title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus I. *De comparatione voluntatis ad suum finem.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum voluntas sit bona et commendabilis ratione boni finis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum voluntas sit bona et commendabilis ratione boni finis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei sexto[^1]: *Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum luminosum erit.* Si ergo oculus est intentio, per quam voluntas ordinatur in finem, secundum quod ibi exponitur, et corpus est congeries operum; videtur, quod si finis bonus sit, quod omnis operatio voluntatis sit bona et commendabilis.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit in undecimo de Trinitate[^2]: « Rectae sunt omnes voluntates, si bona est illa, ad quam cunctae ordinantur »; sed illa, ad quam cunctae ordinantur, est voluntas finis: si ergo finis bonus est, restat, quod voluntas finis et omnis voluntas ad eam ordinata sit bona et recta.

3. Item, maxima est Philosophi[^3]: « Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est »: ergo si actus voluntatis finis bonus est, ergo et ipsa bona est.

4. Item, in actione naturali, in qua forma est finis, bonitas generationis et operationis attenditur penes finem et formam[^4]: ergo cum intentio finis aeque sit essentialis morali actui, ut naturali, et bonitas actus voluntatis pertineat ad mores; videtur, quod bonitas voluntatis et rectificatio penes bonitatem finis habeat attendi et cognosci.

**Sed contra:** 1. « Finis bonorum est beatitudo », sicut Magister dicit in littera[^5]; sed « omnes appetunt beatitudinem », sicut dicit Augustinus, et « omnes eam finaliter intendunt, sicut dicit Boethius in libro de Consolatione, quamvis diverso tramite ad eam currant »: ergo si omnes voluntates communicant in illo fine, ergo omnes erunt bonae, et nulla mala.

2. Item, Dionysius[^6] dicit, quod « nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens », ergo omnis operans finaliter aspicit ad aliquod bonum; unde Philosophus etiam dicit, quod « bonum et finis est idem »: ergo si omnis voluntas intendit aliquod bonum, videtur, quod aut omnis voluntas est bona, aut quod bonitas non inest voluntati ex fine.

3. Item, quantumcumque aliquis finaliter appetit bonum, tamen nunquam operatio eius erit meritoria, nisi sit caritate informata, et anima sit Deo grata et accepta[^7]: ergo videtur, quod bonitas voluntatis in actu potius veniat ex principio quam ex fine.

4. Item, si bonitas voluntatis venit ex fine, cum finis omnis bonae voluntatis sit Deus et sit aequaliter bonus; videtur, quod omnes bonae voluntates sint aequaliter bonae. Si igitur omnes voluntates non sunt aequaliter bonae, videtur, quod bonitas voluntatis non sit eis ex fine[^8].

5. Item, manducare bonum est: ergo si quis finaliter praedicat, ut manducet, cum operatio ista habeat bonum finem, videtur, quod sic praedicare sit bonum et laudabile. Si igitur talis actio iudicatur esse mala, videtur, quod voluntas non sit bona ex voluntate finis.

6. Item, si aliquis mentitur propter salutem proximi, cum salvare proximum sit bonum, mendacium illud esset bonum et meritorium, si opus voluntatis bonitatem haberet ex fine; sed constat, quod « mendacium nunquam est bonum », sicut dicit Augustinus[^9]: ergo videtur, quod bonitas finis non sufficiat ad bonitatem voluntatis.

Quaeritur ergo, unde causetur rectitudo et bonitas in voluntate, utrum ex fine, sicut videtur dicere Magister[^10], an aliunde.

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### Conclusio

> Voluntas est bona ex fine, si adsunt duae conditiones ex parte finis, et duae ex parte ordinationis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicitur voluntas esse bona ex bonitate finis, hoc est dicere, quod voluntas est bona ex ordinatione ad bonum finem. — Ad hoc autem, quod sit recta ordinatio ad bonum finem, requiritur, quod finis sit bonus duobus modis, videlicet secundum *id quod est*, et sub ratione finiendi. Aliquid enim est bonum *in se*, quod tamen non recte ordinatur ad alterum *in ratione finis*; sicut minus bonum, quamvis sit bonum, non tamen est bonus finis maioris boni, pro eo quod « finis melior debet esse his quae sunt ad finem[^1b] ». — Similiter ex parte *ordinationis* duo requiruntur, videlicet *idoneitas* ex parte *ordinabilis*, et *actualis conversio* ex parte *voluntatis ordinantis*. — Et cum ista concurrunt, tunc absque dubio voluntas bona ex fine bono iudicatur. Cum autem horum aliquid deficit, bonitas finis non sufficit ad bonitatem voluntatis, utpote si sit finis bonus *in se*, non tamen sufficit *ad finiendum* vel ad complendum illud quod fit propter ipsum; sicut manducatio, quamvis sit bonum in se, non tamen habet completam rationem finiendi respectu praedicationis[^2b]. Similiter mendacium non est ordinabile ad bonum, cum sit *secundum se* malum; et ideo quantumcumque quis mentiatur propter aliquod bonum, mendacium non est bonum, quia deficit ibi rectitudo ordinationis propter defectum idoneitatis ex parte actus, quem voluntas refert ad illum finem. — Et sic patet responsio ad veritatem quaestionis, quoniam concedendum est, sicut Magister dicit, voluntatem esse bonam et rectam ex fine; hoc enim intelligitur sub praedictis conditionibus. Et secundum hunc modum rationes ad primam partem concedendae sunt.

**Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad illa duo, quae ultimo opponuntur, videlicet de praedicatione et mendacio.**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod beatitudo est finis bonarum voluntatum et etiam omnium; dicendum, quod aliter est finis bonarum voluntatum, et aliter malarum. Nam beatitudo, quae est finis bonarum voluntatum, est beatitudo vera; beatitudo vero, quae est finis malarum, non est beatitudo vera, sed simulata. Avarus enim aestimat, beatitudinem esse in divitiis, et superbus, in honoribus[^3b], et sic in aliis vitiis: unde sicut finis malarum voluntatum quandam habet imaginem finis vere boni, utpote beatitudinis, sic etiam malae voluntates praetendunt speciem virtutis. Quando ergo dicitur, quod omnis voluntas tendit ad beatitudinem; hoc intelligitur de beatitudine in sua *generalitate* considerata, in cuius appetitu omnes, ut dicit Augustinus[^4b], communicant; sed prout beatitudo determinate accipitur pro illa quae consistit in visione Dei, nec ab omnibus appetitur, nec omnes in illam tendunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens; dicendum, quod illud quod movet, aliquando est bonum *secundum veritatem*, aliquando est bonum *secundum aestimationem*; et ad hoc, quod affectus moveatur, sufficit sola aestimatio bonitatis; et sine hac aestimatione non movetur voluntas ad aliquid appetendum, ad minus deliberativo[^5b] appetitu. Et ideo dicit Dionysius, quod « nemo operatur ad malum aspiciens », quia nulla est voluntatis operatio, quam non praecedat boni aestimatio. Sed quia illud quod aestimatur esse bonum, frequenter est malum, ideo frequenter male operatur, etsi nunquam aspiciat ad malum sub ratione mali. Cum ergo dicitur, quod voluntas est bona ex intentione boni finis; hoc non intelligitur de fine, qui est bonus tantum in aestimatione appetentis[^6b], sed etiam de bonitate reali.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est actus voluntatis bonus, nisi qui est ex caritate; dicendum, quod caritas non reddit opus bonum, nisi ex hoc, quod ipsum bonum refert in summum bonum. Nec sufficiens relatio alicuius effectus vel operis ad summum bonum est nec esse potest nisi ex adiutorio caritatis, quae facit, finem illum omnibus aliis praeponderare et prae ceteris carius reputari, et in eo quiescere tanquam in fine ultimo. Et hinc est, quod bonitas omnis voluntatis attribuitur caritati. Nihilominus etiam attribuitur bonitati finis, quia ubi unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum[^7b]; unde qui tenet equum per frenum non dicitur tenere nisi unum. Et sic in proposito intelligendum est.

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis est aequaliter bonus; dicendum, quod etsi finis aequaliter sit bonus, non tamen omnes voluntates aequaliter ordinantur et approximant illi fini, quia bonitas finis non redundat in voluntatem nisi ratione

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ordinationis voluntatis ad illum finem. Et ideo, licet finis sit aequaliter bonus, tamen propter gradus repertos in approximatione et ordinatione voluntatum ad illum finem, voluntates non sunt aequaliter bonae. — Ad duo ultima iam patet responsio ex praedictis.

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### Article I. *On the comparison of the will to its end.*
### Question I. *Whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Matthew six[^1]: *If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome.* If, then, the eye is the intention by which the will is ordered to the end, according to the exposition given there, and the body is the aggregate of works; it seems that, if the end is good, every operation of the will is good and praiseworthy.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity*[^2]: « All wills are right, if that one is good to which all are ordered »; but that to which all are ordered is the will of the end: if, then, the end is good, it remains that the will of the end and every will ordered to it is good and right.

3. Likewise, there is a maxim of the Philosopher[^3]: « That whose end is good is itself also good »: therefore if the act of the will of the end is good, then it too is good.

4. Likewise, in a natural action, in which the form is the end, the goodness of the generation and of the operation is regarded according to the end and the form[^4]: therefore, since the intention of the end is equally essential to the moral act as to the natural one, and the goodness of the act of the will pertains to morals; it seems that the goodness of the will and its rectification must be regarded and known according to the goodness of the end.

**On the contrary:** 1. « The end of good [persons] is beatitude », as the Master says in the text[^5]; but « all desire beatitude », as Augustine says, and « all finally intend it, as Boethius says in the book *On Consolation*, although they run to it by diverse paths »: therefore if all wills share in that end, then all will be good, and none evil.

2. Likewise, Dionysius[^6] says that « no one acts looking toward evil », therefore everyone who acts finally looks toward some good; whence the Philosopher also says that « the good and the end are the same »: therefore if every will intends some good, it seems that either every will is good, or that goodness does not belong to the will from the end.

3. Likewise, however much someone finally desires good, nevertheless his operation will never be meritorious unless it is informed by charity, and the soul is pleasing and acceptable to God[^7]: therefore it seems that the goodness of the will in act comes rather from the principle than from the end.

4. Likewise, if the goodness of the will comes from the end, since the end of every good will is God and is equally good; it seems that all good wills are equally good. If therefore all wills are not equally good, it seems that the goodness of the will is not theirs from the end[^8].

5. Likewise, to eat is good: therefore if someone finally preaches in order that he may eat, since that operation has a good end, it seems that to preach thus is good and laudable. If therefore such an action is judged to be evil, it seems that the will is not good from the will of the end.

6. Likewise, if someone lies for the salvation of his neighbor, since to save one's neighbor is good, that lie would be good and meritorious, if the work of the will had goodness from the end; but it is established that « a lie is never good », as Augustine says[^9]: therefore it seems that the goodness of the end does not suffice for the goodness of the will.

It is asked, then, whence rectitude and goodness are caused in the will, whether from the end, as the Master seems to say[^10], or from elsewhere.

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### Conclusio

> The will is good from the end, if two conditions are present on the side of the end, and two on the side of the ordering.

**I respond:** It must be said that when the will is said to be good from the goodness of the end, this is to say that the will is good from being ordered to a good end. — But for there to be a right ordering to a good end, it is required that the end be good in two ways, namely according to *that which it is*, and under the formal character of ending [finiendi]. For something is good *in itself* which nevertheless is not rightly ordered to another *under the formal character of an end*; just as a lesser good, although it is good, is nevertheless not a good end of a greater good, for the reason that « the better end ought to be [superior] to those things which are toward the end[^1b] ». — Likewise on the side of the *ordering* two things are required, namely *suitability* on the side of *what is orderable*, and *actual conversion* on the side of *the ordering will*. — And when these concur, then without doubt the will is judged good from a good end. But when any of these is lacking, the goodness of the end does not suffice for the goodness of the will, as for instance if the end is good *in itself*, yet does not suffice *for ending* or for completing that which is done for its sake; just as eating, although it is good in itself, nevertheless does not have the complete formal character of ending with respect to preaching[^2b]. Likewise a lie is not orderable to good, since it is *of itself* evil; and therefore, however much one may lie for the sake of some good, the lie is not good, because there is lacking there the rectitude of ordering on account of the defect of suitability on the side of the act, which the will refers to that end. — And thus the response to the truth of the question is plain, since it must be conceded, as the Master says, that the will is good and right from the end; for this is understood under the aforesaid conditions. And according to this mode the arguments for the first part are to be conceded.

**And through this also the response to those two [arguments] which are last opposed, namely concerning preaching and lying, is plain.**

1. But to that which is first objected, that beatitude is the end of good wills and indeed of all; it must be said that the end of good wills is one thing, and of evil wills another. For beatitude, which is the end of good wills, is true beatitude; but beatitude, which is the end of evil [wills], is not true beatitude, but a simulated one. For the avaricious man estimates that beatitude is in riches, and the proud man, in honors[^3b], and so in the other vices: whence just as the end of evil wills has a certain image of the truly good end, namely of beatitude, so also evil wills hold forth an appearance of virtue. When, therefore, it is said that every will tends to beatitude; this is understood of beatitude considered in its *generality*, in the desire for which all share, as Augustine says[^4b]; but as beatitude is taken determinately for that which consists in the vision of God, it is neither desired by all, nor do all tend toward it.

2. To that which is objected, that no one acts looking toward evil; it must be said that that which moves [the will] is sometimes good *according to truth*, sometimes good *according to estimation*; and for the affection to be moved, the estimation of goodness alone suffices; and without this estimation the will is not moved to desire anything, at least by a deliberative[^5b] appetite. And therefore Dionysius says that « no one acts looking toward evil », because there is no operation of the will which the estimation of good does not precede. But because that which is estimated to be good is frequently evil, therefore one frequently acts evilly, even though one never looks toward evil under the formal character of evil. When, therefore, it is said that the will is good from the intention of a good end; this is not understood of an end which is good only in the estimation of the one desiring[^6b], but also of real goodness.

3. To that which is objected, that no act of the will is good except that which is from charity; it must be said that charity does not render a work good except from this, that it refers the good itself to the highest good. Nor is a sufficient relation of any effect or work to the highest good, nor can it be, except from the help of charity, which makes that end outweigh all others and be reckoned more dear than the rest, and [makes the will] rest in it as in the ultimate end. And hence it is that the goodness of every will is attributed to charity. Nevertheless it is also attributed to the goodness of the end, because where one [is] for the sake of another, there is only one[^7b]; whence he who holds a horse by the bridle is not said to hold but one. And so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that the end is equally good; it must be said that even if the end is equally good, nevertheless not all wills are equally ordered to and approach that end, because the goodness of the end does not redound into the will except by reason

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of the will's ordering to that end. And therefore, although the end is equally good, nevertheless, on account of the degrees found in the approach and ordering of the wills to that end, the wills are not equally good. — To the two last [arguments] the response is already plain from what has been said.

la: Vers. 22. — Expositio huius loci, quae sequitur, est secundum Augustinum, qui II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 13. n. 45. ait: *Qui locus sic intelligendus est, ut noverimus, omnia opera nostra tunc esse munda et placere in conspectu Dei, si fiant simplici corde i. e. intentione superna fine illo caritatis, quia et plenitudo Legis caritas* (Rom. 13, 10.). *Oculum* ergo hic accipere debemus ipsam *intentionem*, qua facimus quidquid facimus; quae si munda fuerit et recta et illud aspiciens quod aspiciendum est, omnia opera nostra, quae secundum eam operamur, necesse est bona sint. Quae omnia opera *totum corpus* appellavit etc. Fere idem August. dicit IV. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 33.

en: Verse 22 [of Matthew 6]. — The exposition of this passage, which follows, is according to Augustine, who in *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount* II, c. 13, n. 45, says: *This passage is to be understood thus, that we should know all our works to be clean and pleasing in the sight of God if they are done with a simple heart, that is, with that supernal intention of charity as their end, since the fullness of the Law is charity* (Rom. 13:10). By *eye*, therefore, we ought here to understand the very *intention* by which we do whatever we do; and if it be clean and right and looking to that which is to be looked at, all our works which we do according to it must necessarily be good. All which works he called *the whole body*, etc. Augustine says almost the same in *Against Julian the Pelagian* IV, c. 3, n. 33.

la: Cap. 6. n. 10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Ch. 6, n. 10. See here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Boeth., II. de Differ. topic.; Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: *Cuius finis melior, et ipsum melius.* — Paulo inferius post *bonus est* cod. T sic prosequitur: *ipsum quoque bonum est i. e. et ipsa actio bona est.*

en: Boethius, *On Topical Differences* II; Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 1: *That whose end is better is itself also better.* — A little below, after *is good*, codex T continues thus: *it too is good, that is, the action itself is good.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 81. seqq. (c. 8.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 81 seqq. (c. 8).

la: Hic c. 1. — De sententia August. vide supra pag. 517, nota 2. — Verba propria Boethii, III. de Consol. prosa 2, sunt: *Omnis mortalium cura, quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet, diverso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur pervenire... Hunc, ut diximus, diverso tramite mortales omnes conantur adipisci.*

en: Here c. 1. — On the opinion of Augustine see above p. 517, note 2. — The proper words of Boethius, *On Consolation* III, prose 2, are: *Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold pursuits exercises, proceeds indeed by a diverse path, yet strives to arrive at one same end of beatitude... This, as we have said, all mortals endeavor to attain by a diverse way.*

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. et 31; vide supra pag. 808, nota 2. De sententia Philosophi mox memorata vide pag. cit. nota 5.

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4, §§ 19 and 31; see above p. 808, note 2. On the opinion of the Philosopher just mentioned see the cited page, note 5.

la: Ut habetur supra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et infra d. XL.

en: As held above, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 and following. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 1, and below, d. 40.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi etiam seq. arg. insinuatur. — Pro *eis ex fine* cod. cc et ed. 1 *ei ex fine.*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 3, where the following argument is also intimated. — For *theirs from the end* codex cc and edition 1 [read] *its from the end.*

la: Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6, et de Mendacio, c. 21. n. 42. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XL.

en: *Enchiridion* c. 18, n. 6, and *On Lying* c. 21, n. 42. See below the text of the Master, d. 40.

la: Hic c. 1. seqq. et infra d. XL.

en: Here c. 1 seqq. and below, d. 40.

la: Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. de Bono maiore et utili; III. Topic. c. 1; I. Ethic. c. 7; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 3. (c. 2.) — Pro *non tamen est bonus finis maioris boni* cod. cc et ed. 1 *non tamen ratione finis respectu maioris boni.* Paulo inferius pro *indicatur* codd. I V W X Z et alii *vocatur.*

en: Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I, c. on the greater and the useful good; *Topics* III, c. 1; *Ethics* I, c. 7; *Greater Morals* I, c. 3 (c. 2). — For *is nevertheless not a good end of a greater good* codex cc and edition 1 [read] *is nevertheless not by reason of an end with respect to a greater good.* A little below, for *is regarded* codices I V W X Z and others [read] *is called.*

la: Aristot., II. Phys. text. 23. (c. 2.) ait: *Vult enim [Poëta], non omne ultimum esse finem, sed optimum.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 23 (c. 2), says: *For [the Poet] holds that not every last thing is the end, but the best.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, *et superbiis et honoribus.* Codd. I W cum edd. 2, 3 *in deliciis* pro *in divitiis.*

en: The editions, except edition 1, [read] *and the proud and in honors.* Codices I W with editions 2, 3 [read] *in delights* for *in riches.*

la: Locis supra pag. 517, nota 2. citt. Cfr. infra dub. 1.

en: At the places cited above on p. 517, note 2. Cf. below, dub. 1.

la: Codd. K ee et ed. 1. *deliberato.*

en: Codices K ee and edition 1 [read] *deliberated.*

la: Cod. N *operantis.* Deinde cod. cc. et ed. 1 prosequuntur *sed etiam de fine, qui est bonus bonitate reali.*

en: Codex N [reads] *of the one working.* Then codex cc and edition 1 continue *but also of an end which is good with real goodness.*

la: Verba Aristot. vide supra pag. 639, nota 2. De hac solutione cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 36. q. 6. — Pro *ibi* cod. T (F a secunda manu) substituit *utrobique*, quae vox in hoc axiomate communis est.

en: For the words of Aristotle see above p. 639, note 2. On this solution cf. III Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 36. q. 6. — For *there* codex T (F by a second hand) substitutes *in both cases*, which word is the common one in this axiom. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Voluntatem humanam omnemque eiusdem actionem, quatenus est actio, bonam esse in genere *naturae*, in praecedente distinctione dictum est. Hic agitur de bonitate actuum in genere *moris*, et explicatur doctrina Magistri, quod bonum morale in actibus humanis resultat ex ordine ad finem, et malum principaliter ex defectu ordinis ad finem. — De fine in genere cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 1-5, a. 1. q. 3, a. 2. 3; II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 28. passim, et alibi. Praeter alias finium distinctiones, de quibus agitur in philosophia, hic supponitur distinctio finis in *ultimum* et *intermedium* et *proximum*, et in finem operis et operantis.

De recto ordine actus ad finem dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.): « Tunc autem est *sufficiens* ordo [ad debitum finem], quando est ex parte *volentis*, referentis suum actum in debitum finem, et ex parte *actus volendi*, qui, quantum est ex se, ordinabilis est in illum finem ». Ex utraque autem parte duo requiruntur, secundum nostrum Doctorem, cuius doctrinam Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.) sic contrahit: « Ad perfectionem ordinis quatuor requiruntur: duo ex parte *actus ordinabilis*, et duo ex parte *finis*, ad quem fit ordinatio. Ex parte *actus* requiritur primo, quod ipse sit de genere bonorum et ex natura propria ordinabilis ad talem finem, ita quod per talem actum talis finis possit acquiri; secundo requiritur, quod actus ordinetur in finem secundum intentionem operantis. Ex parte etiam *finis* duo requiruntur, scilicet, quod finis sit debitus, secundum *id quod est*, id est bonus; et quod sit debitus, in quantum finis, scilicet magis bonus, quam id quod fit propter ipsum, quia finis melior est iis quae sunt ad finem ». — S. Thom. (hic a. 5; cfr. S. 1. II. q. 18. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 17.) in hac quaestione procedit ab illa distinctione, quod actus voluntatis dupliciter possit ferri in finem, vel immediate in ipsum finem, vel in finem mediante eo quod est ad finem; hac autem via probat easdem conclusiones, quas tenent S. Bonaventura aliique communiter. Tamen Henr. Gand. in quaestione, unde actio volitionis moralis speciem moris sortiatur (Quodl. 13. q. 10.), ab aliis doctoribus recedit, et quintuplex bonum distinguens, de volitione morali dicit: « Speciem moris et bonitatem atque rationem virtutis moralis habet non ab obiecto, nec ut est principium operationis sicut finis in intellectu practico, neque ut principium eius est a voluntate et operationem suam adeptum, sed potius ab agentis libero arbitrio ». Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 1. § 2. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 7. n. 11. seqq., et in utroque Scripto, d. 40. q. unica. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 133. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 40. q. unica.

**II.** Sequens (2.) quaestio explanat verbum Magistri (vel potius s. Scripturae), quod caritas est finis et praecepti et omnium voluntatum (cfr. hic dub. 1. 2.). Praeter distinctionem triplicis caritatis hic adhibetur distinctio communis inter beatitudinem (finem) *obiectivam* sive ipsam rem beatificantem, et beatitudinem *formalem* sive ipsum actum, quo obiectum beatificans apprehenditur et possidetur. Eadem distinctio exprimitur etiam terminis: *finis in quo* et *finis quo* (hic et dub. 4.), vel ut dicitur ab aliis, *finis cuius* et *finis quo* (S. Thom., S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 8.). Hac distinctione supposita, facile intelligitur, qua ratione non tantum Deus, sed etiam caritas et beatitudo finis ultimus esse possint; tamen caritas est finis ultimus non omnium rerum, sed omnium voluntatum. — De caritate cfr. III. Sent. d. 28; de tota quaestione I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. 3. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 4. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. n. 19. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 7, q. 2. a. 8, cfr. etiam S. 1. q. 44. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. loc. cit. q. incid. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That the human will and every action of the same, insofar as it is an action, is good in the genus of *nature*, was stated in the preceding distinction. Here the matter treated is the goodness of acts in the genus of *morals*, and the doctrine of the Master is explained, namely that moral good in human acts results from the ordering toward the end, and evil principally from the defect of ordering toward the end. — On the end in general cf. I Sent. d. 1, dub. 1-5, a. 1. q. 3, a. 2. 3; II Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 1; III Sent. d. 28. passim, and elsewhere. Besides the other distinctions of ends, which are treated in philosophy, here is presupposed the distinction of end into *ultimate* and *intermediate* and *proximate*, and into the end of the work and of the worker.

On the right ordering of the act to the end Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1. q. 1.) says: « There is a *sufficient* ordering [to the due end] when it is on the side of *the one willing*, referring his act to the due end, and on the side of *the act of willing*, which, so far as it lies in itself, is orderable to that end ». But on each side two things are required, according to our Doctor, whose doctrine Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1. a. 1.) condenses thus: « For the perfection of the ordering four things are required: two on the side of *the orderable act*, and two on the side of *the end* to which the ordering is made. On the side of *the act* it is required first that it itself be of the genus of goods and of its own nature orderable to such an end, so that through such an act such an end can be acquired; secondly it is required that the act be ordered to the end according to the intention of the worker. On the side also of *the end* two things are required, namely, that the end be due according to *that which it is*, that is, good; and that it be due insofar as it is the end, namely more good than that which is done for its sake, because the end is better than the things which are toward the end ». — St. Thomas (here a. 5; cf. S. 1. II. q. 18. a. 4; S. against the Gentiles III. c. 17.) in this question proceeds from that distinction, that the act of the will can be borne toward the end in two ways, either immediately into the end itself, or into the end by means of that which is toward the end; and by this way he proves the same conclusions which St. Bonaventure and others commonly hold. Yet Henry of Ghent in the question whence the action of moral volition takes its moral species (Quodl. 13. q. 10.) departs from the other doctors, and, distinguishing a fivefold good, says of moral volition: « It has the moral species and goodness and the formal character of moral virtue not from the object, nor as it is the principle of the operation as an end in the practical intellect, nor as its principle is from the will and is attained by its operation, but rather from the free will of the agent ». Besides those mentioned: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 1. § 2. — Scotus, II Sent. d. 7. n. 11. seqq., and in both Writings, d. 40. q. unica. — B. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 133. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, II Sent. d. 40. q. unica.

**II.** The following (2.) question explains the word of the Master (or rather of holy Scripture), that charity is the end both of the precept and of all wills (cf. here dub. 1. 2.). Besides the distinction of the threefold charity, there is here employed the common distinction between *objective* beatitude (the end), or the beatifying thing itself, and *formal* beatitude, or the act itself by which the beatifying object is apprehended and possessed. The same distinction is also expressed in the terms: *the end in which* and *the end by which* (here and dub. 4.), or as it is said by others, *the end whose* and *the end by which* (St. Thomas, S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 8.). This distinction being supposed, it is easily understood by what reason not only God, but also charity and beatitude can be the ultimate end; yet charity is the ultimate end not of all things, but of all wills. — On charity cf. III Sent. d. 28; on the whole question I Sent. d. 1. a. 2. 3. Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 4. m. 3. — Scotus, in both Writings, I Sent. d. 1. q. 1, and IV Sent. d. 49. q. 2. n. 19. seqq. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 7, q. 2. a. 8, cf. also S. 1. q. 44. a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 2; S. loc. cit. q. incid. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q. here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 881–883 (PDF pp. 903–905; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR at raw lines 61270–61446 of `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`. Per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion, the Respondeo/Solutio and the SCHOLION (which sit in the cascade-fragmented footer band) were read directly from the column-band crops; the clean *videtur*/*contra* prose and footnote-marker spacing follow the OCR.

**Page-split map.** Page 881: article opener + Quaestio I title + the four *videtur* arguments + the six *Sed contra* arguments + the closing *Quaeritur ergo...* — apparatus markers ¹–¹⁰ (10 footers). Page 882: Conclusio + Respondeo (two conditions of end, two of ordering) + replies 1, 2, 3, and the opening of reply 4.5.6 — apparatus markers ¹–⁷ (7 footers, fresh per-page sequence). Page 883: tail of reply 4.5.6 (`...ordinationis voluntatis ad illum finem...`) + the article-level SCHOLION (sections I–II); page 883 carries no numbered footers (the SCHOLION occupies its footer band). Total apparatus: 17 entries.

**Scholion disposition.** The SCHOLION (sections I and II) is an **article-level** scholion attached to q1, covering all four questions of ARTICULUS I (section II expressly forecasts "the following (2.) question"). Therefore `has_scholion: true` here; siblings **q2, q3, q4 will have `has_scholion: false`** with a pointer "Vide scholion ad primam huius art. quaest."

**Hand-off forwarded to q2 (`bon-sent-II-d38-a1-q2`):** opener is *"Secundo quaeritur, quis sit ille finis, ex cuius bonitate voluntas est bona, et ad quem debent referri nostrae voluntates, ut sint rectae. Et quod huiusmodi finis sit caritas, videtur."* (raw line 61447, title *Quis sit ille finis...*). q2 begins on printed p. 883 (bottom right column, after the scholion) and runs onto p. 884. No shared-footer hand-off from q1: p. 883's footer band is fully consumed by the q1 scholion, and q2's own footers begin on p. 884. q2 inherits `has_scholion: false` (covered by this q1 article scholion).

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the 450 dpi column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Quis sit ille finis, ex cuius bonitate voluntas est bona, et ad quem debent referri nostrae voluntates, ut sint rectae.*

Secundo quaeritur, quis sit ille finis, ex cuius bonitate voluntas est bona, et ad quem debent referri nostrae voluntates ad hoc, quod sint rectae. Et quod huiusmodi finis sit caritas, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum primo[^1]: *Finis praecepti est caritas*; sed ad illum finem referendae sunt voluntates[^2], ad quem referuntur praecepta; si ergo caritas est finis praecepti, caritas est finis bonae voluntatis.

2. Item, ad Romanos decimo tertio[^3]: *Qui diligit proximum legem implevit*; et iterum: *Plenitudo legis est dilectio*; sed ad illud referendae sunt voluntates, in quo consistit plenitudo et consummatio legis; si ergo caritas et dilectio est huiusmodi, patet etc.

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3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Omnis bona voluntas ad hoc ordinatur, ut homo fruatur Deo, et ad hoc, quod habeat Deum; sed nos non fruimur Deo nec habemus ipsum nisi per caritatem; ergo habere caritatem non est aliud quam habere Deum; si ergo omnis bona voluntas est ordinata ad hoc, quod habeat Deum; videtur, quod finis omnis bonae voluntatis sit ipsa caritas[^4].

4. Item, natura in operando finaliter intendit formam perficientem in esse naturae[^5]: ergo voluntas in operando principaliter intendit formam perfectivam in esse moris; sed forma vel habitus perfectivus voluntatis in esse moris est ipsa caritas: ergo caritas est finis principalis omnis bonae voluntatis.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Romanos decimo[^6]: *Finis legis Christus*; sed idem est finis legis et bonae voluntatis: ergo videtur, quod Christus sit principalis finis bonae voluntatis: non ergo caritas.

2. Item, Bernardus in libro de Diligendo Deo[^7]: «De amore venitur in caritatem, et de caritate venitur ad sapientiam»: ergo sapientia est excellentius quam caritas; sed illud debet poni finis bonae voluntatis, quod est excellentissimum: ergo finis bonae voluntatis non est caritas, sed sapientia.

3. Item, finis est illud quo fruendum est; sed caritate non est fruendum, quia solo bono increato est fruendum[^8]: ergo videtur, quod caritas non sit finis principalis bonae voluntatis. Si tu dicas, quod finis bonae voluntatis non est caritas creata, sed increata; contra, Apostolus[^9]: *Finis praecepti est caritas procedens de corde puro* etc.; sed caritas procedens de corde puro et fide non ficta non est nisi caritas creata: ergo etc.

4. Item, finis bonae voluntatis est illud, quo habito, voluntas nihil ultra quaerit[^10]; sed habita caritate, adhuc voluntas ultra quaerit aliquid, videlicet ipsum Deum; immo quanto maiorem habet caritatem, tanto magis quaerit: ergo videtur, quod caritas non habeat rationem finis.

5. Item, «quod est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus[^11]»; sed pondus in corporibus nullo modo dicitur esse finis motus localis: ergo amor in spiritibus nullo modo dicetur esse finis appetitus rationalis, ergo nec voluntatis.

6. Item, finis et principium sunt distincta; sed caritas est radix omnium bonarum affectionum[^12]: si ergo finis consequitur illud quod est ad finem, et caritas est radix; videtur, quod nullo modo debeat dici finis bonae voluntatis.

### Conclusio

> Caritas est finis omnis bonae voluntatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister[^13] recte dicit in eo, quod finem omnis bonae voluntatis caritatem assignat; secutus est enim in hoc doctrinam Apostoli et beati Augustini. Nam Apostolus expresse dicit, quod caritas est consummatio praecepti, et plenitudo legis. Augustinus etiam dicit in Enchiridio, quod «omnia praecepta divina referuntur ad caritatem». Et in libro de Doctrina christiana[^14] ostendit, quod ad caritatis mandatum commendandum ordinatur tota Scriptura; et ita caritas non tantummodo est finis bonae voluntatis, sed etiam totius sacrae Scripturae et cognitionis secundum pietatem. — Licet autem Deus, vel beatitudo, sive Christus possit dici finis bonae voluntatis; maluit tamen Magister dicere, quod caritas sit finis, pro eo quod completa ratio finiendi[^15] competit ipsi caritati. Cum enim tripliciter dicatur finis, videlicet finis, in quo quiescitur, et finis, quo quiescitur; et finis, quo quiescitur, dicitur dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel ut nunc; quolibet istorum modorum caritas est finis bonae voluntatis. Nam caritas increata, quae Deus est, de qua dicitur primae Canonicae Ioannis[^16]: *Deus caritas est*, est finis, in quo quiescitur. Caritas vero creata et consummata, utpote caritas patriae, est finis, quo quiescitur simpliciter in Deo. Caritas vero inchoata, utpote caritas viae, est finis, quo quiescitur in Deo ut nunc. Sicut enim locatum non quiescit in loco nisi mediante pondere, sic anima in Deo non habet quietari, qui est eius locus et finis ultimus nisi mediante dilectione, quae habet considerare bonum sub ratione boni. Bonum autem sub ratione boni simul tenet rationem finis et amabilis[^17]; et propterea intentio finis potissime attribuitur caritati. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

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**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Christus est finis praecepti; dicendum, quod per hoc non excluditur, quin caritas sit finis. Nam etsi Christus sit finis, in quo quiescitur, nihilominus caritas potest esse finis, quo quiescimus in Christo. Rursus, caritas, secundum quod est finis, in quo quiescimus, convenit toti Trinitati; et ideo simul possunt haec duo stare, quod Christus sit finis legis et caritas similiter[^18].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de caritate pervenitur ad sapientiam, ergo sapientia est excellentior; dicendum, quod secundum quod Bernardus loquitur ibi de sapientia, sapientia non dicit aliud donum quam caritas, sed novum statum eiusdem doni, ita quod caritas communiter accepta distinguitur contra caritatem dictam appropriate. Prout tamen caritas describitur communiter, sic continet et amorem et sapientiam; et hoc modo ponitur esse finis praecepti[^19].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis est illud quo fruendum est; dicendum, quod secundum quod finis dicitur dupliciter, scilicet quo quiescitur, et in quo quiescitur, sic frui aliquo dicitur dupliciter: aut sicut obiecto, aut sicut dispositivo; et utroque modo caritate fruimur. Nam caritate, quae Deus est, fruimur sicut obiecto; caritate, quae habitus est, fruimur sicut dispositivo; et sic patet, quod illud non obviat proposito[^20].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas habito fine suo quiescit; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando habet finem suum complete; caritas autem, etsi in via habeatur, non tamen habetur complete; *Ignis enim est in Sion, et caminus in Ierusalem*[^21]. Cum autem habebitur in patria, nihil ultra quaeretur, pro eo quod per eam habebitur bonum increatum, in quo consistit finis et quietatio omnium nostrorum desideriorum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pondus in corporibus non est finis motus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia pondus reperitur in corporibus, tam in absentia loci debiti quam in praesentia; caritas autem nunquam est in anima, nisi Deo praesente. Unde omnis qui habet caritatem, habet Deum; et propterea, dum omnis nostra operatio ad habendum Deum ordinatur, ordinatur ad habendam caritatem. Non sic autem est de pondere, quia non quodlibet corpus habens pondus habet locum sibi debitum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis et principium sunt diversa; respondent aliqui, quod caritas differenti modo est principium et finis; nam principium est boni operis secundum esse inchoatum, et finis est secundum esse consummatum et perfectum. Ad hoc enim unusquisque bene operatur, ut in eo Dei amor et caritas augeatur[^22]. — Aliter potest dici et probabilius, quod sicut modus, species et ordo super idem fundantur, et tamen modus dicit comparationem ad efficiens, et species ad exemplar, et ordo dicit comparationem ad finem[^23]; sic caritas respectu boni operis potest habere et rationem efficientis et finis secundum diversas comparationes. Caritas enim continuat voluntatem nostram ipsi Deo ut principio moventi, et conformat ut regulae dirigenti, et coniungit ut fini quietanti; et ideo, sicut ipse Deus habet rationem efficientis, in quantum movet, et formalis, in quantum dirigit, et finalis, in quantum quietat: sic et ipsa caritas respectu operis rationem habet istius triplicis causae; nec est inconveniens, quia secundum Philosophum[^24] tria genera causarum possunt in unum coincidere. Et sic patet, quod etsi caritas sit principium boni operis, nihilominus potest esse finis secundum diversas comparationes. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quare caritas dicitur radix et forma virtutum et finis. Hoc enim dicitur secundum diversas comparationes nostrae voluntatis ad divinam voluntatem; dicitur etiam super hoc *vinculum perfectionis*[^25] in comparatione ad proximos, qui nobis iunguntur vinculo caritatis.

---

english:
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### Question II. *What is that end from whose goodness the will is good, and to which our wills ought to be referred so that they may be right.*

Secondly it is asked, what is that end from whose goodness the will is good, and to which our wills ought to be referred so that they may be right. And that such an end is charity is shown.

1. First to Timothy, chapter one[^1]: *The end of the precept is charity*; but those wills are to be referred to that end[^2] to which the precepts are referred; if therefore charity is the end of the precept, charity is the end of the good will.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter thirteen[^3]: *He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law*; and again: *The fullness of the law is love*; but wills are to be referred to that in which consists the fullness and consummation of the law; if therefore charity and love are of this kind, it is evident, etc.

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3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. Every good will is ordered to this, that man may enjoy God, and to this, that he may have God; but we do not enjoy God nor have him except through charity; therefore to have charity is nothing other than to have God; if therefore every good will is ordered to this, that it may have God; it is seen that the end of every good will is charity itself[^4].

4. Likewise, nature in acting intends finally the form perfecting in the being of nature[^5]: therefore the will in acting principally intends the form perfective in the being of morals; but the form or perfective habit of the will in the being of morals is charity itself: therefore charity is the principal end of every good will.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter ten[^6]: *Christ is the end of the law*; but the end of the law and of the good will is the same: therefore it seems that Christ is the principal end of the good will: therefore not charity.

2. Likewise, Bernard in the book *On Loving God*[^7]: «From love one comes into charity, and from charity one comes to wisdom»: therefore wisdom is more excellent than charity; but that ought to be set as the end of the good will which is most excellent: therefore the end of the good will is not charity, but wisdom.

3. Likewise, the end is that which is to be enjoyed; but charity is not to be enjoyed, because only the uncreated good is to be enjoyed[^8]: therefore it seems that charity is not the principal end of the good will. If you say that the end of the good will is not created charity, but uncreated; on the contrary, the Apostle[^9]: *The end of the precept is charity proceeding from a pure heart*, etc.; but charity proceeding from a pure heart and unfeigned faith is nothing but created charity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the end of the good will is that which, once had, the will seeks nothing beyond[^10]; but once charity is had, the will still seeks something beyond, namely God himself; nay, the greater the charity it has, the more it seeks: therefore it seems that charity does not have the character of an end.

5. Likewise, «what weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits[^11]»; but weight in bodies is in no way said to be the end of local motion: therefore love in spirits will in no way be said to be the end of the rational appetite, therefore neither of the will.

6. Likewise, end and principle are distinct; but charity is the root of all good affections[^12]: if therefore the end follows upon that which is toward the end, and charity is the root; it seems that it ought in no way to be called the end of the good will.

### Conclusion

> Charity is the end of every good will.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master[^13] rightly says, in that he assigns charity as the end of every good will; for in this he followed the doctrine of the Apostle and of blessed Augustine. For the Apostle expressly says that charity is the consummation of the precept and the fullness of the law. Augustine also says in the *Enchiridion* that «all the divine precepts are referred to charity». And in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^14] he shows that the whole of Scripture is ordered to commending the commandment of charity; and thus charity is not only the end of the good will, but also of all sacred Scripture and of the knowledge that is according to piety. — But although God, or beatitude, or Christ can be called the end of the good will; the Master nevertheless preferred to say that charity is the end, because the complete character of ending[^15] belongs to charity itself. For since "end" is said in three ways, namely the end in which one rests, and the end by which one rests; and the end by which one rests is said in two ways: either simply, or as for now; in each of these ways charity is the end of the good will. For uncreated charity, which is God, of which it is said in the first Canonical [Epistle] of John[^16]: *God is charity*, is the end in which one rests. But created and consummated charity, such as the charity of the homeland, is the end by which one rests simply in God. But inchoate charity, such as the charity of the way, is the end by which one rests in God as for now. For just as the thing located does not rest in its place except through the mediation of weight, so the soul cannot be brought to rest in God, who is its place and ultimate end, except through the mediation of love, which has to consider the good under the character of good. But the good under the character of good holds at once the character of end and of the lovable[^17]; and therefore the intention of the end is most chiefly attributed to charity. — The reasons therefore which show this are to be conceded.

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**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected, that Christ is the end of the precept; it must be said that by this it is not excluded that charity is the end. For although Christ is the end in which one rests, nonetheless charity can be the end by which we rest in Christ. Again, charity, insofar as it is the end in which we rest, belongs to the whole Trinity; and therefore these two can stand together, that Christ is the end of the law and charity likewise[^18].

2. To that which is objected, that from charity one arrives at wisdom, therefore wisdom is more excellent; it must be said that according as Bernard speaks there of wisdom, wisdom does not name a different gift than charity, but a new state of the same gift, so that charity taken commonly is distinguished from charity called [such] by appropriation. Yet according as charity is described commonly, so it contains both love and wisdom; and in this way it is set as the end of the precept[^19].

3. To that which is objected, that the end is that which is to be enjoyed; it must be said that according as "end" is said in two ways, namely that by which one rests, and that in which one rests, so to enjoy something is said in two ways: either as an object, or as a disposition; and in both ways we enjoy charity. For by charity, which is God, we enjoy as an object; by charity, which is a habit, we enjoy as a disposition; and thus it is evident that this does not oppose the proposition[^20].

4. To that which is objected, that the will rests once its end is had; it must be said that this is true when it has its end completely; charity, however, although it is had in the way, is nevertheless not had completely; *for the fire is in Sion, and the furnace in Jerusalem*[^21]. But when it shall be had in the homeland, nothing further will be sought, because through it the uncreated good will be had, in which consists the end and quieting of all our desires.

5. To that which is objected, that weight in bodies is not the end of motion; it must be said that it is not alike, because weight is found in bodies both in the absence of their due place and in its presence; but charity is never in the soul except when God is present. Hence everyone who has charity has God; and therefore, while all our action is ordered to having God, it is ordered to having charity. But it is not so with weight, because not every body having weight has its due place.

6. To that which is objected, that end and principle are diverse; some answer that charity is principle and end in a different way; for it is the principle of the good work according to inchoate being, and the end according to consummated and perfected being. For to this each one acts well, that in him the love and charity of God may be increased[^22]. — Otherwise it can be said, and more probably, that just as mode, species, and order are founded upon the same thing, and yet mode names a comparison to the efficient [cause], and species to the exemplar, and order names a comparison to the end[^23]; so charity in respect of the good work can have both the character of efficient [cause] and of end according to diverse comparisons. For charity continues our will to God himself as to the moving principle, and conforms it as to the directing rule, and joins it as to the quieting end; and therefore, just as God himself has the character of efficient [cause], insofar as he moves, and of formal, insofar as he directs, and of final, insofar as he quiets: so charity too in respect of the work has the character of this threefold cause; nor is it unfitting, because according to the Philosopher[^24] three genera of causes can coincide in one. And thus it is evident that although charity is the principle of the good work, nonetheless it can be the end according to diverse comparisons. — And by this is evident the response to that which was lastly asked, why charity is called the root and form of the virtues and the end. For this is said according to the diverse comparisons of our will to the divine will; it is also called upon this the *bond of perfection*[^25] in comparison to our neighbors, who are joined to us by the bond of charity.

---

la: Primae ad Timotheum 1, 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: First to Timothy 1:5. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Cod. D adiicit *ut est*; in codd. K Q a secunda manu additum est *ut ducit*; edd., excepta I, omissa voce *voluntatis*, exhibent *quae ducit*, codd. B H *ut ducit*.

en: Codex D adds *ut est*; in codices K Q, by a second hand, is added *ut ducit*; the editions, except the first, omitting the word *voluntatis*, give *quae ducit*; codices B H *ut ducit*.

la: Ad Romanos 13, 8. — Sequens textus est ibid. v. 10.

en: To the Romans 13:8. — The following text is in the same place, v. 10.

la: Principia, quibus hoc arg. innititur, habentur I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2; d. 17. p. I. q. 1. et supra d. 26. q. 2, praecipue ad I. — Paulo superius edd., excepta I, cum paucis codd. pro *ergo habere* substituunt *similiter habere*.

en: The principles on which this argument rests are found in I Sent. d. 1, a. 3, q. 2; d. 17, p. I, q. 1; and above, d. 26, q. 2, especially in reply to 1. — A little above, the editions, except the first, with a few codices, substitute *similiter habere* for *ergo habere*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 11 (c. 1.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 11 (c. 1).

la: Ad Romanos 10, 4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: To the Romans 10:4. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Pressius in libro de Natura et dignitate amoris (inter opera Bernardi), c. 2. n. 5, ubi legitur: *De amore [erigitur voluntas]... in caritatem, de caritate proficit in sapientiam*. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. fundam. 4. Ibid. d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ostenditur, *sapientiam* praestantissimum esse *donorum* Spiritus sancti.

en: More closely in the book *On the Nature and Dignity of Love* (among the works of Bernard), c. 2, n. 5, where it reads: *From love [the will is raised]... into charity; from charity it advances into wisdom*. Cf. III Sent. d. 35, q. 1, fundamentum 4. In the same place, d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, it is shown that *wisdom* is the most excellent of the *gifts* of the Holy Spirit.

la: Epist. I. Tim. 1, 5. — De caritate increata et creata vide supra d. 26. q. 2. et I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1.

en: Epistle, First to Timothy 1:5. — On uncreated and created charity see above, d. 26, q. 2, and I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 1.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Secundum Augustinum; cfr. supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Paulo inferius codd. T bb *dicitur* pro *dicetur*.

en: According to Augustine; cf. above p. 76, note 6. — A little below, codices T bb read *dicitur* for *dicetur*.

la: Vide hic dub. 2. et supra d. XXVI. lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: See here dubium 2, and above, d. XXVI, the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Hic c. 1, ubi etiam verba Apostoli et Augustini (Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32.) habentur.

en: Here, c. 1, where also are found the words of the Apostle and of Augustine (*Enchiridion* c. 121, n. 32).

la: Libr. I. c. 22-40. De *cognitione secundum pietatem* cfr. Enchirid. c. 2. n. 1. et XII. de Trin. c. 14. n. 22, ubi August. hanc cognitionem, iuxta illud Iob 28, 28: *Ecce pietas est sapientia* (Vulgata: *Ecce timor Domini, ipsa est sapientia*), vocat *sapientiam* eamque in *cultu Dei* (θεοσέβεια) se manifestare docet. Item, Apostolus 1. Tim. 6, 3 loquitur de eis qui non acquiescunt *ei quae secundum pietatem est doctrina*.

en: Book I, cc. 22–40. On *knowledge according to piety* cf. *Enchiridion* c. 2, n. 1, and *On the Trinity* XII, c. 14, n. 22, where Augustine, in accordance with that text of Job 28:28: *Behold, piety is wisdom* (Vulgate: *Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom*), calls it *wisdom* and teaches that it manifests itself in the *worship of God* (θεοσέβεια). Likewise, the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:3, speaks of those who do not consent *to that doctrine which is according to piety*.

la: Edd. I, 2, 3, 4 et plurimi codd., saltem a prima manu, minus apte *fruendi*. Vat. mox *dupliciter* pro *tripliciter*. Paulo inferius pro *vel ut nunc* codd. C F K O R S T *eo* etc. *vel non*. De locutione *finis, in quo quiescitur* et *finis, quo quiescitur*, vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Editions 1, 2, 3, 4 and most codices, at least by a first hand, less aptly *fruendi* [for *finiendi*]. The Vatican edition shortly *dupliciter* for *tripliciter*. A little below, for *vel ut nunc* codices C F K O R S T [read] *eo* etc. *vel non*. On the expression *the end in which one rests* and *the end by which one rests*, see the scholion on the preceding question.

en: Chapter 4:16.

la: Vide Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 2. — August., II. Enarrat. in Ps. 30. serm. 3. n. 8: *Vilescat totum quidquid praeter Deum est. Qui nos tuetur in loco vitae huius, ipse post istam vitam sit locus noster.*

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 2. — Augustine, *Enarrations on Psalm 30*, sermon 3, n. 8: *Let all become worthless that is besides God. May he who guards us in the place of this life be, after this life, our place.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo superius pro *quiescimus in Christo* cod. bb *quiescamus in Christo*, Vat. cum edd. *4 quiescitur in Christo*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little above, for *we rest in Christ* codex bb [reads] *we may rest in Christ*; the Vatican edition with the editions, *one rests in Christ*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 4.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. I, dubium 4.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 16.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 1, dubium 16.

en: Isaiah 31:9.

la: Vide infra dub. 2.

en: See below, dubium 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paululo superius codd. C L O S (F T a prima manu) *infundantur* pro *fundantur*; dein pro *ad exemplar* edd. 2, 3 *ad formam*, Vat. *ad formam vel exemplar*.

en: Cf. above, d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, and following. — A little above, codices C L O S (F T by a first hand) [read] *infundantur* for *fundantur*; then for *ad exemplar* editions 2, 3 [read] *ad formam*; the Vatican edition *ad formam vel exemplar*.

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. 70 (c. 7.).

en: *Physics* II, text 70 (c. 7).

la: Coloss. 3, 14. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Colossians 3:14. — See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus I.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum bonae voluntatis sit unus solus finis, an possint esse plures.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonae voluntatis sit unus solus finis, an possint esse plures. Et quod unus solus, videtur.

1. Deuteronomii sexto: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum* etc.; Glossa: «Non vult Deus suum amorem partiri, ut simul cum ipso aliud diligamus»[^1]: ergo quicumque sibi diversos constituit fines, non facit quod Deus vult; et si non facit quod Deus vult, non habet bonam voluntatem.

2. Item, super illud ad Philippenses primo[^2]: *Sive per occasionem, sive per bonam voluntatem;* Glossa: «Quisquis a Deo aliud quam Deum quaerit, non caste diligit»; sed nulla voluntas est bona, nisi illa quae eum caste diligit: ergo nulla voluntas est bona, quae aliud quam Deum quaerit.

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3. Item, sicut status est in primo principio, ita in fine ultimo; sed primum principium, in quo est status, non est nisi unicum[^3]: ergo si finis debet respondere principio, videtur, quod bonae voluntatis non debet statui nisi finis unus: ergo si voluntas statuit sibi fines plures, non facit quod debet: ergo non est bona.

4. Item, quicumque diversos fines intendit, habet cor suum divisum; sed qui cor suum dividit non diligit Deum ex toto corde nec in toto corde quaerit Deum; et quicumque talis est, Deo non placet, qui praecipit, se ex toto corde amari[^4], et vult totum cor possidere: ergo non videtur, quod bona voluntas possit esse, quae sibi statuit diversos fines.

**Sed contra:** 1. Super illud primae ad Corinthios nono[^5]: *Quoniam debet in spe qui arat* etc., Glossa: «Praedicator, qui corda aperit ad fidem, debet arare in spe stipendiorum temporalium»: ergo videtur, quod bona voluntas non tantum possit ponere sibi finem spiritualem, sed etiam temporalem: ergo videtur, quod diversos fines possit habere.

2. Item, Lucae decimo quinto[^6]: *Quanti mercenarii in domo patris mei;* ibi dicit Ambrosius, quod «multi sunt mercenarii, qui abundant spe, fide et caritate»; sed mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum, videlicet aliquam mercedem, quae est beatitudo creata. Si enim solum finem increatum sibi statueret, iam non esset mercenarius, sed filius: ergo si contingit, esse bonos mercenarios, contingit, bonam voluntatem habere fines diversos.

3. Item, bonum additum bono facit maius bonum: ergo si unus bonus finis facit voluntatem bonam, ergo multo fortius multi boni fines: ergo videtur, quod tanto voluntas melior sit, quanto plures statuit sibi bonos fines: ergo non est necesse, quod bona voluntas habeat unum solum finem.

4. Item, sicut concupiscibilis appetit dulcedinem, ita irascibilis appetit celsitudinem, et rationalis appetit pulcritudinem. Si ergo pulcritudo non tantum est finis rationalis, sed etiam perfectio, et sic de aliis, et plurium perfectibilium plures sunt perfectiones[^7]; cum sint in nobis tres vires diversae, quibus sursum convertimur, videlicet rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis: videtur, quod in omni bona actione et voluntate sit assignare diversos fines.

> **Conclusio.** Bonae voluntatis unus solus est finis principalis, sub quo possunt esse alii fines non principales.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod bonae voluntatis unus solus est finis principalis. Propter quod intelligendum, quod plures fines statuere hoc potest esse tripliciter. Uno modo ita, quod finis sit sub fine et propter finem; alio modo ita, quod unus sit finis principalis, alter non principalis, ita tamen, quod finis non principalis non referatur ad principalem actualiter; tertio modo ita, quod uterque sit finis principalis. — Exemplum autem huius assignari potest in eo quod frequenter accidit, videlicet, cum quis vadit ad ecclesiam ad percipiendas distributiones[^8]. Hoc enim potest facere tripliciter: aut ita, quod principaliter intendit honorem et gloriam Dei, cum vadit ibi decantare laudes; et simul cum hoc intendit obtinere pecuniam, ut pauperibus distribuat vel in alios usus licitos ad honorem Dei convertat. Alio modo potest aliquis ire ad ecclesiam, intendens Deo placere, et simul cum hoc pecuniam acquirere, ita tamen, quod eius acquisitionem ad Deum non refert, nec tamen ipsam pecuniam statuit finem principalem, pro eo quod ipsam non diligit propter se. Tertio modo vadit quis ad ecclesiam duplicata intentione, ita quod vult Deo placere, et vult obtinere pecuniam, quam sicut avarus appetit acquirere, ut possit thesaurum suum ampliare et in ea[^9] delectari propter se. — Primo modo statuere diversos fines est bonum et meritorium et pertinet ad bonam voluntatem. Secundo modo statuere diversos fines non est bonae voluntatis, loquendo formaliter; attamen non sic repugnat, quin possit cum ea stare; est enim ibi peccatum veniale, non mortale. Et hoc vult dicere Augustinus in libro Confessionum[^10], cum ait: «Minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat». Tertio vero modo statuere diversos fines non est

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bonae voluntatis, immo contra bonam voluntatem; talis enim vult duobus dominis servire; et hoc est impossibile, sicut Matthaei sexto[^11] dicitur. Quando enim sic principaliter duos intendit fines, verificatur illud propheticum: *Coangustatum est stratum, ita ut alter decidat, et pallium breve utrumque operire non potest;* et talis est voluntas hypocritarum, quibus vae damnationis aeternae comminatur Scriptura, pro eo quod terram ingrediuntur duabus viis. Et ideo dicitur Ecclesiastici primo[^12]: *Ne accesseris ad ipsum duplici corde; qui enim accedit in corde et corde, hypocrita est:* et quia gaudium hypocritae ad instar puncti est, ideo dicitur Oseae decimo: *Divisum est cor eorum, nunc interibunt.*

Sic igitur ex dictis colligitur, quod bonae voluntatis plures possunt esse fines, ita quod unus sit finis principalis, et alter non principalis sive finis sub fine. Plures autem constituere fines principales bonae voluntati repugnat, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Cum enim unum solum sit summum et verum bonum, quod quietat humanum desiderium; necesse est, quod voluntas bona, ad hoc quod recta sit, statuat sibi finem unicum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod qui arat debet in spe arare; dicendum, quod ipsa Glossa illam obiectionem dissolvit, dum se ipsam manifestat in sequentibus; facit enim vim in hoc quod dicitur *in spe,* non *propter spem.* Nam *propter* dicit finem principalem; *in* vero non tantummodo dicit finem principalem, immo finem, qui continetur infra finem. Et ideo ex illo verbo non sequitur, quod aliquis possit sibi plures fines principales statuere, immo, si recte intelligatur, potius sequitur oppositum[^13].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum; dicendum, quod est bonus mercenarius et malus; et malus mercenarius in duobus differt a bono. Primo quidem, quia malus mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum, quo habito non necessario habetur Deus; bonus vero mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum, quem habere non est aliud quam habere Deum, sicut ipsam fruitionem Dei. Secundo vero differt in hoc, quod malus mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum tanquam principalem; bonus vero mercenarius statuit sibi finem creatum tanquam finem sub fine; non enim amat Deum propter fruitionem, sed fruitionem propter Deum. Et ideo ex hoc non habetur, quod finis bonae voluntatis plurificetur[^14].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum additum bono facit maius bonum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando additio boni ad bonum fit salvo ordine. Cum enim bonitas necessario ponat ordinem[^15], si additio boni ad bonum tollat ordinem, bonum non anget, sed potius perimit. Quia ergo pluralitas finium principalium ordinem non servat, quia secundum rectum ordinem status debet esse in uno, et unicum debet esse ultimum; hinc est, quod pluralitas finium principalium bonitatem voluntatis non augmentat, sed potius ipsam voluntatem depravat, quia, dum vult placere uni, displicet alteri, et dum vult assequi unum, perdit reliquum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationalis appetit suam pulcritudinem, et concupiscibilis dulcedinem etc.; dicendum, quod pulcritudo[^16] et dulcedo potest dupliciter accipi: aut prout est perfectiva et informativa virtulis animae, aut prout est ipsius animae motiva. Primo modo tenet rationem finis sub fine, et sic plurificari potest secundum diversitatem dotum[^17] animae[^18]; secundo modo, prout scilicet tenet rationem obiecti et motivi, sic unitatem habet. Nam in Deo idem est pulcritudo, celsitudo et dulcedo; et sic tenet rationem finis principalis. — Et sic patet, quod quamvis plures fines non principales contingat constituere, tamen ad hoc quod voluntas sit bona, necesse est, unum solum finem esse principalem. Nam aliter non diligitur Deus ex toto corde.

english:
### Article I.
### Question III. *Whether a good will has one sole end, or whether there can be several.*

Thirdly it is asked whether a good will has one sole end, or whether there can be several. And that there is one sole end seems [to be the case].

1. Deuteronomy 6: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God* etc.; the Gloss: «God does not will to divide His love, so that together with Him we should love something else»[^1]: therefore whoever sets up for himself diverse ends does not do what God wills; and if he does not do what God wills, he does not have a good will.

2. Likewise, upon that text of Philippians 1[^2]: *Whether by occasion, or by good will;* the Gloss: «Whoever seeks from God something other than God does not love chastely»; but no will is good except that which loves Him chastely: therefore no will is good which seeks something other than God.

3. Likewise, just as there is a resting-place in the first principle, so also in the last end; but the first principle, in which there is a resting-place, is but one[^3]: therefore if the end ought to correspond to the principle, it seems that for a good will there ought to be set up but one end: therefore if the will sets up for itself several ends, it does not do what it ought: therefore it is not good.

4. Likewise, whoever intends diverse ends has his heart divided; but he who divides his heart does not love God with his whole heart, nor seek God with his whole heart; and whoever is such does not please God, who commands that He be loved with the whole heart[^4], and wills to possess the whole heart: therefore it does not seem that there can be a good will which sets up for itself diverse ends.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that text of First Corinthians 9[^5]: *For he that plougheth ought to plough in hope* etc., the Gloss: «The preacher, who opens hearts to faith, ought to plough in hope of temporal stipends»: therefore it seems that a good will can set for itself not only a spiritual end, but also a temporal one: therefore it seems that it can have diverse ends.

2. Likewise, Luke 15[^6]: *How many hired servants in my father's house;* there Ambrose says that «there are many hired servants who abound in hope, faith, and charity»; but a hired servant sets up for himself a created end, namely some reward, which is a created beatitude. For if he set up for himself only the uncreated end, he would no longer be a hired servant, but a son: therefore if it happens that there are good hired servants, it happens that a good will has diverse ends.

3. Likewise, good added to good makes a greater good: therefore if one good end makes the will good, then much more several good ends: therefore it seems that the will is the better in proportion as it sets up for itself the more good ends: therefore it is not necessary that a good will have one sole end.

4. Likewise, just as the concupiscible [power] seeks sweetness, so the irascible seeks loftiness, and the rational seeks beauty. If therefore beauty is not only the end of the rational [power], but also a perfection, and so of the others, and of several perfectibles there are several perfections[^7]; since there are in us three diverse powers by which we are turned upward, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible: it seems that in every good action and will there is to be assigned diverse ends.

> **Conclusion.** A good will has one sole principal end, under which there can be other, non-principal ends.

**I respond:** It must be said that a good will has one sole principal end. On account of which it must be understood that to set up several ends can be in three ways. In one way, so that the end is under an end and for the sake of an end; in another way, so that one is the principal end, the other non-principal, yet in such wise that the non-principal end is not actually referred to the principal; in a third way, so that each is a principal end. — But an example of this can be assigned in that which frequently happens, namely, when someone goes to church to receive the distributions[^8]. For he can do this in three ways: either so that he principally intends the honor and glory of God, when he goes there to sing praises; and together with this he intends to obtain money, that he may distribute it to the poor or convert it to other lawful uses for the honor of God. In another way someone can go to church, intending to please God, and together with this to acquire money, yet in such wise that he does not refer its acquisition to God, nor does he set up the money itself as a principal end, for the reason that he does not love it for its own sake. In a third way someone goes to church with a doubled intention, so that he wills to please God, and wills to obtain money, which like a miser he seeks to acquire, that he may enlarge his treasure and delight in it[^9] for its own sake. — In the first way, to set up diverse ends is good and meritorious and pertains to a good will. In the second way, to set up diverse ends does not belong to a good will, formally speaking; yet it is not so repugnant that it cannot stand with it; for there is here a venial sin, not a mortal one. And this is what Augustine wishes to say in the book of the Confessions[^10], when he says: «He loves Thee less who loves something together with Thee, which he does not love for Thy sake». But in the third way, to set up diverse ends does not belong

to a good will, nay rather is against a good will; for such a one wills to serve two masters; and this is impossible, as is said in Matthew 6[^11]. For when one thus principally intends two ends, that prophetic [word] is verified: *The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out, and the short covering cannot cover both;* and such is the will of hypocrites, against whom Scripture threatens the woe of eternal damnation, for the reason that they enter the earth by two ways. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticus 1[^12]: *Come not to him with a double heart; for he who comes in heart and heart is a hypocrite:* and because the joy of the hypocrite is as the size of a point, therefore it is said in Hosea 10: *Their heart is divided, now they shall perish.*

Thus therefore from what has been said it is gathered that a good will can have several ends, so that one is the principal end, and the other non-principal or an end under an end. But to set up several principal ends is repugnant to a good will, as the reasons show which are adduced for the first part. For since there is but one supreme and true good which quiets human desire, it is necessary that a good will, in order to be right, set up for itself one sole end.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that he who ploughs ought to plough in hope; it must be said that the Gloss itself dissolves that objection, while it manifests itself in what follows; for it lays stress on this, that it is said *in hope,* not *for the sake of hope.* For *for the sake of* denotes a principal end; *in,* however, does not only denote a principal end, but rather an end which is contained beneath an end. And therefore from that word it does not follow that one can set up for himself several principal ends, nay, if it be rightly understood, rather the opposite follows[^13].

2. To that which is objected, that the hired servant sets up for himself a created end; it must be said that there is a good hired servant and a bad one; and the bad hired servant differs from the good in two respects. First indeed, because the bad hired servant sets up for himself a created end, which being had, God is not necessarily had; but the good hired servant sets up for himself a created end which to have is nothing other than to have God, namely the very fruition of God. Secondly he differs in this, that the bad hired servant sets up for himself a created end as a principal one; but the good hired servant sets up for himself a created end as an end under an end; for he does not love God for the sake of the fruition, but the fruition for the sake of God. And therefore from this it is not had that the end of a good will is multiplied[^14].

3. To that which is objected, that good added to good makes a greater good; it must be said that this is true when the addition of good to good is made with the order preserved. For since goodness necessarily posits order[^15], if the addition of good to good takes away the order, it does not increase the good, but rather destroys it. Since therefore a plurality of principal ends does not preserve order, because according to right order the resting-place ought to be in one, and the last [end] ought to be one; hence it is that a plurality of principal ends does not augment the goodness of the will, but rather depraves the will itself, because, while it wills to please one, it displeases another, and while it wills to attain one, it loses the other.

4. To that which is objected, that the rational [power] seeks its own beauty, and the concupiscible sweetness etc.; it must be said that beauty[^16] and sweetness can be taken in two ways: either as it is perfective and informative of the virtue of the soul, or as it is motive of the soul itself. In the first way it holds the character of an end under an end, and so can be multiplied according to the diversity of the soul's endowments[^17][^18]; in the second way, namely as it holds the character of object and motive, thus it has unity. For in God beauty, loftiness, and sweetness are the same; and so it holds the character of a principal end. — And so it is clear that although it may happen that several non-principal ends be set up, yet, in order that the will be good, it is necessary that one sole end be principal. For otherwise God is not loved with the whole heart.

la: Vers. 5. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum.

en: Verse 5 [Deut. 6:5]. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one, is found in Strabo and Lyra.

la: Vers. 18; ubi Vulg., quam sequitur Vat., *sive per veritatem* pro *sive per bonam voluntatem.* — Glossa, quam Lyranus exhibet, sumta est ex August., Serm. 137. (alias 49. de Verbis Domini) c. 8. n. 9. In textu origin. Glossae pro *diligit* legitur *quaerit.* — In edd., excepta 1, minor sic sonat: *sed illa voluntas bona est, quae non aliud quam Deum diligit.*

en: Verse 18 [Phil. 1:18]; where the Vulgate, which the Vatican edition follows, reads *whether by truth* for *whether by good will.* — The Gloss, which Lyra presents, is taken from Augustine, *Sermon* 137 (alias 49, On the Words of the Lord), c. 8, n. 9. In the original text of the Gloss, for *loves* is read *seeks.* — In the editions, except the first, the minor [premise] runs thus: *but that will is good which loves nothing other than God.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 26, nota 11, in fine, et I. Sent. d. 2, q. 1. — De ipso arg. cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 26, note 11, at the end, and I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 1. — On the argument itself cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 7.

la: Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37; Prov. 23, 26: *Praebe, fili mi, cor tuum mihi.* Oseae 10, 2: *Divisum est cor eorum, nunc interibunt.* Vide infra in corp. quaest. — Pro *amari* cod. T *diligi.*

en: Deut. 6:5; Matt. 22:37; Prov. 23:26: *Give me, my son, thy heart.* Hosea 10:2: *Their heart is divided, now they shall perish.* See below in the body of the question. — For *to be loved* codex T reads *to be cherished.*

la: Vers. 10. — Glossam, quae apud Lyranum ut interlinearis habetur, vide apud Petr. Lombardum in hunc locum. In Glossa pro *ad fidem* non pauci codd., inter quos F K T Y ee, cum primis edd. *vel fidem.*

en: Verse 10 [1 Cor. 9:10]. — The Gloss, which in Lyra is given as interlinear, see in Peter Lombard on this passage. In the Gloss, for *to faith* not a few codices, among them F K T Y ee, with the first editions read *or faith.*

la: Vers. 17. — Verba integra, quibus Ambrosius hunc locum exponit (VII. n. 220.) vide tom. I. pag. 34, nota 6, et S. Bonav., Commentar. in Ioan. n. 731. — Pro *Ambrosius* cod. C substituit *Glossa Ambrosii.*

en: Verse 17 [Luke 15:17]. — The full words by which Ambrose expounds this passage (VII, n. 220), see vol. I, p. 34, note 6, and St. Bonaventure, *Commentary on John*, n. 731. — For *Ambrose* codex C substitutes *the Gloss of Ambrose.*

la: De principiis huius arg. cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 11.) et III. c. 3, ubi locum argumentandi assignat ex appositione. — In maiori pro *additum* codd. F K T et alii cum ed. 1 *addito.*

en: On the principles of this argument cf. Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 4 (c. 11) and III, c. 3, where he assigns a place of arguing from juxtaposition. — In the major [premise], for *added* codices F K T and others, with the first edition, read *with the addition.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 225, nota 6. — Paulo superius pro *ei* sic cod. Y *sicut,* codd. F I K T ee etc. cum edd. 1, 2 *sic* tantum.

en: Cf. above, p. 225, note 6. — A little above, for *in it* thus codex Y reads *as,* codices F I K T ee etc. with editions 1, 2 read *thus* only.

la: B. Albert., hic a. 3. refert: *In multis ecclesiis consuetudo est dare denarium venientibus ad matutinas, ut libentius veniant.*

en: Bl. Albert, here a. 3, reports: *In many churches the custom is to give a denarius to those coming to matins, that they may come more willingly.*

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *in eo.*

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads *in it [masc.].*

en: [Augustine, *Confessions*] Book X, c. 29, n. 40.

la: Vers. 24. — Seq. textus est Isai. 28, 20; tertius est Eccli. 2, 14: *Vae duplici corde... et peccatori terram ingredienti duabus viis.*

en: Verse 24 [Matt. 6:24]. — The following text is Isa. 28:20; the third is Sir. 2:14: *Woe to the double heart... and to the sinner who enters the earth by two ways.*

la: Vers. 36. — Seq. textus est Ps. 11, 3: *In corde et corde locuti sunt;* tertius est Iob 20, 5; quartus loc. cit. v. 2.

en: Verse 36 [Sir. 1:36]. — The following text is Ps. 11:3: *They have spoken in heart and heart;* the third is Job 20:5; the fourth, the cited place, v. 2.

la: Similis huic obiectio solvitur I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 9.

en: A similar objection to this is solved in I *Sent.* d. 1, dubium 9.

la: De quo vide supra d. 33. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Pro *necessario ponat ordinem* cod. T *necessario ordinet et ponat ordinem.*

en: On which see above, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — For *necessarily posits order* codex T reads *necessarily orders and posits order.*

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt *celsitudo.*

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add *loftiness.*

la: Cod. N *virium.*

en: Codex N reads *of the powers.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Supposita distinctione inter finem ultimum (principalem) et proximum, patet, unum tantum esse finem principalem in una actione, et unum eundemque finem ultimum esse omnium bonarum actionum et voluntatum. Finis enim rei semper respondet eius principio; primum autem et supremum principium omnium bonarum voluntatum est unum, scil. Deus: ergo et unus finis ultimus. Plura autem et diversa possunt esse proxima principia motiva, et per consequens plures et diversi fines boni proximi (cfr. seq. quaest.). Pluralitas autem finium proximorum non excludit unitatem finis ultimi, quia omnia creata mediante fine proprio referuntur ad finem ultimum, omnibus communem. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 4. m. 1. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. n. 22. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. 1. II. q. 1. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 135. q. incid. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

**II.** Quoad seq. quaestionem omnes concedunt, respectu finis principalis aliud dicendum esse de bonis voluntatibus, aliud de malis, ut explicatur in textu. De hac (4.) quaestione specialiter agunt B. Albert., hic a. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Granted the distinction between the last (principal) end and the proximate, it is clear that there is but one principal end in a single action, and one and the same last end of all good actions and wills. For the end of a thing always corresponds to its principle; but the first and supreme principle of all good wills is one, namely God: therefore also there is one last end. But there can be several and diverse proximate motive principles, and consequently several and diverse good proximate ends (cf. the following question). But a plurality of proximate ends does not exclude the unity of the last end, because all created things, by means of their proper end, are referred to the last end, common to all. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 4, m. 1. — Scotus, IV *Sent.* d. 49, q. 2, n. 22 ff. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; *Summa* I-II, q. 1, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; *Summa* p. II, tr. 22, q. 135, incidental q. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2.

**II.** As to the following question, all concede that, with respect to the principal end, one thing is to be said of good wills, another of bad ones, as is explained in the text. Of this (fourth) question there treat especially Bl. Albert, here a. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4; Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p885..887-{L,R}-*.png`) under the Vol II PDF-priority inversion, cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 61591–61749 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). Fresh literal English translation.
- **Page-split map:** quaestio spans printed pp. 885–887 (PDF 907–909, offset +22). p.885: q3 opener (L-col bottom) + fund. 1–2 (the Deut/Phil glosses) → footnotes [^1]–[^2]. p.886: fund. 3–4, Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo + exemplum → [^3]–[^11]. p.887: Respondeo tail (duobus dominis / hypocrita), recapitulation, replies Ad 1–4, Scholion I–II → [^12]–[^18].
- **Apparatus:** 18 entries. Quaracchi restarts footer numbering per printed page; rendered continuous here. p.885 footers 9 (Vers. 5 Glossa ordinaria → [^1]) and 10 (Vers. 18 ad Philippenses → [^2]) were **picked up from the a1-q2 hand-off** — they are q3's opening-fundamenta markers though physically printed in p.885's lower footer block. p.886 footers 1–9 → [^3]–[^11]; p.887 footers 1–7 → [^12]–[^18].
- **Scholion:** present (Scholion I–II) at the foot of p.887. (Earlier articles' q1 carries the cross-reference "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." for some markers; this q3 has its own scholion.)
- **Hand-off forwarded to a1-q4:** q4 opener "Quarto quaeritur, utrum malae voluntates communicent in fine..." begins at raw line 61753 (printed p.887 R-col bottom → p.888). No shared-footer carryover identified from this q3's p.887 footer block into q4 (q4's first markers begin its own p.887/888 footer sequence).
- **[?] flags:** none. Body-marker placement for [^8] (p.886 footer 6, "ei sic" lemma) and [^16] (p.887 footer 5, "ponat ordinem") was set by lemma cue against the printed footers; both match the PDF column bands.