title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum malae voluntates habeant unicum finem.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum malae voluntates habeant unicum finem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi[^1]: *Scrutans corda* etc.: « Finis curae et cogitationis humanae est delectatio, ad quam quisque nititur pervenire »: si ergo omnes voluntates malae finaliter quaerunt delectationem, videtur, quod omnium voluntatum malarum sit unum finem assignare.

2. Item, malarum voluntatum est unus malus exitus sive terminus, sicut dicitur ad Romanos sexto[^2]: *Quorum finis mors est:* ergo si earum contingat esse unum terminum, pari ratione videtur, quod contingat esse unum finem ultimum.

3. Item, quae conveniunt in principio conveniunt et in fine ultimo; sed omnes malae voluntates conveniunt in principio, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Vera Religione*[^3]: « Planum est, inquit, in toto malefaciendi genere nihil aliud quam libidinem dominari ». Si ergo conveniunt in uno principio, utpote in libidine, videtur pari ratione, quod conveniant in uno fine.

4. Item, vitium imitatur virtutem secundum apparentiam[^4]; unde sicut virtus nunquam quiescit citra beatitudinem veram, ita vitium inquirit beatitudinem simulatam: ergo sicut omnes virtutes faciunt tendere voluntatem ad unum finem, scilicet beatitudinem; sic videtur, quod omnia vitia faciant tendere voluntatem ad unum finem, scilicet qui habeat similitudinem cum vero fine.

**Sed contra:** 1. Contrariarum voluntatum contrariae sunt delectationes, ubi autem sunt delectationes contrariae, ibi sunt fines diversi; sed voluptates faciunt voluntates sibi invicem repugnare: ergo faciunt diversos fines habere.

2. Item, mala voluntas ponit finem in creatura; sed impossibile est, quod in una creatura inveniat nostra voluntas sufficientiam, cum nihil sufficiat voluntati humanae nisi sola Trinitas[^5]: si ergo voluntas non quiescit nisi in eo fine, in quo ponit sufficientiam; videtur necessario, quod voluntas mala diversos sibi fines constituat.

3. Item, malae voluntatis appetitus ortum et radicem habet ex libidine; sed libido est quo quis amat bonum proprium[^6]: si ergo bonum proprium necessario diversificatur in diversis, necesse est, diversarum voluntatum diversos fines reperiri.

4. Item, unitas et conformitas voluntatum bonarum venit ex unitate amoris, in quo uniuntur et colligantur[^7]. Si ergo amor, in quo diversi colligantur et uniuntur, unicam debet habere radicem, in pluribus repertam, cum hoc non conveniat amori libidinis, sed solum amori caritatis, qui est amor Spiritus sancti; videtur, quod malarum voluntatum non sit finis unicus, sed diversi.

### Conclusio

> Voluntates malae differentes non unum, sed diversos fines sibi constituunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod e contrario est in bonis voluntatibus et in malis. Nam bonarum voluntatum unicus est finis, sive bonae voluntates sint diversae diversitate numerali[^8], sive diversitate formali. Diversitatem autem numeralem voco, quando plures homines in eodem genere affectionis afficiuntur circa aliquid; diversitatem autem formalem voco, quando idem homo diversis habitibus virtutum afficitur circa diversa. Sive enim sic, sive sic, licet contingat plures fines proximos et proprios assignare, tamen finem ultimum et principalem necesse est esse unicum, videlicet ipsum Deum.

Et ratio huius est et perfectio amoris moventis, et perfectio appetibilis quietantis. Quia enim amor caritatis liberalis est, et non quaerit quod suum est, sed bonum commune[^9]; hinc est, quod plures homines, ex caritate moti, idem bonum appetunt finaliter. Rursus, quia appetibile illud completissimum est, in quo non solum contingit reperire bonum perfectum, sed etiam omne bonum; hinc est, quod omnes voluntates, quantumcumque diversae[^10], inveniunt finem suum, in quo quietantur.

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— Econtra est in malis voluntatibus propter imperfectionem amoris et appetibilis. Propter imperfectionem namque amoris libidinosi voluntates solo numero differentes diversos habent fines, propterea quod amor libidinosus semper quaerit quod suum est; et quia semper quaerit bonum proprium, ideo etsi multi ex amore libidinoso conveniant in actum unum, tamen unusquisque quaerit finem suum proprium, ut patet in adultero et meretrice, quia iste quaerit delectationem, et illa quaerit nummum. — Propter imperfectionem etiam appetibilis necesse est, diversas voluntates formaliter differentes habere diversos fines. Quia enim luxuria appetit iucunditatem et laetitiam, et avaritia sufficientiam, et superbia excellentiam; et haec omnia non contingit reperire circa eandem rem creatam, sed circa diversas: hinc est, quod voluntates malae differentes formaliter non unum, sed diversos fines sibi constituunt. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod delectatio est finis curae et cogitationis: dicendum, quod in ratione illa est figura dictionis, pro eo quod non eadem delectatio est finis curae et cogitationis humanae, sed diversae. Unde stat ibi delectatio in sua generalitate et magis habet ibi suppositionem simplicem quam personalem; et ideo, cum per delectationem descendit ad finis unitatem, fit sophisticatio secundum figuram dictionis ex commutatione suppositionis[^11].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malarum voluntatum est unus malus exitus, ergo unus malus finis: dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam malae voluntates differunt in conversione, sed conveniunt in aversione; et malus exitus principalius respicit aversionem quam conversionem, finis vero movens principalius respicit conversionem quam aversionem. Ideo non sequitur, quod quamvis[^12] sit unus exitus quoad mortem damnationis, quod propter hoc sit unus finis motivus quantum ad quietem delectationis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malae voluntates conveniunt in principio, videlicet in libidine; dicendum, quod in principio non conveniunt nisi per quandam conformitatem. Nam alia est libido in uno, et alia in alio; et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod conveniant in finem unicum. Attamen, etsi in principio convenirent, non propter hoc necesse esset, quod convenirent in termino[^13]. Nam malum semper procedit in dispersionem, bonum vero semper redit ad unitatem. Quanto enim aliquid magis colligitur, tanto magis vigoratur et est perfectius; quanto vero magis dispergitur, tanto magis recedit a perfectione et complemento. Et ideo dicit Philosophus, quod « malum est multifariam, et bonum uno modo ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vitium imitatur virtutem; dicendum, quod sic imitatur, quod plus habet de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine; magis enim virtuti contrariatur, quam ei conformetur. Et ideo potius inferri potest, quod malae voluntates habeant fines diversos, si bonae habent unicum, quam e converso. Quia enim in hoc consistit perfectio virtutis, vitium magis in hoc a virtute deficit, quam eam imitari possit. Et sic patet, quod malarum voluntatum non est unus finis, sed diversi[^14].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether evil wills have a single end.*

Fourthly it is asked whether evil wills have a single end. And that they do, it seems.

1. Augustine, on that passage of the Psalm[^1]: *Searching hearts* etc.: « The end of human care and thought is the delight to which each one strives to attain »: if therefore all evil wills finally seek delight, it seems that one end can be assigned for all evil wills.

2. Likewise, of evil wills there is one evil outcome or terminus, as is said in Romans, chapter six[^2]: *Whose end is death:* therefore, if it happens that they have one terminus, by parity of reasoning it seems that it happens that they have one ultimate end.

3. Likewise, things that agree in their beginning agree also in their ultimate end; but all evil wills agree in their beginning, as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*[^3]: « It is plain, he says, that in the whole class of wrongdoing nothing else holds sway than lust ». If therefore they agree in one beginning, namely in lust, by parity of reasoning it seems that they agree in one end.

4. Likewise, vice imitates virtue according to appearance[^4]; whence, just as virtue never rests short of true beatitude, so vice seeks a feigned beatitude: therefore, just as all virtues make the will tend to one end, namely beatitude; so it seems that all vices make the will tend to one end, namely one that has a likeness to the true end.

**On the contrary:** 1. Of contrary wills the delights are contrary, and where there are contrary delights, there are diverse ends; but pleasures make wills mutually repugnant: therefore they make them have diverse ends.

2. Likewise, an evil will sets its end in a creature; but it is impossible that in one creature our will should find sufficiency, since nothing suffices for the human will except the Trinity alone[^5]: if therefore the will does not rest except in that end in which it sets its sufficiency; it seems necessary that the evil will constitutes diverse ends for itself.

3. Likewise, the appetite of an evil will has its origin and root from lust; but lust is that by which one loves one's own good[^6]: if therefore one's own good is necessarily diversified in diverse persons, it is necessary that diverse ends be found for diverse wills.

4. Likewise, the unity and conformity of good wills comes from the unity of love, in which they are united and bound together[^7]. If therefore love, in which diverse persons are bound together and united, ought to have a single root, found in many, since this does not belong to the love of lust, but only to the love of charity, which is the love of the Holy Spirit; it seems that of evil wills there is not a single end, but diverse ones.

### Conclusion

> Differing evil wills constitute for themselves not one, but diverse ends.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is the contrary in good wills and in evil ones. For of good wills there is a single end, whether the good wills be diverse by numerical diversity[^8] or by formal diversity. I call diversity numerical when several men are affected in the same genus of affection toward something; and I call diversity formal when the same man is affected by diverse habits of the virtues toward diverse things. For whether in the one way or the other, although it may happen that several proximate and proper ends are assigned, nevertheless the ultimate and principal end must necessarily be single, namely God himself.

And the ground of this is both the perfection of the moving love and the perfection of the desirable thing that gives rest. For because the love of charity is liberal, and does not seek what is its own, but the common good[^9]; hence it is that several men, moved by charity, finally seek the same good. Again, because that desirable thing is most complete, in which one can find not only a perfect good, but also every good; hence it is that all wills, however diverse[^10], find their end, in which they rest.

— On the contrary, it is otherwise in evil wills, on account of the imperfection of love and of the desirable thing. For on account of the imperfection of lustful love, wills differing in number alone have diverse ends, because lustful love always seeks what is its own; and because it always seeks its own good, therefore, even if many through lustful love agree in one act, nevertheless each one seeks his own proper end, as is plain in the adulterer and the harlot, for the one seeks delight and the other seeks money. — On account of the imperfection of the desirable thing as well, it is necessary that diverse wills formally differing have diverse ends. For because luxury seeks pleasantness and gladness, and avarice sufficiency, and pride excellence; and all these cannot be found in the same created thing, but in diverse things: hence it is that evil wills formally differing constitute for themselves not one, but diverse ends. — Whence the arguments which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected first, that delight is the end of care and thought: it must be said that in that argument there is a figure of diction, for the reason that it is not the same delight that is the end of human care and of thought, but diverse ones. Whence delight there stands in its generality and has there rather a simple supposition than a personal one; and therefore, when through delight one descends to a unity of end, a sophism arises according to the figure of diction from a commutation of supposition[^11].

2. To that which is objected, that of evil wills there is one evil outcome, therefore one evil end: it must be said that it is not alike. For evil wills differ in conversion, but agree in aversion; and the evil outcome regards aversion more principally than conversion, whereas the moving end regards conversion more principally than aversion. Therefore it does not follow that, although[^12] there is one outcome as regards the death of damnation, that on account of this there is one motive end as regards the rest of delight.

3. To that which is objected, that evil wills agree in their beginning, namely in lust; it must be said that in their beginning they agree only by a certain conformity. For the lust in one is one thing, and that in another is another; and therefore it does not follow from this that they agree in a single end. And yet, even if they agreed in their beginning, it would not on account of this be necessary that they agree in their terminus[^13]. For evil always proceeds toward dispersion, but good always returns to unity. For the more a thing is gathered together, the more it is strengthened and is more perfect; but the more it is dispersed, the more it recedes from perfection and completion. And therefore the Philosopher says that « evil is in many ways, and good in one way ».

4. To that which is objected, that vice imitates virtue; it must be said that it imitates in such a way that it has more of dissimilarity than of similarity; for it is more contrary to virtue than conformed to it. And therefore it can rather be inferred that evil wills have diverse ends, if good wills have a single one, than the converse. For because the perfection of virtue consists in this, vice falls short of virtue in this more than it can imitate it. And thus it is plain that of evil wills there is not one end, but diverse ones[^14].

---

la: Psalm. 7, 10. Verba Augustini vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Pro *illum locum* ed. I *illud*.

en: Psalm 7:10. For the words of Augustine, see here in the text of the Master, c. 4. — For *illum locum* (that passage) ed. I reads *illud*.

la: Vers. 21: *Nam finis illorum mors est.* — Pro *est unus malus exitus* Vat. *est frequentius unus malus exitus.*

en: Verse 21: *For their end is death.* — For *est unus malus exitus* (there is one evil outcome) the Vatican edition reads *est frequentius unus malus exitus* (there is more often one evil outcome).

la: Sententia Augustini hic allata invenitur l. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 8. Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. et d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. ad oppos.

en: The opinion of Augustine here cited is found in *On Free Choice* bk. 1, c. 3, n. 8. See above d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body, and d. 36, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1 to the opposite.

la: Iuvenalis, Sat. 14, 109. ait: *Fallit enim vitium specie virtutis et umbra.* Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 8; August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 6, et IV. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 20. — Mox pro *ita vitium inquirit beatitudinem simulatam* cod. cc et ed. I *ita nec vitium citra beatitudinem simulatam.*

en: Juvenal, Satire 14, 109, says: *For vice deceives by the appearance and shadow of virtue.* Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 8; Augustine, *Letter* 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 6, and *Against Julian the Pelagian* IV, c. 3, n. 20. — Shortly after, for *ita vitium inquirit beatitudinem simulatam* (so vice seeks a feigned beatitude) cod. cc and ed. I read *ita nec vitium citra beatitudinem simulatam.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 2. et 9. (c. 7.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* VII, c. 2 and 9 (c. 7).

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, et August., l. Confess. l. n. 1.

en: See here in the text of the Master, c. 2, and Augustine, *Confessions* bk. 1, n. 1.

la: Secundum Augustinum: vide supra pag. 150, nota — Codd. X Z et ed. I *qua quis* pro *quo quis.*

en: According to Augustine: see above p. 150, note —. Codices X, Z and ed. I read *qua quis* for *quo quis.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 4. (c. 2.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* VII, c. 4 (c. 2).

la: Vat. *materiali*, et paulo post pariter *materialem.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *materiali*, and a little after, likewise, *materialem.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. I hic interiiciunt *sit.*

en: Cod. cc and ed. I here insert *sit.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 5: *[Caritas] non quaerit quae sua sunt.* Et ibid. 10, 24: *Nemo quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius.* — De fallacia figurae dictionis cfr. tom. I. pag. 740, nota 6. et de suppositione eiusque speciebus ibid. d. 4. q. 1. schol.

en: Epistle I Corinthians 13:5: *[Charity] does not seek the things that are its own.* And ibid. 10:24: *Let no one seek what is his own, but what is another's.* — On the fallacy of the figure of diction cf. tom. I, p. 740, note 6; and on supposition and its species ibid. d. 4, q. 1, scholion.

la: Vat. ibid. subiicit *ibi.* — Pro *quamvis* Vat. *si*, codd. P W et edd. 2, 3, 4 *cum finis.* Post pauca voci *damnationis* cod. bb addit *aeternae.*

en: The Vatican edition ibid. adds *ibi.* — For *quamvis* (although) the Vatican edition reads *si*, codd. P W and edd. 2, 3, 4 read *cum finis.* A little after, to the word *damnationis* cod. bb adds *aeternae.*

la: Vide supra pag. 635, nota 3. Cfr. ibid. nota 4. — Paulo superius pro *redit ad unitatem* cod. cc et ed. I *tendit ad unitatem.*

en: See above p. 635, note 3. Cf. ibid. note 4. — A little earlier, for *redit ad unitatem* (returns to unity) cod. cc and ed. I read *tendit ad unitatem* (tends to unity).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De differentia intentionis et voluntatis.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de differentia intentionis et voluntatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum intentio sit in solis rationalibus.

Secundo, utrum intentio in participantibus rationem dicat aliquid ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum intentio sit in his solis, quae participant rationem.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum intentio sit in his solis, quae participant rationem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Glossa super illud Lucae undecimo[^1]: *Vide, ne lumen* etc.; Glossa: «*Lumen* animae est intentio»; sed constat, quod intentio non est lumen corporale, sed spirituale: si igitur lumen spirituale est in solis substantiis spiritualibus, quae natae sunt
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illuminari a summa luce, et hae sunt solae creaturae rationales; videtur ergo, quod intentio sit in solis rationalibus.

2. Item, intentio est actus vis collativae — qui enim intendit ab uno in aliud tendit et unum comparat alteri — si ergo vis collativa est in solis participantibus rationem, videtur, quod in eis solis reperiatur intentio[^2].

3. Item, intentio est illud, secundum quod anima immediatius iungitur ultimo fini: ergo in eis solum est reperiri intentio, quae habent potentiam, mediante qua Deum possunt capere et ei uniri; sed talia sunt sola rationalia, quoniam ipsa sola sunt ad imaginem Dei[^3]: ergo videtur, quod in his solis contingat intentionem reperiri.

4. Item, intentio est supremum in anima, unde ipsa dicitur esse caput nostrum et oculus noster[^4]; sed illa, in quibus communicamus cum irrationalibus creaturis, sunt infima et citra rationem: ergo videtur, quod in nulla alia creatura a rationali contingat intentionem reperiri.

**Sed contra:**
1. In omni eo quod operatur per intentionem, est reperire intentionem; sed «natura, ut dicit Philosophus[^5], est operans per intentionem»: ergo videtur, quod in re naturali est intentionem reperire et ponere.

2. Item, omne illud quod movetur ad aliquid et, eo obtento, quiescit, cum[^6] movebatur, illud intendebat; nisi enim illud intenderet, non moveretur ad eius absentiam, nec quiesceret ad eius praesentiam. Si igitur res naturales sunt huiusmodi, ut patet, cum lapis movetur deorsum; videtur, quod intentio non tantummodo sit in rationalibus, sed etiam in rebus naturalibus.

3. Item, omne quod facit aliquod opus ordinatum ad finem ab illo diversum, operatur per intentionem; sed naturae irrationales sunt huiusmodi, sicut patet in aranea, quae facit telam ad capiendas muscas[^7]: ergo videtur etc.

4. Item, intentio est regula appetitus: ergo si non est ponere aliquid in universo privatum regimine et ordine, videtur, quod ubicumque est ponere appetitum, est ponere intentionem. Sed appetitus non solum est in substantiis rationalibus, sed etiam irrationalibus[^8]: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Intentio proprie est in solis rationalibus, in sensualibus minus proprie, in naturalibus improprie.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem duplex est modus dicendi, qui ad praesens occurrit. Unus est, ut distinguamus in modo operandi per intentionem penes proprium et alienum. Videtur enim satis rationabiliter posse dici, quod quaedam sunt, quae moventur per intentionem propriam, quaedam, quae moventur per intentionem alienam. Per intentionem propriam moventur illa quae finem praecognoscunt et operationem suam ad finem conferunt et referunt. Per intentionem alienam moventur illa quae intra se non habent potentiam discernendi; reguntur tamen et diriguntur ab eo qui discernit, sicut sagitta ab arcu emissa moveri potest dici per intentionem, non, inquam, arcus vel sagittae, sed sagittantis. — Per hunc quidem modum satis rationabiliter posset[^9] dici, quod omnes res naturales per intentionem dicuntur moveri, pro eo quod moventur, sicut Deus instituit et sicut gubernat et regit; ipse enim in omni operatione est principalis motor. Et secundum hunc modum dicendi intentio proprie reperitur in solis substantiis rationalibus, licet irrationalia secundum aliquem modum dicendi per intentionem operari dicantur. — Sed quamvis iste modus dicendi rationabilis[^10] sit et veritatem dicat; non tamen videtur sufficienter dicere, cum dicit, quod natura ideo dicitur operari per intentionem, non ratione propriae intentionis, sed ratione intentionis alienae; quia non dicit sufficienter, dum naturae assignat intentionem[^11] alienam tantum. Secundum hoc enim casualia et fortuita, cum non fiant praeter divinam intentionem, non deberent dici facta praeter intentionem. Rursus, cum videamus, quod naturalia appetitum habeant, mediante quo tendunt ab uno in alterum, et unaquaeque res habeat vim suam regitivam, mediante qua ad finem proprium inclinatur; videtur, quod naturalia non tantum habeant moveri intentione extrinseca et aliena, sed etiam quod moveantur intentione propria et intrinseca[^12].
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Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quia, sicut triplex est appetitus, videlicet naturalis, sensualis sive animalis et rationalis, et quilibet istorum appetituum habet suum regimen, non absurde regimen cuiuslibet istorum trium appellatur intentio; maxime tamen proprie intentio vocatur regimen appetitus rationalis. — Et ratio huius est, quia ad regimen et directivum appetitus naturalis plus spectat dirigi quam dirigere; ad directivum vero appetitus rationalis proprie spectat dirigere: directivum vero appetitus brutalis quodammodo medium tenet[^13]. Et hinc est, quod naturalia moventur quadam necessitate, rationalia vero mera libertate, bruta vero moventur quadam impetuositate, quae est infra libertatem et supra necessitatem; non enim possunt se omnino reprimere, et tamen possunt ad oppositas partes tendere[^14]. Sicut igitur regula directiva operationis reperitur in rationalibus proprie, in sensualibus minus proprie, in naturalibus improprie; sic et intentio.

**Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, et ad rationes ad utramque partem.** Nam intentio proprie accepta, secundum quod dicit lumen, per quod est collatio et tendentia in Deum, attenditur circa animae supremum[^15]; et ideo hoc modo in solis rationalibus reperitur, sicut illae rationes ostendunt. Intentio vero, prout dicit ordinationem et directionem appetitus ad aliquem terminum vel finem quietantem, non tantummodo est in rationalibus, immo etiam in brutis, sicut aliae rationes ad aliam partem ostendunt. Et sic patet, quod utraeque diversis viis verum concludunt, et propterea concedendae sunt.

english:
### Article II. *On the difference of intention and will.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the difference of intention and will. And about this two things are asked.

First it is asked, whether intention is in rational beings alone.

Second, whether intention, in those things that share in reason, denotes something on the side of the intellect, or on the side of the affection.

### Question I. *Whether intention is only in those things which share in reason.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether intention is only in those things which share in reason. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. As the Gloss says upon that passage of Luke, chapter eleven[^1]: *Take heed, lest the light* etc.; the Gloss: «The *light* of the soul is intention»; but it is established that intention is not a corporeal light, but a spiritual one: if therefore spiritual light is in spiritual substances alone, which are born to be
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illumined by the highest light, and these are the only rational creatures; it seems therefore that intention is in rational beings alone.

2. Likewise, intention is an act of the comparative power — for he who intends tends from one thing to another and compares one thing to another — if therefore the comparative power is only in those which share in reason, it seems that intention is found in them alone[^2].

3. Likewise, intention is that by which the soul is most immediately joined to the ultimate end: therefore intention is to be found only in those which have the power by means of which they can lay hold of God and be united to Him; but such are the rational beings alone, since they alone are unto the image of God[^3]: therefore it seems that it is in these alone that intention can be found.

4. Likewise, intention is the highest thing in the soul, whence it is called our head and our eye[^4]; but those things in which we have community with irrational creatures are the lowest and below reason: therefore it seems that in no creature other than the rational can intention be found.

**On the contrary:**
1. In everything which operates through intention, intention is to be found; but «nature, as the Philosopher says[^5], is something that operates through intention»: therefore it seems that in a natural thing intention is to be found and posited.

2. Likewise, everything which is moved toward something and, once that is obtained, comes to rest, was intending that thing when[^6] it was being moved; for unless it intended that thing, it would not be moved toward its absence, nor come to rest at its presence. If therefore natural things are of this kind, as is evident, since a stone is moved downward; it seems that intention is not only in rational beings, but also in natural things.

3. Likewise, everything which makes some work ordered to an end distinct from itself operates through intention; but irrational natures are of this kind, as is evident in the spider, which makes its web for catching flies[^7]: therefore it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, intention is the rule of appetite: therefore if nothing in the universe is to be posited as deprived of governance and order, it seems that wherever there is appetite to be posited, there intention is to be posited. But appetite is not only in rational substances, but also in irrational ones[^8]: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusion.** Intention is properly in rational beings alone, in sensual ones less properly, in natural ones improperly.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this question there is a twofold mode of speaking which presents itself at present. The one is that we distinguish in the mode of operating through intention according to what is proper and what is alien. For it seems that it can be said with sufficient reasonableness that there are certain things which are moved by their own intention, and certain things which are moved by an alien intention. By their own intention are moved those things which foreknow the end and direct and refer their operation to the end. By an alien intention are moved those things which within themselves do not have the power of discerning; yet they are governed and directed by him who discerns, just as an arrow shot from a bow can be said to be moved through intention — not, I say, the intention of the bow or of the arrow, but of the one who shoots. — In this mode, indeed, it could[^9] be said with sufficient reasonableness that all natural things are said to be moved through intention, inasmuch as they are moved as God has appointed and as He governs and rules; for He Himself in every operation is the principal mover. And according to this mode of speaking intention is properly found in rational substances alone, although irrational things may, according to some mode of speaking, be said to operate through intention. — But although this mode of speaking is reasonable[^10] and states the truth, nevertheless it does not seem to state it sufficiently, when it says that nature is said to operate through intention not by reason of its own intention, but by reason of an alien intention; because it does not state it sufficiently, while it assigns to natures only an alien intention[^11]. For according to this, chance and fortuitous events, since they do not come to pass apart from the divine intention, ought not to be said to come to pass apart from intention. Again, since we see that natural things have appetite, by means of which they tend from one thing to another, and each thing has its own governing power, by means of which it is inclined to its proper end; it seems that natural things not only are moved by an extrinsic and alien intention, but also that they are moved by a proper and intrinsic intention[^12].
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And therefore there is another mode of speaking, since, just as appetite is threefold, namely natural, sensual or animal, and rational, and each of these appetites has its own governance, not absurdly is the governance of each of these three called intention; yet most properly is intention called the governance of the rational appetite. — And the reason for this is that to the governance and direction of the natural appetite it pertains rather to be directed than to direct; but to the directing of the rational appetite it properly pertains to direct: while the directing of the brute appetite holds, as it were, a middle position[^13]. And hence it is that natural things are moved by a certain necessity, rational things by pure liberty, but brutes are moved by a certain impetuosity, which is below liberty and above necessity; for they cannot altogether restrain themselves, and yet they can tend toward opposite directions[^14]. As therefore the directive rule of operation is found in rational beings properly, in sensual ones less properly, in natural ones improperly; so also is intention.

**And through this is evident the answer to the proposed question, and to the reasons on both sides.** For intention properly taken, according as it denotes a light through which there is comparison and tending toward God, is regarded as belonging to the highest part of the soul[^15]; and therefore in this mode it is found in rational beings alone, as those reasons show. But intention, according as it denotes the ordering and direction of appetite toward some terminus or quieting end, is not only in rational beings, but even in brutes, as the other reasons for the other side show. And so it is evident that both [sets of reasons] conclude what is true by different ways, and therefore are to be conceded.

la: Vers. 35. — Glossa apud Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis et est secundum August., II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 13. n. 46, et secundum Bedam, super hunc locum. Cfr. etiam Glossa ordinaria apud Lyranum. — De divisione luminis vide supra pag. 839, nota 1. — Pro *a summa luce* permulti codd., ut C F H I Iv L R T Y bb ee etc., *a sua luce* (August., XII. de Trin. c. 16. n. 24; *quadam luce sui generis incorporea*), de quo vide supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Verse 35 [Luke 11:35]. — The Gloss in Lyra is given as interlinear and is according to Augustine, *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* II, c. 13, n. 46, and according to Bede, on this passage. Cf. also the ordinary Gloss in Lyra. — On the division of light see above p. 839, note 1. — For *from the highest light* very many codices, such as C F H I Iv L R T Y bb ee etc., read *from its own light* (Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 16, n. 24; *by a certain incorporeal light of its own kind*), on which see above d. 10, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 57. (c. 11.); III. Ethic. c. 2. seqq.; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 16. (c. 17.); II. Moral. Eudem. c. 10. seqq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 57 (c. 11); *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 2 ff.; *Magna Moralia* I, c. 16 (c. 17); *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 10 ff.

la: Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. et d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 ff. and d. 19, a. 1, q. 2, in the body.

la: Cfr. dictum Augustini, supra pag. 881, nota 1. allatum. — Gregor., X. Moral. c. 23. n. 41, XXVIII. c. 11. n. 30; I. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 2, intentionem vocat *oculum*, et XII. Moral. c. 44. n. 50, nec non I. in Ezech. homil. 4. n. 4. eam nominat *faciem*. — De minori vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4. — In conclusione Vat. perperam omittit praepositionem *o* ante *rationali*.

en: Cf. the saying of Augustine adduced above on p. 881, note 1. — Gregory, *Moralia* X, c. 23, n. 41, XXVIII, c. 11, n. 30; *On Ezekiel* I, homily 7, n. 2, calls intention the *eye*, and *Moralia* XII, c. 44, n. 50, as well as *On Ezekiel* I, homily 4, n. 4, names it the *face*. — On the minor premise see above the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 4. — In the conclusion the Vatican edition wrongly omits the preposition *in* before *rational*.

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. 49. et 75. seqq. (c. 5. et 8.).

en: *Physics* book II, text 49 and 75 ff. (c. 5 and 8).

la: Vat. hic adiicit *enim*, omisso prius *cum* edd. 2,3,4 et compluribus codd. *et* ante *eo obtento*. In fine arg. Vat. cum cod. ee et edd. 3, 4 pro *naturalibus* posuit *irrationalibus*.

en: Here the Vatican edition adds *enim* [for], having previously omitted *cum* [when], with editions 2, 3, 4 and very many codices [also omitting] *et* before *eo obtento* [once that is obtained]. At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, with codex ee and editions 3, 4, has put *irrational* for *natural*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 80. (c. 8.), ubi et haec leguntur: Quapropter dubitant quidam, utrum intellectu, aut quodam alio operentur et araneae et formicae et huiusmodi.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 80 (c. 8), where these things also are read: Wherefore some doubt whether spiders and ants and the like operate by intellect, or by some other [power].

la: Vide supra pag. 15, nota 10; pag. 348, nota 3. et pag. 460, nota 6.

en: See above p. 15, note 10; p. 348, note 3; and p. 460, note 6.

la: Edd. praeter 1 *potest*.

en: The editions except [edition] 1 read *can* [present tense].

la: Cod. ee *probabilis*. Mox in antiquioribus codd. deest *tamen*, et paulo inferius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt *ideo*.

en: Codex ee reads *probable*. Soon after, in the older codices *tamen* [nevertheless] is lacking, and a little below the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 omit *ideo* [therefore].

la: Cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2.

la: Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 1. seqq. et 86. seqq. (c. 1. et 8.). — Post pauca cod. F *quod* pro *quia*; dein pro *sensualis* in cod. T secundis curis substitutum est *sensibilis*.

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 1 ff. and 86 ff. (c. 1 and 8). — A little after, codex F [reads] *quod* for *quia*; then for *sensualis* in codex T, by a second hand, *sensibilis* was substituted.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 604, nota 5, et Aristot., de Animal. motu, c. 3. seqq. (c. 6. seq.). — Paulo superius pro *ad regimen* codd. V Y cc et ed. 1 habent *ad regitivum*, et mox pro *spectat dirigere* in pluribus codd., ut I K T V W Y bb ee, legitur *spectat regere*.

en: Cf. above p. 604, note 5, and Aristotle, *On the Movement of Animals*, c. 3 ff. (c. 6 f.). — A little above, for *ad regimen* [to the governance] codices V Y cc and edition 1 have *ad regitivum*, and presently for *spectat dirigere* [it pertains to direct] in several codices, such as I K T V W Y bb ee, is read *spectat regere*.

la: De hac re plura videsis supra d. 25. p. I. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *mera libertate*, quam lectionem ex codd. F K cc restituimus, edd., excepta 1, cum non paucis codd. corrupte exhibent *mera liberalitate*.

en: On this matter see more above d. 25, p. I, q. 1. — A little above, for *mera libertate* [pure liberty], which reading we have restored from codices F K cc, the editions, except [edition] 1, with not a few codices, corruptly present *mera liberalitate* [pure liberality].

la: Vide supra pag. 642, nota 8. — Aliquanto superius pro *dicit*, quod in plurimis codd., ut H K X bb cc ee etc., nec non in ed. 1 legitur, Vat. substituit *dicitur*, quam lectionem iam codd. V W Z exhibent, qui insuper adiiciunt *Lucae 11*. Inde pro *attenditur* Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 posuerunt *accipitur*, et paulo inferius Vat. sola pro *ordinationem* habet *tendentiam, ordinem*, edd. 2, 3, 4 *tendentiam*.

en: See above p. 642, note 8. — Somewhat above, for *dicit* [denotes], which is read in very many codices, such as H K X bb cc ee etc., as also in edition 1, the Vatican edition has substituted *dicitur*, which reading codices V W Z already exhibit, which moreover add *Luke 11*. Hence for *attenditur* [is regarded] the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 have put *accipitur* [is taken], and a little below the Vatican edition alone has for *ordinationem* [the ordering] *tendentiam, ordinem* [tending, order], editions 2, 3, 4 *tendentiam* [tending].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quid sit *intentio*, explicatur in seq. quaestione (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. I. § I, et S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 12. a. I.). Differt autem intentio ab electione. Electio enim directe respicit ea quae sunt ad finem, tamen in relatione ad finem; intentio autem directe respicit finem, tamen in relatione ad ea quae sunt ad finem (de electione cfr. Itiner. mentis ad Deum, c. 3; de intentione IV. Sent. d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. I. 2.). — S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. et Petro de Tar. distinguit intentionem in sensu largiore et in sensu proprio, dum S. Thom. hoc loco intentionem definit tantum in sensu stricto. Hinc oritur etiam diversus modus loquendi in solutione huius quaestionis. Nam S. Thomas respondet secundum primam opinionem, in respons. positam, solisque rationalibus creaturis intentionem attribuit; de qua opinione S. Bonav. iudicat, eam esse rationabilem et veritatem dicere, videri autem eandem non sufficere. Ratio autem, quam pro hac assertione affert, in se est verissima omnibusque probata, scilicet, quod etiam naturalibus rebus insit quidam appetitus ad perfectionem suam et Dei similitudinem suo modo acquirendam (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 44. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 19. seqq.). Immo etiam ipse S. Thom. (locis citt. et alibi) verbo *intendere* utitur in sensu largiore, scilicet de appetitu naturali rerum irrationabilium, quando dicit, «quod omnia intendunt assimilari Deo», vel quod «unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem». Hinc dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 3.): «Videtur tamen positio Bonaventurae aptior esse. Certum est namque, quod omnis potentia tendat in suum obiectum, etiam intellectus speculationis etc.». Sed tota haec differentia consistit in modo loquendi, sicut etiam alia in solvenda seq. (2.) quaestione differentia, quae aliquatenus cohaeret cum prima. Nam S. Thom. cum Richardo, Scoto aliisque dicit, quod intentio proprie est actus voluntatis, «tamen praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem» (S. I. II. q. 12. a. I. in corp. et ad 3.). Idem secundum rem, sed aliis verbis S. Bonav. dicit hic in corp. et ad 3.

**II.** Plerique commentatores Magistri utramque huius articuli quaestionem unica quaest. absolvunt. — Alex. Hal., loc. cit. Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; Sum. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. I. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit.

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english_scholion:
**I.** What *intention* is, is explained in the following question (cf. Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. I. § I, and St. Thomas, *Summa* I–II. q. 12. a. I.). But intention differs from election. For election directly regards the things which are unto the end, yet in relation to the end; whereas intention directly regards the end, yet in relation to the things which are unto the end (on election cf. *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, c. 3; on intention *IV Sent.* d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. I. 2.). — St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales and Peter of Tarentaise, distinguishes intention in the broader sense and in the proper sense, while St. Thomas in this place defines intention only in the strict sense. From this also arises the diverse mode of speaking in the solution of this question. For St. Thomas answers according to the first opinion, set down in the response, and attributes intention to rational creatures alone; concerning which opinion St. Bonaventure judges that it is reasonable and states the truth, but that the same seems not to suffice. The reason, however, which he brings forward for this assertion, is in itself most true and proved by all, namely, that even in natural things there is a certain appetite for acquiring, in their own way, their perfection and the likeness of God (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I. q. 44. a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles* III. c. 19. seqq.). Indeed, even St. Thomas himself (in the places cited and elsewhere) uses the word *to intend* in the broader sense, namely concerning the natural appetite of irrational things, when he says that «all things intend to be assimilated to God», or that «each creature intends to attain its own perfection». Hence Dionysius the Carthusian says (here q. 3.): «Yet the position of Bonaventure seems to be the more fitting. For it is certain that every power tends toward its object, even the intellect of speculation, etc.». But this whole difference consists in the mode of speaking, just as also the other difference to be resolved in the following question (2.), which is somewhat connected with the first. For St. Thomas, with Richard, Scotus, and others, says that intention is properly an act of the will, «yet presupposing the ordering of the reason ordering something to an end» (*Summa* I–II. q. 12. a. I. in corp. and ad 3.). The same thing in substance, but in other words, St. Bonaventure says here in the body and in [the reply to] the third.

**II.** Most of the commentators on the Master resolve both questions of this article in a single question. — Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. Scotus, in both of his works, here one question. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; *Summa* loc. cit. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. I. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 889–891 = PDF pp. 911–913, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 61845–62002. The two-column Respondeo and per-page footers were cascade-fragmented in the OCR, so the PDF column-band read is authoritative here per the Vol II override.

**Folded ARTICULUS II opener.** Per Vol II override §5, this q1 folds the short ARTICULUS II opener ("Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali… Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo… Secundo…"); there is no standalone d38-a2-divisio chunk. Alignment verified: the opener lists two topics — (1) "utrum intentio sit in solis rationalibus" (this q1) and (2) "utrum intentio in participantibus rationem dicat aliquid ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus" (a2-q2).

**Article-level scholion.** The SCHOLION (I–II) following q1 on pp. 890–891 covers BOTH questions of this article (I = "Quid sit intentio, explicatur in seq. quaestione"; II = lists commentators who treat both questions as one). It is held here in q1; a2-q2 has `has_scholion: false`.

**Page-split / footnote map (Quaracchi numbering restarts per printed page; renumbered [^1]–[^15] for this chunk):**
- p.889: arg.1 marker → page-footer n.5 (Glossa Lyranum, Vers. 35) = [^1]. (p.889 footers nn.1–4 belong to the prior chunk a1-q4 — picked-up hand-off confirmed: a1-q4 owns nn.1–4, a2-q1 owns n.5.)
- p.890: arg.2→n.1 [^2]; arg.3→n.2 [^3]; arg.4→n.3 [^4]; Sed contra 1→n.4 [^5]; Sed contra 2→n.5 [^6]; Sed contra 3→n.6 [^7]; Sed contra 4→n.7 [^8]; Respondeo *posset*→n.8 [^9]; *rationabilis*→n.9 [^10]; *intentionem*→n.10 [^11]; *intrinseca*→n.11 [^12].
- p.891: *medium tenet*→n.1 [^13]; *partes tendere*→n.2 [^14]; *animae supremum*→n.3 [^15]. (p.891 footers nn.4+ belong to the next chunk a2-q2 — forwarded hand-off below.)

**Hand-offs.**
- Picked up from a1-q4: p.889 footer band shared; a1-q4 owns nn.1–4 (figura dictionis, quamvis, redit ad unitatem, "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."); this chunk owns n.5 only.
- Forwarded to a2-q2: p.891 footer band is shared — a2-q1 owns p.891 footers nn.1–3 (above); a2-q2 owns p.891 footers nn.4+ (Bernardus ad Eugenium = n.4, etc.). The q2 body begins on p.891 right column ("Secundo quaeritur de intentione, secundum quod reperitur in rationalibus: utrum se teneat ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus").

**[?] flags.** None. [^15]'s tail (originally cut at the column edge) was recovered from the p.891 R-2 footer band and rendered in full.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum intentio in rationalibus se teneat ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus.*

Secundo quaeritur de intentione, secundum quod reperitur in rationalibus: utrum se teneat ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus. Et quod ex parte affectus, videtur.

1. Bernardus *ad Eugenium*[^1]: « Ut oculus sit simplex, duo sunt necessaria, videlicet caritas in intentione et veritas in electione »; sed caritas non est nisi in voluntate: ergo si caritas est in intentione, intentio se tenet ex parte voluntatis.

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2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera[^2]: « Intentio est, qua sic ad finem pervenire volo »; sed nemo vult pervenire ad finem nisi per voluntatem: ergo intentio est ex parte voluntatis.

3. Item, intentio iungit cum ipso fine; sed « voluntas non tantummodo dicit appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem, immo etiam ipsius finis », sicut vult Philosophus[^3]. Si ergo illud quod principaliter iungit cum fine, est intentio, et hoc ipsum est voluntas; videtur, quod intentio sit voluntas.

4. Item, meritum principaliter residet penes intentionem; sed illud, penes quod principaliter residet meritum et demeritum, est ipsa voluntas[^4]: ergo videtur, quod intentio se teneat ex parte voluntatis sive affectionis.

**Sed contra:**
5. *S. Matthaei* sexto[^5]: *Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex* etc.; ibi Glossa exponit, ut per oculum intelligatur intentio: si ergo oculus animae non est affectus, sed intellectus; videtur, quod intentio non se teneat ex parte affectus, sed magis ex parte intellectus.

6. Item, super illud *Lucae* undecimo[^6]: *Vide, ne lumen, quod in te est* etc.; Glossa: « Intentio, qua bonum quodcumque facimus, lumen est »; sed lumen se tenet ex parte cognitivae: ergo etc.

7. Item, intentionis est *referre* opus sive voluntatem in finem[^7]; sed eius est *referre*, cuius est *conferre*; et *conferre* est proprie ipsius rationis: ergo et intentio.

8. Item, sicut voluntas nunquam vult aliquod volitum, nisi illud praecognoscatur a ratione[^8], sic nunquam appetit finem, nisi ratio vel affectus rationis eam praecurrat, quae finem illum ostendat: si igitur intentio est illa quae finem monstrat, videtur, quod intentio ex parte rationis se teneat.

*Si forte tu dicas*, quod se tenet ex parte *rationis et voluntatis simul*:

**Contra:**
1. Intendere est actus unus: ergo est unius potentiae: ergo non potest esse voluntatis et rationis simul et semel.

2. Item, si intentio se tenet ex parte rationis et voluntatis, aut ergo sicut *potentia*, aut sicut *passio*, aut sicut *habitus*[^9]. Sicut *potentia*, non videtur, quia, cum voluntas et ratio non sint una potentia, et in uno homine respectu unius finis sit una intentio, nomine *intentionis* non potest intelligi potentia. Pari ratione nec *habitus*, quia non est unus habitus in duabus potentiis. Quod nec *passio*, constat, quia passionibus non meremur nec demeremur[^10]; circa intentionem autem est meritum et demeritum. Nullo ergo modo videtur, quod intentio simul spectet ad rationem et voluntatem.

3. Item, si simul spectat ad rationem et voluntatem; quaero: ad quam *principaliter*? Et principalius videtur se tenere ex parte *rationis*, per hoc quod Glossae dicunt, quod *intentio* est *lumen* et *oculus*, quod quidem est solius rationis proprie. Quod autem principalius se teneat ex parte *voluntatis*, videtur per hoc, quod intentio principaliter respicit finem; et potentia in nobis, quae principaliter respicit finem, voluntas est, cum « bonum et finis sint idem[^11] ». Ergo si non potest principaliter esse ex parte utriusque, videtur, quod non consistat in utraque potentia, scilicet in ratione et voluntate.

4. Item, inferius non se extendit ad plus quam suum superius; sed *intelligentia* est universalior quam intentio; unde Damascenus[^12]: « Intelligentia est primus motus; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, intentio dicitur ». Si ergo *intelligentia* non se extendit ad rationem simul et voluntatem, sed tantum consistit in ratione, pari ratione videtur, quod similiter nec *intentio*.

### Conclusio.

> *In nomine intentionis clauditur simul actus rationis et voluntatis.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod frequenter ad cognitionem rei perducimur per considerationem vocabulorum. Qui enim prima vocabula imposuerunt proprietates rerum potissime consideraverunt et iuxta illas vocabula imposuerunt[^13]. Si igitur velimus attendere, hoc verbum *intendere* compositum est ab *in* et *tendere*. Haec autem praepositio *in* duplicem potest importare habitudinem, cum componitur huic verbo *tendere*: aut sicut ad *obiectum* aut sicut ad *terminum* ultimum.

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Et primo modo hoc quod est *intendere* significat solam *conversionem* potentiae respectu obiecti; secundo vero modo non tantummodo significat *conversionem*, immo significat cum hoc quandam *collationem* et coniunctam *quietationem*. Et secundum istam duplicem acceptionem hoc verbum *intendere* diversam[^14] habet constructionem. Differt enim dicere *intendo in hoc*, et *intendo hoc*. Cum enim dico *intendo in hoc*, intendere dicit conversionem potentiae ad aliquid tanquam ad *obiectum*. Cum vero dico *intendo hoc*, intendere dicit conversionem potentiae ad aliquid tanquam ad *finem ultimum*, quem intendit assequi et cui vult copulari. Et ideo in prima acceptione huius verbi *intendere* inter ipsum et suum casuale cadit praepositio media, ut per hoc significetur directio et conversio potentiae ad illud tanquam ad *obiectum supra quod*. In altera vero significatione non cadit praepositio media, pro eo quod hoc verbum *tendere* de se dicebat inclinationem et ordinationem ad aliquid; et haec praepositio *in* sibi iuncta super hoc addit *quietationem*; unde sensus est: intendo beatitudinem, id est, tendo in beatitudinem; et propterea non oportet exterius addi praepositionem. — Et secundum istum ultimum modum accipiendi est hic sermo de intentione. Et quoniam istud vocabulum duo importat, videlicet quandam *collationem*, et praeter hoc quandam *conversionem cum collatione* et quandam *tendentiam cum quietatione*; et unum istorum est *rationis* et alterum *voluntatis*: hinc est, quod in nomine *intentionis* clauditur simul actus *rationis* et *voluntatis*. Quamvis enim sit unum vocabulum, tamen secundum quod compositum est, sic implicat duarum potentiarum actus coniunctos ad unum perficiendum, quod non posset facere actus unius sine actu alterius. — Et est simile de verbo *consentiendi*, quod quamvis videatur importare unicum actum, tamen necessario duos includit. Nam *consensus* non est aliud quam concordia *voluntatis* simul et *rationis* ad unum aliquid faciendum, unius ut *arbitrantis* et iudicantis, alterius autem ut *praeoptantis*. Et propterea sic recte nominatur et respicit ipsum liberum arbitrium, quod quidem simul consistit circa voluntatem et rationem, sicut supra[^15] fuit ostensum.

Unde sicut tota dispositio familiae pendet ex consensu patrisfamilias et matrisfamilias, sic tota *dispositio agendorum* in domo animae pendet ex consensu voluntatis et rationis. Et sicut pendet *dispositio* et regimen ex consensu, sic pendet *directio* et *obliquatio* ex intentione[^16]. Sicut enim ad rectum motum progressivum concurrit simul operatio visus ostendentis viam et operatio pedis incedentis; sic in actu intendendi clauditur simul actus rationis et voluntatis, unius ut aspicientis, alterius ut tendentis. Et quia isti actus coniuncti sunt, ideo per unum vocabulum compositum importantur.

**Ad argumenta prima et secunda:** Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad rationes ad utramque partem. Concedendum est enim, quod intentio nominat aliquid ex parte *voluntatis*, sicut rationes ad primam partem concludunt. Verum est etiam, quod intentio nominat aliquid ex parte *rationis*, ratione cuius dicitur et *oculus* et *lumen*, sicut ostendunt aliae rationes; et quantum ad haec duo intentio dirigi habet *fide* et *caritate*: fide clarificante oculum intellectus, et caritate rectificante pedem affectus[^17].

**Solutio oppositorum:**
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur contra hoc, quod non possit esse simul in ratione et voluntate, quia *intendere* dicit unicum actum; dicendum, quod falsum est; immo importat plures actus, sicut et *consentire*, ut ostensum est.

2. Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, utrum sit sicut potentia, vel sicut passio, vel sicut habitus; dicendum, quod etsi intentio aliquando dicatur ipsa *potentia* intendens, aliquando dicatur ipse *habitus*, secundum quem intendit, aliquando dicatur *actus* intendendi, aliquando *ipsum intentum*; principalius tamen nomen *intentionis* impositum est ipsi *actui*; nihilominus tamen in aliis acceptionibus contingit aliquando reperiri. Nam cum dicitur, quod intentio est *oculus*, accipitur intentio pro *potentia*. Cum dicitur, intentio est *lumen*, accipitur intentio pro *habitu dirigente*. Cum vero dicitur, quod intentio est *ipse finis*, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^18], accipitur intentio pro *intento*. Cum vero dicitur, quod intentio quaedam est *recta*, quaedam est *obliqua*, accipitur intentio pro *actu*. — Cum ergo dicit Philosophus[^19], quod « omne quod est in anima est potentia, vel passio, vel habitus »; dicendum, quod Philosophus sub *habitibus* comprehendit *actus*, vel loquitur de his quae sunt in anima per modum *quietis*, non per modum *fieri*. Talia enim potius dicuntur esse

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ab anima quam in anima. — Et sic patet, quod intentio potest esse *actus*, potest etiam esse *habitus* et *potentia*; et sicut non nominat unum actum simplicem, sed plures, sic non nominat unicum habitum nec unam potentiam tantum. Nec valet ratio illa: est una intentio: ergo una potentia, vel unus habitus; quia hoc est unum nomen impositum pluribus, sicut supra[^20] dictum fuit de libertate arbitrii; et sic est in hoc nomine *concordia et consensus*.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, in quo sit principalius; dicendum, quod secundum diversa et principalius est in cognitiva et principalius in motiva[^21]. Nam quantum ad *directionem* principalius se tenet ex parte cognitivae, quantum vero ad *tendentiam* principalius se tenet ex parte affectivae; et hoc non est inconveniens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intentio est inferius ad intelligentiam; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de intentione secundum aliam acceptionem, scilicet secundum quod dicit *conversionem* ipsius virtutis intellectivae ad aliquod *obiectum determinatum*, per quem modum dicitur in alterum intendere qui illum aspicit vel considerat; et talis modus accipiendi frequenter habetur in Scriptura. Unde *Actuum* tertio[^22] dicitur, quod claudus, qui stabat ad portam templi, *intendebat in eos*, id est in Petrum et Ioannem; et in Psalmo: *Deus in adiutorium meum intende*[^23].

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### Question II. *Whether in rational beings intention belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection.*

Secondly it is asked concerning intention, according as it is found in rational beings: whether it belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection. And that it belongs to the side of the affection seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard *to Eugene*[^1]: "That the eye may be simple, two things are necessary, namely charity in intention and truth in election"; but charity exists only in the will: therefore if charity is in intention, intention belongs to the side of the will.

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2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [of the Master][^2]: "Intention is that by which I will thus to attain the end"; but no one wills to attain the end except through the will: therefore intention is on the side of the will.

3. Likewise, intention joins with the end itself; but "the will does not only name the appetite for those things that are toward the end, but also of the end itself," as the Philosopher holds[^3]. If therefore that which principally joins with the end is intention, and this same thing is the will; it seems that intention is the will.

4. Likewise, merit principally resides with intention; but that with which merit and demerit principally reside is the will itself[^4]: therefore it seems that intention belongs to the side of the will or of the affection.

**On the contrary:**
5. *St. Matthew* the sixth[^5]: *If thy eye be simple* etc.; there the Gloss explains that by the eye is understood intention: if therefore the eye of the soul is not affection, but intellect; it seems that intention does not belong to the side of the affection, but rather to the side of the intellect.

6. Likewise, on that passage of *Luke* the eleventh[^6]: *See that the light which is in thee* etc.; the Gloss: "Intention, by which we do whatever good, is light"; but light belongs to the side of the cognitive power: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, it belongs to intention to *refer* the work or the will to the end[^7]; but it belongs to that one to *refer* whose it is to *confer*; and to confer is properly of reason itself: therefore intention also [is of reason].

8. Likewise, just as the will never wills anything willed unless it be foreknown by reason[^8], so it never seeks the end unless reason or the affection of reason run before it, to show it that end: if therefore intention is that which points out the end, it seems that intention belongs to the side of reason.

*If perhaps you should say* that it belongs to the side of *reason and will together*:

**On the contrary:**
1. To intend is one act: therefore it is of one power: therefore it cannot be of will and reason at once and together.

2. Likewise, if intention belongs to the side of reason and will, then either as a *power*, or as a *passion*, or as a *habit*[^9]. As a *power*, it does not seem [so], because, since will and reason are not one power, and in one man with respect to one end there is one intention, by the name *intention* a power cannot be understood. By like reasoning neither a *habit*, because there is not one habit in two powers. That neither is it a *passion* is established, because by passions we neither merit nor demerit[^10]; but concerning intention there is merit and demerit. In no way therefore does it seem that intention regards reason and will at once.

3. Likewise, if it regards reason and will at once; I ask: which *principally*? And it seems principally to belong to the side of *reason*, through this, that the Glosses say that *intention* is *light* and *eye*, which indeed is properly of reason alone. But that it principally belongs to the side of *the will* seems [so] through this, that intention principally regards the end; and the power in us which principally regards the end is the will, since "the good and the end are the same[^11]." Therefore if it cannot principally be on the side of both, it seems that it does not consist in both powers, namely in reason and will.

4. Likewise, the inferior does not extend to more than its superior; but *intelligence* is more universal than intention; whence Damascene[^12]: "Intelligence is the first motion; but that which is intelligence concerning something is called intention." If therefore *intelligence* does not extend to reason and will at once, but only consists in reason, by like reasoning it seems that neither does *intention*.

### Conclusion.

> *In the name of intention there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that frequently we are led to the knowledge of a thing through the consideration of words. For those who imposed the first words considered most of all the properties of things and imposed words according to them[^13]. If therefore we wish to attend [to it], this word *to intend* (*intendere*) is composed of *in* and *tendere* (to tend). Now this preposition *in*, when it is joined to this verb *tendere*, can import a twofold relation: either as to an *object* or as to an ultimate *terminus*.

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And in the first way this which is *to intend* signifies only the *turning* of the power with respect to the object; but in the second way it not only signifies the *turning*, but signifies along with this a certain *collation* and a conjoined *rest*. And according to this twofold acceptation this word *to intend* has a diverse[^14] construction. For it differs to say *I intend toward this* and *I intend this*. For when I say *I intend toward this*, "to intend" signifies the turning of the power to something as to an *object*. But when I say *I intend this*, "to intend" signifies the turning of the power to something as to an *ultimate end*, which it intends to attain and to which it wills to be united. And therefore in the first acceptation of this verb *to intend*, between it and its case-word there falls a middle preposition, so that thereby may be signified the direction and turning of the power to that as to an *object upon which*. But in the other signification a middle preposition does not fall, for the reason that this verb *tendere* of itself was signifying an inclination and ordination to something; and this preposition *in*, joined to it, adds upon this *rest*; whence the sense is: I intend beatitude, that is, I tend toward beatitude; and therefore it is not necessary to add the preposition externally. — And according to this last mode of taking it is this discourse concerning intention. And since this word imports two things, namely a certain *collation*, and besides this a certain *turning with collation* and a certain *tending with rest*; and one of these is of *reason* and the other of *will*: hence it is that in the name *intention* there is enclosed at once the act of *reason* and of *will*. For although it is one word, yet according as it is composite, it thus implies the conjoined acts of two powers toward accomplishing one [thing], which the act of one could not do without the act of the other. — And it is similar concerning the verb *to consent*, which, although it may seem to import a single act, yet necessarily includes two. For *consent* is nothing other than the concord of *will* together with *reason* toward doing some one thing, the one as *judging* and discerning, the other as *preferring*. And therefore it is rightly so named and regards free choice itself, which indeed at once stands about will and reason, as was shown above[^15].

Whence just as the whole disposition of a household depends on the consent of the father and mother of the family, so the whole *disposition of things to be done* in the house of the soul depends on the consent of will and reason. And just as *disposition* and governance depend on consent, so *direction* and *deflection* depend on intention[^16]. For just as toward a right progressive motion there concur at once the operation of sight showing the way and the operation of the foot walking; so in the act of intending there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will, of the one as looking, of the other as tending. And because these acts are conjoined, therefore they are imported by one composite word.

**To the arguments, the first and the second:** From these things the response to the question proposed and to the reasons on either part is clear. For it must be granted that intention names something on the side of the *will*, as the reasons for the first part conclude. It is also true that intention names something on the side of *reason*, by reason of which it is called both *eye* and *light*, as the other reasons show; and with respect to these two intention has to be directed by *faith* and *charity*: by faith clarifying the eye of the intellect, and by charity rectifying the foot of the affection[^17].

**Solution of the opposing [arguments]:**
1. To that, therefore, which is objected against this, that it cannot be at once in reason and will, because *to intend* signifies a single act; it must be said that this is false; rather it imports several acts, like *to consent* also, as has been shown.

2. To that, however, which is asked, whether it is as a power, or as a passion, or as a habit; it must be said that, although intention is sometimes called the *power* intending, sometimes called the *habit* according to which it intends, sometimes called the *act* of intending, sometimes the *thing intended* itself; yet principally the name *intention* is imposed on the *act* itself; nonetheless it happens sometimes to be found in the other acceptations. For when it is said that intention is the *eye*, intention is taken for the *power*. When it is said, intention is *light*, intention is taken for the *directing habit*. But when it is said that intention is *the end itself*, as the Master says in the text[^18], intention is taken for the *thing intended*. But when it is said that one intention is *right*, another is *crooked*, intention is taken for the *act*. — When therefore the Philosopher says[^19] that "everything that is in the soul is power, or passion, or habit"; it must be said that the Philosopher comprehends *acts* under *habits*, or speaks of those things which are in the soul by way of *rest*, not by way of *becoming*. For such things are rather said to be

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from the soul than in the soul. — And so it is clear that intention can be an *act*, can also be a *habit* and a *power*; and just as it does not name one simple act, but several, so it does not name a single habit nor one power only. Nor does that reasoning avail: there is one intention: therefore one power, or one habit; because this is one name imposed on many, as was said above[^20] concerning freedom of choice; and so there is in this name *concord and consent*.

3. To that which is asked, in which it is principally; it must be said that according to diverse [respects] it is both principally in the cognitive and principally in the motive power[^21]. For as regards *direction* it principally belongs to the side of the cognitive power, but as regards *tending* it principally belongs to the side of the affective power; and this is not unfitting.

4. To that which is objected, that intention is inferior to intelligence; it must be said that Damascene speaks of intention according to another acceptation, namely according as it signifies the *turning* of the intellective power itself to some *determinate object*, in which mode he is said to intend toward another who looks upon or considers him; and such a mode of taking is frequently had in Scripture. Whence in *Acts* the third[^22] it is said that the lame man, who stood at the gate of the temple, *intended upon them*, that is, upon Peter and John; and in the Psalm: *O God, attend (intende) unto my help*[^23].

---

la: Haec sunt Bernardi verba integra, quae habentur in eius libro *de Praecepto et dispens.* c. 14. n. 36: Ego vero, ut interior oculus vere simplex sit, duo illi esse arbitror necessaria, caritatem in intentione, et in electione veritatem.

en: These are Bernard's words in full, which are found in his book *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 14, n. 36: "But I judge that, for the interior eye to be truly simple, those two things are necessary, charity in intention, and truth in election."

la: Hic c. 4, ubi Magister hanc Augustini propositionem affert, commutato tamen *ad finem* in *ad vitam*.

en: Here, c. 4, where the Master adduces this proposition of Augustine, with *to the end* changed, however, to *to life*.

la: Libr. III. Ethic. c. 2 et 4. seq.; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 16. (c. 17.); II. Moral. Eudem. c. 10, ubi docet, voluntatem magis esse ipsius finis, quam eorum quae sunt ad finem.

en: Book III of the *Ethics*, c. 2 and 4 and following; *Magna Moralia* I, c. 16 (c. 17); *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 10, where he teaches that the will is more of the end itself than of those things which are toward the end.

la: Alanus ab Insulis, *Theolog. regul.* regul. 72. ait: « Penes voluntatem est omne meritum ». In qua regula exponenda dictus auctor affert illud Ambrosii: Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XL. c. 1.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 72, says: "With the will is all merit." In expounding which rule the said author adduces that saying of Ambrose: "Your affection imposes the name on your work." Compare below, the text of the Master, d. XL, c. 1.

la: Vers. 22. — De Glossa vide supra pag. 881, nota 1.

en: Verse 22. — Concerning the Gloss see above, p. 881, note 1.

la: Vers. 35. — De Glossa supra pag. 889, nota 5. — Codd. et edd. falso signant *Matthaei 6*.

en: Verse 35. — Concerning the Gloss, above, p. 889, note 5. — The codices and editions falsely mark it *Matthew 6*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Compare here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Vide August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. seqq.

en: See Augustine, *On the Trinity* X, c. 1, n. 1 and following.

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. docet, tria esse in anima: affectus (πάθη), facultates, habitus. — Paulo inferius verbis *in uno homine* codd. C F I K L O R S T Y ee et alii praefigunt *ita*.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 5, teaches that there are three things in the soul: affections (πάθη), faculties, habits. — A little below, to the words *in one man* the codices C F I K L O R S T Y ee and others prefix *thus*.

la: Sive, ut Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5, ait: Neque ex illis boni vel mali dicimur.

en: Or, as Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 5, says: Nor are we called good or bad on account of them.

la: Sicut vult Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 808, nota 5. — Pro *sint* codd. F H K T ee etc. *sit*.

en: As Aristotle holds, concerning whom see above, p. 808, note 5. — For *sint* (are) the codices F H K T ee etc. [read] *sit* (is).

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. In hoc testimonio verba *intelligentia* et *intentio* reddunt Graecas voces νόησις et ἔννοια. Aristoteles quoque utitur vocabulo νόησις (intelligentia) III. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 6.) eique obiectum attribuit *indivisibilia*. Intelligentiam, quae significat primam mentis operationem, sequitur secunda mentis operatio, scil. *iudicium*, quae in compositione et divisione perficitur. Intelligentia ergo secundum Aristot. ad rationem tantum pertinet, quod et S. Bonav. in seq. propos. insinuat.

en: Book II of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22. In this testimony the words *intelligence* and *intention* render the Greek words νόησις and ἔννοια. Aristotle too uses the word νόησις (intelligence) in *On the Soul* III, text 21 (c. 6), and attributes to it as object the *indivisibles*. Intelligence, which signifies the first operation of the mind, is followed by the second operation of the mind, namely *judgment*, which is accomplished in composition and division. Intelligence therefore, according to Aristotle, pertains to reason only, which St. Bonaventure also intimates in the following proposition.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 3, et pag. 537, nota 2.

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. XXIII, c. 3, and p. 537, note 2.

la: Codd. D E *duplicem*.

en: The codices D E [read] *twofold*.

la: Dist. 25. p. 1. q. 2. seqq. — Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. *consensum*, quem γνώμη vocat, significat id quo homo « disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est »; *electionem* autem esse docet « duobus praeiacentibus praeoptare alterum ». Bernard., de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 2. n. 3. ait: Consensus nutus est voluntatis spontaneus vel certe... habitus animi, liber sui. Cfr. supra d. 25. p. 1. q. 3. ad 5.

en: Dist. 25, p. 1, q. 2 and following. — Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 22: *consent*, which he calls γνώμη, signifies that by which a man "disposes and loves what has been judged by counsel"; but *election* he teaches to be "to prefer the one of two things set before [him]." Bernard, *On Grace and Free Choice*, c. 2, n. 3, says: Consent is a spontaneous nod of the will, or rather... a habit of mind, free in its own right. Compare above, d. 25, p. 1, q. 3, ad 5.

la: Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 13: Sic autem Deus ordinavit has duas voluntates sive affectiones [beatitudinis et iustitiae], ut voluntas, quae est instrumentum [potentia], uteretur ea, quae est iustitia, ad imperium et regimen, docente spiritu, qui et mens et ratio dicitur; et altera uteretur ad obediendum sine omni incommoditate. — Paulo inferius pro *ut tendentis* codd. F H X bb et alii *ut intendentis*.

en: Anselm, *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 13: "But God so ordered these two wills or affections [of beatitude and of justice], that the will, which is the instrument [the power], might use that which is justice, for command and governance, the spirit teaching, which is called both mind and reason; and the other might be used for obeying without any inconvenience." — A little below, for *as tending* the codices F H X bb and others [read] *as intending*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *affectiva*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [read] *affective*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, infra d. XLI. c. 1. 2, et supra pag. 685, nota 5.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 4, below d. XLI, c. 1, 2, and above p. 685, note 5.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 5. — S. Thom. in hunc locum (lect. 5.) ait: Patet, quod sub hac divisione non comprehenduntur absolute omnia quae sunt in anima; quia *essentia* animae nihil horum est, nec etiam *operatio* intelligibilis; sed solum hic tanguntur illa quae sunt principia alicuius actionis. — Pro *Cum ergo* edd., excepta 1, *Cum vero*. Paulo inferius pro *vel loquitur* codd. F bb et ed. 1 *et loquitur*, codd. K T Y *ut loquitur*.

en: Book II of the *Ethics*, c. 5. — St. Thomas, on this passage (lect. 5), says: It is clear that under this division are not comprehended absolutely all things that are in the soul; because the *essence* of the soul is none of these, nor even the intelligible *operation*; but only those things are here touched upon which are the principles of some action. — For *When therefore* the editions, except 1, [read] *But when*. A little below, for *or speaks* the codices F bb and ed. 1 [read] *and speaks*, the codices K T Y *as speaks*.

en: Dist. 25, p. 1, q. 3 and following.

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est Ps. 69, 1.

en: Verse 5. — The following text is Ps. 69, 1.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 891 R-col–894 L-col = PDF pp. 913–916, offset +22), with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 62003–62181) used for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The OCR for this quaestio is two-column cascade-shattered through the *Respondeo* and footers, so the column-band PDF read is authoritative per the Vol II override.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 891 R-col: Quaestio II title, opener, arg. 1 (Bernardus); footer nn. 4–5 → chunk [^1]–[^2].
- p. 892: args. 2–4, *Sed contra* (5–8), the *Si forte* dubitatio + *Contra* 1–4, Conclusio, opening of *Respondeo*; footer nn. 1–11 → chunk [^3]–[^13].
- p. 893: bulk of *Respondeo* + *Ad argg. prima et secunda* + Solutio oppositorum 1–2 (through "Talia enim potius dicuntur esse"); footer nn. 1–6 → chunk [^14]–[^19].
- p. 894 L-col: tail of Solutio 2, Solutio 3–4 (ends at "Deus in adiutorium meum intende"); then DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM begins (next chunk). Footer nn. 1–4 → chunk [^20]–[^23]; footer nn. 5–6 belong to the DUBIA (forwarded).

**Hand-off picked up from a2-q1.** p. 891 footer nn. 4–5 (Bernardus *de Praecepto* c. 14 n. 36; Magister *Hic c. 4*) belong to this q2's args. 1–2 and lead the apparatus here ([^1]–[^2]). a2-q1 owns p. 891 footer nn. 1–3 (q1 text + scholion) and the article scholion.

**Hand-off forwarded to d38-dubia.** On printed p. 894, q2 ends mid-L-column at "*Deus in adiutorium meum intende*"; the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM (Dub. I) opens immediately below (raw line 62182). Printed p. 894 footer nn. 5–6 ("Isai. 64, 4; I. Cor. 2, 9. — De proposit. seq..." and "Vide supra pag. 194, nota 2. — In edd., excepta 1, desideratur proposit. minor...") belong to the Dub. I body, not to q2.

**Scholion disposition.** This quaestio has **no own scholion**. The article scholion is held by a2-q1; cf. apparatus [^23] / p. 894 footer n. 4: "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." (= the scholion notes that several commentators resolve both questions of the article in a single quaestio).

**No `[?]` flags** — the entire quaestio was read clean from the 450 dpi column bands.