collection: Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis

title: Quaest. 5, Art. 1

title_alt:
Utrum divinum esse sit aeternum
Whether the divine being is eternal

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum personarum trinitas simul stet cum summa aeternitate.*

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum personarum trinitas stet cum summa aeternitate. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum divinum *esse* sit aeternum.

Secundum est, utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas.

### Articulus I. *Utrum divinum esse sit aeternum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur. Et quod divinum *esse* sit aeternum:

1. Convincit *Scripturae* auctoritas, Exodi decimo quinto[^p87-4]: *Dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra*; et ad Romanos primo: *Sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas*.

2. Convincit etiam hoc *fidei veritas*: «Aeternus, inquit, Pater, in Symbolo Athanasiano, aeternus Filius, aeternus Spiritus sanctus».

3. Item, hoc ipsum concludit *rationis necessitas*. Arguit enim Richardus[^p87-5] sic: Omne, quod est *a se ipso*, est aeternum; sed divinum *esse*, cum sit

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primum, est a se ipso: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est; quia, si non esset aeternum, aliquando non fuisset, et tunc nec sibi nec aliis aliquando *esse* dedisset, ac per hoc nunquam esset. Minor vero patens est per se ipsam.

4. Item, omne illud, quod est suum *esse*, est aeternum; *esse* enim non potest non esse, ergo nec incipere nec desinere, igitur caret principio et fine: si ergo Deus, cum sit simplicissimum, est suum *esse*, immo simpliciter est *esse*[^p88-1]; ergo est omnino aeternum.

5. Item, omne illud, quod est ipsa veritas, est aeternum; sed divinum *esse* est ipsa veritas: ergo etc. Minor patet; maiorem probat Augustinus in *Soliloquiis*[^p88-2]: Veritas enim nec cogitari nec enuntiari potest non esse; immo sequitur, si nulla veritas est, aliquam veritatem esse, quia, si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse, vel non esse: ergo *esse* non potest aliquatenus removeri a veritate: ergo semper fuit, est et erit.

6. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa *infinitas*, est aeternum; nam si coepisset, esset durationis finitae; sed divinum *esse* est infinitum[^p88-3]: ergo necesse est, ipsum esse aeternum, alioquin, si caret aeternitate, caret et immensitate.

7. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa *immortalitas*, est aeternum; «quod enim a versione incipit in versionem tendit[^p88-4]»; sed in divino *esse* est summa immortalitas, cum sit ipsa vita per essentiam sive ipsum vivere: ergo necesse est, divinum *esse* habere aeternitatem.

8. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa *felicitas*, est aeternum; sed divinum *esse* est huiusmodi, cum sit perfectissimum: ergo etc. Maior probatur, quia maior est felicitas, quae caret principio et fine, quam quae sumsit exordium aliunde: si ergo divinum *esse* est felicissimum, sequitur necessario, quod sit aeternum. Et iterum, omnis felicitas dicit absentiam finis[^p88-5]: ergo perfectissima dicit carentiam omnis principii.

9. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa *simplicitas*, est aeternum; divinum *esse* est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor est manifesta; maior probatur: quia in quocumque est summa simplicitas, non differt primum, medium et ultimum, et nihil tale habet praeteritum et futurum, sed tantum praesens mansivum; sed omne tale aeternum[^p88-6]: ergo etc.

10. Item, cum ens dividatur in *aeternum* et *aeviternum* et *temporale*, nobilius est aeviternum quam temporale, et aeternum nobilius utroque[^p88-7]; sed semper quod nobilius est attribuendum est enti nobilissimo: ergo summa aeternitas est attribuenda Deo.

11. Item, omne fluens reducitur ad permanens: ergo duratio fluens reducitur ad durationem permanentem, igitur praesens transiens in praeteritum reducitur ad praesens semper manens; sed tale praesens non est in re defectiva: ergo necesse est, quod sit in creatrice essentia; necesse est igitur, esse divinum *esse* aeternum[^p88-8].

12. Item, verum de futuro fuit verum sine initio, verum de praeterito est verum sine termino; sed futurum et praeteritum necessario reducuntur ad praesens: ergo necesse est ponere verum semper praesens sine fine et sine principio. Hoc autem est aeternum nec potest poni in alio quam circa primum principium: ergo necessario divinum *esse* est aeternum[^p88-9].

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Aeternitas est mensura[^p88-10]; sed nihil immensum habet mensuram; si enim habet mensuram, non est immensum: ergo etc.

2. Item, mensura aequatur mensurato; sed nihil potest aequari *esse* divino: ergo non est in Deo aeternitatis duratio.

3. Item, aeternitas est carentia finis et principii[^p88-11]; sed nihil caret eo quod est: si ergo Deus est principium et finis omnium, ergo divinum *esse* non habet carentiam horum: igitur non potest esse aeternum.

4. Item, carentia complementi sonat in defectum; principium et finis dicunt completionem: ergo in Deo

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non est ponere horum privationem; sed aeternitas dicit horum privationem: ergo non debet poni circa divinum *esse*.

5. Item, aeternitas est carentia praeteriti et futuri; sed Deus vere fuit et est et erit: ergo divinum *esse* non habet rationem aeterni.

6. Item, sit A tempus praeteritum, B futurum; verum est dicere, quod Deus fuit in A et erit in B, et falsum e converso: ergo A vere praeteriit apud Deum, et B vere est futurum: ergo divinum *esse* habet praeteritum et futurum: ergo non est aeternum.

7. Item, ubi est aeternitas, ibi est interminabilitas, quia secundum Boethium[^p89-1] «aeternitas est interminabilis vitae possessio»; ubi interminabilitas, ibi circularitas; sed circulare est posterius recto, nihil autem nisi simpliciter primum est attribuendum *esse* divino: ergo nec aeternitatis duratio.

8. Item, secundum rationem intelligendi et ordinem naturae circumferentia est posterior centro; sed quod est circumferentia ad centrum, hoc est aeternitas ad tempus: ergo multo fortius tempus attribuendum est Deo quam aeternitas: ergo si inconveniens est Deo attribuere temporalitatem, ergo et aeternitatem.

9. Item, ubi aeternitas, et totalitas; quod patet per rationem Boethii[^p89-2]: «Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae possessio tota simul»; ubi autem totalitas, ibi partibilitas et divisibilitas; sed in Deo hoc non potest esse, cum sit summa simplicitas: ergo etc.

10. Item, nusquam est reperire continuitatem extensionis sine partibilitate: ergo nusquam continuationem durationis contingit reperire sine vera totalitate, ergo et divisibilitate; unde ens impartibile non habet rationem durationis nec dicitur totum simul: ergo etc.

11. Item, ubi aeternitas, ibi simultas, per definitionem[^p89-3]; sed ubi simultas, ibi distinctio, quia simultas dicit relationem, et relatio dicit distinctionem; sed divinum *esse* est omnino indistinctum: non ergo est aeternum.

12. Item, si in divino *esse* est omnimoda simultas, ergo simul sunt *esse*, *fuisse* et *fore*; sed in his quae simul sunt quod comitatur unum illorum, et alterum: si ergo aeviternum semper comitatur divinum *fore*, ergo pari ratione et suum *fuisse*: ergo sicut caret fine, ita et principio. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est in Deo ponere perfectam aeternitatis durationem: non est igitur ponere, quod divinum *esse* sit aeternum.

13. Item, aut aeternitas *addit aliquid* supra *nunc* aeternitatis, aut *nihil*. Si *nihil*: ergo quod coëxistit cum *nunc*[^p89-4] aeternitatis est aeternum; sed *nunc* temporis coëxistit cum *nunc* aeternitatis: ergo coëxistit cum tota aeternitate, ergo est aeternum. Si *aliquid*: ergo aeternitas est composita: ergo non competit Deo.

14. Item, licet punctus sit principium et medium et terminus extensionis, tamen impossibile est, intra punctum intelligi extensionem: ergo pari ratione nec intra *nunc* durationem[^p89-5]: ergo si aeternitas dicit durationem, dicit aliquid extra *nunc* aeternitatis: ergo repugnat summae simplicitati: ergo impossibile est, quod sit circa Dei *esse* simplicissimum.

15. Item, eadem mensura mensuratur divinum *esse* et divinum *posse*, *scire* et *velle* seu *praescire*; sed divinum *praescire* non mensuratur aeternitate, cum Deus desinat praescire aliqua: ergo nec divinum *esse* est per aeternitatem mensurabile.

16. Item, eadem mensura mensuratur divinum *esse* et *operari*, quia idem est in Deo substantia, virtus et operatio[^p89-6]: si ergo divinum *esse* mensuratur aeternitate, ergo et divinum *creare*: ergo Deus ab aeterno et aeternaliter creat, ac per hoc creatura aeternaliter creatur; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur.

17. Item, omnis veritas mensuratur tempore, vel aevo, vel aeternitate[^p89-7]; sed mundum esse creandum, fuit verum in Deo ante mundi constitutionem; aut ergo mensuratur *aeternitate*, aut *tempore*; non *tempore*, quia tempus tunc non erat: ergo *aeternitate*. Sed hoc verum desiit esse verum: ergo videtur, quod aeternitas habeat terminum; sed divinum *esse* est interminatum: ergo non potest poni aeternitas circa *esse* divinum.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Divinum esse est aeternum, quia est simplex simul et infinitum.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod divinum *esse* est aeternum, eo ipso quod *simplex* et *infinitum*. — Quia enim *infinitum* est, ideo caret principio et fine; nam si alterum horum haberet, utique ex illa parte haberet terminationem et limitationem, et ita non esset immensitatis summae. Quia vero *simplex* est, caret priori et posteriori, quae necessario inducunt diversitatem et aliquam compositionem. Summa igitur *simplicitas* ponit omnimodam *simultatem*; summa vero *immensitas* omnimodam *interminabilitatem*; quae duo simul iuncta constituunt *aeternitatem*. Ni-

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hil enim aliud est *aeternitas* nisi «vitae possessio interminabilis et tota simul»; et quia in nullo alio est simul haec duo reperire, scilicet immensitatem et simplicitatem, nisi in solo Deo: ideo aeternitatis conditio non potest communicari alicui alii a Deo. — *Rursus*, quia haec duo sunt supra nostram imaginationem et aestimationem; ideo aeternitatis duratio a nullo sane potest intelligi, nisi omni imaginatione postposita. Haec igitur duo simul iungantur, ut intelligatur divini *esse* duratio infinitissima et simplicissima, ac per hoc permanentia vera, carens *inchoatione* et *interpolatione* sive dilatione et *divisione* sive terminatione, et prorsus carens omnino omni *successione*. Et huiusmodi ratio per duas conditiones praedictas *simul iunctas* necessario syllogizat, quamvis imaginationi nostrae videatur contraria.

Potest autem huic simile in *Deo* reperiri. Sicut enim Deus simplex et immensus est totus in locis distantibus, quae loca etsi ad invicem distent, tamen existens hic et ibi non distat a se propter summam unitatem et simplicitatem; sic divinum *esse*, quod est aeternum, etsi sit in diversis temporibus propter immensitatem; licet illa tempora habeant distantiam et dilationem, ipsum tamen est indistans a se propter summam simplicitatem. Et sicut divina *incircumscriptibilitas* habet omnia loca sibi praesentia, et ipsa non distenditur per illa, licet illa vere sint distensa; sic divina *aeternitas* habet sibi omnia *tempora praesentia*, nec tamen ipsa succedit cum illis, licet illa vere succedant.

In *creaturis* vero, licet non possit omnino simile inveniri propter eius defectum, invenitur tamen aliquod cum aliquo defectu, quod quidem, illo defectu per intellectum circumscripto, manuducit ad intelligendam aeternitatem in *esse* divino. Hoc autem adverti aliquo modo potest et in *imagine* et in *vestigio*. In anima namque, quae est Dei *imago*, est *memoria* praeteritorum, *intelligentia* praesentium et *praevidentia* futurorum[^p90-1]; et haec quidem simul sunt in anima, ita quod in anima, quae est substantia spiritualis, simul colliguntur et coniunguntur quae per diversa tempora succedunt; quia tamen ipsa limitata est et aliquid accipit a re *extra*, deficit ab illa simultate perfecta. Deus autem nihil prorsus accipit nec aliquo modo habet limitari; et ideo omnia sibi ut praesentia necessarium est intelligi, et hoc sine principio et fine[^p90-2]; et hoc est intelligere aeternitatem.

In *tempore* vero, quod est aeternitatis *vestigium*, est *praesens*, *praeteritum* et *futurum*, ita quod illud quod fuit *futurum* postea fit *praesens* et demum *praeteritum*, quia radicatur super *esse mutabile et fluidum* sive super ipsum *motum*. Si igitur *praesens* intelligatur radicari super *esse immutabile et fixum*, quod nec habet initium nec terminum, illud intelligetur *aeternum*. — Et sic, si quis recta consideratione a creaturis conscendat in Creatorem, auferendo quod est incompletionis et tenendo quod est complementi; venire poterit aliqualiter ad intelligendam aeternitatem *esse* divini, non tamen perfecte, quamdiu sumus in carne; quia dum hic vivimus, «nostrum intelligere non est sine continuo et tempore[^p90-3]», ac per hoc valde elongatur ab aeternitate, nisi forte per donum speciale altius sublevetur; ut enim dicit Augustinus, «cum aliquid aeternum mente capimus, in hoc mundo non sumus». — Patet igitur, divinum *esse* utique esse aeternum, et quae sit huius ratio necessaria, et qualiter capere possit consideratio nostra. Et rationes probantes, quod aeternitas sit in divino *esse*, sunt concedendae.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod aeternitas est mensura; dicendum, quod licet *aeternitas* secundum *rationem intelligendi* dicat[^p90-4] sub ratione mensurae, secundum *rem* et veritatem nihil aliud dicit quam *esse* divinae substantiae; et sicut illud *esse* est immensum, sic et aeternitas est immensa; et ideo dicitur *sibi aequari*, non per conterminationem, quia immensum non habet terminum, sed per mutui excessus privationem. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur primo et secundo de ratione mensurae: quia rationes illae procedunt de mensura, quae differt a re mensurata, quae terminatur et terminat, ac per hoc non est nisi circa rem finitam; quae omnia deficiunt circa aeternitatem divinam, nec tamen falso dicitur *mensura* secundum *rationem intelligendi*, pro eo quod significat divinum *esse* per modum durationis, quae quidem duratio, etsi omnem creaturam in infinitum excedat, respectu tamen ipsius *esse* divini nec exceditur nec excedit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia principii et finis; dicendum, quod *principium* et *finis*, secundum quod accipitur in ratione aeternitatis, idem sunt quod *terminus initialis* et *finalis* in duratione rei; et hi quidem termini non sunt nisi circa rem, quae incipit esse et desinit. Cum ergo dico, quod Deus est *principium* et *finis*, aequivocatur ibi ratio *principii* et *finis*. Unde duplex est defectus illius rationis: tum quia Deus est principium et finis respectu rerum *extra*, tum quia est principium et finis secundum *rationem causandi*. Cum autem dicitur, quod aeternitas est *carentia*

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*principii et finis*, accipitur *principium* et *finis* ut *intra* et secundum *rationem durandi*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carentia horum, scilicet principii et finis, sonat in defectum, cum ipsa dicant complementum etc.; dicendum, quod *principium* et *finis*, secundum quod dicunt terminum, etsi videantur dicere complementum, dicunt tamen limitationem cum defectu; et ideo e contrario, licet horum carentia videatur esse privatio secundum rationem intelligendi, est tamen vera positio ex parte rei; duratio enim, quae caret principio et fine, ita vera est, quod nihil habet de non-entitate.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia praeteriti et futuri; dicendum, quod *praeteritum* et *futurum* dupliciter attribuitur alicui: vel ita, quod sit per modum dispositionis *rei intellectae*, vel ipsius *intelligentis*. Similiter, cum aliquid dicitur fuisse in praeterito, vel in futuro fore; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: vel per modum *quandoitatis et inhaerentiae* vel per modum *simultatis et coëxistentiae*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia praeteriti et futuri; dicendum, quod illud est verum, secundum quod *praeteritum* et *futurum* dicunt dispositionem *rei*, quae dicitur praeteriisse, ita quod illam mensurando reliquit in ea affectionem seu dispositionem quandam, quae dicitur *quando*, iuxta quod alibi[^p91-1] dicitur, quod «*quando* est in omni eo, quod coepit esse». Cum autem dicitur *Deus* fuisse et fore, *praeteritum* non est ibi dispositio *rei intellectae*, sed *intelligentis*; nec hoc dicitur per *commensurationem*, *quandoitatem* et *inhaerentiam*, sed per *durationem*, *simultatem* quandam et *coëxistentiam*. Unde omnes illae locutiones habent quandam improprietatem; balbutimus autem aeternitatem per varia tempora, quia intellectus noster non conscendit ad intelligenda aeterna, nisi manuducatur per tempora, quamdiu sumus in via.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non dicitur *fuisse* in tempore futuro, nec *futurus esse* in tempore praeterito; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter hoc, quod aliqua successio seu variatio sit in *esse* divino, sed propter connotationem coëxistentiae in tempore praeterito seu futuro, in quo tanta est variatio, ut nec *praeteritum* possit dici *futurum*, nec *futurum* possit dici *praeteritum*. Unde cum non dicatur *futurus* in praeterito nec *praeteritus* in futuro, hoc non est, quia *fuisse* et *fore* dicant aliud *esse*, vel alium *modum essendi* circa *esse* divinum, sed solum circa *esse* creatum.

7. 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est interminabilitas; dicendum, quod non accipit totam rationem aeternitatis, quia non tantum dicit *interminabilitatem*, sed etiam *simultatem*; et sicut per modum *interminabilitatis* dicit *circumferentiam* quandam intelligibilem[^p91-2], carentem principio et fine; sic per modum *simultatis* simplicitatem et indivisionem dicit ad modum *centri*; et haec duo circa divinum *esse* simul ponuntur, quia simul est simplex et infinitum, et ideo circularitas in aeternitate intelligitur; nec ponit posterioritatem respectu *recti* nec etiam respectu *centri*. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de tempore, quod tenet rationem centri respectu aeternitatis interminabilis. Sicut enim praecedens ratio, ita et haec procedit *ex insufficienti*: quia considerat aeternitatem, in quantum est mensura *esse* immensi tantum, cum simul debeat hoc intelligi, quod[^p91-3] ipsa sit mensura simplicis et indivisibilis, quod nequaquam in mensura temporis potest reperiri.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi aeternitas, ibi totalitas; dicendum, quod totalitas, quae ponitur in aeternitate, non attenditur secundum quantitatem molis, sed secundum quantitatem virtutis, in qua simul stat ratio magnitudinis et immensitatis cum perfectione simplicitatis; et ideo non sequitur, quod ubi est totalitas, ibi divisibilitas; non enim habet esse verum nisi de hoc toto, quod est vere quantum, in quo, quia totalitas dicit veram quantitatem, necessario ponit partem et partem. — Vel posset dici, quod *totum simul* dicitur ibi potius secundum rationem perfectionis quam secundum rationem distributionis in partes alicuius totius integralis[^p91-4].

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nusquam est reperire continuitatem extensionis sine partibilitate; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia extensio semper dicit partem extra partem, ac per hoc corporeitatem, quantitatem et partibilitatem[^p91-5]; duratio autem dicit *esse* non intercisum, quod quidem non solum reperitur in compositis, verum etiam in simplicibus.

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11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas dicit simultatem; dicendum, quod *simultas* non dicitur ibi per positionem condurationis et coëxistentiae diversorum durabilium, sed potius per privationem successionis in continuitate rei durantis; unde *tota simul* dicitur aeternitas, quia in ea nihil alteri prorsus succedit, non propter hoc, quod in ea diversa et varia simul existant. Unde *simultas* nihil aliud dicit quam praesentialitatem summam et simplicem et indivisam, et haec nullam dicit diversitatem intrinsecam[^p92-1].

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi idem est in Deo *esse*, *fore* et *fuisse*, quod creatura, sicut commetitur se suo modo divino *fore*, sic et divino *fuisse*; dicendum, quod non est simile, nec unum ex altero inferri debet. Et ratio huius est, quia, licet in Deo idem sit *carere principio* et *carere fine*, in creatura tamen multum differt. Nam creaturae, cum sit de nihilo, essentiale est habere principium et inceptionem; non habere autem finem et terminationem non repugnat naturae creatae; nec eius oppositum est sibi essentiale, pro eo quod appetitus creaturae est ad contraria[^p92-2]. Et propter hoc non sequitur, quodsi possit assimilari Deo secundum id quod est *fore*, quod similiter secundum id quod est *fuisse*. Sicut enim non sequitur: idem est in Deo iustitia et immensitas; sed creatura potest assimilari Deo secundum quod *iustus*: ergo secundum quod *immensus*; sic etiam non concludit nec infert modus argumentandi praedictus.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas aut addit aliquid supra *nunc* aeternitatis, aut nihil; dicendum, quod cum in aeternitate sit simultas et interminabilitas, sive simplicitas et immensitas; *nunc aeternitatis* nominat illam durationem quantum ad *simplicem simultatem*, *aeternitas* vero quantum ad *interminabilem immensitatem*. Sicut ergo *immensitas* interminabilis supra indivisibilitatem divinae simplicitatis et simultatis secundum *rem* nihil quidem addit, sed solum secundum *rationem intelligendi*; sic et *aeternitas* supra *nunc* aeternitatis. Et sicut non sequitur, quod creatura capit Deum simplicissimum: ergo capit Deum ut immensum; sic non sequitur, quodsi aliquid coëxistit cum *nunc* aeternitatis, quod coëxistat cum aeternitate interminabili. His enim, quae in Deo idem sunt, correspondent in creatura varia et diversa, sicut patet in bonitate et sapientia, in iustitia et misericordia, secundum quod praetactum est supra[^p92-3].

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod licet punctus sit principium et medium et terminus extensionis, impossibile est intra ipsum intelligere extensionem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, licet punctus sit *principium* extensionis, non tamen est *tota extensionis essentia* nec etiam *pars* constitutiva; *nunc* autem est tota essentia durationis, non solum in aeternis et aeviternis, verum etiam in duratione temporis. Et ratio huius est: quia *extensio* habet omnes partes simul, et quia «punctus est substantia posita[^p92-4]», unde necessario dicit situm in materia; et ideo, cum sit indivisibile, non potest esse totius divisibilis essentia nec pars constitutiva, cum quaelibet pars continui sit continua. Secus autem est de *duratione*, quia de ipsa nunquam est nisi praesens et indivisibile, etiam in duratione successiva. Et ideo non est mirum, si in *nunc* claudi potest essentia durationis et potissime illius, in qua non differt *essentia* et *esse*, sicut est in aeternitate.

15. 16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem mensura mensuratur divinum *esse* et *posse* et *scire* et *praescire*; dicendum, quod verum est ratione *principalis significati*, non autem est verum ratione *connotati*. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de creatione; nam actus intrinsecus est aeternus, sicut et substantia; effectus vero temporalis, quia creatura[^p92-5].

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mundum esse futurum fuit verum ante mundi constitutionem; dicendum, quod illa propositio, licet sit una, implicat tamen in se duplicem veritatem. Si enim dicatur mundus esse futurus, antequam mundus fieret; hoc non est verum, nisi quia mundus aliquo modo habet *esse* in sua causa; et quantum ad hoc illud dictum est verum veritate aeterna. *Rursus*, ad hoc non sufficit, quod mundus habeat *esse* solum in causa, immo oportet ad hoc, quod propositio sit vera, quod aliquando habeat *esse extra*; et quia illud *esse* nondum, antequam mundus fieret, erat *creatum*, sed *creandum*: hinc est, quod quantum ad hoc non erat verum veritate *creata*, sed *creanda*. Et quia, cum res incipit esse *creata*, tunc desinit esse *creanda*: hinc est, quod propositio illa, quae significabat sententiam veram ab aeterno, desinit esse vera, non propter terminationem in aeternitate, sed propter inchoationem in tempore, quia cum aeterno intelligi dabat aliquod temporale[^p92-6]. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad praehabitam quaestionem.

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### Question V. *Whether the trinity of persons stands together with supreme eternity.*

Next it is asked whether the trinity of persons stands together with supreme eternity. And concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is eternal.

The second is whether trinity and eternity stand together.

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is eternal.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. And that the divine *being* is eternal:

1. The authority of *Scripture* proves it, Exodus, chapter 15[^p87-4]: *The Lord shall reign for ever and ever*; and to the Romans, chapter 1: *His eternal power also and divinity*.

2. The *truth of faith* also proves this: "Eternal," it says, in the Athanasian Creed, "is the Father, eternal the Son, eternal the Holy Spirit."

3. Likewise, the *necessity of reason* concludes this same thing. For Richard[^p87-5] argues thus: Everything which is *from itself* is eternal; but the divine *being*, since it is

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first, is from itself: therefore etc. The major is manifest; because, if it were not eternal, at some time it would not have been, and then it would at some time have given *being* neither to itself nor to others, and thereby would never be. But the minor is evident through itself.

4. Likewise, everything which is its own *being* is eternal; for *being* cannot not be, therefore it can neither begin nor cease, and so it lacks beginning and end: if therefore God, since He is most simple, is His own *being*, nay rather is *being* simply[^p88-1]; therefore He is altogether eternal.

5. Likewise, everything which is truth itself is eternal; but the divine *being* is truth itself: therefore etc. The minor is plain; the major Augustine proves in the *Soliloquies*[^p88-2]: For truth can neither be thought nor stated not to be; nay rather it follows that, if there is no truth, there is some truth, because, if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth, or that there is not: therefore *being* cannot in any way be removed from truth: therefore it always was, is and will be.

6. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *infinity* is eternal; for if it had begun, it would be of finite duration; but the divine *being* is infinite[^p88-3]: therefore it is necessary that it be eternal, otherwise, if it lacks eternity, it lacks immensity also.

7. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *immortality* is eternal; "for what begins from a turning tends toward a turning[^p88-4]"; but in the divine *being* there is supreme immortality, since it is life itself by essence, or living itself: therefore it is necessary that the divine *being* have eternity.

8. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *happiness* is eternal; but the divine *being* is of this kind, since it is most perfect: therefore etc. The major is proved, because that happiness is greater which lacks beginning and end than that which took its start from elsewhere: if therefore the divine *being* is most happy, it follows necessarily that it is eternal. And again, all happiness bespeaks the absence of an end[^p88-5]: therefore the most perfect bespeaks the lack of all beginning.

9. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *simplicity* is eternal; the divine *being* is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is manifest; the major is proved: because in whatever there is supreme simplicity, first, middle and last do not differ, and nothing of that sort has past and future, but only an abiding present; but everything of that sort is eternal[^p88-6]: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, since being is divided into the *eternal* and the *aeviternal* and the *temporal*, the aeviternal is nobler than the temporal, and the eternal nobler than both[^p88-7]; but always what is nobler is to be attributed to the noblest being: therefore supreme eternity is to be attributed to God.

11. Likewise, everything flowing is reduced to something permanent: therefore a flowing duration is reduced to a permanent duration, and so a present passing into the past is reduced to a present always abiding; but such a present is not in a defective thing: therefore it is necessary that it be in the creating essence; it is necessary therefore that the divine *being* be eternal[^p88-8].

12. Likewise, the truth about the future was true without a beginning, the truth about the past is true without a term; but future and past are necessarily reduced to the present: therefore it is necessary to posit a truth always present without end and without beginning. But this is eternal, nor can it be posited in anything other than about the first principle: therefore necessarily the divine *being* is eternal[^p88-9].

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Eternity is a measure[^p88-10]; but nothing immense has a measure; for if it has a measure, it is not immense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a measure is equalled to the thing measured; but nothing can be equalled to the divine *being*: therefore there is not in God the duration of eternity.

3. Likewise, eternity is the lack of end and beginning[^p88-11]; but nothing lacks that which it is: if therefore God is the beginning and end of all things, therefore the divine *being* does not have the lack of these: therefore it cannot be eternal.

4. Likewise, the lack of a completion sounds of a defect; beginning and end bespeak completion: therefore in God

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there is no positing of the privation of these; but eternity bespeaks the privation of these: therefore it ought not to be posited about the divine *being*.

5. Likewise, eternity is the lack of past and future; but God truly was and is and will be: therefore the divine *being* does not have the account of the eternal.

6. Likewise, let A be past time, B future; it is true to say that God was in A and will be in B, and false conversely: therefore A truly passed away with God, and B is truly future: therefore the divine *being* has past and future: therefore it is not eternal.

7. Likewise, where there is eternity, there is interminability, because according to Boethius[^p89-1] "eternity is the possession of interminable life"; where interminability, there circularity; but the circular is posterior to the straight, and nothing except what is simply first is to be attributed to the divine *being*: therefore neither is the duration of eternity.

8. Likewise, according to the account of understanding and the order of nature the circumference is posterior to the centre; but what the circumference is to the centre, this eternity is to time: therefore much more strongly is time to be attributed to God than eternity: therefore if it is unfitting to attribute temporality to God, therefore eternity also.

9. Likewise, where eternity, there totality also; which is plain from the reasoning of Boethius[^p89-2]: "Eternity is the possession of interminable life, whole all at once"; but where there is totality, there is partibility and divisibility; but in God this cannot be, since there is supreme simplicity: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, nowhere is a continuity of extension to be found without partibility: therefore nowhere does it happen that a continuation of duration is found without true totality, and therefore without divisibility; hence an impartible being does not have the account of duration nor is it called *whole all at once*: therefore etc.

11. Likewise, where eternity, there simultaneity, by the definition[^p89-3]; but where simultaneity, there distinction, because simultaneity bespeaks a relation, and relation bespeaks distinction; but the divine *being* is altogether undistinguished: therefore it is not eternal.

12. Likewise, if in the divine *being* there is simultaneity in every mode, therefore *being*, *having been* and *being about to be* are together; but among things which are together, what accompanies one of them accompanies the other also: if therefore the aeviternal always accompanies the divine *being about to be*, therefore by parity of reasoning its *having been* also: therefore as it lacks an end, so it lacks a beginning also. But this is impossible: therefore it is impossible to posit in God the perfect duration of eternity: it is therefore not to be posited that the divine *being* is eternal.

13. Likewise, either eternity *adds something* over the *now* of eternity, or *nothing*. If *nothing*: therefore what coexists with the *now*[^p89-4] of eternity is eternal; but the *now* of time coexists with the *now* of eternity: therefore it coexists with the whole of eternity, therefore it is eternal. If *something*: therefore eternity is composite: therefore it does not belong to God.

14. Likewise, although a point is the beginning and middle and term of an extension, yet it is impossible that an extension be understood within a point: therefore by parity of reasoning neither a duration within a *now*[^p89-5]: therefore if eternity bespeaks a duration, it bespeaks something outside the *now* of eternity: therefore it is repugnant to supreme simplicity: therefore it is impossible that it be about God's most simple *being*.

15. Likewise, by the same measure are measured the divine *being* and the divine *power*, *knowing* and *willing* or *foreknowing*; but the divine *foreknowing* is not measured by eternity, since God ceases to foreknow some things: therefore neither is the divine *being* measurable through eternity.

16. Likewise, by the same measure are measured the divine *being* and *operating*, because in God substance, power and operation are the same[^p89-6]: if therefore the divine *being* is measured by eternity, therefore the divine *creating* also: therefore God creates from eternity and eternally, and thereby the creature is eternally created; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows.

17. Likewise, every truth is measured by time, or by aeviternity, or by eternity[^p89-7]; but that the world was to be created was true in God before the constitution of the world; either therefore it is measured by *eternity*, or by *time*; not by *time*, because time then was not: therefore by *eternity*. But this truth ceased to be true: therefore it seems that eternity has a term; but the divine *being* is unterminated: therefore eternity cannot be posited about the divine *being*.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The divine being is eternal, because it is simple and infinite at once.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the divine *being* is eternal, by the very fact that it is *simple* and *infinite*. — For because it is *infinite*, therefore it lacks beginning and end; for if it had either of these, it would assuredly have on that side a termination and limitation, and so would not be of supreme immensity. But because it is *simple*, it lacks prior and posterior, which necessarily bring in diversity and some composition. Supreme *simplicity*, therefore, posits simultaneity in every mode; and supreme *immensity* interminability in every mode; and these two joined together constitute *eternity*. For

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*eternity* is nothing else than "the possession of life, interminable and whole all at once"; and because in nothing else is it possible to find these two together, namely immensity and simplicity, save in God alone: therefore the condition of eternity cannot be communicated to anything else other than God. — *Again*, because these two are above our imagination and estimation, therefore the duration of eternity can be understood by no one soundly, unless all imagination be set aside. Let these two, therefore, be joined together, so that there may be understood a duration of the divine *being* most infinite and most simple, and thereby a true permanence, lacking *inchoation* and *interpolation* or delay, and *division* or termination, and lacking utterly and altogether all *succession*. And a reasoning of this kind necessarily syllogizes through the two aforesaid conditions *joined together*, although it may seem contrary to our imagination.

Now something like this can be found in *God* Himself. For just as God, simple and immense, is whole in distant places, and although those places are distant from one another, yet existing here and there He is not distant from Himself on account of His supreme unity and simplicity; so the divine *being*, which is eternal, although it be in diverse times on account of immensity — although those times have distance and delay, it nevertheless is undistant from itself on account of supreme simplicity. And just as the divine *incircumscribability* has all places present to itself, and is not itself extended through them, although they are truly extended; so the divine *eternity* has all *times present* to itself, nor does it itself succeed along with them, although they truly succeed.

In *creatures*, however, although what is wholly like cannot be found on account of their defect, yet something is found with some defect, which indeed, that defect being circumscribed by the understanding, leads by the hand to the understanding of eternity in the divine *being*. And this can in some way be observed both in the *image* and in the *vestige*. For in the soul, which is the *image* of God, there is *memory* of things past, *intelligence* of things present and *foresight* of things future[^p90-1]; and these indeed are together in the soul, so that in the soul, which is a spiritual substance, there are gathered and joined together at once things which succeed through diverse times; yet because the soul itself is limited and receives something from a thing *outside*, it falls short of that perfect simultaneity. But God receives nothing whatever, nor has He in any mode to be limited; and therefore it is necessary that all things be understood by Him as present, and this without beginning and end[^p90-2]; and this is to understand eternity.

But in *time*, which is the *vestige* of eternity, there is a *present*, a *past* and a *future*, so that what was *future* afterwards becomes *present* and at length *past*, because it is rooted upon *changeable and fluid being* or upon motion itself. If therefore the *present* be understood to be rooted upon *being immutable and fixed*, which has neither a beginning nor a term, that will be understood as *eternal*. — And thus, if anyone by right consideration ascends from creatures into the Creator, taking away what is of incompletion and holding what is of completion, he will be able in some fashion to come to the understanding of the eternity of the divine *being*, yet not perfectly, so long as we are in the flesh; because while we live here, "our understanding is not without the continuous and time[^p90-3]," and thereby it is very far removed from eternity, unless perhaps it be raised higher by a special gift; for as Augustine says, "when we grasp something eternal with the mind, we are not in this world." — It is plain, therefore, that the divine *being* is assuredly eternal, and what the necessary reason of this is, and in what manner our consideration can grasp it. And the reasonings proving that eternity is in the divine *being* are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that eternity is a measure; it must be said that, although *eternity* according to the *account of understanding* bespeaks[^p90-4] under the account of a measure, according to the *thing* and the truth it bespeaks nothing else than the *being* of the divine substance; and just as that *being* is immense, so eternity also is immense; and therefore it is said to be *equalled to itself*, not by co-termination, since the immense has no term, but by the privation of mutual excess. — And through this the answer is plain to that which is objected first and second concerning the account of a measure: because those reasonings proceed from a measure which differs from the thing measured, which is terminated and terminates, and thereby is only about a finite thing; all of which fail concerning the divine eternity, nor yet is it falsely called a *measure* according to the *account of understanding*, for the reason that it signifies the divine *being* under the mode of a duration, which duration indeed, although it exceeds every creature to infinity, is with respect to the divine *being* itself neither exceeded nor exceeds.

3. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of beginning and end; it must be said that *beginning* and *end*, according as they are taken in the account of eternity, are the same as the *initial* and *final term* in the duration of a thing; and these terms indeed are only about a thing which begins to be and ceases. When therefore I say that God is *beginning* and *end*, the account of *beginning* and *end* is there equivocal. Hence the defect of that reasoning is twofold: both because God is beginning and end with respect to things *outside*, and because He is beginning and end according to the *account of causing*. But when it is said that eternity is the *lack*

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*of beginning and end*, *beginning* and *end* are taken as *within* and according to the *account of enduring*.

4. To that which is objected, that the lack of these, namely of beginning and end, sounds of a defect, since they themselves bespeak completion, etc.; it must be said that *beginning* and *end*, according as they bespeak a term, although they seem to bespeak completion, nevertheless bespeak limitation with defect; and therefore conversely, although the lack of these seems to be a privation according to the account of understanding, it is nevertheless a true position on the side of the thing; for a duration which lacks beginning and end is so true that it has nothing of non-entity.

5. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of past and future; it must be said that *past* and *future* are attributed to something in two ways: either so that it be by mode of a disposition of the *thing understood*, or of the *one understanding* himself. Similarly, when something is said to have been in the past, or to be about to be in the future, this can be understood in two ways: either by mode of *when-ness and inherence*, or by mode of *simultaneity and coexistence*. When therefore it is said that eternity is the lack of past and future; it must be said that this is true according as *past* and *future* bespeak a disposition of the *thing* which is said to have passed away, so that in measuring it, it left in it a certain affection or disposition which is called *when*, according to what is said elsewhere[^p91-1], that "*when* is in everything that began to be." But when *God* is said to have been and to be about to be, the *past* is there not a disposition of the *thing understood*, but of the *one understanding*; nor is this said by *commensuration*, *when-ness* and *inherence*, but by *duration*, a certain *simultaneity* and *coexistence*. Hence all those locutions have a certain impropriety; and we stammer out eternity through various times, because our understanding does not ascend to the understanding of eternal things unless it be led by the hand through times, so long as we are on the way.

6. To that which is objected, that God is not said to *have been* in future time, nor to *be about to be* in past time; it must be said that this is not on account of this, that any succession or variation is in the divine *being*, but on account of the connotation of coexistence in past or future time, in which there is so great a variation that neither can the *past* be called *future*, nor the *future* be called *past*. Hence, since He is not said to be *about to be* in the past nor *past* in the future, this is not because *having been* and *being about to be* bespeak another *being*, or another *mode of being*, about the divine *being*, but only about created *being*.

7. 8. To that which is objected, that eternity is interminability; it must be said that this does not take the whole account of eternity, because it bespeaks not only *interminability*, but also *simultaneity*; and just as by mode of *interminability* it bespeaks a certain intelligible *circumference*[^p91-2] lacking beginning and end, so by mode of *simultaneity* it bespeaks simplicity and indivision after the mode of a *centre*; and these two are posited together about the divine *being*, because it is at once simple and infinite, and therefore circularity is understood in eternity; nor does it posit posteriority with respect to the *straight*, nor even with respect to the *centre*. — And through this the answer is plain to that which is objected concerning time, which holds the account of a centre with respect to interminable eternity. For just as the preceding reasoning, so this one also proceeds *from what is insufficient*: because it considers eternity insofar as it is the measure of immense *being* only, whereas it ought at the same time to be understood[^p91-3] that eternity is the measure of what is simple and indivisible, which can in no way be found in the measure of time.

9. To that which is objected, that where eternity, there totality; it must be said that the totality which is posited in eternity is not regarded according to the quantity of mass, but according to the quantity of power, in which the account of magnitude and immensity stands together with the perfection of simplicity; and therefore it does not follow that where there is totality, there is divisibility; for it has true being only of that whole which is truly quantitative, in which, because totality bespeaks true quantity, it necessarily posits part and part. — Or it could be said that *whole all at once* is there said rather according to the account of perfection than according to the account of distribution into the parts of some integral whole[^p91-4].

10. To that which is objected, that nowhere is a continuity of extension to be found without partibility; it must be said that the case is not alike: because extension always bespeaks part outside part, and thereby corporeity, quantity and partibility[^p91-5]; but duration bespeaks *being* not cut apart, which indeed is found not only in composite things, but also in simple ones.

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11. To that which is objected, that eternity bespeaks simultaneity; it must be said that *simultaneity* is there said not by the positing of the co-duration and coexistence of diverse durable things, but rather by the privation of succession in the continuity of the enduring thing; hence eternity is called *whole all at once*, because in it nothing whatever succeeds to anything else, not on account of this, that in it diverse and various things exist together. Hence *simultaneity* bespeaks nothing else than a presentiality supreme and simple and undivided, and this bespeaks no intrinsic diversity[^p92-1].

12. To that which is objected, that if in God *being*, *being about to be* and *having been* are the same, as a creature measures itself in its own mode with the divine *being about to be*, so also with the divine *having been*; it must be said that the case is not alike, nor ought the one be inferred from the other. And the reason of this is that, although in God *to lack a beginning* and *to lack an end* are the same, in a creature they differ much. For since a creature is from nothing, it is essential to it to have a beginning and an inception; but not to have an end and a termination is not repugnant to created nature; nor is the opposite of this essential to it, for the reason that the appetite of a creature is toward contraries[^p92-2]. And on account of this it does not follow that, if it can be assimilated to God according to that which is *being about to be*, it can likewise be so according to that which is *having been*. For just as it does not follow: justice and immensity are the same in God; but a creature can be assimilated to God according as He is *just*: therefore according as He is *immense*; so neither does the aforesaid mode of arguing conclude or infer.

13. To that which is objected, that eternity either adds something over the *now* of eternity, or nothing; it must be said that, since in eternity there is simultaneity and interminability, or simplicity and immensity, the *now of eternity* names that duration as regards *simple simultaneity*, but *eternity* as regards *interminable immensity*. Just as, therefore, interminable *immensity* adds nothing indeed according to the *thing* over the indivisibility of the divine simplicity and simultaneity, but only according to the *account of understanding*; so also *eternity* over the *now* of eternity. And just as it does not follow that a creature grasps God as most simple: therefore it grasps God as immense; so it does not follow that, if something coexists with the *now* of eternity, it coexists with interminable eternity. For to those things which in God are the same there correspond in a creature things various and diverse, as is plain in goodness and wisdom, in justice and mercy, according to what was touched upon above[^p92-3].

14. To that which is objected, that although a point is the beginning and middle and term of an extension, it is impossible to understand an extension within it; it must be said that the case is not alike: because, although a point is the *beginning* of an extension, yet it is not the *whole essence of the extension*, nor even a constitutive *part*; whereas the *now* is the whole essence of duration, not only in eternal and aeviternal things, but also in the duration of time. And the reason of this is: that *extension* has all its parts together, and because "a point is a posited substance[^p92-4]," whence it necessarily bespeaks position in matter; and therefore, since it is indivisible, it cannot be the essence of a divisible whole nor a constitutive part, since every part of the continuous is continuous. But it is otherwise with *duration*, because of it there is never anything but what is present and indivisible, even in successive duration. And therefore it is no wonder if in a *now* the essence of duration can be enclosed, and most of all of that duration in which *essence* and *being* do not differ, as is the case in eternity.

15. 16. To that which is objected, that by the same measure are measured the divine *being* and *power* and *knowing* and *foreknowing*; it must be said that this is true by reason of the *principal thing signified*, but is not true by reason of what is *connoted*. — And through this the answer is plain to what follows, which is objected concerning creation; for the intrinsic act is eternal, as is the substance also; but the effect is temporal, because it is a creature[^p92-5].

17. To that which is objected, that it was true before the constitution of the world that the world was about to be; it must be said that that proposition, although it be one, nevertheless implies in itself a twofold truth. For if it be said that the world is about to be, before the world was made; this is not true except because the world in some mode has *being* in its cause; and as regards this, that saying is true with an eternal truth. *Again*, for this it does not suffice that the world have *being* only in its cause; nay rather it is required, in order that the proposition be true, that at some time it have *being outside*; and because that *being* was not yet *created*, before the world was made, but *to be created*: hence it is that, as regards this, it was not true with a *created* truth, but with a truth *to be created*. And because, when a thing begins to be *created*, it then ceases to be *to be created*: hence it is that that proposition, which signified a sentence true from eternity, ceases to be true, not on account of a termination in eternity, but on account of an inchoation in time, because along with the eternal it gave something temporal to be understood[^p92-6]. — And through this the answer is plain to the question set before us.

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la: Vers. 18. — Seq. locus est Rom. 1, 20.

en: Verse 18. — The following locus is Rom. 1:20.

la: Libr. I. de Trin. c. 6. 8. et 11.

en: Book I *On the Trinity,* c. 6, 8 and 11.

la: Boeth., in lib. Quomodo substantiae in 〈 〉o, quod sint, bonae sint etc. ait: Ipsum vero *esse* nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum... Omne simplex *esse* suum et *id quod est* unum habet.

en: Boethius, in the book *How substances are good in that they are* [*sic*], etc., says: "But *being* itself has nothing else mingled with it besides itself... Everything simple has its *being* and *that which it is* as one."

la: Vide supra pag. 47, nota 11, et Richard. a S. Vict. II. de Trin. c. 2.

en: See above, p. 47, note 11, and Richard of St. Victor, II *On the Trinity,* c. 2.

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. 4. a. 1. — Inferius pro *immensitate* A E *infinitate*. In B G desideratur hoc arg., B omittit etiam seq. arg.

en: As was shown above, q. 4, a. 1. — Below, in place of *immensitate,* A E have *infinitate*. In B G this argument is wanting, and B omits the following argument also.

la: Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39. (XI. c. 7.): Dicimus itaque Deum sempiternum optimumque vivens esse. Quare vita et aevum continuum et aeternum Deo inest; hoc enim est Deus.

en: Damascene, I *On the Orthodox Faith,* c. 3, and II, c. 27. — Aristotle, XII *Metaphysics,* text 39 (XI, c. 7): "We say, therefore, that God is an everlasting and best living being. Wherefore life and a continuous and eternal age belong to God; for this is God."

la: Cfr. August., de Beata Vita, c. 2. n. 11, ubi ostendit, beatum non esse qui timet, ne amittat quod possidet. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11, de vita beata dicit, «quae procul dubio non nisi aeterna est aeternitatisque suae certa atque secura». Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 25.

en: Compare Augustine, *On the Happy Life,* c. 2, n. 11, where he shows that he is not happy who fears lest he lose what he possesses. In XI *On the City of God,* c. 11, he says of the happy life that "it is beyond doubt not such unless it be eternal and certain and secure of its own eternity." Compare ibid. XIV, c. 25.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 19: In aeterno enim, cum proprie dicitur, neque quidquam praeteritum, quasi transierit, neque quidquam futurum, quasi nondum sit, sed quidquid est tantummodo est. Cfr. ibid. q. 17.

en: Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions,* q. 19: "For in the eternal, when it is properly so called, there is nothing past, as though it had gone by, nor anything future, as though it were not yet, but whatever is, only is." Compare ibid. q. 17.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

en: See II *Sentences,* d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. ult.

en: Compare the *Book of Causes,* last proposition.

la: Anselm., Monolog. c. 18: Deinde cogitet qui potest, quando incepit, aut quando non fuit hoc verum, scilicet quia futurum erat aliquid; aut quando desinet et non erit hoc verum, scilicet quia praeteritum erit aliquid. Quodsi neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest; impossibile est vel cogitare, quod veritas principium vel finem habeat.

en: Anselm, *Monologion,* c. 18: "Then let him think, who can, when it began, or when this was not true, namely that something was future; or when it will cease and this will not be true, namely that something will be past. But if neither of these can be thought, and neither of these truths can be without truth; it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or an end."

la: Scilicet mensura durationis *esse* increati. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Namely the measure of the duration of uncreated *being*. Compare II *Sentences,* d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 9. — Aristot., de Mundo, in fine, ait: Enimvero Deus, ut est vetusto proverbio proditum, principium et finem et media omnium rerum tenens etc.

en: Compare above, p. 79, note 9. — Aristotle, *On the World,* at the end, says: "For indeed God, as has been handed down in an ancient proverb, holds the beginning and the end and the middle of all things," etc.

la: Libr. V. de Consolat. prosa 6. — Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 64. seqq. (c. 8.); I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 5. seqq. (c. 2.), probat, solum motum circularem esse posse infinitum et continuum.

en: Book V *On Consolation,* prose 6. — Aristotle, VIII *Physics,* text 64 and following (c. 8); I *On the Heavens and the World,* text 5 and following (c. 2), proves that only circular motion can be infinite and continuous.

la: Libr. V. de Consolat. prosa 6.

en: Book V *On Consolation,* prose 6.

la: A Boethio supra in arg. 9. datam. — De *simultate* cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Simul.*

en: Given by Boethius above in argument 9. — On *simultaneity* compare Aristotle, *On the Categories,* the chapter *On the Simultaneous.*

la: G *cum toto nunc.*

en: G has *with the whole now.*

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 103. seqq. (c. 11.). et VI. text. 24. seqq. (c. 3.), ostendit indivisibilitatem *instantis.*

en: Aristotle, IV *Physics,* text 103 and following (c. 11), and VI, text 24 and following (c. 3), shows the indivisibility of the *instant.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the body.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. II. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. — Dictio *ante mundi constitutionem* occurrit Ioan. 17, 24; Eph. 1, 4. et I. Petr. 1, 20.

en: See II *Sentences,* d. II, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1. — The expression *before the constitution of the world* occurs at John 17:24; Eph. 1:4 and I Pet. 1:20.

la: Quae secundum Ciceronem, II. Rhet. c. 54, sunt partes *integrales* prudentiae, si cum A B H substituatur *providentia* pro *praevidentia*. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 6.

en: Which according to Cicero, II *Rhetoric,* c. 54, are the *integral* parts of prudence, if with A B H *providentia* be substituted for *praevidentia*. Compare tome III, p. 728, note 6.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. — De *tempore* cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1. — Vocibus *est intelligi* A interserit *simul*.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3. — On *time* compare II *Sentences,* d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 1. — Between the words *est intelligi* A inserts *simul*.

la: Ut dicit Aristot., supra pag. 21, nota 8. allegatus. — Verba Augustini paulo inferius adducta inveniuntur in IV. de Trin. c. 20. n. 28. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 8, et ibid. Commentar. p. II. dub. 5.

en: As Aristotle says, cited above on p. 21, note 8. — The words of Augustine adduced a little below are found in IV *On the Trinity,* c. 20, n. 28. Compare I *Sentences,* the text of the Master, d. XV, c. 8, and the Commentary on the same place, p. II, dub. 5.

la: Supplendum: durationem, vel substituendum *dicatur* (D G omittunt *dicat*).

en: To be supplied: *durationem;* or *dicatur* to be substituted (D G omit *dicat*).

la: A Gilbert. Porret., in lib. Sex Principiorum, c. *de Quando*, ubi textus originalis *incipit* pro *coepit*. Ibid. etiam dicitur: *Quando* vero est quod ex adiacentia temporis relinquitur; tempus vero *quando* non est, utriusque autem ratio coniuncta est, ut tempus quidem praeteritum *quando* non est, effectus autem eius [temporis praeteriti] et affectio, secundum quam dicitur aliquid fuisse, *quando* est... Est igitur *quando* aliud ex eo quod abiit, aliud ex eo quod instat, aliud vero ex eo quod necesse est contingere. Dictum est enim in Categoriis [sive Praedicam. Aristot. c. *de Quanto*] praeteritum et futurum esse *quantitates*, et quod magis est continuans ad praesens etc. — Superius termino *quandoitatis* utitur G, et inferius ipsi accedit E, dum ponunt *quandoitatem*, alii his substituunt *quantitatis* et *quantitatem*. — Circa finem solut. respicitur illud Gregorii, quod Deum «aliquatenus balbutiendo resonamus» (V. Moral. c. 36. n. 66; cfr. tom. III. pag. 175, nota 2.). — De ipsa solutione vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. dub. 7. et d. 9. dub. 5.

en: From Gilbert Porretanus, in the book *Of the Six Principles,* the chapter *On When,* where the original text has *incipit* for *coepit*. In the same place it is also said: "But *when* is what is left over from the adjacency of time; time, however, is not *when*, but the account of the two is conjoined, so that past time indeed is not *when*, but its effect [that is, of the past time] and the affection, according to which something is said to have been, is *when*... *When* is therefore one thing from that which has gone away, another from that which is at hand, and another from that which must come to pass. For it has been said in the *Categories* [or *Predicaments* of Aristotle, the chapter *On Quantity*] that past and future are *quantities,* and that what is more continuous with the present," etc. — Above, G uses the term *quandoitatis,* and below E joins it, when they set down *quandoitatem;* others substitute for these *quantitatis* and *quantitatem*. — Toward the end of the solution there is a reference to that saying of Gregory, that we "in some fashion resound God by stammering" (V *Morals* c. 36, n. 66; compare tome III, p. 175, note 2). — On the solution itself see I *Sentences,* d. 8, p. I, dub. 7, and d. 9, dub. 5.

la: Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regul. 7: Deus est sphaera *intelligibilis*, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam. Infra post *nec ponit* supple: aeternitas.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules,* rule 7: "God is an *intelligible* sphere, whose centre is everywhere, whose circumference nowhere." Below, after *nec ponit,* supply: *aeternitas.*

la: Ita G; A B legunt *simul debeant haec* [immensitas sive interminabilitas et simultas sive simplicitas] *intelligi, cum.* Post pauca pro *indivisibilis* D G H *interminabilis*.

en: So G; A B read *simul debeant haec* [immensity or interminability, and simultaneity or simplicity] *intelligi, cum.* A little after, in place of *indivisibilis,* D G H have *interminabilis*.

la: Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 30. seq. (IV. c. 25. seq.). — Cfr. supra q. 4. a. 1. in corp. et ad 2.

en: See Aristotle, V *Metaphysics,* text 30 and following (IV, c. 25 and following). — Compare above, q. 4, a. 1, in the body and at reply 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quanto.*

en: Compare Aristotle, *On the Categories,* the chapter *On Quantity.*

la: Eodem modo exponit ipse Boeth., V. de Consolat. prosa 6.

en: Boethius himself expounds it in the same way, V *On Consolation,* prose 6.

la: Sensus videtur esse, quod non hac ratione, quia appetitus creaturae tendit ad *esse*, incorruptibilitas sit creaturae essentialis. Hoc explicatur II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. et I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8. Pro *est* B *non est*.

en: The sense seems to be that it is not for this reason, because the appetite of a creature tends toward *being*, that incorruptibility is essential to a creature. This is explained at II *Sentences,* d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, at reply 5, and I *Sentences,* d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, at replies 7 and 8. In place of *est,* B has *non est*.

la: Quaest. 3. a. 1. in corp. et ad 6. seqq.

en: Question 3, a. 1, in the body and at reply 6 and following.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 23. (c. 27.), I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 447, nota 2. et tom. II. pag. 81, nota 4. — Superius post *pars* cum A B adiecimus *constitutiva*.

en: Aristotle, I *Posterior Analytics,* c. 23 (c. 27); I *On the Soul,* text 68 (c. 4), and V *Metaphysics,* text 12 (IV, c. 6). Compare tome I, p. 447, note 2, and tome II, p. 81, note 4. — Above, after *pars,* we have added *constitutiva* with A B.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. q. 3. et 4.

en: Compare I *Sentences,* d. 7, q. 3 and 4.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 30, q. 1 and following; d. 39, a. 2, q. 2; and d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and dub. 4. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L22322–L23104**), with every heading, subtitle, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-087..092.png`). Fresh literal English translation. **Six printed pages, 87–92; 35 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** The chunk opens **`QUAESTIO V.`** with its italic subtitle *Utrum personarum trinitas simul stet cum summa aeternitate*, the short quaestio-level opener *Consequenter quaeritur…* and its two *praeambula*, then **`ARTICULUS I.`** with its subtitle *Utrum divinum esse sit aeternum* — all set full measure across p. 87 below the close of Article II. Then: **twelve arguments** that the divine *esse* is eternal, under the single marginale `Fundamenta.`; a **`Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` series of seventeen** in letter-spaced small caps **in-column**, under the single marginale `Ad oppositum.`; **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column with its two-line italic conclusion; a **`Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ`** whose whole work is that simplicity and infinity taken *together* yield eternity (Boethius' *interminabilis vitae possessio tota simul* resolved into *simultas* from simplicity and *interminabilitas* from immensity), with two corollaries, a simile in God and a twofold simile in the creature (*imago* — memory, intelligence, foresight; *vestigium* — time); and **seventeen replies in fifteen paragraphs** (`1. 2.`, `7. 8.` and `15. 16.` printed combined and preserved, not split).

### ⛔⛔ BOUNDARY 9 (p. 93): IT DOES NOT FORWARD — THE WORK'S SECOND LEAF EDGE

Article I fills p. 92 to the **foot of both columns**, closing *— Et per hoc patet responsio ad praehabitam quaestionem.* at the bottom of the right column; **`ARTICULUS II.` stands at the very head of p. 93**, immediately below the running head, with its subtitle and its own opener and first arguments filling that leaf. **`bon-qmt-q5-a1` therefore owns all six of p. 92's register entries and inherits nothing whatever from p. 93.** ⭐ The negative was established positively, not by silence: **p. 93's register was read from the top before its first numeral, and it opens numbered and indented** (n. 1, `Ex definitione aeternitatis a Boethio data; cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 1…`), so p. 92 forwards no runover either.

⚠ **The index span `q5-a1 86–93` is wrong at BOTH ends** — the second time in two chunks that an index line has failed on both sides. `q4-a2` measured the **first** page wrong by two leaves (Quaracchi's printed `86`; the article opens on **87**); this chunk measures the **last** wrong by one, by the familiar mechanism (an index span's last page is the *next* unit's heading page). ⭐ **And the raw band was exact a second time**: the banked `L22322 → L23104` ends at the article's last word and `ARTICULUS II.` opens at L23106, below the running head at L23103. ⛔ **The page range is the unreliable half of the prediction and the raw band is the reliable half — now attested at both ends of one line.**

▶ **Nine boundaries measured, and the count of shapes stands at SEVEN in nine:** 5/1 · **LEAF EDGE** · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0 · 1/6 · 3/2 · **LEAF EDGE**. The work is now **7 forwarding / 2 leaf edges**. ★★ The leaf edge is the class the shakedown gate named dangerous, and this is its second instance; it is safe here only because p. 93 was extracted **alone** and read before the rest of the span was pulled — the standing order paying a **sixth** time.

### ⭐⭐ A SPURIOUS ANCHOR MARK KILLED BY THE REGISTER'S OWN CROSS-REFERENCE

p. 89 carries **eight** raised marker glyphs in its body — after Contra 4's *divinum esse*, and in Contra 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16 and 17 — against a register of **seven** entries. One is not an anchor, and the raw shows the same eight, so the two witnesses do not settle it.

⭐ **What settles it is p. 89 n. 3's own text: `A Boethio supra in arg. 9. datam.`** The note says the definition it glosses was given by Boethius **above in argument 9** — so n. 3 cannot itself stand at argument 9; it stands at **Contra 11**, whose premiss is *ubi aeternitas, ibi simultas, per definitionem*. That fixes the whole sequence downward and upward: n. 1 → Contra 7, n. 2 → Contra 9, n. 3 → Contra 11, n. 4 → Contra 13, n. 5 → Contra 14, n. 6 → Contra 16, n. 7 → Contra 17 — **and Contra 4's mark has no seat.** It is not an anchor.

⭐ **All seven were then confirmed independently from content**, which is what makes the result more than an arithmetic: n. 1 pairs Boethius' short definition with Aristotle on circular motion being alone infinite and continuous, and Contra 7 argues from *interminabilitas* to *circularitas*; n. 2's bare *Libr. V. de Consolat. prosa 6.* pairs with Contra 9's **fuller** quotation adding *tota simul*; n. 4 is the variant `G cum toto nunc` on Contra 13's *cum nunc aeternitatis*; n. 5 is Aristotle on the indivisibility of the *instans*, Contra 14's *punctus*/*nunc*; n. 6 is `I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.` on divine simplicity, Contra 16's *idem est in Deo substantia, virtus et operatio*; n. 7 is the *ante mundi constitutionem* locus, Contra 17's own phrase. ⛔ **This is `bon-qmt-q3-a2`'s p. 77 finding recurring — *a raw marker glyph is not evidence of an anchor* — but caught here by a different instrument: not the targets, but the register's own back-reference to a numbered argument.** ▶ **A note that names an argument number is a free control on the anchor sequence of its whole leaf.**

### ⭐ A FIFTH COMPOSITOR'S BLANK — THE FIRST INSIDE A WORK'S TITLE

p. 88 n. 1 prints Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* as **`in lib. Quomodo substantiae in 〈 〉o, quod sint, bonae sint`** — the *e* of *eo* is not there. The ratified two-part rule was applied **by measurement, not by eye**, and every one of its three controls was run:

- **The flanking letters are at full strength.** The *n* of *in* runs to a minimum grey of **51** and the *o* to **31**, against a line whose text minima run **28–100** — the *o* is among the darkest glyphs on the line. Neither flank is lighter than its own line and neither slopes off. **First branch: the forme never carried the letter.**
- **The paper inside the gap measures min 136, dark fraction 0.001**, against a text minimum of 28 — no ghost of a failed impression. What stands where the *e* belongs is a 1 px speck, not a letter.
- **The lines below run unbroken through the same pixel column** (minima 70 and 50 at x = 1084–1105), so it is not a stain, a paper repair or a scanner artefact; **and the raw independently gives `in  o,`.**

▶ **The gap is reproduced and NOT filled**, and the English carries `[*sic*]`, on the p. 59 *eandem* precedent. ⚠ **This is the first of the class to fall inside a work's TITLE, and that is exactly why it had to be refused**: the reading is determinate from outside evidence — anyone who knows the treatise supplies *eo* — but the rule turns on the ink and not on the reader's learning. The precedent restorations bracket letters whose traces survive; here nothing survives.

### ⭐⭐ SIX FREE CONTROLS, AND FIVE OF THEM BEAT THE GLYPH

The chunk resolved **five digits from the target rather than from the type**, and one from a same-line control at 12×.

- ⭐⭐ **p. 88 n. 2 `pag. 47, nota 11`** — the raw gives `pag. il, nota II`, decidable by no reading of the glyph. **`bon-qmt-q1-a1` p. 47 n. 11 is the *Soliloquies* note, and it cites *Anselm, Monolog. c. 18* — which is p. 88 n. 9 on this very leaf.** The target is both the right treatise and the right author, and it confirms n. 9's `c. 18` in passing. **Both ends ours.**
- ⭐ **p. 88 n. 11 `pag. 79, nota 9`** → `bon-qmt-q4-a1` p. 79 n. 9, Richard, *II. de Trin. c. 4*, on *sempiternum* against *aeternum* as lacking beginning and end — which is precisely what Contra 3 (*aeternitas est carentia finis et principii*) argues from.
- ⭐ **p. 88 n. 3 `supra q. 4. a. 1.`** → `bon-qmt-q4-a1`, whose own `title_la` is *Utrum divinum esse sit infinitissimum*, against argument 6's premiss *divinum esse est infinitum*. **The target's title IS the note's subject.**
- ⭐⭐ **p. 91 n. 4 `Cfr. supra q. 4. a. 1. in corp. et ad 2.`** — the raw gives `q. i. a. I.` **`bon-qmt-q4-a1`'s *Respondeo* is the *quantitas molis* / *quantitas virtutis* double distinction, and reply 9 here turns on nothing else** (*non attenditur secundum quantitatem molis, sed secundum quantitatem virtutis*). The coordinate is settled by the target's argument, not by its type.
- ⭐⭐ **p. 90 n. 3 `supra pag. 21, nota 8`** → **`bon-qsc-q4` p. 21 n. 8, in the deployed *QD de scientia Christi***, which reads *Non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo neque sine tempore* — **verbatim the Aristotle the body of p. 90 is quoting** (*nostrum intelligere non est sine continuo et tempore*³). p. 24 n. 8 is a two-word variant note on something else entirely, so the 1-vs-4 question never had to be put to the plate at all.
- ⭐⭐⭐ **p. 92 n. 4 `tom. I. pag. 447` and `tom. II. pag. 81` — the sharpest 1-vs-4 calibration the work has produced, because BOTH digits stand on adjacent lines of one note and they go OPPOSITE ways.** The raw gives `pag. ii7` and `pag. 81`. At 4× with the contrast stretched, `pag. 447` sits on the same line as `(c. 4.)` and `text. 12.` — a true `4` and a true `1` four words apart — and its two leading glyphs match the `4`. On the line below, at **12×**, `pag. 81`'s second glyph is a bare upright with a top flag and a foot serif, identical to the uprights of `II.` beside it and unlike the `4` of `nota 4.` three words later. **`447` corrects the raw; `81` confirms it.** ▶ *Read a 1-vs-4 at 5× or better against a control in the same line* — and here the same line supplied controls for both answers.

⭐ **A THIRD internal cross-reference closes inside this work, in the third consecutive chunk: p. 92 n. 3's `Quaest. 3. a. 1.` lands on `bon-qmt-q3-a1`, *Utrum divinum esse sit simplicissimum*** — against reply 13's *His enim, quae in Deo idem sunt, correspondent in creatura varia et diversa… secundum quod praetactum est supra*³, which is that article's own doctrine. Three further outbound citations were opened and land on chunks whose own titles are the notes' subjects: **`II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.` = *Utrum spiritualia habeant propriam mensuram***, cited **three times across two leaves** (p. 88 nn. 7 and 10, p. 89 n. 7) — Quaracchi's own tripled citation settling its own digits, and settling p. 89 n. 7's roman `d. II.` against p. 88's arabic `d. 2.`, both left as printed; **`I. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3.` = *Utrum Deus cognoscat omnia simul***, against p. 90 n. 2's anchor *omnia sibi ut praesentia necessarium est intelligi*; and **`II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.` = *Utrum aevum praecedat aliquo modo tempus*** with **`a. 2. q. 1.` = *Utrum omnium aeviternorum sit unum aevum***, exactly what that note's *De tempore cfr.* announces.

### ▶ GUTTERS — THE DEFAULT WAS WRONG ON THREE OF SIX, AND p. 87 IS A SECOND REGION ON A LEAF ALREADY MEASURED

87 **1161** *(Art. I's region, below `QUAESTIO V.`)* · 88 **1381** · 89 **1157** · 90 **1380** · 91 **1152** · 92 **1406**.

⭐ **p. 87 is the region rule at its cleanest: `bon-qmt-q4-a2` measured that leaf at 1168 and was right — for the region ABOVE the full-measure `QUAESTIO V.` stack.** Article I's region below it profiles to band **1131–1192 (62 px)**, centre-rule island 1155–1162 (peak 153), midpoint **1161** — **7 px away, and both values are correct for their own region.** A gutter is a property of a region, never of a page, and a neighbour chunk's measurement of the same leaf is a thing to check against, never to adopt.

⚠⚠ **`colcrop.py`'s default was wrong on p. 91 by 22 px and on p. 92 by 36 px**, and in both cases the run width was the tell and nothing else: p. 91 returned **1130 on a 15 px run** against a true band 1123–1182 (60 px) with the rule at 1149–1154 (peak 352) → **1152**; p. 92 returned **1442 on a 2 px run** against band 1376–1436 (61 px), rule 1405–1409 (peak 595) → **1406**. p. 89's default (1156/53 px) and p. 90's (1381/56 px) both sat under the 60 px floor, were escalated, and were **confirmed** at 1157 and 1380 — the heavily-inked-rule case twice (p. 89's island peaks at **991**, the most heavily inked in the work so far). **p. 88 alone came back on a sound 60 px run and the profile reproduced it.** ▶ *A narrow run is a reason to profile and never by itself a reason to reject* — four escalations, two corrections, two confirmations.

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**The replies answer the `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` series, and it is checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Et rationes probantes, quod aeternitas sit in divino esse, sunt concedendae* — conceding the twelve *Fundamenta* — and reply `1. 2.` opens *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur **in contrarium**, quod aeternitas est mensura*, quoting Contra 1 word for word, while reply 17 answers Contra 17's *mundum esse creandum, fuit verum ante mundi constitutionem*. ⛔ **This is the reverse of `bon-qmt-q4-a2` immediately before it and the same as `bon-qmt-q4-a1`; the pairing is taken from the replies' own quoted lemmata every time.** · **The opposing heading is `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` in letter-spaced small caps, in-column** — the same shape as `q4-a2`, the fifth shape the work has printed for the series across five chunks that carry one; and ⭐ **the two marginalia have swapped back**: `Fundamenta.` stands on the opening series and `Ad oppositum.` on the `Contra`, as in `q4-a1` and against `q4-a2`, which had them the other way round **inside a single quaestio**. **Find the series by content; the marginale names the side, and the side changes.** · **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.` printed correctly and in-column**, and was found by content, not by header grep — the rule is not retired. · **Three replies print combined** (`1. 2.`, `7. 8.`, `15. 16.`), each with points and a space, matching `q4-a2`'s `5. 6.` and unlike `q4-a1`'s colon-bearing `3:`; fifteen paragraphs carry seventeen replies. · **p. 89 carries the `S. Bonav. — Tom. V.` signature line and the gathering signature `12`** at the foot, between and beside the register blocks; neither is apparatus. · **p. 89 n. 7 prints `d. II.` in roman where p. 88 nn. 7 and 10 print `d. 2.` in arabic for the same target** — recorded as printed at each, not harmonised.

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**Two gutter runovers, ZERO page-crossing** — and the negative was **established, not assumed**: the head of every incoming register (pp. 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 **and 93**) was read before its first numeral, and each opens **numbered and indented** under a superscript, with no flush-left continuation anywhere.

- **p. 91 n. 1** runs over the gutter: the Gilbert Porretanus note fills the left block and its last clause (*…substituunt quan-* | *titatis et quantitatem. — Circa finem solut. respicitur illud Gregorii…*) is set flush left at the head of the right block, above n. 2. Rendered joined.
- **p. 92 n. 4** runs over the gutter: the Aristotle note breaks at *I. de Anima, text. 68.* and completes at the head of the right block (*(c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. …*), above n. 5. Rendered joined.

Ledger line: `bon-qmt-q5-a1	p.91 n.1:gutter,p.92 n.4:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER — AND THE SOLUTION-HEAVY SPLIT IS TOTAL AGAIN

**p. 87** — `Fundamenta.`
**p. 88** — `Ad oppositum.`
**p. 89** — `Conclusio.` · `Ratio.`
**p. 90** — `Quid aeternitas.` · `Corollarium 1.` · `Corollarium 2.` · `Simile in Deo.` · `Omnia tempora Deo praesentia.` · `Simile in creatura duplex.` · `Primum.` · `Secundum.` · `De intelligentia aeternitatis.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Notandum.` · `Quid principium et finis.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 91** — `Distinctio duplex.` · `Applicatur.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.` · `Aliter.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 92** — `De simultate.` · `Notandum.` · `Nunc aeternitatis differt ab aeternitate.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum principium.` · `Duplex veritas in una propositione.` · `Notandum.`

**Thirty-one in all, NONE clipped.** ⭐ **The solution-heavy split holds a sixth time and is again total in one direction:** the **twenty-nine arguments** of the two series, filling pp. 87–89, carry **two** glosses between them, one at the head of each series; the *Conclusio*, the *Respondeo* and the seventeen replies carry **twenty-nine**. ⚠⚠ **p. 88's whole left margin is empty and p. 89's whole left margin is empty** — two consecutive leaves of twelve arguments and seventeen *contra* holding one gloss between them on that side.

⭐ **Fourth scoping of the 69–73 marginalia clipping: pp. 87–92 are CLEAN, checked on full-image-width strips.** The at-risk (gutter-side) margin was read at magnification on every leaf — 87-L, 89-L and 91-L for the rectos, 88-R, 90-R and 92-R for the versos — and every gloss stands complete with clean paper before the scan's dark edge band. ⚠ **A crop that stops short of the true image edge produces the identical symptom in reverse**: p. 87's three right-hand glosses (`bon-qmt-q4-a2`'s) appeared cut until the strip was widened, and the cut was the crop's, not the scan's. **Only a full-width strip decides it, in either direction.**

### Translation choices

- ***simultas* → "simultaneity", following the corpus** (`bon-hex-c11`, `bon-qsc-q7`, `bon-brev-p2-c5`), and ***interminabilitas* → "interminability"** with ***interminabilis* → "interminable"** (`bon-brev-p3-c5`'s rendering). ⚠ **This DIVERGES from `bon-brev-p7-c6`'s *interminabilitas* → "endlessness", and that chunk scoped its own choice explicitly** — it fixed "endlessness" *for that capitulum*, because the word stood in a chain of like-shaped nouns (*varietas* · *acerbitas* · *interminabilitas*) and the chain was the argument. **Here the governing fact is different and it is the *Respondeo*'s own hinge:** *summa simplicitas ponit omnimodam **simultatem**; summa vero immensitas omnimodam **interminabilitatem***. The two abstractions are a matched pair built on *simplex* and *interminabilis*, and they must sound like a pair in English. **Both renderings are right for their own passage; neither is a correction of the other.**
- ***tota simul* / *totum simul* → "whole all at once"** throughout, in Boethius' definition (three times), in Contra 10 and in reply 9's *Vel posset dici* — one English phrase for one Latin phrase, because the whole article is an analysis of it.
- ⭐ ***quandoitas* → "when-ness"**, and *quando* → "when" beside it. The coinage is Gilbert Porretanus', and the sentence that introduces it defines it from the adverb (*affectionem seu dispositionem quandam, quae dicitur* quando), so the English must derive as visibly as the Latin does. ⚠ **p. 91 n. 1 discusses *quandoitatis* AS A WORD** — recording that G uses the term above, E joins below, and other codices substitute *quantitatis* — and there the Latin is kept, because the note is about the type and not about the thing.
- ***praesentialitas* → "presentiality"**, ***conduratio* → "co-duration"**, ***incircumscriptibilitas* → "incircumscribability"**, ***partibilitas* → "partibility"**, ***impartibile* → "impartible"** — coinages rendered by coinages, on the `bon-brev-p7-c6` *nihilitas* → "nothingness" principle.
- ***aeviternum* → "aeviternal"** and ***aevum* → "aeviternity"**, the corpus's settled pair (54 and 21 attestations across Vols I–V).
- ***status* is absent from this span**; ***fluens*/*permanens* → "flowing"/"permanent"**; ***mansivum* → "abiding"**; ***non-entitas* → "non-entity"**, hyphen as printed.
- ⛔ ***intellect-* takes "understanding" at every occurrence, with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English.** The sites are p. 90's *illo defectu per intellectum circumscripto* → "that defect being circumscribed by the understanding" and *nostrum intelligere non est sine continuo et tempore* → "our understanding is not without the continuous and time"; p. 91's *intellectus noster non conscendit ad intelligenda aeterna* → "our understanding does not ascend to the understanding of eternal things"; and the repeated *secundum rationem intelligendi* → "according to the account of understanding", which carries the *Respondeo*'s and replies 1.2, 3 and 13's whole distinction against *secundum rem*. In this work the rendering is **mechanical**: *intellectus agens* and *intellectus possibilis* occur nowhere in its 71 printed pages, so the ratified narrow exception is unreachable and a bare "intellect" would be a defect by construction.
- ⭐⭐ ***intelligentia* → "intelligence", and the ruling PAYS here, in the sharpest site the work has offered.** p. 90's *In anima namque, quae est Dei imago, est* **memoria** *praeteritorum,* **intelligentia** *praesentium et* **praevidentia** *futurorum* is a **three-term division of the soul's temporal powers**, and its middle term stands eleven lines from *aeternitatis duratio a nullo sane potest **intelligi*** and thirty from *intellectus noster*. One English root across *intelligentia* and *intellectus* would flatten a division into a repetition. **This is the *septem donis* c8 case — *memoria praeteritorum, intelligentia praesentium, circumspectio futurorum* — arriving in a third work with Bonaventure's own third term changed and the division intact.** ⚠ The rendering costs idiom, as it did at `bon-praec-c1`, and it is paid.
- ⛔ ***lux* and *lumen* do not occur on these six leaves at all**, so **ruling 2 is not exercised** and the Ps. 4:7 site is not reached; **and *contuit-* is absent from the work**, so ruling 3 is not reached.
- ⛔ ***vacatio*/*quies* is NOT tested here** — a stem census over the whole band (`vaca`, `quie`) returns **zero** for both families, verb and noun alike. The deciding sites remain `q5-a2` (raw L23636, L23645) and `q7-a2` (raw L25824, L25900). **This is the article immediately before the first of them.**
- ⚠ **Ruling 5 (`fundam. N` retained as *fundamentum N*) is NOT reached: the string `fundam.` does not occur in any of this chunk's thirty-five apparatus entries.** Stated here positively, per the mechanism `bon-qmt-q4-a2` established — and stated in the knowledge that a chunk which *does* meet the site is the one likeliest to drop the line.
- **Scripture on the Douay base adjusted to Quaracchi's Latin:** Exodus 15:18 *Dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra* → "The Lord shall reign for ever and ever"; Romans 1:20 *Sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas* → "His eternal power also and divinity". The Athanasian Creed keeps its received English wording around Quaracchi's inserted *inquit*.

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

The multiset **disagrees**, and for the false-positive class `bon-qmt-q4-a1` isolated: the Latin writes *Exodi decimo quinto* and *ad Romanos primo* where the English, on the house form set at `q1-a2`, writes *Exodus, chapter 15* and *to the Romans, chapter 1*. ▶ **The test itself was run directly**: both sections carry **the same six `<!-- page N -->` markers, 87–92, in the same order**, and each falls at a word boundary in both languages (`cum sit | primum` · `in Deo | non est ponere` · `Ni- | hil` — Quaracchi's own hyphenation, marked before the whole word in both — `carentia | principii et finis` · `simplicibus. | 11.`), matched in the English at *since it is | first*, *in God | there is no positing*, *For | eternity*, *the lack | of beginning and end*, and *simple ones. | 11.* **The multiset is a SCREEN, not the test.**

### Ledger

**35 entries** (p. 87 nn. 4–5 of five, nn. 1–3 being `bon-qmt-q4-a2`'s · p. 88 all eleven · p. 89 all seven · p. 90 all four · p. 91 all five · p. 92 all six). **Zero `[?]` flags. Two gutter runovers (p. 91 n. 1, p. 92 n. 4), ZERO page-crossing — and that negative was established by reading the head of every incoming register before its first numeral, p. 93's included.** What this chunk inherits from p. 87 is **body** (`QUAESTIO V.`, its subtitle, its opener, its two *praeambula*, `ARTICULUS I.` with its subtitle, its opener and arguments 1–3) **together with nn. 4–5 of that leaf's five register entries**; what it forwards to `bon-qmt-q5-a2` is **NOTHING** — p. 93 is a clean leaf edge in body and register alike.