title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

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### ARTICULUS III.

*De naturali Angelorum dilectione.*

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de naturali Angelorum dilectione, et de ipsa duo quaeruntur. Primo de dilectione, qua diligebant Deum. Secundo de dilectione, qua unus Angelus diligebat alterum.

### QUAESTIO I.

*Utrum Angeli naturali dilectione dilexerint Deum propter ipsum et super omnia.*

Quaeritur ergo primo de modo naturalis dilectionis ad Deum. Et est quaestio, utrum Angeli naturali dilectione dilexerint Deum propter se et super omnia. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia Bernardus[^1] dicit, quod «natura est curva»: ergo ad se ipsam reflectitur, ergo magis diligit se quam alia, et alia propter se: ergo etc.

2. Item, qui diligit aliquid supra se elevatur supra se. «Amor enim iungit amantem cum amato[^2]». Si ergo magis diligit quod est supra se quam se, ergo supra se elevatur; sed nihil per se elevatur supra se: ergo necesse est, quod talis amor aliud principium habeat quam naturam.

3. Item, actus dilectionis est nobilissimus inter omnes actus animae, et motus iste, scilicet diligere propter se et super omnia, est motus, quo nullus potest cogitari nobilior[^3]: ergo si natura potest in hunc sine gratia, multo fortius et in quemlibet alium, et ita nulla est opportunitas gratiae naturae institutae. Et iterum, si nobilissimus est, Deo est placitus et acceptus: ergo dignus remuneratione: ergo gratia non est necessaria ad merendum.

4. Item, naturalis dilectio diligit quod diligit per modum desiderii sive concupiscentiae: sed omnis concupiscentia naturalis supponit aliquam indigentiam; sed quandocumque aliquis diligit aliquid propter suam indigentiam, magis diligit illud in quo est indigentia, quam illud quod supplet — ut cum appeto vestimentum propter indigentiam corporis et similiter cibum, magis diligo corpus quam vestimentum vel cibum — ergo si Angelus naturaliter diligit Deum propter suam indigentiam, ergo magis diligit se quam Deum.

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CONTRA: 1. Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum[^4]: «Tales Deus creavit Angelos, ut ipsum prae se diligerent, cuius opere se tales creatos esse cognovissent».

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia affectus angelicus amabat bonum naturali dilectione; aut ergo quia bonum, aut quia bonum sibi. Si quia bonum, cum Deus esset summe bonus, magis ergo ipsum Deum quam aliquid aliud diligebat. Si quia bonum sibi; sed Deus adhuc melius erat ei quam aliquid aliud, quia bonus, immo optimus est affectui quaerenti illum[^5]: ergo quocumque modo videtur, quod ipsum propter se et super omnia diligebat.

3. Item, gustus sanus, non errans in iudicio, id magis desiderat et magis amat, quod est magis delectabile; sed Deus est maxime delectabilis: ergo cum Angelus a sua conditione hoc nosset et affectum sanum haberet, ergo in eo propter se et super omnia delectabatur. Sed illud magis diligit, in quo magis[^6] et propter se delectatur: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc mandatum de diligendo Deum propter se et super omnia erat scriptum in corde Angeli, ergo conscientia dictabat ei, quod ad hoc tenebatur: ergo si non sic diligebat, contra conscientiam faciebat, ergo peccabat: ergo ante peccatum Deum super omnia diligebat. Si tu dicas, quod conscientia non obligabat eum nisi pro tempore gratiae, quia ante non poterat: contra: affectus Angeli ante peccatum non repugnabat intellectui[^7], alioquin ante peccatum erat bellum; sed intellectus dicit, nihil esse diligendum super omnia nisi Deum: ergo cum oporteret, Angelum aliquid diligere super omnia, necesse erat[^8], quod aut diligeret Deum propter se et super omnia, aut faceret contra conscientiam, et ita peccaret.

5. Item, Angelus diligebat Deum, aut ergo fruens, aut utens. Si fruens: ergo propter se et super omnia; si utens: ergo cum «summa perversio sit uti fruendis[^9]», erat perversus, et affectus erat in eo inordinatus, cum faceret de via terminum, et e converso; patet ergo etc.

CONCLUSIO.

*Tam Angelus quam homo tempore naturae institutae habiles erant ad diligendum Deum propter ipsum et super omnia.*

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio tempore naturae institutae tam homo quam Angelus habilis erat ad diligendum Deum propter se et super omnia. Et hoc patet: impossibile enim erat, eum aliter esse rectum[^10]. Rectitudo enim mentis consistit radicaliter in amore. Amor autem rectus esse non potest, si aliquid diligat supra Deum vel aeque, vel aliquid diligat propter se, et Deum propter aliud. Si ergo Deus fecit hominem et Angelum rectum[^11], patet, quod unicuique dedit habilitatem ad amandum se, Deum, super omnia et propter se.

Patet etiam hoc planius, si attendamus, quid est diligere propter se, et super omnia. — Contingit enim, aliquid diligi dilectione concupiscentiae, sicut aliquis amat vinum, vel amicitiae, sicut aliquis amat socium[^12]. — Propter se vero aliquid diligere amore concupiscentiae est non alterius gratia, sed ibi sistere, sicut ebriosus diligit vinum propter se. Propter aliud, est alterius gratia, sicut sobrius diligit potum propter salutem. — Similiter in amore amicitiae propter se diligere est non alterius gratia velle alteri bonum, sicut dicit Philosophus[^13], quod «diligimus amicos propter se, etsi nihil omnino boni debeat nobis ab ipsis esse». Propter aliud vero est alterius gratia, sicut aliquis diligit hominem propter commodum suum, sicut dicit idem[^14], quod «inimicos nostros volumus esse iustos, ut nihil nobis noceant». — Diligere vero aliquid super omnia amore amicitiae est nullo commodo vel incommodo velle ipsum offendere nec amicitiam solvere; similiter diligere[^15] dilectione concupiscentiae est nullo commodo vel incommodo velle illud perdere.

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Quoniam igitur affectus Angeli Deum habere cupiebat propter se, quia summe bonum et summe reficiens, non alterius boni gratia, et Deo volebat bonum propter se, multo magis quam amicus amico; similiter nullo commodo vel incommodo volebat Deum offendere vel perdere, ut manifestum est et patet intuenti; dico, quod Deum diligebat propter se et super omnia.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod motus naturae curvus est; dicendum, quod aut Bernardus intelligit de natura, qua communicamus cum brutis; aut si de rationali, intelligit prout lapsa est; aut hoc vocat curvitatem, quod appetit sibi. Sed esto, quod Deum appetat sibi, non tamen aliquid magis diligit sibi quam Deum, et ita nihilominus propter se et super omnia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod elevatur supra se; dicendum, quod elevari supra se est dupliciter: aut supra suum posse, et hoc est impossibile, nisi adiuvetur natura; aut supra suum esse, et hoc est possibile et naturale. Unde bene concedo, quod homo naturaliter natus est elevari supra se, contemplando et amando.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus iste videtur nobilissimus et difficillimus et Deo gratissimus: dicendum, quod motus iste aliter est gratiae, aliter est naturae institutae. Naturae institutae est ex quadam habilitate et rectitudine respectu boni; gratiae vero est, quia captivatur affectus in obsequium Christi, sicut intellectus per fidem[^16]. Tunc autem captivatur intellectus in obsequium Christi, quando contra illud quod ratio sua dictat, assentit primae veritati; sic et affectus, quando id ad quod diligendum naturaliter inclinatur, amore Christi paratus est odire; vel e converso, quando id ad cuius odium naturaliter inclinatur, paratus est amare. Et talis est affectus, qui contemnit vitam et honores et omne desiderabile, et amat odientes se et laedentes propter Deum; et hic est solus affectus, qui Deo famulatur, et quem Deus acceptat[^17] et remunerat; et hic non est a natura, sed solum a gratia.

Aliter etiam differt hic motus ab illo, quia ille a cognitione naturali, scilicet qui est dilectionis naturalis, alius est a cognitione fidei. Et differt haec cognitio ab illa, quia cognitio naturalis cognoscit Deum summe bonum propter diffusionem sive communicationem bonitatis in effectibus creatis; sed fides dictat Deum summe bonum per communicationem bonitatis in divinis personis. Et utraque cognitio dicit Deum summe bonum et summe diligendum; sed multo nobilius fides sive cognitio gratuita. Per hunc modum utraque dilectio Deum diligit summe, sed magis et nobilius dilectio gratuita.

Alia differentia consuevit dari, quod dilectione naturali diligit Deum animus sive affectus rectus, quia bonus[^18] sibi; et ideo summe diligit, quia summe bonum sibi; et omne bonum, quod est et quod habet, pendet ex ipso et nihil esset nisi per ipsum: ideo plus Deum diligit quam etiam se ipsum. Sed dilectione gratuita diligit quis Deum, quia bonus; et quia summe bonus, diligit summe; et quia non est bonus ipse homo, nisi in quantum est ad Deum, non diligit se nisi propter Deum; et hoc dico dilectione gratuita.

Et sic triplex est differentia: prima est a parte modi diligendi; secunda a parte cognitionis disponentis sive principii; tertia est a parte motivi. Omnes autem sunt rationabiles, sed primae magis innitendum.

4. Ad ultimum solvendum est per interemptionem[^19], quia natura rationalis, de qua nunc loquimur, non tantum amat ratione indigentiae, sed etiam ratione convenientiae et complacentiae; et ideo magis illud quod natum est summe delectare et summe placere.

SCHOLION.

I. Vocabulum *naturali* in titulo quaestionis intelligitur, quatenus distinguitur a *gratuito* i. e. supernaturali. In alio sensu naturale distinguitur ab actu deliberativo et libero; sic «amor naturalis respicit ipsam inclinationem naturae, quae est ad unum determinata» (III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; cfr. infra d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.). De amore naturali in utroque sensu haec quaestio a posterioribus theologis tractata est. — Praeter ea quae in corp. de amore concupiscentiae et benevolentiae (amicitiae), de diligere propter se et propter aliud dicuntur, cfr. de his I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.

II. Quaestio solvitur a Seraphico affirmative quoad amorem tum concupiscentiae tum benevolentiae. Consentiunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R. et etiam Scotus (cfr. H. de Montefortino, Sum. Scoti, t. III. p. II. q. 26. a. 3, et t. II. p. 1. q. 60. a. 5.), licet (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica) arguat contra argumentum principale S. Thomae, unde a nonnullis pro opposita sententia citatur. — Alii autem affirmative respondent quoad amorem concupiscentiae, negative quoad amorem benevolentiae. Ita, teste Dionysio Carth., Gulielm. Antissiodorensis, quem sequuntur Alex. Hal., B. Albert. aliique, qui putant, quod amare Deum propter ipsum et super omnia sit caritas supernaturalis. — De differentia autem caritatis sive amoris gratuiti a naturali amore bene loquitur Seraphicus in solut. ad 3; quam doctrinam Petr. a Tar. iisdem fere verbis in compendium redegit.

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III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. m. 1. a. 2. § 2.— Scot., loc. cit. et Report. III. Sent. d. 27. n. 11-13. — S. Thom., hic q. 4; S. I. q. 60. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lit. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 11. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 7.

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### ARTICLE III.

*On the natural love of the Angels.*

Consequently, in the third place, inquiry is made concerning the natural love of the Angels, and concerning it two things are asked. First, concerning the love by which they loved God. Second, concerning the love by which one Angel loved another.

### QUESTION I.

*Whether the Angels by natural love loved God for His own sake and above all things.*

The first inquiry, then, is about the mode of natural love toward God. And the question is whether the Angels by natural love loved God for His own sake and above all things. And that they did not, it seems:

1. Because Bernard[^1] says that «nature is curved»: therefore it is bent back upon itself, therefore it loves itself more than other things, and other things for its own sake: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, whoever loves something above himself is raised above himself. «For love joins the lover with the beloved[^2]». If therefore he loves what is above himself more than himself, then he is raised above himself; but nothing of itself is raised above itself: therefore it is necessary that such love have another principle than nature.

3. Likewise, the act of love is the noblest among all the acts of the soul, and that motion, namely to love for His own sake and above all things, is a motion than which none nobler can be conceived[^3]: therefore if nature can attain to this without grace, much more strongly can it attain to any other, and so there is no occasion for the grace of instituted nature. And again, if it is the noblest, it is pleasing and acceptable to God: therefore worthy of remuneration: therefore grace is not necessary for meriting.

4. Likewise, natural love loves what it loves by way of desire or concupiscence: but every natural concupiscence supposes some indigence; but whenever anyone loves something on account of his own indigence, he loves more that in which the indigence is than that which supplies it — as when I seek clothing on account of the body's indigence and likewise food, I love the body more than the clothing or the food — therefore if the Angel naturally loves God on account of his own indigence, then he loves himself more than God.

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ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine, *On the Faith to Peter*[^4]: «God created the Angels such that they should love Him before themselves, by whose work they had come to know that they were created such».

2. Likewise, by reason it seems so, because the angelic affection loved the good by natural love; either then because it was good, or because it was good for itself. If because it was good, since God was supremely good, then it loved God Himself more than anything else. If because it was good for itself; but God was still better for it than anything else, since He is good, indeed the best, for an affection seeking Him[^5]: therefore in whatever way it seems that it loved Him for His own sake and above all things.

3. Likewise, a healthy taste, not erring in judgment, desires more and loves more that which is more delightful; but God is most delightful: therefore since the Angel from his condition knew this and had a healthy affection, then he was delighted in Him for His own sake and above all things. But one loves more that in which one is delighted more[^6] and for its own sake: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this commandment of loving God for His own sake and above all things was written in the heart of the Angel, therefore conscience dictated to him that he was bound to this: therefore if he did not so love, he acted against conscience, therefore he sinned: therefore before sin he loved God above all things. If you say that conscience did not oblige him except for the time of grace, because before he could not: on the contrary: the affection of the Angel before sin did not conflict with the intellect[^7], otherwise before sin there was war; but the intellect says that nothing is to be loved above all things except God: therefore since it behoved the Angel to love something above all things, it was necessary[^8] that either he should love God for His own sake and above all things, or he should act against conscience, and so sin.

5. Likewise, the Angel loved God either as enjoying or as using. If as enjoying: then for His own sake and above all things; if as using: then since «it is the height of perversity to use things to be enjoyed[^9]», he was perverse, and the affection in him was disordered, since he made of the way an end, and conversely; therefore it is plain, etc.

CONCLUSION.

*Both the Angel and man, in the time of instituted nature, were capable of loving God for His own sake and above all things.*

I respond: It must be said that without doubt, in the time of instituted nature, both man and the Angel was capable of loving God for His own sake and above all things. And this is plain: for it was impossible for him to be upright otherwise[^10]. For the uprightness of the mind consists radically in love. But love cannot be upright if it loves anything above God or equally, or loves anything for its own sake and God for the sake of something else. If therefore God made man and the Angel upright[^11], it is plain that He gave to each the capability of loving himself, and God, above all things and for His own sake.

This is also plainer if we attend to what it is to love for one's own sake and above all things. — For it happens that something is loved by the love of concupiscence, as someone loves wine, or of friendship, as someone loves a companion[^12]. — But to love something for its own sake by the love of concupiscence is not for the sake of another, but to rest there, as the drunkard loves wine for its own sake. For the sake of something else is for the sake of another, as the sober man loves drink for the sake of health. — Similarly in the love of friendship, to love for its own sake is to will the good to another not for the sake of another, as the Philosopher says[^13], that «we love friends for their own sake, even if no good at all need come to us from them». But for the sake of something else is for the sake of another, as someone loves a man for his own advantage, as the same one says[^14], that «we wish our enemies to be just, that they may harm us in nothing». — But to love something above all things by the love of friendship is to will to offend it or dissolve the friendship for no advantage or disadvantage; similarly to love[^15] by the love of concupiscence is to will to lose it for no advantage or disadvantage.

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Since therefore the affection of the Angel desired to have God for His own sake, because supremely good and supremely refreshing, not for the sake of another good, and willed the good to God for His own sake, much more than a friend to a friend; similarly for no advantage or disadvantage it willed to offend or lose God, as is manifest and plain to one considering; I say that he loved God for His own sake and above all things.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that the motion of nature is curved; it must be said that either Bernard understands it of the nature by which we have community with the beasts; or if of the rational nature, he understands it as it is fallen; or he calls this curvature, that it seeks for itself. But granted that it seeks God for itself, nevertheless it does not love anything more for itself than God, and so nonetheless for His own sake and above all things.

2. To that which is objected, that it is raised above itself; it must be said that to be raised above oneself is twofold: either above one's own power, and this is impossible unless nature is helped; or above one's own being, and this is possible and natural. Hence I readily concede that man is naturally born to be raised above himself, by contemplating and loving.

3. To that which is objected, that this motion seems the noblest and most difficult and most pleasing to God: it must be said that this motion is in one way of grace, in another way of instituted nature. Of instituted nature it is from a certain capability and uprightness with respect to the good; but of grace it is, because the affection is taken captive into the obedience of Christ, as the intellect through faith[^16]. Now the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ when, against that which its reason dictates, it assents to the first truth; so also the affection, when that to which it is naturally inclined to love it is, by the love of Christ, prepared to hate; or conversely, when that to whose hatred it is naturally inclined, it is prepared to love. And such is the affection which despises life and honors and everything desirable, and loves those who hate it and harm it for the sake of God; and this is the only affection which serves God, and which God accepts[^17] and remunerates; and this is not from nature, but only from grace.

In another way also this motion differs from that, because the one is from natural cognition, namely that which is of natural love, the other is from the cognition of faith. And this cognition differs from that, because natural cognition knows God to be supremely good on account of the diffusion or communication of goodness in created effects; but faith dictates God to be supremely good through the communication of goodness in the divine persons. And both cognitions declare God supremely good and supremely to be loved; but much more nobly faith or gratuitous cognition. In this way both loves love God supremely, but more and more nobly the gratuitous love.

Another difference is wont to be given, that by natural love the upright soul or affection loves God because He is good[^18] for it; and therefore it loves Him supremely, because He is supremely good for it; and every good which it is and which it has depends on Him and would be nothing except through Him: therefore it loves God more even than itself. But by gratuitous love one loves God because He is good; and because He is supremely good, he loves Him supremely; and because man himself is not good, except insofar as he is ordered to God, he does not love himself except for the sake of God; and this I say by gratuitous love.

And thus the difference is threefold: the first is on the part of the mode of loving; the second on the part of the disposing cognition or principle; the third is on the part of the motive. But all are reasonable, though the first is to be relied on more.

4. To the last, the solution is by destruction[^19], because the rational nature, of which we now speak, loves not only by reason of indigence, but also by reason of fittingness and complacency; and therefore more that which is born to delight supremely and to please supremely.

SCHOLION.

I. The word *natural* in the title of the question is understood insofar as it is distinguished from *gratuitous*, i.e. supernatural. In another sense the natural is distinguished from the deliberative and free act; thus «natural love regards the very inclination of nature, which is determined to one thing» (III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; cfr. below d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.). On natural love in both senses this question has been treated by later theologians. — Besides the things which are said in the body concerning the love of concupiscence and of benevolence (friendship), and concerning loving for one's own sake and for the sake of another, cfr. on these I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.

II. The question is resolved by the Seraphic Doctor affirmatively as to love both of concupiscence and of benevolence. Agreeing are St. Thomas, Petr. a Tar., Richard a Med., Aegid. R. and also Scotus (cfr. H. de Montefortino, Sum. Scoti, t. III. p. II. q. 26. a. 3, and t. II. p. 1. q. 60. a. 5.), although (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica) he argues against the principal argument of St. Thomas, whence by some he is cited for the opposite opinion. — But others answer affirmatively as to the love of concupiscence, negatively as to the love of benevolence. So, on the testimony of Dionysius Carth., William of Auxerre, whom Alex. of Hales, B. Albert and others follow, who hold that to love God for His own sake and above all things is supernatural charity. — But concerning the difference of charity or gratuitous love from natural love the Seraphic Doctor speaks well in the solution to argument 3; which doctrine Petr. a Tar. reduced to a compendium in nearly the same words.

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III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. m. 1. a. 2. § 2.— Scot., loc. cit. and Report. III. Sent. d. 27. n. 11-13. — S. Thom., here q. 4; S. I. q. 60. a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 18; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard a Med., here a. 7. q. 1. — Aegid. R., here p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lit. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 11. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q. here q. 7.

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- **p.126 — 5 footer notes** (L-col n.1–2, R-col n.3–5) → `[^15]`–`[^19]`. Anchors: Respondeo/Epilogus *similiter diligere* (n.1); reply 3 *intellectus per fidem* (n.2); reply 3 *Deus acceptat* (n.3); the *alia differentia* *quia bonus sibi* (n.4); reply 4 *per interemptionem* (n.5).

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**Scholion:** editorial (Quaracchi) Scholion I–III — I = the *naturale/gratuitum* word-sense note + cross-refs; II = the "resolved affirmatively by the Seraphic Doctor" doctrinal survey (Scotus/Aquinas/William of Auxerre positions); III = the bibliographic source-list. No numbered apparatus.

**Marginal glosses trimmed** (not rendered): *Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio*, *Ratio*, *Magis determinatur*, *Distinctio 1/2*, *Subdistinctio 1/2*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Epilogus*, *Differentia 1/2/3 (inter motum gratiae et naturae integrae)*.

**Low-confidence items — RESOLVED at the d.1–d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker (2026-05-22):**
- `[^5]` — RESOLVED. The p.125 footer reads `Alluditur ad Thren. 3, 25:` at 600 dpi (the IA OCR `3, 23` was the digit-mangle). `25` is correct and matches the rendered text. No change.
- `[^1]` — RESOLVED. The p.124 footer note 3 reads `Cfr. etiam Epist. 11, ubi n. 5.` at 600 dpi — `Epist. 11` (arabic 11) confirmed. No change.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 127 -->

### QUAESTIO II.

*Utrum Angelus naturali dilectione magis diligat superiorem, an parem, an inferiorem.*

Circa secundum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Angelus naturali dilectione magis diligat[^1] superiorem, an parem, an inferiorem.

Et quod magis superiorem, videtur.

1. Si Angelus Angelum naturaliter diligit, aut ergo quia bonum, aut quia beneficum; sed quocumque modo Angelus superioris ordinis magis est bonus; et iterum amplius est beneficus, quia Angelus inferioris ordinis a superiori recipit illuminationes per eum modum, per quem Dionysius[^2] dicit: ergo etc.

2. Item, Angelus per naturam institutam Deum super omnia diligebat[^3]: ergo si illud quod magis approximat ad summum, in omni genere est magis intensum, ergo si summe diligebat Deum, id est super omnia, ergo magis illud quod Deo erat similius et proximius; sed Angelus superioris ordinis est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

3. Item, Angelus inferioris ordinis nolebat aequiparari Angelo superioris ordinis, quantum erat de naturali appetitu, ergo magis et eminentius bonum illi volebat quam sibi: sed super omnes Angelos pares et inferiores se diligebat: ergo etc.

Quod autem magis diligeret Angelum eiusdem ordinis, videtur.

4. Dilectio naturalis concernit similitudinem; unde Ecclesiastici decimo tertio[^4]: Omne animal diligit simile sibi; sed Angelus eiusdem ordinis similior est Angelo sui ordinis quam alterius: ergo magis diligit.

5. Item, naturalis dilectio intenditur per familiaritatem et domesticitatem — unde magis diligit homo naturaliter domesticum et socium suum quam extraneum[^5] — sed maior est familiaritas et societas Angelorum eiusdem ordinis: ergo etc.

6. Item, Ecclesia triumphans conformis est Ecclesiae militanti[^6]: sed in Ecclesia militante est distinctio ordinum et religionum, et recto et ordinato affectu, qui non repugnat gratiae, plus iungitur homo ei qui est eiusdem professionis: ergo pari ratione et Angelus naturali dilectione plus diligebat Angelos eiusdem ordinis.

Quod autem magis Angelos inferioris ordinis, videtur.

7. Primo, quia «probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis[^7]»; sed Angelus superioris ordinis plus se communicat Angelo inferioris quam paris vel superioris, et ad hoc faciendum ordinatur per naturam, non solum per gratiam: ergo etc.

8. Item, per naturam plus amat rationalis creatura praeesse quam subesse; sed Angelus medii ordinis ideo subest, quia habet superiores, ideo praeest, quia habet inferiores: ergo si magis diligit praeesse[^8], magis per naturam diligit habere ordines inferiores quam superiores: ergo etc.

9. Item, nos videmus in linea consanguinitatis carnalis, quod magis diligit homo eum qui est infra, quam eum qui est supra, vel iuxta, ut puta magis filium quam patrem vel fratrem, et hoc est per naturam: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod in ordinibus Angelorum magis affectio convertatur ad eum qui infra est, cum nullum sit vinculum consanguinitatis, nec supra nec iuxta.

CONCLUSIO.

*Angelus ratione maioris boni optati magis diligit superiorem Angelum; ratione intensioris affectus plus diligit aequalem; ratione vero impensi beneficii plus diligit inferiorem.*

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod magis diligere aliquem, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut ratione boni optati, aut ratione[^9] affectus intensi, aut ratione effectus impensi.

Ratione boni optati dicitur quis aliquem magis diligere, quando maius bonum optat; et sic dicitur diligere magis, quia ad maius. Hoc modo naturali dilectione, procedente ex iudicio rationis rectae, magis diligebat Angelus Angelum superiorem. Volebat enim, ipsum excellere et plus boni habere, sicut et Deus conditor voluit sic ordinare. — Ratione affectus intensi dicitur aliquis magis alterum diligere, quando affectio eius plus trahit ad[^10] alterum, et magis consolatur de eius societate; et sic dicitur aliquis magis illum diligere, cum quo libentius cohabitat. Et sic Angelus magis diligebat per naturam Angelum eiusdem ordinis; quia, sicut naturali affectu magis diligit quis compatriotas suos, maxime quando conformantur[^11] sibi in moribus; et sicut magis diligit homo eum qui est eiusdem professionis et officii, ubi invidia non interponit partes suas: sic Angelus alterum Angelum eiusdem ordinis magis dilectione naturali amplecti intelligendus est[^12], cum se videret a Conditore in officii aequalitate et naturae similitudine illi sociatum, nec esset tunc morum diversitas nec invidiae malignitas. — Ratione effectus sive beneficii impensi dicitur quis magis eum diligere, cui plura bona impendit, et circa quem magis sollicitatur: sicut mater magis confovet filium tenellum et sollicitior est circa illum quam circa adultum, et magis circa infirmum quam circa sanum. Et huius ratio est consideratio maioris indigentiae. Et hoc modo dici potest, quod Angelus superioris ordinis magis diligit Angelum inferioris[^13], quia Angelus paris vel superioris ordinis non indiget sic sua instructione, sive purgatione, secundum quod Angelus inferioris ordinis.

<!-- page 128 -->

Et sic secundum diversas vias membra propositae quaestionis se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, et ideo rationes ad tria praedicta membra decurrentes sibi non obviant, et concedi possunt, quamvis non sint multum cogentes. — Si autem quis ex praedictis rationibus simpliciter velit inferre maioritatem dilectionis, unica responsione potest omnibus obviari, scilicet quod omnes procedunt ab insufficienti. Si vero concluditur excessus dilectionis determinatae vel in bono optato, vel in affectu intenso, et in effectu impenso, satis de plano omnes possunt concedi.

SCHOLION.

I. Etiam Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 2.) adhibet distinctionem, qua utitur S. Bonav., et dicit: Magis diligere quis alterum altero potest dici tripliciter: aut ratione boni optati, aut ratione affectus intensi, aut effectus impensi»; atque etiam in conclusionibus cum Seraphico convenit. Alii nonnulli secundum membrum non admittunt, hac ducti ratione, quia non sit gradus in intensitate operationis angelicae, cum Angeli semper operentur toto conatu. — Etiam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 7. q. 2.) paulo aliter resolvit, scil. quod Angelus naturaliter Angelum superiorem magis diligebat «quam sibi magis propinquum vel aequalem, et bonum maius illi volebat et bonum illius intensius optando».

II. Alii doctores de hoc non disputant, vel rem tangunt quaerendo, utrum unus Angelus naturali dilectione diligat alium, sicut se ipsum, de quo tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. q. 60. a. 4. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lat. 1.

english:
<!-- page 127 -->

### QUESTION II.

*Whether the Angel by natural love loves more the superior, or the equal, or the inferior.*

Concerning the second point one proceeds thus and inquires whether the Angel by natural love loves more[^1] the superior, or the equal, or the inferior.

And that he loves the superior more, it seems.

1. If an Angel naturally loves an Angel, then either because he is good, or because he is beneficent; but in whatever way the Angel of the higher order is more good; and again he is more beneficent, because the Angel of the lower order receives illuminations from the higher in that mode by which Dionysius[^2] speaks: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Angel by instituted nature loved God above all things[^3]: therefore if that which more closely approaches the highest is in every genus more intense, therefore if he loved God supremely, that is above all things, then more that which was more similar and nearer to God; but the Angel of the higher order is of this kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the Angel of the lower order did not wish to be equated to the Angel of the higher order, so far as natural appetite was concerned, therefore he willed the good more and more eminently to him than to himself: but above all equal and inferior Angels he loved himself: therefore etc.

That he would love more the Angel of the same order, it seems.

4. Natural love regards likeness; whence Ecclesiasticus, the thirteenth chapter[^4]: Every animal loves what is like itself; but an Angel of the same order is more like an Angel of his own order than of another: therefore he loves it more.

5. Likewise, natural love is intensified by familiarity and domesticity — whence a man naturally loves his familiar and his companion more than a stranger[^5] — but the familiarity and society of Angels of the same order is greater: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the Church triumphant is conformed to the Church militant[^6]: but in the Church militant there is a distinction of orders and religious states, and with an upright and ordered affection, which does not conflict with grace, a man is more joined to him who is of the same profession: therefore by parity of reason the Angel too by natural love loved more the Angels of the same order.

That he loves more the Angels of the lower order, it seems.

7. First, because «the proof of love is the showing of the work[^7]»; but the Angel of the higher order communicates himself more to the Angel of the lower than to the equal or the superior, and to do this he is ordained by nature, not only by grace: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, by nature the rational creature loves more to preside than to be subject; but the Angel of the middle order is subject for the reason that he has superiors, and presides for the reason that he has inferiors: therefore if he loves more to preside[^8], he loves more by nature to have lower orders than higher: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, we see in the line of carnal consanguinity that a man loves more him who is below than him who is above, or beside, as for instance a son more than a father or a brother, and this is by nature: therefore it seems by parity of reason that in the orders of the Angels the affection turns more to him who is below, since there is no bond of consanguinity, neither above nor beside.

CONCLUSION.

*The Angel, by reason of the greater good wished, loves more the superior Angel; by reason of the more intense affection he loves more the equal; but by reason of the benefit bestowed he loves more the inferior.*

I respond: It must be said that to love someone more can be in three ways: either by reason of the good wished, or by reason of[^9] the intense affection, or by reason of the benefit bestowed.

By reason of the good wished one is said to love someone more when one wishes a greater good; and so one is said to love more, because for a greater. In this way, by natural love proceeding from the judgment of right reason, the Angel loved the superior Angel more. For he willed him to excel and to have more good, as also God the founder willed thus to ordain. — By reason of the intense affection one is said to love another more when one's affection is drawn more toward[^10] the other, and one is more consoled by his society; and so one is said to love that one more with whom one more gladly dwells together. And thus the Angel loved more by nature the Angel of the same order; because, just as by natural affection one loves more one's fellow-countrymen, especially when they conform[^11] to oneself in character; and just as a man loves more him who is of the same profession and office, where envy does not interpose its part: so the Angel is to be understood[^12] as embracing more by natural love the other Angel of the same order, since he saw himself associated with him by the Founder in equality of office and likeness of nature, nor was there then any diversity of character nor malignity of envy. — By reason of the effect or benefit bestowed one is said to love more him on whom one bestows more goods, and about whom one is more solicitous: just as a mother cherishes more the tender child and is more solicitous about him than about the grown one, and more about the sick than about the healthy. And the reason for this is the consideration of the greater indigence. And in this way it can be said that the Angel of the higher order loves more the Angel of the lower[^13], because the Angel of the equal or higher order does not need his instruction or purgation in the way the Angel of the lower order does.

<!-- page 128 -->

And thus, according to the diverse ways, the members of the proposed question stand as exceeding and exceeded, and therefore the arguments running to the three aforesaid members do not oppose one another, and can be conceded, although they are not very cogent. — But if anyone from the aforesaid arguments wishes simply to infer a greater-ness of love, all can be met with a single response, namely that they all proceed from an insufficient ground. But if there is concluded an excess of love determined either in the good wished, or in the intense affection, and in the benefit bestowed, all can quite plainly be conceded.

SCHOLION.

I. Petr. a Tar. also (here q. 5. a. 2.) employs the distinction which St. Bonaventure uses, and says: «To love one more than another can be said in three ways: either by reason of the good wished, or by reason of the intense affection, or of the benefit bestowed»; and also in his conclusions he agrees with the Seraphic Doctor. Some others do not admit the second member, led by this reasoning, that there is no degree in the intensity of angelic operation, since the Angels always operate with their whole effort. — Richard a Med. also (here a. 7. q. 2.) resolves it somewhat otherwise, namely that the Angel naturally loved the superior Angel more «than one nearer or equal to himself, and willed him a greater good and wished his good more intensely».

II. Other doctors do not dispute about this, or touch the matter by asking whether one Angel by natural love loves another as himself, on which Alex. of Hales treats, S. p. II. q. 30. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. q. 60. a. 4. — B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 3. — Aegid. R., here p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lat. 1.

translators_notes:
**Source range:** raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 9505–9601; printed pp. 127–128 (PDF = printed + 22). Full 450 dpi column-band PDF re-set (`extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 127-128 --dpi 450` + `colcrop.py`). videtur args clean prose from the IA djvu OCR base; the Respondeo (threefold *boni optati / affectus intensi / effectus impensi* + Corollarium) and the Scholion reflowed from the column-band crops; footers walked page-by-page.

**Apparatus crosswalk (continuous renumber 1–13):**
- **p.127 — 9 footer notes** (L-col n.1–2-start, R-col n.2-runover–9) → `[^1]`–`[^9]`. Note 2 (the long *de Caelesti Hierarch.* note) has an L→R column-footer runover (opener on L-col, `…ordinibus. Ratio praecipua inde sumitur…` recovered from R-col). Anchors: intro *magis diligat* (n.1); arg 1 *per quem Dionysius dicit* (n.2); arg 2 *Deum super omnia diligebat* (n.3); arg 4 *Ecclesiastici 13* (n.4); arg 5 *quam extraneum* (n.5); arg 6 *Ecclesiae militanti* (n.6); arg 7 *exhibitio operis* (n.7); arg 8 *magis diligit praeesse* (n.8); Respondeo *aut ratione affectus intensi* (n.9).
- **p.128 — footer SPLIT (this chunk takes n.1–4 only):** n.1 → `[^10]` (conclusio *plus trahit ad alterum*); n.2 → `[^11]` (conclusio *conformantur sibi*); n.3 → `[^12]` (conclusio *amplecti intelligendus est, cum se videret*); n.4 → `[^13]` (conclusio-3 *magis diligit Angelum inferioris*). **n.5+ → next chunk `d3-p2-dubia`** (n.5 = `Hic c. 4. circa medium, ubi ex Augustino haec affe-runtur…` → DUB I *ut infra exponit*; then n.6 *Epist. I. Tim. 2,4*, n.7 *Ioan. 8,44*, n.8 *de Civ. Dei XI. c.18*, n.9 *Matth. 1,22 et 21,4* — all DUB I). This is a **discovered outgoing split**: a3-q2's editorial Scholion I–II is short and ends partway down p.128, so `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` + DUB I's body begin on the *same* printed page (128) as a3-q2's footer; the clean/split rule (split iff q's scholion short enough that the next unit's body begins on q's footer page) yields a split here. Documented for the future `d3-p2-dubia` build: its p.128 apparatus starts at footer note 5.

**Incoming boundary a3-q1→a3-q2 = CLEAN (received):** a3-q1's editorial Scholion I–III carries no numbered apparatus and ends partway down p.127 L-col; QUAESTIO II opens immediately below it; all of p.127's footer (notes 1–9) is a3-q2's. a3-q1's last apparatus was p.126 n.5/`[^19]` — no backfill in either direction.

**Scholion:** editorial (Quaracchi) Scholion I–II — I = the Petr. a Tar. / Richard a Med. parallel-treatment note; II = the "other doctors" cross-reference list (Alex. Hal. / S. Thom. / B. Albert / Aegid. R.). No numbered apparatus (the `«…»` after *magis diligebat* in Scholion I is the opening quotation guillemet of Richard a Med.'s words — IA OCR garbled it `i (`, **not** a footnote marker; verified on the p.128 R-col crop).

**Marginal glosses trimmed** (not rendered): *Ad oppositum*, *Pro positione 1/2/3*, *Argg.*, *Conclusio / Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Distinctio*, *Corollarium*, *Notandum*.

**Low-confidence items parked for the d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker:** none new — the p.127/128 footers read cleanly at 450 dpi (the one colcrop R-col-0 left-edge clip on `[^12]`/`[^13]` was recovered from the full-width IA OCR, faithful).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part I)

source_text:
<!-- page 110 -->

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod *quatuor quidem Angelis videntur esse attributa.* Primum, quia videtur sibi *contradicere* in enumeratione; enumerat enim sex, sicut patet[^1], quae sunt: essentiae simplicitas, personalis discretio, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas et liberum arbitrium. — Item, videtur sibi contradicere in repetitione; dicit enim in sequenti capitulo, quod circa tria est consideratio, scilicet circa substantiam, formam et potestatem. — Quaeritur ergo de sufficientia illorum quatuor. Videtur enim, quod multo *plura* debent attribui, scilicet incorruptibilitas, spiritualitas et huiusmodi ex parte *essentiae*; ex parte *potentiarum* etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et ita competit eis ingenium, sicut memoria[^2]. — Item, videtur *superfluitas*, quia liberum arbitrium non discernitur a ratione et voluntate[^3]: ergo non deberet quarto loco connumerari. — Item, tertium attributum, quod est ratio, aut accipitur pro cognitiva tantum, aut pro cognitiva et motiva; si primo modo: ergo male dividitur in intelligentiam et voluntatem; si secundo modo: ergo superfluit liberum arbitrium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illa attributa sunt convenientia Angelo per naturam suam et in sui creatione tanquam principalia, a quibus alia habent ortum. Et sumitur *sufficientia* sic: in Angelo enim est considerare *esse* et *posse*, sive *substantiam* et *potentiam.* Et circa *substantiam* duo, scilicet *quo est*, et penes hoc est substantiae simplicitas; vel ipsum *quod est*, et penes hoc est personalis discretio. Similiter circa *posse* est considerare ipsam *potentiam*, et penes hoc est tertium, scilicet ratio naturaliter insita. Est iterum considerare *facultatem potentiae*, et penes hoc est quartum attributum, scilicet liberum arbitrium.

Vel aliter: Angelus habet quadrupliciter considerari, scilicet *in se*, et sic essentiae simplicitas; *ad alterum Angelum*, et sic personalis discretio; *ad Deum*, et sic memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, in quibus consistit ratio imaginis; in comparatione *ad ea quae subiecta sunt* eorum regimini, et sic habet liberum arbitrium.

Vel aliter, et magis secundum consonantiam ad ea quae dicuntur in littera[^4]: in Angelo est considerare *substantiam, formam et potentiam.* Substantia autem considerari potest dupliciter, sicut dictum est, et sic competit ei simplicitas et personalitas. <!-- page 111 --> Formae attribuitur imaginis pulcritudo sive venustas. Potentiae attribuitur libertas. — Et sic patet, quomodo quatuor reducuntur ad tria. Patet etiam, quomodo tertium attributum in tria dividitur, in quibus consistit imago. Patet etiam, quomodo tertium attributum differt a quarto. Patet etiam sufficientia et responsio ad obiecta, quia hic enumerantur attributa principalia[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Differentem essentiae tenuitatem habuisse intelligitur.* Contra: simplicitas respicit essentiam sive substantiam, sicut dicit in littera[^6]; sed substantia non recipit magis et minus: ergo etc. — Item, simplex dicit privationem compositionis; sed privationes non recipiunt magis et minus[^7]: ergo etc. — Item, *magis et minus* si alicui imponitur, hoc est per impermixtionem cum suo opposito[^8]; sed simplex spiritus non est permixtus alicui compositioni, quae sit opposita simplicitati angelicae, et omnes habent easdem compositiones: ergo omnes sunt aequaliter simplices.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dicendum, quod in Angelis est gradus simplicitatis, et hoc manifestat *gradus virtutis*, quia unus Angelus est potentior altero; et quanto in spiritualibus aliquid est simplicius, tanto virtuosius[^9]. Hoc etiam manifestat *approximatio ad Deum*; si enim per naturam unus est Deo proximior altero et similior, ergo magis accedit ad divinam simplicitatem. Manifestat ulterius hoc *ipsa cognitio*, quia unus alterum purgat pellendo ignorantiam: ergo unus altero purior et simplicior. — Et ideo bene dicit Magister, quod est gradus in simplicitate essentiae.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod substantia non recipit magis et minus; responderi potest per interemptionem, quia una creatura veriori modo est ens quam alia. Et quod dicitur, substantiam non recipere magis et minus, hoc intelligendum est logice[^10]. — Vel dicendum, quod aliud est dicere *essentiam*, aliud simplicitatem essentiae; et simplicitas est proprietas essentiae.

Quod obiicitur, quod dicit privationem; dicendum, quod etsi dicat privationem, non tamen pure privationem, quia aliquid ponit[^11]; et ideo potest recipere magis et minus.

Quod obiicitur de permixtione, dicendum, quod illud non habet ubique veritatem, sed in his oppositis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura; in aliis vero est per maiorem accessum ad suum summum. Unde maior simplicitas est in Angelo non propter paucitatem compositionis, sed propter accessum maiorem ad summe simplex; hoc autem est propter maiorem nobilitatem formae, sicut ignis potest dici in corporalibus simplicior aere[^12].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *In ipsa facultate arbitrii differentia animadvertenda est.* Contra: Liberum arbitrium est liberum ab omni coactione, nec potest aliquo modo cogi: ergo in libertate arbitrii non potest esse gradus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod libertas arbitrii dupliciter potest considerari: aut in quantum dicit facultatem et facilitatem ad exeundum in opus; et sic dicit *positionem* et consequitur rationem et voluntatem, et istae potentiae consequuntur substantiam; et secundum quod substantia simplicior, sic etiam potentiae excellentiores et facultas maior, et sic est ibi gradus; et hoc modo loquitur Magister. Alio modo accipitur *privative*, ut dicatur libertas per privationem coactionis; et hoc modo est aequalitas, quia est privatio in termino[^13]; et sic opponit.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *aequales sunt in hoc quod spiritus sunt et immortales sunt.* Contra: Ideo sunt spiritus et immortales[^14], <!-- page 112 --> quia sunt simplices; sed non sunt aequaliter simplices: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum quod *spiritus* privat corpulentiam, et *immortalitas* privat corruptionem — quia utrobique et respectu omnium Angelorum est privatio horum universalis — ideo dicit ista esse aequalia; nihilominus tamen, si attendatur ad id quod positionis est ibi, sic posset esse gradus, sicut opponit. Magister accipit secundum sensum verborum magis consuetum, et secundum quod huiusmodi nomina consueverunt intelligi a nobis[^15].

---

english:
### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which he says, that *four [things] indeed seem to be attributed to the angels.* First, because he seems to *contradict* himself in the enumeration; for he enumerates six, as is plain[^1], which are: simplicity of essence, personal distinction, memory, intelligence, will, and free choice. — Likewise, he seems to contradict himself in the repetition; for he says in the following chapter that there is a consideration about three [things], namely about substance, form, and power. — It is asked therefore concerning the sufficiency of those four. For it seems that *more* ought to be attributed, namely incorruptibility, spirituality, and the like, on the side of the *essence*; on the side of the *powers* also the irascible and the concupiscible; and thus intelligence befits them, as [does] memory[^2]. — Likewise, there seems to be a *superfluity*, because free choice is not distinguished from reason and will[^3]: therefore it ought not to be enumerated in the fourth place. — Likewise, the third attribute, which is reason, is taken either for the cognitive only, or for the cognitive and motive; if in the first mode: therefore it is badly divided into intelligence and will; if in the second mode: therefore free choice is superfluous.

**I respond:** It must be said that those attributes are befitting to the angel by its nature and in its creation as principal [ones], from which the others have their rise. And the *sufficiency* is taken thus: for in the angel there is to consider *being* and *power*, that is *substance* and *potency.* And about *substance* two [things], namely *that by which it is*, and in respect of this is the simplicity of essence; or the *that-which-is* itself, and in respect of this is personal distinction. Likewise about *power* there is to consider the *potency* itself, and in respect of this is the third, namely the naturally implanted reason. There is again to consider the *faculty of the potency*, and in respect of this is the fourth attribute, namely free choice.

Or otherwise: the angel can be considered in a fourfold way, namely *in itself*, and so the simplicity of essence; *to another angel*, and so personal distinction; *to God*, and so memory, intelligence, and will, in which the account of the image consists; in comparison *to those [things] which are subject* to their governance, and so it has free choice.

Or otherwise, and more according to the consonance with the [things] which are said in the text[^4]: in the angel there is to consider *substance, form, and potency.* But substance can be considered in two ways, as has been said, and so simplicity and personality befit it. <!-- page 111 --> To form is attributed the beauty or comeliness of the image. To potency is attributed liberty. — And so it is plain how the four are reduced to three. It is also plain how the third attribute is divided into three, in which the image consists. It is also plain how the third attribute differs from the fourth. There is also plain the sufficiency and the response to the objections, because here the principal attributes are enumerated[^5].

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *He is understood to have had a differing thinness of essence.* On the contrary: simplicity regards the essence or substance, as he says in the text[^6]; but substance does not receive more and less: therefore etc. — Likewise, the simple states the privation of composition; but privations do not receive more and less[^7]: therefore etc. — Likewise, *more and less*, if it is imposed on anything, this is through unmixedness with its opposite[^8]; but a simple spirit is not mixed with any composition which would be opposed to angelic simplicity, and all have the same compositions: therefore all are equally simple.

**I respond:** To this it must be said that in the angels there is a degree of simplicity, and this the *degree of power* manifests, because one angel is more powerful than another; and the simpler anything is in spiritual [things], the more powerful[^9]. This also the *approximation to God* manifests; for if by nature one is nearer and more like to God than another, then it approaches more to the divine simplicity. This further manifests *cognition itself*, because one purges another by driving away ignorance: therefore one [is] purer and simpler than another. — And therefore the Master well says that there is a degree in the simplicity of essence.

As to what therefore is objected, that substance does not receive more and less; it can be answered by way of suppression, because one creature is a being in a truer mode than another. And as to what is said, that substance does not receive more and less, this is to be understood logically[^10]. — Or it must be said that it is one [thing] to say *essence*, another the simplicity of essence; and simplicity is a property of the essence.

As to what is objected, that it states a privation; it must be said that although it states a privation, yet not a pure privation, because it posits something[^11]; and therefore it can receive more and less.

As to what is objected concerning the mixture, it must be said that that does not hold true everywhere, but in those opposites of which each is some nature; but in others it is by a greater approach to its highest. Whence there is greater simplicity in an angel not on account of fewness of composition, but on account of a greater approach to the supremely simple; and this is on account of the greater nobility of the form, just as fire among corporeal [things] can be called simpler than air[^12].

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *In the very faculty of choice a difference is to be noted.* On the contrary: free choice is free from all coercion, nor can it be coerced in any way: therefore in the liberty of choice there cannot be a degree.

**I respond:** It must be said that the liberty of choice can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it states a *faculty* and a facility for going forth into the work; and so it states a *position* and follows reason and will, and these potencies follow substance; and according as substance [is] simpler, so also the potencies [are] more excellent and the faculty greater, and so there is a degree there; and in this mode the Master speaks. In another mode it is taken *privatively*, so that liberty be called [the] privation of coercion; and in this mode there is equality, because it is a privation at the limit[^13]; and so he objects.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *they are equal in this, that they are spirits and are immortal.* On the contrary: they are spirits and immortal for this reason[^14], <!-- page 112 --> because they are simple; but they are not equally simple: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as *spirit* deprives [of] corpulence, and *immortality* deprives [of] corruption — because on both sides and with respect to all the angels the privation of these is universal — therefore he says these to be equal; nevertheless however, if attention be paid to that which is of position there, so there could be a degree, as he objects. The Master takes [it] according to the more customary sense of the words, and according as such names have been accustomed to be understood by us[^15].

---

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, c. 1.

la: Respicitur ad illud ex libro de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: *Ingenium investigat, ratio iudicat, memoria servat, intellectus separat, intelligentia comprehendit et ad meditationem sive contemplationem adducit.*

en: Reference is made to that [passage] from the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 11: *Wit investigates, reason judges, memory keeps, intellect separates, intelligence comprehends and leads to meditation or contemplation.*

la: Cfr. de hoc infra d. 25. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. seqq.

en: Cf. on this below d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 ff.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 4-8; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 13-16; S. Thom., Richard. et Petr., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R., hic p. 1. dub. litt. 1.

en: On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 4–8; *Summa* p. II, tract. 4, q. 13–16; St. Thomas, Richard, and Peter, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here p. 1, doubt on the text 1.

la: Hic c. 2. — *Minor* exhibetur ab Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia.*

en: Here, c. 2. — The *minor* is exhibited by Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Substance.*

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.) dicit, quod sicut in nihilo nulla est diversitas, ita et in privatione non est diversitas. Et I. de Part. animal. c. 3. ait: *Privationis, qua privatio est, nulla est differentia; non enim fieri potest, ut species eius sit, quod non est.*

en: Aristotle, IV *Physics* text 67 (c. 8) says that just as in nothing there is no diversity, so also in privation there is no diversity. And I *On the Parts of Animals* c. 3 says: *Of privation, insofar as it is privation, there is no difference; for it cannot happen that there be a species of it, which is not.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.): *Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius.* — Vat. *mixtionem*, non pauci codd. *immixtionem* pro *impermixtionem*, quod habent codd. C R T V cc et ed. 1.

en: Aristotle, III *Topics* c. 4 (c. 5): *And [the things] which are more unmixed from contraries are more such; as the whiter [is] indeed more unmixed from black.* — The Vatican [edition reads] *mixtionem*, not a few codices *immixtionem* for *impermixtionem*, which codices C R T V cc and ed. 1 have.

la: Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 17, in qua et sequens ratio insinuatur. Tertia est Dionys. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 3.

en: Cf. the *Book of Causes*, proposition 17, in which the following reason also is insinuated. The third is Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 3.

la: In cod. Q (a secunda manu) *hoc intelligendum est, qui logice considerat essentiam rei, sed physice non est verum, qui considerat rem sub motu et varietate.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. ad 1.

en: In codex Q (by a second hand) [it reads]: *this is to be understood [of him] who considers the essence of a thing logically, but it is not true physically, [for him] who considers the thing under motion and variety.* Cf. I *Sentences* d. 17, p. II, q. 1, in reply to 1.

la: Scil. modum unitatis nobilem. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2, et d. 24. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Namely, the noble mode of unity. Cf. I *Sentences* d. 8, p. II, q. 2, and d. 24, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq.; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 13. m. 3; S. Thom., Petr., Richard., hic circa lit.; Ægid. R. hic p. I. dub. litt. 3.

en: See I *Sentences* d. 17, p. II, q. 1 f.; Blessed Albert, here a. 9; *Summa* p. II, tract. 4, q. 13, m. 3; St. Thomas, Peter, Richard, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here p. I, doubt on the text 3.

la: Gilbert. Porretanus in libro Sex Principiorum, c. ult., cum agit de eo, quod est plus minusve suscipere, respectu eorum, quae non suscipiunt magis et minus, utitur his verbis: « Impositio [nominum ipsorum] in termino est, ultra quem transgredi impossibile est »; et rationem affert B. Albert. in Comment. super hunc locum, scil. quia ille terminus indivisibilis est. — De hoc dubio cfr. infra d. 25. p. II. q. 1, ubi etiam ceteri Scholastici hanc quaestionem resolvunt; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 29. m. 1. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 16. m. 4; Ægid. R., hic p. I. dub. litt. 5.

en: Gilbert of Poitiers in the book *Six Principles*, the last chapter, when he treats of that which is to admit more or less, with respect to those [things] which do not admit more and less, uses these words: « The imposition [of the names themselves] is at the limit, beyond which to transgress is impossible »; and Blessed Albert in his Commentary on this place adduces the reason, namely because that limit is indivisible. — On this doubt cf. below d. 25, p. II, q. 1, where the other Scholastics also resolve this question; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 9; *Summa* p. II, tract. 4, q. 16, m. 4; Giles of Rome, here p. I, doubt on the text 5.

la: Vat. falso *spiritus mortales.*

en: The Vatican [edition] falsely [reads] *spiritus mortales.*

la: Idem dubium solvitur a B. Alberto, hic a. 11; Ægid. R., hic p. II. dub. litt. 6.

en: The same doubt is solved by Blessed Albert, here a. 11; Giles of Rome, here p. II, doubt on the text 6. ---

translators_notes:
- **Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 8359–8476) cross-verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (pp.110–112), per the Vol II override. The *videtur*/*Contra* objection-clauses are clean running prose in the OCR; the four Respondeo blocks (DUB I's threefold *sufficientia*; DUB II's triple-*ratio* gradus-simplicitatis with its four sub-replies; DUB III's twofold *libertas arbitrii*; DUB IV's *privatio universalis*) cascade-shatter and were reflowed from the crops (L column then R column).
- **Page span / structure.** DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI Pars I closes d.3 pars 1. It opens **low on p.110** (L column, beneath a2-q3's reply text). Four doubts: **DUB I** (the four-vs-six attributes enumeration: *contradicere in enumeratione / in repetitione / sufficientia / superfluitas / tertium attributum*; Respondeo gives three *sufficientia*-derivations + the *quatuor ad tria* recap, pp.110–111); **DUB II** (*differens essentiae tenuitas* — substantia non recipit magis et minus; Respondeo: a *gradus simplicitatis* shown by the triple *ratio* — gradus virtutis / approximatio ad Deum / ipsa cognitio — + four sub-replies, p.111); **DUB III** (*differentia in facultate arbitrii* — libertas non recipit gradus; Respondeo: *libertas arbitrii dupliciter* — facultas/facilitas → gradus vs. *privative* → aequalitas, p.111); **DUB IV** (*aequales… spiritus et immortales* — sed non aequaliter simplices; Respondeo: *spiritus/immortalitas* as universal privation → aequalia, pp.111–112). **NO scholion** (dubia carry none). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Solutio 1./2./3.`, `Triplex ratio.`, `Obiectionis 1. solutio.`, `Obiectio 2. solvitur.`, `Item obiectio 3.`, `Distinctio.`).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–15):** p.110 footer notes **6–9** → `[^1]`–`[^4]` (notes 1–5 are committed a2-q3's; see incoming split); p.111 footer notes 1–10 → `[^5]`–`[^14]` (L col 1–6, R col 7–10); p.111 note 6 (`In cod. Q (a secunda manu) hoc intelligendum est…`) is an **L→R column-footer runover**, the R-col continuation (`qui considerat rem sub motu et varietate. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. ad 1.`) folded into `[^10]`. p.112 footer note **1** → `[^15]` (DUB IV's terminal `Idem dubium solvitur a B. Alberto…`).
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a2-q3 → d3-p1-dubia): SPLIT at p.110.** p.110's footer has 9 notes: notes 1–5 anchor a2-q3's body (committed `d3-p1-a2-q3` `[^18]`–`[^22]`); **notes 6–9 anchor this dubia's DUB I** (`sicut patet⁶`, `sicut memoria⁷`, `a ratione et voluntate⁸`, `in littera⁹`) → this chunk's `[^1]`–`[^4]`. No backfill needed (a2-q3's Notes already documented this split prospectively).
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (d3-p1-dubia → d3-p2-divisio): SPLIT at p.112.** DUB IV's Respondeo tops p.112 (L col + R col) and ends `…intelligi a nobis¹`; the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III. Pars II` then begins on p.112 (raw 8477). p.112's footer: **note 1 → this chunk** (`[^15]`, DUB IV's `Idem dubium solvitur…`); notes **2–4** (`Cod. aa in summa; Vat. in universo`; `Hic c. 4.`; `Vers. 15. — Hoc argumentum insinuatur ab Augustino, XI. de Civ. Dei…`) anchor the COMMENTARIUS Pars II divisio / `d3-p2-a1-q1` body and belong to the pars-2 chunks (next). When building `d3-p2-divisio`/`d3-p2-a1-q1`, start their apparatus at p.112 footer note 2 and confirm the split by content.
- **Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the four cascade Respondeo blocks were verified on the pp.110–112 crops; the OCR base is reliable for the objection-clause prose. The single L→R runover note (`[^10]`) was recovered from the R-col footer head per the standard Vol II pattern; secure on content. Cascade-region marker positions are content-matched in source order; per-clause positions may be off by a few words where the two-column linearization is ambiguous — parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.


title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Pars II).

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part II).

source_text:
<!-- page 128 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de intellectu illius verbi Iob: *Hoc est initium figmenti Dei* etc., quare dicitur figmentum. Si ratione corporis aptati, ut infra[^1] exponit, quomodo hoc verum est, cum illud non habuerit ab initio? — Item, Deus vult omnes salvos fieri[^2]: ergo fecit Angelum illum, ut beatificaretur, non illuderetur: ergo male dicitur, ut illudatur ei etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnis creatura ratione suae fragilitatis figmentum dicitur, maxime rationalis, quando non consolidatur per gratiam. Quoniam igitur lucifer excellens fuit inter ceteras creaturas, et ipse sprevit gratiam et in veritate non stetit[^3]; ideo dicitur initium figmenti. Unde et alia translatio habet: ipse est principium viarum Dei. Hunc autem quamvis Deus praesciret futurum esse malum, tamen fecit, quia et simul praevidit, quibus bonis usibus accommodaret[^4], scilicet Sanctorum victoriae et amplificandae coronae. Potest igitur intelligi haec coniunctio ut consecutive, vel causaliter. Consecutive, sicut frequenter accipitur in Evangelio[^5]: hoc autem factum est, ut impleretur, quia consecutivum est ad hoc; sic diaboli ludificatio subsecuta est, quamvis propter illam non fuerit factus. Si autem intelligatur causaliter, tunc ponitur consequens pro antecedente. Finaliter enim diabolus factus est ad exercitium et propter promotionem bonorum, ad quod consequitur ipsius diaboli ludificatio, qui, dum intendit deiicere, promovet. Unde sensus est, quod Deus fecit diabolum, quem praevidit malum, ad exercitium bonorum, ad quod consequitur eius ludificatio[^6].

<!-- page 129 -->

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de intellectu illius verbi: *Sapientia est fructus pietatis*, quomodo sit intelligendum, quia magis videtur esse principium pietatis, quam fructus. — Item, nihil videtur ad propositum, quia praescientia casus non est sapientia, sed tantum scientia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sapientia non dicitur hic a sapore, sed a sapere[^7]; et dicitur hic sapientia cognitio desursum descendens[^8] per inspirationem sive per revelationem. Haec autem est dupliciter: quaedam est a Verbo, quaedam est in Verbo. Praescientia igitur casus non potuit esse nisi cognitio desursum descendens, quia futurum est contingens, de quo nulla potest haberi certitudo secundum causas inferiores; aut igitur est in Verbo, aut a Verbo. Si in Verbo, sic est fructus pietatis; nemo enim pervenit ad visionem Verbi, nisi per pietatem animi; et quia hanc non habuit diabolus, ideo non potuit hoc nosse in Verbo. Si a Verbo, sic est fructus pietatis, quia a misericordia Dei excludente ignorantiam. Et hoc modo, si praescientia casus daretur innocenti, non esset ex pietate, sed ex crudelitate, sicut infra patebit[^9], quia cruciaretur innocens sine culpa. Et sic patet intellectus verbi illius, et qualiter valet ad propositum.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de intellectu illius verbi: *Triplex erat naturalis cognitio*: aut distinguit formaliter, aut materialiter. Si materialiter, tunc multo plures; si formaliter; contra: unus erat modus cognoscendi.

Respondeo: Potest dici, quod est distinctio quantum ad numerum cognoscibilium, et quantum ad gradum. Quantum ad numerum, quia cognoscibile aut est Creator, aut creatura; et creatura aut corporalis, aut spiritualis. — Ordo etiam est, quia cognoscibile aut supra, aut infra, aut iuxta; et sic clauditur omnis cognoscibilis differentia, ratione cuius Magister distinguit cognitionem magis quam ratione modi cognoscendi.

english:
<!-- page 128 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first inquiry is made about the meaning of that word of Job: *This is the beginning of the handiwork of God* etc., why it is called handiwork. If by reason of the body fitted to it, as he explains below[^1], how is this true, since it did not have that from the beginning? — Likewise, God wishes all to be saved[^2]: therefore He made that Angel that he might be beatified, not mocked: therefore it is ill said that he should be mocked, etc.

I respond: It must be said that every creature, by reason of its fragility, is called handiwork, especially the rational creature, when it is not consolidated by grace. Since therefore Lucifer was excellent among the other creatures, and he himself spurned grace and did not stand in the truth[^3]; therefore he is called the beginning of the handiwork. Hence another translation has: he is the beginning of the ways of God. But although God foreknew that he would be evil, nevertheless He made him, because He also at the same time foresaw to what good uses He would accommodate him[^4], namely to the victory of the Saints and to the enlarging of the crown. This conjunction can therefore be understood as consecutive or as causal. Consecutively, as is frequently taken in the Gospel[^5]: now this was done, that it might be fulfilled, because it is consecutive to this; thus the mocking of the devil followed, although he was not made on account of it. But if it be understood causally, then the consequent is put for the antecedent. For finally the devil was made for the exercise and for the promotion of the good, on which follows the mocking of the devil himself, who, while he intends to cast down, promotes. Hence the sense is that God made the devil, whom He foresaw to be evil, for the exercise of the good, on which follows his mocking[^6].

<!-- page 129 -->

### DOUBT II.

Likewise inquiry is made about the meaning of that word: *Wisdom is the fruit of piety*, how it is to be understood, since it seems rather to be the principle of piety than the fruit. — Likewise, nothing seems to the purpose, because the foreknowledge of the fall is not wisdom, but only knowledge.

I respond: It must be said that wisdom is here named not from taste (*sapor*), but from being wise (*sapere*)[^7]; and wisdom here means cognition descending from above[^8] through inspiration or through revelation. But this is twofold: one kind is from the Word, another is in the Word. The foreknowledge of the fall, therefore, could only be a cognition descending from above, because the future is contingent, of which no certitude can be had according to inferior causes; either therefore it is in the Word, or from the Word. If in the Word, thus it is the fruit of piety; for no one comes to the vision of the Word except through piety of soul; and because the devil did not have this, therefore he could not know this in the Word. If from the Word, thus it is the fruit of piety, because from the mercy of God excluding ignorance. And in this way, if the foreknowledge of the fall were given to an innocent, it would be not from piety, but from cruelty, as will appear below[^9], because the innocent would be tortured without fault. And thus the meaning of that word is plain, and how it avails for the purpose.

### DOUBT III.

Likewise inquiry is made about the meaning of that word: *The natural cognition was threefold*: does it distinguish formally or materially? If materially, then there are far more; if formally, on the contrary: there was one mode of knowing.

I respond: It can be said that the distinction is both as to the number of knowables and as to the grade. As to the number, because the knowable is either the Creator or a creature; and the creature either corporeal or spiritual. — There is also an order, because the knowable is either above, or below, or beside; and thus is enclosed every difference of the knowable, by reason of which the Master distinguishes cognition rather than by reason of the mode of knowing.

translators_notes:
**Source range:** raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 9602–9660; printed pp. 128–129 (PDF = printed + 22). Full 450 dpi column-band PDF re-set (`extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 128-129 --dpi 450` + `colcrop.py`). DUB intros clean prose from the IA djvu OCR base; the three Respondeo blocks and the footers reflowed from the column-band crops (cascade-shattered in OCR, per the Vol II Override). **This chunk closes DISTINCTIO 3 (17/17 Tier-2).**

**Apparatus crosswalk (continuous renumber 1–9):**
- **p.128 — incoming footer SPLIT (received from committed `d3-p2-a3-q2`):** p.128 has 9 footer notes; notes 1–4 are a3-q2's `[^10]`–`[^13]` (conclusio anchors — already committed, **no backfill**, a3-q2 correctly took only n.1–4). This chunk takes **n.5 → `[^1]`** (the `Hic c. 4. circa medium…` note — L→R column-footer runover, opener on L-col, `…afferuntur verba: Sed corpus aereum…` recovered from R-col; anchors DUB I *ut infra exponit*), **n.6 → `[^2]`** (Epist. I. Tim. 2,4 → DUB I *Deus vult omnes salvos fieri*), **n.7 → `[^3]`** (Ioan. 8,44 → DUB I Respondeo *in veritate non stetit*), **n.8 → `[^4]`** (de Civ. Dei XI c.18 → DUB I *quibus bonis usibus accommodaret*), **n.9 → `[^5]`** (Matth. 1,22 et 21,4 → DUB I *frequenter accipitur in Evangelio*).
- **p.129 — 4 footer notes for the dubia** (L-col n.1–2, R-col n.3–4; note 2 has an L→R runover, `…scientia absolute; secunda ut cognitio secundum gustum…` recovered from R-col) → `[^6]`–`[^9]`. Anchors: DUB I Respondeo end *consequitur eius ludificatio* (n.1); DUB II *sed a sapere* (n.2); DUB II *cognitio desursum descendens* (n.3); DUB II Respondeo *sicut infra patebit* (n.4). DUB III carries no apparatus markers.

**Outgoing boundary dubia→DISTINCTIO IV = cross-distinction SPLIT at p.129 (documented for the d.4 work):** the dubia's body (DUB III Respondeo) ends on p.129 R-col with `…ratione modi cognoscendi.` (raw 9660); DISTINCTIO IV (CAP. I littera *An perfecti et beati creati sint…*) begins immediately after on the same page (raw 9661+). p.129's footer therefore splits: notes 1–4 (renumbered `[^6]`–`[^9]`) are the dubia's; the separately-headed **`NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM`** block (its own notes 1–2: `Cfr. Prov. 14, 34…` / `Lib. XI. c. 17. n. 22…`) is DISTINCTIO IV's d4-littera apparatus — to be picked up by the future `d4-littera` build, which starts its p.129 apparatus at that NOTAE block. No backfill into d.3.

**No scholion** (dubia blocks carry none). DUB I = the Job *initium figmenti Dei* verse; DUB II = *Sapientia est fructus pietatis*; DUB III = *Triplex erat naturalis cognitio* (formaliter/materialiter).

**Marginal glosses trimmed** (not rendered): *Duplex sapientia*.

**Low-confidence items parked for the d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker:** none new — the p.128/129 footers read cleanly at 450 dpi (the two L→R runovers on `[^1]` and `[^7]` were recovered from the full-width IA OCR, faithful).


title: Dist. 4

title_alt: Distinction 4. The text of the Master of the Sentences.

source_text:
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### Cap. I. *An perfecti et beati creati sint, an miseri et imperfecti.*

Post haec videndum est, utrum perfectos et beatos creaverit Deus Angelos, an miseros et imperfectos. — Ad quod dici potest, quod nec in beatitudine nec in miseria creati sunt. Miseri enim ante peccatum esse non potuerunt, quia ex peccato miseria est[^1]. Nam si non fuisset peccatum, nulla esset miseria. Beati quoque nunquam fuerunt illi qui ceciderunt, quia sui eventus ignari fuerunt, id est peccati et supplicii futuri. Si enim lapsum suum praescierunt, aut vitare voluerunt, sed non potuerunt, et ita erant miseri; aut potuerunt, sed noluerunt, et ita erant stulti et maligni. Ideoque dicimus, quod non erant praescii eventus sui, nec eis data est cognitio eorum quae futura erant super eos. — Boni vero et qui perstiterunt forte suae beatitudinis praescii fuerunt. Unde Augustinus super Genesim[^2]: «Quomodo, inquit, beatus inter Angelos fuit qui futuri peccati atque supplicii praescius non fuit? Quaeritur autem, cur non fuerit. Forte Deus revelare diabolo noluit, quid facturus vel passurus esset; ceteris vero revelare voluit, quod in veritate mansuri essent». — His verbis videtur Augustinus significare, quod Angeli, qui corruerunt, non fuerunt praescii sui casus, ideoque beati non fuerunt; et quod Angeli, qui perstiterunt, beatitudinem sibi affuturam praescierunt atque de ea certi in spe exstiterunt; unde quodam modo iam beati erant. Et revera, si ita fuisset, posset dici, illos aliquo modo fuisse beatos, alios vero non, qui nescierunt eventum suum.

Sed hoc magis opinando et quaerendo dicit Augustinus quam asserendo; unde et huic opinioni opponens consequenter subdit: «Sed quare discernebantur illi a ceteris, ut Deus istis quae ad ipsos pertinerent non revelaret, aliis vero revelaret, cum non prius sit ipse ultor quam aliquis peccator? Non enim damnat ipse innocentes». — Hic videtur innuere, quod nec peccaturis futurum malum, nec permansuris futurum bonum <!-- page 130 -->revelaverit. Ideoque nec illi qui ceciderunt, unquam, nec illi qui perstiterunt, usque ad consummationem beati fuerunt; quia beati non poterant esse, si de beatitudine certi non erant, vel si damnationis incerti erant. Unde Augustinus in eodem[^3]: «Dicere, inquit, de Angelis, quod in suo genere beati esse possunt, damnationis vel salutis incerti, quibus nec spes esset, quod mutandi essent in melius, nimia praesumtio est». «Quomodo enim beati esse possunt, quibus est incerta sua beatitudo»? Ex praedictis consequitur, quod Angeli, qui corruerunt, nunquam beati fuerunt, nisi beatitudinem aliquis accipiat illum statum innocentiae, in quo fuerunt ante peccatum. Illi vero qui perstiterunt, aut suam beatitudinem futuram, Deo revelante, praescierunt, et ita spei certitudine aliquo modo beati fuerunt; vel incerti exstiterunt suae beatitudinis, et ita aliter beati non fuerunt, quam reliqui qui ceciderunt[^4]. Mihi autem quod posterius dictum est probabilius videtur.

Ad hoc autem, quod quaerebatur, utrum perfecti vel imperfecti fuerint creati, dici potest, quia quodam modo perfecti fuerunt, et quodam alio modo imperfecti. Non enim uno modo aliquid dicitur perfectum, sed pluribus. — Dicitur namque perfectum tribus modis. Est enim perfectum secundum tempus, et est perfectum secundum naturam, et est universaliter perfectum. Secundum tempus perfectum est quod habet quidquid tempus requirit, et convenit secundum tempus haberi; et hoc modo Angeli erant perfecti ante confirmationem, vel lapsum. Secundum naturam perfectum est quod habet quidquid debitum est vel expedit naturae suae ad glorificationem; et hoc modo perfecti fuerunt Angeli post confirmationem, et erunt Sancti post resurrectionem. Universaliter et summe perfectum est cui nihil unquam deest, et a quo universa proveniunt bona, quod est solius Dei. Prima ergo perfectio est naturae conditae, secunda naturae glorificatae, tertia naturae increatae.

Quales fuerint Angeli in creatione, ostensum est, boni scilicet et non mali, et iusti, id est innocentes, et perfecti quodam modo, alio vero imperfecti. Beati vero non fuerunt usque ad confirmationem, nisi beatitudo accipiatur, ut iam dictum est, ille status innocentiae et bonitatis, in quo conditi sunt.

english:
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### Cap. I. *Whether they were created perfect and blessed, or wretched and imperfect.*

After these matters it must be considered whether God created the Angels perfect and blessed, or wretched and imperfect. — To which it can be said that they were created neither in blessedness nor in wretchedness. For they could not be wretched before sin, since wretchedness comes from sin[^1]. For if there had been no sin, there would be no wretchedness. Blessed, too, those who fell never were, because they were ignorant of their own outcome, that is, of the sin and the punishment to come. For if they foreknew their own fall, either they wished to avoid it but could not, and so were wretched; or they could but would not, and so were foolish and malicious. And therefore we say that they were not foreknowers of their own outcome, nor was the knowledge given to them of those things that were to come upon them. — But the good ones, and those who stood fast, were perhaps foreknowers of their own blessedness. Hence Augustine on Genesis[^2]: «How, he says, was he blessed among the Angels who was not foreknowing of the sin and punishment to come? But it is asked why he was not. Perhaps God did not wish to reveal to the devil what he would do or suffer; but to the others he willed to reveal that they would remain in the truth». — By these words Augustine seems to mean that the Angels who fell were not foreknowers of their own fall, and therefore were not blessed; and that the Angels who stood fast foreknew the blessedness that would come to them and were certain of it in hope; whence in a certain way they were already blessed. And indeed, if it had been so, it could be said that those were in some way blessed, but the others not, who did not know their own outcome.

But Augustine says this rather by way of opining and inquiring than of asserting; whence, opposing this opinion, he consequently adds: «But why were those distinguished from the rest, so that God would not reveal to these the things that pertained to them, but would reveal them to the others, since he is not an avenger before anyone is a sinner? For he does not himself condemn the innocent». — Here he seems to suggest that he revealed neither the future evil to those about to sin, nor the future good to those about to remain. <!-- page 130 -->Therefore neither those who fell, ever, nor those who stood fast, were blessed until the consummation; because they could not be blessed if they were not certain of their blessedness, or if they were uncertain of damnation. Hence Augustine in the same [work][^3]: «To say of the Angels, he says, that they can be blessed in their own kind while uncertain of damnation or of salvation, for whom there would not even be hope that they would be changed for the better, is excessive presumption». «For how can they be blessed for whom their own blessedness is uncertain»? From the foregoing it follows that the Angels who fell were never blessed, unless someone takes "blessedness" to mean that state of innocence in which they were before sin. But those who stood fast either foreknew their future blessedness, by God's revealing it, and so by the certainty of hope were in some way blessed; or they remained uncertain of their blessedness, and so were not blessed otherwise than the rest who fell[^4]. But to me what was said last seems more probable.

Now to the question that was asked, whether they were created perfect or imperfect, it can be said that in one way they were perfect, and in another way imperfect. For a thing is not called perfect in one way only, but in several. — For "perfect" is said in three ways. For there is the perfect according to time, and the perfect according to nature, and the universally perfect. Perfect according to time is that which has whatever the time requires, and is fittingly possessed according to [that] time; and in this way the Angels were perfect before the confirmation, or the fall. Perfect according to nature is that which has whatever is due or expedient to its nature for glorification; and in this way the Angels were perfect after the confirmation, and the Saints will be after the resurrection. Universally and supremely perfect is that to which nothing is ever lacking, and from which all goods proceed, which belongs to God alone. The first perfection, therefore, is of created nature, the second of glorified nature, the third of uncreated nature.

What the Angels were like at creation has been shown: namely good and not evil, and just — that is, innocent — and perfect in one way, but imperfect in another. But they were not blessed until the confirmation, unless "blessedness" be taken, as has already been said, [to mean] that state of innocence and goodness in which they were created.

la: Cfr. Prov. 14, 34: *Miseros autem facit populos peccatum.*

en: Cf. Prov. 14:34: *But sin makes peoples wretched.*

la: Lib. XI. c. 17. n. 22, unde etiam quae sequuntur sumta sunt, sed multis omissis et mutatis. Quoad totam dist. cfr. Hugo, I. de Sacram. p. 5. c. 18. 19, et Sent. tr. 2. c. 2. 3.

en: [Augustine, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*] Book XI, c. 17, n. 22, whence also what follows is taken, but with many things omitted and altered. On the whole distinction cf. Hugh [of St. Victor], *On the Sacraments* I, p. 5, c. 18, 19, and *Sentences* tr. 2, c. 2, 3.

la: Cap. 19. n. 25, et seq. loc. ibid. c. 17. — Paulo postea *esse possunt* Vat. cum cod. D et paucis edd. *esse possent.*

en: [The same work, Book XI] c. 19, n. 25, and the following passage ibid. c. 17. — A little later, *esse possunt* the Vatican edition, with codex D and a few editions [reads] *esse possent.*

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 13.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XI, c. 13.

translators_notes:
- This chunk is Lombard's text (the *littera*) for Distinction IV: the single Cap. I, *An perfecti et beati creati sint, an miseri et imperfecti* — whether the Angels were created perfect/blessed or wretched/imperfect, with the Augustine *de Gen. ad lit.* and *de Civ. Dei* discussion and the threefold sense of *perfectum* (secundum tempus / secundum naturam / universaliter). One continuous Lombard text spanning printed pp. 129–130 (= PDF 151–152); the COMMENTARIUS begins mid-p.130 (next chunk `bon-sent-II-d4-divisio`).
- **Source discipline.** Lombard's prose is clean in the IA djvu OCR (raw 9661–9721); transcribed verbatim from the OCR base and cross-verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 129 --dpi 450` / `--pages 130`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 129` / `130`). Both pages are two-column with two-stream footers; footers read off the crops, L column then R column.
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`) — a littera chunk has no scholion.
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.129 (two streams — INHERITED, no backfill).** p.129's footer carries two streams. The **main-stream** notes 1–4 (`1 Primo modo explicat August. hoc verbum Iob, XI. de Civ. Dei c.15 …`; `2 Alex. Hal. S.p.I q.I m.I: Notandum praeterea …`; `3 Cfr. Iac. 3,15`; `4 Dist. I p.2 q.2 …`) anchor the *preceding* committed chunk `bon-sent-II-d3-p2-dubia` (DUB I *hoc verbum Iob* / DUB II *Sapientia est fructus pietatis* / DUB III) and are already its `[^6]`–`[^9]` (confirmed against that chunk's committed apparatus + its Notes, which explicitly deferred the subsequent `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block here). **Not taken here; `d3-p2-dubia` not modified.** This littera's p.129 apparatus is the dedicated **`NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM`** block — `¹ Cfr. Prov. 14,34` → [^1] (*ex peccato miseria est¹*), `² Lib. XI c.17 n.22 …` → [^2] (*Unde Augustinus super Genesim²*). Exactly the `d2-littera`/`d3-littera` precedent (littera takes its dedicated NOTAE block; the prior dubia keeps that page's main-stream).
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.130 (OUTGOING — note for the d4-divisio build).** The littera body continues onto p.130 (*Unde Augustinus in eodem³* … *quam reliqui qui ceciderunt⁴*). p.130's footer is linearized in the raw OCR **after** the `COMMENTARIUS` (i.e. within the still-skeleton `bon-sent-II-d4-divisio` raw range 9722+, not in this chunk's 9661–9721). On the 450 dpi p.130 crops that footer is itself two-stream: the **main-stream** notes `¹ Cap. 19. n. 25, et seq. loc. ibid. c. 17. — Paulo postea esse possunt Vat. …` and `² Cfr. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 13` anchor THIS littera's p.130 body (the *esse possunt/possent* variant + *in eodem* / *qui ceciderunt* loci) → [^3][^4], transcribed here from the crop (authoritative). The separate **`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`** block on p.130 (`¹ Vat. in hac propositione pro habitibus bis substituit habitudinibus …`; `² Accipias particulam et pro etiam …`) is `bon-sent-II-d4-divisio`'s apparatus. **When d4-divisio is promoted it must take the p.130 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block, NOT the p.130 main-stream ¹², which are this littera's [^3][^4]** (d4-divisio is still a skeleton — no backfill issue, just do not double-count at its build).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–4):** p.129 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` ¹² → [^1][^2]; p.130 main-stream ¹² → [^3][^4].
- **No hard `[?]` flags.** Lombard prose clean in OCR. Marginal editorial glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Expositio 1`, `Expositio 2`, `Contra`, `Dubium 1`, `Dubium 3`, `utrum creati sunt beati`, `utrum creati sint perfecti`, `Augustinus`, `Conclusio Magistri`, `Epilogus`, `Triplex perfectum`).