site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Proemium, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### QUAESTIO II.
#### *Quae causa formalis quive modus procedendi sit in his libris Sententiarum.*

Secundo quaeritur[^p9-1] de causa *formali* sive modo agendi. Et dictum est, quod est *perscrutatorius* et inquisitivus secretorum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Isaiae quadragesimo[^p9-2]: *Deus dat secretorum scrutatores quasi non sint.*

2. Item, Proverbiorum vigesimo quinto[^p9-3]: *Perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria.*

3. Item, Ecclesiastici tertio[^p9-4]: *Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris.* Ergo, si ea quae Magister perscrutatur, sunt secreta,

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sunt magna, sunt alta et fortia, male Magister procedit.

4. Item, *ratione* ostenditur sic: modus procedendi in parte scientiae debet esse uniformis *modo* totalis scientiae[^p10-1]; sed modus procedendi in sacra Scriptura est typicus et per modum narrationis, non inquisitionis: cum ergo liber iste pertineat ad sacram Scripturam, non debet procedere inquirendo.

5. Item, modus agendi debet esse conveniens *materiae,* de qua est; unde in principio veteris Ethicae[^p10-2] dicitur: «Sermones inquirendi sunt secundum materiam»; sed materia huius doctrinae est credibile; sed credibile est supra rationem: ergo modus procedendi per rationes non convenit huic doctrinae.

6. Item, modus agendi debet esse conveniens *fini,* ad quem ordinatur scientia; sed haec scientia, ut dicit Magister in littera[^p10-3], ordinatur ad fidei promotionem; sed rationes fidem non promovent, sed evacuant; unde Gregorius[^p10-4]: «Fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum»: ergo talis modus contrariatur fini, ergo non est conveniens. Unde et Ambrosius[^p10-5]: «Tolle, inquit, argumenta, cum de fide agitur. Piscatoribus creditur, non dialecticis». Vanus ergo et inutilis videtur hic modus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Primae Petri tertio[^p10-6]: *Parati omni poscenti reddere rationem de ea quae in vobis est fide et spe.* Cum ergo multi sint, qui fidem nostram impugnant, non tantum rationem de ea poscunt; utile et congruum videtur per rationes eam astruere et modo inquisitivo et ratiocinando procedere: ergo etc.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore in libro de Trinitate[^p10-7]: «Credo sine dubio, ad quorumlibet explanationem, quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, sed etiam necessaria argumenta non deesse, licet contingat nostram industriam latere». Ergo cum fides nostra credat necessaria, et illa habeant rationes latentes, et talia indigeant perscrutatione, ut enodentur[^p10-8]; patet quod modus perscrutatorius maxime convenit huic scientiae.

3. Item, non est peioris conditionis veritas fidei nostrae quam aliae veritates; sed in aliis veritatibus ita est, quod omnis, quae potest per rationem impugnari, potest et debet per rationem defendi: ergo pari ratione et veritas fidei nostrae.

4. Item, non est modo fides nostra peioris conditionis quam in principio; sed in principio, quando impugnabatur per falsa miracula magorum, defendebatur per vera Sanctorum: ergo cum modo impugnetur per falsa argumenta haereticorum, debet defendi per vera argumenta doctorum.

### Conclusio

> *Modus procedendi perscrutatorius sive ratiocinativus convenit huic doctrinae, cum valeat ad confundendum adversarios fidei, ad fovendum infirmos in fide, ad delectandum perfectos.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod modus perscrutatorius convenit huic doctrinae sive libro. Cum enim finis imponat necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem; quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p10-9]: «Serra est dentata, quia est ad secandum»; sic iste liber, quia est ad promotionem fidei, habet modum inquisitivum. Modus enim ratiocinativus sive inquisitivus valet ad fidei promotionem, et hoc tripliciter secun-

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dum tria genera hominum. Quidam enim sunt fidei *adversarii,* quidam sunt in fide *infirmi,* quidam vero *perfecti.*

Modus inquisitivus valet *primo ad confundendum adversarios.* Unde Augustinus primo de Trinitate[^p11-1]: Adversus garrulos ratiocinatores elatiores quam capaciores rationibus catholicis et similitudinibus congruis ad defensionem et assertionem fidei est utendum. *Secundo valet ad fovendum infirmos.* Sicut enim Deus caritatem infirmorum fovet per beneficia temporalia, sic fidem infirmorum fovet[^p11-2] per argumenta probabilia. Si enim infirmi viderent, rationes ad fidei probabilitatem deficere et ad oppositum abundare, nullus persisteret. *Tertio valet ad delectandum perfectos.* Miro enim modo anima delectatur in intelligendo quod perfecta fide credit. Unde Bernardus[^p11-3]: «Nihil libentius intelligimus, quam quod iam fide credimus».

1. 2. 3. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod omnes illae auctoritates intelliguntur de perscrutatione curiosa, non de perscrutatione studiosa. Nam ipse Dominus dixit Iudaeis, Ioannis quinto[^p11-4]: *Scrutamini scripturas* etc.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod iste[^p11-5] modus non competit sacrae Scripturae; dicendum ad hoc, quod liber iste ad sacram Scripturam reducitur per modum cuiusdam subalternationis, non partis principalis; similiter et libri doctorum, qui sunt ad fidei defensionem. Quod patet sic: quia non quaelibet determinatio trahens in partem facit subalternationem scientiae, sed determinatio quodam modo *distrahens*[^p11-6]. Nam scientia de linea recta non dicitur subalternari geometriae, sed scientia de linea visuali, quoniam haec determinatio quodam modo trahit ad alia principia. Quoniam igitur sacra Scriptura est de credibili ut credibili[^p11-7], hic est de credibili ut facto intelligibili, et haec determinatio *distrahit* — «nam quod credimus debemus auctoritati, et quod intelligimus, rationi[^p11-8]» — hinc est, quod sicut alius modus certitudinis est in scientia superiori et inferiori, ita alius modus certitudinis est in sacra Scriptura et alius in hoc libro, et ideo alius modus procedendi. Et sicut scientia subalternata, ubi deficit, redit ad certitudinem scientiae subalternantis, quae maior est; sic etiam, cum Magistro deficit certitudo rationis, recurrit ad auctoritatis certitudinem[^p11-9] sacrae Scripturae, quae excedit omnem certitudinem rationis.

5. Quod tu obiicis, quod[^p11-10] debet convenire *materiae;* dicendum, quod convenit. Et quod obiicitur, quod credibile est supra rationem; verum est, supra rationem quantum ad *scientiam acquisitam*[^p11-11], sed non supra rationem *elevatam per fidem* et per donum scientiae et intellectus. Fides enim elevat ad assentiendum; scientia et intellectus elevant ad ea quae credita sunt intelligendum.

6. Quod obiicitur, quod[^p11-12] non convenit *fini,* quia evacuat meritum; dicendum, quod, quando assentitur propter se rationi, tunc aufertur locus fidei, quia in anima hominis dominatur violentia rationis. Sed quando fides non assentit propter rationem, sed propter amorem eius cui assentit, desiderat habere rationes; tunc non evacuat ratio humana meritum, sed auget solatium. Et primo modo intelligit[^p11-13] Hieronymus, quod non sunt inducenda argumenta dialectica, quibus homo principaliter innitatur, quia innitendum est auctoritati principalius quam rationi.

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english:
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### QUESTION II.
#### *What is the formal cause, or the manner of proceeding, in these books of the Sentences.*

Secondly it is asked[^p9-1] about the *formal* cause, or the manner of acting. And it has been said that it is *searching-out* and inquisitive of things hidden.

**On the contrary:** 1. Isaiah, chapter forty[^p9-2]: *God giveth the searchers of secrets as though they were not.*

2. Likewise, Proverbs, chapter twenty-five[^p9-3]: *He that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory.*

3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter three[^p9-4]: *Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy strength.* Therefore, if the things which the Master searches out are hidden,

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are great, are high and beyond one's strength, the Master proceeds badly.

4. Likewise, it is shown *by reason* thus: the manner of proceeding in a part of a science ought to be uniform with *the manner* of the whole science[^p10-1]; but the manner of proceeding in sacred Scripture is typical and by way of narration, not of inquiry: since therefore this book pertains to sacred Scripture, it ought not to proceed by inquiring.

5. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be suited to *the matter* with which it deals; whence at the beginning of the old *Ethics*[^p10-2] it is said: «Discourses are to be inquired into according to the matter»; but the matter of this doctrine is the credible; but the credible is above reason: therefore a manner of proceeding by reasons does not suit this doctrine.

6. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be suited to *the end* to which the science is ordered; but this science, as the Master says in the text[^p10-3], is ordered to the promotion of faith; but reasons do not promote faith, they empty it out; whence Gregory[^p10-4]: «Faith has no merit, where human reason supplies the proof»: therefore such a manner is contrary to the end, therefore it is not suitable. Whence also Ambrose[^p10-5]: «Away, he says, with arguments, when the question is of faith. Credence is given to fishermen, not to dialecticians». Vain, therefore, and useless does this manner seem.

**On the contrary:** 1. First of Peter, chapter three[^p10-6]: *Ready to render a reason to every one that asketh of the faith and hope which is in you.* Since therefore there are many who assail our faith, they do not merely ask a reason for it; it seems useful and congruous to build it up by reasons and to proceed in an inquisitive manner and by reasoning: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor, in the book *On the Trinity*[^p10-7]: «I believe without doubt that, for the explanation of whatever things must necessarily be, there is no lack of arguments not merely probable but even necessary, though it may happen that they escape our industry». Therefore, since our faith believes things that are necessary, and those things have reasons lying hidden, and such things need searching out in order that they may be unravelled[^p10-8], it is plain that the searching-out manner suits this science supremely.

3. Likewise, the truth of our faith is not of worse condition than other truths; but in other truths it stands thus, that every truth which can be assailed by reason can and ought to be defended by reason: therefore by parity of reason the truth of our faith also.

4. Likewise, our faith is not now of worse condition than in the beginning; but in the beginning, when it was assailed by the false miracles of the magicians, it was defended by the true ones of the Saints: therefore, since it is now assailed by the false arguments of heretics, it ought to be defended by the true arguments of the doctors.

### Conclusion

> *The searching-out or ratiocinative manner of proceeding suits this doctrine, since it avails for the confounding of the adversaries of faith, for the fostering of the weak in faith, for the delighting of the perfect.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the searching-out manner suits this doctrine or book. For since the end imposes necessity upon the things that are for the end — because, as the Philosopher says[^p10-9]: «The saw is toothed, because it is for cutting» — so this book, because it is for the promotion of faith, has an inquisitive manner. For the ratiocinative or inquisitive manner avails for the promotion of faith, and this in three ways accord-

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ing to three kinds of men. For some are *adversaries* of the faith, some are *weak* in faith, and some are *perfect.*

The inquisitive manner avails *first for confounding the adversaries.* Whence Augustine, in the first book *On the Trinity*[^p11-1]: Against garrulous reasoners, more puffed up than capacious, one must make use of catholic reasons and congruous likenesses for the defence and assertion of the faith. *Secondly it avails for fostering the weak.* For just as God fosters the charity of the weak by temporal benefits, so He fosters[^p11-2] the faith of the weak by probable arguments. For if the weak were to see that reasons for the probability of faith were lacking and abounded on the opposite side, no one would persist. *Thirdly it avails for delighting the perfect.* For in a wondrous manner the soul is delighted in understanding what it believes with a perfect faith. Whence Bernard[^p11-3]: «There is nothing we understand more gladly than what we already believe by faith».

1. 2. 3. As to what is therefore objected on the contrary side, it must be said that all those authorities are to be understood of a *curious* searching out, not of a *studious* one. For the Lord Himself said to the Jews, John, chapter five[^p11-4]: *Search the scriptures* etc.

4. As to what is objected, that this[^p11-5] manner does not befit sacred Scripture; to this it must be said that this book is reduced to sacred Scripture by way of a certain subalternation, not as a principal part; and likewise the books of the doctors, which are for the defence of faith. Which is plain thus: because not every determination that draws a thing into a part makes a subalternation of science, but a determination that in some manner *draws it aside*[^p11-6]. For the science of the straight line is not said to be subalternated to geometry, but the science of the visual line, since this determination in some manner draws it to other principles. Since therefore sacred Scripture is of the credible as credible[^p11-7], while this book is of the credible as made intelligible, and this determination *draws aside* — «for what we believe we owe to authority, and what we understand, to reason[^p11-8]» — hence it is that, just as there is one manner of certitude in a higher science and another in a lower, so there is one manner of certitude in sacred Scripture and another in this book, and therefore another manner of proceeding. And just as a subalternated science, where it falls short, returns to the certitude of the subalternating science, which is greater; so also, when certitude of reason fails the Master, he has recourse to the certitude of the authority[^p11-9] of sacred Scripture, which exceeds every certitude of reason.

5. As to what you object, that it[^p11-10] ought to suit *the matter;* it must be said that it does suit it. And as to what is objected, that the credible is above reason; it is true, above reason as regards *acquired science*[^p11-11], but not above reason *elevated by faith* and by the gift of knowledge and of understanding. For faith elevates one to assent; knowledge and understanding elevate one to understand the things that are believed.

6. As to what is objected, that it[^p11-12] does not suit *the end,* because it empties out merit; it must be said that, when assent is given to reason for its own sake, then the place of faith is taken away, because in the soul of man the violence of reason holds mastery. But when faith assents not on account of reason, but on account of love for Him to whom it assents, and desires to have reasons; then human reason does not empty out merit, but increases consolation. And it is in the first way that Jerome understands[^p11-13] that dialectical arguments are not to be brought in, upon which a man should principally lean, because one must lean upon authority more principally than upon reason.

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la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omissis verbis *Secundo quaeritur,* Vat. deinde addit *huius libri.* — *Et dictum est,* scilicet in Prooemio; *perscrutatorius,* id est rationativus sive rationalis, quod vocabulum S. Bonav. sumsit ex loco Iob, in principio Prooemii posito. Constat quod, suppositis fidei principiis, per usum rationis formatur scientia theologica, cuius obiectum, ut supra q. 1. S. Doctor exposuit, est credibile, prout transit in rationem intelligibilis, et hoc per additionem rationis.

en: Against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, the Vatican edition, having omitted the words *Secundo quaeritur,* then adds *huius libri.* — *Et dictum est,* namely in the Proemium; *perscrutatorius,* that is, ratiocinative or rational, which word St. Bonaventure took from the passage of Job set at the beginning of the Proemium. It is settled that, the principles of faith being presupposed, theological science is formed by the use of reason, whose object, as the holy Doctor set out above in q. 1, is the credible, insofar as it passes into the character of the intelligible, and this by the addition of a rational ground.

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Vers. 27; Vulgata legit: *Qui scrutator est maiestatis* etc.

en: Verse 27; the Vulgate reads: *Qui scrutator est maiestatis* etc.

la: Vers. 22.

en: Verse 22.

la: Cod. R propositionem maiorem sic exhibet: *modus procedendi in scientia debet convenire scientiae.*

en: Codex R presents the major proposition thus: *modus procedendi in scientia debet convenire scientiae.*

la: Nullius mss. auctoritate ponit Vat. *primo Ethicorum.* Lectio mss. confirmatur codice lat. 6569 Bibliothecae Regalis Parisiensis, qui continet Aristotelis Ethicam in duas partes distributam. Prima pars comprehendit *primum* Ethicorum librum estque translationis graeco-latinae, uti ex verbo *proheresis,* quod iam in principio occurrit, colligitur. Haec pars intitulatur *Ethica nova.* Secunda pars complectitur *secundum et tertium* Ethicorum librum et vocatur *Ethica vetus.* Vide Jourdain: Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, pag. 179, ubi et de hac *Ethica veteri* adiungitur: Non videtur mihi, quod haec translatio sit aetatis multum antiquioris. Ibidem citatur alia graeco-latina translatio Ethicorum, quae in operibus S. Thomae sub nomine *Translatio vetus* invenitur, in eaque (II. c. 2.) locus a S. Bonaventura allegatus sic exhibetur: Sermones sunt expetendi secundum materiam. Similis locus habetur quidem I. Ethic. c. 3, qui tamen etiam in cit. antiqua translatione aliis verbis exhibetur: Dicetur autem utique sufficienter, si secundum subiectam materiam manifestetur. — Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1 pro *sed credibile* non ita bene *et credibile,* quia est minor subsumta. In hac propositione forsan respicitur illud Dionysii de Div. Nom. c. 1: Eius quidem (Divinitatis) scientia et contemplatio omnibus invia est.

en: On the authority of no manuscript the Vatican edition puts *primo Ethicorum.* The reading of the manuscripts is confirmed by Latin codex 6569 of the Royal Library of Paris, which contains Aristotle's *Ethics* distributed into two parts. The first part comprises the *first* book of the *Ethics* and belongs to the Greek-Latin translation, as is gathered from the word *proheresis,* which occurs already at the beginning. This part is entitled *Ethica nova.* The second part embraces the *second and third* book of the *Ethics* and is called *Ethica vetus.* See Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote,* p. 179, where of this *Ethica vetus* it is added as well: It does not seem to me that this translation is of a much more ancient date. In the same place another Greek-Latin translation of the *Ethics* is cited, which is found among the works of St. Thomas under the name *Translatio vetus,* and in it (II, c. 2) the passage alleged by St. Bonaventure stands thus: Sermones sunt expetendi secundum materiam. A similar passage is indeed found at *Ethics* I, c. 3, which however, even in the cited ancient translation, is presented in other words: Dicetur autem utique sufficienter, si secundum subiectam materiam manifestetur. — Presently the Vatican edition, the manuscripts and edition 1 opposing it, has, less well, *et credibile* for *sed credibile,* since it is the minor premiss subsumed. In this proposition there is perhaps regard to that saying of Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 1: The knowledge and contemplation of it (of the Godhead) is inaccessible to all.

la: Infra in Prologo.

en: Below, in the Prologue.

la: Homil. 26. in Evang.

en: *Homily 26 on the Gospels.*

la: Quoad hunc textum Ambrosii notamus, quod ipse tam in mss. quam in Vat. exhibetur sub nomine *Hieronymi,* at falso; non enim in operibus S. Hieronymi habetur, sed in Ambrosii libro I. de Fide c. 13. n. 84. his verbis profertur: Aufer argumenta, ubi fides quaeritur... non creditur philosophis, creditur piscatoribus; non creditur dialecticis, creditur publicanis. — In quo textu Vat., non consentientibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, ante *piscatoribus* ponit *pastoribus et.*

en: As to this text of Ambrose we note that it is presented, both in the manuscripts and in the Vatican edition, under the name of *Jerome,* but falsely; for it is not found among the works of St. Jerome, but is set forth in Ambrose's book I *On the Faith,* c. 13, n. 84, in these words: Away with arguments, where faith is in question... credence is not given to philosophers, it is given to fishermen; credence is not given to dialecticians, it is given to publicans. — In which text the Vatican edition, without the consent of the more ancient manuscripts and of edition 1, puts *pastoribus et* before *piscatoribus.*

la: Vers. 15, ubi Vulgata legit: Parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est spe. — Mox lectionem Vat. *utique* pro *non tantum,* in qua et constructio propositionis perturbatur et sensus ipsius non integre redditur, emendamus ex fere omnibus mss. (aliqui ut H ff falso habent *non tamen)* et ed. 1. Cod. B vero bene explicans aliorum codd. lectionem ponit *et non tantum.* Mox cod. R non ita bene *eos instruere* loco *eam astruere;* et immediate post ex codd. A F G H I R S T etc. cum ed. 1 *inquisitivo* pro *inquisitorio* substituimus.

en: Verse 15, where the Vulgate reads: Parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est spe. — Presently we emend the Vatican edition's reading *utique* for *non tantum* — a reading in which both the construction of the proposition is thrown into confusion and its sense is not rendered entire — from nearly all the manuscripts (some, such as H ff, falsely have *non tamen)* and from edition 1. Codex B, however, rightly explaining the reading of the other codices, puts *et non tantum.* Presently codex R has, less well, *eos instruere* in place of *eam astruere;* and immediately after we have substituted, from codices A F G H I R S T etc. together with edition 1, *inquisitivo* for *inquisitorio.*

la: Libr. I. c. 4. — Vat., reluctantibus mss. et ed. 1, circa initium huius textus omittit relativum *quae* et verbum *est,* quibus omissis sensus omnino perturbatur.

en: Book I, c. 4. — The Vatican edition, the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, omits near the beginning of this text the relative *quae* and the verb *est,* and with these omitted the sense is thrown into utter confusion.

la: Plures codd. ut M P Z cum ed. 1 *enucleentur.*

en: Several codices, such as M P Z, together with edition 1, read *enucleentur.*

la: Aristot., II. Phys. in fine, text. 92, ubi legitur: Haec autem (divisio sive sectio) non erit, nisi serra habeat dentes tales. Et I. de Partib. animal. c. 5: Non enim sectio serrae gratia facta est, sed serra sectionis gratia.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, at the end, text 92, where it is read: But this (division or cutting) will not be, unless the saw have such teeth. And *On the Parts of Animals* I, c. 5: For the cutting was not made for the sake of the saw, but the saw for the sake of the cutting.

la: Cap. 2, ubi dicitur: Istis garrulis ratiocinatoribus, elatioribus quam capacioribus atque ideo morbo periculosiore laborantibus, sic fortasse serviemus, ut inveniant aliquid, unde dubitare non possint. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 in hoc textu post *ratiocinatoribus* addit *magis.*

en: Chapter 2, where it is said: To those garrulous reasoners, more puffed up than capacious and therefore labouring under a more dangerous disease, we shall perhaps be of service in this way, that they may find something whereof they cannot doubt. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, adds *magis* after *ratiocinatoribus* in this text.

la: Cod. K hic addit *quis,* sed non bene, ut videtur.

en: Codex K here adds *quis,* but not rightly, as it seems.

la: Libr. V. de Consid. c. 3. in fine: Nil autem malumus scire, quam quae fide iam scimus.

en: *On Consideration,* book V, c. 3, at the end: But there is nothing we would rather know than the things we already know by faith.

la: Vers. 39.

en: Verse 39.

la: Substituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *iste* pro *ille.*

en: We have substituted, from the more ancient manuscripts and from edition 1, *iste* for *ille.*

la: Id est, quae rem ad alium conceptum vel ad alia principia specialia trahit.

en: That is, one which draws the thing to another concept or to other special principles.

la: Ita antiquiores mss. (quorum aliqui ut A F G P Q ee cum ed. 1 ante *credibili* repetunt praepositionem *de)* contra Vat., quae habet *credibile.* — Mox per demonstrativum *hic* intelligitur liber Sententiarum. Cod. B addit *vero,* cod. O habet *haec autem scientia* loco *hic.* Dein cod. F pro *facto* ponit *ratione.*

en: So the more ancient manuscripts (some of which, such as A F G P Q ee, together with edition 1, repeat the preposition *de* before *credibili)* against the Vatican edition, which has *credibile.* — Presently, by the demonstrative *hic* is understood the book of the Sentences. Codex B adds *vero;* codex O has *haec autem scientia* in place of *hic.* Then codex F puts *ratione* for *facto.*

la: August. de Utilit. credendi c. 11. n. 25: Quod intelligimus igitur debemus rationi, quod credimus auctoritati. In quo textu plures codd. ut F G H T etc. cum Vat. *debetur* pro *debemus.*

en: Augustine, *On the Usefulness of Believing,* c. 11, n. 25: What we understand, therefore, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority. In which text several codices, such as F G H T etc., together with the Vatican edition, have *debetur* for *debemus.*

la: Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc, omittendo *certitudinem,* legit *auctoritates;* codd. B L N O T ee lectionem Vat. servantes addunt *et ad certitudinem;* codd. autem C D F M P Q U W X Z aa bb exhibent lectionem in textum receptam, quam praeferimus eo, quod in ipsa duae species certitudinis, scilicet *auctoritatis* et *rationis,* distinctiori modo exhibentur.

en: The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc, omitting *certitudinem,* reads *auctoritates;* codices B L N O T ee, keeping the Vatican edition's reading, add *et ad certitudinem;* but codices C D F M P Q U W X Z aa bb present the reading received into the text, which we prefer on this ground, that in it the two species of certitude, namely that *of authority* and that *of reason,* are presented in a more distinct manner.

la: Supple: *modus,* quod Vat. sola addit. — Cod. R *obiicitur* loco *tu obiicis.*

en: Supply: *modus,* which the Vatican edition alone adds. — Codex R has *obiicitur* in place of *tu obiicis.*

la: Hoc est, habitam investigatione naturalis rationis et modo naturali, qui secundum Scholasticos a via sensus et experientiae incipit. Huic scientiae opponitur scientia infusa, sub qua continetur cognitio fidei, utpote quae tam respectu obiecti cogniti, quam respectu modi cognoscendi homini immediate a Deo praestatur. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic addit *per rationem evidentem,* quam additionem tamen nimis arctam iudicamus; certum siquidem est quod ratio, nisi elevetur per donum fidei, ad stricte credibilium cognitionem ne quidem *probabilem* pertingere non possit. Melius cod. K pro *ad scientiam acquisitam* ponit *ratio in se consideratur.* — Mox plurimi codd. A B C D F G I L M P Q S T V X Y ee *sapientiae* loco *scientiae,* quod tamen ex subnexis improbatur.

en: That is, science had by the investigation of natural reason and in the natural manner, which according to the Scholastics begins from the way of sense and experience. To this science is opposed infused science, under which is contained the knowledge of faith, inasmuch as it is bestowed on man immediately by God both in respect of the object known and in respect of the manner of knowing. See III *Sent.* d. 35 q. 2. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1, here adds *per rationem evidentem;* which addition, however, we judge too narrow, since it is certain that reason, unless it be elevated by the gift of faith, cannot attain even a *probable* knowledge of things strictly credible. Better, codex K puts *ratio in se consideratur* for *ad scientiam acquisitam.* — Presently very many codices, A B C D F G I L M P Q S T V X Y ee, have *sapientiae* in place of *scientiae,* which nevertheless is disproved by what is subjoined.

la: Supple: modus iste. — Mox ad idem subiectum propositionis servandum fide multorum mss. A F G I K R S T etc. et ed. 1 praeferimus *evacuat* passivo *evacuatur,* quod habet Vat.

en: Supply: modus iste. — Presently, in order to keep the same subject of the proposition, on the faith of many manuscripts, A F G I K R S T etc., and of edition 1, we prefer *evacuat* to the passive *evacuatur,* which the Vatican edition has.

la: Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, removimus additionem Vat. *Gregorius similiter et,* quae additio, sicuti iacet, omissa scil. qualibet interpunctione, erronea est, quia quae sequuntur non respiciunt verba Gregorii, sed solummodo Hieronymi. Cod. D post *intelligit* adiungit particulam *et.*

en: With the manuscripts and edition 1 favouring it, we have removed the Vatican edition's addition *Gregorius similiter et;* which addition, as it stands — that is, with all punctuation omitted — is erroneous, because what follows does not have regard to the words of Gregory, but only to those of Jerome. Codex D adds the particle *et* after *intelligit.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solut. *ad 4.* S. Doctor tangit aliam quaestionem, utrum scil. theologia sit *scientia subalternata,* de qua scholae Scoti et D. Thomae dissentiunt, quatenus eius subalternatio intelligitur respectu *theologiae beatorum.* Scotus enim negativam sententiam tenet, sumendo *subalternationem* in sensu stricto cum omnibus conditionibus, quas requirit Aristoteles (I. Poster. c. 10.); S. Thom. vero (S. I. q. 1. a. 2.) subalternationem aliquam admittit. Seraphicus autem hic loquitur tantum de subalternatione relate ad *s. Scripturam* et in hac solutione omnino concordat cum S. Thoma (S. I. q. 1. a. 2.), Scoto (hic Prolog. q. 4. et 5.) aliisque doctoribus. — De subalternatione respectu theologiae *beatorum* cfr. Scot., I. Report. Prolog. q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 4; I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. 5. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 4. a. 2. cum Comment. Caietani. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. ad ult. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. et 5. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. Prolog. p. 1. princ. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 7. q. 4. et seqq. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 7. et 8.

**II.** Cum dicitur in solut. *ad 6:* Quando assentitur propter se rationi; sensus est: quando homo non habet voluntatem aliquid credendi nisi propter rationem convincentem. Cfr. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. et 5. — Notabilis est forma locutionis: «In anima hominis *dominatur violentia rationis*». Ratio enim humana, quae se intra suos limites angustos claudendo influxum primae veritatis reiicit legitimoque suo Domino obsequium denegat, iusto iudicio condemnatur, ut sub iugo erroris servire debeat.

**III.** In solutione ipsius quaestionis omnes doctores satis consentiunt, et plurima hic dicta confirmantur Conc. Vaticano cap. IV. de fide cath. — Bonav. Breviloq. Prooem.; Comment. in Evang. S. Ioannis, Prolog. n. 10. (in I. tom. Suppl. Bonelli). — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 4. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. in fine; II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 5; S. I. q. 1. a. 8. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 1. q. 5; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 7. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 14. q. 2; a. 8. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. — Gabr. Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 7.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the solution *to 4* the holy Doctor touches upon another question, namely whether theology is a *subalternated science,* about which the schools of Scotus and of the Doctor Thomas disagree, insofar as its subalternation is understood with respect to *the theology of the blessed.* For Scotus holds the negative opinion, taking *subalternation* in the strict sense with all the conditions which Aristotle requires (*Posterior Analytics* I, c. 10); but St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 1, a. 2) admits some subalternation. The Seraphic Doctor, however, speaks here only of subalternation in relation to *sacred Scripture,* and in this solution he agrees entirely with St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 1, a. 2), with Scotus (here, Prologue, qq. 4 and 5), and with the other doctors. — On subalternation with respect to the theology *of the blessed* see Scotus, I *Report.* Prologue q. 3 a. 3 quaestiuncula 4; I *Sent.* Prologue qq. 4, 5. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 4, a. 2, with the Commentary of Cajetan. — Blessed Albert, I *Sent.* d. 1 a. 4 ad ult. — Richard of Middleton, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 1 and 5. — Giles of Rome, I *Sent.* Prologue p. 1, principale 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 7 q. 4 and following. — Durandus, I *Sent.* Prologue qq. 7 and 8.

**II.** When it is said in the solution *to 6:* When assent is given to reason for its own sake; the sense is: when a man has no will to believe anything except on account of a convincing reason. See *Sent.* d. 24 a. 2 q. 1 ad 2 and 5. — Notable is the form of expression: «In the soul of man *the violence of reason holds mastery*». For human reason, which by shutting itself within its own narrow limits rejects the influx of the first Truth and refuses obedience to its own lawful Lord, is by a just judgement condemned to have to serve under the yoke of error.

**III.** In the solution of the question itself all the doctors are sufficiently agreed, and very many of the things said here are confirmed by the Vatican Council, chapter IV, on the catholic faith. — Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* Prooemium; *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John,* Prologue n. 10 (in vol. I of Bonelli's *Supplement*). — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 2 m. 3 a. 4. — Scotus, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 3, at the end; II *Sent.* d. 1 q. 4. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 1 a. 5; *Summa* I q. 1 a. 8. — Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. I tr. 1 q. 5; I *Sent.* d. 1 a. 5. — Peter of Tarantasia, I *Sent.* Prologue a. 6. — Richard of Middleton, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 7. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 14 q. 2; a. 8 q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 3. — Durandus, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 1. — Gabriel Biel, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 7.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol1_raw.txt`, raw L10234–10626)
with **all four printed pages read at the plate** (`raw/vision/vol1/p-0{09,10,11,12}.png`, 450 dpi,
2028 × 2986 px; offset `pdf = printed + 102`) as the arbiter of the page span, of every footnote
marker position, of the marginalia, and of every apparatus digit. The plate settled six readings the
raw had wrong or garbled — see the digit list below. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page span, fixed positively.** Opens at the bare `QUAESTIO II.` display heading about two-thirds
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against the `QUAESTIO III.` display heading that follows it on the same leaf. p. 9's boundary with
`bon-sent-I-proem-q1` is fixed by the `S. Bonav. — Tom. I.` signature line and the printed page
number `10` at raw L10272 — **not** by the running head, which already reads `PROOEMII QUAEST. II.`
on p. 9 because q2 opens there. **p. 12's running head lies in the same way in the other direction:
it reads `PROOEMII QUAEST. III.` above a leaf whose top half is q2's Scholion.** Same asymmetric-
witness rule, twice on one chunk.

**Apparatus: 26 entries, all read off 1.7–2.0× footer bands, never off a whole-page view.**
p. 9 nn. 1–4 (inherited — see the hand-off below) · p. 10 nn. 1–9 · p. 11 nn. 1–13 ·
**p. 12 none.**

**Hand-off PICKED UP from `bon-sent-I-proem-q1`: ownership was verified, positions were
re-derived here.** q1's report forwarded p. 9 nn. 1–4 as q2's, and that is correct — n. 1 glosses
q2's opening *Secundo quaeritur* and nn. 2–4 are the `Vers.` notes on q2's three *sed contra*
citations (Isaiah 40, Prov. 25, Eccli. 3). Where they land was established here at the plate: **the
whole of p. 9's register is q2's, and n. 1 overruns the column division**, opening in the left block
and running on into the right (`…cuius obiectum, ut` | `supra q. 1. S. Doctor exposuit…`). q1
forwards nothing else, and it owns nothing on p. 9 — its Scholion, which fills the leaf's upper
two-thirds, carries no anchors at all.

**Hand-off FORWARDED to `bon-sent-I-proem-q3`: p. 12's whole register — nn. 1–6 — is q3's.**
Verified here by anchor: n. 1 glosses q3's opening *Tertio quaeritur,* and nn. 2–6 answer to anchors
in q3's fundamenta and *sed contra* (verae ² · undecimo ³ · in littera ⁴ · de fide ⁵ · ab opere
nostro ⁶). **q2 owns no apparatus on the leaf its Scholion occupies** — the Scholion carries no
anchors, citing its authorities inline. This is the shape q1 met on p. 9, arrived at from the other
side, and it is now the second instance in Book I's front.

**Block structure and anchor structure come apart on both footer pages.** p. 10: the block splits
**4/5** (nn. 1–4 left, nn. 5–9 right) while the anchors split **7/2** (nn. 1–7 in the left column,
nn. 8–9 in the right). p. 11: the block splits **9/4** (n. 9 itself overrunning into the right block)
while the anchors split **6/7**. Read anchors, only anchors.

**Digits and sigla settled at the plate against the raw.** `codice lat. 6569` (raw `6369` — 3/5
class, confirmed at 2.2×) · `Cod. K hic addit quis` (raw `Cod. R` — the chronic raw R-for-K) ·
`Melius cod. K` (raw agrees) · `codd. A F G I K R S T` at p. 11 n. 12 (raw `A F G I R R S T`) ·
`Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 2.` (raw `d. 33.` — 3/5 class again, and the citation now resolves) ·
`de Utilit. credendi c. 11. n. 25` (raw `n. 2S`) · `Vers. 15` (raw `1S`) · `I. de Partib. animal.
c. 5` (raw `c. S`) · `S. I. q. 4. a. 2. cum Comment. Caietani` in Scholion I, checked at 4× because
it sits two lines from an unambiguous `d. 1. a. 4.` and because the same Scholion cites `S. I. q. 1.
a. 2.` twice above it — **the plate prints 4 and the raw reads 4; transcribed as printed.**
The `1`/`4` class fired nowhere else on these three leaves; the `3`/`5` class fired twice.
Don't calibrate the next leaf on that.

**Marginalia, trimmed from the body and transcribed here in body order** (standing Vol I
convention). — p. 9: *Ad oppositum.* (beside the first *sed contra*). — p. 10: *Fundamenta.*
(beside the second *sed contra*) · *Conclusio.* (beside the *Respondeo*). — p. 11: *Triplex
utilitas.* · *Solutio oppositorum.* · *Theologia subalternatur S. Scripturae.* — p. 12: none.
**⚠ The gloss order is inverted from q1's.** In q1 *Fundamentum* stood at the opening and
*Ad oppositum* at the *sed contra;* here the question opens with the objections, so *Ad oppositum*
comes first and *Fundamenta* marks the second *Sed contra,* which is the affirmative case. The raw
splices `conciusio.` into the Respondeo line on p. 10; that is the gloss bleeding, not text.

**Register (continues the one frozen at `bon-sent-I-proem-q1`; these are its additions).**
*modus perscrutatorius* → **"the searching-out manner"** (never "investigative": the word is the
question's technical term, it answers to *perscrutator/scrutari* in all three objection texts, and
the apparatus at `[^p9-1]` glosses it as *rationativus sive rationalis*) · *modus inquisitivus* →
"the inquisitive manner" · *modus ratiocinativus* → "the ratiocinative manner" · *scientia
subalternata / subalternans* → "subalternated / subalternating science", *subalternatio* →
"subalternation" · *determinatio distrahens* → "a determination that draws aside" (kept distinct
from *trahens in partem* → "draws into a part") · *evacuare meritum* → **"to empty out merit"** ·
*solatium* → "consolation" · *fovere* → "to foster" · *infirmi* → "the weak" (never "the infirm":
they are set against *perfecti* and *adversarii,* a class of believers, not the sick) ·
*enodari* → "to be unravelled" · *scientia acquisita / infusa* → "acquired / infused science" ·
*ratio elevata per fidem* → "reason elevated by faith".

**⛔ THE THREE GUARD-RAIL AUDITS CANNOT SEE THIS CHUNK.** `audit-paraphrase.py`,
`audit-headers.py` and `audit-apparatus-count.py` all select on the filename regex
`bon-sent-{I,II,III,IV}-d(\d+)-`; a `distinctio: 0` front-matter chunk never matches, and all three
print a clean verdict on **0 chunks audited.** Never record such a run as audits-clean. This chunk
was verified instead by marker pairing in both languages, structural parity, per-page plate
discipline for all three registers, and the decoupled full-corpus scripts.

**`build-citations.py` — this chunk's own QA flags, dispositioned (corpus total 207 → 205).**
Two flags, both in Scholion III, both **false positives of the author-governance class, not digit
errors**: `I. Sent. d. 1. a. 5.` and `II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4.` The resolver reads them as
self-references; on the plate each stands **after a doctor's siglum** — `— B. Albert., S. p. I.
tr. 1. q. 5; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 5.` and `— Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. in fine; II. Sent. d. 1.
q. 4.` — so by the frozen governance rule the locus is Albert's commentary and Scotus's, not
Bonaventure's. Independently confirmed by structure: Book I's d. 1 has three articles, and Book II's
d. 1 is divided by pars, so neither target could exist in this corpus at any digit. Both digits were
read off the 1.9× band. **No edit; Quaracchi is not emended.** The corpus figure moved down by two
because the chunk retires four dangling references elsewhere.

**No `[?]` flags.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Proemium, Q. 3

title_alt: Whether this book, or theology, is for the sake of contemplation or that we may become good — that is, whether it is a speculative or a practical science

source_text:
<!-- page 12 -->

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### QUAESTIO III.
#### *Utrum hic liber sive theologia sit contemplationis gratia, an ut boni fiamus, sive utrum sit scientia speculativa, an practica.*

Tertio quaeritur[^p12-1] de causa *finali.* Et cum dictum sit, quod liber iste est ad revelandum abscondita, quaeritur, utrum opus hoc sit contemplationis gratia, vel ut boni fiamus. Et quod sit, ut boni fiamus, videtur sic.

1. Omnis doctrina, quae est de his, sine quorum cognitione non contingit recte vivere, est, ut boni fiamus: sed iste liber est ad cognitionem verae[^p12-2] fidei, sine qua *impossibile est placere Deo* nec recte vivere, ut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo[^p12-3]: ergo iste liber est, ut boni fiamus.

2. Item, omnis doctrina, quae convenit cum *virtute* in obiecto, est, ut boni fiamus; haec per se manifesta est; sed haec doctrina convenit cum fide in obiecto, quia est de credibili, de quo etiam est fides sive in quo: ergo etc.

3. Item, doctrina particularis convenit cum totali in *fine;* sed finis totalis Scripturae sacrae non est tantum, ut fiamus boni, sed etiam ut fiamus beati; et beatitudo est optimum: ergo finis istius scientiae est, ut boni fiamus.

**Contra:** 1. Magister dicit in littera[^p12-4], quod finis sive intentio sua «est theologicarum inquisitionum abdita pandere»; sed hoc pertinet ad eum, cuius finis est speculatio: ergo etc.

2. Item, scientia, quae est, ut boni fiamus, pertinet ad mores; sed cum theologia sit de fide[^p12-5] et moribus, liber autem iste de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores: ergo opus hoc non est, ut boni fiamus.

3. Item, omnis scientia, quae est, ut boni fiamus, est practica; sed omnis talis est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro[^p12-6]; sed haec non est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, sed a Deo: ergo est contemplationis gratia, non ut boni fiamus.

<!-- page 13 -->

### Conclusio

> *Scientia theologica est habitus affectivus et medius inter speculativum et practicum, et pro fine habet tum contemplationem, tum ut boni fiamus, et quidem principalius, ut boni fiamus.*

**Respondeo:** Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum est, quod perfectibile a scientia est intellectus noster.[^p13-1] Hunc autem contingit considerare tripliciter, scilicet *in se,* vel prout extenditur ad *affectum,* vel prout extenditur ad *opus.* Extenditur autem intellectus per modum dictantis et regulantis. Secundum hunc triplicem statum, quia[^p13-2] errare potest, habet triplicem *habitum directivum.* Nam si consideremus intellectum *in se,* sic est proprie speculativus et perficitur ab habitu, qui est contemplationis gratia, qui[^p13-3] dicitur *scientia speculativa.* Si autem consideremus ipsum ut natum extendi ad *opus,* sic perficitur ab habitu, qui est, ut boni fiamus; et hic est *scientia practica* sive moralis. Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus[^p13-4] extendi ad *affectum,* sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativum et practicum, qui complectitur utrumque; et hic habitus dicitur *sapientia,* quae simul dicit cognitionem et affectum: *Sapientia enim doctrinae est secundum nomen eius,* Ecclesiastici sexto.[^p13-5] Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen, ut boni fiamus.

Talis est cognitio tradita in hoc libro. Nam cognitio haec iuvat fidem, et fides sic est in intellectu, ut, quantum est de sui ratione, nata sit movere affectum[^p13-6]. Et hoc patet. Nam haec cognitio, quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est, et consimiles, nisi sit homo peccator et durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista: quod diameter est asymeter costae[^p13-7].

Concedendum ergo, quod est, ut boni fiamus.

1. Quod obiicitur, quod[^p13-8] est ad pandendum abscondita; dicendum, quod ibi non est status, quia illa revelatio ordinat ad affectum.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod non est de moribus nec de his quae sunt ab opere nostro; iam patet responsio ad illud[^p13-9], quia ipse loquitur de illa quae proprie est, ut boni fiamus, ut de practica.

english:
<!-- page 12 -->

### QUESTION III.
#### *Whether this book, or theology, is for the sake of contemplation, or that we may become good; that is, whether it is a speculative science or a practical one.*

Thirdly it is asked[^p12-1] about the *final* cause. And since it has been said that this book is for revealing things hidden, it is asked whether this work is for the sake of contemplation, or that we may become good. And that it is that we may become good, is shown thus.

1. Every teaching which is about those things without the knowledge of which one cannot live rightly, is that we may become good: but this book is directed to the knowledge of the true[^p12-2] faith, without which *it is impossible to please God,* nor to live rightly, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven[^p12-3]: therefore this book is that we may become good.

2. Likewise, every teaching which agrees with *virtue* in its object, is that we may become good; this is manifest of itself; but this teaching agrees with faith in its object, because it is about the credible, about which faith also is, or in which it is: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a particular teaching agrees with the total one in its *end;* but the total end of sacred Scripture is not only that we may become good, but also that we may become blessed; and beatitude is the best: therefore the end of this science is that we may become good.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Master says in the text[^p12-4] that his end or intention «is to lay open the hidden things of theological inquiries»; but this belongs to him whose end is speculation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a science which is that we may become good pertains to morals; but whereas theology is about faith[^p12-5] and morals, this book is nevertheless about the things that pertain to faith, not about the things that pertain to morals: therefore this work is not that we may become good.

3. Likewise, every science which is that we may become good is practical; but every such science is about the things which are from our own working[^p12-6]; but this one is not about the things which are from our own working, but from God: therefore it is for the sake of contemplation, not that we may become good.

<!-- page 13 -->

### Conclusion

> *Theological science is an affective habit and a middle one between the speculative and the practical, and it has for its end both contemplation and that we may become good — and indeed, more principally, that we may become good.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that what is perfectible by a science is our intellect.[^p13-1] Now this can be considered in three ways, namely *in itself,* or as it is extended to *the affections,* or as it is extended to *work.* And the intellect is extended after the manner of one dictating and regulating. According to this threefold state, because[^p13-2] it can err, it has a threefold *directive habit.* For if we consider the intellect *in itself,* it is in that way properly speculative and is perfected by a habit which is for the sake of contemplation, which[^p13-3] is called *speculative science.* But if we consider it as apt to be extended to *work,* it is in that way perfected by a habit which is that we may become good; and this is *practical* or moral *science.* But if it is considered in the middle way, as apt[^p13-4] to be extended to *the affections,* it is in that way perfected by a habit midway between the purely speculative and the practical, which embraces both; and this habit is called *wisdom,* which says at once cognition and affection: for *the wisdom of doctrine is according to her name,* Ecclesiasticus, chapter six.[^p13-5] Hence this one is for the sake of contemplation, and that we may become good — principally, however, that we may become good.

Such is the knowledge handed down in this book. For this knowledge helps faith, and faith is in the intellect in such a way that, so far as its own account goes, it is apt to move the affections[^p13-6]. And this is clear. For this knowledge, that Christ died for us, and the like, unless a man be a sinner and hardened, moves him to love; not so this one: that the diameter is asymmeter to the side[^p13-7].

It must therefore be granted that it is that we may become good.

1. As to what is objected, that it[^p13-8] is for laying open things hidden; it must be said that there is no resting-point there, because that revelation orders one to the affections.

2. 3. As to what is objected, that it is not about morals nor about the things which are from our own working; the answer to that[^p13-9] is already clear, because he is speaking of that science which is properly that we may become good, that is, of practical science.

la: Vat. proprio marte omittit *Tertio quaeritur.*

en: The Vatican edition, on its own authority, omits *Tertio quaeritur.*

la: Ita plures codd. ut A I K T X etc. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet *nostrae;* praeferimus lectionem codd., utpote quae est S. Doctori familiarior et planius exprimit praerequisitum ad recte vivendum.

en: So several codices, as A I K T X etc., with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, which has *nostrae;* we prefer the reading of the codices, inasmuch as it is more familiar to the holy Doctor and expresses more plainly what is prerequisite to living rightly.

la: Vers. 6.

en: Verse 6.

la: In Prolog. vide infra.

en: In the Prologue; see below.

la: Substituimus particulam *et* pro *non de.* Dubium quidem non leve hac in re ingerebatur nobis eo, quod, cum Scholaticorum tempore theologia communiter dicta contineretur compendiose in libro Sententiarum, sicuti de isto libro statim subiicitur, quod sit *de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores,* ita etiam de theologia dicendum sit, quod *sit de fide, non de moribus.* Sed consentientibus omnibus mss. et ed. 1, lectionem Vat. mutavimus; qua mutatione supposita, *theologia* largiori sensu accipienda est, quatenus diversas complectitur disciplinas. — Mox plures codd. inter quos et cod. T cum ed. 1 post *iste* addunt *est.*

en: We have substituted the particle *et* for *non de.* A doubt indeed by no means slight pressed upon us in this matter, in that, since in the time of the Scholastics theology as commonly so called was contained in compendious form in the book of the Sentences, just as of this book it is at once subjoined that it is *about the things which pertain to faith, not about the things which pertain to morals,* so also of theology it would have to be said that it *is about faith, not about morals.* But since all the manuscripts and edition 1 agree, we have altered the reading of the Vatican edition; and on the supposition of that alteration, *theology* is to be taken in the broader sense, inasmuch as it embraces various disciplines. — Presently several codices, among them codex T, with edition 1, add *est* after *iste.*

la: Duabus his propositionibus consimiles habet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 2: Quoniam praesens tractatio (Ethicae) non est speculationis causa, quemadmodum aliae; non enim fit, ut cognoscamus, quid sit virtus, sed ut boni efficiamur. Et II. Metaph. text. 3. (I. brevior. c. 1.): Speculativae etenim (scientiae) finis veritas, practicae autem opus. — Secundam huius argumenti propositionem cod. K ita exhibet: *et omnis scientia practica est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, non a Deo: sed ista scientia non est* etc.

en: Aristotle has propositions very like these two, *Ethics* II, c. 2: Since the present treatise (of the *Ethics*) is not for the sake of speculation, as the others are; for it does not take place that we may know what virtue is, but that we may be made good. And *Metaphysics* II, text 3 (I of the shorter version, c. 1): For the end of the speculative (sciences) is truth, but of the practical, work. — The second proposition of this argument codex K presents thus: *et omnis scientia practica est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, non a Deo: sed ista scientia non est* etc.

la: Hoc est, intellectus est subiectum aptum perfici a scientia. — Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, ponendo *perfectibilis* transponit verba *a scientia* post *noster.*

en: That is, the intellect is the subject apt to be perfected by science. — The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, by putting *perfectibilis,* transposes the words *a scientia* after *noster.*

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, transponendo *quia* cum praefixa particula *et,* in principio huius propositionis aliqualiter respectum considerationis immutat. — Mox cod. X *perfectivum* pro *directivum,* et plures codd. ut C F G L R S etc. corrupte *ductivum.*

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, by transposing *quia* together with the particle *et* prefixed to it, somewhat alters the respect of the consideration at the beginning of this proposition. — Presently codex X has *perfectivum* for *directivum,* and several codices, as C F G L R S etc., corruptly *ductivum.*

la: Vat. minus bene *quae.* Simile recurrit in sequenti propositione, in qua Vat. habet *haec* pro *hic;* utrobique tamen contra maiorem partem mss. ut A C F G H K M P Q S T U W Z cc ee ff et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition less well *quae.* The like recurs in the following proposition, in which the Vatican edition has *haec* for *hic;* in both places, however, against the greater part of the manuscripts, as A C F G H K M P Q S T U W Z cc ee ff, and edition 1.

la: Codd. K et Z, sicuti in praecedentibus, *consideremus ut natum.* — Mox ex mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3, 6 castigavimus mendum Vat. legentis *effectum* pro *affectum.*

en: Codices K and Z, as in what precedes, *consideremus ut natum.* — Presently, from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have corrected the error of the Vatican edition, which reads *effectum* for *affectum.*

la: Vers. 23, ubi Vulgata transponit *est* post *nomen.* — Sensus est: sapientia secundum etymologiam tempore S. Doctoris communiter receptam idem est ac *sapida scientia,* sive *scientia,* quae dat *saporem.* Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1; S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Paulo supra ante *simul* Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *quia* loco *quae.* — In principio sequentis propositionis sub demonstrativo *hic* subaudi *habitus;* ed. 1 habet *haec,* quod refertur ad *sapientia.* — Mox cod. K cum ed. 1 satis bene *principalius* loco *principaliter.*

en: Verse 23, where the Vulgate transposes *est* after *nomen.* — The sense is: wisdom, according to the etymology commonly received in the time of the holy Doctor, is the same as *savoury science,* or *science* which gives *savour.* See Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 1 m. 1; St. Bonaventure, III *Sent.* d. 35 q. 1. — A little above, before *simul,* the Vatican edition, against almost all the codices and edition 1, has *quia* in place of *quae.* — At the beginning of the following proposition, under the demonstrative *hic* understand *habitus;* edition 1 has *haec,* which is referred to *sapientia.* — Presently codex K, with edition 1, quite well *principalius* in place of *principaliter.*

la: Codd. I et T *et fides licet sit in intellectu, tamen quantum est de sui ratione, nata est movere affectum;* lectio non spernenda. — Mox cod. X pro *Et hoc* ponit *Quod sic.* Dein ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic restituimus particulam *quod,* quae deest in Vat., sed modo loquendi Scholasticorum magis congruit; e contra paulo infra post *amorem* expunximus fide mss. et ed. 1 in Vat. addita verba *et devotionem.*

en: Codices I and T *et fides licet sit in intellectu, tamen quantum est de sui ratione, nata est movere affectum;* a reading not to be despised. — Presently codex X puts *Quod sic* for *Et hoc.* Then, from almost all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have here restored the particle *quod,* which is wanting in the Vatican edition but agrees better with the Scholastics' manner of speaking; on the other hand, a little below, after *amorem,* we have struck out, on the faith of the manuscripts and of edition 1, the words *et devotionem* added in the Vatican edition.

la: Id est, diameter quadrati est incommensurabilis lateri, quae sententia occurrit in IV. Phys. Aristot., ubi iuxta antiquam versionem impressam Venetiis 1489 studio Bernardino de Tridino, textu 120. (ed. Paris. c. 12.) sic legitur: Quoniam neque quod non est, erit in tempore, ut quaecumque non contingunt aliter esse, sicut diametrum esse lateri symetrum. Et ibidem iuxta translationem arabico-latinam: Illud quod impossibile est, ut sit aliter, ut diametrum esse symetrum costae (τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον.). Pro quo textu in Vat. habetur *circulus vincit diametrum,* sed obstant codd. et ed. 1.

en: That is, the diameter of a square is incommensurable with its side — a saying which occurs in Aristotle's *Physics* IV, where, according to the ancient version printed at Venice in 1489 by the care of Bernardino da Trino, at text 120 (Paris edition, c. 12), it reads thus: Since neither will that which is not be in time, as whatever things cannot be otherwise, as that the diameter should be commensurable with the side. And in the same place, according to the Arabic-Latin translation: That which is impossible to be otherwise, as that the diameter should be commensurable with the side (τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον.). In place of this text the Vatican edition has *circulus vincit diametrum,* but the codices and edition 1 stand against it.

la: Subaudi hic et in principio sequentis responsionis: liber iste, vel, scientia praesentis libri.

en: Understand here, and at the beginning of the following reply: this book, or, the science of the present book.

la: Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd., perturbata propositionis constructione, habet *duo ultima* pro *illud.* Immediate post plures codd. ut C F H L O Q etc. minus bene *quod* loco *quia.* — Mox post *illa* supple cum Vat. *scientia.*

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, with the construction of the proposition disturbed, has *duo ultima* for *illud.* Immediately after, several codices, as C F H L O Q etc., less well *quod* in place of *quia.* — Presently, after *illa,* supply with the Vatican edition *scientia.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio communiter sic proponitur: utrum theologia sit speculativa, an practica? Attamen, stricte loquendo, inter hunc et illum loquendi modum est differentia. Nam proprie *practica* est notitia, quae per se est ordinabilis ad *operationem;* et in hoc sensu S. Doctor negat, theologiam esse practicam (ad 2. et 3.). Sed ut *boni fiamus* per directionem ad *finem ultimum* sive per inflammationem affectus, hoc inter speculativas scientias propriissime convenit theologiae.

**II.** In corp. tangitur quaestio inter scholasticos agitata, utrum theologia sit *sapientia,* quod communiter affirmatur, cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 1. q. 3; S. I. q. 1. a. 6. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. ad 1. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5. ad 3. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. Prolog. p. 2. q. 1. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 6. q. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. in fine.

**III.** In ipsa solutione quaestionis cum Seraphico Doctore et re et modo loquendi conveniunt Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., Thom. de Argentina. S. Thom. in Commentar. in Sent. loco infra cit. simpliciter dicit: Ergo (scientia sacra) non est practica, sed speculativa; in Summa vero: Comprehendit sub se utrumque, magis vero est speculativa quam practica. Haec ultima solutio parum distat a doctrina Seraphici, quod patet sic.

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1. Uterque admittit praeter scientiam speculativam et practicam tertium membrum, quod simul utrumque continet. Licet Scotus (Prolog. q. 4.) de hac divisione male sentiat, tamen fere ab omnibus et rationabiliter admittitur et bene defenditur ab Aegid. Rom. loc. cit. Ita habitus theologicae scientiae, cum sit superioris ordinis, quia fundatur in principiis fidei, quae imperatur a voluntate et involvit inclinationem in Deum, videtur esse eminenter speculativus et aliquo modo practicus; habet enim virtutem et intellectum illuminandi et affectum inflammandi. Unde saltem in sensu largo haec scientia potest appellari practica, licet ex parte *obiecti* non immediate dirigat operationem, quia ex parte *finis* de sui ratione inclinat ad amorem Dei. Pro explicatione servire potest III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

2. Si S. Thomas dicit, quod theologia sit magis speculativa quam practica, hoc verum est, si consideratur ex parte *obiecti;* et hanc rationem etiam S. Bonaventura satis innuit, cum in solut. ad 2. et 3. neget, quod haec scientia sit practica in sensu stricto. Si vero Seraphicus affirmat, quod sit «principaliter, ut boni fiamus», hoc iterum verissimum est, si spectatur eius *finis,* qui certe magis est, ut boni fiamus, quam ut tantum divina speculemur.

3. S. Bonaventura hic theologiam expresse non nominat scientiam *affectivam;* tamen tertium membrum divisionis, quod speculativum et practicum in se complectitur, non inepte cum B. Alberto aliisque antiquis hoc vocabulo distingui potest, attendendo finem principalem, qui est caritas in affectu. Nam a fine principali aliqua res nomen bene sortiri potest. — De duplici genere cognitionis, scil. speculationis et devotionis, cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.

**IV.** De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1. et 2. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., Prolog. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 8. q. 3. et seqq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. prolog. q. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 6. — Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 12.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is commonly put thus: whether theology is speculative or practical? Yet, strictly speaking, there is a difference between the one manner of speaking and the other. For properly *practical* is that knowledge which of itself is orderable to *operation;* and in this sense the holy Doctor denies that theology is practical (in the replies to 2 and 3). But that *we may become good* through direction to *the last end,* or through the enkindling of the affections — this belongs most properly to theology among the speculative sciences.

**II.** In the body of the article there is touched a question debated among the scholastics, whether theology is *wisdom,* which is commonly affirmed; see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 1 m. 1. — Scotus, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 3. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* Prologue a. 1 q. 3; *Summa* I q. 1 a. 6. — Blessed Albert, I *Sent.* d. 1 a. 4 ad 1. — Richard of Middleton, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 5 ad 3. — Giles of Rome, I *Sent.* Prologue p. 2 q. 1. — Peter of Tarantasia, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 6 q. 2. — Durandus, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 1, at the end.

**III.** In the solution of the question itself both in substance and in manner of speaking there agree with the Seraphic Doctor: Alexander of Hales, Blessed Albert, Peter of Tarantasia, Giles of Rome, Thomas of Strasbourg. St. Thomas, in the *Commentary on the Sentences* at the place cited below, says simply: Therefore (sacred science) is not practical, but speculative; but in the *Summa:* It comprehends both under itself, yet it is more speculative than practical. This last solution stands little apart from the Seraphic Doctor's teaching, which is clear thus.

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1. Each of them admits, besides speculative and practical science, a third member which contains both at once. Although Scotus (Prologue q. 4) thinks ill of this division, nevertheless it is admitted by almost all, and reasonably, and is well defended by Giles of Rome at the place cited. Thus the habit of theological science, since it is of a higher order — because it is founded on the principles of faith, which is commanded by the will and involves an inclination toward God — seems to be eminently speculative and in some way practical; for it has the power both of illuminating the intellect and of enkindling the affections. Hence at least in a broad sense this science can be called practical, although on the side of its *object* it does not immediately direct operation, because on the side of its *end* it of its own account inclines to the love of God. For an explanation III *Sent.* d. 23 a. 1 q. 2 in the body can serve.

2. If St. Thomas says that theology is more speculative than practical, this is true if it is considered on the side of the *object;* and St. Bonaventure sufficiently hints at this reason too, when in the replies to 2 and 3 he denies that this science is practical in the strict sense. But if the Seraphic Doctor affirms that it is «principally, that we may become good», this again is most true if his *end* is regarded, which is certainly more that we may become good than that we should only speculate upon divine things.

3. St. Bonaventure does not here expressly name theology an *affective* science; nevertheless the third member of the division, which embraces in itself the speculative and the practical, can not ineptly be marked off by this word, with Blessed Albert and the other ancients, by attending to the principal end, which is charity in the affections. For from its principal end a thing can well take its name. — On the twofold kind of cognition, namely of speculation and of devotion, see III *Sent.* d. 35 q. 1.

**IV.** On the whole question: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 1 m. 1 and 2. — Scotus, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 4. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 1 a. 3; *Summa* I q. 1 a. 4. — Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. I tr. 1 q. 3 m. 3; I *Sent.* d. 1 a. 4. — Peter of Tarantasia, I *Sent.* Prologue a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, Prologue q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 8 q. 3 and following. — Denis the Carthusian, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 2. — Durandus, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 6. — Biel, I *Sent.* Prologue q. 12.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol1_raw.txt`, raw L10627–10906)
with **all three printed pages read at the plate** (`raw/vision/vol1/p-0{12,13,14}.png`, 450 dpi,
2028 × 2986 px; offset `pdf = printed + 102`) as the arbiter of the page span, of every footnote
marker position, of the marginalia and of every apparatus digit. **p. 14's Scholion continuation was
re-set from the plate rather than from the raw**: the raw cascade-shatters that region into
two-column bleed (`I. Ulei-que aclmillil`, `(iiiii-ic ni-,iciiiiii..;`), which is the one place in
this chunk where the standing Vol I "OCR is authoritative" rule does not hold. English is a fresh
literal translation. Apparatus entries were read off 2.2–2.4× footer bands, never off a whole-page
view.

**Page span, fixed positively.** Opens at the bare `QUAESTIO III.` display heading at the middle of
**p. 12** (raw L10627) and closes with Scholion IV in the upper third of **p. 14**, against the
`QUAESTIO IV.` display heading that follows it on the same leaf. **⚠ The mapped table in
`next-session-resume.md` put Quaestio IV at "?–15"; it opens on p. 14**, so `bon-sent-I-proem-q4`
runs pp. 14–15, not 15 alone. Fixed on the plate, not from the map.

**★ THE RUNNING HEAD LIED ON BOTH LEAVES OF THIS CHUNK, IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS — the third and
fourth instances in Book I's front.** p. 12's head reads `PROOEMII QUAEST. III.` above a leaf whose
top half is q2's Scholion; **p. 14's head reads `PROOEMII QUAEST. IV.` above a leaf whose top third
is this chunk's Scholion.** Neither head was used for anything. The boundaries are the two display
headings and nothing else.

**Apparatus: 15 entries.** p. 12 nn. 1–6 (inherited — see the hand-off below) · p. 13 nn. 1–9 ·
**p. 14 none.**

**Hand-off PICKED UP from `bon-sent-I-proem-q2`: ownership was verified, positions were re-derived
here.** q2 forwarded p. 12's whole register — nn. 1–6 — as q3's, and that is correct: n. 1 glosses
this chunk's opening *Tertio quaeritur,* and nn. 2–6 answer to anchors in its fundamenta and its
*Contra* (verae ² · undecimo ³ · in littera ⁴ · de fide ⁵ · ab opere nostro ⁶). **q2's summary of
where they land was a claim, and it survives re-derivation**: the register splits **5/1 by block**
(nn. 1–5 in the left block, n. 6 in the right, with n. 5 overrunning the column division and
continuing at the head of the right block at `et ed. 1, lectionem Vat. mutavimus`) against **3/3 by
anchor** (nn. 1–3 anchored in the left column, nn. 4–6 in the right). q2 forwards nothing else and
owns nothing on p. 12.

**Hand-off FORWARDED to `bon-sent-I-proem-q4`: ALL TEN of p. 14's notes are q4's.** Verified here by
anchor: n. 1 glosses q4's opening *potest quaeri,* and nn. 2–10 answer to anchors in its fundamenta,
its *Contra* and the opening of its *Respondeo* (videtur ² · de Magistro ³ · veteri ⁴ · in littera ⁵ ·
Si tu dicis ⁶ · denominatio ⁷ · auctorem ⁸ · in littera ⁹ · aliena ¹⁰). **This chunk owns the top
third of p. 14 and none of its register** — where they land is q4's to establish, not this chunk's
to assert.

**★ A CHUNK CAN OWN A PRINTED PAGE AND HAVE NO APPARATUS ON IT — now three times in a row in this
family, and always for the same reason.** q1 owned none of p. 9's four notes, q2 none of p. 12's
six, and q3 none of p. 14's ten: **a Quaracchi Scholion carries no anchors at all,** citing its
authorities inline. Read anchors, only anchors; where the text sits on the page decides nothing.

**Block structure and anchor structure came apart on both footer pages, again.** p. 12: block
**5/1**, anchors **3/3**. p. 13: block **5/4** (nn. 1–5 left, nn. 6–9 right) against anchors **4/5**
(nn. 1–4 anchored in the left column, nn. 5–9 in the right). State the two splits separately; they
have now disagreed on every footer page of this family.

**Digits settled at the plate against the raw.** `S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.` at p. 13 n. 5
(raw `d. 33.` — the 3/5 class, the same citation q2 had to correct, and the corrected form is the
one that resolves) · Scholion III's `cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.` (raw agrees) · **Scholion IV's
citation run was read at 4× because the `1`/`4` class is live in it and the raw is garbled there**:
`Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1. et 2.` and `S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 3` carry the serif
`1`, while `Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4.`, `S. I. q. 1. a. 4.`, `B. Albert. … I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4.`,
`Petr. a Tar. … a. 4.` and `Richard. a Med., Prolog. q. 4.` carry a true `4` — at 2× the two glyphs
are the same shape, at 4× they are not. Scholion II's run was checked the same way
(`B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. ad 1.`, where the raw reads `a. L ad I`).

**⛔ A QUARACCHI MISPRINT STANDS AS PRINTED.** p. 12 n. 5 prints **`Scholaticorum`** for
*Scholasticorum;* p. 13 n. 6, on the facing leaf of the same opening, prints `Scholasticorum`
correctly. Both confirmed at 2.2×; Quaracchi print no note on either. Not normalised — the same
discipline as q2's `proprie distinguntur` and `thelogorum`, and as the `EXPLICIT ITINERARIUM IN
DEUM` colophon.

**Marginalia, trimmed from the body and transcribed here in body order** (standing Vol I
convention). — p. 12: *Fundamenta.* (beside the first fundamentum) · *Ad oppositum.* (beside the
*Contra*). — p. 13: *Intellectus triplici habitu perficitur.* (beside the *Respondeo*) · *Sapientia
est scientia sapida.* (beside the Ecclesiasticus quotation) · *Conclusio.* (beside *Talis est
cognitio tradita in hoc libro*) · *Solutio oppositorum.* (beside the reply to the first objection).
— p. 14: none in this chunk's region. ⚠ Note that p. 13 carries **both** a display `CONCLUSIO.`
heading with the italic conclusion under it **and** a marginal *Conclusio.* gloss five paragraphs
lower; they are different things, and only the display heading is rendered.

**Register (continues the one frozen at `bon-sent-I-proem-q1` and extended at q2; these are its
additions).** *ut boni fiamus* → **"that we may become good"**, kept as a clause everywhere and
never contracted to "to be good": it is the question's own name, Bonaventure quotes it as a phrase
(*ut boni fiamus per directionem ad finem ultimum*), and the Scholion sets it against *ut tantum
divina speculemur* · *contemplationis gratia* → "for the sake of contemplation" · *habitus
affectivus* → "affective habit" · *affectus* → **"the affections"** (never "affect" or "emotion"; it
is the faculty set against *intellectus*) · *inflammatio affectus* → "the enkindling of the
affections" · *habitus directivus* → "directive habit" · *notitia* → "knowledge" (kept distinct from
*cognitio* → "cognition" where the Scholion uses both) · *status* → **"resting-point"** (*ibi non est
status* — the point at which the ordering stops, not a "state") · *dictantis et regulantis* →
"dictating and regulating" · *Thom. de Argentina* → "Thomas of Strasbourg". ★ **`asymeter costae`
is left transliterated in the English — "that the diameter is asymmeter to the side" — and NOT
rendered "incommensurable".** `[^p13-7]` glosses it precisely as *incommensurabilis lateri;*
putting the gloss's word in the body would make the note circular in English where it is not in
Latin, the same argument that keeps *speciositas* from taking "beauty" in the Itinerarium.

**⛔ THE THREE GUARD-RAIL AUDITS CANNOT SEE THIS CHUNK.** `audit-paraphrase.py`,
`audit-headers.py` and `audit-apparatus-count.py` all select on the filename regex
`bon-sent-{I,II,III,IV}-d(\d+)-`; a `distinctio: 0` front-matter chunk never matches, and all three
print a clean verdict on **0 chunks audited**. This chunk was verified instead by marker pairing and
structural parity in `build-content.mjs`, by `polish-style-scan.py` and `build-citations.py` on the
full corpus, and by plate discipline on all three leaves. **Never record such a run as
audits-clean.**

**`build-citations.py`, run on the full corpus at this commit: 2058 chunks, QA flags 205 → 202.**
**One flag is attributable to this chunk and it is an author-governance false positive:** Scholion
II's `B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. ad 1.` is flagged "target locus does not exist", but the
locus is *Albert's* commentary, not Bonaventure's — the siglum `B. Albert.,` stands between the
chain's inherited locus and this one, which is exactly the discriminator the index conventions
name. The same run in Scholion IV (`B. Albert. … I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4.`) is the same case. q2
dispositioned two flags of this identical species. **No edit; the citation is transcribed as
printed.** **The corpus figure fell by three, and the cause was measured, not inferred** (the
report was rebuilt with this file moved aside and diffed): **four flags elsewhere cleared and this
one arrived.** The four were page-ownership flags — `bon-sent-II-d3-p2-dubia` citing `tom. I. pag.
13, nota 5`, `bon-sent-II-d9-a1-q4` and `bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a1-q1` both citing `tom. I. pag. 14,
nota 7`, and one of `bon-sent-II-d25-p2-dubia`'s pair — all previously reading "no chunk owns
printed page 13/14 of tom. 1". Vols II and IV have been pointing at these two leaves all along.
Nothing was repaired here.

**No `[?]` flags.**