site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III. *Utrum proprietates possint abstrahi a personis divinis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum contingat proprietates abstrahi. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia omnis abstractio supponit concretionem; sed in eis solum proprie est concretio, in quibus est denominativa praedicatio[^1]: ergo si hoc est in accidentibus tantum, videtur, quod ubicumque est ponere proprietatem abstrahibilem, est ponere proprietatem accidentalem. Sed talis nullo modo ponitur in divinis: ergo etc.

2. Item, ubicumque est abstractio, abstractum est simplicius concreto[^2] — hoc non habet instantiam — sed in divinis non est maior simplicitas et minor, cum omne quod est ibi, sit simplicissimum et in fine totius simplicitatis est: ergo in divinis non cadit abstractio.

3. Item, omnis abstractio aut est universalis a particulari, aut est formae a materia[^3]; sed in divinis nec est universale nec particulare, nec forma nec materia: ergo in divinis non est abstractio.

4. Item, quandocumque abstrahitur aliquid ab aliquo, minus[^4] est quod remanet, quam ante abstractionem erat, quia utrumque aliquid est — nihil enim non abstrahitur ab aliquo, nec nihil a nihilo, sed aliquid ab aliquo — ergo si paternitas a persona vel hypostasi est abstrahibilis, ergo minus haberet de entitate quam cum paternitate. Sed contra: paternitate abstracta, intelligitur hypostasis esse Deus: ergo si minus haberet de entitate quam cum paternitate, intelligeretur Deus non habere summum esse.

**Contra:** 1. Magister dicit in littera[^5]: «Paternitas, filiatio, processio ipsas tantum relationes significant»: aut ergo aliquid huic respondet in re, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo falso et inaniter significant; si aliquid: ergo videtur, quod sint abstrahibiles a parte rei.

2. Item, non intellecto Filio, nihilominus potest intelligi hypostasis Patris esse; sed non intellecto Filio, non potest intelligi paternitas: ergo abstracta[^6] proprietate, adhuc potest intelligi hypostasis illa esse, cuius erat proprietas. Sed quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero, unum potest abstrahi ab altero: ergo vere potest intelligi proprietas abstrahi ab hypostasi.

3. Item, cum dico personam, intelligo habentem naturam cum[^7] proprietate incommunicabili; sed constat, hoc totum non simul intelligi, ergo prius unum, postea alterum: ergo prius intelligo naturam, deinde habentem, et tertio proprietatem incommunicabilem: ergo unumquodque per se est intelligibile, ergo et proprietas sine subiecto: ergo ab ipso est abstrahibilis. Si tu dicas mihi, quod a parte intellectus potest abstrahi, sed non a parte rei; contra: tunc secundum hoc, si abstractio est a parte modi intelligendi, ergo notio et persona non differunt nisi solo modo loquendi; et hoc est supra improbatum[^8].

4. Item, relatio in divinis est vera relatio, quia, ut dicit Boethius[^9]: «Deus non est sine relatione relatus»; sed ubi est vere quantitas et quantum, ibi est vera abstractio, non tantum a parte intellectus, sed etiam rei: ergo pari ratione, ubi est vera relatio et vere relatus, ibi est vera abstractio.

5. Item, quandocumque aliqua proprietas habet distingui ab alia secundum rem, a qua non distinguitur secundum suppositum, ibi est abstractio non solum a parte intellectus, sed etiam a parte rei; sed paternitas differt ab innascibilitate, non autem differt Pater ab Innascibili[^10]: ergo vere et proprie est abstrahibilis proprietas sive notio a persona non solum a parte nostra, sed etiam a parte rei.

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> **CONCLUSIO.** *Abstractio proprietatum non est in divinis personis a parte rei, sed a parte intellectus nostri.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod abstrahi aliquid ab aliquo est dupliciter. Uno modo abstractio est[^11] quae ortum habet a natura rei; et sic abstrahitur universale a particulari, et forma a materia, quoniam utrobique est compositio et diversitas. Alio modo est abstractio, quae ortum habet ab intellectu nostro. Intellectus enim noster cum intelligit aliquid completum, de necessitate dupliciter intelligit sive sub duplici ratione, scilicet per modum ipsius *quod est* et ipsius *quo*[^12]. Semper enim cum aliquid intelligit, considerat ipsum intelligibile per aliquam rationem, per quam etiam ipsum capit; et ita intellectus noster est resolubilis in intellectum ipsius *quod est* et ipsius *quo*[^13], quia compositio erat circa ipsum.

Quoniam igitur realis abstractio praesupponit compositionem, quae nullo modo est in Deo, nec quantum ad essentiam nec quantum ad personam; ideo nullo modo est ibi abstractio a parte rei. Rursus, quoniam Deum intelligimus secundum possibilitatem[^14] intellectus nostri, ideo intellectus noster intelligit Deum per modum ipsius *quod* et ipsius *quo*; et intellectus noster est resolubilis, et quia resolubilis, etiam compositus, quamvis res non sit composita. Quantum ad ipsum potest esse abstractio et separatio, ut intelligat ipsum *quo est*, quod est non intelligendo[^15]. Et quoniam modus significandi consequitur modum intelligendi, ideo contingit significare ipsum *quo* in abstractione, et hoc ex parte communicabilis, ut cum dicitur *deitas*[^16]; et ex parte incommunicabilis, ut cum dicitur *paternitas*.

Concedo ergo, sicut manifestant primae rationes, quod non est ibi realis abstractio.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium de significatione, dicendum, quod aliquid respondet a parte nostri intellectus; nec oportet, quod respondeat abstractio. Sicut enim intellectus noster, licet sit compositus, vere intelligit simplex per modum compositi, quia ponit illam compositionem circa se, non circa rem intellectam; ita est omnino intelligendum de abstractione. Et per hoc patent duo sequentia, quae sunt sumta a ratione intelligendi.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc differunt solum modo loquendi; dicendum, quod, sicut tactum fuit in distinctione praecedenti[^18], relatio secundum comparationem ad subiectum transit, secundum comparationem ad obiectum sive terminum manet; et hoc est[^17], quia abstractio est formae a subiecto, non a termino, quia paternitas abstrahitur[^19] a Patre, non a Filio; et quantum ad comparationem ad subiectum est omnino idem, ideo nullo modo est abstrahibilis a parte rei. Nihilominus tamen differre potest aliquo modo per comparationem ad obiectum, quae quidem differentia sumitur a parte rei; sed sicut illa differentia nihil facit ad compositionem, ita nihil facit ad abstractionem.

4. 3. Et sic patent duo sequentia, quia relatio manet et distinguitur ab alia; sed hoc est per comparationem ad obiectum, non ad subiectum[^20].

english:
### QUESTION III. *Whether the properties may be abstracted from the divine persons.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the properties may be abstracted. And that they may not, [it is shown] thus:

1. Because every abstraction presupposes concretion; but properly speaking concretion is found only in those things in which there is denominative predication[^1]: therefore if this is [found] in accidents only, it seems that wherever one posits an abstractable property, one posits an accidental property. But no such [accidental property] is in any way posited in divine things: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, wherever there is abstraction, the abstract is simpler than the concrete[^2] — and this admits no instance against it — but in divine things there is no greater and lesser simplicity, since everything that is there is most simple and is at the limit of all simplicity: therefore in divine things abstraction does not occur.

3. Likewise, every abstraction is either of the universal from the particular, or of form from matter[^3]; but in divine things there is neither universal nor particular, neither form nor matter: therefore in divine things there is no abstraction.

4. Likewise, whenever something is abstracted from something, what remains is less[^4] than was [there] before the abstraction, since each [item] is something — for nothing is not abstracted from something, nor nothing from nothing, but something from something — therefore if paternity is abstractable from the person or hypostasis, then [the hypostasis] would have less of entity than [it had] with paternity. But on the contrary: with paternity abstracted, the hypostasis is understood to be God: therefore if it had less of entity than [it had] with paternity, God would be understood not to have supreme being.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Master says in the *littera*[^5]: «Paternity, filiation, [and] procession signify only the relations themselves»: either therefore something corresponds to this in reality, or nothing. If nothing: therefore they signify falsely and emptily; if something: therefore it seems that they are abstractable on the side of the thing.

2. Likewise, with the Son not being understood, nevertheless the hypostasis of the Father can be understood to be; but with the Son not being understood, paternity cannot be understood: therefore with the property abstracted[^6], the hypostasis whose property it was can still be understood to be. But whenever any two [items] so stand to one another that one can be understood without the other, the one can be abstracted from the other: therefore the property can truly be understood to be abstracted from the hypostasis.

3. Likewise, when I say *person*, I understand [one] having a nature with[^7] an incommunicable property; but it is established that this whole is not understood all at once — therefore [I understand] one [item] first, the other afterward: therefore I understand the nature first, then [the one] having [it], and thirdly the incommunicable property: therefore each [item] is intelligible per se, therefore the property too without a subject: therefore it is abstractable from it. If you say to me that it can be abstracted on the side of the intellect, but not on the side of the thing; on the contrary: then according to this, if the abstraction is on the side of the mode of understanding, then notion and person do not differ except by the mode of speaking alone; and this has been disproved above[^8].

4. Likewise, relation in divine things is true relation, since, as Boethius says[^9]: «God is not without being related by relation»; but where there is truly quantity and a quantum, there is true abstraction, not only on the side of the intellect, but also of the thing: therefore by parity of reason, where there is true relation and [something] truly related, there is true abstraction.

5. Likewise, whenever some property is distinguished from another according to the thing, from which it is not distinguished according to the supposit, there is abstraction not only on the side of the intellect, but also on the side of the thing; but paternity differs from unbegottenness, while the Father does not differ from the Unbegotten[^10]: therefore truly and properly the property or notion is abstractable from the person not only on our side, but also on the side of the thing.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The abstraction of the properties is not in the divine persons on the side of the thing, but on the side of our intellect.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to abstract something from something is twofold. In one mode the abstraction is[^11] one which has its origin from the nature of the thing; and thus the universal is abstracted from the particular, and form from matter, since in either case there is composition and diversity. In another mode there is abstraction which has its origin from our intellect. For our intellect, when it understands something complete, of necessity understands [it] in two ways or under a twofold account, namely by way of the *quod est* itself and of the *quo*[^12] itself. For always when it understands something, it considers the intelligible itself through some account, by which it also grasps it; and so our intellect is resolvable into the understanding of the *quod est* itself and of the *quo*[^13] itself, since the composition was about [the thing] itself.

Since therefore real abstraction presupposes composition, which is in no way in God, neither as to essence nor as to person; therefore in no way is there in him abstraction on the side of the thing. Again, since we understand God according to the capacity[^14] of our intellect, therefore our intellect understands God by way of the *quod* itself and of the *quo* itself; and our intellect is resolvable, and because resolvable, also composite, although the thing is not composite. As to [the intellect] itself there can be abstraction and separation, so that it understands the *quo est* itself, which is to understand non-[whole][^15]. And since the mode of signifying follows the mode of understanding, therefore it happens that the *quo* itself is signified in abstraction, and this on the side of the communicable, as when one says *deity*[^16]; and on the side of the incommunicable, as when one says *paternity*.

I concede therefore, as the first reasons make plain, that there is no real abstraction there.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected on the contrary about signification, it must be said that something corresponds [to the abstract term] on the side of our intellect; nor is it required that an abstraction [in reality] correspond. For just as our intellect, although it is composite, truly understands the simple by way of the composite, since it places that composition about itself, not about the thing understood; so also is it altogether to be understood concerning abstraction. And through this the two following [arguments] are plain, which are taken from the account of understanding.

To that which is objected, that then they differ only by the mode of speaking; it must be said that, as was touched in the preceding distinction[^18], relation passes over according to the comparison to the subject, [but] according to the comparison to the object or term it remains; and this is[^17], because abstraction is of the form from the subject, not from the term, since paternity is abstracted[^19] from the Father, not from the Son; and as to the comparison to the subject it is altogether the same, [and] therefore in no way is it abstractable on the side of the thing. Nevertheless it can in some way differ through the comparison to the object, and this difference is taken on the side of the thing; but just as that difference contributes nothing to composition, so it contributes nothing to abstraction.

4. 3. And so the two following [arguments] are plain, since the relation remains and is distinguished from another; but this is through the comparison to the object, not to the subject[^20].

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. 1. ait: «*Denominativa* vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo differentia casu secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a fortitudine fortis». Duo igitur requiruntur ad hoc, ut aliquid sit denominativum seu denominative de aliquo praedicetur, scil. quod sit concretum adiective (non substantive, ut *homo*), et quod ab aliquo accidente abstracto derivetur. Hinc et facile intelligitur quod S. Doctor statim adiungit: «*ergo si hoc est in accidentibus tantum*». Cfr. etiam supra d. 8, a. I. q. 1. ad 2 et 3, ac infra d. 33. q. 3.

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. 1, says: «*Denominatives* are said to be whatever, differing from something only by case-ending, take their appellation from it according to name, as from *grammar* a grammarian, and from *fortitude* a brave man». Two things therefore are required for something to be a denominative or to be predicated denominatively of another, namely that it be concrete adjectivally (not substantively, as *man*), and that it be derived from some abstracted accident. Hence also is easily understood what the holy Doctor immediately adds: «*therefore if this is in accidents only*». Cf. also above d. 8, a. I, q. 1, ad 2 and 3, and below d. 33, q. 3.

la: Abstractum enim dicit formam solam, concretum vero formam cum subiecto.

en: For the abstract expresses the form alone, but the concrete the form with its subject.

la: Cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 40. a. 3: *Dicendum, quod duplex fit abstractio per intellectum. Una quidem, secundum quod universale abstrahitur a particulari, ut animal ab homine. Alia vero, secundum quod forma abstrahitur a materia, sicut forma circuli abstrahitur per intellectum ab omni materia sensibili.* — Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Phys. text. 18. (c. 2.); III. de Anima, text. 10. seqq. 33. et 39. (c. 4. 6. 8.), et XIII. atque XIV. Metaph. per totum (XII. XIII.); et S. Thom. nec non Averroes in Comment. in hos textus.

en: Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 40, a. 3: *It must be said that a twofold abstraction is made by the intellect. One indeed, according as the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal from man. Another, according as form is abstracted from matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from all sensible matter.* — Cf. also Aristotle, II *Phys.* text 18 (c. 2); III *On the Soul*, text 10 ff., 33, and 39 (cc. 4, 6, 8), and XIII and XIV *Metaph.* throughout (XII, XIII); and St. Thomas as well as Averroes in their *Commentary* on these texts.

la: Hic, c. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *huic*, quod in plerisque codd. nec non in ed. 1 exstat, Vat. cum paucis codd. adhuc, codd. A H N X V Mc.

en: Here, c. 2. — A little below, in place of *huic*, which appears in most of the codices and also in ed. 1, the Vatican [edition] [reads otherwise] with [the support of] a few codices still — codd. A H N X V Mc.

la: Cod. W subiungit *hac*.

en: Cod. W appends *hac*.

la: Pro *cum*, quod etiam Vat. exhibet cum cod. cc, multi codd. cum ed. 1 *ex*.

en: In place of *cum*, which the Vatican [edition] also exhibits with cod. cc, many codices with ed. 1 [read] *ex*.

en: Distinction 26, q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 397, nota 2. — Minor argumenti insinuatur ab Aristot., III. de Anima, illis textibus, quos paulo ante citavimus. — In fine argumenti ante *abstractio* Vat. cum solo cod. cc omittit *vera*.

en: See above p. 397, note 2. — The minor of the argument is intimated by Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, in those texts which we cited a little before. — At the end of the argument, before *abstractio*, the Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc omits *vera*.

la: Vat., praestantioribus codd. nec non ed. 1 refragantibus, *differt ab innascibili Patre*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with the better codices and ed. 1 contradicting [it], [reads] *differt ab innascibili Patre* ("differs from the unbegotten Father").

la: Pro *abstractio est* Vat. *abstractione*; lectio corrupta. Immediate post *sicut* et paulo inferius ex codd. I P Q aa revocavimus *ortum*, pro quo vocabulo Vat. cum aliis mss. ponit *totum*.

en: In place of *abstractio est*, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *abstractione*; a corrupt reading. Immediately after *sicut* and a little below, from codd. I P Q aa we have restored *ortum*, in place of which word the Vatican [edition] with the other manuscripts puts *totum*.

la: Cod. K, omisso *ipsius* et addito *est*, lectionem praebet: *et quo est*.

en: Cod. K, with *ipsius* omitted and *est* added, gives the reading: *et quo est*.

la: Cod. K P Q X repetunt *est*.

en: Codd. K P Q X repeat *est*.

la: Id est potentialitatem sive imperfectionem. — Non multo post auctoritate codd. T Z et ed. 1 restituimus *ideo*, quod a Vat. abest. Aliquanto inferius pro *etiam compositus* cod. 1 est *compositus*, et multi codd. cum ed. 1 *et compositus*; minus distincte.

en: That is, potentiality or imperfection. — Not much after, on the authority of codd. T Z and ed. 1, we have restored *ideo*, which is missing from the Vatican [edition]. A little below, in place of *etiam compositus*, cod. 1 has *compositus*, and many codices with ed. 1 [read] *et compositus*; less distinctly.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *intellecto*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *intellecto*.

la: Codd., uno vel altero excepto, sicut et sex primae edd. voci *deitas* praemittunt *Deus et*, quae lectio tamen non convenit cum eo quod dictum est d. 5. a. I. q. 1.

en: The codices, with one or another excepted, just as also the first six editions, prefix *Deus et* to the word *deitas*; this reading, however, does not agree with what was said in d. 5, a. I, q. 1.

la: Cod. addit *a parte rei*.

en: A codex adds *a parte rei* ("on the side of the thing").

la: Verba *et hoc est*, a Vat. suppressa, restituimus ex codd. C F L O R S U W, pro quibus verbis codd. W *et ratio est*, cod. E *et ratio huius est*, et codd. A G H K T V Z bb ee ff cum ed. 1 *et est*. — Paulo superius cod. V solo *solum* pro *solum*.

en: The words *et hoc est*, suppressed by the Vatican [edition], we restore from codd. C F L O R S U W; in place of which words codd. W [read] *et ratio est*, cod. E *et ratio huius est*, and codd. A G H K T V Z bb ee ff with ed. 1 *et est*. — A little above, cod. V alone [reads] *solum* in place of *solum* [variant spacing].

la: Quaest. 2.

en: Question 2.

la: Sic codd. L T cum ed. 1; Vat. *abstrahit*. Paulo post cod. R *differt* pro *differre potest*.

en: Thus codd. L T with ed. 1; the Vatican [edition] [reads] *abstrahit* ("abstracts"). A little later cod. R [reads] *differt* in place of *differre potest*.

la: Pro *subiectum* codd. E K V X *rem*; edd. 2, 4, 6 *ad rem et hoc est subiectum*.

en: In place of *subiectum*, codd. E K V X [read] *rem*; edd. 2, 4, 6 [read] *ad rem et hoc est subiectum*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum proprietates personarum divinarum, ut paternitas, vocabulo abstracto exprimantur, quaestio oritur, in quo sensu abstractio fieri possit. Abstractio, sicut distinctio, potest esse tum realis (a parte rei), quae importat compositionem in re, a qua abstrahitur, tum secundum modum intelligendi, quae non supponit talem compositionem. Primae speciei abstractionis duplex affertur exemplum, et secundum fundam. 3. et S. Thom., S. I. q. 40. a. 3. haec species iterum dividitur in duas inferiores species, scilicet quatenus abstrahitur vel universale a particulari, vel forma a materia. Haec distinctio est Aristotelis et explicatur a S. Thom. in Comment. ad II. Phys. text. 18. lect. 3. «Considerandum his verbis est, quod multa sunt coniuncta secundum rem, quorum unum non est de intellectu alterius... et ideo potest unum separatim intelligi sine alio. Et hoc est unum intellectum esse abstractum ab alio. Manifestum est autem, quod posteriora non sunt de intellectu priorum, sed e contra. Unde priora possunt intelligi sine posterioribus, et non e contra: sicut patet quod animal est prius homine, et

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prius est *homo* hoc homine. Nam homo se habet ex additione ad animal, et hic homo ex additione ad hominem. Et propter hoc homo non est de intellectu animalis, nec Socrates de intellectu hominis: unde animal potest intelligi absque homine, et homo absque Socrate et aliis individuis; et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari. Deinde explicat abstractionem, quam mathematici faciunt a materia sensibili et naturali. «Similiter autem et inter accidentia omnia, quae adveniunt substantiae, primo advenit ei quantitas, et deinde qualitates sensibiles et actiones et passiones et motus, consequentes sensibiles qualitates. Sic igitur quantitas non claudit in sui intellectu qualitates sensibiles vel passiones vel motus; claudit tamen in sui intellectu substantiam... Et ideo huiusmodi quantitates et quae eis accidunt, sunt secundum intellectum abstracta a motu et a materia sensibili, ut dicitur in VII. Metaph. Quia igitur sic sunt abstracta a motu secundum intellectum, quod non claudunt in suo intellectu materiam sensibilem subiectam motui; ideo mathematicus potest abstrahere a materia sensibili, et nihil differt quantum ad veritatem considerationis, utrum sic vel sic considerentur». Ibidem Angelicus loquitur etiam de errore Platonis, quod docuerit, omnia quae sunt abstracta secundum intellectum, esse abstracta secundum rem. Brulifer (ad hunc locum) intelligit abstractionem formae a materia de separatione animae a corpore, interveniente morte. Aptius intelligitur de abstractione mathematica, «sicut forma circuli abstrahitur per intellectum ab omni materia sensibili» (S. Thom., Sum. loc. cit.). — Plura de speciebus abstractionis vide in S. Bonav., IV. Sent. d. 30. p. II. a. I. q. 1, ubi in fundam. I. et in corp. triplicem gradum abstractionis distinguit secundum actum sentiendi, imaginandi et intelligendi.

**II.** Licet abstractio realis vel a parte rei non admittatur, tamen minime sequitur, proprietates ab essentia et inter se solo modo loquendi distingui, ut vult Praepositivus. Haec opinio explicite reprobatur in solut. ad 3, et infra d. 33. q. 1. (cfr. etiam supra d. 26. q. 1. Scholion). — S. Thom., S. I. q. 32. a. 2, et q. 40. a. 3. eandem omnino doctrinam ex iisdem principiis docet.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 5. a. 6. § 2. — Scot., I. Report. d. 26. q. 3; Quodlib. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 40. a. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 26. princ. 1. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 56. q. 3. n. 7. seqq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 26. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Since the properties of the divine persons, e.g. paternity, are expressed by an abstract vocable, the question arises in what sense abstraction can take place. Abstraction, like distinction, can be either real (on the side of the thing), which imports composition in the thing from which the abstraction is made, or [an abstraction] according to the mode of understanding, which does not presuppose such composition. Of the first species of abstraction a twofold example is brought forward, and according to fundamentum 3 and St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 40, a. 3, this species is again divided into two lower species, namely insofar as the universal is abstracted from the particular, or form from matter. This distinction is from Aristotle and is explained by St. Thomas in *Comment. on II Phys.* text 18, lect. 3. «It must be considered with these words that there are many [items] joined according to the thing, of which one is not part of the understanding of the other... and therefore the one can be understood separately without the other. And this is one understood [item] being abstracted from another. But it is plain that posterior [items] are not part of the understanding of prior [items], but the contrary. Whence prior [items] can be understood without posterior [ones], and not the contrary: as is plain that animal is prior to man, and *man* is prior to this man. For man stands by addition to animal, and this man by addition to man. And on this account man is not part of the understanding of animal, nor Socrates of the understanding of man: whence animal can be understood apart from man, and man apart from Socrates and the other individuals; and this is to abstract the universal from the particular». Then [the Angelic Doctor] explains the abstraction which the mathematicians make from sensible and natural matter. «Likewise also among all the accidents which come to substance, first quantity comes to it, and then sensible qualities and actions and passions and motions, [which are] consequent upon the sensible qualities. Thus therefore quantity does not enclose in its understanding sensible qualities or passions or motions; yet it does enclose in its understanding substance... And therefore quantities of this sort and what is accidental to them, are according to the understanding abstracted from motion and from sensible matter, as is said in VII *Metaph.* Since therefore they are thus abstracted from motion according to the understanding, in such wise that they do not enclose in their understanding the sensible matter that is subjected to motion; therefore the mathematician can abstract from sensible matter, and it makes no difference as to the truth of the consideration, whether [things] be considered thus or thus». In the same place the Angelic [Doctor] also speaks of the error of Plato, that he taught that all things which are abstracted according to the understanding, are abstracted according to the thing. Brulifer (on this place) understands the abstraction of form from matter as concerning the separation of the soul from the body, with death intervening. It is more fittingly understood of mathematical abstraction, «as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from all sensible matter» (St. Thomas, *Summa* loc. cit.). — On the species of abstraction see further in St. Bonaventure, IV *Sent.* d. 30, p. II, a. I, q. 1, where in fundamentum I and in the body he distinguishes a threefold grade of abstraction according to the act of sensing, imagining, and understanding.

**II.** Although real abstraction or [abstraction] on the side of the thing be not admitted, yet it by no means follows that the properties are distinguished from the essence and from one another only by the mode of speaking, as Praepositivus would have it. This opinion is explicitly reproved in the solution to [objection] 3, and below in d. 33, q. 1 (cf. also above d. 26, q. 1, Scholion). — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 32, a. 2, and q. 40, a. 3, teaches altogether the same doctrine from the same principles.

**III.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 5, a. 6, § 2. — Scotus, I *Reportata* d. 26, q. 3; *Quodlib.* q. 4. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 40, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 26, a. 8. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I *Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Aegidius Romanus, I *Sent.* d. 26, *princ.* 1, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 56, q. 3, n. 7 ff. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 26, q. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 478 -->

### QUAESTIO IV. *Utrum de notionibus sive proprietatibus liceat contrarie opinari.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit contrarie de notionibus sive proprietatibus opinari.

Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quoniam Sancti contrarias opiniones habuerunt de Scripturis, et tamen non peccaverunt, sed solum erat eis poena. Unde Augustinus[^1]: «Falsa pro veris approbare non est natura hominis instituti, sed poena damnati».

2. Item, Hieronymus[^2]: «Quod de Scripturis veritatem non habet, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua probatur»; sed notiones non habent veritatem a Scripturis, sed inventae sunt a magistris: ergo licet multa ibi eadem ratione contemnere, qua probare.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia numerus notionum et huiusmodi non sunt de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem; sed contrarie opinari licet in his quae non spectant ad viam salutis, et hoc sine peccato: ergo et in notionibus[^3].

4. Item, si est ibi peccatum, aut ergo fidei, aut morum. Non fidei, quia non est contra articulos; non morum, quia credere falsum non respicit mores: ergo nullum peccatum.

**Contra:**

1. De duobus contrarie opinantibus circa notiones necessarium est alterum dicere falsum circa divina; sed mendacium circa divina est mendacium in christiana religione, et hoc est gravissimum peccatum[^4]: ergo etc.

2. Item, duobus contrarie opinantibus circa notiones, necesse est alterum decipi et errare; sed error circa divina est periculosissimus. Unde Augustinus primo *de Trinitate*[^5]: «Nec periculosius alicubi erratur, nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur». Si ergo error circa humanitatem Christi est peccatum: ergo et circa notiones multo fortius.

3. Item, cum proprietates sint ipse Deus, qui dicit vel credit, quod non sunt proprietates esse vel non esse quod sunt, dicit de Deo quod non est; sed qui dicit, Deum non esse quod est, vel e converso, errat errore peccati: ergo cum alter sic[^6] opinantium sit huiusmodi, ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus[^7]: «Non solum ille mentitur qui dicit falsum, sed etiam qui asserit dubium»; sed uterque opinantium dicit quid dubium, quia nulla opinio duorum est certa: ergo mentitur uterque. Sed qui mentitur circa Deum peccat mortaliter vel venialiter, sed ut plus mortaliter: ergo uterque peccat.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *In iis quae circa notiones ab Ecclesia non sunt determinata, licet contraria opinari, non autem praesumtuose asserere.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod contrarie opinari vel potest esse circa ea quae spectant ad doctrinam christianae religionis, vel circa ea quae spectant ad doctrinam humanae inquisitionis. Circa ea quae spectant ad doctrinam humanae inquisitionis licet contrarie opinari et asserere; opinari quidem[^8], quia illa non faciunt ad salutem, asserere, eo quod nostrae inquisitioni subiecta sunt. — In his quae spectant ad doctrinam religionis distinguendum est. Nam quaedam sunt de[^9] necessitate fidei, quaedam de certitudine Scripturae, quaedam sunt his annexa, ut sunt illa quae faciunt ad fidei explicationem et Scripturae expositionem.

Circa ea quae sunt de necessitate fidei, opinari contraria simpliciter est peccatum in altero, scilicet qui falsum opinatur. Et si sit simplex opinio, est peccatum erroris; si autem assertio et defensio, non tantum error, sed haeresis dicenda est.

In his autem quae sunt de certitudine Scripturae, ignorantes Scripturas licet contrarie opinari; nec est culpa, ut si unus simplex homo credat, quod Iacob fuit pater Isaac, alter non, sed e converso. Et primus, licet quidem hoc suspicetur vel opinetur, non peccat[^10], quia ignorat Scripturam. Scientes autem Scripturam non licet, immo alter peccat si simpliciter opinetur. Si autem defendat, haereticus est iudicandus, quoniam contradicit Scripturae sacrae.

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In his autem quae sunt annexa fidei vel Scripturae, aut una opinio sequitur ad fidem et Scripturam, et ad alteram sequitur oppositum; et tunc dicendum, quod ante pertractationem[^11] licet contrarie opinari, sed post pertractationem non licet, immo peccatum est, sicut fuit de opinione Porretani circa proprietates. Dicebat enim, illas non esse Deum, et ad hoc consequitur contrarium fidei. Cum enim Ecclesia adoret proprietatem, tunc adoraret non Deum et non Deus esset adorandus. Unde si, postquam ostensum est sibi inconveniens, non retractasset errorem, fuisset ab Ecclesia haereticus iudicatus; sed retractavit in concilio Rhemensi, ut dicit Bernardus[^12]. — In his autem quae sunt annexa fidei et non sequuntur nec repugnant[^13], quia dubia sunt, licet opinari; sed non licet asserere, quia opinari est rationis conferentis, sed asserere dubium circa Deum est rationis superbientis.

*Epilogus.* Concedendum ergo, quod uterque opinans si asserat, peccat, non propter errorem, sed propter praesumtionem; et sic concedendum, quod licet ibi contraria opinari.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

*1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mendacium in christiana religione etc.; dicendum quod non[^14] est mendacium, quia neuter dicit contra credulitatem; non in christiana religione, quia non est de necessitate fidei vel morum.

*2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod error ille est periculosus; dicendum, quod verum est, in quantum est contrarius fidei; sed si est de his quae non spectant ad fidem, non est verum.

*3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccat qui dicit, Deum non esse quod est etc.; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si sit determinatum per fidem vel Scripturam; aliter non peccat, nisi asserat vel defendat.

*4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod concedendum est. Nam qui propria auctoritate de Deo asserit vel affirmat, quod nec Scriptura nec fides dicit nec ad eas sequitur, praesumtuosus est iudicandus etiam si verum dicat; et si dubitat corde et affirmat ore, mendax est; si utroque modo asserit, superbus est.

english:
### QUESTION IV. *Whether it is permitted to hold opposing opinions concerning the notions or properties.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether it is a sin to hold opposing opinions concerning the notions or properties.

And that [it is] not, it seems:

1. Because the saints held opposing opinions concerning the Scriptures, and yet did not sin, but it was only a punishment to them. Whence Augustine[^1]: «To approve falsehoods for truths is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of one condemned».

2. Likewise, Jerome[^2]: «What does not have truth from the Scriptures, is despised with the same ease with which it is proved»; but the notions do not have truth from the Scriptures, but were devised by the masters: therefore it is permitted to despise many things there by the same reasoning by which one proves [them].

3. Likewise, this seems [so] by reason, since the number of the notions and such things are not among those things which are necessary for salvation; but it is permitted to hold opposing opinions in those things which do not pertain to the way of salvation, and this without sin: therefore also concerning the notions[^3].

4. Likewise, if there is a sin there, then either of faith or of morals. Not of faith, since it is not against the articles; not of morals, since to believe a falsehood does not regard morals: therefore no sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. Concerning two persons holding opposing opinions about the notions, it is necessary that one say something false concerning divine matters; but a lie concerning divine matters is a lie in the Christian religion, and this is the gravest sin[^4]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, when two are holding opposing opinions about the notions, it is necessary that one be deceived and err; but error concerning divine matters is most dangerous. Whence Augustine, *On the Trinity* book one[^5]: «Nowhere is it more dangerous to err, nor more fruitful is anything found». If, then, error concerning the humanity of Christ is a sin: therefore also concerning the notions much more strongly.

3. Likewise, since the properties are God himself, whoever says or believes that the properties are not, or are not what they are, says of God that which he is not; but whoever says that God is not what he is, or conversely, errs with the error of sin: therefore since one of those holding opinions in this way[^6] is of this kind, therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as Augustine says[^7]: «Not only does he lie who says what is false, but also he who asserts what is doubtful»; but each of those holding opinions says something doubtful, since no opinion of [these] two is certain: therefore each lies. But whoever lies concerning God sins mortally or venially, but more often mortally: therefore each sins.

> **CONCLUSION.** *In those things concerning the notions which have not been determined by the Church, it is permitted to hold opposing opinions, but not to assert them presumptuously.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to hold opposing opinions can be either concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of the Christian religion, or concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry. Concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry it is permitted both to hold opposing opinions and to assert [them]; to opine indeed[^8], because those things do not bear on salvation, [and] to assert, because they are subject to our inquiry. — In those things which pertain to the doctrine of religion a distinction must be made. For some are of[^9] the necessity of faith, some of the certitude of Scripture, [and] some are annexed to these, as are those things which serve for the explication of the faith and the exposition of Scripture.

Concerning those things which are of the necessity of faith, to hold opposing opinions is simply a sin in the one [party], namely in him who opines what is false. And if it be a simple opinion, it is the sin of error; if however assertion and defense, it must be called not only error but heresy.

In those things, however, which are of the certitude of Scripture, it is permitted to those ignorant of the Scriptures to hold opposing opinions; nor is it a fault, as if one simple man should believe that Jacob was the father of Isaac, [and] another not, but the converse. And the first, although indeed he should so suspect or opine, does not sin[^10], because he is ignorant of Scripture. To those, however, knowing Scripture it is not permitted; rather the [other] one sins if he simply opine. If, however, he should defend [it], he must be judged a heretic, since he contradicts Sacred Scripture.

In those things, however, which are annexed to faith or to Scripture, either one opinion follows upon faith and Scripture, and the opposite follows upon the other; and then it must be said that before due treatment[^11] it is permitted to hold opposing opinions, but after due treatment it is not permitted, rather it is a sin, as was the case with the opinion of [Gilbert] of Poitiers concerning the properties. For he was saying that they are not God, and from this there follows the contrary of the faith. For since the Church adores the property, it would then adore what is not God and what is not God would be adored. Whence if, after the unfittingness had been shown to him, he had not retracted the error, he would have been judged a heretic by the Church; but he retracted at the council of Reims, as Bernard says[^12]. — In those things, however, which are annexed to faith and neither follow nor are repugnant[^13], because they are doubtful, it is permitted to opine; but it is not permitted to assert, because to opine is [the act] of conferring reason, but to assert what is doubtful concerning God is [the act] of presumptuous reason.

*Epilogue.* It must therefore be conceded that each opining party, if he should assert, sins, not on account of error, but on account of presumption; and so it must be conceded that it is permitted to hold opposing opinions there.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*1.* To that which is objected, that [there is] a lie in the Christian religion etc.; it must be said that it is not[^14] a lie, since neither says against [the rule of] belief; [it is] not in the Christian religion, since it is not of the necessity of faith or of morals.

*2.* To that which is objected, that that error is dangerous; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is contrary to faith; but if it is concerning those things which do not pertain to faith, it is not true.

*3.* To that which is objected, that he sins who says that God is not what he is etc.; it must be said that this is true, if it has been determined by faith or by Scripture; otherwise he does not sin, unless he assert or defend.

*4.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that it is to be conceded. For he who on his own authority asserts or affirms concerning God that which neither Scripture nor faith says nor follows from them, is to be judged presumptuous even if he speak the truth; and if he doubts in his heart and affirms with his mouth, he is a liar; if he asserts in both modes, he is proud.

la: Libr. I. *Retract.* c. 9. n. 5.

en: Book I, *Retractations*, c. 9, n. 5.

la: *In Matth.* c. 23, 35, in quo textu et etiam paulo inferius in minori huius argumenti codd. G H Z aa bb pro *veritatem* exhibent *auctoritatem*, quae vox et in originali exstat.

en: *On Matthew*, c. 23, [v.] 35; in which text and also a little below in the minor [premise] of this argument the codices G H Z aa bb in place of *veritatem* exhibit *auctoritatem*, which word also stands in the original.

la: In Vat. et in cod. cc desideratur conclusio *ergo et in notionibus*, quae in omnibus aliis codd. habetur.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and in cod. cc the conclusion *ergo et in notionibus* is missing, which is found in all the other codices.

la: Cfr. August., *de Mendacio ad Consent.* c. 3. n. 4. et passim.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Lying, to Consentius*, c. 3, n. 4, and elsewhere.

la: Cap. 3. n. 5. — Vat. in textu citato *alibi* pro *alicubi*; cod. G paulo superius pro *sed error circa* substituit *sed errare circa*, et dein consequenter *periculosissimum* pro *periculosissimus*.

en: [De Trinitate I,] c. 3, n. 5. — The Vatican [edition] in the cited text [reads] *alibi* in place of *alicubi*; cod. G a little above substitutes *sed errare circa* in place of *sed error circa*, and then consequently *periculosissimum* in place of *periculosissimus*.

la: Cum aliquibus codd. ut H Z et ed. 1 adiecimus *sic*, quod in Vat. desideratur.

en: With some codices such as H Z and ed. 1 we have added *sic*, which is missing in the Vatican [edition].

la: *De Mendacio*, c. 3. n. 3, secundum sensum. — Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc falso substituit *Verum* pro *Deum*, et subinde eadem sola post *ut plus* interiicit *qui*; lectionem *ut plus*, quae idem significat ac *ut plurimum*, sumsimus ex cod. T; alii cum Vat. omittunt *ut*, ed. 1 autem omittit *sed ut plus mortaliter*.

en: *On Lying*, c. 3, n. 3, according to the sense. — Toward the end of the argument the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc wrongly substitutes *Verum* in place of *Deum*, and shortly after it alone interjects *qui* after *ut plus*; the reading *ut plus*, which signifies the same as *ut plurimum* ("for the most part"), we have taken from cod. T; others with the Vatican [edition] omit *ut*, but ed. 1 omits *sed ut plus mortaliter*.

la: Textum, quem Vat. sic distortum et mutilatum exhibet: *asserere, quia illa non faciant ad salutem. Asserere autem contraria in his quae* etc., restauravimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Mox voci *religionis* cod. V praemittit *christianae*.

en: The text, which the Vatican [edition] exhibits distorted and mutilated thus: *asserere, quia illa non faciant ad salutem. Asserere autem contraria in his quae* etc., we have restored from the manuscripts and ed. 1. Soon afterwards cod. V prefixes *christianae* to the word *religionis*.

la: Ed. 1 *rectitudine*, Vat. cum ceteris edd. et codd. *necessitate*, sed infra, ubi eadem formula repetitur, *certitudine*, quod vocabulum certe sensum rectius exprimit. — Codd. G K aa post *de* inserunt *necessitate vel*; dein cod. P pro *certitudine* substituit *necessitate*, et paulo post ed. 1 *ignorantibus* pro *ignorantes*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *rectitudine*, the Vatican [edition] with the other editions and codices [reads] *necessitate*, but below, where the same formula is repeated, *certitudine*, which word certainly expresses the sense more rightly. — Codices G K aa after *de* insert *necessitate vel*; then cod. P substitutes *necessitate* in place of *certitudine*, and a little later ed. 1 [reads] *ignorantibus* in place of *ignorantes*.

la: Verba *non peccat* desiderantur in non paucis codd.; in codd. aa bb eorum loco legitur *non est haereticus*. Paulo ante Vat., non suffragantibus codd., post *licet quidem* omittit *hoc* et post *opinetur* adiungit *falsum, tamen*; dein pro *Scientes* substituit *Scienti* (cod. ee *Scientibus*), et post *immo* supprimit *alter*, pro quo codd. M X Z cum ed. 1 [legunt] *necessario*.

en: The words *non peccat* are missing in not a few codices; in codices aa bb in their place is read *non est haereticus*. A little before, the Vatican [edition], without the support of the codices, omits *hoc* after *licet quidem* and adds *falsum, tamen* after *opinetur*; then in place of *Scientes* substitutes *Scienti* (cod. ee *Scientibus*), and after *immo* suppresses *alter*, in place of which codices M X Z with ed. 1 [read] *necessario*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 hic et paulo inferius *percontationem* pro *pertractationem*.

en: The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and of ed. 1, here and a little below [reads] *percontationem* in place of *pertractationem*.

la: *Serm.* 80. *in Cant.* n. 8. 9. Vide et infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1, ubi plura de opinione Gilb. Porretani exhibentur.

en: *Sermon* 80 *on the Canticle*, n. 8, 9. See also below d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, where more is shown about the opinion of Gilbert of Poitiers.

la: Hoc est secundum membrum disiunctionis, quam S. Doctor facit ad ea quae sunt annexa fidei; quare cod. T, quem sequimur, post verba *In his* bene subiungit *autem*. Pro *et non sequuntur* plures codd. ut A C F G K exhibent *nec sequitur*, et codd. H I P Q T W *nec sequitur error*. Dein post *repugnant* Vat., nullo suffragante cod., interponit *ei*, et paulo inferius post *asserere* cum paucis codd. *dubium circa Deum*. — Verba immediate subsequentia: *opinari est rationis conferentis*, accipe in sensu S. Doctoris, III. *Sent.* d. 24. a. 2. q. 2. sic loquentis: «Uno modo dicitur opinio assensio unius partis cum formidine alterius; alio modo dicitur opinio assensio animae generata ex rationibus probabilibus», ita scil., ut sit actus rationis, quo comparatione inter argumenta probabilia diversarum sententiarum facta, uni sententiae adhaeret, non excludendo possibilitatem, quod altera sententia sit vera.

en: This is the second member of the disjunction which the holy Doctor makes for those things which are annexed to faith; wherefore cod. T, which we follow, after the words *In his* well adds *autem*. In place of *et non sequuntur* several codices such as A C F G K exhibit *nec sequitur*, and codices H I P Q T W [exhibit] *nec sequitur error*. Then after *repugnant* the Vatican [edition], with no codex supporting, interposes *ei*, and a little below after *asserere* with a few codices [adds] *dubium circa Deum*. — The words immediately following — *opinari est rationis conferentis* — take in the sense of the holy Doctor speaking thus in *III Sent.* d. 24, a. 2, q. 2: «In one way *opinion* is called the assent to one part with fear of the other; in another way *opinion* is called the assent of the soul generated from probable arguments», so namely, that it be an act of reason by which, when comparison is made between the probable arguments of different positions, one adheres to one position, not excluding the possibility that the other position be true.

la: Supple: *est mendacium*. — In Vat. sic legitur: *credulitatem in Christiana religione*; lectio corrupta.

en: Supply: *est mendacium* ("[it] is a lie"). — In the Vatican [edition] is read thus: *credulitatem in Christiana religione*; a corrupt reading.

latin_scholion:
Gilbertus Porretanus, putans, relationes et proprietates in Deo esse assistentes, inde arguit, eas non esse Deum (cfr. infra d. 33. q. I.). Unde orta est quaestio, utrum doctrina de notionibus spectet ad fidem. Quae hic de fide tanguntur, explicantur diffuse III. Sent. d. 25, praecipue a. 1, q. 1.3. — Consentiunt alii magistri: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 68, m. 1, a. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 5; S. I, q. 32, a. 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26, a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic princ. 2, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 26, q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
Gilbert of Poitiers, supposing the relations and properties in God to be [merely] assistants [adjacent to him], thence argued that they are not God (cf. below d. 33, q. 1). Whence arose the question whether the doctrine of the notions pertains to faith. The points of faith touched on here are explained at length in *III Sent.* d. 25, especially a. 1, q. 1, 3. — Other masters consent: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 68, m. 1, a. 2. — St. Thomas, *I Sent.* d. 33, q. 1, a. 5; *Summa* I, q. 32, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, *I Sent.* d. 26, a. 14. — Petrus a Tarantasia, *I Sent.* d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here *princ.* 2, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, *I Sent.* d. 26, q. 5.

---


title: Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 481 -->

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum verbum in divinis dicatur essentialiter, an notionaliter.*

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur primo utrum verbum dicatur essentialiter, vel notionaliter. Et quod dicatur notionaliter, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate canonis. Beatus Ioannes[^1] elegantissime exprimens incarnationem dicit: *Verbum caro factum est*; sed unio non est facta nisi in persona Filii: ergo verbum non exprimit nisi personam Filii, et proprie: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^2]: «In Trinitate non dicitur verbum nisi Filius, neque donum nisi Spiritus sanctus».

3. Item, Anselmus in *Monologio*[^3]: «Apertissimum est, quia nec ille cuius est verbum, potest esse verbum suum, nec verbum potest esse ille cuius est verbum».

4. Item, ratione videtur, quia verbum est quod emanat a mente per modum conceptionis[^4]; ergo verbum de se dicit conceptum; sed esse conceptum et genitum sunt idem, sed genitum est notionale: ergo etc.

5. Item, verbum dicitur quod emanat per modum perfectae expressionis[^5]; sed esse imaginem est proprium Filii: ergo et verbum.

6. Item, omne verbum dicit respectum ad dicentem[^6]; sed esse respectivum in divinis est notionaliter dictum, si dicat respectum ad personam; sed dicens non potest esse nisi persona: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Quod dicatur essentialiter, ostenditur sic. Sicut dicit Augustinus nono *de Trinitate* capitulo decimo[^7]: «Verbum est cum amore notitia»; sed notitia est essentialiter dictum: ergo etc.

2. Item, verbum est, quo res manifestatur et exprimitur[^8]; sed manifestari est cuiuslibet personae, et manifestatio est essentialis: ergo et verbum. Si tu dicas, quod non dicitur manifestatio simpliciter, sed manifestatio alterius: obiicitur tunc, quia Spiritus sanctus est manifestativus Filii, Ioannis decimo sexto[^9]: *Ille me clarificabit* etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad dicentem, quia verbum dicitur respectu dicentis: sed dicentes sunt tres, sicut dicit Anselmus in *Monologio*[^10]: «Unusquisque in Trinitate se

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dicit»: ergo verbum est trium. Sed nihil est trium nisi essentiale: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut dicit Anselmus in *Monologio*[^11]: «Dicere nihil aliud est quam cogitando intueri»; sed hoc est essentiale: ergo et verbum. Si dicas, quod dicere, secundum quod essentialiter dicitur, non habet correspondens verbum; contra: sicut dicit Anselmus[^12], «Pater se dicendo generat Verbum»; sed omnis actus, secundum quem persona reflectitur supra se, est essentialis: ergo et *dicere*, prout est essentiale, respondet verbum: ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc ostenditur per comparationem ad id quod per verbum dicitur. Nihil medium inter creaturam et Creatorem est notio vel notionale, quoniam medium aequaliter distat ab extremis; sed Verbum est medium, quoniam *omnia per Verbum facta sunt*[^13]: ergo etc.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Verbum aeternum in divinis dicitur tantum notionaliter, non essentialiter.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui quod *dicere* tripliciter accipitur in divinis. Uno modo *dicere* est idem quod *intelligere*; alio modo, idem quod *generare*; unde Augustinus[^14] exponit illud Genesis primo: «*Dixit*, id est Filium genuit, in quo omnia disposuit»; tertio modo, *dicere* idem est quod *creare*; et verbum non respondet ei quod est *dicere*, in quantum increatum, nisi secundum quod *dicere* idem est quod *generare*; et ita convenit soli Patri.

— Sed istud non videtur intelligibile, quod sit loqui sine verbo, et quod aliquid sit dicere, cui non respondeat verbum, sicut nec generare sine genito, nec nosse[^15] sine notitia. Et hoc etiam ipse modus loquendi et intelligendi abhorret, quod dicat aliquis et loquatur sine omni verbo.

Ideo voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod sicut *dicere* accipitur essentialiter et personaliter, quia tres sunt qui dicunt, sicut dicit Anselmus[^16], ita et verbum dicitur essentialiter et personaliter. Et secundum istam viam solvere nituntur obiecta ad utramque partem. — Sed hoc est contra Augustinum et contra Anselmum expresse. Nam Augustinus[^17] dicit, quod «verbum eo ipso quod verbum, dicitur ad alterum». Similiter Anselmus: «Apertissimum est, quod verbum non est ille cuius est verbum». Et hoc patet etiam per auctoritates Augustini, quas Magister adducit in littera[^18], et Anselmus in *Monologio* hoc expresse negat.

Propter hoc intelligendum, quod *dicere* idem est quod *loqui*; *loqui* autem est dupliciter, vel ad se, id est apud se, vel ad alterum. Loqui ad se nihil aliud est quam aliquid mente concipere. Mens autem concipit intelligendo, et intelligendo aliud concipit simile alii, intelligendo se concipit simile sibi, quia intelligentia assimilatur intellecto. Mens igitur dicendo se apud se concipit per omnia simile sibi; et hoc est verbum conceptum[^19]. — Alio modo *dicere* ad alterum est conceptum mentis exprimere; et huic *dicere* respondet verbum prolatum.

Dicendum ergo, quod sicut in nobis dupliciter accipitur *dicere*, ita in Deo. Nam *dicere* Dei apud se, hoc est intelligendo concipere; et hoc est generare prolem similem sibi, et huic *dicere* respondet verbum natum, id est Verbum aeternum. Alio modo *dicere* est exterius se exprimere, et sic idem est *dicere* quod se per creaturam declarare, et huic *dicere* respondet verbum creatum et verbum temporale.

Concedendum ergo, quod *verbum* sicut et *dicere* dupliciter accipitur, scilicet aeternaliter et tem-

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poraliter. Et verbum temporaliter[^20] creatum nec est Deus nec est in Deo, sed creatura respectu Dei. Verbum aeternum est Deus, et est illius solius, cuius est concipi, sicut *dicere* est illius solius, cuius est *concipere*. Ideo rationes probantes verbum dici notionaliter, sunt simpliciter concedendae.

1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verbum est notitia, et verbum est manifestativum; dicendum, quod nec hoc nec illud est tota ratio verbi, sicut nec *nosse* est tota ratio *dicere* vel *manifestare*, sed necesse est, quod cadat ibi conceptum; ideo cum notitia concepta et manifestatio per conceptum sit per solum Filium, non Spiritum sanctum, ideo patet illud quod obiicitur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo in comparatione ad dicentem, dicendum, quod *dicere* non dicitur essentialiter, nisi secundum quod dicitur respectu verbi creati, et secundum quod notat effectum temporalem; secundum vero quod dicit respectum aeternum, sic solus unus est dicens.

4. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod *dicere* non est aliud quam cogitando intueri; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi intuitus non est sine concepto[^21], ut in nobis et in Patre; sed in Filio non est, similiter nec in Spiritu sancto. Quamvis enim se intelligant, tamen non concipiunt prolem, quia non est in eis fecunditas ad generandum. — Si quaeras rationem huius, Augustinus te docet decimo quinto[^22] *de Trinitate*: ratio huius, quia nos non intelligimus nisi per intelligentiam, et illa semper est genita. In illa autem Trinitate beata aliter est quam in imagine, quia quaelibet persona intelligit. Et ideo *intelligere* non dicit ibi rationem concipiendi, ac per hoc non complectitur totam rationem dicendi vel verbi in Deo, ut in nobis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus reflexus supra se etc.; dicendum, quod, sive dicatur apud se, sive exterius ad alterum, utroque modo implicat *apud se* actum absolutum et respectivum. *Dicere* enim apud se est cogitando sive intelligendo conceptum gignere; et ratione primi est reflexio, sed ratione secundi est relatio. Similiter *dicere* exterius est se vel conceptum declarando aliquid extra formare. Unde *dicere* utroque modo reflectitur supra dicentem et dictum: supra dicentem, ratione actus[^23] absoluti; supra dictum, ratione comparati. Et sic manifesta est illa obiectio, quoniam *dicere* non tantum est absolutum; et ideo non est essentiale semper.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum est medium; dicendum, quod duplex est medium, scilicet essentiae et intelligentiae; et Verbum non est medium in essendo, sed extremum, quoniam ipsum Verbum omnia fecit — sed solum in intelligendo — quia Pater per Verbum omnia fecit. Et hoc infra melius dicetur[^24].

english:
### QUESTION I. *Whether 'word' in divine matters is said essentially or notionally.*

As to the first [point], then, it is asked first whether 'word' is said essentially or notionally. And that it is said notionally is shown:

1. *First*, by the authority of canon [Scripture]. Blessed John[^1], most elegantly expressing the incarnation, says: *The Word was made flesh*; but the union was not made except in the person of the Son: therefore 'word' expresses nothing but the person of the Son, and properly: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, fifteenth [book] *On the Trinity*[^2]: «In the Trinity 'word' is said only of the Son, and 'gift' only of the Holy Spirit».

3. Likewise, Anselm in the *Monologion*[^3]: «It is most evident that neither he whose word it is can be his own word, nor can the word be he whose word it is».

4. Likewise, by reason it appears so, since 'word' is what emanates from the mind by way of conception[^4]; therefore 'word' of itself signifies a concept; but to be conceived and to be begotten are the same, and to be begotten is notional: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, 'word' is said of what emanates by way of perfect expression[^5]; but to be image is proper to the Son: therefore so also is 'word'.

6. Likewise, every word signifies a relation to one speaking[^6]; but to be relative in divine matters is said notionally, if it signifies a relation to a person; but a speaker can be nothing but a person: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it is said essentially is shown thus. As Augustine says in the ninth [book] *On the Trinity*, chapter ten[^7]: «A word is knowledge with love»; but knowledge is said essentially: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a word is that by which a thing is manifested and expressed[^8]; but to be manifested belongs to any person, and manifestation is essential: therefore so also is 'word'. If you say that it is not called manifestation simply, but manifestation of another: it is then objected, since the Holy Spirit is the one who manifests the Son, John sixteen[^9]: *He shall glorify me*, etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the speaker, since 'word' is said in respect to the speaker: but speakers are three, as Anselm says in the *Monologion*[^10]: «Each one in the Trinity says himself»: therefore the word is of three. But nothing is of three save what is essential: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as Anselm says in the *Monologion*[^11]: «To say is nothing other than to behold by thinking»; but this is essential: therefore so also is 'word'. If you say that to-say, in so far as it is said essentially, has no corresponding word; on the contrary: as Anselm says[^12], «The Father, by saying himself, generates the Word»; but every act in which a person reflects upon itself is essential: therefore also to *to-say*, in so far as it is essential, there corresponds a word: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is shown by comparison to that which is said through the word. Nothing intermediate between creature and Creator is a notion or notional, since an intermediate stands equally distant from the extremes; but the Word is intermediate, since *all things were made through the Word*[^13]: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The eternal Word in divine matters is said only notionally, not essentially.*

**I respond:** To this some have said that *to-say* is taken in three ways in divine matters. In one way *to-say* is the same as *to understand*; in another way, the same as *to generate*; whence Augustine[^14] expounds that [text] of Genesis one: «*He said*, that is, He begot the Son, in whom He arranged all things»; in a third way, *to-say* is the same as *to create*; and 'word' does not correspond to that which is *to-say*, in so far as [it is] uncreated, except in so far as *to-say* is the same as *to generate*; and thus it belongs to the Father alone.

— But this does not seem intelligible, that there be a speaking without a word, and that something be a saying to which no word corresponds, just as there is no generating without something begotten, nor knowing[^15] without knowledge. And this very mode of speaking and understanding shrinks from anyone saying or speaking without any word.

Therefore some have wished to say that just as *to-say* is taken essentially and personally, since there are three who speak, as Anselm says[^16], so also 'word' is said essentially and personally. And by this way they strive to solve the objections on either side. — But this is expressly against Augustine and against Anselm. For Augustine[^17] says that «a word, by the very fact that it is a word, is said in relation to another». Similarly Anselm: «It is most evident that the word is not he whose word it is». And this is also plain through the authorities of Augustine which the Master adduces in the *littera*[^18], and Anselm in the *Monologion* expressly denies this.

On account of this, it must be understood that *to-say* is the same as *to-speak*; but *to-speak* is in two ways, either to oneself, that is, with oneself, or to another. To speak to oneself is nothing other than to conceive something in mind. But the mind conceives by understanding, and understanding another it conceives a likeness of the other, [and] understanding itself it conceives a likeness of itself, since the intelligence is assimilated to what is understood. The mind, therefore, by saying itself with itself, conceives [what is] in every way like itself; and this is the conceived word[^19]. — In another way, *to-say* to another is to express the concept of the mind; and to this *to-say* there corresponds the uttered word.

It must therefore be said that just as in us *to-say* is taken in two ways, so in God. For *to-say* of God with himself is to conceive by understanding; and this is to generate offspring like to himself, and to this *to-say* there corresponds the born word, that is, the eternal Word. In another way *to-say* is to express oneself outwardly, and so *to-say* is the same as to declare oneself through a creature, and to this *to-say* there corresponds the created word and the temporal word.

It must therefore be conceded that *word*, like *to-say*, is taken in two ways, namely eternally and temporally. And the word created temporally[^20] is neither God nor in God, but a creature in respect to God. The eternal Word is God, and is of him alone whose [property] it is to be conceived, just as *to-say* is of him alone whose [property] it is *to conceive*. Therefore the reasonings proving that 'word' is said notionally are simply to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected, that the word is knowledge, and the word is what manifests; it must be said that neither this nor that is the whole account of 'word', just as *to know* is not the whole account of *to-say* or *to manifest*, but it is necessary that something conceived fall there [as well]; therefore, since knowledge conceived and manifestation through a concept are through the Son alone, not the Holy Spirit, therefore that which is objected is plain.

3. To that which is objected concerning 'word' in comparison to the speaker, it must be said that *to-say* is not said essentially, except in so far as it is said in respect to the created word, and in so far as it notes a temporal effect; but in so far as it signifies an eternal relation, so [the] one alone is the speaker.

4. As to that, then, which is objected, that *to-say* is nothing other than to behold by thinking; it must be said that this is true where intuition is not without a concept[^21], as in us and in the Father; but in the Son it is not so, nor likewise in the Holy Spirit. For although they understand themselves, yet they do not conceive offspring, since there is no fecundity in them for begetting. — If you ask the reason for this, Augustine teaches you in the fifteenth [book] *On the Trinity*[^22]: the reason for this is that we do not understand except by understanding [intelligentia], and that is always begotten. But in that blessed Trinity it is otherwise than in the [created] image, since each person understands. And therefore *to understand* does not there signify the account of conceiving, and through this it does not embrace the whole account of saying or of word in God, as it does in us.

5. To that which is objected, that the act reflects upon itself, etc.; it must be said that, whether it be said with oneself or outwardly to another, in either mode it implies *with itself* an absolute act and a relative one. For *to-say* with oneself is to beget a concept by thinking or by understanding; and by reason of the first there is reflection, but by reason of the second there is relation. Similarly *to-say* outwardly is to form something outside by declaring oneself or one's concept. Whence *to-say* in either mode reflects upon the speaker and what is said: upon the speaker, by reason of the absolute act[^23]; upon what is said, by reason of what is compared. And thus that objection is manifest, since *to-say* is not only an absolute; and therefore is not always essential.

6. To that which is objected, that the Word is intermediate; it must be said that intermediate is twofold, namely [intermediate] of essence and of intelligence; and the Word is not intermediate in being, but extreme, since the Word himself made all things — but only in understanding — since the Father made all things through the Word. And this will be better said below[^24].

la: Cap. 1, 14. — Mox pro *sed* codd. A T *si*.

en: [John] ch. 1, [v.] 14. — Soon after, in place of *sed* ("but"), codices A T [read] *si* ("if").

la: Cap. 17, n. 29. In originali hic locus sic incipit: *tamen non frustra in hac Trinitate non dicitur verbum* etc.

en: Ch. 17, n. 29. In the original this passage begins thus: *yet not without reason in this Trinity is 'word' said*, etc.

la: Cfr. August., IX. *de Trin.* c. 7. n. 12. seqq.; et Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 11. — Deinde codd. aa bb voci *conceptum*, quod bis occurrit, bis adiungunt vocabulum *mentis*.

en: Cf. Augustine, IX *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 12 and following; and Anselm, *Monologion* c. 11. — Then codices aa bb to the word *conceptum* ("concept"), which occurs twice, twice append the word *mentis* ("of the mind").

la: Cfr. August., IX. *de Trin.* c. 11. n. 16; et Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 10. — Codd. P Q W addunt *quod est esse imaginem*, et cod. [?] adiungit *ergo verbum dicitur quod emanat per modum imaginis*.

en: Cf. Augustine, IX *On the Trinity*, c. 11, n. 16; and Anselm, *Monologion* c. 10. — Codices P Q W add *which is to be image*, and cod. [?] adds *therefore 'word' is said of what emanates by way of image*. (The codex siglum is illegible in the OCR.)

la: Cfr. August., VII. *de Trin.* c. 2. n. 3; et Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 38.

en: Cf. Augustine, VII *On the Trinity*, c. 2, n. 3; and Anselm, *Monologion* c. 38.

la: Cfr. August., IX. *de Trin.* c. 7. n. 12; et Ioan. Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 21, ubi *verbum vocatur animi nuntius*. — Mox pro *essentialis*, quod habent Vat. et ed. 1 cum codd. A FLT, alii codd. et edd. *aequalis*; codd. aa bb *aequaliter*.

en: Cf. Augustine, IX *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 12; and John Damascene, II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 21, where *the word is called the messenger of the soul*. — Soon after, in place of *essentialis* ("essential"), which the Vatican [edition] and ed. 1 have with codices A FLT, other codices and editions [read] *aequalis* ("equal"); codices aa bb *aequaliter* ("equally").

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Cap. 62: *Pater et Filius et eorum Spiritus unusquisque se ipsum et alios ambos dicit*.

en: Ch. 62: *The Father and the Son and their Spirit, each one says himself and both the others*.

la: Cap. 63: *Nihil autem aliud est summo spiritui huiusmodi dicere quam quasi cogitando intueri, sicut nostrae mentis locutio nihil aliud est quam cogitantis inspectio.*

en: Ch. 63: *Nothing else is it for the supreme spirit thus to say than as it were to behold by thinking, just as the speech of our mind is nothing other than the inspection of the one thinking.*

la: *Monolog.* c. 33, ubi ostenso generaliter, mentem rationalem cogitando formare imaginem et verbum, dicit: *Hoc itaque modo quis neget, summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est Verbum suum?*

en: *Monologion* c. 33, where, having shown generally that the rational mind by thinking forms an image and a word, he says: *Who therefore would deny in this way that the supreme wisdom, when by saying itself it understands, begets a likeness consubstantial to itself, that is, its own Word?*

en: John 1:3.

la: Libr. II. *de Genes. ad lit.* c. 6. n. 13: *Non ergo Deus toties dixit: fiat illa vel illa creatura, quoties in hoc libro repetitur* Et dixit Deus. *Unum quippe Verbum ille genuit, in quo dixit omnia, priusquam facta sunt singula.* Cfr. et ibid. libr. I. c. 3. n. 8, et c. 6. n. 12; nec non *Enarrat. in Ps.* 61, v. 12, n. 18, quae in seq. q. allegatur.

en: Book II *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 6, n. 13: *God therefore did not so often say: 'let this or that creature be made,' as often as in this book is repeated* And God said. *For he begot one Word, in which he said all things before the individual things were made.* Cf. also ibid. book I, c. 3, n. 8, and c. 6, n. 12; and also *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 61, v. 12, n. 18, which is cited in the following question.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc perperam *nosci*. Paulo inferius fide plurium codd. ut FPQTW etc. reposuimus vocem *aliquis*, quae in Vat. desideratur.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc wrongly [reads] *nosci* ("to be known"). A little below, on the faith of the majority of codices such as FPQTW etc., we have restored the word *aliquis* ("anyone"), which is wanting in the Vatican [edition].

la: Verba Anselmi hic citata vide supra arg. 3, ad oppos. — Vat., alium Anselmi textum (c. 63.) respiciens, ubi iste Doctor dicit, *non esse tres dicentes... nec plura*, quae dicuntur, post verba proxime antecedentia *qui dicunt* addit *et qui dicuntur*, codd. nec non edd. obnitentibus. Paulo superius eadem Vat. sola pro *sicut dicere accipitur* habet *cum dicere accipiatur*, et consequenter postea *ideo* pro *ita et*, quae est lectio nostra, cui suffragantur codd. T W et etiam cod. F, in quo verbis transpositis legitur *et ita*. Alii codd. cum sex primis edd. pro *ita et* substituunt *quod*.

en: For the words of Anselm here cited, see above arg. 3, *ad oppos.* — The Vatican [edition], looking to another text of Anselm (c. 63), where this Doctor says *that there are not three speakers... nor several [things] that are said*, after the immediately preceding words *qui dicunt* ("who say") adds *et qui dicuntur* ("and which are said"), with the codices and editions resisting. A little above, the Vatican alone, in place of *sicut dicere accipitur* ("as 'to-say' is taken"), has *cum dicere accipiatur* ("when 'to-say' is taken"), and consequently afterwards *ideo* ("therefore") for *ita et* ("so also"), which is our reading, supported by codices T W and also cod. F, in which with transposed words is read *et ita*. Other codices with the first six editions in place of *ita et* substitute *quod* ("that").

la: Libr. VII *de Trin.* c. 2, n. 3. — Textum integrum Anselmi habes supra fundam. 3.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 2, n. 3. — You have the entire text of Anselm above at fundament 3.

la: Cap. 3. — Locus Monologii proxime citatus est cap. 63, ubi Anselmus ait: *Licet igitur unusquisque seipsum, et omnes invicem se dicant; impossibile tamen est, in summa essentia esse verbum aliud praeter illud, de quo iam constat, quod sic nascitur ex eo, cuius est Verbum, ut et vera eius dici possit imago et vere Filius eius sit. In quo mirum quiddam et inexplicabile video. Ecce enim cum manifestum sit, unumquemque, scilicet Patrem et Filium et Patris Filiique Spiritum, pariter se et ambos alios dicere, et unum solum ibi esse Verbum; nullatenus tamen ipsum Verbum videtur posse dici Verbum omnium trium, sed tantum unius eorum. Constat enim, ipsum esse imaginem et Filium eius, cuius est Verbum.* — Non pauci codd. post *Monologio* omittunt *hoc*, cuius loco in aliis codd. ut A G K V X legitur *et*.

en: Ch. 3. — The most recently cited passage of the *Monologion* is c. 63, where Anselm says: *Although therefore each one says himself, and all say one another in turn; nevertheless it is impossible that in the supreme essence there be any other word besides that of which it is already established that it is born from him whose Word it is, in such wise that it can truly be called his image and is truly his Son. In which I see something marvelous and inexplicable. For behold, since it is manifest that each one — namely the Father and the Son and the Spirit of the Father and the Son — equally says himself and both the others, and that there is there one Word only; yet in no way does the Word himself seem to be able to be called the Word of all three, but only of one of them. For it is established that he is the image and the Son of him whose Word he is.* — Not a few codices after *Monologio* omit *hoc*, in place of which in other codices such as A G K V X is read *et*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 10. et 32. — Pro verbis subsequentibus *Alio modo* sola Vat. substituit *Loqui autem sive*.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Monologion* cc. 10 and 32. — For the words following *Alio modo* ("In another way") the Vatican alone substitutes *Loqui autem sive* ("But to-speak or").

la: Vat. subiicit *est*, quod removimus auctoritate codd. T Z.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *est* ("is"), which we have removed on the authority of codices T Z.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *et*, ed. 1 cum cod. ff *nec*. Mox pro *conceptum* codd. A V *conceptio*. Porro Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 pro *ideo cum* ponit *quia*, pro *sit* habet *fit*, et in fine addit *secundo*. Denique pro *ideo patet* plures codd. incongrue *et sic*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *et* ("and"), ed. 1 with cod. ff [reads] *nec* ("nor"). Soon after, in place of *conceptum* ("concept"), codices A V [read] *conceptio* ("conception"). Further, the Vatican against the codices and ed. 1, in place of *ideo cum* ("therefore since") puts *quia* ("since"), in place of *sit* ("be") has *fit* ("becomes"), and at the end adds *secundo* ("secondly"). Finally, in place of *ideo patet* ("therefore [it] is plain") several codices incongruously [read] *et sic* ("and thus").

la: In Vat. deest vocabulum *actus*, quod ex vetustioribus codd. restituimus.

en: In the Vatican [edition] the word *actus* ("act") is missing, which we have restored from the older codices.

la: In quaest. seq. Cfr. etiam d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius post *ipsum Verbum* plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *omnia*, quod utique cum Vat. supplendum est. — Cfr. Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 37.

en: In the following question. Cf. also d. 32, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above after *ipsum Verbum* most codices with ed. 1 omit *omnia* ("all things"), which must in any case be supplied with the Vatican [edition]. — Cf. Anselm, *Monologion* c. 37.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Nomen et ratio verbi (quod in homine vel verbum exterius prolatum, vel in mente productum esse potest) ad Deum translatum est, de quo vide infra q. 1. Ab ipso Seraphico infra q. 3. in corp. *verbum mentis* accurate definitur, scilicet quod sit «similitudo expressa et expressiva, concepta vi spiritus intelligentis, secundum quod se vel aliud intuetur»; in qua definitione quatuor tanguntur, ut ibi exponitur. Cum Seraphico et aliis multis convenit S. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 27. a. I.) dicens: «Quicumque intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex eius notitia procedens» (cfr. ibid. q. 34. a. 1.). Dissentiunt autem S. Thomas et Scotus in re secundaria. Ille docet, quod *verbum* intellectus creati, formaliter loquendo, non est ipsa intellectio, sed est similitudo formalis et expressa rei cognitae per actum intelligendi. Scotus vero (I. *Sent.* d. 27. q. I.) affirmat, illud esse ipsam intellectionem actualem. De hac opinionum differentia conferri possunt Caietanus, ad S. I. q. 27. a. 1, et Rada, tom. I. controv. 7.

**II.** Transferendo nomen *verbi* ad divina, differentia attendenda est inter *verbum* in Deo et in creatis, atque omnia, quae sunt imperfectionis, sunt excludenda (infra q. 4.). Inter alia, quae discrimen inter *verbum* creatum et increatum important, haec duo notamus: primo, quod *verbum* creatum est effectus; increatum est tantum terminus productionis. Secundo, *verbum* creatum non praesupponit intellectionem, sed producitur, ut intellectio fiat; increatum vero praesupponit intellectionem essentialem et ingenitam, ipsumque est terminus conceptionis et productionis, qua Pater sibi exprimit talem conceptum omnino sibi similem.

**III.** *Dicere* in Deo dupliciter distinguitur (hic in corp.), scilicet aeternaliter et temporaliter, quod latius explicatur II. *Sent.* d. 13. dub. 3. — Loquendo de dictione aeterna, omnes concedunt, eam esse actum intellectus, ac duplicem actum intellectus esse ponendum in Deo, alium essentialem et tribus personis communem, quo unaquaeque persona se et alias personas et omnia intelligit; alium notionalem, quo Pater producit sive dicit Verbum per memoriam fecundam. Dissentit tamen Scotus a S. Thoma in re secundaria: ille enim vult, dictionem et intellectionem essentialem duos esse actus distinctos vel disparatos, dum Angelicus ponit, dictionem contineri in intellectione essentiali et tantum addere expressionem et relationem. De hac controversia, quae potius de nomine quam de re alicuius momenti esse videtur, videsis Caietanum, ad S. I. q. 34. a. 1, et Rada, controv. 8. — S. Bonaventuram in hac parte potius

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cum Scoto convenire, observat Barth. de Barberiis (tom. 1. disp. 12. q. 6. n. 376.) contra Forestum et alios; quod satis insinuatur in hac quaest. in corp. et praecipue ad 3. et 4., et q. 3. in corp. (cfr. etiam d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et a. 2. q. 1. ad 8.).

**IV.** Prima opinio, quae in responsione commemoratur, etiam a B. Alberto hic a. 6. proponitur. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 62. m. 2.) sex modos profert, quibus accipi possit in Deo *verbum* et *dicere*, scilicet essentialiter, non connotando aliquid in creatura (Pater dicit se); essentialiter, cointelligendo aliquo modo verbum (quia cointelligitur intelligentia, quae appropriatur Filio); notionaliter (Pater loquitur Verbum); notionaliter et connotando effectum in creatura (Pater loquitur nobis in Filio); essentialiter et connotando effectum indistincte trium personarum (locutus est Dominus ad sathan). Idem in solut. ad 2. distinguit in Deo *dicere verbum* et *dicere rem*.

Nihilominus inter S. Doctorem et Alexandrum non est contradictio nisi in modo loquendi, ut S. Bonav. in saepius laudato Prologo (cfr. pag. 472, col. II.) evidenter demonstrat his verbis: «In secunda autem nemo me arbitrabitur discordasse, qui scit distinguere inter *propria* et *transsumtiva*. Sicut enim dicens, non esse verum risum sine ore, nec esse verum volantem sine alis, non contradicit ei, qui dicit, pratum sine ore ridere, et sagittas sine alis volare; sic qui dicit, nomen *loquendi* vel *dicendi*, proprie sumtum, non esse sine verbo, sicut nec generare sine filio, non contradicit ei, qui dicit, loqui vel dicere sic transsumi posse et secundum aliquam significationem transsumtivam dici de aliquo sine verbo generato. In his igitur et in omnibus aliis, si quis adspiciat diligenter et pie, inveniet, me a patrum et maiorum vestigiis non fuisse ausum recedere» (Cfr. etiam q. seq. in corp. de verbo improprie dicto).

Secundae opinioni favet S. Thom. in *Comment.* (hic q. 2. a. 2.). Idem autem in *Sum.* (1. q. 34. a. 4.) omnino consentit Seraphico dicens: «*Verbum* in divinis, si proprie sumitur, est nomen personale tantum». — Singularis prorsus et falsa est opinio Durandi (hic q. 3.) asserentis, *verbum* in Deo proprie dici essentialiter, et non nisi per appropriationem de Filio; quae doctrina consequitur ex alia eiusdem opinione singulari, quod nec Filius per intellectum, nec Spiritus S. per voluntatem procedat.

**V.** Alex. Hal. et S. Thom., locis citt. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2, et *Report.* q. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 35. m. 3. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 58. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The name and account of 'word' (which in man can be either a word uttered outwardly, or one produced in the mind) is transferred to God, on which see below q. 1. By the Seraphic [Doctor] himself below at q. 3 in the body, the *word of the mind* is accurately defined, namely that it is «an expressed and expressive likeness, conceived by the power of an understanding spirit, in so far as it intuits itself or another»; in which definition four things are touched, as is there expounded. With the Seraphic [Doctor] and many others St. Thomas agrees (*Summa* I, q. 27, a. 1) saying: «Whoever understands, by the very fact that he understands, something proceeds within him, which is a conception of the thing understood, proceeding from his knowledge of it» (cf. ibid. q. 34, a. 1). But St. Thomas and Scotus disagree on a secondary matter. The former teaches that the *word* of a created intellect, formally speaking, is not the act of understanding itself, but is a formal and expressed likeness of the thing known through the act of understanding. Scotus on the other hand (I. *Sent.* d. 27, q. 1) affirms that it is the actual act of understanding itself. On this difference of opinions one may consult Cajetan, on *Summa* I, q. 27, a. 1, and Rada, vol. I, controversia 7.

**II.** In transferring the name *word* to divine matters, attention must be paid to the difference between *word* in God and in created things, and all that pertains to imperfection must be excluded (below q. 4). Among the other things which import the distinction between created and uncreated *word*, we note these two: first, that the created *word* is an effect; the uncreated [word] is only the term of a production. Secondly, the created *word* does not presuppose understanding, but is produced in order that understanding may take place; the uncreated, however, presupposes essential and unbegotten understanding, and itself is the term of the conception and production by which the Father expresses to himself a concept altogether like to himself.

**III.** *To-say* in God is distinguished in two ways (here in the body), namely eternally and temporally, which is more broadly explained at II. *Sent.* d. 13, dub. 3. — Speaking of eternal saying, all concede that it is an act of the intellect, and that a twofold act of the intellect is to be posited in God: another essential and common to the three persons, by which each person understands itself and the other persons and all things; another notional, by which the Father produces or says the Word through fruitful memory. Yet Scotus disagrees from St. Thomas on a secondary matter: for the former wishes that essential saying and understanding be two distinct or disparate acts, while the Angelic [Doctor] holds that saying is contained in essential understanding and only adds expression and relation. On this controversy, which seems to be rather about the name than about the substance of any moment, see Cajetan on *Summa* I, q. 34, a. 1, and Rada, controversia 8. — That St. Bonaventure in this matter agrees rather with Scotus is observed by Bartholomaeus de Barberiis (vol. 1, disp. 12, q. 6, n. 376) against Forestus and others; which is sufficiently insinuated in this question in the body and especially [in the replies] to 3 and 4, and at q. 3 in the body (cf. also d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and a. 2, q. 1, ad 8).

**IV.** The first opinion, which is mentioned in the response, is also proposed by Bl. Albert, here a. 6. Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 62, m. 2) puts forward six modes in which *word* and *to-say* can be taken in God, namely: essentially, not connoting anything in a creature (the Father says himself); essentially, co-understanding the word in some way (because there is co-understood the intelligence which is appropriated to the Son); notionally (the Father speaks the Word); notionally and connoting an effect in a creature (the Father speaks to us in the Son); essentially and connoting the effect indistinctly of the three persons (the Lord spoke to Satan). The same [author] in the solution to [obj.] 2 distinguishes in God *to say a word* and *to say a thing*.

Nevertheless between the Holy Doctor and Alexander there is no contradiction except in the mode of speaking, as St. Bonaventure plainly demonstrates in the often-praised Prologue (cf. p. 472, col. II) in these words: «In the second [point] no one will judge me to have disagreed, who knows how to distinguish between *proper* [terms] and *transferred* [terms]. For just as one who says that there is no true laughter without a mouth, nor true flying without wings, does not contradict him who says that the meadow laughs without a mouth, and arrows fly without wings; so he who says that the name *speaking* or *saying*, properly taken, is not without a word, just as there is no generating without a son, does not contradict him who says that 'to speak' or 'to say' can be transferred in this way and according to some transferred signification be said of something without a generated word. In these things therefore and in all others, if anyone will look diligently and piously, he will find that I have not dared to depart from the footsteps of the fathers and elders» (cf. also the following question in the body, on the word improperly so called).

The second opinion is favored by St. Thomas in his *Commentary* (here q. 2, a. 2). The same [author], however, in the *Summa* (1, q. 34, a. 4) altogether agrees with the Seraphic [Doctor], saying: «*Word* in divine matters, if properly taken, is a personal name only». — Quite singular and false is the opinion of Durandus (here q. 3) asserting that *word* in God is properly said essentially, and only by appropriation of the Son; which doctrine follows from another singular opinion of his, namely that neither does the Son proceed by intellect, nor the Holy Spirit by will.

**V.** Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas, locc. citt. — Scotus, in both *Scripta* here q. 2, and *Reportata* q. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6; *Summa* p. I, tr. 8, q. 35, m. 3, a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 58, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, on this and the following questions here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following question here q. 3.

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