title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 6

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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum teneamur diligere Deum ex toto corde, ex tota anima et ex tota mente.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum teneamur ad illum modum implendum, quem Dominus in praecepto implicat Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^1]: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua.* Et quod non, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Augustini, quae habetur in littera[^2]: « Cum inest aliquid carnalis concupiscentiae, non omni modo ex tota anima diligitur Deus »; sed necesse est, in hac vita esse aliquid carnalis concupiscentiae: ergo impossibile est implere illud praeceptum in hac vita. Sed nullus tenetur ad impossibile: ergo non tenemur ad eius impletionem.

2. *Item*, « impossibile est, aliquid moveri simul et semel oppositis motibus »; sed anima, dum est in carne, habet motum reflexum ad corpus, quia *corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam*[^3]: ergo non potest totaliter ferri in Deum; et si homo, quamdiu est in vita, non potest Deum diligere ex toto corde: ergo non tenemur modo illo Deum diligere.

3. *Item*, in hac vita diu esse non possumus sine veniali peccato[^4]; sed cum peccat quis venialiter, movetur motu, qui nec est in Deum nec ad illum ordinatus: ergo impossibile est, quod homo in hac vita omnes motus suos ad Deum referat. Si ergo nemo tenetur ad impossibile, nemo tenetur ad illius modi impletionem.

**Sed contra:**

1. Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^5]: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum* etc.; et eiusdem decimo nono: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*: ergo si hoc est praecipuum omnium mandatorum, homo tenetur praecipue ad illud servandum: ergo tenetur ad illius modi impletionem. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non cadit sub praecepto; contra hoc est, quia, si sub praecepto non cadit, ergo potius modus ille debuit poni inter consilia quam inter praecepta.

2. *Item*, cum Deus praecipit aliquid alicui, ut faciat tali tempore, non solum tenetur ad illud opus, sed etiam ad tempus, similiter etiam, et cum vovet: ergo pari ratione, cum Deus praecipit aliquid fieri, determinans modum, non solum tenetur quis ad actus exsecutionem, sed etiam ad modi impletionem. Si tu dicas, quod homo excusatur a tentione propter impossibilitatem praecepti implendi; contra hoc est quod dicit Hieronymus[^6]: « Anathema sit qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile »; et Augustinus: « Servum pigrum non damnaret, si ea quae nullo modo fieri poterant, imperaret ».

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3. *Item*, diligere Deum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente secundum Bernardum[^7] est diligere « dulciter et sapienter et fortiter »; secundum Augustinum est diligere « sine errore, sine contradictione et sine oblivione »; sed hoc totum potest homo et tenetur facere in statu viae: ergo tenemur ad huiusmodi mandati impletionem. Si tu dicas, quod Augustinus intelligit non tantum privative, sed etiam positive, ut omnis motus intellectus et affectus feratur in Deum[^8]; adhuc videtur posse impleri, quia praeceptum affirmativum non obligat ad semper, et illud simpliciter dicitur posse impleri, quod potest impleri pro loco et tempore; sed aliquando potest homo cogitare solum de Deo et circa ipsum affici: ergo videtur, quod modus ille dilectionis in via simpliciter debeat et potest impleri.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: si modus ille non potest impleri in via, nec quis tenetur illud implere, ad quid apponitur inter praecepta divina? Si tu dicas, sicut dicit Augustinus[^9], quod hoc est, ut sciamus, quo tendere debeamus; pari ratione ergo videtur, quod Deus debuerit praecepisse, ut videamus eum facie ad faciem; quod si non debuit facere, non videtur illa ratio sufficiens, quam Augustinus assignat.

> **Conclusio.** Praeceptum de diligendo Deo datum ita tenemur implere, ut excludatur a corde nostro omnis affectus contrarius; non tamen ita, ut excludatur penitus omnis affectus extraneus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum aliquando dicant sacri Doctores, modum praedictum posse impleri, aliquando dicant, non posse impleri[^10]; ex hoc admonemur, si utrumque videre possumus, quod uno modo ad praedictum modum obligamur adimplendum, alio modo excitamur ad ipsum desiderandum; unde modus praedictus uno modo est dispositio meriti, alio modo est dispositio praemii.

Hoc autem est secundum duplicem modum totalitatis[^11] cordis, animae et mentis. Dupliciter enim potest intelligi, quod amor Dei possideat totum cor: aut ita, quod excludat omnem affectum extraneum; et tunc dominatur plene et perfecte cordi. Hoc autem est, quando omnes motus cordis per amorem referuntur in Deum; et haec totalitas ponit dominium plenum. Alio modo dicitur amor Dei totum cor possidere, quando excludit omnem affectum contrarium, hoc est, quod nihil diligatur supra Deum, vel aequaliter ipsi Deo; et sic diligit Deum ex toto corde, qui diligit eum propter se et super omnia[^12]. — Prima totalitas, quae excludit omnem extraneum motum, est perfecti dominii nec potest haberi ante adeptionem gloriae, ubi ad ipsum Deum aspiciemus et in ipsum feremur continue. Secunda vero totalitas potest haberi per infusionem gratiae, quae est expulsiva omnis mortalis culpae.

Si ergo in illo praecepto intelligatur Deus diligi ex tota anima et ex toto corde et ex tota mente quantum ad *primam* acceptionem totalitatis; sic modus ille non obligat ad sui impletionem; sed exprimitur in praecepto, ut sciamus, quo per amorem debeamus tendere, et ut nemo se perfectum arbitretur, quousque illam perfectionem fuerit assecutus. Si vero dicatur diligere ex toto corde secundum *secundam* acceptionem; sic tenemur ad illum modum implendum. — Et quia secundum utramque acceptionem voluit Spiritus sanctus intelligi praedictum mandatum; hinc est, quod quidam dicunt, ipsum posse impleri in via, quidam vero dicunt, quod non potest impleri, quousque perveniatur in patriam. — Et secundum hoc procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas.

Si autem quaeratur, quare in isto praecepto magis exprimitur, quo tendere debeamus, quam in aliis praeceptis; responderi potest, quia *plenitudo Legis est dilectio*[^13], et *finis praecepti est caritas*, et mandatum dilectionis est primum et summum secundum divinum testimonium; ideo disposuit Spiritus sanctus circa ipsum exprimere perfectionem

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et complementum, ad quod singula bona et mandata ordinantur, magis quam in aliquo praeceptorum. Et per haec patent omnia quae circa hoc quaeruntur.

Si quis autem contendat[^14], modum illum simpliciter posse impleri in via quantum ad aliquod tempus, in quo potest homo totaliter ferri in Deum, ita ut nec sint in eo motus caritati oppositi nec etiam extranei; responderi potest, quod licet hoc possit esse et aliquando sit in aliquibus personis excellentibus, non tamen communiter reperitur in iustis omnibus[^15]. — *Praeterea*, licet sit ibi totalitas motuum ut nunc, non tamen est simpliciter. Et ideo defectus est a perfecta totalitate, quae est totalitas motuum et temporum; et haec est, quae simpliciter excludit motum extraneum. Et ita, quamvis aliquo modo impleri possit modus ille, non tamen omnino, sicut insinuatur in illo praecepto. Et hoc innuit Augustinus, cum dicit: « Cum aliquid adhuc est carnalis concupiscentiae, non omni modo ex tota anima diligitur Deus ». Et hoc ipsum vult dicere Magister[^16], cum dicit, « quod impleri potest hic modus praedictus secundum perfectionem viae, quae est perfectio currentis, non secundum perfectionem patriae, quae est perfectio pervenientis »; et ita vult, quod impleri possit « ex parte », non tamen omnino perfecte et integre[^17].

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### Question VI. *Whether we are bound to love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind.*

Sixth and last, it is asked whether we are bound to fulfill that mode which the Lord implies in the precept of Matthew twenty-two[^1]: *You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole mind.* And that we are not, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine, which is found in the text [of the Master][^2]: « When there is present anything of carnal concupiscence, God is not loved in every way with the whole soul »; but it is necessary that in this life there be something of carnal concupiscence: therefore it is impossible to fulfill that precept in this life. But no one is bound to the impossible: therefore we are not bound to its fulfillment.

2. *Likewise*, « it is impossible for anything to be moved at one and the same time by opposite motions »; but the soul, while it is in the flesh, has a motion bent back toward the body, because *the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul*[^3]: therefore it cannot be borne wholly into God; and if a man, as long as he is in life, cannot love God with his whole heart: therefore we are not bound to love God in that mode.

3. *Likewise*, in this life we cannot be long without venial sin[^4]; but when one sins venially, he is moved by a motion which is neither into God nor ordered toward him: therefore it is impossible that a man in this life should refer all his motions to God. If therefore no one is bound to the impossible, no one is bound to the fulfillment of that mode.

**On the contrary:**

1. Matthew twenty-two[^5]: *You shall love the Lord your God* etc.; and the same [Gospel], nineteen: *If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments*: therefore if this is the chief of all the commandments, a man is bound chiefly to keep it: therefore he is bound to the fulfillment of that mode. If you say that this does not fall under a precept; against this is the fact that, if it does not fall under a precept, then that mode ought rather to have been placed among the counsels than among the precepts.

2. *Likewise*, when God commands anyone to do something at a given time, he is bound not only to that work but also to the time, and likewise too when he makes a vow: therefore by parity of reasoning, when God commands something to be done, determining the mode, one is bound not only to the carrying out of the act but also to the fulfillment of the mode. If you say that a man is excused from the obligation on account of the impossibility of fulfilling the precept; against this is what Jerome says[^6]: « Let him be anathema who says that God commanded the impossible »; and Augustine: « He would not condemn the lazy servant if he commanded things that could in no way be done ».

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3. *Likewise*, to love God with the whole heart and with the whole soul and with the whole mind, according to Bernard[^7], is to love « sweetly and wisely and bravely »; according to Augustine it is to love « without error, without contradiction, and without forgetfulness »; but all this a man can and is bound to do in the state of the wayfarer: therefore we are bound to the fulfillment of this commandment. If you say that Augustine understands [this] not only privatively but also positively, so that every motion of the intellect and of the affection is borne into God[^8]; still it seems able to be fulfilled, because an affirmative precept does not oblige for always, and that is said simply to be able to be fulfilled which can be fulfilled for a [given] place and time; but sometimes a man can think only of God and be affected concerning him: therefore it seems that that mode of love ought and can simply be fulfilled in the way.

Alongside this it is asked: if that mode cannot be fulfilled in the way, nor is anyone bound to fulfill it, to what end is it set among the divine precepts? If you say, as Augustine says[^9], that it is so that we may know whither we ought to tend; then by parity of reasoning it seems that God ought to have commanded that we should see him face to face; and if he ought not to have done so, that reason which Augustine assigns does not seem sufficient.

> **Conclusion.** We are bound to fulfill the precept given concerning the love of God in such a way that every contrary affection is excluded from our heart; not, however, in such a way that every extraneous affection is utterly excluded.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since the holy Doctors sometimes say that the aforesaid mode can be fulfilled, and sometimes say that it cannot be fulfilled[^10], from this we are admonished, if we can see both, that in one way we are obliged to fulfill the aforesaid mode, and in another way we are roused to desire it; whence the aforesaid mode in one way is a disposition for merit, in another way a disposition for reward.

Now this is according to a twofold mode of totality[^11] of the heart, the soul, and the mind. For it can be understood in two ways that the love of God possesses the whole heart: either so that it excludes every extraneous affection, and then it rules the heart fully and perfectly. This is the case when all the motions of the heart are referred through love into God; and this totality establishes full dominion. In another way the love of God is said to possess the whole heart when it excludes every contrary affection, that is, that nothing be loved above God, or equally with God himself; and thus he loves God with his whole heart who loves him for his own sake and above all things[^12]. — The first totality, which excludes every extraneous motion, is that of perfect dominion and cannot be had before the attainment of glory, where we shall gaze upon God himself and be borne into him continually. But the second totality can be had through the infusion of grace, which is expulsive of every mortal fault.

If therefore in that precept God is understood to be loved with the whole soul and with the whole heart and with the whole mind according to the *first* acceptation of totality; then that mode does not oblige to its fulfillment, but is expressed in the precept so that we may know whither we ought to tend through love, and so that no one may think himself perfect until he has attained that perfection. But if loving with the whole heart is taken according to the *second* acceptation; then we are bound to fulfill that mode. — And because according to both acceptations the Holy Spirit willed the aforesaid commandment to be understood; hence it is that some say it can be fulfilled in the way, while others say that it cannot be fulfilled until one arrives in the fatherland. — And according to this the arguments proceed to the opposite sides.

But if it be asked why in this precept it is rather expressed whither we ought to tend than in the other precepts; it can be answered that *the fullness of the Law is love*[^13], and *the end of the precept is charity*, and the commandment of love is the first and greatest according to the divine testimony; therefore the Holy Spirit disposed to express concerning it the perfection

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and completion to which all individual goods and commandments are ordered, more than in any of the precepts. And through these things all that is asked concerning this becomes clear.

But if anyone should contend[^14] that that mode can simply be fulfilled in the way for some time, in which a man can be borne wholly into God, so that there be in him neither motions opposed to charity nor even extraneous ones; it can be answered that, although this can be and sometimes is in certain excellent persons, nevertheless it is not commonly found in all the just[^15]. — *Moreover*, although there be there a totality of motions as for now, yet it is not simply so. And therefore there is a defect from perfect totality, which is the totality of motions and of times; and this is what simply excludes extraneous motion. And so, although that mode can in some way be fulfilled, yet not altogether, as is intimated in that precept. And this Augustine intimates when he says: « When there is yet something of carnal concupiscence, God is not loved with the whole soul in every way ». And this same thing the Master means to say[^16] when he says « that this aforesaid mode can be fulfilled according to the perfection of the way, which is the perfection of one running, not according to the perfection of the fatherland, which is the perfection of one who has arrived »; and so he means that it can be fulfilled « in part », yet not altogether perfectly and entirely[^17].

la: Vers. 17.

la: Hic c. 6. — Circa finem huius nec non 3. arg. respicitur regula 11. iuris (libr. v. Sexti Decretal. in fine): *Nemo potest ad impossibile obligari.*

en: Here [in the text of the Master], c. 6. — Toward the end of this and likewise of the 3rd argument, reference is made to rule 11 of the law (Book V of the Sext of the Decretals, at the end): *No one can be bound to the impossible.* *(P. 613, n. 2.)*

la: Sap. 9, 15. — *Maior* sumta est ex Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 71. (c. 8.). — In conclus. pro *est in via* codd. *l. bb est in hac vita*; deinde cod. Z voci *corde* adiicit *suo.*

en: Wisdom 9:15. — The *major* [premise] is taken from Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 71 (c. 8). — In the conclusion, for *est in via* codices *l, bb* read *est in hac vita*; then cod. Z adds *suo* to the word *corde*. *(P. 613, n. 3.)*

la: Ita et August., de Spiritu et littera, c. 27. n. 48: *Sine peccatis venialibus haec vita non ducitur.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Mox pro *movetur* edd. *peccat.* In fine arg. pro *modi* cod. X *mandati.*

en: So too Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 27, n. 48: *This life is not led without venial sins.* Cf. II Sent., d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — Presently, for *movetur* the editions [read] *peccat.* At the end of the argument, for *modi* cod. X [reads] *mandati.* *(P. 613, n. 4.)*

la: Vers. 37. — Seq. Scripturae locus ibid. 19, 17. — Pro *et eiusdem* non pauci codd. *sed eiusdem.* In fine arg. pro *debuit* edd. *debet.*

en: Verse 37. — The following Scripture passage is the same [Gospel] 19:17. — For *et eiusdem* not a few codices [read] *sed eiusdem.* At the end of the argument, for *debuit* the editions [read] *debet.* *(P. 613, n. 5.)*

la: In Explanatione symboli ad Damasum [inter opera Hieronymi]. Cfr. tom. II, pag. 691, nota 9. — Augustini verba inveniuntur in eius Serm. 54. (alias 2. de Verbis Domini) c. 2. — Pro *praecepti* (cod. D *praecepta*) *implendi* codd. A K bb *mandati implendi.*

en: In the *Explanation of the Creed to Damasus* [among the works of Jerome]. Cf. tom. II, p. 691, note 9. — Augustine's words are found in his *Sermon* 54 (otherwise 2, *On the Words of the Lord*), c. 2. — For *praecepti* (cod. D *praecepta*) *implendi* codices A K bb [read] *mandati implendi.* *(P. 613, n. 6.)*

la: Serm. 20. in Cantic. n. 4. et Serm. 29. de Diversis, n. 1. et 4. — De explicatione, quae hic et alibi Augustino tribuitur, vide quae observavimus tom. I. pag. 81, nota 8, nec non hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. in fine. Innocentius III., Serm. 4. in Communi de uno martyre, dicit: *Ex hac comprehensiva cognitione procedit summa dilectio, per quam Sancti diligunt Deum ex toto corde, ex tota mente, ex tota anima* (Matth. 22, 37.), *Ex mente, id est memoria, diligunt Patrem; tota, id est sine oblivione. Ex corde, id est intellectu, diligunt Filium; toto, id est sine errore. Ex anima, id est voluntate, diligunt Spiritum sanctum; tota, id est sine contrarietate; adeo namque divinae voluntati per caritatem inhaerent, ut nihil omnino velint, nisi quod Deum velle cognoscunt.* Cfr. ibid. Serm. 2. in festo B. Petri et Petr. Pictav., III. Sent. c. 23. Vide infra dub. 4.

en: *Sermon* 20 on the Canticle, n. 4, and *Sermon* 29 *On Diverse Subjects*, n. 1 and 4. — Concerning the explanation which here and elsewhere is attributed to Augustine, see what we observed in tom. I, p. 81, note 8, and also here in the text of the Master, c. 5 at the end. Innocent III, *Sermon* 4 *In the Common of One Martyr*, says: *From this comprehensive knowledge proceeds the highest love, by which the Saints love God with the whole heart, with the whole mind, with the whole soul* (Matt. 22:37). *From the mind, that is the memory, they love the Father; wholly, that is without forgetfulness. From the heart, that is the intellect, they love the Son; wholly, that is without error. From the soul, that is the will, they love the Holy Spirit; wholly, that is without contrariety; for they cleave to the divine will through charity so far that they will nothing at all except what they know God to will.* Cf. ibid. *Sermon* 2 on the feast of St. Peter, and Peter of Poitiers, III Sent. c. 23. See below, dubium 4. *(P. 613, n. 7.)*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine. — Mox pro *ad semper* Vat. *pro semper.* Post pauca codd. et *Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal.* collat. 61. a. 2. omittunt *pro* ante *loco et tempore.*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3 at the end. — Presently, for *ad semper* the Vatican [edition reads] *pro semper.* A little after, the codices and the *Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales*, collatio 61, a. 2, omit *pro* before *loco et tempore.* *(P. 614, n. 1.)*

la: De Perfectione iustit. hominis, c. 8. n. 19, unde et verba Magistri hic in lit. c. 6. circa finem sumta sunt. Cfr. de Spiritu et lit. c. 36. n. 64. — Paulo inferius respicitur I. Cor. 13, 12. — Paulo superius plures codd. et *Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal.* omittunt *in via*; deinde Vat. pro *illud implere* substituit *illum implere.*

en: *On the Perfection of Man's Righteousness*, c. 8, n. 19, whence too the Master's words here in the text, c. 6, near the end, are taken. Cf. *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 36, n. 64. — A little below, reference is made to 1 Cor. 13:12. — A little above, several codices and the *Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales* omit *in via*; then the Vatican [edition] substitutes *illum implere* for *illud implere.* *(P. 614, n. 2.)*

la: Praeter August. iam laudat. cfr. Bernard., de Diligendo Deo, c. 10. n. 29.

en: Besides Augustine already cited, cf. Bernard, *On Loving God*, c. 10, n. 29. *(P. 614, n. 3.)*

la: Cod. Z *secundum duplicem totalitatem.*

en: Cod. Z [reads] *according to a twofold totality.* *(P. 614, n. 4.)*

la: August., de Spiritu et littera, c. 36. n. 63: *Aliud est enim totam nondum assequi caritatem, aliud, nullam sequi cupiditatem. Quam ob rem debet homo, quamvis longe minus amet Deum, quam eum potest amare conspectum, nihil tamen appetere illicitum, sicut etiam in his quae adiacent sensibus corporis, potest oculus nullis tenebris delectari, quamvis non possit in fulgentissima luce defigi. Verum ecce iam talem constituamus animam humanam in hoc corruptibili corpore, quae, etsi nondum illa supereminentissima perfectione caritatis Dei omnes motus terrenae libidinis absorbuerit atque consumserit, attamen in ista minore iustitia ad illicitum aliquid operandum eidem libidini nulla inclinatione consentiat* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *ubi* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 *nisi*, et deinde pro *aspiciemus* codd. A I K L atque edd. 1, 2 *aspiciamus.* Mox pro *feremur* edd. 1, 2 cum cod. A *feramur.*

en: Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 36, n. 63: *For it is one thing not yet to attain the whole of charity, another to follow no cupidity. Wherefore a man, although he love God far less than he can love him when beheld, ought nevertheless to desire nothing unlawful, just as also in those things which lie before the senses of the body the eye can take delight in no darkness, although it cannot be fixed on the most brilliant light. But behold, let us now set up such a human soul in this corruptible body, which, even if it has not yet by that most pre-eminent perfection of the charity of God absorbed and consumed all the motions of earthly lust, nevertheless in this lesser righteousness consents by no inclination to that lust to work anything unlawful* etc. — A little below, for *ubi* not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *nisi*, and then for *aspiciemus* codices A I K L and editions 1, 2 [read] *aspiciamus.* Presently, for *feremur* editions 1, 2 with cod. A [read] *feramur.* *(P. 614, n. 5.)*

la: Rom. 13, 10. — Seq. testimonium est I. Tim. 1, 5; deinde respicitur Matth. 22, 38: *Hoc est maximum et primum mandatum.* — De Augustini verbis [« Sed ideo nobis hoc etiam nunc praeceptum est, ut admoneremur, quid fide exposcere, quo spem praemittere, et obliviscendo quae retro sunt, in quae anteriora nos extendere debeamus » etc.] vide August., de Spiritu et littera, c. 36. n. 64.

en: Rom. 13:10. — The following testimony is 1 Tim. 1:5; then reference is made to Matt. 22:38: *This is the greatest and first commandment.* — On Augustine's words [« But for this reason this too is commanded us even now, that we might be admonished what to ask for by faith, whither to send hope ahead, and, forgetting the things that are behind, into what things that are ahead we ought to extend ourselves » etc.] see Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 36, n. 64. *(P. 614, nn. 6–7.)*

la: Edd. 1, 2 *opponant*, Vat. *opponat sive attentet.* Post pauca pro *in quo potest* cod. Z *quia potest.* Inferius etiam pro *iustis omnibus* codd. A K Z et edd. *iustis hominibus.*

en: Editions 1, 2 [read] *opponant*, the Vatican [edition] *opponat sive attentet* [let him object or attend]. A little after, for *in quo potest* cod. Z [reads] *quia potest.* Lower down too, for *iustis omnibus* codices A K Z and the editions [read] *iustis hominibus* [just men]. *(P. 615, n. 1.)*

la: Cfr. August., de Spiritu et littera, c. 36. n. 66.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 36, n. 66. *(P. 615, n. 2.)*

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here [in the text of the Master], c. 6. *(P. 615, n. 3.)*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. *(P. 615, n. 4.)*

latin_scholion:
**II.** Quoad ultimam (6.) huius articuli quaestionem cfr. hic dub. 3, ubi explicantur ipsa verba s. Scripturae de hoc praecepto. Duplicem de rebus hic tractatis quaestionem S. Thomas (hic q. 3. a. 2. et 4.) cum aliis magistris ponit, nempe, utrum Deus possit totaliter diligi — et utrum modus diligendi, qui est in praecepto, possit in via servari (cfr. S. II. II. q. 27. a. 5, q. 4. a. 6.). Licet non omnes doctores eisdem distinctionibus utantur, tamen in substantia doctrinae conveniunt. — Distinctio duplicis totalitatis, quarum altera est in via, altera in patria, a Guliel. Antissiodorensi (Sum. p. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 7.) tanquam inepta ad solvendam hanc quaestionem reiicitur: « quoniam ille qui est in statu contemplationis, refert omnes motus suos in Deum: ergo impletur illud mandatum etiam totalitate patriae; quod quidem verum est, sed hoc non potest facere diu ». Ad hanc obiectionem solvendam referuntur verba auctoris nostri in fine huius quaestionis posita. — Praeter S. Thomam: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2-4. — Richard. a Med., hic n. 8. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**II.** As to the last (6th) question of this article, see here dubium 3, where the very words of sacred Scripture concerning this precept are explained. A twofold question concerning the matters here treated is posed by St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 2 and 4) along with other masters, namely, whether God can be loved totally — and whether the mode of loving which is in the precept can be observed in the way (cf. S. II–II, q. 27, a. 5; q. 4, a. 6). Although not all the doctors use the same distinctions, nevertheless they agree in the substance of the doctrine. — The distinction of the twofold totality, of which one is in the way, the other in the fatherland, is rejected by William of Auxerre (Summa, p. III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 7) as inept for solving this question: « because he who is in the state of contemplation refers all his motions into God: therefore that commandment is fulfilled even with the totality of the fatherland; which indeed is true, but he cannot do this for long ». For solving this objection the words of our author placed at the end of this question are referred to. — Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2–4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here n. 8, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp. 613–615 (PDF 635–637; `pdf = printed + 22`), per the Vol III two-column PDF-priority discipline (the IA djvu OCR in this region is cascade-shattered, especially the Respondeo and footers). The scholion §II was read off the PDF (p.613 L/R columns) where the OCR fragments it.

**Page span.** q6 = the sixth and last question of Dist. XXVII, Art. II. It begins **mid-p.613** (after the q5/q6 SCHOLION block that spans pp.612–613): the column-spanning `QUAESTIO VI.` header + title sit on p.613 below the scholion §I (q5) / §II (q6); the opener and the three *videtur* (pro) objections (markers [^1]–[^4]) run down the L-col, the three **Sed contra** arguments (markers [^5]–[^6], with [^7] opening contra 3) straddle the L→R columns. The body continues through **all of p.614** (the *Iuxta hoc quaeritur* incidental question, the **Conclusio** in `>`, and the **Respondeo** with the duplex-totalitas analysis, markers [^8]–[^13]) and the **top of p.615** (the *Si quis autem contendat* opinion of William of Auxerre, "Ratio 1 / Ratio 2", ending "...non tamen omnino perfecte et integre"). q6 **ends** at the top of p.615, immediately before the column-spanning `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` header (raw 42744) and `Dub. I.`.

**Scholion §II captured (hand-off picked up).** Per the q5 hand-off, the article's SCHOLION prints §I (q5's, Richard of Mediavilla / S. Thomas / Peter of Tarentaise, "Praeter laudatos de hac **(5.)** quaestione…") and §II (this q6's, "Quoad ultimam **(6.)** huius articuli quaestionem cfr. hic dub. 3…"). q5 already took §I; **q6 owns §II**, captured here. Placed LAST in both `## Latin` and `## English` per the `### Scholion`-must-be-last parser gotcha. §II carries no footnote markers.

**Footer split.**
- **p.613:** seven footers (nn.1–7) all belong to q6's body markers [^1]–[^7] (n.1 *Vers. 17*; n.2 c.6 + Sext rule 11; n.3 Sap. 9:15 + Aristot. VIII Phys.; n.4 August. *de Spiritu et littera* c.27; n.5 *Vers. 37* + ibid. 19:17; n.6 *Explanatio symboli ad Damasum*; n.7 Bernard Serm. 20 in Cantic. + Innocent III). Picked up from the q5 hand-off (q5 took none of p.613's footers).
- **p.614:** seven footers (nn.1–7), all q6's → markers [^8]–[^13]. Quaracchi's p.614 n.7 (Rom. 13:10 + I Tim. 1:5 + Matth. 22:38) and the August. *de Spiritu et littera* c.36 n.64 note (p.614 n.6) both attach to the single body anchor at "...exprimere perfectionem [Rom. 13 / I Tim. / Matth.]"; rendered together as [^13] with a combined `(P. 614, nn. 6–7.)` tag.
- **p.615 — SHARED with Dub. I (forwarded to d27-dubia):** p.615 carries ONE per-page footer sequence serving BOTH q6's tail (top of page) AND Dub. I (below the DUBIA header). The q6 tail markers (*contendat*, *Magister*, *iustis omnibus*, *integre*) draw on the page's note 1 ("Edd. 1,2 *opponat*…; Inferius etiam pro *iustis omnibus* codd. A K Z et edd. *iustis hominibus*") — but that same note is also Dub. I's. The remaining p.615 notes (n.2 August. *de Spiritu et littera* c.36 n.66; n.3 *Hic c.6*; n.4 *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*; nn.5–8+ Aristot./Augustine cites) belong to **Dub. I**. I have **not** parked q6's p.615-tail micro-markers as separate `[^N]` entries because the page note is shared and reads as a Dub. I apparatus note; **d27-dubia must capture the full p.615 footer sequence (nn.1–8+) and re-decide whether the *iustis omnibus*/*in quo potest* clause of n.1 is back-referenced to this q6 tail.** `[?]` flag below.

**p.615 footer backfill (2026-06-11).** The earlier promotion dropped q6's share of the p.615 footer sequence. Eyes-on the 450dpi p.615 L-col footer band confirms the page's nn.1–17 split by body anchor: **nn.1–4 belong to q6's tail** (the *Si quis autem contendat¹ … iustis omnibus²* / *vult dicere Magister³ … integre⁴* opinion printed at the top of p.615), and **nn.5–17 belong to Dub. I** (held by d27-dubia). The four q6 footers are now restored as `[^14]`–`[^17]` tagged `(P. 615, n. 1.)`–`(P. 615, n. 4.)`, with body anchors at *contendat* / *iustis omnibus* / *Magister* / *integre* in both Latin and English. n.1 = the *opponant*/*iustis hominibus* variant note (NOT a Dub. I note — d27-dubia's "n.1 covers both" reading is corrected here: the *opponat sive attentet* / *in quo potest* / *iustis omnibus* variants are all q6-tail readings). This clears the prior `[?]` on the shared p.615 footer; d27-dubia correctly owns only nn.5–17.

**End boundary / hand-off forwarded → d27-dubia.** A genuine d.27 **DUBIA** block exists: `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` at raw **42744** (printed p.615, below q6), with **four dubia** — **Dub. I** (raw ~42746: on the definition of charity the Master gives, *Caritas est dilectio, qua diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum*; the rival definitions + the *Contra primam/secundam/tertiam/quartam/Ultimam* objections + Respondeo), **Dub. II** (raw ~42921: *Pro quo etiam duo sunt mandata* — why there are two commandments of love), **Dub. III** (raw ~42960: *Sic condita est mens humana, ut nunquam sui non meminerit* — the soul's self-memory/intellection/love), **Dub. IV** (raw ~43018: *Dilectionis modus insinuatur, cum dicitur: ex toto corde…* — the threefold/fourfold conditions, Deut. 6 / Mark 12 / Luke 10). The dubia block runs to printed p.619, ending immediately before `DISTINCTIO XXVIII.` at raw **43027/43061**. Its apparatus = the `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` / per-page footers of pp.615–619 (including the shared p.615 sequence noted above). The existing `bon-sent-III-d27-dubia.md` skeleton is therefore legitimate, not spurious.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 27, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 615 -->

# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione, quam ponit Magister, qua dicit: *Caritas est dilectio, qua diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum*; et quaeritur iuxta hoc, cum multae inveniantur definitiones de caritate — cum «unius rei unica sit definitio[^p615-5]» — quomodo ab invicem distinguantur. Praeter enim praedictam definitionem invenitur definiri ab Augustino in libro *de Moribus Ecclesiae*[^p615-6] sic: «Caritas est animi rectissima affectio, coniungens nos cum Deo». — Item, Augustinus in *Soliloquiis*[^p615-7]: «Caritas est virtus, qua Deum videre eoque perfrui desideramus». — Item, in libro *de Spiritu et anima*[^p615-8]: «Caritas est vita copulans amantem cum amato». — Postremo, definitur ab Apostolo primae ad Timotheum primo[^p615-9]: *Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro, conscientia bona et fide non ficta.*

Contra primam definitionem sic obiicitur: idem est dilectio et caritas: ergo cum Magister definit caritatem per dilectionem, definit idem per se ipsum[^p615-10]. — Item, amori naturali in statu innocentiae conveniebat ista definitio[^p615-11]: ergo non videtur esse convertibilis cum caritate.

Contra secundam definitionem obiicitur sic: affectio animi est ab ipsa anima; caritas autem non est ab ipsa anima, sed a Deo[^p615-12]: ergo male dicitur caritas affectio animi. — Item, haec definitio potest competere spei[^p615-13]: ergo non recte assignatur de caritate.

Contra tertiam obiicitur sic: quia visio respondet ipsi fidei, et frui commune est ad omnem virtutem[^p615-14]: ergo male definitur caritas per *videre* et *frui.* — Item, desiderium est rei absentis[^p615-15] et quodam modo imperfectum: cum ergo caritas sit perfectissima, male definitur per actum desiderandi.

Contra quartam obiicitur sic: Dionysius in libro *de Divinis Nominibus*[^p615-16], definiens amorem generaliter, dicit, quod est «virtus unitiva»: ergo copulare amantem cum amato non est proprium caritatis, cum sit commune amori naturali et animali. — Item, vita est perfectio absoluta[^p615-17], copulatio amantis cum amato est qualitas respectiva: ergo male dicitur caritas esse vita copulans.

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Contra ultimam obiicitur sic: caritas est radix virtutum et principium merendi et pondus, quo quis inclinatur et tendit ad finem[^p616-1]: ergo non videtur, quod caritas debeat dici finis.

Item, quaeritur de illis tribus membris, quae adduntur, pro quibus stant, et quomodo distinguuntur? — Item quaeritur, quare *cordi* attribuitur *puritas* et *conscientiae bonitas* et *fidei stabilitas*, cum puritas cordis sit ex fide, Actuum decimo quinto[^p616-2]: *Fide purificans corda eorum?* — Et quare fides ponitur ultima, cum ipsa sit prima?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod caritas secundum multiplicem sui comparationem habet multipliciter definiri. Habet enim caritas comparari ad *obiectum*; et sic assignatur definitio prima, posita a Magistro. — Potest iterum considerari per comparationem ad *finem ultimum*; et sic definitur ab Augustino in *Soliloquiis*. — Potest etiam comparari ad *actum proprium*, qui est *unire*[^p616-3] et *adhaerere*; et sic definitur ab Augustino in libro *de Moribus Ecclesiae* et in libro *de Spiritu et anima*, per actum uniendi et copulandi amantem cum amato, videlicet affectum nostrum cum Deo. — Potest iterum comparari ad *habitum sibi adiunctum*, qui quodam modo est ipsius caritatis principium; et sic definitur ab Apostolo, cum dicitur: *Caritas est finis praecepti* etc. Et hoc patet ex ipsius notificationis explanatione. Nam caritas comparata ad *habitus aliarum virtutum* theologicarum, quia unit eas fini, principatum tenet inter eas, et ideo movet et informat et terminat sive consummat[^p616-4]; et propterea dicitur esse *finis praecepti*; et quia finis est aliarum, actus aliarum disponunt ad actum caritatis, et ipsa caritas immediate elicit. Et ideo tres ponuntur ibi conditiones, et per primam, qua dicitur esse *caritas de corde puro*, tangitur conditio ipsius caritatis, cuius est depurare affectum cordis ab omni terrenitate. Per secundam, scilicet *de conscientia bona*, tangitur conditio spei[^p616-5]; per tertiam conditio fidei; et secundum hoc ordinantur, secundum quod principalius ad actum caritatis disponunt. Et sic patet distinctio et intellectus praepositarum definitionum.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur contra definitionem Magistri, quod idem est dilectio et caritas; dicendum, quod etsi sint idem *re*, tamen aliqua differentia *rationis* est; dilectio enim in plus est quam caritas. Unde consuevit assignari differentia, quod *amor* est naturae, *dilectio* est voluntatis deliberativae, et *caritas* gratiae. — Alia etiam est differentia, quia *caritas* nominat habitum, sed *dilectio* nominat actum; et ita definitur caritas per dilectionem, tanquam minus commune per magis commune, et habitus per suum actum[^p616-6].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illa notificatio convenit dilectioni in statu innocentiae; dicendum, quod differentia est in modo diligendi Deum propter se, secundum quod dicitur de dilectione naturali et ipsa caritate, sicut in secundo libro[^p616-7] ostensum fuit. Et ideo ex hoc non ostenditur illa ratio non esse bene assignata.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de notificatione Augustini *de Moribus Ecclesiae*, quod caritas est animi affectio; dicendum, quod ibi est praedicatio materialis[^p616-8]; ideo in ratione illa est sophisma *secundum accidens.* — Ad hoc vero quod subiungit, quod illa notificatio convenit spei; dicendum, quod spei, proprie loquendo, non convenit *unire*, sed magis *erigere*; fidei enim est *dirigere*, et spei est *erigere*, et caritatis *adhaerere*[^p616-9].

Ad illud quod obiicitur de definitione Augustini *de Soliloquiis*, quod caritas non debet definiri per *videre* et *frui*; dicendum, quod sicut fides cognoscit sibi et aliis virtutibus, sic caritas desiderat sibi et aliis. Et quoniam perfectio mercedis consistit in visione et fruitione Dei; hinc est, quod caritas definitur per desiderium utriusque, non quia *videre* sit eius proprium, sed quia desiderium habendi Deum est proprium caritatis[^p616-10].

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Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod desiderium est rei absentis et imperfectus motus; dicendum, quod definitur ibi caritas *viae*, quae habet secum annexam imperfectionem. — Posset etiam nihilominus dici, quod desiderium, prout excludit fastidium, non solummodo est rei absentis, immo est praesentis[^p617-1]; et hoc modo large accipitur in proposito.

Ad illud quod obiicitur contra definitionem Augustini *de Spiritu et anima*, quod caritas est vita copulans; dicendum, quod etsi *copulare* conveniat omni amori quodam modo, tamen hoc totum, quod est *vita copulans*, est proprium ipsius caritatis; quia nullus est amor, qui animam proprie habeat vivificare, nisi amor gratuitus, qui copulat cum Deo ipsam animam vivificante[^p617-2].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non possunt illa duo simul stare, vita et copula; dicendum, quod quamvis vita, prout est *actus primus*, sit perfectio absoluta, tamen, prout est *actus secundus*, habet respectum ad obiectum extra, sicut patet: quia secundum Philosophum[^p617-3] *alimento uti* et *intelligere* sunt differentiae ipsius quod est *vivere*; et caritas est vita, secundum quod vita dicitur *actus secundus*, ut in praecedentibus[^p617-4] fuit ostensum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de notificatione Apostoli, quod non debet dici *finis*, cum sit *principium*; dicendum, quod cum nihil prohibeat, tres causas coincidere in unum[^p617-5], sicut patet in Deo respectu creaturae; nullum est inconveniens, caritatem simul esse *radicem*, *formam* et *finem*, secundum comparationem triplicis causae, cum nos perfecte faciat Deo conformes, secundum quod superius[^p617-6] habitum est.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de sufficientia et numero et ordine et appropriatione illarum conditionum, quae superadduntur; satis patet responsio ex explanatione ipsius definitionis, et ex his quae in secundo libro determinata sunt, distinctione trigesima octava[^p617-7], quae non oportet ad praesens repetere. Et ideo de illa notificatione Apostoli et de aliis sufficiat ad praesens tantum dixisse.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Pro quo etiam duo sunt mandata.* Videtur enim, quod unum solum debeat esse mandatum, quia unius operis secundum unam rationem unum debet esse mandatum; sed una est ratio diligendi in Deo et in proximo[^p617-8]: ergo unum debet esse mandatum in utroque. — Item, si mandata numerantur secundum numerum diligibilium, cum quatuor sint diligenda ex caritate[^p617-9], quatuor deberent esse mandata. — Item, *qui diligit proximum Legem implevit*, sicut dicitur ad Romanos decimo tertio[^p617-10]; et ibidem dicitur, quod omne aliud mandatum *in illo verbo instauratur*: ergo videtur, quod unum solum debeat esse mandatum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum mandata diversificari habeant secundum ordinem ad Deum et proximum, sicut patet per distinctionem primae tabulae a secunda[^p617-11]; ideo, cum caritas habeat ordinare respectu utriusque, oportuit praecepta distingui; verumtamen, quia una est ratio diligendi, unum potuit in altero implicari.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod mandata distinguuntur penes rationem ipsius habitus; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo penes modum ordinandi ad alterum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quatuor debent esse mandata; dicendum, quod in mandato proximi satis includitur dilectio sui; et quia ad hoc est homo ordinatus per naturam, non oportuit ad hoc induci per praeceptionem divinam[^p617-12].

Ad illud quod obiicitur: *qui diligit proximum Legem implevit*; patet responsio: quia Apostolus loquitur ibi de impletione secundae tabulae. Praeterea, in mandato de dilectione proximi includitur mandatum de dilectione Dei. Quamvis enim unum in altero includatur, non tamen potest inferri, quod unum ab altero non distinguatur; hoc enim est propter connexionem et ordinem, quae non excludit distinctionem.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sic condita est mens humana, ut nunquam sui non meminerit* etc. Contra primum obiicitur sic: memoria est rei absentis et praeteritae[^p618-1]; anima nunquam est sibi absens et praeterita: ergo nunquam meminit sui. — Item, contra illud quod sequitur, quod *nunquam se non intelligit*; obiicitur, quod anima intelligit alia a se; et impossibile est, quod simul plura intelligat[^p618-2]: ergo tunc non intelligit se. Praeterea, multi credunt, se non habere animam, quae sit substantia spiritualis: ergo videtur, quod in talibus anima non intelligat se ipsam. — Item, contra tertium quod dicit: *Ut nunquam se non diligat*; obiicitur sic, quod multi se ipsos interficiunt et vitam suam odiunt: ergo videtur, totum illud esse falsum. Praeterea, in auctoritate sequenti[^p618-3] statim subditur contrarium: *Qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam.*

<!-- page 618 -->

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illa tria, quae tanguntur in littera, dupliciter possunt attribui animae, videlicet *actu* vel *habitu.* Si *habitu*, sic vere et semper attribuuntur ei, quoniam anima per se ipsam nata est sui meminisse, se intelligere et se diligere. Si autem intelligatur in *actu*; sic non semper sibi attribuuntur, quia non semper se cogitat nec semper super se convertitur. Augustinus[^p618-4] ergo loquitur quantum ad *habitum*, non quantum ad *actum.*

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria est respectu praeteritorum; dicendum, quod Augustinus largius accipit memoriam quam Philosophus, sicut in primo libro[^p618-5] fuit ostensum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non semper se cogitat, immo de aliis; iam patet responsio: quia non loquitur de *intelligere*, secundum quod dicit actualem cognitionem et conversionem super se.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilectione; dicendum, quod *diligere* est dupliciter, *affectu* scilicet et *effectu.* *Affectu* nullus est qui se ipsum odiat, immo si se ipsum interimit, hoc est, ut quietem maiorem inveniat; si peccat, hoc est, quia appetit delectationem suam[^p618-6]. Si autem loquamur de dilectione quantum ad *effectum*, sic multi se ipsos odiunt, quia inordinate se diligendo faciunt sibi ipsis malum et inimicantur, sicut multi, qui volentes fugere confusionem vel tribulationem, se ipsos interficiunt corporaliter; et qui volunt satisfacere desideriis carnis interficiunt se ipsos spiritualiter et inimicantur sibi valde crudeliter[^p618-7].

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Dilectionis modus insinuatur, cum dicitur: ex toto corde, id est ex toto intellectu; ex tota anima, id est ex tota voluntate; ex tota mente, id est ex tota memoria.* Diligere enim pertinet ad affectum, non ad intellectum: ergo male dicitur diligere ex intellectu et memoria. — Item, Bernardus *de Amore Dei*[^p618-8]: «Quid est amor nisi vehemens et bene ordinata voluntas»: ergo videtur, quod ex quo dixit: *ex tota anima*, superfluat addere alias conditiones. — Item, beatus Ioannes non ponit nisi duas conditiones, primae Ioannis tertio[^p618-9]: *Diligamus opere et veritate*: ergo videtur, quod in istis tribus conditionibus sit superfluitas. — Item, videtur, quod sit diminutio, quia Deuteronomii sexto[^p618-10] ponitur ista conditio: *Et ex tota fortitudine*, quae non ponitur hic. — Item, Marci duodecimo[^p618-11] additur ista conditio praeter conditiones praedictas: *Ex tota virtute tua*: ergo videtur, quod ibi sit diminutio, vel hic superfluitas. Similiter Lucae decimo[^p618-12] additur ista conditio: *Ex omnibus viribus tuis.* — Quaeritur ergo de illorum trium distinctione et ordine, numero et sufficientia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis caritas immediate respiciat actum concupiscibilis, circa quem primo consistit, nihilominus tamen actus aliarum virium respicit ut disponentes. Unde omnes vires animae quodam modo ordinantur ad ipsam dilectionem, sicut ad illud quod habet rationem completionis respectu omnium virtutum[^p618-13]. Et quoniam superiores vires animae tres sunt, ideo tres apponuntur conditiones. — Et rursus, quia ternarius virium animae dupliciter habet distingui, ita quod unus illorum modorum non discordat ab alio; ideo conditiones circa actum diligendi, respicientes vires animae, duplici modo apponi et distingui habent. Uno enim modo distinguuntur vires animae, secundum quod in eis consistit imago, et dicuntur in mente esse tres potentiae, videlicet *memoria*, *intelligentia* et *voluntas*; et sic secundum istas tres vires apponuntur tres conditiones, quarum una respicit *intelligentiam*, scilicet *ex toto corde*; altera *voluntatem*, scilicet *ex tota anima*; tertia *memoriam*, videlicet *ex tota mente.*

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— Et sic assignantur istae tres conditiones in Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^p619-1] et exponuntur ab Augustino sic: *ex toto corde*, id est ex toto intellectu sine errore; *ex tota anima*, id est ex tota voluntate sine contradictione; *ex tota mente*, id est ex tota memoria sine oblivione.

Alio modo distinguuntur vires animae sic: in *rationalem*, *irascibilem* et *concupiscibilem*; et secundum has tres apponuntur conditiones, quarum una respicit *rationalem*, videlicet *ex toto corde*, et alia *concupiscibilem*, videlicet *ex tota anima*, et tertia *irascibilem*, videlicet *ex tota fortitudine.* — Et sic assignantur in Deuteronomii sexto[^p619-2] et exponuntur a Bernardo sic: *ex toto corde*, id est sapienter; *ex tota anima*, id est dulciter; *ex tota fortitudine*, id est fortiter; ut non seducamur fallaciis, non abducamur blanditiis, non frangamur iniuriis. Et ad haec tria reduci possunt illa tria, quae tanguntur primae ad Timotheum primo[^p619-3]: *Ex corde puro, conscientia bona et fide non ficta.* — Nec est in istis aliqua repugnantia, pro eo quod potentia irascibilis et ipsa memoria conformantur in actu; et ideo una virtus est utriusque reformativa, et una dos utriusque perfectiva, et unam respicit principaliter et aliam ex consequenti[^p619-4]. Et ideo, ubi in Deuteronomio dicitur *ex tota fortitudine*, in Matthaeo dicitur *ex tota mente.* Et haec est ratio, quare haec conditio *ex tota mente* ultimo loco ponitur. — Et sic patet sufficientia, numerus et distinctio illorum quae assignantur circa modum dilectionis, et quod nihil est superfluum et nihil diminutum; patet etiam solutio obiectorum[^p619-5].

english:
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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which the Master sets down, by which he says: *Charity is love by which God is loved for his own sake, and one's neighbor for God's sake*; and in connection with this it is asked, since many definitions of charity are found — since «of one thing there is a single definition[^p615-5]» — how they are distinguished from one another. For besides the aforesaid definition it is found to be defined by Augustine in the book *On the Morals of the Church*[^p615-6] thus: «Charity is the most upright affection of the soul, joining us with God». — Likewise, Augustine in the *Soliloquies*[^p615-7]: «Charity is the virtue by which we desire to see God and to enjoy him fully». — Likewise, in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^p615-8]: «Charity is the life joining the lover with the beloved». — Lastly, it is defined by the Apostle in the first chapter of the first letter to Timothy[^p615-9]: *The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith.*

Against the first definition it is objected thus: love and charity are the same: therefore since the Master defines charity through love, he defines the same through itself[^p615-10]. — Likewise, that definition befitted natural love in the state of innocence[^p615-11]: therefore it does not seem to be convertible with charity.

Against the second definition it is objected thus: the affection of the soul is from the soul itself; but charity is not from the soul itself, but from God[^p615-12]: therefore charity is badly called the affection of the soul. — Likewise, this definition can fit hope[^p615-13]: therefore it is not rightly assigned of charity.

Against the third it is objected thus: because vision corresponds to faith, and to enjoy is common to every virtue[^p615-14]: therefore charity is badly defined through *to see* and *to enjoy.* — Likewise, desire is of an absent thing[^p615-15] and in some way imperfect: since therefore charity is most perfect, it is badly defined through the act of desiring.

Against the fourth it is objected thus: Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*[^p615-16], defining love generally, says that it is a «unitive power»: therefore to join the lover with the beloved is not proper to charity, since it is common to natural and animal love. — Likewise, life is an absolute perfection[^p615-17], the joining of lover with beloved is a relative quality: therefore charity is badly said to be a joining life.

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Against the last it is objected thus: charity is the root of the virtues and the principle of meriting and the weight by which one is inclined and tends toward the end[^p616-1]: therefore it does not seem that charity ought to be called the end.

Likewise, it is asked about those three members which are added, for what they stand, and how they are distinguished? — Likewise it is asked, why to the *heart* is attributed *purity*, and to the *conscience* *goodness*, and to *faith* *stability*, since purity of heart is from faith, in the fifteenth chapter of Acts[^p616-2]: *Purifying their hearts by faith?* — And why is faith placed last, since it is itself first?

**I respond:** It must be said that charity, according to its manifold comparison, can be defined in manifold ways. For charity can be compared to the *object*; and thus the first definition is assigned, set down by the Master. — Again it can be considered through comparison to the *ultimate end*; and thus it is defined by Augustine in the *Soliloquies.* — It can also be compared to its *proper act*, which is *to unite*[^p616-3] and *to adhere*; and thus it is defined by Augustine in the book *On the Morals of the Church* and in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, through the act of uniting and joining the lover with the beloved, namely our affection with God. — Again it can be compared to the *habit joined to it*, which in some way is the principle of charity itself; and thus it is defined by the Apostle, when it is said: *Charity is the end of the precept* etc. And this is clear from the explanation of the notification itself. For charity, compared to the *habits of the other* theological virtues, because it unites them to the end, holds the primacy among them, and therefore moves and informs and terminates or consummates[^p616-4]; and on that account it is said to be the *end of the precept*; and because it is the end of the others, the acts of the others dispose toward the act of charity, and charity itself immediately elicits [it]. And therefore three conditions are set down there, and by the first, by which it is said to be *charity from a pure heart*, the condition of charity itself is touched on, whose [office] is to purify the affection of the heart from all earthliness. By the second, namely *from a good conscience*, the condition of hope is touched on[^p616-5]; by the third the condition of faith; and according to this they are ordered, according as they more principally dispose toward the act of charity. And thus the distinction and understanding of the foregoing definitions is clear.

To that, therefore, which is first objected against the definition of the Master, that love and charity are the same; it must be said that although they are the same in *reality*, yet there is some difference of *account*; for love extends to more than charity. Whence a difference is wont to be assigned, that *love* belongs to nature, *love [as choice]* to the deliberative will, and *charity* to grace. — There is also another difference, because *charity* names a habit, but *love* names an act; and so charity is defined through love, as the less common through the more common, and the habit through its act[^p616-6].

To that which is objected, that that notification fits love in the state of innocence; it must be said that the difference is in the mode of loving God for his own sake, according as it is said of natural love and of charity itself, as was shown in the second book[^p616-7]. And therefore from this that account is not shown not to be well assigned.

To that which is objected concerning the notification of Augustine *On the Morals of the Church*, that charity is the affection of the soul; it must be said that there the predication is *material*[^p616-8]; therefore in that reasoning there is a sophism *according to accident.* — But to that which he adds, that this notification fits hope; it must be said that to hope, properly speaking, it does not belong *to unite*, but rather *to raise up*; for it belongs to faith *to direct*, and to hope *to raise up*, and to charity *to adhere*[^p616-9].

To that which is objected concerning the definition of Augustine *of the Soliloquies*, that charity ought not to be defined through *to see* and *to enjoy*; it must be said that just as faith knows for itself and for the other virtues, so charity desires for itself and for the others. And since the perfection of the reward consists in the vision and fruition of God; hence it is that charity is defined through the desire of both, not because *to see* is proper to it, but because the desire of having God is proper to charity[^p616-10].

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To that which is objected, that desire is of an absent thing and an imperfect motion; it must be said that there charity *of the way* is defined, which has imperfection annexed to it. — It could nonetheless also be said that desire, inasmuch as it excludes weariness, is not only of an absent thing, but also of a present one[^p617-1]; and in this way it is taken broadly in the matter proposed.

To that which is objected against the definition of Augustine *On the Spirit and the Soul*, that charity is a joining life; it must be said that although *to join* befits every love in some way, yet this whole, which is *joining life*, is proper to charity itself; because there is no love which properly has [the power] to vivify the soul, except gratuitous love, which joins with God who vivifies the soul itself[^p617-2].

To that which is objected, that those two cannot stand together, life and joining; it must be said that although life, inasmuch as it is *first act*, is an absolute perfection, yet, inasmuch as it is *second act*, it has a respect to an object outside, as is clear: because according to the Philosopher[^p617-3] *to use food* and *to understand* are differences of that which is *to live*; and charity is life, according as life is called *second act*, as in the preceding [discussions][^p617-4] was shown.

To that which is objected concerning the notification of the Apostle, that it ought not to be called *end*, since it is *principle*; it must be said that since nothing prevents three causes from coinciding in one[^p617-5], as is clear in God with respect to the creature; there is no unfittingness in charity being at once *root*, *form* and *end*, according to the comparison of the threefold cause, since it makes us perfectly conformed to God, according as above[^p617-6] was had.

To that which is asked concerning the sufficiency and number and order and appropriation of those conditions which are superadded; the response is clear enough from the explanation of the definition itself, and from those things which in the second book were determined, in the thirty-eighth distinction[^p617-7], which need not be repeated for the present. And therefore concerning that notification of the Apostle and the others let it suffice for the present to have said only this much.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *For which also there are two commandments.* For it seems that there ought to be one commandment only, because of one work according to one account there ought to be one commandment; but there is one account of loving in God and in one's neighbor[^p617-8]: therefore there ought to be one commandment in both. — Likewise, if commandments are numbered according to the number of things lovable, since there are four things to be loved out of charity[^p617-9], there ought to be four commandments. — Likewise, *he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law*, as is said in the thirteenth chapter to the Romans[^p617-10]; and in the same place it is said that every other commandment *is restored in that word*: therefore it seems that there ought to be one commandment only.

**I respond:** It must be said that since commandments must be diversified according to the order toward God and one's neighbor, as is clear by the distinction of the first tablet from the second[^p617-11]; therefore, since charity has to order with respect to both, it was necessary that the precepts be distinguished; nevertheless, because there is one account of loving, one could be implied in the other.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that commandments are distinguished by the account of the habit itself; it must be said that this is false, but rather by the mode of ordering toward another.

To that which is objected, that there ought to be four commandments; it must be said that in the commandment concerning one's neighbor love of oneself is sufficiently included; and because man is ordered to this by nature, it was not necessary to be led to this by a divine precept[^p617-12].

To that which is objected: *he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law*; the response is clear: because the Apostle there speaks of the fulfillment of the second tablet. Furthermore, in the commandment concerning the love of neighbor is included the commandment concerning the love of God. For although one is included in the other, yet it cannot be inferred that one is not distinguished from the other; for this is on account of the connection and order, which does not exclude the distinction.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The human mind is so constituted that it never fails to remember itself* etc. Against the first it is objected thus: memory is of an absent and past thing[^p618-1]; the soul is never absent and past to itself: therefore it never remembers itself. — Likewise, against that which follows, that *it never fails to understand itself*; it is objected that the soul understands things other than itself; and it is impossible that it understand many things at once[^p618-2]: therefore then it does not understand itself. Furthermore, many believe that they do not have a soul which is a spiritual substance: therefore it seems that in such people the soul does not understand itself. — Likewise, against the third which says: *That it never fails to love itself*; it is objected thus, that many kill themselves and hate their own life: therefore it seems that all that is false. Furthermore, in the following authority[^p618-3] the contrary is at once subjoined: *He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.*

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**I respond:** It must be said that those three things which are touched on in the text can be attributed to the soul in two ways, namely in *act* or in *habit.* If in *habit*, thus they are truly and always attributed to it, since the soul by its very self is born to remember itself, to understand itself, and to love itself. But if it is understood in *act*; thus they are not always attributed to it, because it does not always think of itself nor always turn upon itself. Augustine[^p618-4] therefore speaks as to *habit*, not as to *act.*

To that which is objected, that memory is with respect to past things; it must be said that Augustine takes memory more broadly than the Philosopher, as in the first book[^p618-5] was shown.

To that which is objected, that it does not always think of itself, but rather of other things; the response is already clear: because he does not speak of *to understand*, according as it signifies actual cognition and the turning upon oneself.

To that which is objected concerning love; it must be said that *to love* is in two ways, namely by *affect* and by *effect.* By *affect* there is no one who hates himself, but rather if he kills himself, this is that he may find greater rest; if he sins, this is because he seeks his own delight[^p618-6]. But if we speak of love as to *effect*, thus many hate themselves, because by loving themselves inordinately they do evil to themselves and are hostile [to themselves], like many who, wishing to flee confusion or tribulation, kill themselves bodily; and those who wish to satisfy the desires of the flesh kill themselves spiritually and are hostile to themselves very cruelly[^p618-7].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The mode of love is intimated, when it is said: from the whole heart, that is, from the whole intellect; from the whole soul, that is, from the whole will; from the whole mind, that is, from the whole memory.* For to love pertains to the affect, not to the intellect: therefore it is badly said to love from the intellect and memory. — Likewise, Bernard *On the Love of God*[^p618-8]: «What is love but a vehement and well-ordered will»: therefore it seems that, from the fact that he said *from the whole soul*, it is superfluous to add the other conditions. — Likewise, blessed John sets down only two conditions, in the third chapter of the first letter of John[^p618-9]: *Let us love in deed and in truth*: therefore it seems that in those three conditions there is superfluity. — Likewise, it seems that there is diminution, because in the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy[^p618-10] this condition is set down: *And from the whole strength*, which is not set down here. — Likewise, in the twelfth chapter of Mark[^p618-11] this condition is added besides the aforesaid conditions: *From thy whole power*: therefore it seems that there is diminution there, or superfluity here. Likewise in the tenth chapter of Luke[^p618-12] this condition is added: *From all thy powers.* — It is asked therefore concerning the distinction and order, number and sufficiency of those three.

**I respond:** It must be said that although charity immediately regards the act of the concupiscible [power], about which it first consists, nevertheless it regards the acts of the other powers as disposing. Whence all the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to love itself, as to that which has the character of completion with respect to all the virtues[^p618-13]. And since the higher powers of the soul are three, therefore three conditions are set down. — And again, because the threefold set of the soul's powers can be distinguished in two ways, such that one of those modes does not disagree with the other; therefore the conditions concerning the act of loving, regarding the powers of the soul, must be set down and distinguished in a twofold mode. For in one mode the powers of the soul are distinguished, according as in them the image consists, and they are said to be three potencies in the mind, namely *memory*, *intelligence* and *will*; and thus according to those three powers three conditions are set down, of which one regards *intelligence*, namely *from the whole heart*; another the *will*, namely *from the whole soul*; the third *memory*, namely *from the whole mind.*

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— And thus these three conditions are assigned in the twenty-second chapter of Matthew[^p619-1] and are expounded by Augustine thus: *from the whole heart*, that is, from the whole intellect without error; *from the whole soul*, that is, from the whole will without contradiction; *from the whole mind*, that is, from the whole memory without forgetfulness.

In another mode the powers of the soul are distinguished thus: into *rational*, *irascible* and *concupiscible*; and according to these three the conditions are set down, of which one regards the *rational*, namely *from the whole heart*, and another the *concupiscible*, namely *from the whole soul*, and the third the *irascible*, namely *from the whole strength.* — And thus they are assigned in the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy[^p619-2] and are expounded by Bernard thus: *from the whole heart*, that is, wisely; *from the whole soul*, that is, sweetly; *from the whole strength*, that is, bravely; that we be not seduced by deceits, not led away by flatteries, not broken by injuries. And to these three can be reduced those three which are touched on in the first chapter of the first letter to Timothy[^p619-3]: *From a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith.* — Nor is there in these any repugnance, for the reason that the irascible power and memory itself are conformed in act; and therefore one virtue is reformative of both, and one endowment perfective of both, and it regards one principally and the other as a consequence[^p619-4]. And therefore, where in Deuteronomy it is said *from the whole strength*, in Matthew it is said *from the whole mind.* And this is the reason why this condition *from the whole mind* is placed last. — And thus the sufficiency, number and distinction of those things which are assigned concerning the mode of love is clear, and that nothing is superfluous and nothing diminished; the solution of the objections is also clear[^p619-5].

la: Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 504, nota 2.

en: According to Aristotle, VI *Topics* c. 3 (c. 4). See above p. 504, note 2.

la: Libr. I. c. 11. n. 19. Cfr. supra pag. 397, nota 9. Pro *affectio rectissima* edd. *affectio iustissima.*

en: Book I, c. 11, n. 19. Cf. above p. 397, note 9. In place of *affectio rectissima* the editions read *affectio iustissima* [most just affection].

la: Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13. Vide supra pag. 583, nota 4.

en: Book I, c. 6, n. 13. See above p. 583, note 4.

la: Cap. 16: «*Manete*, inquit, *in dilectione mea* (Ioan. 15, 9.). Per dilectionem namque sibi rationalem creaturam copulavit, ut eum semper haberet et in ipso maneret, de eo et in eo delectans, gaudens et exsultans. Per dilectionem Creatori suo et sibi invicem rationalis creatura copulata est» etc. Ibid. c. 38: «Caritas est concordia mentium et societas electorum, vita beatarum animarum et Angelorum, quia nec animae nec Angeli nisi per caritatem vivunt». — In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 58. a. 1. pro hac definitione allegatur August., VIII. de Trin. c. 7. (c. 10. n. 14.), ubi legitur: *Quid est ergo amor, nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur?* Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., de Arrha animae.

en: Chapter 16: «*Abide*, he says, *in my love* (John 15:9). For through love he joined the rational creature to himself, that it might always have him and abide in him, delighting in him and concerning him, rejoicing and exulting. Through love the rational creature was joined to its Creator and to itself in turn» etc. Ibid. c. 38: «Charity is the concord of minds and the society of the elect, the life of the blessed souls and of the Angels, because neither souls nor Angels live except through charity». — In the Supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 58, a. 1, for this definition Augustine is adduced, VIII *On the Trinity* c. 7 (c. 10, n. 14), where it is read: *What then is love, but a certain life joining two things together, or seeking to join them, namely the lover and that which is loved?* Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Pledge of the Soul.*

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Definire idem per se ipsum vitium est, quod Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.) reprehendit his verbis: Si eodem usus est ei quod definitur. Latet autem, cum non eodem definire nomine utitur, ut si solem stellam in die apparentem definivit; nam qui die utitur sole utitur etc.

en: To define the same through itself is a fault, which Aristotle, VI *Topics* c. 3 (c. 4), censures in these words: [it is a fault] if one uses the same [term] as the thing defined. But it is concealed, when one uses to define a non-identical name, as if he defined the sun as the star appearing in the day; for he who uses the day uses the sun, etc.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, quod a tempore naturae institutae tam homo quam Angelus habilis erat ad diligendum Deum propter se et super omnia. — Post *Item* cod. K interserit *cum.*

en: Cf. II *Sentences*, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, where it is shown that from the time of nature's institution both man and the Angel was fit for loving God for his own sake and above all things. — After *Item* codex K inserts *cum.*

la: Rom. 5, 5: *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum* etc.

en: Romans 5:5: *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit* etc.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. et dub. 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, and doubt 2.

la: Omnis enim virtus delectatur et quietatur, cum unitur suo obiecto, de quo Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 4. — Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. — Pro *frui commune est* edd. *fruitio est.*

en: For every virtue is delighted and brought to rest when it is united to its object, on which see Aristotle, X *Ethics* c. 4. — Cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2, to 4. — In place of *frui commune est* the editions read *fruitio est.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 877, nota 2. — Edd. *desiderium est in absens.*

en: Cf. above p. 877, note 2. — The editions read *desiderium est in absens.*

en: Chapter 4, § 15.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 164, nota 6. et pag. 624, nota 7.

en: Cf. vol. I, p. 164, note 6, and p. 624, note 7.

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *membris, quae* edd. *modis, qui.* Post pauca pro *stant* Vat. *stent*, et pro *distinguuntur* multi codd. et edd. *distinguantur.*

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, in place of *membris, quae* the editions read *modis, qui.* After a little, in place of *stant* the Vatican edition reads *stent*, and in place of *distinguuntur* many codices and the editions read *distinguantur.*

la: Vers. 9.

en: Verse 9.

la: Cod. Z *vivere* pro *unire* itemque mox *vivendi* pro *uniendi*, quo loco in cod. X sic scriptum est: *per actum copulandi uniendo amantem* etc.

en: Codex Z reads *vivere* [to live] for *unire* [to unite], and likewise soon *vivendi* for *uniendi*; in which place in codex X it is so written: *through the act of joining by uniting the lover* etc.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 3, q. 3. ad 1. et infra d. 36. q. 6.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 1, to 3; q. 3, to 1; and below, d. 36, q. 6.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 371, nota 5. et pag. 578, nota 2. — Caritatis definitio, quae hic quarto loco respicitur, explanata fuit II. Sent. d. 38. dub. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *distinctio* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *definitio.*

en: Cf. above p. 371, note 5, and p. 578, note 2. — The definition of charity which is regarded here in the fourth place was explained in II *Sentences*, d. 38, doubt 2. — A little below, in place of *distinctio* the editions with some codices read *definitio.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 10. dub. 1, ubi etiam alia differentia affertur. Isidor., II. Differentiar. (alias *de Differentiis spiritual.*) c. 37. n. 142. (alias c. 32.) ait: *Inter amorem et dilectionem sive caritatem hoc differt, quod amor et dilectio media [i. e. communia] sunt et ad utrumque parata, modo in bonum, modo in malum vertuntur. Caritas autem non nisi in bonum; cuius etiam nomen eo usque extollitur, ut ipse Deus caritas appelletur.*

en: Cf. I *Sentences*, d. 10, doubt 1, where also another difference is brought forward. Isidore, II *Differences* (alias *On the Differences of Spiritual Things*) c. 37, n. 142 (alias c. 32) says: *Between love and affection or charity this differs, that love and affection are intermediate [i.e. common] and ready for either, now turning to good, now to evil. But charity is only to good; whose name too is so far exalted that God himself is called charity.*

la: Dist. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3, ubi triplex differentia assignatur.

en: D. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, to 3, where a threefold difference is assigned.

la: Id est: caritas invenitur in animo tanquam in subiecto, quod ab ipsa afficitur. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 6. — Pro *materialis* codd. C D G N W X et edd. 1, 2 *naturalis*, Vat. *causalis.* In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 58. a. 4. ad eandem obiectionem respondetur sic: *Respondeo dicendum, quod caritas est affectio, materialiter loquendo, ut dicunt quidam, vel effective, ut volunt alii; caritas enim efficit affectionem animi; et sive sic dicatur sive sic, primum argumentum non cogit, immo posset ibi assignari fallacia accidentis.* (De fallacia accidentis supra pag. 179, nota 1 et de praedicatione causali pag. 528, n. 5.)

en: That is: charity is found in the soul as in a subject, which is affected by it. Cf. I *Sentences*, the text of the Master, d. XVII, c. 6. — In place of *materialis* codices C D G N W X and editions 1, 2 read *naturalis*, the Vatican edition *causalis.* In the Supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 58, a. 4, to the same objection it is answered thus: *I respond, it must be said that charity is an affection, speaking materially, as some say, or effectively, as others hold; for charity effects the affection of the soul; and whether it is said in this way or that, the first argument does not compel, but rather the fallacy of accident could be assigned there.* (On the fallacy of accident see above p. 179, note 1, and on causal predication p. 528, n. 5.)

la: De quo fusius disseritur I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

en: On which it is discussed more fully in I *Sentences*, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 585, nota 13. — Paulo superius pro *secum annexam* codd. uz *sibi annexam.*

en: See above p. 585, note 13. — A little above, in place of *secum annexam* codices uz read *sibi annexam.*

la: Ex codd. M N O X bb supplevimus *vivificante*, pro quo codd. A K aa *vivificantem*, codd. H L *vivificatam*, alii codd. *vivificare.*

en: From codices M N O X bb we have supplied *vivificante* [vivifying], in place of which codices A K aa read *vivificantem*, codices H L *vivificatam*, other codices *vivificare.*

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 13. (c. 2.). Cfr. supra pag. 444, nota 7. Aristot., loc. cit. text. 2. seqq. (c. 1.), etiam insinuat duplicem acceptionem vitae, in actum scil. primum et secundum. — Paulo ante edd. omittunt *extra.*

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 13 (c. 2). Cf. above p. 444, note 7. Aristotle, at the place cited, text 2 ff. (c. 1), also intimates a twofold sense of life, namely into first and second act. — A little before, the editions omit *extra.*

la: Art. 1. q. 2. ad 3. — Pro *secundum quod vita* edd. et *secundum quod est vita.*

en: Article 1, q. 2, to 3. — In place of *secundum quod vita* the editions also read *secundum quod est vita.*

la: Aristot., II. Physic. text. 70. (c. 7.): *Veniunt autem tres [causae, scil. efficiens, finalis et formalis, quae est vel intrinseca, vel extrinseca sive exemplaris] in unam plerumque.*

en: Aristotle, II *Physics* text 70 (c. 7): *But three [causes — namely the efficient, the final, and the formal, which is either intrinsic, or extrinsic, i.e. exemplary —] for the most part come together into one.*

la: Art. 2. q. 1. in corp. Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et 3.

en: Article 2, q. 1, in the body. Cf. also II *Sentences*, d. 38, a. 1, q. 2 and 3.

la: Dub. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 6. — Pro *Ad illud quod quaeritur* edd. cum pluribus codd. *Ad illud quod obiicitur.* — Cfr. de hoc dubio Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 58. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 4.

en: Doubt 2. Cf. above p. 561, note 6. — In place of *Ad illud quod quaeritur* the editions with several codices read *Ad illud quod obiicitur.* — Cf. on this doubt the Supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 58, throughout; Blessed Albert, here a. 4.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 5. — Edd. *diligendi Deum et proximum.* Superius cod. K omittit *unam.*

en: See above, a. 1, q. 5. — The editions read *diligendi Deum et proximum* [of loving God and neighbor]. Above, codex K omits *unam.*

la: De quibus vide infra d. 28. q. 6.

en: Concerning which see below, d. 28, q. 6.

la: Vers. 8. — Seq. Scripturae locus est ibid. v. 9: *Et si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc verbo instauratur: Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum.* — Paulo inferius pro *debeat* codd. I L T V Z bb *debebat.*

en: Verse 8. — The following passage of Scripture is ibid. v. 9: *And if there be any other commandment, it is restored in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* — A little below, in place of *debeat* codices I L T V Z bb read *debebat.*

la: Vide infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

en: See below, d. 37, a. 2, q. 1 f.

la: Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXVIII. c. 1, et Comment. dub. 1. — Mox pro *patet responsio* edd. *dicendum quod.* Inferius non pauci codd. *includit* pro *includitur*, et permulti codd. *Quamvis tamen* pro *Quamvis enim.*

en: Cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XXVIII, c. 1, and the Commentary, doubt 1. — Soon, in place of *patet responsio* the editions read *dicendum quod.* Below, not a few codices read *includit* for *includitur*, and very many codices *Quamvis tamen* for *Quamvis enim.*

la: Vide supra pag. 336, nota 4. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 503, nota 8. et pag. 504, nota 1. — Obiectionem ipsam August., XIV. de Trin. c. 11. n. 14. sic exprimit: *Sed dicet aliquis: Non est ista memoria, qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur, quae sibi semper est praesens. Memoria enim praeteritorum est, non praesentium.* — Pro *anima* cod. A *memoria*, et mox pro *meminit sui* edd. *meminit sibi.*

en: See above p. 336, note 4. — On the minor [premise] cf. above p. 503, note 8, and p. 504, note 1. — The objection itself Augustine, XIV *On the Trinity* c. 11, n. 14, expresses thus: *But someone will say: That memory by which the mind is said to remember itself, which is always present to itself, is not [memory]. For memory is of past, not of present, things.* — In place of *anima* codex A reads *memoria*, and soon in place of *meminit sui* the editions read *meminit sibi.*

la: Vide sententiam Aristot., supra pag. 114, nota 5. allatam.

en: See the judgment of Aristotle adduced above p. 114, note 5.

la: Psalm. 10, 6, qui deinde in notula a Magistro allegatur.

en: Psalm 10:6, which is then adduced by the Master in the little note.

la: Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 14. n. 18, unde textus huius dubii sumtus est.

en: Book XIV *On the Trinity* c. 14, n. 18, whence the text of this doubt is taken.

la: Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — Ad hanc obiectionem August. ipse respondet, XIV. de Trin. c. 11. n. 14, respiciens illa verba Virgilii (Aen. III. 628. seq.): «Nec talia passus Ulysses, oblitusve sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto». Dicit enim: «Virgilius enim, cum sui non oblitum diceret Ulyssen, quid aliud intelligi voluit, nisi quod meminerit sui? Cum ergo sibi praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset, nisi ad res praesentes memoria pertineret. Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit, ut valeant recoli et recordari, sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est, ut sua cogitatione possit intelligi» etc. Quibus verbis etiam solutio praecedens confirmatur. — Paulo inferius pro *cognitionem* multi codd. *cogitationem.*

en: D. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, to 3. — To this objection Augustine himself responds, XIV *On the Trinity* c. 11, n. 14, regarding those words of Virgil (*Aeneid* III, 628 f.): «Nor did Ulysses endure such things, nor was the Ithacan forgetful of himself in so great a peril». For he says: «For Virgil, when he said that Ulysses was not forgetful of himself, what else did he wish to be understood, but that he remembered himself? Since therefore he was present to himself, he would in no way have remembered himself, unless memory pertained to present things. Wherefore just as in past things that is called memory by which it comes about that they can be recalled and remembered, so in a present thing that which the mind is to itself is to be called, without absurdity, memory, by which it is at hand to itself, so that it can be understood by its own thinking» etc. By which words also the preceding solution is confirmed. — A little below, in place of *cognitionem* many codices read *cogitationem.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 17. dub. 1, et August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 8. n. 23. — Paulo ante pro *interimit, hoc est* cod. Z *interimat, facit.*

en: Cf. above, d. 17, doubt 1, and Augustine, III *On Free Choice* c. 8, n. 23. — A little before, in place of *interimit, hoc est* codex Z reads *interimat, facit.*

la: Ibid. notulam, quae habetur in textu Magistri, simulque hoc 3. dubium in seq. distinctionem transtulerunt.

en: Ibid. the little note, which is had in the text of the Master, and at the same time they transferred this third doubt into the following distinction.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. Iisdem verbis amor definitur in Libro de Contemplando Deo (inter opera Bernardi), c. 7. n. 14: *Nihil enim aliud est amor quam vehemens et bene ordinata voluntas.* — Mox pro *superfluat*, quod habent codd. A K aa bb, in aliis et edd. *superfluit.*

en: Cf. above p. 596, note 7. In the same words love is defined in the Book *On Contemplating God* (among the works of Bernard), c. 7, n. 14: *For love is nothing else than a vehement and well-ordered will.* — Soon, in place of *superfluat*, which codices A K aa bb have, in the others and the editions *superfluit.*

la: Vers. 18.

en: Verse 18.

la: Vers. 30. — Complures codd. erronee allegant Matth. 12.

en: Verse 30. — Several codices erroneously cite Matthew 12.

la: Vers. 27.

en: Verse 27.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. et infra d. 36. q. 6. — Pro *rationem completionis* edd. *rationem completam.* Paulo superius pro *aliarum virium*, quae lectio habetur in codd. A K W aa bb, alii codd. et edd. *illarum virium.*

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, and below, d. 36, q. 6. — In place of *rationem completionis* the editions read *rationem completam.* A little above, in place of *aliarum virium*, which reading is had in codices A K W aa bb, the other codices and the editions read *illarum virium.*

la: Vers. 37. — Quoad expositionem huius loci, quae hic Augustino tribuitur, cfr. supra pag. 643, nota 7.

en: Verse 37. — As to the exposition of this passage, which is here attributed to Augustine, cf. above p. 643, note 7.

la: Vers. 5, quem versum fere hoc modo exponit Bernard., Serm. 20. in Cant. n. 4. et Serm. 29. de Diversis, n. 1. et 4.

en: Verse 5, which verse Bernard expounds in nearly this manner, *Sermon* 20 on the Canticle, n. 4, and *Sermon* 29 *On Various Matters*, n. 1 and 4.

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. ad 2. — Paulo ante codd. A K post *dos utriusque* supplent *partis.*

en: Cf. above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 5, to 2. — A little before, codices A K after *dos utriusque* supply *partis.*

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw lines 42744–43026) and collated column-by-column against the 450 dpi PDF crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{615,616,617,618,619}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (PDF pp.637–641; `pdf = printed + 22`). The IA OCR for this distinction is severely two-column-interleaved (lines splice the L column of one paragraph to the R column of another, with footer blocks shuffled in mid-body), so the **PDF was authoritative throughout**; the OCR served only as a base for clean running prose and marker spacing. English is a fresh literal translation per the CLAUDE.md formula/terminology tables. `type: dubia`, so **no scholion** (`has_scholion: false`). Marginal index-glosses (`Definitiones caritatis`, `Obiicitur contra 1`, `Contra 2/3/4`, `Quaestiones incidentes`, `Caritas comparatur quadrupliciter`, `Explicatur`, `Solvuntur obiecta`, `Item contra`, `Notandum`, `Aliter`, `Distinctio notanda`, `Diligere affectu et effectu`, `Duplex modus distinguendi`, `Primo`, `Secundus`, `Applicatio 1/2`, `Ad quaestionem`, `Augustinus`, `Bernardus`, etc.) were trimmed per CLAUDE.md OCR-cleanup rules.

**Dubia count — FOUR (Dub. I–IV), confirmed against PDF.** Hand-off forecast four; verified on the page. Lemmas:
- **Dub. I** (raw 42746, pp.615→617): on the def. *Caritas est dilectio, qua diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum* — how four definitions of charity (Magister / *de Moribus Eccl.* / *Soliloquia* / *de Spiritu et anima* / Apostle 1 Tim. 1) are distinguished, with objections against each. Resolved: charity defined per multiplex comparatio (ad obiectum / ad finem ultimum / ad actum proprium [unire, adhaerere] / ad habitum adiunctum); idem re differt ratione (amor naturae / dilectio voluntatis / caritas gratiae); the three Apostolic conditions = caritas/spes/fides.
- **Dub. II** (raw 42923 R-col, p.617): *Pro quo etiam duo sunt mandata* — whether there should be one commandment only (one ratio diligendi; *qui diligit proximum Legem implevit*, Rom. 13). Resolved: precepts diversified per ordo ad Deum/proximum (first vs second tablet); dilectio sui included in mandato proximi; connexion does not exclude distinctio.
- **Dub. III** (raw 42923 left of "Sic condita", p.617→618): *Sic condita est mens humana, ut nunquam sui non meminerit* — soul never absent to itself / understands itself / loves itself, vs. memoria = rei praeteritae, *qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam* (Ps. 10:6). Resolved: actu vs habitu (Augustine *de Trin.* XIV speaks of habitus); diligere affectu (none hates self) vs effectu (many do).
- **Dub. IV** (raw 42961, pp.618→619): *Dilectionis modus insinuatur… ex toto corde* etc. — whether *ex toto corde/anima/mente* (Matt. 22) suffers superfluity or diminution vs Deut. 6 / Mark 12 / Luke 10. Resolved: vires animae distinguished two ways — imago (memoria/intelligentia/voluntas, per Augustine on Matt. 22) and rationalis/irascibilis/concupiscibilis (per Bernard on Deut. 6); the two schemes reconcile (*ex tota fortitudine* ↔ *ex tota mente*).

**Page-split map (printed → content; per-page apparatus restart):**
- **p.615** — DUBIA header (L-col, after q6 tail) + Dub. I (full opener, four-definition list, objections against all five, breaks at "…caritas esse vita copulans"). Footers `[^p615-5..17]` (13): the page's full sequence is nn.1–17, but **nn.1–4 belong to q6's tail** (printed at the top of p.615) — this chunk owns nn.5–17.
- **p.616** — Dub. I cont. (Contra ultimam + quaestiones incidentes + Respondeo + first replies, breaks at "…desiderium habendi Deum est proprium caritatis"). Footers `[^p616-1..10]` (10).
- **p.617** — Dub. I close + **Dub. II** (full opener, args, Respondeo + all replies, closing "…non excludit distinctionem"). Footers `[^p617-1..12]` (12); n.6 ends with the `S. Bonav. — Tom. III.` signature line.
- **p.618** — Dub. III (full opener + objections + Respondeo + replies, closing "…inimicantur sibi valde crudeliter") + **Dub. IV** opener (args through "…ordinatur ad ipsam dilectionem…tres apponuntur conditiones", and first scheme). Footers `[^p618-1..13]` (13).
- **p.619** — Dub. IV close (second scheme + reconciliation, ending "…patet etiam solutio obiectorum"). Footers `[^p619-1..5]` (5, L-col block). **Below n.5 the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block (d.28 littera n.1) and the p.619 R-col footer sequence (Eph. 5,29 etc.) begin — those belong to DISTINCTIO XXVIII, NOT the dubia.**

**Apparatus total = 49 entries** (p.615 nn.5–17 = 13; p.616 nn.1–10 = 10; p.617 nn.1–12 = 12; p.618 nn.1–13 = 13; p.619 nn.1–5 = 5). All walked page-by-page on the 450 dpi PDF footer bands. Note: cross-page Respondeo tails carry the next page's marker (Dub. I's tail on p.615 R closes into p.616 nn.1+; Dub. III's opener on p.617 R uses p.618 nn.1–3; Dub. IV's first scheme on p.618 R closes into p.619 nn.1+) — each marker is paired in both Latin and English at its OCR/PDF position.

**⚠ SHARED-p.615-FOOTER RESOLUTION (q6 hand-off).** p.615 has a single per-page footnote sequence nn.1–17. Eyes-on at 450 dpi: **nn.1–4 attach to the tail of a2-q6** (the William-of-Auxerre / Antissiodorensis opinion `Si quis autem contendat¹ … in iustis omnibus²` + `Et hoc ipsum vult dicere Magister³ … integre⁴`, printed at the top of p.615 L+R), namely n.1 *Edd. 1, 2 opponant… iustis hominibus*, n.2 *Cfr. August., de Spiritu et littera c. 36 n. 196*, n.3 *Hic c. 6*, n.4 *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* The DUBIA's own share begins at **n.5** (*Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic.* → "unius rei unica sit definitio⁵"). **Per the hand-off, q6 was promoted WITHOUT any p.615 footers, so nn.1–4 were genuinely dropped from q6.** I captured only Dub. I's nn.5–17 here (correct for this chunk) and flagged the q6 gap below — **NOT editing q6** per instructions.

**Footer ownership / migration.** Footers IN: p.615 nn.5–17, p.616 nn.1–10, p.617 nn.1–12, p.618 nn.1–13, p.619 nn.1–5 (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart). Footers OUT: p.615 nn.1–4 (belong to a2-q6); p.619 R-col sequence + the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block (belong to DISTINCTIO XXVIII littera). No DUBIA footer was dropped.

**Seam (both ends) CLEAN.** Opens at `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` (raw 42744; OCR `DUBIA CIRCA LITTEBAM MAGISTBI`), continuous from a2-q6's close. Closes at "…patet etiam solutio obiectorum." (raw ~43026, p.619 R-col top), immediately before `CAP. I. Si iubemur totum proximum diligere et nos totos` (d.28 littera). The running heads `DIST. XXVII. DUBIA.` / `DISTINCTIO XXVIII.` / `SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` mid-file are page-top running heads (the raw `DISTINCTIO XXVIII.` at line 43027 is a running head; the **semantic** d.28 start is raw 43061), NOT semantic boundaries within this chunk.

**★ With the dubia done, DISTINCTIO XXVII is COMPLETE** (littera, divisio, a1-q1..q6, a2-q1..q6 etc. + dubia).

**Hand-off to d28-littera (next distinction).** `DISTINCTIO XXVIII` semantic header raw **43061** (running head at 43027), opening with the **littera Cap. I *Si iubemur totum proximum diligere et nos totos*** — d.28 treats the **commandment to love one's neighbor and oneself** (*An praecipiatur dilectio sui ipsius et corporis; quatuor diligenda: Deus, nos, qui iuxta nos, qui infra nos*; whether self-love and love of one's own body fall under precept — Augustine *de Doctr. Christ.* I, c.23). Littera chapters Cap. I–? (Cap. I begins on the lower half of p.619 / R-col). The p.619 R-col **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** n.1 (*Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22. Seq. locus est ibid. c. 26. n. 27; tertius ibid. c. 23, 24, multis a Magistro omissis.*) is d.28-littera's first footer (printed on the d.27-dubia page-spread but owned by d.28).

**[?] flags:** none open.
- **q6 p.615 footers nn.1–4 — RESOLVED / BACKFILLED into `bon-sent-III-d27-a2-q6` (2026-06-11).** The four p.615 footers that print at the top of the page and attach to a2-q6's tail markers ¹²³⁴ (William-of-Auxerre/Antissiodorensis opinion) were restored to q6 as `[^14]`–`[^17]` (commit landed with the d27-q6 footer backfill of 2026-06-11). **Verified at 600 dpi in the d.21–d.30 polish gate** (`/tmp/hires/p615-foot-L.png`): the p.615 footer sequence runs nn.1–17 contiguously — n.1 (*…pro in quo potest cod. Z quia potest. Inferius etiam pro iustis omnibus codd. A K Z et edd. iustis hominibus.*), n.2 (`Cfr. August., de Spiritu et littera, c. 36. n. 66.` — note the correct number is **n.66**, NOT the earlier provisional "n.196"), n.3 (`Hic c. 6.`), n.4 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) belong to q6; **nn.5–17 belong to this Dubia chunk** (n.5 = `Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 504, nota 2.` = this chunk's `[^p615-5]`). This chunk correctly owns only nn.5–17; the gap is closed. All Dub. I–IV bodies and footers were legible at 450 dpi; no other ambiguities.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0