title: Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 125 -->

### Quaestio I. *Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem necessitatis.*

Circa primum, quod generatio sit secundum conditionem necessitatis,[^1] sic ostenditur.

1. *Fecundior et actualior est natura* in Patre ad producendum Filium, quam sit in luce ad producendum radium; sed lucem necesse est radium producere, ita quod productio in ipsa est secundum conditionem necessitatis: ergo multo fortius in Patre respectu Filii.

2. Item, omne quod emanat ab alio[^2], emanat secundum conditionem necessitatis, aut contingentiae: ergo et Filius emanat altero istorum duorum modorum; sed non secundum conditionem contingentiae, quia tunc contingens esset Filium generari: ergo etc.

3. Item, ab omnipotente detrahere maximum posse est impossibile; sed Deus Pater est omnipotens, cuius maximum posse est generare Filium: ergo detrahere ei posse generare Filium est impossibile. Sed in aeternis potentia est coniuncta actui[^3]: ergo pari ratione impossibile est auferre actum generationis: ergo impossibile est non generare; sed *impossibile non esse* et *necesse esse* convertuntur: ergo necesse est generare.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus *ad Orosium*, et Magister dicit in littera[^4]: « Nec voluntate nec necessitate genuit Pater Filium, quia necessitas in Deo non est »: ergo etc.

2. Item, Hilarius in libro *de Synodis*[^5]: « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis nec necessitas alia, ut videtur; ergo etc.

3. Item, nobilius producens est illud quod dominatur suae actioni, quam quod subiacet; sed agens secundum rationem necessitatis subiacet actioni, quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere: ergo si[^6] Pater, qui est nobilissimum agens, nobilissimo modo producit Filium, non igitur secundum conditionem necessitatis.

4. Item, hoc idem potest ostendi sic: quod gratis datur, non de necessitate datur; sed Richardus[^7] dicit, quod in Patre est amor gratuitus, quia dat esse Filio et Spiritui sancto: si ergo gratis dat, non de necessitate dat.

> **Conclusio.** Generatio in divinis necessaria est necessitate immutabilitatis, non tamen alia specie necessitatis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est necessitas. Quaedam[^8] enim est necessitas proveniens ex principio *disconveniente*, quaedam ex principio *deficiente*, quaedam ex principio *conveniente* et *sufficiente*.

<!-- page 126 -->

Illa quae provenit ex principio *disconveniente*, est duplex: aut enim est ex ipso movente contra naturam, et haec est *necessitas violentiae*; aut contra voluntatem, et ista necessitas est *coactionis*[^9]; et de istis duobus modis quaerit haereticus, qui sunt valde usitati.

Illa similiter, quae est ex principio *deficiente*, est duplex: aut enim est respectu eius, quo res est nata compleri; et haec est *necessitas indigentiae*, ut cibi et potus; de hac dicitur primae Ioannis tertio[^10]: *Qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem patientem* etc.; aut respectu eius, quod incurrit ex ipso defectu; et haec est *necessitas inevitabilitatis*, qualis est in morte et in primis motibus; hanc necessitatem incurrit homo ex carentia originalis iustitiae, Psalmus[^11]: *De necessitatibus meis erue me.*

Tertia similiter, quae est ex principio *sufficiente* et *conveniente*, est duplex: aut enim est ex principio sufficiente *in disponendo*, et haec est *necessitas materiae dispositae*, quae potest dici *necessitas exigentiae*; aut *in complendo*, et haec est *necessitas immutabilitatis*[^12].

Et haec ultima[^13] necessitas cadit in Deo, et principaliter in Deo, quia ipse solus est qui sibi omnino sufficit et qui secum omnino convenit. Haec autem necessitas non repugnat libertati voluntatis, sed solum vertibilitati, qualis non est in Deo.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de littera, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessitate coactionis, quae nullo modo cadit in Deo[^14], et de hac quaerebat haereticus.

2. Similiter et Hilarius intelligit de hac eadem, unde et subdit[^15] in littera: *non naturali necessitate, cum nollet*; tunc enim ibi esset coactio, dum repugnaret voluntas.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens per necessitatem subiacet suae actioni; dicendum, quod falsum est, nisi sit necessitas repugnans voluntati. Cum enim est necessitas repugnans, necesse est voluntatem subiici, quia non potest praevalere. Sed quando est necessitas summe consonans, non potens discordare a voluntate, tunc nullam inducit subiectionem, sicut patet. Deus enim[^16] necessario est beatus et necessario vult esse beatus; et sicut necessarium est, ipsum esse beatum, ita et velle; sic intelligendum est in generatione Filii.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo[^17] obiicitur de amore gratuito, dicendum, quod duo sunt in gratuito amore: unum est, quod dat ex mera liberalitate, ita quod nulla est exigentia sive debitum meriti vel naturae; aliud, quod[^18] dat sine retributione, et quantum ad hoc secundum dicitur amor gratuitus in Patre, non quantum ad primum. Naturalis enim fecunditas Patris necessario est ratio communicandi naturam alii.

english:
### Question I. *Whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of necessity.*

Concerning the first point, that the generation [of the Son] is according to the condition of necessity,[^1] it is shown thus.

1. *The nature in the Father is more fertile and more actual* for producing the Son than [the nature] in light is for producing a ray; but it is necessary that light produce a ray, so that the production in it is according to the condition of necessity: therefore much more so in the Father with respect to the Son.

2. Likewise, everything that emanates from another[^2] emanates either according to the condition of necessity or [according to the condition] of contingency: therefore the Son too emanates in one or the other of these two modes; but not according to the condition of contingency, because then it would be contingent that the Son be generated: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to take away from the omnipotent the greatest power is impossible; but God the Father is omnipotent, whose greatest power is to generate the Son: therefore to take from him the power to generate the Son is impossible. But in eternal things potency is conjoined to act[^3]: therefore by parallel reasoning it is impossible to take away the act of generation: therefore it is impossible not to generate; but *to be impossible-not-to-be* and *to be necessary-to-be* are convertible: therefore it is necessary to generate.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine *to Orosius*, and the Master says in the text[^4]: « Neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son, because necessity is not in God »: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Hilary in the book *On the Synods*[^5]: « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »: therefore there was there neither natural necessity nor any other necessity, as it seems; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more noble producer is that which is master of its own action, rather than that which is subject [to it]; but an agent acting according to the account of necessity is subject to the action, because willing or unwilling it must do it: therefore if[^6] the Father, who is the most noble agent, produces the Son in the most noble manner, [it is] therefore not according to the condition of necessity.

4. Likewise, this same point can be shown thus: what is given gratuitously is not given of necessity; but Richard[^7] says that in the Father there is gratuitous love, because he gives being to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: if therefore he gives gratuitously, he does not give of necessity.

> **Conclusion.** Generation in the divine [persons] is necessary by necessity of *immutability*, not however by any other species of necessity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that necessity is manifold. For there is one kind of necessity proceeding from a *disagreeing* principle, another from a *deficient* principle, another from an *agreeing* and *sufficient* principle.[^8]

That [necessity] which proceeds from a *disagreeing* principle is twofold: for either it is from the mover itself acting against nature, and this is *necessity of violence*; or against the will, and this necessity is [the necessity] *of coercion*[^9]; and concerning these two modes — which are very common — the heretic inquires.

Likewise that [necessity] which is from a *deficient* principle is twofold: for either it is with respect to that by which a thing is naturally completed; and this is *necessity of indigence*, as of food and drink; concerning this it is said in 1 John 3[^10]: *Whoever sees his brother suffering necessity* etc.; or with respect to that which is incurred from the very defect; and this is *necessity of inevitability*, such as is in death and in first motions; man incurs this necessity from the lack of original justice, [as in] the Psalm[^11]: *From my necessities deliver me.*

Likewise the third [necessity], which is from a *sufficient* and *agreeing* principle, is twofold: for either it is from a principle sufficient *in disposing*, and this is the *necessity of disposed matter*, which can be called *necessity of requirement*; or [a principle sufficient] *in completing*, and this is the *necessity of immutability*.[^12]

And this last[^13] necessity falls in God, and principally in God, because he alone is the one who is wholly sufficient unto himself and who wholly agrees with himself. But this necessity does not conflict with freedom of the will, but only with changeableness, such as is not in God.

1. To that which is objected from the text, it must be said that it is understood of the necessity of coercion, which in no way falls in God,[^14] and concerning this the heretic was inquiring.

2. Likewise Hilary too understands [this] of this same [necessity of coercion], whence he also adds[^15] in the text: *not by natural necessity, when he was unwilling*; for then there would be coercion, when the will resists.

3. To that which is objected, that an agent [acting] through necessity is subject to its action; it must be said that it is false, unless the necessity is one repugnant to the will. For when there is a repugnant necessity, the will must be subjected, because it cannot prevail. But when there is a necessity supremely consonant [with the will], not able to disagree with the will, then it induces no subjection, as is clear. For God[^16] is necessarily blessed and necessarily wills to be blessed; and just as it is necessary that he be blessed, so [is it necessary that he] will [it]; thus it is to be understood in the generation of the Son.

4. To that which is objected lastly[^17] concerning gratuitous love, it must be said that there are two [things] in gratuitous love: one is, that it gives from sheer liberality, so that there is no requirement or debt of merit or of nature; the other, that it[^18] gives without retribution, and as far as this second [sense] is concerned, [the love] in the Father is called gratuitous love, not as to the first. For the natural fecundity of the Father is necessarily the ground of communicating the nature to another.

la: Vat. *respondet ad haereticum hominem arguendo*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition reads *he responds to the heretical man by arguing*, but the manuscripts and the first edition stand against [it].

la: Nonnulli codd. ut K W X Y *ee aliquo* pro *alio*.

en: Some codices, as K W X Y, [read] *ee aliquo* in place of *alio*.

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32 (c. 1): *Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis*. — Paulo infra post *auferre* cod. O addit *ei*. — De conversione harum propositionum modalium *impossibile non esse* et *necesse esse* cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 3 (c. 13) et de relatione inter omnipotentiam et potentiam vide infra d. 7. q. 1.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 32 (c. 1): *For in eternal things, to be able to be does not differ from being itself*. — A little below, after *auferre*, codex O adds *ei*. — On the conversion of these modal propositions *impossible-not-to-be* and *necessary-to-be*, cf. Aristotle, *De interpretatione* II, c. 3 (c. 13), and on the relation between omnipotence and power see below d. 7. q. 1.

la: In principio huius distinctionis.

en: At the beginning of this distinction.

la: Num. 58. XXV: *Non enim nolente Patre, coactus Pater naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium.*

en: N. 58. XXV: *For not with the Father unwilling, [nor] coerced, did the Father, led by natural necessity, when he was unwilling, beget the Son.*

la: Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, *simpliciter* pro *si*. Paulo ante post *actioni* cod. O adiungit *sine*.

en: The Vatican edition, with the older manuscripts and the first edition resisting, [reads] *simpliciter* in place of *si*. A little before, after *actioni*, codex O adds *sine*.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 17-19, in quorum primo capite ait: *Gratuitum autem amorem se habere ostendit, qui procedentibus de se plenitudinis suae abundantiam tam largiter, quam libenter et gratis impendit*. — Et in ultimo capite dicta recolligens ait: *Constat namque, quia in uno ex tribus (divinis personis) est amor summus et solum gratuitus; in altero vero sic summus* etc. — Vat. mox *quo* pro *quia*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1, et in fine argumenti post *non* repetit *dat*.

en: Book V *On the Trinity*, c. 17–19; in the first of these chapters he says: *He shows himself to have a gratuitous love, who, to those who proceed from himself, expends the abundance of his own fullness as bountifully as gladly and gratuitously*. — And in the last chapter, gathering up what was said, he says: *For it is established that in one of the three (divine persons) there is supreme and only gratuitous love; but in another it is thus supreme* etc. — The Vatican edition presently [reads] *quo* in place of *quia*, but against the manuscripts and the first edition, and at the end of the argument after *non* it repeats *dat*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc additur *autem*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc, *autem* is added.

la: De duplici hac necessitate cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, et I. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 11-16 (c. 12-17). — Paulo ante ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ista*. — De haeretico, quem S. Doctor hoc loco introducit, vide hic lit. Magistri.

en: On this twofold necessity see Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 1, and I *Magna Moralia* c. 11–16 (c. 12–17). — A little before, from the older manuscripts and the first edition, we have supplied *ista*. — On the heretic whom the holy Doctor here introduces, see here the text of the Master.

la: Vers. 17, in quo textu Vulgata pro *patientem* legit *habere*.

en: Verse 17, in which text the Vulgate reads *habere* in place of *patientem*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81 (c. 9), ubi agit de materiae naturali appetitu respectu formae; et V. Metaph. text. 6 (IV. c. 5), ubi praeter necessitatem immutabilitatis alias proponit necessitatis species, quae in praecedentibus tactae sunt.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 (c. 9), where he treats of the natural appetite of matter with respect to form; and *Metaphysics* V, text 6 (IV. c. 5), where, besides necessity of immutability, he proposes other species of necessity, which were touched on in the preceding [passages].

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, *Et hoc ultimo modo*, et paulo infra post *est qui* minus apte repetit *principaliter*. In fine corp. cod. T cum pluribus aliis post *qualis* omittit *non*, quae lectio explicatur lectione cod. R *quare est in Deo*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc, with the older manuscripts and the first edition resisting, [reads] *Et hoc ultimo modo* ["And in this last mode"], and a little below, after *est qui*, less aptly repeats *principaliter*. At the end of the body, codex T with several others, after *qualis*, omits *non*, which reading is explained by the reading of codex R *quare est in Deo* ["wherefore it is in God"].

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Deum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, [reads] *Deum*.

la: Substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *et subdit* loco *subiungit*. — Textum Hilarii supra in argum. 2. ad opp. integre exhibuimus.

en: We have substituted, from the manuscripts and the first edition, *et subdit* ["and he adds"] in place of *subiungit*. — We have given the text of Hilary in full above in argument 2 *ad oppositum*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *enim*.

en: On the trust of the manuscripts and the first edition we have added *enim*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc hic omittit *ultimo*, et paulo infra post *dat* omittit *ex*, sed obstant codd. antiquiores cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc here omits *ultimo*, and a little below, after *dat*, omits *ex*, but the older codices with the first edition stand against [this].

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*. Circa finem solutionis Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *naturalis* et in fine *alii*. Edd. 2,3,4,5,6 cum cod. cc *naturae* pro *naturalis*, omittunt etiam in fine *alii*.

en: From very many manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted *quod* in place of *quia*. Toward the end of the solution, the Vatican edition, beyond the trust of the older manuscripts and the first edition, omits *naturalis* and at the end *alii*. Editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 with codex cc [read] *naturae* in place of *naturalis*, and also omit at the end *alii*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quoad ipsam generationem in divinis cfr. infra d. 9. per totam. — Easdem distinctiones necessitatis, paulo alio modo explicatas, S. Doctor habet in quadam quaestione disputata hucusque anecdota: *utrum divinum esse sit summe necessarium*, ex qua haec inserimus. « Triplex est necessitas: quaedam omnino extrinseca, quaedam partim extrinseca, partim intrinseca, et quaedam omnino intrinseca. Necessitas omnino extrinseca est illa quae ortum habet a principio, quod est extra, nihil cooperante passo; et haec dupliciter habet esse, vel respectu operum naturalium, vel respectu operum voluntariorum; et sic duplex est necessitas, scilicet *violentiae* et *coactionis*. Necessitas vero partim intra, partim extra est, quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum principii moventis, vel per modum termini quiescentis; et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet *inevitabilitatis* et *indigentiae*. Quaedam vero est necessitas omnino intrinseca, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas *immutabilitatis* et *independentiae*, et talis necessitas secundum quid reperitur in creatura, simpliciter autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia. Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa. Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in esse divino, quia est in se ipso et a se ipso » etc.

Ultima illa species necessitatis, quam S. Doctor in corp. vocat *necessitatem immutabilitatis*, intelligenda est in sensu absoluto, ita ut eius oppositum simpliciter sit impossibile. Hoc ideo notandum fuit, quia aliqui doctores necessitatem immutabilitatis aliter accipiunt, nempe pro ea qua aliquid ita habet esse, ut oppositum etiam possit esse, sed non simul cum suo opposito (cfr. Brulifer ad hunc locum). — De variis divisionibus necessitatis cfr. S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; et ibid. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in corp.; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

**II.** Quoad conclusionem ipsam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1, et Report., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. 8. a. 54. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning generation in the divine [persons] itself, see below d. 9 throughout. — The same distinctions of necessity, explained in a slightly different manner, the holy Doctor has in a certain disputed question hitherto unpublished: *whether the divine being is supremely necessary*, from which we insert these [words]. « Necessity is threefold: one [is] entirely extrinsic, one partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic, and one entirely intrinsic. Entirely extrinsic necessity is that which has its origin from a principle which is outside, with the patient cooperating in nothing; and this has its being in two ways, either with respect to natural works or with respect to voluntary works; and thus necessity is twofold, namely [necessity] *of violence* and *of coercion*. But the necessity partly within and partly without is [the necessity] which in some way is from an intrinsic principle regarding something outside, either by way of a moving principle or by way of a resting term; and thus necessity is said in two ways, namely [necessity] *of inevitability* and *of indigence*. But there is a certain necessity entirely intrinsic, which is in a thing from its own nature; and this is the necessity *of immutability* and *of independence*, and such necessity is found in a creature only in a qualified sense, but absolutely cannot be found except in the creating essence. For it [the creating essence] alone is that which admits no dependence; but the rest, since they are created, necessarily depend on it. But this necessity is necessarily posited in the divine being, because it is in itself and from itself » etc.

That last species of necessity, which the holy Doctor in the body [of the article] calls *necessity of immutability*, must be understood in an absolute sense, so that its opposite is simply impossible. This had to be noted because some doctors take *necessity of immutability* otherwise, namely for that by which something has its being in such a way that the opposite can also be, but not at the same time as its opposite (cf. Brulifer at this place). — On the various divisions of necessity see St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; and ibid. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in the body; III Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

**II.** Concerning the conclusion itself see Alex. of Hales, S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1, and *Reportata*, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1. *princ.* q. 1. et 2. — Henry of Ghent, *On this and the following* q. 8. a. 54. q. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether the generation in divinis is according to the account of will

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 127 -->

### Quaestio II

*Utrum generatio in divinis sit secundum rationem voluntatis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem voluntatis. Et quod non, ostenditur[^1] primo per auctoritates, secundo per rationes:

**1.** Primo ostenditur per auctoritatem Hilarii, qui dicit in libro *de Synodis*[^2]: «Omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei *voluntas* attulit, sed Filio *natura* dedit».

**2.** Item, Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^3] reprehendit Eunomium, qui posuit Filium Dei esse *Filium voluntatis*: ergo si recte reprehendit, generatio Filii non est secundum conditionem voluntatis.

**3.** Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: Generatio, quantum est de se, est exitus naturalis sive per modum naturae; sed iste[^4] est alius modus producendi quam per voluntatem: ergo etc.

**4.** Item, Filius est sapientia Patris: ergo si procedit secundum rationem voluntatis, voluntas est prior sapientia; sed hoc est inconveniens, quia cognitio secundum naturalem ordinem[^5] intelligendi praecedit affectionem sive voluntatem: ergo etc.

*Sed contra:*

**1.** In omni natura ordinata positum naturalis subiacet voluntati, vel saltem conformatur voluntati, sicut patet in primo homine; sed in Deo est natura ordinatissima: ergo nihil est a natura vel per naturam, quod non sit per voluntatem: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, consimilis est modus procedendi in imagine[^6] creata et in Trinitate increata; sed in imagine notitia oritur mediante voluntate a mente: ergo et Filius a Patre mediante voluntate sive per voluntatem. Minor patet per Augustinum nono *de Trinitate*[^7]: «Partum mentis praecedit appetitus, quo, dum quaerendo invenimus quod nosse volumus, nascitur proles, ipsa notitia».

**3.** Item, ubi est maior communicatio, ibi est liberalitas maior; sed Pater plus communicat Filio quam omnibus creaturis: ergo maior est ibi liberalitas: ergo cum creaturae procedant per modum liberalitatis, multo magis Filius.

**4.** Item, in creaturis[^8] in actu generationis simul movet natura et voluntas, et nihil ex hoc filio derogatur: ergo si Pater magis producit secundum se totum quam creatura: ergo multo fortius per naturam et voluntatem.

**5.** Item, ad hoc est auctoritas Hilarii in tertio *de Trinitate*[^9]: «Pater ante omne tempus Filium procreavit, omne quod est Deus per caritatem nativitati eius impartiens»; si per caritatem: ergo per voluntatem.

**6.** Item, Origenes[^10] loquens de mente divina dicit: «Germen proferens voluntatis fit Verbi Pater»: ergo videtur, quod Filius generetur a Patre per voluntatem et quod sit Filius voluntatis.

### Conclusio

> *Generatio Filii est secundum voluntatem ut in ratione approbantis, non vero ut in ratione producentis, nisi quatenus voluntas est principium coniunctum naturae — et quidem sic, ut natura producat principaliter, voluntate concomitante.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod voluntas potest dupliciter considerari respectu voliti, scilicet ut *in ratione approbantis et diligentis*; et sic est respectu omnis boni, sive sit[^11] necessarium sive sit contingens, sive creatum sive increatum sive ab alio, quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est *coniunctum*.

<!-- page 128 -->

Pater vult, se esse Deum[^12]. Alio modo consideratur ut in ratione producentis. Et hoc dupliciter: aut prout est principium distinctum contra naturam, secundum quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a[^13] natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est coniunctum.

*Si prout est principium distinctum*, sic distinguitur voluntas dupliciter, scilicet *accedens* et *antecedens*. Voluntas *accedens* est, qua aliquis de non volente fit volens; haec non est in Deo nec respectu Dei nec respectu creaturae[^14]. Deus enim non habet aliquam novam voluntatem nec respectu sui nec respectu alterius. Voluntas *antecedens* praecedit effectum causalitate et duratione; haec quidem est in Deo, sed non respectu Dei, sed respectu creaturae solum; omnes enim divinae personae sunt simul.

*Alio modo, prout voluntas consideratur ut principium coniunctum naturae*, potest esse dupliciter; quia tunc natura et voluntas sunt principium; aut igitur natura est producens principaliter, voluntate concomitante[^15], aut e converso; utrumque enim principaliter esse non potest.

Si *voluntas est principium*, concomitante natura, sic est processio Spiritus sancti, qui procedit per modum amoris, tamen similis in natura. Si vero *natura est primum*[^16] *principium*, concomitante voluntate, sic est generatio Filii, qui producitur ut omnino similis et per modum naturae, nihilominus ut dilectus; et ideo dicitur, quod sibi in eo complacet Pater[^17], et ad Colossenses primo dicitur *Filius caritatis*.

**1. 5. 6.** Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod generatio est per modum voluntatis sive secundum rationem voluntatis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur aut de voluntate *approbante*, ut ostendunt duae auctoritates Hilarii et Origenis, aut de voluntate *concomitante*[^18], ut ratio, quae posita est primo.

**2.** Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de similitudine imaginis; dicendum, quod in hoc est dissimilis imago creata ipsi Trinitati increatae, ut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^19], quia ibi non nascitur verbum per inquisitionem, sicut potest nasci in nobis; unde potius valet ad oppositum quam ad propositum.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est communicatio in generatione Filii; dicendum, quod maior communicatio vel minor non facit modum emanandi esse secundum liberalitatem vel secundum modum voluntatis, sed modus sive ratio communicandi. Et quia Pater communicat creaturis per voluntatem, ita quod voluntas eius est causa producens, Filio[^20] per fecunditatem naturae: ideo non sic dicitur Filius produci per voluntatem, sicut creaturae.

**4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur[^21], quod in generatione hominis simul movet natura et voluntas; dicendum, quod hoc est propter defectum magis quam propter complementum; quia pater per se non potest generare, sed ex coniunctione cum alio distante, quod fit ad imperium voluntatis; Deus autem alio adiuvante non indiget; et ideo non est simile.

english:
### Question II

*Whether the generation in God is according to the account of will.*

Second it is asked whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of will. And that it is not, is shown[^1] first by authorities, second by reasons:

**1.** First, it is shown by the authority of Hilary, who says in the book *On the Synods*[^2]: «To all creatures *will* gave the substance of God, but to the Son *nature* gave it».

**2.** Likewise, Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^3] rebukes Eunomius, who held that the Son of God is *Son of will*: therefore if he rightly rebukes him, the generation of the Son is not according to the condition of will.

**3.** Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: Generation, as it is in itself, is a natural going-forth, or by way of nature; but this[^4] is another mode of producing than through will: therefore, etc.

**4.** Likewise, the Son is the Father's *Wisdom*: therefore if He proceeds according to the account of will, will is prior to wisdom; but this is incongruous, because cognition according to the natural order[^5] of understanding precedes affection or will: therefore, etc.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** In every well-ordered nature, what is naturally placed is subject to the will, or at least is conformed to the will — as is clear in the first man; but in God the nature is most well-ordered: therefore there is nothing from nature or through nature which is not also through will: therefore, etc.

**2.** Likewise, the mode of proceeding is similar in the created image[^6] and in the uncreated Trinity; but in the image knowledge arises from the mind by means of the will: therefore so the Son [arises] from the Father by means of the will, or through the will. The minor premise is clear from Augustine, ninth book *On the Trinity*[^7]: «The birth of the mind is preceded by appetite, by which — when, by seeking, we find what we wish to know — there is born an offspring, which is knowledge itself».

**3.** Likewise, where there is greater communication, there is greater liberality; but the Father communicates more to the Son than to all creatures: therefore there is greater liberality there: therefore, since creatures proceed by way of liberality, much more so the Son.

**4.** Likewise, in creatures[^8] in the act of generation nature and will move at the same time, and nothing of this is detracted from the son: therefore if the Father produces according to His whole self more than the creature does: therefore much more strongly through nature *and* will.

**5.** Likewise, for this is the authority of Hilary in the third [book] *On the Trinity*[^9]: «The Father before all time procreated the Son, imparting all that He is as God by *charity* to His birth»; if through *charity*: therefore through will.

**6.** Likewise, Origen[^10], speaking of the divine mind, says: «Bearing the seed of will, He becomes Father of the Word»: therefore it seems that the Son is begotten by the Father through will, and that He is *Son of will*.

### Conclusion

> *The generation of the Son is according to will as in the account of approving — but not as in the account of producing, except insofar as the will is a principle conjoined to nature; and this so that nature produces principally, with the will concomitant.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the will can be considered in two ways with respect to what is willed — namely either as *in the account of approving and loving*; and so it is with respect to every good — whether it be[^11] necessary or contingent, whether created or uncreated, or from another (which is what is said: that some things are from nature, others from will); — or as *conjoined*.

The Father wills that He Himself is God[^12]. In another way [the will] is considered as in the account of producing. And this in two ways: either as it is a principle distinct from nature — according to which it is said that some things are from[^13] nature, others from will — or as it is conjoined.

*If as a distinct principle*, the will is then distinguished in two ways: as *accedent* and *antecedent*. The *accedent* will is by which someone, from non-willing, becomes willing; this is not in God — neither with respect to God nor with respect to creature[^14]. For God does not have any new will either with respect to Himself or with respect to another. The *antecedent* will precedes the effect in causality and in duration; this indeed is in God, but not with respect to God — only with respect to creature. For all the divine persons are simultaneous.

*In another way, as the will is considered as a principle conjoined to nature*, it can be in two ways; for then nature and will are the principle: either nature is the principal producer, with will concomitant[^15], or conversely; for both cannot be principal.

If *the will is the principle*, with nature concomitant — so is the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, yet similar in nature. If *nature is the first*[^16] *principle*, with the will concomitant — so is the generation of the Son, who is produced as wholly similar and by way of nature, yet as *beloved*; and therefore it is said that the Father is well-pleased in Him[^17], and at Colossians 1 He is called *Son of charity*.

**1., 5., 6.** To the objection on the contrary, that generation is by way of will or according to the account of will: it must be said that this is understood either of the will *approving* — as the two authorities of Hilary and Origen show — or of the will *concomitant*[^18], as the reason set down first holds.

**2.** To the objection from the likeness of the image: it must be said that in this respect the created image is unlike the uncreated Trinity itself, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^19] — because there a word is not born by inquiry, as it can be born in us; whence [the argument] avails for the opposite rather than for the proposition.

**3.** To the objection that there is greater communication in the generation of the Son: it must be said that greater or lesser communication does not make the mode of emanation be according to liberality or according to the mode of will, but rather the *mode or account of communicating*. And because the Father communicates to creatures through will (so that His will is the producing cause), and to the Son[^20] through the fruitfulness of nature: therefore the Son is not said to be produced through will in the same way as creatures are.

**4.** To the objection[^21] that in the generation of a man nature and will move together: it must be said that this is on account of defect rather than completion; because the father by himself cannot generate, but only through conjunction with another distant being — which happens at the command of the will. But God needs no other helper; and therefore it is not similar.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. I posuimus *ostenditur* loco *videtur*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have placed *ostenditur* ("is shown") for *videtur* ("seems").

la: Hilar., *de Synodis* n. 88. XXIV: *Omnibus creaturis substantiam voluntas Dei attulit, sed naturam Filio dedit ex impassibili ac non nata substantia perfecta nativitas*. Ex his verbis patet, posteriorem propositionis partem a S. Bonaventura quoad sensum tantum esse allegatam.

en: Hilary, *On the Synods* n. 88, XXIV: «To all creatures the will of God brought substance, but to the Son the perfect nativity from an impassible and unbegotten substance gave nature». From these words it is clear that the latter part of the proposition is cited by St. Bonaventure only as to its sense.

la: *De Trin.* XV, c. 20, n. 38. Verba ipsius vide hic in lit. Magistri circa initium. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc *rationem* loco *conditionem*, sed obstant ceteri codd. cum ed. 1.

en: [Augustine,] *On the Trinity* XV, c. 20, n. 38. See his words here in the Master's text near the beginning. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *rationem* ("account") for *conditionem* ("condition"), but the other codices with the first edition stand against it.

la: Substituimus ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *iste* pro *ille*.

en: With the help of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted *iste* ("this") for *ille* ("that").

la: Ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc *rationem* loco *naturalem ordinem*.

en: Thus the older codices with the first edition; but the Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *rationem* ("account") for *naturalem ordinem* ("natural order").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *producendi in trinitate* loco *procedendi in imagine*, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 nec non contra subnexa, in quibus semper de modo procedendi agitur. Paulo infra post *ergo* restituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *producendi in trinitate* ("of producing in the Trinity") for *procedendi in imagine* ("of proceeding in the image"), but against the other codices and the first edition and also against what follows, in which the discussion is always about the mode of proceeding. A little below, after *ergo* ("therefore"), we have restored from the older manuscripts and the first edition the particle *et* ("and").

la: Cap. 12. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp.

en: Chapter 12. See above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 1, *ad oppositum*.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. I expunximus *existentibus*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc hic minus apte addit. Paulo infra cod. O *generationi filii* pro *filio*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have expunged *existentibus* ("existing"), which the Vatican edition with codex *cc* less aptly adds here. A little below, codex *O* [reads] *generationi filii* ("to the generation of the son") for *filio* ("to the son").

la: Hilar., III *de Trin.* n. 3: *Hic ergo ingenitus ante omne tempus ex se Filium genuit, non ex aliqua subiacente materia... sed incomprehensibiliter, inenarrabiliter, ante omne tempus et saecula. Unigenitum ex his quae ingenita in se erant procreavit, omne quod Deus est per caritatem atque virtutem nativitati eius impartiens.*

en: Hilary, *On the Trinity* III, n. 3: «He, therefore, the unbegotten, before all time begot the Son from Himself, not from any underlying matter... but incomprehensibly, inenarrably, before all time and ages. He procreated the Only-Begotten from those things which were unbegotten in Him, imparting to His nativity all that God is by charity and power».

la: Haec verba referuntur a Pamphylo Martyre inter fragmenta Origenis *Comment. in Ioan.* tom. II. sub n. 30. ed. Migne (Patr. Graec. tom. XIV. col. 184), secundum quam editionem loco *fit* habetur *factus est*. — Vat. hoc et praecedens argumentum collocat immediate post primum, sed contra mss. et minus bene ob confusionem scil. argumentorum ex ratione et auctoritate.

en: These words are reported by Pamphilus the Martyr among the fragments of Origen's *Commentary on John* tom. II, under n. 30, in Migne's edition (*Patrologia Graeca* tom. XIV, col. 184), according to which edition *factus est* ("was made") is read for *fit* ("becomes"). — The Vatican edition places this and the preceding argument immediately after the first, but against the manuscripts and less well, on account of the confusion namely of arguments from reason and from authority.

la: In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *sit*.

en: In most manuscripts and the first edition the word *sit* ("be") is missing.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et trium primarum edd. *vult esse Deus*.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first three editions, [reads] *vult esse Deus* ("[He] wills to be God").

la: Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *a*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc hic et paulo post minus bene omittit. Mox loco *coniunctum* alii codd. ut ABDEFGHIXZ habent *communicans*, alii ut KLOPQSTUWY cum ed. 1 *concomitans*, sed falso, uti ex subnexis patet, ubi hoc membrum explicatur et ubi omnes codd. ponunt *coniunctum*. Codd. *aa bb* addunt *naturae*.

en: From the older manuscripts and the first edition we have supplied *a* ("from"), which the Vatican edition with codex *cc* here and a little later less well omits. Soon, in place of *coniunctum* ("conjoined"), other codices such as ABDEFGHIXZ have *communicans* ("communicating"), others such as KLOPQSTUWY with the first edition [have] *concomitans* ("concomitant"), but falsely, as is clear from what follows, where this member is explained and where all the codices place *coniunctum*. Codices *aa bb* add *naturae* ("of nature").

la: Sequimur cod. I, qui *nec respectu creaturae* addit, quod tam in aliis mss. quam in Vat. deest, sed minus bene, ut ex contextu colligitur. Paulo infra ope plurium mss. ut G H Y aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquam* pro *aliam*; lectio certe praeferenda.

en: We follow codex *I*, which adds *nec respectu creaturae* ("nor with respect to creature"), which is missing both in the other manuscripts and in the Vatican edition, but less well, as is gathered from the context. A little below, with the help of several manuscripts such as G H Y aa bb ee ff and the first edition, we have substituted *aliquam* ("any") for *aliam* ("other"); certainly the preferred reading.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus hic et paulo infra bis *concomitante* loco *communicante*, quod minus congrue habetur in Vat.

en: On the authority of most manuscripts and the first edition we have placed here and a little below, twice, *concomitante* ("with [will] concomitant") for *communicante* ("communicating"), which is less congruously found in the Vatican edition.

la: Addidimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. I *primum*, non bene omissum in Vat. et cod. cc.

en: We have added from the older manuscripts and the first edition *primum* ("first"), not well omitted in the Vatican edition and codex *cc*.

la: Matth. 17, 5. et II. Petri I, 17. — In textu ex Epist. ad Coloss. 1, 13. desumto Vulgata et Vat. loco *caritatis* habent *dilectionis*, sed mss. et ed. I nec non August., XV. *de Trin.* c. 19. n. 37. stant pro lectione nostra.

en: Matthew 17:5 and II Peter 1:17. — In the text taken from the Epistle to the Colossians 1:13, the Vulgate and the Vatican edition have *dilectionis* ("of love") for *caritatis* ("of charity"), but the manuscripts and the first edition, and also Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV, c. 19, n. 37, stand for our reading.

la: Vat. etiam hic *communicante* cum natura loco *concomitante*, sed obstat auctoritas plurimorum codd. et ed. 1. Paulo ante plerique codd. omittunt *ostendunt*; ed. I loco *ostendunt duae* ponit *dicunt*. — Post *ratio* supple: *ostendit*.

en: The Vatican edition here also [reads] *communicante* ("communicating") with nature for *concomitante* ("concomitant"), but the authority of most codices and the first edition stands against it. A little before, most codices omit *ostendunt* ("show"); the first edition in place of *ostendunt duae* ("the two show") puts *dicunt* ("they say"). — After *ratio* ("reason") supply: *ostendit* ("shows").

la: August., XV *de Trin.* c. 13. n. 22: *Nostra vero scientia in rebus plurimis propterea et amissibilis est et receptibilis... Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei, sic et nostrum verbum, quod nascitur de nostra scientia, dissimile est illi Verbo Dei, quod natum est de Patris essentia.*

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV, c. 13, n. 22: «But our knowledge in most things is for that reason both losable and receivable... For this reason, as our knowledge [is] to that knowledge of God, so also our word, which is born of our knowledge, is unlike that Word of God which was born of the Father's essence».

la: Cod. R addit *vero*.

en: Codex *R* adds *vero* ("but/indeed").

la: Revocamus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. I in Vat. et cod. cc omissum *quod obiicitur* et paulo infra substituimus *coniunctione* loco *communicatione*. Circa finem solutionis cod. B *adminiculo* pro *adiuvante*.

en: We restore from the older manuscripts and the first edition the phrase *quod obiicitur* ("which is objected"), omitted in the Vatican edition and codex *cc*, and a little below we substitute *coniunctione* ("conjunction") for *communicatione* ("communication"). Near the end of the solution, codex *B* [reads] *adminiculo* ("by the help") for *adiuvante* ("helping").

latin_scholion:
**I.** De diversis modis volendi, quae hic tanguntur, Seraphicus in anecdota quaestione disputata: *utrum stent simul Trinitas et summa necessitas*, haec habet: «Est voluntas *accedens*, i. e. de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo. Est iterum voluntas *antecedens*; et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu sui, sed respectu creati, quod antecedit natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas *concomitans et acceptans*; et haec est in Deo respectu sui et respectu creati; approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum sive creatum sive increatum, sive contingens sive necessarium».

**II.** Quoad processionem Spiritus sancti secundum rationem voluntatis cfr. infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. — Circa differentiam inter generationem et spirationem cfr. infra d. 26. q. 1. et ibi Scholion.

**III.** In conclusione doctores consentiunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1; et q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** On the various modes of willing touched on here, the Seraphic in a certain disputed unpublished question — *whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together* — has the following: «There is *accedent* will, i.e., coming anew; and this is not in God. There is also *antecedent* will, and this is in God, but not with respect to Himself, but with respect to the created — which it antecedes in nature and in eternity. There is third the *concomitant and accepting* will, and this is in God with respect to Himself and with respect to the created; for the divine will approves and accepts every good — whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary».

**II.** On the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the account of will, see below d. 10, a. 1, q. 1. — On the difference between generation and spiration, see below d. 26, q. 1, and the Scholion there.

**III.** On the conclusion the doctors agree: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1; and q. 43, m. 3, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 1; *Reportatio* here qq. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2; *Summa* I, q. 41, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here aa. 1, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2 *princ.* q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 129 -->

### Articulus unicus.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem exemplaritatis.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Footer apparatus is preserved verbatim from the Quaracchi edition.

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii a Patre sit secundum rationem exemplaritatis. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Semel locutus est Deus*, Glossa: « id est, Filium genuit, in quo omnia disposuit » ; sed dispositio aeterna dicit rationem exemplaris: ergo si Filius procedit ut verbum, procedit per modum exemplaritatis.

2. Item, generatio Filii a Patre est similis productioni notitiae ex mente[^2]; sed notitia procedit ex mente secundum rationem exemplaris, quia exemplar est ratio cognoscendi: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod est imago in producto, hoc est exemplar in producente; quando enim productum expresse repraesentat, imago dicitur. Similiter quando[^3] producens expresse repraesentat, exemplar dicitur: ergo cum Filius procedat ut imago, eadem ratione per modum exemplaritatis.

4. Item, omne principium cognitivum rei producendae[^4] producit secundum rationem exemplandi; sed Pater est principium Filii cognitivum: ergo producit Filium secundum rationem exemplaris. Si dicas, quod illud non sufficit, immo necesse est, quod exemplar et exemplatum differant in forma et natura; hoc nihil est, quia si homo, dum generat hominem, posset talem generare, qualem cogitat, tunc generatio illa non tantum esset secundum naturam, sed etiam secundum exemplar. Sed Pater omnino produxit Filium, ut scivit et voluit: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod nec illud sufficit, sed necesse est, exemplar praecedere; obiicitur: si Deus ab aeterno creasset mundum per impossibile, nihilominus mundus esset productus secundum rationem exemplaritatis.

**Contra:**
1. In inferioribus agens per naturam et per exemplar ex opposito dividuntur, sicut natura et intellectus[^5]: ergo qui producitur secundum naturam, non producitur secundum rationem exemplaris, sed Filius secundum naturam producitur a Patre: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne producens aliquid[^6] secundum rationem exemplaritatis producit secundum rationem voluntatis; sed Pater, ut ostensum est supra[^7], non producit Filium per voluntatem: ergo etc.

3. Item, formae non est forma[^8], ergo nec exemplaris exemplar; sed Filius est ars et exemplar omnium: ergo non habet exemplar in Patre: ergo non procedit secundum rationem exemplaritatis.

4. Item, quod est in alio secundum veritatem, non est in illo secundum exemplar[^9]; sed Filius est in Patre secundum veritatem: ergo non secundum exemplar; sed quod non est in alio secundum exemplar, non procedit secundum rationem exemplaris: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Filius procedit a Patre sicut ratio exemplandi, non sicut exemplatum ab exemplari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut procedere per modum voluntatis et liberalitatis est dupliciter — uno enim modo procedit per modum liberalitatis ipsum quod non est liberalitas, sed quod fit vel datur ex liberalitate; et sic creaturae procedunt a Deo; alio modo sicut illud[^10] quod est ratio liberalitatis, ut amor; et sic procedit Spiritus sanctus ut amor, qui est donum, in quo omnia dona donantur — sic per modum exemplaritatis est procedere dupliciter. Uno modo sicut exemplatum proprie; et[^11] sic creatura procedit a Deo tanquam exemplatum ab exemplari, et sic exemplar importat causalitatem formalem respectu exemplati. Alio modo dicitur procedere per modum exemplaritatis[^12] sicut ratio exemplandi. Et sic videtur procedere ipse Filius, qui dicitur Verbum Patris,

<!-- page 130 -->

quo non tantum se loquitur Pater, sed etiam cetera disponit. Unde Filius secundum Augustinum sexto *de Trinitate*[^13] dicitur « ars plena omnium rationum viventium ». Et hinc habet ortum illud quod consuevit dici, quod qui negat ideas esse, negat Filium Dei esse. Et iste modus procedendi[^14] secundum exemplaritatem non repugnat processui naturali, immo non potest esse nisi naturalis. Alius vero modus repugnat processui naturali; est enim secundum voluntatis imperium, ita quod producens et productum differunt sicut causa et causatum, et unum secundum veritatem non est in alio.

Unde rationes inductae ad hanc partem procedunt secundum hanc viam et secundum hanc verum concludunt; secundum aliam vero nulla concludit, immo ad omnes solvendum[^15] est per interemptionem.

Illae autem, quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, omnes procedunt secundum aliam viam, quia dicunt, quod[^16] procedit per modum exemplaritatis, quod est ratio exemplandi; quod patet, quia sumuntur a ratione aeternae dispositionis, cognitionis et imaginis. Ultima vero ratio concludit, quod procedat per modum exemplaritatis, sicut exemplatum, et propterea solvenda est per interemptionem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne principium rei producendae, si habet cognitionem, producit per exemplar; dicendum est, quod illud falsum est, nisi ratio cognitionis praecedat, ita quod habeat praecognitionem saltem secundum rationem causae ad effectum; quae ordinatio exigit essentialem diversitatem sive substantialem. Exemplatum enim, secundum quod exemplatum, non est in exemplante secundum veritatem, sed per similitudinem, quae, inquam, similitudo, cum sit ratio cognoscendi et exemplandi, dicitur exemplar. Procedit igitur Filius secundum rationem exemplaritatis, non sicut exemplatum per exemplar, sed sicut ipsum exemplar vel ratio exemplandi cetera. Et si tu obiicias, quod exemplar commune est toti Trinitati, respondet ad hoc Altissiodorensis in quaestione[^17] de mundo archetypo sive de ideis, quod idea sive mundus archetypus non tantum appropriatum est ipsi Filio, verum etiam proprium.

Vel aliter potest dici, quod[^18] secundum quod exemplar dicit rationem cognoscendi, sic commune est toti Trinitati et appropriatur Filio, sicut sapientia. Secundum vero quod ultra hoc dicit rationem emanandi, sic est proprium Filii; et sic importatur per hoc nomen *Verbum*, ut melius patebit infra[^19].

english:
### Single Article.
### Question III. *Whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of exemplarity.*

Lastly it is asked whether the generation of the Son from the Father is according to the account of exemplarity. And that it is so seems thus.

1. On that text of the Psalm[^1]: *Once has God spoken*, the Gloss: "that is, he begot the Son, in whom he disposed all things"; but eternal disposition expresses the account of an exemplar: therefore if the Son proceeds as a word, he proceeds by way of exemplarity.

2. Likewise, the generation of the Son from the Father is similar to the production of knowledge from the mind[^2]; but knowledge proceeds from the mind according to the account of an exemplar, because the exemplar is the ground of knowing: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that which is "image" in the produced is "exemplar" in the producer; for when the produced expressly represents, it is called an image. Similarly, when[^3] the producer expressly represents, it is called an exemplar: therefore since the Son proceeds as image, by the same account he proceeds by way of exemplarity.

4. Likewise, every cognitive principle of a thing to be produced[^4] produces according to the account of exemplifying; but the Father is the cognitive principle of the Son: therefore he produces the Son according to the account of an exemplar. If you say that this does not suffice, but rather it is necessary that exemplar and exemplate differ in form and nature, this is nothing, because if a man, while begetting a man, were able to beget such a one as he conceives, then that generation would not only be according to nature, but also according to an exemplar. But the Father wholly produced the Son as he knew and willed: therefore etc. If you say that not even this suffices, but it is necessary that the exemplar precede; it is objected: if God from eternity had created the world per impossibile, nonetheless the world would have been produced according to the account of exemplarity.

**On the contrary:**
1. In lower things an agent acting through nature and one acting through an exemplar are divided as opposites, as nature and intellect[^5]: therefore what is produced according to nature is not produced according to the account of an exemplar, but the Son is produced from the Father according to nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything producing something[^6] according to the account of exemplarity produces according to the account of will; but the Father, as has been shown above[^7], does not produce the Son through will: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, of a form there is no form[^8], therefore neither of an exemplar an exemplar; but the Son is the art and exemplar of all things: therefore he does not have an exemplar in the Father: therefore he does not proceed according to the account of exemplarity.

4. Likewise, what is in another according to truth is not in him according to an exemplar[^9]; but the Son is in the Father according to truth: therefore not according to an exemplar; but what is not in another according to an exemplar does not proceed according to the account of an exemplar: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** The Son proceeds from the Father as the ground of exemplifying, not as an exemplate from an exemplar.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as to proceed by way of will and liberality is twofold — for in one way that which is not liberality, but is brought about or given out of liberality, proceeds by way of liberality; and thus creatures proceed from God; in another way [proceeds] as that[^10] which is the ground of liberality, as love; and thus the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, who is the gift in whom all gifts are given — so to proceed by way of exemplarity is twofold. In one way as an exemplate properly; and[^11] thus a creature proceeds from God as an exemplate from an exemplar, and thus the exemplar imports formal causality with respect to the exemplate. In another way it is said to proceed by way of exemplarity[^12] as the ground of exemplifying. And thus the Son himself seems to proceed, who is called the Word of the Father,

<!-- page 130 -->

by which the Father not only utters himself, but also disposes the rest. Hence the Son, according to Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^13], is called "an art full of all the living rationales." And from this arises that which is wont to be said, namely that he who denies that the ideas exist denies that the Son of God exists. And this manner of proceeding[^14] according to exemplarity is not repugnant to natural procession; rather, it cannot but be natural. The other manner, however, is repugnant to natural procession; for it is according to the command of will, so that producer and produced differ as cause and caused, and the one is not in the other according to truth.

Hence the reasons brought forward to this side proceed along this way and according to this way conclude truly; according to the other, none concludes; rather, all are to be solved[^15] by interception.

But those which are objected on the contrary all proceed along the other way, because they say that[^16] what proceeds by way of exemplarity is the ground of exemplifying; which is plain, because they are taken from the account of eternal disposition, of knowing, and of image. The last reason, however, concludes that he proceeds by way of exemplarity as an exemplate, and therefore is to be solved by interception.

4. To that which is objected, that every principle of a thing to be produced, if it has cognition, produces through an exemplar; it must be said that this is false, unless the account of cognition precedes, in such a way that it has fore-cognition at least according to the account of cause to effect; which ordering requires essential or substantial diversity. For the exemplate, insofar as it is an exemplate, is not in the exemplifier according to truth, but through a likeness; which likeness, I say, since it is the ground of knowing and of exemplifying, is called an exemplar. The Son therefore proceeds according to the account of exemplarity, not as an exemplate through an exemplar, but as the exemplar itself, or the ground of exemplifying the rest. And if you object that the exemplar is common to the whole Trinity, the Auxerrian responds to this in his question[^17] *On the archetypal world or on the ideas*, that the idea or archetypal world is not only appropriated to the Son himself, but also proper [to him].

Or otherwise it can be said, that[^18] insofar as the exemplar expresses the ground of knowing, it is thus common to the whole Trinity and is appropriated to the Son, as wisdom. But insofar as beyond this it expresses the ground of emanating, it is thus proper to the Son; and thus it is imported by this name *Word*, as will better appear below[^19].

la: 61, 12. — Glossa apud Lyranum: *Apud se semel (locutus est), quia unum Verbum genuit, per quod omnia facta et in quo simul omnia facta sunt.* — Vat. cum cod. cc *disponit* loco *disposuit*, sed obstant ceteri codd. cum ed. I.

en: Ps. 61:12. — Gloss according to Lyra: "With himself once (he has spoken), because he begot one Word, through whom all things were made and in whom all things were simultaneously made." — The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *disponit* in place of *disposuit*, but the other codices together with the first edition stand against it.

la: Cfr. Basil., II. *contra Eunomium*, circa medium, et *Serm. super verba* In principio erat Verbum, circa medium.

en: Cf. Basil, *Against Eunomius* II, near the middle, and *Sermon on the words* "In the beginning was the Word", near the middle.

la: Vat. contra multos codd. et ed. I *cum*. — De varia acceptione *exemplaris* et *imaginis* vide infra d. 31. p. II. a. I. q. I.; si proprie accipiuntur, tunc sunt termini correlativi, *imago* siquidem est in producto sive est similitudo producta, *exemplar* vero est id, ad cuius imitationem aliquid producitur; si vero improprie accipiuntur, tunc non raro unus terminus pro altero adhibetur.

en: The Vatican edition, against many codices and the first edition, reads *cum*. — On the various senses of *exemplar* and *image* see below at d. 31, p. II, a. I, q. I; if they are taken properly, then they are correlative terms — for the *image* is in the produced, that is, it is the produced likeness, while the *exemplar* is that to whose imitation something is produced; but if they are taken improperly, then not seldom the one term is used in place of the other.

la: Mss. et ed. I hic *productae*, sed infra in responsione *producendae*.

en: The manuscripts and the first edition read here *productae*, but below in the response *producendae*.

la: Vide supra d. 2. q. I. fundam. 2. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. I *quod* loco *qui* et paulo infra *exemplaritatis* pro *exemplaris*.

en: See above d. 2, q. I, fundam. 2. — Soon thereafter the Vatican edition with codex cc — but against the older codices and the first edition — reads *quod* in place of *qui*, and a little below *exemplaritatis* in place of *exemplaris*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. I substituimus *aliquid* loco *aliud*.

en: From older manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted *aliquid* in place of *aliud*.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Cfr. Alan. ab Insulis, *Theol. Regul.*, reg. 16.

en: Cf. Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 16.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. q. I. fundam. 5. — Mox mutila lectio Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittuntur verba *ergo non* usque ad *non procedit*, resarcitur ex aliis mss. et ed. I.

en: Cf. above d. 2, q. I, fundam. 5. — Soon thereafter a mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, in which the words from *ergo non* through *non procedit* are omitted, is repaired from the other manuscripts and the first edition.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. I *id*.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many codices and the first edition, reads *id*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. FGHKSTY et ed. I *et*.

en: We have supplied *et* from manuscripts FGHKSTY and the first edition.

la: Sequimur multos codd. ut FGHIKSTY etc. cum ed. I ponendo *exemplaritatis* pro *exemplantis*; lectio in textum recepta magis contextui correspondet. Paulo infra aliqui mss. cum ed. I *dicitur* loco *videtur*. Mox ope vetustiorum mss. et ed. I post *loquitur* adiecimus *Pater*.

en: We follow many codices such as FGHIKSTY etc. with the first edition by putting *exemplaritatis* in place of *exemplantis*; the reading received into the text corresponds better to the context. A little below, some manuscripts with the first edition read *dicitur* in place of *videtur*. Soon, with the help of older manuscripts and the first edition, we have added *Pater* after *loquitur*.

la: Cap. 10. n. 11: *Ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium.* S. Thomas, QQ. disp. de Ver. q. 3. a. 1 proxime sequentem propositionem ita exhibet: *Augustinus dicit in libro de Civ. Dei: Qui negat ideas esse infidelis est, quia negat Filium esse.*

en: [Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI,] c. 10, n. 11: "A certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the living unchangeable rationes." Thomas, *Disputed Questions on Truth* q. 3, a. 1, presents the immediately following proposition thus: *Augustine says in the book On the City of God: He who denies that the ideas exist is unbelieving, because he denies that the Son exists.*

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *ille modus producendi*, sed minus iuste.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and of the six first editions, reads *ille modus producendi* ("that manner of producing"), but less rightly.

la: Vat. *respondendum*, sed obstant mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.

en: The Vatican edition reads *respondendum*, but the manuscripts together with editions 1, 2, 3, and 6 stand against it.

la: Supple cum codd. IZ *Filius*. Mox ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *per* loco *secundum*. Paulo infra ed. 1 satis bene *prout est* pro *quod est*. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 1 *sunt* loco *sumuntur*. Mox codd. LO post *imaginis* addunt *et hoc sunt primae rationes*.

en: Supply *Filius* with codices IZ. Soon thereafter, on the authority of older manuscripts and of the first edition, we have substituted *per* in place of *secundum*. A little below, the first edition reads, well enough, *prout est* in place of *quod est*. Then many codices together with the first edition read *sunt* in place of *sumuntur*. Soon thereafter, codices LO add after *imaginis* the words *et hoc sunt primae rationes* ("and these are the first rationes").

la: Adiecimus auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *in quaestione*. — Iste locus invenitur in Summa dicti auctoris in fine libr. 1, quae Summa fertur impressa Parisiis 1500. Haec plures exstat manuscripta in biblioth. Laurentiana Florentiae. Ibi in cod. (11. plut. sin. VII.) sub rubrica: *de Creatione mundi*, legitur: « Dicimus, quod exemplar sive idea dicitur de Filio Dei et *proprie* et *appropriate*... Sed quia dispositio ad sapientiam pertinet, per *appropriationem* potest dici de Filio, quod sit exemplar vel idea rerum. Sed secundum quod ipse dicitur proprie Imago Patris eadem ratione, qua ipse est Verbum, et in illa Imagine per dictam rationem relucent omnia: et secundum hoc *proprie* dicitur ipse idea vel exemplar rerum » etc. Paulo post sequitur: « Secundo quaeritur, utrum Filius Dei sit mundus archetypus »; ad quod respondet: « Unde Filius Dei quodam modo est mundus archetypus *appropriate*, quodam modo *proprie*, ut dictum est de exemplari ».

en: We have added *in quaestione* on the authority of older manuscripts and of the first edition. — This passage is found in the *Summa* of the said author at the end of book 1, which *Summa* is reported to have been printed at Paris in 1500. Several manuscripts of it are extant in the Laurentian Library in Florence. There, in codex (11. plut. sin. VII.) under the rubric *On the Creation of the world*, it reads: "We say that the exemplar, or idea, is said of the Son of God both *properly* and *by appropriation*... But since disposition pertains to wisdom, by *appropriation* it can be said of the Son that he is the exemplar or idea of things. But insofar as he himself is properly called the Image of the Father by the same account by which he is the Word, and in that Image by the said account all things shine forth, and according to this he is *properly* called the very idea or exemplar of things," etc. A little later it follows: "Secondly it is asked whether the Son of God is the archetypal world"; to which he responds: "Hence the Son of God in a certain manner is the archetypal world *by appropriation*, in a certain manner *properly*, as has been said of the exemplar."

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *quia*, sed minus bene et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *quia*, but less well and against the other codices together with the first edition.

la: Dist. 27. p. II. praecipue q. 3.

en: [See below] Distinction 27, part II, especially question 3.

latin_scholion:
Sensus huius quaestionis est, utrum Filius producatur secundum modum exemplaritatis, sicut creaturae. — Paucos ex antiquis Scholasticis invenimus explicite tractantes hanc quaestionem, nempe Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richar. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
The sense of this question is, whether the Son is produced according to the manner of exemplarity, as creatures are. — We find few among the ancient Scholastics explicitly treating this question, namely Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, here, 2nd princ., q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---


title: Dist. 6, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts concerning the Master's text

source_text:
### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry begins with **La.** for the Latin gloss as printed in the Quaracchi apparatus and **En.** for our English rendering.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista circa litteram dubitatur de ratione Augustini ad Orosium, quod nec voluntate nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est etc. Videtur enim sufficiens[^1] divisio. Omne enim quod Deus facit, aut facit naturaliter, et sic necessario, aut voluntarie: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod ipse respondet ad intellectum haeretici, et haereticus intelligit de voluntate antecedente et necessitate inevitabilitatis: obiicitur, quod oratio nihilominus in se est multiplex. Sed qui respondet orationi multiplici simpliciter affirmando vel negando, male respondet, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[^2]: ergo, etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus respondet secundum intellectum haeretici. Quamvis autem oratio in se sit multiplex, quia tamen haereticus in uno sensu eam accipit, iam multiplicitas illa non faceret[^3] ad solvendum, quia non procedit secundum illam. Sed distinctio propositionis multiplicis, quando secundum illam multiplicitatem non cadit deceptio, magis est ad ostentationem quam ad veram responsionem.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Dicamus, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate.* Videtur enim benedicere, quia Pater alio est Deus, alio est Pater, quia deitate est Deus, et paternitate est Pater, ut dicit Augustinus[^4]. Sed Filius est Deus natura deitatis: ergo hac non dicetur Filius, sed ipsa filiatione[^5].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ille ablativus potest construi formaliter; et sic falsa est, quia formaliter alio est Deus, scilicet natura, et alio Filius. Potest iterum construi originaliter et in ratione principii; et sic vera est, et est sensus, quod Filius ortum habet a Patre naturaliter.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Acute sane quidam respondit,* quia Augustinus commendat istam solutionem, quae non est commendanda, quia multiplicare inconveniens non est solvere[^6].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est solutio *ad hominem* et est solutio *ad orationem*[^7]; et aliquando melius et utilius est solvere *ad hominem* quam *ad orationem*, ut puta, quando respondens est discolus et non vult intelligere veritatem, et quando assistentes sunt simplices et non possunt capere veritatem et subtilitatem. Ideo quia haereticus veritatem respuebat et adversabatur, idcirco adversanti erat adversandum, et tali modo, quo magis privaretur gloria et assistentes fallacia. Ideo commendat istam responsionem Augustinus, quia[^8] manifeste opponentem sua quaestione ligavit. Hunc modum respondendi docuit Dominus Matthaei vigesimo primo[^9], ubi dixit: *Baptismus Ioannis de caelo erat, an ex hominibus* etc.

Item quaeritur, cum non sit responsum ad orationem, quomodo respondendum sit. Videtur enim[^10], quod divisio haeretici sit per immediata, quia *velle* et *nolle* opponuntur contradictorie, inter quae non cadit medium. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod haereticus quaerit hoc de voluntate accedente sive de antecedente; et tunc neutra pars est vera, nec sunt membra opposita contradictorie, sed contrarie. *Nolle* enim et *velle* dicunt actus voluntatis contrarios, inter quos cadit medium. Aliquid enim est, respectu cuius voluntas nec[^11] habet rationem causae nec repugnantiae; et ita patet illud.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de solutione Magistri. Videtur enim falsum dicere, cum dicit: *Scientia Dei et praescientia de bonis et malis est.* Dicit enim Glossa super illud Psalmi[^12]: *Quae ignorabam; interrogabant me* etc.: «Ars nescit vitium»; sed in Deo est ars artium, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod nescit per modum practicum, sed scit per modum speculationis[^13]; *contra:* solum illud scit hoc modo, quod in eo relucet; sed in Deo non relucent mala: ergo etc.

Item, non videtur Magister solvere ad argumentum; multiplicare enim inconveniens non est solvere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut infra dicetur[^14], Deus cognoscit mala per se ipsum, sicut rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra; nec oportet, quod in Deo luceat malum, sed sufficit, quod luceat in eo mali oppositum.

<!-- page 132 -->

Ad illud quod obiicitur de solutione Magistri, dicendum, quod solutionem non ponit, sed innuit contra arguendo, quasi dicat: ex illo unum[^15] non potest inferri ex altero, quia quamvis sint idem in essentia, tamen diversa sunt connotata.

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit[^16] in notula: *quod sancta Ecclesia anathematizat eos qui dicunt, Deum non generasse consilio.* Videtur enim contradicere Damasceno[^17] dicenti, quod in Deo non est consilium, quia consilium est ignorantis naturae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *consilium*[^18] dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur *consulere accipere consilium:* et sic dicit ignorantiam et similiter consilium, dictum ab hoc[^19]; alio modo *consulere* dicitur *dare consilium*, et hoc modo dicit scientiam, et hoc potest transferri ad divina. Deus enim nullo modo accipit consilium aliunde. Unde notandum, quod in consilio duo sunt: est ibi cognitio rei occultae, et est ibi dispositio firma. Quoniam ergo in Deo est verissima cognitio occultorum et invariabilitas, ideo recte dicitur, in ipso esse consilium. Unde Gregorius[^20]: «Deus mutat sententiam, sed non consilium».

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the Master's text.

### Doubt I.

In this part, concerning the text, a doubt is raised about Augustine's argument *to Orosius*, namely that [the Son was generated] neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, etc. For the division seems to be sufficient[^1]: indeed, whatever God does, he either does naturally, and so necessarily, or voluntarily; therefore, etc. If you say that he himself is responding according to the heretic's understanding, and the heretic understands [the question] of an antecedent will and a necessity of unavoidableness — it is objected that the proposition is nonetheless in itself ambiguous. But one who responds to an ambiguous proposition by simply affirming or denying responds badly, according to what the Philosopher says[^2]: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine responds according to the heretic's understanding. For although the proposition is in itself ambiguous, since nevertheless the heretic takes it in one sense, that ambiguity would not bear[^3] upon the solution, because [the heretic] does not proceed according to it. But the distinguishing of an ambiguous proposition, when no deception arises through that ambiguity, belongs more to ostentation than to a true response.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: *Let us say that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will.* For it seems to speak well, since the Father is God by one [thing], and Father by another, because by deity he is God, and by paternity he is Father, as Augustine says[^4]. But the Son is God by the nature of deity: therefore he will not be called Son by this [nature], but by filiation itself[^5].

**I respond:** It must be said that that ablative can be construed formally; and so it is false, because formally he is God by one [thing], namely by nature, and Son by another. It can again be construed originally and in the manner of a principle; and so it is true, and the sense is that the Son has his origin from the Father naturally.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: *Acutely indeed has someone responded* — for Augustine commends that solution, which is not to be commended, because to multiply an inconvenience is not to solve it[^6].

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a solution *ad hominem* and a solution *ad orationem* [to the proposition][^7]; and sometimes it is better and more useful to solve *ad hominem* than *ad orationem* — for instance, when the respondent is contentious and unwilling to understand the truth, and when the bystanders are simple and cannot grasp the truth and its subtlety. Therefore, because the heretic was rejecting and opposing the truth, for that reason the opponent had to be opposed, and in such a way that he might be the more deprived of glory and the bystanders of deception. So Augustine commends that response, because[^8] he manifestly bound the opponent by his own question. The Lord taught this manner of responding in Matthew chapter twenty-one[^9], where he said: *The baptism of John was from heaven, or from men*, etc.

Again it is asked: since there has been no response to the proposition itself, how it ought to be responded to. For it seems[^10] that the heretic's division is by immediates, since *to will* and *not to will* are opposed contradictorily, and between contradictories there is no middle. And it must be said to this that the heretic asks this concerning an accompanying or antecedent will; and then neither part is true, nor are the members opposed contradictorily, but contrarily. For *not to will* and *to will* signify contrary acts of the will, between which a middle does fall. For there is something in respect of which the will has neither the character of cause nor[^11] of repugnance; and so that is plain.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the Master's solution. For he seems to say something false when he says: *The knowledge and foreknowledge of God is of good things and of evil things.* For the Gloss says, on that text of the Psalm[^12]: *Things which I knew not; they questioned me*, etc.: «Art does not know vice»; but in God there is the art of arts: therefore, etc. If you say that [God] does not know [evil] in a practical mode, but knows [it] in the mode of speculation[^13]; *on the contrary:* he knows in this mode only that which shines in him; but evils do not shine in God: therefore, etc.

Likewise, the Master does not seem to solve the argument; for to multiply an inconvenience is not to solve it.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as will be said below[^14], God knows evils through himself, just as the straight judges of the crooked, and light of darkness; nor is it necessary that evil shine in God, but it suffices that the opposite of evil shine in him.

<!-- page 132 -->

To that which is objected concerning the Master's solution, it must be said that he does not posit a solution, but [rather] suggests one by counter-arguing, as if to say: from this, the one[^15] cannot be inferred from the other, because although they are the same in essence, nevertheless their connotations are different.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says[^16] in the marginal note: *that the holy Church anathematizes those who say that God did not beget by counsel.* For it seems to contradict Damascene[^17], who says that in God there is no counsel, because counsel belongs to a nature that is ignorant.

**I respond:** It must be said that *counsel*[^18] is said in two ways. In one way, *to take counsel* means *to receive counsel*; and so it implies ignorance, and likewise *counsel*, said from this[^19]; in another way, *to counsel* means *to give counsel*, and in this mode it implies knowledge, and this can be transferred to divine things. For God in no way receives counsel from elsewhere. Hence it is to be noted that in counsel there are two things: there is the cognition of a hidden matter, and there is firm disposition. Since therefore in God there is the truest cognition of hidden things and invariability, for that reason it is rightly said that in him there is counsel. Hence Gregory[^20]: «God changes his sentence, but not his counsel».

---

la: Multi codd. ut DFRSTVW etc. cum sex primis edd. *insufficiens*, cuius lectionis sensus potest esse: videtur, quod divisio in responsione Augustini (ad bimembrem quaestionem Orosii: *Voluntate genuit vel necessitate*) contenta, in qua scilicet tertium membrum additur *neu necessitate nec voluntate*, sit insufficiens, i. e. non bona, quia divisio Orosii est sufficiens i. e. adaequata.

en: Many codices, such as DFRSTVW etc., together with the first six editions, read *insufficiens* ("insufficient"); the sense of that reading can be: it seems that the division contained in Augustine's response (to the two-membered question of Orosius: *Did he beget by will or by necessity?*) — in which division a third member is added, *neither by necessity nor by will* — is insufficient, i. e. not good, because the division of Orosius is sufficient, i. e. adequate.

la: II. Elenchi. c. 2. (c. 17.) iuxta translationem Boethii: *quoniam nulli eorum quae aequivoca sunt, convenit respondere simpliciter.*

en: *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 2 (c. 17), according to the translation of Boethius: *because to none of those things which are equivocal is it fitting to respond simply.*

la: Nonnulli codd. ut ARTU *fuerat*.

en: Some codices, such as ARTU, read *fuerat* ("had been").

la: Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 1. et c. 6. n. 11. et Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5, ubi sententialiter habetur. Cfr. infra Magister, d. XXXIII. in fine. — Substituimus fide mss. et ed. 1 bis *deitate* loco *divinitatis*, quod et magis correspondet verbis Augustini in loc. cit. et modo loquendi Seraphici, de quo vide infra d. 15. p. II. dub. 6.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 4, n. 1, and c. 6, n. 11, and Sermon 1 *on Psalm* 68, n. 5, where the substance is found. Cf. below the Master, d. XXXIII at the end. — On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have twice substituted *deitate* ("by deity") for *divinitatis* ("of divinity"), which both better corresponds to Augustine's words in the cited place and to the Seraphic Doctor's manner of speaking, on which see below d. 15, p. II, dub. 6.

la: Cod. X addit *scilicet filiatione*, quae verba a cod. I non hic, sed paulo infra post *sensus* adiiciuntur. Mox ex multis mss. ut AGHKSTYZ etc. et ed. 1 posuimus *quod* loco *quia*. — Plura de hoc dubio vide supra q. 2. et infra d. 33. q. 2. et dub. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard., hic q. 3.

en: Codex X adds *scilicet filiatione* ("namely, by filiation"); these words are added by codex I not here, but a little below, after *sensus*. Then, from many manuscripts such as AGHKSTYZ etc. and ed. 1, we have placed *quod* in the place of *quia*. — For more on this doubt see above q. 2 and below d. 33, q. 2 and dub. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard, here q. 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Topic. c. 4. in princ. (c. 8.) — Paulo ante plures codd. SVWXY dd cum ed. 1 *viditur* loco *est*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VIII, c. 4 at the beginning (c. 8). — A little before, several codices SVWXY, dd, with ed. 1, read *viditur* in the place of *est*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. hic et paulo infra ter *rationem* pro *orationem*. Cfr. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.), ubi secundum translationem Boethii, qui pro λόγος semper ponit *oratio*, sic habetur: *Hi omnes non ad orationem, sed ad hominem solvunt.*

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, reads here and three times a little below *rationem* in place of *orationem*. Cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 3 (c. 22), where, according to Boethius's translation — who always renders λόγος by *oratio* — it reads thus: *All these solve not* ad orationem, *but* ad hominem.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *quod* pro *quia*, et paulo infra post *Hunc* male addit *ergo*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices and ed. 1, reads *quod* in place of *quia*, and a little below, after *Hunc*, badly adds *ergo*.

la: Vers. 23. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. *cum* pro *ubi*.

en: Verse 23. — The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts, reads *cum* in place of *ubi*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et edd. 1, 6 *enim*, et paulo infra post *quaerit* addidimus *hoc*.

en: We have supplied *enim* on the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1 and 6, and a little below, after *quaerit*, we have added *hoc*.

la: Vat. cum uno alterove cod. *non*.

en: The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, reads *non*.

la: 34, 11. Glossa interlin. ex Augustino apud Lyranum: *Sicut ars vitium, quod per artem cognitum devitatur.* — Vide August. in hunc Psalm. Serm. 2. n. 2. — Paulo infra post *artium* cod. G addit *et scientia scientiarum*.

en: [Psalm] 34, 11. Interlinear Gloss, from Augustine, in Lyranus: *Just as art [knows] vice, which, being known through art, is avoided.* — See Augustine on this Psalm, Sermon 2, n. 2. — A little below, after *artium*, codex G adds *et scientia scientiarum* ("and the knowledge of knowledges").

la: Corrupta lectio Vat. et codd. sed *speculationis* resarcitur ex cod. X, qui post *sed* addit *scit per modum*.

en: The reading of the Vatican edition and the codices is corrupt, but *speculationis* is restored from codex X, which after *sed* adds *scit per modum*.

la: Dist. 39. a. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Vat. hic *dicitur* loco *dicetur*, et paulo infra post *cognoscit* addit *bona in se ipso et*, non quidem falso, sed contra mss. et minus ad rem, quia tota obiectio est solum de cognitione malorum. — De propositione immediate sequente Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 83. (c. ult.): «Recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus. Iudex enim utrorumque canon est recto». Ultima verba in translatione arabico-latina sic sonant: *Regula enim iudicat utrumque per suam rectitudinem* (ed. Venet. 1489).

en: Distinction 39, a. 1, q. 1 and 2. — The Vatican edition reads here *dicitur* in place of *dicetur*, and a little below, after *cognoscit*, adds *bona in se ipso et* — not, indeed, falsely, but against the manuscripts and less to the point, since the whole objection is only about the cognition of evils. — On the proposition immediately following, [see] Aristotle, *On the Soul* I, text 83 (last chapter): «For by the straight we know both the straight itself and the crooked. For the canon of both is the straight, as a judge». The last words in the Arabic-Latin translation run thus: *For the rule judges each thing by its own straightness* (ed. Venet. 1489).

la: Lectio confusa Vat. *quasi dicat ex eo quod est ex illo*, idem restauratur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

en: A confused reading of the Vatican edition: *quasi dicat ex eo quod est ex illo*; the same is restored with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit hic Vat. *Hilarius* et post *notula* adiungit *circa istum §. Praedicta tamen*, insuper in ipso textu ponit *generare* loco *generasse*.

en: Against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican edition adds here *Hilarius*, and after *notula* adjoins *circa istum §. Praedicta tamen*; moreover, in the text itself it places *generare* in place of *generasse*.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. circa medium: *Deus quippe non deliberat, quia ignorantis est consilium inire.* — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *quia* loco *quod*. Aliqui codd. ut aa bb ff cum ed. 1 *consiliari* pro *consilium*.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 22, near the middle: *For God does not deliberate, because to enter into counsel belongs to one who is ignorant.* — The Vatican edition, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads *quia* in place of *quod*. Some codices such as aa, bb, ff, with ed. 1, read *consiliari* for *consilium*.

la: Cod. dd addit *aut consulere*. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut CISV aa cc cum quinque primis edd. *ad hoc* pro *ab hoc*.

en: Codex dd adds *aut consulere* ("or to take counsel"). A little below, some codices such as CISV, aa, cc, with the first five editions, read *ad hoc* in place of *ab hoc*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *hoc*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc, *hoc* is missing.

la: Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 10: *Deus etsi plerumque mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam.*

en: Book XVI *Morals* c. 10: *God, although he often changes his sentence, [changes] his counsel never.*