title: Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum sit ibi aequalitas cum circumincessione.

title_alt: Whether there is equality with circumincession there

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO IV.

#### *Utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum circumincessione.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum circumincessione. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo auctoritate Domini, Ioannis decimo quarto[^1]: *Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est.*

2. Item, Augustinus *de Fide ad Petrum*[^2]: «Propter unitatem naturae totus Pater est in Filio et Spiritu sancto».

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia in

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quocumque est substantia vel essentia Patris, est Pater: sed substantia Patris est in Filio: ergo Pater est in Filio[^3], eadem ratione est Filius in Patre.

4. Item, omne cognitum est in cognoscente vel per veritatem, vel per similitudinem; sed Pater cognoscit Filium quantum ad hypostasim et proprietatem: ergo Filius est in Patre: aut ergo[^4] quantum ad *veritatem*, aut quantum ad *similitudinem* veritatis. Non quantum ad *similitudinem*, quia tunc esset Filius in Patre sicut creatura: ergo quantum ad *veritatem*: eadem ratione et[^5] Pater in Filio: ergo circumincessio est ibi.

5. Item, omne quod est comparatum ad alterum, aut est in illo, aut extra illum. Si ergo Filius comparatur ad Patrem, aut est in illo, aut extra. Si *in eo*, eadem ratione et Pater in eo: si *extra eum*; sed illa, quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt per substantiam: ergo Pater et Filius substantialiter differunt.

6. Item, maior est convenientia in divinis, quam sit generis ad species vel totius ad partes; sed propter convenientiam generis ad species genus est in speciebus et e converso; et similiter totum in partibus et e converso[^6]: ergo multo fortius in divinis Pater est in Filio et e converso.

**Contra:**
1. Si Pater est in Filio et e converso, ergo Pater est in Patre. Sicut enim sequitur in praedicando, quod quidquid praedicatur in plus vel aeque de aliquo, praedicatur de omni eo quod est sub eo[^7]: ergo similiter, si aliquid est in aliquo, necesse est, quod in eodem sit omne quod est in eo: ergo si Filius est in Patre, omne quod est in Filio, est in Patre: sed Pater est in Filio: ergo Pater est in Patre.

2. Item, quandocumque duo simplicia eiusdem generis simul sunt, ita quod unum est in altero, non distinguuntur ab invicem, sicut punctus est in puncto. Si ergo Pater et Filius sunt omnino simplices; si Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre, non videtur, quod distinguantur.

3. Item, si duae essentiae divinae essent, impossibile esset, quod una esset in alia, quia una non posset illabi alii, quoniam utraque esset aeque spiritualis et summe spiritualis: ergo si duae personae sunt aeque et summe spirituales, impossibile est, quod una sit in altera; et illud[^8] videtur, quia Deus non potest esse in creatura, quin ei illabatur. Si ergo persona est in persona, videtur omnino ei illabi.

4. Item, quaero, quid significet hoc quod est *esse in Patre*, utrum dicatur secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Si secundum relationem, hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit in littera[^9], quod «propter unitatem naturae totus Pater est in Filio et Spiritu sancto». Si secundum substantiam; sed[^10] quae secundum substantiam dicuntur, conveniunt tribus: ergo hoc quod est *esse in Patre* convenit Filio et Spiritui sancto et Patri: ergo Pater est in Patre, quod non conceditur.

5. Item, cum dicitur: Pater est in Filio, et Filius in Patre, aut importatur eadem habitudo, aut altera. Si eadem, cum Filius sit in Patre ut in principio, tunc similiter Pater esset[^11] in Filio ut in principio; quod simpliciter est absurdum. Si non importatur eadem habitudo: ergo sicut[^12] non est circumincessio, cum dicitur: genus est in specie, et species in genere, similiter nec in proposito esset circumincessio.

6. Item, Filius est de Patre et apud Patrem, et non convertitur: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod non convertatur, quodsi Pater est in Filio, quod Filius sit in Patre.

7. Item, novem modi essendi *in*[^13] sunt in crea-

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turis. Primo modo sicut pars in toto; secundo modo sicut totum in partibus; tertio modo sicut species in genere; quarto modo sicut genus in speciebus; quinto modo sicut forma in materia; sexto modo sicut rectum sive motum in regente; septimo modo sicut res in suo fine; octavo modo sicut contentum in continente; et nonum addit Boethius, scilicet[^14] sicut accidens in subiecto. Quaeritur ergo, quo istorum modorum sit Pater in Filio et e converso; et cum nullum horum sit dare, videtur quod nullo modo sit.

### CONCLUSIO.

> In divinis personis est summa et perfecta circumincessio ratione unitatis essentiae cum distinctione personarum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod[^15], sicut auctoritates probant et rationes, in divinis est summa et perfecta circumincessio. Et haec vocatur[^16] *circumincessio*, qua dicitur, quod unus est in alio et e converso; et hoc proprie et perfecte in solo Deo est, quia circumincessio in essendo ponit distinctionem simul et unitatem. Et quoniam in solo Deo est summa[^17] unitas cum distinctione, ita quod distinctio est inconfusa et unitas indistincta: hinc est, quod in solo Deo est circumincessio perfecta. Et patet ratio huius, quia ratio circumincessionis est perfecta unitas essentiae cum distinctione personarum. Et quoniam hoc est proprium solius Dei, ideo et circumincessio talis, secundum quod dicit Hilarius et Magister inducit in littera[^18].

**Ad 1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Pater in Filio et Filius in Patre, ergo Pater[^19] in se; dicunt quidam, quod argumentum non valet, quia mutatur habitudo eius quod est *in*; quia in una dicit habitudinem principiati ad principium, in alia autem habitudinem principii ad principiatum. Tamen illud non oportet dicere, quia sicut iam patebit[^20], *in* non dicit diversam habitudinem. Nec tamen sequitur, immo est accidens ibi, eo quod *in* notat distinctionem, sicut accidens est hic: Petrus est similis Paulo, et Paulus Petro: ergo Petrus est similis Petro; ita et in proposito intelligendum.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[^21] simplicia simul existentia confunduntur in unum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando simplicia habent distingui penes illud, in quo sunt, sicut punctus et unitas ab eo, in quo est. Sed quando se ipsis distinguuntur et in[^22] se ipsis substantificantur, tunc, quamvis sint simul, non confunduntur; et tales sunt hypostases divinae. Et huius simile, quamvis perfecte non possit in creatura inveniri, tamen Dionysius[^23] ponit exemplum in luminibus, quae multa sunt in eodem aere inconfusa: et huius signum est, quia, quando luminare aufertur, secum[^24] trahit lumen suum, nihil de aliis convellens. Et ratio huius est, quia lumina in aere non distinguuntur penes id in quo[^25].

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod essentia non est in essentia nisi per illapsum etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ubi est essentiarum diversitas, si una est in altera, oportet quod una sit aliquo modo materialis alteri; sed quando[^26] personae differunt, salva essentiae unitate, una est in alia, quia essentia unius est essentia alterius; et ita, sicut idem non illabitur sibi, ita nullus potest esse ibi illapsus.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid significet hoc quod est *esse in Patre*; dicendum, quod, sicut Sancti innuunt, sicut *aequale* dicit respectum secundum unitatem quantitatis, et *simile* secundum unitatem qualitatis[^27], similiter hoc quod est *esse in Patre*, secundum unitatem substantiae. Unde sicut *aequale*

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simul importat substantiam cum relatione, sicut patebit infra[^28], ita et hoc quod est *esse in*. Et sicut, cum dicitur *originalis Patri*, arctatur ad standum pro aliis personis, ita et in proposito intelligendum.

**Ad 5.** Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum importetur eadem habitudo; dicendum sine praeiudicio, quod sic, quantum est de ratione nominis. Sicut enim, cum dicitur: Pater est similis Filio et e converso, non importatur alia et alia habitudo: ita nec in hoc quod est *esse in*[^29], quia importat relationem identitatis sive consubstantialitatis. Unde si dicatur: Pater est similis Filio et e converso, non dicitur alia habitudo: sic in proposito, quia significat hoc quod est *esse in Patre* idem quod est *esse Patri consubstantialem*. Et uniformiter accipitur *consubstantialis*, cum dicitur de Patre et Filio. Et hoc patet, quia si non diceret consimilem habitudinem, non esset circumincessio, sicut nec est, quando dicitur creatura esse in Deo, et Deus esse in creatura; quia alia importatur habitudo in utraque.

**Ad 6.** Ad illud quod quaeritur de hoc quod est *apud* etc.; dicendum, quod quaedam praepositiones important habitudinem repugnantiae, ut *contra*; quaedam distantiae, ut hoc quod est *ad* et *prope*; quaedam causae, ut *de* et *ex*; quaedam convenientiae, ut *in* et *cum*. Primae et secundae nullo modo recipiuntur[^30], sed tertiae et quartae sic, et tertiae non conversim, sed quartae conversim, quia convenientia est relatio aequiparantiae.

**Ad 7.** Ad ultimum solvendum, quod iste est singularis modus essendi *in*, qui non continetur inter illos, nec potest reperiri proprie in creaturis.

english:
### QUESTION IV.

#### *Whether in divine matters there is equality with circumincession.*

Fourthly it is asked whether in divine matters there is equality with circumincession. And that there is, is shown:

1. First, by the authority of the Lord, John 14[^1]: *I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.*

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On Faith to Peter*[^2]: «On account of the unity of nature the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit».

3. Likewise, this same is shown by reason, because in whatever the substance or essence of the Father is, there is the Father: but the substance of the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Son[^3], by the same reasoning the Son is in the Father.

4. Likewise, every thing known is in the knower either through truth or through likeness; but the Father knows the Son with respect to hypostasis and property: therefore the Son is in the Father: either, then[^4], with respect to *truth*, or with respect to *likeness* of truth. Not with respect to *likeness*, because then the Son would be in the Father as a creature [is]: therefore with respect to *truth*: by the same reasoning also[^5] the Father [is] in the Son: therefore there is circumincession there.

5. Likewise, everything that is compared to another is either in it, or outside it. If, then, the Son is compared to the Father, he is either in him, or outside. If *in him*, by the same reasoning also the Father [is] in him: if *outside him*; but those things, of which one is outside the other, differ by substance: therefore the Father and the Son differ substantially.

6. Likewise, the agreement in divine matters is greater than that of genus to species or of whole to parts; but on account of the agreement of genus to species the genus is in the species and conversely; and likewise the whole [is] in the parts and conversely[^6]: therefore much more strongly in divine matters the Father is in the Son and conversely.

**On the contrary:**
1. If the Father is in the Son and conversely, then the Father is in the Father. For just as it follows in predicating that whatever is predicated more broadly than or equally with something is predicated of everything which is under it[^7]: therefore likewise, if anything is in something, it is necessary that in the same there be everything that is in it: therefore if the Son is in the Father, everything which is in the Son is in the Father: but the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Father.

2. Likewise, whenever two simples of the same genus are at the same time, such that one is in the other, they are not distinguished from one another, just as a point is in a point. If, then, the Father and the Son are altogether simple; if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, it does not seem that they are distinguished.

3. Likewise, if there were two divine essences, it would be impossible that one should be in the other, because one could not enter into the other [*illabi*], since each would be equally spiritual and supremely spiritual: therefore if two persons are equally and supremely spiritual, it is impossible that one be in the other; and this[^8] is plain, because God cannot be in a creature without entering into it [*illabi*]. If, then, person is in person, it seems that he wholly enters into it.

4. Likewise, I ask what this *being in the Father* signifies, whether it is said with respect to substance, or with respect to relation. If with respect to relation, this is against Augustine, who says in the text [of the Master][^9], that «on account of the unity of nature the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit». If with respect to substance; but[^10] the things which are said with respect to substance belong to the three: therefore this *being in the Father* belongs to the Son and to the Holy Spirit and to the Father: therefore the Father is in the Father, which is not conceded.

5. Likewise, when it is said: the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, either the same regard is imported, or another. If the same, since the Son is in the Father as in [his] principle, then likewise the Father would be[^11] in the Son as in [his] principle; which is simply absurd. If the same regard is not imported: therefore just as[^12] there is no circumincession when it is said: the genus is in the species, and the species in the genus, likewise neither in the matter at hand would there be circumincession.

6. Likewise, the Son is *from* the Father and *with* the Father, and it is not converted: therefore by parallel reasoning it seems that, if the Father is in the Son, it is not converted that the Son be in the Father.

7. Likewise, nine modes of being *in*[^13] are in creatures. In the first mode, as a part in a whole; in the second mode, as the whole in the parts; in the third mode, as a species in a genus; in the fourth mode, as a genus in species; in the fifth mode, as form in matter; in the sixth mode, as the directed or moved [thing] in the director; in the seventh mode, as a thing in its end; in the eighth mode, as the contained in the container; and a ninth Boethius adds, namely[^14] as accident in subject. It is asked, then, by which of these modes the Father is in the Son and conversely; and since none of these can be granted, it seems that he is in no way [therein].

### CONCLUSION.

> In the divine persons there is the highest and perfect circumincession by reason of the unity of essence with the distinction of persons.

**I respond:** It must be said that[^15], as the authorities and the reasons prove, in divine matters there is the highest and perfect circumincession. And this is called[^16] *circumincession*, by which it is said that the one is in the other and conversely; and this properly and perfectly is in God alone, because circumincession in being posits distinction together with unity. And since in God alone is there the highest[^17] unity together with distinction, in such a way that the distinction is unconfused and the unity undistinguished: hence it is that in God alone is there perfect circumincession. And the reason for this is plain, because the account of circumincession is perfect unity of essence together with distinction of persons. And since this is proper to God alone, therefore also such circumincession [is], according as Hilary says and the Master adduces in the text[^18].

**To 1.** To that which is objected, namely that the Father [is] in the Son and the Son in the Father, therefore the Father[^19] [is] in himself; some say that the argument is not valid, because the regard of that which is *in* is changed; because in one [it] expresses the regard of the principled to the principle, in the other however the regard of the principle to the principled. Yet it is not necessary to say this, because as will be plain shortly[^20], *in* does not express a diverse regard. Nor however does it follow, but rather it is by accident there, in that *in* notes a distinction, just as it is by accident here: Peter is like Paul, and Paul like Peter: therefore Peter is like Peter; so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that[^21] simples existing simultaneously are confounded into one; it must be said that this is true when the simples have to be distinguished by reason of that in which they are, just as a point and a unit [are distinguished] from that in which they are. But when they are distinguished by themselves and in[^22] themselves are made substantive, then, although they are simultaneous, they are not confounded; and such are the divine hypostases. And a similitude of this, although it cannot perfectly be found in a creature, nevertheless Dionysius[^23] sets forth an example in lights, which are many in the same air without confusion: and the sign of this is that, when a luminary is removed, it draws its own light with it[^24], plucking nothing of the others. And the reason for this is, because the lights in the air are not distinguished by reason of that in which [they are][^25].

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that essence is not in essence except by entering into [it], etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar, because where there is a diversity of essences, if one is in the other, it is necessary that one be in some way material to the other; but when[^26] persons differ, the unity of essence being preserved, one is in the other, because the essence of the one is the essence of the other; and so, just as the same does not enter into itself, so there can be no entering-in there.

**To 4.** To that which is asked, what this *being in the Father* signifies; it must be said that, as the Saints intimate, just as *equal* expresses a regard according to unity of quantity, and *like* according to unity of quality[^27], likewise this *being in the Father*, [expresses a regard] according to unity of substance. Hence just as *equal*

simultaneously imports substance together with relation, as will be plain below[^28], so also this [is the case for] *being in*. And just as, when *originating from the Father* is said, [the term] is restricted to standing for the other persons, so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

**To 5.** To that which is asked, whether the same regard be imported; it must be said without prejudice, that yes, so far as it pertains to the account of the name. For just as, when it is said: the Father is like the Son and conversely, not different and different regards are imported: so neither in this *being in*[^29], because it imports the relation of identity or of consubstantiality. Hence if it is said: the Father is like the Son and conversely, not a different regard is said: so in the matter at hand, because this *being in the Father* signifies the same as *being consubstantial with the Father*. And *consubstantial* is taken uniformly, when said of the Father and the Son. And this is plain, because if it did not express a like regard, there would not be circumincession, just as neither is there [circumincession], when the creature is said to be in God, and God to be in the creature; because a different regard is imported in each case.

**To 6.** To that which is asked concerning this [particle] *with*, etc.; it must be said that certain prepositions import a regard of repugnance, like *against*; certain ones [a regard] of distance, as this *to* and *near*; certain ones [a regard] of cause, as *from* and *out of*; certain ones [a regard] of agreement, as *in* and *with*. The first and second are in no way received[^30], but the third and fourth are, and the third not convertibly, but the fourth convertibly, because agreement is a relation of equiparance.

**To 7.** To the last [it must be said] in solving, that this is a singular mode of being *in*, which is not contained among those, nor can it properly be found in creatures.

en: Verses 10 and 11.

la: Cap. 1. n. 4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Chapter 1, n. 4. See here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Unus alterque codex ut GV addit *ergo*.

en: One or another codex, such as G and V, adds *ergo*.

la: In Vat. omissum *ergo* supplevimus ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

en: *Ergo*, omitted in the Vatican edition, we have supplied from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: Ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 restituimus particulam *et*. Cod. Z post *Pater* adiungit *est*.

en: By the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the particle *et*. Codex Z after *Pater* adds *est*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 23. (c. 3.). Vide infra arg. 7. ad opp. — Verba *et similiter* usque *e converso* desiderantur in Vat. et cod. cc, quae tamen in ceteris mss. et ed. 1 inveniuntur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *Physics*, text 23 (c. 3). See below, argument 7 for the opposite. — The words *et similiter* through *e converso* are missing in the Vatican edition and codex cc, but they are found in the other manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Denominativis in fine: *Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur.* Haec propositio innuit principium affirmativi syllogismi, quod vocatur *dici de omni*. Vide Aristot., I. *Prior.* c. 1 seqq. — Aristot., II. *Poster.* c. 14. (c. 12.) ait: «Dico autem *in plus* esse quaecumque insunt quidem unicuique universaliter, at vero et alii». Haec sunt, ut ibi innuitur, duplicis rationis; quaedam sunt ita *in plus*, ut sint etiam extra genus, ut sunt conceptus primi analogi v. g. *esse aliquid* respectu *ternarii*; quaedam vero sunt ita *in plus*, ut tamen non sint extra genus, cuiusmodi sunt conceptus univoci generici v. g. *esse numerum imparem* respectu *ternarii*. Porphyrius libr. de Praedicab. ponit *superabundat* loco *est in plus*. Hinc verbis *quidquid praedicatur in plus vel aeque* intellige praedicatum, quod vel est maioris extensionis v. g. genus, vel eiusdem extensionis ac subiectum v. g. genus cum differentia specifica et proprium. Cfr. Boeth., Dialogus 1. in Porphyr., c. de Genere.

en: Aristotle, *On the Categories*, c. *On Denominatives*, at the end: *When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated, all are also said of the subject.* This proposition intimates the principle of the affirmative syllogism, which is called *being said of all*. See Aristotle, *Prior [Analytics]* I, c. 1ff. — Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* II, c. 14 (c. 12), says: «I call *more broadly* [predicated] those things which inhere in each universally, but also in another». These are, as is there intimated, of a twofold account; some are *more broadly* in such a way that they are also outside the genus, as are the concepts of the first analogues, e.g. *to be something* with respect to *the ternary*; others however are *more broadly* in such a way that they are nevertheless not outside the genus, of which sort are univocal generic concepts, e.g. *to be an odd number* with respect to *the ternary*. Porphyry, in the book *On the Predicables*, puts *superabundat* in place of *est in plus*. Hence by the words *whatever is predicated more broadly or equally* understand a predicate which is either of greater extension, e.g. genus, or of the same extension as the subject, e.g. genus with specific difference, and proprium. Cf. Boethius, *Dialogue* 1 on Porphyry, c. *On Genus*.

la: Vat. *ita* loco *illud*, sed contra mss., quorum tamen plures ponunt *istud*, et ed. 1 cum uno alterove codice ut X *per illud*. Mox substituendo *quia Deus non potest* pro ambiguo *quod Deus non possit* exhibemus lectionem cod. T, cum qua et codd. H Z et ed. 1 conveniunt in eo, quod habent *potest* loco *possit*; cod. K, retento *possit*, substituit *cum* pro *quod*; cod. H *per hoc quod*. — Paulo ante cod. A *divinae* loco *duae*, et Vat. contra cod. T aliosque cum ed. 1 *sint* pro *sunt*.

en: The Vatican edition has *ita* in place of *illud*, but against the manuscripts; nevertheless several of them put *istud*, and edition 1, with one or another codex such as X, [reads] *per illud*. Soon after, by substituting *quia Deus non potest* for the ambiguous *quod Deus non possit* we present the reading of codex T, with which codices H, Z and edition 1 agree in this, that they have *potest* in place of *possit*; codex K, retaining *possit*, substitutes *cum* for *quod*; codex H, *per hoc quod*. — A little earlier codex A has *divinae* in place of *duae*, and the Vatican edition, against codex T and others with edition 1, *sint* in place of *sunt*.

la: Hic, c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4.

la: Fide multorum mss. ut A H K M S T W X Y Z etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus *sed*, quod minus bene abest a Vat. — Mox post *substantiam* in cod. X additur *de Deo*.

en: On the testimony of many manuscripts such as A, H, K, M, S, T, W, X, Y, Z, etc. and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied *sed*, which is less aptly absent from the Vatican edition. — Soon after, following *substantiam*, in codex X *de Deo* is added.

la: Ed. 1 *erit*. Paulo post in plurimis antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 perperam *similiter* pro *simpliciter*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *erit*. A little later in most of the older manuscripts and in edition 1, *similiter* is wrongly [given] in place of *simpliciter*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *si* pro *sicut*, et paulo ante contra plurimos codd. *importatur altera* pro *non importatur eadem*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] *si* in place of *sicut*, and a little earlier, against very many codices, [reads] *importatur altera* in place of *non importatur eadem*.

la: In multis mss. sicut et in ed. 1 ac Vat. deest praepositio *in*, sed male et contra codd. H M V ff. — Octo horum modorum ponuntur ab Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 23. (c. 3.), et nonum addit, ut S. Doctor paulo infra dicit, Boethius, 1. in *Categor.* seu *Praedicam.* Aristot. c. de Denominativis.

en: In many manuscripts, as also in edition 1 and in the Vatican edition, the preposition *in* is missing, but wrongly and against codices H, M, V, ff. — Eight of these modes are set forth by Aristotle, IV *Physics*, text 23 (c. 3), and the ninth is added, as the holy Doctor says a little below, by Boethius, 1 on the *Categories* or *Praedicamenta* of Aristotle, c. *On Denominatives*.

la: Plures codd. ut A F G I S T V X Y etc. *quia*, et pauci ut H Z cum ed. 1 *quod* loco *scilicet*. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *modorum*, deinde substituimus *nullum horum* pro *nullo illorum*.

en: Several codices such as A, F, G, I, S, T, V, X, Y, etc. [read] *quia*, and a few such as H, Z with edition 1 [read] *quod* in place of *scilicet*. Soon after, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *modorum*, then we have substituted *nullum horum* in place of *nullo illorum*.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *quia*, sed minus apte.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many codices and edition 1, [reads] *quia*, but less aptly.

la: Respectu huius propositionis magna diversitas in codd. invenitur; sic loco *haec*, quod a pluribus mss. ut I S V aa cc et ed. 1 exhibetur, alii ut K X Z bb ponunt cum Vat. *hic*, cod. O *hoc*; dein aliqui tantum codd. et Vat. *notatur* pro *vocatur*; codd. A R T verba *Et haec vocatur circumincessio* omittunt. Mox pauci codd. ut K O *quia* loco *qua*, et demum paulo infra cod. T *haec* pro *hoc*.

en: With respect to this proposition great diversity is found in the codices; thus in place of *haec*, which is presented by several manuscripts such as I, S, V, aa, cc and edition 1, others such as K, X, Z, bb put with the Vatican edition *hic*, codex O *hoc*; then only some codices and the Vatican [read] *notatur* in place of *vocatur*; codices A, R, T omit the words *Et haec vocatur circumincessio*. Soon after, a few codices such as K, O [read] *quia* in place of *qua*, and lastly, a little below, codex T [reads] *haec* in place of *hoc*.

la: Praestamus antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 lectionem addendo *summa*, quod et loci veritas exigit.

en: We prefer the reading of the older manuscripts and of edition 1 by adding *summa*, which the truth of the passage also requires.

la: Hic, c. 4. — Plures codd. ut A K G H Z cum ed. 1 *adducit* loco *inducit*.

en: Here, c. 4. — Several codices such as A, K, G, H, Z with edition 1 [read] *adducit* in place of *inducit*.

la: Vat. contra plurimos mss. et ed. 1 addit *hic* et paulo ante post *Pater* verbum *est*.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many manuscripts and edition 1, adds *hic*, and a little earlier, after *Pater*, the word *est*.

la: Infra ad 3; cf. etiam dub. 6.

en: Below, [in the response] to [argument] 3; cf. also dubium 6.

la: Ex antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quod*.

en: From the older codices and edition 1 we have supplied *quod*.

la: Codd. V X *ita* pro *in*.

en: Codices V, X [read] *ita* in place of *in*.

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 2. § 4: *Etenim videmus in domo, multis unitis lampadibus, ad unum aliquod lumen unita omnium omnia lumina et unam claritatem indiscretam relucentem, et non etiam quis, ut arbitror, poterit alicuius lampadis lumen ab aliis ex omnia lumina continenti aere discernere, et videre sine altera parte alteram partem, totis in totis inconfuse contemperatis. Sed si etiam unam quis ardentium subduxerit domo, coibit et proprium totum lumen, nullum quiddam aliorum luminum in semetipsa complectens, aut suimet alteris relinquens. Erat enim earum, quod quidem dixi, omnium ad omnia perfectissima unitas, incommixta universaliter, et nulla parte confusa: et haec, existente in corpore aere, et ex materiali igne pendente lumine.*

en: *On the Divine Names*, c. 2, § 4: *For we see in a house, when many lamps are lit, all the lights of all united into some one light, and a single undivided brightness shining forth, and no one, as I think, will be able to discern the light of some one lamp from the others in the air containing all the lights, and to see one part without the other part, since the wholes are blended into the wholes without confusion. But if one should withdraw any one of the burning [lamps] from the house, also its own whole light will go [with it], embracing nothing of the other lights in itself, nor leaving any of itself to the others. For there was, as I said, of these [lights] a most perfect unity of all to all, wholly unmixed and confused in no part: and this, while the air subsists in [its] body, and the light depends from the material fire.*

la: In Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 deest *secum*.

en: In the Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, *secum* is missing.

la: Cod. Y addit *sunt*; codd. vero B D H adiiciunt *sed penes suas origines*, a quibus cod. O in eo tantum discedit, quod loco *penes* habet *per*.

en: Codex Y adds *sunt*; codices B, D, H add *sed penes suas origines* ("but by reason of their origins"), from which codex O differs only in this, that in place of *penes* it has *per*.

la: Vat. perperam et contra mss. nec non sex primas edd. [omittit *quando*].[?]

en: The Vatican edition wrongly and against the manuscripts and the first six editions [omits *quando*].[?]

la: In cod. O additur *essentialis vel substantialis*, et paulo ante cum nomine *quantitatis* coniungitur *virtualis*. Mox post *in Patre* cod. G adiungit *est*, sed melius suppletur *dicit respectum*.

en: In codex O *essentialis vel substantialis* is added, and a little earlier with the word *quantitatis* is joined *virtualis*. Soon after, following *in Patre*, codex G adds *est*, but it is better supplied [as] *dicit respectum*.

la: Dist. 31. p. I. q. 2. — Paulo infra post *quod est* plurimi codd. ut A C G I K L O P Q R S T U W Y etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt *esse*, sed male. Dein fide mss. loco *hoc quod est* substituimus *cum dicitur*, cui codd. O Z adiungunt satis bene *aliqua persona est*.

en: Distinction 31, part I, q. 2. — A little below, after *quod est*, very many codices such as A, C, G, I, K, L, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, W, Y, etc. with editions 1, 2, 3 omit *esse*, but wrongly. Then on the testimony of the manuscripts in place of *hoc quod est* we have substituted *cum dicitur*, to which codices O, Z add, fittingly enough, *aliqua persona est*.

la: Multi codd. ut paulo supra cum edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam omittunt *esse*. Mox post *Unde* auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus additum *sicut*, quod tamen multi codd. paulo infra loco *significat* ponunt, et respectu cuius cod. O (cum quo fere convenit cod. I) post *consubstantialem* addit *sic esse in Filio idem est quod esse Filio consubstantialem*, sed ad rem minus congruenter. Aliqui mss. ut V X verbis *in proposito* praefigunt particulam *et*; dein a multis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 post *idem quod* omittitur *est*, et a pluribus mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 substituitur *Patrem* pro *Patri*.

en: Many codices, as a little above, with editions 1, 2, 3 wrongly omit *esse*. Soon after *Unde* on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out the added *sicut*, which however many codices a little below put in place of *significat*, and with respect to which codex O (with which codex I almost agrees) after *consubstantialem* adds *sic esse in Filio idem est quod esse Filio consubstantialem*, but less congruously to the matter. Some manuscripts such as V, X prefix to the words *in proposito* the particle *et*; then by many codices and editions 1, 2, 3 after *idem quod* *est* is omitted, and by several manuscripts with editions 1, 2, 3 *Patrem* is substituted for *Patri*.

la: Supple: *propositione*; pro qua suppletione elidenda substituit Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *utroque* pro *utraque*. — Subaudi: *in divinis*. — Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, *tertiae sic quod* loco *et tertiae*, pro quo cod. M exhibet *licet tertiae*. In cod. O quartum divisionis membrum subdividitur, *in quantum quaedam praepositiones important habitudinem convenientiae simpliciter, quaedam cum subauctoritate et ultimae nullo modo reciprocantur*.

en: Supply: *propositione* ("with a proposition"); for which supplied word, in order to elide it, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, substitutes *utroque* for *utraque*. — Understand: *in divinis* ("in divine matters"). — Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *tertiae sic quod* in place of *et tertiae*, for which codex M presents *licet tertiae*. In codex O the fourth member of the division is subdivided, *insofar as certain prepositions import a regard of agreement simply, certain ones with sub-authority, and the last [are] in no way reciprocated*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Circumincessio* (περιχώρησις) per duplicem praepositionem (*circum-in*) aliquo modo exprimit duplicem sensum vocabuli Graeci, scilicet *invadere* et *capere*. Nostris temporibus saepe vocatur *circuminsessio*, quod vocabulum tamen minus aptum esse videtur, ut profundus sensus vocabuli Graeci exprimatur. Pro intelligentia quaestionis notandum est, quod saltem tria ad circumincessionem requiruntur: nempe inexistentia actualis unius in alio; realis distinctio eorum qui circumincedunt; intima eorum praesentia et consubstantialitas. Hinc sequitur, nullam creaturam hoc modo in alia esse posse, nec ipsum Deum proprie circumincessive inesse alicui creaturae, sed in solo Deo esse circumincessionem perfectam, ut docet sanctus Doctor in corp. Ceterum sequitur circumincessio, ut bene docet Richard. a Med. (loc. infra cit.), «ex hoc firmissimo fundamento credito, quod in tribus personis una essentia est. Ex quo enim quaelibet persona est in essentia sicut suppositum in natura, et essentia in qualibet persona sicut natura in supposito, sequitur, quamlibet personam per suam essentiam esse in alia, alio tamen modo, quam natura sit in supposito et suppositum in natura» etc., nempe quia requiritur aliqua differentia vel distinctio ad hoc, quod unum sit in alio.

**II.** Quoad solut. ad 1. S. Doctor primam responsionem merito reiicit. Est enim hic fallacia accidentis. *Esse in alio* enim importat distinctionem unius ab alio; *esse in se* vero tollit omnem distinctionem. Fallaciter ergo concluditur: Pater est in Filio, scil. ut distinctus ab eo, et e converso: ergo est in se, cum sit indistinctus omnino. Sic enim fit transitus a distinctione ad identitatem. Exemplum in littera positum rem magis explicat. Sic patet, quod Aristotelica regula: *quidquid praedicatur de aliquo etiam de omni, quod sub illo est, praedicatur*, in applicatione fallere potest. Richard. a Med. tamen eandem obiectionem aliter solvit.

Quintam obiectionem eodem modo solvit S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 2. ad 3.; S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 3.).

**III.** In conclusione omnes conveniunt; et S. Thom., in *Summa* ad probandam conclusionem iisdem tribus argumentis utitur, quae apud S. Bonav. sunt 3. 4. 5. in fundam. — Inepte Durandus et Aureolus hoc 5. argumentum (quod S. Thomas habet 2. loco) impugnare nituntur. — Cfr. Scot., hic q. 2; *Report.*, hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 5; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 9. in fine. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. q. 10. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** *Circumincession* (περιχώρησις) by the double preposition (*circum-in*) in some way expresses the double sense of the Greek word, namely *to invade* and *to contain*. In our times it is often called *circuminsession*, which word however seems less apt for expressing the profound sense of the Greek word. For the understanding of the question it must be noted that at least three things are required for circumincession: namely the actual existence-within of one in the other; the real distinction of those who circumincede; their intimate presence and consubstantiality. Hence it follows that no creature can be in another in this way, nor can God himself properly be present circumincessively in any creature, but only in God is there perfect circumincession, as the holy Doctor teaches in the body [of the question]. Furthermore circumincession follows, as Richard of Mediavilla rightly teaches (loc. cited below), «from this most firm foundation believed, that in the three persons there is one essence. For from the fact that any person whatsoever is in the essence as a supposit in a nature, and the essence in any person whatsoever as a nature in a supposit, it follows that any person whatsoever is, through his own essence, in another, in another mode, however, than the [way in which] nature is in the supposit and the supposit in the nature» etc., namely because some difference or distinction is required for this, that one be in the other.

**II.** As to the solution to [argument] 1: the Holy Doctor rightly rejects the first answer. For there is here a fallacy of accident. *To be in another* imports distinction of one from the other; *to be in oneself* however removes every distinction. So fallaciously it is concluded: the Father is in the Son, namely as distinct from him, and conversely: therefore he is in himself, since he is altogether undistinguished. For thus there comes about a transition from distinction to identity. The example placed in the text explains the matter more fully. So it is plain that the Aristotelian rule — *whatever is predicated of something is predicated also of every thing which is under it* — can fail in application. Richard of Mediavilla nevertheless solves the same objection differently.

The fifth objection St. Thomas solves in the same way (here q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3).

**III.** On the conclusion all agree; and St. Thomas, in the *Summa*, to prove the conclusion, uses the same three arguments which in St. Bonaventure are 3, 4, 5 in the fundamenta. — Ineptly Durandus and Aureolus strive to attack this 5th argument (which St. Thomas has in the 2nd place). — Cf. Scotus, here q. 2; *Reportata*, here q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 5; *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 9, at the end. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, 2nd principal, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 33, q. 10. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum in divinis sit ponere totum integrale.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *Quod a Deo excludi debeant omnes rationes inaequalitatis.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum in divinis ponendum sit totum integrale.*

Circa primum, quod sit[^1] ponere totalitatem integritatis, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum primo, et habetur in littera[^2]: *Tota Trinitas est in singulis personis*: ergo aut est ibi implicatio falsi, aut est ibi totalitas; sed non est ibi implicatio falsi: ergo est ibi totalitas.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia ubi quantitas, ibi totalitas et integritas. Sed in divinis est quantitas virtutis: ergo saltem secundum illam et integritas.

3. Item, ubi pluralitas, ibi integritas, quia omnis pluralitas constat ex unitatibus; sed in Deo est pluralitas, quia trinitas: ergo in Deo est integritas. Si dicas, quod illa pluralitas non integratur, quia nihil plus est in tribus quam in uno — ergo si tantum est in tribus, quantum est in uno, ergo tantum credit et aeque plene credit qui credit, unum solum esse suppositum, sicut qui credit, tres esse personas; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, si aliquid est aequale alicui, eodem addito, adhuc erit aequale; ergo si aliquid est totum ad aliquid, eodem addito, adhuc erit totum; sed tres est totum ad unum: ergo tres personae ad unam personam[^3].

5. Item, omne quod praedicatur de aliquibus simul et de nullo per se, est totum integrum ad illa[^4]; istud constat et non habet instantiam; sed trinitas praedicatur de tribus personis simul et de nulla per se: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne quod removetur ab aliquo, differt ab illo genere, vel specie, vel numero, vel est totum ad illud; sed trinitas removetur a Patre, quia Pater non est trinitas, nec differt genere, vel specie, vel numero: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Ambrosius in libro *de Trinitate*[^5]: «In divinis nullam ponimus totalitatem, quia non est ibi quantitas nec numerus».

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne[^6] integrum est compositum ex partibus; sed Deus est summe simplex: ergo in Deo nulla est totalitas nec integritas.

3. Item, omnis pars sub ratione partis habet esse imperfectum respectu totius, quia ex aliquibus

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omnino perfectis non resultat tertium[^7]: ergo cum in divinis nihil imperfectionis sit ponendum, non est ibi pars: ergo a relativis[^8] nec totum.

4. Item, omne totum est maius sua parte: sed ubi infinitas, ibi non est maius et minus: ergo nec totalitas: sed in divinis est infinitas: ergo.

5. Item, omne totum est resolubile vel secundum rem, vel secundum intellectum; et omne resolubile est corruptibile: ergo cum in Deo nihil sit corruptibile, non erit resolubile, et ita nec totum.

> **Conclusio.** *Ratio totalitatis, prout exprimit aliquid perfectum, convenit Deo; sed prout habet respectum ad partes, nec totalitas nec partialitas in Deo poni potest.*

**Respondeo:** Totum sive totalitas uno modo dicitur absolute: et sic totum idem est quod perfectum[^9]. Alio modo dicitur *totum* per comparationem ad partem; et sic dicitur totum quod habet partem et partem sive partes[^10].

Primo modo bene est ponere totalitatem in Deo, secundo[^11] non, nec etiam partialitatem; totalitatem non, quia aufert simplicitatem; partialitatem non, quia tollit perfectum; neutrum, quia tollit aequalitatem summam.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Augustino, qui dicit, quod *tota Trinitas* etc.; dicendum, quod totum accipit pro perfecto, vel totum ibi accipitur privative, quia privat hoc quod est esse partem extra partem. Unde tantum valet *tota essentia*, quantum valet *non habens partem extra vel intra*.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod est ibi quantitas virtutis; dicendum, quod quantitas virtutis stat cum summa simplicitate; ideo abstrahit a totalitate et integritate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi pluralitas, ibi integritas[^12] etc.; dicendum, quod pluralitas in creaturis duo dicit. Dicit enim aliquorum distinctionem, et ex ipsis unius multitudinis[^13] constitutionem. Primum quidem reperitur in divinis, quia ibi est distinctio vere; secundum non, quia ubi constitutio est, ibi constituentia minus habent quam totum[^14], quod constituunt, et ita essentialiter differunt ab invicem. In divinis autem non sic, quia cum Pater[^15] habeat totam essentiam, non partem, non potest minus habere nec essentialiter differre. Et ideo dicendum, quod in divinis recipitur[^16] pluralitas ratione distinctionis. Sed quia pluralitas est totum ratione constitutionis, et haec non est in divinis; ideo non sequitur, quod sit ibi totalitas; est tamen ibi vere unitas et pluralitas[^17], et tantum est in unitate, quantum in pluralitate, sed non tot modis. Et quia fides non tantum est respectu essentiae vel magnitudinis, sed etiam modi essendi, patet quod obiicitur, quod non tantum credit qui credit unam personam, quantum qui credit plures.

4. Ex hoc patent sequentia, quia unum est pars trium, secundum quod dicit[^18] unitatem, et tria trinitatem. Sed cum additur hoc nomen *persona*, distrahitur et non manet illa ratio unitatis, ideo nec ratio partialitatis.

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedicatur simul et removetur[^19] etc.; dicendum, quod hoc[^20] non solum convenit totalitati respectu partis, sed etiam pluralitati respectu unitatis; quae quamvis non teneat rationem partis[^21] propter diminutionem et imperfectionem[^22], tenet tamen rationem unitatis propter principium et distinctionem.

Unde quod totum removeatur a partibus et non[^23] differat, hoc non est ratione constitutionis principaliter, sed ratione distinctionis. Et quoniam in divina pluralitate, quamvis non sit unius maioris constitutio, quia tamen ibi est distinctio, ideo sic removetur, et sic praedicatur sicut totum in creaturis.

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english:
### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *That all accounts of inequality must be excluded from God.*
### Question I. *Whether an integral whole is to be posited in divine things.*

As to the first [question], that one ought[^1] to posit a totality of integrity, it seems [yes]:

1. By Augustine first, [as] is had in the text [of the Master][^2]: *The whole Trinity is in each of the persons*: therefore either there is there an implication of falsehood, or there is there a totality; but there is not there an implication of falsehood: therefore there is there totality.

2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason, since where there is quantity, there is totality and integrity. But in divine things there is the quantity of virtue: therefore at least according to it [there is] also integrity.

3. Likewise, where there is plurality, there is integrity, since every plurality is composed of unities; but in God there is plurality, since [there is] trinity: therefore in God there is integrity. If you say that that plurality is not made integral, since nothing more is in three than in one — then if there is just as much in three as in one, then he who believes that there is only one supposit believes just as much, and as fully, as he who believes that there are three persons; but this is false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if something is equal to something, when the same is added, it will still be equal; therefore if something is a whole in relation to something, when the same is added, it will still be a whole; but three is a whole in relation to one: therefore three persons in relation to one person[^3].

5. Likewise, everything which is predicated of certain things together and of none singly is an integral whole in relation to them[^4]; this stands and admits of no instance to the contrary; but trinity is predicated of the three persons together and of none singly: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, everything which is removed from something either differs from it in genus, or species, or number, or is a whole in relation to it; but trinity is removed from the Father, since the Father is not the trinity, nor does it differ in genus, or species, or number: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Ambrose, in his book *On the Trinity*[^5]: «In divine things we posit no totality, since there is there neither quantity nor number».

2. Likewise, by reason it seems [so], since every[^6] integral [whole] is composed of parts; but God is supremely simple: therefore in God there is no totality nor integrity.

3. Likewise, every part under the account of a part has imperfect being with respect to the whole, since from things which are altogether perfect[^7] no third thing results: therefore since in divine things nothing of imperfection is to be posited, there is no part there: therefore from the relatives[^8] no whole either.

4. Likewise, every whole is greater than its part: but where there is infinity, there is no greater and lesser: therefore neither totality: but in divine things there is infinity: therefore [no totality].

5. Likewise, every whole is resolvable either in reality or in the intellect; and everything resolvable is corruptible: therefore since in God nothing is corruptible, [God] will not be resolvable, and so neither a whole.

> **Conclusion.** *The account of totality, insofar as it expresses something perfect, befits God; but insofar as it has reference to parts, neither totality nor partiality can be posited in God.*

**I respond:** Whole or totality is said in one way absolutely: and so whole is the same as perfect[^9]. In another way *whole* is said by comparison to a part; and so that is called whole which has part and part, or parts[^10].

In the first way, totality is well posited in God; in the second[^11] not, nor partiality either; not totality, because it removes simplicity; not partiality, because it destroys the perfect; neither, because it destroys the highest equality.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected from Augustine, who says *the whole Trinity* etc.; it must be said that he takes "whole" for "perfect," or "whole" is taken there privatively, since it denies what it is to be part outside of part. Hence "whole essence" is worth as much as "not having part outside or within."

2. To that which is objected secondly, that there is there a quantity of virtue; it must be said that the quantity of virtue stands together with the highest simplicity; therefore it abstracts from totality and integrity.

3. To that which is objected, that where there is plurality, there is integrity[^12] etc.; it must be said that plurality in creatures says two things. For it expresses the distinction of certain things, and from these very things the constitution[^13] of one multitude. The first is indeed found in divine things, since there is truly distinction there; but the second is not, since where there is constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole[^14] which they constitute, and so they essentially differ from one another. But in divine things it is not so, since since the Father[^15] has the whole essence, not a part, he cannot have less, nor essentially differ. And therefore it must be said that in divine things plurality is received[^16] by reason of distinction. But because plurality is a whole by reason of constitution, and this is not in divine things, therefore it does not follow that there is totality there; nevertheless there is truly there unity and plurality[^17], and there is as much in unity as in plurality, but not in as many modes. And because faith is not only with respect to essence or magnitude, but also to the mode of being, it is plain [as to] what is objected, that he who believes one person does not believe as much as he who believes several.

4. From this the following [points] are clear, since one is a part of three, according as it expresses[^18] unity, and three [express] trinity. But when this name *person* is added, [the term] is drawn off and that account of unity does not remain, therefore neither the account of partiality.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that it is predicated together and removed[^19] etc.; it must be said that this[^20] not only befits totality with respect to a part, but also plurality with respect to unity; which, although it does not hold the account of part[^21] on account of diminution and imperfection[^22], nevertheless holds the account of unity on account of [its being a] principle and [having] distinction.

Hence [the fact] that the whole is removed from the parts and does not[^23] differ [from them], this is not principally by reason of constitution, but by reason of distinction. And since in the divine plurality, although there is no constitution of one greater [thing], nevertheless because there is distinction there, therefore it is in this way removed, and in this way predicated, just as a whole [is removed and predicated] in creatures.

la: Cod. X cum ed. 1 adiungit *quaeritur*.

en: Cod. X with edition 1 adds *quaeritur* ("is asked").

la: In ed. 1 additur *ibi*.

en: In edition 1 *ibi* ("there") is added.

la: Hic, c. 4, ubi haec verba Augustini afferuntur: «Propter unitatem naturalem totus Pater in Filio et Spiritu sancto est, totus quoque Spiritus sanctus in Patre et Filio est. Nullus horum extra quemlibet ipsorum est propter naturae divinae unitatem». Et c. 6, ubi Augustinus inter cetera dicit: «Pars ergo Trinitatis esse non potest quicumque unus in tribus». Ex quibus verbis propositio illa obiectionis formata esse videtur. — Vat. hic et infra in principio respons. ad hanc obiectionem praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et sex primarum edd. *essentia* loco *Trinitas*, pro quo codd. *PQ divinitas*.

en: Here, c. 4, where these words of Augustine are alleged: «On account of the natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit also is in the Father and the Son. None of these is outside any of them, on account of the unity of the divine nature». And c. 6, where Augustine among other things says: «No one therefore who is one of the three can be a part of the Trinity». From which words the proposition of that objection appears to have been formed. — The Vatican edition, here and below at the beginning of the response to this objection, against the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and the six first editions, [reads] *essentia* in place of *Trinitas*, in place of which codices *PQ* [read] *divinitas*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. *contra* pro *ergo*. — Cum *ergo* incipit replicatio.

en: The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions, [reads] *contra* in place of *ergo*. — With *ergo* begins the rejoinder.

la: Sensus argumenti est: Si verum est axioma: duae res aequales remanent aequales, si utrique additur idem, etiam verum erit hoc axioma: si aliquid est totum ad aliquid, remanet totum, si subiecto et praedicato idem additur; unde si in propositione: *tres est totum ad unum*, addo vocabulum *persona* ad *tres* et *unum*, non alteratur veritas eiusdem.

en: The sense of the argument is: If the axiom is true that two equal things remain equal, if the same [thing] is added to each, then this axiom too will be true: if something is a whole in relation to something, it remains a whole, if the same is added to subject and predicate; whence if, in the proposition *three is a whole in relation to one*, I add the word *person* to *three* and to *one*, the truth of the same is not altered.

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 31. (IV. c. 26.) ait: «Totum dicitur cuius nulla pars eorum abest, ex quibus totum natura (i. e. secundum propriam naturam) dicitur; et quod continet contenta, ut unum quid illa sint; hoc autem dupliciter: aut enim ut unumquodque unum, aut ex his illud unum. Ipsum enim universale et quod omnino ut totum quippiam ens dicitur, sic est universale, ut multa continens, eo quod de singulis praedicatur... Ceterum continuum et finitum, cum e pluribus inexistentibus unum quid sit, maxime quidem potentia, non actu». Quae verba Scotus, Comment. in hunc locum, ita explicat: *Et per hoc dat intelligere duplex totum, scil. totum universale, cuius quaelibet pars est ipsum totum, quatenus tale totum praedicatur de suis partibus, praedicatione dicente: hoc est hoc; aliud totum integrale, quod ex suis partibus constituitur, tamen nulla eius pars est ipsum totum, quia nullum tale totum de suis partibus praedicatur.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 31 (IV, c. 26), says: «That is called a whole of which no part is absent of those from which the whole is said by nature (i. e. according to its proper nature); and that which contains its contents so that they are some one thing; this in two ways: either as each one is one, or [so that] from these [is constituted] that one. For the universal itself, and what in every way is called something existing as a whole, is universal in this way: as containing many things, in that it is predicated of singulars… Moreover the continuous and the finite, since out of many indwelling [parts] it is some one thing, [is so] above all in potency, not in act». Which words Scotus, in his Commentary on this passage, so explains: *And by this he gives [us] to understand a twofold whole, namely the universal whole, of which each part is the whole itself, inasmuch as such a whole is predicated of its parts, by a predication saying: this is this; another, the integral whole, which is constituted from its parts, yet no part of it is the whole itself, since no such whole is predicated of its parts.*

la: Seu libr. I. *de Fide* c. 2. n. 19; et III. *de Spir. S.* c. 13; n. 93. ait: *Quomodo enim pluralitatem recipit unitas divinitatis, cum pluralitas numeri sit, numerum autem non recipit divina natura?*

en: Or rather book I *On the Faith*, c. 2, n. 19; and III *On the Holy Spirit*, c. 13, n. 93, [where] he says: *For how does the unity of divinity admit plurality, since plurality is of number, but the divine nature does not admit number?*

la: In cod. M additur *totum*.

en: In cod. M *totum* is added.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 14. (VI. c. 13.). Vide supra pag. 311 nota 7.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 14 (VI, c. 13). See above p. 311 note 7.

la: Id est, concludendo ex habitudine unius relativi ad aliud, nempe partis ad totum.

en: That is, concluding from the relation of one relative to another, namely of part to whole.

la: Vide Anselm., *Proslog.* c. 18, et *de Fide Trin.* c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 161 nota 1.

en: See Anselm, *Proslogion* c. 18, and *On the Faith of the Trinity* c. 3. Cf. above p. 161 note 1.

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 64. (c. 6.): *Totum vero et perfectum aut omnino idem sunt, aut natura inter se affinia.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 64 (c. 6): *Whole and perfect are either altogether the same, or by nature akin to one another.*

la: Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 31. (IV. c. 26.). Vide supra arg. 5. ad opp.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 31 (IV, c. 26). See above arg. 5 *ad oppositum*.

la: In codd. *V X* satis bene additur *vero modo*. Paulo infra cod. *Z perfectionem* pro *perfectum*. Dein ed. 1 post *neutrum, quia* bene addit *utrumque*.

en: In codices *V X* there is well added *vero modo* ("but in [this] way"). A little below cod. *Z* [reads] *perfectionem* in place of *perfectum*. Then ed. 1 after *neutrum, quia* well adds *utrumque* ("both").

la: Ex cod. Y supplevimus *integritas*.

en: From cod. Y we have supplied *integritas*.

la: Ita plures mss. ut *FGHPQY* cum ed. 1; alii cum Vat. *multiplicationis*.

en: Thus several manuscripts such as *FGHPQY* with ed. 1; others with the Vatican edition [read] *multiplicationis*.

la: Cod. O *quaelibet persona* loco *Pater*.

en: Cod. O [reads] *quaelibet persona* in place of *Pater*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *recipitur* pro *reperitur*, et paulo infra ex pluribus mss. ut *ACSTV cc* et ed. 1 *haec* pro *hoc*. Multi codd. ut *AFGHISTVZ* etc. cum ed. 1 *erat totum* loco *est totum*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *recipitur* in place of *reperitur*, and a little below, from several manuscripts such as *ACSTV cc* and ed. 1, *haec* in place of *hoc*. Many codices such as *AFGHISTVZ* etc., with ed. 1, [read] *erat totum* in place of *est totum*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc est tamen naturae unitas et personarum pluralitas*, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra multi codd. cum Vat. *Sed quia* loco *Et quia* contra codd. *GH* et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican with cod. *cc* [reads] *est tamen naturae unitas et personarum pluralitas* ("there is nevertheless a unity of nature and a plurality of persons"), but the authority of the other manuscripts and ed. 1 stands against [it]. A little below many codices, with the Vatican, [read] *Sed quia* in place of *Et quia*, against codices *GH* and ed. 1.

la: Supple cum ed. 1 *unum*, quae et mox ponit *adderetur* pro *additur*.

en: Supply with ed. 1 *unum* ("one"), which also soon after puts *adderetur* in place of *additur*.

la: Ita brevissime mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. *obiicitur quod omne, quod praedicatur simul et de nullo* etc. Et ad sequens: *omne quod removetur* etc.

en: Thus very briefly the manuscripts and ed. 1, while the Vatican [reads] *obiicitur quod omne, quod praedicatur simul et de nullo* etc. And for what follows: *omne quod removetur* etc.

la: Cod. Z incongrue hic addit *scilicet in divinis*, et mox post *imperfectionem* adiungit *quam scilicet dicit pars*.

en: Cod. Z incongruously adds here *scilicet in divinis* ("namely in divine things"), and soon after *imperfectionem* appends *quam scilicet dicit pars* ("which, namely, the part expresses").

la: Vat. perperam, quia argumentationi minus respondet, et absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit *non*. Argumentationis summa in hoc est: ratio, quare totum i. e. Trinitas removetur a Patre, nec tamen ab ipso differt sicut totum a [parte, non est ratione constitutionis principaliter, sed ratione distinctionis].

en: The Vatican wrongly, since it corresponds less to the argumentation, and without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits *non*. The sum of the argumentation is this: the reason why the whole, i. e. the Trinity, is removed from the Father, yet does not differ from him as a whole [does] from [a part, is not principally by reason of constitution, but by reason of distinction].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis notandum, quod S. Doctor hic in corp. et ad 1. verbum *totum* sumit triplici modo. Potest enim intelligi vel *positive* vel *privative*; si positive, tunc iterum vel *proprie* i. e. comparative ad partes, et sic totum est idem ac habens partes; vel *absolute*, et sic significat perfectum. Si autem accipitur privative, tunc significat ens, quod non habet partes, sicut sunt omnia indivisibilia v. g. anima. In primo sensu *totum* minime potest transferri ad Deum, bene vero in secundo ac tertio sensu. His suppositis, quaestio resolvitur quoad totalitatem duplici conclusione; deinde negativa solutio extenditur etiam ad partialitatem.

**II.** Pro intelligentia 3. 5. et 6. oppositi et solutionis notandum, quod natura *totius integralis* importat, quod totum praedicetur de omnibus partibus simul, sed de nulla parte per se. Ratio huius est non tantum, quia distinguuntur partes, sed etiam quia totum est *inaequale* in comparatione ad suas partes. Verum quidem est, quod etiam Trinitas non praedicatur de aliqua persona per se, tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod Trinitas sit totum integrale relate ad singulas personas, quia non propter aliquam inaequalitatem Trinitatis ad singulas personas, sed solummodo propter distinctionem personarum ista praedicatio fieri nequit. Unde recte replicatur in 3. oppos.: «*Illa pluralitas* (personarum) *non integratur* (i. e. non facit totum integrum), *quia nihil plus est in tribus quam in uno*». Sic etiam verba in solutione: «*Ubi constitutio est, ibi constituentia minus habent quam totum*», facile intelliguntur, quia manifestum est, quod quando partes constituunt unum totum, partes minus sunt quam totum. In divinis non est sic, quia *pluralitas personarum* non constituit *totum*, ut ibi a S. Doctore bene explicatur.

Pro solut. ad 4. notandum, quod numerus in divinis non habet plenam rationem numeri, quia etsi personae sunt distinctae per suas personales proprietates, tamen conveniunt in una numero essentia; sed numerus secundum plenam sui rationem importat numeratorum distinctionem in essentia. Unde tres unitates personales sunt quidem plures quam una, non tamen sunt plures vel plus in essentia; ita fere Richard. a Med., loc. infra cit. et ad mentem Seraphici Doctoris, cfr. infra d. 24. praecipue a. 3. q. 1.

**III.** Scot., de hac q. et duabus seqq. Report. hic q. 3.[?] — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 1. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. et 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 1. a. 4. — Durand., de hac 1. et 4. q. hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** For the understanding of this question it must be noted that the holy Doctor here, in the corpus and in [the reply] to 1, takes the word *whole* in a threefold mode. For it can be understood either *positively* or *privatively*; if positively, then again either *properly*, i. e. comparatively to parts — and so "whole" is the same as "having parts"; or *absolutely*, and so it signifies "perfect." But if it is taken privatively, then it signifies a being which does not have parts, as are all indivisibles, e. g. the soul. In the first sense *whole* can least of all be transferred to God, but well in the second and third sense. These things being supposed, the question is resolved as to totality by a twofold conclusion; then the negative solution is extended also to partiality.

**II.** For the understanding of [objections] 3, 5, and 6 of the opposite [side] and of the solution it must be noted that the nature of an *integral whole* implies that the whole be predicated of all the parts together, but of no part singly. The reason for this is not only that the parts are distinguished, but also that the whole is *unequal* in comparison to its parts. It is indeed true that the Trinity is not predicated of any one person singly; nevertheless from this it does not follow that the Trinity is an integral whole in relation to the individual persons, since not on account of any inequality of the Trinity to the individual persons, but solely on account of the distinction of the persons, this predication cannot be made. Hence the rejoinder in [objection] 3 of the opposite [side] is correctly made: «*That plurality* (of the persons) *is not made integral* (i. e. does not make an integral whole), *since nothing more is in three than in one*». So also the words in the solution: «*Where there is constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole*» are easily understood, since it is manifest that when parts constitute one whole, the parts are less than the whole. In divine things it is not so, since the *plurality of the persons* does not constitute a *whole*, as is well explained there by the holy Doctor.

For the solution to [objection] 4 it must be noted that number in divine things does not have the full account of number, since although the persons are distinguished by their personal properties, nevertheless they agree in one essence numerically; but number, according to its full account, implies a distinction of the things numbered in essence. Hence three personal unities are indeed more than one, yet they are not more or greater in essence; thus, more or less, Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. below, and according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, cf. below d. 24, especially a. 3, q. 1.

**III.** Scotus, on this question and the two following, *Reportata* here q. 3.[?] — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12; *Summa* p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 1, q. *incidens*. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3 and 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st *principium*, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 43, q. 1, a. 4. — Durandus, on this 1 and 4 q. here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 3.

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