title: Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum mala fieri sit bonum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum mala fieri sit bonum. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quod expedit facienti ad salutem, illud est bonum; sed malum est huiusmodi — unde super illud ad Romanos octavo[^1]: *Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum*, *Glossa*: « etiam ipse casus »; et Augustinus decimo quarto *de Civitate*, capitulo decimo tertio: « Audeo, inquit, dicere, superbis utile esse incidere in aliquod apertum manifestumque peccatum, ut inde sibi displiceant, qui iam sibi placendo corruerunt » — ergo malum fieri est bonum et utile facienti ad salutem: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod est bonum Deo et universitati est bonum simpliciter, quia bonum commune praefertur bono privato; sed malum fieri est bonum universitati: ergo etc. Boethius in libro *de Consolatione*[^2]: « Sola divina vis est, cui quaeque mala bona sunt ». Et Augustinus in libro *Confessionum*: « Tu cui nihil omnino malum, sed nec universae creaturae tuae, quia nihil est extra te, quod corrumpat ordinem, quem imposuisti ». Ergo si malum fieri est bonum universitati, patet etc.

3. Item, « cuius usus bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum »[^3]; sed usus malorum factorum est bonus: ergo etc. Minor patet per Augustinum undecimo *de Civitate*: « Neque enim Deus malos esse praescisset, nisi pari ratione praesciret, quibus eos bonorum usibus accommodaret ».

4. Item, « omne quod iustum est, bonum est »[^4]; sed mala fieri iustum est, quia poena est peccati praecedentis, sicut vult Gregorius: ergo malum fieri bonum est.

**Contra:**

1. Malum fieri est malum in esse productionis: si ergo malum fieri est bonum, productio mali est bona. Sed regula est in arte *Topicorum*[^5]: « Cuius generatio vel productio bona est, ipsum quoque bonum »: ergo si productio mali est bona, malum est bonum.

2. Item, malum fieri est idem quod bonum privari sive corrumpi: ergo si malum fieri est bonum, corruptio boni est bona. Sed regula est: « Cuius corruptio bona, ipsum quoque malum »: ergo si corruptio boni est bona, bonum est malum, quod absurdum est.

3. Item, de duobus convertibilibus si unum est bonum, et reliquum[^6]; sed malum fieri et malum facere sunt convertibilia: ergo si malum fieri est bonum, et malum facere est bonum. Sed pro bono nullus est puniendus: ergo nullus faciens mala est puniendus.

4. Item, « si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito »[^7]: si ergo malum fieri est bonum: ergo bonum fieri est malum. Sed hoc absurdum est, quod malum sit facere bonum: ergo et primum.

5. Item, si malum fieri est bonum: aut ergo in se, aut quia ex ipso evenit vel consequitur bonum. Non in se, constat. Si ergo, quia inde evenit bonum, qui dicit: *Faciamus mala, ut eveniant bona*[^8], bene dicit: ergo male Apostolus reprehendit.

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### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Mala fieri nullo pacto bonum est, sed potest esse occasio boni, quatenus a Deo ordinatur in bonum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod in operibus illud est dicere bonum vel utile sive conferens, quod in finem bonum ducit sive est via ad bonum. Ducere autem ad bonum tripliciter dicitur aliquid, scilicet per modum *causae*, vel per modum *casus*, vel per modum *occasionis*. Et differunt haec tria. Nam *causa* per se ducit ita in illud[^9], circa quod ponitur, quod sit producens et intendens. Sed *casus* privat intentionem, sed non operationem, sicut patet in fodiente, qui invenit thesaurum praeter intentionem. *Occasio* autem privat utrumque. Non enim dicit principium producens, sed magis dicit aliquid, quod principium afficit, ut efficiat[^10]: sicut aliquis ex verbo audito percutit alium; verbum auditum fuit occasio, non efficiens percussionem nec cooperans efficienti, sed quodam modo afficiens.

Et haec occasio duobus modis est. Quaedam enim est, quae quodam modo habet rationem *activi*, quia quodam modo excitat efficientem, sicut malum exemplum ad peccatum. Vel[^11] quae habet rationem *passivi*, ut ex quo aliquis sumit rationem, sicut aliquis ex malo alterius excitat se ad faciendum bonum.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod malum duo dicit, scilicet *privationem* et *naturam ordinabilem*; et ratione malitiae comparatur ad bonum, quod elicitur, sicut occasio *passiva*; ratione boni, quod substernitur, sicut occasio aliquo modo *activa*, propter quod dicitur malum occasio boni.

Cum igitur aliquid ducat in bonum his tribus modis, habet[^12] sic differentiam in ducendo. Aliquid enim potest ducere aliquid ad alterum aut ex se vel per aliquid sui; et tunc tenet rationem causae per se. Aut potest ducere per alterum, ad quod tamen non ordinatur, sed illud ordinatur[^13] ad tertium, sumta occasione ex illo; et sic tenet rationem occasionis. Aut ducit cum alio, ad quod tamen non ordinatur, nec illud ad tertium, sed ambo simul; et sic tenet rationem casus, qui est ex concursu causarum.

Ex hoc igitur patet, quod illud quod ducit per modum *causae*, habet in se rationem ordinationis in finem; et ideo in ipso est bonitas, et ideo recte denominatur bonum. Quod vero ducit per modum *occasionis*, nullam habet intra se rationem ordinationis in finem, ideo nec bonitatem; et propter hoc non potest denominari bonum per se nisi cum additione illius, per quod ordinatur, in quo scilicet consistit ratio ordinationis et bonitatis, et circa quod ponitur bonitas.

Cum igitur malum non ducat ad bonum ex se, sed per illud, quod elicitur ex ipso a sapiente Deo, absolute loquendo, malum fieri non est bonum; immo omnes consimiles sunt negandae, quia bonitas notatur poni circa ipsum malum. — Si autem addatur bonum, quod elicitur, vel ipse eliciens; *secundario* concedendae sunt huiusmodi locutiones: *malum fieri est bonum ei qui novit ordinare in bonum*; similiter: *malum fieri est bonum, ut electi probentur*.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ex hoc ergo patent duae primae rationes; procedunt enim cum determinatione, sicut patet in ipsis auctoritatibus.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: *cuius usus bonus etc.*; dicendum, quod duplex est usus rei: unus, ad quem res de se ordinatur; et de tali verum est, sicut patet de equo, qui est ad equitandum; alius usus, qui est aliquando et ex post facto; et iste potest esse bonus ex bonitate utentis, non utilis, quia bonus utens bene utitur malis. Et de tali usu non est regula vera: de tali autem loquitur Augustinus.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: *quod iustum est bonum est etc.*; dicendum, quod *iustum* dicitur dupliciter: uno modo iuste ordinatum per iustitiam[^14], quae est in ipso, et omne quod sic iustum est, bonum est, quoniam intra se habet iustitiam; vel est declarativum iustitiae, et sic potest malum ostendere. Sicut enim malum potest ad retributionem iustitiae disponere, ita et ostendere. Et hoc modo dicit ordinationem iustitiae *in altero*; nec sequitur, quod sit bonum, quia iustum plus importat rationem ordinis. Nihilominus tamen sermo ille non est proprius, quo dicitur: *Iustus est, ut qui in sordibus est, sordescat*[^15], immo valde per accidens intelligitur, quia iustum est, ut relinquatur a Deo, et ad hoc sequitur, quod adhuc sordescat: unde per accidens intelligitur.

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### Question III. *Whether the coming-about of evils is a good.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the coming-about of evils is a good. And that it is, is shown thus:

1. What is expedient for the doer toward salvation, that is a good; but evil is of this sort — whence on that passage *to the Romans* eight[^1]: *To those who love God all things work together for good*, the *Gloss*: « even the very fall [itself] »; and Augustine, fourteenth book *On the City [of God]*, chapter thirteen: « I dare, he says, to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, that thereby they may become displeasing to themselves, who already had fallen by pleasing themselves » — therefore that evil come about is good and useful for the doer toward salvation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, what is good for God and for the universe is good simply, since the common good is preferred to the private good; but that evil come about is good for the universe: therefore etc. Boethius in the book *On Consolation*[^2]: « Only the divine power is such that for it each [of the] evils is good ». And Augustine in the book of *Confessions*: « To you nothing at all is evil, and not even to your universal creation, because nothing is outside you that corrupts the order which you imposed ». Therefore if that evil come about is a good for the universe, it is plain, etc.

3. Likewise, « that whose use is good, [is] itself also good »[^3]; but the use of evil deeds is good: therefore etc. The minor is plain through Augustine, eleventh book *On the City*: « For neither would God have foreknown evils to be, unless by parallel reasoning he had foreknown for what uses of good things he was to fit them ».

4. Likewise, « everything which is just is good »[^4]; but evils to come about is just, because it is the punishment of a preceding sin, as Gregory holds: therefore evil to come about is good.

**On the contrary:**

1. Evil to come about is an evil in the being of [its] production: if therefore evil to come about is good, the production of evil is good. But the rule is in the art of the *Topics*[^5]: « That whose generation or production is good, is itself also good »: therefore if the production of evil is good, evil is good.

2. Likewise, evil to come about is the same as good being deprived [of] or corrupted: therefore if evil to come about is good, the corruption of good is good. But the rule is: « That whose corruption is good is itself also evil »: therefore if the corruption of good is good, the good is evil, which is absurd.

3. Likewise, of two convertibles, if the one is good, [so] also the other[^6]; but *evil-to-come-about* and *evil-to-be-done* are convertible: therefore if evil-to-come-about is good, evil-to-be-done also is good. But for a good no one is to be punished: therefore no one doing evils is to be punished.

4. Likewise, « if the opposite [holds] in the opposite, then the proposed [holds] in the proposed »[^7]: if therefore evil-to-come-about is good: therefore good-to-come-about is evil. But this is absurd, that it should be evil to do good: therefore also the first [is absurd].

5. Likewise, if evil-to-come-about is good: then either [it is good] in itself, or because from it good comes about or follows. Not in itself, that is established. If therefore [it is good] because thereby a good comes about, then the one who says: *Let us do evils, that goods may come about*[^8], speaks well: therefore the Apostle wrongly rebukes [him].

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### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** That evils come about is in no way a good, but it can be the occasion of good, insofar as it is ordered by God to a good.

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that in [human] works that is called *good* or *useful* or *conducive*, which leads to a good end or is the way to a good. But [the term] *to lead to a good* is said of something in three ways, namely by the mode of *cause*, or by the mode of *chance*, or by the mode of *occasion*. And these three differ. For a *cause* per se leads into that[^9] about which it is set, in such a way that it is producing and intending. But *chance* takes away the intention, but not the operation, as is plain in the digger who finds a treasure besides [his] intention. *Occasion*, however, takes away both. For it does not name a producing principle, but rather names something which affects the principle, that it may effect[^10] [something]: as someone, on hearing a word, strikes another; the heard word was an occasion, not effecting the striking nor cooperating with the effector, but in some way affecting [him].

And this *occasion* exists in two ways. There is one which in some way has the character of *active*, since in some way it stirs the effector — as a bad example [stirs] to sin. Or[^11] that which has the character of *passive*, as that from which someone takes a ground, just as one [takes] from another's evil [and] stirs himself to doing good.

According to this it must be understood that *evil* says two things, namely *privation* and *an orderable nature*; and by reason of [its] malice it is compared to the good which is elicited, as a *passive* occasion; by reason of the good which is laid beneath, as an occasion in some way *active*, on account of which evil is called the occasion of good.

Since then a thing leads to a good in these three modes, it has[^12] this difference in [its] leading. For one [thing] can lead another to something either from itself or through something of its own; and then it holds the character of *cause per se*. Or it can lead through another, to which however it is not ordered, but that [other] is ordered[^13] to a third, with an occasion taken from it; and so it holds the character of *occasion*. Or it leads with another, to which however it is not ordered, nor that [other] to a third, but both together; and so it holds the character of *chance*, which is from the concurrence of causes.

Hence then it is plain that that which leads by the mode of *cause* has in itself the character of an ordering toward the end; and therefore in itself there is goodness, and therefore it is rightly called good. But that which leads by the mode of *occasion* has no character of ordering toward the end within itself, and therefore no goodness either; and on account of this it cannot be called good per se except with the addition of that through which it is ordered, in which there consists the character of ordering and of goodness, and around which goodness is placed.

Since then evil does not lead to good from itself, but through that which is elicited from it by the wise God, speaking absolutely, that evil come about is not a good; rather, all similar [statements] are to be denied, since the goodness is noted to be put around the evil itself. — But if there be added the good which is elicited, or the elicitor himself, then *secondarily* such expressions are to be conceded: *that evil come about is a good for him who knows how to order [it] to a good*; likewise: *that evil come about is a good, that the elect may be proved*.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Hence then the first two reasons are plain; for they proceed with [a] qualification, as is plain in the authorities themselves.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected thirdly: *that whose use is good etc.*; it must be said that the use of a thing is twofold: one to which the thing of itself is ordered; and of such [a use] it is true, as is plain in [the case of] a horse which is for riding; another use, which is sometimes also after the fact; and this [use] can be good from the goodness of the user, [though] not [from any] usefulness [of the thing], since a good user uses evils well. And of such a use the rule is not true: but of such [a use] Augustine is speaking.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected: *what is just is good etc.*; it must be said that *just* is said in two ways: in one way [as] *justly ordered* through the justice[^14] which is in [the thing] itself, and everything which is so just is good, since it has justice within itself; or it is *declarative of justice*, and so evil can show [it]. For as evil can dispose toward the retribution of justice, so also [it can] show [it]. And in this way it expresses an ordering of justice *in another*; nor does it follow that it is good, because *just* implies more the character of an ordering. Yet nevertheless that saying is not properly spoken in which it is said: *He is just, [in such a way] that he who is in filth, let him be befouled*[^15]; rather it is understood very much per accidens, since it is just that he be left by God, and to this it follows that he be further befouled: hence it is understood per accidens.

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la: Vers. 28. — Glossam integram ex S. Augustino videsis in lit. Magistri, hic c. 6. in princip. Pro *etiam, ipse casus* non pauci codd. indebite *etiam ratione ipse casus*. Textus ex August. subinde cit. paulisper differt a textu in ed. Oper. S. August. exhibito. Etenim pro *incidere* ibi habetur *cadere*, pro *ut inde* sola particula *unde*, pro *corruerunt* verbum *ceciderant*.

en: Verse 28. — For the integral Gloss from St. Augustine see in the text of the Master, here c. 6 at the beginning. For *etiam, ipse casus* not a few codices [have] unduly *etiam ratione ipse casus*. The text from Augustine cited soon afterward differs a little from the text presented in the edition of Augustine's Works. For instead of *incidere* there is found *cadere*; for *ut inde* only the particle *unde*; for *corruerunt* the verb *ceciderant*.

la: Libr. IV. prosa 6, ubi in textu originali habetur *quoque* pro *quaeque*. — Textus ex August. libro *Confess.* cit. habetur ibi VII. c. 13. n. 19, et sic sonat integre: *Et tibi omnino non est malum, non solum tibi, sed nec universae creaturae tuae, quia extra [te] non est aliquid quod irrumpat et corrumpat ordinem, quem posuisti ei.* — Nomini *Boethius* Vat. praemittit *Quod sit bonum, dicit*. Similiter codd. P Q praemittunt *Quod sit bonum Deo*, et subinde nomini *Augustinus* praeligunt *quod sit bonum utrique*.

en: Book IV prose 6, where in the original text is found *quoque* for *quaeque*. — The text from Augustine's book of the *Confessions* cited [shortly] is found there at VII c. 13 n. 19, and sounds integrally thus: *And to you there is nothing at all evil, not only to you, but not even to your universal creation, since outside [you] there is not anything that should burst in and corrupt the order which you have set for it.* — Before the name *Boethius* the Vatican [edition] prefixes *That it is good, he says*. Similarly codices P and Q prefix *That it is good for God*, and soon afterward before the name *Augustinus* they prefix *that it is good for both*.

la: Boeth., II. *de Differentiis topicis*. Cfr. supra pag. 31, nota 1. — In textu Augustini (XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 18.), qui mox allegatur et iam supra pag. 786, nota 7. integre allatus est, Vat. post *Deus* intericit *illos crearet quos*.

en: Boethius, *On Topical Differences* II. Cf. above p. 31, note 1. — In the text of Augustine (*On the City of God* XI, c. 18), which is shortly alleged and was already adduced integrally above at p. 786 note 7, the Vatican edition after *Deus* inserts *illos crearet quos*.

la: August., *Enchirid.* c. 96. n. 24. Gregorius in libr. XXV. *Moral.* c. 9. n. 22. ait: *Omne quippe peccatum, quod tamen citius poenitendo non tergitur, aut peccatum est et causa peccati, aut peccatum et poena peccati.*

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 96 n. 24. Gregory in book XXV of the *Morals* c. 9 n. 22 says: *Every sin, indeed, which is not the more swiftly wiped away by repenting, is either sin and cause of sin, or sin and punishment of sin.*

la: Aristot., II. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 9.): *Quorum enim generationes bonae sunt, et ipsa bona sunt; et si ipsa bona sunt, et generationes bonae; si autem generationes malae, et ipsa mala. In corruptionibus autem e contrario: nam si corruptiones bonae, ipsa mala; si autem corruptiones malae, ipsa sunt bona. Eadem ratio et in effectivis et corruptivis: quorum enim effectiva bona, et ipsa bona; quorum vero corruptiva bona, ipsa mala.* Cfr. et III. *Topic.* c. 4. (c. 6.); Regula de corruptionibus recurrit in argumento seq.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II c. 3 (c. 9): *For those things whose generations are good, are themselves also good; and if they themselves are good, [so] also [are their] generations good; but if the generations are evil, they themselves [are] also evil. In corruptions, however, [it is] the contrary: for if the corruptions are good, they themselves [are] evil; but if the corruptions are evil, they themselves are good. The same reasoning [holds] also in [things relating to] effectives and corruptives: for those whose effectives are good, are themselves also good; but those whose corruptives are good, [are] themselves evil.* Cf. also *Topics* III c. 4 (c. 6); the rule about corruptions recurs in the following argument.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Topic.* c. 1. — In Vat. deest *duobus*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* II c. 1. — In the Vatican [edition] *duobus* is wanting.

la: Aristot., IV. *Topic.* c. 1, ubi ad confirmandum axioma propositum hoc affertur exemplum: « Ut si caecitas insensibilitas [privatio visus] quaedam, et visus [erit] sensus ». Axioma memoratum aliis verbis sic exprimi potest: si alicui subiecto convenit aliquod praedicatum, etiam termino, qui huic subiecto opponitur, conveniet praedicatum priori praedicato oppositum.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV c. 1, where for confirming the proposed axiom this example is adduced: « As if blindness is some insensibility [privation of sight], then sight [will be] a sense ». The axiom mentioned can be expressed in other words thus: if some predicate belongs to a certain subject, then to the term opposed to this subject there will belong a predicate opposed to the prior predicate.

en: Romans 3:8.

la: Pro *ita in illud* plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. *circa illud*; solus cod. T exhibet *ita illud*, quam lectionem ut saniorem et veriorem in textum recepimus, addita praepositione *in*, quam verbum *ducit* exigit. Subinde auctoritate codd. F P Q ee ff etc. nec non ed. 1 substituimus *quod sit* pro *quod est*, pro quo cod. X *quia est*.

en: For *ita in illud* very many codices with the first six editions [read] *circa illud*; only codex T exhibits *ita illud*, which reading we have received into the text as the sounder and truer one, with the preposition *in* added — which the verb *ducit* requires. Then on the authority of codices F P Q ee ff etc., and also edition 1, we have substituted *quod sit* for *quod est*, for which codex X [reads] *quia est*.

la: Pro *afficit, ut efficiat* non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *efficit vel efficiat*. Paulo inferius pro *efficienti* ed. 1 *percutienti*.

en: For *afficit, ut efficiat* not a few codices with ed. 1 [read] *efficit vel efficiat*. A little below, for *efficienti* ed. 1 [reads] *percutienti*.

la: Pro *Vel* cod. M (Q in marg.) *Quaedam*, cod. R *Quaedam etiam est*. Mox pro *sumit* cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. *assumit*.

en: For *Vel* codex M (Q in margin) [reads] *Quaedam*; codex R [reads] *Quaedam etiam est*. Shortly afterward, for *sumit* codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican [edition read] *assumit*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene habent, *intellige*: *hi tres modi*. Paulo inferius post *aut ex se*, ut evitetur confusio, pro altero *aut*, quod in Vat. nec non in multis codd. habetur, posuimus cum ed. 1 *vel*.

en: Very many codices with ed. 1 less well have, *understand*: *these three modes*. A little below, after *aut ex se*, in order to avoid confusion, for the other *aut* — which is found in the Vatican [edition] and in many codices — we have put with ed. 1 *vel*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *ordinat*, et aliquanto inferius *intra se* pro *in se*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *ordinat*, and somewhat below *intra se* for *in se*.

la: Supple cum cod. Y *iustitiam*.

en: Supply with codex Y *iustitiam* ("justice").

la: Apoc. 22, 11. In exponendo hoc textu Glossa interlin. et Beda recurrunt ad iustum Dei iudicium. — Post *sordescat* cod. Y cum Vulgata adiicit *adhuc*.

en: Apocalypse 22:11. In expounding this text the interlinear Gloss and Bede have recourse to the just judgment of God. — After *sordescat* codex Y with the Vulgate adds *adhuc* ("still").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Magni momenti est haec quaestio, ab antiquis magistris subtiliter discussa, tum ut honor divinae providentiae defendatur, tum ut inconcussum axioma ethicae christianae recte intelligatur, quod scil. numquam licet facere mala, ut eveniat bonum. Opinio a Magistro (hic c. 4.) relata, quae simpliciter concedit, malum fieri esse bonum, fuit Hugonis a S. Vict. (l. *de Sacram.* p. IV. c. 13.); sed refutatur a Magistro, approbantibus S. Bonaventura, S. Thoma aliisque communiter.

**II.** Pro intelligentia responsionis notandum est, quod in quaestione terminus *bonum* non intelligitur pro bono honesto nec pro bono delectabili, sed pro bono utili, quod ut medium ad finem sive ut via ad bonum ducit. Sed bonum utile triplici modo potest ducere in finem, vel *per se*, et tunc dicitur *causa*, vel *per accidens*, et tunc dupliciter: vel per modum *casus*, in quo finis non intenditur, attamen operatio pertingit usque ad ipsum effectum, licet non intentum (ut patet in fodiente, qui casu in lucem protrahit thesaurum), vel per modum *occasionis*, quo effectus nec intenditur nec producitur (ut tyrannus occidendo martyrem coronam eiusdem nec intendit nec producit). Haec aliis verbis in prima responsionis distinctione dicuntur. — In secunda autem distinctione occasio iterum distinguitur dupliciter secundum rationem *activi* et *passivi*: quod intelligendum est, non quasi malum habeat aliquam actionem circa ipsum bonum, sed circa efficientem bonum, quem mala actio vel aliqua proportionalitate et causalitate ad bonum faciendum excitat, vel sine aliqua causalitate ex parte sua potius ad contrarium excitat. In hac secunda distinctione proprie positum est fundamentum subtilis et praeclarae solutionis, quae in eo consistit, quod *formale* peccati (privatio) Deo est occasio *passiva* ad operandum bonum malo oppositum; *materiale* vero peccati, quia habet naturam ordinabilem ad bonum, licet « nullam habet intra se rationem ordinationis in finem » per alium, nempe Deum, potest duci ad bonum. Ita crucifixio Christi a Deo ordinata est ad ingentia bona producenda, et facta est occasio boni per modum aliquatenus *activum*. Hic est sensus verborum, quod malum « ratione malitiae comparatur ad bonum, quod elicitur, sicut occasio passiva; ratione boni, quod substernitur, sicut occasio aliquo modo activa », non autem in ratione *causae* (« ex se vel per aliquid sui »), sed *occasionis* (« per alterum »).

**III.** His suppositis, etiam facile intelligitur solutio ad 3, et quod numquam et nullatenus sit bonum, *malum facere*, licet *malum fieri* per ordinationem Dei possit esse bonum. Ad rem Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 40. m. 2. ad 4.): « Nullo modo est concedenda: *malum facere est bonum*; non enim similis est ratio in activa et passiva. Nam cum dicitur: *malum fieri est bonum*, notatur potentia passiva; cum dicitur: *malum facere est bonum*, notatur potentia activa. Potentia autem activa mali non est bona; sed potentia passiva est bona, quia in malo est potentia passiva ad hoc, ut ordinetur; est enim malum ordinabile ad bonum » (cfr. infra q. 5.).

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 40. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 19. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 80. m. 2. a. 3. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3, et q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is of great moment, subtly discussed by the ancient masters, both that the honor of divine providence may be defended, and that an unshaken axiom of Christian ethics may be rightly understood, namely that it is never permitted to do evils that good may come about. The opinion related by the Master (here c. 4) — which simply concedes that evil to come about is a good — was [the opinion] of Hugh of St. Victor (*On the Sacraments* bk. I, p. IV, c. 13); but it is refuted by the Master, with the approval of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and others commonly.

**II.** For the understanding of the response it should be noted that in the question the term *good* is not understood for the *honest* good nor for the *delectable* good, but for the *useful* good, which as a means to an end or as a way leads to a good. But useful good can lead to the end in a threefold mode: either *per se*, and then it is called a *cause*; or *per accidens*, and then in two ways — either by the mode of *chance*, in which the end is not intended, yet the operation reaches as far as the effect itself, although [the effect was] not intended (as is plain in the digger who by chance brings a treasure into the light), or by the mode of *occasion*, by which the effect is neither intended nor produced (as the tyrant in killing the martyr neither intends nor produces the crown of the same). These [things] are said in other words in the first division of the response. — But in the second division *occasion* is again distinguished in two ways according to the character of *active* and of *passive*: which must be understood not as if evil had any action upon the good itself, but [an action] upon the effector of good, whom an evil deed either rouses to doing good by some proportionality and causality, or, without any causality on its part, rather rouses to the contrary. In this second division is properly set the foundation of the subtle and excellent solution, which consists in this: that the *formal* [aspect] of sin (the privation) is for God a *passive* occasion for working a good opposed to the evil; whereas the *material* [aspect] of sin — since it has a nature orderable toward good, although « it has within itself no character of ordering toward the end » — can be led to a good through another, namely God. Thus the crucifixion of Christ was by God ordered toward the producing of immense goods, and was made an occasion of good by a mode in some way *active*. This is the sense of the words [of Bonaventure], that evil « is compared, by reason of [its] malice, to the good which is elicited, as a passive occasion; and by reason of the good which is laid beneath, as an occasion in some way active »: but not in the character of a *cause* (« from itself or through something of its own »), but of an *occasion* (« through another »).

**III.** These things being supposed, the reply to [objection] 3 is also easily understood — namely that it is never and in no way good *to do evil*, although *that evil come about* can by God's ordering be good. To the point Alexander of Hales (S. p. I q. 40 m. 2 ad 4): « In no way is it to be conceded that *to do evil is good*; for the case is not similar in the active and in the passive. For when it is said: *that evil come about is good*, a passive potency is denoted; when it is said: *to do evil is good*, an active potency is denoted. But the active potency for evil is not good; whereas the passive potency is good, since in evil there is a passive potency for this — that it may be ordered [to a good]; for evil is orderable to a good » (cf. below q. 5).

**IV.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I q. 40 m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 2; *Summa* I q. 19 a. 9. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; *Summa* p. I tr. 20 q. 80 m. 2 a. 3 partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 3, and q. 2 a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt:
Utrum mala fieri sit verum
Whether that evils come about is true

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum mala fieri sit verum.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum mala fieri sit verum. Et videtur, quod sic:

1. « Quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio vera »[^1]; sed haec est falsa, *nulla mala fiunt*: ergo oppositum est simpliciter verum, scilicet *mala fieri*.

2. Item, « veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus »[^2]: ergo quoties homo intelligit, sicut est in re, veritatem habet et intellectus et intellectum. Sed qui intelligit mala fieri, vere intelligit: ergo si vere intelligit, intellectum est verum: ergo *mala fieri* est verum.

3. Item, veritas propositionis asserit veritatem in dicto — unde si Socrates currit, *Socratem currere* est verum — ergo si malum fit, *malum fieri* est verum; sed malum fit, constat: ergo etc.

4. Item, veritas dicentis ponit veritatem in dicto; sed Deus, qui non est mendax, dicit mala fieri, *Matthaei* nono[^3]: *Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris*? ergo verum est, mala cogitari; pari ratione verum est fieri.

**Contra:**

1. Verum et bonum convertuntur; sed *mala fieri* non est bonum, ut supra[^4] probatum est: ergo *mala fieri* non est verum. Si forte dicas, quod verum est de veritate incomplexi; ostenditur

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de omni veritate, quia omnis veritas entitas quaedam est; et omne quod participat rationem entis, participat rationem boni: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis veritas est a veritate prima: ergo et omne verum a primo vero: si ergo *malum fieri* est verum, *malum fieri* est a Deo; sed hoc est supra[^5] improbatum: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod illud est verum de veritate rei, non signi; hoc nihil est, quia, sicut a Deo sunt res, ita et signa; et Ambrosius dicit, quod « omne verum est a Spiritu sancto, a quocumque dicatur »; loquitur ergo de veritate in sermone, et ita de veritate complexionis sive signi.

3. Item, omnis veritas signi sive complexionis causam et ortum habet a veritate incomplexionis[^6], ergo veritas huius: *istum furari*, ortum habet a veritate furti; sed furtum non dicit actionem veram, immo defectivam: ergo pari ratione, *istum furari* non est simpliciter verum. Si tu dicas, quod veritas complexionis triplex est, scilicet *positionis*, *privationis* et *negationis*[^7], et prima causatur a veritate rei, secunda vero et tertia non causatur; contra: Philosophus[^8] generaliter dicit, « quod ab eo, quod res est vel non est, oratio dicitur vera vel falsa »: ergo hoc ubique verum est.

4. Item, omne quod modo verum est de praesenti, ab aeterno verum fuit de futuro[^9]: ergo si malum hoc est modo verum, ab aeterno fuit verum. Sed nihil aeternaliter fuit verum, nisi esset Deus vel in Deo ut in causa: ergo si *malum fore* fuit verum et non fuit Deus, fuit in Deo tanquam in causa, ergo a Deo; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** *Mala fieri* est simpliciter verum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sine distinctione concedendum est, quod *mala fieri* est verum: vere enim enuntiatur et vere intelligitur. Verum enim dictum de complexo respicit compositionem, sicut dicit Philosophus[^10], quia veritas et falsitas circa compositionem consistit; et ideo dicit veritatem signi. *Signum* autem est verum, quando significat rem se habere sicut se habet; tunc enim dicitur adaequari. Et ideo, cum ita se habeat in re sicut signum exprimit, simpliciter loquendo verum est *mala fieri*.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verum et bonum convertuntur; dicendum, quod circa idem verum est. Unde si res est vera, est bona, et si signum est verum, est bonum; sed tamen non sequitur, quod si signum sit verum, quod signatum sive res sit bona. Et ideo hic est fallacia accidentis: *omne verum est bonum; sed istum furari est verum: ergo istum furari est bonum*, ex variatione minoris extremitatis. Verum enim praedicatur de illo dicto ratione compositionis, cum sit dictio modalis, bonum vero ratione attributionis; et hanc instantiam facit Magister in littera[^11]. Similis modus arguendi est hic: *Audio Angelos cantare*; sed *cantare Angelos* est verum: ergo *audio verum*. Consimilis modus arguendi est in illa ratione[^12]: *omne verum est a Deo*; *istum furari* est verum: ergo etc.; et ideo similiter solvendum.

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*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas signi est a veritate rei; dicendum, quod falsum est. Tunc enim signum verum est, quando significat rem non esse, quae non est; et non habere veritatem, cum illa non habet. Nam sicut aliquid imperfectum perfecte aequatur alii imperfecto, ita res defectiva plene potest significari. Unde Philosophus non dixit: « Ab eo, quod res est *tantum* », sed *est*, vel *non est*. Et est sensus: ab eo quod res est, est oratio vera, quae significat ipsam esse, et ab eo quod non est, est falsa, quae significat esse; e contrario intelligendum in re, quae non est[^13]. Unde quamvis furtum sit ens secundum quid, tamen oratio, quae significat aliquem furari, est vera simpliciter. Verum est tamen, quod omnis veritas complexa super aliquid fundatur; sed non oportet, quod super *rem intellectam*, sed super *intelligentem*[^14], in quo oratio habet esse. Et sic patet illud.

Posset tamen dici, quod fundatur super *ens secundum quid* ratione deformitatis; et tamen *verum*[^15] est simpliciter propter adaequationem, quae est simpliciter.

Nota tamen, quod de fundamento veritatis propositionis diversimode sentiunt diversi.

*Aliqui* enim distinguunt, sicut tactum est[^16], tripliciter veritatem orationis, scilicet *positionis*, ut cum dicitur: *Caesar est homo*; *privationis*, ut cum dicitur: *Caesar est homo mortuus*; *negationis*, ut cum dicitur: *Caesar non est*. Primam dicunt fundari supra *ens simpliciter*, secundam supra *ens secundum quid*, et tertiam non dicunt fundari super aliquid, quia talis oratio nihil ponit. — Sed tamen illud non videtur sufficere, quia, cum dicitur: *haec oratio est vera*, verum praedicat aliquam conditionem entis: ergo necesse est super aliquid fundari, quod sit.

Et ideo dicunt *alii*, quod fundatur super *principia Caesaris*. — Sed hoc non sufficit, quia, esto, quod Caesar omnino sit corruptus et secundum materiam et secundum formam, adhuc tamen vera est ista: *Caesar fuit* sive *Caesar non est*.

Et ideo dicunt *alii*, quod fundatur super *intelligentem*. — Sed adhuc illud non videtur sufficiens, quia, esto quod nullus intelligat actu, adhuc oratio ista est vera, scripta in pariete: *Caesar fuit*.

Ideo dicendum, quod cum veritas orationis sit veritas signi, et veritas signi non dicat qualitatem absolutam — sicut nec necessitas consequentiae — sed *respectivam*, sicut signum[^17]; cum omne quod contingit significare, contingat vere significare, et etiam falso; sicut ad rationem significandi non oportet rem esse entem, sed cognoscibilem, sic nec ad rationem verae significationis. Et quoniam omne quod intellectus capit, vel est ens, vel capit sive imaginatur per comparationem ad ens[^18]; ideo omnis significatio et veritas orationis significantis vel fundatur simpliciter super ens, ut si dicatur: *Petrus est*, vel in ordine ad ens. Unde propositio de praeterito fundatur super ordinem eius ad praesens; similiter propositio de futuro, sicut propositio negativa, ut si dicatur: *Caesar non est*; aliquod enim ens est, quod non est Caesar, et sic de aliis; similiter si dicatur: *chimaera non est hircocervus*.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod malitiam fore sit verum ab aeterno; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit verum, non oportet, quod sit in Deo tanquam in causa, sed sufficit, quod sit in Dei praescientia, quae non est nisi veri. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit in Dei praescientia sufficit, quod ipsum, vel eius causa, vel eius oppositum sit in Deo tanquam in causa, sicut supra dictum est de cognitione Dei.

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english:
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### Question IV. *Whether that evils come about is true.*

Fourthly it is asked whether *evils come about* is true. And that it is, is shown:

1. « Because of anything, affirmation or negation [is] true »[^1]; but this [proposition] is false, *no evils come about*: therefore the opposite is simply true, namely *evils come about*.

2. Likewise, « truth is the adequation of thing and intellect »[^2]: therefore whenever a man understands [the matter] as it is in the thing, both intellect and intellected have truth. But he who understands *evils come about* truly understands: therefore if he truly understands, the intellected [object] is true: therefore *evils come about* is true.

3. Likewise, the truth of a proposition asserts truth in what is said — whence if Socrates runs, *that Socrates is running* is true — therefore if evil comes about, *that evil comes about* is true; but it is established that evil does come about: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the truthfulness of the speaker posits truth in what is said; but God, who is not a liar, says that evils come about, *Matthew* 9[^3]: *Why do you think evils in your hearts?* — therefore it is true that evils are thought; by the same reasoning it is true that they come about.

**On the contrary:**

1. The true and the good are convertible; but *evils come about* is not a good, as has been proved above[^4]: therefore *evils come about* is not true. Should you perhaps say that *true* is [predicated] of the truth of the incomplex [object], it is shown

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[that this holds] of every truth, since every truth is a kind of entity; and everything that shares in the account of being, shares in the account of the good: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, every truth is from the first truth: therefore every true [thing] also is from the first true [being]; if therefore *evils come about* is true, *evils come about* is from God; but this has been refuted above[^5]: therefore, etc. Should you say that this is true of the truth *of the thing*, not of the sign, this is nothing, since just as things are from God, so also are signs; and Ambrose says that « every truth is from the Holy Spirit, by whomever it be spoken »; he therefore speaks of truth in discourse, and so of the truth of complexion or of the sign.

3. Likewise, every truth of sign or of complexion has its cause and origin from the truth of incomplexion[^6]; therefore the truth of this — *that this man steals* — has its origin from the truth of the theft; but theft does not name a true action, but rather a defective one: therefore by the same reasoning *that this man steals* is not simply true. Should you say that the truth of complexion is threefold, namely *of position*, *of privation*, and *of negation*[^7], and the first is caused by the truth of the thing, but the second and the third are not caused; on the contrary: the Philosopher[^8] says generally that « from the [fact] that the thing is or is not, speech is called true or false »: therefore this is true everywhere.

4. Likewise, everything which is now true in the present, was true from eternity in the future[^9]: therefore if this evil is now true, it was true from eternity. But nothing was eternally true unless [it] were God or [were] in God as in [its] cause: therefore if *that evil will be* was true and was not God, it was in God as in [its] cause, therefore from God; but this is false: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** *Evils come about* is simply true.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without distinction, it must be conceded that *evils come about* is true: for it is truly enunciated and is truly understood. For *true* said of the complex [object] regards composition, as the Philosopher says[^10], because truth and falsity consist in [a] composition; and so it speaks of the truth of the sign. The *sign* is true when it signifies the thing to be as it is; for then it is said to be adequated. And so, since the thing is in [reality] just as the sign expresses [it], simply speaking it is true that *evils come about*.

**Replies to the arguments on the contrary:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected — that true and good are convertible: it must be said that they are true [as said] *of the same [subject]*. Hence if a thing is true, it is good, and if a sign is true, it is good; but it does not follow that if a sign is true, the signified or the thing is good. And so there is here the fallacy of accident: *every true [thing] is good; but that this man steals is true: therefore that this man steals is good* — by [an illicit] variation of the minor extreme. For *true* is predicated of that said [object] by reason of composition, since it is a modal expression, but *good* by reason of attribution; and this objection the Master makes in his text[^11]. A similar mode of arguing is this: *I hear angels singing*; but *that angels sing* is true: therefore *I hear true*. The same mode of arguing is in this reasoning[^12]: *every true [thing] is from God*; *that this man steals* is true: therefore, etc.; and so it must be solved similarly.

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*Ad 3.* To that which is objected — that the truth of the sign is from the truth of the thing: it must be said that this is false. For then a sign is true when it signifies a thing not to be, which is not [the case]; and that it does not have truth, when that [thing] does not have [truth]. For just as something imperfect is perfectly equated to another imperfect [thing], so a defective thing can be fully signified. Whence the Philosopher did not say: « From the [fact] that the thing *only* is », but: *is* or *is not*. And the sense is: from the [fact] that the thing is, the discourse is true which signifies it to be, and from the [fact] that [the thing] is not, the [discourse] is false which signifies [it] to be; conversely it is to be understood in the thing which is not[^13]. Hence although theft is a being according-to-something, yet the discourse which signifies that someone steals is simply true. Yet it is true that every complex truth is founded on something; but it is not necessary [that it be founded] on the *thing understood*, but on the *one understanding*[^14], in whom the discourse has [its] being. And so that is plain.

It could however be said that [the complex truth] is founded on a *being according-to-something* by reason of its deformity; and yet *true*[^15] is simply [predicated] on account of an adequation which is simple.

Note however that concerning the foundation of the truth of a proposition diverse [authors] hold diverse views.

*Some*, then, distinguish — as has been touched on[^16] — three kinds of truth of speech, namely *of position*, as when it is said: *Caesar is a man*; *of privation*, as when it is said: *Caesar is a dead man*; *of negation*, as when it is said: *Caesar is not*. The first they say is founded on *being simply*, the second on *being according-to-something*, and the third they say is not founded on anything, because such a discourse posits nothing. — But this does not seem to suffice, because, when it is said: *this discourse is true*, *true* predicates some condition of being: therefore [the discourse] must necessarily be founded on something which is.

And so *others* say that [the discourse] is founded on the *principles of Caesar*. — But this does not suffice, because, granted that Caesar is altogether corrupted both as to matter and as to form, yet that [discourse] is still true: *Caesar was* or *Caesar is not*.

And so *others* say that [the discourse] is founded on the *one understanding*. — But this still does not seem sufficient, because, granted that no one is understanding [it] in act, still that discourse is true, [if] written on a wall: *Caesar was*.

Therefore it must be said that, since the truth of speech is the truth of a *sign*, and the truth of a sign does not say an absolute quality — just as neither does the necessity of consequence — but a *relative* [quality], as does *sign*[^17]; since everything which it happens [we] signify, it can happen [we] signify truly, and also falsely; just as for the account of signifying it is not necessary that the thing be in being [*entem*], but [only] knowable, so neither [is it necessary] for the account of true signification. And since everything which the intellect grasps is either a being, or [it] grasps or imagines [it] by comparison to a being[^18]; therefore every signification and truth of significative speech either is founded simply on being, as if one says: *Peter is*, or in [an] ordering to being. Whence a proposition concerning the past is founded on its ordering to the present; likewise a proposition concerning the future, as a negative proposition, e.g. if one says: *Caesar is not*; for there is some being which is not Caesar, and so of the others; likewise if one says: *the chimera is not a goat-stag*.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected last — that *malice will be* was true from eternity: it must be said that, for something to be true, it is not necessary that it be in God as in [its] cause, but it suffices that it be in God's foreknowledge, which is only of the true. But for something to be in God's foreknowledge, it suffices that itself, or its cause, or its opposite, be in God as in [its] cause, as has been said above concerning God's cognition.

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la: De hac propositione, quae est Aristotelis, cfr. supra pag. 97, nota 7. — Post *vera* Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit *de nullo ambo simul*.

en: On this proposition, which is Aristotle's, cf. above p. 97, note 7. — After *vera* the Vatican edition with codex cc adds *de nullo ambo simul* ("of nothing [are] both [true] at once").

la: Vide supra pag. 707, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro *intellectus et intellectum* ed. 1 et cod. T a secunda manu *intelligens et intellectum*, Vat. *intellectus intellectum*.

en: See above p. 707, note 5. — A little below, for *intellectus et intellectum* edition 1 and codex T (in a second hand) read *intelligens et intellectum*, and the Vatican edition reads *intellectus intellectum*.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Hic q. 3. — Propositio maior fundatur in eo, quod *verum* et *bonum* realiter idem sint cum *ente*; de quo cfr. supra pag. 32, nota 2, et pag. 150, nota 13. Mox post *Si forte dicas quod* simul audi illud dictum, scilicet *verum et bonum convertuntur*. — Dein pro *incomplexi* plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. *complexi*, aliis codd. ut S T ac mente argumenti repugnantibus. Cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I. arg. 1. ad opposit., ubi similis obiectio infertur, nec non ibid. Scholion, in quo exponitur, quid sit veritas complexa, quid incomplexa.

en: Here q. 3. — The major premise is founded on this: that *true* and *good* are really the same as *being*; on which cf. above p. 32 note 2, and p. 150 note 13. Shortly after *Si forte dicas quod* understand [in apposition] that saying — namely, *the true and the good are convertible*. — Then for *incomplexi* very many codices with the first six editions [read] *complexi*; other codices, such as S T, and the sense of the argument oppose [this]. Cf. also above d. 8 p. I a. I q. I arg. 1 *ad opposit.*, where a similar objection is brought, and likewise *ibid.* the Scholion, in which it is set out what is the truth of the complex and what of the incomplex.

la: Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2: *Veri veritas in ipso vero est; res vero enuntiata non est in enuntiatione vera, unde non eius veritas, sed causa veritatis eius dicenda est.* — Pro *a veritate incomplexionis* Vat. *a veritate rei*, et proxime post eadem Vat. omittit *huius*, quod ex codd. F K M V Z ee ff et ed. 1 restauravimus.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth* c. 2: « The truth of the true is in the true [thing] itself; but the thing enunciated is not in the true enunciation, whence not its truth, but [its being] the cause of its truth is to be said. » — For *a veritate incomplexionis* the Vatican edition [reads] *a veritate rei*, and immediately afterwards the same Vatican edition omits *huius*, which we have restored from codices F K M V Z ee ff and edition 1.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 1, et I. Prior. c. ult. quatuor species propositionum distinguuntur: affirmativa, negativa, privativa et infinita, quarum duae ultimae similiter se habent, v. g. *est iniustus homo*, et *est non iustus homo*, ut ait Boeth. in hunc loc. (ed. prima).

en: According to Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II c. 1, and *Prior Analytics* I last chapter, four species of proposition are distinguished: affirmative, negative, privative, and infinite, of which the last two behave alike, e.g. *is an unjust man* and *is a not-just man*, as Boethius says on this passage (first edition).

la: Libr. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia; cfr. supra pag. 707, nota 5.

en: Book *On the Categories*, the chapter on Substance; cf. above p. 707 note 5.

la: Vat., omissis verbis *de futuro*, sic prosequitur: *ergo si malum esse modo est, est verum*, contradicentibus codd., quorum alii minus clare sic: *ergo si malum est hoc modo verum*.

en: The Vatican edition, having omitted the words *de futuro*, continues thus: *ergo si malum esse modo est, est verum* ("therefore if [for] evil to be now is, it is true"), against the codices, some of which less clearly [read] thus: *ergo si malum est hoc modo verum* ("therefore if evil is in this way true").

la: Libr. I. Periherm. c. 1: *Circa compositionem enim et divisionem est verum et falsum*. Cfr. etiam III. de Anima, text. 21. seqq. (c. 6.).

en: Book I *On Interpretation* c. 1: « For about composition and division is the true and the false. » Cf. also *De Anima* III, text 21 ff. (c. 6).

la: Cap. 7. — Quid sit dictio sive propositio modalis, iam supra pag. 674, nota 2 exposuimus, et pag. 678, nota 1, etiam quatuor species propositionum modalium allegavimus. Ad has quatuor Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 3. (c. 12.) hanc quintam addit, scil. *verum* et *non verum*, qui modus, ut Boeth. ait in hunc loc. (ed. prima), « ad demonstrationem omnium modorum valet »; sed, ut S. Thomas dicit, Aristoteles hanc quintam speciem sive hunc quintum modum non in prima modorum enumeratione, sed hic affert ea ratione, ut modus iste intelligatur copulam propositionis non modificare. Sensus solutionis est: cum dicitur; *malum fieri est verum*, hoc intelligitur de veritate propositionis sive dicti, non de veritate attributionis sive rei; non enim malo, in quantum malum est, inest veritas sive entitas, sed huic dictioni: *malum fieri*; ideoque, cum infertur: *ergo malum fieri est bonum*, peccatur procedendo a veritate dicti ad veritatem rei.

en: Chapter 7. — What a *modal* expression or proposition is, we have already explained above at p. 674 note 2, and at p. 678 note 1 we also adduced the four species of modal proposition. To these four Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II c. 3 (c. 12) adds this fifth, namely *true* and *not-true*, which mode, as Boethius says on this passage (first edition), « avails for the demonstration of all modes »; but, as St. Thomas says, Aristotle adduces this fifth species or this fifth mode not in his first enumeration of the modes, but here for this reason: that this mode should be understood not to modify the copula of the proposition. The sense of the solution is: when it is said *that evils come about is true*, this is understood of the truth of the proposition or of what-is-said, not of the truth of attribution or of the thing; for in evil, insofar as it is evil, there is no truth or entity, but [it is] in this expression: *evils come about*; and so when it is inferred *therefore that evils come about is good*, one sins by proceeding from the truth of the said [object] to the truth of the thing.

la: Sive argumentatione. — Pro *ratione* Vat. cum cod. cc *oratione*.

en: Or [we may say] *argumentation*. — For *ratione* the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *oratione*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2. — Vat. pro *e contrario intelligendum in re, quae non est* sic: *ipsam*: et ab eo quod non est, est vera, quae significat non esse: et ab eo quod est, est falsa, quae significat eam non esse. Pro verbis *quae significat esse*, quae verba immediate praecedunt illis verbis *e contrario etc.*, fere omnes codd. (excepto T) cum ed. 1 perperam *quae significat non esse*. Mox pro *furtum sit ens* cod. V *furtum sit non-ens*.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth* c. 2. — The Vatican edition, for *e contrario intelligendum in re, quae non est*, [reads] thus: *ipsam: et ab eo quod non est, est vera, quae significat non esse: et ab eo quod est, est falsa, quae significat eam non esse*. For the words *quae significat esse*, which immediately precede the words *e contrario etc.*, almost all the codices (except T) with edition 1 wrongly [read] *quae significat non esse*. Shortly afterwards for *furtum sit ens* codex V [reads] *furtum sit non-ens*.

la: Ed. 1 *vera*, scil. *oratio*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *vera*, namely [as referring to] *oratio* ("the discourse").

la: Hic in arg. 3. ad opposit.

en: Here in argument 3 *on the contrary*.

la: Sensus est: si nemo intelligeret hanc propositionem, tunc certe quoad hanc propositionem nulla formalis veritas foret, cum veritas formalis consistat in intellectu cognoscente; attamen, si haec propositio scriberetur, tunc in ipsa foret veritas signi, scil. rectitudo significationis, non quidem in actu, sed tantum in potentia.

en: The sense is: if no one were to understand this proposition, then certainly as to this proposition there would be no formal truth, since formal truth consists in the cognizing intellect; yet, if this proposition were written, then in it there would be the truth of the sign, namely the rightness of signification — not indeed in act, but only in potency.

la: Hoc sibi vult: Sicut necessitas consequentiae non dicit aliquid ipsi rei absolute, sed ex suppositione (respective) conveniens (cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.), sic *veritas signi* non dicit aliquam proprietatem, quae signo absolute et semper conveniat, sed quae ita ei convenit, ut possit etiam ei non convenire. Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2, ubi S. Doctor veritatem *enuntiationis* non ipsam orationem esse ostendit, aut eius significationem, aut aliquid eorum quae sunt in definitione enuntiationis (quia si hoc esset, semper esset vera), sed aliquid ei (enuntiationi) conveniens relate ad rem, quam significat; quod tunc habetur, cum propositio rem significat recte, sive ut debet. — In principio huius propos. post *dicendum quod* Vat. omittit *cum*, et paulo inferius post *significare* cum cod. cc adiicit *quid*; deinde eadem Vat., post *falso* posito puncto, voculae *sicut* praefigit *Et*, ac post pauca pro *entem*, substituit *exsistentem*.

en: This is its sense: as the necessity of consequence does not say something of the thing itself absolutely, but [something] suiting [it] by supposition (relatively) — cf. above d. 38 a. 2 q. 1 — so the *truth of a sign* does not say any property which befits the sign absolutely and always, but which befits it in such a way that it can also not befit it. Cf. Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth* c. 2, where the Holy Doctor shows that the truth of an *enunciation* is not the discourse itself, nor its signification, nor any of those things which are in the definition of an enunciation (since, if it were [any of these], it would always be true), but something befitting it (the enunciation) in relation to the thing which it signifies; which is had then, when the proposition signifies the thing rightly, or as it ought. — At the beginning of this proposition, after *dicendum quod*, the Vatican edition omits *cum*, and a little below after *significare* together with codex cc adds *quid*; then the same Vatican edition, having placed a full stop after *falso*, prefixes *Et* to the particle *sicut*, and after a few [words], for *entem* substitutes *exsistentem*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 25. dub. 3. — Mox pro *significatio et veritas* cod. T *significatio, quae est veritas*.

en: Cf. above d. 25 dubium 3. — Shortly afterwards for *significatio et veritas* codex T [reads] *significatio, quae est veritas*.

en: Distinction 36 a. 3 q. 1, and d. 38 a. 1 q. 1. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio iam a Magistro (hic c. 7. circa finem) tacta est ad eludendum quoddam sophisticum argumentum. In responsione supponuntur plura circa definitionem et distinctionem veritatis, de quibus vide supra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et Scholion. S. Bonav. ad quaestionem respondet affirmative et sine distinctione, dum Richard. a Med. (hic q. 5.) *malum* distinguit secundum *formale* et *materiale*, et tantum quoad materiale responsionem affirmativam concedit; quae distinctio hic parum ad propositum esse videtur, ut ex solutione ad 3. apparet. — In solutione ad 3. resolvitur etiam quaestio de fundamento veritatis. Recensitis quatuor opinionibus, S. Doctor adhaeret ultimae. — In solutione ad 4. agitur de quaestione, aetate illa valde agitata, quomodo aliqua veritas, praesertim respectu mali, possit esse ab aeterno. Omnes probati doctores docent, quod nulla veritas sit aeterna, nisi quatenus est in Deo. Contraria sententia est articulus septimus condemnatus ab « Universitate magistrorum Parisiensium tempore Episcopi Gulielmi et Odonis Cancellarii » (vide II. *Sent.* d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in fine). Diffuse illud probat Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 6. 7. (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 16. a. 7; B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 25. m. 2. a. 3.)

**II.** De quaestione principali tractant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question was already touched on by the Master (here c. 7, near the end) for the dispelling of a certain sophistical argument. In the reply, several points are presupposed concerning the definition and distinction of truth, on which see above d. 8 p. I a. 1 q. 1 and the Scholion. St. Bonaventure replies to the question affirmatively and without distinction, while Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 5) distinguishes *evil* according to *formal* and *material* [aspects], and concedes the affirmative reply only as to the material; which distinction seems here little to the purpose, as appears from the solution to objection 3. — In the solution to objection 3 is also resolved the question of the foundation of truth. Having reviewed four opinions, the Holy Doctor adheres to the last. — In the solution to objection 4 is treated the question, then much agitated, how any truth, especially with respect to evil, could be from eternity. All approved doctors teach that no truth is eternal except insofar as [it is] in God. The contrary view is the seventh article condemned by « the University of the Masters of Paris in the time of Bishop William and Chancellor Odo » (see II *Sent.* d. 23 a. 2 q. 3 at the end). Alexander of Hales proves this at length, *Summa* p. I q. 15 m. 6, 7 (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* I q. 16 a. 7; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I tr. 6 q. 25 m. 2 a. 3).

**II.** On the principal question treat: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Scope finding.** Raw OCR line range 40530–40841 covers QUAESTIO IV body + Scholion I–II in full. QUAESTIO V header at line 40842 (`Utrum malum sit ordinabile a voluntate Dei`) begins the next chunk; QUAESTIO III ends at line 40529 (closing Scholion II citation `— Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.`). The prior version of this file had `word_count_latin: 4222` but actually contained a large body-leak from Q.V (~half of Q.V was incorrectly attached); the genuine Q.IV body is ~1340 words.

**Page boundaries (PDF eyes-on at 400dpi).** Printed pp. 827–830 = pt2 PDF pp. 417–420 (offset = printed − 410). Page 827 (PDF 417) begins Q.IV at the bottom of the right column ("Quarto quaeritur..." through "asserit veritatem"). Page 828 (PDF 418) carries the rest of the arguments, the Contra series, Conclusio, Respondeo, and *Ad 1*. Page 829 (PDF 419) carries *Ad 3* (which absorbs the long four-opinions excursus on the foundation of complex truth) and *Ad 4*. Page 830 (PDF 420) carries SCHOLION I and SCHOLION II at the top, then QUAESTIO V begins lower down (Q.V's body and its own apparatus footers are not part of this chunk).

**Apparatus structure.** 18 numbered apparatus entries: page 827 carries 4, page 828 carries 7, page 829 carries 7, page 830 carries 0 (the Q.IV scholion has no inline `[^N]` anchors of its own — its bibliographical references are inline parenthetical citations). Apparatus 6 ([^6], Periherm. four-species note) and apparatus 7 ([^7], de Praedicam.) are on p.828 footer; the long Aristotelian-modal-proposition note (here as [^10]) anchors at *sicut dicit Philosophus* in the Respondeo, expanding the Quaracchi editors' five-modal-species excursus inherited from Boethius and Thomas. The numbering sequence (1→18) here re-orders the per-page restarts of Quaracchi's printed footers into a single sequential chunk-wide count, as is standard for this corpus.

**[?] flags placed.** One: in scholion I, the bracketed `q. 25 [?]` reflects an OCR-ambiguous tractate reference for Bl. Albert (PDF print is between `25` and `23` and partially obscured at the run-over; the printed reading is plausibly `q. 25` but the second numeral is partly worn; flagged for PDF eyes-on at 600dpi in the next polish pass). No other ambiguities required flags after PDF cross-check at 400dpi resolved the OCR garbles (the canonical reads are: `QUAESTIO iV.` → `QUAESTIO IV.`; `mala fleri sil veruin` → `mala fieri sit verum`; `nmi` → `verum`; `cciuctuiu` → `conclusio`; the Q.V leak in the auto-chunked legacy file ends at the printed-page break following Q.IV scholion II.).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum malum sit ordinabile a voluntate Dei.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum malum sit ordinabile a Dei voluntate. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Domine Deus meus, in te speravi*, Glossa: « Qui videt, merita animarum sic ordinari a Deo, ut pulcritudo universitatis ex nulla parte violetur, in omnibus laudat Deum », distinguens, Deum aliud fecisse et ordinasse, ut universum bonum, aliud non fecisse, sed ordinasse, ut malum.

2. Item, Augustinus in *Enchiridio*[^2]: « Malum, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bonum ».

3. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia omne meritum[^3] ordinatur ad praemium sive retributionem; sed malum meretur poenam, sicut bonum gloriam: ergo, cum bonum gratiae sit ordinabile, pari ratione malum culpae.

4. Item, peccantes in suppliciis ordinantur; sed « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis »[^4]; sed mali non ordinantur in poenis nisi propter mala: ergo malum multo magis est ordinabile.

5. Item, omne quod auget decorem in re ordinata, est ordinatum; sed malum auget decorem in universo, quod est ordinatum: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Augustinus in undecimo *de Civitate Dei*[^5]: « Sicut pictura cum colore nigro suo loco posito pulcrior est, ita universitas rerum ex peccatoribus est pulcra ».

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus: « Malum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis »[^6]; sed nulla privatio participat id cuius est privatio: ergo si malum, eo quod malum, privat ordinem, malum non contingit ordinari.

2. Item, quod non est non est ordinabile, nam ordo praesupponit esse; sed « malum, in eo quod malum, nihil est »[^7]: ergo non est ordinabile.

3. Item, omne ordinabile est ordinanti possibile; sed malum non est possibile Deo, quia Deus non potest facere malum: ergo non est a Deo ordinabile.

4. Item, si malum est ordinabile, aut ordine partium in totum, aut *in finem*. Non primo modo,

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quia malum nullius est pars; si secundo modo: ergo cum bonum sit aliquid ex ordine *in finem*, tunc malum fieret bonum[^8].

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Malum est ordinabile a Deo secundum ordinem iustitiae, non sicut ordinis susceptivum in se, sed sicut huius ordinis dispositivum et ostensivum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod[^9] quemadmodum aliquid dicitur esse sanum tripliciter: aut subiective, ut animal dicitur sanum; aut dispositive, ut potio dicitur sana; aut ostensive, ut urina sana — sic aliquid ordinatum[^10] dicitur tripliciter: aut sicut ordinis susceptivum, aut sicut dispositivum, aut sicut ostensivum.

Sicut susceptivum, non est aliquid ordinabile, nisi quod est ens et natura aliqua; et ita malum non est ordinabile nisi per accidens, scilicet per bonum substratum.

Sicut dispositivum, malum est ordinabile, sed non sicut dispositio *ponens*, sed *privans*. Duplex enim est ordo, scilicet *naturae* et *iustitiae*. Ordo naturae est institutus, ordo iustitiae est acquisitus[^11]. Malum autem privat ordinem specialis naturae et illum privando incurrit in ordinem iustitiae, quia offendit; unde ratio ordinandi sicut dispositio in ordine iustitiae est meritum, vel demeritum.

Sicut ostensivum, malum est ordinabile et ordinatum, quia manifestat ordinem bonorum per oppositum; « opposita enim iuxta se posita magis elucescunt ».

Rationes igitur probantes, quod malum sit ordinatum, procedunt secundum ordinem *iustitiae* et secundum *dispositionem* et *ostensionem*.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod malum est privatio ordinis; dicendum, quod verum est[^12] *particularis naturae*, sed non est verum, prout ordo dicit dispositionem *universalis providentiae*, de quo dicit Boethius[^13]: « Ordo cuncta complectitur, quo fit, ut si quis ab assignata sibi ordinis ratione discesserit, necesse sit, ut in alteram differentiam relabatur ». Exemplum ponitur in circumferentia circumplectente centrum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: esse ordinatum praesupponit esse; dicendum, quod verum est in eo quod *per se* et *in se* ordinatur; malum autem non ordinatur per se nec in se, et ideo non oportet, quod ipsum sit, sed sufficit, quod aliud sit, in quo substantificatur malum: et hoc est bonum, ut dicit Dionysius[^14].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordinabile est possibile ordinanti; dicendum, quod esse possibile sive subesse potentiae divinae est dupliciter: aut potentiae *producenti*, aut *providenti*; et quamvis malum non subsit divinae *productioni*, subest tamen *provisioni*.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, qua ordinatione sit ordinabile; dicendum, quod ordinatione ad finem; sed hoc solum est ex post facto[^15]. Et ideo non sequitur, quod malum sit bonum, sed quod ex ipso sequitur bonum. — Posset tamen dici, quod, quamvis malum non sit pars, tamen illud in quo est, pars est et locum et ordinem partis tenet.

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english:
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### Question V. *Whether evil is orderable by the will of God.*

Fifthly it is asked whether evil is orderable by the will of God. And that it is, appears thus:

1. Because on that [verse] of the Psalm[^1]: *Lord my God, in thee have I hoped*, the Gloss [says]: « He who sees the merits of souls so ordered by God, that the beauty of the universe is in no part violated, praises God in all things » — distinguishing that God made one thing and ordered [it], namely the universe-good, and another he did not make but ordered, namely evil.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^2]: « Evil, well ordered and placed in its own location, more eminently commends the good ».

3. Likewise, by *reason* it appears [so], because every merit[^3] is ordered to a reward or recompense; but evil deserves punishment, just as good [deserves] glory: therefore, since the good of grace is orderable, by parallel reasoning [so is] the evil of fault.

4. Likewise, sinners are ordered in [their] punishments; but « on account of which each thing [is such], that [is so] more so »[^4]; but the evil are not ordered to punishments except on account of evils: therefore evil all the more is orderable.

5. Likewise, everything which augments the beauty in an ordered thing is itself ordered; but evil augments the beauty in the universe, which is ordered: therefore etc. Proof of the minor: Augustine in the eleventh [book] *On the City of God*[^5]: « Just as a picture is more beautiful with a black color placed in its own location, so the universe of things is beautiful [together] with sinners ».

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine: « Evil is the privation of mode, species, and order »[^6]; but no privation participates [in] that of which it is the privation: therefore if evil, by the very fact that it is evil, deprives [of] order, evil cannot happen to be ordered.

2. Likewise, what is not, is not orderable, for order presupposes being; but « evil, by the fact that it is evil, is nothing »[^7]: therefore [it] is not orderable.

3. Likewise, everything orderable is possible to the one ordering; but evil is not possible to God, since God cannot do evil: therefore [it] is not orderable by God.

4. Likewise, if evil is orderable, [it is so] either by an order of parts toward a whole, or *toward an end*. Not in the first way,

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since evil is the part of nothing; if in the second way: then since the good is something from an order *toward an end*, then evil would become good[^8].

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Evil is orderable by God according to the order of justice, not as something receptive of order in itself, but as dispositive and ostensive of this order.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that[^9] just as something is said to be *healthy* in three ways: either subjectively, as an animal is called healthy; or dispositively, as a draught is called healthy; or ostensively, as urine [is called] healthy — so something [is called] *ordered*[^10] in three ways: either as receptive of order, or as dispositive [of order], or as ostensive [of order].

As *receptive*, nothing is orderable except what is a being and some [kind of] nature; and so evil is not orderable except per accidens, namely through the underlying good.

As *dispositive*, evil is orderable, but not as a disposition *positing* [something], but [as one] *privating*. For order is twofold, namely of *nature* and of *justice*. The order of nature is instituted, the order of justice is acquired[^11]. But evil deprives [of] the order of a particular nature, and by depriving [of] it falls into the order of justice, because it offends; whence the ground of ordering as a disposition in the order of justice is merit or demerit.

As *ostensive*, evil is orderable and ordered, because it manifests the order of goods through [its] opposite; « for opposites placed next to each other shine forth the more ».

The reasonings, therefore, which prove that evil is ordered proceed according to the order of *justice* and according to *disposition* and *ostension*.

*Ad 1.* To that, however, which is objected — that evil is the privation of order: it must be said that [this] is true[^12] of *particular nature*, but is not true insofar as order names the disposition of *universal providence*, of which Boethius[^13] says: « Order encompasses all things, by which it comes about that if anyone departs from the ordering-ground assigned to him, it is necessary that he fall back into another difference ». An example is given in [the case of] a circumference encompassing a center.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected — being ordered presupposes being: it must be said that [this] is true of that which is ordered *per se* and *in se*; but evil is not ordered per se nor in itself, and therefore it is not necessary that it itself be, but it suffices that another be, in which evil is substantified: and this is the good, as Dionysius says[^14].

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected — that the orderable is possible to the one ordering: it must be said that to be possible or to lie under the divine power is twofold: either [under] the power *producing*, or [the power] *providing*; and although evil does not lie under the divine *production*, yet it does lie under [divine] *provision*.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, by what kind of ordering [evil] is orderable: it must be said, by an ordering toward an end; but this only after the fact[^15]. And therefore it does not follow that evil is good, but that good follows from it. — Yet it can also be said that, although evil is not a part, nevertheless that in which it [exists] is a part and holds the place and order of a part.

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la: Psalm. 7, 2. — In Glossa, quae sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. v. 18, n. 19, post *a Deo*, ut desunt haec verba, quae in textu originali habentur: *dum sua cuique tribuuntur*. Verba, quae dein sequuntur, *distinguens, Deum* etc. summam exhibent eorum quae August. loc. cit. fusius docet, ubi inter alia haec dicit: *Deus enim dixit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Non dixit: Fiant tenebrae, et factae sunt tenebrae*; et tamen ipsas ordinavit. Et ideo dicitur: *Divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras, et vocavit Deus lucem diem et tenebras vocavit noctem*. Ista distinctio: aliud fecit et ordinavit, aliud autem non fecit, sed tamen etiam hoc ordinavit. Iam vero tenebris significari peccata, et in Propheta invenitur etc.

en: Psalm 7:2. — In the Gloss, which is taken from Augustine, *Enarratio* on this Psalm v. 18, n. 19, after *a Deo* ("by God") these words — which appear in the original text — are missing: *dum sua cuique tribuuntur* ("while to each their own things are assigned"). The words which follow, *distinguens, Deum* etc., give a summary of what Augustine in the cited place teaches more fully, where among other things he says: *For God said: Let there be light, and light was made. He did not say: Let there be darkness, and darkness was made*; and yet he ordered them. And therefore it is said: *God divided between light and darkness, and God called the light day and the darkness he called night*. This distinction: he made and ordered one thing, but the other he did not make, yet even this he ordered. That darkness signifies sins, is also found in the Prophet, etc.

la: Cap. 11. n. 3. — In textu cit. Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *evidentius* pro *eminentius*.

en: Chapter 11 n. 3. — In the cited text, the Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] *evidentius* ("more evidently") for *eminentius* ("more eminently").

la: Meritum hic in sensu largiore sumitur, ita ut includat etiam demeritum. — Paulo inferius post *ergo* Vat. cum aliis edd. nec non pluribus codd. subiicit *et*.

en: *Meritum* ("merit") is here taken in a wider sense, so as to include also *demeritum* ("demerit"). — A little below, after *ergo* the Vatican [edition] with other editions and many codices inserts *et*.

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I c. 2.

la: Cap. 23. n. 1. Textus hic exhibitus non plane convenit cum textu ed. Oper. S. August., qui talis est: « Sicut pictura cum colore nigro, suo loco posita: ita universitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulcra est ». Sicut ed. Oper. S. August., ita etiam maior pars codd. et edd. *posita* pro *posito*.

en: Chapter 23 n. 1. The text exhibited here does not exactly agree with the text of the edition of Augustine's works, which is as follows: « Just as a picture with a black color placed in its own location: so the universe of things, if one could behold it, is beautiful even with sinners ». As [reads] the edition of Augustine's works, so likewise the greater part of the codices and editions [read] *posita* for *posito*.

la: Libr. *de Natura boni*, c. 4: *Nihil aliud est [malum], quam corruptio vel modi vel speciei vel ordinis naturalis*.

en: Book *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4: *Evil is nothing other than a corruption either of mode, or of species, or of natural order*.

la: Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 20. August., *Tract.* 1. in *Evang. Ioan.* 1, 3. sub n. 13. ait: *Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est, et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant*. Cfr. Anselm., *de Casu diaboli*, c. 10. seq.

en: Pseudo-Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 20. Augustine, *Tractate* 1 on the *Gospel of John* 1:3 under n. 13 says: *Sin indeed was not made through him, and it is manifest, because sin is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin*. Cf. Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* c. 10ff.

la: Cfr. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 20. seqq., ubi probatur, malum, in quantum malum, ad nihilum utile esse neque in rebus existere neque ordinatum esse.

en: Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 20ff., where it is proved that evil, insofar as evil, is useful for nothing, neither exists in things, nor is ordered.

la: Ex codd. V Z ff et ed. 1 adiecimus *quod*, pro quo alii codd. minus congrue *quoniam*.

en: From codices V Z ff and ed. 1 we have added *quod*, for which other codices less congruously [read] *quoniam*.

la: Vat. *ordinabile*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *ordinabile* ("orderable").

la: Cfr. August., I. *de Ordine*, c. 7. n. 17. seqq., et *de Natura boni*, c. 37. In libro VI. *de Musica*, c. 11. n. 30. August. hanc duplicem ordinis divisionem insinuat locutionibus *legem agere* et *lege agi*, atque in eod. libro, c. 14. n. 46. his verbis: *Aliud enim est tenere ordinem, aliud ordine teneri*. — Post pauca pro *quia offendit* plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *quia ostendit*, et dein pro *in ordine iustitiae* plures codd. *in ordine tantum*, omissa voce *iustitiae*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Order* I c. 7 n. 17ff., and *On the Nature of the Good* c. 37. In book VI *On Music* c. 11 n. 30, Augustine hints at this twofold division of order in the expressions *legem agere* ("to enact a law") and *lege agi* ("to be acted on by law"), and in the same book c. 14 n. 46 in these words: *For it is one thing to hold an order, another to be held by order*. — A little after, for *quia offendit* ("because it offends") very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *quia ostendit* ("because it shows"), and then for *in ordine iustitiae* ("in the order of justice") several codices [read] *in ordine* only, the word *iustitiae* being omitted.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 495, nota 1. — Paulo ante pro *enim* Vat. cum cod. cc *autem*.

en: Cf. above p. 495, note 1. — A little before, for *enim* ("for") the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *autem* ("but").

la: Libr. IV. *de Consol.* prosa 6, ubi in ed. Oper. Boeth. sic legitur: *Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut quod ab assignata ordinis ratione discesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen in ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati*. — Exemplum mox commemoratum bene adhibetur ad Boethii sententiam illustrandam. Nam sicut circumferentia ita circumplectitur centrum, ut nec centrum excedat circumferentiam, nec circumferentia relinquat centrum; sic ordo divinus tanquam circumferentia ita circumplectitur hominem, ut homo eum effugere minime possit, cum, si ab una parte circumferentiae (ab ordine misericordiae) fugit, statim appropinquet alteri (ordini iustitiae). Cfr. S. Anselm., I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 15.

en: Book IV *On the Consolation* [of Philosophy] prose 6, where in the edition of Boethius's works it reads thus: *For a certain order encompasses all things, so that whatever has departed from its assigned ordering-ground — this, although it may [fall] into another [order], yet falls back into [some] order, lest anything in the realm of providence be left to chance*. — The example just mentioned is well employed to illustrate Boethius's sentence. For just as a circumference encompasses a center in such a way that neither does the center exceed the circumference, nor does the circumference leave the center; so the divine order, as a circumference, encompasses man, so that man can in no way escape it, since, if he flees from one part of the circumference (from the order of mercy), he straightaway approaches another (the order of justice). Cf. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I c. 15.

la: Fide codd. F M P Q Z ff etc. nec non ed. 1 substituimus *Dionysius* pro *Boethius*, cui Vat. sententiam allatam tribuit. Praeter citt. codd. etiam B. Albert. (S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 2. in fine) et alii Scholastici istam sententiam nomini addicunt Dionysii, qui in libro *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 20. ait (iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae): « Substantificat (οὐσιοῖ) et suimet privationem bonum tota sui participatione ». Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 5. a. 1. hunc Dionysii textum his verbis reddit: *Bonum sustentificat suam privationem*. Cfr. de hac solutione II. *Sent.* d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. et q. 3, ubi multa huc spectantia tractantur et etiam eadem obiectio solvitur.

en: On the testimony of codices F M P Q Z ff etc. and also ed. 1, we have substituted *Dionysius* for *Boethius*, to whom the Vatican [edition] attributes the saying adduced. Besides the cited codices, also Bl. Albert (*Summa* p. I tr. 6 q. 29 m. 2 at the end) and other Scholastics ascribe this saying to the name of Dionysius, who in the book *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 20 says (according to the version of Scotus Eriugena): « The good substantifies (οὐσιοῖ), by the whole [act of] participation in itself, even its own privation ». Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. II q. 94 m. 5 a. 1) renders this text of Dionysius in these words: *The good sustentifies its own privation*. Cf. on this solution II *Sent.* d. 34 a. 2 q. 2 and q. 3, where many things pertaining to this are treated, and the same objection is also solved.

la: Pro *ex post facto* ed. 1 *ex suppositione*. Dein pro *ex ipso sequitur* codd. V cc *ex ipso sequatur*, et post pauca cod. Y verbis *non sit pars* adiicit *universi*.

en: For *ex post facto* ed. 1 [reads] *ex suppositione* ("by supposition"). Then for *ex ipso sequitur* codices V cc [read] *ex ipso sequatur*, and a little after, codex Y to the words *non sit pars* adds *universi* ("of the universe"). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 38. m. 3. a. 1.) recte docet, bonum esse ordinabile secundum suas quatuor causas, scil. finalem, materialem, formalem et efficientem, sive ratione eius *ad quod* est, *in quo* est, *secundum quod* est, et ratione eius *quod ex eo* est; malum autem non esse ordinabile nisi ratione eius *in quo* est, scil. in bono, et *ad quod* est, scil. bonum contrarium a Deo elicitum. — Hoc a Seraphico subtiliter et multis adhibitis distinctionibus probatur. — Notanda est solut. ad 4, quod scil. malum non ordinetur ad finem ut medium, quod *per se* et *ante factum* a Deo sit volitum et ordinatum. Contraria opinio falsa est, ut explicatur supra q. 3.

**II.** Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 39. q. 2. a. 2. ad 5; S. I. q. 22. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., I. *Sent.* d. 47. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I q. 38 m. 3 a. 1) rightly teaches that the good is orderable according to its four causes — namely final, material, formal, and efficient — that is, by reason of that *toward which* it is, *in which* it is, *according to which* it is, and by reason of that *which is from it*; but that evil is not orderable except by reason of that *in which* it is, namely in the good, and *toward which* it is, namely the contrary good elicited by God. — This is proved by the Seraphic [Doctor] subtly and with many distinctions employed. — Note the solution to objection 4, namely that evil is not ordered toward an end as a means — [a means] which *per se* and *before the fact* would be willed and ordered by God. The contrary opinion is false, as is explained above at q. 3.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 39 q. 2 a. 2 ad 5; *Summa* I q. 22 a. 2 ad 2. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 47 a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question here q. 3.

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translators_notes:
**Apparatus structure:** Page 830 footer carries notes 1–6 (anchoring the long Augustine-Gloss header note [^1] across multi-line gloss; the Enchiridion ref [^2]; the merit-includes-demerit gloss [^3]; the Aristotle ref [^4]; the City-of-God variant note [^5]; and the *de Natura boni* note [^6]). Page 831 footer carries notes 1–8 here numbered [^7]–[^14] (Dionysius/Augustine evangelium gloss [^7]; Dionysius again under [^8]; *Ex codd…* on *quod* [^9]; *Vat. ordinabile* [^10]; the long Augustine *de Ordine* note [^11]; the *Cfr. supra pag. 495* gloss [^12]; the long Boethius *de Consol.* + circumference simile [^13]; the *Fide codd.* Dionysius-not-Boethius substitution note [^14]). Page 832 has a brief footer entry under the scholion which is the *ex post facto* / *ex suppositione* variant note ([^15]).

**[?] flags placed:** None remained after PDF eyes-on at 400dpi cleared OCR garbles. Notable corrections silently applied: the Q.V title line OCR `Utrum malum .nt ordinabile a voluntate Dei.` → `Utrum malum sit ordinabile a voluntate Dei.`; the `QU\ESTIO V.` header → `QUAESTIO V.`; multiple OCR `malura`/`maluni` → `malum`, `bonura` → `bonum`, `iaiura` → `natura`, etc., all unambiguous in 400dpi reads of pp. 830–831. Vat. variant attestation in apparatus [^11] confirmed (`quia ostendit` reading variant); [^14] Dionysius/Boethius substitution confirmed against PDF footer.

**Scope finding:** Raw OCR line range 40842–41053 fully covers QUAESTIO V body (printed pp. 830–832 partial). The QUAESTIO V header at line 40842 is `QU\ESTIO V.` (OCR garble of `QUAESTIO V.`) with `\` for `A`; the title-line OCR `Utrum malum .nt ordinabile a voluntate Dei.` cleans straightforwardly to `Utrum malum sit ordinabile a voluntate Dei.` against the printed page header. The QUAESTIO VI header begins at line 41054 (`Utrum mulum sit de complemento univeisi.` → `Utrum malum sit de complemento universi`). No leakage: q4 ends at 40841 with the closing Scholion of q4 / `Notanda est solut. ad 4` segue on p.830 top; q6 begins at 41054 on p.832 (the SCHOLION here belongs to q5, occupying the top of p.832, then QUAESTIO VI title follows).

**PDF header confirmation (400dpi):** PDF p.420 = printed p.830 (running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.` on left page; Q.V title `Utrum malum sit ordinabile a voluntate Dei.` centered between the SCHOLION close of Q.IV and the start of Q.V two-column body). PDF p.421 = printed p.831 (running head `DIST. XLVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V.`). PDF p.422 = printed p.832 (running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.`; top carries SCHOLION (notes I and II) for Q.V, then QUAESTIO VI title and body begin in the lower half).