title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De gratiae quidditate.*
### Quaestio V. *Utrum gratia primo insit substantiae animae, vel potentiis.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum gratia primo insit substantiae animae, vel potentiis. Et quod primo insit substantiae, videtur.

1. Nulla potentia animae est continue in suo actu; sed gratia est continue in suo actu, quia continue reddit hominem Deo acceptum et gratum: ergo gratia non est in potentiis animae.

2. Item, gratia est vita animae, sicut dicunt Sanctorum auctoritates et etiam doctores[^1]; sed vivere, cum sit actus substantialis, non inest substantiae per potentias, sed potentiis per substantiam: ergo si primus actus gratiae est vivificare, videtur, quod prius respiciat substantiam quam potentias.

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3. Item, accidens habet numerari per suum proprium subiectum[^2]: ergo si gratia primo est in potentiis, cum potentiae sint multae, necesse est, gratiam in anima multiplicari. Si ergo in una anima una tantum est gratia, videtur, quod gratia primo sit in substantia quam in potentia.

4. Item, in gratia et virtutibus consistit imago reformationis[^3]; sed imago reformationis respondet imagini creationis: cum igitur imago creationis consistat in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, et tres sint habitus virtutum, qui respiciunt tres potentias, videtur, quod sit aliquid unum, quod respiciat ipsam animae essentiam; sed non est nisi gratia: ergo etc.

5. Item, sicut operatio exit a potentia, sic potentia oritur a substantia: ergo sicut non placet nec acceptatur a Deo aliqua operatio, nisi prius acceptetur et gratificetur potentia, sic impossibile est acceptari potentiam, nisi prius acceptetur substantia: ergo cum per gratiam fiat acceptatio, per prius est gratia in substantia quam in potentia[^4].

6. Item, in parvulis baptizatis est Deus per inhabitantem gratiam, sicut dicit Augustinus de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum[^5]: ergo cum in ipsis nulla sit potentia expedita, gratia non respicit primum expeditionem potentiae, sed potius vivificationem substantiae, et sic per prius est in substantia quam in potentia.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus[^6] dicit, quod «gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum»: ergo residet in anima ratione liberi arbitrii; sed liberum arbitrium nominat potentiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Magister in littera[^7] adducit auctoritatem Augustini, in qua dividit gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem, et utramque istarum definit per comparationem ad voluntatem: ergo videtur, quod primum et proprium subiectum gratiae est ipsa voluntas. Sed haec est potentia: ergo videtur, quod gratia per prius insit potentiae quam substantiae.

3. Item, sicut inter potentiam et actum cadit medius habitus, sic inter substantiam et habitum cadit media potentia. Cum igitur gratia sit in anima ut habitus et qualitas quaedam, videtur, quod ei insit mediante potentia: ergo per prius est in potentia quam in substantia.

4. Item, «opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem[^8]»; sed gratia ut gratia opponitur culpae in quantum culpa: si ergo culpa primo et proprie respicit arbitrii libertatem, pari ratione et gratia: ergo per prius erit in potentia quam in substantia.

5. Item, gratia, cum sit donum desursum descendens[^9], inest animae secundum suum supremum; sed supremum animae, sicut vult Augustinus, est ipsa mens; mens autem non est ipsa substantia animae, sed potius potentia suprema: ergo videtur, quod gratia per prius sit in potentia.

6. Item, gratia habet existere in anima secundum conversionem ipsius animae ad Deum, et amitti habet secundum aversionem. Si igitur illud, secundum quod anima primo avertitur et convertitur, hoc est potentia: videtur, quod gratia[^10] per prius sit in potentia quam in substantia.

7. Item, gratia non est in anima secundum se ipsam, sed secundum influentiam ab aliquo principio, quod est omnino ab ea diversum. Cum igitur anima suscipit gratiam, aut habet aliquam potentiam ad suscipiendam gratiam, aut non. Si non habet potentiam ad hoc[^11]: ergo nunquam eam suscipiet. Si autem habet potentiam, mediante qua suscipit, aut illa erit ratio, aut voluntas, aut aliqua alia potentia ab his diversa; sed non est ponere potentiam aliam in anima praeter cognitivam et affectivam[^12]: ergo videtur, quod mediantibus illis gratia suscipiatur ab anima.

8. Item, si gratia inesset animae secundum substantiam, cum possibile sit abstrahi[^13] per intellectum substantiam a potentiis, possibile esset intelligere, animam esse gratam, suis potentiis abstractis; sed omnis anima grata est disposita ad gloriam: ergo potest intelligi per consequens anima gloriosa, abstractis potentiis. Sed potentiis abstractis, anima nec videt nec amat Deum: ergo impossibile est animam gloriosam ponere, quae nec Deum videt nec Deum amat. Sed si hoc est impossibile: ergo et illud ex quo istud sequitur.

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### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Gratia inest animae primo secundum libertatem arbitrii, et dicitur respicere substantiam, quia habet esse in potentiis, ut continuantur ad unam essentiam.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod communis opinio tenet, gratiam primo respicere animae substantiam, et virtutes primo respicere potentias, ut sic per gratiam in virtutibus fiat reformatio imaginis creatae, quae consistit in trinitate potentiarum et unitate substantiae. Haec autem positio dupliciter potest intelligi.

Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod Deus prius influat gratiam in essentiam, et postmodum influentia illa in[^14] substantia redundet in potentias, ut sic sit conformitas gratiae ad animam, sive prout consideratur secundum rationem imaginis, sive prout consideratur ut perfectio corporis. Anima enim, ut est perfectio corporis, ratione suae substantiae vel essentiae respicit complexionis aequalitatem[^15]; ratione vero potentiarum respicit organorum diversitatem. Et iterum, anima in se et *vivere* habet et *agere*; sed *vivere* per se ipsam et propriam formam, *agere* vero per potentiam. Per hunc modum, si gratia in perficiendo conformatur animae[^16], sub ratione gratiae prius debet respicere ipsam animae substantiam, et per virtutes debet esse perfectio potentiarum. Et secundum hunc modum dicendi, cum dicitur *gratia* respicere substantiam, et *virtutes* potentias, non tantum intelligitur esse dictum per appropriationem, verum etiam per proprietatem.

Alio modo potest intelligi praedicta positio per appropriationem quandam, non quia Deus prius influat gratiam in substantiam quam in potentiam, sed quia, cum anima suscipiat gratiam et virtutes mediante potentia, et[^17] tam gratia quam virtus insit animae per potentiam, aliter tamen inest haec et illa. *Virtus* enim dicit perfectionem respectu operis, *gratia* vero dicit perfectionem respectu Dei acceptantis. Et quoniam respectu operum potentiae distinguuntur, hinc est, quod virtutes potentias respiciunt ut distinctas, et tunc sunt in actu, quando potentiae sunt in actu. Potentiae autem, in quantum comparantur ad Deum acceptantem, unica acceptatione acceptantur cum ipsa substantia, cuius sunt[^18], et secundum unam naturam in eis repertam. Et hinc est, quod gratia est una, sicut et substantia, et est semper in actu continuo; et primo dicitur respicere substantiam, non quia sit in illa absque potentia, vel per prius quam in potentia, sed quia habet esse in potentiis, ut continuantur ad unam essentiam[^19]. *Virtus* vero dicitur esse in potentiis, quia in eis est, ut referuntur ad operationes diversas.

Et hic modus intelligendi magis consonus est verbis Augustini, qui dicit, quod «gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum»; qui etiam gratiam cooperantem et operantem describit per comparationem ad voluntatem. — Magis etiam est consonus rationi. Si enim intelligimus gratiam tanquam habitum quendam et influentiam, quae inest animae ad Deum conversae; cum talis habilitatio et influentiae susceptio et conversio non possit intelligi nisi per potentiam, non videtur posse recte intelligi, quomodo gratia sit in anima, abstracta potentia. — Rursus, si gratia eo dicitur gratia, quia gratificat, et eo ipso quod gratificat, habet oppositionem ad culpam; cum «opposita secundum idem nata sint inesse», secundum idem ipsum anima nata est gratificari, secundum quod nata est et culpari. Culpatio autem et laus et vituperium inest animae primo secundum liberum arbitrium, ac per hoc et gratiae donum. Non enim quaecumque acceptatio gratificatio dicitur, sed illa sola, qua Deus sic acceptat animam, ut reputet eam remuneratione dignam, et talis respicit ipsam arbitrii libertatem. Et ideo gratia inest animae primo secundum libertatem arbitrii; et huius signum est, quia ad eas solas potentias se extendit, ad quas se extendit arbitrii libertas. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod gratia inest animae secundum potentias. Ad rationes autem ad oppositum facile est respondere per iam dicta.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod gratia est continua[^20] in suo actu; non obviat ei quod nunc dictum est. Quamvis enim potentia in relatione ad opus non sit in suo actu continuo, et sic non habeat perfici *gratia*, sed *virtute*; in comparatione tamen ad substantiam, in qua est, est in suo actu continuo. Ita enim debetur quoddam *vivere* et quidam actus continuus ipsis potentiis, secundum quod continuantur ipsi substantiae, quemadmodum et ipsi substantiae; et ideo secundum hanc comparationem a gratia sunt perfectibiles. — Aliter etiam posset hic dici, quod duplex est actus ipsius formae: unus, qui est a forma per modum informantis; et alter, qui est a forma per modum efficientis, sicut albedo subiectum suum dealbat et oculum disgregat[^21]. Quantum ad primum est omnis forma in actu continuo, quia ille est actus ut habitus; quantum vero ad secundum, non.

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Sic et gratia, quamvis sit in suo actu continuo quantum ad illum actum, quem habet per modum *informantis*, non tamen est in actu continuo quantum ad illum, quem habet per modum *praevenientis* et *subsequentis*, sive *cooperantis* et *operantis*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de actu vivificandi, dicendum, quod etsi vita, secundum quod dicit esse primum, primo respiciat ipsam essentiam quam potentiam; non tamen oportet de vita, secundum quod dicit esse secundum. Cum enim sit accidens superadditum non tantum essentiae, sed etiam potentiae; habet animae inesse, potentia mediante, sicut color dicitur esse in corpore, ita quod primo in superficie.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidens numeratur per subiectum; dicendum, quod verum est, quando ea quae subiiciuntur, diversa sunt et subiiciuntur ut diversa. Quando vero per eandem naturam subiiciuntur, non oportet, esse in accidente diversitatem; et sic gratia est in potentiis animae, in quantum continuantur ad unam substantiam, et in quantum communicant in libertate arbitrii, sicut prius dictum est. Unde, sicut una sanitas dicitur esse in omnibus membris hominis, quia est in ipsis, secundum quod ad unam originem reducuntur, et secundum quod in complexione conveniunt; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de conformitate imaginis creationis et reformationis, dicendum, quod cum deformatio imaginis non possit esse nisi per potentias, sic nec reformatio; et ideo imago reformationis in quantum huiusmodi sufficienter reformat ipsam animam, cum inest ei per suas potentias. Potentiis enim formatis[^22] et perfectis, per consequens perficitur et formatur ipsa substantia. Ideo ad perfectam reformationem animae non oportet aliquid poni, quod per prius sit in substantia quam in potentia, nisi hoc dicatur per appropriationem quandam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non acceptat actum, nisi prius acceptando potentiam; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod potentia potest esse sine actu, et gratia in potentia absque merito operis. Substantia autem absque potentia esse non potest; et si possit intelligi, non tamen potest intelligi absque potentiis divina dona suscipere, in quibus donis decorari dicitur facies animae eo genere decoris, per quem[^23] Deus acceptat.

6. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur de parvulis, dicendum, quod etsi potentiae in parvulo non sint idoneae ad exeundum in usum gratiae et virtutum; nihilominus tamen idoneae sunt non solum per donum gratiae, sed etiam per habitus virtutum decorari et perfici. Et hoc melius declaratur in quarto[^24], cum agitur de effectu baptismatis, quem habet in parvulis.

english:
### Article unique. *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question V. *Whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul, or in the potencies.*

Fifth, it is asked whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul, or in the potencies. And that it is present first in the substance, it seems.

1. No potency of the soul is continuously in its act; but grace is continuously in its act, because it continuously renders a man accepted and pleasing to God: therefore grace is not in the potencies of the soul.

2. Likewise, grace is the life of the soul, as the authorities of the Saints and also the doctors say[^1]; but to live, since it is a substantial act, is not present to the substance through the potencies, but to the potencies through the substance: therefore if the first act of grace is to vivify, it seems that it regards the substance prior to the potencies.

3. Likewise, an accident is numbered by its own proper subject[^2]: therefore if grace is first in the potencies, since the potencies are many, it is necessary that grace be multiplied in the soul. If therefore in one soul there is only one grace, it seems that grace is first in the substance rather than in a potency.

4. Likewise, in grace and the virtues consists the image of reformation[^3]; but the image of reformation corresponds to the image of creation: since therefore the image of creation consists in the unity of essence and the trinity of potencies, and there are three habits of the virtues, which regard the three potencies, it seems that there is some one thing that regards the very essence of the soul; but this is nothing but grace: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, just as operation goes forth from a potency, so a potency arises from the substance: therefore just as no operation is pleasing nor accepted by God unless first the potency is accepted and made pleasing, so it is impossible for a potency to be accepted unless first the substance is accepted: therefore, since acceptance comes about through grace, grace is prior in the substance rather than in a potency[^4].

6. Likewise, in baptized infants God is present through indwelling grace, as Augustine says in the letter on the presence of God, to Dardanus[^5]: therefore, since in them there is no potency ready [for use], grace does not regard first the readiness of a potency, but rather the vivification of the substance, and thus it is prior in the substance rather than in a potency.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine[^6] says that «grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»: therefore it resides in the soul by reason of free choice; but free choice names a potency: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text[^7] adduces an authority of Augustine, in which he divides grace into prevenient and subsequent, and defines each of these by comparison to the will: therefore it seems that the first and proper subject of grace is the will itself. But this is a potency: therefore it seems that grace is present prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

3. Likewise, just as between potency and act there falls a mediating habit, so between substance and habit there falls a mediating potency. Since therefore grace is in the soul as a habit and a certain quality, it seems that it is present to it by the mediation of a potency: therefore it is prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

4. Likewise, «opposites are by nature brought to be about the same thing[^8]»; but grace as grace is opposed to fault inasmuch as it is fault: if therefore fault first and properly regards the freedom of choice, by the same reasoning so too does grace: therefore it will be prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

5. Likewise, grace, since it is a gift descending from above[^9], is present to the soul according to its highest part; but the highest part of the soul, as Augustine holds, is the mind itself; but the mind is not the substance itself of the soul, but rather the highest potency: therefore it seems that grace is prior in a potency.

6. Likewise, grace has its existence in the soul according to the soul's conversion to God, and is lost according to its aversion. If therefore that according to which the soul is first turned away and turned [back] is a potency: it seems that grace[^10] is prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

7. Likewise, grace is not in the soul according to itself, but according to an influence from some principle that is altogether diverse from it. Since therefore the soul receives grace, either it has some potency for receiving grace, or it does not. If it does not have a potency for this[^11]: therefore it will never receive it. But if it has a potency by the mediation of which it receives, either that will be reason, or will, or some other potency diverse from these; but there is no positing another potency in the soul besides the cognitive and the affective[^12]: therefore it seems that grace is received by the soul by the mediation of these.

8. Likewise, if grace were present to the soul according to substance, since it is possible to abstract[^13] the substance from the potencies by the intellect, it would be possible to understand the soul to be pleasing, with its potencies abstracted; but every pleasing soul is disposed to glory: therefore consequently a glorious soul could be understood with the potencies abstracted. But with the potencies abstracted, the soul neither sees nor loves God: therefore it is impossible to posit a glorious soul that neither sees God nor loves God. But if this is impossible: therefore also that from which this follows.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Grace is present to the soul first according to the freedom of choice, and is said to regard the substance because it has being in the potencies as they are continued into one essence.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the common opinion holds that grace first regards the substance of the soul, and the virtues first regard the potencies, so that thus through grace in the virtues there comes about the reformation of the created image, which consists in the trinity of potencies and the unity of substance. But this position can be understood in two ways.

In one way, so that it be understood that God first infuses grace into the essence, and afterward that influence overflows in[^14] the substance into the potencies, so that thus there is a conformity of grace to the soul, whether it be considered according to the account of the image, or considered as the perfection of the body. For the soul, as it is the perfection of the body, by reason of its substance or essence regards the balance of the complexion[^15]; but by reason of the potencies it regards the diversity of the organs. And again, the soul in itself both has *to live* and *to act*; but *to live* through itself and its own form, *to act* through a potency. In this way, if grace in perfecting is conformed to the soul[^16], under the account of grace it ought first to regard the very substance of the soul, and through the virtues there ought to be the perfection of the potencies. And according to this manner of speaking, when *grace* is said to regard the substance, and the *virtues* the potencies, this is understood to be said not only by appropriation, but even by propriety.

In another way the aforesaid position can be understood by a certain appropriation, not because God first infuses grace into the substance rather than into a potency, but because, since the soul receives grace and the virtues by the mediation of a potency, and[^17] both grace and virtue are present to the soul through a potency, yet the one and the other are present in different ways. For *virtue* expresses perfection with respect to a work, but *grace* expresses perfection with respect to God who accepts. And since with respect to works the potencies are distinguished, hence it is that the virtues regard the potencies as distinct, and are then in act when the potencies are in act. But the potencies, inasmuch as they are compared to God who accepts, are accepted by a single acceptance together with the very substance whose they are[^18], and according to one nature found in them. And hence it is that grace is one, just as the substance is, and is always in continuous act; and it is said first to regard the substance, not because it is in it apart from a potency, or prior to being in the potency, but because it has being in the potencies as they are continued into one essence[^19]. But *virtue* is said to be in the potencies because it is in them as they are referred to diverse operations.

And this manner of understanding is more consonant with the words of Augustine, who says that «grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»; who also describes cooperating and operating grace by comparison to the will. — It is also more consonant with reason. For if we understand grace as a certain habit and influence, which is present to the soul turned to God; since such an enabling and the reception of the influence and the conversion cannot be understood except through a potency, it does not seem that it can rightly be understood how grace is in the soul with the potency abstracted. — Again, if grace is called grace because it makes pleasing, and by the very fact that it makes pleasing it has an opposition to fault; since «opposites are by nature present according to the same thing», according to the same very thing the soul is by nature made pleasing, according to which it is by nature also faulted. But faulting and praise and blame are present to the soul first according to free choice, and through this so too is the gift of grace. For not just any acceptance is called a making-pleasing, but only that by which God so accepts the soul that He reckons it worthy of reward, and such [acceptance] regards the very freedom of choice. And therefore grace is present to the soul first according to the freedom of choice; and a sign of this is that it extends itself to those potencies alone to which the freedom of choice extends itself. — The reasons showing that grace is present to the soul according to the potencies are therefore to be granted. But to the reasons to the contrary it is easy to respond through what has already been said.

1. As for what is objected, that grace is continuous[^20] in its act; this does not stand against what has now been said. For although a potency in relation to a work is not in its continuous act, and thus is not perfected by *grace* but by *virtue*; nevertheless in comparison to the substance in which it is, it is in its continuous act. For thus a certain *living* and a certain continuous act is owed to the potencies themselves, insofar as they are continued to the substance itself, just as also to the substance itself; and therefore according to this comparison they are perfectible by grace. — It could also be said here in another way, that the act of the form itself is twofold: one, which is from the form by way of *informing*; and another, which is from the form by way of *efficiency*, as whiteness whitens its subject and dilates the eye[^21]. As to the first, every form is in continuous act, because that is the act as a habit; but as to the second, not.

So too grace, although it is in its continuous act as to that act which it has by way of *informing*, is nevertheless not in continuous act as to that which it has by way of *prevenient* and *subsequent*, or *cooperating* and *operating*.

2. To what is objected concerning the act of vivifying, it must be said that although life, according as it expresses the first being, first regards the essence itself rather than a potency; nevertheless this need not hold of life according as it expresses the second being. For since it is an accident superadded not only to the essence but also to the potency, it is present to the soul by the mediation of a potency, as color is said to be in the body, in such a way that it is first in the surface.

3. To what is objected, that an accident is numbered by its subject; it must be said that this is true when those things that are subjected are diverse and are subjected as diverse. But when they are subjected through the same nature, there need be no diversity in the accident; and thus grace is in the potencies of the soul inasmuch as they are continued into one substance, and inasmuch as they share in the freedom of choice, as was said before. Hence, just as one health is said to be in all the members of a man because it is in them according as they are reduced to one origin, and according as they agree in complexion; so too it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

4. To what is objected concerning the conformity of the image of creation and of reformation, it must be said that since the deformation of the image cannot be except through the potencies, so neither can the reformation; and therefore the image of reformation as such sufficiently reforms the soul itself when it is present to it through its potencies. For when the potencies are formed[^22] and perfected, consequently the substance itself is also perfected and formed. Therefore for the perfect reformation of the soul there is no need to posit something that is prior in the substance rather than in a potency, unless this be said by a certain appropriation.

5. To what is objected, that God does not accept an act unless first accepting the potency; it must be said that it is not similar, because a potency can be without act, and grace [can be] in a potency without the merit of a work. But the substance cannot be without a potency; and even if it could be understood [so], yet it cannot be understood to receive the divine gifts apart from the potencies, in which gifts the face of the soul is said to be adorned by that kind of adornment by which[^23] God accepts.

6. To the last [objection] which is raised concerning infants, it must be said that although the potencies in an infant are not fit for going forth into the use of grace and the virtues; nevertheless they are fit to be adorned and perfected not only by the gift of grace, but also by the habits of the virtues. And this is better explained in the fourth [book][^24], where the effect of baptism, which it has in infants, is treated.

la: August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 47. n. 8; XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2; de Natura et gratia, c. 23. n. 2-5. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 633, nota 5, ubi ii notati sunt loci, in quibus per oppositionem ad peccatum Deus dicitur *vita animae*; nec non Hugo de S. Vict., de Arrha animae. — De *minori* cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. et 37. (c. 2. et 4.).

en: Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, tract. 47, n. 8; *City of God* XIII, c. 2; *On Nature and Grace*, c. 23, nn. 2–5. Cf. also above p. 633, note 5, where the passages are noted in which, by opposition to sin, God is called *the life of the soul*; and also Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Betrothal-Gift of the Soul*. — On the minor premise cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, texts 24 and 37 (c. 2 and 4).

la: Vide supra pag. 119, nota 8. — In fine arg. pro *in potentia* Vat. *in potentiis*.

en: See above p. 119, note 8. — At the end of the argument, for *in potentia* the Vatican edition reads *in potentiis*.

la: Sicut dictum est supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

en: As was said above at d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vat. *potentiis*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *potentiis*.

la: Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 6. n. 21. — Paulo inferius pro *primum* codd. F K T V et alii cum primis edd. *primum*, Vat. *primo*.

en: Letter 187 (alias 57), c. 6, n. 21. — A little below, for *primum* codices F K T V and others, with the first editions, read *primum*, the Vatican edition *primo*.

la: Vide supra pag. 600, nota 6.

en: See above p. 600, note 6.

la: Hic c. 2. seqq.

en: Here, c. 2 ff.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Paulo inferius pro *arbitrii libertatem* Vat. *arbitrium liberum*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter on Opposites, and *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7). — A little below, for *arbitrii libertatem* the Vatican edition reads *arbitrium liberum*.

la: Iac. 1, 17. — Sententia Augustini habetur VI. de Trin. c. 9. n. 10, ubi S. Doctor sic loquitur: *Si enim mentem recte dicimus principale hominis, id est tanquam caput humanae substantiae* etc. Cfr. etiam ibid. XIV. c. 8. n. 11, ubi mens praedicatur illud «quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius»; et supra pag. 45, nota 3. — In fine arg. cod. aa subiungit *quam in substantia*.

en: James 1:17. — The opinion of Augustine is found in *On the Trinity* VI, c. 9, n. 10, where the holy Doctor speaks thus: *For if we rightly call the mind the principal part of man, that is, as it were the head of the human substance*, etc. Cf. also ibid. XIV, c. 8, n. 11, where the mind is predicated to be that «than which our nature has nothing better»; and above p. 45, note 3. — At the end of the argument codex aa adds *quam in substantia* ("than in the substance").

la: Edd. cum multis codd. perperam *anima*; ed. nostra sequitur codd. H K O (T a secunda manu) Y aa. Paulo ante Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pluribus codd., inter quos F aa, omittit *hoc*.

en: The editions, with many codices, wrongly read *anima* ("the soul"); our edition follows codices H K O (T by a second hand) Y aa. A little before, the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4 and several codices, among which F aa, omits *hoc* ("this").

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *ad suscipiendum*. Paulo superius pro *ab ea* plurimi codd. cum primis edd. *ab eo*; non recte.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *ad suscipiendum*. A little above, for *ab ea* very many codices, with the first editions, read *ab eo*; not rightly.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. p. I. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 23, p. I, q. 2, in the body.

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 *abstrahere*.

en: Codex cc, with edition 1, reads *abstrahere*.

la: Ed. 1 cum cod. cc *ex*.

en: Edition 1, with codex cc, reads *ex*.

la: Vide supra d. 17. a. 2. q. 3. De secunda ratione cfr. ibid. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 6.

en: See above d. 17, a. 2, q. 3. On the second reason cf. ibid. a. 1, q. 2, fundamentum 6.

la: Cod. X hic bene subiicit *tunc gratia*.

en: Codex X here fittingly subjoins *tunc gratia* ("then grace").

la: Ed. 1 omittit *et*, quod accipias pro *etiam*.

en: Edition 1 omits *et*, which you may take for *etiam* ("also").

la: Cod. aa hic addit *sit una*, qua lectione admissa, vocula *cum* paulo superius sumenda est ut coniunctio.

en: Codex aa here adds *sit una* ("be one"), on which reading, once admitted, the little word *cum* a little above is to be taken as a conjunction.

la: Cod. B. *unam potentiam et essentiam*, cod. F *unam ipsam essentiam*, cod. aa *unum esse*.

en: Codex B reads *unam potentiam et essentiam*, codex F *unam ipsam essentiam*, codex aa *unum esse*.

la: Vat. supplet *gratia*.

en: The Vatican edition supplies *gratia*.

la: Cod. bb *continuo*, Vat. *continue*. — Aristot. in diversis locis, ut I. Topic. c. 13; III. c. 1. (c. 5.); VII. c. 2; X. Metaph. text. 23. (IX. c. 7.), definiens colorem album, propter hunc effectum dicit, quod sit «disgregativus visum», et definiens colorem nigrum ait, quod sit «congregativus visum». — Paulo superius pro *Aliter etiam* cod. H *Aliter tamen*, cod. aa *Aliter autem*, et subinde pro *posset hic* cod. T *posset hoc*.

en: Codex bb reads *continuo*, the Vatican edition *continue*. — Aristotle in diverse places, as *Topics* I, c. 13; III, c. 1 (c. 5); VII, c. 2; *Metaphysics* X, text 23 (IX, c. 7), in defining the color white, on account of this effect says that it is «that which dilates the sight», and in defining the color black says that it is «that which contracts the sight». — A little above, for *Aliter etiam* codex H reads *Aliter tamen*, codex aa *Aliter autem*, and thereupon for *posset hic* codex T reads *posset hoc*.

la: Vat. *reformatis*. Paulo inferius post *prius sit in* cod. F addit *sua*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *reformatis*. A little below, after *prius sit in*, codex F adds *sua*.

la: Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 *quod*.

en: Codices aa, cc and edition 1 read *quod*.

la: Dist. 4. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — Cod. aa verbis *non solum* praemittit *ut*, et dein post *decorari* addit *possit*.

en: [Book IV,] Distinction 4, part II, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — Codex aa prefixes *ut* to the words *non solum*, and then after *decorari* adds *possit*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ut iam observavit S. Thom. (1. II. q. 110. a. 4.), solutio huius quaestionis dependet a solutione alterius quaestionis, scil. utrum habitus gratiae sanctificantis sit idem cum habitu caritatis, de quo agitur infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. Qui cum Magistro (hic c. 3.) et Scoto inter caritatem et gratiam istam non ponunt nisi distinctionem rationis, scilicet secundum diversa officia et relationes; hi asserere debent, subiectum immediatum gratiae esse voluntatem. Cum autem S. Thomas gratiam a caritate essentialiter distinctam esse velit, etiam docet, essentiam animae esse immediatum subiectum gratiae sanctificantis, virtutis autem subiectum esse potentiam. — S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. distinguit quidem realiter habitum gratiae ab habitu caritatis, sed paulo aliter ac S. Thomas (vide d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.); unde etiam hoc loco media quadam via incedit ac docet, utrumque habitum inesse animae per potentias, sed gratiam respicere suum subiectum, quatenus potentiae sunt *unum in essentia* animae; virtutem autem, quatenus potentiae respiciunt *actus*, qui sunt multiplices. — Cohaeret autem haec solutio aliquatenus cum sententia, quam S. Bonav. quoad distinctionem potentiarum animae ab eius essentia professus est, supra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. — Observandum est, quod in verbis *primo inesse*, vel *prius influere*, pluries repetitis, non tam respicitur ordo generationis horum habituum, quam quid sit immediatum eorum subiectum. In ordine enim generationis, et loquendo de actu caritatis, hic saltem natura praecedere potest infusionem gratiae tanquam ultima dispositio ad eam, sicut quoad adultos multi discipuli S. Thomae docent.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 4. in solutione obiect. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. 1. II. q. 110. a. 4; de Verit. q. 27. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 4. — Richard. a Med., a. unicus q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** As St. Thomas has already observed (1a-2ae, q. 110, a. 4), the solution of this question depends on the solution of another question, namely whether the habit of sanctifying grace is the same as the habit of charity, which is treated below at d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. Those who with the Master (here c. 3) and with Scotus posit between charity and that grace nothing but a distinction of reason, namely according to diverse offices and relations, must assert that the immediate subject of grace is the will. But since St. Thomas wishes grace to be essentially distinct from charity, he also teaches that the essence of the soul is the immediate subject of sanctifying grace, but the subject of virtue is a potency. — St. Bonaventure with Alexander of Hales does indeed really distinguish the habit of grace from the habit of charity, but somewhat otherwise than St. Thomas (see d. 27, a. 1, q. 2); whence here too he proceeds by a certain middle way and teaches that each habit is present to the soul through the potencies, but that grace regards its subject inasmuch as the potencies are *one in the essence* of the soul; but virtue, inasmuch as the potencies regard *acts*, which are manifold. — This solution coheres somewhat with the view that St. Bonaventure professed regarding the distinction of the soul's potencies from its essence, above at d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1. — It must be observed that in the words *to be present first*, or *to influence prior*, repeated several times, what is regarded is not so much the order of generation of these habits, as what is the immediate subject of them. For in the order of generation, and speaking of the act of charity, this at least can by nature precede the infusion of grace as an ultimate disposition to it, as many disciples of St. Thomas teach regarding adults.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, S., p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 4, in the solution of the objection. — Scotus, in both *Scripta*, here, the single question. — St. Thomas, here, the single question, a. 3; S. 1a-2ae, q. 110, a. 4; *On Truth* q. 27, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 3; S., p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, the single question, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, the single article, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, here, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 6

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De gratiae quidditate.*
### Quaestio VI. *Utrum gratia comparetur ad animam in ratione motoris.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum gratia comparetur ad animam in ratione motoris. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per auctoritatem Augustini, quam Magister adducit in littera[^1], quod gratia praeveniens est, quae «praevenit bonae voluntatis meritum, et respectu cuius ipsa voluntas bona pedissequa est, non praevia»: ergo gratia respectu voluntatis se habet per modum excitantis, imperantis et regentis; et omne tale se habet in ratione motoris: ergo etc.

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2. *Item*, Augustinus[^2]: «Gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum»; sed sessor est motor equi: ergo gratia est motrix liberi arbitrii.

3. *Item*, hoc videtur *ratione*. Plus est potentiam aliquam supra se erigere quam ipsam movere; sed gratia elevat potentiam liberi arbitrii ad opera meritoria, quae sunt supra ipsam: ergo est liberi arbitrii motrix.

4. *Item*, plus potest gratia super liberum arbitrium, quam liberum arbitrium possit super se ipsum; sed «liberum arbitrium est instrumentum se ipsum movens», sicut dicit Anselmus[^3], et voluntas movere potest se ipsam: ergo multo fortius moveri potest a gratia.

5. *Item*, omne quod est principium vitae perfectae, est principium motus in eo quod vivificat[^4]; sed gratia est principium vitae in anima: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Voluntas eo ipso est libera, quo movetur ex se ipsa. Cum igitur gratia sit aliud a voluntate, si gratia movet voluntatem, aufert ei libertatem; sed constans est, quod gratia voluntati libertatem non aufert: ergo ipsam non movet.

2. *Item*, omnis motor sufficiens est *hoc aliquid* et substantia completa distans a mobili[^5]: ergo aut gratia non movet liberum arbitrium, aut si movet, est substantia. Si igitur gratia creata non potest esse in genere substantiae, sed in genere accidentis: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, si gratia movet liberum arbitrium, aut movet *naturaliter*, aut *violenter*, aut *voluntarie*. Si *naturaliter*: ergo opera meritoria erunt naturalia. *Rursus*, si *naturaliter* movet, semper movet, quantum est de se: ergo nunquam quiescit homo ab operibus meritoriis. Si *violenter*: ergo nec salvatur ibi ratio meriti nec libertas arbitrii, quorum utrumque patet esse falsum. Si *voluntarie*; sed nihil movet voluntarie, nisi habeat cognitionem et voluntatem: ergo gratia cognoscit et vult, et ita est substantia rationalis. Igitur vel gratia, si movet liberum arbitrium, non est aliquid creatum, vel si est aliquid creatum, non movet liberum arbitrium.

4. *Item*, si movet liberum arbitrium, aut sicut *motor motus*, aut sicut *motor non motus*. Si tu des, quod sicut *motor motus*: ergo cum nihil secundum idem moveatur et moveat[^6], gratia secundum se habebit aliam et aliam naturam, per quam moveatur et moveat: ergo non erit accidens simplex. Si sicut *motor non motus*; sed talis motor non est quid creatum: ergo vel gratia non est quid creatum, vel non movet liberum arbitrium.

5. *Item*, «idem manens idem, in creaturis semper est natum facere idem»[^7]: ergo si gratia est quid creatum et movet liberum arbitrium; cum gratia non varietur, semper ad idem inclinabit liberum arbitrium: ergo nunquam facit homo per gratiam nisi unum opus meritorium. Si igitur liberum arbitrium modo excitatur ad unum genus operis, modo ad aliud; videtur, quod aut illa excitatio non sit a gratia, aut gratia non dicit aliquid creatum, aut gratia mutatur et variatur, sicut liberum arbitrium.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Liberum arbitrium movetur a gratia dupliciter: tum a gratia operante ut instrumento Dei, tum a cooperante ut dispositione ad motum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut auctoritates Sanctorum dicunt, necesse est ponere, liberum arbitrium a gratia moveri et excitari. Ab ipsa enim gratia operante praevenitur et a cooperante ad opera meritoria elevatur, ita quod respectu operis meritorii gratia est sicut principalis motrix, et voluntas sicut pedissequa[^8].

*Qualiter* autem ipsa gratia, cum sit accidens animae, ipsam habeat movere, hoc habet difficultatem. Ad huius autem difficultatis explicationem duplex est modus dicendi sive intelligendi, secundum quem liberum arbitrium dicitur a gratia moveri. —

Unus modus dicendi est, quod gratia movere dicitur liberum arbitrium, quoniam ipsa est *dispositio* ad quendam spiritualem motum. Sicut enim pondus in corporibus disponit ad motum, sic et suo modo pondus in spiritibus. Gratia autem est quoddam spirituale pondus, datum animae, per quod habet sursum tendere[^9]; et quoniam liberum arbitrium est natum se ipsum movere secundum actus, in quos potest de se; cum est adiutum et informatum gratia, excellentius movet se ipsum, ita quod, cum liberum arbitrium sit movens et motum, gratia disponit ipsum sub ratione moventis. Et pro tanto dicitur gratia movere liberum arbitrium, quia liberum arbitrium, gratia informatum, movet se ipsum, per quem modum amor dicitur movere hominem ad magna opera facienda.

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Alius est modus intelligendi, secundum quem liberum arbitrium dicitur a gratia moveri. Gratia enim est sicut quaedam *influentia* procedens a luce superna, quae semper habet coniunctionem cum sua origine, sicut lumen cum sole; et quia semper suae origini coniungitur, ideo non tantum attribuitur ei operatio ratione subiecti, *in quo* est, sed etiam ratione subiecti, *a quo* est[^10]. Unde sicut lumen non solum operatur *cum* aëre, sed etiam operatur *in* ipsum aërem ratione continuationis cum suo fonte; sic et gratia non solum operatur *cum* libero arbitrio, sed etiam operatur *in* liberum arbitrium et liberum arbitrium movet. — Unde non est aliud dicere gratiam liberum arbitrium movere, quam gratiam esse Spiritus sancti *instrumentum* ad movendum liberum arbitrium.

Uterque horum modorum intelligendi conveniens est et rectus, nec unus sine altero sufficit. Nam primus competit gratiae *cooperanti* sive *subsequenti*; secundus competit gratiae *operanti* sive *praevenienti*. Gratia enim *operans* liberum arbitrium praevenit et movet, quia Deus illam infundendo voluntatem hominis sanat et praeparat. Gratia vero *cooperans* sive *subsequens* liberum arbitrium dicitur movere, quia voluntas, tali dono gratiae informata, movet se ipsam. Hanc enim potentiam habet voluntas, scilicet movendi se ipsam, quia est potentia materiae non alligata, sicut supra[^11] ostensum est, cum de libero arbitrio agebatur. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod gratia ad liberum arbitrium comparari habet in ratione motoris. Ad rationes autem ad oppositum plana est responsio ex iam dictis.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de voluntate, quod se ipsam movet; dicendum, quod hoc non obstat, immo consonat ei quod dicitur, quod movetur per gratiam. Sicut enim voluntas movet se ipsam ad opera naturalia, sic adiuta per gratiam movet se ipsam ad opera meritoria. — Vel secundum alium modum intelligendi, Deus per gratiam movet voluntatem; nec tamen hoc voluntati repugnat, quia voluntas vult sic moveri a Deo. Unde sic movetur a Deo, quod movetur etiam a se ipsa; et ideo omne opus meritorium attribuitur gratiae et libero arbitrio.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motor distat a mobili; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur in eo motu, in quo moveri est vere *pati*, sicut est in motu corporali, et de eo motore, qui est tota causa *sufficiens*[^12] et tota causa motus. Talis autem motor non dicitur esse gratia, pro eo quod non movet nisi sicut *dispositio*, vel sicut *instrumentum*, sicut prius fuit explanatum.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut movet *naturaliter* etc.; dicendum, quod movet *voluntarie*, non a voluntate, qua ipsa gratia sit volens, sed[^13] a voluntate, qua Deus *gratiam influens* est volens, et a voluntate, qua liberum arbitrium *gratificatum* vult movere se ipsum.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit *motor motus*, vel *non motus*; iam patet responsio. Illa enim divisio motoris est de motore, qui est *hoc aliquid* et substantia et est motor *sufficiens*; talis autem motor non est gratia, ut praedictum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem, manens idem, semper etc.; dicendum, quod illud fallit in Deo; et ideo, secundum quod *Deus* movet per gratiam, per eandem gratiam potest excitare ad diversa opera. Secundum vero quod *liberum arbitrium* se ipsum movet per gratiam ad diversa opera, est in ipso cognitionis et affectionis diversitas, secundum quas[^14] ordinari habet ad diversa operum genera: et ideo, quamvis gratia non varietur in se, movet tamen ad diversa, ratione variationis in motore sibi coniuncto, sine quo non potest movere. Nunquam enim gratia elicit opus meritorium, nisi voluntas sibi cooperetur.

english:
### Article (Sole). *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question VI. *Whether grace is related to the soul in the character of a mover.*

Sixth and last it is asked whether grace is related to the soul in the character of a mover. And that it is, seems [the case]:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine, which the Master adduces in the text[^1], that grace is prevenient, which «anticipates the merit of a good will, and in regard to which the good will itself is a follower, not a forerunner»: therefore grace with respect to the will stands by way of an arouser, commander, and ruler; and everything of this sort stands in the character of a mover: therefore, etc.

2. *Likewise*, Augustine[^2]: «Grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»; but the rider is the mover of the horse: therefore grace is the mover of free choice.

3. *Likewise*, this seems [so] *by reason*. It is more to raise some potency above itself than to move it; but grace elevates the potency of free choice to meritorious works, which are above it: therefore it is the mover of free choice.

4. *Likewise*, grace can do more upon free choice than free choice can do upon itself; but «free choice is an instrument moving itself», as Anselm says[^3], and the will can move itself: therefore much more strongly can it be moved by grace.

5. *Likewise*, everything that is the principle of perfect life is the principle of motion in that which it vivifies[^4]; but grace is the principle of life in the soul: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. The will is free by this very fact, that it is moved from itself. Since therefore grace is something other than the will, if grace moves the will, it takes away its freedom; but it is established that grace does not take freedom from the will: therefore it does not move it.

2. *Likewise*, every sufficient mover is *a this-something* and a complete substance distant from the movable[^5]: therefore either grace does not move free choice, or, if it moves it, it is a substance. If therefore created grace cannot be in the genus of substance, but in the genus of accident: therefore, etc.

3. *Likewise*, if grace moves free choice, it moves either *naturally*, or *violently*, or *voluntarily*. If *naturally*: therefore meritorious works will be natural. *Again*, if it moves *naturally*, it always moves, as far as it depends on itself: therefore a man never rests from meritorious works. If *violently*: therefore neither is the character of merit preserved there nor the freedom of choice, both of which are clearly false. If *voluntarily*; but nothing moves voluntarily unless it has cognition and will: therefore grace knows and wills, and thus is a rational substance. Therefore either grace, if it moves free choice, is not something created, or, if it is something created, it does not move free choice.

4. *Likewise*, if it moves free choice, [it does so] either as a *moved mover*, or as an *unmoved mover*. If you grant that [it moves] as a *moved mover*: therefore, since nothing is moved and moves according to the same [respect][^6], grace will have in itself one nature and another, by which it is moved and moves: therefore it will not be a simple accident. If as an *unmoved mover*; but such a mover is not something created: therefore either grace is not something created, or it does not move free choice.

5. *Likewise*, «the same thing remaining the same is, in creatures, always apt to do the same»[^7]: therefore if grace is something created and moves free choice; since grace is not varied, it will always incline free choice to the same thing: therefore a man never does, through grace, anything but one meritorious work. If therefore free choice is now aroused to one kind of work, now to another; it seems that either that arousal is not from grace, or grace does not signify something created, or grace is changed and varied, like free choice.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Free choice is moved by grace in two ways: both by grace *operating* as the instrument of God, and by [grace] *cooperating* as a disposition to motion.

**I respond:** It must be said that, beyond doubt, as the authorities of the Saints say, it is necessary to hold that free choice is moved and aroused by grace. For by *operating* grace itself it is prevented, and by *cooperating* [grace] it is elevated to meritorious works, so that with respect to a meritorious work grace is as it were the principal mover, and the will as it were a follower[^8].

But *how* grace itself, since it is an accident of the soul, can move it, this has its difficulty. For the explanation of this difficulty there is a twofold way of speaking or of understanding, according to which free choice is said to be moved by grace. —

One way of speaking is that grace is said to move free choice because it is a *disposition* toward a certain spiritual motion. For just as weight in bodies disposes to motion, so too in its own way [is there] a weight in spirits. But grace is a certain spiritual weight, given to the soul, by which it has [the power] to tend upward[^9]; and since free choice is apt to move itself according to the acts of which it is capable of itself; when it is aided and informed by grace, it more excellently moves itself, so that, since free choice is mover and moved, grace disposes it under the character of mover. And to this extent grace is said to move free choice, because free choice, informed by grace, moves itself; in which manner love is said to move a man to the doing of great works.

The other is the way of understanding according to which free choice is said to be moved by grace. For grace is as it were a certain *influence* proceeding from the supernal light, which always has conjunction with its origin, as light with the sun; and because it is always joined to its origin, therefore operation is attributed to it not only by reason of the subject *in which* it is, but also by reason of the subject *from which* it is[^10]. Hence just as light operates not only *with* the air, but also operates *in* the air itself by reason of its continuation with its source; so too grace not only operates *with* free choice, but also operates *in* free choice and moves free choice. — Hence to say that grace moves free choice is nothing other than [to say] that grace is the *instrument* of the Holy Spirit for moving free choice.

Each of these ways of understanding is fitting and correct, nor does one suffice without the other. For the first belongs to *cooperating* or *subsequent* grace; the second belongs to *operating* or *prevenient* grace. For *operating* grace prevents and moves free choice, because God, by infusing it, heals and prepares the will of man. But *cooperating* or *subsequent* grace is said to move free choice, because the will, informed by such a gift of grace, moves itself. For the will has this potency, namely of moving itself, because it is a potency not bound to matter, as was shown above[^11], when free choice was treated of. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that grace must be related to free choice in the character of a mover. But to the reasons to the contrary the response is plain from what has now been said.

1. For as to what is objected first concerning the will, that it moves itself; it must be said that this does not stand against, nay rather agrees with, what is said, that it is moved by grace. For just as the will moves itself to natural works, so, aided by grace, it moves itself to meritorious works. — Or according to the other way of understanding, God through grace moves the will; nor yet does this repugn the will, because the will wills thus to be moved by God. Hence it is so moved by God that it is also moved by itself; and therefore every meritorious work is attributed to grace and to free choice.

2. To what is objected, that a mover is distant from the movable; it must be said that this is understood of that motion in which to be moved is truly to *undergo*, as is the case in bodily motion, and of that mover which is the whole *sufficient* cause[^12] and the whole cause of the motion. But such a mover is not said to be grace, for the reason that it moves only as a *disposition*, or as an *instrument*, as was explained before.

3. To what is asked: whether it moves *naturally*, etc.; it must be said that it moves *voluntarily*, not by a will whereby grace itself is willing, but[^13] by the will whereby God *infusing grace* is willing, and by the will whereby free choice *made pleasing* wills to move itself.

4. To what is asked, whether it is a *moved mover* or an *unmoved* one; the response is already clear. For that division of mover is about the mover which is *a this-something* and a substance and is a *sufficient* mover; but such a mover is not grace, as was said before.

5. To what is objected, that the same thing, remaining the same, always [does the same], etc.; it must be said that this fails in God; and therefore, according as *God* moves through grace, through the same grace he can arouse to diverse works. But according as *free choice* moves itself through grace to diverse works, there is in it a diversity of cognition and of affection, according to which[^14] it is to be ordered to diverse kinds of works: and therefore, although grace is not varied in itself, it nevertheless moves to diverse things by reason of the variation in the mover joined to it, without which it cannot move. For grace never elicits a meritorious work unless the will cooperates with it.

la: Hic c. 2. in fine.

en: Here [in the text of the Master], c. 2, at the end.

la: Vide supra pag. 600, nota 6.

en: See above, p. 600, note 6.

la: *De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 3. c. 11.

en: [Anselm,] *On the Harmony of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 11.

la: Cum hoc convenit definitio animae, quam Aristot. dat II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.) dicens, animam esse id «quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo».

en: With this agrees the definition of the soul which Aristotle gives, *On the Soul* II, text 24 (c. 2), saying that the soul is that «by which we primarily live and perceive and are moved and understand».

la: De hac duplici proprietate motoris sufficientis vide supra pag. 109, nota 7; pag. 348, nota 1; et pag. 373, nota 6.

en: On this twofold property of a sufficient mover see above, p. 109, note 7; p. 348, note 1; and p. 373, note 6.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 2. 3. 5. (c. 3. 5. 8.); IV. Phys. text. 2-5. (c. 3.); V. Metaph. text. 23. (IV. c. 18.). — Paulo superius pro *Si tu des* codd. N ee et alii *Si tu dicas*, codd. aa bb *Si tu dicis*. In fine arg. post *secundum vel* cod. K interiicit *si est aliquid creatum*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* V c. 2, 3, 5 (c. 3, 5, 8); *Physics* IV, text. 2–5 (c. 3); *Metaphysics* V, text. 23 (IV. c. 18). — A little above, for *Si tu des* codices N, ee and others read *Si tu dicas*, codices aa, bb *Si tu dicis*. At the end of the argument, after *secundum vel*, codex K inserts *si est aliquid creatum*.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.): *Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere.* — In fine arg. pro *sicut* cod. M *secundum*.

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 56 (c. 10): «For the same thing, and behaving in the same way, is always apt to do the same.» — At the end of the argument, for *sicut* codex M reads *secundum*.

la: De divisione gratiae in gratiam *operantem* et *cooperantem* cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et infra d. 27. dub. 1.

en: On the division of grace into *operating* and *cooperating* grace, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, and below d. 27, dub. 1.

la: Cfr. August., XIII. Confess. c. 7. n. 8; c. 9. n. 10; Enarrat. 2. in Ps. 29. n. 10.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, c. 7, n. 8; c. 9, n. 10; *Second Exposition on Psalm 29*, n. 10.

la: Non pauci codd., inter quos F W Y aa bb cc ee, cum ed. 1 omittunt hic et paulo superius post *in quo* verbum *est*.

en: Not a few codices, among them F W Y aa bb cc ee, together with ed. 1, here and a little above omit, after *in quo*, the word *est*.

en: Distinction 25, part 1, q. 3.

la: Edd. 2, 3 *efficiens*, Vat. *efficiens et sufficiens*.

en: Editions 2 and 3 read *efficiens* ["efficient"], the Vatican edition *efficiens et sufficiens* ["efficient and sufficient"].

la: Codd. T ee et pauci alii cum ed. 1 *sc.*

en: Codices T, ee and a few others, with ed. 1, read *sc.* [scilicet].

la: Cod. bb *quam*, cod. Y *per quas*. Paulo inferius pro *sibi coniuncto* plures codd., ut C K O R S V Y, cum edd. 2, 3 *sicut coniuncto*.

en: Codex bb reads *quam*, codex Y *per quas*. A little below, for *sibi coniuncto* several codices, such as C K O R S V Y, with editions 2, 3, read *sicut coniuncto*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Gratia sanctificans, cum sit principium *vitae* supernaturalis, etiam principium *motus* est (hic fundam. 5.). Hinc antiqui Scholastici ipsum habituale donum gratiae distinguebant in gratiam *operantem* et *cooperantem*, secundum duplicem eiusdem effectum (cfr. infra d. 27. a. 1. q. I. et dub. 1; S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. I. II. q. III. a. 2.). Ipsi enim *virtutem infusam* et *actualem motionem* intima quadam connexione inter se coniunctas esse considerabant et saepe eodem nomine significabant, ut iam dictum est (hic q. I. scholion). Inde etiam causa repetenda esse videtur, quod de gratia *actuali* illa aetate parum et quasi obiter tractaretur.

De multiplici sensu, quem termini gratiae operantis et cooperantis, praevenientis et subsequentis in libris Augustini et aliorum auctorum habent, vide infra d. 27. locc. citt. Prima illa distinctione S. Doctor hic utitur, ut explicet duplicem modum, quo gratia movet liberum arbitrium, scilicet ut *dispositio* et ut *instrumentum*: ut dispositio, quatenus illud gratia *cooperante* informatur et «se ipsum movet per gratiam ad diversa opera» (ad 5.); ut instrumentum, quatenus Deus per gratiam *operantem*, cum sua origine divina semper coniunctam, operatur in liberum arbitrium illudque movet. — Ad rem faciunt verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. ad 2.): «Liberum arbitrium secundum duplicem rationem comparatur ad gratiam, scilicet in ratione *recipientis* et in ratione *operantis*; et tamen utrumque est voluntatis seu liberi arbitrii, scilicet recipere gratiam et cum gratia operari». Additur ibid., quod gratia comparata ad liberum arbitrium sub ratione *recipientis* dicitur gratia *operans*; sed *cooperans*, secundum quod simul liberum arbitrium operatur cum gratia. Porro paulo inferius legitur: «In receptione gratiae, hoc est, quando efficit *voluntatem bonam*, prior est actio gratiae, deinde consensus ipsius arbitrii seu cooperatio in consentiendo, et ideo gratia dicitur hic *operans*. Sed liberum arbitrium dicitur *cum gratia operari*, quando operatur bonum per gratiam. Quia ergo opus elicitur a potentia arbitrii, ipsa gratia iuvante, ipsum liberum arbitrium dicitur operans, ipsa vero gratia cooperans velut adminiculans operanti». — Doctrinam S. Bonaventurae aliis verbis et quibusdam additamentis explicat Richard. a Med. (hic a. unicus q. 5.): «Gratia movet liberum arbitrium et per modum *efficientis instrumentalis* et per modum *formae*. Primo modo movet liberum arbitrium in instanti suae infusionis, quia in illo instanti Spiritus S. tanquam *principale* agens per suam influentiam, quae est gratia, tanquam per *instrumentale* efficiens in libero arbitrio causat quandam excitationem et inclinationem ad bonum voluntatis actum. Illa autem excitatio vel inclinatio non est actus volendi, sed *dispositio* ad illum actum, vel aliqualis inchoatio illius actus; quia in eliciendo actum volendi semper cooperatur liberum arbitrium. Sed ad causandam illam excitationem vel inclinationem, quae in ipso causatur in instanti infusionis gratiae, liberum arbitrium est *passivum* tantum. — Movet etiam gratia liberum arbitrium per modum *formae*, in quantum liberum arbitrium per formam gratiae potest se movere et elevare ad opera meritoria de condigno, quibus motibus se movere sine gratia non poterat» etc. — Breviter Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica a. 7.) sic quaestionem solvit: «Movere aliquid dupliciter contingit: aut *effective*, sicut sol movet vaporem elevando sursum; aut *dispositive*, sicut pondus eius vel levitas movet inclinando ipsum. Primo modo *Deus* movet liberum arbitrium, et ipsum liberum arbitrium se ipsum, gratia perfectum et habilitatum ad se movendum. Secundo modo *gratia* movet ipsum». — Quod gratia *habitualis* habeat actum in anima et *effective* et *formaliter*, docet etiam S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 5. ad 2; S. I. II. q. III. a. 2. in fine corp.), sed paulo aliter hanc distinctionem explicat.

Ceterum doctrina S. Bonaventurae in hac quaestione proposita optime convenit cum decretis Concilii Tridentini (Sess. VI. praesertim c. 5. et can. 4. 5.) de efficacia gratiae; immo dici potest, eam non esse nisi quandam expositionem verborum Concilii Arausicani II. (a. 529.), a Bonifacio II. confirmati (can. 9.): «Quoties bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur».

**II.** Cooperationem liberi arbitrii ad actus salutares a saec. XVI. multae haereses diversimode negarunt, quarum errores decretis Concilii Tridentini et Summorum Pontificum condemnati sunt. Hinc catholici theologi de efficacia gratiae, de cooperatione liberi arbitrii et de vero sensu doctrinae S. Augustini *specialiores* et plerumque satis intricatas quaestiones instituerunt et in plurimis libris tractarunt eo laudabili fine, ut concordiam gratiae et libertatis defenderent et evidentius demonstrarent. In fide quidem concordes, diversas vias demonstrationis ingressi sunt. Hinc de *ratione*, qua efficacia gratiae connectitur cum consensu voluntatis, gravissimae et spinosissimae controversiae exortae sunt, praecipue inter celebres scholas duorum Ordinum de Ecclesia optime meritorum, scilicet S. Dominici et Societatis Iesu. S. Sedes post longissimas disputationes et inquisitiones, ab an. 1598 in famosa Congregatione de auxiliis habitas, de ipso obiecto controversiae nihil definivit, nec sub Paulo V., quando (1607) Congregatio de auxiliis dissoluta est, nec sub sequentibus Pontificibus; vetitum tamen est, ne quis in hac quaestione tractanda partem suae oppositam «aut qualificaret, aut censura quapiam notaret». Insuper a Paulo V. et Urbano VIII. prohibitum est, libros et tractatus de auxiliis edere; quae prohibitio postea consuetudine derogata est. Ultimo Clemens XII. (2 Oct. 1733) decreta Clementis XI. et Benedicti XIII, ad quandam defensionem Thomisticae scholae lata, comprobat quidem et confirmat, sed addit: «Nolumus, aut per nostras, aut per ipsorum laudes Thomisticae scholae delatas, quas iterato nostro iudicio comprobamus et confirmamus, quidquam esse detractum ceteris catholicis scholis, diversa ab eadem in explicanda divinae gratiae efficacia sentientibus, quarum etiam erga hanc S. Sedem praeclara sunt merita». Denique ibidem rursus interdicitur, ne «notam aut censuram aliquam theologicam iisdem scholis diversa sentientibus inurere, aut earum sententias conviciis et contumeliis incessere audeant, donec de iisdem controversiis haec s. Sedes aliquid definiendum aut pronuntiandum censuerit» (Denzinger, Enchirid. symbolor. et definit., ed. 3. pag. 312. seqq.). His sapientissimis S. Sedis iudiciis standum est.

**III.** Controversia utriusque scholae praecipue versatur circa explicationem gratiae *sufficientis* et *efficacis*, et etiam *praevenientis*, de quo consulantur proprii utriusque scholae probati auctores. Cum autem in nostro I. tomo p. 710 in scholio n. 2. (ubi agitur de causalitate divinae voluntatis in praedestinatione implicata) aliqua dicta sint de diversa ratione, qua a duabus scholis catholicis explicatur causalitas et connexio divinae voluntatis cum consensu voluntatis creatae; ea quae ibi de causalitate divinae motionis in genere secundum scholam Societatis Iesu occurrunt, nimis breviter et indistincte prolata sunt, ita ut, si de sola gratia praeveniente dicta intelliguntur, non exprimant veram huius celebris scholae sententiam. Hinc melius et mentem nostram et veram dictae scholae sententiam hoc loco explicamus. Docetur igitur ab eadem, voluntatem illustratione et excitatione gratiae *praevenientis* (sive mere sufficientis sive etiam efficacis) ita ad consensum praemoveri, ut ad dissentiendum libera maneat, ac proinde consensus ex hac gratia ita sequatur, ut etiam possit non sequi. Connexionem autem infallibilem gratiae efficacis cum consensu liberi arbitrii ut explicet, ipsa utitur *scientia media*, qua Deus ante omne decretum absolutum praevideat, quid voluntas humana in hypothesi, quod hac vel illa gratia excitaretur, factura esset, et ex hac praevisione praedestinatis decernat gratias efficaces i. e. tales, cum quibus eos libere cooperaturos infallibiliter praescivit. Hanc autem sententiam eadem affirmat exprimere genuinum doctrinae Ss. Augustini et Thomae sensum. — Quoad diversas sententias de concursu Dei generali ad actus voluntatis liberos, sed naturalis ordinis, vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.

**IV.** Hanc praecise quaestionem explicite tractatam non vidimus ab aliis antiquis scholasticis nisi ab his: Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. unicus q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Alii rem tangunt in quaestione de gratia operante et cooperante, quos vide in scholio ad d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Sanctifying grace, since it is the principle of supernatural *life*, is also the principle of *motion* (here, fundamentum 5). Hence the ancient Scholastics distinguished the very habitual gift of grace into *operating* and *cooperating* grace, according to its twofold effect (cf. below d. 27. a. 1. q. I. and dub. 1; St. Thomas, here a. 5; S. I-II. q. 111. a. 2.). For they considered *infused virtue* and *actual motion* to be joined together by a certain intimate connection, and often signified them by the same name, as has already been said (here q. I., scholion). Hence too the cause seems to be sought why *actual* grace was treated of in that age but little and as it were in passing.

Concerning the manifold sense which the terms of operating and cooperating, prevenient and subsequent grace have in the books of Augustine and of other authors, see below d. 27, the places cited. The Holy Doctor uses that first distinction here in order to explain the twofold manner in which grace moves free choice, namely as *disposition* and as *instrument*: as disposition, inasmuch as free choice is informed by *cooperating* grace and «moves itself through grace to diverse works» (ad 5.); as instrument, inasmuch as God through *operating* grace, always joined to its divine origin, operates in free choice and moves it. — To the point are the words of Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. ad 2.): «Free choice is related to grace according to a twofold character, namely in the character of *recipient* and in the character of *operating*; and yet each belongs to the will or free choice, namely to receive grace and to operate with grace». It is added there that grace related to free choice under the character of *recipient* is called *operating* grace; but *cooperating*, according as free choice operates together with grace. Further, a little below it is read: «In the reception of grace, that is, when it effects a *good will*, the action of grace is prior, then the consent of the choice itself or cooperation in consenting, and therefore grace is here called *operating*. But free choice is said to *operate with grace* when it works good through grace. Since therefore the work is elicited by the potency of choice, with grace itself helping, free choice itself is called operating, but grace itself cooperating as it were ministering to the one operating». — The doctrine of St. Bonaventure, in other words and with certain additions, Richard of Mediavilla explains (here, sole article, q. 5): «Grace moves free choice both by way of *instrumental efficient* and by way of *form*. In the first way it moves free choice in the instant of its infusion, because in that instant the Holy Spirit, as the *principal* agent, through his influence, which is grace, as through an *instrumental* efficient, causes in free choice a certain arousal and inclination to a good act of the will. But that arousal or inclination is not the act of willing, but a *disposition* toward that act, or some inchoation of that act; because in eliciting the act of willing free choice always cooperates. But for causing that arousal or inclination, which is caused in it in the instant of the infusion of grace, free choice is *passive* only. — Grace also moves free choice by way of *form*, inasmuch as free choice, through the form of grace, can move and elevate itself to meritorious works of condignity, by which motions it could not move itself without grace» etc. — Briefly Peter of Tarentaise (here q. sole a. 7.) thus solves the question: «To move something happens in two ways: either *effectively*, as the sun moves vapor by raising it upward; or *dispositively*, as its weight or lightness moves [a body] by inclining it. In the first way *God* moves free choice, and free choice itself [moves] itself, perfected and enabled by grace to move itself. In the second way *grace* moves it». — That *habitual* grace has an act in the soul both *effectively* and *formally*, St. Thomas also teaches (here q. sole a. 5. ad 2; S. I-II. q. 111. a. 2. at the end of the corpus), but he explains this distinction a little otherwise.

For the rest, the doctrine of St. Bonaventure proposed in this question agrees excellently with the decrees of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. especially c. 5. and can. 4. 5.) on the efficacy of grace; nay, it can be said that it is nothing but a certain exposition of the words of the Second Council of Orange (a. 529.), confirmed by Boniface II (can. 9.): «As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work».

**II.** From the sixteenth century many heresies in diverse ways denied the cooperation of free choice unto salutary acts, whose errors were condemned by the decrees of the Council of Trent and of the Supreme Pontiffs. Hence Catholic theologians instituted more specialized and generally rather intricate questions concerning the efficacy of grace, the cooperation of free choice, and the true sense of the doctrine of St. Augustine, and treated them in very many books with this laudable aim, that they might defend the harmony of grace and freedom and demonstrate it more evidently. Concordant indeed in faith, they entered upon diverse paths of demonstration. Hence concerning the *manner* in which the efficacy of grace is connected with the consent of the will, most grave and most thorny controversies arose, especially between the celebrated schools of two Orders most excellently deserving of the Church, namely those of St. Dominic and of the Society of Jesus. The Holy See, after the longest disputations and inquiries held from the year 1598 in the famous Congregation *de auxiliis*, defined nothing concerning the very object of the controversy, neither under Paul V., when (1607) the Congregation *de auxiliis* was dissolved, nor under the following Pontiffs; yet it was forbidden that anyone, in treating this question, should «either qualify or note with any censure» the part opposed to his own. Moreover by Paul V. and Urban VIII. it was prohibited to publish books and tractates *de auxiliis*; which prohibition was afterward derogated by custom. Lastly Clement XII. (2 Oct. 1733) indeed approved and confirmed the decrees of Clement XI. and Benedict XIII, issued for a certain defense of the Thomistic school, but added: «We do not wish, either through our praises or through theirs conferred on the Thomistic school, which by repeated judgment of ours we approve and confirm, that anything be detracted from the other Catholic schools, which think differently from it in explaining the efficacy of divine grace, and whose merits toward this Holy See are also illustrious». Finally there again it is forbidden that they should «brand the same schools thinking differently with any theological note or censure, or assail their opinions with reproaches and insults, until this Holy See shall have judged that something is to be defined or pronounced concerning the same controversies» (Denzinger, Enchirid. symbolor. et definit., ed. 3. pag. 312. seqq.). One must stand by these most wise judgments of the Holy See.

**III.** The controversy of the two schools turns chiefly about the explanation of *sufficient* and *efficacious* grace, and also of *prevenient* [grace], concerning which let the approved authors proper to each school be consulted. But since in our first volume, p. 710, in the scholion n. 2 (where there is treated the causality of the divine will implied in predestination), some things were said about the diverse manner in which the causality and connection of the divine will with the consent of the created will is explained by the two Catholic schools; the things that occur there concerning the causality of divine motion in general according to the school of the Society of Jesus were set forth too briefly and indistinctly, so that, if they are understood of prevenient grace alone, they do not express the true opinion of this celebrated school. Hence we here better explain both our mind and the true opinion of the said school. It is therefore taught by it that the will is, by the illumination and arousal of *prevenient* grace (whether merely sufficient or also efficacious), so premoved to consent that it remains free to dissent, and consequently the consent so follows from this grace that it can also not follow. But to explain the infallible connection of efficacious grace with the consent of free choice, it uses *middle knowledge* (*scientia media*), whereby God, before every absolute decree, foresees what the human will would do on the hypothesis that it were aroused by this or that grace, and from this foreknowledge decrees for the predestined efficacious graces, i. e. such as those with which he infallibly foreknew that they would freely cooperate. And this opinion the same [school] affirms expresses the genuine sense of the doctrine of Saints Augustine and Thomas. — As to the diverse opinions about God's general concurrence to the free acts of the will, but of the natural order, see below d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.

**IV.** This precise question we have not seen explicitly treated by other ancient scholastics except by these: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. sole a. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here sole article q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Others touch the matter in the question on operating and cooperating grace, whom see in the scholion to d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.

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translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF per the Vol II Override (raw OCR lines 45024–45230 used as cross-check; OCR cascade-shattered the Conclusio, Respondeo, replies, and the long modern SCHOLION + interleaved the two columns + diagonal-fragmented the p.644 footer band). English freshly translated literally. Apparatus built from the PDF column-band footer reads. The two-column scholion was reflowed L-col-then-R-col per page.
- **Alignment:** VERIFIED. Opener "Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum gratia comparetur ad animam in ratione motoris" = the d.26 ARTICULUS UNICUS sub-question 6 (last) per the TRACTATIO list (*utrum [gratia] insit ad modum perfectionis tantum, an etiam per modum motoris*); the body text frames the same question as *comparetur in ratione motoris*. No q-swap.
- **Page-split map (printed pp. 644–647; pdf = printed + 22):**
  - p.644 (R-col, bottom): QUAESTIO VI title + opener + arg-1 (*Primo per auctoritatem Augustini … in littera*, footer ⁸ anchored).
  - p.645: args 2–5 + *Contra* 1–4 head + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo opener (two modes; Modus 1 = *dispositio*/spiritual weight).
  - p.646: Modus 2 (*influentia a luce superna*, instrument of the Holy Spirit) + concluding remarks (operans/cooperans) + replies 1–5 + SCHOLION I.
  - p.647: SCHOLION II–IV tail (de auxiliis controversy; tom. I p.710 correction; commentator-roll), ending "…quos vide in scholio ad d. 27. a. 1. q. 1." before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI / DUB. I.
- **Apparatus split map (14 entries, body-anchor order, one footer per entry except the single net merge at [^14]):**
  - p.644 footer ⁸ → [^1] (Hic c. 2 in fine; anchors opener *in littera*). **RECEIVED hand-off region:** q5 already consumed p.644 footers ⁵–⁷ (its [^22]–[^24]); footers ¹–⁴ on p.644 anchor in q5's reply tail (q5's concern). q6 takes ONLY footer ⁸ from p.644.
  - p.645 footers ¹–⁸ → [^2]–[^9] (¹ supra p.600 n.6 *sessor* = [^2]; ² Anselm de Concord. q.3 c.11 *instrumentum se ipsum movens* = [^3]; ³ Aristot II de Anima text.24 definition-of-soul *principium vitae* = [^4]; ⁴ duplex proprietas motoris supra p.109/348/373 *substantia distans a mobili* = [^5]; ⁵ Aristot V Topic/IV Phys/V Metaph + *Si tu des/dicas/dicis* variant + cod.K insert *idem moveatur et moveat* = [^6]; ⁶ Aristot II de Gen. et corr. text.56 *idem manens idem natum facere* + *sicut/secundum* cod.M SC-5 = [^7]; ⁷ divisio gratiae operans/cooperans, lit.Magistri c.1 + d.27 dub.1 *pedissequa* = [^8]; ⁸ August XIII Confess + Enarrat.2 in Ps.29 *sursum tendere* = [^9]).
  - p.646 footers ¹–⁶ → [^10]–[^14] in BODY-ANCHOR order (print-footer order ≠ body order, so renumbered to body order): footer ¹ → [^10] (codd F W Y… omit *est* after *in quo*; Modus 2 *a quo est*); footer ² → [^11] (Dist. 25 p.1 q.3; reply-1 *supra ostensum*); footer ⁴ → [^12] (Edd. 2,3 *efficiens*/Vat *efficiens et sufficiens*; reply-2 *tota causa sufficiens*); footer ³ → [^13] (codd T ee *sc.*; reply-3 *sed*); footers ⁵+⁶ → [^14] (cod. CHILORSWY *et;* perperam + cod. bb *quam*/Y *per quas* + *sibi/sicut coniuncto*; reply-5 *secundum quas*, one net merge of the two reply-5 footers). Markers sit at true body positions; entry numbers ascend in body order.
- **has_scholion = TRUE.** q6 carries its own full SCHOLION I–IV (closing scholion for the article). SCHOLION I = the operans/cooperans + dispositio/instrumentum doctrine (Alex.Hal S.p.III q.61 m.3 a.2 / Richard a Med / Petr.a Tar / S.Thom) + Trent/Orange concord; II = de auxiliis controversy history (Congregatio 1598, Paul V/Urban VIII, Clement XII 1733, Denzinger); III = sufficient/efficacious/prevenient grace + scientia media + tom.I p.710 correction; IV = commentator-roll. SCHOLION carries NO footnote markers.
- **Hand-offs:** RECEIVED p.644 footer ⁸ (now [^1]) anchoring the opener; q5 retained p.644 footers ⁵–⁷. FORWARDED nothing — q6 SCHOLION closes clean at raw 45230 before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI / DUB. I (raw 45231/45233); the dubia chunk owns its own p.647 R-col + p.648 footer block.
- **[?] flags:** NONE. Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands per Override; OCR garbles silently corrected (aivimam→animam, gralia→gratia, moy eX naluralilci'→aut movet naturaliter, raotor→motor, niovet→movet, raodum→modum, pedissequa, influcntia→influentia, conlinue→continue, sauat→sanat, gratiftcatum→gratificatum, hoQiinem→hominem, raanens→manens, deflnit→definit). The single OCR siglum-list "C K O R S V V" in p.646 footer 6 reads "C K O R S V Y" at zoom (the second V = Y); rendered C K O R S V Y.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0