site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De scientia, quam anima Christi habuit a Verbo.*

Consequenter quaeritur de scientia, quam anima Christi habuit a Verbo, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquam scientiam habuerit anima Christi a Verbo praeter illam quam habuit in Verbo. Secundo quaeritur, utrum secundum illam profecerit, aut ab initio habuerit eam perfectam. Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit communicare animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit omniscientiam.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus habuerit aliam scientiam praeter illam quam habuit in Verbo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus habuerit aliam scientiam a Verbo praeter illam quam habuit in Verbo. Et quod non fuerit aliqua necessitas habendi aliam, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicit Damascenus[^p318-1]: « Quemadmodum caro hominis secundum propriam naturam non est vivificativa, Domini autem caro unita secundum hypostasim ipsi Deo Verbo vivifi-
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cativa facta est propter eam quae est secundum hypostasim unionem; ita et humana natura quidem substantialiter non possidet futurorum cognitionem, Domini autem anima propter eam quae est ad Deum Verbum unionem ditata est futurorum cognitione »: ergo sicut caro Christi non potest vivificare nisi propter unionem sui ad Verbum, ita anima eius non cognoscet aliquid nisi in ipso Verbo.

2. *Item*, unius secundum unam naturam est una perfectio[^p319-1]; sed intellectus animae Christi perfectus fuit scientia, cognoscendo omnia in ipso Verbo: ergo cum scientia sit perfectio ipsius intellectus, non habuit aliam scientiam praeter illam.

3. *Item*, superfluum est facere per plura quod potest sufficienter fieri per pauciora[^p319-2]; sed anima Christi sufficientissime cognoscit omne cognoscibile cognitione, quae est in ipso Verbo: ergo videtur, quod superfluum sit ei attribuere aliam cognitionem.

4. *Item*, maioris luminis est absorbere minus: si ergo cognitio, quam anima Christi habet in ipso Verbo, fuit perfectae luminositatis, quia fuit in ipso fonte luminis; videtur, quod non[^p319-3] potuerit simul cum ea stare aliud genus cognitionis in anima Christi.

5. *Item*, quando advenit quod perfectum est, evacuatur quod ex parte est[^p319-4]; sed cognitio ipsius animae Christi in Verbo est cognitio perfectissima, cognitio rerum in proprio genere est cognitio minus perfecta: ergo si Christus ab initio habuit cognitionem perfectissimam, quae est in Verbo; videtur, quod alia non habuit locum in ipso.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut dicit Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*, tractans illa tria verba, Genesis primo[^p319-5]: *Fiat, fecit, et factum est*, Angelus tripliciter cognovit res: in Verbo, in se et in proprio genere; sed intellectus animae Christi non fuit minus perfectus quam intellectus angelicus: ergo non tantum habuit cognitionem rerum in Verbo, verum etiam in se ipso.

2. *Item*, Christus assumsit quod dignitatis erat de omni statu, scilicet de statu gloriae, de statu innocentiae et de statu naturae lapsae[^p319-6]: ergo non tantum habuit cognitionem convenientem statui gloriae, verum etiam convenientem statui innocentiae: si ergo Adam habuit cognitionem omnium rerum creatarum divinitus sibi datam in se ipso, videtur, quod praeter cognitionem gloriosam Christus habuit illam scientiam.

3. *Item*, anima Christi in omni dono gratiarum debuit excedere omnes alias animas, et non tantum in dono gratiae gratum facientis, verum etiam in dono gratiae gratis datae: si ergo habere notitiam ipsarum rerum in se ipso, hoc est donum gratiae gratis datae; videtur, quod Christus habuit hanc cognitionem praeter eam cognitionem, quae est in Verbo[^p319-7].

4. *Item*, sicut ratio superior debet habere suam perfectionem, ita etiam ratio inferior in Christo; sed ratio superior nata est nosse res in ipso Verbo aeterno, inferior vero nata est eas considerare in proprio genere[^p319-8]: ergo sicut habuit cognitionem superioris, ita etiam inferioris, et sic etc.

5. *Item*, Christus simul erat perfectus viator et comprehensor; sed utrique statui necessaria est cognitio: ergo sicut habuit scientiam debitam statui comprehensoris, cognoscendo res in ipso Verbo, ita videtur, quod habuit scientiam convenientem statui viatoris, cognoscendo res in se ipsis.

### Conclusio.

> Anima Christi praeter cognitionem, quam habuit in Verbo, habuit etiam cognitionem rerum a Verbo, non tantum cognitionem simplicis intelligentiae, verum etiam experientiae.

**Respondeo:** Absque dubio concedendum est, quod praeter cognitionem, quam habuit anima Christi in ipso Verbo, quae est cognitio gloriosa, habuit cognitionem a Verbo, quae est cognitio gratiae gratis datae, qua etiam cognitione cognoscit Christus res in se ipsis per species ei inditas ab ipso conditionis primordio, sicut fuit in intellectu Adae, vel etiam in intellectu angelico[^p319-9].

Ratio autem huius est perfectio ipsius animae Christi, quae non tantum debuit esse perfecta secundum superiorem portionem, verum etiam secundum inferiorem et secundum partem sensibilem, non tantum quantum ad statum patriae, verum etiam quantum ad statum viae, qui duplex est, videlicet innocentiae et naturae lapsae. Et secundum hoc Christus habuit triplicem cognitionem isti triplici statui convenientem, videlicet cognitionem gloriae, cognitionem naturae integrae et cognitionem poenalis experientiae, ut de quolibet statu aliquid in se haberet. — Rursus, quia perfecta fuit anima Christi quantum ad cognitionem non solum respectu cognoscibilium, sed etiam respectu modorum cognoscendi; ideo cum res tripliciter sint cognoscibiles, se-
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cundum quod tripliciter[^p320-1] habent esse — habent enim esse in Verbo, habent esse in intellectu creato, habent nihilominus esse in proprio genere — ideo ad hoc, quod intellectus animae Christi plenam de rebus cognitionem haberet, res cognovit ista triplici cognitione.

Et sic patet, quod anima Christi non tantum habuit cognitionem rerum in Verbo, sed etiam rerum a Verbo, cognitionem, inquam, non tantum simplicis notitiae, verum etiam experientiae[^p320-2]. — Patet etiam harum trium cognitionum sufficientia, necessitas et distinctio, quae potest sumi vel ex parte virium, scilicet superioris rationis, inferioris et sensualitatis; vel ex parte statuum, videlicet gloriae, innocentiae et naturae lapsae; vel ex parte modorum cognoscendi, scilicet in Verbo, in se et in genere proprio. Et sic patet, quod anima Christi praeter cognitionem, quam habuit in Verbo, habuit aliam cognitionem a Verbo[^p320-3]. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. *Ad illud* quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, dicendum, quod Damascenus non vult assignare similitudinem quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad hoc, quod sicut caro Christi non esset vivificativa, nisi fuisset ipsi Verbo unita, sic anima Christi ignorans esset et imperfecta, nisi fuisset unita cum sapientia perfecta; sed propter illam unionem habet omnis cognitionis perfectionem.

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur secundo, quod unius rei una est perfectio; dicendum, quod verum est secundum unum modum et statum et potentiam; sed quia in anima Christi est considerare diversitatem potentiarum et statuum et modorum cognoscendi, ideo nihil impedit, quin secundum diversitatem horum diversas habeat cognitiones perficientes.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod superfluum est facere per plura quod potest etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si fiat aeque bene et aeque sufficienter; sic autem non esset in proposito, quia non ita haberet anima Christi completionem scientiae secundum omnem modum et[^p320-4] omnem statum, sed solum alteram istarum cognitionum haberet.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod maioris luminis est absorbere minus; dicendum, quod illud alicubi habet veritatem, hoc est de luminibus, quae sunt eiusdem rationis, et eodem modo irradiant et secundum eandem partem; non sic autem est in proposito reperire, sicut in distinctione harum cognitionum ostensum est. Praeterea, quod dicitur, quod maius lumen absorbet minus, hoc non dicitur quantum ad existentiam, sed quantum ad apparentiam; et licet hoc sit verum in lumine corporali, non tamen est verum in lumine spirituali, propter maiorem impermixtionem, quae reperitur in lumine spirituali quam in corporali[^p320-5].

5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod cognitio ex parte non manet cum cognitione perfecta; dicendum, quod verum est, quando cognitio ex parte habet imperfectionem annexam, sicut est cognitio aenigmatica; et de hac verum est, quod non fuit in anima Christi. Si autem dicatur cognitio ex parte, quia minus perfecta est quam cognitio gloriae, non oportet, eam evacuari, in eo potissimum, in quo est simul status viae cum statu patriae[^p320-6].

english:
### Article III. *On the knowledge which Christ's soul had from the Word.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the knowledge which Christ's soul had from the Word, and concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether Christ's soul had any knowledge from the Word besides that which it had in the Word. Second it is asked whether it advanced according to that knowledge, or had it perfect from the beginning. Third it is asked whether God ought to have communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, just as he communicated omniscience.

### Question I. *Whether Christ had any other knowledge besides that which he had in the Word.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether Christ had any other knowledge from the Word besides that which he had in the Word. And that there was no necessity of having another, it seems:

1. *First*, by that which Damascene says[^p318-1]: « Just as the flesh of a man according to its own nature is not life-giving, but the Lord's flesh, united according to the hypostasis to God the Word himself, was made life-giving on account of the union which is according to the hypostasis; so also human nature indeed does not substantially possess the knowledge of future things, but the Lord's soul, on account of the union which is toward God the Word, was enriched with the knowledge of future things »: therefore just as Christ's flesh cannot give life except on account of its union with the Word, so his soul will not know anything except in the Word itself.

2. *Likewise*, of one thing according to one nature there is one perfection[^p319-1]; but the intellect of Christ's soul was perfect in knowledge, knowing all things in the Word itself: therefore, since knowledge is a perfection of the intellect itself, it did not have another knowledge besides that one.

3. *Likewise*, it is superfluous to do through more what can sufficiently be done through fewer[^p319-2]; but Christ's soul most sufficiently knows every knowable thing by the knowledge which is in the Word itself: therefore it seems that it is superfluous to attribute another knowledge to it.

4. *Likewise*, it belongs to the greater light to absorb the lesser: if therefore the knowledge which Christ's soul has in the Word itself was of perfect luminosity, because it was in the very fount of light; it seems that there could not[^p319-3] coexist with it another kind of knowledge in Christ's soul.

5. *Likewise*, when that which is perfect comes, that which is in part is done away with[^p319-4]; but the knowledge of Christ's soul in the Word is the most perfect knowledge, while the knowledge of things in their proper genus is a less perfect knowledge: therefore if Christ from the beginning had the most perfect knowledge, which is in the Word; it seems that the other had no place in him.

**On the contrary:** 1. As Augustine says *On Genesis according to the Letter*, treating those three words, in Genesis chapter one[^p319-5]: *Let it be made, he made it, and it was made*, the Angel knew things in a threefold way: in the Word, in itself, and in its proper genus; but the intellect of Christ's soul was not less perfect than the angelic intellect: therefore it not only had the knowledge of things in the Word, but also in itself.

2. *Likewise*, Christ assumed what was of dignity from every state, namely from the state of glory, from the state of innocence, and from the state of fallen nature[^p319-6]: therefore he not only had the knowledge befitting the state of glory, but also that befitting the state of innocence: if therefore Adam had the knowledge of all created things divinely given to him in himself, it seems that besides the glorious knowledge Christ had that knowledge.

3. *Likewise*, Christ's soul in every gift of graces ought to exceed all other souls, and not only in the gift of grace that makes pleasing, but also in the gift of grace freely given: if therefore to have the knowledge of those things in oneself is a gift of grace freely given; it seems that Christ had this knowledge besides that knowledge which is in the Word[^p319-7].

4. *Likewise*, just as the higher reason ought to have its perfection, so also the lower reason in Christ; but the higher reason is fitted to know things in the eternal Word itself, while the lower is fitted to consider them in their proper genus[^p319-8]: therefore as he had the knowledge of the higher, so also of the lower, and so on.

5. *Likewise*, Christ was at once a perfect wayfarer and comprehensor; but knowledge is necessary for each state: therefore just as he had the knowledge due to the state of the comprehensor, knowing things in the Word itself, so it seems that he had the knowledge befitting the state of the wayfarer, knowing things in themselves.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, also had the knowledge of things from the Word, not only the knowledge of simple intelligence, but also of experience.

**I respond:** Without doubt it must be conceded that, besides the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word itself, which is the glorious knowledge, it had a knowledge from the Word, which is the knowledge of grace freely given, by which knowledge Christ also knows things in themselves through the species imparted to him from the very beginning of his condition, just as was the case in the intellect of Adam, or also in the angelic intellect[^p319-9].

Now the ground of this is the perfection of Christ's soul itself, which ought to have been perfect not only according to the higher portion, but also according to the lower and according to the sensible part, not only as to the state of the homeland, but also as to the state of the way, which is twofold, namely of innocence and of fallen nature. And according to this Christ had a threefold knowledge befitting that threefold state, namely the knowledge of glory, the knowledge of integral nature, and the knowledge of penal experience, that he might have in himself something of each state. — Again, because Christ's soul was perfect as to knowledge not only with respect to the knowables, but also with respect to the modes of knowing; therefore, since things are knowable in a threefold way, ac-
cording as they have being in a threefold way[^p320-1] — for they have being in the Word, they have being in the created intellect, and they have being nonetheless in their proper genus — therefore, in order that the intellect of Christ's soul might have full knowledge of things, it knew things by this threefold knowledge.

And thus it is clear that Christ's soul not only had the knowledge of things in the Word, but also of things from the Word, knowledge, I say, not only of simple acquaintance, but also of experience[^p320-2]. — Clear too is the sufficiency, necessity, and distinction of these three kinds of knowledge, which can be taken either on the part of the powers, namely the higher reason, the lower, and sensuality; or on the part of the states, namely of glory, of innocence, and of fallen nature; or on the part of the modes of knowing, namely in the Word, in itself, and in its proper genus. And thus it is clear that Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, had another knowledge from the Word[^p320-3]. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. *To that* which is first objected concerning the authority of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not intend to assign a likeness as to all things, but as to this, that just as Christ's flesh would not be life-giving unless it had been united to the Word itself, so Christ's soul would be ignorant and imperfect unless it had been united with perfect wisdom; but on account of that union it has the perfection of all knowledge.

2. *To that* which is objected second, that of one thing there is one perfection; it must be said that this is true according to one mode and state and power; but because in Christ's soul there is a diversity of powers and states and modes of knowing to consider, therefore nothing prevents that, according to the diversity of these, it should have diverse perfecting kinds of knowledge.

3. *To that* which is objected, that it is superfluous to do through more what can [be done through fewer] etc.; it must be said that this is true if it be done equally well and equally sufficiently; but this would not be so in the case at hand, because Christ's soul would not thus have the completion of knowledge according to every mode and[^p320-4] every state, but would have only one of these kinds of knowledge.

4. *To that* which is objected, that it belongs to the greater light to absorb the lesser; it must be said that this has truth somewhere, that is, of lights which are of the same nature, and which irradiate in the same way and according to the same part; but it is not so to be found in the case at hand, as was shown in the distinguishing of these kinds of knowledge. Moreover, what is said, that the greater light absorbs the lesser, is not said as to existence, but as to appearance; and although this is true in corporeal light, it is nevertheless not true in spiritual light, on account of the greater unmixedness which is found in spiritual light than in corporeal[^p320-5].

5. *To that* which is objected, that knowledge in part does not remain together with perfect knowledge; it must be said that this is true when knowledge in part has imperfection annexed to it, such as is enigmatic knowledge; and of this it is true that it was not in Christ's soul. But if it be called knowledge in part because it is less perfect than the knowledge of glory, it is not necessary that it be done away with, especially in that case in which the state of the way is together with the state of the homeland[^p320-6].

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 21. — In conclus. arg. pro *non potest... non cognoscet* edd. *non posset... non cognosceret*.

en: [John Damascene,] Book III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 21. — In the conclusion of the argument, for *cannot... will not know* the editions read *could not... would not know*.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 225, nota 6. — De minori vide hic a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Pro *unius* non pauci codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 perperam *unio*.

en: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 225, note 6. — On the minor [premise] see here a. 2. q. 1 ff. — For *unius* not a few codices, and likewise editions 1, 2, wrongly [read] *unio*.

la: Vide supra pag. 277, nota 1. — In fine arg. pro *aliam cognitionem* codd. G I L T U V Z *illam cognitionem*.

en: See above pag. 277, note 1. — At the end of the argument, for *another knowledge* codices G I L T U V Z [read] *that knowledge*.

la: Pro *quod non* complures codd. *quod tunc*, codd. K V Z *quod tunc non*.

en: For *that... not* several codices [read] *that then*, codices K V Z *that then... not*.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 10: *Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur* etc. — Cod. U *evacuabitur*.

en: Epistle I Cor. 13, 10: *But when that which is perfect comes, that [which is in part] shall be done away with* etc. — Cod. U [reads] *evacuabitur*.

la: Vers. 3. et 7. — August. dictum habetur II. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 8. n. 16. seqq. Cfr. supra pag. 306, nota 4.

en: Verses 3 and 7. — The saying of Augustine is found in II *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 8. n. 16 ff. Cfr. above pag. 306, note 4.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 267, nota 7. — De cognitione in statu innocentiae vide II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Pro *dignitatis* cod. W *dignius*.

en: Cfr. above pag. 267, note 7. — On knowledge in the state of innocence see II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1 ff. — For *dignitatis* cod. W [reads] *dignius*.

la: Cod. S *praeter eam quam habuit in Verbo*.

en: Cod. S [reads] *besides that which he had in the Word*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 1. seq. et Comment. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Cfr. II Sent., the Master's text, d. XXIV. c. 1 f., and the Commentary p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

la: Cod. K *triplex*.

en: Cod. K [reads] *triplex* (threefold).

la: Vide quaest. seq.

en: See the following question.

la: Vat., omisso *aliam*, subinde post *cognitionem* suo marte interserit *rerum in se, et in genere proprio; et sic ulterius patet, quod anima Christi praeter cognitionem, quam habuit in Verbo, habuit aliam cognitionem*. Pro *aliam* plures codd. *aliquam*.

en: The Vatican edition, having omitted *aliam*, thereupon after *cognitionem* on its own authority inserts *of things in themselves, and in their proper genus; and so it is further clear that Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, had another knowledge*. For *aliam* several codices [read] *aliquam*.

la: Codd. 1 L N aa adiiciunt *secundum*.

en: Codices 1 L N aa add *secundum* (according to).

la: Ad obiectionem huic similem Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, respondet sic: *Quamvis stellae ita luceant de die sicut de nocte, tamen de die visui non apparent, quia vincitur* [earum lumen] *lumine fortiori; sed intellectus, cum intelligat aliquid valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit intima, sed etiam magis; cuius ratio est, quia excellentia intelligibilis intellectum non debilitat, sed confortat.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 13. m. 1. ad 4: *Ratio huius* [quod in corporalibus minus lumen obfuscatur a maiori] *est, quoniam omnia lumina corporalia sunt ad unum actum, scil. manifestationis, qui quidem actus per se et perfectissime est a lumine maiori. Sed in spiritualibus non sic; non enim omnia lumina spiritualia sunt ad unum actum* etc. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3; ibid. ad 1. habetur etiam solut. obiect. seq.

en: To an objection similar to this Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1, responds thus: *Although the stars shine as much by day as by night, yet by day they do not appear to sight, because* [their light] *is overcome by a stronger light; but the intellect, when it understands something highly intelligible, understands the lesser things no less, but even more; the ground of which is that the excellence of the intelligible does not weaken the intellect, but strengthens it.* Cfr. I Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. III. q. 13. m. 1. ad 4: *The ground of this* [that in corporeal things the lesser light is obscured by the greater] *is that all corporeal lights are ordered to one act, namely of manifestation, which act indeed is per se and most perfectly from the greater light. But in spiritual things it is not so; for not all spiritual lights are ordered to one act* etc. Cfr. II Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3; in the same place ad 1 there is also had the solution of the following objection.

la: Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et 3.

en: See below d. 31. a. 2. q. 1 and 3. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Scientia infusa « per species Christo inditas ab ipso conditionis primordio », vocatur a S. Bonav. *cognitio simplicis notitiae* et a S. Thoma in *Sum.* etiam *scientia indita*. Nonnulli tamen posteriores theologi scientiam *inditam* distinguunt ab *infusa*, ut *inditam* vocent eam quae naturam, in qua est, concomitatur ut proprietas naturalis, sicut est ea quam Angeli habent per species impressas; *infusam* vero, quae naturam non concomitatur, sed, Deo infundente, advenit subiecto. — Insuper, communiter posteriores theologi *infusam* scientiam iterum distinguunt in *infusam per se* et *per accidens*; illa respicit obiectum, quod excedit virtutem naturalem, ut est cognitio rerum supernaturalium, unde a solo Deo communicari potest; ast infusa *per accidens* naturali quidem virtute successive posset comparari, de facto tamen impressa est a Deo.

**II.** Fuerunt qui generatim negaverint, in Christo fuisse scientiam infusam, et quod mirum est, non defuerunt qui S. Bonaventuram, non obstantibus perspicuis ipsius verbis, his annumeraverint. Alii vero plures, ut Suarez (in III. p. *Sum.* disp. 25. sect. 3.) contendunt, S. Doctorem non admittere nisi scientiam infusam *per accidens*; pro qua assertione probanda afferri posset, quod ipse hanc scientiam attribuit rationi inferiori eamque comparat cum scientia Adamo infusa (hic fundam. 2.). Nihilominus hanc limitationem a mente nostri Doctoris alienam esse putamus. Praefata enim distinctio ab eodem nullibi memoratur, asseritur autem (hic q. 2.) de hac infusa scientia: « *Habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine; hinc est, quod proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiae* ». Item, pluries ab eodem docetur, animam Christi omnibus donis Spiritus S. repletam fuisse, pro quo allegat locum Isaiae 11, 3. (cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 1.). Denique est locus peremptorius in *Breviloq.* p. IV. c. 6, ubi, postquam quinque modos cognoscendi in Christo distinxit, duos tribuit scientiae infusae his verbis: « *Tertius per gratiam, et hoc modo cognovit omnia spectantia ad humani generis redemptionem* [quod manifeste pertinet ad scientiam infusam *per se*]. *Quartus est secundum naturam integram, cuiusmodi fuit in Adam, et hoc modo cognovit omnia quae spectant ad universi constitutionem* ». — De obiecto, actu et extensione scientiae infusae est quaedam opinionum differentia inter S. Thom. et Scotum. — Quoad scientiam *experimentalem*, cuius actus certissime Christo competit, non conveniunt sententiae quoad habitum acquisitum, de quo agitur in seq. quaestione.

**III.** Alex. Hal., p. III. q. 13. m. 5. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1-5; S. III. q. 11. a. 1-6; de Verit. q. 20. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. quaest. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The infused knowledge « through species imparted to Christ from the very beginning of his condition » is called by St. Bonaventure *the knowledge of simple acquaintance*, and by St. Thomas in the *Summa* also *imparted knowledge*. Some later theologians, however, distinguish *imparted* knowledge from *infused*, so that they call *imparted* that which accompanies the nature in which it is as a natural property, such as is that which the Angels have through impressed species; but *infused* that which does not accompany the nature, but, with God infusing it, comes upon the subject. — Furthermore, later theologians commonly distinguish *infused* knowledge again into *infused per se* and *per accidens*; the former regards an object which exceeds natural power, such as is the knowledge of supernatural things, whence it can be communicated by God alone; but knowledge infused *per accidens* could indeed be acquired successively by natural power, though in fact it is impressed by God.

**II.** There have been those who in general denied that there was infused knowledge in Christ, and, what is astonishing, there have not been wanting those who, notwithstanding his own clear words, have numbered St. Bonaventure among these. But others, many of them, such as Suarez (in III. p. *Sum.* disp. 25. sect. 3.), contend that the holy Doctor admits only knowledge infused *per accidens*; for proving which assertion it could be alleged that he himself attributes this knowledge to the lower reason and compares it with the knowledge infused into Adam (here, fundamentum 2). Nevertheless we think this limitation alien to the mind of our Doctor. For the aforesaid distinction is nowhere mentioned by him, but it is asserted (here, q. 2) of this infused knowledge: « *The habits and the impressed species were in Christ's soul in all-around fullness; hence it is that he could not advance by the knowledge of simple acquaintance* ». Likewise, it is taught by him many times that Christ's soul was filled with all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for which he alleges the passage of Isaiah 11, 3 (cfr. above d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 1). Finally there is a more decisive passage in the *Breviloquium* p. IV. c. 6, where, after he has distinguished five modes of knowing in Christ, he assigns two to infused knowledge in these words: « *The third is through grace, and in this mode he knew all things pertaining to the redemption of the human race* [which manifestly belongs to knowledge infused *per se*]. *The fourth is according to integral nature, of which kind there was in Adam, and in this mode he knew all things which pertain to the constitution of the universe* ». — Concerning the object, act, and extension of infused knowledge there is a certain difference of opinions between St. Thomas and Scotus. — As for *experimental* knowledge, whose act most certainly belongs to Christ, the opinions do not agree concerning the acquired habit, which is treated in the following question.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, p. III. q. 13. m. 5. — Scotus, in both Writings here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here a. 3. quaestiunculae 1-5; *S.* III. q. 11. a. 1-6; *de Verit.* q. 20. a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. quaestiunculae 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Christus profecerit secundum illud genus cognitionis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus profecerit secundum illud genus cognitionis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Hebraeos quinto[^p321-1]: *Didicit ex his quae passus est, obedientiam*; sed *discere* est proficere in scientia: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, super illud Lucae secundo[^p321-2]: *Proficiebat Iesus aetate et sapientia*; Glossa: «Sicut carnis est aetate proficere, sic animae gratia et sapientia»: ergo sicut Christus profecit secundum carnem crescendo in aetate, ita videtur, quod secundum animam profecerit crescendo in cognitione.

3. *Item*, «Christus assumsit quae plantavit in nostra natura[^p321-3]»; sed Christus plantavit in nostra natura, ut «ex multis sensibilibus fiat una memoria, ex multis memoriis una experientia, ex multis experimentis unum universale, quod est principium artis et scientiae»: ergo si iste modus procedendi facit animam proficere in cognitione; videtur, quod anima Christi in cognitione profecerit.

4. *Item*, aut intellectus agens in Christo potuit abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus materialibus, aut non[^p321-4]. Si non potuit: ergo fuit impotens; si potuit, cum talis modus abstrahendi sit via in cognitionem, videtur, quod Christus in cognitione profecerit.

5. *Item*, qui aliquid apprehendit et retinet quod prius non apprehenderat, aliquid addiscit et in cognitione proficit; sed sensus communis in Christo aliquid apprehendit et aliqua sensibilia retinebat quae prius non apprehenderat nec composuerat, et imaginativa potentia in Christo totum illud retinebat[^p321-5]: ergo videtur, quod anima Christi proficiebat et addiscebat.

**Sed contra:** 1. Gregorius super illud Lucae[^p321-6]: *Proficiebat Iesus* etc.: «Proficiebat, non quod ipse sapientior fieret ex tempore, sed eandem qua plenus erat sapientiam ceteris ex tempore paulatim demonstrabat».

2. *Item*, Damascenus[^p321-7]: «Qui dicunt, eum proficere sapientia, non eam quae est secundum hypostasim unionem venerantur»: ergo si quis dicat, Christum profecisse in scientia, videtur facere iniuriam Sapientiae increatae sibi unitae.

3. *Item*, Christus habuit plenitudinem non solum gratiae gratum facientis, sed etiam gratiae gratis datae[^p321-8]: si ergo cognitio, quam habuit a Verbo in se ipso, fuit cognitio gratiae gratis datae, ergo plena fuit in Christo a suae conditionis primordio: non ergo crescebat in eo.

4. *Item*, anima Christi habuit species rerum cognoscibilium; sed qua ratione habuit species unius cognoscibilis, eadem ratione et omnium; sed impossibile est, duas formas eiusdem speciei esse et in eodem et secundum idem[^p321-9]: ergo impossibile fuit, quod anima Christi novas formas sive novas species reciperet: ergo non potuit in cognitione proficere.

5. *Item*, materia non est possibilis ad formam
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quam habet in actu, pro eo quod «omne recipiens debet esse denudatum a forma recepti[^p322-1]»: ergo si anima Christi a principio habuit in se omnium rerum creatarum speciem et notitiam, videtur, quod amplius non potuerit cognitionem novam recipere, ergo nec in cognitione proficere.

### Conclusio.

> Anima Christi non secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae, sed secundum cognitionem experientiae profecit.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod praeter scientiam, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo, duplicem habuit cognoscendi modum, sicut praedictum fuit[^p322-2]: habuit enim cognitionem simplicis notitiae in intellectu, et cognitionem experientiae in sensu. Cognitio simplicis notitiae consistebat in habitibus et speciebus ipsi animae Christi inditis a primordio suae conditionis ex beneficio Conditoris; cognitio vero experientiae consistebat in usibus sensuum exteriorum. — Quoniam ergo habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine; hinc est, quod Christus proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiae. Quia vero sensus exterior ad aliquid convertebatur de novo, ad quod prius conversus non fuerat; hinc est, quod cognitione experientiae proficiebat. — Iuxta quod dicit Ambrosius[^p322-3], quod «in eo sensus proficiebat humanus»; et Apostolus dicit, quod *didicit ex his quae passus est, obedientiam*; et Glossa super illud Psalmi: *Qui tribuit mihi intellectum*: «Usque ad mortem erudivit me inferior pars mea, scilicet carnis assumtio, ut experirer tenebras mortalitatis». — Et sic anima Christi quamvis non proficeret secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae, proficiebat tamen secundum cognitionem experimentalem. Ille autem profectus scientiae experimentalis in Christo in duobus differebat a profectu cognitionis nostrae, in uno videlicet, quod Christus non proficiebat veniendo in notitiam rei prius incognitae, sed quod prius cognoscebat[^p322-4] uno modo, scilicet per simplicem notitiam, cognoscebat alio modo, scilicet per experientiam. In alio etiam differebat, quia profectus noster est secundum existentiam, profectus vero Christi erat solum secundum apparentiam.

Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem pro magna parte. Nam rationes, quae ostendunt, quod Christus non proficiebat in cognitione sive scientia, procedunt de profectu non solum secundum apparentiam, sed etiam secundum existentiam, non solum secundum cognitionem experientiae, verum etiam secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae. Et ideo rationes illae sunt concedendae, quia verum concludunt.

1. 2. *Ad illud* vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Apostoli et de auctoritate Bedae in Glossa, dicendum, quod utraque auctoritas intelligitur de cognitione experientiae.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod hoc est naturale, videlicet quod ex multis sensibilibus fiat una memoria; dicendum, quod duplex est modus cognoscendi per experientiam: unus, qui est via in acquisitionem scientiae; alius vero, qui est via in exercitium scientiae, ut quod prius sciebatur theoretice postmodum sciatur practice[^p322-5]. Et primus modus experientiae reperitur in scientiae inventione, secundus vero consistit in usu scientiae iam adeptae; et in primo est motus ab incognito ad cognitum, in secundo vero est via sive processus a cognito uno modo, ut cognoscatur alio modo. — Et primus modus respicit imperfectionem naturae lapsae propter ignorantiam annexam, secundus vero respicit statum innocentiae, in quo habitus scientiae praecessisset usum, et cognitio simplicis notitiae praecessisset cognitionem experientiae; et iste modus fuit in Christo et non alius, quia, sicut infra[^p322-6] patebit de statu naturae lapsae, Christus non debuit assumere defectum ignorantiae. Philosophus autem in praedicto progressu cognitionis procedit secundum statum naturae lapsae, quod in Christo non oportet reperiri.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod intellectus agens in Christo potuit abstrahere; dicendum, quod abstractio speciei a conditionibus materialibus quaedam ordinatur[^p322-7] ad generandum habitum, quaedam vero consistit in iudicio eius quod apprehensum est per sensum, iudicio, inquam, facto ab intellectu. Et prima non fuit in Christo, cum intellectus eius haberet habitus et species rerum, illa autem abstractio ordinaretur ad acquisitionem habitus et scientiae nondum adeptae, et ita haberet annexum defectum ignorantiae. Secunda vero in Christo fuit, sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod aliquid didicerit de novo, vel in scientia profecerit, sed solum quod aliquid consideravit intellectu excitato a potentia inferiori.
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5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod sensus eius poterat componere et tenere; dicendum, quod illud non facit profectum in cognitione speculationis, sed in cognitione experimentali, quoniam illa quae sensus componebat, aut dividebat, apud intellectum erant magis cognita, non solum quantum ad essentias, sed etiam quantum ad comparationes[^p323-1], secundum quas compositiones et divisiones possunt formaliter variari. Unde secus est de cognitione rerum in Christo et in quocumque Angelo. Angeli enim potuerunt proficere in cognitione rerum componendo et dividendo et conferendo, etiam cognitione simplicis notitiae, quamvis non reciperent novas species; Christus vero minime, propter cognitionis plenitudinem et perfectionem, quam decuit animam eius habere a principio suae conditionis.

english:
### Question II. *Whether Christ advanced according to that kind of knowledge.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ advanced according to that kind of knowledge. And that he did, it seems.

1. To the Hebrews, chapter five[^p321-1]: *He learned obedience from the things which he suffered*; but *to learn* is to advance in knowledge: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Luke, chapter two[^p321-2]: *Jesus advanced in age and wisdom*; the Gloss: «As it belongs to the flesh to advance in age, so to the soul to advance in grace and wisdom»: therefore, just as Christ advanced according to the flesh by growing in age, so it seems that he advanced according to the soul by growing in knowledge.

3. Likewise, «Christ assumed the things which he had planted in our nature[^p321-3]»; but Christ planted in our nature that «from many sensibles there comes to be one memory, from many memories one experience, from many experiments one universal, which is the principle of art and of knowledge»: therefore, if this manner of proceeding makes the soul advance in knowledge, it seems that Christ's soul advanced in knowledge.

4. Likewise, either the agent intellect in Christ was able to abstract universal forms from material conditions, or it was not[^p321-4]. If it was not able: then it was impotent; if it was able, since such a mode of abstracting is a way into knowledge, it seems that Christ advanced in knowledge.

5. Likewise, he who apprehends and retains something which he had not previously apprehended learns something and advances in knowledge; but the common sense in Christ apprehended something and retained some sensibles which it had not previously apprehended nor composed, and the imaginative power in Christ retained all of it[^p321-5]: therefore it seems that Christ's soul was advancing and learning.

**On the contrary:** 1. Gregory, on that passage of Luke[^p321-6]: *Jesus advanced* etc.: «He advanced, not that he himself became wiser with time, but that he gradually displayed to others, in time, the same wisdom of which he was full».

2. Likewise, Damascene[^p321-7]: «Those who say that he advanced in wisdom do not venerate the union which is according to the hypostasis»: therefore, if anyone should say that Christ advanced in knowledge, he seems to do injury to the uncreated Wisdom united to him.

3. Likewise, Christ had the fullness not only of the grace that makes pleasing, but also of the grace freely given[^p321-8]: if therefore the knowledge which he had from the Word in himself was a knowledge of the grace freely given, then it was full in Christ from the first beginning of his condition: therefore it was not increasing in him.

4. Likewise, Christ's soul had the species of knowable things; but by the same account by which it had the species of one knowable thing, by the same account it had those of all; but it is impossible that two forms of the same species be both in the same thing and according to the same respect[^p321-9]: therefore it was impossible that Christ's soul should receive new forms or new species: therefore it could not advance in knowledge.

5. Likewise, matter is not in potency to a form
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which it has in act, for the reason that «every recipient must be stripped of the form of what is received[^p322-1]»: therefore, if Christ's soul from the beginning had in itself the species and notion of all created things, it seems that it could no longer receive new knowledge, and therefore could not advance in knowledge.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul advanced, not according to the knowledge of simple notion, but according to the knowledge of experience.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, besides the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word, it had a twofold mode of knowing, as has been said before[^p322-2]: for it had the knowledge of simple notion in the intellect, and the knowledge of experience in the sense. The knowledge of simple notion consisted in the habits and species bestowed upon Christ's soul itself from the first beginning of its condition by the benefit of the Creator; but the knowledge of experience consisted in the uses of the exterior senses. — Since therefore the impressed habits and species were in Christ's soul in every kind of fullness, hence it is that Christ could not advance by the knowledge of simple notion. But because the exterior sense was being turned anew to something to which it had not previously been turned, hence it is that he was advancing by the knowledge of experience. — In accordance with which Ambrose says[^p322-3] that «in him the human sense advanced»; and the Apostle says that *he learned obedience from the things which he suffered*; and the Gloss on that passage of the Psalm: *Who bestows understanding on me*: «Even unto death my lower part instructed me, namely the assumption of flesh, that I might experience the darkness of mortality». — And thus Christ's soul, although it did not advance according to the knowledge of simple notion, nevertheless advanced according to experiential knowledge. But that advance of experiential knowledge in Christ differed in two respects from the advance of our knowledge: namely in one, that Christ was not advancing by coming into the knowledge of a thing previously unknown, but that what he previously knew[^p322-4] in one mode, namely by simple notion, he knew in another mode, namely by experience. In another it also differed, because our advance is according to existence, but Christ's advance was only according to appearance.

And according to this the response to the proposed question is clear; the response to the reasons on either side is also for the most part clear. For the reasons which show that Christ was not advancing in cognition or knowledge proceed from an advance not only according to appearance, but also according to existence, not only according to the knowledge of experience, but also according to the knowledge of simple notion. And therefore those reasons are to be conceded, because they conclude what is true.

1. 2. *To that* which is first objected to the contrary from the authority of the Apostle and from the authority of Bede in the Gloss, it must be said that each authority is understood of the knowledge of experience.

3. *To that* which is objected, that this is natural, namely that from many sensibles there comes to be one memory; it must be said that there is a twofold mode of knowing through experience: one, which is a way into the acquisition of knowledge; the other, which is a way into the exercise of knowledge, so that what was previously known theoretically may afterwards be known practically[^p322-5]. And the first mode of experience is found in the discovery of knowledge, the second consists in the use of knowledge already acquired; and in the first there is a motion from the unknown to the known, but in the second there is a way or process from what is known in one mode, so that it may be known in another mode. — And the first mode regards the imperfection of fallen nature on account of the attached ignorance, but the second regards the state of innocence, in which the habit of knowledge would have preceded its use, and the knowledge of simple notion would have preceded the knowledge of experience; and this mode was in Christ and not the other, because, as will be shown below[^p322-6] concerning the state of fallen nature, Christ ought not to assume the defect of ignorance. But the Philosopher, in the aforesaid progress of knowledge, proceeds according to the state of fallen nature, which need not be found in Christ.

4. *To that* which is objected, that the agent intellect in Christ was able to abstract; it must be said that the abstraction of a species from material conditions is ordered, in one way, to[^p322-7] generating a habit, but in another way it consists in the judgment of that which is apprehended through the sense, a judgment, I say, made by the intellect. And the first was not in Christ, since his intellect had the habits and species of things, whereas that abstraction would be ordered to the acquisition of a habit and of a knowledge not yet acquired, and so would have attached to it the defect of ignorance. But the second was in Christ, yet from this it does not follow that he learned anything anew, or advanced in knowledge, but only that he considered something with the intellect roused by the lower power.
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5. *To that* which is objected, that his sense was able to compose and to retain; it must be said that that does not make an advance in speculative cognition, but in experimental cognition, since the things which the sense composed or divided were more known in the intellect, not only as to their essences, but also as to their comparisons[^p323-1], according to which compositions and divisions can be formally varied. Hence it is otherwise concerning the cognition of things in Christ and in any Angel. For the Angels were able to advance in the cognition of things by composing and dividing and comparing, even by the knowledge of simple notion, although they did not receive new species; but Christ not at all, on account of the fullness and perfection of cognition which it was fitting that his soul should have from the first beginning of its condition.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8 [Hebrews 5:8].

la: Vers. 52. — Glossa, quae ut *ordinaria* invenitur apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex Beda, in hunc locum, et est secundum Ambros., de Incarn. domin. sacram. c. 7. n. 72. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIII. circa med., et pag. 282, nota 3, ubi verba Fulgentii.

en: Verse 52 [Luke 2:52]. — The Gloss, which is found as the *ordinary* gloss in Strabo and Lyra, is taken from Bede, on this passage, and is according to Ambrose, *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*, c. 7, n. 72. Cf. above, the *littera* of the Master, d. XIII, near the middle, and p. 282, note 3, where the words of Fulgentius are given.

la: Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 1. in fine. — Seq. testimon. est Aristot., II. Poster. c. 18. (c. 15.), et I. Metaph. c. 1. — Pro *una experientia* (ἐμπειρία μία) cod. K *unum experimentum*, et pro *experimentis* codd. H Z aa *experientiis*.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, bk. III, c. 6. Cf. above, the *littera* of the Master, d. II, c. 1, at the end. — The following testimony is from Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, c. 18 (c. 15), and *Metaphysics* I, c. 1. — For *one experience* (ἐμπειρία μία) codex K reads *one experiment*, and for *experiments* codices H, Z, aa read *experiences*.

la: Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 2. sensum *communem* describit his verbis: Est autem quaedam et communis potentia sequens omnes [sensus exteriores], qua [animal] et quod videt et audit sentit. Non enim visu quidem videt quod videt, et iudicat utique et potest discernere, quod alia quidem dulcia sunt ab albis, nec gustu, nec visu, nec ambobus, sed quadam communi particula omnium sensoriorum; nam est quidem sensus unus et principale sensorium unum etc. Cfr. II. de Anima, text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2.). Cfr. etiam ibid. text. 153. seqq. (III. c. 3.), ubi de potentia imaginativa.

en: Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 2, describes the *common* sense in these words: But there is also a certain common power following upon all [the exterior senses], by which [the animal] perceives both what it sees and what it hears. For it is not by sight that it sees what it sees, and yet it judges and is able to discern that sweet things are other than white things — neither by taste, nor by sight, nor by both, but by a certain common portion of all the sensories; for there is indeed one sense and one principal sensory, etc. Cf. *On the Soul* II, text 136 ff. (III, c. 2). Cf. also ibid., text 153 ff. (III, c. 3), where he treats of the imaginative power.

la: Cap. 2, 52. — Pro *Gregorius* edd. substituerunt *Beda*; cfr. supra pag. 274, nota 4. Gregor. Nazian., homil. 20. n. 65. sic ait: Proficiebat enim, inquit, ut aetate, ita etiam sapientia, non quod haec in illo incrementum caperent; quid enim eo quod a principio perfectum erat, perfectius esse possit? sed quod haec paulatim detegerentur et elucerent.

en: Chapter 2, 52. — For *Gregory* the editions substituted *Bede*; cf. above, p. 274, note 4. Gregory Nazianzen, Homily 20, n. 65, speaks thus: «He advanced,» he says, «as in age, so also in wisdom, not that these took any increase in him; for what could be more perfect than what was perfect from the beginning? but that these were gradually uncovered and shone forth.»

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi in textu origin. post *sapientia* plura adiuncta reperiuntur.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, bk. III, c. 22, where in the original text several additions are found after *wisdom*.

la: Ioan. 1, 14: Plenum gratiae et veritatis.

en: John 1:14: Full of grace and truth.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. — De *maiori* vide quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. tome II, p. 119, note 8. — Concerning the *major* [premise] see the preceding question.

la: Averroes, III. de Caelo et mundo, text. 67; II. de Anima, text. 67. et III. text. 4.

en: Averroes, *On the Heavens and the Earth* III, text 67; *On the Soul* II, text 67, and III, text 4.

la: Quaest. praeced. Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 9. — Paulo inferius ante *Cognitio simplicis* multi codd. ponunt *et*. Deinde pro *conditionis* cod. W substituit *creationis*.

en: The preceding question. Cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, bk. I, c. 9. — A little below, before *The knowledge of simple [notion]*, many codices put *and*. Then for *condition* codex W substitutes *creation*.

la: De Incarn. domin. sacram. c. 7. n. 72. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIII. circa medium. — Seq. Script. loc. est Hebr. 5. 8. — Glossa subinde allata est *ordinaria* in Ps. 15, 7; sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc loc. et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. — Post pauca pro *proficeret* edd. *profecerit*.

en: *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*, c. 7, n. 72. Cf. above, the *littera* of the Master, d. XIII, near the middle. — The following scriptural passage is Hebrews 5:8. — The Gloss thereupon adduced is the *ordinary* gloss on Ps. 15:7; it is taken from Augustine, *Enarration* on this passage, and is found in Strabo and Lyra. — A little after, for *would advance* the editions read *advanced*.

la: Cod. L *sciebat*; edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd., omisso *prius* (quod etiam in codd. A H desideratur), *proficiebat*; perperam.

en: Codex L reads *knew* [*sciebat*]; editions 1, 2 with several codices, having omitted *previously*, read *was advancing* [*proficiebat*]; wrongly.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, c. 1.

la: Dist. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *progressu* cod. X *processu*.

en: Distinction 15, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, for *progress* codex X reads *process*.

la: Non pauci codd. falso *ordinantur*.

en: Not a few codices wrongly read *are ordered* [*ordinantur*].

la: Edd. cum multis codd. vitiose *compositiones*. — De naturali cognitione Angelorum vide II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

en: The editions, with many codices, faultily read *compositions* [*compositiones*]. — Concerning the natural cognition of the Angels, see II Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod Christus non potuerit proficere in scientia *infusa*, saltem quoad habitum, inter omnes constat; item, quod proficere potuerit secundum scientiam *experimentalem*, quatenus per usum sensuum multa nova expertus sit et intuitive cognoverit. Cum autem intellectus humanus usu sensuum acquirat species intelligibiles, et inde habitum demonstrativum sive cognitionem abstractivam *habitualem*; restat quaestio, utrum Christus talem habitum scientiae naturali modo acquisiverit, et sic profecerit. Negative respondent cum S. Bonav. Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. m. 2. circa finem), Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5, Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2, a. 4. q. 3, Scot., hic q. 3. n. 6, Durand., hic q. 4, quorum ratio principalis est, quod duo habitus scientiae *per accidens* infusae et acquisitae sint eiusdem rationis (quod discipuli S. Thomae negant); porro dicunt, etiam adversarios statuere, quod duae formae eiusdem rationis non possint simul esse in eodem subiecto (cfr. 4. fundam.), et quod Christus iam habuerit habitum scientiae omnium rerum per accidens infusum. Huic negativae sententiae etiam S. Thom. prius adhaesit in Comment. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 5.); sed postea in Sum. (III. q. 9. a. 4.) quaestionem affirmative solvit.

**II.** Seq. (3.) quaestio, de qua iam egit Magister (hic c. 2.), ab omnibus concorditer solvitur et a nostro Doctore gravibus argumentis probatur. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 14. m. 2. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 16. q. 2. n. 9. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. III. q. 13. a. 1-4. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That Christ could not advance in *infused* knowledge, at least as to the habit, is agreed among all; likewise, that he could advance according to *experimental* knowledge, inasmuch as through the use of the senses he experienced many new things and knew them intuitively. But since the human intellect acquires intelligible species through the use of the senses, and thence a demonstrative habit or *habitual* abstractive cognition, there remains the question whether Christ acquired such a habit of knowledge in the natural mode, and thus advanced. Together with St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales (Summa, part III, member 2, near the end), Peter of Tarentaise (here, art. 5), Richard of Mediavilla (here, art. 3, q. 2, and art. 4, q. 3), Scotus (here, q. 3, n. 6), Durandus (here, q. 4) answer negatively; their principal reason is that two habits of knowledge — *per accidens* infused and acquired — are of the same account (which the disciples of St. Thomas deny); moreover they say that the adversaries too lay it down that two forms of the same account cannot be at once in the same subject (cf. the 4th fundamentum), and that Christ already had the habit of the knowledge of all things infused per accidens. To this negative opinion St. Thomas too at first adhered in his Commentary (here, art. 3, quaestiuncula 5); but afterwards in the Summa (III, q. 9, art. 4) he resolved the question affirmatively.

**II.** The following (third) question, of which the Master has already treated (here, ch. 2), is concordantly resolved by all and is proved by our Doctor with weighty arguments. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 14, m. 2. — Scotus, III Sent., d. 16, q. 2, nn. 9 ff. — St. Thomas, here, art. 4; Summa III, q. 13, arts. 1–4. — Bl. Albert, here, art. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, art. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, art. 5, qq. 1–3. — Durandus, here, q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
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**[?] flags.** None — the region (pp.321–323) is fully legible at 450 dpi; Respondeo, solutiones, scholion, and all footers re-set column-by-column from the PDF.


title: Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum Deus communicaverit animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit omniscientiam.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus communicaverit animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit ei omniscientiam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Philippenses secundo[^p323-2]: *Dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen:* ergo si non dedit ei nomen sine re, dedit igitur illi virtutem super omnem virtutem et potentiam super omnem potentiam: ergo dedit ei omnipotentiam.

2. Item, cum tria sint in anima, potentia, scientia et voluntas, ut vult Richardus[^p323-3], voluntas praesupponit scientiam, et scientia praesupponit potentiam: ergo natura, quae est capax scientiae, est capax potentiae: ergo quae est capax omniscientiae est capax omnipotentiae; sed anima Christi fuit capax omniscientiae, sicut supra[^p323-4] ostensum fuit: ergo fuit capax omnipotentiae.

3. Item, amplioris extensionis est scientia quam potentia — omne enim quod Deus potest, scit, sed non convertitur — sed quod capax est rei maioris est capax rei minoris[^p323-5]: ergo si anima Christi fuit capax omniscientiae, fuit etiam capax omnipotentiae: ergo debuit Deus ei communicare omnipotentiam.

4. Item, posse scire unum scibile est potentiae, ergo posse scire duo scibilia est maioris potentiae, et sic procedendo: ergo posse scire infinita scibilia est summae et infinitae potentiae; sed anima Christi potuit scire infinita scibilia[^p323-6]: ergo Deus communicavit ei omnipotentiam.

5. Item, artifex materialis non solum communicat filio suo scientiam simplicis notitiae, sed etiam scientiam practicam: ergo multo fortius hoc[^p323-7] Deus communicavit animae Christi; sed scientia practica habet operationem coniunctam, et operatio habet potentiam praeviam: ergo si Deus communicavit animae Christi scientiam practicam omnium rerum, communicavit ergo ei omnipotentiam.

6. Item, sicut intellectus animae Christi coniunctus est divinae sapientiae, ita etiam et virtus illius animae iuncta est divinae potentiae — dicimus enim Christum *Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam*[^p323-8] — ergo sicut intellectus animae Christi propter coniunctionem eius ad summam sapientiam est factus omnisciens, ita et virtus propter coniunctionem cum summa potentia debuit fieri omnipotens.

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**Sed contra:** 1. Omnis potentia creaturae sequitur ipsam substantiam creaturae; sed omnipotentia praecedit substantiam omnis creaturae, quia potest producere omne ens[^p324-1]: ergo nulli creaturae communicari potuit omnipotentia.

2. Item, nihil habens omnipotentiam potest ab aliquo excedi vel superari, quia nihil est maius omnipotente; sed necesse est, omnem creaturam a Deo excedi et superari: ergo impossibile est, alicui creaturae omnipotentiam communicari.

3. Item, « nullius substantiae finitae potest esse virtus infinita », sicut dicit Philosophus[^p324-2], et ratio manifestat; sed omnipotentia est virtus infinita: ergo nulli substantiae finitae potest communicari omnipotentia. Sed omnis creatura est substantiae finitae, cum sit creata *in numero, pondere et mensura:* ergo etc.

4. Item, nulla virtus entis creati transcendit *ens*[^p324-3]; sed omnipotentia transcendit *ens*, quia potest de *non-ente* facere *ens*: ergo impossibile est, alicui virtuti creatae dari omnipotentiam.

> **Conclusio.** Nec animae Christi nec alicui creaturae potest omnipotentia communicari ut proprietas ei inhaerens.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nec animae Christi nec alicui creaturae potest omnipotentia communicari, nisi eatenus, qua communicatur ei nomen et excellentia divinitatis, hoc est per communicationem idiomatum, quae ortum habet ex personali unione — sicut enim possumus dicere, quod homo est Deus, ita possumus dicere, quod homo est omnipotens — et sicut *excellentia divinitatis* nulli communicari potest sicut forma et proprietas eidem inhaerens substantialiter, vel accidentaliter; sic etiam nec omnipotentia.

Ratio autem, quare omnipotentia communicari non potest alicui creaturae, est, quia omnis creatura eo ipso, quod ex nihilo est, deficit a summa stabilitate, unde non *existit* per se ipsam; deficit a summa simplicitate, unde non *agit* per se totam; deficit a summa immensitate, unde *distare* potest in ipsa virtus a substantia[^p324-4]. Et quoniam *a se non subsistit nec in se*, nisi sustentetur a divina potentia; ideo impossibile est, ipsam esse *omnipotentem*; non enim potest *se ipsam* sustinere. — Rursus, quoniam ex se tota non agit, non potest in totam rei substantiam; et ideo non potest esse omnipotens, cum non possit totum producere. — Postremo, quia virtus eius *distat* a substantia, tantum potest elongari, quod omnino deficiet, unde non potest in omnia. — Sicut igitur soli Deo convenit summa stabilitas, summa simplicitas, summa etiam immensitas; sic etiam omnipotentia, quae necessario requirit ista tria. Et ideo omnipotentia communicari non potest alicui creaturae, nec animae Christi nec alii. — Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen; dicendum, quod datio illius nominis fuit per communicationem idiomatum, ut homo ille diceretur esse Deus et Dei Filius. De hac autem communicatione non intelligitur ad praesens; ideo auctoritas illa nihil facit ad propositum.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod potentia antecedit scientiam; dicendum, quod potentia dicitur dupliciter: respectu actus *interioris* et respectu actus *exterioris*. Dicimus enim, aliquem posse *scire* et *velle*; dicimus etiam, posse *operari*. Cum ergo dicimus, quod in creatura potentia antecedit scientiam, hoc verum est respectu actus interioris, sed non exterioris[^p324-5], quia potentia operativa consequitur scientiam. Cum autem dicitur omnipotentia esse in aliquo, hoc non intelligitur respectu actus interioris tantum, sed etiam respectu exterioris; ideo non sequitur, quodsi in aliquo sit omniscientia, quod in eo sit omnipotentia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amplioris extensionis est scientia quam potentia; dicendum, quod esse maioris extensionis est dupliciter: vel respectu *obiecti*, vel respectu *subiecti*. Si loquamur de extensione respectu *obiecti*, maioris extensionis est omniscientia quam omnipotentia, quia respectu plurium est. Si autem loquamur de extensione respectu *subiecti*, maioris amplitudinis est omnipotentia quam omniscientia, quantum est de *propria* ratione utriusque. Nam omnipotentia ponit subiectum suum omnino immensum et infinitum, omniscientia vero non, sicut in praecedentibus[^p324-6] fuit ostensum. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi alicui subiecto naturae creatae possit communicari omniscientia, quod propter hoc possit ei communicari omnipotentia. Communicatio enim omnipotentiae plus respicit amplitudinem *subiecti* quam *obiecti*.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod posse scire omne scibile est posse; dicendum, quod cum anima cognoscat in Verbo, *cognoscere* ipsius animae plus est in *recipiendo* ab ipso Verbo quam in *agendo* in ipsum Verbum; et ideo posse scire aliquid scibile in ipso Verbo est potentiae utique *activae et passivae*, sed *activae* ex parte Verbi illuminantis, *passivae* vero ex parte animae suscipientis. Cum ergo infertur, quod posse scire infinita sit potentiae infinitae; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod in creatura sit infinitas potentiae *activae*, sed in ipsa est infinitas potentiae *passivae*; et hoc quidem non repugnat creaturae, licet ei repugnaret infinitas potentiae activae. Quoniam ergo posse facere infinita dicit infinitatem potentiae activae, posse vero scire omnia dicit infinitatem potentiae passivae; hinc est, quod quamvis alicui creaturae conveniat, ut possit omnia scire, non tamen convenit, ut possit omnia facere. Et si tu obiicias, quod scire non tantum est *pati*, verum etiam *agere*; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de scientia actuali, quae quidem consistit in actu iudicandi, et illa quidem proprium est solius Dei nec potuit alicui creaturae communicari. Sed non est verum de cognitione habituali, sicut in praecedentibus[^p325-1] fuit ostensum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus communicare debuit Christo non tantum scientiam speculativam, verum etiam practicam; dicendum, quod scientia practica dicitur duobus modis: uno modo dicitur scientia practica, quae est *de opere*; sicut moralis philosophia dicitur de opere, quae est de operibus procedentibus[^p325-2] a libera voluntate. Alio modo dicitur scientia practica, quae est *de opere et in opere*; sicut faber, quando fabricat, dicitur habere cognitionem practicam fabricandi. *Primo* modo communicavit Deus scientiam practicam animae Christi, quia Christus cognitionem habuit omnium operum divinorum; *secundo* modo non communicavit ei, pro eo quod anima Christi in cunctis suis operibus non potuit ei cooperari. Ideo non est simile de artifice et eius filio, quia filius artificis potest aequari in scientia et virtute, non sic autem anima Christi Verbo; simile autem erit, si loquamur de Christo secundum divinam naturam. *Pater* enim *omnia demonstrat Filio, et quaecumque Pater facit, haec omnia et Filius facit*, sicut dicitur in Ioannis quinto[^p325-3].

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod ita unitur virtus virtuti, sicut intellectus sapientiae; dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut iam praedictum est, eo quod operatio intellectus est in *suscipiendo*, operatio vero potentiae activae magis consistit in *agendo*. Et huius signum est, quia[^p325-4] multo excellentioris virtutis est aliquid posse *facere*, quam posse *nosse*; multo enim difficilius est facere unam formicam, quam cognoscere caelum et terram. *Cognoscens* enim, eo ipso quod cognoscens, non influit in ipsum cognitum; *potens* vero, in eo ipso quod potens est, comparatur ad ipsum possibile sicut ad effectum. Et hinc est, quod virtus operativa in Christo non est facta *omnipotens*, sicut intellectus eius factus est *omnisciens*[^p325-5].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether God communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, as He communicated omniscience.*

Thirdly it is asked whether God communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, as He communicated to it omniscience. And that He did, it seems.

1. To the Philippians, chapter two[^p323-2]: *He gave Him a name which is above every name:* therefore if He did not give Him the name without the reality, He gave Him therefore a power above every power and a potency above every potency: therefore He gave Him omnipotence.

2. Likewise, since there are three things in the soul, potency, knowledge, and will, as Richard holds[^p323-3], will presupposes knowledge, and knowledge presupposes potency: therefore a nature which is capable of knowledge is capable of potency: therefore that which is capable of omniscience is capable of omnipotence; but Christ's soul was capable of omniscience, as was shown above[^p323-4]: therefore it was capable of omnipotence.

3. Likewise, knowledge is of wider extension than potency — for everything that God can do, He knows, but it is not converse — but that which is capable of the greater thing is capable of the lesser[^p323-5]: therefore if Christ's soul was capable of omniscience, it was also capable of omnipotence: therefore God ought to have communicated omnipotence to it.

4. Likewise, to be able to know one knowable belongs to a potency, therefore to be able to know two knowables belongs to a greater potency, and proceeding thus: therefore to be able to know infinite knowables belongs to a supreme and infinite potency; but Christ's soul was able to know infinite knowables[^p323-6]: therefore God communicated omnipotence to it.

5. Likewise, a material craftsman communicates to his son not only the knowledge of simple acquaintance, but also practical knowledge: therefore much more strongly did God communicate this[^p323-7] to Christ's soul; but practical knowledge has an operation joined to it, and the operation has a potency prior to it: therefore if God communicated to Christ's soul the practical knowledge of all things, He communicated therefore to it omnipotence.

6. Likewise, just as the intellect of Christ's soul is conjoined to the divine wisdom, so too the power of that soul is joined to the divine potency — for we call Christ *the power of God and the wisdom of God*[^p323-8] — therefore just as the intellect of Christ's soul, on account of its conjunction with supreme wisdom, became all-knowing, so too the power, on account of its conjunction with supreme potency, ought to have become omnipotent.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every potency of a creature follows the very substance of the creature; but omnipotence precedes the substance of every creature, since it can produce every being[^p324-1]: therefore omnipotence could be communicated to no creature.

2. Likewise, nothing having omnipotence can be exceeded or surpassed by anything, since nothing is greater than the omnipotent; but it is necessary that every creature be exceeded and surpassed by God: therefore it is impossible that omnipotence be communicated to any creature.

3. Likewise, « of no finite substance can there be an infinite power », as the Philosopher says[^p324-2], and reason makes manifest; but omnipotence is an infinite power: therefore to no finite substance can omnipotence be communicated. But every creature is of a finite substance, since it is created *in number, weight, and measure:* therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no power of a created being transcends *being*[^p324-3]; but omnipotence transcends *being*, since it can make *being* out of *non-being:* therefore it is impossible that omnipotence be given to any created power.

> **Conclusion.** Neither to Christ's soul nor to any creature can omnipotence be communicated as a property inhering in it.

**I respond:** It must be said that neither to Christ's soul nor to any creature can omnipotence be communicated, except to the extent that the name and excellence of divinity is communicated to it, that is, through the communication of idioms, which has its origin from the personal union — for just as we can say that the man is God, so we can say that the man is omnipotent — and just as the *excellence of divinity* can be communicated to none as a form and property inhering in it substantially or accidentally; so neither can omnipotence.

But the reason why omnipotence cannot be communicated to any creature is that every creature, by the very fact that it is from nothing, falls short of supreme stability, whence it does not *exist* through itself; it falls short of supreme simplicity, whence it does not *act* through its whole self; it falls short of supreme immensity, whence the power in it can *stand apart* from the substance[^p324-4]. And since *it does not subsist of itself nor in itself*, unless it be sustained by the divine potency; therefore it is impossible that it be *omnipotent*; for it cannot sustain *itself*. — Again, since it does not act of its whole self, it cannot reach the whole substance of a thing; and therefore it cannot be omnipotent, since it cannot produce the whole. — Lastly, because its power *stands apart* from the substance, it can be so far removed that it altogether fails, whence it cannot reach all things. — As therefore to God alone belong supreme stability, supreme simplicity, and supreme immensity also; so too omnipotence, which necessarily requires these three. And therefore omnipotence cannot be communicated to any creature, neither to Christ's soul nor to another. — And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that He gave Him a name which is above every name; it must be said that the giving of that name was through the communication of idioms, so that that man might be called God and the Son of God. But of this communication there is no question at present; therefore that authority does nothing for the point at issue.

2. To that which is objected, that potency precedes knowledge; it must be said that potency is spoken of in two ways: with respect to the *interior* act and with respect to the *exterior* act. For we say that someone can *know* and *will*; we also say that he can *operate*. When therefore we say that in a creature potency precedes knowledge, this is true with respect to the interior act, but not the exterior[^p324-5], since operative potency follows knowledge. But when omnipotence is said to be in something, this is not understood with respect to the interior act only, but also with respect to the exterior; therefore it does not follow that, if omniscience be in something, omnipotence be in it.

3. To that which is objected, that knowledge is of wider extension than potency; it must be said that to be of greater extension is twofold: either with respect to the *object*, or with respect to the *subject*. If we speak of extension with respect to the *object*, omniscience is of wider extension than omnipotence, since it is with respect to more things. But if we speak of extension with respect to the *subject*, omnipotence is of greater amplitude than omniscience, as regards the *proper* account of each. For omnipotence posits its subject as altogether immense and infinite, but omniscience does not, as was shown in what precedes[^p324-6]. And therefore it does not follow that, if omniscience can be communicated to some subject of a created nature, omnipotence can on this account be communicated to it. For the communication of omnipotence regards the amplitude of the *subject* more than of the *object*.

4. To that which is objected, that to be able to know every knowable is to be able [to do all]; it must be said that, since the soul knows in the Word, the *knowing* of the soul itself is more in *receiving* from the Word than in *acting* upon the Word; and therefore to be able to know some knowable in the Word belongs indeed to a potency *active and passive*, but *active* on the part of the illuminating Word, *passive* on the part of the receiving soul. When therefore it is inferred that to be able to know infinite things belongs to an infinite potency; it must be said that from this it does not follow that there be in the creature an infinity of *active* potency, but in it there is an infinity of *passive* potency; and this indeed is not repugnant to the creature, although an infinity of active potency would be repugnant to it. Since therefore to be able to do infinite things states an infinity of active potency, but to be able to know all things states an infinity of passive potency; hence it is that, although it befits some creature that it be able to know all things, yet it does not befit it that it be able to do all things. And if you object that to know is not only to *suffer*, but also to *act*; it must be said that this is true of actual knowledge, which indeed consists in the act of judging, and that is the property of God alone and could not be communicated to any creature. But it is not true of habitual cognition, as was shown in what precedes[^p325-1].

5. To that which is objected, that God ought to have communicated to Christ not only speculative knowledge, but also practical; it must be said that practical knowledge is spoken of in two ways: in one way that is called practical knowledge which is *concerning the work*; as moral philosophy is said to be concerning the work, which is concerning works proceeding[^p325-2] from a free will. In another way that is called practical knowledge which is *concerning the work and in the work*; as a smith, when he forges, is said to have practical knowledge of forging. In the *first* way God communicated practical knowledge to Christ's soul, since Christ had cognition of all the divine works; in the *second* way He did not communicate it to Him, for the reason that Christ's soul in all His works could not cooperate with Him. Therefore the case is not similar regarding the craftsman and his son, since the son of a craftsman can be made equal in knowledge and power, but not so Christ's soul to the Word; but it will be similar, if we speak of Christ according to the divine nature. For *the Father shows all things to the Son, and whatever the Father does, all these the Son also does*, as is said in John, chapter five[^p325-3].

6. To that which is objected last, that power is united to power just as the intellect to wisdom; it must be said that the case is not similar, as has already been said, for the reason that the operation of the intellect is in *receiving*, but the operation of the active potency consists rather in *acting*. And a sign of this is that[^p325-4] it is of much more excellent power to be able to *do* something than to be able to *know* it; for it is much more difficult to make one ant than to know heaven and earth. For the *knower*, by the very fact that he is a knower, does not flow into the thing known; but the *one who has power*, in the very fact that he has power, is related to the possible as to an effect. And hence it is that the operative power in Christ was not made *omnipotent*, just as His intellect was made *all-knowing*[^p325-5].

---

la: Vers. 9.

en: Verse 9. [Philippians 2:9.]

la: Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 15, ubi de tribus appropriatis, scil. potentia, sapientia et bonitate, agens ostendit, quod multiplex potentia esse potest, ubi nulla potest esse sapientia, ex. gr. in rebus insensatis et brutis; « econtra autem, ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse. Dat igitur esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae… nulla bonitas inesse poterit, ubi sapientia vel potentia omnino defuerit » etc. Cfr. eius opusc. de Tribus appropriatis Personis in Trinitate.

en: Book VI, *On the Trinity*, c. 15, where, treating of the three appropriated [attributes], namely potency, wisdom, and goodness, he shows that there can be manifold potency where there can be no wisdom, e.g. in things without sense and in brutes; « but, on the contrary, where there is no potency, no wisdom can be present. For to be able to be wise is without doubt to be able to do something. Therefore being able to be gives being able, not [the] wisdom of potency, but [the] potency of wisdom… no goodness can be present where wisdom or potency is altogether lacking » etc. Cf. his opusculum *On the Three [Attributes] Appropriated to the Persons in the Trinity*.

en: Article 2, q. 3.

la: Regula iuris 35. (V. Sext. Decret. in fine): *Plus semper in se continet quod est minus.*

en: Rule of law 35 (in the *Sext* of the Decretals, at the end): *That which is greater always contains within itself what is less.*

la: Vide supra a. 2. q. 3.

en: See above, article 2, q. 3.

la: Edd. *hanc.*

en: The editions [read] *hanc* [this].

la: Epist. I. Cor. 1, 24.

en: First Epistle to the Corinthians 1:24.

la: Cfr. supra d. 11. dub. 1. — De *maiori* vide tom. I. pag. 84, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, d. 11, doubt 1. — On the *major* [premise] see vol. I, p. 84, note 6.

la: Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 78. seqq. (c. 10.). — Testimon. Scripturae est Sap. 11, 21. — Infra pro *est substantiae finitae* cod. K *est substantia finita.*

en: Book VIII of the *Physics*, text 78ff. (c. 10). — The scriptural testimony is Wisdom 11:21. — Below, for *est substantiae finitae* codex K [reads] *est substantia finita.*

la: Quia esse habet rationem *effectus communissimi* et transcendentis omne esse particulare et participatum et per consequens etiam virtutem entis particularis, ut docent Scot. de Rerum principiis, S. Thom. de Potent. q. 3. a. 7, et Bonav. I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. Cfr. etiam tom. II. p. 14, nota 7.

en: Because being has the character of a *most common effect* transcending every particular and participated being, and consequently also [transcending] the power of a particular being, as Scotus teaches in *On the Principles of Things*, St. Thomas *On Potency* q. 3, a. 7, and Bonaventure I *Sent.* d. 43, q. 1, and II *Sent.* d. 1, p. I, a. 2. Cf. also vol. II, p. 14, note 7.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2, d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, d. 43. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Subinde pro *a se non subsistit nec in se*, quae est scriptura cod. N (*nec in se* habent etiam multi alii codd.), edd. *in se non subsistit nec a se.* Pro *nec in se* codd. A D U Y Z bb *nec per se.*

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1; d. 43, q. 1; and II *Sent.* d. 37, a. 1, q. 2. — Thereupon, for *a se non subsistit nec in se*, which is the reading of codex N (*nec in se* is also had by many other codices), the editions [read] *in se non subsistit nec a se.* For *nec in se* codices A D U Y Z bb [read] *nec per se.*

la: Codd. F G I K L T U V Z aa omittunt *sed non exterioris*, pro quo cod. A exhibet *non respectu exterioris.*

en: Codices F G I K L T U V Z aa omit *sed non exterioris*, in place of which codex A presents *non respectu exterioris.*

la: Art. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *maioris amplitudinis* cod. bb *extensionis amplioris.* Versus finem solut. pro *quod propter hoc* codd. E F G I K L T V aa *et propter hoc.*

en: Article 2, q. 3. — A little above, for *maioris amplitudinis* codex bb [reads] *extensionis amplioris.* Toward the end of the solution, for *quod propter hoc* codices E F G I K L T V aa [read] *et propter hoc.*

la: Art. 1. q. 3. ad 6. et a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *proprium* cod. A *propria.*

en: Article 1, q. 3, reply 6, and a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for *proprium* codex A [reads] *propria.*

la: Cod. F, omisso *quae est de operibus*, substituit *procedente.*

en: Codex F, having omitted *quae est de operibus*, substitutes *procedente.*

la: Vers. 19. seq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo superius post *potest aequari* [cod. N *adaequari*] cod. A supplet *artifici.*

en: Verse 19f. [John 5:19f.] Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little above, after *potest aequari* [codex N *adaequari*] codex A supplies *artifici.*

la: Cod. G *quod.*

en: Codex G [reads] *quod.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column-band crops of printed pp. 323–325 (PDF 345–347; offset `pdf = printed + 22`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 22680–22824) as base for clean running prose. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; markers are page-suffixed (`[^p323-N]`, `[^p324-N]`, `[^p325-N]`).

**Opener alignment (verified).** `QUAESTIO III. Utrum Deus communicaverit animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit omniscientiam.` / `Tertio quaeritur…` (raw 22680) — confirmed this is ART. III q3, the *omnipotentiam* question, NOT q1/q2. Running heads confirmed via low-dpi render: p.323 = `DIST. XIV. ART. III. QUAEST. III.`; p.324 = `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (Sed contra + Conclusio + Respondeo begin here); p.325 = `DIST. XIV. DUBIA.` (q3 replies 4–6 finish in the L/R columns, then DUB. I begins). The OCR-embedded running head `DIST. XIV. DUBIA. 323` mid-body was a digit-mangle for **325**, not 323.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.323** (PDF 345): q2's Scholion I–II tail occupies the top; q3 body begins at `QUAESTIO III.` — fund. 1–6 (L-col fund. 1–3, R-col fund. 4–6). Footers: p.323 footer 1 (`Edd. cum multis codd. vitiose compositiones…`) is **q2's** (picked up by d14-a3-q2); **footers 2–8 are q3's** (`Vers. 9.` / Richard *de Trin.* / `Art. 2. q. 3.` / Regula iuris 35 / `Vide supra a. 2. q. 3.` / `Edd. hanc.` / `Epist. I. Cor. 1, 24.`).
- **p.324** (PDF 346): Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo (the *triplex ratio*), and replies 1–3 begin. **Footers 1–6 all q3's** (L-col 1–3 + R-col 4–6).
- **p.325** (PDF 347): q3 replies 4–6 finish (ending `…sicut intellectus eius factus est omnisciens.`, raw 22824). **Footers 1–5 are q3's** (`Art. 1. q. 3. ad 6…` / `Cod. F, omisso quae est de operibus…` / `Vers. 19. seq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c. 2` = John 5:19f / `Cod. G quod.` / `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`); **footers 6–8 belong to the DUBIA (DUB. I)** and are forwarded.

**Apparatus count.** 18 entries (p.323: 7 [footers 2–8]; p.324: 6 [footers 1–6]; p.325: 5 [footers 1–5]). Marker pairing 18/18 (Latin = English).

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. q3 prints no scholion of its own; q2's Scholion I–II already cover the article-level cross-reference (Scholion §II is `Seq. (3.) quaestio…` pointing to this q3). The q3 reply markers self-reference the preceding scholion (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`, p.325 footer 5 = `[^p325-5]`).

**Hand-offs picked up.** From d14-a3-q2: confirmed p.323 footer 1 stays with q2; q3's first body-footer is p.323 footer 2 (`Vers. 9.`, anchoring fund. 1 / Phil 2:9). q3 did NOT re-claim p.323 footer 1.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d14-dubia).** The DUBIA block (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` / `DUB. I.`) begins at raw **22825**, in the L-col of printed **p.325** (PDF 347), immediately after q3's tail `…factus est omnisciens.` Seam grammatically clean. **p.325 footers 6–8 belong to DUB. I** and are its first body-footers: footer 6 = `Cfr. supra pag. 279, nota 8` (DUB.I `maius⁶`); footer 7 = `Proslog. c. 20. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 61, nota 8. — Loc. s. Script. est Exod. 15, 18. — Pro et hoc ante dicit Anselmus complures codd. et tantum, edd. ut.` (DUB.I `Anselmus⁷`); footer 8 = `Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 4, nec non S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.` (DUB.I `similitudine⁸`). DUB. II (`Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nemo novit quae sunt Dei…`) also opens on p.325 with a fresh footer sequence (raw ~22842). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render of the running-head TEXT. DUBIA is the LAST unit of d.14; DISTINCTIO XV begins at raw 22917.

**`[?]` flags.** None. OCR base was clean; every Respondeo/Solutio reading and all 18 footers were confirmed line-by-line against the 450 dpi column-band crops.