title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius complementum, videlicet gloriae praemium

title_alt: Whether through grace it happens that one merits its completion, namely the reward of glory

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius complementum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum contingat per gratiam mereri ipsius complementum, hoc est ipsum praemium gloriae, et hoc quantum ad meritum *condigni*, quia de merito *congrui* non est dubium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Secundae ad Timotheum quarto[^1]: *De reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi Dominus in illa die, iustus iudex.* Si ergo quod redditur secundum iustitiam meritis debetur, et respectu eius praecessit meritum; ergo si talis corona, quam exspectabat Apostolus, est gloriae praemium, videtur, quod illud contingat mereri per gratiae donum.

2. Item, Zachariae quarto[^2]: *Adaequabit gratiam gratiae*; et exponunt Sancti et doctores, quod adaequabit gratiam patriae gratiae viae. Et hoc expressius habetur Matthaei septimo: *In qua mensura mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis.* Si igitur ubi est adaequatio meriti et praemii, ibi contingit reperiri meritum condigni; videtur etc.

3. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad poenam, sic se habet gratia ad gloriam; sed per culpam ex condigno meretur quis aeternam damnationem: ergo per gratiam econtra ex condigno meretur quis aeternam beatitudinem.

4. Item, aeque dignus est qui vincit adversarium honore et gloria, sicut qui vincitur est dignus ignominia: si ergo ille qui permittit se a diabolo superari, dignus est aeterno improperio; videtur, quod qui vincit ex condigno mereatur regnum supernum.

5. Item, aut per servitium, quod homo facit Deo, meretur aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo stultus est qui Deo servit. Si aliquid: cum praemium sit maioris dignitatis quam meritum, et nihil sit excellentius gratia nisi gloria, et per nihil potest opus meritorium sufficienter remunerari nisi per gloriam; ergo loquendo de merito condigni, contingit per gratiam gloriam mereri.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Romanos octavo[^3]: *Non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in nobis*: ergo per eas non contingit futuram gloriam mereri merito condigni.

2. Item, ad Romanos sexto[^4]: *Stipendia peccati mors, gratia Dei vita aeterna*; Glossa: « Maluit dicere, *gratia Dei vita aeterna*, ut intelligeremus, Deum ad vitam aeternam pro sua miseratione nos perducere, non nostris meritis »: ergo si non perducit nos nostris meritis, videtur etc.

3. Item, per rationem. Nullum servitium, quod debetur, dum redditur, obligat eum cui fit, in aliquo. Unde Dominus Lucae decimo septimo[^5]: *Quis vestrum habens servum* etc.; sed homo totum, quod facit et quod potest facere, totum debet Deo: ergo videtur, quod non obliget Deum ad reddendum sibi aliquid: ergo nihil meremur apud Deum merito condigni.

4. Item, nullum servitium, quod gratis fit, obligat eum cui fit, in aliquo; sed opera facta ex gratia fiunt gratis: ergo non obligant eum cui fiunt, ad retribuendum ex debito, sed solum de congruo[^6]: ergo idem quod prius.

5. Item, ubi est meritum ex condigno, ibi est ratio dati et accepti; sed Deus nihil potest a nobis accipere, quia bonorum nostrorum non indiget[^7]: ergo praemium gloriae, quod est excellentissimum, non possumus ex condigno mereri apud Deum.

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### Conclusio.

> Per gratiam praemium gloriae mereri possumus, non solum merito congrui, sed etiam merito condigni.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa istam quaestionem aliqui doctores senserunt diversimode.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod quia meritum condigni dicit quandam obligationem in retribuente et quandam commensurationem in servitio et retributione; et Deus non potest alicui obligari, et praemio gloriae[^8] nihil aliud potest commensurari: ideo dixerunt, quod nullus potest caelestem gloriam mereri ex condigno, sed si meretur, hoc tantum est ex congruo. Et ad istam suam positionem astruendam multis fulciuntur auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae et etiam expositorum, qui hoc sentire videntur.

Sed quoniam in Scriptura etiam saepe reperitur, quod *Deus unicuique retribuet secundum opera sua*[^9], et in parabola, in qua exprimitur meritum et retributio, Matthaei vigesimo, dicitur: *Tolle quod tuum est* etc., et plura consimilia reperiuntur; ideo alia rum positio est, quod gloriam non tantum contingit mereri merito congrui — tale enim meritum reperiri potest in gratia gratis data — sed etiam contingit mereri merito condigni, pro eo quod gratiae et gloriae quaedam est commensuratio, et in Deo quaedam cadit obligatio, non ex *necessitate*, sed ex sua mera *benignitate*, qua voluit promittere et pactum firmare cum his qui eum diligerent, quod se ipsum mercedem eis retribueret, sicut in Abraham apparet[^10].

Si autem velimus considerare, quis istorum modorum dicendi sit verior; inveniemus, quod secundum diversas comparationes operis meritorii reperitur in eo et meritum congrui et meritum condigni. Opus enim meritorium comparationem habet ad *principium*, a quo exit, et ad *finem*, pro quo fit, et ad *statum*, in quo fit. — Si loquamur de ipso per comparationem ad *principium*, sic opus et ortum habet a *voluntate libera* et ortum habet a *gratia*. Et in quantum ortum habet a *voluntate libera*, est meritorium merito *congrui*; sic enim quodam modo nostrum est et quasi alterius generis est, quam sit ipsum praemium, quod debet ei retribui. In quantum autem ortum habet a *gratia*, sic, cum gratia reddat hominem acceptum Deo et sit quid divinum, et ad hoc sit ordinata, ut ducat ad Deum; opus illud est meritorium merito *condigni*.

Si autem comparemus opus meritorium ad *eum pro quo* fit, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel ad *largitatem dispensantis*, vel ad *veritatem pollicentis*. Si comparetur ad *largitatem dispensantis*, sic est meritorium merito *congrui*; nam pro suae liberalitatis immensitate decet ipsum pro modico obsequio retribuere magnum praemium[^11]. Si vero comparetur ad *veritatem pollicentis*, ex qua promisit et quodam modo se voluntarie obligavit, quod tanto operi tantum redderet[^12] praemium; sic opus illud meritorium est merito *condigni*.

Si autem tertio modo comparemus opus meritorium ad *statum*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad *temporis opportunitatem*, aut quantum ad *operis difficultatem*. Si quantum ad *temporis opportunitatem*, quia nunc est tempus seminandi, sicut dicit Apostolus[^13], et qui facit opera meritoria semen proiicit in terram bonam: *congruum* est, ut ex hac terra magnum fructum suscipiat. Et ideo recte Deus ei, qui in praesenti dimittit modicum, promittit reddere centuplum[^14]. Si autem consideretur operis *arduitas*; quia opus tale sic est in voluntate facientis, ut sit supra vires; et homo elevetur in faciendo ipsum supra se, et bono proprio praeponat bonum aeternum: hinc est, quod tale genus operis aeterna remuneratione est dignum, et sic per ipsum mereri contingit merito *condigni*.

Patet igitur, quod opus meritorium, consideratum in comparatione ad *voluntatis libertatem* et *dispensatoris liberalitatem* et *temporis opportunitatem*, est meritorium merito *congrui*. Comparatum vero ad *gratiae dignitatem*, ad *pollicentis veritatem* et ad *sui ipsius difficultatem*, est meritorium merito *condigni*. — Et per hoc solvi possunt rationes et auctoritates ad utramque partem inductae, pro eo quod secundum diversas vias procedunt. Nam rationes, quae probant, quod per gratiam contingit mereri praemium aeternum merito condigni, procedunt secundum alteram istarum considerationum[^15]. — Illa tamen ratio, quae fit de simili comparatione culpae ad poenam, ad gratiae comparationem non cogit: tum quia gloria multo plus excellit in bono, quam poena in malo: tum etiam, quia facilius est descendere quam ascendere. — Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt secundum aliam viam, videlicet prout opus habet comparari ad voluntatem nostram; sic enim non est de se sufficiens ad merendum; nam *omnes iustitiae nostrae sicut pannus menstruatae*[^16]; prout etiam habet comparari ad liberalitatem divinam,

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quae nulli potest obligari, sed quidquid facit ex mera liberalitate facit; et hoc modo concludunt verum, quod non sit ibi meritum condigni; aliter enim rationes illae non cogerent.

1. Nam quod dicitur, quod *passiones huius temporis non sunt condignae* etc.; hoc verum est, in quantum sunt *passiones*; sunt tamen *condignae*, in quantum *fiunt ex caritate*, quae actionibus et passionibus dat efficaciam et valorem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non perducit nos ad gloriam nostris meritis; exponendum est, quod hoc intelligitur, secundum quod merita mere comparantur ad voluntatem nostram, non secundum quod habent ortum a gratia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totum, quod homo facit, debet Deo; dicendum, quod etsi opus illud sit debitum, in quantum est *creaturae*; est tamen gratuitum, in quantum fit *ex gratia et caritate*. Et ideo, sicut ratio debiti non tollit rationem gratuiti, sic etiam non tollit rationem meriti. — Et si ipse obiiciat, quod nec opus gratuitum nec debitum potest obligare Deum; dicendum, quod etsi non possit Deus nobis obligari in ratione *dati et accepti*, sicut ostendit etiam ratio ultima; obligari tamen dicitur quodam modo ex sua mera *benignitate*, qua voluit promittere se ipsum diligentibus se[^17]. Praeterea, meritum condigni non necessario ponit obligationem in retribuente, sed ponit sufficientem ordinationem eius qui remuneratur, ad ipsam remunerationem mediante aliqua laudabili operatione. Gratia autem sufficientem ordinationem ponit in viatore ad obtinendam gloriam, tum ratione *suae dignitatis*, ex qua totum hominem reddit Deo et acceptum et carum, tum etiam ratione *divinae pactionis*, tum ratione *arduae operationis*, sicut prius tactum est.

4. 5. Et sic patet responsio ad duas rationes sequentes. Nam quod obiicitur: quod *gratis fit*, non obligat; dicendum, esto quod non obliget, propter hoc non tollitur a merito, quin possit esse condignum. Praeterea, etsi non obliget eum, cuius est retribuere et remunerare servitium sibi factum, pensata propria utilitate; obligat tamen eum quodam modo, qui retribuit, pensata servitutis fidelitate. Unde magis meretur apud Deum, qui servit ei ex amore filiali et liberali, quam qui servit ex amore mercenario, exspectans mercedem et retributionem[^18]. — Si autem aliquis obiiciat, quod non potest ibi esse meritum *condigni*, quia non est ibi commensuratio; dicendum, quod etsi non sit commensuratio per *omnimodam aequalitatem*, est tamen commensuratio per quandam *convenientem proportionabilitatem*[^19], sicut fructus dicitur recte commensurari semini, quando tantum excedit, sicut conveniebat fecunditati seminis et terrae germinanti. Unde sicut aliquis non esset contentus, si de semine non reciperet decuplum, sic nullus posset esse contentus ex operibus meritoriis factis, nisi pro eis reciperet praemium perfectum, quod complet et terminat totum desiderium.

english:
### Question III. *Whether through grace it happens that one merits its completion.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it happens through grace that one merits its completion, that is, the very reward of glory, and this as regards the merit of *condignity*, since concerning the merit of *congruity* there is no doubt. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Second to Timothy, chapter four[^1]: *For the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day.* If therefore what is rendered according to justice is owed to merits, and with respect to it merit went before; therefore if such a crown, which the Apostle was awaiting, is the reward of glory, it seems that it happens that one merits it through the gift of grace.

2. Likewise, Zachariah, chapter four[^2]: *He will make grace equal to grace*; and the Saints and doctors expound that he will make the grace of the fatherland equal to the grace of the way. And this is had more expressly in Matthew, chapter seven: *With what measure you have measured, it shall be measured back to you.* If therefore where there is an equating of merit and reward, there it happens that the merit of condignity is found; it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, as guilt stands to punishment, so grace stands to glory; but through guilt one merits eternal damnation from condignity: therefore, conversely, through grace one merits eternal beatitude from condignity.

4. Likewise, he who conquers the adversary is equally worthy of honor and glory as he who is conquered is worthy of ignominy: if therefore he who allows himself to be overcome by the devil is worthy of eternal reproach; it seems that he who conquers merits from condignity the kingdom above.

5. Likewise, either through the service which a man does to God he merits something, or nothing. If nothing: then he is foolish who serves God. If something: since the reward is of greater dignity than the merit, and nothing is more excellent than grace except glory, and a meritorious work cannot be sufficiently rewarded by anything except by glory; therefore, speaking of the merit of condignity, it happens that one merits glory through grace.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter eight[^3]: *The sufferings of this time are not condign [worthy] of the glory to come, which shall be revealed in us*: therefore through them it does not happen that one merits the glory to come by the merit of condignity.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter six[^4]: *The wages of sin is death, the grace of God life everlasting*; the Gloss: « He preferred to say, *the grace of God life everlasting*, that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life for his mercy's sake, not by our merits »: therefore if he does not lead us by our merits, it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, by reason. No service which is owed, when it is rendered, obligates in anything the one to whom it is done. Hence the Lord in Luke, chapter seventeen[^5]: *Which of you having a servant* etc.; but a man owes to God all that he does and all that he can do: therefore it seems that he does not obligate God to render him anything: therefore we merit nothing before God by the merit of condignity.

4. Likewise, no service which is done gratuitously obligates in anything the one to whom it is done; but works done from grace are done gratuitously: therefore they do not obligate the one to whom they are done to make return out of debt, but only out of congruity[^6]: therefore the same as before.

5. Likewise, where there is merit from condignity, there is the account of giving and receiving; but God can receive nothing from us, since he has no need of our goods[^7]: therefore the reward of glory, which is the most excellent thing, we cannot merit from condignity before God.

### Conclusion.

> Through grace we can merit the reward of glory, not only by the merit of congruity, but also by the merit of condignity.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this question certain doctors have held diverse views.

For some have wished to say that, because the merit of condignity implies a certain obligation in the one who rewards and a certain commensuration in the service and the recompense; and God cannot be obligated to anyone, and nothing else can be commensurated to the reward of glory[^8]: therefore they said that no one can merit heavenly glory from condignity, but if he merits it, this is only from congruity. And to establish this position of theirs they are supported by many authorities of sacred Scripture and also of the expositors, who seem to hold this.

But since in Scripture it is also often found that *God will render to each one according to his works*[^9], and in the parable in which merit and recompense are expressed, in Matthew, chapter twenty, it is said: *Take what is thine* etc., and many like things are found; therefore there is another position, that it happens that glory is merited not only by the merit of congruity — for such merit can be found in grace gratuitously given — but also it happens that it is merited by the merit of condignity, for this reason, that there is a certain commensuration of grace and glory, and a certain obligation falls upon God, not from *necessity*, but from his mere *benignity*, by which he willed to promise and to confirm a covenant with those who would love him, that he would render himself as their reward, as appears in Abraham[^10].

But if we wish to consider which of these manners of speaking is truer; we shall find that according to the diverse comparisons of the meritorious work, both the merit of congruity and the merit of condignity are found in it. For the meritorious work has a comparison to the *principle* from which it proceeds, and to the *end* for which it is done, and to the *state* in which it is done. — If we speak of it by comparison to the *principle*, then the work both has its rise from *free will* and has its rise from *grace*. And insofar as it has its rise from *free will*, it is meritorious by the merit of *congruity*; for thus it is in a certain way ours and is, as it were, of another kind than the reward itself which must be rendered to it. But insofar as it has its rise from *grace*, then, since grace renders a man acceptable to God and is something divine, and is ordered to this, that it may lead to God; that work is meritorious by the merit of *condignity*.

But if we compare the meritorious work to *him for whom* it is done, this can be in two ways: either to the *bounty of the one dispensing*, or to the *truth of the one promising*. If it is compared to the *bounty of the one dispensing*, then it is meritorious by the merit of *congruity*; for on account of the immensity of his liberality it is fitting for him to render a great reward for a slight service[^11]. But if it is compared to the *truth of the one promising*, by which he promised and in a certain way voluntarily obligated himself that to so great a work he would render so great a reward[^12]; then that work is meritorious by the merit of *condignity*.

But if in a third manner we compare the meritorious work to the *state*, this can be in two ways: either as regards the *opportuneness of the time*, or as regards the *difficulty of the work*. If as regards the *opportuneness of the time*, since now is the time of sowing, as the Apostle says[^13], and he who does meritorious works casts seed into good ground: it is *congruous* that from this ground he should receive great fruit. And therefore God rightly promises to render a hundredfold to him who in the present remits a little[^14]. But if the *arduousness* of the work is considered; since such a work is in the will of the doer in such a way that it is above his powers; and a man is lifted up in doing it above himself, and prefers the eternal good to his own good: hence it is that such a kind of work is worthy of eternal remuneration, and thus through it one happens to merit by the merit of *condignity*.

It is therefore clear that the meritorious work, considered in comparison to the *freedom of the will* and the *liberality of the dispenser* and the *opportuneness of the time*, is meritorious by the merit of *congruity*. But compared to the *dignity of grace*, to the *truth of the one promising*, and to its own *difficulty*, it is meritorious by the merit of *condignity*. — And by this can be resolved the reasons and authorities adduced for either side, for this reason, that they proceed by diverse ways. For the reasons which prove that through grace it happens that one merits the eternal reward by the merit of condignity, proceed according to one of these considerations[^15]. — That reason, however, which is made from the similar comparison of guilt to punishment, does not compel for the comparison of grace: both because glory excels much more in the good than punishment in the evil: and also because it is easier to descend than to ascend. — But the reasons to the contrary proceed by another way, namely insofar as the work has to be compared to our will; for thus it is not of itself sufficient for meriting; for *all our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman*[^16]; and also insofar as it has to be compared to the divine liberality,

which can be obligated to no one, but whatever it does it does from mere liberality; and in this manner they conclude truly that there is no merit of condignity there; for otherwise those reasons would not compel.

1. For as to what is said, that *the sufferings of this time are not condign* etc.; this is true insofar as they are *sufferings*; yet they are *condign* insofar as they *are done from charity*, which gives efficacy and worth to actions and sufferings.

2. To that which is objected, that God does not lead us to glory by our merits; it must be explained that this is understood according as the merits are compared merely to our will, not according as they have their rise from grace.

3. To that which is objected, that all that a man does he owes to God; it must be said that although that work is owed, insofar as it is *the creature's*; yet it is gratuitous, insofar as it is done *from grace and charity*. And therefore, just as the account of debt does not take away the account of the gratuitous, so neither does it take away the account of merit. — And if one objects that neither a gratuitous work nor a debt can obligate God; it must be said that although God cannot be obligated to us in the account of *giving and receiving*, as the last reason also shows; yet he is said to be obligated in a certain way from his mere *benignity*, by which he willed to promise himself to those who love him[^17]. Moreover, the merit of condignity does not necessarily posit an obligation in the one who rewards, but it posits a sufficient ordination of him who is rewarded toward the reward itself, through the mediation of some praiseworthy operation. But grace posits a sufficient ordination in the wayfarer toward obtaining glory, both by reason of *its dignity*, by which it renders the whole man both acceptable and dear to God, and also by reason of the *divine covenant*, and by reason of the *arduous operation*, as was touched on before.

4. 5. And thus appears the response to the two following reasons. For as to what is objected: that *what is done gratuitously* does not obligate; it must be said that, granted that it does not obligate, on account of this it is not taken from merit, so that it cannot be condign. Moreover, although it does not obligate him whose [office] it is to repay and reward a service done to him, his own utility being weighed; yet it obligates in a certain way the one who rewards, the faithfulness of the service being weighed. Hence he merits more before God who serves him out of filial and liberal love than he who serves out of mercenary love, awaiting wages and recompense[^18]. — But if anyone objects that there cannot be merit of *condignity* there, since there is no commensuration there; it must be said that although there is no commensuration through *every kind of equality*, yet there is commensuration through a certain *fitting proportionability*[^19], just as fruit is rightly said to be commensurated to the seed, when it exceeds it by as much as befitted the fecundity of the seed and the germinating earth. Hence just as someone would not be content if he did not receive tenfold from the seed, so no one could be content from the meritorious works done, unless for them he received the perfect reward, which completes and terminates the whole desire.

la: Vers. 8: *In reliquo* etc. Circa finem arg. pro *gloriae praemium* ed. 1 *gratiae praemium*.

en: [2 Tim. 4,] v. 8: *For the rest* etc. Near the end of the argument, for *the reward of glory* edition 1 reads *the reward of grace*.

la: Vers. 7: *Et exaequabit* etc. — Ad hunc locum explicandum Haymo, *Enarrat. in Zach. Proph.*, recurrit ad Ioan. 1, 16, dicens: « Quod vero sequitur: *exaequabit gratiam gratiae eius*, illud est quod Apostolus ait: *Nos omnes de plenitudine eius accepimus gratiam pro gratia* ». Sed hunc locum Apostoli August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 3. n. 9. seq. exponit, ut in arg. dicitur. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 2.

en: [Zach. 4,] v. 7: *And he shall make equal* etc. — To explain this passage Haymo, *Commentary on the Prophet Zachariah*, has recourse to John 1:16, saying: « What in fact follows, *he shall make grace equal to his grace*, is that which the Apostle says: *We all have received of his fullness, grace for grace* ». But Augustine expounds this Apostolic passage in *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, tract. 3, n. 9 f., as is said in the argument. Cf. IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, q. 6. — The following text is loc. cit., v. 2.

la: Vers. 18.

la: Vers. 23. — Glossa, quae hic affertur et habetur apud Petrum Lombardum et Lyranum (in hunc loc.), sumta est ex August., *de Gratia et lib. arb.* c. 9. n. 21. Cfr. eius *Epist.* 194. (alias 105.) c. 5. n. 19. seqq.

en: [Rom. 6,] v. 23. — The Gloss which is here adduced and is found in Peter Lombard and Lyranus (on this passage) is taken from Augustine, *On Grace and Free Choice*, c. 9, n. 21. Cf. his *Letter* 194 (otherwise 105), c. 5, n. 19 ff.

la: Vers. 7. seqq., super quem locum (v. 10.) Glossa ordinaria: *Ne quis de suis operibus glorietur, sed quanto fides est foris virtutibus excellentior, tanto conscientia intus sit humilior, quia Domino iure debemus obsequium.*

en: [Luke 17,] v. 7 ff., on which passage (v. 10) the Ordinary Gloss [reads]: *Lest anyone glory in his own works; but the more faith is outwardly more excellent than virtues, the more the conscience within should be humbler, since by right we owe obedience to the Lord.*

la: Codd. I V interiiciunt *redit*.

en: Codices I, V insert *he returns* [*redit*].

la: Psalm. 15, 2: *Quoniam bonorum meorum non eges.* — Beda, V. *Expos. in Luc.* 17, 10. ait: *Servi inutiles sumus: servi* quidem, *quia pretio empti estis; inutiles* vero, *quia Dominus bonorum vestrorum non indiget.* Deinde addit: *Aliter: Servi inutiles sumus, quia non sunt condignae passiones* etc. Et alibi: *Qui coronat me in miseratione et misericordia* (Ps. 102, 4.). — Mox pro *praemium gloriae* codd. F K T Y ee et nonnulli alii cum primis edd. *praemium gratiae*.

en: Psalm 15:2: *For thou hast no need of my goods.* — Bede, *Exposition on Luke* 17:10, says: *We are unprofitable servants: servants* indeed, *because you are bought with a price; unprofitable* truly, *because the Lord has no need of your goods.* Then he adds: *Otherwise: We are unprofitable servants, because the sufferings are not condign* etc. And elsewhere: *Who crowns me in compassion and mercy* (Ps. 102:4). — Further, for *the reward of glory* codices F, K, T, Y, ee and some others, with the first editions, read *the reward of grace*.

la: Plures codd., inter quos sunt H K T bb, cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *gratiae*.

en: Several codices, among which are H, K, T, bb, with editions 2, 3, 4, read *of grace*.

la: Matth. 16, 27: *Et tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera eius.* Rom. 2, 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 14.

en: Matthew 16:27: *And then he will render to each one according to his works.* Rom. 2:6. — The following text is loc. cit., v. 14.

la: Gen. 15, 1: *Noli timere, Abram, ego protector tuus sum et merces tua magna nimis.* — Paulo superius pro *firmare* plures codd., ut F I W Z, *confirmare*; deinde dedd., excepta 1, *diligunt* pro *diligerent*, et codd. I K Y aa cum ed. 1 *tribueret* pro *retribueret*.

en: Gen. 15:1: *Fear not, Abram, I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great.* — A little above, for *to confirm* [*firmare*] several codices, such as F, I, W, Z, read *confirmare*; then the editions, except 1, read *they love* [*diligunt*] for *they would love* [*diligerent*], and codices I, K, Y, aa with ed. 1 read *he would bestow* [*tribueret*] for *he would render* [*retribueret*].

la: Anselm., *Proslog.* c. 10: *Ita iustus es, non quia nobis reddas debitum, sed quia facis quod te decet, summe bonum.*

en: Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 10: *Thus thou art just, not because thou renderest a debt to us, but because thou doest what befits thee, O highest good.*

la: Codd. H T Y bb et ed. 2 *reddet*.

en: Codices H, T, Y, bb and ed. 2 read *he will render* [*reddet*].

la: Epist. II. Cor. 9, 6; Gal. 6, 8. — De seqq. vide Matth. 13, 18. seqq.; Marc. 4, 26. seqq.; Luc. 8, 11. seqq.

en: 2 Cor. 9:6; Gal. 6:8. — On what follows see Matthew 13:18 ff.; Mark 4:26 ff.; Luke 8:11 ff.

en: Matthew 19:29.

la: Codd. K W Y aa bb etc. cum ed. 1 *considerationem*.

en: Codices K, W, Y, aa, bb etc., with ed. 1, read *consideration* [singular].

la: Isai. 64, 6: *Et quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae.*

en: Isaiah 64:6: *And all our justices [are] as the rag of a menstruous woman.*

la: Iac. 1, 12: *Beatus vir... accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus diligentibus se.*

en: James 1:12: *Blessed is the man... he shall receive the crown of life, which God has promised to those who love him.*

la: Cfr. Bernard., *Epist.* 11. n. 3. seq.

en: Cf. Bernard, *Letter* 11, n. 3 f.

la: In multis codd. lectio est dubia, siquidem propter abbreviationem pro *proportionabilitatem* etiam legi potest *proportionalitatem*. Mox pro *quando tantum* codd. C H L O R S T V *quando enim*.

en: In many codices the reading is doubtful, since on account of the abbreviation, for *proportionability* one can also read *proportionality*. Further, for *when [it exceeds] by as much* codices C, H, L, O, R, S, T, V read *when in fact*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Durand. (hic q. 2.), primam opinionem (in corp.) secutus, non admisit « meritum de condigno *stricte* et *proprie* sumtum, videlicet pro actione voluntaria, propter quam debetur merces ex iustitia sic, quod, si non reddatur, ille ad quem pertinet reddere, iniuste faciat ». Haec opinio communiter, praesertim post Concilium Tridentinum, reprobatur. Cum autem inter Deum et hominem non possit esse ratio iustitiae secundum *absolutam aequalitatem*, sed tantum secundum quandam *aequalitatem proportionis* et quandam *analogiam*; theologi aliquatenus dissentiunt in explicanda ratione *debiti* et *iustitiae*, quae implicatur in merito de *condigno*; in specie disputatur, utrum ibi sit iustitia *commutativa*, vel *distributiva*, vel *utraque*. De illo autem debito, quod oritur ex *promissione*, qua Deus sibi est quasi debitor, non est difficultas, sed de alia radice debiti, quae in proportione operis meritorii ad praemium ponitur. S. Bonav. ad rem explicandam praeter pollicentis veritatem adducit gratiae dignitatem et operis arduitatem (cfr. infra d. 29. a. 3. q. 2, d. 40. a. 2. q. 1-3.). — Distinctio illa inter *operis substantiam*, quatenus est a libero arbitrio et non habet nisi quandam congruitatem, et opus meritorium, quatenus procedit a gratia Spiritus S., affertur etiam a S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 114. a. 3.).

De variis speciebus meriti, praesertim de triplici specie, scilicet de merito condigni, digni et congrui, cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. q. 2, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. — Quod merita nostra non derogent divinae liberalitati, explicatur III. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad ult. — Multa alia de merito invenies III. Sent. d. 18. per totam. — De acceptatione ex parte Dei cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.

Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3. n. 22. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. II. q. 14. a. 3; I. q. 21. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Durandus (here, q. 2), following the first opinion (in the body [of the article]), did not admit « merit of condignity taken *strictly* and *properly*, namely for a voluntary action on account of which a wage is owed from justice in such a way that, if it be not rendered, the one to whom it pertains to render it acts unjustly ». This opinion is commonly, especially after the Council of Trent, reproved. But since between God and man there cannot be an account of justice according to *absolute equality*, but only according to a certain *equality of proportion* and a certain *analogy*; theologians dissent to some extent in explaining the account of *debt* and *justice* which is implied in merit of *condignity*; in particular it is disputed whether there is there *commutative* justice, or *distributive*, or *both*. But concerning that debt which arises from a *promise*, by which God is as it were a debtor to himself, there is no difficulty, but [the difficulty is] concerning the other root of debt, which is posited in the proportion of the meritorious work to the reward. St. Bonaventure, to explain the matter, besides the truth of the one promising, adduces the dignity of grace and the arduousness of the work (cf. below, d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1-3). — That distinction between *the substance of the work*, insofar as it is from free choice and has only a certain congruity, and the meritorious work, insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, is also brought forward by St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 114, a. 3).

Concerning the various species of merit, especially the threefold species, namely of the merit of condignity, of dignity, and of congruity, cf. I Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 1; III Sent., d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2. — That our merits do not derogate from the divine liberality is explained in III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad ult. — Many other things concerning merit you will find in III Sent., d. 18, throughout. — Concerning acceptation on the part of God, cf. below, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1.

Scotus, I Sent., d. 17, q. 3, n. 22. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 3; S. I-II, q. 14, a. 3; I, q. 21, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II priority inversion) for the Respondeo, replies, scholion and all footers; clean running prose (videtur/contra args) cross-checked against IA djvu OCR (raw lines 46479–46659). Fresh literal English. QUAESTIO III is the **last quaestio of ARTICULUS II** of d.27.

**Page-split map:**
- **p. 666** (raw ~46479–46552; running head at raw 46469): QUAESTIO III header + title + opener (*Tertio quaeritur… condigni*) + args 1–5 (L-col) + the args 1–2 tail and **Sed contra** args 1–5 (R-col). Footers 1–7 (two-column footer block) → [^1]–[^7].
- **p. 667** (raw ~46553–46607; running head DIST. XXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. III at raw 46534): CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (Opinio 1, Opinio 2, then the three comparisons — *principium / eum pro quo fit / statum*, each *congrui*+*condigni*) breaking mid-sentence at *liberalitatem divinam,*. Footers 1–9 → [^8]–[^16].
- **p. 668** (raw ~46608–46659; running head at raw 46608): Respondeo tail (*quae nulli potest obligari…*) + replies 1, 2, 3, 4–5 (*Solutio oppositorum* / *Notandum* / *Alia obiectio solvitur* marginalia) + SCHOLION I, ending before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (raw 46660). Footers 1–3 → [^17]–[^19].

**Body seams (450 dpi, grammatically continuous):**
- 666→667: *non possumus ex condigno mereri apud Deum.* ‖ CONCLUSIO (clean section break).
- 667→668: *prout etiam habet comparari ad liberalitatem divinam,* ‖ *quae nulli potest obligari…* (continuous).

**Hand-offs:**
- **RECEIVED from a2-q2:** the QUAESTIO III opener (p.666 L-col) and the **p.666 scripture footer run** — all 7 p.666 footers belong to this q3 ([^1]–[^7]: Vers.8, Vers.7/Haymo, Vers.18, Vers.23/Glossa, Vers.7 seqq./Glossa ordinaria, Codd. I V, Psalm.15/Beda). Taken here.
- **FORWARDED to d27-dubia:** the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI block opens at raw **46660** (p.668 R-col, *DUB. I.* — *In parte ista sunt dubitationes… Operans gratia dicitur…*). The p.668 footer band also carries the **DUB. I** footer ⁴ (*Gregorius, quod quidem nos sciamus, termino gratiae…*) which belongs to the dubia chunk, NOT taken here. DISTINCTIO XXVIII begins at raw 46924.

**has_scholion:** TRUE. SCHOLION I (three paragraphs: Durandus/Trent + species of merit cross-refs + the parallel-authorities roll) spans p.668 R-col. It carries **no footnote anchors** — all citations are inline parenthetical (cfr. …, S. I-II q. 114 a. 3, etc.), so all 19 [^N] are body/reply footnotes.

**[?] flags:** none. Marker pairing OK (19 La = 19 En = 19 defs).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 27, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 668 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Operans gratia dicitur, in quantum voluntatem hominis liberat; coo*perans vero, in quantum eandem adiuvat. Gregorius enim in Moralibus[^1], distinguens gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem, dicit ita, quod gratia praeveniens attenditur quantum ad dona naturae; subsequens vero quantum ad dona gratiae: ergo si idem est gratia operans et cooperans[^2], videtur, quod operans non dicatur illa quae hominis voluntatem liberat. — *Si forte tu dicas*, quod alio modo accipitur ibi *praeveniens* et *subsequens*; tunc est quaestio de ratione istorum[^3] nominum, quare scilicet sic nominatur, ut dicatur quaedam *praeveniens*, quaedam *subsequens*, quaedam *operans*, quaedam *cooperans*. Videtur enim, quod omnis gratia sit *cooperans*, quia nulla operatio debetur formae alicui per se, nisi cum subiecto[^4]. Videtur etiam, quod nulla debeat dici *praeveniens*; aut enim praeveniens dicitur per comparationem ad *actum*, aut per comparationem ad *subiectum*. Si per comparationem ad *actum*, sic omnis forma debet dici[^5] *praeveniens*, quia omnis forma praecedit actum suum. Si per comparationem ad *subiectum*, sic nulla debet dici *praeveniens*, cum nulla sit ante subiectum suum.

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Est igitur quaestio, cum gratia a diversis diversimode dicatur, et huiusmodi nomina diversimode exponantur, unde haec diversitas veniat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum gratia una sit, multiplices tamen habet divisiones secundum diversas considerationes. Habet enim gratia comparari ad suum *principium a quo*, habet comparari ad suum *subiectum in quo*, habet nihilominus comparari ad suum *oppositum contra quod*, habet comparari ad suum *effectum, ad quem* ordinatur.

Per comparationem ad suum *principium*, sic dividitur gratia in gratiam praedestinationis, vocationis, iustificationis et magnificationis. Primo enim Deus gratiam praeparat, secundo offert, tertio confert et quarto complet. Et secundum hoc attenditur praedicta divisio, quae sumitur de eo quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos octavo[^6].

Secundum autem quod gratia comparatur ad suum *subiectum*, sic dividitur in gratiam cogitationis, voluntatis et perfectionis secundum triplicem potentiam eius substantiae, in qua est gratia, videlicet secundum intellectivam, affectivam et operativam. Et haec divisio ponitur a Bernardo in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^7].

Secundum autem quod comparatur ad suum *oppositum*, sic est illa divisio gratiae, quae est gratia protectionis, liberationis, extractionis[^8] et salvationis. Sumitur enim haec divisio, secundum quod gratia adiuvat contra multiplex malum, videlicet malum tentationis sive pugnae, malum persecutionis sive miseriae, malum culpae et malum sequelae. A primo protegit, a secundo liberat, a tertio extrahit et a quarto salvat. Et haec divisio sumitur pro eo quod dicitur Isaiae trigesimo primo[^9]: *Protegit Dominus exercituum Iudam et Ierusalem, protegens et liberans, transiens et salvans.*

Secundum comparationem ad *effectum*, ad quem est, dividitur in praevenientem et subsequentem, sive operantem et cooperantem, quae sunt differentiae gratiae secundum effectus, quos habet in ipsam voluntatem. Dicitur enim gratia *praeveniens*, in quantum ipsam voluntatem facit bonam; et ideo praevenit, quia non est a libero arbitrio, sed potius infunditur ab ipso Deo. *Cooperans* vero sive *subsequens* dicitur, in quantum adiuvat liberum arbitrium respectu boni operis eliciendi.

Et notandum, quod secundum quod nomen gratiae diversimode accipitur, sic etiam et istae duae differentiae, *praeveniens* et *subsequens*. Accipitur enim gratia uno modo largissime, et sic comprehendit dona naturalia et dona gratuita; utraque enim desursum sunt. Et hoc modo gratia habet dividi in praevenientem et subsequentem, ita quod praeveniens vocantur dona naturalia, subsequens vero dona gratuita; et sic accipit Gregorius in Moralibus. — Alio modo accipitur gratia minus communiter, et sic comprehendit gratiam gratis datam et gratum facientem; et tunc dividere gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem nihil aliud est quam dividere gratiam in gratis datam et gratum facientem. Et sic dividit Bernardus, cum di-

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cit, quod quaedam est gratia, quae seminat cogitatum, et hanc vocat gratiam praevenientem; quaedam, quae perficit bonum, et hanc dicit gratiam subsequentem. Ait enim sic in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^10]: « Haec tria in nobis operatur Deus, scilicet *cogitare, velle et perficere*. Primum sine nobis operatur, secundum nobiscum, et tertium per nos ». — Accipitur et gratia stricte, et sic comprehendit gratiam gratum facientem et gloriam; et tunc dividere gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem non est aliud, quam dividere gratiam et gloriam. Et sic dividit Augustinus in libro de Natura et gratia[^11], cum ait: « Gratia praevenit, ut pie vivamus; subsequitur, ut cum illo semper vivamus. Nunc praevenit, ut vocemur; tunc subsequitur, ut glorificemur ». — Accipitur etiam gratia magis stricte, et tunc nominat solum gratiam gratum facientem; et tunc dividere eam per[^12] praevenientem et subsequentem hoc est secundum duplicem effectum gratiae, qui potest distingui tripliciter: vel ita, quod unus effectus sit contra malum, et alter ad bonum; vel ita, quod uterque sit ad bonum, sed unus competat gratiae, secundum quod informat, alter, secundum quod movet; vel ita, quod uterque attribuatur gratiae moventi, sed unus in ingressu, et alter in profectu. Et sic tripliciter exponitur ab Augustino in libro de Natura et gratia[^13]. Uno modo sic: gratia praeveniens hominis voluntatem liberat et praeparat; subsequens vero, in quantum eandem adiuvat. Secundo modo sic: gratia praeveniens « praevenit voluntatem, ut sanemur; et subsequitur, ut sanati vegetemur ». Tertio modo sic: gratia praevenit voluntatem, ut velit; et subsequitur, ne frustra velit. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit secundo capitulo: *Praemittendum est, tria esse genera bonorum. Alia namque sunt magna, alia minima, alia media.* Videtur enim ista divisio boni esse insufficiens, quoniam multae sunt aliae bonorum differentiae. Est enim bonum fortunae et bonum naturae et bonum gratiae et gloriae. Si tu dicas, quod istae differentiae reducuntur ad has; quaeritur tunc, sub qua istarum contineatur bonum, quod Deus est, sive ipsa anima. Si tu dicas, quod sub magnis bonis; contra: magna bona sunt, ut dicit[^14], quibus non contingit male uti; sed Deo potest quis male uti, sicut cum diligit propter aliud: ergo non continetur sub magnis bonis. Item arguitur ex hoc: si Deo contingit male uti, videlicet cum refertur ad aliud; et Deus est optimus inter omnia bona: ergo omnibus bonis contingit male uti: ergo nulla sunt bona magna. Falsum igitur dicit, cum dicit, quod magna bona sunt, quibus non contingit male uti. — Item, videtur male exemplificare de virtutibus; nam aliquis potest de virtutibus superbire, potest etiam virtutes propter laudem humanam amare; et hoc est abuti: ergo videtur, quod virtutibus possit abuti: ergo sub magnis bonis non possunt contineri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus, cum dividit bonum per istas tres differentias, scilicet per bonum maximum et medium[^15] et infimum, non generaliter accipit divisionem boni, sed eius boni, quod est bonum alicui, et hoc est bonum, per quod contingit aliquo modo in finem ordinari; et ideo dividit hic bonum utile. Et propter hoc, cum triplex sit differentia boni utilis, per quod quis ordinatur in finem, triplicem boni ponit differentiam. Aliquid enim sic est utile ad finem, ut tamen sine illo possit ad finem perveniri, sicut sunt bona corporalia. Aliquid autem est ita utile ad finem, ut tamen[^16] sine illo non possit ad finem perveniri; per ipsum tamen potest quis a fine deordinari, sicut est liberum arbitrium, quo contingit male uti. Aliquid est ita utile, quod sine ipso ad finem non potest perveniri, nec per ipsum contingit aliquo modo a fine deordinari, sicut est virtus gratuita. Et quoniam in primo bono minima est utilitas, in secundo vero maior, in tertio maxima; hinc est, quod dividit bonum per has tres differentias, scilicet per bona minima, media et magna. — Et patet divisionis sufficientia et responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de summo bono, quod Deus est.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod virtutibus contingit male uti; dicendum, quod uti aliquo est multis modis, sicut dictum fuit in primo libro[^17], videlicet sicut instrumento et habitu directivo, vel sicut obiecto. Primo modo nullo modo contingit male uti virtute, quia virtus, quantum est de se, semper ad bonum dirigit, nec unquam per virtutem aliquid ordinatur ad malum.

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quia « virtus est bonus usus voluntatis », ut dicit Augustinus[^18]. Secundo modo contingit male uti virtutibus, nec est aliquid ita bonum, circa quod non possit se liberum arbitrium deordinare, inordinate amando illud.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de illa ratione virtutis, quam ponit in littera: *Virtus est bona qualitas mentis* etc. Videtur enim haec notificatio primo redargui posse a *modo praedicandi*. « Nihil enim, quod praedicatur de altero in abstractione, praedicari habet de altero in concretione », sicut dicit Philosophus[^19]: si ergo virtus est bonitas, nullo modo virtus dicenda est esse bona. — Item redarguitur praedicta definitio a *defectu convertibilitatis* in praedicando[^20], quia tota haec ratio convenire potest gratiae et donis et aliis habitibus animae. — Item redargui potest a *falsitate* in hoc quod dicit: *quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur*; hoc enim est contra Augustinum, qui dicit[^21], quod « qui creavit te sine te, non iustificat te sine te ». Et Bernardus etiam dicit, quod ad opus nostrae salutis duo concurrunt, scilicet Deus et liberum arbitrium.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum unius rei una sit definitio[^22], et differenter definiatur a diversis ipsa virtus: quomodo illae definitiones distinguuntur?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod virtus accipitur communiter, proprie et magis proprie. — Secundum quod communiter accipitur, sic comprehendit virtutem moralem et naturalem; et sic dupliciter habet definiri: aut in comparatione ad actum, aut in comparatione ad actum et finem ultimum. Primo modo definitur a Philosopho de Caelo et mundo[^23] cum dicit: « Virtus est ultimum potentiae de re ». Secundo modo definitur ab eodem in septimo Physicorum[^24]: « Virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum ». Istae enim duae sunt notificationes virtutis in sua generalitate, prout comprehendit virtutem moralem et naturalem.

Alio modo consideratur virtus proprie, prout comprehendit moralem tantum, extenditur tamen ad politicam et gratuitam. Et sic dupliciter habet considerari: aut per comparationem ad ipsum actum, aut per comparationem ad principium directivum. Si per comparationem ad actum, sic definitur a Philosopho in Ethicis[^25]: « Virtus est habitus, qui perficit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit ». Per comparationem autem ad principium directivum sic definitur ab eodem Philosopho ibidem[^26]: « Virtus est habitus voluntarius in medio consistens, recta ratione determinatus, prout sapiens determinabit ». Et secundum hoc etiam definitur a Tullio[^27] per alia verba: « Virtus est habitus mentis, in modum naturae rationi consentiens ». Secundum hanc duplicem comparationem definitur ab Augustino virtus moralis per alia verba, idem significantia, in libro de Spiritu et anima[^28] sic: « Virtus est habitus mentis bene compositae »; in libro de Quantitate animae[^29]: « Virtus est aequalitas vitae, rationi undique consentiens ». Hae duae notificationes, si quis attendat, realiter idem sunt cum praedictis, et tam istae quam illae sunt illius virtutis, quae per assuetudinem habet acquiri.

Tertio modo potest considerari virtus magis proprie, prout accipitur pro virtute gratuita; et sic qua-

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drupliciter potest comparari, videlicet ad finem, ad subiectum, ad actum et ad suum principium; secundum quadruplex genus causae, videlicet finalis, materialis, formalis et efficientis. In comparatione ad finem sic definitur ab Augustino in Soliloquiis[^30]: « Virtus est ratio recta ad suum finem perveniens ». In comparatione vero ad subiectum, quod informat, quod est ipsa voluntas, sic definitur ab eodem de Civitate Dei[^31]: « Virtus est bona voluntas ». In comparatione vero ad actum proprium sive complementum sic datur illa de Moribus Ecclesiae[^32]: « Virtus est ordo amoris sive amor ordinatus ». In comparatione vero ad suum principium effectivum datur illa quae ponitur a Magistro in littera[^33]: « Virtus est bona qualitas mentis » etc. In qua definitione hoc quod dicitur *qualitas mentis*, ponitur pro genere, et subiunguntur tres differentiae. Per hoc quod dicitur: *qua recte vivitur*, separatur a bonis corporalibus. Per hoc quod dicitur: *qua nemo male utitur*, separatur a proprietatibus spiritualibus et naturalibus. Per hoc autem quod subiungitur: *quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur*, separatur a proprietatibus spiritualibus et consuetudinibus, quae etsi sint boni usus potentiarum animae, non sunt tamen per infusionem, sed per acquisitionem. — Et sic patet intellectus huius definitionis et distinctio ab aliis.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non debet dici *bona*, cum sit *bonitas*; dicendum, quod in primis intentionibus est praedicatio reflexa propter simplicitatem. Haec autem non habet locum in his quae sunt *determinati generis*, de quibus Philosophus loquitur; non enim dicitur: albedo est colorata.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est convertibilis; dicendum, quod hic non definitur virtus, prout distinguitur contra dona et alios habitus gratuitos, sed prout nomine virtutis clauditur omnis qualitas animae gratuita. — Posset tamen dici, quod per appropriationem *recte vivere* est virtutum, *expedite* donorum, sed *perfecte* beatitudinum, sicut alibi manifestabitur.

Ad ultimum dicendum, quod *sine nobis* non privat ex parte liberi arbitrii dispositionem susceptivam ipsius virtutis, sed potestatem effectivam.

---

english:
<!-- page 668 -->

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first the question is raised about what he says: *Grace is called* operating *insofar as it frees the will of man;* and *cooperating insofar as it assists that same will.* For Gregory, in the *Morals*[^1], distinguishing prevenient and subsequent grace, says thus, that prevenient grace is regarded with respect to the gifts of nature; but subsequent grace with respect to the gifts of grace: therefore if operating and cooperating grace are the same[^2], it seems that operating grace would not be called that which frees the will of man. — *But if perhaps you say* that *prevenient* and *subsequent* are taken there in another way; then there is a question about the meaning of these names[^3], namely why it is so named, that one is called *prevenient*, another *subsequent*, another *operating*, another *cooperating*. For it seems that all grace is *cooperating*, because no operation is due to any form of itself, except together with a subject[^4]. It also seems that none ought to be called *prevenient*; for either prevenient is said by comparison to the *act*, or by comparison to the *subject*. If by comparison to the *act*, then every form ought to be called[^5] *prevenient*, because every form precedes its own act. If by comparison to the *subject*, then none ought to be called *prevenient*, since none is before its own subject.

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There is therefore a question, since grace is spoken of in diverse ways by diverse authors, and such names are expounded in diverse ways, whence this diversity comes.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although grace is one, it nevertheless has manifold divisions according to diverse considerations. For grace can be compared to its *principle from which*, it can be compared to its *subject in which*, it can likewise be compared to its *opposite against which*, and it can be compared to its *effect, toward which* it is ordered.

By comparison to its *principle*, grace is thus divided into the grace of predestination, of vocation, of justification, and of magnification. For first God prepares grace, secondly he offers it, thirdly he confers it, and fourthly he completes it. And according to this is regarded the aforesaid division, which is taken from what the Apostle says in Romans, chapter eight[^6].

But insofar as grace is compared to its *subject*, it is thus divided into the grace of thought, of will, and of perfection, according to the threefold power of that substance in which grace is, namely according to the intellective, the affective, and the operative. And this division is set down by Bernard in the book *On Free Choice*[^7].

But insofar as it is compared to its *opposite*, there is that division of grace which is the grace of protection, of liberation, of extraction[^8], and of salvation. For this division is taken according as grace assists against manifold evil, namely the evil of temptation or struggle, the evil of persecution or misery, the evil of fault, and the evil of consequence. From the first it protects, from the second it frees, from the third it draws out, and from the fourth it saves. And this division is taken from what is said in Isaiah, chapter thirty-one[^9]: *The Lord of hosts protects Judah and Jerusalem, protecting and freeing, passing over and saving.*

By comparison to the *effect* toward which it is, it is divided into prevenient and subsequent, or operating and cooperating, which are differences of grace according to the effects which it has upon the will itself. For grace is called *prevenient* insofar as it makes the will itself good; and so it prevents, because it is not from free choice, but rather is infused by God himself. But it is called *cooperating* or *subsequent* insofar as it assists free choice with respect to eliciting a good work.

And it is to be noted that, according as the name of grace is taken in diverse ways, so also are these two differences, *prevenient* and *subsequent*. For grace is taken in one way most broadly, and so it comprehends natural gifts and gratuitous gifts; for both are from above. And in this way grace can be divided into prevenient and subsequent, such that the natural gifts are called prevenient, but the gratuitous gifts subsequent; and so Gregory takes it in the *Morals*. — In another way grace is taken less commonly, and so it comprehends grace freely given and grace making pleasing; and then to divide grace into prevenient and subsequent is nothing other than to divide grace into freely given and making-pleasing. And so Bernard divides it, when he

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says that there is a certain grace which sows the thought, and this he calls prevenient grace; and a certain grace which perfects the good, and this he calls subsequent grace. For he says thus in the book *On Free Choice*[^10]: « These three God works in us, namely *to think, to will, and to accomplish*. The first he works without us, the second with us, and the third through us ». — And grace is also taken strictly, and so it comprehends grace making pleasing and glory; and then to divide grace into prevenient and subsequent is nothing other than to divide grace and glory. And so Augustine divides it in the book *On Nature and Grace*[^11], when he says: « Grace prevents, that we may live piously; it follows after, that we may always live with him. Now it prevents, that we may be called; then it follows after, that we may be glorified ». — And grace is also taken more strictly, and then it names grace making pleasing alone; and then to divide it by[^12] prevenient and subsequent is according to the twofold effect of grace, which can be distinguished in three ways: either so that one effect is against evil, and the other toward good; or so that both are toward good, but one belongs to grace insofar as it informs, the other insofar as it moves; or so that both are attributed to grace as moving, but one at the entrance, and the other in the advance. And so it is expounded in three ways by Augustine in the book *On Nature and Grace*[^13]. In one way thus: prevenient grace frees and prepares the will of man; but subsequent grace insofar as it assists that same will. In the second way thus: prevenient grace « prevents the will, that we may be healed; and follows after, that being healed we may be quickened ». In the third way thus: grace prevents the will, that it may will; and follows after, lest it will in vain. — And through this the response to the objections is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise the question is raised about what he says in the second chapter: *It must be premised that there are three kinds of goods. For some are great, some least, and some intermediate.* For it seems that this division of good is insufficient, since there are many other differences of goods. For there is the good of fortune and the good of nature and the good of grace and of glory. If you say that these differences are reduced to these; then it is asked under which of these is contained the good which God is, or the soul itself. If you say, under the great goods; on the contrary: those are great goods, as he says[^14], which cannot be ill used; but one can ill use God, as when he loves him for the sake of something else: therefore he is not contained under the great goods. Likewise it is argued from this: if God can be ill used, namely when he is referred to something else; and God is the best among all goods: therefore all goods can be ill used: therefore there are no great goods. Therefore he says something false, when he says that there are great goods which cannot be ill used. — Likewise, he seems to exemplify badly concerning the virtues; for someone can be proud of the virtues, and can also love the virtues for the sake of human praise; and this is to abuse them: therefore it seems that the virtues can be abused: therefore they cannot be contained under the great goods.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine, when he divides good by these three differences, namely by the greatest good, the intermediate[^15], and the lowest, does not take the division of good generally, but of that good which is good for someone, and this is the good through which one can in some way be ordered to an end; and therefore he here divides useful good. And on account of this, since there is a threefold difference of useful good, through which one is ordered to an end, he sets down a threefold difference of good. For something is so useful to an end that nevertheless without it one can attain the end, as are bodily goods. But something is so useful to an end that nevertheless[^16] without it one cannot attain the end; yet through it one can be turned away from the end, as is free choice, which can be ill used. Something is so useful that without it the end cannot be attained, nor through it can one in any way be turned away from the end, as is gratuitous virtue. And since in the first good there is least usefulness, in the second greater, and in the third greatest; hence it is that he divides good by these three differences, namely by least, intermediate, and great goods. — And the sufficiency of the division and the response to that which is objected concerning the highest good, which God is, are clear.

But to that which is objected, that the virtues can be ill used; it must be said that to use something is in many ways, as was said in the first book[^17], namely as an instrument and a directive habit, or as an object. In the first way it is in no way possible to ill use a virtue, because virtue, so far as is from itself, always directs toward good, nor is anything ever ordered toward evil through virtue.

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because « virtue is the good use of the will », as Augustine says[^18]. In the second way it is possible to ill use the virtues, nor is there anything so good, concerning which free choice cannot turn itself away, by loving it inordinately.

### Doubt III.

Likewise the question is raised about that account of virtue which he sets down in the text: *Virtue is a good quality of the mind* etc. For it seems that this notification can first be refuted from the *manner of predicating*. « For nothing which is predicated of another in the abstract has to be predicated of another in the concrete », as the Philosopher says[^19]: if therefore virtue is goodness, in no way is virtue to be said to be good. — Likewise the aforesaid definition is refuted from a *defect of convertibility* in predicating[^20], because this whole account can belong to grace and to gifts and to other habits of the soul. — Likewise it can be refuted from *falsity* in this which it says: *which God works in us without us*; for this is against Augustine, who says[^21] that « he who created you without you does not justify you without you ». And Bernard too says that to the work of our salvation two things concur, namely God and free choice.

In keeping with this the question is raised, since of one thing there is one definition[^22], and virtue itself is defined differently by different authors: how are those definitions distinguished?

**I respond:** It must be said that virtue is taken commonly, properly, and more properly. — According as it is taken commonly, so it comprehends moral and natural virtue; and so it has to be defined in two ways: either in comparison to the act, or in comparison to the act and the ultimate end. In the first way it is defined by the Philosopher in *On the Heavens and the World*[^23] when he says: « Virtue is the ultimate of a power with respect to a thing ». In the second way it is defined by the same in the seventh book of the *Physics*[^24]: « Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best ». For these two are notifications of virtue in its generality, insofar as it comprehends moral and natural virtue.

In another way virtue is considered properly, insofar as it comprehends moral virtue only, yet it is extended to the political and the gratuitous. And so it has to be considered in two ways: either by comparison to the act itself, or by comparison to the directive principle. If by comparison to the act, so it is defined by the Philosopher in the *Ethics*[^25]: « Virtue is a habit which perfects the one having it and renders his work good ». But by comparison to the directive principle it is thus defined by the same Philosopher in the same place[^26]: « Virtue is a voluntary habit consisting in the mean, determined by right reason, as the wise man will determine ». And according to this it is also defined by Tully[^27] in other words: « Virtue is a habit of mind consenting to reason after the manner of nature ». According to this twofold comparison moral virtue is defined by Augustine in other words, signifying the same thing, in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*[^28] thus: « Virtue is a habit of a well-composed mind »; in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul*[^29]: « Virtue is an equality of life, consenting to reason on every side ». These two notifications, if one attends, are really the same as the aforesaid, and both these and those belong to that virtue which is acquired through habituation.

In the third way virtue can be considered more properly, insofar as it is taken for gratuitous virtue; and so

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it can be compared in four ways, namely to the end, to the subject, to the act, and to its principle; according to the fourfold kind of cause, namely final, material, formal, and efficient. In comparison to the end it is thus defined by Augustine in the *Soliloquies*[^30]: « Virtue is right reason attaining to its end ». But in comparison to the subject, which it informs, which is the will itself, it is thus defined by the same in *On the City of God*[^31]: « Virtue is a good will ». But in comparison to the proper act or completion, that one is given from *On the Morals of the Church*[^32]: « Virtue is the order of love, or ordered love ». But in comparison to its effective principle is given that one which is set down by the Master in the text[^33]: « Virtue is a good quality of the mind » etc. In which definition, that which is said, *quality of the mind*, is set down for the genus, and three differences are subjoined. By this which is said, *by which one lives rightly*, it is separated from bodily goods. By this which is said, *which no one uses ill*, it is separated from spiritual and natural properties. But by this which is subjoined, *which God works in us without us*, it is separated from spiritual properties and from acquired habits, which, though they be good uses of the powers of the soul, are nevertheless not through infusion, but through acquisition. — And so the understanding of this definition and its distinction from others is clear.

To that which is objected, that it ought not to be called *good*, since it is *goodness*; it must be said that in first intentions there is a reflexive predication on account of simplicity. But this has no place in those things which are of a *determinate genus*, of which the Philosopher speaks; for it is not said: whiteness is white.

To that which is objected, that it is not convertible; it must be said that virtue is not here defined insofar as it is distinguished against gifts and other gratuitous habits, but insofar as under the name of virtue is enclosed every gratuitous quality of the soul. — Yet it could be said that by appropriation *to live rightly* belongs to the virtues, *readily* to the gifts, but *perfectly* to the beatitudes, as will be shown elsewhere.

To the last it must be said that *without us* does not deprive, on the side of free choice, the receptive disposition of virtue itself, but the effective power.

---

la: Gregorius, quod quidem nos sciamus, termino *gratiae praevenientis* et *subsequentis* in duplici sensu utitur, scil. ad significandam misericordiam, qua Deus nobis sua dona, sive naturalia sive supernaturalia, tribuit et custodit (IX. Moral. c. 53. n. 79. seqq.), et ad significandam pietatem, qua Deus « prius agit in nobis aliquid sine nobis, ut, subsequente quoque nostro libero arbitrio, bonum, quod iam appetimus, agat nobiscum » (XVI. Moral. c. 23. n. 30, XVIII. c. 40. n. 63, XXII. c. 9. n. 20. et XXXIII. c. 21. n. 38. seqq.). Forsitan modus dividendi gratiam, de quo hic S. Bonav. loquitur, insinuatur his verbis, quae leguntur loc. cit. VIII. c. 28. n. 47: Hominem Deus magnificat, quia largitate rationis dilat, infusione gratiae visitat (cfr. et loc. cit. XXXV. c. 17. n. 43.). Explicite tamen haec divisio gratiae habetur apud Richard. a S. Vict. (ab Alex. Hal. etiam cit. S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2.), qui in libro de Statu interioris hominis, tr. I. c. 20. ait: Sed alia potuit [primus homo] ex natura, et alia potuit ex gratia. Alia namque bona naturae, et alia sunt dona gratiae. Verumtamen et haec et illa constat esse ex gratia; nam ex gratia utique est ipsa natura. Prima itaque bona ex gratia praeveniente, secunda autem bona ex gratia subsequenti. Recte ergo et praeveniens et subsequens potest dici gratia; sed illa prima, ista secunda etc.

en: Gregory, so far at least as we know, uses the term *prevenient* and *subsequent grace* in a twofold sense, namely to signify the mercy by which God bestows and guards his gifts upon us, whether natural or supernatural (IX. *Morals* c. 53, n. 79 ff.), and to signify the loving-kindness by which God « first works something in us without us, so that, with our free choice also following after, he may work with us the good which we now desire » (XVI. *Morals* c. 23, n. 30; XVIII, c. 40, n. 63; XXII, c. 9, n. 20; and XXXIII, c. 21, n. 38 ff.). Perhaps the manner of dividing grace, of which St. Bonaventure here speaks, is hinted at in these words read in the cited place VIII, c. 28, n. 47: God magnifies man, because he enlarges him by the bounty of reason, and visits him by the infusion of grace (cf. also the cited place XXXV, c. 17, n. 43). Explicitly, however, this division of grace is found in Richard of St. Victor (also cited by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2), who in the book *On the State of the Interior Man*, tr. I, c. 20, says: But one thing [the first man] could do from nature, and another he could do from grace. For some goods are of nature, and others are gifts of grace. Yet it is established that both these and those are from grace; for the nature itself is certainly from grace. The first goods therefore are from prevenient grace, but the second goods from subsequent grace. Rightly therefore can grace be called both prevenient and subsequent; but the former the first, the latter the second etc.

la: Ut argumentatio valeat, supplendum est: ac praeveniens et subsequens.

en: That the argument may hold, this must be supplied: and prevenient and subsequent.

la: Codd. I V X Z dd et alii addunt *duorum*.

en: Codices I V X Z dd and others add *of the two*.

la: Scil., quia actiones sunt suppositorum.

en: Namely, because actions belong to supposits.

la: Cod. aa *potest dici*; edd., excepta I, *dicitur*.

en: Codex aa reads *can be called*; the editions, except I, read *is called*.

la: Vers. 30: Quos autem praedestinavit etc.

en: Verse 30: But whom he predestined etc.

la: Cap. 14. n. 47: Ipsa liberum excitat arbitrium, cum seminat cogitatum; sanat, cum immutat affectum; roborat, ut perducat ad actum; servat, ne sentiat defectum. Sic autem ista cum libero arbitrio operatur, ut tantum illud in primo praeveniat, in ceteris comitetur etc.

en: Chapter 14, n. 47: It itself rouses free choice, when it sows the thought; it heals, when it changes the affection; it strengthens, that it may lead through to the act; it preserves, lest it feel any defect. And it works thus with free choice, that it goes before it only in the first, and accompanies it in the rest etc.

la: Secuti codd. Y (F a secunda manu), hic adiecimus *extractionis*, quod deest in aliis edd. et codd. Sed quia in sequente explicatione quatuor membra divisionis enumerantur, et hoc membrum indicatur verbis *a tertio* [malo culpae] *extrahit*, probabilius nobis visum est, hic illud membrum iam in antiquis exemplaribus excidisse.

en: Following codices Y (F by a second hand), we have here added *of extraction*, which is wanting in the other editions and codices. But since in the following explanation the four members of the division are enumerated, and this member is indicated by the words *from the third* [the evil of fault] *it draws out*, it seemed to us more probable that this member had here already dropped out in the ancient copies.

la: Vers. 8: Sicut aves volantes, sic proteget Dominus exercituum Ierusalem, protegens etc. — Pro *Iudam* nonnulli codd. cum edd., excepta I (quae hoc verbum prorsus omittit), *Iudaeam*.

en: Verse 8: As birds flying, so will the Lord of hosts protect Jerusalem, protecting etc. — For *Judah* several codices with the editions, except I (which omits this word entirely), read *Judaea*.

la: Cap. 11. n. 46: Si ergo Deus tria haec, hoc est bonum cogitare, velle, perficere operatur in nobis: primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem nos praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem, sibi per consensum iungit etc. Cfr. supra pag. 669, nota 6.

en: Chapter 11, n. 46: If therefore God works in us these three, that is, to think, to will, and to accomplish the good: the first indeed he does without us, the second with us, the third through us. For by sending in the good thought he prevents us; and by also changing the evil will, he joins it to himself through consent etc. Cf. above p. 669, note 6.

la: Cap. 31. n. 35: Praevenit, ut vocemur; subsequetur, ut glorificemur: praevenit, ut pie vivamus; subsequetur, ut cum illo semper vivamus.

en: Chapter 31, n. 35: It prevents, that we may be called; it will follow after, that we may be glorified: it prevents, that we may live piously; it will follow after, that we may always live with him.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *in*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *into*.

la: Prima definitio insinuatur c. 12. n. 13, c. 26. n. 29, c. 34. n. 39, c. 63. n. 73; secunda ad verbum habetur c. 31. n. 35; tertia sententialiter c. 27. n. 31. De prima et tertia cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2. seqq., ubi plures alii textus Augustini afferuntur, quae ad complendas has definitiones iuvant. — In prima definitionum hic allatarum pro *eandem adiuvat*, quam lect. ex codd. F I K L O X bb cc et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. *eadem adiuvat*. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. seq.; B. Albert., d. 26. a. 6; Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 26. a. 7; Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 2. 3. 4.

en: The first definition is hinted at c. 12, n. 13; c. 26, n. 29; c. 34, n. 39; c. 63, n. 73; the second is had word for word c. 31, n. 35; the third in substance c. 27, n. 31. On the first and third cf. above the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2 ff., where several other texts of Augustine are adduced, which help to complete these definitions. — In the first of the definitions here adduced, for *assists that same will*, which reading we have restored from codices F I K L O X bb cc and edition 1, the Vatican reads *the same assists*. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2 f.; B. Albert, d. 26, a. 6; Peter of Tarentaise, II *Sent.* d. 26, a. 7; Giles of Rome, II *Sent.* d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, 3, 4.

la: Cap. 19. n. 22. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. II. q. 14. a. 3; I. q. 21. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

en: Chapter 19, n. 22. — St. Thomas, here, the single question a. 3; *Summa* I-II, q. 14, a. 3; I, q. 21, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.

la: Pro *medium*, quam lect. auctoritate codd. V aa bb, contextu hoc exigente, in textum recepimus, Vat. *minimum*. Immediate ante pro *maximum* codd. I V aa bb *magnum*.

en: For *intermediate*, which reading we have received into the text on the authority of codices V aa bb, the context requiring this, the Vatican reads *least*. Immediately before, for *greatest*, codices I V aa bb read *great*.

la: Cod. V omittit *tamen*.

en: Codex V omits *nevertheless*.

la: Dist. I. a. I. q. 2.

en: Distinction I, art. I, q. 2.

la: Libr. I. Retract. c. 9. n. 6. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 102. m. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Book I of the *Retractations*, c. 9, n. 6. See here the text of the Master, c. 4. — On this doubt cf. B. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 16, q. 102, m. 2; St. Thomas, here, concerning the text.

la: Hoc axioma deductum esse videtur ex II. Topic. c. 2, ubi modus assignatur, quo genus false praedicatur de suis inferioribus, quod fit, quando de ipsis praedicatur ut accidens. Praedicatur autem ut accidens aut explicite, « ut si quis albo dicat accidere colorem esse, non enim albo colorem esse accidit, sed genus eius color est »; aut implicite, per denominativam praedicationem, quae propria est accidenti, « ut si quis albedinem colorari [i. e. coloratam a colore] dixerit, vel ambulationem moveri; a nullo enim genere [quod praedicatur de suis inferioribus in abstractione v. g. color] denominative praedicatio [in qua praedicatum dicitur concrete v. g. coloratum] de specie dicitur, sed omnia univoce genera de speciebus praedicantur; nam et nomen et rationem generum suscipiunt species. Qui igitur coloratum dixit album, neque genus assignavit, quoniam denominative dixit, neque ut proprium vel ut definitionem; nam definitio et proprium nulli alii inest, sunt autem colorata et pleraque aliorum, ut lignum, lapis, homo, equus; manifestum igitur, quoniam ut accidens assignavit ». Cfr. tom. I. pag. 478, nota 1.

en: This axiom seems to be derived from II *Topics* c. 2, where is assigned the way in which a genus is falsely predicated of its inferiors, which happens when it is predicated of them as an accident. Now it is predicated as an accident either explicitly, « as if one should say that to be a color is accidental to the white, for to be a color is not accidental to the white, but its genus is color »; or implicitly, by a denominative predication, which is proper to an accident, « as if one should say that whiteness is colored [i.e. made colored by color], or that walking is moved; for from no genus [which is predicated of its inferiors in the abstract, e.g. color] is a denominative predication [in which the predicate is said concretely, e.g. colored] said of a species, but all genera are predicated univocally of their species; for the species receive both the name and the account of the genera. He therefore who called the colored white, neither assigned the genus, since he spoke denominatively, nor as a property or as a definition; for definition and property are in no other, but colored things and very many other things are, such as wood, stone, man, horse; it is manifest therefore that he assigned it as an accident ». Cf. vol. I, p. 478, note 1.

la: Quae secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2. (c. 3.) requiritur, ut definitio sit bona. — Pro *a defectu* codd. AY *quantum ad defectum*.

en: Which, according to Aristotle, VI *Topics* c. 2 (c. 3), is required that a definition be good. — For *from a defect* codices AY read *as to a defect*.

la: Serm. 169. (alias 13. de Verb. Apost.) c. 11. n. 13: Qui ergo fecit te etc. — Dictum Bernardi, quod hic respicitur, habetur in eius libro de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 14. n. 46. et sic sonat: A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis exordium, nec per nos utique, nec nobiscum; verum consensus et opus, etsi non ex nobis, non iam tamen sine nobis. Cfr. supra pag. 669, nota 6, ubi reperies alia verba, quae ibid. sequuntur.

en: Sermon 169 (otherwise 13, *On the Words of the Apostle*) c. 11, n. 13: He therefore who made you etc. — The saying of Bernard which is here regarded is had in his book *On Grace and Free Choice* c. 14, n. 46, and runs thus: From God therefore without doubt comes the beginning of our salvation, neither indeed through us, nor with us; but the consent and the work, although not from us, are nevertheless not now without us. Cf. above p. 669, note 6, where you will find other words which there follow.

la: Ut docet Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.).

en: As Aristotle teaches, VI *Topics* c. 3 (c. 4).

la: Libr. 1. text. 116. (c. 11.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 564, nota 7. Averroes in hunc locum ait: Manifestum est, quod potentia [virtus] eius non est definienda nisi per ultimum istius actionis.

en: Book I, text 116 (c. 11). Cf. vol. I, p. 564, note 7. Averroes on this passage says: It is manifest that its power [virtue] is not to be defined except by the ultimate of that action.

la: Text. 17. (c. 3.). Haec definitio est secundum translationem antiqui textus Graeci, quem textum simul cum translatione Latina nec non cum recentiore textu Graeco videsis in nova (Leon.) ed. oper. S. Thom. (tom. II. pag. 338). — Codd. et edd. falso allegant VII. Ethicorum, in quo libro agitur de continentia et virtute heroica, de voluptate et dolore, et in quo haec definitio non occurrit. At habetur II. Ethic. c. 6; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 20. (c. 22.); II. Moral. Eudem. c. 6. (c. 5.), quibus locis transfertur in virtutem moralem; dicit enim auctor, virtutem esse habitum disponentem ad optimum i. e. ad medium inter excessum et defectum secundum rectam rationem.

en: Text 17 (c. 3). This definition is according to the translation of the ancient Greek text, which text together with the Latin translation as well as with the more recent Greek text you may see in the new (Leonine) edition of the works of St. Thomas (vol. II, p. 338). — The codices and editions falsely allege VII *Ethics*, in which book there is treatment of continence and heroic virtue, of pleasure and pain, and in which this definition does not occur. But it is had in II *Ethics* c. 6; I of the *Great Morals* c. 20 (c. 22); II of the *Eudemian Morals* c. 6 (c. 5), in which places it is transferred to moral virtue; for the author says that virtue is a habit disposing toward the best, i.e. toward the mean between excess and defect according to right reason.

la: Libr. II. c. 6.

en: Book II, c. 6.

la: Loc. cit., ubi ad verbum sic ait: Virtus igitur est habitus electivus, in mediocritate quantum ad nos consistens, quae quidem mediocritas ratione praefinita sit atque ita, ut prudens praefiniret. — Pro *in medio* codd. B D E F I M X Y W aa et alii *in medietate*.

en: The cited place, where it says thus word for word: Virtue therefore is an elective habit, consisting in a mean as regards us, which mean is defined by reason and so as a prudent man would define it. — For *in the mean* codices B D E F I M X Y W aa and others read *in the middle*.

la: Libr. II. Rhet. c. 34: Virtus est animi habitus, naturae modo, rationi consentaneus. In Vat. legitur: Virtus est habitus mentis, naturae moderationi consentaneus.

en: Book II of the *Rhetoric* c. 34: Virtue is a habit of the soul, in the manner of nature, consonant with reason. In the Vatican is read: Virtue is a habit of mind, consonant with the moderation of nature.

la: Cap. 4.

en: Chapter 4.

la: Cap. 16. n. 27, ubi textus origin. et Vat. *consentientis* pro *consentiens*. — De hac et aliis definitionibus virtutis, quae hic occurrunt, vide III. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. seqq.

en: Chapter 16, n. 27, where the original text and the Vatican read *consenting* (gen.) for *consenting*. — On this and the other definitions of virtue which occur here, see III *Sent.* d. 33, q. 2 ff.

la: Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13: Et haec est vere perfecta virtus, ratio perveniens ad finem suum. — Paulo superius verbis *secundum quadruplex genus* ed. 1 praemittit *sic definitur ab eodem*.

en: Book I, c. 6, n. 13: And this is truly perfect virtue, reason attaining to its end. — A little above, before the words *according to the fourfold kind*, edition 1 prefixes *it is thus defined by the same*.

la: Libr. XIV. c. 6. seq., ubi explicans diversos voluntatis motus dicit, quod « si perversa est [voluntas], perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt ». Recti aut perversi erunt hi motus, prout obiecta bona aut mala appetunt. Qui appetit et amat bonum, secundum Deum et non secundum hominem vivit (a. v. virtuosus est); qui amat malum, malus est et vitiosus. Qui amat Deum et proximum et se ipsum propter Deum, a propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae. Cfr. ibid. c. 8. n. 2.

en: Book XIV, c. 6 f., where, explaining the diverse motions of the will, he says that « if it [the will] is perverse, it will have these motions perverse; but if it is right, they will be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy ». These motions will be right or perverse according as they desire good or evil objects. He who desires and loves the good lives according to God and not according to man (and so is virtuous); he who loves evil is evil and vicious. He who loves God and his neighbor and himself for the sake of God is, on account of this love, called of a good will. Cf. ibid. c. 8, n. 2.

la: Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. Vide supra pag. 558, nota 6. — Cod. X et paulo superius et paulo inferius verbis *datur illa* addit *Augustini*.

en: Book I, c. 15, n. 25. See above p. 558, note 6. — Codex X, both a little above and a little below, adds *of Augustine* to the words *that one is given*.

la: Libr. III. Sent. d. 34. p. I. a. I. q. 1. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 62. m. 2. seqq.; B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 103; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. seq.; S. I. II. q. 33. a. 1. seqq.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic circa litt. et a. 1. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1. seqq. et q. 1. a. 1.

en: Book III *Sent.* d. 34, p. I, a. I, q. 1. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 62, m. 2 ff.; B. Albert, here, a. 1; *Summa* p. II, tr. 16, q. 103; St. Thomas, here, q. 1, a. 1 f.; *Summa* I-II, q. 33, a. 1 ff.; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, here, concerning the text and a. 1, q. 1; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 1 ff. and q. 1, a. 1. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 668–672, PDF pp. 690–694, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 46660–46923. Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus drawn from the raw OCR per-page footer blocks, walked page by page.

**Structure:** Three doubts — DUB. I (operating/cooperating, prevenient/subsequent grace; the fourfold division of grace by principle/subject/opposite/effect), DUB. II (Augustine's threefold division of goods — great/intermediate/least), DUB. III (the account of virtue *Virtus est bona qualitas mentis*; the threefold reading of "virtue" — commonly/properly/more properly, and its definitions from Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine). `has_scholion: false` (Dubia carry no scholion).

**Page-split map (apparatus, 33 entries [^1]–[^33]):**
- **p.668** (DUB. I opener, R-col below a2-q3's SCHOLION): footer ⁴ Gregorius → **[^1]** (RECEIVED from a2-q3, which kept p.668 footers 1–3 = Iac.1,12 / Bernard.Epist.11 / proportionabilitatem as its [^17]–[^19]).
- **p.669** (DUB. I body): footers 1–8 → **[^2]–[^9]**.
- **p.670** (DUB. I tail + DUB. II): footers 1–8 → **[^10]–[^17]** (footers 1–3 = DUB. I Augustine/de Lib.Arb. notes; footers 4–8 = DUB. II).
- **p.671** (DUB. II tail + DUB. III): footers 1–12 → **[^18]–[^29]**.
- **p.672** (DUB. III tail): footers 1–3 → **[^30]–[^33]** (the p.672 footer block is physically interleaved in the raw OCR with DISTINCTIO XXVIII Cap. I–II footers because the two-column page-foot is shared across the d.27→d.28 boundary; the three DUB. III notes — *Hic c. 5* renders inline as the *Soliloquiis* ref [^30], *de Civitate Dei* [^31], *de Moribus Ecclesiae* [^32], and *Libr. III. Sent. d. 34* [^33] — were lifted by content, not raw-line order).

**Body seams:** 668→669 (*...cum nulla sit ante subiectum suum. ‖ Est igitur quaestio...*) clean DUB.I argument→Respondeo break; 669→670 (*...Et sic dividit Bernardus, cum di‖cit, quod quaedam est gratia...*) word-split mid-clause, grammatically continuous; 670→671 (*...ad bonum dirigit, nec unquam per virtutem aliquid ordinatur ad malum, ‖ quia «virtus est bonus usus voluntatis»...*) continuous; 671→672 (*...prout accipitur pro virtute gratuita; et sic qua‖drupliciter potest comparari...*) word-split mid-clause, continuous (all verified 450 dpi).

**Hand-offs:**
- RECEIVED from a2-q3: DUBIA opener (raw 46660, p.668 R-col) + p.668 DUB.I footer ⁴ Gregorius → placed as [^1].
- FORWARDED to d.28 (DISTINCTIO XXVIII, raw 46924, p.672 R-col): nothing — DUBIA closes cleanly at *...sed potestatem effectivam.* (p.672 R-col foot) above the DISTINCTIO XXVIII divider; d.28 Cap. I opens fresh. The shared p.672 page-foot was fully partitioned here (3 DUB.III notes taken; the *Libr. I. c. 6 n. 13* Soliloquies-Augustine and *Libr. XIV* de-Civ.-Dei notes that bleed into the d.28 raw block belong to DUB.III and were captured as [^30]/[^31]).

**`[?]` flags:** none. All readings resolved against 450 dpi PDF.

**Dup resolution:** the stray `bon-sent-II-d27-dubia-dup2` (auto-chunked raw 46814–46972) was NOT a misfiled sibling — it held the **continuation** of this same DUBIA (DUB. III body + tail, raw 46814–46923) plus over-run into DISTINCTIO XXVIII (raw 46924+). Its in-range content (DUB. III) is fully folded into this canonical chunk; the d.28 over-run is dropped (belongs to the future d.28 littera). `dup2` is `git rm`'d. d.27 has no missing dubia sibling — this is a genuine split-artifact duplicate, now merged.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0