site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 3, Art. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Utrum possint simul stare trinitas et summa simplicitas.*

Deinde quaeritur circa hoc, utrum simul possint stare trinitas et summa simplicitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur pluribus rationibus.

1. Simplicius est ens abstractum quam concretum[^p73-5]: ergo simplicior est natura nullum habens suppositum, quam natura existens in pluribus hypostasibus; sed trinitas ponit existentiam naturae in pluribus hypostasibus: ergo diminuit de summa simplicitate.

2. Item, simplicius est idem diverso[^p73-6]: ergo omne illud, in quo est omnimoda identitas, est simplicius, quam in quo reperitur aliqua quantulacumque diversitas; sed non potest esse trinitas sine quantulacumque diversitate: ergo non potest stare cum summa simplicitate.

3. Item, commune simplicius est proprio, sicut patet, quia proprium implicat in se commune et amplius; sed non potest esse trinitas vera, quin sint

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trium personarum propria distincta et incommunicabilia[^p74-1]: ergo impossibile est ponere trinitatem, quin in ea ponatur aliquis recessus a summa simplicitate.

4. Item, omne absolutum est simplicius respectivo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus[^p74-2], « omne relativum est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur »; unde respectivum includit absolutum; sed non potest esse trinitas personarum sine pluralitate respectuum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne definiens simplicius est definito; sed natura cadit in ratione personae[^p74-3]: ergo simplicior est semper natura quam persona: ergo non potest ratio personalitatis stare cum summa simplicitate. Sed trinitas non potest esse nisi in personis: ergo trinitas repugnat summae simplicitati.

6. Item, pars semper simplicior est toto; sed trinitatis pars est unitas, et trium personarum una persona: ergo si trinitas ponit veram pluralitatem, et vera pluralitas ponit veram totalitatem, et vera totalitas excludit summam[^p74-4] simplicitatem: ergo *a primo*, trinitas non potest stare cum summa simplicitate.

7. Item, punctus semper est simplicior continuo, ergo et unitas numero: ergo simplicior est personae unitas quam personarum trinitas; sed quod habet aliquid simplicius se non est summe simplex: ergo impossibile est, trinitatem compati summam simplicitatem.

8. Item, aut persona *est* aeque simplex, sicut essentia, aut *non*. Si *non*: ergo aut persona non est in divinis, aut divinum *esse* non est simplicissimum; si autem *aeque simplex*, sicut essentia; sed essentia propter summam simplicitatem non compatitur plures essentias divinas[^p74-5]: ergo pari ratione neque persona.

9. Item, aut persona addit aliquid supra naturam secundum *esse et intellectum*, aut secundum *intellectum solum*, aut secundum *neutrum*. Si primo modo: ergo cadit cum[^p74-6] simplicitate summa; si secundo modo: ergo intellectus vanus et falsus est, cui nihil respondet in re; si tertio modo: ergo sicut natura non plurificatur, ita nec persona.

10. Item, aut quidquid convenit personae *convenit* naturae, et e converso, aut *non*. Si *sic*: ergo cum persona distinguatur, distingueretur et natura, et ita non erit ibi summe simplex; si *non*; sed affirmatio et negatio non sunt verae de eodem et secundum idem[^p74-7]: ergo secundum aliud et aliud; quod autem habet hoc, est compositum: ergo etc.

11. Item, aut una persona omnino *differt* ab alia, aut *omnino convenit*, aut *partim convenit* et *partim differt*. Si *omnino convenit*: ergo nihil habet proprium, ergo non distinguitur; si autem *omnino differt*: ergo si una est Deus, altera non est Deus; si *partim convenit* et *partim differt*: cum hoc non sit secundum idem, erit compositum[^p74-8].

12. Item, cum una persona communicat alii, aut communicat ei *quidquid habet*, aut *non*. Si *non*: ergo aliquid sui dat et aliquid retinet, ergo est composita et avara. Si *quidquid habet*: ergo sicut communicat ei suam quidditatem, ita et personalitatem. — *Si dicas*, quod personalitas non est communicabilis; *contra* est: quia ita est simplex, sicut natura, ut dicis: ergo sicut natura communicabilis est, ita videtur, quod persona[^p74-9].

13. Item, proprietas personae aut est *aliquid*, aut *nihil*. Si *nihil*: ergo nihil facit, ergo non distinguit illud, in quo est; si *aliquid*, aut *est in essentia*, aut *non*. Si *est in essentia*; sed proprietas distinguit illud, in quo est: ergo natura et essentia numerantur; quod est contra trinitatem. Si *non est in essentia*, sed in persona: ergo aliquid secundum rem est in persona, quod non est in essentia: ergo necesse est, quod proprietas faciat personam compositam.

14. Item, proprietas personae est relatio; aut ergo *transit* in substantiam, sicut alia genera[^p74-10], aut *non transit*. Si *transit*: ergo sicut substantia non distinguitur nec distinguit, ita nec proprietas: ergo non est trinitas. Si *non transit*: ergo aliquid ultra substantiam dicit, ergo diminuit de ratione simplicitatis: si ergo non potest esse sine proprietatibus, ergo impossibile est, quod stet cum summa simplicitate.

15. Item, punctus, sicut suis relationibus non componitur, ita nec realiter numeratur: si ergo Deus puncto est simplicior, ergo nullo modo est in eo aliqua realis distinctio.

16. Item, prius est absolutum respectivo[^p74-11]: ergo distinctio secundum proprietatem *absolutam* ea prior est, quae est secundum *respectivam*; sed quanto aliquid prius, tanto simplicius: si ergo distinctio secundum absolutas non stat cum summa simplicitate, ergo nec distinctio secundum respectivas.

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**Contra:** 1. Contingit reperire aliquid *simplex*, quia est unum in uno, et aliquid *amplius simplex*, quia est unum in pluribus multiplicatum; quod est simplicius, quia unum in pluribus, sicut universale[^p75-1], sed tamen non summe, quia numeratur: ergo si aliquid esset unum in pluribus non multiplicatum, illud esset *simplicissimum*; sed hoc attribuendum est divino *esse*, quod est simplicissimum: ergo trinitas non tollit simplicitatem divinae essentiae.

2. Item, pluralitas *naturarum* non repugnat simplicitati *personae*, sicut patet in Christo[^p75-2]: ergo si magis facit ad compositionem *naturarum diversitas* quam *personarum pluralitas*, videtur, quod multo fortius pluralitas personarum simplicitatem naturae in nullo diminuat: stat igitur etc.

3. Item, Deus potest creare sine omni suae simplicitatis diminutione: ergo si generare et spirare est actus intrinsecus, multo fortius generat et spirat, manente simplicitate summa. Sed quia generat et spirat, est trinitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, *intelligere* est actus, qui simplicitati in nullo repugnat, sed magis attestatur et consonat; sed mens quaecumque se intelligendo generat sui similitudinem, quae dicitur *verbum* a generante distinctum[^p75-3]: ergo sicut cum summa simplicitate stare potest actus intelligendi, ita etiam generatio, et pari ratione productio Spiritus sancti: ergo videtur, quod tota trinitas simul stet cum summa simplicitate.

5. Item, ut dicit Augustinus sexto de Trinitate[^p75-4], « in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius »; sed in beata Trinitate quaelibet persona est optima: ergo non sunt aliquid melius tres quam unum, ergo nec maius. Sed in omni compositione ponitur aliquid additum, quod est aliquo modo amplius: ergo illa summa trinitas nullam omnino ponit compositionem: ergo in nullo repugnat simplicitati.

6. Item, summa simplicitas non excludit, sed includit summam perfectionem; summa perfectio non excludit, sed includit pluralitatem: ergo *a primo*, summa simplicitas pluralitatem personarum non excludit, sed includit: ergo non repugnat, sed maxime consonat.

7. Item, summa simplicitas non excludit, sed includit summam potentiam et virtutem, quia, sicut supra[^p75-5] probatum est, quanto aliqua virtus magis est unita, tanto magis est infinita; sed summa virtus et actualissima ponit summam et perfectissimam communicationem et productionem, et hoc ponit trinitatem: ergo simul stat necessario trinitas et summa simplicitas.

8. Item, lux dicitur de substantia spirituali et corporali, et spirituali creata et increata secundum quandam proportionem et analogiam; sed productio splendoris materialis nihil diminuit de simplicitate lucis materialis, productio etiam lucis spiritualis, utpote intelligentiae sive verbi a mente, nihil diminuit de simplicitate substantiae intellectivae: ergo productio aeterni Splendoris a Patre nihil diminuit de simplicitate lucis aeternae.

9. Item, simplicitas puncti et unitatis et cuiuslibet principii creati non excludit, sed includit pluralitatem relationum et respectuum, et hoc modo non est imperfectionis, sed perfectionis; sed omne tale est Deo attribuendum: ergo circa Deum non repugnat simplicitas summa et pluralitas relationum. Sed « relatio multiplicat trinitatem », ut dicit Boethius[^p75-6]: ergo etc.

10. Item, ubi non est materia et situs, non potest esse separatio: productio ergo abstrahens a ratione situs et materiae non ponit aliquam separationem: ergo stat cum omnimoda indivisione, ergo et cum omnimoda simplicitate. Si ergo tali productione producuntur personae in Trinitate, simul ergo stare potest trinitas cum summa simplicitate.

**CONCLUSIO.**

*Trinitas personarum non tollit summam simplicitatem, nec summa simplicitas excludit trinitatem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod primum principium simul est trinum et simplicissimum, ita quod nec trinitas tollit summam simplicitatem, nec summa simplicitas excludit trinitatem; et hoc quidem certissime per fidem tenemus.

Ut autem aliquatenus intelligamus, duo oportet hic praenotare: primo, diversos modos *distinctionum personalium*, secundo, diversos modos *attributionum divinarum*.

Quantum ad primum intelligendum, quod, sicut dicit Richardus de Trinitate[^p75-7], tribus modis distinguitur persona a persona, scilicet *origine tantum, qualitate tantum, origine et qualitate simul*. Primus modus est in divinis, secundus in angelicis spiritibus, tertius in hominibus. — Homines enim distinguuntur ab invicem *qualitate* propter diversitatem accidentium et proprietatum, quibus unum individuum ab altero discernitur[^p75-8]; *origine* vero, quia unus homo ab alio nascitur. — Angeli autem, quia differunt

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substantiis et proprietatibus formalibus, distinguuntur *qualitate*; sed quia unus ab alio non procedit, non distinguuntur *origine*. — Personae autem divinae, quia omnino unum sunt in substantia et forma et nulla habent accidentia, non distinguuntur *qualitate*, sed *sola origine*; illa autem *origo* est ipsius personae non per aliquid aliud, sed per se ipsam, ita quod, sicut Deus se ipso intelligit et est suus intellectus, ita Pater se ipso generat et est ipsa generatio, similiter Filius sua filiatio: si ergo est ibi verissima origo, verissima est personalis distinctio. — *Rursus*, si persona est sua origo, nulla est omnino in persona compositio, ac per hoc ita simplex est, sicut essentia: est igitur omnimoda secundum *rem* indifferentia inter personam et essentiam, et personam et proprietatem et essentiam. Unde vere *persona* est essentia et proprietas, et *essentia* proprietas et persona, et *proprietas* persona et essentia[^p76-1]. Quomodo ergo potest intelligi aliqua compositio in tanta indifferentia? Necesse est igitur in tali distinctione personarum omnimodam intelligere simplicitatem: ex quo ergo impossibile est intelligere aliquam compositionem, non repugnant trinitas personae intellectae et simplicitas summa. — Multum ergo valet ad hoc videndum inspicere modos *distinctionum personalium*, quos ignorantes haeretici erraverunt.

*Rursus*, attendendi sunt diversi modi *attributionum divinarum*. Est enim differentia quantum ad *modos essendi* et quantum ad *modos se habendi* et quantum ad *rationes intelligendi*. — In divinis igitur quantum ad *esse* vel essentiam non potest reperiri diversitas sive differentia, quia illud *esse* est unum et simplicissimum; nec etiam quantum ad *modum essendi absolutum*, quia, sicut in Deo non est aliud ens *essentia* et *esse*, sic non est differens *esse* et *sic esse*. Et ratio huius est, quia in Deo idem est *posse* et *esse*, et non est dicere, quod possit sic et aliter esse. Et ideo, quia *modi essendi* sunt idem quod *essentia*, omnia praedicata dicentia modum *absolutum* transeunt in substantiam, relatione excepta, quae dicit *modum essendi respectivum*; qui modus dicendi in comparatione *ad subiectum* transit in substantiam, ut hypostasis sit sua proprietas, ne inducatur compositio; sed manet in comparatione *ad terminum*, ut vera salvetur distinctio. Differentia enim relationis a *subiecto in quo* inducit *compositionem*; sed differentia a *termino ad quem* non inducit nisi solam *distinctionem*. Cum ergo in divinis non reperiatur differentia, nec quantum ad *essentiam* nec quantum ad *esse* nec quantum ad *absolutos modos essendi*; reperitur tamen tribus modis praedictis. Differentia namque quantum ad *modos essendi*[^p76-2] est in personis ad invicem: quia, licet idem *esse* habeant, tamen alio modo, quia una a se, alia vero ab alio; et haec est tanta diversitas, ut non permittat, unam personam dici de alia. Illi enim modi, sicut prius ostensum est, licet non inducant *compositionem*, faciunt tamen veram *distinctionem*.

Differentia vero quantum ad *modos se habendi* est in personis ad essentiam relatis. Quoniam enim oriri est ipsius personae, non essentiae; ideo persona refertur et se habet ad alteram, essentia non; et hinc est, quod una distinguitur, scilicet persona, et non altera, scilicet essentia. Et ex hac differentia non fit, quod una *removeatur* ab altera, fit tamen, ut possit *aliquid dici* de persona, quod non dicitur de essentia, et e converso. Et ex hac differentia nascitur triplex modus dicendi in divinis, scilicet in *quid* et in *quis* et in *quae*, scilicet *notio, persona* et *essentia*; et inde est, quod, supposita *persona*, non supponitur *notio* nec e converso, et similiter de *essentia*. Sed ex variatione talium modorum introducitur *figura dictionis*[^p76-3] in divinis, sicut patet consideranti.

Differentia vero quantum ad *rationes intelligendi* est in proprietatibus *essentialibus*, quae omnino idem sunt, sicut veritas et bonitas; tamen noster intellectus intelligit per diversa et sub alia ratione et alia, et ideo aliter nominat; et haec est minima differentia, quae possit inveniri circa divina, quia magis est ex parte nostri quam Dei. — Stat igitur summa simplicitas non solum cum personali distinctione, sed etiam cum multiformi attributione. Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad hanc partem; ad oppositas vero satis facile est respondere.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod simplicius est ens abstractum quam concretum; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet in eo, in quo differt forma et suppositum, in quo quidem est *abstractio* et *concretio* ex parte rei; in divinis autem proprie non ponitur *concretio* nisi ex parte nostri. — Similiter quod dicit, quod simplicius est unum non in pluribus quam in pluribus; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, ubi aliquid plus est in pluribus quam in uno, sicut est in numero; non sic autem est in proposito, quia ita complete et perfecte est divina essentia et natura in una suarum hypostasum, sicut in tribus[^p76-4].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicius est idem diverso etc.; dicendum, quod est diversitas sive distinctio, quae venit ex *additione*, sicut illa quae est inter diversas species, quae distinguuntur per diversas differentias additas supra genus; et est distinctio veniens non ex *additione*, sed ex *origine*;

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et haec est in divinis personis, quae distinguuntur ex eo, quod una manat ab altera; et haec nullam ponit compositionem, secundum quod explicatum fuit in principali solutione.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod commune simplicius est proprio; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, ubi *commune* arctatur et contrahitur per *proprium*; tunc enim ratione arctantis et contrahentis admittit et compositionem et distinctionem, sicut apparet in universali et particulari; hoc autem modo non est reperire commune in divinis, quia essentia, licet sit communis in divinis, non tamen contrahitur nec arctatur nec distinguitur in personis[^p77-1].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne absolutum simplicius est respectivo; dicendum, quod respectivum est duplex: quoddam, quod dicit respectum ad aliud *diversum secundum essentiam*; quoddam, quod non dicit respectum nisi ad aliquid sibi *consubstantiale*. Primo modo respectivum includit quandam dependentiam, ac per hoc et defectum dicit a simplicitate summa; secundo modo non dicit aliquam dependentiam nec defectum a simplicitate summa, maxime quando ipsum suppositum est sua proprietas, qua refertur; et hoc modo ponitur respectus in proprietatibus divinarum personarum, non primo modo, et ita nulla ex hoc introducitur compositio. — Et *si obiiciatur*, quod « relativum omne est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur »; dicendum: si primo modo intelligatur, quod veritatem habet non solum ex parte *rationis intelligendi*, verum etiam ex parte *rei*; si secundo modo intelligatur, veritatem habet ex parte *rationis intelligendi*, quia Pater praeter rationem relationis importat hypostasim, quae tamen non est aliud a sua proprietate personali.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne definiens simplicius est definito; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet de definitione *formali* et *in recto*, ubi definientia sunt partes essentiales, constituentes ipsum definitum. Non sic autem est in proposito: tum quia personae divinae, proprie loquendo, definiri non habent; tum etiam, quia natura non cadit in definitione personae *in recto*; tum etiam, quia definitio illa potius respicit intentionem *nominis* personae et naturae, secundum quod venit in intellectu nostro, quam respiciat ipsam secundum *esse* suum proprium, quod nec comprehendi habet nec definiri propter summam simplicitatem et immensitatem *esse* divini[^p77-2].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pars semper est simplicior toto; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed quod assumit, quod trinitatis pars est una personarum, falsum est, quia omne totum dicit aliquid maius quam sua pars. Ut autem saepe dictum est, nihil maius est in tribus personis quam in una; quaelibet enim personarum est summe ens et vera et bona; ideo licet trinitas in divinis ponat rationem *pluralitatis*, non tamen ponit propter hoc rationem *verae totalitatis*[^p77-3].

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod punctus est semper simplicior continuo, et unitas numero; dicendum, quod veritatem habet de numero *vero*, qui est aggregatio diversarum unitatum; sed non talis numerus est in trinitate divinarum personarum, pro eo quod non est ibi aggregatio multarum unitatum, sicut nec entitatum nec veritatum, sed est eiusdem unitatis replicatio circa alium et alium; et hoc importat ipsum vocabulum, quod dicitur *trinitas*, id est unitas trium[^p77-4].

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut persona est aeque simplex, sicut essentia, aut non; dicendum, quod est aeque simplex secundum rem. — Et quod obiicit ultra, quod essentia propter summam simplicitatem non compatitur alias essentias; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, si essent plures essentiae divinae, esset ibi *convenientia* et *differentia* essentialis; *convenientia*, inquam, quia quaelibet esset Deus; *differentia* vero, quia plures, et hoc non posset esse sine additione et compositione[^p77-5]. Non sic autem est in pluralitate personarum: quia, sicut ostensum est, non distinguuntur ad invicem per aliquam additionem realem, sed solum per originem naturalem; et ideo simplicitas essentiae excludit pluralitatem essentiae, et pluralitas personae non excludit unitatem essentiae divinae nec excludit simplicitatem personae.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut persona addit aliquid supra essentiam secundum rem et intellectum etc.; dicendum, quod *secundum intellectum* addit, quia in intellectu vero personae clauditur intellectus naturae et proprietatis et hypostasis. Unde intellectus eius compositus est, ita tamen, quod sicut nulla est compositio, sic etiam nulla est additio a parte rei. — Et *si obiiciatur*, quod intellectus iste est falsus; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia ex parte rei aliquid ei respondet; nam in divinis vere sunt illa tria, scilicet natura et proprietas et hypostasis distincta per proprietatem suam; sunt tamen omnino unum in ipsa per simplicitatem summam, ad quam quia non potest intellectus noster pertingere, intelligit et nominat sub differenti ratione et sub quadam compositione, quam non ponit circa ipsam rem, sed circa se ipsum intelligentem, sicut habitum fuit in praecedenti problemate[^p77-6].

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10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt vera de eodem et secundum idem; dicendum, quod non solummodo impedit contradictionem, quod aliqua dicantur de eodem *non secundum idem*, verum etiam, quod non dicantur *ad idem*. Et quia persona referri habet et comparari ad aliam, natura vero non: hinc est, quod aliquid potest attribui uni, quod non attribuitur alteri; nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod sit in eis compositio vel diversitas secundum *essentiam* vel *esse*; sufficit enim, quod sit solum secundum *se habere*[^p78-1].

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut una persona omnino convenit cum alia, aut partim convenit, partim differt; dicendum, quod persona cum altera convenit secundum essentiam, differt autem secundum proprietatem; proprietas autem illa comparata ad essentiam est tantum *modus essendi*, qui est idem quod essentia, secundum id *quod est*, quia essentia est ipsa proprietas, differt autem secundum id *ad quod*; et quia compositio venit secundum id *in quo*, distinctio secundum id *ad quod*: ideo differentia, quae est inter proprietatem et essentiam, talis est, quae sufficit ad distinctionem, nullam tamen inducit compositionem.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut una persona communicat alii quidquid habet, aut non; dicendum, quod communicat ei quidquid habet *communicabile*, et hoc est essentia vel natura; *personalitas* autem sive respectus, qui est in persona illa, potius dicit rationem distinguentis quam communicabilis; et ideo, licet hoc non communicet, perfecta tamen est ibi communicatio, quia cum communicatione manet salva distinctio.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut proprietas personae est aliquid, aut nihil; dicendum, quod proprietas personae, formaliter et proprie loquendo, est *ad aliquid*; et illud *ad aliquid* comparari habet et ad divinam essentiam et ad personam, quam distinguit, et ad personam, a qua distinguit. Per comparationem ad personam, *a qua distinguit*, vere *res* est, quia realiter ab illa differt, sicut et realiter distinguitur per paternitatem Pater a Filio; per comparationem autem ad personam, *in qua est*, seu etiam ad ipsam essentiam, *modus* tantum est, qui non ponit aliquam compositionem circa Deum, quia, sicut prius ostensum fuit, non differt in Deo *esse* et *sic esse* sive *modus essendi*, sicut non differt « *vivere* et *beate vivere*[^p78-2] ».

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas personae aut transit in substantiam, aut non; dicendum, quod relatio duplicem dicit respectum, scilicet ad *subiectum in quo* et ad *extremum*[^p78-3] *ad quod*. Primo modo transit, sicut et alia genera, secundo modo manet. Et quia ipsa praeter alia genera dicit comparationem ut ad alterum; hinc est, quod omnia dicuntur transire in substantiam, ipsa non transeunte, non quia ipsa aliquo modo dicat *aliquid*, quod non sit essentia, sed quia competit sibi *ad aliquid* dici, ad quod essentia non habet dici nec referri. Unde absque dubio essentia est illud *ad*, sed non est illud, *ad quod* est illud *ad*; et ideo salva est ibi distinctio et nulla compositio.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod punctus propter suam simplicitatem suis relationibus nec componitur nec numeratur; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia relationes puncti sunt *ad extra*, sed relationes personales sunt *ad intra*; ideo, quamvis punctus possit dici principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum, nulla tamen hypostasis simul potest dici Pater et Filius, quia nulla potest sibi ipsi esse nascendi principium.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est absolutum quam respectivum: ergo et distinctio secundum proprietatem absolutam prior, quam ea quae est secundum proprietatem respectivam; dicendum, quod illud non valet: quia omnis distinctio includit aliquem respectum[^p78-4]; et praeterea, distinctio illa, quae minus recedit a prima et summa unitate, illa quidem est prior; haec autem distinctio est illa, in qua non plurificatur unitas, et talis non potest esse essentialis, sed relati      Unde dici potest, vel quod ratio illa non con        aut quod propositio illa veritatem habet de respectivo, quod aliquam importat dependentiam. Hoc autem genus respectivi non ponitur circa distinctionem aeternarum personarum; et ideo non facit recedere a ratione simplicissimi, sicut nec a ratione primi et absolutissimi, sicut ex praehabitis elucescit.

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english:
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together.*

Next it is asked concerning this, whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together. And that they are incompossible seems to follow from several reasons.

1. An abstract being is simpler than a concrete one[^p73-5]: therefore a nature having no supposit is simpler than a nature existing in several hypostases; but trinity posits the existence of the nature in several hypostases: therefore it takes something away from the highest simplicity.

2. Likewise, the same is simpler than the diverse[^p73-6]: therefore everything in which there is identity in every way is simpler than that in which some diversity, however slight, is found; but there cannot be trinity without diversity, however slight: therefore it cannot stand with the highest simplicity.

3. Likewise, the common is simpler than the proper, as is plain, because the proper implies in itself the common and something more; but there cannot be a true trinity unless

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the properties of the three persons are distinct and incommunicable[^p74-1]: therefore it is impossible to posit trinity without positing in it some falling away from the highest simplicity.

4. Likewise, everything absolute is simpler than the relative, because, as Augustine says[^p74-2], « every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively »; whence the relative includes the absolute; but there cannot be a trinity of persons without a plurality of relations: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, everything defining is simpler than the defined; but nature falls within the account of person[^p74-3]: therefore nature is always simpler than person: therefore the account of personality cannot stand with the highest simplicity. But trinity cannot exist save in persons: therefore trinity is repugnant to the highest simplicity.

6. Likewise, the part is always simpler than the whole; but unity is a part of trinity, and one person a part of the three persons: therefore if trinity posits a true plurality, and a true plurality posits a true totality, and a true totality excludes the highest[^p74-4] simplicity: therefore *from the first*, trinity cannot stand with the highest simplicity.

7. Likewise, a point is always simpler than a continuum, and therefore unity than number: therefore the unity of a person is simpler than the trinity of persons; but that which has something simpler than itself is not supremely simple: therefore it is impossible that trinity should be compatible with the highest simplicity.

8. Likewise, either person *is* equally simple as essence, or *not*. If *not*: then either person is not in the divine, or the divine *being* is not most simple; but if it is *equally simple* as essence; yet essence, on account of the highest simplicity, is not compatible with several divine essences[^p74-5]: therefore by the same reasoning neither is person.

9. Likewise, either person adds something over nature according to *being and understanding*, or according to *understanding alone*, or according to *neither*. If in the first way: then it falls together with[^p74-6] the highest simplicity; if in the second way: then the understanding is empty and false, to which nothing corresponds in reality; if in the third way: then just as nature is not pluralized, so neither is person.

10. Likewise, either whatever belongs to person *belongs* to nature, and conversely, or *not*. If *so*: then, since person is distinguished, nature too would be distinguished, and thus there will not be there what is supremely simple; if *not*; but affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same[^p74-7]: therefore according to one thing and another; but that which has this is composite: therefore, etc.

11. Likewise, either one person *differs* wholly from another, or *agrees wholly*, or *agrees in part* and *differs in part*. If it *agrees wholly*: then it has nothing proper to itself, and therefore it is not distinguished; but if it *differs wholly*: then if one is God, the other is not God; if it *agrees in part* and *differs in part*: since this is not according to the same, it will be composite[^p74-8].

12. Likewise, when one person communicates with another, either it communicates to it *whatever it has*, or *not*. If *not*: then it gives something of its own and retains something, and therefore it is composite and grudging. If *whatever it has*: then just as it communicates to it its own quiddity, so also its personality. — *If you say* that personality is not communicable; *on the contrary*: because it is as simple as nature, as you say: therefore just as nature is communicable, so it seems that person is[^p74-9].

13. Likewise, the property of a person is either *something* or *nothing*. If *nothing*: then it does nothing, and therefore does not distinguish that in which it is; if *something*, either it *is in the essence* or *not*. If it *is in the essence*; but the property distinguishes that in which it is: then nature and essence are numbered; which is against trinity. If it *is not in the essence*, but in the person: then something according to the thing is in the person which is not in the essence: therefore it must be that the property makes the person composite.

14. Likewise, the property of a person is a relation; therefore either it *passes over* into substance, as the other genera do[^p74-10], or it *does not pass over*. If it *passes over*: then just as substance is not distinguished and does not distinguish, so neither does the property: therefore there is no trinity. If it *does not pass over*: then it expresses something beyond substance, and therefore takes something away from the account of simplicity: if therefore there cannot be a trinity without properties, then it is impossible that it should stand with the highest simplicity.

15. Likewise, just as a point is not composed by its relations, so neither is it really numbered: if therefore God is simpler than a point, then in no way is there in him any real distinction.

16. Likewise, the absolute is prior to the relative[^p74-11]: therefore that distinction which is according to an *absolute* property is prior to that which is according to a *relative* one; but the prior a thing is, the simpler it is: if therefore a distinction according to absolutes does not stand with the highest simplicity, then neither does a distinction according to relatives.

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**On the contrary:** 1. It happens that we find something *simple*, because it is one in one, and something *more simple*, because it is one multiplied in many; and this is simpler, because it is one in many, as the universal is[^p75-1], yet not supremely so, because it is numbered: therefore if something were one in many without being multiplied, that would be *most simple*; but this is to be attributed to the divine *being*, which is most simple: therefore trinity does not take away the simplicity of the divine essence.

2. Likewise, a plurality of *natures* is not repugnant to the simplicity of a *person*, as is plain in Christ[^p75-2]: therefore if *a diversity of natures* makes more for composition than *a plurality of persons* does, it seems that much more strongly a plurality of persons takes nothing away from the simplicity of the nature: it stands, therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, God can create without any diminution of his own simplicity: therefore if to generate and to spirate is an intrinsic act, much more strongly does he generate and spirate while the highest simplicity remains. But because he generates and spirates, there is trinity: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, *to understand* is an act which is in no way repugnant to simplicity, but rather attests to it and is consonant with it; but any mind whatever, by understanding itself, generates a likeness of itself, which is called the *word* distinct from the one generating[^p75-3]: therefore just as the act of understanding can stand with the highest simplicity, so also can generation, and by the same reasoning the production of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the whole trinity stands together with the highest simplicity.

5. Likewise, as Augustine says in the sixth book on the Trinity[^p75-4], « in spiritual things the greater is the same as the better »; but in the blessed Trinity every person is best: therefore three are not anything better than one, and therefore not greater either. But in every composition something added is posited which is in some way more: therefore that highest trinity posits no composition whatever: therefore it is in no way repugnant to simplicity.

6. Likewise, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes the highest perfection; and the highest perfection does not exclude but includes plurality: therefore *from the first*, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes a plurality of persons: therefore it is not repugnant, but most consonant.

7. Likewise, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes the highest power and strength, because, as was proved above[^p75-5], the more united any strength is, the more infinite it is; but the highest and most actual strength posits the highest and most perfect communication and production, and this posits trinity: therefore trinity and the highest simplicity necessarily stand together.

8. Likewise, light is predicated of spiritual and of corporeal substance, and of spiritual substance created and uncreated, according to a certain proportion and analogy; but the production of a material splendour takes nothing away from the simplicity of the material light, and the production of a spiritual light also — namely of an intelligence or of a word from a mind — takes nothing away from the simplicity of the intellective substance: therefore the production of the eternal Splendour from the Father takes nothing away from the simplicity of the eternal light.

9. Likewise, the simplicity of a point and of unity and of any created principle whatever does not exclude but includes a plurality of relations and respects, and in this way it is not a mark of imperfection but of perfection; but everything of this kind is to be attributed to God: therefore in God the highest simplicity and a plurality of relations are not repugnant. But « relation multiplies the trinity », as Boethius says[^p75-6]: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, where there is no matter and situation, there can be no separation: therefore a production abstracting from the account of situation and of matter posits no separation: therefore it stands with undividedness in every way, and therefore with simplicity in every way. If therefore the persons in the Trinity are produced by such a production, then trinity can stand together with the highest simplicity.

**CONCLUSION.**

*The trinity of persons does not take away the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude trinity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the first principle is at once threefold and most simple, so that neither does trinity take away the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude trinity; and this indeed we hold most certainly by faith.

But that we may understand it in some measure, two things must be noted beforehand here: first, the diverse modes of *personal distinctions*; second, the diverse modes of *divine attributions*.

As to the first it is to be understood that, as Richard says in *On the Trinity*[^p75-7], person is distinguished from person in three modes, namely *by origin alone, by quality alone, and by origin and quality together*. The first mode is in the divine, the second in the angelic spirits, the third in men. — For men are distinguished from one another *by quality*, on account of the diversity of accidents and properties by which one individual is discerned from another[^p75-8]; but *by origin*, because one man is born of another. — Angels, however, because they differ

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in substances and in formal properties, are distinguished *by quality*; but because one does not proceed from another, they are not distinguished *by origin*. — But the divine persons, because they are wholly one in substance and in form and have no accidents, are not distinguished *by quality*, but *by origin alone*; and that *origin* belongs to the person itself not through anything else, but through the person itself, so that, just as God understands by himself and is his own understanding, so the Father generates by himself and is generation itself, and likewise the Son is his own filiation: if therefore there is there a most true origin, the personal distinction is most true. — *Again*, if the person is its own origin, there is no composition whatever in the person, and thereby it is as simple as the essence: there is therefore an undifferentiatedness in every way according to the *thing* between person and essence, and between person and property and essence. Whence truly *person* is essence and property, and *essence* is property and person, and *property* is person and essence[^p76-1]. How then can any composition be understood in so great an undifferentiatedness? It is necessary, therefore, in such a distinction of persons to understand simplicity in every way: since therefore it is impossible to understand any composition, the trinity of the persons understood and the highest simplicity are not repugnant. — Much therefore avails toward seeing this: to look into the modes of *personal distinctions*, in ignorance of which the heretics erred.

*Again*, the diverse modes of *divine attributions* are to be attended to. For there is a difference in respect of the *modes of being*, and in respect of the *modes of being related*, and in respect of the *accounts of understanding*. — In the divine, therefore, in respect of *being* or essence no diversity or difference can be found, because that *being* is one and most simple; nor even in respect of the *absolute mode of being*, because, just as in God *essence* and *being* are not another being, so *to be* and *to be thus* are not different. And the reason for this is that in God *to be able* and *to be* are the same, and it cannot be said that he could be otherwise than thus. And therefore, since the *modes of being* are the same as the *essence*, all predicates expressing an *absolute* mode pass over into substance, relation excepted, which expresses a *relative mode of being*; and this mode of speaking, in comparison *to the subject*, passes over into substance, so that the hypostasis is its own property, lest composition be introduced; but it remains in comparison *to the term*, so that a true distinction may be preserved. For a difference of relation from the *subject in which* introduces *composition*; but a difference from the *term to which* introduces nothing but *distinction* alone. Since therefore in the divine no difference is found, neither in respect of the *essence* nor in respect of the *being* nor in respect of the *absolute modes of being*; it is nevertheless found in the three modes just named. For a difference in respect of the *modes of being*[^p76-2] is in the persons with regard to one another: because, although they have the same *being*, yet they have it in another mode, since one is from itself and another from another; and this is so great a diversity that it does not permit one person to be predicated of another. For those modes, as was shown before, although they do not introduce *composition*, nevertheless make a true *distinction*.

But a difference in respect of the *modes of being related* is in the persons as related to the essence. For since to arise belongs to the person, not to the essence, therefore the person is referred and is related to another, while the essence is not; and hence it is that one is distinguished, namely the person, and not the other, namely the essence. And from this difference it does not come about that one is *removed* from the other, but it does come about that *something can be said* of the person which is not said of the essence, and conversely. And from this difference there arises a threefold mode of speaking in the divine, namely in *what*, and in *who*, and in *which*, namely *notion, person*, and *essence*; and hence it is that, when *person* is supposited, *notion* is not supposited, nor conversely, and likewise of *essence*. But from the variation of such modes a *figure of diction*[^p76-3] is introduced in the divine, as is plain to one who considers.

But a difference in respect of the *accounts of understanding* is in the *essential* properties, which are wholly the same, as truth and goodness are; yet our understanding understands them through diverse things and under one account and another, and therefore names them differently; and this is the least difference that can be found concerning divine things, because it is more on our side than on God's. — The highest simplicity, therefore, stands not only with a personal distinction, but also with a manifold attribution. Whence the reasons which are on this side are to be conceded; and to those on the opposite side it is easy enough to reply.

1. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that an abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: it must be said that this holds true in that in which form and supposit differ, in which indeed there is *abstraction* and *concretion* on the side of the thing; but in the divine, *concretion* is not properly posited except on our side. — Likewise as to what he says, that one not in many is simpler than one in many: it must be said that this holds true where something is more in many than in one, as is the case in number; but it is not so in the matter proposed, because the divine essence and nature is as completely and perfectly in one of its hypostases as in three[^p76-4].

2. To that which is objected, that the same is simpler than the diverse, etc.: it must be said that there is a diversity or distinction which comes from *addition*, as that which is between diverse species, which are distinguished by diverse differences added over the genus; and there is a distinction coming not from *addition* but from *origin*;

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and this is in the divine persons, which are distinguished by the fact that one flows from another; and this posits no composition, according to what was explained in the principal solution.

3. To that which is objected, that the common is simpler than the proper: it must be said that this holds true where the *common* is restricted and contracted by the *proper*; for then, by reason of what restricts and contracts, it admits both composition and distinction, as appears in the universal and the particular; but the common is not to be found in the divine in this way, because the essence, although it is common in the divine, is nevertheless not contracted nor restricted nor distinguished in the persons[^p77-1].

4. To that which is objected, that everything absolute is simpler than the relative: it must be said that the relative is twofold: one which expresses a respect toward something *diverse according to essence*; another which expresses a respect only toward something *consubstantial* with itself. In the first way the relative includes a certain dependence, and thereby expresses also a defect from the highest simplicity; in the second way it expresses no dependence nor defect from the highest simplicity, especially when the supposit itself is its own property, by which it is referred; and in this way respect is posited in the properties of the divine persons, not in the first way, and thus no composition is introduced from this. — And *if it be objected* that « every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively »: it must be said that if it be understood in the first way, it holds true not only on the side of the *account of understanding*, but also on the side of the *thing*; if it be understood in the second way, it holds true on the side of the *account of understanding*, because the Father, beyond the account of relation, implies a hypostasis, which nevertheless is not other than his own personal property.

5. To that which is objected, that everything defining is simpler than the defined: it must be said that this holds true of a *formal* definition and *in the direct case*, where the defining terms are the essential parts constituting the defined thing itself. But it is not so in the matter proposed: both because the divine persons, properly speaking, are not to be defined; and also because nature does not fall within the definition of person *in the direct case*; and also because that definition regards rather the intention of the *name* of person and of nature, according as it comes into our understanding, than that it regards the thing itself according to its own proper *being*, which can neither be comprehended nor defined on account of the highest simplicity and immensity of the divine *being*[^p77-2].

6. To that which is objected, that the part is always simpler than the whole: it must be said that this is true. But what he assumes, that one of the persons is a part of the trinity, is false, because every whole expresses something greater than its part. But as has often been said, there is nothing greater in three persons than in one; for each of the persons is supremely being and true and good; therefore, although trinity in the divine posits the account of *plurality*, it does not on this account posit the account of a *true totality*[^p77-3].

7. To that which is objected, that a point is always simpler than a continuum, and unity than number: it must be said that this holds true of number in the *true* sense, which is an aggregation of diverse unities; but number of this sort is not in the trinity of the divine persons, for the reason that there is not there an aggregation of many unities, just as there is not of entities nor of truths, but there is a replication of the same unity about one and another; and this is what the very word which is called *trinity* imports, that is, the unity of three[^p77-4].

8. To that which is objected, that either person is equally simple as essence, or not: it must be said that it is equally simple according to the thing. — And as to what he objects further, that essence on account of the highest simplicity is not compatible with other essences: it must be said that the case is not alike, because if there were several divine essences, there would be there an essential *agreement* and *difference*; *agreement*, I say, because each would be God; but *difference*, because they are several, and this could not be without addition and composition[^p77-5]. But it is not so in a plurality of persons: because, as has been shown, they are not distinguished from one another by any real addition, but only by natural origin; and therefore the simplicity of the essence excludes a plurality of the essence, while the plurality of the person does not exclude the unity of the divine essence, nor does it exclude the simplicity of the person.

9. To that which is objected, that either person adds something over the essence according to the thing and to understanding, etc.: it must be said that it adds *according to understanding*, because in the true understanding of person there is enclosed the understanding of nature and of property and of hypostasis. Whence the understanding of it is composite, yet in such a way that, just as there is no composition, so also there is no addition on the side of the thing. — And *if it be objected* that this understanding is false: it must be said that it is false to say so, because on the side of the thing something corresponds to it; for in the divine those three truly are, namely nature and property and hypostasis distinguished by its own property; yet they are wholly one in the thing itself through the highest simplicity, and because our understanding cannot attain to it, it understands and names under a differing account and under a certain composition, which it posits not about the thing itself but about itself as understanding, as was established in the preceding problem[^p77-6].

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10. To that which is objected, that affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same: it must be said that it not only prevents contradiction that things be said of the same thing *not according to the same*, but also that they be not said *toward the same*. And because a person has to be referred and compared to another, whereas a nature has not: hence it is that something can be attributed to the one which is not attributed to the other; nor nevertheless does it follow from this that there is in them composition or diversity according to *essence* or *being*; for it is enough that it be only according to *being related*[^p78-1].

11. To that which is objected, that either one person agrees wholly with another, or agrees in part and differs in part: it must be said that a person agrees with another according to essence, but differs according to property; and that property, compared to the essence, is only a *mode of being*, which is the same as the essence according to that *which it is*, because the essence is the property itself, but differs according to that *toward which* it is; and because composition comes according to that *in which*, and distinction according to that *toward which*: therefore the difference which is between property and essence is such as suffices for distinction, yet introduces no composition.

12. To that which is objected, that either one person communicates to another whatever it has, or not: it must be said that it communicates to it whatever it has that is *communicable*, and this is the essence or nature; but *personality*, or the respect which is in that person, expresses rather the account of what distinguishes than of what is communicable; and therefore, although it does not communicate this, nevertheless the communication there is perfect, because along with the communication the distinction remains preserved.

13. To that which is objected, that the property of a person is either *something* or *nothing*: it must be said that the property of a person, formally and properly speaking, is *toward something*; and that *toward something* has to be compared both to the divine essence and to the person which it distinguishes and to the person from which it distinguishes. By comparison to the person *from which it distinguishes*, it truly is a *thing*, because it really differs from that person, just as the Father is really distinguished from the Son by paternity; but by comparison to the person *in which it is*, or also to the essence itself, it is only a *mode*, which posits no composition about God, because, as was shown before, in God *to be* and *to be thus*, or the *mode of being*, do not differ, just as « *to live* and *to live blessedly*[^p78-2] » do not differ.

14. To that which is objected, that the property of a person either passes over into substance or does not: it must be said that a relation expresses a twofold respect, namely to the *subject in which* and to the *extreme*[^p78-3] *toward which*. In the first way it passes over, as the other genera do; in the second way it remains. And because it, beyond the other genera, expresses a comparison as toward another; hence it is that all things are said to pass over into substance while it itself does not pass over — not because it in any way expresses *something* which is not the essence, but because it belongs to it to be said *toward something*, toward which the essence has not to be said nor referred. Whence without doubt the essence is that *toward*, but it is not that *toward which* that *toward* is; and therefore the distinction is preserved there, and there is no composition.

15. To that which is objected, that a point, on account of its simplicity, is neither composed nor numbered by its relations: it must be said that the case is not alike, because the relations of a point are *toward the outside*, whereas the personal relations are *toward the inside*; therefore, although a point can be called a beginning and an end with respect to diverse lines, nevertheless no hypostasis can at once be called Father and Son, because none can be to itself the principle of being born.

16. To that which is objected, that the absolute is prior to the relative: therefore also a distinction according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative property: it must be said that this does not hold, because every distinction includes some respect[^p78-4]; and moreover, that distinction which recedes less from the first and highest unity is indeed the prior one; and this distinction is that in which unity is not pluralized, and such a distinction cannot be essential but relati [*sic*] Whence it can be said either that that reasoning does not con [*sic*] or that that proposition holds true of the relative which implies some dependence. But this kind of relative is not posited about the distinction of the eternal persons; and therefore it does not make anything recede from the account of what is most simple, just as neither from the account of what is first and most absolute, as is clear from what has gone before.

---

la: Quod praeter formam sive naturam includit suppositum. — Cfr. de hac quaest. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. et d. 8. p. II. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 5. m. 2.

en: Because the supposit includes something beyond the form or nature. — On this question compare I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 2, and d. 8, p. II, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. I, q. 5, m. 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.).

en: Compare Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 16 (IV, c. 9).

la: Vide supra pag. 65, nota 3. et pag. 67, nota 1.

en: See above, p. 65, note 3, and p. 67, note 1.

la: Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2: Omnis essentia, quae relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid, excepto relativo. — Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6: Quod vero per se est et substantia prius eo natura est, quod est *ad aliquid* [i. e. relativum]; *esse* enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 2: "Every essence which is said relatively is also something, apart from the relative." — Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 6: "But that which is *per se* and substance is by nature prior to that which is *toward something* [i.e. the relative]; for this *being* seems to be a kind of appendage and an accident of that which is."

la: Vide supra pag. 65, nota 3. definitionem personae a Boethio datam.

en: See above, p. 65, note 3, for the definition of person given by Boethius.

la: G *veram et summam*.

en: G reads *true and highest*.

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. 2. a. 1. — In fine arg. G supplet *plures personas*.

en: As was shown above, q. 2, a. 1. — At the end of the argument G supplies *several persons*.

la: Videtur esse substituendum *a* pro *cum*, E *in*.

en: It seems that *a* is to be substituted for *cum*; E reads *in*.

la: Aristot., II. Elench. c. 5. (c. 25.): Nam contraria et opposita et affirmationem et negationem simpliciter quidem impossibile inesse eidem. Cfr. I. Prior. c. 42. (c. 40.) et IV. Metaph. text. 15. seqq. (III. c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 5 (c. 25): "For it is simply impossible that contraries and opposites, and affirmation and negation, should be in the same thing." Compare *Prior Analytics* I, c. 42 (c. 40), and *Metaphysics* IV, text 15 and following (III, c. 4).

la: Pro *erit* [A B *erunt*] *compositum* G *erit compositio*.

en: For *erit* [A B *erunt*] *compositum*, G reads *erit compositio*.

la: B *ita etiam videtur, quod personalitas*.

en: B reads *thus it also seems, that personality*.

la: Scil. praedicamentorum v. g. quantitas, qualitas etc. Cfr. August., V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. seqq., et Boeth., de Trin. c. 4. seqq.

en: Namely of the predicaments, e.g. quantity, quality, etc. Compare Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, c. 8, n. 9 and following, and Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 4 and following.

la: Cfr. supra nota 2. et pag. 46, nota 9. — De propos. *quanto aliquid prius, tanto simplicius*, cfr. Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.).

en: Compare above, note 2, and p. 46, note 9. — On the proposition *the prior a thing is, the simpler it is*, compare Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1).

la: Vide supra pag. 66, nota 2. — Superius pro *simplex, quia* A G bis *simplex, quod*.

en: See above, p. 66, note 2. — Above, for *simplex, quia*, A G twice read *simplex, quod*.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 6. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Compare III *Sentences*, d. 6, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 34, nota 6.

en: See above, p. 34, note 6.

la: Cap. 8. n. 9: In iis enim, quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse.

en: C. 8, n. 9: "For in those things which are not great in bulk, to be greater is to be better."

la: Art. 1. fundam. 6. et de scientia Christi q. 6. in corp. — Lib. de Causis, propos. 17.

en: Article 1, fundamentum 6, and *On the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 6, in the body. — *Book of Causes*, proposition 17.

la: Libr. de Trin. c. 6.

en: The book *On the Trinity*, c. 6.

la: Libr. IV. c. 13. seq. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 587, nota 7; tom. II. pag. 103, nota 6. et pag. 104, nota 5.

en: Book IV, c. 13 and following. Compare vol. I, p. 587, note 7; vol. II, p. 103, note 6, and p. 104, note 5.

la: Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Specie*: Individua autem dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio nunquam in alio eadem erit etc.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species*: "Individuals, however, are so called because each of them consists of properties whose collection will never be the same in another," etc.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. seqq., d. 33. per totam et d. 34. q. 1. seq., ubi etiam de seqq. modis essendi. — Superius post *sicut essentia* B addit *et proprietas*.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 26, q. 1 and following; d. 33 throughout; and d. 34, q. 1 and following, where the following modes of being are also treated. — Above, after *sicut essentia*, B adds *et proprietas*.

la: Ita A, alii *existendi*.

en: So A; the others read *existendi*.

la: Vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.), ubi de hac et aliis fallaciis in dictione. — De suppositione personae et notionis cfr. tom. I. pag. 576, nota 1.

en: See Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 3 (c. 4), where this and the other fallacies in diction are treated. — On the supposition of person and of notion compare vol. I, p. 576, note 1.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 1. et 3.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 8, p. II, q. 1, replies 1 and 3.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 2.

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 19, p. II, q. 2.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. et 2; d. 34. q. 1. — Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 8. c. 4: Primus igitur non habet genus, et ideo non habet differentiam; quia enim non habet genus, non habet differentiam; ideo non habet *definitionem*.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 25, a. 1 and 2; d. 34, q. 1. — Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, tr. 8, c. 4: "The First, therefore, has no genus, and therefore has no difference; for because it has no genus, it has no difference; therefore it has no *definition*."

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 1. Ibid. q. 4. insinuatur solutio seq.

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 19, p. II, q. 1. In the same place, q. 4, the following solution is intimated.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. ad 16. et Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 3. ad 8. — Isidor., VII. Etymolog. c. 4. n. 1: *Trinitas appellata, quod fiat totum unum ex quibusdam tribus, quasi triunitas.* — Superius pro *vero* A *illo*.

en: Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, reply 16, and the *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 3, reply 8. — Isidore, *Etymologies* VII, c. 4, n. 1: *"It is called trinity because one whole is made out of certain three, as it were a tri-unity."* — Above, for *vero*, A reads *illo*.

la: Vide supra q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 7.

en: See above, q. 2, a. 1, fundamentum 7.

la: Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1. — In principio solut. vocibus *intellectu vero* A B E interserunt *nominis*.

en: Compare also I *Sentences*, d. 34, q. 1. — At the beginning of the solution A B E insert *nominis* between the words *intellectu vero*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. ad 5.

en: Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, reply 5.

la: Ut docet August., XIII. Confess. c. 3. n. 4, supra pag. 68, nota 3. allatus. — De hac solut. vide I. Sent. d. 33. q. 2, ubi etiam seq. solut. exhibetur.

en: As Augustine teaches, *Confessions* XIII, c. 3, n. 4, cited above at p. 68, note 3. — On this solution see I *Sentences*, d. 33, q. 2, where the following solution is also set out.

la: G *terminum* (sic etiam habetur I. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. in corp.). Inferius vocibus *ipsa non* B interserit *tamen*.

en: G reads *terminum* (so too it stands in I *Sentences*, d. 33, q. 2, in the body). Below, B inserts *tamen* between the words *ipsa non*.

la: Distinctio siquidem generatim est negatio unius respectu alterius; *distincta* enim dicimus quorum unum non est alterum. Distinctio opponitur identitati i. e. convenientiae rei cum se ipsa vel unitati plurium in entitate. Aristot., V. Metaph. text 16. (IV. c. 9.): Identitas unitas quaedam essentiae est aut plurium, aut cum ut pluribus utatur, ut puta cum dicat ipsum sibi ipsi idem; ut duobus enim ipso utitur.

en: For distinction in general is the negation of one with respect to another; for we call those things *distinct* of which one is not the other. Distinction is opposed to identity, that is, to the agreement of a thing with itself or to the unity of several in entity. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 16 (IV, c. 9): "Identity is a certain unity of the being either of several things, or when one uses a thing as several — as, for instance, when one says that a thing is the same as itself; for one uses it as two." ---

translators_notes:
**Structure.** `ARTICULUS II.` stands **full measure on p. 73**, about three-fifths down the leaf, below the close of Art. I, with its italic subtitle *Utrum possint simul stare trinitas et summa simplicitas* — **both unanchored**, the work's frozen heading rule holding for the seventh heading running. Then a one-sentence opener (*Deinde quaeritur circa hoc…*), **unanchored**; **sixteen arguments** that trinity and the highest simplicity are incompossible, under the single marginale `Ad oppositum.` set against argument 1 on p. 73; a **`Contra`** series of **ten arguments** under the single marginale `Fundamenta.` on p. 75; **`CONCLUSIO`** with its italic subtitle, printed **in-column**, not at full measure; a **`Respondeo`** in **two declared praenotanda** (*diversos modos distinctionum personalium, diversos modos attributionum divinarum*); and **sixteen replies**, answering the sixteen arguments of the first series in order.

### ⭐⭐ THE TWO MARGINALIA CHANGE SIDES, AND THEY TRACK THE ARTICLE'S THESIS, NOT THE PAGE

In `bon-qmt-q3-a1` the affirmative series carried `Fundamenta.` and the `Contra` series carried `Ad oppositum.`; **here the two are exactly reversed** — the opening sixteen arguments (that the two are incompossible) carry `Ad oppositum.`, and the `Contra` series of ten (that they stand together) carries `Fundamenta.`. The reason is that the marginalia name the **article's own position**, which this article affirms and the previous one also affirmed, so the series that opposes it moves from second place to first. ⛔ **The consequence is the one `q1-a1` already froze: never assume which series the replies answer.** Here the sixteen replies answer the **opening** series, which is the *Ad oppositum* one, and reply 1 quotes argument 1 word for word (*quod simplicius est ens abstractum quam concretum*). The pairing was taken from the replies' own quoted lemmata, not from position.

### ⭐ THE INDEX SPAN 73–78 IS RIGHT, AND IT WAS MEASURED BEFORE THE PLATES WERE PULLED

Per the standing order that `q2-a2` left and `q3-a1` paid for a second time, **p. 78 was extracted alone and read first**, and only then were pp. 74–77 pulled. The article closes at *…sicut ex praehabitis elucescit* two-thirds down p. 78, and `QUAESTIO IV.` with its italic subtitle *Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate* stands full measure below it, with the two-column opener (*Consequenter quaeritur…* / *Primum est…* / *Secundum est…*) beneath that. ⚠ **The index shape here is the dangerous one**: it gives `q3-a2 73–78` and `q4-a1 79–84`, i.e. **non-overlapping**, which is the exact shape that was wrong at `q2-a2` (index 63–67, actual 63–68). It is right this time — the running head numbered **79** stands above `ARTICULUS I.`, so Quaestio IV's heading and opener sit on p. 78 and the article does not run onto p. 79 — but **being right is not the same as being known to be right**, and the one extra page extraction is what makes the span safe.

### ⭐ BOUNDARY 6 (p. 78): THE BODY FORWARDS, THE REGISTER DOES NOT — A 4/0 SPLIT

`QUAESTIO IV.` opens full measure on p. 78 and, under the frozen rule that a chunk opening an *Articulus I* also carries its `Quaestio` heading, **the heading, the subtitle and the two-column opener on p. 78 all belong to `bon-qmt-q4-a1`**. But **all four of p. 78's register entries belong here**: n. 1 anchors in reply 10 (*se habere*¹), n. 2 in reply 13 (*beate vivere*²), n. 3 in reply 14 (*extremum*³), n. 4 in reply 16 (*respectum*⁴), and **Quaestio IV's opening carries no anchor at all**. ▶ **Six boundaries measured now, in five shapes: 5/1 · LEAF EDGE · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0.** The 4/0 shape is new and is the inverse of p. 68's: there the whole left footer block sat under the *next* unit's opening columns and still forwarded four entries; here the *next* unit occupies the bottom third of the leaf and forwards none. ⛔ **The split is taken by body anchor, never by block position, and the ratio carries no rule.**

### ⚠⚠ TWO PRINTED BLANKS IN CONSECUTIVE LINES OF ONE PARAGRAPH — REPRODUCED, NOT FILLED

Reply 16 on p. 78 prints **…sed relati〈blank〉Unde dici potest, vel quod ratio illa non con〈blank〉aut quod propositio illa…**, with about five characters of white space in the first line and seven in the second. The sense wants *relativa.* and *concludit,*; **neither is supplied.** The ratified two-part rule decides it on the flanking letters, not on the gap, and it was measured rather than eyeballed: over the two lines the letters on either side of each blank run to a minimum grey value of **13–36** with the same dark fraction as the line's own opening words, i.e. **full strength on both sides** — the first branch, *the forme never carried the letters* → **reproduce, never fill**. The English carries `[*sic*]` at each, on the p. 59 *eandem* precedent.

⭐ **Three further checks, because the shape invited a different diagnosis.** (1) The two gaps overlap horizontally (x 1765–1839 and 1706–1842 of 2571), which looks like a rectangular patch on the leaf; but the lines immediately above (*…catur unitas, et talis…*) and below (*…tatem habet de respectivo…*) run **unbroken through the same column of pixels**, so it is not a stain, a repair or a scanner artefact. (2) The paper inside the blanks measures **min 141 and min 228** against a text minimum of 13 on the same lines — the second is bare paper, with no ghost of a failed impression. (3) The raw shows the same two gaps, so plate and OCR are two witnesses to the blank and not one. ▶ **Fourth attestation of the compositor's-blank class** (after `q1-a2`'s p. 58 n. 6 and `q2-a1`'s p. 59 *eandem*, and now twice here), and **the first where two of them fall in consecutive lines of a single paragraph**.

### ⭐ THE MARGINALIA ARE NOT CLIPPED ON THIS SPAN — THE q3-a1 FINDING DOES NOT GENERALISE

`q3-a1` found that the scan cuts the gutter-side marginale on every one of its leaves and predicted the same for the rest of the work. **On pp. 73–78 it does not happen.** Full-image-width margin strips were pulled for both margins of every leaf and **every gloss stands complete with clear paper beyond it**, including `Fundamenta.` at the extreme left of p. 75 and `Duplex re-spectus in relatione.` at the extreme right of p. 78. ⚠ **The check is still owed on every leaf** — the failure mode is silent, and a crop that stops short of the image edge manufactures the same symptom — but the clipping is a property of leaves 69–73, not of the work.

### ⭐ p. 74 CARRIES NO MARGINALIA AT ALL

Fourteen arguments over two full columns, **eleven register entries**, and **not one marginal gloss in either margin** — verified on full-width strips of both margins, which return bare paper. The pilot recorded the work's marginalia as "dense, one per argument or reply"; that is true of the *solutions*, and false of the argument runs, which take **one gloss at the head of the whole series** and nothing after. `q2-a2` had already measured the same split (thirty arguments, two marginalia; the *Conclusio* and twenty replies, thirty). ▶ On this span the whole of the *Ad oppositum* run is glossed once, on p. 73.

### ⭐⭐ THE FREE CONTROLS: SEVEN CROSS-REFERENCES OPENED, ALL SEVEN LAND

Every citation naming a target we already hold was opened, per `q2-a2`'s rule:

- **p. 77 n. 4 → `bon-qsc-q3` ad 8** is the strongest of the span: our own deployed page reads *ille sit ex aggregatione diversarum unitatum … per replicationem eiusdem unitatis circa diversas hypostases*, which is **reply 7's doctrine in reply 7's own words** (*non est ibi aggregatio multarum unitatum … sed est eiusdem unitatis replicatio circa alium et alium*).
- **p. 77 n. 4 → `bon-qmt-q2-a2` ad 16** likewise: that reply turns on *nec unitatum aggregatio*, the same phrase.
- **p. 77 n. 5 → `bon-qmt-q2-a1` fundam. 7** is the *omnino convenirent / partim convenirent et partim differrent* argument, exactly the *convenientia et differentia* that reply 8 is disposing of.
- **p. 74 n. 11 → `bon-qmt-q1-a1` p. 46 n. 9**, whose body reads *respectivum nunquam terminatur nisi ad absolutum*, against argument 16's *prius est absolutum respectivo*.
- **p. 75 n. 5 → `bon-qmt-q3-a1` fundam. 6** (*omne potentissimum est simplicissimum*), against argument 7's *summam potentiam et virtutem*.
- **p. 74 n. 1 → `bon-qmt-q2-a2` p. 65 n. 3 and p. 67 n. 1**: the first is Boethius' definition of *persona* (which is what p. 74 n. 3 says it is), the second is *hypostasis proprietate distincta*, against argument 3's *trium personarum propria distincta et incommunicabilia*.
- **p. 78 n. 2 → `bon-qmt-q3-a1` p. 68 n. 3**, which our built page gives as *Cap. 3. n. 4: Solus simpliciter es…* — Quaracchi's own back-reference to a note this project has already set, landing on the number and the chapter alike.

### ⚠⚠ REPLY 4 CARRIES NO ANCHOR, AND THE AUDIT IS WHAT CAUGHT IT

The raw prints a marker glyph after p. 77's *…non est aliud a sua proprietate personali*, and the
first pass through this chunk trusted it, anchoring the label `p77-2` there and pushing every later anchor
on the leaf down one — which left a seventh anchor on a **six**-note leaf and was refused by
`check-vol5-apparatus.py`'s pairing check as *anchored but undefined*. **At 5× the plate shows
nothing after *personali*.** The corrected map, every position read off the plate: **n. 1** at reply
3's *…in personis*¹ · **n. 2** at reply 5's *…immensitatem esse divini*² · **n. 3** at reply 6's
*…rationem verae totalitatis*³ · **n. 4** at reply 7's *…unitas trium*⁴ · **n. 5** at reply 8's
*…sine additione et compositione*⁵ · **n. 6** at reply 9's *…in praecedenti problemate*⁶ —
**and reply 4 has none.**

⭐⭐ **The three left-column notes then confirm the correction from their own targets, and it is
the cleanest such confirmation the work has produced**, because `I. Sent. d. 19. p. II` has four
questions whose titles divide the ground exactly: **q. 2 is *Utrum sit ponere totum universale*,
which n. 1 cites and reply 3 argues about** (*commune*/*universale et particulare*); **q. 1 is
*Utrum in divinis sit ponere totum integrale*, which n. 3 cites and reply 6 argues about**
(part and whole); and n. 3's own closing clause — *Ibid. q. 4. insinuatur solutio seq.* — points
at **q. 4, *Utrum in divinis sit differentia secundum numerum*, which is reply 7, the very next
reply**. Meanwhile n. 2's Avicenna (*ideo non habet definitionem*) is reply 5's whole subject.
**Four independent targets, four anchors, one order.** ⛔ The general rule is the one `q1-a1` and
`q2-a1` have now both paid for from the other side: **the raw's marker glyphs are not evidence of
an anchor, and a mid-zoom plate read is not a control.**

### ⚠ BLOCK AND ANCHOR COME APART ON TWO LEAVES, IN THE SAME DIRECTION

On pp. 74, 75 and 76 the footer block splits exactly where the anchors do. **On p. 77 and p. 78 it
does not**, and both times because the outgoing reply crosses the gutter: p. 77's **n. 3 prints
last in the LEFT block and anchors at the top of the RIGHT column** (reply 6 begins low in the left
column and ends high in the right), so the block splits 3/3 while the anchors split 2/4; p. 78's
**n. 2 prints in the LEFT block and anchors in the RIGHT column** for the same reason (reply 13
crosses the gutter and ends at *beate vivere*²), so the block splits 2/2 and the anchors 1/3.
**Read anchors, only anchors** — and note that the two splits are stated separately here because
either alone would have been reported as the leaf's structure.

### ⭐ ZERO RUNOVERS — NEITHER GUTTER-CROSSING NOR PAGE-CROSSING

Not one of the thirty-five entries continues past the end of its block, on any of the six leaves.
The ledger line is therefore a **negative** (`bon-qmt-q3-a2	-`), and the corpus totals are unmoved
at **201 runovers (180 gutter, 21 page)**. ⚠ It is worth stating positively rather than by silence:
`q1-a1` had three, `q2-a1` three, `q2-a2` two, `q3-a1` two, and a chunk that reports none is
indistinguishable in a ledger from a chunk whose author never looked.

### ⚠ THE ENGLISH LOST A PAGE MARKER, AND THE DIGIT MULTISET FOUND IT

The `<!-- page 73 -->` marker was present in the Latin and absent from the English on the first
pass. **Nothing else catches this**: the file parses, both language blocks extract, marker pairing
is unaffected, and the rendered English simply attributes its first three arguments to p. 74.
The frozen cheap check — *strip the `pNN-N` labels and compare the digit multiset of the two
language blocks* — returned one surplus `7` and one surplus `3` in the Latin, which is `73` and
nothing else. **Run it on every chunk; it costs one command and it is the only instrument that
sees this class.**

### Digit and letter resolution — raw versus plate

**p. 77 n. 2 raw `d. 23. a. 1. et 2` → `d. 25. a. 1. et 2`** — the same digit class `q3-a1` fixed on p. 71 n. 4, and decided the same way: at 4.3× the glyph shows a flat top bar over an open lower bowl, and **I. Sent. d. 25 is the *de persona* distinction**, which is what a note on *hypostasis* beyond *ratio relationis* wants; d. 23 is not. · **p. 74 n. 7 raw `c. S. (c. 23.)` → `c. 5. (c. 25.)`** at 12×, the second digit carrying the identical 5-glyph as the `c. 5.` two words earlier. · **p. 74 n. 1 raw garbage → `pag. 65, nota 3. et pag. 67, nota 1.`**, the last digit a flagged upright and **both targets opened**. · **p. 74 n. 11 raw `pag. 46, nola «` → `nota 9.`** (glyph loss). · **p. 73 n. 5's final digit read `q. 1`, decided from the target**: of d. 8 p. II's four questions, **only q. 1 contains *abstractum*, *concretum* and *suppositum* at all** (4/2/4 hits against 0/0/0 in q. 4), so the note's *Quod praeter formam sive naturam includit suppositum* can only point there. · **p. 76 n. 1 raw ok, `d. 26 … d. 33 … d. 34` confirmed at 8×.** · **p. 75 raw `trihum` → `trinum`**, `miniim` → `minima`, `in quid et in quit` → **`in quid et in quis et in quae`**, `ne induratur` → **`ne inducatur`**.

### ⚠ A STRAY MARK THAT IS NOT A COLON — p. 74 n. 2's `Ethic.`

The raw gives `Aristot., I. Ethic: c. 6`, and at 3× the plate appears to agree. **At 22× it does not.** The true colon four words later (after `c. 6`) sets two round dots of equal size on a common vertical; the mark after `Ethic` is **a baseline point with a wedge-shaped ink blot above it**, at a different height and a different shape. Read as **`Ethic.`**, with the blot recorded here and not in the text. ⛔ The lesson is `q3-a1`'s, sharpened: **a raw reading and a low-zoom plate reading are not two witnesses** — they are one witness read twice, because the OCR is reading the same ink.

### Marginalia, in body order

**p. 73** — `Ad oppositum.`
**p. 74** — *(none)*
**p. 75** — `Fundamenta.` · `Conclusio.` · `Duo praenotanda.` · `Modi 3 distinguendi personas.` · `Primus.` · `Secundus.`
**p. 76** — `Tertius.` · `Distinctio sine compositione.` · `Modi 3 attributionum.` · `De modis essendi.` · `De modis se habendi.` · `De rationibus intelligendi.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Duplex diversitas.`
**p. 77** — `Distinctio.` · `Duplex respectivum.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.` · `De numero.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 78** — `Notandum.` · `De proprietate personali.` · `Quid proprietas personae.` · `Notandum.` · `Duplex respectus in relatione.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.`

Twenty-eight in all, **none clipped** (see above); seven of the twenty-eight are the bare word `Notandum.`

### Translation choices

- ***intellect-* takes "understanding" at every one of its eleven occurrences, with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English**, per the work's frozen register: *intellectus agens* / *possibilis* occur nowhere in the work's 71 printed pages, so the ratified narrow exception is unreachable and a bare "intellect" would be a defect by construction. The one adjectival site, *substantia intellectiva* in argument 8 of the `Contra` series, goes to "intellective substance" — an adjective, not the bare noun the rule forbids.
- ***lux* → "light" at all five sites; *lumen* does not occur on the span.** Ruling 2 is therefore exercised **on the *lux* side only**, and the Ps. 4:7 and Ps. 35:10 exemptions are both unreached — argument 8's *lux / lucis materialis / lucis spiritualis / lucis aeternae* is ordinary body prose with no scriptural quotation anywhere near it.
- ***respectivum* → "the relative"** (substantive) against *proprietas respectiva* → "respective property" and *respectus* → "respect", the three held apart across argument 16 and replies 4, 12 and 16, where the whole argument is that a *respectus ad consubstantiale* is not the *respectivum* that implies dependence. `q1-a1` set "the relative" for the substantive at p. 46 and `q2-a2` set "respective" for the adjective; both are followed.
- ***modus se habendi* → "mode of being related"** and the bare *se habere* → "being related", kept verbal rather than resolved into "relation", because the *Respondeo*'s second *praenotandum* distinguishes it precisely from *relatio*, and reply 10's whole answer is that composition is avoided *solum secundum se habere*.
- ***in quid / in quis / in quae* keep the Latin interrogatives rendered flatly as "in *what* / in *who* / in *which*"**, since the sentence is about the grammatical form of the question and not about its answer.
- ***indifferentia* → "undifferentiatedness"**, an ugly word kept because the *Respondeo* means the absence of a difference, not indifference in any modern sense, and the sentence immediately turns on *differentia*.
- ***illud ad* / *ad quod* in reply 14 keep the Latin construction in English** ("that *toward*", "that *toward which* that *toward* is"), because the reply's move is that the essence is the term of the relation without being the relation's own *ad quod*; an idiomatic English erases the distinction the reply exists to make.

### ⚠ ONLY ONE OF THE FIVE PAGE BREAKS FALLS MID-WORD

`sub|stantiis` (75→76) is the only one; 73→74 (*quin sint* | *trium*), 74→75 (the close of argument 16 | `Contra`), 76→77 (*ex origine;* | *et haec est*) and 77→78 (*in praecedenti problemate* | reply 10) all fall at white space. The `<!-- page 76 -->` marker is set at the word boundary immediately before *substantiis*, so the split word is carried whole into the new page, and **both languages are marked at the same place**. ⚠ This is the inverse of `q3-a1`, where five of six broke mid-word; **the ratio is a property of the leaf, not of the work, and the digit-multiset check is what confirms the markers agree across the two languages.**

### Apparatus: page-split map and hand-offs

| page | entries | this chunk |
|---|---|---|
| 73 | 6 | **nn. 5–6 only** (INHERITED; n. 2, which stays with `q3-a1`, runs over the gutter) |
| 74 | 11 | all eleven |
| 75 | 8 | all eight |
| 76 | 4 | all four |
| 77 | 6 | all six |
| 78 | 4 | **all four** — the leaf forwards in the body but not in the register |

**35 entries. Zero `[?]` flags. Zero runovers.** Nothing is forwarded to `bon-qmt-q4-a1` from the register; what it inherits from p. 78 is **body**: `QUAESTIO IV.`, its subtitle, and the two-column opener.

⭐ **The citation profile stays clean for a fifth chunk running:** `build-citations.py` returns **26 records from this chunk — 21 `chunk`, 2 `page-multi`, 1 `articulus`, 1 `distinctio`, 1 `work` — with ZERO dangling, ZERO unresolvable, ZERO ambiguous and ZERO QA flags**, against a corpus running ~2 % in each of the first three. That is the return on opening every target the notes name.

⚠ **A registry gap found and closed here, belonging to the previous chunk.** `bon-qmt-q3-a1` landed without adding **division 3** to the `WORKS` registry, so Quaestio III has been rendering under the fallback label `Quaestio 3` instead of its subtitle. The line went in with this chunk — *Quaestio III: Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas*, verified word for word against the italic subtitle on p. 68 — and the convention it broke is worth restating: **divisions go in one at a time as each chunk lands, and the chunk that opens a division owns that line.** ⛔ Nothing audits it; the fallback is silent and looks deliberate.

**Gutters, measured on every leaf** (`gutter-profile.py`, band midpoints): 73 **1163** · 74 **1317** · 75 **1213** · 76 **1367** · 77 **1178** · 78 **1395**. ⚠ **`colcrop.py`'s default was wrong on four of the six** — p. 73 returned 1187 on an 8 px run, p. 77 returned 1203 on an 11 px run against a true 1178, p. 78 returned 1384 on a **2 px** run against a true 1395, and p. 76 was off by 4 px. ⚠⚠ **Both shared leaves needed the region treatment**, and for opposite reasons: p. 73 because `ARTICULUS II.` stands full measure across its middle (profiled below the heading it gives 1163, above it 1160), and p. 78 because `QUAESTIO IV.` stands full measure across its lower third (profiled above the heading, rows 0.05–0.68, it gives **1395 on a 61 px run** where the default window straddles the heading and collapses to 2 px). **A full-measure heading inside the body window is as destructive as one at the head of a page — and this span met one at each end.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0