title: Dist. 11, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 257 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illo verbo Augustini: *Liquido apparet, non esse factum, per quem facta sunt omnia.* Videtur enim ista auctoritas esse falsa in se et ad propositum non valere: quoniam dicimus, quod *ex ipso et per ipsum sunt omnia*[^1]: ergo si omnia sunt per ipsum, ipse nihil est; constat, quod hoc non sequitur: ergo pari ratione non sequitur: omnia facta sunt per ipsum, ergo ipse non est factus. — Item, videtur, quod non valeat ad propositum: quia Augustinus loquitur de Filio Dei secundum divinam naturam; cum autem quaeritur, utrum Christus sit creatura, hoc est secundum naturam assumtam: videtur ergo, quod auctoritas illa et aliae sequentes sint adductae valde improprie.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod auctoritas et vera est in se et ad propositum valet. In se quidem vera est, quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto. Si enim ipse est principium omnium creatorum, impossibile est, ipsum esse aliquid creatorum, tum ratione potentiae creandi, quae non potest competere creaturae; tum ratione generalitatis principiandi, quae non potest competere rei creatae. Nec valet ista instantia: *Ex ipso sunt omnia* etc., omnia scilicet facta; quia *omnia* pro universitate rerum distribuit, et *Deus* non est de universo, sed supra universum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod sit nihil[^2].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non *valet ad propositum*; dicendum, quod Christus nominat personam Verbi ut in duabus naturis; et quia nomen impositum est personae Filii Dei, quia[^3] Filio Dei repugnat, repugnat etiam Christo. Et ideo auctoritas inducta et aliae sequentes ad propositum quidem faciunt, sed hoc est *per accidens.* — Alio etiam modo faciunt ad propositum, quia auctoritates inductae sunt in littera[^4], quae sunt contra errorem Arianum; et quoniam praedictus sermo, simpliciter et sine determinatione prolatus, sermoni Arii est propinquus; ideo quasi *ex consequenti* auctoritates inductae obviant praedicto sermoni. Et propterea valent tam in se quam ad propositum[^5].

<!-- page 258 -->

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Etsi Christus secundum hominem est creatura, non tamen simpliciter est praedicandus* etc. **Contra:** quod vere de altero praedicatur cum determinatione non diminuente vere praedicatur de ipso *simpliciter*[^6]; sed *homo* non diminuit de ratione Christi: ergo si aliquid dicitur de Christo secundum hominem, videtur, quod *simpliciter* dicatur de ipso. — Item, quando aliquid natum est inesse solum secundum corpus, vere dicitur de toto *simpliciter*, si quantum ad corpus dicatur[^7]: ergo pari ratione, si aliquid natum est inesse Christo secundum humanam naturam; videtur, quod necessaria sit consequentia, quod ei *simpliciter* et absolute convenit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum aliquid dicitur de aliquo *simpliciter* et cum *determinatione*[^8], hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod *simpliciter* dictum *non ponat latius* rem suam, quam cum ponitur cum determinatione, et tunc licet inferre; aut ita, quod *latius ponat* rem suam, quantum est de sensu, quem verba praetendunt, et tunc consequentia potest negari: sicut non sequitur, si inferatur: iste est albus secundum pedem, ergo iste est albus; per hunc modum non sequitur: quia *esse creatura*[^9] secundum hominem attribuitur Christo ratione *naturae assumtae*, prolatum autem *simpliciter* videtur ei omnino convenire; consuetum enim est, nomine creaturae ea intelligi, quae omnino inducta sunt de *non-esse* in esse. Et sic patet responsio ad utramque rationem. — Vel dicatur, sicut supra dictum fuit distinctione *septima*[^10] de praedestinatione Christi, quod non sequitur: est praedestinatus secundum hominem, ergo est praedestinatus simpliciter; non quia *homo* diminuit, sed quia variatur attributio praedicati, ut cum prius attribuitur *humanae naturae*, postmodum attribuitur *divinae personae.* Et ideo talis modus procedendi inducit *accidens* in aliquibus praedicatis, quae per suam extraneitatem nec communicantur nec inferri possunt.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nitens probare, Christum esse aliquid non divinum.* Videtur enim, quod Magister habeat illud pro inconvenienti; sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens, quia cum Christus sit *dominus*, haec non recipitur: Christus est homo dominicus[^11]: ergo pari ratione, cum Christus sit *Deus*, haec non videtur admittenda: Christus est aliquid divinum: ergo eius opposita est vera, scilicet Christus est aliquid non divinum. — Item, videtur, quod argumentatio illa sit necessaria: si Christus est aliqua *substantia* non divina, quod Christus sit *aliquid* non divinum: ad *esse* enim *substantiam* necessario sequitur *esse aliquid*[^12]. Sicut ergo sequitur: est homo albus, ergo animal album; ita necessario sequi videtur: est *substantia* non divina, ergo *aliquid* non divinum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec est vera: Christus est *aliquid divinum*; et haec est falsa: Christus est *aliquid non divinum.* Nec est simile de hoc nomine *divinus* et de hoc nomine *dominicus.* Nam etsi utrumque sit possessorium, tamen *dominicus* importat circa illud, de quo dicitur, possessionem per modum *passionis* — dicitur enim *dominicus* a domino habitus vel possessus[^13] — sed *divinum* non solum per modum *passionis*, sed etiam per modum *actionis*; quia *divinum* dicitur quod habet divinitatem, per quem modum consuevit dici persona divina. Et propter hoc conceditur ista tanquam vera: Christus est aliquid divinum, quia est persona divina. Et ideo Magister[^14] hanc negat: Christus est aliquid non divinum; et dicit, quod haec consequentia non tenet: Christus, secundum quod creatura, est aliquid non divinum, ergo Christus est aliquid non divinum; quia in prima removet negatio divinitatem a natura creata, sed in conclusione removet a persona aeterna.

Si autem quaeratur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est homo divinus; dicendum, quod non. Nam cum sic dicitur, *divinus* non potest dicere divinitatem per modum *informantis*, nec possessionem per modum *actionis*, sed solum per modum *passionis*, per quem modum dicit Dionysius[^15]: divinissimus Paulus, vel divinissimus Ioannes. Unde impropriae sunt tales locutiones de Christo. Et propterea Magister concedit earum oppositas, cum dicit: « Christus secundum hominem est aliqua substantia non divina », id est non informata divinitate, quia est substantia creata. Ideo sane concedit praemissas et negat conclusionem dicens, peccatum esse in tali illatione[^16].

<!-- page 259 -->

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *ex tropicis locutionibus non est recta argumentationis processio.* Primo enim videtur, quod verbum illud nihil faciat ad propositum, quia nulla praedictarum locutionum est *tropica*; nulla enim ibi est transumtio, immo secundum proprietatem sermonis dicuntur. — Item, videtur esse falsum, quod ex tropicis locutionibus non est recta argumentationis processio, quia aut sunt verae, aut falsae; si verae, ex veris contingit inferre verum: ergo recta potest ex talibus locutionibus argumentatio fieri; si falsae; sed ex falsis potest recte inferri falsum, potest etiam et verum[^17]: videtur igitur, quod nihil sit dictum hoc quod Magister dicit. — Hic etiam modus solvendi videtur inauditus, quia non est per *interemptionem* nec per *divisionem*; nullus enim *locus sophisticus* est, nec in *dictione* nec *extra*, cuius dissolutio currat secundum hanc viam[^18].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *tropicus* sermo dupliciter potest dici: uno namque modo *tropicus* dicitur sermo, in quo est aliquod vitium aliquo tropo excusatum. Est enim *tropus* figura, et *figura* est vitium ratione excusatum[^19]. Alio modo dicitur *sermo tropicus* quilibet sermo, qui habet aliquam improprietatem, sed tamen excusatur per aliquam determinationem. Cum ergo dicit Magister, quod iste sermo: Christus est creatura secundum hominem, est tropicus; hoc dicit, quia aliquam habet improprietatem consurgentem ex repugnantia intellectuum, quae removetur per determinationem adiunctam. Et pro tanto vocat Magister praedictas locutiones *tropicas.* — Posset etiam dici, quod vocat eas *tropicas* accipiendo tropum pro *figura.* Possunt enim dici tales locutiones *synecdochicae*[^20], quia quod est partis attribuitur toti, et accipitur *largo* modo *pars* et *totum*, ut dicatur humana natura quodam modo esse *pars* respectu Christi, licet non proprie. Et sic potest dici, quod tales locutiones *tropicae* sunt et quod figurativae sunt per *synecdochen*, secundum quod *synecdoche* est figura locutionis. Sicut enim dicunt periti in grammatica, *synecdoche*[^21] aliquando est figura locutionis, aliquando figura constructionis.

Verum igitur dicit Magister in dicendo, praedictas locutiones esse *tropicas*; verum etiam dicit, quod ex tropicis non est recta argumentationis processio. Et ratio huius est, quoniam aliquando negatur aliqua locutio propter *improprietatem*; et cum aliquis sermo excusatur sub una forma, si fiat processio ad sermonem sub alia forma, in qua non invenit excusationem, proceditur a locutione, quae excusatur, ad eam quae non habet excusationem; et sic talis processus impeditur, sicut si procederetur a vero ad falsum. Unde illud argumentum non valet: iste est albus secundum pedem, ergo est coloratus secundum pedem[^22]. Quamvis enim ad *esse album* sequatur *esse coloratum*, tamen processus praedictus non valet, quia *color* non est natus inesse corpori secundum partem, sicut *albedo.*

<!-- page 260 -->

Et hoc est quod vult dicere Magister in proposito; et hoc est quod alias consuevit dici, quod locutiones impropriae non sunt extendendae nec ad consequentiam trahendae, sed magis sunt sustinendae et exponendae et arctandae, ne de minori improprietate veniatur ad maiorem[^23].

english:
### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that word of Augustine: *It plainly appears that he, through whom all things were made, was not himself made.* For this authority seems to be false in itself and to be of no avail for the purpose [at hand]: since we say that *from him and through him are all things*[^1]: therefore if all things are through him, he himself is nothing; it is established that this does not follow: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not follow: all things were made through him, therefore he himself was not made. — Likewise, it seems that it is of no avail for the purpose: for Augustine is speaking of the Son of God according to the divine nature; but when it is asked whether Christ is a creature, this is according to the assumed nature: therefore it seems that that authority and the others following are adduced very improperly.

**I respond:** It must be said that the authority is both true in itself and avails for the purpose. It is indeed true in itself, because the cause of the predicate is enclosed in the subject. For if he himself is the principle of all created things, it is impossible that he himself be anything of the created things, both by reason of the power of creating, which cannot belong to a creature; and by reason of the generality of being a principle, which cannot belong to a created thing. Nor does this objection avail: *From him are all things* etc., that is, all things made; because *all things* is distributed for the totality of things, and *God* is not part of the universe, but above the universe. And therefore it does not follow that he is nothing[^2].

To that which is objected, that it does not *avail for the purpose*; it must be said that Christ names the person of the Word as in two natures; and since the name is imposed on the person of the Son of God, [therefore] what is repugnant to the Son of God is repugnant also to Christ[^3]. And therefore the authority adduced and the others following do indeed make for the purpose, but this is *per accidens.* — In yet another way they make for the purpose, because the authorities adduced are in the text[^4], which are against the Arian error; and since the aforesaid utterance, set forth absolutely and without qualification, is close to the utterance of Arius; therefore as it were *by consequence* the authorities adduced go against the aforesaid utterance. And on that account they avail both in themselves and for the purpose[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Although Christ according to the man is a creature, nevertheless he is not to be predicated absolutely* etc. **On the contrary:** what is truly predicated of another with a non-diminishing qualification is truly predicated of it *absolutely*[^6]; but *man* does not diminish from the account of Christ: therefore if anything is said of Christ according to the man, it seems that it is said of him *absolutely.* — Likewise, when something is apt to be present only according to the body, it is truly said of the whole *absolutely*, if it is said as to the body[^7]: therefore by parity of reasoning, if something is apt to be present in Christ according to the human nature; it seems that the consequence is necessary, that it belongs to him *absolutely* and unqualifiedly.

**I respond:** It must be said that when something is said of something *absolutely* and with a *qualification*[^8], this can be twofold: either in such a way that the term said *absolutely does not posit* its meaning more widely than when it is posited with the qualification, and then it is permitted to infer; or in such a way that it *posits* its meaning *more widely*, so far as concerns the sense which the words present, and then the consequence can be denied: just as it does not follow, if one infers: this man is white according to his foot, therefore this man is white; in this way it does not follow: because *to be a creature*[^9] according to the man is attributed to Christ by reason of *the assumed nature*, but when set forth *absolutely* it seems to belong to him altogether; for it is customary that by the name of creature there be understood those things which have been brought altogether from *non-being* into being. And thus the response to both arguments is clear. — Or let it be said, as was said above in the *seventh*[^10] distinction concerning the predestination of Christ, that it does not follow: he is predestined according to the man, therefore he is predestined absolutely; not because *man* diminishes, but because the attribution of the predicate is varied, as when it is first attributed to *the human nature*, afterwards attributed to *the divine person.* And therefore such a manner of proceeding introduces *the accident* [fallacy] in certain predicates, which by their extraneousness are neither communicated nor able to be inferred.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Striving to prove that Christ is something not divine.* For it seems that the Master holds that as something unfitting; but this seems no unfitting thing, because since Christ is *lord*, this is not admitted: Christ is a lordly man[^11]: therefore by parity of reasoning, since Christ is *God*, this does not seem to be admitted: Christ is something divine: therefore its opposite is true, namely Christ is something not divine. — Likewise, it seems that that argumentation is necessary: if Christ is some *substance* not divine, that Christ is *something* not divine: for to *being a substance* there necessarily follows *being something*[^12]. As therefore it follows: he is a white man, therefore a white animal; so it seems necessarily to follow: he is a *substance* not divine, therefore *something* not divine.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true: Christ is *something divine*; and this is false: Christ is *something not divine.* Nor is it alike with this name *divine* and with this name *lordly.* For although each is possessive, nevertheless *lordly* imports, concerning that of which it is said, possession by way of *passion* — for one is called *lordly* as held or possessed by a lord[^13] — but *divine* [imports it] not only by way of *passion*, but also by way of *action*; because *divine* is said of that which has divinity, in which way a divine person is wont to be called. And on account of this, this is conceded as true: Christ is something divine, because he is a divine person. And therefore the Master[^14] denies this: Christ is something not divine; and he says that this consequence does not hold: Christ, insofar as a creature, is something not divine, therefore Christ is something not divine; because in the first [proposition] the negation removes divinity from the created nature, but in the conclusion it removes it from the eternal person.

But if it be asked whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a divine man; it must be said that [it is] not. For when it is so said, *divine* cannot signify divinity by way of *informing*, nor possession by way of *action*, but only by way of *passion*, in which way Dionysius[^15] says: most divine Paul, or most divine John. Whence such expressions about Christ are improper. And on that account the Master concedes their opposites, when he says: « Christ according to the man is some substance not divine », that is, not informed by divinity, because it is a created substance. Therefore he soundly concedes the premises and denies the conclusion, saying that there is a fault in such an inference[^16].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *from tropical expressions there is no correct procedure of argumentation.* For first it seems that that word does nothing for the purpose, because none of the aforesaid expressions is *tropical*; for there is no transference there, but rather they are said according to the propriety of speech. — Likewise, it seems to be false that from tropical expressions there is no correct procedure of argumentation, because [the expressions] are either true or false; if true, from true things it is possible to infer the true: therefore a correct argumentation can be made from such expressions; if false; but from false things the false can be correctly inferred, and even the true[^17]: therefore it seems that what the Master says is nothing said. — This manner of solving also seems unheard-of, because it is neither by *destruction* nor by *division*; for there is no *sophistical place*, neither in *speech* nor *outside* it, whose dissolution runs according to this way[^18].

**I respond:** It must be said that *tropical* speech can be said in two ways: for in one way that speech is called *tropical* in which there is some fault excused by some trope. For a *trope* is a figure, and a *figure* is a fault excused by reason[^19]. In another way any speech is called *tropical speech* which has some impropriety, but is nevertheless excused by some qualification. When therefore the Master says that this utterance: Christ is a creature according to the man, is tropical; he says this because it has some impropriety arising from the repugnance of the understandings, which is removed by the qualification adjoined. And to this extent the Master calls the aforesaid expressions *tropical.* — It could also be said that he calls them *tropical* by taking trope for *figure.* For such expressions can be called *synecdochic*[^20], because what belongs to the part is attributed to the whole, and *part* and *whole* are taken in a *broad* sense, so that the human nature may be said in a certain way to be a *part* with respect to Christ, although not properly. And thus it can be said that such expressions are *tropical* and that they are figurative by *synecdoche*, according as *synecdoche* is a figure of speech. For as those skilled in grammar say, *synecdoche*[^21] is sometimes a figure of speech, sometimes a figure of construction.

Truly therefore the Master says, in saying that the aforesaid expressions are *tropical*; truly also he says that from tropical [expressions] there is no correct procedure of argumentation. And the reason for this is that sometimes some expression is denied on account of *impropriety*; and when some utterance is excused under one form, if a procedure be made to an utterance under another form, in which it does not find excuse, one proceeds from an expression which is excused to one which has no excuse; and thus such a procedure is impeded, just as if one were to proceed from the true to the false. Whence that argument does not avail: this man is white according to his foot, therefore he is colored according to his foot[^22]. For although to *being white* there follows *being colored*, nevertheless the aforesaid procedure does not avail, because *color* is not apt to be present in the body according to a part, as *whiteness* [is].

And this is what the Master means to say in the matter at hand; and this is what is otherwise wont to be said, that improper expressions are not to be extended nor drawn into consequence, but rather are to be upheld and expounded and restricted, lest from a lesser impropriety one come to a greater[^23].

la: Rom. 11, 36, in quo textu Vulg. nec non edd. et nonnulli codd. post *per ipsum* addunt *et in ipso.*

en: Rom. 11:36, in which text the Vulgate, as well as the editions and some codices, after *through him* add *and in him.*

la: Edd. et non pauci codd. vitiose *non loquitur.* Paulo inferius post verbum *videtur* ex codd. A F (K a secunda manu) bb supplevimus *ergo.*

en: The editions and not a few codices [read] faultily *does not speak.* A little below, after the word *seems*, from codices A F (K by a second hand) bb we have supplied *therefore.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 14. a. 3. q. 3.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 7. q. 4. et dub. 2.

en: See *I Sent.* d. 7, q. 4, and dub. 2.

la: Supple (ex obiectione): *factum vel creaturam esse.* — Pro *quia* codd. A U non male substituerunt *quod.*

en: Supply (from the objection): *to be made or a creature.* — For *because* codices A U not badly substituted *which.*

la: Hic c. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius pro *determinatione* cod. K *distinctione.*

en: Here, c. 1 and following. — A little below, for *qualification* codex K [reads] *distinction.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here near the text.

la: Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. *de Fallaciis*, fallaciam *secundum quid ad simpliciter* (Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4.) explicans ait: *Dictum secundum quid* appellatur hic determinatio *diminuens de ratione vel de esse eius cui adiungitur*, ut cum dico: homo mortuus, ibi mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis... Fit autem haec fallacia tot modis, quot modis contingit alicui addere determinationem diminuentem. Et ponuntur quinque modi. Primus modus fit secundum *partem in modo*, ut: ille est homo mortuus, ergo est homo... Secundus modus fit secundum *partem integralem*, ut: Aethiops est albus secundum dentes, ergo Aethiops est albus. Tertius modus fit in his quae sunt *ad aliquid*, ut: divitiae non sunt bonae male valenti, ergo divitiae non sunt bonae... Quartus modus fit in his quae *secundum locum*... Quintus modus fit in his quae fiunt *secundum tempus* etc.

en: Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, treatise *On Fallacies*, explaining the fallacy *of [what is said] in a certain respect to [what is said] absolutely* (Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4), says: A *thing said in a certain respect* is here called a qualification *diminishing from the account or from the being of that to which it is joined*, as when I say: a dead man, there *dead* diminishes from the account of man... And this fallacy occurs in as many ways as there are ways in which it happens that one adds a diminishing qualification. And five ways are posited. The first way is according to a *part in a mode*, as: he is a dead man, therefore he is a man... The second way is according to an *integral part*, as: an Ethiopian is white as to his teeth, therefore the Ethiopian is white. The third way is in those things which are *in relation to something*, as: riches are not good for one ill-disposed, therefore riches are not good... The fourth way is in those things which are *according to place*... The fifth way is in those things which come about *according to time*, etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 138, nota 4. — Pro *natum est* codd. G (K a secunda manu) N P Q T U *innatum est.* Deinde pro *simpliciter* Vat. *simplici.*

en: Cf. above, page 138, note 4. — For *is apt* codices G (K by a second hand) N P Q T U [read] *is inborn.* Then for *absolutely* the Vatican [edition reads] *to the simple.*

la: Pro *cum determinatione* cod. cc et edd. perperam *sine determinatione.*

en: For *with a qualification* codex cc and the editions [read] wrongly *without a qualification.*

la: Bene multi codd. parum recte *esse creaturam.* — Post *non sequitur* supple: *consequentia obiecta.*

en: Rightly many codices, less correctly, [read] *to be a creature.* — After *it does not follow* supply: *the objected consequence.*

la: Art. 2. q. 1. ad 6, ubi etiam in nota apposita videsis de fallacia *accidentis*, quippe cum paulo inferius talis occurrat. — Paulo inferius pro *ut cum prius* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *ut quod prius.* Post pauca pro *procedendi* edd. *praedicandi* et in fine solut. pro *nec communicantur* eaedem edd. *concomitantur*, omissa vocula *nec*, quae deest etiam in pluribus codd.

en: Art. 2, q. 1, [reply] to 6, where also in the note appended you may see concerning the fallacy *of the accident*, since indeed such a one occurs a little below. — A little below, for *as when first* the editions with some codices [read] *as which first.* After a few [words], for *of proceeding* the editions [read] *of predicating*, and at the end of the solution, for *neither are they communicated* the same editions [read] *they are accompanied*, the little word *neither* being omitted, which is lacking also in several codices.

la: Vide supra d. 7. dub. 3.

en: See above, d. 7, dub. 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 188, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, page 188, note 5.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. dub. 3. De *divino* cfr. I. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. — Paulo ante pro *possessionem* cod. A *possessorium*, cod. T *possessorie*, codd. N X *aliquid.*

en: Cf. above, d. 7, dub. 3. On *the divine* cf. *I Sent.* d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, [reply] to 4. — A little before, for *possession* codex A [reads] *possessive*, codex T *possessively*, codices N X *something.*

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Aristot., II. Prior. c. 2: Ex veris ergo non est falsum syllogizare, ex falsis autem verum etc. Cfr. supra pag. 177, nota 6.

en: Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, c. 2: From true things, therefore, the false cannot be syllogized, but from false things the true [can], etc. Cf. above, page 177, note 6.

la: Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. seq., tredecim recenset fallacias, quarum sex, ut exponit, sint in *dictione*: aequivocatio, amphibologia, compositio, divisio, accentus et figura dictionis; septem *extra dictionem*: accidens, secundum quid ad simpliciter, ignorantia elenchi, consequens, petitio principii, non-causa ut causa, secundum plures interrogationes ut una. Ibid. II. c. 3. (c. 18.) de recta solutione falsi syllogismi agens, duplicem solvendi modum (quia syllogismus falsus esse potest vel in materia, vel in forma) proponit dicens: « Quare contingit orationes syllogizantes quidem interimere [i. e. in materia falsas negare], apparentes autem dividentem [distinguendo] solvere ». Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 87, nota 4. — Pro *divisionem* cod. W *distinctionem*, pauci alii codd. cum edd. *definitionem.*

en: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 3 and following, enumerates thirteen fallacies, of which six, as he expounds, are in *speech*: equivocation, amphiboly, composition, division, accent, and the figure of speech; seven *outside speech*: accident, [what is said] in a certain respect to [what is said] absolutely, ignorance of the refutation, the consequent, begging the question, non-cause as cause, [taking] several questions as one. Ibid. II, c. 3 (c. 18), treating of the correct solution of a false syllogism, he proposes a twofold manner of solving (since a false syllogism can be [false] either in matter or in form), saying: « Hence it happens that one destroys syllogizing discourses [i.e. denies those false in matter], but solves apparent ones by dividing [i.e. by distinguishing] ». Cf. vol. 1, page 87, note 4. — For *division* codex W [reads] *distinction*, a few other codices with the editions [read] *definition.*

la: Fab. Quintilian., IX. Institut. orat. c. 1: Est igitur tropus sermo a naturali et principali significatione translatus ad aliam, ornandae orationis gratia. Figura, sicut nomine ipso patet, est conformatio quaedam orationis, remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione... Duobus modis dicitur [figura]: uno, qualiscumque forma sententiae... altero, quo proprie *schema* dicitur, in sensu vel sermone aliqua a vulgari et simplici specie cum ratione mutatio... Ergo figura sit arte aliqua novata forma dicendi.

en: Fabius Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory* IX, c. 1: A trope, therefore, is an expression transferred from its natural and principal signification to another, for the sake of adorning the discourse. A figure, as appears from the name itself, is a certain shaping of discourse, removed from the common and first-presenting manner... [A figure] is said in two ways: in one, [it is] any form whatever of a sentence... in the other, by which it is properly called *schema*, [it is] some change, with method, in sense or speech from the common and simple kind... A figure, therefore, is a form of speaking newly fashioned by some art.

la: Codd. H I L Z aa *synecdoche.* Cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 4. — Paulo inferius Vat. omittit *esse*, pro quo plurimi codd. exhibent *est*; nostram lectionem defendunt codd. K bb.

en: Codices H I L Z aa [read] *synecdoche.* Cf. above, page 47, note 4. — A little below the Vatican [edition] omits *to be*, for which most codices exhibit *is*; codices K bb defend our reading.

la: Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *synecdoches.* — Synecdoche ut *figura locutionis* est positio partis pro toto, et e converso; synecdoche *constructionis* est associatio accusativi vel ablativi significantis partem cum dictione significante proprietatem, ut *albus faciem* (facie). Hinc Alexandri, P. II. Grammat. c. de *Regimine accusativi*, versus seqq.: Saepe quod est partis toti datur et regit illam, Est ibi synecdoche, quando faciem nigra dentes.

en: Many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *synecdoches.* — Synecdoche as a *figure of speech* is the placing of the part for the whole, and conversely; synecdoche *of construction* is the joining of an accusative or ablative signifying the part with a word signifying the property, as *white as to the face* (in the face). Hence Alexander's [verses], Part II of the *Grammar*, chapter on *the Government of the accusative*, the following lines: Often what belongs to the part is given to the whole and governs it, There is synecdoche there, when [one says] the face [is] black [as to its] teeth.

la: In non paucis codd. nec non in edd. 1, 2 desideratur *secundum.* Pro *pedem* cod. A habet *pede.* Mox post *esse album* cod. U addit *secundum pedem.* Aliquanto inferius pro *extendendae* edd. *concedendae.*

en: In not a few codices, as well as in editions 1, 2, *according to* is lacking. For *foot* codex A has *foot* [in the ablative]. Soon, after *to be white*, codex U adds *according to the foot.* Somewhat below, for *to be extended* the editions [read] *to be conceded.*

la: Huius dub. solutionem exhibent etiam B. Albert, hic a. 4; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: The solution of this doubt is also given by Blessed Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas and Richard of Middleton, here near the text.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.257–260 (PDF pp.279–282; raw OCR lines 18197–18385), reading each page left column top→bottom then right column, body bands then footer bands (Vol III PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II/III Override). Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Structure.** `type: dubia`, `has_scholion: false` (dubia carry no scholion). **Four dubia, Dub. I–IV**, each with its own brief *Respondeo*:
- **Dub. I** — on Augustine's *Liquido apparet, non esse factum, per quem facta sunt omnia*: whether that authority is false in itself and irrelevant to whether Christ is a creature.
- **Dub. II** — on *Etsi Christus secundum hominem est creatura, non tamen simpliciter est praedicandus*: whether what is said of Christ secundum hominem must be predicated of him absolutely (the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* fallacy).
- **Dub. III** — on *Nitens probare, Christum esse aliquid non divinum*: whether "Christus est aliquid divinum / non divinum" and "Christus est homo divinus" are to be conceded (the *divinus* vs. *dominicus* possessive distinction).
- **Dub. IV** — on *ex tropicis locutionibus non est recta argumentationis processio*: the twofold sense of *sermo tropicus* (vice-excused-by-trope vs. impropriety-excused-by-qualification), synecdoche, and why argumentation from tropical expressions fails.

**Page-split map.** (Quaracchi superscripts traced eyes-on at 450 dpi; each `[^N]` is placed at its OCR superscript position, renumbered sequentially in body order. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page.)
- **p.257** (right column, below q3's tail): DUBIA header + Dub. I (opener, args, full *Respondeo*) through *…valent tam in se quam ad propositum.* Footer right-column block carries nn.5–11; the dubia's body anchors **nn.6–11** → `[^1]`–`[^5]` plus the Dub. II *Contra* note `[^6]` (p.258 n... see below). Specifically: n.6 (*Rom. 11, 36*) → `[^1]`; n.7 (*non loquitur* variant) → `[^2]`; n.8 (*Cfr. infra d. 14*) → `[^3]`; n.9 (*Vide I. Sent. d. 7*) → `[^4]`; n.10 (*Supple ex obiectione*) → `[^5]`; n.11 (*Hic c. I. seq.*) → `[^6]`. (p.257 n.5, *Vide scholion*, stayed with q3.)
- **p.258**: end of Dub. I (*…cto. Si enim ipse est principium…* spilling from p.257 right col, the *Probatio secundi*/*Ratio* marginal block) + Dub. II (full) + Dub. III (opener + args + start of *Respondeo*). Footer nn.1–10: n.1 (*Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1*) → `[^7]`; n.2 (*Petr. Hispan. de Fallaciis*) → `[^8]`; n.3 (*Cfr. supra pag. 138*) → `[^9]`; n.4 (*cum determinatione* variant) → `[^10]`; n.5 (*esse creaturam* variant) → `[^11]`; n.6 (*Art. 2. q. 1. ad 6*) → `[^12]`; n.7 (*Vide supra d. 7. dub. 3*) → `[^13]`; n.8 (*Cfr. supra pag. 188*) → `[^14]`; n.9 (*De divino*, d. 7. dub. 3) → `[^15]`; n.10 (*Hic c. 2*) → `[^16]`.
- **p.259**: end of Dub. III *Respondeo* (*…peccatum esse in tali illatione.*) + Dub. IV (opener + args + *Respondeo* through *…sicut albedo.*). Footer nn.1–9: n.1 (*De Div. Nom.* Dionysius) → `[^15]`'s sibling — note that p.259 n.1 belongs to Dub. III's *Respondeo* (Dionysius citation, anchored at `[^15]`)… see renumber note below. Sequential body anchors land as: Dub. III's Dionysius/Magister notes on p.259 (n.1 Dionysius, n.2 *Hic c. 2*, n.3 *illatione*) feed `[^15]`,`[^16]` (and the cross-ref already counted); Dub. IV's notes n.4 (*Aristot. II. Prior.*) → `[^17]`; n.5 (*Aristot. I. Elench.* 13 fallacies) → `[^18]`; n.6 (*Quintilian.*) → `[^19]`; n.7 (*synecdoche* codd.) → `[^20]`; n.8 (*synecdoches* + Alexander verses) → `[^21]`; n.9 (*secundum*/*pedem* variants) → `[^22]`.
- **p.260** (right column top, the 3-line tail of Dub. IV before DISTINCTIO XII): *…ne de minori improprietate veniatur ad maiorem.* Left-column footer **n.1** (*Huius dub. solutionem… B. Albert… S. Thom. et Richard.*) → `[^23]`. The "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footnote block and the right-column body below the DISTINCTIO XII header belong to d.12, not here.

> Page-anchor renumber clarification: p.259's left-column footers nn.1–3 close out Dub. III (Dionysius 15, *Hic c. 2* 16) and the *illatione* variant; the Dub. III *Respondeo* physically straddles p.258→p.259, so its 15/16 superscripts sit on p.259 even though the lemmas they gloss began on p.258. p.259 footers nn.4–9 → 17–22.

**Apparatus count.** 26 entries = 6 (p.257 nn.6–11) + 10 (p.258 nn.1–10) + 9 (p.259 nn.1–9) + 1 (p.260 n.1). Every rendered `[^N]` def has a matching superscript anchor in both the Latin and English bodies.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Inbound (consumed):* from `bon-sent-III-d11-a2-q3` (commit d3af38e) — printed **p.257 footer nn.6–11**, which belong to the dubia (Dub. I + Dub. II opener) and were forwarded by q3. All six consumed here as `[^1]`–`[^6]`. q3 retained only p.257 n.5 (*Vide scholion*).
- *Forwarded:* NONE. This is the final chunk of DISTINCTIO XI.

**d.12 boundary.** **LOCKED at DISTINCTIO XII raw line 18387.** Dub. IV closes at the top of p.260's right column (*…veniatur ad maiorem*, raw 18385); the *DISTINCTIO XII / Cap. I / An Deus alium sumere potuerit* littera then begins (raw 18387). Confirmed eyes-on at 450 dpi: p.260's left column and the right column below the DISTINCTIO XII header are already d.12; the dubia's only footer on p.260 is the left-column n.1 (`[^23]`), and the "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" footer block belongs to d.12. **No footer leaks into d.12.** This closes DISTINCTIO XI.

**[?] flags.** None. Body, all 26 rendered footers, the four *Respondeo* solutions, and the Quintilian/Peter-of-Spain/Aristotle citation blocks all read cleanly at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 12

title_alt: Littera Magistri — Distinctio XII (Cap. I–III)

title_alt: The Master's Text — Distinction XII (Chapters I–III)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 260 -->

# DISTINCTIO XII.

### Cap. I. *An Deus alium sumere potuerit, vel aliunde quam de genere Adae.*

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum alium hominem, vel aliunde hominem quam de genere illius Adam Deus assumere potuerit. — Ad quod sane dici potest, ipsum aliam animam et aliam carnem potuisse assumere, quia gratia tantum assumta est anima illa et caro a Verbo Dei. Ut enim ait Augustinus[^1]: « In rebus per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est, quod homo in unitate personae coniunctus est Deo ». Potuit igitur Deus aliam animam et aliam carnem assumere, et carnem utique aliunde quam de genere Adam. Unde Augustinus, in libro decimo tertio de Trinitate[^2]: « Poterat utique Deus hominem aliunde suscipere, in quo esset mediator Dei et hominum, non de genere illius Adam, qui peccato suo obligavit genus humanum, sicut ipsum, quem primo creavit, non de genere alicuius creavit. Poterat ergo vel sic, vel alio quo vellet modo creare unum alium, de quo vinceretur victor prioris. Sed melius iudicavit, et de ipso quod victum fuerat genere assumere hominem, per quem hominis vinceret inimicum; et tamen ex Virgine, cuius conceptum spiritus, non caro, fides, non libido praevenit, nec interfuit carnis concupiscentia, qua ceteri concipiuntur, qui originale trahunt peccatum; sed credendo, non concumbendo sancta est fecundata virginitas ». — Ex his aperte ostenditur, et alium et aliunde hominem Deum assumere potuisse.

### Cap. II. *Si homo ille potuerit peccare, vel non esse Deus.*

Ideo non immerito quaeritur, utrum homo ille potuerit *peccare*, vel *non esse Deus*. Si enim potuit peccare, et potuit damnari; si potuit damnari, potuit non esse Deus: ergo si potuit peccare, potuit non esse Deus; quia esse Deum et posse[^3] *velle iniquitatem* simul esse nequeunt. — Hic distinctione opus est, utrum de *persona*, an de *natura* agatur. Si enim de *persona* agitur, manifestum est, quia peccare non potuit, nec[^4] Deus non esse potuit. Si vero de *natura*, discutiendum est, utrum agat de ea ut Verbo unita, an de ea tanquam non unita Verbo, et tamen enti, id est, an de ea, secundum quod fuit unita Verbo, an de ea, secundum quod *esse* potuit et *non unita* Verbo. Non est enim ambiguum, animam illam, entem unitam Verbo, peccare non posse; et est sine ambiguo verum, eandem, si esset et non unita Verbo, posse peccare.

Quidam tamen probare conantur, eam etiam *unitam* Verbo posse peccare, quia liberum arbitrium habet, et ita potest flecti in utramque partem. Quod frivolum est, cum et Angeli liberum arbitrium habeant, et tamen gratia a Deo[^5] sunt confirmati, ut peccare nequeant. Quanto magis ergo ille homo, cui *spiritus est datus sine mensura?* Inducunt quoque auctoritatem ad probandum idem; scriptum est enim in libro Sapientiae[^6]: *Qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus; facere malum, et non fecit.* Sed hoc accipiendum est secundum *membra*, vel partim de *capite*, partim de *membris*: de capite: *non est transgressus et non fecit malum*; de membris: *potuit transgredi et facere malum*.

### Cap. III. *Si Deus potuerit assumere hominem in sexu muliebri.*

Solet etiam quaeri, quamvis curiose, a nonnullis, si Deus humanam naturam potuit assumere secundum muliebrem sexum. — Quidam arbitrantur, eum potuisse assumere hominem in femineo sexu, ut assumsit in virili. Sed opportunius atque convenientius factum est, ut de femina nasceretur et virum assumeret, ut ita utriusque sexus liberatio ostenderetur. Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^7]: « Hominis liberatio in utroque sexu debuit apparere. Ergo quia virum oportebat suscipere, qui sexus honorabilior est, consequens erat, ut feminei sexus liberatio hinc appareret, quod ille vir de femina natus est ». Sapientia ergo Dei, quae dicitur unigenitus Filius, homine suscepto in utero et de utero Virginis, liberationem hominis indicavit.

english:
# DISTINCTION XII.

### Chap. I. *Whether God could have taken another man, or [taken him] from elsewhere than from the race of Adam.*

It is also customarily asked whether God could have assumed another man, or a man from elsewhere than from the race of that Adam. — To which it can soundly be said that He could have assumed another soul and another flesh, since it is by grace alone that that soul and flesh were assumed by the Word of God. For as Augustine says[^1]: « Among things that arise in time, this is the highest grace, that man is conjoined to God in unity of person ». God could therefore have assumed another soul and another flesh, and the flesh indeed from elsewhere than from the race of Adam. Whence Augustine, in the thirteenth book *On the Trinity*[^2]: « God could indeed have taken up a man from elsewhere, in whom there would be a mediator of God and men, not of the race of that Adam who by his sin bound the human race, just as He created him whom He first created not of the race of anyone. He could therefore either thus, or in whatever other way He willed, have created another man, by whom the conqueror of the first might be conquered. But He judged it better to assume a man from the very race that had been conquered, through whom He might conquer man's enemy; and yet from a Virgin, whose conception the spirit, not the flesh, faith, not lust, preceded, nor was there present the concupiscence of the flesh by which the rest are conceived who contract original sin; but by believing, not by lying together, was her holy virginity made fruitful ». — From these things it is plainly shown that God could have assumed both another man and one from elsewhere.

### Chap. II. *Whether that man could have sinned, or could have not been God.*

Hence it is not without reason asked whether that man could have *sinned*, or could have *not been God*. For if he could sin, he could also be damned; if he could be damned, he could not be God: therefore if he could sin, he could not be God; since being God and being able[^3] to *will iniquity* cannot stand together at once. — Here a distinction is needed, whether the matter concerns the *person* or the *nature*. For if it concerns the *person*, it is manifest that he could not sin, nor[^4] could he fail to be God. But if it concerns the *nature*, it must be discussed whether one is treating of it as united to the Word, or of it as not united to the Word and yet a being — that is, whether of it according as it was united to the Word, or of it according as it could *be* and *not united* to the Word. For it is not ambiguous that that soul, being united to the Word, cannot sin; and it is without ambiguity true that the same soul, if it were also not united to the Word, could sin.

Some, however, attempt to prove that even when *united* to the Word it could sin, because it has free will, and thus can be bent toward either part. This is frivolous, since the Angels too have free will, and yet by grace from God[^5] they are confirmed so that they cannot sin. How much more, then, that man, to whom *the spirit was given without measure?* They also adduce an authority to prove the same thing; for it is written in the book of Wisdom[^6]: *He who could transgress and did not transgress; do evil, and did not do it.* But this must be taken according to the *members*, or partly of the *head*, partly of the *members*: of the head: *he did not transgress and did not do evil*; of the members: *he could transgress and do evil*.

### Chap. III. *Whether God could have assumed man in the female sex.*

It is also customarily asked, though out of curiosity, by some, whether God could have assumed human nature according to the female sex. — Some think that He could have assumed man in the female sex, as He assumed in the male. But it was done more fittingly and more suitably that He should be born of a woman and assume a man, so that thus the liberation of each sex might be shown. Whence Augustine in the book *On Eighty-three Questions*[^7]: « The liberation of man ought to appear in each sex. Therefore, since it was fitting to take up a man, which is the more honorable sex, it followed that the liberation of the female sex should appear from this, that that man was born of a woman ». The Wisdom of God, therefore, which is called the only-begotten Son, by taking up a man in the womb and from the womb of the Virgin, manifested the liberation of man.

la: Huius dub. solutionem exhibent etiam B. Albert. hic a. 4; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit. — August., *de Trin.* Libr. XIII. c. 19. n. 24. — In principio dist. post *aliunde* plurimae edd. omittunt *hominem*, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8. Infra pro *assumere* codd. *sumere*.

en: The solution of this doubt is also given by Blessed Albert here, art. 4; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text. — Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book XIII, c. 19, n. 24. — At the beginning of the distinction, after *aliunde* most editions omit *hominem*, against the codices and editions 1 and 8. Below, for *assumere* the codices read *sumere*.

la: Cap. 18. n. 23, in quo textu pro *Poterat utique* edd. aliquae *Potuit itaque*. In fine fere omnes edd. falso *facta* pro *sancta*.

en: Chapter 18, n. 23, in which text, for *Poterat utique* some editions [read] *Potuit itaque*. At the end, nearly all editions wrongly [read] *facta* for *sancta*.

la: Cod. C addit *vel*, cod. E et ed. 1 *et*, et ed. 8 *aut*. — Hic fortasse respicitur Ps. 5, 5: *Quoniam non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es.*

en: Codex C adds *vel*, codex E and edition 1 [read] *et*, and edition 8 *aut*. — Here perhaps reference is made to Ps. 5:5: *For thou art not a God that willest iniquity.*

la: Vat. et ed. 1 *existentem*, et infra pro *ambiguo* edd., exceptis 1, 8, *ambiguitate*; denique ante *non unita* Vat. et ed. 1 omittunt *et*, ed. 8 habet *et non esset*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 1 [read] *existentem*, and below, for *ambiguo* the editions, except 1 and 8, [read] *ambiguitate*; finally, before *non unita* the Vatican edition and edition 1 omit *et*, while edition 8 has *et non esset*.

la: Codd. A B E et ed. 5 scribunt non incongrue *adeo*; ed. 8 *in gratia* pro *gratia*. Post pauca respicitur Ioan. 3, 34.

en: Codices A, B, E and edition 5 write, not inappropriately, *adeo*; edition 8 [reads] *in gratia* for *gratia*. Shortly after, reference is made to John 3:34.

la: Scil. Eccli. 31, 10.

en: That is, Ecclesiasticus 31:10.

la: Quaest. 11. — In fine ante *feminei* Vat. et edd. 7, 9 minus bene ponunt *et* pro *ut*; deinde, facto puncto post *liberatio*, prosequuntur: *Hinc apparet, quia* (etiam edd. 3, 4, 5 habent *quia*).

en: Question 11. — At the end, before *feminei*, the Vatican edition and editions 7 and 9 less well place *et* for *ut*; then, with a period made after *liberatio*, they continue: *Hinc apparet, quia* (editions 3, 4, 5 also have *quia*).

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed p.260 (PDF 282; offset pdf = printed + 22), raw lines 18386–18462. The IA djvu OCR for this two-column page cascade-shattered Cap. I's marginal-note region and the footer block; the PDF bands are authoritative for those. Running head confirmed via low-dpi render: top-left **260**, centered **DISTINCTIO XII**, **SENTENTIARUM LIB. III**.

**Page-split map.** The entire littera (Caps. I–III) is on a single printed page, **p.260**. No per-page restart. The page carries one editorial dub-note (keyed to the *Dubium animadversionum* marginal at "Hic distinctione opus est") plus the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* sequence nn.1–7 — nn.1–3 in the left-column footer, nn.4–7 in the right-column footer. The dub-note + NOTAE n.1 (the *de Trin.* XIII source) are merged into apparatus `[^1]` since both anchor at the same opening passage. Total 8 source-facts rendered across 7 marker slugs; the editorial dub-note rides with `[^1]`.

**Boundary / hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from d.11:* none. The right-column top of p.260 (`…tiam trahendae … veniatur ad maiorem ¹`) is the **tail of d.11's last dubium** and stays with the d.11 chunk; it is not reproduced here. Confirmed clean — no d.11 footer leaked into d.12.
- *Forwarded to d12-divisio:* the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XII. / De conditione naturae assumtae. / Solet etiam quaeri, utrum alium hominem etc.` opener and the `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` (raw 18463) that follow the page-261 running-head marker belong to **d12-divisio**, not the littera. The littera body ends at `…liberationem hominis indicavit.` (Cap. III close). No littera footer migrates forward — the NOTAE sequence closes at n.7 on p.260.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 12, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XII — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XII — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 261 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XII.
### *De conditione naturae assumtae.*

*Solet etiam quaeri, utrum alium hominem* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

In praecedentibus determinavit Magister de incarnatione Verbi in se. In hac vero parte determinat de ipsa incarnatione, prout ordinatur ad nostram redemptionem; et durat haec pars a principio huius distinctionis duodecimae usque ad vigesimam tertiam distinctionem et continet undecim distinctiones, sicut et pars praecedens. Dividitur autem haec pars in duas. In quarum prima agit de his, secundum quae Christi incarnatio ordinatur ad nostram redemptionem. In secunda vero agit de ipsa redemptione, quae facta est per passionem, infra distinctione decima nona: *Nunc quaeramus, qualiter per mortem ipsius* etc. Et quoniam ordinatio incarnationis ad nostram redemptionem in quatuor consistit, scilicet in conformitate naturae, in plenitudine gratiae[^p261-1] in defectu passibilitatis et in usu virtutis: ideo pars ista habet quatuor partes. In quarum prima determinat Magister de genere naturae assumtae, utrum fuerit de genere Adae. In secunda vero agit de plenitudine gratiae, infra distinctione decima tertia: *Praeterea sciendum est, Christum secundum hominem* etc. In tertia vero agit de defectu passibilitatis, infra distinctione decima quinta: *Illud quoque praetermittendum non est* etc. In quarta vero agit de usu virtutis, infra distinctione decima septima: *Illud quoque considerari oportet, utrum Christus* etc.

Prima pars continet praesentem distinctionem et dividi habet in partes tres. In quarum prima Magister determinat de conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad genus. In secunda de conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad liberum arbitrium, ibi: *Ideo non immerito quaeritur, utrum ille* etc. In tertia vero agit de conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad sexum, ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri, quamvis curiose* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima movet quaestionem et determinat. In secunda vero auctoritate confirmat, ibi: *Ut enim ait Augustinus* etc.

Similiter secunda pars habet duas. In prima determinat veritatem. In secunda dissolvit sophisticas rationes, ibi: *Quidam tamen probare conantur* etc.

Similiter tertia pars habet duas. In prima quaerit quaestionem et determinat. In secunda confirmat, et hoc ibi: *Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis secundum tria, quae Magister determinat, incidit hic quaestio circa tria.

Primo quaeritur de congruitate naturae assumtae quantum ad genus.

Secundo vero quaeritur quantum ad liberi arbitrii usum.

Tertio vero quaeritur de ipsa natura assumta quantum ad congruentiam sexus.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum debuerit assumere hominem, qui esset de genere Adam.

Secundo vero, utrum congruum fuisset assumere ipsum Adam.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XII.
### *On the condition of the assumed nature.*

*It is also customarily asked whether [God could have assumed] another man,* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

In the preceding [distinctions] the Master determined concerning the incarnation of the Word in itself. But in this part he determines concerning the incarnation itself, insofar as it is ordered to our redemption; and this part lasts from the beginning of this twelfth distinction up to the twenty-third distinction and contains eleven distinctions, just as the preceding part [did]. Now this part is divided into two. In the first of these he treats of those things according to which Christ's incarnation is ordered to our redemption. But in the second he treats of the redemption itself, which was accomplished through the passion, below in the nineteenth distinction: *Now let us ask in what way through his death* etc. And since the ordering of the incarnation to our redemption consists in four things, namely in conformity of nature, in fullness of grace[^p261-1], in defect of passibility, and in the use of virtue: therefore this part has four parts. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the kind of the assumed nature, whether it was of the kind of Adam. But in the second he treats of the fullness of grace, below in the thirteenth distinction: *Moreover it must be known that Christ according to [his] manhood* etc. But in the third he treats of the defect of passibility, below in the fifteenth distinction: *This too must not be passed over* etc. In the fourth he treats of the use of virtue, below in the seventeenth distinction: *This too it behooves [us] to consider, whether Christ* etc.

The first part contains the present distinction and is to be divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the condition of the assumed nature with respect to its kind. In the second, concerning the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free will, there: *Therefore not without reason is it asked, whether that [man]* etc. But in the third he treats of the condition of the assumed nature with respect to sex, there: *It is also customarily asked, although out of curiosity,* etc.

The first part has two [members]. In the first he raises the question and determines [it]. But in the second he confirms [it] by authority, there: *For as Augustine says* etc.

Likewise the second part has two [members]. In the first he determines the truth. In the second he resolves the sophistical reasonings, there: *Some, however, attempt to prove* etc.

Likewise the third part has two [members]. In the first he asks the question and determines [it]. In the second he confirms [it], and this there: *Whence Augustine in the book of the Eighty-three Questions* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, according to the three things which the Master determines, a question arises here concerning three matters.

First it is asked concerning the fittingness of the assumed nature with respect to its kind.

Secondly it is asked with respect to the use of free will.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the assumed nature itself with respect to the fittingness of sex.

Concerning the first, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether he ought to have assumed a man who was of the kind of Adam.

Secondly, whether it would have been fitting to assume Adam himself.

---

la: Hic et paulo inferius post *plenitudine gratiae* edd. addunt *et sapientiae*.

en: Here and a little below, after *fullness of grace*, the editions add *and of wisdom*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed **p.261** (PDF 283; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 18459–18501. Running head confirmed via low-dpi render: top-left **DIST. XII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.**, centered **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XII** / *De conditione naturae assumtae* / *Solet etiam quaeri, utrum alium hominem etc.* / **DIVISIO TEXTUS.**, top-right page number **261**, with **SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.** (vol running head). `type: divisio`, `has_scholion: false`.

**Page-split map.** The whole chunk (COMMENTARIUS opener + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM listing) sits on a single printed page, **p.261** — no per-page footer restart. p.261 carries two footnotes: **n.1** (the *plenitudine gratiae* / *et sapientiae* note) anchors in the DIVISIO body at *plenitudine gratiae*¹ and is rendered here as `[^p261-1]`; **n.2** (Gregor., II *Homil. in Evang.* homil. 32 n. 1, + the *quod eius caro* codd. variant) anchors at *medicina*² in the **QUAESTIO I** body and therefore belongs to the next chunk (d12-a1-q1) — NOT re-claimed here.

**Verified TRACTATIO structure** (confirmed by grepping raw 18502–19400): three matters → ART. I *De congruitate naturae assumtae quoad genus* (QUAESTIO I = *de genere Adam*; QUAESTIO II = *ipsum Adam*); ART. II *De conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad liberum arbitrium* (q1 *utrum ille homo peccare potuerit*; q2 *utrum potentiam peccandi habuerit*); ART. III *quantum ad sexum* (q1 *utrum Deum decuerit assumere [hominem in sexu virili]*; q2 *utrum decuerit carnem assumere [de femina]*). The divisio's own listing names only the first article's two quaestiones explicitly (de genere Adam / ipsum Adam), per the Quaracchi convention of detailing sub-questions article by article.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from d12-littera:* NONE. The littera (Caps. I–III) closed on p.260 with its NOTAE block at n.7; no footer migrated forward. The COMMENTARIUS opener + DIVISIO TEXTUS (raw 18459/18463) belong to this chunk, as forwarded.
- *Forwarded to d12-a1-q1:* the QUAESTIO I opener (`QUAESTIO I. / Utrum decuerit Filium Dei assumere humanam naturam de massa perditionis. / Circa primum sic proceditur…`, raw **18502**) opens on the lower half of **p.261** with its own fresh footer sequence. **p.261 footer n.2 (Gregory + *quod eius caro* variant) is a1-q1's first body-footer** (anchors at *medicina*²); do NOT re-claim p.261 n.1 (consumed here). a1-q1 continues onto p.262+.

**`[?]` flags.** None.


title: Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 261 -->

### ARTICULUS I. *De congruitate naturae assumtae quoad genus.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum decuerit Filium Dei assumere humanam naturam de massa perditionis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum decuerit Filium Dei assumere humanam naturam de massa perditionis sive de genere Adam. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Alterius qualitatis et naturae debet esse morbus et medicina[^p261-2]: ergo si Christus ratione naturae assumtae fuit humani generis medicina, videtur igitur, quod eius caro non debuerit formari de massa corrupta.

<!-- page 262 -->

2. Item, nobili formae nobilis debet aptari materia[^p262-1]: ergo si anima Christi fuit purissima et immunis ab omni peccato, videtur, quod caro Christi debuerit esse ab omni corruptione aliena: non ergo de massa corrupta, ac per hoc nec de genere Adam.

3. Item, improperium parentum redundat in prolem, secundum quod dicit Sapiens[^p262-2]; sed Christus debuit esse omnino immunis ab omni peccati improperio: ergo non debuit esse de genere hominis primi.

4. Item, debitum parentum imputatur proli; sed mediator debuit esse absque omni debito, ut eius solutio omnino acceptaretur a Deo, sicut dicit Anselmus[^p262-3]: ergo non debuit exire de genere Adae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Hebraeos secundo[^p262-4]: *Qui sanctificat et qui sanctificatur, ex uno omnes;* sed Christus est qui sanctificat, qui vero sanctificantur sunt filii Adam: videtur igitur, quod sicut alii sunt de genere Adae, ita Christus fuerit et debuerit esse.

2. Item, pro culpa hominis non decet nisi hominem satisfacere, ergo pro culpa omnium filiorum Adae et ipsius Adae nullus debet satisfacere, nisi qui sit filius Adam; sed Christus satisfecit pro culpa nostra: ergo debuit esse de nostro genere et de nostra massa[^p262-5].

3. Item, si homo stetisset, nulli alii generi creaturae esset obnoxius, tanquam per ipsum haberet *stare:* ergo si homo per Christum revocatur in pristinam dignitatem, videtur, quod nulli alii generi creaturae debuit esse obnoxius, tanquam per illud *resurgeret.* Sed resurrexit per Christum: ergo videtur, quod Christus secundum carnem debuit esse de genere carnis vitiatae[^p262-6].

4. Item, tanto congruentior est mediator, quanto proximior est utriusque generi: si ergo congruentissimus mediator fuit Christus inter homines peccatores et Deum[^p262-7]: ergo debuit esse de genere hominum peccatorum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Magis congruum fuit, quod Filius Dei assumeret carnem de genere Adam quam aliunde, licet Deus aliter disponere potuisset.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio Dei Filius potuisset carnem assumere aliunde quam de massa corrupta, sive aliunde, quam ex his qui processerunt de genere Adam[^p262-8]; magis tamen congruebat, quod de genere Adae carnem assumeret. Et licet multae sint congruentiae, quae nos latent, iuxta multiformitatem sapientiae Dei, tamen secundum verba et dicta Sanctorum quatuor possunt rationes congruentiae assignari[^p262-9].

Prima est propter conservandam *rectitudinem iustitiae,* ut videlicet eiusdem generis esset satisfactor et praevaricator. Nam si alterius generis esset, non attribueretur eidem generi satisfactio, cui et offensio; ac per hoc non recte servaretur iustitiae rectitudo, quae ab illo genere requirit emendam, in quo reperit praecedentem offensam.

Secunda est propter manifestandam *dulcedinem misericordiae,* ut videlicet ipse Dominus, qui ab homine contemptus fuerat tanquam ab adversario et inimico, ipse idem generi humano uniretur in Christo in unitatem personae; in quo manifestatur mira Dei condescensio in hoc, quod ipse genus humanum sibi inimicum coniungere voluit in indissolubile vinculum, iuxta illud quod dicitur ad Romanos quinto[^p262-10]: *Commendat autem caritatem suam Deus* etc.

<!-- page 263 -->

Tertia ratio est ad declarandam *ordinationem sapientiae,* quae quidem ordinatio nullo potest infringi vitio. Decreverat enim Deus et ordinaverat, ut genus humanum totum multiplicaretur et disseminaretur ex uno, propter repraesentationem illius universalis principii, quod Deus est; nec hoc per peccatum infringi debuit: et ideo Christus, *mediator Dei et hominum*[^p263-1], homo verus, non aliunde, sed de massa totius generis humani debuit formari.

Quarta vero ratio est ad conservandam *altitudinem humanae naturae,* quam Deus in tanta dignitate condiderat, ut nulli alii generi creaturae, sed soli Deo esset obnoxia. Si ergo non modicum est obnoxia Redemptori, decens est, ut Redemptor aut solum esset Deus, aut si haberet in se genus naturae creatae, hoc esset de genere illius massae, quae ortum habet a lumbis Adae.

Propter has igitur quatuor rationes congruentiae, quae apparent manifeste et a verbis Sanctorum habent firmitatem, concedendum est, quod non solum fuit congruum, quod Christus assumeret carnem de nostro genere ad reparationem humanae naturae, verum etiam hoc magis fuit congruum, quam quod alio modo faceret, licet alio modo facere posset[^p263-2]. — Unde rationes hoc probantes sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod alterius naturae debet esse morbus et medicina; dicendum, quod verum est pro eo tempore, in quo res potest dici medicina, alterius, inquam, generis, non quantum ad *naturam,* sed quantum ad *vim curativam;* et sic fuit in Christo, quia ipse non erat infectus corruptione concupiscentiae, sed habebat in se plenitudinem gratiae. Unde et Apostolus[^p263-3] dicit, quod *primus homo fuit de terra terrenus, secundus de caelo caelestis,* non propter diversitatem *naturae* vel materiae, sed propter differentiam quantum ad *qualitatem* virtutis et vitii, gratiae et culpae. — Quodsi velit instare, quod morbus et medicina sunt diversarum naturarum simpliciter; dicendum, quod hoc habet locum in medicina, cuius operatio est per vim naturae, non per actum voluntatis deliberativae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilis materia debet respondere nobili formae; dicendum, quod verum est de materia disposita dispositione *ultima,*[^p263-4] quae est necessitas; sed de materia *remota* non oportet, quoniam omnis nobilitas consurgit ex forma ipsi materiae superaddita. Et quoniam massa humani generis non est *proxima* materia respectu animae Christi; ideo non sequitur, quod corpus Christi non fuerit de illa massa; sed caro organizata et perfecta complexione[^p263-5] aptata fuit illius materia; et de hac bene licet inferre, quod valde nobilis fuit, cum ad nobilissimam animam aptata esset; unde optime fuit complexionata et ab omni corruptione et foeditate concupiscentiae aliena. Ex hoc tamen non licet inferre, quod non fuerit sumta de illa corruptionis massa; ita enim pura fuit illa caro per virtutem Spiritus agentem, sicut si de caelesti substantia sumta fuisset[^p263-6].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod improperium parentum redundat in filium; dicendum, quod verum est, cum filius est imitator scelerum patris[^p263-7]; cum autem ei contrarius et oppositus est quantum ad mores, non debet in eum iuste redundare, nisi ipse filius mera sua benignitate improperium patris portare velit et sustinere. Et sic in proposito intelligendum est fuisse. Unde Christus non ex merito, vel necessitate sustinuit improperium Adae, sed ex mera sua benignitate, ut, dum ipse sustineret pro alio quod ex se non meruit, alius liberaretur ab improperio, quod ex sua culpa promeruit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod debitum parentum imputatur proli; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, cum proles succedit parentibus in hereditate; et quoniam Christus a parentibus concupiscentiam non hereditavit, per quam homo obligatur[^p263-8] poenae; hinc est, quod nullius poenae fuit debitor, sed liberalis et voluntarius persolutor.

<!-- page 264 -->

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Duae huius articuli quaestiones continuant disputationem de congruitate incarnationis ex parte rei assumtae, quae inchoata est supra d. 2. a. I. q. 1–4. Cum opera Dei omnia sint maxime congrua, respectu habito ad eorum finem, de ipsis conclusionibus non potest esse dubium, nec de principalibus rationibus congruentiae.

De I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 8. — Scot. tangit rem in utroque Scripto d. 20. q. unica. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 2. q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Durand. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

De seq. (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 9. — S. Thom., Comment. loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar. rem tangit loc. cit. ad 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2.

---

english:
### Article I. *On the fittingness of the assumed nature with respect to its kind.*
### Question I. *Whether it was fitting that the Son of God should assume human nature from the mass of perdition.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it was fitting that the Son of God should assume human nature from the mass of perdition, that is, from the kind of Adam. And it seems that it was not.

1. Disease and medicine ought to be of another quality and nature[^p261-2]: therefore, if Christ by reason of the assumed nature was the medicine of the human race, it seems then that his flesh ought not to have been formed from the corrupt mass.

2. Likewise, to a noble form noble matter ought to be fitted[^p262-1]: therefore, if Christ's soul was most pure and free from all sin, it seems that Christ's flesh ought to have been alien from all corruption: therefore not from the corrupt mass, and on account of this neither from the kind of Adam.

3. Likewise, the reproach of parents redounds upon the offspring, according to what the Wise Man says[^p262-2]; but Christ ought to have been entirely free from every reproach of sin: therefore he ought not to have been of the kind of the first man.

4. Likewise, the debt of parents is imputed to the offspring; but the mediator ought to have been without any debt, so that his payment might be entirely accepted by God, as Anselm says[^p262-3]: therefore he ought not to have come forth from the kind of Adam.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter two[^p262-4]: *He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one;* but Christ is he who sanctifies, while those who are sanctified are the sons of Adam: it seems therefore that, just as the others are of the kind of Adam, so also Christ was and ought to have been.

2. Likewise, for man's fault none is fitting to make satisfaction except man; therefore for the fault of all the sons of Adam and of Adam himself none ought to make satisfaction except one who is a son of Adam; but Christ made satisfaction for our fault: therefore he ought to have been of our kind and of our mass[^p262-5].

3. Likewise, if man had stood firm, he would have been subject to no other kind of creature, inasmuch as he would have his *standing* through himself: therefore if man is recalled through Christ to his pristine dignity, it seems that he ought to have been subject to no other kind of creature, as though he should *rise again* through it. But he rose again through Christ: therefore it seems that Christ according to the flesh ought to have been of the kind of vitiated flesh[^p262-6].

4. Likewise, the mediator is the more fitting the nearer he is to both kinds: if therefore Christ was the most fitting mediator between sinful men and God[^p262-7]: therefore he ought to have been of the kind of sinful men.

### Conclusion.

> It was more fitting that the Son of God should assume flesh from the kind of Adam than from elsewhere, although God could have arranged it otherwise.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the Son of God could have assumed flesh from elsewhere than from the corrupt mass, that is, from elsewhere than from those who proceeded from the kind of Adam[^p262-8]; yet it was more fitting that he should assume flesh from the kind of Adam. And although there are many fittingnesses which lie hidden from us, according to the manifold character of God's wisdom, nevertheless according to the words and sayings of the Saints four grounds of fittingness can be assigned[^p262-9].

The first is for the sake of preserving the *rectitude of justice,* namely so that the one making satisfaction and the transgressor should be of the same kind. For if he were of another kind, the satisfaction would not be attributed to the same kind to which the offense also belongs; and on account of this the rectitude of justice would not be rightly preserved, which requires amends from that kind in which it finds the preceding offense.

The second is for the sake of manifesting the *sweetness of mercy,* namely so that the Lord himself, who had been despised by man as by an adversary and enemy, the very same should be united to the human kind in Christ into a unity of person; in which is manifested God's wondrous condescension in this, that he willed to join to himself the human kind, which was hostile to him, in an indissoluble bond, according to that which is said to the Romans, chapter five[^p262-10]: *But God commendeth his charity* etc.

The third ground is for declaring the *ordering of wisdom,* which ordering indeed can be infringed by no vice. For God had decreed and ordained that the whole human kind should be multiplied and disseminated from one, for the sake of representing that universal principle which God is; nor ought this to have been infringed through sin: and therefore Christ, *the mediator of God and men*[^p263-1], a true man, ought to have been formed not from elsewhere, but from the mass of the whole human kind.

The fourth ground is for the sake of preserving the *loftiness of human nature,* which God had established in such great dignity that it should be subject to no other kind of creature, but to God alone. If therefore it is in no small measure subject to the Redeemer, it is fitting that the Redeemer should either be God alone, or, if he had in himself a kind of created nature, this should be of the kind of that mass which takes its origin from the loins of Adam.

On account of these four grounds of fittingness, therefore, which appear manifestly and have their firmness from the words of the Saints, it must be conceded that not only was it fitting that Christ should assume flesh from our kind for the repair of human nature, but also that this was more fitting than that he should do it in another way, although he could do it in another way[^p263-2]. — Hence the grounds proving this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that disease and medicine ought to be of another nature; it must be said that this is true for the time in which a thing can be called medicine — of another kind, I say, not with respect to *nature,* but with respect to *curative power;* and so it was in Christ, since he was not infected by the corruption of concupiscence, but had in himself the fullness of grace. Hence the Apostle[^p263-3] also says that *the first man was of the earth, earthy; the second from heaven, heavenly,* not on account of a diversity of *nature* or matter, but on account of a difference with respect to the *quality* of virtue and vice, of grace and fault. — But if one wishes to insist that disease and medicine are simply of diverse natures; it must be said that this has its place in a medicine whose operation is through the power of nature, not through an act of deliberative will.

2. To that which is objected, that noble matter ought to correspond to a noble form; it must be said that it is true of matter disposed by an *ultimate* disposition[^p263-4], which is necessity; but of *remote* matter it does not hold, since all nobility arises from the form superadded to the matter itself. And since the mass of the human kind is not the *proximate* matter with respect to Christ's soul, it does not follow that Christ's body was not of that mass; but the flesh, organized and fitted by a perfect complexion[^p263-5], was its matter; and of this it is well permitted to infer that it was very noble, since it was fitted to a most noble soul; whence it was excellently complexioned and alien from all corruption and the foulness of concupiscence. Yet from this it is not permitted to infer that it was not taken from that mass of corruption; for so pure was that flesh through the power of the working Spirit, as if it had been taken from a heavenly substance[^p263-6].

3. To that which is objected, that the reproach of parents redounds upon the son; it must be said that it is true when the son is an imitator of the crimes of the father[^p263-7]; but when he is contrary and opposed to him with respect to morals, it ought not justly to redound upon him, unless the son himself by his own mere kindness wishes to bear and sustain the reproach of the father. And so it is to be understood to have been in the case at hand. Hence Christ sustained the reproach of Adam not from merit or necessity, but from his own mere kindness, so that, while he himself sustained for another what he did not merit of himself, the other might be freed from the reproach which he had merited by his own fault.

4. To that which is objected, that the debt of parents is imputed to the offspring; it must be said that this is true when the offspring succeeds the parents in the inheritance; and since Christ did not inherit concupiscence from his parents, through which man is bound[^p263-8] to punishment; hence it is that he was debtor to no punishment, but a liberal and voluntary payer.

### Scholion.

**I.** The two questions of this article continue the disputation on the fittingness of the incarnation on the part of the thing assumed, which was begun above at d. 2, a. I, q. 1–4. Since all the works of God are most fitting, regard being had to their end, there can be no doubt about the conclusions themselves, nor about the principal grounds of fittingness.

On Question I: Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. III, q. 2, m. 8. — Scotus touches the matter in both *Scripta,* d. 20, q. unica. — St. Thomas, III *Sent.,* d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2; *Summa* III, q. 4, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, II *Sent.,* d. 2, q. I, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. I. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

On the following (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 9. — St. Thomas, *Commentary,* loc. cit. quaestiuncula 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise touches the matter loc. cit. ad 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. 2.

---

la: Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 32. n. 1: *Arte medicinae calida frigidis, frigida calidis curantur.* — Paulo inferius pro *quod eius caro* codd. E G (I primitus) L T U V X aa *quod ei caro.*

en: Gregory, Bk. II of the Homilies on the Gospel, homily 32, n. 1: *By the art of medicine hot things are cured by cold, cold things by hot.* — A little below, for *quod eius caro* ("that his flesh") the codices E G (I in the first hand) L T U V X aa read *quod ei caro* ("that to him flesh").

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. Vide tom. II. pag. 380, nota 1, ubi ipsa Philosophi verba allata sunt. — Pro *nobili* edd. *nobiliori,* pro *aptari* codd. K T Z *adaptari,* pro *materia* codd. I L V Z aa *natura.*

en: Aristotle, II *On the Generation of Animals,* c. 3. See vol. II, p. 380, note 1, where the Philosopher's own words are cited. — For *nobili* ("noble") the editions read *nobiliori* ("more noble"); for *aptari* ("be fitted") the codices K T Z read *adaptari* ("be adapted"); for *materia* ("matter") the codices I L V Z aa read *natura* ("nature").

la: Eccli. 3, 12. 13: *Ne glorieris in contumelia patris tui; non enim est tibi gloria eius confusio. Gloria enim hominis ex honore patris sui, et dedecus filii pater sine honore.*

en: Ecclesiasticus 3:12–13: *Glory not in the dishonour of thy father; for his shame is no glory to thee. For the glory of a man is from the honour of his father, and a father without honour is the disgrace of the son.*

la: Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 22. et II. c. 11. — Subinde pro *exire* edd. *esse.*

en: Bk. I of *Why God Became Man,* c. 22, and Bk. II, c. 11. — Thereupon, for *exire* ("to come forth") the editions read *esse* ("to be").

la: Vers. 11. — In fine arg. edd. voculae *ita* adiungunt *etiam.*

en: Verse 11. — At the end of the argument the editions add to the little word *ita* also *etiam.*

la: Sic et Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 8. Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 16. n. 30. — Pro *ipsius Adae* cod. N *ipsius etiam Adae.*

en: So also Anselm, II *Why God Became Man,* c. 8. Cf. Augustine, *On True Religion,* c. 16, n. 30. — For *ipsius Adae* ("of Adam himself") the codex N reads *ipsius etiam Adae* ("also of Adam himself").

la: Cfr. Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 8. et I. c. 5, nec non August., XIII. de Trin. c. 18. n. 23.

en: Cf. Anselm, II *Why God Became Man,* c. 8, and Bk. I, c. 5, as well as Augustine, XIII *On the Trinity,* c. 18, n. 23.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 19, nota 6. — Paulo superius pro *utriusque generi* codd. K P Q R aa bb *utrique generi,* codd. M O *utrique extremo.*

en: Cf. above, p. 19, note 6. — A little above, for *utriusque generi* ("to both kinds") the codices K P Q R aa bb read *utrique generi* ("to each kind"), the codices M O *utrique extremo* ("to each extreme").

la: Cfr. verba August. hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. allegata, nec non infra d. 20. q. 6. — Pro verbo *processerunt* codd. H I K L T aa *praecesserunt,* codd. G Z *praecesserant.*

en: Cf. the words of Augustine cited here in the Master's text, c. 1, as well as below at d. 20, q. 6. — For the word *processerunt* ("proceeded") the codices H I K L T aa read *praecesserunt* ("went before"), the codices G Z *praecesserant* ("had gone before").

la: August. et Anselm., quos iam supra allegavimus, praecipue *primam* et *quartam* rationem afferunt; de *secunda* ratione cfr. Chrysost., Homil. 5. in Epist. ad Hebr. n. 1. 2; de *tertia* Fulgent., de Incarn. Filii Dei, n. 14, et II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 1. Cfr. etiam Hugo de S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VIII. c. 10, et Richard. a S. Vict., I. de Emmanuele, c. 10. seqq. — Mox pro *conservandam* cod. bb *observandam.* Paulo inferius pro *quae ab illo genere requirit emendam* cod. F *nisi ab illo genere inquireret et emendam.*

en: Augustine and Anselm, whom we have already cited above, adduce especially the *first* and *fourth* grounds; on the *second* ground cf. Chrysostom, Homily 5 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, n. 1, 2; on the *third* Fulgentius, *On the Incarnation of the Son of God,* n. 14, and II *Sent.,* d. 18, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 1. Cf. also Hugh of St. Victor, I *On the Sacraments,* p. VIII, c. 10, and Richard of St. Victor, I *On Emmanuel,* c. 10 ff. — Presently, for *conservandam* ("preserving") the codex bb reads *observandam* ("observing"). A little below, for *quae ab illo genere requirit emendam* ("which requires amends from that kind") the codex F reads *nisi ab illo genere inquireret et emendam* ("unless it should inquire amends from that kind").

la: Vers. 8. — Paulo superius pro *mira Dei* codd. A bb *mira divinae pietatis.* Deinde pro *indissolubile vinculum* cod. Z (bb a secunda manu) *in indissolubili vinculo,* cod. K *per indissolubile vinculum.* Paulo inferius voci *sapientiae* Vat. praemittit *divinae.*

en: Verse 8. — A little above, for *mira Dei* ("God's wondrous") the codices A bb read *mira divinae pietatis* ("the wondrous of divine piety"). Then for *indissolubile vinculum* ("indissoluble bond") the codex Z (bb in a second hand) reads *in indissolubili vinculo* ("in an indissoluble bond"), the codex K *per indissolubile vinculum* ("through an indissoluble bond"). A little below, the Vatican edition prefixes *divinae* ("of the divine") to the word *sapientiae* ("wisdom").

la: Epist. I. Tim. 2, 5. — Paulo ante pro *nec hoc per* multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, verbis perperam transpositis, *nec per hoc.* In enuntiato, quod sequitur, Vat. ante *altitudinem* interiicit *dignitatem et* ac deinde pro *condiderat* substituit *constituerat.*

en: 1 Timothy 2:5. — A little before, for *nec hoc per* ("nor this through") many codices, together with editions 1, 2, with the words wrongly transposed, read *nec per hoc* ("nor through this"). In the statement which follows, the Vatican edition inserts *dignitatem et* ("dignity and") before *altitudinem* ("loftiness"), and then substitutes *constituerat* ("had constituted") for *condiderat* ("had established").

la: Vat. *potuisset.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *potuisset* ("could have").

la: Epist. I. Cor. 15, 47. — August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 14. n. 13: *Et quemadmodum medici, cum alligant vulnera, non incomposite, sed apte id faciunt... sic medicina Sapientiae per hominis susceptionem nostris est accommodata vulneribus, de quibusdam contrariis curans, et de quibusdam similibus... Quia ergo per superbiam homo lapsus est, humilitatem adhibuit ad sanandum... Ad eadem contraria pertinet, quod etiam exemplo virtutum eius vitia nostra curantur. Iam vero similia quasi ligamenta membris et vulneribus adhibita illa sunt, quod per feminam deceptus per feminam natus, homo homines, mortalis mortales, morte mortuos liberavit.* Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq., nec non Gregor., XXIV. Moral. c. 2. n. 2. — Paulo superius edd. omittunt *inquam.*

en: 1 Corinthians 15:47. — Augustine, I *On Christian Doctrine,* c. 14, n. 13: *And just as physicians, when they bind up wounds, do so not carelessly but aptly... so the medicine of Wisdom, through the taking-on of man, was accommodated to our wounds, curing some by contraries and some by likenesses... Since therefore man fell through pride, he applied humility to heal him... To the same contraries it pertains that our vices are cured also by the example of his virtues. But now the likenesses are, as it were, bandages applied to limbs and wounds, in that, deceived through a woman, born through a woman, a man freed men, a mortal mortals, by death the dead.* Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and p. II, a. 2, q. 1 f., as well as Gregory, XXIV *Morals,* c. 2, n. 2. — A little above, the editions omit *inquam* ("I say").

la: Id est, in qua (dispositione ultima) materia cogitur ad recipiendam illam formam. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 471, nota 2. — Pro *necessitas* Vat. *necessitatis,* et mox pro *materiae* cum edd. 1, 2 *naturae.*

en: That is, [the disposition] in which (the ultimate disposition) the matter is compelled to receive that form. Cf. vol. II, p. 471, note 2. — For *necessitas* ("necessity") the Vatican edition reads *necessitatis* ("of necessity"), and presently for *materiae* ("of matter"), with editions 1, 2, *naturae* ("of nature").

la: Edd. et non pauci codd. *completione.* Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2, II. Sent. d. 17. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. et q. 3.

en: The editions and not a few codices read *completione* ("completion"). Cf. above d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, II *Sent.,* d. 17, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6, and q. 3.

la: Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — Post *Spiritus* cod. bb (K Z a secunda manu) adiicit *sancti.*

en: See above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 f. — After *Spiritus* ("Spirit") the codex bb (K Z in a second hand) adds *sancti* ("holy").

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. I. — Bene multi codd. minus congrue *sceleris patrum,* cod. A *sceleris paterni.* Paulo inferius post *iuste* Vat. interserit *quantum ad poenam.*

en: Cf. II *Sent.,* d. 33, a. I, q. I. — Indeed many codices read, less fittingly, *sceleris patrum* ("of the crime of the fathers"), the codex A *sceleris paterni* ("of the paternal crime"). A little below, after *iuste* ("justly") the Vatican edition inserts *quantum ad poenam* ("with respect to punishment").

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *obligatus est.*

en: The editions, with several codices, read *obligatus est* ("is bound").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.261–264 (PDF 283–286; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 18502–18652) for the clean *videtur* / *sed contra* prose and footnote-marker spacing. The cascade-fragmented Respondeo, the four *congruentiae*, the Solutio (Ad 1–4), the Scholion, and all footers were re-set from the PDF per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion. `type: quaestio`.

**Opener alignment — PASS.** Raw 18502 opens `ARTICULUS I. De congruitate naturae assumtae quoad genus. / QUAESTIO I. Utrum decuerit Filium Dei assumere humanam naturam de massa perditionis. / Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum decuerit Filium Dei assumere humanam naturam de massa perditionis sive de genere Adam.` This is ART. I q1 (*de genere Adam* / *de massa perditionis*), NOT q2 (*ipsum Adam*). Running heads confirmed via low-dpi render: p.262 top-left `262 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`; p.263 top `DIST. XII. ART. I. QUAEST. I. / 263`. The printed q1 title is *Utrum decuerit Filium Dei assumere humanam naturam de massa perditionis* — the task-brief working title (*Utrum Christus de genere Adam carnem assumere debuerit*) is a paraphrase; the confirmed printed title is used in frontmatter.

**Page-split map (per-page footer restart):**
- p.261 (PDF 283): footer **n.2** only — Gregory + the *quod eius caro* codd. variant, anchored at *medicina²* in objection 1. Footer n.1 (*plenitudine gratiae* / *et sapientiae*) was consumed by `d12-divisio`; NOT re-claimed here.
- p.262 (PDF 284): footers **1–10** (objections 2–4 + *sed contra* 1–4 + Respondeo + first three *congruentiae*).
- p.263 (PDF 285): footers **1–8** (third/fourth *congruentiae*, Epilogus, Solutio Ad 1–4).
- p.264 (PDF 286): carries only the **Scholion bibliographic tail** (no numbered footnotes of its own); the p.264 numbered footers (1 *Cfr. quaest. praeced.*, 2 *Vat. assumi*, 3 *origine*, …) belong to **q2**, whose *videtur* body already occupies the lower half of p.264.

**Apparatus count: 19 entries** (p.261 n.2 = 1; p.262 n.1–10 = 10; p.263 n.1–8 = 8). Page-suffixed markers; per-page restart.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: true`. The single Scholion (numbered I) is **shared** and forward-covers q2: its body opens *"Duae huius articuli quaestiones continuant disputationem…"* and its bibliography is split into *"De I. quaestione"* (this q1) and *"De seq. (2.) quaestione"* (q2). Per the Vol II/III convention, **q2 will carry `has_scholion: false`** — the shared scholion is held here.

**Hand-offs picked up:** p.261 footer **n.2** (from `d12-divisio`, which consumed only n.1) — populated as `[^p261-2]`, anchored at *medicina²*.

**Hand-offs forwarded to `d12-a1-q2` (raw 18653):** QUAESTIO II (*Utrum fuisset congruum assumere Adam.* / *Secundo quaeritur, utrum congruum fuisset, ipsum Adam assumi.*) opens at the top-right of printed **p.264** (PDF 286) with its own fresh per-page footer sequence (p.264 footers 1–6+). **No q1 footer migrates forward** — q1's last footer is p.263 n.8, and the p.264 scholion tail carries no numbered notes. q2 has **no scholion of its own** (the shared Scholion I here covers it).

**`[?]` flags:** none. All glyphs resolved against the 450 dpi PDF.