collection: Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis

title: Quaest. 7, Art. 1

source_text:
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### Quaestio VII. *Utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate.*

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primum est, utrum *esse* divinum sit summe necessarium.

Secundum est, utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas[^p106-5].

### Articulus I. *Utrum esse divinum sit summe necessarium.*

Quaeritur ergo, utrum *esse* divinum sit summe necessarium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Omne immutabile et aeternum est summe necessarium[^p106-6]; sed divinum *esse* est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

2. Item, necesse est, omne, quod est nobilitatis et perfectionis, poni in Deo in summo; sed constans est, quod[^p106-7] necessitas est magis quam scientia: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne, quod ita est, quod non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse, est necessarium in summo; sed divinum *esse* est huiusmodi[^p106-8]: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne, quod habet *esse* a se et per se et secundum se, est omnino necessarium; sed tale est *esse* divinum, cum sit primum: ergo etc.

5. Item, impossibile est, necessitatem esse in effectu nisi per causam: ergo si in Deo non est

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necessitas, in nullo est necessitas: ergo nihil est necessarium. Sed si nihil est necessarium, nihil est impossibile: ergo omnia sunt possibilia: ergo aliquid simul esse et non esse est possibile. Sed hoc est absurdum[^p107-1]: ergo etc.

6. Item, impossibile est, necessitatem esse in composito nisi per necessitatem existentem in simplici; ergo si simplicissimum caret necessitate, impossibile est, quod in aliqua complexione vel compositione sit ponere necessitatem. Sed hoc est absurdum, quod nulla argumentatio necessaria sit[^p107-2]: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Omne necessarium est determinatum ad sic et non aliter se habendum; omne determinatum ad aliquid est finitum[^p107-3]; sed divinum *esse* est infinitum: ergo etc.

2. Item, nihil, quod est indifferens ad opposita, est necessarium; sed divinum *posse*, *velle* et *agere* est indifferens ad opposita: ergo non[^p107-4] est necessarium. Sed divinum *posse*, *velle* et *agere* est divinum *esse:* ergo divinum *esse* non est necessarium.

3. Item, nulli immutabili potest attribui aliquid mutabile, ergo nulli summe necessario potest attribui aliquid contingens; sed Deo attribuitur aliquid contingens: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut *impossibilitas* repugnat potentiae, ita *necessitas* voluntati; sed divina potentia tanta est, quod omnia sunt ei possibilia, nec ponitur aliquo modo impossibilitas in Deo[^p107-5]: ergo cum *velle* Dei sit perfectissimum, videtur, quod non patiatur necessitatem in *esse* divino.

5. Item, si causa est necessaria, et effectus[^p107-6]; sed Deus est causa omnium prima et summa et immediata: ergo si in Deo est necessitas, omnia sunt necessaria.

6. Item, quanto aliquid contingentius, tanto est indifferentius, et quanto indifferentius, tanto communius, et quanto communius, tanto simplicius[^p107-7]: ergo *a primo*, quanto aliquid contingentius, tanto simplicius: ergo simplicissimum est contingentissimum, non ergo necessarium.

7. Item, omne necessarium scibile, sicut omne probabile opinabile[^p107-8]; sed omne scibile vel est principium demonstrationis, vel demonstratum; divinum autem *esse* neutrum est: ergo etc.

8. Item, quanto aliquid magis est necessarium, tanto est magis certum, et quanto magis certum, tanto magis notum[^p107-9]; sed divinum *esse* est maxime occultum: ergo etc.

9. Item, sicut frustra movetur quis, quia appetit impossibile[^p107-10], ita, quia timet necessarium: ergo si divina Maiestas est necessitas, ergo nullo modo est timenda. Sed hoc est falsum et absurdum: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Divinum esse est necessarium perfectissima necessitate immutabilitatis.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod triplex est necessitas: quaedam *omnino extrinseca*, quaedam *partim intrinseca* et *partim extrinseca*, et quaedam *omnino intrinseca*. Necessitas *omnino extrinseca* est illa, quae ortum habet a principio, quod est *extra*, nihil cooperante passo[^p107-11]; et haec dupliciter habet esse: vel respectu operum *naturalium*, vel respectu *voluntariorum;* et sic duplex est necessitas, scilicet *coactionis* et *violentiae*. — Necessitas vero *partim intra*, *partim extra* est quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco, respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum *principii moventis*, vel per modum *termini quiescentis;* et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet *inevitabilitatis* et *indigentiae*. — Quaedam vero est necessitas *omnino intrinseca*, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas *immutabilitatis* et independentiae; et talis necessitas *secundum quid* reperitur in creatura, *simpliciter* autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia. Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa.

Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in *esse divino*, quia est *in se ipso* et *a se ipso*. Quia autem *in*[^p107-12] *se ipso*, ideo caret *componente* principio, aut *sustentante;* ideo nec potest mutari nec deficere.

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Quia autem *a se ipso*, ideo caret *producente* et creante; ideo nec potest *dependere* nec *incipere;* ac per hoc summam et perfectissimam habet necessitatem, quae excludit omnem mutabilitatem et dependentiam, inevitabilitatem et indigentiam, coactionem et violentiam, quae necessitatem dicunt diminutam; et econtra ponit summam permanentiam et stabilitatem, summam sufficientiam et libertatem. Quia enim est *se ipsa*, ideo est permanens et stabilissima; quia vero *sui gratia*, ideo liberalis et sufficientissima; quia vero est *se ipsa* et *sui gratia*, ideo est *alpha et omega*[^p108-1]; et ideo cetera sunt *ab ipsa*, et cetera *propter ipsam*, sive necessaria sive contingentia. Sicut enim omnia *mobilia* manant ab uno immobili primo et ad illud reducuntur; sic omnia *contingentia* a necessario fluunt et in illud reducuntur[^p108-2]. Est igitur necessitas divini *esse* omnis *esse*, *vivere* et *intelligere* origo et complementum; et omnia clamant, primum principium esse necessarium, sive sint necessaria sive contingentia. — Et ideo rationes concedendae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne determinatum ad aliquid est finitum; dicendum, quod est determinatio duplex, scilicet per *arctationem*, cuiusmodi est illa, quae fit per *additionem* unius super alterum, sicut additur dispositio super potentiam materiae incompletam; et est determinatio per *completionem*, sicut summe bonum est ad bonum agendum, quia non potest deficere in faciendo malum. Primo modo determinatio repugnat infinitati secundo vero modo non repugnat[^p108-3]; et haec quidem determinatio convenit necessitati, secundum quod est in Deo, et non primo modo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil indifferens ad opposita est necessarium; dicendum, quod divinum *posse* et *velle* et *agere* dicitur *indifferens ad opposita* non ratione sui in *se ipso*, sed ratione indifferentiae in *effectu producendo*. Unde indifferentia illa non ponit aliquam vertibilitatem in divino *posse;* sed ponit potestatem unam et simplicissimam, super omnia opposita omnipotentem, ita quod ad nullum illorum restringi potest[^p108-4]; et hoc magis necessitati consonat, quam repugnet.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulli summe necessario potest attribui aliquid contingens; dicendum, quod cum aliquid contingenter praedicatur de Deo, ibi in praedicato illo clauditur et *principale significatum* et *connotatum;* et quantum ad *principale significatum* non est aliud quod Deus, quantum autem ad *connotatum* est effectus; et ratione primi, cui competit praedicatio, *necessario* inest; ratione vero secundi dicitur inesse *contingenter*, ac per hoc non ponitur contingentia esse *in Deo*, sed potius *a Deo*. In huiusmodi praedicationibus divinum *esse* intra se nullam praedicationem recipit, quae non includat completissimam necessitatem. — Quod autem dicitur totum illud dictum *contingens*, scilicet Deum salvare Petrum; hoc est, quia talis est natura totius copulati, quod fit in eo denominatio a minus nobili, ut dicatur *falsa* propositio copulativa, cuius altera pars falsa, et *contingens*, cuius altera pars est contingens. Et ratio huius est, quia facilius est rem destrui quam construi[^p108-5]; et *habitus* impermixtus debet esse privationi et eius denominatio; denominatio autem *privationis* se habet contrario modo, quia de necessitate intellectus positionis et habitus aliquo modo in eius clauditur intellectu.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessitas repugnat voluntati, ut impossibilitas potestati; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet de illa necessitate, quae est *ab extra*, cuiusmodi est necessitas *violentiae* et *coactionis;* de illa autem necessitate, quae est *intrinseca*, cuiusmodi est necessitas *immutabilitatis*, veritatem non habet, sicut ex praecedentibus apparet.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si causa necessaria, et effectus; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus quinto de Civitate Dei[^p108-6], causarum aliae sunt tantum *factae;* aliae vero *facientes et factae;* tertiae vero sunt *facientes tantum*. Causas autem *tantum factas* vocat causas naturales, quae determinatae sunt ad unum cursum; causas vero *facientes et factas*, liberum arbitrium et voluntatem; causas vero *factivas tantum*, ipsam divinam providentiam. Dicit autem, causas naturales *factas* esse, non *facientes*, non quia nihil faciant, sed quia sic faciunt, secundum quod est eis inditum, non habendo dominium super actum suum, quemadmodum habet liberum arbitrium, et tales sunt unigeneae suis partibus et conformes; et in huiusmodi praedicta propositio veritatem habet. De causa vero *faciente*, quae quidem potens est efficere et non efficere per eandem vim propter dominium super actionem et

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effectum consequentem, non habet veritatem. Sicut enim talis causa non mutatur propter effectuum mutabilitatem et differentiam, sic etiam nec contingens esse ponitur propter contingentiam in suis effectibus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid indifferentius, tanto communius; dicendum, quod est *communitas* duplex, scilicet per *abstractionem*, et per *indenominationem*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod quanto aliquid indifferentius, tanto communius; hoc intelligitur de communitate per *indenominationem*, per quem modum dicimus, quod contrariorum unicum est subiectum; quod maxime verum est in his quorum alterum non habet circa subiectum determinatam causam[^p109-1]. Cum autem adiungit, quod quanto aliquid communius, tanto simplicius; illud intelligitur de communitate per *abstractionem;* unde ex hoc non concluditur, quod contingentia ponant simplicitatem; quin potius includunt mutabilitatem, quae excludit summam simplicitatem; propter quod summa simplicitas non potest nisi in summe necessario reperiri. Quia ergo divinum *esse* est simplicissimum; ideo necesse est, ipsum esse non contingens, sed necessarium.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne necessarium est scibile, et omne scibile est principium demonstrationis, vel per demonstrationem conclusum; dicendum, quod est necessarium *in genere*, et est necessarium *extra genus;* et hoc quidem est dupliciter: vel extra *genus determinatum*, vel extra *omne genus simpliciter*[^p109-2]. Necessarium ergo *extra omne genus simpliciter*, hoc est in solo Deo, qui est supra et extra omne genus entis, quia in genere esse non potest, nec *per se* nec *per appropriationem;* et tale necessarium omnem demonstrationem antecedit et supergreditur, quia nullam definitionem prorsus habere potest[^p109-3]. — Quod ergo dicitur: omne necessarium est principium demonstrationis, vel demonstratum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessario, quod est *determinati generis*, vel quod ad *determinatum genus potest appropriari*, sicut sunt communes animi conceptiones, quae, in quantum appropriantur, demonstrationem ingrediuntur. Unde ratio illa non concludit, quod divinum *esse* est necessarium ad genus determinatum coarctatum.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto magis necessarium, tanto magis certum; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse certius altero seu notius dupliciter: vel *simpliciter*, vel *quoad nos*[^p109-4]. Prima igitur propositio veritatem habet, secundum quod intelligitur de maiori certitudine *simpliciter*, non autem, secundum quod intelligitur de certitudine *quoad nos*, pro eo quod illa quae sunt certissima et luculentissima in se ipsis obscura nobis videntur propter defectum ex parte intellectus creati; et ideo Philosophus[^p109-5] dicit, quod « sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem, sic oculus noster ad manifestissima naturae ». Nihilominus tamen, licet divinum *esse* secundum plenitudinem suae claritatis sit nobis occultum, quamdiu sumus in statu viatorum, certissimum nobis est et indubitabile, Deum esse, secundum quod ex praecedentibus quaestionibus[^p109-6] manifeste apparet.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessarium non est timendum, sicut nec impossibile appetendum; dicendum, quod necessarium in *eventu* vel in effectu formidandum non est, quia nihil prodest formido, ubi necesse est sic evenire; necessarium autem secundum *statum intrinsecum*, quod potest sine sui mutatione retribuere sempiternam gloriam, vel sempiternum supplicium; hoc, inquam, est maxime formidandum et propter acquirendam gratiam et propter declinandam poenam, quia tale necessarium voluntatis liberalitatem et aequitatis iustitiam non excludit, secundum quod in sequenti quaestione melius apparebit.

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### Question VII. *Whether trinity can stand with supreme necessity.*

Next it is asked whether trinity can stand with supreme necessity. And concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine *being* is supremely necessary.

The second is whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together[^p106-5].

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is supremely necessary.*

It is asked, then, whether the divine *being* is supremely necessary. And that it is, it seems.

1. Everything immutable and eternal is supremely necessary[^p106-6]; but the divine *being* is of this kind: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is necessary that everything which belongs to nobility and perfection be posited in God in the highest degree; but it is certain that[^p106-7] necessity is more than knowledge: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is such that it cannot not be, nor be thought not to be, is necessary in the highest degree; but the divine *being* is of this kind[^p106-8]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything which has *being* from itself and through itself and according to itself is altogether necessary; but such is the divine *being*, since it is first: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that necessity be in an effect except through a cause: therefore if in God there is not

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necessity, in nothing is there necessity: therefore nothing is necessary. But if nothing is necessary, nothing is impossible: therefore all things are possible: therefore it is possible for something at once to be and not to be. But this is absurd[^p107-1]: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is impossible that there be necessity in the composite except through a necessity existing in the simple; therefore if the most simple lacks necessity, it is impossible that necessity be posited in any combination or composition. But this is absurd, that no argumentation should be necessary[^p107-2]: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Everything necessary is determined to being disposed thus and not otherwise; everything determined to something is finite[^p107-3]; but the divine *being* is infinite: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nothing that is indifferent to opposites is necessary; but the divine *being able*, *willing* and *acting* is indifferent to opposites: therefore it is not[^p107-4] necessary. But the divine *being able*, *willing* and *acting* is the divine *being:* therefore the divine *being* is not necessary.

3. Likewise, to nothing immutable can anything mutable be attributed, therefore to nothing supremely necessary can anything contingent be attributed; but something contingent is attributed to God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as *impossibility* is repugnant to power, so *necessity* is to will; but the divine power is so great that all things are possible to it, nor is impossibility posited in God in any mode[^p107-5]: therefore since the *willing* of God is most perfect, it seems that it does not suffer necessity in the divine *being*.

5. Likewise, if the cause is necessary, the effect is also[^p107-6]; but God is the first and highest and immediate cause of all things: therefore if there is necessity in God, all things are necessary.

6. Likewise, the more contingent a thing is, the more indifferent it is, and the more indifferent, the more common, and the more common, the more simple[^p107-7]: therefore *from the first*, the more contingent a thing is, the more simple: therefore the most simple is the most contingent, and therefore not necessary.

7. Likewise, everything necessary is knowable, just as everything probable is matter of opinion[^p107-8]; but everything knowable is either a principle of demonstration or something demonstrated; but the divine *being* is neither: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the more necessary a thing is, the more certain it is, and the more certain, the more known[^p107-9]; but the divine *being* is supremely hidden: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, just as one is moved in vain because he desires the impossible[^p107-10], so too because he fears the necessary: therefore if the divine Majesty is necessity, then it is in no way to be feared. But this is false and absurd: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The divine being is necessary with the most perfect necessity of immutability.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that necessity is threefold: one *wholly extrinsic*, one *partly intrinsic* and *partly extrinsic*, and one *wholly intrinsic*. Necessity *wholly extrinsic* is that which has its origin from a principle which is *outside*, the patient cooperating in nothing[^p107-11]; and this has being in two ways: either with respect to *natural* works, or with respect to *voluntary* ones; and thus necessity is twofold, namely of *coercion* and of *violence*. — But necessity *partly within*, *partly without* is that which is in some way from an intrinsic principle regarding something outside, either by way of a *moving principle*, or by way of a *resting term;* and thus necessity is spoken of in two ways, namely of *inevitability* and of *need*. — But there is a necessity *wholly intrinsic*, which is in the thing from its own nature; and this is the necessity of *immutability* and of independence; and such necessity is found *in a certain respect* in the creature, but *simply* it cannot be found except in the creating essence. For it alone is that which admits no dependence; but the rest, since they are created, necessarily depend on it.

Now this necessity is necessarily posited in the *divine being*, because it is *in itself* and *from itself*. And because it is *in*[^p107-12] *itself*, it therefore lacks a *composing* principle, or a *sustaining* one; therefore it can neither be changed nor fail.

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And because it is *from itself*, it therefore lacks anything *producing* and creating it; therefore it can neither *depend* nor *begin;* and on this account it has the highest and most perfect necessity, which excludes all mutability and dependence, inevitability and need, coercion and violence, which speak of a diminished necessity; and on the contrary it posits the highest permanence and stability, the highest sufficiency and freedom. For because it is *itself*, it is therefore permanent and most stable; but because it is *for its own sake*, it is therefore liberal and most sufficient; and because it is *itself* and *for its own sake*, it is therefore the *alpha and omega*[^p108-1]; and therefore the rest are *from it*, and the rest are *for its sake*, whether necessary or contingent. For just as all *mobile* things flow forth from one immobile first and are led back to it; so all *contingent* things flow from the necessary and are led back to it[^p108-2]. The necessity of the divine *being*, therefore, is the origin and completion of all *being*, *living* and *understanding;* and all things cry out that the first principle is necessary, whether they be necessary or contingent. — And therefore the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

1. To the objection that everything determined to something is finite, it must be said that determination is twofold, namely by *restriction*, of which kind is that which comes about by the *addition* of one thing upon another, as a disposition is added upon the incomplete potency of matter; and there is determination by *completion*, as the supreme good is determined to doing good, because it cannot fail by doing evil. In the first mode determination is repugnant to infinity but in the second mode it is not repugnant[^p108-3]; and it is this determination that befits necessity as it is in God, and not the first mode.

2. To the objection that nothing indifferent to opposites is necessary, it must be said that the divine *being able* and *willing* and *acting* is called *indifferent to opposites* not by reason of itself in *itself*, but by reason of an indifference in the *effect to be produced*. Whence that indifference does not posit any vertibility in the divine *being able;* but it posits one most simple power, omnipotent over all opposites, such that it cannot be restricted to any one of them[^p108-4]; and this is more consonant with necessity than repugnant to it.

3. To the objection that nothing contingent can be attributed to what is supremely necessary, it must be said that when something is predicated contingently of God, there is enclosed in that predicate both the *principal significate* and the *connoted;* and as regards the *principal significate* it is nothing other than God, but as regards the *connoted* it is an effect; and by reason of the first, to which the predication belongs, it is in Him *necessarily;* but by reason of the second it is said to be in Him *contingently*, and on this account contingency is not posited to be *in God*, but rather *from God*. In predications of this kind the divine *being* receives within itself no predication that does not include the most complete necessity. — But that the whole dictum is called *contingent*, namely that God saves Peter, this is because the nature of the whole conjunction is such that the denomination in it comes from the less noble part, so that a copulative proposition is called *false* when one of its parts is false, and *contingent* when one of its parts is contingent. And the reason for this is that it is easier for a thing to be destroyed than to be constructed[^p108-5]; and a *habit* ought to be unmixed with privation, and so ought its denomination; but the denomination of *privation* holds in the contrary way, because of necessity the understanding of position and of habit is in some way enclosed in its understanding.

4. To the objection that necessity is repugnant to will, as impossibility is to power, it must be said that this holds true of that necessity which is *from outside*, of which kind is the necessity of *violence* and of *coercion;* but of that necessity which is *intrinsic*, of which kind is the necessity of *immutability*, it does not hold true, as is clear from what has gone before.

5. To the objection that if the cause is necessary, the effect is also, it must be said that, as Augustine says in the fifth book of *The City of God*[^p108-6], of causes some are only *made;* others are *making and made;* and the third are *making only*. The causes *only made* he calls natural causes, which are determined to a single course; the causes *making and made*, free choice and will; the causes *productive only*, the divine providence itself. And he says that natural causes are *made*, not *making*, not because they do nothing, but because they so act, according to what is implanted in them, not having dominion over their act, as free choice has, and such causes are of one kind with their parts and conformed to them; and in these the aforesaid proposition holds true. But of a *making* cause, which is able to effect and not to effect by the same power on account of its dominion over its action and

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the consequent effect, it does not hold true. For just as such a cause is not changed on account of the mutability and difference of its effects, so neither is it posited to be contingent on account of the contingency in its effects.

6. To the objection that the more indifferent a thing is, the more common it is, it must be said that *commonness* is twofold, namely by *abstraction*, and by *non-denomination*. When therefore it is said that the more indifferent a thing is, the more common it is, this is understood of commonness by *non-denomination*, in which mode we say that there is a single subject of contraries; which is most true in those of which neither has a determinate cause in regard to the subject[^p109-1]. But when it adds that the more common a thing is, the more simple it is, that is understood of commonness by *abstraction;* whence from this it is not concluded that contingent things posit simplicity; rather they include mutability, which excludes supreme simplicity; on account of which supreme simplicity cannot be found except in what is supremely necessary. Since therefore the divine *being* is most simple, it is therefore necessary that it be not contingent, but necessary.

7. To the objection that everything necessary is knowable, and everything knowable is a principle of demonstration or concluded through demonstration, it must be said that there is the necessary *in a genus*, and there is the necessary *outside a genus;* and this in two ways: either outside a *determinate genus*, or outside *every genus simply*[^p109-2]. The necessary *outside every genus simply*, then, is in God alone, who is above and outside every genus of being, because He cannot be in a genus, neither *through Himself* nor *by appropriation;* and such a necessary precedes and surpasses all demonstration, because it can have no definition whatever[^p109-3]. — As to what is said, then, that everything necessary is a principle of demonstration or something demonstrated, it must be said that this is understood of the necessary which is *of a determinate genus*, or which *can be appropriated* to a *determinate genus*, as are the common conceptions of the mind, which, inasmuch as they are appropriated, enter into demonstration. Whence that reasoning does not conclude that the divine *being* is necessary as restricted to a determinate genus.

8. To the objection that the more necessary a thing is, the more certain it is, it must be said that a thing is said to be more certain or more known than another in two ways: either *simply*, or *as regards us*[^p109-4]. The first proposition, then, holds true inasmuch as it is understood of greater certitude *simply*, but not inasmuch as it is understood of certitude *as regards us*, for the reason that the things which are most certain and most lucid in themselves seem obscure to us on account of a defect on the part of the created understanding; and therefore the Philosopher[^p109-5] says that "as the eye of the owl is to the light, so is our eye to the most manifest things of nature." Nevertheless, although the divine *being* in the fullness of its clarity is hidden from us so long as we are in the state of wayfarers, it is most certain and indubitable to us that God is, as is manifestly clear from the preceding questions[^p109-6].

9. To the objection that the necessary is not to be feared, just as neither is the impossible to be desired, it must be said that the necessary in the *event* or in the effect is not to be dreaded, because dread profits nothing where it is necessary that things so come about; but the necessary according to an *intrinsic state*, which can without change of itself render everlasting glory or everlasting punishment — this, I say, is most to be dreaded, both for acquiring grace and for avoiding punishment, because such a necessary does not exclude the liberality of will and the justice of equity, as will appear better in the following question.

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la: Haec secunda pars: *Secundum est... necessitas*, deficiens in D, a nobis pro more auctoris suppleta est.

en: This second part, *The second is... necessity*, lacking in D, has been supplied by us according to the author's custom.

la: Vide supra q. 5. a. 1. et q. 6. a. 1.

en: See above, q. 5, a. 1 and q. 6, a. 1.

la: Cod. *quia*. — Defectus esse videtur in cod.

en: The codex has *quia* ("because"). — There seems to be a defect in the codex.

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. 1. a. 1, ubi etiam principia seqq. argg. insinuantur.

en: As was shown above, q. 1, a. 1, where the principles of the following arguments are also intimated.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 9. seqq. (III. c. 3.), qui ibid. IX text. 17. (VIII. c. 8.) ait: Si enim ipsa [necessaria] non essent, nihil esset. — Superius post *in Deo*, contextu exigente, supplevimus *non*.

en: Compare Aristotle, IV *Metaphysics*, text 9 ff. (III, c. 3), who in the same work, IX, text 17 (VIII, c. 8), says: "For if these [necessary things] were not, nothing would be." — Above, after *in Deo* ("in God"), the context requiring it, we have supplied *non* ("not").

la: Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3. seqq.

en: See Aristotle, I *Posterior Analytics*, c. 3 ff.

la: Cod. omittit *est* post *necessarium*, pro *omne* ponit *esse* ante *determinatum*, et iterum omittit *finitum*. Respectu habito ad solutionem huius arg., sic completius illud formavimus. — Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.): Quod non contingit aliter se habere *necesse* dicimus ita se habere. Ibid. IX. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.) potentiae *irrationales* dicuntur esse determinatae ad unum, sive unius tantum factivae, potentiae *rationales* vero indifferentes ad plura sive contraria.

en: The codex omits *est* after *necessarium*, puts *esse* for *omne* before *determinatum*, and again omits *finitum*. With regard had to the solution of this argument, we have formed it more completely thus. — Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 6 (IV, c. 5): "What cannot be otherwise, we say is *necessarily* so." In the same work, IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5), *irrational* powers are said to be determined to one thing, or productive of one thing only, but *rational* powers indifferent to many things or to contraries.

la: Perperam omittit D *non*.

en: D wrongly omits *non* ("not").

la: Vide Luc. 1, 37.

en: See Luke 1:37.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 61, nota 1, et Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 7. (X. c. 8.). — De *minori* vide supra pag. 98, nota 11. verba August.

en: Compare above, p. 61, note 1, and Aristotle, XI *Metaphysics*, c. 7 (X, c. 8). — On the *minor*, see above, p. 98, note 11, the words of Augustine.

la: Vide supra pag. 20, nota 6.

en: See above, p. 20, note 6.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.); *minor* ibid. et c. 2. seqq. insinuatur.

en: According to Aristotle, I *Posterior Analytics*, c. 26 (c. 33); the *minor* is intimated in the same place and in c. 2 ff.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2; I. Phys text. 2. seqq. et IV. Metaph. test. 8. seqq. (III. c. 3.).

en: Compare Aristotle, I *Posterior Analytics*, c. 2; I *Physics*, text 2 ff.; and IV *Metaphysics*, text 8 ff. (III, c. 3).

la: Aristot., II. Rhet. c. 3. (c. 2.): Nemo vero expetit ea quae a se fieri non posse videntur. Cfr. ibid. c. 23. (c. 19.). et V. Polit. c. 11. (c. 9.): Nemo enim sibi impossibilia aggreditur.

en: Aristotle, II *Rhetoric*, c. 3 (c. 2): "No one seeks the things which seem impossible for him to bring about." Compare the same work, c. 23 (c. 19), and V *Politics*, c. 11 (c. 9): "For no one undertakes things impossible for himself."

la: Ita describit Aristot. III. Ethic. c. 1. *violentum* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. et 5.). — De diversis acceptionibus necessitatis vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.). De necessitate *indigentiae* cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 22.

en: So Aristotle describes the *violent* in III *Ethics*, c. 1 (compare II *Sentences*, d. 25, p. II, q. 4 and 5). — On the various senses of necessity, see Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 6 (IV, c. 5). On the necessity of *need*, compare Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 22.

la: D hic male omittit *in*, quod primo loco posuit.

en: D here wrongly omits *in*, which it had put in the first place.

la: Apoc. 1, 8. — Superius respicitur Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi illum hominem vocat liberum, « qui est sui ipsius et non alterius gratia » (cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2.).

en: Apocalypse 1:8. — Above, Aristotle is in view, I *Metaphysics*, c. 3 (c. 2), where he calls that man free "who is for his own sake and not for another's" (compare vol. II, p. 592, note 2).

la: Vide supra q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 13. et 20. (Pro *immobili primo* D *mobili primo*). — Lib. de Causis, propos. 18: Res omnes habent *essentiam* per ens primum, et res *vivae* omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res *intelligibiles* omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam.

en: See above, q. 1, a. 1, *fundamenta* 13 and 20. (For *immobili primo* D has *mobili primo*.) — *Book of Causes*, proposition 18: "All things have *essence* through the first being, and all *living* things are moved through their essence on account of the first life, and all *intelligible* things have knowledge on account of the first intelligence."

la: Cfr. supra q. 3. a. 1. ad 4. et q. 4. a. 1.

en: Compare above, q. 3, a. 1, reply to 4, and q. 4, a. 1.

la: Vide supra q. 6. a. 1. ad 11. seqq.

en: See above, q. 6, a. 1, reply to 11 ff.

la: Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Quemadmodum in aliis corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his destruere quam construere. Cfr. II. Ethic. c. 6. et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31. De habitu et privatione cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 1. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 6. (c. 31.) docet, quod inesse appareat « facere in non-facere et omnino in negatione affirmatio ». — Similis solut. habetur supra q. 6. a. 1. ad 3. 4.

en: Aristotle, VII *Topics*, c. 3 (c. 4): "Just as in other things it is easier to corrupt than to make, so also in these it is easier to destroy than to construct." Compare II *Ethics*, c. 6, and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 4, § 31. On habit and privation, compare above, p. 47, note 1. Aristotle, II *Sophistical Refutations*, c. 6 (c. 31), teaches that "doing is seen to be present in not-doing, and in general affirmation in negation." — A similar solution is had above, q. 6, a. 1, replies to 3 and 4.

la: Cap. 9. n. 4: Causa itaque rerum, quae *facit* nec fit, Deus est. Aliae vero causae et *faciunt* et *fiunt*, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. Corporales autem causae, quae *magis fiunt quam faciunt*, non sunt inter causas efficientes annumerandae, quoniam hoc possunt, quod ex ipsis faciunt spirituum voluntates. — De fine solut. cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. ad 8. et 9. ac q. 6. a. 1. ad 11. seqq.

en: Chapter 9, n. 4: "The cause of things, then, which *makes* and is not made, is God. But other causes both *make* and *are made*, as are all created spirits, above all the rational ones. But bodily causes, which *are made rather than make*, are not to be numbered among efficient causes, since they can do only what the wills of spirits do out of them." — On the end of the solution, compare above, q. 2, a. 1, replies to 8 and 9, and q. 6, a. 1, reply to 11 ff.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Oppositis*, docet, alterum oppositorum non necessario eidem *susceptibili* [i. e. subiecto] inesse, nisi unum insit naturaliter, ut igni calidum esse. Lib. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): Idem contrariorum susceptivum. — De seq. propos. cfr. supra pag. 7, nota 9.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On Opposites*, teaches that one of two opposites is not necessarily present in the same *receptive thing* [that is, subject], unless one is present by nature, as being hot is in fire. Book II *Topics*, c. 3 (c. 7): "The same thing is receptive of contraries." — On the following proposition, compare above, p. 7, note 9.

la: Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.), agens de *perfecto*, utitur distinctione: *in aliquo genere* et *in unoquoque genere*. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4.

en: Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 21 (IV, c. 16), treating of the *perfect*, uses the distinction: *in some genus* and *in each genus*. Compare I *Sentences*, d. 8, p. II, q. 4.

la: Vide supra pag. 77, nota 2. — De communibus animi conceptionibus cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 6. et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7. In fine solutionis post *divinum esse* expunximus, contextu suffragante, *non*.

en: See above, p. 77, note 2. — On the common conceptions of the mind, compare above, p. 79, note 6, and Aristotle, I *Posterior Analytics*, c. 7. At the end of the solution, after *divinum esse* ("the divine being"), we have struck out *non* ("not"), the context supporting it.

la: Hac distinctione utitur Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et I. Phys. text. 2. seqq.

en: Aristotle uses this distinction, I *Posterior Analytics*, c. 2, and I *Physics*, text 2 ff.

la: Libr. II. Metaph. text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.).

en: Book II *Metaphysics*, text 1 (the shorter I, c. 1).

en: Question 1, a. 1. — From this place it can be gathered that this question is as genuine as the question cited, which Peter John Olivi attributes to St. Bonaventure in express words.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L25101–L25570**), with every heading, subtitle, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-106..109.png`). The body raw is usable on all four leaves (p. 108's is the noisiest, *jwr* / *deiien-tlentiam* / *iTermanens*, every word re-read on the plate); footers usable, digits corrected below. Fresh literal English translation. **Four printed pages, 106–109; 28 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** The chunk opens on **p. 106**, two-fifths down the leaf, below `bon-qmt-q6-a2`'s close: **`QUAESTIO VII.`** full measure with its italic subtitle *Utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate*, the opener *Consequenter quaeritur…* with its two *praeambula*, **`ARTICULUS I.`** with its subtitle *Utrum esse divinum sit summe necessarium*, the article's opener and **arguments 1–5** — re-read here on a full-width crop at 0.72× and the column regions at 1.0×, not adopted from the hand-off. **Nothing after either heading or either subtitle is anchored; the opener's second *praeambulum* carries n. 5** (*…summa necessitas*⁵), confirmed. Then: **six arguments** that the divine being is supremely necessary (marginale `Fundamenta.`); a **`Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` series of nine** (marginale `Ad oppositum.`), letter-spaced small caps, in-column; **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column; a *Respondeo* that distinguishes a **threefold necessity** — *omnino extrinseca* (of coercion and violence), *partim intrinseca et partim extrinseca* (of inevitability and need), *omnino intrinseca* (of immutability and independence) — and places the last, *simpliciter*, in the creating essence alone, because it is *in se ipso* (no composing or sustaining principle) and *a se ipso* (no producing principle); and **nine replies for nine arguments, none combined**, answering the **`Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ`** series.

### ⭐⭐ BOUNDARY 13 (p. 109): IT FORWARDS, SPLIT 6/1 — AND THE INDEX WAS RIGHT AT BOTH ENDS

**p. 109 was extracted ALONE and read before pp. 107–108 were pulled**, per the standing order. The raw predicted a shared leaf (`ARTICULUS II.` at L25571, ~97 lines into p. 109) and **the plate confirms it**: Article I's replies 5 (its tail) through 9 fill both columns to about three-fifths of the leaf, closing *…secundum quod in sequenti quaestione melius apparebit.*; **`ARTICULUS II.`** then stands full measure with its subtitle *Utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas*, its opener and **argument 1**. The register holds **seven** entries: **nn. 1–6 are this chunk's** (reply 6 *causam*¹, reply 7 *simpliciter*² and *potest*³, reply 8 *nos*⁴, *Philosophus*⁵, *quaestionibus*⁶); **n. 7** (*Sive Quaest. 65 dialog.… I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. et 2.*) anchors at Article II's argument 1, *Augustinus ad Orosium*⁷, and **forwards to `bon-qmt-q7-a2`**. The raw's six marks in the Art. I region match the six entries — no spurious mark on this leaf.

▶ **Thirteen boundaries, ELEVEN shapes: 5/1 · LEAF EDGE · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0 · 1/6 · 3/2 · LEAF EDGE · 5/0 · 3/1 · 4/4 · 6/1** — **11 forwarding / 2 leaf edges.** ⭐ **The index line `q7-a1 106–109` is right at BOTH ends** — the second line in the work verified sound on both sides (after `q5-a2`), and **this span is shared at both ends**, which `q5-a2`'s was not. ⛔ A line being right is a fact about that line. The raw band was exact a fourth time: L25101 → L25570 ends at the article's last word. ★ The standing order paid a **tenth** time.

### ⭐ THE WHOLE CHUNK RESTS ON CODEX D ALONE

`q6-a2` recorded that from p. 104 n. 4 *omnes codd. desinunt, excepto D*, and that p. 106 n. 5 shows D still alone at Quaestio VII's opener. **This chunk bears it out on every leaf**: the register's variant notes name D or *Cod.* in the singular and nothing else — p. 106 n. 5 (the second *praeambulum* supplied *pro more auctoris*), n. 7 (*Cod. quia. — Defectus esse videtur in cod.*); p. 107 n. 1 (*non* supplied *contextu exigente*), n. 3 (Contra 1 **re-formed by Quaracchi** "with regard had to the solution of this argument" — the codex omits *est*, puts *esse* for *omne*, omits *finitum*), n. 4 (*Perperam omittit D non*), n. 12 (*D hic male omittit in*); p. 108 n. 2 (*Pro immobili primo D mobili primo*); p. 109 n. 3 (*non* **struck out** after *divinum esse* at reply 7's end, *contextu suffragante*). ⚠ **Two of Quaracchi's conjectures shape an argument's very wording** (Contra 1, reply 7's last sentence), and both are recorded here because a reader of the English is reading an editor's reconstruction at those two places.

### ⭐⭐ QUARACCHI ARGUES FOR THIS QUESTION'S AUTHENTICITY, IN A FOOTNOTE — A SECOND TIME IN THE WORK

**p. 109 n. 6**, at reply 8's *ex praecedentibus quaestionibus*⁶: *Quaest. 1. a. 1. — Ex hoc loco colligi potest, hanc quaestionem esse aeque genuinam, ac citata quaestio, quam Petrus Ioannis Olivi S. Bonaventurae expressis verbis tribuit.* The back-reference to Q. I, Art. I (*Deum esse… certissimum… et indubitabile*) ties Q. VII to a question Olivi names as Bonaventure's. ⭐ **The second such editorial argument in this work, after `q4-a1`'s p. 80 n. 11** (the *Respondeo* already printed in tom. I from cod. M, *ex quo novum arg. insinuatur pro genuitate huius quaestionis*). Both are notes, not citations; neither produces a resolver record.

### ⭐ PRINTING ANOMALIES — ONE UNIDENTIFIED SORT, ONE WRONG SORT, TWO MISSING POINTS, THE REST SPECKS

- ⭐ **p. 109 reply 7, *omne* ~~n~~*ecessarium*, first letter.** Raw `liecessarium`; at 6× the letter is **two separate strokes with no arch at the top or the foot**: a stem with a leftward flag rising ~7 px above the line's x-height (the line's own *t*, in *est*, carries its crossbar to the RIGHT and rises higher), and **a second stroke carrying a dot, seated ~4 px below the x-height of its neighbours** (the *i* of *principium* on the same line: dot at rows 2200–2204, stem from 2209; this stroke: dot 2202–2209, stem from 2213). A pixel map was printed for both controls. **The strokes cannot be named as a definite pair of wrong sorts** (they match neither the line's *t* nor its *l*), so the `q6-a1` *compa-rattonis* rule — *transcribe an identifiable wrong sort as printed* — has nothing identifiable to transcribe. **Read plain as *necessarium*** (the reading is not in doubt: it repeats Contra 7 and reply 7's own opening), **disclosed here**. ⚠ **For the work-close gate**: if the gate prefers the letter reproduced, the evidence above is what it will need.
- **p. 107 n. 9 `IV. Metaph. test. 8.`** — ***test.*** for *text.*, the *s* plain at 3.5× → **a wrong sort, transcribed as printed** (the `q6-a1` class); English "text". The same note sets **`I. Phys text.`** with **no abbreviating point** (control: p. 109 n. 4's `I. Phys. text. 2.`, the same locus) and **`c. 2;`** with no point before the semicolon — as printed.
- **p. 107 n. 1 `ibid. IX text. 17.`** — no point after the numeral *IX* (against `IV.` and `VIII.` on the same line); as printed. The **missing-abbreviating-point class** again (`q4-a1`'s `text 16.`, `q2-a2`'s `Homil in`).
- **p. 109 n. 1 `(c. 7.)`** — the *c* is set in an **italic sort** with a hairline inside its bowl (read at 8×; raw `(c. 7.)`); a wrong-fount letter inside a citation coordinate, transcribed as the letter it is, *c*.
- **p. 107 n. 2 `c. 3.`** — the *3* is fouled by an ink blob fused to its point (raw `3i`); at 10× the round-topped head matches the `(c. 33.)` control in n. 8 → *3*, read plain.
- **Specks and stray marks, not transcribed:** p. 106 n. 8 ***etiam, principia*** — the mark after *etiam* is a **headless hairline** descending from the *m*'s foot; the control comma in n. 5 (*necessitas,*) has a full head at the baseline → not a comma, dropped (the raw reads it as one). p. 106 *huiusmodi* (stroke over the *i*), *tale est* · (margin point), *si ·in*; p. 107 *etc. ·*, *2.-Item*, *si ’causa*, *. 7. Item*; p. 107 n. 9's two ticks; p. 108 *Ad illud. quod*, *a se ipso,·*, *Dei*⁶ *,’*, *vocat*, *De habitu.et*; p. 108 n. 5 `VII:` (a period plus a speck at x-height, 10× → `VII.`); p. 109 *Ad illud ·quod*, *demonstrationis , .*, *tale.*, *principium ,demonstrationis*, *coarctatum:* (a period plus a faint speck, 7×).

### ⭐⭐ THE TARGETS BEAT THE GLYPH

Every citation naming a place we hold was opened; **every one lands on its note's subject**:

- ⭐ **p. 108 n. 1 `tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2`** (raw `!}92`) → `bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q1` n. 2: *Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.) illum hominem vocat liberum, «qui sui ipsius et non alterius gratia est»* — **the very quotation this note makes**, so the digits are fixed by the target.
- ⭐ **p. 108 n. 2 `q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 13. et 20.`** → `bon-qmt-q1-a1` arguments 13 (*si est ens possibile, est ens necessarium*) and 20 (*si est ens mutabile, est ens immutabile… motus est ab ente quieto*) — the *Respondeo*'s *omnia mobilia… ab uno immobili primo… omnia contingentia a necessario* exactly. **RULING 5 IS MET (fifth site in the work): `fundam. 13. et 20.` → *fundamenta 13 and 20*, quoted in the apparatus above.**
- **p. 108 n. 3 `q. 3. a. 1. ad 4.`** (raw `ad i.`) → `bon-qmt-q3-a1` reply 4, *forma, quae se habet ex additione* / *actualitas in genere* — reply 1's *determinatio per arctationem… per additionem unius super alterum*. `q. 4. a. 1.` = *Utrum divinum esse sit infinitissimum*, reply 1's *infinitati*.
- **p. 108 nn. 4 and 6 `q. 6. a. 1. ad 11. seqq.`** (raw `ad H.`, `ad II.`) → `bon-qmt-q6-a1` replies 11.12 (*de potestate*), 13.14 (*de scientia*), 15 (*causa proxima et immediata*), 16 (*divinum velle*) — reply 2's *posse, velle, agere* and reply 5's free cause. **p. 108 n. 5 `q. 6. a. 1. ad 3. 4.`** → the same chunk's combined reply 3.4, ***principale significatum et connotatum*** — reply 3's own terms. **p. 108 n. 6 `q. 2. a. 1. ad 8. et 9.`** → `bon-qmt-q2-a1` replies 8 (*influentia*) and 9 (*causa agente per modum naturae, cuius virtus est arctata*).
- **p. 107 n. 6 `pag. 61, nota 1`** → `bon-qmt-q2-a1` p. 61 n. 1, *Quia sunt relativa, quae sunt simul natura*, at *multiplicato effectu… multiplicari causam* — Contra 5's *si causa est necessaria, et effectus*. Same note's **`pag. 98, nota 11`** → `bon-qmt-q6-a1` p. 98 n. 11, Augustine *Voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium* — **the *minor*, *Deus est causa omnium prima et summa***, word for word.
- **p. 107 n. 7 `pag. 20, nota 6`** → `bon-qsc-q4` p. 20 n. 6 at *quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto prius* (Contra 6's chain). **p. 109 n. 1 `pag. 7, nota 9`** → `bon-qsc-q2` p. 7 n. 9, *Quia universalius, sicut genus simplicius est speciebus* — reply 6's *quanto communius, tanto simplicius*.
- **p. 108 n. 5 `pag. 47, nota 1`** → `bon-qmt-q1-a1` p. 47 n. 1 at *sicut privatio non intelligitur nisi per habitum* — the note's *De habitu et privatione*.
- **p. 109 n. 3 `pag. 77, nota 2`** → `bon-qmt-q3-a2` p. 77 n. 2, Avicenna *Primus… non habet definitionem* — reply 7's *nullam definitionem prorsus habere potest*; **`pag. 79, nota 6`** → `bon-qmt-q4-a1` p. 79 n. 6, Boethius *Communis animi conceptio…* — reply 7's *communes animi conceptiones*.
- **p. 106 n. 6 `q. 5. a. 1. et q. 6. a. 1.`** → *Utrum divinum esse sit aeternum* / *Utrum esse divinum sit immutabile* — argument 1's *immutabile et aeternum*. **p. 106 n. 8 and p. 109 n. 6 `q. 1. a. 1.`** → *Utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile* — argument 3's *non potest… cogitari non esse* and reply 8's *certissimum… et indubitabile, Deum esse*.
- **Outbound into Vols I–II:** **p. 107 n. 11 `II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. et 5.`** → `bon-sent-II-d25-p2-a1-q4` *Utrum liberum arbitrium ab aliquo agente creato cogi possit* and `-q5` *…a Deo cogi possit* — *coactio*. **p. 109 n. 2 `I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4.`** → `bon-sent-I-d8-p2-a1-q4` *Utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere sive praedicamento* — reply 7's *extra omne genus*.
- **Doubled citations as free controls:** p. 107 nn. 3 and 11 both print `V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.)` (raw `c. 3.` at n. 11 — corrected by n. 3); p. 107 n. 9 and p. 109 n. 4 both cite `I. Poster. c. 2.` with `I. Phys. text. 2. seqq.`
- **Digits on the type at 3–10× against same-line controls:** p. 107 n. 1 `text. 17.` (flagged 1); n. 3 `et 10.`; n. 5 `Luc. 1, 37.` (Luke 1:37 *non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum*); n. 8 `c. 26. (c. 33.)`; n. 10 `c. 23. (c. 19.)` (Rhet. II.19 is the chapter on the possible and impossible) and `c. 11. (c. 9.)`; n. 11 `c. 1.`; p. 108 n. 1 `Apoc. 1, 8.`; n. 2 `propos. 18`; n. 5 `c. 3. (c. 4.)` (closed-bowl 4) and `c. 31.`; p. 109 n. 2 `text. 21. (IV. c. 16.)` (Metaph. Δ 16 is *perfectum*); n. 5 `text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.)`.

### ▶ GUTTERS — THE DEFAULT FAILED OR WAS WEAK ON ALL FOUR LEAVES

106 **1409** for Quaestio VII's Article I REGION *(rows 0.62–0.75, band 1379–1440, 62 px, rule 1408–1411 peak 332; the opener stack above profiles to 1413; `q6-a2` measured 1421 for Art. II's region above — a neighbour's figure checked against, not adopted)* · 107 **1145** *(default 1133 on 41 px; the skew screen shows a **9 px walk** from 1151 at the head to 1141 at 0.59, and one split separates the columns — max left edge 1120 < min right 1171)* · 108 **1390** *(default **1412 on a 13 px run**, flagged WEAK; **skewed leaf**, band walking 1381→1390 down the body; band 1362–1419 midpoint 1390, rule 1386–1395 peak 468)* · 109 **1162** for Article I's REGION *(rows 0.06–0.58, twenty-four windows spread 4 px, band 1132–1193, 62 px; ⭐ **the centre rule peaks at 1107**, the work's third-heaviest after pp. 105 (1304) and 93 (1242); whole-leaf default 1165 on 49 px, `ARTICULUS II.` crossing the gutter)*.

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**Three gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** The head of every incoming register (pp. 107–109) was read before its first numeral, and each opens numbered and indented at n. 1 — **the negative is established, not assumed**:

- **p. 107 n. 6** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *(X. c. 8.). — De minori…*.
- **p. 108 n. 5** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *construere. Cfr. II. Ethic.…*.
- **p. 109 n. 3** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *c. 7. In fine solutionis…*.
- p. 106's inherited register: nn. 5–8 stand in the right block; nothing of them crosses a column or a page.

Ledger line: `bon-qmt-q7-a1	p.107 n.6:gutter,p.108 n.5:gutter,p.109 n.3:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER — AND THE SOLUTION-HEAVY SPLIT IS TOTAL A TENTH TIME

**p. 106** — `Fundamenta.`
**p. 107** — `Ad oppositum.` · `Triplex necessitas.` · `Subdistinctio 1.` · `Subdistinctio 2.` · `Conclusio.` · `Ratio duplex.`
**p. 108** — `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Determinatio duplex.` · `Notandum de praedicatione.` · `Tres species causarum.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 109** — `Duplex communitas.` · `Duplex necessarium.` · `Subdistinctio.` · `Notius simpliciter et quoad nos.`

**Sixteen in all, none clipped.** The gutter-side margin was checked on a **full-image-width strip at 2.5×** on every leaf that carries a gutter-side gloss (p. 107 `Ad oppositum.`, p. 108 `Notandum de praedicatione.` / `Tres species causarum.` / `Notandum.`, p. 109 `Duplex communitas.` / `Duplex necessarium.`) — all complete, with clean paper before the scan's edge. ⚠ `Subdistinctio 1.` / `2.` on p. 107 and the bare `Subdistinctio.` on p. 109 are as printed. ⭐ **The fifteen arguments of the two series carry TWO glosses, one at the head of each; the *Conclusio*, *Respondeo* and nine replies carry fourteen.**

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**The replies answer the `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` series, checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Et ideo rationes concedendae sunt ad partem istam* — the six *fundamenta*, which prove the divine being necessary — and reply 1 quotes Contra 1 (*omne determinatum ad aliquid est finitum*), reply 9 Contra 9 (*necessarium non est timendum*). **The marginalia follow the side**: `Fundamenta.` on the opening series, `Ad oppositum.` on the `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` — the same polarity as `q5-a1` and `q6-a1`, the first articles of their quaestiones. · **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.` in-column**, its italic sentence centred in the right column, found by content; its *esse*, like the subtitle's, is set roman inside the italic, and the heading line follows the frozen flat-italic markup (`q2-a1`, `q6-a1`). · **The subtitle prints *esse divinum*, and the *praeambulum* and article opener agree** (*utrum esse divinum sit summe necessarium*). · **The second *praeambulum* prints *stent simul*, the Art. II subtitle on p. 109 *stent simul*, and its opener *stent simul*** — all three agree; the Q. VII subtitle's *possit stare* is the quaestio's own form. · **Reply 1 prints *infinitati secundo* with no comma** and **the *Respondeo* prints *partim extra est quae*** with none — as printed, both witnesses agreeing. · **Reply 3's *non est aliud quod Deus*** — *quod* for *quam*, as printed; the English gives the sense. · Reply 9's *in sequenti quaestione* points forward to Quaestio VIII.

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

**The multiset differs by one spelled-out chapter number**: reply 5's *quinto de Civitate Dei* → "in the fifth book of *The City of God*" — rendered in words, so no digit enters the English, and the multisets agree. ▶ **The test itself was run directly:** both languages carry **the same four `<!-- page N -->` markers, 106–109, in the same order**, each at a word boundary — p. 107's before *necessitas* in both (the page breaking *ne-* | *cessitas*), p. 108's at a sentence boundary inside the *Respondeo* (*Quia autem a se ipso*), p. 109's before *effectum* (the page breaking *ef-* | *fectum*). **28 anchors in each language, in the same order, each defined once.**

### Translation choices

- ⭐ **Ruling 5 is MET — the fifth site in the work**: p. 108 n. 2's **`fundam. 13. et 20.`** → ***fundamenta* 13 and 20** ("See above, q. 1, a. 1, *fundamenta* 13 and 20").
- ⭐ ***vacatio*/*quies*: a stem census on `quie` returns ONE hit** — the *Respondeo*'s *per modum **termini quiescentis*** → "by way of a **resting** term", a participle, consistent with the ruled "rest" and **not a deciding site**; **`vaca` returns ZERO**. The pair is still decided only at **`q7-a2` L25824** (*non quiescit nisi in summe amabili vacando*), the very next chunk.
- ⛔ **Ruling 2 exercised on ONE side only, a third time**: *lux* **once** (reply 8's Aristotle, *oculus noctuae ad **lucem*** → "to the light"), *lumen* **ZERO**; nothing transliterated. **Record it, or a later reader takes the bare "light" for a lapse.** `contuit-` absent.
- ***intellect-* → "understanding" with ZERO bare "intellect"**: *intellectus positionis et habitus… in eius clauditur **intellectu*** → "the understanding of position and of habit is… enclosed in its understanding"; *propter defectum ex parte **intellectus** creati* → "on the part of the created understanding"; *omnis esse, vivere et **intelligere*** → "understanding". ***intelligentia*** occurs twice: the formula *Ad praedictorum **intelligentiam*** → "For the understanding of what has been said" (the `q1-a1` / `q4-a1` precedent for the formula), and p. 108 n. 2's *Liber de causis* ***intelligentiam primam*** → "the first **intelligence**" (the ruled rendering, where the word names the separate Intelligence of the *Liber*).
- **The threefold necessity**, kept literal and parallel: *coactionis* / *violentiae* → "of coercion" / "of violence"; *inevitabilitatis* / *indigentiae* → "of inevitability" / "of need"; *immutabilitatis* / *independentiae* → "of immutability" / "of independence"; *omnino extrinseca* / *partim intrinseca et partim extrinseca* / *omnino intrinseca* → "wholly extrinsic" / "partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic" / "wholly intrinsic"; *secundum quid* / *simpliciter* → "in a certain respect" / "simply".
- ***arctatio* → "restriction"** (the `q3-a1` *arctativa* → "restrictive" precedent), ***coarctatum* → "restricted"**, ***restringi* → "be restricted"**; ***completio* → "completion"**; ***vertibilitas* → "vertibility"**.
- ***principale significatum* / *connotatum* → "principal significate" / "the connoted"** (the `q6-a1` rendering). ***propositio copulativa* → "copulative proposition"**, ***totius copulati* → "of the whole conjunction"**.
- ***communitas per abstractionem* / *per indenominationem* → "commonness by abstraction" / "by non-denomination"** — *indenominatio* is the commonness of a subject that is denominated by neither of two contraries (reply 6's own gloss: *contrariorum unicum est subiectum*); kept as a technical coinage, not paraphrased.
- ***habitus impermixtus debet esse privationi et eius denominatio*** → "a habit ought to be unmixed with privation, and so ought its denomination" — *privationi* taken with *impermixtus*.
- ***causae tantum factae* / *facientes et factae* / *facientes tantum* → "only made" / "making and made" / "making only"**, and the one-off ***factivas tantum* → "productive only"**, keeping the *facere*/*fieri* root that Augustine's text (p. 108 n. 6) turns on; ***unigeneae suis partibus et conformes*** → "of one kind with their parts and conformed to them".
- ***in statu viatorum* → "in the state of wayfarers"**; ***luculentissima* → "most lucid"**; ***Maiestas* → "Majesty"**; ***sempiternus* → "everlasting"** (the `q6-a2` rendering); ***formido* / *formidandum* → "dread" / "to be dreaded"**, against *timere* → "fear".
- ***alpha et omega*** (Apoc. 1:8, italic in the body) → "the *alpha and omega*".

### Ledger

**28 entries** (p. 106 nn. 5–8 of eight · p. 107 all twelve · p. 108 all six · p. 109 nn. 1–6 of seven). **Zero `[?]` flags. Three gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** What this chunk inherits from `bon-qmt-q6-a2` is **p. 106 nn. 5–8** (positions re-derived: n. 5 at the second *praeambulum*'s *necessitas*, right column of the opener stack; n. 6 at argument 1's *necessarium*, left column; n. 7 at argument 2's *quod*, left; n. 8 at argument 3's *huiusmodi*, right) and **Quaestio VII's heading, subtitle, opener, *praeambula*, `ARTICULUS I.` with its subtitle, and arguments 1–5 on p. 106** (re-read at full width). What it forwards to `bon-qmt-q7-a2` is **p. 109 n. 7** (at Article II's argument 1, *ad Orosium*⁷) and **Article II's heading, subtitle, opener and argument 1 on p. 109**. **QUAESTIO VII IS OPENED.**

### ⚠ CITATIONS — 15 RECORDS, ZERO DANGLING, THREE ANAPHORA ARTEFACTS, AND TWO FORWARDS THAT NOW LAND (ONE RIGHTLY)

`build-citations.py` returns **15 records from this chunk: 12 chunk · 1 page-multi · 2 verse; ZERO dangling, ZERO unresolvable, ZERO ambiguous.** Corpus QA stays at **202**. Named for the work-close gate, none edited here:

- ⚠ **Three `ibid.` inside Aristotle citations are carried by anaphora onto the previous cross-reference**: p. 107 n. 1's *qui ibid. IX text. 17.* (= *Metaph.*) resolves **cross-chunk** to `bon-sent-I-d19-p2-a1-q1` (from `q6-a2` p. 106 n. 4); p. 107 n. 8's *minor ibid.* (= *I. Poster.*) and n. 10's *Cfr. ibid. c. 23.* (= *II. Rhet.*) resolve to `bon-qsc-q4` from n. 7's *supra pag. 20, nota 6*. **All three are wrong and all three look resolved** — the `q5-a2` p. 94 n. 8 / `q6-a2` p. 103 n. 2 class, now five sites in the work. An `ibid.` that follows an author's name within its own note refers to that author, not to the last cross-reference in the register.
- **p. 108 n. 1's `tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2`** is `page-multi` (`bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q1` + `-divisio`, both carrying p. 592); the note is `q1`'s n. 2, the Aristotle this note quotes.
- ⭐ **Two inbound forward references now land on this chunk.** `bon-itin-c5` p. 309 n. 2's **`supra pag. 109, nota 5`** → this chunk's p. 109 n. 5, *Libr. II. Metaph. text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.)* — **the very locus the Itinerarium note itself cites** (the owl's eye), so the forward closes correctly and confirms p. 109 n. 5's digits from outside the work. ⛔ But **`bon-hex-c5` p. 355 n. 1's `tom IV. pag. 107, nota 5`** now resolves to this chunk's p. 107 n. 5 (Luke 1:37) — **wrong**: the note names *tom IV*, printed without its point after *tom*, and the resolver does not take the unpointed `tom` as a tome. **A resolver error that finds a target is harder to see than one that dangles** — the `q6-a2` lesson, recurring.
- Internal `q. N. a. M.` references (eight in this chunk) produce no record — true of every chunk in the work.