title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 589 -->

### Articulus I. *De ipsa caritate quantum ad habitum.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum caritas sit habitus ab aliis virtutibus distinctus.*

Circa primum de quatuor sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum caritas sit habitus ab aliis virtutibus distinctus, an omnibus virtutibus communis et generalis. Et quod sit habitus omnibus communis, videtur:

1. Et primo auctoritate Apostoli primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p589-4], ubi Apostolus dicit: *Caritas patiens est, benigna est* etc., et enumerat ibi quindecim opera virtutum; sed quidquid habet in se actus omnium virtutum, est commune et universale ad omnes virtutes; habitus autem caritatis est huiusmodi, secundum quod in praecedenti auctoritate habetur: ergo omnibus virtutibus est communis.

2. Item, Hieronymus[^p589-5]: « Ut breviter complectar omnem definitionem virtutis, virtus est caritas, qua diligitur omne diligendum »: ergo cum definitio et definitum sint aequalis ambitus, et virtus sit generalis ad omnes virtutes; videtur similiter, quod et caritas.

<!-- page 590 -->

3. Item, Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^p590-1] et Bernardus *de Diligendo Deo* dicunt, quod « virtus non est aliud quam ordo amoris vel amor ordinatus »; ergo cum amor ordinatus nihil aliud sit quam caritas, et omnis virtus nihil aliud sit quam amor ordinatus; omnis virtus est caritas: ergo caritas non est ab aliis virtutibus distincta.

4. Item, sicut se habet praeceptum caritatis ad alia praecepta, sic se habet habitus caritatis ad alios habitus virtutum; sed praeceptum caritatis omnia alia praecepta comprehendit, sicut dicitur ad Romanos decimo tertio[^p590-2]: *Qui diligit proximum Legem implevit*: ergo videtur, quod habitus caritatis contineat in se habitus omnium virtutum, et non sit ab aliis distinctus.

5. Item, sicut se habet obiectum caritatis ad obiecta aliarum virtutum, ita se habet habitus caritatis ad alios habitus; sed obiectum caritatis est bonum sub ratione boni simpliciter: si ergo hoc est commune obiectis omnium aliarum virtutum[^p590-3], videtur, quod habitus caritatis sit communis omnibus aliis habitibus.

6. Item, qui habet dilectionem caritatis in via habet omne quod necessarium est ad *meritum*, quia dicit Augustinus[^p590-4]: « Tene caritatem, et fac quidquid vis »; similiter, qui habet dotem fruitionis correspondentem caritati, in patria habet sufficientissimum *praemium*: « Frui enim, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, est amore inhaerere »: ergo si caritas inchoata sufficit ad *meritum*, et caritas consummata sufficit ad *praemium*; videtur, quod habita caritate, aut ceterae virtutes superfluant, aut ipsa non differat ab habitibus aliarum virtutum. Sed constans est, quod aliae virtutes non superfluant: restat ergo, quod ipsa ab aliis virtutibus non distinguitur.

**Sed contra:** 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p590-5]: *Nunc manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec.* Quod recte connumeratur et superponitur habilibus aliis virtutibus, distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus; sed caritas connumeratur et superponitur aliis virtutibus: ergo ab illis distinguitur.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ab *obiecto*: quia, sicut *fides* respicit Deum sub ratione veri, et *spes* sub ratione ardui, sic *caritas* sub ratione boni: si ergo bonum sub ratione boni et verum sub ratione veri dicunt diversas rationes movendi; et secundum diversitatem rationis movendi est distinctio in habitibus et actibus[^p590-6]: videtur ergo, quod caritas differat ab aliis theologicis virtutibus: ergo multo fortius ab aliis, scilicet cardinalibus.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ab *actu proprio*: quia constans est, quod diligere et credere et sperare actus sunt diversi, loquendo formaliter: si ergo penes diversitatem actuum principalium necesse est esse diversitatem habituum; videtur, quod necesse sit ponere, habitum caritatis ab habitibus aliarum virtutum differre.

4. Item, penes diversitatem *subiectorum* est diversitas proprietatum; sed sicut fides est in rationali et spes in irascibili[^p590-7], sic caritas et amor est in concupiscibili: si ergo vis concupiscibilis distincta est ab aliis viribus, necesse est, quod habitus caritatis distinctus sit ab aliis habitibus.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *per comparationem ad suum oppositum*: quia vitium directe oppositum caritati distinguitur[^p590-8] ab aliis vitiis, utpote odium ab infidelitate et desperatione: si ergo distinctio malorum et vitiorum est ratione bonorum, quibus opponuntur, cum sint privationes; videtur, quod si vitium caritati oppositum ab aliis vitiis distinguitur, consimiliter et habitus caritatis ab aliis habitibus.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *per comparationem ad praemium*: quia quandocumque aliqui sic se habent, quod quando unus perficitur, alii evacuantur, necesse est, illos habitus per essentiam differre; sed habitus caritatis in patria perficitur et consummatur, habitus vero fidei et spei evacuantur, sicut dicit Magister, et habitum est in distinctione praecedenti[^p590-9]: ergo necesse est, caritatis habitum ab habitibus aliarum virtutum distingui.

<!-- page 591 -->

> ### Conclusio.
> Caritas est habitus virtutis ab aliis virtutibus distinctus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc reperitur triplex modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod caritatis habitus est ab aliis virtutibus indistinctus, propter ipsorum habituum essentialem unitatem. Dixerunt enim, ipsos habitus virtutum ab invicem non differre per essentiam nisi sola relatione ad actus. Et hoc ipsum dixerunt de potentiis animae[^p591-1]. Et quod sint unum per essentiam inter se invicem, hoc probare nituntur propter mutuam ipsorum habituum denominationem. Cum enim formae disparatae nullo modo possint se ipsas denominare; et una virtus aliam denominet, ut iustitia est prudens, et prudentia est iusta, fides amat, et caritas credit: impossibile est igitur, habitus virtutum essentialiter inter se differre. Ex hac eadem ratione concludere voluerunt, quod non differant a caritate, cum caritati attribuantur quasi omnium virtutum actus, sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p591-2]. Et hoc ipsum dicunt sensisse Augustinum in libro *de Moribus Ecclesiae*, ubi sic definit virtutem: « Nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Nam illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris quodam vario affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur ».

Sed quantumcumque hoc innuerent auctoritates, ponere tamen, omnes habitus virtutum a se invicem[^p591-3] non differre nisi sola relatione, non videtur consonum rationi nec etiam doctrinae communi. Quod enim diversitas sit in potentiis animae et ipsarum habitibus, manifestat ipsa diversitas actuum et obiectorum. Et propterea, cum una virtus denominat alteram, vel actus unius attribuitur alteri, hoc non est intelligendum fieri propter omnimodam ipsorum habituum indifferentiam, sed propter mutuam circumincessionem et concomitantiam; sicut dicimus de potentiis animae, quod se invicem circumincedunt, et supra se mutuo reflectuntur, non quia omnino idem sint, sed quia, cum sint in eodem et possint reflecti super illud, in quo sunt — quia anima intelligit se et amat se — per consequens et super se invicem reflectuntur[^p591-4]. Et propterea, quia reflexio non tantummodo fit propter omnimodam indivisionem convenientiae, verum etiam propter circumincessionem concomitantiae; ideo non cogimur ponere, nec potentias animae nec habitus, secundum id quod sunt, ab invicem non differre[^p591-5]. — Nec Augustinus in libro *de Moribus Ecclesiae* vult illud dicere, sed omnes virtutes alias vult ad caritatem tanquam ad fundamentum reducere, sine qua aliae virtutes non sunt verae virtutes, quia ad veram beatitudinem non perducunt.

Est et hic alius modus dicendi[^p591-6], videlicet quod caritas ab aliis virtutibus non distinguitur propter ipsius caritatis generalitatem. Voluerunt enim quidam dicere, quod ipsa vis concupiscibilis diffunditur per omnes alias vires, pro eo quod omnes vires animae appetunt sua obiecta. Unde[^p591-7] amor reperitur in omnibus viribus, ut dicunt, et amor ordinatus in omnibus virtutibus; et quia caritas non est aliud quam ordo amoris: hinc est, quod dicere voluerunt, caritatem ob suam generalitatem non distingui ab aliis virtutibus.

Sed nec illud videtur rationabile usquequaque, nec convenienter dici, cum Apostolus eam distinguat ab aliis. Nec ratio, quam assignant, multum est efficax, pro eo quod concupiscibilis ita est vis in se distincta, secundum quod[^p591-8] rationalis et irascibilis: unde quod actus concupiscibilis ad actum aliarum virium concurrit, hoc non est propter identitatem et indivisionem in essendo, sed propter simultatem et ordinem in movendo. Unde et generale sive universale consuevit aliquid dici dupliciter: vel propter communitatem in praedicando, vel propter communitatem in causando; sicut sol dicitur causa universalis, non quia de aliis causis inferioribus praedicatur, sed quia alias adiuvat et movet[^p591-9]. Et ideo, sicut possibile est, quod aliquid habeat rationem generalis motoris respectu aliorum, et tamen in se sit unum et ab eis distinctum in causis naturalibus; sic reperire contingit in animae potentiis et viribus. Et ideo, quamvis voluntas

<!-- page 592 -->

imperet aliis viribus animae, et caritas aliis virtutibus, non oportet propter hoc ponere, quod ab eis non distinguatur[^p592-1].

Tertius vero modus dicendi communis et usitatus rationi et auctoritatibus satis consonus est, quod caritatis habitus est ab habitibus aliarum virtutum distinctus, sicut innuit ipse Apostolus. — Et eius distinctio ab habitibus aliis potest colligi ex multiplici ipsius comparatione, sicut in opponendo[^p592-2] fuit demonstratum, primo videlicet ex comparatione ad *obiectum*, quod sub ratione movendi ab aliis distinguitur; secundo per comparationem ad *actum*, qui differt ab actibus aliarum[^p592-3]; tertio per comparationem ad *subiectum* proprium; quarto per comparationem *ad oppositum*, quod ei determinate opponitur, ita quod non habitibus aliarum virtutum; quinto per comparationem ad *praemium*, in quo perficitur, cum habitus spei et fidei evacuetur; sexto vero et ultimo per comparationem ad suum *principium*, quod repraesentat. Consistit enim *imago recreationis* in tribus virtutibus theologicis et unitate gratiae, sicut *imago creationis* in tribus potentiis et unitate substantiae. Si ergo ipsae potentiae ad hoc, quod sint recte imago, a se invicem discernuntur, et una de altera non praedicatur; si in tribus virtutibus theologicis reperitur similiter ratio cuiusdam imaginis[^p592-4]: opportunum est ponere, ipsas ab invicem distinctas esse. — Concedendum est igitur, habitum caritatis distinctum esse ab habitibus aliarum virtutum; concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Apostoli, patet responsio ex iam dictis: quoniam actus aliarum virtutum attribuuntur ipsi caritati non sicut *elicienti*, sed sicut *imperanti* et sicut motori *primo*, non sicut motori *immediato*. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod caritas ab aliis virtutibus non distinguatur, quia non habet generalitatem ad illas in *praedicando*, sed solum in *movendo*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Hieronymi, quod virtus non est aliud quam caritas; dicendum, quod praedicatio illa est praedicatio *causalis*. Ideo enim omnes virtutes definiri possunt per caritatem, quia amor caritatis dat eis rationem merendi; qua ablata, non est, proprie loquendo, dicenda virtus esse in anima[^p592-5].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur per auctoritatem Augustini, dicendum similiter, quod notificationes illae et consimiles *per causam* datae sunt. — Et si tu quaeras, per quod genus causae; responderi potest, quod caritas respectu aliarum in movendo quodam modo habet rationem *efficientis*, quodam modo *formalis*, quodam modo *finalis*. Amor autem caritatis aliis virtutibus, ut in actus suos exeant, *imperat* et imperando *informat* et facit eos meritorios et informando *iungit fini* et in ipso quietat, dum facit nos Deo adhaerere et ipso frui; et ideo merito virtus gratuita per caritatis amorem est definienda[^p592-6]. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quod amor ille, qui cadit in definitione virtutis generaliter, non est amor *caritatis*, quae est una de virtutibus theologicis, sed est amor omnibus et ceteris virtutibus communis et generalis. Et ideo in processu illo est sophisma *consequentis* a superiori ad inferius affirmando[^p592-7].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praeceptum caritatis comprehendit omnia praecepta; dicendum, quod non comprehendit ea per omnimodam *identitatem*, sed per quandam *reductionem*; omnia enim praecepta reducuntur ad illam et in illa consummantur; et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod habitus caritatis sit aliis communis nisi solum per *radicationem*, secundum quod dicit Gregorius[^p592-8], quod praecepta sunt multa per diversitatem operis et unum in radice dilectionis, « quia quidquid praecipitur, in sola caritate radicatur ». Hoc autem non est, quia solius caritatis sit exsequi praecepta iniuncta, sed quia aliae virtutes sine caritate non exsequuntur divina praecepta secundum acceptionem divinam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obiectum caritatis commune est obiectis aliarum virtutum; respondendum est *per interemptionem*[^p592-9], quia obiectum caritatis non est quodcumque bonum, sed bonum summum et bonum sub ratione boni; et ita obiectum caritatis distinguitur *secundum substantiam* ab obiectis virtutum cardinalium, quae habent obiectum creatum; ab obiecto vero aliarum virtutum

<!-- page 593 -->

theologicarum *secundum substantiam* non distinguitur, sed *secundum rationem movendi*, quae quidem ratio movendi facit diversitatem in actu et habitu et potentia substantiae motae, sicut patet: quia, quamvis unum et idem sit verum et bonum, tamen cognitio et affectio, et potentia cognitiva et affectiva, et habitus scientiae et virtutis habent ad invicem differentiam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas sufficit ad praemium et meritum; dicendum, quod caritas dicitur sufficere ad meritum et ad praemium propter connexionem aliarum virtutum et dotum. Qui enim habet caritatem habet alias virtutes, et qui habet dotem sibi correspondentem habet alias dotes, et ita sufficientiam in merito et praemio, non ratione caritatis tantum, sed[^p593-1] ratione aliarum virtutum annexarum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod aliae virtutes superfluant, vel quod caritas sola sit virtus ab aliis non distincta, pro eo quod non habet sufficientiam per se sola, sed prout est cum aliis coniuncta[^p593-2]. Et per hoc patet, quod non potest aliquis sufficienter mereri, nisi speret et credat; nunquam autem potest aliquis esse expeditus et habilitatus ad credendum et sperandum nisi mediante fide et spe; similiter circa dotes praemii intelligendum est.

english:
### Article I. *On charity itself as to disposition.*
### Question I. *Whether charity is a disposition distinct from the other virtues.*

Concerning the first of the four [questions] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether charity is a disposition distinct from the other virtues, or one common and general to all the virtues. And that it is a disposition common to all is shown:

1. And first by the authority of the Apostle in First Corinthians chapter thirteen[^p589-4], where the Apostle says: *"Charity is patient, is kind"* etc., and there he enumerates fifteen works of the virtues; but whatever has in itself the acts of all the virtues is common and universal to all the virtues; but the disposition of charity is of this kind, according to what is contained in the preceding authority: therefore it is common to all the virtues.

2. Likewise, Jerome[^p589-5]: "To embrace briefly every definition of virtue, virtue is charity, by which everything that is to be loved is loved": therefore since the definition and the thing defined are of equal scope, and virtue is general to all the virtues, it seems likewise that charity also is.

3. Likewise, Augustine in *On the City of God*[^p590-1] and Bernard in *On Loving God* say that "virtue is nothing other than the order of love, or ordered love"; therefore since ordered love is nothing other than charity, and every virtue is nothing other than ordered love; every virtue is charity: therefore charity is not distinct from the other virtues.

4. Likewise, as the precept of charity stands to the other precepts, so the disposition of charity stands to the other dispositions of the virtues; but the precept of charity comprehends all the other precepts, as is said in Romans chapter thirteen[^p590-2]: *"He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law"*: therefore it seems that the disposition of charity contains in itself the dispositions of all the virtues, and is not distinct from the others.

5. Likewise, as the object of charity stands to the objects of the other virtues, so the disposition of charity stands to the other dispositions; but the object of charity is the good under the aspect of good without qualification: if therefore this is common to the objects of all the other virtues[^p590-3], it seems that the disposition of charity is common to all the other dispositions.

6. Likewise, he who has the love of charity on the way has everything that is necessary for *merit*, because Augustine says[^p590-4]: "Hold to charity, and do whatever you will"; likewise, he who has the dowry of fruition corresponding to charity has in the fatherland the most sufficient *reward*: "For to enjoy, according to what Augustine says, is to cleave by love": therefore if inchoate charity suffices for *merit*, and consummated charity suffices for *reward*; it seems that, charity being had, either the remaining virtues are superfluous, or charity itself does not differ from the dispositions of the other virtues. But it is established that the other virtues are not superfluous: it remains, therefore, that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues.

**On the contrary:** 1. First Corinthians chapter thirteen[^p590-5]: *"Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."* That which is rightly enumerated with and set above the other dispositions of the virtues is distinguished from the other virtues; but charity is enumerated with and set above the other virtues: therefore it is distinguished from them.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *object*: for, just as *faith* regards God under the aspect of the true, and *hope* under the aspect of the arduous, so *charity* under the aspect of the good: if therefore the good under the aspect of good and the true under the aspect of the true express diverse aspects of moving; and according to the diversity of the aspect of moving there is a distinction in the dispositions and acts[^p590-6]: it seems therefore that charity differs from the other theological virtues: therefore much more strongly from the others, namely the cardinal ones.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *proper act*: for it is established that to love and to believe and to hope are diverse acts, speaking formally: if therefore in accordance with the diversity of the principal acts there must be a diversity of dispositions; it seems that it is necessary to posit that the disposition of charity differs from the dispositions of the other virtues.

4. Likewise, in accordance with the diversity of *subjects* there is a diversity of properties; but just as faith is in the rational [power] and hope in the irascible[^p590-7], so charity and love is in the concupiscible: if therefore the concupiscible power is distinct from the other powers, it is necessary that the disposition of charity be distinct from the other dispositions.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown *by comparison to its opposite*: for the vice directly opposed to charity is distinguished[^p590-8] from the other vices, as hatred [is distinguished] from unbelief and despair: if therefore the distinction of evils and vices is by reason of the goods to which they are opposed, since they are privations; it seems that if the vice opposed to charity is distinguished from the other vices, likewise also the disposition of charity [is distinguished] from the other dispositions.

6. Likewise, this same thing is shown *by comparison to the reward*: for whenever some things are so disposed that when one is perfected, the others are emptied out, it is necessary that those dispositions differ essentially; but the disposition of charity in the fatherland is perfected and consummated, while the dispositions of faith and hope are emptied out, as the Master says, and as was held in the preceding distinction[^p590-9]: therefore it is necessary that the disposition of charity be distinguished from the dispositions of the other virtues.

> ### Conclusion.
> Charity is a disposition of virtue distinct from the other virtues.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is found a threefold manner of speaking.

For some wished to say that the disposition of charity is undistinguished from the other virtues, on account of the essential unity of the dispositions themselves. For they said that the dispositions of the virtues do not differ from one another by essence but only by relation to acts. And this same thing they said of the powers of the soul[^p591-1]. And that they are one by essence among themselves, this they strive to prove on account of the mutual denomination of the dispositions themselves. For since disparate forms can in no way denominate themselves; and one virtue denominates another, as justice is prudent, and prudence is just, faith loves, and charity believes: it is therefore impossible that the dispositions of the virtues differ essentially among themselves. From this same reasoning they wished to conclude that they do not differ from charity, since the acts of, as it were, all the virtues are attributed to charity, as the Apostle says in First Corinthians chapter thirteen[^p591-2]. And this same thing they say Augustine held in the book *On the Morals of the Church*, where he so defines virtue: "I would affirm that virtue is nothing at all except the highest love of God. For that which is called fourfold virtue is so called, as far as I understand, from a certain varied affection of love itself."

But however much the authorities might suggest this, nevertheless to posit that all the dispositions of the virtues do not differ from one another[^p591-3] except by relation alone does not seem consonant with reason nor even with the common teaching. For that there is diversity in the powers of the soul and in their dispositions, the very diversity of acts and objects makes manifest. And therefore, when one virtue denominates another, or the act of one is attributed to another, this is not to be understood to come about on account of a total indifference of the dispositions themselves, but on account of the mutual circumincession and concomitance; just as we say of the powers of the soul that they circumincede one another, and mutually reflect upon one another, not because they are altogether the same, but because, since they are in the same [soul] and can be reflected upon that in which they are — because the soul understands itself and loves itself — consequently they are also reflected upon one another in turn[^p591-4]. And therefore, since reflection comes about not only on account of the total indivision of agreement, but also on account of the circumincession of concomitance; therefore we are not compelled to posit either that the powers of the soul or that the dispositions, according to that which they are, do not differ from one another[^p591-5]. — Nor does Augustine in the book *On the Morals of the Church* wish to say that, but he wishes to reduce all the other virtues to charity as to a foundation, without which the other virtues are not true virtues, because they do not lead through to true beatitude.

There is also here another manner of speaking[^p591-6], namely that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues on account of the generality of charity itself. For some wished to say that the concupiscible power itself is diffused through all the other powers, for this reason, that all the powers of the soul seek their objects. Hence[^p591-7] love is found in all the powers, as they say, and ordered love in all the virtues; and because charity is nothing other than the order of love: hence it is that they wished to say that charity, on account of its generality, is not distinguished from the other virtues.

But neither does that seem reasonable in every respect, nor fittingly said, since the Apostle distinguishes it from the others. Nor is the reason which they assign very effective, for this reason, that the concupiscible is a power so distinct in itself, according as [is][^p591-8] the rational and the irascible: hence the fact that the act of the concupiscible concurs with the act of the other powers, this is not on account of identity and indivision in being, but on account of simultaneity and order in moving. Hence also something is wont to be called general or universal in two ways: either on account of community in *predicating*, or on account of community in *causing*; just as the sun is called a universal cause, not because it is predicated of the other lower causes, but because it aids and moves the others[^p591-9]. And therefore, just as it is possible that something have the character of a general mover with respect to others, and yet in itself be one and distinct from them in natural causes; so it happens to be found in the powers and forces of the soul. And therefore, although the will

commands the other powers of the soul, and charity the other virtues, it is not necessary on account of this to posit that it is not distinguished from them[^p592-1].

But the third manner of speaking, which is common and customary and sufficiently consonant with reason and with the authorities, is that the disposition of charity is distinct from the dispositions of the other virtues, as the Apostle himself suggests. — And its distinction from the other dispositions can be gathered from its manifold comparison, as was demonstrated in the opposing arguments[^p592-2], namely first from comparison to the *object*, which under the aspect of moving is distinguished from the others; second by comparison to the *act*, which differs from the acts of the others[^p592-3]; third by comparison to its proper *subject*; fourth by comparison *to the opposite*, which is determinately opposed to it, so that [it is] not [opposed] to the dispositions of the other virtues; fifth by comparison to the *reward*, in which it is perfected, while the dispositions of hope and faith are emptied out; sixth and last by comparison to its *principle*, which it represents. For the *image of recreation* consists in the three theological virtues and the unity of grace, just as the *image of creation* [consists] in the three powers and the unity of substance. If therefore the powers themselves, in order that they may rightly be an image, are discerned from one another, and one is not predicated of the other; if in the three theological virtues there is found likewise the character of a certain image[^p592-4]: it is fitting to posit that they are distinct from one another. — It must therefore be conceded that the disposition of charity is distinct from the dispositions of the other virtues; and the reasons which show this are also to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary side concerning the authority of the Apostle, the response is clear from what has already been said: since the acts of the other virtues are attributed to charity itself not as to one *eliciting*, but as to one *commanding* and as to the *first* mover, not as to an *immediate* mover. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues, because it does not have generality with respect to them in *predicating*, but only in *moving*.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Jerome, that virtue is nothing other than charity; it must be said that that predication is a *causal* predication. For all the virtues can be defined by charity for this reason, that the love of charity gives them the character of meriting; which being taken away, virtue is not, properly speaking, to be said to be in the soul[^p592-5].

3. To that which is objected through the authority of Augustine, it must be said likewise that those notifications and the like are given *through a cause*. — And if you ask, through what genus of cause; it can be answered that charity with respect to the others in moving has in a certain manner the character of an *efficient* [cause], in a certain manner of a *formal* [cause], in a certain manner of a *final* [cause]. For the love of charity *commands* the other virtues, that they go out into their acts, and by commanding *informs* [them] and makes them meritorious, and by informing *joins* [them] to the end and quiets [them] in it, while it makes us cleave to God and enjoy him; and therefore gratuitous virtue is rightly to be defined by the love of charity[^p592-6]. — It could also be said otherwise, that the love which falls in the definition of virtue generally is not the love of *charity*, which is one of the theological virtues, but is a love common and general to all the other virtues. And therefore in that process there is the sophism of the *consequent*, from the superior to the inferior by affirming[^p592-7].

4. To that which is objected, that the precept of charity comprehends all the precepts; it must be said that it does not comprehend them through a total *identity*, but through a certain *reduction*; for all the precepts are reduced to it and consummated in it; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the disposition of charity is common to the others except only through *radication*, according as Gregory says[^p592-8], that the precepts are many through diversity of work and one in the root of love, "because whatever is commanded is rooted in charity alone." This, however, is not because it belongs to charity alone to carry out the enjoined precepts, but because the other virtues without charity do not carry out the divine precepts according to the divine acceptation.

5. To that which is objected, that the object of charity is common to the objects of the other virtues; it must be answered *by interemption*[^p592-9], because the object of charity is not just any good, but the highest good and the good under the aspect of good; and so the object of charity is distinguished *according to substance* from the objects of the cardinal virtues, which have a created object; but from the object of the other

theological virtues it is not distinguished *according to substance*, but *according to the aspect of moving*, which aspect of moving indeed makes the diversity in the act and disposition and power of the substance moved, as is clear: for, although the true and the good are one and the same, nevertheless cognition and affection, and the cognitive and affective power, and the disposition of knowledge and of virtue have a difference among one another.

6. To that which is objected, that charity suffices for reward and merit; it must be said that charity is said to suffice for merit and for reward on account of the connection of the other virtues and dowries. For he who has charity has the other virtues, and he who has the dowry corresponding to it has the other dowries, and thus sufficiency in merit and reward, not by reason of charity alone, but[^p593-1] by reason of the other annexed virtues. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the other virtues are superfluous, or that charity alone is a virtue not distinct from the others, for this reason, that it does not have sufficiency by itself alone, but as it is joined with the others[^p593-2]. And through this it is clear that no one can sufficiently merit unless he hope and believe; but no one can ever be made ready and enabled to believe and to hope except by the mediation of faith and hope; likewise it is to be understood concerning the dowries of reward.

en: Verses 4 and following. *(P. 589, n. 4.)*

la: Rectius August., Epist. 167 (alias 29). — Hieronym. (vide opera Hieronymi, Epist. 132.) n. 18: *Et ut perfectiore brevitateque complectar, qui de virtute habeam notionem, quod ad recte vivendum attinet, virtus est caritas, qua id quod diligendum est, diligitur.* Cfr. infra III. Magistri, d. XXXVI. c. 5. De ratione definiti et definitionis cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *ambitus* codd. A H K Z *habitus*. *(P. 589, n. 5.)*

en: More correctly Augustine, Letter 167 (alias 29). — Jerome (see the works of Jerome, Letter 132) n. 18: "And to embrace it more fully and briefly, the notion which I have of virtue, as far as pertains to living rightly, is that virtue is charity, by which that which is to be loved is loved." Cf. below III [Sent.], the Master's [text], d. XXXVI, c. 5. On the account of the thing defined and of the definition cf. Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1. — A little below, for *ambitus* ["scope"] codices A H K Z [read] *habitus* ["disposition"]. *(P. 589, n. 5.)*

la: Libr. XV. c. 22. Vide supra pag. 173, nota 1. — Bernard., de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. n. 5, virtutem definit dignitatis in homine [i. e. liberi arbitrii] et scientiae fructum, « per quam ille inquiritur ac tenetur, qui omnium auctor et dator merito glorificetur de omnibus ». Ex qua definitione deinde (n. 6.) cogit, Deum diligendum esse ex toto corde etc., et in seqq. capitulis motiva et ordinem (c. 8. seqq.) amoris exponit. Cfr. infra dub. 4. et supra pag. 500, nota 6. — Seq. propos. illustratur verbis his, quae habentur in Tract. de caritate (inter opera Bernard.) c. 9: *Ab hac [caritate] omnis amor legitimus ordinem formamque sortitur, nec ordinata esse potest aliqua mentis affectio, nisi ab ea causam, modum et ordinem sumat.* Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6. *(P. 590, n. 1.)*

en: Book XV, c. 22. See above p. 173, note 1. — Bernard, On Loving God, c. 2. n. 5, defines virtue as the fruit of dignity in man [i.e. of free choice] and of knowledge, "by which he is sought and held who, the author and giver of all things, may deservedly be glorified for all things." From which definition he then (n. 6) concludes that God is to be loved with the whole heart etc., and in the following chapters (c. 8 ff.) sets forth the motives and order of love. Cf. below dub. 4. and above p. 500, note 6. — The following proposition is illustrated by these words, which are found in the Treatise on Charity (among the works of Bernard) c. 9: "From this [charity] every legitimate love receives its order and form, nor can any affection of the mind be ordered unless it takes from it its cause, mode, and order." Cf. below d. 36. q. 6. *(P. 590, n. 1.)*

la: Vers. 8. — In fine arg. pro *ab aliis* codd. F G I L (N primitus) T V aa *de aliis*. *(P. 590, n. 2.)*

en: Verse 8. — At the end of the argument, for *ab aliis* ["from the others"] codices F G I L (N originally) T V aa [read] *de aliis*. *(P. 590, n. 2.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Paulo ante edd. voci *obiectis* praefigunt *omnibus*. *(P. 590, n. 3.)*

en: Cf. above p. 470, note 8. — A little before, the editions prefix *omnibus* ["all"] to the word *obiectis* ["objects"]. *(P. 590, n. 3.)*

la: Bernard., Epist. 229. n. 13: *Audi et patrem Augustinum: Habe caritatem et fac quidquid vis.* Verba Augustini vide supra pag. 509, nota 3. — Seq. testimonium August. habetur I. de Doctr. christ. c. 4. n. 4. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. 1., c. 2, et Comment. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *differat* codd. et edd. 1, 2 *differt*. Mox pro *constans est* cod. A *constat* et dein in fine arg. *distinguatur* pro *distinguitur*. *(P. 590, n. 4.)*

en: Bernard, Letter 229. n. 13: "Hear also father Augustine: Have charity and do whatever you will." See the words of Augustine above p. 509, note 3. — The following testimony of Augustine is found in On Christian Doctrine I, c. 4. n. 4. Cf. I Sent., the Master's text, d. 1, c. 2, and the Commentary a. 2. q. 1. — A little below, for *differat* codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *differt*. Soon, for *constans est* codex A [reads] *constat*, and then at the end of the argument *distinguatur* for *distinguitur*. *(P. 590, n. 4.)*

la: Vers. 13. — Subinde pro *superponitur* edd. bis exhibent *supponitur* eliamque omittunt *habitis* post primum *superponitur*. In fine arg. pro *ab illis* codd. A K L Z *ab aliis*. *(P. 590, n. 5.)*

en: Verse 13. — Thereupon, for *superponitur* ["is set above"] the editions twice exhibit *supponitur* ["is set under"] and also omit *habitis* after the first *superponitur*. At the end of the argument, for *ab illis* codices A K L Z [read] *ab aliis*. *(P. 590, n. 5.)*

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. et 3, d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 4, ubi etiam principia argg. seqq. tanguntur. — Paulo superius pro *et secundum* edd. *quia secundum*, et pro *diversitatem rationis* cod. bb *diversas rationes*. *(P. 590, n. 6.)*

en: Cf. above d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. and 3, d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. and a. 2. q. 4, where also the principles of the following arguments are touched on. — A little above, for *et secundum* the editions [read] *quia secundum*, and for *diversitatem rationis* codex bb [reads] *diversas rationes*. *(P. 590, n. 6.)*

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — De distinctione concupiscibilis ab aliis viribus cfr. scholion supra ad d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. *(P. 590, n. 7.)*

en: See above d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. and d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — On the distinction of the concupiscible from the other powers cf. the scholion above on d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. *(P. 590, n. 7.)*

en: The editions [read] *distinguit*. *(P. 590, n. 8.)*

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 4. Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seq. et a. 3. q. 1. — Superius post *quandocumque aliqui* cod. U supplet *habitus*. *(P. 590, n. 9.)*

en: The Master's text, c. 4. See below d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. and following, and a. 3. q. 1. — Above, after *quandocumque aliqui* codex U supplies *habitus*. *(P. 590, n. 9.)*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *virtutibus* edd. *habitibus*; et dein *sed* pro *nisi*. Paulo inferius pro *propter* edd. *per*. Post *igitur* pro *igitur*, quod codd. A V exhibent, sed uti edd. abest, alii codd. *sibi*. *(P. 591, n. 1.)*

en: See II Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — A little above, for *virtutibus* the editions [read] *habitibus*; and then *sed* for *nisi*. A little below, for *propter* the editions [read] *per*. After *igitur*, for *igitur*, which codices A V exhibit but which is absent as in the editions, other codices [read] *sibi*. *(P. 591, n. 1.)*

la: Vers. 4 seqq. — Augustini sententia, in qua pro *affirmaverim* primum codd., edd. 1, 2 et Supplement. Sum. III. collat. 57. a. 1. exhibent *affirmaverint*, et pro *quodam vario affectu* Vat. et edd. 1, 2 substituerunt *quaternario affectu*, habetur I. de Morib. Eccles. cathol. c. 18. n. 15. *(P. 591, n. 2.)*

en: Verses 4 and following. — Augustine's sentence, in which for *affirmaverim* first the codices, editions 1, 2 and the Supplement to the Summa III, collation 57. a. 1. exhibit *affirmaverint*, and for *quodam vario affectu* the Vatican [edition] and editions 1, 2 substituted *quaternario affectu*, is found in On the Morals of the Catholic Church I, c. 18. n. 15. *(P. 591, n. 2.)*

la: Multi codd. hic et pluries infra ad *se invicem*, superius pro *innuerent* cod. A *invenirentur* et sequitur *auctoritates ponere*. *(P. 591, n. 3.)*

en: Many codices here and frequently below [read] *ad se invicem*; above, for *innuerent* codex A [reads] *invenirentur*, and there follows *auctoritates ponere*. *(P. 591, n. 3.)*

la: Cfr. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro *quod* habent codd. A H U Z bb, in aliis et edd. abest. *(P. 591, n. 4.)*

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 1. — A little before, for *quod* [thus read] codices A H U Z bb; in the others and in the editions it is absent. *(P. 591, n. 4.)*

la: Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. seq. et II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. — Quod deinde dicitur de Augustino confirmatur his verbis, quae sententiae eius supra laudatae praecedunt: *Quae virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit.* Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., ubi etiam, quid vera virtus sit, explicatur. *(P. 591, n. 5.)*

en: Cf. below d. 33. q. 1. and following, and II Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. in the body. — What is then said of Augustine is confirmed by these words, which precede his sentence praised above: "Which virtue leads us to the blessed life." Cf. above d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in the body, where also what true virtue is, is explained. *(P. 591, n. 5.)*

la: Pro *Est et hic* cod. A *Est etenim*, cod. F *Et secundum hoc est*, cod. V *Et propterea est*, cod. bb (a secunda manu) *Est adhuc*. *(P. 591, n. 6.)*

en: For *Est et hic* codex A [reads] *Est etenim*, codex F *Et secundum hoc est*, codex V *Et propterea est*, codex bb (by a second hand) *Est adhuc*. *(P. 591, n. 6.)*

la: Post *Unde* Vat. interiicit *quia*, et mox omittit *et* ante *quia caritas*. *(P. 591, n. 7.)*

en: After *Unde* the Vatican [edition] inserts *quia*, and soon omits *et* before *quia caritas*. *(P. 591, n. 7.)*

la: Vat. *sicut*. Paulo post pro *virium* codd. A K U *virtutum*, cod. V *habituum*. *(P. 591, n. 8.)*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *sicut*. A little after, for *virium* codices A K U [read] *virtutum*, codex V *habituum*. *(P. 591, n. 8.)*

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 171, nota 3. — Paulo ante pro *et movet* cod. V *verbo dicendo*. *(P. 591, n. 9.)*

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 171, note 3. — A little before, for *et movet* codex V [reads] *verbo dicendo*. *(P. 591, n. 9.)*

la: Vide infra d. 36. q. 6. — Quae hic proponuntur, Guliel. Mara, hic q. 1. explicat, exemplum adducens de metaphysica, quae licet scientia sit distincta ab aliis, tamen propter communitatem sui obiecti influit in alias scientias ipsisque impertit perfectionem. « Ita est, inquit Mara, et in virtutibus, quod illa virtus, quae maxime habet rationem finis, est virtus per se, et tamen imperat et ponit motivum et formam in omnibus; haec est caritas, cuius obiectum est bonum divinum... Ratio autem, quare imperat omnibus [est], quia voluntas, quae est subiectum caritatis, imperat omnibus potentiis; ita et eius habitus. item, sicut est in artibus, quod quanto magis ars appropinquat fini, imperat artibus [aliis], sicut ars militaris, quae est propinqua victoriae, imperat arti... sellariae et huiusmodi; sic est de caritate, quae, [quia] est fini propinquior, omnibus virtutibus imperat ». *(P. 592, n. 1.)*

en: See below d. 36. q. 6. — What is here proposed, William of Mare here q. 1. explains, adducing the example of metaphysics, which though it be a science distinct from the others, nevertheless on account of the community of its object flows into the other sciences and imparts perfection to them. "So it is also," says Mare, "in the virtues, that that virtue which most has the character of an end is virtue per se, and yet commands and places the motive and form in all; this is charity, whose object is the divine good... But the reason why it commands all [is], because the will, which is the subject of charity, commands all the powers; so also its disposition. Likewise, as it is in the arts, that the more an art approaches the end, it commands [the other] arts, as the military art, which is near to victory, commands the art of saddlery and the like; so it is concerning charity, which, [because] it is nearer to the end, commands all the virtues." *(P. 592, n. 1.)*

la: Intellige: in fundamentis. *(P. 592, n. 2.)*

en: Understand: in the fundamenta [the *Sed contra* arguments]. *(P. 592, n. 2.)*

la: Cod. Z supplet *virtutum*. Aliquanto inferius pro *perficitur* Vat. et nonnulli codd. *perficit*. *(P. 592, n. 3.)*

en: Codex Z supplies *virtutum*. Somewhat below, for *perficitur* the Vatican [edition] and some codices [read] *perficit*. *(P. 592, n. 3.)*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo ante pro *si in tribus*, quod habent codd. N aa, codd. U Z *et in tribus*, codd. K O *sic in tribus*, alii cum edd. *sed in tribus*. Paulo inferius pro *ab invicem*, quod habent codd. T bb, in aliis *ad invicem*. *(P. 592, n. 4.)*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. — A little before, for *si in tribus*, which codices N aa have, codices U Z [read] *et in tribus*, codices K O *sic in tribus*, the others with the editions *sed in tribus*. A little below, for *ab invicem*, which codices T bb have, in the others *ad invicem*. *(P. 592, n. 4.)*

la: Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1, ubi et triplex genus causae exponitur, quod in seq. solut. memoratur. De praedicatione causali vide supra pag. 328, nota 5. — Paulo superius pro *dat eis* edd. cum non paucis codd. perperam *dat ei*. *(P. 592, n. 5.)*

en: Cf. below a. 2. q. 1, where also the threefold genus of cause is set forth, which is recalled in the following solution. On causal predication see above p. 328, note 5. — A little above, for *dat eis* the editions with not a few codices wrongly [read] *dat ei*. *(P. 592, n. 5.)*

la: Vide infra q. 3. seq. et dub. 1. — Post pauca pro *quae est una* edd. *qui est una*. *(P. 592, n. 6.)*

en: See below q. 3. and following, and dub. 1. — After a little, for *quae est una* the editions [read] *qui est una*. *(P. 592, n. 6.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 18, nota 5 et pag. 171, nota 7. *(P. 592, n. 7.)*

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 27. n. 1. — Paulo superius pro *ad illam et in illa*, ut etiam in Vat. legitur, aliae edd. cum codd. exhibent *ad illa et in illis*, quae lectio, etsi minus congrua, intelligi posset de duobus mandatis unius caritatis. In fine solut. pro *acceptionem* edd. *acceptationem*. *(P. 592, n. 8.)*

en: Book II of the Homilies on the Gospel, homily 27. n. 1. — A little above, for *ad illam et in illa*, as is also read in the Vatican [edition], the other editions with the codices exhibit *ad illa et in illis*, which reading, though less fitting, could be understood of the two commandments of the one charity. At the end of the solution, for *acceptionem* the editions [read] *acceptationem*. *(P. 592, n. 8.)*

la: Sive per negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — De virtute cardinali vide infra d. 33. q. 1. seqq. — Proxime ante multi codd. omittunt *virtutum*. *(P. 592, n. 9.)*

en: That is, by negation. Cf. vol. I, p. 87, note 4. — On cardinal virtue see below d. 33. q. 1. and following. — Immediately before, many codices omit *virtutum*. *(P. 592, n. 9.)*

la: Codd. A K T *sed etiam*. Paulo superius ante *praemio* codd. U V Z repetunt *in*. Aliquanto inferius pro *per se sola* codd. A Z bb habent *per se solam*, et subinde cod. A voculae *sed* subiicit *etiam*. *(P. 593, n. 1.)*

en: Codices A K T [read] *sed etiam*. A little above, before *praemio* codices U V Z repeat *in*. Somewhat below, for *per se sola* codices A Z bb have *per se solam*, and thereupon codex A adds *etiam* to the little word *sed*. *(P. 593, n. 1.)*

latin_scholion:
**I.** De *nomine* caritatis cfr. I. Sent. Prolog. dub. 4, d. 17. p. I. q. 3, et infra q. 3. in corp. — De *differentia* inter amorem, dilectionem et caritatem cfr. hic dub. 1, et I. Sent. d. 10. dub. 1. — De *definitionibus* caritatis hic dub. 1. — De *amore amicitiae, concupiscentiae et complacentiae* I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2, et infra q. 2. ad 6, a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 29. dub. 1. — De *obiecto formali et materiali* hic et infra a. 2. q. 2. 3. 4. et d. 28. per totam et alibi passim. — De *caritate ut habitu creato* I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. et seqq.

**II.** In conclusione omnes posteriores Scholastici conveniunt (cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6.); item, quod *subiectum* caritatis sit voluntas rationalis (cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3.). Passim autem S. Bonav. secundum antiquum modum loquendi etiam dicit, eam esse in concupiscibili, quia, ut supra in scholio (d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.) dictum est, in ipsa voluntate distinguit vim concupiscibilem et irascibilem. Unde non nisi in modo loquendi a nostro auctore recedit S. Thom., qui docet (loc. cit.): « Quidam autem dicunt, caritatem in concupiscibili esse, quod esse non potest, quia concupiscibilis pars appetitus sensitivae est partis. Et si dicatur concupiscibilis humana, hoc non habet nisi per participationem rationis; nisi forte ipsam voluntatem aequivoce irascibilem et concupiscibilem vocare vellent ».

**III.** De hac (I.) quaestione: Scot. (hanc et seq. q. iungendo), hic q. unica n. 1-9. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 23. a. 1; Qq. disp. de caritate a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**IV.** Solutio sequentis (2.) quaestionis eruitur ex hoc principio communiter recepto, quod actus et habitus non specificantur nisi ex formali diversitate obiecti. De eadem specialiter agunt: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. loc. cit. a. 4; Qq. disp. de caritate a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the *name* of charity cf. I Sent. Prologue dub. 4, d. 17. p. I. q. 3, and below q. 3. in the body. — Concerning the *difference* between love (*amor*), love (*dilectio*) and charity cf. here dub. 1, and I Sent. d. 10. dub. 1. — Concerning the *definitions* of charity here dub. 1. — Concerning the love of *friendship, of concupiscence, and of complacency* I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2, and below q. 2. ad 6, a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 29. dub. 1. — Concerning the *formal and material object* here and below a. 2. q. 2. 3. 4. and d. 28. throughout and elsewhere passim. — Concerning *charity as a created disposition* I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. and following.

**II.** In the conclusion all the later Scholastics agree (cf. below d. 36. q. 6.); likewise, that the *subject* of charity is the rational will (cf. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3.). But frequently St. Bonaventure, according to the ancient manner of speaking, also says that it is in the concupiscible, because, as was said above in the scholion (d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.), in the will itself he distinguishes the concupiscible and irascible power. Hence St. Thomas departs from our author only in the manner of speaking, who teaches (loc. cit.): "But some say that charity is in the concupiscible, which it cannot be, because the concupiscible is a part of the sensitive appetite. And if the concupiscible be called human, this it has only through participation in reason; unless perhaps they should wish to call the will itself equivocally irascible and concupiscible."

**III.** On this (the first) question: Scotus (joining this and the following question), here q. unica n. 1-9. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 2; S. II. II. q. 23. a. 1; Disputed Questions on Charity a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following question here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following question here a. 6. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. unica.

**IV.** The solution of the following (the second) question is drawn from this commonly received principle, that acts and dispositions are specified only from the formal diversity of the object. On this same [point] specially treat: St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 1; St. [Thomas] loc. cit. a. 4; Disputed Questions on Charity a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{589,590,591,592,593}-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 40998–41263) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. English freshly translated, literal. PDF authoritative for the Respondeo, Ad-replies, scholion, and all footers (Vol III two-column override).

**Page span.** Opens at the foot of p.589 (ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I heading + objections 1–2); body runs p.590 (objections 3–6, *Sed contra* 1–6), p.591 (Conclusio, Respondeo: opinio 1 + opinio 2 with refutations), p.592 (opinio 3 / conclusio + Ad 1–5), p.593 (Ad 5 tail, Ad 6, Scholion I–IV). pdf = printed + 22 (PDF 611–615).

**Alignment.** Verified against the d27-divisio hand-off: ARTICULUS I raw 40994, QUAESTIO I raw 40998. Opener = *Circa primum de quatuor sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum caritas sit habitus ab aliis virtutibus distinctus, an omnibus virtutibus communis et generalis.* Aligned. q2 opener confirmed at raw 41264: *Secundo quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus* (printed title *Utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus*). q1 span = raw 40998–41263.

**Apparatus = 31 entries**, per-page restart:
- **p.589 nn.4–5** (hand-off from divisio; divisio carried nn.1–3): n.4 *Vers. 4 seqq.*; n.5 *Boetius/Rectius August., Epist. 167 — Hieronym. Epist. 132*.
- **p.590 nn.1–9** (all q1): n.1 *Libr. XV c.22 / Bernard. de Dilig. Deo*; n.2 *Vers. 8*; n.3 *Cfr. supra pag.470*; n.4 *Bernard. Epist. 229*; n.5 *Vers. 13*; n.6 *Cfr. supra d.23*; n.7 *Vide supra d.23*; n.8 *Edd. distinguit*; n.9 *Lit. Magistri c.4*.
- **p.591 nn.1–9** (all q1).
- **p.592 nn.1–9** (all q1).
- **p.593 nn.1–2** (q1's Ad-6 footers; **n.3 onward on p.593 belongs to q2** — the page-593 footer block is shared at the q1/q2 seam): n.1 *Codd. A K T sed etiam… per se solam*; n.2 *Cfr. infra d.33 q.1 ad 1*.

**Scholion present** (I–IV), translated. II cross-refers to the d.26 a.2 q.5 scholion on the concupiscible/will. No `[^N]` markers inside the scholion (pure cross-references).

**Cross-chunk footer forward to q2:** on shared p.593, q2 receives footers nn.3+ (n.3 *Vide supra pag. 368…*, n.4 *Vide hic lit. Magistri c.2*, n.5 *Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c.2 et 3*). q1's share of p.593 = nn.1–2 only.

**[?] flags:** none. All readings resolved against the 450 dpi PDF bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 593 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus. Et quod habeat per species multiplicari, videtur:

1. *Primo* per *obiecta*: quoniam circa diversa volita et obiecta diversae sunt voluntates; sicut enim vult Augustinus[^3], voluntates diversificantur secundum volita; sed caritas est amor Dei et proximi: si ergo Deus et proximus distant distantia infinita, necesse est, habitum regulantem animum ad amandum Deum et amandum proximum esse alium et alium.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *praecepta*: quia, ubi sunt diversa praecepta, diversi sunt habitus habilitantes animam ad illa praecepta implenda, maxime cum ipsis praeceptis praecipiuntur opera virtutum: si ergo circa actum caritatis duo consistunt mandata[^4], videtur, quod virtus caritatis non sit una.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *modos diligendi*: alius enim est modus diligendi Deum quam diligendi proximum — Deum enim debet unusquisque diligere plus quam se *et ex toto corde*, sed proximum sicut se ipsum et ex parte[^5] — si ergo habitus virtutis datur ad modificandum actum, cum
<!-- page 594 -->
alius et alius sit hinc et inde modus, alius et alius erit hinc et inde habitus.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per *simile*: quia sapientia, quae est de aeternis, alius est habitus et aliud donum quam scientia, quae est de temporalibus[^6]: et similiter *latria*, quae est cultus Dei, est alia virtus quam *dulia*, quae est honor proximi: ergo pari ratione alia et alia virtus erit, qua diligitur proximus, et qua diligitur Deus.

5. Item, plus differt vita activa a contemplativa, quam differant operationes eiusdem vitae ad se invicem: ergo similiter plus differt virtus, quae dirigit hominem ad vitam contemplativam, ab ea quae dirigit ad vitam activam, quam duae virtutes, quae dirigunt ad vitam contemplativam. Sed caritas, secundum quod est amor Dei, dirigit ad vitam contemplativam, prout est amor proximi, ad vitam activam: cum ergo caritas, secundum quod est amor Dei, differat a fide[^7], licet utraque harum sit virtus dirigens ad vitam contemplativam; videtur multo fortius, quod amor Dei et proximi ab invicem distinguuntur.

6. Item, amor amicitiae et amor concupiscentiae sunt diversae species amoris[^8]; sed caritas amat Deum amore concupiscentiae, quia facit Deum desiderare et appetere, proximum vero amore amicitiae: si ergo illae sunt diversae affectiones et diversae dilectiones, videtur, quod virtus caritatis habeat multiplicari per species.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut una est summa Veritas, sic una est summa Bonitas; et sicut fides omnino assentit summae Veritati et propter illam credit quidquid credit, sic caritas omnino adhaeret summae Bonitati et propter illam amat quidquid amat: ergo sicut fides est una virtus et unus habitus respectu credendorum[^9], ita et caritas respectu amandorum.

2. Item, sicut se habet rationalis ad verum, et irascibilis ad arduum, sic se habet concupiscibilis ad bonum[^10]; et sicut aliae duae vires habent unitatem in se, sic et ipsa concupiscibilis; sed rationalis in credendo verum non habet perfici nisi una virtute, similiter et irascibilis in exspectando arduum: ergo similiter videtur, quod concupiscibilis in amando bonum non habeat nisi unam solam virtutem. Sed haec est caritas: ergo etc.

3. Item, quanto aliquid est magis unitivum, tanto magis habet in se unitatem; sed virtus caritatis inter ceteras virtutes est praecipue unitiva, cum ipsa sit *vinculum perfectionis*, sicut dicitur ad Colossenses tertio[^11]: ergo videtur, quod caritas inter ceteras virtutes teneat unitatem: ergo non habet subdividi per alias species.

4. Item, in omni genere, in quo contingit reperire ordinem motorum, necesse est esse statum in uno[^12]; sed caritas omnibus virtutibus animae imperat et omnes movet, tam theologicas quam cardinales: ergo necesse est, ipsam habere unitatem: non ergo multiplicatur per species.

> **Conclusio.** Habitus caritatis est unus atque indivisus secundum speciem, licet secundum numerum multiplicetur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod habitus caritatis est unus et indivisus secundum speciem, licet secundum numerum plurificetur in diversis. — In diversis enim animabus plures sunt caritates, cum habitus et accidentia numerentur penes subiecta[^13]. In omnibus autem, in quibus est, est una caritas secundum speciem, propter hoc quod unitas habitus venit ab unitate obiecti et actus principalis; et hoc quidem est reperire in caritate, si quis diligenter velit attendere. — Actus enim caritatis est diligere, diligere autem idem est, quod velle bonum[^14]. Cum ergo caritas diligit aliquem, bonum optat ei quem diligit; istud autem bonum, quod caritas optat, unum solum est, videlicet bonum aeternum et bonum summum. Istud autem summum bonum aliquando homo per caritatem optat Deo, aliquando sibi, aliquando proximo. Secundum quod optat ipsum ipsi Deo, dicitur diligere Deum, quia vult, quod ipse Deus sit summum bonum et quod habeat omne bonum per essentiam. Secundum quod optat illud proximo, sic dicitur diligere proximum, quia vult, quod habeat illud bonum per gratiam et gloriam. Secundum quod optat illud sibi, sic dicitur diligere se ipsum. — Generaliter ergo in actu dilectionis ipsius caritatis unum est bonum optatum, licet multa sint, quibus illud bonum optatur; et illud est obiectum[^15] prin<!-- page 595 -->cipale ipsius habitus diligendi, quoniam ipsum propter se optatur a caritate, ita quod habet rationem obiecti principaliter moventis et finis quietantis. Et quia illud est unum solum, sive comparetur ad se, sive comparetur ad eum qui habet caritatem, sive comparetur ad eius proximum; hinc est, quod caritatis habitus habet esse unus[^16]. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod obiecta sunt diversa; iam patet responsio: quia, licet caritas diligat proximum, tamen proximus non est principale obiectum, sed est illud, ad quod principale obiectum caritatis comparatur. Quia enim proximus est imago Dei et capax ipsius Dei[^17]; ideo virtus caritatis, quae desiderat, summum Bonum haberi ab omni eo qui potest ipsum habere et ipso frui, appetit, summum Bonum a proximo haberi, sicut et ab eo, in quo est; et hoc non est aliud quam amare proximum per caritatis affectum. Et si tu obiicias, quod caritas non tantum facit, quod homo velit proximo bonum, quod Deus est, sed etiam omne aliud bonum: dicendum, quod hoc non est principaliter et elicitive, sed quasi consequenter et imperative; et hoc manifestabitur infra[^18] magis aperte, cum agetur de his quae sunt diligenda ex caritate.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod duo sunt praecepta caritatis; dicendum, quod illa duo praecepta non sunt diversa formaliter, sed solum materialiter, quia « unum illorum clauditur in altero », secundum quod Magister dicit in littera[^19]: et propter hoc non sequitur, quod habitus caritatis diversificetur secundum formam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de diversitate modorum, dicendum, quod diversitas illorum[^20] modorum est ex diversitate comparationum illius summi Boni, quod potest diligi vel optari sibi ipsi, et potest optari creaturae, quae nata est in ipso beatificari: unde diversitas illorum modorum non venit ex diversitate principalis obiecti, sed ex varia comparatione ipsius. Et propterea non sequitur, quod sit diversitas in virtute modificante, quia diversitas comparationis obiecti non sufficit ad faciendum habitum diversificari[^21].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia et scientia, latria et dulia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia sapientia negotiatur de aeternis secundum rationes aeternas, et scientia de temporalibus secundum rationes temporales; et ideo diversas rationes habent, secundum quas diriguntur et in actibus suis regulantur[^22]. Sed caritas unam solam habet rationem moventem, videlicet ipsam summam Bonitatem, quae cum sit summe amabilis, et prout est in se et prout participatur a creatura, utroque modo caritas eam amat, et sic habet unam rationem motivam; et propterea non debet sic diversificari sicut sapientia et scientia. — Eodem modo dicendum est de latria et de dulia, sicut in praecedentibus est ostensum distinctione nona[^23].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de differentia contemplativae et activae, dicendum, quod contemplativa et activa vita nominat statum sive virtutis exercitium; diversitas autem status vel exercitii non inducit diversitatem in habitu, sed diversitas principalis obiecti[^24]. Unde eaedem virtutes secundum diversos status et diversum exercitium dirigunt hominem in utraque vita, sicut fides dirigit hominem in contemplationem et operationem. Propter hoc non sequitur, quod caritas, eo quod ad activam vitam et contemplativam dirigat et habilitet, sit virtus duplex.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de amore amicitiae et concupiscentiae, dicendum, quod sicut dictum est in praecedentibus[^25] de actu confidentiae et exspectationis, quod unus habet ex altero oriri, et unus alium quodam modo includit; sic amor amicitiae quodam modo includit amorem concupiscentiae. Qui enim est amicus alii, optat ei aliquod bonum: et dum optat ei illud bonum, et ipsum bonum optatum facit concupiscere et eidem facit adhaerere. Unde sicut spes innititur summae Immensitati sive Potestati, sic caritas adhaeret et adhaerere facit summae Bonitati; et iste est eius actus primus et unicus, ex quo oritur et in quo includitur amor concupiscentiae et amor amicitiae. Et propterea, sicut spes non diversificatur propter actum confidentiae et exspectationis, sic nec caritas propter actum amicitiae et concupiscentiae. — Quod autem adhaerere Deo sit actus caritatis principalis, Augustinus satis expresse dicit in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae[^26], et Apo<!-- page 596 -->stolus primae ad Corinthios sexto: *Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est*; et Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus: « Amorem sive divinum, sive naturalem, sive intellectualem unitivam quandam dicimus virtutem ». Et quia unum est illud bonum, cui principaliter caritas unit; hinc est, quod habitus caritatis unitatem habet, sicut prius ostensum est[^1].

english:
### Question II. *Whether the habit of charity is one and indivisible, or multiplied according to species.*

Secondly it is asked whether the habit of charity is one and indivisible, or multiplied according to species. And that it is multiplied according to species, it seems:

1. *First*, from its *objects*: since with respect to diverse things-willed and objects the acts of will are diverse; for as Augustine holds[^3], acts of will are diversified according to the things willed; but charity is the love of God and of neighbor: if therefore God and neighbor are separated by an infinite distance, the habit regulating the mind to loving God and to loving neighbor must of necessity be one and another.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *precepts*: for where there are diverse precepts, there are diverse habits fitting the soul to fulfill those precepts, especially since by the precepts themselves the works of the virtues are commanded: if therefore concerning the act of charity there stand two commandments[^4], it seems that the virtue of charity is not one.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *modes of loving*: for the mode of loving God is one thing, and of loving neighbor another — for each one ought to love God more than himself and *with his whole heart*, but his neighbor as himself and in part[^5] — if therefore the habit of virtue is given for modifying the act, since
the mode is one and another on this side and on that, the habit too will be one and another on this side and on that.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown from a *parallel*: for wisdom, which is about eternal things, is one habit and one gift, and knowledge, which is about temporal things, is another[^6]: and likewise *latria*, which is the worship of God, is one virtue, and *dulia*, which is the honor of neighbor, is another: therefore by parallel reasoning the virtue by which the neighbor is loved, and that by which God is loved, will be one and another.

5. Likewise, the active life differs from the contemplative more than the operations of the same life differ from one another: therefore likewise the virtue which directs a man to the contemplative life differs from that which directs to the active life more than two virtues which direct to the contemplative life. But charity, insofar as it is the love of God, directs to the contemplative life, and insofar as it is the love of neighbor, to the active life: since therefore charity, insofar as it is the love of God, differs from faith[^7], although each of these is a virtue directing to the contemplative life; it seems much more strongly that the love of God and of neighbor are distinguished from one another.

6. Likewise, the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence are diverse species of love[^8]; but charity loves God with the love of concupiscence, because it makes God desired and sought after, but the neighbor with the love of friendship: if therefore those are diverse affections and diverse acts of love, it seems that the virtue of charity is multiplied according to species.

**On the contrary:** 1. As there is one supreme Truth, so there is one supreme Goodness; and as faith wholly assents to the supreme Truth and on account of it believes whatever it believes, so charity wholly adheres to the supreme Goodness and on account of it loves whatever it loves: therefore as faith is one virtue and one habit with respect to things to be believed[^9], so also is charity with respect to things to be loved.

2. Likewise, as the rational [power] stands to the true, and the irascible to the arduous, so the concupiscible stands to the good[^10]; and as the other two powers have unity in themselves, so too the concupiscible itself; but the rational in believing the true is perfected only by one virtue, and likewise the irascible in awaiting the arduous: therefore likewise it seems that the concupiscible in loving the good has only one single virtue. But this is charity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more unitive a thing is, the more it has unity in itself; but the virtue of charity among the other virtues is preeminently unitive, since it is the *bond of perfection*, as is said in the third chapter to the Colossians[^11]: therefore it seems that charity among the other virtues holds unity: therefore it is not to be subdivided into other species.

4. Likewise, in every genus in which it happens to find an order of movers, there must of necessity be a stopping-point in one[^12]; but charity commands all the virtues of the soul and moves them all, both theological and cardinal: therefore it is necessary that it have unity: it is not therefore multiplied according to species.

> **Conclusion.** The habit of charity is one and indivisible according to species, although it is multiplied according to number.

**I respond:** It must be said that the habit of charity is one and indivisible according to species, although according to number it is multiplied in diverse [subjects]. — For in diverse souls there are several charities, since habits and accidents are numbered according to their subjects[^13]. But in all in whom it exists, charity is one according to species, on account of this, that the unity of the habit comes from the unity of the object and of the principal act; and this indeed is to be found in charity, if one is willing to attend diligently. — For the act of charity is to love, and to love is the same as to will the good[^14]. When therefore charity loves someone, it wishes the good for him whom it loves; but this good which charity wishes is one only, namely the eternal good and the supreme good. But this supreme good a man sometimes through charity wishes to God, sometimes to himself, sometimes to his neighbor. Insofar as he wishes it to God himself, he is said to love God, because he wills that God himself be the supreme good and that he have every good by essence. Insofar as he wishes it to his neighbor, he is so said to love his neighbor, because he wills that he have that good through grace and glory. Insofar as he wishes it to himself, he is so said to love himself. — Generally, therefore, in the act of love of charity itself the good wished is one, although there be many to whom that good is wished; and that is the principal object[^15] of the very habit of loving, since it is wished for its own sake by charity, so that it has the character of the object that principally moves and of the end that brings rest. And because that is one only, whether it be compared to itself, or compared to him who has charity, or compared to his neighbor; hence it is that the habit of charity is one[^16]. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the objects are diverse; the answer is now clear: for although charity loves the neighbor, yet the neighbor is not the principal object, but is that to which the principal object of charity is compared. For because the neighbor is the image of God and capable of God himself[^17]; therefore the virtue of charity, which desires that the supreme Good be had by everyone who can have it and enjoy it, seeks that the supreme Good be had by the neighbor, just as also by him in whom it is; and this is nothing other than to love the neighbor by the affection of charity. And if you object that charity does not only bring it about that a man wills for his neighbor the good which is God, but also every other good: it must be said that this is not principally and elicitively, but as it were consequently and imperatively; and this will be shown below[^18] more openly, when it shall be treated of those things which are to be loved out of charity.

2. To that which is objected, that there are two precepts of charity; it must be said that those two precepts are not diverse formally, but only materially, because « one of them is contained in the other », as the Master says in the text[^19]: and on account of this it does not follow that the habit of charity is diversified according to form.

3. To that which is objected concerning the diversity of modes, it must be said that the diversity of those[^20] modes is from the diversity of the comparisons of that supreme Good, which can be loved or wished for itself, and can be wished for the creature, which is born to be beatified in it: hence the diversity of those modes does not come from the diversity of the principal object, but from the varied comparison of it. And therefore it does not follow that there is diversity in the modifying virtue, because diversity of the comparison of the object does not suffice to make the habit be diversified[^21].

4. To that which is objected concerning wisdom and knowledge, latria and dulia; it must be said that it is not the same case: for wisdom deals with eternal things according to eternal accounts, and knowledge with temporal things according to temporal accounts; and therefore they have diverse accounts, according to which they are directed and in their acts regulated[^22]. But charity has one single moving account, namely the supreme Goodness itself, which, since it is supremely lovable, both as it is in itself and as it is participated by the creature, in both ways charity loves it, and thus has one motive account; and therefore it ought not to be diversified as wisdom and knowledge are. — In the same manner it must be said of latria and of dulia, as was shown in what preceded, in the ninth distinction[^23].

5. To that which is objected concerning the difference of the contemplative and the active, it must be said that the contemplative and the active life name a state or exercise of virtue; but diversity of state or of exercise does not induce diversity in the habit, but [only] diversity of the principal object[^24]. Hence the same virtues according to diverse states and diverse exercise direct a man in either life, just as faith directs a man in contemplation and in operation. On account of this it does not follow that charity, because it directs and fits one to the active and to the contemplative life, is a twofold virtue.

6. To that which is last objected concerning the love of friendship and of concupiscence, it must be said that, as was said in what preceded[^25] concerning the act of confidence and of expectation, that one has to arise from the other, and one in some way includes the other; so the love of friendship in some way includes the love of concupiscence. For he who is a friend to another wishes him some good: and while he wishes him that good, he also makes the good itself wished for to be desired and makes him cling to it. Hence as hope rests upon the supreme Immensity or Power, so charity adheres and makes one adhere to the supreme Goodness; and this is its first and only act, from which arises and in which is included the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship. And therefore, as hope is not diversified on account of the act of confidence and of expectation, so neither is charity on account of the act of friendship and of concupiscence. — But that to adhere to God is the principal act of charity, Augustine says quite expressly in the book *On the Morals of the Church*[^26], and the Apostle in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the sixth [chapter]: *He who adheres to God is one spirit*; and Dionysius in *On the Divine Names*: « Love, whether divine, or natural, or intellectual, we call a certain unitive power ». And because that good is one, to which charity principally unites; hence it is that the habit of charity has unity, as was shown before[^1].

la: *Vide supra pag. 368, nota 1, et l. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 25. — De minore cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et infra dub. 1. — In hoc arg. Vat. bis voci* voluntates *adiungit* vel virtutes. *(P. 593, n. 3.)*

en: See above p. 368, note 1, and the book *On Free Choice* c. 12, n. 25. — On the minor [premise] cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2, and below dub. 1. — In this argument the Vatican [edition] twice adds to the word *voluntates* the words *vel virtutes*. *(P. 593, n. 3.)*

la: *Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et Comment. hic dub. 2. — Circa initium arg. Vat. cum nonnullis codd. ante* diversi *inserit* ibi. *Deinde pro* cum ipsis *codd. G H V Z exhibent* cum illis, *cod. A* cum illis ipsis. *(P. 593, n. 4.)*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2, and the Commentary here, dub. 2. — Near the beginning of the argument the Vatican [edition], with some codices, inserts *ibi* before *diversi*. Then for *cum ipsis* codices G H V Z give *cum illis*, codex A *cum illis ipsis*. *(P. 593, n. 4.)*

la: *Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 5, et Comment. infra d. 29. passim. — Paulo inferius pro* modificandum *[cfr. supra pag. 388, nota 2.] edd. 1, 2 et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 57. a. 5.* movendum. *(P. 593, n. 5.)*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2 and 5, and the Commentary below at d. 29, throughout. — A little below, for *modificandum* [cf. above p. 388, note 2] editions 1 and 2 and the *Supplement to the Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 57 a. 5, read *movendum*. *(P. 593, n. 5.)*

la: *Vide infra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. I. et d. 35. q. I. seq. De latria et dulia cfr. supra d. 9. a. 2. q. 4. — Mox pro* honor proximi *multi codd. et edd. 1, 2* amor proximi; *peram. (P. 594, n. 1.)*

en: See below d. 34 p. 1 a. 2 q. 1, and d. 35 q. 1 and following. On latria and dulia cf. above d. 9 a. 2 q. 4. — Presently, for *honor proximi* many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *amor proximi*; wrongly. *(P. 594, n. 1.)*

la: *Vide quaest. praeced. (P. 594, n. 2.)*

en: See the preceding question. *(P. 594, n. 2.)*

la: *Cfr. Aristot., II. Prior. c. 22. (c. 24.), ubi docetur, quod amor amicitiae et concupiscentiae se habeant sicut finis et ea quae sunt ad finem. (P. 594, n. 3.)*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Prior [Analytics]* II c. 22 (c. 24), where it is taught that the love of friendship and of concupiscence are related as the end and the things which are toward the end. *(P. 594, n. 3.)*

la: *Ut dictum est supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. — Superius pro* et sicut fides *edd.* quia sicut fides. *(P. 594, n. 4.)*

en: As was said above d. 23 a. 1 q. 3. — Higher up, for *et sicut fides* the editions [read] *quia sicut fides*. *(P. 594, n. 4.)*

la: *Vers. 14. — Idem insinuat auctor libri de Causis in proposit. 17, ubi docet, quod « quanto plus [virtus] approximat uni puro et vero, fit vehementior eius unitas ». — Paulo post pro* per alias *cod. A* in alias. *(P. 594, n. 6.)*

en: Verse 14. — The same is hinted by the author of the *Book of Causes* in proposition 17, where he teaches that « the more [a power] approaches the one, pure, and true, the more vehement its unity becomes ». — A little after, for *per alias* codex A [reads] *in alias*. *(P. 594, n. 6.)*

la: *Vide Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 3. seqq. (c. 1.), et II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (l. brevior, c. 2.); cfr. etiam supra pag. 307, nota 3. — De minori vide supra pag. 592, nota 1. (P. 594, n. 7.)*

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* VII text 3 ff. (c. 1), and *Metaphysics* II text 5 ff. (the shorter book, c. 2); cf. also above p. 307, note 3. — On the minor [premise] see above p. 592, note 1. *(P. 594, n. 7.)*

la: *Cfr. supra pag. 192, nota 2, et tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. Cfr. etiam quae supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 6. de fide dicuntur. — Paulo superius edd. omittunt* in diversis *post* plurificetur. *(P. 594, n. 8.)*

en: Cf. above p. 192, note 2, and tome II p. 119, note 8. Cf. also what is said above in the text of the Master, d. XXIII c. 6, concerning faith. — A little higher up the editions omit *in diversis* after *plurificetur*. *(P. 594, n. 8.)*

la: *Ut docet Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 574, nota 5. (P. 594, n. 9.)*

en: As Aristotle teaches, on whom see above p. 574, note 5. *(P. 594, n. 9.)*

la: *Pro* obiectum *codd. A K et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 57. a. 5, exhibent* bonum. *In enuntiato seq. post* est unum *cod. G supplet* obiectum. *(P. 594, n. 10.)*

en: For *obiectum* codices A K and the *Supplement to the Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 57 a. 5, give *bonum*. In the following statement, after *est unum* codex G supplies *obiectum*. *(P. 594, n. 10.)*

en: Cf. above d. 23 a. 1 q. 3 and d. 26 a. 1 q. 2. — The Vatican [edition reads] *unius*. *(P. 595, n. 1.)*

la: *August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11: Eo quippe ipso [mens] imago eius est, quo eius capax est eiusque particeps esse potest. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 80, nota 4, II. Sent. d. 16. per totam. (P. 595, n. 2.)*

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV c. 8 n. 11: « By this very thing [the mind] is his image, that it is capable of him and can be a partaker of him ». Cf. tome I p. 80, note 4; II *Sent.* d. 16, throughout. *(P. 595, n. 2.)*

la: *Dist. 28. q. I. seqq. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. (P. 595, n. 3.)*

en: Distinction 28, q. 1 and following. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 3. *(P. 595, n. 3.)*

en: Codices A K [read] *illa.* *(P. 595, n. 5.)*

la: *Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. (P. 595, n. 6.)*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 5. *(P. 595, n. 6.)*

la: *Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et 3. — Pro* diriguntur *cod. G* distinguuntur. *(P. 595, n. 7.)*

en: Cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2 and 3. — For *diriguntur* ("are directed") cod. G [reads] *distinguuntur* ("are distinguished"). *(P. 595, n. 7.)*

la: *Art. 2. q. 4. — Superius pro* a creatura *edd.* in creatura. *(P. 595, n. 8.)*

en: Art. 2, q. 4. — Above, for *a creatura* ("by the creature") the editions [read] *in creatura* ("in the creature"). *(P. 595, n. 8.)*

la: *Ex eodem principio S. Doctor, II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. deducit, distinctionem intellectus in* speculativum *et* practicum *non esse nisi secundum diversitatem* status. *(P. 595, n. 9.)*

en: From the same principle the Holy Doctor, II *Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, deduces that the distinction of the intellect into *speculative* and *practical* is only according to the diversity of *state.* *(P. 595, n. 9.)*

la: *Dist. 26. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et a. 2. q. 3. ad 3. — Paulo inferius post* et dum optat *codd. G H I L T V Z aa (bb a secunda manu) nec non edd. 1, 2 et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. non repetunt* ei. *(P. 595, n. 10.)*

en: Dist. 26, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 and a. 2, q. 3, ad 3. — A little below, after *et dum optat* the codices G H I L T V Z aa (bb by a second hand), as well as editions 1, 2 and the Supplement of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, do not repeat *ei.* *(P. 595, n. 10.)*

la: *Libr. I. c. 14. n. 24: Nam quid erit aliud optimum hominis, nisi cui adhaerere est beatissimum? Id autem est solus Deus, cui haerere certe non valemus nisi dilectione, amore, caritate. Ibid. c. 16. n. 26: Nam enim Paulus tantum dicit, Deo nos esse debere subunctos, ita ut in medio quod separet nihil sit [Rom. 8, 35.]? Nonne et Propheta commodissime hoc et brevissime significat, cum dicit:* Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est *[Ps. 72, 28.]. (P. 595, n. 11.)*

en: Book I, c. 14, n. 24: For what else will be the best of man, save that to which to adhere is most blessed? But that is God alone, to whom indeed we cannot cling save by love, by affection, by charity. Ibid., c. 16, n. 26: For does not Paul say only that we ought to be joined to God, so that there be nothing in between to separate us [Rom. 8:35]? Does not the Prophet too most aptly and most briefly signify this when he says: *But for me to adhere to God is good* [Ps. 72:28]. *(P. 595, n. 11.)*

la: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (P. 596, n. 1.)*

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. *(P. 596, n. 1.)*

translators_notes:
**Page span.** Opens at the foot of p.593 (QUAESTIO II heading + opener *Secundo quaeritur…* + objections 1, 2, into 3); body runs p.594 (objections 3–6, *Sed contra* 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo opening), p.595 (Respondeo continuation + Ad 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), and p.596 top-right (final sentence of Ad 6 / Respondeo close: Augustine *de Moribus*, 1 Cor 6, Dionysius *de Div. Nom.*). pdf = printed + 22 (PDF 615–618). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion (OCR cascade-fragments the Respondeo and footers).

**Alignment.** VERIFIED. Raw opener at line 41262, *Secundo quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus* — matches the assigned title. q3 opener (*Tertio quaeritur… utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum*) found at raw line 41425 (QUAESTIO III header) — sets q2's end at line 41424 (`…dicimus vir-` / `…sicut prius ostensum est`). No auto-chunker q-swap.

**Scholion: ABSENT (sibling-scholion redirect).** q2 has no SCHOLION of its own (no SCHOLION header between raw 41262–41424; the next SCHOLION belongs to q3 at raw ~41598). The p.593-foot scholion §I–IV is held by sibling **d27-a1-q1**, whose §IV (*Solutio sequentis (2.) quaestionis eruitur…*) IS q2's scholion content. Consistently, q2's closing footnote [^1] (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) redirects there. `has_scholion: false`.

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (19 entries).**
- **p.593 (hand-off received):** q2 receives nn.3, 4, 5 ([^3]–[^5]); q1 kept p.593 nn.1–2. (n.1 = *Codd. A K T sed etiam…*; n.2 = *Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 36. q. 1.* — both q1's.)
- **p.594:** nn.1–10 ([^6]–[^15]) all q2's (10 footers, full page).
- **p.595:** ALL eleven footers nn.1–11 are q2's. nn.1–4 → [^16]–[^19] (Respondeo: *esse unus*, *imago Dei*, *infra*, *in littera*). **nn.5–11 → [^20]–[^26], BACKFILLED in the d.21–d.30 polish gate (2026-06-11) after a 600 dpi read found each carries a distinct printed body superscript that the prior promotion missed** (see `[?]` resolution below): n.5 ([^20]) *diversitas illorum⁵* (Ad-3), n.6 ([^21]) *habitum diversificari⁶* (Ad-3), n.7 ([^22]) *regulantur⁷* (Ad-4, *diriguntur* variant), n.8 ([^23]) *distinctione nona⁸* (Ad-4, *a creatura* variant), n.9 ([^24]) the *speculativum/practicum* deduction (Ad-4 tail), n.10 ([^25]) *in praecedentibus¹⁰* (Ad-6), n.11 ([^26]) *de Moribus Ecclesiae¹¹* (Ad-6). Apparatus now 26 entries; no orphaned defs or markers.
- **p.596:** n.1 ([^1]) = q2 tail's `sicut prius ostensum est¹`. p.596 nn.2+ belong to q3 (*mere gratuitus* arguments, which begin at p.596 top after this sentence).

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a1-q3** (*mere gratuitus*): raw start **41425** (QUAESTIO III header; opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum*). Title: *Utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum*. Page span: opens p.596 (body of objections begins p.596 right column under the heading), runs p.596–p.598+; q3 HAS its own scholion (raw ~41598 / printed p.597). **Footer split:** q3 takes **p.596 nn.2 onward** (n.1 retained by q2 here as its tail reference); then p.597+ per-page restart. Verify the *Tertio quaeritur* alignment before promoting.

**`[?]` flags.** RESOLVED at 600 dpi (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11; `/tmp/hires/p595-foot-{L,R}.png`, `p595-Lbody-mid.png`, `p595-Rbody-mid.png`, `p595-Rtop.png`, `p595-Rad45.png`, `p595-n9full.png`). The prior promotion's assumption — that p.595 nn.5–11 were unanchored "contextual" cross-references — was **WRONG**: each of nn.5–11 carries a distinct printed Quaracchi body superscript (⁵ *illorum*, ⁶ *diversificari*, ⁷ *regulantur*, ⁸ *distinctione nona*, ⁹ *principalis obiecti*, ¹⁰ *praecedentibus*, ¹¹ *de Moribus Ecclesiae*) across Ad-3 → Ad-6. All seven were BACKFILLED as `[^20]`–`[^26]` with matching Latin + English body anchors. No flags remain.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0