site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 1, Art. 2

title_alt: Utrum Deum esse trinum sit verum credibile

title_alt: Whether it is a credible truth that God is three

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Utrum Deum esse trinum sit verum credibile.*

Supposito, quod Deum esse sit verum indubitabile, quaeritur consequenter, utrum Deum esse trinum sit verum *credibile*. *Credibile* autem voco quod est *congruum* et *debitum* credi. Et quod sit *debitum* credi, ostenditur.

1. Matthaei ultimo[^p51-6]: *Euntes docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.* His verbis additur Marci ultimo: *Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit salvus erit, qui vero non crediderit condemnabitur.* Sed illud verum, sine

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cuius credulitate non potest esse salus, est verum maxime credibile; sed Deum esse trinum est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

2. Item, Athanasius in Symbolo: « Fides autem catholica haec est, ut unum Deum in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate veneremur »; et paulo ante praemittitur: « Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in aeternum peribit »: ergo si sine hac fide non potest esse salus, sequitur idem quod prius.

3. Item, Augustinus, primo de Trinitate, capitulo tertio[^p52-1]: « Cum quaeritur unitas Trinitatis, Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, nusquam periculosius erratur, nec laboriosius aliquid quaeritur, nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur »; sed omne tale est maxime credibile, in quo est periculum in errando et salus in recte sentiendo: cum ergo Deum esse trinum sit huiusmodi verum, redit idem quod prius.

4. Item, Augustinus, Hypognosticon libro primo, capitulo tertio[^p52-2] dicit, quod « nullus potest salvari sine fide Mediatoris »: ergo necessarium est ad salutem credere Mediatorem; sed Mediator cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur distinctio personarum; ergo credere personarum distinctionem est necessarium ad salutem. Sed haec personarum distinctio est in Trinitate: ergo Deum esse trinum est verum, quod necessarium est credere ad salutem.

5. Item, nullus potest salvari, in quo non habitat Trinitas; tota enim Trinitas inhabitat simul in homine per gratiam; sed Trinitas non inhabitat nisi in eo qui credit: ergo nullus salvari potest, nisi in eo quod credit beatissimam Trinitatem. *Maior* manifesta est; *minor* probatur sic per illud quod dicitur Ioannis decimo quarto[^p52-3], *quod Spiritum veritatis mundus non potest accipere, quia non videt eum neque scit eum; vos autem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos manebit et in vobis erit.*

6. Item, impossibile est, aliquem salvari, qui non sit membrum Christi; sed membrum esse non potest, nisi sit connexum; connexum autem esse non potest nisi per fidem, spem et caritatem: ergo nullus potest salvari sine fide Christi. Sed fides Christi includit fidem aeternae generationis, et secundum illam attenditur distinctio Trinitatis: ergo sine fide Trinitatis impossibile est, aliquem salvari.

7. Item, impossibile est, aliquem salvari, qui non credit, Deum esse principium creativum; nisi enim hoc de Deo credatur, nullo modo Deus ab homine recte colitur et veneratur[^p52-4]; sed nobilius est esse principium generativum quam creativum, quia nobilior est proles genita quam creatura facta: ergo nullus potest salvari, qui non credit, Deum esse principium generativum, pari ratione et spirativum, ac per hoc, nisi credat, Deum esse trinum.

8. Item, impossibile est, aliquem salvari, qui non amat et honorat eum qui est summe amandus et honorandus; sed Filius et Spiritus sanctus est summe amandus et honorandus, sicut Pater, secundum illud quod dicitur Ioannis quinto[^p52-5]: *Qui non honorificat Filium non honorificat Patrem, qui misit illum*: ergo nullus salvari potest, qui non amat et honorat Filium et Spiritum sanctum, sicut Patrem. Sed nullus amat et honorat, nisi aliquo modo cognoscat et credat: ergo etc. — Ex his manifeste ostenditur, quod ad salutem est *necessarium* et *debitum* credere, Deum esse trinum.

Item, quod sit *congruum*, ostenditur.

9. Affectus rectus plus adhaeret summae bonitati quam sibi: ergo et intellectus rectus plus assentit summae veritati quam sibi. Si ergo intellectus noster credendo rectificatur, necesse est, quod sibi proponatur aliquod verum, quod excedat eius iudicium[^p52-6]; sed primum inter vera et credibilia propositum est, Deum esse trinum et unum: ergo quamvis lateat intellectum humanum, recte et congrue est propositum ad credendum.

10. Item, sicut caritas captivat affectum in obsequium Christi, sic fides captivat intellectum[^p52-7]; sed non captivaret, nisi faceret assentire alicui vero, quod excedit eius iudicium: ergo congruum est, quod primum inter credibilia propositum excedat intellectum humanum.

11. Item, « quod videtur omnibus, vel pluribus, vel sapientibus hoc ipso, quod videtur, efficitur probabile[^p52-8] »: ergo quod creditur a pluribus, vel sapientibus hoc ipso, quod creditur, efficitur credibile; sed Deum esse trinum est creditum a pluribus et sapientibus: ergo congruum est credere, ipsum esse trinum.

12. Item, irrationabilius est ponere, quod innumera multitudo credat incredibile, quam ponere, creditum a multitudine esse credibile; sed certissimum est, quod Deum esse trinum est creditum a multitudine: ergo rationabile est sic credere.

13. Item, sicut intelligere debetur rationi, sic credere debetur auctoritati[^p52-9]; sed nihil est magis au-

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thenticum, quam sit sacra Scriptura, quae non tantum assertione veritatis et sua antiquitate, sed etiam miraculis et prophetiis stabilitatem habet: si ergo hoc verum testantur communiter divinae Scripturae, congruum est et rationabile illud verum credere, scilicet Deum esse unum in trinitate.

14. Item, cum sit triplex genus credibilis secundum Augustinum[^p53-1]: « Quaedam enim creduntur simul et intelliguntur, quaedam prius creduntur et postea intelliguntur, quaedam creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur, sicut est historia humana gesta percurrens »; magis est credibile quod sic creditur, quod potest intelligi per rationem, quam illud quod non potest; sed Deum esse trinum est huiusmodi: ergo cum aliqua facta historica narrata a Scriptura authentica sunt credibilia — non enim est incredibile, quod « Abraham genuit Isaac », immo est valde credibile; sic etiam de aliis consimilibus — ergo credibile est, Deum esse trinum et unum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Omne illud, cuius contrarium dictat omnis ratio, est incredibile rationi; sed contrarium huius quod est, unum esse realiter trinum, dictat omnis ratio: ergo est incredibile rationi.

2. Item: Omne illud, cuius contrarium natura creata praetendit, est rationi incredibile; sed contrarium huius quod est, unum in forma non multiplicata multiplicari in suppositis, praetendit omnis natura creata; in qualibet enim natura creata, supposito multiplicato, multiplicatur forma: ergo si intellectus noster manuducitur per creaturas ad cognoscendum Deum si est, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p53-2]: *Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate*; cum omnis natura creata contrarium habeat dictamen ad hoc verum, quod est, Deum esse trinum: necesse est, illud esse verum incredibile.

3. Item, omne quod creditur, aut creditur per rationem, aut praeter rationem: si ergo Deum esse trinum est verum credibile; aut ergo ex ratione, aut praeter rationem; sed si *ex ratione*, iam non est meritorium, quia « fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum[^p53-3] ». Si *praeter rationem*; sed quod creditur ab habente usum rationis praeter rationem irrationabiliter creditur et non est verum credibile: ergo creditur irrationabiliter, ergo Deum esse trinum est verum incredibile.

4. Item, omne, quod creditur, aut creditur propter se, aut propter aliud: si ergo Deum esse trinum est verum credibile, aut isto modo, aut illo. Si propter aliud: ergo non est ipsius rectae fidei obiectum; si propter se; sed nihil est propter se amabile, nisi quod per se sufficit affectui: ergo nihil est propter se credibile, nisi quod per se patet intellectui. Sed Deum esse trinum non patet intellectui per se: ergo non est verum credibile.

5. Item, virtus consonat naturae, quia, ut dicit Tullius[^p53-4], et approbat Augustinus, « virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi consentaneus »: ergo quod est incredibile virtuti naturali est incredibile virtuti fidei; sed Deum esse trinum non est credibile ab ipsa natura: ergo nec est credibile a virtute superaddita naturae.

6. Item, gratia est perfectio naturae[^p53-5], et perfectio non repugnat perfectibili, sed concordat: si ergo Deum esse trinum non est credibile per naturam, ergo nec per gratiam superadditam.

7. Item, « Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam cooperantem[^p53-6] »: ergo doctor et inspirator naturae nihil facit contra naturale rationis dictamen: si ergo Deum esse trinum non est credibile per naturale rationis dictamen, ergo non est credibile per superadditam inspirationem.

8. Item, principium cognitionis scientialis debet esse facillimum ad sciendum, sicut patet in principiis demonstrationum, quae per se ipsa sunt nota intellectui[^p53-7]: ergo principium cognitionis fidelis debet esse facillimum ad credendum; sed Deum esse trinum non est facillimum ad credendum, immo valde difficile, sicut patet in iis qui nondum habent fidem: ergo non est inter credibilia primum; nec medium est nec postremum, sicut apparet: ergo nullo modo est credibile. — His rationibus videtur posse ostendi, quod Deum esse trinum non sit credibile tanquam *congruum* credi.

Item, ostenditur, quod non sit credibile tanquam *debitum* credi.

9. Nullus tenetur ad id quod non potest, quia dicit Hieronymus[^p53-8]: « Anathema sit qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile »; sed credere, Deum esse trinum, non est in nostra potestate, quia donum Dei est habere fidem: ergo si nullus obligatur ad id quod non est in potestate sua, nullus obligatur ad illud credendum.

10. Item, si ad hoc credendum obligamur, aut secundum legem *naturae*, aut *Scripturae*, aut *gra-*

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*tiae*. Non secundum legem *naturae*, quia illa est in corde hominum impressa et omnibus est notissima[^p54-1]; hoc autem est verum occultum et latens humanam industriam. Non secundum legem *Scripturae*, quia ante fuit ista veritas credibilis, quam Scriptura inciperet; rursus, si solum esset credibile propter Scripturam, non respiceret omne tempus nec omnes personas. Non etiam secundum legem *gratiae*, quia ante fuit fides ista, quam lex gratiae inciperet; et praeterea, lex gratiae est lex non onerosa: si ergo hoc credere est difficile, non obligamur ad illud secundum legem gratiae; nec secundum legem *naturae* nec *Scripturae*, ut ostensum est: ergo nullo modo astringimur ad credendum illud.

11. Item, si astringimur ad illud credendum[^p54-2], aut quia *verum*, aut quia *verum cadens sub praecepto*. Non quia verum, quia tunc pari ratione astringeremur ad omne verum credendum; si quia cadens sub praecepto, aut ergo *morali*, aut *sacramentali*; non quia sub sacramentali, illud constat; nec quia sub morali, quoniam omnia moralia reducuntur ad decem praecepta decalogi, in quorum nullo praecipitur credere Deum trinum: ergo nullo modo ad illud astringimur.

12. Item, si astringimur, aut quia verum *visum*, aut quia verum *auditum*, aut quia verum *inspiratum*. Non quia visum, quia nullus viator hoc vidit; non quia auditum, quia tunc nullus astringeretur ad illud credendum, nisi qui audisset; si quia inspiratum; sed omnis, cui inspiratur, credit: ergo nullus astringitur, nisi qui credit. Sed hoc falsum est: ergo et primum.

13. Item, quaero, quid moveat Christianum ad credendum illud verum. *Si tu dicas*, quod movet te divina Scriptura: ergo si divina Scriptura hoc non doceret[^p54-3], hoc tu non crederes; *sed contra*: esto quod tota Scriptura esset combusta, adhuc a fide Trinitatis non recederet Ecclesia nec anima christiana: ergo ex parte Scripturae non residet principalis ratio movens nos ad istam credulitatem. — *Item, si tu dicas*, quod miracula; *contra*: « Fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum[^p54-4] »; et talis fides, quae est ex miraculis, potius est extorta quam voluntaria: ergo huiusmodi credulitas non esset meritoria. — *Si dicas*, quod gratia; *contra*: nemo scit, utrum habeat gratiam, ergo nemo scit, utrum illud verum credere debeat; sed de credibili, ad quod credendum astringimur, certi sumus, quod debemus illud credere: ergo ad hoc credendum non movemur ratione gratiae. — *Si dicas*, quod ad hoc credendum moveat ipsa *veritas aeterna; sed contra*: veritas ad nihil credendum movet, nisi quia est veritas visa: ergo cum haec veritas non sit visa ab anima, videtur, quod aliunde moveatur ad credendum quam ab ipsa veritate aeterna.

Est ergo quaestio: si illud est verum credibile, per quid movemur ad istud credendum, et per quid astringimur, ut illud credamus?

> **Conclusio.** *Deum esse trinum est verum credibile, quia hoc credere est congruum, debitum et dignum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deum esse trinum est verum credibile tanquam *congruum* et *debitum* et *dignum* credi.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum, quod cum illud verum credibile sit fundamentum totius fidei christianae, ad hoc[^p54-5], ut illud fundamentum maneat inconcussum, triplex habet testimonium, per quod ad istud credendum *manuducimur, astringimur* et *levamur*. Hoc autem triplex testimonium attenditur secundum triplicem librum, qui est *liber creaturae, liber Scripturae* et *liber vitae*. Primus liber dat testimonium *efficax*, secundus dat testimonium *efficacius*, tertius vero *efficacissimum*. — Primus namque liber, qui est *liber creaturae*, quem ideo dico *primum*, quia primo sensibus nostris ostenditur, dat testimonium duplex, ut *in ore duorum testium stet omne verbum*[^p54-6]. Omnis enim creatura vel est ad Dei *vestigium* tantum, sicut est natura corporalis, vel est ad Dei *imaginem*, sicut est creatura intellectualis. Utraque istarum testificatur Trinitatem, sed illa, quae tenet rationem *vestigii*, quasi *de longinquo*. Habet enim omnis creatura modum, speciem et ordinem, sive unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem, sive mensuram, numerum et pondus; quae per appropriationem correspondent trinitati personarum et per quae testificatur, Deum esse trinum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^p54-7]: « Omne quod est, aliud est, quo *constat*, aliud, quo *discernitur*, aliud, quo *congruit*. Universa

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igitur creatura causam eius trinam ostendit, qua *sit*, et qua *hoc sit*, et qua *sibi amica sit*; creaturae autem causam, hoc est auctorem, Deum dicimus. Oportet ergo Trinitatem esse, qua nihil praestantius, intelligentius et beatius perfecta ratio invenire potest ». Ex hoc ostendit Augustinus, quod creatura tenet rationem *vestigii*, quae testatur, Deum esse trinum.

Illa vero creatura, quae tenet rationem *imaginis*, utpote intellectualis, Deum esse trinum testatur quasi *de propinquo*, quia *imago* est expressa similitudo. Habet enim creatura intellectualis *memoriam, intelligentiam* et *voluntatem*, seu *mentem, notitiam* et *amorem*: *mentem* ad modum parentis, *notitiam* ad modum prolis, *amorem* ad modum nexus ab utroque procedentis et utrumque connectentis; non enim potest mens non amare verbum, quod generat. In iis autem non tantum attenditur *origo* et emanatio, per quam est in eis distinctio, verum etiam *aequalitas*[^p55-1] et *consubstantialitas* et *inseparabilitas*, ex quibus expresso testimonio clamatur, Deum esse trinum. Cum enim sit spiritus et intellectus, non potest carere verbo genito et amore processivo, in quibus sit distinctio ratione originis et emanationis unius ab altero, sive etiam cum hoc *aequalitas* et *consubstantialitas* et *inseparabilitas*. Et hoc est, quod intendit Augustinus astruere in nono libro de Trinitate usque in finem, qualiter videlicet per imaginem creatam testimonium redditur Trinitati aeternae[^p55-2]. — Hoc autem geminum testimonium *libri naturae* efficax erat in statu naturae conditae, quando nec liber iste obscurus erat, nec oculus hominis caligaverat. Cum vero per peccatum hominis oculus caligavit, speculum illud factum est aenigmaticum et obscurum, et auris intelligentiae interioris obsurduit ad illud testimonium audiendum. Et ideo divina providentia dispensative providit testimonium alterius libri, scilicet *libri Scripturae*, qui quidem editus est secundum divinam revelationem, quae nunquam defuit nec deerit a principio mundi usque in finem.

Hic autem liber testatur dupliciter, Trinitatem esse, secundum duplicem sui partem: in *veteri* quidem testamento testatur *implicite*, sed in *novo* testamento testatur *explicite*. — Testimonium namque datur in *veteri* testamento de Trinitate tam in *figuris* quam in *verbis*. Inter *figuras* autem illa fuit authentica maxime, quae fuit ostensa *patri fidei nostrae Abraham*; de quo dicitur Genesis decimo octavo[^p55-3], quod tribus viris sibi apparentibus, tres quidem vidit, sed unum adoravit, unde tribus loquebatur, sicut uni, in hoc intelligens in se et insinuans aliis mysterium Trinitatis. — In *verbis* autem illud videtur maxime efficax ad testificandum, quod dixit David eximius Prophetarum in Psalmo[^p55-4]: *Verbo Domini caeli firmati sunt, et Spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum*, ubi simul insinuatur trinitas personarum, ita quod duae personae *explicite* in nomine *Spiritus* et *Verbi*, et una *implicite* nomine *Domini*. In pluribus autem locis, immo fere in omnibus veteris testamenti, licet implicite, figuris tamen et verbis testimonium redditur Trinitati aeternae.

Per hunc etiam modum in *novo* testamento testimonium datur, sed *explicite*, tam in Sacramentis quam in documentis expressis. Nam primum Sacramentorum, quod est baptismus, secundum quod scribitur ultimo Matthaei[^p55-5], fieri habet in invocatione expressa divinae Trinitatis. Ibi enim dicitur: *Docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti*; propter quod in illo Sacramento fundamentali character imprimitur Trinitatis. Hoc ipsum testantur et verba, inter quae, cum multa sint, illud unicum est expressum, quod scripsit amicus sponsi primae Ioannis quinto[^p55-6]: *Tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater, Verbum et Spiritus sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt.* Hoc autem testimonium est adeo efficax et expressum, quod non solum praedictum verum facit credibile, id est *congruum* credi, verum etiam *debitum*, dum astringit nos et arctat ad illud credendum.

Sed quia *non omnes obediunt Evangelio*[^p55-7], et verum illud supra rationem est; ideo providit divina sapientia aeternum testimonium, quod quidem est *liber vitae*. Hic autem liber vitae per se et in se explicite et expresse testimonium dat irrefragabile Trinitati aeternae his qui *revelata facie*[^p55-8] in *patria* Deum vident, in *via* autem testimonium secundum influentiam lucis, cuius capax est anima in statu viae; ut enim dicitur Ioannis primo: *Vita erat lux hominum*, quia liber iste vitae est *lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.* Illuminat autem dupliciter, scilicet per *lumen inditum* et per *lumen infusum*, ex quorum luminum concursu habitus fidei tanquam argumentum elicitur ad credendum, Deum esse trinum, et consequenter omne verum, quod pertinet ad christianae religionis cultum.

Et hoc patet sic. Per lumen enim naturaliter homini a Deo inditum et signatum tanquam lumen divini vultus[^p55-9] unicuique dictat ratio propria, quod de primo principio sentiendum est *altissime* et *piis-*

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*sime*: *altissime*, quia a nullo; *piissime*, quia cetera ab ipso. Et in hoc concordant Christiani, Iudaei et Saraceni et etiam haeretici. Quod autem Deus possit et velit sibi producere aequalem et consubstantialem, ut aeternalem habeat *dilectum* et *condilectum*[^p56-1]; et quod hoc quidem de ipso Deo sentire sit sentire *altissime* et *piissime* — quia, si sentitur, quod hoc non *possit*, non sentitur de Deo *altissime*; si sentitur, quod *possit* et *non velit*, non sentitur de Deo *piissime* — quod, inquam, ita sit et ita sentiatur, hoc non dictat *lumen inditum* per se, sed *lumen infusum*, ex quo cum *lumine indito* colligitur, quod de Deo sentiendum est, quod generet et spiret sibi coaequalem et consubstantialem, ut sentiatur de Deo *altissime* et *piissime*; et hoc de Deo sentire est Deum maxime honorificare, venerari et colere. Et ex hoc apparet, quomodo fides Trinitatis et fundamentum et radix est divini *cultus* et totius *christianae religionis*.

Ex hac autem radice, qua credimus, de Deo esse sentiendum *altissime* et *piissime*, ac per hoc ipsum esse trinum et unum, consequenter elicitur, quod credendum est, Deum esse *creatorem* omnium, *punitorem* malorum, *retributorem* bonorum et *relevatorem* miserorum. Quia enim *altissimus*, ideo decet eius dignitatem facere *magna* et *iusta*. Quia vero *piissimus*, decet eius dignitatem *respicere humilia*[^p56-2] et *relevare prolapsa*. Et hinc est, quod credimus eum *incarnatum* et *passum* pro summa pietate, *iudicaturum* tandem orbem terrarum pro summa altitudine et aequitate.

Ex dictis igitur colligitur, quae sit *radix* fidei christianae, quae sint eius *testimonia*, et quae etiam sint ab ipsa *credibilia*, et quod *principium et primum* omnium credibilium, quae faciunt ad divinum cultum, est credere, Deum esse trinum et unum. — Et quia summus et maximus cultor omnium fuit Iesus Christus, ideo ipse primo iussit, hoc verum lucide et aperte praedicari per totum mundum, per hoc astringens universos ad illud credendum. Unde cum ante eius adventum non tenerentur ad credendum Trinitatem nisi *implicite*, iam nunc post novi testamenti vulgationem tenentur omnes ad illam *explicite* credendum, ut iam non tantum sit illud credibile, quia *dignum* credi, vel *congruum* ex testimonio creaturae, verum etiam *debitum* per divulgationem veritatis evangelicae, cuius vulgatio principium habuit a Salvatore, sicut dicitur ad Hebraeos secundo[^p56-3], ubi loquens Apostolus de fide christiana ait sic: *Cum initium accepisset enarrari per Dominum ab eis qui audierunt, in nos confirmata est signis et portentis et variis virtutibus et Spiritus sancti distributionibus secundum suam voluntatem.*

Si ergo quaeritur: quid movet ad illud credendum, utrum videlicet *Scriptura*, vel *miracula*, vel *gratia*, sive ipsa *veritas aeterna*? dicendum, quod *principaliter movens* ad hoc est *ipsa illuminatio*, quae inchoatur in *lumine indito* et consummatur in *lumine infuso*, quae quidem facit, nos non solum *alte*, verum etiam *pie* sentire de Deo; et hoc, quia illuminatio procedit ab ipso lumine aeterno, in cuius *obsequium nostrum captivat intellectum*[^p56-4], et captivando, dum ipsum subiicit Deo, colit et veneratur et reddit habilem ad credendum quaecumque ad divinum honorem et cultum spectant, etsi sint supra rationem nostram. Hoc patet per experientiam, si quis recurrat ad suae mentis arcana. — *Moventia* autem sicut *adminiculantia* et quodam modo inducentia plurima sunt: quia movent Scripturae testimonia authentica, movent Sanctorum exempla et martyria, movent Doctorum argumenta et ipsius universalis Ecclesiae sententia, movent et ipsa miracula irrefragabilia. Unde Richardus, in primo libro de Trinitate, capitulo secundo: « Nihil constantius tenemus, quam quod fide apprehendimus; sunt namque Patribus caelitus revelata et tam multis quam magnis, tam miris signis vel prodigiis divinitus confirmata, ut gravis videatur esse dementiae in his vel aliquantulum dubitare. Innumera itaque miracula et alia, quae non nisi divinitus fieri possunt, in huiusmodi fidem faciunt et dubitare non sinunt. Utimur itaque in eorum attestatione seu etiam confirmatione signis pro argumentis, prodigiis pro experimentis. Utinam attenderent Iudaei, attenderent pagani, cum quanta conscientiae securitate pro hac parte ad divinum iudicium poterimus accedere! Nonne cum omni fiducia Deo dicere possumus: Domine, si error est, a te decepti sumus; nam ista in nobis tantis signis et prodigiis confirmata sunt et talibus, quae non nisi per te fieri possunt. Certe a summae sanctitatis viris sunt nobis tradita et cum summa et authentica attestatione probata, te ipso *cooperante et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis*[^p56-5] ». — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa quatuor, quae ultimo quaerebantur: quid est illud quod fidelem movet ad credendum, Deum esse trinum et unum?

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur: omne illud, cuius contrarium dictat omnis ratio etc.; dicen-

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dum, quod est tripliciter loqui de ratione: aut de ratione *defectiva*, aut *stante*, aut *elevata*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod omne illud, cuius contrarium dictat omnis ratio, est incredibile; si intelligatur particulariter de ratione *defectiva*, falsum est, quia potest esse aliquid repugnans rationi defectivae, quod tamen consonat rationi *stanti*, vel *elevatae*. Si vero intelligitur *universaliter* de ratione secundum triplicem statum, tunc prima propositio est vera et concedenda; sed *minor* est falsa et interimenda[^p57-1]: quia, quamvis ratio defectiva dictet contrarium eius quod est, Deum esse trinum et unum, ratio tamen *stans* dictat aliquid, quod huic est consonum; *elevata* vero dictat id ipsum, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne illud, cuius contrarium omnis natura creata praetendit, est incredibile; dicendum, quod natura creata potest aliquid praetendere dupliciter: vel in *se ipsa*, vel in *causa* sua. Natura enim creata praetendit, *se* esse *temporalem* et *mutabilem* et *compositam*; *causam* vero suam *aeternam* et *immutabilem* et *simplicissimam*. Per hunc etiam modum, licet in *creatura* non possit stare unitas formae cum trinitate suppositorum, cum supposita in creatura distinguantur per materiam et formam ipsi materiae appropriatam[^p57-2]; in *Creatore*, in quo nulla prorsus est materia et vera fecunditas, manente una forma et substantia, est distinctio in suppositis ratione originis. Quia igitur creatura non praetendit universaliter *contrarium* huius quod est, Deum esse trinum, immo recte *conformiter* praetendit id ipsum; ideo est magis credibile quam incredibile.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne, quod creditur, aut creditur ex ratione, aut praeter rationem; dicendum, quod credere aliquid *ex ratione* est dupliciter: vel ex ratione *mera*, vel ex ratione *adiuta*. Quamvis ergo Deum esse trinum non sit credibile ex ratione *mera*, est tamen credibile ex ratione *adiuta* per gratiam et lucem desuper infusam. Et quod sic est credibile non irrationabiliter creditur, quia gratia et lux desuper infusa potius rationem dirigit, quam pervertat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne, quod creditur, creditur aut propter se, aut propter aliud; dicendum, quod Deum esse trinum creditur propter se ipsum, quia summum et primum verum spectans ad cultum divinum. — Et quod obiicitur, quod omne tale credibile per se patet credenti; dicendum, quod illud verum est de credente, qui non habet obicem, sed potius dispositionem habilitantem ad assentiendum ipsi veritati increatae; et sic se habet in proposito, quia verus Christianus credit hoc verum sibi propositum sine aliquo persuasionis superaddito.

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus consonat naturae; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de virtute *politica*[^p57-3]; vel si illud intelligitur de virtute *gratuita*, non habet veritatem, quod consonet naturae, in quantum *lapsa* est, sed in quantum *reformata* et *elevata*, quod fit per gratiam divinam, desuper infusam. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod consequenter obiicitur de gratia, quod gratia est perfectio naturae. Est enim gratia perfectio naturae non tantum *habilitans*, verum etiam *reformans* et *elevans*. *Reformando* autem et *elevando* non destruit ipsam naturam, nec aliquid, quod sit de ipsa natura, sed defectum circa naturam.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam; dicendum, quod *natura* dicitur dupliciter: vel naturalis *cursus*, vel naturalis *obedientia creaturae*. Secundo modo nihil facit, primo autem modo frequenter facit, ut in operibus, quae sunt supra naturam, vel contra, ut opera miraculosa[^p57-4]. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est de naturali intelligentia, quod dupliciter est de ipsa loqui: vel in quantum nata est *ratiocinari secundum lucem propriam*, vel in quantum nata est *se subiicere sub luce aeterna*. Hoc ultimo modo nihil dictat contra intelligentiam; primo autem modo dictat aliquid, quod etsi videatur esse contrarium, post lumen infusum fit consonum: quia quod prius videbatur rationi impossibile sive difficile ad credendum, postea fit ad credendum facillimum, adeo ut verus credens dicat ipsi aeterno Doctori: *Testimonia tua credibilia facta sunt nimis*[^p57-5].

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principium cognitionis scientialis est facillimum ad sciendum etc.; dicendum, quod cognitio secundum fidem est cognitio *secundum pietatem*, sicut dicitur ad Titum primo[^p57-6]. Et licet intellectui procedenti secundum ariditatem speculationis videatur illud difficillimum credere, quod est, Deum esse trinum et unum; intellectui tamen pietate pleno facillimum est illud sentire de summo Patre, quod Unigenitum habeat, quem sicut se ipsum diligat, quem etiam pro salute hominum tradat[^p57-7].

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus tenetur ad illud quod non potest; dicendum, quod licet homo ex se non sufficienter possit, potest tamen divino adminiculo, quod sibi praesto est, si faciat quod in se est; et quia potest facere illud, quo facto possit

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credere: ideo pro potente iudicatur, et ad illud debet astringi, maxime quando nec interior nec exterior commonitio deest; quod quidem est tempore gratiae revelatae[^p58-1].

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut astringimur secundum legem naturae, aut Scripturae, aut gratiae; dicendum, quod proprie secundum *legem gratiae*, in qua obligamur et astringimur ad illud credendum distincte. Nihilominus et in *lege naturae* et in *lege Scripturae* erat obligatio ad credendum, saltem *implicite*. Omni enim tempore qui pertinaciter negaret, Deum esse trinum, reputaretur alienus a veritate et divino cultu; sed nunc potissime tempore *gratiae*, quando haec virtus revelata est et praedicata et approbata multipliciter et expresse. — Et *si obiicias*, quod hoc non deberet, quia lex gratiae facilis debet esse; dicendum, quod sicut amare inimicum non est facile cuicumque, sed habenti caritatem; sic credere Deum trinum, quamvis infideli videatur difficile, facile tamen est habenti fidem[^p58-2].

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut tenemur ad illud credendum, quia verum visum, aut quia auditum, aut quia inspiratum; dicendum, quod ad illud tenemur, quia est verum maxime spectans ad divinum cultum et publice praedicatum; et ideo non excusatur homo per defectum auditus, nec per defectum lucis interioris, quia potest facere, quo facto inspiratur sibi.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si astringimur ad illud credendum, aut quia verum, aut quia verum cadens sub praecepto; dicendum, quod quia *verum cadens sub praecepto*. — Et *si quaeris*: sub quo praecepto? dico, quod sub primo, in quo quidem dicitur[^p58-3]: *Audi, Israel, Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est. Dominum Deum tuum adorabis et illi soli servies.* In hoc quidem praecepto obligamur *expresse* ad credendum, Deum esse unum, sed *implicite* ad credendum, Deum esse trinum. Et hoc patet sic: quia hoc praecepto astringimur ad colendum Deum culto latriae, quae ibi vocatur *servitus*. *Colere* autem in spiritualibus est secundum transumtionem a materialibus; in materialibus autem *colere agrum* est manifestare pullulationes originaliter ex ipsa terra procedentes. Per hunc etiam modum *colere Deum* est corde et ore et opere profiteri, ipsum esse principium, ita quod non perfecte colitur, nisi confiteamur, ipsum esse principium principians non tantum *effectivum* in creatione, sed etiam *refectivum* in redemptione et *perfectivum* in glorificatione; nec adhuc perfecte[^p58-4], si credatur esse principium ex *tempore*, nisi credatur principium principians ex *aeternitate*; nec adhuc, nisi credatur principium principians *aeternaliter principiantem*; quod credimus, dum credimus, Patrem aeternaliter generare Filium, spirantem cum ipso Spiritum sanctum, ut aeternaliter sit in Deo principium de principio, et principium non de principio.

Ad perfectam igitur Dei culturam necessario est sentire et credere, ipsum esse principium *aeternaliter principians principiantem*, ut sic fiat manifestatio *aeternarum* pullulationum; necessarium etiam est credere, ipsum esse principium *creativum* et *recreativum* et *retributivum*, ut sic fiat manifestatio *temporalium* pullulationum; et qui in aliquo horum deficit non est perfectus Dei cultor. Et quoniam tempore gratiae revelatur non qualitercumque, sed perfecte; ideo omnia ista oportet *explicite* credere, si in numero divinorum cultorum volumus computari; et ad hoc astringimur per ipsum[^p58-5] praeceptum divinae legis; quod quidem ante Christi adventum astringebat *implicite*, nunc autem *explicite*, quia est tempus colendi Deum perfecte.

Ex his patet, quare sacrificia placuerunt Deo tempore legis scriptae, et spectabant ad cultum divinum, pro eo quod omnia erant *signa profitentia* et *praefigurantia* reparationem humanam, quae fuit per oblationem agni immaculati et effusionem sanguinis Iesu Christi[^p58-6]. — Patet etiam, quare in statu legis *gratiae* non offertur sacrificium *figurale*, sed ipse Iesus Christus in sua carne et sanguine, pro eo quod est tempus colendi Deum veraciter et perfecte; et ideo oportet, quod sacrificium verissimum et perfectissimum offeratur, quod quidem est unicum et solum, ipse scilicet Iesus Christus[^p58-7]. — Patet etiam, quare iuste condemnentur infideles. Si enim valde inhonorat regem terrenum qui aufert ei unam regni particulam, et per hoc merito dignus efficitur, ut expellatur a regno; multo magis qui negat, Deum esse principium principians ex tempore universa, vel aeternaliter principians intra, inhonorat maiestatem aeternam et dignus est non tantum expelli a regno Dei, sed etiam praecipitari in infernale supplicium cum diabolo et angelis eius. — Patet etiam, quare *fide Deum colimus*. Nam hoc modo sentiendo de Deo, quo fides christiana sentit, sentimus de ipso, quod ipsum est principium *altissimum* et *piissimum*; et ideo *timendum* est et *amandum*, ex quibus duobus revocatur homo a malo et inflammatur ad omne bonum; et haec est perfecta iustitia, quam qui habet dignus est hereditate aeterna.

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### Article II. *Whether it is a credible truth that God is three.*

Granted that it is an indubitable truth that God is, it is next asked whether it is a *credible* truth that God is three. And by *credible* I mean what is *fitting* and *due* to be believed. And that it is *due* to be believed is shown as follows.

1. Matthew, last chapter[^p51-6]: *Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* To these words there is added, in the last chapter of Mark: *He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned.* But that truth, without

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belief in which there can be no salvation, is a truth in the highest degree credible; but that God is three is of this sort: therefore, etc.

2. Again, Athanasius in the Creed: "Now the catholic faith is this, that we venerate one God in trinity and trinity in unity"; and a little before this is set down: "Which unless everyone keep whole and inviolate, without doubt he shall perish eternally": therefore, if without this faith there can be no salvation, the same follows as before.

3. Again, Augustine, *On the Trinity,* book I, chapter 3[^p52-1]: "When the unity of the Trinity is inquired into, of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, nowhere is error more dangerous, nor is anything sought with more labour, nor is anything found with more fruit"; but everything of that sort is in the highest degree credible, in which there is danger in erring and salvation in judging rightly: since therefore it is a truth of this sort that God is three, the same returns as before.

4. Again, Augustine in the *Hypognosticon,* book I, chapter 3[^p52-2] says that "no one can be saved without faith in the Mediator": therefore it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Mediator; but the Mediator cannot be known unless the distinction of persons be known; therefore to believe the distinction of the persons is necessary for salvation. But this distinction of persons is in the Trinity: therefore that God is three is a truth which it is necessary to believe for salvation.

5. Again, no one can be saved in whom the Trinity does not dwell; for the whole Trinity dwells together in man by grace; but the Trinity does not dwell save in him who believes: therefore no one can be saved except in that he believes the most blessed Trinity. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved thus by what is said in John, chapter 14[^p52-3], *that the world cannot receive the Spirit of truth, because it seeth him not nor knoweth him; but you shall know him, because he shall abide with you and shall be in you.*

6. Again, it is impossible that anyone be saved who is not a member of Christ; but he cannot be a member unless he be joined on; and he cannot be joined on save through faith, hope and charity: therefore no one can be saved without faith in Christ. But faith in Christ includes faith in the eternal generation, and according to that the distinction of the Trinity is regarded: therefore without faith in the Trinity it is impossible that anyone be saved.

7. Again, it is impossible that anyone be saved who does not believe that God is a creative principle; for unless this be believed of God, in no way is God rightly worshipped and venerated by man[^p52-4]; but it is nobler to be a generative principle than a creative one, because an offspring begotten is nobler than a creature made: therefore no one can be saved who does not believe that God is a generative principle, and by parity of reasoning a spirative one also, and through this, unless he believe that God is three.

8. Again, it is impossible that anyone be saved who does not love and honour him who is to be loved and honoured in the highest degree; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be loved and honoured in the highest degree, as the Father is, according to what is said in John, chapter 5[^p52-5]: *He who honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father, who sent him*: therefore no one can be saved who does not love and honour the Son and the Holy Spirit as he does the Father. But no one loves and honours unless in some way he knows and believes: therefore, etc. — From these things it is manifestly shown that for salvation it is *necessary* and *due* to believe that God is three.

Again, that it is *fitting* is shown as follows.

9. A right affection adheres more to the highest goodness than to itself: therefore a right understanding also assents more to the highest truth than to itself. If therefore our understanding is set right by believing, it is necessary that some truth be proposed to it which exceeds its own judgment[^p52-6]; but the first among the truths and credible things proposed is that God is three and one: therefore, although it lies hidden from the human understanding, it is rightly and fittingly proposed for belief.

10. Again, just as charity takes the affection captive unto the obedience of Christ, so faith takes the understanding captive[^p52-7]; but it would not take it captive unless it made it assent to some truth which exceeds its judgment: therefore it is fitting that the first thing proposed among credible things should exceed the human understanding.

11. Again, "what seems so to all, or to the many, or to the wise, by that very fact that it so seems is made probable[^p52-8]": therefore what is believed by the many, or by the wise, by that very fact that it is believed is made credible; but that God is three is believed by the many and by the wise: therefore it is fitting to believe that he is three.

12. Again, it is more unreasonable to hold that an innumerable multitude believes what is incredible than to hold that what is believed by a multitude is credible; but it is most certain that it is believed by a multitude that God is three: therefore it is reasonable to believe so.

13. Again, just as understanding is owed to reason, so believing is owed to authority[^p52-9]; but nothing is more au-

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thentic than sacred Scripture is, which has its stability not only from the assertion of truth and from its own antiquity, but also from miracles and prophecies: if therefore the divine Scriptures commonly bear witness to this truth, it is fitting and reasonable to believe that truth, namely that God is one in trinity.

14. Again, since there is a threefold kind of what is credible, according to Augustine[^p53-1]: "For some things are believed and understood at once, some are first believed and afterwards understood, some are believed and never understood, as is a history running through human deeds"; that is more credible which is so believed that it can be understood by reason, than that which cannot; but that God is three is of this sort: therefore, since certain historical facts narrated by authentic Scripture are credible — for it is not incredible that "Abraham begot Isaac," nay it is highly credible; and so too of other like things — therefore it is credible that God is three and one.

**Sed contra:** 1. Everything the contrary of which all reason dictates is incredible to reason; but all reason dictates the contrary of this, that one thing be really three: therefore it is incredible to reason.

2. Again: Everything the contrary of which created nature holds forth is incredible to reason; but every created nature holds forth the contrary of this, that one thing in an unmultiplied form be multiplied in supposits; for in any created nature whatever, when the supposit is multiplied, the form is multiplied: therefore if our understanding is led by the hand through creatures to know God, whether he is, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter 13[^p53-2]: *We see now through a glass in a dark manner*; since every created nature has a dictate contrary to this truth, that God is three: it must be that this is an incredible truth.

3. Again, everything which is believed is believed either through reason or beside reason: if therefore it is a credible truth that God is three, then it is so either from reason or beside reason; but if *from reason,* then it is no longer meritorious, because "faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof[^p53-3]." If *beside reason;* but what is believed beside reason by one having the use of reason is believed unreasonably and is not a credible truth: therefore it is believed unreasonably, and therefore it is an incredible truth that God is three.

4. Again, everything which is believed is believed either for its own sake or for the sake of something else: if therefore it is a credible truth that God is three, then either in this way or in that. If for the sake of something else: then it is not the object of right faith itself; if for its own sake — but nothing is lovable for its own sake save what of itself suffices for the affection: therefore nothing is credible for its own sake save what of itself lies open to the understanding. But that God is three does not lie open to the understanding of itself: therefore it is not a credible truth.

5. Again, virtue is in accord with nature, because, as Tully says[^p53-4], and Augustine approves, "virtue is a habit in the mode of nature agreeable to reason": therefore what is incredible to natural virtue is incredible to the virtue of faith; but that God is three is not credible from nature itself: therefore neither is it credible from a virtue superadded to nature.

6. Again, grace is the perfection of nature[^p53-5], and a perfection is not repugnant to what is perfectible, but agrees with it: if therefore it is not credible through nature that God is three, then neither is it through superadded grace.

7. Again, "the Founder of nature does nothing against cooperating nature[^p53-6]": therefore the teacher and inspirer of nature does nothing against the natural dictate of reason: if therefore it is not credible through the natural dictate of reason that God is three, then it is not credible through superadded inspiration.

8. Again, the principle of scientific cognition ought to be most easy to know, as is plain in the principles of demonstrations, which are known of themselves to the understanding[^p53-7]: therefore the principle of the cognition of faith ought to be most easy to believe; but that God is three is not most easy to believe, nay it is very difficult, as is plain in those who do not yet have faith: therefore it is not the first among credible things; nor is it the middle nor the last, as appears: therefore in no way is it credible. — By these reasons it seems possible to show that it is not credible as *fitting* to be believed that God is three.

Again, it is shown that it is not credible as *due* to be believed.

9. No one is held to that which he cannot do, because Jerome says[^p53-8]: "Let him be anathema who says that God has commanded the impossible"; but to believe that God is three is not in our power, because to have faith is the gift of God: therefore if no one is obliged to what is not in his own power, no one is obliged to believe that.

10. Again, if we are obliged to believe this, it is either according to the law of *nature,* or of *Scripture,* or of *gra-*

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*ce.* Not according to the law of *nature,* because that is impressed upon the heart of men and is best known to all[^p54-1]; but this is a hidden truth and lies beyond human industry. Not according to the law of *Scripture,* because this truth was credible before Scripture began; and again, if it were credible only because of Scripture, it would not regard every time nor all persons. Nor yet according to the law of *grace,* because this faith was before the law of grace began; and besides, the law of grace is a law not burdensome: if therefore it is difficult to believe this, we are not obliged to it according to the law of grace; nor according to the law of *nature* nor of *Scripture,* as has been shown: therefore in no way are we bound to believe it.

11. Again, if we are bound to believe it[^p54-2], it is either because it is *true,* or because it is *a truth falling under a precept.* Not because it is true, for then by parity of reasoning we should be bound to believe every truth; if because it falls under a precept, then either under a *moral* or a *sacramental* one; not because under a sacramental one, that is agreed; nor because under a moral one, since all moral matters are reduced to the ten precepts of the decalogue, in none of which is it enjoined to believe that God is three: therefore in no way are we bound to it.

12. Again, if we are bound, it is either because the truth is *seen,* or because it is *heard,* or because it is *inspired.* Not because seen, for no wayfarer has seen this; not because heard, for then no one would be bound to believe it save he who had heard; if because inspired — but everyone to whom it is inspired believes: therefore no one is bound save he who believes. But this is false: therefore so is the first.

13. Again, I ask what moves a Christian to believe that truth. *If you say* that divine Scripture moves you: then if divine Scripture did not teach this[^p54-3], you would not believe it; *but on the contrary:* suppose that the whole of Scripture were burnt, still the Church would not withdraw from faith in the Trinity, nor would the Christian soul: therefore the principal reason moving us to that belief does not reside on the side of Scripture. — *Again, if you say* that miracles do; *on the contrary:* "Faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof[^p54-4]"; and such faith as is from miracles is extorted rather than voluntary: therefore belief of this sort would not be meritorious. — *If you say* that grace does; *on the contrary:* no one knows whether he has grace, therefore no one knows whether he ought to believe that truth; but of a credible thing to the believing of which we are bound, we are certain that we ought to believe it: therefore we are not moved to believe this by reason of grace. — *If you say* that the *eternal truth* itself moves to believing this; *but on the contrary:* truth moves to believing nothing except because it is truth seen: therefore, since this truth is not seen by the soul, it seems that the soul is moved to believe from somewhere other than from the eternal truth itself.

There is therefore this question: if that is a credible truth, by what are we moved to believe it, and by what are we bound to believe it?

> **Conclusio.** *That God is three is a credible truth, because to believe this is fitting, due and worthy.*

**Respondeo:** It must be said that it is a credible truth that God is three, as *fitting* and *due* and *worthy* to be believed.

For the understanding of which it is to be noted that, since that credible truth is the foundation of the whole Christian faith, to this end[^p54-5], that the foundation may remain unshaken, it has a threefold testimony, by which we are *led by the hand, bound* and *lifted up* to believe it. And this threefold testimony is regarded according to the threefold book, which is the *book of the creature,* the *book of Scripture* and the *book of life.* The first book gives an *efficacious* testimony, the second gives a *more efficacious* one, the third indeed the *most efficacious.* — For the first book, which is the *book of the creature,* which I therefore call the *first,* because it is shown first to our senses, gives a twofold testimony, that *in the mouth of two witnesses every word may stand*[^p54-6]. For every creature is either only unto a *vestige* of God, as is corporeal nature, or unto an *image* of God, as is the intellectual creature. Each of these bears witness to the Trinity, but that which holds the character of a *vestige* does so as it were *from afar.* For every creature has mode, species and order, or unity, truth and goodness, or measure, number and weight; which by appropriation correspond to the trinity of persons and through which it is testified that God is three. And this is what Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions*[^p54-7]: "Everything that is, is one thing by which it *subsists,* another by which it is *distinguished,* another by which it *agrees.* Every

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creature therefore shows its cause to be threefold: that by which it *is,* and that by which it *is this,* and that by which it *is at one with itself;* and the cause of the creature, that is the author, we call God. There must therefore be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent and more blessed." From this Augustine shows that the creature holds the character of a *vestige,* which bears witness that God is three.

But that creature which holds the character of an *image,* being intellectual, bears witness that God is three as it were *from near at hand,* because an *image* is an express likeness. For the intellectual creature has *memory, intelligence* and *will,* or *mind, knowledge* and *love: mind* after the manner of a parent, *knowledge* after the manner of offspring, *love* after the manner of a bond proceeding from both and connecting both; for the mind cannot but love the word which it begets. And in these there is regarded not only the *origin* and emanation by which there is distinction in them, but also *equality*[^p55-1] and *consubstantiality* and *inseparability,* out of which it is cried aloud by express testimony that God is three. For since he is spirit and understanding, he cannot lack a begotten word and a proceeding love, in which there is distinction by reason of origin and of the emanation of one from the other, or also, along with this, *equality* and *consubstantiality* and *inseparability.* And this is what Augustine intends to establish in the ninth book *On the Trinity* right to the end, namely how through the created image testimony is rendered to the eternal Trinity[^p55-2]. — Now this twin testimony of the *book of nature* was efficacious in the state of nature as founded, when neither was that book obscure nor had the eye of man grown dim. But when through the sin of man the eye grew dim, that mirror was made enigmatic and obscure, and the ear of the interior intelligence grew deaf to hearing that testimony. And therefore divine providence dispensatively provided the testimony of another book, namely of the *book of Scripture,* which indeed was published according to divine revelation, which never was wanting nor will be wanting from the beginning of the world to the end.

Now this book bears witness in two ways that the Trinity is, according to its twofold part: in the *old* testament it bears witness *implicitly,* but in the *new* testament it bears witness *explicitly.* — For testimony is given in the *old* testament concerning the Trinity both in *figures* and in *words.* Among the *figures* that was most authentic which was shown to *Abraham, the father of our faith;* of whom it is said in Genesis, chapter 18[^p55-3], that when three men appeared to him, he saw three indeed but adored one, whence he spoke to three as to one, in this understanding within himself and insinuating to others the mystery of the Trinity. — But among the *words* that seems most efficacious for bearing witness which David, the most eminent of the Prophets, said in the Psalm[^p55-4]: *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the spirit of his mouth all the power of them,* where the trinity of persons is insinuated all at once, in such a way that two persons are named *explicitly,* under the name of *Spirit* and of *Word,* and one *implicitly,* under the name of *Lord.* And in many places, nay in almost all of the old testament, though implicitly, yet by figures and words testimony is rendered to the eternal Trinity.

In this same manner testimony is given also in the *new* testament, but *explicitly,* both in the Sacraments and in express documents. For the first of the Sacraments, which is baptism, according to what is written in the last chapter of Matthew[^p55-5], has to be performed with the express invocation of the divine Trinity. For there it is said: *Teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*; on account of which in that fundamental Sacrament the character of the Trinity is imprinted. The words also bear witness to this same thing, among which, though they are many, that one is express which the friend of the bridegroom wrote in First John, chapter 5[^p55-6]: *There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one.* And this testimony is so efficacious and express that it not only makes the aforesaid truth credible, that is *fitting* to be believed, but also *due,* since it binds and constrains us to believe it.

But since *not all obey the Gospel*[^p55-7], and that truth is above reason, therefore divine wisdom provided an eternal testimony, which indeed is the *book of life.* Now this book of life, by itself and in itself, gives explicitly and expressly an irrefragable testimony to the eternal Trinity to those who *with face unveiled*[^p55-8] see God in the *fatherland,* but on the *way* it gives testimony according to the influence of light, of which the soul is capable in the state of the way; for as is said in John, chapter 1: *The life was the light of men,* because this book of life is *the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.* And it enlightens in two ways, namely by an *implanted lumen*[^tr-lumen] and by an *infused lumen,* from the concurrence of which lumens the habit of faith is drawn forth as an argument for believing that God is three, and consequently every truth which pertains to the worship of the Christian religion.

And this is plain as follows. Through the lumen naturally implanted in man by God and sealed as the lumen of the divine countenance[^p55-9], each man's own reason dictates to him what is to be judged of the first principle *most highly* and *most piou-*

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*sly: most highly,* because he is from none; *most piously,* because all else is from him. And in this Christians, Jews and Saracens and even heretics agree. But that God can and wills to produce for himself an equal and consubstantial, so that he may have eternally one *beloved* and one *loved together with him*[^p56-1]; and that to judge this of God is indeed to judge *most highly* and *most piously* — because, if it is judged that he *cannot* do this, God is not judged of *most highly;* if it is judged that he *can* and *does not will,* God is not judged of *most piously* — that it is so, I say, and is so judged, this the *implanted lumen* does not dictate of itself, but the *infused lumen* does, from which, together with the *implanted lumen,* it is gathered that it is to be judged of God that he begets and breathes forth one coequal and consubstantial with himself, so that God may be judged of *most highly* and *most piously;* and to judge thus of God is to honour, venerate and worship God in the highest degree. And from this it appears how faith in the Trinity is both the foundation and the root of divine *worship* and of the whole *Christian religion.*

Now from this root, by which we believe that God is to be judged of *most highly* and *most piously,* and through this that he is three and one, it is consequently drawn forth that it must be believed that God is the *creator* of all things, the *punisher* of the evil, the *rewarder* of the good and the *raiser up* of the wretched. For because he is *most high,* therefore it befits his dignity to do things *great* and *just.* And because he is *most pious,* it befits his dignity *to look upon lowly things*[^p56-2] and *to raise up things fallen.* And hence it is that we believe him *incarnate* and *suffering* out of the highest piety, and *about to judge* the world at last out of the highest loftiness and equity.

From what has been said, then, it is gathered what the *root* of the Christian faith is, what its *testimonies* are, and also what things are *credible* from it, and that the *principle and first* of all credible things which make for divine worship is to believe that God is three and one. — And because the highest and greatest worshipper of all was Jesus Christ, therefore he himself first commanded that this truth be preached lucidly and openly through the whole world, thereby binding all men to believe it. Whence, since before his coming men were not held to believe the Trinity save *implicitly,* now after the publishing abroad of the new testament all are held to believe it *explicitly,* so that now it is not only credible because *worthy* to be believed, or *fitting* from the testimony of the creature, but also *due* through the divulging of evangelical truth, whose publishing had its beginning from the Saviour, as is said in Hebrews, chapter 2[^p56-3], where the Apostle, speaking of the Christian faith, says thus: *Which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to his own will.*

If then it is asked what moves to believing that truth — whether, namely, *Scripture,* or *miracles,* or *grace,* or the *eternal truth* itself? — it must be said that what *principally moves* to this is *illumination itself,* which is begun in the *implanted lumen* and consummated in the *infused lumen,* which indeed makes us judge of God not only *loftily* but also *piously;* and this because illumination proceeds from the eternal lumen itself, into obedience to which *it takes our understanding captive*[^p56-4], and in taking it captive, while it subjects it to God, it worships and venerates him and renders the understanding fit to believe whatever regards divine honour and worship, even if these be above our reason. This is plain by experience, if anyone will have recourse to the secret places of his own mind. — But there are very many things that *move* as *helping on* and in a certain manner inducing: for the authentic testimonies of Scripture move, the examples and martyrdoms of the Saints move, the arguments of the Doctors and the judgment of the universal Church itself move, and the irrefragable miracles themselves move. Whence Richard, in the first book *On the Trinity,* chapter 2: "We hold nothing more steadfastly than what we apprehend by faith; for these things were revealed to the Fathers from heaven, and confirmed by God by signs and prodigies as many as they were great, and as wondrous as many, so that it would seem grievous madness to doubt of them even a little. Innumerable miracles therefore, and other things which cannot be done save by God, produce faith in such matters and do not suffer us to doubt. And so in their attestation, or also confirmation, we use signs for arguments and prodigies for experiments. Would that the Jews would attend, would that the pagans would attend, with how great a security of conscience we shall be able to come to the divine judgment on this side! Can we not with all confidence say to God: Lord, if it is an error, we have been deceived by thee; for these things have been confirmed among us by signs and prodigies so great, and of such a kind as cannot be done save by thee. Surely they have been handed down to us by men of the highest sanctity and proved with the highest and most authentic attestation, *thyself cooperating and confirming the word with signs that followed*[^p56-5]." — And by this is plain the answer to those four things which were last asked: what is it that moves the faithful man to believe that God is three and one?

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that everything the contrary of which all reason dictates, etc., it must be

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said that there are three ways of speaking about reason: either of *defective* reason, or of *standing* reason, or of *elevated* reason. When therefore it is said that everything the contrary of which all reason dictates is incredible: if this be understood particularly of *defective* reason, it is false, because there can be something repugnant to defective reason which nevertheless is in accord with *standing* or with *elevated* reason. But if it be understood *universally* of reason according to its threefold state, then the first proposition is true and to be conceded; but the *minor* is false and to be destroyed[^p57-1]: because, although defective reason dictates the contrary of this, that God is three and one, yet *standing* reason dictates something which is in accord with it, and *elevated* reason dictates the very thing itself, as is plain from what has been said.

2. To that which is objected, that everything the contrary of which every created nature holds forth is incredible, it must be said that created nature can hold something forth in two ways: either in *itself,* or in its *cause.* For created nature holds forth that *itself* is *temporal* and *mutable* and *composite,* but that its *cause* is *eternal* and *immutable* and *most simple.* In this same manner, although in the *creature* the unity of form cannot stand together with a trinity of supposits, since supposits in the creature are distinguished through matter and through the form appropriated to that matter[^p57-2], yet in the *Creator,* in whom there is no matter at all and there is true fecundity, while one form and substance remains, there is a distinction in the supposits by reason of origin. Since therefore the creature does not universally hold forth the *contrary* of this, that God is three, but rather rightly holds forth *conformably* the very thing itself, therefore it is more credible than incredible.

3. To that which is objected, that everything which is believed is believed either from reason or beside reason, it must be said that to believe something *from reason* is twofold: either from *bare* reason, or from *assisted* reason. Although therefore that God is three is not credible from *bare* reason, it is nevertheless credible from reason *assisted* by grace and by the light infused from above. And what is credible in this way is not believed unreasonably, because grace and the light infused from above rather direct reason than pervert it.

4. To that which is objected, that everything which is believed is believed either for its own sake or for the sake of something else, it must be said that it is believed for its own sake that God is three, because it is the highest and first truth regarding divine worship. — And as to what is objected, that every such credible thing lies open of itself to the believer, it must be said that this is true of a believer who has no obstacle, but rather a disposition fitting him to assent to the uncreated truth itself; and so it stands in the case before us, because the true Christian believes this truth proposed to him without any added persuasion.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that virtue is in accord with nature, it must be said that this is understood of *political* virtue[^p57-3]; or if it be understood of *gratuitous* virtue, it is not true that it is in accord with nature inasmuch as nature is *fallen,* but inasmuch as it is *reformed* and *elevated,* which is done through divine grace infused from above. — And by this is plain the answer to what is objected consequently about grace, that grace is the perfection of nature. For grace is a perfection of nature not only *making it fit,* but also *reforming* and *elevating* it. And in *reforming* and *elevating* it does not destroy nature itself, nor anything which belongs to nature itself, but the defect about nature.

7. To that which is objected, that the Founder of nature does nothing against nature, it must be said that *nature* is spoken of in two ways: either the natural *course,* or the natural *obedience of the creature.* In the second way he does nothing against it; but in the first way he frequently does, as in works which are above nature, or against it, as miraculous works[^p57-4]. In this same manner it is to be understood of natural intelligence, that there are two ways of speaking about it: either inasmuch as it is born to *reason according to its own light,* or inasmuch as it is born to *subject itself under the eternal light.* In this last way it dictates nothing against intelligence; but in the first way it dictates something which, even if it seem to be contrary, after the infused lumen becomes concordant: because what before seemed to reason impossible or difficult to believe, afterwards becomes most easy to believe, so much so that the true believer says to the eternal Teacher himself: *Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible*[^p57-5].

8. To that which is objected, that the principle of scientific cognition is most easy to know, etc., it must be said that cognition according to faith is cognition *according to piety,* as is said in Titus, chapter 1[^p57-6]. And although to an understanding proceeding according to the dryness of speculation it may seem most difficult to believe that which is, that God is three and one, yet to an understanding full of piety it is most easy to judge this of the highest Father, that he has an Only-begotten whom he loves as himself, whom also he delivers up for the salvation of men[^p57-7].

9. To that which is objected, that no one is held to that which he cannot do, it must be said that although man of himself cannot suffice, yet he can by the divine help which is at hand for him, if he does what is in him; and because he can do that, which being done he could

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believe, therefore he is judged as able, and ought to be bound to it, especially when neither interior nor exterior admonition is wanting; and this indeed is so in the time of revealed grace[^p58-1].

10. To that which is objected, either we are bound according to the law of nature, or of Scripture, or of grace, it must be said that properly it is according to the *law of grace,* in which we are obliged and bound to believe it distinctly. Nevertheless in the *law of nature* also and in the *law of Scripture* there was an obligation to believe, at least *implicitly.* For in every age one who pertinaciously denied that God is three would be reckoned a stranger to truth and to divine worship; but now most of all in the time of *grace,* when this power has been revealed and preached and approved in many ways and expressly. — And *if you object* that this ought not to be, because the law of grace ought to be easy, it must be said that just as to love an enemy is not easy for anyone whatever, but for him who has charity, so to believe God three, although it seem difficult to the unbeliever, is nevertheless easy for him who has faith[^p58-2].

12. To that which is objected, that either we are held to believe it because the truth is seen, or because it is heard, or because it is inspired, it must be said that we are held to it because it is a truth regarding divine worship in the highest degree and publicly preached; and therefore man is not excused by a defect of hearing, nor by a defect of interior light, because he can do that which being done it is inspired in him.

11. To that which is objected, that if we are bound to believe it, it is either because it is true or because it is a truth falling under a precept, it must be said that it is because it is *a truth falling under a precept.* — And *if you ask:* under what precept? I say, under the first, in which indeed it is said[^p58-3]: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God. The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and him only shalt thou serve.* In this precept we are obliged *expressly* to believe that God is one, but *implicitly* to believe that God is three. And this is plain thus: because by this precept we are bound to worship God with the worship of latria, which is there called *service.* Now to *worship* in spiritual things is by a transference from material things; and in material things to *cultivate a field* is to bring out the shoots proceeding originally from the earth itself. In this same manner to *worship God* is to profess with heart and mouth and work that he is a principle, in such wise that he is not perfectly worshipped unless we confess that he is a principiating principle not only *effective* in creation, but also *restorative* in redemption and *perfective* in glorification; nor yet perfectly[^p58-4], if he be believed to be a principle from *time,* unless he be believed a principiating principle from *eternity;* nor yet, unless he be believed a principle principiating one that *eternally principiates;* which we believe, when we believe that the Father eternally generates the Son, breathing forth with him the Holy Spirit, so that eternally there may be in God a principle from a principle and a principle not from a principle.

For the perfect worship of God, therefore, it is necessary to judge and to believe that he is a principle *eternally principiating one that principiates,* so that there may thus be a manifestation of the *eternal* burgeonings; it is necessary also to believe that he is a principle *creative* and *re-creative* and *retributive,* so that there may thus be a manifestation of the *temporal* burgeonings; and he who fails in any one of these is not a perfect worshipper of God. And since in the time of grace this is revealed not in any manner whatever, but perfectly, therefore all these things must be believed *explicitly,* if we wish to be counted in the number of the worshippers of God; and to this we are bound by the very[^p58-5] precept of the divine law, which indeed before the coming of Christ bound *implicitly,* but now *explicitly,* because it is the time for worshipping God perfectly.

From these things it is plain why sacrifices pleased God in the time of the written law and regarded divine worship, inasmuch as they were all *signs professing* and *prefiguring* the human reparation which came about through the offering of the immaculate lamb and the shedding of the blood of Jesus Christ[^p58-6]. — It is plain also why in the state of the law of *grace* no *figurative* sacrifice is offered, but Jesus Christ himself in his own flesh and blood, inasmuch as it is the time for worshipping God truly and perfectly; and therefore it behooves that the truest and most perfect sacrifice be offered, which indeed is one and alone, namely Jesus Christ himself[^p58-7]. — It is plain also why unbelievers are justly condemned. For if he greatly dishonours an earthly king who takes away from him one small portion of his kingdom, and by this deservedly becomes worthy to be expelled from the kingdom, much more does he who denies that God is a principle principiating all things from time, or eternally principiating within, dishonour the eternal majesty, and he is worthy not only to be expelled from the kingdom of God, but also to be cast headlong into infernal punishment with the devil and his angels. — It is plain also why *we worship God by faith.* For by judging of God in this way, in which the Christian faith judges, we judge of him that he is a principle *most high* and *most pious;* and therefore he is *to be feared* and *to be loved,* by which two man is called back from evil and set aflame for every good; and this is perfect justice, and he who has it is worthy of the eternal inheritance.

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la: Vers. 19: Euntes ergo docete etc. — Seq. locus est Marc. 16, 16.

en: Verse 19: "Going therefore, teach ye," etc. — The passage following is Mark 16:16.

la: Num. 5.

en: Number 5.

la: Num. 4. Ubi docet auctor huius libri (inter opera August.), quod ut moriantur homines, poena peccati sit; ut convertantur ad vitam, Domini miserantis et sanguine Christi sanctificantis. Clarius habetur ibid. III. c. 14. et 15. n. 31-33. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. et ibid. pag. 236, nota 10.

en: Number 4. Where the author of this book (among the works of Augustine) teaches that it is by the penalty of sin that men die, and by the Lord's mercy and the blood of Christ that sanctifies that they are converted to life. It is more clearly had ibid., III, cc. 14 and 15, nn. 31–33. Compare III *Sentences,* d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, and ibid., p. 236, note 10.

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., de Sacram. legis naturalis et scriptae (circa finem); I. de Sacram. p. X. c. 5.

en: Compare Hugh of St Victor, *On the Sacraments of the Natural and the Written Law* (towards the end); *On the Sacraments,* I, p. X, c. 5.

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Compare III *Sentences,* d. 23, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 10, 5: In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. — Post *fides* A B E addunt *Christi*.

en: Second Epistle to the Corinthians 10:5: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ." — After *fides* A B E add *Christi*.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 1. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 520, nota 5.

en: According to Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 1. Compare vol. III, p. 520, note 5.

la: August., de Utilitate credendi, c. 11. n. 25: Quod intelligimus igitur debemus rationi; quod credimus, auctoritati; quod opinamur, errori.

en: Augustine, *On the Usefulness of Believing,* c. 11, n. 25: "What we understand, therefore, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority; what we opine, to error."

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 48, ubi tamen textus originalis alio ordine haec tria enumerat et plura interserit. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 24. dub. 3. — Circa finem arg. allegatur Matth. 1, 2. Cfr. Gen. 21, 3.

en: The book of the *Eighty-three Questions,* q. 48, where however the original text enumerates these three in a different order and inserts several other things. Compare III *Sentences,* d. 24, dub. 3. — Towards the end of the argument Matthew 1:2 is alleged. Compare Genesis 21:3.

la: Vers. 12. — In *maiori* vocibus *natura creata* D G H praemittunt *omnis*, et pro *praetendit* B *dictat*.

en: Verse 12. — In the *major* D G H prefix *omnis* to the words *natura creata,* and for *praetendit* B has *dictat*.

la: Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1.

en: Gregory, *Homilies on the Gospels* II, homily 26, n. 1.

la: Libr. II. Rhet. c. 54: Virtus est animi habitus, naturae modo, rationi consentaneus (cfr. tom. II. pag. 671, nota 10.). — Eandem definitionem ponit August., 83 Qq. q. 31. n. 1. — Finem arg. D H sic exhibent: *non est* (*verum* addit D) *credibile per naturam, ergo nec per gratiam superadditam.*

en: *Rhetoric* [i.e. *On Invention*], book II, c. 54: "Virtue is a habit of mind, in the mode of nature, agreeable to reason" (compare vol. II, p. 671, note 10). — Augustine sets down the same definition, *Eighty-three Questions,* q. 31, n. 1. — D H give the end of the argument thus: *non est* (D adds *verum*) *credibile per naturam, ergo nec per gratiam superadditam.*

la: Ambros., Expos. in Ps. 118. serm. 14. n. 42: Dedit [Christus] gratiam, reformavit naturam.

en: Ambrose, *Exposition of Psalm 118,* sermon 14, n. 42: "[Christ] gave grace, he reformed nature."

la: August., XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3.

en: Augustine, *Against Faustus* XXVI, c. 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et IV. Metaph. text. 8. (III. c. 3.).

en: Compare Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2, and *Metaphysics* IV, text 8 (III, c. 3).

la: Expos. Symboli ad Damasum (inter opera Hieron.); cfr. tom. I. pag. 846, nota 2, ubi allegavimus etiam Hieron. Comment. in Matth. 5, 44. — Inferius respicitur regula iuris 6. in VI: Nemo potest ad impossibile obligari.

en: *Exposition of the Creed to Damasus* (among the works of Jerome); compare vol. I, p. 846, note 2, where we alleged also Jerome's *Commentary on Matthew* 5:44. — Below, the rule of law 6 in the *Sext* is referred to: "No one can be obliged to the impossible."

la: Cfr. Rom. 2, 14. seq. — Inferius respicitur illud Matth. 11, 30: Iugum enim meum suave est et onus meum leve. — Vocibus *humanam industriam* D G H interserunt *intelligentiam vel*.

en: Compare Romans 2:14f. — Below, that saying of Matthew 11:30 is referred to: "For my yoke is sweet and my burden light." — D G H insert *intelligentiam vel* into the words *humanam industriam*.

la: F addit *hoc est*.

en: F adds *hoc est*.

la: A B F *diceret*, et post *tota* B E addunt *divina*.

en: A B F have *diceret,* and after *tota* B E add *divina*.

la: Gregor. supra pag. 53, nota 3. allatus. — Inferius respicitur Eccle. 9, 1: Nescit homo, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit. — Subinde pro *moveatur* A G *moveamur*, E F *movemur*.

en: Gregory, cited above at p. 53, note 3. — Below, Ecclesiastes 9:1 is referred to: "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." — Thereafter, for *moveatur* A G have *moveamur,* E F *movemur*.

la: A B E G incongrue adiiciunt *autem*.

en: A B E G incongruously add *autem*.

la: Deut. 19, 15: In ore duorum aut trium testium stabit omne verbum. Cfr. Matth. 18, 16; II. Cor. 13, 1.

en: Deuteronomy 19:15: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." Compare Matthew 18:16; Second Corinthians 13:1.

la: Quaest. 18: Omne quod est... Universa igitur creatura, si et est quoquo modo, et ab eo quod omnino nihil est plurimum distat, et suis partibus sibimet congruit, causam quoque eius trinam esse oportet, qua sit... Creaturae autem causam, id est auctorem, Deum dicimus etc. — Superius respicitur Sap. 11, 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3.

en: Question 18: "Everything that is… Every creature therefore, if it both is in some manner whatever, and is very far distant from that which is altogether nothing, and agrees with itself in its parts, must have a threefold cause also, by which it is… And the cause of the creature, that is the author, we call God," etc. — Above, Wisdom 11:21 is referred to: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight." — Compare I *Sentences,* d. 3, p. I, dub. 3.

la: Codd. male *causalitas*, sed infra *aequalitas*.

en: The codices wrongly have *causalitas,* but below *aequalitas*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. et 2. — Superius pro *sit distinctio* F *fit distinctio*.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 3, p. II, aa. 1 and 2. — Above, for *sit distinctio* F has *fit distinctio*.

la: Vers. 2. seq.: Apparuerunt ei tres viri stantes prope eum, quos cum vidisset cucurrit... et adoravit in terram et dixit: Domine, si inveni gratiam in oculis tuis etc.

en: Verse 2f.: "There appeared to him three men standing near him, and when he had seen them he ran… and adored down to the ground and said: Lord, if I have found favour in thy sight," etc.

la: Psalm. 32, 6. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 4.

en: Psalm 32:6. Compare I *Sentences,* the letter of the Master, d. II, c. 4.

la: Vers. 19. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Verse 19. Compare IV *Sentences,* d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vers. 7.

en: Verse 7.

en: Romans 10:16.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 3, 18. — Seq. textus est Ioan. 1, 4. et 9.

en: Second Epistle to the Corinthians 3:18. — The text following is John 1:4 and 9.

la: Psalm. 4, 7: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.

en: Psalm 4:7: "The lumen of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4, Breviloq. I. c. 4.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 2, q. 4; *Breviloquium* I, c. 4.

la: Psalm. 137, 6: Quoniam excelsus Dominus et humilia respicit et alta a longe cognoscit. — Pro *dignitatem* A B G *dignationem*, qui etiam aliquanto inferius substituunt *promulgationem* pro *vulgationem*.

en: Psalm 137:6: "For the Lord is high, and looketh on the low, and the high he knoweth afar off." — For *dignitatem* A B G have *dignationem,* and they also, somewhat further down, substitute *promulgationem* for *vulgationem*.

la: Vers. 3. seq. Vulgata voci *signis* praemittit *contestante Deo*.

en: Verse 3f. The Vulgate prefixes *contestante Deo* to the word *signis*.

la: Respicitur II. Cor. 10, 5; cfr. supra pag. 52, nota 7. — Supra pro *hoc, quia* A B G H *hoc, quod*, D *haec, quod*. Inferius pro *sicut* A B E *sive*.

en: Second Corinthians 10:5 is referred to; compare above, p. 52, note 7. — Above, for *hoc, quia* A B G H have *hoc, quod,* D *haec, quod.* Below, for *sicut* A B E have *sive*.

la: Marc. 16, 20. — In verbis Richardi textus originalis *genus* pro *gravis* (ita F et B a secunda manu, alii *gravius*), *utinam animadverterent pagani* pro *attenderent pagani* et *confidentia Deo dicere poterimus* pro *fiducia Deo dicere possumus*. Pro *confirmatione* D G H *affirmatione*, F *confirmatione vel affirmatione*.

en: Mark 16:20. — In the words of Richard the original text has *genus* for *gravis* (so F, and B by a second hand; the others *gravius*), *utinam animadverterent pagani* for *attenderent pagani,* and *confidentia Deo dicere poterimus* for *fiducia Deo dicere possumus.* For *confirmatione* D G H have *affirmatione,* F *confirmatione vel affirmatione*.

la: Sive neganda; cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — De solut. vide III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Mox pro *aliquid* B *aliquando*.

en: Or: to be denied; compare vol. I, p. 87, note 4. — On the solution see III *Sentences,* d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. — Presently, for *aliquid* B has *aliquando*.

en: Compare II *Sentences,* d. 3, p. I, a. 2, qq. 1–3.

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 901, nota 5. et tom. III. pag. 730, nota 5, ubi ex Macrobio divisionem virtutum et definitionem earum attulimus.

en: See vol. II, p. 901, note 5, and vol. III, p. 730, note 5, where we brought forward from Macrobius the division of the virtues and the definition of them.

en: Compare II *Sentences,* d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5.

la: Psalm. 92, 5. — Vocibus *post lumen* F praemittit *tamen*, et pro *ipsi aeterno* substituit *Christo aeterno*.

en: Psalm 92:5. — F prefixes *tamen* to the words *post lumen,* and for *ipsi aeterno* substitutes *Christo aeterno*.

la: Vers. 1: Paulus... secundum fidem electorum Dei et agnitionem veritatis, quae secundum pietatem est.

en: Verse 1: "Paul… according to the faith of the elect of God and the acknowledging of the truth which is according to piety."

la: Cfc. Ioan. 3, 16.

en: Cfc. [*sic*, for *Cfr.*] John 3:16.

en: See III *Sentences,* d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6; d. 20, q. 4, ad 2.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 40. q. 3. — Nota inversionem ordinis argg.

en: Compare III *Sentences,* d. 40, q. 3. — Note the inversion of the order of the arguments.

la: Deut. 6, 4. et 13. (decem praecepta recitantur Exod. 20, 2. seqq. et Deut. 5, 6. seqq.) Pro *Deus tuus Deus unus est* Vulgata *Deus noster Dominus unus est*. — De latria vide III. Sent. d. 9. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Deuteronomy 6:4 and 13 (the ten precepts are recited at Exodus 20:2ff. and Deuteronomy 5:6ff.). For *Deus tuus Deus unus est* the Vulgate has *Deus noster Dominus unus est.* — On latria see III *Sentences,* d. 9, a. 2, q. 1.

la: G addit *confitetur* (confitemur?).

en: G adds *confitetur* (*confitemur*?).

la: D F H *primum*. — Cfr. III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. et 3.

en: D F H have *primum.* — Compare III *Sentences,* d. 25, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3.

la: Epist. I. Petr. 1, 19: Sed [redempti estis] pretioso sanguine quasi agni immaculati        incontaminati.

en: First Epistle of Peter 1:19: "But [you were redeemed] with the precious blood of a lamb unspotted        and undefiled." ⚠ The printed note leaves a blank space of about a dozen characters where the Vulgate has *Christi et*; the gap is reproduced, not filled — see `## Notes`.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Mox pro *quare* A B *quam*.

en: Compare IV *Sentences,* d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1ff. — Presently, for *quare* A B have *quam*.

en: Translator’s note: both Latin words stand within three lines here, and the sentence will not hold if they collapse into one. The book of life is *lux vera*, light in its source; it enlightens by a *lumen inditum* and a *lumen infusum*, light as given off and received, and the habit of faith is drawn from the meeting of the two. Render all three "light" and Bonaventure is left saying that the light enlightens by light and by light. So *lux* is "light" and *lumen* is left as it stands, here and wherever it occurs. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin base = the IA djvu OCR of Tom. V, raw band **L17009–L18085**, with **p. 53's upper left column wholly re-set from the 450 dpi plate columns** (it is the worst-graded region in this span: *tlienticnin, qnain sit sacra Scriptnni … conf;ninm cst et rationabile illud verum cre<lere*). pp. 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 grade clean for running prose and were re-set from the raw with every heading, marginale, anchor position and apparatus entry checked against the plate. **All 53 apparatus entries were read off 450 dpi footer bands at 1.8×, with every digit-critical one re-read at 3.0–3.2× against a same-line control.** Gutters measured per leaf: p. 51 **1182** (carried from `bon-qmt-q1-a1`) · p. 52 **1396** · p. 53 **1140** · p. 54 **1382** · p. 55 **1199** · p. 56 **1389** · p. 57 **1183** · p. 58 **1296**.

**⚠ `colcrop.py`'s default was rejected on p. 55, and the failure is a NEW shape.** The measurement over the script's own body window (rows 0.45–0.92) returned **1227 on a 3 px run** — a failure, by the tool's own ≥15 px test. Re-profiling over **rows 0.20–0.50** returned **1199 on a 62 px run**, stable across three overlapping windows, and 1199 is what was adopted and what the crops confirm. **The leaf's lower half is what defeats the default**: the register and the last body lines close up the gutter there. ⚠ **p. 58 was profiled too and is sound at 1296** — its body windows all agree within 3 px; the 1389/247 px run that appears over rows 0.60–0.90 is the **white space below the article's close**, not a gutter, and would have been adopted by a wider window. **Two different leaves, two different reasons the default window is the wrong window: profile, do not just re-run.**

**Structure.** **Fourteen affirmative arguments in two declared runs** — *debitum credi* (nn. 1–8, marginale `Fundamenta.`) and *congruum credi* (nn. 9–14, marginale `De congruitate credendi.`) — then a **thirteen-argument `SED CONTRA` series, also in two runs** (nn. 1–8 against *congruum,* nn. 9–13 against *debitum*), then an **incidental question** (*Est ergo quaestio: si illud est verum credibile, per quid movemur…*), `CONCLUSIO`, `Respondeo`, and **twelve replies**.

**⭐ THE OPPOSING SERIES IS A PRINTED HEADING HERE — `SED CONTRA:` in letter-spaced small capitals, IN-COLUMN.** This is the third shape the corpus has now seen for the same unit in Vol V: `bon-qsc-q1`/`q2` print `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:`, `bon-qsc-q3` prints `Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:`, and `bon-qmt-q1-a1` prints **no heading at all**, running the series in as an italic formula. Rendered `**Sed contra:** 1.`, the standing convention, with the wording as printed. ⛔ **The find-it-by-content rule is not retired and must not be**: two consecutive chunks of the same work disagree about whether the unit is headed at all.

**⛔ THE REPLIES ANSWER THE OPPOSING SIDE.** The *Respondeo* concedes the affirmative outright (*Deum esse trinum est verum credibile tanquam congruum et debitum et dignum credi*), so the fourteen *fundamenta* stand and the replies dispose of the thirteen `Sed contra` arguments. Twelve numbered replies cover thirteen arguments: **replies 5 and 6 are printed combined** as a single `5. 6.` paragraph and are preserved so, per the standing rule; and **argument 13 is not answered in the reply series at all** — it is the argument that generated the incidental question, and Quaracchi's own marginale says so: `Ad arg. 13. circa quaestionem incid.` stands beside the *Respondeo*'s closing sentence. **Never assume the pairing, and never assume the reply count matches the argument count.**

**`CONCLUSIO.` printed in the right column at full column measure**, letter-spaced small caps, the conclusion following in centred italic. Rendered as the `> **Conclusio.**` blockquote, which encodes the unit and not the measure.

### ⛔⛔ THE REPLIES ARE PRINTED OUT OF ORDER — 10, 12, 11 — AND QUARACCHI SAYS SO

p. 58 prints reply **10**, then reply **12**, then reply **11**. This is **not** an OCR artifact and **not** a dropped reply: the plate, the raw and Quaracchi's own apparatus all agree. **p. 58 n. 2 ends `— Nota inversionem ordinis argg.`** ("note the inversion of the order of the arguments"), attached to reply 10's last word. The order is transcribed **as printed**, on the standing record-do-not-complete rule; the reader who wants reply 11 finds it after reply 12, which is where Bonaventure's editors left it and where they flagged it.

⭐ **The lesson worth keeping is the direction of the catch.** A gap in a numbered series (…10, 12…) reads as a *dropped unit* — the failure mode the corpus has fought since d.27 — and the reflex is to hunt for missing text. Here the missing unit was on the **next** leaf-column, out of order, and **the apparatus entry two inches below it named the anomaly**. ⚠ **Read the register for the page before concluding that a numbered series has lost a member.**

### ⚠ TWO PRINTING DEFECTS RECORDED AS PRINTED, NOT COMPLETED

1. **p. 57 n. 7 prints `Cfc. Ioan. 3, 16.`** — `Cfc.`, not Quaracchi's universal `Cfr.` Read at 2.1×: the third letter is an unmistakable **c**, with no shoulder and no descender-stem, and **the raw agrees** (`' Cfc. loan. 3, 16.`, raw L17937), where the same OCR gives `Cfr.`/`Cft-.` elsewhere on the same page. **Two independent witnesses**, so it is the print, not the reading. Transcribed as printed with a `[*sic*]` in the English only.
2. **p. 58 n. 6 carries a BLANK GAP inside a scripture quotation.** The note reads `…quasi agni immaculati␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣incontaminati.`, with about a dozen characters of white space where the Vulgate has *Christi et*. The gap is visible on the plate at 1.9× and the raw preserves it as a run of spaces. **Reproduced, not filled** — filling it would put words into a Quaracchi note that Quaracchi did not print.

### Apparatus: page-split map and hand-offs

| page | entries | this chunk |
|---|---|---|
| 51 | 6 | **n. 6 only** (inherited) |
| 52 | 9 | all nine |
| 53 | 8 | all eight |
| 54 | 7 | all seven |
| 55 | 9 | all nine |
| 56 | 5 | all five |
| 57 | 7 | all seven |
| 58 | 7 | all seven |

**Total 53.** **One note is picked up: p. 51 n. 6**, forwarded by `bon-qmt-q1-a1` and re-derived here down to its digits — `Vers. 19` (John's chapter, for *Matthaei ultimo*) and `Marc. 16, 16` — **both of which read as `49` and `46` at 1.6× and are 1s at 3×.** That single entry is the 1-vs-4 calibration's cleanest specimen in the work so far, because the external control is decisive: the Great Commission is Matthew 28:19 and the sequel is Mark 16:16.

**Nothing is forwarded.** **BOUNDARY 2 (p. 58) MEASURED: the leaf does NOT forward.** Articulus II closes at *…dignus est hereditate aeterna.* about two-fifths of the way down p. 58's right column; the rest of the leaf is white, and `QUAESTIO II.` with its subtitle opens on p. 59 (raw L18089). This is the opposite of boundary 1 and it was measured, not inferred: **the p. 498 rule asks whether the incoming unit's numbered body reaches the leaf, and here no part of Quaestio II is on p. 58.**

**Runovers: one, gutter-crossing, none page-crossing** — **p. 53 n. 4** (the Cicero definition of virtue) begins at the foot of the left footer block and completes at the head of the right block with the D/H variant reading of the argument's close. ⚠ On p. 57 the volume signature line **`S. Bonav. — Tom. V.`** stands below the left footer block and the gathering signature **`8`** below the right; neither is apparatus, and neither interrupts a note here.

### Digit resolution — six raw-vs-plate defects, all resolved TO THE PLATE, two of them by an internal control

p. 52 n. 4 raw `p. X. c. S.` → **c. 5.** · p. 54 n. 4 raw `supra pag. 33` → **pag. 53** · p. 55 n. 4 raw `d. II. c. i.` → **c. 4.** · p. 55 n. 9 raw `Psalm. i, 1` → **Psalm. 4, 7** · p. 56 n. 4 raw `supra pag. 32` → **pag. 52** · p. 58 n. 1 raw `d. 20. q. L ad 2` → **q. 4. ad 2.**

⭐⭐ **Two of these are settled by an internal control rather than by the glyph, and that is the stronger warrant.** p. 54 n. 4 says *Gregor. supra pag. 53, nota 3. allatus* — and **p. 53 n. 3 is exactly `Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1.`**, the Gregory the note is pointing back to. p. 56 n. 4 says *cfr. supra pag. 52, nota 7* — and **p. 52 n. 7 is exactly the II Cor. 10:5 note** it names. In both cases the OCR's `33`/`32` would point at a page in another work entirely. **A Quaracchi back-reference inside the same span is a free, decisive control on its own page number; use it before straining at the type.**

⚠ **And the 1-vs-4 calibration was re-run rather than inherited.** Every `1`/`4` in this span was read at 3.0–3.2× against a same-line control: p. 52 n. 2's `c. 14. et 15.` (two 1s and a 4 in six characters), p. 52 n. 6's `d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.`, p. 56 n. 1's `d. 2. q. 4, Breviloq. I. c. 4.` (two true 4s), p. 57 n. 1's `a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.` (both glyphs, five characters apart), p. 58 n. 1's `a. 1. q. 2. ad 6; d. 20. q. 4.` **The frozen rule held every time and cost nothing but the zoom.**

### Register — what was exercised

- ***intellectus* → "understanding" at every occurrence, with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English.** The ratified narrow exception is **unreachable in this work** (the pilot's census found *intellectus agens* / *intellectus possibilis* zero times in all 71 printed pages), so any bare "intellect" here would be a defect by construction. The load-bearing sites are argument 10's *fides captivat intellectum* → "faith takes the understanding captive" and the *Respondeo*'s *in cuius obsequium nostrum captivat intellectum* → "into obedience to which it takes our understanding captive" — the same II Cor. 10:5 clause twice, once in an argument and once in the solution, both rendered the same way. *Intelligentia* is a different word and takes **"intelligence"** where it is Bonaventure's own faculty term (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*; *naturalis intelligentia*; *auris intelligentiae interioris*).
- ***lux* → light / *lumen* → "lumen" HELD APART, and this chunk is where ruling 2 does the most work in the work so far.** *lumen inditum* / *lumen infusum* → "implanted lumen" / "infused lumen" (six sites across pp. 55–57), *lumen divini vultus* → "the lumen of the divine countenance", *lumen aeternum* → "the eternal lumen", *post lumen infusum* → "after the infused lumen". Against these, *lux vera* → "the true light", *Vita erat lux hominum* → "The life was the light of men", *influentia lucis* → "the influence of light", *lucem propriam* / *luce aeterna* → "its own light" / "the eternal light", *gratia et lux desuper infusa* → "grace and the light infused from above". ⭐ **The pair stands side by side in one sentence** — *quia liber iste vitae est lux vera… Illuminat autem dupliciter, scilicet per lumen inditum et per lumen infusum* — which is the best argument the ruling has yet had for itself in this work: the Latin is drawing the distinction, and an English that says "light" twice erases it.
- **⚠ THE PSALM 4:7 SITE RECURS, and it is handed to the shakedown gate exactly as `bon-qmt-q1-a1` handed it on.** p. 55 n. 9 is the same verse as p. 50 n. 2 — *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine* — and here it is the **anchor for the body's own *lumen divini vultus***, so the note and the body must agree. Ruling 2 was **followed, not suspended**: "The lumen of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." ⭐ **What is new is that the site is now attested twice, five pages apart, and the second time it is load-bearing rather than incidental** — the *Respondeo*'s whole account of the *lumen inditum* is built on this verse. That strengthens, not weakens, the question ruling 4 poses (*is there a received English wording a reader will recognise?*), and it is the gate's to answer. **Do not settle it in a chunk.**
- ***notitia* → "knowledge" / *cognitio* → "cognition" held apart** (the `bon-qsc-q2` ruling): the *Respondeo*'s image-triad *mentem, notitiam et amorem* → "mind, knowledge and love" sits a few lines from *principium cognitionis scientialis* → "the principle of scientific cognition" and *cognitio secundum fidem* → "cognition according to faith".
- ***ratio*** takes its contextual English throughout, and reply 1 is the chunk's hardest paragraph for it: *ratio defectiva / stans / elevata* → "defective / standing / elevated reason" (the faculty), against *ratio propria* → "each man's own reason", *principalis ratio movens* → "the principal reason moving", and *ratione originis* → "by reason of origin". ⚠ *rationem probantem* does not occur here; *ratio* is the faculty in nearly every site, which is why "reason" carries almost the whole span.
- ***pullulatio* → "burgeoning"** at p. 58's *aeternarum* / *temporalium pullulationum*, matched to the same paragraph's agricultural figure (*colere agrum est manifestare pullulationes originaliter ex ipsa terra procedentes* → "to cultivate a field is to bring out the shoots proceeding originally from the earth itself"). The figure is Bonaventure's own and the English keeps it visible.
- **Ruling 5 is not reached:** the formula `fundam. N` does not occur in this span's apparatus.
- **⛔ *vacatio* / *quies* is NOT tested here** — neither family occurs in these eight leaves. The deciding sites remain `q5-a2` (raw L23636, L23645) and `q7-a2` (raw L25824, L25900), of which **L25824 holds both families in one clause**. **Do not re-open the question against a chunk with no data for it.**

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention; body order, 52 in all):
p. 51 — `De debito credendi.` · `Fundamenta.`
p. 52 — `De congruitate credendi.`
p. 53 — `Ad oppositum.` · `Quod non sit congruum hoc credere.` · `Quod non sit debitum.`
p. 54 — `Quaestio incidens de motivo et dignitate fidei.` · `Conclusio.` · `Triplex testimonium et liber.` · `Primi libri est testimonium duplex.` · `Primum.`
p. 55 — `Secundum.` · `Corollarium.` · `Liber secundus.` · `Eiusdem testimonium duplex.` · `Primum.` · `Secundum.` · `Notandum.` · `Liber tertius.` · `Dupliciter testatur.` · `Lumen duplex.` · `Explicatur hoc testimonium.`
p. 56 — `Consequentia 1.` · `Consequentia 2.` · `Quatuor credenda.` · `Epilogus.` · `Corollarium.` · `Quaestio incid. solvitur.` · `Ratio movens principaliter.` · `Rationes minus principaliter moventes.` · `Ad arg. 13. circa quaestionem incid.` · `Solutio oppositorum.`
p. 57 — `Ratio triplex.` · `Notandum.` · `Distinctio.` · `Distinctio.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.` · `Gratia facit tria.` · `Natura sumitur dupliciter.` · `Item intelligentia.` · `Notandum.`
p. 58 — `Notandum.` · `Quaestio incid. solvitur.` · `De latria.` · `Notandum.` · `Duae pullulationes.` · `Corollaria quatuor.` · `De sacrificiis Legis.` · `De sacrificio N. T.` · `De damnatione infidelium.` · `De cultu Dei per fidem.`

⭐ **Marginalia density belongs to the SOLUTION again, and the split is sharper than `bon-qmt-q1-a1`'s.** pp. 51–53 carry **fourteen affirmative arguments and thirteen opposing ones — twenty-seven in all — and hold six marginalia**; pp. 54–58, which carry the incidental question, the *Respondeo* and the replies, hold **forty-six**. Two chunks of this work now agree on the pattern, which the *septem donis* and the *scientia Christi* also showed: **the argument runs are cheap to gloss and the solution is not.**

**Zero `[?]` flags.** Every reading in this chunk is settled positively — on the plate, from a same-line control, or from a Quaracchi back-reference that names its own target.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0