title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus I. *De locutionibus exprimentibus ipsam unionem.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum vera sit locutio: Deus est homo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de hac locutione: Deus est homo. Et quod sit vera, videtur:

1. (*Fundamenta*) Per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo[^1]: « Deus et homo unus est Christus»: Christus igitur et est Deus et est homo et est unus; sed quaecumque dicuntur de uno et de eodem secundum numerum, dicuntur de se invicem: ergo Deus est homo, et homo est Deus.

2. Item, Bernardus in quinto ad Eugenium[^2]: « Tantam et tam expressam vim unionis in se praefert ea persona, qua Deus et homo unus est Christus, ut, si duo de se praedices, non erres».

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3. Item, sicut superius[^3] ostensum fuit, illa unio terminatur ad unitatem personalem sive hypostasis; sed quotiescumque aliqua duo uniuntur in supposito, de se invicem in concretione praedicantur: ergo sicut Deus nominat divinam naturam in concretione, et homo similiter; videtur, quod ibi sit mutua praedicatio, ut dicatur Deus homo, et homo Deus.

4. Item, medium, quod optime iungit extrema, ad utrumque extremorum comparatur secundum habitudinem subiiciendi et praedicandi[^4]: si ergo Christus perfectus mediator est inter Deum et hominem, ergo Deus et homo talem habent habitudinem respectu eiusdem. Sed quae talem habent habitudinem respectu eiusdem dicuntur necessario de se invicem: ergo homo praedicatur de Deo, et Deus de homine.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Ad oppositum*) Maior est unitas personarum in divina natura, quam sit naturarum in Christo in una persona, quia, sicut dicit Bernardus[^5]: «Illa unitas arcem tenet super omnes unitates»; sed ratione unitatis naturae non contingit dicere, quod una persona sit altera: ergo ratione unitatis personae non contingit dicere, quod Deus sit homo, et quod homo sit Deus.

2. Item, magis conveniunt ea quae sunt eiusdem generis et uniuntur in natura et persona, quam quae sunt diversorum generum et uniuntur in persona tantum; sed anima et corpus sunt in genere substantiae et uniuntur in uno homine, qui est eiusdem naturae et unius personae; divinitas autem et humanitas non sunt eiusdem generis nec uniuntur in unitatem[^6] naturae, sed solum in unitatem personae: ergo cum haec sit falsa: anima est corpus, et e converso; ergo et haec: homo est Deus, et Deus est homo.

3. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est homo[^7], aut homo praedicatur de Deo et de Petro univoce, aut aequivoce. Si univoce: ergo aliquid est univocum Creatori et creaturae, quod est impossibile; si aequivoce: ergo non videtur Christus homo ad genus hominum pertinere, ex quo homo de ipso et aliis non dicitur uniformiter.

4. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est homo, aut homo praedicatur per se, aut per accidens. Si per se; et quod praedicatur per se dicitur de quolibet supposito: ergo quaelibet persona divina est homo. Si per accidens: ergo videtur, quod aliquid accidat Deo; quod omnino falsum est, sicut probatum est in primo libro[^8].

5. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est homo, aut homo praedicatur de Deo absolute, aut relative. Si absolute: ergo dicitur de tribus, quia nomina absoluta dicuntur de tribus, sicut vult Augustinus[^9], et haec dicunt substantiam. Si secundum relationem; sed omne relativum dicitur respectu alicuius: ergo homo dicitur respectu alicuius. Sed hoc est plane falsum: ergo non videtur, quod homo aliquo modo praedicetur de Deo.

6. Item, si homo praedicatur de Deo, aut est in plus, aut in minus, aut in aeque[^10]. Si in minus: ergo quilibet homo est Deus, et non convertitur; si in plus: ergo quilibet, qui Deus est, homo est; si in aeque: ergo redit idem inconveniens.

7. Item, hoc nomen Deus aut supponit pro persona Filii, aut non. Si pro persona Filii supponit, eadem ratione et pro persona Patris: ergo si haec est vera pro persona Filii: Deus est homo, et haec pro persona Patris: Deus non est homo[^11]. Si vero non supponit pro persona Filii: ergo cum in illa persona facta sit unio, praedicta locutio erit simpliciter falsa.

8. Item, plus distat Deus et homo, quam homo et non-homo; sed Deus nunquam facit, quod homo

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sit non-homo: ergo non videtur, quod possit facere nec per naturam nec per miraculum, quod haec sit vera: Deus est homo.

9. (*Quaestio implicita*) Item, triplex est praedicandi modus: quod enim praedicatur de altero aut praedicatur per essentiam, aut per inhaerentiam, aut per causam[^12]. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, aut praedicatur per essentiam, et tunc Deus et homo erit eiusdem essentiae, quod est impossibile; aut per inhaerentiam, et tunc accidit Deo esse hominem; aut per causam, et tunc pari ratione poterit dici, quod Deus est lapis, quia ita est causa lapidis, sicut et hominis: nullo igitur modo videtur posse concedi, hominem de Deo posse praedicari.

### Conclusio

> Necesse est concedere, hominem esse Deum, et Deum hominem; haec tamen praedicatio est *per modum singularem*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum catholicam veritatem absque dubio necesse est concedere, (*Conclusio 1*) hominem esse Deum, et Deum hominem, pro eo (*Ratio*) quod duae naturae ibi unitae sunt in unam personam. Quae autem in uno supposito uniuntur necessario de se invicem praedicantur, si accipiantur concrete, propter illam maximam, qua dicitur: «quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem»; per quam etiam fundari habet virtus syllogismi expositorii, quod probat Philosophus in libro Priorum[^13], ea quae dicuntur de uno et eodem, praedicari de se invicem. Si igitur unus est Christus, qui est Deus et homo, necessario oportet concedere, Deum esse hominem, et hominem esse Deum. Et hoc quidem attestantur Sanctorum auctoritates, et communiter fatentur doctores theologiae. — (*De modo praedicationis*) De modo tamen praedicandi diversi diversimode sentiunt.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod haec praedicatio (*Opinio 1*) non sit in recto, sed in obliquo, ut sit sensus: Deus est homo, id est, Deus habet hominem. (*Improbatur*) — Et hic modus dicendi relabitur ad tertiam opinionem, quae dixit, hominem praedicari de Deo secundum habitum, quae etiam superius[^14] improbata est. Manifestum est etiam, quod illud non est sufficienter dictum, quia, si diceretur Deus esse homo, id est habens hominem, eadem ratione diceretur caro, quia habet carnem, et pes, quia habet pedem.

(*Opinio 2*) Et ideo alii dicere voluerunt, quod talis praedicatio est in recto, verumtamen nec est praedicatio formalis nec causalis nec accidentalis, sed per identitatem; et est sensus: Deus est homo, id est, Deus est ille qui est homo; ille autem, qui est homo, id est Filius Dei, de Deo praedicatur per praedicationem identitatis[^15]. (*Non probatur*) — Sed nec adhuc illud plene solvit, quia quaelibet implicatio claudit in se praedicationem; et ideo, cum dicitur: Deus est ille qui est homo, adhuc contingit quaerere de illa implicatione, quae est ex parte praedicati, ad quam praedicationem habeat reduci; et tunc vel oportet ire in infinitum implicando, vel oportebit[^16] recurrere ad alium modum praedicandi.

(*Opinio 3 et conclusio 2*) Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, ut cum dicitur: Deus est homo, hic est singularis modus praedicandi. Non enim est talis praedicatio per essentiam nec per causam nec per inhaerentiam, sicut ostendebat ratio ultima, sed est praedicatio per unionem; ideo enim homo praedicatur de Deo, quia unitur ei in unitatem personae. Et quoniam haec unio est singularis[^17], non est mirum, si singularem modum exigit praedicandi.

(*Ad quaestionem implicitam*) Et per hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur; quia talis praedicatio non reducitur ad alios modos praedicandi consuetos, habet tamen in se veritatem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**
*Ad 1.* (*Solutio oppositorum*) Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod propter unionem in natura una persona non praedicatur de alia, quamvis illa unio sit excellentior: ergo sic et in proposito; dicendum, quod non sequitur. (*Notandum*) Unitas enim Trinitatis maior est quantum ad rationem similitudinis et conformitatis, non autem quantum ad rationem mutuae praedicationis, pro eo quod illa quae conveniunt in una natura, non praedicantur de se ita mutuo, sicut illa quae concurrunt in unam personam, pro eo quod natura dicit quid commune, hypostasis dicit suppositum proprium; consequentia autem affirmativa tenet ab inferiori ad superius, non e converso. Unde cuicumque subiicitur iste homo, potest subiici homo; cuicumque subiicitur homo, potest subiici animal; sed e converso non sequitur: de quocumque praedicatur animal, praedicatur et homo; immo est ibi consequens[^18]. Ideo, quando una hypostasis subiicitur duobus, necesse est illa sibi invicem subiici, et sic per consequens praedicari. Quando autem una natura dici-

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tur de pluribus, non est necesse, illa de se invicem praedicari.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima et caro concurrunt in unam personam et naturam, non tamen praedicantur de se invicem mutua praedicatione; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ex causa. (*Ratio 1*) Primum quidem, quia concurrunt in unitatem personae atque naturae tanquam partes constitutivae, quarum non est praedicari de toto, nec per consequens de se invicem; non sic divina natura et humana, sicut in praecedentibus[^19] visum est. (*Ratio 2*) — Alia est etiam ratio, quia anima et caro significant partes constitutivas in abstractione; Deus autem et homo non in abstractione, sed in concretione significant; et hac de causa possunt de se invicem dici, quamvis in abstractione de se invicem non praedicentur. Haec enim est falsa: Deitas est humanitas, sicut haec: caro est anima, quamvis ista sit vera: caro est animata. — (*Nota*) Intelligatur tamen sane quod dictum est, homo significari in concretione; concretio enim proprie dicta reperitur in terminis accidentalibus[^20].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, si homo praedicatur de Deo, aut praedicatur univoce de Deo, aut aequivoce; (*Notandum*) dicendum, quod proprie nec univoce nec aequivoce: non aequivoce, quia non est diversa hominis significatio, secundum quod dicitur de Deo et de Martino; univoce non, quia etsi homo retineat eandem significationem, cum dicitur de Deo et de Petro, alio tamen modo comparatur ad Petrum et Paulum, alio modo ad Deum. Ad Petrum comparatur praedicatione formali et essentiali, ad Deum vero in unione personali; ideo ad neutrum praedictorum modorum possunt illae duae praedicationes plenarie reduci, licet aliquid possit ibi reperiri de uno praedictorum modorum, aliquid de alio[^21].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum dicitur: Deus est homo, aut praedicatur per se, aut per accidens; dicendum, quod neutro modo, accipiendo proprie per se et[^22] per accidens: per se, inquam, non praedicatur, cum non sit essentialis habitudo unius ad alterum; per accidens non praedicatur, quia unum non est accidens alterius. Nec illud est inconveniens, quia talis modus praedicandi sub praedicta divisione non habet comprehendi[^23]. (*Alia solutio*) — Posset tamen dici, quod uniri humanae naturae ex parte Dei non dicit accidens, sed ex parte naturae assumtae. Unde quodam modo talis praedicatio posset dici per se, quodam modo per accidens: per se, comparando divinam naturam ad personam, in qua est unio, de qua per se praedicatur; per accidens posset dici, humanam naturam comparando ad personam, cui habet uniri per gratiam[^24].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum homo praedicetur absolute, vel relative; (*Distinctio notanda*) dicendum, quod dici relative est dupliciter: vel relatione implicita, vel explicita. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, homo praedicatur de Deo quodam modo absolute, quodam modo relative: absolute quantum ad privationem relationis extrinsecae; relative quantum ad positionem relationis intrinsecae[^25]. Est enim sensus: Deus est homo, id est, Deus est unitus humanae naturae unitate personae, ratione cuius homo de Deo, et Deus habet dici de homine.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si praedicatur homo de Deo, aut praedicatur in plus, aut in minus, aut in aeque; (*Notandum*) dicendum, quod quoddam est genus praedicationis, in quo praedicatum et subiectum se habent ut excedentia et excessa, ut cum dicitur: homo est albus; et sic est in proposito. Nam etsi homo dicatur de aliquo supposito Dei, non tamen dicitur de quolibet, nec e converso; sicut non omnis homo est albus, nec omne album est homo.

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut haec est vera pro persona Filii: Deus est homo, ita haec pro persona Patris est vera: Deus non est homo; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia, sicut in primo libro[^26] dictum fuit, (*Notandum*) iste terminus Deus partim habet naturam termini communis propter suppositorum pluralitatem, partim naturam termini discreti propter formam incommunicabilem. Et ideo, quia naturam habet termini communis, locutionem potest reddere veram pro uno supposito; quia vero naturam

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habet termini discreti, ideo non refert, si praeponatur, vel postponatur ei negatio. Unde in negativa negatur pro omnibus suppositis, quamvis in affirmativa possit reddere locutionem veram pro uno solo. Et ideo haec est falsa: Deus non est homo; quia praedicatum removetur non tantum pro Patre, sed etiam pro Filio; et ex hoc necessario sequitur, quod affirmativa sibi opposita sit vera, haec scilicet: Deus est homo.

(*Quaestio incidens 1*) Unde si quaeratur: quanta est ista propositio: Deus est homo? respondendum est, quod partem habet naturae indefinitae, partem naturae singularis; et hoc est propter naturam termini subiecti. —

(*Quaestio incidens 2*) Si vero quaeratur, in qua materia sit, utrum in naturali, vel remota, vel contingenti; dicendum, quod in materia contingenti praedicatum et subiectum se habent ut excedentia et excessa; et sic est in proposito; et praedicta propositio reduci habet ad materiam illam, sapit tamen aliquid de materia naturali propter hoc, quod illae naturae, quantum est de se, sunt ad invicem disparatae, per gratiam unionis sunt coniunctae, et quasi naturales factae.

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### Article I. *On the locutions that express the union itself.*
### Question I. *Whether the locution "God is man" is true.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and the inquiry is about this locution: God is man. And that it is true seems so:

1. (*Arguments*) From what is said in the Creed[^1]: « God and man is one Christ»: Christ therefore both is God and is man and is one; but whatever things are said of one and the same thing according to number, are said of each other reciprocally: therefore God is man, and man is God.

2. Likewise, Bernard in the fifth book *to Eugenius*[^2]: « That person, by which God and man is one Christ, bears within itself so great and so express a force of union, that, if you should predicate the two of each other, you would not err».

3. Likewise, just as was shown above[^3], that union is terminated at a personal unity, that is, of a hypostasis; but whenever any two things are united in a supposit, they are predicated of each other reciprocally in the concrete: therefore just as "God" names the divine nature in the concrete, and "man" likewise; it seems that there is a mutual predication there, so that God is called man, and man God.

4. Likewise, the middle term, which best joins the extremes, is related to each of the extremes according to the relation of being-subjected and being-predicated[^4]: if therefore Christ the perfect mediator is between God and man, then God and man have such a relation with respect to the same thing. But things that have such a relation with respect to the same thing are necessarily said of each other reciprocally: therefore man is predicated of God, and God of man.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*On the opposite side*) Greater is the unity of the persons in the divine nature than is the unity of the natures in Christ in one person, because, as Bernard says[^5]: «That unity holds the citadel above all unities»; but by reason of the unity of nature it does not happen that one says that one person is the other: therefore by reason of the unity of person it does not happen that one says that God is man, and that man is God.

2. Likewise, things that are of the same genus and are united in nature and person are more in agreement than things that are of diverse genera and are united in person only; but soul and body are in the genus of substance and are united in one man, who is of the same nature and of one person; but divinity and humanity are not of the same genus, nor are they united into a unity[^6] of nature, but only into a unity of person: therefore since this is false: the soul is the body, and conversely; then also this: man is God, and God is man.

3. Likewise, when it is said: God is man[^7], either "man" is predicated of God and of Peter univocally, or equivocally. If univocally: then something is univocal to the Creator and the creature, which is impossible; if equivocally: then Christ does not seem to belong to the genus of men, since "man" is not said uniformly of him and of others.

4. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated essentially (*per se*), or accidentally. If essentially; and what is predicated essentially is said of every supposit: then every divine person is man. If accidentally: then it seems that something is accidental to God; which is altogether false, as was proved in the first book[^8].

5. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated of God absolutely, or relatively. If absolutely: then it is said of the three, because absolute names are said of the three, as Augustine holds[^9], and these signify substance. If according to relation; but every relative is said with respect to something: then "man" is said with respect to something. But this is plainly false: therefore it does not seem that "man" is predicated of God in any way.

6. Likewise, if "man" is predicated of God, it is either of wider extent, or of narrower, or of equal extent[^10]. If of narrower: then every man is God, and it does not convert; if of wider: then everyone who is God, is man; if of equal: then the same incongruity returns.

7. Likewise, this name "God" either supposits for the person of the Son, or not. If it supposits for the person of the Son, then by the same reasoning also for the person of the Father: therefore if this is true for the person of the Son: God is man, then this is also for the person of the Father: God is not man[^11]. But if it does not supposit for the person of the Son: then, since in that person the union came about, the aforesaid locution will be simply false.

8. Likewise, God and man are more distant than man and non-man; but God never brings it about that a man

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be a non-man: therefore it does not seem that he can bring it about, neither by nature nor by miracle, that this be true: God is man.

9. (*Implicit question*) Likewise, the mode of predicating is threefold: for what is predicated of another is predicated either by essence, or by inherence, or by cause[^12]. When therefore it is said: God is man, either it is predicated by essence, and then God and man will be of the same essence, which is impossible; or by inherence, and then it is accidental to God to be man; or by cause, and then by the same reasoning it could be said that God is a stone, because he is the cause of a stone just as also of a man: in no way therefore does it seem that "man" can be predicated of God.

### Conclusion

> It is necessary to concede that man is God, and God man; this predication, however, is *by a singular mode*.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to Catholic truth it is without doubt necessary to concede (*Conclusion 1*) that man is God, and God man, on the ground (*Reason*) that the two natures there are united into one person. And things that are united in one supposit are necessarily predicated of each other reciprocally, if they are taken concretely, on account of that maxim by which it is said: «whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other»; by which also the force of the expository syllogism comes to be grounded, which the Philosopher proves in the book of the *Prior Analytics*[^13], namely that those things which are said of one and the same thing are predicated of each other reciprocally. If therefore Christ, who is God and man, is one, it is necessary to concede that God is man, and man is God. And this indeed the authorities of the Saints attest, and the doctors of theology commonly avow. — (*On the mode of predication*) About the mode of predicating, however, different men think in different ways.

For some have wished to say that this predication (*Opinion 1*) is not in the direct (*in recto*), but in the oblique (*in obliquo*), so that the sense is: God is man, that is, God has a man. (*It is disproved*) — And this manner of speaking falls back into the third opinion, which said that man is predicated of God by way of a habit, which also was disproved above[^14]. It is also manifest that this was not sufficiently said, because, if one were to say that God is man, that is, having a man, by the same reasoning he would be called flesh, because he has flesh, and a foot, because he has a foot.

(*Opinion 2*) And therefore others have wished to say that such a predication is in the direct, yet it is neither a formal nor a causal nor an accidental predication, but one by identity; and the sense is: God is man, that is, God is the one who is man; but that one who is man, that is the Son of God, is predicated of God by a predication of identity[^15]. (*It is not proved*) — But this still does not fully resolve it, because every implication encloses a predication within itself; and therefore, when it is said: God is the one who is man, it still happens that one inquires about that implication, which is on the side of the predicate, to which predication it is to be reduced; and then either one must go on to infinity implicating, or it will be necessary[^16] to have recourse to another mode of predicating.

(*Opinion 3 and conclusion 2*) And for this reason there is a third manner of speaking, namely that when it is said: God is man, this is a singular mode of predicating. For such a predication is not by essence nor by cause nor by inherence, as the last argument showed, but it is a predication by union; for "man" is predicated of God on this account, that it is united to him into a unity of person. And since this union is singular[^17], it is no wonder if it requires a singular mode of predicating.

(*To the implicit question*) And by this is made clear what was asked last; because such a predication is not reduced to the other customary modes of predicating, yet it has truth in itself, as the arguments adduced for this side show.

**Replies to the arguments on the opposite side:**
*To 1.* (*Solution of the opposing arguments*) As to that which is objected, that on account of a union in nature one person is not predicated of another, although that union is more excellent: therefore so also in the matter at hand; it must be said that it does not follow. (*Note*) For the unity of the Trinity is greater with respect to the account of likeness and conformity, but not with respect to the account of mutual predication, on the ground that those things which agree in one nature are not predicated of each other so mutually as those things which concur into one person, on the ground that nature signifies something common, the hypostasis signifies a proper supposit; but the affirmative consequence holds from the inferior to the superior, not conversely. Hence to whatever "this man" is subjected, "man" can be subjected; to whatever "man" is subjected, "animal" can be subjected; but conversely it does not follow: of whatever "animal" is predicated, "man" is also predicated; nay, there is a fallacy of the consequent[^18] there. Therefore, when one hypostasis is subjected to two things, it is necessary that these be subjected to each other, and thus consequently be predicated. But when one nature is said

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of many things, it is not necessary that these be predicated of each other.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that soul and flesh concur into one person and nature, yet are not predicated of each other by a mutual predication; it must be said that the case is not alike, for a twofold reason. (*Reason 1*) First indeed, because they concur into the unity of person and of nature as constitutive parts, of which there is no being-predicated of the whole, nor consequently of each other; not so the divine and human nature, as was seen in the preceding[^19]. (*Reason 2*) — There is also another reason, because soul and flesh signify the constitutive parts in the abstract; but God and man signify not in the abstract, but in the concrete; and for this reason they can be said of each other, although in the abstract they are not predicated of each other. For this is false: Deity is humanity, just as this: the flesh is the soul, although this is true: the flesh is ensouled. — (*Note*) Let it nevertheless be understood soundly, what was said, that "man" is signified in the concrete; for concretion properly so called is found in accidental terms[^20].

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, whether, if "man" is predicated of God, it is predicated univocally of God, or equivocally; (*Note*) it must be said that properly neither univocally nor equivocally: not equivocally, because the signification of "man" is not diverse according as it is said of God and of Martin; not univocally, because, although "man" retains the same signification when it is said of God and of Peter, yet in another way it is related to Peter and Paul, in another way to God. To Peter it is related by a formal and essential predication, but to God in a personal union; therefore to neither of the aforesaid modes can those two predications be fully reduced, although something may be found there of one of the aforesaid modes, something of the other[^21].

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that when it is said: God is man, it is predicated either essentially (*per se*) or accidentally; it must be said that it is by neither mode, taking *per se* and accidentally[^22] properly: essentially, I say, it is not predicated, since there is no essential relation of the one to the other; accidentally it is not predicated, because the one is not an accident of the other. Nor is that incongruous, because such a mode of predicating is not to be comprehended under the aforesaid division[^23]. (*Another solution*) — It could nevertheless be said that to be united to human nature, on the part of God, does not signify an accident, but on the part of the assumed nature. Hence in one way such a predication could be called *per se*, in another way accidental: *per se*, by comparing the divine nature to the person, in which the union is, of which it is predicated *per se*; accidental it could be called, by comparing the human nature to the person, to which it comes to be united by grace[^24].

*To 5.* As to that which is asked, whether "man" is predicated absolutely, or relatively; (*Distinction to be noted*) it must be said that to be said relatively is in two ways: either by an implicit relation, or by an explicit one. When therefore it is said: God is man, "man" is predicated of God in one way absolutely, in another way relatively: absolutely with respect to the privation of an extrinsic relation; relatively with respect to the positing of an intrinsic relation[^25]. For the sense is: God is man, that is, God is united to the human nature by a unity of person, by reason of which "man" comes to be said of God, and "God" of man.

*To 6.* As to that which is objected, that if "man" is predicated of God, it is predicated either of wider extent, or of narrower, or of equal extent; (*Note*) it must be said that there is a certain genus of predication, in which the predicate and the subject are related as exceeding and exceeded, as when it is said: a man is white; and so it is in the matter at hand. For although "man" be said of some supposit of God, yet it is not said of every one, nor conversely; just as not every man is white, nor is every white thing a man.

*To 7.* As to that which is objected, that just as this is true for the person of the Son: God is man, so this is true for the person of the Father: God is not man; it must be said that the case is not alike; because, as was said in the first book[^26], (*Note*) this term "God" partly has the nature of a common term on account of the plurality of supposits, partly the nature of a discrete term on account of the incommunicable form. And therefore, because it has the nature of a common term, it can render the locution true for one supposit; but because it has the nature

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of a discrete term, therefore it makes no difference whether the negation be placed before it or after it. Hence in the negative it is negated for all supposits, although in the affirmative it can render the locution true for one alone. And therefore this is false: God is not man; because the predicate is removed not only for the Father, but also for the Son; and from this it necessarily follows that the affirmative opposed to it is true, namely this: God is man.

(*Incidental question 1*) Hence if it be asked: how great in quantity is this proposition: God is man? it must be answered that it has part of the nature of an indefinite [proposition], part of the nature of a singular one; and this is on account of the nature of the subject term. —

(*Incidental question 2*) But if it be asked, in what matter it stands, whether in the natural, or the remote, or the contingent; it must be said that in contingent matter the predicate and the subject are related as exceeding and exceeded; and so it is in the matter at hand; and the aforesaid proposition is to be reduced to that matter, yet it savors somewhat of natural matter on this account, that those natures, so far as concerns themselves, are mutually disparate, [but] by the grace of the union are conjoined, and made as it were natural.

la: Athanasiano. — De minori cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. I. (p.169, nota 6)

en: [From the Creed] of Athanasius. — On the minor premise cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 1. (p.169, note 6)

la: Sive de Consider. c. 9. n. 21, quod testimonium in textu origin. sic exit: ut si duo illa de se invicem praedices, non erraveris, Deum videlicet hominem, et hominem Deum vero catholiceque pronuntians. (p.169, nota 7)

en: Or rather *On Consideration* c. 9, n. 21, which testimony in the original text runs thus: that if you should predicate those two of each other, you would not err, namely pronouncing God to be man, and man to be God, truly and catholically. (p.169, note 7)

la: Dist. 6. a. 2. q. 1. — Quod ad minorem spectat, respicias, quod Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia docet respectu eorum quae in subiecto sunt, ut e. gr. album, scil. ipsa non praedicari de subiecto secundum rationem sive in abstractione; « dicitur enim corpus album, ratio vero albi nunquam de corpore praedicabitur » [dicendo: corpus est albedo]. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. I. — Pro *hypostasis* Vat. *hypostasim*. Paulo inferius pro *et homo similiter*; *videtur* cod. F *et homo nominat humanam naturam in concretione, sequitur*. (p.170, nota 1)

en: Dist. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — As regards the minor premise, observe that Aristotle, *On the Categories*, in the chapter on Substance, teaches with respect to those things which are in a subject, as e.g. "white," namely that they themselves are not predicated of the subject according to the formal account, that is, in the abstract; « for a body is called white, but the account of white will never be predicated of the body » [by saying: a body is whiteness]. Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 1. — For *hypostasis* the Vatican [ed. reads] *hypostasim*. A little below, for *et homo similiter; videtur*, cod. F [reads] *et homo nominat humanam naturam in concretione, sequitur*. (p.170, note 1)

la: Secundum Aristot., 1. Prior. c. 4. Et idem ait IV. Polit. c. 9. (c. 7.): In eo [medio] enim utrumque extremorum apparet. (p.170, nota 2)

en: According to Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, c. 4. And the same he says in *Politics* IV, c. 9 (c. 7): For in it [the middle] each of the extremes appears. (p.170, note 2)

la: Libr. V. de Consider. c. 8. n. 19. — In maiori post *personarum* Vat. subdit *divinarum*. (p.170, nota 3)

en: *On Consideration* book V, c. 8, n. 19. — In the major premise, after *personarum* the Vatican [ed.] adds *divinarum*. (p.170, note 3)

la: Cod. A hic et post pauca *in unitate*. (p.170, nota 4)

en: Cod. A here and shortly after [reads] *in unitate* [into a unity]. (p.170, note 4)

la: Codd. FUbb ex seqq. supplent *et Petrus est homo*. Paulo inferius post *pertinere* cod. O interserit *quod damnatum est in decreto Alexandri, sicut patuit supra* [d. 6. a. I. q. 3. fundam. I.]. (p.170, nota 5)

en: Codd. FUbb supply from what follows *et Petrus est homo* [and Peter is man]. A little below, after *pertinere* cod. O inserts *quod damnatum est in decreto Alexandri, sicut patuit supra* [which was condemned in the decree of Alexander, as appeared above] [d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, fundam. 1]. (p.170, note 5)

la: Dist. S. p. 1. a. 2. q. I; d. 26. dub. 5; d. 30. q. 2. seq. — De divisione praedicationis vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4, et VII. Metaph. text. II. seq. (VI. c. i.). Boeth., I. in Praedicam. Aristot., primam regulam antepraedicamentalem explicans ait: Duobus enim modis praedicationes fiunt: uno secundum accidens, alio de subiecto [per se]; de homine namque praedicatur album, dicitur enim homo albus; rursus de eodem homine praedicatur animal, dicitur enim homo animal. Sed illa prior praedicatio... secundum accidens est; namque accidens, quod est album, de subiecto homine praedicatur, sed non in eo quod quid sit [essentialiter]... De subiecto [per se] vero praedicare est, quoties altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur, ut animal de homine; quoniam animal et substantia est et genus hominis; idcirco etc. (p.170, nota 6)

en: Dist. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1; d. 26, dub. 5; d. 30, q. 2 f. — On the division of predication see Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 4, and *Metaphysics* VII, text 11 f. (VI, c. 1). Boethius, *On the Categories of Aristotle* I, explaining the first antepredicamental rule, says: For predications come about in two modes: one according to accident, the other of a subject [essentially]; for "white" is predicated of "man," for a man is called white; again "animal" is predicated of the same man, for a man is called an animal. But that former predication... is according to accident; for the accident, which is "white," is predicated of the subject "man," but not in respect of what it is [essentially]... But to predicate of a subject [essentially] is whenever one thing is predicated of another in the very substance, as "animal" of "man"; since "animal" is both a substance and the genus of man; therefore etc. (p.170, note 6)

la: Libr. V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. seqq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. XXVII. lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq. — Relativa secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de His quae ad aliquid, « dicuntur quaecumque haec ipsa quae sunt, aliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad alterum, ut maius hoc ipsum quod est, alterius dicitur ». (p.170, nota 7)

en: *On the Trinity* book V, c. 8, n. 9 f. Cf. I Sent. d. 27, text of the Master, c. 4 f. — Relatives according to Aristotle, *On the Categories*, in the chapter on Things which are toward something [relatives], « those things are called [relative] which, being the very things that they are, are said to be of other things, or somehow otherwise toward another, as the greater, the very thing that it is, is said [to be greater] than another ». (p.170, note 7)

la: Damasc., Dialectica, c. 15: Omne praedicatum aut latius patet quam subiectum, aut aeque; minus autem late nunquam... Latius porro patent superiora; minus late inferiora... Praedicatum autem, quod subiecto est aequale, illud est quod cum subiecto convertitur... Quapropter generum de speciebus, et differentiarum de speciebus, ac specierum de individuis praedicatio latior dicitur; propriorum autem aequa. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 348, nota 5. (p.170, nota 8)

en: Damascene, *Dialectica*, c. 15: Every predicate is either of wider extent than the subject, or of equal extent; but of narrower extent never... Now superior things are of wider extent; inferior things less wide... But the predicate which is equal to the subject is that which converts with the subject... Wherefore the predication of genera of species, and of differences of species, and of species of individuals is called wider; but that of propria equal. Cf. tom. I, p. 348, note 5. (p.170, note 8)

la: Et consequenter Deus simul est homo et non homo, quod est absurdum. — Mox codd. AFGHKUZaa omittunt *in* ante ablativum *illa persona*. (p.170, nota 9)

en: And consequently God is at once man and not man, which is absurd. — Presently codd. AFGHKUZaa omit *in* before the ablative *illa persona*. (p.170, note 9)

la: Cfr. Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regul. 12. et 18. seqq. (p.171, nota 1)

en: Cf. Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rules 12 and 18 ff. (p.171, note 1)

la: Libr. I. c. 6. Vide tom. I. pag. 576, nota 5, ubi de syllogismo expositorio eiusque principio agitur. — Immediate post Vat. voculae *en* annectit *scilicet*. (p.171, nota 2)

en: Book I, c. 6. See tom. I, p. 576, note 5, where the expository syllogism and its principle are treated. — Immediately after, the Vatican [ed.] appends to the particle *en* the word *scilicet*. (p.171, note 2)

la: Dist. 6. a. I. q. 3. et dubium 2. (p.171, nota 3)

en: Dist. 6, a. 1, q. 3, and doubt 2. (p.171, note 3)

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. a. I. q. I. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 2. — Paulo inferius post *praedicationem* Vat. adiungit *aliquam*. — Terminus *implicatio*, qui in hac ulteriore propositione occurrit, significat propositionem relativam. Sic Petrus Hispan., Summul. tr. de Restrictione, ait, restrictionem fieri posse per implicationem, ut cum dicatur: homo, qui est albus, currit etc. (p.171, nota 4)

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 8, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, and d. 34, q. 2. — A little below, after *praedicationem* the Vatican [ed.] adds *aliquam*. — The term *implicatio*, which occurs in this further proposition, signifies a relative proposition. Thus Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract on Restriction, says that restriction can be made by implication, as when one says: the man who is white runs, etc. (p.171, note 4)

la: Codd. O U K X *oportet*. (p.171, nota 5)

en: Codd. O U K X [read] *oportet* [it is necessary]. (p.171, note 5)

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 6. a. I. et 2. (p.171, nota 6)

en: As was shown above d. 6, a. 1 and 2. (p.171, note 6)

la: De qua fallacia vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 18, nota 5. — In edd. haec ultima propositio in fine multum truncata et transformata est: *Unde cuicumque subiicitur iste terminus homo, potest subiici et ille terminus animal*; scil. et homo, ibi est enim consequens. Paulo inferius pro *dicitur* cod. B *praedicatur*, et dein cod. Q sic terminat solutionem: *illa sibi invicem subiici et per consequens praedicari*. (p.171, nota 7)

en: On which fallacy see Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5). Cf. above p. 18, note 5. — In the editions this last proposition at the end is much truncated and transformed: *Hence to whatever this term "man" is subjected, that term "animal" can also be subjected*; namely also "man," for there it is a fallacy of the consequent. A little below, for *dicitur* cod. B [reads] *praedicatur*, and then cod. Q ends the solution thus: *that these be subjected to each other and consequently be predicated*. (p.171, note 7)

la: Dist. 6. a. 2. q. I. — Ibid. a. 1. q. I. vide etiam de alia ratione seq. (p.172, nota 1)

en: Dist. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — Ibid. a. 1, q. 1, see also on the other reason following. (p.172, note 1)

la: Sicut enim duplex distinguitur abstractum, scil. a supposito seu ab individuis, v. gr. humanitas, et a subiecto, v. gr. albedo: sic etiam duplex concretum, scil. ad suppositum, v. gr. homo, et ad subiectum, v. gr. album. Prima species vocatur concretum metaphysicum, secunda physicum; prima spectat ad essentiam, secunda ad accidens. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *homo significari* Vat. substituit *hominem significari*. (p.172, nota 2)

en: For just as the abstract is distinguished as twofold, namely from the supposit or from individuals, e.g. *humanitas* [humanity], and from the subject, e.g. *albedo* [whiteness]: so also the concrete is twofold, namely toward the supposit, e.g. *homo* [man], and toward the subject, e.g. *album* [a white thing]. The first species is called the metaphysical concrete, the second the physical; the first regards essence, the second accident. Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 3. — A little above, for *homo significari* the Vatican [ed.] substitutes *hominem significari*. (p.172, note 2)

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *ad Deum vero* codd. H K Z aa bb *ad Deum non nisi*, codd. B C D G L N (T a prima manu) *ad Deum non*. Deinde pro *plenarie* cod. Z *plene*. (p.172, nota 3)

en: See above d. 2, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for *ad Deum vero* codd. H K Z aa bb [read] *ad Deum non nisi*, codd. B C D G L N (T by the first hand) *ad Deum non*. Then for *plenarie* cod. Z [reads] *plene*. (p.172, note 3)

la: Supplevimus ex codd. K U X bb *per se et*, exigente hoc etiam contextu. (p.172, nota 4)

en: We have supplied from codd. K U X bb the words *per se et*, the context too requiring this. (p.172, note 4)

la: Ut ostensum est in corp. quaest. (p.172, nota 5)

en: As was shown in the corpus of the question. (p.172, note 5)

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et in fine, et infra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. (p.172, nota 6)

en: Cf. above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, in the corpus and at the end, and below d. 13, a. 2, q. 2. (p.172, note 6)

la: Vel aliis verbis: De Deo homo praedicatur absolute, scil. ratione significati, quia homo significat quid absolutum; relative vero ratione suppositi, quia homo in Christo propter relationem implicitam ad suppositum divinum stat pro persona Filii et ratione illius relationis implicitae non de qualibet persona divina, sed solum de persona Filii praedicatur. — Codd. B C D hanc propositionem sic subvertunt: *absolute quantum ad privationem relationis intrinsecae; relative quantum ad positionem relationis extrinsecae*; codd. G H I L N U (K T a prima manu) bis exhibent *relationis extrinsecae*. Mox cod. U voci *unitate* praefigit *in*. (p.172, nota 7)

en: Or in other words: Of God "man" is predicated absolutely, namely by reason of the thing signified, because "man" signifies something absolute; but relatively by reason of the supposit, because "man" in Christ, on account of the implicit relation to the divine supposit, stands for the person of the Son, and by reason of that implicit relation is predicated not of every divine person, but only of the person of the Son. — Codd. B C D invert this proposition thus: *absolutely with respect to the privation of an intrinsic relation; relatively with respect to the positing of an extrinsic relation*; codd. G H I L N U (K T by the first hand) twice exhibit *relationis extrinsecae*. Presently cod. U prefixes *in* to the word *unitate*. (p.172, note 7)

la: Dist. 4. q. 1. et 4., ubi etiam quae in seq. propositione proponuntur, explicata habes. — Paulo inferius pro *incommunicabilem* codd. BCDEILMTXaa exhibent *communicabilem*, Vat. substituit *immultiplicabilem*, scilicet divinitatem. (p.172, nota 8)

en: Dist. 4, q. 1 and 4, where you also have explained the things which are proposed in the following proposition. — A little below, for *incommunicabilem* codd. BCDEILMTXaa exhibit *communicabilem*, the Vatican [ed.] substitutes *immultiplicabilem*, namely the divinity. (p.172, note 8)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Circa tres huius articuli quaestiones, quae agunt de proprio et sincero sensu earum locutionum, quas Magister in principio dist. VI. commemorat, principales Scholastici vix nisi in modo loquendi et in rationibus allatis dissentiunt. — De conclusione principali quaestionis I. haud potest esse dubium, quin omnino concedenda sit duplex ista locutio: Deus est homo, et homo est Deus, « non solum propter veritatem terminorum (quia scilicet Christus est verus Deus et verus homo), sed etiam propter veritatem praedicationis » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 16. a. I. in corp.). Tamen veritas praedicationis sustineri nequit neque secundum primam neque secundum tertiam praedictarum opinionum; de quo in annexa quaestione secundaria agitur. Prima enim illa opinio vult, hic esse praedicationem non formalem, sed secundum identitatem, scilicet per implicationem; tertia vero putat, esse praedicationem secundum inhaerentiam (in obliquo). Utraque haec positio merito communiter reprobatur, ast sustinetur, quod hic sit proprie praedicatio per se, modo tamen singulari, quam Scoto placet nominare substantialem. — Nec facit differentiam in re, quando S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. I. ad 6.) ait: « Quod est praedicatio per essentiam », dum S. Bonav. (hic in corp.) dicit: « Non est talis praedicatio per essentiam... sed est praedicatio per unionem». Nam S. Thom. ibi explicat suum modum loquendi, ita continuans: « Non quod divinitas sit humanitas, sed quia suppositum divinae naturae essentialiter [i. e. per unionem] est suppositum humanae naturae ». Et in solutione ad 5. idem dicit, et rem et praedicationem in hac materia esse prorsus singularem.

**II.** De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., de hac et seqq. qq. S. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. et m. 3, q. 7. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. I. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; S. III. q. 16. a. I. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**III.** Locutio in 2. quaest. discussa ab omnibus conceditur, tamen a patronis trium illarum opinionum diverso modo intelligitur. Quod verbum fieri de Deo intelligatur non simpliciter, sed in sensu explicato (hic solut. ad 2.), manifestum est. De hac quaest. agunt: Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. I; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 6. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. I.

**IV.** Respectu 3. quaestionis Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 7; Report. hic q. 3.) tenet, locutionem: homo factus est Deus, esse simpliciter et proprie veram. Alii vero cum S. Bonav. eam declarant esse impropriam, nisi factus intelligatur impersonaliter, et quatenus determinet totam compositionem. — Praeter Scotum cfr.: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 11. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. a. 4. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Durand., loc. cit. q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the three questions of this article, which treat of the proper and genuine sense of those locutions which the Master recalls at the beginning of dist. VI, the principal Scholastics dissent scarcely except in the manner of speaking and in the reasons adduced. — Concerning the principal conclusion of question I there can be no doubt that this twofold locution is wholly to be conceded: God is man, and man is God, « not only on account of the truth of the terms (because namely Christ is true God and true man), but also on account of the truth of the predication » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 16. a. I. in corp.). Nevertheless the truth of the predication cannot be upheld either according to the first or according to the third of the aforesaid opinions; about which the matter is treated in the annexed secondary question. For that first opinion holds that here there is a predication not formal, but according to identity, namely by implication; the third in turn supposes that there is a predication according to inherence (in the oblique). Both these positions are deservedly commonly disapproved, but it is maintained that here there is properly a predication *per se*, yet by a singular mode, which it pleases Scotus to name substantial. — Nor does it make a difference in the matter, when S. Thomas (here q. I. a. I. ad 6.) says: « It is a predication by essence », while S. Bonaventure (here in the corpus) says: « It is not such a predication by essence... but it is a predication by union». For S. Thomas there explains his manner of speaking, continuing thus: « Not that divinity is humanity, but because the supposit of the divine nature is essentially [i. e. by union] the supposit of the human nature ». And in the solution to 5 he says the same, that both the reality and the predication in this matter are altogether singular.

**II.** On this 1st question: Alex. of Hales, on this and the following qq. S. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. and m. 3, q. 7. m. 3. a. 2. — Scotus, in each *Scriptum* here q. I. — S. Thom., here q. I. a. I; S. III. q. 16. a. I. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. I. a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. I. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. I. a. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following qq. here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following qq. here the sole question.

**III.** The locution discussed in the 2nd question is conceded by all, yet is understood in a different manner by the partisans of those three opinions. That the word "is made" (*fieri*) is understood of God not simply, but in the explained sense (here solution to 2), is manifest. On this question treat: Scotus, in each *Scriptum* here q. 2. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. I; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 6. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. I. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. I.

**IV.** With respect to the 3rd question, Scotus (here q. 2. n. 7; *Reportata* here q. 3.) holds that the locution: man is made God, is simply and properly true. But others, with S. Bonaventure, declare it to be improper, unless "is made" be understood impersonally, and insofar as it determines the whole composition. — Besides Scotus cf.: S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 11. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. a. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, loc. cit. a. 4. — Durandus, loc. cit. q. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.169–173 (PDF 191–195; `pdf = printed + 22`), read Left column top→bottom then Right, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw 12238–12519, clean here — no cascade-shatter; the OCR captured this quaestio faithfully). Fresh literal English. Apparatus transcribed from the raw OCR footers, page by page.

**Page-split map (q1 spans pp.169–173):**
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- **p.170**: Fundamenta args 3–4 + Sed contra args 1–8 (partial). Footers p.170 notes 1–9 = `[^3]`–`[^11]`.
- **p.171**: Sed contra arg.8 tail + arg.9 (Quaestio implicita) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (Conclusio 1/Ratio, three opinions [opinio 1 improbatur / opinio 2 non probatur / opinio 3 = conclusio 2], Ad quaestionem implicitam, Solutio ad 1). Footers p.171 notes 1–7 = `[^12]`–`[^18]`.
- **p.172**: Solutio ad 1 tail through ad 7. Footers p.172 notes 1–8 = `[^19]`–`[^26]`.
- **p.173** (running head `DIST. VII. ART. I. QUAEST. II.` — running head already shows q2, but the q1 tail still prints here): Solutio ad 7 tail + Quaestio incidens 1 + Quaestio incidens 2 + SCHOLION I–IV, ending "...Durand., loc. cit. q. 2." just before the QUAESTIO II header. **q1 carries NO footer markers on p.173** — p.173's footers belong to q2.

**Footer hand-off.** RECEIVED p.169 notes **6–7** from `d7-divisio` (commit 9e1c3e9), correctly keying the Fundamenta. NONE forwarded to `d7-a1-q2`: q1's footers (p.169 n.6–7; p.170 n.1–9; p.171 n.1–7; p.172 n.1–8) are fully exhausted, and q1 owns nothing on p.173. q2 opens its own footer sequence on p.173 (its first markers — *Ioannis primo* / *in Symbolo* / *Augustinus* — key p.173 footers belonging to QUAESTIO II).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. The standalone SCHOLION (sections **I–IV**) prints at q1's tail on p.173 (after Quaestio incidens 2) and carries NO footnote markers (cross-references only). It is an **article-level** scholion: §I treats q1's principal conclusion; §II lists parallel commentators for q1 ("De hac 1. quaestione"); §III forecasts q2 ("Locutio in 2. quaest."); §IV forecasts q3 ("Respectu 3. quaestionis"). **Forward-coverage:** because this scholion already surveys all three quaestiones of the article, expect `d7-a1-q2` and `d7-a1-q3` to have `has_scholion: false` (their commentator source-lists are absorbed here, §III and §IV).

**Boundary integrity.** q1 opener is grammatically continuous; the q1/q2 seam at p.173 is clean — the SCHOLION closes with "...Durand., loc. cit. q. 2." and QUAESTIO II (*Utrum haec sit admittenda: Deus factus est homo*, raw 12520) opens immediately after with its own header + *Secundo quaeritur* opener.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR clean; all readings confirmed against the PDF column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 173 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum haec sit admittenda: Deus factus est homo.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec sit admittenda: Deus factus est homo. Et quod sic, videtur:

(*Fundamenta*) 1. Ioannis primo[^4]: *Verbum caro factum est*; sed caro, ut dicit Augustinus, non stat ibi pro parte, sed pro toto homine: ergo si haec est vera: *Verbum Dei factum est caro*, multo magis haec erit vera: Deus factus est homo.

2. Item, in Symbolo[^5]: « Incarnatus... et homo factus est ».

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3. Item, Augustinus[^6]: « Tanta fuit illa unio, quod faceret hominem Deum, et Deum hominem »: ergo si unio illa fecit Deum esse hominem, cum omnis activa inferat suam passivam, igitur Deus factus est homo.

4. Item, post incarnationem Deus est homo, et ante incarnationem non erat homo; sed quicumque *modo* est homo, et *prius* non erat homo, est *factus* homo: ergo si Deus est huiusmodi[^1b], Deus est factus homo.

5. Item, idem est *humanari* quod hominem fieri; sed haec simpliciter conceditur: Deus est humanatus[^2b]: ergo simpliciter concedendum est: Deus factus est homo.

(*Ad oppositum*) **Sed contra:** 1. *Mutatum esse* est superius ad *factum esse*[^3b]; sed haec simpliciter est falsa: Deus est mutatus: ergo et haec: Deus est factus homo.

2. Item, *factum esse* praesupponit *fieri*[^4b]; et *fieri* ponit imperfectionem: ergo de quocumque est dicere *factum esse*, est dicere *imperfectionem*. Sed hoc dicere de Deo est falsum: ergo et ista est falsa: Deus factus est homo.

3. Item, quandocumque dicitur: hoc fit illud, terminus habet rationem complementi respectu eius, circa quod fit; ut cum dicitur: homo fit albus, notatur albedo esse complementum hominis[^5b]: ergo cum dicitur: Deus fit homo, notatur fieri complementum Dei. Sed falsum est, quod homo aliquod complementum Deo tribuat: ergo praedicta locutio simpliciter erit falsa.

4. Item, adiectivum ponit rem suam circa suum substantivum; sed hoc adiectivum *factus*, cum cadit circa subiectum et praedicatum, potius adiacet subiecto quam praedicato — quod patet, quia dicitur: *Verbum est factum caro* — ergo iste terminus *factus* ponit circa divinum suppositum rem suam: ergo praedicta locutio nominat aliquam factionem[^6b] circa Deum. Sed hoc est falsum, cum nulla circa Deum possit esse factio vel innovatio: ergo falsa erit praedicta locutio.

5. Item, quandocumque praedicatur aliquid de aliquo cum determinatione non diminuente, potest praedicari simpliciter; sed iste terminus *homo* non diminuit de ratione eius quod est *factus*: ergo si haec est vera: Deus est *factus homo*; haec erit vera: Deus est *factus*. Sed hoc est contra Symbolum[^7b], quod dicit, quod « nec factus nec creatus, sed genitus ».

### Conclusio

> Haec locutio: Deus factus est homo, quocumque sensu accipiatur, vera est, licet semper habeat aliquid improprietatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de hac locutione: Deus factus est homo, iuxta illud quod consuetum est[^8b], (*Sensus triplex*) praedicta locutio multipliciter est distinguenda, ex hoc quod illud participium potest ponere rem suam super totum, vel circa alterum extremorum absolute, vel circa unum extremum in comparatione ad alterum. — (*Conclusio 1*) Si ponat rem suam, scilicet ipsam factionem, super totum, vera est locutio, et est sensus: Deus factus est homo, id est, factum est, ut Deus esset homo; et hoc quidem factum fuit in opere incarnationis. — (*Conclusio 2*) Si autem ponat rem suam circa alterum extremorum absolute, utpote circa praedicatum, tunc est sensus: Deus factus est homo, id est, Deus est homo, qui quidem factus est sive productus; et hoc quidem verum est. — (*Conclusio 3*) Si autem ponat rem suam circa unum extremum in comparatione ad alterum, sic est sensus: Deus factus est homo, id est, Deus fecit semetipsum hominem per humanitatis assumtionem, sicut homo facit semetipsum doctum per doctrinae acquisitionem.

(*Conclusio 1*) Et primus quidem sensus est verus et consuetus secundum sensum[^9b] communem, non tamen est secundum locutionis virtutem; quia hoc participium, quod est *factus*, cum sit masculini generis et adiectivum et adiective retentum, non potest ponere rem suam circa copulatum, sed necessario ponit, quantum est de virtute sermonis, circa subiectum, vel circa praedicatum.

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(*Conclusio 2*) Secundus autem sensus verus quidem est et haberi potest per sermonis virtutem et proprietatem, est tamen praeter usum communem. Cum enim dicimus, quod Deus factus est homo, non volumus dicere, quod Deus sit homo, qui productus est, sed volumus exprimere ipsam incarnationem sive unionem divinae naturae ad humanam.

(*Conclusio 3*) Tertius vero sensus habetur et secundum usum communem et secundum locutionis proprietatem, habet tamen in se aliquid proprietatis et aliquid improprietatis. (*Notandum*) Et hoc patet, quia, cum dicitur: iste factus est bonus, vel huiusmodi, hoc participium *factus* tria importat, videlicet *antecessionem* ex parte subiecti, et *inceptionem* ex parte praedicati, et *transmutationem* ex parte utriusque, quantum[^1c] est ex vi sermonis, pro eo quod *factum esse* implicat *fieri*. In proposito autem est reperire *antecessionem* ex parte subiecti, et *inceptionem* ex parte praedicati, sed non est reperire *transmutationem* in supposito Dei; et ideo *factus* hic cadit a propria significatione quantum ad tertiam conditionem, nec importat *transmutationem*, sed *unionem*; nec significatur, quod Filius Dei sit suppositum transmutationis, cum dicitur: Deus factus est homo, sed quod est suppositum naturae factae et sibi unitae.

(*Conclusio generalis*) Licet igitur praedictus sermo, quocumque modo accipiatur, aliquam habeat improprietatem; quia veritatem habet, nihilominus recipitur, quia in expressione fidei nostrae magis consideratur sermonis veritas quam sermonis congruitas. (*Notandum*) Ea enim, quae sunt fidei nostrae, ut dicit Augustinus[^2c], melius intelligimus quam proferimus; unde Gregorius dicit, quod « excelsa Dei balbutiendo resonamus ». — Concedendus est igitur sermo praedictus, et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, quia veritatem astruunt.

(*Solutio oppositorum*) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod *mutatum esse* est superius ad *factum esse*; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *factum esse* et *fieri* accipitur proprie; hoc autem est, cum dicit transmutationem circa ipsum suppositum. Non sic autem est in proposito, pro eo quod in incarnationis opere factum est, ut Deus sit homo, non secundum aliquam transmutationem factam in Deo, sed secundum transmutationem factam in altero extremo[^3c].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *factum esse* praesupponit *fieri*, et *fieri* dicit imperfectionem; (*Notandum*) dicendum, quod *fieri* dicit imperfectionem circa illud quod dicit mutationem; in praesenti autem non dicit circa Deum mutationem nec imperfectionem, sed solum circa hominem; nec circa illum ponit imperfectionem praecedentem tempore, sed natura, quia ibi simul est *fieri* et *factum esse*[^4c].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod terminus factionis est complementum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando illud quod notatur fieri circa principium, vel suppositum, facit aliquam innovationem[^5c] secundum aliquam proprietatem absolutam. Non sic autem est in proposito; quia, sicut iam dictum est, ex parte Dei non dicit nisi habitudinem unionis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *factus*, cum sit participium, ponit rem suam circa subiectum, ut cum dicitur: *Verbum est factum caro*; dicendum, quod etsi trahat nomen a supposito, tamen quia non respicit ipsum absolute, sed in relatione ad praedicatum, ideo non est necesse, quod ponat circa ipsum aliquid absolutum. Ideo ad veritatem sufficit, ut circa subiectum ponatur antecessio, et unio respectu praedicati. Et hoc quidem reperitur in proposito.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ille terminus[^6c] *homo* non diminuit de ratione huius quod est *factus*; (*Notandum*) dicendum, quod verum est; non tamen licet inferre: est factus homo, ergo est factus; non propter diminutionem, sed propter denominationis mutationem. Non enim sequitur: iste est albus monachus, ergo est albus; non quia diminuat de ratione eius quod est albus, sed quia aliter denominat albus, cum dicitur cum adiuncto[^7c], aliter, cum dicitur absolute. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, et hoc patet inspicienti[^8c].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether this is to be admitted: God was made man.*

Secondly it is asked whether this is to be admitted: God was made man. And that it is so seems to be the case:

(*Fundamenta*) 1. In the first chapter of John[^4]: *The Word was made flesh*; but "flesh," as Augustine says, does not there stand for a part, but for the whole man: therefore if this is true: *The Word of God was made flesh*, much more will this be true: God was made man.

2. Likewise, in the Creed[^5]: « Incarnate... and was made man ».

3. Likewise, Augustine[^6]: « So great was that union, that it made the man God, and God man »: therefore if that union made God to be man, since every active [verb] entails its passive, then God was made man.

4. Likewise, after the incarnation God is man, and before the incarnation he was not man; but whoever in any *mode* is man, and *previously* was not man, has been *made* man: therefore if God is of this kind[^1b], God has been made man.

5. Likewise, "to be made human" is the same as "to become a man"; but this is conceded without qualification: God has been made human[^2b]: therefore it is to be conceded without qualification: God was made man.

(*Ad oppositum*) **On the contrary:** 1. *To have been changed* is superior to *to have been made*[^3b]; but this is simply false: God has been changed: therefore also this: God has been made man.

2. Likewise, *to have been made* presupposes *to become*[^4b]; and *to become* posits imperfection: therefore of whatever it is possible to say *to have been made*, it is to say *imperfection*. But to say this of God is false: therefore this too is false: God was made man.

3. Likewise, whenever it is said: this becomes that, the term has the character of a completion with respect to that about which the becoming takes place; as when it is said: a man becomes white, whiteness is noted to be the completion of the man[^5b]: therefore when it is said: God becomes man, becoming is noted to be the completion of God. But it is false that man contributes any completion to God: therefore the aforesaid locution will simply be false.

4. Likewise, an adjective posits its reality about its substantive; but this adjective *factus* ("made"), when it falls about both subject and predicate, lies rather alongside the subject than the predicate — which is evident, because it is said: *The Word was made flesh* — therefore this term *factus* posits its reality about the divine supposit: therefore the aforesaid locution names some making[^6b] about God. But this is false, since there can be no making or innovation about God: therefore the aforesaid locution will be false.

5. Likewise, whenever something is predicated of something with a non-diminishing determination, it can be predicated without qualification; but this term *man* does not diminish from the account of that which is *made*: therefore if this is true: God is *made man*; this will be true: God is *made*. But this is against the Creed[^7b], which says that he is « neither made nor created, but begotten ».

### Conclusion

> This locution: "God was made man," in whatever sense it is taken, is true, although it always has something of impropriety.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked concerning this locution: "God was made man," according to what is customary[^8b], (*Threefold sense*) the aforesaid locution is to be distinguished in many ways, from this fact, that that participle can posit its reality upon the whole, or about either of the extremes absolutely, or about one extreme in comparison to the other. — (*Conclusion 1*) If it posits its reality, namely the making itself, upon the whole, the locution is true, and the sense is: God was made man, that is, it was made [to be], that God should be man; and this indeed was done in the work of the incarnation. — (*Conclusion 2*) But if it posits its reality about either of the extremes absolutely, namely about the predicate, then the sense is: God was made man, that is, God is man, who indeed was made or produced; and this indeed is true. — (*Conclusion 3*) But if it posits its reality about one extreme in comparison to the other, then the sense is: God was made man, that is, God made himself man through the assumption of humanity, just as a man makes himself learned through the acquisition of doctrine.

(*Conclusion 1*) And the first sense indeed is true and customary according to the common sense[^9b], yet it is not [true] according to the force of the locution; because this participle, which is *factus*, since it is of the masculine gender and an adjective and retained adjectivally, cannot posit its reality about the copula, but necessarily posits [it], so far as it pertains to the force of the discourse, about the subject, or about the predicate.

(*Conclusion 2*) But the second sense indeed is true and can be had through the force and propriety of the discourse, yet it is beyond common usage. For when we say that God was made man, we do not wish to say that God is a man who was produced, but we wish to express the incarnation itself, that is, the union of the divine nature to the human.

(*Conclusion 3*) But the third sense is had both according to common usage and according to the propriety of the locution, yet it has in itself something of propriety and something of impropriety. (*Note*) And this is evident, because, when it is said: this man was made good, or the like, this participle *factus* implies three things, namely *antecedence* on the part of the subject, and *inception* on the part of the predicate, and *transmutation* on the part of both, so far as[^1c] it pertains to the force of the discourse, for the reason that *to have been made* implies *to become*. But in the matter at hand there is found *antecedence* on the part of the subject, and *inception* on the part of the predicate, but there is not found *transmutation* in the supposit of God; and therefore *factus* here falls away from its proper signification with respect to the third condition, nor does it imply *transmutation*, but *union*; nor is it signified that the Son of God is the supposit of a transmutation, when it is said: God was made man, but that he is the supposit of a nature made and united to himself.

(*General conclusion*) Therefore, although the aforesaid discourse, in whatever way it is taken, has some impropriety; because it has truth, it is nonetheless received, because in the expression of our faith the truth of the discourse is considered more than the fittingness of the discourse. (*Note*) For those things which belong to our faith, as Augustine says[^2c], we understand better than we utter; whence Gregory says that « we echo the lofty things of God by stammering ». — The aforesaid discourse, therefore, is to be conceded, and the reasons which show this, because they establish the truth.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments*) 1. To that which is objected in the first place to the contrary, that *to have been changed* is superior to *to have been made*; it must be said that this is true, insofar as *to have been made* and *to become* are taken properly; and this is so, when it expresses a transmutation about the supposit itself. But it is not so in the matter at hand, for the reason that in the work of the incarnation it was made [to be], that God should be man, not according to any transmutation made in God, but according to a transmutation made in the other extreme[^3c].

2. To that which is objected, that *to have been made* presupposes *to become*, and *to become* expresses imperfection; (*Note*) it must be said that *to become* expresses imperfection about that which it [signifies as] expressing change; but in the present case it does not express, about God, change or imperfection, but only about the man; nor does it posit about him an imperfection preceding in time, but in nature, because there the *becoming* and the *to have been made* are at once[^4c].

3. To that which is objected, that the term of a making is a completion; it must be said that that is true, when that which is noted to become about the principle, or supposit, makes some innovation[^5c] according to some absolute property. But it is not so in the matter at hand; because, as has already been said, on the part of God it expresses nothing but the relation of union.

4. To that which is objected, that *factus*, since it is a participle, posits its reality about the subject, as when it is said: *The Word was made flesh*; it must be said that, although it draws its name from the supposit, yet because it does not regard it absolutely, but in relation to the predicate, therefore it is not necessary that it posit about it anything absolute. Therefore for truth it suffices that about the subject there be posited antecedence, and union with respect to the predicate. And this indeed is found in the matter at hand.

5. To that which is objected, that this term[^6c] *man* does not diminish from the account of that which is *made*; (*Note*) it must be said that this is true; yet it is not permissible to infer: he is made man, therefore he is made; not on account of diminution, but on account of the change of denomination. For it does not follow: this man is a white monk, therefore he is white; not because it diminishes from the account of that which is white, but because "white" denominates one way when it is said with an adjunct[^7c], another way when it is said absolutely. So too in the matter at hand it must be understood, and this is evident to one who considers it[^8c].

---

en: Verse 14. — Augustine, *Letter* 140 (formerly 120), c. 4, n. 12; *Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 80, n. 2; *On the City of God* XIV, c. 2, n. 1; *On the Trinity* II, c. 6, n. 11.

la: Nicaeno. — Cod. K *Incarnatus est de Spiritu S. ex Maria Virgine, et homo factus est* (ex Symb. Nicaeno-Constantinopolitano).

en: [The] Nicene [Creed]. — Codex K: *Incarnate of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary, and was made man* (from the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed).

la: Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28. — Pro *Tanta* in testim. allegato textus origin. et Vat. exhibent *Talis*. In seq. quaest. arg. 1. ad oppos. etiam codd. habent *Talis*. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: *On the Trinity*, Book I, c. 13, n. 28. — For *Tanta* ("So great") in the cited testimony the original text and the Vatican edition exhibit *Talis* ("Such was"). In the following question, the first argument to the contrary, the codices likewise have *Talis*. Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1.

la: Pro *huiusmodi* edd. *homo*.

en: For *huiusmodi* ("of this kind") the editions read *homo* ("man").

la: Graece θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας i. e. *Deus inhumanatus*. Hac locutione Ecclesia contra Apollinaristas utebatur in explicando verbo « incarnatus est », et nihil aliud dicit ista locutio nisi: Deus assumsit perfectum hominem, animam scil. et corpus et mentem et omnia, quae ad verum hominem constituendum requiruntur. Cfr. Epist. Concil. Constant. I. ad Damasum Papam, et Epiphan., Ancor. n. 121. — Subinde pro *simpliciter* cod. U *similiter*.

en: In Greek θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας, that is, *God made-human*. The Church used this expression against the Apollinarists in explaining the word « he was incarnate », and that expression says nothing else than: God assumed a perfect man, namely a soul and a body and a mind and all the things which are required for the constituting of a true man. Cf. the *Letter of the First Council of Constantinople to Pope Damasus*, and Epiphanius, *Ancoratus*, n. 121. — Thereupon for *simpliciter* ("without qualification") codex U [reads] *similiter* ("likewise").

la: Omne siquidem quod fit, mutatur, sed non vice versa; quare et Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.) sub genere transmutationis tanquam species ponit non tantum generationem et corruptionem, sed etiam motum (alterationem, augmentationem etc.). Vide II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 3. q. 1.

en: For indeed everything that comes to be is changed, but not vice versa; wherefore Aristotle too, *Physics* V, text 7 (c. 1), places under the genus of transmutation, as species, not only generation and corruption, but also motion (alteration, augmentation, etc.). See II *Sentences*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 59. (c. 6.): *Manifestum est igitur, quod et id quod factum est, necesse est fieri prius.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 59 (c. 6): *It is manifest, therefore, that that which has been made must necessarily come to be first.*

la: Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 8. (XI. c. 2.): *Omne mutatur ex potentia ente in actu ens, ut ex potentia albo in actu album.* Cfr. V. Phys. text. 4. et 8. (c. 1. et 5.), ubi docetur, mutationem denominandam esse ex termino. — Edd. voci *terminus* addunt *factionis*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, text 8 (XI, c. 2): *Everything is changed from being in potency to being in act, as from being potentially white to being actually white.* Cf. *Physics* V, texts 4 and 8 (c. 1 and 5), where it is taught that change is to be denominated from its terminus. — The editions add to the word *terminus* the word *factionis* ("of making").

la: Codd. A T *actionem*, et paulo inferius pariter *actio* pro *factio*. Aliquanto superius pro *circa subiectum* cod. K *inter subiectum*.

en: Codices A T [read] *actionem* ("action"), and a little below likewise *actio* for *factio* ("making"). Somewhat above, for *circa subiectum* ("about the subject") codex K [reads] *inter subiectum* ("between the subject").

la: Athanasianum. — Pro *Sed hoc* codd. A G H I L N T U aa *Sed haec*. In maiori post *diminuente* codd. M O adiungunt *rationem eius*.

en: [The] Athanasian [Creed]. — For *Sed hoc* codices A G H I L N T U aa [read] *Sed haec*. In the major [premise], after *diminuente* ("non-diminishing"), codices M O add *rationem eius* ("its account").

la: Codd. K, Z (aa a secunda manu) addunt *dici*.

en: Codices K, Z (aa by a second hand) add *dici* ("to be said").

la: Codd. A K U aa bb cc *usum*. Codd. A G H I K (T a prima manu) Z bb post *consuetus* interiiciunt *et*. Paulo inferius post *et adiectivum* Vat. omittit *et*.

en: Codices A K U aa bb cc [read] *usum* ("usage"). Codices A G H I K (T by a first hand) Z bb insert *et* after *consuetus*. A little below, after *et adiectivum*, the Vatican edition omits *et*.

la: Codd. A F H I L T U W aa hic incongrue inserunt *enim*.

en: Codices A F H I L T U W aa here incongruously insert *enim* ("for").

la: Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7, de ineffabili Trinitatis mysterio agens, ait: « Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur ». Dictum Gregorii, quod hic respicitur, quodque habetur in eius V. Moral. c. 36. n. 66., sic ibi sonat: « Eum [Deum] aliquatenus balbutiendo resonamus ». Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. IX. c. 4.

en: *On the Trinity*, Book VII, c. 4, n. 7, treating of the ineffable mystery of the Trinity, says: « For God is more truly thought than spoken ». The saying of Gregory, which is here regarded, and which is found in his *Morals* V, c. 36, n. 66, there runs thus: « We echo Him [God] in some measure by stammering ». Cf. I *Sentences*, the Master's text, d. IX, c. 4.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Post *simul* codd. A E I L N (T U a prima manu) W aa subdunt *sibi*.

en: Cf. above, d. 3, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — After *simul* ("at once") codices A E I L N (T U by a first hand) W aa add *sibi*.

la: Cod. bb *immutationem vel innovationem*.

en: Codex bb [reads] *immutationem vel innovationem* ("a change or an innovation").

la: Plurimi codd. omittunt *ille terminus* et codd. A I L T aa etiam *homo*.

en: Very many codices omit *ille terminus* ("this term"), and codices A I L T aa also omit *homo* ("man").

la: Cuiusmodi in allato exemplo esset *vestis* seu *habitus*. Petr. Hispan., in Summul., tr. *de Fallaciis*, sub fallacia accidentis idem exemplum afferens ait: Nam *albedo* [in exemplo allato] non est in subiecto *secundum se*, sed *secundum habitum*. — Paulo superius post *diminuat* cod. bb subiungit *aliquid*.

en: Of which kind, in the example adduced, would be *garment* or *habit*. Peter of Spain, in the *Summulae*, treatise *On Fallacies*, adducing the same example under the fallacy of accident, says: For *whiteness* [in the example adduced] is not in the subject *in itself*, but *by way of habit*. — A little above, after *diminuat* ("diminishes"), codex bb adds *aliquid* ("anything").

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of vol3 pp.173–175 (PDF 195–197; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 12520–12656, clean here — no cascade-shatter). Fresh literal English. Running heads confirm `DIST. VII. ART. I. QUAEST. II.` (the p.175-R running-head OCR-garbles to `QUAEST. III.` and the p.175 page-number OCR-mangles `175`→`173`; trusted the +22 offset + running-head text per the Vol II/III override).

**Alignment VERIFIED.** Opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec sit admittenda: Deus factus est homo* (whether "God was made man" is to be admitted). Distinct from q1 (*Deus est homo*, raw 12243) and q3 (*homo factus est Deus*, raw 12657). q2 range raw 12520–12656.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.173-R** (after q1's article-level SCHOLION §I–IV, which fills p.173-L top + p.173-R top, markerless): QUAESTIO II header + opener + Fundamenta arg.1 (*Ioannis primo*, marker 4) + arg.2 (*in Symbolo*, marker 5).
- **p.174**: Fundamenta arg.3 (*Augustinus*, marker 6) + args 4–5; Sed contra (Ad oppositum) args 1–5; Conclusio; Respondeo opens (Sensus triplex + Conclusio 1 of the three-sense distinction).
- **p.175**: Respondeo continues (Conclusio 2/3 + Conclusio generalis); Solutio oppositorum ad 1–5; then QUAESTIO III opens at the bottom of p.175-R.

**Apparatus = 20 entries.** p.173 notes **4–6** (`[^4]`–`[^6]`; markers *Ioannis primo⁴* [John 1:14 + August.] / *in Symbolo⁵* [Nicene] / *Augustinus⁶* [de Trin. I; *Tanta* vs *Talis* variant note]). p.174 notes **1–9** (`[^1b]`–`[^9b]`; markers *huiusmodi¹ᵇ* / *humanatus²ᵇ* [Greek ἐνανθρωπήσας gloss] / *factum esse³ᵇ* [Phys. V] / *fieri⁴ᵇ* [Phys. VI] / *complementum hominis⁵ᵇ* [Metaph. XII] / *factionem⁶ᵇ* [codd. *actionem*] / *Symbolum⁷ᵇ* [Athanasian] / *consuetum est⁸ᵇ* / *sensum⁹ᵇ* [codd. *usum*]). p.175 notes **1–8** (`[^1c]`–`[^8c]`; markers *quantum¹ᶜ* [codd. *enim*] / *Augustinus²ᶜ* [de Trin. VII + Gregory *Moral.* V] / *altero extremo³ᶜ* [d.1 a.1 q.1] / *factum esse⁴ᶜ* [d.3 p.2 a.3 q.2] / *innovationem⁵ᶜ* / *ille terminus⁶ᶜ* / *cum adiuncto⁷ᶜ* [Petr. Hispan. *de Fallaciis*] / *inspicienti⁸ᶜ*).

**Note on p.173 notes 1–3.** Page 173 footer notes 1 (*Propositiones ratione quantitatis*), 2 (*Edd. hic interiiciunt quia*) and 3 (*B. Albert., hic d.6 a.1*) gloss q1's *Quaestio incidens 2* (*quanta est ista propositio: Deus est homo?*), not q2; they were left markerless in the q1 chunk (`bon-sent-III-d7-a1-q1`, commit c1b2f6e, whose apparatus ends at p.172 note 8). They are NOT this question's footers and are not reproduced here. **q2's first footers on p.173 are notes 4–6.**

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. q2 carries NO standalone scholion: q1's article-level SCHOLION §III forward-covers it (*Locutio in 2. quaest. discussa ab omnibus conceditur*), and q2's own last footnote (p.175 note 8, `[^8c]`) explicitly redirects: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"). This matches the q1 hand-off forecast.

**Footer hand-off.**
- **RECEIVED: NONE.** q1's footers (p.169 n.6–7, p.170 n.1–9, p.171 n.1–7, p.172 n.1–8) were fully exhausted in `bon-sent-III-d7-a1-q1`; q1 owned no footer markers on p.173. q2 opens its own footer sequence on p.173 with note 4 (*Ioannis primo* = John 1:14).
- **FORWARDED to `bon-sent-III-d7-a1-q3`: p.175 footer notes 9 and 10.** Eyes-on the p.175-R footer band: note 9 (*Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28*) keys q3's first Fundamenta marker (*1. Primo auctoritate Augustini⁹: « Talis fuit illa unio… »*) and note 10 (*Nam, ut supra q. 1. in fine dicitur… Petr. Hispan., Summul. de Proposition.*) keys q3's marker¹⁰ (*sicut haec est vera: Deus est homo, eius conversa: homo est Deus¹⁰*). These belong to QUAESTIO III, not q2. q2's p.175 notes 1–8 are fully exhausted here.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 175 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo factus est Deus.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: homo est factus Deus. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) Primo auctoritate Augustini[^9]: « Talis fuit illa unio, ut faceret Deum hominem, et hominem Deum »: ergo si fecit hominem Deum, homo ergo factus est Deus.

2. Item, homo est Deus, et ante incarnationem non fuit Deus; et incarnatio est Dei operatio: ergo per incarnationem homo factus est Deus.

3. Item, sicut haec est vera: Deus est homo, ita eius conversa: homo est Deus[^10]: ergo pari ratione, sicut haec est vera: Deus factus est homo, haec erit vera: homo factus est Deus.

<!-- page 176 -->

4. Item, hominem esse Deum est verum[^1b]; aut est verum veritate aeterna, aut veritate temporali. Si veritate aeterna, ergo ab aeterno verum fuit dicere, hominem esse Deum; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc. Si veritate temporali, ergo hominem esse Deum est temporale; et omne tale est factum: ergo factum est, Deum hominem esse: ergo homo factus est Deus.

**Sed contra:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) Subiectum fieri se habet per modum substantificantis et praecedentis ipsum terminum[^2b]; sed homo respectu Dei neutro modo se habet: ergo haec est falsa simpliciter: homo est factus Deus.

2. Item, cum dicitur: homo est factus Deus, aut homo tenetur ratione suppositi, vel ratione formae. Ratione formae non, quia non praedicatur Deus de homine ratione formae[^3b]; si ergo est verum, intelligitur ratione suppositi vel hypostasis. Sed hypostasis illa est hypostasis Filii Dei, et illa est aeterna: ergo de illa est falsum simpliciter dicere, quod homo ratione illius sit factus homo-Deus.

3. Item, quia Deus factus est homo, Deus est homo novus, ergo a simili, si homo factus est Deus, homo est Deus novus sive recens; sed hoc est impossibile[^4b]: ergo etc.

4. Item, communicatio est idiomatum[^5b], ergo si homo factus est Deus, Deus est factus Deus; sed haec est falsa: ergo et prima.

### Conclusio.

> Locutio: homo factus est Deus, falsa est, nisi intelligatur in hoc sensu: factum est, ut homo sit Deus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, qua dicitur: homo factus est Deus, distingui habet (*Triplex sensus.*) per hunc modum, quo distincta est[^6b] praedicta: Deus est factus homo, ex eo quod res huius participii *factus* poni potest circa *totum*, vel circa *praedicatum*, vel circa *utrumque extremum*. In primo sensu locutio est vera, et est sensus: homo factus est Deus, id est factum est, ut homo esset Deus; et hoc quidem verum est. (*Conclusio 1.*) — Si autem determinet praedicatum, est sensus: homo est Deus, qui[^7b] factus est; et hoc quidem falsum est. (*Conclusio 2.*) — Si autem cadat circa utrumque extremum et dicat ordinem subiecti ad praedicatum, tunc est sensus: homo factus est Deus, id est, qui prius erat homo factus est Deus posterius; et hoc quidem adhuc falsum est, quia esse hominem nullo modo antecessit in illo supposito esse Deum, nec divinum esse aliquatenus inchoatur. (*Conclusio 3.*)

Et sic patet, quod ista locutio, si aliquo modo possit concedi in *primo* sensu, in duobus aliis concedi non potest nec debet: homo factus est Deus. (*Conclusio generalis.*) Unde magis est impropria: homo factus est Deus, quam haec: Deus factus est homo, et rarius invenitur scripta[^8b]. Si tamen alicubi legatur vel inveniatur, tunc secundum primum sensum est accipienda. (*Corollarium.*)

Et per hoc patent obiecta ad utramque partem inducta. (*Ad argumenta.*) Unde rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, procedunt secundum primam viam; aliter enim non concluderent, sicut patet. Rationes vero ad aliam partem inductae procedunt secundum alias duas vias, videlicet prout participium cadit inter extrema, vel prout determinat praedicatum, sicut patet aspicienti.

Ad illud tamen quod ultimo obiicitur de communicatione idiomatum, dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod unio illa facit communicari idiomata; (*Ad 4. fundamentum.*) dicendum, quod ab hac generalitate excipiuntur illa nomina, quae important unionem. (*Notandum.*) Unde non sequitur: divina natura assumsit humanam naturam, ergo homo assumsit humanam naturam; sic nec et in proposito sequitur. Cum enim dico, hominem esse factum Deum, dico, hominem esse Deo unitum; et tale idioma Deo non communicatur per unionem, pro eo quod ipsa unio inter unibilia importat diversitatem et distinctionem, et eam praesupponi oportet ad idiomatum communicationem; et ideo talia idiomata unionem importantia non sunt communicabilia. Et per hoc responderi potest ad ultimum obiectum et consimilia[^9b].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether this is to be conceded: man was made God.*

Thirdly it is asked whether this is to be conceded: man was made God. And that it is so, it seems:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) First, on the authority of Augustine[^9]: "Such was that union, that it made God man, and man God": therefore if it made man God, then man was made God.

2. Likewise, man is God, and before the incarnation he was not God; and the incarnation is an operation of God: therefore through the incarnation man was made God.

3. Likewise, just as this is true: God is man, so its converse: man is God[^10]: therefore by parity of reasoning, just as this is true: God was made man, this will be true: man was made God.

4. Likewise, that man is God is true[^1b]; either it is true by an eternal truth, or by a temporal truth. If by an eternal truth, then from eternity it was true to say that man is God; but this is false: therefore etc. If by a temporal truth, then that man is God is temporal; and everything such has been made: therefore it has been made that God is man: therefore man was made God.

**On the contrary:** 1. (*Fundamenta.*) A subject of becoming stands in the manner of something that gives substance to and precedes the term itself[^2b]; but man with respect to God stands in neither manner: therefore this is false simply: man was made God.

2. Likewise, when it is said: man was made God, either "man" is taken by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. Not by reason of the form, because God is not predicated of man by reason of the form[^3b]; if therefore it is true, it is understood by reason of the supposit or hypostasis. But that hypostasis is the hypostasis of the Son of God, and it is eternal: therefore concerning it, it is false simply to say that man, by reason of it, was made a God-man.

3. Likewise, because God was made man, God is a new man; therefore by a similar reasoning, if man was made God, man is a new or recent God; but this is impossible[^4b]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, there is a communication of idioms[^5b]; therefore if man was made God, God was made God; but this is false: therefore the first is too.

### Conclusion.

> The locution "man was made God" is false, unless it is understood in this sense: it has been brought about that man is God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid locution, by which it is said "man was made God," is to be distinguished (*The threefold sense.*) in this manner, by which the aforesaid was distinguished[^6b]: "God was made man," from the fact that the reality of this participle *made* can be placed about the *whole*, or about the *predicate*, or about *both extremes*. In the first sense the locution is true, and the sense is: man was made God, that is, it has been brought about that man should be God; and this indeed is true. (*Conclusion 1.*) — But if it determine the predicate, the sense is: man is God, who[^7b] was made; and this indeed is false. (*Conclusion 2.*) — But if it fall about both extremes and assert an order of the subject to the predicate, then the sense is: man was made God, that is, he who was previously man was afterwards made God; and this indeed is still false, because being man in no way preceded being God in that supposit, nor is the divine being in any way begun. (*Conclusion 3.*)

And so it is clear that this locution, if in any way it can be conceded in the *first* sense, in the two others cannot and ought not be conceded: man was made God. (*General conclusion.*) Hence "man was made God" is more improper than this: "God was made man," and is more rarely found written[^8b]. If nevertheless it is anywhere read or found, then it is to be taken according to the first sense. (*Corollary.*)

And by this the objections brought for both parts are made clear. (*To the arguments.*) Hence the reasons that are brought for the first part proceed according to the first way; for otherwise they would not conclude, as is clear. But the reasons brought for the other part proceed according to the other two ways, namely insofar as the participle falls between the extremes, or insofar as it determines the predicate, as is clear to one who looks.

But to that which is objected last concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that, when it is said that that union causes idioms to be communicated; (*To the 4th of the Fundamenta.*) it must be said that from this generality are excepted those names which imply union. (*Note.*) Hence it does not follow: the divine nature assumed the human nature, therefore man assumed the human nature; so neither in the case at issue does it follow. For when I say that man was made God, I say that man is united to God; and such an idiom is not communicated to God through the union, because the union itself between things that can be united implies diversity and distinction, and it is required that this be presupposed for the communication of idioms; and therefore such idioms implying union are not communicable. And by this an answer can be given to the last objection and to those like it[^9b].

---

la: Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book I, c. 13, n. 28. See here the Master's text, c. I.

la: Nam, ut supra q. I. in fine dicitur, haec propositio: Deus est homo, « partem habet naturae indefinitae, partem naturae singularis ». Sed secundum Petr. Hispan. (Summul., tr. de Proposition.), qui sequitur Aristot. (I. Prior. c. 2.), « eadem est conversio particularis, indefinitae et singularis », conversio scilicet simplex. Ratio est, quia sicut singularis propositio conversa pro uno supposito verificatur, ita et particularis et indefinita. — Edd. perperam, quia contra processum arg.: Deus factus est homo; ita eius conversa: homo factus est Deus.

en: For, as is said above in q. I at the end, this proposition "God is man" "has part of an indefinite nature, part of a singular nature." But according to Peter of Spain (*Summulae*, tract *On the Proposition*), who follows Aristotle (*Prior [Analytics]* I, c. 2), "the conversion of a particular, of an indefinite, and of a singular [proposition] is the same," namely a simple conversion. The reason is that, just as a converted singular proposition is verified for one supposit, so too the particular and the indefinite. — The editions wrongly [read otherwise], for it is against the course of the argument: "God was made man; so its converse: man was made God."

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. I.

en: As was shown above in q. I.

la: Ut, si homo dicitur fieri albus, albedo recipitur (substantificatur) in ipso, et praesupponitur, quod prius sit homo, quam albus. — De minori vide supra d. 6. a. I. q. I. ad 3; a. 2. q. I. ad 4; d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.

en: As, if man is said to become white, whiteness is received (made substantial) in him, and it is presupposed that he is man prior to being white. — On the minor premise see above d. 6, a. I, q. I, ad 3; a. 2, q. I, ad 4; d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Non enim dicitur: humanitas est Deus. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. I. q. I. ad 5. — In fine arg. pro homo — Deus, quam lectionem ex codd. P R delibavimus, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam solum homo, Vat. Deus tantum.

en: For it is not said: humanity is God. Cf. above d. 6, a. I, q. I, ad 5. — At the end of the argument, for *man — God*, which reading we have drawn from codices P R, the other codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] only *man*, the Vatican [edition] only *God*.

la: Psalm. 80, 10: Non erit in te Deus recens. — Post Deus est homo novus cod. U adiicit sive recens.

en: Psalm 80:10 [Vulgate]: "There shall be no new God in thee." — After "God is a new man" codex U adds "or recent."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 3.

en: Cf. above p. 14, note 3.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Mox pro circa totum codd. H (K a secunda manu) M O Y perperam circa subiectum. Dein pro circa praedicatum cod. S circa partem.

en: The preceding question. — Shortly after, for *about the whole* the codices H (K by a second hand) M O Y wrongly [read] *about the subject*. Then for *about the predicate* codex S [reads] *about the part*.

la: Cod. U qui Deus. Aliquanto inferius pro nullo modo edd. nunquam.

en: Codex U [reads] *who [is] God*. Somewhat below, for *in no way* the editions [read] *never*.

la: Codd. M O U Z in scriptura.

en: Codices M O U Z [read] *in writing*.

en: See the scholion to the 1st question of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.175–176 (PDF 197–198), read Left column top→bottom then Right, body bands then footer bands, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw 12657–12745). The OCR was lightly cascade-fragmented at the q3 opener (two-column bleed at the header) but the running prose was clean; the PDF column bands were authoritative throughout per the Vol II/III override.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.175** (PDF 197): QUAESTIO III header + opener + Fundamenta args 1–3 (arg.3 runs to the foot of p.175-R; the q3 block opens at the bottom of p.175-R after q2's Solutio-oppositorum tail). Footers: notes **9–10** (note 10's *conversio* discussion continues onto the p.175→176 footer seam).
- **p.176** (PDF 198): arg.3 tail + Fundamenta arg.4 + Sed contra args 1–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (threefold sense → Conclusio 1/2/3 + Conclusio generalis + Corollarium + Ad argumenta + Ad 4. fundamentum + Notandum), ending *…ad ultimum obiectum et consimilia⁹*. Footers: left column notes **1–3** (note 3 = the *homo — Deus* reading variant, continues to the R footer), right column notes **4–9**.

**Apparatus.** 11 entries total = p.175 notes 9–10 (`[^9]`, `[^10]`) + p.176 notes 1–9 (`[^1b]`–`[^9b]`). Per-page Quaracchi restart on p.176 suffixed `b`. (p.175 notes 1–8 were consumed by q2 per the received hand-off; note 7 = the *cum adiuncto* fallacy-of-accident note and note 8 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* belong to q2's body, not q3.)

**Footer hand-off RECEIVED.** p.175 footer notes 9–10 (from the d7-a1-q2 hand-off): note 9 (*de Trin. I c.13 n.28*) keys q3 Fundamenta arg.1 (*Augustini⁹*); note 10 (*Petr. Hispan., conversion of singular/particular/indefinite*) keys arg.3 (*homo est Deus¹⁰*). Both correctly belong to q3.

**Footer hand-off FORWARDED to d7-a2-q1: NONE.** q3's p.175 notes 9–10 + p.176 notes 1–9 are fully exhausted. ARTICULUS II (raw 12746, printed p.177) opens its own NOTAE/footer sequence; QUAESTIO I's Fundamenta opens with its own first markers.

**Scholion disposition: has_scholion = FALSE.** q3 carries no standalone SCHOLION. This is confirmed by q3's own final footer note 9 (`[^9b]`): *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* ("See the scholion to the 1st question of this article") — q1's article-level SCHOLION §IV (*Respectu 3. quaestionis…*) forward-covers q3, exactly as forecast in the d7-a1-q1 hand-off.

**[?] flags:** none. The Latin and apparatus read cleanly against the 450 dpi bands.