title: Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO IV. *Utrum omnia nomina dicta de Deo secundum substantiam dicantur.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum omnia nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam. Et quod non, immo aliter, ostenditur:

1. Auctoritate Augustini quinto *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas, substantialiter dici: quod autem ad aliquid, non substantialiter, sed relative»; sed Pater et Filius dicitur ad aliquid: ergo etc.

2. Item, Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Deus est sine quantitate magnus, sine qualitate bonus, sed non est sine relatione relatus»: ergo relatio vere et proprie manet in Deo, ergo et modus dicendi relative.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia in divinitate sunt aliqua nomina incommunicabilia, ut patet in omnibus[^3] personalibus; sed substantia est communicabilis, cum sit una in tribus: ergo talia nomina non indicant substantiam: ergo in divinis est alius modus dicendi quam secundum substantiam.

4. Item, in divinis est alio et alio modo se habere, quia aliter se habet ad Patrem Filius quam Spiritus sanctus; sed non est aliud et aliud esse sive subsistere: ergo cum hoc contingat intelligere et intellectum dicere, necesse est, quod sit ibi alius modus dicendi et intelligendi quam secundum substantiam: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Omne quod dicitur, aut dicitur secundum substantiam, aut secundum accidens, quia substantia et accidens sufficienter dividunt ens[^4]; sed in divinis nihil dicitur secundum accidens: ergo secundum substantiam.

2. Item, omne quod dicitur, aut dicitur per se, aut non per se. Si per se, tunc secundum substantiam; si non per se, tunc ergo per aliud et in alio; sed omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, dicuntur per se: ergo omnia dicuntur secundum substantiam.

3. Item, dici secundum substantiam et[^5] secundum relationem aut dicit diversitatem a parte rei, aut a parte modi intelligendi sive modi dicendi. Si a parte rei: ergo in Deo est diversitas et compositio; si a parte modi dicendi: tunc cum diversus sit modus dicendi in hoc quod est *bonus* et in hoc quod est *magnus* et in hoc quod est *Deus* — quia si quaeratur: *quantus* est Deus? respondetur[^6] *magnus*, non respondetur *bonus*; similiter si quaeratur: *qualis* est Deus? respondetur *bonus*, non *magnus* — ergo non tantum essent duo modi, sed etiam multo plures quam duo.

4. Item, quod[^7] respondetur ad quaestionem factam per *quid* dicitur secundum substantiam et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum; sed nomina relativa respondentur ad quaestionem factam per *quid* de Deo: ergo dicuntur secundum substantiam. Probatio minoris: Augustinus in libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^8]: *Si quaeratur, quid est Deus, convenienter respondetur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus*.

5. Item, cum quaedam sint in divinis, quae

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non dicuntur secundum substantiam nec[^9] secundum relationem, ut hoc nomen *incarnatus*, hoc nomen *ingenitus*, videtur quod ista divisio non complectatur omnia nomina divina.

> **Conclusio.** *Non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam, sed quaedam etiam per modum quantitatis vel qualitatis et insuper quaedam secundum relationem.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod est dici diversimode secundum triplicem differentiam.

Uno modo dici diversimode attenditur secundum diversum modum essendi, qui est per se et per accidens; et hoc quidem modo non est dici diversimode in divinis, quia ista diversitas modi ponit diversitatem essentialem[^10] in re dicta; et quantum ad hoc unus solus modus dicendi est in Deo. Nam omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, sunt ipse Deus et eius substantia.

Alio modo dici diversimode est secundum diversum modum intelligendi, qui quidem attenditur secundum aliam et aliam rationem sive medium[^11] cognoscendi; et sic non tantum est dici diversimode in nominibus divinis, immo omnimode, quia Deus non tantum cognoscitur per diversa, immo per omnia rerum genera; et sic nomina dicta de Deo, quaedam dicuntur per modum substantiae, ut *Deus*; quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut *magnus*[^12]; quaedam per modum qualitatis, ut *bonus*; et sic de aliis omnibus.

Tertio modo dici diversimode est secundum diversum modum se habendi; quod[^13] quidem attenditur quantum ad absolutum et ad comparatum sive relatum; et hic quidem modus diversitatis minor est quam primus, et maior quam secundus. Minor quam primus, quia secundum primum attenditur diversitas essentialis et compositio; maior quam secundus, quia secundum illum nulla[^14] omnino attenditur in re distinctio. Secundum autem istum modum attenditur in eo unitas et pluralitas: unitas secundum absolutum, pluralitas secundum respectum. Et quantum ad hunc modum sunt solum duo modi dicendi, scilicet secundum substantiam, ut illa quae dicuntur ad se[^15], et secundum relationem, ut illa quae dicuntur ad aliquid. Quia vero haec non dicunt alium modum essendi, ideo haec praedicantur de illis et sunt unum; et quia dicunt alium modum se habendi, ideo secundum illa unitas, secundum haec pluralitas[^16]. Ex his patent obiecta.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod omne quod dicitur, dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum accidens; dicendum, quod in divinis habet instantiam, ubi relatio non est accidens, nec tamen dicitur secundum substantiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod omne quod dicitur in divinis, est ens per se; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen non sequitur: dicitur ut ens per se, ergo secundum substantiam, quia non dicitur: nomen dici secundum substantiam, ut substantia dicitur per se, sed ut dicitur ad se[^17].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, qualis sit haec diversitas, aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum intelligendi; dicendum, quod secundum modum se[^18] habendi, qui non tantum est in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto, quod nomina relativa respondentur ad interrogationem factam de substantia; dicendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter: aut ens per se, aut ad se[^19]. Si ut ens per se, sic omnia et relativa et absoluta dicunt in Deo substantiam; et quia hoc modo substantia respondetur ad quaestionem factam per *quid*, ideo omnia possunt responderi. Si autem dicatur substantia ut ens absolutum, non comparatum, sic dicitur secundum substantiam, quod dicitur ad se. Et sic non[^20]

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accipit Augustinus; et sic *Pater* et *Filius*, et nomina relativa secundum substantiam non dicuntur.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod multa dicuntur de Deo, quae non dicuntur secundum substantiam nec secundum relationem; dicendum, quod dici relative in divinis potest esse dupliciter. Quaedam enim nomina dicuntur relative ex principali nominis intellectu, quaedam ex consequenti.

Et prima differentia dividitur in tres: quia quaedam significant relationem et dicuntur relative, ut *Pater*; quaedam significant relationem, ut *paternitas*, quae non dicitur ad alterum, sed est ipsum quo alterum refertur; quaedam dicuntur relative, quia privant relationem, ut *ingenitus*, *improcessibilis*; tamen ista non est privatio pura, ut infra videbitur.

Quae autem important relationem ex consequenti intellectu, similiter sunt secundum triplicem differentiam. Quaedam enim dicuntur dici relative, quia ponuntur pro relativis, ut cum dicitur: *Deus generat Deum*, id est *Pater Filium*. Quaedam dicuntur relative, quia claudunt in suo significato interius relationem, ut cum dicitur *incarnatus* — sensus enim est, id est *carni unitus*; unio enim dicit relationem, quae singularem personam respicit — sive *assumere carnem* et huiusmodi. Quaedam dicuntur relative, quia claudunt relationem in suppositis, ut *similis* et *aequalis*; non enim sunt similes, nisi qui referuntur et distinguuntur.

english:
### QUESTION IV. *Whether all names said of God are said according to substance.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether all names said of God are said according to substance. And that they are not, but rather otherwise, is shown:

1. By the authority of Augustine in the fifth [book] *On the Trinity*[^1]: «Let us hold this especially, that whatever is said of that most excellent and divine sublimity *with respect to itself* (*ad se*) is said substantially: but what is said *in relation to something* (*ad aliquid*) [is said] not substantially, but relatively»; but *Father* and *Son* are said in relation to something: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*[^2]: «God is great without quantity, good without quality, but is not related without relation»: therefore relation truly and properly remains in God, therefore also the mode of being said relatively.

3. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason, since in the divinity there are certain incommunicable names, as is clear in all[^3] the personal [names]; but substance is communicable, since it is one in three: therefore such names do not indicate substance: therefore in the divine [things] there is another mode of being said than according to substance.

4. Likewise, in the divine [things] there is a being-disposed in one way and another, since the Son stands toward the Father otherwise than the Holy Spirit; but there is not another and another being or subsisting: therefore since this happens to be understood and the understood thing said, it is necessary that there be another mode of being said and of being understood than according to substance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Everything that is said is said either according to substance or according to accident, since substance and accident sufficiently divide being[^4]; but in the divine [things] nothing is said according to accident: therefore [it is said] according to substance.

2. Likewise, everything that is said is said either *per se* (through itself), or not *per se*. If *per se*, then according to substance; if not *per se*, then therefore through another and in another; but all things which are said of God are said *per se*: therefore all are said according to substance.

3. Likewise, to be said according to substance and[^5] according to relation either expresses a diversity on the side of the thing, or on the side of the mode of understanding or the mode of being said. If on the side of the thing: then in God there is diversity and composition; if on the side of the mode of being said: then since the mode of being said is diverse in this, that he is *good*, and in this, that he is *great*, and in this, that he is *God* — for if it be asked, *how great* is God? the response is[^6] *great*, the response is not *good*; similarly if it be asked, *what kind* is God? the response is *good*, not *great* — therefore there would not only be two modes, but also many more than two.

4. Likewise, that which[^7] is given in answer to a question framed by *what* (*per quid*) is said according to substance both as to the thing and as to the mode; but relative names are given in answer to a question framed by *what* concerning God: therefore they are said according to substance. Proof of the minor: Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^8]: *If it be asked, what is God, the fitting response is: Father and Son and Holy Spirit*.

5. Likewise, since there are certain things in the divine [order] which

are not said according to substance nor[^9] according to relation, as this name *incarnate*, this name *unbegotten*, it seems that this division does not embrace all the divine names.

> **Conclusion.** *Not all names are said of God according to substance, but some also by mode of quantity or quality, and moreover some according to relation.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that to be said diversely (*dici diversimode*) [occurs] according to a threefold difference.

In one way, to be said diversely is considered according to a diverse mode of being, which is *per se* and *per accidens* (through itself and through accident); and in this mode there is no being-said-diversely in the divine [things], since this diversity of mode posits an essential[^10] diversity in the thing said; and as to this there is in God only one mode of being said. For all things which are said of God are God himself and his substance.

In another way, to be said diversely is according to a diverse mode of understanding, which is considered according to one and another account or means[^11] of knowing; and so there is not only being-said-diversely among the divine names, but rather in every way, since God is known not only through diverse [things], but through all the genera of things; and so among the names said of God, some are said by mode of substance, as *God*; some by mode of quantity, as *great*[^12]; some by mode of quality, as *good*; and so of all the others.

In the third way, to be said diversely is according to a diverse mode of being-disposed; which[^13] indeed is considered as regards the absolute and the compared or related; and this mode of diversity is *less* than the first, and *greater* than the second. Less than the first, because according to the first an essential diversity and composition is considered; greater than the second, because according to that [second] no[^14] distinction at all is considered in the thing. But according to this [third] mode unity and plurality are considered in him: unity according to the absolute, plurality according to relation. And as to this mode there are only two modes of being said, namely according to substance, as those things which are said *with respect to itself* (*ad se*)[^15], and according to relation, as those things which are said *in relation to something* (*ad aliquid*). But because these do not bespeak another mode of being, therefore these are predicated of those and are one; and because they bespeak another mode of being-disposed, therefore according to the former [there is] unity, according to the latter plurality[^16]. From these [points] the objections are clear.

1. For as to what is objected, that everything which is said is said according to substance or according to accident; it must be said that in the divine [things] it has an instance [against it], where relation is not an accident, nor yet is said according to substance.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that everything which is said in the divine [things] is being *per se*; it must be said that this is true, but yet it does not follow: it is said as being *per se*, therefore according to substance, since "name to be said according to substance" is not used in the sense in which substance is said *per se*, but as it is said *with respect to itself* (*ad se*)[^17].

3. To that which is objected, of what kind this diversity is — whether according to the thing, or according to the mode of understanding; it must be said that [it is] according to the mode of being-[^18]disposed (*se habendi*), which is not only in our intellect, but also in the thing.

4. To that which is objected fourthly, that relative names are given in answer to an interrogation framed concerning substance; it must be said that *substance* is said in two ways: either as *being per se*, or as *ad se*[^19]. If as *being per se*, then all [names], both relatives and absolutes, bespeak substance in God; and because in this mode substance is given in answer to a question framed by *what*, therefore all [names] can be given in answer. But if substance be said as *being absolute, not compared*, then that is said according to substance which is said *with respect to itself*. And it is not in this [sense][^20]

that Augustine takes [it]; and so *Father* and *Son*, and the relative names, are not said according to substance.

5. To that which is objected lastly, that many [things] are said of God which are said neither according to substance nor according to relation; it must be said that to be said relatively in the divine [things] can be in two ways. For some names are said relatively *from the principal understanding of the name*, some *from a consequent [understanding]*.

And the first difference is divided into three: for some [names] signify relation and are said relatively, as *Father*; some signify relation [as such], as *paternity*, which is not said in relation to another, but is itself that by which the other is referred; some are said relatively because they take away (*privant*) relation, as *unbegotten*, *improcessible*; yet this is not pure privation, as will be seen below.

But those which import relation *from a consequent understanding* likewise are according to a threefold difference. For some are said to be said relatively, because they are put in place of relatives, as when it is said: *God begets God*, that is, *the Father [begets] the Son*. Some are said relatively, because they enclose relation inwardly in their signified [meaning], as when it is said *incarnate* — for the sense is, that is, *united to flesh*; for union bespeaks a relation, which regards the singular person — or *to assume flesh* and the like. Some are said relatively, because they enclose relation in their *supposita*, as *like* and *equal*; for they are not like, except those which are referred and distinguished.

la: Cap. 8. n. 9. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, in quibus verbis Vat. contra originale et mss. nec non ed. 1, posito *dicitur* pro *dici* et *ad aliud* loco *ad aliquid*, tum post *autem* tum post *relative* addit *dicitur*. In fine argumenti ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquid* pro incongruo *aliud*.

en: [Augustine, *On the Trinity* V,] c. 8, n. 9. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, in which words the Vatican [edition], against the original and the manuscripts and also against ed. 1 — having set *dicitur* in place of *dici*, and *ad aliud* in place of *ad aliquid* — adds *dicitur* both after *autem* and after *relative*. At the end of the argument, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted *aliquid* for the incongruous *aliud*.

la: Cap. 4, ubi quoad sensum continetur haec propositio, in quantum scil. Boethius ibi ostendit, quod cum quis alia praedicamenta praeter relationem in divinam verterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur in substantiam. Quod si verba propositionis attendas, videntur sumta ex Augustino, V. *de Trin.* c. 1. et 8.

en: C. 4, where this proposition is contained as to the sense, namely insofar as Boethius there shows that when one transfers the other predicaments — beyond relation — into divine predication, all are changed into substance. But if you attend to the words of the proposition, they seem to be drawn from Augustine, V *On the Trinity*, c. 1 and 8.

la: Ed. 1 *nominibus* pro *omnibus*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *nominibus* in place of *omnibus*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 116 nota 6.

en: Cf. above page 116, note 6.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* incongrue et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1 *aut* loco *et*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex *cc*, incongruously and against the other codices together with ed. 1, [reads] *aut* in place of *et*.

la: In cod. V hic et mox post *non respondetur* adiicitur *quod est*, ac paulo infra post *modi* additur *dicendi*.

en: In codex V, here and soon after *non respondetur*, *quod est* is added; and a little below, after *modi*, *dicendi* is added.

la: Codd. PQ *quidquid*. Ed. 1 cum cod. *cc* propositionem minorem exhibet sic: *sed per nomina relativa respondetur ad quaestionem* etc., ac dein ed. 1 nomini *Deo* praefigit *ipso*.

en: Codices PQ [read] *quidquid*. Ed. 1 with codex *cc* exhibits the minor proposition thus: *but by relative names answer is given to the question* etc.; and then ed. 1 prefixes *ipso* to the noun *Deo*.

la: Libr. I. c. 5. n. 8; secundum sensum. Verba Augustini sunt: *Non enim facile nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, potest inveniri, nisi quod melius ita dicitur: Trinitas haec, unus Deus ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ita Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus* etc.

en: Book I, c. 5, n. 8; according to the sense. The words of Augustine are: *For a name which would befit such excellence cannot easily be found, except that it is better said thus: This Trinity, one God from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things; thus the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit*, etc.

la: Plures codd. ut AIKMS etc., contradicente contextu, *sed* loco *nec*; Vat. cum paucis mss. *sed nec*; ceteri mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptam. Mox post *incarnatus* codd. OX *addunte*[?], ac dein plures mss. ut AFHTV etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 *complectitur* pro *complectatur*.

en: Several codices such as A, I, K, M, S etc., the context contradicting, [read] *sed* in place of *nec*; the Vatican [edition] with a few manuscripts [reads] *sed nec*; the rest of the manuscripts together with ed. 1 exhibit the reading received into the text. Soon after, after *incarnatus*, codices O, X [read] *addunte*[?]; and then several manuscripts such as A, F, H, T, V etc. with editions 1, 2, 3, 6 [read] *complectitur* in place of *complectatur*.

la: Cod. R *essendi* loco *essentialem*. Mox pauci codd. ut FO[?] *de Deo* pro *in Deo*. — Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 13 (IV. c. 7.).

en: Codex R [reads] *essendi* in place of *essentialem*. Soon after, a few codices such as F, O [?] [read] *de Deo* in place of *in Deo*. — Cf. Aristotle, V *Metaphysics*, text 13 (IV, c. 7).

la: Sic plures et quidem bonae notae codd. ut AGHKRTVW *ee ff* cum ed. 1, dum Vat. habet *modum*.

en: So [read] several codices, and indeed of good standing, such as A, G, H, K, R, T, V, W, *ee, ff* together with ed. 1, while the Vatican [edition] has *modum*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 perperam omittit *quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the witness of nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1, wrongly omits *quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus* ("some by mode of quantity, as *great*").

la: Codd. IOZ cum ed. 1 *qui*. Mox cod. R *relativum* pro [*relatum*?].

en: Codices I, O, Z together with ed. 1 [read] *qui*. Soon after, codex R [reads] *relativum* in place of [*relatum*?].

la: In Vat. substituitur *non* pro *nulla*, sed minus apte et contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

en: In the Vatican [edition] *non* is substituted in place of *nulla*, but less aptly and against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Indebita omissio verborum *ut illa quae dicuntur*, quae habetur in Vat., resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1. Mox aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *Quae quia*, aliqui vero *Quia quod*, pauci *Quia* pro *Quia vero haec*, quod ceteri cum Vat. exhibent.

en: The undue omission of the words *ut illa quae dicuntur* ("as those things which are said"), which is found in the Vatican [edition], is restored by the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1. Soon after, some codices with ed. 1 [read] *Quae quia*, some indeed *Quia quod*, a few *Quia* in place of *Quia vero haec*, which the rest with the Vatican [edition] exhibit.

la: Communissima lectio mss. et sex primarum edd., in qua, transpositis verbis *illa* et *haec* (aliqui codd. ut AHIK cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *hoc*), habetur *secundum haec unitas, secundum illa pluralitas*, contextu ut reiicienda comprobatur.

en: The most common reading of the manuscripts and the first six editions, in which, with the words *illa* and *haec* transposed (some codices such as A, H, I, K with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *hoc*), there is *secundum haec unitas, secundum illa pluralitas* ("according to these unity, according to those plurality"), is shown by the context to be such as ought to be rejected.

la: Sensus est: in hac propositione *nomen dici secundum substantiam*, verba *secundum substantiam* non sumuntur in eo sensu, quo per *substantiam* intelligitur *ens per se*, sed *ens ad se*, ideoque relationes divinae, licet sint *per se*, non vero *ad se*, non secundum substantiam dicuntur. Vide paulo infra ad 4.

en: The sense is: in this proposition *name to be said according to substance*, the words *according to substance* are not taken in the sense in which by *substance* is understood *being per se*, but *being ad se*; and therefore the divine relations, though they be *per se*, yet not *ad se*, are not said according to substance. See a little below, at [reply to argument] 4.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 restituimus perperam omissum *se*. Paulo ante cod. V *quaeritur* pro *obiicitur*.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have restored the wrongly omitted *se*. A little before, codex V [reads] *quaeritur* in place of *obiicitur*.

la: Plures codd. ut FMXYZ cum ed. 1 duplex hoc membrum ita exhibent: *aut ens per se aut ens per se et ad se*. Paulo ante cod. I *quod per nomina relativa respondetur* loco *quod nomina relativa respondentur*, et cod. K *quaestionem* pro *interrogationem*. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *sic* pro *tunc*. Dein cod. S *dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam* loco *dicunt in Deo substantiam*.

en: Several codices such as F, M, X, Y, Z with ed. 1 exhibit this twofold member thus: *aut ens per se aut ens per se et ad se* ("either being *per se*, or being *per se* and *ad se*"). A little before, codex I [reads] *quod per nomina relativa respondetur* in place of *quod nomina relativa respondentur*, and codex K [reads] *quaestionem* in place of *interrogationem*. Soon after, on the witness of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have set *sic* in place of *tunc*. Then codex S [reads] *dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam* in place of *dicunt in Deo substantiam*.

la: Fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt *non*, sed male, ut ex contextu patet. Mox ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *nomina*, quod Vat. cum cod. *cc* omittit et pro quo cod. S ponit *omnia*.

en: Nearly all the codices together with editions 1, 2, 3 omit *non*, but wrongly, as is clear from the context. Soon after, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *nomina*, which the Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* omits and in place of which codex S sets *omnia*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro statu quaestionis facilius intelligendo notamus, quod *substantia* sumitur duplici sensu, uti patet ex solut. ad 2. Intelligitur enim vel ut *res per se stans*; et sic distinguitur contra accidens, quod est in alio, et in hoc sensu est *substantia* quidquid est in Deo; et ipsae relationes non manent in praedicamento accidentis, sed transeunt in praedicamentum substantiae. Vel *substantia* sumitur ut *res absoluta sive ad se*, et sic distinguitur contra relationem; in hoc secundo sensu intelligitur quaestio principalis, ut patet ex argumentis in fundam. Praeter hoc dubium etiam aliae quaestiones solvuntur. Quaesivit enim S. Bonav. supra (in divisione quaestionum), utrum nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam, an etiam aliquo alio modo. Quare hic primo loco explicat tres diversos modos dicendi de Deo et respondet ad quaesitum iuxta hanc triplicem distinctionem.

**II.** Ut melius intelligantur quae hic dicuntur de modo dicendi secundum substantiam et secundum relationem, haec ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. § 3.) notamus: «Dicendum, quod (in Deo) omnia praedicamenta mutantur, sed tamen dissimiliter. Alia enim praedicamenta a *substantia* et *relatione* mutantur dupliciter: secundum rationem sui generis et secundum rationem qua sunt in creatura... *Substantia* vero et *ad aliquid* mutantur uno modo; mutantur enim a ratione, qua sunt in creatura, sed manent secundum intentionem primam sui generis. Nam *substantia*, ut est in creatura subsistens sub accidentibus, non est in divinis; tamen in divinis est *substantia* ut *ens per se*. Iterum in creatura *ad aliquid* est accidens, quo modo non est in divinis; sed tamen in divinis est *ad aliquid*, hoc est *ad aliud se habens*, vel potius *ad alium se habens*».

**III.** Attentione digna sunt quae hic in corp. et ad 5. de variis speciebus differentiae sive distinctionis et de nominibus relationem significantibus docentur. Cfr. supra d. 13. q. 3; d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4, et praesertim d. 26. q. 1. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4. b.

**IV.** Quoad conclusionem omnes consentiunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. — S. Thom., *de Potent.* q. 7. a. 4. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 37. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. circa med. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For more easily understanding the state of the question we note that *substance* is taken in a twofold sense, as is clear from the solution to [argument] 2. For it is understood either as *a thing standing through itself* (*res per se stans*); and so it is distinguished against accident, which is *in another*, and in this sense whatever is in God is *substance*; and the relations themselves do not remain in the predicament of accident, but pass over into the predicament of substance. Or *substance* is taken as *a thing absolute or with respect to itself* (*res absoluta sive ad se*), and so it is distinguished against relation; in this second sense the principal question is to be understood, as is clear from the arguments in the foundations. Besides this difficulty, other questions also are solved. For St. Bonaventure asked above (in the division of the questions), whether the names said of God are said according to substance, or also in some other way. Wherefore here, in the first place, he explains three diverse modes of being said of God, and responds to what was asked according to this threefold distinction.

**II.** That what is here said of the mode of being said *according to substance* and *according to relation* may be better understood, we note this from Alexander of Hales (loc. infra cit. § 3): «It must be said that (in God) all the predicaments are changed, but yet dissimilarly. For the other predicaments — beyond *substance* and *relation* — are changed in a twofold way: according to the account of their genus and according to the account by which they are in the creature... But *substance* and *ad aliquid* are changed in one way [only]; for they are changed from the account by which they are in the creature, but they remain according to the first intention of their genus. For *substance*, as it is in the creature subsisting under accidents, is not in the divine [things]; yet in the divine [things] there is *substance* as *being per se*. Again, in the creature *ad aliquid* is an accident, in which mode it is not in the divine [things]; but yet in the divine [things] there is *ad aliquid*, that is, *being-disposed-toward-another* (*ad aliud se habens*), or rather *being-disposed-toward-Another* (*ad alium se habens*)».

**III.** Worthy of attention are the things taught here in the body and in [reply] to [argument] 5 concerning the various species of difference or distinction and concerning names signifying relation. Cf. above d. 13, q. 3; d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4, and especially d. 26, q. 1. The same is taught by Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4. b.

**IV.** As to the conclusion all agree. Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3. — St. Thomas, *de Potentia* q. 7, a. 4, [ad] 3; *S.* I, q. 13, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, *S.* p. I, tr. 14, q. 37. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome), here 1 princ., q. 4, near the middle. — Henry of Ghent, *S.* a. 32, q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 22, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *His adiiciendum est, quaedam etiam nomina* etc., quia aut divisiones Augustini et Ambrosii sunt sufficientes, aut non. Si sic: ergo Magister superflue addit; si dicantur insufficientes, pro inconvenienti est habendum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nec divisio Augustini nec Ambrosii est diminuta; nec additio Magistri superflua, quoniam[^1] membra divisionis Magistri includuntur in membris divisionis Ambrosii. Illa enim est per immediata; cum enim sit trimembris[^2], reducitur ad has divisiones[^3]: quia omne nomen Dei aut est proprium, aut translativum; si proprium, aut spectat ad substantiam, aut ad personas. Magister autem ista membra magis specificat, quia nomen aliquod potest spectare ad unitatem substantiae[^4] ab aeterno, vel ex tempore; similiter ad personas ab aeterno, vel[^5] ex tempore; et ad personas dupliciter: vel divisim, ut hoc nomen *Pater*, vel simul et coniunctim, ut hoc nomen *Trinitas*; et ita[^6] sunt sex membra.

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### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Trinitas est quasi collectivum*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia «unitas collectiva, ut dicit Bernardus[^7], est minima unitas; sed unitas Trinitatis arcem tenet inter omnes unitates»: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc nomen *Trinitas* deficit[^8] in duobus a nomine proprie collectivo. Primo, quia illa quae nomen collectivum colligit, habent simpliciter diversitatem; et secundo, quia habent unitatem secundum quid; sed[^9] e contra est in nomine Trinitatis. Tamen in hoc est similitudo, quia sicut nomen collectivum plures simul dicit et de nullo per se praedicatur, ita nec hoc nomen *Trinitas* praedicatur de aliqua personarum, et tamen omnes simul importat; et[^10] ideo Magister non dicit, quod sit collectivum simpliciter, sed *quasi*[^11].

### Quinque Regulae de Nominibus Divinis.

*Sciendum est igitur, quod illa quae proprie* etc. Circa hoc notandum, quod ex verbis Augustini, quae hic ponuntur et in libro de Trinitate[^12], eliciuntur quinque[^13] regulae de nominibus divinis. Prima est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de Deo, dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem, excepto hoc nomine *homo*. Secunda est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de tribus personis, ita quod de qualibet singulariter, dicitur secundum substantiam[^14], exceptis nominibus partitivis. Tertia est haec: omne nomen dictum secundum substantiam praedicatur de tribus personis simul sumtis singulariter, excepto hoc nomine *persona*. Quarta est haec: omne nomen dictum de Deo respectu creaturae indicat essentiam, exceptis his quae pertinent ad unionem. Quinta est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de Deo ex tempore et non dicitur de personis singulis, praedicat notionem vel quasi; hoc[^15] dicitur propter hoc nomen *missus*, quod dicit esse ab alio.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens*; quia cum dicamus[^16] *tres potentes*, videtur quod pari ratione possumus dicere *tres omnipotentes*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod verbum semper adiective et in adiacentia significat, et[^17] ideo semper trahit numerum a supposito; similiter participium manens participium, quia habet naturam verbi. Sed nomen, quia in quiete significat, aliquando substantivatur, et quando numeratur, tunc numeratur sicut nomen substantivum a parte suae formae. Et ideo, quia *potens* potest esse participium, *omnipotens* est nomen tantum: ideo non sic recipitur, *tres omnipotentes*, sicut *tres potentes*, nisi *omnipotens* sit adiectivum vel[^18] adiective retentum. Ratio autem, quare *omnipotens* non potest esse participium, est propter compositionem, quam non admittit verbum. Participium enim, ut dicit Grammaticus[^19], transit in nomen quatuor modis: scilicet compositione, ut *indoctus*; comparatione, ut *doctior*; constructione, ut *amans illius*; temporis amissione, ut *amandus*, secundum quod idem significat vel[^20] idem sonat, quod *amari dignus*.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de ratione ista Augustini: *Si est participatione magnus, ergo magnitudo est maior quam ipse*, et ponitur ibi: *Deus non est magnus ea magnitudine* etc. Et videtur ista ratio non valere. Non enim valet: iste est albedine albus per participationem: ergo albedo est albior vel maior[^21] quam ipse.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ratio Augustini bona est et fundatur supra ipsam nominis expositionem, quia *participare* est *partem capere*, et si partem capit, ergo minus est quam totum. Quod ergo obiicitur de albedine, dicendum, quod est esse maius[^22] dupliciter; vel quantum ad esse, vel quantum ad

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posse. Dicendum igitur, quod participatio subiecti attenditur respectu formae universalis; et quamvis ipsa sit tota in subiecto quantum ad esse, non tamen quantum ad posse, quia potest in aliis esse; Deo autem[^23] nihil potest esse maius nec quantum ad esse, nec quantum ad posse. Et ideo argumentum Augustini bene tenet, quod Deus nihil possit participare.

Aliter potest dici, quod argumentum Augustini bene tenet in his formis, quae natae sunt aliquid denominare per essentiam; et in talibus, quod est per participationem, reducitur ad illud quod est per essentiam; et quandocumque sic est, illud quod est ens per essentiam, excellit illud quod habet[^24] ens per participationem. Si ergo magnitudo est magna per essentiam, et Deus per participationem, necessario sequitur, quod magnitudo est maior quam Deus. Non sic est de albedine, quia non est nata se denominare nec de aliquo per[^25] essentiam praedicari, denominando illud.

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what he says: *To these are to be added certain names also* etc., because either the divisions of Augustine and Ambrose are sufficient, or not. If [they are] so, then the Master superfluously adds [more]; if they are said to be insufficient, [this] is to be held as unfitting.

**I respond:** It must be said that neither the division of Augustine nor of Ambrose is deficient, nor is the Master's addition superfluous, since[^1] the members of the Master's division are included in the members of Ambrose's division. For that [division of Ambrose] is by way of immediate [members]; for since it is three-membered[^2], it is reduced to these divisions[^3]: for every name of God either is proper, or transferred; if proper, either it pertains to substance, or to persons. But the Master specifies these members further, because some name can pertain to the unity of substance[^4] from eternity, or in time; likewise to the persons from eternity, or[^5] in time; and to the persons in two ways: either dividedly, as this name *Father*, or together and conjointly, as this name *Trinity*; and so[^6] there are six members.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Trinity is as it were a collective [noun]*. For he seems to speak ill, because «a collective unity, as Bernard says[^7], is the least unity; but the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel among all unities»: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *Trinity* falls short[^8] in two [respects] of a properly collective noun. First, because the things which a collective noun gathers have diversity simply; and second, because they have unity in a certain respect; but[^9] the contrary is the case in the name of the Trinity. Yet in this there is a likeness, because just as a collective noun says many at once and is predicated of none per se, so neither is this name *Trinity* predicated of any of the persons, and yet it imports them all together; and[^10] therefore the Master does not say that it is collective simply, but *as it were* (*quasi*)[^11].

### Five Rules on the Divine Names.

*It must be known therefore that those things which* properly etc. On this it is to be noted that from the words of Augustine, which are placed here and in the book *On the Trinity*[^12], five[^13] rules concerning the divine names are drawn forth. The first is this: every name which is said of God is said according to substance or according to relation, except this name *man*. The second is this: every name which is said of the three persons, in such a way that [it is said] of each one singly, is said according to substance[^14], with the exception of partitive names. The third is this: every name said according to substance is predicated of the three persons taken together in the singular, except this name *person*. The fourth is this: every name said of God in relation to a creature signifies the essence, except those which pertain to the union. The fifth is this: every name which is said of God in time and is not said of the persons singly, predicates a notion or as it were [a notion]; this[^15] is said on account of this name *sent*, which says a being-from-another.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent*; for since we say[^16] *three powerful [ones]*, it seems that by parity of reasoning we can say *three omnipotents*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the verb always signifies adjectivally and in adjacency, and[^17] therefore always draws its number from the supposit; likewise the participle, while remaining a participle, because it has the nature of the verb. But the noun, because it signifies in rest, is sometimes substantivized, and when it is enumerated, then it is enumerated as a substantive noun on the side of its form. And therefore, because *powerful* (*potens*) can be a participle, *omnipotent* (*omnipotens*) is a noun only: hence one does not so receive *three omnipotents* as *three powerful*, unless *omnipotens* be an adjective or[^18] held adjectivally. But the reason why *omnipotens* cannot be a participle is on account of composition, which the verb does not admit. For the participle, as the Grammarian says[^19], passes into a noun in four ways: namely by composition, as *unlearned* (*indoctus*); by comparison, as *more learned* (*doctior*); by construction, as *loving him* (*amans illius*); by loss of tense, as *to-be-loved* (*amandus*), insofar as it signifies the same or[^20] sounds the same as *worthy to be loved* (*amari dignus*).

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this argument of Augustine: *If he is great by participation, then greatness is greater than he himself*, and there is set down: *God is not great by that greatness* etc. And it seems this argument does not hold. For it does not hold [thus]: this [thing] is white by whiteness through participation: therefore whiteness is whiter or greater[^21] than it [the thing].

**I respond:** It must be said that the argument of Augustine is good and is founded upon the very explication of the name, because *to participate* is *to take a part*, and if it takes a part, then it is less than the whole. To what therefore is objected concerning whiteness, it must be said that *being greater* is[^22] [taken] in two ways: either as to being, or as to power.

It must be said therefore that the participation of a subject is regarded with respect to a universal form; and although it [the form] is wholly in the subject as to being, yet not as to power, because it can be in others; but to God[^23] nothing can be greater either as to being or as to power. And therefore the argument of Augustine holds well, [namely] that God can participate in nothing.

Otherwise it can be said that the argument of Augustine holds well in those forms which are by nature [apt] to denominate something through essence; and in such [forms], that which is by participation is reduced to that which is through essence; and whenever it is so, that which is being through essence excels that which has[^24] being through participation. If therefore greatness is great through essence, and God [is great] by participation, it necessarily follows that greatness is greater than God. It is not so concerning whiteness, because it is not [by nature apt] to denominate itself nor to be predicated of anything through[^25] essence, denominating it.

---

la: Postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *quoniam* pro *nam*. Paulo ante in pluribus mss. ut A S T V etc. et ed. 1 desunt verba *Augustini nec*.

en: With many manuscripts and edition 1 demanding [it], we have substituted *quoniam* in place of *nam*. A little earlier, in several manuscripts such as *A S T V* etc., and in edition 1, the words *Augustini nec* are missing.

la: In cod. X additur *et non dicuntur relative*. Paulo infra post *primam* cod. S addit *ipsam*.

en: In codex *X* there is added *and they are not said relatively*. A little below, after *primam*, codex *S* adds *ipsam*.

en: Distinction 28, question 1.

en: In several manuscripts and edition 1, here and a little below after *personis*, *vel* is omitted, which the Vatican [edition] adds.

la: In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post *personis* omittitur *vel*, quod Vat. adiungit. (Continuation of preceding note's anchor.)

en: [Same apparatus entry as note 4, second anchor — see note 4.]

la: In Vat. deest particula *Et*, quam antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 exhibent. — Vat. cum uno alterove codice *ista* pro *ita*. — De conciliatione harum diversarum divisionum vide etiam B. Albert., hic a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

en: In the Vatican [edition] the particle *Et* is missing, which the older codices and edition 1 exhibit. — The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] *ista* in place of *ita*. — On the reconciliation of these various divisions see also B. Albert, here a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

la: Libr. V. de *Consid.* c. 8.

en: Book V *On Consideration*, c. 8.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *differt*, quae et paulo ante, antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 contradicentibus, omittit *Dicendum*.

en: The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] *differt* ("differs") [in place of *deficit*, "falls short"], which [edition] also a little earlier, with the older codices and edition 1 contradicting [it], omits *Dicendum*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *solum et* pro *sed*. Mox post *similitudo* pauci codd. ut A V V Y *quod* loco *quia*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex *cc* [reads] *solum et* in place of *sed*. Soon after *similitudo*, a few codices such as *A V V Y* [read] *quod* in place of *quia*.

la: Suffragantibus plurimis codd. cum ed. 1, supplevimus *et*.

en: With many codices supporting [it], together with edition 1, we have supplied *et*.

la: Plura de hoc videsis in Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3.

en: See more on this in Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 66, m. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 3.

la: Libr. V. c. 8. seqq. n. 9. seqq.

en: Book V, c. 8 ff., n. 9 ff. [of Augustine, *De Trinitate*].

la: Mox auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quinque* pro *quaedam*.

en: Soon, on the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *quinque* in place of *quaedam*.

la: In cod. H additur *ut Deus, potens, bonus, magnus et huiusmodi*; in cod. O autem post *partitivis* adiungitur *ut unus, aliquis*; et distinctivis *ut distinctus, distinctio, discretio*.

en: In codex *H* there is added *as God, powerful, good, great and the like*; in codex *O*, however, after *partitivis* there is added *as one, some*; and [as] distinctive [names] *as distinct, distinction, discretion*.

la: Vat. praefigit particulam *et*, ac paulo ante ed. 1 voci *personis* praemittit *tribus*. — Easdem regulas expositas invenies apud B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6.

en: The Vatican [edition] prefixes the particle *et*, and a little earlier edition 1 prefixes *tribus* to the word *personis*. — You will find the same rules expounded in B. Albert, here a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 6.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut G T ee *dicimus*, et mox cod. Y *possemus* loco *possumus*.

en: Some codices such as *G T ee* [read] *dicimus*, and soon codex *Y* [reads] *possemus* in place of *possumus*.

la: A codd. V X hic additur *et*.

en: From codices *V X*, here *et* is added.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *et*, ac mox *tentum* loco *retentum*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] *et*, and soon *tentum* in place of *retentum*.

la: Cfr. Priscian., V. *Grammat.* c. 11, ubi agit de primo modo, scil. compositione, et XI. c. 1, ubi de aliis modis, ac VIII. c. 10, ubi et de ultimo modo loquitur. — Paulo post supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *scilicet*.

en: Cf. Priscian, V. *Grammar* c. 11, where he treats of the first mode, namely composition, and XI. c. 1, where [he treats] of the other modes, and VIII. c. 10, where he also speaks of the last mode. — A little later we have supplied from the older manuscripts and edition 1 *scilicet*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut A S X etc. *quod* loco *vel*, ed. 1 *secundum quod idem* et pro *vel idem*, e contra cod. W omittit *significat vel idem*.

en: Some codices such as *A S X* etc. [read] *quod* in place of *vel*; edition 1 [reads] *secundum quod idem*, and in place of *vel idem*; on the contrary codex *W* omits *significat vel idem*.

la: Vat., refragantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, omittit *vel maior*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 resisting, omits *vel maior*.

la: In Vat. et uno alterove codice male deest *esse*. Cod. T *quod esse maius dicitur dupliciter*. Paulo ante cod. X *sed si* pro *et si*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and in one or another codex *esse* is wrongly missing. Codex *T* [reads] *quod esse maius dicitur dupliciter*. A little earlier codex *X* [reads] *sed si* in place of *et si*.

la: Ex omnibus fere codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *autem* loco *tamen*.

en: From almost all the codices and edition 1 we have substituted *autem* in place of *tamen*.

la: Vat. *est*, sed contra mss. et sex primas edd.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *est*, but against the manuscripts and the first six editions.

la: Cod. G *quantum ad*. — Idem dubium resolvit B. Albert., hic a. 8, ubi tenet primam solutionem. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 4. a. 3. § 6. ait: *Unde Augustinus (V. c. 10.) de Trinit. dicit: Quod cum dicitur magnum de creatura, ut de domo vel de monte, dicitur magnum participatione, et non est creatura sua magnitudo; sed cum dicitur magnum de Deo, dicitur magnitudo per essentiam, et ipse est sua magnitudo. Accipit autem hic magnum Augustinus, secundum quod est commune ad magnum dimensione et magnum virtute; nam in Deo non est magnum dimensione, sed magnum in virtute; ita etiam intelligendum, cum dicitur bonus et huiusmodi. Hoc ergo modo vult dicere Augustinus, quod dicuntur de Deo proprie huiusmodi nomina abstrahendo a modo, quo sunt in creatura* etc. — Ultimam propositionem, quam S. Bonav. de albedine ponit, S. Thomas, hic circa lit. sic demonstrat: *Rem albam dicimus albam, sed albedinem dicimus albedinem (non denominatur alba). Non enim quod est in causato oportet esse in causa eodem modo, sed eminentiori.* — Vide etiam Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Codex *G* [reads] *quantum ad*. — B. Albert resolves the same doubt here a. 8, where he holds the first solution. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 18, m. 4, a. 3, § 6, says: *Whence Augustine (V. c. 10) on the Trinity says: That when "great" is said of a creature, as of a house or of a mountain, it is called great by participation, and the creature is not its [own] greatness; but when "great" is said of God, greatness is said through essence, and he himself is his [own] greatness. But Augustine here takes "great" insofar as it is common to "great in dimension" and "great in power"; for in God there is no greatness of dimension, but greatness in power; so also it is to be understood when "good" and the like is said. In this way, then, Augustine wishes to say that names of this kind are properly said of God by abstracting from the mode in which they are in a creature*, etc. — The last proposition, which St. Bonaventure sets down concerning whiteness, St. Thomas, here on the *littera*, demonstrates thus: *We call a white thing white, but we call whiteness whiteness (it is not denominated white). For what is in the caused does not need to be in the cause in the same mode, but in a more eminent [mode].* — See also Peter of Tarentaise, here on the *littera*.

translators_notes: The block titled **QUINQUE REGULAE DE NOMINIBUS DIVINIS** in the Quaracchi edition is set as a centered, free-standing heading between DUB. II and DUB. III, on printed page 400. It is **not** numbered as a dubium (it has no `DUB.` label), and the dubia numbering proceeds I → II → III → IV without skipping. We render it under its own subheading rather than promote it silently to DUB. III, since the printed edition treats it as a distinct rule-listing appendix to DUB. II rather than as a fresh dubitatio. See the manual-review log for project-owner confirmation.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 23

title_alt:
Distinctio XXIII littera Magistri
Lombard's text on Distinction XXIII

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXIII.

#### Cap. I. *De hoc nomine quod est persona, quod secundum substantiam dicatur, non singulariter, sed pluraliter accipitur in summa.*

Praedictis[^1] adiiciendum est, quod cum omnia nomina, quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, singulariter et non pluraliter de omnibus in summa dicantur personis, ut supra ostensum est[^2], est tamen unum nomen, scilicet *persona*, quod secundum substantiam dicitur de singulis personis et pluraliter, non singulariter in summa accipitur. Dicimus enim: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, et hoc secundum substantiam dicitur. Nec tamen dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una persona, sed tres personae. Hoc ergo nomen excipitur a praedicta[^3] regula nominum, quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, quia cum hoc ad se dicatur et secundum substantiam, pluraliter tamen, non singulariter in summa accipitur.

Quod autem persona secundum substantiam dicatur, Augustinus ostendit in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^4] dicens: «Non est aliud Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem». Item[^5]: «In hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est; ita et persona Patris non aliud quam ipse Pater est; ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum, sicut ad se dicitur Deus et magnus et bonus et iustus et huiusmodi. Et quemadmodum hoc illi est esse, quod Deum esse, quod magnum esse, quod bonum esse; ita hoc illi est esse, quod personam esse»[^6]. Ecce expresse habes, quod persona secundum substantiam dicitur, ut cum dicitur: Pater est persona, hic sit sensus: Pater est essentia divina; similiter, cum dicitur: Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, id est essentia divina.

Ideo oritur hic quaestio difficilis quidem, sed non inutilis, qua quaeritur, cur non dicantur hi tres una persona, sicut una essentia et unus Deus. Quam quaestionem Augustinus diligenter tractat atque congrue explicat in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^7] ita dicens: «Cur non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus, sicut unam essentiam et unum Deum, sed dicimus tres personas, cum tres deos aut tres essentias non dicamus? Quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servare huic significationi, qua intelligitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interroganti, quid tres essent, cum tres esse fateamur». «Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tres, ut ait Augustinus in libro quinto *de Trinitate*, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur omnino». Non enim rei ineffabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet. Ecce ostendit, qua necessitate dicatur pluraliter personae, videlicet ut hoc uno nomine quaerentibus de tribus respondeamus[^8].

#### Cap. II. *Qua necessitate dictum sit tres personae a Latinis, et a Graecis tres hypostases vel substantiae.*

Qua necessitate non solum Latinus sermo, sed etiam Graecus eadem pene super hac re laborans nominum penuria coarctatur. Unde Augustinus, quid a Graecis vel a Latinis necessitate de ineffabili Trinitate dictum sit, aperiens, in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^9] ait: «Loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquo modo dictum est a Graecis una essentia, tres substantiae, id est una usia, tres hypostases. Aliter enim Graeci accipiunt substantiam quam Latini. A Latinis autem dictum est una essentia vel substantia, tres personae, quia non aliter in sermone nostro, id est Latino, essentia quam substantia solet intelligi. Et ut intelligatur saltem in aenigmate, placuit ita dici, ut diceretur aliquid, cum quaereretur, quid tria sint, quae tria esse[^10] fides vera pronuntiat, cum et Patrem non dicit esse Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, scilicet Donum Dei, nec Patrem dicit esse nec Filium. Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tria vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod nomen, quo complectamur haec tria. Neque occurrit animo, quia supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem excedit. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur et verius est quam cogitatur».

«Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quoniam tres sunt, quid tres sint quaeramus, et quid commune habeant. Non enim possunt dici tres patres, quia tantum Pater ibi Pater est, nec tres filii, cum nec Pater

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ibi sit Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, nec tres spiritus sancti, quia Spiritus sanctus propria significatione, qua etiam[^11] *Donum Dei* dicitur, nec Pater est nec Filius. Quid ergo tres? Si tres personae esse dicuntur, commune est eis id quod persona est». «Certe enim, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo dicuntur tres personae». «Propterea ergo dicimus tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est[^12]». Ex praedictis aperte intelligi potest, qua necessitate dictum sit a Latinis tres personae, cum persona secundum substantiam dicatur. Unde et tribus commune est id quod persona est.

#### Cap. III. *Quare non dicimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres deos, ut tres personas.*

Sed quaeritur hic, cum dicamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres personas, quia commune est eis quod persona est, id est, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona: cur non dicamus similiter tres deos, cum et Pater sit Deus, et Filius sit Deus, et Spiritus sanctus sit Deus? Quia scilicet illud Scriptura contradicit; hoc autem, etsi non dicit, non tamen contradicit. Unde Augustinus hanc movens quaestionem atque definiens in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^13] ita ait: «Si ideo dicimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est; cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? Certe, ut praedictum est, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo tres personae dicuntur. Quia ergo Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus sanctus Deus, cur non dicuntur tres dii?» Ecce proposuit quaestionem; attende, quid respondeat subdens[^14]: «An ideo non dicuntur tres dii, quia Scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas alicubi Scripturae textus commemorat. An ideo licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit? Si autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret Scriptura dicens[^15]: *Audi Israel, Deus tuus, Deus unus est*». Ecce absolutio quaestionis, quare potius dicamus tres personas quam tres deos, quia scilicet illud non contradicit Scriptura.

#### Cap. IV. *Cur non dicimus tres essentias, ut tres personas.*

Verum et hic alia emergit quaestio, quam Augustinus consequenter annectit dicens[^16]: «Cur, inquit, et tres essentias non licet dicere, quod similiter Scriptura sicut non dicit, ita non contradicit? At si dicis, quod propter unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres essentiae, sed una essentia; quaero, cur non propter eandem unitatem Trinitatis dicantur una persona, et non tres personae. Ut enim est illis commune nomen essentiae, ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, sic illis commune est personae vocabulum». «Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur, loquendi necessitate a Graecis et Latinis parta haec vocabula adversus insidias vel errores haereticorum? Cumque conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis de Deo tenet sive per piam fidem sive per qualemcumque intelligentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne intelligeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non poterat dicere, non esse tria quaedam; quod quia dixit Sabellius, in haeresim lapsus est. Quaesivit ergo, quid tria diceret, et dixit tres personas sive tres substantias secundum Graecos».

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«Quod enim de personis secundum nostram, hoc Graecorum de substantiis secundum Graecorum consuetudinem oportet intelligi. Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias, unam essentiam, id est tres hypostases, unam usiam; quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam vel substantiam[^17]»; «quamquam et illi, si vellent, sicut dicunt tres substantias, tres hypostases, possent dicere tres personas, tria prosopa. Illud autem maluerunt dicere, quia fortasse secundum linguae suae consuetudinem aptius dicitur».

#### Cap. V. *Quod in Trinitate non est diversitas vel singularitas vel solitudo, sed unitas et trinitas et distinctio et identitas.*

Iam sufficienter, ut puto, ostensum est, qua necessitate dicamus tres personas, et quare non similiter tres deos vel essentias, quia scilicet in altero obviat Scriptura, in altero diversitatis intelligentia; quia ibi nulla penitus est diversitas, sicut nec singularitas vel solitudo, sed unitas et trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^18] ait: «Humana inopia quaerens, quid diceret tria, dixit tres personas vel substantias, quibus nominibus non diversitatem voluit intelligi, sed singularitatem noluit, ut non solum ibi unitas intelligatur ex eo, quod dicitur una essentia, sed trinitas ex eo, quod dicuntur tres personae». Hilarius quoque in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^19] ait: «Dominus dicit[^20]: *Qui me videt, videt et Patrem*. Cum hoc dicitur, excluditur singularis atque unici, id est solitarii intelligentia. Nam nec solitarium sermo significat, et indifferentem tamen naturam professio docet. Visus est enim in Filio Pater per naturae unitam similitudinem. Unum sunt enim natus et generans, unum sunt neque unus. Non itaque solitarius Filius est nec singularis nec dispar». Item in eodem[^21]: «Sicut in Patre et Filio credere duos deos impium est, ita Patrem et Filium singularem Deum praedicare sacrilegum est. Nihil in his novum, nihil diversum, nihil alienum, nihil separabile est». De hoc etiam Augustinus in libro Quaestionum veteris ac novae Legis[^22] ait: «Unus est Deus, sed non singularis». Item Ambrosius in libro *de Fide*[^23] ait: «Quod unius est substantiae separari non potest, etsi non sit singularitatis, sed unitatis». «Deus unus cum dicitur, nequaquam Deitatis trinitatem excludit et ideo non quod singularitatis, sed quod unitatis est praedicatur». Ecce ex praedictis ostenditur, quod nec singularis nec diversus nec unicus vel solitarius confitendus est Deus, quia singularitas vel solitudo personarum pluralitatem excludit, et diversitas unitatem essentiae tollit. Diversitas inducit separationem Divinitatis, singularitas adimit distinctionem Trinitatis. Ideo Ambrosius in secundo libro *de Fide*[^24] ait: «Non est diversa nec singularis aequalitas»; «nec iuxta Sabellianos Patrem Filiumque confundens, nec iuxta Arianos Patrem Filiumque secernens. Pater enim et Filius distinctionem habent, separationem vero non habent». Item in eodem[^25]: «Pater et Filius divinitate unum sunt, nec est ibi substantiae differentia nec ulla diversitas; alioquin quomodo unum Deum dicimus? Diversitas enim plures facit». Constat ergo ex praedictis, quia in Trinitate nulla est diversitas; si tamen aliquando in Scriptura invenitur dictum tres diversae personae et huiusmodi, diversas dicit distinctas.

#### Cap. VI. *Quod non debet dici Deus multiplex.*

Et sicut in Trinitate non est diversitas, ita nec multiplicitas, et ideo non est dicendus Deus multiplex, sed trinus et simplex. Unde Ambrosius in primo libro *de Fide*[^26] ait: «Est in Patre et Filio non discrepans, sed una divinitas, nec confusum quod unum est, nec multiplex esse potest quod indifferens est». Multiplex itaque Deus non est[^27].

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXIII.

#### Cap. I. *On this name, "person", which is said according to substance, but is taken in the plural, not in the singular, in sum.*

To the foregoing[^1] it must be added that, although all names which are said according to substance of God are said singularly and not plurally of all the persons together in sum, as has been shown above[^2], there is nevertheless one name, namely *person*, which is said according to substance of single persons and is taken in the plural, not in the singular, in sum. For we say: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person — and this is said according to substance. Yet we do not say: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person, but three persons. This name, therefore, is excepted from the aforesaid[^3] rule of names which are said according to substance of God, since although it is said *to itself* and according to substance, it is nevertheless taken in the plural, not in the singular, in sum.

That *person* is said according to substance, Augustine shows in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^4], saying: "It is not one thing for God to be, another for Him to be a person, but altogether the same". Likewise[^5]: "In this Trinity, when we say the person of the Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father. Wherefore, just as the substance of the Father is the Father Himself, not by which He is Father, but by which He is; so also the person of the Father is nothing other than the Father Himself; for *person* is said *to Himself*, not to the Son or to the Holy Spirit, just as God and great and good and just and the like are said *to Himself*. And just as for Him to be is the same as to be God, the same as to be great, the same as to be good; so for Him to be is the same as to be a person"[^6]. Behold, you have it expressed that *person* is said according to substance, so that when it is said: the Father is a person, the sense is: the Father is the divine essence; similarly, when it is said: the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person, that is, the divine essence.

Hence there arises here a question difficult indeed, but not useless, by which it is asked why these three are not called one person, just as one essence and one God. Augustine carefully treats this question and fittingly explains it in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^7], thus saying: "Why do we not call these three together one person, just as one essence and one God, but say three persons, when we do not say three gods or three essences? Because we wish to preserve at least some one term for this signification by which the Trinity is understood, lest we should be wholly silent before one inquiring what the three are, when we confess them to be three". "When therefore it is asked, what three? — as Augustine says in the fifth book *On the Trinity* — human eloquence labors under utter poverty. Yet *three persons* was said, not that this might be said, but that it might not be wholly passed over in silence". For the eminence of an ineffable thing cannot be expressed by this term. Behold, he shows by what necessity it is said in the plural *persons*, namely so that by this one name we may answer those who inquire about the three[^8].

#### Cap. II. *By what necessity it is said three persons by the Latins, and three hypostases or substances by the Greeks.*

By what necessity not only Latin speech, but also Greek, laboring almost equally on this matter, is constrained by a poverty of terms. Whence Augustine, opening up what has been said by the Greeks or by the Latins out of necessity concerning the ineffable Trinity, says in the seventh book *On the Trinity*:[^9] "For the sake of speaking about ineffable things, in order to express them in some way, it has been said by the Greeks: one essence, three substances, that is, one *usia*, three *hypostases*. For the Greeks understand *substance* otherwise than the Latins. By the Latins, however, it has been said: one essence or substance, three persons, since in our speech, that is in Latin, *essence* is not usually understood otherwise than *substance*. And so that it may be understood at least in an enigma, it pleased that it should be so said, that something might be said when it was asked what three things are, which the true faith pronounces to be[^10] three, since it neither says the Father is the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, namely the Gift of God, neither says the Father nor the Son. When therefore it is asked, *what three* or *what three* [persons], we betake ourselves to finding some name by which we may comprehend these three. Nor does any occur to the mind, since the supereminence of the divinity exceeds the faculty of customary speech. For God is more truly thought than spoken, and is more truly than He is thought".

"The Father therefore and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they are three, let us inquire what the three are, and what they have in common. For they cannot be called three Fathers, since only the Father is there Father, nor three Sons, since neither the Father

ibi sit Filius nor the Holy Spirit [is Son], nor three Holy Spirits, since the Holy Spirit, in His proper signification, by which also[^11] He is called *Gift of God*, is neither Father nor Son. What therefore are the three? If they are said to be three persons, that which *person* is is common to them". "For surely, since the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons". "Therefore we say three persons, because that which *person* is is common to them[^12]". From the foregoing it can be plainly understood by what necessity *three persons* has been said by the Latins, since *person* is said according to substance. Whence what *person* is is also common to the three.

#### Cap. III. *Why we do not say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three gods, as [we say they are] three persons.*

But it is asked here: when we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, because that which *person* is is common to them — that is, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person — why do we not similarly say three gods, since the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God? Because Scripture contradicts that; but although it does not say this, neither does it contradict it. Whence Augustine, raising this question and defining it, in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^13] thus says: "If we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons because that which *person* is is common to them, why do we not also say three gods? Surely, as has been said, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons. Since therefore the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, why are they not called three gods?" Behold, he has set forth the question; mark what he answers, adding[^14]: "Or are they not called three gods because Scripture does not say three gods? But neither does the text of Scripture anywhere mention three persons. Or has it been allowed by the necessity of speaking and disputing to say three persons, not because Scripture says it, but because Scripture does not contradict it? But if we were to say three gods, Scripture would contradict, saying[^15]: *Hear, O Israel, thy God, God is one*". Behold the resolution of the question why we say rather three persons than three gods, namely because Scripture does not contradict that.

#### Cap. IV. *Why we do not say three essences, as [we say] three persons.*

But here also another question emerges, which Augustine consequently appends, saying[^16]: "Why, he says, is it not also permitted to say three essences, since Scripture similarly, just as it does not say it, so does not contradict it? But if you say that on account of the unity of the Trinity three essences are not said, but one essence — I ask, why on account of the same unity of the Trinity are they not called one person, and not three persons? For just as the name *essence* is common to them, so that each individual is called an essence, so the term *person* is common to them". "What therefore remains, except that we should confess that these terms have been brought forth by the Greeks and Latins out of the necessity of speaking against the snares or errors of heretics? And when human poverty was striving to bring forth in speech to the senses of men what it holds in the inner chamber of the mind concerning God, whether through pious faith or through some sort of understanding, it feared to say three essences, lest in that supreme equality any diversity should be understood. On the other hand, it could not say that they were not three of some sort; which because Sabellius said, he fell into heresy. It sought therefore what to call the three, and said three persons or three substances according to the Greeks".

"For what concerns the persons according to our [usage], the same must be understood of the substances according to the custom of the Greeks. For thus they say three substances, one essence, that is three hypostases, one *usia*; just as we say three persons, one essence or substance[^17]"; "although they too, if they wished, just as they say three substances, three hypostases, could say three persons, three *prosopa*. But they preferred to say [substances], because perhaps according to the custom of their language it is more aptly said".

#### Cap. V. *That in the Trinity there is no diversity nor singularity nor solitude, but unity and trinity and distinction and identity.*

It has now been sufficiently shown, as I think, by what necessity we say three persons, and why not similarly three gods or essences — namely because in the one case Scripture stands in the way, in the other the understanding of diversity; since there is no diversity at all there, just as there is no singularity nor solitude, but unity and trinity. Whence Augustine in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^18] says: "Human poverty, seeking what it might call the three, said three persons or substances; by which terms it did not wish diversity to be understood, but did not wish singularity, so that there not only unity might be understood from the fact that one essence is said, but also trinity from the fact that three persons are said". Hilary likewise in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^19] says: "The Lord says[^20]: *He who sees me, sees also the Father*. When this is said, the understanding of the singular and unique, that is of the solitary, is excluded. For the speech does not signify a solitary, and yet the profession teaches an undifferentiated nature. For the Father was seen in the Son through the united likeness of nature. For the begotten and the begetter are one, they are one, yet not one [person]. Therefore the Son is not solitary, nor singular, nor unequal". Likewise in the same place[^21]: "Just as in the Father and the Son to believe in two gods is impious, so to preach the Father and the Son as a singular God is sacrilegious. There is in these nothing new, nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable". Of this also Augustine in the book *of the Questions of the Old and New Law*[^22] says: "God is one, but not singular". Likewise Ambrose in the book *On the Faith*[^23] says: "What is of one substance cannot be separated, even though it be not of singularity, but of unity". "When God is called one, He in no way excludes the trinity of the Deity, and therefore He is predicated, not as of singularity, but as of unity". Behold, from the foregoing it is shown that God must be confessed as neither singular nor diverse nor unique nor solitary, since singularity or solitude excludes the plurality of the persons, and diversity removes the unity of the essence. Diversity induces separation of the Divinity; singularity takes away the distinction of the Trinity. Therefore Ambrose in the second book *On the Faith*[^24] says: "There is no diverse nor singular equality"; "neither in the manner of the Sabellians confounding the Father and the Son, nor in the manner of the Arians separating the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son have distinction, but not separation". Likewise in the same[^25]: "The Father and the Son are one in divinity, nor is there a difference of substance there, nor any diversity; otherwise how do we call God one? For diversity makes many". It is established therefore from the foregoing that in the Trinity there is no diversity; if nevertheless sometimes in Scripture it is found said *three diverse persons* and the like, it calls *diverse* what are *distinct*.

#### Cap. VI. *That God ought not to be called manifold.*

And just as in the Trinity there is no diversity, so neither is there manifoldness, and therefore God is not to be called manifold, but threefold and simple. Whence Ambrose in the first book *On the Faith*[^26] says: "There is in the Father and the Son no discrepant, but one divinity, nor can what is one be confused, nor can what is undifferentiated be manifold". God therefore is not manifold[^27].

---

la: Codd. BE adiungunt *tamen*.

en: Codices BE add *tamen* ("nevertheless").

la: Dist. XXII. c. 3.

en: Distinction XXII, chapter 3.

la: Codd. ABE *praescripta*.

en: Codices ABE read *praescripta* ("prescribed").

la: Cap. 6. n. 11, ubi sola Vat. pro *non est aliud Deo* perperam legit *non aliud Deum*, ed. 8 et cod. C *est Deum esse*.

en: Chapter 6, n. 11, where the Vatican edition alone wrongly reads *non aliud Deum* ("not another God") in place of *non est aliud Deo* ("it is not one thing for God"); edition 8 and codex C read *est Deum esse* ("is to be God").

la: Ibid.

en: Same place.

la: Ibid. immediate post. — Hic Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd., ed. I et originale post *cum* addunt *tamen*. Paulo post eadem Vat. et paucae edd. *taceamus interrogati* pro *taceremus interroganti*.

en: Same place, immediately after. — Here the Vatican edition and other editions, against the manuscripts, edition 1, and the original, after *cum* add *tamen* ("nevertheless"). A little later the same Vatican edition and a few editions read *taceamus interrogati* in place of *taceremus interroganti* ("we should be silent before one inquiring").

en: Chapter 9, n. 10.

la: Codd. et ed. I *responderemus*, et paulo ante pro *dicatur* sola ed. 8 *dicantur*.

en: Codices and edition 1 read *responderemus* ("we might answer"); and a little earlier in place of *dicatur* edition 8 alone reads *dicantur*.

la: Cap. 4. n. 7. — Paulo ante Vat. cum nonnullis edd. omittit *a* ante *Latinis*. Verba in textu *id est* usque *quam Latini* inclusive a Magistro interpolata sunt.

en: Chapter 4, n. 7. — A little earlier the Vatican edition with several editions omits *a* before *Latinis*. The words in the text from *id est* up to and including *quam Latini* have been interpolated by the Master.

la: Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 post *Quae tria esse* male addunt *tria*: edd. 5, 9 *quia tria esse fides*.

en: Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 wrongly add *tria* after *Quae tria esse*: editions 5, 9 read *quia tria esse fides* ("since the faith [pronounces] three to be").

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 8 omittunt *etiam*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8 omit *etiam* ("also").

la: Tres loci Augustini leguntur loc. cit. n. 7. et 8.

en: The three passages of Augustine are read at the place cited, n. 7 and 8.

la: Hic Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. I et omnes codd. addunt: *id est hoc nomen persona*.

en: Here the Vatican edition and other editions, against edition 1 and all the manuscripts, add: *id est hoc nomen persona* ("that is, this name *person*").

la: Cap. 4. n. 8. — Ex codd. et plurimis edd. adiecimus *ita* ante *ait*. In fine textus Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 bis addunt *est*, scil. post *Pater* et post *Filius*.

en: Chapter 4, n. 8. — From the manuscripts and most editions we have added *ita* ("thus") before *ait*. At the end of the text the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5 twice add *est* ("is"), namely after *Pater* and after *Filius*.

la: Ibid. paucis interpositis. — Paulo ante Vat. contra codd. et plures edd. addit *hanc* ante *quaestionem*. In ipso textu cod. D post *textus* addit *scilicet novi et veteris Testamenti*.

en: Same place, with a few words intervening. — A little earlier the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and several editions, adds *hanc* ("this") before *quaestionem*. In the text itself codex D after *textus* adds *scilicet novi et veteris Testamenti* ("namely of the New and Old Testament").

la: Deuter. 6, 4. Vulgata: *Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est*. Cum Magistro et Augustino legunt Ambrosius, libr. I. *de Fide ad Gratianum* c. 1. n. 6. et c. 3. n. 23; et Hilarius, libr. IV. *de Trinitate* n. 8. — Immediate post cod. p *solutio* loco *absolutio*. Deinde pro *illud* ed. 6 *illi*.

en: Deuteronomy 6:4. The Vulgate reads: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one*. With the Master and Augustine, Ambrose reads thus, in book I *On the Faith, to Gratian*, c. 1, n. 6, and c. 3, n. 23; and Hilary, in book IV *On the Trinity*, n. 8. — Immediately after, codex p reads *solutio* ("solution") in place of *absolutio* ("resolution"). Then in place of *illud* ("that") edition 6 reads *illi* ("to him").

la: Ibid. immediate post, et quod sequitur n. 9. — In fine primi textus ed. 1 post *vocabulum* addit *et essentiam praedicat*.

en: Same place, immediately after, and what follows in n. 9. — At the end of the first text edition 1, after *vocabulum*, adds *et essentiam praedicat* ("and predicates the essence").

la: Ibid. n. 8; sed verba *id est* usque *usiam* a Magistro inserta sunt. Locus sequens est ibid. c. 6. n. 11.

en: Same place, n. 8; but the words from *id est* up to *usiam* have been inserted by the Master. The following passage is at the same place, c. 6, n. 11.

la: Cap. i. n. 9. — Paulo infra post *Item* sola Vat. *dicit* pro *dixit*.

en: Chapter 1, n. 9. — A little below, after *Item*, the Vatican edition alone reads *dicit* in place of *dixit*.

la: Num. 38. et 39. — Sed textum hunc Magister ex septem locis Hilarii contexuit; quod, ut ipsius methodus exemplo aliquo illustretur, hic lectoris oculis subiicimus. Verba: *Dominus dicit* etc. sunt ex n. 38; *Nam nec solitarium* etc. ibid. paulo ante; *Visus est* etc. ibid. paulo post; *Unum sunt enim natus et generans*, n. 39. *Unum sunt neque unus*, n. 38; *non itaque solitarius Filius est*, n. 39; *nec singularis nec dispar*, n. 38.

en: Numbers 38 and 39. — But the Master has woven this text together from seven passages of Hilary; which, that his method may be illustrated by some example, we here put before the reader's eyes. The words *Dominus dicit* etc. are from n. 38; *Nam nec solitarium* etc., same place a little before; *Visus est* etc., same place a little after; *Unum sunt enim natus et generans*, n. 39; *Unum sunt neque unus*, n. 38; *non itaque solitarius Filius est*, n. 39; *nec singularis nec dispar*, n. 38.

la: Ioan. 14, 9. — Paulo infra post *excluditur* Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. 1, omnes codd. et originale *singularitas* pro *singularis*.

en: John 14:9. — A little below, after *excluditur*, the Vatican edition and other editions, against edition 1, all the manuscripts, and the original, read *singularitas* ("singularity") in place of *singularis* ("singular").

la: Ibid. n. 39, sed ordine propositionum immutato. Pro *sacrilegum* aliqui codd. et edd. I, 2 habent *sacrilegium*.

en: Same place, n. 39, but with the order of the propositions changed. In place of *sacrilegum* some codices and editions 1, 2 have *sacrilegium*.

la: Quaestiones, scil. ex veteri et novo Testamento mixtim, quaest. 122. Non sunt Augustini, sed potius auctoris haeretici, fortasse Hilarii diaconi, de quo supra dist. XIX. locuti sumus. In textu Vat. cum originali, sed contra omnes codd. et alias edd., *solitarius* pro *singularis*.

en: *Questions*, namely from the Old and New Testament intermixed, q. 122. They are not by Augustine, but rather by a heretical author, perhaps Hilary the deacon, of whom we have spoken above at distinction XIX. In the text the Vatican edition with the original, but against all the manuscripts and other editions, reads *solitarius* in place of *singularis*.

la: Libr. V. c. 3. n. 46. — Locus sequens est loc. cit. II. c. 1. n. 18. Finito textu, post *ostenditur* omnes codd. et ed. 1 *quod* loco *quia*, quod habent Vat. et aliae edd.

en: Book V, c. 3, n. 46. — The following passage is at the place cited, II, c. 1, n. 18. After the text is finished, after *ostenditur*, all the manuscripts and edition 1 read *quod* in place of *quia*, which the Vatican edition and other editions have.

la: Cap. 8. n. 69. — Sequens textus est ibid. c. 3. n. 33.

en: Chapter 8, n. 69. — The following text is at the same place, c. 3, n. 33.

la: In eodem opere, sed libr. I. c. 2. n. 18. et 19.

en: In the same work, but book I, c. 2, n. 18 and 19.

en: Chapter 2, n. 17.


title: Dist. 23, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text of Distinction XXIII

source_text:
<!-- page 404 -->

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de diversitate divinorum nominum in generali. Hic incipit secunda pars, in qua agit de eadem[^1] in speciali. Et quoniam quaedam nomina sunt substantialia, quaedam relativa, et haec contingit considerare absolute, et ad se invicem[^2]: ideo haec pars habet tres partes. In prima agit de nominibus substantialibus. In secunda de relativis, infra distinctione vigesima sexta: *Nunc de proprietatibus personarum, quas frequenter* etc. In tertia de his[^3] relativis ad invicem, infra distinctione trigesima tertia: *Post supra dicta interius considerari*.

Et quoniam inter nomina substantialia hoc nomen *persona* excipitur a generali regula, quae est, quod substantiale dicitur de tribus singulariter: ideo nomen istud[^4] primo a generali regula excipit, ostendens, quod debemus dicere tres personas; et hoc in praesenti distinctione. Secundo vero determinat quid significetur per hoc nomen *tres* et per hoc nomen *personas*, cum dicimus *tres personas*, infra distinctione proxima: *Hic diligenter inquiri oportet*.

Prima pars habet quatuor. In prima Magister illud nomen excipit a generali regula. In secunda rationem huius exceptionis investigat, ibi: *Ideo oritur hic quaestio difficilis*, ostendens, quod fuit inopia humani eloquii. In tertia Magister contra assignationem opponit et determinat, ibi: *Sed quaeritur hic, cum dicamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum*. In quarta epilogat determinata, ut addat, ibi: *Iam sufficienter, ut puto, ostensum est*. Harum partium subdivisiones per se patent. Nam quaelibet pars subdividitur in duas iuxta duo capitula, quae continet[^5].

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione de his nominibus *persona*, *substantia* et *essentia*, duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de translatione istorum nominum ad divina.

Secundo de numeratione eorundem in divinis.

<!-- page 405 -->

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo, utrum debuerit ibi[^6] transferri nomen personae.

Secundo vero, utrum nomen substantiae.

Tertio, utrum nomen essentiae.

---

english:
### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the diversity of the divine names in general. Here begins the second part, in which he treats of the same[^1] in particular. And since certain names are substantial, certain relative, and these may be considered absolutely and in relation to one another[^2]: therefore this part has three parts. In the first he treats of the substantial names. In the second of the relative, below in the twenty-sixth distinction: *Now concerning the properties of the persons, which frequently* etc. In the third of these[^3] relatives in relation to one another, below in the thirty-third distinction: *After the foregoing, to be considered more inwardly*.

And since among the substantial names this name *person* is excepted from the general rule, which is that what is substantial is said of the three in the singular: therefore this name[^4] is first excepted from the general rule, showing that we ought to say three persons; and this in the present distinction. Secondly, however, he determines what is signified by this name *three* and by this name *persons*, when we say *three persons*, below in the next distinction: *Here it must be diligently inquired*.

The first part has four [parts]. In the first the Master excepts that name from the general rule. In the second he investigates the reason for this exception, there: *Hence arises here a difficult question*, showing that it was the poverty of human speech. In the third the Master raises objections against the assignment and resolves them, there: *But it is asked here, when we say Father and Son and Holy Spirit*. In the fourth he epilogizes the matters determined, so as to add, there: *Now sufficiently, as I think, it has been shown*. The subdivisions of these parts are clear of themselves. For each part is subdivided into two according to the two chapters which it contains[^5].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of those things which are said in the present distinction concerning these names *person*, *substance*, and *essence*, two questions are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning the translation of these names to divine matters.

Secondly concerning the numeration of the same in divine matters.

Concerning the first, three questions are asked.

First, whether the name of *person* ought to have been transferred there[^6].

Secondly indeed, whether the name of *substance*.

Thirdly, whether the name of *essence*.

---

la: In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 minus congrue deest *de eadem*.

en: In very many manuscripts and edition 1, the words *de eadem* ("of the same") are less aptly missing.

la: Lectio plurimorum codd. et ed. 1, in qua omittitur *invicem*, ambiguitatem generat et est contra subnexa; codd. aa bb, omisso *invicem*, verbis *ad se* praefigunt *per comparationem*.

en: The reading of very many manuscripts and edition 1, in which *invicem* ("mutually") is omitted, generates ambiguity and is contrary to what follows; codices aa, bb, with *invicem* omitted, prefix to the words *ad se* the phrase *per comparationem* ("by comparison").

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *substantialibus* et pro *his*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and the first six editions, reads *substantialibus* ("substantial [names]") and in place of *his* ("these").

la: Codd. VY *illud*.

en: Codices V and Y read *illud* ("that").

la: In Vat. desideratur ultima haec propositio *Nam quaelibet* etc., quae tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1.

en: In the Vatican edition this final sentence *Nam quaelibet* etc. is wanting, which nevertheless is found in the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Vat. *ad divina debeat* loco *debuerit ibi*, sed contra codd., quorum tamen plures cum ed. 1 habent *debuit*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *ad divina debeat* ("ought [to be transferred] to divine matters") in place of *debuerit ibi* ("ought to have [been transferred] there"), but against the codices, of which however many along with edition 1 have *debuit* ("ought").