title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De gratiae quidditate.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum gratia sit in genere substantiae, vel accidentis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum gratia sit in genere substantiae, vel in genere accidentis. Et quod sit in genere accidentis, videtur.

1. Omne quod advenit substantiae iam completae, est accidens[^1]; sed gratia advenit substantiae iam completae, scilicet animae rationali: ergo gratia est accidens.

2. Item, quod « adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem est accidens »[^2]; sed gratia est huiusmodi, sicut patet, quia multi iusti efficiuntur peccatores, et e converso: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod recipit magis et minus, est accidens[^3]; sed gratia recipit magis et minus, quia maior est in uno quam in altero, et in eodem ipso secundum diversa tempora magis intenditur: ergo etc.

4. Praeterea, aut gratia est substantia, aut accidens. Si est accidens, habeo propositum; si substantia: aut substantia-*materia*, aut substantia-*forma*, aut substantia-*compositum*[^4]. Substantia-*materia* non, hoc constat; substantia composita non, quia tunc non esset animae unibilis; substantia-*forma* non, quia tunc ex gratia et anima fieret unum per essentiam: ergo si non est substantia, restat, quod est accidens.

5. Item, si est substantia; aut corporalis, aut spiritualis. Non corporalis, hoc constat; si spiritualis, aut Deus, aut Angelus, aut anima rationalis; sed constans est, quod gratia creata nec est Deus, nec est Angelus, nec rationalis anima: ergo restat, quod gratia creata sit in genere accidentis.

6. Item, nulla substantia est habitus; sed gratia est quidam habitus animam decorans et ornans, sicut dicitur super illud Psalmi[^5]: *Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo*: « Gratia est quidam nitor animi » etc.: ergo gratia non est substantia; et est substantia, vel accidens: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Nullum accidens est nobilius substantia[^6]: sed gratia est nobilior anima, quam perficit et complet, sicut perfectio est nobilior perfectibili: ergo gratia non est accidens; et est accidens, vel substantia: ergo etc.

2. Item, nullum accidens est substantiae similius quam substantia; sed gratia inter ceteras creaturas est Deo similior, et Deus est substantia: ergo gratia est in genere substantiae.

3. Item, nullum accidens est stabilius quam substantia, pro eo quod substantia praebet fulcimentum

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accidenti, non e converso; sed gratia stabilit ipsam animam et confirmat in bono, nec potest ipsa gratia aliquo modo incurvari in malo: si ergo anima est substantia, gratia est substantia.

4. Item, omnis forma, quae est principium vitae, est in genere substantiae[^7]; sed gratia est principium vitae et nobilissimae vitae: ergo gratia est in genere substantiae.

5. Item, tria sunt genera bonorum, scilicet bona media, bona minima et bona maxima, sicut vult Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^8]; sed bona minima et bona media sunt in genere substantiae: ergo multo fortius et bona maxima; et gratia est de bonis maximis: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne accidens quod inest alicui ut accidens, aut inest per se, aut per accidens. Si igitur gratia inest animae ut accidens, aut ergo inest per se, aut per accidens. Si per se: ergo habet ortum ex propriis principiis subiecti[^9]: ergo iam non erit gratia, sed naturalis proprietas. Si per accidens; sed omne per accidens reducibile est ad per se: ergo si gratia inest animae per accidens, erit aliud subiectum, cui inerit per se. Quaero igitur, quid sit illud. Si autem non est aliquod tale dare, restat, quod gratia non est accidens; et est accidens, vel substantia: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Gratia ut donum creatum est accidens.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ponentes, gratiam donum esse creatum, necesse habent ponere, gratiam esse in genere accidentis.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quod est aliquod accidens, quod comparatur ad aliquid, sicut ad subiectum et causam; aliquod, quod solum comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum, et ad aliud sicut ad causam: verbi gratia, nigredo in corvo comparatur ad ipsum corvum, sicut ad subiectum et causam; lumen in aere, vel species in speculo comparatur solum sicut ad subiectum, non sicut ad causam, quia, etsi ibi recipiatur, aliunde tamen habet ortum[^10].

Tale autem accidens, quod comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum, et ad aliud sicut ad causam, potest esse sub triplici differentia. Quoddam enim est, quod habet ortum ab inferiori; quoddam, quod habet ortum a pari; quoddam, quod habet ortum a superiori: sicut[^11] ab inferiori, ut species lapidis in oculo, vel etiam in intellectu nostro; sicut a pari, ut similitudo speculi in speculo; sicut a superiori, ut lumen in aere illuminato. — Tale autem accidens, quod habet ortum a superiori, in quantum accidens est, complementum est, non quantum ad esse primum, sed quantum ad esse secundum. Quia vero a superiori est, habet nobilitare subiectum in hoc, quod iungit ipsum et conformat ei quod est ipso superius. Et si sit tale accidens, quod ortum habet ab ente primo[^12] supremo; si eius infusio vel origo sit secundum perfectam influentiam, non solum habet nobilitare, verum etiam consummare et quietare; et hoc non facit tantum ratione sui, verum etiam ratione eius, a quo procedit, in quo reperitur omnis perfectio et bonorum omnium aggregatio, ac per hoc completa beatitudo[^13]. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes probantes, gratiam esse accidens.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod nullum accidens nobilius est substantia; dicendum, quod illa ratio deficit tripliciter. Primum quidem, quia nobilitas substantiae et accidentis, et bonitas substantiae et accidentis proprie non habent comparari. Accidens enim bonum dicitur non sibi, sed alii[^14], non sicut ordinatum, sed sicut ratio ordinandi; sed ipsa substantia bona est tanquam bonitatis participativa. — Alius etiam defectus est ibi, quoniam, etsi nullum accidens nobilius sit substantia, prout accidens comparatur in se quantum ad essentiam generis sive quantum ad esse primum; nihilominus tamen, prout accidens consideratur in subiecto et includit esse subiecti, quandam nobilitatem superaddit quantum ad esse secundum. — Tertius etiam defectus est, quia, quod gratia dicatur nobilior anima et perfectio animae, hoc non est ratione sui tantum, sed quia unit bono increato, sicut praedictum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum accidens

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similius est substantiae quam substantia; dicendum, quod sicut dictum est[^15] de bonitate, quod alio modo dicitur anima esse bona, alio modo gratia; sic etiam alio modo anima Deo assimilatur, et alio modo gratia. Anima enim Deo assimilatur sicut divinae similitudinis susceptiva, *gratia* vero sicut ipsa similitudo vel donum assimilativum; unde non est comparatio proprie inter hunc modum assimilandi et illum. — Alius est etiam defectus, quia, cum anima assimiletur Deo propter gratiam, et ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum[^16]; sic non est maior vel minor assimilatio dicenda in anima gratificata quam in gratia gratificante. — Tertius etiam defectus est, quia, etsi substantia plus assimiletur substantiae in ratione entis, nihil tamen prohibet accidens plus assimilari alicui substantiae sub ratione proprietatis, sicut anima sapiens plus assimilatur Deo, in quantum est *ens per se,* quam ipsa qualitas sapientiae; nihilominus tamen Deo, in quantum est *sapiens,* plus assimilatur anima, in quantum est sapiens, quam in quantum est substantia. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum accidens est stabilius substantia; dicendum, quod verum est de illo accidente, quod comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et causam; de eo vero accidente, quod aliunde habet originem, non habet veritatem, sicut patet in radio exeunte a sole, qui fixus permanet, aere moto. Et quia gratia est tale accidens, ideo illa ratio non habet locum in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est forma, quae est principium vitae; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de forma, quae dat vivere, quod spectat ad esse *primum.* Gratia autem est forma dans vitam quantum ad esse secundum sive quantum ad bene esse; et ideo illud non valet. Non enim fit unum per essentiam ex gratificato et gratia, sicut fit unum per essentiam ex corpore vivificato et anima vivificante.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bonis maximis et minimis et mediis, dicendum, quod illa divisio bonorum est secundum acceptionem boni, qua aliquid dicitur bonum, quia bonum alii et utile, sicut patet ex verbis Augustini ibidem: quia bona maxima sunt illa quibus non contingit male uti; et ideo ad gradum bonitatis secundum eum modum, per quem ibi loquitur Augustinus, nihil facit, utrum bonum illud, quod dicitur maximum, sit in genere substantiae, vel accidentis.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum insit animae per se, aut per accidens; dicendum, quod per se inest in genere subiecti, sed non per se in genere causae. Et quia per se inest in genere subiecti, ideo non est quaerendum aliud subiectum, cui per prius insit. Quia vero non inest per se in genere causae, ideo non inest omni animae nec ex principiis animae habet originem; ideo quodam modo habet naturam accidentis inhaerentis per se, quodam modo naturam accidentis inhaerentis per accidens.

english:
### Article, sole. *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question III. *Whether grace is in the genus of substance or of accident.*

Thirdly it is asked whether grace is in the genus of substance or in the genus of accident. And that it is in the genus of accident, it seems.

1. Everything that comes to a substance already complete is an accident[^1]; but grace comes to a substance already complete, namely to the rational soul: therefore grace is an accident.

2. Likewise, that which « is present and absent without the corruption of the subject is an accident »[^2]; but grace is of this kind, as is clear, since many just men become sinners, and conversely: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that admits of more and less is an accident[^3]; but grace admits of more and less, since it is greater in one than in another, and in the same person it is intensified more at different times: therefore etc.

4. Furthermore, either grace is a substance or an accident. If it is an accident, I have my proposition; if a substance: then either substance-*matter,* or substance-*form,* or substance-*composite*[^4]. Substance-*matter* it is not, this is established; substance-composite it is not, since then it would not be unitable to the soul; substance-*form* it is not, since then from grace and the soul there would come to be one thing in essence: therefore if it is not a substance, it remains that it is an accident.

5. Likewise, if it is a substance, then either corporeal or spiritual. Not corporeal, this is established; if spiritual, then either God, or an Angel, or a rational soul; but it is certain that created grace is neither God, nor an Angel, nor a rational soul: therefore it remains that created grace is in the genus of accident.

6. Likewise, no substance is a habit; but grace is a certain habit adorning and beautifying the soul, as is said upon that text of the Psalm[^5]: *That he may make the face cheerful with oil*: « Grace is a certain brightness of the soul » etc.: therefore grace is not a substance; and it is [either] a substance or an accident: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. No accident is nobler than a substance[^6]: but grace is nobler than the soul, which it perfects and completes, just as the perfection is nobler than the perfectible: therefore grace is not an accident; and it is [either] an accident or a substance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no accident is more like a substance than a substance [is]; but grace among other creatures is more like God, and God is a substance: therefore grace is in the genus of substance.

3. Likewise, no accident is more stable than a substance, for the reason that the substance furnishes support

to the accident, and not conversely; but grace stabilizes the soul itself and confirms it in good, nor can grace itself in any way be bent toward evil: if therefore the soul is a substance, grace is a substance.

4. Likewise, every form that is a principle of life is in the genus of substance[^7]; but grace is a principle of life, and of the noblest life: therefore grace is in the genus of substance.

5. Likewise, there are three kinds of goods, namely middle goods, least goods, and greatest goods, as Augustine holds in the book *On Free Choice*[^8]; but the least goods and the middle goods are in the genus of substance: therefore much more so are the greatest goods; and grace is among the greatest goods: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every accident which is present in something as an accident is present either *per se* or *per accidens.* If therefore grace is present in the soul as an accident, then it is present either *per se* or *per accidens.* If *per se*: then it has its origin from the proper principles of the subject[^9]: therefore it will no longer be grace, but a natural property. If *per accidens*; but everything *per accidens* is reducible to something *per se*: therefore if grace is present in the soul *per accidens,* there will be another subject in which it is present *per se.* I ask, then, what that is. But if no such thing can be given, it remains that grace is not an accident; and it is [either] an accident or a substance: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *Grace, as a created gift, is an accident.*

**I respond:** It must be said that those who hold grace to be a created gift must necessarily hold grace to be in the genus of accident.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that there is a certain accident which is related to something as to a subject and a cause; and a certain [accident] which is related only to something as to a subject, and to another thing as to a cause: for example, blackness in a crow is related to the crow itself as to a subject and a cause; light in the air, or a species in a mirror, is related only as to a subject, not as to a cause, since, although it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin elsewhere[^10].

Now such an accident, which is related to something as to a subject and to another as to a cause, can be under a threefold difference. For there is one which has its origin from something lower; one which has its origin from something equal; one which has its origin from something higher: as[^11] from something lower, like the species of a stone in the eye, or even in our intellect; from something equal, like the likeness of a mirror in a mirror; from something higher, like light in illuminated air. — Now such an accident, which has its origin from something higher, insofar as it is an accident, is a complement, not with respect to first being, but with respect to second being. But because it is from something higher, it ennobles the subject in this, that it joins it and conforms it to that which is higher than itself. And if it be such an accident as has its origin from the first[^12] supreme being; if its infusion or origin be according to a perfect influence, it not only ennobles, but even consummates and brings to rest; and this it does not only by reason of itself, but also by reason of that from which it proceeds, in which is found every perfection and the aggregation of all goods, and through this complete beatitude[^13]. — Therefore the reasons proving that grace is an accident must be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that no accident is nobler than a substance; it must be said that that argument fails in three ways. First indeed, because the nobility of substance and of accident, and the goodness of substance and of accident, cannot properly be compared. For an accident is called good not for itself, but for another[^14], not as something ordered, but as the ground of ordering; whereas the substance itself is good as being participative of goodness. — There is also another defect there, since, although no accident is nobler than a substance, insofar as the accident is considered in itself with respect to the essence of the genus or with respect to first being; nevertheless, insofar as the accident is considered in the subject and includes the being of the subject, it adds a certain nobility with respect to second being. — There is also a third defect, because the fact that grace is called nobler than the soul and the perfection of the soul is not by reason of itself only, but because it unites [the soul] to the uncreated good, as was said before.

2. To that which is objected, that no accident

is more like a substance than a substance [is]; it must be said that, just as it was said[^15] of goodness, that in one way the soul is called good, in another way grace; so also in one way the soul is assimilated to God, and in another way grace. For the soul is assimilated to God as receptive of the divine likeness, but *grace* as the very likeness or assimilating gift; hence there is properly no comparison between this mode of assimilating and that. — There is also another defect, because, since the soul is assimilated to God on account of grace, and where one thing [is] on account of another, in both there is only one[^16]; thus no greater or lesser assimilation is to be spoken of in the grace-given soul than in the grace-giving grace. — There is also a third defect, because, although a substance is more assimilated to a substance in the character of being, nothing nevertheless prevents an accident from being more assimilated to some substance under the character of a property, just as the wise soul is more assimilated to God, insofar as it is *a being per se,* than is the quality of wisdom itself; nevertheless the soul, insofar as it is *wise,* is more assimilated to God, insofar as he is wise, [by that] in which it is wise, than [by that] in which it is a substance. And so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that no accident is more stable than a substance; it must be said that this is true of that accident which is related to something as to a subject and a cause; but of that accident which has its origin elsewhere, it does not hold true, as is clear in the ray going out from the sun, which remains fixed though the air be moved. And because grace is such an accident, therefore that argument has no place in the matter at hand.

4. To that which is objected, that grace is a form which is a principle of life; it must be said that this holds true of the form which gives life [in the sense] that pertains to *first* being. But grace is a form giving life with respect to second being, or with respect to *well-being*; and therefore that [objection] is of no force. For there does not come to be one thing in essence from the grace-given [soul] and grace, as there comes to be one thing in essence from the vivified body and the vivifying soul.

5. To that which is objected concerning the greatest, least, and middle goods, it must be said that that division of goods is according to the acceptation of good by which something is called good because it is good for another and useful, as is clear from the words of Augustine in the same place: that the greatest goods are those which it is not possible to use badly; and therefore, as to the degree of goodness according to that mode in which Augustine there speaks, it makes no difference whether that good which is called greatest is in the genus of substance or of accident.

6. To that which is asked, whether it is present in the soul *per se* or *per accidens*; it must be said that it is present *per se* in the genus of subject, but not *per se* in the genus of cause. And because it is present *per se* in the genus of subject, therefore there is no need to seek another subject in which it might be present prior [to this]. But because it is not present *per se* in the genus of cause, therefore it is not present in every soul, nor does it have its origin from the principles of the soul; therefore in one way it has the nature of an accident inhering *per se,* in another way the nature of an accident inhering *per accidens.*

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et accidentis; Boeth., in hunc loc.; etiam supra pag. 327, nota 1.

en: Cfr. Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* c. *On the Common Features and Differences of Genus and Accident*; Boethius, on this passage; also above, p. 327, note 1.

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Accidente, secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* c. *On the Accident,* following Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 4.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et accidentis, c. de Com. et diff. differentiae et accidentis, et c. de Com. et diff. speciei et accidentis.

en: Cfr. Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* c. *On the Common Features and Differences of Genus and Accident,* c. *On the Common Features and Differences of Difference and Accident,* and c. *On the Common Features and Differences of Species and Accident.*

la: Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 2. et 23. (c. 1. seq.) et XII. Metaph. text. 14. (XI. c. 3.). — Vat. *composita*; sed plurimi codd., ut F K M P Q T bb cc ee etc., cum primis edd. *compositum,* quod et cod. M habet paulo inferius.

en: See Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text. 2 and 23 (c. 1 seq.) and *Metaphysics* XII, text. 14 (XI, c. 3). — The Vatican [edition reads] *composita*; but very many codices, such as F K M P Q T bb cc ee etc., together with the first editions, [read] *compositum,* which cod. M also has a little further below.

la: Psalm. 103, 15. Explicatio apposita est ex August., super hunc Ps. Serm. 3. n. 13. et integra sic sonat: *Gratia Dei, nitor quidam in manifestationem; sicut dicit Apostolus* [I. Cor. 12, 7.]: *Unicuique autem datur Spiritus ad manifestationem. Gratia quaedam, quae est hominum ad hominem perspicua, ad conciliandum sanctum amorem, oleum dicitur, in nitore divino.* Cfr. infra dub. 2.

en: Psalm 103:15. The explanation appended is from Augustine, on this Psalm, *Serm.* 3, n. 13, and in full it runs thus: « The grace of God [is] a certain brightness unto manifestation; as the Apostle says [1 Cor. 12:7]: *And to each is given the Spirit unto manifestation.* A certain grace, which is perceptible from man to man, [given] for the conciliating of holy love, is called oil, in divine brightness ». Cfr. below, dub. 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 319, nota 4.

en: See above, p. 319, note 4.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. seq. (c. 2.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text. 24 seq. (c. 2).

la: Libr. II. c. 19. n. 50, et I. Retract. c. 9. n. 4. Cfr. lit. Magistri, dist. seq. c. 2. 3, ubi etiam exempla horum bonorum afferuntur.

en: Book II, c. 19, n. 50, and *Retract.* I, c. 9, n. 4. Cfr. the text of the Master, in the following distinction, c. 2 and 3, where also examples of these goods are adduced.

la: Vide supra pag. 327, nota 6. — Quod omne per accidens reducatur ad per se, insinuat Aristot., II. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.). Averroes, in IV. Phys. text. 43. ait: *Omne enim, quod invenitur in aliquo per accidens, invenitur in eo propter aliquod habens illud per se.*

en: See above, p. 327, note 6. — That everything *per accidens* is reduced to something *per se* is intimated by Aristotle, *Physics* II, text. 66 (c. 6). Averroes, on *Physics* IV, text. 43, says: « For everything which is found in something *per accidens* is found in it on account of something having it *per se* ».

la: Sicut supra d. 13. a. 3. q. 2. in fine explanatum est. — In hac propos. cod. aa inde a verbis *lumen in aere* textum formavit sic: *vel species in speculo comparatur solum ad aerem et speculum sicut ad subiectum, non sicut ad causam; et comparatur ad solem et ad illum cuius est species sicut ad causam, non sicut ad subiectum; quia si ibi recipiatur, aliunde tamen habet ortum.*

en: As was explained above, d. 13, a. 3, q. 2, at the end. — In this proposition cod. aa, from the words *light in the air,* formed the text thus: « or a species in a mirror is related only to the air and the mirror as to a subject, not as to a cause; and it is related to the sun and to that of which it is the species as to a cause, not as to a subject; for if it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin elsewhere ».

la: Pro *sicut* ed. I ponit *Si est,* et dein pro *sicut a pari* substituit *si a pari* et *si est a superiori.*

en: For *sicut* (« as ») ed. I puts *Si est,* and then for *sicut a pari* (« as from something equal ») it substitutes *si a pari* and *si est a superiori.*

la: In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 deest *primo.*

en: In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4, *primo* (« first ») is wanting.

la: Respicitur nota Boethii definitio beatitudinis, quam supra pag. 467, nota 9. attulimus. — Pro *aggregatio* cod. Y *congregatio.*

en: Reference is made to Boethius' well-known definition of beatitude, which we cited above, p. 467, note 9. — For *aggregatio* cod. Y [reads] *congregatio.*

la: Nam accidens, secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), non est *ens,* sed *quid entis* [substantiae]. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 626, nota 4, ubi monstratur, quod secundum Aristot. ad propriam comparationem requiritur univocatio; substantia autem et accidens non sunt univoca. Clarius adhuc S. Doctor de hoc loquitur 1. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. ad 1. his verbis: *Dicendum, quod non est ibi comparatio, quia ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum; unde habens caritatem bonus est propter caritatem. Vel non cadit ibi comparatio, quia non uniformiter dicitur bonum. Nam substantia rationalis dicitur bona, quia ordinabilis in finem, caritas bona, quia ordinans.*

en: For an accident, according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text. 2 (VI, c. 1), is not *a being,* but *something of a being* [of a substance]. Cfr. also above, p. 626, note 4, where it is shown that according to Aristotle a proper comparison requires univocity; but substance and accident are not univocal. Still more clearly the Holy Doctor speaks of this in I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 1, ad 1, in these words: « It must be said that there is no comparison there, because where one thing [is] on account of another, there is only one; hence one having charity is good on account of charity. Or, no comparison falls there, because *good* is not said uniformly. For the rational substance is called good because it is orderable to an end, charity good because it is ordering ».

la: In solut. ad 1. — Immediate post pro *de bonitate* cod. O *de substantiae bonitate.* In seqq. codd. K T V aa bb et alii cum ed. 1 pluries substituunt *similatur* pro *assimilatur.*

en: In the solution to [objection] 1. — Immediately after, for *de bonitate* cod. O [reads] *de substantiae bonitate.* In what follows, codd. K T V aa bb and others, together with ed. 1, several times substitute *similatur* for *assimilatur.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. contra propositionem, quod plura bona sint eligibiliora paucioribus, haec profert: *Si alicubi alterius gratia; nihil enim eligibiliora utraque quam unum, ut sanum fieri et sanitas quam sanitas etc.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2, against the proposition that several goods are more choiceworthy than fewer, brings forward this: « [Unless] somewhere [one is] for the sake of the other; for the two together are in no way more choiceworthy than the one, as [e.g.] to become healthy and health [are no more choiceworthy] than health, etc. ».

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod gratia creata non tantum accidentaliter se habeat ad habentem (quod etiam verum esse potest respectu eius quod in se est substantia, ut patet in veste respectu corporis vestiti), sed etiam in se sit in genere accidentis, scilicet qualitatis; non est nisi corollarium solutionis praecedentium quaestionum. Notanda sunt verba in corp. de effectu subiectum nobilitante, consummante et quietante, quem habet gratia, quatenus iungit animam origini superiori, scil. Spiritui S.

Quoad modum loquendi in sequente (4.) quaest. usurpatum notandum, quod termini *corrumpi, fieri* et *creari* secundum S. Thomam (S. I. II. q. 110. a. 2. ad 3.) de accidentibus minus proprie dicuntur: « Ideo *proprie* loquendo nullum accidens neque *fit,* neque *corrumpitur,* sed dicitur *fieri* vel *corrumpi,* secundum quod subiectum incipit, vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicitur creari ex eo, quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, id est in novo *esse* constituuntur ex nihilo, id est non ex meritis, secundum illud Ephes. 2, 10: *Creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis* ». Ipse tamen in Comment. (hic q. 2. ad 5.) eodem ac S. Bonav. utitur modo loquendi.

**II.** Alii auctores hanc et sequentem quaest. plerumque coniungunt. De utraque igitur tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 3. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3. n. 23. 27. 28. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 2; S. loc. et art. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. q. 98. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 3. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. unicus q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That created grace is related to the one having it not only accidentally (which can also be true with respect to that which is in itself a substance, as is clear in a garment with respect to the clothed body), but is also in itself in the genus of accident, namely of quality; this is nothing but a corollary of the solution of the preceding questions. The words in the body are to be noted, concerning the effect of ennobling, consummating, and bringing to rest the subject, which grace has insofar as it joins the soul to its higher origin, namely the Holy Spirit.

As to the manner of speaking employed in the following (fourth) question, it is to be noted that the terms *to be corrupted, to be made,* and *to be created* are, according to St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3), said less properly of accidents: « Therefore, *properly* speaking, no accident either *comes to be* or *is corrupted,* but is said *to come to be* or *to be corrupted* according as the subject begins or ceases to be in act with respect to that accident. And according to this grace too is said to be created from the fact that men are created according to it, that is, are constituted in a new *being* out of nothing, that is, not out of merits, according to that text of Ephes. 2:10: *Created in Christ Jesus in good works* ». Yet he in his Commentary (here, q. 2, ad 5) uses the same manner of speaking as St. Bonaventure.

**II.** Other authors for the most part join this and the following question. They treat of both, therefore: Alex. Hal., S. p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 3. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 17, q. 3, n. 23, 27, 28. — St. Thom., here q. unica a. 2; S., loc. and art. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II, q. 98, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. unica a. 3, 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. unicus q. 2, 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 637–639 = PDF pp. 659–661) per the Vol II Override, with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 44541–44696) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The Respondeo (*duplex accidens* / *triplex differentia* analysis), the *solutio oppositorum,* the SCHOLION, and the page footers were cascade-fragmented and two-column-interleaved in the OCR; all were reflowed against the PDF column bands (Left top→bottom, then Right). OCR garbles silently corrected: *geiiere*→genere, *accitJentis*→accidentis, *abesl*→abest, *palet*→patet, *fleret*→fieret, *quain*→quam, *sfantia*→stantia, *aniniam*→animam, *Angustinus*→Augustinus, *jjer accidem*→per accidens, *deflcit*→deficit, *nobiliussit*→nobilius sit, *diceii-dum*→dicendum, *sirailius*→similius, *raodo/raaior/rainimis*→modo/maior/minimis, *flt/viviflcato*→fit/vivificato, *snbstantia*→substantia, *cni*→cui, *gralia/creala*→gratia/creata, *liabe.it*→habet, *commpi*→corrumpi, *indpit*→incipit, *Ilal.*→Hal.

**Page-split map.**
- **p. 637** (q3 opens lower on the page, after the tail of q2's SCHOLION which physically occupies the upper page): title + opener + arguments *pro accidens* 1–6 + *Sed contra* 1 + *Sed contra* 2 + *Sed contra* 3 opener ("…substantia praebet fulcimentum"). Footers 1–6 → [^1]–[^6].
- **p. 638**: *Sed contra* 3 tail + *Sed contra* 4 (forma) + 5 (bona maxima) + 6 (per se/per accidens) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (*duplex accidens*; *triplex differentia*; *ens primum supremum*) + reply-1 (triple defect of the nobilius-objection) + reply-2 opener. Footers 1–8 → [^7]–[^14].
- **p. 639**: reply-2 tail (assimilation) + reply-3 (stabilius) + reply-4 (forma/principium vitae) + reply-5 (bona maxima) + reply-6 (per se/per accidens) + SCHOLION I–II. Footers 1–2 → [^15]–[^16] (the p.639 footer ³ — Aristot. *de Longitud. et brevit. vitae* — anchors the QUAESTIO IV *fundamentum* and is FORWARDED to a1-q4).

**Apparatus:** 16 entries [^1]–[^16] in body-anchor order (p.637 ff.1–6; p.638 ff.1–8; p.639 ff.1–2). One footer per entry; no merges, no splits. Body seams 637→638 ("praebet fulcimentum / accidenti") and 638→639 ("nullum accidens / similius") are grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**has_scholion: TRUE** — q3 carries its own SCHOLION I (corollary on grace being in the genus of accident, qua quality; *fieri/creari/corrumpi* note re S. Thomas, anticipating q4's vocabulary) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll: Alex. Hal., Scotus, S. Thom., Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard a Med., Dionys. Carth., Biel — noting that other authors join q3 and q4). SCHOLION carries no footnote markers. (Cross-confirmed by q2's SCHOLION III "infra q. 3 in corpore".)

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED nothing (q2 closed clean with its own SCHOLION before QUAESTIO III opens p.637). FORWARDED to a1-q4: the p.639 footer ³ (Cfr. Aristot., *de Longitud. et brevit. vitae* c. 2 + *de Iuvent. et senect.* + supra p. 192 nota 7), which anchors the QUAESTIO IV opening *fundamentum* ("…secundum quod est variabile, est corruptibile") at raw 44700.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum gratia sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, vel incorruptibilis.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum gratia sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, an incorruptibilis. Et quod sit accidens corruptibile, videtur.

1. Omne accidens, quod est in subiecto variabili, secundum quod est variabile, est corruptibile[^1]; sed gratia est in subiecto variabili, utpote in anima, secundum libertatem arbitrii, in qua consistit mutatio et vertibilitas: ergo etc.

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2. Item, omne accidens, quod habet oppositum potens inesse suo subiecto, est corruptibile; sed gratia opponitur culpae, et culpa potest inesse animae viri iusti, quamdiu est in statu viae: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne accidens, quod est aliunde et non habet causam in subiecto, potest ab illo separari; sed gratia est in anima et non habet ortum ab anima: ergo potest separari ab ipsa; sed post separationem non potest in *esse* conservari: ergo gratia nata est corrumpi.

4. Item, omne accidens, cuius conservatio pendet ex conversione voluntatis ad Deum, est corruptibile, cum voluntas possit a Deo averti; sed gratia est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Anima eo ipso, quod est imago Dei, est incorruptibilis — «non enim esset imago Dei, sicut dicit Augustinus[^2], si mortis termino clauderetur» — ergo cum in gratia consistat imago reformationis, videtur, quod gratia sit incorruptibilis.

2. Item, accidens, quod est in subiecto non a se, sed ab alio, non movetur necessario ad motum eius in quo est, sicut patet de specie existente in speculo, et lumine existente in medio; sed gratia est in anima non a se, sed a Deo: ergo non videtur, quod ad mutationem seu ad variationem animae corrumpatur.

3. Item, his quae sunt corruptibilia, dedit divina virtus propagandi potentiam: igitur aut gratia non est corruptibilis, aut si corrumpitur, habet vim producendi gratiam sibi similem; sed gratia non potest sibi similem producere, sicut in primo libro ostensum est[^3]: ergo non est corruptibilis de se.

4. Item, omne quod corrumpitur in tempore, sui diuturnitate senescit in tempore[^4]; sed gratia, quanto magis durat in homine, tanto perfectior est et stabilior et magis renovat spiritum: ergo gratia non videtur corrumpi.

5. Item, si gratia corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur a Deo, aut a libero arbitrio, aut a peccato; a Deo non, cum gratiam corrumpi sit malum; a libero arbitrio non, cum nullum subiectum corrumpat suam perfectionem[^5]; a peccato non, quia peccatum est pura privatio, et modica gratia potest super omnem culpam: ergo cum nihil habeat corrumpens, videtur, quod sit incorruptibilis.

6. Item, si corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur in aliquid, aut in nihil. Si in aliquid, quaero: in quid? Nec est aliquid dare, cum non producatur ex aliquo, sed de nihilo. Si in nihil; contra: nihil quod corrumpitur, secedit omnino in *non-ens*[^6]. Si igitur gratia nobilissimum est inter omnia accidentia, et Deus non permittit alia accidentia in non-ens cedere, videtur, quod nec de gratia permittat.

### Conclusio.

> Gratia est corruptibilis et in nihil potest redigi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum gratia sit accidens, non potest esse praeter subiectum, in quo est; et cum in subiecto, in quo est, non possit simul cum culpa subsistere, et ipsi subiecto, in quo est gratia, contingat culpam inesse: necesse est, gratiam esse quid corruptibile. — Rursus, cum gratia non producatur ex aliquo materialiter, sed sit simpliciter donum gratuitum et omnino *desursum descendens a Patre luminum*[^7]; et omne quod corrumpitur, in id cedat, unde producitur: necesse est, gratiam, sicut ex nihilo producitur, sic in nihilum redigi, cum corrumpitur. — Talis autem modus corrumpendi non solum competit gratiae ratione sui initii, sed etiam ratione esse proprii sive modi existendi. Ratione, inquam, sui initii, quia, sicut dictum est, sicut ex nihilo producitur, ita in nihil redigitur, quemadmodum in aliis accidentibus consimiliter reperitur, quod in id redeunt, unde exeunt, cum producuntur. — Competit etiam hoc ei ratione esse proprii sive modi existendi, quoniam, cum gratia non causetur ex principiis eius in quo est, sed aliud habeat pro subiecto, aliud pro causa, quemadmodum, cum lumen corrumpitur, vel similitudo in speculo, vel ipsa species in anima, non corrumpitur illud in quo est, nec redit ad illud a quo est, sed quantum est de se, in nihil cedit: sic gratia — quia non habet *esse* in anima per modum naturae, sed per modum habitus, ut prius[^8] habitum est, nec ex principiis animae producitur — cum corrumpitur, in nihil redigitur. Et propterea peccatum, in quo fit gratiae corruptio, dicitur esse nihil[^9], et inter omnes corruptiones summo Auctori et Conservatori omnium bonorum maxime displicere dignoscitur. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod gratia corrumpitur.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod in gratia reperitur ratio imaginis, sicut in anima; dicendum, quod aliter et aliter reperitur imago hic et ibi. Anima enim «est imago Dei, quia capax Dei est et particeps esse potest[^10]», et ita propter beatitudinem facta est et ad beatitudinem apta.

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Quae, inquam, beatitudo non potest inesse nisi substantiae immortali; ideo necesse est, animam immortalem esse. Gratia vero ex hoc solo dicitur imago, quia est imaginis reformatio; et quoniam illa imago per gratiam reformata potest deformari, hinc est, quod gratia potest corrumpi. Nec valet illa ratio, quia hinc inde non est consimilis imaginis acceptio.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidens, quod non habet ortum a subiecto, non mutatur ad mutationem subiecti; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter hoc solum, quod habeat ortum aliunde, sed quia non dependet ab eo in quo est, sicut patet in radio et lumine. Gratia autem non solum dependet ab eo, a quo est, sed etiam ab anima, in qua est, nec persistit in ea, nisi quamdiu habet faciem suam sive mentem ad Deum conversam[^11].

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rei corruptibili debet dari virtus propagandi; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando illa res est nata talem virtutem suscipere, et quando etiam illa corruptibilitas inest rei ex defectu propriae naturae; neutrum autem horum competit gratiae. Nam gratia nata est immediate ab ipso Deo procedere[^12], nec aliquo modo corrumpitur nisi propter aversionem mentis nostrae a rectitudine veritatis aeternae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod omne quod corrumpitur, senescit in tempore; hoc enim verum est de eo quod habet causam corruptionis intra se.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, a quo corrumpitur, utrum a Deo, vel a peccato, vel a libero arbitrio; dicendum, quod ipsa gratia deficit in se ipsa. — Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, quare deficit; hoc est[^13] propter aversionem mentis humanae. Cum enim gratia non salvetur nisi ex continuatione influentiae a bonitate divina super faciem mentis nostrae; quando anima a Deo avertitur, influentia non continuatur, et per consequens gratia corrumpitur; anima autem avertitur per peccatum: et ideo quodam modo gratia per peccatum dicitur corrumpi, non quod peccatum agat in gratiam, sed quia, anima per peccatum se avertente et Deo cessante influere, necesse est, gratiam in se ipsa deficere.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil quod corrumpitur secedit omnino in non-ens; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in accidentibus, quae habent *esse* naturae, et in eis quae causantur ex principiis subiecti, pro eo quod, cum corrumpuntur accidentia, manent nihilominus et salvantur illa principia; et ideo, cum talia accidentia corrumpuntur, non[^14] omnino annihilantur. In his vero accidentibus, quae habent *esse* habitus, sicut similitudo in anima et lumen in aere, non habet veritatem. Non enim similitudo hominis mortui, quae est in anima tua, si de anima tua deleatur et corrumpatur, redit ad hominem illum; vel cum lumen corrumpitur, redit ad solem, maxime si corruptio luminis fiat per corporis interpositionem; nisi forte quis dicat, ad suam originem redire, pro eo quod adhuc salvatur in suo principio effectivo, quod potest producere illi simile. Quia igitur gratia habet se ad modum habitus et ex nihilo producitur, ut prius habitum est; ideo illa propositio non habet hic locum. — Et si tu quaeras: unde hoc est, quod Deus permittit perire tam nobile accidens? satis facile est respondere. Similis enim quaestio est, si quaeratur: cum Deus diligat amicos suos et plus diligat unam animam sanctam, quam diligat caelum et terram; quid est, quod permittit, animam sanctam a se separari, et non permittit, caelum et terram corrumpi? Ad hoc respondebit qui sane intelligit, quod hoc cursui rerum congruit, et «Deus sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat». Et propterea, quia thesaurus gratiae habetur in vasis fictilibus, quamvis sit valde nobilis, tamen de facili amittitur, quamdiu procellis tentationum concutitur.

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether grace is in the genus of a corruptible or an incorruptible accident.*

Fourthly it is asked whether grace is in the genus of a corruptible or an incorruptible accident. And that it is a corruptible accident, it seems.

1. Every accident that is in a variable subject, insofar as it is variable, is corruptible[^1]; but grace is in a variable subject, namely in the soul, according to the freedom of choice, in which consist change and mutability: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every accident that has an opposite capable of being in its subject is corruptible; but grace is opposed to fault, and fault can be in the soul of a just man, so long as he is in the state of the wayfarer: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every accident that is from elsewhere and does not have its cause in the subject can be separated from it; but grace is in the soul and does not have its origin from the soul: therefore it can be separated from it; but after separation it cannot be preserved in *being*: therefore grace is apt to be corrupted.

4. Likewise, every accident whose preservation depends on the conversion of the will to God is corruptible, since the will can be turned away from God; but grace is of this kind: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. The soul, by the very fact that it is the image of God, is incorruptible — «for it would not be the image of God, as Augustine says[^2], if it were closed off by the term of death» — therefore since the image of reformation consists in grace, it seems that grace is incorruptible.

2. Likewise, an accident that is in a subject not of itself, but from another, is not necessarily moved by the motion of that in which it is, as is clear of the species existing in a mirror, and of light existing in a medium; but grace is in the soul not of itself, but from God: therefore it does not seem that it is corrupted by the change or variation of the soul.

3. Likewise, to things that are corruptible the divine power gave the capacity of propagating; therefore either grace is not corruptible, or if it is corrupted, it has the power of producing grace like itself; but grace cannot produce its like, as was shown in the first book[^3]: therefore it is not corruptible of itself.

4. Likewise, everything that is corrupted in time grows old in time by its long duration[^4]; but grace, the more it endures in a man, is the more perfect and stable and the more it renews the spirit: therefore grace does not seem to be corrupted.

5. Likewise, if grace is corrupted, it is corrupted either by God, or by free choice, or by sin; not by God, since for grace to be corrupted is an evil; not by free choice, since no subject corrupts its own perfection[^5]; not by sin, since sin is a pure privation, and a little grace prevails over every fault: therefore since it has nothing to corrupt it, it seems that it is incorruptible.

6. Likewise, if it is corrupted, it is corrupted either into something, or into nothing. If into something, I ask: into what? Nor is there anything to assign, since it is not produced out of anything, but from nothing. If into nothing; on the contrary: nothing that is corrupted withdraws entirely into *non-being*[^6]. If therefore grace is the most noble among all accidents, and God does not permit other accidents to pass into non-being, it seems that He does not permit it of grace either.

### Conclusion.

> Grace is corruptible and can be reduced to nothing.

**I respond:** It must be said that since grace is an accident, it cannot exist apart from the subject in which it is; and since in the subject in which it is, it cannot subsist together with fault, and it happens that fault is in the very subject in which the grace is: it is necessary that grace be something corruptible. — Again, since grace is not produced materially out of anything, but is simply a gratuitous gift and entirely *coming down from above from the Father of lights*[^7]; and since everything that is corrupted passes into that out of which it is produced: it is necessary that grace, just as it is produced from nothing, so be reduced to nothing, when it is corrupted. — But such a mode of corruption belongs to grace not only by reason of its beginning, but also by reason of its proper being or mode of existing. By reason, I say, of its beginning, because, as has been said, just as it is produced from nothing, so it is reduced to nothing, just as is found likewise in other accidents, that they return into that out of which they go forth, when they are produced. — This belongs to it also by reason of its proper being or mode of existing, since, as grace is not caused from the principles of that in which it is, but has one thing for its subject, another for its cause, just as, when light is corrupted, or a likeness in a mirror, or the species itself in the soul, that in which it is is not corrupted, nor does it return to that from which it is, but as far as it is of itself, it passes into nothing: so grace — because it does not have *being* in the soul after the manner of a nature, but after the manner of a habit, as was held before[^8], nor is it produced from the principles of the soul — when it is corrupted, is reduced to nothing. And therefore sin, in which the corruption of grace occurs, is said to be nothing[^9], and among all corruptions it is known to displease most the supreme Author and Preserver of all goods. — Therefore the arguments showing that grace is corrupted must be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that in grace is found the account of an image, just as in the soul; it must be said that the image is found otherwise here and otherwise there. For the soul «is the image of God, because it is capable of God and can be a partaker[^10]», and so it is made for the sake of beatitude and apt for beatitude.

Which beatitude, I say, cannot be in any but an immortal substance; therefore it is necessary that the soul be immortal. But grace is called an image on this ground alone, that it is the reformation of the image; and since that image reformed by grace can be deformed, hence it is that grace can be corrupted. Nor does that argument avail, because the reception of the image is not alike on the one side and the other.

2. To that which is objected, that an accident which does not have its origin from the subject is not changed at the change of the subject; it must be said that this is not on account of this alone, that it has its origin from elsewhere, but because it does not depend on that in which it is, as is clear in the case of a ray and light. But grace not only depends on that from which it is, but also on the soul in which it is, nor does it persist in it except so long as it has its face or mind turned to God[^11].

3. 4. To that which is objected, that to a corruptible thing ought to be given the power of propagating; it must be said that this is true when that thing is apt to receive such a power, and when also that corruptibility is in the thing from a defect of its proper nature; but neither of these belongs to grace. For grace is apt to proceed immediately from God Himself[^12], nor is it corrupted in any way except on account of the turning away of our mind from the rectitude of eternal truth. — And by this is clear the answer to the next, which is objected, that everything that is corrupted grows old in time; for this is true of that which has the cause of its corruption within itself.

5. To that which is asked, by what it is corrupted, whether by God, or by sin, or by free choice; it must be said that grace itself fails in itself. — But if the reason of this be asked, why it fails; this is[^13] on account of the turning away of the human mind. For since grace is not preserved except by the continuation of the influence from the divine goodness upon the face of our mind; when the soul is turned away from God, the influence is not continued, and consequently grace is corrupted; but the soul is turned away through sin: and therefore in a certain manner grace is said to be corrupted through sin, not because sin acts upon grace, but because, when the soul turns itself away through sin and God ceases to inflow, it is necessary that grace fail in itself.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing which is corrupted withdraws entirely into non-being; it must be said that this is true in accidents that have the *being* of a nature, and in those which are caused from the principles of the subject, for the reason that, when the accidents are corrupted, those principles nonetheless remain and are preserved; and therefore, when such accidents are corrupted, they are not[^14] entirely annihilated. But in those accidents which have the *being* of a habit, such as a likeness in the soul and light in the air, it is not true. For the likeness of a dead man, which is in your soul, if it be erased and corrupted from your soul, does not return to that man; nor when light is corrupted does it return to the sun, especially if the corruption of the light occurs through the interposition of a body; unless perhaps someone should say that it returns to its origin, for the reason that it is still preserved in its effective principle, which can produce its like. Since therefore grace stands after the manner of a habit and is produced from nothing, as was held before; therefore that proposition does not hold here. — And if you ask: whence is it that God permits so noble an accident to perish? it is easy enough to answer. For a similar question is, if it be asked: since God loves His friends and loves one holy soul more than He loves heaven and earth; what is it that He permits a holy soul to be separated from Him, and does not permit heaven and earth to be corrupted? To this he who understands rightly will answer that this is fitting to the course of things, and «God so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them perform their proper motions». And therefore, because the treasure of grace is held in earthen vessels, although it is very noble, yet it is easily lost, so long as it is shaken by the storms of temptations.

---

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Longitud. et brevit. vitae*, c. 2, et *de Iuvent. et senect.* etc., c. 3. (c. 5.), ubi et *maior* seq. arg. insinuatur. Vide supra pag. 192, nota 7.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Length and Shortness of Life*, c. 2, and *On Youth and Old Age* etc., c. 3 (c. 5), where also the major premise of the following argument is suggested. See above p. 192, note 7.

la: Vide supra pag. 411, nota 3.

en: See above p. 411, note 3.

la: Dist. 17. p. II. q. 2. — De *maiori* cfr. supra pag. 215, nota 4.

en: Distinction 17, part II, q. 2. — On the major premise cf. above p. 215, note 4.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 117. (c. 12.), ex quo supra pag. 66, nota 2. quaedam allata sunt. — In fine arg. codd. K M Y adiungunt *posse*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 117 (c. 12), from which above on p. 66, note 2, certain things were adduced. — At the end of the argument codices K M Y add *posse*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.); Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11: *Porro autem, quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque conservat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica, corrumpunt.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 (c. 9); Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* III, prose 11: *Moreover, that which is agreeable to each thing preserves each thing, just as those things which are hostile corrupt it.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 20. et 23. (c. 3. seq.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, texts 20 and 23 (c. 3 ff.).

la: Iac. 1, 17. — Pro *et omnino* codd. H K Y *et ideo*.

en: James 1:17. — For *et omnino* ("and entirely") codices H K Y read *et ideo* ("and therefore").

la: Hic q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius pro *cedit* ed. 1 *secedit*.

en: Here, q. 2 following. — A little above, for *cedit* edition 1 reads *secedit*.

la: August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 1. n. 13: *Peccatum quidem non per ipsum [Verbum] factum est; et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant.*

en: Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, tract. 1, n. 13: *Sin indeed was not made through Him [the Word]; and it is manifest that sin is nothing, and that men become nothing when they sin.*

la: August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — De seqq. cfr. supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — On what follows cf. above d. 19, a. 1, q. 1 in the body, and d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1.

la: Gregor., X. Moral. c. 13. n. 27: *Interna quippe facies hominis mens est, in qua nimirum recognoscimur, ut ab auctore nostro diligamur.*

en: Gregory, *Moralia* X, c. 13, n. 27: *For the inner face of a man is his mind, in which indeed we are recognized, that we may be loved by our Author.*

la: Cod. F *produci*.

en: Codex F reads *produci* ("to be produced").

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *dicendum est, hoc esse* pro *hoc est*. Paulo inferius edd., excepta 1, post *avertitur* addunt *per peccatum*, et dein omittunt *anima autem avertitur per peccatum*. Circa finem solut. cod. T post *se avertente* adiungit *a Deo*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *dicendum est, hoc esse* for *hoc est*. A little below the editions, except 1, after *avertitur* add *per peccatum*, and then omit *anima autem avertitur per peccatum*. Toward the end of the solution codex T after *se avertente* adds *a Deo*.

la: Cod. F *nec*, omisso paulo ante *cum*, quae particula deest etiam in non paucis aliis codd., ut C F H O R S Y ee etc.

en: Codex F reads *nec*, with *cum* omitted a little before, which particle is also lacking in not a few other codices, such as C F H O R S Y ee etc. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II two-column PDF-priority inversion), pp. 639–641 (PDF 661–663, offset +22). Raw OCR lines 44697–44816 used for clean running prose and for footnote-marker spacing; the IA djvu OCR for this span interleaves the two columns and splices q3 footers into q4's opener, so the column-band PDF read is authoritative.

**Alignment.** Confirmed: the auto-chunker opener *Quarto quaeritur, utrum gratia sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, an incorruptibilis* matches `title_la` (q4). No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 639 (bottom of right column): QUAESTIO IV title + arg-1 only. Footer ³ printed here belongs to arg-1.
- p. 640: args 2–4, sed contra 1–6, Conclusio, Respondeo, opening of reply 1. Footers ¹–⁹.
- p. 641 (upper portion, before QUAESTIO V): rest of reply 1, replies 2, 3.4, 5, 6. Footers ¹–⁴ (left column). The p.641 right-column footers ⁵–⁷ belong to QUAESTIO V and are excluded.

**Apparatus (14 entries, body-anchor order, one footer per entry, no merges/splits):**
- [^1] = p.639 footer ³ (Aristot. *de Longitud. et brevit. vitae*) — **hand-off RECEIVED from a1-q3**, anchors arg-1 *est corruptibile*.
- [^2]–[^10] = p.640 footers ¹–⁹ (sed contra 1 Augustinus on imago; sed contra 3 *in primo libro ostensum est*; sed contra 4 *senescit in tempore*; sed contra 5 *suam perfectionem*; sed contra 6 *in non-ens*; respondeo *a Patre luminum* Iac.1:17; respondeo *ut prius*; respondeo corollary *dicitur esse nihil* August.in Ioan.; reply 1 *capax Dei... particeps esse potest* August.de Trin.XIV).
- [^11]–[^14] = p.641 footers ¹–⁴ (reply 2 *mentem ad Deum conversam* Gregor.Moral.X; reply 3.4 *procedere* cod.F; reply 5 *hoc est* cod.cc/ed.1 variant; reply 6 *non⁴ omnino annihilantur* cod.F nec variant).

**Hand-offs.** Received: p.639 footer ³ from a1-q3 (now [^1]). Forwarded: none — q4 closes cleanly before QUAESTIO V (raw 44817 / p.641 mid-page); q5's p.641 footers ⁵–⁷ stay with q5.

**has_scholion = false.** The SCHOLION I+II printed on p.639 belongs to QUAESTIO III (confirmed by eyes-on: it is the q3 commentator-roll and the *fieri/creari/corrumpi* corollary). QUAESTIO IV has no scholion; its body ends with reply 6.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0