against Lyranus and against codices PQT, on whose authority we have restored the verb *tacere*; nevertheless with the Vatican [edition] and some codices, and consenting with the original text, we have retained *possis* ("you can") for *possit* ("he can").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 23, nota 9. — Pro *obviat* Vat. *obviare*.

en: Cf. above p. 23, note 9. — For *obviat* the Vatican [reads] *obviare*.

en: Psalm 24:10 [Vulg.].

la: Cfr. supra d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 44 a. 1 q. 3 in the corpus.

la: Cap. 30; cfr. supra pag. 843, nota 9. — Mox in cod. T ad verbum *regere* a secunda manu adiunctum est *hominum*.

en: Chapter 30; cf. above p. 843, note 9. — Soon after, in codex T, to the verb *regere* ("to govern") has been added by a second hand *hominum* ("of men").

la: Cod. H subiicit *etiam*. Dein pro *reperire* Vat. *reperiri*.

en: Codex H adds *etiam* ("also"). Then for *reperire* the Vatican [reads] *reperiri*.

la: Cap. 18; cfr. supra pag. 786, nota 7. In textu allato pro *bonorum usibus* non pauci codd. *beatorum usibus*.

en: Chapter 18; cf. above p. 786, note 7. In the text adduced, for *bonorum usibus* ("uses of the good [things]") not a few codices [read] *beatorum usibus* ("uses of the blessed").

la: Serm. 15, (de Psalm. 25, 8.) c. 9. n. 9: *Nec mihi volo dicas: saltem si necesse esset propter exercitationem nostram, ut essent mali, pauci essent mali, et boni multi essent. Non attendis, quia si pauci essent, multis non nocerent? Utique considera vir prudens, quia si multi boni essent, et pauci mali essent, pauci mali multis bonis nocere non auderent. Si non auderent, non exercerent.* — Codd. V X: *dicit in libro de Lapsu mundi*.

en: *Sermon* 15 (on *Psalm* 25:8) c. 9 n. 9: *Nor do I want you to say to me: at least, if it were necessary on account of our exercise, that there be evil [men], let there be few evil and many good. Do you not consider, that if they were few, they would not harm many? Indeed, prudent man, consider that if there were many good and few evil, few evil would not dare to harm many good. If they did not dare, they would not exercise [them].* — Codices V X [read]: *he says in the book On the Fall of the World*.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 5, 6: *Ut quid enim Christus... secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est?*

en: Reference is to that text Rom. 5:6: *For why has Christ... according to the time died for the impious?*

la: Cap. 12; cfr. supra pag. 733, nota 9, [?: lectio OCR confusa]. — c. 99. n. 23.

en: Chapter 12; cf. above p. 733, note 9, [?: OCR reading garbled here]. — c. 99 n. 23.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 hic, et multo plures codd. etiam in secundo distinctionis membro *malum* pro *manum*.

en: Many codices with edition 1 here, and many more codices also in the second member of the distinction, [read] *malum* ("evil") for *manum* ("hand").

la: In Vat. deest *ire*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *ire* ("to go") is missing.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Plura ad hanc quaestionem spectantia vide supra d. 46. q. 2-6, et d. 44. a. 1. q. 1-3, et apud Alexandrum Hal., S. p. I. q. 38. per totam, ubi plures de hac re quaestiones solvuntur. — De duplici rerum ordine, scil. *in universo* et *ad finem*, cfr. supra d. 44. a. 1. q. 3.; et de distinctione duplicis finis, scil. *ultimi et principalis* (laus Dei) et « *finis sub fine* » (salus electorum) cfr. II. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 38. a. 1. q. 3.

**II.** Tangitur hic quaestio, quae vulgo in doctrina de reprobatione in utramque partem discutitur, utrum permissio peccati sit in Deo *actus positivus*, vel *negatio actus positivi*. Pro prima sententia citantur a patronis ipsius Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 1, et S. Thom., S. I. q. 23. a. 3, et a Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. tom. 1. d. 6. q. 11.) etiam S. Bonav. (hic et dub. 3.), cuius tamen verba nobis ambigua esse videntur. Scotus (hic q. unica) licet utramque sententiam probabilem aestimet, tamen praefert sententiam, quod in Deo permissio sit negatio actus positivi, sed simul reflexe actus positivus.

**III.** Auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 10. a. 1, q. 38. m. 1. 2. — Scot., Report. hic q. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 46. a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3, et d. 46. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For more matters bearing on this question, see above d. 46 q. 2–6, and d. 44 a. 1 q. 1–3, and in Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 38 throughout, where many questions on this matter are resolved. — On the twofold order of things, namely *in the universe* and *to the end*, cf. above d. 44 a. 1 q. 3; and on the distinction of the twofold end — namely the *ultimate and principal* (the praise of God) and the « *end under [the] end* » (the salvation of the elect) — cf. II *Sent.* d. 15 a. 2 q. 1 and d. 38 a. 1 q. 3.

**II.** Touched on here is the question, which is commonly disputed on both sides in the doctrine concerning reprobation, whether the permission of sin is in God a *positive act*, or a *negation of a positive act*. For the first opinion are cited by its patrons Alexander of Hales himself, *Summa* p. I q. 36 m. 1, and St. Thomas, *Summa* I q. 23 a. 3, and by Barth. de Barberiis (*Cursus theolog.* tom. 1 d. 6 q. 11) also St. Bonaventure (here and dub. 3), whose words however seem to us ambiguous. Scotus (here q. unica), although he reckons each opinion probable, nevertheless prefers the opinion that in God permission is a negation of a positive act, yet at the same time reflexively a positive act.

**III.** Authors: Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 18 m. 10 a. 1, q. 38 m. 1. 2. — Scot., *Report.* here q. 2. — B. Albert., I *Sent.* d. 46 a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., I *Sent.* d. 46 q. 1 a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3, and d. 46 q. 3. — Aegid. R., here 2 princ. q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt:
Utrum Deus possit mala praecipere
Whether God can command evils

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum Deus possit mala praecipere.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit mala praecipere. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia praecepit Oseae primo[^1], ut duceret uxorem fornicariam, et Bernardus exponit ad litteram. Quod si dicas, ad litteram non esse intelligendum; obiicitur tunc: quia praecepit non tantum ducere uxorem, sed etiam facere filios fornicationis; quodsi esset uxor legitima, non essent filii fornicationis.

2. Item, *Exodi* duodecimo[^2] praecepit facere furtum filiis Israel; sed furtum est malum et contra legem naturae: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non est malum secundum se, et ideo potest fieri bene; obiicitur: quia praecepit Abrahae occidere filium innocentem et quem sciebat innocentem, *Genesis* vigesimo secundo[^3]; et hoc est malum secundum se: ergo videtur, quod Deus possit praecipere malum.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia Deus est super omnem legem: ergo in omni mandato potest dispensare: ergo potest omnium praeceptorum et prohibitionum contraria praecipere.

4. Item, plus distat non-ens ab ente quam malum a bono; sed Deus solo imperio voluntatis ex non-ente facit ens: ergo solo imperio voluntatis ex malo facit bonum: ergo potest praecipere mala, ut videtur.

**Contra:**

1. Praeceptum est signum divinae voluntatis: ergo aut est falsum signum, cum significet, Deum velle quod praecipit[^4], aut Deus vult illud. Sed si Deus vult malum, est malus; si non vult, et praecipit, est falsus; et utrumque est impossibile apud Deum: ergo etc.

2. Item, nullus obediens divino praecepto debet puniri: ergo si Deus potest malum praecipere, potest malum impune fieri. Sed malum remanere impunitum est contra divinam iustitiam: ergo Deus

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potest facere contra se, ergo sibi adversari. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

3. Item, Deus praecipit mala non fieri: si ergo praecipit fieri, praecipit duo opposita[^5]; sed duo opposita fieri est impossibile: ergo Deus praecipit impossibile. Sed ad nullum tale praeceptum obligamur: ergo Deo possumus non obedire; quod absurdum est. Et iterum, omnis praecipiens impossibile est stultus, vel impius: ergo Deus esset stultus, vel impius, quorum utrumque est impossibile. Et ideo dicit Hieronymus[^6]: *Qui dicit Deum praecepisse impossibile, anathema sit*.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Deus nullatenus potest praecipere malum, quod remanet sub ratione mali, et ideo nunquam id quod est malum secundum se; tamen id quod est malum in se, potest praecipere et praecipiendo facere bonum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus possit praecipere malum, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi: aut malum manens malum, aut ita, quod praecipiendo faciat bonum. Primum simpliciter est impossibile; secundum vero aliquo modo est possibile, licet non omnino.

Est enim aliquid malum *in se*, aliquid malum *secundum se*. Malum *in se* potest fieri bene[^7]; malum *secundum se* nullo modo potest fieri bene, immo hoc intelligere quod fiat bene, est intelligere, quod idem sit malum et bonum. Potest ergo dici, quod Deus potest praecipere malum *in se*, et non malum *secundum se*; quia nihil potest praecipere, quin bonum sit, postquam praeceptum est; et illud est malum *in se*, non autem *secundum se*; ideo potest illud praecipere et non aliud.

Et hinc habet ortum quod dicit Bernardus in libro *de Dispensatione et praecepto*[^8], quod Deus potest dispensare in praeceptis secundae tabulae et non primae. Et ratio huius est, quia in praeceptis secundae tabulae, quantum est de ratione praecepti, tangitur sive praecipitur ordinatio ad proximum, et prohibetur deordinatio ad eundem. Deordinatio autem respectu proximi, nisi sit deordinatio respectu Dei, malum est *in se*; si autem respectu Dei, malum est *secundum se*: sicut cognoscere non suam malum est *in se*, sed cognoscere alienam ex libidine sive non suam malum est *secundum se*. Sed Deus in praeceptis secundae tabulae dispensat et dispensare potest, et contra illa potest praecipere, ratione praedicta. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod praecipiat contraria, quia mandatum speciale absolvit a communi, sicut privilegium speciale[^9].

In praeceptis autem primae tabulae non potest Deus dispensare, quia eorum opposita sunt mala *secundum se*; ipsa enim praecepta dicunt ordinationem ad Deum sive in finem de sua ratione, et eorum opposita deordinationem. Et ideo, si contrarium praeciperet, praeciperet contra se; contra se autem non potest facere. Et si illa praeciperet — cum illa sint mala *secundum se*, ita quod nullo modo possunt bene fieri — aut Deus vellet malum, quod est inconveniens; aut impune fieret malum; aut idem esset bonum et malum, quorum utrumque est inconveniens simpliciter.

Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes probantes, quod Deus non potest omne[^10] malum praecipere, ut puta malum manens malum, et hoc est malum *secundum se*. — Tamen ultima ratio de hoc quod praecipit[^11] malum, non valet, et iam soluta est.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Osea, dicendum, quod illud fuit malum *in se*, scilicet cognoscere non suam, et divino praecepto factum est ei bonum. Sed secundum quod fornicatio dicit actum libidinosum et cognoscere aliquam ex libidine, hoc Dominus nunquam praecepit.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Exodi, quod praecepit filiis Israel furtum; dicendum, quod illud similiter praecepit, in quantum fuit malum *in se*, scilicet accipere rem alienam; et hoc potuit facere, quia, cum sit Dominus omnium, dominium potuit transferre. Sed nunquam praecepit, quod ex libidine hoc facerent; illud enim est malum *secundum se*.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo quod praecepit Abrahae de Isaac; dicendum, quod illud non erat malum *secundum se*, quia Isaac, quamvis non esset reus mortis sibi infligendae ab homine, tamen ratione peccati originalis reus erat mortis temporalis sibi infligendae a Deo, ad quam habebat necessitatem; et ideo Deus habebat auctoritatem, et ita de iure potuit illam Abrahae ex causa committere. — Tamen aliqui volunt dicere, quod non praecepit occidere, sed offerre. Sed contra hoc est Glossa[^12]

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et textus, quia dicitur, quod portavit ignem et gladium.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest super omnem legem datam; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest, quia potest imponere, sed non potest destruere iam positam. Quoniam enim ordinationem ad ipsum dicunt aliqua mandata, sicut non potest contra suam iustitiam facere, sic nec contra illa praecipere.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de non-ente potest facere ens; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest facere, sed hoc non potest facere, quod aliquid sit simul[^13] ens et non-ens; et quia non-ens non habet necessitatem ad hoc, quod sit non-ens, ideo potest fieri ens. Sed aliqua sunt mala, quae si sunt, de necessitate sunt mala, sicut mentiri et odire Deum. Et ideo non est simile, quia si faceret ista esse bona, faceret, quod idem simul esset bonum et malum.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether God can command evils.*

Fourth and last it is asked, whether God can command evils. And that he can, it seems:

1. Because he commanded Hosea in chapter one[^1] that he should take a fornicating wife, and Bernard expounds [this] according to the letter. But if you say that it is not to be understood according to the letter; it is objected then: that he commanded not only to take a wife, but also to beget sons of fornication; but if she were a legitimate wife, they would not be sons of fornication.

2. Likewise, in *Exodus* chapter twelve[^2] he commanded the sons of Israel to commit theft; but theft is evil and contrary to the law of nature: therefore etc. If you say, that it is not evil *in itself*, and therefore can be done well; it is objected: because he commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and one whom he knew to be innocent, *Genesis* chapter twenty-two[^3]; and this is evil *in itself*: therefore it seems that God can command an evil.

3. Likewise, by reasoning it seems so: because God is above every law: therefore in every commandment he can dispense: therefore he can command the contraries of all precepts and prohibitions.

4. Likewise, non-being is more distant from being than evil from good; but God by the sole command of his will makes being out of non-being: therefore by the sole command of his will he makes good out of evil: therefore he can command evils, as it seems.

**On the contrary:**

1. A precept is a sign of the divine will: therefore either it is a false sign, since it signifies that God wills what he commands[^4], or God wills it. But if God wills evil, he is evil; if he does not will it, and yet commands it, he is false; and both are impossible with God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no one obeying a divine precept ought to be punished: therefore if God can command an evil, an evil can be done with impunity. But for an evil to remain unpunished is against divine justice: therefore God

would be able to act against himself, and so to be opposed to himself. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, God commands evils not to be done: if then he commands them to be done, he commands two opposites[^5]; but for two opposites to be done is impossible: therefore God commands the impossible. But to no such precept are we bound: therefore we can disobey God; which is absurd. And again, everyone commanding the impossible is foolish or impious: therefore God would be foolish or impious, both of which are impossible. And therefore Jerome says[^6]: *Whoever says that God has commanded the impossible, let him be anathema*.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God can in no way command an evil which remains under the ratio of evil, and therefore never that which is evil *according to itself*; nevertheless that which is evil *in itself* he can command, and by commanding [can] make [it] good.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that when it is asked, whether God can command an evil, this can be understood in two ways: either as an evil remaining an evil, or in such a way that by commanding [it] he makes [it] good. The first is simply impossible; the second, however, is in some way possible, though not entirely.

For there is something evil *in itself* (*in se*), and something evil *according to itself* (*secundum se*). What is evil *in itself* can be done well[^7]; what is evil *according to itself* can in no way be done well, but rather to understand that it be done well is to understand that the same thing be evil and good. It can therefore be said, that God can command an evil *in itself*, and not an evil *according to itself*; because he can command nothing which is not good once it has been commanded; and that is evil *in itself*, but not *according to itself*; therefore he can command this and not the other.

And from this arises what Bernard says in his book *On Dispensation and Precept*[^8], namely that God can dispense in the precepts of the second table and not [in those] of the first. And the reason for this is that in the precepts of the second table, as far as the ratio of the precept is concerned, an ordering to the neighbor is touched upon or commanded, and disorder toward the same is prohibited. But disorder with respect to the neighbor, unless it is a disorder with respect to God, is evil *in itself*; if, however, [it is] with respect to God, it is evil *according to itself*: just as to know a woman not one's own is evil *in itself*, but to know another's [woman] out of lust, or one not one's own [out of lust], is evil *according to itself*. But in the precepts of the second table God dispenses, and can dispense, and against them he can command, for the aforesaid reason. Nor does it follow from this, that he commands contraries, because a special mandate releases from a common one, just as a special privilege [does][^9].

In the precepts of the first table, however, God cannot dispense, because their opposites are evils *according to themselves*; for the precepts themselves bespeak an ordering to God or to [him as] end by their very ratio, and their opposites [bespeak] disorder. And therefore, if he commanded the contrary, he would command against himself; but he cannot act against himself. And if he were to command those things — since they are evils *according to themselves*, such that in no way can they be done well — either God would will evil, which is unfitting; or evil would be done with impunity; or the same thing would be good and evil, both of which are unfitting absolutely.

And therefore the reasonings are to be conceded which prove, that God cannot command every[^10] evil, namely an evil remaining an evil, and this is what is evil *according to itself*. — Yet the last argument, about [God's] commanding[^11] evil, does not hold, and has already been answered.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning Hosea, it must be said, that that was evil *in itself*, namely to know a woman not one's own, and by the divine precept it became for him a good. But insofar as fornication denotes a lustful act and to know some woman out of lust, this the Lord never commanded.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the authority of Exodus, that he commanded the sons of Israel to commit theft; it must be said, that he commanded that likewise, insofar as it was evil *in itself*, namely to take another's property; and this he was able to do, because, since he is Lord of all, he was able to transfer dominion. But he never commanded that they should do this out of lust; for that is evil *according to itself*.

To that which is objected concerning what he commanded Abraham regarding Isaac; it must be said, that that was not evil *according to itself*, because Isaac, although he was not guilty of a death to be inflicted on him by a man, nevertheless by reason of original sin he was guilty of a temporal death to be inflicted on him by God, to which he was bound by necessity; and therefore God had the authority, and so by right he could commit [the doing of] it to Abraham for a [just] cause. — Yet some wish to say that he did not command [him] to kill, but to offer. But against this is the Gloss[^12]

and the text, because it is said, that he carried fire and a sword.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he can [act] above every given law; it must be said, that it is true, that he can, because he can impose [law], but he cannot destroy [a law] already laid down. For since certain commandments bespeak an ordering to himself, just as he cannot act against his own justice, so neither [can he] command against them.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that out of non-being he can make being; it must be said, that it is true that he can do this, but he cannot do this, that anything be at the same time[^13] being and non-being; and because non-being does not have any necessity that it be non-being, therefore it can become being. But some [things] are evils which, if they are, are of necessity evils, such as to lie and to hate God. And therefore the case is not similar, because if he were to make these things to be good, he would bring it about that the same thing would at once be good and evil.

la: *Vers.* 2: « *Vade, sume tibi uxorem fornicationum et fac tibi filios fornicationum* ». S. Bernardi expositio in hunc locum habetur in eius libro *de Praecepto et dispensatione* c. 3. n. 6, ubi S. Doctor etiam de furto a filiis Israel in Aegypto facto, quod in seq. argumento commemoratur, dicit: « *Quorum utique alterum [factum] quid nisi grave furti facinus, alterum quid nisi flagitii turpitudo reputaretur, si non excusasset utrumque factum auctoritas imperantis?* » Secundum August., XXII. *contra Faustum*, c. 89, illa verba apud Oseam significant vocationem gentilium ad fidem, et ab eodem S. Doctore ibid. c. 41 etiam illud factum furti mystice explicatur. — Circa finem argumenti pro *filios fornicationis* Vat. cum cod. cc *filios fornicariae*.

en: *Verse* 2: « *Go, take to thyself a wife of fornications and beget for thyself sons of fornications* ». St. Bernard's exposition of this passage is found in his book *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 3, n. 6, where the Holy Doctor, also concerning the theft by the sons of Israel in Egypt, which is mentioned in the following argument, says: « *Of which two [deeds], the one would be reckoned a grave act of theft, the other nothing but the shamefulness of disgrace, had not the authority of the One commanding excused both deeds?* » According to Augustine, XXII *Against Faustus*, c. 89, those words in Hosea signify the calling of the Gentiles to the faith, and by the same Holy Doctor *ibid.* c. 41, that deed of theft is likewise explained mystically. — Near the end of the argument, for *filios fornicationis*, the Vatican edition with cod. cc reads *filios fornicariae*.

en: *Verse* 36.

en: *Verse* 2.

la: In Vat. cod. cc hic et paulo post *praecepit*.

en: In the Vatican edition, cod. cc, here and a little later, [reads] *praecepit*.

la: Cod. V verbo *opposita* praefigit *contradictorie*. Immediate ante, Vat. cum cod. cc ter *praecepit* pro *praecipit*.

en: Cod. V prefixes *contradictorie* to the word *opposita*. Immediately before, the Vatican edition with cod. cc three times has *praecepit* in place of *praecipit*.

la: *Symboli Explic. ad Damasum* (quod opusculum, etsi inter opera S. Hieronymi habetur, alius auctoris est, scil. Pelagii, ut dicunt): « *Execramur etiam eorum blasphemiam, qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo praeceptum esse* ». Cfr. etiam *Comment. in Matth.* 6, 44. — *Nota,* quod S. Doctor hoc argumentum reprobat in fine corp. quaest.

en: *Explanation of the Creed addressed to Damasus* (which little work, even though it is found among the works of St. Jerome, is by another author, namely Pelagius, as they say): « *We curse also the blasphemy of those who say that something has been commanded by God to man as impossible* ». Cf. also *Commentary on Matthew* 6:44. — Note that the Holy Doctor refutes this argument at the end of the *corpus quaestionis*.

la: Pro *bene*, quod ter in hac propositione occurrit, codd. L ter *bonum*.

en: For *bene*, which occurs three times in this proposition, the codd. L three times [read] *bonum*.

la: Cap. 3. n. 6. seq., ubi quoad sensum invenitur. Cfr. supra pag. 843, nota 3.

en: Chapter 3, n. 6 ff., where it is found as to the sense. Cf. above p. 843, note 3.

la: Ed. addit *derogat generali*.

en: The edition adds *derogates from the general*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *omne*.

en: In the Vatican edition and cod. cc, *omne* is wanting.

la: Ed. 1 *praecepit*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *praecepit*.

la: *Glossa* ad *Genesis* 22, et textus ipse Vulgatae, qui memorat Abraham portasse ignem et gladium (cfr. v. 6).

en: The *Gloss* on *Genesis* 22, and the text itself of the Vulgate, which records that Abraham carried fire and a sword (cf. v. 6).

la: OCR garble in raw line 42612: « *quod aliquid sit simul ens et non-ens* » read as printed; no codex variant noted in apparatus.

en: Editorial note: the OCR at raw line 42612 reads « *that anything be at the same time being and non-being* » as printed; no codex variant is noted in the apparatus.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Manifestum est, Deum non posse praecipere malum, quatenus manet malum. Quaeri tantum potest, utrum Deus rebus prohibitis praecepto suo auferre possit rationem mali per quandam dispensationem. — Distinctionem inter malum *in se* et malum *secundum se*, suffragantibus Alexandro Hal. (*S.* p. 1. q. 37. m. 2. 3.) et S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 4.), S. Bonav. explicat reducendo eam ad duplicem ordinem rerum, scil. in universo et ad finem ultimum (cfr. hic q. praeced.). Deordinatio contra primum ordinem, qui est unius rei ad alteram, est malum *in se* et prohibitum praeceptis secundae tabulae; sed malum *secundum se* est contra secundum ordinem, in quo est etiam ratio primi ordinis.

**II.** Distinctio decalogi in praecepta primae et secundae tabulae, ita ut tria prima praecepta primae tabulae attribuantur, septem alia vero secundae, iuxta S. Doctorem (III. *Sent.* d. 37. a. 2. q. 3.) intelligenda est secundum sensum mysticum, non autem litteralem seu historicum, cum (ut vult Iosephus) in unaquaque tabula scripta essent quinque praecepta. Quod Deus in praeceptis secundae tabulae possit dispensare, approbatur etiam a S. Thoma in Commentario (hic q. 1. a. 4.). Hoc tamen intelligendum est cum illa restrictione, quae a Seraphico insinuatur hic *ad 1.* Quae restrictio si attenditur, conciliari potest doctrina eius cum verbis S. Thomae in *Summa* (I. II. q. 100. a. 8.), ubi dicitur etiam quoad praecepta secundae tabulae, quod « sunt omnino indispensabilia ». Sed haec verba intelligenda sunt cum ulteriore explicatione, quae ibi *ad 3.* ponitur. Idem fere docet Scotus (III. *Sent.* d. 37. q. unica), licet opinetur, non omnia praecepta secundae tabulae esse stricte de iure naturali, et per consequens, ea esse dispensabilia. — Facta Oseae et Abrahae (de quo vide hic dub. 3.) et spoliatio Aegyptiorum eodem modo explicantur ab Alexandro et S. Thoma, locis citt.

**III.** *Praeter laudatos:* B. Albert., I. *Sent.* d. 46. a. 9; *S.* p. 1. tr. 20. q. 80. a. 3. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** It is manifest that God cannot command an evil, insofar as it remains an evil. It can only be asked, whether God can take away the ratio of evil from things prohibited, by his precept, through a certain dispensation. — The distinction between evil *in itself* and evil *according to itself*, with the support of Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. 1, q. 37, m. 2, 3) and St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 4), St. Bonaventure explains by reducing it to a twofold order of things, namely [the order] within the universe and [the order] to the ultimate end (cf. here, the preceding question). Disorder against the first order, which is of one thing to another, is evil *in itself* and is prohibited by the precepts of the second table; but evil *according to itself* is [disorder] against the second order, in which there is also the ratio of the first order.

**II.** The distinction of the decalogue into precepts of the first and second table, in such a way that the first three precepts are attributed to the first table and the other seven to the second, according to the Holy Doctor (III *Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2, q. 3) is to be understood according to the mystical sense, not the literal or historical, since (as Josephus holds) five precepts were written on each tablet. That God can dispense in the precepts of the second table is approved also by St. Thomas in the *Commentary* (here q. 1, a. 4). This, however, is to be understood with the restriction which is hinted at by the Seraphic [Doctor] here in *Ad 1*. If this restriction is attended to, his doctrine can be reconciled with the words of St. Thomas in the *Summa* (I-II, q. 100, a. 8), where it is said also concerning the precepts of the second table, that « they are altogether indispensable ». But these words are to be understood with the further explanation which is given there in *ad 3*. Almost the same is taught by Scotus (III *Sent.*, d. 37, q. unica), although he is of opinion that not all precepts of the second table are strictly of natural right, and consequently that they are dispensable. — The deeds of Hosea and of Abraham (concerning which see here *dub.* 3) and the spoliation of the Egyptians are explained in the same manner by Alexander and St. Thomas, in the places cited.

**III.** *Besides those praised:* B. Albert, I *Sent.*, d. 46, a. 9; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 20, q. 80, a. 3, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 6. — Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 *princ.*, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. unica. — Biel, here q. unica.

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