title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXV, Pars II — Divisio textus et Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXV, Part II — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 609 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV.

### Pars II.

*De libero arbitrio secundum differentes eius status in speciali.*

*Ex praedictis perspicuum etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de libero arbitrio secundum id quod est in generali. In hac parte agit de diversis statibus eius in speciali, ostendens, quod secundum diversos eius status diversi sunt libertatis gradus, pro eo quod libertas arbitrii minui habet per peccatum. Et quoniam non omnis libertas habet diminui, ideo pars ista continet tres particulas. In prima assignat Magister gradus[^1] libertatis in homine secundum diversos status. In secunda vero assignat diversas differentias libertatis, ibi: *Est namque libertas arbitrii triplex.* In tertia vero breviter epilogat, ostendens, quantum ad quod genus libertatis liberum arbitrium intelligi debeat minui per peccatum, ibi: *Ex praedictis iam apparet, in quo per peccatum etc.*

Prima pars habet tres particulas. In prima determinat gradus libertatis. In secunda vero assignat status diversos hominis, in quibus libertas habet augeri et diminui, ibi: *Et possunt notari in homine quatuor status etc.* In tertia vero determinat, per quid minui habet arbitrii libertas, ibi: *Unde manifestum est, quod praeter*[^2] *alias poenalitates etc.*

Similiter secunda[^3] pars tres habet partes secundum triplicem libertatis differentiam. Primo enim agit de libertate a coactione. Secundo, de libertate a culpa, ibi: *Est et alia libertas a peccato.* Tertio, de libertate a miseria, ibi: *Est iterum libertas a miseria etc.* Aliarum autem partium subdivisiones manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, cum supra[^4] habitum sit de libero arbitrio in se, quaeritur hic de ipso in comparatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.

Primo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad subiectum.

Secundo quaeritur de ipso in comparatione ad actum.

Tertio vero quaeritur in comparatione ad obiectum.

Quarto, in comparatione ad aliquod aliud agens creatum.

Quinto, in comparatione ad movens primum, scilicet Deum.

Sexto et ultimo, in comparatione ad corpus coniunctum.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXV.

### Part II.

*On free choice according to its differing states in particular.*

*"From what has been said it is clear, etc."*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of free choice according to what it is in general. In this part he treats of its diverse states in particular, showing that according to its diverse states the degrees of liberty are diverse, inasmuch as the liberty of choice can be diminished through sin. And since not every liberty can be diminished, this part therefore contains three subdivisions. In the first the Master assigns the degrees[^1] of liberty in man according to his diverse states. In the second he assigns the diverse differences of liberty, there: *"For the liberty of choice is threefold."* In the third he briefly epilogizes, showing with respect to which kind of liberty free choice is to be understood to be diminished through sin, there: *"From what has been said it now appears in what respect through sin, etc."*

The first part has three subdivisions. In the first he determines the degrees of liberty. In the second he assigns the diverse states of man, in which liberty can be increased and diminished, there: *"And there can be noted in man four states, etc."* In the third he determines through what the liberty of choice can be diminished, there: *"Whence it is manifest that besides*[^2] *the other penalties, etc."*

Likewise the second[^3] part has three parts according to the threefold difference of liberty. For first it treats of liberty from coercion. Secondly, of liberty from fault, there: *"There is also another liberty from sin."* Thirdly, of liberty from misery, there: *"There is again a liberty from misery, etc."* The subdivisions of the other parts are manifest in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, since above[^4] free choice has been treated in itself, here inquiry is made concerning it in comparison. And concerning this six questions are asked.

First it is asked concerning free choice in comparison to its subject.

Secondly it is asked concerning it in comparison to its act.

Thirdly it is asked in comparison to its object.

Fourthly, in comparison to some other created agent.

Fifthly, in comparison to the first mover, namely God.

Sixthly and lastly, in comparison to the conjoined body.

---

la: Pro *gradus*, quam lect. ex codd. A aa cc et ex ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. *gradum*. Paulo inferius pro *quantum ad quod genus* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quo genere*.

en: For *gradus* ("degrees"), the reading we have restored from codices A aa cc and from edition 1, the Vatican edition reads *gradum* ("degree"). A little below, for *quantum ad quod genus* ("with respect to which kind") the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *quo genere*.

la: Codd. cum edd. 1, 2 falso *propter*.

en: The codices, together with editions 1, 2, wrongly read *propter* ("on account of").

la: Ed. 1 *similiter ista secunda*.

en: Edition 1 reads *similiter ista secunda* ("likewise this second").

la: Part. I. huius dist.

en: Part I of this distinction.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed p. 609 (PDF 631; offset `pdf = printed + 22`); the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 42603–42640) cascade-fragmented the two-column reflow of the DIVISIO TEXTUS, so the PDF column bands are authoritative here per the Vol II Override. This chunk holds the **Pars II COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM** for Distinctio XXV. Per Override §5 the ARTICULUS UNICUS opener (`Circa primum sic proceditur…`) folds into Pars II a1-q1, not this chunk; the divisio ends where ARTICULUS UNICUS / QUAESTIO I body begins (raw ~42641, "Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de libero arbitrio per comparationem ad subiectum…").

**Page span.** Single printed page: p. 609 (all of the Pars II commentary opening — COMMENTARIUS header, DIVISIO TEXTUS, TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM — sits on p. 609, between the d25-p1-dubia DUB.III tail at the top of the page and the QUAESTIO I body at the bottom). No page split.

**Apparatus / page-split map.** 4 entries, all p. 609:
- [^1] = p.609 footer 3 (Vat. *gradum* / *quo genere* variants), anchored at *gradus* and *quantum ad quod genus*.
- [^2] = p.609 footer 4 (codd./edd. *propter* variant), anchored at *praeter*.
- [^3] = p.609 footer 5 (ed. 1 *similiter ista secunda*), anchored at *secunda*.
- [^4] = p.609 footer 6 (*Part. I. huius dist.*), anchored at *supra*.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none — d25-p1-dubia closed clean before the Pars II COMMENTARIUS and forwarded nothing. NOTE: p.609 footers **1** (`Codd. A K quae…`) and **2** (`Cfr. infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1; Alex. Hal.…`) belong to d25-p1-dubia (its [^24] and [^25]); the divisio takes only footers 3–6. FORWARDED: none — the divisio ends cleanly before QUAESTIO I; p.609 has no further footers, and the QUAESTIO I args anchor footers on p.610 (next chunk's own page).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (`liijertatis`→*libertatis*, `liberlas`→*libertas*, `contiuet`→*continet*, `gradus '`→*gradus*[^1], `peecatum`→*peccatum*, `notari`→*notari*, `uiiseria`→*miseria*, `suiit`→*sunt*, `hnius`→*huius*, `quaeritnr`→*quaeritur*, `Mbero`→*libero*, `Secnndo`→*Secundo*).

**has_scholion = false** — divisio chunks carry no scholion.

**Pars II TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim from raw 42603–42640, ARTICULUS UNICUS, 6 questions):**
1. Primo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad **subiectum**.
2. Secundo quaeritur de ipso in comparatione ad **actum**.
3. Tertio vero quaeritur in comparatione ad **obiectum**.
4. Quarto, in comparatione ad **aliquod aliud agens creatum**.
5. Quinto, in comparatione ad **movens primum, scilicet Deum**.
6. Sexto et ultimo, in comparatione ad **corpus coniunctum**.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem et voluntatem

title_alt: Whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 592 -->

### Articulus Unicus. *De libero arbitrio in comparatione ad rationem et voluntatem.*

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidit hic quaestio, quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem. Et quoniam eius quidditas et natura cognoscitur in assignando convenientiam et differentiam ipsius ad voluntatem et rationem, ideo de ipso quaerendum est in comparatione ad rationem et voluntatem. Ad huius autem comparationis dilucidationem circa sex contingit dubitare et quaerere.

*Primo* enim quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem et voluntatem.

*Secundo,* dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem, an non.

*Tertio,* dato quod non, quaeritur, utrum complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.

*Quarto,* dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum complectatur illas duas potentias per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus.

*Quinto,* dato quod per modum habitus, quaeritur, utrum habitus ille addat aliquid per essentiam rationi et voluntati.

*Sexto et ultimo* quaeritur, secundum quam illarum duarum potentiarum principalius insit animae libertas arbitrii, utrum videlicet secundum rationem, an secundum voluntatem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem, an etiam sit in animalibus brutis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem: an etiam sit in animalibus brutis. Et quod sit in animalibus brutis, videtur.

1. Illa potentia libera dicitur esse, cuius est eligere bonum et fugere malum[^1]; sed hanc potentiam videmus esse in brutis, sicut patet in ove, quae fugit lupum et quaerit pastorem: ergo etc.

2. Item, illa potentia libertatem habet, quae potens est in opposita; sed in brutis animalibus est potentia ad faciendum opposita, quia modo ostendunt benignitatem, modo ferocitatem, modo vadunt, modo veniunt: ergo talia animalia a libertate arbitrii non sunt aliena.

3. Item, illa potentia est libera, quae est domina sui actus[^2], haec autem est, quae potest se ipsam in suo actu refrenare et compescere; sed talis potentia reperitur in brutis animalibus, quod patet, quia ab his quae appetunt, per disciplinam compescuntur, sicut planum est in animalibus domitis et domesticatis: ergo etc.

4. Item, illa potentia libertatem habet in movendo, cuius motus incipit a principio intrinseco[^3]; hic enim motus est potentiae perfectae in movendo; sed in animalibus brutis a principio intrinseco incipit: ergo etc.

5. Item, illa potentia libera est praecipue, cuius est gerere providentiam non solummodo circa praesentia, sed etiam circa futura[^4]; sed talis est in brutis animalibus, sicut patet in formicis et aliis animalibus irrationalibus: ergo etc.

6. Item, illa potentia magis participat libertatem, quae non potest redigi in servitutem, quam quae potest[^5]; sed homines in servitutem rediguntur, sed quaedam sunt animalia bruta, quae nequaquam domari possunt, sicut dracones et leones: ergo videtur, quod talia maxime habeant arbitrii libertatem.

**Sed contra:**
1. Liberum arbitrium sic definitur ab Augustino: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis», sicut habitum est distinctione praecedenti[^6]; sed in nullo est facultas rationis, in quo non sit ratio, et haec est in solis rationalibus: ergo et liberum arbitrium.

2. Item, omne quod habet liberum arbitrium est laudabile et vituperabile; sed sola rationalia sunt digna laude et vituperio, poena et praemio[^7]: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod habet liberum arbitrium, natum est consiliari et deliberare; hoc autem est solius rationalis: ergo etc.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium est nobilissimum, quod sit in homine[^8]: ergo si liberum arbitrium inveniretur in brutis, nobilissimum, quod est in homine, reperiretur in eis: ergo aeque nobilia essent bruta animalia, sicut sunt rationalia. Quod si hoc est inconveniens, patet etc.

<!-- page 593 -->

> ### Conclusio
> In solis substantiis rationalibus reperitur liberum arbitrium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio liberum arbitrium reperitur in solis substantiis rationalibus. — Et ratio huius sumitur tum ex parte *libertatis*, tum ex parte *arbitrationis*. Ex parte *libertatis*: libertas enim opponitur servituti. Unde illa sola potentia dicitur esse libera, quae dominium habet plenum tam respectu *obiecti*, quam respectu *actus proprii*. Illa autem potentia dominium habet ex libertate respectu *obiecti*, quae non est arctata ad aliquod genus appetibilis, sed nata est omnia *appetibilia* appetere et omne *fugibile* respuere. Tria autem sunt, quae sunt in *appetitibus*, et quorum opposita sunt in *fugis*, videlicet *bonum, conferens* et *delectabile*; et nomine *boni* ibi intelligitur *honestum*[^9]. Cum autem bonum *conferens* et *delectabile* nata sint appeti ab irrationalibus, bonum *honestum* a solis rationalibus potest appeti; et ideo in eis solum reperitur virtus, quae non est ad aliquod genus appetibilis arctata, ac per hoc habens libertatem respectu *obiecti*.

In eis etiam solis reperitur potentia habens libertatem respectu *actus proprii*[^10]; quod patet. Nam voluntas in rationalibus non solum compescit manum exteriorem vel pedem, sed etiam compescit se ipsam et refrenat, incipiens odire frequenter quod prius diligebat; et hoc ex sui ipsius imperio et dominio. In brutis autem animalibus, etsi aliquo modo sit reperire dominium respectu actus *exterioris*, quia bene refrenant[^11] aliquando, sicut patet in animalibus domesticis; respectu tamen actus proprii *interioris*, videlicet appetitus, dominium non est. Unde si aliquid amant, non possunt illud non amare, licet a prosecutione alicuius rei amatae arceantur timore alicuius passionis inflictivae. Et ideo dicit Damascenus[^12], quod «magis aguntur quam agant»; ac per hoc, cum non possint actum proprium reprimere, respectu actus proprii non habent libertatem, nec etiam respectu *obiecti*; et ideo, deficiente in eis libertate, liberum arbitrium non possunt participare.

Sumitur etiam ratio ex parte arbitrationis. *Arbitrium* enim idem est quod *iudicium*[^13], ad cuius nutum ceterae virtutes moventur et obediunt. Iudicare autem illius est secundum rationem completam, cuius est discernere inter iustum et iniustum, et inter proprium et alienum. Nulla autem potentia novit, quid iustum et quid iniustum, nisi illa sola, quae est particeps rationis et nata est cognoscere summam iustitiam, a qua est regula omnis iuris. Haec autem solum est in ea substantia, quae est ad imaginem Dei; qualis est tantum potentia rationalis[^14]. Nulla enim substantia discernit, quid proprium et quid alienum, nisi cognoscat se ipsam et actum suum proprium. Sed nunquam aliqua potentia se ipsam cognoscit, vel super se ipsam reflectitur, quae sit alligata materiae[^15]. Si igitur omnes potentiae sunt alligatae materiae et substantiae corporali praeter solam rationalem, sola illa est, quae potest se super se ipsam reflectere; et ideo ipsa sola est, in qua est plenum iudicium et arbitrium in discernendo, quid iustum et quid iniustum, quid proprium et quid alienum. — Tam igitur ratione *libertatis*, quam ratione *arbitrationis* liberum arbitrium in solis substantiis rationalibus reperitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum plana est responsio per iam dicta. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod bruta praeeligunt bonum malo; dicendum, quod verum est de bono conferenti et delectabili; sed non est verum de bono honesto, respectu cuius proprie liberum arbitrium consistit.

2. Ad illud similiter quod obiicitur, quod bruta possunt ad opposita moveri; patet responsio, quia non possunt moveri in omnia opposita, sed solum in illa quae sunt infra dignitatem liberi arbitrii.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bruta dominantur actibus suis, quia possunt se reprimere; dicendum, quod non dominantur actibus interioribus, licet dominentur exterioribus; etsi enim comprimantur ab actu, non tamen retrahuntur ab appetitu. — Vel aliter potest dici, quod etsi etiam retrahantur ab actu suo, non tamen hoc est per dominium proprium; hoc enim est ex imaginatione

<!-- page 594 -->

mali exterioris, quod adeo exterret, ut magis retrahat, quam appetitus attrahat; et ideo sicut in appetendo et prosequendo magis aguntur quam agant, sic etiam in abstinendo vel se retrahendo magis reprimuntur quam se reprimant[^16].

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad aliud, quod dicit[^17], quod principium motus est ab intrinseco in brutis animalibus. Dici enim potest, quod etsi principium motus exterioris procedat ab intrinseco, tamen appetitus interior potius habet ortum ab exteriori appetibili quam ex imperio appetitivae virtutis. Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus, quo vis motiva movet se ipsam; «voluntas enim et liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Anselmus[^18], est instrumentum se ipsum movens».

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberi arbitrii est providere; dicendum, quod providentia quaedam provenit ex actu deliberationis et praecognitionis, quaedam provenit ex instinctu naturali. Prima est libertatis arbitrariae et reperitur in solis rationalibus; secunda vero est naturalis sagacitatis et industriae; natura enim prudentissima est; et haec reperitur in brutis animalibus, et talis non ponit liberum arbitrium[^19].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam animalia bruta domari non possunt; dicendum, quod aliquod animal non posse redigi in servitutem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ratione voluntariae libertatis, aut ratione naturalis ferocitatis. Primo modo impossibile est, hominem redigi in servitutem. Quamvis enim aliquis possit aliquem compellere quantum ad actum exteriorem, quantum tamen ad interius velle nemo potest alterum compellere, sicut patebit infra[^20]. Secundo modo bestiae aliquae sunt indomabiles nec possunt redigi in servitutem, quia tanta est earum ferocitas et impetus ad ea quae ferocitatis sunt, ut non possint assuefieri ad ea quae sunt lenitatis; et ideo ratio illa non cogit.

english:
### Article Unique. *On free choice in comparison to reason and will.*

For the understanding of this part there arises here the question, what free choice is according to the thing itself. And since its quiddity and nature is known by assigning its agreement and difference with respect to the will and reason, therefore an inquiry must be made about it in comparison to reason and will. For the clarification of this comparison there are six points on which one may raise doubt and inquire.

*First,* then, it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will.

*Second,* granted that it is so, it is asked whether it is a power distinct over against reason and will, or not.

*Third,* granted that it is not, it is asked whether it embraces reason and will together.

*Fourth,* granted that it does, it is asked whether it embraces those two powers after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit.

*Fifth,* granted that it is after the manner of a habit, it is asked whether that habit adds anything by essence to reason and will.

*Sixth and last,* it is asked according to which of those two powers the soul's freedom of choice more principally inheres, namely whether according to reason, or according to will.

### Question I. *Whether free choice is in those alone that have reason, or whether it is also in the brute animals.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason, or whether it is also in the brute animals. And that it is in the brute animals seems to be the case.

1. That power is said to be free whose office is to choose the good and to flee evil[^1]; but we see this power to be in the brutes, as is clear in the sheep, which flees the wolf and seeks the shepherd: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, that power has freedom which is able toward opposites; but in the brute animals there is a power for doing opposites, since now they show gentleness, now ferocity, now they go, now they come: therefore such animals are not foreign to freedom of choice.

3. Likewise, that power is free which is mistress of its own act[^2], and this is one that can restrain and check itself in its act; but such a power is found in the brute animals, which is clear, because from those things which they desire they are checked through training, as is plain in animals that are tamed and domesticated: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, that power has freedom in moving whose motion begins from an intrinsic principle[^3]; for this is the motion of a power perfect in moving; but in the brute animals it begins from an intrinsic principle: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, that power is especially free whose office is to exercise foresight not only concerning present things, but also concerning future ones[^4]; but such is found in the brute animals, as is clear in ants and other irrational animals: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, that power participates more in freedom which cannot be reduced to servitude than the one which can[^5]; but men are reduced to servitude, whereas there are certain brute animals which can in no way be tamed, such as dragons and lions: therefore it seems that such have the freedom of choice in the highest degree.

**On the contrary:**
1. Free choice is thus defined by Augustine: «Free choice is the faculty of reason and will», as was held in the preceding distinction[^6]; but in nothing is there a faculty of reason in which there is not reason, and this is in rational beings alone: therefore so too is free choice.

2. Likewise, everything that has free choice is praiseworthy and blameworthy; but rational beings alone are worthy of praise and blame, of punishment and reward[^7]: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that has free choice is born to take counsel and to deliberate; but this belongs to the rational being alone: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, free choice is the noblest thing that is in man[^8]: therefore if free choice were found in the brutes, the noblest thing that is in man would be found in them: therefore the brute animals would be equally noble, as the rational beings are. And if this is unfitting, the matter is clear, etc.

> ### Conclusion
> In rational substances alone is free choice found.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt free choice is found in rational substances alone. — And the reason for this is taken both on the side of *freedom* and on the side of *arbitration* (judgment). On the side of *freedom*: for freedom is opposed to servitude. Hence that power alone is said to be free which has full dominion both with respect to its *object* and with respect to its *own act*. Now that power has dominion from freedom with respect to its *object* which is not narrowed to some one genus of the desirable, but is born to desire all *desirable* things and to reject everything *to-be-fled*. Now there are three things which are among the things *desired*, and whose opposites are among the things *fled*, namely the *good, the advantageous,* and the *pleasant*; and by the name *good* there is understood the *honorable* (the morally good)[^9]. But since the *advantageous* and *pleasant* good are born to be desired by irrational beings, the *honorable* good can be desired by rational beings alone; and therefore in them alone is found the power which is not narrowed to some genus of the desirable, and through this has freedom with respect to its *object*.

In them alone too is found a power having freedom with respect to its *own act*[^10]; which is clear. For the will in rational beings not only checks the outer hand or foot, but also checks and restrains itself, beginning often to hate what it previously loved; and this from its own command and dominion. But in the brute animals, even though in some manner dominion is to be found with respect to the *outer* act, since they do indeed restrain themselves[^11] at times, as is clear in domestic animals; yet with respect to the *inner* proper act, namely appetite, there is no dominion. Hence if they love something, they cannot not love it, although they may be kept from the pursuit of some loved thing by fear of some inflicting passion. And therefore Damascene says[^12] that they «are driven rather than drive»; and through this, since they cannot repress their own act, they do not have freedom with respect to their own act, nor even with respect to the *object*; and therefore, freedom being lacking in them, they cannot participate in free choice.

The reason is also taken on the side of arbitration. For *arbitration* (judgment) is the same as *judgment*[^13], at whose beck the other powers are moved and obey. But to judge belongs to that one, according to complete reason, whose office is to discern between the just and the unjust, and between the proper and the alien. Now no power knows what is just and what unjust except that one alone which is a participant of reason and is born to know the highest justice, from which is the rule of all right. And this is only in that substance which is to the image of God; such as is only the rational power[^14]. For no substance discerns what is proper and what alien unless it knows itself and its own act. But never does any power know itself, or reflect upon itself, which is bound to matter[^15]. If therefore all the powers are bound to matter and to corporeal substance except the rational alone, that alone is the one which can reflect upon itself; and therefore it alone is that in which there is full judgment and arbitration in discerning what is just and what unjust, what proper and what alien. — Therefore, both by reason of *freedom* and by reason of *arbitration*, free choice is found in rational substances alone. And the arguments which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

1. To the arguments to the contrary the response is plain from what has been said. For to that which is objected in the first place, that brutes choose the good in preference to the evil, it must be said that this is true of the advantageous and pleasant good; but it is not true of the honorable good, in respect of which free choice properly consists.

2. To that likewise which is objected, that brutes can be moved toward opposites, the response is clear, because they cannot be moved toward all opposites, but only toward those which are below the dignity of free choice.

3. To that which is objected, that brutes have dominion over their acts because they can repress themselves, it must be said that they do not have dominion over their inner acts, although they have dominion over the outer ones; for even if they are restrained from the act, they are nonetheless not drawn back from the appetite. — Or it can be said otherwise, that even if they also are drawn back from their act, this is nonetheless not through their own dominion; for this is from the imagination

of an outer evil, which so terrifies that it draws back more than the appetite attracts; and therefore, just as in desiring and pursuing they are driven rather than drive, so also in abstaining or drawing back they are repressed rather than repress themselves[^16].

4. And through this the response to the other point is clear, which says[^17] that the principle of motion is from within in the brute animals. For it can be said that even though the principle of outer motion proceeds from within, nonetheless the inner appetite takes its rise rather from the outer desirable thing than from the command of the appetitive power. Hence not just any motion from within makes a power free, but that motion by which the moving force moves itself; «for the will and free choice, as Anselm says[^18], is an instrument moving itself».

5. To that which is objected, that it belongs to free choice to exercise foresight, it must be said that a certain foresight comes from the act of deliberation and foreknowledge, and a certain foresight comes from natural instinct. The first belongs to the freedom of choice and is found in rational beings alone; but the second is of natural sagacity and industry; for nature is most prudent; and this is found in the brute animals, and such does not posit free choice[^19].

6. To that which is objected, that certain brute animals cannot be tamed, it must be said that for some animal not to be reducible to servitude can be so in two ways: either by reason of voluntary freedom, or by reason of natural ferocity. In the first way it is impossible for a man to be reduced to servitude. For although someone may be able to compel another as to the outer act, yet as to the inner willing no one can compel another, as will be clear below[^20]. In the second way certain beasts are untamable and cannot be reduced to servitude, because so great is their ferocity and impetus toward the things of ferocity that they cannot be habituated to the things of gentleness; and therefore that argument does not compel.

la: *Liberum* per oppositionem ad *naturale* i. e. quod determinatum est ad unum, dicit generatim quandam actus indifferentiam, quae, si est ad actus speciei diversae, vocatur *indifferentia specificationis sive contrarietatis*; si vero est ad positionem vel negationem actionis, v. g. amare, vel non amare, nuncupatur *indifferentia exercitii sive contradictionis*. Ex prima indifferentia deducuntur duo prima argg. (cfr. supra pag. 153, nota 5. et pag. 183, nota 7.); ex secunda arg. tertium.

en: *Free* by opposition to *natural*, i.e. what is determined to one thing, signifies generally a certain indifference of act which, if it is toward acts of a diverse species, is called *indifference of specification or of contrariety*; but if it is toward the positing or the negating of an action, e.g. to love or not to love, it is termed *indifference of exercise or of contradiction*. From the first indifference the first two arguments are deduced (cfr. above p. 153, note 5, and p. 183, note 7); from the second, the third argument.

la: Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.) illum hominem vocat liberum, «qui sui ipsius et non alterius gratia est». Nemesius, episc. Emesenus, in libro de Natura hominis, c. 41. sic ait: Si autem [quis] sit dominus actionum, omnino liberam habebit agendi voluntatem. Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 26. seq., ubi summa doctrinae laudati Nemesii exhibetur. — In fine arg. pro *domesticatis* nonnulli codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *domesticis*.

en: Aristotle, I. Metaphysics c. 3 (c. 2) calls that man free «who is for his own sake and not for the sake of another». Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, in the book On the Nature of Man, c. 41, says thus: But if anyone be master of his actions, he will have an altogether free will of acting. Cfr. Damascene, II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 26 seq., where a summary of the doctrine of the said Nemesius is set forth. — At the end of the argument, for *domesticatis* some codices with the Vatican and editions 2, 3, 4 read *domesticis*.

la: *Liberum* enim, oppositum *violenti*, supponit *spontaneum* et *voluntarium*, quod secundum Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, est illud, «cuius principium est in eo qui agit, particularia cognoscente, in quibus actio consistit».

en: For *free*, opposed to *violent*, presupposes the *spontaneous* and the *voluntary*, which according to Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 1, is that «whose principle is in the one who acts, who knows the particulars in which the action consists».

la: Siquidem *liberum* supponit et includit consultationem et electionem mediorum ad obtinendum finem. Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2. seq.; Nemesius, loc. cit. c. 33. seq.; Damasc. loc. cit.

en: For indeed *free* presupposes and includes consultation and the choice of means for attaining the end. Cfr. Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 2 seq.; Nemesius, loc. cit. c. 33 seq.; Damascene, loc. cit.

la: Aristot., I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.) servum, oppositum libero, definit: Quicumque sui ipsius non est, sed alterius.

en: Aristotle, I. Politics c. 3 (c. 2) defines the slave, the opposite of the free man: Whoever is not his own, but another's.

la: In lit. Magistri, c. 3: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, vel malum, eadem desistente». Hanc definitionem, quae in seqq. qq. saepe saepius recurrit, Magister delibavit ex Hugone (Sent. tr. 3. c. 8, ubi Augustino tribui videtur); secundum B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 16. m. 1. seq. sumta est ex August., I. de Lib. Arb. (c. 7. n. 16. seqq.).

en: In the text of the Master, c. 3: «Free choice is the faculty of reason and will, by which the good is chosen, grace assisting, or evil, the same desisting». This definition, which recurs very often in the following questions, the Master drew from Hugh (Sentences tr. 3. c. 8, where it seems to be attributed to Augustine); according to B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 16. m. 1. seq., it is taken from Augustine, I. On Free Choice (c. 7. n. 16. seqq.).

la: Cfr. de hoc et seq. arg. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. seqq.

en: Cfr. on this and the following argument Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 1 seqq.

la: Richard. a S. Vict., de Statu interioris hominis, tr. I. c. 3. sic ait: Inter omnia creationis bona nihil in homine sublimius, nihil dignius libero arbitrio. Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 6. Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.) eloquitur sic: Solus omnium animantium homo actionum quarundam principium est; quippe quod praeter hunc nullum agere praeterea dicitur. — Paulo inferius pro *aeque nobilia* cod. aa *aeque nobilissima*.

en: Richard of St. Victor, On the State of the Inner Man, tr. I. c. 3, says thus: Among all the goods of creation there is nothing in man more sublime, nothing more worthy than free choice. Cfr. above p. 113, note 6. Aristotle, II. Eudemian Ethics c. 7 (c. 6) speaks thus: Man alone of all living things is the principle of certain actions; for besides him nothing else is said to act. — A little below, for *aeque nobilia* (equally noble) codex aa reads *aeque nobilissima* (equally most noble).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 16. seqq. (c. 6. seqq.), et tom. I. pag. 34, nota 4, nec non pag. 40, nota 3, ubi Ciceronis et Augustini dicta de hac re allata sunt. — Quod ad seq. propositionem attinet, referimus illud Aristot., I. Magn. Moral. c. 20. (c. 22.): Neque enim cetera animalia, praeter hominem, dicimus temperantia, quod ab ipsis ratio absit, qua honestum deligimus; omnis siquidem virtus honesti est et ad honestum tendit.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, I. Rhetoric c. 16 seqq. (c. 6 seqq.), and tome I. p. 34, note 4, as well as p. 40, note 3, where the sayings of Cicero and Augustine on this matter are adduced. — As regards the following proposition, we refer to that saying of Aristotle, I. Great Ethics c. 20 (c. 22): For we do not call the other animals besides man temperate, because reason, by which we choose the honorable, is absent from them; since indeed every virtue is of the honorable and tends toward the honorable.

la: Cod. aa addit *quae [qua?] se refrenant respectu actus interioris et exterioris*. Paulo inferius pro *et refrenat, incipiens* cod. cc cum ed. 1 *et refrenans incipit*.

en: Codex aa adds *which restrain themselves with respect to the inner and outer act*. A little below, for *et refrenat, incipiens* codex cc with edition 1 reads *et refrenans incipit*.

la: Scilicet actum exteriorem; plures codd., ut E F N aa, adiiciunt *se*; ed. 1 *refrenantur*.

en: Namely the outer act; several codices, such as E F N aa, add *se* (themselves); edition 1 reads *refrenantur* (they are restrained).

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 27. Vide supra pag. 186, nota 1. — Paulo ante pro *inflictione* nonnulli codd. *inflictae*.

en: Book II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 27. See above p. 186, note 1. — A little before, for *inflictione* some codices read *inflictae*.

la: Libr. III. Hypognosticon (inter opera August.), c. 1: Arbitrium scilicet ab arbitrando rationali consideratione vel discernendo, quid eligat, quidve recuset, puto quod nomen accepit; ideo liberum dictum, quod in sua sit positum potestate, habens agendi quod velit possibilitatem, quod est vitalis et rationalis animae motus.

en: Book III. Hypognosticon (among the works of Augustine), c. 1: Arbitration, namely, I think received its name from arbitrating, by a rational consideration or discerning of what it should choose and what reject; therefore it is called free, because it is placed in its own power, having the possibility of doing what it wills, which is a vital and rational motion of the soul.

la: Aristot., II. de Part. animal. c. 10. ait: Quae autem una cum vita sensu etiam praedita sunt, haec speciem multiformiorem numerosioremque varietatem recipiunt; atque inter ea aliis alia magis et eo amplius, quod non solum vivendi, sed etiam bene vivendi rationem natura eorum obtinuit, quale hominum genus est, quippe quod aut unum ex omnibus animalibus nobis cognitis divinitatis particeps sit, aut omnium maxime. — Aliqui codd. cum Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *substantia rationalis*. Immediate post pro *substantia* codd. K T Y bb *potentia*.

en: Aristotle, II. On the Parts of Animals c. 10 says: But those which together with life are also endowed with sense receive a more multiform appearance and a more numerous variety; and among these, some more than others, and the more so because their nature has obtained the principle not only of living but also of living well, such as the human race is, inasmuch as it is either the one being among all the animals known to us that is a partaker of divinity, or most of all so. — Some codices with the Vatican and editions 3, 4 read *substantia rationalis* (rational substance). Immediately after, for *substantia* codices K T Y bb read *potentia* (power).

la: Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 15.

en: Cfr. the Book of Causes, prop. 15.

la: Vat., pro *retrahendo* posito *reprimendo*, et ante *reprimant* omisso *se*, post *reprimant* cum codd. 10 P V W addit *et retrahuntur quam retrahant*. Aliquanto superius pro *hoc enim est* eadem Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit simpliciter *sed*.

en: The Vatican edition, for *retrahendo* having placed *reprimendo*, and before *reprimant* having omitted *se*, after *reprimant*, with codices 10 P V W, adds *et retrahuntur quam retrahant*. Somewhat above, for *hoc enim est* the same Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 substitutes simply *sed*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *obiicitur*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *obiicitur*.

la: De Concord. praesc. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11.

en: On the Concord of [Divine] Foreknowledge and Free Choice, q. 3. c. 11.

la: Aristot., VIII. de Histor. animal. c. 1: Ut enim in homine ars, sapientia, prudentia, sic in nonnullis brutis inest vis quaedam eiusmodi; altera naturalis. — Circa initium solutionis Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *contingit* loco *provenit*.

en: Aristotle, VIII. On the History of Animals c. 1: For as in man there is art, wisdom, prudence, so in some brutes there is present a certain force of this kind; the other [being] natural. — Near the beginning of the solution the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *contingit* in place of *provenit*.

la: Part. II. huius dist. q. 4. seq. — Circa finem solutionis post *lenitatis* cod. U addit *et servitutis*.

en: Part II. of this distinction, q. 4 seq. — Near the end of the solution, after *lenitatis* codex U adds *et servitutis*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Negatio liberi arbitrii est omnis impietatis fomentum; et cum satis de hoc fundamentali articulo doctrina ab antiquis temporibus plurimos semper habuerit adversarios, magni momenti est, doctrinam veram de ipso distincte determinare. Unde S. Bonav. cum aliis coaevis doctoribus plurimas (12) de hac re quaestiones solvere nititur, quae in scholis a praecedentibus magistris positae erant, ut patet ex Summa (p. II.) Praepositivi. Inter alia disputabatur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia, an habitus, an actus, et si potentia sit, utrum rationis, an voluntatis, an utriusque. — Iuvat hic duo praenotare.

1. Cum S. Augustino et Magistro triplex libertas in creaturis distinguebatur: libertas a necessitate (coactione), a culpa, a miseria, sive libertas secundum naturam, gratiam et gloriam. Hinc variae libertatis definitiones circumferebantur, praecipue eae quarum Aristoteles et Ss. Augustinus, Bernardus, Anselmus sunt auctores; quas explicare et in concordiam redigere nititur S. Doctor, hic p. I. et II. Dub. 1-3.

2. Notandum est, illa aetate nomen libertatis in usu plerumque latius patuisse, quam nunc consuetudo scholarum patitur; quod etiam de termino coactionis dicendum est. Nunc enim nomen libertatis apud theologos bene restringitur ad tale voluntarium, quod non tantum excludit coactionem (violentiam) extrinsecus illatam, sed etiam necessitatem per interiorem determinationem ad unum, quae aufert potentiae indifferentiam, sive plenum dominium, quod habet voluntas super actus suos, ita ut in potestate eius sit velle et non velle. Hoc autem dominium requiritur ad actum electionis. In actu autem eligendi inter diversa media ad finem consequendum consistit propria et peculiaris liberi arbitrii operatio, praesertim quoad libertatem viatoris. Constat autem definitionibus Ecclesiae contra Baium et Iansenium, quod ad merendum, vel demerendum in statu naturae lapsae requiritur in homine non tantum libertas a coactione, sed etiam a necessitate (cfr. prop. 3. Iansenii, damnata ab Innocentio X. Alexandro VII. et Clemente XI; et Baii propp. 39. 67. 73. damnatae a S. Pio V. aliisque Summ. Pontif.). — Antiqui autem Scholastici, licet istas duas species voluntarii non raro iisdem nominibus significarent (ut v. g. S. Thom., S. I. q. 82. a. 1. ad 1.), tamen libertatem in sensu proprio, quae non tantum excludit coactionem, sed simul includit potentiam eligendi inter diversa media ad finem, bene distinguebant a libertate in sensu improprio, quae tantum importat spontaneitatem, quando scilicet voluntas intrinsecus determinata est ad unum. Talis determinatio est in viatoribus respectu finis, sive beatitudinis in genere; unde haec non cadit sub electione, nec circa ipsam ullo modo est libertas specificationis, sed tantum aliquatenus libertas exercitii. Comprehensores autem ad perpetuum actum amoris erga divinam bonitatem clare visam determinati sunt; unde hic actus propter ipsam summam cognitionis perfectionem perfectissime est voluntarius, sed non proprie liber. Tamen S. Bonav. (infra p. II. q. 2.) ita eundem nominat: «Et pro tanto dicitur liberum, quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud» (cfr. August., VI. Oper. imp. contra Iulian. c. 12.).

**II.** Ibidem autem et passim S. Bonav. duplex distinguit liberum arbitrium, scilicet secundum quod *liberum* (voluntarium) et secundum quod *deliberans*, et docet, deliberantis obiectum semper esse contingens; quod cum aliis approbat B. Albert. (hic a. 2.) his verbis: «Liberum arbitrium quantum ad actum deliberandi vel eligendi non est nisi futurorum contingentium per nos operabilium, quorum nos domini sumus». Ipse S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.) dicit de electione, quod «omnis agens a proposito deliberans alteram partem contradictionis praeaccipit». S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. ad 20.) similiter distinguit libertatem voluntatis a libertate liberi arbitrii his verbis: «De fine ultimo non iudicamus iudicio discussionis vel examinationis, sed naturaliter approbamus; propter quod de eo non est electio, sed voluntas. Habemus ergo respectu eius liberam voluntatem, cum necessitas naturalis inclinationis libertati non repugnet, secundum Augustinum, V. de Civitate Dei (c. 10), non omni libero iudicio, proprie loquendo, cum non cadit sub electione». Diffuso et egregie totam rem discutit idem, de Malo, q. 6. a. unicus (cfr. etiam huc q. unica a. 5. S. I. q. 83. a. 1-4.). — Quoad libertatem, quae requiritur ad merendum, vel demerendum, cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et 2, infra d. 20. q. 6, d. 29. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. et q. 3. ad 3. — De variis speciebus necessitatis cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. 2.

**III.** In hac quaestione egregie demonstratur, ad libertatem omnino praerequiri rationem, scilicet ut haberi possit plenum dominium tam respectu *obiecti* quam respectu *actus*. Duplex hoc dominium explicatur infra q. 3; aliaque plura, quae hic dicuntur, ibi et in seqq. huius distinctionis quaest. magis determinantur. Si autem distinctius quaeritur, quomodo se habeat ratio respectu liberi arbitrii, diversae fuerunt opiniones, de quibus infra in scholiis ad q. 1. et 6. nonnulla dicuntur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 3. a. 2. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 83. a. 1; de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 94. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The denial of free choice is the fomentation of all impiety; and since the doctrine concerning this fundamental article has always, from ancient times, had very many adversaries, it is of great moment to determine the true doctrine concerning it distinctly. Hence St. Bonaventure, together with other contemporary doctors, strives to resolve very many (12) questions on this matter, which had been posed in the schools by preceding masters, as is clear from the Summa (p. II.) of Praepositivus. Among other things it was disputed whether free choice is a power, or a habit, or an act, and, if it is a power, whether of reason, or of will, or of both. — It is helpful here to note two things beforehand.

1. With St. Augustine and the Master a threefold freedom was distinguished in creatures: freedom from necessity (coercion), from fault, from misery, that is, freedom according to nature, grace, and glory. Hence various definitions of freedom were circulated, especially those of which Aristotle and Saints Augustine, Bernard, and Anselm are the authors; which the holy Doctor strives to explain and to bring into harmony, here in p. I. and II. Dub. 1-3.

2. It must be noted that in that age the name of freedom in usage extended more broadly for the most part than the custom of the schools now allows; which must also be said of the term coercion. For now the name of freedom among theologians is rightly restricted to such a voluntary act as not only excludes coercion (violence) brought from without, but also necessity through an inner determination to one thing, which removes from the power its indifference, that is, the full dominion which the will has over its own acts, such that it is in its power to will and not to will. Now this dominion is required for the act of election. And in the act of choosing among diverse means for attaining the end consists the proper and peculiar operation of free choice, especially as regards the freedom of the wayfarer. Now it is established by the definitions of the Church against Baius and Jansenius that for meriting or demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is required in man not only freedom from coercion, but also from necessity (cfr. prop. 3 of Jansenius, condemned by Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement XI; and propp. 39, 67, 73 of Baius, condemned by St. Pius V and other Supreme Pontiffs). — But the ancient Scholastics, although they not rarely signified those two species of the voluntary by the same names (as e.g. St. Thomas, S. I. q. 82. a. 1. ad 1.), nonetheless rightly distinguished freedom in the proper sense, which not only excludes coercion but at the same time includes the power of choosing among diverse means to the end, from freedom in the improper sense, which only imports spontaneity, namely when the will is intrinsically determined to one thing. Such determination is in wayfarers with respect to the end, or to beatitude in general; hence this does not fall under election, nor is there in any way concerning it freedom of specification, but only to some extent freedom of exercise. But the comprehensors are determined to a perpetual act of love toward the divine goodness clearly seen; hence this act, on account of that highest perfection of cognition, is most perfectly voluntary, but not properly free. Yet St. Bonaventure (below, p. II. q. 2.) names it thus: «And to that extent it is said to be free, although it is immutably ordered to that thing» (cfr. Augustine, VI. Oper. imp. contra Iulian. c. 12.).

**II.** There too, and throughout, St. Bonaventure distinguishes a twofold free choice, namely according as it is *free* (voluntary) and according as it is *deliberating*, and he teaches that the object of the deliberating one is always contingent; which, with others, B. Albert approves (here a. 2.) in these words: «Free choice, as to the act of deliberating or choosing, is only of future contingents operable through us, of which we are masters». St. Bonaventure himself (I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.) says of election that «every agent deliberating from purpose takes beforehand one part of the contradiction». St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. ad 20.) likewise distinguishes the freedom of the will from the freedom of free choice in these words: «Concerning the last end we do not judge by a judgment of discussion or examination, but we approve it naturally; on which account there is no election concerning it, but volition. We have therefore with respect to it a free will, since the natural necessity of inclination is not repugnant to freedom, according to Augustine, V. of the City of God (c. 10), not by every free judgment, properly speaking, since it does not fall under election». The same author discusses the whole matter diffusely and excellently, de Malo, q. 6. a. unicus (cfr. also here q. unica a. 5. S. I. q. 83. a. 1-4.). — As to the freedom which is required for meriting or demeriting, cfr. above d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. and 2, below d. 20. q. 6, d. 29. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. and q. 3. ad 3. — On the various species of necessity cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. 2.

**III.** In this question it is excellently demonstrated that for freedom there is altogether prerequired reason, namely that there may be had full dominion both with respect to the *object* and with respect to the *act*. This twofold dominion is explained below in q. 3; and many other things which are said here are more fully determined there and in the following questions of this distinction. But if it is asked more distinctly how reason stands with respect to free choice, there were diverse opinions, concerning which some things are said below in the scholia to q. 1 and 6. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 72. m. 3. a. 2. — St. Thomas, S. I. q. 83. a. 1; de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 94. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. — Durand, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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translators_notes:
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license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

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license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem

source_text:
<!-- page 595 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta a ratione et voluntate.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Bernardus, *de Libero Arbitrio*[^1], loquens de potentia liberi arbitrii: «Quid similius aeternitati, quod non sit aeternitas»? Si ergo aeternitas nec respicit rationem nec voluntatem, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium sit aliqua potentia praeter has.

2. Item, ratio respondet Filio, voluntas Spiritui sancto: ergo si in nobis est ponere aliquam potentiam reformandam correspondentem Patri, est in nobis ponere aliquam potentiam praeter rationem et voluntatem, quae spectat ad reformationem; talis autem non est nisi liberum arbitrium: ergo etc.

3. Item, ad productionem operis ista tria sunt necessaria, videlicet posse et scire et velle: ergo si scimus per rationem, volumus per voluntatem, videtur, quod in nobis sit ponere tertiam potentiam, per quam simus *potentes*; hanc autem dicimus liberi arbitrii facultatem: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum lapis movetur deorsum, ista tria reperiuntur: intentio, appetitus et virtus. Dicimus enim, quod lapis intendit deorsum moveri, cum natura sit operans per intentionem[^2]; appetit etiam deorsum moveri; habet nihilominus virtutem, per quam deorsum movetur: ergo videtur, quod ista tria sit reperire in anima rationali. Si igitur rationis est *intendere*, voluntatis *appetere*, erit ponere tertiam potentiam, cuius sit *virtualiter agere*; hanc autem dicimus arbitrii facultatem: ergo etc.

5. Item, iudicans praeeminet iudicando, et movens praeeminet mobili; sed «liberum arbitrium est liberum de voluntate iudicium[^3]»: ergo liberi arbitrii est iudicare de voluntate. Similiter liberi arbitrii est movere omnes vires animae et rationi imperare, ut discernat, et voluntati, ut appetat: ergo videtur, quod sit tertia potentia ab istis distincta.

**Sed contra:**

1. Potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivas et affectivas: ergo si ratio comprehendit virtutes[^4] cognitivas, et voluntas affectivas, non videtur, quod sit conveniens ponere tertiam potentiam ab his differentem.

2. Item, actus liberi arbitrii est *iudicare*[^5]; sed de omni eo quod iudicamus, per rationem iudicamus: ergo non videtur, quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia a ratione et voluntate distincta.

3. Item, alia[^6] potentia circumscripta, remanente sola voluntate et ratione, possumus consentire, quia potest praecedere deliberatio per actum rationis, et subsequi praeoptatio per actum voluntatis: si ergo consentire est actus liberi arbitrii, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium non sit alia potentia a ratione et voluntate.

4. Item, liberi arbitrii est movere: aut ergo movet voluntatem, aut non. Si non: ergo non videtur esse plene liberum. Si movet voluntatem; et est alia potentia: ergo voluntas movetur ab alia potentia. Si movetur ab alia potentia: ergo non est libera: ergo si voluntas in nobis est maxime libera[^7], videtur etc.

5. Item, eadem est potentia cognitiva, qua intelligo aliquid et intelligo, me intelligere: ergo eadem virtus est, et non alia, qua volo aliquid et volo, me velle illud; sed potentia, qua volo me velle,
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est liberum arbitrium, potentia, qua volo, est voluntas: ergo liberum arbitrium non est alia potentia a voluntate.

### Conclusio.

> *Liberum arbitrium non dicit potentiam secundum rem distinctam a ratione et voluntate, tamen importat aliquam ab his potentiis distinctionem secundum rationem.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictae quaestionis intelligentiam notandum est, quod super hac quaestione diversae fuerunt doctorum positiones.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod sicut mens dupliciter accipitur: aliquando *communiter*, et sic comprehendit memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; aliquando *proprie*, et sic distinguitur contra intelligentiam et voluntatem: sic liberum arbitrium dupliciter accipitur, videlicet *communiter*[^8], et sic *non distinguitur* contra rationem et voluntatem; et *proprie*, et sic contra rationem et voluntatem *habet distingui* et est virtus imperans rationi et voluntati et utramque regens et movens, cuius actus primus non est *discernere et velle*, sed actus reflexus super haec duo et haec duo movens et regens, ille videlicet, quo dicitur quis *velle discernere*, vel *velle se velle*. Et iste *actus* praeambulus est ad rationem et voluntatem, et ista *potentia* respondet Patri, pro eo quod actus eius maxime potens est et primus est, cum non *moveatur*, sed *moveat*. Et ideo a Sanctis dicitur *facultas* sive *potestas* voluntatis et rationis, id est potestas faciliter movens voluntatem et rationem; et consistit in istis tribus quaedam ratio imaginis ex parte *motivae*, quae principaliter per gratiam in via et per dotes in patria habet reformari.

Aliis autem aliter videtur, quod cum rationis et voluntatis sit reflectere se super se, et istae duae potentiae sufficiant ad omnes actus animae perficiendos, videlicet ad *iudicandum* et *fugiendum* et *eligendum*, quod frustra poneretur in anima aliqua potentia differens ab istis. Si igitur «natura nihil facit frustra[^10]», potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivas et affectivas, sive per rationem et voluntatem; et ideo dicunt, quod liberum arbitrium non est potentia ab his duabus potentiis distincta.

Quaelibet autem harum positionum multum habet probabilitatis; et si velimus utramque earum intelligere diligenter et pie, inveniemus, eas ab invicem non discordare, sed ad unius veritatis maiorem expressionem concurrere. Cum enim dicimus, aliquam potentiam distingui ab aliis, hoc est dupliciter: aut secundum rem, aut secundum rationem. Secundum *rem*, sicut[^11] distinguitur intellectus et affectus; secundum *rationem*, sicut distinguitur ratio, ut est cognitiva et motiva, id est dictans moveri, vel disponens ad motum. —[^9] Loquendo igitur de distinctione secundum rationem, dici potest, liberum arbitrium quodam modo distingui a ratione et voluntate, in hoc scilicet, quod liberum arbitrium nominat[^12] in ratione moventis, voluntas vero et ratio in ratione moti; hoc in ratione imperantis, istae duae in ratione exsequentis. — Et ex ista parte per quandam rationem appropriationis invenitur in anima quaedam ratio imaginis; et per hunc modum intelligitur prima positio, et rationes currunt, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Non enim concludunt distinctionem liberi arbitrii a ratione et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem et appropriationem, sicut patet discurrenti per singulas.

Loquendo autem de distinctione potentiarum secundum rem, sic liberum arbitrium non dicit potentiam diversam vel distinctam a ratione et voluntate, pro eo quod potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivam et motivam, et omnes actus animae per has potentias, quae sunt cognitiva et affectiva, sive ratio et voluntas, exerceri possunt, sicut rationes, quae ad hoc inducuntur, ostendunt. Cum enim tam ratio quam voluntas sit nata super se reflecti; cum nomino voluntatem ut volentem aliquid, et voluntatem ut volentem se velle, non dico potentiam aliam et aliam secundum rem. Movens enim et motum in spiritualibus non oportet differre secundum substantiam, quia, sicut dicit Anselmus[^13], «voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens», et ratio etiam est virtus se ipsam cognoscens, pari ratione; et ideo, si aliqua est ibi distinctio, haec est solum secundum rationem. — Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem et ad rationes ad utramque partem[^14]. Concedo enim, quod liberum arbitrium secundum rem non dicit potentiam distinctam a ratione et voluntate; concedo tamen nihilominus, quod aliquam distinctionem habet secun-
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dum rationem, ratione cuius dicitur facultas utriusque. Quanta autem sit distinctio, melius patebit infra[^15]. Ad praesens autem tantum dixisse sufficiat, quod non est tanta distinctio, quod faciat ipsum esse aliam potentiam in genere potentiae, a ratione et voluntate realiter distinctam.

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Et quod obiicit, quod est similius aeternitati, et appropriatur Patri, et est virtus, a qua est *posse*; totum illud non ponit nisi solummodo distinctionem quandam secundum quandam appropriationem et quandam rationem. Et hoc patet, quia ipsa ratio includit in se intelligentiam et memoriam, et ita aliquid, per quod assimilatur Patri, et aliquid, per quod assimilatur Filio. Ipsa voluntas includit in se irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et ita potentiam, per quam appetit, et potentiam, per quam potest. Et ideo non oportet, liberum arbitrium esse aliquam aliam potentiam praeter has.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod iudicans praeeminet iudicato, et movens moto; dicendum, quod non oportet in spiritualibus, loquendo de praeeminentia, quae faciat diversitatem secundum essentiam. Sicut enim saepe dictum est, eadem est vis, quae vult aliquid et quae vult se velle, et quae iudicat et quae iudicat se iudicare; alioquin esset in infinitum abire. Nihilominus tamen sortitur quasi dignius officium, dum est in ratione iudicantis, quam cum est in ratione iudicati; et cum est in ratione moventis, quam cum est in ratione moti.

english:
### Question II. *Whether free choice is a power distinct from reason and will.*

Secondly it is asked whether free choice is a power distinct over against reason and will. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*[^1], speaking of the power of free choice: «What is more like eternity than that which is not eternity»? If therefore eternity regards neither reason nor will, it seems that free choice is some power besides these.

2. Likewise, reason corresponds to the Son, will to the Holy Spirit: therefore if in us a power corresponding to the Father is to be posited as something to be reformed, then there is to be posited in us some power besides reason and will which pertains to reformation; but such [a power] is nothing other than free choice: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, for the production of a work these three are necessary, namely to be able and to know and to will: therefore if we know through reason, we will through will, it seems that there is to be posited in us a third power through which we are *able*; and this we call the faculty of free choice: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when a stone is moved downward, these three are found: intention, appetite, and power. For we say that the stone intends to be moved downward, since nature operates through intention[^2]; it also has an appetite to be moved downward; nonetheless it has power by which it is moved downward: therefore it seems that these three are to be found in the rational soul. If therefore it belongs to reason *to intend*, to will *to seek*, there will be a third power to be posited whose [function] is *to act with power*; and this we call the faculty of choice: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the one judging takes precedence over the thing judged, and the mover takes precedence over the movable; but «free choice is a free judgment concerning the will[^3]»: therefore it belongs to free choice to judge concerning the will. Likewise it belongs to free choice to move all the powers of the soul and to command reason, that it may discern, and the will, that it may seek: therefore it seems that it is a third power distinct from these.

**On the contrary:**

1. The powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into cognitive and affective: therefore if reason comprehends the cognitive powers[^4], and will the affective, it does not seem fitting to posit a third power differing from these.

2. Likewise, the act of free choice is *to judge*[^5]; but everything that we judge, we judge through reason: therefore it does not seem that free choice is a power distinct from reason and will.

3. Likewise, with another[^6] power set aside, while will and reason alone remain, we can consent, because deliberation can precede through an act of reason, and a prior choosing can follow through an act of will: if therefore to consent is an act of free choice, it seems that free choice is not a power other than reason and will.

4. Likewise, it belongs to free choice to move: therefore either it moves the will, or not. If not: then it does not seem to be fully free. If it moves the will; and it is another power: then the will is moved by another power. If it is moved by another power: then it is not free: therefore if the will in us is most free[^7], it seems etc.

5. Likewise, it is the same cognitive power by which I understand something and I understand that I understand: therefore it is the same power, and not another, by which I will something and I will that I will it; but the power by which I will that I will
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is free choice, [and] the power by which I will is will: therefore free choice is not a power other than will.

### Conclusion.

> *Free choice does not name a power really distinct from reason and will, yet it implies some distinction from these powers according to reason.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid question it must be noted that concerning this question there have been diverse positions among the doctors.

For some have wished to say that, just as *mind* is taken in two ways: sometimes *commonly*, and thus it comprehends memory, intelligence, and will; sometimes *properly*, and thus it is distinguished over against intelligence and will: so free choice is taken in two ways, namely *commonly*[^8], and thus it is *not distinguished* over against reason and will; and *properly*, and thus over against reason and will it *can be distinguished* and is a power commanding reason and will and ruling and moving each, whose first act is not *to discern and to will*, but a reflexive act over these two and moving and ruling these two, namely that [act] by which one is said *to will to discern*, or *to will to will*. And this *act* is preambulary to reason and will, and this *power* corresponds to the Father, for the reason that its act is most powerful and is first, since it is not *moved*, but *moves*. And therefore by the Saints it is called the *faculty* or *power* of will and reason, that is, a power readily moving the will and reason; and there consists in these three a certain character of image on the part of the *motive* [power], which is principally reformed through grace in the wayfaring state and through the endowments in the homeland.

To others, however, it seems otherwise, namely that since it belongs to reason and will to reflect upon themselves, and these two powers suffice for accomplishing all the acts of the soul, namely for judging and fleeing and choosing, it would be in vain that any power differing from these be posited in the soul. If therefore «nature does nothing in vain[^10]», the powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into cognitive and affective, or into reason and will; and therefore they say that free choice is not a power distinct from these two powers.

But each of these positions has much probability; and if we are willing to understand each of them carefully and devoutly, we shall find that they do not disagree with one another, but converge toward a greater expression of one truth. For when we say that some power is distinguished from others, this is in two ways: either according to the thing, or according to reason. According to the *thing*, as[^11] intellect and affection are distinguished; according to *reason*, as reason is distinguished, insofar as it is cognitive and motive, that is, dictating that there be motion, or disposing toward motion. —[^9] Speaking therefore of distinction according to reason, it can be said that free choice is in a certain manner distinguished from reason and will, namely in this, that free choice names[^12] [something] in the character of mover, while will and reason [are] in the character of moved; this in the character of commander, those two in the character of executor. — And from this part, through a certain character of appropriation, a certain character of image is found in the soul; and through this manner the first position is understood, and the reasons hold which are adduced for the first part. For they do not conclude to a distinction of free choice from reason and will according to the thing, but only according to reason and appropriation, as is clear to one running through them one by one.

But speaking of the distinction of powers according to the thing, free choice in this way does not name a power diverse or distinct from reason and will, for the reason that the powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into the cognitive and the motive, and all the acts of the soul can be exercised through these powers, which are the cognitive and the affective, or reason and will, as the reasons adduced for this show. For since both reason and will are born to reflect upon themselves; when I name will as willing something, and will as willing to will, I do not name one power and another according to the thing. For mover and moved in spiritual things need not differ according to substance, because, as Anselm says[^13], «the will is an instrument moving itself», and reason also is a power knowing itself, by like reasoning; and therefore, if there is any distinction there, this is only according to reason. — And thus the answer to the question is clear, and to the reasons on each side[^14]. For I concede that free choice according to the thing does not name a power distinct from reason and will; yet I concede nonetheless that it has some distinction accord-
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ing to reason, by reason of which it is called the faculty of both. But how great the distinction is, will appear better below[^15]. For the present let it suffice to have said only this, that the distinction is not so great as to make it be another power in the genus of power, really distinct from reason and will.

*To 1, 2, 3.* And as for what is objected, that it is more like eternity, and is appropriated to the Father, and is a power from which there is *being-able*; all that posits nothing but only a certain distinction according to a certain appropriation and a certain reason. And this is clear, because reason itself includes in itself intelligence and memory, and so something through which it is assimilated to the Father, and something through which it is assimilated to the Son. The will itself includes in itself the irascible and the concupiscible, and so a power through which it seeks, and a power through which it is able. And therefore it is not necessary that free choice be some other power besides these.

*To 5.* As for that which is objected last, that the one judging takes precedence over the thing judged, and the mover over the moved; it must be said that in spiritual things, speaking of precedence, it is not necessary [that there be a precedence] which makes a diversity according to essence. For as has often been said, it is the same power which wills something and which wills to will, and which judges and which judges that it judges; otherwise it would go on to infinity. Nonetheless it obtains as it were a more worthy office, while it is in the character of the one judging, than when it is in the character of the thing judged; and when it is in the character of the mover, than when it is in the character of the moved.

en: [Bernard, *On Free Choice*] c. 9, n. 28.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 75. seqq. (c. 8.), ubi naturam propter finem agere ostenditur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 75 ff. (c. 8), where it is shown that nature acts for the sake of an end.

la: Boeth., III. Maior. Comment. in librum de Interpretatione (Periherm.), ed. secunda, ait: *Sed est liberum arbitrium, quod ipsa quoque vocabula produnt, liberum nobis de voluntate iudicium.* — Quoad *maiorem* hic afferimus illud August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53: «Iam vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam illa res est, de qua iudicatur»; et ex Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 19. (c. 5.) haec: *Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente.* — Pro *iudicando*, quod ducibus codd. I' II K T V cc ee etc. et ed. 1 posuimus, Vat. *iudicato*, forsan quia et in solutione fere omnes codd., excepto cod. H, et edd. exhibent *iudicato*.

en: Boethius, *Greater Commentary on the book On Interpretation* (Periherm.), book III, second edition, says: *But there is free choice, which the very words make evident, [namely] a free judgment for us concerning the will.* — As to the *major* [premise] we here adduce that statement of Augustine, *On True Religion* c. 29, n. 53: «But now it is most easy to see that the one judging is more excellent than the thing about which judgment is made»; and from Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 19 (c. 5), this: *For the agent is always more honorable than the patient.* — For *iudicando* (judging), which on the lead of codd. I', II, K, T, V, cc, ee etc. and ed. 1 we have set down, the Vatican [edition reads] *iudicato* (the thing judged), perhaps because in the solution too nearly all the codices, except cod. H, and the editions read *iudicato*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene *potentias*; cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp.

en: Very many codices with ed. 1 read, less well, *potentias* (powers); cf. above d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body.

la: Bernard., de Lib. Arb. c. 4. n. 11: *Arbitrium quippe iudicium est. Sicut vero iudicii est discernere, quid liceat, vel quid non liceat, sic profecto consilii probare, quid expediat* etc.

en: Bernard, *On Free Choice* c. 4, n. 11: *For choice is judgment. But just as it belongs to judgment to discern what is permitted, or what is not permitted, so indeed [it belongs] to counsel to weigh what is expedient* etc.

la: Codd. Y bb ee *omni alia*.

en: Codd. Y, bb, ee read *omni alia* (every other).

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 7: *Nihil tam in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas est.* — In codd. F K T V et pluribus aliis nec non in ed. 1 desiderantur verba *si movetur ab alia potentia*.

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 3, n. 7: *Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself.* — In codd. F, K, T, V and in many others, as also in ed. 1, the words *si movetur ab alia potentia* (if it is moved by another power) are lacking.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 sic: *communiter et proprie. Communiter, et sic* etc. Eaedem edd. omittunt dein *et* ante *proprie*. Paulo inferius pro *utramque*, quod ex cod. aa restituimus, contextu exigente, Vat. *utrumque*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4 reads thus: *communiter et proprie. Communiter, et sic* etc. The same editions then omit *et* before *proprie*. A little below, for *utramque*, which we have restored from cod. aa, the context requiring it, the Vatican reads *utrumque*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 592, note 6.

la: Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 32. (c. 4.). Cfr. supra pag. 44, nota 3. — Paulo superius verbo *iudicandum* cod. cc et ed. 1 praefigunt *videndum*, quod verbum codd. T bb (a prima manu) et nonnulli alii substituunt pro *iudicandum*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I, text 32 (c. 4). Cf. above p. 44, note 3. — A little above, to the word *iudicandum* [judging] cod. cc and ed. 1 prefix *videndum* [seeing], which word codd. T, bb (by the first hand) and some others substitute for *iudicandum*.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 hic et paulo inferius sic.

en: Some codices with edd. 2, 3, 4 [read] thus here and a little below.

la: Codd. I W cc et ed. 1 *nominatur*. Paulo inferius pro *hoc* [i. e. liberum arbitrium] *in ratione* nonnulli codd. cum edd. *haec in ratione*.

en: Codd. I, W, cc and ed. 1 read *nominatur* [it is named]. A little below, for *hoc* [i.e. free choice] *in ratione*, some codices with the editions read *haec in ratione*.

la: De Concord. praesc. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. — Pro *se ipsum* plures codd., ut K T V bb etc., cum edd. 1, 2 minus recte *se ipsam*. Paulo superius post *secundum rem* Vat. cum ed. 4 addit *sed secundum rationem*. Paulo inferius codd. F T bb cc ee cum edd. 1, 2 *hoc est* pro *haec est*.

en: [Anselm,] *On the Concord of Foreknowledge [and Predestination and Grace] with Free Choice* q. 3, c. 11. — For *se ipsum* (itself, masc.) several codices, such as K, T, V, bb etc., with edd. 1, 2 read, less correctly, *se ipsam* (itself, fem.). A little above, after *secundum rem* the Vatican with ed. 4 adds *sed secundum rationem* (but according to reason). A little below, codd. F, T, bb, cc, ee with edd. 1, 2 read *hoc est* for *haec est*.

la: Cod. 1 addit *inductas*.

en: Cod. 1 adds *inductas* (adduced).

la: Ib. q. 5. [scil. infra, in hac dist. p. I. a. un. q. 5.]

en: Ibidem, q. 5 [i.e. below, in this distinction, p. I, a. un., q. 5].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primam opinionem in corp. positam tenet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 1. § 2.), et consentit B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 3.), qui dicit, quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia specialis, tamen in multis aliis potentiis diffusa est, prius tamen in ratione, et deinde in voluntate; et idem docet hic a. 1. Quo posito principio, iidem etiam seqq. quaestiones solvunt, sibi constantes et ab aliis Scholasticis discrepantes. — S. Thom. autem (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 24. a. 6.) docet, quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia non alia a voluntate. Eandem sententiam tenent Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Scotus aliique plurimi. — Licet S. Bonav. duas istas sententias inter se conciliare nitatur, tamen in re S. Thomae consentit, dum cum eodem negat, liberum arbitrium esse potentiam aliam a voluntate et ratione, nec aliam admittit distinctionem, nisi secundum rationem et appropriationem, quae scilicet nihil secundum essentiam addat super rationem et voluntatem.

**II.** Praeter laudatos: Scot., apud Hier. de Monteforlino, l. II. q. 83. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seqq. qq. II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. II. Sent. d. 24. q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**III.** Sequentem (3.) quaest. resolvit Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. § 1.) sic: «Liberum arbitrium continet in se omnes vires, secundum quas est meritum vel demeritum; non tamen ideo est plures potentiae essentialiter [quod quidam docuerant; vide hic q. 4.], sed plurium potentiarum». Similiter B. Albert. (S. loc. cit. m. 2.) resolvit. — S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2.) docet, quod liberum arbitrium intellectum virtualiter in se colligit, licet formaliter et simpliciter sit voluntas; reprobat autem tum opinionem, quae vult, plures potentias colligi in eo, ut sint totum universale, sive essentialiter, tum aliam asserentem, plures potentias colligi ut totum integrale. — S. Bonav. hoc loco totus est in eo, ut probet necessitatem, quod actus rationis et voluntatis simul concurrant in libero arbitrio; quoad modum autem, quo duae potentiae concurrunt, consentit S. Thomae in hoc, quod non uniantur ut totum universale, vel integrale; ipse tamen vult, ut medio modo uniantur sive ut totum potentiale (ad 6.). Quomodo hoc intelligatur, explicatur in seqq. quaestionibus. — De eadem quaest. vide etiam: S. Thom., de Verit. q. 24. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The first opinion set down in the body is held by Alexander of Hales (S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 1. § 2.), and Blessed Albert agrees (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 3.), who says that free choice is a special power, yet diffused through many other powers, prior however in reason, and then in will; and the same is taught here in a. 1. With this principle laid down, the same authors also solve the following questions, consistent with themselves and disagreeing from the other Scholastics. — Saint Thomas, however (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 24. a. 6.), teaches that free choice is a power not other than the will. The same opinion is held by Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Scotus, and very many others. — Although Saint Bonaventure strives to reconcile these two opinions with each other, yet in fact he agrees with Saint Thomas, since with him he denies that free choice is a power other than will and reason, nor does he admit any other distinction except according to reason and appropriation, which namely adds nothing according to essence over reason and will.

**II.** Besides those praised: Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, l. II. q. 83. a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following questions, II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 3. — Giles of Rome, II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here, the sole question.

**III.** The following (3rd) question Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. § 1.) resolves thus: «Free choice contains in itself all the powers according to which there is merit or demerit; yet not for that reason is it several powers essentially [which certain ones had taught; see here q. 4.], but [it is] of several powers». Similarly Blessed Albert (S. loc. cit. m. 2.) resolves it. — Saint Thomas (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2.) teaches that free choice virtually gathers the intellect into itself, although formally and simply it is will; but he rejects both the opinion which holds that several powers are gathered in it so as to be a universal whole, or essentially, and the other asserting that several powers are gathered as an integral whole. — Saint Bonaventure in this place is wholly intent on proving the necessity that the act of reason and of will concur together in free choice; as to the manner, however, in which the two powers concur, he agrees with Saint Thomas in this, that they are not united as a universal whole, or an integral one; he wishes nonetheless that they be united in a middle manner, that is, as a potential whole (to 6). How this is to be understood is explained in the following questions. — On the same question see also: Saint Thomas, de Verit. q. 24. a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 2. — Giles of Rome, II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 2.

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translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 41653–41810), cross-checked band-by-band against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 595–597 = PDF 617–619, offset +22) via `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p59{5,6,7}-{L,R}-*.png`. OCR for this quaestio is clean (single continuous flow; no cascade-shatter in the Respondeo/scholion), so the OCR is the base with PDF used to confirm footnote-marker positions and footer readings.
- **Page-split map:**
  - **p.595** (running head DIST. XXV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II) — q2 opens here (immediately after q1's scholion II); holds the 5 *quod sic* arguments + 5 *Sed contra*; footers 1–7 → [^1]–[^7].
  - **p.596** — Conclusio, Respondeo (two *positiones* + reconciliation through *secundum rem* / *secundum rationem*); footers 1–7 → [^8]–[^14].
  - **p.597** (running head DIST. XXV. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III) — Respondeo epilogue (*facultas utriusque* / *patebit infra*), *Ad 1,2,3* and *Ad 5*, and SCHOLION I–III. q2 ends just before QUAESTIO III opens (raw ~41811). q2 owns only the **infra-pointer** portion of p.597 footer 1 → [^15]; the remainder of that printed footnote ("*Paulo inferius pro quod faciat* …") belongs to q3's first argument and is left for q3.
- **Hand-offs:** RECEIVED — none (q1 consumed all of p.594's footers; q2 opens on a fresh footer sequence at the top of p.595). FORWARDED to a1-q3 — the *quod faciat* / *ipsam* variant tail of p.597 footer 1, which sits with q3's argument-1.
- **has_scholion:** true — own SCHOLION I–III on p.597 (own commentator-roll; not a sibling-pointer).
- **`[?]` flags:** none. All footers legible at 450 dpi; the only editorial reconstruction is the [^15] bracket noting that the printed footer's "Ib. q. 5" is the *infra* cross-reference.
- **Dup handling (this pass):** the stray `bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q2-dup2.md` was NOT a duplicate of this chunk. Its body (line_start 42801; running head DIST. XXV. **P. II.** ART. UNICUS) is the genuine **Pars II ARTICULUS UNICUS QUAESTIO II** — *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit actuum contingentium et necessariorum, an contingentium tantum* (the "Secundo … in comparatione ad actum" question of the Pars II TRACTATIO) — which was on the MISSING list. It was `git mv`'d to `bon-sent-II-d25-p2-a1-q2.md` with id+pars corrected (still a skeleton). `d25-p2-a1-q2` is therefore no longer missing.