title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 4, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum contritio possit intendi
Whether contrition can be intensified

source_text:
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### Articulus IV. *De contritione quoad intensionem.*

Consequenter quantum ad quartum articulum quaeritur de contritionis intensione; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum contritio possit intendi. Secundo, utrum oporteat intensius conteri de uno peccato quam de alio.

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### Quaestio I. *Utrum contritio possit intendi.*

Circa primum, quod possit intendi, videtur:

1. Quia contritio est actus alicuius virtutis; sed quaelibet virtus potest intendi, ut in primo[^1] probatum est de caritate; sed augmentata eius virtute, augetur eius motus: ergo etc.

2. Item, in contritione non sunt nisi duo, scilicet dolor et gratia, et unum est sicut formale, reliquum sicut materiale[^2]; sed est possibile, dolorem in nobis intendi, possibile est etiam, gratiam augeri: ergo etc.

3. Item, si non potest intendi, ergo in omnibus est aequalis; sed contritione existente aequali, aequalis est iustificatio et gratificatio[^3]: ergo omnes secundum hoc essent aequaliter iusti.

4. Item, in omni actu animae, in quo contingit proficere per assuefactionem et continuationem, contingit ipsum intendi; hoc patet; sed profectus est in multiplicatione contritionis et frequentatione: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Nihil intenditur, cuius « impositio est in termino[^4] »; sed impositio contritionis est in termino, quia contritio est divisio in minima; sed minimo non est minus: ergo etc.

2. Item, nihil intenditur, quo non potest cogitari vel esse maius[^5]; sed illo quod habet effectum infinitum, nihil potest esse maius, cum sit infinitum: ergo nihil tale potest intendi. Sed contritio est huiusmodi, cum deleat omnem culpam, quod est virtutis infinitae: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod intenditur, aut intenditur per accessum ad veram nominis impositionem, vel per depurationem a contrario[^6]; sed contritio non intenditur per *depurationem a contrario*, cum statim, cum est, expellat totaliter omnem culpam, quia habet gratiam coniunctam; nec per accessum ad impositionem nominis veram, quia eius « impositio est in termino »: ergo etc.

4. Item, si intenditur, aut ergo a gratia, aut a libero arbitrio. A libero arbitrio non, quoniam contritio est motus gratuitus, et talis mensuratur secundum quantitatem gratiae; sed augmentum gratiae et caritatis non potest esse a libero arbitrio, sed a Deo. Si a gratia; contra: gratia uniformiter movet liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se: ergo non videtur intendere in eo contritionem. Praeterea, secundum illud attenditur intensio vel augmentum penes quod consistit ratio quantitatis; sed quantitas est ex parte materiae, formalis vero contritionis ratio potius convenit gratiae quam materialis: ergo secundum illam non intenditur nec augetur.

### Conclusio.

> Contritio potest intendi atque augeri tum secundum fervorem motus, tum secundum augmentum virtutis poenitentiae per gratiam factum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod contritio[^8] est motus virtutis habens quantitatem virtutis, sicut est virtus, a qua est. Unde et augmentum et intensionem habet secundum illud, a quo recipit quantitatem; haec autem est virtus poenitentiae. Unde sicut certum est, caritatem augeri, ita et poenitentiam; ac per hoc certum est, contritionem[^10] et intendi et augeri[^9].

Unde notandum, quod quemadmodum caritas dicitur intendi quantum ad *fervorem*, et augeri quantum ad essentialem virtutem; et primum est a cooperatione liberi arbitrii, secundum vero est a dono caelesti[^7]: ita et in proposito oportet intelligi, quod motus contritionis ferventior esse potest secundum cooperationem liberi arbitrii. Unde ex aequali gratia aliquando magis fervens elicitur motus, aliquando minus, secundum cooperationem liberi arbitrii. Sed proprie loquendo, non dicitur maior, nisi virtute poenitentiae augmentata; et hoc est per gratiam. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, quod contritio possit intendi.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est divisio in minima; dicendum, quod contritio et habet respectum ad obiectum, supra quod dirigitur, et ad virtutem, a qua oritur, sive dicatur habitus, sive liberum arbitrium. Secundum comparationem ad obiectum, quia omne mortale expellit et quasi in pulverem redigit, non habet intendi. Habet etiam comparationem ad vim, a qua exit; et secundum illam viam habet intendi; et in prima via ratio procedit, et ideo non concludit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est virtutis infinitae; dicendum, quod contritio non delet nisi virtute gratiae; gratia autem est donum, per quod inhabitat in nobis ille, cuius virtus est infinita; et illa est, quae potest in infinitum effectum, et illi virtuti attribuitur expulsio primo et per se et contritioni per illam. Et ideo non sequitur, quod contritio sit infinita; sed quod coniuncta est cum virtute, cuius operatio est infinita.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non accedit magis nec recedit; dicendum, quod utrumque falsum est, immo ratione gratiae magis accedit, ratione vero doloris, dico, quod magis recedit. Dolor enim non tantum habet oppositionem ad culpam, sed etiam ad sequelas et pronitates peccati, quae quodam modo doloris intensione in nobis remittuntur paulative et expelluntur, prout dolor est purior et intensior. Accessus autem ad veram impositionem non attenditur in hoc, quod non habeat verum nomen, sed quia non participat illud in termino secundum rationem gratuiti.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum intendatur secundum intensionem doloris, aut gratiae, sive a libero arbitrio, an a gratia; iam patet responsio. Si enim loquamur de fervore; dico, quod est a libero arbitrio; si autem loquamur quantum ad veram augmentationem, sic dico, quod immediate venit ab exercitio poenitentiae, qua augmentata, augetur dolor rationalis partis, qui est detestationis vel displicentiae. — Et si quaeras, unde veniat; dico, quod a Deo effective, a libero arbitrio dispositive, a gratia completive. — Et si tu obiicias, quod gratia uniformis est, et praeterea est forma; dicendum, quod quamvis ipsa uniformiter gratificet, dum tamen magis a Deo influitur et abundantius datur, magis gratificat. — Et rursus, quamvis a gratia, cum sit forma, non habeat principaliter ortum quantitas molis, quae est a materia principaliter, habet tamen ortum quantitas virtutis, quae est a forma; et hoc genere quantitatis est contritio quanta. Et ex hoc patet, quomodo, vel unde habeat quantitatem, et unde habeat intensionem, et qualiter.

english:
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### Article IV. *On contrition with respect to intensity.*

Next, concerning the fourth article, inquiry is made about the intensity of contrition; and concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether contrition can be intensified. Second, whether one ought to be more intensely contrite over one sin than over another.

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### Question I. *Whether contrition can be intensified.*

Concerning the first point — that it can be intensified — it seems so:

1. Because contrition is the act of some virtue; but any virtue can be intensified, as was proved in the first [book][^1] concerning charity; but when its virtue is augmented, its motion is augmented: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in contrition there are but two things, namely sorrow and grace, and the one is as it were the formal element, the other as it were the material[^2]; but it is possible for sorrow to be intensified in us, it is also possible for grace to be augmented: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it cannot be intensified, then it is equal in all; but, contrition being equal, justification and gratification[^3] are equal: therefore on this basis all would be equally just.

4. Likewise, in every act of the soul in which it happens that one makes progress through habituation and continuation, it happens that the act itself is intensified; this is evident; but there is progress in the multiplication of contrition and its frequent repetition: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Nothing is intensified whose « imposition [of name] is at the limit[^4] »; but the imposition of contrition is at the limit, because contrition is a division into the least [parts]; but than the least there is nothing less: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nothing is intensified than which nothing can be thought or be greater[^5]; but than that which has an infinite effect, nothing can be greater, since it is infinite: therefore nothing of this kind can be intensified. But contrition is of this kind, since it blots out every fault, which belongs to an infinite power: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that is intensified is intensified either by approach toward the true imposition of the name, or by purification from a contrary[^6]; but contrition is not intensified by *purification from a contrary*, since at once, when it exists, it totally expels every fault, because it has grace conjoined to it; nor by approach toward the true imposition of the name, because its « imposition is at the limit »: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if it is intensified, then either by grace or by free choice. Not by free choice, since contrition is a gratuitous motion, and such a motion is measured according to the quantity of grace; but the increase of grace and charity cannot be from free choice, but from God. If by grace; on the contrary: grace, of itself, moves free choice uniformly: therefore it does not seem to intensify contrition in it. Furthermore, intensity or increase is reckoned according to that in which the formal character of quantity consists; but quantity is on the side of matter, whereas the formal character of contrition belongs rather to grace than to the material element: therefore according to that [formal character] it is not intensified nor augmented.

### Conclusion.

> Contrition can be intensified and augmented both according to the fervor of its motion, and according to the augmentation of the virtue of penance brought about through grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that contrition[^8] is a motion of a virtue having the quantity of the virtue, just as it is a virtue, from which it [comes]. Hence it has both augmentation and intensification according to that from which it receives quantity; and this is the virtue of penance. Hence, just as it is certain that charity is augmented, so too is penance; and through this it is certain that contrition[^10] is both intensified and augmented[^9].

Hence it must be noted that, just as charity is said to be intensified with respect to *fervor*, and to be augmented with respect to its essential virtue; and the first is from the cooperation of free choice, the second from a heavenly gift[^7]: so too in the case at hand it must be understood that the motion of contrition can be more fervent according to the cooperation of free choice. Hence from equal grace a more fervent motion is sometimes elicited, sometimes a lesser, according to the cooperation of free choice. But properly speaking, it is not called greater unless the virtue of penance is augmented; and this is through grace. — Therefore the reasons showing that contrition can be intensified are to be granted.

**To the arguments:**

1. To the objection that it is a division into the least [parts]; it must be said that contrition has a relation both to the object, upon which it is directed, and to the power from which it arises, whether this be called a habit, or free choice. According to its comparison to the object, since it expels everything mortal and as it were reduces it to dust, it cannot be intensified. It also has a comparison to the power from which it proceeds; and according to that way it can be intensified; and along the first way the argument proceeds, and therefore it does not conclude.

2. To the objection that it belongs to an infinite power; it must be said that contrition does not blot out [sin] except by the power of grace; and grace is a gift through which He dwells in us whose power is infinite; and it is that [power] which can [produce] an infinite effect, and to that power expulsion is attributed primarily and *per se*, and to contrition through it. And therefore it does not follow that contrition is infinite; but [only] that it is conjoined with a power whose operation is infinite.

3. To the objection that it does not approach more nor recede; it must be said that both are false — rather, by reason of grace it approaches more, while by reason of sorrow, I say, it recedes more. For sorrow has opposition not only to fault, but also to the consequences and inclinations of sin, which in a certain manner are little by little remitted in us and expelled by the intensity of sorrow, in proportion as the sorrow is purer and more intense. But the approach toward the true imposition [of the name] is not reckoned in this — that it does not have a true name — but because it does not participate in it at the limit according to the formal character of the gratuitous.

4. To what is asked, whether it is intensified according to the intensity of sorrow or of grace, or whether by free choice or by grace; the answer is now evident. For if we speak of fervor, I say that it is from free choice; but if we speak with respect to true augmentation, then I say that it comes immediately from the exercise of penance, and once this is augmented, the sorrow of the rational part is augmented, which is [the sorrow] of detestation or displeasure. — And if you ask whence it comes; I say that [it is] from God effectively, from free choice dispositively, from grace completively. — And if you object that grace is uniform, and moreover that it is a form; it must be said that, although it gratifies uniformly, nevertheless inasmuch as it is more fully infused by God and more abundantly given, it gratifies more. — And again, although [it is] from grace, since this is a form, the quantity of mass does not principally have its origin [from it], for that is principally from matter; yet the quantity of virtue, which is from form, does have its origin [from it]; and contrition is quantified by this kind of quantity. And from this it is evident how, or whence, it has quantity, and whence it has intensity, and in what manner.

la: Dist. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2, ubi de augmento gratiae.

en: D. 17, p. II, q. 1 and following. Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, where the augmentation of grace [is treated].

la: Nam contritio est dolor gratia informatus. Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. in fine; q. 2. ad 2; a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. et q. 2. pro parte negat. I. — Inferius post gratiam cod. R addit *in nobis*.

en: For contrition is sorrow informed by grace. See above a. 1, q. 1, at the end; q. 2, ad 2; a. 2, q. 1, ad 3, and q. 2, on the negative side, [arg.] I. — Below, after *gratiam*, codex R adds *in nobis*.

la: Edd. *glorificatio*.

en: The [printed] editions read *glorificatio* [glorification].

la: Gilbert. Porretan., de Sex Principiis, c. ult.: *Albissimus vel nigerrimus et huiusmodi sine amplius sunt et minus*, eo quod huiusmodi impositio [nominis] in termino est, ultra quem porrigi impossibile est. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. scholion; tom. II. pag. 304, nota 9. et pag. 787, nota 8. — Minor insinuata est supra a. 1. q. 1. in fine.

en: Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles*, last chapter: *the whitest or the blackest and the like are not further [degrees] of more and less*, because the imposition [of the name] of such things is at the limit, beyond which it is impossible to extend. Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 17, p. II, q. 1, scholion; vol. II, p. 304, note 9, and p. 787, note 8. — The minor [premise] was intimated above at a. 1, q. 1, at the end.

la: Respicitur illud Anselmi, Proslog. c. 3: *Deus est id quo maius cogitari non potest.*

en: Reference is made to that [saying] of Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 3: *God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 3.): *Quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia, ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 4 (c. 3): *Things that are more unmixed with their contraries are more such, just as the whiter is more unmixed with black.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 276, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 276, note 1.

la: Vide infra pag. 399, nota 1. — Pro *quod contritio* codd. F G (I a secunda manu) K V *quod contritionis motus*, cod. L *quod contritio motus est et*.

en: See below, p. 399, note 1. — For *quod contritio* codices F G (I, by a second hand) K V read *quod contritionis motus* [the motion of contrition], cod. L *quod contritio motus est et*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 12. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

en: Cf. above d. 12, p. II, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Cod. X supplet *contritio*.

en: Codex X supplies *contritio*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusiones 1. quaestionis passim supponuntur ab aliis Scholasticis, quin plerique specialiter rem tractent. — In probatione conclusionis 2. minime negatur illud axioma Augustini, quod voluntas hominis in actibus supernaturalibus sit pedissequa gratiae, sed potius hoc asseritur, praesertim in solut. ad 4. Cfr. Concil. Trident., Sess. VI. c. 5. can. 4; S. Thom., infra d. 17. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. De ipsa quaestione specialiter tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 1. § 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 29. — Petr. a Tar., infra d. 17. q. 1. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. infra d. 17. q. 4.

**II.** In solutione seq. (2.) quaestionis S. Thom. aliique doctores consentiunt. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — Scot., supra d. 15. q. 1. n. 9. — S. Thom., infra d. 17. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 3. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 30. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusions of the first question are everywhere presupposed by other Scholastics, though most do not treat the matter specially. — In the proof of the second conclusion the axiom of Augustine is by no means denied — that the will of man in supernatural acts is the handmaid of grace — but rather this is asserted, especially in the reply to objection 4. Cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, c. 5, can. 4; St. Thomas, below at d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, sub-question 2. On this question specially treat: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV, q. 17, m. 2, a. 1, § 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 29. — Peter of Tarentaise, below at d. 17, q. 1, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, below at d. 17, a. 1, q. 9. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, below at d. 17, q. 4.

**II.** In the solution of the following (2.) question St. Thomas and other doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — Scotus, above at d. 15, q. 1, n. 9. — St. Thomas, below at d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, sub-question 3; *Suppl.* q. 3, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 30. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 3, sub-question 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, below at d. 17, a. 1, q. 5.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` lines 44752–44917). The cascade-shattered Respondeo, replies to objections, and the SCHOLION were cross-read against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp. 391–392 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p39{1,2,3}-{L,R}-*.png`) per the Vol II override (two-column PDF-priority inversion in damaged regions). Offset `pdf = printed + 20`.
- **Page span.** The ARTICULUS IV opener (`Consequenter … quaeruntur duo`) prints at the foot of p. 391 right column and is folded into this q1 per the Vol II chunking convention; QUAESTIO I and its body + scholion print on p. 392. `<!-- page 391 -->` / `<!-- page 392 -->` mark the boundary at the QUAESTIO I header. (The OCR running-head digits are mangled — "394" before QUAESTIO I = printed 392; the in-text running head "DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. IV. QUAEST. II. 393" belongs to the next page, q2.)
- **Scholion coverage.** The Articulus IV SCHOLION (raw ~44918+) is a single block covering BOTH questions of the article: **§ I** treats q1 (this chunk), **§ II** treats the following q2 (`bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a4-q2`). It is rendered IN FULL here, body-then-scholion. Sibling q2 renders no scholion of its own and points to this chunk.
- **OCR vs. PDF discrepancy on the q2 title.** The raw OCR (line 44934) gives the next question's title as *"Utrum oporteat intensius conteri de uno peccato quam de alio"* (matching the article opener's *Secundo* clause and the dispatch brief), but the printed page bands show the immediately-following QUAESTIO II header as *"Utrum homo debeat semper conteri."* The IA OCR has interleaved/reordered the article's later questions; q1's own boundary (opener → q1 body → scholion) is unaffected and verified.
- **Apparatus.** 10 numbered Quaracchi footers transcribed from the printed-page footer of p. 392 (raw 44890–44906). Notes 8–10 (codex variants on the Respondeo/Solutio) are carried here as they sit in this page's footer sequence. The marginal glosses (*Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Conclusio, Notandum, Corollarium*) are editorial sidenotes and are omitted per the project's marginalia rule.
- **No `[?]` flags** — all readings resolved against the PDF bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 4, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum oporteat intensius conteri de uno peccato quam de alio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum per contritionem plus vel intensius oporteat conteri de uno peccato quam de alio. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia contritio delens culpam est in instanti, sicut patet de iustificatione impii[^1]; sed motus idem in instanti non potest esse magis et minus intensus: ergo etc.

2. Item, quidquid agit in multa simul, ita quod non in singula, non agit in quoddam plus, in quoddam minus; sed contritio simul agit in multa peccata, ita quod non considerat singula, quia tunc oporteret, respectu illorum dividi actionem: ergo contritio non magis detestatur unum peccatum quam alterum.

3. Item, contritio ea ratione detestatur peccatum, qua separativum est a Deo; sed quodlibet se<!-- page 396 -->parat a Deo, et ita amittitur Deus per unum peccatum mortale, sicut per aliud, et ita per parvum, sicut per magnum: ergo etc.

4. Item, contritio respicit peccatum quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad *offensam* et quantum ad *damnum*; sed quantum ad *offensam* omne peccatum habet rationem infiniti, cum sit contra Deum infinitum; quantum ad *damnum*, omne peccatum aufert omnes virtutes, sicut dicitur Iacobi secundo[^2], et habetur in littera: *Qui peccat in uno factus est omnium reus*: cum ergo damnum et offensa habeant rationem aequalitatis, videtur, quod contritio debeat de omnibus esse aequalis.

5. Item, quantumcumque contritio detestetur modicum peccatum, laudabile[^3] est; et quantumcumque sit parva contritio etiam de maximo peccato, bona est et laudabilis: ergo videtur, quod non sit necessarius gradus intensionis secundum gradum vitiorum et peccatorum.

**Contra:**
1. Maior est dolor de mortali et debet esse quam de veniali[^4]: ergo pari ratione de uno peccato mortali graviori quam de alio minus gravi[^5].

2. Item, secundum Gregorium[^6]: « magis se debet punire per satisfactionem qui gravius peccavit »: ergo pari ratione idem ipse, cum gravius peccat, gravius se debet punire per contritionem: si ergo de graviori peccato in diversis oportet esse contritionem maiorem, pari ratione in eodem.

3. Item, is est ordo in dolore, qui est et debet esse in amore, quoniam ab ipso habet ortum; sed magis bonum secundum ordinatam dilectionem magis est amandum: ergo pari ratione maius malum magis est detestandum.

4. Item, contritio est dolor rationalis[^7]; sed dolor consequitur existimationem rationis, existimatio autem rationis non aequaliter pensat omnia peccata, sed quaedam maiora: ergo pari ratione et dolor.

5. Item, esto per impossibile, quod aliquis perplexus esset, ut caderet in alterum duorum malorum; constat, quod si haberet dilectionem ordinatam, magis refugeret maius malum[^8]: ergo si magis refugit ante lapsum, pari ratione et post lapsum, et sic etc.

> **Conclusio.** Contritio, ut est deletiva culpae, ordinem habet ad magis detestandum maius malum secundum habitum, non secundum actum, sed ut est deletiva poenae, etiam secundum actum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de contritione: aut prout est deletiva *culpae*, aut prout est deletiva *poenae*. Si prout est deletiva *culpae*; sic operatur in iustificatione impii[^9] in instanti, et sic *actu* non potest habere ordinem respectu specialium peccatorum, quia simul et in instanti est contra omne peccatum commissum; habet tamen secundum *habitum*, quia dolor ille habitualiter disponit ad detestandum aliquod plus, aliquod minus; et quia habilitat ad detestandum malum, quia malum, ideo ad magis detestandum maius malum. — Si autem loquamur de[^10] deletiva *poenae*; sic dicendum, quod habet maiorem intensionem et minorem etiam secundum *actum*, sicut ostendunt rationes inductae ad secundam partem.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1 et 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, patet responsio, scilicet ad primum et secundum. Procedunt enim de contritione secundum primam viam, scilicet ut est in iustificatione impii.

*Ad 3 et 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de separatione et damno et offensa, dicendum, quod *separatio* attenditur in elongatione secundum dissimilitudinem, et *offensa* secundum contemptum, et *damnum* secundum amissionem gratuitorum et vulnerationem naturalium sive dehabilitationem[^11]; et in his poenae gradus est; unde illud non valet. Quamvis enim Deus ab omnibus offendatur, tamen aliqui contemnunt eum plus, aliqui minus; et similiter in aliquo peccato plus natura laeditur et a virtute plus elongatur.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de parvo non minus potest dolere[^11a]; dicendum, quod sicut in caritate non est dare, quin amor, quantumcumque sit parvus et quantumcumque magnus, semper sit bonus, tamen in sua magnitudine et parvitate necessario habet ordinem; sic in proposito est intelligendum. Et sic facile est ad cetera respondere[^12].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether one ought to be contrite more intensely for one sin than for another.*

Secondly it is asked whether through contrition one ought to be contrite more, or more intensely, for one sin than for another. And that one ought not, it seems:

1. Because the contrition which blots out guilt is in an instant, as is clear concerning the justification of the ungodly[^1]; but the same motion in an instant cannot be more and less intense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, whatever acts upon many things at once, so that it does not act upon them singly, does not act upon one more and another less; but contrition acts upon many sins at once, so that it does not consider them singly, because then it would be necessary, with respect to them, that the action be divided: therefore contrition does not detest one sin more than another.

3. Likewise, contrition detests sin by that account by which it is something separating from God; but anything whatever<!-- page 396 -->separates from God, and so God is lost through one mortal sin just as through another, and so through a small one just as through a great one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, contrition regards sin in two respects, namely as to *offense* and as to *harm*; but as to *offense* every sin has the character of the infinite, since it is against the infinite God; as to *harm*, every sin takes away all the virtues, as is said in the second chapter of James[^2], and is held in the text: *Whoever sins in one is made guilty of all*: since therefore harm and offense have the character of equality, it seems that contrition ought to be equal concerning all of them.

5. Likewise, however much contrition detests a slight sin, it is praiseworthy[^3]; and however small the contrition, even concerning the greatest sin, it is good and praiseworthy: therefore it seems that a degree of intensity according to the degree of vices and sins is not necessary.

**On the contrary:**
1. The grief over a mortal sin is greater, and ought to be, than over a venial one[^4]: therefore by parity of reasoning over one graver mortal sin than over another less grave one[^5].

2. Likewise, according to Gregory[^6]: « he who has sinned more gravely ought to punish himself more by satisfaction »: therefore by parity of reasoning the same person, when he sins more gravely, ought to punish himself more gravely through contrition: if therefore over a graver sin in different persons the contrition must be greater, by parity of reasoning so in the same person.

3. Likewise, that order is in grief which is and ought to be in love, since it takes its origin from it; but the greater good, according to ordered love, is more to be loved: therefore by parity of reasoning the greater evil is more to be detested.

4. Likewise, contrition is a rational grief[^7]; but grief follows the estimation of reason, and the estimation of reason does not weigh all sins equally, but some as greater: therefore by parity of reasoning grief too.

5. Likewise, suppose by the impossible that someone were so perplexed that he would fall into one of two evils; it is settled that, if he had ordered love, he would shun the greater evil more[^8]: therefore if he shuns it more before the fall, by parity of reasoning so after the fall, and so etc.

> **Conclusion.** Contrition, insofar as it is destructive of guilt, has an order toward detesting the greater evil more according to habit, not according to act; but insofar as it is destructive of punishment, also according to act.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of contrition: either insofar as it is destructive of *guilt*, or insofar as it is destructive of *punishment*. If insofar as it is destructive of *guilt*; thus it operates in the justification of the ungodly[^9] in an instant, and thus *actually* it cannot have an order with respect to particular sins, because at once and in an instant it is against every sin committed; it has it, however, according to *habit*, because that grief habitually disposes one to detest one thing more, another less; and because it makes one apt to detest evil, as it is evil, therefore to detest the greater evil more. — But if we speak of it as[^10] destructive of *punishment*; then it must be said that it has greater and lesser intensity even according to *act*, as the reasons brought forward for the second part show.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1 and 2.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, the response is clear, namely to the first and second. For they proceed concerning contrition according to the first way, namely as it is in the justification of the ungodly.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected concerning separation and harm and offense, it must be said that *separation* is regarded in the estrangement according to unlikeness, and *offense* according to contempt, and *harm* according to the loss of gratuitous goods and the wounding of natural ones, or the disabling of them[^11]; and in these there is a degree of punishment; whence that argument does not hold. For although God is offended by all, yet some despise him more, some less; and likewise in one sin nature is more wounded and is more estranged from virtue.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that over a small sin one can grieve no less[^11a]; it must be said that, just as in charity it cannot be granted that love — however small and however great it be — is not always good, yet in its greatness and smallness it necessarily has an order; so it is to be understood in the matter proposed. And thus it is easy to respond to the rest[^12].

---

la: Pro *ratio*, quod in plurimis codd. desideratur, cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *argumentum*. Cod. aa *comparationem* pro *viam*.

en: In place of *ratio*, which is wanting in most codices, codex K (1, by a second hand) reads *argumentum*. Codex aa reads *comparationem* for *viam*.

la: A cod. bb suppletur *peccati*.

en: From codex bb *peccati* is supplied.

la: Cod. H, cod. E *neque*, alii codd. et ed. 1 *quia non*; ita *quia non*, Vat. *et quod non*.

en: Codex H, codex E read *neque*, the other codices and edition 1 read *quia non*; thus *quia non*, the Vatican edition *et quod non*.

la: Scilicet quod contritio, quae intenditur, nondum fuerit contritio vera.

en: Namely that the contrition which is intensified would not yet have been true contrition.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 391, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 391, note 1.

la: Vers. 10: *Offendat autem in uno* etc. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro *omne peccatum* edd. *unum peccatum*.

en: Verse 10: *But offend in one* etc. See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For *omne peccatum* the editions read *unum peccatum*.

la: Edd. *laudabilis*.

en: The editions read *laudabilis*.

la: Deut. 25, 2: *Pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus*. Cfr. Apoc. 18, 7, et Ambros., *de Lapsu virginis consecr.* c. 8. n. 37.

en: Deut. 25:2: *According to the measure of the sin shall the manner of the stripes also be*. Cf. Rev. 18:7, and Ambrose, *On the Fall of a Consecrated Virgin* c. 8, n. 37.

la: Vide supra pag. 364, nota 6, et pag. 380, nota 1.

en: See above, p. 364, note 6, and p. 380, note 1.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. — Superius pro *sed magis* cod. K *sed maius*.

en: Cf. III Sent., d. 29, q. 1. — Above, for *sed magis* codex K reads *sed maius*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. et 2. De *dissimilitudine* vide August., Enarrat. in Ps. 34. serm. 2. n. 6.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 35, a. 1 and 2. On *unlikeness* see Augustine, *Enarration on Ps. 34*, sermon 2, n. 6.

la: Cod. aa *de parvo multum potest dolere, et magno minus potest dolere*.

en: Codex aa reads *over a small sin one can grieve much, and over a great one less can one grieve*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 44934–45087), with the cascade-shattered two-column regions (videtur arguments, Respondeo/Solutiones, and both pages' footers) cross-read against 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p395-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p396-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`. Running heads verified: p. 395 = "DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. IV. QUAEST. II"; p. 396 = "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." Offset pdf = printed + 20 (pdf 415–416).

**Page-span correction.** The dispatch brief assigned printed pp. 393–394 and bands `vol4-p393/p394`, but eyes-on running-head verification placed this quaestio on **pp. 395–396**: p. 393 holds the end of ARTICULUS III plus the ARTICULUS IV opener; p. 394 holds the whole of QUAESTIO I (its videtur, Conclusio, Respondeo, and footers); QUAESTIO II opens at the foot of p. 395 L-column (after the Art IV scholion §I–II) and runs through p. 396. Pages 395–396 were extracted and cropped fresh; `printed_pages`/`pdf_pages` set to the verified span. (Note: sibling q1's frontmatter currently lists pp. 391–392 — likely also mis-set; not touched here.)

**Scholion disposition (has_scholion: false).** The ARTICULUS IV scholion (§I–II) is a single block covering BOTH q1 and q2; it is printed on p. 395 L-column between q1's Respondeo and the QUAESTIO II header, and is rendered in full with QUAESTIO I (`bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a4-q1`, which records `has_scholion: true`, scholion I–II covering q1–q2). This chunk carries no scholion; q2's own footnote [^12] points the reader there (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*).

**Footnote numbering.** Page-restart sequences: p. 395 footers 1–5 (markers [^1]–[^5]; the page break falls inside arg. 3); p. 396 footers 1–12 mapped to [^6]–[^12], with the p. 396 *Ad 5* codex-variant footer (`Cod. aa de parvo multum potest dolere…`) anchored as [^11a] so that both p. 396 note "11" senses are preserved separately from the dehabilitatio note [^11]. 12 apparatus entries total.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the PDF column bands. Minor OCR garbles silently corrected per CLAUDE.md (e.g. `oporieat`→`oporteat`, `iniensius`→`intensius`, `nmlta`→`multa`, `siraul`→`simul`, `quodliijet`→`quodlibet`, `conlritio`→`contritio`, `detestalur`→`detestatur`, `lacobi`→`Iacobi`, `dilTerentia`-type column-bleed dropped).

**Hand-off to p1-dubia.** This quaestio ends just before "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI" (raw line 45088). p. 396 R-column bottom closes the Solutiones; the DUBIA begin at the foot of p. 396 R / top of p. 397 (running head "DIST. XVI. P. I. DUBIA. 397"). No shared-footer split crosses into the dubia chunk — p. 396's footers are fully consumed by this q2. The next chunk (Pars I dubia) starts clean at p. 397.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 403 -->

### Pars II. *De partibus subiectivis poenitentiae.*

### Articulus I. *De poenitentia ante baptismum.*

Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum oporteat poenitere et pro originali peccato. Secundo, utrum accedentem ad baptismum cum poenitentia necesse sit ante Sacramentum poenitentiae [agere].

### Quaestio I. *Utrum oporteat poenitere de originali peccato.*

Circa primum, quod non sit necesse poenitere de originali, videtur:

1. Quia potentior est vis regenerativa Sacramenti quam vis propagativa hominis corrupti; sed per propagationem sine delectatione transfunditur originale[^1]: ergo ab oppositis, immo multo fortius, per Sacramentum sine dolore deletur.

2. Item, omnis poenitentia est respectu voliti, non enim poenitet homo de eo quod noluit[^2]; sed originale nunquam fuit voluntarium: ergo de illo non est necessaria poenitentia.

3. Item, omnis poenitentia est in actu volente; sed originale est in parvulo, in quo est morbus et remedium: ergo non oportet ipsum poenitere, cum non possit actu velle.

4. Item, omnis poenitentia est respectu actus proprii; poenitet enim homo de eo quod fecit, non de alieno; sed originale est per actum alienum: ergo etc.

5. Item, baptismus ordinatur contra originale[^3]; sed non sunt duo remedia contra idem: ergo poenitentia non est remedium contra originale.

<!-- page 404 -->

**Contra:**

1. De eo, de quo iuste arguitur homo ab alio, iuste arguitur a se ipso; sed Augustinus dicit in libro *de Correctione et gratia*[^4], quod peccator pro originali est arguendus: ergo peccator debet arguere se ipsum; sed homo de culpa arguit se ipsum per poenitentiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut *ira per zelum* detestatur homo omnem iniustitiam in alio, ita poenitentia omnem iniustitiam in se ipso; sed originale est iniustitia in homine: ergo est detestanda per poenitentiam, et sic etc.

3. Item, omnis qui vult Deo reconciliari, necesse habet detestari omne quod a Deo separat; sed originale separat: ergo etc.

4. Item, de peccato, de quo iuste punitur a Deo, debet poenitens punire se ipsum; sed pro originali iuste punitur homo a Deo poena carentiae, quae est maxima poena, quia maximum damnum[^5]: ergo pro eo debet se punire.

> **Conclusio.** Quoad adultos scientes se habere peccatum originale, congruum est, ut hoc eis actu displiceat, tamen non est eis necessarium de eo conteri et poenitere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de originali peccato est loqui communiter et specialiter. Communiter, ut est in omnibus[^6]; et sic ad eius deletionem non requiritur aliquis actus ex parte eius, in quo est, ut patet in parvulo. — Est etiam loqui specialiter, quantum ad adultos, qui se habere nesciunt; et quantum ad hos non oportet quod aliquis actus detestationis interveniat. — Est iterum loqui quantum ad adultos, qui se habere sciunt; et quantum ad tales congruum est, ut sibi displiceat, congruum, inquam, quod displiceat non in speciali, sed in generali, quia debet displicere omne quod a Deo separat; conteri autem non est necessarium[^7].

Ratio autem, quare non est necesse, ut conteratur, est, quia non est actu nostro commissum; et sic, licet in adulto sit talis originalis displicentia, non tamen est poenitentia, quia poenitentia, sicut ostensum est[^8], proprie est respectu voliti.

Rationes igitur probantes, quod non est necessaria poenitentia ad deletionem originalis, verae sunt et concedendae. Rationes omnes ad oppositum procedentes probant, quod congruum est, ut originale displiceat adulto, ne velit amplius in illo remanere[^9]; sed quod teneatur *se affligere*, non concludunt, vel etiam poenitere.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Quod enim obiicitur, quod arguendus est pro originali; non intelligitur, quia ipsum contraxit, sed ne in ipso velit permanere.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poenitentia[^10] est detestandum omne malum nostrum; dicendum, quod verum est: *actum*, non *contractum*; similiter videtur de *ira per zelum* in proximo.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod debet detestari omne malum, quod separat a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, si illud sit ex propria voluntate introductum; et esto quod detestetur, non propter hoc poenitens dicitur.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod debet se punire de omni eo, de quo iuste punitur a Deo; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si Deus poena *sensus* puniret, vel etiam baptismus non sufficeret; nunc autem Deus non punit poena *sensus*, et baptismus sine omni poena satisfactoria sive assumta absolvit, sicut melius supra[^11] visum est.

english:
### Part II. *On the subjective parts of penance.*

### Article I. *On penance before baptism.*

Concerning the first point, two questions are asked. First it is asked whether one must repent also of original sin. Second, whether for one approaching baptism with penance it is necessary, before the Sacrament, to [perform] penance.

### Question I. *Whether one must repent of original sin.*

Concerning the first point, that it is not necessary to repent of original sin, it seems so:

1. Because the regenerative power of the Sacrament is mightier than the propagative power of corrupt man; but through propagation original sin is transmitted without pleasure[^1]: therefore from the opposite cause — indeed much more strongly — through the Sacrament it is wiped away without pain.

2. Likewise, all penance is in respect of something willed, for a man does not repent of what he did not will[^2]; but original sin was never voluntary: therefore penance for it is not necessary.

3. Likewise, all penance is in one who is actually willing; but original sin is in an infant, in whom there is the disease and the remedy: therefore there is no need for him to repent of it, since he cannot actually will.

4. Likewise, all penance is in respect of one's own act; for a man repents of what he himself did, not of another's deed; but original sin comes about through another's act: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, baptism is ordained against original sin[^3]; but there are not two remedies against the same thing: therefore penance is not a remedy against original sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. Concerning that of which a man is justly accused by another, he is justly accused by himself; but Augustine says in the book *On Correction and Grace*[^4] that the sinner is to be accused for original sin: therefore the sinner ought to accuse himself; but a man accuses himself of fault through penance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, just as by *zealous anger* a man detests every injustice in another, so by penance every injustice in himself; but original sin is an injustice in man: therefore it is to be detested through penance, and so etc.

3. Likewise, everyone who wills to be reconciled to God must necessarily detest everything that separates from God; but original sin separates: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, of the sin for which one is justly punished by God, the penitent ought to punish himself; but for original sin man is justly punished by God with the punishment of privation, which is the greatest punishment, because the greatest loss[^5]: therefore he ought to punish himself for it.

> **Conclusion.** As regards adults who know they have original sin, it is fitting that this should actually displease them; nevertheless it is not necessary for them to be contrite over it and to repent.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of original sin in a general way and in a special way. Generally, as it is in all[^6]; and thus for its deletion no act is required on the part of him in whom it is, as is clear in the case of an infant. — One may also speak of it specially, as regards adults who do not know they have it; and as regards these there is no need that any act of detestation intervene. — Again, one may speak as regards adults who know they have it; and as regards such it is fitting that it displease them — fitting, I say, that it displease not in particular, but in general, since one ought to be displeased at everything that separates from God; but to be contrite is not necessary[^7].

Now the reason why it is not necessary that one be contrite is that it was not committed by our own act; and so, although in an adult there be such a displeasure at original sin, it is nevertheless not penance, since penance, as has been shown[^8], is properly in respect of something willed.

Therefore the reasons proving that penance is not necessary for the deletion of original sin are true and to be granted. All the reasons proceeding to the opposite prove that it is fitting that original sin displease the adult, lest he wish to remain any longer in it[^9]; but that he is bound *to afflict himself* they do not conclude, nor even to repent.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* As to what is objected, that one is to be accused for original sin; this is not understood to mean because he contracted it, but lest he wish to remain in it.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that penance[^10] is to detest every evil of ours; it must be said that this is true: of *the act*, not of *what is contracted*; the same seems to hold of *zealous anger* toward one's neighbor.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that one ought to detest every evil that separates from God; it must be said that this is true if that evil has been introduced by one's own will; and granting that he detest it, he is not on that account called a penitent.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that one ought to punish himself for everything for which he is justly punished by God; it must be said that this would be true if God punished with the punishment of *sense*, or even if baptism did not suffice; but as it is, God does not punish with the punishment of *sense*, and baptism absolves without any satisfactory or assumed punishment, as has better been seen above[^11].

la: Codd. F G *poenitentia*.

en: Codices F G read *poenitentia* ("penance").

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. [3. q. 1.] — Vide pro hoc et seqq. argg. supra d. 14. p. I. dub. 1. definitiones poenitentiae.

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 31, a. [3, q. 1]. — For this and the following arguments see above d. 14, p. I, dub. 1, the definitions of penance.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1.

en: As was shown above, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

la: August., *de Correptione et gratia*, c. 6. n. 9: «An vero ideo *pravitas ista* corripienda non est in homine, quia non eius propria qui corripitur, sed communis est omnibus? Immo vero corripiatur et in singulis quod est omnium... Corripiatur ergo origo damnabilis, ut ex dolore correptionis voluntas regenerationis oriatur». Ultima verba respicit S. Bonav. in solut. huius obiect.

en: Augustine, *On Correction and Grace*, c. 6, n. 9: «But is *that depravity* therefore not to be reproved in a man because it is not proper to him who is reproved, but is common to all? On the contrary, let that which belongs to all be reproved also in each one... Let the damnable origin, then, be reproved, so that from the pain of reproof the will to regeneration may arise». St. Bonaventure has these last words in view in his solution of this objection.

la: Vide supra pag. 321, nota 10.

en: See above p. 321, note 10.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — In *maiori* post *punitur* cod. aa supplet *homo*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 33, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — In "*maiori*," after "*punitur*," codex aa supplies "*homo*."

la: Alex. [Hal.], S. p. IV. q. 15. m. 1. a. 1: *ut est morbus*, quae lectio in antiqua scriptura parum differt a nostra et, attento supra posito 3. fundamento, verisimilis esse videtur. Inferius *verbis se habere* (quae bis occurrunt) Alex. Hal. praemittit *huiusmodi morbum*.

en: Alexander [of Hales], Summa p. IV, q. 15, m. 1, a. 1: *ut est morbus* ("as it is a disease"), a reading which in the old text differs little from ours and, given the third foundation set out above, seems probable. Further down, to *the words* "*se habere*" (which occur twice) Alexander of Hales prefixes "*huiusmodi morbum*."

la: Ita cod. X, cuius lectio confirmatur tum ex subnexis, tum ex codd. F G, qui minus bene ponunt *conteri autem de ipso specialiter non est necessarium*; alii codd. vel et hoc [scil. *displicere*] est necessarium (non apte, cum ante de eadem re dicatur *congruum est*), vel cum edd. perperam *nec* [cod. E *non*] *est necessarium*, vel, ut codd. M O, haec verba omittunt.

en: So codex X, whose reading is confirmed both by what follows and by codices F G, which less well read *conteri autem de ipso specialiter non est necessarium* ("but to be contrite over it in particular is not necessary"); other codices read either *and this* [namely "*to be displeased*"] *is necessary* (not aptly, since just before it is said of the same matter that it *is fitting*), or with the editions wrongly *nor* [cod. E *not*] *is it necessary*, or, as codices M O, omit these words.

la: In fundam. 2. — Codd. R T sensum sic exprimunt per *poenitentiam*, edd. legunt *poenitentia est ad detestandum*. Inferius post *dicendum* substituimus lectionem codd. M T U X, in aliis et edd. legitur: *quod verum est, attamen non contractum* (cfr. tom. II. pag. 767, nota 6. et pag. 826, nota 1.).

en: On fundamentum 2. — Codices R T express the sense thus by *poenitentiam*; the editions read *poenitentia est ad detestandum* ("penance is to detest"). Below, after *dicendum*, we have substituted the reading of codices M T U X; in the others and the editions it reads: *quod verum est, attamen non contractum* (cf. vol. II, p. 767, note 6, and p. 826, note 1).

la: Dist. 1. p. 1. a. [1. q. 2.] — Superius pro *sine omni*, quod exhibent codd. A F G I O U X Z, alii codd. et edd. etiam *bene ab omni*. In principio solut. multi codd. omittunt *a Deo*.

en: D. 1, p. 1, a. [1, q. 2]. — Above, in place of *sine omni* ("without any"), which codices A F G I O U X Z give, other codices and the editions also read *bene ab omni*. At the beginning of the solution many codices omit *a Deo* ("by God").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Praeeunte Alexandro Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 15. m. 1. a. 1.), S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; cfr. Suppl. q. 2. a. 2.) distinguit poenitentiam proprie dictam a large dicta, quae est omnis displicentia mali praeteriti. Prima, ut dicit, *nullo modo* potest esse de originali, secunda vero *debet* esse. Idem reapse docet S. Bonav., quidquid dicat Estius (hic § 6.), qui cum a S. Thoma discedere et insufficienter loqui asserit. Sed deceptus est falsa illa antiquarum editionum lectione: nec est necessarium, notata pag. 404, nota 5. Ceterum attento consideranti cohaerentiam totius sermonis iam patere debuit vera auctoris nostri sententia.

**II.** Seq. (2.) quaestio ab aliis doctoribus eodem sensu solvitur, sed plerumque, dum tractant de conditionibus ad baptismum ex parte baptizandi adulti requisitis. Cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 15. m. 1. a. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto supra d. 1. q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. S. III. q. 68. — De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. et q. 17. m. 3. a. 1. 5. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 48. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** With Alexander of Hales going before (Summa, p. IV, q. 15, m. 1, a. 1), St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, little-question 2; cf. *Supplement* q. 2, a. 2) distinguishes penance properly so called from penance broadly so called, which is every displeasure at a past evil. The first, as he says, can in *no way* be of original sin, but the second *ought* to be. The same is in fact taught by St. Bonaventure, whatever Estius may say (here § 6), who asserts that Bonaventure departs from St. Thomas and speaks insufficiently. But Estius was deceived by that false reading of the old editions: nor is it necessary, as noted at p. 404, note 5. Moreover, to one who attentively considers the coherence of the whole discourse, the true mind of our author should already have been clear.

**II.** The following (second) question is resolved by other doctors in the same sense, but for the most part while they treat of the conditions required for baptism on the part of an adult to be baptized. Cf. Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. q. 15, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, in both *Scripts*, above d. 1, q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, little-question 3; *Summa* III, q. 68. — On this first question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. and q. 17, m. 3, a. 1, 5, 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 48. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1, n. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4, little-question 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, d. 4, a. 1, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1, 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol IV PDF (printed pp. 403–404, pdf pp. 423–424), using the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 45770–45928) as base. Read p. 403 left column (Pars II opener: Commentarius / Divisio textus header bleed) then right column (Tractatio quaestionum opener "Circa primum quaeruntur duo… Primo… Secundo…" + fundamenta 3–5); p. 403 left lower band held the quaestio body header + fundamenta 1–2; then p. 404 left (Contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo) and right (Respondeo continuation, replies 1–4, scholion). Running heads on p. 403 read "QUAEST. I." / "403" (OCR digit-mangled the page number to 404/403 in places); confirmed against the +20 offset and the running-head text. The Art I opener ("Circa primum quaeruntur duo…") is folded into this q1 per the Vol II/IV chunking convention; there is no standalone divisio chunk for the article (the Pars II divisio textus + commentarius is its own pars-level chunk).

**Article opener alignment (verified).** *Primo* = "utrum oporteat poenitere et pro originali peccato" → THIS q1. *Secundo* = "utrum accedentem ad baptismum cum poenitentia necesse sit ante Sacramentum…" → q2. Alignment confirmed against p. 403 right column; no q-swap.

**Scholion finding.** The Article I / Quaestio I SCHOLION is present in this raw range (header garbled "8CH0LI0N", raw ~line 118) and is rendered IN FULL here (body first, scholion last). It has two numbered points: **I** (substantive — the Alex. Hal. / St. Thomas / Estius discussion of penance proprie vs. large dicta) and **II** (the cross-references / doctor list, which forwards to and shares with q2 — "Seq. (2.) quaestio…"). **q2 points here for its scholion coverage.** The scholion's own apparatus notes (Cap. 6 n.9; Vide supra pag. 321; Alex. Hal. *ut est morbus*; the codex-X variant; etc.) are folded into the body-footer apparatus above as footnotes [^5]–[^11] because Quaracchi prints them in the single p.-404 footer sequence keyed to body markers; they are not a separately numbered scholion apparatus.

**[?] flags.** Footnote completions shown in brackets are editor-standard expansions of references the OCR/PDF footer truncated at the column edge:
- [^3]: "II. Sent. d. 31. a." truncated; supplied "[3. q. 1.]" as the standard reference (the footer ran off the column band) — `[?]` low-confidence on the exact a./q. numerals.
- [^11]: "Dist. 1. p. 1. a." truncated; supplied "[1. q. 2.]" by parallel to the body's "supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2." cross-reference — `[?]` low-confidence on numerals.
No other ambiguous readings; OCR + PDF agreed cleanly on the body.


title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 405 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum adultum, accedentem ad baptismum cum actuali peccato, necesse sit antea Sacramentum poenitentiae accipere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum adultum, accedentem ad baptismum cum actuali, necesse sit ante Sacramentum poenitentiae accipere quam baptismum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Actuum* secundo[^1]: *Poenitemini, et baptizetur unusquisque vestrum;* Glossa: « Dicturus de baptismate praemisit lamenta poenitentiae, ut prius se aqua afflictionis perfunderent et post Sacramento baptismatis lavarent ».

2. Item, *Matthaei* tertio[^2]: *Exibant ad illum* etc.; Glossa: « Iam tunc exemplum baptizandis dabatur confitendi peccata et promittendi meliora »: ergo si debent confiteri, similiter et conteri et satisfacere.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia Dominus et beatus Ioannes inceperunt praedicationem suam a poenitentia[^3]; sed ab eo debuerunt incipere, quod est salutis initium: ergo si ita inceperunt, patet, quod primo debet accipere poenitentiam.

4. Item, primo persona corrupit naturam[^4]; sed actuale est corruptio personae, et originale naturae, et contra actuale est poenitentia: ergo praeit baptismum.

5. Item, parvulus non habet nisi originale, sed adultus actuale cum originali; sed qui habet ampliorem morbum debet habere amplius remedium: cum ergo baptismus necessarius sit parvulo, aliquid ultra baptismum erit necessarium adulto. Sed hoc non est nisi poenitentia: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Baptismus est ianua Sacramentorum[^5]; sed ianua est primo, et ante ipsam nihil debet praemitti: ergo etc.

2. Item, « poenitentia est secunda tabula post naufragium », ut dicit Hieronymus, et habetur in littera supra distinctione decima quarta[^6]; sed secunda dicitur respectu baptismi: ergo haec non praecedit ipsum.

3. Item, baptismus omnem culpam delet, sicut supra[^7] monstratum est — unde Augustinus ad Valerium: *Lavacro regenerationis omnia peccata hominum mundantur atque sanantur* — sed superfluum est facere per plura quod potest fieri per unum: ergo ad emundationem non est necessaria poenitentia.

> **Conclusio.** Poenitentia, prout est virtus et contritio, in adultis praecedere debet baptismum, sed non, prout est Sacramentum et absolutio et satisfactio; confessio autem de congruo praemitti potest.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de poenitentia, ut est virtus et ut est Sacramentum. Si loquamur de poenitentia, ut est virtus, cuius actus est contritio; necesse est, quod praecedat baptismum in adulto, qui habet actuale peccatum; « nemo enim inchoare potest novam vitam, nisi poeniteat eum veteris vitae[^8] ». — Si autem loquamur de poenitentia, ut est Sacramentum, secundum quod homo confitetur et recipit absolutionem; dico, quod non est necesse praecedere, sed de congruo potest. Fit

<!-- page 406 -->

enim confessio sacerdoti, ut homo erubescat et peccata sua recognoscat et de eorum remissione Deo ingratus non existat, et quantum ad hoc congruum est; sed non oportet nec debet sequi absolutio nec ligatio, quia omnino solvitur in baptismo. — Igitur poenitentia quantum ad *contritionem* praecedit necessario; quantum ad *confessionem* de congruo; quantum ad *absolutionem* et *satisfactionem* neutro modo. Et quia Sacramentum completum est in absolutione, quia ibi est remedium; ideo dico, quod poenitentia, secundum quod Sacramentum est Ecclesiae, sequitur, non praecedit.

**Ad oppositorum solutionem:**
*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod lamenta poenitentiae debent praecedere; dicendum, quod istud concedendum est; similiter, quod exemplum dabatur confitendi, non quia necessarium, sed quia congruum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedicatio incepit a poenitentia; dicendum, quod incepit a poenitentia-virtute, non Sacramento.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prior est corruptio personae; dicendum, quod verum est in primis parentibus, sed post fuit e converso; et quia Sacramenta currunt secundum cursum necessitatis nostrae; ideo patet, quod prius debuit esse baptismus.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amplius remedium debet habere; dicendum, quod verum est, scilicet contritionem; sed non oportet, quod aliud Sacramentum, quia baptismus ad utrumque valet; et ideo non requiritur aliud Sacramentum, sed sufficit actus mentis, per quem se praeparat ad effectum baptismi, alioquin accederet fictus. Et sic patet illud.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether one who is an adult, approaching baptism with an actual sin, must first receive the Sacrament of penance.*

Secondly it is asked whether one who is an adult, approaching baptism with an actual [sin], must receive the Sacrament of penance before baptism. And that it must be so, it seems.

1. In *Acts*, chapter two[^1]: *Repent, and let each one of you be baptized;* the Gloss: « About to speak of baptism, he set before it the laments of penance, that they might first be drenched with the water of affliction and afterward be washed in the Sacrament of baptism ».

2. Likewise, in *Matthew*, chapter three[^2]: *They went out to him* etc.; the Gloss: « Even then an example was given to those to be baptized, of confessing their sins and promising better things »: therefore if they must confess, likewise also they must have contrition and make satisfaction.

3. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because the Lord and the blessed John began their preaching from penance[^3]; but they ought to have begun from that which is the beginning of salvation: therefore if they so began, it is plain that one must first receive penance.

4. Likewise, the person first corrupted the nature[^4]; but the actual [sin] is a corruption of the person, and the original of the nature, and against the actual is penance: therefore it goes before baptism.

5. Likewise, the little child has only the original [sin], but the adult the actual together with the original; but he who has the greater illness ought to have the greater remedy: since therefore baptism is necessary for the little child, something beyond baptism will be necessary for the adult. But this is nothing other than penance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Baptism is the gate of the Sacraments[^5]; but the gate is first, and before it nothing ought to be set: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « penance is the second plank after shipwreck », as Jerome says, and it is held in the text above, in the fourteenth distinction[^6]; but it is called second in respect of baptism: therefore this does not precede it.

3. Likewise, baptism wipes away every fault, as was shown above[^7] — whence Augustine to Valerius: *By the washing of regeneration all the sins of men are cleansed and healed* — but it is superfluous to do through many what can be done through one: therefore for cleansing penance is not necessary.

> **Conclusion.** Penance, insofar as it is a virtue and contrition, ought in adults to precede baptism, but not insofar as it is a Sacrament and absolution and satisfaction; confession, however, may fittingly be set before.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of penance as it is a virtue and as it is a Sacrament. If we speak of penance as it is a virtue, whose act is contrition; it is necessary that it precede baptism in the adult who has actual sin; « for no one can begin a new life unless he repents of his old life[^8] ». — But if we speak of penance as it is a Sacrament, according to which a man confesses and receives absolution; I say that it is not necessary that it precede, but it may fittingly do so. For

confession is made to a priest, that a man may blush and recognize his sins and not be ungrateful to God for their remission, and as to this it is fitting; but neither ought absolution nor binding to follow, because [the sin] is wholly loosed in baptism. — Therefore penance as to *contrition* precedes necessarily; as to *confession* fittingly; as to *absolution* and *satisfaction* in neither way. And because the Sacrament is completed in absolution, since there is the remedy; therefore I say that penance, according as it is the Sacrament of the Church, follows, it does not precede.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:**
*To 1 and 2.* To that, then, which is objected first, that the laments of penance ought to precede; it must be said that this is to be granted; likewise, that the example was given of confessing, not because it was necessary, but because it was fitting.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that preaching began from penance; it must be said that it began from penance-as-virtue, not as Sacrament.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the corruption of the person is prior; it must be said that this is true in the first parents, but afterward it was the reverse; and because the Sacraments run according to the course of our necessity; therefore it is plain that baptism had to be first.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that he ought to have the greater remedy; it must be said that this is true, namely contrition; but it is not necessary that [he have] another Sacrament, because baptism avails for both; and therefore another Sacrament is not required, but the act of the mind suffices, by which one prepares oneself for the effect of baptism, otherwise he would approach feignedly. And so that is plain.

---

la: Vers. 38: *Poenitentiam,* inquit [Petrus], *agite,* et etc. — Glossa, quam refert Lyranus, sumta est ex Beda, qui in hunc loc. ait: *Dicturus baptisma, praemisit poenitentiae lamenta, ut Ecclesiae more prius se aqua suae afflictionis infunderent et postmodum Sacramento baptismatis lavarent.* Non pauci codd. *effunderent.*

en: Verse 38: « Do penance, » he says [Peter], etc. — The Gloss, which Lyra reports, is taken from Bede, who on this passage says: « About to speak of baptism, he set before it the laments of penance, that, after the manner of the Church, they might first pour over themselves the water of their affliction and afterward be washed in the Sacrament of baptism. » Not a few codices read *effunderent.*

la: Vers. 5: *Tunc exibat ad eum Ierosolyma et omnis Iudaea* etc. — Glossa est *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum ex Beda, in Marc. 1, 4. seq.

en: Verse 5: « Then there went out to him Jerusalem and all Judea » etc. — The Gloss is the *Ordinary* one, in Strabo and Lyra, from Bede, on Mark 1, 4 seq.

la: Cfr. Matth. 3, 1. seq. et 4, 17.

en: Cf. Matthew 3, 1 seq. and 4, 17.

la: Ut docet Anselm. verbis supra pag. 37, nota 3. allegatis. — Cod. H *persona corrupta corrupit naturam, natura corrupta corrupit personam.* Inferius post *poenitentia* codd. R S T addunt *contra originale baptismus.*

en: As Anselm teaches in the words cited above on page 37, note 3. — Codex H reads *a corrupted person corrupted the nature, a corrupted nature corrupted the person.* Below, after *penance,* codices R S T add *against the original [sin], baptism.*

la: Vide supra d. 1. p. II. dub. 1. et d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.

en: See above d. 1, p. II, dub. 1, and d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, in the body.

la: Cap. 1. Cfr. ibid. Comment. p. I. dub. 1.

en: Chapter 1. Cf. there the Commentary, p. I, dub. 1.

la: Dist. 4. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Verba August. habentur in l. de Nuptiis et concupisc. ad Valerium comitem, c. 33. n. 38, ubi ostendit, baptismo omnem peccatorum remissionem plenamque in resurrectione sanationem acceptam referri debere. *Sic, inquam, hoc [Eph. 5, 23-27.] accipiendum est, ut eodem lavacro regenerationis et verbo sanctificationis omnia prorsus mala hominum regeneratorum mundentur atque sanentur, non solum peccata, quae omnia nunc remittuntur in baptismo, sed etiam quae posterius humana ignorantia vel infirmitate contrahuntur* etc. Pro *ad Valerium* cod. aa *ad Valerianum,* alii codd. et edd. *ad Valentinum.* — De axiomate *superfluum est facere per plura* etc. cfr. tom. III. pag. 277, nota 1. — In fine arg. pro *emundationem* multi codd. et edd. *emendationem* (plures codd. addunt *necessariam*).

en: Dist. 4, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — The words of Augustine are found in the book *On Marriage and Concupiscence,* to Count Valerius, c. 33, n. 38, where he shows that to baptism is to be referred all remission of sins and full healing received in the resurrection. « Thus, I say, this [Eph. 5, 23–27] is to be understood: that by the same washing of regeneration and the word of sanctification all the evils of regenerated men whatsoever are cleansed and healed, not only the sins, which are all now remitted in baptism, but also those which are afterward contracted by human ignorance or weakness, » etc. For *ad Valerium* codex aa reads *ad Valerianum,* other codices and editions *ad Valentinum.* — On the axiom *it is superfluous to do through many* etc., cf. tom. III, p. 277, note 1. — At the end of the argument, for *emundationem* many codices and editions read *emendationem* (several codices add *necessariam*).

la: Ut dicit August. allegatus hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: As Augustine says, cited here in the text of the Master, c. 4.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450-dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p405-{L,R}` and `vol4-p406-{L,R}` (Vol IV is two-column; IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the Respondeo, replies, and footers). The auto-chunker dragged in a block from printed p.404 (the tail of a1-q1: its *Contra* with "Ad oppositum" running head and q1's CONCLUSIO/apparatus); that material was discarded — **q2 actually occupies pp. 405–406 only.** Running head verified: p.405 reads "DIST. XVI. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. II." Offset confirmed pdf = printed + 20.
- **Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. No SCHOLION header falls in this range. The Art I scholion is printed on p.405 just *above* QUAESTIO II (the "S. Thoma discedere…" / "De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal.…" block) and belongs to **a1-q1** — see `bon-sent-IV-d16-p2-a1-q1`. The footnote block immediately after q2 on p.406 (notes ¹–¹⁰ on ignorance) belongs to **ARTICULUS II, q1**, not to this quaestio.
- **Apparatus split.** All 8 of q2's footnotes are printed in the p.405 footer (which covers both the p.405 body arguments and the p.406 replies). The p.406 footer is owned by Art II q1 (begins "Fere omnes codd. ut.") and is forwarded to the Art II chunk.
- **Hand-off to ARTICULUS II.** Art II opens immediately after this chunk (raw 46063 / p.406 L–R): "Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de secunda poenitentia post baptismum… Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur" → its q1 ("Utrum necesse sit poenitere de peccatis commissis per ignorantiam") and q2 ("utrum necesse sit conteri de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis"). The Art II opener divisio folds into Art II q1 per the locked chunking convention. The p.406 footer notes ¹–¹⁰ are Art II q1's.
- **[?] flags.** None.


title: Dist. 16, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 406 -->

### Articulus II. *De poenitentia post baptismum, quae est de mortalibus.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de secunda poenitentia post baptismum, scilicet quae est de mortalibus. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur:

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum de mortalibus per ignorantiam commissis necesse sit poenitere.

*Secundo* quaeritur, utrum necesse sit conteri de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum necesse sit poenitere de peccatis commissis per ignorantiam.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod necesse est poenitere de peccatis commissis per ignorantiam:

1. Quia dicit Ambrosius[^1]: «Gravissime peccas, si ignoras»; sed, sicut exponitur, hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia talis non de facili quaerit medicum: ergo tali necessaria est medicina; et haec est poenitentia, et sic etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia Augustinus *de Correctione et gratia*[^2] dicit, quod non excusatur homo propter ignorantiam, quin teneatur credere: ergo pari ratione non excusatur homo propter ignorantiam, quin teneatur conteri.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia peccatum ex ignorantia est peccatum actuale ex nostro actu commissum: ergo sine actu nostro non deletur; sed actus, per quem deletur culpa, est poenitentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, ignorantia in eo qui peccavit, non excusavit a peccato[^3]: ergo non excusat, quin egeat remedio.

**Contra:**

1. Poenitentia non est nisi de volito[^4]; sed quod per ignorantiam fit, est involuntarium: ergo de tali non debet fieri poenitentia.

2. Item, incognita bona non possumus amare[^5]: ergo nec incognita mala possumus odire nec detestari: ergo de his non est poenitentia.

3. Item, nullo iure sumus certi, utrum offendimus Deum per ignorantiam; sed nullus tenetur agere aliquid ex praecepto, nisi ad quod habet certitudinem ex aliquo iure: ergo nullus tenetur poenitere de commissis per ignorantiam.

4. Item, de solis illis tenemur poenitere, de quibus tenemur confiteri; sed sola illa tenemur confiteri, quae possumus veraciter enarrare, et illa sola possumus veraciter enarrare, quae novimus; quia, si dubia vel ignorata asseramus, est mendacium[^6]: ergo cum ignoranter commissa nesciamus esse peccata, non possumus ea veraciter confiteri: ergo nec tenemur de his aliquo modo poenitere.

> **Conclusio.** De peccatis commissis per ignorantiam necesse est adhibere diligentiam, ut sciantur, atque poenitere in generali, non autem in speciali.

<!-- page 407 -->

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod poenitere de aliquo est dupliciter, scilicet in *generali* et in *speciali*: in *generali*, quando homo dolet generaliter de omni offensa Dei, quam fecit; in *speciali*, quando dolet de hac vel illa. — Dico ergo, quod de peccatis commissis per ignorantiam debet poenitere in *generali* et dicere cum Propheta[^7]: *Delicta iuventutis meae et ignorantias meas* etc.; in *speciali* vero non tenetur poenitere, sed tenetur facere quod in se est, ut sciat et ut peccata recognoscat. Committuntur enim peccata per ignorantiam *iuris*; et tunc, cognito iure, scit, se peccasse, ut puta qui fornicatus est ignorans, illud esse peccatum. Committuntur etiam per ignorantiam *facti*, diligentia debita non adhibita; et tunc cognoscuntur, Domino revelante; unde tenetur orare, ut Dominus parcat ei, vel revelet.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod peccatum commissum per ignorantiam est involuntarium; dicendum, quod non est omnino involuntarium, quia, etsi non perfecta fuerit cognitio, fuit tamen cognitio actus, quamvis non recognosceretur *circumstantia deformans*; et hoc melius patet in quaestione de ignorantia in secundo[^8].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non possumus poenitere de ignoratis; dicendum, quod verum est de *ignoratis omnino*, sed de *ignoratis in particulari et in universali scitis*[^9] contingit conteri in universali. Et quia quaedam ignorata in particulari per negligentiam sciuntur per diligentiam; ideo tenetur facere quod in se est, ut sciat; et si non occurrat, tunc sufficit poenitentia in generali, ut doleat et etiam aliqua mala sustineat et in multis se offendisse[^10] credat, quae ignorat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignoratum nullo iure scitur etc.; dicendum, quod ad poenitentiam sufficit cognitio *probabilis*; et probabile est cuilibet, qui fuit ignorans etiam in adulto, quod in multis offenderit. Et hoc insinuat lex divina, quae de illis docet poenitere et petere veniam; unde in Psalmo: *Delicta quis intelligit? ab occultis meis munda me.*

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorata non possunt confiteri: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod illa tenemur confiteri, pro quibus oportet poenitentiam facere in speciali; talia autem, nisi nobis innotescant vel per nostram diligentiam, vel per revelationem divinam, ad poenitentiam in speciali agendam non obligant; nihilominus tamen in ipsa confessione debet homo se totum ostendere et libenter poenam portare, etiam de his quae sunt ignoranter perpetrata.

english:
### Article II. *On the penance after baptism, which concerns mortal sins.*

Next, with regard to the second article, the inquiry concerns the second penance after baptism, namely that which concerns mortal sins. And concerning this two things are asked:

*First*, it is asked whether it is necessary to repent of mortal sins committed through ignorance.

*Second*, it is asked whether it is necessary to be contrite over sins knowingly committed and afterward forgotten.

### Question I. *Whether it is necessary to repent of sins committed through ignorance.*

Concerning the first it is shown that it is necessary to repent of sins committed through ignorance:

1. Because Ambrose says[^1]: «You sin most gravely if you are ignorant»; but, as it is explained, this is for no other reason than that such a person does not readily seek a physician: therefore medicine is necessary for such a one; and this is penance, and so on.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because Augustine in *On Correction and Grace*[^2] says that a man is not excused on account of ignorance from being bound to believe: therefore by parity of reasoning a man is not excused on account of ignorance from being bound to be contrite.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because a sin from ignorance is an actual sin committed by our own act: therefore it is not blotted out without an act of ours; but the act by which guilt is blotted out is penance: therefore, and so on.

4. Likewise, ignorance in the one who has sinned did not excuse from the sin[^3]: therefore it does not excuse from needing a remedy.

**On the contrary:**

1. Penance concerns only what is willed[^4]; but what is done through ignorance is involuntary: therefore over such a thing penance ought not to be done.

2. Likewise, we cannot love goods that are unknown[^5]: therefore neither can we hate nor detest evils that are unknown: therefore over these there is no penance.

3. Likewise, by no right are we certain whether we offend God through ignorance; but no one is bound to do anything from precept, except that for which he has certitude from some right: therefore no one is bound to repent of things committed through ignorance.

4. Likewise, we are bound to repent only of those things of which we are bound to confess; but we are bound to confess only those things which we can truthfully relate, and we can truthfully relate only those things which we know; because, if we assert doubtful or unknown things, it is a lie[^6]: therefore, since we do not know things committed through ignorance to be sins, we cannot truthfully confess them: therefore neither are we bound to repent of these in any way.

> **Conclusion.** Concerning sins committed through ignorance it is necessary to apply diligence, that they may be known, and to repent in general, but not in particular.

**I respond:** It must be said that to repent of something is twofold, namely in *general* and in *particular*: in *general*, when a man grieves generally over every offense against God which he has committed; in *particular*, when he grieves over this or that one. — I say therefore that over sins committed through ignorance he ought to repent in *general* and to say with the Prophet[^7]: *The sins of my youth and my ignorances* etc.; but in *particular* he is not bound to repent, but is bound to do what is in him, that he may know and may recognize the sins. For sins are committed through ignorance of *right* (law); and then, the right being known, he knows that he has sinned, as for instance one who has committed fornication being ignorant that it was a sin. Sins are also committed through ignorance of *fact*, due diligence not having been applied; and then they become known when the Lord reveals it; whence he is bound to pray that the Lord spare him, or reveal it.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that a sin committed through ignorance is involuntary; it must be said that it is not wholly involuntary, because, even if the knowledge was not perfect, there was nevertheless knowledge of the act, although the *deforming circumstance* was not recognized; and this is better shown in the question concerning ignorance in the second [book][^8].

2. To that which is objected, that we cannot repent of things unknown; it must be said that this is true of things *wholly unknown*, but of things *unknown in particular and known in universal*[^9] it is possible to be contrite in universal. And because certain things unknown in particular through negligence become known through diligence; therefore he is bound to do what is in him, that he may know; and if it does not come [to mind], then penance in general suffices, that he grieve and also endure some evils and believe that he has offended[^10] in many things which he does not know.

3. To that which is objected, that what is unknown is known by no right, etc.; it must be said that for penance a *probable* knowledge suffices; and it is probable to anyone, who was ignorant even as an adult, that he has offended in many things. And this the divine law intimates, which teaches to repent of these things and to seek pardon; whence in the Psalm: *Who understands his sins? from my hidden ones cleanse me.*

4. To that which is objected, that things unknown cannot be confessed: therefore, and so on; it must be said that we are bound to confess those things for which it is necessary to make penance in particular; but such things, unless they become known to us either through our diligence or through divine revelation, do not oblige to performing penance in particular; nevertheless, in the confession itself a man ought to show himself wholly and willingly to bear the penalty, even concerning those things which were ignorantly perpetrated.

la: In *Comment. super Rom.* [attributo olim Ambrosio] 2, 5. Sententiam ipsius (cfr. tom. II. pag. 526, nota 1.) Glossa apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum exhibet sic: *Gravissime peccas, quia ignoras, te contemnere* [bonitatem Dei]. — De expositione huius dicti cfr. Petr. Pictav., II. Sent. c. 15. Vide etiam S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.

en: In the *Commentary on Romans* [formerly attributed to Ambrose] 2, 5. The Gloss in Peter Lombard and Lyra presents his view thus: *You sin most gravely, because in being ignorant you despise the goodness of God.* — On the exposition of this saying cf. Peter of Poitiers, II Sent. c. 15. See also St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 43, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.

la: Cap. 7. n. 11. seq.: *Si enim, sicut Veritas loquitur, nemo liberatur a damnatione, quae facta est per Adam, nisi per fidem Iesu Christi, et tamen ab hac damnatione non se liberabunt qui poterunt dicere, non se audisse Evangelium Christi, cum fides ex auditu sit* [Rom. 10, 17.]; *quanto minus se liberabunt qui dicturi sunt: perseverantiam non accepimus?* etc. — Post *ratione* cod. X addit *a simili.*

en: Chap. 7, n. 11 ff.: *For if, as Truth declares, no one is freed from the damnation which was brought about through Adam except through faith in Jesus Christ, and yet those will not free themselves from this damnation who will be able to say that they have not heard the Gospel of Christ, since faith is from hearing* [Rom. 10:17]; *how much less will those free themselves who are going to say: We have not received perseverance?* etc. — After *ratione* codex X adds *a simili* (from a similar case).

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3. — In principio arg. post *Item* cod. X addit *alia*, post *actuale* cod. bb et.

en: Cf. above d. 14, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3. — At the beginning of the argument, after *Item* codex X adds *alia*, after *actuale* so too codex bb.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 14, 38: *Si quis autem ignorat, ignorabitur.* Cfr. supra pag. 86, nota 7, et II. Sent. d. 22. a. 2. q. 3, ubi etiam minor seq. arg. insinuatur.

en: Epistle I Cor. 14:38: *But if anyone is ignorant, he shall be ignored.* Cf. above p. 86, note 7, and II Sent. d. 22, a. 2, q. 3, where also the minor of the following argument is intimated.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 1.

en: See above a. 1, q. 1.

la: Ut proponit August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. seqq.

en: As Augustine sets forth, X *On the Trinity* c. 1, n. 1 ff.

la: Psalm. 24, 7. — *Delicta iuventutis meae et ignorantias meas ne memineris.* Cfr. Glossam apud Lyranum.

en: Psalm 24:7 (Vulg.). — *Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances.* Cf. the Gloss in Lyra.

la: Respicitur Iac. 3, 2: *In multis enim offendimus omnes.* — Vide II. Sent. d. 22. a. 1. q. 2. Pro *etiam in adulto* secunda manu cod. X substituit *etiam in adulta aetate.*

en: Reference is made to James 3:2: *For in many things we all offend.* — See II Sent. d. 22, a. 1, q. 2. For *etiam in adulto* (even in an adult), by a second hand codex X substitutes *etiam in adulta aetate* (even in adult age).

la: Cap. 7. n. 4. — De Glossa, quae est apud Lyranum interlineari, vide supra pag. 210, nota 10.

en: Chap. 7, n. 4. — On the Gloss, which is the interlinear one in Lyra, see above p. 210, note 10.

en: Reference is made to James 3:2: *For in many things we all offend.* ---

latin_scholion:
Principia adhibita ad solvendam utramque huius articuli quaestionem communi suffragio approbantur. Plures commentatores Lombardi eadem tradunt disputantes de contritione (infra d. 17.) et in quaestione, utrum peccatum sit actus voluntarius (II. Sent. d. 41, vel d. 24.). De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 13. m. 2. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. ad 2. 3; Suppl. q. 2. a. 3. ad 2. 3; cfr. S. I. II. q. 76. a. 1-4; III. q. 86. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 32. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. quaestiunc. 2. 3.

---

english_scholion:
The principles employed for solving both questions of this article are approved by common consent. Many commentators on Lombard hand down the same things when disputing concerning contrition (below, d. 17) and in the question whether sin is a voluntary act (II Sent. d. 41, or d. 24). On both questions: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV, q. 13, m. 2, a. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3, ad 2, 3; *Supplement* q. 2, a. 3, ad 2, 3; cf. *Summa* I-II, q. 76, a. 1-4; III, q. 86, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 32. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5, quaestiuncula 2, 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 46063–46176), with the vol4 PDF column-bands (pp. 406–407, pdf 426–427; offset pdf = printed + 20) authoritative for the cascade-shattered Articulus II opener, the TRACTATIO, the Respondeo/Solutio (Ad 1–4), the SCHOLION, and the page footers. Running head on p. 407 verified: "DIST. XVI. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. I". Two-column VOL II OVERRIDE method applied (column split x≈1880).

**Chunking.** The Articulus II opener (*Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum… Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur*) and its TRACTATIO (Primo/Secundo quaeritur) are folded into this q1 per the locked convention — no standalone divisio chunk. Opener alignment verified: q1 = "de peccatis commissis per ignorantiam"; q2 = "de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis" (raw 46177).

**Scholion ownership/coverage.** The single Articulus II scholion block (raw ~46167) falls inside this q1's range and is rendered here in full (body then scholion, per parser ordering). It is explicit that it covers **both questions** ("ad solvendam utramque huius articuli quaestionem… De utraque quaestione…"). Quaestio II renders no scholion of its own and points here.

**Page split.** p. 406 holds the tail of a1's last quaestio (not in this chunk), then the Art. II opener through fundamenta 1–4 / Contra 1–3; p. 407 holds Contra 4, Conclusio, Respondeo, Solutio (Ad 1–4), and the scholion. Footer apparatus split accordingly: notes 1–6 are the p. 406 footer sequence; notes 7–10 the p. 407 footer sequence.

**[?] flags.** No unresolved [?] flags. Two minor footer reconstructions ([^7] Ps. 24:7 wording; [^9] cross-reference to p. 210, note 10) were read from slightly soft p. 407 footer bands but the body readings they anchor are clean. The "Ad oppositum" / "Solutio oppositorum" / "Notandum" marginalia in the PDF are editorial running marginalia, not body text, and are trimmed per the OCR-cleanup rule.

**J2 apparatus-anchor fix (2026-07-13).** English body was missing `[^10]` (Latin: "in multis se offendisse[^10] credat"); inserted after "he has offended" in reply 2's English rendering to restore Tier-2 dual-body anchoring.

**Hand-off to q2.** Quaestio II (*Utrum necesse sit conteri de peccatis scienter commissis et postmodum oblitis*, raw 46177→) carries NO scholion of its own — its `## Notes` should point here. Its fundamenta begin on p. 407 R column (*Item, primae ad Corinthios quarto: Nihil conscius sum…*); the p. 407 footers from note 7 onward (the *Nihil mihi conscius sum* / Glossa cluster) belong to q2, not this chunk.