title: Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum anima Adae fuerit producta ex materia.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Adae producta fuerit ex materia. Et quod non, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Primo per philosophum[^1], qui dicit, quod «forma est compositioni contingens in simplici essentia consistens». Si igitur anima rationalis vere forma est, ergo simplex est: ergo non componitur ex materia et forma.

2. Item, Philosophus in principio tertii de Anima[^2] dicit, quod «intellectus est impermixtus et impassibilis»; sed omne quod habet materiam, habet potentiam passivam: ergo substantia intellectiva non habet materiam.

3. Item, Magister in littera[^3]: «Substantiam animae, in qua viveret, creavit Deus non de materia aliqua corporali, vel spirituali, sed de nihilo».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit, nisi abstrahatur a materia[^4]; sed in actu cognoscendi fit assimilatio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile, et e converso: ergo si ad hoc, quod intelligatur, necesse est, quod abstrahatur a materia, ad hoc, quod aliqua substantia intelligat, necesse est, quod sit per naturam a materia separata. Sed anima Adae fuit huiusmodi: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto forma nobilior, tanto simplicior[^5]; sed anima inter omnes formas est nobilissima: ergo simplicissima. Sed aliae formae non componuntur ex materia et forma: ergo multo fortius nec rationalis anima.

6. Item, omne quod habet materiam et formam ut partes constitutivas, est *hoc aliquid* et est *completum*[^6]; nihil autem, quod est *hoc aliquid* et *completum* in se, venit ad constitutionem tertii; sed anima rationalis venit ad constitutionem tertii, ita quod ex anima et corpore fit unum per essentiam: ergo anima non est *hoc aliquid*: ergo vel est *materia*, vel *forma pura*; non *materia*: ergo *forma*.

**Sed contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. In tertio de Anima[^7] dicit Philosophus, quod «sicut in omni natura est materia et efficiens, sic in anima est intellectus, quo est omnia fieri, et intellectus, quo est omnia facere». Si igitur potentia passiva est a materia, et haec est in anima, patet etc.

2. Item, in nono[^8] Primae Philosophiae dicit Philosophus, quod «sicut materia est subiectum formarum substantialium, sic compositum est subiectum accidentis»; sed anima rationalis est subiectum scientiarum et virtutum, etiam secundum se considerata: ergo composita est ex materia et forma.

3. Item, Philosophus in octavo[^9] Metaphysicae: «Operans et generans non facit aliud nisi propter materiam»: ergo si Deus facit animam, quae est

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aliud quam ipse, necesse est, quod materia vel sit *in Deo*, vel sit *in anima;* sed non est *in Deo,* ergo est *in anima*.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. Omne creatum, cui debetur propria operatio, habet haec duo diversa, scilicet *quod agit* et *quo agit*[^10]; sed animae secundum se consideratae debetur propria operatio: ergo videtur, quod non *solum* sit forma, quia, si pure forma esset, tunc ageret se ipsa: ergo habet aliquid de materia.

5. Item, omne illud quod secundum sui mutationem est susceptibile contrariorum, est *hoc aliquid* et substantia per se existens in genere[^11], et omne tale compositum est ex materia et forma; sed anima secundum sui mutationem est susceptiva gaudii et tristitiae: ergo anima rationalis composita est ex materia et forma.

6. Item, anima rationalis non solummodo vitam praebet corpori, sed etiam ipsa vivit; aut igitur est *sua vita,* aut *non*. Si *sic:* ergo non differt in ea *vivens,* et *quo vivit*. Et iterum, si est sua vita, non vivit per participationem, sed per essentiam; quae duo sunt contra Boethium[^12] et Augustinum: ergo ponere est in anima, secundum se considerata, aliquid quod *det* vitam, et aliquid quod *recipiat*. Et si hoc, ergo est composita ex materia et forma. — Et ad hoc possunt adduci rationes, quae adductae sunt supra[^13] ad ostendendum, Angelum esse compositum ex materia et forma.

> **CONCLUSIO.** Anima rationalis, non autem brutalis, habet materiam, quae vocatur spiritualis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa opinati sunt.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam enim dixerunt, nullam animam, nec rationalem nec brutalem, habere materiam, quia spiritus sunt simplices; animam tamen rationalem dixerunt habere compositionem ex *quo est* et *quod est,* quia ipsa est *hoc aliquid* et nata est per se et in se subsistere. — *Non probatur.* Sed cum planum sit, animam rationalem posse pati et agere et mutari ab una proprietate in aliam et in se ipsa subsistere; non videtur, quod illud sufficiat dicere, quod in ea sit tantum compositio ex *quo est* et *quod est,* nisi addatur esse in ea compositio materiae et formae.

*Opinio 2.* Ideo fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, non solum animam rationalem, sed etiam brutalem ex materia et forma compositam esse, cum utraque sit motor corporis sufficiens. — *Non probatur.* Sed quia anima brutalis propriam[^14] operationem non habet nec est nata per se subsistere, non videtur, quod habeat materiam intra se.

*Opinio 3.* Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, tenens medium inter utrumque, scilicet quod anima rationalis, cum sit *hoc aliquid* et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri[^15], quod habet

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intra se *fundamentum* suae existentiae et *principium materiale,* a quo habet *existere,* et *formale,* a quo habet *esse*. *Conclusio 1.* De brutali autem non oportet illud dicere, cum ipsa fundetur in corpore. Cum igitur principium, a quo est *fixa existentia* creaturae in se, *Conclusio 2.* sit principium materiale: concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere. Illa autem materia sublevata est supra *esse extensionis,* et supra *esse* *Conclusio 3.* *privationis* et *corruptionis,* et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis. — *Corollarium.* Et propterea illi qui locuti sunt de materiali principio quantum ad *esse extensionis,* et prout habet *esse* sub privatione, dixerunt, animam rationalem non habere materiam, non intendentes de materia in sua generalitate, sed prout ad eam stat resolutio physica, sicut dictum est de simplicitate Angeli[^16]. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis forma est simplex; dicendum, quod auctor ille, definiens formam, loquitur de forma illa, quae est *forma tantum* non de ea, quae est forma et *hoc aliquid;* unde vel definit ibi formam *accidentalem,* vel definit formam *universalem*[^17].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus est impassibilis et impermixtus; dicendum, quod Philosophus removet ab intellectu materiam, secundum quod consideratur sub *privatione* et sub *potentia* ad transmutationem secundum *esse;* non removet materiam *universaliter,* immo ponit, cum dicit, quod in intellectu est natura, qua est *facere,* et qua est *fieri*.

3. Ad illud quod dicit Magister in littera, dicendum, quod Magister non vult dicere, quod anima non habeat materiam, sed quod non habeat materiam *praeiacentem;* huius autem ratio habebitur infra[^18], scilicet, quare anima non est producta nec producitur ex praeiacenti materia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit, nisi quod abstrahitur a materia; dicendum, quod hoc non facit *Ratio notabilis 1.* propter hoc, quod ipsa sit omnino immaterialis, sed propter hoc, quod res non potest ei uniri secundum *veritatem*. Ideo oportet, quod uniatur secundum *similitudinem,* *Alia ratio.* quam anima abstrahit a re[^19]. — Alia est etiam ratio, quia intellectus per similitudinem, per quam intelligit, debet fieri in actu intelligendi; illud autem, quod facit, rem esse in actu, *species* est et *forma*. Ideo anima non cognoscit rem, nisi speciem eius et formam sibi imprimat; et hoc non potest esse, nisi illa abstrahatur a materia[^20]. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod anima careat materia; res enim abstracta a materia propria bene potest fieri in re alia, quae suam habet propriam materiam et formam, sicut similitudo coloris in speculo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto forma nobilior, tanto simplicior est; dicendum, quod istud habet locum in his quae sunt *purae* formae; anima autem non tantum est forma, immo etiam est *hoc aliquid;* et ideo, si comparetur forma animae ad alias formas, absque dubio simplicior erit quam aliae formae. Ipsa autem anima, cum sit rationalis, cum sit per se existens, aliquam compositionem habet, quam aliae formae non sunt natae per se habere, dum non sunt natae per se *existere;* nihilominus tamen ipsa anima simplicior aliis formis dici potest.

*Multiplex simplicitas.* — Est enim multiplex genus simplicitatis, secundum quod et multiplex est genus compositionis et partium. Sunt enim partes *substantiales* et sunt partes *quantitativae,* et compositio ex partibus *substantialibus* et compositio ex partibus *quantitativis*[^21]. Et sic simplex dicitur dupliciter: aut quod caret partibus *constitutivis,* aut quod caret partibus *quantitativis*. Quamvis igitur anima non sit aliis formis simplicior quantum ad partes *constitutivas,* quia tales partes habere spectat ad complementum et perfectionem; hoc enim facit, rem esse *per se;* simplicior tamen est quantum ad privationem partium *quantitativarum*. *Notandum.* Ipsa enim nec habet extensionem *per se* nec habet extensionem *per accidens,* nec quantum ad substantiam nec quantum ad proprium actum. Aliae autem formae *per accidens* possunt habere extensionem et partibilitatem, vel secundum id quod *sunt,* vel secundum id quod *operantur*. Et ideo quantum ad hoc anima, et maxime rationalis, est forma nobilior.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod compositum ex materia et forma est ens completum, et ita non venit[^22] ad constitutionem tertii; dicendum, quod *Notandum.* hoc non est verum generaliter, sed tunc, quando materia terminat omnem appetitum formae, et forma omnem appetitum materiae; tunc[^23] non est appetitus ad aliquid extra, et ita nec possibilitas ad composi-

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tionem, quae praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem. Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est, et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendam animam.

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### QUESTION II. *Whether the soul of Adam was produced from matter.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the soul of Adam was produced from matter. And that it was not, it seems:

*To the opposite.*

1. First, through the Philosopher[^1], who says that «form is something belonging to composition, consisting in a simple essence». If therefore the rational soul is truly form, then it is simple: therefore it is not composed of matter and form.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the beginning of *De Anima* III[^2] says that «the intellect is unmixed and impassible»; but everything which has matter has passive potency: therefore the intellective substance does not have matter.

3. Likewise, the Master in the text[^3]: «The substance of the soul, in which it might live, God created not from any corporeal or spiritual matter, but from nothing».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. The intellective substance knows nothing unless it is abstracted from matter[^4]; but in the act of knowing there is an assimilation of the knower to the knowable, and conversely: therefore if, for something to be understood, it is necessary that it be abstracted from matter, then for some substance to understand, it is necessary that it be by nature separated from matter. But the soul of Adam was of this kind: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the nobler a form, the simpler it is[^5]; but the soul is the noblest among all forms: therefore the simplest. But the other forms are not composed of matter and form: therefore much more so the rational soul.

6. Likewise, everything which has matter and form as constitutive parts is *something this* and *complete*[^6]; but nothing which is *something this* and *complete* in itself comes to the constitution of a third; but the rational soul comes to the constitution of a third, so that from soul and body there is made one thing through essence: therefore the soul is not *something this*: therefore it is either *matter* or *pure form*; not *matter*: therefore *form*.

**On the contrary:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. In *De Anima* III[^7] the Philosopher says that «just as in every nature there is matter and an efficient cause, so in the soul there is the intellect by which it is all things in becoming, and the intellect by which it is all things in making». If therefore passive potency is from matter, and this is in the soul, it is plain etc.

2. Likewise, in the ninth book[^8] of First Philosophy the Philosopher says that «just as matter is the subject of substantial forms, so the composite is the subject of accident»; but the rational soul is the subject of sciences and virtues, even considered in itself: therefore it is composed of matter and form.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VIII[^9]: «An operating and generating agent does no other thing except on account of matter»: therefore if God makes a soul, which is

other than himself, it is necessary that matter either be *in God,* or be *in the soul;* but it is not *in God,* therefore it is *in the soul*.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by *reason*. Every created thing to which a proper operation is owed has these two distinct things, namely *that which acts* and *that by which it acts*[^10]; but to the soul considered in itself a proper operation is owed: therefore it seems that it is not *only* form, because, if it were pure form, then it would act of itself: therefore it has something of matter.

5. Likewise, every thing which, according to its mutation, is receptive of contraries, is *something this* and a substance existing per se in a genus[^11], and every such thing is composed of matter and form; but the soul, according to its mutation, is receptive of joy and sadness: therefore the rational soul is composed of matter and form.

6. Likewise, the rational soul not only gives life to the body, but is itself alive; therefore either it is *its own life,* or *not*. If so: then in it the *living* and *that by which it lives* do not differ. And further, if it is its own life, it does not live by participation, but by essence; which two things are against Boethius[^12] and Augustine: therefore one must posit in the soul, considered in itself, something which *gives* life and something which *receives* it. And if this, then it is composed of matter and form. — And to this can be brought the reasons which were brought above[^13] to show that an Angel is composed of matter and form.

> **CONCLUSION.** The rational soul, but not the brute soul, has matter, which is called spiritual.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that on this matter different men have held different opinions.

*Opinion 1.* For some have said that no soul, neither rational nor brute, has matter, because spirits are simple; yet they said that the rational soul has a composition out of *that by which it is* and *that which it is,* because it itself is *something this* and is fit to subsist per se and in itself. — *It is not proved.* But since it is plain that the rational soul can suffer and act and be changed from one property to another and subsist in itself; it does not seem that it suffices to say that in it there is only a composition out of *that by which it is* and *that which it is,* unless one add that there is in it a composition of matter and form.

*Opinion 2.* Therefore there were also others who said that not only the rational soul, but also the brute soul, is composed of matter and form, since each is a sufficient mover of the body. — *It is not proved.* But because the brute soul does not have its proper[^14] operation nor is it fit to subsist per se, it does not seem that it has matter within itself.

*Opinion 3.* And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, holding the middle between both, namely that the rational soul, since it is *something this* and is fit per se to subsist and to act and suffer, to move and be moved[^15], has

within itself the *foundation* of its existence and a *material principle,* from which it has *existing,* and a *formal* one, from which it has *being*. *Conclusion 1.* Concerning the brute soul, however, it is not necessary to say this, since it is itself founded in the body. Since therefore the principle from which there is a *fixed existence* of a creature in itself, *Conclusion 2.* is a material principle: it must be conceded that the human soul has matter. But that matter is raised above *the being of extension,* and above *the being* *Conclusion 3.* *of privation* and *of corruption,* and therefore it is called spiritual matter. — *Corollary.* And on this account those who spoke of a material principle as far as *the being of extension* is concerned, and inasmuch as it has *being* under privation, said that the rational soul does not have matter, not meaning matter in its generality, but inasmuch as physical resolution stops at it, just as has been said about the simplicity of the Angel[^16]. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be granted.

**Solution of the opposed arguments.**

1. To that which is objected, that every form is simple; it must be said that that author, in defining form, is speaking of that form which is *form alone,* not of that which is form and *something this;* hence either he is defining there *accidental* form, or he is defining *universal*[^17] form.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is impassible and unmixed; it must be said that the Philosopher removes from the intellect matter insofar as it is considered under *privation* and under *potency* for change according to *being;* he does not remove matter *universally,* indeed he posits it, when he says that in the intellect there is a nature by which it *makes* and by which it *becomes*.

3. To that which the Master says in the text, it must be said that the Master does not mean to say that the soul does not have matter, but that it does not have *pre-existent* matter; the reason for this will be had below[^18], namely, why the soul is not produced nor is it produced from pre-existent matter.

4. To that which is objected, that the intellective substance knows nothing except what is abstracted from matter; it must be said that this is not so *Notable reason 1.* on account of the fact that it is altogether immaterial, but on account of the fact that the thing cannot be united to it according to *reality*. Therefore it must be united to it according to *likeness,* *Another reason.* which the soul abstracts from the thing[^19]. — There is also another reason, because the intellect, through the likeness by which it understands, must be made into act in understanding; but that which makes a thing be in act is *species* and *form*. Therefore the soul does not know a thing unless it impresses upon itself its species and form; and this cannot be unless that is abstracted from matter[^20]. Nor does it follow from this that the soul lacks matter; for a thing abstracted from its proper matter can well come to be in another thing which has its own proper matter and form, just as the likeness of a color in a mirror.

5. To that which is objected, that the nobler a form, the simpler it is; it must be said that this holds in those which are *pure* forms; but the soul is not only form, indeed it is also *something this;* and therefore, if the form of the soul be compared to other forms, without doubt it will be simpler than the other forms. But the soul itself, since it is rational, since it is per se existing, has some composition which other forms are not naturally able to have per se, since they are not naturally able per se to *exist;* nevertheless the soul itself can be called simpler than other forms.

*Manifold simplicity.* — For there is a manifold kind of simplicity, according as there is also a manifold kind of composition and parts. For there are *substantial* parts and there are *quantitative* parts, and there is composition out of *substantial* parts and composition out of *quantitative* parts[^21]. And so *simple* is said in two ways: either as lacking *constitutive* parts, or as lacking *quantitative* parts. Although therefore the soul is not simpler than other forms as regards *constitutive* parts, since to have such parts pertains to completion and perfection; for this is what makes a thing be *per se;* nevertheless it is simpler as regards the privation of *quantitative* parts. *Note.* For it has neither extension *per se* nor extension *per accidens,* neither as regards substance nor as regards its proper act. But other forms *per accidens* can have extension and divisibility, either according to what they *are,* or according to what they *operate*. And therefore as regards this the soul, and especially the rational soul, is a nobler form.

6. To that which is objected, that what is composed of matter and form is a complete being, and so does not come[^22] to the constitution of a third; it must be said that *Note.* this is not true generally, but only when matter terminates every appetite of form, and form every appetite of matter; then[^23] there is no appetite for anything outside, and so neither is there possibility for composi-

tion, which pre-requires in the components an appetite and an inclination. Although, however, the rational soul has a composition out of matter and form, yet it has an appetite for perfecting corporeal nature; just as an organic body is composed of matter and form, and yet has an appetite for receiving the soul.

la: Intellige cum Vat. *auctorem Sex Principiorum* (c. 1.), scilicet Gilbertum Porretanum.

en: Understand with the Vatican edition *the author of the Sex Principia* (c. 1), namely Gilbert of Poitiers.

la: Text. 3. seq. (c. 4.). — Non pauci codd. cum Vat. *de Animalibus;* perperam.

en: Text 3 ff. (c. 4). — Not a few codices with the Vatican edition read *de Animalibus;* erroneously.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 9. seqq. et text. 37. seqq. (c. 4. et 8.). De minori vide eiusdem VI. Ethic. c. 1.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 9 ff. and text 37 ff. (cc. 4 and 8). On the minor see the same author's *Ethics* VI, c. 1.

la: Vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. et I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — De seqq. cfr. infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: See below d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, and *I Sent.* d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in corp. — On the following see below d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 10. et 17.

en: Cfr. *Liber de Causis,* prop. 10 and 17.

la: Vide supra pag. 109, nota 7. et pag. 197, nota 3. — De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.).

en: See above p. 109, note 7, and p. 197, note 3. — On the following proposition cfr. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 49 (VI, c. 13).

la: Text. 12. (VIII. c. 7.). Verba non sunt ipsius Aristotelis, sed exhibent summam longioris expositionis.

en: Text 12 (VIII, c. 7). The words are not Aristotle's own, but they present the substance of a longer exposition.

la: Text. 11. seq. (VII. c. 4.); sententialiter; clarius VII. text. 28, quem iam supra pag. 109, nota 5. allegavimus. — Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *nihil facit* pro *non facit*.

en: Text 11 ff. (VII, c. 4); in substance; more clearly VII, text 28, which we have already cited above p. 109, note 5. — Several codices, with editions 1 and 2, read *nihil facit* for *non facit*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 3. et d. 8. p. II. q. 2, ubi haec ex Boethio formata propositio explicatur.

en: Cfr. *I Sent.* d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, *fundam.* 3, and d. 8, p. II, q. 2, where this proposition formed from Boethius is explained.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia. — Pro seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 12. (I. brevior, c. 2.) et XII. text. 10. (XI. c. 2.), ubi dicit, quod in omni eo quod movetur sive mutatur, materia inveniatur. — August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 9. inquirens, utrum anima ex materia spirituali producta sit, ait: *Si enim quiddam incommutabile esset anima, nullo modo eius quasi materiam quaerere deberemus; nunc autem mutabilitas eius satis indicat, eam interim vitiis atque fallaciis deformem reddi, formari autem virtutibus veritatisque doctrina, sed in sua iam natura, qua est anima, sicut etiam caro in sua natura, qua iam caro est, et salute decoratur et morbis vulneribusque foedatur* etc.

en: Aristotle, *De Praedicamentis,* c. on Substance. — For the following proposition cfr. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, text 12 (I, the shorter, c. 2) and XII, text 10 (XI, c. 2), where he says that in every thing which is moved or changed, matter is found. — Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VII, c. 6, n. 9, inquiring whether the soul was produced from spiritual matter, says: *For if the soul were something incommutable, we ought in no way to seek for it as it were a matter; but now its mutability sufficiently indicates that it is in the meantime rendered deformed by vices and falsehoods, and is formed by virtues and the teaching of truth, yet now in its own nature, by which it is soul, just as also flesh in its own nature, by which it is now flesh, is both adorned by health and disfigured by diseases and wounds,* etc.

la: De Trin. c. 2: «Reliqua [praeter Deum] enim non sunt id quod sunt; unumquodque enim habet *esse* suum *ex his,* *ex quibus* est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc, vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus, vel anima». In libro de Hebdomadibus docet, quod creaturae non sint suum *esse,* sed participent *esse*. In libro autem de Unitate et uno dicit, quod tam Angelus quam anima sint aliquod «unum coniunctione materiae et formae». Similiter August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 4. n. 6. docet, quod creaturae sint bonae «participando bonum et habendo». In Ioan. tract. 19. n. 13, exponens illa verba: *Vitam dedit Filio, ut habeat eam in semetipso,* per oppositionem ad vitam animae dicit de Filio Dei: «Dedit ei, ut Filius esset, genuit, ut vita esset, hoc est *Dedit ei habere vitam in semetipso,* ut esset vita non egens vita, ne participando intelligatur habere vitam. Si enim participando haberet vitam, posset et amittendo esse sine vita». Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 36. comparatur vita animae cum Dei vita: «Vita Deus est, vita et anima est, similis, sed dispar; similis, quod vita, quod se ipsa vivens... dispar, quoniam ille creator est, et ista creatura. Nisi enim ab illo creata esset, non esset; et nisi ab illo vivificata non viveret... Vita anima est, vivens quidem, sed non aliunde quam se ipsa; et ob hoc non tam vivens, quam vita est» etc. Haec verba, quae sumta sunt ex Bernard., in Cant. serm. 81. n. 3. seq., intelligit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. in eodem sensu ac S. Bonav., scil. «anima vivit se ipsa i. e. aliquo sibi intrinseco, utpote formali principio»; et explicat exemplo sumto ab animali: «Animal enim dicitur *se ipso moveri* i. e. ab aliquo principio sibi intrinseco, eo modo quo dicitur anima *vivere se*».

en: *De Trinitate* c. 2: «For the rest [besides God] are not what they are; for everything has its *being* *from those things from which* it is, that is, from its parts, and is this and this, that is, its conjoined parts, but not this or this singly, just as when an earthly man stands together out of soul and body, he is both body and soul, not either body or soul». In the book *De Hebdomadibus* he teaches that creatures are not their own *being,* but participate in *being*. In the book *De Unitate et uno* he says that both Angel and soul are some «one by the conjunction of matter and form». Similarly Augustine, *De Moribus Manichaeorum* II, c. 4, n. 6, teaches that creatures are good «by participating in good and by having it». In *Tractate on John* 19, n. 13, expounding those words: *He gave life to the Son, that he might have it in himself,* by opposition to the life of the soul he says of the Son of God: «He gave to him to be Son, he begot, that he might be life, this is *He gave him to have life in himself,* that he might be life not needing life, lest by participating he be understood to have life. For if by participating he had life, he could also by losing it be without life». In the book *De Spiritu et anima* (among the works of Augustine), c. 36, the life of the soul is compared with the life of God: «God is life, and the soul is life, similar, but unlike; similar, in that it is life, in that it lives by itself... unlike, since he is creator, and this is creature. For unless created by him it would not be; and unless vivified by him it would not live... Life is the soul, living indeed, but from no other than itself; and on this account it is not so much living as life itself» etc. These words, which are taken from Bernard, *In Cantica* serm. 81, n. 3 ff., Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 87, m. 1, a. 2, § 2, understands in the same sense as St. Bonaventure, namely «the soul lives by itself, i.e. by something intrinsic to itself, as by a formal principle»; and he explains it by an example taken from the animal: «For an animal is said *to be moved by itself,* i.e. by some principle intrinsic to itself, in the way in which the soul is said *to live by itself*».

la: Intellige *propriam per se ipsam* sive independentem a corpore, quia omnis operatio animae sensitivae est coniuncti. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 12. seqq. (c. 1.). — Ex hac ratione deducitur sequens, scil. quod anima brutalis non est nata per se *subsistere*. — Paulo inferius in codd. O R S habetur *per se et intra se* pro *intra se*.

en: Understand *proper through itself* or independent of the body, since every operation of the sensitive soul is of the conjoined whole. Cfr. Aristotle, *De Anima* I, text 12 ff. (c. 1). — From this reason the following is deduced, namely that the brute soul is not naturally fit per se *to subsist*. — A little below, in codices O R S, *per se et intra se* is given for *intra se*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 5.

en: Cfr. above p. 89, note 5.

la: Supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam plura praecedentium explicantur. — Vat. *resolutio philosophica* pro *resolutio physica*.

en: Above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where also many of the foregoing matters are explained. — The Vatican edition reads *resolutio philosophica* for *resolutio physica*.

la: Cod. T *formalem substantialem universalem,* scil. «secundum essentiam abstractam», ut dicit Bonav., I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. In cod. A additur *universalis est «species, genus, vel intelligitur de particulari, sicut est anima bruti».*

en: Codex T reads *formalem substantialem universalem,* namely «according to abstracted essence», as Bonaventure says in *I Sent.* d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, *ad* 1. In codex A is added: *the universal is «a species, a genus, or is understood of the particular, as is the soul of a brute»*.

la: Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius post primum *materiam* cod. A subiungit *concreatam,* vel *coexistentem*.

en: Dist. 18, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, after the first *materiam,* codex A appends *concreatam,* or *coexistentem*.

la: De hac ratione cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. seq. (c. 8.). — Paulo superius in multis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur *Ideo* [pro quo cod. V ponit *unde*], et paulo inferius falso legitur *quam intelligit* pro *per quam intelligit*.

en: On this reason cfr. Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 38 ff. (c. 8). — A little above, in many codices and editions 1 and 2, *Ideo* is missing [for which codex V puts *unde*], and a little below, *quam intelligit* is falsely read for *per quam intelligit*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 28. seqq. (c. 7.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 28 ff. (c. 7).

la: Vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. — Vat. omittit *et compositio ex partibus substantialibus*.

en: See above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and *I Sent.* d. 8, p. II, q. 2. — The Vatican edition omits *et compositio ex partibus substantialibus*.

la: Ita plures codd. ut F W aa, alii codd. cum edd. *convenit*.

en: Thus several codices such as F W aa; other codices with the editions read *convenit*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec non intelligitur in eo sensu, quod anima producta sit de materia *praeiacente,* sive quae tempore praecesserit productionem animae, sed in eo sensu, quod producta anima constet ex materia et forma tanquam principiis constituentibus. Aliud enim est, aliquid habere materiam *in qua fiat,* ut est in omnibus formis corporalibus; aliud, *ex qua fiat* ut ex aliquo praeiacente, sicut est in generabilibus et corruptibilibus; aliud, *ex qua sit,* quod olim supponebatur quoad corpora incorruptibilia, et a nonnullis quoad spirituales substantias creatas (cfr. Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Eadem igitur quaestio hic de anima humana ponitur, quae supra (d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1. 2. 3.) quoad Angelos discussa est; eadem etiam principia a S. Doctore adhibentur ad eandem conclusionem ponendam, eademque est auctorum dissensio, quae ibi in scholio ad q. 1. est notata.

S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) dicit: «Mihi non videtur, in anima vel in aliqua spirituali substantia aliquo modo esse materiam, sed ipsas esse simplices formas et naturas, quamvis quidam aliter dicant. Et praeter alias rationes, quibus hoc de Angelis impossibile videtur... etiam quadam speciali ratione materia a ratione animae secluditur. Cum enim anima sit forma corporis, oportet, quod vel secundum totam essentiam suam sit corporis forma, vel secundum partem essentiae suae. Si secundum essentiam suam totam, impossibile est, quod pars essentiae sit materiae... Si autem secundum partem substantiae suae est forma corporis, per quam est in actu, et non secundum alteram, quae est materia eius, sequuntur duo inconvenientia» etc. In fine addit: «Nec tamen negamus, animam rationalem quendam modum compositionis habere, scil. ex *esse* et *quod est*... Qui tamen compositionis modus in aliis formis non invenitur, quia non possunt esse subsistentes quasi in *esse suo,* sed sunt per *esse* compositi. Et in hoc anima deficit a simplicitate divina». Praenotatum argumentum grave repetitur Sum. I. q. 75. a. 5. in corp. (cfr. S. c. Gent. II. c. 30.). — Eandem obiectionem, quod scil. compositum ex materia et forma non possit esse alterius compositi forma, S. Bonav., hic ad 6, solvere nititur; similiter Richard. (qui utramque opinionem probabilem aestimat), hic a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. sic ad eam respondet: «Dico, quod hoc esset verum, si materia esset *unigenea*. Sed materia animae non est unigenea cum materia ipsius corporis, sed est actualior quam forma incompleta in corpore humano, praecedens ordine naturae animae intellectivae infusionem». Et ibid. ad 3. ex hoc, quod materia non est unigenea, concludit: «Unde potest esse pars perfectionis illius». — Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 1.) ad principalem quaest. respondet: «Anima humana dicitur composita ex forma et materia *intellectuali;* nullatenus autem sic habet materiam et formam, sicut dicuntur *corpora* habere materiam et formam, sive sint caelestia sive inferiora. Materiae enim corporalis terminus est magnitudo; spiritualis autem materiae (magnitudo) non est terminus». — Iam in praedicto scholio notavimus ipsius S. Thomae verbis, quod ex sententia S. Bonaventurae, Alexandri et Scoti minime sequatur praeiudicium contra immortalitatem animae; item verbis Petri a Tar. (loc. cit.), quod haec opinio, quae nunc est obsoleta, tunc esset celebris et a multis probata.

**II.** Praeter auctores citatos: Scotus, de Anima, q. 13; de Rerum princ. q. 7. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Alios vide in scholio supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is not to be understood in the sense that the soul was produced from *pre-existent* matter, that is, from matter which preceded the production of the soul in time, but in the sense that the produced soul stands together out of matter and form as constitutive principles. For it is one thing for something to have matter *in which it is made,* as is the case in all corporeal forms; another, *from which it is made* as from something pre-existent, as is the case in things generable and corruptible; another, *from which it is,* which was once supposed concerning incorruptible bodies, and by some concerning created spiritual substances (cfr. Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2). The same question therefore is here set down about the human soul which was discussed above (d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1, 2, 3) concerning the Angels; the same principles also are employed by the Holy Doctor for laying down the same conclusion, and the same is the disagreement of authors, which is noted there in the scholion to q. 1.

St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2) says: «To me it does not seem that there is in any way matter in the soul or in any spiritual substance, but that they are simple forms and natures, although some say otherwise. And besides the other reasons by which this seems impossible concerning the Angels... also by a certain special reason matter is excluded from the account of the soul. For since the soul is the form of the body, it must be that either according to its whole essence it is the form of the body, or according to part of its essence. If according to its whole essence, it is impossible that a part of the essence be of matter... But if according to part of its substance it is the form of the body, by which it is in act, and not according to the other, which is its matter, two inconveniences follow,» etc. At the end he adds: «Nor however do we deny that the rational soul has a certain mode of composition, namely out of *being* and *that which is*... Which mode of composition however is not found in other forms, because they cannot be subsistent as if in their own *being,* but they are through composite *being*. And in this the soul falls short of divine simplicity». The weighty argument noted is repeated in *Summa* I, q. 75, a. 5, in corp. (cfr. *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 30). — The same objection, namely that what is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another composite, St. Bonaventure here tries to solve at *ad* 6; similarly Richard (who esteems both opinions probable), here a. 1, q. 1, *ad* 2, responds to it thus: «I say that this would be true if the matter were *of one kind*. But the matter of the soul is not of one kind with the matter of the body itself, but it is more actual than the incomplete form in the human body, preceding by the order of nature the infusion of the intellective soul». And in the same place *ad* 3, from the fact that the matter is not of one kind, he concludes: «Hence it can be a part of the perfection of that thing». — Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. II, q. 61, m. 1) responds to the principal question: «The human soul is said to be composed of *intellectual* form and matter; in no way however does it have matter and form thus, as *bodies* are said to have matter and form, whether they be celestial or lower. For the limit of corporeal matter is magnitude; but of spiritual matter the (magnitude) is not the limit». — Now in the aforesaid scholion we have noted in the very words of St. Thomas, that from the opinion of St. Bonaventure, Alexander, and Scotus there in no way follows a prejudice against the immortality of the soul; likewise in the words of Peter of Tarentaise (loc. cit.), that this opinion, which is now obsolete, was then celebrated and approved by many.

**II.** Besides the authors cited: Scotus, *De Anima,* q. 13; *De Rerum princ.* q. 7, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 3. — See others in the scholion above d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum anima Adae fuerit producta ante corpus, vel postea.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima Adae producta fuerit ante corpus, vel postea. Et quod ante, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Per textum Genesis primo[^1]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem* etc.; hoc dictum est sexta die; sed post septimam subditur: *Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae:* ergo si prima formatio refertur ad animam, secunda ad corpus, prius fuit facta anima quam corpus.

2. Item, hoc videtur *ratione.* Sicut homo ex parte corporis communicat cum animalibus brutis, ita ex parte animae communicat cum Angelis[^2]: ergo sicut corpus hominis productum est eodem die cum animalibus brutis, sic spiritus eius rationalis debuit produci eodem die cum Angelis: ergo etc.

3. Item, anima Adae se habet ad corpus sicut aeviternum ad temporale, et sicut aevum ad tempus[^3]; sed aevum est prius tempore, et aeviternum prius temporali: ergo prius videtur debuisse produci anima Adae quam corpus, cui debebat uniri.

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4. Item, substantia spiritualis, a corpore non dependens quantum ad *esse,* non dependet quantum ad *productionem;* sed spiritus rationalis Adae ab eius corpore non dependebat quantum ad *esse:* ergo nec quantum ad *productionem.* Corpus autem a spiritu dependebat, quia sine illo permanere non poterat: ergo si *absolutum* est ante *dependens*[^4], prius debuit produci anima quam corpus.

5. Item, maior est distantia inter spirituale et corporale, quam sit inter corpora miscibilia; sed corpora miscibilia prius producta sunt separatim, quam sint ad invicem mixta ad constitutionem tertii: ergo anima prius debuit produci quam corpori uniri: ergo non est creata in corpore, sed extra[^5].

6. Item, tanto aliquid prius debet produci, quanto magis appropinquat primariae rerum origini; sed anima plus appropinquat ad Deum, qui est principium omnium, quam corpus humanum, cum sit ei similior in simplicitate et spiritualitate: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Genesis secundo[^6]: *Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae;* quod exponitur, id est, spiritum fecit; sed *spiraculum vitae spirare* nihil aliud est quam *animam hominis creare:* ergo si prius creavit corpus, quam *spiraculum* inspiraret, prius ergo produxit corpus quam animam.

2. Item, anima naturaliter est forma corporis[^7]; sed naturalis forma aut simul producitur cum materia, aut sequitur materiam: ergo aut anima non est forma naturalis, aut si est forma naturalis, producta est post corpus, vel simul cum corpore: non ergo ante.

3. Item, quanto forma nobilior est, tanto ultimior; sed anima rationalis nobilissima est inter omnes formas naturales: ergo ultima: ergo produci debuit post vegetabilem et sensibilem[^8].

4. Item, ordinata productio procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum[^9]: si ergo perfectio omnium operum facta est in homine, et maxime quantum ad animam, videtur, quod homo quantum ad animam produci debuit ultimo post omnia.

5. Item, si anima producta esset ante corpus, cum haberet usum liberi arbitrii, nihil esset impediens nec retardans: ergo videtur, quod ante unionem ad corpus meruisset vel demeruisset: ergo corpus non esset particeps omnis meriti ipsius animae, nec anima deberet remunerari in corpore; quodsi hoc falsum est, planum est, animam Adae ante corpus suum non fuisse productam[^10].

6. Item, si anima Adae ante corpus esset producta: aut appetivisset uniri corpori, aut non. Si non: ergo unio eius ad corpus non esset naturalis, nec unio eius ad corpus fieret per naturam; si sic: appetebat ergo corpus, quod non habebat. Si ergo corpus ei differebatur, ipsa in appetendo affligebatur: ergo poena erat ei ante culpam[^11].

> **CONCLUSIO.**
> *Anima Adae producta fuit in corpore.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis circa istam quaestionem videatur dubitasse egregius doctor Augustinus[^12], quia utraque pars videtur posse sustineri probabiliter, et ordo congruus servari utrobique; tenendum est tamen tanquam verum et magis congruum, quod anima Adae producta fuerit in corpore, nec Deus eam produxerit ante corporis formationem. *Dubitat Augustinus.* *Conclusio.* — Licet enim videatur satis rationabiliter posse dici, quod Deus animam ante corpus eius produxerit, ut ostenderetur[^13] eam a corpore non dependere, sed per se posse subsistere; ut etiam cum hoc pariter ostenderet conformitatem eius et naturae angelicae tam in *rationis capacitate,* per quam est anima imago, quam in *beatitudine,* ad quam anima et Angelus habent ordinari: *Rationes Augustini.* longe tamen rationabilius videtur ponere, quod anima producta sit statim cum corpore, tum quia anima unitur corpori ut perfectio naturalis, cui naturaliter appetit copulari, adeo, ut sine illo poena sit ei esse et ab illo sequestrari; *Rationes pro conclusione.* tum etiam, quia unitur sicut motor mobili, ita quod sine ipso non potest mereri nec demereri; et ideo non debuit ante corpus produci, ne ante culpam puniretur, et ne absque corpore mereretur vel demereretur. — Huic autem positioni non tantum[^14] concordat ratio, immo etiam Scripturae suffragatur auctoritas, quae dicit, post productionem et formationem hominis[^15] Deum sibi vitae spiraculum inspirasse. — Huic igitur parti tanquam probabiliori et securiori adhaerendo, concedere possumus rationes hanc partem astruentes.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de textu, dicendum, quod alterum eorum est dictum per *recapitulationem,* vel primum est dictum per *anticipationem.* Melius tamen est dicere, quod Scriptura illud recapitulat, ut addat[^16].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus simul productum est cum brutis, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile; productio enim corporis sic concordat productioni brutorum animalium, ut pro-

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ductio rationalis spiritus non discordet, immo potius illorum imperfectionem sua dignitate consummet[^17]; productio vero spiritus sic concordat productioni Angelorum, ut minime concordet productioni corporum humanorum, quae quidem spectant ad terrae ornatum, cuius ornatus productio spectat ad diem sextum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione aeviterni ad temporale, dicendum, quod etsi substantia aeviterna ex parte *post* se plus extendat quam temporalis, utpote quia caret fine; non tamen oportet, quod a parte *ante,* maxime, si sit talis, quae sui productione appetitum rei temporalis habeat terminare; et sic fuit in anima Adae. *Et praeterea,* si illud possit esse verum de aeviterno, quod *pure* habet rationem aeviterni, non tamen habet veritatem de eo, quod *sic* habet rationem aeviterni, quod etiam temporalis. Anima enim rationalis, etsi in quantum *spiritus* et *ens per se* habeat rationem aeviterni in quantum tale, tamen, in quantum *animat* corpus transmutabile, habet tempore mensurari[^18].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima non dependet a corpore quantum ad *esse;* dicendum, quod etsi non dependeat a corpore tanquam indigens eo ad sui conservationem, dependet tamen per appetitus sui inclinationem, quam habet ad ipsum, sicut forma ad materiam propriam; et ideo, sicut forma producitur in materia, sic anima Adae produci debuit in proprio corpore.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de corporibus miscibilibus, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia elementa, quae miscentur, non dependent ab invicem, et unum potest habere *esse completum* sine altero; non sic autem est de anima et eius corpore, quorum utrumque ab altero dependet[^19].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima origini primae magis approximat; dicendum, quod cum Deus sit *alpha et omega, principium et finis*[^20], et *Notandum.* rationalis creatura in utraque habitudine sit ei propinqua; proprie tamen loquendo, angelica natura plus ei appropinquat in ratione *principii,* et humana plus in ratione *finis:* ideo inter omnes creaturas *prior omnium creata est sapientia*[^21], sive creatura angelica, et dignitate et origine; et post omnia producta est anima humana tanquam finis omnium et consummatio. Et ideo quamvis multum approximet Deo, in quantum tenet rationem *originis,* non minus tamen approximat Deo, in quantum habet rationem *finis;* et ideo competentius fuit, eam produci posterius quam prius. Haec dicta sunt de anima Adae; nam de aliis animabus infra[^22] suo loco quaeretur.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Praeexistentia animarum *in genere,* quam cum Platone Origenes docuit, censurata est a Concilio generali V. (ut communius dicitur) can. 1. his verbis: « *Si quis fabulosam animarum praeexistentiam et, quae ex illa consequitur, monstruosam restitutionem asseruerit a. s.* ». De hoc errore S. Doctor cum aliis commentatoribus agit infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. Hoc autem loco speciatim tractatur *de anima primi parentis,* quia ob rationes speciales Augustinus magis de hac dubitavit quam de illis, ut loco citato exponitur.

**II.** Alii auctores antiqui hanc specialem quaestionem non explicite tractant, sed eam tangunt (vel hic, vel d. 17. vel 18.) in generali quaestione de praeexistentia animarum. Alex. Hal. eam tangit S. p. II. q. 60. m. 2. a. 2.

De hac speciali quaestione tractant: S. Thom., S. I. q. 91. a. 4. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2; a. 2.

---

english:
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### Question III.
### *Whether the soul of Adam was produced before the body, or afterward.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the soul of Adam was produced before the body, or afterward. And that it was before, it seems:

*To the contrary [position].*

1. By the text of Genesis 1[^1]: *Let us make man to our image* etc.; this is said on the sixth day; but after the seventh it is added: *And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth:* therefore if the first formation refers to the soul, the second to the body, the soul was made before the body.

2. Likewise, this seems by *reason.* Just as man on the side of the body shares with the brute animals, so on the side of the soul he shares with the Angels[^2]: therefore just as the body of man was produced on the same day as the brute animals, so his rational spirit ought to have been produced on the same day as the Angels: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the soul of Adam stands to the body as the aeviternal stands to the temporal, and as aevum stands to time[^3]; but aevum is prior to time, and the aeviternal prior to the temporal: therefore the soul of Adam seems to have had to be produced before the body, to which it was to be united.

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4. Likewise, a spiritual substance, not depending on the body as to *being,* does not depend as to *production;* but the rational spirit of Adam did not depend on his body as to *being:* therefore not as to *production* either. The body, however, depended on the spirit, because it could not endure without it: therefore if the *absolute* is prior to the *dependent*[^4], the soul ought to have been produced before the body.

5. Likewise, the distance between the spiritual and the corporeal is greater than that between miscible bodies; but miscible bodies are first produced separately, before they are mixed together for the constitution of a third: therefore the soul ought first to have been produced before being united to the body: therefore it was not created in the body, but outside[^5].

6. Likewise, a thing ought to be produced earlier in proportion as it more nearly approaches the primary origin of things; but the soul approaches God, who is the principle of all things, more closely than the human body, since it is more like Him in simplicity and spirituality: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations.*

1. Genesis 2[^6]: *And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life;* which is expounded, that is, He made the spirit; but to *breathe the breath of life* is nothing other than to *create the soul of man:* therefore if He first created the body before He breathed in the *breath,* then He produced the body before the soul.

2. Likewise, the soul is naturally the form of the body[^7]; but a natural form is either produced together with matter, or follows matter: therefore either the soul is not a natural form, or, if it is a natural form, it is produced after the body, or together with the body: therefore not before.

3. Likewise, the nobler a form is, the later [it is]; but the rational soul is the noblest among all natural forms: therefore the last: therefore it ought to be produced after the vegetative and the sensitive[^8].

4. Likewise, an orderly production proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect[^9]: if therefore the perfection of all works was accomplished in man, and most of all as to the soul, it seems that man as to the soul ought to have been produced last after all things.

5. Likewise, if the soul had been produced before the body, since it would have had the use of free choice, nothing would have been impeding or delaying it: therefore it seems that before union with the body it would have merited or demerited: therefore the body would not be partaker of all the merit of the soul itself, nor ought the soul be rewarded in the body; but if this is false, it is plain that the soul of Adam was not produced before its body[^10].

6. Likewise, if the soul of Adam were produced before the body: either it would have desired to be united to the body, or not. If not: then its union with the body would not be natural, nor would its union with the body come about by nature; if so: then it desired the body, which it did not have. If, therefore, the body was deferred to it, it was afflicted in desiring: therefore there was punishment for it before fault[^11].

> **CONCLUSION.**
> *The soul of Adam was produced in the body.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, although concerning this question the eminent doctor Augustine[^12] seems to have been in doubt, because each side seems able to be sustained probably, and a fitting order to be kept either way; nevertheless it must be held as true and more fitting that the soul of Adam was produced in the body, and that God did not produce it before the formation of the body. *Augustine doubts.* *Conclusion.* — For although it may seem to be said with sufficient reasonableness that God produced the soul before its body, in order that it might be shown[^13] that it does not depend on the body, but is able to subsist through itself; and that with this He might equally show its conformity also with the angelic nature both in *the capacity of reason,* through which the soul is image, and in *beatitude,* to which the soul and the Angel are ordered: *Augustine's reasons.* yet it seems far more reasonable to hold that the soul was produced at once with the body, both because the soul is united to the body as its natural perfection, to which it naturally desires to be joined, so much so that it is a punishment for it to be without it and to be separated from it; *Reasons for the conclusion.* and likewise because it is united as a mover to the movable, so that without it the soul can neither merit nor demerit; and therefore it ought not to have been produced before the body, lest it be punished before fault, and lest it merit or demerit apart from the body. — To this position not only[^14] does reason concord, but indeed the authority of Scripture also gives support, which says that after the production and formation of man[^15] God breathed the breath of life into him. — Adhering therefore to this side as more probable and safer, we can grant the reasons that establish this side.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that, however, which is first objected in contrary from the text, it must be said that one of them was said by way of *recapitulation,* or the first was said by *anticipation.* Yet it is better to say that Scripture recapitulates this, in order to add [something further][^16].

2. To that which is objected, that the body was produced together with the brutes, therefore etc.; it must be said that the cases are not similar; for the production of the body so concords with the production of the brute animals, that

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the production of the rational spirit does not discord, but rather consummates their imperfection by its dignity[^17]; whereas the production of the spirit so concords with the production of the Angels that it concords least with the production of human bodies, which indeed belong to the adornment of the earth, the production of which adornment belongs to the sixth day.

3. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of the aeviternal to the temporal, it must be said that although an aeviternal substance extends more than the temporal on the side *after* itself, inasmuch as it lacks an end; nevertheless it is not necessary that [it extends more] on the side *before,* especially if it is such that by its production it has to terminate the appetite of a temporal thing; and so it was in the soul of Adam. *And moreover,* if that may be true of the aeviternal which has the character of the aeviternal *purely,* it does not, nevertheless, hold true of that which *so* has the character of the aeviternal that it is also temporal. For the rational soul, although insofar as it is *spirit* and *being through itself* it has the character of the aeviternal as such, nevertheless, insofar as it *animates* a changeable body, it has to be measured by time[^18].

4. To that which is objected, that the soul does not depend on the body as to *being;* it must be said that although it does not depend on the body as needing it for its own conservation, yet it depends through the inclination of its own appetite, which it has toward it, just as a form toward its proper matter; and therefore, just as a form is produced in matter, so the soul of Adam ought to have been produced in its proper body.

5. To that which is objected concerning miscible bodies, it must be said that the cases are not similar, because the elements which are mixed do not depend on one another, and one can have *complete being* without the other; but it is not so concerning the soul and its body, of which each depends on the other[^19].

6. To that which is objected, that the soul approximates more closely to the primary origin; it must be said that since God is *alpha and omega, principle and end*[^20], and *Note.* the rational creature is near to Him in either relation; yet, speaking properly, the angelic nature approaches Him more in the character of *principle,* and the human more in the character of *end:* therefore among all creatures *wisdom was created before all*[^21], that is, the angelic creature, both in dignity and in origin; and after all things the human soul was produced as the end of all and the consummation. And therefore, although it approximates much to God insofar as it holds the character of *origin,* nevertheless it approximates God no less insofar as it has the character of *end;* and therefore it was more fittingly produced later than earlier. These things have been said concerning the soul of Adam; for concerning the other souls it will be asked below[^22] in its proper place.

### Scholion.

**I.** The pre-existence of souls *in general,* which Origen taught along with Plato, was censured by the Fifth General Council (as is more commonly said) can. 1, in these words: «*If anyone shall have asserted the fabulous pre-existence of souls and the monstrous restoration that follows from it, let him be anathema.*» Concerning this error the Holy Doctor, with other commentators, treats below in d. 18, a. 2, q. 2. But in this place there is specially treated *the soul of the first parent,* because for special reasons Augustine doubted concerning this more than concerning the others, as is expounded in the place cited.

**II.** Other ancient authors do not explicitly treat this special question, but touch on it (either here, or in d. 17 or 18) in the general question on the pre-existence of souls. Alex. Hal. touches on it in S. p. II. q. 60. m. 2. a. 2.

On this special question treat: S. Thomas, S. I. q. 91. a. 4. ad 3. — B. Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 2; a. 2.

---

la: Vers. 26. Seq. textus est Gen. 2, 7.

en: Gen. 1, 26. The following text is Gen. 2, 7.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 398, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 398, note 5.

la: Vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. I. q. I. — Ibid. a. 2. q. I. *minor* insinuatur.

en: See above d. 2, p. I, a. I, q. I. — Ibid., a. 2, q. I, where the minor is suggested.

la: Simile ex Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6. de *absoluto et relativo* occurrit supra pag. 49, nota 3.

en: A similar [point] from Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 6, on *the absolute and the relative,* occurs above p. 49, note 3.

la: Vat. *extra corpus.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *outside the body.*

la: Vers. 7. — Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 1, ubi expositio huius textus habetur.

en: Gen. 2, 7. — Cf. above q. 1, ad 1, where the exposition of this text is given.

la: Vide supra pag. 82, nota 1. — De *minori* ait Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.): *Uniuscuiusque enim actus in eo, quod potentia existit, et in propria materia aptus natura est fieri.*

en: See above p. 82, note 1. — Concerning the *minor* Aristotle says, *On the Soul* II, text 26 (c. 2): *For the act of each thing is by nature apt to come to be in that which exists potentially, and in its own proper matter.*

la: Huius arg. expositionem vide supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.

en: For the exposition of this argument see above d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 330, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 330, note 5.

la: Cfr. infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 3. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 post *usum liberi arbitrii* subiungunt *et.*

en: Cf. below d. 18, a. 2, q. 2, fundam. 3. — Codex cc and ed. 1 add *and* after *the use of free choice.*

la: Hoc arg. tangit August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 25. n. 36. seqq. et X. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 3.). — Cod. cc et ed. 1 *antequam culpa.*

en: Augustine touches on this argument in *On Genesis according to the Letter* VII, c. 25, n. 36ff., and *City of God* X, c. 30. Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 53 (c. 3). — Codex cc and ed. 1 read *before fault.*

la: Libr. VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 24. n. 35. seqq.

en: Book VII *On Genesis according to the Letter,* c. 24, n. 35ff.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. *ostenderet.* — De seq. prop. cfr. supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Several codices with the Vatican edition read *He would show.* — On the following proposition cf. above d. 16, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vat. perperam *tamen.*

en: The Vatican edition reads, incorrectly, *however.*

la: Scriptura ponit hic *totum* pro *parte,* scil. corpore.

en: Here Scripture puts *the whole* for *the part,* namely the body.

la: Vide August., VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 1. seqq.

en: See Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* VI, c. 1, n. 1ff.

la: Cfr. supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et ad 2; d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Multi codd. cum ed. 4 incongrue *consummat;* Vat. cum ceteris edd. *conservet.* Paulo inferius non pauci codd. *productio corporum* pro *productioni corporum,* et dein Vat. *quae quidem spectat* pro *quae quidem spectant.*

en: Cf. above d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, in the body and ad 2; d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — Many codices with ed. 4 incongruously read *consummates;* the Vatican edition with the other editions reads *let it preserve.* A little further down, not a few codices read *production of bodies* for *to the production of bodies,* and then the Vatican reads *which indeed belongs* for *which indeed belong.*

la: Intellige cum Vat. *etsi,* quae etiam aliquanto inferius cum edd. 3, 4 omittit verba *etsi in quantum* usque ad *tamen.*

en: Understand with the Vatican edition *although,* which also a little further down, with edd. 3, 4, omits the words *although insofar as* up to *nevertheless.*

la: Non pauci codd. *non dependet;* erronee. In aliquibus horum codd. error iam a secunda manu correctus fuit.

en: Not a few codices read *does not depend;* erroneously. In some of these codices the error was corrected already by a second hand.

la: Apoc. 22, 13: *Ego sum alpha et omega, primus et novissimus, principium et finis.*

en: Apoc. 22, 13: *I am alpha and omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.*

en: Eccli. 1, 4. — Cf. concerning these things above d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 3; d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2; d. 15, a. 2, q. 1f.

translators_notes:
- Spans printed pp. 416–418 (PDF pp. 438–440). QUAESTIO III opens on p.416 R band 1 immediately after q2 SCHOLION II close; closes on p.418 R band 1 immediately before `ARTICULUS II.` opener at raw 29467.
- 22 apparatus entries [^1]–[^22] continuously renumbered. Page-split map: p.416 L band 2 footers 1–3 = [^1]–[^3] (received per d17-a1-q2 forward hand-off: Vers. 26 + Cfr. supra pag. 398 nota 5 + Vide supra d.2 p.I a.1 q.1); p.416 R band 2 footers 4–5 = [^4]–[^5] (Aristot. *absoluto et relativo* + Vat. *extra corpus*); p.417 L band 2 footers 1–5 = [^6]–[^10] (Vers. 7 cross-ref to q1 ad 1 + Aristot. II de Anima text 26 + Vide supra d.15 a.2 q.2 + Cfr. supra pag. 330 nota 5 + Cfr. infra d.18 a.2 q.2 fundam. 3 with cod. cc *et* gloss); p.417 R band 2 footers 6–11 = [^11]–[^16] (Aug. VII de Gen ad lit. c.25 + X de Civ. Dei c.30 + Aristot. I de Anima text 53 *antequam culpa* / Aug. VII de Gen ad lit c.24 / Plures codd. *ostenderet* + d.16 a.2 q.1 cross-ref / Vat. *tamen* / Scriptura *totum* pro *parte* / Aug. VI de Gen ad lit c.1); p.418 L band 2 footers 1–2 = [^17]–[^18] (d.15 a.2 q.2 + d.1 p.II a.2 q.2 cross-refs with *consummat* / *conserve* variants + Vat. *etsi* gloss); p.418 R band 2 footers 3–6 = [^19]–[^22] (Non pauci codd. *non dependet* + Apoc. 22:13 + Eccli. 1:4 with d.2 p.I a.2 q.3 + d.10 a.2 q.2 + d.15 a.2 q.1 cross-refs + Dist. 18 a.2 q.2 forward pointer).
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Dubitat Augustinus.*, *Conclusio.*, *Rationes Augustini.*, *Rationes pro conclusione.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Notandum.*
- `has_scholion: true` — SCHOLION I (substantial: Concilio generali V can. 1 anathema on Origen/Plato pre-existence of souls + forward pointer to d.18 a.2 q.2 for the general question); SCHOLION II = q3 commentator list (Alex. Hal. S. p. II q. 60 m. 2 a. 2 + S. Thom. S. I q. 91 a. 4 ad 3 + B. Albert hic a. 2 + S. p. II tr. 12 q. 72 m. 4 a. 1 + Petr. a Tar. hic q. 1 a. 3 quaestiunc. 1 + Aegid. R. hic q. 2 a. 2).
- No `[?]` flags — all 22 anchors + 8 marginal labels crisp at 450 dpi across pp.416–418. Column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override; OCR around raw 29326–29466 is two-column cascade-fragmented (`QU\EST10 111.` header garble + diagonal token reorder around the CONCLUSIO/Respondeo splice + marginal-label bleed-through).
- Cross-chunk hand-off received from d17-a1-q2: p.416 L band 2 footers 1–3 migrate here as [^1]–[^3]. Forward hand-off to d17-a2-q1: none — ARTICULUS II opens on p.418 R band 1 with its own *Consequenter quaeritur de productione primi hominis ex parte corporis* opener + sub-divisio listing 3 questions, and p.418 R band 2 footers all anchor in this q3 body (last is [^22] = Dist. 18 a.2 q.2).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De productione hominis quoad corpus.*

Consequenter quaeritur de productione primi hominis ex parte corporis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum corpus primi hominis produci debuit pure de natura caelesti.

*Secundo* quaeritur, utrum productum fuerit pure de natura elementari.

*Tertio* quaeritur, utrum conditum fuerit in complexione aequali, vel inaequali.

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### Quaestio I. *Utrum corpus Adae debuerit produci de natura pure caelesti.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod corpus Adae produci debuerit pure de natura caelesti, sic.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Nobilissimae formae debet dari nobilissima materia[^1]; sed nobilissima inter formas est anima rationalis innocens et absque peccato, qualis fuit anima Adae; sed nobilissima inter naturas corporales est natura caelestis: ergo etc.

2. Item, motoris ad mobile debet esse proportio[^2]; sed anima rationalis est motor incorruptibilis: ergo debuit ei dari corpus impassibile.

3. Item, finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem[^3]; sed totus Adam factus est ad perceptionem beatitudinis, locus autem beatitudinis spiritualis est ipse Deus, corporalis est caelum: ergo sicut spiritus Adae non quiescit nisi in Deo, sic debuit ei dari corpus, quod non quiescit nisi in caelo; hoc autem est corpus de natura caelesti: ergo etc.

4. Item, spiritus rationalis, prout absque culpa conditus fuit, maxime erat potens et idoneus ad agendum, perfectus erat cognitionis lumine et[^4] idoneus ad cognoscendum, liber erat voluntate et rectitudine, et ideo facilis ad tendendum in sui optimum: ergo debuit ei dari corpus, cui maxime competit agere et ad cognitionem disponere, et quod minime habet retardationem; hoc autem est lux et natura caelestis: ergo corpus Adae pure produci debuit de caelesti corpore.

**Sed contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. «Anima rationalis quodam modo est omnia[^5].» Si igitur corpus debet proportionari animae, corpus eius debet habere cum omnibus convenientiam; sed hoc non haberet, si esset pure de natura caelesti et non communicaret elementis: ergo etc.

2. Item, anima rationalis, quamvis sit simplex in essentia, tamen est multiplex in effectu[^6]: ergo si corpus ei debet correspondere, necesse est, quod corpus eius habeat varietatem in partium compositione et organizatione; sed hoc non haberet, si esset corpus pure caeleste: ergo etc.

3. Item, vegetabilis et sensibilis disponunt ad rationalem, et magis ad ipsam appropinquant quam natura alicuius corporis, nec alicui corpori unitur rationalis potentia absque vegetabili et sensibili: nullum ergo corpus est habile ad actum vitae rationalis, nisi prius fuerit habile ad actum vitae vegetabilis[^7]; tale autem est corpus cibabile, et huiusmodi non potest esse corpus pure caeleste: ergo etc.

4. Item, corpori simplici debetur unus motus tantum, sive illud corpus sit caeleste, sive elementare[^8]; corpori autem, quod movetur ab anima, debetur motus in omnem differentiam, cum anima sit motor sufficiens: ergo corpus Adae non potuit esse omnino de natura corporis simplicis, ergo nec pure de natura caelesti.

> **Conclusio.** Corpus Adae non fuit formatum nec debuit formari de natura pure caelesti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod corpus Adae non fuit pure formatum de natura caelesti, sicut innuit textus Genesis[^9] qui dicit eum formatum *de limo terrae*. *Conclusio 1.*

Nec debuit pure de natura caelesti formari, immo de natura elementari, hoc exigente ordinis congruentia, quam in omnibus suis operibus semper servat Sapientia divina. *Conclusio 2.* Requirebat enim hoc ordo hominis, sive *in se*, sive ad *creaturam inferiorem*, sive ad *creaturam parem*, sive ad *Deum finem*. *Quadruplex ordo.*

*Ordo hominis in se.* Ordo ipsius hominis in se ipso hoc requirebat. Quia enim homo conditus fuit ut natus multa cognoscere, non solum cognitione intellectiva, sed etiam sensitiva; ideo debuit ei dari corpus *multiforme*, ut diversa organa diversitati sensuum deservirent ad diversa obiecta cognoscenda. Quia etiam[^10] conditus fuit in vertibilitate liberi arbitrii ut potens vivere in iustitia et mori per culpam; dari debuit etiam corpus, quod non tantum esset habile ad vivendum, sed etiam, quod posset fieri *habile ad corrumpendum* sive moriendum. Et ita ordo hominis ipsius in se requirebat, ut corpus daretur homini *multiforme* et ad *corruptionem possibile*, et ideo non caeleste, sed elementare.

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*Ad creaturam inferiorem.* Ordo etiam hominis ad *creaturam inferiorem* requirebat. Quia enim corporales naturae inferiores factae sunt, ut *deservirent* creaturae rationali, sicut supra[^11] ostensum fuit; factae sunt etiam, ut mediante illa quodam modo *perducantur in finem*: hinc est, quod debuit fieri rationalis creatura taliter composita, quod obsequium inferiorum creaturarum esset ei *utile*, et quod, mediante illa creatura, naturae inferiores quodam modo *perducerentur ad beatitudinem*. Et ideo, ut naturae inferiores possent homini *deservire* et in homine quodam modo *glorificari,* debuit homo non tam ex natura superiorum corporum quam ex natura elementorum constitui.

*Ad creaturam parem.* Ordo etiam ad *creaturam parem,* id est ad Angelum, hoc requirebat. Sicut enim facta est una rationalis creatura prope Deum et in loco *supremo*, ut in empyreo; sic debuit fieri alia rationalis creatura in loco *infimo*, scilicet terra. Et ideo corpus eius constitui debuit ex natura tali habitationi convenienti, et ideo magis ex natura elementari quam caelesti.

*Ad Deum finem.* Ordo etiam ad *finem*[^12] hoc requirebat. Debebat enim homo subiici, ut per humilitatem subiectionis ascenderet unde angelus ceciderat per sublimitatem elationis; et ideo debuit sibi dari corpus constitutum de natura inferiori, ut, se ipsum pulverem reputans, Deo per omnia subiaceret. Unde et Scriptura maluit eum dicere de *limo terrae* productum, ut ex hoc homo proficeret et ascenderet per humilitatis meritum. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad hoc sunt inductae.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud vero, quod obiicitur in contrarium de nobilitate formae, dicendum, quod nobilitas materiae venit ex ordinatione ad formam. Quoniam igitur corpus magis erat ordinabile ad animam, quod erat constitutum ex varietate naturae, quam corpus, quod esset pure caeleste; hinc est, quod si[^13] illud sit nobilius in se, tamen in relatione ad formam corpus ex diversis elementis compositum magis est nobile.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motoris ad mobile debet esse proportio; dicendum, quod quamvis anima sit immortalis morte *naturae*, quando tamen creata fuit, mori potuit morte *culpae*. Et quia corpus datum est ei non solum ad vivificandum, sed etiam ad merendum; ideo non solum debuit dari corpus aptum eius *immortalitati*, sed etiam aptum eius *vertibilitati*, et ideo non solum necessarium ad perpetuitatem, sed etiam possibile ad mortalitatem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo factus est propter beatitudinis perceptionem; dicendum, quod etsi factus est propter beatitudinem, ita tamen, ut illuc[^14] perveniret per merita et bona opera, et ita prius esset *viator* quam *comprehensor*; et quia prius oportuit eum transire per *viam*, quam perveniret ad *patriam*: ideo in primaria sui conditione debuit ei dari corpus conveniens secundum statum *viae*. *Notandum.* Et quia locus sibi deputatus ad merendum erat locus inferior, scilicet paradisus terrestris[^15]; inde est, quod competebat, corpus suum de natura terrestri assumi, non principaliter de caelesti. Cum autem assumetur in gloria, tunc corporis eius dispositio erit variata, sicut patet in quarto[^16], ubi agitur de dotibus corporum glorificatorum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima illa erat potens ad agendum et cognoscendum et tendendum in Deum; dicendum, quod etsi erat potens ad *actionem*, non tamen ita perfecte potens erat, quin esset possibilis ad *defectionem*[^17]. Et ideo non sequitur, quod deberet sibi ad haec complenda dari corpus caeleste, quod est incorruptibile, sed magis elementare, quod ex bona dispositione et complexione aequali esset idoneum ad agendum, et nihilominus, si homo peccaret, esset possibile ad patiendum.

english:
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### Article II. *On the production of the human being with respect to the body.*

It is next asked concerning the production of the first human with respect to the body. And concerning this three things are asked.

*First* it is asked whether the body of the first human ought to have been produced purely from a celestial nature.

*Second* it is asked whether it was produced purely from an elementary nature.

*Third* it is asked whether it was constituted in an equal complexion, or in an unequal one.

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### Question I. *Whether the body of Adam ought to have been produced from a purely celestial nature.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the body of Adam ought to have been produced purely from a celestial nature, thus.

*To the opposite [view].*

1. To the most noble form ought to be given the most noble matter[^1]; but the most noble among forms is the rational soul, innocent and without sin, such as was the soul of Adam; but the most noble among corporeal natures is the celestial nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there ought to be a proportion of mover to movable[^2]; but the rational soul is an incorruptible mover: therefore there ought to be given to it an impassible body.

3. Likewise, the end imposes necessity on those things which are ordered to the end[^3]; but the whole of Adam was made for the reception of beatitude, and the place of spiritual beatitude is God himself, the corporeal [place] is heaven: therefore just as the spirit of Adam does not rest except in God, so there ought to have been given to him a body which does not rest except in heaven; but this is a body of celestial nature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the rational spirit, inasmuch as it was constituted without fault, was supremely able and fit for acting, was perfect with the light of cognition, and[^4] fit for knowing, was free in will and rectitude, and therefore prone to tending toward its own optimum: therefore there ought to have been given to it a body to which it maximally pertains to act and to dispose for cognition, and which has the least retardation; but this is light and the celestial nature: therefore the body of Adam ought to have been produced purely from a celestial body.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations.*

1. «The rational soul is in some manner all things[^5].» If therefore the body ought to be proportioned to the soul, its body ought to have agreement with all things; but it would not have this, if it were purely of celestial nature and did not communicate with the elements: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the rational soul, although it is simple in essence, is nevertheless manifold in effect[^6]: therefore if the body ought to correspond to it, it is necessary that its body have variety in the composition and organization of its parts; but it would not have this, if it were a purely celestial body: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the vegetative and the sensitive [powers] dispose for the rational, and approach more closely to it than the nature of any [particular] body, nor is the rational power united to any body without the vegetative and the sensitive: therefore no body is fit for the act of rational life, unless it is first fit for the act of vegetative life[^7]; but such is a body capable of nourishment, and a body of this kind cannot be a purely celestial body: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, to a simple body there is owed but one motion only, whether that body be celestial or elementary[^8]; but to a body which is moved by the soul there is owed motion in every difference, since the soul is a sufficient mover: therefore the body of Adam could not be wholly of the nature of a simple body, and therefore neither purely of celestial nature.

> **Conclusion.** The body of Adam was not formed nor ought to have been formed from a purely celestial nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that the body of Adam was not formed purely from a celestial nature, as the text of Genesis[^9] indicates, which says he was formed *from the slime of the earth*. *Conclusion 1.*

Nor ought it to have been formed purely from a celestial nature, but rather from an elementary nature, this being demanded by the congruence of order, which in all his works divine Wisdom always preserves. *Conclusion 2.* For this was required by the order of the human being, whether *in himself*, or to the *inferior creature*, or to the *equal creature*, or to *God as end*. *Fourfold order.*

*Order of the human being in himself.* The order of the human being in himself required this. For since the human being was constituted as one born to know many things, not only by intellective cognition, but also by sensitive [cognition]; therefore there had to be given to him a *multiform* body, that diverse organs might serve the diversity of senses for the knowing of diverse objects. And since[^10] he was constituted in the vertibility of free choice, as able to live in justice and to die through fault; there had to be given also a body which would not only be fit for living, but also one which could be made *fit for corrupting* or dying. And thus the order of the human being himself in himself required that there be given to him a body *multiform* and *capable of corruption*, and therefore not celestial, but elementary.

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*To the inferior creature.* The order of the human being to the *inferior creature* also required this. For since the inferior corporeal natures were made that they might *serve* the rational creature, as was shown above[^11]; they were also made so that, by its mediation, they might in some manner be *led to their end*: hence it is that the rational creature had to be made composed in such a way, that the service of the inferior creatures should be *useful* to him, and that, by the mediation of that creature, the inferior natures should in some manner be *led to beatitude*. And therefore, that the inferior natures might be able to *serve* the human being and in some manner to be *glorified* in him, the human being had to be constituted not so much from the nature of the superior bodies as from the nature of the elements.

*To the equal creature.* The order to the *equal creature*, that is to the Angel, also required this. For just as one rational creature was made near God and in the *supreme* place, as in the empyrean; so another rational creature had to be made in the *lowest* place, namely the earth. And therefore his body had to be constituted from a nature suitable to such a habitation, and therefore rather from elementary nature than from celestial.

*To God as end.* The order to the *end*[^12] also required this. For the human being had to be subjected, so that by the humility of subjection he might ascend whence the angel had fallen through the sublimity of pride; and therefore there had to be given to him a body constituted of an inferior nature, so that, accounting himself dust, he might in all things lie subject to God. Whence Scripture also preferred to say him produced *from the slime of the earth*, that hereby the human being might profit and ascend by the merit of humility. — And therefore the reasons which were adduced for this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary concerning the nobility of the form, it must be said that the nobility of matter comes from its ordination to the form. Since therefore the body was more ordainable to the soul, which was constituted from a variety of nature, than a body which would be purely celestial; hence it is that even if[^13] the latter is nobler in itself, nevertheless in relation to the form a body composed of diverse elements is more noble.

2. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a proportion of mover to movable; it must be said that, although the soul is immortal with the death of *nature*, yet when it was created, it could die with the death of *fault*. And since the body was given to it not only for vivifying, but also for meriting; therefore there had not only to be given a body apt for its *immortality*, but also apt for its *vertibility*, and therefore not only necessary for perpetuity, but also possible to mortality.

3. To that which is objected, that the human being was made for the reception of beatitude; it must be said that, although he was made for beatitude, yet so that he should arrive there[^14] through merits and good works, and so that he should first be a *wayfarer* before a *comprehensor*; and since it was first fitting for him to pass through the *way* before he came to the *fatherland*: therefore in his primary condition there had to be given to him a body suitable according to the state of the *way*. *To be noted.* And since the place deputed to him for meriting was the inferior place, namely the terrestrial paradise[^15]; hence it is that it was fitting that his body be assumed from a terrestrial nature, not principally from a celestial one. But when it shall be assumed into glory, then the disposition of his body shall be varied, as is clear in the fourth [book][^16], where there is treated the dowries of the glorified bodies.

4. To that which is objected, that that soul was able to act and to know and to tend toward God; it must be said that although it was able for *action*, yet it was not so perfectly able, that it was not capable of *defection*[^17]. And therefore it does not follow that there ought to be given to it, for the fulfillment of these things, a celestial body, which is incorruptible, but rather an elementary one, which from a good disposition and an equal complexion would be fit for acting, and nevertheless, if the human being should sin, would be capable of suffering.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 380, nota 1. — Conclusionem arg. codd. Y aa ita supplent: *ergo corpus Adae constitui debuit de natura caelesti pure.*

en: Cf. above p. 380, note 1. — The conclusion of the argument codices Y aa supply thus: *therefore the body of Adam ought to have been constituted purely of celestial nature.*

la: Vide supra pag. 216, nota 3. et pag. 346, nota 4.

en: See above p. 216, note 3, and p. 346, note 4.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Phys. text. 88. seqq. (c. 9.). — De Deo ut *loco spirituali* cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et scholion.

en: According to Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 88 ff. (c. 9). — On God as *spiritual place* cf. above d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and scholion.

la: Cod. W *et ideo si*, Vat. *et ideo.*

en: Codex W reads *et ideo si*, the Vatican edition *et ideo.*

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 37 (c. 8).

la: Sive *operatione.* Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 3.

en: Or *in operation.* Cf. above d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. fundamentum 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. seq. (c. 3.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 31 ff. (c. 3).

la: Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 7. (c. 2.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 7 (c. 2).

la: Cap. 2, 7. — Paulo inferius plures codd. *quem in omnibus* pro *quam in omnibus.*

en: Chap. 2, 7. — A little below, several codices read *quem in omnibus* in place of *quam in omnibus.*

la: Ita codd. F l aa; alii cum edd. 1, 2 *enim*, Vat. vero.

en: So codices F l aa; others, with editions 1, 2, read *enim*; the Vatican edition [reads] *vero.*

la: Dist. 15. a. 2. q. 1. et infra pag. 421, nota 4.

en: Dist. 15. a. 2. q. 1., and below p. 421, note 4.

la: Vat. *Deum finem*; codd. F l autem post *subiici* addunt *Deo.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *Deum finem*; codices F l add *Deo* after *subiici.*

la: Vat. *etsi.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *etsi.*

la: In multis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur *illuc.*

en: In many codices and in edition 1, *illuc* is wanting.

en: Dist. 49. p. II. principal art. 1. a. 2. q. 1. ff.

la: Unus alterque cod. cum Vat. *defectum.*

en: One or another codex, with the Vatican edition, reads *defectum.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Tres huius articuli quaestiones in compendium rediguntur doctrinam Alexandri Hal., qui integra quaestione (S. p. II. q. 77.) diffuse disputat de causa *materiali* corporis humani, et q. 81. m. 1. de *compositione* eiusdem. Alii auctores adhuc brevius et plerumque una quaestione has tres qq. fere in eadem sententia resolvunt. — Supponuntur autem plura, quae supra d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. 3. de compositione corporum animalium dicta sunt.

**II.** De his 3 qq. praeter laudatum Alexandrum Hal., Scot., in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 15. q. unica, et apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. 1. q. 91. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 91. a. 1. et a. 3. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. q. 76. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The three questions of this article reduce in compendium the doctrine of Alexander of Hales, who in a whole question (Summa, p. II. q. 77) diffusely disputes concerning the *material* cause of the human body, and in q. 81. m. 1. concerning the *composition* of the same. Other authors, still more briefly and most often in a single question, resolve these three questions almost in the same opinion. — There are presupposed, however, many things which above, in d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. 3., were said concerning the composition of animal bodies.

**II.** On these three questions, besides the praised Alexander of Hales, [see] Scotus, in either Scriptum on II Sent. d. 15. q. unica, and in Hieronymus of Montefortino, t. II. p. 1. q. 91. a. 1. — S. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1; Summa I. q. 91. a. 1. and a. 3. ad 1. — B. Albert, here a. 3; Summa p. II. q. 76. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
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- ARTICULUS II opener + 3-question sub-divisio folded into this q1 per locked Vol II Override step 5 (no standalone d17-a2-divisio chunk).
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