title: Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus I. *De hominis immortalitate ex parte animae.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum anima humana per naturam sit immortalis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima rationalis non sit naturaliter immortalis.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Primo per auctoritatem Apostoli primae ad Timotheum ultimo[^1]: *Qui solus habet immortalitatem*; loquitur de Deo: ergo immortalitas non convenit alicui creaturae. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum, quia soli Deo convenit per naturam, animae hominis vero non convenit per naturam, sed per gratiam; contra: gratia non repugnat naturae nec naturam variat, sed potius conservat. Si ergo mortalitas inest omni creaturae per naturam, immortalitas, quae est conditio opposita, nulli creaturae inest per gratiam, ergo nec animae.

2. Item, Damascenus[^2]: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit»; sed anima rationalis a versione incipit, cum sit creata, ut ostensum fuit supra: ergo tendit in versionem: ergo non est immortalis. *Si tu dicas*, quod tendit, quantum est de se, sed tenetur et sustentatur manu Conditoris; *contra hoc* est illud Augustini, septimo de Civitate Dei[^3]: «Sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat»; loquitur de Deo. Si ergo de se ad corruptionem tendit, divinae manus potentia non obsistit.

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3. Item, per auctoritatem Philosophi[^4]: «Intellectus corrumpitur, quodam interius corrupto»; sed non corrumpitur intellectus nisi a corruptione animae rationalis: ergo anima rationalis non est immortalis.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Anima patitur in corpore per naturam, sicut planum est; sed «passio magis et magis facta abiicit a substantia[^5]»; a quacumque autem substantia fiat aliqua abiectio, fit etiam aliqua corruptio, per quam aliquid inde corrumpitur; et omnis talis substantia est corruptibilis: ergo anima rationalis est corruptibilis.

5. Item, anima rationalis condolet corpori patienti: ergo magis patienti magis condolet et maxime patienti maxime compatitur: ergo videtur, quod morienti commoriatur.

6. Item, si substantia est incorruptibilis, et operatio correspondens illi substantiae, quia nunquam substantia privatur propria operatione[^6]: ergo si destruitur et laeditur operatio, destruitur et laeditur substantia. Sed ad laesionem corporis laeditur et impeditur actus substantiae rationalis, qui est intelligere: ergo videtur, quod laedatur et ipsa substantia: ergo substantia est corruptibilis et mortalis.

**Fundamenta.** Ad oppositum sunt innumerabiles auctoritates et philosophorum[^7] et Sanctorum, et ideo ostendamus hoc rationibus. Ut autem sufficienter animae ostendatur immortalitas, attendendum est, quod anima habet considerari in *ordine*, et habet considerari in *se*: in ordine respectu *universae creaturae*, vel respectu *divinae iustitiae*, vel respectu *finis*, qui competit propriae naturae; et in *se* quantum ad *virtutem*, quantum ad *actum* et quantum ad *obiectum*; et sic sex modis considerari habet. *(Modi 6 considerandi.)*

1, 2. Et prima consideratio est secundum ordinem, quem habet inter *creaturas universi*, et secundum hanc considerationem ostenditur eius immortalitas ex duplici ratione. Prima est haec. In ordine creaturarum universi reperimus primam materiam et ultimam formam, et aeque vel magis est de complemento universi ultima forma, sicut et prima materia. Si igitur prima materia est incorruptibilis[^8], ergo et ultima forma; sed haec est anima rationalis: ergo etc.

Item, alia ratio ad idem. Ad hoc quod universum sit completum, necesse est reperire differentias creaturarum secundum perfectam combinationem; sed contingit reperire in universo substantiam habentem magnitudinem, existentem incorruptibilem, ut corpus caeli; et contingit reperire substantiam incorruptibilem, quae nec est magnitudo nec coniuncta magnitudini[^9]: ergo contingit reperire substantiam mediam incorruptibilem, quae non sit magnitudo, sed coniuncta magnitudini; sed haec est anima rationalis. — Ex perfectione igitur ordinis universitatis colligitur, animam esse immortalem.

3, 4. Ex secunda consideratione, scilicet ex ordine *divinae iustitiae* ostenditur sic. «Nullum bonum est irremuneratum, et nullum malum est impunitum[^10]» apud eum, *qui iuste iudicat*; sed multa bona remanent irremunerata, et multa mala impunita secundum praesentem vitam: ergo est ponere vitam aliam quam hanc; sed hoc non esset, nisi anima remaneret post corpus: ergo etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod hoc non cogit, quia, sicut suscitatur corpus, ita posset anima suscitari; non est conveniens talis instantia. Cum enim anima ex nihilo sit creata, si corrumperetur, in nihilum tenderet: ergo non suscitaretur, sed alia anima de novo crearetur[^11].

Item, ad *divinam iustitiam* spectat, quod nihil bene et iuste factum debet vergere in malum exitum; sed secundum moralem philosophum et secundum legem divinam et secundum etiam omnes sectas potius homo debet pati mortem quam recedere a veritate vitae et a veritate iustitiae[^12]. Sed si omnino perimeretur anima, perimeretur omnino iustitia, quae est in ipsa: ergo talis mortis perpessio, quae iusta est, et quam laudat omnis ratio recta, malum haberet simpliciter exitum; quod est

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contra divinam iustitiam. — Colligitur igitur ex ordine iustitiae[^13], animam immortalem esse.

5, 6. Ex tertia consideratione, scilicet ex ordine ipsius animae ad proprium *finem*, ostenditur sic. Remoto ultimo fine, qui principaliter movet, omnes alii fines cassi sunt et vani; sed finis ultimus omnis operationis rationalis est beatitudo perfecta: ergo si illa non est, omnia quaecumque facit anima, facit frustra. Si ergo hoc est inconveniens, necesse est illum finem ponere. Sed «beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus[^14]»; ubi autem hoc est, necesse est, esse immortalitatem: ergo anima per naturam est apta nata ad incorruptionem et immortalitatem.

Item, omnis anima rationalis naturaliter appetit beatitudinem; sed nihil est otiosum in fundamento naturae: ergo omnis anima rationalis nata est ad beatitudinem pervenire. Ubi autem beatitudo, ibi perfecta securitas; ubi perfecta securitas, ibi immortalitas; ubi enim mors potest accidere, necesse est timere. — Colligitur igitur ex ordine ipsius animae ad suum finem, ipsam habere immortalitatem. Et haec triplex consideratio sumta est secundum triplicem *ordinem* ipsius animae, scilicet ad finem proprium, ad divinum iudicium, ad totum universum.

7, 8. Ex quarta consideratione, scilicet ipsius animae quantum ad propriam *virtutem*, arguitur sic. Nulla virtus materialis et corruptibilis nata est super se reflecti — haec per se manifesta est — anima rationalis secundum actum proprium nata est super se reflecti cognoscendo se et amando: ergo virtus animae rationalis non est materialis et corruptibilis[^15]: ergo est immaterialis et incorruptibilis. Sed si virtus est incorruptibilis, et substantia: ergo etc.

Item, omnis virtus, quae per recessum et impermixtionem cum corpore corruptibili fortificatur et potentior efficitur, est incorruptibilis per naturam; anima rationalis est huiusmodi, sicut patet, quia tanto magis relevatur spiritus et homo interior, quanto magis mortificatur homo exterior[^16]: virtus igitur animae rationalis est incorruptibilis. — Et sic ex sua virtute colligitur anima rationalis esse immortalis.

9, 10. Ex quinta consideratione, scilicet quantum ad *operationem*, arguitur sic. Cuiuslibet substantiae spiritualis, secundum esse et durationem pendentis ex corpore, operatio pendet ex corpore; sed anima rationalis propriam operationem habet, secundum quam non pendet ex corpore, scilicet intelligere, quia nullum organum sibi appropriat: ergo duratio animae non pendet ex corpore[^17]. Sed ipsa de se corrumpi non habet, cum nullam contrarietatem habeat: ergo de se est immortalis et incorruptibilis.

Item, cuiuslibet substantiae corruptibilis operatio antiquatur et senescit in tempore; sed animae rationalis operatio nec antiquatur nec senescit in tempore, immo iuvenescit, quia *in antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia*[^18]. — Ex propria ergo operatione colligere possumus, animam rationalem esse immortalem.

11, 12. Ex sexta consideratione, scilicet per comparationem ad *obiectum*, probatur anima rationalis immortalis esse sic. Necesse est, proportionem esse cognoscentis ad cognitum, sive potentiae ad obiectum; sed anima rationalis nata est cognoscere et intelligere veritatem; veritas autem est incorruptibilis, sicut probat Augustinus in *Soliloquiis*[^19], cum sit talis naturae, quod ipsa negatio veritatis veritatem ponat: ergo anima rationalis, cum sit veritati proportionabilis, est immortalis. Haec autem ratio non solum concludit, animam esse immortalem, per veritatem *intelligentiae* sive conscientiae, sed etiam per veritatem *vitae* sive iustitiae, de qua Sapientiae primo[^20] dicitur: *Iustitia est perpetua et immortalis*, ac per hoc anima, quae est iustitiae capax.

Item, omnis virtus corruptibilis laeditur ab obiecto improportionabiliter excellenti, et magis nata est delectari in medio quam in extremo. Sed anima rationalis, intelligens maiora et maxima, non propter hoc peius intelligit minora, et magis delectatur in cognitione summae lucis et perceptione sapientiae Dei quam in cognitione alicuius creati[^21]. —

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Ex comparatione ergo ad obiectum colligitur anima rationalis esse immortalis. Si igitur substantia cognoscitur per virtutem, et virtus per operationem, et operatio per obiectum, cum secundum hanc triplicem considerationem ipsius animae ostensum sit, ipsam esse immortalem: omnis animae consideratio sive *in se* sive *in ordine* astruit animae immortalitatem.

> ### Conclusio.
> **Animam rationalem esse immortalem, quadruplici ratione probatur.**

**Respondeo:** Ad praedicta dicendum est, quod anima rationalis est immortalis, secundum quod dicit fides catholica, cui concordat philosophia et omnis ratio recta. Licet autem in cognitionem immortalitatis animae rationalis multiplici via possemus deduci et manuduci; potissimus tamen modus deveniendi in eius cognitionem est ex consideratione *finis*; et hunc modum praecipue approbat Augustinus in decimo tertio de Trinitate[^22] et in libro de Civitate Dei. Nec immerito, quia *finis* imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem.

*Ratio ex parte causae finalis.* Hoc igitur primo supponendum est tanquam verum et certum, quod anima rationalis facta sit ad participandam summam beatitudinem. Hoc enim adeo certum est ex clamore omnis appetitus naturalis, quod nullus de eo dubitat, nisi cuius ratio est omnino subversa. Certissimum enim est nobis, quod omnes volumus esse beati. Si igitur beatus esse non potest qui bonum, quod habet, potest amittere, quia hoc ipso iam habet, unde timeat et unde etiam doleat, et ita unde miser existat; necesse est ergo, quodsi anima facta est capax beatitudinis, quod ipsa sit per naturam immortalis. Et sic colligitur eius immortalitas ex parte causae finalis.

*Ex parte causae formalis.* Colligitur etiam nihilominus consequenter ex parte causae *formalis*. Quia enim facta est ad participandam beatitudinem, quae consistit in solo summo bono, facta est capax Dei, et ita ad ipsius imaginem et similitudinem[^23]. Sed si est imago Dei, expresse ei assimilatur; hoc autem non esset, «si mortis termino clauderetur[^24]»: cum ergo de natura sua sit imago Dei, non potest mortis termino claudi.

*Ex parte causae materialis.* Ex hoc etiam habetur et colligitur ratio ex parte *materiae*. Quia enim ipsum *quo est* anima sive *forma* tantae dignitatis est, ut ipsam animam reddat Dei imagine insignitam, quae est conditio nobilissima: materia, quae huic formae unitur, tanto appetitu ei coniungitur, et ita eius appetitus in ipsa terminatur, quod nullatenus queat aliam formam appetere, cum optima colligantia iungantur ad invicem.

*Ex parte causae efficientis.* Et quoniam «quod bona ratione iunctum est, ei dissolvi velle non est Dei[^25]», hinc est, quod Deus, qui fuit animae auctor, est continuus animae conservator. — Et sic patet ratio immortalitatis animae ex quadruplici genere causae, quamvis principaliter sumatur ex *fine*. Et istae sunt rationes ostendentes non solummodo, *quia* est immortalis, sed etiam *propter quid* est[^26]. — Rationes vero superius inductae ostendunt, quod anima est immortalis, et verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Apostolo, dicendum, quod Apostolus dicit, solum Deum habere immortalitatem, quia solus est, qui potest summe se perpetuare sine alterius iuvamine. Anima autem, etsi sit secundum suam originem idonea ad immortalitatem, non tamen potest sufficienter se continuare in esse, nisi conservetur a summo Auctore; et illa conservatio est a gratuita Dei bonitate nec repugnat naturae ipsius animae quantum ad principia, ex quibus constituitur, sed potius conservat illorum principiorum appetitum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod tendit in versionem; dicendum, quod tendentia illa non est per aliquem *appetitum virtutis*, sed potius per *defectum vanitatis*, qua creatura est ex nihilo. Hunc autem defectum summa Veritas et Potestas sua praesentia et manutenentia excludit a creatura. Et quia sic praesens est animae rationali, quam fecit, ut eam nunquam deserat, quin sit in ea per potentiam, praesentiam et essentiam; ideo anima rationalis nunquam potest corrumpi. — Nec valet instantia, quam obiicit de verbo Augustini. Augustinus enim intelligit de motibus, qui sunt a *natura*, secundum quod *natura* dicit originale principium alicuius effectus, non secundum quod dicit defectum. Et sic intelligendum est etiam, quod gratia naturam perficit et ei non repugnat; et hoc melius explicatum est in libro primo, distinctione octava[^27].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Philosopho, quod intellectus corrumpitur etc.; dicendum, quod illud verbum *pium debet habere intellectum*. *(Notandum.)* Non enim

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credendum est, quod Philosophus voluerit dicere, intellectum esse *corruptibilem*, cum postea probet, ipsum *impassibilem*, *incorruptibilem* et *immortalem* esse, sicut in tertio de Anima[^28] expresse patet; sed vult dicere, quod operatio intellectus, quam habet in corpore, impeditur propter aliquam laesionem factam interius in organo imaginationis, vel alterius virtutis sensibilis. Et quantum ad hoc verum dixit, sicut patet et est manifestum sensui.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima patitur; responderi potest dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia passio eius non est per ipsius laesionem, sed per compassionem respectu corporis laesi: et hoc non ponit, aliquid de substantia eius abiici, sed de substantia, cui habet uniri. — *(Alia solutio.)* Aliter potest responderi, quod ipsa anima non solum in corpore, sed etiam extra corpus habet pati; nec tamen sequitur, quod habeat corrumpi: non enim est illa corruptio per partis ademptionem, sed per quietis et pacis continuam impeditionem. Hoc autem in quarto[^29] planius determinatum est, cum agitur de poenis animarum damnatarum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima corpori condolet; dicendum, quod illa compassio non est, nisi salva coniunctione animae et corporis. Et quoniam mors separat illam coniunctionem, ideo non oportet compassionem mortis communicare, quia illa consequentia non tenet, nisi manente causa. Praeterea, illa consequentia non tenet, si anima maxime compatitur corpori maxime patienti, quod commoriatur morienti. Anima enim, cum sit capax laetitiae, est capax et doloris; sed cum sit capax vitae, nullo modo est susceptibilis mortis.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio animae laeditur vel impeditur: dicendum, quod hoc est per accidens solum. Quia enim anima magna inclinatione inclinatur ad corpus et corpori suas operationes communicat, et virtutes sensitivae ipsi virtuti intellectivae immediate subministrant[^30]; inde est, quod laesis organis corporeis et impeditis viribus sensitivis, operatio intellectus, quamdiu est in corpore, habet impediri, ipso intellectu nullatenus in se laeso; quod ex hoc patet, quod statim cum a corpore separatur, habet suum usum completum. Et haec sufficiant quantum ad propositum.

### Scholion.

**I.** Argumenta pro immortalitate animae humanae hoc loco allata et potissimum a S. Augustino accepta etiam in *Summa de anima* Ioannis a Rupella, p. I. c. 42. 43 (edita Prato 1882), aliis verbis proponuntur. — In solut. ad 3. Aristoteles absolvitur ab accusatione, quod immortalitatem animae non cognoverit; idem sentit S. Thom. cum communiore Scholasticorum sententia. Sed de hac re cum Henrico Gand. (cfr. supra schol. ad d. 18. a. 1. q. 1.) Scotus dubitat (IV. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 16.) dicens: «Probabile est, quod Aristoteles in illa conclusione semper fuerit dubius»; Durandus autem (hic q. 1.), Aristoteli magis favens, primam opinionem reputat esse probabiliorem.

**II.** Scot., loc. cit., IV. Report. d. 43. q. 2. n. 10. seqq., et apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75. a. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 75. a. 6; S. c. Gent. II. c. 79. 80. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 73. m. 2, et tr. 13. q. 77. m. 5.). — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. — Durand., loc. cit. — Dionys. Carth. de hoc aliqua habet II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica.

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### Article I. *On the immortality of man on the part of the soul.*
### Question I. *Whether the human soul is by nature immortal.*

Concerning the first [article] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the rational soul is not naturally immortal.

**On the contrary [side]:**

1. First by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Timothy, last chapter[^1]: *Who alone has immortality*; he is speaking of God: therefore immortality does not belong to any creature. If you say that this is said because it belongs to God alone by nature, but to the soul of man not by nature but by grace; against [this]: grace does not repugn nature nor change nature, but rather conserves it. If therefore mortality is in every creature by nature, immortality, which is the opposite condition, is in no creature by grace, therefore neither in the soul.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^2]: «Everything that begins from change [*versione*] tends toward change»; but the rational soul begins from change, since it is created, as was shown above: therefore it tends toward change: therefore it is not immortal. *If you say* that it tends [thus] so far as itself is concerned, but is held and sustained by the hand of the Creator; *against this* is that [saying] of Augustine, *On the City of God* VII[^3]: «He so administers the things which he founded, that he allows them to perform their proper motions»; he speaks of God. If therefore [the soul] of itself tends to corruption, the power of the divine hand does not stand in the way.

3. Likewise, by the authority of the Philosopher[^4]: «The intellect is corrupted by some interior thing being corrupted»; but the intellect is not corrupted except by the corruption of the rational soul: therefore the rational soul is not immortal.

4. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [shown] by reason. The soul suffers in the body by nature, as is plain; but «passion made greater and greater casts away from the substance[^5]»; and from whatever substance some casting-away takes place, there also takes place some corruption, by which something is thereby corrupted; and every such substance is corruptible: therefore the rational soul is corruptible.

5. Likewise, the rational soul condoles the suffering body: therefore [it condoles] the more-suffering [body] more, and the most-suffering [body] most: therefore it seems that it dies-with the dying [body].

6. Likewise, if a substance is incorruptible, also [its] operation corresponding to that substance, because a substance is never deprived of its proper operation[^6]: therefore if the operation is destroyed and injured, the substance also is destroyed and injured. But upon the injury of the body the act of the rational substance, which is *to understand*, is injured and impeded: therefore it seems that the substance itself also is injured: therefore the substance is corruptible and mortal.

**Foundations [for the contrary].** On the opposite side are innumerable authorities both of philosophers[^7] and of the Saints, and so let us demonstrate this by reasonings. Now in order that the immortality of the soul may be sufficiently shown, one must attend to this, that the soul can be considered in *order* and can be considered in *itself*: in order with respect to the *whole of creation*, or with respect to *divine justice*, or with respect to the *end* which befits its proper nature; and in *itself* as regards *power*, as regards *act*, and as regards *object*; and thus it can be considered in six modes. *(Six modes of consideration.)*

1, 2. And the first consideration is according to the order which it has among the *creatures of the universe*, and according to this consideration its immortality is shown from a twofold reasoning. The first is this. In the order of the creatures of the universe we find prime matter and ultimate form, and the ultimate form pertains as much or more to the completion of the universe as does prime matter. If therefore prime matter is incorruptible[^8], then also the ultimate form; but this is the rational soul: therefore etc.

Likewise, another reasoning to the same [conclusion]. For the universe to be complete, it is necessary to find differences of creatures according to a perfect combination; but it happens that there is found in the universe a substance having magnitude, existing as incorruptible, namely the body of the heavens; and it happens that there is found an incorruptible substance which is neither magnitude nor conjoined to magnitude[^9]: therefore it happens that there is found a middle incorruptible substance, which is not magnitude but is conjoined to magnitude; but this is the rational soul. — From the perfection therefore of the order of the totality it is gathered that the soul is immortal.

3, 4. From the second consideration, namely from the order of *divine justice*, [the case] is shown thus. «No good is unrewarded, and no evil is unpunished[^10]» with him *who judges justly*; but many goods remain unrewarded, and many evils unpunished according to the present life: therefore one must posit another life than this one; but this would not be unless the soul remained after the body: therefore etc. *If you say* that this does not compel [the conclusion], because, just as the body is raised, so the soul could be raised; such an instance is not fitting. For since the soul is created from nothing, if it were corrupted, it would tend toward nothing: therefore it would not be raised, but another soul would be created anew[^11].

Likewise, it pertains to *divine justice* that nothing well and justly done ought to incline toward an evil outcome; but according to the moral philosopher and according to the divine law and according also to all sects, man ought rather to suffer death than depart from the truth of life and from the truth of justice[^12]. But if the soul were utterly destroyed, the justice which is in it would be utterly destroyed: therefore such a suffering of death, which is just and which all right reason praises, would have simply an evil outcome; which is against divine justice. — Therefore from the order of justice[^13] it is gathered that the soul is immortal.

5, 6. From the third consideration, namely from the order of the soul itself to its proper *end*, [the case] is shown thus. The ultimate end being removed, which principally moves, all other ends are empty and vain; but the ultimate end of every rational operation is perfect beatitude: therefore if that does not exist, whatever the soul does, it does in vain. If therefore this is unfitting, it is necessary to posit that end. But «beatitude is a state perfect by the gathering-together of all goods[^14]»; and where this is, there must be immortality: therefore the soul by nature is born apt for incorruption and immortality.

Likewise, every rational soul naturally desires beatitude; but nothing is idle in the foundation of nature: therefore every rational soul is born to attain beatitude. But where beatitude is, there is perfect security; where perfect security is, there is immortality; for where death can come, one must fear. — Therefore from the order of the soul itself to its end it is gathered that it has immortality. And this threefold consideration has been taken according to a threefold *order* of the soul itself, namely to its proper end, to divine judgment, to the whole universe.

7, 8. From the fourth consideration, namely of the soul itself as regards its proper *power*, the argument runs thus. No material and corruptible power is born to reflect upon itself — this is manifest of itself — [but] the rational soul, according to its proper act, is born to reflect upon itself by knowing itself and loving itself: therefore the power of the rational soul is not material and corruptible[^15]: therefore it is immaterial and incorruptible. But if the power is incorruptible, so also the substance: therefore etc.

Likewise, every power which by withdrawal and unmingling with a corruptible body is fortified and rendered more powerful, is incorruptible by nature; the rational soul is of this kind, as is plain, because the spirit and the interior man are the more raised up the more the exterior man is mortified[^16]: therefore the power of the rational soul is incorruptible. — And thus from its own power it is gathered that the rational soul is immortal.

9, 10. From the fifth consideration, namely as regards *operation*, [the case] is argued thus. The operation of every spiritual substance whose being and duration depend on the body, depends on the body; but the rational soul has its proper operation, according to which it does not depend on the body, namely *to understand*, because it appropriates no organ to itself: therefore the duration of the soul does not depend on the body[^17]. But of itself it does not undergo corruption, since it has no contrariety: therefore of itself it is immortal and incorruptible.

Likewise, the operation of every corruptible substance grows old and decays in time; but the operation of the rational soul neither grows old nor decays in time, but rather grows young, because *in the ancients is wisdom, and in much time prudence*[^18]. — Therefore from its proper operation we can gather that the rational soul is immortal.

11, 12. From the sixth consideration, namely by comparison to the *object*, the rational soul is proved to be immortal thus. There must be a proportion of the knower to the known, or of the power to the object; but the rational soul is born to know and understand truth; and truth is incorruptible, as Augustine proves in the *Soliloquies*[^19], since it is of such a nature that the very negation of truth posits truth: therefore the rational soul, since it is proportionable to truth, is immortal. Now this reasoning concludes not only that the soul is immortal through the truth of *understanding* or of conscience, but also through the truth of *life* or of justice, of which it is said in Wisdom 1[^20]: *Justice is perpetual and immortal*, and through this the soul which is capable of justice.

Likewise, every corruptible power is injured by an object of disproportionate excellence, and is born more to delight in a mean than in an extreme. But the rational soul, understanding greater and greatest [things], does not on that account understand lesser [things] worse, and more delights in the cognition of the highest light and in the perception of the wisdom of God than in the cognition of any created [thing][^21]. — Therefore from comparison to the object it is gathered that the rational soul is immortal. If, therefore, substance is known through power, and power through operation, and operation through object, since according to this threefold consideration of the soul itself it has been shown that the soul is immortal: every consideration of the soul, whether *in itself* or *in [its] order*, establishes the soul's immortality.

> ### Conclusion.
> **That the rational soul is immortal is proved by a fourfold reason.**

**I respond:** To the foregoing it must be said that the rational soul is immortal, as the catholic faith says, with which philosophy and every right reason concord. Now although we can be led and led-by-the-hand to the cognition of the immortality of the rational soul along many ways, yet the most powerful mode of coming to that cognition is from the consideration of the *end*; and this mode Augustine especially approves in book thirteen of *On the Trinity*[^22] and in his book *On the City of God*. And not without reason, because the *end* imposes necessity on those things which are toward the end.

*Reason on the part of the final cause.* This therefore must first be supposed as true and certain: that the rational soul has been made to participate in the highest beatitude. For this is so certain from the cry of every natural appetite that no one doubts it, except one whose reason is wholly subverted. For it is most certain to us that all of us will to be blessed. If therefore he cannot be blessed who can lose the good he has — because by this very fact he has whence to fear, and whence also to grieve, and so whence to be wretched — it is therefore necessary that, if the soul has been made capable of beatitude, it be by nature immortal. And thus its immortality is gathered on the part of the final cause.

*On the part of the formal cause.* Likewise nonetheless consequently is it gathered on the part of the *formal* cause. For because it has been made for participating in beatitude, which consists in the highest good alone, it has been made capable of God, and so [made] to his image and likeness[^23]. But if it is the image of God, it is expressly assimilated to him; but this would not be, «if it were enclosed by the term of death[^24]»: since therefore by its nature it is the image of God, it cannot be enclosed by the term of death.

*On the part of the material cause.* From this also is had and gathered a reason on the part of *matter*. For because the very *that-by-which* the soul is, namely its *form*, is of such great dignity that it renders the soul itself stamped with the image of God — which is the most noble condition — the matter which is united to this form is united to it with such great appetite, and so its appetite is so terminated in it, that it can in no way desire another form, since the best-fitting [partners] are joined to one another.

*On the part of the efficient cause.* And because «what is joined by good reason — for it to will to be dissolved is not [proper] of God[^25]», hence it is that God, who was the soul's author, is the continuous conserver of the soul. — And thus appears the reason for the soul's immortality from the fourfold kind of cause, though principally it is taken from the *end*. And these are the reasons that show not only *that* it is immortal, but also *on account of what* it is[^26]. — But the reasons adduced above show that the soul is immortal and conclude true, and therefore are to be conceded.

**Solution of the contrary arguments.**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary from the Apostle, it must be said that the Apostle says God alone has immortality because he alone is the one who can perpetuate himself supremely without the help of another. The soul, however, even if it is according to its origin suited to immortality, nevertheless cannot sufficiently continue itself in *esse* unless it is conserved by the highest Author; and that conservation is from the gratuitous goodness of God, nor does it repugn the soul's nature as regards the principles from which it is constituted, but rather it conserves the appetite of those principles.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from Damascene, that it tends to *versio*; it must be said that that tendency is not through any *appetite of power* but rather through a *defect of vanity* by which the creature is from nothing. But this defect the highest Truth and Power, by his presence and sustaining, excludes from the creature. And because he is so present to the rational soul which he made, that he never forsakes it but is in it through potency, presence, and essence; therefore the rational soul can never be corrupted. — Nor does the instance avail which is objected from a saying of Augustine. For Augustine understands [it] of motions which are from *nature*, according as *nature* means the original principle of some effect, not according as it means a defect. And so also it must be understood that grace perfects nature and does not repugn it; and this has been better explained in book one, distinction eight[^27].

*To 3.* To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that the intellect is corrupted, etc.; it must be said that that saying *must have a pious sense [intellectum]*. *(To be noted.)* For one must not believe that the Philosopher meant to say that the intellect is *corruptible*, since afterward he proves it *impassible*, *incorruptible*, and *immortal*, as is expressly plain in book three *On the Soul*[^28]; but he means that the operation of the intellect, which it has in the body, is impeded on account of some injury made interiorly in the organ of imagination, or of some other sensible power. And as regards this he spoke truly, as is plain and manifest to sense.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the soul suffers; one can respond in two ways. First indeed, because its passion is not through its own injury, but through compassion with respect to the injured body: and this does not posit that anything is cast away from its substance, but [from] the substance to which it has [to be] united. — *(Another solution.)* Otherwise it can be answered that the soul itself has [to] suffer not only in the body but even outside the body; nor however does it follow that it has [to] be corrupted: for that corruption is not through removal of a part but through continual impedition of rest and peace. But this has been more clearly determined in [book] four[^29], where the punishments of the souls of the damned are treated.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the soul condoles the body; it must be said that that compassion is not [present] except when the conjunction of soul and body is preserved. And since death separates that conjunction, therefore one need not extend compassion to death, because that consequence does not hold except while the cause remains. Moreover, that consequence does not hold, namely that, if the soul most compassionates the most-suffering body, it dies-with the dying [body]. For the soul, since it is capable of joy, is also capable of sorrow; but since it is capable of life, it is in no way susceptible of death.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the operation of the soul is injured or impeded: it must be said that this is by accident only. For because the soul with great inclination is inclined toward the body and communicates its operations to the body, and the sensitive powers immediately subminister to the intellective power itself[^30]; hence it is that, when the bodily organs are injured and the sensitive powers are impeded, the operation of the intellect, while it is in the body, is impeded, the intellect itself being in no way injured in itself; which appears from this, that as soon as it is separated from the body it has its complete use. And let these suffice as regards the matter proposed.

### Scholion.

**I.** The arguments for the immortality of the human soul brought forward in this place and taken chiefly from St. Augustine are also proposed, in other words, in the *Summa de anima* of John of La Rochelle, p. I. c. 42, 43 (edited at Prato 1882). — In the solution to [argument] 3 Aristotle is absolved from the accusation that he did not know the immortality of the soul; the same is the opinion of St. Thomas with the more common opinion of the Scholastics. But on this matter, with Henry of Ghent (cf. above, scholion at d. 18 a. 1 q. 1), Scotus doubts (IV. *Sent.* d. 43, q. 2, n. 16), saying: «It is probable that Aristotle in that conclusion was always doubtful»; but Durandus (here q. 1), more favorable to Aristotle, considers the first opinion to be the more probable.

**II.** Scotus, *loc. cit.*, IV. *Report.* d. 43, q. 2, nn. 10 sqq., and apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75, a. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. unica a. 1; S.T. I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG II, c. 79, 80. — B. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. II, tr. 12, q. 73, m. 2, and tr. 13, q. 77, m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1, and dub. lat. 1. — Durandus, *loc. cit.* — Dionysius the Carthusian has something on this, II. *Sent.* d. 18, q. 1. — Biel, II. *Sent.* d. 16, q. unica.

---

la: Vers. 16. — Scil. I. Timoth. 6, 16: *Qui solus habet immortalitatem*.

en: Verse 16. — Namely 1 Timothy 6:16: *Who alone has immortality*.

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — Quod anima creata sit, vide supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 18. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3, and Book II, c. 27. — That the soul is created, see above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 18, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Cap. 30. — Paulo inferius post *Si ergo de se* supple cum cod. 0 *anima rationalis*.

en: Chapter 30. — A little below, after *Si ergo de se*, supply with codex 0 *anima rationalis*.

la: Libr. I. de Anima, text. 66. (c. 4.). — In cod. I post *corrupto* subiungitur *ut patet in phreneticis*.

en: Book I *On the Soul*, text 66 (c. 4). — In codex I after *corrupto* is added *ut patet in phreneticis*.

la: In cod. 1 additur *ut dicit Philosophus, VI. Topic.*, in quo c. 3. (c. 6.): *Nam omnis affectus* (πάθος), *cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia*. — De maiori cfr. August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. — Paulo inferius codd. L O substituunt *aliquando* pro *aliquid inde*.

en: In codex 1 is added *as the Philosopher says, VI. Topics*, where c. 3 (c. 6): *For every affection* (πάθος) *when it grows greater detracts from the substance*. — On the major [premise] cf. Augustine, *City of God* XXI, c. 3. — A little below, codices L O substitute *aliquando* for *aliquid inde*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 197, note 5.

la: Sufficiat allegare Platonem, qui in *Phaedone* (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 69. seqq.) immortalitatem animae variis argg. probat et contrarias opiniones refutat; Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 65. seq. text. 82. et 92. (c. 4. seq.); II, text. 11. 21. et 150. seqq. (c. 1. seq. et III. c. 3.); III. text. 4. seqq. 15. 20. (c. 4. seq.); II. de Generat. animal. c. 3; XII. Metaph. text. 17. (XI. c. 3.). In omnibus his locis profitetur Aristoteles, intellectum non dependere a corpore, posse ab ipso separari et esse incorruptibilem. Cfr. etiam Aristotelis fragmenta (ed. Firmin-Didot, tom. IV. pag. 48. seqq.), ubi testimonio variorum auctorum constat, Aristotelem scripsisse quendam dialogum, qui *Eudemus* intitulabatur, in quo immortalitas animae diversis argg. propugnabatur. Avicenna, V. de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, c. 2. et 4, decem signa affert, ex quibus colligi potest, animam rationalem esse incorruptibilem.

en: Let it suffice to allege Plato, who in the *Phaedo* (ed. Serranus, tom. I, pp. 69 sqq.) proves the soul's immortality by various arguments and refutes the contrary opinions; Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 65 sq., text 82 and 92 (c. 4 sq.); II, texts 11, 21, and 150 sqq. (c. 1 sq. and III, c. 3); III, text 4 sqq., 15, 20 (c. 4 sq.); II *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 3; XII *Metaphysics*, text 17 (XI, c. 3). In all these places Aristotle professes that the intellect does not depend on the body, that it can be separated from it, and that it is incorruptible. Cf. also the *Fragments of Aristotle* (ed. Firmin-Didot, tom. IV, pp. 48 sqq.), where from the testimony of various authors it is established that Aristotle wrote a certain dialogue entitled *Eudemus*, in which the immortality of the soul was defended by various arguments. Avicenna, V *On the Soul* or of the sixth book of the *Naturalia*, c. 2 and 4, adduces ten signs from which it can be gathered that the rational soul is incorruptible.

la: Ut docet Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.).

en: As Aristotle teaches, I *Physics*, text 82 (c. 9).

la: Huiusmodi sunt tam primum movens sive Deus, ut probat Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 86. (c. 10.) et XII. Metaph. text. 41. (XI. c. 7.), quam aliae substantiae separatae sive Intelligentiae, ut docet ibidem, text. 43. (c. 8.). — Cod. A post *substantiam incorruptibilem* subiungit *ut angelica natura*. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 210, nota 11. — Simile arg. proponit Gregor., IV. Dialog. c. 3.

en: Of this kind is both the first mover or God, as Aristotle proves, VIII *Physics*, text 86 (c. 10) and XII *Metaphysics*, text 41 (XI, c. 7), and also the other separate substances or Intelligences, as he teaches there, text 43 (c. 8). — Codex A after *substantiam incorruptibilem* adds *as the angelic nature*. — On the major [premise] cf. above p. 210, note 11. — A similar argument is proposed by Gregory, IV *Dialogues*, c. 3.

la: Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. Cfr. de hoc arg. Plato, Phaedo (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 107.). Quod sequitur est Ier. 11, 20.

en: According to Boethius, IV *On Consolation*, prose 1 and 4. Cf. tom. I, p. 713, note 2. Cf. on this argument Plato, *Phaedo* (ed. Serranus, tom. I, p. 107). What follows is Jeremiah 11:20.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 70. (c. 11.) dicit: *Quorumcumque autem non* [incorruptibilis est substantia], *sed corruptibilis, necesse est specie, numero autem non, reverti*. Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. scholion II. n. 2, ubi aliquid simile effectus asseritur ex S. Bonav. de actione creaturae respectu sui ipsius.

en: Aristotle, II *On Generation and Corruption*, text 70 (c. 11), says: *Of whatever things, however, the substance is not* [incorruptible] *but corruptible, they must return in species, but not in number*. Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, scholion II, n. 2, where something similar is asserted on the effect from St. Bonaventure on the action of the creature with respect to itself.

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1: *Quaedam autem fortasse sunt, ad quae perpetranda nemo cogi compellive potest* [Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι], *sed potius extrema quaeque pati ac mori convenit*.

en: Aristotle, III *Ethics*, c. 1: *But there are perhaps certain things to the perpetrating of which no one can be coerced or compelled* [Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι], *but it is rather fitting to suffer extremes whatsoever and to die*.

la: Codd. Y *ad divinae iustitiae*.

en: Codices Y read *ad divinae iustitiae*.

la: Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. — Principia huius et seq. arg. insinuantur ab Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. seq. et ab August., XIII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. seq.

en: Boethius, III *On Consolation*, prose 2. — The principles of this and the following argument are intimated by Aristotle, I *Ethics*, c. 1 sq., and by Augustine, XIII *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 10 sq.

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 15. (c. 4.): *Et ipse* [intellectus] *etiam intelligibilis est, sicut ipsa intelligibilia. In his enim, quae sunt sine materia, idem est quod intelligit et quod intelligitur*. Cfr. ibid. II. text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2.), ubi ex materialitate sensuum ostendit, impossibile esse, quod eodem sensu, quo sentimus, etiam nos sentire percipiamus, adeoque alium sensum, scil. communem, esse admittendum. Idem dicit I. Magn. Moral. c. 17. (c. 18.) et Auctor libri de Causis, prop. 15. Avicenna, V. de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, c. 2. hoc arg. latius exponit.

en: Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 15 (c. 4): *And it itself* [the intellect] *is also intelligible, just as the intelligibles themselves. For in those things which are without matter, that which understands and that which is understood are the same*. Cf. ibid. II, text 136 sqq. (III, c. 2), where from the materiality of the senses he shows that it is impossible that we should perceive ourselves sensing by the same sense by which we sense, and therefore another sense, namely the common [sense], must be admitted. The same he says in I *Magna Moralia*, c. 17 (c. 18), and the author of the book *De Causis*, prop. 15. Avicenna, V *On the Soul* or of the sixth book of the *Naturalia*, c. 2, expounds this argument more amply.

la: Alluditur ad illud II. Cor. 4, 16: *Sed licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui intus est renovatur de die in diem.*

en: Allusion is made to 2 Cor 4:16: *But though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward [man] is renewed from day to day.*

la: Vide Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 12. seq. (c. 1.) et III. text. 4. seqq. (c. 4.). — Ratio seq. prop. continetur in eo, quod anima cognoscere possit *omnia* (Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. c. 8.); si enim haberet contrarium, anima recipere non posset similitudinem sive speciem illius, ideoque nec illud cognoscere. Cfr. Plato, X. de Republ. (tom. II. pag. 608. seqq.), ubi ostendit, animae contraria esse vitia et ignorantiam, quae tamen nequeunt ipsam dissolvere. Idem respectu falsitatis asserit August., de Immortal. animae, c. 11. n. 18. seq.

en: See Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 12 sq. (c. 1) and III, text 4 sqq. (c. 4). — The reason of the following proposition is contained in this, that the soul can know *all things* (Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 37, c. 8); for if it had a contrary, the soul could not receive the likeness or species of that [contrary], and so could not know it. Cf. Plato, X *Republic* (tom. II, pp. 608 sqq.), where he shows that the soul's contraries are vices and ignorance, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it. The same with respect to falsity Augustine asserts, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, c. 11, n. 18 sq.

la: Iob 12, 12. — De hoc arg. cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 63. seq. (c. 4.); Problem. sect. 30. n. 4. (5.) et Avicenna, loc. cit.

en: Job 12:12. — On this argument cf. Aristotle, I *On the Soul*, text 63 sq. (c. 4); *Problems*, sect. 30, n. 4 (5); and Avicenna, *loc. cit.*

la: Libr. II. c. 2. — August. hoc arg. proponit ibid. c. 13. n. 24; de Immortal. animae, c. 1. n. 1; c. 4. n. 5; c. 6. n. 10; Epist. 3. (alias 151.) ad Nebrid. n. 4.

en: Book II, c. 2. — Augustine proposes this argument *ibid.* c. 13, n. 24; *On the Immortality of the Soul*, c. 1, n. 1; c. 4, n. 5; c. 6, n. 10; Letter 3 (alias 151) to Nebridius, n. 4.

la: Vers. 15. — Supra cod. aa bene *scientiae* pro *conscientiae*. Deinde Vat. *veritatem misericordiae* pro *veritatem vitae*.

en: Verse 15. — Above, codex aa rightly has *scientiae* for *conscientiae*. Then the Vatican [edition] [reads] *veritatem misericordiae* for *veritatem vitae*.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. 143. (c. 12. et III. c. 2.) et III. text. 7. (c. 4.) docet, sensum laedi ex obiecto excellente, non vero intellectum.

en: Aristotle, II *On the Soul*, text 123, 143 (c. 12, and III, c. 2), and III, text 7 (c. 4), teaches that the sense is injured by an excelling object, but not the intellect.

la: Cap. 7. n. 10. seqq. — De Civ. Dei, VIII. c. 8; XIV. c. 25; XIX. c. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius plures codd. *percipiendam* pro *participandam*.

en: Chapter 7, n. 10 sqq. — *City of God* VIII, c. 8; XIV, c. 25; XIX, c. 1 sqq. — A little below, several codices [read] *percipiendam* for *participandam*.

la: Secundum August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.

en: According to Augustine, XIV *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 11.

la: Cassiodor., de Anima, c. 8. et Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 18. Cfr. supra pag. 411, nota 3.

en: Cassiodorus, *On the Soul*, c. 8, and the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 18. Cf. above p. 411, note 3.

la: Plato, in *Timaeo* (Chalcidio interprete, ed. Wrobel, pag. 43.). — Paulo superius post *ad invicem* Vat. addit *Denique ex parte causae efficientis colligitur*, et hic subiungit *efficientis*.

en: Plato, in the *Timaeus* (Chalcidius's translation, ed. Wrobel, p. 43). — A little above, after *ad invicem*, the Vatican [edition] adds *Lastly it is gathered on the part of the efficient cause*, and here subjoins *efficientis*.

la: Supple: *immortalis*, quod in uno alteroque cod., in Vat. et aliis edd., excepta 1, etiam additur.

en: Supply: *immortalis*, which is also added in one and another codex, in the Vatican and other editions, except 1.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 86. m. 2. a. 2. § 1, ubi appetitum intrinsecum principiorum rerum explicat, de anima ait: *Ergo cum anima sit substantia simplex et semper in actu, in ea fortis et potens actus et vigens est appetitus*. Huius vigoris modum exprimens, maximus poetarum Virgilius (Aeneid. 6, 729) dixit: «Igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo, Seminibus» etc. *Igneus vigor*, quia subtilis et acutus; et *caelestis origo*, quia vis est indita divinitus.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 86, m. 2, a. 2, § 1, where, explaining the intrinsic appetite of the principles of things, he says of the soul: *Therefore since the soul is a simple substance and ever in act, in it there is a strong and powerful act and a vigorous appetite*. Expressing the manner of this vigor, the greatest of poets, Virgil (*Aeneid* 6:729), said: «Fiery is the vigor in them and a heavenly origin, in their seeds» etc. *Fiery vigor*, because subtle and acute; and *heavenly origin*, because the force is divinely instilled.

la: Part. I. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam ibid. d. 37. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et in hoc libro d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Part I, a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also *ibid.* d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 sq., and in this book d. 37, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Dist. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo superius cod. O *illa passio* pro *illa corruptio*.

en: Distinction 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 50, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 sqq. — A little above, codex O [reads] *illa passio* for *illa corruptio*.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum quaevis anima, etiam brutalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis anima, utpote brutalis, non solum rationalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Ecclesiastis tertio[^1]: *Unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum*; sed homines, etsi intereant quantum ad corpora, non tamen intereunt quantum ad animas: ergo pari ratione nec bruta animalia.

2. Item, Sapientiae primo[^2]: *Deus mortem non fecit nec delectatur in perditione vivorum*; igitur mors non est introducta nisi propter peccatum: ergo si homo non peccasset, nec moreretur ipse, nec moreretur brutum animal. Sed hoc non esset, nisi animae brutorum essent immortales: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Probato, quod anima Petri sit immortalis, probatur, quod omnis anima sit immortalis *per hypothesim*[^3], quia non est maior ratio de una quam de alia, loquendo de animabus rationalibus; ergo pari ratione, loquendo de animalibus sensibilibus, si una anima sensibilis est immortalis, ergo et omnes. Sed anima sensibilis humana est immortalis, quia nunquam est rationalis sine sensibili: ergo cum in hac communicet homo cum brutis, anima sensibilis brutorum animalium per naturam est immortalis.

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4. Item, omnis anima, quantumcumque parum habeat de nobilitate, excellit omne corpus, sicut vult Augustinus, ergo magis accedit ad Dei similitudinem; sed aliqua corpora per naturam sunt immortalia, sicut corpora caelestia: ergo multo fortius animae brutorum animalium.

5. Item, substantia, cuius virtus et operatio non senescit in tempore, non corrumpitur in tempore: sed anima sensibilis est huiusmodi, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus, « si senex acciperet oculum iuvenis, ita videret, sicut iuvenis »: ergo etc.

6. Item, quia homo servit Deo, est dignus remuneratione; et ideo necesse est ponere animam eius immortalem, ut remuneretur post mortem: ergo pari ratione, cum bruta animalia serviant homini, et per hoc Deo in homine, videtur similiter, quod ipsa debeant remunerari.

**Contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Nulla forma est separabilis a corpore, nisi quae habet operationem propriam praeter corpus; sed nullus spiritus brutalis est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Maior* manifesta est, tum quia Philosophus[^4] dicit, tum etiam, quia nulla est substantia, quae omni careat operatione, cum nulla sit otiosa. *Secunda* manifesta est ad sensum.

2. Item, omnia bruta animalia facta sunt propter usum hominis[^5]; sed usus hominis est in vescendo eis, et vescitur eis, dum ea occidit: ergo facta sunt ad hoc, ut non tantum serviant homini per vitam, sed etiam per mortem; sed hoc non esset, si animae eorum essent immortales: ergo etc.

3. Item, animae immortali debetur corpus immortale, quantum est ex institutione prima[^6]: ergo si animae brutorum erant immortales, habebant corpora immortalia. Sed constat, quod bruta non peccaverunt: ergo deberent adhuc esse immortalia. Quodsi[^7] hoc constat esse falsum, patet etiam, quod et primum.

4. Item, si animae brutorum essent immortales, ergo deberent omnia corpora brutorum redire[^8], sicut et corpora hominum; sed si hoc, esset impossibile, quod omnia essent in terra, cum innumerabilis bestiarum multitudo et animalium continue sibi succedat: ergo inconveniens est dicere, brutorum animas esse immortales.

> ### Conclusio.
> *Irrationales animae ex sua prima conditione sunt mortales.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, brutorum animas esse immortales, pro eo quod eaedem animae sunt, quae vivificant corpora brutorum et corpora hominum, cum merito peccatorum suorum de corpore ad corpus circumeundo pertranseant. — *Opinio 1.* — *Reprobatur.* Et haec positio quorundam philosophorum et haereticorum fuit, sicut dictum est supra[^9], et iam improbata est supra tanquam haeretica; et prorsus abiicienda est ista positio tanquam vilis et derogans dignitati creaturae rationalis, dum ponit, homines et bestias esse pares. In hoc enim indicat, quod sui inventores et defensores sunt homines bestiales, dum animas suas credunt vel bestiarum fuisse, vel futuras esse[^10]. — *Notandum.*

*Opinio 2.* Fuerunt et alii, qui dicere voluerunt, quod animae brutorum nec sunt adeo immortales, sicut animae rationales, ut possint post corpora vivere, nec sunt adeo corruptibiles, sicut aliae formae, quae habent contrarietatem; sed quantum est de sui natura, natae sunt continue durare, nisi impedimentum suae durationis habeant ex corpore, sine quo non possunt subsistere. Huiusmodi autem impedimentum durationis introductum esse dicunt in corpora brutorum propter peccatum hominum[^11]. Si enim Adam non peccasset, nullum animal brutum decederet. Unde sicut merito peccati humani quae ad eius obsequium facta sunt deteriorata fuerunt, sic et bruta animalia facta sunt morti obnoxia. — *Sed improbatur tripliciter.* Sed istud prima fronte obviat ei quod dicit Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram* libro tertio[^12], quod si homo non peccasset, nihilominus essent animalia viventia de rapina, quae ad suam vitam servandam alia interficerent animalia. — Repugnat etiam *rationi*, cum nulla ratio dicat, congruum esse, ovem interfici propter hoc, quod homo peccavit, cum nullo modo ei in peccato communicaverit, nec peccatum suum in ovem transfuderit. — Repugnat etiam *imaginationi* sensibili. Ubi enim essent tot animalia, quae multiplicata essent super terram ab initio

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mundi usque in finem, si nulla essent mortua? Quodsi dicas, quod non essent multiplicata, si homo non peccasset; quomodo etiam verum esset quod dicitur eis Genesis primo[^13]: *Crescite et multiplicamini et replete aquas*? Quod si dictum est piscibus, cur non intelligendum est etiam dictum esse aliis animalibus? Nunquid propter culpam hominis facta sunt fecundiora? Quae omnia si inconvenientia sunt, positio ista tanquam inconveniens respuenda est.

*Opinio 3. et Conclusio.* Et ideo dicendum est tertio modo, quod nulla alia anima nisi rationalis immortalis est. — Et ratio huius apparet, si aspiciamus ad finem, propter quem creaturae factae sunt, ex quo fine ponitur in rebus perpetuitas, vel corruptibilitas, secundum earum exigentiam. Cum autem omnes creaturae factae sint propter Deum iuxta illud[^14]: *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus*, sola creatura rationalis facta est ad fruendum Deo, et ut beatificetur in ipso, quae sola est ad imaginem. Aliae vero creaturae, quae solum tenent rationem vestigii, factae sunt vel ad *manifestationem divinae bonitatis*, vel ad *obsequium creaturae rationalis*. — *Ratio ex fine principali.*

*Haec duplex.* Manifestatio autem divini exemplaris et bonitatis Dei est in productione universi, quod est quoddam exemplatum, complete repraesentans illud exemplar, et propter repraesentationis completionem completam debet habere et perpetuam durationem. Universum autem dupliciter[^15] habet esse, videlicet *decurrens* et *permanens*. *Esse decurrens* non potest esse perpetuum, quia necesse est, quod aliquando sit quietum. *Esse* vero *permanens* est perpetuum. Illae igitur partes, quae respiciunt universum quantum ad *esse permanens*, sicut sunt orbes caelorum et elementorum, perpetuitatem habent. Illae vero quae respiciunt[^16] quantum ad *esse decurrens*, utpote quae consistunt in generatione et corruptione, qualia sunt mineralia, plantae et animalia bruta, non debent habere *esse* perpetuum, sed terminatum, quae quasi quodam transitu suo et quadam inveteratione et innovatione, morte et vivificatione decorant universum. Et sic patet, quod bruta animalia quantum ad corpus et animam corruptibilia sunt per naturam, in quantum facta sunt ad *repraesentandum* divinam bonitatem et sapientiam. Et haec ratio sumta est a fine principali.

*Ratio secundaria.* Est etiam alia ratio, sumta a fine non principali, in quantum scilicet creaturae, in quibus est sola ratio vestigii, factae sunt propter creaturam rationalem, scilicet hominem. Quaedam enim factae sunt propter hominem secundum omnem statum, sive viae, sive patriae; quaedam solum secundum statum viae; et quaedam solum secundum statum patriae. — *Distinctio.* Et illa quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum omnem statum, sive viae, sive patriae[^17], cum status patriae sit perpetuus, debent esse perpetua; et talia sunt quae integrant hominis habitaculum, sicut caelum et quatuor elementa. Illa vero, quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum statum viae, cum ille status sit pertransitorius et habeat finem, debent esse corruptibilia; talia autem sunt animalia bruta, quae facta sunt ad supplendam corporis indigentiam secundum eum statum, in quo indiget cibis et alimoniis. — Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, animas brutales esse mortales ex sua prima conditione.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Ecclesiaste, quod *unus est interitus* etc.; dicendum, quod loquitur quantum ad exteriorem intelligentiam[^18]; et propterea subiungit[^19]: *Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum?* quasi dicat: non novit homo, qui ambulat secundum intellectum carnalem, qui ea sola considerat, quae exterius apparent; homo autem sapiens novit, qui illud attendit, quod ipse Ecclesiastes in fine[^20] dicit: *Scito, quod pro omni errato adducet te Deus in iudicium*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de libro Sapientiae, dicendum, quod loquitur vel de morte damnationis aeternae, vel de morte temporali in eo cui mors est poena. Tale autem est solum animal rationis capax, quod, sicut solum natum est esse beatum, solum natum est esse miserum, sic solum natum est praemiari, solum natum est puniri, quia solum ipsum est, cui data est vis discretiva inter bonum et malum, verum et falsum[^21]. Unde etsi bestia doleat, cum occiditur vel laeditur, non tamen punitur; non enim est capax miseriae; solus enim ille est miser, qui vel scit, se esse miserum vel scire debet, cum malum habet.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis hominis est immortalis; dicendum, quod non est simile. *Sensibile* enim in *homine* nominat potentiam, scilicet animae rationalis, sicut infra[^22] patebit; *sensibile* vero in *brutis* nominat formam, quae substantificatur in materia transmutabili; et quia pendet ex illa quantum ad *esse*, corrumpitur, illa corrupta.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis est nobilior omni corpore; dicendum, quod maior nobilitas et minor non facit ad maiorem durationem creaturae — magis enim nobilis est etiam secundum statum naturae lapsae homo, quam sit lapis; tamen lapis plus durat modo[^23] — sed hoc facit privatio corrumpentis causae. Et hanc habet anima sensibilis propter hoc, quod fundatur et pendet ex corpore composito ex contrariis, supra quam contrarietatem sublimata est natura caelestis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis non senescit; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est per se; senescit tamen ratione eius in quo radicatur, scilicet ratione corporis, ratione cuius etiam habet corrumpi; et hoc ex conditione sua primaria.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bruta serviunt hominibus; dicendum, quod servitium remunerabile non est nisi illud quod est laudabile. Sola autem potentia rationalis et deliberativa, in qua consistit arbitrii libertas, est, in qua cadit laus et vituperium; et ideo quantumcumque obsequium sit magnum et utile, non est dignum remuneratione, nisi factum fuerit ex arbitrii libertate: ideo non decet, remunerari animas brutorum. Et sic patet illud.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether every soul, even the brutish, was from its first condition immortal.*

Secondly it is asked whether every soul, namely the brutish, and not only the rational, was from its first condition immortal. And that it was, seems thus:

*To the contrary [Ad oppositum].*

1. Ecclesiastes 3[^1]: *One is the destruction of man and of beasts*; but men, although they perish as to their bodies, do not however perish as to their souls: therefore by parity of reasoning neither do the brute animals.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 1[^2]: *God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living*; therefore death has not been introduced except on account of sin: therefore if man had not sinned, neither would he himself die, nor would the brute animal die. But this would not be, unless the souls of brutes were immortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems from reason. When it is proved that the soul of Peter is immortal, it is proved that every soul is immortal *by hypothesis*[^3], because there is no greater reason as to one than as to another, speaking of rational souls; therefore by parity of reasoning, speaking of sensible animals, if one sensible soul is immortal, then all are. But the human sensible soul is immortal, because never is [the soul] rational without the sensible: therefore since in this man shares with the brutes, the sensible soul of brute animals is by nature immortal.

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4. Likewise, every soul, however little nobility it has, surpasses every body, as Augustine wills, therefore it more nearly approaches the likeness of God; but certain bodies are by nature immortal, like the celestial bodies: therefore much more so the souls of the brute animals.

5. Likewise, a substance whose power and operation does not grow old in time, is not corrupted in time: but the sensible soul is of this kind, because, as the Philosopher says, « if an old man took the eye of a youth, he would see thus as a youth »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, because man serves God, he is worthy of recompense; and therefore it is necessary to posit his soul to be immortal, that he may be recompensed after death: therefore by parity of reasoning, since the brute animals serve man, and through this serve God in man, it seems similarly that they ought to be recompensed.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations [Fundamenta].*

1. No form is separable from the body, except one which has its own operation apart from the body; but no brutish spirit is of this kind: therefore etc. The *major* is manifest, both because the Philosopher[^4] says it, and also because there is no substance which lacks every operation, since none is idle. The *second* [premise] is manifest to sense.

2. Likewise, all the brute animals were made for the use of man[^5]; but the use of man consists in feeding on them, and he feeds on them when he kills them: therefore they were made for this, that they should serve man not only through life, but also through death; but this would not be, if their souls were immortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an immortal body is owed to an immortal soul, so far as is from the first institution[^6]: therefore if the souls of brutes were immortal, they had immortal bodies. But it is established that the brutes have not sinned: therefore they ought still to be immortal. But if[^7] this is established to be false, it is plain also that the first thing [is false].

4. Likewise, if the souls of brutes were immortal, therefore all the bodies of brutes ought to return[^8], just as the bodies of men also; but if so, it would be impossible that all should be on the earth, since an innumerable multitude of beasts and animals continually succeeds itself: therefore it is inconvenient to say that the souls of brutes are immortal.

> ### Conclusion.
> *Irrational souls are, from their first condition, mortal.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that the souls of brutes are immortal, on the ground that the same souls vivify the bodies of brutes and the bodies of men, since by the merit of their sins they pass through, going around from body to body. — *First opinion.* — *It is reproved.* And this was the position of certain philosophers and heretics, as has been said above[^9], and has already been disproved above as heretical; and this position is altogether to be cast aside as vile and derogating from the dignity of the rational creature, when it posits that men and beasts are equals. In this matter it indicates that its inventors and defenders are bestial men, when they believe their own souls either to have been or to be in future those of beasts[^10]. — *Note.*

*Second opinion.* There have been others also who wished to say that the souls of brutes are neither so immortal as the rational souls, that they could live after their bodies, nor are they so corruptible as other forms which have contrariety; but as far as is from their own nature, they are born to endure continuously, unless they have an impediment to their duration from the body, without which they cannot subsist. And this kind of impediment to duration they say has been introduced into the bodies of brutes on account of the sin of men[^11]. For if Adam had not sinned, no brute animal would perish. Hence just as by the merit of human sin those things which were made for his service were made worse, so also the brute animals were made subject to death. — *But it is disproved in a threefold way.* But this at first sight conflicts with what Augustine says in his book *On Genesis according to the letter*, book three[^12], that if man had not sinned, there would nonetheless be animals living by rapine, which to preserve their own life would kill other animals. — It is also repugnant to *reason*, since no reason says it is fitting that the sheep should be killed because man has sinned, when it has in no way shared with him in sin, nor has it transmitted its sin into the sheep. — It is also repugnant to sensible *imagination*. For where would those animals be, which would have been multiplied upon the earth from the beginning of

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the world unto its end, if none were dying? But if you say that they would not have been multiplied, if man had not sinned; how then would that be true which is said to them in Genesis 1[^13]: *Increase and multiply and fill the waters*? Now if this was said to the fishes, why is it not to be understood as said also to the other animals? Or were they made more fruitful on account of man's fault? If all these are inconvenient, that position is to be rejected as inconvenient.

*Third opinion and conclusion.* And therefore it must be said in a third way, that no other soul than the rational is immortal. — And the reason for this appears, if we look to the end on account of which creatures were made, from which end is set in things perpetuity, or corruptibility, according to their need. Now since all creatures were made on account of God, according to that [text][^14]: *The Lord hath made all things for himself*, the rational creature alone has been made to enjoy God, and that it should be made blessed in him, and it alone is to the image. But other creatures, which hold only the character of vestige, were made either for the *manifestation of divine goodness*, or for the *service of the rational creature*. — *Reason from the principal end.*

*This is twofold.* Now the manifestation of the divine exemplar and of God's goodness consists in the production of the universe, which is a certain exemplated thing, completely representing that exemplar, and on account of the completion of representation it must have a complete and perpetual duration. But the universe in a twofold way[^15] has being, namely *running* and *permanent*. *Running being* cannot be perpetual, because it is necessary that at some time it be at rest. But *permanent being* is perpetual. Those parts, therefore, which respect the universe so far as *permanent being*, such as are the orbs of the heavens and of the elements, have perpetuity. But those which respect[^16] [it] as to *running being*, namely those which consist in generation and corruption, such as are minerals, plants and brute animals, ought not to have perpetual *being*, but terminated, which by a certain transit of their own and by a certain growing-old and renewal, by death and vivification, adorn the universe. And thus it is plain that the brute animals, as to body and soul, are by nature corruptible, inasmuch as they were made for *representing* the divine goodness and wisdom. And this reason is taken from the principal end.

*Secondary reason.* There is also another reason, taken from the non-principal end, namely inasmuch as the creatures in which there is only the character of vestige were made on account of the rational creature, namely man. For some were made on account of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland; some only according to the state of the way; and some only according to the state of the fatherland. — *Distinction.* And those which were made on account of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland[^17], since the state of the fatherland is perpetual, ought to be perpetual; and such are those which complete man's dwelling-place, like the heaven and the four elements. But those which were made on account of man according to the state of the way, since that state is transitory and has an end, ought to be corruptible; and such are the brute animals, which were made to supply the body's need according to that state, in which it needs foods and nourishments. — And thus the reasons showing the brutish souls to be mortal from their first condition are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposite arguments.*

1. To that, then, which is first objected from Ecclesiastes, that *one is the destruction* etc.; it must be said that he speaks as to the exterior understanding[^18]; and therefore he adds[^19]: *Who knoweth, if the spirit of the sons of Adam ascend upward?* as if to say: the man does not know who walks according to the carnal intellect, who considers only those things which appear outwardly; but the wise man knows, who attends to that which Ecclesiastes himself at the end[^20] says: *Know thou that for every error God will bring thee into judgment*.

2. To that which is objected from the book of Wisdom, it must be said that it speaks either of the death of eternal damnation, or of temporal death in him for whom death is a punishment. But such is only the animal capable of reason, which, just as it alone is born to be blessed, alone is born to be miserable, so alone is born to be rewarded, alone is born to be punished, because it alone is that to which has been given the discretive force between good and evil, true and false[^21]. Hence even if the beast feels pain, when it is killed or wounded, it is not however punished; for it is not capable of misery; for only he is miserable, who either knows that he is miserable, or ought to know it, when he has evil.

3. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul of man is immortal; it must be said that it is not similar. For *sensible* in *man* names a power, namely of the rational soul, as below[^22] it shall be made plain; but *sensible* in *brutes* names a form, which is substantialized in transmutable matter; and because it depends on it as to *being*, when that is corrupted, it is corrupted.

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4. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is nobler than every body; it must be said that greater or lesser nobility does not make for greater duration of a creature — for man is more noble even according to the state of fallen nature, than a stone is; nevertheless the stone now endures longer[^23] — but this is the work of the privation of a corrupting cause. And the sensible soul has this on account of the fact that it is founded upon and depends on a body composed of contraries, above which contrariety the celestial nature has been raised.

5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul does not grow old; it must be said that it is true, so far as is of itself; nevertheless it grows old by reason of that in which it is rooted, namely by reason of the body, by reason of which also it has corruption; and this from its primary condition.

6. To that which is objected, that the brutes serve men; it must be said that recompensable service is not anything except that which is praiseworthy. But only the rational and deliberative power, in which consists the freedom of choice, is that in which praise and blame fall; and therefore however great and useful the service may be, it is not worthy of recompense, unless it has been done from freedom of choice: therefore it is not fitting that the souls of brutes be recompensed. And thus that is plain.

---

la: Vers. 19. — Scil. Eccle. 3, 19: *Unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum.*

en: Verse 19. — Namely Ecclesiastes 3:19: *One is the destruction of man and of beasts.*

la: Vers. 13. — Scil. Sap. 1, 13: *Quoniam Deus mortem non fecit nec laetatur in perditione vivorum.*

en: Verse 13. — Namely Wisdom 1:13: *For God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 6.) inter locos argumentandi recenset illum *ex suppositione* sive *ex hypothesi*, in quo scil. non proceditur a particulari ad universale, sive quando aliquis postulat, illud quod uni inest vel non inest, etiam omni inesse vel non inesse, « ut si hominis anima immortalis, et alias, si autem haec non, nec alias... Manifestum igitur est, quod qui hypothesi utitur facit problema universale particulariter positum; nam particulariter confitentem universaliter postulabit confiteri, eo quod uni, et omni similiter postulaverit inesse ».

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 4 (c. 6), among the loci of argumentation reckons that [argument] *from supposition* or *from hypothesis*, in which namely one does not proceed from the particular to the universal, or when someone postulates that what is in or not in one thing, is also in or not in all: « as if a man's soul is immortal, then also others; but if this one not, then not others either... It is therefore manifest, that he who uses hypothesis makes a universally posited problem out of one particularly stated; for he will demand that the one confessing particularly confess universally, on the ground that he postulated it to be in one and similarly in all ».

la: Libr. VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 23; XII. c. 16. n. 32; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 16; de Duabus animabus contra Manich. c. 1. n. 4; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 3. Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12; IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 9.

en: Book VII *On Genesis according to the letter*, c. 19, n. 23; XII, c. 16, n. 32; III *On Free Choice*, c. 5, n. 16; *On the Two Souls against the Manichees* c. 1, n. 4; *Enarration on Psalm* 145, n. 3. Cf. III *On Free Choice*, c. 5, n. 12; IX *On the City of God*, c. 9.

la: Libr. I. de Anima, text. 65. (c. 4.).

en: Book I *On the Soul*, text 65 (c. 4).

la: Libr. I. de Anima, text. 12. seq. (c. 1.) — De seq. ratione cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5.

en: Book I *On the Soul*, text 12f. (c. 1) — On the following reasoning cf. above p. 197, note 5.

la: Cfr. supra d. 15, a. 2. q. 1.

la: Vide art. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — Paulo inferius antiquiores codd. *Quod etsi hoc*, cod. aa *Et si hoc* pro *Quodsi hoc*, quod habet cod. cc cum ed. I.

en: See art. 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 1. — A little below the more ancient codices read *Quod etsi hoc*; codex aa reads *Et si hoc* in place of *Quodsi hoc*, which codex cc has with ed. I.

la: Cod. I *resurgere*.

en: Codex I reads *to rise again*.

la: Vide August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 10. n. 14. seqq.

en: See Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* VII, c. 10, n. 14ff.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *hominis*. — Mox post *peccati humani* codd. F aa addunt *cetera*, et dein plures alii codd. cum ed. I substituunt *deteriora* pro *deteriorata*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 read *of man*. — Soon after *of human sin* codices F aa add *the other things*, and then several other codices with ed. I substitute *worse things* for *deteriorated*.

la: Vers. 22.

en: Verse 22.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *duplex*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 read *twofold*.

la: Supple cum cod. cc et ed. 1 *universum*.

en: Supply with codex cc and ed. 1 *the universe*.

la: Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, omisso secundo disiunctionis membro: *quaedam solum secundum statum viae*, omittunt etiam sequentia: *Et illa quae facta... sive patriae*.

en: Many codices with eds. 1, 2, 3, with the second disjunction-member omitted: *some only according to the state of the way*, omit also the following: *And those things which were made... or of the fatherland*.

la: Cap. 3, 21. — Paulo superius codd. AIY aa aliique *apparentiam* pro *intelligentiam*; fortasse melius.

en: Chap. 3:21. — A little above codices AIY aa and others read *appearance* in place of *understanding*; perhaps better.

la: Cap. 12, 14: *Ut cuncta, quae fiunt, adducet Deus in iudicium pro omni errato, sive bonum, sive malum illud sit.*

en: Chap. 12:14: *That God will bring all things which are done into judgment for every error, whether it be good, or evil.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 433, nota I. De sequentibus cfr. August., de Natura boni c. 7. 8.

en: Cf. above p. 433, note I. On what follows cf. Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good* c. 7, 8.

translators_notes:
- Chunk spans raw lines 32485–32662 (printed pp.461–464); QUAESTIO II opens at raw 32485 in the lower right half of p.461, and closes immediately before ARTICULUS II at raw 32663 in the middle of p.464 L-1.
- `has_scholion: false` — explicitly confirmed by p.464 L-2 footer ² (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*), which directs the reader to the d19-a1-q1 SCHOLION. Per Vol II Override step 5, a quaestio with no scholion is normal when the sibling's scholion covers both.
- **23 apparatus entries [^1]–[^23]** drawn from pp.461–464 footer blocks: p.461 L-2 ⁴–⁶ = [^1]–[^3] (Q2 args 1–3 verse/Aristot.Topic anchors); p.462 L-2 ¹–⁵ + R-2 ⁶–¹⁰ = [^4]–[^13] (Fundamenta 1–4 + Opinio 1–2 + Improbatur tripliciter); p.463 L-2 ¹–⁵ + R-2 ⁶–⁹ = [^14]–[^22] (Opinio 3 + duplex esse + secondary ratio + Solutio ad 1–3); p.464 L-2 ¹ = [^23] (ad 4 anchor on *lapis plus durat modo*).
- Cross-chunk hand-off: **received nothing** from d19-a1-q1 (p.461 L-2 ¹ Text.4.seqq + ² Dist.44/passio variant are already absorbed in d19-a1-q1 as [^29]–[^30] anchoring at *in quarto* and *illa corruptio* of Q1 ad-4; p.461 L-2 ³ Vat. *virtutes sensitivas... subministrat* is the Vatican-edition variant on Q1's *subministrant* phrase in ad-6 and likewise stays with Q1). p.464 L-2 footers ²–⁴ (scholion cross-ref + Hic c.2.seqq Aristot./Averroe + Damasc. I de Fide orth. c.4 on *pugnae*) all anchor in ARTICULUS II Q1 body and **migrate forward to d19-a2-q1**.
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Opinio 1.*, *Reprobatur.*, *Notandum.*, *Opinio 2.*, *Sed improbatur tripliciter.*, *Opinio 3. et Conclusio.*, *Ratio ex fine principali.*, *Haec duplex.*, *Ratio secundaria.*, *Distinctio.*, *Solutio oppositorum.* (thirteen labels).
- Notable apparatus: [^3] long Aristot. III *Topic.* c.4 *ex suppositione/ex hypothesi* full block; [^4] Aug. multi-citation (*VII de Gen ad lit* + *de Lib. Arb.* + *de Duabus animabus* + *Enarrat. in Ps. 145* — Quaracchi here cross-bundles five Augustinian loci for the *operatio propria praeter corpus* fundamentum); [^12] *VII de Gen ad lit* c.10 on animals living *de rapina* even without sin (the lynchpin against Opinio 2); [^23] Aug. *de Musica* VI c.4 *Sanitas unius diei profecto est melior quam multorum dierum imbecillitas* gloss on duration ≠ nobility.
- No `[?]` flags — all 23 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp.461–464. OCR around raw 32485–32662 two-column cascade-fragmented around Respondeo (Opinio 1–3 + Sed improbatur tripliciter + Ratio principalis/secundaria); column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override step 1.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0