title: Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus Unicus. *De voluntate Dei respectu salutis omnium, et respectu mali.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri voluntate beneplaciti.*

Quod autem Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri voluntate *beneplaciti*, ostenditur sic:

1. *Primae ad Timotheum* secundo[^1]: *Vult omnes homines salvos fieri*; sed constat, quod hoc non est dictum de voluntate signi, quia nec praecepti nec impletionis nec alicuius alterius — hoc enim non cadit sub praecepto — ergo constat esse dictum de voluntate beneplaciti.

2. Item, Damascenus[^2]: « Oportet scire, quoniam Deus vult antecedenter omnes homines salvos fieri, et regni sui potiri fortuna; non enim ad puniendum plasmavit nos Deus »: ergo cum voluntas *antecedens* sit voluntas beneplaciti, quae est bonorum, quae sunt bona irrefragabiliter, voluntate beneplaciti vult omnes homines salvos fieri sive salvari.

3. Item, omnis habens *caritatem* vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quantumcumque modicam habeat dilectionem[^3]. Cum ergo Deus summam habeat dilectionem et caritatem, videtur, quod ipse velit omnes homines salvos fieri.

4. Item, sicut vult Philosophus[^4], primum uno modo se habet ad omnia sive ad omnes, ergo, quantum est de se, omnes uniformiter diligit; ergo si vult aliquos salvari, et omnes; vel si de aliquibus non vult, pari ratione de nullis.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. *Contra* hoc *primo* est instantia, quam adducit Magister in littera[^5]: si vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et de omnibus plures damnantur, quam salvantur, ergo voluntas eius frustratur et cassatur; quod est contra veritatem aperte.

2. Item, omnes quos vult Deus salvari, *eligit* ad salutem — electio enim Dei non dicit aliud quam dilectionem ad salvandum — ergo si omnes vult salvos fieri, omnes sunt electi. *Contra*, Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^6]: *Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi*.

3. Item, in *praedestinatione* non sunt nisi haec duo, scilicet *praecognitio* et voluntas *salvandi*, ratione cuius Deus dicitur praedestinare. Dum enim proponit dare gratiam et gloriam praeparare, praedestinare dicitur[^7]: ergo cum praecognitio Dei omni-

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bus sit communis, si voluntas salutis est respectu omnium, ergo omnes sunt praedestinati. Sed omnes praedestinati salvabuntur: ergo omnes salvabuntur; quod est contra fidem. Si tu dicas mihi, quod duplex est voluntas, *absoluta* et *conditionalis*, et Deus absoluta voluntate solum vult salvare quos praescivit *conformes fieri imagini Filii sui*[^8], et istos praedestinavit, voluntate vero conditionali vult omnes, si ipsi velint; tunc obiicitur, quod voluntas conditionalis non videtur convenire Deo, quia haec est voluntas semiplena, Deus autem quidquid vult, plene vult. Et *iterum*, quidquid facit, plene facit. Et *iterum*, haec conditionata voluntas aut est voluntas *beneplaciti*, aut voluntas *signi*. Si signi, tunc nihil ad propositum, quia voluntate signi non vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Si voluntas *beneplaciti*; sed haec uno modo tantum est et dicitur et semper impletur: ergo omnes homines salvantur. Et *praeterea*, haec voluntas conditionata, qua dicitur, quod vult, si ipsi velint, locum non potest habere in parvulis, qui moriuntur: ergo adhuc non solvit ista distinctio.

4. Item, cum sic dicitur: vult hunc salvari, aliquo demonstrato, aut hoc quod est velle aliquid connotat, aut *nihil*. Si nihil: ergo pari ratione potest dici de lapide, quod Deus vult hunc salvari. Si *aliquid*, non nisi salutem: ergo sequitur, si vult hunc salvari, quod iste salvabitur, qualitercumque accipiatur *velle*. Si dicas, quod connotat possibilitatem et ordinabilitatem ad salutem; obiicitur tunc, quod de quolibet ordinabili ad aliquid potest dici Deum velle; sed quilibet clericus est ordinabilis ad episcopatum, et quilibet miles ad dignitatem regiam: ergo Deus vult, omnes clericos esse episcopos, et omnes milites esse reges; quod non conceditur.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Deus vult, omnes voluntate beneplaciti salvos fieri, quod intelligi potest sive cum Augustino de voluntate consequenti, sive cum Damasceno de voluntate antecedenti.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum Apostolus dicat, quod Deus hoc vult, scilicet *omnes homines salvos fieri*, quod necesse habemus concedere, quod Deus velit. Et cum non possit exponi de voluntate *signi*, necesse habemus exponere de voluntate *beneplaciti*. Sed cum non omnes salventur, et voluntas Dei numquam frustretur, ideo necesse est, quod fiat vis in *modo distribuendi*, vel in *modo volendi*[^9].

Et egregius doctor Augustinus duplicem facit vim in *modo distribuendi* in Enchiridio[^10]: uno modo, quod distributio sit *accommoda*, sicut et haec: omnis homo timet in mari, secundum communem modum loquendi intelligitur: qui est in mari. Similiter Augustinus[^11] exemplificat, si dicatur: « Magister iste docet omnes pueros de ista civitate, quia scilicet docet omnes qui addiscunt. Nullus enim docetur nisi per ipsum ». Similiter, « Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quia nullus salvatur, nisi velit Deus, et ideo orandus est, ut velit »[^12]. — Facit etiam alio modo vim in distributione secundum communem modum distinguendi, quod potest fieri pro *singulis generum*, et sic est falsa, et non intelligit Apostolus sic; vel pro *generibus singulorum*, et sic vera, quia Deus de omni gente voluit et vult aliquos salvari, et de Graecis et Latinis, et de praelatis et subditis, et de omni gente; et ideo dicit Apostolus[^13], pro omnibus esse orandum. Haec est responsio Augustini, cui Magister innititur; et

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necesse est sic vel sic solvere, supposito quod *velle* dicat ibi velle Dei, secundum quod dicitur velle placito quietato sive voluntate *absoluta*, de qua verum est dicere: *Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit*[^14].

Sed Damascenus[^15] facit vim in *modo volendi*. Distinguit enim in Deo voluntatem *antecedentem* et voluntatem *consequentem*. Et voluntas *antecedens* est voluntas respectu eius, propter quod Deus hominem facit, et est irrefragabiliter bonorum. Voluntas autem *consequens* est voluntas, non quae sequitur merita, sed quae vult aliqua secundum praescientiam meritorum. *Prima*, scilicet antecedens, dicitur a magistris voluntas *conditionalis* sive voluntas, qua Deus vult, quantum in se est. *Secunda* autem, scilicet consequens, dicitur *absoluta*. Differentia autem inter hanc voluntatem et illam non est secundum diversitatem *affectionis* sive modi volendi, qui sit in Deo, sed secundum rationem *connotandi* et *intelligendi*. — Prout enim Deus dicitur velle omnium salutem, *quantum in se est et antecedenter*, connotatur in omnibus hominibus *ordinabilitas*[^16] ad salutem, tum ex parte naturae datae, tum ex parte gratiae oblatae. Dedit enim Deus naturam, secundum quam possent ipsum cognoscere et cognitum quaerere et quaesitum invenire et invento inhaerere, ac per hoc salutem obtinere. Gratiam similiter obtulit, dum Filium misit et obtulit, cuius pretium omnium saluti suffecit. Leges etiam et mandata tribuit salutis et ostendit. Ipse etiam praesto est omnibus inquirentibus *et prope est omnibus invocantibus eum*[^17]. Velle ergo hominem *antecedenter* salvare est ordinatum ad salutem facere et volenti pervenire non deesse. Unde velle antecedenter salvare non connotat salutem, sed ordinabilitatem ad salutem. Velle autem *consequenter* sive absolute salvare est velle dare salutem ei, quem praescit ad salutem perventurum per suum auxilium et gratiam, et connotat *salutis eventum*. Et sic non est dicere, quod Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri.

Huic responsioni magis consonant magistri, quamvis utraque bona sit. Secundum hanc igitur respondendum, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quantum in se est sive voluntate *antecedente*, non autem voluntate *absoluta* sive *consequente*.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3, 4.* Et quia illa non connotat effectus solum, ideo non impeditur in hoc, quod non omnes salvantur. — Patet etiam responsio ad illud quod obicit de *praedestinatione* sive *electione*, quia in illis clauditur voluntas absoluta, non solum antecedens. — Patet etiam responsio ad ultimum de connotato.

Ad illud tamen quod *obiicitur*, quod voluntas *conditionata* non cadit in Deum; dicendum, quod non ponitur in Deo velleitas quantum ad defectum[^18] plenitudinis voluntatis nec propter diversos modos volendi, sed propter aliam comparationem in connotando, et sic patet illud.

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad rationes vero ad oppositum, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri; responderi potest ad duas primas, quod verum concludunt et vere.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de caritate hominum, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia nos nescimus merita hominum futura finaliter; et si quis sciret, aliquos esse praescitos, quamvis, quantum in se est, deberet eos velle salvari, non tamen voluntate absoluta. Sed haec melius infra patebunt[^19].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus uno modo se habet ad omnes; dicendum, quod illud verbum Philosophi habet locum quantum ad rerum gubernationem, non quantum ad earum productionem; vel quantum ad naturalia, non quantum ad gratuita.

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### Sole Article. *On the will of God with respect to the salvation of all, and with respect to evil.*
### Question I. *Whether God wills all men to be saved by the will of good-pleasure.*

That God wills all men to be saved by the will of *good-pleasure* is shown thus:

1. *First Letter to Timothy*, chapter 2[^1]: *He wills all men to be saved*; but it is established that this was not said of the will of sign, since [it is] neither of precept nor of fulfillment nor of any other [kind of sign] — for this does not fall under precept — therefore it is established to have been said of the will of good-pleasure.

2. Likewise, [John] Damascene[^2]: « It must be known, that God antecedently wills all men to be saved, and to obtain the fortune of his kingdom; for God did not fashion us for punishment »: therefore, since the *antecedent* will is the will of good-pleasure, which is of good things — things which are irrefragably good — by the will of good-pleasure he wills all men to be saved or to attain salvation.

3. Likewise, everyone having *charity* wills all men to be saved, however small the love he has[^3]. Since therefore God has supreme love and charity, it appears that he himself wills all men to be saved.

4. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds[^4], a first [principle] in one way relates to all things or to all [men]; therefore, so far as in itself, it loves all uniformly; therefore if [God] wills some to be saved, he wills all; or if of some he does not will [it], by the same reasoning of none.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Against* this, *first*, is the instance which the Master adduces in the text[^5]: if he wills all men to be saved, and of all the greater number are damned than are saved, then his will is frustrated and rendered void; which is openly against the truth.

2. Likewise, all whom God wills to be saved he *elects* to salvation — for God's election says nothing other than love unto saving — therefore if he wills all to be saved, all are elect. *On the contrary*, Matthew 22[^6]: *Many are called, but few are chosen*.

3. Likewise, in *predestination* there are only these two, namely *foreknowledge* and the will of *saving*, by reason of which God is said to predestine. For when he proposes to give grace and to prepare glory, he is said to predestine[^7]: therefore, since God's foreknowledge is com-

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mon to all, if the will of salvation is with respect to all, then all are predestined. But all the predestined will be saved: therefore all will be saved; which is against the faith. If you say to me that the will is twofold, *absolute* and *conditional*, and that God by absolute will wills to save only those whom he foreknew to be *made conformed to the image of his Son*[^8], and these he predestined, but by conditional will he wills all, if they themselves will [it]; then it is objected that the conditional will does not seem to befit God, since this is a half-full will, whereas God whatever he wills, wills fully. And *again*, whatever he does, he does fully. And *again*, this conditioned will is either the will of *good-pleasure*, or the will of *sign*. If of sign, then [it is] nothing to the purpose, since by the will of sign he does not will all men to be saved. If [it is] the will of *good-pleasure*; but this exists and is so called in one way only, and is always fulfilled: therefore all men are saved. And *furthermore*, this conditioned will, by which it is said that he wills [it] if they themselves will, can have no place in little ones who die [in infancy]: therefore even so this distinction does not solve [the difficulty].

4. Likewise, when it is said thus: he wills this one to be saved, with someone pointed out, either this — i.e. to will something — connotes [something], or *nothing*. If nothing: then by the same reasoning it can be said of a stone, that God wills this one to be saved. If [it connotes] *something*, [it connotes] nothing but salvation: therefore it follows that if he wills this one to be saved, then this one will be saved, however *to-will* be taken. If you say that it connotes possibility and orderability toward salvation, then it is objected that of anything orderable toward anything else it can be said that God wills it; but every cleric is orderable to the episcopate, and every soldier to royal dignity: therefore God wills all clerics to be bishops, and all soldiers to be kings; which is not granted.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God wills all to be saved by the will of good-pleasure, which can be understood either with Augustine of the consequent will, or with Damascene of the antecedent will.

**I respond:** It must be said that since the Apostle says that God wills this, namely *that all men be saved*, we must necessarily concede that God wills [it]. And since it cannot be expounded of the will of *sign*, we must necessarily expound [it] of the will of *good-pleasure*. But since not all are saved, and God's will is never frustrated, therefore it is necessary that force be put on the *mode of distribution*, or on the *mode of willing*[^9].

And the eminent doctor Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^10] applies force in two ways in the *mode of distribution*: in one way, [namely] that the distribution is *accommodated*, as also this [example]: "every man fears at sea" is understood according to the common manner of speaking [as referring to him] who is at sea. Similarly Augustine[^11] gives the example: « This master teaches all the boys of this city, namely because he teaches all who are learning. For no one is taught except through him ». Similarly, « God wills all men to be saved, because no one is saved unless God wills [it], and therefore he must be prayed to, that he may will it »[^12]. — He also applies force in another way to the distribution according to the common manner of distinguishing — [namely] that [the distribution] can be made for *individuals of [each] genus*, and thus it is false, nor does the Apostle understand [it] thus; or for *genera of individuals*, and thus [it is] true, since God of every nation has willed and wills some to be saved — of Greeks and Latins, of prelates and subjects, and of every nation; and therefore the Apostle says[^13] that prayer is to be made for all. This is Augustine's reply, on which the Master leans; and

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it is necessary to resolve [it] in this way or that, supposing that *to will* there says the willing of God according as he is said to will by satisfied resolve or by *absolute* will, of which it is true to say: *He has done all that he willed*[^14].

But Damascene[^15] applies force in the *mode of willing*. For he distinguishes in God an *antecedent* will and a *consequent* will. And the *antecedent* will is the will with respect to that on account of which God makes man, and is irrefragably of good things. The *consequent* will, however, is the will, not which follows merits, but which wills certain things according to the foreknowledge of merits. The *first*, namely the antecedent, is called by the masters the *conditional* will, or the will by which God wills, so far as in himself. The *second*, namely the consequent, is called *absolute*. But the difference between this will and that is not according to diversity of *affection* or of mode of willing which may be in God, but according to a ground of *connotation* and *understanding*. — For inasmuch as God is said to will the salvation of all, *so far as in himself and antecedently*, there is connoted in all men *orderability*[^16] toward salvation, both on the side of given nature, and on the side of grace offered. For God gave a nature according to which they can know him, and seek him once known, and find him once sought, and cling to him once found, and through this obtain salvation. Likewise he offered grace, when he sent and offered the Son, whose price sufficed for the salvation of all. He also bestowed laws and commandments of salvation and showed them. He himself also is present to all who seek, *and is near to all who call upon him*[^17]. Therefore to will *antecedently* to save a man is to be ordered toward making salvation and to not fail him who wills to attain [it]. Hence to will antecedently to save does not connote salvation, but orderability toward salvation. But to will *consequently* or absolutely to save is to will to give salvation to him whom [God] foreknows will reach salvation through his own help and grace, and it connotes *the event of salvation*. And thus it is not to be said that God wills all men to be saved.

To this reply the masters give greater consent, although both [replies] are good. According to this [reply], therefore, it must be said that God wills all men to be saved, so far as in himself, or by *antecedent* will, but not by *absolute* or *consequent* will.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3, 4.* And because [the antecedent will] does not connote the effects alone, it is not therefore hindered by the fact that not all are saved. — The reply is also plain to that which is objected concerning *predestination* or *election*, because in these the absolute will is included, not only the antecedent. — The reply is also plain to the last [objection], concerning the connotation.

To that which is *objected*, that *conditioned* will does not fall in God, it must be said that velleity is not posited in God as regards a defect[^18] of the fullness of will, nor on account of diverse modes of willing, but on account of another relation in connoting; and thus this [objection] is clear.

**Replies to the arguments on the contrary:**

*Ad 1, 2.* As to the reasonings on the contrary side — that God wills all men to be saved — it can be answered to the first two that they conclude both truly and rightly.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected concerning the charity of men, it must be said that the case is not similar, since we do not know the future merits of men finally; and if anyone did know that some were foreknown [as reprobate], although, so far as in himself, he ought to will them to be saved, yet not by absolute will. But these matters will be made clearer below[^19].

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that God relates to all in one way; it must be said that this saying of the Philosopher has place as regards the *governance* of things, not as regards their *production*; or as regards natural things, not as regards things of grace.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 29. Textum originalem vide supra pag. 728, nota 2. — Circa finem argumenti Vat. sic: *irrefragibiliter, vult voluntate beneplaciti, vult ergo omnes* etc.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 29. See the original text above, p. 728, note 2. — Near the end of the argument the Vatican [edition reads] thus: *irrefragibiliter, vult voluntate beneplaciti, vult ergo omnes* etc.

la: Vat. et cod. cc adiiciunt *et caritatem*.

en: The Vatican edition and codex cc add *et caritatem* ("and charity").

la: Intellige auctorem libri *de Causis*, cuius verba iam supra pag. 646, nota 1. allata sunt. Cfr. etiam propos. 20, in qua docetur, causam primam stando in sua unitate regere omnia. — Vat. post *primum* adiungit *ens*, scilicet Deus.

en: Understand [him to mean] the author of the book *On Causes*, whose words have already been adduced above p. 646, note 1. Cf. also proposition 20, in which it is taught that the first cause, standing in its unity, governs all things. — The Vatican [edition] after *primum* adds *ens*, namely God.

la: Hic c. 1. — Mox pro *salvos fieri* Vat. cum cod. cc *salvari*.

en: Here c. 1. — Shortly afterward, for *salvos fieri* the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *salvari* ("to be saved").

la: Vers. 14. — De propos. minori, quae praecedit, cfr. supra d. 40. a. 3. q. I. seq.

en: Verse 14. — On the preceding minor proposition, cf. above d. 40 a. 3 q. 1 and following.

la: Vide supra d. 40. a. 1. q. I. ad 5, et ibid. q. 2.

en: See above d. 40 a. 1 q. 1 ad 5, and the same q. 2.

la: Rom. 8, 29. — Mox post *omnes* in cod. V additur *salvos fieri*, in cod. W *homines*.

en: Rom. 8:29. — Shortly afterward, after *omnes* codex V adds *salvos fieri*, and codex W [adds] *homines*.

la: Vel aliis verbis: ideo necesse est, quod vel signum distributivum *omnes* distinguendo accipiamus in sensu congruo vel verbum *vult* distinguamus, prout scil. significare potest aut voluntatem antecedentem, aut consequentem.

en: Or in other words: therefore it is necessary that either we take the distributive sign *omnes* ("all"), in distinguishing, in a congruent sense, or we distinguish the verb *vult* ("wills"), inasmuch as it can signify either antecedent or consequent will.

la: Cap. 103. n. 27. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo post pro *accommoda* Vat. *accommodata*. De distributione accommoda cfr. supra pag. 817, nota 3.

en: Chapter 103, n. 27. See here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little afterward, for *accommoda* the Vatican [reads] *accommodata*. On accommodated distribution, cf. above p. 817, note 3.

la: Libr. de Natura et gratia contra Pelagium, c. 41. n. 48: « Itaque omnes dictum est, ne aliquo modo alio praeter ipsum quisquam salvus fieri posse credatur. Sicut enim, uno litterarum magistro in civitate constituto, rectissime dicimus: omnes iste hic litteras docet; non quia omnes cives litteras discunt, sed quia nemo discit, nisi quem ille docuerit: sic nemo iustificatur, nisi quem iustificaverit Christus ». Idem exemplum habetur in libro II. Oper. imperf. contra Iulian., sent. 134, his verbis: *Sicut dicimus de litterarum magistro, si in civitate solus est: omnes iste hic litteras docet; non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab ipso.*

en: Book *On Nature and Grace against Pelagius*, c. 41 n. 48: « And so *all* was said, lest it should be believed that anyone in any other way besides him himself could be saved. For just as, with one master of letters appointed in a city, we most rightly say: this one teaches all here their letters; not because all the citizens learn letters, but because no one learns except him whom he has taught: so no one is justified except him whom Christ has justified ». The same example is found in book II *Opus imperfectum against Julian*, sent. 134, in these words: *As we say of a master of letters, if he is the only one in the city: this one teaches all here their letters; not because all learn, but because [none does] except by him.*

la: August., Enchir., c. 103. n. 27, ubi etiam quae hic sequuntur quoad sensum inveniuntur. Eandem distinctionem, ac hic, August. facit in libro IV. Oper. imperf. contra Iulian., sent. 124: *Quomodo miseretur omnium Deus, cum alia Scriptura dicat: Non miserearis omnium qui operantur iniquitatem (Ps. 58, 6.), nisi quia et illis in quorum non miseretur, omnes homines ita sunt, ut omnia genera hominum intelligantur, sicut dictum est: Decimatis omne olus (Luc. 11, 42.) i. e. omne oleris genus?* — Paulo inferius post *potest fieri* supple cum codd. M Z ff et ed. 1 *distributio*; pro *potest fieri* cod. H *potest distribuere*; Vat. sic: *secundum omnem modum distribuendi, quae potest fieri pro* etc.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 103 n. 27, where also what follows here is found as to the sense. The same distinction as here, Augustine makes in book IV *Opus imperfectum against Julian*, sent. 124: *How does God have mercy on all, when another Scripture says: Have no mercy on all who work iniquity (Ps. 58:6), unless because also of those on whom he does not have mercy, all men are so [described] that all kinds of men should be understood — as it has been said: You tithe every herb (Luke 11:42), i.e. every kind of herb?* — A little below, after *potest fieri* supply with codices M Z ff and edition 1 *distributio*; for *potest fieri* codex H [reads] *potest distribuere*; the Vatican [reads] thus: *secundum omnem modum distribuendi, quae potest fieri pro* etc.

la: Epist. 1. Tim. 2, 1. seq. — Sententiam Magistri vide hic in lit. c. 2.

en: Epistle 1 Tim. 2:1ff. — See the opinion of the Master here in the text, c. 2.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 29. Verba ipsa Damasceni vide supra pag. 728, nota 2.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 29. See the words of Damascene themselves above, p. 728, note 2.

la: Pro *ordinabilitas*, quam lectionem codd. P Q T (H in marg.) exhibent, Vat. *ordinatis*, omissa voce *hominibus*, quae in omnibus codd. exstat. Mox post *Dedit enim* eadem Vat. inserit *eis*, et dein pro *ipsum*, quod a plurimis codd. et ed. 1 incongrue omittitur, substituit *eum*, pro quo cod. T (in secunda manu) *Deum*; primitus in cod. T legebatur *ipsum*.

en: For *ordinabilitas* — which reading codices P Q T (H in margin) exhibit — the Vatican [reads] *ordinatis*, with the word *hominibus* omitted, which is present in all the codices. Shortly after *Dedit enim* the same Vatican [edition] inserts *eis*, and then for *ipsum* — which is incongruously omitted by very many codices and edition 1 — substitutes *eum*, for which codex T (in a second hand) [reads] *Deum*; originally in codex T was read *ipsum*.

la: Pro *defectum* multi codd. cum sex primis edd. *effectum*; pro *defectum* militat cod. T. Proxime ante pro *velleitas* codd. A I W *voluntas*.

en: For *defectum* many codices with the first six editions [read] *effectum*; for *defectum* codex T contends. Just before, for *velleitas* codices A I W [read] *voluntas*.

en: Distinction 48 a. 2 q. 1 and 2, and dubium 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Magister in hac distinctione non parum laborat, ut sustineat, voluntatem divinam *numquam fieri cassam*, nec si vult bonum, nec si non vult malum. Imprimis nititur explicare verba Apostoli (I. Tim. 2, 4): *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri* etc. Unde incidit hic quaestio, utrum Deus vere velit salutem omnium hominum; cum qua intime connexae sunt duae aliae quaestiones; utrum Christus mortuus sit pro omnibus hominibus, et utrum Deus conferat vel saltem offerat omnibus hominibus media sufficientia ad salutem. — Notum est, Cornelium Iansenium, Calvini vestigia secutum, ad has tres quaestiones pro statu naturae lapsae respondere negative; item, ab Innocentio X. (Constit. « Cum occasione », 31 Maii 1653) damnatam esse propositionem Iansenii: « Semipelagianum est dicere, Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse ». Cfr. etiam inter propositiones Paschasii Quesnelli, a Clemente XI. (Constit. « Unigenitus », 8 Sept. 1713) damnatas, propos. 30. et

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32. — Contra istos errores S. Bonav. docuit, quod Christus mortuus sit pro omnibus, III. *Sent.* d. 20. q. 4. in corp. 1; IV. *Sent.* d. 4. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. ad 3; — item, quod sufficientia auxilia modis diversis offerat omnibus, II. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4; q. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Quoad parvulos sine baptismo morientes cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 32. a. 3. q. 2.

**II.** Quoad expositionem illius testimonii Apostoli: *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri*, notandum, quod cum Pelagiani et Semipelagiani hoc dicto abuterentur ad errores suos confirmandos, S. Augustinus plures interpretationes excogitavit, quibus intelligi terminum *omnes* cum *restrictione*, et terminus positus in sensu voluntatis *consequentis* (id est voluntatis *absolutae et efficacis* respectu salutis). Ita etiam Magister hunc locum interpretatur, atque S. Bonav. aliique antiqui magistri has conclusiones ut bonas et probabiles referunt; sed aliam planiorem iuxta Damasceni, hic propositam, praeferre videntur, ut explicite (hic q. unica, n. 3.) dicit: « Tamen multo melius posset exponi de voluntate antecedenti ». Ipse S. August. (de Spiritu et littera c. 33, et de Catechiz. Rudibus c. 26.) expositionem iuxta voluntatem antecedentem satis indicat. Nostra aetate uniter docetur, divinam voluntatem salvandi omnes spectare ad voluntatem *antecedentem*, sed praedestinationem et reprobationem ad voluntatem *consequentem*.

**III.** Circa hanc distinctionem *antecedentis* et *consequentis* voluntatis diversae propugnatae sunt sententiae. Apud Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. I. q. 36. m. 2.) primo loco ponitur, quod voluntas antecedens salvandi omnes non sit voluntas *beneplaciti*, sed voluntas *signi*; quae sententia etiam posterioribus theologis placuit, sed ab Alexandro, a Bonaventura, S. Thoma (de Verit. q. 23. a. 3, et I. *Sent.* d. 19. a. 2.) aliisque communiter reprobatur. — Omissis aliis huius distinctionis explicationibus, nunc communiter voluntatem *antecedentem* in Deo attingere obiectum *in nudis circumstantiis*, *consequentem* vero obiectum *circumstantiis omnibus vestitum* (vide explicationem S. Thomae, S. [I.] q. 19. a. 1. ad 1.). In ulteriore harum circumstantiarum determinatione theologi in diversas sententias abeunt. Qui praedestinationem post praevisa merita defendunt, putant, praevisionem consensus humanae voluntatis praecedere Dei voluntatem *consequentem*. Opposita autem sententia Thomistarum vult, quod utraque voluntas, et *antecedens* et *consequens*, antecedit praevisionem meritorum, et quod voluntas antecedens praeparat omnibus auxilia et media sufficientia, *consequens* vero tantum electis auxilia efficacia (Gotti, l. tr. 5. dub. 4. § 2.).

**IV.** Nobis sufficiat in conspectu ponere quae S. Bonav. hoc loco et infra d. 47. q. 1. docet de hac distinctione. Haec valde conveniunt cum iis, quae S. Thom. habet in suo Commentario in *Sent.* (hic q. unica, a. 1.). [In ulteriore harum circumstantiarum determinatione theologi in diversas sententias abeunt secundum applicationem S. Thomae (S. I. q. 19. a. 1. ad 1.).]

1. Haec distinctio attenditur non ex parte ipsius voluntatis divinae, sed ex parte *volitorum*. « Differentia autem inter hanc voluntatem et illam non est secundum diversitatem affectionis sive modi volendi... sed secundum rationem connotandi et intelligendi » (hic in corp.); S. Thom. (loc. cit. in corp.): « Hoc contingit non ex aliqua diversitate *voluntatis* divinae, sed propter diversas conditiones *ipsius* voliti ».

2. In voluntate *antecedenti* « connotatur in omnibus ordinabilitas ad salutem, tum ex parte naturae datae, tum ex parte gratiae oblatae » etc. (S. Bonav. ibid.). S. Thom. (ibid.): « In illius voluntatis (antecedentis) *effectus* est ipse ordo naturae in finem salutis et promoventia in finem, omnibus communiter proposita, tum naturalia quam gratuita, sicut potentiae naturales et praecepta legis, et huiusmodi ».

3. Unde voluntas *antecedens* non est *pura velleitas*, sed quoad effectum suum *proprium* (scil. *ordinabilitatem* ad salutem et media sufficientia) est semper *efficax*. Explicite hoc declarat (infra d. 47. q. 1. in corp.): « Unde voluntas (antecedens) non cassatur, quia habet proprium effectum ».

4. Voluntas *consequens* connotat « *salutis eventum* » (hic in corp.), et sicut « connotat *effectum*, ita connotat *existentiam causae particularis* »; « connotat *causam creatam concurrere* » (d. 47. q. 1. ad 2.). S. Thom. (ibid.) notat in voluntate consequenti hanc circumstantiam, quod homo « est volens et praeparans se ad salutem suam, vel etiam repugnans et contrarie agens ».

5. In voluntate *consequenti* implicatur *praescientia salutis*, quia est « velle dare salutem ei, quem praescit ad salutem perventurum per suum auxilium et gratiam » (hic). « Numquam enim vellet (istum salvari), nisi pariter praesciret, eum esse salvandum » (d. 47. q. 1.).

6. Implicatur in eadem voluntate *consequenti* etiam *praescientia bonorum operum*. « Voluntas autem consequens est voluntas, non quae sequitur merita, sed quae vult aliqua secundum praescientiam meritorum ». « Voluntas Dei secundum convenientiam ad praescientiam vult illa quae vult » (d. 47. q. 1. ad 4.). Similiter S. Thom. (loc. cit. in hac corp.): « Dicitur voluntas consequens, eo quod praesupponit praescientiam operum, non tanquam causam *voluntatis*, sed quasi rationem *voliti* ». — De praescientia meritorum, quatenus esse possit ratio motiva voluntatis, S. Bonaventuram paulo aliter loqui ac S. Thom., iam supra d. 41. a. q. I. 2. observavimus.

**V.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 2. ad 1. — Scot., hic q. unica ad 1. — S. Thom., locc. citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, d. 40. a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 3. a. 2. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. unica. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., ex parte q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Master in this distinction labors not a little to maintain that the divine will *never becomes void*, neither when it wills good, nor when it does not will evil. First of all, he strives to explain the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:4): *Who wills all men to be saved* etc. Hence falls here the question, whether God truly wills the salvation of all men; with which two other questions are intimately connected: whether Christ died for all men, and whether God confers or at least offers to all men sufficient means for salvation. — It is known that Cornelius Jansen, following in Calvin's footsteps, answered these three questions in the negative for the state of fallen nature; likewise, that by Innocent X (Constitution « Cum occasione », 31 May 1653) the proposition of Jansen was condemned: « It is semipelagian to say that Christ died or shed his blood for all men absolutely ». Cf. also among the propositions of Paschasius Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI (Constitution « Unigenitus », 8 Sept. 1713), propositions 30 and

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32. — Against these errors St. Bonaventure taught that Christ died for all, III *Sent.* d. 20 q. 4 in corp. 1; IV *Sent.* d. 4 p. I a. 1 q. 3 ad 3; — likewise, that sufficient helps are offered to all in various ways, II *Sent.* d. 28 a. 1 q. 3 ad 4; q. 2 q. 1 ad 1. — As to little ones dying without baptism, cf. II *Sent.* d. 32 a. 3 q. 2.

**II.** As to the exposition of that testimony of the Apostle, *Who wills all men to be saved*, it must be noted that since the Pelagians and Semipelagians abused this saying to confirm their errors, St. Augustine thought out several interpretations by which the term *all* may be understood with a *restriction*, and the term [is to be] taken in the sense of the *consequent* will (that is, of the *absolute and efficacious* will with respect to salvation). The Master too interprets this place in this way, and St. Bonaventure and other ancient masters report these conclusions as good and probable; but they seem to prefer another plainer one according to Damascene, here proposed, as he says explicitly (here q. unica, n. 3): « Yet it could be far better expounded of the antecedent will ». St. Augustine himself (*On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 33, and *On Catechizing the Uninstructed* c. 26) sufficiently indicates the exposition according to the antecedent will. In our age it is uniformly taught that the divine will of saving all pertains to the *antecedent* will, but predestination and reprobation to the *consequent* will.

**III.** Concerning this distinction of *antecedent* and *consequent* will, diverse opinions have been advanced. In Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I q. 36 m. 2) it is first proposed that the antecedent will of saving all is not the will of *good-pleasure*, but the will of *sign*; which opinion also pleased later theologians, but is commonly rejected by Alexander, by Bonaventure, by St. Thomas (*de Verit.* q. 23 a. 3, and I *Sent.* d. 19 a. 2), and others. — Other explanations of this distinction being passed over, it is now commonly [held] that the *antecedent* will in God attains its object *in bare circumstances*, the *consequent* will, however, the object *clothed with all [its] circumstances* (see St. Thomas's explanation, *Summa* [I] q. 19 a. 1 ad 1). In the further determination of these circumstances theologians depart into different opinions. Those who defend predestination after foreseen merits hold that the foreseeing of the consent of the human will precedes God's *consequent* will. The opposite opinion, of the Thomists, holds that both wills — both *antecedent* and *consequent* — precede the foreseeing of merits, and that the antecedent will prepares for all sufficient helps and means, the *consequent* will only for the elect efficacious helps (Gotti, l. tr. 5 dub. 4 § 2).

**IV.** Let it suffice for us to set forth here what St. Bonaventure teaches in this place and below at d. 47 q. 1 concerning this distinction. These [points] agree very much with what St. Thomas has in his Commentary on the *Sentences* (here q. unica, a. 1). [In the further determination of these circumstances theologians depart into diverse opinions according to St. Thomas's application (*Summa* I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1).]

1. This distinction is considered not on the side of the divine will itself, but on the side of the *willed things*. « But the difference between this will and that is not according to a diversity of affection or of mode of willing... but according to a ground of connoting and understanding » (here in corp.); St. Thomas (loc. cit. in corp.): « This happens not from any diversity of God's *will*, but on account of diverse conditions of *the willed thing itself* ».

2. In the *antecedent* will « there is connoted in all [men] an orderability toward salvation, both on the side of given nature, and on the side of grace offered » etc. (St. Bonav., ibid.). St. Thomas (ibid.): « The *effect* of this (antecedent) will is the very ordering of nature toward the end of salvation and [the things] promoting toward the end, commonly proposed to all — both natural and gratuitous — such as the natural powers and the precepts of the law, and the like ».

3. Hence the *antecedent* will is not *pure velleity*, but as to its *proper* effect (namely, *orderability* toward salvation and sufficient means) is always *efficacious*. He declares this explicitly (below d. 47 q. 1 in corp.): « Hence the (antecedent) will is not rendered void, since it has its proper effect ».

4. The *consequent* will connotes « *the event of salvation* » (here in corp.), and just as « it connotes the *effect*, so also it connotes the *existence of the particular cause* »; « it connotes that the *created cause concurs* » (d. 47 q. 1 ad 2). St. Thomas (ibid.) notes in the consequent will this circumstance, that man « is willing and preparing himself for his salvation, or also resisting and acting contrarily ».

5. In the *consequent* will *foreknowledge of salvation* is implied, since it is « to will to give salvation to him whom he foreknows will reach salvation through his own help and grace » (here). « For he would never will (this one to be saved), unless he equally foreknew him to be one who would be saved » (d. 47 q. 1).

6. There is also implied in the same *consequent* will the *foreknowledge of good works*. « The consequent will is, however, the will, not which follows merits, but which wills certain things according to the foreknowledge of merits ». « God's will according to its congruity with foreknowledge wills those things which it wills » (d. 47 q. 1 ad 4). Similarly St. Thomas (loc. cit. in this corp.): « It is called the consequent will, in that it presupposes the foreknowledge of works, not as a cause of the *will*, but as a kind of ground of the *willed thing* ». — Concerning foreknowledge of merits, inasmuch as it can be a motive ground of the will, we have already observed above (d. 41 a. q. 1. 2) that St. Bonaventure speaks somewhat differently from St. Thomas.

**V.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 36 m. 2 ad 1. — Scot., here q. unica ad 1. — S. Thom., locc. citt. — B. Albert, here a. 1, d. 40 a. 8; *Summa* p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 3 a. 2 q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1 princ. q. unica. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., ex parte q. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum Deus velit mala fieri
Whether God wills that evils come about

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus velit mala fieri.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus velit mala fieri. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Per Anselmum[^1]: Deus non vult, inquit, quod impossibile est fieri; ergo per *consequentiam e converso*, quod possibile est fieri, Deus vult illud; sed malum possibile est fieri: ergo malum fieri est Deo volibile.

2. Item, omnis iustus vult omne quod iustitiae

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est; sed « omnis poena iusta est », ut dicit Augustinus[^2], et omne malum poena: ergo omne malum, quod fit, a Deo est volitum fieri. Quod omne malum sit poena, patet per Augustinum primo *Confessionum*: « Iussisti, inquit, Domine, et sic est, quod omnis inordinatus animus sibi sit poena ».

3. Item, duobus oppositis propositis, inter quae non est medium, necesse est, alterum esse a Deo scitum: ergo pari ratione necesse est, alterum esse volitum. Sed demonstrato peccante, istum peccare, istum non peccare sunt opposita: ergo Deus vult alterum. Sed quidquid vult Deus, illud fit: ergo si vult istum non peccare, iste non peccat, quod est contra hypothesim[^3]: vult ergo istum peccare. Sed hoc est malum: ergo malum fieri est a Deo volitum.

4. Item, omne volens aliquid voluntate consiliata et deliberata vult[^4] illud, sine quo illud non potest esse — quamvis enim aliquis velit esse abbas, sed non monachus, tamen, si deliberative velit esse abbas, vult pariter esse monachus — sed Deus vult aliquod bonum; quod nunquam potest esse sine malo, sicut Sanctos suos probari et pati Filium suum: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Nihil est ab aliquo volitum vel volibile, quod omnino displicet ei et est odiosum; sed Ecclesiastici duodecimo[^5] dicitur: *Altissimus odio habet peccatores*; sed non nisi ratione peccati sive mali: ergo multo magis odit malum: ergo non vult illud fieri.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^6]: « Idem est fieri Deo volente et Deo auctore »; sed malum non fit Deo auctore: ergo malum non fit Deo volente. Primam supponit ipse, secundam probat, quia « nullo homine sapiente fit homo deterior »: ergo multo fortius nec Deo.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omnis voluntas aut denominatur a volito, aut denominat volitum[^7]. Si ergo Deus vult malum, aut voluntas est mala, aut, si voluntas est bona, volitum est bonum: ergo aut nihil est malum, aut Deus est malus, si vult malum fieri. Sed utrumque falsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis volens malum vult sub ratione apparentis boni[^8], ergo omnis volens malum decipitur: ergo si Deus vult fieri mala, Deus decipitur; quod est impossibile.

5. Item, omnis qui vult aliquid, quod non potest, est miser; sed Deus non potest malum, sicut supra probatum est[^9]: ergo si vult illud, est miser. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Malum nec est a Deo volibile, nec Deus vult illud fieri ab aliis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut probant ultimae rationes, malum non est a Deo *volibile*, malum inquam culpae, quia omnis voluntas inordinata est, cui placet illud malum: et hoc omnes concedunt.

Sed tamen aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod Deus vult malum fieri, cum ipse non sit causa eius, sed alius, Deo volente. Et hoc quidem dicebant Deum velle non ratione sui, sed ratione eius, quod inde elicit. — Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, sicut ostendit Magister in littera[^10], qui hanc opinionem improbat. Ideo neutrum est concedendum; sed si alicubi legitur, exponendum.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus non vult quod impossibile est fieri; dicendum, quod *non velle* dicitur dupliciter, aut negative, aut privative. Si negative, non est verum illud, nec Anselmus ita intelligit. Si privative, tunc *non vult* est una dictio, et est tertia persona eius[^11]

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quod est *nolo*; et hoc modo dicitur Deus nolle, quod absolute vult non fieri. Hoc autem modo non est dicere, quod Deus nolit mala fieri; et hoc modo non tenet *consequentia e contrario*, quia non tenet in contrariis, sed in contradictoriis[^12].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quilibet iustus vult iustitiam etc.; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur iustum dupliciter, *in se* scilicet et *ex ordine*. Quod iustum est *in se*, secundum id quod est, a Deo est volitum. Quod vero est iustum *ex ordine*[^13] est volitum a Deo, secundum quod ordinatum; et malum non est volitum, secundum quod *malum*, sed secundum quod *punit*, et ita secundum quod *ordinatum*, et ita, secundum id quod *est*, non est volitum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod duobus oppositis propositis, necesse est alterum scire, ergo necesse est alterum velle; dicendum, quod loquendo de voluntate beneplaciti non est simile. Nam *scientia* est respectu omnium quae fiunt, *voluntas* autem beneplaciti non est nisi respectu eorum quae sunt ab ipso[^14].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui vult aliquid, vult omne illi annexum; dicendum, quod *velle aliquid sine alio* est dupliciter: aut voluntate *antecedente*, aut voluntate *consequente*. Quod vult aliquis voluntate antecedente, vult omne annexum illi necessario. Quod vero vult voluntate consequente, potest etiam velle sine annexo. Potest enim ex malo bonum elici, quod non eliceretur, nisi factum illud malum displiceret, et bonum elicitum complaceret ei qui novit elicere. — Potest tamen responderi per *interemptionem*[^15], quod volens voluntate consiliata vult aliquid, non tamen vult illud quod consequitur; sicut aliquis vult aliquem surgere, sed tamen non vult eum cecidisse.

Tamen potest aliter dici et melius, quod *velle aliquid sine alio* est dupliciter: aut velle hoc et non velle aliud, quia unum placet et aliud displicet; et sic possibile est in his quae inseparabiliter sunt coniuncta. Alio modo *velle aliquid sine alio* est dicere velle, aliquid sine illo esse; et hoc modo velle aliquid sine inseparabiliter annexo est velle impossibile. Primo modo non sequitur, quod velit illud, quamvis non sine illo. Sensus enim est, non sine illo *ente*, sed tamen sine illo *volito*. Et est exemplum sensibile: volo enim aliquem, qui cecidit, surgere, ita quod non volo, eum cecidisse; non tamen volo, quod surgat, ita quod non ceciderit.

english:
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### Question II. *Whether God wills that evils come about.*

Secondly, it is asked whether God wills that evils come about. And that he does, is shown as follows:

1. From Anselm[^1]: God, he says, does not will what is impossible to come about; therefore by *consequence by conversion*, what is possible to come about, God wills it; but evil is possible to come about: therefore that evil come about is willable by God.

2. Likewise, every just [agent] wills everything which belongs to justice;

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but « every punishment is just », as Augustine says[^2], and every evil is a punishment: therefore every evil that comes about is willed by God to come about. That every evil is a punishment is clear from Augustine in *Confessions* I: « You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered mind should be a punishment to itself ».

3. Likewise, given two opposed [propositions], between which there is no middle, it is necessary that the one be known by God: therefore by parallel reasoning it is necessary that the one be willed [by him]. But, given the case of a sinner, *that he sins* and *that he does not sin* are opposites: therefore God wills the one. But whatever God wills, that comes to pass: therefore if he wills that this man not sin, this man does not sin, which is contrary to the hypothesis[^3]: therefore he wills that this man sin. But this is evil: therefore that evil come about is willed by God.

4. Likewise, every agent willing something by a deliberated and counseled will[^4] wills that thing without which it cannot come about — for although someone may will to be an abbot, but not a monk, yet, if he deliberatively wills to be an abbot, he equally wills to be a monk — but God wills some good which can never come about without an evil, as he wills his saints to be tested and his Son to suffer: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Nothing is willed or willable by anyone which altogether displeases him and is hateful [to him]; but in *Ecclesiasticus* twelve[^5] it is said: *The Most High hates sinners*; but [he hates them] only by reason of [their] sin or evil: therefore much more does he hate the evil [itself]: therefore he does not will it to come about.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of *Eighty-three Questions*[^6]: « It is the same [thing] to come to pass with God willing [it] and with God [as its] author »; but evil does not come about with God [as its] author: therefore evil does not come about with God willing [it]. He himself supposes the first [proposition]; the second he proves, because « no man is made worse by a wise man »: therefore much more strongly [is no one made worse] by God.

3. Likewise, [the matter] appears from reason: because every will either is denominated from the willed [object], or denominates the willed [object][^7]. If therefore God wills evil, either the will is evil, or, if the will is good, the willed [object] is good: therefore either nothing is evil, or God is evil, if he wills that evil come about. But both [conclusions] are false: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, everyone willing evil wills [it] under the aspect of an apparent good[^8]; therefore everyone willing evil is deceived: therefore if God wills that evils come about, God is deceived; which is impossible.

5. Likewise, everyone who wills something which he cannot [bring about] is miserable; but God cannot do evil, as has been proved above[^9]: therefore if he wills it, he is miserable. But this is impossible: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Evil is neither willable by God, nor does God will that it come about [as caused] by others.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the last arguments prove, evil is not *willable* by God — evil, I mean, of fault [*malum culpae*] — because every will is disordered to which that evil is pleasing: and this all concede.

Yet some have wished to say that God wills that evil come about, while he himself is not its cause, but another [is], with God willing [it]. And this indeed they said, that God wills [it] not by reason of itself, but by reason of that which he elicits from it. — But this is against Augustine, as the Master shows in his text[^10], who refutes this opinion. Therefore neither [way of speaking] is to be conceded; but if anywhere [such language] is read, it must be explained [away].

*Ad 1.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary side — that God does not will what is impossible to come about: it must be said that *not to will* is spoken of in two ways, either negatively or privatively. If negatively, that [proposition] is not true, nor does Anselm so understand [it]. If privatively, then *non vult* ['does not will'] is a single expression, and is the third person of [the verb] that[^11]

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is *nolo* ['I am unwilling']; and in this way God is said to be unwilling [for] that which he absolutely wills not to come about. But in this way one cannot say that God is unwilling [for] evils to come about; and in this way the *consequence by contrariety* does not hold, because it does not hold in contraries, but only in contradictories[^12].

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected — that every just [agent] wills justice etc.: it must be said that something is called just in two ways, namely *in itself* and *from [its] order*. What is just *in itself*, according to what it is, is willed by God. But what is just *from [its] order*[^13] is willed by God insofar as it is ordered; and evil is not willed insofar as it is *evil*, but insofar as it *punishes*, and so insofar as it is *ordered*, and so, according to what it *is*, is not willed.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected — that given two opposed [propositions], it is necessary to know the one, therefore it is necessary to will the one: it must be said that, speaking of the will of [divine] good-pleasure, the case is not parallel. For *knowledge* is with respect to all things that come about, but the will of good-pleasure is only with respect to those things which are from him[^14].

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected — that he who wills something wills everything joined to it: it must be said that *to will something without another* [is taken] in two ways, either by an *antecedent* will, or by a *consequent* will. What one wills by an antecedent will, he necessarily wills everything joined to it. But what one wills by a consequent will, he can also will without [its] adjunct. For from an evil a good can be elicited, which would not be elicited unless that evil deed displeased [him], and the elicited good pleased him who knows how to elicit [it]. — Yet a reply can also be given by *interception*[^15]: that one willing by a counseled will wills something, but does not however will that which follows upon it; just as someone wills another to rise, but yet does not will that he should have fallen.

Yet it can be said otherwise and better: that *to will something without another* is twofold: either to will this and not to will the other, because the one pleases and the other displeases; and this is possible in those things which are inseparably joined. In another way, *to will something without another* is to say [that one wills] something to be without it; and in this way, to will something without [its] inseparably-joined [adjunct] is to will the impossible. In the first way it does not follow that he wills it, although [he does not will it] not without [the other]. For the sense is, *not without that [other] existing*, but yet *without that [other] being willed*. And there is a perceptible example: I will that someone who has fallen rise up, in such a way that I do not will that he had fallen; not, however, do I will that he rise up in such a way that he had not fallen.

la: Haec sententia desumta et formata videtur ex II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 18: « Nihil enim est necessarium aut impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita vult; ipsum vero aut velle aut nolle aliquid propter necessitatem aut impossibilitatem, alienum est a veritate ». In quo textu propositio Anselmi a S. Doctore hic allata necessario supponitur, quia impossibilitas rerum nullam necessitatem sive coactionem voluntati Dei imponere demonstratur. — Verba *per consequentiam e converso* sive *e contrario*, ut in ed. 1 et etiam infra in solut. huius obiect. habetur, occurrunt in Aristot., II. *Topic.* c. 3 (c. 8). Et est notandum, quod haec consequentia comprehenditur sub *consequentia oppositorum*, quae in eo generatim differt a *consequentia simplici*, quod ipsa est inter talia, quorum unum sequitur aliud et vice versa. Et duplex est haec consequentia: *consequentia in ipso* (εἰς ταὐτό), et *e contrario* (ἀντίστροφος) — directo et inverso ordine — prout vel eodem ordine terminorum oppositum infertur, vel non eodem ordine, sed ordine inverso. *Consequentia in ipso* invenitur tantum in convertibilibus, v. g. si *homo est, risibile est*; sed non est homo: ergo non est risibile. Exemplum *consequentiae e contrario*: si homo est, animal est; sed animal non est: ergo nec homo est. Ut brevius loquamur: *consequentia in ipso* est, quando ex proposito infertur oppositum praedicati de opposito subiecti; *consequentia e contrario*, quando ex proposito infertur oppositum subiecti de opposito praedicati. De *consequentia e contrario* Aristot., loc. cit., nec non S. Bonav. infra in solut. huius obiect. docent, quod valeat in contradictoriis, sed non in contrariis, saltem non in omnibus.

en: This sentence seems to be drawn and shaped from *Cur Deus Homo* II c. 18: « For nothing is necessary or impossible except because he so wills [it]; but for him to will or not-will something on account of necessity or impossibility is foreign to the truth ». In which text the proposition of Anselm here adduced by the Holy Doctor is necessarily presupposed, since it is shown that the impossibility of things imposes no necessity or coercion on the will of God. — The words *per consequentiam e converso* or *e contrario* — as is found in ed. 1 and also below in the solution of this objection — occur in Aristotle, *Topics* II c. 3 (c. 8). And it is to be noted that this consequence is comprised under *consequentia oppositorum*, which differs in general from *consequentia simplex* in that it is between things one of which follows the other and vice versa. And this consequence is twofold: *consequentia in ipso* (εἰς ταὐτό) and *e contrario* (ἀντίστροφος) — in direct and in inverted order — according as either the opposite is inferred in the same order of terms, or not in the same order but in the inverted order. *Consequentia in ipso* is found only in convertible [propositions], e.g. *if man is, capable-of-laughter is*; but he is not man: therefore he is not capable-of-laughter. An example of *consequentia e contrario*: if man is, animal is; but animal is not: therefore man is not. To speak more briefly: *consequentia in ipso* is when from a proposition is inferred the opposite of the predicate of the opposite subject; *consequentia e contrario* is when from a proposition is inferred the opposite of the subject of the opposite predicate. On the *consequentia e contrario* Aristotle, loc. cit., and also St. Bonaventure below in the solution of this objection teach that it holds in contradictories, but not in contraries, at least not in all.

la: Libr. I. *Retract.* c. 26, et III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 18, n. 51. — Textus mox e primo libro *Confess.* citatus habetur ibi c. 12, n. 19, ubi in edit. Oper. S. August. post *poena* additur *sua*. In textu cit. pro *inordinatus animus* codd. cum ed. 1 *motus inordinatus*. In propos. maiori huius argum. pro *quod iustitiae est* Vat. *quod iustum est*.

en: Book I *Retractations* c. 26, and *On Free Choice* III c. 18, n. 51. — The text soon afterward cited from the first book of the *Confessions* is found there at c. 12, n. 19, where in the edition of Augustine's works *sua* is added after *poena*. In the cited text, for *inordinatus animus* the codices with ed. 1 read *motus inordinatus*. In the major premise of this argument, for *quod iustitiae est* the Vatican edition reads *quod iustum est*.

la: Pro *hypothesim* Vat. *positionem*.

en: For *hypothesim* the Vatican edition reads *positionem*.

la: Post *vult* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. subiicit *omne*, et in fine argumenti cum multis codd. et ed. 1 verbo *Filium* praemittit *et*.

en: After *vult* the Vatican edition with one or another codex adds *omne*, and at the end of the argument, with many codices and ed. 1, prefixes *et* to the word *Filium*.

la: Vers. 3.

en: Verse 3.

la: Quaest. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: Question 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.

la: Obiectum voluntatis sive volitum est *bonum*; hinc voluntas aut denominatur a volito bona, in quantum scil. vult aliquid, quod in se bonum est; sic est respectu voluntatis creatae; aut ipsa denominat volitum, in quantum scil. bonitas voluntatis obiecto tribuit bonitatem; sic est respectu voluntatis divinae.

en: The object of the will, or that-which-is-willed, is *good*; hence the will is either denominated good from the willed, namely insofar as it wills something which is in itself good — and so it is with respect to a created will; or it itself denominates the willed [as good], namely insofar as the goodness of the will confers goodness on its object — and so it is with respect to the divine will.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 804, nota 6. De propositione subsequenti cfr. Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 1 et 5, ubi docetur, omnem malum esse ignorantem. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 4, § 32, ostendit, malum esse per accidens, cum propter bonum fiat. « Quam ob rem quod non bonum, bonum arbitramur », i. e. decipimur. — Mox pro *mala* cod. T *malum*.

en: Cf. above p. 804, note 6. On the subsequent proposition cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* III c. 1 and 5, where it is taught that every evil [agent] is ignorant. Pseudo-Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 32, shows that evil is *per accidens*, since it comes about on account of a good. « On which account we judge to be good that which is not good », i.e. we are deceived. — Soon, for *mala* codex T [reads] *malum*.

la: Dist. 42, q. 2. Quoad propos. maiorem argumenti afferimus dictum August. *de Beata Vita*, n. 11: *Omnis igitur, inquam, qui quod vult non habet, miser est?* Placuit omnibus. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 798, nota 8.

en: Distinction 42, question 2. As to the major premise of the argument we adduce the saying of Augustine *On the Happy Life*, n. 11: *Therefore everyone, I say, who does not have what he wills, is miserable? It pleased all*. Cf. also above p. 798, note 8.

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here c. 4.

la: Sensus est: *non velle* negative est non habere volitionem; *non velle* privative (contrarie) est habere nolitionem. Quod aliis verbis sic exprimi potest: *non velle*, negative sumtum, dicit negationem voluntatis, non voluntatem negationis; sed *non velle*, privative acceptum, dicit voluntatem negationis, non negationem voluntatis. Primo modo sumtum illud dictum Anselmi non est verum, quia multa fieri possunt, quorum esse vel fieri Deus positive non vult, et sic dicitur *Sine ipso factum est nihil*, i. e. peccatum; at verum est, si non vult in secundo sensu accipitur, et tunc istius dicti sensus est: impossibile est, id quod Deus vult non esse vel non fieri. Attamen hoc modo non dicitur, Deum nolle mala fieri; neque tenet consequentia a *nolle fieri* ad *velle fieri*: quia inter haec duo medium est, scilicet *non velle fieri*, negative sumtum. — In medio argumento pro *tunc non vult est una dictio, et est tertia persona* Vat. *tunc non velle una dictio est, et tertia persona*.

en: The sense is: *non velle* taken negatively is *not to have a volition*; *non velle* taken privatively (contrarily) is *to have a nolition*. Which can be expressed in other words thus: *non velle*, taken negatively, expresses the negation of will, not the will of a negation; but *non velle*, taken privatively, expresses the will of a negation, not the negation of will. Taken in the first way, that saying of Anselm is not true, because many things can come about whose being or coming-about God does not positively will, and in this sense it is said *Without him was made nothing* [Jn 1:3], i.e. sin; but it is true if *non vult* is taken in the second sense, and then the sense of this saying is: *it is impossible that what God wills should not be or not come about*. Yet in this way one does not say that God is unwilling [for] evils to come about; nor does the consequence hold from *to be unwilling that [it] come about* to *to will that [it] come about*: because between these two there is a middle, namely *not to will that [it] come about*, taken negatively. — In the middle argument, for *tunc non vult est una dictio, et est tertia persona* the Vatican edition has *tunc non velle una dictio est, et tertia persona*.

la: Intellige: Deo. — Cod. R *ipsa*. Paulo ante pro *fiunt* codd. S V *sunt*.

en: Understand: by God. — Codex R [reads] *ipsa*. A little earlier, for *fiunt* codices S and V read *sunt*.

la: Cod. G W sic: *ex ordine et volitum a Deo, est volitum secundum* etc. Paulo inferius pro *punit* cod. R *punitivum*.

en: Codices G and W read thus: *from the order and willed by God, is willed according to* etc. A little below, for *punit* codex R [reads] *punitivum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 87, nota 4. — Mox in Vat. deest *quod*, ante *consequitur*.

en: Cf. above p. 87, note 4. — Soon, in the Vatican edition *quod* is missing before *consequitur*.

la: Vat. omittit *in*, et paulo post *dicere*. Paulo inferius verbis *inseparabiliter annexo* codd. V X praemittunt *alio*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *in*, and a little after [omits] *dicere*. A little below, before the words *inseparabiliter annexo* codices V and X prefix *alio*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De malo in se considerato praecipue agitur II. *Sent.* dd. 34, 35; *Breviloq.* p. III, c. 1; *Sermo de Seminante*, n. 42-46 (*Supplem.* Bonelli, t. I, col. 410 seqq.). — Cum triplex sit malum, scil. *naturae*, *culpae* et *poenae*, hic agitur de malo culpae, et quidem de eodem *formaliter*. — Et notandum, quod *velle malum* potest intelligi vel ita, quod ipsum malum sit immediatum obiectum voluntatis, ut est in eo qui vult malum facere, vel ita, quod malum fiat ab alio. In utroque sensu Deus non vult malum; sed respectu secundi sensus non defuerunt, qui opinati sint, Deum velle fieri ab aliis malum, cum de facto fiat. Inter hos est Hugo a S. Vict., qui *de Sacram.* l. p. I, c. 12, in principio quidem dicit: « Tali quaestione coarctamur et ducimur in ambiguum, ut non facile audeamus hoc vel hoc aliquid affirmare, vel quod Deus fieri praecepit quod noluit, vel quod quae noluit fieri permisit ». In fine autem de dicta sententia affirmat: « Et ideo refutat hoc mens pia, non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur, sed quia quod bene dicitur non bene intelligitur ». Similia docet idem in *Summa Sententiarum*, c. 13. Haec falsa sententia duce Magistro (hic c. 3, 4) a S. Bonaventura et aliis Scholasticis refellitur. Error Hugonis in eo consistit, quod non satis haec tria distinxit: *Deus odit peccatum*; hoc vere et formaliter de Deo dicitur. *Deus non vult fieri peccata*; hoc nolle non est proprie in Deo, quia alias nulla fieri possent peccata, unde Deus nec vult fieri peccata, nec vult ea non fieri; sed tertium verum est: *Deus permittit fieri peccata*. — Quoad solutionem ad 3. et distinctionem inter culpam *in se*, et culpam *ordinatam* cfr. supra d. 40, a. 4, q. 2, hic q. 5, et II. *Sent.* d. 36, a. 1, q. 1.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 40. m. 1. — Scot., I. *Report.* d. 47, q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 19, a. 9; S. c. Gent. I. c. 95. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 20, q. 80. m. 2. a. 3. partic. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Of evil considered in itself, [the question] is treated principally at *II Sent.* dd. 34, 35; *Breviloquium* p. III, c. 1; *Sermon on the Sower*, n. 42–46 (*Supplement* of Bonelli, t. I, coll. 410ff.). — Since evil is threefold, namely of *nature*, of *fault*, and of *punishment*, here we treat of the evil of fault, and indeed of the same *formally* [considered]. — And it should be noted that *to will evil* can be understood either as [meaning] that the evil itself be the immediate object of the will, as is the case in one who wills to do evil, or as [meaning] that the evil come about [as caused] by another. In either sense God does not will evil; but with respect to the second sense there were not lacking those who held that God wills evil to be done by others, since in fact it is done. Among these is Hugh of St. Victor, who in *On the Sacraments* bk. I, p. 4, c. 12, at the outset indeed says: « By such a question we are hard pressed and led into ambiguity, so that we hardly dare to affirm this or that — either that God commanded that to come about which he did not will, or that he permitted those things to come about which he did not will ». But at the end, regarding the said opinion, he affirms: « And therefore the pious mind refuses this, not because what is said is not well said, but because what is well said is not well understood ». The same teaches similar things in the *Summa Sententiarum*, c. 13. This false opinion, with the Master as guide (here c. 3, 4), is refuted by St. Bonaventure and the other Scholastics. The error of Hugh consists in this, that he did not sufficiently distinguish these three: *God hates sin* — this is said truly and formally of God; *God does not will sins to come about* — this *nolle* is not properly in God, since otherwise no sins could come about, whence God neither wills sins to come about nor wills them not to come about; rather, the third is true: *God permits sins to come about*. — As to the solution to objection 3 and the distinction between fault *in itself* and fault as *ordered*, cf. above d. 40, a. 4, q. 2; here q. 5; and *II Sent.* d. 36, a. 1, q. 1.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 40, m. 1. — Scotus, I *Report.* d. 47, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 9; *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 95. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; *Summa* p. I, tr. 20, q. 80, m. 2, a. 3, partic. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Apparatus structure:** Quaracchi numbers footers per printed page. Page 822 has 1 footer entry (anchored [^1] — the long Anselm/Cur Deus Homo gloss). Page 823 has notes anchored 1–7 in the printed footer (re-numbered [^2]–[^9] here, with the long left-column note on *consequentia in ipso* / *e contrario* absorbed into [^1] since the OCR shows it printed under the same superscript 1 across the page-break). Page 824 has notes anchored 1–5 in its footer (re-numbered [^11]–[^15] here); [^10] points to a tiny mid-body footer entry on p.823. Total: 15 numbered apparatus entries.

**[?] flags placed:** None remained after PDF eyes-on at 400dpi cleared the OCR garbles. The main OCR garbles cleaned (and silently corrected after PDF verification) were: line 40034 `0. Item` → `5. Item` (the fifth contra argument); line 40043 `Matinn iiec est… volihilc` → `Malum nec est… volibile` (conclusio summary header); line 40129 `(|uod esl iwlo` → `quod est nolo`; the boxed scholion garble `Lielle'-aliquid sine alio` → `velle aliquid sine alio` confirmed against PDF p.824 right column. The Vat. variant note at line 40145 (`volcns Yolniilalc (oiisili;it;i vidl idiipiid`) reads in the printed page as `volens voluntate consiliata vult aliquid, non tamen vult illud quod consequitur; sicut aliquis vult aliquem surgere, sed tamen non vult eum cecidisse`.

**Scope finding:** Raw OCR line range 39996–40237 fully covers QUAESTIO II body + scholion. QUAESTIO III header at line 40238 (`Utrum mala fieri sit bonum`) begins the next chunk. Printed pages 822–824 confirmed against PDF renders `d46-a1-q2-r400-{412,413,414}.png`: p.412 running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.` with page no. `822` (start of Q.II on bottom half, after Q.I scholion ends); p.413 running head `DIST. XLVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II.` with page no. `823` (body in two columns); p.414 running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.` with page no. `824` (Ad-1 carry-over from p.823, then *Ad 2/3/4*, then SCHOLION header at very bottom). No leakage into neighbor chunks (d46-a1-q1 ends at line 39995 with the *Carlh., ex parte q. I.* citation closing Q.I Scholion II; d46-a1-q3 begins at line 40238 with `QUAESTIO III. Utrum mala fieri sit bonum`).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0