title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus I. *De incarnatione quantum ad unionis possibilitatem.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum divina natura potuerit uniri cum humana natura.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum divina natura potuerit uniri cum humana natura. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Uniri est pati, sicut unire est agere[^3], ergo quod impossibile est pati impossibile est uniri; sed divinam naturam impossibile est pati: ergo impossibile est cum alia natura uniri.

2. Item, quaecumque ad invicem uniuntur, aliquo modo componuntur, ergo quod impossibile est alteri componi impossibile est alteri uniri; sed divinam naturam impossibile est alteri componi, cum sit simplicissima et perfectissima[^4]: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne unibile et non unitum est ad actum et complementum unionis possibile, omne autem possibile ad actum et complementum est mutabile et imperfectum; sed in Deo nulla potest esse mutatio, nulla imperfectio[^5]: ergo nulla temporalis unio.

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4. Item, quaecumque sunt unibilia, sunt ad invicem proportionabilia, quoniam inter illa nulla est unio, inter quae nulla cadit proportio; sed Dei, qui infinitus est, ad creaturam, quae finita est, nulla cadit proportio[^6]: ergo nulla potest esse illarum naturarum coniunctio.

5. Item, plus distat Creator a creatura, quam distent duo opposita, pro eo quod omnia opposita communicant in aliquo genere proximo, vel remoto[^7], Deus autem et creatura nullum genus commune participant: ergo facilius est unire aliqua opposita, quam sit unire divinam naturam cum humana. Sed Deus non potest facere, quod idem sit homo et asinus, vel quod idem sit album et nigrum, aut certe, quod idem sit et non sit: ergo non potest facere, quod idem sit homo et Deus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Plus potest Deus facere, quam homo potest dicere, iuxta illud Lucae primo[^8]: *Non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum:* si igitur homo potest illud credere et dicere, quod Deus sit humanitati nostrae unitus; videtur, quod hoc non sit apud Deum impossibile.

2. Item, plus potest Deus facere, quam nos petere, iuxta illud ad Ephesios tertio[^9]: *Deus, qui potest facere superabundanter, quam petimus, aut intelligimus;* sed homo potuit petere, Filium Dei incarnari: ergo Verbum Dei fieri carnem vel incarnari non fuit Deo impossibile.

3. Item, quando duo sic se habent, quod unum est materiale respectu alterius et illi conforme, possibile est, uniri unum alteri; sed anima plus habet de possibilitate[^10] respectu Dei, quam habeat corpus respectu animae; plus etiam habet de ratione conformitatis, cum anima sit substantia spiritualis et imago Dei: ergo si Deus animam potuit unire corpori, videtur, quod similiter possit substantiam humanam unire sibi.

4. Item, omne quod est alteri maxime intimum et amabile, est ei unibile unione maxima; sed Deus est animae intimus et amabilissimus[^11]: ergo videtur, quod substantiae rationali perfecte uniri possit Spiritus increatus.

5. Item, si divina natura non potest sibi unire humanam, aut hoc est propter impedimentum ex parte naturae suae, aut propter impedimentum ex parte creaturae. Si propter impedimentum ex parte naturae suae: ergo cum illud sit opus perfectissimum et nobilissimum, videtur, quod divina natura non sit consona omnimodae perfectioni et nobilitati. Si propter impedimentum[^12] creaturae: ergo videtur, quod creatura non sit in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris; hoc autem derogat divinae omnipotentiae: ergo impossibile est, quod respectu talis unionis interveniat impedimentum ex parte aliqua. Et si hoc, restat quod Deus potuit creaturam rationalem sibi unire.

### Conclusio

> *Possibile fuit, humanam naturam uniri divinae in persona Filii.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio possibile fuit, naturam humanam uniri divinae in persona Filii.

Ratio autem huius est ista: quia omnia illa attribuenda sunt divinae potentiae, quae sibi non derogant; et talia sunt, quae posse est potentiae[^13]. Divinam autem naturam uniri humanae in unitatem personae non est aliud, quam divinam personam, quae ab aeterno fuit hypostasis respectu divinae naturae, esse hypostasim respectu humanae naturae in tempore; hoc autem non dicit aliquam imperfectionem, sed potius dignitatem et nobilitatem. — Sicut enim, cum Deus sit bonus ab aeterno, in nullo fit derogatio bonitati suae, dum est causa bonitatis creatae[^14] in tempore, quamvis bonitas creata longe sit inferior bonitate increata; sic, cum persona Filii Dei sit hypostasis intellectualis et spiritualis et increata ab aeterno, in nullo derogat ei, si sit hypostasis rationalis naturae creatae in tempore. — Et quemadmodum Deus de non creante fit creans in actu absque aliqua sui mutatione vel innovatione, sed solum facta immutatione ex parte naturae creatae[^15]; sic persona Filii Dei, quae non erat hypostasis humanae naturae in actu, habet esse eius hypostasis absque aliqua sui mutatione vel innovatione, sola facta mutatione ex parte naturae assumtae. —

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Et quemadmodum Deus, cum est in creatura per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, in nullo dependet ab ipsa, sed potius dependet creatura ab ipso, tanquam a causa conservante et sustentante[^16]; sic et Deus, cum est in creatura rationali per unionem, non dependet ex ipsa, sed potius e converso rationalis natura dependet ex hypostasi divina et habet substantificari[^17] in illa, sicut natura substantificatur in persona.

Et sic patet, quod unio divinae naturae cum humana in nullo derogat nobilitati divinae[^18]; et ideo, cum omnia attribuenda sint Deo, quae non derogant omnipotentiae eius, indubitanter ponendum est, eius incarnationis mysterium esse Deo possibile. Propter quod dixit Angelus ad Mariam, in eius primordio aperiens incarnationis mysterium: *Non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum.* — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod uniri est pati; dicendum, quod sicut dicit Priscianus[^19], quaedam sunt verba, quae in voce activa significant passionem; et quaedam sunt verba, quae in voce passiva significant actionem; et hoc modo intelligendum est, cum dicitur, divinam naturam humanae uniri, non quia divina natura aliquid patiatur, sed quia ipsa divina natura humanam naturam unit[^20] sibi in propriam personam sive hypostasim. Posset etiam aliter dici, quod sicut *generare* et *generari* non significant in divinis actionem vel passionem, sed relationem[^21]; sic etiam *uniri,* dictum de divina natura vel persona, non dicit actionem aliquam, sed relationem potius, quae quidem relatio dicit dependentiam solum in natura creata; sicut haberi potest ex his, quae in primo Libro determinata sunt, cum agebatur de divinis nominibus, quae dicunt respectum ad creaturam, distinctione trigesima[^22].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae uniuntur componuntur; dicendum, quod si proprie accipiatur verbum *componendi,* in plus est *unio* quam *compositio.* *Unio* enim dicit coniunctionem duorum in tertio, sive uniantur ad constitutionem tertii, sive non[^23]. *Compositio* vero dicit coniunctionem aliquorum, ita quod veniunt ad constitutionem tertii; et omne tale aliquo modo est materiale respectu alterius. Et ideo *compositio* semper importat imperfectionem in componentibus, *unio* vero non. Et propterea non sequitur, quod si divina natura non potest alteri componi, quod non possit alteri uniri.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne unibile non[^24] unitum est ad complementum unionis possibile; dicendum, quod illud verum est de illo unibili, quod habet perduci ad actum unionis per aliquid acquisitum in ipso; de illo autem, quod est unibile solum per aliquid acquisitum in altero, non habet veritatem; et hoc modo est unibilis divina natura humanae naturae per mutationem factam in creatura. Et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod aliqua sit possibilitas imperfectionis vel mutationis[^25] ex parte divinae naturae, sed solum ex parte naturae creatae. Et ratio huius est, quia unio dicit relationem, relatio introduci habet in esse per mutationem factam in uno extremo, altero omnino immobili remanente; sicut patet: si ego sim albus, et generetur

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alius, qui sit albus, statim incipit mihi esse similis, nulla in me facta mutatione, sed solum in ipso. Similiter exemplum ponit Boethius[^26] de dextro et sinistro. Sic intelligendum est in proposito. Et potest etiam huius simile inveniri in unione radii et crystalli. Si enim crystallus superinducatur radio iam domum illuminanti, crystallus illuminari dicitur et a radio pertransiri et ei copulari absque mutatione facta ex parte radii, sed solum ex parte crystalli[^27]. Sic suo modo, sed longe spiritualius, intelligendum est in natura assumta et persona Verbi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne unibile est proportionabile; dicendum, quod verum est, si intelligatur de proportione, quae attenditur in convenientia ordinis. Si autem intelligatur de proportione, quae est in commensuratione quantitatis, veritatem non habet, pro eo quod, si aqua maris infinita esset, adhuc posset spongia immergi, sicut nunc immergeretur, et uniri; et ideo sufficit ad unionem proportio, quae surgit ex convenientia ordinis. Et talis est convenientia, quae est inter creaturam rationalem et Deum, pro eo quod natura rationalis, eo ipso quod est imago Dei, nata est ordinari ad ipsum immediate, sicut in primo[^28] et secundo libro fuit ostensum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est convenientia oppositorum, quam sit Dei ad creaturam, et ita quod magis sunt unibilia; dicendum, quod etsi maior sit convenientia propter alicuius communis[^29] participationem, nunquam tamen ita est convenientia secundum possibilitatem et ordinem unius ad alterum, quia unum oppositum non habet ordinari ad suum oppositum sicut ad causam et complementum, sicut creatura rationalis habet ordinari ad Deum. Convenientia autem in participatione alicuius communis non facit, aliqua esse unibilia, nisi sit aliqua convenientia secundum rationem inclinationis et ordinis, sicut patet. Magis enim est anima unibilis corpori, quam sit una anima unibilis alteri; et sicut non tenet illud argumentum: anima non potest alteri animae uniri: ergo non potest corpori uniri: sic nec illud argumentum concludit: oppositum non potest uniri opposito: ergo creatura non potest uniri Deo.

english:
### Article I. *On the incarnation as regards the possibility of union.*
### Question I. *Whether the divine nature could be united with human nature.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the divine nature could be united with human nature. And it seems that it could not.

1. To be united is to undergo, just as to unite is to act[^3]; therefore that which is impossible to undergo is impossible to be united; but it is impossible for the divine nature to undergo: therefore it is impossible for it to be united with another nature.

2. Likewise, whatever things are united to one another are in some manner composed; therefore that which is impossible to be composed with another is impossible to be united to another; but it is impossible for the divine nature to be composed with another, since it is most simple and most perfect[^4]: therefore, and so on.

3. Likewise, everything unitable and not united is in potency to the act and completion of union, and everything in potency to the act and completion is mutable and imperfect; but in God there can be no change, no imperfection[^5]: therefore there can be no temporal union.

4. Likewise, whatever things are unitable are proportionable to one another, since there is no union between those between which no proportion falls; but between God, who is infinite, and the creature, which is finite, no proportion falls[^6]: therefore there can be no conjunction of those natures.

5. Likewise, the Creator is more distant from the creature than two opposites are distant, on account of the fact that all opposites share in some genus, whether proximate or remote[^7], whereas God and the creature participate in no common genus: therefore it is easier to unite some opposites than it is to unite the divine nature with the human. But God cannot bring it about that the same thing be a man and an ass, or that the same thing be white and black, or indeed that the same thing both be and not be: therefore he cannot bring it about that the same thing be a man and God.

**On the contrary:** 1. God can do more than a man can say, according to that text of Luke, chapter one[^8]: *No word shall be impossible with God:* if therefore a man can believe and say that God is united to our humanity, it seems that this is not impossible with God.

2. Likewise, God can do more than we can ask, according to that text in Ephesians, chapter three[^9]: *God, who is able to do superabundantly more than we ask or understand;* but a man could ask that the Son of God be incarnate: therefore for the Word of God to be made flesh or to be incarnate was not impossible for God.

3. Likewise, when two things are so disposed that one is material in relation to the other and conformed to it, it is possible for the one to be united to the other; but the soul has more of possibility[^10] in relation to God than the body has in relation to the soul; it has also more of the character of conformity, since the soul is a spiritual substance and the image of God: therefore if God could unite the soul to the body, it seems that he could likewise unite human substance to himself.

4. Likewise, everything which is most intimate and lovable to another is unitable to it by the greatest union; but God is most intimate and most lovable to the soul[^11]: therefore it seems that the uncreated Spirit could be united perfectly to a rational substance.

5. Likewise, if the divine nature cannot unite the human to itself, this is either on account of an impediment on the part of its own nature, or on account of an impediment on the part of the creature. If on account of an impediment on the part of its own nature: then, since that work is most perfect and most noble, it seems that the divine nature is not consonant with perfection and nobility in every mode. If on account of an impediment[^12] on the part of the creature: then it seems that the creature is not in perfect obedience in respect of the Creator; but this derogates from the divine omnipotence: therefore it is impossible that, in respect of such a union, an impediment should intervene from any part. And if this is so, it remains that God could unite a rational creature to himself.

### Conclusio

> *It was possible for human nature to be united to the divine in the person of the Son.*

**Respondeo:** It must be said that without doubt it was possible for human nature to be united to the divine in the person of the Son.

Now the ground of this is the following: that all those things are to be attributed to the divine power which do not derogate from it; and such are the things which are within the power to do[^13]. But for the divine nature to be united to the human in the unity of person is nothing other than for the divine person, which from eternity was the hypostasis in respect of the divine nature, to be the hypostasis in respect of the human nature in time; and this says no imperfection, but rather dignity and nobility. — For just as, since God is good from eternity, no derogation is made to his goodness when he is the cause of created goodness[^14] in time, although created goodness is far inferior to uncreated goodness; so, since the person of the Son of God is an intellectual and spiritual and uncreated hypostasis from eternity, it in no way derogates from him if he be the hypostasis of a rational created nature in time. — And just as God becomes a creator in act from being a non-creator without any change or innovation of himself, but only by a change being made on the part of the created nature[^15]; so the person of the Son of God, who was not in act the hypostasis of human nature, has the being of its hypostasis without any change or innovation of himself, by a change being made on the part of the assumed nature alone. —

And just as God, when he is in a creature by essence, presence, and power, in no way depends on it, but rather the creature depends on him, as on a conserving and sustaining cause[^16]; so also God, when he is in a rational creature by union, does not depend on it, but rather conversely the rational nature depends on the divine hypostasis and has its being-substantified[^17] in it, just as the nature is substantified in the person.

And thus it is clear that the union of the divine nature with the human in no way derogates from the divine nobility[^18]; and therefore, since all things are to be attributed to God which do not derogate from his omnipotence, it must without hesitation be laid down that the mystery of his incarnation is possible for God. On account of which the Angel said to Mary, at its beginning disclosing the mystery of the incarnation: *No word shall be impossible with God.* — Hence also the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**Ad argumenta:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that to be united is to undergo; it must be said that, as Priscian says[^19], there are certain verbs which in the active voice signify passion; and there are certain verbs which in the passive voice signify action; and in this manner it must be understood, when it is said that the divine nature is united to the human, not that the divine nature undergoes anything, but that the divine nature itself unites[^20] the human nature to itself into its own person or hypostasis. It could also be said otherwise, that just as *to generate* and *to be generated* do not signify in divine matters action or passion, but a relation[^21]; so too *to be united,* said of the divine nature or person, does not state any action, but rather a relation, which relation indeed states a dependence only in the created nature; as can be gathered from those things which were determined in the first Book, when divine names which state a respect to the creature were treated, in distinction thirtieth[^22].

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that things which are united are composed; it must be said that, if the word *to compose* be taken properly, *union* is wider than *composition.* For *union* states the conjunction of two in a third, whether they be united for the constitution of a third or not[^23]. But *composition* states the conjunction of some things in such a way that they come to the constitution of a third; and every such thing is in some manner material in relation to the other. And therefore *composition* always imports imperfection in the things composed, whereas *union* does not. And on that account it does not follow that, if the divine nature cannot be composed with another, that it cannot be united to another.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that everything unitable and not[^24] united is in potency to the completion of union; it must be said that this is true of that unitable thing which has to be brought to the act of union through something acquired in itself; but of that which is unitable only through something acquired in the other, it does not hold; and in this manner the divine nature is unitable to the human nature through a change made in the creature. And therefore from this it does not follow that there is any possibility of imperfection or change[^25] on the part of the divine nature, but only on the part of the created nature. And the ground of this is that union states a relation, and a relation has to be introduced into being through a change made in one extreme, the other remaining wholly unmoved; as is clear: if I am white, and another be generated

who is white, he straightway begins to be like me, with no change made in me, but only in him. Boethius likewise[^26] gives the example of right and left. Thus it must be understood in the case at hand. And a likeness of this can also be found in the union of a ray and a crystal. For if a crystal be set beneath a ray already illuminating a house, the crystal is said to be illuminated and to be penetrated by the ray and joined to it without any change made on the part of the ray, but only on the part of the crystal[^27]. So in its own manner, but far more spiritually, must it be understood in the assumed nature and the person of the Word.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that everything unitable is proportionable; it must be said that it is true, if it be understood of the proportion which is regarded in the agreement of order. But if it be understood of the proportion which is in the commensuration of quantity, it does not hold, on account of the fact that, if the water of the sea were infinite, a sponge could still be immersed, as it now would be immersed, and united; and therefore for union there suffices the proportion which arises from the agreement of order. And such is the agreement which is between the rational creature and God, on account of the fact that the rational nature, by the very fact that it is the image of God, is born to be ordered to him immediately, as was shown in the first[^28] and second books.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the agreement of opposites is greater than that of God to the creature, and thus that they are more unitable; it must be said that, although the agreement be greater on account of the participation of something common[^29], yet never is the agreement such according to the possibility and order of the one to the other, because one opposite is not born to be ordered to its opposite as to a cause and completion, as the rational creature is born to be ordered to God. But agreement in the participation of something common does not make things to be unitable, unless there be some agreement according to the character of inclination and order, as is clear. For the soul is more unitable to the body than one soul is unitable to another; and just as that argument does not hold: the soul cannot be united to another soul: therefore it cannot be united to the body: so neither does that argument conclude: an opposite cannot be united to its opposite: therefore the creature cannot be united to God.

la: A Damasceno (ed. Migne, *Patrol. Graec.* tom. 95. col. 231, inter *Fragmenta*) unio generaliter definitur διεστώτων πραγμάτων κοινωνικὴ συνδρομή, i. e. *rerum distantium communicativus concursus* (sive concursus, quo res distantes sese communicant) vel, ut in ed. Migne legitur, *rerum distantium in sui invicem communionem venientium concursus.* Ab eodem Damasc. deinde 12 modi unionis enumerantur (iam prius a Maximo Confess. recensiti, de quo vide Migne, *Patrol. Graec.* tom. 91. col. 214), quos, cum complures eorum a S. Bonav. adducantur, hic afferre iuvat. Est etenim: unio secundum *mixtionem* seu temperationem (κρᾶσιν), ut in fluidis; secundum *coacervationem* (σωρείαν), ut in siccis; secundum *conspersionem* (φύσιν), qualis est inter humidum et siccum; secundum *admixtionem* sive permixtionem (ἀνάμιξιν), ut in variis farinis; secundum *confusionem* (σύγχυσιν), ut in his quae liquantur, v. g. auro et argento; secundum *compaginationem* (ἁρμονίαν), ut in lapidibus; secundum appositionem (παράθεσιν), ut in asseribus et tabulis; secundum *contractionem* sive coalitionem (συναλοιφήν), ut in lampade ex igne prodeunte ac rursus cum igne unita; secundum *essentiam* (οὐσίαν), ut in individuis Petro et Paulo; secundum *affectum* (σχέσιν), ut in amicis ac sententiis; secundum *compositionem* (σύνθεσιν), ut in anima et corpore; secundum *hypostasim* (ὑπόστασιν), ut in Christo, ubi duae naturae unam personam habent; alio etiam modo unio secundum hypostasim et concursus rerum diversae essentiae in unam personam, servata unicuique post unionem sua naturali proprietate, ut in anima et corpore humano. Praeter hos 12 unionis modos etiam notatu digna est unio secundum *consertionem* (συναίρεσιν), ut in texturis; sicut et unio secundum *insertionem* (insitionem), de qua Rom. 11, 24: *Insertus es in bonam olivam;* nec non unio secundum *commeationem* sive circumincessionem (περιχώρησιν). — In Vat. desiderantur verba *ergo quod impossibile est pati.* Post *maiori ergo* cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. Post *secundum* ergo cod. S repetit *divinam naturam.*

en: From Damascene (ed. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* tom. 95, col. 231, among the *Fragments*) union is generally defined as διεστώτων πραγμάτων κοινωνικὴ συνδρομή, i.e. *the communicative concurrence of distant things* (or the concurrence by which distant things communicate themselves to one another), or, as it is read in the Migne edition, *the concurrence of distant things coming into communion with one another.* From the same Damascene there are then enumerated 12 modes of union (already earlier reviewed by Maximus the Confessor, on whom see Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* tom. 91, col. 214), which, since several of them are adduced by St. Bonaventure, it is helpful to set forth here. For there is: union according to *mixture* or tempering (κρᾶσιν), as in fluids; according to *heaping together* (σωρείαν), as in dry things; according to *sprinkling together* (φύσιν), such as is between the moist and the dry; according to *admixture* or commingling (ἀνάμιξιν), as in various flours; according to *confusion* (σύγχυσιν), as in those things which are liquefied, e.g. gold and silver; according to *joining together* (ἁρμονίαν), as in stones; according to apposition (παράθεσιν), as in planks and boards; according to *contraction* or coalition (συναλοιφήν), as in a lamp going forth from fire and again united with the fire; according to *essence* (οὐσίαν), as in the individuals Peter and Paul; according to *affection* (σχέσιν), as in friends and opinions; according to *composition* (σύνθεσιν), as in soul and body; according to *hypostasis* (ὑπόστασιν), as in Christ, where two natures have one person; in yet another mode, union according to hypostasis and the concurrence of things of diverse essence into one person, each retaining after the union its own natural property, as in the human soul and body. Besides these 12 modes of union, worthy of note also is union according to *interweaving* (συναίρεσιν), as in textures; just as also union according to *engrafting* (insertion), of which Romans 11:24: *Thou wast grafted into the good olive tree;* and also union according to *commeation* or circumincession (περιχώρησιν). — In the Vatican edition the words *ergo quod impossibile est pati* are wanting. After *maiori ergo* compare I Sent. d. 19 p. II q. 3. After *secundum* therefore codex S repeats *divinam naturam.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. seq. — In hoc arg. supponitur, quod componentia teneant rationem partis, quae per se includit imperfectionem. « Pars enim, ut ait Aristot., I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.), non solum alterius est pars, sed omnino alterius » (scil. totius). — Pro *ergo quod* codd. A F U *sed quod.*

en: Compare I Sent. d. 8 p. II q. 1 ff. — In this argument it is supposed that the components hold the character of a part, which of itself includes imperfection. "For a part, as Aristotle says, *Politics* I c. 3 (c. 2), is not only a part of another, but wholly of another" (namely, of the whole). — For *ergo quod* codices A F U read *sed quod.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: Compare I Sent. d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 1 ff.

la: Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 52. et 64. (c. 6. seq.), infiniti ad finitum proportionem esse negat.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 52 and 64 (c. 6 ff.), denies that there is a proportion of the infinite to the finite.

la: Vide locc. ex Aristot. citt. tom. II. pag. 814, nota 8. — Quod Deus duo opposita coniungere nequeat, monstratum est I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3. — Paulo inferius post *aliqua opposita* cod. S addit *quae communicant in aliquo genere proximo, vel remoto.*

en: See the places from Aristotle cited in tom. II, p. 814, note 8. — That God cannot conjoin two opposites was shown in I Sent. d. 42 q. 3. — A little below, after *aliqua opposita,* codex S adds *quae communicant in aliquo genere proximo, vel remoto.*

la: Vers. 37. — Post pauca cod. T omittit *illud.*

en: Verse 37. — After a few words codex T omits *illud.*

la: Vers. 20. Pro *qui potest facere* Vulgata exhibet *qui potens est omnia facere.*

en: Verse 20. For *qui potest facere* the Vulgate gives *qui potens est omnia facere* (who is able to do all things).

la: *De possibilitate* hic dictum est per analogiam ad materiale principium sive materiam, quae respectu formae, quacum coniungitur, *potentia* (possibilitas) esse dicitur. — August., Epist. 137. (alias 3.) ad Volusian. c. 3. n. 11. ait: « Si autem utrumque [scil. unio animae nostrae cum corpore et unio Verbi cum anima] nobis pariter inexpertum credendum praeciperetur, quid horum citius crederemus? Quomodo non faleremur, duo incorporea quam unum corporeum alterumque incorporeum facilius potuisse misceri »? Cfr. etiam X. de Civ. Dei, c. 29. n. 2. — Leo M., Epist. 35. (alias 25.) ad Iulian. episc. Coensem c. 2. scribit: Cur autem inconveniens aut impossibile videatur, ut Verbum et caro atque anima unus Iesus Christus et unus Dei hominisque sit filius, si caro et anima, quae *dissimilium naturarum* sunt, unam faciunt etiam sine Verbi incarnatione personam; cum multo sit facilius, ut hanc unitatem sui atque hominis Deitatis praestet *potestas,* quam ut eam in substantiis suis obtineat solius humanitatis *infirmitas?*

en: *Of possibility* is here said by analogy to the material principle or matter, which in respect of the form with which it is conjoined is said to be *potency* (possibility). — Augustine, *Letter* 137 (elsewhere 3) to Volusianus c. 3 n. 11, says: "But if both [namely, the union of our soul with the body and the union of the Word with the soul] were enjoined upon us alike, as something never experienced, to be believed, which of these would we believe more readily? How should we not confess that two incorporeal things could more easily be mingled than one corporeal and the other incorporeal?" Compare also *On the City of God* X c. 29 n. 2. — Leo the Great, *Letter* 35 (elsewhere 25) to Julian, bishop of Cos, c. 2, writes: But why should it seem unfitting or impossible that the Word and flesh and soul be one Jesus Christ and one son of God and of man, if flesh and soul, which are of *unlike natures,* make one person even without the incarnation of the Word; since it is far easier that the *power* of the Godhead should furnish this unity of itself and of man, than that the *weakness* of mere humanity should obtain it in its own substances?

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2, et II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. — Paschasius diac., II. de Spiritu S. c. 1. ait: Anima vero animae, aut Angelus Angelo coniungi potest, infundi non potest, quia huiusmodi creaturarum genera tantum Spiritus S. i. e. solius Dei capacia sunt; quia figuli sui vasa sunt, ab illo solo impleri possunt, a quo de nihilo facta sunt, et sine quo vacua esse sentiuntur... Sola ergo se divina potentia, quae et in Spiritu sancto est, rationabilibus creaturis infusa et circumfusa permiscet, sicut peculiariter in illo dominici hominis corpore, ex Maria matre suscepto, gratia exuberante requievit, sicut de se ipso Filius dicit: *Spiritus Domini super me* (Luc. 4, 18.). — Ex hoc principio, quod Deus intimus sit animae, deduci potest, nullam creaturam rationalem cum alia tam intime posse coniungi, sicut Verbum incarnatum hypostatice coniunctum est cum natura humana.

en: Compare I Sent. d. 1 a. 3 q. 2, and II Sent. d. 8 p. II q. 2 in the body. — Paschasius the deacon, *On the Holy Spirit* II c. 1, says: A soul indeed can be conjoined to a soul, or an Angel to an Angel, but cannot be infused, because creatures of this kind are capable only of the Holy Spirit, i.e. of God alone; for they are vessels of their potter, and can be filled only by him by whom they were made from nothing, and without whom they perceive themselves to be empty... The divine power alone, therefore, which is also in the Holy Spirit, being infused into and poured around rational creatures, mingles itself with them, just as it peculiarly rested with overflowing grace in that body of the Lord's manhood, received from Mary his mother, as the Son says of himself: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me* (Luke 4:18). — From this principle, that God is intimate to the soul, it can be deduced that no rational creature can be so intimately conjoined with another as the incarnate Word is hypostatically conjoined with the human nature.

la: Vat. addit *ex parte.* Paulo ante cod. S verbo *nobilitati* adiungit *quod est inconveniens.* — De potentia obedientiali cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

en: The Vatican edition adds *ex parte.* A little before, codex S to the word *nobilitati* adds *quod est inconveniens.* — On obediential potency compare II Sent. d. 18 a. 1 q. 2 in the body.

la: Pro *posse est potentiae,* quam lectionem ex cod. V restauravimus, quaeque lectio prorsus convenit cum iis quae I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. in corp. habentur, cod. M substituit *posse est posse,* Vat. cum ceteris edd. nec non cum aliis codd. *possibile est posse.*

en: For *posse est potentiae* — the reading which we have restored from codex V, and which agrees entirely with what is held in I Sent. d. 42 q. 2 in the body — codex M substitutes *posse est posse,* the Vatican edition with the other editions and also with other codices *possibile est posse.*

la: Codd. A E N *creaturae.*

en: Codices A E N read *creaturae.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq., et II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *sola facta mutatione* codd. K S *sed solum facta mutatione.*

en: Compare I Sent. d. 30 q. 1 ff., and II Sent. d. 1 p. I a. 1 q. 2. — A little below, for *sola facta mutatione* codices K S read *sed solum facta mutatione.*

la: De quo vide I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. per totam, praecipue a. 3. q. 2, et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Aliquanto superius pro *cum est* in edd. *qui est in.*

en: On which see I Sent. d. 37 p. I throughout, especially a. 3 q. 2, and II Sent. d. 37 a. 1 q. 2. — Somewhat above, for *cum est* the editions read *qui est in.*

la: De hoc verbo cfr. II. Sent. pag. 812, nota 6.

en: On this word compare II Sent. p. 812, note 6.

la: In cod. S legitur: *Et sic patet, quod potest esse quaedam unio divinae naturae cum humana, quae in nullo derogat divinae naturae.* Paulo inferius ante *incarnationis* in codd. H K Z bb deest *eius.*

en: In codex S it reads: *And thus it is clear that there can be a certain union of the divine nature with the human, which in no way derogates from the divine nature.* A little below, before *incarnationis,* in codices H K Z bb *eius* is wanting.

la: Libr. VIII. Grammat. c. 2: Haec enim [metuo, metuor; timeo, timeor] contrarias vocibus videntur habere significationes, quamvis etiam ad sensus pertinentia verba, si quis altius consideret, in activis vocibus passionem, et in passivis actionem fieri inveniret, ut audio te, video te, tango te. Ostendo enim, pati me aliquid in ipso actu etc. — Subinde cod. F omittit verba *quaedam sunt... passionem,* et non pauci alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt illa alia verba *et quaedam sunt verba... actionem,* quorum loco cod. bb substituit *e converso.*

en: *Grammar* book VIII c. 2: For these [metuo, metuor; timeo, timeor] seem to have meanings contrary to their voices, although even verbs pertaining to the senses, if one consider more deeply, one would find that in active voices passion, and in passive voices action, comes about, as *audio te* (I hear thee), *video te* (I see thee), *tango te* (I touch thee). For I show that I undergo something in the very act, and so on. — Thereupon codex F omits the words *quaedam sunt... passionem,* and not a few other codices with editions 1, 2 omit those other words *et quaedam sunt verba... actionem,* in place of which codex bb substitutes *e converso* (conversely).

la: Codd. K Z *univit.*

en: Codices K Z read *univit.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro *vel passionem* codd. K Z bb exhibent *et passionem;* paulo inferius pro *dicit actionem aliquam* cod. Z *dicit actionem et passionem.*

en: Compare I Sent. d. 9 q. 2. — A little before, for *vel passionem* codices K Z bb give *et passionem;* a little below, for *dicit actionem aliquam* codex Z reads *dicit actionem et passionem.*

la: Praesertim q. 3.

en: Especially q. 3.

la: Ut duo rami in uno trunco, individua in specie, species in genere; econtra corpus et anima in sua unione constituunt tertium (vide hic in scholio locum S. Thomae). — Paulo superius pro *quod si,* quae lectio est codd. K Z, plurimi codd. cum edd. incongrue substituunt *quod etsi,* cod. A *quod etiamsi.* Post pauca pro *in plus* [i. e. latius] edd. exhibent *etiam plus.* Paulo inferius pro *veniunt* in codd. H K Q S U legitur *conveniunt,* et deinde in codd. K (K a secunda manu) Q *componibilibus* pro *componentibus.*

en: As two branches in one trunk, individuals in a species, species in a genus; on the contrary, body and soul in their union constitute a third (see here in the scholion the passage of St. Thomas). — A little above, for *quod si,* which is the reading of codices K Z, very many codices with the editions incongruously substitute *quod etsi,* codex A *quod etiamsi.* After a few words, for *in plus* [i.e. more broadly] the editions give *etiam plus.* A little below, for *veniunt* in codices H K Q S U is read *conveniunt,* and then in codices K (K by a second hand) Q *componibilibus* for *componentibus.*

la: Ante *non unitum* codd. F S (T a secunda manu) U inserunt *et;* codd. G L V cum edd. 1, 2 *non unitum* commutarunt in *intimum.* Subinde codd. aa bb inter *ad* et *complementum* interiiciunt *actum et.*

en: Before *non unitum* codices F S (T by a second hand) U insert *et;* codices G L V with editions 1, 2 changed *non unitum* into *intimum.* Thereupon codices aa bb between *ad* and *complementum* interpose *actum et.*

la: Edd. addunt *in hac unione.*

en: The editions add *in hac unione* (in this union).

la: Libr. de Trin. c. 5: Age enim, stet quisquam; et igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim etc. — Pro *Similiter* edd. cum aliquot codd. *Simile.*

en: *On the Trinity* book, c. 5: For come now, let someone stand; if then I approach on the right, he will be on the left in comparison to me, not because he himself is left, but because I have approached on the right, and so on. — For *Similiter* the editions with some codices read *Simile.*

la: Cod. F *quantitatum.* Paulo inferius pro *immergeretur* cod. H K *immergitur,* et immediate post pro *uniri* cod. Z *uniretur.*

en: Codex F reads *quantitatum.* A little below, for *immergeretur* codices H K read *immergitur,* and immediately after, for *uniri* codex Z reads *uniretur.*

la: Dist. I. a. 3. q. 1. seq.; d. 3. p. II. per totam; II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. seq., quo ultimo loco etiam exponitur, in quo consistat convenientia ordinis et convenientia in natura, ad quam spectat etiam convenientia in commensuratione quantitatis.

en: Distinction I a. 3 q. 1 ff.; d. 3 p. II throughout; II Sent. d. 16 a. 1 q. 1 ff., in which last place it is also explained in what the agreement of order and the agreement in nature consist, to which pertains also the agreement in the commensuration of quantity.

la: Ita Vat. et usus auctori familiaris; in aliis edd. et codd. *communem.* Paulo ante pro *magis sunt* codd. F L T U Z aa *magis sint.*

en: So the Vatican edition and the author's familiar usage; in the other editions and codices, *communem.* A little before, for *magis sunt* codices F L T U Z aa read *magis sint.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum, fide testante, Verbum caro factum sit, etiam fide constat, *possibile* fuisse Deo carnem assumere, non solum secundum potentiam ipsius *absolutam,* sed etiam *ordinatam,* quae attenditur in congruitate ad omnia divina attributa. Sola autem naturali ratione non potest evidenter probari, sive a priori sive a posteriori, *possibile* esse hoc mysterium; nec ipse *modus* hypostaticae unionis potest indagari, cum sit prorsus singularis et valde diversus ab omnibus unionis speciebus, quae in creaturis inveniuntur. Solvi autem possunt omnia argumenta ab infidelibus contra possibilitatem ac congruentiam incarnationis obiecta. — Praedicta communiter a theologis docentur; secundum quam doctrinam etiam argumenta proposita a seraphico Doctore intelligenda sunt. Obiectiones autem infidelium fere omnes iam satis solvuntur determinando veram ineffabilis huius unionis intelligentiam, quod fit in seqq. distinctionibus. De variis unionis speciebus vide infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et ad 4, d. 5. a. 1. q. 1, d. 21. a. 1. q. 3, d. 22. a. 1. q. 1; I. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2, d. 16. q. 3. ad 3, d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. Cfr. etiam doctrina Damasceni relata supra pag. 8, nota 3, et praecipue S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1, ubi multos naturalis unionis modos ad tria capita reducit, scilicet vel quando aliqua non uniuntur nisi per coniunctionem eorum in aliquo uno (ita uniuntur duo rami in uno trunco, duo homines in una specie, homo et equus in uno genere, et analoga in quodam uno); vel quando uniuntur tum per coniunctionem ad invicem, tum aliquo uno, quod ex eorum coniunctione constituitur (sicut materia et forma); vel quando ita coniunguntur ad invicem, ut non in aliquo uno, quia ex eorum unione nihil resultat, sicut ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se, cuius subiectum et accidens *partes* dici possint.

**II.** Observandum est, quod in solut. ad 1. duae responsiones afferuntur, quia prima sola non sufficeret. Manifestum quidem est, quod unibilitas ex parte Dei, qui est actus purus, nullo modo dicit *potentiam passivam,* sed *potentiam activam* assumendi naturam humanam; sed haec *potentia* activa (sicut et ipse *actus* sive operatio uniendi) est tribus personis communis. In Filio autem haec unio insuper importat *relationem,* quae quidem ex parte naturae assumtae est *realis,* non autem ex parte personae assumentis. Hoc egregie explicatur in solut. ad 3, et simul per distinctionem *duplicis unibilis* solvitur difficultas satis intricata et a theologis non eodem modo enodata, scilicet quod substantialis unio Verbi cum humana natura eidem quandam mutationem vel novitatem attribuere videatur.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 2. m. 1. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 39. 40. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. (simul agit de congruitate). — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

**IV.** De sequenti (2.) quaestione inter catholicos nulla potest esse controversia, nec etiam differentia opinionum in assignanda ratione *principali,* licet in explicatione eiusdem diversae de constitutione personae divinae sententiae se prodant. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 4; Report. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 3. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since, faith bearing witness, the Word was made flesh, it is also established by faith that it was *possible* for God to assume flesh, not only according to his *absolute* power, but also according to his *ordained* power, which is regarded in congruity with all the divine attributes. But by natural reason alone it cannot be evidently proved, either a priori or a posteriori, that this mystery is *possible;* nor can the *mode* itself of the hypostatic union be searched out, since it is altogether singular and very diverse from all the species of union which are found in creatures. But all the arguments objected by unbelievers against the possibility and congruity of the incarnation can be resolved. — The foregoing are commonly taught by the theologians; and according to this doctrine the arguments proposed by the Seraphic Doctor are also to be understood. Now nearly all the objections of unbelievers are already sufficiently resolved by determining the true understanding of this ineffable union, which is done in the following distinctions. On the various species of union see below d. 6 a. 2 q. 1, d. 2 a. 3 q. 2 in the body and ad 4, d. 5 a. 1 q. 1, d. 21 a. 1 q. 3, d. 22 a. 1 q. 1; I Sent. d. 10 a. 2 q. 2, d. 16 q. 3 ad 3, d. 37 p. I a. 1 q. 1 ad 1. Compare also the doctrine of Damascene related above on page 8, note 3, and especially St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 1, where he reduces the many modes of natural union to three heads, namely: either when some things are not united except through their conjunction in some one thing (thus two branches are united in one trunk, two men in one species, man and horse in one genus, and analogous things in some one thing); or when they are united both through conjunction with one another and in some one thing which is constituted from their conjunction (as matter and form); or when they are so conjoined with one another that they are not in some one thing, since from their union nothing results, as from an accident and a subject there is not effected one thing *per se,* whose subject and accident could be called *parts.*

**II.** It must be observed that in the solution to objection 1 two responses are brought forward, because the first alone would not suffice. It is indeed manifest that unitability on the part of God, who is pure act, in no way states *passive potency,* but *active potency* of assuming human nature; but this active *potency* (as also the *act* itself or operation of uniting) is common to the three persons. In the Son, however, this union further imports a *relation,* which indeed on the part of the assumed nature is *real,* but not on the part of the assuming person. This is excellently explained in the solution to objection 3, and at the same time, through the distinction of the *twofold unitable,* there is resolved a difficulty rather intricate and not unraveled by the theologians in the same manner, namely that the substantial union of the Word with the human nature seems to attribute to it a certain change or novelty.

**III.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III q. 2 m. 1, 2. — Scotus, in both Writings, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* IV c. 39, 40. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1 (he treats at the same time of congruity). — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1 q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1 a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

**IV.** Concerning the following (second) question there can be no controversy among Catholics, nor even any difference of opinions in assigning the *principal* ground, although in the explanation of the same diverse opinions concerning the constitution of the divine person show themselves. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 4; *Reportata* q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1; *Summa* III q. 3 a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3 a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, a. 1 q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1 a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p008..p011-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`), Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion applied to the cascade-shattered Respondeo, Ad-argumenta, Scholion, and footers; clean videtter/contra prose and footnote-marker spacing taken from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw lines ~1200–1461). Literal English, paragraph-for-paragraph.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 12 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum una persona possit uniri humanae naturae sine altera.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum una persona possit uniri sine altera. Et quod non, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Damascenum[^1], qui dicit, quod in divinis «omnia sunt unum praeter generationem, ingenerationem et processionem»; sed incarnatio non est aliquid horum: ergo si incarnari convenit uni personae, necesse est, quod conveniat alteri.

2. Item, opera Trinitatis sunt indivisa[^2]: ergo opus, quod convenit uni personae, necesse est, quod conveniat alteri: ergo si incarnatio est opus Dei, impossibile est, quod conveniat uni personae sine alia.

3. Item, incarnatio est opus recreationis, sicut hominis formatio fuit opus creationis; sed impossibile est, hominem formari ab una persona, quod non ab alia: ergo impossibile est, hominem reformari ab una persona, quod non ab alia[^3]: ergo una persona non potest incarnari sine alia.

4. Item, perfectiori modo est Deus in aliquo, quando est per unionem, quam cum est per gratiam inhabitantem; sed impossibile est, unam personam inhabitare in aliquo sine alia[^4]: ergo impossibile est, unam personam uniri carni, quod non uniatur et alia.

5. Item, impossibile est, Filium venire in mentem, quin simul cum eo veniat et Pater et Spiritus sanctus, sicut dicitur Ioannis decimo quarto[^5]: *Ad eum veniemus* etc.: ergo impossibile est, Filium venire in carnem, quin simul veniat Pater et Spiritus sanctus. Si ergo *mitti in carnem* est incarnari, videtur etc.

6. Item, impossibile est, aliquid absolutum convenire uni, quod non conveniat alteri, pro eo quod[^6] solum relationibus distinguuntur: ergo si *esse incarnatum*, vel *esse hominem* est praedicatum absolutum; ergo impossibile est, quod conveniat uni, quod non conveniat alteri: ergo una persona non potest sine altera incarnari.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ioannis primo[^7]: *Verbum caro factum est;* sed Verbum, sicut in primo habitum est, nominat proprietatem personae: ergo si attribuitur ipsi Verbo incarnatio, videtur, quod alicui personae poterit convenire per se.

2. Item, *incarnari* non est aliud quam in carnem mitti[^8]; sed mitti potest convenire uni personae sine alia, quia Filius mittitur, et «nunquam Pater legitur esse missus»: ergo et incarnari.

3. Item, incarnatio est unio in persona: ergo si «alia est persona Patris, alia Filii[^9]»; videtur, quod si unio sit in persona una, non sit necesse fieri in alia; et si unio potest fieri, similiter et incarnatio.

4. Item, quamvis una sit veritas Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, tamen persona Patris significari potest per aliud signum quam persona Filii vel Spiritus sancti, sive loquamur de signo vocali, sive reali; sed qua ratione signum potest copulari uni personae sine aliis secundum significationem, eodem modo potest aliquod creatum copulari secundum unionem personalem: ergo si una persona potest sine altera significari, similiter potest una sine altera incarnari[^10].

### Conclusio

> Una divina persona incarnari potest, ita quod non alia incarnetur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sine dubio una persona[^11] incarnari potest, ita quod non alia incarnetur, sicut operis evidentia manifestat.

Et ratio huius est ista, quia, cum contingat dupliciter comparari *creaturam* ad Creatorem, videlicet secundum *susceptionem alicuius completionis* et
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secundum *habitudinem relationis, una*[^12] comparatio necessario respicit tres personas indistincte et indivisim, pro eo quod in eis est una perfectio essentialis. Comparatio vero secundum *habitudinem relationis* potest esse respectu alicuius personae determinate et distincte, pro eo quod istae personae relationibus distinguuntur. — Similiter *Deus* dupliciter habet[^13] comparari ad creaturam, videlicet in ratione *principii causantis* et in ratione *suppositi substantificantis*. In *prima* comparatione necessario communicant tres personae, pro eo quod in Deo unica est natura et unica est virtus operativa, per quam Deus creaturarum est causa. *Secunda* vero comparatio potest respicere aliquam personam distincte, pro eo quod, etsi una persona conveniat cum altera in natura et eius virtute, distinguitur tamen ab alia in supposito et personali proprietate[^14].

Quoniam igitur in unione naturarum sive incarnatione persona divina fit suppositum sive hypostasis humanae naturae, ita quod unio sive incarnatio non tantum dicit habitudinem Dei ad creaturam per modum *causae*, immo etiam per modum *suppositi;* similiter ex parte creaturae non dicit comparationem solum quantum ad *susceptionem completionis*, sed etiam quantum ad *habitudinem relationis:* hinc est, quod incarnatio potest convenire uni personae, ita quod non conveniat alteri[^15]. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod in divinis omnia sunt unum praeter ingenerationem etc.; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed cum dicitur, quod incarnatio non est aliquid horum; dicendum, quod etsi non sit aliquid horum, tamen aliquid horum includit. Includit enim intellectum personalis distinctionis; incarnatio enim est unio carnis ad naturam divinam in personam distinctam[^16]. — Cum vero dicitur, quod indivisa sunt Trinitatis opera; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed cum dicitur, quod incarnatio est operatio[^17] Trinitatis; dicendum, quod incarnatio, secundum quod dicit operationem, est communis tribus personis; sed quia praeter hoc importat relationem, ideo uni personae sine alia potest attribui. Et est exemplum: si tres puellae vestiant unam, vestis induitio est a tribus, non tamen tres induuntur, sed una sola. Similiter tres personae operatae sunt incarnationem, et tamen una sola dicitur incarnari[^18].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de opere creationis, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia hominis formatio[^19] dicit actionem et operationem tantum, non relationem ad personam, et ideo communis est tribus; non sic est de incarnatione.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius non potest esse in aliquo per inhabitantem gratiam, quod non sit tota Trinitas; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia *Deum inhabitare*[^20] *in aliquo* dicit effectum in creatura, quem necesse est esse a tota Trinitate; sed *uniri* dicit respectum ad personam, et hoc potest esse ad unam personam sine alia, sicut prius ostensum est.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de missione in carnem et mentem, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia missio Filii in mentem solum est secundum *operationem essentialem*, non secundum *unionem personalem;* non sic est de missione Filii in carnem.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod esse incarnatum est praedicatum absolutum; dicendum, quod quamvis sit praedicatum absolutum[^21] *exterius*, est tamen relatio *interius*, et ratione relationis implicitae potest alicui personae convenire distincte. Et hoc patet, quia nihil aliud est *Filium incarnari* quam *Filium sibi carnem unire;* nihil aliud est *Deum esse hominem* quam unam et eandem personam esse hypostasim divinae et humanae naturae[^22].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether one person can be united to human nature without another.*

Secondly it is asked whether one person can be united without another. And that it cannot, it seems thus:

1. *First*, by Damascene[^1], who says that in the divine things "all things are one except generation, ingeneration, and procession"; but the incarnation is not any of these: therefore if to be incarnate belongs to one person, it is necessary that it belong to another.

2. Likewise, the works of the Trinity are undivided[^2]: therefore a work that belongs to one person necessarily belongs to another: therefore if the incarnation is a work of God, it is impossible that it belong to one person without another.

3. Likewise, the incarnation is a work of re-creation, just as the formation of man was a work of creation; but it is impossible for man to be formed by one person and not by another: therefore it is impossible for man to be re-formed by one person and not by another[^3]: therefore one person cannot be incarnate without another.

4. Likewise, God is in something in a more perfect way when he is so through union than when he is so through indwelling grace; but it is impossible for one person to indwell in something without another[^4]: therefore it is impossible for one person to be united to flesh and not the other be united as well.

5. Likewise, it is impossible for the Son to come into the mind without the Father and the Holy Spirit coming together with him, as is said in John, chapter fourteen[^5]: *We will come to him* etc.: therefore it is impossible for the Son to come into the flesh without the Father and the Holy Spirit coming together. If therefore *to be sent into the flesh* is to be incarnate, it seems etc.

6. Likewise, it is impossible for something absolute to belong to one which does not belong to another, for the reason that[^6] they are distinguished only by relations: therefore if *to be incarnate*, or *to be man*, is an absolute predicate; therefore it is impossible that it belong to one which does not belong to another: therefore one person cannot be incarnate without another.

**On the contrary:** 1. John, chapter one[^7]: *The Word was made flesh;* but the Word, as was established in the first [book], names a property of a person: therefore if the incarnation is attributed to the Word itself, it seems that it can belong to some person of itself.

2. Likewise, *to be incarnate* is nothing other than to be sent into the flesh[^8]; but to be sent can belong to one person without another, since the Son is sent, and "the Father is never read to have been sent": therefore so also is to be incarnate.

3. Likewise, the incarnation is a union in a person: therefore if "the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another[^9]"; it seems that, if the union is in one person, it is not necessary that it occur in another; and if the union can occur, likewise also the incarnation.

4. Likewise, although the truth of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, nevertheless the person of the Father can be signified by a sign other than the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, whether we speak of a vocal sign or a real one; but by the same reasoning by which a sign can be coupled to one person without the others according to signification, in the same way something created can be coupled according to a personal union: therefore if one person can be signified without another, likewise one can be incarnate without another[^10].

### Conclusio

> One divine person can be incarnate, in such a way that another is not incarnate.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt one person[^11] can be incarnate, in such a way that another is not incarnate, as the evidence of the work makes manifest.

And the reason for this is this: that, since it happens that the *creature* is compared to the Creator in two ways, namely according to the *reception of some completion* and according to the *relationship of relation, one*[^12] comparison necessarily regards the three persons indistinctly and indivisibly, for the reason that in them there is one essential perfection. But the comparison according to the *relationship of relation* can be in respect of some person determinately and distinctly, for the reason that these persons are distinguished by relations. — Likewise *God* has[^13] to be compared to the creature in two ways, namely in the character of the *causing principle* and in the character of the *substantifying supposit*. In the *first* comparison the three persons necessarily share in common, for the reason that in God the nature is one and the operative power is one, by which God is the cause of creatures. But the *second* comparison can regard some person distinctly, for the reason that, although one person agrees with another in nature and its power, it is nevertheless distinguished from the other in supposit and personal property[^14].

Since therefore in the union of natures, or the incarnation, the divine person becomes the supposit or hypostasis of the human nature, in such a way that the union or incarnation states not only the relationship of God to the creature in the manner of a *cause*, but indeed also in the manner of a *supposit;* likewise on the part of the creature it states a comparison not only as to the *reception of completion*, but also as to the *relationship of relation:* hence it is that the incarnation can belong to one person, in such a way that it does not belong to another[^15]. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected, that in the divine things all things are one except ingeneration etc.; it must be said that it is true. But when it is said that the incarnation is not any of these; it must be said that, even if it is not any of these, nevertheless it includes something of these. For it includes the notion of personal distinction; for the incarnation is a union of flesh to the divine nature into a distinct person[^16]. — But when it is said that the works of the Trinity are undivided; it must be said that it is true. But when it is said that the incarnation is an operation[^17] of the Trinity; it must be said that the incarnation, according to that it states an operation, is common to the three persons; but because beyond this it imports a relation, therefore it can be attributed to one person without another. And there is an example: if three maidens clothe one [maiden], the putting-on of the garment is by the three, yet the three are not clothed, but only one. Likewise the three persons have wrought the incarnation, and yet only one is said to be incarnate[^18].

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the work of creation, it must be said that it is not similar; because the formation of man[^19] states an action and operation only, not a relation to a person, and therefore is common to the three; it is not so with the incarnation.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the Son cannot be in something through indwelling grace without it being the whole Trinity; it must be said that it is not similar, because *for God to indwell*[^20] *in something* states an effect in the creature, which must be from the whole Trinity; but *to be united* states a respect to a person, and this can be to one person without another, as was shown before.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning the mission into the flesh and into the mind, it must be said that it is not similar; because the mission of the Son into the mind is only according to *essential operation*, not according to *personal union;* it is not so with the mission of the Son into the flesh.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that to be incarnate is an absolute predicate; it must be said that, although it is an absolute predicate[^21] *exteriorly*, it is nevertheless a relation *interiorly*, and by reason of the implied relation it can belong to some person distinctly. And this is plain, because *for the Son to be incarnate* is nothing other than *for the Son to unite flesh to himself;* *for God to be man* is nothing other than for one and the same person to be the hypostasis of the divine and the human nature[^22].

---

la: Libr. 1. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 460, nota 3, ubi integer textus (secundum ed. Migne) habetur.

en: Bk. 1, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 8. Cf. tom. 1, p. 460, note 3, where the entire text (according to the Migne edition) is given.

la: Cfr. Ambros., Apologia prophetae David altera, c. 12. n. 62; V. de Fide, c. II. n. 134; III. de Spiritu sancto, c. 4. n. 19. seqq.; nec non Hieronym., Comment. in Epist. ad Ephes. c. 5, 1; atque August., Epist. II. (alias 218.) n. 2; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 20. n. 3. seqq.; Enchirid. c. 38. n. 12; I. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7, c. 6. n. 12; II. c. 10. n. 18.

en: Cf. Ambrose, *Second Apology of the Prophet David*, c. 12, n. 62; *On the Faith*, Bk. V, c. II, n. 134; *On the Holy Spirit*, Bk. III, c. 4, n. 19 ff.; likewise Jerome, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, c. 5, 1; and Augustine, *Epistle* II (otherwise 218), n. 2; *On the Gospel of John*, tract. 20, n. 3 ff.; *Enchiridion* c. 38, n. 12; *On the Trinity*, Bk. I, c. 4, n. 7, c. 6, n. 12; Bk. II, c. 10, n. 18.

la: August., II. de Trin. c. 5. n. 9: *Ille Mariae conceptus et partus operatio Trinitatis est, qua creante omnia creantur.* — In edd. deest prima conclusio.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Bk. II, c. 5, n. 9: *That conception and birth of Mary is an operation of the Trinity, by whose creating all things are created.* — In the editions the first conclusion is wanting.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3, ubi simile arg. contra missionem Filii et Spiritus S. proponitur. Ibid. missio Spiritus S. explicatur his verbis ex August.; IV. de Trin. c. 20. n. 28. allatis: «Mittitur Filius, cum ex tempore cuiusquam *mente* percipitur», quae verba in arg. seq. respicienda sunt. — In cod. F minor sic sonat: *sed una persona non potest esse in aliquo sine alia per gratiam.* In conclusione codd. G H bb pro *quod non* substituunt *quin.*

en: Cf. I *Sent.*, d. 15, p. I, q. 3, where a similar argument is proposed against the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit. There the mission of the Holy Spirit is explained by these words adduced from Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Bk. IV, c. 20, n. 28: "The Son is sent, when in time he is perceived by someone's *mind*," which words are to be regarded in the following argument. — In cod. F the minor [premise] reads thus: *but one person cannot be in something without another through grace.* In the conclusion codd. G H bb substitute *but that not* for *that not.*

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Vat. hic addit *tres personae*, et paulo inferius cum edd. 1, 2 post *uni* bene subiungit *ita*. — De maiori cfr. I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1.

en: The Vatican edition here adds *the three persons*, and a little below, with edd. 1, 2, after *to one* well subjoins *thus*. — On the major [premise] cf. I *Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1.

la: Vers. 14. — De Verbo cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. I.

en: Verse 14. — On the Word cf. I *Sent.*, d. 27, p. II, q. I.

la: Gal. 4, 4: *At ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere.* — De minori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3. Verba: *nunquam Pater legitur esse missus*, sumta sunt ex August., II. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8, ubi proprie sic legitur: *Pater enim solus nusquam legitur missus.*

en: Gal. 4:4: *But when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, made of a woman.* — On the minor [premise] cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, and I *Sent.*, d. 15, p. I, q. 3. The words: *the Father is never read to have been sent*, are taken from Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Bk. II, c. 5, n. 8, where it properly reads thus: *For the Father alone is nowhere read to have been sent.*

la: Symbol. Athanas. — De maiori vide infra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1, et Comment. a. I. q. I. seqq. — Mox pro *si unio sit* cod. Z *si unio fit.*

en: Athanasian Creed. — On the major [premise] see below the text of the Master, d. V, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. I, q. I ff. — Presently for *if the union be* cod. Z [reads] *if the union occur.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine. — Paulo superius edd. verbo *copulari* adiiciunt *increato*, et post pauca codd. A E N T U V omittunt *una* ante *sine altera.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, at the end. — A little above the editions add *uncreated* to the word *to be coupled*, and after a few [words] codd. A E N T U V omit *one* before *without another.*

la: Cod. Z subiungit *sine altera*. Cod. P: *sicut est operis evidentia manifestum.*

en: Cod. Z subjoins *without another*. Cod. P: *as is manifest by the evidence of the work.*

la: Edd. *prima*.

en: The editions [read] *first*.

la: Cod. T *potest*.

en: Cod. T [reads] *can*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. I. seqq. et d. 33. q. I. seqq. — Paulo superius pro *conveniat* codd. K Z *communicat.*

en: Cf. I *Sent.*, d. 26, q. I ff. and d. 33, q. I ff. — A little above, for *agree* codd. K Z [read] *share in common*.

la: Vide Anselm., de Fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi (ad Urbanum Papam, contra blasphemias Ruzelini sive Roscelini), c. 1.

en: See Anselm, *On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word* (to Pope Urban, against the blasphemies of Ruzelinus or Roscelinus), c. 1.

la: Cfr. infra d. V. et VI. lit. Magistri, et Comment., ubi plura de hac re. — Paulo superius post *Includit enim* cod. F verbo *intellectum* praemittit *habitudinem sive.*

en: Cf. below d. V and VI, the text of the Master, and the Commentary, where there is more on this matter. — A little above, after *for it includes*, cod. F prefixes *a relationship or* to the word *the notion*.

la: Edd. *opus*. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: The editions [read] *work*. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Petr. Pictaviensis (✝ 1205), IV. Sent. c. 8, eandem obiectionem solvens ait: *In praedicta argumentatione fallacia est secundum accidens, vel potius secundum quid et simpliciter, quia prius proponitur quid, postea assumitur quid et cui. Fallacia. Quidquid facit unus istorum trium, facit uterque reliquorum; unus induit se: ergo et reliqui duo, scil. posito, quod imus in medio se induat, et alii duo eundem adiuvent;* et est hic eadem fallacia et similitudo. — Paulo superius post *vestiant unam* plurimi codd. cum edd. perperam supplent *vestem* (fortasse in originali legebatur *veste?*), nec pauci codd., ut F G H L T U V aa cum edd. 1, 2 deinde omittunt *vestis*. Melius codd. P Z bb post *vestiant unam* supplent *ex se;* nos nihil supplevimus, secuti codd. M O.

en: Peter of Poitiers (✝ 1205), IV *Sent.*, c. 8, solving the same objection, says: *In the aforesaid argumentation there is a fallacy of accident, or rather of the qualified and the absolute, because first the "what" is proposed, afterwards the "what" and "for whom" is assumed. Fallacy. Whatever one of these three does, each of the rest does; one clothes himself: therefore so also the other two, namely supposing that the one in the middle clothe himself, and the other two help him;* and here there is the same fallacy and likeness. — A little above, after *clothe one*, very many codd. with the editions wrongly supply *garment* (perhaps in the original it read *with a garment?*), and not a few codd., as F G H L T U V aa with edd. 1, 2 then omit *garment*. Better, codd. P Z bb after *clothe one* supply *of themselves;* we have supplied nothing, following codd. M O.

la: Cod. U ante *dicit* interserit *formationis*, et deinde codd. L aa voculae *non* praefigunt *sed.*

en: Cod. U before *states* inserts *of formation*, and then codd. L aa prefix *but* to the particle *not*.

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. *habitare*, et mox edd. *eaedem quam* pro *quem.*

en: The editions and some codd. [read] *to dwell*, and presently the editions [read] *the same which* for *which*.

la: Codd. A T V falso *relatum* pro *absolutum;* edd. *quamvis non sit praedicatum relatum*. Subinde pro *est tamen relatio interius*, quae lectio habetur etiam in codd. C N P U bb, Vat. *est tamen relatum interius*, alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *est tamen interius.*

en: Codd. A T V wrongly [read] *related* for *absolute;* the editions [read] *although it is not a related predicate*. Then for *it is nevertheless a relation interiorly*, which reading is found also in codd. C N P U bb, the Vatican edition [reads] *it is nevertheless something related interiorly*, other codd. with edd. 1, 2 *it is nevertheless interiorly.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false` — the ARTICULUS I Scholion I–IV printed in a1-q1 (commit 16ed0fd) covers this question; Scholion IV explicitly treats q2 (`De sequenti (2.) quaestione…`). No scholion rendered here. The p.13 footer 11 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) is rendered as `[^22]` — a cross-reference to that q1 scholion, NOT a scholion in this chunk.

**Incoming hand-off (from d1-a1-q1, commit 16ed0fd).** CLEAN PAGE BREAK at the q1→q2 seam: q1 consumed all p.11 footers; q2 starts fresh at the top of p.12 with its own footer sequence. No shared-footer split inherited.

**Forward hand-off → d1-a1-q3.** QUAESTIO III (`Tertio quaeritur, utrum persona una possit simul uniri cum alia`) begins at raw **1600**, on printed **p.14** (PDF 36), in the L-col immediately after q2's last reply. q2's Ad 6 ends grammatically complete (`…hypostasim divinae et humanae naturae.`); the q3 opener is continuous and fresh. q3 `has_scholion: false` (covered by a1-q1 Scholion IV). CLEAN PAGE BREAK expected at p.13/14 seam (q2 consumed all p.13 footers 1–11); verify against the p.14 crops whether q2's last reply shares the p.14 footer sequence — q2's Ad 6 ends on p.13 R-col, so q3 should get a fresh p.14 footer sequence.

**Alignment result: PASS.** Opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum una persona possit uniri sine altera` = TRACTATIO q2 (`utrum una persona potuerit uniri sine alia`); printed title `Utrum una persona possit uniri humanae naturae sine altera`. Minor wording variance (*possit* vs *potuerit*, + *humanae naturae*), SAME question, no q-swap.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0