title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum idem motus dilectionis possit esse in Deum et in proximum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum idem motus dilectionis possit esse in Deum et in proximum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Idem est motus in finem et in id quod est ad finem, quia motus non numeratur propter differentiam medii, sed extremi[^1]; sed motus caritatis est in Deum tanquam in finem, in proximum solummodo tanquam in viam: ergo unus et idem motus potest esse in utrumque obiectum.

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2. Item, ubi est unum dilectum, ibi est unus motus dilectionis; sed cum diligitur Deus et proximus, unum est dilectum — nam, sicut dicit Augustinus[^2], « in proximo non diligitur nisi Deus »: — ergo respectu utriusque unus est caritatis actus et motus.

3. Item, unus et idem est honor, quo honoratur imago beati Petri et ipse beatus Petrus, quia « honor imaginis refertur ad prototypum », sicut dicit Damascenus[^3]; sed dilectio proximi refertur ad Deum: ergo unus est motus dilectionis, quo amatur Deus et proximus.

4. Item, « ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum », sicut vult Philosophus[^4]; unde qui tenet equum per frenum una tentione tenet utrumque: ergo pari ratione, cum homo diligat proximum propter Deum, una dilectione potest diligere utrumque.

5. Item, quamvis plures sint divinae personae, tamen una dilectione diliguntur a nobis, quia in eis est una ratio diligendi, scilicet Bonitas summa[^5]; sed similiter una est ratio diligendi Deum et proximum, videlicet ipsa summa Bonitas: ergo videtur, quod uno dilectionis motu simul amari possit Deus et proximus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut vult Philosophus[^6], « motus numeratur tripliciter, scilicet subiecto, tempore et termino sive obiecto »; sed alius est terminus sive obiectum dilectionis, cum amatur Deus, et cum amatur proximus: ergo motus dilectionis est hinc inde alius et alius.

2. Item, nullus diligit aliquid deliberative nisi praecogitans; sed nullus simul et semel potest Deum et proximum intelligere, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^7], « intelligimus unum solum »: ergo pari ratione simul et semel non potest utrumque diligere: ergo alio motu dilectionis amatur Deus, alio proximus.

3. Item, unus et idem motus non potest esse intensior et remissior; sed motus dilectionis in Deum est intensior quam motus in proximum[^8]: ergo motus iste et ille est alius et alius.

4. Item, magis conformatur in ratione diligendi Petrus et Paulus, quam Deus et proximus; sed non potest unus motus dilectionis esse in Petrum et Paulum, immo secundum proprias rationes diversis motibus diliguntur: ergo alius et alius motus dilectionis est in Deum et in proximum.

5. Item, praeceptum respicit virtutis actum et usum; sed duo sunt praecepta caritatis, secundum quod dicitur Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^9]: unum respectu Dei, et aliud respectu proximi: ergo videtur, quod motus et actus dilectionis respectu illorum duorum habeant distingui et numerari.

> **Conclusio.** Motus caritatis in Deum non potest idem esse, nisi quando in Deum est ut finem ultimum, in proximum vero ut obiectum; vel quando utrumque obiectum respicit sub diversa ratione, scilicet Deum ut bonum, quod optat, proximum vero, cui optat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod in utrumque sit tanquam in obiectum et terminum; aut ita, quod in unum sit tanquam in obiectum et in alterum tanquam in finem ultimum. Si est in unum tanquam in obiectum et in alterum tanquam in finem ultimum; sic potest esse unus et idem motus in proximum et in Deum, ut patet, quia uno actu dilectionis diligitur[^10] proximus propter Deum, et est ille motus quasi collativus. — Si autem sit in utrumque sicut in obiectum, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia, cum actus caritatis sit diligere, et diligere sit « velle bonum alicui[^11] », dupliciter secundum hoc habet obiectum caritatis assignari, videlicet ut illud bonum dicatur obiectum, quod optatur, et ille etiam, cui optatur. Potest ergo motus caritatis ad Deum et proximum comparari in ratione obiecti dupliciter: vel sub eadem ratione et uniformi, ita quod utrumque diligat sicut illud, cui optat bonum; vel difformiter, ita quod unum respiciat sicut illud bonum, quod optat; et aliud sicut illud, cui optat. — Si respiciat difformiter, sic adhuc idem potest esse motus[^12] dilectionis in Deum et in proximum. Caritas enim in illo motu, quo diligit proximum, optat proximo Deum. — Si autem respiciat uniformiter, sic necesse est, motum dilectionis esse alium et alium in Deum et

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in proximum. Alius enim motus dilectionis est, quo volo bonum Deo, alius, quo volo bonum proximo, quia alius et alius est dilectionis terminus; et unus est intensior, et alius remissior. Et secundum hoc circa actum dilectionis consistunt duo praecepta[^13]. — Et secundum hanc viam rationes ad istam partem adductae procedunt, et ideo concedi possunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, patet responsio: quia procedit, secundum quod actus dilectionis est in proximum sicut in obiectum, et in Deum sicut in finem; et sic non recipit[^14] numerationem, sed quandam relationem et rectam ordinationem.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod est idem utrobique dilectum; similiter patet responsio: quia procedit secundum alteram viam, videlicet secundum quod Deus dicitur diligi, cum optatur proximo; sed si intelligamus de dilecto, ut illud dicatur dilectum, cui bonum optatur, non est idem dilectum, cum diligitur Deus, et cum diligitur proximus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem est adoratio, qua adoratur imago Petri et Petrus; dicendum, quod non est simile hinc inde, quia aliter refertur dilectio proximi ad Deum, aliter honor imaginis refertur ad prototypum. Honor enim imaginis refertur ad prototypum non solum sicut ad finem, sed etiam sicut ad obiectum. Unde totaliter refertur honor in illum qui per imaginem signatur; non enim adoratur signum, secundum quod res, sed solum ipsum signatum[^15]. Non sic autem est in dilectione, quia, cum diligitur proximus propter Deum, vere afficitur homo circa proximum, et aliter quam circa Deum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in his quae non possunt invicem separari[^16]; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam sic potest homo affici circa Deum, quod nihil cogitet de proximo; sic etiam potest affici circa proximum, quod tunc non afficiatur circa Deum; et ideo consideratio illa non habet hic locum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod eadem est ratio diligendi utrobique, sicut in divinis personis; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia in divinis personis est una ratio diligendi et eodem modo comparatur ad illas tres personas dilectas; non sic autem est in dilectione Dei et proximi, quia, quamvis utrobique sit una ratio diligendi, differenti tamen modo habet ad Deum et ad proximum comparari. Et quia ex diversitate comparationum consurgit pluralitas actuum, ex unitate rationis principaliter moventis consurgit unitas habitus; hinc est, quod habitus, quo amatur Deus et proximus, est unus, licet motus eius in Deum et in proximum sit alius et alius[^17].

english:
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### Question III. *Whether one and the same motion of love can be toward God and toward neighbor.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one and the same motion of love can be toward God and toward neighbor. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. The motion to the end and to that which is to the end is the same, because a motion is not numbered on account of a difference of the means, but of the extreme[^1]; but the motion of charity is toward God as toward the end, toward neighbor only as toward the way: therefore one and the same motion can be toward each object.

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2. Likewise, where there is one thing loved, there is one motion of love; but when God and neighbor are loved, there is one thing loved — for, as Augustine says[^2], « in the neighbor nothing is loved but God »: — therefore with respect to each there is one act and motion of charity.

3. Likewise, one and the same is the honor by which the image of blessed Peter is honored and blessed Peter himself, because « the honor of the image is referred to the prototype », as Damascene says[^3]; but the love of neighbor is referred to God: therefore there is one motion of love by which God and neighbor are loved.

4. Likewise, « where one [is] for the sake of another, in both [cases] there is only one », as the Philosopher holds[^4]; whence he who holds a horse by the bridle holds both by one holding: therefore by parity of reasoning, since a man loves his neighbor for the sake of God, he can by one love love both.

5. Likewise, although the divine persons are several, nevertheless they are loved by us with one love, because in them there is one ground of loving, namely the highest Goodness[^5]; but similarly there is one ground of loving God and neighbor, namely that highest Goodness itself: therefore it seems that by one motion of love God and neighbor can be loved at once.

**On the contrary:** 1. As the Philosopher holds[^6], « a motion is numbered in a threefold manner, namely by subject, by time, and by term or object »; but the term or object of love is other when God is loved and when neighbor is loved: therefore the motion of love is on this side and that one and another.

2. Likewise, no one loves anything deliberately without forethought; but no one can understand God and neighbor at one and the same time, because, as the Philosopher says[^7], « we understand one thing only »: therefore by parity of reasoning he cannot love both at one and the same time: therefore by one motion of love God is loved, by another the neighbor.

3. Likewise, one and the same motion cannot be more intense and more remiss; but the motion of love toward God is more intense than the motion toward neighbor[^8]: therefore this motion and that one are one and another.

4. Likewise, Peter and Paul are more conformed in the ground of loving than God and neighbor; but there cannot be one motion of love toward Peter and Paul, nay according to their proper grounds they are loved by diverse motions: therefore the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor is one and another.

5. Likewise, a precept regards the act and use of a virtue; but the precepts of charity are two, according as it is said in Matthew twenty-two[^9]: one with respect to God, and another with respect to neighbor: therefore it seems that the motion and act of love with respect to those two must be distinguished and numbered.

> **Conclusion.** The motion of charity toward God cannot be the same [as that toward neighbor], except when it is toward God as toward the ultimate end and toward neighbor as toward the object; or when it regards each object under a different ground, namely God as the good which it wishes, but neighbor as that for whom it wishes [it].

**I respond:** It must be said that the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can be twofold: either in such a way that it is toward each as toward object and term; or in such a way that it is toward the one as toward object and toward the other as toward the ultimate end. If it is toward the one as toward object and toward the other as toward the ultimate end; thus there can be one and the same motion toward neighbor and toward God, as is plain, because by one act of love[^10] the neighbor is loved for the sake of God, and that motion is as it were collative. — But if it is toward each as toward object, this can be in two ways, because, since the act of charity is to love, and to love is « to will good to someone[^11] », accordingly the object of charity can be assigned in two ways, namely that that good which is wished be called the object, and also that one for whom it is wished. The motion of charity, then, can be compared to God and neighbor in the character of object in two ways: either under the same and uniform ground, in such a way that it loves each as that for whom it wishes good; or in a different manner, in such a way that it regards the one as that good which it wishes, and the other as that for whom it wishes [it]. — If it regards [them] in a different manner, thus the motion[^12] of love toward God and toward neighbor can still be the same. For charity, in that motion by which it loves the neighbor, wishes God for the neighbor. — But if it regards [them] uniformly, thus it is necessary that the motion of love be one and another toward God and

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toward neighbor. For the motion of love by which I will good to God is one, and that by which I will good to neighbor is another, because the term of love is one and another; and the one is more intense, the other more remiss. And according to this, about the act of love there stand the two precepts[^13]. — And according to this way the reasons adduced to that part proceed, and therefore they can be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, the answer is plain: because it proceeds insofar as the act of love is toward neighbor as toward object, and toward God as toward end; and thus it does not receive[^14] a numbering, but a certain relation and right ordering.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the thing loved is the same in both [cases]; similarly the answer is plain: because it proceeds according to the other way, namely insofar as God is said to be loved when [good] is wished for the neighbor; but if we understand of the thing loved, so that that be called the thing loved for whom good is wished, the thing loved is not the same when God is loved and when neighbor is loved.

3. To that which is objected, that the adoration is the same by which the image of Peter and Peter [himself] are adored; it must be said that it is not alike on this side and that, because the love of neighbor is referred to God in one way, the honor of the image is referred to the prototype in another. For the honor of the image is referred to the prototype not only as to an end, but also as to an object. Whence the honor is referred wholly to him who is signified by the image; for the sign is not adored as a thing, but only the very thing signified[^15]. But it is not so in love, because, when the neighbor is loved for the sake of God, the man is truly affected toward the neighbor, and otherwise than toward God.

4. To that which is objected, that where one [is] for the sake of another, there is only one; it must be said that this is true in those things which cannot be separated from one another[^16]; but it is not so in the case at hand. For a man can be so affected toward God that he thinks nothing of the neighbor; so too he can be affected toward the neighbor in such a way that he is then not affected toward God; and therefore that consideration has no place here.

5. To that which is objected last, that the ground of loving is the same in both [cases], as in the divine persons; it must be said that it is not alike: because in the divine persons there is one ground of loving and it is compared in the same way to those three persons loved; but it is not so in the love of God and of neighbor, because, although in both [cases] there is one ground of loving, it nevertheless is compared in a different manner to God and to neighbor. And because from the diversity of comparisons there arises a plurality of acts, [while] from the unity of the ground principally moving there arises a unity of habit; hence it is that the habit by which God and neighbor are loved is one, although its motion toward God and toward neighbor is one and another[^17].

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 34. seqq. et 18. (c. 1. 4.). Huic simile est illud dictum de disciplina sive scientia, II. Top. c. 2. (c. 8.): *Disciplina una plurium, ut finis, aut ut eius quod ad finem.* — Pro *sed extremi* multi codd. nec non edd. 1. 2. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 60. a. 3. *et extremi*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 34 ff. and 18 (ch. 1, 4). Like this is that saying about discipline or science, *Topics* II, ch. 2 (ch. 8): *One discipline [is] of several things, as an end, or as of that which [is ordered] to the end.* — For *sed extremi* many codices, and also editions 1, 2, and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 60, art. 3, [read] *et extremi*.

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 65. n. 2; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. Cfr. etiam I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 21.

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tract 65, n. 2; see here the text of the Master, ch. 7. Cf. also *On Christian Doctrine* I, ch. 22, n. 21.

la: Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16. Cfr. supra pag. 202, nota 2.

en: Book IV *On the Orthodox Faith*, ch. 16. Cf. above, p. 202, note 2.

la: Libr. III. Topic. c. 2. Vide supra pag. 441, nota 6.

en: Book III of the *Topics*, ch. 2. See above, p. 441, note 6.

la: Idem dicitur supra d. 9. dub. 2. de adoratione. — In edd. deest *Sed* ante *similiter*, et pro *ipsa summa Bonitas* legitur *illa summa Bonitas*.

en: The same is said above, dist. 9, dubium 2, on adoration. — In the editions *Sed* is wanting before *similiter*, and for *ipsa summa Bonitas* is read *illa summa Bonitas*.

la: Libr. V. Phys. text. 34. seqq. (c. 4.) et VIII. text. 64. (c. 8.). Cfr. X. Ethic. c. 4.

en: Book V of the *Physics*, text 34 ff. (ch. 4) and VIII, text 64 (ch. 8). Cf. X of the *Ethics*, ch. 4.

la: Libr. II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 10.). Vide supra pag. 114, nota 3. — Pro *deliberative* codd. G H W aa et edd. 1. 2. *deliberatione*, cod. Z *deliberate*, qui cod. Z et paulo inferius pro *diligere* substituit *diligi*.

en: Book II of the *Topics*, ch. 4 (ch. 10). See above, p. 114, note 3. — For *deliberative* codices G H W aa and editions 1, 2 [read] *deliberatione*, codex Z *deliberate*; which codex Z also, a little below, substitutes *diligi* for *diligere*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq. — Edd. *quam motus dilectionis in proximum*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 4 f. — The editions [read] *quam motus dilectionis in proximum* [than the motion of love toward neighbor].

la: Vers. 37-40. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 4.

en: Verses 37-40. See here the text of the Master, ch. 2 and 4.

la: Cod. F hic bene interserit *Deus propter se*, cod. N vero subiungit *Deus et*.

en: Codex F here aptly inserts *Deus propter se*, but codex N adds *Deus et*.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 5. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 573, nota 5. — Subinde respicitur illud Arist., II. de Anima, text. 35. (c. 4.): *Ipsum autem cuius causa* [i. e. finis] *duplex est, hoc quidem cuius, illud vero cui.* — Pro *dupliciter secundum hoc* codd. A G i (K a prima manu) L N T U aa bb et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. *duplex secundum hoc*. Aliquanto inferius pro *et uniformi* Vat. *et uniformiter*.

en: According to Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II, ch. 5 (ch. 4). See above, p. 573, note 5. — Thereupon there is regarded that [saying] of Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 35 (ch. 4): *But that for the sake of which [a thing exists] is twofold, the one of which, the other for which.* — For *dupliciter secundum hoc* codices A G i (K by the first hand) L N T U aa bb and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] *duplex secundum hoc*. Somewhat below, for *et uniformi* the Vatican edition [reads] *et uniformiter*.

la: Edd. *actus*.

en: The editions [read] *actus* [act].

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 4.

la: Edd. *respicit*. Post pauca pro *rectam* codd. W Y *rastam*.

en: The editions [read] *respicit*. After a few [words], for *rectam* codices W Y [read] *rastam*.

la: Vide supra d. 9. a. 1. q. 2. et 3. in solut. oppos.

en: See above, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 2 and 3, in the solution of the opposing [arguments].

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. — Edd. *ab invicem separare*. Mox pro *Nam sic* cod. K *Nam sicut*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, dist. 40, art. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — The editions [read] *ab invicem separare*. Soon, for *Nam sic* codex K [reads] *Nam sicut*.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 2.

en: See above, art. 1, q. 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ad hanc quaestionem respondet Guliel. Antissiodorensis (Sum. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 3.): « Dicimus, quod impossibile est, quod eodem motu numero diligatur Deus et proximus ». Sed rectius solvit S. Bonav., duplici adhibita distinctione. Similiter docent B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a 7. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

**II.** Sequentis (4.) quaestionis solutio fluit ex principiis communiter receptis, quibus probatur, quod idem habitus caritatis se extendat ad dilectionem Dei ut obiectum principale, et ad dilectionem proximi ut obiectum secundarium (cfr. S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 23. a. 5, q. 25. a. 1.). Hoc loco non invenimus explicite de hac quaestione tractantes praeter Guliel. Antissiodorensem (Sum. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 5.), nec non Petrum a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.), qui ad mentem nostri auctoris hic adhibet notissimum principium: quod est primum in intentione posterius est in exsecutione, et e converso. Sed alibi, ubi agitur de ordine caritatis (infra d. 29.), idem docent alii commentatores Magistri (cfr. S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 26. a. 1. 2.).

english_scholion:
**I.** To this question William of Auxerre replies (Summa III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 3): « We say that it is impossible that God and neighbor be loved by one and the same motion in number ». But St. Bonaventure solves it more correctly, by applying a twofold distinction. Bl. Albert teaches similarly, here, art. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, art. 2, little-question 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, art. 7, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 4.

**II.** The solution of the following (4th) question flows from principles commonly received, by which it is proved that the same habit of charity extends itself to the love of God as the principal object, and to the love of neighbor as the secondary object (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* II-II, q. 23, a. 5; q. 25, a. 1). In this place we do not find [authors] treating explicitly of this question except William of Auxerre (Summa III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 5), and also Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 3, art. 2, little-question 2), who, according to the mind of our author, here applies the well-known principle: that what is first in intention is later in execution, and conversely. But elsewhere, where the order of charity is treated (below, dist. 29), other commentators of the Master teach the same (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* II-II, q. 26, a. 1, 2).

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**`[?]` flags.** None. All body text, the scholion (§I–II), and the 17 numbered footers resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands. The heavy OCR garbles in this region (heading shatter `QDAKSTIO`, digit-mangled superscripts, two-column footer bleed) are unambiguous against the bands.

**Hand-off received ← d27-a2-q2:** confirmed q2's true span ends raw 42213; q3 = raw 42214–42358; p.607 footer split = q2 nn.2–6, q3 n.7; QUAESTIO IV boundary at raw 42359.

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a2-q4** (fourth question of ART. II): raw start **42359** = `QUAESTIO IV.`; exact title *Quis duorum motuum caritatis praecedat alterum* (raw 42360); opener `Quarto quaeritur, quis istorum motuum praecedat reliquum. Et videtur, quod prius sit motus dilectionis in proximum quam motus in Deum` (raw 42363). q4 begins **mid-p.609 R-col** (printed below q3's scholion) and runs onto p.610+. **Footer split:** p.609 carries q3's nn.1–5 (above) and q4's nn.6–7 (n.6 *Vers. 20* re 1 Ioan., n.7 *Vers. 16* re 1 Cor 15 + *dilectio Dei* / *dilectio vero Dei* codd. A K variant) plus the `Argg. pro 1. parte` body marginal; verify the p.609→p.610 footer band split at q4 promotion. q4's end boundary is the next `QUAESTIO V.` / DUBIA header following p.610 — grep the next semantic boundary at q4 dispatch.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 609 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Quis duorum motuum caritatis praecedat alterum.*

Quarto quaeritur, quis istorum motuum praecedat reliquum. Et videtur, quod prius sit motus dilectionis in proximum quam motus in Deum:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicitur primae Ioannis quarto[^1]: *Qui non diligit fratrem suum, quem videt, Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere?* Secundum hoc ergo ad destructionem dilectionis proximi sequitur destructio dilectionis Dei: si ergo ad destructionem posterioris non sequitur destructio prioris, sed e converso: ergo prior est motus dilectionis in proximum quam in Deum.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^2]: *Prius quod animale est, deinde quod spirituale;* sed dilectio proximi sensibilior est, dilectio Dei spiritualior: ergo prius oportet affectum inclinari ad diligendum proximum quam ad diligendum Deum.

<!-- page 610 -->

3. Item, processus est ab inferioribus ad superiora et ab imperfecto ad perfectum secundum rectum ordinem, non e converso[^3]: si ergo dilectio Dei perfectior et superior est quam dilectio proximi, dilectio proximi est via ad illam. Sed via prior est quam terminus: ergo per prius est motus dilectionis in proximum quam in Deum.

4. Item, prior est actio quam contemplatio secundum rectum ordinem[^4]; sed dilectio proximi facit hominem versari circa vitam activam, dilectio Dei circa vitam contemplativam: ergo secundum rectum ordinem prior est motus caritatis in proximum quam in Deum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Secundum eum modum caritas movet hominem ad diligendum Deum, secundum quem Deus praecipit; sed Deus praecipit, primo amari se, et deinde amari proximum, quia *primum et summum mandatum est: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum. Secundum autem simile est huic: Diliges proximum tuum,* secundum quod dicitur Matthaei vigesimo secundo[^5]: ergo prius movet caritas ad amandum Deum quam ad amandum proximum.

2. Item, « causa prior est suo effectu[^6] »; sed dilectio Dei causa est dilectionis proximi, quia ideo diligit homo proximum, quia diligit Deum, cuius proximus est imago: ergo etc.

3. Item, diligibile, quod prius est in intentione, prius est in affectione; sed intentio per prius est respectu finis quam respectu eius quod est ad finem[^7]: ergo et dilectio. Si ergo Deus diligitur in ratione finis, et proximus in ratione eius quod est ad finem; necessario videtur, quod dilectio Dei praeambula sit ad dilectionem proximi.

4. Item, amor inclinat ad illud prius, ad quod inclinat ardentius, quia affectus sequitur inclinationem maiorem; sed caritatis amor ardentius inclinat ad amandum Deum quam proximum[^8]: ergo prius facit exire in illum motum quam in istum.

> **Conclusio.** Motus caritatis in Deum quoad inclinationem et dignitate et origine prior est quam in proximum, sed quoad exercitationis perfectionem prior est dilectio proximi quam Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit comparare istos motus dilectionis ad habitum caritatis: aut secundum primam ipsius habitus inclinationem, aut secundum exercitii perfectionem. Si secundum primam eius inclinationem, sic concedendum est, quod motus dilectionis in Deum prior est, quam motus dilectionis in proximum, quoniam caritas prius inclinat ad Deum quam ad proximum, cum Deus sit obiectum principalius, et inclinatio respectu ipsius Dei sit causa inclinationis respectu proximi. Caritas enim Deum facit diligi[^9] propter se, et proximum propter Deum, ita quod *propter* dicit habitudinem causae finalis et causae moventis et inducentis. Secundum ergo primam caritatis inclinationem prior est non solum dignitate, sed etiam origine motus dilectionis in Deum quam motus dilectionis in proximum. — Si vero loquamur secundum exercitationis perfectionem; cum exercitatio circa motum[^10] dilectionis in proximum respiciat vitam activam, exercitatio vero motus dilectionis in Deum respiciat vitam contemplativam; et ille status[^11] sit isto inferior et imperfectior: prior est dilectio proximi quam dilectio Dei. Qui enim vult esse perfectus amator Dei prius debet se exercere in amore proximi, sicut qui vult esse bonus contemplativus prius debet esse bonus activus, sicut docet Gregorius[^12]. — Et in huius rei signum bis datus fuit Spiritus sanctus, et primo in terra, Ioannis vigesimo; secundo de caelo, Actuum secundo; quia prius oportet amorem caritatis exerceri in his quae videmus, ut per amorem visibilium « in amorem invisibilium rapiamur[^13] ».

<!-- page 611 -->

**Ad argumenta:** Et secundum hanc viam procedunt rationes, quae ad oppositam partem inducuntur, sicut patet aspicienti. Ex his igitur patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas; procedunt enim secundum diversas vias, secundum quas utraeque verum concludunt, sicut patet ex his quae praedicta sunt[^14].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Which of the two motions of charity precedes the other.*

Fourth, it is asked which of these motions precedes the other. And it seems that the motion of love toward the neighbor is prior to the motion toward God:

1. *First*, through what is said in the first [letter] of John, chapter four[^1]: *He who does not love his brother, whom he sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?* According to this, then, upon the destruction of the love of the neighbor there follows the destruction of the love of God: if therefore upon the destruction of the latter the destruction of the former does not follow, but the reverse: therefore the motion of love toward the neighbor is prior to [that] toward God.

2. Likewise, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen[^2]: *First [comes] that which is animal, then that which is spiritual;* but the love of the neighbor is more sensible, the love of God more spiritual: therefore the affect must first be inclined to loving the neighbor than to loving God.

3. Likewise, the process goes from lower things to higher and from the imperfect to the perfect according to right order, not the reverse[^3]: if therefore the love of God is more perfect and higher than the love of the neighbor, the love of the neighbor is the way to it. But the way is prior to the terminus: therefore the motion of love toward the neighbor is prior to [that] toward God.

4. Likewise, action is prior to contemplation according to right order[^4]; but the love of the neighbor makes a man occupy himself about the active life, the love of God about the contemplative life: therefore according to right order the motion of charity toward the neighbor is prior to [that] toward God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Charity moves a man to loving God according to that manner in which God commands; but God commands, first, that He be loved, and then that the neighbor be loved, because *the first and greatest commandment is: You shall love the Lord your God. And the second is like to it: You shall love your neighbor,* according to what is said in Matthew, chapter twenty-two[^5]: therefore charity moves to loving God before loving the neighbor.

2. Likewise, « the cause is prior to its effect[^6] »; but the love of God is the cause of the love of the neighbor, because a man loves his neighbor for this reason, that he loves God, whose image the neighbor is: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the lovable thing that is prior in intention is prior in affection; but the intention is first with respect to the end than with respect to that which is toward the end[^7]: therefore so also is the love. If therefore God is loved in the character of the end, and the neighbor in the character of that which is toward the end; it necessarily seems that the love of God is preliminary to the love of the neighbor.

4. Likewise, love inclines first toward that to which it inclines more ardently, because the affect follows the greater inclination; but the love of charity inclines more ardently to loving God than the neighbor[^8]: therefore it makes one go out into that motion before this one.

> **Conclusion.** The motion of charity toward God, as regards inclination, is prior both in dignity and in origin to [that] toward the neighbor, but as regards the perfection of exercise the love of the neighbor is prior to [that] of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that these motions of love can be compared to the habit of charity in two ways: either according to the first inclination of the habit itself, or according to the perfection of exercise. If according to its first inclination, then it must be conceded that the motion of love toward God is prior to the motion of love toward the neighbor, since charity inclines toward God before [it inclines] toward the neighbor, because God is the more principal object, and the inclination with respect to God Himself is the cause of the inclination with respect to the neighbor. For charity makes God be loved[^9] for His own sake, and the neighbor for God's sake, in such a way that *for the sake of* expresses the relation of a final cause and of a moving and inducing cause. According therefore to the first inclination of charity, the motion of love toward God is prior to the motion of love toward the neighbor not only in dignity but also in origin. — But if we speak according to the perfection of exercise; since the exercise about the motion[^10] of love toward the neighbor regards the active life, while the exercise of the motion of love toward God regards the contemplative life; and that state[^11] is inferior to and more imperfect than this one: the love of the neighbor is prior to the love of God. For he who wishes to be a perfect lover of God ought first to exercise himself in the love of the neighbor, just as he who wishes to be a good contemplative ought first to be a good active, as Gregory teaches[^12]. — And as a sign of this thing the Holy Spirit was given twice, and first on earth, [in] John chapter twenty; secondly from heaven, [in] Acts chapter two; because the love of charity must first be exercised in those things which we see, so that through the love of visible things « we may be caught up into the love of invisible things[^13] ».

**To the arguments:** And along this way proceed the reasonings which are brought forward for the opposite part, as is plain to one who looks. From these, therefore, the response to the question proposed is plain, and likewise plain is the response to the reasonings adduced for both parts; for they proceed according to diverse ways, according to which both conclude what is true, as is plain from those things which have been said before[^14].

---

la: *(P. 609, n. 6.)* Vers. 20. — Cfr. supra pag. 438, nota 1. et pag. 600, nota 5.

la: *(P. 609, n. 7.)* Vers. 16. — Paulo inferius pro *dilectio Dei* codd. A K *dilectio vero Dei*.

en: *(P. 609, n. 7.)* [1 Cor. 15,] verse 16. — A little further down, for *dilectio Dei* codices A K [read] *dilectio vero Dei*.

la: *(P. 610, n. 1.)* Secundum Aristot.; vide tom. II. pag. 330, nota 5. in fine.

en: *(P. 610, n. 1.)* According to Aristotle; see vol. II, p. 330, note 5, at the end.

la: *(P. 610, n. 2.)* Bernard., Serm. 3. in Assumt. B. M. V. n. 1: *Optimam enim partem elegit Maria, teste ipso quem Martha suscepit. Sed prior natu Martha videtur, et salutis initium sibi magis actio quam contemplatio noscitur vindicare. Laudat Christus Mariam, sed a Martha suscipitur. Amat Rachaelem Iacob, sed Lia supponitur ignoranti* etc. Serm. 46. in Cantic. n. 5: *En forte appetis et ipse contemplationis quietem, et bene facis; tantum ne obliviscaris flores, quibus lectulum sponsae legis aspersum. Ergo cura et tu tuum similiter circumdare bonorum floribus operum, virtutum exercitio... Sed et praeposterus ordo est, ante meritum exigere praemium, et ante laborem sumere cibum, cum dicat Apostolus: Qui non laborat non manducet* (II. Thess. 3, 10.) etc.

en: *(P. 610, n. 2.)* Bernard, *Sermon 3 on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, n. 1: *For Mary chose the best part, by the witness of Him whom Martha received. But Martha seems prior by birth, and action rather than contemplation is known to claim for itself the beginning of salvation. Christ praises Mary, but is received by Martha. Jacob loves Rachel, but Leah is substituted upon him while he is unaware,* etc. *Sermon 46 on the Canticle*, n. 5: *Behold, perhaps you too desire the quiet of contemplation, and you do well; only do not forget the flowers with which the bride's couch, by the law, is strewn. Therefore see that you too likewise surround your [couch] with the flowers of good works, with the exercise of the virtues... But it is also a preposterous order to demand the reward before merit, and to take food before labor, since the Apostle says: He who does not labor, let him not eat* (II Thess. 3, 10) etc.

la: *(P. 610, n. 3.)* Vers. 37. seqq.: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum... hoc est maximum et primum mandatum... Secundum autem* etc. — In maiori pro *Secundum eum* codd. A Y *Secundum eundem*. In minori pro *amari proximum*, quod habent multi codd. et edd. 1, 2, in aliis codd. et Vat. *amare proximum*; cod. A et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 60. a. 4. omittunt *amari*.

en: *(P. 610, n. 3.)* [Matt. 22,] verses 37ff.: *You shall love the Lord your God... this is the greatest and first commandment... And the second* etc. — In the larger [print], for *Secundum eum* codices A Y [read] *Secundum eundem*. In the smaller [print], for *amari proximum*, which many codices and editions 1, 2 have, in other codices and the Vatican [edition] *amare proximum*; codex A and the Supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 60, art. 4, omit *amari*.

la: *(P. 610, n. 4.)* Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.): *Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa.*

en: *(P. 610, n. 4.)* Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* II, ch. 17 (ch. 14): *For the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause.*

la: *(P. 610, n. 6.)* Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: *(P. 610, n. 6.)* See here the text of the Master, ch. 4.

la: *(P. 610, n. 7.)* Edd. *diligere*. Mox post *et proximum* codd. B D repetunt *facit diligi*. Paulo inferius pro *primam* codd. A K P R S bb *primariam*.

en: *(P. 610, n. 7.)* The editions [read] *diligere*. Soon after *et proximum* codices B D repeat *facit diligi*. A little further down, for *primam* codices A K P R S bb [read] *primariam*.

la: *(P. 610, n. 8.)* Edd. omittunt *circa motum*, et bis pro *exercitatio* substituunt *exercitium*.

en: *(P. 610, n. 8.)* The editions omit *circa motum*, and twice substitute *exercitium* for *exercitatio*.

la: *(P. 610, n. 9.)* Codd. et edd. 1, 2 non congrue hic *status sit illo*; tamen etiam alibi auctor simili modo istis pronominibus utitur.

en: *(P. 610, n. 9.)* The codices and editions 1, 2 [read], not congruously, here *status sit illo*; yet elsewhere too the author uses these pronouns in a similar manner.

la: *(P. 610, n. 10.)* Libr. VI. Moral. c. 37. n. 38. seqq.; I. Homil. in Ezech. hom. 3. n. 9. — Loci Script. allati sunt Ioan. 20, 22, et Act. 2, 2. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et I. Sent. d. 14. dub. 4.

en: *(P. 610, n. 10.)* *Morals* book VI, ch. 37, n. 38ff.; *Homilies on Ezekiel* I, hom. 3, n. 9. — The Scripture passages cited are John 20, 22, and Acts 2, 2ff. Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 4, and *Sentences* I, dist. 14, dub. 4.

la: *(P. 610, n. 11.)* Gregor. in Praefat. Missae in Nativ. Domini. Cfr. supra pag. 26, nota 6. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 47. n. 8: *Dei dilectio prior est ordine praecipiendi, proximi autem dilectio prior est ordine faciendi.* Cfr. Bernardi Sententiae n. 21. — Paulo inferius edd. omittunt *patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam*.

en: *(P. 610, n. 11.)* Gregory, in the Preface of the Mass on the Nativity of the Lord. Cf. above, p. 26, note 6. Augustine, *On the Gospel of John*, tract 47, n. 8: *The love of God is prior in the order of commanding, but the love of the neighbor is prior in the order of doing.* Cf. Bernard's *Sentences*, n. 21. — A little further down the editions omit *patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam*.

la: *(P. 611, n. 1.)* Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: *(P. 611, n. 1.)* See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Page span.** q4 spans printed pp. 609–611 (PDF 631–633; pdf = printed + 22), raw lines 42359–42457. It opens **mid-p.609 R-col** (printed directly below q3's scholion, which closes the foot of p.609): `QUAESTIO IV.` heading + title (raw 42360, full-width) + opener + obj.1 (with marker ⁶ on *quarto*, 1 John 4) + obj.2 (marker ⁷, 1 Cor 15). The body then runs through **all of p.610** (obj.3–4, Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo with markers 1–11) and onto **p.611 L-col top**, where the brief *Ad argumenta* tail sits (marker ¹), ending immediately before `QUAESTIO V.` (also printed on p.611). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion (the raw OCR in this two-column region is cascade-shattered).

**Alignment.** Confirmed: raw 42359 = `QUAESTIO IV.`; title raw 42360 = *Quis duorum motuum caritatis praecedat alterum*; opener raw 42363 = *Quarto quaeritur, quis istorum motuum praecedat reliquum. Et videtur, quod prius sit motus dilectionis in proximum quam motus in Deum* — matching frontmatter `title_la`. The **"Quarto quaeritur"** ordinal aligns with this being the fourth question of ART. II. **No q-swap.**

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (14 entries).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; q4's body markers cross three pages.
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**Scholion. ABSENT — sibling redirect.** q4 prints **no scholion** of its own. Its closing body footer (p.611 n.1) is *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"), i.e. the editors route q4's commentary to q3's scholion (§I–II, foot of p.609), which already forward-pointed (§II) to the order-of-charity material treated here and in d.29. `has_scholion: false`. No `### Scholion` subsection added (the parser captures `### Scholion` to end-of-block; an empty/redirect scholion would blank the body — see CLAUDE.md parser gotcha).

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body text and the 14 numbered footers resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands. (The p.609 n.6 cross-ref "pag. 438" reads cleanly on the band against the cascade-shattered OCR "i:is".)

**Hand-off received ← d27-a2-q3:** confirmed q3 took p.609 nn.1–5; q4 = raw 42359–42457; p.609 footer split = q3 nn.1–5, q4 nn.6–7; q4 begins mid-p.609 R-col below q3's scholion; QUAESTIO V boundary follows on p.611.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 611 -->

### Quaestio V. *Utrum actus dilectionis in Deum habeat modum.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum actus dilectionis in Deum habeat modum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Sapientiae* undecimo[^1]: *Omnia in numero et mensura et pondere disposuisti, Domine:* ergo motus caritatis in Deum mensuram habet; et omne quod habet mensuram, habet modum: ergo necesse est, motum dilectionis in Deum esse modificatum.

2. Item, omne finitum est terminatum[^2], et omne terminatum est mensuratum, et omne tale est modificatum: ergo *a primo* omne finitum habet modum; sed motus caritatis in Deum est finitus, cum sit creatus et a virtute finita: ergo necesse est, ipsum habere modum.

3. Item, sapientia est supra caritatem, sicut dicit Bernardus in libro *de Amore Dei*[^3], quod « amor proficit in caritatem, et caritas in sapientiam »; sed sapientiam oportet habere modum, secundum quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos duodecimo: *Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere* etc.: si ergo sapientia debet habere modum, pari ratione videtur, immo multo fortiori, quod ipsa caritas habeat modum.

4. Item, modus, species et ordo ad se invicem comparantur, sicut unum, verum et bonum[^4]; sed bonum praesupponit verum, et verum praesupponit unum: ergo pari ratione ordo praesupponit speciem, et species praesupponit modum. Sed motus caritatis in Deum est ordinatus: ergo et modificatus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Bernardus *de Diligendo Deo*[^5]: « Causa diligendi Deum Deus est, modus est sine modo diligere »; et iterum: « Mihi fides tanto plus dicit Deum amandum, quanto me pluris ipsum aestimandum intelligo »; sed intelligo, quod ipse pluris aestimandus est quam ego in infinitum: ergo in infinitum est diligendus. Sed nihil tale habet modum: ergo motus caritatis non habet modum.

2. Item, ratio diligendi Deum est ipsa summa Bonitas[^6]; sed summa Bonitas est infinita, non habens modum neque mensuram: ergo et habitus, qui movere et inclinare habet secundum rationem illam: videtur ergo, quod motus dilectionis in Deum non habeat terminum neque modum.

3. Item, caritas est aequa ponderatrix, cum sit affectio ordinata; sed qui aequaliter et ordinate ponderat appretiatur et amat unumquodque, quantum est appretiandum et amandum[^7]: si ergo summum Bonum in infinitum excedit omne bonum creatum, videtur, quod motus caritatis in Deum in infinitum excedat motum caritatis in proximum: ergo non videtur, quod habeat modum.

4. Item, omne quod habet modum per sui excessum potest vitiari: ergo si motus caritatis in Deum modum haberet, per suum excessum vitiari posset. Sed nemo vituperabilis est, quantumcumque diligat Deum affectuose et intense[^8]: si ergo motus caritatis in Deum non potest vitiari per excessum, videtur, quod in se non habeat modum.

> **Conclusio.** Actus dilectionis erga Deum habet modum ex virtutis limitatione et debitarum circumstantiarum additione, sed non modum ex mediatione inter superfluum et diminutum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tripliciter potest dici aliquis actus habere modum: uno modo per limitationem quantum ad *se ipsum*; alio modo per aggregationem circumstantiarum; tertio modo ex mediatione[^9] inter superfluum et diminutum. Primo modo est dicere, quod modum habet actus omnis virtutis creatae. Omnis enim virtus creata finita est et limitata; et ideo omnis actus eius finitatem habet et modum, loquendo de limitatione et finitate non secundum possibilitatem, sed secundum actum.

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— Secundo vero modo est dicere, modum esse circa actum virtutis *moralis* et *meritoriae,* quia nullus actus fit laudabiliter, nisi ad eum concurrant debitae circumstantiae[^10]. — Tertio modo est dicere, quod modum habet actus omnis virtutis *cardinalis* sive politicae. Omnes enim in medietate consistunt inter superfluum et diminutum, ex hoc ipso quod habent obiectum creatum et finitum.

Quoniam ergo caritas est virtus *creata* et virtus *gratuita* et virtus *theologica*; hinc est, quod actus eius modum habet ex *virtutis limitatione*; modum etiam habet ex debitarum *circumstantiarum additione,* ut patet, quia modus, qui est circa actum caritatis, est, ut quis diligat Deum super omnia et propter se *ex toto corde, ex tota anima et ex tota mente*[^11]. Sed modum illum, qui est ex *mediatione* inter superfluum et diminutum, non habet, quia obiectum eius est immensum et infinitum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam: quia motus dilectionis in Deum quodam modo accipiendi modum, modificari habet, quodam modo vero minime. — Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad oppositas partes. Nam rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, quae ostendunt, motum caritatis habere modum, concludunt de modo, qui consistit in limitatione actus quantum ad se ipsum. — Illa tamen ratio de sapientia non cogit: quia sapientia uno modo dicta est a *sapere,* alio modo dicta est a *sapore*[^12], ita quod uno modo consistit in *cognitione,* alio modo in *affectione.* Et secundum quod consistit in *affectione,* sic dicit Bernardus, quod « caritas crescit in sapientiam »; et hoc modo non habet vitiari per excessum. Secundum autem quod consistit in *cognitione,* sic potest vitiari per excessum et curiositatem perscrutationis[^13]; sed hoc modo non est superior ad caritatem nec illa dignior: et ideo non sequitur, quod motus caritatis in Deum habeat modum, secundum quod modus dicit medium inter superfluum et diminutum. — Aliae vero tres rationes verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad rationes vero quae ad oppositum adducuntur, similiter plana est responsio. Nam illud Bernardi *de Diligendo Deo,* quod Deus diligendus est sine modo; non tollit modum debitae circumstantiae, vel finitatem virtutis creatae; sed hoc tollit, quod nemo debet sibi terminum infra[^14] virtutem suam praefigere, quia nemo potest superflue Deum diligere, et ita aufert modum tertio modo dictum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio diligendi Deum est Bonitas infinita; dicendum, quod licet caritas moveat conformiter illi rationi, secundum quod potest, nunquam tamen facit aequalem[^15]; et ideo, quamvis ipsa summa Bonitas sit infinita, non tamen propter hoc oportet, quod affectio caritatis, quae movetur secundum illam, habeat infinitatem et careat omni mensura; pro eo quod, sicut lux claritatis divinae, quam sumus visuri in patria, est *in se infinita,* tamen *finite cognoscetur* a nobis, et claritas cognoscibilis in infinitum excedet claritatem nostrae cognitionis[^16]: sic etiam intelligendum est ex parte *affectionis,* quod multo maior erit bonitas illius summi Boni amabilis, quam sit affectio amantis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est aequa ponderatrix; dicendum, quod verum est; hoc etiam verum est, quod in infinitum plus diligit Deum quam creaturam; sed tamen non propter hoc sequitur, quod diligat Deum omnino infinite sine mensura, quia linea in infinitum excedit punctum[^17], et tamen ipsa in se finita est.

4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur de excessu, patet responsio: quia obiicit de modo, qui non solum est ex parte *virtutis moventis,* sed etiam ex parte *obiecti,* qui etiam medium locum tenet respectu superflui et diminuti: et hunc non est reperire circa actum dilectionis Dei, sicut prius tactum est, propter immensitatem ipsius obiecti[^18].

english:
### Question V. *Whether the act of love toward God has a measure.*

Fifth, it is asked whether the act of love toward God has a measure. And it seems that it does:

1. *Wisdom* eleven[^1]: *You have arranged all things in number and measure and weight, O Lord:* therefore the motion of charity toward God has a measure; and everything that has a measure, has a mode: therefore it is necessary that the motion of love toward God be moded.

2. Likewise, everything finite is terminated[^2], and everything terminated is measured, and everything such is moded: therefore *from the first* everything finite has a mode; but the motion of charity toward God is finite, since it is created and [proceeds] from a finite power: therefore it is necessary that it have a mode.

3. Likewise, wisdom is above charity, as Bernard says in the book *On the Love of God*[^3], that « love advances into charity, and charity into wisdom »; but wisdom must have a mode, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans, chapter twelve: *Not to be more wise than it behooves to be wise* etc.: if therefore wisdom ought to have a mode, by like reasoning it seems, indeed by a much stronger one, that charity itself has a mode.

4. Likewise, mode, species, and order are compared to one another, as one, true, and good[^4]; but the good presupposes the true, and the true presupposes the one: therefore by like reasoning order presupposes species, and species presupposes mode. But the motion of charity toward God is ordered: therefore also moded.

**On the contrary:** 1. Bernard, *On Loving God*[^5]: « The cause of loving God is God, the mode is to love without mode »; and again: « Faith tells me that God is to be loved so much the more, the more I understand that He Himself is to be esteemed above me »; but I understand that He is to be esteemed above me infinitely: therefore He is to be loved infinitely. But nothing such has a mode: therefore the motion of charity does not have a mode.

2. Likewise, the ground of loving God is the supreme Goodness itself[^6]; but the supreme Goodness is infinite, having neither mode nor measure: therefore so also is the habit, which has [the property] of moving and inclining according to that ground: it seems therefore that the motion of love toward God has neither term nor mode.

3. Likewise, charity is an equal weigher, since it is an ordered affection; but he who weighs equally and orderly esteems and loves each thing as much as it is to be esteemed and loved[^7]: if therefore the supreme Good infinitely exceeds every created good, it seems that the motion of charity toward God infinitely exceeds the motion of charity toward the neighbor: therefore it does not seem that it has a mode.

4. Likewise, everything that has a mode can be vitiated through its own excess: therefore if the motion of charity toward God had a mode, it could be vitiated through its own excess. But no one is blameworthy, however affectionately and intensely he loves God[^8]: if therefore the motion of charity toward God cannot be vitiated through excess, it seems that in itself it has no mode.

> **Conclusion.** The act of love toward God has a measure from the limitation of the virtue and from the addition of due circumstances, but not a measure from a mean between the superfluous and the diminished.

**I respond:** It must be said that an act can be said to have a measure in three ways: in one way by limitation as regards *itself*; in another way by the aggregation of circumstances; in a third way from a mean[^9] between the superfluous and the diminished. In the first way one is to say that the act of every created virtue has a measure. For every created virtue is finite and limited; and therefore every act of it has finitude and measure, speaking of limitation and finitude not according to possibility, but according to act.

— In the second way, however, one is to say that the measure is about the act of a *moral* and *meritorious* virtue, because no act is done praiseworthily unless due circumstances concur with it[^10]. — In the third way one is to say that the act of every *cardinal* or political virtue has a measure. For all of them consist in a mean between the superfluous and the diminished, from this very fact that they have a created and finite object.

Since therefore charity is a *created* virtue and a *gratuitous* virtue and a *theological* virtue; hence it is that its act has a measure from *the limitation of the virtue*; it also has a measure from the *addition of due circumstances,* as is plain, because the measure that is about the act of charity is this, that one love God above all and for His own sake *with one's whole heart, with one's whole soul, and with one's whole mind*[^11]. But that measure which is from a *mean* between the superfluous and the diminished it does not have, because its object is immense and infinite.

From these things the response to the question proposed is plain: that the motion of love toward God, in a certain way of taking the measure, has [reason] to be moded, but in a certain way by no means. — And according to this the reasonings run to opposite parts. For the reasonings which are brought forward for the first part, which show that the motion of charity has a measure, conclude about the measure that consists in the limitation of the act as regards itself. — Yet that reasoning about wisdom does not compel: because wisdom in one way is named from *to know* (*sapere*), in another way from *taste* (*sapor*)[^12], so that in one way it consists in *cognition,* in another way in *affection.* And insofar as it consists in *affection,* so Bernard says, that « charity grows into wisdom »; and in this way it cannot be vitiated through excess. But insofar as it consists in *cognition,* so it can be vitiated through excess and the curiosity of investigation[^13]; but in this way it is not superior to charity, nor is it more worthy than it: and therefore it does not follow that the motion of charity toward God has a measure, insofar as the measure expresses a mean between the superfluous and the diminished. — But the other three reasonings conclude what is true, and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To the reasonings, however, which are adduced for the opposite, the response is likewise plain. For that [saying] of Bernard *On Loving God,* that God is to be loved without mode; does not take away the measure of due circumstance, or the finitude of the created virtue; but it takes away this, that no one ought to set for himself a term below[^14] his own power, because no one can love God superfluously, and thus it removes the measure spoken of in the third way.

2. To that which is objected, that the ground of loving God is infinite Goodness; it must be said that although charity moves conformably to that ground, insofar as it can, yet it never makes [itself] equal[^15]; and therefore, although the supreme Goodness itself is infinite, nevertheless it is not on this account necessary that the affection of charity, which is moved according to it, should have infinity and lack all measure; for this reason, that, just as the light of the divine brightness, which we are to see in the homeland, is *in itself infinite,* yet *will be known finitely* by us, and the knowable brightness will infinitely exceed the brightness of our cognition[^16]: so also it is to be understood on the part of the *affection,* that the goodness of that supreme lovable Good will be much greater than is the affection of the one loving.

3. To that which is objected, that charity is an equal weigher; it must be said that it is true; this also is true, that it loves God infinitely more than the creature; but yet it does not follow on this account that it loves God altogether infinitely without measure, because a line infinitely exceeds a point[^17], and yet it is in itself finite.

4. To the last [objection], which is raised about excess, the response is plain: because it objects about the measure which is not only on the part of the *moving virtue,* but also on the part of the *object,* which also holds a middle place with respect to the superfluous and the diminished: and this is not to be found about the act of love of God, as was touched upon before, on account of the immensity of the object itself[^18].

la: *(P. 611, n. 2.)* Vers. 21. — In fine arg. pro *esse modificatum* cod. Y *habere modum*.

en: *(P. 611, n. 2.)* [Wisdom 11,] verse 21. — At the end of the argument, for *esse modificatum* codex Y [reads] *habere modum*.

la: *(P. 611, n. 3.)* Vide verba Ambrosii supra pag. 300, nota 6. allata.

en: *(P. 611, n. 3.)* See the words of Ambrose cited above, p. 300, note 6.

la: *(P. 611, n. 4.)* Sive *de Natura et dignit. amoris,* c. 2. n. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. — Seq. verbum Apostoli est Rom. 12, 3.

en: *(P. 611, n. 4.)* Or *On the Nature and Dignity of Love,* ch. 2, n. 3. Cf. above, p. 596, note 7. — The following word of the Apostle is Rom. 12, 3.

en: *(P. 611, n. 5.)* Cf. *Sentences* I, dist. 3, p. I, dub. 3, and *Sentences* II, dist. 35, art. 2, q. 1 ff. — On the *minor* [premise] see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 13, m. 2, q. 15, m. 2, and q. 17, m. 1.

la: *(P. 611, n. 6.)* Cap. 1. n. 1. — Seq. testimonium invenitur ibid. c. 5. n. 15. — In fine arg. edd. voci *caritatis* adiungunt *in Deum*.

en: *(P. 611, n. 6.)* Chapter 1, n. 1. — The following testimony is found ibid., ch. 5, n. 15. — At the end of the argument the editions add *in Deum* to the word *caritatis*.

la: *(P. 611, n. 7.)* Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro *habitus, qui* cod. A *habitus, quia*.

en: *(P. 611, n. 7.)* Cf. above, art. 1, q. 1 ff. — Soon, for *habitus, qui* codex A [reads] *habitus, quia*.

la: *(P. 611, n. 8.)* Bernard., Epist. 85. n. 3: O Domine, qui illuminas lucernam meam... illumina ipsas quoque tenebras meas, ut videam et gaudeam ordinatam in me caritatem, sciens et diligens quae diligenda sunt, et quantum et ad quid diligenda sunt etc. Cfr. de Modo bene vivendi (inter opera Bernardi), c. 5. n. 12. — Post pauca pro *excedat* multi codd. *excedit*.

en: *(P. 611, n. 8.)* Bernard, *Letter 85,* n. 3: O Lord, who lightest my lamp... enlighten also my very darknesses, that I may see and rejoice in the charity ordered within me, knowing and loving the things that are to be loved, and how much and to what end they are to be loved, etc. Cf. *On the Manner of Living Well* (among the works of Bernard), ch. 5, n. 12. — A little after, for *excedat* many codices [read] *excedit*.

la: *(P. 611, n. 9.)* Eccli. 43, 32. seq.: Glorificantes Dominum, quantumcumque potueritis; supervalebit enim adhuc... maior enim est omni laude.

en: *(P. 611, n. 9.)* Sirach 43, 32 f.: Glorifying the Lord, as much as ever you can; for He will yet surpass [you]... for He is greater than all praise.

la: *(P. 611, n. 10.)* Vat. hic, et inferius cum Vat. etiam edd. 1, 2, *mediate*; aliquanto inferius pro *finitate* eaedem edd. cum Vat. substituunt *finitatione*.

en: *(P. 611, n. 10.)* The Vatican [edition] here, and below the editions 1, 2 also with the Vatican, [read] *mediate*; somewhat further down, for *finitate* the same editions with the Vatican substitute *finitatione*.

la: *(P. 612, n. 1.)* Vide supra pag. 472, nota 2. — De *tertio* modo, quem aliquis actus habere potest, vide supra pag. 474, nota 6. in fine. — Pro *laudabiliter* edd. *laudabilis*.

en: *(P. 612, n. 1.)* See above, p. 472, note 2. — On the *third* mode, which an act can have, see above, p. 474, note 6, at the end. — For *laudabiliter* the editions [read] *laudabilis*.

la: *(P. 612, n. 3.)* Bernard., Serm. 85. in Cantic. n. 8: Et si quis sapientiam virtutis amorem definierit, non mihi a vero deviare videtur. Ubi autem amor est, labor non est, sed sapor. Et forte *sapientia* a sapore denominatur, quod virtuti accedens, quoddam veluti condimentum sapidam reddat, quae per se insulsa quodam modo et aspera sentiebatur. Nec duxerim reprehendendum, si quis sapientiam saporem boni definiat. Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 1. et I. Sent. prooem. q. 3. in corp.

en: *(P. 612, n. 3.)* Bernard, *Sermon 85 on the Canticle,* n. 8: And if anyone should define wisdom as the love of virtue, he does not seem to me to stray from the truth. But where there is love, there is no labor, but taste (*sapor*). And perhaps *wisdom* (*sapientia*) is named from taste, because, coming to a virtue, it renders savory, as it were by a certain seasoning, that which by itself was felt to be in a way insipid and harsh. Nor would I hold it blameworthy, if anyone should define wisdom as the taste of the good. Cf. below, dist. 35, q. 1, and *Sentences* I, proem, q. 3, in the body.

la: *(P. 612, n. 4.)* Cfr. supra d. 22. dub. 5. — Paulo inferius pro *secundum quod* non pauci codd. *secundum quem*.

en: *(P. 612, n. 4.)* Cf. above, dist. 22, dub. 5. — A little further down, for *secundum quod* not a few codices [read] *secundum quem*.

en: *(P. 612, n. 5.)* The editions [read] *iuxta* [beside].

la: *(P. 612, n. 6.)* Vat. *nunquam tamen potest facere aequalem affectionem ipsi; et ideo,* et paulo ante *conformiter ad illam rationem;* edd. 1, 2 *dicendum, quod licet bonitas moveat conformiter illam affectionem secundum quod potest* etc.

en: *(P. 612, n. 6.)* The Vatican [edition reads] *nunquam tamen potest facere aequalem affectionem ipsi; et ideo,* and a little before *conformiter ad illam rationem;* editions 1, 2 [read] *dicendum, quod licet bonitas moveat conformiter illam affectionem secundum quod potest* etc.

la: *(P. 612, n. 8.)* Vide supra pag. 280, nota 5. — Pro *diligat* codd. G H I L T Z aa *diligit*.

en: *(P. 612, n. 8.)* See above, p. 280, note 5. — For *diligat* codices G H I L T Z aa [read] *diligit*.

la: *(P. 612, n. 9.)* Codd. M O S addunt *quod est Deus*.

en: *(P. 612, n. 9.)* Codices M O S add *which is God*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Eandem fere quaestionem Richard. a Med. (hic a. 8. q. 1.) sic proponit: « Utrum Deus diligi possit excessive » (i. e. nimis). Patet, quod ad quaestionem sic intellectam et respectu actus interioris in affectu, responderi debeat, quod e contrario, cum ratio caritatis, scilicet Bonitas divina, sit infinita, nulla creatura possit Deum diligere *satis* i. e. quantum meretur, et multo minus *nimis*. (Cfr. solut. ad 1. 2.). Et secundum hunc sensum aliis verbis resolvit S. Thomas (hic q. 3. a. 3; cfr. S. II. II. q. 27. a. 6.), quod caritas « non habeat modum, scilicet praefixum, ultra quem non oportet progredi ». — Distinctiones, quas hic adhibet S. Bonaventura, aptae sunt; quas Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 4. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) sic repetit: « Aliquis actus tripliciter dicitur habere modum: aut secundum limitationem essentiae, aut secundum determinationem debitae circumstantiae, aut secundum proportionem medii inter superfluum et diminutum. Primo modo omnis actus creatus habet modum; secundo omnis actus virtuosus, quia est ex debitis circumstantiis mensuratus; tertio modo actus virtutum cardinalium ». Praeter laudatos de hac (5.) quaestione: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 10. quaestiunc. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Richard of Mediavilla (here art. 8, q. 1) poses nearly the same question thus: « Whether God can be loved excessively » (i.e. too much). It is plain that, to the question so understood and with respect to the interior act in the affect, it must be answered to the contrary, that, since the ground of charity, namely the divine Goodness, is infinite, no creature can love God *enough,* i.e. as much as He deserves, and much less *too much.* (Cf. the solution to objections 1 and 2.). And according to this sense S. Thomas resolves [it] in other words (here q. 3, art. 3; cf. *Summa* II–II, q. 27, art. 6), that charity « does not have a measure, namely a fixed one, beyond which one ought not to advance ». — The distinctions which S. Bonaventure here employs are apt; which Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 4, art. 1, quaestiuncula 1) repeats thus: « An act is said to have a measure in three ways: either according to the limitation of essence, or according to the determination of due circumstance, or according to the proportion of a mean between the superfluous and the diminished. In the first way every created act has a measure; in the second, every virtuous act, because it is measured by due circumstances; in the third way the acts of the cardinal virtues ». Besides those praised on this (the fifth) question: Blessed Albert, on this and the following question, here art. 10, quaestiunculae 1–3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Page span.** q5 spans printed pp. 611–613 (PDF 633–635; pdf = printed + 22), raw lines 42455–42604. It opens **mid-p.611** (printed below q4's brief *Ad argumenta* tail at the top of p.611 L-col, full-width `QUAESTIO V.` header + title at raw 42455–42456): opener + the four *videtur* (pro) objections (markers 2–5) in the L-col, the **Sed contra** args 1–4 (markers 6–9) straddling the L/R columns, the **Conclusio** (centered) and start of the **Respondeo** (marker 10) at the foot of p.611 R-col. The Respondeo (three-modes analysis), the *Ad-fundamenta* solutions (markers 1–4) and the four *Ad oppositum* replies (markers 5–9) run through **all of p.612**, ending with the **Scholion §I**, which begins centered at the foot of p.612 and **carries onto p.613 L-col top** (closing with "Praeter laudatos de hac (5.) quaestione…"), immediately before `QUAESTIO VI.` (p.613). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion; the IA djvu OCR in this two-column region is cascade-shattered (footers especially).

**Alignment.** Confirmed: raw 42455 = `QUAESTIO V.`; title raw 42456 = *Utrum actus dilectionis in Deum habeat modum*; opener raw 42458 = *Quinto quaeritur, utrum actus dilectionis in Deum habeat modum. Et quod sic, videtur* — matching frontmatter `title_la`. The **"Quinto quaeritur"** ordinal aligns with this being the fifth question of ART. II. **No q-swap.**

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (18 entries).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page.
- **p.611 — q5 takes nn.2–10** (n.1 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* belongs to q4, taken as its `[^14]`; hand-off received): n.2 obj.1 (Wisd 11:21; *esse modificatum* / *habere modum* cod. Y) → `[^1]`; n.3 obj.2 (Ambrose, supra pag. 300) → `[^2]`; n.4 obj.3 (William of St-Thierry *de Nat. et dignit. amoris*; Rom 12:3) → `[^3]`; n.5 obj.4 (I/II Sent. + Alex. Hal.) → `[^4]`; n.6 SedContra 1 (Bernard *de Diligendo Deo* c.1 + c.5) → `[^5]`; n.7 SedContra 2 (supra a.1 q.1; *habitus, qui* / *quia* cod. A) → `[^6]`; n.8 SedContra 3 (Bernard Epist. 85 n.3; *excedat*/*excedit*) → `[^7]`; n.9 SedContra 4 (Sir 43:32) → `[^8]`; n.10 Respondeo *mediatione* (Vat. *mediate* / *finitatione* variants) → `[^9]`.
- **p.612 — nn.1–9, all q5:** Respondeo 2nd mode (n.1, pag. 472 / 474; *laudabiliter*/*laudabilis*) → `[^10]`; Conclusio 2 *ex tota mente* (n.2, Mark 12:30) → `[^11]`; *a sapore* (n.3, Bernard Serm. 85 in Cantic. n.8) → `[^12]`; *perscrutationis* (n.4, supra d.22 dub.5; *secundum quod*/*quem*) → `[^13]`; Ad-reply 1 *infra* (n.5, edd. *iuxta*) → `[^14]`; Ad-reply 2 *aequalem* (n.6, Vat./edd. variants) → `[^15]`; *cognitionis* (n.7, supra d.14 a.1 q.2) → `[^16]`; Ad-reply 3 *punctum* (n.8, supra pag. 280; *diligat*/*diligit*) → `[^17]`; Ad-reply 4 *obiecti* (n.9, codd. M O S add *quod est Deus*) → `[^18]`.

**Scholion. PRESENT — §I only.** q5 prints one scholion section (§I): Richard of Mediavilla's parallel ("Utrum Deus diligi possit excessive"), S. Thomas, and Peter of Tarentaise's threefold-measure restatement, closing "Praeter laudatos de hac **(5.) quaestione**…". The following section **§II** ("Quoad ultimam **(6.)** huius articuli quaestionem…") expressly concerns the **sixth** question and therefore belongs to **q6**, not here. `has_scholion: true`. The scholion §I carries no footnote markers. Placed LAST in both `## Latin` and `## English` per the CLAUDE.md parser gotcha.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body text, the 18 numbered footers, and the scholion §I resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands against the cascade-shattered OCR.

**Hand-off received ← d27-a2-q4:** confirmed q4 took p.611 n.1 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*); q5 = raw 42455–42604; q5 begins mid-p.611 below q4's *Ad argumenta* tail; p.611 footer split = q4 n.1 / q5 nn.2–10 (the q4 hand-off had estimated q5 nn.2–7 from the L-col OCR only; the actual page carries nn.8–10 in the R-col footer band for the SedContra 3–4 + Respondeo markers, confirmed on the 450dpi band).

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a2-q6** (sixth and last question of ART. II, last question of d.27): raw start **42605** = opener `Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum teneamur ad illum modum implendum, quem Dominus in praecepto implicat Matthaei vigesimo secundo¹: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo…` (header `QUAESTIO VI.` raw 42602, title raw 42603 = *Utrum teneamur diligere Deum ex toto corde, ex tota anima et ex tota mente*). q6 begins **mid-p.613 R-col** (printed below the scholion §I/§II block and the q5/q6 SCHOLION that spans pp.612–613) and runs onto p.614+. **Scholion split already done here:** the SCHOLION's **§II** ("Quoad ultimam (6.) huius articuli quaestionem cfr. hic dub. 3…", on p.613 L-col, treating the duplex-totalitas / Gulielmus Antissiodorensis material + "Praeter S. Thomam: Petr. a Tar.… Richard. a Med.… Durand.…") belongs to **q6** — take it as q6's scholion, NOT to q5. **Footer split:** p.613 footer nn.1–6 (n.1 *Vers. 37*; n.2 c.6 + V. Sexti Decretal.; n.3 Sap 9:15 + Aristot. VIII Phys.; n.4 August. *de Spiritu et littera* c.27; n.5 *Vers. 37* + Script. ibid. 19:17; n.6 *Explanatio symboli ad Damasum*) are all q6's body markers — verify the p.613→p.614 footer band split at q6 promotion. q6's end boundary = the next `QUAESTIO` / the close of d.27 (then `DUBIA` / d.28) — grep at dispatch. **The "Sexto et ultimo quaeritur" ordinal aligns** with this being the sixth question of ART. II — re-verify at dispatch.