title: Dist. 26

title_alt: Distinctio XXVI littera Magistri (capp. I — VIII)

title_alt: Lombard's text on Distinction XXVI (chapters I through VIII)

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXVI.

#### Cap. I. *De hoc nomine hypostasis.*

Nunc de proprietatibus personarum, quas frequenter in hoc tractatu commemoravimus, aliquid nos loqui oportet. Sed primum audiamus, quid de hoc nomine *hypostasis* Hieronymus dicit. Ait enim, sub hoc nomine venenum latere. Sed hoc dicit, secundum quod haeretici eo utebantur, ut simplices seducerent, scilicet pro persona et pro essentia, ut, sive diceretur una tantum hypostasis sive tres, minus peritos ad inconveniens deducerent, cum non erat hoc nomen ita apud catholicos vulgatum, nec ita eius significatio determinata, ut modo. Et ideo Hieronymus dicit, hoc nomine non utendum fore sine distinctione vel expositione, tunc scilicet, quando cum haereticis contendebatur, ita scribens *de Fide catholica ad Damasum Papam*[^1]: «Ab Arianorum praesule hypostaseon novellum nomen a me homine Romano exigitur. Interrogamus, quid tres hypostases arbitrentur intelligi; tres personas subsistentes, aiunt. Respondemus, nos ita credere. Non sufficit eis sensus; ipsum nomen efflagitant; quia nescio quid veneni in syllabis latet. Clamamus: si quis tres hypostases, id est, tres subsistentes personas non confitetur, anathema sit. Si quis autem, hypostasim usiam intelligens non tribus personis unam hypostasim indicit, alienus a Christo est, qui scilicet, tres hypostases dicens, sub nomine pietatis tres naturas conatur asserere. Sufficiat nobis dicere unam substantiam et tres personas perfectas aequales; taceamus tres hypostases, si placet. Nomen hoc non bonae suspicionis est, cum in eodem verbo sensus dissentiunt. Aut si rectum putatis, tres hypostases cum interpretationibus suis debere nos dicere, non negamus. Sed mihi credite, venenum sub melle latet; transfigurat enim se angelus satanae in Angelum lucis[^2]». His verbis non negat utendum esse nomine *hypostasis*, sed haereticos eo prave usos ostendit, contra quos cautela opus erat in distinctione significationis; alioquin sibi contradiceret, qui supra tres hypostases confitetur.

#### Cap. II. *De proprietatibus personarum et de nominibus earum relativis.*

Iam de proprietatibus personarum videamus, quae etiam notiones sive relationes in Scriptura plerumque dicuntur in illa Trinitate sancta, quae ideo a nobis repetitur[^3], ut nostro cordi tenacius infigatur. Ait Augustinus *in libro de Fide ad Petrum*[^4]: «Aliud est genuisse quam natura esse, aliudque est procedere quam genuisse vel natum esse. Unde manifestum est, quod alius est Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus». «Et est proprium solius Patris, non quia non est natus ipse, sed quia genuit; et proprium solius Filii, non quia ipse non genuit, sed quia de Patris essentia natus est; proprium vero Spiritus sancti est, non quia nec natus est ipse nec genuit, sed quia solus de Patre Filioque procedit». Ecce breviter assignavit tres proprietates trium personarum, quarum una non est alia. Hoc enim significavit, cum dixit: *Aliud est genuisse quam natum esse aliudque procedere*, id est, alia proprietas sive notio est generatio, et alia nativitas, alia processio, quae aliis nominibus dicuntur paternitas, filiatio, spiratio[^5]. Has proprietates designant illa nomina personarum, scilicet *Pater*, *Filius* et *Spiritus sanctus*, quae relativa sunt et ad se invicem dicuntur; quia notant relationes, quae non sunt Deo accidentales, sed in ipsis personis ab aeterno sunt immutabiliter, ut non modo appellationes sint relativae, sed etiam relationes sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in personis sint.

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#### Cap. III. *Quod non omnia dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam; quaedam enim secundum relationem, nihil tamen secundum accidens.*

Quocirca sciendum est, non omne quod dicitur de Deo, dici secundum substantiam; quia quaedam dicuntur secundum relationem, quae non est accidens, quia non est mutabilis. Ut enim Augustinus *in quinto libro de Trinitate*[^6] ait: «Nihil in Deo secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil ei accidit; nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam de Deo dicitur. In rebus creatis atque mutabilibus quod non secundum substantiam dicitur, restat ut secundum accidens dicatur. In Deo autem nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil in eo mutabile est aut amissibile; nec tamen omne quod dicitur de Deo, secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid, sicut Pater ad Filium, et Filius ad Patrem, quod non est accidens; quia et ille semper Pater, et ille semper Filius; et ita semper, quia semper natus est Filius, nec coepit unquam esse Filius. Quod si aliquando esse coepisset, aut aliquando esse desineret[^7] Filius, secundum accidens diceretur. Et quia Pater non dicitur Pater, nisi ex eo quod est ei Filius, et Filius non dicitur Filius, nisi ex eo quod habet Patrem; non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur, sed ad invicem ista dicuntur, neque tamen secundum accidens, quia et quod dicitur Pater, et quod dicitur Filius aeternum atque incommutabile est eis». Ecce his verbis aperte ostenditur, quaedam dici de Deo secundum substantiam, quaedam secundum relationem, nihil tamen secundum accidens. Ostenditur etiam proprietas Patris esse, quod habet Filium, et proprietas Filii, quod habet Patrem. Ideoque, cum dixit, aeternum et incommutabile esse, quod Pater dicitur, et quod Filius dicitur; ita intelligi voluit, idest: proprietas, qua Pater est Pater, et proprietas, qua Filius est Filius, aeterna est et incommutabilis, quia et Pater semper est Pater, et Filius semper Filius. Unde et Hilarius proprietates personarum assignans *in duodecimo libro de Trinitate*[^8] ait: «Si semper Patri proprium est, quod semper est Pater, necesse est semper Filio proprium esse, quod semper est Filius. Ubi enim semper Pater est, semper et Filius est: ergo qui non semper Pater est, non semper genuit». Item in eodem: «Nato Deo manifestum est proprium esse, quod Filius est».

#### Cap. IV. *Quare dicatur proprium esse Unigeniti, Filium Dei esse, cum etiam homines sint filii Dei.*

Hic quaeritur, quomodo dicatur esse proprium nato Deo, quod est Dei Filius vel genitus ex Deo, cum etiam homines filii Dei dicantur et sint, secundum illud: *Filii Excelsi omnes*[^9]. Et ad Moysen de populo Israel Dominus ait[^10]: *Filius meus primogenitus Israel*. Sed magna est distantia: homines enim filii Dei sunt factura, non nativitatis proprietate; Deus autem Filius originis proprietate Filius est et veritate nativitatis, non factura vel adoptione; et illi quidem ante sunt, quam filii Dei sint; fiunt enim filii Dei[^11], non nascuntur filii Dei. Unde Hilarius, solum Deum natum originis proprietate Dei filium ostendens, inter ipsum et homines filios Dei evidentissime distinguit *in duodecimo libro de Trinitate*[^12], ita dicens: «Vero Patri solus qui ex eo nascitur vere Filius est. Et nos quidem filii Deo sumus, sed per facturam. Fuimus enim aliquando filii iracundiae, sed filii Deo per adoptionem effecti sumus potius, quam nascimur. Et quia omne quod fit, antequam fiat, non fuit, nos, cum filii non fuissemus, efficimur. Ante enim filii non eramus, sed per gratiam facti sumus, non nati neque generati, sed acquisiti. Acquisivit enim nos Deus sibi, et

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per hoc dicitur nos genuisse. Genuisse enim Deum filios nunquam cum proprietatis significatione cognoscimus dici. Ex adoptione enim homo factus est filius Dei, non ex generatione; neque ei proprietas est, sed nuncupatio, ac per id non vere filius est, quia nec proprie natus dicitur, nec semper filius fuit. Unigenitus autem Deus nec fuit aliquando non filius, nec fuit aliquid antequam filius, nec quidquam ipse nisi filius. Atque ita qui semper est filius, nascibilitatis proprietate ac veritate filius est eius solius, qui genuit; et ille tantum qui genuit, pater ipsius est; quia sicut ille filius origine, ita ille pater generatione».

#### Cap. V. *Quod homo dicitur filius Trinitatis, et Trinitas pater.*

Homo vero, qui filius Dei est, factura non tantum Patris, sed et Filii et Spiritus sancti filius est, id est totius Trinitatis; et Trinitas ipsa Pater eius dici potest. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^13] ait: «Non potest dici Trinitas pater, nisi forte translative ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. Quod enim scriptum est[^14]: *Audi Israel, Dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est*, non utique, excepto Filio aut Spiritu sancto, oportet intelligi; quem unum Dominum Deum nostrum recte dicimus etiam Patrem nostrum per gratiam suam nos regenerantem». De hoc etiam Hilarius in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^15] ait: «Omnibus per fidem Deus est pater, quibus est pater per eam fidem, qua Iesum Christum Dei Filium confitemur». Ecce ostensum est, quare proprium dicatur esse Dei nati, quod filius est, quia scilicet ipse solus natus proprie dicitur. Unde Hilarius in libro tertio *de Trinitate*[^16] ait: «Dominus dicens: *Clarifica Filium tuum*, non solo nomine contestatus est, se esse filium, sed et proprietate. Nos filii Dei sumus, sed non talis hic filius[^17]. Hic enim verus et proprius est filius origine, non adoptione; veritate, non nuncupatione; nativitate, non creatione».

#### Cap. VI. *Quod Spiritus sanctus eadem proprietate donum dicitur, qua Spiritus sanctus, et utroque modo relative ad Patrem et Filium.*

Ita etiam de Spiritu sancto dicendum est, qui proprie dicitur donum Dei, cum tamen et alia plura sint dona Dei. Sed Spiritus sanctus ita proprietate immutabili et aeterna donum est, sicut Filius proprietate est filius. Eo enim donum dicitur, quo spiritus sanctus, et utroque utique nomine relative dicitur, eademque relatione dicitur spiritus sanctus et donum; licet ipsa relatio non ita appareat in hoc nomine *spiritus sanctus*, sicut in hoc nomine *donum*. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^18] ita ait: «Spiritus sanctus, qui non est Trinitas, sed in Trinitate intelligitur, in eo quod proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus, relative dicitur, cum et ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur, quia Spiritus sanctus et Patris et Filii spiritus est. Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine, apparet autem, cum dicitur donum Dei; donum enim est Patris et Filii, quia et a Patre procedit et a Filio. Ergo Spiritus sanctus ineffabilis est quaedam Patris Filiique communio. Et ideo forlasse sic appellatur, ut iam diximus nec iterare piget, quia[^19] Patri et Filio potest eadem appellatio convenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur, quod illi communiter: quia et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus. Ut ergo ex nomine, quod utrique convenit, utriusque communio significetur, vocatur donum amborum spiritus sanctus». Ecce habes, quare Spiritus sanctus proprie dicatur donum, et quod relative dicitur sive donum, sive spiritus sanctus, et quod nomen sibi proprium tenet, quod communiter Patri et Filio convenit, sed divisim. Et est sciendum, quod[^20] cum Pater vel Filius dicitur spiritus, sive sanctus, neutrum relative dicitur, sed secundum substantiam.

#### Cap. VII. *Utrum Pater vel Filius vel Trinitas ipsa possit dici spiritus sanctus.*[^21]

Hic quaeri potest, utrum Pater vel Filius vel etiam ipsa Trinitas possit dici spiritus sanctus, sicut disiunctim dicitur et spiritus et sanctus. De hoc Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^22] sic ait: «Trinitas nullo modo potest dici filius, spiritus vero sanctus potest quidem universaliter dici, secundum id quod scriptum est: *Quoniam Deus spiritus est*. Itaque Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quoniam unus est Deus, et utique Deus sanctus est, et Deus spiritus est, potest appellari trinitas, et spiritus sanctus. Sed tamen tunc spiritus sanctus relative non dicetur, sed secundum essentiam, quia proprie Spiritus sanctus, qui non est Trinitas, sed in Trinitate, dicitur relative».

#### Cap. VIII. *Quod non omnia, quae relative dicuntur, suis ad se vicissim respondent vocabulis.*

Quidam tamen putant, spiritum sanctum vel donum non dici relative ad Patrem vel ad Filium. Si enim, inquiunt, haec relative ad se dicuntur, suis invicem sibi respondent vocabulis: ut, sicut dicitur:

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Pater Filii pater, et Filius Patris filius, ita dicatur pater Spiritus sancti vel Doni pater, et Spiritus sanctus vel Donum Patris spiritus vel donum. Sed non ita est in omnibus relativis. Non enim omnia, quae relative dicuntur, suis ad se invicem respondent vocabulis. Unde Augustinus huius elidens opinionem, in quinto libro *de Trinitate*: «Non moveat, inquit, quoniam diximus, Spiritum sanctum non ipsam Trinitatem, sed eum qui est in Trinitate, relative dici, licet non ei vicissim respondeat vocabulum eius, ad quem refertur. Dicimus enim Spiritum sanctum Patris, sed non vicissim dicimus Patrem Spiritus sancti, ne filius eius intelligatur Spiritus sanctus. Item dicimus Spiritum sanctum Filii, sed non dicimus Filium Spiritus sancti, ne pater eius intelligatur Spiritus sanctus. In multis enim relativis hoc contingit, ut non inveniatur vocabulum, quo sibi vicissim respondeant. Cum ergo dicimus donum Patris et Filii, non quidem possumus dicere patrem doni aut filium doni, sed ut haec vicissim respondeant, dicimus donum donatoris, et donatorem doni, quia hic potuit inveniri usitatum vocabulum, illic non potuit». «Donum ergo donatoris, et donator doni cum dicimus, relative utrumque ad invicem dicimus». «Donator tamen non fuit Deus nisi ex tempore, cum Spiritus sanctus sit donum etiam ab aeterno».

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### DISTINCTION XXVI.

#### Cap. I. *On this name "hypostasis".*

Now we must say something about the properties of the persons, which we have frequently mentioned in this treatise. But first let us hear what Jerome says about this name *hypostasis*. For he says that under this name a poison lurks. But he says this insofar as the heretics used it to seduce the simple, namely [using it] for *person* and for *essence*, so that, whether one only or three hypostases were said, they might lead the less skilled to incongruity, since this name was not so widespread among Catholics, nor its signification so determined, as now. And therefore Jerome says that this name should not be used without distinction or exposition, then namely, when one was contending with heretics, writing thus *On the Catholic Faith to Pope Damasus*[^1]: "From the Arian prelate the new name of *hypostases* is demanded of me, a Roman man. We ask, what they think to be understood by the three hypostases; *three subsisting persons*, they say. We answer, that we so believe. The sense does not suffice them; they demand the name itself; because I know not what poison lurks in the syllables. We cry out: if anyone does not confess three hypostases, that is, three subsisting persons, let him be anathema. But if anyone, understanding *hypostasis* as *usia* (essence), does not declare one hypostasis in three persons, he is alien from Christ, who namely, saying three hypostases, under the name of piety attempts to assert three natures. Let it suffice us to say one substance and three perfect equal persons; let us be silent about three hypostases, if it pleases. This name is not of good suspicion, since in the same word the senses dissent. Or if you think it right that we ought to say three hypostases together with their interpretations, we do not deny [it]. But believe me, poison lurks under honey; for the angel of Satan transforms himself into an Angel of light[^2]." By these words he does not deny that the name *hypostasis* must be used, but he shows that the heretics used it perversely, against whom caution was needed in the distinction of signification; otherwise he would contradict himself, who above confesses three hypostases.

#### Cap. II. *On the properties of the persons and on their relative names.*

Now let us see concerning the properties of the persons, which are also said for the most part in Scripture [to be] notions or relations in that holy Trinity, which therefore is repeated by us[^3], so that it may be more tenaciously fixed in our heart. Augustine says *in the book On Faith to Peter*[^4]: "It is one thing to have begotten, another to be by nature, and another thing to proceed than to have begotten or been born. Whence it is manifest that the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another." "And it is proper to the Father alone, not because He Himself is not born, but because He has begotten; and proper to the Son alone, not because He Himself has not begotten, but because He was born from the essence of the Father; but proper to the Holy Spirit, not because neither was He Himself born nor did He beget, but because He alone proceeds from the Father and the Son." Behold, He briefly has assigned three properties of the three persons, of which one is not the other. For He signified this when He said: *It is one thing to have begotten than to have been born, and another to proceed* — that is, one property or notion is generation, and another is being-born, another is procession, which by other names are called paternity, filiation, spiration[^5]. Those names of the persons designate these properties, namely *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Spirit*, which are relative and are said with reference to one another; because they note relations, which are not accidental to God, but in the persons themselves are immutably from eternity, so that not only are the appellations relative, but also the relations or notions are in the things themselves, namely in the persons.

#### Cap. III. *That not all things are said of God according to substance; for some [are said] according to relation, yet none according to accident.*

Wherefore it must be known that not everything which is said of God is said according to substance; for some things are said according to relation, which is not an accident, since it is not mutable. For as Augustine says *in the fifth book On the Trinity*[^6]: "Nothing in God is said according to accident, since nothing happens to Him; yet not everything which is said is said of God according to substance. In created and mutable things what is not said according to substance, it remains [must be the case] that it be said according to accident. But in God indeed nothing is said according to accident, since nothing in Him is mutable or losable; yet not everything which is said of God is said according to substance. For [something] is said in relation to something, just as Father in relation to Son, and Son in relation to Father, which is not an accident; because both He is always Father, and He is always Son; and so always, since the Son is always born, nor did He ever begin to be Son. But if He had at some time begun to be, or at some time would cease[^7] to be Son, He would be said according to accident. And since the Father is not called Father, except from this that the Son is to Him, and the Son is not called Son, except from this that He has a Father; these things are not said according to substance, but they are said with reference to one another, nor yet according to accident, since both that He is called Father, and that He is called Son, is eternal and incommutable to them." Behold by these words it is openly shown that some things are said of God according to substance, some according to relation, yet none according to accident. It is also shown that it is the property of the Father, that He has a Son, and the property of the Son, that He has a Father. And therefore, when he said that it is eternal and incommutable that He is called Father, and that He is called Son; he wished it to be understood thus, that is: the property by which the Father is Father, and the property by which the Son is Son, is eternal and incommutable, since both the Father is always Father, and the Son is always Son. Whence Hilary, assigning the properties of the persons *in the twelfth book On the Trinity*[^8] says: "If it is always proper to the Father, that He is always Father, it is necessary that it always be proper to the Son, that He is always Son. For where the Father always is, there always is also the Son: therefore he who is not always Father, has not always begotten." Likewise in the same place: "When God is born, it is manifest that it is proper that He is Son."

#### Cap. IV. *Why it is said to be proper to the Only-begotten to be Son of God, although men too are sons of God.*

Here it is asked how it can be said to be proper to the One born of God that He is Son of God or begotten from God, since men too are called sons of God and are [such], according to that [text]: *All sons of the Most High*[^9]. And to Moses concerning the people of Israel the Lord says[^10]: *My son the firstborn, Israel*. But there is a great distance: for men are sons of God by being made [such], not by the property of being-born; but God the Son is Son by the property of origin and by the truth of [His] being-born, not by being-made or by adoption; and they indeed exist before they are sons of God; for they are made sons of God[^11], not born sons of God. Whence Hilary, showing that God alone, born by the property of origin, is Son of God, most clearly distinguishes between Him and the men [who are] sons of God *in the twelfth book On the Trinity*[^12], saying thus: "To the true Father, only He who is born of Him is truly Son. And we indeed are sons to God, but through being-made. For we were once sons of wrath, but we have been made sons to God through adoption rather than [as those who] are born. And since everything which is made, before it is made, was not, we, since we had not been sons, are made [sons]. For before we were not sons, but through grace we were made [such], not born nor begotten, but acquired. For God acquired us for Himself, and

through this it is said that we have begotten. For we never recognize that God is said to have begotten sons with the signification of [proper] property. For man is made a son of God by adoption, not by generation; nor is it for him a property, but a designation, and on that account he is not truly a son, since he is neither properly said to be born, nor was he always a son. But the Only-begotten God neither was at any time not a son, nor was He anything before [being] son, nor [is] He Himself anything except son. And so He who is always Son, by the property and truth of His being-born is the Son of Him alone who begot [Him]; and only He who begot is His Father; because just as that one is Son by origin, so this one is Father by generation."

#### Cap. V. *That a man is called son of the Trinity, and the Trinity father.*

But man, who is a son of God, since he is made [so], is a son not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, that is, of the whole Trinity; and the Trinity itself can be called his Father. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^13] says: "The Trinity cannot be called father, except perhaps transferred to the creature on account of the adoption of sons. For what is written[^14]: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God, [the Lord thy] God is one*, must by no means be understood with the exception of the Son or the Holy Spirit; whom we rightly call our one Lord and God, also our Father, regenerating us by His grace." Concerning this also Hilary in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^15] says: "God is father to all by faith, to whom He is father by that faith by which we confess Jesus Christ to be the Son of God." Behold it has been shown why it is called proper to the One born of God that He is Son, namely because He alone is properly said to be born. Whence Hilary in the third book *On the Trinity*[^16] says: "The Lord, in saying: *Glorify Thy Son*, attested that He was the Son not only by name but also by property. We are sons of God, but not such a son [is He] here[^17]. For He is the true and proper Son by origin, not by adoption; by truth, not by designation; by birth, not by creation."

#### Cap. VI. *That the Holy Spirit is called Gift by the same property by which He is [called] Holy Spirit, and in both ways relatively to the Father and the Son.*

So also it must be said of the Holy Spirit, who is properly called the Gift of God, although there are also many other gifts of God. But the Holy Spirit is Gift by such an immutable and eternal property, just as the Son is Son by [His] property. For He is called Gift by that [property] by which [He is called] Holy Spirit, and assuredly by both names He is said relatively, and by the same relation He is called Holy Spirit and Gift; although that very relation does not so appear in this name *Holy Spirit*, as in this name *Gift*. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^18] thus says: "The Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity, but is understood in the Trinity, in that He is properly called Holy Spirit, is said relatively, when He is referred both to the Father and to the Son, since the Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. But the relation itself does not appear in this name, but it appears, when He is called the Gift of God; for He is the Gift of the Father and of the Son, since He proceeds both from the Father and from the Son. Therefore the Holy Spirit is an ineffable certain communion of the Father and the Son. And therefore perhaps He is so called, as we have already said, nor does it weary [us] to repeat, since[^19] the same appellation can befit the Father and the Son. For He Himself is properly called that, which they [are] in common: for both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. Therefore that the communion of both might be signified out of a name which befits both, the Holy Spirit is called the gift of both." Behold you have why the Holy Spirit is properly called Gift, and that He is said relatively whether [as] Gift or [as] Holy Spirit, and that He holds as proper to Himself a name which befits the Father and the Son in common, but separately. And it must be known that[^20] when the Father or the Son is called spirit, or holy, neither is said relatively, but according to substance.

#### Cap. VII. *Whether the Father or the Son or the Trinity itself can be called Holy Spirit.*[^21]

Here it can be asked whether the Father or the Son or even the Trinity itself can be called Holy Spirit, just as disjunctively He is called both spirit and holy. Concerning this Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^22] thus says: "The Trinity in no way can be called Son, but the Holy Spirit can indeed be said universally, according to that which is written: *For God is Spirit*. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since God is one, and surely God is holy, and God is spirit, can be called both trinity and holy spirit. Yet then *holy spirit* will not be said relatively, but according to essence, since properly the Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity, but [is] in the Trinity, is said relatively."

#### Cap. VIII. *That not all things, which are said relatively, correspond to one another by their own [reciprocal] vocabulary.*

Some however think that the Holy Spirit or Gift is not said relatively to the Father or to the Son. For if, they say, these things are said relatively to themselves, they correspond to one another by their own [reciprocal] terms: so that, just as it is said:

Father [is] father of the Son, and Son [is] son of the Father, so let it be said: father of the Holy Spirit or father of the Gift, and the Holy Spirit or Gift [is] spirit or gift of the Father. But it is not so in all relatives. For not all things which are said relatively correspond to one another by their own reciprocal vocabulary. Whence Augustine, refuting their opinion, in the fifth book *On the Trinity*: "Let it not move you, he says, that we have said the Holy Spirit is not the Trinity itself, but Him who is in the Trinity, to be said relatively, although a vocabulary corresponding to the one to whom He is referred does not in turn correspond to Him. For we say *Holy Spirit of the Father*, but we do not in turn say *Father of the Holy Spirit*, lest the Holy Spirit be understood as His son. Likewise we say *Holy Spirit of the Son*, but we do not say *Son of the Holy Spirit*, lest the Holy Spirit be understood as His father. For in many relatives this happens, that no vocabulary be found by which they correspond to one another. When therefore we say *Gift of the Father and of the Son*, we cannot indeed call [Him] *father of the Gift* or *son of the Gift*, but in order that these may correspond to one another, we say *gift of the giver*, and *giver of the gift*, since here a customary vocabulary could be found, there it could not". "Therefore *gift of the giver*, and *giver of the gift*, when we say [these], we say both relatively to one another". "But God was not Giver except from time, although the Holy Spirit is Gift even from eternity."

---

la: Epist. 15. n. 3; in quo textu pro *indicit* ed. 2 *inducit*, originale *dicit*, sed adiicit particulam *in* ante *tribus personis*. Deinde codd. A C D E et ed. 1 cum originali omittunt *Nomen hoc* post *si placet*, quae lectio, licet minus clara, fortasse genuina est. Immediate post in originali legitur in eodem sensu verba *dissentiunt* pro *in eodem verbo sensus dissentiunt*; haec tamen lectio Magistri omnino praeferenda est.

en: Epistle 15, n. 3; in which text edition 2 [reads] *inducit* in place of *indicit*, the original [reads] *dicit*, but adds the particle *in* before *tribus personis* ("three persons"). Then codices A, C, D, E and edition 1 with the original omit *Nomen hoc* ("this name") after *si placet* ("if it pleases"); this reading, although less clear, is perhaps the genuine one. Immediately after, the original reads in the same sense the words *dissentiunt* in place of *in eodem verbo sensus dissentiunt* ("the senses dissent in the same word"); nevertheless the Master's reading is altogether to be preferred.

la: Respicitur ad II. Cor. 11, 14.

en: Reference is made to II Corinthians 11:14.

la: Solummodo ed. 2 repetuntur, *ut cordi nostro tenacius infigantur*, scilicet *proprietates personarum*; in nostro textu haec propositio refertur ad *Trinitate sancta*.

en: Edition 2 alone repeats them, "*so that they may be more tenaciously fixed in our heart*", namely *the properties of the persons*; in our text this clause is referred to *the holy Trinity*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 6. Sequens locus ibid. c. 2. n. 7.

en: Chapter 1, n. 6. The following passage [is] in the same place, c. 2, n. 7.

la: Excepta ed. 8, aliae edd. et codd. minus b *spiratio*. Cod. A (in margine ab alia manu) repetit *processio*. Immediate postea ante *nomina* adiecimus *illa* fide omnium codd. et ed. 1.

en: Excepting edition 8, the other editions and codices [read with the exception of] b *spiratio*. Codex A (in the margin, by another hand) repeats *processio*. Immediately after, before *nomina* ("names") we have added *illa* ("those") on the authority of all the codices and edition 1.

la: Cap. 5. n. 6. — Paulo superius Vat. cum pluribus edd. et codd. DE *Unde Augustinus* pro *Ut enim Augustinus*. Post medium textum et post *ille semper* Vat. cum aliis edd., excepto 1, bis addit *est*, refragantibus codd. et originali.

en: Chapter 5, n. 6. — A little above, the Vatican edition with several other editions and codices D, E [reads] *Unde Augustinus* ("Whence Augustine") in place of *Ut enim Augustinus* ("For as Augustine"). After the middle of the text and after *ille semper* ("he always"), the Vatican with other editions, edition 1 excepted, twice adds *est* ("is"), against the codices and the original.

la: Solummodo Vat. cum edd. 4, 6 *dixerit*.

en: The Vatican alone with editions 4, 6 [reads] *dixerit*.

la: Num. 23; Magister tamen ordinem propositionum transmutat. — Sequens locus est ibid. n. 15.

en: n. 23; the Master however transposes the order of the propositions. — The following passage is in the same place, n. 15.

la: Psalm. 81, 6. — Paulo superius post *dicatur* fide omnium codd. et edd. 1, 2, 5 adiecimus *esse*, et ante *secundum illud* posuimus contra solam Vat. *sint* pro *fiant*.

en: Psalm 81:6. — A little above, after *dicatur* we have added *esse* on the authority of all codices and editions 1, 2, 5; and before *secundum illud* we have set, against the Vatican alone, *sint* in place of *fiant*.

en: Exodus 1:22.

la: A sola Vat. omittitur *filii Dei*, non inepte legendo *fiunt enim, non nascuntur filii Dei*. Omnes codd. et aliae edd. addunt saltem *filii*, codd. DE et ed. 1 *filii Dei*, quae lectio accuratius sensum exprimit; paulo superius pro *sint* cod. C et plurimae edd. *sunt*.

en: The Vatican alone omits *filii Dei* ("sons of God"), not inaptly reading *fiunt enim, non nascuntur filii Dei* ("for they are made, sons of God are not born"). All the codices and other editions add at least *filii*, codices D, E and edition 1 [read] *filii Dei*, which reading more accurately expresses the sense; a little above, in place of *sint* codex C and most editions [read] *sunt*.

la: Num. 12 et 13; in quo textu solummodo edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 post *Vero* addunt *Deo*; eaedem et nonnullae aliae edd. *qui ex Deo* pro *qui ex eo*. Textus Hilarii omittit *vere* ante *Filius*. Fide eiusdem originalis et codd. A B C posuimus meliorem lectionem *filii Deo sumus*, licet omnes edd. et codd. D E habeant *filii Dei sumus*. Item correximus paulo inferius *filii Deo per* pro *filii Dei per*. Verba *aliquando filii iracundiae* respiciunt ad Ephes. 2, 3: *Et eramus natura filii irae*.

en: n. 12 and 13; in which text only editions 2, 3, 7, 8 add *Deo* after *Vero*; the same and some other editions [read] *qui ex Deo* in place of *qui ex eo*. The text of Hilary omits *vere* ("truly") before *Filius*. On the authority of the same original and of codices A, B, C we have set the better reading *filii Deo sumus* ("we are sons to God"), although all editions and codices D, E have *filii Dei sumus* ("we are sons of God"). Likewise we have corrected a little below *filii Deo per* in place of *filii Dei per*. The words *aliquando filii iracundiae* ("once sons of wrath") refer to Ephesians 2:3: *And we were by nature children of wrath*.

la: Haec leguntur ibid. n. 13, sed multis a Magistro omissis vel mutatis.

en: These [words] are read at the same place, n. 13, but with many things omitted or changed by the Master.

la: Cap. VI. n. 12. — Supra Vat. et edd. 1, 4, 6 omittunt *et* post *Patris, sed*.

en: Chapter VI, n. 12. — Above, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 4, 6 omit *et* ("and") after *Patris, sed* ("of the Father, but").

la: Deut. 6, 4. Vulgata: *Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est*.

en: Deuteronomy 6:4. The Vulgate reads: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord*.

la: Num. 11. Locus citatus s. Scripturae est Ioan. 17, 1.

en: n. 11. The cited passage of Sacred Scripture is John 17:1.

la: Solummodo codd. A D addunt *Dei*; deinde codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *est* ante *filius*.

en: Codices A, D alone add *Dei* ("of God"); then the codices and edition 1 omit *est* ("is") before *filius* ("son").

la: Cap. II. n. 12.

en: Chapter II, n. 12.

la: Codd. ABDE et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 *quia*. Etiam alibi Magister particula *quia* utitur pro *quod*.

en: Codices ABDE and editions 1, 2, 3, 7 [read] *quia*. Elsewhere too the Master uses the particle *quia* in place of *quod*.

la: Codd. D E hic incipiunt d. XXVII.

en: Codices D, E here begin distinction XXVII.

la: Cap. II. n. 12, nonnullis a Magistro mutatis et omissis. — Locus s. Scripturae est Ioan. 4, 24. — Circa finem textus Augustini solummodo Vat. et ed. 4, 5 *non dicitur* pro *non dicetur*.

en: Chapter II, n. 12, with several things changed and omitted by the Master. — The passage of Sacred Scripture is John 4:24. — Near the end of the Augustine text, the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5 alone [read] *non dicitur* in place of *non dicetur*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 26, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text of Distinction XXVI

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 450 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXVI.

#### *De proprietatibus personarum, secundum quod in ipsis personis assignantur.*

> *Iam de proprietatibus personarum videamus etc.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra Magister egit[^1] de his quae dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam; hic secundo agit de his quae dicuntur de Deo secundum relationem.

Dividitur autem haec pars in duas. In prima agit de his quae dicuntur de Deo proprie et aeternaliter. In secunda agit de his quae dicuntur de Deo temporaliter et communiter[^2], infra distinctione trigesima: *Sunt enim quaedam, quae ex tempore.*

Prima iterum pars dividitur in duas; quia quaedam sunt proprietates sive relationes personales, et de his agit primo; quaedam non personales, et de his agit secundo, infra distinctione vigesima octava: *Praeterea considerari oportet, quod non tantum tres etc.*

Prima iterum pars dividitur in duas. In prima assignat proprietates personarum, secundum quod in ipsis personis assignantur. In secunda vero agit de ipsis, secundum quod eas contingit diversis nominibus exprimi, infra distinctione vigesima septima: *Hic quaeri potest, utrum proprietates etc.*

Prima pars habet duas. In prima Magister assignat proprietates personarum. In secunda vero circa assignationem movet dubitationem, ibi: *Hic quaeritur, quomodo proprium dicatur esse nato etc.*

<!-- page 451 -->

Prima pars habet tres partes secundum tria capitula[^3]. In prima determinat, quibus assignentur proprietates, quia hypostasibus. In secunda assignat, quae sint illae proprietates, ibi: *Iam de proprietatibus personarum videamus.* Tertio ostendit, quid sint illae proprietates, quoniam sunt relationes sive dictae secundum relationem, non tamen secundum accidens, et hoc tertio capitulo facit, ibi: *Quocirca sciendum est, non omne etc.*

*Hic quaeritur, quomodo dicatur esse proprium nato Deo.* Haec est secunda pars, in qua movet dubitationes iuxta praedictas assignationes, et haec pars habet duas. In prima movet dubitationem contra assignationem proprietatis Filii. In secunda contra assignationem proprietatis Spiritus sancti, ibi: *Hic quaeri potest, utrum Pater.* Prima pars habet duas. In prima proponit quaestionem et solvit auctoritate[^4] Hilarii. In secunda illam solutionem applicat etiam circa proprietatem Spiritus sancti, quae est donum, ibi: *Ita etiam de Spiritu sancto dicendum est.*

Similiter secunda pars habet duas partes. In prima quaerit et solvit; in secunda quorundam positionem improbat. Primum facit ibi: *Hic quaeri potest, utrum Pater etc.*; secundum facit ibi: *Quidam tamen putant, Spiritum sanctum etc.*

---

english:
<!-- page 450 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXVI.

#### *On the properties of the persons, insofar as they are assigned within the persons themselves.*

> *"Now let us consider the properties of the persons" etc.*

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated[^1] of the things which are said of God according to substance; here, in the second place, he treats of the things which are said of God according to relation.

Now this part is divided into two. In the first he treats of the things which are said of God properly and eternally. In the second he treats of the things which are said of God temporally and in common[^2], below in the thirtieth distinction: *"For there are certain things which are said from time."*

The first part is again divided into two; for certain properties or relations are personal, and with these he deals first; certain are non-personal, and with these he deals second, below in the twenty-eighth distinction: *"Furthermore, it must be considered that not only three etc."*

The first part is again divided into two. In the first he assigns the properties of the persons, insofar as they are assigned within the persons themselves. In the second, however, he treats of them insofar as they may be expressed by various names, below in the twenty-seventh distinction: *"Here it can be asked whether the properties etc."*

The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first the Master assigns the properties of the persons. In the second, however, he raises a difficulty concerning their assignment, there: *"Here it is asked how a property is said to belong to the begotten etc."*

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The first part has three parts according to three chapters[^3]. In the first he determines to whom the properties are to be assigned — namely, to the hypostases. In the second he assigns what those properties are, there: *"Now let us consider the properties of the persons."* In the third he shows what those properties are, since they are relations, or said according to relation, yet not according to accident; and this he does in the third chapter, there: *"Wherefore it should be known that not every etc."*

*"Here it is asked how a property is said to belong to the begotten God."* This is the second part, in which he raises difficulties concerning the aforesaid assignments, and this part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he raises a difficulty against the assignment of the property of the Son. In the second, against the assignment of the property of the Holy Spirit, there: *"Here it can be asked whether the Father."* The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he poses the question and resolves it by the authority[^4] of Hilary. In the second he applies that solution also to the property of the Holy Spirit, which is *gift*, there: *"So also it must be said concerning the Holy Spirit."*

Likewise the second part has two parts. In the first he inquires and answers; in the second he refutes a certain position of some. The first he does there: *"Here it can be asked whether the Father etc."*; the second he does there: *"But certain ones think that the Holy Spirit etc."*

---

la: Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 verbo *egit* praemittit *multipliciter*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the codices and the first edition, prefixes *multipliciter* ("in many ways") to the verb *egit* ("treated").

la: Sic codd. nec non ed. 1. Vat. perperam omittit verba *et communiter*, et paulo superius inter verba *Deo temporaliter* interiicit *proprie et*.

en: So the codices and also the first edition. The Vatican edition wrongly omits the words *et communiter* ("and in common"), and a little earlier, between the words *Deo temporaliter* ("of God temporally"), it inserts *proprie et* ("properly and").

la: In sola Vat. desiderantur verba *secundum tria capitula*, et quae paulo inferius sequuntur: *et hoc tertio capitulo facit*.

en: Only in the Vatican edition are the words *secundum tria capitula* ("according to three chapters") missing, together with what follows a little below: *et hoc tertio capitulo facit* ("and this he does in the third chapter").

la: Pro *auctoritate* plures codd. cum ed. 1 perperam *auctoritatem*. — Vat. sola: *auctoritate Augustini et Hilarii*.

en: For *auctoritate* ("by authority") several codices, together with the first edition, wrongly read *auctoritatem* (accusative). — The Vatican edition alone reads: *auctoritate Augustini et Hilarii* ("by the authority of Augustine and Hilary").

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 451 -->

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum in divinis ponendae sint proprietates personarum.*

Quod autem in divinis sit ponere proprietates non solum vocaliter, sed etiam realiter, ostenditur sic.

1. Hieronymus dicit, et habetur in fine praecedentis distinctionis[^1]: «Non tantum nomina, sed etiam nominum proprietates confitemur»: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^2]: «Proprium est Patris, quod unum filium genuit»: ergo a coniugatis, generatio est proprietas Patris; sed constat, quod generatio realiter est in Deo, constat etiam, quod convenit soli Patri: ergo secundum rem est Patris proprietas.

3. Item, proprietatis est distinguere, ergo ubi est vera distinctio, ibi est vera proprietas; sed in divinis est vera distinctio: unde Damascenus[^3]: «Differentiam hypostaseon, id est personarum, in tribus proprietatibus, paternali, filiali et processibili recognoscimus».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia sicut alius est modus quaerendi de essentia et persona, ita alius est modus quaerendi de essentia et proprietate. De essentia enim quaeritur per *quid*, de proprietate per *quomodo se habet*: ergo sicut ponitur in divinis et essentia et persona secundum veritatem, ita debet poni proprietas.

5. Item, supra[^4] probatum est, quod differunt generatio et processio realiter — alioquin non differrent personae — ergo generatio et spiratio differunt realiter. Sed tam generatio, quam spiratio est in una persona non multiplicata, ut in persona Patris: ergo cum persona sit realiter una, et proprietates realiter plures, ergo ponere est proprietates realiter in divinis differentes; sed non differentia essentiali nec personali, cum sint in eadem persona: ergo notionali. Quodsi non differunt generatio et spiratio, sicut haec est vera: Pater spirat Spiritum sanctum, ita et haec: Pater generat Spiritum sanctum; et tunc sequeretur, quod Spiritus sanctus esset Filius.

6. Item, Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, hoc supra[^5] probatum est, et est ratio in promptu, quia unus omnino est qui spiratur. Hoc quod est unum dicit unitatem non essentiae nec personae: ergo oportet, quod proprietatis; et si hoc, necesse est ponere proprietates in divinis realiter, non nominaliter sive tantum in voce.

7. Item, in Patre est paternitas et innascibilitas: aut ergo eadem proprietas, aut alia. Si eadem proprietas, ergo et relatio eadem; sed secundum paternitatem refertur ad Filium: ergo et secundum innascibilitatem. Sed hoc est falsum, ergo est alia[^6]; et persona est una: ergo necesse est ponere proprietates in divinis personis etiam realiter differentes.

**Contra:**

1. Hilarius *de Trinitate*[^7]: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus solis differunt nominibus: ergo si differunt solis nominibus, non sunt ibi reales proprietates, sed vocales.

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2. Item, Damascenus dicit primo libro[^8]: «Oportet scire, quod aliud est differre re, aliud ratione», et dicit, quod in creaturis est differentia re et convenientia ratione, sed in divinis e contrario. Cum ergo sit distinctio secundum proprietates, videtur ergo, quod sint ibi solum secundum modum loquendi vel intelligendi: non ergo a parte rei.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia in summe simplici non cadit differentia aliqua; sed divina persona est summe simplex: ergo aut ibi non est proprietas, aut est solo modo loquendi: ergo etc.

4. Item, ita simplex est persona, sicut essentia; sed proprietates essentiae non differunt nisi solo modo loquendi, non secundum rem: ergo similiter proprietates personae.

5. Item, divina essentia propter summam simplicitatem se ipsa refertur ad creaturam, et ideo relatio essentialis solo modo loquendi differt ab essentia, ut cum dicitur *Dominus*; omnino enim transit in substantiam[^9]: ergo pari ratione persona se ipsa refertur ad personam.

6. Item, creatura propter essentialem comparationem ad suum principium se ipsa refertur ad suum Creatorem — alioquin inter Creatorem et creaturam caderet medium, quod non esset nec Creator nec creatura — ergo si multo essentialior est comparatio personae ad personam, ergo se ipsa refertur. Et si hoc: ergo videtur, quod ipsa proprietas vel relatio non differat nisi solo modo loquendi a persona.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Proprietates personarum ponendae sunt in divinis, quae non solum secundum vocem, sed etiam realiter a se invicem, et aliquo modo etiam a personis differunt.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnes catholici tractatores posuerunt proprietates personarum in divinis. Cum enim sint plures personae et distinctae, necesse est, quod sit ibi distinguens; hoc autem proprietatem appellamus. Sed diversificati sunt in modo positionis.

Quoniam ergo viderunt aliqui[^10] summam simplicitatem in persona sicut in essentia, posuerunt, quod sicut in essentia omnino est idem *quo est* et *quod est*, ita in persona omnino idem[^11] qui distinguitur et quo, et ita suppositum et proprietas, differens autem solo modo loquendi; sicut si dicatur: rogo te benignum vel benignitatem tuam.

Sed ista positio non potest stare, quoniam, sicut in opponendo[^12] probatum est, in eadem persona sunt proprietates differentes non solum modo loquendi, sed et realiter. Videmus enim, quod una persona uno modo comparatur ad unam, ut Pater ad Filium; et videmus, unam personam uno modo sive una habitudine comparari ad plures, ut Spiritus sanctus ad Patrem et Filium; et iterum, unam personam pluribus modis comparari ad plures, ut Filius ad Patrem et Spiritum sanctum. Similiter videmus, plures personas eodem modo comparari ad unam, ut Pater et Filius ad Spiritum sanctum: ergo unitas habitudinis non potest accipi a parte essentiae — certum est — nec a parte personae quae refertur; nec ex parte personae, ad quam refertur. Restat ergo, quod sit alius modus dicendi, sumtus a parte rei.

Et ideo nunc communis opinio tenet, in divinis esse proprietates personarum realiter differentes a se invicem, et per hoc etiam differentes a personis aliquo modo. Sicut enim, quia in una essentia non plurificata plures ponimus personas, modi[^13] dicendi essentialiter et personaliter differunt non solum differentia sumta a parte nostra, sed etiam a parte rei; sic etiam dicendum de modo dicendi personaliter et notionaliter. Et ideo distinguunt magistri tres modos dicendi in divinis, qui sumuntur a parte rei, scilicet essentialem, personalem et notionalem. Et dicitur communiter, quod tres sint modi praedicandi, scilicet *in quid*, *in quis* et *in quae* sive *in quo modo se habet*. Et incidit peccatum secundum figuram dictionis ex commutatione[^14] horum modorum, sicut in creaturis ex commutatione praedicamentorum. Sicut ergo in divinis vera est essentia, et verae sunt personae, ita verae sunt personarum proprietates.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium primo de Hilario, dicendum, quod Hilarius accipit nomina

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non pro ipsis vocibus, sed pro intellectibus sive significatis importatis per illa tria nomina. Important enim ibi proprietates. Nam *solis* non excludit ibi proprietatis veritatem, sed excludit diversitatem formae vel substantiae vel naturae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod differunt solum ratione; dicendum, quod *differre ratione* est tripliciter. Uno modo a parte nostrae apprehensionis, sicut differunt in Deo bonitas et magnitudo. Alio modo *differre ratione* est secundum differentiam attributionis, quia aliquis modus ponitur circa unum vel attribuitur uni, qui non attribuitur alteri; et sic differunt ratione essentia et persona et notio. Tertio modo *differre ratione* est differre secundum pluralitatem distinctionis, quae non inducit diversitatem in essentia vel natura, tamen tantam inducit differentiam, quod unum non dicitur de altero; et sic differt ratione persona a persona et proprietas a proprietate. Et prima quidem differentia secundum rationem est minima, quia nihil ei respondet a parte rei; sed ultimae respondet. Non vult ergo Damascenus dividere rem contra rationem, nisi secundum quod res accipitur pro natura, nec etiam sic omnino dividit, sed quasi a principali denominat. Nam in creaturis non solum est communitas rationalis, immo etiam naturalis. Nam Petrus et Paulus non tantum in ratione conveniunt, sed etiam in natura communi.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec[^15] tollit summam simplicitatem; dicendum, quod differentia rationis quaedam fundatur super quid absolutum sive substantiale sive accidentale, quaedam super respectum sive modum se habendi. Et prima differentia omnino repugnat simplicitati, et non potest esse in Deo; secunda vero non repugnat. Nam videmus, respectum aliquem de novo esse circa aliquid, illo nullo modo mutato[^16]. Videmus etiam, aliquid habere plures respectus, ipso sine compositione existente. Dicendum ergo, quod proprietates personales sunt respectivae, non absolutae; et ideo possunt differre ratione respectuum; quia persona suppositum sive hypostasim dicit, sed proprietas dicit habitudinem ad alterum.

4. Ex hoc patet sequens. Quia enim proprietates essentiales sunt absolutae, non possunt dicere realem differentiam, nisi essentialem habeant; et ideo solo modo loquendi differunt. Non sic proprietates personales. Unde proprietates essentiales omnino transeunt in essentiam, sed personales non.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod essentia se ipsa refertur; dicendum, quod essentia divina non potest referri nisi ad aliam essentiam; ad illam autem non refertur, quoniam relatio dicit ordinem et habitudinem. Sicut autem vult Philosophus[^17]: «Deus non ordinatur ad res, sed res ad ipsum»; et ideo non est ibi relatio nisi solo modo loquendi. Sed cum persona ad personam refertur, ibi vere est ordo originis, et ideo habitudo, et ideo vera relatio. Et sic patet illud.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura se ipsa refertur; dicendum, quod referri se ipso potest intelligi tripliciter: aut quia inter rei respectum et essentiam non cadit medium, quia ipsa essentia essentialiter dependet; et sic quidem reperitur in creaturis. Sic enim refertur materia ad formam et forma ad materiam; unde dicit Philosophus[^18], quod «materia hoc ipsum quod est ad alterum est»; tamen nec materia est suus respectus, nec forma, quia non habent omnimodam simplicitatem. Alio modo est referri se ipso, quia inter id quod refertur et suum correlativum non cadit aliquod medium, quod non sit alterum eorum; et sic Pater refertur se ipso ad Filium, et e converso. Nam Pater est sua paternitas, et hoc propter summam simplicitatem. Tertio modo referri se ipso est, quia ipsum quod refertur non est nisi relatio et respectus purus; et hoc est impossibile esse neque in Deo neque in creatura, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^19], «omne quod refertur est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur»; alioquin relationis esset relatio. Et ita patet, quod omnis

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proprietas relativa sive sit in Deo sive in creatura necessario differt aliquo modo ab eo cuius est proprietas, et magis in creatura quam in Creatore. Et intelligantur omnia haec, sicut prius, quoniam omne respectivum fundatur super aliquid absolutum.

english:
### QUESTION I. *Whether properties of the persons are to be posited in divine matters.*

That in divine matters there is to be a positing of properties not only verbally, but also really, is shown thus.

1. Jerome says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction[^1]: «We confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the book *On the Faith to Peter*[^2]: «It is proper to the Father, that he begot one son»: therefore by [the rule] from conjugates, generation is a property of the Father; but it is established that generation really is in God, and it is also established that it belongs to the Father alone: therefore according to the thing it is the Father's property.

3. Likewise, it belongs to a property to distinguish; therefore where there is a true distinction, there is a true property; but in divine matters there is a true distinction: whence Damascene[^3]: «We recognize the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties — the paternal, the filial, and the processible».

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since just as the mode of inquiring about essence and person is one [thing], so the mode of inquiring about essence and property is another. For about essence one inquires through *what*, about property through *how it stands*: therefore just as essence and person are posited in divine matters according to truth, so a property must be posited.

5. Likewise, above[^4] it has been proved that generation and procession really differ — otherwise the persons would not differ — therefore generation and spiration differ really. But both generation and spiration are in one person not multiplied, as in the person of the Father: therefore since the person is really one, and the properties are really many, therefore there is to be a positing of properties really differing in divine matters; but not by an essential or personal difference, since they are in the same person: therefore by a notional [difference]. But if generation and spiration do not differ, just as this is true: *the Father spirates the Holy Spirit*, so also this: *the Father generates the Holy Spirit*; and then it would follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son.

6. Likewise, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, this has been proved above[^5], and the reason is at hand, since the one who is spirated is altogether one. This [fact] that he is one expresses a unity not of essence nor of person: therefore it must be that of a property; and if so, it is necessary to posit properties in divine matters really, not nominally or only in voice.

7. Likewise, in the Father there is paternity and unbegottenness: either then [it is] the same property, or another. If the same property, then also the same relation; but according to paternity he is referred to the Son: therefore also according to unbegottenness. But this is false, therefore it is another[^6]; and the person is one: therefore it is necessary to posit properties in the divine persons even really differing.

**On the contrary:**

1. Hilary, *On the Trinity*[^7]: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ by names alone: therefore if they differ by names alone, there are not real properties there, but vocal ones.

2. Likewise, Damascene says in the first book[^8]: «It is needful to know that to differ in thing is one [matter], to differ in account is another», and he says that in creatures there is a difference in thing and an agreement in account, but in divine matters [it is] the contrary. Since therefore there is a distinction according to properties, it seems then that they are there only according to the mode of speaking or of understanding: therefore not on the side of the thing.

3. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since in what is supremely simple no difference falls; but the divine person is supremely simple: therefore either there is no property there, or it is only by mode of speaking: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the person is just as simple as the essence; but the properties of the essence do not differ except only by mode of speaking, not according to the thing: therefore likewise the properties of the person.

5. Likewise, the divine essence on account of its supreme simplicity refers itself to the creature, and therefore an essential relation differs from the essence only by mode of speaking, as when [God] is called *Lord*; for it altogether passes into the substance[^9]: therefore by parity of reason a person refers itself to a person.

6. Likewise, a creature on account of its essential comparison to its principle refers itself to its Creator — otherwise between Creator and creature there would fall a middle, which would be neither Creator nor creature — therefore if the comparison of person to person is much more essential, then it refers itself. And if so: it seems that the property or relation itself differs from the person only by mode of speaking.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Properties of the persons are to be posited in divine matters, which differ from one another not only according to voice, but also really, and in some way also from the persons.*

**I respond:** It must be said that all Catholic treatise-writers have posited properties of the persons in divine matters. For since there are several and distinct persons, it is necessary that there be a distinguishing [factor] there; this we call a property. But they have varied in the mode of positing.

Since therefore some[^10] saw the supreme simplicity in the person as in the essence, they posited that just as in the essence *that by which it is* and *that which is* are altogether the same, so in the person there is altogether the same[^11] [item] who is distinguished and that by which [he is distinguished], and so [the same] supposit and property, differing only by mode of speaking; as if one were to say: *I beg you, kindly one* or *your kindness*.

But this position cannot stand, because, as has been proved in the opposing [arguments][^12], in the same person there are properties differing not only by mode of speaking, but also really. For we see that one person is compared to one in one mode, as the Father to the Son; and we see one person to be compared in one mode or by one relation to several, as the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son; and again, one person to be compared in several modes to several, as the Son to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Likewise we see several persons to be compared in the same mode to one, as the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit: therefore the unity of the relation cannot be taken from the side of the essence — this is certain — nor from the side of the person which refers; nor from the side of the person to which it refers. It remains, therefore, that there is another mode of speaking, taken on the side of the thing.

And therefore now the common opinion holds that in divine matters there are properties of the persons really differing from one another, and through this also differing in some way from the persons. For just as, because in one not-pluralified essence we posit several persons, the modes[^13] of speaking essentially and personally differ not only by a difference taken on our side, but also on the side of the thing; so also it must be said of the mode of speaking personally and notionally. And therefore the masters distinguish three modes of speaking in divine matters, which are taken on the side of the thing, namely the essential, the personal, and the notional. And it is commonly said that there are three modes of predicating, namely *in quid* ("in what"), *in quis* ("in who"), and *in quae* ("in which") or *in quo modo se habet* ("in how it stands"). And the fault according to the figure of speech is incurred from the interchange[^14] of these modes, just as in creatures from the interchange of predicaments. Therefore, just as in divine matters the essence is true, and the persons are true, so the properties of the persons are true.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary first concerning Hilary, it must be said that Hilary takes the names not for the voices themselves, but for the understandings or things signified imported through those three names. For they import properties there. For *alone* does not exclude there the truth of the property, but excludes a diversity of form or substance or nature.

2. To that which is objected concerning Damascene, that they differ only in account; it must be said that *to differ in account* is threefold. In one mode on the side of our apprehension, as in God goodness and magnitude differ. In another mode *to differ in account* is according to the difference of attribution, since some mode is posited around one or attributed to one, which is not attributed to another; and thus essence and person and notion differ in account. In a third mode *to differ in account* is to differ according to the plurality of distinction, which does not bring in a diversity in essence or nature, yet brings in so great a difference that one is not said of the other; and thus person differs in account from person and property from property. And the first difference according to account is the least, since nothing corresponds to it on the side of the thing; but to the last [something] does correspond. Therefore Damascene does not mean to divide thing against account, except according as *thing* is taken for *nature*, nor even thus does he altogether divide, but rather denominates [it] from the principal [aspect]. For in creatures there is not only a rational community, but indeed even a natural one. For Peter and Paul agree not only in account, but also in common nature.

3. To that which is objected, that this[^15] takes away the supreme simplicity; it must be said that a difference of account is in some cases founded upon some absolute thing, whether substantial or accidental, [and] in some cases upon a respect or mode of standing. And the first difference altogether resists simplicity, and cannot be in God; the second, however, does not resist [it]. For we see that some respect comes about anew around something, [the latter] in no way being changed[^16]. We see also that something has several respects, [it] itself existing without composition. It must be said therefore that the personal properties are respective, not absolute; and therefore they can differ according to the account of the respects; since *person* expresses a supposit or hypostasis, but *property* expresses a relation to another.

4. From this what follows is plain. For since the essential properties are absolute, they cannot express a real difference, unless they have an essential [one]; and therefore they differ only by mode of speaking. Not so the personal properties. Hence the essential properties altogether pass into the essence, but the personal [properties] do not.

5. To that which is objected, that the essence refers itself; it must be said that the divine essence cannot be referred except to another essence; but to that [other] it is not referred, since a relation expresses an order and a relation. As, however, the Philosopher holds[^17]: «God is not ordered to things, but things to him»; and therefore there is no relation there except only by mode of speaking. But when person refers to person, there truly is the order of origin, and therefore relation, and therefore true relation. And so that is plain.

6. To that which is objected, that a creature refers itself; it must be said that *to be referred by itself* can be understood in three ways: either since between the respect of the thing and the essence no middle falls, since the essence itself depends essentially [on its principle]; and thus indeed it is found in creatures. For thus matter is referred to form and form to matter; whence the Philosopher says[^18] that «matter, this very [thing] which it is, is in relation to another»; yet neither is matter its own respect, nor form, since they do not have every-way simplicity. In another mode it is *to be referred by itself*, since between that which is referred and its correlative no middle falls which is not one of them; and thus the Father is referred by himself to the Son, and conversely. For the Father is his own paternity, and this on account of the supreme simplicity. In a third mode *to be referred by itself* is, since that which is referred is nothing but a relation and pure respect; and this is impossible to be either in God or in a creature, since, as Augustine says[^19], «everything which is referred is something, except that which is said relatively»; otherwise there would be a relation of a relation. And so it is plain that every relative property, whether it be in God or in a creature, necessarily differs in some way from that of which it is the property, and more in a creature than in the Creator. And let all these [statements] be understood, as before, since every respective [thing] is founded upon something absolute.

la: Cap. 3.

en: Chapter 3 [of the preceding distinction].

la: Cap. 2. n. 7. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Mox verba *a coniugatis* intellige: locum sive modum argumentandi a concreto ad abstractum, vel e contrario. Concretum et abstractum dicuntur coniugata, i. e. sub uno iugo significationis posita, quia conveniunt in principali significato et non nisi secundum modum significationis differunt.

en: Chapter 2, n. 7. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 2. — Soon understand the words *a coniugatis*: the topic or mode of arguing from concrete to abstract, or conversely. The concrete and the abstract are called *coniugata*, that is, things placed under one yoke of signification, since they agree in their principal signified and differ only according to the mode of signification.

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 5. Cfr. et libr. I. c. 8. — De maiori argumenti cfr. infra q. 3.

en: Book III *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 5. Cf. also book I, c. 8. — On the major [premise] of the argument cf. below q. 3.

en: Distinction 13, q. 3.

la: Dist. 11. q. 2. — In fine argumenti Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 *poni* pro *ponere*, et dein contra codd. BD H K P Q V aa bb *nec tantum* pro *sive tantum*; cod. F *vel tantum*. — A multis codd. abest *in* ante *voce*; in codd. aa bb legitur: *nominaliter tantum sive secundum vocem*.

en: Distinction 11, q. 2. — At the end of the argument, the Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *poni* in place of *ponere*, and then against codices BD H K P Q V aa bb [reads] *nec tantum* in place of *sive tantum*; cod. F [reads] *vel tantum*. — From many codices *in* before *voce* is missing; in codices aa bb is read: *nominaliter tantum sive secundum vocem* ("only nominally or according to voice").

la: Sic codd. F H P Q T ee aliique; cod. — *ergo alia et alia*; Vat. cum cod. cc *igitur alia*.

en: Thus codices F H P Q T ee and others; cod. [reads] *ergo alia et alia* ("therefore another and another"); the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *igitur alia* ("therefore another").

la: Contrarium constanter docet Hilarius. Videtur igitur haec sententia formata esse ex iis locis, qui in singulis libris supra laudati operis occurrunt, in quibus sanctus Doctor substantialem personarum divinarum unitatem urget, vel ex oppositione haereticorum v. g. libro II. n. 8.

en: Hilary constantly teaches the contrary. It seems therefore that this opinion has been formed from those places which occur in the several books of the work praised above, in which the holy Doctor urges the substantial unity of the divine persons, or from the opposition of the heretics, e.g. book II, n. 8.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 8: *Hoc autem nosse interest, quod aliud sit, quoad rem, et aliud, ratione ac cogitatione considerari. Enimvero in omnibus creaturis discretio quidem personarum quoad rem consideratur... communitas autem et coniunctio atque unitas ratione atque cogitatione perspicitur... In sacrosancta vero... Trinitate contrario modo se res habet.*

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 8: *But it is of importance to know this, that one [thing] is to be considered as to the thing, and another by account and thought. For indeed in all creatures the discrimination of persons is considered as to the thing... but the community and conjunction and unity is perceived by account and thought... In the most-holy Trinity, however, the matter stands in the contrary mode.*

la: Id est, omnino est idem ac ipsa substantia vel essentia divina. — Proxime post pro *se ipsa* cod. T *per se ipsam*.

en: That is, [the relation] is altogether the same as the divine substance or essence itself. — Soon afterwards, in place of *se ipsa* cod. T [reads] *per se ipsam* ("through itself").

la: Inter quos Praepositivus; cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1; et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 1. a. 1.

en: Among whom [is] Praepositivus; cf. below d. 33, q. 1; and Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 1, a. 1.

la: Supple cum Vat. *est* et mox post *proprietas* cum eadem *omnino est idem*.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *est*, and soon after *proprietas* with the same [edition] *omnino est idem* ("is altogether the same").

la: Fundam. 7. — Paulo inferius post *realiter* cod. 1 interponit *quia alius est modus, quo se habet Pater ad Filium, alius quo se habet ad Spiritum sanctum*. — Complures codd. ut AST V X Y *modus*.

en: *Fundamentum* 7. — A little below, after *realiter* cod. 1 interposes *quia alius est modus, quo se habet Pater ad Filium, alius quo se habet ad Spiritum sanctum* ("since one is the mode by which the Father stands to the Son, another by which he stands to the Holy Spirit"). — Several codices such as AST V X Y [read] *modus*.

la: Vat., paucis tantum faventibus codd., *sunt*. — Mox post *praedicandi* supple cum sola Vat. *in divinis*. — De tribus modis praedicandi, quae sequuntur, vide Alan. ab Insulis libr. Theolog. Regul., regul. 50.

en: The Vatican [edition], with only a few codices favoring [it], [reads] *sunt*. — Soon after *praedicandi* supply with the Vatican [edition] alone *in divinis* ("in divine matters"). — On the three modes of predicating which follow, see Alan of Lille, book *Theological Rules*, rule 50.

la: Sic praestantiores codd. cum ed. 1. Male sonat textus Vaticanae: *Et incidit in peccatum, scilicet figuram dictionis ex commixtione*.

en: Thus the more excellent codices with ed. 1. The text of the Vatican [edition] sounds badly: *Et incidit in peccatum, scilicet figuram dictionis ex commixtione* ("And the fault is incurred, namely the figure of speech from commixture").

la: Vat. contra codd. et tres primas edd. *rationis*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the codices and the first three editions, [reads] *rationis* ("of reason").

la: Supple: *differentia*. Intellige: *mutatione, quam dicunt ad se sive secundum aliquam entitatem absolutam*. De qua re ait Boeth., de Trin. c. 5: *Age enim stet quispiam; ei igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus; non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister accedo, item fit ille dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter, velut albus ac longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter, atque id quod est, a me et ex me est, minime vero ex sese. Quare quae secundum rei alicuius, in eo quod ipsa est, proprietatem non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare vel mutare queunt, nullamque omnino variare essentiam.*

en: Supply: *differentia* ("difference"). Understand: *by a change, which they call [a change] in itself or according to some absolute entity*. On which matter Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 5, says: *For let someone stand; if then I approach him from the right, he will be on the left compared to me; not that he is in himself on the left, but that I have approached on the right. Again, I approach on the left, [and] he likewise becomes on the right, not that he is so on the right per se, like white and tall, but that with me approaching he becomes on the right, and that which he is, is from me and out of me, by no means however out of himself. Wherefore those [things] which according to the property of some thing, in that which it itself is, do not make a predication, can in no way alternate or change, nor vary the essence at all.*

la: Lib. XII. Metaph. text. 52. (XI. c. 10.): *Non enim ipse (dux universi) propter ordinem, verum ordo propter ipsum est.* — Supple cum codd. V X *ad Deum*.

en: Book XII *Metaph.*, text 52 (XI, c. 10): *For he himself (the leader of the universe) [is] not on account of the order, but rather the order is on account of him.* — Supply with codices V X *ad Deum* ("to God").

la: Lib. II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.): *« Eorum quae ad aliquid materia est; ad aliam enim formam alia materia. »* In libr. autem de Praedicam. c. de Relatione Aristot. relativa sive ea quae sunt ad aliquid definit: *Quaecumque haec ipsa quae sunt, aliorum esse dicuntur vel quomodolibet aliter ad alterum.* — Plura de eo quod nec materia nec forma sit suus respectus, vide supra d. 3. p. II. q. 3. ad opp. 4. nec non ipsius solut. pag. 87. — Paulo inferius post vocem *forma* Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, repetit *est suus respectus*, et subinde pro *habent* substituit *habet*.

en: Book II *Phys.*, text 26 (c. 2): *« Of those [things] which are towards something there is matter; for there is another matter for another form. »* But in the book *On the Categories*, c. on Relation, Aristotle defines relatives or those things which are towards something: *Whatsoever, these very [things] which they are, are said to be of others or in any other way [referred] to another.* — More on the [point] that neither matter nor form is its own respect, see above d. 3, p. II, q. 3, ad opp. 4, and likewise its solution, p. 87. — A little below, after the word *forma* the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, the other codices and ed. 1 resisting, repeats *est suus respectus*, and thereupon in place of *habent* substitutes *habet*.

la: Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2: *Omnis essentia, quae relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid, excepto relativo.* Cfr. etiam XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 10. — Paulo superius post *respectus* cod. T interserit *est*. — Quod est impossibile. Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. seqq. (c. 2.), ubi sex rationibus huic simile probat, scil. motus non esse motum nec generationis generationem nec omnino mutationis mutationem. Una ratio est, quod si mutationis esset mutatio, statuendus esset processus in infinitum, qui repugnat.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 2: *Every essence which is said relatively is also something, the relative excepted.* Cf. also XI *On the City of God*, c. 10. — A little above, after *respectus* cod. T inserts *est*. — *Which is impossible.* Cf. Aristotle, V *Phys.*, text 10 ff. (c. 2), where he proves a similar [point] by six reasons, namely that motion is not motion, nor of generation [is there] generation, nor at all of change [is there] change. One reason is that, if there were a change of change, an infinite process would have to be established, which is repugnant.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Proprietates personales hoc loco accipiuntur in sensu largiore, quatenus opponuntur proprietatibus essentialibus; unde etiam innascibilitas et spiratio activa inter proprietates personales numerantur. Infra vero d. 28. q. 3. proprietates personales vocantur eae, quae personam et distinguunt et constituunt. Dicitur enim ibi: «Ad hoc quod aliqua relatio sit personalis, oportet quod dicat illius personae primam et propriam habitudinem et per modum positionis et completionis». In hoc sensu innascibilitas et spiratio activa non sunt proprietates personales.

Duplex quaestio hoc loco tractatur. Prima est, utrum in divinis personis sint proprietates; secunda vero, qua ratione inter se et a persona distinguantur. In prima quaestione affirmanda theologi catholici conveniunt. De secunda quaestione diversae fuerunt sententiae, quae hic et accuratius infra d. 33. q. 1. recensentur. Sententia in respons. primo posita in d. 33. q. 1. tribuitur Praepositivo (cfr. supra pag. 105, nota 3), a Dionysio Carth. autem Antissiodorensi, quam profitebantur etiam Nominales. Hi inter proprietatem et personam essentiamque non admittebant nisi distinctionem solius rationis sive secundum modum loquendi; unde, retento nomine proprietatis, rem tollebant. Haec opinio reprobatur a S. Bonaventura, ab Alexandro Hal., a S. Thoma, Scoto aliisque. — Ad oppositam partem declinavit Gilbertus Porretanus, qui proprie realem distinctionem hic ponendam esse docuit asserendo, quod proprietates non sunt personae nec in personis, sed personis assistentes (cfr. d. 33. q. 1.). — De hac distinctione nonnulla iam supra d. 13. q. 3. in Scholio dicta sunt; sed hic accuratius indaganda est vera sententia S. Doctoris, qua ratione distinguantur proprietates a persona, ab essentia, et etiam inter se, quando plures sunt in eadem persona.

**II.** Modus loquendi de natura huius distinctionis, quo utitur S. Bonav., aliquatenus differt ab eo, qui nunc in scholis est communis.

1. Saepius dicitur a S. Doctore, proprietates in eadem persona inter se differre realiter (cfr. hic fundam. 5. et in corp.; d. 13. q. 3; d. 33. q. 1.). Verbum *realiter* minime intelligi debet in sensu distinctionis realis et absolutae. Hoc manifestum est ex plurimis locis, ut hic ad 3; d. 33. q. 1; d. 25. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 3; d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4. Vocatur autem haec distinctio realis, quia maior est quam rationis pure mentalis; tamen non importat realitatem absolutam, sed relativam, id est respectum ad diversos terminos. Quod ut melius intelligatur attendendum est ad triplicem modum dicendi (hic in fine respons.), scilicet essentialem, personalem et notionalem. Modus notionalis est, quando praedicatum non convenit nec uni nec tribus, sed duabus personis, v. g. Pater et Filius spirant; sed quando dicitur Pater generat, tunc est modus loquendi personalis. De diversis modis dicendi in divinis plura dicuntur d. 22. q. 4. ad 5. — Etiam notandum est, hanc differentiam non esse nec substantialem nec accidentalem, quia, ut bene observatur d. 13. q. 3. ad 5, «in divinis est relationum differentia, quae nec accidentalis est, nec substantialis, sed magis dicitur originalis».

2. Distinctio igitur inter proprietatem et personam a Seraphico (d. 33. q. 1. in fine corp.) sic describitur: «Proprietas est persona et in persona, quia idem est per essentiam sive modum essendi, differt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi». Ibid. q. 2. ad 2: «Proprietas distinguit in eo, quod differens non essentia, sed modo; qui modus non dicit compositionem, quia transit in substantiam, nec dicit solum intellectum, quia res est et manet respectu obiecti». Sive in distinctione inter proprietatem et essentiam dicitur (d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 1.): «Quod paternitas non est aliud re ab essentia, est tamen aliud ratione... et ratio illa per comparationem ad essentiam non est nisi modus (scil. *se habendi*), sed per comparationem ad aliam personam est res». Hanc formulam saepe repetit, ut d. 22. q. 4. in corp.; d. 13. q. 3. Eodem modo loquuntur Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 1; Richard. a Med., hic q. 1; Scotus aliique.

3. Quid sit haec differentia secundum rem et modum se habendi, magis determinatur hic in solut. ad 2, cum quo loco conferendus est alius supra d. 22. q. 4. Distinguitur enim triplex gradus, quo aliquid potest differre ratione. Primus gradus versatur circa attributa absoluta et est «ex parte nostrae apprehensionis», et «nihil ei respondet a parte rei». Haec verba intelligenda sunt praecise de differentia actuali, non autem de fundamento differentiae a nobis apprehensae, ut manifeste constat ex eis, quae leguntur supra d. 22. q. 2. ad ult. (cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 2, Scholion). Secundus gradus est «secundum differentiam attributionis», quae obtinet inter essentiam, personam et notionem. Tertius gradus est distinctio realis, sed tantum secundum relationem, et haec est inter personas et proprietates personales ad invicem.

Ex ipso textu est manifestum, S. Bonaventuram docere maiorem esse distinctionem inter essentiam et proprietates sive personas, quam ea est quae vulgo dicitur *virtualis*, quae est inter attributa absoluta ad invicem et ad essentiam, minorem autem esse eandem, quam est ea quae est inter ipsas personas. Ratio, quare differentia *attributionis* sit maior quam differentia primi gradus, in eo posita est, quia proprietas habet relationem ad aliud, quam non habet essentia; et hic *modus se habendi* non est tantum in intellectu nostro, sed etiam a parte rei. Disertis verbis S. Doctor hoc asserit infra d. 27. p. I. q. 3. ad 1. 2. 3. dicens: paternitas «quantum ad comparationem ad subiectum est omnino idem, ideo nullo modo est abstrahibilis a parte rei. Nihilominus tamen differre potest aliquo modo per comparationem ad obiectum, quae quidem differentia sumitur a parte rei» (cfr. d. 33. q. 2. ad 2.). Haec autem differentia rationis minime importat compositionem in Deo, quia «paternitas non est aliud re ab essentia, est tamen aliud ratione. Et si obiicias: aut rationi illi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; dicendum, quod ratio illa per comparationem ad essentiam non est nisi modus, sed per comparationem ad aliam personam est res. Et hoc patet, quoniam habere essentiam ab alio et non habere non dicit rem aliam, sed solum modum; habere autem ab alio (ut in Filio est) et habere non ab alio (ut est in Patre) dicit realem differentiam, quia nulla res est a se et ab alio». Ita dicit S. Doctor supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4, quod magis explicatur d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et infra d. 34. q. 1, et q. 2. ad 7. Quod autem differentia attributionis minor sit tertio gradu differentiae, iam per se patet et insinuatur in loc. cit.

4. S. Thomas, quod scimus, non distinguit expressis verbis differentiam attributionis ut medium gradum differentiae a primo et tertio; doctrinam autem eandem exprimit his verbis (S. I. q. 28. a. 2. in corp.): «Relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae». Verba huius loci: *secundum intelligentiae rationem*, non intelliguntur de distinctione rationis ratiocinantis, quod clarissime patet ex verbis eiusdem (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. a. 2.): «Relinquitur, quod sunt diversa ratione, non tantum ex parte ipsius ratiocinantis, sed ex proprietate ipsius rei». Scotus (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 7. n. 41, et Quodl. 5. § *Circa tamen*) hic utitur sua distinctione formali, quam ipse, ut vult Brulifer (ad hunc locum), formavit ex distinctione attributionis, qualem S. Bonav. hic et supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 4, et d. 13. q. 3. docuit. Borthol. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. I. disp. 13. pag. 210) recte dicit, perperam et contra perspicua verba Seraphici complures interpretes S. Bonaventurae reduxisse illam distinctionem attributionis ad puram distinctionem virtualem. Idem Borthol. de discrimine inter Scoti distinctionem formalem ex natura rei et S. Bonaventurae distinctionem attributionis haec observat: «Scotus vult, ipsam esse absolutam formalitatem, seu distinctionem inter formalitates; S. Bonav. vero, esse tantum secundum comparationem, seu secundum modum diversum se habendi, eo quod relatio in divinis secundum rationem in (scilicet quatenus est in natura) identificatur formaliter cum ea, sed retinet respectum ad obiectum, sicque differt per istam comparationem».

**III.** In solut. ad 6. triplex distinguitur modus immediatae relationis, scilicet relatio per essentiale, relatio correlativorum, relatio relationis, de quo conferri potest II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 3. q. 2. Notanda est etiam differentia inter relationem, quae est ratio referendi, relativum, quod formaliter refertur, ut pater ad filium, et relatum, quod est fundamentum ipsius relationis, ut homo in patre et filio.

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. a. 2, et hic q. 2. a. 1. 3; S. I. q. 28. a. 1, q. 40. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 39. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1, et d. 27. q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** "Personal properties" are taken in this place in a broader sense, insofar as they are opposed to "essential properties"; whence also unbegottenness and active spiration are numbered among the personal properties. But below, d. 28, q. 3, those are called personal properties which both distinguish and constitute the person. For it is said there: «In order that some relation be personal, it must express that person's primary and proper relation, and by way of position and completion». In this sense unbegottenness and active spiration are not personal properties.

A twofold question is treated in this place. The first is, whether in the divine persons there are properties; the second, by what account they are distinguished from one another and from the person. In the first question, [requiring] affirmation, the Catholic theologians agree. On the second question diverse opinions have been [held], which are reviewed here and more accurately below in d. 33, q. 1. The opinion placed in the first response in d. 33, q. 1 is attributed to Praepositivus (cf. above p. 105, note 3), but by Dionysius the Carthusian to [William] of Auxerre, which the Nominalists also professed. They admitted between property and person and essence only a distinction of reason alone or according to mode of speaking; whence, retaining the name of property, they took away the thing. This opinion is reproved by St. Bonaventure, by Alexander of Hales, by St. Thomas, Scotus, and others. — To the opposite side inclined Gilbert of Poitiers, who taught that a properly real distinction must here be posited, asserting that the properties are not the persons, nor [are they] in the persons, but assistants to the persons (cf. d. 33, q. 1.). — On this distinction some things have already been said above in d. 13, q. 3, in the Scholion; but here the true judgement of the holy Doctor must be more accurately investigated, by what account the properties are distinguished from the person, from the essence, and even from one another, when several are in the same person.

**II.** The mode of speaking about the nature of this distinction, which St. Bonaventure uses, somewhat differs from that which is now common in the schools.

1. It is said rather often by the holy Doctor that the properties in the same person differ from one another *really* (cf. here, fundamentum 5 and in the body; d. 13, q. 3; d. 33, q. 1). The word *really* is by no means to be understood in the sense of a real and absolute distinction. This is plain from very many places, as here ad 3; d. 33, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 2; d. 7, q. 3; d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4. This distinction is, however, called *real*, since it is greater than [that] of pure mental reason; yet it does not import absolute reality, but relative, that is, a respect to diverse terms. That this may be better understood, attention must be paid to the threefold mode of speaking (here at the end of the response), namely the essential, the personal, and the notional. The notional mode is when the predicate belongs neither to one nor to three, but to two persons, e.g. *the Father and the Son spirate*; but when it is said *the Father generates*, then it is the personal mode of speaking. On the diverse modes of speaking in divine matters, more is said in d. 22, q. 4, ad 5. — It must also be noted that this difference is neither substantial nor accidental, since, as is well observed in d. 13, q. 3, ad 5, «in divine matters there is a difference of relations, which is neither accidental nor substantial, but is rather called original».

2. The distinction therefore between property and person is described by the Seraphic [Doctor] (d. 33, q. 1, at the end of the body) thus: «A property is the person and in the person, since it is the same by essence or by mode of being, [yet] it differs as to the mode of standing». Ibid. q. 2, ad 2: «A property distinguishes in this, that it differs not in essence, but in mode; which mode does not express composition, since it passes into the substance, nor does it express only an [act of] understanding, since it is a thing and remains [a thing] with respect to its object». Or in the distinction between property and essence it is said (d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 1.): «That paternity is not another *thing* from the essence, is yet another *in account*... and that account, by comparison to the essence, is nothing but a *mode* (namely *of standing*), but by comparison to another person it is a *thing*». This formula he often repeats, as in d. 22, q. 4, in the body; d. 13, q. 3. In the same way speak Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1; Scotus, and others.

3. What this difference *according to thing* and *mode of standing* is, is more determined here in the solution to [objection] 2, with which place must be conferred another above d. 22, q. 4. For a threefold grade is distinguished, by which something can differ in account. The first grade concerns absolute attributes and is "on the side of our apprehension," and "nothing corresponds to it on the side of the thing." These words are to be understood precisely of an actual difference, not however of the foundation of the difference apprehended by us, as is manifestly clear from those things which are read above in d. 22, q. 2, ad ult. (cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 2, Scholion). The second grade is "according to the difference of attribution," which obtains between essence, person, and notion. The third grade is a real distinction, but only according to relation, and this is between persons and personal properties to one another.

From the text itself it is manifest that St. Bonaventure teaches that the distinction between essence and properties or persons is greater than that which is commonly called *virtual*, which is between absolute attributes to one another and to the essence, but [is] less than the same [distinction] which is between the persons themselves. The reason why the difference of *attribution* is greater than the difference of the first grade is placed in this, that property has a relation to another, which essence does not have; and this *mode of standing* is not only in our intellect, but also on the side of the thing. In express words the holy Doctor asserts this below in d. 27, p. I, q. 3, ad 1. 2. 3, saying: paternity «as to its comparison to the subject is altogether the same, therefore in no way is it abstractable on the side of the thing. Nevertheless it can differ in some way by comparison to the object, which difference indeed is taken on the side of the thing» (cf. d. 33, q. 2, ad 2.). But this difference of account by no means imports composition in God, since «paternity is not another *thing* from the essence, [yet] it is another *in account*. And if you object: either to that account something corresponds in the thing, or nothing; it must be said that that account by comparison to the essence is nothing but a *mode*, but by comparison to another person is a *thing*. And this is plain, since to have essence from another and not to have [it from another] does not express another *thing*, but only a *mode*; but to have from another (as is in the Son) and to have not from another (as is in the Father) expresses a *real* difference, since no thing is from itself and from another». So speaks the holy Doctor above d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4, which is more fully explained in d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1, and below d. 34, q. 1, and q. 2, ad 7. That, however, the difference of attribution is less than the third grade of difference, is already plain of itself and is intimated in the cited place.

4. St. Thomas, so far as we know, does not distinguish in express words the difference of attribution as a middle grade of difference between the first and the third; but he expresses the same doctrine in these words (*Summa* I, q. 28, a. 2, in corp.): «A relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to the thing, and does not differ except according to the account of understanding, insofar as in the relation there is imported a respect to its opposite, which is not imported in the name of essence». The words of this place: *according to the account of understanding*, are not understood of a distinction of reasoning reason, which is most clearly plain from the words of the same one (I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.): «It remains that they are diverse in account, not only on the side of the one reasoning, but from the property of the thing itself». Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 7, n. 41, and *Quodl.* 5, § *Circa tamen*) here uses his own formal distinction, which he himself, as Brulifer wills (on this place), formed from the distinction of attribution, such as St. Bonaventure here and above d. 8, p. II, q. 1, ad 4, and d. 13, q. 3 taught. Bartholomew de Barberiis (*Cursus theologicus*, t. I, disp. 13, p. 210) rightly says that wrongly and against the perspicuous words of the Seraphic [Doctor] very many interpreters of St. Bonaventure have reduced that distinction of attribution to a pure virtual distinction. The same Bartholomew on the discrimination between Scotus's formal distinction *from the nature of the thing* and St. Bonaventure's distinction *of attribution* observes these things: «Scotus wills it to be an absolute formality, or a distinction between formalities; St. Bonaventure, however, [wills it to be] only according to comparison, or according to the diverse mode of standing, since the relation in divine matters according to its account in (namely insofar as it is in the nature) is identified formally with it [the essence], but retains a respect to the object, and so differs through this comparison».

**III.** In the solution to [objection] 6, a threefold mode of immediate relation is distinguished, namely relation per essence, relation of correlatives, relation of relation, on which II *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2 may be consulted. It is also to be noted [that there is] a difference between *relation*, which is the account of referring, *the relative*, which is formally referred, as father to son, and *the related*, which is the foundation of the relation itself, as man in father and son.

**IV.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 1. — Scotus, in both *Scripta* here, q. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, and here q. 2, a. 1, 3; *Summa* I, q. 28, a. 1, q. 40, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9; *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 *princ.* q. 1. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 53, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1, and d. 27, q. 1.

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