title: Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De ipsius materiae quantitate.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de ipsius materiae quantitate, circa quam triplex versatur inquisitio.

Primo, quantum ad numerum.
Secundo, quantum ad tempus.
Tertio, quantum ad locum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum caelestium et terrestrium una sit materia quantum ad esse.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum caelestium et terrestrium una sit materia quantum ad esse; supra[^1] enim quaesitum est de unitate materiae quantum ad essentiam. Et quod sit una, videtur.

*Arg. pro parte affirmativa.*

1. Communiter secundum expositores nomine *terrae*, cum dicitur: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*[^2], intelligitur materia omnium visibilium citra caelum empyreum: ergo si illa una fuit et habuit aliquam formam, ut supra[^3] visum est, ergo videtur, quod caelestia et terrestria ex una materia quantum ad esse sint producta.

2. Item, materia illa, ex qua formata sunt corpora, nec habebat formam caelestem nec elementarem nec consequentem ad has: ergo si aliquam habebat formam, habebat formam ad has communem et indifferentem[^4]: ergo videtur, quod secundum aliquod esse formale sit ponere, caelestium et terrestrium materiam esse communem.

3. Item, extensio consequitur materiam non secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum aliquod esse, cum sit accidens[^5]: ergo si communiter reperitur extensio in corporibus superioribus et inferioribus, ergo videtur, quod una sit materia communis secundum esse in caelestibus et terrestribus.

4. Item, lux est natura communis, reperta in omnibus corporibus tam caelestibus quam terrestribus, sive sit substantia, sive accidens[^6]: ergo si forma ista corporalis non est in materia nisi secundum aliquod esse, videtur idem quod prius.

5. Item, perspicuitas est natura similiter reperta in omnibus corporibus, tam superioribus quam inferioribus, secundum plus et minus[^7]; sed perspicuitas non tantum consequitur materiam, sed etiam formam et esse materiae, non tantum essentiam: ergo videtur, quod in omnibus corporibus, sive caelestibus sive terrenis, est ponere materiam unam secundum esse.

6. Item, rari et densi secundum esse ponitur una materia[^8], ergo pari ratione luminosi et opaci: et si hoc, ergo caeli et elementi.

*Pro parte negativa.*

**Contra:**

1. «Corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non est materia una», sicut vult Philosophus[^9]; sed corpora superiora sunt incorruptibilia, et inferiora corruptibilia: ergo etc.

2. Item, quae habent eandem materiam sunt ad invicem transmutabilia[^10]; sed corpora caelestia et terrestria non sunt ad invicem transmutabilia: ergo etc.

3. Item, materia subiecta privationi et quae

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non est subiecta privationi differunt secundum esse[^11]; sed in caelestibus materia non est subiecta privationi, in terrestribus vero est subiecta: ergo etc.

4. Item, corpus caeleste et elementare non tantummodo differunt forma ac qualitate, sed etiam discontinuitate[^12]: si ergo continuitas venit ab unitate materiae secundum esse, cum ista ad invicem sint discontinua, quod patet, quia unum movetur, reliquum quiescit, videtur, quod secundum esse caelestium et terrestrium non possit esse materia una.

### Conclusio.

> *Corporum caelestium et terrestrium una fuit materia secundum esse incompletum, quod materia ante productionem habuit; sed post productionem et secundum esse completum differt eorum materia.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum corpora caelestia et terrestria sint ex eadem materia secundum esse, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut secundum esse, quod materia habuit *ante* productionem, aut secundum esse, quod materia habet *post* productionem.

*Conclusio 1.* Si secundum esse, quod materia habuit ante productionem[^13], sic sine dubio una fuit materia corporum caelestium et terrestrium, quia una fuit moles, habens unam formam *incompletam*.

*Conclusio 2.* Si secundum esse, quod habet materia post productionem, quod quidem est esse completum, sic absque dubio differt materia caelestium et terrestrium quantum ad esse, tum quia sub una forma est corruptibilis, sub alia incorruptibilis, tum quia sub una forma est subiecta privationi, sub alia non. Et hoc non solum facit diversitatem in materia secundum esse quantum ad *actum*, immo etiam quantum ad *potentiam ordinatam ad actum*; quae quidem diversitas non est in materia, secundum quod est formis elementaribus subiecta. Nam etsi materia subiecta igni et aëri habeat aliud et aliud *esse actuale*, tamen, quia utrobique subiecta est transmutationi et privationi et possibilis ad utrumque, ideo dicuntur habere unam materiam secundum esse; in caelestibus autem corporibus et elementaribus non contingit hoc reperire.

Et ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem.

*Ad argg. pro parte affirm.*

Primae enim rationes, quae ostendunt, quod caelestia corpora et elementaria communicant in materia secundum esse, loquuntur de materia quantum ad illud esse, quod habuit ante productionem, et quantum ad proprietates, quae consequuntur illud esse, sicut sunt extensio et perspicuitatis participatio.

6. Ultima tamen ratio non concludit, quae procedit per simile de raro et denso et caelesti et elementari. Non enim est simile, quia rarum et densum sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, non sic corpora caelestia et elementaria; et loquor de potestate[^14] transmutandi secundum naturam, non secundum virtutem divinam.

*Ad argg. pro parte negat.*

Rationes vero ad oppositum concludunt, quod materia secundum esse non est eadem in caelestibus et terrestribus *post* ipsorum productionem, sicut patet discurrendo per singulas.

*Alius modus distinguendi.*

Aliter posset dici, et quasi in idem redit, quoniam quadrupliciter potest intelligi et esse unitas in materia: aut quantum ad essentiam, aut quantum ad esse *incompletum* et a completione *remotum*, aut secundum esse *incompletum*, completioni *proximum*, aut secundum esse *simpliciter completum*. Et secundum hoc distinguitur materia, quod quaedam est subiecta formae substantiali tantum, quaedam formae substantiali et extensioni sive quantitati, quaedam formae substantiali et quantitati et contrarietati, quaedam formae substantiali et quantitati, non contrarietati, et in omnibus suis partibus uniformitati. —

*Conclusiones.*

Primo modo dicitur esse eadem materia spiritualium et corporalium, sicut supra fuit ostensum[^15]; secundo modo, caelestium et terrestrium, sive corruptibilium corporum et incorruptibilium; tertio modo, corporum elementarium et ad invicem transmutabilium; quarto modo, corporum specie et natura similium. Primo igitur et secundo modo eadem est materia caelestium et terrestrium, sicut primae rationes ostendunt; tertio et quarto modo non, sicut concludunt rationes inductae ad oppositum.

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english:
### Article II. *On the quantity of matter itself.*

Consequently the question is asked concerning the second article, namely concerning the quantity of matter itself, about which a threefold inquiry is conducted.

First, as regards number.
Second, as regards time.
Third, as regards place.

### Question I. *Whether the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is one as regards being.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks whether the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is one as regards being; for above[^1] the question was asked concerning the unity of matter as regards essence. And that it is one, seems [to be the case].

*Argument for the affirmative.*

1. According to expositors, by the name *earth*, when it is said: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*[^2], is commonly understood the matter of all visible things this side of the empyrean heaven: therefore if that [matter] was one and had some form, as was seen above[^3], therefore it seems that celestial and terrestrial things were produced from one matter as regards being.

2. Likewise, that matter from which the bodies were formed had neither celestial form nor elemental form nor any form consequent upon these: therefore if it had some form, it had a form common and indifferent to these[^4]: therefore it seems that, as regards some formal being, one must hold that the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is common.

3. Likewise, extension follows upon matter not according to its essence, but according to some being, since it is an accident[^5]: therefore if extension is commonly found in superior and inferior bodies, therefore it seems that there is one common matter as regards being in celestial and terrestrial things.

4. Likewise, light is a common nature, found in all bodies, both celestial and terrestrial, whether it be a substance or an accident[^6]: therefore if that corporeal form is not in matter except according to some being, it seems the same as before.

5. Likewise, transparency is a nature similarly found in all bodies, both superior and inferior, according to more and less[^7]; but transparency follows not only upon matter, but also upon form and the being of matter, not only upon essence: therefore it seems that in all bodies, whether celestial or earthly, one must posit one matter according to being.

6. Likewise, one matter is posited as regards being for the rare and the dense[^8]; therefore by parity of reasoning, for the luminous and the opaque; and if this, therefore for the heaven and the element.

*For the negative.*

**On the contrary:**

1. «Of corruptible and incorruptible things there is not one matter», as the Philosopher holds[^9]; but the superior bodies are incorruptible, and the inferior corruptible: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, things which have the same matter are mutually transmutable[^10]; but celestial and terrestrial bodies are not mutually transmutable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, matter subject to privation and [matter] which is not subject to privation differ as regards being[^11]; but in celestial things matter is not subject to privation, whereas in terrestrial things it is subject [to it]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a celestial body and an elemental body differ not only in form and quality, but also in discontinuity[^12]: if therefore continuity comes from the unity of matter as regards being, since these are mutually discontinuous — which is clear, because one moves while the other rests — it seems that as regards being there cannot be one matter of celestial and terrestrial things.

### Conclusion.

> *Of celestial and terrestrial bodies there was one matter according to the incomplete being which matter had before production; but after production and according to complete being, their matter differs.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, when one asks whether celestial and terrestrial bodies are from the same matter as regards being, this can be understood in two ways: either as regards the being which matter had *before* production, or as regards the being which matter has *after* production.

*Conclusion 1.* If as regards the being which matter had before production[^13], thus without doubt the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies was one, because it was one mass, having one *incomplete* form.

*Conclusion 2.* If as regards the being which matter has after production, which is indeed complete being, thus beyond doubt the matter of celestial and terrestrial things differs as regards being, both because under the one form it is corruptible, under the other incorruptible, and because under the one form it is subject to privation, under the other not. And this produces diversity in matter as regards being not only with respect to *act*, but also with respect to *potency ordered to act*; which diversity is not in matter insofar as it is subject to elemental forms. For although matter subject to fire and to air has one and another *actual being*, nevertheless, because in both cases it is subject to transmutation and privation and is capable of both, therefore they are said to have one matter as regards being; in celestial bodies and elemental ones, however, it does not happen that this is found.

And from these things the objections to either side are plain.

*To the arguments for the affirmative.*

For the first reasons, which show that celestial bodies and elemental bodies share in matter as regards being, speak of matter as regards that being which it had before production, and as regards the properties which follow upon that being, such as extension and the participation of transparency.

6. The last reason, however, does not conclude, which proceeds by likeness from the rare and the dense to the celestial and the elemental. For there is no likeness, because the rare and the dense are mutually transmutable, but not so celestial and elemental bodies; and I am speaking of the power[^14] of transmuting according to nature, not according to divine power.

*To the arguments for the negative.*

The reasons to the contrary, however, conclude that matter is not the same as regards being in celestial and terrestrial things *after* their production, as is plain by running through them one by one.

*Another way of distinguishing.*

It could be put otherwise, and almost amounts to the same thing, since unity in matter can be understood and exist in a fourfold way: either as regards essence, or as regards *incomplete* being and being *remote* from completion, or as regards *incomplete* being *proximate* to completion, or as regards *simply complete* being. And accordingly matter is distinguished thus: that some is subject to substantial form alone, some to substantial form and extension or quantity, some to substantial form and quantity and contrariety, some to substantial form and quantity, not to contrariety, and to uniformity in all its parts. —

*Conclusions.*

In the first way, the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is said to be the same, as was shown above[^15]; in the second way, of celestial and terrestrial things, or of corruptible and incorruptible bodies; in the third way, of elemental bodies, mutually transmutable; in the fourth way, of bodies similar in species and nature. Therefore in the first and second way, the matter of celestial and terrestrial things is the same, as the first reasons show; in the third and fourth way, not, as the reasons brought forward to the contrary conclude.

la: Gen. 1, 1. — Cfr. supra d. 11. lit. Magistri, c. 4. et ibid. in Comment. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et infra dub. 1. — Mox cod. aa *sed per terram intelligitur... et per caelum caelum empyreum*.

en: Gen. 1, 1. — Cf. above d. 11, the *Littera Magistri*, c. 4, and *ibid.* in the Commentary, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and below, dubium 1. — Just below, codex aa [reads] *but by «earth» is understood... and by «heaven» the empyrean heaven*.

la: Art. praeced. q. 1. seq.

en: The preceding article, q. 1 and following.

la: Notum est, Scotum aliosque multum disputare pro forma corporeitatis. Cfr. etiam Avicenna, l. *Sufficientiae*, c. 2. seq. — Gul. Mara, hic q. 4. hoc arg. ita exhibet: *Forma corporeitatis est unius rationis in omnibus, ergo et materia, quia propriae formae correspondet propria materia*. Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 26. (c. 2.) et II. *de Anima*, text. 26. (c. 2.). — Paulo superius plures codd. *ad haec* pro *ad has*.

en: It is well known that Scotus and others greatly debated on behalf of a *form of corporeity*. Cf. also Avicenna, *Sufficientia*, c. 2 and following. — William of Mara, here q. 4, sets out this argument thus: *The form of corporeity is of one nature in all things; therefore so is the matter, because to a proper form corresponds proper matter*. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 26 (c. 2), and *On the Soul* II, text 26 (c. 2). — A little above, several codices [read] *ad haec* for *ad has*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *Metaph.* text. 17. (II. c. 5.) et VII. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, text 17 (II, c. 5), and VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3).

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 68. (c. 7.). — Quaestio illa: *utrum lux sit substantia, an accidens*, solvitur infra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 68 (c. 7). — That question — *whether light is a substance or an accident* — is resolved below at d. 13, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Aristot., *de Sensu et sens.*, c. 3.

en: Aristotle, *On Sense and the Sensible*, c. 3.

la: Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 84. (c. 9.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 84 (c. 9).

la: Libr. VIII. *Metaph.* text. 12. seqq. et XII. text. 10. et 26. (VII. c. 4. et XI. c. 2. et 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 97, nota 2.

en: *Metaphysics* VIII, text 12 and following, and XII, text 10 and 26 (VII, c. 4, and XI, c. 2 and 5). Cf. above p. 97, note 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 91, nota 6. et pag. 93, nota 8, ubi verba Augustini et Boethii allegantur.

en: Cf. above p. 91, note 6, and p. 93, note 8, where the words of Augustine and Boethius are alleged.

la: Averroes, X. *Metaph.* text. 26. (IX. c. 10.) ait: *Illud enim, per quod differt corruptibile ab incorruptibili, est differentia privationis diversarum potentiarum duarum, scil. quod corruptibile differt ab incorruptibili, quia alterum habet ad corruptionem potentiam, et alterum non habet potentiam ad corruptionem; contraria vero, quae sunt in eodem genere, differunt, quoniam* in genere communi eis *sunt duae potentiae diversae, quarum una recipit alterum contrariorum, et altera alterum. Et ideo corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt diversa non secundum formam tantum, sed secundum formam et genus.*

en: Averroes, *Metaphysics* X, text 26 (IX, c. 10) says: *For that by which corruptible differs from incorruptible is the difference of privation of two diverse potencies, namely that corruptible differs from incorruptible because the one has a potency for corruption and the other does not have a potency for corruption; contraries, however, which are in the same genus, differ because* in the genus common to them *there are two diverse potencies, of which one receives one of the contraries and the other the other. And therefore corruptible and incorruptible are diverse not according to form alone, but according to form and genus.*

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 11. seq. (IV. c. 6.) inter ea quae *unum* dicuntur, recenset illa quae una sunt «aut *continuatione*, aut *forma*, aut *ratione*... Quare maxime linearum circuli linea una est, quoniam tota et perfecta est». Quae verba Averroes applicat ad corpus caeleste, dicens: «Et ideo corpus caeleste est unum per continuationem et per formam totalem et per motum unum continuum». Insuper, II. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 30. et 47. (c. 4. et 8.), Aristot. docet, corpora caelestia non esse continua cum istis inferioribus, sed tantum in se.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 11 and following (IV, c. 6), among the things which are called *one*, recounts those which are one «either *by continuity*, or *by form*, or *by account* (*ratione*)... Wherefore the line of the circle is most of all one among lines, because it is whole and perfect». Which words Averroes applies to the celestial body, saying: «And therefore the celestial body is one through continuation and through total form and through one continuous motion». Furthermore, in *On the Heaven and the World* II, text 30 and 47 (c. 4 and 8), Aristotle teaches that celestial bodies are not continuous with these lower ones, but only among themselves.

la: In cod. Y additur *id est, antequam ex illa corpora producerentur distincta, scilicet superiora et inferiora, quando scilicet habebat adhuc istud esse incompletum sub forma incompleta*.

en: In codex Y is added *that is, before from it the bodies were produced as distinct, namely superior and inferior, that is, when it still had this incomplete being under an incomplete form*.

la: Ed. 1 cum Vat. *possibilitate*.

en: Edition 1 with the Vatican [edition reads] *possibilitate* [for *potestate*].

la: Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 *et contrarietati* pro *non contrarietati*, sed contra subnexa.

en: Distinction 3, part I, article 1, question 2 and following. — A little above, almost all codices with edition 1 [read] *et contrarietati* for *non contrarietati*, but the contrary is subjoined.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio orta est ex opinione tunc communi et nunc obsoleta, quae tenebat, corpora caelestia esse naturaliter incorruptibilia. Dissensio autem in solvenda hac nostra quaestione fuit iam inter philosophos Arabes, scil. Avicennam et Averroem, quorum primus unitatem materiae esse in omnibus corporibus affirmavit, alter negavit, immo in libro *de Substantia orbis* docet, caelum esse substantiam simplicem et materia carentem. Cum B. Alberto et Richardo a Med. S. Thomas (hic q. unica, a. 1; S. I. q. 66. a. 2.) sententiae negativae magis adhaeret. Has opiniones Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica, a. 1.) sic explanat: «Dicunt quidam, quod non secundum essentiam nec secundum esse est una et eadem materia horum, nec in genere nec in specie nec numero — nisi genus accipiatur secundum communitatem analogicam, sicut si *ens* diceretur genus ad decem praedicamenta — sed diversa propter diversitatem potentiae continentis ipsa. Alii vero dicunt, quod eadem est *per essentiam* etiam *numero*, sed differt *secundum esse*, prout accipitur ut concreta formis diversis vel genere vel specie vel numero». Ipse utramque sententiam iudicat esse probabilem. — S. Bonav. sequitur secundam opinionem, et clare eam determinat in fine totius quaestionis. Consentiunt Ægid. R. (hic q. 3. a. 1.), Scot. (I. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 4; *de Rerum princip.* q. 8. a. 4.) et etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 44. m. 2.), qui tamen aliter sentit quoad *empyreum*. De hac materia plura dicta sunt supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.

**II.** Praeter citatos: B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 1. a. 4; S. p. II. tr. I. q. 4. m. 1. a. 1. partic. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. 9. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question arose from the then-common and now-obsolete opinion which held that celestial bodies are naturally incorruptible. The disagreement, however, in solving this our question already existed among the Arabian philosophers, namely Avicenna and Averroes, of whom the first affirmed the unity of matter to be in all bodies, the other denied it, and indeed in the book *On the Substance of the Orb* teaches that heaven is a simple substance lacking matter. With Blessed Albert and Richard of Mediavilla, St. Thomas (here, sole question, a. 1; *Summa I*, q. 66, a. 2) more strongly adheres to the negative opinion. Petrus a Tarantasia (here, sole question, a. 1) explains these opinions thus: «Some say that neither according to essence nor according to being is the matter of these things one and the same, neither in genus nor in species nor in number — unless genus be taken according to analogical commonality, as if *being* were called the genus of the ten predicaments — but they are diverse on account of the diversity of the potency which contains them. Others, however, say that it is the same *by essence* even *in number*, but it differs *according to being*, insofar as it is taken as concreted with diverse forms whether of genus or of species or of number». He himself judges each opinion to be probable. — St. Bonaventure follows the second opinion, and clearly determines it at the end of the whole question. Giles of Rome (here q. 3, a. 1), Scotus (I Sent. d. 14, q. 1, n. 4; *On the Principles of Things* q. 8, a. 4), and also Alexander of Hales (*Summa*, p. II, q. 44, m. 2) agree, the latter however taking a different view regarding the *empyrean*. On this matter more was said above at d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2–3.

**II.** Besides those cited: Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 1, a. 4; *Summa*, p. II, tr. I, q. 4, m. 1, a. 1, partic. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7, 9. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 2.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
### Quaestio II. *Utrum materia prima producta sit in die, an ante omnem diem.*

Secundo quaeritur de informi materia quantum ad tempus suae productionis, et est quaestio, utrum producta fuerit in die, an ante omnem diem. Et quod ante omnem diem, videtur:

*Fundamenta.*

1. Primo per textum Genesis[^1]: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*; constans est, hoc factum fuisse ante productionem lucis, sicut ipsa Scriptura insinuat; sed cum luce coepit dies: ergo ante omnem diem fuit productio informis materiae.

2. Item, Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum[^2]: «*Informem materiam fecisti ante omnem diem*».

3. Item, Hugo de S. Victore in libro de Sacramentis[^3]: «*Primo momento temporis, in quo creata est omnium visibilium invisibiliumque natura, neque nox fuit neque dies*».

4. Item, ratione videtur. Qualitas temporis debet respondere qualitati rei productae; sed materia prima nec est producta omnino sub privatione formae nec sub completa distinctione[^4]: ergo eius productio nec diei competebat nec nocti, ergo ante omnem diem.

*Ad oppositum.*

**Sed contra:** 1. Genesis secundo[^5]: *Istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae, quando creata sunt in die, quo fecit Deus caelum et terram*; sed quando Deus fecit caelum et terram, tunc creavit illam primordialem materiam: ergo in die ipsam creavit.

2. Item, Creator omnium est Deus lucis[^6], ergo omnia quae facit, facit in luce: ergo si creavit materiam, in luce creavit, et ita in die.

3. Item, arguit Manichaeus: si Deus creavit aliquid in tenebris, erat in tenebris; quomodo ergo *habitat lucem inaccessibilem*[^7]? Si ergo hoc est inconveniens, inconveniens est ipsam creasse in tenebris; et creavit in tenebris vel in die: ergo etc.

4. Item, nox et dies immediate dividunt tempus; sed materia rerum corporalium producta fuit cum tempore[^8], ergo cum nocte vel cum die; sed non cum nocte: ergo cum die.

### Conclusio.

> *Materia certo producta fuit ante omnem diem secundum ordinem naturae, et probabilius etiam secundum ordinem temporis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod creatio caeli et terrae secundum omnes fuit ante omnem diem quantum ad ordinem *naturae*; quantum vero ad ordinem *temporis* sive durationis diversimode senserunt diversi.

*Opinio 1.* Quidam enim senserunt, quod non fuit aliqua mora inter creationem et distinctionis inceptionem; immo statim cum producta fuit illa materia producta fuit[^9] et lux, quae diem faciebat, nec fuit morula aliqua intermedia.

*Opinio 2 et conclusio 2.* Aliis autem videtur, quod fuerit mora temporis interiacens inter terrae creationem et lucis factionem; et istud videtur magis consonum sententiae expositorum, sicut patebit in distinctione sequenti[^10]. Utrumque tamen potuit esse verum, nec est aliquod horum usquequaque certum.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Sustinendo tamen illud ultimum, respondendum est ad primum obiectum de textu Genesis, quod *creare* aequivoce sumitur in Scriptura, et ibi dicitur creatio caeli et terrae utriusque factio sive formatio; et sic exponit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram quinto[^11], ubi innuit, quod *creare* caelum et terram dicitur dupliciter: vel informem materiam facere, vel per formas et species distinguere.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est in luce; dicendum, quod intelligendum est, Deum esse lucem spiritualem, non corporalem, quae est lux sapientiae, et in hac fecit quidquid produxit, quia *omnia in sapientia fecit*[^12]. — Et ideo quod obiicitur de tenebris corporalibus nihil facit ad propositum, quia non magis est Deus in tenebris in loco corporaliter tenebroso quam in luminoso.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nox et dies immediate dividunt tempus; dicendum, quod verum est secundum *esse*, quod habent *nunc*, quod quidem attenditur secundum revolutionem corporum caelestium. Sed *tunc* erat tempus secundum mutabilitatem, quae erat in materiae partibus, quae quidem mutabilitas erat absque praesentia corporis luminosi et absque umbra corporis opaci; et ideo tempus illud non erat habens vicissitudinem diei et noctis ante formationem lucis[^13].

*Solutio secundum aliam opinionem.* Si quis autem velit sustinere oppositum, plane poterit ad rationes et auctoritates ad oppositum respondere, quod intelligantur insinuare ordinem *naturae*, non *temporis*, secundum quem informis materia omnem diem antecessit.

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english:
### Question II. *Whether primary matter was produced on a day, or before every day.*

Secondly, the question is asked concerning unformed matter as regards the time of its production, and the question is whether it was produced on a day, or before every day. And that [it was produced] before every day seems [to be the case]:

*Foundations.*

1. First, by the text of Genesis[^1]: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*; it is established that this took place before the production of light, as Scripture itself intimates; but the day began with light: therefore the production of unformed matter was before every day.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*[^2]: «*Thou hast made unformed matter before every day*».

3. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor in his book *On the Sacraments*[^3]: «*In the first moment of time, in which the nature of all visible and invisible things was created, there was neither night nor day*».

4. Likewise, by reason it appears so. The quality of time ought to correspond to the quality of the thing produced; but primary matter is produced neither wholly under privation of form nor under complete distinction[^4]: therefore its production was fitting neither to day nor to night, therefore [it was produced] before every day.

*For the opposite.*

**On the contrary:** 1. Genesis chapter 2[^5]: *These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day in which God made the heaven and the earth*; but when God made the heaven and the earth, then He created that primordial matter: therefore He created it on a day.

2. Likewise, the Creator of all is the God of light[^6], therefore all things which He makes, He makes in light: therefore if He created matter, He created it in light, and so on a day.

3. Likewise, the Manichee argues: if God created anything in darkness, He was in darkness; how then does He *inhabit inaccessible light*[^7]? If therefore this is unfitting, it is unfitting that He created [matter] in darkness; and He created it either in darkness or on a day: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, night and day immediately divide time; but the matter of corporeal things was produced together with time[^8], therefore [it was produced] together with night or together with day; but not with night: therefore on a day.

### Conclusion.

> *Matter was certainly produced before every day according to the order of nature, and more probably also according to the order of time.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the creation of heaven and earth, according to all [doctors], was before every day as regards the order of *nature*; but as regards the order of *time* or of duration, different [doctors] have thought differently.

*Opinion 1.* For some have thought that there was no delay between the creation and the beginning of distinction; nay rather, as soon as that matter was produced, the light too, which made the day, was produced[^9], and there was no intervening pause.

*Opinion 2 and Conclusion 2.* But to others it seems that there was an intervening delay of time between the creation of the earth and the making of light; and this seems more consonant with the view of the expositors, as will become clear in the following distinction[^10]. Yet either could have been true, and none of these [views] is altogether certain.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. Maintaining however the latter [view], a reply must be given to the first objection drawn from the text of Genesis, [namely] that *to create* is taken equivocally in Scripture, and there the creation of heaven and earth is called the making or formation of both; and thus Augustine expounds in *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book five[^11], where he intimates that *to create* heaven and earth is said in two ways: either to make unformed matter, or to distinguish [things] through forms and species.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that God is in light: it must be said that this is to be understood [as meaning] that God is *spiritual* light, not corporeal — namely the light of wisdom — and in this [light] He made whatever He produced, because *He made all things in wisdom*[^12]. — And therefore what is objected concerning corporeal darkness has nothing to do with the matter, because God is no more in darkness in a corporeally dark place than in an illumined one.

4. To that which is objected, that night and day immediately divide time: it must be said that this is true as regards the *being* which they have *now*, which indeed is reckoned according to the revolution of the celestial bodies. But *then* time was reckoned according to the changeability which was in the parts of matter — which changeability was without the presence of a luminous body and without the shadow of an opaque body; and therefore that time did not have the vicissitude of day and night before the formation of light[^13].

*Solution according to the other opinion.* But if anyone wishes to maintain the opposite, he will plainly be able to respond to the reasons and authorities [adduced] for the opposite [view] by saying that they are to be understood as intimating the order of *nature*, not of *time*, according to which unformed matter preceded every day.

en: [Augustine, *Confessions* XII,] c. 8, n. 8.

la: Ita est sensus eorum, quae Hugo dicit loc. cit. libr. I. p. 1. c. 5. seq., scil.: «Sed nec illud, quantum opinor, absurdum erit, si credimus, unum et idem prorsus momentum temporis fuisse, quo in principio simul creata sit et rerum visibilium corporaliumque materia et invisibilium in angelica natura essentia... quia eodem momento simul et visibilium materia essentialiter creata est et invisibilium natura». In seq. cap. idem repetit explicans illud verbum Gen. 1, 2: *Et tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi*.

en: Such is the sense of what Hugh says at the place cited, book I, part 1, c. 5 and following, namely: «But neither, as I judge, will it be absurd if we believe that there was one and the very same precise moment of time, in which at the beginning the matter of visible and corporeal things and the essence of invisibles in their angelic nature were simultaneously created… because in the same moment the matter of visible things was essentially created together with the nature of invisibles». In the following chapter he repeats the same, explaining that word of Gen. 1, 2: *And darkness was upon the face of the deep*.

la: Sicut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1-3.

en: As was shown above, article 1, q. 1–3.

la: Vers. 4; in quo textu codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *creatae sunt* pro *creata sunt*, et Vulgata *Dominus Deus* pro *Deus*.

en: Verse 4; in which text the codices with editions 1, 2 [read] *creatae sunt* for *creata sunt*, and the Vulgate [reads] *Dominus Deus* for *Deus*.

la: Ioan. 1, 3. seq. et I. Ioan. 1, 5.

en: John 1, 3 and following, and 1 John 1, 5.

la: Epist. 1. Tim. 6, 16: *Lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem*. — Hoc arg. insinuat August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 3. n. 6: Sequitur in eodem libro; *Et tenebrae erant super abyssum*. Quod Manichaei reprehendunt dicentes: in tenebris ergo erat Deus, antequam faceret lucem?

en: 1 Tim. 6, 16: *He inhabits inaccessible light*. — This argument is intimated by Augustine, *On Genesis against the Manichees* I, c. 3, n. 6: There follows in the same book: *And darkness was upon the deep*. Which the Manichees reproach, saying: was God then in darkness, before He made light?

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. dub. 2.

en: Cf. above d. 2, p. I, dubium 2.

la: In pluribus mss. et in Vat. desideratur *producta fuit*.

en: In several manuscripts and in the Vatican [edition] *producta fuit* is wanting.

la: Art. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox cod. cc et ed. 1 *potest* pro *potuit*.

en: [Distinction 13,] art. 1, q. 1 and following. — Just below, codex cc and edition 1 [read] *potest* for *potuit*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 5. n. 13. seqq. — Paulo superius ex cod. cc et ed. 1 substituimus *quod creare* pro *qua creare*.

en: [Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* V,] c. 1, n. 1 and following, and c. 5, n. 13 and following. — A little above, with codex cc and edition 1 we have substituted *quod creare* for *qua creare*.

la: Ps. 103, 24: *Omnia in sapientia fecisti*. — Cfr. August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 3. n. 6.

en: Ps. 103, 24: *Thou hast made all things in wisdom*. — Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis against the Manichees* I, c. 3, n. 6.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 66, nota 8.

en: Cf. above p. 66, note 8.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius et sequentis quaestionis facile intelligitur. Quoad rationes temporis et loci cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 2; et p. II. a. 2. — De hac 2. quaestione explicite et in eadem sententia agunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 44. a. 4; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. II. q. 45; Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6; Richard. a Med., hic q. 7; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3; Biel, hic q. 2. in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question and of the following is easily understood. As regards the reasons of time and place, cf. above d. 2, p. I, a. 2; and p. II, a. 2. — On this second question, expressly and to the same effect, treat Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 44, a. 4; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. II, q. 45; Petrus a Tarantasia, here, the single question, a. 6; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3; Biel, here q. 2, at the end.

---

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Quam relationem materia illa informis habuerit ad locum.*

Tertio quaeritur de illa informi materia quantum ad locum, et est quaestio, utrum habuerit illa materia situm. Et quod illa materia corporalium habuerit situm, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Hugo de sancto Victore[^1]: «*Erat terrenum hoc elementum medio uno loco subsidens, ceteris in una confusione permixtis et circumquaque in modum nebulae oppansis*»; sed hoc non potuit esse absque situ corporali: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod repleverit locum, videtur, quia caelum empyreum, sicut dicit Beda[^2], cum ipsa materia corporalium fuit creatum; sed constans est, quod empyreum intra concavitatem suam natura est omnia corpora alia continere: ergo vel erat vacuum, vel ab illa mole corporea replebatur. Sed natura non sustinet vacuum: ergo videtur, quod moles illa repleret locum.

3. Item, videtur, quod haberet sursum et deorsum, «*quia summitas eius, sicut dicit Hugo*[^3], *porrigebatur, quousque nunc summum creaturae corporeae pertingit*»: ergo erat ibi circumferentia et centrum.

4. Item, «*materia illa, sicut Magister dicit in littera*[^4], *in partibus superioribus erat rarior, levior et subtilior, in inferiori parte spissior et grossior*»: ergo erat ibi gravitas et levitas; sed secundum has proprietates corpora habent locari sursum et deorsum: ergo redit idem quod prius.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Nihil per se est in loco, nisi quod est *hic et nunc*; et nihil est *hic et nunc*, nisi quod est *hoc aliquid*; et nihil est *hoc aliquid*, nisi quod est individuum; et omne tale est ens completum[^5]: ergo *a primo*, nihil est in loco, nisi quod est ens completum. Sed materia illa non erat ens completum: ergo in loco non habebat situm.

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2. Item, quod non repleret locum, videtur, quia nihil inane et vacuum replet locum; sed materia illa *erat inanis et vacua*, sicut dicitur in principio Genesis: ergo locum non replebat.

3. Item, quod non haberet differentias positionis secundum *sursum* et *deorsum*, videtur, quia istae sunt positiones, secundum quas distinguuntur et ordinantur diversa corpora mundi in universo; sed tunc non erat ibi distinctio nec ordo: ergo nec erat ibi huiusmodi diversa positio.

4. Item, gravitas et levitas sunt proprietates consequentes formas elementares; sed in materia illa nondum erant formae elementares: ergo nec erat ibi grave nec leve, ergo nec sursum nec deorsum, cum hae positionis differentiae attendantur secundum illas proprietates.

### Conclusio.

> *Materia illa informis erat in loco, locum replebat et imperfecte positionem habebat secundum sursum et deorsum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum materia illa esset moles, habens extensionem, et caelum empyreum haberet ambiens, *Conclusio 1.* quod ipsa in loco erat, et cum esset substantia corpulenta, locum replebat. Rursus, cum in partibus distinctionem quandam haberet secundum subtilitatem et grossitiem, sed semiplenam, *Conclusio 2.* positiones secundum sursum et deorsum quodam modo, sed imperfecte habebat. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad istam partem adductae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nihil est in loco nisi ens completum; dicendum, quod hoc est falsum, si intelligatur de completione perfecta: embryo enim in loco est, quamvis sit aliquid incompletum. Nec valet illa deductio; peccat enim in hoc quod dicit, quod omne quod est *hoc aliquid*, est completum. Hoc enim falsum est, nam ipsum individuum et forma individualis habet esse completum et minus completum[^6].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non replebat locum, quia erat *inanis et vacua*; dicendum, quod vacuitas loci et vacuitas materiae est aequivoce dicta. Vacuitas enim loci est per privationem corporis contenti, sed vacuitas materiae est per privationem formae et complementi. — *Notandum.* Attendendum tamen, quod sicut *locus* dupliciter dicitur vacuus: aut proprie, ut per privationem omnis corporis, aut large secundum vulgarem modum[^7] per privationem corporis solidi et sensibilis, sicut dicitur arca vacua propter absentiam panis, et dolium vacuum propter absentiam vini; sic etiam intelligendum est in vacuitate *materiae*, quod dicitur dupliciter vacua: aut quia non habet aliquam formam, et sic nunquam fuit vacua; aut quia non habet formam omnimode perfectam, et sic quamvis esset vacua, tamen locum poterat replere, quia erat extensa et corporea[^8].

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non habebat sursum et deorsum, quia carebat ordine et distinctione et elementari proprietate; ad illas duas rationes simul dicendum est, quod sicut illa tria proposita non habebat nisi *imperfecte* et *semiplene* ratione cuiusdam inclinationis et longinquae dispositionis, sic etiam sursum et deorsum non habebat *proprie*, habebat tamen quodammodo, scilicet incomplete et propter quasdam dispositiones, quas habebat ad grave et leve. Dicit Magister, leviorem fuisse in superiori parte, et graviorem in inferiori, non quod istas proprietates complete participaret, sed in quadam longinqua et praeambula dispositione, sicut supra[^9] ostensum est ex parte.

english:
### Question III. *What relation that unformed matter had to place.*

Thirdly, the question is asked concerning that unformed matter as regards place, and the question is whether that matter had a situation. And that the matter of corporeal things had a situation, appears [as follows]:

*Foundations.*

1. Hugh of Saint Victor[^1]: «*That earthen element was settling in one middle place, while the others were mingled together in a single confusion and spread round about in the manner of a mist*»; but this could not have been without a corporeal situation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it filled a place appears [as follows]: because the empyrean heaven, as Bede says[^2], was created together with the matter of corporeal things itself; but it is settled that the empyrean is, by nature, that which contains all other bodies within its concavity: therefore either it was empty, or it was filled by that corporeal mass. But nature does not allow a vacuum: therefore it appears that that mass filled the place.

3. Likewise, it appears that [the matter] had up and down, «*because its summit, as Hugh says*[^3], *stretched out to where the summit of corporeal creation now reaches*»: therefore there was there a circumference and a centre.

4. Likewise, «*that matter, as the Master says in the text*[^4], *was in its upper parts rarer, lighter and more subtle, in its lower part denser and grosser*»: therefore there was there gravity and lightness; but according to these properties bodies are located up and down: therefore the same conclusion returns as before.

*For the opposite.*

1. Nothing is *per se* in a place except that which is *here and now*; and nothing is *here and now* except that which is *this something*; and nothing is *this something* except that which is individual; and every such thing is a complete being[^5]: therefore *from the first* [premise], nothing is in a place except that which is a complete being. But that matter was not a complete being: therefore in place it did not have a situation.

2. Likewise, that it did not fill a place appears [as follows]: because nothing empty and void fills a place; but that matter *was empty and void*, as is said at the beginning of Genesis: therefore it did not fill a place.

3. Likewise, that it did not have differences of position according to *up* and *down* appears [as follows]: because these are positions according to which the diverse bodies of the world are distinguished and ordered in the universe; but at that time there was there neither distinction nor order: therefore neither was there at that time such a diverse position.

4. Likewise, gravity and lightness are properties consequent upon the elementary forms; but in that matter there were not yet the elementary forms: therefore there was there neither heavy nor light, therefore neither up nor down, since these differences of position are reckoned according to those properties.

### Conclusion.

> *That unformed matter was in a place, was filling a place, and imperfectly had position according to up and down.*

**I respond:** It must be said that since that matter was a mass, having extension, and the empyrean heaven had [it as] something it encompassed, *Conclusion 1.* it itself was in a place, and since it was a corpulent substance, it was filling the place. Again, since in its parts it had a certain distinction according to subtlety and grossness, but a half-full one, *Conclusion 2.* it had the positions according to up and down in a certain way, but imperfectly. — And therefore the reasons which have been adduced for this side are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that nothing is in a place save a complete being: it must be said that this is false, if it is understood of *perfect* completion: for an embryo is in a place, although it is something incomplete. Nor does that deduction hold; for it errs in this, that it says that everything which is *this something* is complete. For this is false, since the individual itself and the individual form have being [that is] complete and less complete[^6].

2. To that which is objected, that it did not fill a place, because it was *empty and void*: it must be said that the emptiness of a place and the emptiness of matter is said equivocally. For the emptiness of a place is by privation of a contained body, but the emptiness of matter is by privation of form and of completion. — *Note.* It is to be observed, however, that just as *place* is said to be empty in two ways — either properly, namely by privation of every body, or broadly according to the common manner[^7] by privation of a solid and sensible body, as a chest is said to be empty on account of the absence of bread, and a cask empty on account of the absence of wine — so also is it to be understood in the emptiness of *matter*, [which] is said to be empty in two ways: either because it does not have any form, and so it never was empty; or because it does not have a form altogether perfect, and so although it was empty, yet it could fill a place, because it was extended and corporeal[^8].

3. 4. To that which is objected, that it did not have up and down, because it lacked order and distinction and elementary property: to those two arguments together it must be said that just as it had those three proposed [features] only *imperfectly* and *half-fully* by reason of a certain inclination and a far-off disposition, so also up and down it did not have *properly*, yet it had [them] in some way, namely incompletely and on account of certain dispositions which it had toward the heavy and the light. The Master says that it was lighter in the upper part, and heavier in the lower, not that it participated those properties completely, but in a certain far-off and preambular disposition, as has been shown above[^9] in part.

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. I. c. 6. — Paulo superius plures codd. *cuiusmodi* pro *utrum*, et dein codd. A ee *corporalem* pro *corporalium*.

en: [Hugh of St. Victor,] *On the Sacraments*, book I, p. I, c. 6. — A little above, several codices [read] *cuiusmodi* for *utrum*, and then codices A and ee [read] *corporalem* for *corporalium*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 55, nota 8. et pag. 68, nota 1. — Quod vacuum non detur, ostendit Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. seqq. (c. 8. seq.).

en: Cf. above p. 55, note 8, and p. 68, note 1. — That a vacuum is not given, Aristotle shows in *Physics* IV, text 67 and following (c. 8 and following).

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. I. c. 6.

la: Hic c. 5.

en: [Lombard, *Sentences* II, d. 12,] here, c. 5.

la: De his cfr. supra pag. 77, nota 2; pag. 79, nota 1; pag. 90, nota 1; pag. 109, nota 7. et Avicenna, II. Metaph. c. 3. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 bis pro *hic et nunc* substituunt *hoc unum*. Mox post *a primo* Vat. addit *ad ultimum*; sed in pluribus codd. et ed. 1 desideratur tota propositio usque ad *Sed materia*.

en: On these [matters] cf. above p. 77, note 2; p. 79, note 1; p. 90, note 1; p. 109, note 7; and Avicenna, *Metaphysics* II, c. 3. — Codex cc and edition 1 twice substitute *hoc unum* for *hic et nunc*. Just after *a primo* the Vatican [edition] adds *ad ultimum*; but in several codices and in edition 1 the whole proposition down to *Sed materia* is lacking.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 3. in corp.

en: See above, article 1, q. 3, in the body [of the response].

la: In Vat. omittuntur verba *per privationem* usque ad *modum*. — Paulo superius plures codd. *est vacuus* pro *dicitur vacuus*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] the words *per privationem* down to *modum* are omitted. — A little above, several codices [read] *est vacuus* for *dicitur vacuus*.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. above article 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Art. 1. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: [Above,] article 1, q. 3. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Sequentem 3. quaestionem ex Hugone a S. Victore accepit Magister (*hic* c. 5.). De ea explicite tractant Alex. Hal., loc. cit. in fine, et Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Master took the following 3rd question from Hugh of Saint Victor (*here*, c. 5). On it Alexander of Hales (at the place cited, at the end) and Peter of Tarantasia (here, the single question, a. 5) treat expressly.

---

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title: Dist. 12, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the Master's text (d. XII)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *materiam quatuor elementorum nomine terrae appellavit Moyses, quia inter omnia elementa est terra minus speciosa*. Contra hoc obiicitur quod dicit Hugo[^1]: «*Per terram hoc elementum terrae significari puto, cum dicitur: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*»: ergo non videtur significare illam materiam informem in sua generalitate. — Item, si per *terram* significatur materia informis, cum in illa conveniat caelum et terra, videtur, quod non bene distinguantur ista duo.

*Quaestio incidens.* Iuxta hoc est quaestio, propter quid istis tribus nominibus illa informis materia appellatur, scilicet nomine *terrae*, *abyssi* et *aquae*[^2], cum non magis esset ibi de ratione terrae et aquae quam ignis et aeris.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod etsi multae sint

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expositiones huius verbi: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*[^3]; quatuor tamen sunt principales, et secundum has differenter exponitur nomen *terrae*.

*Expositio 1.* Una expositio est, quod *caelum* et *terra* eandem materiam nominant, scilicet materiam informem omnium corporalium, prout tamen de ipsa debebant fieri duorum corporum genera, scilicet caelestia et elementaria, ut sit sensus: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*, id est materiam, ex qua debebat fieri caelum et omnia elementa. Et ista expositio confirmatur per subsequentem litteram[^4]. Subsequenter enim exprimitur, qualiter factum est caelum, et qualiter facta est terra.

*Expositio 2.* Alia vero expositio est ab hac expositione valde longinqua, quae nomine *caeli* vult intelligi naturam spiritualem, nomine *terrae* naturam corporalem, ut sit sensus: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*, id est *angelicam naturam* et *materiam primam*[^5]. Et haec expositio confirmatur per litteram sequentem, quia in secundo die productio *caeli corporei* exprimitur: ergo in principio temporis, si qua fuerit productio caeli, non fuit caeli corporalis, sed spiritualis.

*Expositio 3.* Tertia expositio, quasi media inter has duas, est expositio Hugonis[^6], qui dicit, per *terram* intelligi terrenum elementum, et per *caelum* tria alia elementa, quae super terram circumquaque in modum nebulae erant oppansa et in una confusione permixta, sive potius in una permixtione confusa circumquaque suspensa, quae eousque in altum protendebantur, quousque nunc summitas corporeae naturae pertingit. Et illud videtur similiter per litteram sequentem confirmari[^7].

*Expositio 4.* Quarta expositio, quae communior est secundum expositores et planior, est, quod per *caelum* intelligatur *caelum empyreum*, quod est Angelorum habitaculum, in quo Angeli sunt creati; per *terram* vero *materia omnium corporum intra ipsum contentorum*, sive caelestium sive terrestrium[^8]. Haec expositio sequenti litterae concordat, quae exprimit, de illa materia facta esse corpora caelestia et elementaria. Et si tu quaeras, quare illa duo distinguit? plana est responsio; quia caelum empyreum completum erat et immutabile et habebat mensurari aeviternitate cum suis contentis; materia vero illa incompleta erat et subiecta mutabilitati, tam ipsa, quam ea quae ex ipsa futura erant; et ideo debebat mensurari tempore. — Et per hoc patet, quod Scriptura distinxit illa duo valde rationabiliter et eleganter, cum in primaria conditione diversas haberent mensuras, secundum quas ad invicem differrent, sive eorum differentiae innotescerent. Et per hoc patent duo prima obiecta.

*Ad quaestionem incid.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare his tribus nominibus appellata est? dicendum, quod etsi ad hoc satis sufficienter respondeat Magister in littera[^9], potest tamen dici, quod insinuatur ipsa materia informis illis tribus nominibus sub triplici conditione se habere in comparatione ad formam. *De relatione materiae ad formam.* Ipsa enim materia dat formae fixionem, et propter hoc appellatur nomine *terrae*, quae inter cetera elementa plus habet de stabilitate[^10]. Ipsa etiam materia a forma recipit speciositatem et completionem, et per se est quasi tenebra; et ideo significatur nomine *abyssi tenebrosae*. Ipsa etiam materia ad formam habet aptitudinem et inclinationem, et ita quandam fluxibilitatem, quae signatur nomine *aquae*[^11].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non enim tenebrae aliquid sunt*. Si enim *tenebra nihil est*: ergo non est alicubi[^12]: ergo non videtur, quod essent super faciem abyssi. — Item, si tenebra nihil dicit nisi negationem praesentiae lucis corporalis; cum ab aeterno esset verum dicere, quod lux corporalis non erat ab aeterno, est verum dicere, quod esset tenebra; quod falsum est. — Item, si tenebra nihil est; et quod nihil est non potest ab alio dividi: ergo non potuit tenebra dividi a luce, cuius contrarium habetur in littera Genesis[^13]. — Item, si tenebra nihil est; et quod nihil est non benedicit Dominum: ergo tenebrae non benedicunt Domino[^14].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *tenebra* semper accipitur *privative*; et quoniam privatio relinquit constantiam alicuius subiecti[^15], tenebra semper aliquid praesupponit *in obliquo*; nunquam enim est tenebra, nisi sit aliquid quod obtenebretur; unde *tenebra* non dicit tantum non-existentiam lucis, sed etiam cum hoc addit aptitudinem corporis illuminabilis. Quia ergo tenebra privationem dicit, ideo non[^16]

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dicitur esse facta; quia vero aliquid ponit in obliquo, ideo non est aeterna. Si ergo alicubi dicatur, quod *tenebra nihil est*, hoc dicitur quantum ad illud quod dicit tenebra *in recto*, sicut dicitur caecitas nihil esse. Si vero dicatur, quod *tenebrae aliquid sunt*, vel quod *divisae sunt*, vel quod *benedicunt Dominum*, hoc dicitur ratione eius, *circa quod sunt*. Et sic patent obiecta.

*Obiicitur.* Sed adhuc posset obiici, quod habitus naturaliter praecedit privationem[^17]: ergo si tenebra dicit privationem luminis, prius fuit lux, quam essent tenebrae. Praeterea, nox est differentia temporis, ergo non est privatio pura; sed Scriptura[^18] dicit, quod *tenebras appellavit noctem*: ergo videtur, quod falsum dicat, cum dicit, quod tenebrae non aliquid sunt.

*Solvitur distinguendo.* — Et propterea oportet distinguere, quod *tenebra* dupliciter potest importare privationem. Uno modo, quia simpliciter dicit lucis absentiam, et hoc modo non sequitur lucem; et sic nihil est, formaliter loquendo. Sic etiam intelligit Scriptura[^19], quod *tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi*; et sic intelligit Augustinus, cum dicit, quod *tenebrae non aliquid sunt*. Alio modo *tenebra* dicit privationem lucis in una parte cum positione illuminationis in alia, et hoc modo *tenebra* appellatur umbra, quae resultat ex obiectu corporis opaci; et sic *tenebra*, etsi aliquo modo sit privatio, non tamen est privatio pura; et per hunc modum accipiendo intelligitur a luce esse divisa, et significatur nomine *noctis* et invitatur ad laudem Creatoris et consequitur habitum lucis[^20].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Alcuinus, quod *Deus operatur in Verbo omnia disponendo*; contra: omni enim operationi respondet aliquis effectus: ergo si Deus operatur omnia disponendo in Verbo, cum operatio ista fuerit ab aeterno, videtur, quod multa ab aeterno produxerit. — Item, in sapiente operatore *dispositio* praecedit *operationem*: ergo cum Deus sit sapiens in omnibus operibus suis[^21], videtur, quod nulla operatio eius debeat *dispositio* dici.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Alcuinus indiget hic pio expositore. Multum enim loquitur improprie, dum ipsam aeternam *dispositionem* vocat *operationem*; ipse enim extendit nomen *operationis* ad omnem productionem. Et quoniam Pater, generando et producendo Verbum, omnia in ipso disposuit, ideo largo modo, sed improprio, ipsum ab aeterno *disponendo* in Filio *operari* dixit[^22].

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE MASTER'S TEXT

### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first the question is asked concerning what he says, that *Moses called the matter of the four elements by the name "earth," because among all the elements earth is the least comely*. Against this it is objected — by what Hugh says[^1]: «*By "earth" I think this element of earth is signified, when it is said: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*»: therefore it does not seem to signify that unformed matter in its generality. — Likewise, if by *earth* unformed matter is signified, since heaven and earth coincide in it, it appears that those two are not well distinguished.

*An incidental question.* Alongside this is a question, why that unformed matter is called by these three names, namely by the name *earth*, *deep*, and *water*[^2], since there was there no more of the character of earth and water than of fire and air.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although there are many

expositions of this saying: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*[^3], yet four are the principal ones, and according to these the name of *earth* is differently expounded.

*Exposition 1.* One exposition is that *heaven* and *earth* name the same matter, namely the unformed matter of all corporeal things, yet inasmuch as out of it there were to be made two genera of bodies, namely the celestial and the elementary, so that the sense is: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, that is, the matter out of which the heaven and all the elements were to be made. And this exposition is confirmed by the following text[^4]. For thereafter is expressed how the heaven was made and how the earth was made.

*Exposition 2.* But another exposition is very far removed from this one, which by the name *heaven* wishes to be understood spiritual nature, and by the name *earth* corporeal nature, so that the sense is: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, that is, the *angelic nature* and *first matter*[^5]. And this exposition is confirmed by the following text, because on the second day the production of the *corporeal heaven* is expressed: therefore at the beginning of time, if there was any production of heaven, it was not [the production] of a corporeal heaven but of a spiritual [one].

*Exposition 3.* The third exposition, as it were midway between these two, is the exposition of Hugh[^6], who says that by *earth* is understood the element earth, and by *heaven* the other three elements, which were spread round about over the earth in the manner of a mist and were mingled together in a single confusion, or rather were suspended round about in a single confused commingling, which were stretched out on high to where the summit of corporeal nature now reaches. And this likewise seems to be confirmed by the following text[^7].

*Exposition 4.* The fourth exposition, which is the more common according to the expositors and the plainer, is that by *heaven* is understood the *empyrean heaven*, which is the dwelling-place of the Angels, in which the Angels were created; and by *earth* the *matter of all bodies contained within it*, whether celestial or terrestrial[^8]. This exposition accords with the following text, which expresses that out of that matter were made the celestial and elementary bodies. And if you ask why he distinguishes the two, the answer is plain: because the empyrean heaven was complete and immutable and was to be measured by aeviternity together with its contents; but that matter was incomplete and subject to mutability — both itself and the things which were to come to be out of it — and therefore it had to be measured by time. — And by this it is clear that Scripture distinguished those two very reasonably and elegantly, since in their primary condition they had diverse measures, according to which they differed from one another, or [according to which] their differences became known. And by this both of the first two objections are answered.

*To the incidental question.* To that which is asked, why it was called by these three names: it must be said that, although the Master in the text responds sufficiently to this[^9], yet it can be said that it is intimated that the unformed matter itself by those three names has, under a threefold condition, [a relation] in comparison to form. *On the relation of matter to form.* For matter itself gives fixity to form, and on this account it is called by the name *earth*, which among the other elements has the most of stability[^10]. Also matter receives from form beauty and completion, and is of itself as it were a darkness; and therefore it is signified by the name *dark deep*. Also matter has toward form an aptitude and inclination, and so a certain fluidity, which is signified by the name *water*[^11].

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *For darknesses are not anything*. For if *darkness is nothing*: then it is not anywhere[^12]: therefore it does not appear that they were upon the face of the deep. — Likewise, if darkness signifies nothing but the negation of the presence of corporeal light: since from eternity it was true to say that corporeal light was not from eternity, it is true to say that there was darkness; which is false. — Likewise, if darkness is nothing; and what is nothing cannot be divided from anything else: therefore darkness could not have been divided from the light, the contrary of which is held in the text of Genesis[^13]. — Likewise, if darkness is nothing; and what is nothing does not bless the Lord: therefore darknesses do not bless the Lord[^14].

**I respond:** It must be said that *darkness* is always taken *privatively*; and since a privation leaves the constancy of some subject[^15], darkness always presupposes something *in the oblique* [case]; for there is never darkness unless there be something which is being darkened; hence *darkness* does not signify only the non-existence of light, but together with this also adds the aptitude of an illuminable body. Therefore because darkness signifies a privation, on that account it is not[^16]

said to be made; but because it posits something in the oblique [case], on that account it is not eternal. If therefore it is said somewhere that *darkness is nothing*, this is said as regards what darkness signifies *in the direct* [case], as blindness is said to be nothing. But if it is said that *darknesses are something*, or that *they were divided*, or that *they bless the Lord*, this is said by reason of that *about which* they are. And thus the objections are answered.

*An objection.* But it could still be objected that habit naturally precedes privation[^17]: therefore if darkness signifies the privation of light, light was prior to the time when darknesses existed. Furthermore, night is a difference of time, therefore it is not a pure privation; but Scripture[^18] says that He *called the darknesses night*: therefore it appears that he speaks falsely when he says that darknesses are not anything.

*It is solved by distinguishing.* — And therefore it must be distinguished, [namely] that *darkness* can imply privation in two ways. In one way, because it simply signifies the absence of light, and in this way it does not follow light; and so [in this sense] it is nothing, formally speaking. In this sense also Scripture[^19] understands [it] when [it says] that *darknesses were upon the face of the deep*; and in this sense Augustine understands [it] when he says that *darknesses are not anything*. In another way *darkness* signifies the privation of light in one part together with the position of illumination in another, and in this way *darkness* is called *shadow*, which results from the interposition of an opaque body; and so *darkness*, although in some way it is a privation, yet is not a *pure* privation; and taking [it] in this manner, it is understood to have been divided from the light, and is signified by the name *night*, and is invited to the praise of the Creator, and follows upon the habit of light[^20].

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Alcuin says, that *God operates in the Word by disposing all things*; on the contrary: every operation has some effect corresponding to it: therefore if God operates all things by disposing in the Word, since that operation has been from eternity, it appears that He has produced many things from eternity. — Likewise, in a wise operator *disposition* precedes *operation*: therefore since God is wise in all His works[^21], it appears that no operation of His ought to be called *disposition*.

**I respond:** It must be said that Alcuin needs here a pious expositor. For he speaks very improperly, when he calls the eternal *disposition* itself an *operation*; for he extends the name *operation* to every production. And since the Father, in generating and producing the Word, has disposed all things in Him, on this account in a broad but improper manner he said that [the Father] from eternity *operates* by *disposing* in the Son[^22].

---

en: [Hugh of St. Victor,] *On the Sacraments*, book I, p. I, c. 6.

la: Gen. 1, 6. seqq.

en: Gen. 1, 6 and following.

la: De hac Augustini sententia cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3, nec non supra d. II. c. 1.

en: On this view of Augustine, cf. here the Master's text, c. 1 and 3, as also above [book II,] d. II, c. 1.

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. I. c. 6. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. — Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *quae* pro *qui*.

en: [Hugh,] *On the Sacraments*, book I, p. I, c. 6. See here the Master's text, c. 5. — Just below, not a few codices with edition 1 [read] *quae* for *qui*.

la: Cfr. supra d. II. lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Cf. above [book II,] d. II, the Master's text, c. 4.

la: Vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. et ibid. a. 2. q. 1. et 3.

en: See above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; and ibid., a. 2, q. 1 and 3.

la: Hic c. 3.

en: [Lombard, *Sentences* II, d. 12,] here, c. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. dub. 1. et pag. 96, nota 5.

en: Cf. above d. 2, p. I, dubium 1, and p. 96, note 5.

la: Idem dubium solvunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 2. et S. p. II. tract. 11. q. 43. seq.; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1, q. 2. a. 1. et dub. litt. 4. seqq.

en: The same doubt is solved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 43, membrum 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 2 and *Summa* p. II, tract. 11, q. 43 and following; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the literal commentary; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1, q. 2, a. 1, and *dub. litt.* 4 and following.

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 1: *Etenim quae sunt omnes existimant alicubi esse, quod vero non est nusquam esse*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 1: *For all suppose that the things that are exist somewhere, but that what is not is nowhere*.

la: Contrarium autem dicitur Dan. 3, 72: *Benedicite lux et tenebrae Domino*.

en: But the contrary is said in Dan. 3, 72: *Bless the Lord, light and darkness*.

la: Simili modo loquitur B. Albert., I. Phys. tract. 3. c. 16: *Privatio autem, in quantum privatio, de se vel per se non est, eo quod de se habet non-esse; quia tamen dicit non-esse, etiam privatio aptitudinem in subiecto relinquit*. — Vat. *requirit* pro *relinquit*.

en: In a similar way Bl. Albert speaks, *Physics* I, tract. 3, c. 16: *But privation, insofar as it is privation, is not of itself or *per se*, in that it has of itself not-being; yet because it signifies not-being, even privation leaves an aptitude in the subject*. — The Vatican [edition reads] *requirit* for *relinquit*.

la: Aliqui codd. cum Vat. omittunt *non*.

en: Some codices with the Vatican [edition] omit *non*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.), in cuius expositione Averroes ait: *Quoniam dispositio in hoc [motu naturali et violento] est sicut dispositio in habitu et privatione; quoniam habitus est prior privatione in re, quae caret habitu*. — Mox cod. ec et ed. 1 *privatione lucis* pro *privationem luminis*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* c. *On Opposites*, and *Physics* IV, text 67 (c. 8), in whose exposition Averroes says: *For the disposition in this [namely natural and violent motion] is as the disposition in habit and privation; because habit is prior to privation in the thing which lacks the habit*. — Just below, codex ec and edition 1 [read] *privatione lucis* for *privationem luminis*.

la: De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 45. m. 4; B. Albert., S. p. II. tract. 11. q. 31. m. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 45, membrum 4; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tract. 11, q. 31, membrum 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantasia, and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the literal commentary.

la: Psalm. 103, 24: *Omnia in sapientia fecisti*.

en: Ps. 103, 24: *Thou hast made all things in wisdom*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 3. et d. 27. p. II. q. 2; B. Albert., S. p. II. tract. 11. q. 30; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. *Sentences* I, d. 6, q. 3, and d. 27, p. II, q. 2; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tract. 11, q. 30; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, here in the literal commentary.

translators_notes:
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- **No scholion block** for d.12 dubia (consistent with the d.10–d.11 dubia pattern; the Quaracchi editors reserve scholion blocks for the articulated quaestiones).
- **Boundary integrity (per CLAUDE.md polish-cadence pass 3)**: backward boundary with `d12-a2-q3` at p.306 R is clean — q3 ends "*sicut supra ostensum est ex parte.*", then the centred DUBIA banner opens this chunk; p.306 footers 9–10 were explicitly reserved for it. Forward boundary at p.308 R (mid-column) is also clean — dubia ends "*operari dixit.*"; the centred "DISTINCTIO XIII." banner opens immediately below and is owned by `d13-littera`. The p.308 R footer "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" block that begins below footer 6 is d.13 littera's, not this chunk's.
- **No `[?]` flags raised.** Body reconciled against p.306 R-2 + p.307 L-0/L-1/L-2 + R-0/R-1/R-2 + p.308 L-0/L-1/L-2 + R-0/R-1/R-2 column bands; footers reconciled against p.307 L-2/R-2 and p.308 L-2/R-2. Marginal labels (*Quaestio incidens.*, *Ad quaestionem incid.*, *De relatione materiae ad formam.*, *Expositio 1./2./3./4.*, *Obiicitur.*, *Solvitur distinguendo.*) preserved inline per Vol II convention.