title: Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum malis Angelis revelari potuerit ipsorum damnatio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum malis angelis revelari potuit suus casus. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Omnis certa cognitio futurae poenae et miseriae est poenalis; sed si Angelus certitudinaliter sciret, se peccaturum, cum certo iudicatorio[^1] cognosceret, peccatum esse puniendum, et peccatorem a Deo separatum esse miserum, haberet praecognitionem certam suae miseriae: ergo poenam ante culpam haberet. Sed hoc est contra ordinem divinae iustitiae: ergo si Deus contra ordinem divinae iustitiae non potest facere, Deus non potuit revelare.

2. Item, omnis praecognitio certa de amissione alicuius boni cogit hominem desperare de illo; sed Deus neminem innocentem potest cogere ad desperationem, quia non potest cogere ad peccatum: ergo non potuit Angelo revelare casum suum.

3. Item, fiat argumentum Anselmi in libro de Casu diaboli[^2]: «Si diabolus sciebat casum suum, aut volebat, aut non. Si volebat: ergo iam ceciderat, ergo non praesciebat, se casurum. Si praesciebat et nolebat; sed quanto magis nolebat, tanto plus dolebat; et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat; et quanto magis dolebat, tanto erat miserior: ergo quanto iustior, tanto miserior. Sed hoc omnino est inconveniens»: ergo etc.

4. Item, fiat argumentum Magistri[^3]: «Si praescierunt, aut ergo vitare potuerunt et voluerunt, et ita non ceciderunt; aut vitare voluerunt et non potuerunt, et ita fuerunt miseri; aut vitare potuerunt et noluerunt, et ita fuerunt stulti et maligni». Si ergo quodlibet istorum est impossibile, impossibile est, quod habuerunt praescientiam sui casus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Dominus potuit praedicere Petro sine peccato suum casum, sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo sexto[^4] et in aliis Evangeliis: ergo pari ratione potuit revelare lucifero.

2. Item, Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis[^5] tractans illud verbum Isaiae decimo quarto: *Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem:* «Puto per aquilonem reprobandos homines fuisse designatos; per sedem, potestatem in illos». Et in sequentibus dicit, quod «in praescientia Dei suum praevidit principatum», scilicet quod debebat praeesse malis; et ideo dixit: *Ponam sedem.* Ergo principatus sequebatur casum; et potuit praevidere principatum: videtur similiter, quod potuit praevidere casum.

3. Item, videtur, quod rationes de *poena* non valeant, duplici ex causa. Deus enim potest separare quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta, ut in igne calorem a luce, sicut dicit Basilius[^6]: ergo multo fortius cognitionem praedictam a poena. *Praeterea,* quantumcumque aliquid sit punitivum, tamen non punit, nisi subiectum punibile sit — unde si anima Petri esset in inferno, non puniretur[^7] — ergo cum Angelus in statu illo esset innocens et nullo modo ad poenam dispositus, patet etc.

4. Item, videtur quod ratio de *desperatione* non valeat, quia sicut praecognitio damnationis est occasio *desperationis,* ita praecognitio gloriae est occasio *praesumtionis;* sed *praesumtio* non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare futuram glorificationem: ergo pari ratione lapsum[^8]. *Si tu dicas,* quod non est simile, quia ex parte illa est *occasio,* hic est *necessitas; contra:* desperare est actus voluntatis deliberativae et actus, qui est peccatum; sed nihil potest cogere voluntatem ad aliquid, maxime ad peccatum: ergo etc.

5. Item, praescientia Dei non ponit necessitatem[^9], ergo nec praescientia diaboli: ergo si sciret, quod posset aliter esse, ergo posset adhuc sperare: non ergo cogeretur desperare.

> **Conclusio.** Angelus malus certam sui casus praescientiam habere non potuit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod angelus certam praescientiam sui casus habere non potuit. — Cum enim hoc esset contingens, sciri certitudinaliter non potuit[^10], nisi ab eo qui certitudinaliter omnia cognoscit, et tam necessaria quam contingentia, quia eius co<!-- page 138 -->gnitio ex re non pendet; talis est Deus solus[^11]. Non ergo potuit praescire, nisi Domino revelante. Deus autem sibi *revelare* non potuit, quia non debuit *praedicere,* quod potuit — sicut *praedixit* Petro — quod non voco revelare, sed certam interius illuminationem dare ad praecognoscendum suum lapsum, hoc voco revelationem. Hanc autem dare Deus non potuit de potentia *ordinata,* quia talis praecognitio de necessitate habet annexam culpam, aut miseriam. Aut enim sibi *placeret,* quod laberetur, et ita esset impius; aut *displiceret,* et ita esset miser et dolorosus. Utrumque est Deo impossibile et inordinatum, sive innocenti *infligere poenam,* sive innocentem, dum est innocens, *habere culpam.* — Et hoc probat ratio *prima,* et ratio Anselmi et Magistri. Alia vero ratio de *desperatione* probat, quod non potuit Angelo revelari sua damnatio, quia impossibile est, certum de damnatione sperare. Unde illa via bona est et concedenda.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod potuit ei Dominus revelare, sicut et Petro; solvitur, quia Petro non revelavit, sed praedixit; unde Petrus non intellexit simpliciter, sed sub conditione, vel etiam non bene advertit usque ad lapsum; sic credo, quod potuit praedicere Angelo. — Tamen aliqui dicunt, quod non est simile, quia lapsus Petri erat reparabilis, non sic lapsus Angeli.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praevidit suum dominium; quare similiter non suum praecipitium? dicendum, quod de ipso Bernardus[^12] miratur et solvit, quod ita potuit esse, sicut de Ioseph, qui vidit suum principatum et non praevidit suam venditionem. Sed et diabolo potuit Dominus revelare dominium, et non *praecipitium,* quoniam dominium illud non de necessitate habet annexum praecipitium; potest enim aliquis bonus dominari malis. — Aliqui tamen voluerunt dicere, quod illud quod dictum est *ad aquilonem,* verbum est Prophetae. Diabolus enim volebat praeesse et aliis sedem dominationis[^13] suae praeponere; et Propheta praedicens quod eventurum sibi fuerat, dicit *aquilonem,* in hoc significans malos.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra rationem de *poena,* dicendum, quod ab ista cognitione separare poenam sive dolorem est auferre bonam voluntatem; quia qui praevidet, se facturum malum, et non dolet, hoc ipso est malus; et ita ista cognitio necessaria dispositione disponit animam vel ad *poenam,* vel ad *culpam;* nec Deus debet auferre et separare *poenam,* ut ex hoc redundet *culpa.* Et sic patet illud.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *desperatione,* dico, quod, supposito quod praevideret lapsum et impossibilitatem resurgendi, cogeretur desperare, quia haec cognitio non potest stare cum spe. Unde si quis non credit aliam vitam, necessario desperat de futura vita, quia hoc necessario exigitur ad spem; sic qui certus est de damnatione desperat de salute. Unde non est simile de occasione praesumtionis et praescientia Dei, quia illa non aufert[^14] quod est necessarium ad humilitatem et salutem; sed haec praecognitio certa necessario aufert certitudinem ad oppositum, et ita certitudinem spei[^15].

english:
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### QUESTION II. *Whether their damnation could have been revealed to the evil Angels.*

Secondly it is asked whether their own fall could have been revealed to the evil angels. And that [it could] not, it seems.

1. Every certain knowledge of future punishment and misery is penal; but if an Angel were to know with certainty that he would sin, since he would know by a certain judgment[^1] that sin is to be punished and that the sinner separated from God is wretched, he would have a certain foreknowledge of his own misery: therefore he would have punishment before fault. But this is against the order of divine justice: therefore, if God cannot act against the order of divine justice, God could not reveal [it].

2. Likewise, every certain foreknowledge of the loss of some good compels a man to despair of it; but God cannot compel any innocent [being] to despair, since he cannot compel to sin: therefore he could not reveal to the Angel his own fall.

3. Likewise, let the argument of Anselm in the book *On the Fall of the Devil*[^2] be made: «If the devil knew his own fall, either he willed [it] or not. If he willed [it]: then he had already fallen, therefore he did not foreknow that he would fall. If he foreknew [it] and did not will [it]; but the more he did not will [it], the more he grieved; and the more he did not will [it], the more just he was; and the more he grieved, the more wretched he was: therefore the more just, the more wretched. But this is altogether unfitting»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, let the argument of the Master[^3] be made: «If they foreknew [it], then either they could and willed to avoid [it], and so they did not fall; or they willed to avoid [it] and could not, and so they were wretched; or they could avoid [it] and would not, and so they were foolish and malicious». If therefore any of these is impossible, it is impossible that they had foreknowledge of their own fall.

**But on the contrary:** 1. The Lord could foretell to Peter, without sin, his own fall, as is said in Matthew 26[^4] and in the other Gospels: therefore by a like reasoning he could reveal [it] to lucifer.

2. Likewise, Bernard, *On the Degrees of Humility*[^5], treating that word of Isaiah 14: *I will set my seat toward the north:* «I think that by the north the reprobate men were designated; by the seat, [his] power over them». And in what follows he says that «in God's foreknowledge he foresaw his own princedom», namely that he was to be set over the evil [ones]; and therefore he said: *I will set my seat.* Therefore the princedom followed the fall; and he could foresee the princedom: it seems similarly that he could foresee the fall.

3. Likewise, it seems that the reasons concerning *punishment* are not valid, for a twofold cause. For God can separate things that are naturally conjoined, as in fire heat from light, as Basil says[^6]: therefore much more strongly the aforesaid knowledge from punishment. *Moreover,* however much something be punitive, yet it does not punish unless the subject be punishable — whence if Peter's soul were in hell, it would not be punished[^7] — therefore, since the Angel in that state was innocent and in no way disposed to punishment, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, it seems that the reason concerning *despair* is not valid, because just as the foreknowledge of damnation is an occasion of *despair,* so the foreknowledge of glory is an occasion of *presumption;* but *presumption* does not prevent God from being able to reveal future glorification: therefore by a like reasoning [neither does it prevent revealing] the fall[^8]. *If you say* that it is not similar, because on that side it is an *occasion,* [but] here a *necessity; on the contrary:* to despair is an act of the deliberative will and an act which is a sin; but nothing can compel the will to anything, most of all to sin: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, God's foreknowledge does not impose necessity[^9], therefore neither [does] the devil's foreknowledge: therefore if he knew that it could be otherwise, then he could still hope: therefore he would not be compelled to despair.

> **Conclusion.** The evil Angel could not have a certain foreknowledge of his own fall.

**I respond:** It must be said that the angel could not have a certain foreknowledge of his own fall. — For since this was contingent, it could not be known with certainty[^10] except by him who knows all things with certainty, both the necessary and the contingent, because his know<!-- page 138 -->ledge does not depend on the thing; such is God alone[^11]. Therefore he could not foreknow [it] except by the Lord's revealing [it]. But God could not *reveal* [it] to him, because he ought not to *foretell* what he could [foretell] — as he *foretold* to Peter — which I do not call revealing; but to give a certain interior illumination for foreknowing one's own fall, this I call revelation. And this God could not give by his *ordained* power, because such foreknowledge necessarily has fault or misery annexed. For either it would *please* him that he should fall, and so he would be impious; or it would *displease* [him], and so he would be wretched and sorrowful. Either is impossible and disordered for God: namely, to inflict *punishment* on the innocent, or that the innocent, while he is innocent, should *have fault.* — And this the *first* reason proves, and the reason of Anselm and of the Master. But the other reason, concerning *despair,* proves that his damnation could not be revealed to the Angel, because it is impossible to hope with certainty of damnation. Whence that way is good and is to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the Lord could reveal [it] to him, as also to Peter; it is resolved [thus]: because to Peter he did not reveal, but foretold; whence Peter did not understand [it] simply, but under a condition, or also did not advert well [to it] up to the fall; so I believe that he could foretell to the Angel. — Yet some say that it is not similar, because Peter's fall was reparable, not so the Angel's fall.

2. To that which is objected, that he foresaw his own dominion; why similarly not his own downfall? it must be said that Bernard[^12] himself wonders at this and resolves [it]: that it could be so, as in the case of Joseph, who saw his own princedom and did not foresee his own sale. But also the Lord could reveal to the devil [his] dominion and not [his] *downfall,* since that dominion does not necessarily have a downfall annexed; for someone good can have dominion over the evil. — Yet some wished to say that what is said *toward the north* is a word of the Prophet. For the devil wished to be set over [others] and to set his seat of dominion[^13] before the others; and the Prophet, foretelling what was to befall him, says *the north,* signifying by this the evil [ones].

3. To that which is objected against the reason concerning *punishment,* it must be said that to separate punishment or grief from this knowledge is to take away good will; because he who foresees that he will do evil and does not grieve, by this very [fact] is evil; and so this knowledge by a necessary disposition disposes the soul either to *punishment* or to *fault;* nor ought God to take away and separate *punishment,* so that from this *fault* should redound. And so that [objection] is clear.

4. To that which is objected concerning *despair,* I say that, supposing he were to foresee the fall and the impossibility of rising again, he would be compelled to despair, because this knowledge cannot stand with hope. Whence if someone does not believe [in] another life, he necessarily despairs of the future life, because this is necessarily required for hope; so he who is certain of damnation despairs of salvation. Whence it is not similar concerning the occasion of presumption and God's foreknowledge, because that [foreknowledge] does not take away[^14] what is necessary for humility and salvation; but this certain foreknowledge necessarily takes away the certainty toward the opposite, and so the certainty of hope[^15].

la: Vat. *iudicio.* — Principia huius et seq. argumenti vide hic in lit. Magistri, ubi verba Augustini ex XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 22. afferuntur.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *iudicio.* — For the beginnings of this and the following argument see here in the Master's text, where the words of Augustine from *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* XI, c. 17, n. 22, are adduced.

la: Cap. 21, pluribus interiectis et mutatis verbis. Plures codd. cum Vat. circa medium textus *et quanto dolebat magis, iustior erat* pro *et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat,* quod habent codd. H L W Y bb cc et ed. 1. Dein ex codd. M aa ante *erat miserior* supplevimus *tanto.*

en: C. 21, with several [words] interposed and altered. Several codices with the Vatican edition, near the middle of the text, [read] *et quanto dolebat magis, iustior erat* for *et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat,* which codices H L W Y bb cc and ed. 1 have. Then from codices M aa, before *erat miserior,* we have supplied *tanto.*

la: In hac dist. — Vat. omittit primum membrum argumenti.

en: In this distinction. — The Vatican edition omits the first member of the argument.

la: Cap. 10. n. 36. — Isai. 14, 13, ubi Vulgata: «Sedebo in monte testamenti, in lateribus aquilonis». S. Bernardus, loc. cit.: *Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem.* Multi codd. hic habent *ab Aquilone,* sed in solut. ad 2. *ad aquilonem.* — Conclusio argumenti, quam iuxta fidem maioris partis codd. et edd. 1, 2 exhibuimus, a codd. I W sic profertur: *Sed principatus sequebatur casum, ergo si potuit* etc.; codd. Q U *Ergo si principatus* etc. Vat.: *Ergo cum principatus... et si potuit* etc.

en: C. 10, n. 36. — Isa. 14:13, where the Vulgate: «I will sit on the mount of the covenant, on the sides of the north». St. Bernard, loc. cit.: *I will set my seat toward the north.* Many codices here have *ab Aquilone,* but in the solution to 2, *ad aquilonem.* — The conclusion of the argument, which we have presented according to the faith of the greater part of the codices and editions 1, 2, is given by codices I W thus: *Sed principatus sequebatur casum, ergo si potuit* etc.; codices Q U *Ergo si principatus* etc.; the Vatican edition: *Ergo cum principatus... et si potuit* etc.

la: Hexaem. hom. 6. n. 3. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 730, nota 7.

en: *Hexaemeron,* homily 6, n. 3. Cf. vol. I, p. 730, note 7.

la: Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 3.

la: Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. *ergo pari ratione desperatio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare lapsum.* — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

en: Codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican edition [read] *ergo pari ratione desperatio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare lapsum.* — Cf. I *Sent.* d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.

la: Vat. *scire certitudinaliter omnia non potuit.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *scire certitudinaliter omnia non potuit.*

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius Vat. *quia praedicere quidem potuit* pro *quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit,* quae est lectio maioris partis codd. et edd. 2, 3; alii codd. ab hac lectione in tantum discedunt, quod substituunt *praedicere quidem potuit* pro *praedicere, quod potuit.*

en: See I *Sent.* d. 38, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — A little below the Vatican edition [reads] *quia praedicere quidem potuit* for *quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit,* which is the reading of the greater part of the codices and editions 2, 3; other codices depart from this reading so far that they substitute *praedicere quidem potuit* for *praedicere, quod potuit.*

la: Loc. cit. n. 36. seq.; *Sed miror, cum in praescientia Dei tuum praevideris principatum, cur non in eadem et praevidisti praecipitium? Nam, si praevidisti, quae insania fuit, ut cum tanta miseria cuperes principari, ut malles misere praeesse, quam feliciter subesse?... Sed credibilius est, quod non praevidisti* etc. — Paulo inferius Vat. *Sic etiam* pro *Sed et.*

en: Loc. cit. n. 36 f.; *But I wonder: since in God's foreknowledge you foresaw your princedom, why did you not in the same [foreknowledge] also foresee your downfall? For, if you foresaw [it], what madness was it that, with such great misery, you should desire to rule, so that you would rather be wretchedly set over [others] than happily subject?... But it is more credible that you did not foresee [it]* etc. — A little below the Vatican edition [reads] *Sic etiam* for *Sed et.*

la: Vat. *damnationis;* perperam.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *damnationis;* wrongly.

la: Vat. *haec* et dein *sicut* pro *sic.* Plures codd. cum Vat. aliquanto inferius *quia illa non auferunt* pro *quia illa non aufert.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *haec,* and then *sicut* for *sic.* Several codices with the Vatican edition, somewhat below, [read] *quia illa non auferunt* for *quia illa non aufert.*

la: Vide Schol. ad quaestionem praeced.

en: See the Scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- Dist. IV, Art. II, Quaest. II — *Utrum malis Angelis revelari potuerit ipsorum damnatio.* 4 *videtur* (quod non) args (the *Fundamenta*) + 5 *Sed contra* args (the *ad oppositum* set) + one-sentence *Conclusio* (the blockquote) + Respondeo (the angel could not have certain foreknowledge; *de potentia ordinata*) + replies 1, 2, 3, 4. Spans printed pp. 137–138 (= PDF 159–160).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** The Respondeo and Solutio are cascade-shattered in the IA djvu OCR (raw 10163–10260; the diagonal two-column fragmentation at 10198–10260); re-set off the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 137`/`138 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 137`/`138`), read L column then R column. The clean prose (videtur/sed-contra args) is the OCR base; footers read off the crops L then R.
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`).** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d4-a2-q1` carries the single-block Scholion that explicitly covers *"Ad quaest. I. et 2. huius 2. articuli"* — i.e. both q1 and this q2. p.138 footer note 5 (`Vide Schol. ad quaestionem praeced.`, → [^15]) confirms this q2 defers its scholion to a2-q1's. The CLAUDE.md sibling-scholion pattern (a missing scholion is normal when the article's prior q's scholion covers it).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–15).** p.137 footer notes 1–10 → [^1]–[^10] (the 4 videtur + 5 sed-contra args + the Respondeo opener *non potuit¹⁰*); p.138 footer notes 1–5 → [^11]–[^15] (the Respondeo *talis est Deus solus¹* + Solutio replies 2/2-alia/4 + the *Vide Schol.* tail). 15 markers, all anchored in this chunk's body across pp. 137–138.
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.137 (INCOMING — CLEAN).** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d4-a2-q1`'s single-block Scholion (no apparatus) ended on p.136; this q2's body begins p.137. p.137's footer (notes 1–10) is wholly this q2's. `d4-a2-q1` not modified.
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- **No `[?]` flags.** Cascade regions resolved on the 450 dpi crops; footers verified (p.137 on the crops L then R; p.138 footnote prose from the raw OCR, which is faithful for footers even where the body cascade-shatters). Marginal editorial glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Fundamenta`, `Ad oppositum`, `Conclusio`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Ad 2. fundamentum`, `Alia solutio`).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 4, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 138 -->

### ARTICULUS III. *De cognitione matutina et vespertina Angelorum.*

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur, utrum creati sint Angeli illuminati cognitione matutina. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primum est, utrum cognitionem matutinam habuerint in ipsa creatione. Secundum est, utrum vespertinam post glorificationem.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum Angeli in ipsa creatione habuerint matutinam cognitionem.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod in ipsa creatione habuerunt cognitionem matutinam.

1. Primo per Augustinum. Augustinus enim super Genesim quasi per totum[^1] sic prosequitur illos septem dies, ut per hoc intelligat septemplicem conversionem Angelorum super res; et dicit, «quod simul tempore omnia facta sunt et ab Angelis cognita». <!-- page 139 -->Si ergo quilibet dies habet mane et vesperam, et isti dies fuerunt a principio conditionis angelicae, quilibet Angelus habuit cognitionem matutinam et vespertinam a suae creationis primordio.

2. Item, idem Augustinus quarto super Genesim ad litteram[^2]: «Mens angelica, pura caritate inhaerens Verbo Dei, posteaquam illo ordine creata est, ut praecederet omnia, prius vidit in Verbo Dei facienda quae facta sunt». Si ergo omnia simul condita sunt, necesse est, quod hanc cognitionem habuit Angelus ab instanti creationis; sed cognitio in Verbo est cognitio matutina: ergo etc.

3. Item, Dionysius[^3] dicit, quod «Angeli sunt lumina», ergo quod Angelus videt in se videt in lumine: ergo si cognitio matutina eo ipso dicitur matutina, quia est in lumine, cum Angeli hoc habuerint a sua creatione, patet etc.

4. Item, Angeli ante lapsum in principio suae conditionis[^4] nullam habebant impuritatem peccati nec obscuritatem mentis: ergo videtur, quod cognitio eorum esset cognitio clara: ergo videtur, quod matutina; et ita ab instanti creationis cognitione matutina perfecti sunt.

**Contra:** 1. Cognitio matutina est cognitio, qua quis cognoscit in ipso Verbo; sed in Verbo non potest aliquis aliquid videre, nisi videat Verbum, Verbum autem nullus potest videre nisi Beatus: si ergo Angeli in principio suae conditionis non fuerunt beati, sicut supra[^5] probatum est, ergo etc.

2. Item, lux faciebat vespere et mane; sed «lux dicit angelicam naturam formatam», sicut dicit Augustinus et super Genesim et de Civitate[^6]; sed formata fuit per gratiam et gloriam. Cum ergo Angeli nec gratiam nec gloriam habuerint in principio conditionis, quia non essent lapsi: ergo etc.

3. Item, si in principio conditionis habuerunt cognitionem matutinam, cum daemones habeant[^7] sibi data integra et splendidissima, maxime quae spectant ad cognitionem, ergo adhuc haberent cognitionem matutinam: sed cognitio matutina est in Verbo et in rationibus aeternis: ergo daemones adhuc haberent istam cognitionem; quod est contra Augustinum de Civitate[^8], qui dicit de Christo, quod «innotuit daemonibus non per id quod est vita et lumen incommutabile, sed per quaedam lucis effecta».

4. Item, sicut patet ex textu, vespere praecedit mane; unde dicitur: *Factum est vespere*[^9] etc., ergo cognitio vespertina [praecedit] matutinam; sed cognitio vespertina sequitur existentiam rerum, sicut dicitur super Genesim ad litteram libro quarto, ubi dicit Augustinus: «Nisi prius sit quod cognoscatur, cognosci non potest»: ergo cognitio matutina sequitur vespertinam: ergo oportet, quod sit post existentiam rerum: ergo non fuit concreata Angelis a principio.

Est igitur quaestio, si omnia simul creata sunt, qualiter Angelus potuit cognoscere res fiendas de primo creatis? — *Rursus,* si matutina cognitio est gloriosa, quomodo potuit esse in Angelis a suo primordio, cum omnes aequales fuerint, sicut Augustinus videtur velle ad Orosium[^10], et Magister dicit in littera?

> **Conclusio.** Angeli a sua creatione non habuerunt cognitionem matutinam, nisi haec intelligatur in sensu largiore.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc diversae sunt positiones, quae consurgunt ex diversificatione verborum Augustini in hac materia.

Quidam enim, attendentes ad verba Augustini super Genesim ad litteram, dicunt, quod quando quaeritur, utrum Angeli a principio suae creationis cognitionem habuerint *matutinam,* facienda est vis[^11]: aut enim quaeritur de *omnibus,* aut de *aliquibus.* Si de *omnibus;* sic respondent, quod non omnes habuerunt. Lucifer enim nunquam habuit cognitionem matutinam, quia nunquam divinam lucem vidit in se ipsa, sicut in antecedentibus monstratum est[^12]. Si autem quaeratur de *aliquibus;* sic dicunt, quod habuerunt, quia simul tempore sunt creati et ad Deum per gloriam conversi, et in eodem instanti sunt formati et a tenebris divisi, et in eodem res omnes cognoverunt secundum suum ordinem et connexionem, et hoc in ipso Verbo. Quae res, etsi in eodem instanti et simul cum Angelis fuerint conditae, tamen Angelorum conditione et ipsorum ad Deum conversione sunt posteriores natura et dignitate; et ideo dicitur, quod Angeli in Verbo cogno<!-- page 140 -->verunt res faciendas. Et illud expresse videntur sonare verba Augustini in quarto super Genesim ad litteram, circa finem[^13].

Sed quoniam Augustinus undecimo de Civitate expresse videtur sentire contrarium — ibi enim dicit, quod fuerit mora inter creationem et lapsum, et quod ante lapsum nec boni praescii fuerunt beatitudinis, nec mali miseriae, nec illi lux, nec illi tenebrae erant — ideo, ne sibi contradicere videatur, distinguunt aliqui cognitionem *matutinam* dupliciter. Cognitionem enim *matutinam* vocat Augustinus cognitionem in Verbo. In Verbo autem dupliciter dicuntur cognoscere: *uno* modo perfecte, scilicet *speculando* et intuendo ipsum Verbum et in ipso alia, et haec cognitio facit Beatos[^14]; *alio* modo *suscipiendo illuminationem* a Verbo et in illa susceptione cognoscendo alia, et haec cognitio fuit Angelis innata, quia indidit eis Deus omnium species, et lumen etiam super mentes Angelorum expandit, quo cognoscerent facta et facienda. Et haec cognitio *matutina* est, de qua loquitur Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram[^15]; et haec fuit in Angelis. Et per hoc solvunt contrarietatem ad utramque partem. Hanc etiam dicunt in daemonibus remansisse, sed obscuratam propter culpam; ideo non *matutinam* esse dicendam. — Et sicut distinguunt in *cognitione,* ita etiam distinguunt et in *luce* et in *tenebris,* quod *uno* modo dicuntur Angeli *lux* propter irradiationem ab illa superna luce procedentem secundum statum *naturae,* per quam cognoscunt res in proprio genere cognitione, quae dicitur *vespertina;* et referunt ad Deum, et sic dicitur *matutina.* Et *tenebra* per oppositum dicitur ignorantia, quae ab Angelis est exclusa; unde dicuntur repleti fuisse sapientia[^16]. — *Alio* modo dicitur *lux* ipse Angelus propter irradiationem procedentem a summa luce secundum plenitudinem gratiae consummatae sive gloriae, qua dicuntur Angeli «illuminati, ut beate sapienterque viverent[^17]»; et in hoc statu dicitur matutina cognitio proprie, quae nunquam fuit nisi in Angelis beatis. — Et sic diversis modis loquitur Augustinus.

Ex his patent rationes ad utramque partem, quia rationes ad primam partem intelliguntur de cognitione matutina large dicta, scilicet primo modo. Rationes vero ad oppositum intelliguntur de cognitione matutina proprie dicta, quae scilicet est per gloriam. — Et hoc curialius est dicere quam dicere, quod Augustinus dicat contraria, et tanquam instabilis modo dicat hoc, modo contrarium. Nisi enim distinguatur, quod dicitur super Genesim recte videtur contrariari ei quod dicitur undecimo de Civitate Dei. Quidquid tamen sit de opinione Augustini in productione rerum — quia infra[^18] determinatur, cum aliis Sanctis contradicere videatur — non est tamen credendum, quod tantus homo sibi contradicat, maxime in his quae non retractat. Verum qualitercumque intelligantur verba eius, magis standum est his quae dicuntur in libro de Civitate Dei, ubi loquitur asserendo, quam super Genesim ad litteram, ubi ipsemet protestatur se loqui inquirendo[^19]. Cum igitur ibi dicat, quod vere aliqua mora fuit inter creationem et lapsum Angeli, ac per hoc inter glorificationem et creationem, et cognitio matutina proprie sit gloriosa; tenendum est, quod illam non habuerunt a sui conditione.

Ad auctoritates igitur in contrarium aut solvendum est, quod ipse locutus fuerit inquirendo et opinando; aut certe respondendum est per distinctionem, ut praedictum est[^20].

english:
<!-- page 138 -->

### ARTICLE III. *On the morning and evening knowledge of the Angels.*

Next, in the third place, it is asked whether the Angels were created illumined with morning knowledge. And concerning this two [things] are asked. The first is, whether they had morning knowledge in their very creation. The second is, whether [they had] the evening [knowledge] after glorification.

### QUESTION I. *Whether the Angels had morning knowledge in their very creation.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that in their very creation they had morning knowledge.

1. First, through Augustine. For Augustine, throughout almost the whole [of his work] on Genesis[^1], so pursues those seven days that by this he understands a sevenfold conversion of the Angels upon things; and he says «that all things were made at the same time in time and known by the Angels». <!-- page 139 -->If therefore every day has a morning and an evening, and those days were from the beginning of the angelic condition, every Angel had morning and evening knowledge from the first beginning of his creation.

2. Likewise, the same Augustine, fourth [book] *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*[^2]: «The angelic mind, cleaving with pure charity to the Word of God, after it was created in that order, so as to precede all things, first saw in the Word of God the things to be made which were made». If therefore all things were created at the same time, it is necessary that the Angel had this knowledge from the instant of creation; but knowledge in the Word is morning knowledge: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Dionysius[^3] says that «the Angels are lights», therefore [it follows] that what an Angel sees in himself he sees in the light: therefore if morning knowledge is for that very reason called morning, because it is in the light, since the Angels had this from their creation, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, the Angels before the fall, in the beginning of their condition[^4], had no impurity of sin nor obscurity of mind: therefore it seems that their knowledge was clear knowledge: therefore it seems [that it was] morning [knowledge]; and so from the instant of creation they were perfected with morning knowledge.

**On the contrary:** 1. Morning knowledge is the knowledge by which one knows in the Word itself; but in the Word no one can see anything unless he sees the Word, and the Word no one can see except the Blessed: if therefore the Angels in the beginning of their condition were not blessed, as was proved above[^5], therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the light made evening and morning; but «light denotes the formed angelic nature», as Augustine says both *On Genesis* and *On the City of God*[^6]; but it was formed through grace and glory. Since therefore the Angels had neither grace nor glory in the beginning of [their] condition — for [otherwise] they would not have fallen: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if in the beginning of [their] condition they had morning knowledge, since the demons have[^7] given to them intact and most splendid [endowments], especially those that pertain to knowledge, then they would still have morning knowledge: but morning knowledge is in the Word and in the eternal reasons: therefore the demons would still have that knowledge; which is against Augustine *On the City of God*[^8], who says of Christ that «he became known to the demons not through that which is life and unchangeable light, but through certain effects of light».

4. Likewise, as is evident from the text, evening precedes morning; whence it is said: *It was evening*[^9] etc., therefore evening knowledge [precedes] morning [knowledge]; but evening knowledge follows the existence of things, as is said *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* book four, where Augustine says: «Unless that which is known first exists, it cannot be known»: therefore morning knowledge follows the evening [knowledge]: therefore it must be after the existence of things: therefore it was not con-created with the Angels from the beginning.

There is, then, a question: if all things were created at the same time, how could the Angel know the things to be made [as distinct] from the things first created? — *Again,* if morning knowledge is glorious, how could it be in the Angels from their first beginning, since they were all equal, as Augustine seems to wish [in his work] to Orosius[^10], and the Master says in the text?

> **Conclusion.** The Angels from their creation did not have morning knowledge, unless this be understood in the broader sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there are diverse positions, which arise from the diversification of Augustine's words in this matter.

For some, attending to the words of Augustine *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,* say that when it is asked whether the Angels from the beginning of their creation had *morning* knowledge, a force [of distinction] must be applied[^11]: for either it is asked of *all,* or of *some.* If of *all;* thus they answer that not all had [it]. For lucifer never had morning knowledge, because he never saw the divine light in itself, as was shown in what precedes[^12]. But if it is asked of *some;* thus they say that they had [it], because they were at the same time created in time and converted to God through glory, and in the same instant were formed and divided from the darkness, and in the same [instant] knew all things according to their order and connection, and this in the Word itself. Which things, although in the same instant and at the same time with the Angels they were created, yet by the condition of the Angels and their conversion to God are posterior in nature and dignity; and therefore it is said that the Angels in the Word knew <!-- page 140 -->the things to be made. And the words of Augustine in the fourth [book] *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,* near the end[^13], seem expressly to sound this.

But since Augustine in the eleventh [book] *On the City of God* expressly seems to feel the contrary — for there he says that there was a delay between the creation and the fall, and that before the fall neither were the good [Angels] foreknowing of blessedness, nor the evil [ones] of misery, nor was there light for those, nor darkness for these — therefore, lest he seem to contradict himself, some distinguish *morning* knowledge in two ways. For Augustine calls *morning* knowledge the knowledge in the Word. But in the Word [Angels] are said to know in two ways: in *one* way perfectly, namely by *speculating* and gazing upon the Word itself and in it the other things, and this knowledge makes [them] Blessed[^14]; in *another* way by *receiving illumination* from the Word and in that reception knowing other things, and this knowledge was innate to the Angels, because God implanted in them the species of all things, and also spread a light over the minds of the Angels, by which they would know things done and to be done. And this is the *morning* knowledge of which Augustine speaks *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*[^15]; and this was in the Angels. And by this they resolve the contrariety on both sides. This also they say remained in the demons, but obscured on account of fault; therefore it is not to be called *morning.* — And just as they distinguish in *knowledge,* so also they distinguish in *light* and in *darkness:* that in *one* way the Angels are called *light* on account of the irradiation proceeding from that supernal light according to the state of *nature,* by which they know things in their proper kind by the knowledge which is called *evening;* and they refer [them] to God, and so it is called *morning.* And *darkness* by the opposite is called the ignorance which is excluded from the Angels; whence they are said to have been filled with wisdom[^16]. — In *another* way the Angel himself is called *light* on account of the irradiation proceeding from the highest light according to the fullness of consummated grace or glory, by which the Angels are said to be «illumined, that they might live blessedly and wisely[^17]»; and in this state morning knowledge is properly so called, which was never except in the blessed Angels. — And so Augustine speaks in diverse ways.

From these the reasons on both sides are clear, because the reasons for the first part are understood of morning knowledge broadly spoken, namely in the first way. But the reasons to the opposite are understood of morning knowledge properly spoken, which namely is through glory. — And this is more courteous to say than to say that Augustine says contrary [things], and, as though unstable, now says this, now the contrary. For unless a distinction be made, what is said *On Genesis* rightly seems to contradict what is said in the eleventh [book] *On the City of God.* Yet whatever may be [the case] concerning Augustine's opinion on the production of things — since below[^18] it is determined, as he seems to contradict the other Saints — it is nevertheless not to be believed that so great a man contradicts himself, especially in those [matters] which he does not retract. But however his words be understood, one must rather stand by those [things] which are said in the book *On the City of God,* where he speaks by asserting, than [by] *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,* where he himself protests that he speaks by inquiring[^19]. Since therefore there he says that there was truly some delay between the creation and the fall of the Angel, and through this between the glorification and the creation, and morning knowledge properly [taken] is glorious; it must be held that they did not have it from their condition.

To the authorities, then, to the contrary, either it must be resolved that he spoke by inquiring and opining; or certainly the answer must be given by a distinction, as was said before[^20].

la: Praecipue II. c. 8. n. 16. seqq.; III. c. 20. n. 31. seq.; IV. c. 22. n. 39. seqq., V. c. 3. n. 5. seqq.

la: Cap. 32. n. 49, ubi textus originalis ultimam verborum partem ita exhibet: *ut praecederet cetera, prius ea vidit in Verbo Dei facienda, quam facta sunt.* — Plurimi codd. perperam *postea vidit* pro *prius vidit.*

en: C. 32, n. 49, where the original text presents the last part of the words thus: *that it might precede the rest, it first saw them in the Word of God to be made, before they were made.* — Very many codices wrongly [read] *postea vidit* for *prius vidit.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 83, note 1.

la: Plures codd. *creationis.*

en: Several codices [read] *creationis.*

la: Art. I. q. 1.

en: Art. I, q. 1.

en: Book I, c. 3, 5; c. 9 and c. 17. — XI *On the City of God,* c. 9, 11, 19, 20.

la: Plures codd. ut A H I M O addunt *naturalia.* Cfr. supra pag. 122, nota 8. Paulo superius codd. M X voci *conditionis* praefigunt *suae.*

en: Several codices, as A H I M O, add *naturalia.* Cf. above, p. 122, note 8. A little above, codices M X prefix *suae* to the word *conditionis.*

la: Libr. IX. c. 21, ubi textus originalis: *sed per quaedam temporalia suae virtutis effecta* pro *sed per quaedam lucis effecta.*

en: Book IX, c. 21, where the original text [reads]: *but through certain temporal effects of his power* for *but through certain effects of light.*

la: Gen. I, 5. — Textus Augustini, qui mox allegatur, est loc. cit. c. 32. n. 49. — Aliquanto inferius plures codd. *non fuit data* pro *non fuit concreata,* et dein post *Est igitur quaestio* contra codd. B D E I cc et ed. 1 tam in aliis mss. quam in Vat. additur *quomodo.*

en: Gen. 1:5. — The text of Augustine, which is presently adduced, is loc. cit. c. 32, n. 49. — Somewhat below, several codices [read] *non fuit data* for *non fuit concreata,* and then after *Est igitur quaestio,* against codices B D E I cc and ed. 1, both in other mss. and in the Vatican edition, *quomodo* is added.

la: Quaest. 17. — Sententia Magistri elicitur ex praesente distinctione, in qua dicit Angelos aequales conditos quantum ad statum; dist. III. c. 3. autem, sub alio respectu, Angelos inaequales conditos esse docet.

en: Quaest. 17. — The Master's opinion is elicited from the present distinction, in which he says the Angels were created equal with respect to state; but dist. III, c. 3, under another respect, teaches that the Angels were created unequal.

la: Supple cum codd. I Q bb *in verbo,* scil. distinguendo.

en: Supply, with codices I Q bb, *in verbo* (in the word), namely by distinguishing.

la: Art. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo inferius post *secundum* et in eodem Vat. supplet *instanti.*

en: Art. 1, q. 1. Cf. also d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — A little below, after *secundum* and *in eodem,* the Vatican edition supplies *instanti.*

la: Cap. 22. usque ad finem libri. — Sententia Augustini de hac re invenitur XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11, c. 13-15, c. 19. seq.; eadem supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. et hic a. 1. et 2. exposita est.

en: C. 22 to the end of the book. — Augustine's opinion on this matter is found XI *On the City of God,* c. 11, c. 13-15, c. 19 f.; the same was expounded above, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, and here, a. 1 and 2.

la: Haec insinuatur in Dialogo Orosii, q. 26. — Paulo inferius multi codd. cum tribus primis edd. incongrue *cognoscere,* aliqui codd. *cognoscente* pro *cognoscendo.*

en: This is insinuated in the *Dialogue of Orosius,* q. 26. — A little below, many codices with the first three editions [read], incongruously, *cognoscere,* some codices *cognoscente* for *cognoscendo.*

la: Praesertim libro IV. c. 22. seqq. — Mox Vat. falso *solvit* pro *solvunt.*

en: Especially book IV, c. 22 ff. — Presently the Vatican edition falsely [reads] *solvit* for *solvunt.*

la: Cfr. Augustin., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22-32; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. et 9.

en: Cf. Augustine, IV *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,* c. 22-32; XI *On the City of God,* c. 7 and 9.

la: August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. Cfr. I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 10. et II. c. 5. n. 17.

en: Augustine, XI *On the City of God,* c. 11. Cf. I *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,* c. 5, n. 10, and II, c. 5, n. 17.

la: Dist. 12. a. 1. q. 2; d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. Plurimi codd. contra cod. L ita; Vat., interpunctione variata: *in productione rerum ita determinatur. Quia licet aliis* etc. Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 *Verumtamen* pro *Verum.*

en: Dist. 12, a. 1, q. 2; d. 13, a. 1, q. 1. Very many codices, against codex L, [read] thus; the Vatican edition, with the punctuation varied: *in the production of things it is so determined. For although to others* etc. A little below, codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *Verumtamen* for *Verum.*

la: Libr. IV. c. 28. n. 45. Cfr. II. Retract. c. 24. Plura de hoc infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. circa finem. — Mox plurimi codd. cum tribus primis edd. incongrue *quod Angeli mora fuit inter creationem et lapsum* pro *quod vere aliqua mora fuit inter creationem et lapsum Angeli,* quae est lectio codd. F V. Vat. *quod in Angelo mora* etc.

en: Book IV, c. 28, n. 45. Cf. II *Retractations* c. 24. More on this below, d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, in the body, near the end. — Presently very many codices with the first three editions [read], incongruously, *quod Angeli mora fuit inter creationem et lapsum* for *quod vere aliqua mora fuit inter creationem et lapsum Angeli,* which is the reading of codices F V. The Vatican edition [reads] *quod in Angelo mora* etc.

la: In corp. quaest.

en: In the body of the question.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Augustinus primus distinxit cognitionem Angelorum in *matutinam,* qua res noscuntur in Verbo immediate viso ut medio eas cognoscendi, et in *vespertinam,* qua res in proprio genere per species Angelis concreatas attinguntur. Hac distinctione, quae est verissima, idem usus est, ut suam hypothesim explicaret, quod sex dies (Gen. I.) formationis mundi non sint dies successionem temporis exprimentes, sed intelligibiles, quibus exprimitur ordo, quo res creatae intellectui angelico repraesentatae sint. Cum autem S. August. in solvenda quaestione, utrum omnes Angeli habuerint a primordio cognitionem matutinam, in diversis locis sibi non constare videatur; hic de vera sententia S. Augustini inquiritur, ut eius testimonia in concordiam redigantur. Suppositis principiis supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. stabilitis, hic distinguitur duplex cognitio rerum matutina, quarum prima est in sensu proprio accepta et supra definita; secunda vero, in sensu largo dicta, est ea naturalis rerum cognitio, quae coniuncta est cum actu voluntatis, qui ipsam cognitionem refert in laudem Conditoris. Nec primam nec secundam cognitionem matutinam mali Angeli unquam habuerunt. — Etiam alii Scholastici eodem fere modo sententiam <!-- page 141 -->S. Augustini exponunt et plerumque simul hanc et seq. quaestionem tractant, exceptis Alexandro, S. Thoma in Summa, Petro et Richardo.

**II.** De utraque quaestione et annexis aliis diffuse disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 23. per totam. — Breviter Scotus, II. Sent. d. 3. q. 9. n. 9. 10. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 12. q. unica, a. 3; S. I. q. 38. a. 6. 7; de Verit. q. 8. a. 16. 17. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 3. a. 2. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. a. 3. dub. later. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. in fine.

english_scholion:
**I.** Augustine first distinguished the knowledge of the Angels into *morning,* by which things are known in the Word, immediately seen as the medium of knowing them, and into *evening,* by which things are attained in their proper kind through the species con-created with the Angels. He used this distinction, which is most true, in order to explain his hypothesis, that the six days (Gen. 1) of the formation of the world are not days expressing a succession of time, but intelligible [days], by which is expressed the order in which created things were represented to the angelic intellect. But since St. Augustine, in resolving the question whether all the Angels had morning knowledge from the first beginning, seems in diverse places not to be consistent with himself; here the true opinion of St. Augustine is inquired into, so that his testimonies may be brought into concord. With the principles established above, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, being supposed, here a twofold morning knowledge of things is distinguished, of which the first is taken in the proper sense and defined above; the second, however, spoken of in the broad sense, is that natural knowledge of things which is conjoined with an act of the will, which refers the knowledge itself to the praise of the Creator. Neither the first nor the second morning knowledge did the evil Angels ever have. — Other Scholastics too in almost the same way expound <!-- page 141 -->the opinion of St. Augustine and for the most part treat this and the following question together, with the exceptions of Alexander, St. Thomas in the *Summa,* Peter, and Richard.

**II.** On both questions and on other annexed [matters] Alex. Hal. disputes at length, *S.* p. II, q. 23, throughout. — Briefly Scotus, II *Sent.* d. 3, q. 9, n. 9, 10. — St. Thomas, II *Sent.* d. 12, q. unica, a. 3; *S.* I, q. 38, a. 6, 7; *de Verit.* q. 8, a. 16, 17. — B. Albert, *S.* p. II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 3, a. 2, partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 3, 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1, 2. — Aegidius Romanus, II *Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, dub. later. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4. — Biel, II *Sent.* d. 3, q. 2, at the end.

translators_notes:
- Dist. IV, Art. III, Quaest. I — *Utrum Angeli in ipsa creatione habuerint matutinam cognitionem.* The short ARTICULUS III opener + its title (*De cognitione matutina et vespertina Angelorum*) + the two-question sub-divisio are folded into this q1 per the Vol II convention. 4 *videtur* args + 4 CONTRA + two incidental questions (*Est igitur quaestio… — Rursus…*) + one-sentence *Conclusio* (the blockquote) + a long Respondeo (opinio 1 with the duplex *cognitio matutina* and the parallel *lux/tenebrae* distinction; opinio 2 from *de Civitate*; Bonaventure's resolution favoring *de Civitate*) + the *Ad auctoritates* + Scholion I–II. Spans printed pp. 138–141 (= PDF 160–163) — the heaviest d.4 chunk.
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** The Respondeo is cascade-shattered in the IA djvu OCR (raw 10261–10437; the diagonal two-column fragmentation at 10356–10398); re-set off the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 138`/`139`/`140`/`141 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 138`/`139`/`140`/`141`), read L column then R column. Clean prose (videtur/contra args, incidental questions, Scholion I–II) is the OCR base; footers read off the crops L then R / from the faithful raw OCR footer prose.
- **Scholion I–II** present (`has_scholion: true`); editorial (the Augustine *matutina/vespertina* distinction + the "true mind of Augustine" discussion + the parallel-loci list); clean OCR prose, no numbered apparatus.
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–20).** p.138 footer note 6 → [^1] (arg 1 *quasi per totum⁶*); p.139 footer notes 1–11 → [^2]–[^12] (args 2–4 + Contra 1–4 + the incidental-q *ad Orosium* + Respondeo opinio-1 *facienda est vis* / *monstratum est*); p.140 footer notes 1–8 → [^13]–[^20] (opinio-1 end + the duplex-cognitio + lux/tenebrae + the resolution/conclusio/*Ad auctoritates*). 20 markers, all in this chunk's body across pp. 138–140 (none in the Scholion).
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 4, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 141 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum Angeli modo habeant cognitionem vespertinam.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum in Angelis sit cognitio vespertina post glorificationem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus quarto super Genesim ad litteram[^1], loquens de superna Ierusalem[^2]: «Ibi semper est dies in contemplatione incommutabilis veritatis; semper vespere in cognitione creaturae in se ipsa; semper mane ex hac cognitione in laude Creatoris».

2. Item, ratione. Eadem lux est, quae faciebat vespere et mane: si ergo lux, quae facit mane, est illuminatio gloriae, ergo in hac illuminatione est vespere: ergo in statu gloriae est cognitio vespertina.

3. Item, cognitio vespertina est cognitio rerum in proprio genere; sed Angelus gloriosus in proprio genere cognoscit res: ergo habet cognitionem vespertinam.

4. Item, Angelus gloriosus amplius laudat Deum quam homo viator; sed homo viator non solum laudat Deum in sua maiestate, sed in operum suorum multiformitate: ergo et Angelus beatus. Sed haec laus praesupponit cognitionem: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^3]: *Cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est;* sed cognitio vespertina ideo dicitur vespertina, quia tenebrae est admixta; Angeli autem vident in luce plena: ergo etc.

2. Item, cognitio fidei, quae est per speculum, evacuatur, adveniente cognitione gloriae, quae consistit in videndo Verbum aeternum. Si ergo cognitio vespertina ideo vespertina est, quia in umbra creaturae, ergo non stat cum cognitione gloriae.

3. Item, mane adveniens expellit vesperam, et similiter vespera expellit mane; sed in Angelis continue est cognitio matutina, qua vident in ipso Verbo sine interpolatione: ergo non habet locum in eis vespertina cognitio.

4. Item, vespera est per declinationem solis ad occasum; sed in Angelis beatis nunquam est approximatio ad occasum, sed continuus fulgor et calor lucis aeternae[^4]: ergo nunquam est in eis cognitio vespertina.

Et propter hoc est quaestio — cum tam mane quam vespere utrumque importet approximationem ad noctem et ad tenebras; et Angeli distent distantia omnimoda tam a frigore peccati quam ab ignorantia veri: videtur, quod nec matutina nec vespertina cognitio sit ponenda, sed potius meridiana — quaeritur igitur pro quanto dicatur cognitio matutina et pro quanto vespertina; et quare non ponatur differentia tertia, scilicet cognitio meridiana. — Et iuxta hoc quaeritur, ad quos pertineant istae cognitiones, et de ipsarum ordine et praerogativa, ut sic elucescat harum cognitionum quidditas et natura.

> **Conclusio.** Angeli beati simul cum cognitione matutina habent etiam vespertinam.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut vult Augustinus[^5], «omnis creatura, quantum est de se, tenebra est»; *Deus* autem *lux* est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae, sicut dicitur in prima canonica Ioannis[^6]. *Dies* dicit illustrationem a luce procedentem super haec tenebrosa; *mane* autem et *vespera* dicunt media inter diem et noctem secundum accessum et regressum.

Intelligendum igitur, quod divina lux, illuminans Angelum illuminatione perfecta ad cognitionem sui, facit Angelum lucem; et cognitio ipsius Dei in se *dies* dicitur, quia pure est lux et cognitio et ratio cognoscendi. Lux ista angelica, illuminata, habet cognoscere creaturam; et sic, quia cognoscit id quod est tenebra, est eius cognitio *mane* vel *vespera* appellata; sed *vespera,* prout cognoscit creaturam in se ipsa, *mane,* prout ex illa cognitione consurgit ad laudandum[^7] et refert ad cognitionem ipsius, quam habet in Verbo. Unde Augustinus de Civitate undecimo, septimo capitulo: «Scientia creaturae in comparatione scientiae Creatoris quodam modo advesperascit, itemque lucescit et mane fit, cum ipsa refertur in laudem dilectionemque Creatoris; nec in noctem vertitur[^8], ubi non Creator amore creaturae relinquitur».

<!-- page 142 -->Unde nota, quod etsi ad similitudinem huius lucis visibilis dicatur ibi mane et vespere, sicut dictum est, tamen duplex est differentia: una, quia ibi vespera non vertitur in noctem, sicut in luce materiali; altera vero, quia mane non succedit meridies, nec diei vespere, sed totum est simul. Unde Augustinus super Genesim quarto[^9]: «Simul, inquit, habent diem et vesperam et mane». Et sic patet, quod in Angelis beatis est nunc cognitio vespertina cum matutina, nec habent successionem vel ordinem temporis, habent tamen ordinem dignitatis, quia dicit Augustinus de Civitate undecimo[^10]: «Cognitio creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, quam cum in Dei sapientia cognoscitur».

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est ex parte; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo bene potest esse perfecta in proprio genere; et si dicatur aliquo modo minus perfecta, hoc est respectu cognitionis in Verbo. Verumtamen non habent oppositionem, quia haec imperfectio non venit ex parte cognoscentis, sed ex parte cognoscibilis vel ipsius medii. — Et per hoc patet sequens de fide, quia ibi est imperfectio ex parte cognoscentis, non cogniti.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vespera declinat ad occasum et non compatitur mane; dicendum, quod verum est in his, ubi est vespera et mane propter lucis variationem; non ibi, ubi simul convertit se Angelus ad creaturam et Deum. Nec est ista diversitas nisi solum ratione diversi modi cognoscendi, qui quamvis sint diversi, non sunt tamen oppositi, sed unus famulatur alteri, et unus perficit alterum, non excludit[^11].

Ex his etiam patere possunt aliae quaestiones incidentes, scilicet, in quibus sunt istae cognitiones; quia proprie in beatis Angelis, nisi nomina extendantur. — Patet etiam, quare non dicitur cognitio creaturae dies sive meridies, sed cognitio Dei[^12]; quia omnis creatura tenebra. — Patet etiam, quod cognitio matutina praecellit propter pleniorem lucem, ob quam clarior est et certior et altior; et sic patet totum[^13].

english:
<!-- page 141 -->

### QUESTION II. *Whether the Angels now have evening knowledge.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this, whether in the Angels there is evening knowledge after glorification. And that [there is], it seems.

1. Augustine, fourth [book] *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*[^1], speaking of the heavenly Jerusalem[^2]: «There it is always day in the contemplation of unchangeable truth; always evening in the knowledge of the creature in itself; always morning [when] from this knowledge [it passes] into the praise of the Creator».

2. Likewise, by reason. It is the same light that made evening and morning: if therefore the light which makes morning is the illumination of glory, then in this illumination there is evening: therefore in the state of glory there is evening knowledge.

3. Likewise, evening knowledge is the knowledge of things in their proper kind; but the glorified Angel knows things in their proper kind: therefore he has evening knowledge.

4. Likewise, the glorified Angel praises God more than a man [who is] a wayfarer; but the wayfaring man praises God not only in his majesty, but in the manifoldness of his works: therefore the blessed Angel too. But this praise presupposes knowledge: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. First to the Corinthians, chapter 13[^3]: *When that which is perfect comes, that which is in part will be done away;* but evening knowledge is called evening for this [reason], that darkness is mixed with it; but the Angels see in full light: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the knowledge of faith, which is through a mirror, is done away when the knowledge of glory comes, which consists in seeing the eternal Word. If therefore evening knowledge is evening for this [reason], that [it is] in the shadow of the creature, then it does not stand with the knowledge of glory.

3. Likewise, the coming morning expels the evening, and similarly the evening expels the morning; but in the Angels there is continually morning knowledge, by which they see in the Word itself without interruption: therefore evening knowledge has no place in them.

4. Likewise, evening is through the declination of the sun toward setting; but in the blessed Angels there is never an approach toward setting, but a continuous splendor and warmth of the eternal light[^4]: therefore there is never in them evening knowledge.

And on account of this there is a question — since both morning and evening alike imply an approach to night and to darkness, and the Angels are distant with every distance both from the cold of sin and from the ignorance of the true: it seems that neither morning nor evening knowledge is to be posited, but rather midday [knowledge] — it is asked, then, for how much [reason] knowledge is called morning and for how much evening; and why a third difference is not posited, namely midday knowledge. — And in connection with this it is asked to whom these [kinds of] knowledge pertain, and concerning their order and prerogative, so that thus the quiddity and nature of these [kinds of] knowledge may shine forth.

> **Conclusion.** The blessed Angels, together with morning knowledge, have also the evening.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as Augustine wishes[^5], «every creature, as far as concerns itself, is darkness»; but *God* is *light,* and there are no shadows at all in him, as is said in the first canonical [letter] of John[^6]. *Day* denotes the illumination proceeding from the light upon these dark [things]; *morning* and *evening* denote means between day and night according to approach and return.

It must be understood, then, that the divine light, illumining the Angel with a perfect illumination unto the knowledge of itself, makes the Angel light; and the knowledge of God himself in himself is called *day,* because it is purely light and knowledge and the ground of knowing. This angelic light, illumined, has to know the creature; and so, because it knows that which is darkness, its knowledge is called *morning* or *evening;* but *evening,* insofar as it knows the creature in itself, *morning,* insofar as from that knowledge it rises up to praising[^7] and refers [it] to the knowledge of him which it has in the Word. Whence Augustine, *On the City of God* eleven, chapter seven: «The knowledge of the creature, in comparison with the knowledge of the Creator, in a certain way grows toward evening, and likewise grows light and becomes morning, when it itself is referred to the praise and love of the Creator; nor is it turned into night[^8], where the Creator is not abandoned out of love of the creature».

<!-- page 142 -->Whence note that, although in likeness of this visible light morning and evening are spoken of there, as has been said, yet there is a twofold difference: one, because there evening is not turned into night, as in material light; the other, because there morning is not succeeded by midday, nor day by evening, but the whole is at once. Whence Augustine *On Genesis* four[^9]: «At once, he says, they have day and evening and morning». And so it is clear that in the blessed Angels there is now evening knowledge with the morning, nor do they have succession or order of time, yet they have an order of dignity, because Augustine says *On the City of God* eleven[^10]: «The knowledge of the creature in itself is more discolored than when it is known in the wisdom of God».

1. 2. To that, then, which is objected, that it is in part; it must be said that it is false; rather, it can well be perfect in its proper kind; and if it be said to be in some way less perfect, this is in respect of the knowledge in the Word. Nevertheless they do not have an opposition, because this imperfection does not come from the side of the knower, but from the side of the knowable or of the medium itself. — And by this the following [objection] concerning faith is clear, because there the imperfection is from the side of the knower, not of the known.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that evening declines toward setting and is not compatible with morning; it must be said that this is true in those [cases] where there is evening and morning on account of the variation of light; not there, where the Angel turns himself at once to the creature and to God. Nor is this diversity [anything] except solely by reason of the diverse mode of knowing, which, although they be diverse, are nevertheless not opposed, but one serves the other, and one perfects the other, [it does] not exclude[^11].

From these also other incidental questions can be made clear, namely, in whom these [kinds of] knowledge are; for [they are] properly in the blessed Angels, unless the names be extended. — It is also clear why the knowledge of the creature is not called day or midday, but the knowledge of God[^12]; because every creature [is] darkness. — It is also clear that morning knowledge excels on account of the fuller light, by reason of which it is clearer and more certain and higher; and thus the whole is clear[^13].

la: Vers. 10.

en: Verse 10.

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 13, 12: *Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.*

en: Reference is made to 1 Cor. 13:12: *We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *candor lucis aeternae,* quod respicit ad Sap. 7, 26: *Candor est enim lucis aeternae.* Infra d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 2. legitur: *Fulgor cognitionis et calor affectionis.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *candor lucis aeternae,* which looks to Wisd. 7:26: *For she is the brightness of eternal light.* Below, d. 5, a. 3, q. 1, fundam. 2, is read: *Fulgor cognitionis et calor affectionis.*

la: Cfr. XIII. Confess. c. 2. n. 3, c. 8. n. 9; I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 9. seqq. et IV. c. 22. n. 39. et c. 26. n. 43, ubi hoc supponitur pro declaranda cognitione vespertina; Serm. 67. de Verbis Evang. Matth. c. 5. n. 8. seq.

en: Cf. *Confessions* XIII, c. 2, n. 3, c. 8, n. 9; I *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* c. 4, n. 9 ff., and IV, c. 22, n. 39, and c. 26, n. 43, where this is supposed for the explanation of evening knowledge; Sermon 67 *On the Words of the Gospel of Matthew* c. 5, n. 8 f.

la: Cap. 1, 5. — Vat. hic addit *ubi Glossa.*

en: C. 1, 5. — The Vatican edition here adds *ubi Glossa.*

la: Vat. *consurgit, ad laudem Dei sive ad laudandum Deum.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *consurgit, ad laudem Dei sive ad laudandum Deum.*

la: Vat. cum textu originali *vergitur.*

en: The Vatican edition, with the original text, [reads] *vergitur.*

la: Cap. 7.

la: Cod. T *ibi.* Finis solutionis in cod. F sic sonat: *et unus alterum non excludit* pro *non excludit.*

en: Codex T [reads] *ibi.* The end of the solution in codex F sounds thus: *et unus alterum non excludit* for *non excludit.*

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *diei;* perperam. Dein post *creatura* cod. aa interserit *est.*

en: Very many codices with editions 2, 3 [read] *diei;* wrongly. Then after *creatura* codex aa inserts *est.*

la: Vide Schol. praecedentis quaest.

en: See the Scholion of the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- Dist. IV, Art. III, Quaest. II — *Utrum Angeli modo habeant cognitionem vespertinam.* 4 *videtur* args + 4 CONTRA + an incidental-question paragraph (*Et propter hoc est quaestio… cognitio meridiana… ad quos pertineant…*) + one-sentence *Conclusio* (the blockquote) + Respondeo (the *dies/mane/vespera* exposition applied to the divine light) + replies 1.2 / 3.4 + a closing *Ex his etiam patere possunt* on the incidental questions. Spans printed pp. 141–142 (= PDF 163–164).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** The incidental-question paragraph and the Respondeo/Solutio are cascade-shattered in the IA djvu OCR (raw 10438–10528; the diagonal two-column fragmentation at 10446–10528); re-set off the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 141`/`142 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 141`/`142`), read L column then R column. Clean prose (videtur/contra args) is the OCR base; footers read off the crops L then R.
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`). The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d4-a3-q1` carries the Scholion I–II that explicitly treats *"hanc et seq. quaestionem"* together — i.e. both a3-q1 and this a3-q2. p.142 footer note 5 (`Vide Schol. praecedentis quaest.`, → [^13]) confirms this q2 defers its scholion to a3-q1's (the CLAUDE.md sibling-scholion pattern).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–13).** p.141 footer notes 1–8 → [^1]–[^8] (1–4 left-column footer, 5–8 right-column footer: arg 1's Aug-quote loci, Contra 1's *I. Cor. 13,12*, Contra 4's *fulgor/candor lucis aeternae*, and the Respondeo's *omnis creatura tenebra* / *prima canonica Ioannis* / *consurgit ad laudandum* / *nec in noctem vertitur*); p.142 **LEFT-column** footer notes 1–5 → [^9]–[^13] (the Respondeo *super Genesim quarto* / *de Civitate undecimo c.7* + Solutio *non excludit* / *cognitio Dei* + the *Vide Schol.* tail). 13 markers, all anchored in this chunk's body across pp. 141–142.
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- **No `[?]` flags.** Cascade regions resolved on the 450 dpi crops; p.141 footer verified L then R; the p.142 left-column footer (this q2's) verified on the p.142 L-2 crop. Marginal editorial glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Fundamenta`, `Ad oppositum`, `Quaestiones incidentes`, `Conclusio`, `Exponuntur termini`, `Applicantur ad divina`, `similitudo`, `Solutio oppositorum`).


title: Dist. 4, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

source_text:
<!-- page 142 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de hoc quod dicit: *Beati nunquam fuerunt qui ceciderunt, quia sui eventus ignari fuerunt.* Contra: ad hoc quod aliquis sit beatus, non oportet scire omnia, sed sufficit Deum cognoscere. — Item, beatitudo non est aliud quam clara visio Dei; sed ad hoc non requiritur cognitio eventus: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad beatitudinem non solum dos visionis requiritur, sed perfectae tentionis. Perfecta autem tentio non est, nisi quando est cum securitate; securitas autem non est, nisi cum[^1] est securitas de permansione; et quia hoc Angeli habere non potuerunt, saltem qui lapsuri erant, quia falsum erat, ipsos permansuros: ideo beati non fuerunt.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sufficit Deum cognoscere; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo oportet etiam perfecte tenere. Et quod subiungit, quod aperta et clara visio Dei est tota merces; dicendum est, hoc esse verum per concomitantiam; vix enim aut nunquam est ita aperta Dei visio, quin sit futurae permansionis certitudo; aut si non est, non est in illa perfecta beatitudo. Hanc autem visionem apertam, quae est *facie ad faciem*[^2], non habuerunt Angeli ante confirmationem, immo simul Dei visionem habuerunt et tentionem, licet ante aliquatenus cognoscerent et amarent, sive ad haec duo habiles essent.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Beati esse non poterant, si damnationis incerti erant.* Contra: certitudo damnationis potius est contraria beatitudini quam consona: ergo si certitudo nihil confert ad gloriam, ergo incertitudo nullo modo impedit gloriam sive beatitudinem perfectam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de aliquo futuro dupliciter potest haberi certitudo: vel in partem *affirmativam,* vel in partem *negativam;* et sicut ad beatitudinem oportet habere certitudinem de eius perpetuatione futura, ita oportet habere certitudinem de miseria nunquam futura; ista enim duo sunt omnino inseparabilia. *Certitudo* ergo damnationis nunquam futurae *confert* ad gloriam. Et quoniam incertitudo aeque privat certitudinem respectu *affirmationis,* sicut et respectu *negationis;* ideo incertitudo negationis ita repugnat[^3], sicut incertitudo permansionis. Et sic habet intelligi illud verbum.

<!-- page 143 -->

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de divisione perfecti. Videtur enim insufficiens, quia non tantum est perfectio secundum naturam, sed etiam secundum gratiam et gloriam; et secundum gratiam multiplex genus perfectionis. — Item quaeritur, quare magis accipitur unum genus perfectionis secundum tempus, quam secundum aliud accidens?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod perfectum dicit complementum sive completionem, in qua est status. Status autem ponitur in aliquo dupliciter; aut simpliciter, aut in genere. Si simpliciter, sic est status, [et] sumitur tertium membrum; si in genere creaturae, hoc dupliciter: aut in quantum exit a Deo; et sic habet rationem vestigii, et reperitur haec perfectio in omni creatura, quando perducta est ad modum, speciem et ordinem sibi competentem. Alio modo, in quantum creatura redit in Deum; et sic est perfectio gloriae; et hanc vocat Magister perfectionem secundum naturam. Unde ponendum, quod est perfectio secundum *essentiam,* et secundum *participationem;* et hoc dupliciter, vel secundum *egressum,* vel secundum *regressum.*

english:
<!-- page 142 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and it is asked first about this which he says: *The blessed never were those who fell, because they were ignorant of their own outcome.* On the contrary: for someone to be blessed, it is not necessary to know all things, but it suffices to know God. — Likewise, blessedness is nothing other than the clear vision of God; but for this the knowledge of the outcome is not required: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that for blessedness not only the dowry of vision is required, but [the dowry] of perfect holding. But perfect holding does not exist except when it is with security; and security does not exist except when[^1] there is security concerning perseverance; and since the Angels could not have this — at least those who were going to fall, because it was false that they would persevere — therefore they were not blessed.

To that which is objected, that it suffices to know God; it must be said that it is false; rather, it is also necessary to hold perfectly. And as for what he adds, that the open and clear vision of God is the whole reward; it must be said that this is true by concomitance; for scarcely ever, or never, is the vision of God so open that there is not [also] a certainty of future perseverance; or if there is not, there is not in that [vision] perfect blessedness. But this open vision, which is *face to face*[^2], the Angels did not have before the confirmation; rather, they had the vision of God and the holding [of him] at the same time, although before [that] they knew and loved [him] to some extent, or were apt for these two [things].

### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *They could not be blessed, if they were uncertain of damnation.* On the contrary: certainty of damnation is rather contrary to blessedness than consonant [with it]: therefore if certainty contributes nothing to glory, then uncertainty in no way impedes glory or perfect blessedness.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning some future [thing] certainty can be had in two ways: either toward the *affirmative* part, or toward the *negative* part; and just as for blessedness it is necessary to have certainty of its future perpetuation, so it is necessary to have certainty of misery never being in the future; for these two are altogether inseparable. *Certainty,* then, of damnation never being in the future *contributes* to glory. And since uncertainty equally deprives [one] of certainty in respect of *affirmation,* as also in respect of *negation;* therefore uncertainty of the negation is just as repugnant[^3] as uncertainty of perseverance. And thus that word is to be understood.

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### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the division of "perfect." For it seems insufficient, because there is perfection not only according to nature, but also according to grace and glory; and according to grace [there is] a manifold kind of perfection. — Likewise it is asked, why one kind of perfection is taken rather according to time than according to some other accident?

**I respond:** It must be said that "perfect" denotes a completion or completeness, in which there is a state. But a state is posited in something in two ways: either simply, or in a kind. If simply, then it is a state, [and] the third member is taken; if in the kind of creature, this [is] in two ways: either insofar as it goes forth from God — and so it has the character of a vestige, and this perfection is found in every creature, when it has been brought to the measure, species, and order befitting it. In another way, insofar as the creature returns into God; and so it is the perfection of glory; and this the Master calls perfection according to nature. Whence it must be posited that there is a perfection according to *essence,* and according to *participation;* and this in two ways, either according to *going forth,* or according to *return.*

la: Aliqui codd. *quando,* Vat. *ubi.*

en: Some codices [read] *quando* (when), the Vatican edition *ubi* (where).

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thomas et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: First Letter to the Corinthians 13:12. — Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here near the text [of the Master].

la: Supple: *beatitudini.* — Paulo ante non pauci codd. cum primis edd. *certitudo negationis;* perperam. Aliquanto superius plures codd. cum Vat. falso *nunquam futura* pro *nunquam futurae.*

en: Supply: *to blessedness.* — A little before, not a few codices with the first editions [read] *certitudo negationis;* wrongly. Somewhat above, several codices with the Vatican edition falsely [read] *nunquam futura* for *nunquam futurae.*

translators_notes:
- Dist. IV — *Dubia circa litteram Magistri,* DUB I–III. DUB I (whether the fallen were never blessed *quia sui eventus ignari fuerunt* — the dowry of *visio* + *tentio*); DUB II (whether they could not be blessed *si damnationis incerti erant* — twofold certainty, affirmative/negative); DUB III (whether the division of *perfectum* is insufficient — *status simpliciter / in genere,* *egressus/regressus*). Spans printed pp. 142–143 (= PDF 164–165): DUB I (left column) and DUB II (right column) on p.142; DUB III on p.143 (below the `DISTINCTIO V.  143` running-head bleed at raw 10570, which is NOT the semantic d.5 — semantic `DISTINCTIO V.` is raw 10586).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** DUB I/II are two-column on p.142 with the Respondeo lightly cascade-fragmented; re-set off the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 142`/`143 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 142`/`143`), read L column then R column. Clean prose is the OCR base; the p.142 footer read off the crop (R-2).
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`) — a dubia chunk has no scholion.
- **Apparatus crosswalk.** Only printed p.142's **RIGHT-column** footer notes 6–8 are this chunk's, renumbered 1–3 — note 6 (`Aliqui codd. quando, Vat. ubi`) at DUB I *nisi cum⁶ est securitas;* note 7 (`Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thomas…`) at DUB I *facie ad faciem⁷;* note 8 (`Supple: beatitudini…`) at DUB II *ita repugnat⁸.* DUB III (p.143) carries no numbered apparatus.
- **Cross-chunk footer at p.142 (INCOMING — received clean, no backfill).** p.142's footer is linearized in the raw within this chunk's own range (raw 10560–10569). It splits **by column** (documented at the committed `bon-sent-II-d4-a3-q2` build): the **LEFT-column** notes 1–5 anchor a3-q2's Solutio and are its `[^9]`–`[^13]`; the **RIGHT-column** notes 6–8 anchor THIS chunk's DUB I/II → [^1]–[^3]. Received exactly as documented; `d4-a3-q2` not modified.
- **Closes DISTINCTION IV.** The d4-dubia→`DISTINCTIO V` boundary (raw 10585 → semantic d.5 at 10586) is the concern of the d.5 decade-rechunked skeleton's later Tier-2 build (`bon-sent-II-d5-littera`); DUB III has no apparatus, so no footer split crosses here. With this chunk, all 9 d.4 chunks are Tier-2 (the decade-batch-rechunk → Tier-2 POC is complete end-to-end for the full distinction).
- **No `[?]` flags.** Marginal editorial glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Distinctio`, `Notandum`).