title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum donum intellectus simul consistat in contemplatione Creatoris et creaturae.*

Tertio quaeritur de actu et obiecto ipsius doni intellectus, et est quaestio, utrum donum intellectus simul consistat in contemplatione Creatoris et creaturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Magistri in littera[^1]: «Intelligentia vero non modo de aeternis est, sed etiam de rebus invisibilibus et spiritualibus temporaliter exortis».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Dionysium ad Titum[^2], qui dicit, quod «impossibile est, quamdiu in via sumus, relucere nobis divinum radium nisi circumvelatum»: si ergo illud est velamen creaturae, videtur, quod intellectus non possit Deum nisi in creatura cognoscere: ergo si est ad cognitionem Creatoris, necesse est, quod sit simul ad cognitionem creaturae.

3. Item, non est perfectus habitus amoris, nisi ametur Deus et in se et in sua imagine[^3]: ergo similiter non erit perfectum donum intellectus, nisi Deus per illud cognoscatur et quantum ad conditiones suas et quantum ad conditiones creaturarum, quae sunt ei similes: ergo videtur, quod donum intellectus sit ad contemplanda temporalia et aeterna.

4. Item, de eisdem habet esse intellectus, de quibus habet esse fides, secundum quod dicit Gregorius[^4], quod «Deus intellectum dat, dum de auditis mentem illustrat»; sed fides non tantummodo respicit divinam essentiam in se, verum etiam in comparatione ad creaturam: videtur ergo, quod actus doni intellectus ordinetur ad illa duo contemplanda.

**Sed contra:** 1. Dono *sapientiae* cognoscuntur aeterna, dono *scientiae* cognoscuntur temporalia, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^5]: ergo aut donum *intellectus* superfluit, duobus donis habitis, aut circa illa duo actus eius praecipuus non consistit.

2. Item, *sapientia* et *scientia* differunt et sunt diversa dona per hoc, quod unum eorum est circa temporalia, aliud vero circa aeterna: ergo si donum *intellectus* est unum, videtur, quod non possit esse circa illa duo.

3. Item, aut donum intellectus consistit in *cognoscendo tantum,* aut in *cognoscendo et afficiendo.* Si consistit in *cognoscendo tantum:* ergo non videtur, quod sit donum gratuitum, cum actus pure cognitivus non sit meritorius. Si in *cognoscendo et afficiendo:* ergo doni *intellectus* est aeterna cognoscere et circa illa affici; sed iste est actus doni *sapientiae:* ergo aut donum *intellectus* non est circa aeterna, aut si est, non differt ab ipsa *sapientia.*

4. Item, sicut contingit Deum cognoscere et contemplari in imagine, ita contingit Deum cognoscere et contemplari in eius vestigio: ergo sicut donum intellectus est ordinatum ad cognitionem ipsius creaturae spiritualis[^6], ita ad cognitionem creaturae corporalis; sed non dirigit ad cognitionem corporalis creaturae: ergo pari ratione non videtur, donum intellectus ordinari ad cognitionem alicuius creaturae.

5. Item, dona, quae sibi invicem correspondent et ad se combinantur, ad idem et circa idem versantur; sed donum *intellectus* et *sapientiae* combinantur ad invicem[^7]: ergo cum donum sapientiae sit circa aeterna, et non circa creata; videtur, quod et donum intellectus.

6. Item, si simul est circa Creatorem et creaturam: ergo videtur, quod donum intellectus intelligat et cognoscat Deum per speculum[^8]: ergo non videtur differre a cognitione fidei.

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### Conclusio.

> Donum intellectus attenditur in contemplatione tum Creatoris tum spiritualis creaturae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cognitio de Deo sub ratione veri potest haberi secundum triplicem modum: uno modo habetur cognitio de Deo per *simplicem assensum;* alio modo per *rationis adminiculum;* tertio modo per *simplicem contuitum.* Primum est virtutis fidei, cuius est assentire; secundum est doni intellectus, cuius est credita per rationem intelligere; tertium est beatitudinis munditiae cordis, cuius est Deum videre[^9]. Quoniam ergo rationes, secundum quas iuvamur ad credita intelligenda, accipiuntur non solum a conditionibus Creatoris, sed etiam a conditionibus creaturae spiritualis, quae inter creaturas habet proximiorem assimilationem ad Creatorem; hinc est, quod donum intellectus — cuius actus est in contemplationem summi Veri elevare per lumen, quod non solum facit assentire, sed etiam per congruas rationes credita intelligere — non solum attenditur in contemplatione creatricis essentiae, sed etiam spiritualis creaturae[^10].

Et ex hoc patet, quis sit actus et obiectum proprium ipsius doni intellectus: quoniam obiectum eius est ipsum Verum aeternum, in quantum intelligibile, non solum secundum proprias conditiones, sed etiam secundum proprietates creaturarum sibi similium, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera[^11]. Actus vero eius est contemplari ipsum verum creditum, ut devotius credatur et ardentius diligatur. Et ita donum intellectus consistit in contemplatione rationali Creatoris et spiritualis creaturae, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad istam partem sunt inductae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod donum *sapientiae* ordinatur ad cognitionem Creatoris, et donum *scientiae* ad cognitionem creaturae; dicendum, quod aliter et aliter sunt illa duo dona ad cognitionem illorum duorum quam donum intellectus: quia donum *sapientiae* est ad cognitionem aeternorum, secundum tamen quod illae aeternae rationes sunt via ad *gustum* et experimentalem cognitionem divinae suavitatis, ita quod cognitio illa gustui est annexa; donum vero *intellectus* negotiatur circa aeterna secundum rationes aeternas, quae sunt via ad *cognitionem veritatis.* Et hinc est, quod Bernardus[^12] appropriat donum *intellectus* fidei, quae assentit summae Veritati propter se; donum vero *sapientiae* appropriat caritati, cuius est disponere ad gustandum Deum. — Per hunc etiam modum est differentias invenire inter *intellectum* et *scientiam:* quia *scientia* negotiatur circa creaturas secundum rationes creatas; unde negotiari habet non solum circa creaturas spirituales, quae habent rationem *imaginis,* sed etiam circa sensibiles et corporales, quae habent rationem *vestigii.* Donum vero *intellectus,* etsi negotiatur circa creaturas, hoc tamen est secundum rationes aeternas; et ideo solum est circa creaturas spirituales, in quibus rationes aeternae relucent magis expresse. — Et sic patet, quod quia[^13] alio et alio modo est *intellectus* circa Creatorem et creaturam quam *sapientia* et *scientia;* hinc est, quod illis habitis, non superfluit.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum *sapientiae* et *scientiae* distinguuntur, quia hoc est circa temporalia, et illud circa aeterna etc.; iam patet responsio, quia non est simile. *Sapientia* enim negotiatur circa aeterna secundum rationes aeternas; *scientia* vero circa creata secundum rationes creatas; et quia[^14] habent diversa obiecta etiam secundum rationem movendi et dirigendi: hinc est, quod sunt dona diversa. *Intellectus* vero, sive circa creaturam sive circa Creatorem negotietur, semper refertur ad rationes aeternas, ad quas per creaturas etiam elevat contemplandas; et ideo unum solum donum est, quamvis illa sint plura. Et ex hoc colligi potest, quod donum intellectus est infra *sapientiam* et supra *scientiam.*

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum intellectus aut est in simpliciter speculando, aut in speculando et afficiendo; dicendum, quod est cognitio *experientiae,* quae attenditur secundum gustum, et ista est doni *sapientiae acquisitae;* et est cognitio *speculationis extensae,* quae quodam modo *via* est ad gustum, sicut cognitio fidei ad delectationem[^15] caritatis; et haec est doni *intellectus,* quae quidem viam praebet ad usum doni *sapientiae;* quae ideo *gratuita* est, quoniam super assensum fidei fundatur et ulterius ordinat ad sapientiae gustum. Nihilominus tamen in ipso actu *intellectus* est quaedam delectatio, sed longe inferior quam in dono *sapientiae.* Delectatur enim quis in cognitione veritatis, sed non sic, sicut in gustu summae suavitatis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut contingit Deum cognoscere in imagine, sic et in vestigio; dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo. In *imagine* enim, quia magis appropinquat, magis clare habet cognosci; in *vestigio* vero, quia multum distat, sub maiori obscuritate et aenigmate. Et quia ad donum intellectus spectat contemplatio clarior et excellentior, quam sit cognitio fidei; hinc est, quod ad donum illud non spectat cognoscere Deum in quacumque creatura, sed in ea, quae est eius *imago* et similitudo expressa, sicut dictum est supra.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum intellectus combinatur dono sapientiae; dicendum, quod quia donum *sapientiae* consistit in gustu, donum vero *intellectus* consistit in lumine rationis; et amplius ascendit affectio quam ratio, et unio quam cognitio, secundum quod vult Dionysius[^16]: hinc est, quod donum *sapientiae* in actu suo non sic indiget adminiculo creaturae, secundum quod donum *intellectus.* Et ideo donum *sapientiae* in actu suo versatur solum circa aeterna, donum vero *intellectus* non solum circa aeterna, sed etiam circa creata. Cum ergo dicit, quod dona, quae ad invicem combinantur, debent habere idem obiectum; hoc verum est de obiecto *principali,* non autem de eo quod habet rationem *adminiculantis.*

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod intellectus videt per speculum, sicut et fides; dicendum, quod in visione per speculum sunt multi gradus secundum maiorem et minorem depurationem ab obscuritate aenigmatis; et secundum hoc alio et alio modo habet illuminari et habilitari. Unde *fides* habilitat ad assentiendum Deo in articulis, quos, etsi non videat in se, tamen videt in creatura, cognoscendo, «*quid est* quod per nomen dicitur[^17]»; numquam enim cognoscit aliquis credens, quid sit Trinitas, nisi quia videt, quid sit ternarius in creatura. Sed ulterius donum *intellectus* illuminat ad intelligendum non solum, «quid est quod per nomen dicitur», sed etiam ad videndam *rationem,* quod Trinitas debeat in Deo esse, per hoc quod videt in ipsa imagine egressum verbi a mente per viam generationis, et amoris ab utroque per viam connexionis[^18]. Ex his patet, quod etsi *fides* et *intellectus* sint per speculum, tamen in modo speculandi differunt, et ideo sunt diversi habitus; patet etiam similiter cum hoc, quis sit *actus* doni intellectus, et quod *obiectum,* et quae *differentia* ipsius respectu aliorum habituum.

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### Question III. *Whether the gift of understanding consists at once in the contemplation of the Creator and of the creature.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of understanding itself, and the question is whether the gift of understanding consists at once in the contemplation of the Creator and of the creature. And that it does [seem] so [is shown]:

1. *First,* by the authority of the Master in the [his] text[^1]: "But *intelligence* is not only of eternal things, but also of invisible and spiritual things temporally arisen."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through Dionysius to Titus[^2], who says that "it is impossible, so long as we are on the way, for the divine ray to shine forth to us except veiled about": if therefore that is the veil of the creature, it seems that the intellect cannot know God except in the creature: therefore if it is for the cognition of the Creator, it is necessary that it be at the same time for the cognition of the creature.

3. Likewise, the habit of love is not perfect unless God be loved both in himself and in his image[^3]: therefore likewise the gift of understanding will not be perfect unless God be known through it both as to his own conditions and as to the conditions of the creatures which are like him: therefore it seems that the gift of understanding is for contemplating things temporal and eternal.

4. Likewise, understanding is concerned with the same things as faith is concerned with, according as Gregory says[^4], that "God gives understanding when he illumines the mind concerning the things heard"; but faith regards not only the divine essence in itself, but also in comparison to the creature: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of understanding is ordered to contemplating those two.

**On the contrary:** 1. By the gift of *wisdom* eternal things are known, by the gift of *knowledge* temporal things are known, as Augustine says, and as is had in the [Master's] text[^5]: therefore either the gift of *understanding* is superfluous, when the two gifts are had, or its chief act does not consist concerning those two.

2. Likewise, *wisdom* and *knowledge* differ and are diverse gifts by this, that one of them is concerned with temporal things, the other with eternal: therefore if the gift of *understanding* is one, it seems that it cannot be concerned with those two.

3. Likewise, either the gift of understanding consists *in knowing only,* or *in knowing and affecting.* If it consists *in knowing only:* then it does not seem to be a gratuitous gift, since a purely cognitive act is not meritorious. If *in knowing and affecting:* then it belongs to the gift of *understanding* to know eternal things and to be affected concerning them; but this is the act of the gift of *wisdom:* therefore either the gift of *understanding* is not concerned with eternal things, or, if it is, it does not differ from *wisdom* itself.

4. Likewise, just as it happens that God is known and contemplated in the image, so it happens that God is known and contemplated in his vestige: therefore just as the gift of understanding is ordered to the cognition of the spiritual creature itself[^6], so [it would be ordered] to the cognition of the corporeal creature; but it does not direct toward the cognition of the corporeal creature: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not seem that the gift of understanding is ordered to the cognition of any creature.

5. Likewise, gifts which correspond to one another and are combined together are occupied with the same thing and concerning the same thing; but the gift of *understanding* and [the gift] of *wisdom* are combined with one another[^7]: therefore since the gift of wisdom is concerned with eternal things, and not with created things, it seems that the gift of understanding is too.

6. Likewise, if it is at once concerned with the Creator and the creature: then it seems that the gift of understanding understands and knows God through a mirror[^8]: therefore it does not seem to differ from the cognition of faith.

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### Conclusion.

> The gift of understanding is regarded in the contemplation both of the Creator and of the spiritual creature.

**I respond:** It must be said that the cognition of God under the formal character of the true can be had according to a threefold mode: in one mode the cognition of God is had through *simple assent;* in another mode through the *support of reason;* in a third mode through *simple intuition.* The first belongs to the virtue of faith, whose [office] is to assent; the second belongs to the gift of understanding, whose [office] is to understand by reason the things believed; the third belongs to the beatitude of cleanness of heart, whose [office] is to see God[^9]. Since therefore the reasons by which we are aided to understand the things believed are taken not only from the conditions of the Creator, but also from the conditions of the spiritual creature, which among creatures has the closer assimilation to the Creator; hence it is that the gift of understanding — whose act is to elevate into the contemplation of the highest True by a light which not only makes [one] assent, but also through fitting reasons [makes one] understand the things believed — is regarded not only in the contemplation of the creating essence, but also of the spiritual creature[^10].

And from this it is clear what is the proper act and object of the gift of understanding itself: since its object is the eternal True itself, insofar as intelligible, not only according to its own conditions, but also according to the properties of the creatures like it, according as the Master says in the [his] text[^11]. But its act is to contemplate the believed truth itself, that it may be more devoutly believed and more ardently loved. And so the gift of understanding consists in the rational contemplation of the Creator and of the spiritual creature, as the reasons which have been adduced for this part show.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that the gift of *wisdom* is ordered to the cognition of the Creator, and the gift of *knowledge* to the cognition of the creature; it must be said that those two gifts are [ordered] otherwise and otherwise to the cognition of those two than the gift of understanding [is]: because the gift of *wisdom* is for the cognition of eternal things, yet according as those eternal reasons are a way to the *taste* and experimental cognition of the divine sweetness, so that that cognition is annexed to the taste; but the gift of *understanding* is occupied concerning eternal things according to the eternal reasons, which are a way to the *cognition of the truth.* And hence it is that Bernard[^12] appropriates the gift of *understanding* to faith, which assents to the highest Truth for its own sake; but he appropriates the gift of *wisdom* to charity, whose [office] is to dispose toward tasting God. — In this mode too the differences are to be found between *understanding* and *knowledge:* because *knowledge* is occupied concerning creatures according to created reasons; whence it has to be occupied not only concerning spiritual creatures, which have the character of the *image,* but also concerning sensible and corporeal ones, which have the character of the *vestige.* But the gift of *understanding,* although it is occupied concerning creatures, this is nonetheless according to the eternal reasons; and therefore it is only concerned with spiritual creatures, in which the eternal reasons shine forth more expressly. — And thus it is clear that because[^13] the *intellect* is concerned with the Creator and the creature in one mode and another than *wisdom* and *knowledge;* hence it is that, when these are had, it is not superfluous.

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2. To that which is objected, that the gift of *wisdom* and [the gift] of *knowledge* are distinguished because this is concerned with temporal things, and that with eternal things, etc.; the response is already clear, because it is not alike. For *wisdom* is occupied concerning eternal things according to eternal reasons; but *knowledge* concerning created things according to created reasons; and because[^14] they have diverse objects even according to the character of moving and directing: hence it is that they are diverse gifts. But the *intellect,* whether it be occupied concerning the creature or concerning the Creator, is always referred to the eternal reasons, to the contemplation of which it elevates [us] even through creatures; and therefore it is only one gift, although those things [contemplated] be many. And from this it can be gathered that the gift of understanding is below *wisdom* and above *knowledge.*

3. To that which is objected, that the gift of understanding either is in simply speculating, or in speculating and affecting; it must be said that there is a cognition of *experience,* which is regarded according to taste, and this belongs to the gift of *acquired wisdom;* and there is a cognition of *extended speculation,* which is in a certain way a *way* to the taste, as the cognition of faith [is a way] to the delight[^15] of charity; and this belongs to the gift of *understanding,* which indeed furnishes the way to the use of the gift of *wisdom;* which therefore is *gratuitous,* because it is founded upon the assent of faith and further orders [it] toward the taste of wisdom. Nevertheless in the very act of *understanding* there is a certain delight, but far inferior to that in the gift of *wisdom.* For one is delighted in the cognition of truth, but not so as in the taste of the highest sweetness.

4. To that which is objected, that just as it happens that God is known in the image, so also in the vestige; it must be said that there is not an altogether [equal] likeness. For in the *image,* because it approaches more nearly, [God] has to be known more clearly; but in the *vestige,* because it stands far off, under greater obscurity and enigma. And because to the gift of understanding there belongs a clearer and more excellent contemplation than the cognition of faith is; hence it is that to that gift it does not belong to know God in any creature whatsoever, but in that which is his *image* and express likeness, as was said above.

5. To that which is objected, that the gift of understanding is combined with the gift of wisdom; it must be said that since the gift of *wisdom* consists in taste, but the gift of *understanding* consists in the light of reason; and affection ascends higher than reason, and union [higher] than cognition, according as Dionysius wills[^16]: hence it is that the gift of *wisdom* in its act does not so need the support of the creature, as does the gift of *understanding.* And therefore the gift of *wisdom* in its act is occupied only concerning eternal things, but the gift of *understanding* not only concerning eternal things, but also concerning created things. When therefore he says that gifts which are combined with one another ought to have the same object; this is true of the *principal* object, but not of that which has the character of *supporting.*

6. To that which is lastly objected, that understanding sees through a mirror, as does faith also; it must be said that in vision through a mirror there are many grades according to the greater and lesser purgation from the obscurity of enigma; and according to this it has to be illumined and enabled in one mode and another. Whence *faith* enables [one] to assent to God in the articles, which, even though it does not see them in themselves, it nonetheless sees in the creature, knowing "*what is that* which is signified by the name[^17]"; for one who believes never knows what the Trinity is, except because he sees what a ternary is in the creature. But further the gift of *understanding* illumines [one] to understand not only "what is that which is signified by the name," but also to see the *reason* why the Trinity must be in God, by this, that he sees in the image itself the going-forth of the word from the mind by way of generation, and of love from both by way of connection[^18]. From these things it is clear that, even though *faith* and *understanding* are [both] through a mirror, nonetheless they differ in the mode of speculating, and therefore are diverse habits; it is likewise clear together with this what is the *act* of the gift of understanding, and what the *object,* and what is its *difference* with respect to the other habits.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here c. 2.

la: Sive Epist. 9, ubi tamen dictum hic allatum sententialiter tantum habetur; invenitur ad verbum in Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1. § 2, ubi pro *nisi circumvelatum* in translatione Scoti Erigenae legitur *nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum anagogice circumvelatum.*

en: Or Epistle 9, where however the saying here adduced is had only in substance; it is found word for word in the *Celestial Hierarchy* c. 1, § 2, where for *nisi circumvelatum* in the translation of Scotus Erigena it reads *nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum anagogice circumvelatum* ("except veiled about anagogically by the variety of the sacred coverings").

la: Cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1. seqq. — Inferius pro *conditiones creaturarum* cod. K *conditiones naturales creatas.*

la: Libr. I. Moral. c. 32. n. 44: *Intellectus in die suo conscium parat, quia in eo quod audita penetrat, reficiendo cor tenebras eius illustrat.* Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 2, ubi et alios locos habes. — Cod. A *dum auditus mentis illustrat.*

en: *Morals* book I, c. 32, n. 44: "Understanding prepares the conscious [mind] on its own day, because, in penetrating the things heard, by refreshing the heart it illumines its darknesses." Cf. above p. 474, note 2, where you also have other passages. — Codex A [reads] *dum auditus mentis illustrat.*

la: Hic c. 1. et 2.

en: Here c. 1 and 2.

en: Cf. above d. 28, q. 1 ff. — Below, for *conditiones creaturarum* codex K [reads] *conditiones naturales creatas.* [Printed p.778 n.1, anchoring arg 4's *creaturae spiritualis* near the page seam.]

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. [Printed p.778 n.2, anchoring arg 5's *combinantur ad invicem.*]

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 13, 12. — In fine arg. pro *fidei* cod. K *sub ratione verae fidei.*

en: Reference is to 1 Corinthians 13:12. — At the end of the argument, for *fidei* codex K [reads] *sub ratione verae fidei.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 737, nota 3. — Nomen *intellectus* (derivatur ab *intus legere*) generalim importat quandam intimam cognitionem; quare Aristot. per intellectum designat vel potentiam, quae non, ut sensus, accidentia externa, sed ipsam rei essentiam percipit (III. de Anima, text. 9. seqq. et text. 26); vel habitum principiorum (II. Poster. c. ult. et VI. Ethic. c. 6.). August., Enarrat. in Ps. 32, 15. enarrat. 2. serm. 2. n. 22. ait: *Qui intelligit omnia opera eorum. Intelligit,* quid est? *Secretius et interius videt... Occultus visus intellectus vocatur... intus enim intelligit et intus agnoscit [Deus], fines ipsorum videt etc.* Et in libro de Utilitate credendi, c. 11. n. 25. docet, *intelligere* idem esse atque aliquid mentis certa ratione tenere.

en: Cf. above p. 737, note 3. — The name *intellectus* (it is derived from *intus legere,* "to read within") generally imports a certain intimate cognition; whence Aristotle by "intellect" designates either the potency which, not like sense, [perceives] external accidents, but perceives the very essence of the thing (*On the Soul* III, text. 9 ff. and text. 26); or the habit of principles (*Posterior* [Analytics] II, c. ult., and *Ethics* VI, c. 6). Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 32:15, enarr. 2, serm. 2, n. 22, says: "*Who understands all their works. He understands,* what is it? *He sees more secretly and more inwardly... It is called the hidden sight of the intellect... for [God] inwardly understands and inwardly recognizes, sees their ends,* etc." And in the book *On the Usefulness of Believing,* c. 11, n. 25, he teaches that *to understand* is the same as to hold something of the mind by a certain reasoning. [Anchors the Respondeo's *Deum videre.*]

la: Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 11, sic de intellectu, sumto pro naturali potentia, scribit: *Intellectus ea vis animae est, quae invisibilia percipit, sicut Angelos, daemones, animas et omnem spiritum creatum. Intelligentia ea vis animae est, quae immediate supponitur Deo, cernit siquidem ipsum summum Verum et vere incommutabilem. Sic igitur anima sensu percipit corpora, imaginatione corporum similitudines, ratione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intelligentia spiritum increatum.* — Paulo superius pro *elevare* edd. substituunt *elevari.*

en: The author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul,* c. 11, writes thus of the intellect, taken as a natural potency: "*Intellect* is that power of the soul which perceives invisible things, such as Angels, demons, souls, and every created spirit. *Intelligence* is that power of the soul which is immediately set under God, since it discerns the highest True itself and the truly unchangeable. Thus therefore the soul by sense perceives bodies, by imagination the likenesses of bodies, by reason the natures of bodies, by intellect created spirit, by intelligence uncreated spirit." — A little above, for *elevare* the editions substitute *elevari.* [Anchors the Respondeo-conclusion's *spiritualis creaturae.*]

la: Hic c. 2. — Pro *similium* cod. A *consimilium.* Paulo inferius pro *rationali* nonnulli codd. *rationabili,* et deinde pro *sunt inductae* plurimi codd. *fuerant inductae,* aliqui *fuerunt inductae.*

en: Here c. 2. — For *similium* codex A [reads] *consimilium.* A little below, for *rationali* some codices [read] *rationabili,* and then for *sunt inductae* very many codices [read] *fuerant inductae,* some *fuerunt inductae.* [Anchors *secundum quod dicit Magister in littera.*]

la: Serm. in Cantic. serm. 8. n. 5. seq.; Serm. 14. de Diversis, n. 5; de Diligendo Deo, c. 11. n. 33; Serm. 2. in festo Annuntiat. B. M. V. n. 4. seq. Cfr. Gilberti abbatis Serm. 4. in Cantic. n. 2. (inter opera Bernardi).

en: *Sermon on the Canticle,* serm. 8, n. 5 f.; *Sermon* 14 *on Divers [Matters],* n. 5; *On Loving God,* c. 11, n. 33; *Sermon* 2 *on the Feast of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary,* n. 4 f. Cf. abbot Gilbert's *Sermon* 4 *on the Canticle,* n. 2 (among the works of Bernard).

la: Cod. A magis congrue omittit *quia.*

en: Codex A more fittingly omits *quia.*

la: Cod. A *quia haec,* et paulo inferius pro *refertur,* quod habent codd. A H I L U Z aa bb, in aliis et edd. *refert,* ac verbis *ex hoc* cod. U praemittit *idem.*

en: Codex A [reads] *quia haec,* and a little below, for *refertur,* which codices A H I L U Z aa bb have, in the others and in the editions [it reads] *refert,* and to the words *ex hoc* codex U prefixes *idem.*

la: Ita edd. 1, 2, codd. *dilectionem,* Vat. *delectationem sive dilectionem.* Inferius pro *ideo,* quod habet cod. U, in aliis codd. et edd. parum congrue *a Deo* vel *adeo;* cod. V *est a Deo.*

en: Thus editions 1, 2; the codices [read] *dilectionem* ("love"), the Vatican [edition] *delectationem sive dilectionem* ("delight or love"). Below, for *ideo,* which codex U has, in the other codices and editions less fittingly *a Deo* or *adeo;* codex V [reads] *est a Deo.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 689, nota 4.

en: Cf. above p. 689, note 4.

la: Vel aliis verbis: definitionem nominalem. Cfr. supra pag. 491, nota 4. — De gradibus cognitionis vide I. Sent. d. 2. dub. 1, d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

en: Or in other words: the nominal definition. Cf. above p. 491, note 4. — On the grades of cognition see I Sent. d. 2, dub. 1; d. 3, p. I, q. 2, ad 4; II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, in the body.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. et 2, d. 5, d. 9. et d. 10. — Paulo inferius pro *similiter cum hoc* codd. A T U *simul cum hoc.*

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 2, q. 1; d. 3, p. II, a. 1 and 2; d. 5, d. 9, and d. 10. — A little below, for *similiter cum hoc* codices A T U [read] *simul cum hoc.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Multa in hac quaestione sunt notatu digna. Ipsa quaestio praecise in hac formula ab aliis non tractatur, sed doctrina in ea exposita a P. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 8. a. 1-8.) passim tangitur. In assignando obiecto doni intellectus S. Bonav. sequitur Magistrum (hic c. 2.), qui hoc ex Augustino sumsisse videtur (cfr. pag. 771, nota 6.). Eandem simili modo tangunt: B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** In seq. (4.) quaestione S. Bonav. virtuti *prudentiae* tribuit dirigere in operabilibus secundum regulam *iuris naturalis,* dono vero *consilii* dirigere secundum regulam *iuris divini* et in rebus *arduis.* Quibus verbis idem re videtur exprimere, quod S. Thom. docet, scilicet prudentiam in istis dirigere «modo humano», consilium vero «supra humanum modum» (hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2.), vel clarius, illam dirigere «secundum ea quae ratio comprehendere potest», hoc vero «quasi consilio a Deo accepto» (S. II. II. q. 52. a. 1. ad 1.), et «in quantum ratio a Spiritu S. movetur» (ibid. ad 3.). De hac quaestione cfr.: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1-3; S. loc. cit. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Many things in this question are worthy of note. The question itself, precisely in this formula, is not treated by others, but the doctrine set forth in it is touched upon throughout by P[ater] Thomas (here q. 2, a. 2; S. II. II. q. 8, a. 1–8). In assigning the object of the gift of understanding S. Bonaventure follows the Master (here c. 2), who seems to have taken this from Augustine (cf. p. 771, note 6). The same [matter] is touched upon in a similar mode by: Bl. Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.

**II.** In the following (4th) question S. Bonaventure attributes to the virtue of *prudence* to direct in things to be done according to the rule of *natural law,* but to the gift of *counsel* to direct according to the rule of *divine law* and in *arduous* things. By which words he seems to express in substance the same thing that S. Thomas teaches, namely that prudence directs in these things "in a human mode," but counsel "above the human mode" (here q. 2, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2), or more clearly, that prudence directs "according to those things which reason can comprehend," but counsel as it were "by a counsel received from God" (S. II. II. q. 52, a. 1, ad 1), and "insofar as reason is moved by the Holy Spirit" (ibid., ad 3). On this question cf.: S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 4, quaestiunculae 1–3; S. loc. cit. a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6, 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 5.

---

translators_notes:
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**Page-split / apparatus map (18 markers over 18 printed footer notes, per-page restart, one-to-one).**
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**`[?]` flags:** none. pp.777–779 legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum actus ipsius doni consilii sit consiliari.*

Quarto quaeritur de actu proprio et obiecto ipsius doni consilii, et est quaestio, utrum actus ipsius doni consilii sit consiliari. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Sapientis[^1] exhortationem, qua hortatur nos omnia facere cum consilio; hoc autem fit consiliando de his quae facimus: cum igitur hortetur ad actum doni consilii, videtur, quod actus istius doni sit consiliari.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Tullii definitionem in primo *Rhetoricae*[^2], ubi definiens consilium dicit: «Consilium est aliquid faciendi, vel non faciendi vere excogitata ratio»; sed ista excogitatio de faciendo, vel non faciendo est ipsa consiliatio: ergo proprius actus doni consilii est consiliari.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Gregorii assignationem. Dicit enim Gregorius super primum *Iob*[^3], ubi assignat donorum differentiam, quod «consilium est contra praecipitationem»; sed actus, qui directe opponitur praecipitationi, est consiliari — ideo enim consiliamur, ne praecipitanter aliquid faciamus — ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per nominis rationem: quoniam, sicut se habet *timere* ad *timorem,* sic se habet *consiliari* ad *consilium;* sed actus proprius et principalis ipsius doni *timoris* est *timere:* ergo actus proprius[^4] ipsius doni consilii est consiliari. Si dicas, quod non dicitur consilium a *consiliando,* sed magis a *consulendo,* et actus ipsius consilii magis est *consulere* quam *consiliari*[^5]; obiicitur contra hoc: quia *consulere* dupliciter[^6] dicitur: uno modo consilium ab aliquo *quaerere,* alio modo *consilium dare;* sed actus doni consilii non est *consilium quaerere* — qui enim consilium quaerit eget consilio, et qui eget consilio iam non habet donum consilii — igitur actus istius doni non est *consulere,* secundum quod *consulere* idem est quod *consilium quaerere.* Rursus, *consilium dare* non est magnae utilitatis nec etiam magnae virtutis, cum multi sciant aliis consulere, qui se ipsos regunt valde miserabiliter; si ergo donum consilii est ordinatum ad propriam utilitatem, videtur, quod actus eius non sit consilium alteri *dare* nec consilium ab alio *accipere,* ut prius ostensum est: ergo videtur, quod actus istius doni directe sit ipsum *consiliari.*

**Sed contra:** 1. Super illud Psalmi[^7]: *Consilium meum iustificationes tuae;* ibi Glossa: «Consilium est servare iustificationes»; sed de eo quod servamus, non consiliamur: ergo si actus ipsius doni consilii est iustificationes observare, non videtur, quod actus eius sit consiliari.

2. Item, sicut dicit Damascenus[^8]: «Consilium est ignorantis et dubitantis», unde et «Christo non convenit consiliari»: si ergo donum consilii fuit in Christo et in quolibet alio sapientiae et scientiae dono perfecto, videtur, quod actus ipsius doni non sit consiliari.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione.* Sicut se habet *addiscere* ad *scire,* sic se habet *consiliari* ad *eligere,* quia utrumque est via ad alterum[^9]; sed sicut per scientiam habilitamur ad cognoscendum, sic per consilii donum habilitamur ad eligendum: cum ergo actus ipsius scientiae non sit *addiscere,* sed magis *scire;* videtur, quod actus ipsius doni non sit *consiliari,* sed magis *eligere.*

4. Item, consilium ordinat et dirigit ad ea quae sunt supererogationis[^10]; sed de istis nemo dubitat, quin sint manifeste bona; de his autem, de quibus nulla est dubitatio, nulla necessaria est consiliatio: cum ergo donum consilii dirigat ad huiusmodi, videtur, quod actus eius non sit consiliari.

5. Item, *consiliari* est ipsius providentiae, quae

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est pars prudentiae[^11]: ergo aut donum consilii non est nobis opportunum, aut est ad alium actum; sed constat, quod nobis est opportunum: videtur ergo, quod consiliari non sit eius actus proprius.

### Conclusio.

> Doni consilii actus proprius est dirigere in electione horum quae sunt arduitatis, secundum dictamen iuris divini, et sic consiliari.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut *intellectus* aliquando accipitur pro *actu intelligendi,* aliquando pro ipso *intellecto* sive intelligibili, aliquando pro ipso *habitu,* qui dirigit intellectum in iudicando de veris et falsis[^12]; sic et consilium tripliciter accipi consuevit: aliquando pro ipso *actu consiliandi;* aliquando pro eo, ad quod *terminatur* ille actus, sicut quando dicitur: hoc est consilium meum; aliquando vero pro ipso *habitu,* qui expedit et dirigit animam ad eligendum prosequenda et ad fugiendum vitanda. — Hic autem *habitus* dirigens ad huiusmodi electionem duplex est secundum diversitatem *eligibilium* et secundum diversitatem *modorum* sive *rationum* eligendi. Nam eligibilia quaedam sunt *necessitatis,* quaedam vero *arduitatis.* In primis dirigit *prudentia,* in secundis vero dirigit *donum consilii* propter excellentiorem et maiorem difficultatem, quae in eis quae arduitatis sunt, habet reperiri. — Rursus, dirigi in electione potest aliquis vel secundum regulam iuris *naturalis,* vel secundum regulam iuris *divini;* et primum quidem est *virtutis politicae*[^13], secundum vero spectat ad *donum consilii.* — Ex his potest elici per quandam circumlocutionem, quis sit *actus proprius* doni consilii: quoniam actus eius est dirigere in electione agendorum, prosequendorum, vel fugiendorum, quae sunt specialis arduitatis, et hoc secundum regulam iuris *divini;* et in hoc distinguitur actus eius ab actu *prudentiae-virtutis* et *scientiae-doni*[^14]. — Si igitur quaeras, utrum actus doni consilii sit *consiliari;* dicendum, quod si per verbum *consiliandi* intelligatur directio secundum regulam et lumen consilii; sic bene potest concedi, quod actus eius sit consiliari. — Sed attendendum est, quod, secundum quod vult Damascenus[^15], consilium respicit aliquem actum *praecedentem* et aliquem actum *sequentem.* Dicit enim, quod «primo homo inquirit et consiliatur, deinde disponit et ordinat, postmodum eligit et consentit». Et secundum hoc intelligendum est, quod dirigi secundum regulam consilii, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut consilium *inquirendo,* aut secundum consilium *disponendo* et *eligendo.* Primo quidem modo non est actus ipsius consilii principalis et universalis, sed quasi actus eius *initialis,* et[^16] in eo, in quo est secundum statum imperfectionis; secundo vero modo actus eius universalis est et principalis. Unde sive per verbum *consiliandi,* sive per verbum *consulendi,* sive per quodcumque aliud verbum id significetur, quod est dirigi in electione horum quae sunt arduitatis secundum consilii donum, quod regit secundum dictamen iuris *divini;* dicendum est, quod hic est actus principalis et proprius doni consilii. — Unde concedi potest, quod consiliari secundum istam acceptionem est eius actus proprius, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt.

Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur de actu consulendi, quomodo spectet ad donum consilii; dicendum, quod *consulere,* prout respicit alterum, accidit dono consilii; donum enim consilii proprie respicit directionem actus proprii; unde licet actus doni consilii attendatur in dispositione et ordinatione *arduorum*[^17] prosequendorum; quia tamen donum illud aliquando est in abundantia, aliquando in defectu, et cum est in abundantia, habet iuvare alios, cum vero est in defectu, habet iuvari ab aliis: hinc est, quod actus consulendi alium, vel consulendi alii dono consilii potest attribui; neuter tamen est actus eius principalis. Unde inter istos duos medius cadit actus consiliandi, ratione cuius et alii habent esse doni consilii. Propter quod non absurde potest dici, quod actus doni consilii est semetipsum regere, et ulterius, cum abundat, scire in consimili alterum adiuvare et dirigere.

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod consilium est iustificationes observare; dicendum, quod ibi non tangitur actus consilii principalis, sed consequens. Nam doni consilii est *dirigere,* sed alterius doni[^18] est exsequi et facere; ideo iustificationum *observatio* non attribuitur ipsi consilio per se et primo, sed ad iustificationes observandas *directio* proprie attribuenda est consilii dono. — Verumtamen quod dicit, neminem consiliari de eo quod observat, non habet veritatem: quia nemo recte observat, nisi suam observationem rectitudo in consiliando praecedat vel quantum ad consilii *inquisitionem,* vel saltem quantum ad consilii *dispositionem.*

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consiliari est ignorantis, sicut dicit Damascenus; dicendum, quod illud est verum, prout *consiliari* idem est quod *consilium inquirere,* non autem prout *consiliari* idem est quod in arduis eligendis *dirigere.* Et hoc modo *consiliari* est actus ipsius consilii et fuit in Christo; et secundum istum modum divina dispositio in his quae secreta sunt, *consilium* appellatur[^19].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut *addiscere* se habet ad *scire,* ita *consiliari* ad *eligere;* dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *consiliatio* idem est quod consilii *inquisitio;* secundum autem quod *consiliatio* idem est quod *discreta* et *recta dispositio* et *ordinatio,* sic non se habet illo modo, quia talis dispositio regula est et principium recte eligendi, et ideo actus est doni perfecti; et hoc modo accipiendo, non est simile inter *consiliari* et *addiscere.*

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consilium ordinat ad ea quae sunt supererogationis; dicendum, quod licet illa quae sunt supererogationis, in se sint *bona* et *magis bona;* in eis tamen facilius deficit infirmitas nostra, nisi iuvetur per divinam gratiam tam in *expediendo*[^20] quam in *eligendo* quam etiam in *exsequendo;* unde multi refugiunt et abhorrent ipsa consilia Iesu Christi, qui tamen esse possunt in statu iustitiae. Et propterea respectu talium opportunum est donum consilii ultra donum scientiae et virtutem prudentiae et regulam fidei.

5. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod consiliari est actus ipsius prudentiae; iam patet responsio. Aliter enim est ipsius prudentiae tum ratione obiecti tum etiam ratione modi, quam sit ipsius doni consilii. Est enim[^21] multo excellentiori modo, tum quia ea, circa quae versatur, sunt magis ardua et excellentia, tum etiam quia regere habet secundum principia altiora; et ideo donum illud nomine *consilii* valde proprie censetur. — Ex his igitur manifestum est, quis sit huius doni *actus,* et quod *obiectum,* et quae *differentia* ipsius respectu aliorum habituum, et quare etiam sic *nominetur*[^22].

---

english:
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### Question IV. *Whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel.*

Fourthly there is inquiry concerning the proper act and object of the gift of counsel, and the question is whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel. And that it is [so], seems [thus]:

1. *First,* by the Wise Man's[^1] exhortation, by which he exhorts us to do all things with counsel; but this is done by taking counsel about the things we do: since therefore he exhorts us to the act of the gift of counsel, it seems that the act of this gift is to take counsel.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Tully's definition in the first book of the *Rhetoric*[^2], where, defining counsel, he says: "Counsel is the truly devised reasoning of something to be done or not to be done"; but this devising about doing or not doing is the very act of counseling: therefore the proper act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by Gregory's assignment. For Gregory says, on the first book of *Job*[^3], where he assigns the difference of the gifts, that "counsel is against precipitation"; but the act which is directly opposed to precipitation is to take counsel — for we take counsel precisely lest we do something precipitately — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by the meaning of the name: for as *to fear* stands to *fear,* so *to take counsel* stands to *counsel;* but the proper and principal act of the gift of *fear* is *to fear:* therefore the proper[^4] act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel. If you say that counsel is not named from *taking counsel* (consiliando), but rather from *advising* (consulendo), and that the act of counsel itself is rather *to advise* than *to take counsel*[^5]; it is objected against this: that *to advise* is said in two ways[^6]: in one way to *seek* counsel from someone, in another way to *give* counsel; but the act of the gift of counsel is not *to seek counsel* — for he who seeks counsel is in need of counsel, and he who is in need of counsel does not yet have the gift of counsel — therefore the act of this gift is not *to advise,* according as *to advise* is the same as *to seek counsel.* Again, *to give counsel* is not of great utility nor even of great virtue, since many know how to advise others who govern themselves very wretchedly; if therefore the gift of counsel is ordered to one's own utility, it seems that its act is not *to give* counsel to another nor to *receive* counsel from another, as was shown before: therefore it seems that the act of this gift is directly *to take counsel* itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that [verse] of the Psalm[^7]: *Thy justifications are my counsel;* there the Gloss [says]: "Counsel is to keep the justifications"; but concerning what we keep, we do not take counsel: therefore if the act of the gift of counsel is to observe the justifications, it does not seem that its act is to take counsel.

2. Likewise, as Damascene says[^8]: "Counsel belongs to one ignorant and doubting," whence also "it is not fitting for Christ to take counsel": if therefore the gift of counsel was in Christ and in any other [person] perfect in the gift of wisdom and knowledge, it seems that the act of this gift is not to take counsel.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by *reason.* As *to learn* stands to *to know,* so *to take counsel* stands to *to choose,* because each is a way to the other[^9]; but as by knowledge we are enabled for knowing, so by the gift of counsel we are enabled for choosing: since therefore the act of knowledge itself is not *to learn,* but rather *to know;* it seems that the act of this gift is not *to take counsel,* but rather *to choose.*

4. Likewise, counsel orders and directs toward those things which are of supererogation[^10]; but concerning these no one doubts that they are manifestly good; but concerning those things about which there is no doubt, no taking of counsel is necessary: since therefore the gift of counsel directs toward such things, it seems that its act is not to take counsel.

5. Likewise, *to take counsel* belongs to providence itself, which

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is a part of prudence[^11]: therefore either the gift of counsel is not opportune for us, or it is for another act; but it is established that it is opportune for us: it seems therefore that to take counsel is not its proper act.

### Conclusion.

> The proper act of the gift of counsel is to direct in the choice of those things which are of difficulty, according to the dictate of divine law, and thus to take counsel.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as *intellect* is sometimes taken for the *act of understanding,* sometimes for the very thing *understood* or intelligible, sometimes for the very *habit* which directs the intellect in judging concerning things true and false[^12]; so too *counsel* is wont to be taken in three ways: sometimes for the very *act of taking counsel;* sometimes for that at which that act *terminates,* as when it is said: this is my counsel; sometimes indeed for the very *habit* which expedites and directs the soul to choosing things to be pursued and to fleeing things to be avoided. — But this *habit* directing toward such choice is twofold according to the diversity of *the things to be chosen* and according to the diversity of *modes* or *grounds* of choosing. For some things to be chosen are *of necessity,* but some are *of difficulty.* In the first *prudence* directs, but in the second the *gift of counsel* directs, on account of the more excellent and greater difficulty which is found in those things which are of difficulty. — Again, one can be directed in choosing either according to the rule of *natural* law, or according to the rule of *divine* law; and the first indeed belongs to *political virtue*[^13], but the second regards the *gift of counsel.* — From these things one can elicit, by a certain circumlocution, what is the *proper act* of the gift of counsel: namely that its act is to direct in the choice of things to be done, to be pursued, or to be fled, which are of special difficulty, and this according to the rule of *divine* law; and in this its act is distinguished from the act of *prudence-as-virtue* and of *knowledge-as-gift*[^14]. — If therefore you ask whether the act of the gift of counsel is *to take counsel;* it must be said that if by the word *taking counsel* there is understood the direction according to the rule and light of counsel, then it can well be conceded that its act is to take counsel. — But it must be observed that, according as Damascene holds[^15], counsel regards a certain act *preceding* and a certain act *following.* For he says that "first a man inquires and takes counsel, then he disposes and orders, afterwards he chooses and consents." And according to this it must be understood that to be directed according to the rule of counsel can be in two ways: either by *inquiring* counsel, or by *disposing* and *choosing* according to counsel. In the first way indeed it is not the principal and universal act of counsel itself, but as it were its *initial* act, and[^16] in him who is in the state of imperfection; but in the second way its act is universal and principal. Whence whether by the word *taking counsel,* or by the word *advising,* or by whatever other word that is signified which is to be directed in the choice of those things which are of difficulty according to the gift of counsel, which governs according to the dictate of *divine* law; it must be said that this is the principal and proper act of the gift of counsel. — Whence it can be conceded that to take counsel according to that acceptation is its proper act, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

But as to that which is lastly objected concerning the act of advising, how it regards the gift of counsel; it must be said that *to advise,* insofar as it regards another, befalls the gift of counsel [accidentally]; for the gift of counsel properly regards the direction of its own proper act; whence although the act of the gift of counsel is attended to in the disposition and ordering of *difficult things*[^17] to be pursued; yet because that gift is sometimes in abundance, sometimes in defect, and when it is in abundance, it has [the office of] helping others, but when it is in defect, it has [the office of] being helped by others: hence it is that the act of advising another, or of advising for another, can be attributed to the gift of counsel; yet neither is its principal act. Whence between these two falls in the middle the act of taking counsel, by reason of which the others too come to be of the gift of counsel. On account of which it can not absurdly be said that the act of the gift of counsel is to govern oneself, and further, when it abounds, to know how in a like case to help and direct another.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that counsel is to observe the justifications; it must be said that there the principal act of counsel is not touched, but a consequent one. For it belongs to the gift of counsel *to direct,* but to another gift[^18] [it belongs] to execute and to do; therefore the *observation* of the justifications is not attributed to counsel itself of itself and primarily, but to the observing of the justifications the *direction* is properly to be attributed to the gift of counsel. — Nevertheless, that which it says, that no one takes counsel concerning what he observes, is not true: because no one rightly observes unless rectitude in taking counsel precede his observation either as to the *inquiry* of counsel, or at least as to the *disposition* of counsel.

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2. To that which is objected, that to take counsel belongs to one ignorant, as Damascene says; it must be said that this is true insofar as *to take counsel* is the same as *to inquire* counsel, but not insofar as *to take counsel* is the same as *to direct* in choosing difficult things. And in this way *to take counsel* is the act of counsel itself and was in Christ; and according to this mode the divine disposition in those things which are secret is called *counsel*[^19].

3. To that which is objected, that as *to learn* stands to *to know,* so *to take counsel* [stands] to *to choose;* it must be said that it is true, according as *taking counsel* is the same as the *inquiry* of counsel; but according as *taking counsel* is the same as the *discreet* and *right disposition* and *ordering,* it does not stand in that way, because such disposition is the rule and principle of choosing rightly, and therefore it is an act of a perfect gift; and taking [it] in this way, there is no likeness between *to take counsel* and *to learn.*

4. To that which is objected, that counsel orders toward those things which are of supererogation; it must be said that although those things which are of supererogation are in themselves *good* and *more good;* yet in them our infirmity more easily fails, unless it be helped by divine grace both in *expediting*[^20] and in *choosing* and also in *executing;* whence many shrink from and abhor the very counsels of Jesus Christ, who nevertheless can be in the state of justice. And therefore with respect to such things the gift of counsel is opportune beyond the gift of knowledge and the virtue of prudence and the rule of faith.

5. But to that which is lastly objected, that to take counsel is the act of prudence itself; the response is already clear. For it belongs to prudence otherwise both by reason of the object and also by reason of the mode than it belongs to the gift of counsel. For it is[^21] in a much more excellent mode, both because the things about which it is occupied are more difficult and excellent, and also because it has [the office of] governing according to higher principles; and therefore that gift is very properly reckoned under the name of *counsel.* — From these things, therefore, it is manifest what is the *act* of this gift, and what its *object,* and what is its *difference* with respect to the other habits, and why also it is so *named*[^22].

---

la: Eccli. 32, 24: *Fili, sine consilio nihil facias, et post factum non poenitebis.* Ibid. c. 37, 20: *Ante omnem actum* [praecedat] *consilium stabile.*

en: Sirach 32:24: "Son, do nothing without counsel, and after the deed thou shalt not repent." Likewise c. 37:20: "Before every act [let] a stable counsel [precede]."

la: Cap. 25. et 11. c. 9. D. Schütz in sua ed. (Augustae Taurin. a. 1823), quae prae manibus est, pro inepta vulgari lectione (ut in notula ibi apposita dicit) *aut non faciendi vere* ex Alcuino substituit *non faciendive.*

en: [Cicero, *De inventione*] c. 25; and c. 9. D. Schütz, in his edition (Augsburg–Turin, 1823), which is at hand, for the unsuitable common reading (as he says in the note appended there) substitutes from Alcuin *non faciendive* in place of *aut non faciendi vere.*

la: Vers. 19. — Gregor., 11. *Moral.* c. 49. n. 77. Cfr. supra pag. 736, nota 8. — De *minori* dicit Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 9: *Unde aiunt, cito agenda esse quae consultaveris, tarde vero ac diu consulendum.*

en: Verse 19. — Gregory, *Morals* book XI, c. 49, n. 77. Cf. above p. 736, note 8. — Concerning the *minor* [premise] Aristotle says, *Ethics* book VI, c. 9: "Whence they say that what you have deliberated upon must be done quickly, but the deliberating must be slow and long."

la: Cod. Y addit *et principalis.*

en: Codex Y adds *et principalis* (and principal).

la: Eadmer., *de S. Anselmi similitudinibus* (inter opera Anselmi), c. 131: *Post haec vero consilium fortitudini superaedificat* [Spiritus S.], *cum mens iam fortis ad operandum, quae pie timendo scit esse facienda, suo experimento didicit Spiritus sancti gratia, quid de his omnibus aliis consulere debeat.*

en: Eadmer, *On the Similitudes of St. Anselm* (among the works of Anselm), c. 131: "But after these things [the Holy Spirit] builds counsel upon fortitude, when the mind, now strong for doing the things which by piously fearing it knows are to be done, has learned by its own experience, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, what it ought to advise concerning all these other things."

la: Videlicet *consulere aliquem* et *consulere alicui.* — Mox pro *ab aliquo quaerere* non pauci codd. *ab alio quaerere* (cod. II *petere*).

en: Namely *to advise someone* (consulere aliquem) and *to take counsel for someone* (consulere alicui). — Presently for *ab aliquo quaerere* not a few codices [read] *ab alio quaerere* (codex II *petere*).

la: Psalm. 118, 24. — Glossa integra, quae sumta est ex August. et hic ex parte tantum exhibetur, apud Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc., sic sonat: *Quasi dicat: Consilium meum est servare iustificationes, in quibus est diligere inimicos. Ecce consilium contra consilium. Consilium sedentium principum fuit inventos martyres perdere; martyrum patientium fuit consilium illos perditos acquirere.* — De *minori* cfr. Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 3.

en: Psalm 118:24. — The full Gloss, which is taken from Augustine and is here exhibited only in part, in Peter Lombard on this passage reads thus: "As if to say: My counsel is to keep the justifications, in which is to love enemies. Behold, counsel against counsel. The counsel of the princes sitting [in judgment] was to destroy the martyrs they had found; the counsel of the patient martyrs was to win those destroyers." — On the *minor* [premise] cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* book III, c. 3.

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22. circa finem. Seq. locus sententialiter ibid. et III. c. 14. circa finem.

en: [Damascene,] *On the Orthodox Faith* book II, c. 22, near the end. The following passage [is found] in substance in the same place and in book III, c. 14, near the end.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 2. seq. — Edd. addunt *addiscere ad scire, consiliari ad eligere.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* book III, c. 2 f. — The editions add *addiscere ad scire, consiliari ad eligere* (to learn [is] to to know, to take counsel [is] to to choose).

la: Matth. 19, 21: *Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes* etc. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Damascenus, II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22: *Nemo enim de eo deliberaverit* [βουλεύεται], *quod exploratum habet.*

en: Matthew 19:21: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast" etc. Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* book II, c. 22: "For no one deliberates [βουλεύεται] about that which he holds as ascertained."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 728, nota 6. Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 5. docet, viri prudentis esse, consultare posse; et c. 7. ait: *Prudentis* enim *id maxime opus esse dicimus, ut recte consultet.*

en: Cf. above p. 728, note 6. Aristotle, *Ethics* book VI, c. 5, teaches that it belongs to the prudent man to be able to deliberate; and c. 7 says: "For we say that it is most of all the work of the *prudent* man that he deliberate rightly."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 778, nota 4. et pag. 214, nota 4. — Edd. *aliquando pro ipso habitu intelligendi, qui dirigit ipsum intellectum* etc.

en: Cf. above p. 778, note 4, and p. 214, note 4. — The editions [read] *aliquando pro ipso habitu intelligendi, qui dirigit ipsum intellectum* (sometimes for the very habit of understanding, which directs the intellect itself) etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 730, nota 5. — Vat. *prudentiae.*

en: Cf. above p. 730, note 5. — The Vatican [edition reads] *prudentiae* (of prudence).

la: Vide supra q. 2. et d. 33. dub. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *quod si* permulti codd. *quod etsi.*

en: See above q. 2 and d. 33, dub. 2. — A little below, for *quod si* very many codices [read] *quod etsi.*

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22. et III. c. 14. — Post *attendendum est* non pauci codd. omittunt *quod.*

en: [Damascene,] *On the Orthodox Faith* book II, c. 22, and book III, c. 14. — After *attendendum est* not a few codices omit *quod.*

la: Edd. supplent *est.*

en: The editions supply *est* (is).

la: Codd. A U *istorum arduorum.*

en: Codices A U [read] *istorum arduorum* (of those difficult things).

la: Scil. fortitudinis. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia). — Mox pro *ideo* (cod. E *et ideo*) edd. *et.* Inferius pro *proprie,* quod habent codd. DMPRXYZ bb, aliqui *pro actu,* cod. K *pro proprio actu,* cod. W *proprie pro actu,* edd. *in actu.*

en: Namely, of fortitude. Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way). — Presently for *ideo* (codex E *et ideo*) the editions [read] *et.* Below, for *proprie,* which codices DMPRXYZ bb have, some [read] *pro actu,* codex K *pro proprio actu,* codex W *proprie pro actu,* the editions *in actu.*

la: Eph. 1, 11: *In quo etiam et nos sorte vocati sumus, praedestinati secundum propositum eius qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo superius post *et secundum* bene multi codd. inserunt *etiam.*

en: Ephesians 1:11: "In whom we also are called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Cf. I Sent. d. 40, a. 3, q. 1, in the body. — A little above, after *et secundum* a good many codices insert *etiam.*

la: Cod. N *exponendo,* cod. A *experiendo.* Paulo inferius pro *opportunum* cod. bb et edd. 1, 2 *optimum.*

en: Codex N [reads] *exponendo,* codex A *experiendo.* A little below, for *opportunum* codex bb and editions 1, 2 [read] *optimum.*

la: Cod. Z supplet *consilii.* Circa finem huius quaest. et pluries in quaest. seq. pro *et quod obiectum* edd. *et quid obiectum.*

en: Codex Z supplies *consilii.* Near the end of this question, and several times in the following question, for *et quod obiectum* the editions [read] *et quid obiectum.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.780–782 (PDF 802–804; `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p78{0,1,2}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 54151–54317. Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied. Offset pdf = printed + 22. Running heads verified: p.780 verso `780 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`; p.781 recto `DIST. XXXV. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV. 781`; p.782 verso `782 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`. Marginal print-glosses (Quaracchi side-notes) on pp.781–782 confirm the argument-frame: *Fundamenta* (p.780 L); *Ad oppositum* (p.780 R Sed contra); *Intellectus et consilium suo modo tribuuntur tripliciter* / *ipse habitus duplex* / *Praenotata* / *Conclusio 1–3* / *Respicit 2 actus* / *Notandum* / *Ad 4. fundamentum* / *Solutio oppositorum* (p.781); *Notandum* / *Nota* (p.782).

**Alignment check — PASS (1:1).** TRACTATIO **Quarto** = *quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni **consilii*** → a1-q4. The opener reads *Quarto quaeritur de actu proprio et obiecto ipsius doni consilii, et est quaestio, utrum actus ipsius doni consilii sit consiliari* — q4 = **consilium**, confirmed against the divisio's six-question listing. q5 (raw 54318) opens *Quinto quaeritur, quis sit actus proprius doni fortitudinis* = **fortitudo**, confirming the forward boundary. No q-swap.

**Page span / apparatus map (22 markers, per-page restart over 3 printed footer bands).**
- **p.780** (L-col opener + args 1–4; R-col arg 4-tail, arg 5, Sed contra 1–4, start of SC 5): the page's footer is interleaved across both columns but is a single 10-note band, all q4 by body anchor. **nn.1–10 → [^1]–[^10]:** arg 1 *Sapientis¹* (Eccli. 32,24) → [^1]; arg 2 *Rhetoricae²* (Cicero/Schütz) → [^2]; arg 3 *Iob³* (Gregor. + Aristot. VI Ethic c.9) → [^3]; arg 4 *actus proprius⁴* (Cod. Y *et principalis*) → [^4]; *consiliari⁵* (Eadmer *de similitudinibus*) → [^5]; *dupliciter⁶* (*consulere aliquem/alicui* + *ab alio quaerere* variant) → [^6]; SC 1 *Psalmi⁷* (Ps. 118,24 + the full Augustine/Lombard Gloss) → [^7]; SC 2 *Damascenus⁸* (de Fide orthod. II.22) → [^8]; SC 3 *via ad alterum⁹* (Aristot. III Ethic) → [^9]; SC 4 *supererogationis¹⁰* (Matth. 19,21 + Damasc.) → [^10].
- **p.781** (SC 5-tail, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, reply 1): **nn.1–8 → [^11]–[^18]:** SC 5 *prudentiae¹* (Aristot. VI Ethic c.5/c.7) → [^11]; Respondeo *de veris et falsis²* (the *intellectus*-triplex cross-ref + Edd. variant) → [^12]; *virtutis politicae³* (*Vat. prudentiae*) → [^13]; *scientiae-doni⁴* (Vide supra q.2 et d.33 dub.2) → [^14]; *Damascenus⁵* (de Fide orthod. II.22/III.14 + *omittunt quod*) → [^15]; *initialis, et⁶* (Edd. supplent *est*) → [^16]; *arduorum⁷* (Codd. A U *istorum arduorum*) → [^17]; reply 1 *alterius doni⁸* (*Scil. fortitudinis* + d.34 cross-ref + *proprie* variant cluster) → [^18].
- **p.782** (replies 2–5): **nn.1–4 → [^19]–[^22]:** reply 2 *consilium appellatur¹* (Eph. 1,11 + I Sent. d.40) → [^19]; reply 4 *expediendo²* (Cod. N *exponendo* + *optimum* variant) → [^20]; reply 5 *Est enim³* (Cod. Z supplet *consilii* + *et quid obiectum* variant) → [^21]; final clause *nominetur⁴* (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) → **[^22]** = the scholion-redirect marker. **p.782 n.5** (*Libr. I. Moral. c.32 n.44, super Iob… Fortitudinis-doni est dare trepidanti confidentiam*) opens **QUAESTIO V**'s band (arg 1 *per Gregorium*) — **FORWARDED to a1-q5.** Marker pairing verified **22/22** equal in Latin and English bodies.

**Scholion disposition — `has_scholion: false`, REDIRECT.** q4's range (raw 54151–54317) has NO own `SCHOLION.` header (verified by grep) — the SCHOLION at raw 54124 closes **a1-q3** (and its §II is the *consilium* dossier). Per the a1-q3 hand-off, **a1-q3's article-master scholion §II is exactly this question's dossier** (*In seq. (4.) quaestione…*: prudentia directs *modo humano* by *ius naturale,* the gift of counsel *supra humanum modum* by *ius divinum* in *rebus arduis;* S. Thom. hic q. 2 a. 4 quaestiunc. 1–3 / S. II. II. q. 52 a. 1; Bl. Albert a. 6–7, Petr. a Tar. q. 3 a. 1, Richard a. 2 q. 5). The final footer note [^22] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms the redirect in the source itself. → **see the scholion to a1-q3, §II.**

**Footer hand-offs.** PICKED UP from a1-q3: NOTHING — q4 opens a fresh per-page footer band on p.780 (q3 closed fully at p.779 n.5). FORWARDED to a1-q5: p.782 nn.5 ff. (the *fortitudo* question's opening band, beginning with the Gregory *super Iob* note on *fortitudinis-doni est dare trepidanti confidentiam*). QUAESTIO V opens at the foot of p.782 L-col, beneath q4's reply 4 (its args run p.782 R-col onward).

**`[?]` flags:** none. pp.780–782 legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0