title: Dist. 5

title_alt: Distinction 5. The text of the Master of the Sentences.

source_text:
<!-- page 143 -->

### Distinctio V.

### Cap. I. *De confirmatione et conversione stantium, et aversione et lapsu cadentium.*

« Post haec consideratio adducit inquirere, quales effecti sint, dum dividerentur aversione et conversione. Post creationem namque mox quidam conversi sunt ad Creatorem suum, quidam aversi. Converti ad Deum fuit ei caritate adhaerere, averti odio habere vel invidere. Invidiae namque mater est superbia, qua voluerunt se parificare Deo. — In conversis quasi in speculo relucere coepit Dei sapientia, qua illuminati sunt; aversi vero excaecati sunt. Et illi quidem conversi sunt et illuminati a Deo, gratia apposita. Isti vero sunt excaecati non immissione malitiae, sed desertione gratiae, a qua deserti sunt, non ita, quod prius dedita[^1][^2] subtraheretur, sed quia nunquam est apposita, ut converterentur. Haec est ergo conversio et aversio, qua divisi sunt qui natura boni erant, ut sint alii supra illud bonum per iustitiam boni, alii illo corrupto per culpam mali. Conversio iustos fecit, et aversio iniustos. Utraque fuit voluntatis, et voluntas utrinque libertatis ».

### Cap. II. *De libero arbitrio breviter tangitur.*

« Habebant enim omnes liberum arbitrium, quod est libera potestas et habilitas voluntatis rationalis. Poterant enim voluntate eligere quodlibet et ratione iudicare, id est discernere, in quibus constat liberum arbitrium. Nec creati sunt *volentes* averti vel converti, sed *habiles* ad volendum hoc vel illud; et post creationem spontanea voluntate alii elegerunt malum, alii bonum. Et ita discrevit *Deus lucem a tenebris*, sicut dicit Scriptura[^3], id est bonos Angelos a malis, et lucem appellavit *diem*, tenebras vero *noctem*, quia bonos Angelos gratia sua illuminavit, malos vero excaecavit ».

### Cap. III. *An aliquid datum fuerit stantibus, quo converterentur.*

« Si autem quaeritur, utrum post creationem conversis aliquid collatum sit, per quod converterentur, id est, diligerent Deum; dicimus, quia est eis collata gratia *cooperans*, sine qua non potest proficere rationalis creatura ad meritum vitae. Cadere enim potest per se, sed proficere non potest sine gratia adiuvante ».

### Cap. IV. *Qua gratia indigebant Angeli, et qua non.*

Non indigebat Angelus gratia, per quam iustificaretur, quia malus non erat, sed qua ad diligendum Deum perfecte et obediendum adiuvaretur. *Operans* quidem gratia dicitur, qua iustificatur impius, id est de impio fit pius, de malo bonus. *Cooperans* vero, qua iuvatur ad bene volendum efficaciter et Deum prae omnibus diligendum et ad operandum bonum et ad perseverandum in bono et huiusmodi, de quibus postea plenius agemus[^4]. Data est ergo Angelis, qui perstiterunt, *cooperans* gratia, per quam conversi sunt, ut Deum perfecte diligerent. Conversi ergo sunt a bono, quod habebant, non perdito, ad maius bonum, quod non habebant; et est facta ista conversio per gratiam *cooperantem* libero arbitrio, quae gratia aliis, qui ceciderunt, apposita non fuit.

### Cap. V. *An lapsis sit imputanda aversio.*

Ideoque a quibusdam dici solet, non esse imputandum illis qui aversi sunt et non conversi, quia sine gratia converti non poterant; sed illa non est eis data, nec culpa illorum fuit, quod non est data, quia in eis nulla culpa adhuc praecesserat. — Ad quod dici potest, quoniam quibus apposita est ipsa gratia, non fuit ex meritis eorum, alioquin iam non esset gratia[^5], si ex <!-- page 144 -->merito, quod esset ante gratiam, daretur. Quod vero aliis non est data, culpa eorum fuit, quia, cum stare possent, noluerunt, quousque gratia apponeretur, sicut alii perstiterunt, donec, illis cadentibus per superbiam, eis gratia est apposita. Aperte ergo cadentium culpa in hoc deprehendi potest, quia, licet sine gratia nequirent proficere, quam nondum acceperant, per id tamen, quod eis collatum erat in creatione, poterant non cadere, id est stare; quia nihil erat, quod ad casum eos compelleret, sed sua spontanea voluntate declinaverunt; quod si non fecissent, quod datum est aliis utique daretur et istis.

### Cap. VI. *Utrum beatitudinem, quam acceperunt in confirmatione stantes, meruerunt per aliquam tunc appositam gratiam.*

Hic quaeri solet, utrum in ipsa confirmatione beati fuerunt Angeli, et an ipsam beatitudinem aliquo modo meruerint. — Quod in ipsa confirmatione beati fuerunt, plures contestantur auctoritates[^6], et ideo pro constanti habendum est. — Utrum vero per gratiam tunc sibi datam ipsam beatitudinem meruerint, ambiguum est. Quibusdam enim placet, quod eam meruerint per gratiam, quam in confirmatione perceperunt[^7], simulque in eis meritum et praemium fuisse dicunt, nec meritum praecessisse praemium tempore, sed causa. — Aliis autem videtur, quod beatitudinem, quam receperunt in confirmatione, per gratiam tunc appositam non meruerint, dicentes, tunc non fuisse eis collatam gratiam ad merendum, sed ad beate vivendum; nec tunc eis datum esse bonum, quo mererentur, sed quo feliciter fruerentur. Quod autem tunc in praemium acceperunt per obsequia nobis exhibita ex Dei obedientia et reverentia mereri dicunt; et ita praemium praecessit merita. Et hoc mihi magis placere fateor[^8].

english:
### Distinction V.

### Cap. I. *On the confirmation and conversion of those who stood, and the aversion and fall of those who fell.*

« After these matters, the consideration leads us to inquire of what sort they were made, when they were divided by aversion and conversion. For after creation some were soon turned to their Creator, some turned away. To be turned to God was for him to cleave [to God] in charity; to be turned away was to hate or to envy. For the mother of envy is pride, by which they wished to make themselves equal to God. — In those turned [to God] the wisdom of God began to shine back as in a mirror, by which they were illumined; but those turned away were blinded. And those indeed were turned and illumined by God, grace having been applied. But these were blinded not by the infusion of malice, but by the desertion of grace, from which they were forsaken — not in such a way that what had first been bestowed[^1][^2] was withdrawn, but because it was never applied, that they might be converted. This, then, is the conversion and aversion by which those who were good by nature were divided, so that some are above that good through the righteousness of good, others, that good being corrupted, through the fault of evil. Conversion made [them] just, and aversion [made them] unjust. Each was a matter of the will, and the will on both sides was a matter of liberty ».

### Cap. II. *Free choice is briefly touched upon.*

« For they all had free choice, which is the free power and aptitude of the rational will. For they were able by will to choose anything and by reason to judge, that is, to discern — in which [two] free choice consists. Nor were they created *willing* to be turned away or turned [to God], but *apt* for willing this or that; and after creation, by spontaneous will some chose evil, others good. And thus *God divided the light from the darkness*, as Scripture says[^3], that is, the good Angels from the evil, and he called the light *day*, but the darkness *night*, because he illumined the good Angels with his grace, but blinded the evil ».

### Cap. III. *Whether something was given to those who stood, by which they might be converted.*

« But if it is asked whether after creation something was conferred on those who were converted, by which they might be converted, that is, might love God: we say that there was conferred on them *cooperating* grace, without which the rational creature cannot advance to the merit of life. For it can fall of itself, but it cannot advance without assisting grace ».

### Cap. IV. *By what grace the Angels had need, and by what they did not.*

The Angel did not need grace by which he might be justified, since he was not evil, but [grace] by which he might be assisted to love God perfectly and to obey. *Operating* grace, indeed, is that by which the impious is justified, that is, from impious is made pious, from evil good. But *cooperating* [grace is that] by which one is helped to will the good effectively and to love God above all things and to do good and to persevere in good and the like, of which we shall later treat more fully[^4]. There was given, then, to the Angels who stood firm, *cooperating* grace, by which they were converted, that they might love God perfectly. They were therefore turned away from a good which they had, not by losing it, to a greater good which they did not have; and this conversion was made through grace *cooperating* with free choice — which grace was not applied to the others, who fell.

### Cap. V. *Whether the aversion is to be imputed to those who fell.*

Therefore it is wont to be said by some that it is not to be imputed to those who were turned away and not converted, since without grace they could not be converted; but that grace was not given to them, nor was it their fault that it was not given, since in them no fault had yet preceded. — To which it can be said that, for those to whom that grace was applied, it was not from their merits — otherwise it would no longer be grace[^5], if it were given <!-- page 144 -->from a merit which would exist before grace. But that it was not given to the others was their fault, since, although they were able to stand, they were unwilling [to do so] until grace should be applied, just as the others stood firm until, those [first] falling through pride, grace was applied to them. Plainly, therefore, the fault of those who fell can be detected in this: that, although without grace they could not advance, which they had not yet received, yet through that which had been conferred on them in creation they were able not to fall, that is, to stand; since there was nothing which compelled them to the fall, but by their own spontaneous will they turned aside; and had they not done so, what was given to the others would certainly be given to these as well.

### Cap. VI. *Whether the beatitude which those who stood received in confirmation, they merited through some grace then applied.*

Here it is wont to be asked whether in the confirmation itself the Angels were blessed, and whether they merited that beatitude in some way. — That in the confirmation itself they were blessed, several authorities attest[^6], and therefore it is to be held as certain. — But whether through the grace then given to them they merited that beatitude is ambiguous. For it pleases some that they merited it through the grace which they received[^7] in confirmation, and they say that in them merit and reward were simultaneous, and that merit did not precede reward in time, but in cause. — But to others it seems that the beatitude which they received in confirmation they did not merit through the grace then applied — saying that grace was then conferred on them not for meriting, but for living blessedly; nor was a good then given to them by which they might merit, but by which they might happily enjoy. But what they then received as reward, through the services rendered to us out of obedience and reverence toward God, they say is merited; and thus reward preceded merits. And I confess that this latter view pleases me more[^8].

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.). — Totum hoc cap. I. fere ad verbum ex Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. 5. c. 23. et Summa Sent. tr. 2. c. 2. exscriptum est; sequens cap. nec non plura alia ex eadem Sum. tr. 2. c. 3. sumpta sunt.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16). — This entire chapter I is copied almost word for word from Hugh [of St. Victor], *On the Sacraments* I, p. 5, c. 23, and the *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 2, c. 2; the following chapter, as well as several other things, are taken from the same *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 2, c. 3.

la: Vat. sola *habita*, edd. 2, 6, 8 *data*. Paulo inferius post *illud bonum* edd. 1, 8 inserunt *quod habebant*. Deinde pro *utrinque* Vat. cum ceteris edd., exc. 1, *utriusque; incongrue.*

en: The Vatican edition alone [reads] *habita*; editions 2, 6, 8 [read] *data*. A little below, after *illud bonum* ("that good") editions 1, 8 insert *quod habebant* ("which they had"). Then for *utrinque* ("on both sides") the Vatican edition, with the rest of the editions except 1, [reads] *utriusque* ("of each"); incongruously.

la: Vat. cum codd. B E et nonnullis edd. *dicemus*, scilicet in d. XXVI. et XXIX.

en: The Vatican edition, with codices B E and several editions, [reads] *dicemus* ("we shall say"), namely in dist. XXVI and XXIX.

la: Respicitur Rom. 11, 6.

en: Reference is made to Rom. 11:6.

la: Cod. Erf.: sicut August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12, et XI. de Gen. c. 8, et libr. de Corrept. et gratia circa medium, et fere ubique secundum August., ubi loquitur de materia ista.

en: The Erfurt codex [annotates]: as Augustine, *On the City of God* XI, c. 12, and *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* XI, c. 8, and the book *On Rebuke and Grace* about the middle, and almost everywhere according to Augustine, where he speaks of this matter.

la: Codd. B C E *acceperunt*.

en: Codices B C E [read] *acceperunt* ("they received").

la: Cod. Erf. annotat: Hic non tenetur Magister. — Nec [?]

en: The Erfurt codex annotates: Here the Master is not followed. — Nor [?] *(the printed p.144 footnote breaks off at* Nec *at the L→R column edge; full continuation to be confirmed in the d.10 600 dpi polish pass).*

translators_notes:
- This chunk is Lombard's text (the *littera*) for Distinction V: Cap. I–VI on the confirmation/conversion of the Angels who stood and the aversion/fall of those who fell — free choice (Cap. II), the *cooperating* grace given to those who stood (Cap. III–IV), whether the aversion is imputable to the fallen (Cap. V), and whether the beatitude received in confirmation was merited (Cap. VI). One continuous Lombard text spanning printed pp. 143–144 (= PDF 165–166); the COMMENTARIUS begins mid-p.144 (next chunk `bon-sent-II-d5-divisio`).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** Lombard's prose is in the IA djvu OCR (raw 10586–10672) but two-column-bled; transcribed from the OCR base and fully re-set against the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 143-144 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 143` / `144`), read L column top→bottom then R column. Both pages are two-column with two-stream footers; footers read off the crops + a custom high-zoom footer crop for the p.144 note ³ row.
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`) — a littera chunk has no scholion.
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.143 (INCOMING — clean, no backfill).** p.143's top carries the tail of the preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d4-dubia`'s DUB. III (both columns). That chunk's own Notes state explicitly: *"DUB III has no apparatus, so no footer split crosses here."* Verified on the crops: every p.143 footer note anchors in this littera's Cap. I–V body. So this littera owns **all** of p.143's footer; `d4-dubia` not modified. p.143 footer is two-stream: the **main stream** ¹ `Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.)` (L-column) with its `— Totum hoc cap. I. fere ad verbum ex Hugone …` continuation running over into the R-column footer → combined as [^1] (*dedita¹*, Cap. I); ² `Gen. 1, 4` → [^3] (*Scriptura²*, Cap. II); ³ `Vat. … dicemus, scilicet in d. XXVI. et XXIX.` → [^4] (*agemus³*, Cap. IV); ⁴ `Respicitur Rom. 11, 6` → [^5] (*gratia⁴*, Cap. V). The dedicated **`NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM`** block on p.143 (L-column, its own ¹ `Vat. sola habita …`) anchors the same Cap. I superscript at *dedita* and is rendered as [^2], placed immediately after [^1] (the classic Vol II double-apparatus: one body superscript ¹ feeds both the main source note and the NOTAE variant note). Continuous renumber p.143: main ¹ → [^1]; NOTAE ¹ → [^2]; main ² → [^3]; main ³ → [^4]; main ⁴ → [^5].
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.144 (OUTGOING — note for the d5-divisio build).** p.144 footnote numbering restarts. The **L-column** footer notes ¹ ² ³ anchor THIS littera's Cap. VI body — ¹ `Cod. Erf.: sicut August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12 …` (*auctoritates¹*) → [^6]; ² `Codd. B C E acceperunt` (*perceperunt²*) → [^7]; ³ `Cod. Erf. annotat: Hic non tenetur Magister. — Nec` (*fateor³*) → [^8]. The **R-column** footer on p.144 — `S. Bonav. hanc sententiam approbat. Cfr. Comment. hic a. 3. q. 2.` and the separately-headed **`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`** block (¹ `Vat. conversio; falso.`; ² `Cod. cc et ed. 1 mali.`) — is the following `bon-sent-II-d5-divisio`'s apparatus (the COMMENTARIUS begins mid-p.144). **d5-divisio is still a decade-rechunked skeleton — when it is promoted it must take the p.144 R-column `S. Bonav. …` note + the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block, NOT this littera's L-column ¹²³ (which are [^6]–[^8] here).** No backfill issue now; just do not double-count at the d5-divisio build.
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–8):** p.143 main-stream ¹ → [^1]; p.143 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` ¹ → [^2]; p.143 main-stream ² ³ ⁴ → [^3] [^4] [^5]; p.144 L-column main-stream ¹ ² ³ → [^6] [^7] [^8].
- **One `[?]` flag — [^8] tail.** The p.144 L-column note ³ reads `Cod. Erf. annotat: Hic non tenetur Magister. — Nec` and visibly breaks off at *Nec* at the L→R column edge on the 450 dpi crop (the raw OCR line 10713 merges the R-column `q. 2.` bleed and the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` note ² into the same physical line). The continuation after *Nec* is not resolvable at 450 dpi. Parked for the **d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker** (no separate `manual-review` file for Vol II per the override).
- Marginal editorial glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Dubium 1`, `Dubium 2`, `Notandum`, `Opinio falsa quorundam`, `Ad 1. quaestionem`, `Ad 2. quaestionem`, `solut. 1`, `Solutio 2. Magistro probata`).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 5, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem V — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction 5 — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 144 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

*Quales facti sint Angeli aversione et conversione.*

**Post haec consideratio etc.**

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, quales facti sunt Angeli in sua prima conditione. Hic secundo intendit agere, quales facti sunt aversione et conversione. Dividitur autem haec pars in tres. In prima agit de aversione et conversione. In secunda de confirmatione et obstinatione, infra distinctione septima: *Supra dictum est, quod Angeli* etc. In tertia de ordinum distinctione, infra distinctione nona: *Post praedicta superest cognoscere.* Prima pars habet duas. In prima agit de conversione et aversione. In secunda de ruina, quae consecuta est malorum aversionem, et hoc infra distinctione sexta: *Praeterea sciri oportet* etc. Prima pars habet tres. In prima ostendit, quid sit averti et converti. In secunda ostendit, a quo sit, ibi: *Habebant enim omnes* etc. In tertia quaedam dubia circa conversionem movet et solvit, ibi: *Si autem quaeritur, utrum post creationem.* Et illa tertia pars habet tres partes secundum tres dubitationes, quas determinat et explanat. Primo enim determinat, utrum bonis gratia sit collata ad hoc, ut efficaciter converterentur. Secundo vero, utrum malis sit sua aversio imputanda, cum gratiam non habuerint, ibi: *Ideoque quibusdam videtur* etc. In tertia vero determinat, utrum conversio fuerit meritoria confirmationis, ibi: *Hic quaeri solet, utrum in ipsa confirmatione* etc. — Et sic tria tanguntur in universo, scilicet aversio luciferi, aversio[^1] aliorum minorum et conversio bonorum.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua quaeritur, quales facti sint Angeli per aversionem et conversionem, tria quaeruntur. Primo enim quaeritur de aversione luciferi, qui fuit caput totius malitiae[^2][^3]. Secundo quaeritur de aversione minorum Angelorum. Tertio de conversione bonorum. Quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur. Primum est, utrum peccaverit peccato superbiae. Secundum est, quid fuerit eius appetibile.

---

english:
<!-- page 144 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V.

*Of what sort the Angels were made by aversion and conversion.*

**"After these things, [a] consideration" etc.**

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed of what sort the Angels were made in their first condition. Here, secondly, he intends to treat of what sort they were made by aversion and conversion. Now this part is divided into three. In the first he treats of aversion and conversion. In the second, of confirmation and obstinacy, below in distinction seven: *Above it was said that the Angels* etc. In the third, of the distinction of the orders, below in distinction nine: *After the foregoing it remains to know.* The first part has two [sections]. In the first he treats of conversion and aversion. In the second, of the ruin which followed upon the aversion of the wicked, and this below in distinction six: *Moreover it must be known* etc. The first part has three [sections]. In the first he shows what it is to be averted and to be converted. In the second he shows by whom it is, there: *For they all had* etc. In the third he raises and resolves certain doubts concerning the conversion, there: *But if it is asked, whether after creation.* And that third part has three parts according to the three doubts, which he settles and explains. For first he determines whether grace was conferred on the good for this, that they might be efficaciously converted. Secondly, whether their aversion is to be imputed to the wicked, since they had not had grace, there: *And therefore to some it seems* etc. In the third he determines whether the conversion was meritorious of confirmation, there: *Here it is wont to be asked, whether in the confirmation itself* etc. — And thus three [things] are touched upon in all, namely the aversion of Lucifer, the aversion[^1] of the other lesser [Angels], and the conversion of the good.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, in which it is asked of what sort the Angels were made through aversion and conversion, three [things] are asked. For first it is asked about the aversion of Lucifer, who was the head of all malice[^2][^3]. Secondly it is asked about the aversion of the lesser Angels. Thirdly about the conversion of the good. Concerning the first, two [things] are asked. The first is, whether he sinned by the sin of pride. The second is, what was his object of appetite.

la: Vat. *conversio*; falso.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *conversio* (conversion); wrongly.

en: St. Bonaventure approves this opinion. Cf. the Commentary here, art. 3, q. 2.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *mali.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *mali* (of evil).

translators_notes:
- This chunk is the COMMENTARIUS opening for Distinction V: the *Divisio textus* (Bonaventure's division of Lombard's d.5 text into the three parts — aversion/conversion, confirmation/obstinacy [d.7], the distinction of the orders [d.9] — with the first part's subsections and the three doubts on conversion) and the *Tractatio quaestionum* (the question-plan: three heads — the aversion of Lucifer, the aversion of the lesser Angels, the conversion of the good — with the first head's two questions: whether Lucifer sinned by pride / what was his object of appetite). Wholly on printed p.144 (= PDF 166); the COMMENTARIUS begins mid-p.144, below the end of Lombard's Cap. VI (preceding chunk `bon-sent-II-d5-littera`).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** Clean structured prose in the IA djvu OCR (raw 10673–10717), two-column-bled; transcribed from the OCR base and fully re-set against the 450 dpi p.144 column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 144 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 144`), read L column top→bottom then R column for both the DIVISIO TEXTUS and the TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, plus custom high-zoom crops of the DIVISIO/TRACTATIO body (to fix the *aversio*¹ and *malitiae*² superscripts) and of the R-column footer (to read the NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM block).
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`) — a divisio chunk has no scholion.
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.144 (RECEIVED — no backfill).** p.144's footer is two-column / two-stream. The **L-column** main-stream notes ¹ `Cod. Erf.: sicut August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 12 …`, ² `Codd. B C E acceperunt`, ³ `Cod. Erf. annotat: Hic non tenetur Magister. — Nec` anchor the *preceding* committed chunk `bon-sent-II-d5-littera`'s Cap. VI body and are already its `[^6]`/`[^7]`/`[^8]` (the outgoing split documented in that chunk's Notes). **Not taken here; `d5-littera` not modified.** This divisio's apparatus is the **R-column** material: the main-stream source note `S. Bonav. hanc sententiam approbat. Cfr. Comment. hic a. 3. q. 2.` (→ [^2], anchored at the TRACTATIO's *malitiae*, on the opinion that Lucifer was *caput totius malitiae*) and the separately-headed **`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`** block: ¹ `Vat. conversio; falso.` (→ [^1], anchored at the DIVISIO's *aversio[^1] aliorum minorum* — the Vatican edition wrongly reads *conversio* for *aversio*) and ² `Cod. cc et ed. 1 mali.` (→ [^3], anchored at the TRACTATIO's *malitiae*, the cc/ed.1 variant *mali* for *malitiae*).
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- **Boundary to d5-a1-q1 — CLEAN.** The short `ARTICULUS I.` opener + title *De aversione luciferi* + `QUAESTIO I. Utrum lucifer peccaverit peccato superbiae* (raw 10718–10724, top of p.145 = PDF 167) folds into the following `bon-sent-II-d5-a1-q1` (Vol II convention — no standalone article-divisio chunk). This divisio's footer is wholly the p.144 R-column; a1-q1's apparatus begins on p.145. No split, no backfill.
- **No `[?]` flags.** Prose clean in OCR, the two body superscripts and the R-column footer verified on the p.144 high-zoom crops. The COMMENTARIUS lemma rendered as the bold incipit (`Post haec consideratio etc.`) and the divisio's *ibi:* lemma-cues kept in italic per the divisio convention. (The d5-littera build parked one separate `[?]` for the p.144 L-column note ³ tail — that is `d5-littera`'s [^8], not this chunk's, and stays parked for the d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 145 -->

### ARTICULUS I.

*De aversione luciferi.*

### QUAESTIO I.

*Utrum lucifer peccaverit peccato superbiae.*

Quod autem peccaverit peccato superbiae, videtur sic.

1. Super illud Lucae decimo[^1]: *Videbam satanam* etc., Glossa: «Qui singulariter elatus erat, ut in eius casu ceteri de elatione timerent».

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo[^2]: *Initium omnis peccati superbia;* sed primum inter omnia peccata fuit peccatum diaboli: ergo etc.

3. Item, Augustinus undecimo super Genesim ad litteram[^3]: «Factus continuo se a luce veritatis avertit, superbia tumidus et propriae potestatis delectatione corruptus».

4. Item, Isidorus de Summo Bono, libro primo, capitulo decimo[^4]: «Mox ut factus est, in superbiam erupit et praecipitatus de caelo est».

5. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia non contingit peccare nisi tripliciter, videlicet aut ex *concupiscentia carnis,* aut *concupiscentia oculorum,* aut *superbia vitae*[^5]. Sed primum peccatum non potuit esse carnis concupiscentia, nec potuit esse appetitus divitiarum, quia spiritus istis non indiget: ergo necesse est, quod fuerit superbia vitae.

6. Item, peccatorum spiritualium non sunt nisi quatuor genera praeter avaritiam, quae tenet quasi medium inter carnalia et spiritualia, scilicet superbia, ira, accidia, invidia; sed in omnibus tribus generibus est odium: ergo cum omne odium causetur ab amore, odium inordinatum causatur ab amore inordinato[^6]: ergo ante ista tria genera oportet aliquod peccatum spirituale praecedere in diabolo. Sed hoc non potuit esse nisi superbia: ergo etc.

7. Item, nunquam pervertitur affectus, nisi prius pervertatur iudicium; nunquam pervertitur iudicium in his quae sunt de necessitate salutis, nisi aliqua excaecatio sit in ratione: ergo excaecatio rationis praecedit omnem appetitum. Sed excaecatio non potest esse, quin praecesserit peccatum; et non potuit praecedere peccatum *appetitus:* ergo praecessit peccatum *praesumtionis;* sed hoc est peccatum superbiae: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Quod fuerit primum peccatum *omissio,* videtur, quia, si ipse deliberasset, utrum illud esset appetendum, nunquam peccasset, nec aliter vitare poterat: ergo tenebatur deliberare; et ante omisit deliberare, quam illud appeteret: ergo ante omisit, quam superbiret. *Si forte dicas,* quod per intellectum deiformem poterat sine deliberatione videre, quid faciendum; *contra:* ad hoc, quod ipse hoc inspiceret, oportuit ipsum considerare circumstantias appetiti et consequentia, et ista sunt multa; sed simplex virtutis finitae, quod cognoscit multa per multa, impossibile est simul multa cognoscere, cum se totaliter convertat ad *cognitum*[^7]: ergo necesse habuit deliberare. *Praeterea,* hoc non solvit, quia quidquid esset, tenebatur vitare peccatum, tenebatur reprimere cogitationem suam, ne procederet ad consensum, et hoc, antequam consentiret: ergo ante omisit: ergo etc.

2. Item, videtur, quod peccato *ingratitudinis.* Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis[^8]: «Quia gratuitae bonitati Dei, a qua conditus es, ingratus existis, iustitiam, quam expertus non es, non metuis; ideo audacter culpam committis»: ergo ante fuit ingratus, quam committeret culpam illam superbiae.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia tenetur quis gratias agere de beneficiis, quando illa considerat; sed diabolus consideravit beneficia Dei, cum respexit[^9] suam pulcritudinem et excellentiam, et non egit gratias, immo oppositum fecit, quia voluit sibi attribuere quod Dei erat: ergo etc.

4. Item, videtur, quod peccato *infidelitatis,* quia Anselmus de Peccato diaboli et Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis[^10] dicunt, quod diabolus non credidit, se esse puniendum, sive credidit, se non debere puniri; sed qui credit, peccatum a Deo impunitum relinqui, est infidelis: ergo diabolus, antequam peccaret appetendo, peccavit per infidelitatem.

5. Item, *ratione* videtur: diabolus nunquam appetivisset, nisi credidisset, sibi esse bonum vel <!-- page 146 -->possibile; sed omnis qui credit, creaturam posse aequari ipsi Creatori, est infidelis: ergo diabolus, antequam superbiret, infidelis fuit.

6. Item, videtur, quod peccatum *curiositatis* fuerit primum. Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis, capitulo decimo[^11]: «Per curiositatem a veritate cecidit, quia quod prius spectavit curiose, affectavit illicite et speravit praesumtuose».

7. Item, hoc videtur *ratione:* quia curiositatis vitium est diligenter respicere, quod non licet appetere, secundum illud: «Non licet intueri quod non licet concupisci[^12]»; sed diabolus diligenter aspexit quod supra se erat, quando dixit: *In caelum ascendam:* ergo manifestum etc.

8. Item, quod *invidia* fuerit, videtur. Augustinus de Sancta Virginitate[^13], loquens de superbia et invidia: «His duobus diabolus diabolus est»; sed in primo peccato factus est diabolus: ergo fuit simul invidia ut superbia: ergo qua ratione superbia primum, et invidia.

9. Item, *ratione* Magistri[^14] videtur: «Sicut converti est caritate adhaerere, ita ab oppositis averti est odio habere vel invidere»: cum ergo primo peccato diabolus fuerit aversus, invidia fuit eius primum peccatum.

### Conclusio.

> Primum Angeli peccatum fuit superbia; quod initiatum est in praesumtione, consummatum in ambitione, confirmatum in invidiae et odii aversione.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere ad praedictas rationes et auctoritates, quod diabolus simul tempore peccavit pluribus generibus peccatorum; naturaliter tamen et principaliter prae aliis peccatis fuit peccatum superbiae. Et sic respondent unica et brevi responsione ad omnia obiecta, quod verum concludunt. — Sed haec responsio nec *verum dicit,* nec *solvit.* Non *dicit verum,* quia, cum affectus diaboli simplex sit, sicut et intellectus, et intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere vel plures cogitationes habere, similiter nec affectus simul et in eodem instanti plura peccata committere, maxime quae spectant omnino ad diversas actiones, sicut infidelitas, superbia et invidia. *Praeterea,* esto quod vera esset[^15], non *solvit,* quia praedictae rationes non tantum probant, quod praedicta peccata concomitentur superbiam, sed quod antecedant.

Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod est loqui de peccato quantum ad triplicem statum, scilicet quantum ad inchoationem, consummationem et confirmationem. Peccatum diaboli *initiatum* est in *praesumtione,* statim enim, ut suam vidit pulcritudinem, praesumsit; *consummatum* est in *ambitione,* quia praesumens de se appetiit quod omnino supra se fuit et ad quod pervenire non potuit; sed *confirmatum* est *invidiae et odii* aversione, quia ex quo obtinere non potuit quod appetiit, ideo invidere coepit et affectu odii contraire. Et in hoc firmatus est, quia hoc[^16] omnino ipsum a Deo separavit et perfectum obstaculum posuit, sicut perfecta caritas perfecte Deo iungit.

Concedendae ergo sunt rationes primae, quod superbia fuerit primum peccatum; nam superbia praesumtionis et tumoris primum fuit generatione, superbia ambitionis primum fuit consummatione.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *omissione,* notandum, quod omissio nec fuit nec potuit esse principale peccatum sive primum, quia dimissio boni venit ex *timore male humiliante,* et omnis talis timor venit ex *amore male inflammante*[^17]. Unde nullus dimittit aliquid facere quod debet, nisi aliquid amet, quod non debet; sicut aliquis omittit ire ad matutinum, quia amat somnum et quietem in lectulo. — Hac eadem ratione non potuit primum[^18] esse *ingratitudo,* nec etiam *invidia.* — Dicendum est igitur, quod non quaecumque dimissio inducit peccatum omissionis. Contingit enim omittere *circumstantiam,* et tunc non est peccatum omissionis, sed negligentia quaedam. Contingit omittere *actum,* et hoc dupliciter: vel *generaliter,* vel *specialiter; generaliter,* secundum quod comprehendit praeceptum *affirmativum et negativum; specialiter*[^19] contra *affirmativum,* sicut *transgressio* contra *negativum.* Unde non omittit qui non vitat fornicationem, sed qui non honorat parentes. Et secundum quod est actus *specialis,* potest esse actus *principalis,* vel *non principalis.* Et non est omissio peccatum principale, nisi pro actu *principali,* sicut patet de eo qui te<!-- page 147 -->netur ire ad matutinas, tenetur se induere et surgere de lecto, et sic de aliis; et quamvis sint multi actus, una est omissio. Ad hoc autem, quod sit peccatum aliquod censendum esse peccatum omissionis, oportet, quod sit omissio *actus,* non circumstantiae; *affirmativi*[^20], non negativi; *principalis,* non annexi. — Sic autem patet, quod non est in proposito, quia diabolus actum principalem aliquem, ad quem teneretur, non dimisit, sed id appetiit, quod non debuit. Et sic patet breviter de *omissione.*

*Ad 2. 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *ingratitudine,* dicendum, quod ingratitudo potest dici dupliciter, scilicet *negative,* vel *privative*[^21]. *Negative,* quando quis non est gratus Deo, ut debet, et sic est circumstantia omnium peccatorum. *Privative,* quando non tantum non est gratus, immo contrarie movetur, ut puta quando cogitat de beneficio, ut est beneficium, et parvipendit beneficium vel benefactorem; et sic est speciale peccatum. Sic autem non peccavit diabolus, quia non cogitavit de beneficiis Dei, in quantum erant Dei, sed in quantum erant bona propria, et ideo elatus est.

*Ad 4. 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *infidelitate,* dicendum, quod nec peccatum infidelitatis nec curiositatis fuit primum, quia oculus sanus et clarus ipsius intellectus non pervertitur in iudicando vel inquirendo, nisi prius aliqua elatione inquinetur[^22].

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non credidit etc.; dicendum, quod ad infidelitatis peccatum duo concurrunt. Oportet enim, quod sit *consensus* rationis cum *iudicio universali.* Si enim aliquis cogitat, quod fornicari est *sibi* bonum; vel cogitat in universali, quod est bonum, et non consentit iudicio rationis[^23], non est infidelis, ut patet. Et de diabolo dico, quod non consensit iudicio rationis, sed aestimavit sibi bonum.

*Ad 6. 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de *curiositate,* dicendum, quod duo faciunt considerationem dici curiosam, scilicet *curae attentio* et *utilitatis privatio*[^24]. Unde si diabolus ex omnibus quae respexit, suum bonum elicuisset, referendo illa in gloriam Dei; illa consideratio nec esset culpanda nec curiosa dicenda. Quod ergo fuit *curiosa,* ex hoc fuit, quod non suum[^25] bonum inde elicuit, sed malum ambitionis et praesumtionis incurrit; et ita est primo ratio peccati in praesumtione et in consideratione. Et sic patet, quod quamvis in diabolo fuerit curiositas, non fuit culpa antecedens praesumtionem, nec alia, sed conditio illi annexa.

*Ad 8. 9.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de *invidia,* patet responsio per verbum Augustini, quod non fuit primum peccatum. Nam Augustinus dicit, quod est *proles* superbiae, in libro de Virginitate[^26], et ita eam consequitur, etsi non in eodem instanti, tamen in eodem tempore sine morae intermissione. Unde in huius prolis generatione confirmata est superbia, et diabolus dictus est diabolus, quia *deorsum fluxit*[^27] et ex hoc in malitia sua firmatus fuit. Et ideo Magister describens perfectam aversionem, qualis est in diabolo, non qualis est in hominibus peccatoribus, dicit, quod «averti est odio habere vel invidere». Diabolus enim superbus non valens conscendere, sed compulsus descendere, odit Deum iustum et invidet excellentiae eius.

english:
<!-- page 145 -->

### ARTICLE I.

*On the aversion of Lucifer.*

### QUESTION I.

*Whether Lucifer sinned by the sin of pride.*

That he sinned by the sin of pride, it seems thus.

1. On that text of Luke, chapter ten[^1]: *I saw Satan* etc., the Gloss: «Who was so singularly elated that, at his fall, the rest might fear elation».

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter ten[^2]: *The beginning of every sin is pride;* but the first among all sins was the sin of the devil: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine, on the eleventh [book] On Genesis according to the letter[^3]: «Made [good], he straightway turned himself away from the light of truth, swollen with pride and corrupted by the delight of his own power».

4. Likewise, Isidore, On the Highest Good, book one, chapter ten[^4]: «As soon as he was made, he burst into pride and was hurled down from heaven».

5. Likewise, it seems *by reason,* because one does not happen to sin except in three ways, namely either from *concupiscence of the flesh,* or *concupiscence of the eyes,* or *pride of life*[^5]. But the first sin could not be concupiscence of the flesh, nor could it be the appetite for riches, since a spirit does not need these things: therefore it must be that it was pride of life.

6. Likewise, of spiritual sins there are only four kinds besides avarice, which holds as it were the middle between the carnal and the spiritual, namely pride, anger, sloth, envy; but in all three kinds there is hatred: therefore, since all hatred is caused by love, inordinate hatred is caused by inordinate love[^6]: therefore before these three kinds some spiritual sin must precede in the devil. But this could not be except pride: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, the affection is never perverted unless the judgment is first perverted; the judgment is never perverted in those things which are of the necessity of salvation unless there is some blinding in the reason: therefore a blinding of reason precedes every appetite. But a blinding cannot be unless a sin preceded; and a sin of *appetite* could not precede: therefore a sin of *presumption* preceded; but this is the sin of pride: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. That the first sin was *omission,* it seems, because, if he had deliberated whether that thing was to be desired, he would never have sinned, nor could he avoid it otherwise: therefore he was bound to deliberate; and he omitted to deliberate before he desired that thing: therefore he omitted before he was proud. *If perhaps you say* that through a deiform intellect he could see without deliberation what was to be done; *on the contrary:* for him to inspect this, it was necessary for him to consider the circumstances of the thing desired and the consequences, and these are many; but for a simple [power] of finite virtue, which knows many things through many, it is impossible to know many things at once, since it turns itself wholly to the *thing known*[^7]: therefore he had to deliberate. *Moreover,* this does not solve [it], because, whatever it might be, he was bound to avoid sin, he was bound to repress his thought lest it proceed to consent, and this before he consented: therefore he omitted beforehand: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems [that he sinned] by the sin of *ingratitude.* Bernard, On the Steps of Humility[^8]: «Because to the gratuitous goodness of God, by which you were made, you show yourself ungrateful; the justice which you have not experienced you do not fear; therefore you boldly commit the fault»: therefore he was ungrateful before he committed that fault of pride.

3. Likewise, it seems *by reason,* because one is bound to give thanks for benefits when he considers them; but the devil considered the benefits of God, when he beheld[^9] his own beauty and excellence, and did not give thanks, nay did the opposite, because he wished to attribute to himself what was God's: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it seems [that he sinned] by the sin of *infidelity,* because Anselm, On the Sin of the Devil, and Bernard, On the Steps of Humility[^10], say that the devil did not believe that he was to be punished, or believed that he ought not to be punished; but whoever believes that a sin is left unpunished by God is unfaithful: therefore the devil, before he sinned by desiring, sinned through infidelity.

5. Likewise, it seems *by reason:* the devil would never have desired unless he had believed it to be good or <!-- page 146 -->possible for himself; but everyone who believes that a creature can be made equal to the Creator himself is unfaithful: therefore the devil, before he was proud, was unfaithful.

6. Likewise, it seems that the sin of *curiosity* was the first. Bernard, On the Steps of Humility, chapter ten[^11]: «Through curiosity he fell from the truth, because what he first beheld curiously, he affected illicitly and hoped for presumptuously».

7. Likewise, this seems *by reason:* because the vice of curiosity is to look diligently at what it is not licit to desire, according to that [saying]: «It is not licit to gaze upon what it is not licit to covet[^12]»; but the devil diligently looked at what was above himself, when he said: *I will ascend into heaven:* therefore [it is] manifest etc.

8. Likewise, that there was *envy,* it seems. Augustine, On Holy Virginity[^13], speaking of pride and envy: «By these two the devil is a devil»; but in the first sin he was made a devil: therefore there was envy together with pride: therefore by the same reasoning as pride was first, so also envy.

9. Likewise, it seems *by the reasoning of the Master*[^14]: «As to be converted is to adhere by charity, so to be averted from the opposites is to hold in hatred or to envy»: since therefore in the first sin the devil was averted, envy was his first sin.

### Conclusion.

> The first sin of the Angel was pride; which was initiated in presumption, consummated in ambition, confirmed in the aversion of envy and hatred.

**I respond:** It must be noted on this point that some wished to say, to the aforesaid arguments and authorities, that the devil sinned at the same time by several kinds of sins; yet naturally and principally, before the other sins, it was the sin of pride. And thus they answer with a single brief response to all the objections, that they conclude what is true. — But this response neither *says what is true* nor *solves [it].* It does not *say what is true,* because, since the devil's affection is simple, as also his intellect, and the intellect cannot understand many things at once or have several thoughts, similarly neither can the affection commit several sins at once and in the same instant, especially those which pertain wholly to diverse actions, such as infidelity, pride, and envy. *Moreover,* granted that it were true[^15], it does not *solve [it],* because the aforesaid arguments prove not only that the aforesaid sins accompany pride, but that they precede [it].

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that one may speak of the sin with respect to a threefold state, namely with respect to inception, consummation, and confirmation. The devil's sin was *initiated* in *presumption,* for at once, as he saw his own beauty, he presumed; it was *consummated* in *ambition,* because, presuming about himself, he desired what was wholly above himself and to which he could not attain; but it was *confirmed* by the aversion of *envy and hatred,* because, since he could not obtain what he desired, he therefore began to envy and to go against [God] with the affection of hatred. And in this he was made firm, because this[^16] wholly separated him from God and set up a perfect obstacle, just as perfect charity perfectly joins to God.

The first arguments are therefore to be conceded, that pride was the first sin; for the pride of presumption and swelling was first in generation, the pride of ambition was first in consummation.

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning *omission,* it must be noted that omission neither was nor could be a principal or first sin, because the relinquishing of a good comes from *fear that badly humbles,* and every such fear comes from *love that badly inflames*[^17]. Hence no one relinquishes doing something he ought to do unless he loves something he ought not [to love]; just as someone omits to go to matins because he loves sleep and rest in his little bed. — By this same reasoning ingratitude could not be the first[^18], nor even envy. — It must therefore be said that not every relinquishing induces the sin of omission. For it happens that one omits a *circumstance,* and then there is not a sin of omission, but a certain negligence. It happens that one omits an *act,* and this in two ways: either *generally* or *specially; generally,* according as it comprehends an *affirmative and negative* precept; *specially*[^19] against the *affirmative,* as a *transgression* [is] against the *negative.* Hence he does not omit who does not avoid fornication, but he who does not honor [his] parents. And according as it is a *special* act, it can be a *principal* act or a *non-principal* one. And omission is not a principal sin except for a principal act, as is clear of him who is <!-- page 147 -->bound to go to matins, [and] is bound to dress himself and rise from bed, and so of the rest; and although there are many acts, there is one omission. But for some sin to be reckoned a sin of omission, it is required that it be an omission of an *act,* not of a circumstance; of an *affirmative*[^20], not a negative; of a *principal,* not an annexed [one]. — Thus it is clear that it is not so in the case at issue, because the devil did not relinquish some principal act to which he was bound, but desired what he ought not. And so it is briefly clear concerning *omission.*

*To 2. 3.* To that which is objected concerning *ingratitude,* it must be said that ingratitude can be spoken of in two ways, namely *negatively* or *privatively*[^21]. *Negatively,* when someone is not grateful to God as he ought, and thus it is a circumstance of all sins. *Privatively,* when not only is he not grateful, but nay is moved contrariwise, as for instance when he thinks of a benefit, as it is a benefit, and makes little of the benefit or the benefactor; and thus it is a special sin. But the devil did not sin in this way, because he did not think of the benefits of God insofar as they were God's, but insofar as they were goods proper [to himself], and therefore he was elated.

*To 4. 5.* To that which is objected concerning *infidelity,* it must be said that neither the sin of infidelity nor of curiosity was the first, because the sound and clear eye of his intellect is not perverted in judging or inquiring unless first stained by some elation[^22].

To that, then, which is objected, that he did not believe etc.; it must be said that to the sin of infidelity two things concur. For it is required that there be a *consent* of reason with a *universal judgment.* For if someone thinks that to fornicate is good *for himself;* or thinks in the universal what is good, and does not consent to the judgment of reason[^23], he is not unfaithful, as is clear. And of the devil I say that he did not consent to the judgment of reason, but estimated [it] good for himself.

*To 6. 7.* To that which is objected concerning *curiosity,* it must be said that two things make a consideration to be called curious, namely *attention of care* and *privation of usefulness*[^24]. Hence if the devil, from all the things he beheld, had elicited his own good, referring them to the glory of God; that consideration would be neither blameworthy nor to be called curious. That it was *curious,* then, came from this, that he did not elicit his own[^25] good from it, but incurred the evil of ambition and presumption; and so the ground of the sin is first in presumption and in consideration. And thus it is clear that, although there was curiosity in the devil, it was not a fault antecedent to presumption, nor any other, but a condition annexed to it.

*To 8. 9.* To that which is objected last concerning *envy,* the response is clear through the word of Augustine, that it was not the first sin. For Augustine says that it is the *offspring* of pride, in the book On Virginity[^26], and so it follows it, even if not in the same instant, yet in the same time without an interval of delay. Hence in the generation of this offspring pride was confirmed, and the devil was called a devil, because he *flowed downward*[^27] and from this was made firm in his malice. And therefore the Master, describing the perfect aversion, such as is in the devil, not such as is in sinful men, says that «to be averted is to hold in hatred or to envy». For the devil, proud, not able to ascend, but compelled to descend, hates the just God and envies his excellence.

la: Vers. 18. — Glossa sumta est ex Gregor., XXIII. Moral. c. 6. n. 13: *Ipse quippe singulariter elatus dixerat: Supra astra caeli...* (Isai. 14, 13.), *et mire Dominus, ut in discipulorum cordibus elationem premeret, mox iudicium ruinae retulit, quod ipse magister elationis accepit, ut in auctore superbiae discerent, quid de elationis vitio formidarent.*

en: Verse 18. — The Gloss is taken from Gregory, XXIII Moralia, c. 6, n. 13: *He indeed, singularly elated, had said: Above the stars of heaven...* (Isa. 14:13), *and wondrously the Lord, to press down elation in the hearts of the disciples, at once brought back the judgment of ruin which the very master of elation received, that in the author of pride they might learn what they should dread of the vice of elation.*

la: Vers. 15.

en: Verse 15.

en: Chapter 23, n. 30.

la: Num. 7.

en: Number 7.

la: Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 16.

en: First Epistle of John 2:16.

la: Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 6. seq. — Cod. 1 *causetur* pro *causatur.*

en: Cf. Augustine, XIV de Civ. Dei, c. 6 ff. — Codex 1 [reads] *causetur* for *causatur.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 67, nota 8. et pag. 79, nota 2. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 *quia cognoscit* pro *quod cognoscit.*

en: Cf. above, p. 67, note 8, and p. 79, note 2. — A little above, codex cc and edition 1 [read] *quia cognoscit* for *quod cognoscit.*

la: Cap. 10. n. 33, ubi agit de lucifero ipsumque his verbis alloquitur.

en: Chapter 10, n. 33, where he treats of Lucifer and addresses him with these words.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *respexerit.*

en: Some codices, with edition 1, [read] *respexerit.*

la: Anselm., de Casu diab. c. 23; Bernard., loc. cit. c. 10. n. 33. et 36.

en: Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 23; Bernard, loc. cit., c. 10, n. 33 and 36.

la: Num. 38; in qua sententia textus originalis, verbis transpositis: *quia prius spectavit curiose, quod affectavit illicite,* speravit praesumtuose.

en: Number 38; in which sentence the original text, with the words transposed: *because what he first beheld curiously, he affected illicitly,* hoped presumptuously.

la: Gregor., XXI. Moral. c. 2. n. 4. — Sequens textus est Isai. 14, 13.

en: Gregory, XXI Moralia, c. 2, n. 4. — The following text is Isa. 14:13.

la: Cap. 31. n. 31: *Quibus duobus malis, hoc est superbia et invidentia, diabolus est.* — Paulo inferius Vat. cum pluribus mss. *et superbia,* cod. cc et ed. 1 *cum superbia* pro *ut superbia.*

en: Chapter 31, n. 31: *By which two evils, that is, pride and envy, [one] is a devil.* — A little below, the Vatican edition with several manuscripts [reads] *et superbia,* codex cc and edition 1 *cum superbia* for *ut superbia.*

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, chapter 1.

la: Subaudi: *haec responsio.* — Nonnulli codd. *quod ita esset.*

en: Understand: *this response.* — Some codices [read] *quod ita esset.*

la: Scil. odium. — Vat. *firmatum est, quia haec.*

en: Namely, hatred. — The Vatican edition [reads] *firmatum est, quia haec.*

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 79, n. 3: *Succensa igni et effossa* etc. *Omnia peccata duae res faciunt in homine, cupiditas et timor... Ad omne recte factum amor et timor ducit, ad omne peccatum amor et timor ducit... Quae sunt peccata succensa igni et effossa? Quid fecerat amor malus? Tanquam ignem succenderat. Quid fecerat timor malus? Tanquam effoderat. Amor quippe inflammat, timor humiliat.* — In hac prop. sicut et aliquanto inferius nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *omissio* pro *dimissio.*

en: Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 79, n. 3: *Kindled with fire and dug up* etc. *Two things make all sins in man, cupidity and fear... To every rightly done deed love and fear lead, to every sin love and fear lead... What are the sins kindled with fire and dug up? What had the bad love done? It had as it were kindled the fire. What had the bad fear done? It had as it were dug up. For love inflames, fear humbles.* — In this proposition, as also a little below, some codices, with edition 1, [read] *omissio* for *dimissio.*

la: Supple cum Vat. *peccatum.*

en: Supply, with the Vatican edition, *peccatum.*

la: Cod. U *specialiter vero ita est omissio.* Cod. cc et ed. 1 *specialiter contra affirmativum. Sic enim omissio est contra praeceptum affirmativum, sicut* etc. Non pauci codd. cum Vat. incongrue *apprehendit* pro *comprehendit.*

en: Codex U [reads] *specialiter vero ita est omissio.* Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *specialiter contra affirmativum. For thus omission is against an affirmative precept, as* etc. Not a few codices, with the Vatican edition, incongruously [read] *apprehendit* for *comprehendit.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *praecepti affirmativi.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *praecepti affirmativi.*

la: Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *contrarie,* quod non convenit subnexis. Eadem distinctio insinuatur hoc modo: *materialiter et formaliter.*

en: Many codices, with editions 1, 2, [read] *contrarie,* which does not agree with what follows. The same distinction is suggested in this way: *materially and formally.*

la: Vat. *inclinetur.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *inclinetur.*

la: Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. *iudicium rationis;* perperam, ut claret ex contextu. — Cfr. Aristot., de Motu animalium, c. 4. (c. 7.), ubi electionem et appetitum exponit per modum syllogismi, qui habet tres propositiones.

en: Very many codices, with the first editions, [read] *iudicium rationis;* wrongly, as is clear from the context. — Cf. Aristotle, On the Motion of Animals, c. 4 (c. 7), where he expounds choice and appetite by the manner of a syllogism, which has three propositions.

la: Eadmerus (✝ 1121), de S. Anselmi similitudinibus (inter opera Anselmi), c. 26. definit curiositatem ita: *Curiositas est studium perscrutandi ea quae scire nulla est utilitas.* — Quoad primam curiositatis notam, scil. quod sit *curae attentio,* codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures enim cum edd. 1, 2 pro *attentio* substituunt *accusatio,* nonnulli *accuratio,* aliqui *actio;* melius codd. N P Q W *applicatio* et cod. 1 *accumulatio.*

en: Eadmer (✝ 1121), On the Similitudes of St. Anselm (among the works of Anselm), c. 26, defines curiosity thus: *Curiosity is the zeal of scrutinizing those things which there is no usefulness in knowing.* — As to the first mark of curiosity, namely that it is *attention of care,* the codices disagree among themselves; for several, with editions 1, 2, substitute *accusatio* for *attentio,* some *accuratio,* others *actio;* better, codices N P Q W [read] *applicatio* and codex 1 *accumulatio.*

la: In pluribus mss. et ed. 1 desideratur *suum.*

en: In several manuscripts and edition 1 the word *suum* is lacking.

la: Cap. 31. n. 31: *Hanc (superbiam) sequitur invidentia, tanquam filia pedissequa; eam quippe superbia continuo parit, nec unquam est sine tali prole atque comite.* Cfr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 *filia superbiae* pro *proles superbiae.*

en: Chapter 31, n. 31: *Envy follows this (pride), as a handmaid daughter; for pride continually begets it, nor is it ever without such offspring and companion.* Cf. XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 14, n. 18. — Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *filia superbiae* for *proles superbiae.*

la: Isidor., VIII. Etymolog. c. 11. n. 18: *Diabolus Hebraice dicitur deorsum fluens, quia quietus in caeli culmine stare contempsit, sed superbiae pondere deorsum corruens cecidit; Graece vero diabolus criminator vocatur* etc.

en: Isidore, VIII Etymologies, c. 11, n. 18: *In Hebrew the devil is called «flowing downward», because, having scorned to stand quiet in the summit of heaven, he fell, rushing downward by the weight of pride; but in Greek the devil is called «accuser»* etc.

latin_scholion:
I. Fide constat, aliquos Angelos peccasse; theologi in hoc etiam consentiunt, quod nulla creatura ex natura sua esse possit omnino impeccabilis in ordine ad finem tum *naturalem* tum *supernaturalem.* Respectu autem finis et legis *naturalis* S. Thom. (S. q. 63. a. 1. ad 3; de Malo, q. 16. a. 3, et a. 5. ad 10.) censet, Angelos *directe* et *immediate* non contra hunc finem et legem, sed tantum contra finem et legem *supernaturalem* potuisse peccare. S. Bonav. autem, Scot. aliique multi omnem creaturam peccabilem esse sine restrictione dicunt (cfr. infra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.).

II. Primum peccatum luciferi in *superbia* ponendum esse, communiter tenetur. Quod etiam Alex. Hal. docet, sed addit: «Et radix eius avaritia vel cupiditas», scil. in sensu largiore. Scotus autem putat, illud non esse superbiam proprie dictam, quam intelligit esse appetitum immoderatum excellentiae per respectum ad *alios;* sed potius reducendam esse ad quandam *luxuriam spiritualem.* Porro doctores in hoc convenire videntur, quod *initium* huius peccati non consistat in *appetendo* aliquod bonum non habitum, sed in *amando* inordinate bonum, quod Angelus habuit; sive quod ipse peccare incepit ab inordinato amore non cuiuscumque, sed *sui ipsius.* Et cum inordinatus amor recurvetur in se ipsum, hinc ille sibi complacuit, et *motus* complacentia excellentiae in se ipso considerata, prorupit in *appetitum* inordinatum alicuius obiecti, vel *per se* ipsi non concessi, vel saltem *inordinato modo* desiderati. Sed de hoc *progressu* in peccando, et praecipue de <!-- page 148 -->obiecto ab ipso appetito (de quo agitur seq. quaest.), diversae sunt sententiae, vel saltem modi loquendi. Hunc *progressum* in peccando S. Bonav. egregie hic et clarius in Breviloquio (p. II. c. 7.) adumbrat, ubi dicit: «Lucifer, suae pulcritudinis et altitudinis consideratione excitatus ad *se diligendum* et suum privatum bonum, *praesumsit* de altitudine habita et *ambivit* excellentiam propriam, non tamen obtentam; ac per hoc *praesumendo* constituit se sibi *principium summum,* in se ipso gloriando; et *ambiendo* constituit se sibi *summum bonum,* in se ipso quiescendo». Ex his verbis, ni fallimur, apparet, verba (in corp.) *in praesumtione* sensu largiore accipienda esse pro actu, quo voluit esse bonus et magnus *secundum se* et non *per aliud;* totam autem sententiam Seraphici congruere cum iis quae de peccato Adami dicit S. Augustinus (XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 1.): «Quid est autem superbia nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim celsitudo est, deserto eo cui debet animus inhaerere principio, sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, dum sibi nimis placet. Sibi vero ita placet, qui ab illo bono incommutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit, quam ipse sibi». Cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 1.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 2. — Scotus, in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 63. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103. 110. — C. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
I. By faith it is established that some Angels sinned; theologians also agree in this, that no creature can by its own nature be wholly impeccable in relation to the end, whether *natural* or *supernatural.* But with respect to the *natural* end and law, St. Thomas (S. q. 63. a. 1. ad 3; de Malo, q. 16. a. 3, and a. 5. ad 10.) holds that the Angels could sin not *directly* and *immediately* against this end and law, but only against the *supernatural* end and law. But St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and many others say without restriction that every creature is peccable (cf. below, d. 24, p. I, a. 1, q. 1).

II. That the first sin of Lucifer is to be placed in *pride* is commonly held. Alexander of Hales also teaches this, but adds: «And its root [is] avarice or cupidity», namely in the broader sense. But Scotus thinks that it was not pride properly so called, which he understands to be an immoderate appetite of excellence by respect to *others;* but rather is to be reduced to a certain *spiritual luxury.* Further, the doctors seem to agree in this, that the *beginning* of this sin consists not in *desiring* some good not possessed, but in *loving* inordinately a good which the Angel had; or that he began to sin from an inordinate love not of just anything, but of *his very self.* And since inordinate love is curved back into itself, hence he was pleased with himself, and, *moved* by complacency in the excellence considered in himself, burst forth into an inordinate *appetite* of some object, either not granted to him *of itself,* or at least desired in an *inordinate manner.* But concerning this *progress* in sinning, and especially concerning <!-- page 148 -->the object desired by him (which is treated in the following question), there are diverse opinions, or at least manners of speaking. This *progress* in sinning St. Bonaventure sketches excellently here and more clearly in the Breviloquium (p. II, c. 7), where he says: «Lucifer, excited by the consideration of his own beauty and height to *loving himself* and his private good, *presumed* concerning the height he had and *sought after* an excellence of his own, not yet obtained; and through this, by *presuming,* he constituted himself for himself a *highest principle,* glorying in himself; and by *seeking* he constituted himself for himself a *highest good,* resting in himself». From these words, unless we are mistaken, it appears that the words (in the body) *in presumption* are to be taken in the broader sense for the act by which he wished to be good and great *according to himself* and not *through another;* and that the whole opinion of the Seraphic [Doctor] agrees with what St. Augustine says concerning the sin of Adam (XIV de Civ. Dei, c. 13, n. 1): «What is pride but an appetite for a perverse loftiness? For a perverse loftiness is, having forsaken the principle to which the soul ought to adhere, to become and be in a certain manner a principle to oneself. This happens when one is too pleased with oneself. And he is thus pleased with himself who falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to have pleased him more than he himself». Cf. also below, a. 2, q. 1.

III. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 98, m. 2. — Scotus, in each Scriptum, II Sent., d. 6, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; S. I, q. 63, a. 2; S. c. Gent. III, c. 103, 110. — Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q., here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following q., II Sent., d. 6, q. unica.

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **Distinction V, Article I, Question I** — *Whether Lucifer sinned by the sin of pride* — with the short `ARTICULUS I.` opener + article title *De aversione luciferi* folded in per the Vol II chunking convention (no standalone article-divisio chunk). 7 *videtur* arguments (pride first), 9 *Contra* arguments surveying the rival candidates for the first sin (omission, ingratitude, [reason], infidelity, [reason], curiosity, [reason], envy, the reasoning of the Master), a *Conclusio*, the *Respondeo* (rejecting the "all sins at once" opinion; the threefold inception/consummation/confirmation analysis), the *Solutio* replying to the nine *Contra* in five grouped blocks (Ad 1; Ad 2.3; Ad 4.5; Ad 6.7; Ad 8.9), and an editorial **Scholion I–III**. Spans printed pp. 145–148 (= PDF 167–170).
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- **Apparatus crosswalk (Quaracchi restarts numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously 1–27):**
  - **p.145 (10 notes → [^1]–[^10]):** L-col ¹–⁵ (*Lucae decimo*¹ / *Ecclesiastici decimo*² / *Genesim ad litteram*³ / *capitulo decimo*⁴ Isidore / *superbia vitae*⁵), ⁶ (*amore inordinato*⁶); R-col ⁷ (*cognitum*⁷, Contra 1 omission), ⁸ (*humilitatis*⁸, Contra 2 ingratitude), ⁹ (*respexit*⁹, Contra 3), ¹⁰ (*humilitatis*¹⁰, Contra 4 infidelity). The stray OCR `'` after *et* in Contra 4 (raw 10760) is not a marker — note ¹⁰ anchors the combined Anselm/Bernard citation at *humilitatis*; verified on the p.145 R-1/R-2 crops.
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- **Incoming boundary divisio→a1-q1 — CLEAN/received, no backfill.** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d5-divisio` Notes document that its footer was wholly the p.144 R-column; this quaestio's apparatus begins at p.145 footer note 1 (*Lucae decimo*¹, *videtur* 1). Verified on the p.145 crops: every p.145 footer note anchors a1-q1 body. `d5-divisio` not modified.
- **Outgoing boundary a1-q1→a1-q2 — CLEAN, no split, no backfill.** The editorial **Scholion I–III carries no numbered apparatus** (Vol II convention) and its tail spans p.147→p.148. a1-q1's last numbered apparatus is p.147 note 8 ([^27], *deorsum fluxit*⁸). On p.148 the Scholion II/III tail ends and `QUAESTIO II` (*Utrum lucifer appetiverit Deo aequiparari*, raw 10935 = next chunk `bon-sent-II-d5-a1-q2`) opens; the entire p.148 footer (¹ *Vers. 13* … etc.) anchors a1-q2's *videtur* body, not the Scholion. The no-apparatus-scholion-tail clean-boundary pattern (as d4-a1-q1→a1-q2). **`d5-a1-q2` build: take all of p.148's footer; do not backfill into this chunk.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 27 body superscripts and the three page-footers were verified on the 450 dpi crops. Editorial marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (*Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Opinio 1, Improbatur, Sententia auctoris cum distinctione, Triplex conclusio, Notandum, Solutio oppositorum, Quando committatur peccatum omissionis*). The *Conclusio* is set as a `>` blockquote per the structural-marker convention; the five grouped *Solutio* replies are tagged *Ad 1 / Ad 2. 3. / Ad 4. 5. / Ad 6. 7. / Ad 8. 9.* matching the printed grouping.