title: Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Christus assumserit omnes defectus nostros praeter peccatum.*

Secundo quaeritur de huiusmodi defectibus quantum ad generalitatem, et est quaestio, utrum Christus assumserit omnes defectus nostros praeter peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Ad oppositum:* Per Damascenum, qui in libro tertio[^p332-1] ait sic: «Totus totum assumsit me, ut toti mihi salutem gratificaret»: ergo si omnes defectus nostros venit curare, videtur, quod omnes debuit assumere.

2. Item: «Quod fuit inassumtibile fuit incurabile[^p332-2]»: ergo si aliqui defectus nostri fuerunt a Christo inassumtibiles, fuerunt incurabiles; si igitur omnes fuerunt curabiles, omnes fuerunt assumtibiles: ergo videtur, quod assumserit omnes.

3. Item, in assumtione nostrorum defectuum manifestatur divina misericordia, ergo in assumtione plurium defectuum ostenditur maior misericordia, et in assumtione omnium ostenditur maxima; sed maxima misericordia Dei ostensa fuit in assumtione nostrarum infirmitatum et defectuum: ergo videtur, quod Christus omnes defectus debuit assumere.

4. Item, in nostrorum defectuum assumtione fuit humiliatio; sed tantum se humiliavit, quantum potuit, secundum quod dicit Bernardus[^p332-3]: «Descendit, quantum descendere potuit»: si igitur maior est humiliatio in assumtione plurium defectuum quam paucorum, et in assumtione omnium quam quorundam; videtur, quod Christus assumere debuerit universitatem defectuum nostrorum.

**Sed contra:** 1. *Fundamenta.* In nobis videmus defectus membrorum et aliquorum sensuum exteriorum, sicut visus et auditus; sed tales Christus non assumsit, nec decuit eum assumere: ergo non decuit ipsum assumere omnes defectus nostros poenales[^p332-4].

2. Item, in nobis reperiuntur aegritudines contrariae, sicut patet in febribus et aliis infirmitatibus, reperiuntur etiam aegritudines incurabiles: ergo si «contraria non possunt esse simul in eodem[^p332-5]», videtur, quod omnes defectus nostros poenales nec potuerit nec debuerit simul assumere.

3. Item, fomes et pronitas ad malum non est culpa, quia potest esse in nobis, omni culpa deleta; sed Christus talem defectum nec habuit nec habere potuit, quia non potuit peccare[^p332-6], ergo nec ad peccatum pronitatem habere: et ita redit idem quod prius.

4. Item, obiicitur de difficultate ad bonum, quae est defectus in nobis poenalis; in Christo autem talis defectus non fuit nec esse potuit: quaeritur igitur in generali, quales defectus assumsit, si non omnes assumsit.

> **Conclusio.** Christus assumsit defectus poenales tantum, non vitiosos, nec omnes poenales, sed tantum naturales, non autem personales.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio «Christus non omnes defectus nostros assumsit, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^p332-7], sed illos tantum, quos ipsum assumere decuit et nobis expediens fuit». Sed qui sint isti defectus, adhuc quaestione indiget, sicut et

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primum, et innuit Magister, illos defectus decuisse et expedivisse illum assumere, qui faciunt «vel ad veritatis naturae assumtae ostensionem, vel ad operis propter quod venerat consummationem». Sed adhuc, qui sunt isti defectus, difficile est discernere.

Voluerunt autem aliqui dicere, quod isti sunt defectus, quos «Deus *plantavit* in nostra natura[^p333-1]». Quidam enim defectus sunt, qui ortum habent ex absentia gratiae, sicut ignorantia et rebellio carnis ad spiritum et consimilia. Quidam autem sunt, qui non solum ex hoc ortum habent, sed etiam ex compositione partium constituentium, sicut fames, sitis, mors, dolor et consimilia, quae ortum habent non tantum ex culpa, sed ex hoc, quod humana natura est ex contrariis constituta; et tales defectus sunt, qui faciunt ad veritatis naturae assumtae manifestationem et ad operis suscepti consummationem; alii vero minime. — Sed illud adhuc habet calumniam, propter hoc quod aegritudines multae ortum habent ex complexione hominis, quas constat Christum non assumsisse. Praeterea[^p333-2], omnes defectus nostri poenales magis videntur seculi esse ex nostra transgressione et divina punitione quam ex primaria plantatione.

Et propterea potest alio modo dici, quod quidam sunt defectus, qui sunt ex culpa, quidam vero, qui sunt *ex culpa et ad culpam*, sicut pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum. Illos autem defectus, qui non tantum sunt *ex culpa*, sed etiam *via ad culpam*, non decuit Christum assumere, quia Christus fuit minister iustitiae, omnino segregatus a peccato[^p333-3]. Alios autem defectus decuit ipsum assumere, sed non omnes, quia quidam sunt defectus *naturales*, quidam *personales*. Defectus autem *naturales* voco illos qui respiciunt totam naturam humanam universaliter, sicut fames et sitis et defectus consimiles. *Personales* autem defectus sunt qui respiciunt aliquas personas specialiter, sicut diversae aegritudinum species. Quoniam igitur Christus venerat naturam humanam redimere communiter sine personarum distinctione; hinc est, quod defectus *naturales*, non *personales* defectus, *poenales* tantum, non *vitiosos*, debuit in se habere, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem adductae[^p333-4].

**Solutio oppositorum.** 1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Damasceno, quod totum assumsit, ut totum curaret; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de his quae sunt de constitutione naturae, non de his quae pertinent ad defectum naturae; et hoc ipsum verbum[^p333-5] insinuat. Nam proprie quod curatur dicitur natura, morbus vero est illud, a quo curatur, quia morbus expellitur, sed natura servatur. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quo dicitur, quod inassumtibile est incurabile; hoc enim intelligitur de natura et eius partibus, quae proprie dicuntur curari, non de defectibus, qui potius dicuntur coassumi quam assumi[^p333-6], magis etiam dicuntur expelli quam sanari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ostensione misericordiae, dicendum, quod misericordia semper se ostendit, salva rectitudine iustitiae et ordine sapientiae[^p333-7]; ideo nullos defectus debuit assumere, qui non essent ordinati ad nostrum profectum et expeditionem nostrae salutis; multi autem sunt, qui potius impedivissent, quam iuvissent, sicut defectus membrorum, vel sensuum et aliorum consimilium. Et ideo non sequitur illud.

4. Ad illud vero quod postremo obiicitur de humiliatione, dicendum consimiliter, quod omnis humiliatio virtuosa et laudabilis ortum habet ex discretione rationis; non enim procedere debet ex impetu[^p333-8], sed ex causa rationabili. Et quia de aliquibus defectibus rationabile non erat, ut Christus se per eorum assumtionem humiliaret, quia se potius ex illa humiliatione inutilem quam utilem reddidisset, sicut si fuisset caecus, vel gibbosus et huiusmodi; ideo tales nullo modo debuit assumere, sed illos solum, de quibus supra dictum est, videlicet illos qui respiciunt ipsam naturam et praebent viam ad iustitiam, non ad culpam[^p333-9].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether Christ assumed all our defects except sin.*

Secondly it is asked concerning defects of this kind in respect of their universality, and the question is whether Christ assumed all our defects except sin. And that he did, it seems:

1. *To the opposite [view]:* By Damascene, who in the third book[^p332-1] says thus: «He, the Whole, assumed the whole of me, that he might bestow salvation on the whole of me»: therefore if he came to cure all our defects, it seems that he ought to have assumed them all.

2. Likewise: «What was unassumable was incurable[^p332-2]»: therefore if any of our defects were unassumable by Christ, they were incurable; if then all were curable, all were assumable: therefore it seems that he assumed them all.

3. Likewise, in the assumption of our defects the divine mercy is manifested, therefore in the assumption of more defects greater mercy is shown, and in the assumption of all the greatest is shown; but the greatest mercy of God was shown in the assumption of our infirmities and defects: therefore it seems that Christ ought to have assumed all defects.

4. Likewise, in the assumption of our defects there was humiliation; but he humbled himself as much as he could, according to what Bernard says[^p332-3]: «He descended as far as he could descend»: if then there is greater humiliation in the assumption of more defects than of fewer, and in the assumption of all than of some; it seems that Christ ought to have assumed the totality of our defects.

**On the contrary:** 1. *Foundations.* In ourselves we see defects of the limbs and of certain outward senses, such as sight and hearing; but such defects Christ did not assume, nor was it fitting for him to assume them: therefore it was not fitting for him to assume all our penal defects[^p332-4].

2. Likewise, in us are found contrary diseases, as is plain in fevers and other infirmities, and there are also found incurable diseases: therefore if «contraries cannot be at the same time in the same subject[^p332-5]», it seems that he neither could nor ought to have assumed all our penal defects at the same time.

3. Likewise, the tinder and proneness to evil is not a fault, since it can be in us when every fault is removed; but Christ neither had nor could have such a defect, since he could not sin[^p332-6], therefore neither could he have proneness to sin: and thus the same thing returns as before.

4. Likewise, an objection is raised concerning the difficulty toward the good, which is a penal defect in us; but in Christ such a defect did not and could not exist: therefore it is asked in general what defects he assumed, if he did not assume all.

> **Conclusion.** Christ assumed penal defects only, not vicious ones; nor all penal defects, but only natural ones, not however personal ones.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, «Christ did not assume all our defects, as the Master says in the text[^p332-7], but only those which it was fitting for him to assume and expedient for us». But which these defects are still requires inquiry, just as also

primum, and the Master suggests that it was fitting and expedient for him to assume those defects which contribute «either to the showing forth of the truth of the assumed nature, or to the consummation of the work for which he had come». But still, which these defects are, is difficult to discern.

Now some wished to say that these are the defects which «God *planted* in our nature[^p333-1]». For there are certain defects which take their origin from the absence of grace, such as ignorance and the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit and the like. But there are others which take their origin not only from this, but also from the composition of the constituent parts, such as hunger, thirst, death, pain and the like, which take their origin not only from fault, but from this, that human nature is constituted out of contraries; and such are the defects which contribute to the manifestation of the truth of the assumed nature and to the consummation of the undertaken work; but others not at all. — But this still has a difficulty, on account of this, that many diseases take their origin from the complexion of the man, which it is agreed Christ did not assume. Moreover[^p333-2], all our penal defects seem rather to have followed from our transgression and the divine punishment than from a primary planting.

And therefore it can be said in another way, that certain defects are *from fault*, but certain others are *from fault and toward fault*, such as proneness to evil and difficulty toward the good. But those defects which are not only *from fault*, but also *a way toward fault*, it was not fitting for Christ to assume, because Christ was a minister of justice, wholly set apart from sin[^p333-3]. But the other defects it was fitting for him to assume, yet not all, because certain defects are *natural*, certain *personal*. Now I call those *natural* defects which regard the whole human nature universally, such as hunger and thirst and like defects. But *personal* defects are those which regard certain persons specially, such as the various species of diseases. Since therefore Christ had come to redeem human nature in common, without distinction of persons; hence it is, that he ought to have in himself *natural* defects, not *personal* defects, *penal* only, not *vicious*, as the reasons adduced for this side show[^p333-4].

**Solution of the opposing [arguments].** 1. 2. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary concerning Damascene, that he assumed the whole that he might cure the whole; it must be said that this is to be understood of those things which belong to the constitution of nature, not of those which pertain to a defect of nature; and the very word[^p333-5] suggests this. For properly what is cured is called the nature, but the disease is that from which it is cured, since the disease is expelled, but the nature is preserved. — And by this the answer to the next [argument] is plain, where it is said that the unassumable is incurable; for this is understood of the nature and its parts, which properly are said to be cured, not of defects, which are rather said to be co-assumed than assumed[^p333-6], and are said rather to be expelled than healed.

3. To that which is objected concerning the showing of mercy, it must be said that mercy always shows itself with the rectitude of justice and the order of wisdom preserved[^p333-7]; therefore he ought to assume no defects which were not ordered to our advancement and the expediting of our salvation; but there are many which would rather have hindered than helped, such as the defects of the limbs, or of the senses and other like things. And therefore that [argument] does not follow.

4. To that, however, which is last objected concerning humiliation, it must be said likewise that all virtuous and laudable humiliation takes its origin from the discretion of reason; for it ought not to proceed from impulse[^p333-8], but from a reasonable cause. And since concerning certain defects it was not reasonable that Christ should humble himself by their assumption, since he would rather have rendered himself useless than useful by that humiliation, as if he had been blind, or hunchbacked and the like; therefore such defects he ought in no way to have assumed, but only those of which it was said above, namely those which regard the nature itself and afford a way to justice, not to fault[^p333-9].

---

la: *De Fide orthod.* c. 6. — Vat. sola sententiam Damasc. temere sic ampliavit: *Totus... me, ut totum me curaret aut toti mihi* etc. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 1. — In conclus. codd. N Q post *curare* subiungunt *et tollere*.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 6. — The Vatican edition alone rashly amplified the sentence of Damascene thus: *He, the Whole... me, that he might cure the whole of me or [bestow on] the whole of me* etc. Compare above the text of the Master, d. II, c. 1. — In the conclusion codices N Q after *curare* add *et tollere* [and to take away].

la: Damasc., III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 6. et 18.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 6 and 18.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 266, nota 1.

en: Compare above, p. 266, note 1.

la: De hoc arg. nec non de seq. vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Concerning this argument, as also concerning the following, see here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: De hoc Aristot. verbo vide supra pag. 85, nota 10.

en: Concerning this saying of Aristotle, see above, p. 85, note 10.

la: Cfr. supra d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. — De *maiori* vide supra pag. 74, nota 3, et II. Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Compare above, d. 12, a. 2, q. 1. — Concerning the *major* [premise] see above, p. 74, note 3, and II *Sent.* d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Hic c. 1. Ibid. et text. seq. — Paulo inferius vocabulum *primum* respicit principalem quaestionem.

en: Here c. 1. There and in the following text. — A little below, the word *first* refers to the principal question.

la: Damasc., III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 6. et 20. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 1. — Paulo ante pro *qui sunt* codd. F G I L aa *qui sint*. Subinde post *difficile est* codd. I L aa interiiciunt *videre et*.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 6 and 20. See above the text of the Master, d. II, c. 1. — A little before, for *qui sunt* codices F G I L aa read *qui sint*. Then after *difficile est* codices I L aa insert *videre et*.

la: Codd. F L T U V aa *Et praeterea*.

en: Codices F L T U V aa: *And moreover*.

la: Respicitur illud Gal. 2, 17: «Numquid Christus peccati minister est? Absit»; et etiam Hebr. 7, 26. Cfr. supra pag. 264, nota 7.

en: Reference is made to that of Gal. 2:17: «Is Christ then a minister of sin? God forbid»; and also Heb. 7:26. Compare above, p. 264, note 7.

la: Damasc., III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 20: *Christum porro naturales minimeque reprehendendas* [ἀδιάβλητα] *hominis passiones assumsisse confitemur. Nam suscepit totum hominem et quaecumque hominis sunt, excepto peccato. Neque enim istud naturale est neque a Creatore nobis insitum... Naturales porro et inculpatae* [ἀδιάβλητα] *passiones hae sunt, quae in arbitrio nostro sitae non sunt; quae nimirum in violati praecepti poenam humanae vitae irrepserunt, velut fames, sitis... quae quidem natura universo hominum generi conveniunt* (ed. Migne).

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 20: *Further, we confess that Christ assumed the natural and in no way blameworthy* [ἀδιάβλητα] *passions of man. For he took up the whole man and whatever belongs to man, except sin. For this [sin] is neither natural nor implanted in us by the Creator... Now the natural and blameless* [ἀδιάβλητα] *passions are these, which are not placed within our choice; which, namely, crept into human life as a penalty for the violated precept, such as hunger, thirst... which indeed by nature befit the whole human race* (Migne edition).

la: Cod. O subnectit *assignatum*. Post pauca codd. A F H N X verbo *dicitur* adiungunt *esse*.

en: Codex O appends *assignatum*. A little after, codices A F H N X to the word *dicitur* add *esse*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 5. ad 1.

en: Compare above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 5, to the first [objection].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 267, nota 5. — Circa finem obiect. pro *membrorum* cod. V *morborum*.

en: Compare above, p. 267, note 5. — Near the end of the objection, for *membrorum* [limbs] codex V reads *morborum* [diseases].

la: De hac dictione cfr. tom. I. pag. 785, nota 2.

en: Concerning this expression compare tome I, p. 785, note 2.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p33{2,3}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`), read left column top→bottom then right column, body bands then footer bands, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo/Solutio and footers in this region — e.g. the OCR garbled the *Solutio* opener into a scrambled `tum Damasceno; curaret; totumhocassumsit,` block, fully restored from the PDF here). English is a fresh literal translation. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Page span:** printed pp.332–333 (PDF 354–355). Running heads confirmed eyes-on: p.332 `332 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.333 `DIST. XV. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 333`.

**Raw range:** q2 = raw lines 23275–23387 (`QUAESTIO II.` opener at 23275; the line-based chunker overshot to include the p.334 running head `334 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`, which belongs to the next page / QUAESTIO III).

**Apparatus page-split map (16 entries, per-page restart):**
- p.332 → 7 footnotes (`[^p332-1..7]`): left-column footer 1–3, right-column footer 4–7.
- p.333 → 9 footnotes (`[^p333-1..9]`): left-column footer 1–4, right-column footer 5–9.

**`has_scholion: false`** — correct, not an error. Article I's q1 scholion (§I covers all three quaestiones; §II "De 1. quaestione"; §III "De hac 2. quaestione") forward-covers this quaestio. Footnote `[^p333-9]` ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") is Quaracchi itself directing the reader to the prior question's scholion.

**Hand-offs:**
- *Picked up:* **NONE.** q2 opens cleanly at the top of the p.332 right-column body region after a1-q1's Scholion; the seam (raw 23275) is grammatically clean.
- *Forwarded to d15-a1-q3:* QUAESTIO III (`Utrum Christus assumserit defectus istos a principio suae conceptionis...` — the *Tertio quaeritur* question) begins at **raw 23388**, printed **p.334** (PDF 356), at the top of p.334. q2 ends cleanly at the foot of p.333 right column (`...non ad culpam⁹.` = end of Solutio Ad 4); **no footer migrates forward** — p.333's 9 footers are all consumed by q2's body; **q3's apparatus restarts on p.334**. q3 also carries **no scholion of its own** (a1-q1 scholion §I forward-covers all three quaestiones of the article); set `has_scholion: false` there too.

**Correction to the inbound hand-off note:** the d15-a1-q1 resume said "p.332 footer band empty" / "q2's apparatus restarts on p.333." Ground-truth from the printed page: p.332 *does* carry q2 footers 1–7 (keyed to the Damascene/Aristotle/Bernardus/Magister markers in the q2 body); the resume's claim was about the *a1-q1 → q2* seam (nothing of a1-q1's apparatus spills into q2), which is correct. Captured per the CLAUDE.md rule to ground-truth on the printed footer.

**`[?]` flags:** none — the region is fully legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 334 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum defectus in Christo fuerint a natura, an a voluntate.*

Tertio quaeritur de huiusmodi defectibus quantum ad causalitatem, et est quaestio, utrum in Christo fuerint a natura, an a voluntate. Et quod non a voluntate, sed a natura, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.* 1. Sapientiae primo[^p334-1]: *Deus mortem non fecit;* si non fecit mortem, ergo pari ratione nec defectum ordinatum ad mortem: ergo si in Christo fuit talis defectus, videtur, quod non fuerit ex voluntate assumentis, sed ex defectu naturae assumtae.

2. Item, defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed *deficientem*[^p334-2]; sed voluntas assumentis non ponitur causa *deficiens* alicuius: ergo tales defectus non potuerunt esse a voluntate assumentis; et fuerunt ex voluntate assumentis, vel ex conditione naturae assumtae: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod inest alicui a sua naturali origine inest ei per naturam[^p334-3]; sed huiusmodi defectus insunt Christo a sua prima origine: ergo videtur, quod insint ei a natura.

4. Item, illud in quo proles assimilatur parenti, est naturale proli, pro eo quod « natura est vis insita rebus, ex similibus similia procreans »[^p334-4]; sed Christus in defectu passibilitatis assimilatur Matri suae, a qua traxit originem: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi defectus et poenalitates sint ei naturales.

5. Item, per naturam prius fuit illud corpus formatum, quam esset unitum[^p334-5]; sed corpus illud statim, ut fuit formatum, fuit *passibile,* vel *impassibile;* et constat, quod non *impassibile:* ergo *passibilitatem* prius per naturam habuit, quam uniretur animae Christi, vel ipsi divinitati: ergo videtur, quod talis passibilitas non fuit a voluntate assumentis. *Si tu dicas,* quod hoc fuit a voluntate Spiritus sancti, qui fuit fabricator et sanctificator illius corporis[^p334-6]; *obiicitur,* quod gratia Spiritus sancti simul stat cum passibilitate et poena. Si ergo Spiritus sanctus superveniens compatiebatur secum passibilitatem, videtur, quod potius defectum passibilitatis sustinuerit, quam causaverit: igitur defectus huiusmodi in Christo non ex voluntate, sed ex natura fuerunt.

**Sed contra:** *Fundamenta.* 1. Magister in littera[^p334-7]: « Ex sola voluntate miserationis in se transtulit veram infirmitatem, sicut accepit veram carnem »: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnes defectus et poenalitates, quae in Christo fuerunt, per assumtionem fuisse dicuntur; sed *assumere* est actus voluntatis, non naturae[^p334-8]: ergo poenalitates illae fuerunt in Christo non naturaliter, sed voluntarie.

3. Item, qualitas corporis principaliter attribuenda est principio effectivo; sed Spiritus sanctus fuit principale principium effectivum corporis Christi: ergo qualitas passibilitatis magis debet attribui Spiritui sancto quam naturae. Sed Spiritus sanctus est operans per voluntatem: ergo tales defectus fuerunt in Christo a voluntate.

4. Item, poenalitas non sequitur secundum legem communem nisi naturam vitiatam et corruptam per culpam; sed caro Christi immunis fuit ab omni foeditate culpae[^p334-9]: ergo immunis fuit ab omni defectu passibilitatis: ergo si defectus passibilitatis habuit, hoc non fuit a natura, sed a voluntate.

5. Item, quod est in nobis a natura generantium dicitur esse *contractum:* ergo si huiusmodi defectus essent in Christo a natura generantis, essent ergo in ipso *contracti.* Si ergo hoc non conceditur[^p334-10], Christum defectus tales a natura contraxisse; videtur, quod illos non habuit a natura, sed a voluntate.

### Conclusio.

> Defectus, qui fuerunt in Christo, non fuerunt ex necessitate contracti, sed ex voluntate assumti, voluntate divina praeveniente, sed non infligente, et voluntate creata concomitante.

*Conclusio 1.* **Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^p334-11], ex alia et alia causa sunt isti defectus in *nobis* et in *Christo;* in *nobis* enim sunt ex necessitate *contracti,* sed in *Christo* sunt ex voluntate *assumti.* — *Explicatur.* Et hoc patet sic. Nos enim istos defectus a parentibus trahimus propter legem propagationis et legem concupiscentiae, quae militat in illis membris[^p334-12]; nam passibilis generat passibilem, et habens legem concupiscentiae in membris generat filium subiectum concupiscentiae, ex reatu cuius concupiscentiae insunt proli omnes poenalitates. Et

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propterea dicuntur istae poenalitates in nobis *contractae,* quasi ex concursu duorum tractae, videlicet propagationis naturae et corruptionis concupiscentiae[^p335-1]. — *Aliter in Christo.* In Christo autem secus est; ipse enim neutro modo fuit propagatus, nec secundum propagationem legis naturalis nec secundum corruptionem libidinis; sed Spiritus sanctus, adveniens in ipsam Virginem et ipsam fecundans, carnem eius ab omni foeditate corruptionis purificavit, passibilitatem tamen reliquit. Ex illa autem carne sapientia Patris, scilicet ipse Filius Dei, aedificavit sibi corpus immaculatum[^p335-2], et illud corpus univit sibi et animae rationali, quae quidem immunitatem habuit a culpa et in se et in carne coniuncta. Et sicut immunitatem habuit a reatu culpae, sic secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae immunitatem habere debuisset a passibilitate miseriae. Quod ergo in carne illa remansit poenalitas, hoc fuit ex dispensatione[^p335-3] ipsius assumentis, concurrente simul acceptione illius animae rationalis, quae in primo instanti suae creationis habuit usum cognitionis, et placuit sibi tali corpori uniri propter salutem generis humani. — *Conclusio 2.* Et sic patet, quod tales defectus in Christo fuerunt non necessitate generationis, sed voluntate dispensationis, voluntate, inquam, divina praeveniente, sed voluntate creata concomitante. *Conclusio 3.* Dico autem, ipsos fuisse a voluntate divina non tanquam ab *infligente* de novo, sed tanquam a *relinquente* et *acceptante,* cum in eius potestate et arbitrio esset defectus illos excludere. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus mortem non fecit; patet responsio: quia Deus illum defectum mortalitatis carni Christi non inflixit de novo, sed non abstulit, cum caro haberet illum a suo originali principio. *Notandum.* Ideo talis defectus non dicitur esse a voluntate assumentis sicut ab *efficiente,* sed sicut a *suscipiente*[^p335-4], cum posset excludere.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem; similiter patet responsio: quia tales defectus non habent ortum ab actione Dei agentis, sed potius ex defectu naturae ipsius Virginis concipientis. *Notandum.* Magis tamen attribuitur voluntati, quam attribuatur naturae, propter hoc quod in illius corporis constitutione plus fuit per virtutem supernaturalem quam per naturalem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud est a natura, quod est a naturali origine; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur aliquid esse a naturali origine, ita quod praepositio non solum dicat *concomitantiam,* sed etiam *causam*[^p335-5]. Huiusmodi autem defectus infuerunt Christo in principio suae originis, non tamen fuerunt secundum propagationem naturalem. Secundum enim naturalem propagationem tales defectus ortum habent a natura vitiata, in quantum natura illa agit quodam modo *naturaliter,* et quodam modo *vitiose;* hoc autem non habet veritatem in generatione Christi, quae fuit praeter vitium et supra naturam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in passibilitate assimilabatur Matri; dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo assimilaretur ei, nihilominus tamen in modo et causa reperitur differentia. Nam Virgo passibilitatem habet pro reatu peccati originalis ex necessitate contracto[^p335-6]; Christus vero passibilitatem habuit absque aliquo reatu in ipso reperto, ex[^p335-7] sola dispensatione divina. Et ideo non dicuntur omnino fuisse in Christo *a natura,* nec tamen fuerunt omnino *praeter naturam;* de natura enim Matris erat talem filium generare.

5. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod illud corpus prius fuit formatum quam unitum; dicendum, quod etsi prius fuerit secundum *naturam* vel secundum *ordinem* intelligendi, *tempore* tamen simul fuit formatio et unio; utrumque autem, scilicet[^p335-8] formationem et unionem, praecessit voluntas Verbi tale corpus formantis et assumentis, et voluntas animae utrumque concomitata est. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod defectus passibilitatis in carne praecesserit actum sive imperium voluntatis. Operatio enim ipsius Spiritus sancti in Virgine, quae quidem fuit secundum voluntatem Verbi, fecit ipsam carnis conceptionem et purgationem ab omni foeditate[^p335-9] *prius naturaliter,* quam uniretur animae; et cum tali purgatione non debet stare poenalitas secundum legem communem, secundum quam immunis a culpa debet esse immunis a poena. — Unde quod ipse subiungit, quod purgatio simul stat cum passibilitate; dicendum, quod etsi aliqua purgatio simul possit stare cum passibilitate, sicut purgatio, quae est a peccatis prius perpetratis; illa tamen puritas, quae fuit in Christo, stare non potuisset cum poenalitate, nisi intervenisset Dei dispensatio et voluntatis Christi acceptio. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.

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english:
### Question III. *Whether the defects in Christ were from nature or from will.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning defects of this kind as to their causality, and the question is whether in Christ they were from nature or from will. And that [they were] not from will, but from nature, [thus] it seems.

*To the opposite.* 1. Wisdom, chapter one[^p334-1]: *God made not death;* if he made not death, then by parity of reasoning neither a defect ordered to death: therefore if such a defect was in Christ, it seems that it was not from the will of the one assuming, but from a defect of the assumed nature.

2. Likewise, a defect has no efficient cause, but a *deficient* one[^p334-2]; but the will of the one assuming is not posited as a *deficient* cause of anything: therefore such defects could not be from the will of the one assuming; and they were [either] from the will of the one assuming, or from the condition of the assumed nature: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, what belongs to something from its natural origin belongs to it by nature[^p334-3]; but defects of this kind belong to Christ from his first origin: therefore it seems that they belong to him by nature.

4. Likewise, that in which the offspring is made like to the parent is natural to the offspring, by reason of the fact that « nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like things from like »[^p334-4]; but Christ in the defect of passibility is made like to his Mother, from whom he drew his origin: therefore it seems that defects and penalties of this kind are natural to him.

5. Likewise, by nature that body was first formed before it was united[^p334-5]; but that body, as soon as it was formed, was *passible* or *impassible;* and it is agreed that [it was] not *impassible:* therefore it had *passibility* by nature before it was united to Christ's soul, or to the divinity itself: therefore it seems that such passibility was not from the will of the one assuming. *If you say* that this was from the will of the Holy Spirit, who was the maker and sanctifier of that body[^p334-6]; *it is objected* that the grace of the Holy Spirit stands together with passibility and penalty. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit coming upon [it] suffered passibility along with itself, it seems that it rather sustained the defect of passibility than caused it: therefore defects of this kind in Christ were not from will, but from nature.

**On the contrary:** *Fundamenta.* 1. The Master in the text[^p334-7]: « From the will of mercy alone he transferred into himself true infirmity, just as he took true flesh »: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, all the defects and penalties that were in Christ are said to have been [in him] through assumption; but *to assume* is an act of will, not of nature[^p334-8]: therefore those penalties were in Christ not naturally, but voluntarily.

3. Likewise, the quality of a body is principally to be attributed to its effective principle; but the Holy Spirit was the principal effective principle of Christ's body: therefore the quality of passibility ought rather to be attributed to the Holy Spirit than to nature. But the Holy Spirit operates through will: therefore such defects were in Christ from will.

4. Likewise, a penalty does not follow according to the common law except [upon] a nature vitiated and corrupted through fault; but Christ's flesh was immune from all foulness of fault[^p334-9]: therefore it was immune from all defect of passibility: therefore if he had a defect of passibility, this was not from nature, but from will.

5. Likewise, what is in us from the nature of those who generate is said to be *contracted:* therefore if defects of this kind were in Christ from the nature of the one generating, they would therefore be *contracted* in him. If, therefore, it is not granted[^p334-10] that Christ contracted such defects from nature, it seems that he had them not from nature, but from will.

### Conclusio.

> The defects that were in Christ were not contracted by necessity, but assumed by will, the divine will going before, but not inflicting, and the created will accompanying.

*Conclusion 1.* **I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^p334-11], from one and another cause are these defects in *us* and in *Christ;* for in *us* they are *contracted* by necessity, but in *Christ* they are *assumed* by will. — *It is explained.* And this is plain thus. For we draw these defects from our parents on account of the law of propagation and the law of concupiscence, which wars in those members[^p334-12]; for a passible [parent] generates a passible [offspring], and one having the law of concupiscence in his members generates a son subject to concupiscence, from the guilt of which concupiscence all penalties belong to the offspring. And

therefore these penalties in us are called *contracted,* as drawn from the concurrence of two things, namely the propagation of nature and the corruption of concupiscence[^p335-1]. — *Otherwise in Christ.* In Christ, however, it is otherwise; for he was propagated in neither mode, neither according to the propagation of natural law nor according to the corruption of lust; but the Holy Spirit, coming upon the Virgin herself and making her fruitful, purified his flesh from all foulness of corruption, yet left passibility. From that flesh, however, the Wisdom of the Father, namely the Son of God himself, built for himself an immaculate body[^p335-2], and united that body to himself and to the rational soul, which indeed had immunity from fault both in itself and in the conjoined flesh. And just as it had immunity from the guilt of fault, so according to the order of divine justice it ought to have had immunity from the passibility of misery. That, therefore, penalty remained in that flesh, this was from the dispensation[^p335-3] of the one assuming, with the acceptance of that rational soul concurring at the same time, which in the first instant of its creation had the use of cognition, and it pleased him to be united to such a body for the salvation of the human race. — *Conclusion 2.* And so it is plain that such defects were in Christ not by the necessity of generation, but by the will of dispensation — by the will, I say, divine [and] going before, but by a created will accompanying. *Conclusion 3.* And I say that they were from the divine will not as from one *inflicting* anew, but as from one *leaving* [them] and *accepting* [them], since it was in his power and choice to exclude those defects. — Hence the reasons that are for this side are to be granted.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God made not death; the response is plain: because God did not inflict that defect of mortality anew upon Christ's flesh, but did not take it away, since the flesh had it from its original principle. *Note.* Therefore such a defect is not said to be from the will of the one assuming as from an *efficient* [cause], but as from one *receiving* [it][^p335-4], since he could exclude [it].

2. To that which is objected secondly, that a defect has no efficient cause, but a deficient one; likewise the response is plain: because such defects do not take their rise from the action of God acting, but rather from a defect of the nature of the conceiving Virgin herself. *Note.* Yet it is attributed more to will than it is attributed to nature, on account of the fact that in the constitution of that body there was more by supernatural power than by natural.

3. To that which is objected, that that is from nature which is from a natural origin; it must be said that this does not hold true, unless something be understood to be from a natural origin in such a way that the preposition denotes not only *concomitance,* but also *cause*[^p335-5]. But defects of this kind were in Christ at the beginning of his origin, yet they were not [there] according to natural propagation. For according to natural propagation such defects take their rise from a vitiated nature, inasmuch as that nature acts in a certain manner *naturally,* and in a certain manner *viciously;* but this does not hold true in the generation of Christ, which was beyond vice and above nature.

4. To that which is objected, that Christ in passibility was made like to his Mother; it must be said that, even if he were made like to her in some way, nonetheless a difference is found in the mode and the cause. For the Virgin has passibility on account of the guilt of original sin contracted by necessity[^p335-6]; but Christ had passibility without any guilt found in him, from[^p335-7] the divine dispensation alone. And therefore they are not said to have been in Christ altogether *from nature,* nor yet were they altogether *beyond nature;* for it was of the Mother's nature to generate such a son.

5. To that, then, which is objected, that that body was first formed before it was united; it must be said that, even if it were first [so] according to *nature* or according to the *order* of understanding, in *time* nonetheless the formation and the union were simultaneous; but both, namely[^p335-8] the formation and the union, were preceded by the will of the Word forming and assuming such a body, and the will of the soul accompanied both. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the defect of passibility in the flesh preceded the act or command of the will. For the operation of the Holy Spirit himself in the Virgin, which indeed was according to the will of the Word, brought about the very conception of the flesh and the purgation from all foulness[^p335-9] *first naturally,* before it was united to the soul; and with such a purgation a penalty ought not to stand according to the common law, according to which one immune from fault ought to be immune from penalty. — Hence as to what he himself adds, that purgation stands together with passibility; it must be said that, even if some purgation can stand together with passibility, such as the purgation that is from sins previously committed, that purity nonetheless which was in Christ could not have stood together with penalty, unless the dispensation of God and the acceptance of Christ's will had intervened. And so the response to the questions raised is plain.

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 2. Ibid. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — Vide *de minori,* in qua Vat. pro *deficiens* substituit *deficientis.* Paulo inferius Vat. inter *et fuerunt* ponit *tamen.*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 2. Ibid. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — See [it] *in the minor* [premise], in which the Vatican [edition] for *deficiens* substitutes *deficientis.* A little below, the Vatican [edition] places *tamen* between *et fuerunt.*

la: Vide supra pag. 108, nota 3.

en: See above p. 108, note 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 188, nota 1. — Mox pro *in defectu* edd. *ex defectu.* In fine solut. pro *sint* multi codd. *sunt,* cod. F *fuerunt.*

en: Cf. above p. 188, note 1. — Presently, for *in defectu* the editions [read] *ex defectu.* At the end of the solution, for *sint* many codices [read] *sunt,* codex F *fuerunt.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. ad 4.

en: Cf. above d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2, at [reply] 4.

la: De quo supra lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1. in fine, et d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro *obiicitur, quod* codd. A G H I L U V Z bb *obiicitur, quia.* Paulo inferius pro *compatiebatur secum passibilitatem* edd. *compatiebatur se cum passibilitate et pro causaverit* (aliqui codd. *creaverit*) cum aliquot codd. *curaverit.*

en: Concerning which [see] above the text of the Master, d. III. c. 1, at the end, and d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Thereupon, for *obiicitur, quod,* codices A G H I L U V Z bb [read] *obiicitur, quia.* A little below, for *compatiebatur secum passibilitatem* the editions [read] *compatiebatur se cum passibilitate;* and for *causaverit* (some codices *creaverit*) with several codices [read] *curaverit.*

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here c. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Cod. U pro *poenalitates* semper *passibilitates.*

en: Cf. above d. 3. a. 1. q. 1, in the body. — Codex U for *poenalitates* [reads] always *passibilitates.*

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: As was shown above d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1 and following.

la: Vide hic corp. quaest.

en: See here [in] the body of the question.

la: Respicitur illud Iac. 4, 1: *Unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne hinc? ex concupiscentiis vestris, quae militant in membris vestris?* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Reference is made to that [passage] of James 4, 1: *Whence wars and contentions among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences, which war in your members?* Cf. II Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Cod. K addit *quae militant in illis membris.*

en: Codex K adds *which war in those members.*

la: Respicitur illud Proverb. 9, 1: *Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum.* — Mox pro *sibi et animae* edd. *sibi cum anima,* cod. K *sibi et cum anima,* codd. G I L T aa *sibi et anima.*

en: Reference is made to that [passage] of Proverbs 9, 1: *Wisdom hath built herself a house.* — Presently, for *sibi et animae* the editions [read] *sibi cum anima,* codex K *sibi et cum anima,* codices G I L T aa *sibi et anima.*

la: Cod. W *ex sola dispensatione.*

en: Codex W [reads] *from the dispensation alone.*

la: Cod. U (N a secunda manu) *sustinente.*

en: Codex U (N by a second hand) [reads] *sustinente* [from one sustaining].

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 1. a. 2. q. 3, in the body.

la: De hac falsa opinione vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2, scholion.

en: Concerning this false opinion, see above d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, 2, the scholion.

la: Edd. *sed ex;* cod. A *et ex.*

en: The editions [read] *sed ex;* codex A *et ex.*

la: Edd. et multi codd. perperam *secundum.* Paulo inferius pro *et voluntas animae utrumque concomitata est* multi codd. perperam *et voluntatis animae utrumque communicata est.*

en: The editions and many codices wrongly [read] *secundum.* A little below, for *et voluntas animae utrumque concomitata est* many codices wrongly [read] *et voluntatis animae utrumque communicata est.*

la: Edd. addunt *immunem.* Pro *purgationem* non pauci codd. *praepurgationem,* edd. 1, 2 *propagationem.* Paulo superius pro *in Virgine* codd. A C D H I K L aa *in Virginem.*

en: The editions add *immunem.* For *purgationem* not a few codices [read] *praepurgationem,* editions 1, 2 *propagationem.* A little above, for *in Virgine* codices A C D H I K L aa [read] *in Virginem.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Manifesta est conclusio, quod praedicti defectus « in nobis sunt ex necessitate *contracti,* sed in Christo sunt ex voluntate *assumti* » (hic in corp.). Nam illud proprie dicitur *contrahi,* quod « simul cum sua causa ex necessitate trahitur... Et ideo illi proprie dicuntur hos defectus *contrahere,* qui ex debito peccati hos defectus incurrunt » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 14. a. 3.). Nihilominus hi defectus consequebantur naturam humanam et principia eius naturalia, nec fuerunt « a voluntate divina tanquam *infligente* de novo, sed tanquam a *relinquente* » (hic in corp.), « cum caro haberet illum (defectum mortis) a suo originali principio » (hic ad 1. et cfr. ad 2.). Huic doctrinae consentit S. Thom. (loc. cit. a. 3.) docens, Christum assumsisse *necessitatem naturalem* (non *necessitatem coactionis*) his defectibus subiacendi, quatenus « haec necessitas causatur ex principiis carnis humanae ». Plura de hac necessitate patiendi et moriendi vide infra d. 16. a. 1. q. 3.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 1. praecipue ad 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. locc. citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. in principio.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is manifest, that the aforesaid defects « in us are *contracted* by necessity, but in Christ are *assumed* by will » (here in the body). For that is properly said to be *contracted* which « is drawn by necessity together with its cause... And therefore those are properly said to *contract* these defects who from the debt of sin incur these defects » (St. Thomas, *S.* III. q. 14. a. 3). Nonetheless these defects followed upon human nature and its natural principles, nor were they « from the divine will as *inflicting* [them] anew, but as *leaving* [them] » (here in the body), « since the flesh had it (the defect of death) from its original principle » (here at [reply] 1 and cf. at [reply] 2). With this doctrine St. Thomas agrees (loc. cit. a. 3), teaching that Christ assumed a *natural necessity* (not a *necessity of coercion*) of being subject to these defects, inasmuch as « this necessity is caused from the principles of human flesh ». More concerning this necessity of suffering and dying, see below d. 16. a. 1. q. 3.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. III. q. 5. m. 1, especially at [reply] 3. — Scotus, in both his Writings, III. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; *S.* in the places cited. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 4. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1, at the beginning.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p33{4,5,6}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`, PDF pp.356–358 = printed pp.334–336, offset pdf = printed + 22), per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override. The IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 23388–23528) cascade-shattered the page footers and the Respondeo/Solutio; the PDF column read is authoritative throughout. Running heads confirmed eyes-on: p.334 `334 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.335 `DIST. XV. ART. I. QUAEST. III. 335`; p.336 `336 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (the `SCHOLION` page).

**Alignment confirmed.** Opener `Tertio quaeritur de huiusmodi defectibus quantum ad causalitatem, et est quaestio, utrum in Christo fuerint a natura, an a voluntate` matches `title_la` — this is ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO III, the last quaestio of the article. No q-swap. The prior range's `334 SENTENTIARUM` running head was overshoot (q2 ended at the foot of p.333); q3 genuinely begins at the top of p.334.

**Page-split map.**
- p.334: opener; *Ad oppositum* args 1–5; *Sed contra / Fundamenta* args 1–5 (q2's "5th" here is the `Item, quod est in nobis a natura generantium` argument); Conclusio (`Defectus, qui fuerunt in Christo, non fuerunt ex necessitate contracti…`); Respondeo (*Conclusio 1* + *Explicatur*) opening. Footers **1–12** (`[^p334-1..12]`; L column footer carries 1–6, R column footer carries 7–12 — a single continuous per-page sequence split across the two footer bands).
- p.335: Respondeo continues (*Aliter in Christo;* *Conclusio 2; Conclusio 3*) + *Solutio oppositorum* replies 1–5, ending `Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.` Footers **1–9** (`[^p335-1..9]`; L footer 1–6, R footer 7–9).
- p.336: SCHOLION §I–§II only. **The p.336 SCHOLION carries no apparatus of its own** — the footnote band on p.336 (Damasc. *de Fide orthod.* / Ambros. *de Spiritu S.* / Leo *Serm. 34* / *scientia inflat* / Cor. cit.) belongs to **ARTICULUS II QUAESTIO I**, which opens immediately below the scholion. Total q3 apparatus = **21** entries.

**has_scholion — CORRECTION TO HAND-OFF (verify-before-asserting).** The brief and `next-session-resume.md` instructed `has_scholion: false` on the premise that a1-q1's scholion §I forward-covers all three quaestiones. **This is not borne out by the source.** p.336 carries a distinct, q3-specific SCHOLION (`I. Manifesta est conclusio, quod praedicti defectus « in nobis sunt ex necessitate contracti, sed in Christo sunt ex voluntate assumti »…`) that comments directly on q3's own conclusion, plus a §II author-survey (Alex. Hal., Scot., S. Thom. *here q. 1. a. 3*, B. Albert. *a. 7,* Richard., Dionys.). a1-q1's scholion §I/§II/§III explicitly handles only q1 and q2 (§I: "Concerning the conclusions of the three questions… no doubt"; §II "De 1. quaestione"; §III "De hac 2. quaestione" — **there is no §IV for q3**). Dropping the p.336 scholion would lose genuine source content, so this chunk is set **`has_scholion: true`** with the §I–§II scholion translated in full. Flagging the deviation here per guard-rail discipline.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up — NONE.* q3 opens at the top of p.334 (raw 23388); q2 closed cleanly at the foot of p.333. No footer migrated forward (p.333's footers were all consumed by q2; q3's apparatus restarts on p.334).
- *Forwarded to d15-a2-q1:* **ARTICULUS II** (`Consequenter quaeritur de defectibus a Christo assumtis in speciali`) opens at **raw ~23529**, immediately below the q3 scholion on **p.336 R column**. Per the locked Vol II/III chunking convention, the short ARTICULUS II opener + its sub-title (`De defectibus a Christo assumtis in speciali`) + the 3-question listing (`Primo… ignorantiam in rationali; Secundo… tristitiam in concupiscibili; Tertio… iram in potentia irascibili`) **fold into a2-q1** (no standalone a2-divisio chunk). QUAESTIO I (`Utrum Christus habuerit ignorantiam in rationali`) opens on p.336 R, continues onto p.337. **Migrating footers:** the p.336 footer band (`[^p336-1..5]` in a2-q1's numbering: Damasc. *Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 21;* Ambros. *de Incarn. domin. sacram.;* Leo *Serm. 34;* *scientia inflat* = 1 Cor. 8, 1; cf. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.) belongs entirely to **a2-q1** and must be captured there. **a2-q1's own scholion status is undetermined** — verify on the page where ARTICULUS II's questions close whether a2-q1 carries its own scholion or is forward-covered.

**[?] flags:** none — region fully legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 15, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De defectibus a Christo assumtis in speciali.*

Consequenter quaeritur de defectibus a Christo assumtis in speciali. Et circa hoc tria quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum habuerit ignorantiam in rationali.

Secundo, utrum habuerit tristitiam in concupiscibili.

Tertio, utrum habuerit iram in potentia irascibili.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus habuerit ignorantiam in rationali.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus habuerit ignorantiam in rationali. Et quod sic, videtur:

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Primo auctoritate Damasceni[^p336-1]: « Oportet scire, quod servilem et ignorantem naturam assumsit »; loquitur de Verbo incarnato: ergo natura assumta in Christo fuit ignorans, habuit igitur defectum ignorantiae.

2. Item, Ambrosius in libro primo de Spiritu sancto[^p336-2]: « Per humanam imprudentiam quod adhuc non didicit ignorat »: ergo habuit ignorantiam.

3. Item, Leo Papa in Homilia de Epiphania[^p336-3]: « Adoraverunt infantem, in nullo ab aliorum generalitate discretum »; sed generaliter alii infantes sunt ignorantes: ergo et Christus in sua infantia habuit ignorantiam.

4. Item, *scientia inflat*[^p336-4]; sed Christus summe se humiliavit et defectus illos assumsit, qui faciunt ad humilitatem: ergo habuit in se defectum et inopiam scientiae. Sed iste defectus est ignorantia: ergo etc.

5. Item, Christus in sua infantia habuit defectum eloquentiae, quamvis esset Verbum Patris, ut veritatem humanae naturae in se ostenderet[^p336-5]: ergo pari ratione, quamvis esset sapientia Patris, secundum humanam naturam debuit habere defectum sapientiae. Sed hic est ignorantia: ergo etc.

6. Item, quamvis Christus esset virtus Patris — iuxta illud quod dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios primo: *Dicimus Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam* — habuit tamen defectum virium iuxta exigentiam humanae naturae: videtur igitur pari ratione, quod habuerit defectum sapientiae.

**Sed contra:**

1. Assumtio carnis fuit opus divinae sapientiae; sed sapientia, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est principium ignorantiae: ergo Christus non assumsit defectum illum, qui est ignorantia[^p337-1].

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2. Item, Christus venerat nos docere; sed ignorantis non est docere: ergo non debuit ignorantiam assumere.

3. Item, nulli nisi scienti credendum est; sed Christus ad hoc venit in carnem, ut crederemus in eum[^p337-2]: ergo videtur, quod cum sapientia debuerit venire, non cum ignorantia.

4. Item, anima illa non potuit uniri Verbo, quin esset deiformis[^p337-3]; sed deiformitas tollit obscuritatem ignorantiae: ergo videtur, quod impossibile fuerit, Christum secundum humanam naturam defectum ignorantiae in se assumere.

### Conclusio.

> Christus non habuit defectum ignorantiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^p337-4], Christus non habuit defectum ignorantiae. — Et ratio huius est: quia nec ipsum decebat, nec nobis expediebat. Ipsum non decebat, quia anima eius debuit esse deiformis, ac per hoc repleta luce sapientiae et rectitudine iustitiae; ignorantia autem privatio est scientiae et potest esse via in errorem et obliquationem a rectitudine iustitiae, ac per hoc Christo non competebat. — Nobis etiam non expediebat, quos venerat redimere et dirigere. Si enim defectum ignorantiae habuisset, nos redimere nescivisset; dirigere etiam nescivisset, quia et, *si caecus caeco ducatum praebeat, ambo in foveam cadunt*[^p337-5]. — Et ideo nec ipsum decebat, nec nobis expediebat, quod talem defectum assumeret. — Concedendum est igitur, Christum defectum ignorantiae nequaquam in se habuisse. Et rationes ad hoc inductae sunt concedendae.

**Solutio oppositorum:**

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod assumsit naturam servilem et ignorantem; dicendum, quod ignorantia et servilitas non attribuitur naturae assumtae ratione illius singularis naturae, quae fuit Verbo copulata in unitatem personae, sed quantum ad alias naturas consimiles in specie, quasi dicat: assumsit naturam nostram, quae est ignorans, non in Christo, sed in nobis[^p337-6].

2. Ad illud Ambrosii, quod dicitur, Christum ignorasse quod non didicit; dicendum, quod quaedam est scientia *simplicis notitiae*, quaedam *experientiae*. Ambrosius autem non loquitur ibi de ignorantia, prout dicit privationem *cuiuscumque scientiae*, sed prout dicit privationem *experientiae*, secundum quod in praecedentibus[^p337-7] determinatum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Leone Papa, quod infans ille in nullo erat ab aliorum generalitate discretus; dicendum, quod Leo Papa loquitur quantum ad ea quae exterius apparebant; nam quantum ad ea quae intrinsecus latebant[^p337-8], in multis ab aliis differebat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *scientia inflat*; dicendum, quod est loqui de scientia, prout est *absque caritate*, vel prout est *caritati coniuncta*. Si, prout est *a caritate divisa*, sic dicit Apostolus, quod inflat. Si autem, prout est *caritati coniuncta*, sic non est via ad inflationem, sed potius ad rectitudinem et aedificationem et humilitatem. Ex cognitione enim sui et Dei consurgit perfectio humilitatis; et hoc secundo modo fuit in Christo[^p337-9].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Christo fuit defectus eloquentiae, ergo similiter et sapientiae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia in defectu eloquentiae, sicut in aliis necessitatibus infantilibus, manifestabatur veritas naturae assumtae; defectus autem sapientiae interius latet; ideo ad nihil valuisset, si in Christo fuisset. Et ideo non est simile.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus, Dei virtus, habuit defectum virium; dicendum, quod non est simile, tum quia defectus virium exterius apparebat et in carne erat, defectus vero sapientiae interius erat in anima, quae ad unionem sui cum Verbo a primordio debuit esse perfecte disposita; tum etiam, quia defectus virium est materia exercendae virtutis, non sic autem defectus cognitionis, quin potius[^p337-10] impedit. Ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

english:
### Article II. *On the defects assumed by Christ in particular.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the defects assumed by Christ in particular. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether he had ignorance in the rational [faculty].

Second, whether he had sorrow in the concupiscible [faculty].

Third, whether he had anger in the irascible power.

### Question I. *Whether Christ had ignorance in the rational [faculty].*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether Christ had ignorance in the rational [faculty]. And that he did, it seems:

**For the opposite:**

1. First, by the authority of Damascene[^p336-1]: "It must be known that he assumed a servile and ignorant nature"; he speaks of the Word incarnate: therefore the nature assumed in Christ was ignorant, and so it had the defect of ignorance.

2. Likewise, Ambrose in the first book *On the Holy Spirit*[^p336-2]: "Through human imprudence he is ignorant of what he has not yet learned": therefore he had ignorance.

3. Likewise, Pope Leo in the Homily *On the Epiphany*[^p336-3]: "They adored the infant, in no way distinguished from the generality of others"; but in general other infants are ignorant: therefore Christ too in his infancy had ignorance.

4. Likewise, *knowledge puffs up*[^p336-4]; but Christ humbled himself utterly and assumed those defects which make for humility: therefore he had in himself a defect and lack of knowledge. But this defect is ignorance: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, Christ in his infancy had a defect of eloquence, although he was the Word of the Father, in order to show in himself the truth of human nature[^p336-5]: therefore by parity of reasoning, although he was the wisdom of the Father, according to human nature he ought to have had a defect of wisdom. But this is ignorance: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, although Christ was the power of the Father — according to that which the Apostle says in the first [Epistle] to the Corinthians, chapter one: *We declare Christ to be the power of God and the wisdom of God* — yet he had a defect of strength according to the exigency of human nature: it seems therefore by parity of reasoning that he had a defect of wisdom.

**On the contrary:**

1. The assumption of flesh was the work of divine wisdom; but wisdom, as such, is not the principle of ignorance: therefore Christ did not assume that defect which is ignorance[^p337-1].

2. Likewise, Christ had come to teach us; but it does not belong to one who is ignorant to teach: therefore he ought not to assume ignorance.

3. Likewise, one is to be believed only if he is knowing; but Christ came in the flesh to this end, that we might believe in him[^p337-2]: therefore it seems that he ought to have come with wisdom, not with ignorance.

4. Likewise, that soul could not be united to the Word without being deiform[^p337-3]; but deiformity removes the obscurity of ignorance: therefore it seems that it was impossible for Christ to assume in himself, according to human nature, the defect of ignorance.

### Conclusion.

> Christ did not have the defect of ignorance.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^p337-4], Christ did not have the defect of ignorance. — And the reason for this is: because it neither befitted him, nor was expedient for us. It did not befit him, because his soul ought to be deiform, and by this filled with the light of wisdom and the rectitude of justice; but ignorance is a privation of knowledge and can be a way into error and a deviation from the rectitude of justice, and by this it did not pertain to Christ. — Nor was it expedient for us, whom he had come to redeem and to direct. For if he had had the defect of ignorance, he would not have known how to redeem us; he would also not have known how to direct us, because indeed, *if a blind man gives guidance to a blind man, both fall into the pit*[^p337-5]. — And therefore it neither befitted him, nor was expedient for us, that he should assume such a defect. — It must therefore be granted that Christ in no way had the defect of ignorance in himself. And the reasons adduced for this are to be granted.

**Solution of the opposing [arguments]:**

1. To that which is objected from Damascene, that he assumed a servile and ignorant nature; it must be said that ignorance and servility are not attributed to the assumed nature by reason of that singular nature which was joined to the Word in unity of person, but as regards the other natures similar in species, as if to say: he assumed our nature, which is ignorant — not in Christ, but in us[^p337-6].

2. To that of Ambrose, where it is said that Christ was ignorant of what he had not learned; it must be said that one kind of knowledge is of *simple cognition*, another of *experience*. But Ambrose is not there speaking of ignorance insofar as it signifies the privation of *any knowledge whatever*, but insofar as it signifies the privation of *experience*, according to what was determined in the preceding [questions][^p337-7].

3. To that which is objected concerning Pope Leo, that that infant was in no way distinguished from the generality of others; it must be said that Pope Leo is speaking as regards those things which appeared outwardly; for as regards those things which lay hidden within[^p337-8], he differed from others in many respects.

4. To that which is objected, that *knowledge puffs up*; it must be said that one may speak of knowledge either insofar as it is *without charity*, or insofar as it is *conjoined to charity*. If insofar as it is *divided from charity*, then the Apostle says that it puffs up. But if insofar as it is *conjoined to charity*, then it is not a way to inflation, but rather to rectitude and edification and humility. For from the knowledge of oneself and of God arises the perfection of humility; and in this second way it was in Christ[^p337-9].

5. To that which is objected, that in Christ there was a defect of eloquence, therefore likewise also of wisdom; it must be said that it is not similar, because in the defect of eloquence, as in the other infantile necessities, the truth of the assumed nature was made manifest; but the defect of wisdom lies hidden within; therefore it would have been of no avail, had it been in Christ. And therefore it is not similar.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ, the power of God, had a defect of strength; it must be said that it is not similar, both because the defect of strength appeared outwardly and was in the flesh, whereas the defect of wisdom was inwardly in the soul, which from the beginning ought to have been perfectly disposed for its union with the Word; and also because the defect of strength is matter for the exercise of virtue, but not so the defect of cognition, which rather[^p337-10] impedes it. Therefore it is not similar on the one side and the other.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 21. — Mox pro *Verbo incarnato* multi codd. *Verbo increato*, et dein pro *in Christo* fere omnes codd. *in ipso.*

en: [John Damascene,] Book III of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 21. — Presently, for *Word incarnate* many codices [read] *Word uncreated*, and then for *in Christ* nearly all codices [read] *in him.*

la: Ita codd. et edd., sed re vera locus cit. invenitur in Ambrosii libro *de Incarn. domin. sacram.* c. 7. n. 74, olim III. *de Spiritu* S. Vide supra pag. 274, nota 7.

en: Thus the codices and editions, but in fact the cited passage is found in Ambrose's book *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*, c. 7, n. 74, formerly [book] III *On the Holy Spirit.* See above, p. 274, note 7.

la: Serm. 34. (alias 33.) c. 3: *Viderunt et adoraverunt [Magi] puerum, quantitate parvulum, alienae opis indigum, fandi impotem, et in nullo ab humanae infantiae generalitate dissimilem.*

en: Sermon 34 (otherwise 33), c. 3: *The [Magi] saw and adored the boy, small in size, in need of another's aid, unable to speak, and in no way unlike the generality of human infancy.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 8, 1.

en: [Paul's] Epistle, 1 Cor. 8:1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — Mox post *humanam naturam* edd. subdunt *tamen*, et non pauci codd. deinde pro *sed hic* substituunt *sed haec.*

en: Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1. — Presently, after *human nature* the editions add *yet*, and not a few codices then, for *but this* [masc.], substitute *but these* [fem.].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 286, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, p. 286, note 5.

la: Codd. G I L T aa et alii ante *ut crederemus in eum* superflue et inepte interserunt *et*; melior et fortasse vera lectio est codd. AN *ut crederemus ei* et *ut crederemus in eum.*

en: Codices G I L T aa and others superfluously and ineptly insert *and* before *that we might believe in him*; the better and perhaps the true reading is that of codices A N, *that we might believe him* and *that we might believe in him.*

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. — Cod. K voci *Verbo* praefigit *cum.*

en: See above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 13, a. 1, q. 1. — Codex K prefixes *with* to the word *Word.*

en: Here [in the text], c. 1.

la: Matth. 15, 14. Vulgata: *ducatum praestet.*

en: Matt. 15:14. The Vulgate: *gives guidance.*

en: Cf. above, d. 9, a. 1, q. 1, reply to 6, and d. 14, a. 3, q. 1, reply to 1.

la: Dist. 14. a. 3. q. 2. De seq. solut. vide ibid. nec non lit. Magistri, d. XIII. — Paulo superius pro *non didicit* cod. A *non didicerat.*

en: Dist. 14, a. 3, q. 2. On the following solution see ibid., as also the text of the Master, d. XIII. — A little above, for *he has not learned* codex A [reads] *he had not learned.*

la: Edd., paulo ante pro *nam* substituto *non*, hic addunt *per quae*, et subinde cod. M solutionem terminat sic: *in multis aliis differebant.*

en: The editions, a little before, having substituted *not* for *for*, here add *by which*, and thereupon codex M ends the solution thus: *they differed in many other respects.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 223, nota 1. — In initio solut. post *prout est absque caritate* Vat. addit *et a caritate divisa*, et inferius pro *humilitatem* codd. A T Z substituunt *humiliationem.*

en: Cf. above, p. 223, note 1. — At the beginning of the solution, after *insofar as it is without charity* the Vatican [edition] adds *and divided from charity*, and below, for *humility* codices A T Z substitute *humiliation.*

la: Pro *quin potius* cod. U *quoniam plus.*

en: For *which rather* codex U [reads] *since more.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Circa hanc quaestionem cfr. auctor aliique supra d. 14. per totam. Specialiter de eadem agunt Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 2. a. 1. § 1, et S. Thom., S. III. q. 13. a. 3.

**II.** Seq. (2.) quaestio solvitur secundum triplicem distinctionem tristitiae (cfr. hic dub. 4.). Aliis verbis, sed in conformi sententia, distinguit S. Thom. (S. loc. cit. a. 4.) triplicem differentiam, quae est inter passiones nostras atque Christi, scilicet secundum *obiectum, principium* atque *effectum*.

De hac quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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**III.** Etiam in ultima (3.) quaestione solvenda omnes consentiunt, et conclusio iam sequitur ex doctrina 2. quaestionis, cum ira sit *effectus tristitiae*, ut docet S. Thom. (S. III. q. 15. a. 9. et alibi). Alii Scholastici etiam de passione *timoris* solent specialem quaestionem instituere, de qua S. Bonav. agit hic dub. 3.

De 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 5. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning this question cf. the author and others above, d. 14, throughout. Treating of the same in particular are Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 5. m. 2. a. 1. § 1, and St. Thomas, S. III. q. 13. a. 3.

**II.** The following (2nd) question is solved according to a threefold distinction of sorrow (cf. here dub. 4.). In other words, but in a conformable sense, St. Thomas (S. loc. cit. a. 4.) distinguishes a threefold difference which exists between our passions and Christ's, namely according to *object, principle*, and *effect*.

On this question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — Scotus, in both Writings here, one question. — St. Thomas, here a. 2. little-question 1; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. little-question 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 2. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**III.** In the last (3rd) question to be solved likewise all agree, and the conclusion already follows from the doctrine of the 2nd question, since anger is the *effect of sorrow*, as St. Thomas teaches (S. III. q. 15. a. 9. and elsewhere). Other Scholastics are also accustomed to set up a special question on the passion of *fear*, on which St. Bonaventure treats here in dub. 3.

On the 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 5. — St. Thomas, here loc. cit. little-question 2; S. loc. cit. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. little-question 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p33{6,7,8}-{L,R}-*.png`), read Left column top→bottom then Right, body then footers (Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion). Raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` ~23529–23655) used only to confirm boundaries and footnote-marker spacing. Running heads confirmed eyes-on: p.336 `336 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.337 `DIST. XV. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 337`; p.338 `338 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Alignment confirmed.** ART. II opener `Consequenter quaeritur de defectibus a Christo assumtis in speciali … Primo quaeritur, utrum habuerit ignorantiam in rationali` + q1 opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus habuerit ignorantiam in rationali` both match `title_la` — this is ART. II q1, not q2/q3. No q-swap.

**Chunking convention.** Per the locked Vol II/III convention, the short ARTICULUS II opener + sub-title (`De defectibus a Christo assumtis in speciali`) + the 3-question listing are folded into a2-q1 (no standalone a2-divisio chunk).

**Page-split map.**
- p.336 (R column top carries the prior chunk's q3 scholion §II tail; this chunk begins lower): ART. II opener + 3-question listing + q1 opener + *Ad oppositum* args 1–6 + *Sed contra* 1. Footers `[^p336-1..5]`.
- p.337: *Sed contra* 2–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + *Solutio oppositorum* (Ad 1–6) + Scholion §I and §II (down to `De hac quaestione …`). Footers `[^p337-1..10]`. Note: the p.337 footer numbered "1" (`Cfr. supra pag. 286, nota 5.`) is the reference for the *Sed contra 1* argument; its body anchor sits at the p.336/337 column seam (the *Sed contra 1* sentence opens on p.336 R and completes at the seam), so the marker `[^p337-1]` is placed on `… qui est ignorantia` and the footer is rendered as a proper p.337 entry. No duplicate-slug collision.
- p.338: Scholion §III (continuation of the q1 scholion's survey). No body footnotes on p.338 (the page footer band is the scholion's bibliographic continuation, already inline in §II/§III).

**Scholion status.** a2-q1 **has its own scholion** (§I–§III). §I solves q1 proper; **§II forward-covers q2** (passio tristitiae) and **§III forward-covers q3** (ira). Per the locked Vol II/III pattern, sibling chunks a2-q2 and a2-q3 may therefore carry **no scholion of their own** — do not treat their missing scholion as an error; the q1 scholion §II/§III is their `pro quaest. seq.` coverage. Documented here for the a2-q2 dispatch.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up* — **p.336 footers 1–5** (`[^p336-1..5]`: Damasc. *de Fide orthod.*; Ambros. *de Incarn. domin. sacram.*; Leo *Serm. 34*; *scientia inflat* = 1 Cor. 8:1; cf. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.), forwarded from d15-a1-q3 (a1-q3 consumed none of p.336's footer band). All five are this chunk's body footers.
- *Forwarded* to **d15-a2-q2** (raw ~23656): **QUAESTIO II** (`Utrum in Christo fuerit passio tristitiae`) opens at the bottom of p.338 L/R and continues onto p.339+. The **p.338 footer band belongs to a2-q2** (the *Fundamenta* args' notes: August., *de Civ. Dei*; Damasc., *de Fide orthod.*; Seneca *Epist. 86 / de Clementia / de Tranquillitate*; etc.) — capture those as a2-q2's first apparatus block. a2-q2's scholion is **forward-covered by this q1 scholion §II** (see above), so a2-q2 likely carries no standalone scholion — verify on the page where its CONCLUSIO closes.

**[?] flags.** None. The region is fully legible at 450 dpi; no genuine OCR ambiguity remains. (The p.337 footer-1 anchor placement is noted in the page-split map above, not an ambiguity.)


title: Dist. 15, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in Christo fuerit passio tristitiae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerit passio tristitiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*
1. Matthaei vigesimo sexto[^p338-1]: *Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem:* si ergo veritas falsitatem dicere non poterat, videtur, quod veraciter tristis erat.

2. Item, Christus flevit super Ierusalem, secundum quod dicitur Lucae decimo nono[^p338-2]; sed fletus signum est interioris moeroris: ergo si Christus nihil fecit per duplicitatem, veraciter habuit in se affectum tristitiae.

3. Item, Christus amabat et desiderabat nostram salutem; sed qui amat aliquid tristatur de eius amissione[^p338-3]: ergo cum Christus videret multos salutem suam negligere, videtur, quod pro eis verum senserit in se affectum tristitiae.

4. Item, quanto sunt in aliquo maiora viscera pietatis, tanto magis compatitur afflictis; et quanto magis compatitur interius, tanto magis moerore afficitur; sed Christus habuit in se abundantissima viscera pietatis: ergo videtur, quod in aliorum necessitatibus et infirmitatibus veraciter et intense habuit passionem tristitiae[^p338-4].

**Ad oppositum:**
**Sed contra:** 1. Isaiae quadragesimo secundo[^p338-5]: *Non erit tristis neque turbulentus,* dicitur de Christo: ergo Christus neque turbationem neque tristitiam habuit in se.

2. Item, Proverbiorum duodecimo[^p338-6]: *Non contristabit iustum, quidquid ei acciderit;* sed Christus fuit iustissimus: ergo videtur, quod Christus de nullo sibi accidente fuerit contristatus.

3. Item, Seneca[^p338-7] probat multiplici ratione, quod « tristitia non cadit in sapientem », et fundamentum suae rationis est, quia « virtutem nihil potest laedere, sicut nihil eam potest auferre »: ergo si Christus vere sapiens fuit et virtutem inconcussam habuit, videtur, quod passionem tristitiae in se non habuerit.

4. Item, nullus tristatur, nisi de eo quod fit contra voluntatem suam[^p338-8]; sed contra voluntatem Christi nihil fieri potuit, quia in omnibus impleta fuit: ergo non videtur, quod in se veraciter tristitiam habuerit.

### Conclusio.

> In Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est, sed tantum, secundum quod dictabat ei ratio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^p338-9], et textus etiam evangelicus confirmat, in Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est. *Conclusio 1.* Est enim quaedam tristitia, quae est praeter rationis imperium; et est tristitia, quae est contra rationis iudicium rectum; et est tristitia, quae est subiecta rationis imperio et iudicio. *Triplex tristitia.* Et illa tristitia est praeter rationis imperium[^p338-10], quae consurgit ex quadam necessitate et surreptione, sicut motus primi; et haec quidem communis est sapientibus et insipientibus, et bonis et malis. — Illa vero tristitia est contra rationis iudicium rectum, in qua ratio subiicitur sensualitati nec tantum turbatur, sed etiam perturbatur. — Illa autem est secundum rationis imperium et iudicium, quando quis tristatur, ratione dictante et suadente, ipsum tantum et taliter super aliquo debere tristari.

*Conclusio 2.* Dico ergo, quod in Christo fuit tristitia tantum isto tertio modo, quia de nullo tristatus fuit, nisi secundum quod dictabat ei ratio. Et hoc idem in

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nuitur Ioannis undecimo[^p339-1], ubi dicitur: *Iesus autem infremuit spiritu et turbavit semetipsum;* in quo ostenditur, quod turbatio et tristitia rationi non praesidebat, sed subiacebat. Primis autem duobus modis non fuit in Christo tristitia. — Per hoc patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas. *Ad argumenta.* Nam rationes ad primam partem procedunt de tristitia secundum tertium modum; rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt secundum primum modum et secundum: et hoc patet discurrenti per singulas.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. 2. 3. Quod enim dicitur in Isaia: *Non erit tristis* etc.; hoc non excludit quamcumque tristitiam, sed tristitiam perturbantem. — Similiter illud quod dicitur in Proverbiis: *Non contristabit iustum* etc.; intelligitur de illa tristitia, quae statum mentis evertit, non de illa tristitia, qua quis tristatur compatiendo alii[^p339-2], vel etiam refugiendo aliquod malum illatum sibi. — Similiter illud quod dicit Seneca, intelligendum est. Seneca enim non vult probare, quod tristitia turbans non sit in sapiente, sed quod non est in sapiente tristitia perturbans. *Quid perturbatio.* Perturbatio autem dicit deflexionem rationis ab aequitate[^p339-3]; et hoc modo sapiens nec tristatur nec perturbatur. Non vult autem ostendere Seneca, quod sapiens nullo modo turbetur; hoc enim est quasi impossibile in aliquo reperiri; et praeterea, nec turbari, vel non tristari, de quibus homo debet, id non est sapientiae, sed potius duritiae, *Notandum.* cum dicat Apostolus ad Romanos duodecimo[^p339-4]: *Gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus.*

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod nihil contra voluntatem Christi evenit; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de voluntate rationis absoluta, non autem verum est de voluntate sensualitatis, vel de voluntate conditionata. Tristitia autem non tantum insurgit ex voluntate rationis absoluta, sed etiam secundum alias differentias, sicut melius manifestabitur infra[^p339-5], cum agetur de voluntate Christi.

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether there was a passion of sorrow in Christ.*

Secondly it is asked, whether there was a passion of sorrow in Christ. And that there was, seems [to follow].

*Foundations.*
1. Matthew twenty-six[^p338-1]: *My soul is sorrowful even unto death:* if therefore the Truth could not utter a falsehood, it seems that he was truly sorrowful.

2. Likewise, Christ wept over Jerusalem, according to what is said in Luke nineteen[^p338-2]; but weeping is a sign of inward grief: therefore, since Christ did nothing through duplicity, he truly had in himself an affect of sorrow.

3. Likewise, Christ loved and desired our salvation; but whoever loves something is saddened at its loss[^p338-3]: therefore, since Christ saw many neglecting their own salvation, it seems that on their account he truly felt in himself an affect of sorrow.

4. Likewise, the greater the bowels of compassion are in someone, the more he has compassion for the afflicted; and the more he has compassion inwardly, the more he is affected by grief; but Christ had in himself the most abundant bowels of compassion: therefore it seems that in the necessities and infirmities of others he truly and intensely had the passion of sorrow[^p338-4].

**To the opposite:**
**On the contrary:** 1. Isaiah forty-two[^p338-5]: *He shall not be sorrowful nor turbulent,* is said of Christ: therefore Christ had in himself neither disturbance nor sorrow.

2. Likewise, Proverbs twelve[^p338-6]: *Whatever may befall him, it shall not sadden the just man;* but Christ was most just: therefore it seems that Christ was saddened by nothing befalling him.

3. Likewise, Seneca[^p338-7] proves by manifold reasoning that « sorrow does not fall upon the wise man », and the foundation of his reasoning is that « nothing can injure virtue, just as nothing can take it away »: therefore if Christ was truly wise and had unshaken virtue, it seems that he did not have the passion of sorrow in himself.

4. Likewise, no one is saddened except over that which happens against his own will[^p338-8]; but nothing could happen against Christ's will, since in all things it was fulfilled: therefore it does not seem that he truly had sorrow in himself.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ there was true sorrow, yet not in every manner in which it is in us, but only according to what reason dictated to him.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt, as the Master says in the text[^p338-9], and the evangelical text also confirms, in Christ there was true sorrow, yet not in every manner in which it is in us. *Conclusion 1.* For there is a certain sorrow which is apart from the command of reason; and there is a sorrow which is against the right judgment of reason; and there is a sorrow which is subject to the command and judgment of reason. *Threefold sorrow.* And that sorrow is apart from the command of reason[^p338-10] which arises from a certain necessity and stealth, like the first movements; and this indeed is common to the wise and the foolish, and to the good and the bad. — But that sorrow is against the right judgment of reason in which reason is subjected to sensuality and is not only disturbed but even thrown into turmoil. — But that [sorrow] is according to the command and judgment of reason, when someone is saddened, reason dictating and persuading, that he ought to be saddened only so much and in such a way over something.

*Conclusion 2.* I say therefore that in Christ there was sorrow only in this third manner, because he was saddened over nothing except according to what reason dictated to him. And this same thing is in

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timated in John eleven[^p339-1], where it is said: *But Jesus groaned in spirit and troubled himself;* in which it is shown that disturbance and sorrow did not preside over reason, but lay subject to it. But in the first two manners there was no sorrow in Christ. — Through this is clear the response to the arguments adduced for either side. *To the arguments.* For the arguments for the first part proceed concerning sorrow in the third manner; but the arguments to the opposite proceed according to the first manner and the second: and this is clear to one running through them one by one.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].*
1, 2, 3. For what is said in Isaiah: *He shall not be sorrowful* etc.; this does not exclude every sorrow, but disturbing sorrow. — Similarly what is said in Proverbs: *It shall not sadden the just man* etc.; is understood of that sorrow which overturns the state of the mind, not of that sorrow by which someone is saddened in having compassion for another[^p339-2], or even in fleeing some evil inflicted upon himself. — Similarly what Seneca says must be understood. For Seneca does not wish to prove that disturbing sorrow is not in the wise man, but that there is not in the wise man a sorrow that throws into turmoil. *What turmoil is.* Now turmoil means a deflection of reason from rectitude[^p339-3]; and in this manner the wise man is neither saddened nor thrown into turmoil. But Seneca does not wish to show that the wise man is in no way disturbed; for this is well-nigh impossible to be found in anyone; and moreover, neither to be disturbed, nor not to be saddened, over the things by which a man ought [to be], that is not [a mark] of wisdom but rather of hardness, *Note.* since the Apostle says to the Romans twelve[^p339-4]: *To rejoice with those who rejoice, and to weep with those who weep.*

4. But to that which is objected, that nothing happens against Christ's will; it must be said that this is true of the absolute will of reason, but it is not true of the will of sensuality, or of the conditioned will. Now sorrow does not only arise from the absolute will of reason, but also according to other differences, as will be better made manifest below[^p339-5], when the will of Christ is treated.

---

en: Verse 38. [Matthew 26:38.]

la: August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2: « Amor ergo... fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia est ». Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. cum Nemesio, episc. Emeseno (lib. de Natura hominis, c. 17.), docet, quod « exspectatum malum [constituat] timorem, praesens vero tristitiam » [λύπην].

en: Augustine, *City of God* XIV, c. 7, n. 2: « Love therefore... fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and if, perceiving it, this should happen, it is sorrow ». Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 12, together with Nemesius, bishop of Emesa (in the book *On the Nature of Man*, c. 17), teaches that « an awaited evil [constitutes] fear, but a present one sorrow » [λύπην].

la: Cfr. Luc. 19, 41. seqq.

en: Cf. Luke 19:41 ff.

en: Verse 4. [Isaiah 42:4.]

en: Verse 21. [Proverbs 12:21.]

la: Epist. 86. Idem II. de Clementia, c. 5. ait: Aegritudo autem in sapientem virum non cadit. Serena enim eius mens est, nec quidquam incidere potest, quod illam obducat. Nihil aeque hominem quam magnus animus decet. Non potest autem magnus esse idem, si metus et moeror contundit, si mentem obducit et contrahit etc. Et II. de Tranquillitate vitae ad Serenum, c. 7. ait: Denique validius debet esse quod laedit, eo quod laeditur. Non est autem fortior nequitia virtute. Non potest ergo laedi sapiens c. 8. etc.

en: *Letter* 86. The same author, *On Clemency* II, c. 5, says: But sickness [of soul] does not fall upon a wise man. For his mind is serene, and nothing can befall it that would becloud it. Nothing so befits a man as a great soul. But one cannot be the same and great, if fear and grief crush it, if it beclouds and contracts the mind, etc. And in *On the Tranquillity of Life, to Serenus* II, c. 7, he says: Finally, that which injures must be stronger than that which is injured. But wickedness is not stronger than virtue. The wise man therefore cannot be injured, c. 8, etc.

la: Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 1. seqq. et XIV. c. 8. n. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. Augustine, *City of God* IX, c. 4, n. 1 ff. and XIV, c. 8, n. 1 ff.

la: Hic c. 1. [Magister, in littera.]

en: Here, c. 1. [The Master, in the text.]

la: August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2: Animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. — Cod. U: Et istarum prima scilicet praeter rationis imperium etiam consurgit etc.

en: Augustine, *City of God* XIV, c. 15, n. 2: The pain of the soul, which is called sorrow, is a dissension from those things which have happened to us against our will. — Codex U: And the first of these, namely [that which is] apart from the command of reason, also arises, etc.

la: Ioan. 11, 33. Cod. F cum Vulgata: Infremuit spiritu et turbavit se ipsum. Cfr. q. praeced. in corp.

en: John 11:33. Codex F, with the Vulgate: He groaned in spirit and troubled himself. Cf. the preceding question in the body.

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. *aliis.* Edd. 1, 2 subinde omittunt *vel etiam,* cuius loco codd. F I K L N perperam posuerunt *scilicet,* et pro *refugiendo* edd. 1, 2 exhibent *removendo,* codd. G I L T aut *resurgendo.*

en: The editions, with a few codices, [read] *to others.* Editions 1, 2 thereupon omit *or even,* in whose place codices F I K L N wrongly put *namely,* and for *fleeing* editions 1, 2 give *removing,* codices G I L T either *rising again.*

la: Zeno apud Ciceronem, IV. Tuscul. Disput. c. 6, perturbationem sive passionem definit « aversam a recta ratione contra naturam commotionem ». — Pro *Perturbatio autem* cod. A *Perturbatio enim.*

en: Zeno, in Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* IV, c. 6, defines turmoil or passion as « a commotion turned away from right reason, contrary to nature ». — For *But turmoil* codex A [reads] *For turmoil.*

la: Vers. 15. Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 3. et XIV. c. 8. n. 3. — Paulo ante pro *tristari* codd. G K Z bb *contristari,* et mox pro *duritiae* cod. Z *dementiae.* [Rom. 12, 15.]

en: Verse 15. Cf. Augustine, *City of God* IX, c. 4, n. 3 and XIV, c. 8, n. 3. — A little before, for *to be saddened* codices G K Z bb [read] *to be saddened together,* and shortly after, for *of hardness* codex Z [reads] *of madness.* [Romans 12:15.]

la: Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 3. Cf. also I Sentences, d. 48, a. 2, q. 2, and dubium 4. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p33{8,9}-{L,R}-*.png`), per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the two-column Respondeo + footers). Printed **pp. 338–339** (PDF 360–361; offset pdf = printed + 22). Running heads confirmed eyes-on: p.338 `338 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.339 `DIST. XV. ART. II. QUAEST. III. 339` (the running head reads QUAEST. III because q3 dominates the lower part of p.339, but the upper-left column is still q2's *Ad argumenta* / *Solutio* tail).

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**Page-split map.**
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