title: Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum Verbum aeternum connotet aliquid ex parte creaturae.*

Secundo quaeritur de Verbi aeterni connotatione, et est quaestio, utrum Verbum aeternum connotet aliquid ex parte creaturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Psalmi[^1]: *Dixit et facta sunt*; et primo Genesis: *Dixit Deus: fiat, et factum est*: ergo cum dicere non sit aliud quam verbum proferre, et ad dicere sequatur facere, et ad facere ipsum factum, ergo ad verbum sequitur factum: ergo videtur, quod Verbum connotet aliquid creatum. Si tu dicas, hoc non esse dictum de dicere, prout accipitur aeternaliter et respondet ei Verbum aeternum[^2], sed prout accipitur temporaliter et respondet ei verbum creatum; contra: Augustinus undecimo *Confessionum*[^3]: «Verbo tibi coaeterno dicis quaecumque dicis, et fit quidquid dicis, nec aliter quam dicendo facis»: ergo videtur quod illud sit intelligendum de Verbo aeterno.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^4] tractans illud Evangelii: *In principio erat Verbum*, dicit: «Melius in hoc loco *Verbum* interpretamur, ut significetur non tantum ad Patrem respectus, sed etiam ad ea quae facta sunt operativa potentia»: ergo Verbum significat respectum ad facta. Sed constat, quod de Verbo aeterno loquitur, scilicet quod erat in principio.

3. Item, super illud Psalmi: *Semel locutus est Deus*, dicit Augustinus[^5]: id est, Filium genuit, in quo omnia disposuit. Si ergo Verbum importat non tantum generationem, immo etiam dispositionem omnium, ergo ad omnia dicit respectum.

4. Item, Anselmus in *Monologio*[^6]: «Cum summus Spiritus se ipsum dicit, dicit omnia quae facta sunt»: ergo eodem Verbo dicit se et creaturas. Sed Verbum dicit respectum ad illud quod per Verbum dicitur: ergo non tantum ad Patrem, sed etiam ad ea quae facta sunt dicit respectum: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Omne quod connotat temporale, dicitur temporaliter; sed Verbum non dicitur temporaliter in divinis, quia *in principio erat Verbum*[^7]: ergo Verbum non connotat temporale, quia omnis creatura vel creatum temporaliter incipit, accipiendo large tempus: ergo Verbum nihil connotat in comparatione ad creaturas. Si tu dicas, quod connotat in

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habitu, non in actu, sicut aeterna dispositio et praedestinatio; contra: si nunquam aliquid fieret vel fiendum esset, adhuc Pater se ipsum diceret, ergo et Verbum mente[^8] conciperet: ergo Verbum esset, si nunquam ulla creatura esset futura vel praesens: ergo etc.

2. Item, dicere Verbum est necessarium, quoniam, sicut in praecedentibus probatum fuit, distinctione sexta[^9], productio personae est necessaria; sed productio creaturae est voluntaria, unde cum producit eam, posset non producere. Si ergo simpliciter necessarium non claudit in se contingens, Verbum non dicit respectum aliquem ad creaturam.

3. Item, Creator et creatura summe sunt distantia, ergo in nullo communicant; si ergo Verbum Patris est unum, et summe unum, ergo illo Verbo cum dicatur Deus Pater, impossibile est creaturam dici. Ergo si creatura non dicitur illo Verbo, non ergo dicit respectum ad creaturam.

4. Item, si Verbum dicit respectum ad creaturam, ergo poterit dici Verbum creaturae; quod expresse negat Anselmus in *Monologio*[^10]: «Verbum quo creaturam dicit, nequaquam est Verbum creaturae». Si tu dicas mihi, quod dicit respectum ad dicentem principaliter, unde non potest dici nisi Verbum Patris; eadem ratione, cum Spiritus dicat respectum ad spirantem principaliter, non poterit dici: spiritus Moysis, vel spiritus Eliae; quod est contra Scripturam[^11].

5. Item, si dicit respectum ad creaturam, cum omne nomen, dicens respectum ad creaturam, sit essentiale, non personale; Verbum nullo modo dicitur personaliter; quod est contra praedeterminata[^12].

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Verbum aeternum importat etiam respectum ad creaturam per modum exemplaritatis dispositivae et virtutis operativae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum est, sicut dicit Anselmus[^13], quod tunc verbum dicitur vel generatur, quando mente similitudo vel imago alicuius cognoscibilis concipitur; et verbum illud respicit, quod respicit similitudo concepta. Quoniam igitur mens nostra non simul nec uno et eodem videt se et alia, ideo alio verbo dicit se, et alio alia, immo aliis: tot enim in ea sunt verba, quot intellecta. Summus autem Spiritus in Patre se et omnia uno aspectu et eodem cognoscit; et cum intelligit se et alia, cognoscit se ut aliorum principium. Et quia in ipso vis conceptiva concipit similitudinem, omnia circumplectentem sub intuitu uno sive aspectu, concipit sive generat unum Verbum, quod est similitudo Patris imitativa et similitudo rerum exemplativa et similitudo operativa; et ita tenet quasi medium, et dicitur Pater operari per Verbum; et ulterius ipsi Verbo attribuitur, quod sit Dei virtus et Dei sapientia[^14].

Et ita patet, quod Verbum divinum dicit respectum ad Patrem, dicentem ipsum, a quo generatur, per omnia consimilem. Dicit etiam respectum ad creaturam per modum exemplaritatis dispositivae et virtutis operativae. Et quia ista non dicunt respectum in actu, sed solum in habitu, dico, quod sicut exemplar dicit respectum in habitu, et potentia similiter — quia multa scit Deus et potest, quae non facit — sic et Verbum aeternum. Unde sicut supra[^15] dictum est de Dono, ita etiam nunc intelligendum de Verbo.

**Ad oppositum:**

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod dicit respectum; sed non connotat effectum actualiter. Unde prima ratio[^16], quae probat de effectu actuali, solvenda est, sicut in opponendo tactum est, quia ibi loquitur de dicere, secundum quod ei respondet verbum creatum, quod est quasi verbum prolatum; sed tamen illud dicere est per Verbum increatum, sicut Pater dicitur operari per Filium; et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, «quod aeterno Verbo dicis quaecumque dicis, et fit quidquid dicis». — Potest tamen dici, quod illud dicere est aeternum, et tantum valet, quantum disponere; sed hoc non dicit effectum, sed respectum in habitu; et hoc concessum est, quod Verbum dicit. Et quod iste sit intellectus Augustini, patet per litteram sequentem:

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«Et simul et sempiterne dicis. Nec tamen simul et sempiterna sunt[^17] quaecumque facis». Ex hac auctoritate patet veritas responsionis, quod Verbum dicit habitualem respectum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod nullum aeternum connotat temporale; dicendum, quod hoc verum est in actu; unde Verbum proprie loquendo non connotat effectum, sed dicit respectum non ad creaturam iam entem vel etiam tantum futuram, verum etiam possibilem fieri. Et sic patet responsio ad instantiam, quam adducit in contrarium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod productio Verbi est necessaria et aeterna, sed creaturae voluntaria; dicendum, quod quamvis actualis productio creaturae sit voluntaria, tamen potentia producendi et scientia est necessaria. Impossibile enim est, Deum non posse, et impossibile est, Deum nescire creaturas producere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non communicant in aliquo; dicendum, quod verum est de communitate essentiali et praedicatione; et hoc modo non communicant in Verbo, quia Verbum est Deus, non creatura; nihilominus tamen secundum aliquam rationem possunt habere respectum ad idem. Nihil enim impedit, quod unius et eiusdem Deus sit principium, et creatura sit effectus; et ita est de Verbo aeterno, quod dicit respectum ad Patrem ut ad principium, ad creaturam autem ut ad effectum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc poterit dici Verbum creaturae; dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex ratione nominis, verbum dicit respectum ut ad producentem, quia *illius verbum dicentis*; similiter *domini*: et quia principalis respectus, importatus per nomen, solum dicitur respectu personae, ideo nec Filius dicitur verbum creaturae, nec Spiritus sanctus donum creaturae. Et si tu obiicias de hoc nomine *spiritus*, dicendum, quod prout de spiritu Eliae dicitur, non accipitur ab actu personali — quia Spiritus sanctus dicitur spiritus Patris et Filii tantum — sed accipitur ab actu spirandi, de quo Ioannis tertio[^18]: *Spiritus, ubi vult spirat*; et iste est actus essentialis. Unde sicut dicitur Deus Eliae quia fovet Eliam, vel ab aliquo alio actu, ita spiritus Eliae, quia spirat Eliae; ita etiam posset dici spiritus sanctus Eliae, sicut dicitur Danielis decimo tertio[^19]: *Suscitavit Deus spiritum sanctum pueri iunioris*. Nec hoc est contra Magistrum, quia ipse loquitur de Spiritu sancto, prout est nomen impositum a proprietate personali. Et magis determinatum est illud totale nomen, quod stet pro persona, quam hoc nomen *spiritus* per se; ideo frequentius invenimus spiritum dici alicuius hominis quam spiritum sanctum alicuius hominis. Attamen invenitur alicubi, quia, sicut dicitur spiritus Eliae, quia in eum spirat et inspirat[^20], ita et spiritus sanctus Eliae, quia ei sancta inspirat. Et ideo fortassis ibi[^21] dictum est, quod suscitavit spiritum sanctum, quia non fuit ad futura praedicendum, sed ad iniquum iudicium retractandum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nomen dicens respectum ad creaturam non est notionale; dicendum, quod verum est, si illum pure dicat; sed Verbum non tantum ipsum dicit nec principaliter dicit, sed principaliter dicit respectum ad Patrem, sicut et de Dono dictum est[^22]. Magis autem Filius et Spiritus sanctus nominantur nominibus dicentibus respectum ad creaturam quam Pater, quoniam secundum rationem intelligendi et appropriandi quasi medium sunt inter nos et Deum, et secundum rationem appropriandi sunt reducentes ad Deum. Unde secundum Augustinum[^23]: «Pater est principium, ad quod reducimur; Filius forma, quam sequimur; et Spiritus sanctus gratia, qua reconciliamur». Unde et ipsi magis proprie nobis dari dicuntur quam Pater.

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### Question II. *Whether the eternal Word connotes anything on the side of the creature.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the connotation of the eternal Word, and the question is whether the eternal Word connotes anything on the side of the creature. And that it does, is shown:

1. First, by the authority of the Psalm[^1]: *He spoke and they were made*; and from the first chapter of Genesis: *God said: Let it be made, and it was made*: therefore, since to say is nothing other than to utter a word, and since making follows upon saying, and the thing made follows upon making, therefore the thing made follows upon the word: therefore it seems that the Word connotes something created. If you say that this is not said of saying as it is taken eternally and corresponds to the eternal Word[^2], but as it is taken temporally and corresponds to the created word; on the contrary: Augustine in the eleventh book of the *Confessions*[^3]: «By a Word coeternal with thee thou sayest whatever thou sayest, and whatever thou sayest comes to be, nor in any other way than by speaking dost thou make»: therefore it seems that this is to be understood of the eternal Word.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions*[^4], treating that text of the Gospel: *In the beginning was the Word*, says: «Better in this place do we interpret *Word*, so that there is signified not only relation to the Father, but also operative power toward those things which have been made»: therefore the Word signifies relation to things made. But it is clear that he is speaking of the eternal Word, namely that which was in the beginning.

3. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm: *God hath spoken once*, Augustine says[^5]: that is, He begot the Son, in whom He disposed all things. If therefore the Word imports not only generation, but also the disposition of all things, then it bears a relation to all things.

4. Likewise, Anselm in the *Monologion*[^6]: «When the supreme Spirit speaks Himself, He speaks all things which have been made»: therefore by the same Word He speaks Himself and creatures. But the Word bears a relation to that which is spoken through the Word: therefore not only to the Father, but also to those things which have been made does it bear a relation: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Everything which connotes a temporal thing is said temporally; but the Word is not said temporally in divine matters, because *in the beginning was the Word*[^7]: therefore the Word does not connote anything temporal, since every creature or created thing temporally begins, taking *time* broadly: therefore the Word connotes nothing in relation to creatures. If you say that it connotes in

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habit, not in act, like the eternal disposition and predestination; on the contrary: if nothing were ever made or to be made, the Father would still speak Himself, and so would conceive the Word in His mind[^8]: therefore the Word would be, even if no creature were ever to be future or present: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, to speak the Word is necessary, since, as was proved in what precedes, in distinction six[^9], the production of a Person is necessary; but the production of a creature is voluntary, whence when He produces it, He could not produce it. If therefore the simply necessary does not include in itself the contingent, the Word does not bear any relation to the creature.

3. Likewise, the Creator and the creature are most distant, therefore in nothing do they share; if therefore the Word of the Father is one, and supremely one, then by that Word, since God the Father is spoken, it is impossible for a creature to be spoken. Therefore if a creature is not spoken by that Word, then it does not bear a relation to the creature.

4. Likewise, if the Word bears a relation to the creature, then it could be called the Word of the creature; which Anselm expressly denies in the *Monologion*[^10]: «The Word by which He speaks the creature is in no way the Word of the creature». If you say to me that it bears a relation principally to the speaker, and so cannot be called anything but the Word of the Father; for the same reason, since the Spirit bears a relation principally to the spirator, it could not be said: the spirit of Moses, or the spirit of Elias; which is contrary to Scripture[^11].

5. Likewise, if it bears a relation to the creature, since every name bearing a relation to the creature is essential, not personal; the Word would in no way be said personally; which is contrary to what has been determined above[^12].

> **CONCLUSION.** *The eternal Word also imports a relation to the creature by way of dispositive exemplarity and operative power.*

**I respond:** It must be said, as Anselm says[^13], that a word is then spoken or generated, when in the mind a likeness or image of some knowable thing is conceived; and that word looks toward what the conceived likeness looks toward. Since therefore our mind does not see itself and other things together, nor by one and the same act, it speaks itself by one word, and other things by another, indeed by others: for there are as many words in it as things understood. But the supreme Spirit in the Father knows Himself and all things by one and the same gaze; and when He understands Himself and other things, He knows Himself as the principle of others. And because in Him the conceiving power conceives a likeness embracing all things under one intuition or gaze, He conceives or generates one Word, which is the imitative likeness of the Father and the exemplative likeness of things and the operative likeness; and so it holds, as it were, a middle place, and the Father is said to operate through the Word; and further it is attributed to the Word itself that it is the power of God and the wisdom of God[^14].

And so it is clear that the divine Word bears a relation to the Father, who speaks it, by whom it is generated, in all things like Him. It also bears a relation to the creature by way of dispositive exemplarity and operative power. And because these do not bespeak relation in act, but only in habit, I say that, just as exemplar bespeaks relation in habit, and so does power — because God knows and can do many things which He does not — so also the eternal Word. Hence as was said above[^15] of the Gift, so likewise it is now to be understood of the Word.

**To the opposite arguments:**

The arguments proving that it bears a relation are therefore to be conceded; but it does not connote an effect actually. Hence the first argument[^16], which proves about an actual effect, is to be solved as was touched on in the objection, because there it speaks of saying according as the created word — which is, as it were, an uttered word — corresponds to it; but nevertheless that saying is through the uncreated Word, just as the Father is said to operate through the Son; and this is what Augustine says, «that by an eternal Word thou sayest whatever thou sayest, and whatever thou sayest comes to be». — Yet it can be said that that saying is eternal, and amounts to as much as disposing; but this does not bespeak an effect, but rather relation in habit; and this has been conceded, that the Word bespeaks. And that this is the meaning of Augustine, is clear from the following text:

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«And both together and eternally thou sayest. Nor however are they together and eternal[^17] whatsoever things thou makest». From this authority is plain the truth of the response, that the Word bespeaks habitual relation.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that nothing eternal connotes a temporal thing; it must be said that this is true in act; whence the Word, properly speaking, does not connote an effect, but bespeaks relation not to a creature already existing, or even merely future, but also to one that is possible to be made. And so the response to the instance which is brought against it is plain.

2. To that which is objected, that the production of the Word is necessary and eternal, but that of the creature voluntary; it must be said that, although the actual production of the creature is voluntary, nevertheless the power of producing and the knowledge are necessary. For it is impossible that God should not be able, and impossible that God should not know how to produce creatures.

3. To that which is objected, that they share in nothing; it must be said that this is true of essential community and predication; and in this way they do not share in the Word, because the Word is God, not a creature; nevertheless, according to a certain account, they can have relation to the same thing. For nothing prevents that God should be the principle of one and the same thing, and that the creature should be its effect; and so it is with the eternal Word, which bears a relation to the Father as to a principle, but to the creature as to an effect.

4. To that which is objected, that then it could be called the Word of the creature; it must be said that, as is plain from the meaning of the name, *word* bears a relation as to the producer, because it is *the word of the speaker*; likewise *of the lord*: and because the principal relation imported by the name is said only with respect to the person, therefore neither is the Son called the word of the creature, nor the Holy Spirit the gift of the creature. And if you object concerning this name *spirit*, it must be said that as it is said of the spirit of Elias, it is not taken from a personal act — because the Holy Spirit is called the spirit of the Father and of the Son only — but is taken from the act of breathing, of which John in the third chapter[^18]: *The Spirit breathes where He wills*; and this is an essential act. Hence as God is called the God of Elias because He cherishes Elias, or from some other act, so the spirit of Elias, because He breathes upon Elias; thus it could also be said the Holy Spirit of Elias, as is said in Daniel chapter thirteen[^19]: *God raised up the holy spirit of the younger boy*. Nor is this against the Master, because he is speaking of the Holy Spirit as it is a name imposed from the personal property. And that total name, which stands for a person, is more determinate than this name *spirit* by itself; therefore we more frequently find a spirit said of some man than a holy spirit of some man. Yet it is found in some places, because, just as the spirit of Elias is so called because He breathes and inspires upon him[^20], so also the Holy Spirit of Elias, because He inspires holy things into him. And therefore perhaps it was said there[^21] that He raised up the holy spirit, because it was not for predicting future things, but for retracting an iniquitous judgment.

5. To that which is objected, that a name bearing a relation to the creature is not notional; it must be said that this is true if it bespeaks it purely; but the Word does not only bespeak it, nor does it bespeak it principally, but principally it bespeaks the relation to the Father, as has also been said of the Gift[^22]. The Son and the Holy Spirit are however more named by names bespeaking a relation to the creature than the Father, since by the account of understanding and appropriation they are, as it were, a middle between us and God, and by the account of appropriation they are reducing us to God. Whence according to Augustine[^23]: «The Father is the principle, to whom we are reduced; the Son the form, whom we follow; and the Holy Spirit the grace, by which we are reconciled». Whence also they themselves are more properly said to be given to us than the Father.

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la: Ps. 32, 9, et 148, 5. — In Vat. desiderantur verba a *et primo Genesis: Dixit Deus: fiat, et factum est*.

en: Ps. 32:9, and 148:5. — In the Vatican edition the words from *and from the first chapter of Genesis: God said: Let it be made, and it was made* are missing.

la: Sic codd.; Vat. omittit ante *esse dictum* particulam *non*, et deinde etiam verba: *prout accipitur aeternaliter, et respondet ei Verbum aeternum*, sed.

en: Thus the codices; the Vatican omits before *esse dictum* the particle *non*, and likewise the words: *as it is taken eternally and corresponds to the eternal Word*, but.

la: Cap. 7, n. 9, ubi originale: *Verbo Tibi coaeterno simul et sempiterne dicis omnia quae dicis, et fit quidquid dicis ut fiat, nec aliter quam dicendo facis, nec tamen et simul et sempiterne fiunt omnia quae dicendo facis*.

en: Chapter 7, n. 9, where the original reads: *By a Word coeternal with thee, together and eternally thou sayest all that thou sayest, and whatever thou sayest comes to be, that it should come to be, nor in any other way than by speaking dost thou make, nor however do all the things which by speaking thou makest come to be together and eternally*.

la: Quaest. 63. In originali ultima verba textus citati sunt: *sed ad illa etiam, quae per Verbum facta sunt, operativa potentia*.

en: Question 63. In the original the last words of the cited text are: *but also toward those things which through the Word were made, an operative power*.

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 61. v. 12. n. 18; non ad verbum, sed ad sensum.

en: Commentary on Psalm 61, v. 12, n. 18; not word for word, but as to the sense.

en: Chapter 34.

en: John 1:1.

la: Cod. T omittit *mente*, et subinde pro *illa* substituit *aliqua*.

en: Codex T omits *mente*, and thereafter substitutes *aliqua* for *illa*.

la: Quaest. 1. — Paulo post pro *voluntaria* sola Vat. *contingens*, quam immutationem textus eadem Vat. facit etiam infra in solutione huius obiectionis.

en: Question 1. — A little later, for *voluntaria* the Vatican alone reads *contingens*, which textual change the same Vatican edition makes also below in the solution to this objection.

en: Chapter 33.

la: *Num.* 11, 17. et 25, de quo vide supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 1, d. 18. dub. 6. De spiritu Eliae cfr. IV. Reg. 2, 9. et 15. Cfr. etiam lit. Magistri, d. XVIII. c. 4. et 5.

en: *Numbers* 11:17 and 25, on which see above d. 17. p. II. dub. 1, d. 18. dub. 6. On the spirit of Elias, see IV Kings 2:9 and 15. See also the text of the Master, d. XVIII. c. 4 and 5.

la: In quaest. praeced.

en: In the preceding question.

la: *Monolog.* c. 31. 33. Propositiones sequentes summam continent eorum quae Anselmus loc. cit. c. 32-36 docet. — Vat. perperam *Augustinus* pro *Anselmus*.

en: *Monologion*, cc. 31, 33. The following propositions contain a summary of what Anselm in the cited place, cc. 32–36, teaches. — The Vatican wrongly has *Augustine* for *Anselm*.

en: Cf. I Cor. 1:24; and below d. 32. a. 2. q. 2.

la: Dist. 18, praesertim q. 2. et 5.

en: Distinction 18, especially q. 2 and 5.

la: Vide fundam. 1, ubi et integer textus Augustini, qui deinde occurrit. — Paulo inferius cod. cc *actualem* pro *actualiter*.

en: See foundation 1, where also the entire text of Augustine, which then occurs. — A little later codex cc reads *actualem* for *actualiter*.

la: Pro *sunt*, quod auctoritate omnium codd. et edd. posuimus, Vat. cum originali *fiunt*. Mox pro *habitualem* multi codd. ut C H L M R S T U V Y Z bb *habitudinalem*, et codd. A G L O *habitudinem*; non recte; vide supra pag. 325, nota 10.

en: For *sunt*, which on the authority of all the codices and editions we have placed, the Vatican with the original reads *fiunt*. Soon for *habitualem* many codices, as C H L M R S T U V Y Z bb, read *habitudinalem*, and codices A G L O *habitudinem*; not rightly; see above p. 325, note 10.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8.

la: Dan. 13, 45: *Suscitavit Dominus spiritum sanctum pueri iunioris, cuius nomen Daniel*.

en: Dan. 13:45: *The Lord raised up the holy spirit of the younger boy, whose name was Daniel*.

la: Vers. 45. — Actus spirandi, de quo S. Doctor loquitur paulo superius, idem accipiendus est ac actus inspirandi. — Post verba *de quo*, quae proxime sequuntur, ed. 1 subiicit *dicitur*; idem verbum Vat. praeter auctoritatem codd. mox repetit post *ita*. Deinde pro *spirat Eliae* cod. *inspiratur Eliae*, et ed. 1 *inspirat Eliae*. — De etymologia vocis *Deus* vide supra pag. 60, nota 2.

en: Verse 45. — The act of breathing (*spirandi*) of which the holy Doctor speaks a little above is to be taken as the same as the act of inspiring (*inspirandi*). — After the words *de quo*, which follow next, edition 1 inserts *dicitur*; the Vatican repeats the same word, against the authority of the codices, after *ita*. Then for *spirat Eliae* a codex reads *inspiratur Eliae*, and edition 1 *inspirat Eliae*. — On the etymology of the word *Deus* see above p. 60, note 2.

la: Cod. T *inspiratur*.

en: Codex T reads *inspiratur*.

en: Above d. 18. q. 4 and 5.

la: *De Vera Religione*, c. 55. n. 113, ubi originale *recurrimus* pro *reducimur*. — Paulo ante codd. P Q tum post *et Deum*, tum post *ad Deum* addunt *Patrem*.

en: *On True Religion*, c. 55, n. 113, where the original reads *recurrimus* for *reducimur*. — A little before, codices P Q add *Patrem* both after *et Deum* and after *ad Deum*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In respons. distinguitur in Verbo triplex similitudo, scilicet Patris imitativa (expressiva), rerum creatarum exemplativa, et earundem operativa. Haec accepta sunt ex August., 83 *Quaest.* q. 63, et approbata ab Alex., S. p. I. q. 62. m. 1. a. 3, et ab Angelico, S. q. 34. a. 3; cfr. etiam quaest. seq. ad 2. argum. 1. — Pro fundam. eget explicatione quae fit in respons. dupliciter, incipiendo a verbis: *Concedendae igitur sunt*. Pro tota quaestione cfr. supra d. 18. q. 5, et pro solut. ad 1. ibid. q. 6.

**II.** Cum hac quaestione cohaeret controversia quaedam praecipue inter scholam Thomisticam et Scotisticam agitata, scilicet ex qua cognitione producatur Verbum, utrum ex aliqua cognitione actuali essentiae personarum et creaturarum, an ex praesupposita cognitione divinae essentiae et personarum, non autem creaturarum; et utrum ista cognitio praesupponatur ut principium *quo* Verbi, an solum ordine naturae praesupponatur, quin sit principium productionis. Haec differentia oritur ex illo diverso modo loquendi, de quo in Scholio ad praeced. quaest. locuti sumus. S. Bonav. ad utramque partem trahitur a suis interpretibus, qui verba egregia (in corp.): *Summus autem Spiritus* etc. sibi favere ex utraque parte putant. Probabilius autem (ut nobis videtur) Barth. de Barberiis (disput. 14. q. 9.) asserit, eum ad modum Scoti loqui. Sed res exigui est momenti.

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**III.** In ipsa quaestione solvenda omnes consentire videntur. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 62. m. I. a. i. — Scot., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3; *Report.* hic q. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. q. 34. a. 3, et q. 37. a. 2. ad 3. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. I. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 10; S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 35. m. 3. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. Med., a hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 59. q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. circa finem. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the response there is distinguished in the Word a threefold likeness, namely the imitative (expressive) likeness of the Father, the exemplative likeness of created things, and the operative likeness of the same. These are taken from Augustine, 83 *Questions*, q. 63, and approved by Alexander, *Summa* p. I. q. 62. m. 1. a. 3, and by the Angelic Doctor, *Summa* q. 34. a. 3; see also the following question, reply to argument 1. — As to the foundation, it requires the explanation which is given in the response in two ways, beginning with the words: *The arguments are therefore to be conceded*. For the whole question, see above d. 18. q. 5, and for the solution to the first, ibid. q. 6.

**II.** With this question coheres a certain controversy, agitated chiefly between the Thomistic and Scotistic schools, namely from what cognition the Word is produced — whether from some actual cognition of the essence, of the persons, and of creatures, or from a presupposed cognition of the divine essence and persons, but not of creatures; and whether this cognition is presupposed as the principle *by which* of the Word, or only in the order of nature is presupposed, without being the principle of production. This difference arises from that diverse manner of speaking of which we spoke in the Scholion to the preceding question. St. Bonaventure is drawn to either side by his interpreters, who think that the excellent words (in the body): *But the supreme Spirit* etc. favor them on either side. More probably however (as it seems to us) Barth. de Barberiis (*disput.* 14. q. 9.) asserts that he speaks after the manner of Scotus. But the matter is of small moment.

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**III.** In the resolution of the question itself all seem to agree. Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I. q. 62. m. I. a. i. — Scotus, on this and the following questions, here q. 3; *Reportata*, here q. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3; *Summa* q. 34. a. 3, and q. 37. a. 2. ad 3. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, I. *Sent.* d. 28. a. 10; *Summa* p. I. tr. 8. q. 35. m. 3. a. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 3. — Richardus Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. *princ.* q. 4. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 59. q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3. near the end. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following questions, here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III. *Quae sit comparatio Verbi ad sapientiam sive notitiam.*

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione Verbi ad sapientiam. Et cum Filius sit verbum et sapientia, quaeritur, quod istorum sit prius secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod sapientia prior sit, videtur.

1. Augustinus, nono *de Trinitate* capitulo decimo[^1]: «Verbum est cum amore notitia»: ergo verbum secundum rationem intelligendi addit supra notitiam; sed quod se habet per additionem ad aliquid, praesupponit illud: ergo etc.

2. Item, notitia dicit essentiale, sed verbum personale: ergo cum essentiale sit communius, et omne communius secundum rationem intelligendi sit prius[^2]: ergo etc.

3. Item, verbum dicit respectum ad creaturas, sapientia autem dicit quid absolutum de ratione sui nominis: ergo cum absolutum secundum rationem intelligendi sit prius respectivo[^3], ergo et sapientia [prior] quam verbum.

**Contra:** 1. Ecclesiastici primo[^4]: *Fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis*; fons dicit rationem principii: ergo verbum est principium sapientiae. Sed quod est principium, est prius secundum rationem intelligendi: necessario ergo verbum prius quam sapientia.

2. Item, «Verbum, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^5], dicit operativam potentiam»; sed potentia, sicut dicit Richardus, secundum rationem intelligendi prior est quam sapientia: ergo etc.

3. Item, verbum dicit similitudinem interius conceptam, sapientia dicit habitum vel habilitatem ad cognoscendum[^6]; sed conceptio similitudinis et speciei praecedit ipsam habilitatem: ergo et verbum praecedit sapientiam in intelligendo.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum Filius dicatur verbum et sapientia, propter quid sapientia solum est appropriatum, non proprium, verbum autem est proprium. — Et iterum, cum Filius sit filius et imago et verbum proprie, quaeritur, quae sit differentia istorum nominum. Si enim non est differentia nisi in voce, tunc videntur esse nomina synonyma.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Secundum rationem intelligendi intellectus sapientiae et notitiae est prior intellectu verbi.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in intellectu verbi importantur istae conditiones, scilicet intelligentis cognitio, similitudinis conceptio et alicuius expressio. Et hoc patet, si consideremus generationem verbi secundum Anselmum in suo *Monologio*[^7], qui dicit sic: «Cum cogito notum hominem absentem, formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem imaginem eius, qualem illam per visum oculorum in memoriam attraxi; quae imago in cogitatione verbum est eiusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico.

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Habet igitur mens rationalis, cum cogitando se intelligit, secum imaginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui, ad sui similitudinem quasi sua impressione formatam; quae imago eius verbum est. Hoc itaque modo quis neget summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem, id est Verbum suum?» Verbum autem non est aliud quam similitudo expressa et expressiva, concepta vi spiritus intelligentis, secundum quod se vel aliud intuetur.

Unde patet, quod intellectus verbi praesupponit intellectum notitiae et generationis et imaginis: intellectum notitiae in intuitu spiritus intelligentis, intellectum generationis in conceptione interiori, intellectum imaginis in similitudine per omnia conformi, et superaddit his omnibus intellectum expressionis.

Quoniam igitur intuitus intelligentis non dicit respectum, ideo ipsa sapientia et notitia non dicit proprium. Sed quoniam conceptio et similitudo dicunt respectum, ideo necesse est, tam nomen filii quam imaginis, quam etiam verbi proprie dici.

Et rursus patet ordo in dicendo, et patet etiam differentis modi dicendi ratio. Nam sapientia vel notitia dicit primum in intelligendo: deinde filius, qui dicit ipsam emanationem sive conceptionem, deinde imago, quae dicit modum expressum emanandi, et tertio loco verbum, quod dicit haec omnia, et superaddit rationem exprimendi et manifestandi.

His visis, facile est ad obiecta respondere. Concedo enim, quod secundum rationem intelligendi intellectus notitiae et sapientiae est prior.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum est fons sapientiae; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur de sapientia creata.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicit potentiam operativam; dicendum, quod Verbum, etsi habeat omnipotentiam, sicut Pater, tamen ipsum Verbum non dicit potentiam operativam de ratione sui nominis, nisi in quantum illa potentia est operativa praevia dispositione; et quoniam dispositio est actus sapientiae, ideo sapientia prior in intelligendo est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est prior habilitate in intelligendo; dicendum, quod istud verum est in quibus est sapientia per acquisitionem, sicut in nobis; sed non sic in Deo, immo e converso, quia ex intuitu mentis summe sapientis oritur Verbum, quod dicitur esse summa sapientia, ita quod similitudo concepta non dat sapientiam concipienti, immo magis accipit. Quod ultimo quaeritur, iam determinatum est.

english:
### QUESTION III. *What the comparison of the Word to wisdom or knowledge is.*

Thirdly the question is raised concerning the comparison of the Word to wisdom. And since the Son is both Word and wisdom, the question is raised which of these is prior according to the account of understanding. And that wisdom is prior, [it] seems thus.

1. Augustine, in book nine of *On the Trinity*, chapter ten[^1]: «A word is knowledge with love»: therefore the word, according to the account of understanding, adds something over knowledge; but that which stands by addition to something, presupposes it: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, knowledge bespeaks something essential, but the word [something] personal: therefore since the essential is more common, and everything more common is, according to the account of understanding, prior[^2]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the word bespeaks a relation to creatures, while wisdom bespeaks something absolute according to the account of its name: therefore since the absolute is, according to the account of understanding, prior to the relative[^3], therefore wisdom too [is prior] to the word.

**On the contrary:** 1. Ecclesiasticus chapter one[^4]: *The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high*; fountain bespeaks the account of a principle: therefore the Word is the principle of wisdom. But that which is a principle is prior according to the account of understanding: therefore necessarily the Word is prior to wisdom.

2. Likewise, «the Word, as Augustine says in the book of *Eighty-three Questions*[^5], bespeaks operative power»; but power, as Richard says, is according to the account of understanding prior to wisdom: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the word bespeaks a likeness inwardly conceived, [while] wisdom bespeaks a habit or aptitude for knowing[^6]; but the conception of a likeness and species precedes the aptitude itself: therefore the word too precedes wisdom in [the order of] understanding.

Alongside this it is asked, since the Son is called Word and wisdom, why wisdom alone is appropriated and not proper, while word is proper. — And again, since the Son is properly Son and image and word, it is asked what the difference among these names is. For if there is no difference except in the spoken sound, then they seem to be synonymous names.

> **CONCLUSION.** *According to the account of understanding the understanding of wisdom and knowledge is prior to the understanding of the word.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in the understanding of *word* these conditions are imported, namely the cognition of the one understanding, the conception of a likeness, and the expression of something. And this is plain if we consider the generation of the word according to Anselm in his *Monologion*[^7], who speaks thus: «When I think of a known man who is absent, the gaze of my thought is formed into such an image of him as I drew into memory through the sight of the eyes; and this image in thought is the word of the same man whom in thinking I speak. The rational mind therefore has, when by thinking it understands itself, with itself an image of itself born of itself, that is, a thought of itself, formed to its own likeness as if by its own impress; and this image of itself is its word. In this way then who would deny that the highest wisdom, when by speaking [itself] it understands itself, begets a likeness consubstantial with itself, that is, its Word?» But the word is nothing other than a likeness expressed and expressive, conceived by the power of the understanding spirit, according as it gazes upon itself or upon another.

Whence it is plain that the understanding of *word* presupposes the understanding of knowledge and of generation and of image: the understanding of knowledge in the gaze of the understanding spirit, the understanding of generation in the inward conception, the understanding of image in a likeness conformed in all things, and it superadds to all these the understanding of expression.

Since therefore the gaze of the one understanding does not bespeak a relation, on this account wisdom and knowledge themselves do not bespeak something proper. But since conception and likeness do bespeak a relation, on this account it is necessary that the name of *son*, of *image*, and also of *word* be said properly.

And again the order in speaking [these names] is plain, and the account of the differing mode of speaking is also plain. For *wisdom* or *knowledge* bespeaks what is first in [the order of] understanding; then *son*, which bespeaks the very emanation or conception; then *image*, which bespeaks the expressed mode of emanating; and in the third place *word*, which bespeaks all these, and superadds the account of expressing and manifesting.

These things seen, it is easy to reply to the objections. For I concede that according to the account of understanding the understanding of knowledge and of wisdom is prior.

1. To that which is objected, that the Word is the fountain of wisdom; it must be said that this is understood of created wisdom.

2. To that which is objected, that [the word] bespeaks operative power; it must be said that the Word, although he have omnipotence, as the Father does, nevertheless the Word himself does not bespeak operative power according to the account of his name, except insofar as that power is operative by a previous disposition; and since disposition is the act of wisdom, therefore wisdom is prior in [the order of] understanding.

3. To that which is objected, that the likeness is prior to the aptitude in [the order of] understanding; it must be said that this is true in those in whom wisdom comes by acquisition, as in us; but it is not so in God, but rather conversely, since from the gaze of a most wise mind there arises the Word, who is said to be the highest wisdom, in such a way that the conceived likeness does not give wisdom to the one conceiving but rather receives [it]. As to what is asked last, it has already been determined.

la: *Num.* 15. — Aliqui codd. cum Vat. paulo superius *prius* pro *prior*, et paulo inferius *aliud* pro *aliquid*.

en: *N.* 15. — Some codices with the Vatican [edition] [read], a little above, *prius* in place of *prior*, and a little below *aliud* in place of *aliquid*.

la: Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 3 (c. 4.) ait: *Haec* (genus et differentiae) *autem simpliciter notiora et priora sunt specie; interimit enim genus et differentia speciem, quare priora haec specie. Sunt autem notiora; nam specie quidem nota, necesse est genus et differentias cognosci; qui hominem enim cognoscit, et animal gressibile cognoscit; at genere et differentia notis, non necesse est et speciem cognosci; quare ignotior species*. — Paulo ante pro *omne*, quod ex mss. B O P Q reposuimus, Vat. *esse*.

en: Under this respect Aristotle, VI *Topics* c. 3 (c. 4), says: *These* (genus and differences) *however are simply more known and prior to the species; for the genus and difference do away with the species, on which account these are prior to the species. And they are more known; for when the species is known, it is necessary that the genus and differences be known; for whoever knows man, also knows walking animal; but when the genus and difference are known, it is not necessary that the species also be known; on which account the species is the less known*. — A little before, in place of *omne*, which we have restored from MSS. B O P Q, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *esse*.

la: Vide supra pag. 487, nota 5.

en: See above p. 487, n. 5.

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: *Quaest.* 63. — Richardi, qui mox citatur, verba sunt haec: *Constat ergo, quod superius dictum iam est, quia potest esse multiplex potentia, ubi nulla potest esse sapientia* [v. g. in rebus inanimatis et brutis]; *e contra autem, ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse. Dat itaque esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae* (VI. *de Trin.* c. 15.).

en: *Quaestio* 63. — The words of Richard, who is cited just below, are these: *It is established therefore, as has already been said above, that there can be a manifold power where there can be no wisdom* [for example in inanimate things and brutes]; *but on the contrary, where there is no power, no wisdom can be present. For to be able to be wise is, without doubt, to be able to do something. So it is not the wisdom of power that grants the being able [to be wise], but the power of wisdom* (VI *On the Trinity* c. 15).

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 3, ubi quinque intellectuales habitus, scil. ars, scientia, prudentia, sapientia, intellectus afferuntur; et c. 7, ubi sapientia fusius explicatur. — Mox pro *speciei* in Vat. et cod. cc habetur *specierum*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VI *Ethics* c. 3, where the five intellectual habits, namely art, science, prudence, wisdom, [and] understanding, are brought forward; and c. 7, where wisdom is more fully explained. — Just below, in place of *speciei*, the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc have *specierum*.

la: Cap. 33. — Mox Vat. afferens textum Anselmi, paucis tantum codd. suffragantibus, *formal acies cognitionis in se talem* pro *formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem*. Verba *in se* loco nostrae lectionis *meae in* non paucis mss. et in ed. 1 exstant, sed falso; nostrae lectioni suffragatur cod. [?] cum originali.

en: Chapter 33. — Just below, the Vatican [edition], in giving the text of Anselm, with only a few codices in support, [reads] *formal acies cognitionis in se talem* in place of *formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem*. The words *in se*, in place of our reading *meae in*, are present in not a few manuscripts and in ed. 1, but falsely; our reading is supported by cod. [?] together with the original.

latin_scholion:
Praeter solutionem propositae quaestionis in resp., tum accurate indagatur ratio verbi, tum asseritur, quod Verbum proprie dicitur, tum differentia describitur inter quatuor nomina secundae personae. De nomine *sapientia* cfr. infra d. 27, dub. 4, d. 32, dub. 1–5. De nomine *imago* cfr. infra d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, 2, et dub. 2, 3, 4. — De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 62, m. I, a. 2. — S. Thom. quaestionem tangit S. p. I, q. 34, a. I, ad 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. I, quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic, a. 2, q. I. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 38, q. 2, n. 11 seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
Beyond the solution of the proposed question in the response, the account of *word* is accurately investigated, [next] it is asserted that *Word* is said properly, [and finally] the difference among the four names of the second person is described. On the name *wisdom* see below d. 27, dub. 4, d. 32, dub. 1–5. On the name *image* see below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, 2, and dub. 2, 3, 4. — On the question itself: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 62, m. I, a. 2. — St. Thomas touches the question at *Summa* p. I, q. 34, a. I, ad 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. I, *quaestiuncula* 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 2, q. I. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 38, q. 2, n. 11 ff. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO IV. *Utrum nomen verbi recte sit translatum ad divina.*

Quarto quaeritur de translatione huius nominis *verbum* ad divina. Et quod nullo modo debeat transferri, ostenditur.

1. Omnis translatio est secundum similitudinem[^1]; sed nihil in creatura vanius est verbo, quia statim dum fit, transit et non est, *verbum autem Domini manet in aeternum*[^2]: ergo etc.

2. Item, cum sit verbum intelligibile et sensibile secundum duplex *dicere*, quaeritur, quod istorum transferatur. Et quod non exterius, vult Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Verbum exterius non est verbum, sed signum verbi»: ergo si Verbum divinum est verum verbum, ergo etc.

3. Item, exterius verbum exit a dicente, Verbum autem divinum semper est in dicente, *ego in Patre*, dicit Veritas, Ioannis decimo quarto[^4]: ergo etc.

4. Item, videtur quod nec ad similitudinem interioris cogitationis, quia dicit Augustinus decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^5]: *Cogitatio est quid volubile*; in Deo autem nihil est volubile: ergo etc.

5. Item, *cogitationes mortalium timidae sunt*, *Sapientiae* nono[^6], *et incertae providentiae nostrae*; sed in Verbo divino nulla est falsitas, nulla dubietas: ergo etc.

6. Item, multa cogitamus, quae nobis displicent; sed Verbum divinum est per omnia placens Patri[^7]: ergo etc.

7. Item, multa cogitamus, quae non possumus, sed Verbum divinum est omnipotens[^8]: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Inter omnia creata imago est expressior, ergo inter omnes emanationes ea est expressior, quae est in imagine; sed emanatio similis Verbo increato in imagine est emanatio verbi a mente: ergo expressissima, ergo convenienter transfertur.

2. Item, quod dicatur per comparationem verbi intellectus, hoc videtur per comparationem ad res extra, quoniam secundum aliam translationem Septuaginta *Ecclesiasticus*[^9]: *Principium omnis operis verbum*; sed per Dei Filium omnia sunt facta: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod verbum vocis sit simile, videtur, quia Verbum dicitur, quia expressivum et manifestativum — unde *nec Patrem quis novit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare*, *Matthaei* undecimo[^10] — sed hoc maxime est in verbo vocis, nam verbum interius non patet nisi per verbum vocis: ergo Verbum increatum dicitur ad similitudinem exterioris verbi.

4. Item, Basilius[^11]: «Filio Dei attribuitur sensus, sapientia, virtus, et verbum, lumen: sensus, quo cogitantur omnia; sapientia, qua omnia disponuntur; virtus, qua fiunt: verbum, quo annuntiantur; lumen, quo clarescunt». Si ergo Verbum dicitur ratione annuntiationis, et hoc pertinet ad verbum vocis, patet quod illud Verbum dicitur ad similitudinem verbi prolati.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Nomen verbi, intellectum cum certis conditionibus, convenienter transfertur ad divina.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut ratio paternitatis per prius reperitur in Deo quam in creaturis, tamen ipsum nomen translatum est a nobis ad Deum[^12]; sic ratio lucis, sic sapientiae, et horum similium, sic etiam ratio verbi. Et significatum per prius et nobilius est in Deo quam in nobis; tamen nomen translatum est a nobis ad Deum.

Translatio autem fit propter duo: una ratio est propter similitudinem expressam, alia ratio est propter instructionem nostram; et haec duo hic sunt.

Primum quidem est similitudo verbi creati ad increatum, ad quam insinuandam distinguit beatus Augustinus in libro decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^13] verbum secundum triplicem differentiam. Nam unum est verbum sensibile, aliud est verbum intelligibile, tertium est verbum medium. Verbum sensibile attenditur in prolatione vocis, verbum intelligibile in cogitatione rei, verbum medium in cogitatione vocis. — Et est ordo, quia primo cogitat aliquid homo quid sit, secundo, qualiter debeat cogitatum pronuntiare, tertio pronuntiat.

Sicut ergo ratio trinitatis reperitur in sensu, reperitur in ratione conversa ad sensum, reperitur et in ratione secundum se[^14], sic et ratio verbi. Et quemadmodum trinitas, in qua consistit expressa[^15] similitudo, non est in sensu, nec in inferiori parte rationis, sed in ratione secundum se; sic cum tripliciter dicatur *verbum*, in nullo consistit similitudo expressa, nisi in verbo intelligibili; et hoc est verbum, quod ad nullam pertinet linguam. Unde dicit[^16] quod «qui hoc potest videre, aliquo modo videt illius verbi similitudinem».

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Similitudinem autem istius verbi ad illud assignat quantum ad tria, scilicet quantum ad emanationem sive originem, quantum ad dispositionem, quantum ad unionem. Nam haec tria in Filio Dei est considerare: originem, secundum quam dicitur filius; dispositionem aeternam, secundum quam dicitur mundus archetypus et ars plena omnium rationum viventium[^17]; et unionem, secundum quam dicitur homo factus.

Similitudo est in origine. Nam sicut Filius per modum naturae procedit per omnia Patri similis, sic verbum intellectus a mente procedit per modum naturae per omnia ei simile et aequale; unde dicitur *mentis conceptus*.

Quantum ad dispositionem est similitudo[^18]. Nam sicut homo nihil operatur rationabiliter, quod non praecogitet et mente concipiat, sic Deus Pater omnia in Verbo disposuit. Et sicut dispositio nostra vel praeconceptio potest esse, etiam si non sequatur opus, sic et dispositio aeterna et praecognitio non ab opere dependet.

Quantum vero ad unionem est similitudo. Nam sicut verbum mentis unitur voci, ut innotescat, et tamen non transit in vocem, sed manet integrum in mente; sic per omnia in Verbo aeterno intelligendum est, quod unitum est carni et non transit in carnem, sed manet integrum apud Patrem. Haec igitur est similitudo.

Sed tamen haec similitudo non attenditur in verbo mentis generaliter. Nam, sicut idem dicit Augustinus[^19], frequenter cogitamus quae nescimus, et sic verbo nostro coniuncta est fallacia; frequenter, quae nolumus, et tunc iuncta est displicentia; frequenter, quae non possumus, et tunc iuncta est impotentia. Divinum autem verbum est verissimum, placentissimum, omnipotentissimum; ideo expressa similitudo non consistit in verbo nostro, nisi sit verbum certae notitiae et complacentiae et potentiae; et hoc est verbum, quod consistit in cogitatione, iuncta sibi affectiva et operativa. Unde Augustinus nono *de Trinitate*[^20]: «Verbum est cum amore notitia»; et si addatur *virtus*, tunc est ratio perfecta, et sic verbum est cum amore et virtute notitia. — Transfertur igitur verbum a verbo interiori secundum praedictas similitudines et praedeterminatas conditiones; et haec est ratio ex parte rei.

Ratio autem ex parte nostra est, quia divina intelligimus per creata[^21]. Quoniam ergo, cum audimus *Patrem* et *Filium*, cogitamus de patre carnali et filio, ut sublevemur ad cogitandum generationem spiritualem; ideo divinissimus Ioannes[^22], qui totus erat in contemplatione divinitatis elevatus, *verbi* nomine usus est dicens: *In principio erat Verbum*; quod Verbum qui intelligit, multum proficit in cognitione Filii Dei.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

His visis, patent obiecta. Concedo enim, quod verbum exterius non habet expressam similitudinem, tum quia vanum, tum quia procedit exterius, tum etiam quia non est verbum, sed verbi signum; verbum autem interius habet horum opposita. Concedo etiam, quod verbum interius dubium, vel falsum, vel impotens, vel displicens non habet expressam similitudinem, sed verbum, quod habet oppositas conditiones.

Ad illud quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod verbum intelligibile habet similitudinem; concedendum est. Quod autem obiicitur de verbo sensibili, dicendum, quod aliqualem habet similitudinem, sed non expressam; ideo translatio non est secundum ipsum, sed secundum[^23] interius, quod est similius, ut patet. Nullum autem verbum potest per omnia illi assimilari. Nam illud solum habet cum dicente identitatem substantialem et simultatem naturalem, quia est simul natura et duratione: quae conditiones, ut dicit beatus Augustinus[^24], non sunt in nostro verbo. Et ideo quamvis sit similitudo, est tamen nonnulla dissimilitudo; et ideo potest recte dici translatio, quia non est per omnia simile. Et sic omnia patent.

english:
### QUESTION IV. *Whether the name 'word' is rightly transferred to divine matters.*

Fourthly, the question is asked concerning the transference of this name *word* to divine matters. And that it ought in no way to be transferred is shown.

1. Every transference is according to a likeness[^1]; but nothing in a creature is more empty than a word, since as soon as it comes to be, it passes away and is not, *but the word of the Lord endures forever*[^2]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, since there is an intelligible and a sensible word, according to the twofold sense of *to speak*, it is asked which of these is transferred. And that it is not the exterior [word], Augustine in *On the Trinity* book fifteen[^3] holds: «The exterior word is not a word, but a sign of a word»: therefore if the divine Word is a true word, then etc.

3. Likewise, the exterior word goes forth from the speaker, but the divine Word is always in the speaker — *I [am] in the Father*, says the Truth, in *John* fourteen[^4]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it seems that [it is] not even according to the likeness of interior thought, since Augustine says in *On the Trinity* book fifteen[^5]: *Thought is something fluctuating*; but in God there is nothing fluctuating: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, *the thoughts of mortals are timid*, *Wisdom* nine[^6], *and our forecasts uncertain*; but in the divine Word there is no falsity, no doubt: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, we think many things which displease us; but the divine Word is in all things pleasing to the Father[^7]: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, we think many things which we cannot [do], but the divine Word is omnipotent[^8]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Among all created things the image is the most expressive, therefore among all emanations that one is the most expressive which is in [the manner of] an image; but the emanation similar to the uncreated Word in [the manner of] an image is the emanation of a word from the mind: therefore [it is] most expressive, therefore [the name *word*] is fittingly transferred.

2. Likewise, that it is said by comparison with the word of the intellect seems [to be shown] by comparison with things outside, since according to the other translation of the Septuagint, *Ecclesiasticus*[^9]: *The beginning of every work is the word*; but through the Son of God all things were made: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that the word of the voice is similar [to the divine Word] is seen, since [the Son] is called *Word* because [he is] expressive and manifestative — whence *no one knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son shall will to reveal [him]*, *Matthew* eleven[^10] — but this [manifesting function] is most fully in the word of the voice, for the interior word is not made open except through the word of the voice: therefore the uncreated Word is so called by likeness to the exterior word.

4. Likewise, Basil[^11]: «To the Son of God are attributed *sense*, *wisdom*, *power*, and *word*, *light*: *sense*, by which all things are thought; *wisdom*, by which all things are arranged; *power*, by which they are made; *word*, by which they are announced; *light*, by which they shine forth». If, then, [the Son] is called *Word* by reason of announcement, and this pertains to the word of the voice, it is plain that that Word is so called by likeness to the spoken word.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The name 'word', understood with certain conditions, is fittingly transferred to divine matters.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as the account of paternity is found prior in God than in creatures, yet the very name was transferred by us from [creatures] to God[^12], so the account of light, [the account] of wisdom, and of these similar [things], so also the account of *word*. And what is signified is, prior and more nobly, in God than in us; yet the name was transferred by us from [creatures] to God.

Now transference is made for two [reasons]: one ground is on account of an express likeness, another ground is on account of our instruction; and both these are present here.

The first [reason] indeed is the likeness of the created word to the uncreated, to the indicating of which blessed Augustine in book fifteen of *On the Trinity*[^13] distinguishes the word according to a threefold difference. For one is the sensible word, another is the intelligible word, the third is the medial word. The sensible word is regarded in the utterance of the voice, the intelligible word in the thought of a thing, the medial word in the thought of the voice. — And there is an order, since first man thinks of something, what it is; secondly, in what manner he ought to pronounce what has been thought; thirdly, he pronounces [it].

Just as, therefore, the account of trinity is found in sense, [and] is found in reason turned toward sense, [and] is found also in reason in itself[^14], so also is the account of *word*. And just as the trinity in which an express[^15] likeness consists is not in sense, nor in the lower part of reason, but in reason in itself; so when *word* is said in three ways, in none does the express likeness consist except in the intelligible word; and this is the word which pertains to no [particular] tongue. Whence he says[^16] that «whoever is able to see this, in some way sees the likeness of that Word».

Now he assigns the likeness of this [created] word to that [uncreated Word] with respect to three things, namely with respect to emanation or origin, with respect to disposition, [and] with respect to union. For these three things are to be considered in the Son of God: origin, according to which he is called *son*; eternal disposition, according to which he is called *the archetypal world* and *the art full of all the living reasons*[^17]; and union, according to which he is called *made man*.

There is a likeness in [respect of] origin. For just as the Son by way of nature proceeds in all things like to the Father, so the word of the intellect from the mind proceeds by way of nature, in all things like and equal to it; whence it is called *the concept of the mind*.

With respect to disposition there is a likeness[^18]. For just as man does nothing rationally that he does not previously think and conceive in mind, so God the Father has disposed all things in the Word. And just as our disposition or preconception can exist even if a work does not follow, so also the eternal disposition and foreknowledge does not depend on a work.

With respect indeed to union there is a likeness. For just as the word of the mind is united to a voice in order to become known, and yet does not pass over into the voice, but remains entire in the mind; so in all respects it is to be understood concerning the eternal Word, that he is united to flesh and does not pass over into flesh, but remains entire with the Father. This therefore is the likeness.

But yet this likeness is not regarded in the word of the mind generally. For, as the same Augustine says[^19], we frequently think things we do not know, and so falsehood is conjoined to our word; frequently [we think] things which we do not will, and then displeasure is conjoined; frequently, things which we cannot [do], and then impotence is conjoined. But the divine word is most true, most pleasing, most omnipotent; therefore the express likeness does not consist in our word unless it be a word of certain knowledge and complacency and power; and this is the word which consists in thought, with the affective and operative joined to it. Whence Augustine in *On the Trinity* book nine[^20]: «A word is knowledge with love»; and if *power* be added, then the account is perfect, and so a *word* is knowledge with love and power. — Therefore *word* is transferred from the interior word according to the aforesaid likenesses and predetermined conditions; and this is the ground from the side of the thing.

Now the ground from our side is that we understand divine things through created things[^21]. Since therefore, when we hear *Father* and *Son*, we think of a carnal father and son, in order that we may be lifted up to think of spiritual generation; therefore the most divine John[^22], who was wholly elevated in the contemplation of divinity, used the name *word*, saying: *In the beginning was the Word*; whoever understands which Word, profits much in the knowledge of the Son of God.

**Solution of the opposites.**

These things having been seen, the objections are clear. For I concede that the exterior word does not have an express likeness, both because [it is] empty, and because it proceeds outwardly, and also because it is not a word, but a sign of a word; but the interior word has the opposites of these. I also concede that the interior word [if it be] doubtful, or false, or impotent, or displeasing does not have an express likeness, but [only] the word which has the opposite conditions.

To that which is objected on the opposite side, that the intelligible word has a likeness, it must be conceded. As to what is objected concerning the sensible word, it must be said that it has some sort of likeness, but not an express [likeness]; therefore the transference is not according to it, but according to the[^23] interior [word], which is more like, as is plain. But no word can be assimilated to that one in all respects. For that [Word] alone has substantial identity with the speaker and natural simultaneity, since it is simultaneous in nature and duration: which conditions, as blessed Augustine says[^24], are not in our word. And therefore although there is likeness, yet there is some dissimilitude; and therefore it can rightly be called *transference*, since it is not similar in all things. And so all things are clear.

la: Omnes fere codd. cum ed. 1 *propnum* [recte: *propinquum*] pro *respectum*, lectio contextui contraria. Proxime ante cod. T post *similitudo* interiicit *et expressio*.

en: Almost all the codices with ed. 1 [read] *propinquum* in place of *respectum*, a reading contrary to the context. Just before this, cod. T after *similitudo* interjects *et expressio*.

la: Permulti codd. cum sex primis edd. *modo* pro *loco*; inepte, ut liquet. — *Epist.* I. Petr. I, 23.

en: Very many codices with the first six editions [read] *modo* in place of *loco*; unfittingly, as is plain. — 1 Peter 1:23.

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *paterna* pro *praevia*; lectio evidenter corrupta. — Cap. 11. n. 20: *Verbum quod foris sonat, signum est verbi quod intus lucet, cui magis verbi competit nomen.* — Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 6 omittunt *istorum*.

en: Very many codices with editions 2, 3 [read] *paterna* in place of *praevia*; a clearly corrupt reading. — *De Trinitate* XV, c. 11, n. 20: «The word which sounds outside is a sign of the word which shines within, to which the name of *word* more properly belongs.» — A little before, very many codices with editions 1, 6 omit *istorum*.

la: Vers. 11.

en: [John 14,] verse 11.

la: Cap. 15. n. 25: *Quid est, inquam, hoc formabile nondumque formatum, nisi quiddam mentis nostrae, quod hac atque hac volubili quadam motione iactamus, cum a nobis nunc hoc, nunc illud, sicut inventum fuerit vel occurrerit, cogitatur?* — Et c. 16: *Quapropter ita dicitur illud Dei Verbum, ut Dei cogitatio non dicatur, ne aliquid esse quasi volubile credatur in Deo.*

en: [*De Trinitate* XV,] c. 15, n. 25: *What is, I say, this thing capable of being formed but not yet formed, if not something of our mind, which we toss about with such-and-such fluctuating motion, when by us now this, now that, as it shall have been found or shall have occurred, is thought?* — And c. 16: *Wherefore that Word of God is so called that it not be called the *thought* of God, lest anything be believed to be as it were fluctuating in God.*

la: Vers. 14. — Ed. 1 voci *Sapientiae* praemittit *sicut dicitur*.

en: [Wisdom 9,] verse 14. — Ed. 1 prefixes *sicut dicitur* ("as is said") to the word *Sapientiae*.

la: Cfr. Matth. 3, 17, et 17, 5. — Vocabulum *Patri*, in Vat. desideratum, posuimus auctoritate praestantiorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: Cf. Matthew 3:17 and 17:5. — The word *Patri*, missing in the Vatican [edition], we have placed [in the text] on the authority of the more excellent manuscripts and of ed. 1.

en: Wisdom 18:15.

la: Cap. 37, 20, ubi Vulgata: *Ante omnia opera verbum verax praecedat te*.

en: [Ecclesiasticus] c. 37, [v.] 20, where the Vulgate [reads]: *Before all works let a true word precede thee.*

la: Vers. 27.

en: [Matthew 11,] verse 27.

la: Hunc textum etiam alii Scholastici, ut B. Albertus et S. Thomas, citant, sed non indicant, in quo Basilii scripto habeatur. Editores operum illorum Scholasticorum textum sumtum volunt ex Basilii opere *contra Eunomium*, in quo opere (lib. II. n. 17.) aliqua quidem istorum nominum, quae hic Filio Dei attribuuntur, occurrunt, sed non omnia, neque ibi nomina ista explicantur, sicut fit in nostro textu. Plura praedictorum nominum exposita inveniuntur apud Greg. Nazianz., *Orat.* 36 et 49. — Tertullian. vero in *Apolog.* c. 21 ait: «Et nos etiam Sermoni (Verbo) atque rationi itemque virtuti, per quae omnia molitum Deum ediximus, propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus, cui et Sermo insit pronuntianti, et ratio adsit disponenti, et virtus praesit perficienti». Et in libr. *adv. Prax.* c. 6 dicit, quod Deus protulit Sermonem (Verbum), «ut per ipsum fierent universa, per quem erant cogitata atque disposita, immo et facta iam quantum in Dei sensu». — In ipso textu citato post *virtus* qm [?] codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt *cuncta*.

en: This text other Scholastics also, such as Bl. Albert and St. Thomas, cite, but they do not indicate in which writing of Basil it is found. The editors of the works of those Scholastics hold the text to be taken from Basil's work *Against Eunomius*, in which work (book II, n. 17) some of these names which are here attributed to the Son of God do indeed occur, but not all, nor are these names there explained as is done in our text. Several of the aforesaid names are found explained in Gregory Nazianzen, *Orations* 36 and 49. — Tertullian, however, in *Apology* c. 21 says: «We also ascribe to the *Speech* (Word) and to the *reason* and likewise to the *power*, through which we have declared God to have wrought all things, a proper substance, [namely] *spirit*, in which the *Speech* is present to the one pronouncing, and the *reason* is at hand to the one disposing, and the *power* presides over the one perfecting». And in the book *Against Praxeas* c. 6 he says that God brought forth the *Speech* (Word), «that through him all things might come to be, by whom they had been thought and disposed, indeed already made insofar as [they were] in the sense [mind] of God». — In the very text cited, after *virtus*, certain[?] codices with editions 1, 2, 3 omit *cuncta*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 22. q. 3, praecipue fundam. 1. — Paulo inferius post *quam* sola Vat. interponit *in hominibus vel*.

en: Cf. above d. 22, q. 3, especially fundamentum 1. — A little below, after *quam*, the Vatican [edition] alone interposes *in hominibus vel* ("in human beings, or").

la: Cap. 10. n. 19, et c. 11. n. 20. — Paulo superius voci *similitudo* Vat. cum paucis codd. praemittit *expressa*.

en: [*De Trinitate* XV,] c. 10, n. 19, and c. 11, n. 20. — A little above, the Vatican [edition] with a few codices prefixes *expressa* to the word *similitudo*.

la: Libr. XV. *de Trin.* c. 3. n. 5, ubi S. Doctor summam exhibet eorum quae in aliis libris de triplici hac trinitate docuit, de prima scil. et secunda in libr. XI. c. 2. et 3; de tertia in libr. IX. c. 4, et X. c. 11.

en: *De Trinitate* book XV, c. 3, n. 5, where the holy Doctor [Augustine] presents a summary of what he had taught in the other books concerning this threefold trinity — concerning the first and second namely in book XI, c. 2 and 3; concerning the third in book IX, c. 4, and X, c. 11.

la: Lib. XV. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 19. Quae sententiam citatam sequuntur, sumta sunt ex c. 11. n. 20.

en: *De Trinitate* book XV, c. 10, n. 19. What follows the cited sentence is taken from c. 11, n. 20.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 130, nota 1 et 3.

en: Cf. above [in this volume] p. 130, notes 1 and 3.

la: Pro *est similitudo* multi codd. *similis*, ed. 1 etiam *est similis*.

en: In place of *est similitudo* many codices [read] *similis*; ed. 1 also [reads] *est similis*.

en: Loc. cit. [*De Trinitate* XV,] c. 14, n. 23, and c. 15, n. 24.

en: [*De Trinitate* XV,] c. 10, n. 15.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. q. 2.

en: Cf. above d. 3, p. II, q. 2.

la: Cap. I, 1.

la: *In principio erat Verbum*, Ioan. I, 1.

en: *In the beginning was the Word*, John 1:1.

la: Supple cum cod. X *verbum*; et paulo inferius post *illud* cum codd. A aa bb *scilicet aeternum*.

en: Supply, with cod. X, *verbum* ("word"); and a little below after *illud* [supply], with codices A aa bb, *scilicet aeternum* ("namely the eternal").

la: Libr. XV. *de Trin.* c. 13-16. n. 22-26. — Immediate post Vat. cum cod. cc *non insunt* pro *non sunt in*, et in fine *similis* pro *simile*.

en: *De Trinitate* book XV, c. 13–16, n. 22–26. — Immediately after, the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *non insunt* in place of *non sunt in*, and at the end *similis* in place of *simile*.

latin_scholion:
De translatione eiusque speciebus vide supra d. 22. q. 3, et S. Thom., S. I. q. 13. a. 6. — Cum argumenta ex utraque parte allata nimium importent, dum prima series probare nititur, quod nulla species creati verbi transferri debeat, alia vero, quod omnes species; hinc est quod S. Doctor ad utramque seriem argumentorum ponit aliquas restrictiones. — Responsio <!-- page 491 --> auctoris praeclara est, praesertim quod de similitudine et dissimilitudine inter verbum Dei et nostrum dicit; nonnulla magis explicantur per ea quae de differentia inter vestigium et imaginem etc. dicta sunt supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2, et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2.

Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 62. m. 1. a. 1. 3. — S. Thom., quaestionem tangit hic q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. q. 34. a. 1; *de Veritate* q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic. 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., a. 59. q. 2. passim, praesertim n. 41.

---

english_scholion:
Concerning *transference* and its species see above d. 22, q. 3, and St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 13, a. 6. — Since the arguments adduced from each side carry too much weight — while the first series strives to prove that no species of created word ought to be transferred, and the other [strives to prove] that all species [are to be transferred] — hence it is that the holy Doctor places certain restrictions upon each series of arguments. — The author's response is excellent, especially what he says concerning the likeness and unlikeness between the word of God and ours; some points are more fully explained through what was said concerning the difference between vestige and image etc. above at d. 3, p. I, q. 2, and p. II, a. 1, q. 1, 2.

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 62, m. 1, a. 1, 3. — St. Thomas touches on the question here at q. 2, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 34, a. 1; *On Truth* q. 4, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 4, 7. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1, *quaestiunc.* 1, 2. — Richardus de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here *princ.* 2, q. 1. — Henricus Gandavensis, a. 59, q. 2, *passim*, especially n. 41.

---


title: Dist. 27, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Part I)

source_text:
<!-- page 479 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Proprium est Patris quod semper est pater*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia omnis proprietas differt ab eo cuius est proprietas, vel re vel ratione; sed *pater* et *pater* conveniunt re, ratione et nomine: ergo unum non est proprietas alterius.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in Patre intelligimus et illum[^1] *qui est pater*, et *quo est pater*. Quando ergo *pater* praedicatur de se, ratione unius subiicitur et ratione alterius praedicatur. Similiter, quando assignatur esse patrem proprium Patris, quia assignatur ut in ratione attributi, ideo ratione ipsius proprietatis attribuitur ipsi hypostasi. Unde dicit, quod *esse patrem* est proprium Patris, non quod *Pater sit pater*.

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Eadem dicitur nativitas vel origo*. Videtur enim dicere contra illud, quod dictum est supra, distinctione tertia capitulo[^2] *de vestigio*[^3], et tractum est ab Augustino[^4] *de Vera Religione*, scilicet quod origo appropriatur Patri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *origo* semper dicitur relative[^5]. Potest ergo accipi origo vel respectu creaturae, vel respectu personae. Si respectu creaturae, sic est totius Trinitatis et appropriatur Patri; si autem respectu personae, sic potest accipi active, vel passive: si active, sic est Patris et Filii, sed appropriatur Patri; si passive, sic Filii et Spiritus sancti, et appropriatur Filio, non secundum quod simpliciter dicitur, sed secundum quod *origo* dicit emanationem per modum naturae. Sic enim cum illud sit proprium Filii, similiter et origo, secundum quod sic accipitur; et hoc modo accipitur hic, et ideo non est contra illud.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *gignere et gigni*[^6], ipsas tantum relationes, non hypostases significant. Videtur enim falsum, quia cum relationes significantur in concretione[^7], non solum important relationes, sed etiam suppositum; sed quando tantum important relationes, significantur abstracte. Si ergo hoc quod est *gignere et gigni* non important relationem abstracte, sed concrete: videtur, quod non tantum importent relationes.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod differenter importatur concretio. Aliter enim importatur per verbum, aliter per nomen adiectivum. Quia enim verbum importat actum ut egredientem, ideo in quadam distantia; et ideo etiam[^8] importat sub quadam inclinatione. Et propter hoc, quia in distantia importat, non claudit intra se suppositum, immo oportet, quod addatur extra, nisi locum exterioris additionis suppleat demonstratio, quae est in actu propriae primae et secundae personae, quoniam semper sunt praesentes et demonstrativae. Et ideo, quamvis importet in concretione, tamen non importat nisi relationem,

<!-- page 480 -->

quantum est de se, non suppositum. — Sed nomen adiectivum, idem significans, significat[^9] proprietatem informantem, et ideo in quadam unione et indistantia; et ideo simul importat formam et suppositum, ut cum dicitur *album*, nisi significetur in abstractione, ut cum dicitur *albedo*. Hoc attendens Magister dicit, quod *paternitas* et *filiatio*, *gignere* et *gigni* dicunt tantum relationes.

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit[^10]: *Cum nomina relationum ponimus in praedicatis, ipsas tantum notiones significamus, non hypostases*; quia si hoc verum est, quando dicitur: *essentia est Pater*, cum *Pater* ponatur in praedicato, stat tunc[^11] pro notione: ergo idem est dicere: *essentia est Pater*, ac si diceretur: *essentia generat*; sed haec est falsa: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam ponuntur in praedicato per naturam propriam et significationem: et talia sunt quae de se important compositionem, sicut sunt verba[^13]; et de talibus loquitur Magister. Quaedam ita ponuntur in praedicato, quod sunt nata subiici, ut hoc nomen *pater* et hoc nomen *filius*; et talia, quia non solum nata sunt praedicari, verum etiam subiici, possunt importare intellectum hypostasis. Unde verbum Magistri intelligendum est cum praecisione[^12], scilicet de illis[^14] quae ita nata sunt praedicari, quod non subiici; et ita non habet instantiam.

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Characteristica idiomata determinativa sunt hypostaseon, non naturae* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia proprietates, quae non determinant naturam, sunt non naturales; quia omnis proprietas naturalis, eo ipso quod naturalis est, naturam determinat: ergo si proprietates in divinis non determinant naturam, non sunt naturales, ergo praeter naturam: ergo acci[?]…[^15]

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut ordo naturae dicitur dupliciter: aut quo natura *ordinatur*, aut in quo natura est ratio *ordinandi*; sic etiam de proprietatibus intelligendum: et quando dicimus proprietatem naturalem, non oportet, quod proprietas habeat naturam ut subiectum, sed quod sit consonans naturae ipsius subiecti, sicut filius naturalis non dicitur, quia sit a natura vel essentia, sed a patre naturaliter producente[^16]; sic et in proposito est intelligendum.

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english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what [the Master] says: *It is proper to the Father that he is always Father*. For he seems to say [something] false, because every property differs from that of which it is the property, either in reality or in reason; but *father* and *father* agree in reality, in reason, and in name: therefore the one is not the property of the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the Father we understand both him[^1] *who is Father*, and *that by which he is Father*. When therefore *father* is predicated of himself, by reason of the one [aspect] he is made the subject and by reason of the other he is predicated. Likewise, when "to be Father" is assigned as proper to the Father, because it is assigned in the manner of an attribute, therefore by reason of the property itself it is attributed to the hypostasis. Whence he says that *to be Father* is proper to the Father, not that *the Father is Father*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The same [thing] is called nativity or origin*. For he seems to say [something] against what was said above, in the third distinction, in the chapter[^2] *On the vestige*[^3], and [what] was drawn from Augustine[^4] *On True Religion*, namely that origin is appropriated to the Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that *origin* is always said relatively[^5]. Therefore *origin* can be taken either in respect of a creature, or in respect of a person. If in respect of a creature, thus it belongs to the whole Trinity and is appropriated to the Father; but if in respect of a person, thus it can be taken actively or passively: if actively, thus it belongs to the Father and the Son, but is appropriated to the Father; if passively, thus it belongs to the Son and the Holy Spirit, and is appropriated to the Son, not insofar as it is said simply, but insofar as *origin* states an emanation by way of nature. For thus, since that [emanation by nature] is proper to the Son, so likewise [is] origin, in the sense in which it is so taken; and in this way it is taken here, and therefore it is not against [what was said earlier].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *to beget and to be begotten*[^6] signify only the relations themselves, not the hypostases. For it seems false, because when relations are signified in concretion[^7], they import not only the relations, but also the supposit; but when they import only the relations, they are signified abstractly. If therefore this which is *to beget* and *to be begotten* does not import the relation abstractly, but concretely: it seems that they do not import only the relations.

**I respond:** It must be said that concretion is imported differently. For it is imported in one way through a verb, in another way through an adjectival noun. For because a verb imports the act as going forth, therefore [it imports it] at a certain distance; and therefore it also[^8] imports [it] under a certain inclination. And on account of this, because it imports [it] at a distance, it does not enclose the supposit within itself; on the contrary, it must be added externally, unless a demonstrative pronoun supplies the place of the external addition — [a demonstrative] which is in the act of properly the first and second person, since [these] are always present and demonstrative. And therefore, although [a verb] imports [the relation] in concretion, nevertheless of itself it imports nothing but the relation,

not the supposit. — But an adjectival noun, signifying the same [thing], signifies[^9] the property informing [the supposit], and so [imports it] in a certain union and non-distance; and therefore it imports the form and the supposit at the same time, as when one says *white*, unless it is signified in the abstract, as when one says *whiteness*. Attending to this, the Master says that *paternity* and *filiation*, *to beget* and *to be begotten* state only the relations.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says[^10]: *When we place the names of the relations in the predicates, we signify only the notions themselves, not the hypostases*; because if this is true, when it is said: *the essence is the Father*, since *Father* is placed in the predicate, it then[^11] stands for a notion: therefore it is the same to say: *the essence is the Father*, as if it were said: *the essence generates*; but this is false: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that some [things] are placed in the predicate through their own proper nature and signification: and such are those which of themselves import composition, as verbs[^13] are; and the Master speaks about such [things]. Some [things] are placed in the predicate in such a way that they are by nature [fit] to be made the subject, as this name *father* and this name *son*; and such, because they are by nature not only [fit] to be predicated, but also to be made the subject, can import the understanding of a hypostasis. Hence the Master's word must be understood with [a certain] precision[^12], namely of those [things][^14] which are by nature [fit] to be predicated in such a way that [they are] not [fit] to be made the subject; and so it has no instance against it.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The characteristic idioms are determinative of the hypostases, not of the nature*, etc. For he seems to say [something] amiss, because properties which do not determine the nature are non-natural; since every natural property, by the very fact that it is natural, determines the nature: therefore, if the properties in divine [things] do not determine the nature, they are not natural — therefore [they are] outside of nature, and therefore acci[?]… [accidental?][^15]

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as the order of nature is said in two ways — either [as that] by which nature *is ordered*, or [as that] in which nature is the ground *of ordering* — so too is it to be understood concerning the properties: and when we speak of a *natural* property, it is not required that the property have nature as its subject, but [only] that it be consonant with the nature of the subject itself; just as a son is not called *natural* because he is from a nature or essence, but [because he is] from a father naturally producing[^16]; so too in the case at hand it is to be understood.

---

la: Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. *illa*, minus congrue.

en: The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] *illa* (those [feminine]), less suitably.

la: Cap. I, ubi et verba Augustini habentur.

en: Chapter 1, where also the words of Augustine are had.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 152, nota I.

en: Cf. above page 152, note 1.

la: Codd. *P Q W* adiungunt *signanter*.

en: Codices *P Q W* add *signanter* (expressly).

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* *relatio*. — Proxime post pro *Potest ergo* codd. *L* *Potest autem*. Paulo inferius Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 verbis *totius Trinitatis* praefigit *respectu*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with codex *cc*, [reads] *relatio* (relation). — Immediately after, in place of *Potest ergo* (it can therefore), codices *L* [read] *Potest autem* (it can however). A little further below, the Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and edition 1, prefixes *respectu* (in respect of) to the words *totius Trinitatis* (of the whole Trinity).

la: Vat. omittit *et gigni*, contra codd. *L P Q W X* etc., et dein cum codd. *L O*, nec non contextu exigente, substituimus *important* pro *importat*.

en: The Vatican [edition] omits *et gigni* (and to be begotten), against codices *L P Q W X* etc.; and then, with codices *L O*, and as the context requires, we have substituted *important* (they import) for *importat* (it imports).

la: Sic recte legitur in codd. *P Q* reliqui codd. cum ed. 1 et Vat. minus bene: *quia relationes significant in concretione et ideo non solum important*.

en: Thus correctly is it read in codices *P Q*; the remaining codices with edition 1 and the Vatican [edition] [read] less well: *quia relationes significant in concretione et ideo non solum important* (because the relations signify in concretion and therefore not only do they import).

la: Multi codd. cum Vat. omittunt *etiam*, contra codd. *M P Q T* et ed. 1.

en: Many codices with the Vatican [edition] omit *etiam* (also), against codices *M P Q T* and edition 1.

la: Vat., fere omnibus codd. et edd. obnitentibus, *significet formam* pro *significetur*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with nearly all the codices and editions opposing, [reads] *significet formam* (let it signify the form) in place of *significetur* (it is signified).

la: Haec quaestio de significatione formarum grammaticalium non parvi momenti est pro rebus abstrusis exacte enuntiandis. Plurima et subtilissima de hoc argumento habentur in «Grammatica speculativa» Scoti. In formis verbi suppositum tantum indeterminate significatur, excepta prima et secunda persona (*amo, amas*); nam tertia persona (*amat, amant*) non significat aliquod distinctum suppositum, nisi addatur subiectum. — Mox codd. *L O*, verbis transpositis, *proprietatem ut informantem* pro *ut proprietatem informantem*.

en: This question concerning the signification of grammatical forms is of no small moment for stating abstruse matters exactly. Very many and most subtle [observations] on this topic are had in Scotus's *Grammatica speculativa*. In the forms of the verb the supposit is signified only indeterminately, except [in] the first and second person (*amo, amas*); for the third person (*amat, amant*) does not signify any distinct supposit unless a subject is added. — Soon, codices *L O*, with the words transposed, [read] *proprietatem ut informantem* in place of *ut proprietatem informantem*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* *tantum* pro *tunc*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with codex *cc*, [reads] *tantum* (only) in place of *tunc* (then).

la: Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. quaest. — Paulo post pro *quando* Vat. *quoniam*, refragantibus codd. *F L O P Q T Y* nec non ed. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 2, in the body of the question. — A little after, in place of *quando* (when) the Vatican [edition] [reads] *quoniam* (since), against codices *F L O P Q T Y* as well as edition 1.

la: Cfr. dub. praeced. — Paulo superius verba *de se* omittuntur a Vat. et nonnullis codd. et edd.

en: Cf. the preceding doubt. — A little above, the words *de se* ("of itself") are omitted by the Vatican [edition] and by some codices and editions.

la: Pro *illis quae ita* codd. *P Q* *illis de quibus constat quod ita*.

en: In place of *illis quae ita* ("of those which thus") codices *P Q* [read] *illis de quibus constat quod ita* ("of those of which it is established that thus").

la: Editorial note. The Quaracchi text breaks at the page-bottom band of p. 480 col. B with `ergo acci-`; the OCR preserves no continuation, and the printed page resumes with *Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ordo naturae...* The truncated word is presumably *accidentales* ("accidental"), but verification at 600-dpi PDF eyes-on is needed; logged in `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities-d27-p1-dubia.md`.

en: Editorial note. The Quaracchi text breaks at the page-bottom band of p. 480 col. B with *ergo acci-*; the OCR preserves no continuation, and the printed page resumes with *Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ordo naturae...* The truncated word is presumably *accidentales*, but verification at 600-dpi PDF eyes-on is needed.

la: Pro *producente* plures codd. ut *AG H T X Y aa* perperam *procedente*; codd. *L* rectius *procedens*.

en: In place of *producente* ("producing") many codices, such as *A G H T X Y aa*, mistakenly [read] *procedente* ("proceeding"); codices *L* more correctly [read] *procedens* ("proceeding [nominative]").