title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum verarum formarum inductio sit a spiritu maligno.

title_alt: Whether the inducing of true forms is from an evil spirit.

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum daemones veras rerum formas inducere possint.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum verarum formarum inductio possit esse a spiritu maligno. Et quod sic, videtur:

**Pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Primo auctoritate sacrae Scripturae. Exodi septimo[^1] dicitur: *Fecerunt autem malefici similiter*; sed constat, quod virga Moysi conversa fuit in verum draconem, alioquin non esset verum miraculum: si ergo malefici similiter fecerunt, et hoc non nisi virtute daemonum, ergo daemones veros serpentes de virgis possunt facere: ergo veras formas inducere.

2. Item, in Glossa[^2] habetur ibidem: « Daemones discurrunt per mundum et subito semina afferunt, sicque novas rerum species producunt ». Ex hoc patet, quod specierum sive formarum inductio sit a spiritu maligno.

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3. Item, maior est potestas daemonum quam hominum per artificium; sed homines, mediante arte alchimiae, diversorum metallorum species faciunt: ergo multo fortius hoc daemones possunt[^3].

4. Item, quod subiacet potentiae inferiori subiacet superiori; sed potentia daemonum per naturam superior est potentiis rerum naturalium, quia dicitur Iob quadragesimo primo[^4]: *Non est potestas super terram, quae ei possit comparari*: si ergo natura inferior veras et novas species potest inducere et inducit, ergo et potentia daemonum.

5. Item, formae secundum seminales rationes latent in materia, ut habetur in littera et praedeterminatum est supra[^5]; et ad hoc, quod fiant in actu, non indigent nisi extrinseco adiutorio: si ergo diabolus scit modum educendi et posse habet ad adiuvandum, ergo veras formas potest inducere.

6. Item, ordo universitatis est, ut superiora per naturam influant in inferiora, sicut patet, quod caelestia influunt in haec inferiora[^6]; sed spiritualia sunt multo superiora respectu corporalium quam corporalia respectu corporalium: ergo si corporale adeo potest influere in corporale, quod sua influentia et virtute et actione educit formam de potentia in actum, sicut patet tam in actione elementorum quam corporum caelestium, ergo multo fortius potest hoc spiritus sive bonus sive malus.

**Pro parte negativa:**

**Contra:** 1. Exodi septimo[^7]: *Absorbuit virga Moysi virgas magorum*; quod exponens Augustinus ait, et habetur in Glossa: « Moysi virga absorbuit virgas, non dracones. Absorbere enim potuit quod erant, non quod non erant »: ergo virgae, quae videbantur versae in dracones, erant virgae non versae in serpentes. Si ergo daemones tunc operati sunt ita excellenter ut potuerunt, videtur, quod species rerum non possint vere transmutare aut educere.

2. Item, secundae ad Thessalonicenses secundo[^8] dicitur, quod manifestatio antichristi erit in signis et prodigiis mendacibus secundum operationem satanae. Si ergo mendacia erunt prodigia et signa, ergo non vere faciet quod videbitur facere; sed tunc maxime operabitur diabolus secundum posse suum: ergo non potest veras formas inducere.

3. Item, super illud[^9]: *Immissiones per angelos malos*, Glossa Augustini: « Ea quae mirabiliter in creaturis fiunt, attribuere malis angelis non audemus »; sed subito de virgis facere veros serpentes est miraculum, quia contra solitum cursum naturae: ergo hoc non potest malus angelus.

4. Item, ratione videtur hoc ipsum sic. Omne quod dat alteri speciem et actum, est ens actu respectu eius quod dat — hoc probat Philosophus et dicit in septimo Primae Philosophiae[^10]: « Nihil enim dat quod non habet » — sed angelus malus nec genere nec specie convenit cum istis rebus corporalibus: ergo non potest eis formas et species dare.

5. Item, in productione sive in transmutatione rerum naturalium angelus operatur, aut ergo naturaliter, aut artificialiter. Si naturaliter; cum natura sit vis insita rebus, similia ex similibus procreans[^11], tunc faceret angelos. Si artificialiter; sed quod est ab operante artificialiter est artificiatura: ergo formae, quas inducit, sunt artificiales. Sed asinus artificialis non est asinus vere, sed aequivoce, et similiter manus et consimilia: ergo nunquam inducit veras formas.

6. Item, si inducit veras formas, ergo facit vera miracula: ergo miracula non attestantur divinae potentiae: ergo non sunt in robur fidei Christianae. — Si dicas, quod differunt ab istis; *quaestio incidens*: quaeritur, quomodo differant, et quomodo haec possint discerni.

### Conclusio.

> Daemones formas artificiales inducere possunt per virtutem propriam, naturales vero non per propriam virtutem, sed tantum per alienam.

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**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod quando quaeritur, utrum daemon possit inducere formas veras, aut transmutare de forma in formam; *Conclusio 1*: non est quaestio de forma artificiali — quia planum est, quod potest imagines et figuras facere, sicut homo — sed de formis naturalibus, utrum scilicet possit verum serpentem et veram ranam producere, et sic de aliis.

Ad hanc autem quaestionem respondendum est per *distinctionem*, quoniam, quod daemon formam inducat, dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quod virtute propria, aut quod virtute aliena. Si intelligatur, quod inducat virtute propria, sic absque dubio *Conclusio 3*: falsum est, et hoc dicit Augustinus[^12]; si intelligatur, quod virtute aliena, scilicet per virtutem rerum naturalium, quas coniungit ad invicem, sic potest. *Exemplum.* — Sicut est exemplum in agricola, qui segetes, mediante semine iacto et terra germinante et aqua irrigante, fructificare facit; et hoc est virtute aliena, virtute autem propria generat sibi similem. Et ratio huius est, quia forma naturalis non producitur nisi a Conditore naturae, vel a natura condita, operante per modum naturae, et ideo rem naturalem virtute sibi indita producit; sed operando in agricultura operatur ut artifex, et ideo naturam potest expedire et adiuvare, sed rem naturae non potest producere.

*Repetitio cum ratione*: Dicendum igitur, quod maligni spiritus possunt formas artificiales inducere per virtutem propriam; et formas naturales per virtutem alienam, per propriam autem non possunt. — Et ratio huius est, quia operantur per modum artis in hoc et non per modum naturae; unde sicut natura non producit formam artificialem, sic nec ars formam naturalem.

*Rationes ulteriores*: Si quaeratur ratio huius, dico, quod est limitatio potentiae agentis ad talem et talem effectum secundum dispositionem Dei et primariam ordinationem causarum. — Rursus, si quaeras rationem, quare Deus sic disposuit; dico, quod ordo sapientiae hoc requirit. *Triplex agens*: Cum enim sit triplex agens, scilicet Deus, natura et intelligentia[^13], ista sunt agentia ordinata, ita quod primum praesupponitur a secundo, et secundum praesupponitur a tertio. Deus enim operatur ex nihilo; natura vero non facit ex nihilo, sed ex ente in potentia; ars supponit operationem naturae et operatur supra completum; non enim facit lapides, sed domum de lapidibus. Unde sicut natura non potest anticipare operationem Dei, quae est de nihilo producere; sic nec ars operationem naturae.

*Quaestio incidens 2 solvitur*: Sed tunc quaeres, quare non est e converso, ut ars praecedat naturam? Et dicendum, quod operatio naturalis per naturam prius est in eodem quam operatio artis. Et praeterea, alia ratio est, quia agens per naturam producit sibi similem[^14] secundum veritatem, sed agens secundum artem similem solum secundum speciem vel ideam vel exemplar. Quia ergo in productione rei naturalis sive formae naturalis agens aliquid impartitur passo, et nihil impartitur aliquid nisi illud, respectu cuius est in actu secundum veritatem; ideo formas illas de potentia in actum educere non potest nisi quod agit per modum naturae. In artificialibus autem nihil impartitur agens passo, sed aufert vel mutat secundum locum, sicut patet in forma compositionis et figura incisionis. Et hinc est, quod agens per artem non potest virtute propria formas naturales producere, nisi ille solus, qui est actus plenus[^15] et perfectus respectu omnium, tam in cognoscendo quam in operando, scilicet solus Deus.

*Epilogus*: Dicamus igitur brevius, quod has formas, de quibus loquimur, daemones possunt vere transmutare, non tamen virtute sua, sed naturae. Unde tantum sunt ministri, non principales agentes, quia, si essent principales agentes, cum non producant per conveniens nomine et specie[^16] producerent sicut creator, et ita essent creatores; quod Augustinus negat expresse.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1. 2. 3.* Unde tres rationes primae verum concludunt, quoniam non probant, quod faciant virtute sua, sed virtute seminum adductorum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud vero quod ostenditur, quod virtute propria, quia potentia eius est excellentior; dicendum, quod illa propositio non habet veritatem nisi de virtute, quae per omnem modum est superior; vel si in aliis habet locum, oportet intelligi in his, ad quae utraque virtus habet similiter ordinari. Aliter patet[^17] esse falsum. Homo enim potentior est asino, non tamen potest generare asinum, sicut asinus facit, quia virtus eius non est ad hoc. Similiter intellige in proposito.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod formae sunt in materia seminaliter; dicendum, quod illa ratio seminalis valde remota est ab actu completo nec potest ad actum reduci, nisi multa adminiculantia habeat, ex quorum influentia, sibi et naturae suae conveniente, proficiat, quousque in actum perveniat. Talis non est influentia spiritus propter disconvenientiam in forma et natura; influere enim potest ad motum localem et regimen, non ad generationem.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritualia influant in corporalia, et superiora in inferiora; dicendum, quod influunt secundum proportionem unius ad alterum, et secundum quod competit naturae suscipientis. Aliter enim influit sol, aliter Angelus. Sol potest influere formalem[^18] proprietatem, communicando scilicet lucem et calorem; Angelus non sic potest influere in corporalia, sed solum localiter mutando, non ad formam, sed ad situm, cum non habeat convenientiam in forma et natura.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malefici nihil vere faciunt[^19], primo per glossae '*Moysi virga*' virgas magorum;

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dicendum, quod veritas est, quod glossae videntur sibi obviare ibidem; verumtamen hoc magis sonant, quod veros serpentes fecerunt; et denominant ibi serpentes a materia praeexistente, sicut serpentem Moysi vocant virgam, licet verus esset serpens; sic et de aliis intelligendum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod antichristus faciet signa mendacia; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur, non quia non faciet aliqua signa veracia secundum transmutationem formarum; sed non erunt veracia, habendo aspectum ad finem sive ad intentionem, quia ad hoc faciet, ut mendacium et falsum persuadeat.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de glossa Augustini, dicendum, quod Augustinus non negat, quin aliquid possit daemonibus attribui, sed quod non omnia sunt eis attribuenda, immo quaedam tribuuntur bonis Angelis.

*Ad 4. 5.* Ad duas sequentes rationes non oportet respondere; verum enim concludunt, scilicet quod Angelus propria virtute non potest formas naturales transmutare sive inducere vel educere de potentia in actum.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur[^20], qualitercumque educat, si vere educit, facit miracula: ergo miracula sunt signa fallibilia, ergo non sunt efficacia nostrae fidei testimonia; dicendum ad hoc, quod etsi sint vera opera, non tamen sunt vera miracula; quoniam miracula non sunt per vim naturae, sed per vim supra naturam, quae est agentis primi. Sunt enim supra facultatem naturae, et ideo attestantur omnipotentiae facientis[^21]. Sed opera, quae faciunt daemones, etsi miracula videantur, quia fiunt in tempore imperceptibili, non tamen sunt vera miracula, quia fiunt vi naturae. — Et si tu obiicias, quod natura non potest ita cito operari; dicendum, quod verum est de hac natura per se, sed taliter potest esse adiuta et confota[^22] rebus convenientibus, ut quasi repente prorumpat in effectum; sicut patet de generatione ranarum, quas de quibusdam foliis in modico tempore nasci contingit.

**Quaestio incidens — quomodo discernantur huiusmodi miracula.**

Si autem quaeras, quomodo discernantur huiusmodi miracula; dicendum, quod etsi conveniunt in materia, differunt tamen *quadrupliciter* — ex parte principalis agentis et ex parte ministri et ex parte finis et ex parte facti.

*Ex parte principalis agentis*; nam in miraculis divinis operatur agens potentiae infinitae et supra naturam; in miraculis daemonum operatur virtus naturae, multipliciter adiuta per alias naturas[^23]. — *Ex parte ministri*: nam Dei miracula fiunt per publicam iustitiam secundum veritatem, vel secundum apparentiam; sed miracula daemonum fiunt per privatos contractus et quaedam arcana. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus[^24]: quod « boni faciunt miracula per publicam iustitiam », hoc est per fidem veram, quae vere iustificat, quam veritas omnibus praedicat; « mali christiani per signa publicae iustitiae », quia fidem habent et videntur habere opera; sed « magi per privatos contractus », et hoc est quod dicitur in Exodo[^25] per incantationes et arcana quaedam. Huius signum est, quod ibi sunt tenebrarum opera, quia *qui male agit odit lucem*. — *Ex parte finis* similiter differunt, quia miracula Dei fiunt ad utilitatem et divinam gloriam[^26]; sed magorum ad deceptionem et ad gloriam vanam et excellentiam[^27]: unde sunt quasi inutilia. — *Differunt etiam ex parte facti*, quia daemones faciunt huiusmodi vilia et inutilia; miracula vero divina circa valde necessaria et utilia. Unde daemones maxime faciunt ranas et serpentes, quia haec de facili producuntur operatione naturae, et quia divino iudicio magis permittuntur ad prioris facti memoriam.

**Reiectio Boni.** Unde sic Deus temperat[^28] potentiam et astutiam diabolicam, ut sic patiatur eum perverse imitari, ut in ipsa imitatione possit seducere malos iuxta eorum merita mala; possit etiam deprehendi a bonis, et ut fides simul cum miraculis habeat locum. Si enim solus Deus et eius servi miracula facerent, quis non credidisset in Deum, miraculis compulsus? Nunc autem, cum magi[^29] faciunt et boni faciunt, qui divinitus illustrantur, ut inter haec possint discernere, per vera miracula adiuvantur et per daemonum miracula exercentur et probantur.

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### Scholion.

**I.** In hac quaestione attentione digna sunt quae dicuntur in corp. de differentia actionis in triplici agente, qui sunt Deus, natura, ars (cfr. hic dub. 3.); item, quae in solut. ad 5. pro parte affirm. occurrunt de ratione seminali, valde distante ab actu completo, et in fine de veris et falsis miraculis (cfr. infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3, d. 37. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; IV. Sent. d. 12. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. et a. 2. q. 3.). — In solut. ad 1. (pro parte negat.) tangitur quaestio de praestigiis magorum Pharaonis (Exod. 7. et 8.). Quidam dixerunt, serpentes et ranas a magis istis productos vel a daemonibus aliunde allatos et suppositos esse (ita Lyranus in Exod.), vel fuisse tantum phantasticas illusiones. Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 43. m. 1.) putat, magos ope naturae et daemonum ea animalia vere produxisse, cui sententiae suffragantur S. Thom., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Dionys. Carth., et favet etiam S. Bonav. De potentia daemonum respectu specierum intentionalium cfr. infra d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

**II.** In conclusionibus alii doctores satis conveniunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 2, q. 18. m. 2. a. 2. — Scot. apud Hier. a Montefortino, t. II. q. 16. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 65. a. 4; de Potent. q. 6. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103; de Malo, q. 16. a. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. seqq.; S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 30. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 1.2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether demons can induce the true forms of things.*

Secondly it is asked whether the inducing of true forms can be from an evil spirit. And that it can, it seems:

**On the affirmative side:**

1. First, by the authority of sacred Scripture. In Exodus 7[^1] it is said: *The magicians also did in like manner*; but it is established that Moses' rod was turned into a true dragon, otherwise it would not have been a true miracle: if therefore the magicians did in like manner, and this only by the power of demons, then demons can make true serpents from rods: therefore they can induce true forms.

2. Likewise, in the Gloss[^2] it is said on the same passage: « The demons run through the world and suddenly bring seeds, and thus produce new species of things ». From this it is clear that the inducing of species or forms is from an evil spirit.

3. Likewise, the power of demons is greater than that of men through art; but men, by means of the art of alchemy, make species of various metals: therefore much more strongly can demons do this[^3].

4. Likewise, what lies under an inferior power lies under a superior; but the natural power of demons is superior to the powers of natural things, since it is said in Job 41[^4]: *There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him*: if therefore an inferior nature can induce true and new species, and does so, then much more so can the power of demons.

5. Likewise, forms according to seminal reasons lie hidden in matter, as is held in the letter and has been predetermined above[^5]; and for them to come into act, they need nothing except extrinsic help: if therefore the devil knows the manner of bringing them out and has the power to help, then he can induce true forms.

6. Likewise, it is the order of the universe that superior things should naturally influence inferior things, as is plain in that celestial things influence things here below[^6]; but spiritual things are much more superior with respect to corporeal things than corporeal things are with respect to corporeal things: therefore if a corporeal thing can so influence a corporeal thing that by its influence and power and action it brings forth form from potency into act, as appears both in the action of the elements and of the celestial bodies, then much more strongly can a spirit, whether good or evil.

**On the negative side:**

**On the contrary:** 1. Exodus 7[^7]: *Moses' rod swallowed up the rods of the magicians*; expounding which, Augustine says, and it is held in the Gloss: « Moses' rod swallowed up the rods, not the dragons. For it could swallow what they were, not what they were not »: therefore the rods which seemed to have been turned into dragons were rods not turned into serpents. If therefore the demons then operated as excellently as they could, it seems that they cannot truly transmute or bring forth the species of things.

2. Likewise, in 2 Thessalonians 2[^8] it is said that the manifestation of Antichrist will be in signs and lying wonders according to the working of Satan. If therefore the wonders and signs shall be lying, then he shall not truly do what he shall seem to do; but then the devil shall work to the greatest extent according to his power: therefore he cannot induce true forms.

3. Likewise, on this[^9]: *Sendings through evil angels*, the Gloss of Augustine: « Those things which are done miraculously in creatures we do not dare to attribute to evil angels »; but to make true serpents from rods suddenly is a miracle, since it is against the usual course of nature: therefore an evil angel cannot do this.

4. Likewise, by reason it seems thus. Everything which gives species and act to another is a being in act with respect to what it gives — this the Philosopher proves and says in the seventh book of First Philosophy[^10]: « For nothing gives what it does not have » — but an evil angel agrees with these corporeal things neither in genus nor in species: therefore he cannot give them forms and species.

5. Likewise, in the production or transmutation of natural things an angel either operates naturally or artificially. If naturally — since nature is a force set in things, *bringing forth like from like*[^11] — then he would make angels. If artificially — but what comes from an agent operating artificially is artificial: therefore the forms which he induces are artificial. But an artificial ass is not truly an ass, but equivocally, and likewise a hand and such things: therefore he never induces true forms.

6. Likewise, if he induces true forms, then he makes true miracles: therefore miracles do not bear witness to the divine power: therefore they are not for the strengthening of the Christian faith. — If you say that they differ from these; *incidental question*: it is asked how they differ, and how these can be discerned.

### Conclusion.

> Demons can induce artificial forms by their own power, but natural forms not by their own power, but only by another's.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that when it is asked whether a demon can induce true forms, or transmute from form into form; *Conclusion 1*: the question is not about artificial form — since it is plain that he can make images and figures, as a man does — but about natural forms, namely whether he can produce a true serpent and a true frog, and so of other things.

To this question one must respond by a *distinction*: that a demon induce form can be understood in two ways: either by his own power, or by another's power. If it is understood that he induces by his own power, then *Conclusion 3*: this is without doubt false, and Augustine says this[^12]; if it is understood that by another's power, namely through the power of natural things which he joins together, then he can. *Example.* — As is the example in the farmer who, by means of seed cast and earth germinating and water irrigating, makes the crops bear fruit; and this is by another's power, but by his own power he generates one like himself. And the reason for this is that natural form is not produced except by the Author of nature, or by created nature operating in the manner of nature, and so by a power given to it produces a natural thing; but in working at agriculture he works as an artisan, and so can dispatch and help nature, but cannot produce the thing of nature.

*Repetition with reason*: It must therefore be said that evil spirits can induce artificial forms by their own power; and natural forms by another's power, but not by their own. — And the reason for this is that they operate in the manner of art in this and not in the manner of nature; whence just as nature does not produce artificial form, so neither does art produce natural form.

*Further reasons*: If the reason for this be sought, I say that it is the limitation of the power of the agent to such-and-such effects according to the disposition of God and the primary ordering of causes. — Again, if you ask the reason why God so disposed; I say that the order of wisdom requires this. *Threefold agent*: For since there is a threefold agent, namely God, nature, and intelligence (or art)[^13], these are ordered agents, so that the first is presupposed by the second, and the second by the third. For God works out of nothing; nature does not make out of nothing, but out of being in potency; art presupposes the operation of nature and works upon what is completed; for it does not make stones, but a house out of stones. Whence just as nature cannot anticipate the operation of God, which is to produce from nothing, so neither does art anticipate the operation of nature.

*Incidental question 2 resolved*: But then you will ask, why is it not the converse, that art should precede nature? And it must be said that the natural operation through nature is prior in the same thing to the operation of art. And further, another reason is that an agent acting through nature produces one like itself[^14] in truth, but an agent acting through art produces one like only in species or idea or exemplar. Since therefore in the production of a natural thing or natural form the agent imparts something to the patient, and nothing imparts anything except that with respect to which it is in act according to truth; therefore those forms cannot be brought forth from potency into act except by what acts in the manner of nature. In artificial things, however, the agent imparts nothing to the patient, but takes away or alters according to place, as appears in the form of composition and the figure of incision. And hence it is that an agent acting through art cannot by its own power produce natural forms — except him alone who is full[^15] and perfect act with respect to all things, both in knowing and in operating, namely God alone.

*Epilogue*: Let us therefore say more briefly that these forms of which we speak the demons can truly transmute, not however by their own power, but by nature's. Whence they are only ministers, not principal agents; for if they were principal agents, since they do not produce by what is fitting in name and species[^16], they would produce as the Creator, and thus would be creators — which Augustine expressly denies.

**To the arguments on the affirmative side:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* The first three reasons therefore conclude truly, since they do not prove that they do this by their own power, but by the power of the seeds brought in.

*Ad 4.* To that which is shown, that it is by their own power because their power is more excellent; it must be said that that proposition has no truth except concerning a power that is in every way superior; or, if it holds in other cases, it must be understood for things to which both powers stand in like ordering. Otherwise it is plainly[^17] false. For a man is more powerful than an ass, yet cannot generate an ass as an ass does, since his power is not directed to this. Understand likewise in the case at hand.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected, that forms are in matter seminally; it must be said that that seminal reason is very far removed from completed act, and cannot be reduced to act unless it has many supports, by whose influence — agreeing with itself and its nature — it makes progress, until it comes to act. Such is not the influence of a spirit, on account of the disagreement in form and nature; for it can influence to local motion and direction, not to generation.

*Ad 6.* To that which is objected, that spiritual things influence corporeal things, and superior things influence inferior things; it must be said that they influence according to the proportion of one to another, and according to what befits the nature of the recipient. For the sun influences in one way, the Angel in another. The sun can influence a formal[^18] property, namely by communicating light and heat; the Angel cannot so influence corporeal things, but only by moving them locally — not to form, but to place — since he has no agreement with them in form and nature.

**To the arguments on the negative side:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected, that the magicians truly make nothing[^19], first through the gloss '*Moses' rod*' [swallowed] the rods of the magicians; it must be said that the truth is that the glosses appear to be at odds with one another there; nevertheless they more strongly suggest that they made true serpents — and they name the serpents there from the preexisting matter, just as they call the serpent of Moses a rod, although it was a true serpent; and so it is to be understood of other cases.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that Antichrist will make lying signs; it must be said that this is to be understood not as if he will not make any true signs by the transmutation of forms, but they will not be true with respect to their end or intention, since he will do this in order to persuade lying and falsehood.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected concerning the gloss of Augustine, it must be said that Augustine does not deny that something may be attributed to demons, but rather that not all things are to be attributed to them — indeed, some are attributed to good Angels.

*Ad 4, 5.* To the two following reasons it is not necessary to respond; for they conclude truly, namely that an Angel cannot by his own power transmute or induce natural forms or bring them forth from potency into act.

*Ad 6.* To that which is last asked[^20], in whatever manner he brings forth, if he truly brings forth, he makes miracles: therefore miracles are fallible signs, therefore they are not effective testimonies of our faith; it must be said to this that, although they are true works, they are nevertheless not true miracles; for miracles are not through the force of nature, but through a force above nature, which is that of the first agent. For they are above the capacity of nature, and so bear witness to the omnipotence of the doer[^21]. But the works which the demons do, although they may seem miracles, since they are done in an imperceptible time, are nevertheless not true miracles, since they are done by the force of nature. — And if you object that nature cannot operate so quickly; it must be said that this is true of this nature taken by itself, but it can be so helped and *planted*[^22] by suitable things that it may, as it were, suddenly burst forth into effect — as appears in the generation of frogs, which it happens are born from certain leaves in a short time.

**Incidental question — how such miracles are to be discerned.**

But if you ask how such miracles are to be discerned, it must be said that, although they agree in matter, they differ *fourfold* — on the side of the principal agent, and on the side of the minister, and on the side of the end, and on the side of the deed.

*On the side of the principal agent*: for in divine miracles an agent of infinite power and above nature operates; in the miracles of demons the power of nature operates, in manifold ways helped by other natures[^23]. — *On the side of the minister*: for the miracles of God are done by public justice according to truth, or according to appearance; but the miracles of demons are done through private contracts and certain secret pacts. And this is what Augustine says[^24]: that « the good do miracles through public justice » — that is, through true faith, which truly justifies, which Truth preaches to all; « bad Christians, through the signs of public justice », because they have faith and seem to have works; but « magicians through private contracts » — and this is what is said in Exodus[^25], by incantations and certain secret arts. The sign of this is that there the works of darkness are present, since *he who does evil hates the light*. — *On the side of the end* they likewise differ, because the miracles of God are done for utility and for the divine glory[^26]; but those of magicians for deception and for vain glory and self-exaltation[^27]: whence they are as it were useless. — *They differ also on the side of the deed*, because the demons do such vile and useless things; but the divine miracles concern things very necessary and useful. Whence the demons most of all make frogs and serpents, since these are easily produced by the operation of nature, and since by divine judgment they are more permitted as a memorial of the prior deed.

**Rejection of [the merely-good explanation].** Whence God so tempers[^28] the diabolical power and cunning that He so suffers him perversely to imitate, that in this very imitation he can seduce the evil according to their evil merits; and may also be caught out by the good — and that faith together with miracles may have place. For if only God and His servants did miracles, who would not have believed in God, compelled by miracles? But as it is now, since magicians[^29] do them and the good also do them — who are divinely enlightened, so that they can discern between them — they are aided by true miracles, and tried and proved by the miracles of demons.

### Scholion.

**I.** In this question what is said in the body concerning the difference of action in the threefold agent — God, nature, art — is worthy of attention (cf. here Dub. 3.); likewise, what occurs in the solution *ad 5* on the affirmative side, concerning the seminal reason as very distant from completed act, and at the end concerning true and false miracles (cf. below d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3; d. 37. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; IV. Sent. d. 12. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3 and a. 2. q. 3.). — In the solution *ad 1* on the negative side, the question is touched on concerning the prodigies of Pharaoh's magicians (Exod. 7 and 8). Some have said that the serpents and frogs were produced by those magicians, or were brought from elsewhere and substituted by the demons (so Lyranus on Exodus), or were merely phantastic illusions. But Alex. of Hales (S. p. II. q. 43. m. 1.) holds that the magicians, by the help of nature and demons, truly produced those animals — a view supported by St. Thomas, B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Dionysius Carthusian — and St. Bonaventure also favors it. On the power of demons with respect to intentional species, cf. below d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

**II.** In their conclusions other doctors sufficiently agree: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 43. m. 2; q. 18. m. 2. a. 2. — Scotus, in Hier. of Montefortino, t. II. q. 16. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 65. a. 4; de Potent. q. 6. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103; de Malo, q. 16. a. 9, 10. — B. Albert, here a. 6. seqq.; S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 30. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 3. a. 1, 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

la: Vers. 22.

en: Verse 22.

la: Haec Glossa est apud Lyranum, in hunc locum, v. 11, et attribuitur Augustino. Cfr. August., II. Qq. in Exod. q. 21. et III. de Trin. c. 8. n. 13. seqq., ex quo Magister, hic c. 6. seqq., plura allegavit.

en: This Gloss is in Lyranus on this passage, v. 11, and is attributed to Augustine. Cf. Augustine, II *Qq. in Exod.* q. 21, and III *de Trin.* c. 8, n. 13ff., from which the Master here, c. 6ff., has cited several things.

la: Codd. T U *aa faciunt*.

en: Codices T and U read *aa faciunt* ['the latter do thus'].

la: Vers. 24.

en: Verse 24.

la: Quaest. praeced. In lit. Magistri, hic c. 8. — Cod. F *super Genesim ad litteram* [VI. c. 10. n. 17. et 14. n. 25. seqq.] pro *in littera*.

en: The preceding Question. In the letter of the Master, here c. 8. — Codex F reads *super Genesim ad litteram* [VI. c. 10, n. 17, and 14, n. 25ff.] for *in littera*.

la: Aristot., II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 36. seqq. (c. 10.).

en: Aristotle, II *De Gener. et corrupt.* text 36ff. (c. 10).

la: Vers. 12: *Sed devoravit virga Aaron virgas eorum*. — Glossa est August., II. Qq. in Exod. q. 21. Genitivus *Moysi* invenitur in codd., apud August. aliosque. — Vat. *Item* pro *Contra*.

en: Verse 12: *But Aaron's rod devoured their rods*. — The Gloss is from Augustine, II *Qq. in Exod.* q. 21. The genitive *Moysi* is found in the codices, in Augustine, and elsewhere. — The Vatican edition reads *Item* for *Contra*.

la: Vers. 9. — Paulo inferius cod. K *sed tunc in antichristo* pro *sed tunc maxime*.

en: Verse 9. — A little below, codex K reads *sed tunc in antichristo* ['but then in Antichrist'] for *sed tunc maxime* ['but then most of all'].

la: Psalm. 77, 4-9. — Glossa est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc Ps. n. 30: *Ea vero quae mirabiliter de creaturis facta sunt, malignis angelis tribuere non audemus.*

en: Psalm 77, 4–9. — The Gloss is from Augustine, *Enarrat.* on this Psalm, n. 30: *Those things, however, which have been done miraculously concerning creatures, we do not dare to attribute to evil angels.*

la: Text. 32. (VI. c. 9.): « Ceterum ex his proprium substantiae accipere est, quod necesse est, praeexistere semper aliam substantiam actu existentem, quae facit, ut puta animal, si animal fit ». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: « Et est proprium substantiae inter alia praedicamenta, ut ante generatum sit alia substantia agens ipsum, quod [alia ed. Venet. 1560 *quo*] est in actu ex specie illius, quod aget, ut animal, quod generat animal sibi simile ». Cfr. ibid. text. 22. (c. 7.) et supra pag. 15, nota 11. Ratio addita: *Nihil enim dat quod non habet* insinuatur II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 *quod datur* pro *secundo quod dat*.

en: Text 32 (VI. c. 9): « Moreover, it is proper to substance to take from these, that there must always pre-exist another substance actually existing, which makes — as for instance an animal, if an animal comes to be ». Which words Averroes thus expounds: « And it is proper to substance, among the other categories, that before what is generated there should be another substance acting upon it, which [Venice ed. 1560 *quo*] is in act from the species of that which it will produce — as the animal which generates an animal like itself ». Cf. ibid. text 22 (c. 7) and above p. 15, note 11. The added principle: *For nothing gives what it does not have* is hinted at in II *Elench.* c. 3 (c. 22). — A little above, codex cc and edition 1 read *quod datur* for *secundo quod dat*.

la: De hac naturae definitione cfr. tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10.

en: On this definition of nature, cf. tom. I, p. 134, note 10.

la: Libr. II. Qq. in Exod. q. 21. et III. de Trin. c. 8. n. 13. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. seq.

en: Book II *Qq. in Exod.* q. 21, and III *de Trin.* c. 8, n. 13ff. Cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 8 seq.

la: Cod. Y *ars*. — Differentiam naturae et artis vide in Aristot., II. Phys. text. 11. seqq. (c. 1.); VII. Metaph. text. 22. seqq. (VI. c. 7.); VI. Ethic. c. 4; et August., 83 Qq. q. 78.

en: Codex Y reads *ars* ['art']. — On the difference between nature and art see Aristotle, II *Phys.* text 11ff. (c. 1); VII *Metaph.* text 22ff. (VI. c. 7); VI *Eth.* c. 4; and Augustine, 83 *Qq.* q. 78.

la: Supple: *formam*, vel potius sume *agens* in genere masculino. — Vat. hic et paulo inferius *simile*.

en: Supply *formam* ['form'], or rather take *agens* ['agent'] in the masculine gender. — The Vatican edition here and a little below reads *simile* ['like'].

la: Cod. aa *purus*. Dein cod. bb *fons* pro *perfectus*.

en: Codex aa reads *purus* ['pure']. Then codex bb reads *fons* ['source'] for *perfectus* ['perfect'].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 11. — De Augustini sententia vide loca paulo superius citata.

en: Cf. above p. 15, note 11. — On Augustine's view, see the places cited a little above.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut bb cc et edd. 1, 2 *potest*. Aliquanto superius Vat. cum nonnullis mss. *obiicitur* pro *ostenditur*.

en: Some codices, such as bb and cc, and editions 1 and 2, read *potest* ['it can']. Somewhat above, the Vatican edition with several manuscripts reads *obiicitur* ['it is objected'] for *ostenditur* ['it is shown'].

la: Plures codd. *corporalem*; Vat. *corporalem vel formalem*.

en: Several codices read *corporalem* ['corporeal']; the Vatican edition reads *corporalem vel formalem* ['corporeal or formal'].

la: Cod. aa *probando*.

en: Codex aa reads *probando* ['testing'].

la: Vat. *obiicitur*, et deinde omittit *qualitercumque educat*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *obiicitur* ['it is objected'], and then omits *qualitercumque educat* ['in whatever manner he brings forth'].

la: Cfr. August., XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3. seqq. et de Utilitate credendi, c. 16. n. 34.

en: Cf. Augustine, XXVI *contra Faustum*, c. 3ff., and *de Utilitate credendi*, c. 16, n. 34.

la: Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *consita*; Vat. *confortata vel consita*. Paulo inferius cod. aa *in generatione* pro *de generatione*.

en: Several codices with editions 1, 2, 3 read *consita* ['planted']; the Vatican edition reads *confortata vel consita* ['strengthened or planted']. A little below, codex aa reads *in generatione* ['in generation'] for *de generatione* ['concerning generation'].

la: Cfr. August., III. de Trin. c. 1. n. 4. seqq.; Hilarius et Chrysost. in Ps. 135, 4; Anselm., de Concept. Virg. c. 11.

en: Cf. Augustine, III *de Trin.* c. 1, n. 4ff.; Hilary and Chrysostom on Psalm 135, 4; Anselm, *de Concept. Virg.* c. 11.

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 79. n. 4, ubi etiam ea quae sequuntur, insinuantur, de quibus cfr. etiam XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 10.

en: Book *83 Qq.* q. 79, n. 4, where also the things which follow are intimated; on which cf. also XXII *de Civ. Dei*, c. 10.

la: Cap. 7, 11. Sequens textus est Ioan. 3, 20.

en: Chapter 7, 11. The text that follows is John 3, 20.

la: De hoc duplici fine miraculorum cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 41. m. 6. a. 1.

en: On this twofold end of miracles, cf. Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 41. m. 6. a. 1.

la: Non pauci codd. *extollentiam*. Aliquanto inferius post *miracula vero divina* Vat. cum nonnullis codd. omittit *circa*; plurimi codd., incongrue verbis transpositis, scribunt *valde circa necessaria*; nostra lectio habetur in cod. bb.

en: Not a few codices read *extollentiam* ['self-elevation']. Somewhat below, after *miracula vero divina*, the Vatican edition with several codices omits *circa*; very many codices, with the words incongruously transposed, write *valde circa necessaria*; our reading is found in codex bb.

la: Haec ratio assignatur in libro III. Recognit. Clement. (Itinerarii) n. 59. seq. et in libro *Opus imperf. in Matth.* hom. 19. et 49. (inter Opera S. Ioan. Chrysostomi).

en: This reasoning is assigned in book III of the *Recognitions of Clement* (Itinerary), n. 59 seq., and in the book *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum*, hom. 19 and 49 (among the works of St. John Chrysostom).

la: Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *mali*.

en: The Vatican edition, with some codices, reads *mali* ['the evil']. ---

translators_notes:
**Boundaries (verified s45 + this session):**
- **Incoming a2-q1 → a2-q2 split at p.200**: Q2 opens at the **bottom of p.200** (below a2-q1's SCHOLION III tail) with title + Prologus + videtur 1–2 spanning the bottom of both columns. p.200's footer has **2 entries** (¹² → [^1][^2]) anchoring this chunk's videtur 1 *septimo* (Exod. 7, 22) and videtur 2 *Glossa*. The committed `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a2-q1` closes at p.199 R-col [^22] *existentem*; its SCHOLION I–III tail spans p.199 R-col-2 + the TOP of p.200, carrying no numbered apparatus; **`d7-p2-a2-q1` not modified.** (Corrects s44's resume note which said Q2 "opens fresh top of p.201" — verified eyes-on on `/tmp/p200-bot.png` during the s45 revert.)
- **Outgoing a2-q2 → a2-q3 split at p.204**: Q2 closes mid-L-col of p.204 (end of SCHOLION II, after the doctor list). QUAESTIO III (*Utrum quis magicis artibus uti possit absque peccato*) opens immediately after. **All of p.204's footer is `d7-p2-a2-q3`'s** (L-col ¹²³⁴ = q3 videtur 1–3 anchors; R-col ⁵⁶⁷ = q3 Solutio anchors). The `d7-p2-a2-q3` build must take all p.204 footer, no backfill into a2-q2.

**Apparatus per-page totals (29 entries):**
- p.200 footer = 2 → [^1][^2]
- p.201 footer = 9 (L-col ¹–⁷ + R-col ⁸–⁹) → [^3]–[^11]
- p.202 footer = 8 (L-col ¹²³ + R-col ⁴⁵⁶⁷⁸) → [^12]–[^19]
- p.203 footer = 10 (L-col ¹–⁶ + R-col ⁷–¹⁰) → [^20]–[^29]
- p.204 footer = 0 q2 entries (all q3's, per above)

**Body marker corrections from s45 (which was reverted for these exact errors):**
- Contra 4 *Primae Philosophiae* → [^10] (Text. 32 + Averroes long quote), NOT the s45-wrong note.
- Contra 5 *procreans* → [^11] (De hac naturae definitione cfr. tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10).
- Top of p.202 body *Augustinus* → [^12] (Libr. II. Qq. in Exod. q. 21. + III. de Trin. c. 8).
- *intelligentia* → [^13] (Cod. Y *ars* + Arist./Aug. nature-vs-art).
- Then [^14]–[^19] proceed for p.202 ³–⁸ in body order: *producit sibi similem* (³ → [^14]), *actus plenus* (⁴ → [^15]), *nomine et specie* (⁵ → [^16]), *Aliter patet* (⁶ → [^17]), *formalem* (⁷ → [^18]), *nihil vere faciunt* (⁸ → [^19]).

**SCHOLION = I + II only** (no III). Confirmed against p.204 L-col content.

**[?] flags (1):**
- **[^28] body anchor placement**: per the s45 verified findings, p.203 note ⁹ (*Haec ratio assignatur in libro III. Recognit. Clement. …*) anchors at the OPENING of the *Reiectio Boni* paragraph (probably *Unde sic Deus temperat⁹* — placed here — or *compulsus?⁹*), since note ⁹ precedes ¹⁰ numerically and so its body anchor must precede *magi* (which is ¹⁰ = [^29]). Placed at *Unde sic Deus temperat*; if the d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker reveals the marker is actually at *miraculis compulsus?*, move accordingly.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 204 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum quis magicis artibus uti possit absque peccato.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit uti ministerio daemonum in faciendis huiusmodi miraculis absque peccato. Et quod non, videtur:

**Pro parte negativa — Fundamenta:**

1. Non potest a daemonibus requiri consilium absque peccato: ergo nec recipi ministerium sive consilium. Prima probatur auctoritate et exemplo: auctoritate, quia Levitici vigesimo[^1] praecipitur occidi qui sciscitatur magos et ariolos; exemplo probatur ex quarti Regum primo, ubi reprehenditur et punitur rex Israel, qui misit ad consulendum deum Accaron.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Doctrina christiana*[^2] dicit, *divinationes esse damnandas et fugiendas, quia ibi intercedunt pacta daemonum*: si ergo plus est facere quam dicere, et primum non est sine pactionibus damnabilibus, ergo nec secundum.

3. Item, diabolus est dolosus, et constat nobis, quod nullum diligit nisi in malum suum, et ut ipsum pervertat: ergo qui suscipit ab eo obsequium committit se discrimini; et omnis talis peccat mortaliter: ergo etc.

4. Item, diabolus est inimicus Iesu Christi et Dei: ergo qui suscipit ab eo auxilium vel facit commercium, cum nulla sit *conventio Christi ad Belial*[^3], efficitur Christi inimicus. Sed hoc non potest esse sine peccato: ergo etc.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. **Contra** hoc videtur auctoritate. Apostolus tradebat incorrigibiles satanae in interitum carnis, sicut patet primae ad Corinthios quinto[^4]: ergo utebatur ministerio daemonum ad adimplendam iustitiam: ergo pari ratione potest homo, quando indiget, uti ad alia obsequia.

2. Item, si indigeo eleemosyna[^5], non tantum a bono, sed etiam a peccatore et impio possum accipere et petere: ergo si indigeo pane et vino, possum hoc petere a daemonio, ut procuret, si non adest homo, qui statim tribuat.

3. Item, a malo servo potest quis exigere servitium et recipere: ergo si aliquis Sanctus diabolum superavit, potest ei licite imperare et eius obsequium in creaturis transmutandis accipere.

4. Item, esto quod huiusmodi artes solis characteribus exerceantur sine immolationibus et aliis commerciis, videtur, quod ibi nullum sit peccatum, quia ibi characteres aut habent aliquam virtutem compellendi daemones, aut nullam. Si nullam: ergo daemones nihil faciunt. Si aliquam; sed omnis virtus est a Deo, et uti aliquo ad id ad quod est, non est peccatum: ergo videtur, quod miracula ista daemonum possunt exerceri absque peccato.

5. Item, si aliquis suscipiat obsequium daemonis in his quae expediunt sibi, sive in miraculis sive in aliis, bene sciens, quantum potest; in quo peccat? Videtur, quod in nullo: quia in fide non peccat, quia nihil credit divinitatis esse in diabolo; in moribus non peccat: ergo nullo modo, ut videtur.

6. Item, si ego amisissem librum meum, non esset peccatum, si requirerem a quocumque qui sciret, ubi esset: ergo si aliquis amisit cappam, et ego scio bene, quod diabolus potest nosse; videtur, quod illud saltem sine peccato posset fieri.

*Quaestio connexa*: Quaeritur ergo, utrum huiusmodi artes vel divinationes possint esse absque peccato.

### Conclusio.

> Daemonum consilium vel auxilium non potest requiri absque peccato.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod huiusmodi artes magicae sive divinationes non possunt esse absque peccato: nec potest a diabolo requiri consilium vel etiam auxilium sive ministerium absque peccato, nisi fortassis in hoc casu, ubi Deus diabolum subiiceret homini iusto suo iudicio, et sicut de aliquibus viris sanctis audivi narrari; voluntario autem commercio non potest uti[^6] sine peccato. *Triplex peccatum*: Aut enim est ibi peccatum infidelitatis, utpote si daemonio credendo attribuat divinum aliquid; aut est ibi peccatum idololatriae, utpote in oblationibus et sacrificiis; aut inobedientiae saltem, quia facit contra prohibitionem divinam et Ecclesiae[^7].

<!-- page 205 -->

*Ratio*: Ratio autem huius prohibitionis est, quia talis peccat in se ipsum, dum se committit discrimini; peccat in Ecclesiam, dum habet commercium cum illo, qui est omnino praecisus et Ecclesiae adversarius; peccat etiam in maiestatem divinam, dum recurrit ad diabolum, quasi non sit omnipotens et omnino sufficiens et benignus Deus christianorum. Et ideo prohibitum est et sine peccato fieri non potest. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Paulus utebatur ministerio diabolico in puniendo malos; dici potest, quod hoc non erat diabolico commercio, sed magis divino iudicio, et ipsius Apostoli imperio, cui subiiciebantur spiritus maligni, non confoederabantur, sicut[^8] magis et divinis. — *Aliter*: Vel dicendum, quod illud *tradere* non erat aliud quam exponere vexationi daemonum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de eleemosyna, quam possum accipere ab impio; dicendum, quod non est simile *duplici ex causa*. Primum quidem, quia etsi membrum non sit actualiter unitum, non tamen est membrum omnino praecisum, sicut daemonium, et possunt recipi et impendi ex caritate pietatis officia; non sic est de diabolo et angelis eius, quorum certa est damnatio. — Amplius, eleemosyna, quam habet impius, tempore necessitatis est viri iusti: ergo vir iustus, cum exigit eam et recipit, quod suum est accipit; et ideo iuste facit. Non sic est de ministerio diaboli in faciendis miraculis: *Deus quadrupliciter subvenit* — nunquam enim diabolicis miraculis vel praesidiis indigemus, quia aut Dominus subvenit per se, aut per Angelum suum, aut per proximum nostrum, aut tribuit patientiae meritum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus est servus; dicendum, quod eius servitium et ministerium non est ad hoc deputatum a Deo, nisi fiat speciali privilegio, sed potius deputatus est ad tentandum et exercendum; et sic servit, licet intendat expugnare, quia de malo suo Deus facit bonum nostrum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, quod peccatum sit in characteribus; dicendum, quod magnum peccatum est, quia ad hoc fiunt, scilicet ad ministerium daemonum implorandum, quod non licet, et ideo malo fine fit. — Quod autem quaeritur: aut habent virtutem, aut non; dicendum, quod ex se non habent virtutem, sed solum ex diabolica pactione; *Notandum*: sic enim pepigit diabolus cum illis qui fuerunt ei familiariores, quod talia signa recognosceret et ad talia se praesentem offerret. Ostendit autem, per illa se cogi, ut ostendat, aliquid veritatis esse in huiusmodi artibus, in quibus sunt multa nefanda, per quae abducitur homo et a fide et a cultu Dei. Unde nullo modo credendum est, quod tales characteres aliquid possint, maxime super spiritus, nisi ex pactione eorum; et ideo omnia talia carmina vana sunt et perniciosa, nec facit diabolus, quia in illis delectetur, sed in infidelitate facientium.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod quaeritur: in quo est peccatum? dicendum, quod si aliquis hoc faciat, non credens, eos habere posse[^9], nec offerens quidquam, peccat peccato inobedientiae et peccato morum, quia ex hac ipsa invocatione daemonum facit contumeliam Deo suo et coetui christiano; et dum iungit se schismatico et mendaci, se periculo committit. *Notandum*: Sed vix aut nunquam ex hoc solo diabolo satisfacit, nisi aliqua infidelitas vel idololatria immisceatur. Sicut enim ad divina miracula plurimum facit fides recta, sicut sonant Evangelia[^10]; sic ad daemonum miracula multum facit fides perversa, quoniam diabolus perversus imitator est Dei.

*Ad 6.* *Ad quaestionem connexam*: Ad illud quod quaeritur[^11], quod sit peccatum quaerere de perditis; dicendum, quod peccatum est, quia contra prohibitionem; et prohibitum est praedictis de causis. Potissima tamen causa est, quia ipse mendax est et pater eius[^12], et frequentissime veris immiscet falsa. Et ideo periculum magnum est credere sibi, quia posset hominem de facili inducere in errorem et dicere, quod ille habet rem, qui non habet, si videret, per hoc posse oriri mala; et quia etiam ad se tallicit per huiusmodi revelationes, ad suam societatem, quae perniciosa est valde, et quam desiderat diabolus, ut decipiat. Et ideo, ut homines minus caveant, in suis divinationibus quaedam honesta praetendit, utpote quia puero virgini suas divinationes ostendit, cum tamen in occultis ad turpissima incitet. Et ideo dicit Augustinus secundo *super Genesim ad litteram* in fine[^13]: « Bono christiano sive mathematici, sive quilibet impie divinantes, maxime vera dicentes, cavendi sunt, ne consortio daemoniorum animam deceptam pacto quodam societatis irretiant ». Et sic patet totum.

### Scholion.

Solutio quaestionis approbatur communiter a doctoribus. Cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 96. a. 2, q. 98. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether one may use magical arts without sin.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one may use the ministry of demons in making such miracles without sin. And that one may not, it seems:

**On the negative side — Fundamenta:**

1. Counsel cannot be sought from demons without sin: therefore neither can their ministry or counsel be received. The first is proved by authority and example: by authority, since in Leviticus 20[^1] it is commanded that he be killed who consults magicians and soothsayers; by example, from 4 Kings 1, where the king of Israel is rebuked and punished who sent to consult the god of Accaron.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *De Doctrina christiana*[^2] says that *divinations are to be condemned and shunned, because in them pacts of demons intervene*: if therefore to do is more than to say, and the first is not without damnable pacts, then neither is the second.

3. Likewise, the devil is deceitful, and it is well known to us that he loves no one except for his harm, and to pervert him: therefore one who receives service from him commits himself to peril; and every such person sins mortally: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the devil is the enemy of Jesus Christ and of God: therefore one who receives help from him or makes commerce with him, since there is no *agreement of Christ with Belial*[^3], is made an enemy of Christ. But this cannot be without sin: therefore etc.

**To the opposite:**

1. **Contra** this it seems by authority. The Apostle handed over the incorrigible to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, as appears in 1 Corinthians 5[^4]: therefore he was using the ministry of demons to fulfill justice: therefore by parity of reason a man, when he is in need, may use it for other services.

2. Likewise, if I need alms[^5], I can receive and ask not only from a good man but also from a sinner and an impious one: therefore if I need bread and wine, I may ask this from a demon, that he may procure it, if there be no man at hand who may give it at once.

3. Likewise, one may demand service from a wicked servant and receive it: therefore if some saint has overcome the devil, he may lawfully command him and accept his service in the transmuting of creatures.

4. Likewise, granted that such arts are performed by characters alone, without immolations and other dealings, it seems that there is no sin there, since the characters either have some power to compel demons, or none. If none: then the demons do nothing. If some — but every power is from God, and to use something for that for which it exists is not a sin: therefore it seems that those miracles of demons may be performed without sin.

5. Likewise, if someone receives the service of a demon in things which are useful to himself, whether in miracles or in other matters, well knowing how much he can do; in what does he sin? It seems, in nothing: because he does not sin in faith, since he believes nothing of divinity to be in the devil; in morals he does not sin: therefore in no way, as it seems.

6. Likewise, if I had lost my book, it would be no sin if I were to ask of anyone who might know where it was: therefore if someone lost a cloak, and I well know that the devil can know it, it seems that this at least could be done without sin.

*Connected question*: It is therefore asked whether such arts or divinations can exist without sin.

### Conclusion.

> The counsel or help of demons cannot be sought without sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that such magical arts or divinations cannot be without sin: nor can counsel, or even help or ministry, be sought from the devil without sin, except perhaps in this case where God might subject the devil to a just man by his own judgment — as I have heard told of certain holy men; but by *voluntary* commerce one cannot use[^6] him without sin. *Threefold sin*: For either there is the sin of infidelity there — namely, if by believing the demon one ascribes something divine to him; or there is the sin of idolatry — namely, in offerings and sacrifices; or at least of disobedience, since one acts against the prohibition of God and of the Church[^7].

*Reason*: Now the reason for this prohibition is that such a one sins against himself, while committing himself to peril; he sins against the Church, while having commerce with one who is altogether cut off and the adversary of the Church; he sins also against the divine majesty, while having recourse to the devil as though God, the God of Christians, were not omnipotent and altogether sufficient and gracious. And so it is forbidden, and cannot be done without sin. Whence the reasons brought forward for this must be granted.

**To the arguments in opposition:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected, that Paul used a diabolical ministry in punishing the wicked; it can be said that this was not by diabolical commerce but rather by divine judgment and by the command of the Apostle himself, to whom the evil spirits were subjected — they were not confederated with him[^8] as with magicians and diviners. — *Alternatively*: Or it may be said that the *handing over* was nothing else than exposing them to the vexation of demons.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected about alms, which I can receive from an impious man; it must be said that the case is not similar, *for a twofold reason*. First, because although the member is not actually united, it is nevertheless not a member altogether cut off, as a demon is, and the offices of charity and pietas can be received and bestowed; it is not so with the devil and his angels, whose damnation is certain. — Furthermore, the alms which an impious man holds in time of necessity belongs to the just man: therefore the just man, when he demands it and receives it, takes what is his own; and so does justly. It is not so with the ministry of the devil in performing miracles: *God comes to our aid in four ways* — for we never need diabolical miracles or aids, since either the Lord comes to our aid through Himself, or through His Angel, or through our neighbor, or He grants the merit of patience.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the devil is a servant; it must be said that his service and ministry is not deputed by God for this, unless it be done by a special privilege; but rather he is deputed to tempt and to exercise; and so he serves, though he intends to overcome — because of his evil God makes our good.

*Ad 4.* To what is asked, that the sin lies in the characters; it must be said that it is a great sin, because they are made for this — namely, for imploring the ministry of demons — which is not lawful, and so is done for an evil end. — But as to what is asked: either they have power, or they do not; it must be said that of themselves they have no power, but only from a diabolical pact. *Note*: For thus the devil pacted with those who were more familiar to him, that he would recognize such signs and would present himself when they were used. He shows, however, that he is compelled by them — to show that there is some truth in such arts, in which there are many nefarious things, by which a man is led away both from faith and from the worship of God. Whence in no way is it to be believed that such characters can do anything, especially over spirits, except by their pact; and so all such charms are vain and pernicious; nor does the devil do this because he delights in them, but in the infidelity of the doers.

*Ad 5.* To what is asked: in what is the sin? it must be said that, if anyone does this — not believing them to have the power[^9], nor offering anything — he sins by the sin of disobedience and by the sin of morals, because by this very invocation of demons he does insult to his God and to the Christian community; and while he joins himself to a schismatic and liar, he commits himself to peril. *Note*: But scarcely or never does he by this alone satisfy the devil, unless some infidelity or idolatry be mixed in. For just as upright faith does much for divine miracles — as the Gospels declare[^10] — so does perverse faith do much for the miracles of demons, since the devil is the perverse imitator of God.

*Ad 6.* *To the connected question*: To what is asked[^11], that it be a sin to inquire about lost things; it must be said that it is a sin, because contrary to a prohibition; and it is prohibited for the aforesaid reasons. The strongest reason, however, is that he himself is a liar and the father thereof[^12], and most frequently mixes false things with true. And so it is a great danger to believe him, because he could easily lead a man into error — saying that this one has the thing who does not have it (if he were to see, evils might arise from this); and because also he draws men to himself by such revelations, to his own fellowship, which is exceedingly pernicious, and which the devil desires, that he may deceive. And so, that men may be less on their guard, he puts forward in his divinations certain honorable things — as that he shows his divinations to a virgin boy, while nevertheless in hidden things he incites to the most shameful. And therefore Augustine says in book II *Super Genesim ad litteram* at the end[^13]: « To a good Christian, mathematicians, or any who divine impiously — most of all when they speak true things — are to be shunned, lest by the fellowship of demons they ensnare the deceived soul in a certain pact of society ». And so the whole is plain.

### Scholion.

The solution of the question is commonly approved by the doctors. Cf. St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 2; *S.* II. II. q. 96. a. 2, q. 98. a. 4; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 103ff. — B. Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 3. a. 3. — Dionysius Carthusian, here q. 6.

---

la: Vers. 6. — Sequens textus est loc. cit. v. 2. seqq.

en: Verse 6. — The text that follows is from the cited place, v. 2ff.

la: Libr. II. c. 23. n. 36. — Deinde primum intellige *divinationes*, secundum *artes magicas*. — Vat. *docere* pro *dicere*.

en: Book II, c. 23, n. 36. — Then understand the first as *divinations*, the second as *magical arts*. — The Vatican edition reads *docere* ['to teach'] for *dicere* ['to say'].

la: Epist. II. ad Cor. 6, 15: *Quae autem conventio Christi ad Belial?*

en: 2 Corinthians 6, 15: *And what agreement hath Christ with Belial?*

la: Vers. 5. — Vat. cum pluribus codd. *auctoritate Apostoli, qui* pro *auctoritate. Apostolus*. Circa finem argumenti cod. cc et ed. 1 post *uti* subiungunt *eo*.

en: Verse 5. — The Vatican edition with several codices reads *auctoritate Apostoli, qui* ['by the authority of the Apostle, who'] for *auctoritate. Apostolus* ['by authority. The Apostle']. Toward the end of the argument, codex cc and edition 1 add *eo* ['it'] after *uti*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 hic et infra in solutione obiectionis *eleemosynam*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 here and below in the solution of the objection read *eleemosynam* [accusative].

la: Ex cod. aa supplevimus *uti*. Idem cod. paulo inferius *epula*. — Post *attribuat* interserit *ei*, cod. cc cum ed. 1 legit *attribuat diabolo dominium in aliquod*; aut etc.

en: From codex aa we have supplied *uti* ['to use']. The same codex a little below reads *epula* ['feast']. — After *attribuat* it inserts *ei*; codex cc with edition 1 reads *attribuat diabolo dominium in aliquod* ['ascribe to the devil dominion over something']; or etc.

la: Cfr. Corp. Iur. Can. 14. XXVI. q. 5. et August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 19.

en: Cf. *Corpus Iuris Canonici* 14, XXVI. q. 5, and Augustine, VIII *de Civ. Dei*, c. 19.

la: Supple: *confoederantur*.

en: Supply: *confoederantur* ['they are confederated'].

la: Accipiendum esse videtur ut substantivum. Aliter supplendum esset: *quidquam divinitatis*.

en: It seems to be taken as a substantive. Otherwise it would have to be supplied: *quidquam divinitatis* ['anything of divinity'].

la: Matth. 8, 13; Marc. 5, 34; Luc. 18, 42. — Paulo superius cod. aa *satisfit* pro *satisfacit*, et plures codd. *diabolus* pro *diabolo*.

en: Matthew 8, 13; Mark 5, 34; Luke 18, 42. — A little above, codex aa reads *satisfit* ['it is satisfied'] for *satisfacit* ['he satisfies'], and several codices read *diabolus* [nominative] for *diabolo* [dative].

la: Vat. *obiicitur quod non sit etc.* Dein multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *de praesentibus* pro *de perditis*, perperam. Post *prohibitionem*, cod. F addit *Ecclesiae*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *obiicitur quod non sit etc.* ['it is objected that it not be etc.']. Then many codices with editions 1, 2 read *de praesentibus* ['concerning present things'] for *de perditis* ['concerning lost things'], wrongly. After *prohibitionem*, codex F adds *Ecclesiae* ['of the Church'].

la: Ioan. 8, 44. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. *et videret ipso si videret*, quae dein cum cod. aa post *revelationes* addit *et*.

en: John 8, 44. — Somewhat below, the Vatican edition reads *et videret ipso si videret* ['and he would see by him if he saw'], which then, with codex aa, adds *et* ['and'] after *revelationes*.

translators_notes:
**Boundaries (verified s47 + s46 documented):**
- **Incoming a2-q2 → a2-q3 split at p.204**: Q3 opens at mid-L-col of p.204 immediately after the SCHOLION II doctor list of `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a2-q2`. Per the s46 documented split, **`d7-p2-a2-q3` takes ALL of p.204's footer** (L-col ¹²³⁴ + R-col ⁵⁶⁷ = 7 entries, → [^1]–[^7]); the committed `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a2-q2` carries no p.204 apparatus. Verified clean handoff: a2-q2's `[^29]` closes at p.203 R-col *magi/boni faciunt*; its SCHOLION I + II tail spans p.203 R-col bot through p.204 L-col-top, carrying no numbered apparatus.
- **Outgoing a2-q3 → dubia CLEAN cross-page out at p.206**: Q3 closes at end of SCHOLION on p.205 R-col (`— Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.`). p.206 opens fresh with `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` → `DUB. I.` — the next chunk `bon-sent-II-d7-p2-dubia` will build whole p.206+ with no backfill into a2-q3.

**Apparatus per-page totals (13 entries):**
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- p.205 footer = 6 (L-col ¹² = Sol. ad 1 *sicut*, Sol. ad 5 *posse* → [^8]–[^9]; R-col ³⁴⁵⁶ = Sol. ad 5 *Evangelia*, Sol. ad 6 *quaeritur*, *eius*, *fine* → [^10]–[^13])

**SCHOLION = single paragraph** (no I/II/III); editorial doctor-concord list only, no apparatus.

**OCR repairs (silent):**
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**No [?] flags** — all 13 superscripts + 2 page-footers verified column-by-column against the cached `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p20{4,5}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` and `raw/vision/vol2/p-20{4,5}.png` 450 dpi extractions.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Pars II).

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part II).

source_text:
<!-- page 206 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de illa divisione, quam ponit Isidorus in tria membra, cum dicit, quod *daemones triplici scientiae acumine vigent*. Videtur enim diminute procedere, quia Augustinus *super Genesim* secundo quatuor modos ponit, quos etiam Magister adducit in littera[^1]. — Item, videtur superflua; Philosophus[^2] enim non ponit nisi duos modos; dicit enim, quod omne quod quis novit, *discens vel inveniens novit*.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod divisio Isidori sufficiens est et consona verbis Augustini. Sufficientia autem patet sic. Omne enim quod daemones sciunt, aut sciunt cognitione *innata*, et sic dicuntur scire *acumine sensus*; aut cognitione *acquisita*. Sed cognitio *acquisita* potest esse dupliciter: aut de rebus, quae *subsunt* rationi, et haec per experientiam addiscuntur; aut de rebus, quae sunt *supra*, et sic est per revelationem superiorum spirituum.

Quod ergo obiicitur de Augustino, dicendum, quod duo modi reducuntur ad unum. Et *iterum*, Augustinus magis assignat modos praedicendi futura quam cognoscendi. Philosophus autem loquitur de cognitione *acquisita*; vel si generaliter de *omni*, tunc sub inventione comprehendit *sensus acumen* et *experientiam temporum*[^3].

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *daemones aliqua cognoscunt a sanctis Angelis, quae ab omnipotenti Deo discunt, iussu eius sibi revelantibus*. Contra: Daemones sunt inimici Dei et Angelorum; si ergo ab inimicis abscondenda sunt secreta consilia, ergo videtur, quod Deus eis nunquam revelari faciat. — Item, ipsi sunt in tenebris damnationis: ergo cum non sint idonei ad gratiam, et revelatio sit cognitio gratiae, non naturae, videtur, quod nullo modo fiat ipsis daemonibus.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod pro vero habendum est quod dicit Isidorus et Augustinus[^4], quod aliqua praesciunt revelatione supernorum spirituum, cuius revelationis attendendus est *finis* et *modus*. *Revelationis huius finis*: *Finis*, quia mirabilis Sapientia per inimicantes implet voluntatem suam; unde sicut revelatio somnii de exaltatione Iosephi[^5], facta insidiantibus, secundum mirabilem Dei dispositionem fecit ad eius impletionem, licet secundum intentiones illorum esset ad impedimentum: sic Deus aliqua ostendit per Angelos suos daemonibus, ut, dum illi obviant, aliquid valde decens et competens ordinatissime impleat et eliciat. — Et ex hoc patet primum, quia non est simile. Humanum enim consilium potest irritari, non tamen divinum.

Attendendus est etiam *modus*. *Revelationis modus duplex*: Duplici enim modo fit revelatio: aliquando *mentis illustratione*, sicut fiebat sanctis Prophetis, et haec est gratiae; aliquando vero *sola praedictione*[^6], sicut homo revelat aliquando voluntatem suam. Et haec non est *gratiae* aliquo modo perficientis vel elevantis naturam, sed potest esse opus *misericordiae*, si illud ordinetur ad bonum eius cui praedicitur, vel *iustitiae*, si ordinetur ad punitionem alicuius mali, utpote si ad fallendum fallaces; vel *utriusque*, si simul ad utrumque. Et ita est quasi semper, quia huiusmodi futura praedicuntur daemonibus, et permittuntur miracula fieri ab eis, ut boni talia parvipendant, in quibus se vident a damnatis et miseris superari, et mali et fallaces proficiant in peius[^7], errantes et in errorem mittentes occulto Dei iudicio, tamen iudicio iusto. *Notandum*: Unde valde stultum est desiderare facere miracula vel praescire futura et quasi magna haec reputare, cum inimicos Dei in his videamus abundare[^8].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Angeli non sunt creatores, quia non operantur nisi exterius*. Sed contra: haec non videtur ratio, quia si solus Creator operatur interius, tunc ergo natura nihil producit. — Item, *creare* est producere aliquid de nihilo; sed si daemon propria virtute extraheret semen de potentia in actum, non de nihilo faceret: ergo non esset creator.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod quaedam est virtus, quae in productione rerum solum operatur exterius; quaedam quae perfecte operatur interius; quaedam partim interius, partim exterius. *Triplex operatio virtutis*: Virtus *artificis* solum exterius operatur, amovendo sive iungendo et applicando unam naturam cum alia. Virtus *Dei* operatur perfecte interius, quia ipsa primordialia semina, quae sunt intima, producit. Virtus vero, quae est partim interius, partim exterius, est virtus *naturae*, quae *exterius* est respectu rationum seminalium, sed *interius* respectu producendorum ex <!-- page 207 -->ipsis. Natura enim, dum operatur, immittit virtutem suam usque ad intima passi; et in illa immissione ipsam *essentiam* formae, quae erat in potentia incompleta, non *producit*, sed productam a Deo supponit: ipsam tamen adiuvando ad actum perfectum *adducit*. Solus igitur ille potest seminales illas rationes facere, qui potest creare; quoniam ipsae non sunt ex aliis, sed ex nihilo, et ex ipsis fiunt omnia, quae naturaliter producuntur. Igitur nec pater est creator filii, nec agricola segetum; quia licet pater operetur *interius*, sicut natura, tamen operatur *exterius* et *circa* aliquid et *ex* aliquo, non ex nihilo, licet non operetur adeo exterius, sicut agricola. Operatio autem daemonum magis est similis operationi agricolae quam paternae[^9].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sicut mentem nostram non potest formare nisi Deus* etc. Si ergo hoc verum est; tunc, sicut gratia est a Deo, nullo modo a natura vel potentia creata, videtur, quod similiter omnis alia forma sit a solo Deo: ergo agens creatum nullam formam inducit.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod beatus Augustinus valde subtiliter loquitur et veraciter, si quis verba eius sane intelligat. Vult ergo dicere, quod sicut mentem nostram iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus, quia gratia non est ex aliquo, sed potius ex *Notandum* nihilo[^10]; sic formarum *seminales rationes* sive formarum *primas essentias* solus Deus potest producere. Illas enim aut necesse est esse ex nihilo, aut in infinitum abire. Non ergo intelligit Augustinus quoad *eductionem* formae de potentia in actum, quam vocat actionem quodammodo exteriorem, sed potius quoad *productionem* illius seminalis rationis, quae est essentia rei, aliter se habens, cum est in potentia, et in actu[^11].

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *daemones quaedam possunt per naturae subtilitatem, quae non possunt propter Dei prohibitionem*. Contra hoc est, quod Deus sic dedit virtutes rebus et «sic administrat eas, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat», sicut dicit Augustinus septimo *de Civitate*[^12]; unde peccare volentes non cohibet, sed sinit prout volunt peccare: ergo pari ratione non debet angelorum potentiam cohibere.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Deus *voluntates non cohibet* propter legem libertatis, quam eis statuit, sed iusto iudicio de malo in peius ruere permittit; sed *virtutem restringit* iudicio aeque iusto, quia operatio potentiae, ut frequenter in his qui potentia abutuntur, est ad aliorum afflictionem et punitionem. Quoniam igitur omnis poena debet esse iusta; si habens potentiam iniuste affligit vel vult affligere, debet potentia compesci, non ratione eius qui *agit*, sed ratione eius qui *patitur*, nisi altissima Dei iudicia aliud requirant[^13]. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod res agere proprios motus sinit; non intelligitur, quod non compescat virtutem per contrarias potestates, sed quia tantum sinit agere, quantum suam iustitiam decet permittere.

---

english:
<!-- page 206 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that division which Isidore lays down in three members, when he says that *demons flourish by a threefold sharpness of knowledge*. For it seems to proceed deficiently, since Augustine, on *Genesis* book two, lays down four modes, which the Master also adduces in the text[^1]. — Likewise, it seems superfluous; for the Philosopher[^2] lays down only two modes; for he says that everything which anyone knows, *he knows by learning or by discovering*.

I RESPOND: It must be said that Isidore's division is sufficient and consonant with the words of Augustine. Its sufficiency is shown thus. For everything that demons know, either they know by *innate* cognition, and thus are said to know by *the sharpness of sense*; or by *acquired* cognition. But *acquired* cognition can be in two ways: either of things which *fall under* reason, and these are learned by experience; or of things which are *above*, and this is by the revelation of higher spirits.

To the objection from Augustine, then, it must be said that the two modes are reduced to one. And *again*, Augustine assigns modes of foretelling future things rather than of knowing them. The Philosopher, however, is speaking of *acquired* cognition; or if generally of *every* [cognition], then under invention he includes *the sharpness of sense* and *the experience of times*[^3].

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *demons know certain things from the holy Angels, which they learn from almighty God, by his command revealing [them] to them*. On the contrary: Demons are enemies of God and of the Angels; if therefore secret counsels are to be hidden from enemies, then it seems that God would never have [anything] revealed to them. — Likewise, they are in the darkness of damnation: therefore, since they are not fit for grace, and revelation is a cognition of grace, not of nature, it seems that in no way is it made to demons themselves.

I RESPOND: It must be said that as true is to be held what Isidore and Augustine say[^4], that they foreknow certain things by the revelation of higher spirits, of which revelation the *end* and *mode* must be attended to. *The end of this revelation*: The *End*, because the wondrous Wisdom through hostile beings fulfills its own will; whence, just as the revelation of the dream concerning the exaltation of Joseph[^5], made to those plotting [against him], according to the wondrous disposition of God served toward its fulfillment, although according to their intentions it was [meant] toward its impediment: so God shows certain things through his Angels to the demons, so that, while they oppose, he may most orderly fulfill and bring forth something very fitting and proper. — And from this the first [objection] is clear, since it is not similar. For human counsel can be thwarted, but not the divine.

The *mode* also must be attended to. *The mode of revelation is twofold*: For in two ways revelation is made: sometimes by *illumination of the mind*, as was done to the holy Prophets, and this is of grace; but sometimes by *bare prediction*[^6], as a man sometimes reveals his own will. And this is not of *grace* in any way perfecting or elevating nature, but it can be a work of *mercy*, if it be ordered to the good of him to whom it is foretold, or of *justice*, if it be ordered to the punishment of some evil, as for instance to the deceiving of deceivers; or of *both*, if at the same time toward both. And so it is almost always, because such future things are foretold to demons, and miracles are permitted to be done by them, that the good may make light of such things, in which they see themselves surpassed by the damned and miserable, and the evil and deceitful may progress into worse[^7], erring and sending [others] into error by the hidden judgment of God, yet by a just judgment. *Note*: Hence it is very foolish to desire to perform miracles or to foreknow future things and to reckon these as great, since we see the enemies of God to abound in such things[^8].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *Angels are not creators, because they do not operate except outwardly*. But on the contrary: this does not seem a [good] reason, since if only the Creator operates inwardly, then nature produces nothing. — Likewise, *to create* is to produce something from nothing; but if a demon by his own power were to draw forth seed from potency into act, he would not make it from nothing: therefore he would not be a creator.

I RESPOND: It must be said that there is a certain power which in the production of things operates only outwardly; a certain [power] which operates inwardly in a complete way; a certain [power] partly inwardly, partly outwardly. *The threefold operation of power*: The power of the *artisan* operates only outwardly, by removing or joining and applying one nature with another. The power of *God* operates completely inwardly, since it produces the very primordial seeds, which are innermost. But the power which is partly inwardly, partly outwardly, is the power of *nature*, which is *outward* with respect to seminal accounts, but *inward* with respect to the things to be produced from <!-- page 207 -->them. For nature, when it operates, sends in its power even to the innermost parts of the patient; and in that sending in, [it does] not *produce* the very *essence* of the form, which was in incomplete potency, but presupposes it as produced by God: it yet, by aiding it, *brings* it forth to perfect act. Therefore he alone can make those seminal accounts, who can create; since they are not from others, but from nothing, and from them all things are made which are produced naturally. Therefore neither is the father a creator of the son, nor the farmer of the crops; since although the father operates *inwardly*, like nature, yet he operates *outwardly* and *about* something and *from* something, not from nothing, although he does not operate so outwardly as the farmer. But the operation of demons is more similar to the operation of the farmer than to that of the father[^9].

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *As none can form our mind except God* etc. If therefore this is true; then, just as grace is from God, in no way from nature or created power, it seems that likewise every other form is from God alone: therefore a created agent induces no form.

I RESPOND: It must be said that blessed Augustine speaks very subtly and truly, if anyone soundly understands his words. He wishes therefore to say that, just as none can form our mind by justifying it except God, since grace is not from anything, but rather from *Note* nothing[^10]; so the *seminal accounts* of forms or the *first essences* of forms only God can produce. For these must either be from nothing, or go on to infinity. Augustine therefore does not understand [this] as regards the *educing* of form from potency into act, which he calls in some way an outward action, but rather as regards the *production* of that seminal account, which is the essence of the thing, otherwise disposed when it is in potency and [when] in act[^11].

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *demons can do certain things by the subtlety of nature, which they cannot do because of God's prohibition*. Against this is, that God so gave powers to things and «so administers them, that he lets them perform their proper motions», as Augustine says in the seventh [book] *On the City [of God]*[^12]; whence he does not restrain those wishing to sin, but lets them sin as they will: therefore by parity of reason he ought not to restrain the power of the angels.

I RESPOND: It must be said that God *does not restrain wills* on account of the law of liberty which he established for them, but by a just judgment permits [them] to rush from evil into worse; yet he *restrains [their] power* by an equally just judgment, since the operation of power, as frequently in those who abuse power, is for the affliction and punishment of others. Since therefore every penalty must be just; if one having power unjustly afflicts or wills to afflict, the power must be checked, not on account of him who *acts*, but on account of him who *suffers*, unless the most high judgments of God require otherwise[^13]. — As to the objection, then, that he lets things perform their proper motions; it is not understood [to mean] that he does not check power by contrary powers, but that he only lets [them] act as much as it is fitting for his justice to permit.

---

la: Cap. 5.

en: Chapter 5 [of the *littera Magistri* of this distinction, where Augustine's four modes are quoted].

la: Lib. III. *de Anima*, text. 8. (c. 4.). Cfr. I. *Poster.* c. 1, ubi contra Platonem ostenditur, novam cognitionem nos posse habere; et c. 14. (c. 18.); I. *Metaph.* c. 1. seqq. et II. *Ethic.* c. 1.

en: Book III *On the Soul*, text 8 (c. 4). Cf. *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 1, where it is shown against Plato that we can have new cognition; and c. 14 (c. 18); *Metaphysics* I, c. 1 seqq. and *Ethics* II, c. 1.

la: Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 4.

en: B. Albert solves the same doubt here, a. 4.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Cf. here the *littera Magistri*, c. 5.

la: Gen. 37, 6. seqq.

en: Genesis 37, 6 ff.

la: Plures codd. ut F T Z aa bb *praedicatione*, qui etiam dein ponunt cum pluribus aliis *Et hoc* pro *Et haec*.

en: Several codices such as F T Z aa bb read *praedicatione* ['by preaching']; the same then, with several others, put *Et hoc* ['And this (masc./neut.)'] for *Et haec* ['And these (n. pl.)'].

la: Vat. *poenis*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *poenis* ['penalties'] [for *peius*].

la: Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 2, S. c. Gent. III. c. 103. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3.

en: Cf. B. Albert here a. 4; Ægidius Romanus here in the *dubia circa litteram* 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 103 ff. — B. Albert here a. 12. — Petrus a Tarantasia here q. 3, a. 3.

la: Vide supra a. 2. q. 2.

en: See above, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. addit *vel esset abire in infinitum*, quae etiam paulo inferius pro *Illas enim* substituit *Alias enim*.

en: The Vatican edition with one or another codex adds *vel esset abire in infinitum* ['or [it] would be to go on to infinity'], which also a little below substitutes *Alias enim* ['for otherwise'] for *Illas enim* ['for those'].

la: Simili modo dubium hoc solvitur ab Ægidio R., hic dub. lit. 4.

en: In a similar way this doubt is solved by Ægidius Romanus here in the *dubia circa litteram* 4.

en: Chapter 30.

la: Cfr. August., III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 18, n. 51.

en: Cf. Augustine, III *On Free Will*, c. 18, n. 51. ---

translators_notes:
**Boundaries (verified s48):**
- **Incoming a2-q3 → d7-p2-dubia CLEAN cross-page out at p.206**: a2-q3 ended on p.205 R-col with its single editorial SCHOLION (`— Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.`); p.206 opens fresh with `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` → `DUB. I.` — no backfill into a2-q3.
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- p.207 footer = 5 (L-col only ¹²³⁴⁵ = DUB III Resp. *paternae* [Vide supra], DUB IV Resp. *nihilo* [Vat. *infinitum* var.], DUB IV Resp. *in actu* [Simili modo Ægid.], DUB V Contra *Civitate* [c. 30], DUB V Resp. *requirant* [Cfr. August. de Lib. Arb.] → [^9]–[^13])

**No own SCHOLION** (standard for dubia chunks).

**Marginal labels preserved inline** per Vol II convention (cf. s47 `d7-p2-a2-q3` *Triplex peccatum* / *Ratio* / *Notandum* inline): *Revelationis huius finis* / *Revelationis modus duplex* / *Notandum* (×2) / *Triplex operatio virtutis* — all editorial chapter-marker glosses, woven into the body at their printed-margin anchors.

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- p.207: `Natiira` → *Natura*; `diim` → *dum*; `operalur` → *operatur*; `immittit virtiitem` → *immittit virtutem*; `intima passi;` retained; `in)missione` → *immissione*; `qnae` → *quae*; `producil` → *producit*; `cuin est in potentia` retained; `actu` retained; `eductionem formae` retained; `actionera` → *actionem*; `productioneni` → *productionem*; `liabens` → *habens*; `daemones quaedam possunt per naturae subtilitatem` retained; `proliibitionem` → *prohibitionem*; `« sic administrat eas, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »` retained as a Quaracchi-marked quotation; `septimo deCivitate` → *septimo de Civitate*; `cohibet propter legem libertatis` retained; `slatuit` → *statuit*; `peius ruere permittit` retained; `virtutem restringit` retained; `aliornm afflictionera` → *aliorum afflictionem*; `iuiuste affligit vel vult affligere` retained; `compesci` retained; `qni agit` → *qui agit*; `palilur` → *patitur*; `aliud reqnirant` → *aliud requirant*; `lornm potentiam` (column-marginal head) → *angelorum potentiam* (the broken column-bleed `lornm` resolved against the L-col body `cohibere` continuation).
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**No [?] flags** — all 13 superscripts + the clean incoming + the cross-distinction NOTAE split + the OCR-garbled `DuB./DuR.` titles + the marginal-gloss anchors verified column-by-column on the cached `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p20{6,7}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` and `raw/vision/vol2/p-20{6,7}.png` 450 dpi extractions.