title: Dist. 20

title_alt:
Distinctio XX littera Magistri
Lombard's text on Distinction XX

source_text:
<!-- page 366 -->

### DISTINCTIO XX.

#### Cap. I. *Quod[^1] aliqua personarum non excedit aliam potentia.*

Nunc ostendere restat, quomodo aliqua harum personarum aliam non excellat potentia, ut, sicut una et indifferens est magnitudo trium, ita una et indifferens monstretur potentia trium. Sciendum est igitur, quia non est potentior Pater Filio, nec Filius vel Pater Spiritu sancto, nec maiorem potentiam habent duo vel tres simul quam singulus eorum; quia nec plus potest Pater simul et Filius quam solus Spiritus sanctus, nec hi tres simul plus possunt quam singulus eorum, quia omnipotentiam, quam habet Pater, et Filius accepit nascendo et Spiritus sanctus procedendo. Quod Augustinus rationibus et auctoritatibus probabiliter astruit in libro contra Maximinum[^2], qui dicebat Patrem potentiorem ac meliorem Filio.

#### Cap. II. *Quod non minus potest Filius quam Pater.*

«Nihil, inquit[^3], Patre minus habet ille qui dicit: *Omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt*». «Nam si minus habet in potestate aliquid quam Pater, non sunt eius omnia, quae habet Pater; sed eius sunt omnia quae habet Pater; tantam igitur habet potestatem Filius, quantam Pater»: «aequalis ergo est Patri. Non enim potest qui accepit inaequalis esse ei qui dedit».

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#### Cap. III. *De obiectionibus haereticis contra hoc et responsionibus catholicis.*

«Tu autem hoc de potentia sapis, quod potens sit Filius, sed potentior Pater, ut secundum doctrinam vestram potens potentem potuerit gignere, et non omnipotens omnipotentem. Habet ergo Pater omnipotentiam, quam non habet Filius; at si hoc est, falsum est quod ait Filius: *Omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt*[^4]».

«Sed, inquis, Pater a nemine potentiam accepit, Filius autem a Patre. Fatemur et nos, Filium accepisse potentiam ab illo[?], de quo natus est potens; Patri vero potentiam nullus dedit, quia nullus eum genuit. Gignendo enim dedit potentiam Pater Filio, sicut omnia quae habet in substantia sua, gignendo dedit ei quem genuit de substantia sua[^5]».

«Sed quaeritur, utrum tantam quantam ipsi est potentiam Pater Filio dederit, an minorem. Si tantam, non solum potentem, sed etiam omnipotentem genuisse Omnipotens intelligitur; si vero minorem, quomodo omnia quae habet Pater, Filii sunt? Si Patris omnipotentia Filii non est, non omnia procul dubio, quae habet Pater, Filii sunt[^6]». At omnia Filii sunt; omnipotentia ergo Patris etiam Filii est: non est ergo Pater potentior Filio.

Item, alio modo probat Filium aequalem Patri contra Maximinum[^7] ita dicens: «Tu dicis, quod Pater genuit Filium minorem se ipso, in quo et Patri derogas, qui si Filium unicum minorem genuit, aut non potuit, aut non voluit gignere aequalem. Si dicis, quia non voluit, eum invidum esse dixisti; si autem non potuit, ubi est omnipotentia Dei Patris? Prorsus ad hunc articulum res colligitur, ut Deus Pater aequalem sibi gignere Filium aut non potuerit, aut noluerit. Si non potuit, infirmus; si noluit, invidus invenitur. Sed utrumque hoc falsum est: Patri igitur Filius verus aequalis est. Genuit ergo Pater sibi aequalem Filium, et ab utroque procedit utrique aequalis Spiritus sanctus[^8]». «Si enim formam suam, ut ait Augustinus contra eundem[^9], Pater in unico Filio plenam gignere potuit, nec tamen plenam genuit, sed minorem, cogimini Patrem invidum dicere». Plenum ergo Deum et aequalem sibi genuit Filium.

Hoc autem per similitudinem humanam ita esse demonstrat inquiens[^10]: «Homo pater, si potuisset, aequalem Filium genuisset. Quis ergo audeat dicere, quod hoc Omnipotens non potuit? Addo etiam, quia, si posset homo, maiorem melioremque se ipso gigneret Filium. Sed maius vel melius Deo quidquam esse non potest». «Deus ergo cur non aequalem, ut ais, Filium genuit, cui nec anni necessarii fuerunt, per quos adimpleretur aequalitas, nec omnipotentia defuit. An forte noluit? ergo, quod absit, invidit; sed non invidit: aequalem igitur genuit Filium[^11]». «Credamus ergo, Filium ei esse aequalem».

«Sed forte dices: eo ipso maior est Pater Filio, quia de nullo genitus genuit tamen aequalem. Ad quod cito respondebo: immo ideo non est maior Pater Filio, quia aequalem genuit. Originis enim quaestio ista est, quis de quo sit; aequalitatis autem, qualis aut quantus sit[^12]», quod est dicere: ad originem pertinet quaestio, qua quaeritur, quis de quo sit; ad aequalitatem vero illa qua quaeritur, qualis aut quantus quis sit. «Nec cum dicitur Filius a Patre genitus, ostenditur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae, non quo alter prior esset altero, sed quo alter est ex altero». Non ergo secundum hoc, quod Pater genuit, et Filius genitus est, vel Spiritus sanctus ab utroque procedit, aequalitas vel inaequalitas ibi existit, quia non secundum hoc alia persona alii aequalis vel inaequalis dicitur. Ecce aequalitas Trinitatis et una eademque substantia, quantum breviter potuimus, demonstrata est in superioribus[^13], qualiter scilicet aliqua trium personarum quamlibet aliam nec aeternitate nec magnitudine nec potentia excellat.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XX.

#### Cap. I. *That[^1] none of the persons exceeds another in power.*

It now remains to show how none of these persons excels another in power, so that, just as the magnitude of the three is one and undifferentiated, so also the power of the three may be shown to be one and undifferentiated. It must therefore be known that the Father is not more powerful than the Son, nor the Son or the Father than the Holy Spirit, nor do two or three together have greater power than any one of them; since neither can the Father together with the Son do more than the Holy Spirit alone, nor can these three together do more than any one of them, because the omnipotence which the Father has, the Son also received by being born and the Holy Spirit by proceeding. This Augustine probably establishes by reasonings and authorities in the book *Against Maximinus*[^2], who used to say that the Father was more powerful and better than the Son.

#### Cap. II. *That the Son can no less than the Father.*

"Nothing," he says[^3], "less than the Father has He who says: *All things which the Father has are mine*." "For if He has anything less in power than the Father, then not all things which the Father has are His; but His are all things which the Father has; therefore the Son has as much power as the Father": "He is therefore equal to the Father. For He who has received cannot be unequal to Him who gave."

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#### Cap. III. *On heretical objections against this and the Catholic responses.*

"But you understand this concerning power, that the Son is powerful, but the Father is more powerful, so that according to your doctrine a powerful one has been able to beget a powerful one, and not an omnipotent one an omnipotent. The Father therefore has an omnipotence which the Son does not have; but if this is so, false is what the Son says: *All things which the Father has are mine*[^4]."

"But, you say, the Father has received power from no one, but the Son from the Father. We too confess that the Son has received power from Him[?] from whom He is born powerful; but to the Father no one gave power, since no one begot Him. For by begetting the Father gave power to the Son, just as all things which He has in His substance, by begetting He gave to Him whom He begot from His own substance[^5]."

"But it is asked whether the Father gave the Son as much power as is His own, or less. If as much, the Omnipotent is understood to have begotten not only a powerful one, but also an omnipotent one; but if less, how are all things which the Father has the Son's? If the Father's omnipotence is not the Son's, then without doubt not all things which the Father has are the Son's[^6]." But all things are the Son's; therefore the Father's omnipotence is also the Son's: therefore the Father is not more powerful than the Son.

Likewise, in another way he proves the Son equal to the Father against Maximinus[^7], saying thus: "You say that the Father begot the Son lesser than Himself, in which you also detract from the Father, who, if He begot the only-begotten Son lesser, either could not, or did not will to beget Him equal. If you say that He did not will, you have called Him envious; but if He could not, where is the omnipotence of God the Father? Plainly the matter is gathered down to this point, that God the Father either could not, or would not, beget a Son equal to Himself. If He could not, He is found weak; if He would not, envious. But both of these are false: the Son therefore is the true equal of the Father. Therefore the Father begot a Son equal to Himself, and from both proceeds the Holy Spirit equal to both[^8]." "For if His form, as Augustine says against the same person[^9], the Father in His only Son could beget full, and yet did not beget full, but lesser, you are forced to call the Father envious." Therefore He begot a full God and one equal to Himself as Son.

This he also demonstrates to be so by a human likeness, saying[^10]: "A human father, if he could, would have begotten an equal son. Who therefore would dare to say that the Omnipotent could not do this? I add also that, if a man could, he would beget a son greater and better than himself. But nothing can be greater or better than God." "Why therefore did God not beget, as you say, an equal Son — He for whom no years were necessary through which equality might be filled out, nor did omnipotence fail? Or did He perhaps not will? Then, far be it, He envied; but He did not envy: therefore He begot an equal Son[^11]." "Let us therefore believe the Son to be equal to Him."

"But perhaps you will say: by this very fact the Father is greater than the Son, because, begotten of no one, He nevertheless begot an equal. To which I will quickly reply: rather, for this reason the Father is not greater than the Son, because He begot an equal. For the question of origin is this: who is from whom; but the question of equality is: of what sort or how great he is[^12]," which is to say: to origin pertains the question by which it is asked, who is from whom; but to equality, that by which it is asked, of what sort or how great anyone is. "Nor when the Son is said to be begotten by the Father is inequality of substance shown, but the order of nature — not by which the one is prior to the other, but by which the one is from the other." Therefore not according to this — that the Father begot, and the Son was begotten, or the Holy Spirit proceeds from both — does equality or inequality there exist, since not according to this is one person said to be equal or unequal to another. Behold, the equality of the Trinity and one and the same substance has been demonstrated, as briefly as we could, in the foregoing[^13] — namely, how no one of the three persons excels any of the others in eternity, in magnitude, or in power.

---

la: Edd. 5, 8 *quod*.

en: Editions 5, 8 read *quod*.

la: Vat. et aliae edd. *in libro tertio contra Maximinum*; codd. et ed. 1 sic: *in libro contra Maxim*. In edd. impressis Augustini duo tantum sunt libri *contra Maximinum*. Sed in antiquis mss. exemplaribus huius operis opusculum *Collatio Augustini cum Maximino* inscribebatur primus liber c. M., et illi duo secundus et tertius. Textus sequentes sunt ex secundo libro iuxta computationem modernam.

en: The Vatican edition and other editions read *in libro tertio contra Maximinum* ("in the third book against Maximinus"); the manuscripts and edition 1 thus: *in libro contra Maxim*. In the printed editions of Augustine there are only two books *Against Maximinus*. But in ancient manuscript copies of this work the little treatise *Collatio Augustini cum Maximino* ("Augustine's Conference with Maximinus") was entitled the first book *Contra Maximinum*, and those two [printed] the second and third. The texts that follow are from the second book according to the modern reckoning.

la: Libr. II, c. 14, n. 7. — Locus Scripturae est Ioan. 16, 15. Duo loci sequentes Augustini sunt ibid. n. 9 et 7.

en: Book II, c. 14, n. 7. — The Scripture passage is John 16:15. The two following passages of Augustine are at the same place, n. 9 and n. 7.

la: Ibid. c. 12, n. 1. — In hoc textu Augustini Vat. cum pluribus edd. verbo *gignere* praemittit *generare vel*, contra codd. et originale.

en: Same place, c. 12, n. 1. — In this text of Augustine, the Vatican edition with several editions prefixes to the word *gignere* the word *generare vel* ("generate or"), against the manuscripts and the original.

la: Loc. cit. paucis interpositis. — Hic codd. ABC et ed. 1 *Fateamur* pro *Fatemur*.

en: Same place, with a few words intervening. — Here codices ABC and edition 1 read *Fateamur* in place of *Fatemur*.

la: Ibid. immediate post. — In principio textus post *utrum* Vat. cum paucis edd. male addit *ei*. Finito textu, post *omnia* Vat. cum aliis edd. contra 1, 2, 3, 7 et omnes codd. addit *quae habet Pater*, quod facile ex praecedentibus suppleri potest.

en: Same place, immediately after. — At the beginning of the text, after *utrum*, the Vatican edition with a few editions wrongly adds *ei*. At the end of the text, after *omnia*, the Vatican edition with other editions, against 1, 2, 3, 7 and all the manuscripts, adds *quae habet Pater* ("which the Father has"), which can easily be supplied from what precedes.

la: Libr. II, c. 7 et 5. Eadem docet Augustinus in libr. LXXXIII Quaest., q. 50.

en: Book II, c. 7 and 5. Augustine teaches the same thing in *Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 50.

la: Ibid. cap. 15, n. 1.

en: Same place, c. 15, n. 1.

la: Ibid. cap. 18, n. 3, ubi Vat. et plures edd. post *Addo etiam* omittunt *quia*, refragantibus codd. BCDE, ed. 1 et originali.

en: Same place, c. 18, n. 3, where the Vatican edition and several editions, after *Addo etiam*, omit *quia*, against codices BCDE, edition 1, and the original.

la: Ibid. c. 15, n. 8. — Quae sequuntur, leguntur ibid. c. 18, n. 3.

en: Same place, c. 15, n. 8. — What follows is read at the same place, c. 18, n. 3.

la: Ibid. immediate post, ubi Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 post *quia aequalem* adiiciunt *sibi*, contra alias edd., codd. et originale.

en: Same place, immediately after, where the Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, 9 after *quia aequalem* add *sibi*, against the other editions, manuscripts, and the original.

la: Ibid. cap. 14, n. 8. — Solummodo Vat. post *prior* male legit *est* pro *esset*.

en: Same place, c. 14, n. 8. — The Vatican edition alone, after *prior*, wrongly reads *est* in place of *esset*.

la: Scilicet in hac et praecedente dist.

en: Namely, in this and the preceding distinction.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 20, Divisio Textus

title_alt:
Divisio textus distinctionis XX
Division of the text of Distinction XX

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 368 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

#### *De trium personarum aequalitate quantum ad potentiam et virtutem.*

> *Nunc ostendere restat, quomodo aliqua harum personarum* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister aequalitatem personarum quantum ad magnitudinem, hic ostendit aequalitatem[^1] quantum ad potentiam et virtutem. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In prima proponit quod intendit[^2]. In secunda probat, ibi: *Nihil, inquit, Patre minus habet* etc. In tertia dubium sive obiectionem in contrarium dissolvit, ibi: *Sed forte dices, eo ipso maior est* etc.

Prima et ultima parte remanentibus indivisis, media dividitur in tres, secundum tres probationes sive rationes, quarum prima sumta est ab auctoritate Domini, Ioannis decimo sexto[^3]: *Omnia, quae habet Pater, mea sunt*. Secunda sumta est per deductionem ad impossibile, quia si non genuit aequalem, aut potuit et noluit, et ita fuit invidus; aut voluit et non potuit, et ita fuit impotens; et haec ponitur[^4] ibi: *Item alio modo probat Filium aequalem Patri*. Tertia ratio est ostensiva, sumta per simile in generatione creata et ponitur ibi: *Hoc autem per similitudinem humanam*.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum, quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione, duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere potentiae adaequationem.

Secundo, utrum in divinis sit ponere ordinem.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere potentiae[^5] adaequationem quantum ad extensionem possibilium.

Secundo, utrum sit ibi aequatio[^6] quantum ad intensionem potentiae.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XX.

#### *On the equality of the three persons with respect to power and virtue.*

> *Now it remains to show, how any of these persons* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master showed the equality of the persons with respect to magnitude; here he shows the equality[^1] with respect to power and virtue. And this part has three parts. In the first he proposes what he intends[^2]. In the second he proves it, at: *Nothing, he says, less than the Father has* etc. In the third he dissolves a doubt or objection to the contrary, at: *But perhaps you will say, by this very fact greater is* etc.

The first and last parts remaining undivided, the middle one is divided into three, according to three proofs or reasons, of which the first is taken from the authority of the Lord, John the sixteenth[^3]: *All things which the Father has are mine*. The second is taken by deduction to the impossible, since if He did not beget an equal, either He could and would not, and so was envious; or He willed and could not, and so was impotent; and this is placed[^4] at: *Likewise in another way he proves the Son equal to the Father*. The third reason is ostensive, taken by likeness from created generation, and is placed at: *This, however, by a human likeness*.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of the things which are said in the present distinction, two things are principally asked.

First it is asked whether in divine matters an equation of power is to be posited.

Secondly, whether in divine matters an order is to be posited.

As to the first, two things are asked.

First it is asked whether in divine matters an equation of power[^5] is to be posited with respect to the extension of possibles.

Secondly, whether there is there an equation[^6] with respect to the intension of power.

---

la: In Vat. et paucis codd. deest *aequalitatem*.

en: In the Vatican edition and a few codices the word *aequalitatem* is missing.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *intenditur*, scilicet quod *alia persona non excedit aliam potentia*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *intenditur* — namely, that *one person does not exceed another in power*.

la: Vers. 15, in quo textu Vulgata habet *quaecumque* pro *quae*.

en: Verse 15, in which text the Vulgate has *quaecumque* in place of *quae*.

la: Cod. T *hoc ponit*.

en: Codex T reads *hoc ponit* ("places this").

la: Supplevimus ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *potentiae*.

en: We have supplied *potentiae* ("of power") from very many manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Cod. V *adaequatio*.

en: Codex V reads *adaequatio*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 368 -->

### ARTICULUS I. *De potentiae adaequatione in divinis.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum in divinis personis potentia sit aequalis quantum ad extensionem possibilium.*

Quod sit ibi ponere potentiae adaequationem quantum ad numerum possibilium, ostenditur sic.

1. Quaecumque habent eandem naturam, habent eandem potentiam naturalem[^1]; sed quaecumque habent omnino eandem potentiam, quidquid potest unum, et alterum; sed Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus habent eandem potentiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, quaecumque habent omnino eandem operationem, nihil potest unum operari sine altero; sed Pater et Filius habent eandem operationem: ergo nihil potest Pater sine Filio, Ioannis quinto[^2]: *Quaecumque Pater facit, haec omnia similiter Filius facit*.

3. Item, nullus potest plura omnipotente; sed Verbum Dei est omnipotens, sicut dicitur Sapientiae decimo octavo[^3]: *Omnipotens sermo tuus, Domine* etc. Maior patet, quia qui *omne* dicit nihil excipit.

<!-- page 369 -->

4. Item, infinitis non est ponere aliqua esse plura[^4]; sed Filius potest infinita, quia non potest tot, quin plura: ergo Pater non potest plura quam Filius, pari ratione nec quam Spiritus sanctus.

**Contra:**

1. Quanto producta sunt magis distantia, tanto potentia producens est latior sive amplior; sed potentia Patris se extendit ad creatum et increatum, potentia Filii ad creatum tantum, et magis distat creatum et increatum quam creata[^5] solum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Filius Dei et creatura sunt aliud et aliud, quia creatura est quid creatum, sed Filius est essentia increata; ergo si[^6] Filius et creatura sunt aliud et aliud, ergo plura: ergo potentia, quae potest in Filium et creaturam, potentior est, quam quae potest in creaturam tantum, sive potens est in plura; sed potentia Patris est talis: ergo etc.

3. Item, tantum vel aeque magnum vel maius est producere personam aequalem, sicut creaturam; sed Pater potest sine Filio producere personam, ergo et producere creaturam: ergo videtur, quod potentia in Patre se extendat ad plura.

4. Item, quamvis Spiritus sanctus[^7] et Filius non sint aliquid plus, tamen plures sunt quam Filius solus: ergo cum in Patre potentia possit in productionem utriusque, in Filio in alteram tantum, in plures[^8] potest potentia in Patre quam in Filio: ergo extensione possibilium est maior.

> **Conclusio.** *Potentia essentialis in divinis personis est aequalis quantum ad extensionem possibilium.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod loquendo de potentia essentiali, quae est respectu actus essentialis sive productionis, ad nihil se extendit in Patre, ad quod pariter non extendat se in Filio. Et ideo, quia aequalitas[^9] consistit quantum ad potentiam essentialem, concedendum est sine calumnia, quod Pater et Filius aequaliter sunt[^10] potentes quantum ad extensionem possibilium.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod latior est potentia, quae potest in magis distantia; dicendum, quod istud verum est de potentia eodem modo dicta et quantum ad consimilem modum producendi; sed Patrem posse producere quid creatum est potentiae essentialis et operis creationis; Patrem vero posse producere Filium est potentiae ut in persona et generationis; ideo ratio illa non valet.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura et Filius sunt plura; dicendum, quod verum est, quod sunt plura, et[^11] tamen non sunt plura producta. Quamvis enim Filius sit aliud quam creatura, tamen non est aliud productum. Filius enim est essentia et natura, sed tamen non est essentia vel natura producta, quia producere Filium non est producere aliquid, sed aliquem. Et ideo non sequitur, quod producere Filium et creaturam sit posse producere plura quam[^12] producere alterum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod producit personam sine Filio; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia cum producere creaturam sit producere essentiam, tam productio quam potentia est essentialis; et quia essentia est indivisa[^13] in Patre et Filio, ideo et potentia et actio, proinde et productio illa. Quia vero producere Filium est producere personam, ideo productio illa et potentia dicit quid personale; et quoniam Pater et Filius non conveniunt in persona, sed in essentia, ideo[^14] patet etc.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt plures etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest etiam in plures, sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur aequalitas vel inaequalitas, ut visum est[^15].

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the equality of power in divine things.*
### Question I. *Whether in the divine persons power is equal as to the extension of the possibles.*

That an equality of power as to the number of possibles is to be posited there is shown thus.

1. Whatever things have the same nature have the same natural power[^1]; but whatever things have altogether the same power, whatever the one can do, the other can also; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit have the same power: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, of whatever things have altogether the same operation, the one cannot operate anything without the other; but the Father and the Son have the same operation: therefore the Father can do nothing without the Son, John 5[^2]: *Whatever things the Father does, all these likewise does the Son*.

3. Likewise, no one can [do] more things than the omnipotent; but the Word of God is omnipotent, as is said in Wisdom 18[^3]: *Thy almighty word, O Lord*, etc. The major is plain, since he who says *all* excepts nothing.

4. Likewise, beyond the infinite no things can be posited as more[^4]; but the Son can [do] infinite things, since He cannot [do] so many but [there can be] more: therefore the Father cannot [do] more than the Son, and by like reason neither than the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:**

1. The more distant the things produced are, the wider or ampler is the producing power; but the power of the Father extends to the created and the uncreated, the power of the Son to the created only, and the created and the uncreated stand at a greater distance than [things] created[^5] alone: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Son of God and a creature are one thing and another, since a creature is something created, but the Son is uncreated essence; therefore if[^6] the Son and a creature are one thing and another, therefore [they are] more [than one]: therefore the power which can [extend] to the Son and to a creature is more powerful than that which can [extend] to a creature only, that is, is able [to extend] to more; but such is the power of the Father: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is as much, or equally great, or greater to produce an equal person as to produce a creature; but the Father can without the Son produce a person; therefore [He can] also produce a creature [without the Son]: therefore it seems that the power in the Father extends to more.

4. Likewise, although the Holy Spirit[^7] and the Son are not anything more, nevertheless they are more [in number] than the Son alone: therefore since in the Father the power can [extend] to the production of both, in the Son [only] to one of them, the power in the Father can [extend] to more[^8] than [the power] in the Son: therefore by extension of possibles it is greater.

> **Conclusion.** *The essential power in the divine persons is equal as to the extension of the possibles.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, speaking of the essential power, which is in respect to an essential act or production, [the power] in the Father extends to nothing to which it does not equally extend in the Son. And therefore, since equality[^9] consists with respect to essential power, it is to be conceded without cavil that the Father and the Son are[^10] equally powerful as to the extension of the possibles.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that the power which can [extend] to more distant things is wider; it must be said that this is true of power said in the same way and with respect to a like manner of producing; but for the Father to be able to produce something created [pertains] to essential power and to the work of creation; whereas for the Father to be able to produce the Son [pertains] to power as in a person and to generation; therefore that argument is not valid.

2. To that which is objected, that the creature and the Son are more [than one]; it must be said that it is true that they are more, and[^11] yet they are not more produced [things]. For although the Son is other than a creature, nevertheless He is not another produced [thing]. For the Son is essence and nature, but nevertheless He is not produced essence or nature, since to produce the Son is not to produce something [a "what"], but someone. And therefore it does not follow that to produce the Son and a creature is to be able to produce more than[^12] to produce one of them.

3. To that which is objected, that He produces a person without the Son; it must be said that it is not similar; since, since to produce a creature is to produce an essence, both the production and the power are essential; and since the essence is undivided[^13] in the Father and in the Son, therefore also the power and the action, and consequently that production. But since to produce the Son is to produce a person, therefore that production and power expresses something personal; and since the Father and the Son do not agree in person, but in essence, therefore[^14] it is plain etc.

4. To that which is objected, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are more etc.; it must be said that it is true that [the Father] is also able [to extend] to more, but as to this equality or inequality is not regarded, as has been seen[^15].

la: De hac propositione cfr. supra pag. 51 nota II. — Paulo infra cod. M *terminis et alterum* praefigit verbum *potest*, certe supplendum.

en: On this proposition cf. above p. 51, note II. — A little below cod. M prefixes to *terminis et alterum* the word *potest*, which is certainly to be supplied.

la: Vers. 19, ubi Vulgata: *Quaecumque enim ille (Pater) fecerit, haec et Filius similiter facit*.

en: Verse 19, where the Vulgate has: *For whatever things he (the Father) does, these the Son also does in like manner*.

la: Vers. 15, in quo textu Vulgata omittit *Domine*.

en: Verse 15, in which text the Vulgate omits *Domine* ("O Lord").

la: Propositio haec communiter ita exhibetur: *infinito non potest fieri additio*. — Aliqui codd. ut *CIU cc* verbo *infinitis* praemittunt *in*, et cod. *U si in*. Dein pauci codd. ut *SY* omittunt *aliqua*.

en: This proposition is commonly given thus: *no addition can be made to the infinite*. — Some codices such as *CIU cc* prefix *in* to the word *infinitis*, and cod. *U* [reads] *si in*. Then a few codices such as *SY* omit *aliqua*.

la: Ita maior pars codd. cum edd. 2, 3; alii ut *IKXZ aa ee* legunt vel *creatum* vel cum ed. 1 et Vat. *creatura*, sed minus distincte. Paulo ante cod. *Z Spiritus sancti* pro *Filii*, quae lectio per se praeferenda videri posset, sed ex responsione infra posita patet, quod nomine *potentiae* intelligitur praeter potentiam creandi potentia generandi, quae soli Patri competit.

en: Thus the greater part of the codices, with editions 2, 3; others, such as *IKXZ aa ee*, read either *creatum*, or, with ed. 1 and the Vatican, *creatura*, but less distinctly. A little before, cod. *Z* [reads] *Spiritus sancti* in place of *Filii*, which reading might per se seem preferable, but from the response placed below it is plain that by the name *potentiae* is understood, besides the power of creating, the power of generating, which befits the Father alone.

la: Addendo particulam *si* praestamus meliorem lectionem, quae et in multis mss. ut *AFGHSTY* etc. et ed. 1 reperitur.

en: By adding the particle *si* we present a better reading, which is also found in many manuscripts such as *AFGHSTY* etc. and in ed. 1.

la: Plures codd. ut *AITW aa bb Pater* loco *Spiritus sanctus*, sed contra subnexa.

en: Several codices such as *AITW aa bb* [read] *Pater* in place of *Spiritus sanctus*, but against what follows.

la: Praeferimus lectionem aliquorum mss. ut *EXZ* ponendo *plures* pro *plura*, utpote quae magis cum praecedentibus cohaeret.

en: We prefer the reading of some manuscripts such as *EXZ*, putting *plures* in place of *plura*, as one which agrees better with what precedes.

la: Supple: *potentiae*; Vat. autem contra finem in hac quaestione a S. Doctore intentum addit *personarum*, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1. Paulo supra post *Filio* codd. *aa bb* addunt *et Spiritu sancto*.

en: Supply: *potentiae* ("of power"); the Vatican, however, contrary to the end intended by the Holy Doctor in this question, adds *personarum* ("of the persons"), which is missing in the manuscripts and in ed. 1. A little above, after *Filio*, codices *aa bb* add *et Spiritu sancto* ("and the Holy Spirit").

la: Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 *sint*. Cod. *bb* post *Filius* adiungit *et Spiritus sanctus*.

en: The Vatican, against the authority of very many codices and of ed. 1, [reads] *sint*. Cod. *bb*, after *Filius*, appends *et Spiritus sanctus* ("and the Holy Spirit").

la: Fide multorum mss. ut *A S T V W X Y aa bb cc* et edd. 2, 3, 6 supplevimus particulam *et*, pro qua plures codd. ut *GHIKZ* cum ed. 1 ponunt *sed*, quamque Vat. cum uno alterove codice omittit. Immediate post in Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1, deest *sunt*.

en: On the authority of many manuscripts such as *A S T V W X Y aa bb cc* and editions 2, 3, 6 we have supplied the particle *et*, in place of which several codices such as *GHIKZ* with ed. 1 put *sed*, and which the Vatican with one or another codex omits. Immediately afterwards in the Vatican, against the older manuscripts and ed. 1, *sunt* is missing.

la: Minus bene et antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 reluctantibus, Vat. adiungit *posse*; quodsi lectionem Vat. servare velis, addas cum cod. K *posse* etiam supra *potest* sequitur quod.

en: Less well, and against the older manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican appends *posse*; but if you wish to keep the reading of the Vatican, you should add with cod. K *posse* also above, [where] *potest* follows *quod*.

la: Ita mss. cum ed. 1, excepto codice *cc*, qui cum Vat. ponit *individua*.

en: Thus the manuscripts with ed. 1, except codex *cc*, which with the Vatican puts *individua* ("indivisible").

la: Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ideo*.

en: From very many codices and ed. 1 we have supplied *ideo* ("therefore").

la: In corp. huius q.

en: In the corpus of this question.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Non agitur hic de potentia, quatenus distinguitur contra actum, quae omnino removenda est a Deo, sed de potentia, quatenus est principium activum et effectivum aliorum, sive de omnipotentia. — Aequalitas huius potentiae intelligi potest vel extensive sive quoad numerum obiectorum causabilium, vel intensive sive, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (loc. cit. infra), quan-

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tum ad vigoris potentiae intensionem. Specialiter quaeritur de aequalitate trium personarum in potentia, quia etiam specialis difficultas circa potentiam solvenda est, cum in Patre sit potentia activa generandi, quae non est in Filio neque in Spiritu sancto; similiter est iudicandum de potentia spirandi, quae non est in Spiritu sancto. Ex hac difficultate sumta sunt omnia argumenta ad oppositum, quae tamen iam supra d. 7. q. 3. et 4. fere soluta sunt. Fundamentum huius solutionis est distinctio potentiae in corp. posita, scil. in potentiam essentialem et notionalem (quae in solut. ad 1. vocatur potentia in persona). Illa respicit productionem ad extra, quae tribus personis est communis, haec vero productionem ad intra, sive potentiam generandi in Patre et spirandi in Patre et Filio. Potest quidem potentia et omnipotentia sumi in sensu largo pro qualibet potentia productiva, sive producat ad intra sive ad extra; attamen proprie sub omnipotentia non intelligitur nisi potentia essentialis. Ad solvendam obiectionem, quod generare in Deo sit simpliciter potentia, quae non convenit Filio et Spiritui sancto, bene observat Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. ad I.): «Dissimiliter est generare in homine et in Deo, quia in divinis ipsum generare est de tota substantia, non de parte, et propter hoc in divinis eadem est substantia. In homine autem non est sic; non enim fit generatio de tota substantia, sed per decisionem de parte. Unde ibi non est omnino eadem substantia patris et filii, licet eadem sit forma specifica; et propter hoc in generatione, qua homo generat hominem, multiplicatur substantia et relatio. Et ideo in homine est generare posse quid et ad aliquid; posse quid dicit per multiplicationem substantiae, posse ad aliquid per multiplicationem relationis. In divinis autem in generatione non multiplicatur substantia, sed solum relatio; et propter hoc generare posse in divinis non est posse quid, sed posse ad aliquid». His positis, intelligitur solutio eiusdem Alexandri ad obiectionem: aliqua potentia est in Patre, quae tamen non est in Filio, sic respondentis: «Mutatio est praedicamenti, mutatur enim *quid* in *ad aliquid*». — De ipsa potentia in se agitur infra dd. 42. 43. 44.

**II.** Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. hic q. unic.; *Report.*, hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 5; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. S. a. 70. q. 2. n. 41-63. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unic.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** It is not treated here of power as it is distinguished against act — which [sense] is altogether to be removed from God — but of power as it is the active and effective principle of other things, that is, of omnipotence. — The equality of this power can be understood either *extensively*, that is, as to the number of objects that can be caused, or *intensively*, that is, as Richard of Mediavilla says (loc. cit. below), as to the intension of the vigor of the power. The equality of the three persons in power is asked specially, since also a special difficulty concerning power is to be solved, since in the Father there is the active power of generating, which is not in the Son nor in the Holy Spirit; similarly it must be judged concerning the power of spirating, which is not in the Holy Spirit. From this difficulty are taken all the arguments to the opposite, which however have already been almost solved above at d. 7, q. 3 and 4. The foundation of this solution is the distinction of power placed in the corpus, namely into essential and notional power (which in the solution to [objection] 1 is called power *in a person*). The former regards production *ad extra*, which is common to the three persons; the latter, however, [regards] production *ad intra*, that is, the power of generating in the Father and of spirating in the Father and the Son. Indeed, power and omnipotence can be taken in a broad sense for any productive power, whether it produces *ad intra* or *ad extra*; nevertheless properly under omnipotence is understood nothing but essential power. To solve the objection that to generate in God is simply [a] power which does not befit the Son and the Holy Spirit, Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below ad I.) well observes: «To generate in man and in God is dissimilar, since in divine things this very generating is from the whole substance, not from a part, and on this account in divine things the substance is the same. But in man it is not so; for generation does not occur from the whole substance, but by a separation from a part. Hence there [in man] the substance of father and son is not altogether the same, although the specific form is the same; and on this account in the generation by which a man generates a man, substance and relation are multiplied. And therefore in man to generate is to be able [in respect of] *what* and [in respect of] *toward something*; to be able [in respect of] *what* speaks by way of multiplication of substance, to be able [in respect of] *toward something* by multiplication of relation. But in divine things, in generation, substance is not multiplied, but only relation; and on this account to be able to generate in divine things is not to be able [in respect of] *what*, but to be able [in respect of] *toward something*». These things being supposed, the solution of the same Alexander is understood as to the objection: there is some power in the Father, which nevertheless is not in the Son, in this way responding: «It is a change of category, for *what* is changed into *toward something*». — Concerning power itself in itself it is treated below at dd. 42, 43, 44.

**II.** Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 3. — Scotus, on this and the following [question] here q. unic.; *Reportata*, here q. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 2; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following here a. 5; on this and the following q., *Summa* p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 1-3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st *principium*, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following, *Summa* a. 70, q. 2, n. 41-63. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unic.

---


title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum sit ibi aequatio quantum ad intensionem potentiae.

title_alt: Whether there is equality there as to the intensity of power

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum in divinis personis sit aequalitas quantum ad intensionem potentiae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas quantum ad intensionem potentiae. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Nihil est potentius sua virtute; sed Christus est Dei virtus[^1]: ergo Pater non est potentior Filio; similiter pari ratione nec Filius Spiritu sancto.

2. Item, substantiae aeque nobilis[^2] aeque nobilis et excellens est potentia; sed substantia est aeque nobilis in Filio ut in Patre, ergo et potentia aeque nobilis: ergo nihil potentius potest Pater quam Filius.

3. Item, ea potentia, qua potest quis supra infinitam et summam distantiam, nihil est potentius; sed potentia Verbi potest supra infinitam et summam distantiam, quae est inter ens et non ens, quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, ea potentia, cui nihil potest resistere nec aliquid potest eam retardare, nihil est potentius; sed potentiam Filii nihil potest retardare nec aliquid potest ei resistere, quia subito facit et libere, Psalmus[^4]: *Dixit et facta sunt*: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Potentior est potentia in eo qui[^5] solum potest agere, quam in eo qui agere et pati; sed in Patre est solum agere, in Filio agere et pati: ergo etc.

2. Item, potentius aliquid potest quod est primum principium, quam quod non est primum, quia «omnis causa primaria plus influit quam secunda[^6]»; sed Pater est primum principium: ergo unum et idem potentius potest Pater quam Filius.

3. Item, potentius potest qui habet potentiam a se, quam qui ab alio; qui enim aliquid a se habet multo melius habet, quam qui ab alio accipit[^7]: ergo cum Filius habeat posse a Patre, Pater autem per se et a se, ergo etc.

4. Item, plus potest aliquis, qui potest et per se et per alium, quam qui tantum per se; sed Pater potest operari per Filium, Spiritus sanctus non potest per Filium, nec etiam ipse Filius proprie loquendo: ergo etc.

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> **Conclusio.** *Potentia in divinis personis est aeque intensa.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod potentia in Patre et Filio est aeque intensa, quia in utroque summa est et aeque nobilis, quia in utroque una per naturam non degenerans[^8] — similiter et in Spiritu sancto — et hoc, loquendo de Filio secundum divinam naturam, secundum quam est aequalis Patri.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Filius potest pati; dicendum, quod istud[^9] non est secundum potentiam divinam, sed secundum infirmitatem humanam; et secundum illam inferior est Patre et minus potens; secundum autem divinam non potest pati, sicut nec Pater.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod primum principium magis potest; dicendum, quod primum et[^10] principium aut solum dicit ordinem, aut substantialem differentiam. Si solum ordinem, cum unum et idem sit utrobique, non est potentius hic quam ibi. Si autem differentiam substantialem cum ordine, sic verum est, quod potentius est primum quam secundum, quia secundum addit aliquid supra primum, quod dum facit magis compositum[^11], magis reddit limitatum, et ita minus potens.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, iam solutum est: quia habere ab alio, hoc est aut differente substantialiter, aut personaliter. Si substantialiter, sic[^12] verum est, quia cum habeat ab alio per essentiam, non habet essentialiter, sed participatione; sed quando habet ab alio personaliter, eodem tamen essentialiter, tunc habet aeque nobiliter, quia totaliter et essentialiter. Unde Ioannis quinto[^13]: *Sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio* etc.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto, quod Pater potest per se[^14] et per alium; dicendum, quod posse per alium est dupliciter: aut per aliam causam inferiorem simul agentem, aut per aliam personam. Primo modo potentius est posse per se et per alium, quam per se tantum; quia posse per alium dicit dominium, et ita potestatem; sed posse per alium ut[^15] per personam consubstantialem non dicit dominium, sed tantum auctoritatem. Auctoritas autem non dicit majoritatem, sed solum dicit originem, sicut posse ab alio et non ab alio non dicit minoritatem in potentia[^16], sed solum subauctoritatem et originem; et sic intelligendum in proposito de posse per alium et non posse per alium.

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in the divine persons there is equality as to the intensity of power.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] there is equality as to the intensity of power. And that it is so, is shown in this manner.

1. Nothing is more powerful than its own virtue; but Christ is the virtue of God[^1]: therefore the Father is not more powerful than the Son; likewise by parity of reason neither [is] the Son [more powerful] than the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, of an equally noble substance[^2] [there] is an equally noble and excellent power; but the substance is equally noble in the Son as in the Father, therefore also the power [is] equally noble: therefore the Father can [do] nothing more powerful than the Son.

3. Likewise, than that power by which someone is able [to act] over an infinite and supreme distance, nothing is more powerful; but the power of the Word is able [to act] over an infinite and supreme distance, which is between being and non-being, since *all things were made through him*[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, than that power which nothing can resist nor anything can hinder, nothing is more powerful; but nothing can hinder the power of the Son nor can anything resist it, since he acts suddenly and freely, the Psalm[^4]: *He spoke, and things were made*: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The power in him who[^5] only is able to act is more powerful than [the power] in him who [is able] to act and to be acted upon; but in the Father there is only acting, in the Son acting and being acted upon: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that which is the first principle is able to do something more powerful than that which is not the first, since «every primary cause influences more than the second[^6]»; but the Father is the first principle: therefore the Father can [do] one and the same thing more powerfully than the Son.

3. Likewise, he who has power from himself can [do] more powerfully than he who [has it] from another; for he who has something from himself has [it] much better than he who receives [it] from another[^7]: therefore since the Son has [his] power-to-be from the Father, but the Father [has it] through himself and from himself, therefore etc.

4. Likewise, he who is able [to act] both through himself and through another can [do] more than he who [is able] only through himself; but the Father can operate through the Son, [whereas] the Holy Spirit cannot [operate] through the Son, nor even the Son himself, properly speaking: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *Power in the divine persons is equally intense.*

**I respond:** It must be said, that the power in the Father and the Son is equally intense, since in both it is supreme and equally noble, since in both [it is] one through nature, not degenerating[^8] — likewise also in the Holy Spirit — and this, speaking of the Son according to the divine nature, according to which he is equal to the Father.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that the Son can be acted upon; it must be said, that this[^9] is not according to the divine power, but according to human infirmity; and according to that he is inferior to the Father and less powerful; but according to the divine [nature] he cannot be acted upon, just as neither [can] the Father.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the first principle is more able; it must be said, that *first* and[^10] *principle* either expresses only order, or substantial difference. If only order, since there is one and the same [thing] in both, it is not more powerful here than there. But if [it expresses] substantial difference together with order, in this way it is true that the first is more powerful than the second, since the second adds something over and above the first, which, while it makes [it] more composite[^11], renders [it] more limited, and so less powerful.

3. To that which is objected thirdly, [the answer] is already resolved: because to have from another is either by a substantial difference, or a personal one. If substantially, in this way[^12] it is true, since when he has from another by essence, he does not have essentially, but by participation; but when he has from another personally, yet by the same [thing] essentially, then he has equally nobly, because totally and essentially. Whence in John the fifth[^13]: *As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son* etc.

4. To that which is objected fourthly, that the Father can [act] through himself[^14] and through another; it must be said, that to-be-able through another is in two ways: either through another inferior cause acting at the same time, or through another person. In the first way it is more powerful to be able [to act] through oneself and through another, than through oneself only; since to be able through another expresses dominion, and so power; but to be able through another as[^15] through a consubstantial person does not express dominion, but only authority. But authority does not express majority, but only expresses origin, just as to-be-able from another and not from another does not express minority in power[^16], but only sub-authority and origin; and so it is to be understood in the present matter concerning to-be-able through another and not-to-be-able through another.

la: I. *Cor.* I, 24. — Paulo ante post *virtute* codd. *aa bb* addunt *nec extensive nec intensive*.

en: 1 *Cor.* 1, 24. — A little before, after *virtute*, codices *aa, bb* add *nec extensive nec intensive* ("neither extensively nor intensively").

la: In lectione, quae in mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 communior est, ponitur genitivus *nobilis* pro *nobili*, quod habet Vat. Paulo infra post *ergo et potentia* cod. *bb* adiungit *est*.

en: In the reading which is more common in the manuscripts together with editions 1, 2, 3, the genitive *nobilis* is set in place of *nobili*, which the Vatican edition has. A little below, after *ergo et potentia*, codex *bb* adds *est*.

la: 148, 5. — Vat. cum cod. *cc*, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, *patet quia* loco *Psalmus*.

en: [Psalm] 148, 5. — The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, with the other codices together with edition 1 however resisting, [reads] *patet quia* in place of *Psalmus*.

la: Supple cum cod. V *potest*. Habentur hic in codicibus diversae lectiones: sic in aliquibus ut A T et in ed. 1 post *quam* omittitur *in eo*, immo inveniuntur mss. ut Z, in quibus desunt verba *in eo qui*. Paulo infra post *Filio* cod. X addit *est*, e contra plures codd. ut S T V cum ed. 1 omittunt *agere et*.

en: Supply with codex V *potest* ("is able"). Various readings are found here in the codices: thus in some such as A, T and in edition 1, after *quam* the words *in eo* are omitted, indeed there are found manuscripts such as Z in which the words *in eo qui* are missing. A little below, after *Filio*, codex X adds *est*; on the contrary, several codices such as S, T, V together with edition 1 omit *agere et*.

la: Libr. *de Causis*, propos. 1: *Omnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda*. — Paulo ante post *quod non* in edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 et in pluribus mss. ut T V Y omittitur *est*.

en: The book *On Causes*, proposition 1: *Every primary cause is more influential upon its caused [effect] than the universal second cause*. — A little before, after *quod non*, in editions 1, 2, 3, 6 and in many manuscripts such as T, V, Y, *est* is omitted.

la: Praestamus antiquam lectionem ed. 1 et mss., quorum tamen aliqui ut A G P Q habent *recipit* loco *accipit*, dum Vat. legit *quam si ab alio recipiat*. Paulo supra cod. V post *ab alio* addit *accipit*, qui et dein cum aliquibus mss. ut V X loco *a se* ponit *per se*, cod. T autem *a se et per se*, quae lectio subnexis conformior est.

en: We offer the ancient reading of edition 1 and of the manuscripts, of which however some such as A, G, P, Q have *recipit* in place of *accipit*, whereas the Vatican edition reads *quam si ab alio recipiat* ("than if he should receive from another"). A little above, codex V after *ab alio* adds *accipit*; the same [codex] also then, with some manuscripts such as V, X, in place of *a se* sets *per se*, but codex T [reads] *a se et per se*, which reading is more conformable to what follows.

la: Alludit ad verba Hilarii supra d. XIX. p. 1. c. 4. allegata et ibid. dub. II. explicata. — Paulo infra post *Spiritu sancto* Vat. cum cod. *cc* adiungit *est*.

en: [Bonaventure] alludes to the words of Hilary cited above d. XIX, p. 1, c. 4 and explained ibid. dub. II. — A little below, after *Spiritu sancto*, the Vatican edition with codex *cc* adds *est*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut Y Z cum ed. 1 *illud*. Mox post *potentiam* in cod. *bb* additur *vel naturam*.

en: Some codices such as Y, Z together with edition 1 [read] *illud*. Soon after, after *potentiam*, in codex *bb* is added *vel naturam* ("or nature").

la: Ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus particulam *et*, quae a cod. V etiam paulo supra, ubi eadem propositio occurrit, minus bene ponitur, quia ibi est tantum repetitio obiectionis, hic autem ipsius resolutio.

en: From very many manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied the particle *et*, which by codex V is also a little above — where the same proposition occurs — less well set [there], since there it is only the repetition of the objection, but here [it is] the resolution of it.

la: Cod. T hic addit *est*, ac post *compositum* particulam *et*; lectio non spernenda. — Cfr. supra pag. 169 nota 4.

en: Codex T here adds *est*, and after *compositum* the particle *et*; a reading not to be despised. — Cf. above p. 169, note 4.

la: Aliqui codd. ut X Z cum ed. 1 *tunc*. Mox post *habeat ab alio* in cod. X additur *differente ab alio*, et paulo infra verbo *personaliter* praefigitur *differente*. Cod. Y *per participationem* pro *participatione*.

en: Some codices such as X, Z together with edition 1 [read] *tunc* ("then"). Soon after, after *habeat ab alio*, in codex X is added *differente ab alio* ("differing from another"), and a little below the word *personaliter* is prefixed with *differente*. Codex Y [reads] *per participationem* in place of *participatione*.

la: Vers. 26, in quo textu Vulgata cum Vat. post *dedit* adiungit *et*, sed contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.

en: Verse 26, in which text the Vulgate together with the Vatican edition after *dedit* adds *et*, but against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.

la: In pluribus codd. ut A I T Y Z et ed. 1 deest *per se et*. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 post *primum aut per* substituit *aliquam* loco *aliam*.

en: In many codices such as A, I, T, Y, Z and in edition 1 the words *per se et* are missing. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and edition 1, after *primum aut per* substitutes *aliquam* in place of *aliam*.

la: Fide plurium mss. ut F G H M Y *ee* supplevimus *ut*, loco cuius codd. *aa bb* post *personam* addunt *scilicet*. Paulo ante cod. Y post *quia posse* adiungit *sic*, et dein ed. 1 omittit *ita*.

en: On the authority of several manuscripts such as F, G, H, M, Y, *ee* we have supplied *ut* ("as"), in place of which codices *aa, bb* after *personam* add *scilicet* ("namely"). A little before, codex Y after *quia posse* adds *sic*, and then edition 1 omits *ita*.

la: Supple: *in eo qui potest ab alio*. — Pauci codd. ut M N cum ed. 1 post *minoritatem* addunt *vel maioritatem*, unus alterve codex autem ut S ponit *maioritatem* loco *minoritatem*.

en: Supply: *in eo qui potest ab alio* ("in him who is able [to act] from another"). — A few codices such as M, N together with edition 1 after *minoritatem* add *vel maioritatem* ("or majority"); but one or another codex such as S sets *maioritatem* in place of *minoritatem*.

latin_scholion:
De hac quaestione non invenimus speciatim tractare nisi Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 2. Alex. Hal. autem eadem obiecta solvit *S.* p. I. q. 47. m. 2. 3. Quoad 2. oppositionis ita dicit: «Descensus causarum creatarum est secundum minorem distantiam a causa prima, propter quod, secundum quod magis descendunt, minus participant de virtute primae causae; non sic in divinis, licet sit ibi ordo naturae; sunt enim omnino idem secundum substantiam; unde in illis non potest esse differentia virtutis vel potentiae.»

---

english_scholion:
On this question we have not found [anyone] who treats [it] in particular except Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 2. But Alex. of Hales solves the same objections [in] *S.* p. I, q. 47, m. 2, 3. As to the second of the opposing arguments he speaks thus: «The descent of created causes is according to a lesser distance from the first cause, on account of which, according as they descend more, they participate less in the virtue of the first cause; not so in the divine [persons], although there is there an order of nature; for they are altogether the same according to substance; whence in them there cannot be a difference of virtue or of power.»

---


title: Dist. 20, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum ordo sit ibi ponendus.
Whether order is to be posited there

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II.

#### *De ordine in divinis.*

Consequenter est quaestio secundo loco de secundo articulo, scilicet[^1] utrum in divinis sit ordo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum ordo sit ibi[^2] ponendus.

Secundo, utrum ordo naturae.

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### QUAESTIO I.

#### *Utrum in divinis sit ratio ordinis.*

Quod in divinis sit ordo, ostenditur:

1. Primo per Augustinum *contra Maximinum*[^3]: «Cum dicitur Filius a Patre, non significatur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae».

2. Item, hoc videtur auctoritate Ecclesiae, quia Ecclesia nominationem Trinitatis exprimit ordinate. Dicitur enim *in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti*, et hic ordo nunquam mutatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, principium dicit rationem ordinis. «Primum enim et principium, dicit Philosophus[^4], idem dico»; sed in divinis Pater est principium Filii, ergo primus. Sed ubi hoc, ibi ordo: ergo etc.

4. Item, ordo dicit rationem completi esse et boni — «esse enim, ut dicit Boethius[^5], est quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam»; similiter et bonum — sed in divinis perfectissime est ratio esse et boni: ergo est ibi ratio ordinis.

5. Item, ubicumque sunt plures, inter quos non est ordo, sunt inordinati; sed in divinis personis est pluralitas: ergo si non est ibi ordo, est inordinatio et confusio; sed inordinatio et confusio repugnat[^6] divinis; ergo est ibi ordo.

**Contra:** 1. Eusebius[^7]: «In divinis est numerus, sed non ordo».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ex ratione ordinis. Augustinus *de civitate Dei*[^8]: «Ordo est parium dispariumque sua unicuique tribuens loca dispositio»; sed in divinis non est distinctio locorum: ergo etc.

3. Item, ordo contrariatur *simultati*[^9], ergo ubi est ordo, non est omnimoda simultas; sed ubi non est omnimoda simultas, non est perfecta aequalitas: ergo cum in divinis sit omnimoda et perfecta aequalitas, nullus est ibi ordo.

4. Item, si ordo est in divinis, aut est quid essentiale, aut notionale. Non essentiale, quia ubi ordo, ibi distinctio; in divinis autem non est distinctio secundum essentiam: ergo etc. Nec quid notionale, quoniam idem est notio et proprietas, sed ordo nullius personae est proprietas[^10]: ergo etc.

5. Item, ubi est ordo, ibi est dependentia et inclinatio; nihil enim ordinatur ad aliquid, nisi ad illud habeat inclinationem; in divinis autem nulla est dependentia: ergo ibi nullus omnino ordo[^11].

6. Item, ordo praesupponit numerum; sed in divinis non cadit differentia secundum numerum, ut ostensum est supra[^12]: ergo nec ordo.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Ordo ponendus est in divinis, sed solummodo ordo secundum originem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod triplex est ordo, scilicet secundum positionem, secundum antecessionem et secundum originem.

Ordo secundum positionem dicitur aliquorum, quorum unum est superius, aliud inferius. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel in loco, vel in dignitate. Et hic ordo non cadit in divinis, sicut ostendit prima ratio sumta ab Eusebio, et secunda sumta ab Augustino, sicut patet.

Ordo vero secundum antecessionem dicitur esse eorum, quorum unum prius est, alterum vero posterius; et hoc dicitur dupliciter: aut quia antecedit duratione sive tempore, aut prius naturali intelligentia sive cognitione. Et hic ordo non est in divinis, sicut probat ratio tertia, quia hic ordo tollit aequalitatem et simultatem, quorum utrumque perfecte est in divinis.

Ordo autem secundum originem sive secundum emanationem est producentis ad productum[^13]. Et iste ordo est in divinis, quia ibi est ordo principii et

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principiati, sive producentis et producti, et hunc ordinem esse in divinis probant rationes primae.

**Ad 4.** Quod obiicitur quarto, quod ordo non est quid notionale nec essentiale[^14]; dicendum, quod est notionale; sed notionem contingit dupliciter significare: aut sub propria ratione, ut cum dicitur generatio; aut sub communi ratione, communitate, inquam, rationis, ut cum dicitur ordo, notio, proprietas[^17] — sicut individuum est communis intentio — et sub hac communitate non distinguit, tamen in suis inferioribus distinctionem supponit.

**Ad 5.** Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi est ordo, ibi dependentia; dicendum, quod ordo importat habitudinem, et quia habitudo in creaturis ratione imperfectionis dicit dependentiam, ideo in creaturis importat dependentiam; in divinis autem habitudo[^15] solum ponit comparationem et connexionem et nullam dependentiam et inclinationem: ideo etc.

**Ad 6.** Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod ordo praesupponit numerum; dicendum, quod sicut in divinis numerus distrahit[^16] a ratione numeri, quia ibi est distinctio hypostasum tantum, ita ordo a ratione ordinis simpliciter, quia, quamvis ibi sit ordo, non tamen est ibi antecessio, sed solum originis emanatio.

Vel aliter dicendum, quod non semper praesupponit distinctionem secundum numerum, nisi intelligatur de ordine locali sive secundum positionem. Nam ordo secundum naturam et secundum naturalem intelligentiam attenditur inter superius et inferius, inter quae non cadit numerus. Et ita patet illud.

english:
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### ARTICLE II.

#### *On order in the divine.*

Consequently the question is in the second place concerning the second article, namely[^1] whether in the divine there is order. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether order is to be posited there[^2].

Secondly, whether order of nature.

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### QUESTION I.

#### *Whether in the divine there is the account of order.*

That in the divine there is order, is shown:

1. First through Augustine *Against Maximinus*[^3]: «When the Son is said to be from the Father, an inequality of substance is not signified, but an order of nature».

2. Likewise, this is seen by the authority of the Church, for the Church expresses the naming of the Trinity in an ordered way. For it is said *in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*, and this order is never changed: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, principle expresses the account of order. «For the *first* and *principle*, says the Philosopher[^4], I call the same»; but in the divine the Father is the principle of the Son, therefore he is first. But where this is, there is order: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, order expresses the account of complete being and of the good — «for being, as Boethius says[^5], is what retains order and preserves nature»; and likewise the good — but in the divine the account of being and of the good is most perfectly: therefore there is there the account of order.

5. Likewise, wherever there are several things, among which there is no order, they are unordered; but in the divine persons there is plurality: therefore if there is no order there, there is unorderedness and confusion; but unorderedness and confusion is repugnant[^6] to the divine; therefore there is order there.

**On the contrary:** 1. Eusebius[^7]: «In the divine there is number, but not order».

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen from the account of order. Augustine *On the City of God*[^8]: «Order is the disposition assigning to each its own places, of equal and unequal things»; but in the divine there is no distinction of places: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, order is contrary to *simultaneity*[^9], therefore where there is order, there is not complete simultaneity; but where there is not complete simultaneity, there is not perfect equality: therefore since in the divine there is complete and perfect equality, there is no order there.

4. Likewise, if order is in the divine, either it is something essential, or notional. Not essential, because where there is order, there is distinction; but in the divine there is no distinction according to essence: therefore etc. Nor [is it] something notional, since notion and property are the same, but order is the property of no person[^10]: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, where there is order, there is dependence and inclination; for nothing is ordered to anything, unless it has an inclination toward it; but in the divine there is no dependence: therefore there is no order at all there[^11].

6. Likewise, order presupposes number; but in the divine there does not occur difference according to number, as was shown above[^12]: therefore neither order.

### CONCLUSION.

> Order is to be posited in the divine, but only order according to origin.

**I respond:** It must be said that order is threefold, namely according to position, according to antecedence, and according to origin.

Order according to position is said of those things of which one is higher, the other lower. And this can be in two ways: either in place, or in dignity. And this order does not occur in the divine, as the first reason taken from Eusebius shows, and the second taken from Augustine, as is plain.

But order according to antecedence is said to be of those things of which one is prior, while the other is posterior; and this is said in two ways: either because it precedes in duration or in time, or [because it is] prior in natural intelligence or cognition. And this order is not in the divine, as the third reason proves, because this order takes away equality and simultaneity, both of which are perfectly in the divine.

But order according to origin or according to emanation is [the order] of the producer to the produced[^13]. And this order is in the divine, because there is there the order of principle and

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of that-from-the-principle, or of the producer and the produced; and that this order is in the divine the first reasons prove.

**To 4.** As to what is objected fourth, that order is neither something notional nor essential[^14]; it must be said that it is notional; but notion can be signified in two ways: either under its proper account, as when one says *generation*; or under a common account — by community, I say, of account — as when one says *order*, *notion*, *property*[^17] — just as *individual* is a common intention — and under this community it does not distinguish, yet in its lower [members] it presupposes distinction.

**To 5.** To that which is objected: where there is order, there is dependence; it must be said that order imports a relation, and because in creatures relation by reason of imperfection expresses dependence, therefore in creatures it imports dependence; but in the divine, relation[^15] only posits comparison and connection and no dependence and inclination: therefore etc.

**To 6.** To that which is objected last, that order presupposes number; it must be said that just as in the divine number is drawn[^16] away from the account of number, because there is there a distinction of hypostases only, so order [is drawn] from the account of order simply, because, although there is order there, nevertheless there is no antecedence there, but only emanation of origin.

Or otherwise it must be said that [order] does not always presuppose distinction according to number, unless it be understood of local order or [order] according to position. For order according to nature and according to natural intelligence is regarded between higher and lower, between which number does not occur. And so that [argument] is plain.

la: Aliqui codd. ut *Y Z* cum ed. 1 *illud*. Mox post *potentiam* in cod. *bb* additur *vel naturam*.

en: Some codices such as *Y Z* with edition 1 [read] *illud*. Next, after *potentiam*, in codex *bb* there is added *vel naturam*.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ibi* loco *in divinis*, quod et paulo infra post *Secundo, utrum* Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *ibi* ("there") in place of *in divinis* ("in the divine"), which the Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, also adds a little below after *Secundo, utrum*.

la: Libr. II. c. 14. n. 8. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem. — Ex cod. *T* posuimus *contra* loco *ad*. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, post *Maximinum* addit *ubi dicit*.

en: Book II, c. 14, n. 8. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 3, near the end. — From codex *T* we have placed *contra* in place of *ad*. The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, after *Maximinum* adds *ubi dicit* ("where he says").

la: Libr. I. *Poster.* c. 2. — Totum hoc tertium argumentum abest a Vat. et cod. *cc*, exstat tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1.

en: Book I *Posterior [Analytics]*, c. 2. — This whole third argument is absent from the Vatican edition and codex *cc*, but is extant in the other manuscripts and in edition 1.

la: Libr. IV. *de Consol.* Prosa 2.

en: Book IV *On Consolation*, Prose 2.

la: Cod. *V* *repugnant*.

en: Codex *V* [reads] *repugnant* ("are repugnant").

la: Colligitur ex libro S. Eusebii Vercellens. *de Trin. Confessione*, ubi n. 8. ait: «Haec ergo sancta Trinitas, quae unus est et verus Deus, non recedit a numero nec capitur numero. In relatione enim personarum numerus cernitur. In divinitatis vero substantia quid innumeratum sit, non comprehenditur». Et ibid. n. 10: «Nec tamen tres istae personae separabiles existimandae sunt, cum nulla ante aliam, nulla post aliam, nulla sine alia vel exstitisse vel quidpiam operasse aliquando credatur».

en: It is gathered from the book of St. Eusebius of Vercelli *On the Confession of the Trinity*, where in n. 8 he says: «This holy Trinity therefore, which is one and true God, neither departs from number nor is grasped by number. For in the relation of the persons number is discerned. But in the substance of the divinity what is unnumbered is not comprehended». And in the same place, n. 10: «Nor however are these three persons to be esteemed separable, since none is believed ever to have existed or to have done anything before another, after another, or without another».

la: Libr. XIX. c. 13. n. 1, ubi Vat. falso *partium disparium* loco *parium dispariumque*. Mox cod. *V* *dispositio* pro *distinctio*.

en: Book XIX, c. 13, n. 1, where the Vatican edition wrongly [reads] *partium disparium* in place of *parium dispariumque*. Next codex *V* [reads] *dispositio* in place of *distinctio*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Priori et Simul.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter *On the Prior and the Simultaneous*.

la: Cod. *X*, addito in principio huius argumenti tertio disiunctionis membro, scil. *aut personale*, hic adiungit *Item non personale, quia ordo est communis, persona non*. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 46. m. 1. in simili obiectione tria membra ponit, scil. aut est *essentia* aut *persona* aut *notio*, et respectu secundi membri ait: «Item nec potest dici, quod iste ordo sit persona, immo est personarum, quia dicit habitudinem personarum ad personas». Et B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tract. 9. q. 41. m. 2. a. 1. tria obiectionis membra proferens, de secundo ait: «Nec (ordo dicit) personam: ordo enim personarum est, persona autem personarum non est; sicut non sunt ordinata ordo, sed ordo est ordinatorum». Attamen iam per se manifestum est, quod ordo non dicit personam; unde hoc divisionis membrum omitti potuit; vel dic, quod sub *notionali* comprehenditur *personale*.

en: Codex *X*, with a third member of the disjunction added at the beginning of this argument, namely *or personal*, here adjoins *Likewise not personal, because order is common, person is not*. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 46, m. 1, in a similar objection puts forward three members, namely either it is *essence* or *person* or *notion*, and with respect to the second member he says: «Likewise neither can it be said that this order is a person, rather it is of persons, because it expresses the relation of persons to persons». And Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tract. 9, q. 41, m. 2, a. 1, putting forward three members of the objection, says of the second: «Nor (does order express) a person: for order is of persons, but person is not of persons; just as the things ordered are not order, but order is of the things ordered». Yet it is already manifest of itself that order does not express a person; whence this member of the division could be omitted; or say that under *notional* the *personal* is comprehended.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut *V Z* praemittunt verbum *est*.

en: Some codices such as *V Z* prefix the word *est*.

en: Distinction 19, part II, question 4.

la: In codd. *aa bb* additur *et hoc dupliciter: vel secundum quod unum est ab alio essentialiter, et sic non est in divinis, sed solum in his inferioribus; vel secundum quod unum est ab alio personaliter tantum*.

en: In codices *aa bb* there is added *and this in two ways: either according as one is from another essentially, and thus it is not in the divine, but only in these lower [things]; or according as one is from another personally only*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 loco *essentiale* ponunt *personale*, quod vel est lapsus librariorum, vel signum, quod hic et in ipsa obiectione tertium divisionis membrum, ut non necessario enumerandum, omissum sit, sicut supra a nobis fide codicis *X* observatum est. — Paulo ante fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 delevimus *Ad illud*, quod Vat. verbis *quod obiicitur* praefigit. Mox cod. *A* *notionale* pro *notionem*.

en: Very many codices with editions 1, 2, 3 in place of *essentiale* put *personale*, which is either a slip of the scribes, or a sign that here, and in the objection itself, the third member of the division was omitted as not necessarily to be enumerated, as has been observed above by us on the testimony of codex *X*. — A little before, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted *Ad illud*, which the Vatican edition prefixes to the words *quod obiicitur*. Next codex *A* [reads] *notionale* in place of *notionem*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, omittit hic *habitudo* et paulo infra *ideo*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, with the other codices and edition 1 nevertheless resisting, here omits *habitudo*, and a little below *ideo*.

la: Cod. *X* *distrahitur*, scilicet *numerus in divinis trahitur a sensu proprio ad improprium*. Cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 4, et dub. 2.

en: Codex *X* [reads] *distrahitur*, namely *numerus in divinis trahitur a sensu proprio ad improprium* ("number in the divine is drawn from a proper to an improper sense"). Cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 4, and dub. 2.

la: In codd. *aa bb* additur *principium*, cuius mentionem facit et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4.

en: In codices *aa bb* there is added *principium* ("principle"), which St. Thomas also mentions, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Richard. a Med. (hic q. 3.) dicit: «Ordo simpliciter importat ordinatorum distinctionem et distinctorum mutuam habitudinem prioris et posterioris gradus. Quamvis autem personae inter se sint distinctae et habeant mutuam habitudinem inter se, gradum tamen prioris et posterioris non habent, quia nulla prior est alia duratione nec dignitate nec etiam secundum naturam». Unde merito concludit, quod, sicut in divinis non dici debet numerus nisi cum determinatione, scil. *numerus personarum*, sic non debet dici, quod in divinis est ordo simpliciter, sed cum determinatione, scil. *ordo originis*, non quo unus sit prior alio, sed quo unus est ab alio. Eandem sententiam Seraphicus, distinctis variis ordinis speciebus, pluribus conclusionibus tuetur et in solut. ad ult. clarius explicat. Quod hic dicit de numeris iam supra d. 19. p. II. q. 4. probatum est.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 46. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq. *Quodlib.* q. 1. et 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 42. a. 3, q. 33. a. 1. ad 3. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 7; *S.* p. I. tr. 9. q. 41. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 52. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. [hic].

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english_scholion:
**I.** Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 3) says: «Order simply imports the distinction of the things ordered and the mutual relation of the distinct things of a prior and posterior grade. Now although the persons among themselves are distinct and have a mutual relation among themselves, nevertheless they do not have a grade of prior and posterior, because none is prior to another in duration, nor in dignity, nor even according to nature». Whence he rightly concludes that, just as in the divine number ought not to be said except with a determination, namely *number of persons*, so it ought not to be said that in the divine there is order simply, but with a determination, namely *order of origin*, not by which one is prior to another, but by which one is from another. The Seraphic Doctor maintains the same opinion, the various species of order being distinguished, with several conclusions, and explains it more clearly in the solution to the last [objection]. What he says here about numbers has already been proved above d. 19, p. II, q. 4.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 46, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following [questions], *Quodlibet* qq. 1 and 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 3, q. 33, a. 1, ad 3. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following, here a. 7; *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unic., a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ., q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 52, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following, [here].

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