title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum homo in omni statu cognoscat Deum per creaturas.*

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Tertio quaeritur, utrum cognitio Dei per creaturas sit hominis quantum ad omnem[^1] statum. Quod sit hominis quantum ad primum statum, sic ostenditur.

1. Homo in statu innocentiae non cognoscebat Deum facie ad faciem: ergo si cognoscebat Deum, cognoscebat per effectum, ergo per vestigium, ergo per creaturam.

2. Item, in homine in statu innocentiae cognitio sensibilis non erat in impedimentum, sed in adminiculum cognitionis intellectivae; sed intellectiva cognitio, propter quam factus est homo, est cognitio Dei: ergo omnis cognitio sensibilis in primo homine ordinabatur ad hanc; sed cognitio Dei per adminiculum sensibilium est cognitio per creaturam: ergo etc.

Item, quod sit hominis quantum ad statum beatitudinis, videtur:

1. Quia Beati cognoscunt creaturam, sed non sistunt in illa, sed referunt ad Deum: ergo cognoscunt Deum per creaturam.

2. Item, beatae animae laudant Deum per creaturas; sed laudare Deum per creaturas est cognoscere per creaturas: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** quod non sit hominis instituti, sic ostenditur.

1. Cognitio per vestigium est cognitio per medium; «sed mens, ut dicit Augustinus[^2], immediate ab ipsa veritate formatur»: ergo talis cognitio non convenit humanae naturae quantum ad illum statum, nec etiam quantum ad alium.

2. Item, non est rectus ordo, quod propinquius perveniat in finem per medium magis distans; sed homo in statu primo erat propinquior Deo ceteris aliis[^3] creaturis: ergo non conveniebat ei pervenire in cognitionem Dei per alias creaturas.

Item, quod non sit hominis talis cognitio quantum ad statum beatitudinis, videtur.

1. Quia cognitio per vestigium est cognitio per manuductionem: ergo non est cognitio perfecta, ergo est ex parte[^4]: ergo non manet in Beatis, quia in ipsis evacuabitur quod est ex parte.

2. Item, vestigium sive creatura est sicut scala ad ascendendum vel sicut via ad perveniendum ad Deum; sed cum perventum est ad terminum, non est usus viae ulterius[^5]: ergo similiter, cum homo sit sursum, non indiget scala; sed cognitio Beatorum immediate est in Deum: ergo non est per creaturas.

### Conclusio.

> Deus in creaturis cognoscitur a comprehensoribus perfecte, a viatoribus semiplene; sed per creaturas proprie cognoscitur a viatoribus, aliter autem ante, aliter post lapsum.

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam[^6] praedictorum notandum, quod aliud est cognoscere Deum in creatura, aliud per creaturam. Cognoscere Deum in creatura est cognoscere ipsius praesentiam et influentiam in creatura[^7]. Et hoc quidem est viatorum semiplene, sed comprehensorum perfecte; unde dicit Augustinus in fine libri de Civitate Dei[^8], quod tunc expresse Deus videbitur, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus. Cognoscere autem Deum per creaturam est elevari a cognitione creaturae ad cognitionem Dei quasi per scalam mediam. Et hoc est proprie viatorum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium[^9].

Aliter tamen convenit homini in statu naturae institutae, et[^10] naturae lapsae: quia in statu primo cognoscebat Deum per creaturam tanquam per speculum clarum; sed post lapsum cognovit tanquam per speculum et aenigma, sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^11], propter obnubilationem intellectus et peiorationem rerum.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de statu beatitudinis; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, beatorum non est cognoscere per creaturas, sed potius in

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creaturis. Et rationes, quae videntur probare contrarium, non probant, sed potius, quod cognoscatur ab eis in creaturis.

1. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur de statu innocentiae, quod mens immediate formatur etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est medium, scilicet efficiens et disponens. De primo medio debet intelligi quod dixit Augustinus, sed de secundo non[^12]; quoniam Deus est medium efficiens et obiectum ipsius mentis. Illud autem verbum dicit Augustinus contra philosophos, quorum opinio erat, quod mens non coniungeretur primo[^13] immediate, sed mediante aliqua intelligentia.

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod non est rectus ordo; dicendum, quod dupliciter potest considerari homo: vel ens in se, vel extra. Primo modo non pervenit per creaturas a se in Deum, sed ens extra se per cognitionem creaturarum recolligitur in se et elevatur supra se[^14].

Vel dicendum, quod aliae creaturae possunt considerari ut res, vel ut signa. Primo modo sunt inferiores homine, secundo modo sunt media in deveniendo sive in via, non in termino, quia illae non perveniunt, sed per illas pervenit homo ad Deum, illis post se relictis.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the human being in every state knows God through creatures.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the knowledge of God through creatures belongs to the human being in respect to every[^1] state. That it belongs to the human being in respect to the first state, is shown thus.

1. The human being in the state of innocence did not know God face to face: therefore if he knew God, he knew through effect, therefore through vestige, therefore through creature.

2. Likewise, in the human being in the state of innocence sensible knowledge was not an impediment, but an aid to intellective knowledge; but intellective knowledge, on account of which the human being was made, is the knowledge of God: therefore all sensible knowledge in the first human being was ordered to this; but knowledge of God through the aid of sensibles is knowledge through creature: therefore etc.

Likewise, that it belongs to the human being in respect to the state of beatitude, is shown:

1. Because the Blessed know the creature, but do not rest in it, but refer it to God: therefore they know God through the creature.

2. Likewise, blessed souls praise God through creatures; but to praise God through creatures is to know through creatures: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** that it does not belong to the human being as instituted [in the state of innocence], is shown thus.

1. Knowledge through vestige is knowledge through a medium; «but the mind, as Augustine[^2] says, is formed immediately by truth itself»: therefore such knowledge does not befit human nature in respect to that state, nor even in respect to another.

2. Likewise, it is not a right order, that what is nearer should reach the end through a more distant medium; but the human being in the first state was nearer to God than other[^3] creatures: therefore it did not befit him to attain the knowledge of God through other creatures.

Likewise, that such knowledge does not belong to the human being in respect to the state of beatitude, is shown.

1. Because knowledge through vestige is knowledge through leading-by-the-hand: therefore it is not perfect knowledge, therefore it is in part[^4]: therefore it does not remain in the Blessed, because in them what is in part shall be done away.

2. Likewise, the vestige or creature is like a ladder for ascending or like a way for arriving at God; but when the terminus is reached, there is no further[^5] use of the way: therefore likewise, since the human being is above, he does not need a ladder; but the knowledge of the Blessed is immediately into God: therefore it is not through creatures.

### Conclusio.

> God is known in creatures by the comprehensors perfectly, by the wayfarers half-fully; but he is properly known through creatures by the wayfarers, otherwise however before, otherwise after the fall.

**I respond:** For the understanding[^6] of the foregoing it must be noted, that it is one thing to know God *in* a creature, another *through* a creature. To know God in a creature is to know his presence and influence in the creature[^7]. And this indeed belongs to the wayfarers half-fully, but to the comprehensors perfectly; whence Augustine says at the end of the book *On the City of God*[^8], that then God will be expressly seen, when God will be all in all. But to know God through a creature is to be elevated from the knowledge of the creature to the knowledge of God as it were by an intermediate ladder. And this is properly of the wayfarers, as Bernard says to Eugenius[^9].

Otherwise however it befits the human being in the state of instituted nature, and[^10] of fallen nature: because in the first state he knew God through a creature as through a clear mirror; but after the fall he knew as through a mirror and in a riddle, as the Apostle says in First Corinthians thirteen[^11], on account of the clouding of the intellect and the worsening of things.

Therefore to that which is objected concerning the state of beatitude; it must be said, that, as has been said, it does not belong to the Blessed to know through creatures, but rather in

creatures. And the reasons which seem to prove the contrary, do not prove it, but rather that he is known by them in creatures.

1. *To that* which is objected concerning the state of innocence, that the mind is immediately formed etc.; it must be said, that the medium is twofold, namely efficient and disposing. Of the first medium that which Augustine said must be understood, but not[^12] of the second; because God is the efficient medium and the object of the mind itself. But Augustine speaks that word against the philosophers, whose opinion was, that the mind was not first[^13] joined immediately, but mediated by some intelligence.

2. *To that* which is objected, that it is not a right order; it must be said, that the human being can be considered in two ways: either as a being in itself, or outside [itself]. In the first way he does not arrive through creatures from himself into God, but as a being outside himself through the knowledge of creatures he is gathered back into himself and elevated above himself[^14].

Or it must be said, that other creatures can be considered as things, or as signs. In the first way they are inferior to the human being, in the second way they are media in the journeying or on the way, not at the terminus, because they do not arrive, but through them the human being arrives at God, they being left behind.

la: Sola Vat. praemittit *omnes*.

en: Only the Vatican edition prefixes *omnes* [all].

la: Vide supra q. 2. ad 4. — In quo textu cod. Y post *ipsa* addit *prima*.

en: See above q. 2. ad 4. — In which text codex Y, after *ipsa*, adds *prima*.

la: Fide plurimorum codd. ut ACFHIKLNOSTU etc. et ed. 1 addidimus *aliis*, et mox post *pervenire* substituimus *in* loco *ad*.

en: On the faith of very many codices, such as ACFHIKLNOSTU etc. and ed. 1, we have added *aliis* [other], and shortly after *pervenire* we have substituted *in* in place of *ad*.

la: Praeferimus succinctiorem lectionem mss. et ed. 1 lectioni Vat., in qua post *perfecta* additur *et si non est cognitio perfecta* et post *parte* adiungitur *et si est ex parte*. Argumentum hoc innititur verbis Apostoli I. Cor. 13, 10: *Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est.*

en: We prefer the more succinct reading of the manuscripts and ed. 1 to the Vatican reading, in which after *perfecta* is added *et si non est cognitio perfecta*, and after *parte* is joined *et si est ex parte*. This argument relies on the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13:10: *But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.*

la: Mendum Vat. *alterius* loco *ulterius* correximus ex mss. et ed. 1, sicut et paulo post substituimus *sit* pro *est* et *sed* pro *nam*. — In hoc argumento alluditur ad verba S. Bernard., V. de Consid. c. 1: *Sane hac scala cives non indigent, sed exules.*

en: We have corrected the Vatican misprint *alterius* in place of *ulterius* from the manuscripts and ed. 1, just as a little later we substituted *sit* for *est* and *sed* for *nam*. — In this argument allusion is made to the words of St. Bernard, *On Consideration* V, c. 1: *Surely the citizens do not need this ladder, but the exiles do.*

la: Vat. contra mss. *intellectum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, reads *intellectum*.

la: Codd. L O *creaturam*. Mox cod. W post *quidem* addit *cognoscere*, ed. 1 autem post *est* addit *viatorum et comprehensorum*.

en: Codices L O read *creaturam*. Shortly after, codex W, following *quidem*, adds *cognoscere*; but ed. 1, following *est*, adds *viatorum et comprehensorum*.

la: Libr. 22. c. 30. n. 4: *Vacabimus in aeternum, videntes quia ipse est Deus, quo pleni erimus, quando ipse erit omnia in omnibus.* — In quo textu plures mss. ut A I T etc. cum ed. 1 *quomodo* pro *quando*.

en: Book 22, c. 30, n. 4: *We shall be at rest forever, seeing that he himself is God, with whom we shall be filled, when he himself shall be all in all.* — In which text several manuscripts, such as A I T etc., with ed. 1, [read] *quomodo* [how] in place of *quando* [when].

la: Libr. V. de Consid. c. 1.

en: Book V *On Consideration*, c. 1.

la: Cod. X *quam* loco *et*.

en: Codex X reads *quam* in place of *et*.

la: Vers. 12.

en: Verse 12.

la: Ita cod. F; Vat. autem, transpositis verbis *disponens* et *efficiens*, consequenter habet *De primo medio non debet intelligi quod dicit Augustinus, sed de secundo, quoniam*. Praeferimus lectionem cod. F, quia ceteri codd. et edd. 2, 3, 6 cum ipso F legunt *De primo medio debet... de secundo non*, licet cum Vat. in transpositione verborum *disponens* et *efficiens* conveniant; sed in lectione codd. sensus est falsus, uti tum ex subnexis tum ex aliis locis S. Doctoris in Scholio citatis colligitur.

en: Thus codex F; but the Vatican edition, having transposed the words *disponens* and *efficiens*, consequently has *De primo medio non debet intelligi quod dicit Augustinus, sed de secundo, quoniam*. We prefer the reading of codex F, because the other codices and editions 2, 3, 6, together with F itself, read *De primo medio debet... de secundo non*, although they agree with the Vatican edition in the transposition of the words *disponens* and *efficiens*; but in the reading of the codices the sense is false, as is gathered both from what is subjoined and from other places of the Holy Doctor cited in the Scholion.

la: Supple: *principio*. — Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, *aeternae veritati* pro *primo*.

en: Supply: *principio* [in principle/in the first place]. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads *aeternae veritati* [to eternal truth] in place of *primo*.

la: Sensus est: homo consideratus ut ens in se, i. e. substantia, immediate refertur ad Deum eiusque cognitionem, quia, ut in praecedentis obiectionis solutione et supra q. 2. ad 4. dictum est, inter substantiam animae et Deum nullum cadit medium. Homo consideratus ut ens extra se, i. e. res exteriores percipiens, recolligitur in se, i. e. res exteriores percipiendo trahit ipsas intra se et ad reflexionem excitatur, et per mentales suas operationes tum respectu sui tum respectu rerum exteriorum cognitarum elevatur supra se i. e. ad Dei cognitionem.

en: The sense is: the human being considered as a being in himself, i. e. as substance, is immediately referred to God and to his knowledge, because, as has been said in the solution of the preceding objection and above q. 2. ad 4., between the substance of the soul and God no medium falls. The human being considered as a being outside himself, i. e. as perceiving exterior things, is gathered back into himself, i. e. by perceiving exterior things he draws them within himself and is excited to reflection, and through his mental operations, both with respect to himself and with respect to the exterior things known, is elevated above himself, i. e. to the knowledge of God.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quoad distinctionem inter cognoscere Deum *in creatura* et *per creaturam*, quae habetur in corp., cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5; *Itinerar. mentis*, c. 1. Consentiunt Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Item verba in fine corp. occurrentia: «propter obnubilationem intellectus et peiorationem rerum» approbantur et amplius explicantur a S. Thom., S. I. q. 94. a. 1. ad 3. et ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 4.

De duplici medio, scil. efficiente et disponente (in solut. ad 2.), clarius mentem suam explicat Seraphicus II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. his verbis: «Augustinus vult, quod inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium, scil. in ratione causae efficientis vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subservit potentiae cognoscenti, quam praesit». Plura de triplici medio Deum videndi invenies II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7. Concordant S. Thom., S. q. 94. a. 1. ad 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. ad 3.

**II.** Quoad ordinem argumentorum et solutionem notandum, quod S. Doctor hic non tenet consuetum modum, quia pro triplici statu etiam triplex responsio datur, ita ut nonnulla argumenta respectu unius status sint vera, respectu aliorum falsa. Argumenta prima affirmativa recte probant illam conclusionem, quod homo in statu innocentiae cognovit Deum per creaturas; duo argg. sequentia ab ipso S. Doctore in solut. prima quoad beatos reprobantur; item argg. 1. et 2. sub *Contra* in solutione ultima refelluntur. Duo vero ultima vera sunt quoad beatos.

**III.** De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 4. et m. 3. a. 1. et p. II. q. 92. m. 2. a. 1. et 2. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 12. a. 11. et q. 94. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic. a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. (de beatis); II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. (de statu innocentiae); ibid. d. 24. a. 3. q. 5. (de praesenti statu). — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. ult.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** As to the distinction between knowing God *in* a creature and *through* a creature, which is found in the body of the article, cf. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5; *Itinerary of the Mind*, c. 1. Petrus a Tarantasia agrees, here q. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Likewise the words occurring at the end of the body: «on account of the clouding of the intellect and the worsening of things» are approved and more amply explained by St. Thomas, *Summa* I. q. 94. a. 1. ad 3. and by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 4.

Concerning the twofold medium, namely efficient and disposing (in the solution ad 2.), the Seraphic Doctor explains his mind more clearly in II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. in these words: «Augustine wills, that between the mind and God no medium falls, namely in the account of efficient or influencing cause, yet there falls a medium of leading-by-the-hand, which however does not properly have the account of a medium, because it serves the cognitive power more than presides over it». More on the threefold medium of seeing God you will find in II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7. St. Thomas concurs, *Summa* q. 94. a. 1. ad 3., and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. ad 3.

**II.** As to the order of the arguments and the solution it must be noted, that the Holy Doctor here does not hold his customary mode, because for the threefold state a threefold response is also given, so that some arguments are true with respect to one state, false with respect to the others. The first affirmative arguments rightly prove that conclusion, that the human being in the state of innocence knew God through creatures; the two following arguments are reproved by the Holy Doctor himself in the first solution as regards the Blessed; likewise arguments 1. and 2. under *Contra* are refuted in the last solution. But the two final ones are true as regards the Blessed.

**III.** On the whole question: Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I. q. 2. m. 2. a. 4. and m. 3. a. 1. and p. II. q. 92. m. 2. a. 1. and 2. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I. q. 12. a. 11. and q. 94. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 13. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. (on the Blessed); II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. (on the state of innocence); ibid. d. 24. a. 3. q. 5. (on the present state). — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. ult.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum trinitas personarum cum unitate essentiae naturaliter per creaturas cognosci possit.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturas. Et dicit Apostolus[^1], quod sempiterna virtus et divinitas. Et quaeritur, utrum per creaturas possit cognosci personarum pluralitas. Et videtur quod sic.

1. Quia philosophi non habuerunt cognitionem de Deo nisi per creaturas, et cognoverunt Trinitatem: ergo etc. Minor patet per Augustinum *de Civitate Dei*[^2]: « Philosophi tripartitam dicunt esse philosophiam », in qua est cognitio Trinitatis.

2. Item, magi defecerunt in tertio signo, *Exodi* octavo[^3]; et exponitur, quod defecerunt in cognitione tertiae personae; aut ergo quantum ad propria aut quantum ad appropriata. Non quantum ad ap-

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propriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura: ergo quantum ad propria: ergo saltem duas personas cognoverunt.

3. Item, hoc idem[^4] videtur per rationem: quia vestigium, cum dicat distinctionem, est ratio cognoscendi Deum distinctive sive in distinctione; sed non est in Deo nisi distinctio personarum: ergo per vestigium potuerunt cognoscere distinctionem personarum.

4. Item, per imaginem est cognitio Trinitatis quantum ad ordinem, distinctionem et aequalitatem; sed cognitio per imaginem est cognitio per creaturam: ergo per creaturam potuerunt cognoscere Trinitatem.

5. Item, difficilior est cognitio proprietatum occultarum creaturae quam cognitio pluralitatis personarum, quia illa non capitur nisi a magnis et subtilibus, haec autem capitur etiam[^5] a rudibus et insipientibus: ergo si potuerunt per proprietates creaturarum visibiles pervenire ad invisibiles, multo fortius ad cognoscendum, personas esse plures. Et hoc est quod dicitur *Sapientiae* decimo tertio[^6]: *Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent saeculum aestimare, quomodo huius Dominum non facilius invenerunt?*

**Contra:**

1. Cognitio Trinitatis est cognitio fidei; sed cognitio fidei est[^7] de his quae sunt supra rationem; et quae sunt supra rationem non possunt cognosci per creaturas: ergo etc.

2. Item, non est nisi duobus modis[^8] de Deo cognoscere per creaturam, aut affirmando quod est in creatura vel simile, aut removendo; sed Trinitas non cognoscitur per remotionem, sed per positionem; sed in nulla creatura invenitur pluralitas suppositorum cum unitate essentiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, lex scripta est super[^9] legem naturae, sive liber sacrae Scripturae super librum mundanae creaturae; sed nullus fide carens per sacram Scripturam venit in cognitionem pluralitatis personarum: ergo multo minus per librum mundanae creaturae.

### Conclusio.

> Trinitas personarum non est cognoscibilis per creaturas, sed tantum trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitas, veritas, bonitas.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod pluralitas personarum cum unitate essentiae est proprium divinae naturae solius, cuius simile nec reperitur in creatura nec potest reperiri nec rationabiliter cogitari: ideo nullo modo trinitas personarum est cognoscibilis per creaturam, rationabiliter ascendendo a creatura in[^10] Deum. Sed licet non habeat omnino simile, habet tamen aliquo modo quod creditur simile in creatura. Unde dico, quod philosophi nunquam per rationem cognoverunt personarum trinitatem nec etiam[^11] pluralitatem, nisi haberent aliquem habitum fidei, sicut habent aliqui haeretici; unde quae dixerunt, aut locuti sunt non intelligentes, aut fidei radio illustrati.

Est alia trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis[^12], et hanc cognoverunt, quia habet simile.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod per tripartitam philosophiam cognoverunt philosophi Trinitatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod per illud et per alia venerunt in[^13] cognitionem appropriatorum, credentes vero in cognitionem utriusque trinitatis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio signo, dicitur et bene, quia sapientes ideo dicuntur defecisse in tertio signo, quia defecerunt in cognitione effectus potissimi[^14] bonitatis, scilicet redemptionis.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod vestigium dicit distinctionem proprietatum essentialium, et huic respondet trinitas appropriatorum, non propriorum sive personarum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de imagine, dicendum, quod est cognoscere animam secundum id quod est; et cognitio ista est rationis; vel secundum[^15] quod imago; et cognitio ista est solius fidei.

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5. Ad illud quod ultimo[^16] obiicitur, quod difficilius est cognoscere mundum; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur, supposito divino adminiculo; simpliciter autem loquendo falsum est. Citius enim disponeretur homo ad fidem, quam acquireret[^17] cognitionem philosophiae. Intellectus tamen noster plus potest in cognitionem rerum mundanarum quam Trinitatis; quia illa est supra rationem, et contrarium eius videt in sensu; et ideo indiget nova elevatione, utpote cognitione per infusionem.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether the trinity of persons together with the unity of essence can be known naturally through creatures.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, what of God is knowable through creatures. And the Apostle says[^1] that *his eternal power also and divinity* [are knowable]. And it is asked whether through creatures the plurality of the persons can be known. And it seems that yes.

1. Because the philosophers had no knowledge of God except through creatures, and they knew the Trinity: therefore etc. The minor is clear through Augustine, *On the City of God*[^2]: "The philosophers say that philosophy is threefold," in which there is knowledge of the Trinity.

2. Likewise, the magicians failed at the third sign, *Exodus* eight[^3]; and it is expounded that they failed in the knowledge of the third person; either therefore as regards what is proper [to each person] or as regards what is appropriated. Not as regards what is appropriated, because goodness shines forth in creatures most of all for us: therefore as regards what is proper: therefore they knew at least two persons.

3. Likewise, this same point[^4] seems to follow by reason: because a vestige, since it bespeaks distinction, is a ground for knowing God distinctively or in distinction; but there is no distinction in God except the distinction of persons: therefore through the vestige they were able to know the distinction of the persons.

4. Likewise, through the image there is knowledge of the Trinity as regards order, distinction, and equality; but knowledge through the image is knowledge through a creature: therefore through a creature they were able to know the Trinity.

5. Likewise, more difficult is the knowledge of the hidden properties of a creature than the knowledge of the plurality of the persons, because that [hidden-property knowledge] is grasped only by the great and subtle, but this [plurality of persons] is grasped even[^5] by the rude and the unwise: therefore if [the philosophers] were able through the visible properties of creatures to arrive at the invisible properties, much more strongly [were they able to arrive] at knowing that the persons are several. And this is what is said in *Wisdom* thirteen[^6]: *For if they were able to know so much that they could estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?*

**On the contrary:**

1. Knowledge of the Trinity is knowledge of faith; but the knowledge of faith is[^7] of those things which are above reason; and those things which are above reason cannot be known through creatures: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there are only two ways[^8] of knowing of God through a creature, either by affirming what is in the creature or [what is] similar, or by removing; but the Trinity is not known by removal, but by position; but in no creature is there found a plurality of supposits with unity of essence: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the written law is above[^9] the law of nature, or the book of sacred Scripture above the book of mundane creation; but no one lacking faith comes through sacred Scripture into knowledge of the plurality of the persons: therefore much less through the book of mundane creation.

### Conclusion.

> The trinity of persons is not knowable through creatures, but only the trinity of appropriated [attributes], namely unity, truth, goodness.

**I respond:** It must be said that the plurality of persons with unity of essence is proper to the divine nature alone, whose like neither is found in any creature nor can be found nor can be rationally thought: therefore in no way is the trinity of persons knowable through a creature, by ascending rationally from creature to[^10] God. But although [the divine nature] has no full likeness, nevertheless it has in some way what is believed to be a likeness in a creature. Hence I say that the philosophers never by reason knew the trinity of persons nor even[^11] the plurality, unless they had some habit of faith, just as certain heretics have; whence those things which they said, either they spoke not understanding, or [they spoke] illumined by a ray of faith.

There is another trinity of appropriated [attributes], namely of unity, truth, and goodness[^12], and this they knew, because it has a likeness.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that therefore which is objected, that through threefold philosophy the philosophers knew the Trinity; it must be said that it is true that through that and through other things they came into[^13] knowledge of the appropriated [attributes], but believers [came] into knowledge of both trinities.

2. To that which is objected concerning the third sign, it is said, and well, that the wise are said to have failed at the third sign because they failed in the knowledge of the chief[^14] effect of goodness, namely redemption.

3. To the other [it must be said] that the vestige bespeaks the distinction of essential properties, and to this corresponds the trinity of appropriated [attributes], not of properties proper [to the persons] or of the persons themselves.

4. To that which is objected concerning the image, it must be said that it is one thing to know the soul according to that which it is; and this knowledge is of reason; or according to[^15] [the soul's character] as image; and this knowledge is of faith alone.

5. To that which is objected last[^16], that it is more difficult to know the world; it must be said that this is understood on the supposition of divine assistance; but speaking simply, it is false. For a man would be sooner disposed to faith than he would acquire[^17] the knowledge of philosophy. Yet our intellect can do more toward the knowledge of mundane things than toward [the knowledge] of the Trinity; because the latter is above reason, and its contrary one sees in sense; and therefore it requires a new elevation, namely [a knowledge] by infusion.

en: Romans 1:20.

la: Libr. XI. c. 25: *Hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt.* — Ex cod. U adiungimus glossema dicta Augustini exponens: *cui haec sunt adscribenda, nisi creatori omnium creaturarum, datori intelligentiae, amorum inspiratori* (ex August. loc. cit.)? Unde vult dicere, quod naturalis philosophia est de his quae pertinent ad conditionem naturae; rationalis de his quae pertinent ad rationem et intelligentiam; moralis de his quae pertinent ad amorem. Ideo naturalis adscribitur auctori Patri, rationalis sapientiae Filio, moralis amori seu bonitati Spiritus sancti.

en: Book XI, c. 25: "Hence the philosophers wished the discipline of wisdom to be threefold." — From codex U we add a gloss expounding what Augustine says: "to whom are these to be ascribed, if not to the creator of all creatures, the giver of intelligence, the inspirer of loves" (from Augustine, loc. cit.)? Whence he means to say that natural philosophy is concerned with what pertains to the condition of nature; rational [philosophy] with what pertains to reason and intelligence; moral [philosophy] with what pertains to love. Therefore natural philosophy is ascribed to the Father as author, rational [philosophy] to the Son as wisdom, moral [philosophy] to the love or goodness of the Holy Spirit.

la: Vers. 18. Expositionem huius loci vide apud Lyranum et Magistrum, hic in fine c. 2.

en: Verse 18. For the exposition of this passage see Lyra and the Master [Lombard], here at the end of c. 2.

la: Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit *idem*, pro quo cod. Z habet *ipsum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits *idem*, for which codex Z has *ipsum*.

la: Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus *etiam*, quod Vat. minus bene omittit. Mox cod. R post *si* adiungit *philosophi*, ac plurimi codd. ut A F G H I K S T Y etc. post *creaturarum* addunt *rerum*, in qua lectione *creaturarum* falso positum est loco *creatarum*.

en: With the support of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added *etiam*, which the Vatican edition less well omits. Soon after, codex R after *si* adds *philosophi*, and many codices such as A F G H I K S T Y etc. after *creaturarum* add *rerum*, in which reading *creaturarum* is falsely placed in place of *creatarum*.

la: Vers. 9, ubi Vat. post *scire* ponit *quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo*.

en: Verse 9, where the Vatican edition after *scire* puts *quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo*.

la: Ed. 1 hic repetit *cognitio*. — De hoc argumento cfr. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 1. §. 2.

en: Ed. 1 here repeats *cognitio*. — On this argument cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 1, §2.

la: Cod. K satis bene adiungit *aliquid*, cod. X *Verum* ponit loco *de Deo*. Mox plurimi codd. ut A C F G H I L O S T U X etc. *vel simile vel removendo*, pro quo Vat. *aut simile aut removendo*; sequimur codd. quoad primam partem ponendo *vel simile*, et Vat. quoad secundam retinendo *aut removendo*, quia in hac lectione membra divisionis et subdivisionis clarius exhibentur. Cod. Y omittit *vel* et ed. 1 loco *vel* ponit *ut* ante *simile*. — De hoc argumento vide Dionys., *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 2.

en: Codex K rather well adds *aliquid*, codex X puts *Verum* in place of *de Deo*. Soon after, many codices such as A C F G H I L O S T U X etc. [read] *vel simile vel removendo*, for which the Vatican edition has *aut simile aut removendo*; we follow the codices as to the first part by putting *vel simile*, and the Vatican edition as to the second by retaining *aut removendo*, because in this reading the members of the division and subdivision are more clearly exhibited. Codex Y omits *vel* and ed. 1 puts *ut* before *simile* in place of *vel*. — On this argument see Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 2.

la: Plures codd. ut B S bb et ed. 1 hic et paulo post *supra*.

en: Several codices such as B S bb and ed. 1, here and a little later, [read] *supra*.

la: Ed. 1 *ad*. Cod. R paulo post loco *quod* habet *et* ac cod. T *cernitur* pro *creditur*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *ad*. Codex R a little later in place of *quod* has *et*, and codex T [has] *cernitur* in place of *creditur*.

la: Desideratur in Vat. *etiam*, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo post Vat. *unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut*; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 in eo conveniunt, quod omittant *hanc Trinitatem*, dissentiunt tamen inter se, quod alii cum Vat. habeant *qui dixerunt*, cod. I *qui hoc dixerunt*, alii ut O T etc. *quae dixerunt*, quos sequimur; ed. 1 tandem legit *qui aliquid inde dixerunt*.

en: In the Vatican edition *etiam* is missing, which however is found in the manuscripts and ed. 1. A little later the Vatican edition has *unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut*; all the codices with ed. 1 agree in this, that they omit *hanc Trinitatem*, but disagree among themselves, in that some with the Vatican edition have *qui dixerunt*, codex I *qui hoc dixerunt*, others such as O T etc. *quae dixerunt*, whom we follow; ed. 1 finally reads *qui aliquid inde dixerunt*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte *veritas, unitas et bonitas* et paulo post *habent*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, less aptly [reads] *veritas, unitas et bonitas*, and a little later *habent*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *ad*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *ad*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *potissimae*. Mox cod. O ante *redemptionis* praemittit *incarnationis et*.

en: The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and ed. 1 opposing, less well [reads] *potissimae* [agreeing with *bonitatis* rather than *potissimi* with *effectus*]. Soon after, codex O before *redemptionis* prefixes *incarnationis et*.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. minus bene addit *id*.

en: The Vatican edition, against many codices, less well adds *id*.

la: Ope mss. substituimus *ultimo* pro *ulterius* et immediate post adiunximus *quod*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts we have substituted *ultimo* for *ulterius* and immediately after we have added *quod*.

la: Cod. Y *quam ad acquirendam*; lectio haud spernenda.

en: Codex Y [reads] *quam ad acquirendam*; a reading by no means to be despised.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quoad propositionem in corp., quae attribuit haereticis aliquem habitum fidei, sciendum, quod duplex distinguitur habitus fidei, scil. infusus et acquisitus, et hic est ordinis naturalis. Acquisitum habitum vel ipsi haeretici formales habere possunt.

Recte dicitur in solut. ad 4, quod cognitio imaginis sit solius fidei. Imago enim, in quantum imago, dicit respectum ad id cuius est imago. Nullus autem respectus potest cognosci nisi cognito utroque extremo. Licet igitur cognoscatur fundamentum relationis in anima, i. e. imago materialiter intellecta, tamen non cognoscitur *formaliter* ut imago, quamdiu alter terminus relationis non cognoscitur, nempe tres personae divinae.

**II.** S. Bonav., *Breviloq.* p. I. c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., *Quodlib.* q. 14. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 32. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 43. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** With respect to the proposition in the body [of the article] which attributes to heretics some habit of faith, it is to be known that a twofold habit of faith is distinguished, namely infused and acquired, and this [latter] is of the natural order. The acquired habit the formal heretics themselves can have.

It is rightly said in the solution to the fourth [argument] that the knowledge of the image is of faith alone. For the image, insofar as image, bespeaks a relation to that of which it is the image. But no relation can be known unless both extremes are known. Although therefore the foundation of the relation in the soul, i.e. the image *materially* understood, is known, nevertheless it is not known *formally* as image, so long as the other term of the relation is not known, namely the three divine persons.

**II.** St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* p. I. c. 2. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scotus, *Quodlibet* q. 14. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 4; *Summa* I. q. 32. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 18; *Summa* p. I. tr. 3. q. 43. m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Quaestio I. *Utrum ratio imaginis attendatur in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.*

Quod autem in omnibus simul sit, videtur.

1. Ad rationem enim imaginis requiritur expressa conformatio in distinctione[^1]; sed distinctio in divinis attenditur quantum ad tres personas: ergo maxime in imagine creata attenditur quantum ad tres potentias.

2. Item, ratio imaginis consistit in perfecta capacitate, quia secundum Augustinum[^2] « eo est mens imago, quo potest esse capax et particeps Dei »; sed Deus non capitur ab anima plene nisi ametur, neque amatur nisi intelligatur, nec intelligitur nisi praesens ad animam habeatur; sed primum est per voluntatem, secundum per intelligentiam, tertium per memoriam: ergo etc.

3. Item, notitia sive intelligentia appropriatur Filio, voluntas Spiritui sancto: ergo aut truncata et diminuta erit assignatio imaginis, aut necesse[^3] est ponere potentiam respondentem Patri.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ad esse imaginis requiritur repraesentatio in distinctione originis et ordinis; sed in istis potentiis non est talis distinctio, quia simul sunt cum anima concreatae, nec una est[^4] ab alia nec una post aliam: ergo in istis non est reperire rationem imaginis.

2. Item, imago est repraesentatio secundum exteriorem dispositionem, ut patet[^5]; sed istae tres potentiae sunt intimae ipsi animae: ergo in ipsis non est ratio imaginis.

3. Item, quod specialiter memoria non sit de ratione imaginis, videtur, quia imago cum sit animae essentialis et secundum potentiam rationalem sit in ipsa, memoria vero, ut dicit Philosophus[^6], est sensibilium, quia est in brutis; unde differt a reminiscentia, quia reminiscentia non est in brutis: ergo videtur quod memoria non pertineat ad imaginem. Praeterea, sive[^7] memoria sit sensibilium sive in-

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telligibilium, concernit differentiam temporis, quia est acceptio praesens de praeteritis; sed imago abstrahit a conditionibus sensibilibus et temporibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, imago attenditur in his quae sunt nata recipere imaginem reformationis sive similitudinis; sed imago illa consistit in tribus virtutibus theologicis, quarum nulla est in memoria: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod voluntas non sit de integritate imaginis, videtur, quia dicitur in libro *de Spiritu et anima*[^8]: « Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo est in potentia diligendi »; sed voluntas non pertinet ad potentiam cognitivam: ergo etc.

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae est de imagine, debet aliis aequari, quia ad rationem imaginis requiritur aequalitas; sed voluntas non aequatur aliis, quia multa intelligimus, quae non volumus: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non attenditur aequalitas respectu obiectorum, sed respectu actuum, ut sit sensus: quaecumque[^9] intelligo, volo me intelligere, adhuc non est verum, quia multorum meminimus, quae nollemus.

### Conclusio.

> Ratio imaginis attenditur in his tribus potentiis, memoria, intellectu et voluntate, cum comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister recitat[^10], imago attenditur in his tribus potentiis, tamen[^11] in comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum, in quibus est distinctio et ordo et origo unius ab altero per modum quendam disponendi. Nam retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum, si quod intelligitur est bonum[^12].

1. Et per hoc patet solutio ad illud[^13] quod obiicitur: in istis potentiis non est distinctio per originem: ergo etc.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago attenditur secundum exteriorem dispositionem; dicendum, quod est imago rei corporalis et sensibilis; et haec, quia offert se cognitioni per exteriora, habet imaginem repraesentantem secundum exteriorem dispositionem. Est iterum imago rei spiritualis, quae est intima cuilibet rei, et quae cognoscitur secundum quod virtus recolligitur ad intima; et haec[^14] habet imaginem repraesentantem quantum ad intimas dispositiones.

3. Ad illud[^15] quod obiicitur, quod memoria est sensibilium; dicendum, quod memoria accipitur tripliciter: uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum, sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum. Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis; sed obiectio currit de aliis primis duobus modis. Primo modo memoria sequitur sensum, secundo modo sequitur ipsam intelligentiam et voluntatem, tertio modo antecedit et respondet Patri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria non reformatur; dicendum, quod immo memoria reformatur et quantum ad statum viae et quantum ad statum patriae: in primo per spem; et hoc patet per expositionem Augustini super illud verbum Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^16]: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde*, « id est, intellectu sine errore, ex tota anima, id est, voluntate sine contradictione, ex tota mente, id est, memoria sine oblivione ». In secundo statu reformatur quantum ad tentionem; unde Bernardus[^17] dicit, quod « Deus est futurus intelligentiae plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis ». Nec est[^18] inconveniens, quod memoria, quamvis sit prima, reformetur per dotem ultimam; quia ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori, ordo autem informationis[^19] incipit a superiori: ideo a voluntate incipit reformatio et tendit usque in memoriam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi; dicendum, quod similitudo dicit quid gratuitum, et ideo dicitur esse per ap-

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propriationem in voluntate sive in dilectione. Imago vero non dicit gratuitum, et[^20] ideo dicitur esse in potentia cognoscendi.

Vel aliter de imagine: quia in Filio est propria[^21] imago, et Filio appropriatur intelligentia, quae est in potentia cognitiva; ideo dicitur imago esse in potentia cognoscendi.

6. Ad illud[^22]: Voluntas non aequatur intelligentiae; dicendum, quod voluntas, prout communiter accipitur ad velle et nolle, quorum utrumque est actus voluntatis, bene aequatur, secundum quod dicitur uti esse commune ad utrumque, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera[^23] quod voluntas capit alia, dum utor etc. Quidquid enim recordamur vel intelligimus, in facultatem voluntatis accipimus ad eligendum vel ad respuendum; et istud est, secundum quod dicit actum communem voluntatis[^24]; sed secundum actum specialem, qui est velle tantum, non aequatur; et de isto opponitur, quia[^25] sic velle non comprehendit totam voluntatem, sicut meminisse totam memoriam et intelligere totam intelligentiam.

english:
### Question I. *Whether the account of the image is found in memory, understanding, and will.*

That, however, it is in all [three] together, seems [to be the case].

1. For to the account of the image is required an express conformation in distinction[^1]; but distinction in the divine [persons] is found with regard to the three persons: therefore most of all in the created image it is found with regard to three powers.

2. Likewise, the account of the image consists in perfect capacity, because according to Augustine[^2]: « the mind is the image in this, that it can be capable and partaker of God »; but God is not fully grasped by the soul unless he be loved, nor is he loved unless he be understood, nor is he understood unless he be held as present to the soul; but the first is through the will, the second through the understanding, the third through the memory: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, knowledge or understanding is appropriated to the Son, the will to the Holy Spirit: therefore either the assignment of the image will be truncated and diminished, or it is necessary[^3] to posit a power answering to the Father.

**On the contrary:**

1. To the being of the image is required representation in distinction of origin and order; but in these powers there is no such distinction, because they are con-created with the soul together, nor is one[^4] from another, nor one after another: therefore in these the account of the image is not to be found.

2. Likewise, the image is a representation according to exterior disposition, as is evident[^5]; but these three powers are intimate to the soul itself: therefore in them is not the account of the image.

3. Likewise, that especially memory is not of the account of the image, is seen [from this], because, since the image is essential to the soul and is in it according to the rational power, but memory, as the Philosopher says[^6], is of sensibles, because it is in brutes; whence it differs from reminiscence, because reminiscence is not in brutes: therefore it seems that memory does not pertain to the image. Further, whether[^7] memory be of sensibles or of in-

telligibles, it concerns the difference of time, because it is a present apprehension of past things; but the image abstracts from sensible conditions and times: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the image is found in those things which are apt to receive the image of reformation or likeness; but that image consists in the three theological virtues, of which none is in memory: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that the will is not of the integrity of the image, is seen [from this], because it is said in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^8]: « The image is in the power of knowing, the likeness is in the power of loving »; but the will does not pertain to the cognitive power: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every power which belongs to the image ought to be equal to the others, because to the account of the image is required equality; but the will is not equal to the others, because we understand many things which we do not will: therefore etc. If you should say that equality is not regarded with respect to objects, but with respect to acts, so that the sense is: whatever[^9] I understand, I will to understand myself, still it is not true, because we remember many things which we would not [will].

### Conclusion.

> The account of the image is found in these three powers, memory, intellect, and will, with comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine says and the Master recites[^10], the image is found in these three powers, yet[^11] in comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts, in which there is distinction and order and origin of one from another through a certain mode of disposing. For the retention of the species disposes to understanding, and understanding to loving, if that which is understood is good[^12].

1. And by this is clear the solution to that[^13] which is objected: in these powers there is no distinction through origin: therefore etc.

2. To that which is objected, that the image is found according to exterior disposition; it must be said that there is an image of a corporeal and sensible thing; and this, because it offers itself to cognition through external things, has an image representing according to exterior disposition. There is again an image of a spiritual thing, which is intimate to every thing, and which is known insofar as the power is gathered back to inner things; and this[^14] has an image representing with regard to interior dispositions.

3. To that[^15] which is objected, that memory is of sensibles; it must be said that memory is taken in three ways: in one way as it is receptive and retentive of sensibles and of past things; in another way as it is retentive of past things, whether sensible or intelligible; and in the third way as it is retentive of species, abstracting from every difference of time, as of innate species. And in this third way it is part of the image; but the objection runs concerning the other first two modes. In the first mode memory follows sense, in the second mode it follows understanding itself and will, in the third mode it precedes and answers to the Father.

4. To that which is objected, that memory is not reformed; it must be said that, on the contrary, memory is reformed both with regard to the state of the way and with regard to the state of the fatherland: in the first through hope; and this is evident from Augustine's exposition on that word of Matthew twenty-two[^16]: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, « that is, with the understanding without error, with all thy soul, that is, with the will without contradiction, with all thy mind, that is, with the memory without forgetfulness ». In the second state it is reformed with regard to retention; whence Bernard[^17] says that « God shall be to the understanding the fullness of light, to the will the multitude of peace, to the memory the continuation of eternity ». Nor is it[^18] unfitting that memory, although it be first, should be reformed through the last endowment; because the order of reformation and deformation begins from the posterior, but the order of information[^19] begins from the superior: therefore from the will reformation begins and tends as far as memory.

5. To that which is objected, that the image is in the power of knowing; it must be said that the likeness expresses something gratuitous, and therefore it is said to be by appropriation in the will or in love. The image, however, does not express something gratuitous, and[^20] therefore it is said to be in the power of knowing.

Or otherwise concerning the image: because in the Son is the proper[^21] image, and to the Son is appropriated the understanding, which is in the cognitive power; therefore the image is said to be in the power of knowing.

6. To that[^22]: The will is not equal to the understanding; it must be said that the will, as it is commonly taken for to-will and to-not-will, of which each is an act of the will, is well equated, according to which it is said *to use* to be common to both, as Augustine says, and it is held in the letter [of the Master][^23] that the will takes other things, while I make use of them, etc. For whatever we remember or understand, we receive into the faculty of the will for choosing or rejecting; and this is, according to which it expresses the common act of the will[^24]; but according to the special act, which is to-will alone, it is not equal; and concerning this the objection is raised, because[^25] thus to-will does not comprise the whole will, as to-remember [comprises] the whole memory, and to-understand the whole understanding.

la: De veritate plura vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I.

en: Concerning truth see further below d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I.

la: Vat. omittit: *cuius divisio posita est supra*, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. I; et paulo infra post *tribus* ponit *scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate*.

en: The Vatican edition omits: *cuius divisio posita est supra* ("whose division is set forth above"), which however is extant in the manuscripts and ed. 1; and a little below, after *tribus*, it adds *scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate* ("namely memory, understanding, and will").

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss., *necessario*. — De variis imaginis definitionibus, in quibus hoc argumentum et plura sequentia fundantur, cfr. d. 31. p. II. q. I. et 2., ac ibid. dub. 2. et 3.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, [reads] *necessario*. — On the various definitions of the image, on which this argument and many following are founded, cfr. d. 31. p. II. q. I. and 2., and ibid. dub. 2. and 3.

la: Libr. XIV. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 11. Vide supra d. III. in lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa initium. — Paulo infra post *praesens* ope mss. posuimus *ad* loco *apud*.

en: Book XIV *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 11. See above d. III. in the letter of the Master, c. 2, near the beginning. — A little below, after *praesens*, with the help of the manuscripts we have placed *ad* in place of *apud*.

la: Plures codd. ut ABIPQTX etc. hic repetunt *est*.

en: Several codices such as ABIPQTX etc. here repeat *est*.

la: Codd. IXY « in imagine hominis picti patet ». Immediate post cod. I *igitur* si loco *sed*.

en: Codices IXY [read] « in imagine hominis picti patet » ("it is evident in the image of a painted man"). Immediately after, codex I [reads] *igitur si* in place of *sed*.

la: Libr. *de Memoria et Reminisc.* c. 1. et 2. (in aliis edd. c. 2. et 4.). — Paulo infra post *brutis* Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit *unde differt* usque ad *brutis*, ac mox habet *pertinet* loco *pertineat*. Paulo ante codd. N Z *connaturalis* pro *essentialis*.

en: Book *On Memory and Reminiscence* c. 1 and 2 (in other editions c. 2 and 4). — A little below, after *brutis*, the Vatican edition, without any authority of manuscripts and ed. 1, omits *unde differt* down to *brutis*, and shortly has *pertinet* in place of *pertineat*. A little before, codices N Z [read] *connaturalis* for *essentialis*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *cum* loco *sive* et in fine argumenti *temporalibus* pro *temporibus*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *cum* in place of *sive*, and at the end of the argument *temporalibus* for *temporibus*.

la: Cap. 39: *Anima rationalis et intellectus facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factorem suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligat. Ex imagine namque Dei habet rationem et ex similitudine caritatem.*

en: Chapter 39: "The rational soul and intellect was made to the image and likeness of God, that it might know its Maker through the image and love him through the likeness. For from the image of God it has reason, and from the likeness, charity."

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut ACFGHIKT etc. et ed. 1 *quidquid*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices such as ACFGHIKT etc. and ed. 1, [reads] *quidquid*.

la: Hic c. 2. — Paulo post Vat. *cum* loco *tamen in*, sed minus signanter et contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: Here c. 2. — Shortly after, the Vatican edition [reads] *cum* in place of *tamen in*, but less pointedly and against the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Corruptam lectionem Vat. *amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum* emendavimus ope mss. et ed. I.

en: The corrupt reading of the Vatican edition *amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum* we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Plures codd. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 *aliud* loco *illud*.

en: Several codices such as A T etc. and ed. 1 [read] *aliud* in place of *illud*.

la: Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *haec*. Paulo ante post *virtus* in cod. A additur *intelligibiliter*.

en: We restore from the manuscripts and ed. 1 *haec*. A little before, after *virtus*, in codex A is added *intelligibiliter*.

la: Ope antiquorum mss. et ed. I expunximus a Vat. additum *ergo*. Paulo infra post *sensibilium* cod. O omittit *et*, moxque cod. M loco *retentiva* ponit *receptiva*.

en: With the aid of the ancient manuscripts and ed. 1 we have expunged *ergo* added by the Vatican edition. A little below, after *sensibilium*, codex O omits *et*, and shortly codex M puts *receptiva* in place of *retentiva*.

la: Vers. 37. Expositionem huius loci, non solum a S. Bonaventura, sed etiam a S. Thoma (III. Sent. d. 27. expos. textus) Augustino adscriptam, non potuimus invenire in ipsius operibus. S. Thomas in Catena aurea (Matth. 22, 37.) eam attribuit Glossae interlineari, in qua sic legitur: *Ex toto corde, id est intellectu, ut nullam in confessione divinitatis relinquas errori locum; in tota anima, id est voluntate, ut nihil ei contrarium velis, in tota mente, nihil reminiscens quo minus de eo sentias.* — Tam in libr. *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 35, quam in libr. *de Diligendo Deo*, c. 2, qui inter opera S. Augustini recensebantur, simpliciter dicitur: *Id est ex toto intellectu tuo et ex tota voluntate tua et ex tota memoria tua.*

en: Verse 37. The exposition of this passage, ascribed to Augustine not only by St. Bonaventure but also by St. Thomas (III. Sent. d. 27. expos. textus), we have been unable to find in his [Augustine's] works. St. Thomas in the *Catena aurea* (Matth. 22, 37) attributes it to the interlinear Gloss, in which is read thus: *With all thy heart, that is, with the intellect, that you leave no place for error in confessing the divinity; with all thy soul, that is, with the will, that you wish nothing contrary to it; with all thy mind, remembering nothing whereby you might think less of him.* — Both in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 35, and in the book *On Loving God*, c. 2, which used to be counted among the works of St. Augustine, it is simply said: *That is, with all your intellect and with all your will and with all your memory.*

la: In Cant. Cant. Serm. II. n. 5. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. I *quia* loco *quod*.

en: On the Song of Songs, Sermon II, n. 5. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *quia* in place of *quod*.

la: Ope mss. et ed. 1 delevimus *etiam*. Paulo post cod. T *prior* loco *prima*.

en: With the aid of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have deleted *etiam*. Shortly after, codex T [reads] *prior* in place of *prima*.

la: Vat. *formationis*, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. I, qui etiam paulo post omittunt *reformatio*, quod tamen claritatis gratia non expunximus. Vide plura infra in Scholio ad hanc quaestionem.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *formationis*, but the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 stands against it, which also shortly after omit *reformatio*, which however for the sake of clarity we have not expunged. See more below in the Scholion on this question.

la: Fide mss. restituimus particulam *et*.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts we have restored the particle *et*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *prima*. Cod. R *quia enim in Filio proprie est imago*. Mox codd. P Q *cognitiva* loco *cognoscendi*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *prima*. Codex R [reads] *quia enim in Filio proprie est imago* ("because indeed in the Son there is properly the image"). Shortly after, codices P Q [read] *cognitiva* in place of *cognoscendi*.

la: Plures codd. ut X V hic addunt *quod*, alii ut B I aa bb *quod obiicitur quod*.

en: Several codices such as X V here add *quod*, others such as B I aa bb [read] *quod obiicitur quod*.

la: Hic c. 2, circa medium, iuxta quem textum et ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus hoc loco *illam* in *alia*, scilicet *intelligentiam et memoriam*. — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt particulam *enim*.

en: Here c. 2, near the middle, according to which text and with the help of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have changed in this place *illam* to *alia*, namely *intelligentiam et memoriam*. — Shortly after, many codices together with ed. 1 omit the particle *enim*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cfr. above d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Ita mss. cum ed. 1, licet aliqui loco *quia* minus bene habeant *quod*, sed Vat: *De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic*.

en: Thus the manuscripts together with ed. 1, although some in place of *quia* less correctly have *quod*, but the Vatican edition: *De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic* ("Concerning this there is an opposition, how thus").

latin_scholion:
**I.** In responsione duplex est propositio. Prima est ipsa conclusio principalis, quae dicit, quod imago summae Trinitatis consistit in dictis tribus animae potentiis, quatenus includunt et unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum secundorum. Secunda propositio, quae illam explicat et probat, est haec: sicut in divinis personis est et distinctio et ordo et origo, ita etiam in actibus harum potentiarum haec tria inveniuntur. Nam actus earum realiter distinguuntur; porro memoriae actus sive retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum. Unde ex memoria quasi procedit actus intellectus, et ex memoria et intellectu amor.

Triplex illa distinctio memoriae (in solut. ad 3.) invenitur etiam apud Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. et Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1.

**II.** In solut. ad 4. dicitur cum sententia tunc communi, quod memoria reformatur in statu viae per spem, in statu gloriae per tentionem. Rationem, cur spes attribuatur memoriae, S. Doctor exhibet II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., scil. « quia habent conformitatem in actu, qui est tenere ». — Verba ibidem posita: « Ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori » hunc sensum habent: *deformatio* imaginis per culpam et reformatio per gratiam incipit a voluntate, quae in ordine potentiarum est ultima sive posterior, quia actus voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, et hic actum memoriae, si memoria sumitur in tertio sensu, immediate antea explicato. In hoc sensu memoria est prior et intimior et per consequens superior. Nam « in anima humana idem est intimum et supremum » (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.). In ordine vero formationis sive informationis hae tres potentiae constituunt ipsam vitam spiritualem quasi per modum formae informantis; et sic memoria est prima potentia, et in hoc sensu informatio incipit ab ipsa. Pro explicatione cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. praesertim ad 4. — Ad obiect. 5. duplex datur responsio; de prima cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

**III.** Quoad rationem imaginis vide infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et Schol. Alia plura, quae in hac et seqq. qq. occurrunt, exponuntur et probantur ab ipso S. Doctore II. Sent. d. 16; Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis, c. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. et 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93. praesertim a. 5. 6. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. et 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. et Report. hic q. 7. — Albert., hic a. 19; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. Richard. a Med., hic p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 40. q. 7. n. 16. — Durand., hic. p. II. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 10.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the response there are two propositions. The first is the principal conclusion itself, which says that the image of the supreme Trinity consists in the said three powers of the soul, insofar as they include both the unity of essence and the plurality of second acts. The second proposition, which explains and proves the first, is this: as in the divine persons there is both distinction and order and origin, so also in the acts of these powers these three are found. For their acts are really distinguished; further, the act of memory or the retention of the species disposes to understanding, and understanding to loving. Whence from memory there proceeds, as it were, the act of the intellect, and from memory and intellect love.

That threefold distinction of memory (in solut. ad 3.) is also found in Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. and Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5. a. 1.

**II.** In solut. ad 4. it is said, with the then-common opinion, that memory is reformed in the state of the way through hope, in the state of glory through retention. The reason why hope is attributed to memory the holy Doctor exhibits in II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., namely « because they have a conformity in act, which is to hold ». — The words placed there: « The order of reformation and deformation begins from the posterior » have this sense: the *deformation* of the image through fault and the reformation through grace begins from the will, which in the order of the powers is the last or posterior, because the act of the will presupposes the act of the intellect, and this the act of memory, if memory is taken in the third sense just explained. In this sense memory is prior and more interior and consequently superior. For « in the human soul the inmost is the same as the supreme » (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.). But in the order of formation or *information* these three powers constitute the spiritual life itself as it were through the mode of an informing form; and thus memory is the first power, and in this sense information begins from it. For explanation cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. especially ad 4. — To objection 5. a twofold response is given; concerning the first cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

**III.** As to the account of the image, see below d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. and Schol. Many other matters that occur in this and the following questions are expounded and proved by the holy Doctor himself in II. Sent. d. 16; Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis, c. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. and 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93. especially a. 5. 6. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. and 7. — Scotus, here q. 9. and Report. here q. 7. — Albert, here a. 19; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5. a. 1. Richard of Mediavilla, here p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 40. q. 7. n. 16. — Durandus, here. p. II. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 8. — Biel, here q. 10.

---


title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II

*Utrum imago attendatur in his potentiis per comparationem ipsarum ad Deum.*

Secundo quaeritur de potentiis in comparatione ad obiectum, utrum videlicet attendatur imago in eis per comparationem ipsarum ad Deum[^1]. Et[^2] quod sic, videtur:

**1.** «Eo est anima imago, quo capax Dei est et[^3] particeps esse potest», ut dicit Augustinus decimo quarto *de Trinitate*[^4]; sed est capax quantum ad partem superiorem: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, in eodem[^5]: «Imago illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda est et invenienda, quo mens nostra nihil melius habet»; sed hoc est superior pars: ergo etc.

**3.** Item, hoc idem videtur ratione, quia[^6] imago dicitur eo quod[^7] ducit in prototypum[^8]: ergo cum illud sit Deus, non attenditur imago in his potentiis[^9],

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nisi secundum quod ducunt in Deum; sed per has potentias homo ducitur in Deum, dum per eas convertitur in eum: ergo etc.

**4.** Item, Deus est obiectum virtutum theologicarum, in quibus consistit imago reformationis: ergo, cum idem sit obiectum utriusque imaginis, quia una est ductiva[^11] alterius et perfectiva, si Deus est obiectum unius, et alterius.

**Contra**[^10]**:**

**1.** Augustinus nono *de Trinitate*[^12] assignat imaginem in mente, notitia et amore, secundum quod anima meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se: ergo videtur, quod imago attendatur per conversionem sui supra se.

**2.** Item, Augustinus duodecimo *de Trinitate*, capitulo quarto[^13]: «Cum in natura mentis humanae quaerimus trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem temporalium a contemplatione aeternorum, ut tertium aliquid iam quaeramus»: ergo trinitas imaginis attenditur secundum actionem temporalium, et ita per conversionem ad inferiora.

**3.** Item, secundum quod anima convertitur supra inferiora vel supra se, in ipsa[^14] est aequalitas et ordo et origo et omnia, quae concurrunt ad rationem imaginis.

**4.** Item, imago est in peccatoribus a Deo aversis, et in illis etiam qui nullo modo possunt reverti, ut sunt damnati: ergo ratio imaginis non attenditur penes conversionem ad Deum.

**5.** Item, necesse est, quantum ad perfectam rationem imaginis aequari cognoscentem et cognitum, sive dicentem et dictum; nam ista duo Patrem et Filium repraesentant; sed in conversione ad Deum non est talis aequatio: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Imago primo et principaliter est in potentiis animae, quatenus convertuntur in Deum; secundario vero in eis, quatenus convertuntur ad ipsam animam; quatenus vero convertuntur ad inferiora, non est in eis imago, sed vestigium Trinitatis.

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam praedictorum tria oportet in imaginis ratione praesupponere: primo enim imago attenditur secundum expressam conformitatem ad imaginatum; secundo, quod illud quod conformatur imagini, per consequens conformetur[^15] imaginato; unde qui videt imaginem Petri, per consequens videt et Petrum; tertio, quod anima secundum suas potentias conformis reddatur his ad quae convertitur, sive secundum cognitionem, sive secundum amorem.

Quoniam igitur, cum anima convertitur ad Deum, sibi conformatur, et imago attenditur secundum conformitatem: ideo imago Dei consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod[^16] habent obiectum Deum.

Rursum, quoniam anima est imago Dei, et quod convertitur et conformatur imagini, et imaginato[^17], ideo anima, secundum quod convertitur supra se, non recedit a conformitate; et ideo imago consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod habent animam pro obiecto.

Sed cum convertitur ad creaturas inferiores, illis conformatur, in quibus non est imago Dei, sed vestigium. Ideo[^18] potentiae animae, secundum quod habent inferiora pro obiectis, recedunt a ratione imaginis, quia recedunt a conformitate expressa.

Licet itaque in huiusmodi potentiis, secundum quod convertuntur ad inferiora, sit reperire trinitatem et aliquam conformitatem, similiter et in potentiis sensitivis, sicut ostendit Augustinus[^19]; quia tamen deficiunt ab expressa conformitate, non reperitur ratio imaginis in eis. Unde Augustinus investigat in omnibus potentiis animae trinitatem, non quia in eis sit imago, sed ut a ratione imaginis excludat. Unde quaerens totam[^20] trinitatem in tota anima, quaerit eam in superiori et inferiori parte rationis et in sensu. Et hoc est quod dicit in illa auctoritate: «Cum in natura mentis humanae quaerimus trinitatem, in tota quaerimus»; non dicit, quaerimus imaginem. Unde Augustinus duodecimo *de Trinitate*, capitulo quarto[^21]: «Quamvis in inferiori parte rationis inveniri trinitas possit, imago tamen inveniri non potest».

Concedendum est ergo, quod imago consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod ad animam convertuntur, primo tamen et principaliter, ut ostendunt primae rationes, secundum quod convertuntur ad Deum. Unde Augustinus his duobus modis assignat imaginem: prima est in mente, notitia et amore;

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secundum quod mens novit et amat se; secunda est in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate. Et in fine libri ostendit, completissimam rationem imaginis esse in comparatione ad Deum[^22].

**Ad 1, 2, 3.** Ex his patet responsio ad primum et secundum et tertium: quia primum argumentum concedendum est, secundum vero concludit, quod in inferiori parte sit trinitas, et tertium, quod conformitas; sed haec soluta sunt, quia non est expressa.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de aversione peccatorum, solvendum[^23] quod non dicimus imaginem in his potentiis secundum conversionem actualem, sed aptitudinalem, quae nunquam relinquit potentias: sicut gressibilis etiam dicitur homo, qui habet pedes truncatos, quamvis non gradiatur.

**Ad 5.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necesse est, in imagine cognoscens et cognitum adaequari; dicendum, quod non oportet, cognitum adaequari cognoscenti adaequatione *rei ad rem*, sed sub ratione[^24] cognoscibilis. Unde tantum est cognitum in intelligentia, quantum repraesentatur a memoria. Quod autem simpliciter adaequetur non oportet; adaequatur tamen, secundum quod anima convertitur supra se. Unde ratio imaginis quoad quid est plus in conversione ad Deum, quoad quid est plus in conversione animae supra se. In conversione ad Deum est plus, quia plus habet de ratione venustatis et conformitatis; in conversione ad se plus habet de ratione consubstantialitatis et aequalitatis.

english:
### Question II

*Whether the image is found in these powers through their comparison to God.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the powers in comparison to their object, namely whether the image is found in them through their comparison to God[^1]. And[^2] that it is so, it seems:

**1.** «The soul is image in that by which it is capable of God and can be a participant in him», as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*[^4]; but it is capable [of God] with respect to its higher part: therefore etc.[^3]

**2.** Likewise, in the same work[^5]: «The image of him than whom nothing is better must there be sought and found, where our mind has nothing better»; but this is the higher part: therefore etc.

**3.** Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason, because[^6] something is called an image insofar as[^7] it leads back to the prototype[^8]: therefore, since that [prototype] is God, the image is not found in these powers[^9],

except insofar as they lead to God; but through these powers a person is led to God, since through them he is turned to him: therefore etc.

**4.** Likewise, God is the object of the theological virtues, in which the image of reformation consists: therefore, since the object of both images is the same — for one is conducive[^11] to the other and perfective of it — if God is the object of the one, [he is the object] also of the other.

**On the contrary**[^10]**:**

**1.** Augustine in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^12] assigns the image to mind, knowledge, and love, according as the soul remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself: therefore it seems that the image is found through the turning of [the soul] back upon itself.

**2.** Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*, chapter four[^13]: «When we seek the trinity in the nature of the human mind, we seek it in the whole, not separating the activity concerning temporal things from the contemplation of the eternal, so as to seek some third thing besides»: therefore the trinity of the image is found according to activity concerning temporal things, and so by turning toward lower things.

**3.** Likewise, according as the soul is turned toward lower things or upon itself, in it[^14] there is equality and order and origin and all the things that concur to constitute the account of image.

**4.** Likewise, the image is in sinners turned away from God, and even in those who can in no way return, such as the damned: therefore the account of image is not found in terms of turning toward God.

**5.** Likewise, for the perfect account of image it is necessary that knower and known, or speaker and spoken, be made equal; for these two represent the Father and the Son; but in turning toward God there is no such equation: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> The image is first and principally in the powers of the soul insofar as they are turned to God; secondarily in them insofar as they are turned to the soul itself; insofar, however, as they are turned to lower things, there is in them not image but vestige of the Trinity.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing, three things must be presupposed in the account of image: first, the image is found according to express conformity to that of which it is image; second, that what is conformed to the image is consequently conformed[^15] to that of which it is image — whence whoever sees the image of Peter consequently sees Peter also; third, that the soul according to its powers is rendered conformed to those things to which it is turned, whether by knowledge or by love.

Since therefore, when the soul is turned to God, it is conformed to him, and the image is found according to conformity: therefore the image of God consists in these powers, according as[^16] they have God as their object.

Again, since the soul is image of God, and what is turned and conformed to the image is conformed also to that of which it is image[^17], therefore the soul, according as it is turned upon itself, does not depart from conformity; and so the image consists in these powers, according as they have the soul as their object.

But when it is turned to lower creatures, it is conformed to those things in which there is not the image of God but [his] vestige. Therefore[^18] the powers of the soul, according as they have lower things as their objects, depart from the account of image, because they depart from express conformity.

Although therefore in powers of this kind, according as they are turned to lower things, a trinity and some conformity may be found, likewise also in the sensitive powers, as Augustine shows[^19]; nevertheless, because they fall short of express conformity, the account of image is not found in them. Hence Augustine investigates the trinity in all the powers of the soul, not because the image is in them, but in order to exclude them from the account of image. Hence seeking the whole[^20] trinity in the whole soul, he seeks it in the higher and lower part of reason and in sense. And this is what he says in that authority: «When we seek the trinity in the nature of the human mind, we seek it in the whole»; he does not say, we seek the image. Hence Augustine in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*, chapter four[^21]: «Although a trinity can be found in the lower part of reason, the image nevertheless cannot be found [there]».

It must therefore be granted that the image consists in these powers, according as they are turned to the soul, first however and principally, as the first arguments show, according as they are turned to God. Hence Augustine in these two ways assigns the image: the first is in mind, knowledge, and love,

according as the mind knows and loves itself; the second is in memory, intelligence, and will. And at the end of the book he shows that the most complete account of image is in [its] comparison to God[^22].

**To 1, 2, 3.** From these things the response to the first, second, and third [objections] is clear: because the first argument must be conceded; the second indeed concludes that in the lower part there is a trinity; and the third, that [there is] conformity; but these are resolved because [the conformity] is not express.

**To 4.** To that which is objected concerning the turning-away of sinners, it must be resolved[^23] that we do not say image [is] in these powers according to actual turning but according to aptitudinal [turning], which never abandons the powers: just as a person whose feet have been cut off is also called "able to walk", although he does not walk.

**To 5.** To that which is objected, that it is necessary in image that knower and known be made equal; it must be said that it is not necessary that the known be made equal to the knower by an equality *of thing to thing*, but under the account[^24] of the knowable. Hence there is as much known in the intelligence as is represented by the memory. That it should be equated simpliciter is not necessary; it is however equated, according as the soul is turned upon itself. Hence the account of image quoad-quid is greater in the turning to God, [and] quoad-quid is greater in the turning of the soul upon itself. In the turning to God [the image] is greater, because it has more of the account of beauty and conformity; in the turning to itself it has more of the account of consubstantiality and equality.

la: Cod. X addit *tantum vel etiam attendatur in eis per conversionem animae supra se vel etiam per conversionem ipsius super inferiora. Et videtur primo per comparationem ad Deum*. Deinde post *videtur* expunximus *quia* ope plurimorum codd. et ed. 1.

en: Codex X adds: *only or also is it found in them through the soul's turning upon itself, or also through its turning upon lower things. And it seems first through comparison to God.* Then, after *videtur*, we have expunged *quia* with the help of most of the codices and the first edition.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts we have restored the particle *et*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 prima. Cod. R *quia enim in Filio proprie est imago*. Mox codd. P Q *cognita* loco *cognoscendi*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads thus] against the manuscripts and the first edition. Codex R [reads]: *for in the Son properly is the image*. Soon after, codices P and Q [read] *cognita* in place of *cognoscendi*.

la: Cap. 8. n. 11; vide hic in lit. Magistri, cap. 2.

en: Chapter 8, n. 11; see here in the text of the Master [Lombard], chapter 2.

la: Libr. XIV. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 11: *Imago tamen naturae eius, qua natura melior nulla est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius.* — In his verbis Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ponit *inquirenda* loco *ibi quaerenda*. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 paulo post *haec* loco *hoc*.

en: Book XIV, *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 11: *Yet the image of his nature, than which no nature is better, must be sought and found in us where also our nature has nothing better.* — In these words the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, puts *inquirenda* in place of *ibi quaerenda*. Many codices with the first edition shortly after [read] *haec* in place of *hoc*.

en: Many codices such as X V here add *quod*; others such as B I aa bb [add] *quod obiicitur quod*.

en: Here c. 2, around the middle, in accordance with which text and with the help of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have here changed *illam* to *alia*, namely *intelligentiam et memoriam*. — Soon after, many codices with the first edition omit the particle *enim*.

la: Ioan. Damasc., *Orat. 1. de Imag.* ait: *Imago itaque est similitudo exemplar (πρωτότυπον) ita exprimens, ut aliqua ratione tamen ab eo differat.* Et ibid. *Orat. 3*: *Imago itaque est similitudo, exemplum et effigies cuiuspiam, in qua ille cuius est ostenditur.*

en: John of Damascus, *Oration 1 on Images*, says: *An image is therefore a likeness expressing the exemplar (πρωτότυπον) in such a way that it nevertheless differs from it in some respect.* And there, *Oration 3*: *An image is therefore a likeness, copy and effigy of someone, in which the one whose image it is is shown.*

en: Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Ita ms. cum ed. 1, licet aliqui loco *quia* minus bene habeant *quod*, sed Vat.: *De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic.*

en: Thus the manuscript with the first edition, although some less correctly have *quod* in place of *quia*; but the Vatican edition: *Concerning this there is an opposition, [as to] in what way [it is] so.*

la: Aliqui codd. ut FMY cum ed. 1 *directiva* loco *ductiva*. Cod. K (a secunda manu) *ductiva vel directiva in cognitionem alterius*. Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post *perfectiva* addit *propterea* et post *unius* adiungit *ergo*.

en: Some codices such as FMY with the first edition [read] *directiva* in place of *ductiva*. Codex K (by a second hand): *ductiva or directiva in the knowledge of the other*. Soon after, the Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and the first edition, after *perfectiva* adds *propterea* and after *unius* adds *ergo*.

la: Cap. 4. n. 4, in cuius imaginis assignatione Vat. tum contra textum Augustini tum contra mss. et ed. 1 loco *notitia* ponit *intellectu*.

en: Chapter 4, n. 4 — in this assignment of the image, the Vatican edition, both against Augustine's text and against the manuscripts and the first edition, puts *intellectu* in place of *notitia*.

la: Num. 4, in quo textu loco *temporalium* in originali legitur *rationalem in temporalibus*.

en: Number 4, in which text in place of *temporalium* the original reads *rationalem in temporalibus*.

la: Sequimur codd. DFT adiungendo manifeste supplendum *in ipsa*.

en: We follow codices DFT in adjoining what is clearly to be supplied: *in ipsa*.

la: Vat. *conformatur* et paulo post *redditur*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *conformatur* and shortly afterward *redditur*.

la: Restituimus meliorem lectionem mss. et ed. 1 loco *quae* ponendo *secundum quod*. Paulo ante in multis codd., ut AF GHKT etc. post *imago* abest *Dei*.

en: We restore the better reading of the manuscripts and the first edition, putting *secundum quod* in place of *quae*. A little before, in many codices, such as AF GHKT etc., after *imago* the word *Dei* is absent.

la: Ita maior pars codd. BDEHIKVW etc. cum ed. 1; alii omittunt vel *convertitur et* vel *et conformatur*. Vat. autem contra omnes codd. ponit *et secundum quod conformatur imagini*; codd. L O Y elipsim explendo post *imagini* addunt *conformatur*.

en: Thus the major part of the codices BDEHIKVW etc. with the first edition; others omit either *convertitur et* or *et conformatur*. The Vatican edition however, against all the codices, puts *et secundum quod conformatur imagini*; codices L O Y, filling out the ellipsis, after *imagini* add *conformatur*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut A T bb cum ed. 1 addunt *ergo*.

en: Some codices such as A T bb with the first edition add *ergo*.

la: Augustini opinionem de trinitate in potentiis animae ad inferiora conversis vide XII. *de Trin.*, et de trinitate in potentiis sensitivis ibid. libr. XI. — Paulo ante post *similiter* a Vat. indebite omissam particulam *et* revocavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: For Augustine's opinion on the trinity in the powers of the soul turned to lower things, see XII *On the Trinity*; and on the trinity in the sensitive powers, ibid. book XI. — A little before, after *similiter*, we have recalled from the manuscripts and the first edition the particle *et*, which had been undulyomitted by the Vatican edition.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. *totam*.

en: We have supplied from the manuscripts the word *totam*.

la: Num. 4: *In hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen imago Dei possit inveniri.*

en: Number 4: *In that, however, which is derived [from the mind] in activity concerning temporal things, even if a trinity can [be found], nevertheless the image of God cannot be found [there].*

la: De prima assignatione vide IX. *de Trin.*, per totum; de secunda ibid. X. c. 11. et 12; de completissima imaginis ratione ibid. XIV. c. 8. ac 12. seqq.

en: On the first assignment [of the image], see IX *On the Trinity*, throughout; on the second, ibid. X, c. 11 and 12; on the most complete account of the image, ibid. XIV, c. 8 and 12 ff.

la: Vat. contra mss. *respondeo*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, [reads] *respondeo*.

la: Cod. O addit *suum*.

en: Codex O adds *suum*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Distinctio rationis in partem superiorem et inferiorem in corp. accipitur non ex parte ipsius potentiae, sed ex parte obiecti, quatenus anima attingit vel obiecta exteriora et inferiora, vel interiora et superiora, sive ut dicit S. Doctor: «Non est differentia nisi secundum aspectum», *II. Sent.* d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 2., cfr. etiam ibidem p. II. a. 1. q. 1; *Breviloq.* p. I. c. 12; *Itinerar. mentis*, c. 1. — Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 3. — S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 79. a. 9. et 10; *de Verit.*, q. 15. a. 1. et 2.

**II.** Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 3. §. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 22; *S.* p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. subp. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Ceteros vide in Scholio praecedenti.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The distinction of reason into higher and lower part is taken in the body [of the article] not on the side of the power itself, but on the side of the object, insofar as the soul attains either exterior and lower objects, or interior and higher [objects], or, as the Holy Doctor says: «There is no difference except in respect of aspect», *II Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2; cf. also there p. II, a. 1, q. 1; *Breviloquium* p. I, c. 12; *Itinerarium mentis*, c. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 3. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 79, a. 9 and 10; *De Veritate*, q. 15, a. 1 and 2.

**II.** As to the question itself: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 3, §. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 22; *Summa* p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, subp. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ., q. 3. — For others see the preceding scholion.

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