title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De voti obligatione.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de voti obligatione, et circa hoc tria quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de obligatione voti per comparationem ad matrimonii contractionem. Secundo, per comparationem ad commutationem. Tertio, per comparationem ad dispensationem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum votum continentiae impediat, vel dirimat matrimonium.*

Quantum ergo ad primum sic proceditur; supposito, quod votum continentiae universaliter impediat matrimonium, et quod votum solemne impediat contrahendum et dirimat iam contractum[^p819-3]; quaeritur de voto simplici, utrum sit impedimentum *rescindens*, sive *impediens* matrimonium. Et quod non dirimat:

1. Dicit Caelestinus Papa, *Extra, de Voventibus et ordinatis*, quod non possunt contrahere matrimonium[^p819-4], *Rursus quidam* etc., quod « votum simplex impedit contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum ».

2. Item, non magis obligat votum simplex quam iuramentum; sed iuramentum non impedit matrimonium, ita ut dirimat iam contractum: ergo etc.

3. Item, si votum simplex matrimonium dirimeret; cum votum illud sit occultum, et quilibet possit simulare, se vovisse; quandocumque malitiose alter coniugum vellet, posset matrimonium separari[^p819-5] etiam legitimum.

4. Item, videtur, quod *nullo modo impediat*, sic: sicut se habet matrimonium consummatum ad votum solemnizatum, ita matrimonium non consummatum ad votum non solemnizatum; sed matrimonium non consummatum non impedit votum, ergo votum non solemnizatum non impedit nec dirimit matrimonium.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ratio, quare votum rescindit et dirimit matrimonium, ut dicit Magister in littera[^p819-6], est, quia « voventibus non solum nubere, sed etiam velle nubere est damnabile »; et quia nuptiae sunt eis damnabiles, ideo irritantur; sed hoc non solum in voto solemni est, sed etiam in simplici: ergo etc.

2. Item, Caelestinus dicit et auctoritas in decretali praemissa[^p819-7], quod « apud Deum non minus obligat votum simplex quam votum solemne »: si ergo non minus obligat; cum obligatio voti solemnis irritet matrimonium, videtur, quod et obligatio voti simplicis.

3. Item, qui voto simplici vovet continentiam tenetur nunquam coire: ergo quotiescumque coit, peccat mortaliter; sed nullus potest obligari ad mortale peccatum: ergo cum matrimonium obliget ad coitum, iste non potest obligari matrimonio.

Item quaero, quare magis votum solemne matrimonium dirimat quam simplex. *Si dicas*, quia privatum, et ideo non scandalizat nec potest probari[^p819-8]; *contra hoc est*, quia matrimonium contractum in clanculo sic irritat matrimonium sequens de facto, sicut contractum in manifesto. Et praeterea,
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votum emissum in publico coram omnibus etiam in foro iudicatur simplex nec dirimit matrimonium iam contractum.

> **Conclusio.** *Probatur, quod votum simplex continentiae impedit quidem matrimonium contrahendum, non autem simplex, sed tantum solemne dirimit matrimonium iam contractum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod votum continentiae est tale votum, quod generaliter *impedit* matrimonium contrahendum, sed non *dirimit* iam contractum nisi[^p820-1] solemnizatum. — Et rationem huius assignant aliqui Ecclesiae institutionem. Quod enim vovens sit persona illegitima, hoc non est ex *voto*, quia in ipso matrimonio perfectio continentiae servari potest ab eo qui debitum non exigit, sed solvit. Unde Augustinus[^p820-2] dicit, quod « computatur pro sanctificatione perfecta, si non exigis, sed reddis quod debes ». Sed quod impediat, hoc est ex *constitutione Ecclesiae*, cuius est personas legitimas, vel illegitimas matrimonio determinare. Ratio autem, quare Ecclesia de voto solemni instituit, ut dicunt, est, quod in voto solemni non potest decipi, et potest in fractione eius scandalizari, quia publicum est; sed in voto simplici neutrum habet locum, quia privatum est. — Sed haec solutio videtur supponere duplex falsum: unum, quod sit ab *institutione* talis illegitimitas, quia Ecclesia, ut communiter dicitur, non potest ibi dispensare[^p820-3]; potest autem dispensare generaliter in suis constitutionibus. Aliud falsum est: quia votum solemne non dicitur, quia notorium vel publicum; quia votum, quantumcumque publicetur, nisi aliud adsit, *simplex* iudicatur nec impedit matrimonium iam contractum; unde aliud est votum *publicum*, aliud *solemne*.

Ideo alia ratio assignatur veracior a voti solemnizatione. Votum enim tripliciter solemnizatur, scilicet ordinis susceptione, professionis emissione et habitus professorum assumtione cum aliis, quae hominem professum ostendunt[^p820-4]. Et hoc est commune in voti solemnizatione, quod fiat coram persona, quae locum Dei tenet et quae votum potest approbare; qua recipiente votum continentiae, transfertur potestas corporis voventis in alium, quia alius adest, qui recipit. Sed in voto simplici, ubi homo mera se obligat voluntate et in nullius manibus hoc facit, obligatur quidem, sed tamen dominium sui corporis in alterum non transfertur. Et quia quod translatum est in potestatem unius non potest transferri in potestatem alterius: ideo, emisso voto solemni, non potest matrimonium contrahi, in quo est translatio dominii proprii corporis. Sed quod translatum non est adhuc transferri potest; ideo, voto simplici emisso, potest vir potestatem sui corporis in matrimonio dare: ideo, si contrahat, contractum est. — *Amplius*, in voto solemni Deo et homini obligatur, sic et in matrimonio; et quoniam utrobique est *par obligatio*, et par obligatio non solvit vinculum paris obligationis, sed bene *praepotens* solvit[^p820-5] vinculum minoris obligationis: ideo obligatio voti solemnis non potest infringi per superveniens vinculum matrimonii. — Hoc autem non ideo dico, quod faciat scandalum, quia et illud potest esse in voto simplici; sed hoc facit obligatio duplex cum translatione potestatis in alterum. Est igitur haec summa[^p820-6] rationis, quia votum solemne obligat *aequaliter districte*; ex opposito non sic simplex; ideo impedit.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ratio irritationis matrimonii est, quia, post votum damnabile est nubere; dicendum, quod hoc[^p820-7] non est ratio *tota*, sed *concausa*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non minus obligat etc.; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad *culpam* sive transgressionem; tamen minus obligat quantum ad *alterius vinculi solutionem*, ut fiat vis in hoc quod dicit *quantum ad Deum*. Hoc enim dupliciter dicitur: vel quantum ad Deum ut *obiectum*, quia votum astringit astrictione[^p820-8] necessitatis; vel quantum ad Deum, id est quantum ad *divinum iudicium*. Deus autem hunc qui obligatus est voto solemni, reputat magis obligatum, pro eo quod non solum reputat eum obligatum sibi, sed etiam homini; non solum reputat promissionem factam acceptam, immo per ministrum potestatem corporis esse translatam: et ideo Deus iudicat, quod votum solemne impediat, et non simplex. Et hoc non tantum est
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manifestum in foro Ecclesiae, sed etiam in foro conscientiae[^p821-1].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenetur nunquam coire; dicendum, quod verum est, nisi fortiori vinculo solvatur; et quia matrimonium fortius est, ideo dicunt, quod cum consummatur matrimonium, tunc omnino absolvitur a voto, sed debet de eo poenitentiam agere, quia votum violavit; unde dicunt, quod potest debitum petere et solvere[^p821-2]. — Sed hoc non credo, scilicet quod absolvatur a voto quantum ad matrimonium, nisi in quantum ius matrimonii compellit eum agere contra votum; sed non compellit ius matrimonii debitum *petere* — quia hoc est libertatis — sed solum *solvere*. — Ideo dico, quod potest sine peccato *solvere*, quia facit id, ad quod tenetur, nunquam tamen potest sine peccato *petere*; et si uxor moriatur, tenetur omnino continere[^p821-3].

Quod tamen obiicit, quod matrimonium non consummatum non impedit votum; ratio huius est, quia nullum fit ei praeiudicium, potest enim uxor, sive sponsa alteri nubere[^p821-4]; sed per matrimonium omni voto praeiudicium generatur.

english:
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### Article II. *On the obligation of the vow.*

Next, as to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of the vow, and about this three questions are asked. First, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of the vow by comparison to the contracting of marriage. Second, by comparison to commutation. Third, by comparison to dispensation.

### Question I. *Whether a vow of continence impedes or dissolves marriage.*

As to the first, then, one proceeds thus; it being supposed that a vow of continence universally impedes marriage, and that a solemn vow impedes the contracting [of it] and dissolves [it] once contracted[^p819-3]; the question is asked about a simple vow, whether it is an impediment *rescinding*, or [merely] *impeding*, marriage. And that it does not dissolve [it]:

1. Pope Celestine says, in the *Extra, On those who vow and are ordained*, that they cannot contract marriage[^p819-4]; and again, *Rursus quidam* etc., that "a simple vow impedes the contracting, but does not dissolve what is already contracted."

2. Likewise, a simple vow does not oblige more than an oath; but an oath does not impede marriage so as to dissolve what is already contracted: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if a simple vow were to dissolve marriage; since that vow is hidden, and anyone can pretend that he has vowed; whenever, maliciously, either spouse should wish it, a marriage could be dissolved[^p819-5], even a legitimate one.

4. Likewise, it seems that it *in no way impedes*, thus: as a consummated marriage is related to a solemnized vow, so a non-consummated marriage [is related] to a non-solemnized vow; but a non-consummated marriage does not impede a vow, therefore a non-solemnized vow neither impedes nor dissolves marriage.

**On the contrary:**

1. The reason why a vow rescinds and dissolves marriage, as the Master says in the text[^p819-6], is that "for those who vow, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry is damnable"; and because marriages are for them damnable, therefore they are annulled; but this is not only in a solemn vow, but also in a simple one: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Celestine says, and the authority in the aforementioned decretal[^p819-7], that "before God a simple vow obliges no less than a solemn vow": if therefore it obliges no less; since the obligation of a solemn vow annuls marriage, it seems that the obligation of a simple vow [does] also.

3. Likewise, he who by a simple vow vows continence is bound never to have intercourse: therefore as often as he has intercourse, he sins mortally; but no one can be obliged to a mortal sin: therefore, since marriage obliges to intercourse, such a one cannot be bound by marriage.

I also ask why a solemn vow dissolves marriage more than a simple one does. *If you say*, because [the simple vow] is private, and therefore does not scandalize nor can be proved[^p819-8]; *against this is*, that a marriage contracted clandestinely thus annuls a subsequent marriage in fact, just as one contracted openly. And moreover,
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a vow uttered in public before all, even in [the external] forum, is judged simple and does not dissolve a marriage already contracted.

> **Conclusion.** *It is proved that a simple vow of continence indeed impedes the contracting of marriage, but a simple [vow] does not, but only a solemn [vow] dissolves a marriage already contracted.*

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow of continence is such a vow as generally *impedes* the contracting of marriage, but does not *dissolve* what is already contracted unless[^p820-1] solemnized. — And some assign as the reason for this the institution of the Church. For that the one vowing is an illegitimate person, this is not from the *vow*, because in marriage itself the perfection of continence can be preserved by him who does not exact the debt, but pays it. Whence Augustine[^p820-2] says that "it is reckoned as perfect sanctification, if you do not exact, but render what you owe." But that it impedes, this is from the *constitution of the Church*, whose [office] it is to determine legitimate or illegitimate persons for marriage. But the reason why the Church instituted [this] concerning a solemn vow, as they say, is that in a solemn vow one cannot be deceived, and one can be scandalized at the breaking of it, because it is public; but in a simple vow neither has place, because it is private. — But this solution seems to suppose a twofold falsehood: one, that such illegitimacy is from the *institution*, since the Church, as is commonly said, cannot dispense there[^p820-3]; but it can dispense generally in its own constitutions. The other falsehood is: that a vow is not called solemn because it is notorious or public; because a vow, however much it be published, unless something else be present, is judged *simple* and does not impede a marriage already contracted; whence one thing is a *public* vow, another a *solemn* [one].

Therefore another, truer, reason is assigned from the solemnization of the vow. For a vow is solemnized in three ways, namely by the reception of [holy] orders, by the making of profession, and by the assumption of the habit of the professed together with the other [rites], which show a man to be professed[^p820-4]. And this is common in the solemnization of a vow, that it be made before a person who holds the place of God and who can approve the vow; and when that person receives the vow of continence, the power over the body of the one vowing is transferred to another, because another is present who receives [it]. But in a simple vow, where a man obliges himself by mere will and does this in the hands of no one, he is indeed obliged, but nevertheless the dominion of his own body is not transferred to another. And because what has been transferred into the power of one cannot be transferred into the power of another: therefore, once a solemn vow has been made, marriage cannot be contracted, in which there is a transfer of the dominion of one's own body. But what has not been transferred can still be transferred; therefore, once a simple vow has been made, a man can give the power over his body in marriage: therefore, if he contracts, it is contracted. — *Furthermore*, in a solemn vow one is obliged to God and to man, and so [also] in marriage; and since on both sides there is an *equal obligation*, and an equal obligation does not loose the bond of an equal obligation, but indeed a *more powerful* [one] looses[^p820-5] the bond of a lesser obligation: therefore the obligation of a solemn vow cannot be infringed by a supervening bond of marriage. — But I do not say this because it would cause scandal, since that too can be present in a simple vow; but this the twofold obligation does, together with the transfer of power to another. This, then, is the sum[^p820-6] of the reasoning: that a solemn vow obliges *equally strictly*; from the opposite side a simple [vow] does not thus [oblige]; therefore it impedes.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that the reason for the annulment of marriage is that, after a vow, it is damnable to marry; it must be said that this[^p820-7] is not the *whole* reason, but a *concurrent cause*.

2. To that which is objected, that it obliges no less etc.; it must be said that this is true as regards *fault* or transgression; yet it obliges less as regards *the loosing of the other bond*, so that force be given to this which it says, *before God*. For this is said in two ways: either before God as an *object*, because the vow binds with the binding[^p820-8] of necessity; or before God, that is, as regards the *divine judgment*. Now God reckons him who is bound by a solemn vow to be more obliged, in that He reckons him obliged not only to Himself, but also to man; He reckons not only the promise made to be accepted, but rather the power over the body to have been transferred through the minister: and therefore God judges that a solemn vow impedes, and not a simple one. And this is not only
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manifest in the forum of the Church, but also in the forum of conscience[^p821-1].

3. To that which is objected, that he is bound never to have intercourse; it must be said that this is true, unless he be loosed by a stronger bond; and because marriage is stronger, therefore they say that when a marriage is consummated, then one is wholly absolved from the vow, but he ought to do penance for it, because he violated the vow; whence they say that he can seek and pay the debt[^p821-2]. — But this I do not believe, namely that he is absolved from the vow as regards marriage, except insofar as the right of marriage compels him to act against the vow; but the right of marriage does not compel [him] to *seek* the debt — because this is a matter of liberty — but only to *pay* [it]. — Therefore I say that he can without sin *pay*, because he does that to which he is bound, yet he can never without sin *seek*; and if his wife dies, he is bound wholly to be continent[^p821-3].

As for what he objects, that a non-consummated marriage does not impede a vow; the reason for this is that no prejudice is done to it [the vow], for the wife, or betrothed, can marry another[^p821-4]; but by [consummated] marriage prejudice is generated against every vow.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Inferius pro *rescindens* codd. E L N Y aa *irritans*, codd. K V *dirimens*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — Below, for *rescindens* codd. E L N Y aa [read] *irritans*, codd. K V *dirimens*.

la: Libr. IV. tit. 6, qui nunc inscribitur: « Qui clerici vel voventes matrimonium contrahere possunt », c. 6, quod a codd. et ed. 1 tribuitur *Clementi* (idem recurrit infra in 2. arg. ad oppos.). Cfr. ibid. C. *Consuluit* (4.).

en: Bk. IV, tit. 6, which is now entitled "What clerics or those who vow can contract marriage," c. 6, which by the codices and ed. 1 is attributed to *Clement* (the same recurs below in the 2nd argument to the opposite). Cf. ibid., c. *Consuluit* (4.).

la: Cod. E *separare*.

en: Cod. E [reads] *separare*.

la: Hic c. 2. — Post *est*, quod in plurimis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur, Vat. addit *et habetur 27. dist. C. Voventibus* (4.). Cfr. supra pag. 695, nota 2. Superius pro *rescindit* plures codd. *irritat*, cod. I *impedit*.

en: Here c. 2. — After *est*, which is wanting in very many codices and in ed. 1, the Vatican [edition] adds *et habetur 27. dist. C. Voventibus* (4.). Cf. above, p. 695, note 2. Above, for *rescindit* several codices [read] *irritat*, cod. I *impedit*.

la: Scil. *Rursus quidam* in fundam. 1. allegata.

en: Namely *Rursus quidam*, cited in the 1st fundamentum.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Mox pro *clanculo* cod. aa *clandestino*.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — Soon, for *clanculo* cod. aa [reads] *clandestino*.

la: Cod. P *nisi sit* (votum).

en: Cod. P [reads] *nisi sit* (the vow).

la: *Enarrat. in Ps.* 149. n. 15. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXII. c. 2. — Superius pro *perfectio continentiae* edd. *perfecto continentia*.

en: *Enarration on Ps.* 149, n. 15. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. 32, c. 2. — Above, for *perfectio continentiae* the editions [read] *perfecto continentia*.

la: Cfr. infra q. 3.

en: Cf. below, q. 3.

la: In additione Glossae super praeallegatam decretalem *Rursus quidam* legitur: Unde versus: *Votum solemne demonstrant quatuor ista: | Ordo sacer, scriptum, professio praestita sponte, | Et professorum vestis suscepta scienter.* Vel sic: *Ordo sacer, vestis, professio religionis, | Quae sit facta palam, faciunt solemnia vota.* — Superius pro *veracior* codd. L Y *verior*, edd. *et accipitur*. Inferius pro *qua recipiente* plures codd. *quia recipiente* (edd. *quia in recipiente*), cod. K (I a secunda manu) legit: *quia in voto solemni continentiae transfertur* etc.

en: In the addition of the Gloss upon the aforecited decretal *Rursus quidam* one reads: Whence the verses: "These four things show a solemn vow: | holy order, a written [profession], a profession freely rendered, | and the garb of the professed knowingly received." Or thus: "Holy order, the garb, profession of religion, | which, made openly, make solemn vows." — Above, for *veracior* codd. L Y [read] *verior*, the editions *et accipitur*. Below, for *qua recipiente* several codices [read] *quia recipiente* (editions *quia in recipiente*), cod. K (I, by a second hand) reads: *quia in voto solemni continentiae transfertur* etc.

la: Pro *super*, cui codd. K L U (I V a secunda manu) praemittunt *est*, substituimus ex cod. A *solvit*.

en: For *super*, before which codd. K L U (I V by a second hand) prefix *est*, we have substituted from cod. A *solvit*.

la: Cod. K *substantia*, plures alii codd. *sententia*. Sensus sequentis propositionis est, quod vinculum voti solemnis aequaliter districte obligat, ac vinculum matrimonii; unde non eliditur alio vinculo praepotentis obligationis.

en: Cod. K [reads] *substantia*, several other codices *sententia*. The sense of the following proposition is that the bond of a solemn vow obliges equally strictly as the bond of marriage; whence it is not annulled by another bond of a more powerful obligation.

la: Pro *dicendum, quod hoc* codd. *solum* vel *haec* vel *hoc*.

en: For *dicendum, quod hoc* the codices [read] *solum* or *haec* or *hoc*.

la: Codd. A S *affectione*, edd. *constrictione*. Inferius voci *corporis* cod. aa praemittit *sui*.

en: Codd. A S [read] *affectione*, the editions *constrictione*. Below, to the word *corporis* cod. aa prefixes *sui*.

la: Cfr. Glossa in hanc decretalem (*Rursus quidam*).

en: Cf. the Gloss on this decretal (*Rursus quidam*).

la: Hanc opinionem profitetur Magister (hic c. 3.), quae merito a posterioribus reprobatur.

en: The Master professes this opinion (here, c. 3), which is rightly rejected by later [authors].

la: Vide supra d. 27. dub. 4; d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 2.

en: See above, d. 27, dub. 4; d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. dub. 5. — Mox post *matrimonium* Vat. addit *consummatum*.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, dub. 5. — Soon, after *matrimonium* the Vatican [edition] adds *consummatum*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Votum *solemne* religionis irritare matrimonium, declaratum est a Concilio Trident. (cfr supra d. 27. a 1. q. 1. scholion). Votum *simplex* vero non *dirimit* matrimonium, sed *impedit* tantum, exceptis votis simplicibus, in Societate Iesu post primum novitiatum emissis, quae a Gregorio XIII. paria in hoc solemnibus posita sunt. — Multum tamen ab antiquo disceptatum est de *intrinseca ratione*, qua differunt ista vota simplicia et solemnia. Cum S. Bonav. etiam S. Thomas, B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et Durand. docent, in voto solemni non fieri tantum promissionem cum obligatione, ut in simplici, sed etiam actualem traditionem sive translationem corporis, qua ipsa persona Deo consecratur. Scotus vero cum Richardo a Med. docet, solemne votum differre a simplici hoc tantum, quod habeat annexam quandam *institutionem ecclesiasticam*, quosdam effectus determinantem. Prima sententia sibi constans vult, vota solemnia dirimere *iure divino* matrimonia nec admittere proprie dispensationem, ne a Summo quidem Pontifice. Secundum Scotum tota differentia fundata est in iure *ecclesiastico*, unde etiam proprie dispensatio fieri potest. Sententiae Scoti favent plures constitutiones et ipsa praxis S. Sedis. Iam Bonifacius VIII. (libr. III. tit. 15.) dicit, « quod voti solemnitas ex sola constitutione Ecclesiae est inventa »; quod repetit Gregor. XIII. Const. *Ascendente Domino*. Unde antiqua illa doctrina aliquatenus limitanda est, praesertim quoad 3. quaestionis solutionem.

**II.** De 1. quaestione: Scot. (de hac et 2. seqq.), hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 88. a. 7; Suppl. q. 53. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 12-15. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 2; Dionys. Chart., hic q. 2.

**III.** De quaestione 2. et 3: S. Thom., locis citt. hic a. 3. 4, S. a. 10. 11. — B. Albert., hic a. 16-18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1-5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1-3, a. 9. q. 1-3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That a *solemn* vow of religion annuls marriage was declared by the Council of Trent (cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, scholion). But a *simple* vow does not *dissolve* marriage, but only *impedes* [it], with the exception of the simple vows made in the Society of Jesus after the first novitiate, which by Gregory XIII were placed as equal in this to solemn [vows]. — Yet from of old there has been much dispute concerning the *intrinsic reason* by which these simple and solemn vows differ. With St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas also, Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, and Durandus teach that in a solemn vow there is made not only a promise with obligation, as in a simple one, but also an actual handing-over or transfer of the body, by which the very person is consecrated to God. But Scotus, with Richard of Middleton, teaches that a solemn vow differs from a simple one only in this, that it has annexed a certain *ecclesiastical institution* determining certain effects. The first opinion, consistent with itself, holds that solemn vows dissolve marriages by *divine law* and do not admit of dispensation properly [speaking], not even by the Supreme Pontiff. According to Scotus the whole difference is founded in *ecclesiastical* law, whence dispensation too can properly be made. Several constitutions and the very practice of the Holy See favor the opinions of Scotus. Already Boniface VIII (bk. III, tit. 15) says "that the solemnity of a vow was devised from the constitution of the Church alone"; which Gregory XIII repeats in the Constitution *Ascendente Domino*. Whence that ancient doctrine is to be somewhat limited, especially as regards the solution of the third question.

**II.** On the first question: Scotus (on this and the two following), here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* II-II, q. 88, a. 7; Suppl. q. 53, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12-15. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4, 5. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 7, q. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. 2; Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2.

**III.** On the second and third question: St. Thomas, in the cited places, here a. 3, 4, [Suppl.] a. 10, 11. — Bl. Albert, here a. 16-18. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1-5. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 8, q. 1-3, a. 9, q. 1-3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF bands at printed pp. 819–821 (pdf 839–841; offset +20), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF authoritative for the cascade-shattered Respondeo/solutions/scholion/footers); raw OCR L87594–87800 used only for footnote-marker positions. Bands regenerated via `colcrop.py vol4 <p> 1780` (L) / `1560` (R) — the default split truncates the right column here. Running heads verified: p. 819 recto "DIST. XXXVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I."; p. 820 verso "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."; p. 821 recto "DIST. XXXVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. II." (see [?] flag).

**Chunking.** The ARTICULUS II opener ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum … tria quaeruntur") is folded into this q1, per the locked convention. This chunk carries the Article II master-scholion.

**Scholion disposition.** The Article II scholion is printed as **three numbered sections (§ I, II, III)** at the mid-foot of p. 821, set two-column (§ I flows left→right; § II and § III are the doctor-lists). It treats the whole article: § I the intrinsic-reason dispute over simple vs. solemn vows (Trent, Bonav./Thomas/Albert/Petr.a Tar./Durand. vs. Scotus/Richard, Boniface VIII & Gregory XIII); § II "De 1. quaestione" (this q1) doctor-list; § III "De quaestione 2. et 3" doctor-list. Rendered here in full, both languages, as the last subsection of both `## Latin` and `## English`. Siblings a2-q2 and a2-q3 carry **no** scholion.

**Apparatus split (18 entries).** p. 819 → 6 (footers 3–8; footers 1–2 belong to a1-q3, see hand-off); p. 820 → 8 (footers 1–8, all in this q1's Respondeo/solutions); p. 821 → 4 (footers 1–4, anchored to the q1 solutions: 1 on *foro conscientiae*, 2 on *petere et solvere* [Master's opinion rejected], 3 on *continere*, 4 on *nubere* / Vat. *consummatum*).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Received / left to a1-q3:* p. 819 footers 1 (*Quaest. 1. in corp. et ad 1.* — anchors *sicut superius dictum est*) and 2 (*Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*) belong to Art. I q. 3, whose tail ("…cipere et deliberatione firmare … qui hoc habent") occupies the top of the p. 819 right column. NOT claimed here.
- *Forwarded to a2-q2:* Question II (*Utrum votum possit commutari / permutari*, opener "Secundo quaeritur de obligatione voti in comparatione ad commutationem") begins at the foot of p. 821. Its footers are p. 821 nn. 5 (Levit. ult., *Animal quod immolari potest…*), 6 (Eccles. 5, *Quodcumque voveris redde*), 7 (*intellectus* / concordia vocis), 8 (Bernard. *de Dispensatione*), 9 (Bernard.) etc. — all belong to a2-q2, NOT claimed here.

**[?] flags.**
- p. 821 running head — **RESOLVED (600dpi p.821), 2026-07-13 decade polish-blocker.** Read on `raw/vision/vol4/p-hires-821-r600-0841.png`, top band (crop full width, y 0.03h–0.09h). The head prints exactly: **`DIST. XXXVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`** with the folio **`821`** at the outer right — confirming both the running-head text as recorded in *Provenance* above and the `printed_pages: [819, 820, 821]` / `pdf_pages: [839, 840, 841]` frontmatter (offset `pdf = printed + 20`; the 600 dpi extract of printed 821 is PDF page 841). The head reads "…QUAEST. II." although the upper page (this q1's solutions + the article scholion) is still q1; this is Quaracchi's forward-looking running head — Question II opens lower on the same page. Not an error; ownership unaffected. Flag closed.
- No unresolved textual ambiguities: the bands were legible at this dpi (variant lists, the Gloss verses, and the § II/§III doctor-lists all clear).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum votum possit permutari
Whether a vow can be commuted

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 821 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum votum possit permutari.*

Secundo quaeritur de obligatione voti in comparatione ad commutationem, utrum possit commutari. Et quod *non*, videtur.

1. Levitici ultimo[^p821-5]: *Animal, quod immolari potest Domino, mutari non potest, nec in peius nec in melius*: ergo etc.

2. Item, Ecclesiastis quinto[^p821-6]: *Quodcumque voveris, redde*: ergo ad illud quod vovet homo, tenetur: ergo non potest commutare.

3. Item, sicut veritas locutionis consistit in concordia vocis et intellectus[^p821-7], sic veritas voti in concordia promissionis et solutionis; sed quandocumque vox discordat ab intellectu, est ibi falsitas: ergo et in voto, quando promissio a solutione. Sed unusquisque tenetur esse verax in promisso: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod non possit sine *auctoritate superioris*, videtur. Bernardus de Dispensatione[^p821-8] etc.: « De bene ordinatis monasteriis nullus meo consilio egredietur desiderio arctioris vitae sine licentia superioris »: si ergo de hoc magis tenetur, patet etc.

5. Item, quod *superior non possit mutare*, videtur: quia aeque obligat votum solemne, ut matrimonium; sed matrimonium nulla auctoritate superioris potest mutari: ergo nec votum.

**Contra:** 1. Votum institutum est ad caritatem fovendam; sed dicit Bernardus[^p821-9]: « Quod ex caritate institutum est contra caritatem sustineri non debet »: ergo ubi est necessitas vel utilitas, cum caritas exigat, potest commutari; sed hoc est per votum: ergo etc.

<!-- page 822 -->
2. Item, semper licet proficere secundum statum: ergo et votum de bono in melius commutare, ergo etc.

3. Item, si quis emittit duo vota incompossibilia, quorum alterum est perfectius, impleto perfectiori, absolvitur ab alio, etiam quod prius vovit: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut testamentum est propriae voluntatis, ita et votum; sed licet, quamdiu homo vivit, mutare testamentum: ergo et votum sine omni licentia.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** *Votum potest cum praelati auctoritate mutari et propter necessitatem supervenientem et propter periculum imminens et propter maiorem utilitatem voventis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod licet votum mutari ex causa, illud scilicet, quod recipit recompensationem; sed non ex levitate nec ex propria voluntate, quam obligavit, sed ex necessitate sive utilitate, cum praelati auctoritate; excepto voto religionis, vel etiam status perfectioris, in quod potest aliud votum commutari sine praelati licentia, quia propter sui dignitatem licentiam dant iura[^p822-1]. Sanum tamen est consilium, quod fiat superioris auctoritate, ubi non creditur, quod contradicat, ne videatur ex levitate procedere et auctoritatem superioris contemnere.

Ratio autem, quare licet votum mutare et commutare, est propter *necessitatem* supervenientem, vel propter *periculum*, quod imminet frequenter in observatione, vel propter *maiorem utilitatem* et voventis et aliorum. In his enim ratio recta et divina illustratio manifeste clamat, quod per mediatorem et procuratorem debeat et possit provideri, ut Deus non damnificetur, nec iste periclitetur, in quo et iste debuit salvari, et Deus honorari, et propter quod votum ordinatum est fieri. Et ideo ex hoc potest mutari.

Quod tamen obiicit de testamento, non est simile, quia testamentum non obligat, ut votum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Levitico secundum Glossam[^p822-2] solvendum est: *propria auctoritate*.

2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ecclesiaste, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur in se, vel in aequivalenti. — Et per hoc patet de veritate, quia concordat impletio promissioni, dum datur aequivalens illi. — Quod vero dicit Bernardus de ascendentibus ad altiorem statum, credo, quod dicitur consulendo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de matrimonio, solvendum, quod non est simile: quia vinculum matrimonii ligat non tantum ratione *promissionis*, sed etiam *significationis* rei insolubilis, in quam nulla potest auctoritas[^p822-3]. — *Praeterea*, non est unum matrimonium melius alio, sicut votum; et ideo non competit matrimonium permutari nec commutari, sicut competit de voto[^p822-4].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether a vow can be commuted.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of a vow in comparison to commutation, whether it can be commuted. And that it *cannot*, seems [to be the case]:

1. Leviticus, the last [chapter][^p821-5]: *An animal that can be immolated to the Lord cannot be changed, neither for the worse nor for the better*: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiastes, chapter five[^p821-6]: *Whatever you have vowed, render it*: therefore to that which a man vows he is bound: therefore he cannot commute it.

3. Likewise, just as the truth of speech consists in the agreement of the voice and the understanding[^p821-7], so the truth of a vow [consists] in the agreement of the promise and its fulfillment; but whenever the voice is discordant from the understanding, there is falsity there: therefore also in a vow, when the promise [is discordant] from the fulfillment. But everyone is bound to be truthful in what he has promised: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it cannot [be commuted] without the *authority of a superior*, seems [to be shown]. Bernard, On Dispensation[^p821-8], etc.: "From well-ordered monasteries let no one, by my counsel, depart out of a desire for a stricter life without the permission of his superior": if therefore one is the more bound to this, it is clear, etc.

5. Likewise, that a *superior cannot change* [it], seems [to be shown]: because a solemn vow binds equally, like matrimony; but matrimony cannot be changed by any authority of a superior: therefore neither can a vow.

**On the contrary:** 1. A vow is instituted for fostering charity; but Bernard says[^p821-9]: "What is instituted out of charity ought not to be maintained against charity": therefore where there is necessity or utility, since charity requires it, it can be commuted; but this is [done] through a vow: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is always permitted to make progress according to one's state: therefore also to commute a vow from a good [thing] into a better [thing], therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if someone makes two incompatible vows, of which one is more perfect, when the more perfect has been fulfilled, he is absolved from the other, even from that which he vowed first: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as a testament is of one's own will, so also is a vow; but it is permitted, as long as a man lives, to change a testament: therefore also [to change] a vow, without any permission.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** *A vow can, with the authority of a prelate, be changed both on account of a supervening necessity and on account of an imminent danger and on account of the greater utility of the one who vows.*

**I respond:** It must be said that it is permitted to change a vow for a cause — namely, that [cause] which admits a recompense; but not out of levity nor out of the private will by which one bound oneself, but out of necessity or utility, with the authority of a prelate; with the exception of the vow of religion, or even of a more perfect state, into which another vow can be commuted without the permission of a prelate, because on account of its dignity the laws grant permission[^p822-1]. Yet it is sound counsel that it be done by the authority of the superior, where it is not believed that he would contradict [it], lest one seem to proceed out of levity and to despise the authority of the superior.

Now the reason why it is permitted to change and commute a vow is on account of a supervening *necessity*, or on account of a *danger* which frequently threatens in the observance [of it], or on account of the *greater utility* both of the one who vows and of others. For in these [cases] right reason and divine illumination manifestly cry out that through a mediator and procurator it ought to and can be provided that God be not defrauded, nor this man endangered — in which [matter] both this man ought to be preserved and God to be honored, and on account of which a well-ordered vow is made. And therefore on this account it can be changed.

But what he objects concerning a testament is not similar, because a testament does not bind, as a vow does.

1. To that which is objected from Leviticus, according to the Gloss[^p822-2], it must be resolved: *by one's own authority*.

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected from Ecclesiastes, it must be said that it is understood [as fulfilled] either in itself or in an equivalent. — And through this the matter of truth is made clear, because the fulfillment agrees with the promise, when an equivalent to it is given. — But as to what Bernard says about those ascending to a higher state, I believe that it is said by way of counsel.

5. To that which is objected last concerning matrimony, it must be resolved that it is not similar: because the bond of matrimony binds not only by reason of the *promise*, but also of the *signification* of an indissoluble thing, over which no authority has power[^p822-3]. — *Moreover*, one matrimony is not better than another, as [one] vow [is better than another]; and therefore it is not fitting for a matrimony to be exchanged or commuted, as it is fitting concerning a vow[^p822-4].

---

la: Vers. 9. seq.: *Animal autem, quod immolari potest Domino, si quis voverit, sanctum erit et mutari non poterit, id est nec melius malo nec peius bono.*

en: Verses 9f. [Lev. 27:9–10]: "But an animal that can be immolated to the Lord, if someone has vowed it, shall be holy and cannot be changed — that is, neither a better for a worse nor a worse for a better."

la: Vers. 3.

en: Verse 3 [Eccles. 5:3].

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5. — Pro *vocis* plures codd. et edd. *voluntatis*. In fine arg. pro *promisso* edd. *promissione*.

en: Cf. vol. I, p. 707, note 5. — For *vocis* ("of the voice") several codices and editions [read] *voluntatis* ("of the will"). At the end of the argument, for *promisso* the editions [read] *promissione*.

la: *De Praecepto et dispensat.* c. 16. n. 13: Sane de religiosis ac bene ordinatis monasteriis nullus professorum meo consilio, ne arctioris quidem vitae desiderio, sine licentia sui senioris egredietur.

en: *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 16, n. 13: "Indeed, from religious and well-ordered monasteries let no one of the professed, by my counsel — not even out of a desire for a stricter life — depart without the permission of his elder."

la: *De Praecepto et dispensat.* c. 2. n. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 483, nota 3. — Propositio in fine arg. *sed hoc est per votum* intelligenda videtur sic: sed necessitas vel utilitas commutationis habetur interdum per votum, i. e. voto emisso: ergo.

en: *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 2, n. 5. Cf. above, p. 483, note 3. — The proposition at the end of the argument, *"but this is through a vow,"* seems to be understood thus: but the necessity or utility of commutation is sometimes had through a vow, i.e., once a vow has been made: therefore.

la: Can. *Scripturae* (4.), X. de Voto et voti redemptione (lib. III. tit. 34.).

en: The canon *Scripturae* (4), in the Decretals [X], "On the Vow and the Redemption of a Vow" (book III, title 34).

la: Hugo de S. Charo Card., in hunc loc., glossam istam afferre videtur dicens: Non tamen tua auctoritate hoc [commutationem voti in melius] debes facere, sed superioris auctoritate.

en: Hugh of Saint-Cher, Cardinal, on this passage, seems to bring forward this gloss, saying: "Yet you ought not to do this [the commutation of a vow into something better] by your own authority, but by the authority of a superior."

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{821,822}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; R bands regenerated at 1780, p.822 L at 2120 to un-clip); raw OCR L87801–87884 used as cross-check (clean for this quaestio). Alignment verified: the "Secundo quaeritur… utrum possit commutari" opener sits at raw L87803 exactly as briefed; QUAESTIO III (*Utrum Summus Pontifex possit dispensare in voto*) begins immediately after my range → a2-q3.

**Page verification.** Running heads confirm printed pp. 821 (`DIST. XXXVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` / `821`) and 822 (`822` / `SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.`). printed_pages/pdf_pages unchanged (offset pdf = printed + 20).

**Scholion.** has_scholion: false. The Art. II scholion is printed at the foot/head of p. 821 (SCHOLION §I–III, the doctor-concordance for Art. II qq. 1–3) but belongs to **a2-q1**, which owns it for all three Art. II questions. Footnote [^p822-4] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) explicitly points back to that scholion.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- p. 821: footnotes **1–4** (the *Ad*-replies + scholion refs at the top of the page) belong to **a2-q1** (its Respondeo/replies close on this shared page); I claim **5, 6, 7, 8, 9**, all anchored in my QUAESTIO II body (args 1–5 / Contra 1).
- p. 822: footnotes **5, 6, 7** (Psalm 75; Bernard *De Praecepto*; Eccli. 26) are anchored in the QUAESTIO III arguments and belong to **a2-q3**; I claim **1, 2, 3, 4**, anchored in my Respondeo + Solutio.
- Total apparatus: **9 entries** (p821: 5; p822: 4).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR + bands agreed throughout; the only reconstructed word was p822 note 1's clipped "*redemptione*" (canon title *De voto et voti redemptione*, X 3.34), confirmed from the p822-L band which shows "voti redemptione" intact.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 822 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum Summus Pontifex possit dispensare in voto.*

Tertio quaeritur de obligatione voti in comparatione ad dispensationem, et quaeritur, utrum Summus Pontifex possit dispensare in voto. Et quod *non*, videtur:

1. Quia Glossa super illud Psalmi[^p822-5]: *Vovete et reddite* etc.: « Reddere est necessitatis »; sed circa ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis, non potest dispensari: ergo etc.

2. Item, obligatio voti est secundum ius naturale, quod patet, quia omni tempore cucurrit; sed Pontifex non potest in ea quae sunt iuris naturalis: ergo etc.

3. Item, Bernardus[^p822-6] dicit: quaedam sunt praecepta moralia primae tabulae ordinantia ad Deum; quaedam secundae ordinantia ad proximum; quaedam superaddita, ut canonicae sanctiones et Patrum instituta. In primis non potest dispensare nec homo nec Deus; in secundis non homo, sed Deus; in tertiis et homo et Deus. Ratio autem huius est: quia praecepta primae tabulae immediate ordinant ad Deum: si ergo votum immediate ad Deum ordinat, videtur etc.

4. Item, qui non facit quod promittit mentitur; sed Papa non potest dispensare in mendacio: ergo nec in voto.

5. Item, quod non in voto *continentiae* specialiter, videtur: Ecclesiastici vigesimo sexto[^p822-7]: *Non est digna ponderatio continentis animae*: si ergo continentia nullo modo potest recompensari, patet etc.

6. Item, quod nec in voto *paupertatis*, videtur, quia perfectius est pro Deo mendicare quam continere: ergo perfectius est votum paupertatis: ergo si dispensare non potest in voto continentiae, nec paupertatis.

<!-- page 823 -->

7. Item, quod nec in voto *obedientiae*, videtur: quia hoc est perfectissimum, quia in castitate vincit homo corpus suum, in paupertate mundum, in obedientia mactat homo se ipsum: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Quod possit in *omni* dispensare, videtur: quia votum unum non minus obligat quam aliud; sed potest dispensare in aliquo, utpote in voto peregrinationis et abstinentiae: ergo et in omni.

2. Item, quod specialiter in voto *continentiae*, videtur: quia dispensatio locum habet, ut dicit Bernardus[^p823-1], ubi cadit *necessitas*, vel *communis utilitas*; sed possibile est, quod aliquis ex defectu mulieris incurrat periculum mortis, sicut dicitur de rege Ludovico; sed possibile est, quod omnes moriantur, qui possunt generare, solo eo remanente, qui vovit, et remanente Papa et muliere: ergo si necessitas est conservationis *speciei*[^p823-2], in casu isto posset contrahere.

3. Item, possibile est ex matrimonio pacem Ecclesiae dari, quae est communis utilitas; sed communis utilitas praeferenda est bono privato[^p823-3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod in voto *paupertatis*, videtur: quia dispensare potest in voto abstinentiae; sed maius est carnem suam macerare quam divitias dimittere: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod in voto *obedientiae*, videtur: quia Summus Pontifex assumit de religionibus[^p823-4] ad dignitates et praelationes; sed sic assumti non tenentur obedire praelatis sui ordinis, quibus voverunt obedientiam: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Votum potest dispensari a Summo Pontifice, prout dispensatio dicit iuris declarationem, non autem, prout dicit iuris relaxationem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dispensatio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo iuris *relaxatio*, alio modo iuris *declaratio*. — Dicunt ergo aliqui, quod Papa potest in voto dispensare, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris *relaxatio*, eo quod eius auctoritas est circa[^p823-5] obligationem voti. Et rationem huius assignant, quia Papa est immediatus omnium praelatus, et ad ipsum spectat omnium ordinatio, maxime quantum ad ea quae sunt supererogationis. Et quia omnium voluntates eius subsunt auctoritati et dispositioni; nullum votum aliter debet emitti nisi cum hac conditione, nisi dominus Papa de vovente aliter duxerit disponendum; et ideo nullus obligatur ad votum faciendum, cum Papa aliter disponat; quodsi illam conditionem non apponat, tamen non potest eam excludere. Et ideo dicunt, quod in omni voto potest dispensare et ab omni tali obligatione absolvere. Et ad omnes rationes respondent, quod non est ibi obligatio *absoluta*, sed *conditionata*; et ideo dispensare potest, cum possit illam conditionem infringere, si sibi aliud de vovente placet disponere. — Sed cum illa[^p823-6] quae Deus consulit facienda — et absque dubio bona sunt — sine haesitatione totis visceribus amplectenda sint; videtur etiam, cum Deus voluerit, unumquemque liberum esse, quod unusquisque sine conditione aliqua talia possit et debeat vovere.

Et ideo alii dicunt, quod Papa in nullo voto potest dispensare, secundum quod dispensare[^p823-7] est iuris *relaxatio*, quia obligatio voti pendet ex iure divino, non humano, ex iure naturali, non ex constitutione Patrum. Propterea Papa non habet *posse* nec auctoritatem in votum *relaxando ius*, quia illud non est ei subiectum; habet tamen potestatem, quantum ius sibi dat; et ideo dispensare potest, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris *declaratio*. Et haec positio est rationabilior et securior est, quia magis per ipsam satisfit conscientiae.

Ad intelligentiam eius est notandum quod ius obligationis voti constituitur ex duplici iure naturali, ex hoc videlicet, quod homo debet esse verax in promisso; et ex alio, quod nihil debet homo promittere, nisi salva sua salute et divinae maiestatis honore: ergo ex iure naturali est, quod quis per votum non impediri debet, quin facere possit sibi utilius et Deo acceptabilius; et ideo in omni voto, quod recipit recompensationem melioris boni, sive simpliciter, sive pro loco et tempore, dominus Papa, cuius est ius dilucidare, potest dispensare.

Et in hoc communiter omnes conveniunt, sed diversificantur penes *modum* dispensandi[^p823-8]. Aliqui enim dicunt, quod non est aliquod votum, quod pro loco et tempore non *recipiat recompensationem*; ideo nullum est, in quo non possit dispensare. Unde dicunt, quod bono continentiae praefertur bonum universalis Ecclesiae, ut pax; et ideo in voto continentiae, de quo minus videtur, potest fieri dispensatio, vel *simpliciter*, vel *ad tempus*, sicut etiam aliquando factum est.

Alii vero dicunt, quod votum continentiae non

<!-- page 824 -->

recipit recompensationem, quia *non est digna ponderatio animae continentis*[^p824-1], quando obtinetur victoria de domestico inimico; in omnibus aliis *est recompensatio*: ideo potest dispensare in omnibus, praeterquam in hoc.

Tertii dicunt, quod *perfectioni religionis*, quae est in imitatione Christi, nihil potest aequari nec pro illa recompensari; et illa substantialiter consistit in triplici voto, scilicet continentiae, paupertatis et obedientiae: et ideo in his tribus non potest dispensare. Perfectio enim consistit in assimilatione ad Christum maxime, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione[^p824-2]; et quia in nullo tantum assimilatur homo Christo, sicut in his; nihil potest haec tria homini recompensare; quoniam recompensatio non tantum aliorum respicit bonum, verum etiam voventis, quoniam Deus vult, quod magis sit unusquisque sollicitus de sua salute quam aliorum.

Quae istarum trium opinionum sit verior, fateor me nescire; et satis potest quaelibet sustineri, ideo nullam assero. Si quis tamen velit hanc ultimam acceptare, non occurrit ei inconveniens manifestum, ut dicatur, quia nec in omni nec in nullo, sed in quodam sic et in quodam non.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in nullo potest dispensare; dicendum, quod illa argumenta currunt, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris *relaxatio*; et sic non potest, potest tamen, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris *declaratio*, quia ius concedit, votum non teneri, cum potest recompensari; et universaliter domini Papae est hoc ius interpretari: et ideo in omnibus aliis ab his tribus potest dispensare.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si potest in uno, et in omnibus; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia conditio recompensationis melioris non stat uniformiter in omnibus.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in voto continentiae potest cadere *necessitas* et *utilitas*; dicendum quod non cadit; et *praeterea*, cum certitudo[^p824-3] cadit, non cadit *necessitas*, quia nunquam est infirmitas, a qua non possit quis nisi per coitum liberari. Non cadit necessitas respectu *speciei*, quia nunquam erit aliquis solus. Non cadit ibi maior *utilitas facientis*, et ibi non est, quia commutat meritum centesimi fructus in meritum trigesimi[^p824-4]. — *Praeterea*, si totum hoc esset, incertum esset, quia nescitur, utrum infirmus coitu sanaretur; nescitur, utrum ex coitu aliquis generaretur; nescitur etiam, utrum ex matrimonio pax reformaretur; et non est dimittendum certum pro incerto: ideo non valet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod votum abstinentiae voto paupertatis est maius; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia *exercitatio corporalis est ad modicum utilis, pietas autem valet ad omnia*, ut dicit Apostolus[^p824-5]; et summa pietas est, quod omnia vendantur et dentur pauperibus. — *Praeterea*, difficilius est; plures enim inveniuntur, qui volunt ieiunare quam qui volunt mendicare. — *Praeterea*, ibi non tantum est abdicatio *rei terrenae*, sed etiam *voluntatis habendi*; unde pauperculus veniens ad religionem dimittit totum mundum ratione voluntatis[^p824-6].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voto obedientiae, quod fit dispensatio in religiosis, qui promoventur; dicendum, quod licet in praelationibus non teneantur obedire et multa habeant, quae non licerent eis, si essent subditi; tamen in neutro voto est dispensatum. Nam in voto *paupertatis* non dispensatur, quia non licet tali religioso habere proprium, etiam si Papa dispenset; sed tamen potest bona Ecclesiae dispensare, sicut abbas bona monasterii, nec amittit meritum paupertatis; sed est divitiarum non dominus, sed dispensator, non amator, sed contemptor, non conservator, sed dispersor[^p824-7] in pauperes. — Similiter in voto *obedientiae* non est dispensatum, quia omnem obedientiam quam debebat prius suo superiori, debet Papae; et Papa a sua obedientia non potest eum absolvere; et in talibus meritum obedientiae commutatur in meritum pastoralis curae; nec est *dispensatio*, sed *exemptio* proprius debet dici[^p824-8].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a matter of a vow.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the obligation of a vow in comparison to dispensation, and it is asked whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a matter of a vow. And that he *cannot*, seems [to follow]:

1. Because the Gloss on that [text] of the Psalm[^p822-5]: *Vow and pay* etc., [says]: "To pay back belongs to necessity"; but concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, one cannot be dispensed: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the obligation of a vow is according to natural law, which is clear, because it has run in every age; but the Pontiff has no power in those things which are of natural law: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Bernard[^p822-6] says: some are moral precepts of the first table, ordaining [man] toward God; some of the second, ordaining toward the neighbor; some are superadded, such as canonical sanctions and the institutions of the Fathers. In the first neither man nor God can dispense; in the second not man, but God; in the third both man and God. And the reason for this is: because the precepts of the first table order [man] immediately toward God: if, then, a vow orders [him] immediately toward God, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, he who does not do what he promises lies; but the Pope cannot dispense in a lie: therefore neither in a vow.

5. Likewise, that [he cannot] especially in a vow of *continence*, seems [so]: Ecclesiasticus 26[^p822-7]: *No weighing is worthy of a continent soul*: if, then, continence can in no way be recompensed, it is evident etc.

6. Likewise, that [he cannot] even in a vow of *poverty*, seems [so], because it is more perfect to beg for God's sake than to be continent: therefore the vow of poverty is more perfect: therefore if he cannot dispense in a vow of continence, neither [can he] in [a vow] of poverty.

7. Likewise, that [he cannot] even in a vow of *obedience*, seems [so]: because this is the most perfect, since in chastity a man conquers his own body, in poverty the world, in obedience a man immolates his very self: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. That he can dispense in *every* [vow], seems [so]: because one vow does not bind less than another; but he can dispense in some, as in a vow of pilgrimage and of abstinence: therefore also in every one.

2. Likewise, that [he can] especially in a vow of *continence*, seems [so]: because dispensation has place, as Bernard[^p823-1] says, where *necessity* falls, or *common utility*; but it is possible that someone through the defect of a woman incur danger of death, as is said of King Louis; but it is possible that all who can generate should die, only he remaining who vowed, and the Pope and the woman remaining: therefore, if there is necessity of preserving the *species*[^p823-2], in that case he could contract [marriage].

3. Likewise, it is possible that peace of the Church be given from a marriage, which is a common utility; but common utility is to be preferred to a private good[^p823-3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that [he can] in a vow of *poverty*, seems [so]: because he can dispense in a vow of abstinence; but it is greater to mortify one's own flesh than to relinquish riches: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that [he can] in a vow of *obedience*, seems [so]: because the Supreme Pontiff takes [men] from religious orders[^p823-4] to dignities and prelacies; but those so taken are not bound to obey the prelates of their own order, to whom they vowed obedience: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *A vow can be dispensed by the Supreme Pontiff insofar as dispensation means a declaration of the law, but not insofar as it means a relaxation of the law.*

**I respond:** It must be said that dispensation is spoken of in two ways: in one way [as] a *relaxation* of the law, in another way [as] a *declaration* of the law. — Some, then, say that the Pope can dispense in a vow insofar as dispensation is a *relaxation* of the law, because his authority is over[^p823-5] the obligation of a vow. And they assign the reason for this: that the Pope is the immediate prelate of all, and to him belongs the ordering of all, especially as to those things which are of supererogation. And because the wills of all are subject to his authority and disposition; no vow ought to be made otherwise than with this condition, unless the lord Pope should judge to dispose otherwise concerning the one vowing; and therefore no one is bound to make a vow, when the Pope disposes otherwise; but if he does not append that condition, still he cannot exclude it. And therefore they say that in every vow he can dispense and absolve from every such obligation. And to all the reasons they respond that the obligation there is not *absolute*, but *conditioned*; and therefore he can dispense, since he can break that condition, if it pleases him to dispose otherwise concerning the one vowing. — But since those things which God counsels[^p823-6] to be done — and they are without doubt good — are to be embraced without hesitation with the whole heart; it seems also, since God has so willed, that each one is free, so that everyone without any condition can and ought to vow such things.

And therefore others say that the Pope can dispense in no vow, insofar as to dispense[^p823-7] is a *relaxation* of the law, because the obligation of a vow depends on divine law, not human, on natural law, not on the institution of the Fathers. Therefore the Pope has neither *power* nor authority over a vow by *relaxing the law*, because that is not subject to him; yet he has power, insofar as the law grants it to him; and therefore he can dispense, insofar as dispensation is a *declaration* of the law. And this position is more reasonable and safer, because through it the conscience is more fully satisfied.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that the law of the obligation of a vow is constituted from a twofold natural law, namely from this: that a man ought to be truthful in his promise; and from another: that a man ought to promise nothing except with his salvation preserved and the honor of the divine majesty: therefore it is of natural law that a man ought not to be impeded by a vow from being able to do for himself what is more useful and more acceptable to God; and therefore in every vow which admits a recompense of a better good, whether simply or for place and time, the lord Pope, whose it is to clarify the law, can dispense.

And in this all commonly agree, but they differ as to the *manner* of dispensing[^p823-8]. For some say that there is no vow which for place and time does not *admit a recompense*; therefore there is none in which he cannot dispense. Whence they say that to the good of continence is preferred the good of the universal Church, such as peace; and therefore in a vow of continence, in which it seems least [possible], a dispensation can be made, whether *simply* or *for a time*, as indeed has sometimes been done.

But others say that a vow of continence does not

recompense, because *no weighing is worthy of a continent soul*[^p824-1], when victory over the domestic enemy is obtained; in all others there is *recompense*: therefore he can dispense in all, except in this.

The third say that to the *perfection of religion*, which consists in the imitation of Christ, nothing can be equated nor recompensed for it; and that consists substantially in the threefold vow, namely of continence, poverty, and obedience: and therefore in these three he cannot dispense. For perfection consists in assimilation to Christ most of all, as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*[^p824-2]; and because in nothing is a man so assimilated to Christ as in these; nothing can recompense these three to a man; since recompense regards not only the good of others, but also of the one vowing, for God wills that each one be more solicitous of his own salvation than of others'.

Which of these three opinions is truer, I confess that I do not know; and each can well enough be maintained, therefore I assert none. If, however, anyone wish to accept this last one, no manifest inconvenience meets him, so that it be said that [he can dispense] neither in every [vow] nor in none, but in a certain one yes and in a certain one no.

To that, then, which is objected, that he can dispense in none; it must be said that those arguments run insofar as dispensation is a *relaxation* of the law; and in this sense he cannot, yet he can, insofar as dispensation is a *declaration* of the law, because the law grants that a vow is not binding when it can be recompensed; and universally it belongs to the lord Pope to interpret this law: and therefore in all others besides these three he can dispense.

1. To that which is objected, if he can in one, [then] also in all; it must be said that it is not similar; because the condition of a better recompense does not stand uniformly in all.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that in a vow of continence *necessity* and *utility* can fall; it must be said that it does not fall; and *besides*, when certitude[^p824-3] falls, necessity does not fall, because there is never an infirmity from which one cannot be freed except by intercourse. Necessity does not fall with respect to the *species*, because there will never be anyone alone. Nor does there fall there a greater *utility of the agent*, and there it is not [present], because he exchanges the merit of the hundredfold fruit for the merit of the thirtyfold[^p824-4]. — *Besides*, if all this were so, it would be uncertain, because it is not known whether the sick man would be healed by intercourse; it is not known whether anyone would be generated from the intercourse; it is not known either whether peace would be restored from the marriage; and the certain is not to be relinquished for the uncertain: therefore it does not hold.

4. To that which is objected, that a vow of abstinence is greater than a vow of poverty; it must be said that it is false: because *bodily exercise is useful for a little, but piety avails for all things*, as the Apostle[^p824-5] says; and the highest piety is that all things be sold and given to the poor. — *Besides*, it is more difficult; for more are found who wish to fast than who wish to beg. — *Besides*, there [in poverty] there is not only the renunciation of an *earthly thing*, but also of the *will to possess*; whence the poor man coming to religion relinquishes the whole world by reason of the will[^p824-6].

5. To that which is objected concerning a vow of obedience, that dispensation is made in religious who are promoted; it must be said that, although in prelacies they are not bound to obey and have many things which would not be licit for them if they were subjects; nevertheless in neither vow is there a dispensation. For in a vow of *poverty* there is no dispensation, because it is not licit for such a religious to have property, even if the Pope dispense; yet he can dispense the goods of the Church, as an abbot [dispenses] the goods of the monastery, nor does he lose the merit of poverty; but he is of riches not the owner, but the dispenser, not the lover, but the despiser, not the keeper, but the disperser[^p824-7] among the poor. — Similarly in a vow of *obedience* there is no dispensation, because all the obedience which he owed before to his superior he owes to the Pope; and the Pope cannot absolve him from his obedience; and in such cases the merit of obedience is exchanged for the merit of pastoral care; nor is it a *dispensation*, but rather ought to be called an *exemption*[^p824-8].

---

la: Psalm. 75, 12. — Glossam vide supra pag. 816, nota 5.

en: Ps. 75:12 [Vulg.]. — For the Gloss, see above p. 816, note 5.

la: Libr. de Praecepto et dispensat. c. 2. et 3.

en: [Bernard,] the book *On Precept and Dispensation*, cc. 2 and 3.

la: Vers. 20: Omnis autem ponderatio non est digna continentis animae.

en: Verse 20: But no weighing is worthy of a continent soul.

la: Libr. III. de Considerat. c. 4. n. 18; de Praecepto et dispensat. c. 2. n. 4. seq. c. 4. n. 9.

en: [Bernard,] book III *On Consideration*, c. 4, n. 18; *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 2, n. 4 f., c. 4, n. 9.

la: Gen. 1, 28. et 9, 1: Crescite etc.

en: Gen. 1:28 and 9:1: Increase etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2; Iustinian., C. VI. de Caducis tollendis, tit. 50, lex *Et nomen* (1. § *Haec autem*).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 2; Justinian, *Codex* VI, *On removing lapsed [inheritances]*, tit. 50, the law *Et nomen* (1, § *Haec autem*).

la: Cod. X *religiosis*.

en: Codex X [reads] *religiosis*.

la: Nonnulli codd. et Val. *supra*.

en: Several codices and the Vatican edition [read] *supra*.

la: Ed. 1 legit *Sed alii dicunt contra, quia, cum illa Deo complaceant et absque dubio* etc.

en: The first edition reads *But others say the contrary, because, since those things are pleasing to God and without doubt* etc.

la: Codd. F G L *dispensatio*.

en: Codices F G L [read] *dispensatio*.

la: Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XII. c. 8. seq.; Glossa in C. *Sunt quidam dicentes* (6.), C. 25. q. 1. et in C. *Cum ad monasterium* (6.), X. de Statu monachor. (lib. III. tit. 35.). — Pro *communiter* codd. H W *communi*, et pro *penes modum dispensandi* codd. *communiter*, sed perperam substituunt *postmodum dispensando* (cod. E a secunda manu *postmodum de dispensando*).

en: Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments* II, p. XII, c. 8 f.; the Gloss on the canon *Sunt quidam dicentes* (6.), C. 25, q. 1, and on the canon *Cum ad monasterium* (6.), X, *On the Status of Monks* (bk. III, tit. 35.). — For *communiter* codices H W [read] *communi*, and for *penes modum dispensandi* the codices [read] *communiter*, but wrongly substitute *postmodum dispensando* (codex E, by a second hand, *postmodum de dispensando*).

la: Eccli. 26, 20. — Immediate post pro *quando* codd. L Y *quoniam ibi*, cod. aa *quia*, et pro *victoria* cod. Y (E a secunda manu) *triumphus*, multi codd. *dupliciter*, cui in cod. V secunda manus addidit *victoria*.

en: Ecclus. 26:20. — Immediately after, for *quando* codices L Y [read] *quoniam ibi*, codex aa *quia*, and for *victoria* codex Y (E by a second hand) *triumphus*, many codices *dupliciter*, to which in codex V a second hand added *victoria*.

la: Cap. 16. n. 30. seqq. et c. 41. n. 78. — Superius verbis *et illa* in cod. V secunda manus interseruit *quia*, quam lectionem sequuntur edd. Subinde ex cod. K (I a secunda manu) substituimus *et ideo in his*, cod. A *et in his*, edd. *quod in his*.

en: [*On True Religion*] c. 16, n. 30 ff. and c. 41, n. 78. — Above, at the words *et illa*, in codex V a second hand inserted *quia*, which reading the editions follow. Thereupon, from codex K (I by a second hand), we have substituted *et ideo in his*; codex A [reads] *et in his*, the editions *quod in his*.

la: Codd. L Y *incertitudo*, cod. I (a secunda manu) *et praeterea*, ubi *incertitudo*, edd. *certitudo non*. Mox pro *nisi* codd. N aa *aliter quam*.

en: Codices L Y [read] *incertitudo*, codex I (by a second hand) *et praeterea*, where [it has] *incertitudo*, the editions *certitudo non*. Presently, for *nisi* codices N aa [read] *aliter quam*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 754, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 754, note 6.

la: Epist. 1. Tim. 4, 8, ubi pro *valet* Vulgata *utilis est*. — Matth. 19, 21: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes et da pauperibus etc.

en: 1 Tim. 4:8, where for *valet* the Vulgate has *utilis est*. — Matt. 19:21: If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor etc.

la: Cfr. Gregor., 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 5. n. 2. (in Breviar. Roman. pro festo S. Andreae Apost. 30. Nov.). — Edd. addunt *habendi*.

en: Cf. Gregory, book 1 of the *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 5, n. 2 (in the Roman Breviary for the feast of St. Andrew the Apostle, 30 Nov.). — The editions add *habendi*.

la: Codd. A P Q *dispensator*.

en: Codices A P Q [read] *dispensator*.

en: See the scholion at question I of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF page bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{822,823,824}-{L,R}` regenerated at split_x 2120 for the left column, 1780 for the right, per the CLAUDE.md VOL II OVERRIDE — the IA djvu OCR for this two-column page is cascade-shattered in the Respondeo/opinio bands and footers). Raw OCR range L87885–L88094. Offset pdf = printed + 20.

**Page span corrected.** Frontmatter previously listed `printed_pages: [822, 823, 824, 825]`. Page 825 is entirely the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (raw ~L88095), not q3. q3 begins with the `QUAESTIO III.` header on p. 822 (left column, after a2-q2's Respondeo) and ends on p. 824 at "…nec est *dispensatio*, sed *exemptio* proprius debet dici" immediately before the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header. Corrected to `[822, 823, 824]` / pdf `[842, 843, 844]`. line_start/line_end unchanged.

**"Tertio quaeritur" alignment — VERIFIED.** Raw L87885 (`QUAESTIO III.`) → L87887 opener `Tertio quaeritur de obligatione voti in comparatione ad dispensationem…utrum Summus Pontifex possit dispensare in voto`. Matches title_la exactly. No q-swap.

**Scholion.** has_scholion is false and correct: this quaestio prints no scholion. Two Quaracchi footers explicitly redirect the reader to the article's q1 scholion — p. 822 note 4 "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." (anchored in a2-q2, NOT claimed here) and p. 824 note 8 "Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest." (anchored at the end of my body, rendered as `[^p824-8]`). No scholion text falls in my range.

**Footer hand-offs (cross-chunk splits on shared pages):**
- *Page 822 (shared with a2-q2):* page-822 footers **1–4 belong to a2-q2** (note 1 = Respondeo "iura"; note 2 = Hugo/commutatio; note 3 = "auctoritas"; note 4 = "de voto" + "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."). This chunk claims **only footers 5, 6, 7** (Psalm; Bernard *De Praecepto*; Ecclus. vers. 20), all anchored in q3's arguments 1, 3, 5. a2-q2 should verify it holds notes 1–4.
- *Page 823:* all 8 footers anchor in q3 (Sed contra 1–5, Respondeo, opinio 1, opinio 2). All claimed.
- *Page 824 (shared with the DUBIA chunk):* footers **1–8 are q3's** (all claimed); **footer 9 belongs to the DUBIA** (note 9 = "Cfr. supra d. 30. q. 2. et dub. 4. — De Tiburtio…", anchored at "sicut Ioseph et Maria⁹" inside Dub. I). NOT claimed here — forward to the dubia chunk.

**Apparatus count:** 19 entries — p822: 3 (notes 5–7); p823: 8 (notes 1–8); p824: 8 (notes 1–8).

**Editorial marginalia omitted** (Quaracchi side-glosses, not Bonaventure's text): *Argg. pro parte negativa*, *Conclusio*, *opinio 1/2/3*, *Non probatur*, *Explicatur*, *Radix obligationis duplex*, *De modo dispensandi*, *Notandum*, *Iudicium de his suspenditur*, *Ad argg. pro parte negativa/affirmativa*.

**[?] flags:** none. All readings resolved against the PDF bands. (Two minor OCR-vs-PDF corrections silently adopted from the PDF: p824 note 6 "homil. 5" not "6"; body "nihil debet homo promittere" not OCR "nulli".)