title: Dist. 43, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–21 across the three printed pages (776, 777, 778).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de responsione Magistri, qua dicit: *His autem respondemus, duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes; unde scilicet veniat duplicitas huius*[^1]: *non potest Deus, nisi quod iustum est*: quod hoc verbum *est* potest significare iustitiam, quae est, vel iustitiam, quae esset, si Deus faceret. Hoc enim nihil videtur, quia, si dicatur: *iustum est hoc fieri*, intelligitur iustum esse ut nunc. Similiter in proposito.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri est rationabilis. Ratio autem huius multiplicitatis est, quod hoc verbum *est* potest dicere praesens ut nunc, vel simpliciter, et ita iustitiam, quae nunc est, vel quae esset, si res fierent[^2]. Potest autem multiplicitas assignari a tribus: primo a ratione attributi; sicut enim hoc verbum *currit*, per se dictum, dicit praesens ut nunc, sed quando additur determinatio, potest stare pro praesenti simpliciter, ut puta si dicatur de equo iacente in stabulo: *iste equus bene currit*; ita potest esse de hoc verbo *est* ratione eius quod additur *bonum* et *iustum*. Aliter potest assignari a parte ampliationis[^3] huius verbi *potest*, quia si ampliatio huius verbi *potest* totum dictum respiciat, ita quod implicatio cadat sub ampliatione, ita dicit praesens simpliciter. Si autem cadat extra, sic dicit praesens ut nunc; et secundum hoc accipitur duplex sensus, quem Magister assignat. Tertio modo potest assignari ratio a parte eius quod *est* nisi, quia potest teneri exceptive, vel consecutive[^4]. Si exceptive, tunc stat actus sive exceptum pro praesenti ut nunc, et est sensus: *non potest Deus, nisi quod iustum est*, id est, nihil potest Deus praeter hoc quod est iustum. Vel potest teneri consecutive; et tunc necesse est, quod hoc verbum *est* teneatur simpliciter, quia regula est, quod termini in conditione[^5] ampliantur ad omne tempus; et tunc est sensus: *non potest Deus nisi quod iustum est*, id est, nisi sit iustum; et sic ampliatur ibi ad omne tempus. Ex quacunque tamen causa accipiatur locutio, vere multiplex est.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hac expositione Magistri: *Poterat per potentiam, non per iustitiam*, quia iustitia stat ibi pro voluntate. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nihil potest Deus facere, quod non possit velle: ergo si iustitia Dei est voluntas, omne quod potest simpliciter, potest de iustitia, et e converso. — Item, *«possibili posito in esse, non sequitur impossibile»*: si ergo Deus poterat per potentiam Loth subvertere sive comburere; ponatur. Tunc quaero: aut hoc fuit iustum, aut non. Si sic: ergo poterat per iustitiam; si non: ergo fecit contra iustitiam, ergo inique; quod est omnino impossibile.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *iustitia* non stat ibi pro voluntate divina simpliciter considerata — sic enim poterat velle quod[^6] et poterat facere — sed stat ibi pro voluntate pensante merita et volente retribuere secundum merita. Et quoniam Loth non meruerat submergi cum illis peccatoribus, non poterat iuste submergi, quantum fuit de exigentia meritorum. Nihilominus tamen poterat Deus hoc facere, quia ex hoc laudem suam et Loth utilitatem poterat elicere, cum non sit malum secundum se vere[^7] iustum affligere; potest enim hoc Deus facere ad bonum suum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicit. Posito enim, quod hoc factum fuerit, ponitur etiam, fuisse iustum quantum ad condecentiam, licet non quantum ad merita. Contra enim exigentiam meritorum Deus potest facere et facit; Ieremiae vigesimo, Glossa: *«Quod facere cogitabam propter iustitiam, non feci propter clementiam»*.

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#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Hoc verbum* debet *non proprie convenit Deo, nisi forte dicatur ex promisso*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, sicut qui debet ex commisso obligatur, ne incurrat ingratitudinem, ita qui debet ex promisso, si non reddit, incurrit falsitatem: ergo Deus vere est obligatus[^8]: ergo et vere et proprie est debitor.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod debitum ex commisso est debitum proprie, quia praeit voluntatem; velit enim nolit, obligatus est[^9] qui accepit beneficium, si necessario eget beneficio. Debitum autem ex promisso, quod est merae liberalitatis, est debitum, quod sequitur largitatem promittentis; et ideo secundum rem plus habet de ratione gratiae quam debiti; et hoc modo Deus est debitor, primo modo non. Ex sua enim liberalitate promittit, ut alliciat, sed nihil recipit. Unde obsequia nostra non acceptat propter indigentiam; ideo ratio debiti, secundum quod obligationem dicit, proprie in Deo non cadit. Si autem abutamur nomine, ut *debitum* sonet in condecentiam bonitatis Dei, sic recipitur[^10].

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *eadem ratione manente, potuit alia facere et ista dimittere*. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia Augustinus[^11] dicit, quod *«alia ratione conditus est homo, alia ratione conditus est equus»*: ergo alia et alia ratione fiunt opposita: ergo eadem ratione manente, non potuit facere oppositum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister vocat hic *rationem* voluntatem Dei aequissimam: et sicut dictum est supra[^12], quod quia Deus novit omnia, ideo potest scire opposita sine innovatione scientiae, ita etiam et de voluntate. Unde non intelligitur voluntas mutari, quando Deus potest velle quod non vult, sed aliquod volitum ad ipsam comparari ipsa una et eadem et immutabili remanente, sed alio modo comparata sive ad aliud et aliud. Et ita intelligit Magister[^13].

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Haec autem quaestio de praescientia facile determinari potest per ea quae superius dicta sunt*; per quid determinatur superius dictum? Videtur enim argumentatio necessaria. Si enim *«Deus nihil potest operari nisi illud praesciat: et non praescit, nisi quae facit: ergo etc.»*

Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod Deus potest praescire plura, quam praescit, sicut potest plura operari. Unde huiusmodi solutio est, quod praescientia Dei potest esse alicuius, cuius non est, et ita Deus potest facere illud; et alicuius non esse, cuius est, et ita Deus potest illud non facere; et nunquam ponitur aliquid facere sine praescientia. Et hoc manifestum est, quod non est necessarium, Deum praescire quod praescit; si enim hoc esset, tunc impossibile esset, Deum aliud facere, quam illud quod facit. Et hic est error manifestus[^14].

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#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *An putas, quod non possum rogare Patrem* etc. Videtur enim illud non benedictum, quia aut Pater volebat dare, aut non. Si volebat, et Christus non volebat: ergo in voluntate discordabant: si autem nolebat, et Christus poterat petere: ergo poterat a voluntate Patris discordare, ergo peccare: quod est contra veritatem aperte.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Pater volebat dare, et Christus nolebat petere: sed Pater poterat velle, et Christus similiter petere, et ita non discordare. Tunc autem discordantia esset, si Christus posset petere, et Pater non posset velle. Quomodo autem Deus possit aliquid velle, quod non velit, supra habitum est[^15].

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nunquid dicendum est, non potuit Iudam suscitare in mente*? Ex hoc videtur, quod Deus possit salvare Iudam: ergo pari ratione damnare Petrum. Contra: *Iustus est, et negare se ipsum non potest*[^16]: ergo hoc facere contra iustitiam. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non potest; contra: posset Deus destruere omnia quae fecit, quod maius est: ergo multo fortius hoc potest.

**Respondeo:** Aliqui distinguunt hic potentiam Dei dupliciter, dicentes, Deum posse aut de potentia absoluta, et sic potest Iudam salvare et Petrum damnare; aut de potentia ordinata, et sic non potest. — Sed haec distinctio non videtur esse conveniens, quia nihil potest Deus, quod non possit ordinate. Posse enim inordinate facere est non posse, sicut posse peccare et posse mentiri. Unde nec potentia absoluta nec ordinata potest mentiri[^17].

Aliter dicunt alii, quod potest salvare Iudam, sed non damnare Petrum, quia *misericordia eius super omnia opera eius*[^18], et *misericordia superexaltat iudicium*; et salvare Iudam esset superabundantis misericordiae, sed damnare Petrum esset crudelitatis maximae. — Sed tamen cum Deus, summe iustus sit et summe misericors, sicut non potest facere contra misericordiam, sic nec contra iustitiam.

Ideo aliter dicunt alii, quod Deus neutrum potest, et hoc non derogat eius potentiae, quia utrumque esset iniustitia et inordinatio, revocare quem finaliter damnavit, et qui finaliter damnari meruit. Nec est simile de Traiano, quia Deus sic disposuerat ad honorem Sanctorum et suum, aliqua specialia facere; et ideo mors illa Traiani et damnatio, licet secundum causas inferiores finalis videretur, secundum tamen divinam dispositionem et consilium aliter erat[^19]. — Sed tamen quis hoc audeat dicere, quin Deus de Iuda hoc disponere potuerit, quod disposuit de Traiano? et quin generaliter possit omnibus facere quod probatur fecisse uni? Et iterum, Augustinus[^20] dicit, quod Deus ipsi diabolo bonam voluntatem posset dare.

Et propter hoc, dicendum, quod quando quaeritur, utrum Deus posset salvare Iudam et damnare Petrum, dicendum, quod aut loqueris salvis meritis, aut non salvis. Si salvis meritis, sic dico, quod non posset. Hoc enim idem est dicere et quaerere, ac si quaereretur, utrum posset iudicare iniuste; quod quidem absque dubio Deus non potest. Si autem intelligatur non salvis meritis, sic absque dubio posset salvare Iudam, auferendo per gratiam peccata et demerita et dando merita. Petro autem non potest dare merita mala; sed tamen sicut liberaliter dedit gratiam et naturam, potest auferre utrumque et alterum tantum; et tunc Petrus posset peccare et Deus aeternaliter punire. Sicut enim Deus liberaliter[^21] dedit bonam voluntatem Petro, ita etiam liberaliter conservat, similiter et naturam. Et sic patent obiecta.

---

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the Master's response, by which he says: *"To these things we reply, opening up a twofold understanding of the words; namely whence the duplicity of this statement comes"*[^1]: *"God can do nothing except what is just"*: that this verb *"is"* can signify the justice which is, or the justice which would be, if God were to do it. This seems to be nothing, since, if it be said: *"it is just that this be done,"* it is understood to be just as-of-now. Similarly in the matter at hand.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master's distinction is reasonable. The reason for this multiplicity is that this verb *"is"* can speak of the present as-of-now, or in an absolute sense, and thus of the justice which is now, or which would be, if the things were done[^2]. The multiplicity, however, can be assigned from three sources: first, from the account of the attribute; for just as this verb *"runs,"* taken by itself, speaks of the present as-of-now, but when a determination is added, it can stand for the present in an absolute sense — as for instance, if it be said of a horse lying in the stable: *"this horse runs well"*; so it can be with this verb *"is"* by reason of what is added: *"good"* and *"just."* In another way it can be assigned from the side of the amplification[^3] of this verb *"can,"* since if the amplification of this verb *"can"* regards the whole statement, in such a way that the implication falls under the amplification, then it speaks the present absolutely. But if it falls outside, then it speaks the present as-of-now; and according to this is taken the twofold sense which the Master assigns. In a third way the reason can be assigned from the side of that which *"is"* unless, because it can be held *exceptively* or *consecutively*[^4]. If exceptively, then the act or that-which-is-excepted stands for the present as-of-now, and the sense is: *"God cannot do, except what is just,"* that is, God cannot do anything besides what is just. Or it can be held consecutively; and then it is necessary that this verb *"is"* be held absolutely, because there is a rule, that terms in a conditional[^5] are amplified to every time; and then the sense is: *"God cannot do anything except what is just,"* that is, unless it be just; and so it is there amplified to every time. From whatever cause, however, the locution be taken, it is truly manifold.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning this exposition of the Master: *"He was able by power, not by justice,"* because justice there stands for will. For it seems to speak ill, because nothing can God do, which he cannot will: therefore if God's justice is will, everything which he can do absolutely, he can do of justice, and conversely. — Likewise, *"with a possible posited in being, no impossibility follows"*: if therefore God was able by power to overthrow or burn Lot; let it be posited. Then I ask: either this was just, or not. If so: therefore he was able by justice; if not: therefore he did against justice, therefore unjustly; which is altogether impossible.

**I respond:** It must be said that *"justice"* there does not stand for the divine will considered simply — for thus he was able to will what[^6] he was also able to do — but stands there for the will weighing merits and willing to repay according to merits. And since Lot had not merited to be submerged with those sinners, he could not justly be submerged, as far as concerns the exigence of merits. Nonetheless God could do this, because from it he could elicit his own praise and Lot's utility, since it is not evil in itself to afflict one truly[^7] just; for God can do this for his own good. — And by this is plain the response to that which he objects. For granted that this had been done, it is also granted that it was just as to fittingness, although not as to merits. For God can do, and does, contrary to the exigence of merits; Jeremiah twenty, the Gloss: *"What I had thought to do by justice, I did not, on account of clemency."*

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *This word "ought" does not properly belong to God, unless perhaps it be said from a promise*. For it seems to speak ill, because, just as he who owes from a thing committed is obliged, lest he incur ingratitude, so he who owes from a promise, if he does not render, incurs falsity: therefore God truly is obliged[^8]: therefore he is also truly and properly a debtor.

**I respond:** It must be said that what is owed from a thing committed is properly a debt, because it precedes the will; willy-nilly, he is obliged[^9] who has accepted a benefit, if he necessarily needs the benefit. But what is owed from a promise, which is of pure liberality, is a debt which follows the bounty of the promiser; and therefore in reality it has more of the character of grace than of debt; and in this mode God is a debtor; not in the first mode. For from his liberality he promises, in order to allure, but he receives nothing. Whence our services he does not accept on account of need; therefore the account of *debt*, according as it bespeaks obligation, does not properly fall in God. But if we misuse the word, so that *"debt"* may sound for the fittingness of God's goodness, in that sense it is received[^10].

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *with the same ratio remaining, he could have done other things and let these go*. For it seems this is false, because Augustine[^11] says that *"by one ratio man is made, by another ratio the horse is made"*: therefore opposites are made by diverse rationes: therefore with the same ratio remaining, he could not have done the opposite.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here calls *ratio* the most equitable will of God: and just as it has been said above[^12], that because God knows all things, he can therefore know opposites without any innovation of his knowledge, so also it is in the matter of his will. Whence the will is not understood to be changed, when God can will what he does not will, but some willed thing is compared to it — itself remaining one and the same and unchangeable — but compared in another way, or to one thing or another. And so the Master understands[^13].

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *"This question concerning foreknowledge can easily be determined through what has been said above"*; by what is what was said above determined? For the argumentation seems necessary. For if *"God can effect nothing unless he foreknow it: and he does not foreknow except what he does: therefore etc."*

And it must be said to this, that God can foreknow more things than he foreknows, just as he can do more things. Whence such a solution is: that God's foreknowledge can be of something which is not, and so God can do that; and of the non-being of something which is, and so God can not-do that; and never is anything posited as done without foreknowledge. And this is manifest, that it is not necessary that God foreknow what he foreknows; for if this were so, then it would be impossible for God to do anything other than what he does. And here is the manifest error[^14].

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#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *"Do you think, that I cannot ask the Father"* etc. For it seems that this is not blessed, because either the Father willed to give, or not. If he willed, and Christ did not will: therefore they were discordant in will: if however he did not will, and Christ was able to ask: therefore he was able to be discordant with the will of the Father, therefore to sin: which is openly contrary to truth.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Father willed to give, and Christ was not willing to ask: but the Father could will, and Christ likewise ask, and so not be discordant. Then, however, there would be discordance, if Christ could ask, and the Father could not will. But how God can will something which he does not will, has been treated above[^15].

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *"Are we to say, that he could not raise up Judas in mind"*? From this it seems that God can save Judas: therefore by parity of reason damn Peter. On the contrary: *"He is just, and cannot deny himself"*[^16]: therefore to do this is against justice. If you say, that he cannot do this, on the contrary: God could destroy all things he made, which is greater: therefore much more easily can he do this.

**I respond:** Some distinguish here God's power twofold, saying that God can do something either by absolute power, and thus he can save Judas and damn Peter; or by ordained power, and thus he cannot. — But this distinction does not seem fitting, because God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly. For to be able to do something disorderedly is not to be able, as to be able to sin and to be able to lie. Whence neither absolute nor ordained power can lie[^17].

Others say in a different way, that he can save Judas, but not damn Peter, because *his mercy is over all his works*[^18], and *mercy exalts itself above judgement*; and to save Judas would be of overflowing mercy, but to damn Peter would be of the greatest cruelty. — But still, since God is most just and most merciful, just as he cannot act against mercy, so neither against justice.

Therefore others say still differently, that God can do neither, and this does not derogate from his power, because either would be injustice and disorder, namely, to recall whom he finally damned, and who finally merited to be damned. Nor is it like the case of Trajan, because God had so disposed for the honour of the Saints and his own, to do certain special things; and therefore that death of Trajan and his damnation, although according to inferior causes it would seem final, yet according to divine disposition and counsel it was otherwise[^19]. — But yet who would dare to say this, but that God could dispose concerning Judas what he disposed concerning Trajan? and but that he could generally do for all what he is proved to have done for one? And again, Augustine[^20] says, that God could give a good will to the devil himself.

And on account of this, it must be said, that when it is asked whether God could save Judas and damn Peter, it must be said, that either you speak with merits preserved, or not preserved. If with merits preserved, thus I say that he could not. For this is the same as to say and ask whether he could judge unjustly; which without doubt God cannot. But if it be understood without merits being preserved, then without doubt he could save Judas, by removing through grace sins and demerits, and granting merits. To Peter, however, he cannot give evil merits; but yet just as he liberally gave grace and nature, he can take away both, or just the one; and then Peter could sin and God eternally punish. For as God liberally[^21] gave a good will to Peter, so also he liberally preserves it, and likewise nature. And so the objections are plain.

---

la: Scilicet propositionis. Pro *huius* Vat. *huiusmodi, quae* et deinde post *iustum est* interiicit *Si dicas*. Immediate post pro *quod* codd. VX *quia*, et mox pro *quae esset* plurimi codd. cum ed. I *quae efficit*.

en: Namely, of the proposition. For *huius* the Vatican has *huiusmodi, quae*, and then after *iustum est* inserts *Si dicas*. Immediately after, for *quod* codd. VX read *quia*, and shortly for *quae esset* very many codd. with ed. I read *quae efficit*.

la: Sic et Alex. Hal., S. p. q. 21. m. 2. § 1. ad 1: Ad I. primum quod dicit, quod Deus non potest facere, nisi quod bonum et iustum est, distinguendum: hoc verbum *est* potest copulare praesens indeterminatum sive in habitu, vel praesens ut nunc sive in actu. Primo modo vera est, et sensus est: Deus non potest facere, nisi quod bonum et iustum esset, si faceret. Secundo modo falsa est, et est sensus: non potest facere, nisi quod bonum et iustum est nunc. — Paulo superius pro *quod hoc verbum* aliqui codd. ut TX *quia hoc verbum*, et immediate post *si res fierent* pro *Potest autem multiplicitas assignari* codd. Y aa bb *Ratio autem huius multiplicitatis potest assignari*, pro quo non pauci alii codd. cum ed. I brevius *Potest assignari*. Post pauca voce *attributi* significatur quod iustum est.

en: So also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. q. 21. m. 2. § 1. ad 1: To the first which he says, that God cannot do except what is good and just, this verb *"is"* must be distinguished: it can couple an indeterminate present (in habit) or a present as-of-now (in act). In the first mode it is true, and the sense is: God cannot do, except what would be good and just, if he were to do it. In the second mode it is false, and the sense is: he cannot do, except what is now good and just. — A little above, for *quod hoc verbum* some codd. such as TX have *quia hoc verbum*, and immediately after *si res fierent* for *Potest autem multiplicitas assignari* codd. Y aa bb have *Ratio autem huius multiplicitatis potest assignari*, in place of which not a few other codd. with ed. I have more briefly *Potest assignari*. After a little, by the word *"attributi"* is signified that which is just.

la: Ad rem B. Albert. hic dicit in princ. dist.: «In hac enim locutione ponitur hoc verbum *potest*, quod habet vim ampliandi et ponitur circa Deum ut potentem, et hoc quod dico *iustum* et *bonum est fieri* cadit sub hoc verbo *potest*, sicut materia, in qua terminatur actus illius potentiae, quam copulat verbum *est*: ergo duplex locutio, scil. quod potest intelligi, quod prius cadat sub verbo habente vim ampliandi *[potest]*, antequam restringatur... et tunc ly *est* non copulabit praesens tempus, sed confusum respondens potentiae; et tunc vera est sub sensu, quem ponit Magister: *non potest Deus* etc., i. e. *non potest facere, nisi quod bonum et iustum esset, si fieret*. Si autem econtra *iustum et bonum* intelligatur restringi prius a verbo *est* ad praesens *bonum* et *iustum*, tunc falsa est locutio, quia tunc sequeretur, quod nihil posset facere Deus, nisi quod modo iustum et bonum est fieri». Fere iisdem verbis S. Thom., hic circa lit., hoc dubium solvit. Eadem distinctio recurrit infra d. 44. a. I. q. 4. in fine corp. quaest. — Pro *implicatio cadat* ed. I *implicatum cadat*.

en: To the point Bl. Albert here says at the beginning of the distinction: «For in this locution this verb *"can"* is posited, which has the force of amplifying and is posited concerning God as powerful, and this which I call *"just"* and *"good to be done"* falls under this verb *"can,"* as the matter in which the act of that power is terminated, which the verb *"is"* couples: therefore a twofold locution, namely, that it can be understood that what first falls under the verb having the force of amplifying *[can]* before it is restricted... and then the *"is"* will not couple present time, but a confused [tense] corresponding to power; and then it is true in the sense which the Master posits: *"God cannot do"* etc., i. e., *he cannot do except what would be good and just, if it were to be done*. But if conversely *"just and good"* be understood to be restricted first by the verb *"is"* to present *"good"* and *"just,"* then the locution is false, because then it would follow that God could do nothing except what is now just and good to be done». In nearly the same words St. Thomas, here in his commentary on the text, resolves this doubt. The same distinction recurs below at d. 44 a. 1 q. 4 at the end of the body of the question. — For *implicatio cadat*, ed. I has *implicatum cadat*.

la: Cfr. opusculum cui titulus: *Parvorum logicalium* (Petro Hispano adscriptum) c. *De coniunctione* Nisi.

en: Cf. the little work entitled *Parvorum logicalium* (attributed to Peter of Spain), c. *On the conjunction* Nisi.

la: Pro *conditione* cod. V *conditionali*, scil. propositione.

en: For *conditione*, cod. V has *conditionali*, namely, "[conditional] proposition."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 674, nota 5. — De Loth cfr. Gen. 19, 12. seqq.

en: Cf. above page 674, note 5. — On Lot, cf. Genesis 19:12 ff.

la: Pro *quod* Vat. *quia*.

en: For *quod*, the Vatican has *quia*.

la: Pro *vere* Vat. cum cod. cc *iure*.

en: For *vere*, the Vatican with cod. cc has *iure* ("by right").

la: Haec citatio, *Ieremiae vigesimo*, quae in Vat. deest, invenitur in codd. et ed. I; sed Glossa, quae ex S. Hieronymo in hunc locum affertur, non convenit cum Glossa a S. Bonav. hic citata. Haec sunt enim verba Glossae apud Hieronymum: «Qui pauper est spiritu... cum fuerit vindictam a Domino consecutus, Dominum laudat in spiritu et se de manu pessimorum erutum gloriatur. Hoc autem totum fit non nostro merito, sed eius gratia, qui pauperem liberavit nec habet divitias superbiae corruentis, sed humilitatem pauperis liberati». Marra, in suo Comment. anecdoto, verba a Bonav. ut verba Glossae citata in Glossa ordinaria ad Gen. 19, 22. haberi vult; sed ibi non inveniuntur; at in eadem Glossa ad Ionam 2, 9. legitur: *Deus natura misericors paratus est, ut salvet per clementiam, quos salvare non potest per iustitiam*. — Quid verbum *condecentia* significet, quod paulo ante occurrit, vide supra pag. 775, nota 2 et dub. seq. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. Thom., hic; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: This citation, *"Jeremiah twenty,"* which is missing in the Vatican edition, is found in the codd. and ed. I; but the Gloss which is here adduced from St. Jerome at this place does not agree with the Gloss cited here by St. Bonaventure. For these are the words of the Gloss according to Jerome: «He who is poor in spirit... when he has obtained vengeance from the Lord, praises the Lord in spirit and glories in being plucked from the hand of the worst men. All this, however, happens not by our merit, but by his grace, who freed the poor man and has not the riches of falling pride, but the lowliness of the freed poor man». Marra, in his unpublished Commentary, would have it that the words cited by Bonaventure as words of the Gloss are found in the ordinary Gloss on Gen. 19:22; but they are not found there; but in the same Gloss on Jonah 2:9 it is read: *"God, merciful by nature, is ready to save through clemency those whom he cannot save through justice."* — What the word *"condecentia"* signifies, which occurred a little before, see above page 775, note 2 and the following doubt. — On this doubt, cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 3; St. Thomas, here; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the text.

la: Ed. I *obligatur*.

en: Ed. I reads *obligatur* ("is obliged" [present passive]).

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 3; Petr. a Tar. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 3; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard, here in their commentary on the text.

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 16. n. 2. — In contextu obiectionis pro *oppositum* Vat. cum paucis codd. *opposita*.

en: *Book of 83 Questions,* q. 16, n. 2. — In the context of the objection, for *oppositum*, the Vatican with a few codd. reads *opposita*.

la: Dist. 39. a. 2. q. 2; d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. — Mox post *ita etiam* cod. Y bene supplet *intelligendum est*.

en: Distinction 39, a. 2, q. 2; d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4; d. 41, a. 2, q. 2. — Shortly after *"ita etiam,"* cod. Y rightly supplies *intelligendum est* ("it is to be understood").

la: Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 2. q. 1, et d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. Porro cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 2; et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit., quo loco etiam duo sequentia dubia solvuntur.

en: Cf. below d. 44, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 45, a. 2, q. 1. Further cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 2; and Peter of Tarentaise, here in his commentary on the text, in which place also the two following doubts are resolved.

en: Here doubt 4, and d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4.

la: Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13.

en: 2 Timothy 2:13.

la: Distinctionem ipsam inter potentiam absolutam et ordinatam S. Doctor non improbat. Nam ipse hanc distinctionem facit II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; et Breviloq. p. I. c. 7. docet: «Potentiam ordinatam contingit tripliciter dici: vel secundum actum, vel secundum aptitudinem ex parte creaturae, vel secundum aptitudinem ex parte solius virtutis increatae. Quod possibile est potentiae primo modo dictae, est non tantum possibile, sed etiam actuale. Quod secundo modo et non primo, est possibile simpliciter, licet non actuale. Quod autem tertio modo, et non primo modo vel secundo, est possibile Deo, sed impossibile creaturae. Quod autem nullo praedictorum modorum est possibile, sicut illud quod directe repugnat ordini secundum rationes et causas primordiales et aeternas, simpliciter est impossibile». S. Doctor hoc loco modum tantum impugnat, quo haec distinctio ab aliquibus intelligebatur et applicabatur, quod etiam ex solutione huius dubii colligi potest, quae mox sequitur.

en: The distinction itself between absolute and ordained power the Holy Doctor does not disapprove. For he himself makes this distinction in *Sent.* II, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1; and in the *Breviloquium* p. I, c. 7, he teaches: «Ordained power can be spoken of in three ways: either according to act, or according to aptitude on the side of the creature, or according to aptitude on the side of the uncreated power alone. What is possible to power in the first mode is not only possible, but actual. What [is possible] in the second mode and not in the first, is possible absolutely, although not actual. What [is possible] in the third mode, and not in the first or second, is possible to God, but impossible to the creature. But what is possible in none of the foregoing modes, like that which directly is repugnant to order according to the primordial and eternal rationes and causes, is simply impossible». The Holy Doctor in this place attacks only the manner in which this distinction was understood and applied by some — which can also be gathered from the solution of this doubt which immediately follows.

la: Psalm. 144, 9, ubi Vulgata *miserationes* pro *misericordia*. Altera citatio est ex Iac. 2, 13.

en: Psalm 144:9, where the Vulgate has *miserationes* for *misericordia*. The other citation is from James 2:13.

la: In legenda seu vita S. Gregorii, a Ioanne Diacono conscripta (habetur inter opera S. Gregorii), narratur libr. II. c. 44, Deum, lacrymis S. Gregorii motum, imperatorem Traianum, propter idololatriam damnatum ab inferis revocasse. De hac re cfr. nostra Prolegomena pag. LXIV, col. I.

en: In the *Legend* or *Life* of St. Gregory, written by John the Deacon (it is found among the works of St. Gregory), it is narrated, book II, c. 44, that God, moved by the tears of St. Gregory, recalled from hell the emperor Trajan, who had been damned on account of idolatry. On this matter cf. our Prolegomena, p. LXIV, col. I.

la: Vel potius colligi potest ex Fulgentii libr. *de Fide ad Petrum*, c. 3, n. 32-34, qui liber olim sub Augustini nomine circumferebatur. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, ubi S. Bonav. in solvenda quaestione: *An affectus vel voluntas daemonis rectificari possit*, ad librum cit. recurrit. — Paulo superius pro *hoc disponere* Vat. cum cod. cc *hac dispositione*, et deinde voci *omnibus* praefigit *de*.

en: Or rather it can be gathered from Fulgentius's book *De Fide ad Petrum*, c. 3, n. 32–34, which book formerly circulated under the name of Augustine. Cf. *Sent.* II, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, where St. Bonaventure, in resolving the question *Whether the affect or will of a demon can be rectified*, has recourse to the said book. — A little above, for *hoc disponere* the Vatican with cod. cc reads *hac dispositione*, and then prefixes *de* to the word *omnibus*.

la: Vat. omittit verba *dedit gratiam* et sequentia usque ad *liberaliter*. Aliquanto superius inter verba *utrum posset* codd. aa bb interiiciunt *Deus*. — Dubium hic tractatum solvunt etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. ad 5; Richard., hic q. 7. et circa lit.

en: The Vatican omits the words *dedit gratiam* and following down to *liberaliter*. Somewhat earlier, between the words *utrum posset*, codd. aa bb interject *Deus*. — The doubt here treated is also resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2. ad 5; Richard, here q. 7 and in his commentary on the text. ---

translators_notes: **J4 Class D/E health-scan false positive (2026-07-17):** the corpus scan flagged this chunk as `defs=21 la=23 en=21` (2 "extra" Latin anchors, labels `1` and `21`). Investigated per `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2/§6: this is **not a real defect**. The intro blockquote at the top of `## Latin` ("Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially [^1]–[^21] across the three printed pages (776, 777, 778).") uses a **plain, non-backtick-quoted** `[^1]`–`[^21]` example range inside explanatory prose to describe the renumbering scheme. The regex-based classifier (and the live site's `text-reader.tsx` renderer) doesn't distinguish this from real body anchors, so it double-counts labels `1` and `21`. All 21 real body anchors `[^1]`–`[^21]` occur exactly once each in the actual Latin argument text, matching all 21 apparatus defs and all 21 English anchors 1:1. No change made to markers or apparatus content — this is the same false-positive pattern already confirmed in `I-d32-littera`, `I-d41-a2-q1`, `I-d41-a2-q2`, and `I-d42-dubia`. Flagged for Wilson per the handoff: the underlying corpus-wide backtick/plain-example-range convention vs. the live renderer's literal-marker bug is a separate, un-fixed issue (§2 of the handoff) affecting 300+ files — not addressed here.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 44

title_alt:
Distinctio XLIV. — Littera Magistri
Distinction XLIV — The Master's Text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 779 -->

### DISTINCTIO XLIV.

### Cap. I.

#### *An Deus possit facere aliquid melius, quam facit, vel alio vel meliori modo.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Nunc illud restat discutiendum, utrum melius aliquid Deus[^1] possit facere, quam facit. Solent enim illi scrutatores dicere, quod ea quae facit Deus, non potest meliora facere, quia si posset facere et non faceret, invidus esset summe bonus. Et hoc *ex simili* astruere conantur. Ait enim Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^2]: « Deus quem genuit, quoniam meliorem se generare non potuit — nihil enim Deo melius — generare debuit aequalem. Si enim voluit et non potuit, infirmus est; si potuit et noluit, invidus. Ex quo conficitur aequalem genuisse filium ». A simili volunt dicere, quod si potest Deus rem meliorem facere, quam facit, invidus est. — Sed non valet huius similitudinis inductio, quia filium genuit de substantia sua; ideoque, si posset gignere aequalem et non gigneret, invidus esset. Alia vero, quae non de substantia sua facit, meliora facere potest.

Verum hic ab eis responderi deposco, cur dicant, rem aliquam sive etiam rerum universitatem, in qua maior consummatio expressa est, non posse esse meliorem, quam est: sive ideo, quia summe bona est, ita ut nulla omnino boni perfectio ei desit, sive ideo, quia maius bonum, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat. Sed si ita summe bona dicitur, ut nulla ei perfectio boni desit, iam creatura Creatori aequatur. Si vero ideo non potest melior esse, quia bonum amplius, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat; iam hoc ipsum non posse defectionis est, non consummationis; et potest esse melior, si fiat capax melioris boni, quod ipse potest qui eam fecit. Potest ergo Deus meliorem rem facere, quam faciat[^3]. Unde Augustinus super Genesim: « Talem potuit Deus hominem fecisse, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse »? — Ex praedictis constat, quod potest Deus et alia facere, quam facit, et quae facit meliora ea facere, quam facit.

Post haec considerandum est, utrum alio modo vel meliori, quam facit, possit ea facere quae facit. Si modus operationis ad sapientiam opificis referatur, nec alius nec melior[^4] esse potest. Non enim potest facere aliquid aliter vel melius, quam facit, id est alia sapientia vel maiori sapientia; nihil enim sapientius potest facere, quam facit. Si vero referatur modus ad rem ipsam, quam facit Deus, dicimus, quia et alius et melior potest esse modus. Et secundum hoc concedi potest, quia ea quae facit, potest facere melius et aliter, quam facit, quia potest quibusdam meliorem modum existendi praestare, et quibusdam alium. Unde Augustinus in decimo tertio libro *de Trinitate*[^5]: quod fuit et alius modus nostrae liberationis possibilis Deo, qui omnia potest; sed nullus alius nostrae miseriae sanandae fuit convenientior. Potest igitur Deus eorum quae facit, quaedam alio modo meliori, quaedam alio modo aeque bono, quaedam etiam minus bono facere, quam facit; ut tamen modus referatur ad qualitatem[^6] creaturae, non ad sapientiam Creatoris.

### Cap. II.

#### *Utrum Deus semper possit omne quod potuit.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit. Quod quibusdam non videtur dicentibus: Potuit Deus incarnari et potuit mori et resurgere, et alia huiusmodi, quae modo non potest. Potuit ergo quae modo non potest, et ita habuit potentiam, quam modo non habet. Unde videtur eius potentia imminuta. — Ad quod[^8] dicimus, quia sicut[^7] omnia semper scit, quae aliquando scivit, et semper vult, quae aliquando voluit, nec unquam aliquam scientiam amittit, vel voluntatem mutat, quam habuit; ita omnia semper potest, quae aliquando potuit, nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur. Non est ergo privatus potentia incarnandi vel resurgendi, licet non possit modo incarnari vel resurgere. Sicut enim potuit olim incarnari, ita et potest modo incarnatus esse, in quo eiusdem rei potentia monstratur. Ut enim olim scivit, se resurrecturum, et modo scit, se resurrexisse, nec est alia scientia illud olim scivisse, et hoc modo scire, sed eadem omnino; et sicut voluit olim resurgere, et modo resurrexisse, in quo unius rei voluntas exprimitur; ita potuit olim nasci et resurgere, et modo potest natus fuisse et resurrexisse; et est eiusdem rei potentia. Si enim posset modo nasci et resurgere, non esset idem posse. Verba enim diversorum temporum, diversis prolata temporibus et diversis adiuncta adverbiis, eundem faciunt sensum: ut modo loquentes dicimus: *iste potest legere hodie*, cras autem dicemus: *iste potest legisse*, vel *potuit legere heri*, ubi[^9] <!-- page 780 --> *unius rei monstratur potentia*. Si autem diversis temporibus loquentes eiusdem temporis verbis et adverbiis utamur, dicentes hodie: *Iste potest legere hodie*, et dicentes cras: *iste potest hodie legere*; non idem, sed diversa dicimus eum posse. Fateamur igitur, Deum semper posse quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnem illam potentiam, quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiam, cuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud, quod aliquando potuit facere; potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit. Similiter quidquid voluit, et vult, id est, omnem quam habuit voluntatem et modo habet; et cuiuscumque rei voluntatem habuit, et modo habet; non tamen vult *esse* vel *fieri* omne, quod aliquando voluit esse vel fieri, sed vult *fuisse* vel *factum esse*. Ita et de scientia Dei dicendum est.

---

english:
<!-- page 779 -->

### DISTINCTION XLIV.

### Chapter I.

#### *Whether God can make anything better than he makes [it], or in another or a better way.*

Now this remains to be discussed, whether God[^1] can make anything better than he makes. For those searchers are wont to say that the things which God makes, he cannot make better, because if he could make [them better] and did not do so, he would not be supremely good, but envious. And this they strive to establish *from a similar case*. For Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions*[^2] says: « God, whom he begot, since he could not generate one better than himself — for nothing is better than God — he had to generate an equal. For if he willed and could not, he is weak; if he could and would not, he is envious. From which it is concluded that he begot an equal Son. » By a similar [reasoning] they wish to say that if God can make a thing better than he makes it, he is envious. — But the inference of this similitude does not hold, because he begot the Son from his own substance; and therefore, if he could have begotten an equal and did not, he would have been envious. But the other things, which he does not make from his own substance, he can make better.

But here I demand a response from them: why do they say that any thing, or even the totality of things, in which a greater perfection has been expressed, cannot be better than it is — either because it is supremely good, so that no perfection of good is altogether lacking to it; or because the greater good which is lacking to it, it cannot receive? But if it is said to be supremely good in such a way that no perfection of good is lacking to it, then the creature is equated to the Creator. But if it cannot be better because the greater good which is lacking to it, it cannot receive — then this very *not-being-able* is of defect, not of perfection; and it can be better, if it is made capable of a better good, which he himself who made it can [do]. Therefore God can make a better thing than he makes[^3]. Whence Augustine on Genesis: « God could have made man such, that he should be unable and unwilling to sin; and if he had made him such, who doubts that he would have been better »? — From the foregoing it is established that God can both make other [things] than he makes, and can make those which he makes better than he makes them.

After this it must be considered, whether in another or better way than he does, he can make those things which he makes. If the manner of operation is referred to the wisdom of the operator, it can neither be other nor better[^4]. For he cannot do anything otherwise or better than he does — that is, with another wisdom or with greater wisdom; for he cannot do anything more wisely than he does. But if the manner is referred to the thing itself which God makes, we say that the manner can be both other and better. And according to this it can be conceded that the things he makes, he can make better and otherwise than he makes them, because he can grant to some a better mode of existing, and to others another. Whence Augustine in the thirteenth book *On the Trinity*[^5]: that there was another mode of our liberation possible to God, who can do all things; but no other was more fitting for the healing of our misery. Therefore God can make some of the things he makes in another and better way, some in another way equally good, and some even in a less good way than he makes them; provided, however, that the mode be referred to the quality[^6] of the creature, not to the wisdom of the Creator.

### Chapter II.

#### *Whether God always has the power to do everything he once could do.*

Furthermore, it is wont to be asked whether God can always [do] everything he once could do. To some it does not seem so, who say: God could become incarnate, and could die and rise again, and other things of this kind, which now he cannot. Therefore he could [do] things which now he cannot, and so he had a power which now he does not have. Whence his power seems to have been diminished. — To which[^8] we say that, just as[^7] he always knows all things which at some time he knew, and always wills [those] which at some time he willed, nor ever loses any knowledge nor changes a will which he had; so he can always [do] all the things which at some time he could, nor is he ever deprived of any of his power. Therefore he is not deprived of the power of becoming incarnate or of rising again, although he cannot now become incarnate or rise. For as he once could become incarnate, so even now he can have-been incarnate, in which the power of the same thing is shown. For as he once knew that he was going to rise, and now knows that he has risen — nor is it another knowledge to have once known that, and now to know this, but altogether the same; and as he once willed to rise, and [now wills] now to have risen, in which the will of one [and the same] thing is expressed — so he could once be born and rise, and now can have-been-born and have-risen; and it is the power of the same thing. For if he could now be born and rise, it would not be the same power. For the words of different tenses, uttered at different times and joined with different adverbs, make the same sense: as speaking now we say: *this one can read today*, but tomorrow we shall say: *this one can have-read*, or *he could read yesterday*, where[^9] <!-- page 780 --> the power of one [and the same] thing is shown. But if, speaking at different times, we use words and adverbs of the same tense — saying today: *this one can read today*, and saying tomorrow: *this one can read today* — we do not say that he can [do] the same, but different things. Let us confess therefore that God can always [do] whatever he once could — that is, [he can] have every power which he once had, and the power of every thing of which he once had [the power]; but not that he can always do everything which he at some time could do; he can indeed do, or have done, that which at some time he could. Similarly, whatever he willed, he also wills — that is, [he has] every will which he had, and now has; and of whatever thing he had the will, he now also has it; nevertheless he does not will every [thing] which at some time he willed to be or to come-to-be, [now] to be or to come-to-be, but he wills it to have-been or to have-come-to-be. And so it must be said also of God's knowledge.

---

la: Edd., excepta 1, omittunt *Deus*, refragantibus codd. Paulo post codd. A B post *si posset* addunt *meliora*. Deinde codd. A B D E *a simili* pro *ex simili*.

en: The editions, except edition 1, omit *Deus* ("God"), against [all] the codices. Shortly afterwards codices A and B, after *si posset* ("if he could"), add *meliora* ("better things"). Then codices A, B, D, E [read] *a simili* in place of *ex simili* ("from a similar [case]").

la: Quaest. 50. (cfr. lI. *contra Maximin.* c. 7.). — Vat. cum pluribus edd. et codd. A C E omittit *generare* ante *debuit*; cod. B et ed. 1 *genuit* pro *debuit*.

en: Question 50 (cf. Book II *Against Maximinus*, c. 7). — The Vatican edition with most editions and codices A, C, E omits *generare* ("to generate") before *debuit* ("he had to"); codex B and ed. 1 [read] *genuit* ("he begot") in place of *debuit*.

la: Ad lit. XI. c. 7. n. 9. — Immediate ante Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, refragantibus codd. *facit* pro *faciat*.

en: [Augustine,] *On the literal [meaning of Genesis]*, Book XI, c. 7, n. 9. — Immediately before [the citation], the Vatican and other editions, except ed. 1, against the codices, [read] *facit* in place of *faciat*.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, repetunt *modus*, contradicentibus codd.

en: The Vatican edition and other editions, except ed. 1, repeat *modus* ("manner"), against [all] the codices.

la: Cap. 10. n. 13; secundum sensum.

en: Chapter 10, n. 13; according to the sense.

la: Vat. et aliae edd. addunt *operis, id est*, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican and other editions add *operis, id est* ("of the work, that is"), against the codices and ed. 1.

la: Vat. cum plurimis edd. addit *ipse*.

en: The Vatican edition with most editions adds *ipse* ("he himself").

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 5 *ubi*.

en: The codices and editions 1 and 5 [read] *ubi* ("where") [in place of variant readings in other editions].

la: De hac opinione Magistri cfr. Comment. hic a. 2. q. unica.

en: On this opinion of the Master cf. the Commentary here, article 2, the single question.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 44, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLIV. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLIV. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 780 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLIV.

#### *De potentia Dei in comparatione ad modum sive qualitatem rerum.*

> *Nunc illud restat discutiendum, utrum melius* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra[^1] egit Magister de potentia in comparatione ad possibile secundum *substantiam* et *quantitatem*; hic tertio agit de potentia quantum ad *modum* sive *qualitatem* rerum. Et haec pars habet duas partes. In *prima* Magister agit de potentia quantum ad qualitatem possibilium, quae quidem est maior et minor bonitas. *Secundo*, quantum ad qualitatem potentiae, quae quidem est immutabilitas, ibi: *Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Deus* etc.

*Prima* pars habet duas. In *prima* quaerit, utrum Deus mundum potuerit facere meliorem[^2]. In *secunda*, utrum res, quas facit, possit facere meliori modo sive alio modo, et hoc ibi: *Post haec considerandum est* etc., ubi agit quantum ad modum. *Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Deus* etc. Haec est *secunda* pars, ubi quaerit de divinae potentiae immutabilitate, quaerens, utrum Deus possit quidquid potuit, et habet haec pars duas. In *prima* ostendit, quod non possit quidquid potuit, et hoc facit opponendo[^3]. In *secunda* vero contrarium asserit in solvendo, ibi: *Ad quod dicimus, quod sicut omnia semper* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de modo sive qualitate divinae potentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur principaliter duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus mundum potuerit facere meliorem.

Secundo quaeritur de immutabilitate divinae potentiae, utrum quod semel potest Deus, semper possit.

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum meliorem quoad substantiam partium integrantium.

Secundo, utrum potuerit ipsum facere meliorem quoad partium integrantium proprietates.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum potuerit facere mundum meliorem quantum ad ordinem partium.

Quarto, utrum potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XLIV.

#### *On the power of God in comparison to the mode or quality of things.*

> *"It now remains to be discussed whether [God could have made the world] better,"* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above[^1] the Master treated of [God's] power in comparison to the possible according to *substance* and *quantity*; here, in the third place, he treats of [God's] power as to the *mode* or *quality* of things. And this part has two parts. In the *first* the Master treats of [God's] power as to the quality of possibles, which is indeed [their] greater and lesser goodness. *Second*, as to the quality of the power [itself], which is indeed [its] immutability, there: *"Furthermore it is wont to be asked, whether God"* etc.

The *first* part has two [parts]. In the *first* he asks whether God could have made the world better[^2]. In the *second*, whether the things which he makes he can make in a better mode or in another mode, and this there: *"After these things it must be considered,"* etc., where he treats of the mode. *"Furthermore it is wont to be asked, whether God,"* etc. — this is the *second* part, where he inquires concerning the immutability of the divine power, asking whether God can [do] whatever he could [do], and this part has two [parts]. In the *first* he shows that he cannot [do] whatever he could [do], and this he does by way of objection[^3]. In the *second*, however, he asserts the contrary by way of resolution, there: *"To which we say that just as all things always,"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, [the question] is asked concerning the mode or quality of the divine power. And on this point two [questions] are principally asked.

First it is asked whether God could have made the world better.

Second it is asked concerning the immutability of the divine power: whether what God can [do] once, he can always [do].

Concerning the first, four [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its integrating parts.

Second, whether he could have made it better as to the properties of its integrating parts.

Third it is asked whether he could have made the world better as to the order of its parts.

Fourth, whether he could have made the world more ancient.

---

la: Dist. XLII. et XLIII.

en: Distinctions XLII and XLIII.

la: Vat. *utrum Deus potuerit aliquid melius facere, quam facit.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *utrum Deus potuerit aliquid melius facere, quam facit* ("whether God could have made anything better than he makes [it]").

la: Vat. sic: *In prima quaerit, utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit, et opponit, quod non possit.*

en: The Vatican edition reads thus: *In prima quaerit, utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit, et opponit, quod non possit* ("In the first he asks whether God can always [do] everything which he once could, and objects that he cannot"). ---

translators_notes: Page-foot apparatus on printed p. 780 contains exactly 3 numbered Quaracchi footnotes, all of which anchor inside this divisio body — there is no other content on p. 780 (the *Commentarius in Distinctionem XLIV* opens at the top of this page). [^1] anchors on *Supra* (the body marker is preserved in OCR as `Supra '`); [^2] anchors on *meliorem* in *utrum Deus mundum potuerit facere meliorem* (OCR `meliorem '`); [^3] anchors on *opponendo* (OCR `opponendo ^`). Body-anchor placement confirmed by 500 dpi PNG eyes-on of PDF p. 370 (= printed p. 780). The `audit-apparatus-count.py` heuristic reports raw=5 for this chunk; the regex is picking up two spurious openers in the OCR garble of the body (the `'` and `^` superscript markers inside the body text itself), not three additional footer entries. Ground truth is the printed page footer: 3 entries.


title: Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De possibilitate mundi melioris.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus potuerit mundum facere meliorem quoad substantiam partium integrantium.*

Quod autem potuerit facere mundum meliorem quoad substantiam partium integrantium, ostenditur sic.

1. Partes integrantes mundum sunt finitae bonitatis et intensive et extensive; sed omni finito potest aliquid maius et melius cogitari; sed Deus plus potest facere, quam homo possit intelligere[^1]: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod mundus non potuit amplius capere; hoc non solvit, quia Deus facit capacitatem: ergo maiorem potuit capacitatem dare, cum eius potentia sit infinita.

2. Item, suprema creatura in universo est finita, ergo distat a Deo in infinitum; sed in distantia infinita est ponere gradus infinitos: ergo ultra bonitatem creaturarum est intelligere creaturas gradus bonitatis habentes, et ex his potuit integrari mundus: ergo etc.

3. Item, constat, quod Deus potuit facere mundum ex partibus maioribus mole, ut caelum amplius sive latius et terram latiorem: ergo si potuit facere maius mole, eadem ratione et maius virtute: et si hoc, ergo simpliciter melius.

4. Item, materia secundum se totam capax est formae nobilissimae, ut patet: si ergo Deus dare potuit quod natura materiae potuit capere, ergo potuit dare toti materiae et omnibus partibus perfectionem formae nobilissimae, ut puta rationalis naturae: ergo potuit facere mundum, qui constaret ex solis substantiis rationalibus. Et si hoc, tunc mundus haberet omnes partes secundum substantiam meliores: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus in tertio libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^2]: « Quidquid in vera ratione melius tibi occurrerit, scias fecisse Deum tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem; non esse autem, quod vera ratione cogitas, non potest. Neque enim tu potes aliquid melius in creatura cogitare, quod creaturae artificem fugerit ». Ergo non potest aliqua creatura nobilis cogitari, quae non sit de constitutione mundi.

2. Item, Augustinus duodecimo *Confessionum*[^3]: « Duo fecisti, Domine, unum prope te, aliud prope nihil », scilicet angelicam creaturam et materiam primam; sed non potest maior ambitus cogitari quam a propinquitate Dei ad nihil: ergo non potuit fieri mundus, qui natus esset amplecti plures naturas rerum: ergo non potuit mundus fieri melior quantum ad capacitatem. Sed constat, capacitatem illam non esse vacuam quantum ad aliquem gradum, alioquin nec mundus perfectus esset, nec universum perfectum dici posset: ergo nec iste plus capere, nec alius capacior potuit fieri.

3. Item, materia prima est creata in omnimoda possibilitate et in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris[^4]: ergo si capacitas ipsius materiae attenditur secundum suam possibilitatem et obedientiam, quam habuit ad Deum, et in summa possibilitate et in summa obedientia est creata, ergo mundus quantum ad capacitatem non potuit fieri melior. Si ergo dedit Deus unicuique, quantum capax erat, ergo nullo modo potuit fieri melior.

4. Item, quantumcumque creatura fiat bona, necesse est esse finitam: ergo necesse est aliquando ponere statum, ita quod creatura nullo modo possit fieri melior, in nullo derogando divinae potentiae; sed qua ratione statur in aliqua specie creaturae, statur in suprema specie creaturae spiritualis: nulla igitur creatura vel species potest illa fieri nobilior. Et « si optimum in genere est melius optimo in alio, et simpliciter hoc illo melius[^5] », ergo, si optimum in universo est optimum omnis creaturae,

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quae possit esse creatura, et simpliciter iste est ita bonus, quod eo non potest fieri melior.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Deus potuit facere alium mundum meliorem quoad substantiam partium, sed hunc mundum tantum secundum accidentalia meliorem et maiorem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod excessus bonitatis substantialis in rebus potest attendi dupliciter: quantum ad essentiarum nobilitatem et gradus, et sic dicitur, quod species hominis melior est et nobilior specie asini; aut quantum ad esse, prout concernit additionem sive augmentum, sicut dicitur quod marca[^6] auri melior est uncia, non quia nobiliorem habet formam vel essentiam, sed quia plus habet de auri substantia ac per hoc de bonitate et valore.

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit mundum facere meliorem quantum ad substantiam partium; si tu intelligas de excessu quantum ad primum modum, quod mundus constaret ex melioribus et nobilioribus *essentiis, dico, quod iste mundus*, qui est nunc, non potuit fieri melior, quia non esset iste, sed alius; sicut, si iste qui factus est homo, fuisset factus asinus[^7], non esset ille qui est. Quia tamen posse eius non est arctatum nec limitatum, non video, quare non potuisset mundum facere meliorem hoc genere melioritatis.

Si autem intelligas quantum ad secundum modum, sic dico, quod non solum alium, verum etiam hunc potuit facere meliorem, sicut et maiorem. Et si fecisset, non esset alius; sicut posset facere, quod iste puer esset ita magnus ut gigas, et plus haberet de substantia et virtute, et tamen non esset alius, quam est.

Concedo ergo rationes probantes, quod Deus simpliciter potuit alium mundum quantum ad substantiam partium meliorem, etiam hunc fecisse quantum ad magnitudinem partium et virtutem, non tamen quantum ad essentiarum nobilitatem munclus maiorem. Et hoc vult Augustinus dicere in praemissa auctoritate *de Libero Arbitrio*[^8], quod nulla essentia nobilior potest cogitari esse in hoc mundo rationabiliter, quae non sit ibi. Nam si cogites, meliores esse partes, hoc est aut secundum totum, aut secundum partem: si secundum totum, iam non istum mundum cogitas, sed alium; si secundum partem, tunc ergo tollis ordinem et perfectionem de hoc mundo: ut si cogites, quod Deus fecisset lunam ita lucidam, ut est sol, vel terram sicut caelum, non rationabiliter cogitas, quia perimis universum. « Non enim essent omnia, si essent aequalia[^9] ». Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus *de Libero Arbitrio*: « Non est vera ratio, sed invida infirmitas, cum aliquid melius faciendum fuisse cogitaveris, iam nihil aliud inferius fieri velle, tanquam si, perfecto caelo, nolles terram factam esse, utique omnino inique cogitares ».

Et sic patet, ultimo obiectum ad primam partem[^10] esse sophisticum, pro eo quod hoc non competebat universo, ut materia secundum se totam perfecta esset forma nobilissima.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Augustini *de Libero Arbitrio*, iam patet responsio, quia intelligit de hoc mundo, et de melioritate secundum essentiam, ut patet ex textu[^11].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summa distantia est in universo; dicendum, quod *prope Deum* potest dupliciter intelligi, scilicet quantum

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ad immediatam receptionem et conversionem in Deum, aut quantum ad summam imitationem et assimilationem. Primo modo est natura angelica prope Deum, simpliciter loquendo; sed secundo modo non nisi in *comparatione*, quia magis est dissimilis quam similis, et plus deficit quam exprimit, immo infinitis gradibus distat[^12]; et ideo maior propinquitas est nobis cogitabilis et Deo possibilis, quamvis nunc non sit.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia est creata in omnimoda possibilitate; dicendum, quod possibilitatem obedientiae nulla creatura Deus in complet totaliter, quia hoc est secundum omnimodum imperium Creatoris, sed complet capacitatem et possibilitatem, ut disponitur per aliquas dispositiones. Et sic Deus complet materiam, quia eius capacitatem debitis dispositionibus limitavit et illis formas completivas et perfectivas adiunxit, ita quod nihil dimisit incompletum. Quis tamen audeat dicere, quin Deus nobilius disponere et nobilioribus formis perficere posset, secundum suae sapientiae et potentiae infinitatem? Quod ergo dicitur: *dedit unicuique* bonitatis quantum erat capax; hoc intelligitur de capacitate, non prout dicit longinquam possibilitatem et obedientiam respectu Creatoris, sed prout cum hoc dicit dispositionem et exigentiam; et hanc constans est Deum potuisse maiorem facere.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in creaturis est stare; dicendum, quod sicut nummus semper habet statum in actu, tamen nunquam est dare statum aliquem, ultra quem divina potentia non possit se extendere; sic intelligendum est in magnitudine molis et bonitatis, quod quantumcumque sit in creatura, status est semper, quia finita; et bene agit Deus hucusque, ita quod non agit amplius, sed quin possit amplius, nunquam est dare, ut credo. Et ideo, si alium mundum meliorem hoc fecisset, adhuc erit ultra quaerere, quare non fecit meliorem, cum possit, et sic procedendo ulterius; et ideo talis quaestio est irrationalis, et solutio non potest dari nisi haec, quia voluit, et rationem ipse novit. Attamen si non fecit, nemo potest arguere, quia hoc totum, quod fecit, fuit gratia; nec erat aliqua exigentia, ratione cuius possit poni in eo fuisse invidia.

english:
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### Article I. *On the possibility of a better world.*
### Question I. *Whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its integral parts.*

That he could have made the world better as to the substance of its integral parts is shown thus.

1. The parts that integrate the world are of finite goodness, both intensively and extensively; but for every finite thing something greater and better can be thought of; but God can do more than man can understand[^1]: therefore, etc. If you say that the world could not have received more, this does not solve it, because God makes the capacity: therefore he could have given a greater capacity, since his power is infinite.

2. Likewise, the highest creature in the universe is finite, therefore it is distant from God to infinity; but within an infinite distance one must posit infinite degrees: therefore beyond the goodness of the [existing] creatures one can think of creatures possessing degrees of goodness, and from these the world could have been made whole: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, it is plain that God could have made the world out of parts greater in mass — a wider or broader heaven and a wider earth: therefore if he could make it greater in mass, by the same reasoning [he could make it] greater also in power: and if so, then better, absolutely.

4. Likewise, matter taken as a whole is capable of the most noble form, as is evident: if therefore God could give what the nature of matter could receive, then he could have given to the whole of matter and to all its parts the perfection of the most noble form, namely of rational nature: therefore he could have made a world that would consist of rational substances alone. And if so, then the world would have all its parts better according to substance: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the third book *On Free Will*[^2]: « Whatever in true reason occurs to you as better, know that God has made it as the founder of all goods; but that what you think of in true reason should not exist, is impossible. For neither can you think anything better in a creature than has escaped the creator's notice ». Therefore no noble creature can be thought of which is not of the constitution of the world.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*[^3]: « Two things you made, Lord, one near to you, the other near to nothing », namely the angelic creature and primary matter; but no greater span can be thought of than from God's nearness to nothing: therefore there could not have come to be a world that was apt to embrace more natures of things: therefore the world could not have been made better as to capacity. But it is plain that this capacity is not empty as to any degree, otherwise neither would the world be perfect, nor could the universe be called perfect: therefore neither could this [world] hold more, nor could another be made more capacious.

3. Likewise, primary matter has been created in every kind of possibility and in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator[^4]: therefore if the capacity of matter itself is considered according to its possibility and obedience, which it had toward God, and it is created in supreme possibility and in supreme obedience, then the world as to capacity could not have been made better. If therefore God gave to each thing as much as it was capable of, then in no way could it have been made better.

4. Likewise, however good a creature is made, it must of necessity be finite: therefore a stopping-point must at some time be set, such that a creature can in no way be made better, without derogating in any way from divine power; but on the same ground on which one stops at any species of creature, one stops at the supreme species of spiritual creature: no creature or species therefore can be made nobler than that. And « if the best in a genus is better than the best in another, then absolutely this is better than that[^5] »; therefore, if the best in the universe is the best of every creature

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that can be a creature, then absolutely this [world] is so good that nothing better can come to be than it.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God could have made another world better as to the substance of its parts, but this [present] world only better and greater according to accidentals.

**I respond:** It must be said that an excess of substantial goodness in things can be considered in two ways: as to the nobility and grades of essences — and in this way it is said that the species of man is better and nobler than the species of an ass; or as to being, insofar as it concerns addition or augmentation, as it is said that a mark[^6] of gold is better than an ounce — not because it has a nobler form or essence, but because it has more of the substance of gold and thereby more of its goodness and value.

When therefore it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its parts, if you understand it of an excess in the first mode, [namely] that the world would consist of better and nobler essences, *I say that this world* which now is could not have been made better, because it would not be this [world] but another; just as, if this one who has been made a man had been made an ass[^7], he would not be the one who is. Yet since his power is not narrowed nor limited, I do not see why he could not have made the world better by this kind of betterment.

If however you understand it as to the second mode, then I say that not only another but also this very [world] he could have made better, just as also greater. And if he had done so, it would not be another; just as he could make this child to be as great as a giant, having more of substance and power, and yet not be other than he is.

I therefore concede the arguments proving that God could absolutely have made another world better as to the substance of its parts, and also have made this very [world] greater as to magnitude of parts and as to power, though not as to the nobility of essences. And this is what Augustine wishes to say in the aforementioned authority *On Free Will*[^8], that no nobler essence can rationally be thought of as in this world which is not there. For if you think the parts to be better, this is either according to the whole or according to a part: if according to the whole, then you no longer think of this world but of another; if according to a part, then you destroy the order and perfection of this world: as if you think that God had made the moon as bright as the sun, or earth like heaven, you do not think rationally, because you destroy the universe. « For all things would not be, if they were equal[^9] ». And this is what Augustine says *On Free Will*: « It is not true reason, but envious infirmity, when, having thought that something ought to have been made better, you then want nothing else more lowly to be made, just as if, the heaven being perfect, you should be unwilling for the earth to have been made — in which case you would altogether be thinking unjustly ».

And thus it is clear that the last objection to the first part[^10] is sophistical, on the ground that this did not belong to the universe, that matter taken as a whole should be perfected by the most noble form.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of Augustine *On Free Will*, the response is already clear, because he understands it of this world, and of betterment according to essence, as is plain from the text[^11].

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that there is the greatest distance in the universe; it must be said that *near to God* can be understood in two ways, namely as to

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immediate reception and conversion into God, or as to supreme imitation and assimilation. In the first way the angelic nature is near to God, absolutely speaking; but in the second way only by *comparison*, because it is more unlike than like, and falls short more than it expresses — indeed it is distant by infinite grades[^12]; and therefore a greater nearness is thinkable by us and possible for God, although it is not at present.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that matter is created in every possibility; it must be said that no creature does God fully complete as to the possibility of obedience, because that belongs to the all-encompassing dominion of the Creator, but he completes its capacity and possibility, as it is disposed by certain dispositions. And thus God completes matter, because he has limited its capacity by due dispositions, and to those [dispositions] he has joined completive and perfective forms, so that he has left nothing incomplete. Yet who would dare to say that God could not dispose more nobly and perfect by nobler forms, according to the infinity of his wisdom and power? When therefore it is said: *he gave to each* as much goodness as it was capable of — this is understood of the capacity, not as it expresses remote possibility and obedience with respect to the Creator, but as together with this it expresses disposition and exigency; and this disposition God could certainly have made greater.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that in creatures there must be a stopping-point; it must be said that, just as a coin always has a stopping-point in act, yet there is never given any stopping-point beyond which the divine power could not extend itself; so it must be understood in magnitude of mass and of goodness — that, however much it be in a creature, there is always a stopping-point, because it is finite; and God acts well thus far, so that he does not act further — but that he could not act further, this is never to be granted, as I believe. And therefore, if he had made another world better than this one, it would still remain further to ask why he did not make a still better one, since he can; and so on indefinitely; and therefore such a question is irrational, and no solution can be given except this: that he willed, and he himself knows the reason. Yet even if he did not make it, no one can argue [against him], because this whole that he made was grace; nor was there any exigency by reason of which envy could be supposed to have been in him.

la: Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 3. arg. 1. pro parte affirmativa.

en: Cf. above, d. 42, q. 3, arg. 1, on the affirmative side.

la: Cap. 5. n. 13. In textu Augustini hic plures propositiones omissae sunt; ipse bene illustratur infra in corp. quaest. his verbis: quod nulla essentia nobilior potest cogitari esse in hoc mundo rationabiliter [sive, ut in ipso textu habetur, vera ratione], quae non sit ibi.

en: Chapter 5, n. 13. In Augustine's text several propositions have here been omitted; he is well illustrated below in the body of the question by these words: that no nobler essence can rationally be thought of as existing in this world [or, as the very text has it, by true reason], which is not there.

la: Cap. 7. n. 7. — Paulo inferius post *ambitus* in cod. Q (in marg.) additur *vel distantia*.

en: Chapter 7, n. 7. — A little below, after *ambitus* ("span"), codex Q adds in the margin *or distance*.

la: Sive in perfecta potentia tum passiva tum obedientiali relate ad Creatorem. — Paulo inferius pro *non potuit* ed. 1. *nec potuit*.

en: Or: in perfect potency, both passive and obediential, with regard to the Creator. — A little below, for *non potuit* edition 1 has *nec potuit*.

la: Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 2, de eligibilioribus agens ait: « Amplius si hoc simpliciter illo melius, etiam omnino optimum eorum quae in hoc melius eo quod in altero optimum; ut si melior est homo quam equus, etiam optimus homo optimo equo melior. Et si optimum optimo melius, etiam simpliciter hoc illo melius: ut si optimus homo optimo equo melior, et simpliciter homo simpliciter equo melior ». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: quia quod simpliciter praestantius est alia re, quod in hoc illo genere est primum nobilitate, nobilius est primo secundum nobilitatem in altero genere, v. g. si homo sit simpliciter nobilior equo, id quod est primum secundum hominum nobilitatem, praestantius est secundum nobilitatem ipso equo. Et econtra, si primum nobilitate in hoc genere fuerit nobilius primo alterius generis, hoc itaque genus est nobilius illo altero genere. — Pro *in genere* Vat. *in uno genere*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III c. 2, treating of preferable things, says: « Further, if this is absolutely better than that, then also the best of those that are in the former is better than the best of those that are in the latter; as if man is better than horse, then also the best man is better than the best horse. And if the best is better than the best, then absolutely this is better than that: as if the best man is better than the best horse, then absolutely man is better than horse ». Averroes expounds these words thus: because that which is absolutely more excellent than another thing, [namely] that which in its genus is first in nobility, is nobler than what is first by nobility in another genus — for example, if man is absolutely nobler than horse, that which is first by the nobility of men is more excellent in nobility than the horse itself. And on the contrary, if what is first by nobility in this genus is nobler than what is first in another genus, then this genus is nobler than that other genus. — For *in genere* the Vatican [edition has] *in uno genere*.

la: *Marca*, ut explanat Du Cange in *Gloss. mediae et infimae latinitatis*, est pondus, quod appendit bessem librae regiae, qua negotiatores et pigmentarii et alii utuntur, omnesque omnino, qui appensas merces venditant... Apud nos igitur *Marca* duplicata libram efficit, quae dividitur in 16 uncias; uncia vero subdividitur in 8 drachmas vel 24 scrupulos seu denarios etc. — Paulo ante pro *sicut* cod. M *ut cum*, Vat. *sic*.

en: *Marca* (a mark), as Du Cange explains in his *Glossary of Middle and Low Latin*, is a weight equal to two-thirds of the royal pound, used by traders, perfumers, and others — by all, in short, who sell wares by weight... Among us, then, a doubled *Marca* makes up a pound, which is divided into 16 ounces; an ounce in turn is subdivided into 8 drachms or 24 scruples or pence, etc. — A little above, for *sicut* codex M reads *ut cum*, the Vatican [reads] *sic*.

la: Pro *asinus* Vat. et ed. 1 *Angelus*, omnibus codd. contradicentibus. Paulo superius Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *melioribus et*, et paulo inferius verbo *mundum* praemittit *alium*, nonnullis codd. suffragantibus.

en: For *asinus* (ass) the Vatican edition and ed. 1 have *Angelus* (Angel), against all the manuscripts. A little above, the Vatican edition together with codex cc omits *melioribus et*, and a little below it prefixes *alium* to the word *mundum*, with several codices in support.

la: Vide hic 1. arg. ad opposit.

en: See here argument 1 on the opposite side.

la: August., libr. 83 *Qq.* q. 41. — Textus sequens habetur loc. cit. c. 8. n. 13, ubi tamen in originali ultimum verbum *cogitares* desideratur.

en: Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 41. — The following text is found at the same place, c. 8, n. 13, where however in the original the final word *cogitares* is missing.

la: Scilicet in fundam.

en: Namely, [the last argument] in the *fundamenta*.

la: Paulo ante in fine corp. quaest. allato. — Pro *textu* ed. 1 *contextu*.

en: A little above, [in the text] cited at the end of the body of the question. — For *textu* edition 1 has *contextu*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 38. q. 1. ad 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 38, q. 1, ad 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Seraphicus de perfectione divinorum operum (sive mundi) sub distinctis quaestionibus prae ceteris antiquis Scholasticis accurate disputat. Cum autem universae creaturae quoddam totum, ex partibus integrantibus constitutum, sive, quendam, ut dicunt, organismum exhibeant, respici potest tum ad bonitatem partium in se sive absolutam, tum ad earum bonitatem quoad ordinem in finem sive respectivam; quae distinctio explicatur hic dub. 2. et q. 2. De bonitate absoluta (quam vocat S. Doctor « melius simpliciter ») praecipue agitur in qq. 1. 2; de bonitate in ordine ad finem in q. 3.

**II.** Mundum non posse fieri meliorem ex parte causae efficientis, exemplaris et finalis nec ex parte modi agendi manifestum est, et probatur ab Alexandro Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 2, et a S. Thom., S. I. q. 25. a. 6. ad 1. Sed dubitatur, utrum ipse mundus, in se spectatus, possit esse melior; et haec quaestio secundum S. Doctorem (hic in corp.) potest vel intelligi de eodem hoc mundo, vel de alio possibili et a Deo creabili. Et iterum intelligi potest vocabulum *melius* quoad perfectionem partium mundi vel essentialem, vel accidentalem. His factis distinctionibus, cum sententia communi eliditur systema Optimismi, quod defendit inter alios Leibnitius. — Argumentum autem 1. in fundam. ab ipso S. Bonaventura notatur ut sophisticum. — In solutione ad 4. negatur, aliquam creaturam habere posse ultimum gradum perfectionis, ita ut sit in ea status, ultra quem non possit esse maior perfectio. Consentiunt S. Thom. (loc. cit.) aliique. Aliter sentiunt Scotus (III. Sent. d. 13. q. 1.), Durand. (hic q. 2, et d. 43. q. 1.) et, ut videtur, Henr. Gand. (Quodlib. 5. q. 22.). Plura de hac re, speciatim de perfectione Christi et B. Virginis Mariae, vide hic dub. 3 et supra d. 17. p. II. q. 4.

**III.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1-7. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 25. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 3. a. 1. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. 4. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The Seraphic Doctor disputes accurately concerning the perfection of the divine works (or of the world), under distinct questions, ahead of the other ancient Scholastics. Since, however, the totality of creatures presents a certain whole, constituted of integral parts — or, as they say, a certain organism — it can be considered both as to the goodness of the parts in themselves or absolute, and as to their goodness in respect of order toward the end or relative; which distinction is explained here in dub. 2 and q. 2. The absolute goodness (which the holy Doctor calls « better absolutely ») is treated chiefly in qq. 1 and 2; the goodness in order toward the end in q. 3.

**II.** That the world cannot be made better on the side of the efficient, exemplary, and final cause, nor on the side of the mode of acting, is manifest, and is proved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 21 m. 3 a. 2, and by St. Thomas, *Summa* I q. 25 a. 6 ad 1. But it is disputed whether the world itself, considered in itself, can be better; and this question, according to the holy Doctor (here in the body), can be understood either of this same world, or of another that is possible and creatable by God. And again the term *better* can be understood as to the perfection of the parts of the world, either essential or accidental. With these distinctions drawn, the system of Optimism — which Leibniz among others defends — is dismissed in line with the common opinion. — And argument 1 in the *fundamenta* is noted by St. Bonaventure himself as sophistical. — In the reply to objection 4 it is denied that any creature can have an ultimate degree of perfection such that there is in it a stopping-point beyond which there cannot be a greater perfection. With this agree St. Thomas (loc. cit.) and others. Otherwise think Scotus (III *Sent.* d. 13 q. 1), Durand. (here q. 2, and d. 43 q. 1) and, as it seems, Henry of Ghent (*Quodlib.* 5 q. 22). For more on this matter, especially concerning the perfection of Christ and of the Blessed Virgin Mary, see here dub. 3 and above d. 17 p. II q. 4.

**III.** Alex. Hal., on this and the following qq., *Summa* p. I q. 21 m. 3 a. 1–7. — Scot., on this and the following q., *Report.* here q. 2. — S. Thom., on this and the following qq., here q. 1 aa. 1, 2, 3; *Summa* I q. 25 a. 6. — B. Albert, on this and the following q., here a. 2; *Summa* p. I tr. 19 q. 77 m. 3 aa. 1, 2, 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., on this and the following qq., here q. 1, 4, 5. — Aegid. R., here 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., here qq. 1, 2. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following qq., here qq. 1, 2. — Biel, on this and the following q., here q. unica.

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