title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus
Whether God is in all things

source_text:
<!-- page 638 -->

### Articulus I.
#### *Quod esse ubique conveniat Deo.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem sit in omnibus rebus, ostenditur sic.

1. Philosophus in *prima Philosophia*: «Quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto a pluribus indigetur et in pluribus invenitur»[^1]; sed Deus est simplicissimus in fine simplicitatis: ergo invenitur in omnibus. Sed non reperitur nisi ubi est: ergo est in omnibus.

2. Item, quanto causa prior, tanto universalior, ergo causa prima est universalissima; sed quanto aliquid universalius, tanto influit in plura: ergo cum prima causa sit universalissima, influit in omnia[^2]. Sed omne quod influit in aliquid, est illi praesens secundum virtutem — nusquam enim et nunquam operatur agens nisi per praesentiam virtutis — sed Deus propter suam simplicitatem est idem quod sua virtus: cum ergo virtus Dei sit in omnibus, et substantia est in omnibus.

3. Item, hoc videtur per impossibile: quia omne quod est in una re limitata, ita quod non est in alia, est limitatum et arctatum; sed hoc est impossibile circa Deum: ergo non est in una re, quin in omnibus sit.

4. Item, si Deus est in una re, ita quod non in alia, aut potest esse in illa, in qua non est, aut non: si non potest, ergo non est omnipotens; si potest esse, et non est, cum res non mutetur, ergo mutari potest. Ergo si Deus non est in omnibus rebus, aut non est omnipotens, aut non immutabilis; quorum utrumque est impossibile.

**Contra:**

1. Quanto aliquid magis seiungitur a natura tenebrosa, tanto est impermixtius et sub nobiliori luce cognoscit; sed Deus clarissime cognoscit: ergo maxime a natura tenebrosa seiungitur. Sed omnis creatura tenebra: ergo Deus aut in nullis, aut in paucissimis est rebus creatis.

2. Item, quanto motor magis distat a mobili, tanto sufficientius movet — unde sufficientius movet anima quam forma naturalis[^3], et Intelligentia quam anima — sed Deus est motor et operator sufficientissimus: ergo summe distat ab omni mobili: ergo aut in nullis est rebus, aut in paucis.

3. Item, «omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam multiplicata»[^4]; sed divina virtus est infinitissima: ergo unitissima. Sed quanto aliquid magis est unitum, tanto minus diffusum et in paucioribus repertum: ergo etc.

4. Item, quaeritur: quae necessitas est, Deum ponere[^5] in rebus omnibus? Videtur, quod nulla ex parte Dei. Nobilitatis enim est in agente, quod possit agere ubi non est, similiter, quod possit facere effectum per se stantem — alioquin opera Dei magis sunt debilia quam opera creatorum, artificum quae salvantur in esse, ipsis absentibus — ergo si nulla necessitas est, videtur ergo esse superfluitas. Sed impossibile est, in Deo esse superfluitatem: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus est in omnibus rebus, cuius ratio est tum perfectio ipsius, tum indigentia rerum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus in omnibus rebus est, sicut ipse David[^6] testatur dicens: *Si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es* etc.

Necessitas autem existendi Deum in omnibus sumitur tum a parte perfectionis ipsius, tum a parte indigentiae rerum. A parte ipsius propter summam immensitatem et summam potestatem;

<!-- page 639 -->

et utriusque ratio est summa simplicitas. Quia enim summe simplex est, ad nihil arctatum, ideo in omnibus invenitur tanquam immensum; quia summe simplex, ideo in infinitum virtuosissimum, et ideo virtus eius in omnibus; et virtus idem est quod substantia, et ideo necesse est, quod sit in omnibus[^7].

Ex parte creaturae est necessitas, quia creatura tum habet in se possibilitatem et vanitatem, et utriusque causa est, quia producta est de nihilo. Quia enim creatura est et accepit[^8] esse ab alio, qui eam fecit esse, cum prius non esset; ex hoc non est suum esse, et ideo non est purus actus, sed habet possibilitatem; et ratione huius habet fluxibilitatem et variabilitatem, ideo caret stabilitate, et ideo non potest esse nisi per praesentiam eius qui dedit ei esse. Exemplum huius apertum est in impressione formae sigilli in aqua, quae non conservatur ad momentum, nisi praesente sigillo. — Et iterum, quia creatura de nihilo producta est, ideo habet vanitatem; et quia nihil vanum in se ipso fulcitur, necesse est, quod omnis creatura sustentetur per praesentiam Veritatis. Et est simile: si quis poneret corpus ponderosum in aere, quod est quasi vanum, non sustentaretur. Sic et in proposito.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de distantia et impermixtione, dicendum, quod tripliciter unitur aliquid alicui: aut secundum praesentiam tantum, aut secundum praesentiam et dependentiam, aut secundum praesentiam et dependentiam et concomitantiam in materia. Primo modo est radius in aere, secundo modo anima in corpore, tertio modo liquor in liquore. Quod primo modo est in aliquo non permiscetur, similiter quod secundo modo est non permiscetur proprie, sed solum quod tertio. Et primo quidem modo est Deus in rebus, non secundo vel tertio.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia motoris a mobili, dicendum, quod est distantia per absentiam, et haec impedit, non iuvat ad motum; et est distantia per independentiam, et haec iuvat, quia quanto motor perfectior est et absolutior, minus dependet et est sufficientior; et hoc modo distat Deus etiam praesens.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus unita est magis infinita; dicendum, quod unitas virtutis, quae facit ad eius magnitudinem, per se attenditur respectu subiecti, per accidens respectu obiecti. Respectu autem subiecti attenditur per subiecti simplicitatem, respectu autem obiecti per indistantiam a virtute, quia virtus tanto potentior, quanto obiecto[^9] propinquior. Quoniam igitur virtus divina in substantia est simplicissima et nunquam a substantia elongatur, ideo in multis est infinitissima, quia unitissima in multis, ut in uno. «Ubique enim est centrum illius potentiae», sicut dicit Trismegistus[^10].

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur iam solutum est, quia necessitas est ex parte Dei et creaturae, sicut visum est. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod agens creatum ubi non est operatur et effectum producit, qui sine ipso stat; dicendum, quod non est simile in Deo. Nam si attendatur hoc in artifice creato, hoc venit ex defectu perfectionis: quia enim agens creatum limitatum est, et differt a sua virtute, potest operari per virtutem ubi non est; rursus, quoniam agit ex suppositione et non potest in totum, ideo effectus non totaliter dependet ab ipso. Deus autem habet condiciones oppositas, quia infinitus, et idem est in eo virtus et substantia, et totum producit; ideo non est simile.

english:
<!-- page 638 -->

### Article I.
#### *That to be everywhere is fitting to God.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether God is in all things.*

That [God], however, is in all things, is shown thus:

1. The Philosopher in the *first [book of the] Philosophy* [says]: "The simpler something is, the more it is needed by many and is found in many things"[^1]; but God is most simple at the limit of simplicity: therefore he is found in all things. But he is not found except where he is: therefore he is in all.

2. Likewise, the prior the cause, the more universal; therefore the first cause is the most universal; but the more universal something is, the more it flows into many things: therefore since the first cause is the most universal, it flows into all things[^2]. But everything which flows into something is present to it according to power — for nowhere and never does an agent operate except through the presence of [its] power — but God by reason of his simplicity is the same as his power: therefore since the power of God is in all things, his substance also is in all things.

3. Likewise, this is seen by the impossible: because everything which is in one limited thing in such a way that it is not in another, is limited and constrained; but this is impossible concerning God: therefore he is not in one thing without being in all.

4. Likewise, if God is in one thing in such a way that he is not in another, either he can be in that in which he is not, or not: if he cannot, then he is not omnipotent; if he can be, and is not, since the thing is not changed, then he can be changed. Therefore if God is not in all things, either he is not omnipotent, or [he is] not unchangeable; both of which are impossible.

**On the contrary:**

1. The more something is separated from a dark nature, the more it is unmixed and knows under a more noble light; but God knows most clearly: therefore he is most separated from a dark nature. But every creature is darkness: therefore God is in no, or in very few, created things.

2. Likewise, the more a mover is distant from the movable, the more sufficiently it moves — whence the soul moves more sufficiently than a natural form[^3], and the Intelligence than the soul — but God is the most sufficient mover and operator: therefore he is supremely distant from every movable thing: therefore either he is in no things, or in few.

3. Likewise, "every united power is more infinite than [a power] multiplied"[^4]; but the divine power is most infinite: therefore most united. But the more something is united, the less diffused and found in fewer things: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is asked: what necessity is there to place[^5] God in all things? It seems, that none on God's part. For it belongs to nobility in an agent, that it can act where it is not, likewise, that it can make an effect standing by itself — otherwise the works of God are weaker than the works of created [agents], of artisans, which are preserved in being when they themselves are absent — therefore if there is no necessity, it seems then to be a superfluity. But it is impossible that there be superfluity in God: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *God is in all things, the reason for which is both his own perfection and the indigence of things.*

**I respond:** It must be said that God is in all things, just as David[^6] himself testifies, saying: *If I ascend into heaven, thou art there* etc.

The necessity, however, of God's existing in all things is taken both on the part of his perfection, and on the part of the indigence of things. On his own part, on account of the highest immensity and the highest power;

<!-- page 639 -->

and the ground of both is the highest simplicity. For because he is supremely simple, constrained to nothing, therefore he is found in all things as immense; because he is supremely simple, therefore [he is] infinitely most powerful, and therefore his power is in all things; and the power is the same as the substance, and therefore it is necessary that he be in all things[^7].

On the part of the creature there is necessity, because the creature has in itself both possibility and emptiness, and the cause of both is that it has been produced from nothing. For because the creature is and has received[^8] being from another, who made it to be, since previously it was not; from this it is not its own being, and therefore is not pure act, but has possibility; and by reason of this it has fluxibility and variability, therefore it lacks stability, and therefore it cannot be except through the presence of him who gave it being. An open example of this is in the impression of the form of a seal in water, which is not preserved for a moment except with the seal present. — And again, because the creature has been produced from nothing, therefore it has emptiness; and because nothing empty is supported in itself, it is necessary that every creature be sustained through the presence of Truth. And there is a similar [example]: if someone were to place a heavy body in the air, which is as it were empty, it would not be sustained. So also in the matter at hand.

1. To that which is objected concerning distance and unmixedness, it must be said that something is united to something else in three ways: either according to presence only, or according to presence and dependence, or according to presence and dependence and concomitance in matter. In the first way is the [sun's] ray in the air, in the second way the soul in the body, in the third way liquid in liquid. What is in something in the first way is not mixed [with it], likewise what is [in it] in the second way is not properly mixed, but only what is [in it] in the third [way]. And in the first way indeed God is in things, not in the second or third.

2. To that which is objected concerning the distance of the mover from the movable, it must be said that there is distance through absence, and this impedes, [it does] not help motion; and there is distance through independence, and this helps, since the more perfect and more absolute the mover is, the less it depends and the more sufficient it is; and in this way God is distant even [while] present.

3. To that which is objected, that a united power is more infinite; it must be said that the unity of a power, which makes for its magnitude, is *per se* attended to with respect to the subject, *per accidens* with respect to the object. With respect to the subject it is attended to according to the simplicity of the subject, but with respect to the object according to non-distance from the power, since a power is the more potent the closer to the object[^9]. Since therefore the divine power in [its] substance is most simple and is never separated from the substance, therefore in many things it is most infinite, since most united in many [things], as in one. "For everywhere is the center of that power," as Trismegistus says[^10].

4. What is objected last has already been solved, since the necessity is on the part of God and of the creature, as has been seen. — As for what is objected, that a created agent operates where it is not and produces an effect which stands without it; it must be said that it is not similar in God. For if this is observed in a created artisan, this comes from a defect of perfection: because a created agent is limited, and differs from its power, it can operate through [its] power where it is not; again, since it acts on a presupposition and cannot [act] as to the whole, therefore the effect does not totally depend on it. But God has the opposite conditions, since [he is] infinite, and the power and the substance in him are the same, and he produces the whole; therefore [the case] is not similar.

la: Haec propositio collecta videtur ex iis, quae Aristot., XI. *Metaph.* c. 1. (X. c. 1.) de primis principiis eloquitur, scil. quod sint simpliciora, contineant omnia, et quod, ipsis peremptis, cetera simul pereant. — Verba mox subsequentia *in fine simplicitatis* sumta sunt ex libro *de Causis*, prop. 20. (ed. Bardenhewer, alias 21.) In pluribus edd. libri *de Causis* legitur sic: *infinita simplicitatis simplex*.

en: This proposition seems to be collected from those things which Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1) speaks about the first principles, namely that they are simpler, contain all things, and that, when they are taken away, the rest also perish together. — The words immediately following, *at the limit of simplicity*, are taken from the book *On Causes*, prop. 20 (ed. Bardenhewer, alias 21). In several editions of the book *On Causes* it reads thus: *infinita simplicitatis simplex* ("simple of infinite simplicity").

la: Cfr. libr. *de Causis*, prop. 1. et 20, iam supra pag. 471, nota 3. allegatae. — De propositione proxime subsequenti ait Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 9. (c. 2.): *Unde est principium motus, est simul cum eo quod movetur*. Cfr. et I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 84. (c. 7.). — Aliquanto inferius pro *suam simplicitatem* codd. S Z *summam simplicitatem*, cod. K *summam suam simplicitatem*.

en: Cf. the book *On Causes*, prop. 1 and 20, already cited above on page 471, note 3. — On the proposition immediately following, Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 9 (c. 2) says: "Whence the principle of motion is, [it is] together with that which is moved." Cf. also I *On Generation and Corruption* text 84 (c. 7). — A little below, in place of *suam simplicitatem*, codices S Z [read] *summam simplicitatem*, codex K *summam suam simplicitatem*.

la: Vat. voci *naturalis* praemittit *materialis vel*. Vocabulum *Intelligentia*, quod proxime sequitur, significat hic *Angelum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] prefixes to the word *naturalis* the words *materialis vel*. The word *Intelligentia*, which next follows, here signifies *Angel*.

la: Libr. *de Causis*, prop. 17.

en: Book *On Causes*, prop. 17.

la: Pro *ponere* codd. L *esse*.

en: In place of *ponere*, codices L [read] *esse*.

la: Miro modo S. Doctor de hoc loquitur in *Itinerario mentis in Deum*, c. 5. et 6.

en: In a wonderful way the Holy Doctor speaks of this in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 5 and 6.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut F I V cc *accipit*; Vat. ed. 1. *creata* pro *creatura*. Paulo inferius pro *sed* Vat. cum cod. cc perperam *quia*.

en: Several codices, such as F I V cc, [read] *accipit*; Vatican ed. 1, *creata* in place of *creatura*. A little below, in place of *sed*, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc wrongly [reads] *quia*.

la: Permulti codd. cum sex primis edd. *subiecto*; lectio prava, quia contextui non respondet. — Cod. T hic inserit *ergo*, et paulo superius ante *nihil* cum pluribus aliis codd. et ed. 1 omittit *quia*. Paulo inferius pro *Veritatis* codd. X bb cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *virtutis*. De rationibus hic allatis cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7, et Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 13. n. 20. seqq.

en: Very many codices with the first six editions [read] *subiecto*; a corrupt reading, since it does not correspond to the context. — Codex T here inserts *ergo*, and a little above, before *nihil*, with several other codices and ed. 1, omits *quia*. A little below, in place of *Veritatis*, codices X bb cc with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *virtutis*. On the grounds here adduced cf. above d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, *ad* 7, and Anselm, *Monologion* c. 13, n. 20 ff.

la: Haec verba in Hermetis Trismegisti operibus non invenimus, at in Alani ab Insulis libro, *Theolog. Regulae*, regul. 7, ubi sic legitur: «Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam», quae verba etiam ab Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 7. m. 1. citantur et Trismegisto adscribuntur. B. Albert. vero in *Comment.* I. *Sent.* d. 3. a. 18. ait: *Nescio, quis fuit iste Trismegistus, et credo, quod liber confictus est. Omnia enim quae dicitur dixisse Trismegistus, inveni in quodam libro magistri Alani, qui confectus est de quibusdam propositionibus generalibus et supponitur* [esse] *eorundem*. — Cfr. August., IV. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 12. n. 22.

en: These words we have not found in the works of Hermes Trismegistus, but in the book of Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, *regula* 7, where it reads thus: "God is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere, [whose] circumference nowhere," which words are also cited by Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 7, m. 1, and ascribed to Trismegistus. B. Albert, however, in his *Commentary on* I *Sent.* d. 3, a. 18, says: "I do not know who that Trismegistus was, and I believe that the book is fabricated. For all things which Trismegistus is said to have said, I found in a certain book of master Alan, which was composed of certain general propositions and is supposed [to be] of the same [authors]." — Cf. Augustine, IV *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 12, n. 22.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Simul cum quaestione principali solvitur alia connexa quaestio, in 4. *ad opposit.* proposita, scil. de causa, quare Deus est in omnibus rebus.

Deum inesse omnibus rebus et locis, fide certum est. Haec inexistentia Dei secundum omnes doctores est prorsus singularis et supereminenter continet omnes modos praesentiae, secundum quos creaturae, et corporales et spirituales, sibi possunt esse praesentes, sed seclusa omni imperfectione, quae comitatur illos modos in creaturis. Unde Dei praesentia implicat 1. quandam «*praesentialitatis indistantiam*» (infra a. 3. q. 2.) vel coexistentiam, sed non eam, qua substantiae corporales quantitate praeditae sibi coexistunt, ita ut sit una extra aliam, et tantum pars alterius contingat alterius partem; 2. implicat «*intimitatis existentiam*, ut illud quod est continens intra, ut anima in corpore» (ibid.), seclusa tamen omni dependentia, analogo modo, sicut lux est in aere; 3. implicat causalitatem, qua Deus immediate operatur «*per virtutis influentiam*» (ibid.) «*portans omnia verbo virtutis suae*» (Hebr. 1, 3.). Constat etiam, quod simplicissima Dei essentia simul est eius potentia et operatio.

**II.** Attamen de ratione propria et formali ubiquitatis Dei est controversia inter Scotum eiusque scholam et scholam S. Thomae. Nam S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 8. a. 1. et alibi) ex praesentia Dei per operationem concludit eiusdem praesentiam per essentiam. Omnes concedunt, hanc argumentationem esse veram, si est *a posteriori*, cum essentia, potentia et operatio in Deo in re minimo ab invicem separari vel distingui possint; si vero intelligitur *a priori*, ita ut ipsa ratio operandi sit ratio formalis divinae ubiquitatis, Scotus (hic q. unica, et II. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 1.) contradicit, asserens, quod, si per impossibile Deus non operaretur in aliqua re, tamen ibi esset, et e contrario, si non esset in aliqua re, tamen posset ibi operari, scil. in distans. De hac controversia cfr. Caietanus ad locum cit.; Rada *controv.* 28; Macedo, *coll.* 9. *diff.* 3. aliique plurimi. S. Bonav. a diversis trahitur ad utramque partem; ipse autem praesentiam Dei utroque modo probat, scil. a priori quidem per immensitatem et simplicitatem Dei, quae ad nihil arctatur quoad intimitatis praesentiam; a posteriori autem per causalitatem et operationem, a qua ipsa essentia et potentia et operatio creaturarum intime dependet. Haec fundamenta conceduntur ab omnibus. Actionem in distans, quam contra Scotum S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 3.) in nullo agente admittit, etiam S. Bonav. (2. *fundam.* et *solut.* ad 4.) negat. Infra a. 3. q. 2. etiam asserit, quod «*praesentialiter principaliter non respondet operationi; nam praesens est aliquis alicubi, etiamsi non operetur*».

— Notandum est id quod in *solut.* ad 4. dicitur de triplici differentia inter agens creatum et increatum, scil. quod agens creatum habet esse limitatum, unde praesens esse non potest nisi uni loco — quod virtus eius differt ab ipso — quod agat ex suppositione non in totum, id est supponendo materiam, circa quam agit; unde etiam effectus dependet ab ipso in fieri, non in esse.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica; *Report.* hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 8. a. 1; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 68. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1. 2. 3. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. *princ.* q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Together with the principal question another connected question is solved, proposed in 4 *ad oppositum*, namely about the cause why God is in all things.

That God is in all things and places, is certain by faith. This in-existence of God, according to all the doctors, is altogether singular and supereminently contains all the modes of presence according to which creatures, both corporeal and spiritual, can be present to themselves, but with every imperfection excluded which accompanies those modes in creatures. Hence God's presence implies 1. a certain "*non-distance of presentiality*" (below a. 3. q. 2.) or coexistence, but not that by which corporeal substances endowed with quantity coexist with themselves, such that one is outside another, and only a part of one touches a part of another; 2. it implies "*intimacy of existence*, such that what is contained within, as the soul in the body" (ibid.), with however every dependence excluded, in an analogous mode, just as light is in air; 3. it implies causality, by which God immediately operates "*through the influence of [his] power*" (ibid.), "*bearing all things by the word of his power*" (Heb. 1, 3). It is also evident, that the most simple essence of God is at once his power and his operation.

**II.** However, on the proper and formal ground of God's ubiquity there is controversy between Scotus and his school and the school of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 8. a. 1. and elsewhere) from God's presence by operation concludes the same [God's] presence by essence. All concede that this argumentation is true, if it is *a posteriori*, since in God essence, power and operation in reality can scarcely be separated or distinguished from one another; but if it is understood *a priori*, in such a way that the very ground of operating is the formal ground of divine ubiquity, Scotus (here q. *unica*, and II *Sent.* d. 2. q. 1.) contradicts, asserting that, if by the impossible God did not operate in some thing, yet he would be there, and on the contrary, if he were not in some thing, yet he could operate there, namely at a distance. On this controversy cf. Cajetan at the place cited; Rada *controv.* 28; Macedo, *coll.* 9. *diff.* 3. and very many others. St. Bonaventure is drawn by various [authors] to either side; he himself, however, proves God's presence in either way, namely *a priori* indeed by the immensity and simplicity of God, which is constrained to nothing as regards the presence of intimacy; *a posteriori*, however, by causality and operation, on which the very essence and power and operation of creatures intimately depend. These foundations are conceded by all. Action at a distance, which against Scotus St. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 3.) admits in no agent, St. Bonaventure too (2. *fundam.* and *solut.* ad 4.) denies. Below a. 3. q. 2. he also asserts that "*presentiality principally does not correspond to operation; for someone is present somewhere even if he does not operate*."

— It must be noted what is said in *solut.* ad 4. concerning the threefold difference between created and uncreated agent, namely that the created agent has limited being, whence it cannot be present except in one place — that its power differs from itself — that it acts on a presupposition not as to the whole, that is, supposing matter about which it acts; whence also the effect depends on it in becoming, not in being.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 9, m. 3. — Scotus, on this and the following q., here q. *unica*; *Report.* here q. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 8, a. 1; *S. c. Gent.* III, c. 68. — B. Albert., on this and the following q., here a. 1, 2, 3, 7. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 1, *princ.* q. 1, 2. — Durand., here p. I, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the two following qq., here q. *unica*.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit in omnibus locis
Whether God is in all places

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 640 -->

### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum Deus sit in omnibus locis.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit ubique localiter, id est, utrum sit in omnibus locis. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Deus ita esse ubique dici videtur, non quod in omni loco, sed quod omnino in loco esse non potest».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia, sicut vult Philosophus[^2], locus ad locatum magis comparatur in ratione formae; sed Deus est forma excellentissima: ergo respectu eius nulla est forma, ergo nullus locus.

3. Item, alia ratione videtur, quia quadruplex est conditio loci in respectu ad locatum, scilicet continere, salvare, mensurare et terminare[^3]. Continet locus ut vas, mensurat ut quantitas, salvat ut natura, terminat ut finis; sed Deus secundum nullam harum conditionum comparatur ad locum: ergo etc.

4. Item, prima et propria passio essendi in loco est dimensio[^4], ergo quod magis recedit a dimensione, minus est in loco; et quod maxime, minime; et quod omnino recedit, nullo modo est in loco; sed Deus est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Ieremias vigesimo tertio[^5]: *Caelum et terram ego impleo*; sed omne quod est in loco ipsum implendo, est in loco secundum quod locus.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia loci, secundum quod locus, est indigentia ad locatum, ut ab ipso repleatur[^6]; sed omnis creatura vanitas, vanitas autem non replet nisi per veritatis praesentiam: ergo ad hoc, quod locus repleatur, necesse est, Deum adesse. Sed hoc posito, ponitur Deus esse in loco, ut locus est.

3. Item, maior est indivisio[^7] formae ad materiam quam locati ad locum; sed forma non unitur materiae nec permanet nisi per Dei praesentiam: ergo multo minus nec locatum loco. Sed quia per Dei praesentiam forma unitur materiae, Deus est in qualibet re ut natura: ergo cum per Dei praesentiam uniatur et salvetur locatum in loco, Deus est in loco, ut est locus.

4. Item, est praesentia et simultas secundum locum et secundum tempus; sed Deus perfectissime est praesens cuilibet rei: ergo secundum locum et tempus. Sed quae sunt praesentia secundum tempus, sunt in eodem tempore: ergo et illa quae sunt praesentia secundum locum, sunt in eodem loco: si ergo Deus est praesens omni loco, Deus est in loco, non tantum, ut est res, sed etiam, ut est locus.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus est in omni loco, non autem circumscriptive, nec definitive, sed secundum excellentiam et per praesentiam supplens loci indigentiam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod triplex est conditio, secundum quam comparatur locatum ad locum. Prima, secundum quam[^8] excellitur, et haec est proprietas salvationis; sic enim locatum indiget loco, et locus complet eius indigentiam et conservat naturam, et secundum hanc proprietatem sola corporalia sunt in loco, non autem spiritualia, quia non recipiunt influentiam a loco corporeo.

<!-- page 641 -->

Alia est proprietas, secundum quam locatum aequatur et proportionatur loco; et haec est proprietas commensurationis, et secundum hanc conditionem proprie corporalia sunt in loco, quia illa sola sunt commensurabilia, unde circumscribuntur. Spiritualia autem minus proprie; nam non sunt commensurative respectu partium[^9], sunt tamen definitive respectu totius. Tertia est conditio, secundum quam locatum excellit locum, videlicet quod per sui praesentiam replet et supplet indigentiam loci. Locus enim sine locato privatus est et indigens, sicut concavitas oculi sine organo.

Quoniam igitur Deus ad nullam creaturam comparatur, nec secundum rationem inferioritatis nec aequalitatis, sed superioritatis et excellentiae; Deus non est in loco quantum ad primam et secundam proprietatem, sed solum quantum ad tertiam, scilicet quod per praesentiam supplet loci indigentiam. Nam locatum per praesentiam replet vacuitatem distantiae; Deus autem per praesentiam replet vanitatem essentiae, et illa quidem sine hac esse non potest[^10].

Ex his patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes probantes, Deum esse in loco, ut est locus, procedunt secundum tertiam conditionem, ut patet; rationes vero ad oppositum secundum primam et secundam, scilicet salvationis et terminationis.

english:
<!-- page 640 -->

### Question II.
#### *Whether God is in all places.*

Secondly it is asked, whether God is everywhere locally, that is, whether he is in all places. And it appears that he is not.

1. Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*[^1]: "God is said to be everywhere in such a way, not that he is in every place, but that he cannot be in a place at all."

2. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason, since, as the Philosopher holds[^2], place is more compared to the thing placed in the account of form; but God is the most excellent form: therefore with respect to him there is no form, therefore no place.

3. Likewise, it appears by another reason, because there is a fourfold condition of place in respect to the thing placed, namely to contain, to preserve, to measure, and to terminate[^3]. Place contains as a vessel, measures as a quantity, preserves as a nature, terminates as an end; but God according to none of these conditions is compared to place: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the first and proper attribute of being in place is dimension[^4], therefore what more recedes from dimension, is less in place; and what most [recedes], least [is in place]; and what altogether recedes, in no way is in place; but God is of this kind: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Jeremiah, twenty-third[^5]: *Heaven and earth I fill*; but everything that is in place by filling it, is in place insofar as [there is] place.

2. Likewise, this appears by reason, since place, insofar as it is place, has a need toward the thing placed, that it be filled by it[^6]; but every creature [is] vanity, and vanity does not fill except through the presence of truth: therefore for this, that place be filled, it is necessary that God be present. But this being posited, God is posited to be in place, insofar as place is place.

3. Likewise, greater is the union[^7] of form to matter than of the thing placed to place; but form is not united to matter nor does it remain except through God's presence: therefore much less [is] the thing placed [united] to place. But since through God's presence form is united to matter, God is in every thing as nature: therefore since through God's presence the thing placed is united and preserved in place, God is in place, insofar as it is place.

4. Likewise, there is presence and simultaneity according to place and according to time; but God is most perfectly present to every thing: therefore according to place and time. But things which are present according to time, are in the same time: therefore also those which are present according to place, are in the same place: if therefore God is present to every place, God is in place, not only insofar as he is a thing, but also insofar as he is place.

### Conclusion.

> *God is in every place, not however circumscriptively, nor definitively, but according to excellence and by his presence supplying the indigence of place.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a threefold condition according to which the thing placed is compared to place. The first, according to which[^8] [the thing placed] is excelled, and this is the property of preservation; for thus the thing placed is in need of place, and place fulfills its indigence and conserves its nature, and according to this property only corporeal things are in place, and not spiritual things, since they do not receive influence from corporeal place.

<!-- page 641 -->

Another is the property according to which the thing placed is equated and proportioned to place; and this is the property of commensuration, and according to this condition properly corporeal things are in place, since these alone are commensurable, whence they are circumscribed. Spiritual things, however, [are in place] less properly; for they are not [in place] commensuratively with respect to parts[^9], yet they are definitively with respect to the whole. The third is the condition according to which the thing placed excels place, namely that by its presence it fills and supplies the indigence of place. For place without a thing placed is deprived and indigent, like the concavity of an eye without an organ.

Since therefore God is compared to no creature, neither according to the account of inferiority nor of equality, but of superiority and excellence; God is not in place as to the first and second property, but only as to the third, namely that by his presence he supplies the indigence of place. For the thing placed by its presence fills the emptiness of distance; but God by his presence fills the vanity of essence, and the former indeed cannot be without the latter[^10].

From these the response to the objections is clear. For the reasons proving that God is in place, insofar as it is place, proceed according to the third condition, as is clear; but the reasons to the contrary [proceed] according to the first and second, namely of preservation and termination.

la: Cap. 4: *Quod [Deus] ubique est, ita dici videtur, non quod in omni sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest), sed quod ei omnis locus adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est, sed non in loco.*

en: Cap. 4: "That [God] is everywhere, is said to be so, not that he is in every place (for he cannot be in place at all), but that every place is present to him for grasping him, since he himself is not received in place; and therefore he is said to be nowhere in place, because he is everywhere, but not in place."

la: Libr. IV. *Phys.* text. 14. (c. 2.): «Quare videbitur species ac forma cuiusque locus esse, quo terminatur magnitudo et materia magnitudinis; hic enim est uniuscuiusque terminus». Et IV. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 33. (c. 4.): «Dicimus autem id quidem quod continet, formae esse, quod autem continetur, materiae». — Paulo inferius post *formae* Vat. cum cod. cc addit *quam in ratione alterius generis causae*.

en: *Physics* IV, text 14 (c. 2): "Wherefore the species and form of each thing will seem to be its place, by which the magnitude and the matter of the magnitude is terminated; for this is the limit of each thing." And IV *On the Heaven and the Earth*, text 33 (c. 4): "We say, however, that what contains belongs to form, what is contained to matter." — A little below, after *formae*, the Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds *quam in ratione alterius generis causae* ("than in the account of another kind of cause").

la: Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 30. (c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 30 (c. 4).

la: Vide textum Aristotelis hic, nota 2.

en: See the text of Aristotle here, note 2.

la: Vers. 24.

en: Verse 24.

la: Quod sequitur ex definitione loci apud Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 41. (c. 4.): «Locus est continentis terminus immobilis primus», quae definitio iuxta Aristotelem convenit loco, ut locus est, non loco, ut vas est: sic enim locus non est immobilis. — Propositio subsequens alludit ad illud Rom. 8, 20: *Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est.* — Paulo post pro *replet* codd. G K T ff perperam *repletur*.

en: Which follows from the definition of place in Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 41 (c. 4): "Place is the first immobile boundary of the container," which definition according to Aristotle suits place insofar as it is place, not place insofar as it is a vessel: for thus place is not immobile. — The following proposition alludes to that of Rom. 8, 20: *For the creature is subject to vanity.* — A little after, in place of *replet*, codices G K T ff wrongly [read] *repletur*.

la: Sive *unio*. — Aliquanto inferius verba *ut natura* non pertinent ad vocem *Deus*, sed ad *qualibet re*, ita ut scriptoris mens haec sit: *Deus est in qualibet re, quatenus res est natura*.

en: Or *unio* ("union"). — A little below, the words *ut natura* do not pertain to the word *Deus*, but to *qualibet re*, so that the meaning of the writer is this: *God is in every thing, insofar as the thing is a nature*.

la: Vat. et ed. 1 repetunt hic *locatum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and ed. 1 here repeat *locatum*.

la: Supple hic et paulo superius post *partium* vocem *loci*. — Vat. *commensurabilia* pro *commensurative*, et *definibilia* pro *definitive*.

en: Supply here and a little above, after *partium*, the word *loci* ("of place"). — The Vatican [edition] [reads] *commensurabilia* in place of *commensurative*, and *definibilia* in place of *definitive*.

la: Sensus est: et illa repletio, qua locatum replet vacuitatem distantiae, esse non potest sine hac repletione, qua Deus replet vanitatem essentiae creaturae. Cfr. Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 13. seq. et c. 20. seqq. — Paulo ante pro *vanitatem essentiae* Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *vacuitatem essentiae*.

en: The meaning is: that filling by which the thing placed fills the emptiness of distance cannot exist without this filling by which God fills the vanity of the creature's essence. Cf. Anselm, *Monologion* c. 13 ff. and c. 20 ff. — A little before, in place of *vanitatem essentiae*, the Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] *vacuitatem essentiae*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio differt a praecedente, cum S. Bonav. (4. arg. ad opposit.) distinguat locum, ut est res, sub quo respectu ad quaestionem praeced. pertinet, et ut est locus, sub quo respectu speciales difficultates discutiendae sunt. Ad rem Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 3. q. collater.) de differentia inter locutionem: *Deus est in omni re*, et aliam: *Deus est ubique*, sic ait: «Cum dico: *Deus est in omni re*, dico habitudinem conservantis ad conservatum. Sed conservatum magis est in conservante quam e converso, quia conservans continet conservatum ad minus virtualiter. Ergo ex hoc, quod dicitur: *Deus est in omni re*, ponitur, quod res sint in Deo et contineantur ab illo, et non e converso. Sed cum dico: *Deus est ubique*, nihil pono esse in Deo, sed pono ipsum replere omnia loca». — Pro intelligentia quaestionis notanda est quadruplex conditio loci ad locatum (arg. 3. in fundam., et infra p. II. a. I. q. I. in corp.; II. *Sent.* d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. I.).

**II.** Communiter distinguitur quadruplex modus essendi in loco: *circumscriptive*, quando totum locatum respondet toti loco, et partes locati respondent partibus loci, sic sunt corpora in loco; *definitive*, quando res est in uno loco ita, ut non in alio, sed tamen tota in toto loco et tota in partibus loci, sic anima est in corpore et Angelus in loco; *sacramentaliter*, sicut solummodo ss. Corpus Christi est totum sub tota specie et eius partibus, sed simul etiam sub aliis speciebus, non autem ubique; *repletive*, ut dicunt S. Bonav. et Alex. Hal. ad significandum modum prorsus singularem, quo Deus inconfuse et impermixte omnibus inest, omnia replet, continet et in immensum superexcedit. Hic modus loquendi mutuatus esse videtur ex Ier. 23, 24, et S. August. (I. *Conf.* c. 3.): «Quae imples omnia, continendo imples... quae imples omnia, te toto imples omnia». — Verba in fine corp. «*Deus per praesentiam replet vacuitatem essentiae*» etc. bene explicantur a S. Thom. (*S.* p. I. q. 8. a. 2.): «Deus omnem locum replet, non sicut corpus; corpus enim dicitur replere locum in quantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus est in aliquo loco, non excluditur, quin alia sint ibi, immo per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent omnia loca».

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. I. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question differs from the preceding, since St. Bonaventure (4. arg. *ad oppositum*) distinguishes place, insofar as it is a thing, under which respect it pertains to the preceding question, and insofar as it is place, under which respect special difficulties are to be discussed. To the point Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I, q. 9, m. 3, *q. collateralis*) on the difference between the locution: *God is in every thing*, and the other: *God is everywhere*, speaks thus: "When I say: *God is in every thing*, I express the relation of the conserving to the conserved. But the conserved is more in the conserver than conversely, since the conserver contains the conserved at least virtually. Therefore from this, that it is said: *God is in every thing*, it is posited that things are in God and contained by him, and not conversely. But when I say: *God is everywhere*, I posit nothing to be in God, but I posit him to fill all places". — For the understanding of the question, the fourfold condition of place to the thing placed is to be noted (arg. 3. *in fundamentis*, and below p. II, a. I, q. I, *in corpore*; II *Sent.* d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. I).

**II.** A fourfold mode of being in place is commonly distinguished: *circumscriptively*, when the whole thing placed corresponds to the whole place, and the parts of the thing placed correspond to the parts of place, thus bodies are in place; *definitively*, when a thing is in one place in such a way as not [to be] in another, but yet whole in the whole place and whole in the parts of place, thus the soul is in the body and an angel in place; *sacramentally*, as only the most holy Body of Christ is whole under the whole species and its parts, but at the same time also under other species, yet not everywhere; *repletively*, as St. Bonav. and Alex. Hal. say, to signify the wholly singular mode by which God, unconfusedly and unmixedly, indwells all things, fills all things, contains [them], and exceeds them immeasurably. This mode of speaking seems to be borrowed from Jer. 23, 24, and St. Augustine (I *Conf.* c. 3): "Thou who fillest all things, by containing fillest [them]... Thou who fillest all things, fillest all things wholly with thyself." — The words at the end of the body, "*God by his presence fills the vanity of essence*" etc., are well explained by St. Thomas (*S.* p. I, q. 8, a. 2): "God fills every place, not as a body; for a body is said to fill a place inasmuch as it does not allow another body with itself; but from the fact that God is in some place, it is not excluded that other things be there, rather by this he fills all places, since he gives being to all things placed, which fill all places."

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 9, m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. I. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. I. — Ægid. R., here 2 *princ.* q. I. — Durand., here p. I, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q. here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the two following qq. here q. unica.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 642 -->

### Articulus II.
#### *Esse ubique est Deo proprium.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur, utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei. Et quia proprium est quod soli convenit et semper[^1], ideo quantum ad hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum esse ubique conveniat soli Deo. Secundo, utrum conveniat ei semper sive ab aeterno.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum esse ubique soli Deo conveniat.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem soli Deo conveniat, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro *de Symbolo*[^2]: «Ubique esse est Deum esse»; sed nulli creaturae convenit Deum esse, immo hoc est Dei propriissimum: ergo nulli creaturae convenit esse ubique.

2. Item, Ambrosius in libro *de Spiritu sancto*[^3]: «Cum omnis creatura certis suae naturae sit circumscripta limitibus, esse ubique et in omnibus rebus divinitatis et dominationis est proprium».

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omnis creatura, per se existens et in se, est *hoc aliquid*[^4]; sed omne quod est *hoc aliquid*, est singulare, et omne singulare est *hic et nunc*, et nihil tale natura est esse ubique: ergo solius Dei est esse ubique.

4. Item, conditio ista, qua Deus est ubique, convenit Deo ratione suae immensitatis; sed immensitas est proprietas solius Dei, quae nulli creaturae potest convenire: ergo nec esse ubique.

**Contra hoc:**

1. Obiicitur de universali, quoniam universale est semper et ubique[^5], et tamen non est Deus. — Si tu dicas, quod est ubique respectu suorum singularium et non simpliciter; obiicitur tunc, quod aliquod universale est, cuius singularia sunt ubique, et impossibile est aliquid fieri, quod non sit eius singulare vel in singulari, ut hoc universale *substantia*: ergo est ubique.

2. Item, obiicitur de numero, qui est in omnibus entibus, et nihil potest fieri, in quo non sit numerus[^6]; et praeterea, in omnibus entibus est unus numerus: ergo cum numerus non sit Deus, esse ubique non est proprium solius Dei. — Si dicas, quod non est ibi totus, sed secundum partem et partem; obiicitur de voce, quae est in auribus diversorum tota et in toto aere: esto quod vox esset ita magna, quod per totum mundum audiretur, tunc esset ubique tota et una. *Probatio*[^7]: quia si multae, cum infinitae sint partes aeris, et vox sit in qualibet parte: tunc ergo infinitae sunt voces actu; quod est impossibile.

3. Item, obiicitur de anima, quae est in qualibet

<!-- page 643 -->

parte animalis tota, ut supra monstratum est[^8]: esto ergo, quod fieret animal giganteum ita magnum quasi totus mundus, tunc anima esset ubique: ergo quod non sit, hoc est propter defectum corporis, et non suum. — Si dicas, quod est in pluribus tanquam in uno loco, unde nunquam una anima est nisi in uno corpore; obiicitur de corpore Christi, quod totum et integrum est in diversis altaribus distinctis.

4. Item, obiicitur per rationem. Cum enim de natura singularis sit esse hic et nunc, tamen alicui dat Deus semper esse, ut Angelis: ergo pari ratione alicui dabit esse ubique.

5. Item, si aliqua duo inseparabiliter sunt unita, ubicumque est unum, et alterum; sed humana natura et divina in Christo inseparabiliter sunt unita: ergo ubi est divina[^9], et humana. Sed divina natura est ubique: ergo et humana, et sic etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Soli Deo proprie et singulariter convenit esse ubique.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod esse ubique, sicut dicunt Sancti, convenit soli Deo proprie et singulariter, ita quod nulli convenit alii, nec intelligi potest convenire, si recte intelligatur[^10]. — Nam Deus dicitur esse ubique, ita quod ex parte Dei intelligitur identitas et totalitas, ex parte loci pluralitas et universalitas. Per conditionem identitatis excluditur universale, quod quamvis sit in omnibus singularibus, tamen secundum aliud et aliud suppositum, et ita numeratum. Per conditionem totalitatis excluditur numerus; nam quamvis numerus sit ubique, tamen secundum aliam et aliam partem. Per conditionem pluralitatis a parte loci excluditur spiritus creatus, qui quamvis sit in pluribus partibus corporis, non tamen[^11] in omnibus nisi ut unitis. Per conditionem universalitatis excluditur corpus Christi sub Sacramento, quod quamvis sit in pluribus, non tamen est in omnibus nec esse potest, quia hoc solum convenit ei sub Sacramento.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Et ita patent primae instantiae. Quod tamen obiicitur de voce, intelligendum, quod generatio sensibilium in medio est per diffusionem, unde non numeratur vox, sicut nec lux, nisi ad numerationem susceptibilis — unde quot sunt aures tot sunt voces, quoniam vox in aere erat multiplicabilis, et non multiplicata — et ideo patet, quod nec tota ubique ante numerationem, sicut nec lux diffusa, nec eadem post numerationem. Et ideo exemplum de existentia vocis non est multum simile Deo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus dat sempiternitatem; dicendum, quod tam esse ubique, quam semper, importat quandam infinitatem; et infinitas sempiternitatis est infinitas durationis, quae est secundum potentiam; et haec non repugnat creaturae, quia non impedit durationem creaturae esse finitam actu et infinitam potentia; et ideo omni durationi creaturae necesse est aliquid adiici. Sed esse ubique dicit immensitatem actu, quia importat simultatem locorum: et haec repugnat creaturae, et ideo non potest ei omnino communicari. Communicatur tamen secundum possibilitatem creaturae, secundum quod participat magis et minus de natura spiritualitatis. Nam nihil est omnino spirituale nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus *de Moribus Ecclesiae*[^12]: «Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet». Creaturae autem quaedam sunt spirituales per abstractionem, ut universale et numerus; et istae possunt esse in pluribus propter communitatem ad plura, et ita secundum sui plurificationem. Quaedam spirituales sunt per separationem a materia corporali, ut animae[^13]; et istae sunt in pluribus, tamen non multiplicatis. Quaedam autem spirituales per unionem, ut corpus Christi est cibus spiritualis naturae, quamvis sit verum corpus, et ideo quasi est medium inter animam et Deum, et ideo in quantum cibus plus sapit naturam spiritualitatis; et ideo est in pluribus, ut sunt plura loca, non tamen in omnibus, quia ratio cibationis non se extendit ad omnia. Et sic patet, quare sub Sacramento est in pluribus.

*Ad 5.* Quod obiicitur de inseparabiliter unitis, solvendum est per *interemptionem*[^14], cum alterum excedit alterum, ut patet in genere et specie. Quod obiicitur, per unionem homo est Deus; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur per *communicationem idiomatum*; similiter et esse ubique convenit per idiomatum communicationem.

english:
<!-- page 642 -->

### Article II.
#### *To be everywhere is proper to God.*

Consequently, with regard to the second article, it is asked whether to be everywhere is proper to God. And because *proper* is what belongs to one alone and always[^1], two questions are accordingly asked here. First, whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone. Second, whether it belongs to him always or from eternity.

### Question I.
#### *Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone.*

That, however, it belongs to God alone is shown thus.

1. Augustine in the book *On the Symbol*[^2]: «To be everywhere is to be God»; but to be God belongs to no creature, indeed this is most properly God's own: therefore to be everywhere belongs to no creature.

2. Likewise, Ambrose in the book *On the Holy Spirit*[^3]: «Since every creature is circumscribed by certain limits of its own nature, to be everywhere and in all things is proper to divinity and dominion».

3. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason: because every creature, existing per se and in itself, is *this something*[^4]; but every *this something* is singular, and every singular is *here and now*, and nothing of such a nature is to be everywhere: therefore to be everywhere belongs to God alone.

4. Likewise, this condition by which God is everywhere belongs to God by reason of his immensity; but immensity is a property of God alone, which can belong to no creature: therefore neither can being everywhere.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is objected concerning the universal, since the universal is always and everywhere[^5], and yet is not God. — If you say that it is everywhere with respect to its singulars and not simply; then it is objected that there is some universal whose singulars are everywhere, and it is impossible for anything to come about which is not its singular or in a singular, as this universal *substance*: therefore it is everywhere.

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning *number*, which is in all beings, and nothing can come about in which there is no number[^6]; and besides, in all beings there is one number: therefore since number is not God, to be everywhere is not proper to God alone. — If you say that it is not there as a whole, but according to part and part; it is objected concerning the *voice*, which is whole in the ears of various people and whole in the whole air: suppose that the voice were so great that it were heard throughout the whole world, then it would be everywhere whole and one. *Proof*[^7]: because if many, since the parts of the air are infinite, and the voice is in any given part: then there would actually be infinite voices; which is impossible.

3. Likewise, it is objected concerning the soul, which is whole in any given

<!-- page 643 -->

part of the animal, as has been shown above[^8]: suppose then that there came to be a giant animal as great as the whole world, then the soul would be everywhere: therefore that it is not so, this is on account of the defect of the body, and not its own. — If you say that it is in many things as in one place, whence one soul is never except in one body; it is objected concerning the body of Christ, which is whole and entire in different distinct altars.

4. Likewise, it is objected by reason. For since it is of the nature of a singular to be here and now, nevertheless to some God grants always-being, as to the Angels: therefore by parity of reasoning he will grant to some to be everywhere.

5. Likewise, if any two are inseparably united, wherever the one is, the other is also; but the human and the divine nature in Christ are inseparably united: therefore where the divine is[^9], the human also is. But the divine nature is everywhere: therefore the human also, and so on.

### Conclusion.

> *To God alone properly and singularly does it belong to be everywhere.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to be everywhere, as the Saints say, belongs to God alone properly and singularly, in such a way that it belongs to no other, nor can it be understood to belong, if rightly understood[^10]. — For God is said to be everywhere in such a way that on the side of God identity and totality are understood, and on the side of place plurality and universality. By the condition of *identity*, the universal is excluded, which, although it is in all singulars, is so according to one supposit and another, and thus numbered. By the condition of *totality*, number is excluded; for although number is everywhere, it is so according to one part and another. By the condition of *plurality* on the side of place, the created spirit is excluded, which, although it is in many parts of the body, is nevertheless not[^11] in all except as united. By the condition of *universality*, the body of Christ under the Sacrament is excluded, which, although it is in many, is yet not in all nor can be, because this belongs to it only under the Sacrament.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus the first instances are clear. As for what is objected concerning the voice, it is to be understood that the generation of sensibles in the medium is by diffusion, whence the voice is not numbered, just as light is not, except according to the numbering of the recipient — whence as many ears as there are, so many voices, since the voice in the air was multipliable, and not multiplied — and so it is clear that it is neither whole everywhere before numbering, just as diffused light is not, nor the same after numbering. And therefore the example concerning the existence of voice is not very similar to God.

*To 4.* As for what is objected, that God grants sempiternity; it must be said that both being everywhere and being always import a certain infinity; and the infinity of sempiternity is the infinity of duration, which is according to *potency*; and this is not repugnant to the creature, because it does not impede the duration of the creature from being finite in act and infinite in potency; and therefore to every duration of the creature it is necessary that something be added. But to be everywhere expresses immensity in *act*, because it imports a simultaneity of places: and this is repugnant to the creature, and therefore cannot be wholly communicated to it. Yet it is communicated according to the possibility of the creature, according as it participates more and less in the nature of spirituality. For nothing is wholly spiritual except God alone, as Augustine says *On the Morals of the Church*[^12]: «God alone is incorporeal, because he fills all things». Now of creatures, some are spiritual by *abstraction*, as the universal and number; and these can be in many on account of their commonness to many, and so according to their being multiplied. Some are spiritual by *separation* from corporeal matter, as souls[^13]; and these are in many, yet not multiplied. And some are spiritual by *union*, as the body of Christ is the food of spiritual nature, although it is a true body, and so is, as it were, a mean between the soul and God, and therefore inasmuch as it is food it has more of the nature of spirituality; and therefore it is in many, as there are many places, yet not in all, because the account of feeding does not extend to all. And so it is clear why it is in many under the Sacrament.

*To 5.* What is objected concerning things inseparably united must be solved by *interemption*[^14], when the one exceeds the other, as is clear in genus and species. As for what is objected, that by union man is God; it must be said that this is understood by *communication of idioms*; and likewise to be everywhere belongs by communication of idioms.

la: Secundum Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 4, et V. c. I, et Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Proprio* quatuor modis sumi potest *proprium*: vel quod convenit soli, sed non omni; vel omni, sed non soli; vel soli et omni, sed non semper; vel soli et omni et semper. Hic *proprium* quarto modo sumitur vel, ut dici solet, in sensu stricto.

en: According to Aristotle, *Topics* I c. 4 and V c. 1, and Porphyry, *On the Predicables* c. *On the Proper*, *proprium* can be taken in four ways: either what belongs to one alone, but not to every [member]; or to every, but not to one alone; or to one alone and to every, but not always; or to one alone and to every and always. Here *proprium* is taken in the fourth way, or, as is customarily said, in the strict sense.

la: *Ad Catechumenos* (Serm. III.), c. 7. n. 7: *Hoc est enim esse Deum, ubique esse totum*.

en: *To the Catechumens* (Sermon III), c. 7 n. 7: *For this is to be God, to be everywhere whole*.

la: Libr. I. c. 7. n. 81. Cfr. hic *Lit. Magistri*, c. I. In textu hic allato pro *divinitatis* Vat. cum cod. cc *Dei virtutis*, et subinde pro *dominationis* plures codd. cum ed. 1 *durationis*.

en: Book I c. 7 n. 81. Cf. here the *Letter of the Master*, c. I. In the text here cited, in place of *divinitatis* the Vatican [edition] with codex cc reads *Dei virtutis*, and further for *dominationis* several codices with edition 1 read *durationis*.

la: Sive *substantia*. Cfr. supra pag. 620, nota 3. — Quod attinet ad minorem, ex Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia* notentur haec: «Omnis autem substantia videtur *hoc aliquid* significare. In primis (i. e. singularibus) igitur substantiis indubitabile et verum est, quod *hoc aliquid* significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis (i. e. generibus et speciebus) videtur quidem similiter... non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significant; neque enim unum est quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de multis homo dicitur et animal».

en: Or *substance*. Cf. above p. 620, note 3. — As regards the minor premise, from Aristotle, *Categories* c. *On Substance*, note these: «Every substance, however, seems to signify *this something*. In primary substances (i. e. singulars) it is therefore indubitable and true that they signify *this something*. For what is signified is an individual and one in number. In secondary substances (i. e. genera and species) it seems indeed similar... yet it is not true, but rather they signify a certain quale; for what is the subject is not one, as in the first substance, but *man* and *animal* are said of many».

la: Et *I. Poster.* c. 24. (c. 31.) ait: *Neque per sensum est scire; si enim est sensus talis huius (i. e. singularis rei) et non huius alicuius (i. e. universalis); sed sentire hoc aliquid est necesse, et ubi et nunc. Universale autem, quod est in omnibus, impossibile est sentire; neque enim hoc aliquid est, neque nunc neque ubi; neque enim utique esset universale; quod enim semper est et ubique universale dicimus esse.*

en: And the *Posterior Analytics* I c. 24 (c. 31) says: *Nor is it [possible] to know through sense; for if such-and-such a sense is of this (i. e. of a singular thing) and not of some [universal] thing (i. e. of a universal); but to sense is necessarily of this something, and where and when. The universal, however, which is in all, is impossible to sense; for it is neither this something, nor now nor where; for it would not in any way be universal; for what we call universal is what is always and everywhere*.

la: Vide notam praecedentem.

en: See the preceding note.

la: Nam quodlibet ens productum, eo ipso quod est singulare, erit numero unum. — Sequenti propositioni haec subiecta est sententia: in omnibus entibus *collective* sumtis est numerus determinatus. — In conclusione post *ergo* cum cod. T repetit *unus*.

en: For any produced being, by the very fact that it is singular, will be one in number. — To the following proposition this sense underlies: in all beings taken *collectively* there is a determined number. — In the conclusion after *ergo* it repeats, with codex T, *unus*.

la: Pro *Probatio* Vat. *prolatio*, quam vocem, suppresso puncto antecedenti, cum verbis *et una* immediate coniungit. Mox post *parte* cod. V interserit *aeris*.

en: For *Probatio* the Vatican [edition reads] *prolatio*, which word, with the preceding period suppressed, it joins immediately with the words *et una*. Soon after *parte* codex V inserts *aeris*.

la: Supple cum Vat. *est*.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *est*.

la: Cod. Z *intelligatur*, cod. W addit *esse*. — Paulo post pro *quasi* cod. T cum aliquibus aliis codd. *ut*, et in fine argumenti pro *suum* cod. K *minuit*.

en: Codex Z [reads] *intelligatur*; codex W adds *esse*. — A little later, in place of *quasi* codex T with some other codices reads *ut*, and at the end of the argument in place of *suum* codex K reads *minuit*.

la: Cod. T subiicit *est*.

en: Codex T subjoins *est*.

la: Verba citata in libro *de Moribus Ecclesiae* non habentur, sed in Gennadii libro *de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* (qui olim nomini Augustini addicebatur) c. 11 sic legitur: *Nihil incorporeum et invisibile natura credendum, nisi solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum; qui ex eo incorporeus creditur, quia ubique est et omnia implet et constringit*.

en: The words cited are not found in the book *On the Morals of the Church*, but in Gennadius's book *On Ecclesiastical Doctrines* (which was formerly attributed to the name of Augustine) c. 11 it reads thus: *Nothing is to be believed incorporeal and invisible by nature, except only God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; who is believed to be incorporeal because he is everywhere and fills and contains all things*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *animae*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc reads *animae*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 87, nota 4. — Sive *unio*. (i. e. *interemptio* sive *unio* per quam alterum exceditur ab altero, ut in genere et specie.)

en: Cf. above p. 87, note 4. — That is, *union*. (I. e., *interemption* or *union* by which one is exceeded by the other, as in genus and species.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quatuor conditiones, quae soli divinae ubiquitati conveniunt, ex ipsa eminentia divinae perfectionis resultant, et facile intelliguntur per argumenta ad opposita. — Verba in solut. ad 2: «quot sunt aures, tot sunt voces», intelligendae sunt de speciebus in medio et in organo receptis, non de ipsa voce. Eadem fere solutio quaestionis et obiectionum invenitur apud Alexandrum Hal., S. Thomam, Richardum a Med. aliosque.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 8. a. 4; *Quodlib.* II. q. I. a. I. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. a. 3. q. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The four conditions which belong to the divine ubiquity alone result from the very eminence of the divine perfection, and are easily understood through the arguments to the opposite. — The words in the solution to argument 2: «as many as the ears, so many the voices», are to be understood concerning the species received in the medium and in the organ, not concerning the voice itself. Almost the same solution of the question and of the objections is found in Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, Richard of Middleton, and others.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 8. a. 4; *Quodlib.* II. q. I. a. I. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. a. 3. q. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 644 -->

### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum esse ubique ab aeterno Deo conveniat.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum esse ubique conveniat Deo semper sive aeternaliter. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut semper se habet ad tempus, ita ubique ad locum; sed ante omne tempus Deus fuit semper: ergo ante omnem locum Deus fuit ubique.

2. Item, proprium Dei essentialius ei convenit quam propria passio alicui subiecto; sed propter necessariam convenientiam passionis ad subiectum distributio suppositorum includit distributionem temporum[^1] — unde *« dici de omni est, quod non est in quodam sic, in quodam non, nec aliquando sic, aliquando non »*, sed in quolibet et semper — ergo similiter hoc quod est *ubique* includit sempiternitatem: ergo *esse ubique* semper convenit Deo, ergo ab aeterno.

3. Item, *res sunt in Deo*, et *Deus in rebus*, sed res sunt in Deo ab aeterno: ergo a relativis, cum dicantur haec ad convertentiam[^2], Deus est in rebus ab aeterno, sed non nisi in omnibus: ergo etc.

Si dicas, quod non dicuntur correlative: contra: cum dicitur: *Deus est in rebus*, non significatur respectus nec dependentia Dei ad res, sed rerum ad Deum: ergo nihil aliud est dicere, Deum esse in rebus, quam res esse in Deo.

4. Item, si Deus non fuit ubique ab aeterno, et fuit, ergo fuit alibi quam ubique; et modo est ubique: ergo mutavit locum, ergo in Deo cadit mutatio. Sed hoc falsum: ergo et primum. Si tu dicas, quod mutatio est in connotato[^3]; *contra*: cum dicitur: *Deus est in loco*, non notatur effectus, sed solum Dei praesentia: ergo videtur, quod secundum hoc non significetur mutatio in connotato, sed solum in ipso Deo: restat ergo per impossibile, quod Deus est ubique aeternaliter.

**Contra:**

1. *Ubique* praesupponit *ubi*, et *ubi* praesupponit locum; et locum non est ponere nisi ex tempore: ergo et Deum esse ubique, non est ponere nisi ex tempore.

2. Item, bene sequitur: *Deus est ubique*, ergo est in caelo; ergo destructo consequente, destruitur et antecedens; sed ab aeterno non fuit in caelo: ergo etc.

3. Item, bene sequitur: *Deus est ubique*, ergo in ista domo; sed ista domus non fuit nisi ex tempore et post initium temporis: ergo et esse ubique.

### Conclusio.

> *Esse ubique convenit Deo ab initio rerum et locorum, qui connotantur, non aeternaliter, nisi per esse ubique intelligatur praesentialitas divinae immensitatis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *esse ubique* dupliciter potest accipi de Deo, sicut et *esse semper*. Uno enim modo *semper* importat divinam immensitatem secundum durationem, et sic idem est quod aeternitas, et convenit Deo aeternaliter; alio modo connotat simultatem temporis, et sic convenit ei a principio temporis. Sic *esse ubique* uno modo importat praesentialitatem divinae immensitatis, per

<!-- page 645 -->

quam est praesens omni ei quod est, sive sibi, sive alii; et sic idem est *Deum esse ubique* quod *Deum esse immensum*. Et sic convenit Deo aeternaliter, et secundum hoc procedit prima ratio.

Alio modo, prout connotat locum creatum sive rem; et tunc convenit ei ab initio rerum et locorum propter connotatum, et convenit semper; et adhuc est proprium, quia convenit soli, et semper uno modo, licet non aeternaliter; sicut etiam in demonstrativis[^4]. Et sic procedit secunda ratio. Et iste modus accipiendi *Deum esse ubique* est usitatior, et secundum hunc modum non convenit ei aeternaliter.

3. Quod vero obiicitur contra hoc, quod conveniat aeternaliter per suam conversam[^5]; dicendum, quod non est sua conversa. Cum enim dicitur, quod *res sunt in Deo*, hoc intelligitur ratione exemplaritatis, et nihil connotatur actu; sed cum dicitur *Deus esse in rebus*, connotatur aliquid creatum. Nam nihil est in eo[^6] quod non est: ergo si Deus est in rebus et locis, res et loca sunt; non-ens tamen secundum se bene est in exemplari tanquam in principio. Unde haec: *Deus est in rebus*, non est conversa huius: *res sunt in Deo*, sed haec: *Deus est exemplar rerum*, et utraque est vera aeternaliter. Et huius: *Deus est in rebus* conversa est: *res continentur a Deo et conservantur ab ipso*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus non fuit ubique, et modo est, ergo est mutatus; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia hoc non est propter mutationem Dei[^7].

Quod obiicitur, quod *ubique* non connotat effectum, sed solum praesentiam; dicendum, quod praesentia importat habitudinem ad duo, scilicet eius qui praesens est, et cui est praesens, et ideo potest esse inceptio ratione rei cui praesens est, non novi effectus.

Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, procedit secundum quod *ubique* connotat locum creatum.

Quod tamen ultimo obiicitur, non valet, immo est ibi fallacia accidentis, sicut hic: *iste triangulus incipit habere tres: non ergo omnis triangulus semper habuit tres*, quia non fit distributio pro partibus[^8] ut nunc, sed simpliciter.

english:
### Question II.
#### *Whether being everywhere belongs to God from eternity.*

Secondly it is asked whether being everywhere belongs to God always or eternally. And that it does, it seems:

1. Because, just as "always" stands to time, so "everywhere" stands to place; but before all time God always was: therefore before all place God was everywhere.

2. Likewise, what is proper to God belongs to him more essentially than a proper attribute (*propria passio*) belongs to any subject; but on account of the necessary suitability of the attribute to the subject, the distribution of supposits includes the distribution of times[^1] — whence *"to be said of every is what is not in some thus, in some not so, nor at one time so and at another not so,"* but in any whatsoever and always — therefore likewise the term *everywhere* includes everlastingness: therefore *being everywhere* belongs to God always, therefore from eternity.

3. Likewise, *things are in God*, and *God is in things*, but things are in God from eternity: therefore from the relatives, since these are said by way of conversion[^2], God is in things from eternity, but only in all things: therefore etc.

If you say that they are not predicated correlatively: on the contrary: when one says *God is in things*, no relation or dependence of God on things is signified, but rather of things on God: therefore to say "God is in things" is nothing other than to say "things are in God."

4. Likewise, if God was not everywhere from eternity, and now is, therefore he was elsewhere than everywhere; and now he is everywhere: therefore he changed place, therefore change falls in God. But this is false: therefore so too is the first. If you say that the change is in the connoted term[^3]; *on the contrary*: when one says *God is in a place*, no effect is noted but only the presence of God: therefore it seems that according to this no change is signified in the connoted term, but only in God himself: it remains then by impossible inference that God is everywhere eternally.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Everywhere* presupposes *where*, and *where* presupposes place; and place is not to be posited except from time: therefore neither is God's being everywhere to be posited except from time.

2. Likewise, the inference is sound: *God is everywhere*, therefore he is in heaven; therefore with the consequent destroyed, the antecedent too is destroyed; but from eternity he was not in heaven: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the inference is sound: *God is everywhere*, therefore in this house; but this house was not except from time and after the beginning of time: therefore neither was *being everywhere*.

### Conclusion.

> *Being everywhere belongs to God from the beginning of things and places that are connoted, not eternally, unless by being everywhere is understood the presentiality of the divine immensity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *being everywhere* can be taken of God in two ways, just as *being always*. For in one way *always* imports the divine immensity according to duration, and so it is the same as eternity, and belongs to God eternally; in another way it connotes simultaneity with time, and so belongs to him from the beginning of time. Likewise *being everywhere* in one way imports the presentiality of the divine immensity, by

which he is present to everything that is, whether to himself or to another; and so it is the same to say *God is everywhere* as *God is immense*. And in this way it belongs to God eternally, and according to this the first reason proceeds.

In another way, insofar as it connotes a created place or thing; and then it belongs to him from the beginning of things and places on account of the connoted term, and belongs always; and even so it is proper, because it belongs to him alone, and always in one way, although not eternally; just as also in demonstratives[^4]. And in this way the second reason proceeds. And this way of taking *God is everywhere* is the more usual, and according to this way it does not belong to him eternally.

3. As to what is objected against this — that it would belong eternally through its converse[^5] — it must be said that it is not its converse. For when it is said that *things are in God*, this is understood by reason of exemplarity, and nothing is connoted in act; but when it is said that *God is in things*, something created is connoted. For nothing is in him[^6] which is not: therefore if God is in things and places, things and places are; non-being, however, is in itself well in the exemplar as in a principle. Hence this proposition: *God is in things*, is not the converse of this: *things are in God*, but rather this: *God is the exemplar of things* — and both are true eternally. And the converse of *God is in things* is: *things are contained by God and conserved by him*.

4. To that which is objected — that if God was not everywhere, and now is, therefore he is changed — it must be said that this does not follow, because this is not on account of any change of God[^7].

To what is objected, that *everywhere* does not connote an effect, but only presence; it must be said that presence imports a relation to two terms, namely to him who is present, and to that to which he is present; and therefore there can be a beginning by reason of the thing to which he is present, not of any new effect.

What is objected on the opposite side proceeds insofar as *everywhere* connotes a created place.

What is finally objected does not hold; rather, there is here a fallacy of accident, just as in this: *this triangle begins to have three [angles]: therefore not every triangle has always had three* — because the distribution is not made for the parts[^8] as now, but absolutely.

la: Sensus est: sed propria passio rei creatae non convenit tantum omni et soli, sed etiam semper. Cfr. supra pag. 642, nota 1. De notione distributionis vide supra pag. 99, Scholion, 1. n. 2. — Verba, quae mox citantur, sunt ex Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. Cfr. etiam V. Topic. c. I.

en: The sense is: a proper attribute of a created thing belongs not only to every and only [its subject], but also always. Cf. above p. 642, note 1. On the notion of *distributio* see above p. 99, Scholion 1, n. 2. — The words quoted just now are from Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 4. Cf. also *Topics* V, c. I.

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione. — Verbis [...] relativis significatur modus argumentandi, qui nititur in habitudine unius relativorum ad alterum, et generaliter exprimitur his propositionibus: posito uno relativorum, ponitur et reliquum: remoto uno relativorum, removetur et reliquum.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Relation*. — By the words [...] of relatives is signified the mode of arguing which rests on the relation of one of the relatives to the other, and is generally expressed in these propositions: if one of the relatives is posited, the other is also posited; if one of the relatives is removed, the other is also removed.

la: Cod. Z connotatum.

en: Codex Z reads *connotatum*.

la: Simul audi: scientiis suo modo est. In his enim propria passio monstratur semper inesse sive convenire subiecto, licet sit quid creatum. Ad hoc ait Boeth., in Comment. in Aristotelis libr. de Interpretatione, edit. secund. libr. III. in principio: *Aliae vero sunt (propositiones), quae non sempiterna significantes, sunt tamen et ipsae necessariae, quousque illa subiecta sunt, de quibus propositio aliquid affirmat aut negat, ut cum dico: homo mortalis est, quamdiu homo est, tamdiu hominem mortalem esse necesse est. Nam si quis dicat: ignis calidus est quamdiu est ignis, tamdiu ex necessitate vera est propositio.* Paulo inferius pro *non convenit ei aeternaliter* aliqui codd., ut I Z, *convenit ei temporaliter*.

en: At the same time hear: it is in the demonstrative sciences in its own way. For in these the proper attribute is shown to inhere or belong to the subject always, even though it be something created. To this Boethius says, in his *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation*, second edition, book III, at the beginning: *"There are other [propositions] which, though not signifying eternal things, are nevertheless themselves necessary, so long as those subjects exist of which the proposition affirms or denies something — as when I say: man is mortal: as long as man is, so long is it necessary that man be mortal. For if one should say: fire is hot, as long as it is fire, just so long is the proposition by necessity true."* A little further below, for *non convenit ei aeternaliter* some codices, such as I and Z, read *convenit ei temporaliter*.

la: Nempe propositio: res sunt in Deo, non idem significat ac haec: Deus est in rebus. De differentia harum propositionum cfr. supra d. 36. dub. 1, et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3, et Aegid. Rom., hic. — Mox pro X Z nihil tamen, et nihil codd.

en: Namely, the proposition *things are in God* does not signify the same as this: *God is in things*. On the difference between these propositions cf. above d. 36, dub. 1, and Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 9, m. 3, and Giles of Rome, here. — Just below, for *nihil tamen*, codd. X Z and *nihil* read otherwise.

la: Multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam *in Deo*; codd. FL *Nam in nullo est Deus*.

en: Many codices with editions 2 and 3 read, wrongly, *in Deo*; codices F and L read *For God is in nothing*.

la: Vat. cum paucis mss. addit *sed rerum*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few mss. adds *sed rerum* ("but of things").

la: Ita fere omnes codd.; cod. S pro *rebus*, cod. T a prima manu *in rebus*, Vat. cum cod. cc *de tribus*. Sensus nostrae lectionis est: distributio per signum *omnis* refertur ad partes subiectivas (sive inferiores sub toto universali), prout sunt simpliciter secundum earum naturam, non prout fiunt hic et nunc, v. g. triangulus formatur. — Paulo superius Vat. *sola fuit* pro *fit*.

en: So nearly all the codices; cod. S reads *rebus*, cod. T at first hand reads *in rebus*, the Vatican with cod. cc reads *de tribus*. The sense of our reading is: the distribution by the sign *omnis* refers to the subjective parts (or lower [members] under the universal whole), insofar as they are taken absolutely according to their nature, not insofar as they come to be here and now — e.g., a triangle is formed. — A little above, the Vatican reads *sola fuit* in place of *fit*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusiones facile intelliguntur, supposita illa distinctione circa sensum vocabulorum *esse ubique* et *esse semper*. In sensu *absoluto*, qui sensus est minus usitatus (ad 2.), primum significat divinam immensitatem, quatenus importat praesentiam in *habere* et *eo* primo et per se; in sensu vero usitatiore (ad 1. *contra*) connotat etiam locum creatum, et tunc *esse ubique* idem est ac *esse in omni loco creato*. Simili modo *esse semper* significat vel absolute aeternitatem, vel connotando tempus et supponendo initium temporis. — Ultimum argum. pro parte negativa merito reiicitur propter *fallaciam accidentis*, quae committitur, quando id quod vere praedicatur de subiecto respectu accidentis, quod habet, praedicatur etiam de subiecto qua tali. Ita in exemplo proposito, quando in tabula delineatur triangulus, verum est, sed tantum *per accidens*, quod ista figura *incipit* habere tres angulos, sed *absolute ab aeterno* competit triangulo habere tres angulos. Eodem modo in illo argumento falso fit transitus a sensu *per accidens* propositionis: *Deus est ubique*, ad sensum absolutum eiusdem, sicut hic: Deus est in rebus. De differentia harum propositionum cfr. supra d. 36. dub. 1, et Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 3, et Aegid. Rom., hic. — S. Thomas (hic q. 2. a. 3. ad 2.) aliique *esse ubique* accipiunt solummodo in sensu usitatiore, quatenus connotat locum creatum; unde maiorem in arg. 1. pro parte affirm. non distinguunt, sed simpliciter negant. Tamen in ipsa doctrina non est differentia.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 8. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. ad 5. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic a. 2. in princ.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusions are easily understood, given that distinction concerning the sense of the words *being everywhere* and *being always*. In the *absolute* sense — which sense is less usual (cf. *ad* 2) — the first signifies the divine immensity, inasmuch as it imports presence in *having* and in *that* (*eo*) primarily and *per se*; but in the more usual sense (*ad* 1 *contra*) it also connotes a created place, and then *being everywhere* is the same as *being in every created place*. Likewise *being always* signifies either eternity absolutely, or, by connoting time and supposing a beginning of time. — The last argument on the negative side is rightly rejected on account of the *fallacy of accident*, which is committed when that which is truly predicated of a subject in respect of an accident which it has, is also predicated of the subject as such. So in the example proposed: when a triangle is drawn upon a tablet, it is true, but only *per accidens*, that this figure *begins* to have three angles; but *absolutely from eternity* it belongs to the triangle to have three angles. In the same way, in that argument, a false transition is made from the *per accidens* sense of the proposition *God is everywhere* to its absolute sense, just as here: *God is in things*. On the difference of these propositions cf. above d. 36 dub. 1, and Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 9, m. 3, and Aegidius Romanus, here. — St. Thomas (here q. 2 a. 3 ad 2) and others take *being everywhere* only in the more usual sense, insofar as it connotes a created place; whence in the major in arg. 1 on the affirmative side they do not distinguish but simply deny. Yet in the doctrine itself there is no difference.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 9, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 3; *Summa* I, q. 8 a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 3 ad 5. — Aegidius Romanus, here princ. 2 q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here a. 2 in principio.

---