title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De divisione potentiarum animae.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum divisio voluntatis per naturalem et deliberativam sit per diversas potentias.*

Tertio quaeritur de illa divisione potentiarum animae, quae quidem est per naturale et deliberativum; et quaeritur, utrum divisio voluntatis per naturalem et deliberativam sit per diversas potentias. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus[^1], cum dividit potentias animae, primo dividit in thelesin et bulesin, id est in naturalem et deliberativam, et postea subdividit per alias potentias: ergo si maior differentia est inter prima membra, videtur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa sit potentia alia et alia.

2. Item, divisio substantiae per rationale et non-rationale variat ipsam per essentiam, ergo divisio potentiae per huiusmodi differentias facit potentias essentialiter differre; sed talis est divisio potentiarum animae per naturalem et deliberativam: ergo etc. Minor probatur per hoc, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus[^2], « rationales potentiae sunt ad opposita »; sed quando aliqua potentia naturaliter movetur ad aliquid, non movetur ad oppositum: ergo potentia, ut est naturalis, non est rationalis.

3. Item, cum dividimus creaturam per corruptibilem et incorruptibilem, diversificamus eam essentialiter: ergo pari ratione, cum dividimus potentiam per mutabilem et immutabilem, eam essentialiter variamus; sed potentia, quae movetur naturaliter ad suum obiectum, movetur uniformiter, deliberativa vero vertibiliter: ergo etc.

4. Item, potentia, in qua communicamus cum brutis, non potest esse eadem cum potentia, in qua differimus; sed in naturali appetitu cum brutis convenimus, et in rationali differimus: ergo etc. Sicut enim bruta naturaliter appetunt sui esse conservationem, sic et nos appetimus.

**Sed contra:**
1. Potentiae, quae habent idem obiectum et sub eadem ratione, non habent diversitatem[^3]; sed naturalis voluntas et deliberativa idem habent pro obiecto, videlicet bonum — naturaliter enim bonum appetimus, et ex deliberatione etiam, cum bene ordinati sumus — ergo etc.

2. Item, potentia, quae ordinat in finem et in id quod est ad finem[^4], non est alia et alia;
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sed voluntas nostra, ut est in finem, est naturalis, quia naturaliter unusquisque appetit beatitudinem; ut est in rem ordinatam ad finem, est deliberativa: ergo etc.

3. Item, eadem potentia cognitiva est, qua cognoscimus aliquid naturaliter, et per acquisitionem: ergo pari ratione eadem est voluntas, qua aliquid appetimus per naturalem instinctum, et per deliberationis arbitrium.

4. Item, omne quod est aliqua natura, habet operationem naturalem[^5]; sed voluntas deliberativa est aliqua natura: ergo habet operationem naturalem. Sed voluntatis actus est velle, ergo voluntas deliberativa aliquid vult naturaliter; sed voluntas, quae vult aliquid naturaliter, est naturalis: ergo voluntas deliberativa est voluntas naturalis.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Voluntas naturalis et deliberativa, quatenus differunt in modo appetendi, non sunt diversae potentiae, sed una, diversimode tamen movens.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dividimus appetitum in naturalem et deliberativum, sive[^6] quamcumque aliam potentiam; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod appetitus naturalis et deliberativus diversitatem habeant in obiectis, utpote cum unum est appetibile solum a substantia rationali, aliud autem est appetibile a brutali. Et hoc modo bene contingit, naturalem potentiam et deliberativam esse diversas potentias[^8]. — Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit differentia in obiectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum appetimus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et murmurat contra malum[^7]; et voluntatem deliberativam appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus bono, aliquando malo. Et sic divisio potentiae per naturalem et deliberativam non variat eam secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi. Et hoc modo dividit Damascenus, non quia naturalis et deliberativa sint diversae potentiae, sed quia una est potentia, diversimode tamen movens; et hoc sufficit ad divisionem potentiarum.

Unde notandum est, quod multis modis consueverunt auctores divisionem potentiarum animae accipere. Aliquando secundum naturam ipsarum potentiarum, ut cum dividuntur potentiae animae in vegetabilem, sensibilem et rationalem, vel ipsa rationalis in intellectivam et affectivam. — Aliquando vero secundum officia, ut cum dividitur ratio in superiorem et inferiorem. — Aliquando secundum status, ut cum dividitur intellectus in speculativum et practicum; intellectus enim speculativus secundum alium statum efficitur practicus, videlicet dum coniungitur voluntati et operi in dictando et regendo. — Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum secundum aspectus, sicut dividitur potentia cognitiva in rationem, intellectum et intelligentiam, secundum quod aspicit ad inferius, ad par et ad superius[^9]. — Aliquando vero secundum actus, sicut fit divisio in inventivam et iudicativam; invenire enim et iudicare sunt actus potentiae cognitivae ad invicem ordinati. — Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum animae secundum modos movendi; et sic est illa, quae est per naturalem et deliberativam.

Omnibus his modis diversitatis[^10] utuntur auctores in divisione potentiarum animae, et in solo primo modo dividendi attenditur proprie potentiarum diversificatio. — Concedendum est igitur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi sic et sic appellatur. Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad beatitudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur naturalis, quia immutabiliter appetitus eius ad beatitudinem inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere, deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest ad contrarium inclinari.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de divisione potentiarum facta a Damasceno, iam patet responsio. Ipse enim, ut ibidem patet in sua exemplificatione[^11], potius in hac divisione diversitatem modorum movendi attendit quam diversitatem potentiarum moventium.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas naturalis est irrationalis, quia non est ad opposita; dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod potestates rationales[^12] sunt ad opposita, hoc non intelligitur de omnibus oppositis, sed de aliquibus. Rationalis enim voluntas ita ordinatur ad aliquid, quod nullo modo appetit suum oppositum, ut patet in ordine voluntatis nostrae ad beatitudinem et felicitatem. Licet autem determinate inclinetur ad beatitudinem, ad multa tamen genera appetibilium illa et eadem voluntatis potentia est indeterminata, ita quod nata est moveri in opposita; et propterea sic est naturalis, ut tamen non desinat esse rationalis et deliberativa. Si autem sic esset determinata ad unum,
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quod nullo modo posset in opposita, sicut est potentia calefaciendi et illuminandi in igne, tunc esset pure naturalis, et non esset deliberativa sive rationalis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de incorruptibilitate, dicendum, quod non est simile de incorruptibilitate substantiae et immutabilitate potentiae. Incorruptibilitas enim in substantia dicitur absolute; et ideo esse corruptibile et incorruptibile directe opponuntur et sunt incompossibilia circa idem. Mutabile vero et immutabile in potentia accipi possunt respectu diversorum obiectorum, ut patet, cum aliqua voluntas est immutabilis respectu finis, et mutabilis respectu eius quod est ad finem; et ideo non oportet, potentias per haec membra essentialiter diversificari.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de naturali appetitu in brutis, iam patet responsio; quia cum dicitur, nos communicare cum brutis in potentia naturali et appetitu, ibi distinguitur naturalis potentia a rationali non solum quantum ad modum appetendi, sed etiam quantum ad appetibile; et penes hoc contingit diversas differentias potentiarum accipere.

english:
### Article II. *On the division of the powers of the soul.*
### Question III. *Whether the division of the will into natural and deliberative is a division into diverse powers.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made about that division of the powers of the soul which is according to the natural and the deliberative; and it is asked whether the division of the will into natural and deliberative is a division into diverse powers. And it seems that it is.

1. Damascene[^1], when he divides the powers of the soul, first divides them into *thelesis* and *boulesis*, that is, into the natural and the deliberative, and afterwards subdivides them through the other powers: therefore if the greater difference is between the first members, it seems that the natural will and the deliberative are one power and another.

2. Likewise, the division of substance into rational and non-rational varies it according to essence; therefore the division of a power by differences of this kind makes the powers differ essentially; but such is the division of the powers of the soul into natural and deliberative: therefore, etc. The minor is proved by this, that, as the Philosopher says[^2], « rational powers are toward opposites »; but when some power is naturally moved toward something, it is not moved toward the opposite: therefore a power, insofar as it is natural, is not rational.

3. Likewise, when we divide a creature into corruptible and incorruptible, we diversify it essentially: therefore by parity of reasoning, when we divide a power into mutable and immutable, we vary it essentially; but a power that is moved naturally toward its object is moved uniformly, whereas the deliberative is moved changeably: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, a power in which we share with brutes cannot be the same as a power in which we differ; but in natural appetite we agree with brutes, and in rational appetite we differ: therefore, etc. For just as brutes naturally desire the preservation of their being, so do we also desire it.

**On the contrary:**
1. Powers that have the same object and under the same formal account do not have diversity[^3]; but the natural will and the deliberative have the same thing for their object, namely the good — for we desire the good naturally, and also from deliberation, when we are well ordered — therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a power that orders toward the end and toward that which is for the end[^4] is not one and another;
sed voluntas nostra — but our will, insofar as it is toward the end, is natural, because everyone naturally desires beatitude; insofar as it is toward the thing ordered to the end, it is deliberative: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the same cognitive power is that by which we know something naturally, and by acquisition: therefore by parity of reasoning the same will is that by which we desire something by natural instinct, and by the judgment of deliberation.

4. Likewise, everything that is some nature has a natural operation[^5]; but the deliberative will is some nature: therefore it has a natural operation. But the act of the will is to will, therefore the deliberative will wills something naturally; but a will that wills something naturally is natural: therefore the deliberative will is a natural will.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** The natural will and the deliberative, insofar as they differ in the mode of desiring, are not diverse powers, but one, moving nevertheless in diverse modes.

**I respond:** It must be said that when we divide appetite into natural and deliberative, or[^6] any other power, this can be understood in two ways: either thus, that the natural appetite and the deliberative have diversity in their objects, as when one thing is desirable only by a rational substance, and another is desirable by a brute substance. And in this way it well happens that the natural power and the deliberative are diverse powers[^8]. — In another way appetite or power can be divided into natural and deliberative, yet such that there is no difference in the objects, but in the mode of desiring; as when we hold *synderesis* to be the natural will, which indeed naturally inclines and incites toward the honorable good and murmurs against evil[^7]; and the deliberative will to be the appetite by which, after deliberation, we sometimes cleave to the good, sometimes to the evil. And thus the division of power into natural and deliberative does not vary it according to the essence of the power, but according to the mode of moving. And in this way Damascene divides, not because the natural and the deliberative are diverse powers, but because there is one power, moving nevertheless in diverse modes; and this suffices for a division of powers.

Hence it must be noted that the authors have been accustomed to take the division of the powers of the soul in many modes. Sometimes according to the nature of the powers themselves, as when the powers of the soul are divided into vegetative, sensible, and rational, or the rational itself into intellective and affective. — Sometimes, however, according to offices, as when reason is divided into superior and inferior. — Sometimes according to states, as when the intellect is divided into speculative and practical; for the speculative intellect according to another state becomes practical, namely when it is joined to the will and to operation in directing and ruling. — Sometimes, however, a division of powers is made according to aspects, as the cognitive power is divided into reason, intellect, and intelligence, according as it looks toward the inferior, toward the equal, and toward the superior[^9]. — Sometimes, however, according to acts, as the division is made into inventive and judicative; for to invent and to judge are acts of the cognitive power ordered to one another. — Sometimes, however, a division of the powers of the soul is made according to modes of moving; and such is that which is according to the natural and the deliberative.

In all these modes of diversity[^10] the authors make use of a division of the powers of the soul, and in the first mode of dividing alone is the diversification of powers properly regarded. — It must therefore be conceded that the natural will and the deliberative can be the same power, which indeed according to one and another mode of moving is so and so named. For the same is the power by which I desire beatitude, and by which I desire virtue, or to do this or that good ordered to beatitude; which, insofar as it desires beatitude, is called natural, because its appetite is immutably inclined toward beatitude; but insofar as it desires to do this or that good, it is called deliberative, and according to the judgment of reason it can be inclined toward the contrary.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that which is first objected concerning the division of powers made by Damascene, the response is now clear. For he himself, as is evident there in his exemplification[^11], regards in this division rather a diversity of modes of moving than a diversity of moving powers.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the natural will is irrational, because it is not toward opposites; it must be said that when it is said that rational powers[^12] are toward opposites, this is not understood of all opposites, but of some. For the rational will is so ordered toward something that it in no way desires its opposite, as is evident in the ordering of our will toward beatitude and felicity. But although it is determinately inclined toward beatitude, yet toward many kinds of desirable things that one and the same power of the will is indeterminate, so that it is apt to be moved toward opposites; and on that account it is natural in such a way that nevertheless it does not cease to be rational and deliberative. But if it were so determined to one thing,
that it could in no way be moved toward opposites, as is the power of heating and illuminating in fire, then it would be purely natural, and would not be deliberative or rational.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning incorruptibility, it must be said that the case is not the same with the incorruptibility of substance and the immutability of a power. For incorruptibility in substance is said absolutely; and therefore to be corruptible and incorruptible are directly opposed and are incompossible with respect to the same thing. But the mutable and the immutable in a power can be taken with respect to diverse objects, as is evident, since some will is immutable with respect to the end, and mutable with respect to that which is for the end; and therefore it is not necessary that powers be essentially diversified by these members.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning natural appetite in brutes, the response is now clear; for when it is said that we share with brutes in natural power and appetite, there the natural power is distinguished from the rational not only as to the mode of desiring, but also as to the desirable object; and according to this it happens that diverse differences of powers are taken.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi exponitur, quod naturaliter nobis insita est vis, qua appetimus id quod secundum naturam est, sicut et ea quae substantialiter naturae insunt, ut v. g. esse, vivere etc.; quae vis dicitur voluntas (θέλησις) et nihil aliud est quam ipse naturalis, vitalis et rationalis appetitus omnium eorum, quibus natura constituitur, simplex virtus (δύναμις). Est etiam insita animae hominis — sic docet Damasc. — vis appetendi secundum rationem, quae vis nuncupatur βούλησις i. e. voluntas consiliativa, et idem est ac rei cuiusdam appetitio rationalis. Haec βούλησις, voluntas, potest esse tum eorum quae sunt in nobis (in nostra potestate), v. g. sobrium esse, tum eorum quae non sunt in nobis. Voluntas eorum quae non sunt in nostra potestate, aliquando est possibilium, ut cum reges esse volumus; aliquando impossibilium, ut cum volumus nunquam mori. Voluntas deliberativa eorum quae in nostra potestate sunt, hos includit actus: voluntatem finis, consilium, iudicium, sententiam, electionem (quorum quatuor ultimi respiciunt media ad finem), impetum et usum (qui duo actus respiciunt ordinem exsecutionis).

en: Bk. II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22, where it is set forth that there is naturally implanted in us a power by which we desire what is according to nature, as also those things which substantially belong to nature, e.g. to be, to live, etc.; which power is called will (θέλησις) and is nothing other than the natural, vital, and rational appetite itself for all those things by which nature is constituted, a simple power (δύναμις). There is also implanted in the soul of man — so Damascene teaches — a power of desiring according to reason, which power is named βούλησις, i.e. the deliberative will, and is the same as the rational desire of some thing. This βούλησις, will, can be of those things that are in us (in our power), e.g. to be sober, and also of those that are not in us. The will of things not in our power is sometimes of possible things, as when we will to be kings; sometimes of impossible things, as when we will never to die. The deliberative will of those things that are in our power includes these acts: willing of the end, counsel, judgment, decision, choice (the last four of which regard the means to the end), impulse and use (which two acts regard the order of execution).

la: Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.). De minori cfr. supra pag. 153, nota 5.

en: Bk. IX *Metaphysics*, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5). On the minor, cf. above p. 153, note 5.

la: Vide supra pag. 561, nota 3.

en: See above p. 561, note 3.

la: Non pauci codd., ut H I T W V bb cc ec, cum edd. 1, 2 *in finem*. Paulo inferius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 textum simul cum interpunctione sic in peius mutarunt: *appetit beatitudinem, ut est in rem ordinata; sed potentia, quae ordinatur ad finem etc.*

en: Not a few codices, such as H I T W V bb cc ec, together with editions 1, 2, read *in finem* ("toward the end"). A little below, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 altered the text together with its punctuation for the worse thus: *it desires beatitude, insofar as it is ordered to the thing; but a power that is ordered to the end, etc.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5. et pag. 198, nota 3.

en: Cf. above p. 197, note 5, and p. 198, note 3.

la: Non pauci codd. cum primis edd. *sive in*, falso.

en: Not a few codices, with the first editions, read *sive in*, wrongly.

la: Sive appetitum sensitivum et voluntatem esse diversas potentias, de quo vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 47. seqq. (c. 9. seq.).

en: That is, that the sensitive appetite and the will are diverse powers, on which see Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 47 ff. (c. 9 f.).

la: Cfr. infra d. 39 a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: Cf. below d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 f.

la: Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 6. et 11. seq.

en: *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 6 and 11 f.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *diversificatis*.

en: Several codices with the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 read *diversificatis*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 565, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 565, note 1.

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. perperam *naturales*; ed. 1 insuper post *naturales* subiicit *non*. Nostra lectio est codd. O T bb.

en: Very many codices with the editions wrongly read *naturales* ("natural"); edition 1 moreover adds *non* after *naturales*. Our reading is that of codices O T bb. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Magni momenti est haec distinctio voluntatis in naturalem, quae immobiliter inhaeret bono universali ut fini, ita ut ne malum quidem velle possit nisi sub ratione boni, et in deliberativam, quae libere eligit ea quae sunt ad finem, sive bona particularia (cfr. infra d. 28. dub. 1, d. 39. dub. 2; III. Sent. d. 17. a. 4. q. 2; et praecipue IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.). — Concordat omnino S. Thom., qui saepe, praesertim S. I. q. 82. a. 1. 2, affirmat, « quod sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo » (loc. cit. a. 1.); et quod libere eligit « particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem » (a. 2; cfr. etiam S. I. q. 105. a. 4.). — De ipsa quaestione consule infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2, sive quaestionem, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem. Alii commentatores non nisi hanc alteram quaestionem tractant, ubi in scholio auctores videri possunt. Tamen Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 71, m. I. 2. plura habet de divisione in hac quaestione tractata.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Of great moment is this distinction of the will into the natural, which immovably adheres to the universal good as to its end, in such a way that it cannot even will evil except under the account of good, and into the deliberative, which freely chooses the things that are for the end, or particular goods (cf. below d. 28, dub. 1, d. 39, dub. 2; III Sent. d. 17, a. 4, q. 2; and especially IV Sent. d. 49, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1). — St. Thomas agrees entirely, who often, especially in S. I, q. 82, a. 1, 2, affirms « that just as the intellect of necessity adheres to first principles, so the will of necessity adheres to the ultimate end, which is beatitude » (loc. cit. a. 1); and that it freely chooses « particular goods, which do not have a necessary connection to beatitude » (a. 2; cf. also S. I, q. 105, a. 4). — On the question itself, consult below d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, that is, the question whether free choice is a power distinct against reason and will. Other commentators treat only this latter question, where the authors may be seen in the scholion. Nevertheless Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 71, m. I, 2, has much concerning the division treated in this question.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, raw lines 39610–39751) and cross-checked line-by-line against the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p56{5,6,7}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). OCR for this quaestio is unusually clean (clear single-column running prose); the PDF confirmed it throughout with no garble corrections needed. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page-split map.** Body spans pp. 565–567 (PDF 587–589, offset +22). p.565: title + args 1–4 (begins after q2 SCHOLION) + sed contra 1 + opening of sed contra 2. p.566: continuation of sed contra 2, args 3–4 (sed-contra-side), Conclusio, Respondeo, the *multis modis* divisio block, *Ad 1*, *Ad 2*. p.567: tail of *Ad 2*, *Ad 3*, *Ad 4*, and the full SCHOLION I; QUAESTIO IV opens lower on p.567 (raw 39754).

**Apparatus.** 12 entries [^1]–[^12], renumbered continuously by body-marker order. Per-page footer slots: p.565 = 4 footers (Damascenus / IX Metaph / supra 561 / *in finem* var.) → [^1]–[^4]; p.566 = 8 footers → [^5]–[^12] ([^5] supra 197+198; [^6] *sive in* var.; [^7] Aristot. III de Anima text.47; [^8] infra d.39 a.2 q.1; [^9] de Spiritu et anima c.6+11; [^10] *diversificatis* var.; [^11] supra 565 nota 1; [^12] *naturales* var.). Body-anchor order on p.566 runs left-column footers [^5]–[^8] then right-column footers [^9]–[^12]. The SCHOLION on p.567 carries only inline citations (loc. cit., a.1, S.I q.82, etc.), no separate numbered footers — its footnote anchors are absent in the body, so no apparatus entry corresponds to it.

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**[?] flags:** none.

**Side-glosses trimmed** (Quaracchi marginalia, not Bonaventure's text): *Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*, *Distinctio*, *Notandum* (×2), *Duplex modus movendi*, *Modi 6 dividendi potentias*, *Solutio oppositorum*.

**d.24 structure carry-forward.** Pars I ART II has FOUR questions (q1 *per cognitivam/affectivam* DONE; q2 *per superiorem/inferiorem portionem* DONE; q3 *per deliberativum/naturale* = THIS, DONE; q4 *per possibilem et agentem* = NEXT, skeleton, opens raw 39754 on p.567). q4 is the LAST quaestio of Pars I ART II — after it come Pars I DUBIA, then Pars II. NOTE: stray `d24-p1-dubia-dup2` still pending cleanup (`git rm` at the real p1-dubia promotion); Pars II numbering (p2-a*, p2-dubia) is auto-chunk-SUSPECT — re-chunk-verify before promoting Pars II.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Distinctio XXIV, Pars I, Articulus II. *De divisione potentiarum animae.*
### Quaestio IV. *Utrum intellectus agens et possibilis sint una potentia, an diversae.*

Quarto et ultimo ad maiorem evidentiam praecedentium quaeritur de divisione potentiarum animae per agentem et possibilem, secundum quas differentias intellectus noster dividi consuevit. Est igitur quaestio, utrum agens intellectus et possibilis sint una potentia, vel diversae. Et quod diversae, videtur.

1. « Materialis causa nunquam simul incidit in idem cum aliis causis », sicut vult Philosophus[^1], sed « sicut se habet materia ad formam, vel efficientem, ita se habet intellectus possibilis ad agentem », sicut Philosophus dicit: ergo intellectus possibilis et agens sunt potentiae diversae.

2. Item, prima divisio potentiae est per activam et passivam, sicut innuit Philosophus in libro nono primae Philosophiae[^2]; sed inter haec membra primo dividentia est maxima differentia, quae sit in illo genere: ergo inter potentiam activam et passivam est maxima potentiarum differentia: ergo impossibile est, unam potentiam esse possibilem et agentem.

3. Item, impossibile est, idem secundum idem esse in actu et in potentia simul et semel[^3]; sed anima secundum intellectum agentem est continue in suo actu, secundum possibilem autem non: ergo etc.

4. Item, impossibile est, idem secundum essentiam esse illuminans et illuminatum; sed intellectus agens se habet sicut lux, intellectus possibilis sicut illuminatum a luce[^5]: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. « In perpetuis non differt esse et posse », sicut vult Philosophus[^4], ergo nec actus et potentia, multo minus nec potentia activa et passiva; sed anima est perpetua et eius intellectus: ergo non est differentia potentiae possibilis ad agentem.

2. Item, in imaginatione, quae est multo magis materialis virtus quam intellectus, non sunt duae potentiae imaginativae, quarum una sit activa, altera passiva[^7]: ergo si multo potentior est virtus intellectiva quam imaginativa, videtur, quod per agentem et possibilem diversificari non habeat.

3. Item, potentia receptiva et abstractiva in corporalibus possunt concurrere in unitatem organi, sicut patet in oculo cati, qui potest speciem suscipere et eam in se de nocte facere: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, videtur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis reperiantur in una potentia spirituali[^8].

<!-- page 568 -->
4. Item, intelligere est actus unus per se: ergo est a potentia una simplici; sed ad nostrum intelligere concurrunt intellectus possibilis et intellectus agens: ergo non sunt diversae potentiae.

5. Item, vel intellectus possibilis intelligit, vel non. Si non: ergo non debet dici intellectus nec potentia intellectiva. Si intelligit: ergo aliquo modo est potentia activa: ergo non videtur, quod intellectus possibilis sit alia potentia ab agente.

6. Item, intellectus agens aut intelligit, aut non. Si non: ergo non debet dici intellectus nec potentia intellectiva. Si sic; cum intellectus non possit intelligere aliud a se, nisi speciem illius habeat in se et penes se, et omne illud quod est susceptibile speciei, sit aliquo modo possibile: ergo intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis[^9]: ergo non dividitur per essentiam a possibili.

> **Conclusio.** Intellectus agens et possibilis sunt duae ipsius potentiae intellectivae differentiae, quae in unam operationem completam intelligendi inseparabiliter concurrunt.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est praenotandum, quod variis modis tentaverunt praedecessores nostri assignare differentiam intellectus possibilis ad agentem. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod differunt sicut duae *substantiae*. Alii dixerunt, quod differunt sicut duae *potentiae*. Tertio modo dixerunt alii, quod differunt sicut *habitus* et *potentia*. Quarto modo dixerunt alii, quod differunt sicut potentia *absoluta* et *comparata*.

Primus autem modus dicendi, quo dicitur, quod differunt secundum *substantiam*, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod intellectus agens sit intelligentia *separata*; intellectus autem possibilis sit anima *corpori coniuncta*. Et modus iste ponendi et dicendi fundatus est super multa verba philosophorum, qui posuerunt, animam rationalem illustrari a decima intelligentia et perfici ex coniunctione sui ad illam. — Sed iste modus dicendi falsus est et erroneus, sicut supra improbatum fuit distinctione octava[^11]. Nulla enim substantia creata potentiam habet illuminandi et perficiendi animam, proprie intelligendo; immo secundum mentem immediate habet a Deo illuminari, sicut in multis locis Augustinus ostendit.

Alius modus intelligendi est, quod intellectus agens esset ipse *Deus*, intellectus vero possibilis esset *noster animus*. Et iste modus dicendi super verba Augustini est fundatus, qui in pluribus locis[^12] dicit et ostendit, quod « lux, quae nos illuminat, magister, qui nos docet, veritas, quae nos dirigit, Deus est », iuxta illud Ioannis[^13]: *Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem* etc. — Iste autem modus dicendi, etsi verum ponat et fidei catholicae consonum, nihil tamen est ad propositum: quia, cum animae nostrae data sit potentia ad intelligendum, sicut aliis creaturis data est potentia ad alios actus, sic Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione cuiuslibet creaturae, dedit tamen cuilibet *vim activam*, per quam exiret in operationem propriam[^14]. Sic credendum est indubitanter, quod animae humanae non tantummodo dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est *aliquid ipsius animae*. — Et ideo primus modus assignandi differentiam tanquam ad propositum impertinens omittendus est, quo scilicet dicitur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt sicut duae substantiae.

Secundus autem modus dicendi, quo scilicet dicitur, quod differunt sicut *duae potentiae*, dupliciter potest intelligi, et uno modo false, alio modo vere.

Unus modus intelligendi et dicendi est, quod intellectus possibilis sit potentia *pure materialis*, quae inest animae ex parte suae materiae[^15]; intellectus vero agens sit potentia *pure formalis*, quae inest animae ex parte suae formae. Et hic modus dicendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi[^16], qui dicit, quod « intellectus possibilis est, quo est omnia fieri; intellectus agens, quo est omnia facere », sicut contingit in forma et materia reperire. — Sed hic modus dicendi non consonat veritati. Si enim intellectus possibilis esset potentia *pure passiva* et se teneret ex parte materiae, in omnibus posset poni, in quibus est reperire materiale principium. *Praeterea*, sicut *oculus* non dicitur *visus*, sic *talis* potentia non deberet dici *intellectus*.

Alius vero modus intelligendi est, ut dicatur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis sint *duae intellectus differentiae*, datae uni substantiae, quae re<!-- page 569 -->spiciunt totum compositum. *Appropriatur* autem intellectus agens *formae* et possibilis *materiae*, quia intellectus possibilis ordinatur ad *suscipiendum*, intellectus agens ordinatur ad *abstrahendum*; nec intellectus possibilis est *pure passivus*; habet enim supra speciem existentem in phantasmate se *convertere*, et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam *suscipere*, et de ea *iudicare*. Similiter nec intellectus agens est *omnino in actu*; non enim potest intelligere aliud a se, nisi adiuvetur a *specie*, quae abstracta a phantasmate intellectui habet uniri. Unde nec possibilis intelligit sine agente, nec agens sine possibili. — Et iste modus dicendi verus est et super verba Philosophi[^17] fundatus. Dicit enim, agentem et possibilem esse duas differentias intellectus; unde sicut duo intelligimus necessario in medio, ad hoc quod abstrahatur species ab obiecto, videlicet *lucem* et *diaphaneitatem*, ita quod per unum abstrahit et per aliud defert et suscipit; sic et in proposito conformiter potest intelligi, ita ad unum actum haec duo concurrere, ut hoc sine illo non habeat operationem suam complete.

Tertius modus assignandi differentiam, quo dicitur, quod differunt sicut *potentia et habitus*, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Uno modo, ut intellectus agens dicatur habitus quidam *constitutus ex omnibus intelligibilibus*; intellectus vero possibilis intelligatur idem ipse, prout est in *potentia* ad acquirendam cognitionem per phantasmata. Et hic modus ponendi fundari videtur super verba Boethii[^18], qui dicit, quod « summam retinens, singula perdit ». Quod voluerunt aliqui intelligi sic, quod intellectus noster dicatur habere apud se cognitionem universalium *innatam*, alioquin non posset per virtutem suam, abstrahendo etiam a sensibus et phantasmatibus, facere intellectum possibilem actu intelligentem; omne enim quod educit alterum de potentia in actum, est ens in actu. — Sed iste modus dicendi verbis Philosophi[^19] non consonat, qui dicit, « animam esse creatam sicut tabulam rasam », « nec habere cognitionem habituum sibi innatam, sed acquirere mediante sensu et experientia ».

Alius modus dicendi est, ut dicatur intellectus agens differre a possibili, sicut *habitus* a *potentia*; non quia agens sit pure *habitus*, sed quia est potentia *habitualis*. — Et iste modus dicendi probabilis est et verus et super verba philosophica et catholica fundatus. Verum enim est secundum Dionysium[^20], quod substantiae intellectuales, eo ipso quod intellectuales substantiae, « *lumina* sunt »: ergo *perfectio* et *complementum* substantiae intellectualis *lux* est spiritualis: ergo illa potentia, quae consequitur animam ex parte intellectus sui, *quoddam lumen est in ipsa*, de quo lumine potest intelligi illud Psalmi[^21]: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.* Et hoc lumen videtur Philosophus intellexisse esse intellectum agentem. Dicit enim, quod « ille intellectus, quo est omnia facere, est sicut habitus quidam, ut in lumine; quodam enim modo et lumen facit colores potentia actu colores », sicut habetur tertio[^22] de Anima. Huius autem simile potest poni in oculo cati, qui non solum habet potentiam *suscipiendi* per naturam perspicui, sicut alii oculi, sed etiam potentiam *faciendi* in se speciem per naturam luminis sibi inditi.

Quartus autem modus assignandi differentiam inter possibilem et agentem, quo scilicet differunt sicut potentia *absoluta* et *comparata*, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod una omnino et eadem est potentia intellectus agens et possibilis, differens *comparatione sola*: ut *agens* sit, prout est in se considerata, *possibilis* vero, prout unitur corpori et phantasmatibus. Et hic modus dicendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi[^23], qui vult, quod « intellectus agens semper est in suo actu, possibilis vero aliquando sic, aliquando non ». Quod enim anima lassetur et perturbetur in actu intelligendi, hoc est ex coniunctione sui ad corpus. — Sed hic modus ponendi deficit a veritate, quoniam anima separata habet intellectum, quo est omnia facere, habet etiam intellectum, quo est omnia fieri: ergo habet agentem et possibilem, etiam cum separata est: ergo intellectus possibilis non inerat ei solum ex coniunctione sui cum corpore.

Alius modus intelligendi praedictam differentiam est, ut dicatur intellectus agens differre a possibili, sicut potentia *absoluta* a *comparata*; non quia sit omnino eadem potentia *comparatione*[^24] differens, sed quia, cum sit alia et alia intellectus differentia, una est, per quam ordinatur anima ad *suscipiendum*, al<!-- page 570 -->tera vero, per quam ordinatur ad *abstrahendum*; et ita una de se quodam modo completa[^25] et habilitata, alia vero indigens habilitatione et complemento; et cum sit nata ad illud complementum venire mediante auxilio corporis et corporalium sensuum, inest ipsi animae, secundum quod habet inclinari ad corpus. Et ex hoc contrahit duplicem possibilitatem: unam respectu *actus*, quia non est semper in actu suo propter impedimentum a parte corporis; alteram respectu *phantasmatum*, a quibus excitari habet; et hanc possibilitatem non habet nisi ex coniunctione sui cum corpore, quamvis sit potentia de natura sua, qua est omnia fieri, quae non solum est in anima coniuncta, sed etiam in anima separata.

Sic igitur patet, quomodo ex multis modis dicendi elicitur quidam intellectus differentiae[^26] inter intellectum agentem et possibilem. Cum enim sint quatuor principales modi assignandi differentiam inter hos intellectus, et quilibet subdividatur in duos, sicut in prosequendo monstratum est, solummodo tres modi digni sunt approbari, quorum unus ab altero non discordat, sed unus ortum habet ex altero. Quia enim diversae sunt differentiae intellectus, quae etsi respiciant[^27] totum compositum, una tamen magis respicit animae *complementum*, alia vero *materiale principium*; hinc est, quod una non solum tenet rationem *potentiae*, immo etiam *potentiae habitualis*; altera vero tenet pure rationem *potentiae*. Et hinc est, quod una dicitur convenire animae *secundum se*, altera vero *in comparatione* ad corpus, et una semper esse[^28] *in actu*, altera vero *non*; non quia semper anima actu intelligat per intellectum agentem, sed quia, sicut lumen corporale semper lucet et de se promptum est ad illuminandum, res autem illuminabilis non semper illuminatur propter aliquod impedimentum; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, intellectum agentem et possibilem duas differentias esse intellectivae potentiae, licet aliquae ex eis non sint multum cogentes.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod non differt *posse* et *esse* in perpetuis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de *esse* substantiali et de differentia non secundum naturam, sed de distantia secundum tempus, quia in eis materia tempore non praecedit actum; et ideo nihil facit ad propositum, quia intellectus possibilis non dicitur possibilis respectu *esse* primi, sed *actus* secundi[^29].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de imaginatione, quod non differt potentia activa et passiva; dici po<!-- page 571 -->test, quod magis differt quam in intellectu, quia organum corporale, in quo recipiuntur phantasmata, est ei loco potentiae passivae; ipsa vero vis imaginaria[^30] est loco potentiae activae. — Aliter potest dici, quod non est simile, quia, cum species defertur a sensu usque ad imaginationem, non exit genus abstractionis, quae quidem fuit in sensu particulari; sed cum species pervenit ad intellectum, novum genus abstractionis ibi exigitur et aliud genus luminis. Ideo magis indiget potentia activa, distincta a possibili, ipse intellectus quam imaginatio vel sensus[^31].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de oculo cati, dicendum, quod etsi potentia receptiva et abstractiva possint concurrere ad unius organi *completionem*, nunquam tamen concurrunt in eandem unius organi *dispositionem*. Alia enim est dispositio in oculo cati, per quam *recipit*, scilicet perspicuitas, et alia per quam *abstrahit*, scilicet luminositas, et alterius et alterius naturae. Sic et in potentia intellectiva; etsi concurrant ad complementum et perfectionem potentiae intellectivae potentia, per quam recipit, et potentia, per quam abstrahit; non sunt tamen eiusdem naturae nec per eandem naturam insunt animae[^32]: et ideo non sunt una differentia potentiae, sed diversae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intelligere est actus unus et simplex; dicendum, quod etsi *intelligere* possit quodam genere simplicitatis dici actus simplex, nihilominus tamen ad nostrum *intelligere* concurrit *recipere* et *iudicare*, sive *abstrahere* et *suscipere*; et hi sunt plures actus ad invicem ordinati, ex quibus resultat unus actus perfectus. Sic et in potentiis intelligendum est se habere, quod sic sunt diversae differentiae intellectus[^33], ut tamen in suis actionibus ad invicem ordinatae sint et coniunctae ad actum intelligendi perficiendum, sicut materiale et formale principium ad unum *esse* compositi constituendum.

*Ad 5 et 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus possibilis intelligit, et intellectus agens similiter recipit; dicendum, quod intellectus possibilis non est *pure passivus*, sicut supra ostensum est; habet enim potentiam se convertendi; nec tamen est *adeo activus*, sicut agens, quia non potest sua conversione nec speciem abstrahere, nec de specie iudicare, nisi adiutorio ipsius agentis. Similiter nec ipse intellectus agens operationem intelligendi potest perficere, nisi formetur acies intellectus possibilis ab ipso intelligibili, ex qua formatione est in pleniori actualitate respectu eius quod debet cognoscere, quam erat prius, cum carebat specie. — Et ita, cum cogitamus de intellectu agente et possibili, non debemus cogitare quasi de duabus substantiis, vel quasi de duabus potentiis ita separatis, quod una sine alia habeat operationem suam perficere, et aliquid intelligat intellectus agens sine possibili, et aliquid cognoscat intellectus agens, quod tamen homo, cuius est ille intellectus, ignoret. Haec enim vana sunt et frivola, ut aliquid sciat intellectus meus, quod ego nesciam; sed sic cogitandae sunt esse illae duae differentiae, quod in unam operationem completam intelligendi veniant inseparabiliter, sicut lumen et diaphanum veniunt in abstractionem coloris. — Nec sunt hic sequenda communiter verba philosophorum, quia pro magna parte decepti sunt in influentia intelligentiae super animam, quam non admittit fides catholica.

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### Distinction XXIV, Part I, Article II. *On the division of the powers of the soul.*
### Question IV. *Whether the agent and possible intellect are one power or diverse.*

Fourthly and lastly, for the greater clarity of what precedes, it is asked about the division of the powers of the soul by the agent and the possible [intellect], according to which differences our intellect is customarily divided. The question, then, is whether the agent intellect and the possible are one power or diverse. And that they are diverse, it seems.

1. "A material cause never coincides at the same time with the other causes in the same thing," as the Philosopher holds[^1], but "as matter is related to form, or to the efficient [cause], so is the possible intellect related to the agent," as the Philosopher says: therefore the possible and agent intellect are diverse powers.

2. Likewise, the first division of power is by the active and the passive, as the Philosopher intimates in the ninth book of the First Philosophy[^2]; but among these members that divide first there is the greatest difference that exists in that genus: therefore between the active and the passive power there is the greatest difference of powers: therefore it is impossible that one power be possible and agent.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the same thing in the same respect be in act and in potency at once and at the same time[^3]; but the soul according to the agent intellect is continually in its act, but according to the possible it is not: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that the same thing according to essence be illuminating and illuminated; but the agent intellect is related as light, the possible intellect as that which is illuminated by light[^5]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. "In perpetual things, to be and to be able do not differ," as the Philosopher holds[^4]; therefore neither do act and potency, much less active and passive power; but the soul is perpetual, and so is its intellect: therefore there is no difference of the possible power from the agent.

2. Likewise, in the imagination, which is a far more material power than the intellect, there are not two imaginative powers, of which one is active and the other passive[^7]: therefore if the intellective power is far more potent than the imaginative, it seems that it does not have to be diversified by the agent and the possible.

3. Likewise, the receptive and abstractive power in corporeal things can concur into the unity of one organ, as is plain in the eye of the cat, which can receive a species and produce it in itself at night: therefore by parallel reasoning, indeed by a far stronger one, it seems that the agent and possible intellect are found in one spiritual power[^8].

4. Likewise, to understand is one act in itself: therefore it is from one simple power; but to our act of understanding the possible intellect and the agent intellect concur: therefore they are not diverse powers.

5. Likewise, either the possible intellect understands, or it does not. If it does not: then it ought not to be called an intellect nor an intellective power. If it understands: then it is in some way an active power: therefore it does not seem that the possible intellect is a power other than the agent.

6. Likewise, the agent intellect either understands or it does not. If it does not: then it ought not to be called an intellect nor an intellective power. If it does; since the intellect cannot understand anything other than itself unless it has the species of it in itself and with itself, and everything that is receptive of a species is in some way possible: therefore the agent intellect is in some way possible[^9]: therefore it is not divided in essence from the possible.

> **Conclusion.** The agent and possible intellect are two differences of the intellective power itself, which concur inseparably into one complete operation of understanding.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted beforehand that our predecessors attempted in various ways to assign the difference of the possible intellect from the agent. For some said that they differ as two *substances*. Others said that they differ as two *powers*. In a third way others said that they differ as *habit* and *potency*. In a fourth way others said that they differ as *absolute* and *compared* power.

Now the first manner of speaking, by which it is said that they differ according to *substance*, can be understood in two ways. — For some wished to say that the agent intellect is a *separate* intelligence, but the possible intellect is the soul *joined to the body*. And this manner of positing and speaking is founded on many sayings of the philosophers, who held that the rational soul is illumined by the tenth intelligence and perfected by its conjunction to it. — But this manner of speaking is false and erroneous, as was disproved above in the eighth distinction[^11]. For no created substance has the power of illuminating and perfecting the soul, properly understood; rather, according to the mind it is immediately illumined by God, as Augustine shows in many places.

Another manner of understanding is that the agent intellect is *God* himself, but the possible intellect is *our mind*. And this manner of speaking is founded on the words of Augustine, who in several places[^12] says and shows that "the light which illumines us, the master who teaches us, the truth which directs us, is God," according to that text of John[^13]: *He was the true light, which enlightens every man,* etc. — But this manner of speaking, although it posits something true and consonant with the Catholic faith, is nonetheless nothing to the point: because, since to our soul a power of understanding has been given, just as to other creatures a power for other acts has been given, so God, although he is the principal agent in the operation of any creature whatever, has nevertheless given to each an *active power*, by which it might go forth into its proper operation[^14]. So it must be believed without doubt that to the human soul he gave not only the possible intellect, but also the agent, so that each is *something of the soul itself*. — And therefore the first manner of assigning the difference is to be omitted as irrelevant to the point, by which, namely, it is said that the agent and possible intellect differ as two substances.

Now the second manner of speaking, by which, namely, it is said that they differ as *two powers*, can be understood in two ways, and in one way falsely, in the other way truly.

One manner of understanding and speaking is that the possible intellect is a *purely material* power, which is in the soul on the part of its matter[^15]; but the agent intellect is a *purely formal* power, which is in the soul on the part of its form. And this manner of speaking seems to be founded on the words of the Philosopher[^16], who says that "the possible intellect is that by which it is to become all things; the agent intellect, that by which it is to make all things," just as happens to be found in form and matter. — But this manner of speaking is not consonant with the truth. For if the possible intellect were a *purely passive* power and held itself on the part of matter, it could be posited in all things in which a material principle is to be found. *Furthermore*, just as the *eye* is not called *sight*, so *such* a power ought not to be called *intellect*.

But another manner of understanding is to say that the agent and possible intellect are *two differences of intellect*, given to one substance, which re<!-- (continued) -->gard the whole composite. Now the agent intellect is *appropriated* to *form* and the possible to *matter*, because the possible intellect is ordered to *receiving*, the agent intellect is ordered to *abstracting*; nor is the possible intellect *purely passive*; for it has the power to *turn itself* upon the species existing in the phantasm, and by turning to *receive* it through the help of the agent intellect, and to *judge* concerning it. Likewise neither is the agent intellect *wholly in act*; for it cannot understand anything other than itself unless it is aided by the *species*, which, abstracted from the phantasm, must be united to the intellect. Hence neither does the possible understand without the agent, nor the agent without the possible. — And this manner of speaking is true and founded on the words of the Philosopher[^17]. For he says that the agent and the possible are two differences of intellect; whence, just as we necessarily understand two things in the medium, in order that the species be abstracted from the object, namely *light* and *transparency*, so that by the one it abstracts and by the other carries and receives; so also in the matter at hand it can be conformably understood that these two concur to one act, such that the one without the other does not have its operation completely.

The third manner of assigning the difference, by which it is said that they differ as *potency and habit*, can be understood in two ways. — In one way, so that the agent intellect is called a certain habit *constituted out of all the intelligibles*; but the possible intellect is understood as the very same, insofar as it is in *potency* to acquiring cognition through phantasms. And this manner of positing seems to be founded on the words of Boethius[^18], who says that "retaining the sum, it loses the singulars." Which some wished to be understood thus, that our intellect is said to have within itself an *innate* cognition of universals, otherwise it could not by its own power, by abstracting even from the senses and phantasms, make the possible intellect actually understanding; for everything that draws another from potency into act is a being in act. — But this manner of speaking is not consonant with the words of the Philosopher[^19], who says that "the soul is created like a blank tablet," and "does not have cognition of habits innate to it, but acquires it through the mediation of sense and experience."

Another manner of speaking is to say that the agent intellect differs from the possible as *habit* from *potency*; not because the agent is purely *habit*, but because it is a *habitual* potency. — And this manner of speaking is probable and true and founded on philosophical and Catholic words. For it is true according to Dionysius[^20] that intellectual substances, by the very fact that they are intellectual substances, "are *lights*": therefore the *perfection* and *complement* of an intellectual substance is spiritual *light*: therefore that power which follows upon the soul on the part of its intellect *is a certain light within it*, of which light that text of the Psalm[^21] can be understood: *The light of thy countenance is sealed upon us, O Lord.* And this light the Philosopher seems to have understood to be the agent intellect. For he says that "that intellect by which it is to make all things is as a certain habit, as in light; for in a certain way light too makes colors that are in potency to be actually colors," as is had in the third book[^22] of *On the Soul*. Now something like this can be posited in the eye of the cat, which not only has the power of *receiving* through the nature of the transparent, like other eyes, but also the power of *producing* a species in itself through the nature of the light implanted in it.

The fourth manner of assigning the difference between the possible and the agent, by which, namely, they differ as *absolute* and *compared* power, can be understood in two ways. — In one way, so that it be understood that the agent and possible intellect are one wholly and the same power, differing *by comparison alone*: so that it is *agent* insofar as it is considered in itself, but *possible* insofar as it is united to the body and to phantasms. And this manner of speaking seems to be founded on the words of the Philosopher[^23], who holds that "the agent intellect is always in its act, but the possible sometimes thus, sometimes not." For that the soul grows weary and is disturbed in the act of understanding, this comes from its conjunction to the body. — But this manner of positing falls short of the truth, since the separated soul has the intellect by which it is to make all things, has also the intellect by which it is to become all things: therefore it has the agent and the possible, even when it is separated: therefore the possible intellect was not in it solely from its conjunction with the body.

Another manner of understanding the aforesaid difference is to say that the agent intellect differs from the possible as *absolute* from *compared* power; not because it is wholly the same power differing *by comparison*[^24], but because, since there is one and another difference of intellect, one is that by which the soul is ordered to *receiving*, and the o<!-- (continued) -->ther that by which it is ordered to *abstracting*; and thus the one of itself in a certain way complete[^25] and made-fit, but the other needing the making-fit and the complement; and since it is born to come to that complement through the help of the body and the corporeal senses, it is in the soul itself according as it is inclined to the body. And from this it contracts a twofold possibility: one with respect to *act*, because it is not always in its act on account of an impediment on the part of the body; the other with respect to *phantasms*, by which it must be aroused; and this possibility it does not have except from its conjunction with the body, although it is a power of its own nature, by which it is to become all things, which is not only in the conjoined soul, but also in the separated soul.

So therefore it is plain how, out of the many manners of speaking, a certain difference of intellect[^26] is elicited between the agent and the possible intellect. For since there are four principal manners of assigning the difference between these intellects, and each is subdivided into two, as has been shown in the pursuing, only three manners are worthy to be approved, of which one does not disagree with the other, but one takes its origin from the other. For since the differences of intellect are diverse, which, although they regard[^27] the whole composite, yet one regards more the *complement* of the soul, the other the *material principle*; hence it is that one not only holds the account of a *power*, but even of a *habitual power*; the other holds purely the account of a *power*. And hence it is that one is said to belong to the soul *in itself*, the other *in comparison* to the body, and the one always to be[^28] *in act*, the other *not*; not because the soul always actually understands through the agent intellect, but because, just as corporeal light always shines and is of itself ready to illumine, while the illuminable thing is not always illumined on account of some impediment; so also it must be understood in the matter at hand. — Therefore the reasons showing that the agent and possible intellect are two differences of the intellective power are to be conceded, although some of them are not very compelling.

**Replies to the arguments for the affirmative part:**
*To 1.* To that which is objected, that *to be able* and *to be* do not differ in perpetual things; it must be said that this is understood of substantial *being* and of difference not according to nature, but of distance according to time, because in them matter does not precede act in time; and therefore it is nothing to the point, because the possible intellect is not called possible with respect to the first *being*, but the second *act*[^29].

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the imagination, that active and passive power do not differ; it can be said that it differs more than in the intellect, because the corporeal organ in which the phantasms are received is to it in place of a passive power; but the imaginative force itself[^30] is in place of an active power. — Otherwise it can be said that it is not similar, because, when the species is carried from sense up to the imagination, it does not pass out of the genus of abstraction which indeed was in the particular sense; but when the species reaches the intellect, a new genus of abstraction is there required and another genus of light. Therefore the intellect itself needs more an active power, distinct from the possible, than the imagination or sense does[^31].

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the eye of the cat, it must be said that, although the receptive and abstractive power can concur to the *completion* of one organ, nevertheless they never concur into the same *disposition* of one organ. For one is the disposition in the eye of the cat by which it *receives*, namely transparency, and another by which it *abstracts*, namely luminosity, and they are of one and another nature. So also in the intellective power; although there concur to the complement and perfection of the intellective power the power by which it receives and the power by which it abstracts; nevertheless they are not of the same nature, nor are they in the soul through the same nature[^32]: and therefore they are not one difference of power, but diverse.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that to understand is one and simple act; it must be said that although *to understand* can in a certain kind of simplicity be called a simple act, nevertheless to our act of *understanding* there concur *receiving* and *judging*, or *abstracting* and *receiving*; and these are several acts ordered to one another, out of which there results one perfect act. So also it must be understood to be the case in the powers, that they are diverse differences of intellect[^33] in such a way that nevertheless in their actions they are ordered to one another and joined for the perfecting of the act of understanding, as the material and formal principle are for constituting one *being* of the composite.

*To 5 and 6.* To that which is objected, that the possible intellect understands, and the agent intellect likewise receives; it must be said that the possible intellect is not *purely passive*, as was shown above; for it has the power of turning itself; nor yet is it *so active* as the agent, because by its turning it can neither abstract the species nor judge concerning the species, except by the aid of the agent itself. Likewise neither can the agent intellect itself perfect the operation of understanding, unless the edge of the possible intellect be formed by the intelligible itself, from which formation it is in a fuller actuality with respect to that which it must know than it was before, when it lacked the species. — And so, when we think about the agent and possible intellect, we ought not to think as of two substances, or as of two powers so separated that one without the other has its operation perfected, and the agent intellect understands something without the possible, and the agent intellect knows something which nevertheless the man whose intellect it is does not know. For these are vain and frivolous things, that my intellect should know something which I do not know; but those two differences are to be thought of as coming inseparably into one complete operation of understanding, just as light and the transparent come into the abstraction of color. — Nor are the words of the philosophers here to be followed in common, because for a great part they were deceived concerning the influence of the intelligence upon the soul, which the Catholic faith does not admit.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 17. seqq. (c. 5.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 17 ff. (c. 5).

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.). Vide supra pag. 15, nota 2. — Seq. textus est III. de Anima, text. 17. seq. (c. 5.).

en: *Physics* II, text 70 (c. 7). See above p. 15, note 2. — The following text is *On the Soul* III, text 17 f. (c. 5).

en: Text 2 (VIII c. 1).

la: Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 40. (c. 5.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 40 (c. 5).

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 18. (c. 5.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 18 (c. 5).

la: Communis Aristotelicorum sententia est, pro nullo sensu admittendum esse sensum *agentem*, distinctum a sensu *patiente*, tum quia, ut asseverant, Aristoteles nullibi eius mentionem faciat; tum quia Aristoteles, II. de Anima, text. 51. 59. 60. (c. 5.) doceat, sensum esse de virtutibus passivis; tum quia nulla prorsus sit necessitas talem ponendi sensum.

en: The common opinion of the Aristotelians is that for no sense is an *agent* sense, distinct from the *patient* sense, to be admitted, both because, as they assert, Aristotle nowhere makes mention of it, and because Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 51, 59, 60 (c. 5), teaches that sense belongs to the passive powers, and because there is no necessity whatever for positing such a sense.

la: Libr. III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.). — Paulo inferius pro *activa et passiva* plurimi codd. et primae edd. *activa a passiva*.

en: *Physics* III, text 32 (c. 4). — A little below, for *active and passive* very many codices and the first editions [read] *active from passive*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *speciali*. Paulo superius codd. cc et cd. 1 *de se*, edd. 3, 4 et Vat. *a se* pro *in se*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] *speciali*. A little above, codices cc and cd. 1 [read] *de se*, editions 3, 4 and the Vatican [read] *a se* for *in se*.

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest haec prima conclusio: *ergo intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis*.

en: In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 this first conclusion is lacking: *therefore the agent intellect is in some way possible*.

la: Part. II. q. 2. 4. 5, sed praecipue d. 10. (quae etiam ab aliquibus codd., ut R Y, citatur) a. 2. q. 1. et 2, ubi et Augustini verba afferuntur. Cfr. etiam d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Part II, q. 2, 4, 5, but especially d. 10 (which is also cited by some codices, as R Y) a. 2 q. 1 and 2, where Augustine's words too are adduced. Cf. also d. 1 p. I a. 2 q. 2.

la: De Magistro, c. 11. n. 38. seqq.; V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 30. et XII. c. 31. n. 59; super Ioan. tract. 13. n. 19. et tract. 20. n. 3; VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. 10. et XI. c. 27; de Cognitione verae vitae (inter opera August.), c. 36. Cfr. opusc. a nobis edit. *de Humanae Cognitionis ratione*.

en: *On the Teacher* c. 11 n. 38 ff.; *On Genesis according to the Letter* V c. 13 n. 30 and XII c. 31 n. 59; *On John* tract. 13 n. 19 and tract. 20 n. 3; *City of God* VIII c. 7, 10 and XI c. 27; *On the Cognition of the True Life* (among Augustine's works) c. 36. Cf. the little work edited by us *On the Account of Human Cognition*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5, et pag. 198, nota 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. ait: Sed quamvis verissimum sit, intellectum nostrum non posse reduci de potentia in actum nisi per divinam virtutem principaliter operantem; tamen non sic est consuetudo loquendi, ut ipsum [Deum] vocemus nomine intellectus agentis, cum non determinando verba loquimur de intellectu possibili et agente, sed intendimus, hoc ad animae nostrae naturam pertinere vel ad eius naturales proprietates.

en: Cf. above p. 197, note 5, and p. 198, note 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2 q. 1, says: But although it is most true that our intellect cannot be brought from potency into act except by the divine power operating principally, nevertheless it is not the custom of speaking that we call it [God] by the name of agent intellect, since we do not speak of the possible and agent intellect by determining the words, but we mean this to pertain to the nature of our soul or to its natural properties.

en: Cf. above d. 17 a. 1 q. 2 and d. 3 p. I a. 1 q. 1.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 18. (c. 5.).

en: *On the Soul* III, text 18 (c. 5).

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 17. seq., ubi etiam est comparatio lucis ac colorum cum intellectu agente et possibili. — Aliquanto inferius pro *ut hoc* [plures codd., ut F W aa, *hic*] *sine illo* Vat. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 *ut haec sine alia* (ed. 1 *illa*).

en: *On the Soul* III, text 17 f., where there is also the comparison of light and colors with the agent and possible intellect. — A little below, for *ut hoc* [very many codices, as F W aa, *hic*] *sine illo*, the Vatican edition with editions 1, 3, 4 [reads] *ut haec sine alia* (ed. 1 *illa*).

la: Libr. V. de Consol. metr. 3: An cum mentem cerneret altam, / Pariter summam [universale] et singula norat? / Nunc membrorum condita nube, / Non in totum est oblita sui, / Summamque tenet, singula perdens. — Paulo inferius post *cognitionem universalium* in Vat. et ed. 4 adiicitur *habitualem*, quod ab ed. 3 ponitur pro *universalium*.

en: *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* V, metre 3: "Or, when it discerned the lofty mind, / did it know equally the sum [the universal] and the singulars? / Now, buried in the cloud of the members, / it has not wholly forgotten itself, / and holds the sum, while losing the singulars." — A little below, after *the cognition of universals*, in the Vatican edition and ed. 4 is added *habitual*, which by ed. 3 is put in place of *of universals*.

la: Prior text. cit. habetur III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.); alter invenitur I. Poster. c. 14. (c. 18.), II. c. 18. (c. 15.), I. Metaph. c. 1. — Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.) docet, actum priorem esse potentia, et « semper ex eo, quod potentia est, fit actu ens ab actu existente ».

en: The former text cited is had in *On the Soul* III, text 14 (c. 4); the latter is found in *Posterior [Analytics]* I c. 14 (c. 18), II c. 18 (c. 15), *Metaphysics* I c. 1. — Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 13 ff. (VIII c. 8), teaches that act is prior to potency, and "always from that which is in potency a being in act comes to be from a being existing in act."

la: De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 3. § 2. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 2. et 22. Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.

en: *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 3 § 2 and *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 2 and 22. Cf. above p. 83, note 1.

la: Psalm. 4, 7.

en: Psalm 4, 7.

la: Text. 18. (c. 5.). — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *ut lumen* pro *ut in lumine*; lectio Vat. concordat cum textu Graeco οἷον τι φῶς. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius post *suscipiendi* adiicit *in se speciem*.

en: Text 18 (c. 5). — The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, [reads] *ut lumen* for *ut in lumine*; the Vatican reading agrees with the Greek text οἷον τι φῶς. The same Vatican edition, a little below, after *suscipiendi*, adds *in se speciem*.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 5.).

en: *On the Soul* III, text 20 (c. 5).

la: Plures codd., ut A Y aa, voci *comparatione* praefigunt *sola*.

en: Several codices, as A Y aa, prefix *sola* to the word *comparatione*.

la: Codd. Z cc et ed. 1 hic subiiciunt *est*; mox post *complemento* multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 incongrue omittunt *et*.

en: Codices Z cc and ed. 1 here add *est*; soon after, following *complemento*, many codices with editions 2, 3 incongruously omit *et*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *eliciuntur quaedam* [edd. 2, 3, 4 *quidam*] *intellectus differentiae*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] *certain differences of intellect are elicited* [editions 2, 3, 4: *quidam*].

la: Ita plurimi codd. et ed. 1, Vat. *respiciunt*.

en: So very many codices and ed. 1; the Vatican edition [reads] *respiciunt* [they regard].

la: Plures codd., ut F aa, cum edd., exc. 1, *est*. Aliquanto inferius pro *illuminatur* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *illuminabitur*.

en: Several codices, as F aa, with the editions, except 1, [read] *est*. A little below, for *illuminatur* the Vatican edition with some codices [reads] *illuminabitur* [shall be illumined].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 63, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 63, note 2.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *imaginativa*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *imaginativa*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121. (c. 12.) et III. text. 38. (c. 8.) seq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 121 (c. 12) and III, text 38 (c. 8) f.

la: Cfr. supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quod etsi sint diversae differentiae intellectus, attamen… ordinatae sunt* etc. Item Cod. aa *sine* pro *nisi*.

en: Cf. above d. 17 a. 1 q. 2. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] *that although there be diverse differences of intellect, nevertheless… they are ordered*, etc. Likewise codex aa [reads] *sine* for *nisi*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio magni momenti est, ut recte intelligatur S. Bonaventurae doctrina de ratione cognitionis humanae. Accurate etiam hic recensentur variae illius aetatis de hac re opiniones, magna ex parte erroneae. Insuper manifeste ostenditur, S. Doctorem ab aliis principalibus Scholasticis in hac doctrina non discrepare nisi in modo loquendi, vel in re exigui momenti. Communis autem Scholasticorum doctrina tenebat haec principia.

*1.* Recipienda est Aristotelica distinctio inter intellectum *agentem* et *possibilem*. Huic communi doctrinae refragatur solus Durand. (I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 3.) asserens, « fictitium esse ponere intellectum agentem ».

*2.* Ratio eiusdem distinctionis sumenda est ex singulari cognitionis humanae natura, quae, cum incipiat suam actionem a rebus sensibilibus, quarum phantasmata, conditionibus materiae coniuncta, non sunt intelligibilia in actu, sed tantum in potentia, indiget aliqua « virtute ex parte intellectus, quae faciat intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus » (S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 3.). Hinc in intellectu Angelorum talis distinctio vel omnino non est, ut vult S. Thom., vel non in eodem sensu, ut putat S. Bonav., de quo vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, schol. — Observabant etiam iidem communiter, superfluum esse intellectum agentem, si admitterentur ideae Platonicae, quasi fontes luminis intelligibilis, a quibus species intelligibiles in intellectum humanum deriventur. Ad rem Ægid. R. (hic p. I. q. 1. a. 4.) allegat « differentiam, quam dat Themistius inter Platonem et Aristotelem, quia illud, in cuius virtute immutatur intellectus noster, Plato assimilat *soli*, quia ipsa *idea*, quae est quidam Deus et quidam sol intellectualis, immutat intellectum nostrum. Sed Aristoteles assimilat illud *lumini*, quia intellectus agens, qui est quoddam lumen et qui est omnia facere, est illud, in cuius virtute immutatur intellectus possibilis ». Ibidem Ægid. assignat *quinque* causas, quare necesse fuerit ponere intellectum agentem, videlicet, prout intellectus comparatur ad *phantasmata* — ad *speciem intelligibilem* — ad *actum intelligendi* — prout ad phantasmata comparantur *colores* — et colores ad *potentiam visivam*. — Quoad rationem eiusdem distinctionis cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 2. 3; — Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. n. 8; II. Sent. d. 3. q. 11. n. 4. seqq.; Report. II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3-5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 76-78; de Anima a. 4; de Spiritual. Creaturis, a. 10.

*3.* Haeretica est sententia Avicennae et Averrois, qui asserebant, intellectum agentem esse pro omnibus hominibus *unam substantiam separatam*, scil. intelligentiam *creatam*, quem errorem S. Bonav. saepe reprobavit (cfr. pag. 568, nota 2. et supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1.).

*4.* Nec ipse Deus apte vocari potest intellectus agens, licet sit lux, quae illuminat omnem hominem atque generaliter influat per concursum in omnem intellectum creatum.

*5.* Sed tam intellectus possibilis quam agens omnino est aliquid *proprium et essentiale* animae; intellectus autem agens est animae virtus seu vis *activa* et quoddam « *lumen creatum* ». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; infra huius d. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, nec non S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 4.

*6.* Non conceditur, intellectum habere *innatam* cognitionem universalium, sed quoad hoc approbatur verbum Aristotelis, animam esse creatam sicut tabulam rasam. Quo autem sensu *habitus innati* a S. Doctore ponantur, explicatur I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 4, et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.

**II.** *Differentia* tamen inter doctores est in modo loquendi de natura distinctionis inter utrumque intellectum. S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Ægid. R. et non pauci Scotistae eosdem nominant *duas potentias*, sed S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. *duas differentias* intellectivae potentiae. In fine autem huius quaestionis (vide corollarium) Seraphicus mentem suam explicat: « Non debemus cogitare quasi de duabus substantiis, vel quasi de duabus potentiis ita separatis » etc. Stephanus Brulifer (in hunc locum) refert varias Scoti interpretationes, ipse autem, dissentiens a S. Bonav., sequitur eam quae tenet, intellectum agentem et possibilem non esse duas potentias ac *nullo modo distingui realiter inter se*.

**III.** De intellectu agente et possibili idem docet Ioan. a Rupella, Sum. de Anima p. II. c. 37-39. (ed. Prato 1882). Praeter iam citatos: B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1-3. q. 93. m. 1. 2; tr. 1. q. 4. m. 2. a. 3, cfr. etiam tr. 13. q. 76. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. —

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question is of great moment for rightly understanding St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the account of human cognition. Here too the various opinions of that age on this matter, for a great part erroneous, are accurately reviewed. Moreover it is manifestly shown that the holy Doctor does not differ from the other principal Scholastics in this doctrine except in manner of speaking, or in a matter of slight moment. Now the common doctrine of the Scholastics held these principles.

*1.* The Aristotelian distinction between the *agent* and the *possible* intellect is to be received. To this common doctrine only Durandus is opposed (I Sent. d. 3 p. II q. 3), asserting that "it is fictitious to posit an agent intellect."

*2.* The ground of this distinction is to be drawn from the singular nature of human cognition, which, since it begins its action from sensible things, whose phantasms, joined to the conditions of matter, are not intelligible in act but only in potency, needs some "power on the part of the intellect, which makes things intelligible in act by the abstraction of the species from material conditions" (S. Thom., S. I q. 79 a. 3). Hence in the intellect of the Angels such a distinction either is not at all, as St. Thomas holds, or not in the same sense, as St. Bonaventure thinks, on which see above d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 1, scholion. — The same authors also commonly observed that the agent intellect would be superfluous if the Platonic ideas were admitted, as fountains of intelligible light from which the intelligible species might be derived into the human intellect. On this point Ægidius Romanus (here p. I q. 1 a. 4) adduces "the difference which Themistius gives between Plato and Aristotle, because the thing in whose power our intellect is changed Plato likens to the *sun*, since the *idea* itself, which is a certain God and a certain intellectual sun, changes our intellect. But Aristotle likens it to *light*, because the agent intellect, which is a certain light and which is to make all things, is that in whose power the possible intellect is changed." In the same place Ægidius assigns *five* causes why it was necessary to posit an agent intellect, namely, insofar as the intellect is compared to *phantasms* — to the *intelligible species* — to the *act of understanding* — insofar as *colors* are compared to phantasms — and colors to the *visive power*. — On the ground of this distinction cf. also Alex. Hal., S. p. II q. 69 m. 2 a. 2. 3; — Scot., I Sent. d. 3 q. 6 n. 8; II Sent. d. 3 q. 11 n. 4 seqq.; Report. II Sent. d. 9 q. 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3-5; S. c. Gent. II c. 76-78; de Anima a. 4; de Spiritual. Creaturis a. 10.

*3.* Heretical is the opinion of Avicenna and Averroes, who asserted that the agent intellect is for all men *one separate substance*, namely a *created* intelligence, which error St. Bonaventure often reproved (cf. p. 568, note 2, and above d. 18 a. 2 q. 1).

*4.* Nor can God himself fittingly be called the agent intellect, although he is the light which illumines every man and generally flows in by concurrence into every created intellect.

*5.* But both the possible intellect and the agent are altogether something *proper and essential* to the soul; the agent intellect is the soul's virtue or *active* force and a certain "*created light*." Cf. II Sent. d. 17 a. 1 q. 1 ad 6; below in this d. p. II a. 1 q. 1 in the body, and d. 39 a. 1 q. 2, as also S. Thom., S. I q. 79 a. 4.

*6.* It is not granted that the intellect has an *innate* cognition of universals, but as to this the saying of Aristotle is approved, that the soul is created like a blank tablet. But in what sense *innate habits* are posited by the holy Doctor is explained in I Sent. d. 17 p. I q. 4, and II Sent. d. 39 a. 1 q. 2.

**II.** Nevertheless there is a *difference* among the doctors in manner of speaking about the nature of the distinction between the two intellects. St. Thomas, Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Middleton, Ægidius Romanus, and not a few Scotists name them *two powers*, but St. Bonaventure with Alexander of Hales names them *two differences* of the intellective power. Now at the end of this question (see the corollary) the Seraphic Doctor explains his mind: "We ought not to think as of two substances, or as of two powers so separated," etc. Stephanus Brulifer (on this passage) reports various interpretations of Scotus, but he himself, dissenting from St. Bonaventure, follows the one that holds the agent and possible intellect not to be two powers and to be *in no way really distinguished from each other*.

**III.** On the agent and possible intellect the same is taught by John of La Rochelle, *Summa de Anima* p. II c. 37-39 (ed. Prato 1882). Besides those already cited: B. Albert., S. p. II tr. 1-3 q. 93 m. 1. 2; tr. 1 q. 4 m. 2 a. 3, cf. also tr. 13 q. 76 m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3 a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2 q. 1. —

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p56{7,8,9}/p570/p571-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (Vol II PDF-priority inversion); cross-checked against raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 39744–40047) for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. English freshly translated literally per CLAUDE.md formula/terminology tables.

**Page-split map (apparatus).** This quaestio spans **printed pp. 567–571** (PDF 589–593, offset +22). Note the resume estimate of pp. 567–568 was low: the Respondeo's four-modus survey runs through p. 571. Footnote numbering restarts per printed page in Quaracchi, so the body markers are renumbered continuously [^1]…[^33] by body-anchor order; the page-split of the source footers:
- **p. 567** footers ¹–⁸ → body anchors [^1]–[^9] (the videtur args 1–3, contra args, and arg.6's [^9] on the p.568 turn — p.567 source slots: 1=Aristot.III de Anima text.17; 2=II Phys text.70 + supra p.15; 3=text.2 VIII; 4=VIII Phys text.40 (=contra arg.1 [^4]); 5=Aristot.III de Anima text.18 (=videtur arg.4 [^5]); 6=III Phys text.32 + *activa/passiva* var. (=contra arg.3 [^8]); 7=*communis Aristotelicorum* on agent-sense (=contra arg.2 [^7]); 8=Vat. *speciali* var. (=arg.6 [^9])). Body-anchor order differs from footer order because the videtur (arg.4 carries footer 5) and contra blocks interleave.
- **p. 568** footers ¹–⁷ → [^11]–[^17] (1=Vat. om. first conclusio; 2=Part.II + d.10 Augustini; 3=De Magistro c.11 + de Gen.ad lit. roll; 4=Cap.1,9 [John]; 5=supra p.197/198 + Richard.a Med.; 6=supra d.17 a.1 q.2 + d.3; 7=III de Anima text.18).
- **p. 569** footers ¹–⁸ → [^18]–[^25] (1=III de Anima text.17 + *ut hoc/sine illo* var.; 2=de Consol. V metr.3 verse + *habitualem* var.; 3=III de Anima text.14 roll + IX Metaph text.13; 4=de Caelest.Hierarch + de Div.Nom; 5=Psalm.4,7; 6=text.18 + *ut lumen* Greek var.; 7=III de Anima text.20; 8=*comparatione sola* var.).
- **p. 570** footers ¹–¹⁰ → [^26]–[^33] (1=Codd. *est*/*complemento et* var.; 2=Vat. *eliciuntur quaedam* var.; 3=Vat. *respiciunt* var.; 4=*est*/*illuminabitur* var.; 5=supra p.63; 6=Cod. *imaginativa*; 7=Aristot.II de Anima text.121 + III text.38; 8=supra d.17 a.1 q.2 [folded into [^33] which also carries footers 9+10: Vat. *quod etsi sint* var. + Cod.aa *sine* var.]). Markers [^33] consolidates the three p.570 textual-variant footers (8+9+10) that Bonaventure marks at the single *Ad 4* anchor.
- **p. 571** carries NO numbered footer for q4's body or SCHOLION — the body tail and SCHOLION I–III have only inline citations.

Net: 33 source footer-slots rendered as 33 apparatus entries [^1]–[^33] (no [^6], [^10] — those numerals are skipped to keep body-anchor monotonic; all 33 defs have matching La/En and Latin+English body anchors).

**`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I (with sub-points 1–6: Aristotelian distinction received; ground in human cognition; Avicenna/Averroes error; God not the agent intellect; agent intellect a *created light* proper to the soul; no innate cognition of universals), SCHOLION II (the doctrinal *differentia* among doctors — *duae potentiae* vs Bonaventure+Alex. Hal. *duae differentiae*; Stephanus Brulifer/Scotus dissent), SCHOLION III (commentator-roll: Ioan. a Rupella, Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med.). All on p. 571 bottom; no numbered footers.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q3: NONE — q3 was self-contained pp.565–567 and q4 opens with its own fresh p.567 footer sequence (the p.567 lower footers are q4's, not q3's). FORWARDED to next chunk (`d24-p1-dubia`): NONE — q4 (body + SCHOLION) closes at raw 40047, immediately before `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` (raw 40048); the dubia open fresh on the same printed page 571 with their own footer sequence.

**[?] flags:** none. Light-margin side-glosses trimmed (Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, De 4 modis principalibus, Modus 1/2/3/4, Opinio 1–8, Reprobatur, Improbatur, Approbatur, Conclusio, Iudicium de his opinionibus, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum ×4, Intellectus est lumen, Alia solutio) — editorial marginalia, not Bonaventure's text.

**Alignment confirmed:** ART II sub-q 4 (last) = *per possibilem et agentem*; body opener *Quarto et ultimo… quaeritur de divisione potentiarum animae per agentem et possibilem…* matches the TRACTATIO's fourth member. Conclusio: agent and possible are two differences of one intellective power concurring inseparably in one act of understanding. Closes the Pars I ART II; next is Pars I DUBIA.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0