title: Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit nominabilis.
Whether God is nameable

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *De nominibus divinis.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum Deus sit nominabilis.*

Circa primum, quod Deus sit innominabilis, ostenditur auctoritatibus et rationibus. Auctoritatibus sic:

1. Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*[^1]: «Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est». Et iterum: «Dei neque nomen est neque verbum neque ratio neque opinio neque phantasia»: ergo Deus est omnino innominabilis.

2. Item, Philosophus in libro *de Causis*[^2]: «Prima causa superior est omni narratione»; sed quod est superius omni narratione est inenarrabile, et omne tale innominabile: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: nomen proportionem et similitudinem aliquam habet ad nominatum, ut vox ad significatum; sed Deus est infinitus omnino, vox autem omnis finita: ergo cum nulla sit proportio[^3], nulla per vocem erit expressio: ergo nec nominatio.

4. Item, omne nomen imponitur a forma aliqua[^4]; sed in Deo non est ponere certam formam; unde Augustinus[^5]: «Deus, qui omnem formam subterfugit, intellectui pervius esse non potest»: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate[^6]; sed in Deo est substantia mera sine quantitate et qualitate: ergo non contingit Deum significare per nomen.

6. Item, quod nec[^7] per pronomen. Pronomen enim non habet significationem determinatam nisi per demonstrationem vel relationem[^8]. Demonstratio autem fit mediantibus accidentibus, quae possunt oculis conspici; sed haec non sunt in Deo: ergo videtur, quod Dei neque sit nomen, neque pronomen.

**Contra:**

1. In Psalmo[^9]: *Dominus nomen illi.* Et iterum[^10]: *Quam admirabile est nomen tuum in universa terra*: ergo Deus habet nomen.

2. Item, Dionysius fecit librum *de divinis nominibus*: aut ergo Deus est nominabilis, aut scientia ibi tradita cassa[^11] est et inutilis.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne quod se exprimit verbo, potest se exprimere signo verbi; sed signum verbi est vox[^12]: ergo cum Deus se suo verbo exprimat, potest exprimi voce; sed quod potest voce exprimi, potest nominari: ergo etc.

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4. Item, quod contingit intelligere contingit significare sive enuntiare; sed contingit Deum a nobis cognosci; hoc certum est et supra probatum[^13]: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod contingit laudare contingit et nominare; sed Deum contingit laudare, immo ipse est[^14] summe laudabilis: ergo et nominabilis.

> **Conclusio.** *Deus est nominabilis, sicut est intelligibilis, non quidem perfecte, sed imperfecte.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut intelligere dicitur dupliciter, sic[^15] effabile et nominabile. Uno enim modo intelligere dicitur per perfectam comprehensionem; alio modo per semiplenam cognitionem. Sic[^16] effabile dupliciter dicitur: uno modo per perfectam expressionem, alio modo per semiplenam narrationem. Sic etiam nominabile.

Si dicatur effabile sive nominabile secundum perfectionem expressionis, sic dicendum, quod sicut Deus sibi soli est intelligibilis, sic sibi soli est effabilis et nominabilis, non[^17] alio nomine, quam ipse sit, nec alio verbo, quam ipse sit; et sicut nobis est incomprehensibilis, ita et ineffabilis, ita etiam et innominabilis; et per hunc modum loquitur Dionysius et Philosophus.

Si vero dicatur effabile et nominabile secundum qualemcumque narrationem[^18], sic, quemadmodum Deus est nobis cognoscibilis, ita et effabilis et nominabilis; et qui melius cognoscit melius effatur et melius nominat et expressius. Unde expressius nominat fidelis quam infidelis[^19], et scriptura, quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura, quam ratio vel philosophia. Et hoc modo procedunt rationes et auctoritates ad secundam partem.

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod[^20] obiicitur de Dionysio et Philosopho, iam patet responsio per hoc quod loquuntur de nominatione, in qua est perfecta expressio.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vox in nomine[^21] est proportionabilis verbo interiori sive significato; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de nominatione, quae totam rei significationem includit; aliter non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur esse proportio ad rem sub ratione cognoscibilis; et sic potest esse nominabilis. Quamvis enim Deus sit infinitus, tamen finite cognoscitur a nobis.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non habet formam; dicendum, quod non habet formam perviam nostro intellectui, cuiusmodi est forma, cuius est[^22] imago in sensu; habet tamen formam, quia ipse est forma, quae est ratio cognoscendi, quam[^23] etsi nos non cognoscimus in se, ipse cognoscit se in se, et nos eum in forma creata. Unde a forma creata nos nomina imponimus, quam intelligimus et videmus.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nomen significat substantiam et qualitatem; dicendum, quod substantia et qualitas non accipiuntur ibi[^24] proprie, sed communiter; substantia dicitur *quod cognoscitur*, qualitas dicitur *quo cognoscitur*[^25], et hoc per modum quietis; et hoc dico propter verbum et participium et adverbium, quod est dispositio verbi. Et quoniam in creaturis, ut plurimum differt quod cognoscitur et quo, ideo nomen in creaturis ut plurimum haec[^26] importat per diversitatem. In Deo vero idem est cognitum et ratio cognoscendi quantum est de se: ideo significat nomen divinum illa duo per indifferentiam secundum rem; et ita salvatur ibi ratio substantiae et qualitatis, ut congruit nomini[^27].

english:
### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *On the divine names.*

### Question I. *Whether God is nameable.*

Concerning the first [point], that God is unnameable, is shown from authorities and reasons. From authorities thus:

1. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^1]: «Of God it is possible neither to speak nor to understand». And again: «Of God there is neither name nor word nor account nor opinion nor phantasm»: therefore God is altogether unnameable.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book *On Causes*[^2]: «The first cause is above all narration»; but what is above all narration is unnarratable, and everything such is unnameable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: a name has some proportion and likeness to the thing named, as the voice [has] to what is signified; but God is altogether infinite, while every voice is finite: therefore since there is no proportion[^3], there will be no expression by voice: therefore neither naming.

4. Likewise, every name is imposed from some form[^4]; but in God there is no positing of a determinate form; whence Augustine[^5]: «God, who escapes every form, cannot be accessible to the intellect»: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every name signifies substance with quality[^6]; but in God there is pure substance without quantity and quality: therefore it does not happen that God is signified by a name.

6. Likewise, that neither[^7] [is He signified] by a pronoun. For a pronoun has no determinate signification except by demonstration or relation[^8]. But demonstration takes place by means of accidents which can be looked upon by the eyes; but these are not in God: therefore it seems that of God there is neither a name nor a pronoun.

**On the contrary:**

1. In the Psalm[^9]: *The Lord is His name.* And again[^10]: *How admirable is Your name in the whole earth*: therefore God has a name.

2. Likewise, Dionysius made a book *On the Divine Names*: therefore either God is nameable, or the science there handed down is empty[^11] and useless.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears: since everything that expresses itself by a word can express itself by a sign of the word; but the sign of the word is the voice[^12]: therefore since God expresses Himself by His own Word, He can be expressed by voice; but what can be expressed by voice can be named: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, what it is possible to understand it is possible to signify or enounce; but it is possible for God to be known by us — this is certain and proved above[^13]: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, what it is possible to praise it is also possible to name; but it is possible to praise God — nay, He Himself is[^14] supremely praiseworthy: therefore also nameable.

> **Conclusion.** *God is nameable, just as He is intelligible, not indeed perfectly, but imperfectly.*

**I respond:** It must be said that just as "to understand" is said in two ways, so [is] "speakable" and "nameable"[^15]. For in one way "to understand" is said by perfect comprehension; in another way by half-full cognition. So[^16] "speakable" is said in two ways: in one way by perfect expression, in another way by half-full narration. So also "nameable."

If [something] is called speakable or nameable according to perfection of expression, then it must be said that just as God alone is intelligible to Himself, so He alone is speakable and nameable to Himself, not[^17] by another name than He Himself is, nor by another word than He Himself is; and just as He is incomprehensible to us, so also ineffable, so also unnameable; and in this way Dionysius and the Philosopher speak.

If, however, [it] is called speakable and nameable according to any narration whatever[^18], then, just as God is knowable to us, so also speakable and nameable; and he who knows better speaks better and names better and more expressly. Whence the believer names more expressly than the unbeliever[^19], and Scripture, which supports faith, such as Sacred Scripture, [more so] than reason or philosophy. And in this way the reasons and authorities for the second part proceed.

*To 1, 2.* To that, then, which[^20] is objected from Dionysius and the Philosopher, the response is already plain by the fact that they speak of [that] naming in which there is perfect expression.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the voice in the name[^21] is proportionable to the interior word or to what is signified; it must be said that this is understood of [that] naming which includes the whole signification of the thing; otherwise it has no truth, unless it be understood that there is a proportion to the thing under the aspect of the knowable; and thus it can be nameable. For although God is infinite, yet He is known finitely by us.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that God does not have form; it must be said that He does not have a form accessible to our intellect, of the kind which is the form whose[^22] image [is] in sense; yet He has form, since He Himself is the form which is the ground of knowing, which[^23], although we do not know it in itself, He Himself knows Himself in Himself, and we [know] Him in a created form. Whence from a created form we impose names — [the form] which we understand and see.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a name signifies *substance* and *quality*; it must be said that *substance* and *quality* are not taken there[^24] properly, but commonly; *substance* is called *that which is known*, *quality* is called *that by which it is known*[^25], and this in the manner of rest; and I say this on account of the verb and the participle and the adverb, which is a disposition of the verb. And since in creatures, for the most part, *that which is known* and *that by which* differ, therefore a name in creatures, for the most part, imports these two[^26] through diversity. But in God *the known* and *the ground of knowing* are the same, as far as concerns Himself: therefore the divine name signifies those two with indifference as to the thing; and so the character of substance and of quality is preserved there, as befits a name[^27].

la: Cap. I. circa med. Cfr. supra pag. 67. nota 6. — Verba, quae immediate post ex Dionysio allegantur, reperies loc. cit., ac juxta translationem Scoti Erigenae sic exhibentur: *Et neque sensus eius est, neque phantasia, neque opinio, neque nomen, neque verbum, neque tactus, neque scientia.*

en: Chapter I, near the middle. Cf. above page 67, note 6. — The words which are immediately afterwards alleged from Dionysius you will find in the place cited, and according to the translation of Scotus Eriugena are presented thus: *And there is neither sense of Him, nor phantasy, nor opinion, nor name, nor word, nor touch, nor knowledge.*

la: Prop. 6.

en: Proposition 6.

la: Nempe inter vocem et Deum. Vat. incongrue et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. I addit *finiti ad infinitum*. — De maiori huius argumenti vide Boethium in prima et secunda editione super I. *Periherm.* c. I, ubi inter alia dicit: *Omnis vox animi sensa significat, quare ex animi intellectibus quidquid evenerit vocibus indicatur. Ergo nunc hoc dicit (Aristoteles): Similitudo est, inquit, quaedam inter se intellectuum atque vocum; quemadmodum enim sunt quaedam simplicia, quae ratione animi concipiuntur et constituuntur intelligentia mentis, in quibus neque veritas ulla neque falsitas invenitur, ita quoque in vocibus est.*

en: Namely, between voice and God. The Vatican [edition], incongruously and against the older codices and ed. I, adds *finiti ad infinitum* ("of the finite to the infinite"). — On the major [premise] of this argument, see Boethius in the first and second editions on book I of the *Peri Hermeneias*, c. I, where among other things he says: *Every voice signifies the perceptions of the mind, wherefore from the understandings of the mind whatever has come about is indicated by voices. Therefore now [Aristotle] says this: There is, he says, a certain likeness among themselves of understandings and voices; for just as there are certain simple things which are conceived by reason of the mind and constituted by the intelligence of the mind, in which neither any truth nor falsity is found, so also is it in voices.*

la: Alanus ab Insulis, *Theolog. regulae*, reg. 17, ait: *Cum omne nomen secundum primam institutionem datum sit a proprietate sive a forma*, unde Boethius ait: *Rebus ex materia formaque constantibus solus humanus animus exstitit, qui prout voluit, nomina rebus impressit* etc.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 17, says: *Since every name, according to its first institution, is given from a property or from a form*, whence Boethius says: *Of things consisting of matter and form, the human mind alone has stood out, which, as it willed, has imposed names on things,* etc.

la: Cfr. *Serm.* 117. de verbis Evang. Ioan. 1: *In principio erat Verbum* etc., c. 2, n. 3: *Ineffabiliter potest intelligi, non verbis hominis fit, ut intelligatur. Verbum Dei tractamus et dicimus, quare non intelligatur. Non nunc dicimus, ut intelligatur, sed dicimus quid impediat, ne intelligatur. Est enim forma quaedam, forma non formata, sed forma omnium formatorum; forma incommutabilis, sine lapsu, sine defectu, sine tempore, sine loco, superans omnia, existens omnibus et fundamentum quoddam in quo sint, et fastigium sub quo sint... Dicimus, quam incomprehensibile sit quod lectum est; tamen lectum est, non ut comprehenderetur ab homine, sed ut doleret homo, quia non comprehendit... Ergo est forma omnium rerum, forma infabricata, sine tempore, ut diximus, et sine spatiis locorum. Quidquid enim loco capitur, circumscribitur. Forma circumscribitur finibus, habet metas, unde et quousque sit. Deinde quod loco capitur et mole quadam et spatio distenditur, minus est in parte, quam in toto. Faciat Deus, ut intelligatis.*

en: Cf. *Sermon* 117, on the words of the Gospel of John 1: *In the beginning was the Word* etc., c. 2, n. 3: *Ineffably can He be understood; it does not come about by the words of man that He is understood. We treat and speak of the Word of God, [explaining] why He is not understood. We do not now speak so that He may be understood, but we speak [of] what prevents His being understood. For He is a certain form, a form not formed, but the form of all formed things; an unchangeable form, without lapse, without defect, without time, without place, surpassing all things, existing to all things and a certain foundation in which they are, and a summit under which they are... We say how incomprehensible is what has been read; yet it has been read, not that it might be comprehended by man, but that man might grieve because he does not comprehend... Therefore He is the form of all things, an unfabricated form, without time, as we have said, and without the spaces of places. For whatever is contained by place is circumscribed. A form is circumscribed by limits, has bounds whence and how far it extends. Furthermore, what is contained by place and is extended by some bulk and space is less in a part than in the whole. May God grant that you understand.*

la: Priscian., II. *Grammat.* c. 5, ait de nomine: *Nomen quasi notamen, quod hoc nomine notamus uniuscuiusque substantiae qualitatem.* Plura de hoc vide apud Scotum, *Grammat. speculativa* c. 8. — Mox in cod. Z omittitur *quantitate et*. In fine argumenti ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *significare* pro *significari*.

en: Priscian, II *Grammar* c. 5, says of the name: *Nomen* [is] as if *notamen*, since by this *nomen* we mark (*notamus*) the quality of each substance. See more on this in Scotus, *Speculative Grammar* c. 8. — Soon after, in cod. Z *quantitate et* is omitted. At the end of the argument, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *significare* for *significari*.

la: Supple: *contingit Deum significare*, vel etiam cum Vat. *Deus sit nominabilis*, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. I.

en: Supply: *it happens that God is signified*, or also with the Vatican [edition] *that God is nameable*, which however is absent from the manuscripts and ed. I.

la: Respicitur divisio pronominum, scil. in *demonstrativa* et *relativa*; quae iuxta Priscianum, XII. *Grammat.* c. 1, in eo differunt, *quod demonstratio interrogationi reddita primam cognitionem ostendit. Quis fecit? ego. Relatio vero secundam cognitionem significat, ut* is, *de quo iam dixi.* Cfr. Scotus, *Grammat. speculativa* c. 22.

en: [The] division of pronouns is referred to, namely into *demonstrative* and *relative*; which according to Priscian, XII *Grammar* c. 1, differ in this, *that demonstration given in answer to a question shows the first cognition. Who did [it]? I. But relation signifies a second cognition, as* is *("he"), of whom I have already spoken.* Cf. Scotus, *Speculative Grammar* c. 22.

la: Psalm. 8, 2.

en: Psalm 8:2.

la: Cod. KV *superflua*.

en: Cod. KV [reads] *superflua* ("superfluous").

la: Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 1: *Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, notae.* — Mox post *Deus* Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. I omittit *se*, deinde post *verbo exprimatur* loco *exprimat*.

en: Aristotle, I *Peri Hermeneias* c. 1: *Therefore those things which are in the voice are notes of the affections which are in the soul.* — Soon after *Deus*, the Vatican [edition], against the older manuscripts and ed. I, omits *se*, then after *verbo* [reads] *exprimatur* in place of *exprimat*.

la: Dist. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1. — Postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus paulo supra verba activa *intelligere, significare, enuntiare* pro passivis *intelligi* etc. Dein cod. Y *et supra* loco *et supra*.

en: Distinction 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1. — On the demand of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted a little above the active verbs *intelligere, significare, enuntiare* ("to understand, to signify, to enounce") for the passives *intelligi* etc. Then cod. Y [reads] *et supra* in place of *et supra*.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. I supplevimus *est*.

en: From very many manuscripts and ed. I we have supplied *est* ("is").

la: Ed. 1 addit *et*.

en: Ed. 1 adds *et* ("and").

la: Pauci codd. ut PQX *Similiter* loco *Sic*.

en: A few codices such as PQX [read] *Similiter* ("likewise") in place of *Sic* ("so").

la: In cod. V particulae *non* praefigitur *et*.

en: In cod. V *et* is prefixed to the particle *non*.

la: Restituimus lectionem antiquiorum mss. et ed. I, ponendo *narrationem* pro *nominationem*, quae lectio et divisioni paulo supra allatae respondet. Mox post *effabilis* cod. Z et ed. 1 repetunt *ita*.

en: We have restored the reading of the older manuscripts and ed. I, putting *narrationem* ("narration") in place of *nominationem* ("naming"), which reading also corresponds to the division adduced a little above. Soon after *effabilis*, cod. Z and ed. 1 repeat *ita*.

la: Sequimur codd. T et bb, dum ceteri codd. cum edd. omittunt *quam, infidelis*, et Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice substituit insuper *fides* loco *fidelis*. Lectionem codd. T et bb praeferimus, tum quia regulis grammaticae conformior est, tum quia indirecte auctoritate fere omnium mss. et sex primarum edd. ponentium *fidelis* comprobatur. Dein in paucis mss. ut SV omittuntur verba *quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura*.

en: We follow codices T and bb, while the other codices with the editions omit *quam, infidelis* ("than the unbeliever"), and the Vatican [edition], with only one or another codex, substitutes moreover *fides* ("faith") in place of *fidelis* ("the believer"). We prefer the reading of codices T and bb, both because it is more conformable to the rules of grammar, and because it is indirectly confirmed by the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and the first six editions which place *fidelis*. Then in a few manuscripts such as SV the words *quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura* ("which supports faith, such as Sacred Scripture") are omitted.

la: In plurimis codd. (exc. Y) et Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 indebite hic additur *secundo*, et paulo infra Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et sex primas edd. incongrue ponit *loquitur* pro *loquuntur*.

en: In very many codices (except Y) and the Vatican [edition] with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, *secundo* ("secondly") is unduly added here, and a little below the Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and the first six editions, incongruously places *loquitur* in place of *loquuntur*.

la: Lectio Vat. et cod. cc *homine* pro *nomine* est contra ea quae in obiectione ipsa afferuntur et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.

en: The reading of the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc *homine* ("man") in place of *nomine* ("name") is against those things which are adduced in the objection itself and against the older codices and ed. 1.

la: Plures codd. ut GHIM Z etc. cum ed. 1 adiiciunt *aliqua*.

en: Several codices such as GHIM Z etc. with ed. 1 add *aliqua* ("some").

la: Ex fere omnibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quam* pro minus congruo *quoniam*. Mox cod. V *cognoscamus* loco *cognoscimus*, et paulo infra post *Unde* in codd. Y additur *et*.

en: From nearly all the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *quam* ("which") for the less fitting *quoniam* ("since"). Soon after, cod. V [reads] *cognoscamus* in place of *cognoscimus*, and a little below, after *Unde*, in codd. Y *et* is added.

la: Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *ibi*, quod tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo supra cod. W *cum qualitate* loco *et qualitatem*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and cod. cc omit *ibi* ("there"), which however is had in other manuscripts and ed. 1. A little above, cod. W [reads] *cum qualitate* in place of *et qualitatem*.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. I. ad ult. idem his verbis exprimit: «*Non enim substantia et qualitas, cum dicitur:* nomen significat substantiam *etc., distinguunt sicut in praedicamentis, sed* substantia *dicitur ipsum signatum nominis,* qualitas *illud idem, in quantum capabile est ab intellectu*». Aliis verbis: substantia et qualitas hic non accipiuntur, in quantum sunt praedicamenta seu res aliquae, sed secundum modum significandi; in quantum scil. *substantia* significat illud, cui nomen imponitur, *qualitas* vero illud, a quo imponitur, seu respectum, sub quo imponitur. — Paulo ante fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *prout*, quod Vat. post *communiter* addit. Mox post *verbum* in pluribus mss. et ed. 1 deest particula *et*.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 48, m. I, ad ult., expresses the same in these words: «*For substance and quality, when it is said:* a name signifies a substance *etc., do not distinguish as in the categories, but* substance *is called the very thing signified by the name,* quality *the same thing insofar as it is graspable by the intellect*». In other words: substance and quality are not taken here insofar as they are categories or some realities, but according to the mode of signifying; insofar, namely, as *substance* signifies that on which the name is imposed, [and] *quality* that from which it is imposed, that is, the respect under which it is imposed. — A little before, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged *prout*, which the Vatican [edition] adds after *communiter*. Soon after *verbum*, in several manuscripts and ed. 1, the particle *et* is missing.

la: Vat. cum pluribus mss. minus bene *hoc*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with several manuscripts [reads], less well, *hoc* ("this").

la: Ad ultimam obiectionem, quae est de pronomine, non est explicite data solutio; quia sufficienter in praedictis continetur. — Paulo ante praestamus lectionem planiorem, quae est et lectio maioris numeri codd. et ed. 1, ponendo *secundum rem* pro *rei*, quod Vat. cum paucis mss. habet; alii demum omittunt vel *secundum* vel *secundum rem*.

en: To the last objection, which is concerning the pronoun, no solution is explicitly given; since it is sufficiently contained in what has been said. — A little before, we have offered the plainer reading, which is also the reading of the greater number of codices and ed. 1, putting *secundum rem* ("according to the thing") in place of *rei* ("of the thing"), which the Vatican [edition] with a few manuscripts has; others, finally, omit either *secundum* or *secundum rem*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Distinctio et duae conclusiones in corp. positae per se sunt manifestae. — In solut. ad 1. conceditur, aliquam proportionem esse inter vocem et rem nominatam, sed tantum quatenus cognoscibilis est. Infinitus autem Deus tantum finite a nobis est cognoscibilis. Huic finitae cognitioni proportionabile potest esse etiam *nomen positum*, «loquendo de proportione, quae est inter aliqua duo sub ratione, qua unum est signum et aliud signatum». Ita Richard. a Med., hic q. I. ad 3. — Notanda est sententia in solut. ad 3, quod nos Deum cognoscimus «in forma creata; unde a forma creata nos nomina imponimus, quam intelligimus et videmus»; de quo cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2. Addit Alex. Hal. (loc. infr. cit.), quod a creaturis secundum Ioan. Damascenum tribus modis nomina imponimus, scil. «*imaginibus* et *formis* et *notis*. *Notis* nominatur Deus privationibus, cum dicitur immensus Deus, infinitus, incircumscriptibilis; *imaginibus*, cum nominatur dispositionibus spiritualium creaturarum, ut cum dicitur spiritus, sapiens, intelligens; *formis*, cum nominatur similitudinibus corporalium creaturarum, ut cum dicitur leo, ignis et huiusmodi».

**II.** Solut. ad 6. 7.[?] in eodem sensu magis explicatur a S. Thom. (S. I. q. 13. a. 1. ad 3.), et ab Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. ad ult.), qui verba ob brevitatem subobscura: «Et hoc dico propter verbum et participium et adverbium, quod est dispositio verbi», sic explanat: «Licet verbum et participium significent cum tempore, nihilominus tamen Deus quodammodo notificabilis est, non quia ipse cadit sub tempore, sed quia iuxta possibilitatem intellectus nostri, qui intelligit cum motu et tempore, intelligimus et significamus. Unde et hoc verbum *est*, dictum de Deo, non significat cum motu et tempore. Unde Augustinus super illud Ioan. 1: *In principio erat Verbum*, dicit: Verbum substantivum (nempe *est*) duplicem habet significationem: aliquando enim temporales motus secundum analogiam aliorum verborum declarat; aliquando substantiam uniuscuiusque rei, de qua praedicatur, sine ullo temporali motu designat; ideo et substantivum vocatur. Tale est quod dicitur: *In principio erat Verbum*» etc. — Cfr. etiam hic dub. 3.

**III.** Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq. hic q. I. 2; Report. hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1; S. I. q. 13. a. 1. — B. Albert., I. *Sent.* d. 2. a. 16; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 16. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. I. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. I. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 73. q. I. — Durand., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. hic q. unic.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The distinction and the two conclusions placed in the body are by themselves manifest. — In the solution to [objection] 1 it is conceded that there is some proportion between the voice and the thing named, but only insofar as it is knowable. Now infinite God is knowable by us only finitely. Proportionable to this finite cognition can also be a *name imposed*, «speaking of proportion which is between any two things under the aspect by which one is sign and the other thing signified». So Richard of Mediavilla, here q. I, ad 3. — To be noted is the saying in the solution to [objection] 3, that we know God «in a created form; whence from a created form we impose names — [the form] which we understand and see»; concerning which cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2. Alexander of Hales adds (in the place cited below) that, according to John Damascene, we impose names from creatures in three ways, namely by «*images* and *forms* and *notes*. By *notes* God is named through privations, as when He is called immense God, infinite, uncircumscribable; by *images*, when He is named through the dispositions of spiritual creatures, as when He is called spirit, wise, intelligent; by *forms*, when He is named through likenesses of corporeal creatures, as when He is called lion, fire, and the like».

**II.** The solution to [objections] 6, 7[?] is more fully explained in the same sense by St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 3), and by Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below, ad ult.), who explains the words [of Bonaventure], obscure on account of brevity: «And I say this on account of the verb and the participle and the adverb, which is a disposition of the verb», thus: «Although the verb and the participle signify with time, nevertheless God is in some way notifiable, not because He Himself falls under time, but because, according to the possibility of our intellect, which understands with motion and time, we understand and signify. Whence also this verb *is*, said of God, does not signify with motion and time. Whence Augustine, on that [text] of John 1: *In the beginning was the Word*, says: The substantive verb (namely *est*) has a twofold signification: for sometimes it declares temporal motions according to analogy with other verbs; sometimes it designates the substance of each thing of which it is predicated, without any temporal motion; and so it is also called substantive. Such is what is said: *In the beginning was the Word*» etc. — Cf. also here dub. 3.

**III.** Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 48, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following, here q. I, 2; *Reportata* here q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 13, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, *I Sent.* d. 2, a. 16; *Summa* p. I, tr. 3, q. 16. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. I, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. I. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st *principium*, q. I. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 73, q. I. — Durandus, on this and the two following, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following, here q. unic.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum Deus habeat unum solum nomen, an plura.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus habeat unum solum nomen, an plura. Et quod plura, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Scripturae, quae ipsum diversis nominibus appellat. Exodi sexto[^1]: *Nomen meum magnum Adonai non indicavi eis*. Exodi decimo quinto[^2]: *Omnipotens nomen eius*. Et Psalmo[^3]: *Dominus nomen illi*. Si ergo ista sunt diversa nomina, patet auctoritate Scripturae, quod Deus habet plura nomina.

2. Item, Dionysius in libro *de Divinis Nominibus*[^4] plura assignat nomina Dei; Ambrosius similiter in libro *de Trinitate*[^5], et Magister similiter in littera.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ratione videtur; quia nullum nomen sufficienter exprimit esse divinum nec in se nec in comparatione ad nostrum[^6] intellectum. Quod patet, quia omnis perfectio et est et intelligitur esse in Deo; et nullum nomen exprimit omnis conditionis perfectionem: ergo cum non possit fieri per unum, indigemus pluribus.

4. Item, illud in quo res conveniunt et in quo differunt, aut necesse est pluribus nominibus[^7] dicere, aut necesse est unum aequivocari; sed aequivocatio generat ambiguitatem et tollenda est: ergo congruum est diversis exprimere nominibus. Cum ergo in divinis sit commune et proprium et hoc in pluribus, necesse est, plura nomina esse.

5. Item, quamvis una sit prima veritas[^8], tamen articuli fidei sunt multi: si ergo fides de Deo multos articulos credit, et quod corde creditur ad iustitiam oportet ore confiteri ad salutem[^9], multos potest et debet articulos ore confiteri; sed multi articuli uno nomine non expresse et explicite exprimuntur: ergo oportet habere plura nomina.

**Contra:** 1. Hilarius[^10]: «Non sermoni res, sed rei sermo est subiectus»: ergo cum in Deo sit omnimoda realis unitas, ergo et vocis et nominis.

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2. Item, omne quod est in Deo, est Deus, ergo quod significat aliquid quod est in Deo, est Deus; sed Deus unus est: ergo omnia[^11] divina nomina habent unum significatum; sed omnia talia sunt synonyma, nominibus autem synonymis non plus dicitur pluribus quam uno: ergo videtur, quod omnia alia ab uno sint praeter necessaria.

3. Item, multiplicatio divinorum nominum aut venit a parte rei, aut a parte intellectuum, aut a parte effectuum. Si a parte rei, tunc bonitas et veritas non sunt nomina diversa, quia res omnino una; si a parte effectuum, tunc ergo unitas et aeternitas non sunt diversa, cum non connotent effectum; si a parte intellectuum solum: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi nomina cassa sint et vana, cum non habeant aliquid respondens[^12] in re.

4. Item, in Scriptura nomen Dei singulariter proponitur, sive addatur uni, ut cum dicitur: *Dominus nomen illi*[^13], sive pluribus, ut cum dicitur: *In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti*: ergo cum eadem sit ratio rei et unius rei, et nominis et unius nominis[^14], ergo Deus tantum unum habet nomen.

> **Conclusio.** *Deum nominamus modo uno nomine, modo pluribus, iuxta diversos modos, quibus nomen accipitur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in nomine tria sunt, scilicet vox et significatio et ratio innotescendi. Unde et nomen multipliciter accipitur: aliquando pro voce significante, ut cum dicitur: *Petrus est nomen Apostoli*; et sic constat, quod in Deo sunt plura nomina. Aliquando nomen accipitur pro re significata, ut cum dicitur: *bonum et honestum sunt idem nomine*; et sic in divinis quodam modo est dicere nomen unum, quodam modo plura. Si enim res significata dicatur essentialiter, sic omnia unum; si personaliter, sic plures et plura nomina correspondentia. Aliquando nomen accipitur pro ipso notamine sive ratione innotescendi; et sic dicendum, quod[^15] quodam modo nomen unum, quodam modo plura.

Si enim accipitur ratio innotescendi ex parte Dei, sic innotescit per virtutem, quae una et magna est; et sic unum nomen Dei est et magnum sive maximum. Unde Jeremiae decimo[^16]: *Magnus es tu, et magnum nomen tuum*; quantum ad rationem innotescendi sive virtutem, per quam innotescit, secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo[^17]: *Notus in Iudaea Deus, in Israel magnum nomen eius*.

Si autem accipiatur ratio innotescendi ratione[^18] effectuum sive creaturarum, sic diversa sunt nomina. Nam Deus innotescit nobis tripliciter, scilicet per causalitatem, per ablationem et per excellentiam[^19]; et secundum hoc est multitudo nominum. Si enim nominetur per causalitatem, multa sunt nomina, quia multos habet effectus; si per ablationem, multa sunt nomina, quia multa removentur, scilicet omnia creata; si per excellentiam, multa, quia in multis, in omnibus scilicet conditionibus nobilitatis, excedit creaturas[^20].

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

4. Ex praedictis patent obiecta. Quod enim obiicit, quod Scriptura nomen Dei exprimit singulariter; dicendum, quod Scriptura, ut plurimum nomen Dei praedicat magnum, admirabile[^21], sanctum et laudabile; et sic non loquitur de nomine, secundum quod vox, sed secundum quod ratio innotescendi a parte Dei; et sic unum. Tamen non sequitur: loquitur singulariter, ergo unum solum, quia frequenter quod dicitur singulariter dicitur et universaliter, ut patet in multis exemplis in Lege, cum dicebatur: *homo de domo Israel*[^22], vel *homo qui fecerit hoc vel illud*, intelligebatur de quolibet homine.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas[^23] est a parte rei; dicendum, quod pluralitas a parte rei est.

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ut accipiatur res pro persona. Si autem pro natura, etsi non sit pluralitas in se, tamen[^24] in quantum innotescit. Et ideo plura nomina.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nomina talia sunt synonyma; dicendum, quod tunc sunt nomina synonyma, cum differunt a parte vocis solum. Hic autem est differentia secundum rationem innotescendi, et ideo non sunt synonyma. Alia ratio dicta fuit supra, distinctione octava in primo problemate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si venit a parte intelligendi solum, ergo talia nomina sunt vana; dicendum, quod non venit ab hoc solum, quoniam illi rationi innotescendi respondet pluralitas in creaturis, et in Deo respondet vera unitas complectens illam totam pluralitatem. Unde quia intelligimus Dei potentiam et sapientiam per diversa, diversimode nominamus; et quia in Deo est vere sapientia et potentia, ideo non est ibi vanitas.

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether God has one only name, or several.*

Secondly it is asked, whether God has one only name, or several. And that [he has] several, it seems:

1. By the authority of Scripture, which calls him by diverse names. Exodus 6[^1]: *My great name Adonai I did not show to them*. Exodus 15[^2]: *Almighty is his name*. And in the Psalm[^3]: *The Lord is his name*. If therefore these are diverse names, it is clear by the authority of Scripture that God has several names.

2. Likewise, Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*[^4] assigns several names to God; Ambrose likewise in the book *On the Trinity*[^5], and the Master likewise in the text [of the Sentences].

3. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason; since no name sufficiently expresses the divine being neither in itself nor in comparison to our[^6] intellect. Which is clear, since every perfection both is and is understood to be in God; and no name expresses the perfection of every condition: therefore since it cannot be done by one, we have need of several.

4. Likewise, that in which things agree and that in which they differ must be expressed either by several names[^7], or it is necessary that one [name] be used equivocally; but equivocation generates ambiguity and is to be removed: therefore it is fitting to express [them] by diverse names. Since therefore in divine matters there is what is common and what is proper, and this in several [respects], it is necessary that there be several names.

5. Likewise, although there is one first truth[^8], yet the articles of faith are many: if therefore faith concerning God believes many articles, and *what is believed in the heart unto justice must be confessed with the mouth unto salvation*[^9], one can and ought to confess many articles with the mouth; but many articles are not expressly and explicitly expressed by one name: therefore it is necessary to have several names.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hilary[^10]: «It is not the thing that is subject to discourse, but discourse to the thing»: therefore since in God there is altogether real unity, therefore [there is unity] also of speech and of name.

2. Likewise, everything which is in God, is God; therefore that which signifies something which is in God, is God; but God is one: therefore all[^11] divine names have one signified; but all such [names] are synonyms, and by synonymous names no more is said by several than by one: therefore it seems that all [names] other than one are beyond what is necessary.

3. Likewise, the multiplication of divine names comes either from the side of the thing, or from the side of the intellects [understanding], or from the side of the effects. If from the side of the thing, then *goodness* and *truth* are not diverse names, since the thing is altogether one; if from the side of the effects, then likewise *unity* and *eternity* are not diverse, since they do not connote an effect; if from the side of the intellects only: then it seems that names of this sort are empty and vain, since they have nothing corresponding[^12] in the thing.

4. Likewise, in Scripture the name of God is set forth in the singular, whether [the name] be added to one [person], as when it is said: *The Lord is his name*[^13], or to several, as when it is said: *In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*: therefore since the account of a thing and of one thing, and of a name and of one name, is the same[^14], therefore God has only one name.

> **Conclusion.** *We name God now by one name, now by several, according to the diverse modes by which "name" is taken.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in a name there are three [things], namely the vocal sound, the signification, and the ground of making known (*ratio innotescendi*). Whence "name" is also taken in many ways: sometimes for the signifying vocal sound, as when it is said: *Peter is the name of the Apostle*; and so it is established that in God there are several names. Sometimes "name" is taken for the thing signified, as when it is said: *the good and the honourable are the same in name*; and so in divine matters in a certain way one may say [there is] one name, in a certain way several. For if the thing signified be spoken of essentially, then all [the names are] one; if personally, then [there are] several and several corresponding names. Sometimes "name" is taken for the very note of recognition or the ground of making known; and so it must be said that[^15] in a certain way the name [is] one, in a certain way several.

For if the ground of making known be taken on the side of God, [God] is so made known by [his] power, which is one and great; and so the one name of God is also great or greatest. Whence Jeremiah 10[^16]: *Great are you, and great is your name*; as regards the ground of making known or the power through which he is made known, according to what is said in the Psalm[^17]: *God is known in Judah, in Israel his name is great*.

But if the ground of making known be taken by reason[^18] of the effects or creatures, then the names are diverse. For God is made known to us in three ways, namely by causality, by removal (*ablatio*), and by excellence[^19]; and according to this there is a multitude of names. For if he be named by causality, the names are many, since he has many effects; if by removal, the names are many, since many [things] are removed [from him], namely all created [things]; if by excellence, [the names are] many, since in many [things] — namely in all conditions of nobility — he exceeds creatures[^20].

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

4. From what has been said the [arguments] objected are clear. For as regards what is objected, that Scripture expresses the name of God in the singular; it must be said that Scripture for the most part predicates the name of God [as] great, admirable[^21], holy and praiseworthy; and so it does not speak of "name" as vocal sound, but as the ground of making known on the side of God; and so [it is] one. Yet it does not follow: it speaks in the singular, therefore [the name is] one only, since frequently what is said in the singular is also said universally, as is clear in many examples in the Law, when it was said: *a man of the house of Israel*[^22], or *a man who shall do this or that*, [and] it was understood of any man whatever.

1. To that which is objected, that the unity[^23] is on the side of the thing; it must be said that the plurality is [also] on the side of the thing,

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so that "thing" be taken for "person". But if [it be taken] for the nature, although there be no plurality in itself, yet[^24] [there is plurality] insofar as it is made known. And therefore [there are] several names.

2. To that which is objected, that such names are synonyms; it must be said that names are then synonymous, when they differ on the side of vocal sound only. But here there is a difference according to the ground of making known, and therefore they are not synonymous. Another reasoning was stated above, in the eighth distinction, in the first problem.

3. To that which is objected, that if [the multiplication] comes from the side of understanding only, then such names are vain; it must be said that it does not come from this alone, since to that ground of making known there corresponds plurality in creatures, and in God there corresponds true unity comprehending that whole plurality. Whence since we understand God's power and wisdom through diverse [things], we name [them] in diverse modes; and since in God there is truly wisdom and power, therefore there is no vanity there.

la: Vers. 3.

en: Verse 3.

la: Cap. I. § 8, ubi nomina generatim recensentur, quae Deo et a sacra Scriptura v. g. *Ego sum qui sum*, *vita*, *lux* etc. et a sapientibus v. g. *bonum*, *pulcrum* etc. attribuuntur.

en: C. 1, § 8, where the names that are attributed to God — both by sacred Scripture, e.g. *I am who am*, *life*, *light* etc., and by the wise, e.g. *good*, *beautiful* etc. — are reviewed in general.

la: Id est, II. *de Fide ad Gratianum*, in Prologo; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. *W* ponit *Augustinum* et ed. 1 *Anselmum* pro *Ambrosius*. Mox post *Magister* unus alterve codex ut SV omittit *similiter*.

en: That is, [Ambrose,] *On the Faith to Gratian*, II, in the Prologue; see here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Codex *W* puts *Augustinum*, and edition 1 *Anselmum*, in place of *Ambrosius*. Soon after, after *Magister*, one or another codex such as S, V omits *similiter*.

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* desideratur *nostrum*, quod in ceteris mss. et ed. 1 invenitur. Paulo infra cod. X *perfectionis conditionem* pro *conditionis perfectionem*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc*, *nostrum* ("our") is wanting, which is found in the other manuscripts and in edition 1. A little below, codex X [reads] *perfectionis conditionem* in place of *conditionis perfectionem*.

la: Praeferimus lectionem codd. G M et ed. 1 ponendo *nominibus* pro *modis*, quam contextus exigit; vel si magis placet, legas cum codd. *aa bb* *modis vel nominibus*. Mox post *ambiguitatem* cod. X *quae* loco *et*; dein post *congruum est* in cod. H additur *pluribus* et ac in cod. 1 post *diversis* adiungitur *modis dicere et*.

en: We prefer the reading of codices G, M and edition 1 in setting *nominibus* ("by names") in place of *modis* ("by modes"), which the context requires; or if you prefer, read with codices *aa, bb*: *modis vel nominibus* ("by modes or names"). Soon after, after *ambiguitatem*, codex X [reads] *quae* in place of *et*; then after *congruum est* in codex H is added *pluribus*, and in codex 1 after *diversis* is appended *modis dicere et*.

la: Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. in hac propositione exhibent *prima*, quamvis aliqui eorum vel verbis transpositis legant *una prima sit veritas* vel *una* male omittant.

en: The more ancient codices together with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, exhibit in this proposition *prima* ("first"), although some of them, with the words transposed, read *una prima sit veritas* ("there is one first truth"), or wrongly omit *una*.

la: Rom. 10, 10. — Paulo infra post *expresse* cod. *bb* *nec* pro *et*, qui et dein cum cod. *aa* ponit *debet* loco *oportet*.

en: Romans 10:10. — A little below, after *expresse*, codex *bb* [reads] *nec* in place of *et*; which [codex] also then, with codex *aa*, sets *debet* in place of *oportet*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* n. 14.

en: [Hilary,] *On the Trinity* IV, n. 14.

la: Ex mss. et sex primis edd. supplevimus *omnia*. Paulo supra post *primum ergo* in cod. T repetitur *omne*. In fine huius argumenti Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 habet *non sint necessaria* loco *sint praeter necessaria*.

en: From the manuscripts and the first six editions we have supplied *omnia* ("all"). A little above, after the first *ergo*, in codex T *omne* is repeated. At the end of this argument, the Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, has *non sint necessaria* ("are not necessary") in place of *sint praeter necessaria* ("are beyond what is necessary").

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *correspondens*.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many codices and edition 1, [reads] *correspondens*.

la: Psalm. 67, 5; Matth. 28, 19. — Paulo ante ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *addatur* loco *additur*, et codd. GHM cum ed. 1 post *singulariter* bene addunt *semper*.

en: Psalm 67:5; Matthew 28:19. — A little before, from very many of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *addatur* in place of *additur*, and codices G, H, M with edition 1, after *singulariter*, rightly add *semper* ("always").

la: Aristot., IV. *Metaph.* text. 3 (III. c. 2): *Idem enim et unus homo, et homo et ens homo; et non diversum aliquid ostendit secundum dictionem repetitam homo et ens, homo et unus homo*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, text 3 (III, c. 2): *For "one man" and "man" and "a being [that is a] man" are the same; and the repeated expression "man and a being", "man and one man", does not point out something diverse*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, sed aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *quod*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, but with the other codices and edition 1 resisting, omits *quod* ("that").

la: Vers. 6, post quem textum in Vat. et cod. *cc* additur *id est*. Paulo ante cod. Y *et* loco *sive*, dum cod. W particulam *et* ibi verbo *magnum* praefixam omittit.

en: Verse 6, after which text in the Vatican edition and codex *cc* is added *id est* ("that is"). A little before, codex Y [reads] *et* in place of *sive*, while codex W omits the particle *et* prefixed there to the word *magnum*.

la: Cod. M cum ed. 1 *a parte*.

en: Codex M with edition 1 [reads] *a parte* ("from the side of").

la: Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 7. § 3, cuius verba vide supra pag. 77 nota 10.

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 7, § 3, the words of which see above on page 77, note 10.

la: Cod. *aa* addit: *Quartus modus potest addi, ut dicatur, quod innotescit nobis Deus per similitudinem; et sic similiter sunt multa nomina, ut leo, agnus, lapis et huiusmodi*. Eadem verba inveniuntur in cod. *bb* ad marginem. Praedicti duo codices pro quolibet trium modorum cognoscendi Deum addunt exempla; sic pro via causalitatis post *nomina* adiiciunt *ut creator, conditor et huiusmodi*; pro via ablationis post *nomina* ponunt *ut incorporeus, immensus et huiusmodi*; pro via excellentiae post *nomina* addunt *ut supersubstantialis, superbonus et huiusmodi*. Cod. X hic addit verbum *sunt*. Cod. Y in principio huius propositionis habet *nominatur* pro *nominetur*.

en: Codex *aa* adds: *A fourth mode can be added, namely that it be said that God is made known to us by likeness; and so in like manner there are many names, such as lion, lamb, stone and the like*. The same words are found in codex *bb* in the margin. The said two codices add examples for each of the three modes of knowing God; thus for the way of causality, after *nomina*, they add *as creator, founder and the like*; for the way of removal, after *nomina*, they put *as incorporeal, immense and the like*; for the way of excellence, after *nomina*, they add *as supersubstantial, supergood and the like*. Codex X here adds the word *sunt* ("are"). Codex Y at the beginning of this proposition has *nominatur* ("is named", indicative) for *nominetur* (subjunctive).

la: Plures mss. ut ASTV etc. cum ed. 1 *mirabile*. Paulo infra termino *unum* in cod. W praefigitur *est*.

en: Several manuscripts such as A, S, T, V etc. with edition 1 [read] *mirabile* ("wonderful"). A little below, before the term *unum*, codex W prefixes *est*.

la: Levit. 17, 8. — Fide mss. antiquiorum et ed. 1 restituimus *domo*.

en: Leviticus 17:8. — On the witness of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored *domo* ("house").

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* *pluralitas*, sed contra scopum obiectionis et alios codd. cum ed. 1. Mox cod. 1, verbis transpositis, *dicendum, quod si accipiatur res pro persona, pluralitas a parte rei est*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc* [reads] *pluralitas* ("plurality"), but against the scope of the objection and against the other codices together with edition 1. Soon after, codex 1, with the words transposed, [reads] *dicendum, quod si accipiatur res pro persona, pluralitas a parte rei est* ("it must be said that if 'thing' be taken for 'person', the plurality is on the side of the thing").

la: Supple: *est*, quod codd. Z *aa bb* particulae *tamen* praefigunt. — Paulo infra ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *nomina*, et mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *differunt* pro inepto *dicuntur*, ac paulo infra supplevimus *sunt*. — Et infra: nempe p. I. q. 1. ad ult. — Cod. T *una veritas*, cum quo concordat cod. S, qui, omisso *vera*, ponit *veritas*; cod. Y, omisso *vera*, habet *unitas*, et codd. *aa bb* post *unitas* addunt *sive veritas*. — Ed. 1 adiungit *sed veritas et unitas*, quae et paulo ante adverbio *vere* praemittit *unum*.

en: Supply *est*, which codices Z, *aa, bb* prefix to the particle *tamen*. — A little below, from very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *nomina*, and soon after, on the witness of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *differunt* for the inept *dicuntur*, and a little below we have supplied *sunt*. — And below: namely [d. 8] p. I, q. 1, near the end. — Codex T [reads] *una veritas*, with which codex S agrees, which, omitting *vera*, sets *veritas*; codex Y, omitting *vera*, has *unitas*, and codices *aa, bb* after *unitas* add *sive veritas*. — Edition 1 appends *sed veritas et unitas*, which [edition] also a little before prefixes *unum* to the adverb *vere*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Distinguit S. Doctor in termino tria, scilicet vocem significantem, rem significatam, rationem innotescendi. Ad illustrandum hoc ultimum membrum vulgo exemplum hoc afferebatur in notificatione hominis, quod factus sit ex humo. Divina autem essentia, in se una, simplicissima et infinita, est ratio innotescendi respectu ad plura, cum intellectus noster illam unam summam perfectionem non unico conceptu exprimere possit, sed alium conceptum formet de infinito illo uno sub ratione sapientiae, alium sub ratione bonitatis, et sic de aliis attributis. — Iuxta dictam distinctionem quaestio solvitur quinque propositionibus principalibus et nonnullis adiunctis. Pro explicatione servire potest supra d. 8. p. II. q. 2; et quoad solut. ad 2. 3. ibid. p. I. a. I. q. 1. circa fin.; S. Thom., S. I. q. 13. a. 4; S. c. Gent. I. c. 35.

**II.** Notandum, quod in solutione oppositorum ordo argumentorum mutatus est. Opposit. 1. non solvitur explicite, cum principia solutionis iam exhibita sint in corp. Prima solutio respicit 4. opposit.; secunda vero respicit 3. opposit. quoad primum membrum. Deinde sequitur solut. ad 2; et ultimo loco ad tertium membrum 3. oppositi.

**III.** In conclusione omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 1. et m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 8. a. 3; S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 59. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 73. q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The holy Doctor distinguishes three [things] in a term, namely the signifying vocal sound, the thing signified, [and] the ground of making known. To illustrate this last member the example was commonly adduced of the naming of "man" (*homo*), [namely] that he was made from earth (*humus*). The divine essence, however, in itself one, most simple and infinite, is the ground of making known with respect to several [names], since our intellect cannot express that one supreme perfection by a single concept, but forms one concept of that one infinite [essence] under the aspect of wisdom, another under the aspect of goodness, and so of the other attributes. — According to the said distinction the question is solved by five principal propositions and several adjoined ones. For explanation, [the following] can serve: above, d. 8, p. II, q. 2; and as to the solutions to [arguments] 2 and 3, [see] there, p. I, a. I, q. 1, near the end; St. Thomas, *S.* I, q. 13, a. 4; *S. contra Gentiles* I, c. 35.

**II.** It is to be noted that in the solution to the opposites the order of the arguments has been changed. Opposite 1 is not explicitly solved, since the principles of [its] solution have already been set forth in the body. The first solution regards opposite 4; the second regards opposite 3 as to its first member. Then follows the solution to [opposite] 2; and in the last place [the solution] to the third member of opposite 3.

**III.** In the conclusion all agree. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 1, and m. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 8, a. 3; *S.* p. I, tr. 14, q. 59, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unic., a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), here 1 princ., q. 2. — Henr. of Ghent, *S.* a. 73, q. 9. — Dionys. the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 394 -->

### QUAESTIO III.

#### *Utrum omnia divina nomina dicantur translative.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnia nomina divina dicantur translative, an etiam quaedam dicantur proprie. Et quod omnia dicantur translative, videtur.

1. In *Regulis fidei*[^1] dicitur: «Omne simplex proprie est, et improprie dicitur»; sed quod improprie dicitur, improprie nominatur: cum ergo Deus sit simplex, nominatur improprie; sed improprietas reducitur ad proprietatem: ergo nomina divina de Deo dicuntur improprie, de aliis proprie; sed quod dicitur de aliquo improprie, dicitur translative, si de alio proprie[^2]: ergo etc.

2. Item, unumquodque, sicut contingit intelligere, contingit et significare: sed non contingit Deum intelligere[^3] nisi per proprietates et conditiones creaturarum, ergo nec nominare; sed quod nominatur secundum alienas proprietates semper translative nominatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, non est nisi duplex theologia, scilicet mystica et symbolica, secundum quod vult Dionysius[^4]; sed utraque Deum nominat translative — nam mystica per creaturas spirituales et invisibiles, sed symbolica per corporales — ergo omnis nominatio Dei translativa est.

4. Item, omne nomen divinum est impositum propter nostram instructionem[^5]; sed omnis nostra

<!-- page 395 -->

doctrina incipit a sensu: ergo omne nomen Dei accipitur secundum aliquod sensibile; sed in Deo nulla est proprietas sensibilis secundum veritatem, sed solum translative: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Apostolus dicit ad Ephesios tertio[^6], loquens de Deo: *A quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur*; sed si paternitas in terris nominatur a paternitate Dei: ergo Deus proprius et principalius dicitur Pater quam alia, non ergo translative. Hoc ipsum dicunt Dionysius[^7] et Damascenus, innitentes huic auctoritati Apostoli. Inquit enim Damascenus[^8]: «Sciendum, quod non est a nobis translatum ad beatam Deitatem paternitatis et filiationis et processionis nomen, sicut ait divinus Apostolus: *Ex quo omnis paternitas*»: ergo etc.

2. Item, beatus Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in littera[^9], quod triplex est nominum divinorum differentia, et una ex illis sunt nomina translativa: non ergo omnia dicuntur translative.

3. Item, quaedam dicuntur de Deo, quae habent oppositum in omni creatura, ut aeternitas et immensitas; sed nomen translativum attenditur secundum aliquam similitudinem[^10]: ergo talia nomina non sunt translativa.

4. Item, quaedam dicuntur de Deo, quorum significatum est proprie in solo Deo, ut hoc nomen *bonum* et *qui est*, Lucae decimo octavo[^11]: *Nemo bonus nisi solus Deus*. Et Augustinus[^12] dicit, quod «solus Deus vere est, cuius comparatione cetera non sunt».

> **Conclusio.** *Non omnia nomina de Deo dicuntur translative: quando enim significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et oppositum in creatura, nullo modo transferuntur; quando significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et similitudo in creatura, transferuntur secundum impositionem, non secundum rem; quando denique significant rem, cuius veritas est in creatura et consimilis proprietas in Deo, proprie transferuntur.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc voluerunt quidam dicere, quod quaedam sunt nomina, quae Deus sibi imposuit, quaedam, quae nos ei imposuimus. Si loquamur de nominibus, quae Deus sibi imposuit, cum ipse se proprie intelligat, huiusmodi nomina sunt propria; et talia dicuntur esse *bonum* et *qui est*. Unde Dionysius[^13] videtur velle, quod illud nomen *bonum* solum sit proprium et principale; Damascenus[^14] vero, quod illud nomen *qui est* solum est proprium et principale; et unus attendit in nomine perfectionem, alter absolutionem, uterque tamen proprietatem[^15]. Si autem loquamur de nominibus, quae nos ei imposuimus, sic cum non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, non eum nominamus nisi per nomina creaturarum; et[^16] ideo solum translative, sive quia proprius et prius conveniunt creaturae, sive quia prius imposita sunt creaturae, quamvis non proprius conveniant creaturae. Et haec est

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translatio quaedam, quamvis, proprie loquendo, sit translatio, quando proprius conveniunt iis, a quibus transferuntur, ut *ridere* hominibus proprius quam pratis.

Sed haec positio non videtur stare[^17]. Cum enim[^18] nos cognoscamus Deum tripliciter, scilicet per effectum, per excellentiam et per ablationem, constat quod omnibus his modis contingit Deum nominare. Si per effectum, nulla est ibi translatio[^19]; similiter, si per ablationem, quoniam translatio attenditur secundum aliquam similitudinem: «omnes enim transferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt[^20]».

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et oppositum in creatura, ut *immensus* et *aeternus*; et talia nullo modo transferuntur, nec secundum rem nec secundum impositionem. Quaedam[^21] significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et similitudo eius in creatura, ut *potentia*, *sapientia* et *voluntas*; et talia nomina transferuntur a creaturis ad Deum, non secundum rem, sed secundum impositionem; quia prius imposita sunt creaturis quam Deo, licet prius sint in Deo. Quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant rem, cuius veritas[^22] est in creatura et consimilis proprietas in Deo, ut *lapis* et *leo* — res enim significata est in creatura, sed similitudo proprietatis, ut stabilitas et fortitudo in Deo est — et ista sunt proprie translativa. Concedendum ergo, quod in divinis sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *simplex* improprie dicitur; dicendum, quod *dicere* ibi non est nominare, sed[^23] enuntiare, quia simplici non est compositio in essendo, sed est compositio in enuntiando, et ideo improprie; non sic in nominando. — Vel dic, quod non omne dictum improprie est dictum translative.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solum per creaturas intelligitur; dicendum, quod quamvis intelligatur solum per creaturas, non tamen solum per similitudinem[^24], immo per negationem et dissimilitudinem est cognoscibilis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod symbolica et mystica theologia nominant Deum translative; dicendum, quod quamvis mystica nominet[^25] Deum translative quantum ad proprietates excellentiae, tamen non solum sic nominat, sed etiam per abnegationem; et ideo non solum translative.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis nostra doctrina incipit a sensu; dicendum, quod verum est; et[^26] omne nomen aliquid habet sensibile, scilicet vocem, ut audiatur; sed non oportet, quod habeat sensibilem significationem, quia verbum intelligentiae, quod est insensibile, induit vocem sensibilem.

english:
### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether all divine names are said by transference.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether all divine names are said by transference (*translative*), or whether some are also said properly. And that all are said by transference, it seems.

1. In the *Rules of Faith*[^1] it is said: «Everything simple properly *is*, and is improperly *said*»; but that which is said improperly is named improperly: since therefore God is simple, he is named improperly; but impropriety is reduced to propriety: therefore the divine names are said improperly of God, [and] properly of others; but what is said of one [thing] improperly is said by transference, if [it is said] of another properly[^2]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, each thing, just as it happens to be understood, also happens to be signified: but it does not happen that God be understood[^3] except through the properties and conditions of creatures, therefore neither [does it happen that he be] named [otherwise]; but what is named according to alien properties is always named by transference: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, there is only a twofold theology, namely mystical and symbolic, according to what Dionysius wills[^4]; but each names God by transference — for the mystical [does so] through spiritual and invisible creatures, and the symbolic through bodily ones — therefore every naming of God is by transference.

4. Likewise, every divine name is imposed for the sake of our instruction[^5]; but all our

doctrine begins from sense: therefore every name of God is taken according to some sensible [thing]; but in God there is no sensible property in truth, but only by transference: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Apostle says to the Ephesians 3[^6], speaking of God: *From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named*; but if paternity on earth is named from the paternity of God: therefore God is more properly and more principally called *Father* than other [things], therefore not by transference. This same [thing] Dionysius[^7] and the Damascene say, leaning on this authority of the Apostle. For the Damascene says[^8]: «It must be known that the name of paternity and of filiation and of procession has not been transferred by us to the blessed Deity, as the divine Apostle says: *From whom all paternity*»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, blessed Ambrose says, and it is found in the text [of the Sentences][^9], that the difference of the divine names is threefold, and one [class] from these is the names by transference: therefore not all are said by transference.

3. Likewise, certain [things] are said of God which have an opposite in every creature, such as eternity and immensity; but a name of transference is taken according to some likeness[^10]: therefore such names are not by transference.

4. Likewise, certain [things] are said of God, the signified of which is properly in God alone, like this name *good* and *who is*, Luke 18[^11]: *No one is good but God alone*. And Augustine[^12] says that «God alone truly is, in comparison with whom the rest are not».

> **Conclusion.** *Not all names are said of God by transference: for when they signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose opposite is in creatures, in no way are they transferred; when they signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose likeness is in creatures, they are transferred according to imposition, not according to the thing; finally, when they signify a thing whose truth is in creatures and whose corresponding property is in God, they are properly transferred.*

**I respond:** To this some have wished to say that certain names there are which God imposed on himself, [and] certain [names] which we have imposed on him. If we speak of the names which God imposed on himself, since he properly understands himself, names of this sort are proper; and such are said to be *good* and *who is*. Whence Dionysius[^13] seems to wish that that name *good* alone be proper and principal; the Damascene[^14] indeed [wishes] that that name *who is* alone is proper and principal; and the one attends in the name to perfection, the other to absolution (*absolutio*), each however to propriety[^15]. But if we speak of the names which we have imposed on him, then since we do not know God except through creatures, we do not name him except through the names of creatures; and[^16] therefore [we name him] only by transference, either because [these names] more properly and earlier befit creatures, or because they were earlier imposed on creatures, although they do not more properly befit creatures. And this is

a certain transference, although, properly speaking, it is [only] transference when [the names] more properly befit those [things] from which they are transferred, as *to laugh* [befits] men more properly than meadows.

But this position does not seem to stand[^17]. For since[^18] we know God in three ways, namely through effect, through excellence, and through removal (*ablatio*), it is established that in all these modes it happens that God be named. If [we name him] through effect, there is no transference there[^19]; likewise, if [we name him] through removal, since transference is taken according to some likeness: «for all who transfer transfer according to some likeness[^20]».

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that certain names there are which signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose opposite is in the creature, like *immense* and *eternal*; and such [names] are in no way transferred, neither according to the thing nor according to imposition. Certain [names][^21] signify a thing whose truth is in God and whose likeness is in the creature, like *power*, *wisdom*, and *will*; and such names are transferred from creatures to God, not according to the thing, but according to imposition; since they were imposed on creatures earlier than on God, although they are earlier in God. There are certain names which signify a thing whose truth[^22] is in the creature and whose corresponding property is in God, like *stone* and *lion* — for the thing signified is in the creature, but the likeness of the property, like stability and fortitude, is in God — and these are properly [names] of transference. It must therefore be granted that in divine matters there are some names of transference, [but] not all.

1. To that which is objected, that *simple* is said improperly; it must be said that *to say* there is not to name, but[^23] to enunciate, since for the simple there is no composition in being, but there is composition in enunciating, and therefore [it is said] improperly; not so in naming. — Or say that not every utterance [made] improperly is an utterance by transference.

2. To that which is objected, that [God] is understood only through creatures; it must be said that, although he is understood only through creatures, yet [he is] not [understood] only through likeness[^24]; rather, he is knowable through negation and unlikeness.

3. To that which is objected, that symbolic and mystical theology name God by transference; it must be said that, although the mystical [theology] names[^25] God by transference as regards the properties of excellence, yet it does not name only thus, but also through abnegation; and therefore not only by transference.

4. To that which is objected, that all our doctrine begins from sense; it must be said that it is true; and[^26] every name has something sensible, namely a vocal sound, that it may be heard; but it is not necessary that it have a sensible signification, since the word of the understanding (*verbum intelligentiae*), which is insensible, puts on a sensible vocal sound.

la: Alanus ab Insulis, *Theologicae Regulae*, reg. 20. — Codd. *aa bb* post *fidei* addunt *vel theologiae*.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 20. — Codices *aa, bb* after *fidei* add *vel theologiae* ("or of theology").

la: In cod. *aa* additur *dicatur*; codd. vero P Q ultima verba legunt *sed de aliquo proprie* et transponunt post *improprie*.

en: In codex *aa* is added *dicatur*; but codices P, Q read the last words [as] *sed de aliquo proprie* and transpose [them] after *improprie*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, sed aliis codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *intelligi*. Paulo ante pauci codd. ut PQV verbis *contingit* et *apte* praefigunt *sic*; cod. T autem loco *contingit et significare* ponit *ita et nominare*, lectio, si formam argumenti spectes, praeferenda.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, but with the other codices and edition 1 resisting, [reads] *intelligi*. A little before, a few codices such as P, Q, V prefix *sic* to the words *contingit* and *apte*; codex T however in place of *contingit et significare* puts *ita et nominare* — a reading which, if you look to the form of the argument, is to be preferred.

la: Epist. 9. Cfr. etiam *de Div. Nom.* c. 1. versus finem et *de Mystica Theolog.* c. 1. — Paulo infra post *spirituales* ed. 1 omittit *et*, ac dein in aliquibus codd. ut V W X particula *sed* deest; in fine argumenti plurimi mss. cum edd. 2, 3, 6 exhibent minus congrue *translative* pro *translativa*; tandem cod. O ibidem ponit *dicitur* et codd. PQ *dicitur esse* loco *est*.

en: [Dionysius,] *Letter* 9. Cf. also *On the Divine Names* c. 1, near the end, and *On Mystical Theology* c. 1. — A little below, after *spirituales*, edition 1 omits *et*; and then in some codices such as V, W, X the particle *sed* is wanting; at the end of the argument very many manuscripts together with editions 2, 3, 6 exhibit, less fittingly, *translative* in place of *translativa*; finally codex O in the same place puts *dicitur*, and codices P, Q [put] *dicitur esse* in place of *est*.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 15, 4: *Quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt*.

en: Reference is made to that [text of] Romans 15:4: *Whatever things were written, were written for our instruction*.

la: Vers. 15, in quo textu Vat. cum Vulgata *Ex quo* pro *A quo*, et dein Vulgata *caelis* pro *caelo* contra codd. et ed. 1 exhibet. — Paulo infra cod. V *alius* loco *alia*.

en: Verse 15, in which text the Vatican edition with the Vulgate exhibits *Ex quo* in place of *A quo*, and then the Vulgate [exhibits] *caelis* in place of *caelo*, against the codices and edition 1. — A little below, codex V [reads] *alius* in place of *alia*.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 1. § 4: *Unde in omni fere theologica actione thearchiam videmus divinitus laudatam, ut monadem quidem et unum propter simplicitatem et unitatem... ut trinitatem vero propter subsistentem ter superessentialis fecunditatis expressionem, ex qua omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra est et nominatur.*

en: [Dionysius,] *On the Divine Names*, c. 1, § 4: *Whence in nearly every theological action we see the Thearchy divinely praised, as monad indeed and as one on account of simplicity and unity... but as trinity on account of the subsistent thrice-superessential expression of fecundity, from which all paternity in heaven and on earth is and is named.*

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 8: *Quin illud quoque nosse interest, paternitatis, filiationis et processionis vocabula non a nobis ad beatam Deitatem esse translata, verum contra illinc nobis communicata, quemadmodum Apostolus ait: Propterea flecto genua mea ad Patrem, ex quo omnis paternitas.*

en: [John of Damascus,] *On the Orthodox Faith*, Bk. I, c. 8: *Indeed it is also of importance to know this: that the words of paternity, of filiation and of procession have not been transferred by us to the blessed Deity, but rather, on the contrary, communicated to us from there, as the Apostle says: For this reason I bend my knees to the Father, from whom all paternity.*

la: Hic, c. 1. — Mox cod. V *illarum* pro *ex illis*.

en: Here [in the *Sentences*], c. 1. — Soon after, codex V [reads] *illarum* in place of *ex illis*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 1 nota 8.

en: Cf. above, p. 1, note 8.

la: Vers. 19. Quia ista verba sic leguntur apud Lucam, ipsum in textu citavimus, licet in mss. et edd. habeatur Matthaei, 19, 14, ubi sic legitur: *Unus est bonus, Deus*.

en: Verse 19. Since these words are read thus in Luke, we have cited him in the text, although in the manuscripts and editions [the citation] is of Matthew 19:14, where it is read thus: *One is good, [namely] God*.

la: Libr. VIII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 11: «*Ego sum qui sum; et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos; tanquam in eius comparatione qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, ea quae mutabilia facta sunt, non sint*». Ceterum cfr. de hoc supra d. VIII. c. 1. lit. Magistri, ubi idem recurrit et Hieronymo attribuitur.

en: [Augustine,] *On the City of God*, Bk. VIII, c. 11: «*I am who am; and you shall say to the sons of Israel: He who is has sent me to you; as if in comparison with him who truly is, because he is unchangeable, those things which were made changeable are not*». For the rest, cf. on this above, d. VIII, c. 1, in the text of the Master, where the same [text] recurs and is attributed to Jerome.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 3. § 1: *Ac primum, si videtur, perfectum et quod omnes Dei emanationes manifestat, boni nomen expendamus* (versio Corderii). Cfr. et c. 4.

en: [Dionysius,] *On the Divine Names*, c. 3, § 1: *And first, if it seems good, let us weigh the name of "the Good", [as] perfect and as that which manifests all the emanations of God* (Corderius's version). Cf. also c. 4.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 9, ubi et rationem addit: *Nam totum esse velut immensum quoddam ac nullis terminis definitum essentiae pelagus complexu suo ipse continet*. — Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus particulam *vero*.

en: [John of Damascus,] *On the Orthodox Faith*, Bk. I, c. 9, where he also adds the reason: *For he himself contains in his embrace the whole [of] being as a kind of immense and boundless sea of essence*. — From almost all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the particle *vero*.

la: Aliis verbis, Dionysius in nomine *bonum* attendit divinum esse, quatenus in se completissime existens est causa omnia comprehendens sive omnium principium et finis. Nam *bonum* ex natura sua est diffusivum sui tenetque rationem finis; *perfectum* autem est illud quod omnia praehabens potest facere sibi simile (cfr. loc. cit. c. 4. et 13.). Damascenus vero in nomine *Qui est* considerat divinum esse secundum se et absolute, quatenus est infinitum pelagus essentialitatis. Uterque tamen in his nominibus tale designat, quod Deo vere et proprie convenit. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 49. m. 4. a. 2.

en: In other words, Dionysius in the name *good* attends to the divine being insofar as, most completely existing in itself, it is the cause comprehending all things, that is, the principle and end of all. For *the good* by its nature is diffusive of itself and holds the account of an end; while *the perfect* is that which, pre-having all things, can make [something] similar to itself (cf. loc. cit. c. 4 and 13). The Damascene, on the other hand, in the name *Who Is* considers the divine being according to itself and absolutely, insofar as it is the infinite sea of essentiality. Each, however, designates by these names that which truly and properly befits God. Cf. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 49, m. 4, a. 2.

la: In Vat. et cod. *cc* deest *et* ab aliis codd. et ed. 1 exhibitum. Paulo supra post *cum* et dein post *creaturas* fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *nos*. Mox cod. T *non quia* pro *quamvis non*. Unus alterque codex ut Y in hac et in sequenti propositione *per prius* loco *proprius*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *cc*, *et* — exhibited by the other codices and edition 1 — is wanting. A little above, after *cum* and then after *creaturas*, on the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged *nos*. Soon after, codex T [reads] *non quia* in place of *quamvis non*. One or another codex such as Y in this and in the following proposition [reads] *per prius* in place of *proprius*.

la: Pauci mss. ut I X cum ed. 1 verbo *stare* bene praemittunt *posse*.

en: A few manuscripts such as I, X with edition 1 rightly prefix *posse* to the word *stare*.

la: In cod. O additur *secundum Dionysium*, cuius verba vide supra pag. 77, nota 10.

en: In codex O is added *secundum Dionysium* ("according to Dionysius"), whose words see above p. 77, note 10.

la: Vat. addit *Pariformiter si per excellentiam*, quae tamen verba omittuntur in mss. et ed. 1; rationem huius omissionis vide paulo infra in solutione ad 3.

en: The Vatican edition adds *Pariformiter si per excellentiam* ("Likewise if [we name him] through excellence"), which words however are omitted in the manuscripts and edition 1; for the reason for this omission see a little below in the solution to [argument] 3.

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 2, de quo vide supra pag. 1 nota 8.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 2, on which see above, p. 1, note 8.

la: Ed. 1 adiungit *sunt nomina, quae*.

en: Edition 1 appends *sunt nomina, quae* ("there are names which").

la: Codd. KV *proprietas*; paulo infra post *fortitudo* in cod. A additur *proprie*, et dein multi codd. ut ACFGHKLS etc. ponunt *ita* pro *ista*, inter quos est cod. T, qui, pluribus omissis, breviter legit *et ita sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia*.

en: Codices K, V [read] *proprietas*; a little below, after *fortitudo*, in codex A is added *proprie*, and then many codices such as A, C, F, G, H, K, L, S etc. put *ita* in place of *ista*, among which is codex T, which, with several [things] omitted, reads briefly *et ita sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia* ("and so there are some names of transference, [but] not all").

la: Cod. T *nisi* pro *sed*. — Notandum, quod *[dicere?]* respicit terminum, *enuntiare* autem propositionem, quae semper est aliquid complexum sive compositum.

en: Codex T [reads] *nisi* in place of *sed*. — It is to be noted that *[to say]* regards a term, while *to enunciate* [regards] a proposition, which is always something complex or composite.

la: In cod. O adiicitur *creaturae*.

en: In codex O is added *creaturae* ("of the creature").

la: Cod. V, post *mystica* addito *et symbolica*, consequenter habet *nominent* et paulo infra *nominant*. Mox in aliquibus mss. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 deest *Deum*. Dein cod. S *negationem* pro *abnegationem*.

en: Codex V, with *et symbolica* added after *mystica*, consequently has *nominent* and a little below *nominant*. Soon after, in some manuscripts such as A, T etc. and edition 1, *Deum* is wanting. Then codex S [reads] *negationem* in place of *abnegationem*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc*, mutata interpunctione, *quod* loco *et* ac mox *secundum* pro *scilicet*, sed minus distincte et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. W *intelligibile* pro *intelligentiae*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex *cc*, with the punctuation altered, [reads] *quod* in place of *et* and soon *secundum* in place of *scilicet*, but less distinctly and against the other codices together with edition 1. A little below, codex W [reads] *intelligibile* in place of *intelligentiae*.

la: [OCR lacuna in scholion: two short clauses in Richard of Mediavilla's quotation are missing in the source djvu, which truncates the column at *intelligimus di-* and resumes at *sed ratione huius, quod per nomen*. The intervening text could not be recovered from OCR.]

en: [OCR lacuna — see Latin note. Logged in `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities-d22-a1-q3.md`.]

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Nomen proprium* hic non accipitur, quatenus in divinis distinguitur contra *commune*, sed quatenus distinguitur contra *metaphoricum* seu *translativum*. — S. Doctor cum Angelico reiicit sententiam in prima opinione notatam, quod omnia nomina, Deo a nobis imposita, non sint nisi metaphorica; hoc probat per inductionem, enumerando tres vias seu modos, quibus formamus nomina divina, scil. causalitatis, negationis, eminentiae. In via eminentiae translatio fit quidem secundum quandam similitudinem, quae tamen differt a similitudine metaphorica. — Quoad modum concipiendi perfectiones divinas Richard. a Med. (loco infra cit.) haec observat: «Quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant, vel potius per quae significare intendimus distincte et insinuare (quamvis ad sic significandum non attingamus) res, quae per prius sunt in Deo et per posterius in creatura; et talia nomina magis proprie dicuntur de Deo quam de creatura, non ratione huius, quod per nomen intelligimus [?][^27], sed ratione huius, quod per nomen [?]; et sic de Deo non dicuntur translative». Deinde idem in solut. ad 1. dicit: «Quamvis Deum intelligamus per suos effectus, quae sunt quaedam similitudines Dei, tamen cognitio nostra non sistit in illis effectibus, sed ascendit ad cognoscendam Dei virtutem et divinitatem, quamvis in generali et obscure». — Dionysius autem Carth. (hic q. 2.) non omnino consentit solutioni S. Thomae, Bonav., Alberti aliorumque, praesertim quoad hoc, quod omnia nomina Deo imposita sint ex creaturis et quantum ad vocem translata a creaturis ad creatorem; in specie facit quasdam exceptiones contra reprobationem primae opinionis, quam habet S. Bonav. in responsione, asseritque, frequenter esse translationem, dum nominamus Deum tum per effectum, tum per ablationem, tum per eminentiam. Sed responderi potest, S. Bonaventuram minime negare, quaedam nomina non nisi Deo revelante ipsi imposita esse, sed ipse negat, hac ratione apte distingui posse nomina propria a metaphoricis. Item, non negat S. Bonav., immo expresse affirmat, quosdam effectus Dei et nomina hos effectus significantia non nisi metaphorice de Deo dici posse. Denique secundum mentem eiusdem Seraphici dici potest, etiam nomina, quae proprie Deo conveniunt quoad rem significatam (ut *sapientia*), tamen quoad modum significandi non proprie Deo attribui, quatenus non eo modo, quo nos ea in hac vita concipimus, sed per modum in infinitum eminentiorem et perfectiorem Deo conveniunt. Sed hoc non efficit, ut ista nomina sint translativa (metaphorica) nisi in sensu improprio. Nam, ut bene dicit Richard. (loc. cit. ad 4.), «nomen translatum non dicitur, nisi ubi est translatio ratione rei significatae».

**II.** Plura de necessitate et regulis translationis vide infra d. 31. q. 4. — De nomine Dei: *Qui est*, magnifice loquitur S. Doctor in *Itinerar. mentis in Deum* c. 5. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 4. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 8. q. 1. a. 1. et 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 11. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 3. a. 13. 14. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6.

**III.** Quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 13. a. 3. et 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 36. et 59. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 2, et a. 73. q. 2 seqq. — Dionys. Carth., [...].

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english_scholion:
**I.** *Proper name* (*nomen proprium*) is not here taken insofar as in divine matters it is distinguished against *common*, but insofar as it is distinguished against *metaphorical* or *of transference*. — The holy Doctor with the Angelic [Doctor] rejects the opinion noted in the first opinion, that all names imposed on God by us are nothing but metaphorical; he proves this by induction, enumerating three ways or modes by which we form divine names, namely of causality, of negation, of eminence. In the way of eminence transference is indeed made according to a certain likeness, which however differs from a metaphorical likeness. — As to the mode of conceiving the divine perfections, Richard of Mediavilla (in the place cited below) observes the following: «There are certain names which signify, or rather through which we intend to signify distinctly and to convey (although we do not attain to signifying thus) things which are *prior* in God and *posterior* in the creature; and such names are said more properly of God than of the creature, not by reason of this, that through the name we understand [?][^27], but by reason of this, that through the name [?]; and so they are not said of God by transference». Then the same [author] in the solution to [argument] 1 says: «Although we understand God through his effects, which are certain likenesses of God, yet our cognition does not stop in those effects, but ascends to knowing God's power and divinity, although in general and obscurely». — Dionysius the Carthusian, however (here, q. 2), does not entirely consent to the solution of St. Thomas, of Bonaventure, of Albert and others, especially as to this, that all names imposed on God are [taken] from creatures and as to the vocal sound transferred from creatures to the creator; in particular he makes certain exceptions against the rejection of the first opinion which St. Bonaventure holds in [his] response, and asserts that there is frequently transference when we name God either through effect, or through removal, or through eminence. But it can be replied that St. Bonaventure in no way denies that some names have been imposed on [God] only by God's revelation, but he denies that proper names can fittingly be distinguished from metaphorical ones by this account. Likewise, St. Bonaventure does not deny — rather, he expressly affirms — that certain effects of God and the names signifying these effects can be said of God only metaphorically. Finally, according to the mind of the same Seraphic [Doctor] it can be said that even the names which properly befit God as to the *thing signified* (such as *wisdom*) are nevertheless not properly attributed to God as to the *mode of signifying*, insofar as they befit God not in the way in which we conceive them in this life, but in a mode infinitely more eminent and more perfect. But this does not bring it about that those names should be [names] of transference (metaphorical) except in an improper sense. For, as Richard rightly says (loc. cit., to [argument] 4), «a name is not called transferred except where there is transference by reason of the *thing signified*».

**II.** For more on the necessity and rules of transference, see below, d. 31, q. 4. — Concerning the name of God *Who Is*, the holy Doctor speaks magnificently in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 5. Cf. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 49, m. 4, a. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 and 3; *S.* I, q. 13, a. 11. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 3, a. 13, 14. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6.

**III.** As to the conclusion: Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 13, a. 3 and 6. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following [question], here a. 1; *S.* p. I, tr. 14, q. 36 and 59, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), here 1 princ., q. 3. — Henr. of Ghent, *S.* a. 32, q. 2, and a. 73, q. 2 ff. — Dionys. the Carthusian, [...].

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