title: Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 5

title_alt: Utrum, adveniente gratia, fides informis fiat formata

title_alt: Whether, when grace comes, unformed faith becomes formed

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum fides informis fiat formata, adveniente gratia.*

Quinto et ultimo quaeritur de ipsius fidei informis formatione, et est quaestio, utrum, adveniente gratia, fides informis fiat formata. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Antequam aliquis peccet, non habet nisi fidem formatam, cum autem peccat, tunc incipit habere fidem informem: si ergo in peccando non infunditur ei nova fides, necesse est, quod per peccatum fides formata fiat informis. Si ergo fides informis ante fuit formata, videtur, quodsi aliquis restituatur in gradum pristinum per adventum gratiae, quod fides informis fiat formata.

2. Item, gratia adveniens informat naturam: si ergo fides informis plus approximat gratiae quam ipsa natura, videtur per locum *a minori*[^p497-1], quod fides informis habeat per gratiam informari.

3. Item, plus convenit habitus infusus cum gratia, quae est infusa, quam habitus acquisiti; sed habitus acquisiti per adventum gratiae informantur — quod patet, quia in eorum exercitio et usu homo meretur[^p497-2] — ergo multo fortius habitus fidei informis formatur per ipsam gratiam supervenientem.

4. Item, opera mortificata per adventum gratiae vivificantur, secundum quod communiter dicitur[^p497-3], ergo pari ratione et habitus mortuus: si ergo fides informis est huiusmodi, videtur, quod per adventum gratiae habeat informari.

5. Item, nihil aliud est dicere, habitum vivum esse, quam per illum vitam aeternam mereri posse; sed credere fidei informis, quod est assentire primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, superveniente caritate, habet omne quod necessarium est ad meritum: ergo videtur, quodsi actus eius est meritorius, quod habitus sit vivificatus. Quod autem habeat omne quod necessarium est ad meritum, planum est, cum ipsum opus de se sit bonum et rectum et sit[^p497-4] a caritate imperatum.

6. Item, omne illud, quod dicitur esse mortuum ex solo defectu alicuius, illo superveniente, vivificatur; sed fides informis dicitur esse mortua ob defectum gratiae et operationis fructuosae: ergo ipsis supervenientibus, reviviscit. Sed cum reviviscit, formatur: ergo fides informis potest fieri formata. Et hoc est quod habetur in Glossa super illud Iacobi secundo[^p497-5]: *Fides sine operibus mortua est*; Glossa: « Reviviscit ex operibus fides »; sed si fides ex operibus reviviscit: ergo ex adventu operum habet vitam et formam.

**Sed contra:**
1. Nullum peccatum potest fieri formatum[^p497-6], ergo nulla virtus potest fieri informis, ergo fides formata non potest fieri informis: pari ratione nec informis potest fieri formata.

2. Item, nullum opus mortuum potest fieri vivum — opera enim, quae in peccato facta sunt, nunquam revivificantur per gratiam, ut sint digna remuneratione vitae aeternae[^p497-7] — ergo si fides informis mortua est, videtur, quod per gratiam non habeat vivificari, ergo nec informari.

3. Item, nullum accidens potest alterari, secundum quod vult Boethius[^p497-8]; sed fides informis est accidens: ergo alterari non potest. Sed omne quod de informi fit formatum, alteratur: ergo impossibile est, fidem informem fieri formatam.

4. Item, ex his quae sunt diversa genere, non potest fieri unum per essentiam[^p497-9]; sed fides formata dicit habitum unum per essentiam: ergo impossibile est, ipsam constare ex gratia gratum faciente et gratia gratis data. Si ergo fides informis est donum gratiae gratis datae, videtur, quod impossibile sit, ipsam fieri formatam, superveniente gratia.

5. Item, fides informis per adventum gratiae non transmutatur nisi accidentaliter: ergo si per adventum gratiae efficitur virtus formata, accidit fidei, quod sit formata: si ergo nullum genus accidit speciei[^p497-10], fides non est species virtutis proprie dictae. Quodsi hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod habitus fidei informis per adventum gratiae formetur.

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6. Item, sicut se habet anima ad potentias suas, sic se habet gratia ad virtutes; sed quotiescumque anima infunditur, fert secum potentias suas: ergo quotiescumque infunditur gratia, fert secum virtutes suas[^p498-1]: ergo cum infunditur gratia, infunditur simul fides formata: ergo fides formata non est eadem cum illa quae prius erat in anima. Et si hoc, restat, quod fides informis per adventum gratiae non formetur.

> **Conclusio.** Fides informis formatur per ipsius gratiae adventum, ita ut ex utraque fiat unum per quandam ordinationem et relationem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod praeter illas positiones, quae dicebant, fidem informem ad adventum gratiae excludi[^p498-2], secundum illos qui dicunt, ipsum habitum fidei informis remanere cum gratia superveniente, triplex est adhuc modus dicendi. — Quidam enim dixerunt, quod habitus fidei informis non formatur a gratia superveniente nec ab aliquo, quod sit *a gratia*, vel *cum gratia*. — Alii vero dixerunt, quod quamvis non formetur *a gratia*, formatur tamen ab aliquo, quod infunditur simul *cum gratia*. — Tertii vero dixerunt, quod ipse habitus fidei informis formatur *ab ipsa gratia*.

Ratio autem huius diversae positionis est propter diversum modum intelligendi infusionem gratiae et virtutum. Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod sicut *anima* est *totum potentiale* respectu suarum virium[^p498-3], et cum infunditur anima, simul secum portat suas potentias, et cum egreditur, simul trahit; sic et de *gratia* dicere voluerunt, quod gratia simul secum fert virtutes ipsas, quibus informantur potentiae, simul etiam secum trahit. Unde nulla virtus formata efficitur informis, nec aliqua[^p498-4] informis efficitur formata; infunditur enim quaelibet virtus plene et integre cum ipsa gratia, ita quod nihil extrinsecus intrat eius essentiam, nec quantum ad *materiale* nec quantum ad *formale*. — Sed quoniam experimento videmus, aliquam virtutem, quantum ad id quod est in ea *materiale*, minime infundi, ut contingit videre in parvulo baptizato, qui post gratiae infusionem indiget adhuc articulis fidei erudiri ad hoc, quod in actum fidei exeat; non videtur iste modus intelligendi infusionem gratiae et virtutum omnino esse conveniens, videlicet quod cum *ipsa gratia* virtutes infundantur quantum ad ipsarum *totalitatem* et integritatem, hoc est, quantum ad id quod est in eis *materiale* et *formale*.

Et propterea alius modus est intelligendi infusionem gratiae[^p498-5], quod *cum ipsa gratia* infunditur *formale* omnium virtutum in genere gratuiti, quod quidem *essentialiter differt* ab ipsa gratia, sicut potentia animae essentialiter differt ab eius substantia. Et illud quidem *formale* virtutis cuiuslibet, infusum cum gratia, potens est suum *materiale* educere de potentia in actum, si non sit adhuc in actum eductum; si vero iam est in actum eductum, potest ipsum facere gratuitum et vivum. Et isti dicunt et sentiunt, quod habitus fidei informis formetur per ipsam *virtutem fidei*, quae simul cum gratia infunditur, et similiter efficitur informe, quando illud quod *formale* fuit in fide, simul cum gratia recedit et expellitur. Et secundum hanc positionem gratia, qua *virtus* dicitur gratuita, differt ab ea, qua *anima* dicitur Deo grata.

Sed quoniam in una anima una sola est gratia gratum faciens, secundum quod in secundo libro[^p498-6] ostensum fuit, per quam accepta est Deo anima et eius potentia; ideo est adhuc tertius modus dicendi probabilior et intelligendi infusionem gratiae et virtutum, qui videtur esse probabilior et facilior quam praedicti, videlicet quod ipsa gratia gratum faciens comparatur ad habitus virtutum substratos, sicut comparatur lux ad colores. In hoc tamen est differentia, quod lux ista corporalis non *ita efficaciter* potest colores educere de potentia in actum quantum ad *esse*, quod habet color in genere *coloris*, secundum quod[^p498-7] ipsa gratia existens in ipsa anima potest facere germinare habitus virtutum. Ipsa enim *gratia*, adveniens in animam carentem habitibus virtutum, se habet quasi originale principium illorum quantum ad *esse primum*. Unde sicut pluvia infusa terrae habenti in se seminarium facit eam germinare, donec veniat ad fructum completum; sic intelligendum est de gratia respectu habituum ipsarum virtutum quantum ad ipsorum *esse primum*[^p498-8]. Non sic autem potest facere lux superinfusa exterius respectu colorum. — Sed si comparemus colores ad lucem et habitus virtutum ad gratiam gratum facientem quantum ad *esse secundum*, utpote quantum ad esse colorum in genere *lucidi*, et habituum in genere *gratuiti*; tunc est similitudo expressa: ut, sicut multi *colores* in una domo tenebrosa existentes efficiuntur *luminosi* per unam luminositatem super-

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venientem et ab illa informantur et decorantur et venustantur; sic habitus virtutum informes, existentes in anima venustantur et decorantur ab una gratia superveniente. — Et secundum hunc modum intelligendi infusionem gratiae et virtutum facile est intelligere, qualiter habitus fidei informis formetur per ipsius gratiae adventum: dicitur enim formari, sicut color tenebrosus formatur ad luminis ingressum. Et sicut ex colore et lumine superinfuso non fit *unum per essentiam*, sed *unum per ordinationem* quandam; sic nec ex gratia gratum faciente et informi fide intelligitur fieri unum nisi secundum quandam *ordinationem et relationem*, quia fides informis per adventum gratiae incipit complete ordinari in finem et in Deum tendere et eidem complacere[^p499-1]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, fidem informem fieri formatam per adventum gratiae.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nullum peccatum efficitur formatum, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile. Facilius enim est, aliquid *deformari* quam *informari*, quia plura exiguntur ad bonum quam ad malum[^p499-2]; ideo non sequitur, quodsi habitus substratus virtutis possit *obliquari*, quod peccatum et vitium possit *rectificari*. Et ex eadem causa non sequitur, quodsi peccatum non potest fieri formatum, quod virtus non potest fieri informis. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod *peccatum* dupliciter potest accipi, videlicet *abstracte* et *concrete*[^p499-3]. Si abstracte accipiatur, impossibile est, peccatum posse formari, cum sit malitia pura; si autem accipiatur *concrete*, ut dicatur peccatum aliqua habilitas animae, in qua est deformatio malitiae — utpote cum aliquis abstinet propter vanam gloriam, ipsa abstinentia efficitur ei culpa — hoc modo ratione talis habitus substrati, qui deformatur a culpa, potest informari a gratia. Et per hunc modum dicimus virtutem formatam effici informem, ratione videlicet habitus substrati, qui indifferens est ad statum culpae et gratiae.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod opus mortuum non potest fieri vivum; dicendum, quod non est simile. *Opus* enim transit nec manet nisi in sua radice; ideo impossibile est, aliquod opus vivificari, quod a radice vivente ortum non sumserit. Et pro tanto dicimus, opera facta in caritate posse reviviscere, quae autem extra caritatem facta sunt, vivificari non posse; gratia enim illa non posset attingere, cum simpliciter cesserint in praeteritum[^p499-4]. Non sic autem est de *habitibus virtutum informium*, quae manent in anima post ipsius gratiae adventum et per ipsam gratiam possunt venustari et decorari et in finem ordinari.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum accidens potest alterari; dicendum, quod hoc verum est secundum *propriam* mutationem; sed nihil prohibet intelligere, alterationem fieri in accidente ratione[^p499-5] alterationis factae in *subiecto*; sicut *albedo* modo est clara, modo obscura ratione alterationis factae in *subiecto proprio*; et *color* modo est tenebrosus, modo est luminosus ratione transmutationis factae in *perspicuo sibi coniuncto*. Sic fides modo est informis, modo formata ratione alterationis factae in *anima*, quae modo habet gratiam, modo privatur ipsa per culpam.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ex his quae sunt diversorum generum, non fit unum per essentiam; iam patet responsio; quoniam, sicut praedictum fuit, *informatio* habitus informis virtutis a gratia non est per *essentialem unionem*, sed magis secundum quandam *ordinationem* et directionem in finem. Nam proprie loquendo, accidentia non habent materiam et formam[^p499-6]; sed quod dicitur habitus informis esse *materia* fidei, et illud quod superinducitur, esse *forma*, hoc est secundum quandam comparationem, sicut prius dictum est de lumine et colore. Unde sicut, quando dico *colorem illuminatum*, dico duo, tamen per modum unius, propter hoc quod ordinantur ad unum actum, videlicet ad movendum visum; sic, quando dico *fidem formatam*, duo dico, videlicet *fidem et gratiam*, tamen per modum unius, propter hoc quod ordinantur ad unum opus meritorium, scilicet ad credendum in Deum.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides informis non transmutatur nisi accidentaliter; dicendum, quod transmutatio *accidentalis* in genere *naturae* potest esse *essentialis* in genere *morum*; sicut patet de aliquo actu, qui per *privationem* alicuius circumstantiae accidentalis est in genere vitii, et per *positionem* est in genere virtutis. Per hunc modum est intelligendum in proposito. Quamvis enim illi habitui accidat esse cum gratia, vel sine gratia; *essentiale* tamen est ei esse cum gratia, prout est principium *meriti*. Praeterea, ipse habitus fidei informis, etiam gratia circumscripta, tenet rationem *virtutis*[^p499-7]; ideo

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ex hoc non potest concludi, quin fides sit sub genere *virtutis* tanquam sub proprio genere.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet anima ad suas potentias, sic se habet gratia ad virtutes; dicendum, quod ista non est *omnimoda similitudo*, pro eo quod non est tanta diversitas ipsius gratiae ad virtutes quantum ad earum principium formale, sicut animae ad suas vires, quemadmodum in secundo libro[^p500-1] ostensum fuit, ubi fuit haec quaestio pertractata. *Virtutes* enim non dicuntur esse virtutes ipsius gratiae, per quas ipsa *gratia operetur*, sicut anima operatur per suas potentias. — Nec est intelligendum, quod gratia et virtus[^p500-2] sint in *diversis subiectis*. Haec enim ducunt in imaginationem falsam, in hanc videlicet, quod gratia *omnino* ita veniat in animam et eius potentias, sicut anima venit in corpus et eius organa. Tunc enim necessario oporteret, quod gratia abeunte per peccatum, expellerentur omnes habitus virtutum, quos secum defert; quod ex ipsa experientia planum est esse falsum. Et ideo ratio illa non concludit, quia accipit pro simili quod valde est dissimile.

Potest autem accipi *simile* de *infusione* gratiae et virtutum in pluvia et terra seminata; sicut de *informatione* virtutum a gratia accipitur in lumine et colore. Si enim una pluvia adveniat in terram, in qua sunt plantata diversa semina, quae non[^p500-3] germinaverunt, facit illam germinare et secundum diversitatem seminum diversas plantas producere. Si vero iam alias germinavit, sed propter defectum aquae iam arefactae sunt plantae; tunc pluvia denuo veniens facit illas plantas virescere. Sic gratia adveniens in animam, in qua sunt seminaria habituum virtutum, facit ipsam germinare, ita quod, ipsa habita, habentur per consequens et virtutes, et continue facit illa germina[^p500-4] crescere, quousque perducat usque ad perfectionem. Et si contingat merito peccati, humorem gratiae auferri, habitus illi virtutum efficiuntur quasi aridi; et postmodum, si restituatur pluvia et humor gratiae, non oportet, quod anima iterum de novo germinet; sed illa quae germinavit, per humorem gratiae advenientem iterum reviviscunt[^p500-5]. — Sic satis aperte intelligi potest, qualiter *gratia* cum *virtutibus simul* infundatur in animam, et quare aliquando *simul* dicitur infundi cum *habitibus substratis*, aliquando vero *minime*, cum tamen gratia, quantum est de se, infundatur semper uniformiter.

Quod autem seminaria virtutum quantum ad *habitus substratos* sint plantata in natura mentis rationalis, expresse potest haberi ab Augustino in multis locis[^p500-6], et a Bernardo in decimo capitulo de Amore Dei, et in libro de Collationibus sanctorum Patrum, et in aliis locis pluribus. Quidquid tamen sit de hoc, quia quaestio ista alibi[^p500-7] habet locum, ad praesens tantum sufficiat dixisse de quaestione proposita, quod iuxta sententiam et opinionem Magistri illa positio videtur esse verior, quae dicit, quod fides informis per advenientem gratiam fiat formata, sive formetur ab ipsa gratia *mediate*, sive *immediate*[^p500-8].

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### Question V. *Whether unformed faith becomes formed when grace comes.*

Fifthly and lastly it is asked concerning the *forming* of unformed faith itself, and the question is whether, when grace comes, unformed faith becomes formed. And that it does seems to be the case.

1. Before anyone sins, he has only formed faith, but when he sins, then he begins to have unformed faith: if therefore in sinning no new faith is infused into him, it is necessary that through sin formed faith becomes unformed. If therefore unformed faith was previously formed, it seems that, if someone is restored to his former condition through the advent of grace, unformed faith becomes formed.

2. Likewise, advening grace informs nature: if therefore unformed faith more nearly approaches grace than does nature itself, it seems, by an argument *from the lesser*[^p497-1], that unformed faith would be informed by grace.

3. Likewise, an infused habit is more in agreement with grace, which is infused, than are acquired habits; but acquired habits are informed by the advent of grace — which is clear, because in their exercise and use a man merits[^p497-2] — therefore much more strongly is the habit of unformed faith formed by the supervening grace itself.

4. Likewise, mortified works are vivified by the advent of grace, according to what is commonly said[^p497-3], therefore by parity of reasoning a dead habit also is: if therefore unformed faith is of this kind, it seems that it would be informed by the advent of grace.

5. Likewise, to say that a habit is *living* is nothing other than to say that through it eternal life can be merited; but the believing of unformed faith, which is to assent to the First Truth for its own sake and above all things, when charity supervenes, has everything that is necessary for merit: therefore it seems that, if its act is meritorious, the habit is vivified. And that it has everything necessary for merit is plain, since the work itself is in itself good and right and is[^p497-4] commanded by charity.

6. Likewise, everything which is said to be dead from the mere lack of something, when that something supervenes, is vivified; but unformed faith is said to be dead from the lack of grace and of fruitful operation: therefore when these supervene, it revives. But when it revives, it is formed: therefore unformed faith can become formed. And this is what is found in the Gloss on that text of James, chapter two[^p497-5]: *Faith without works is dead*; Gloss: « Faith revives from works »; but if faith revives from works: therefore from the advent of works it has life and form.

**On the contrary:**
1. No sin can become formed[^p497-6], therefore no virtue can become unformed, therefore formed faith cannot become unformed: by parity of reasoning neither can the unformed become formed.

2. Likewise, no dead work can become living — for works which have been done in sin are never revivified through grace, so as to be worthy of the reward of eternal life[^p497-7] — therefore if unformed faith is dead, it seems that it cannot be vivified through grace, therefore neither informed.

3. Likewise, no accident can be altered, according to what Boethius holds[^p497-8]; but unformed faith is an accident: therefore it cannot be altered. But everything which from unformed becomes formed is altered: therefore it is impossible for unformed faith to become formed.

4. Likewise, from things which are diverse in genus, there cannot be made one thing essentially[^p497-9]; but formed faith bespeaks one habit essentially: therefore it is impossible for it to consist of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) and gratuitously given grace (*gratia gratis data*). If therefore unformed faith is a gift of gratuitously given grace, it seems that it is impossible for it to become formed when grace supervenes.

5. Likewise, unformed faith is not transmuted by the advent of grace except accidentally: therefore if by the advent of grace it is made a formed virtue, that it is formed is accidental to faith: if therefore no genus is accidental to a species[^p497-10], faith is not a species of virtue properly speaking. And if this is false: then so too is that from which it follows, namely that the habit of unformed faith is formed by the advent of grace.

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6. Likewise, as the soul stands to its powers, so grace stands to the virtues; but whenever the soul is infused, it carries its powers with it: therefore whenever grace is infused, it carries its virtues with it[^p498-1]: therefore when grace is infused, formed faith is infused at the same time: therefore formed faith is not the same as that which was previously in the soul. And if this is so, it remains that unformed faith is not formed by the advent of grace.

> **Conclusion.** Unformed faith is formed by the advent of grace itself, in such a way that from the two there comes to be one thing by a certain ordination and relation.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, besides those positions which said that unformed faith is excluded at the advent of grace[^p498-2], according to those who say that the habit of unformed faith itself remains with the supervening grace, there are still three ways of speaking. — For some have said that the habit of unformed faith is not formed by the supervening grace, nor by anything which is *from grace* or *with grace*. — Others, however, have said that although it is not formed *from grace*, it is nevertheless formed by something which is infused at the same time *with grace*. — Still others have said that the habit of unformed faith itself is formed *by grace itself*.

Now the reason for this diversity of position is the diverse way of understanding the infusion of grace and of the virtues. For some wished to say that, just as the *soul* is a *potential whole* with respect to its powers[^p498-3], and when the soul is infused, it carries its powers with it at the same time, and when it departs, it draws them along at the same time; so too they wished to say of *grace* that grace carries the virtues themselves with it at the same time, by which the powers are informed, and likewise draws them along with it. Hence no formed virtue becomes unformed, nor does any[^p498-4] unformed one become formed; for each virtue is infused fully and completely with grace itself, in such a way that nothing extrinsic enters into its essence, neither as to the *material* nor as to the *formal*. — But since by experience we see that some virtue, as to that which is *material* in it, is by no means infused — as one may see in a baptized infant, who after the infusion of grace still needs to be instructed in the articles of faith in order that he may proceed to the act of faith — this way of understanding the infusion of grace and of the virtues does not seem to be altogether fitting, namely that with *grace itself* the virtues are infused as to their *totality* and integrity, that is, as to that which is *material* and *formal* in them.

And therefore there is another way of understanding the infusion of grace[^p498-5], namely that *with grace itself* there is infused the *formal* element of all the virtues in the genus of the gratuitous, which indeed *essentially differs* from grace itself, just as a power of the soul essentially differs from its substance. And that *formal* element of each virtue, infused with grace, is able to lead its own *material* element from potency into act, if it is not yet led into act; but if it is already led into act, it can make it gratuitous and living. And these men say and hold that the habit of unformed faith is formed through the *virtue of faith* itself, which is infused at the same time with grace, and likewise becomes unformed when that which was *formal* in faith withdraws and is expelled at the same time as grace. And according to this position, grace, by which a *virtue* is called gratuitous, differs from that by which the *soul* is called pleasing to God.

But since in one soul there is one sole sanctifying grace, according to what was shown in the second book[^p498-6], by which the soul and its power are made acceptable to God; therefore there is still a third way of speaking, more probable, of understanding the infusion of grace and of the virtues, which seems to be more probable and easier than the foregoing, namely that sanctifying grace itself is compared to the underlying habits of the virtues just as light is compared to colors. There is, however, this difference, that this corporeal light cannot *so efficaciously* lead colors from potency into act with respect to the *being* which a color has in the genus of *color*, as[^p498-7] grace existing in the soul itself can make the habits of the virtues sprout forth. For *grace* itself, advening into a soul lacking the habits of the virtues, stands as it were as an originating principle of them with respect to their *first being*. Hence just as rain infused into earth which has within it a seedbed makes it sprout, until it comes to the completed fruit; so it must be understood of grace with respect to the habits of the virtues themselves as to their *first being*[^p498-8]. But superinfused light cannot do so from without with respect to colors. — But if we compare colors to light and the habits of the virtues to sanctifying grace as to *second being*, that is, as to the being of colors in the genus of the *luminous*, and of habits in the genus of the *gratuitous*; then the likeness is exact: so that, just as many *colors* existing in one dark house are made *luminous* by one super-

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vening luminosity and are informed and adorned and beautified by it; so the unformed habits of the virtues, existing in the soul, are beautified and adorned by one supervening grace. — And according to this way of understanding the infusion of grace and of the virtues it is easy to understand how the habit of unformed faith is formed by the advent of grace itself: for it is said to be formed, just as a darkened color is formed at the entrance of light. And just as from a color and superinfused light there does not come to be *one thing essentially*, but *one thing by a certain ordination*; so neither from sanctifying grace and unformed faith is there understood to come to be one thing except according to a certain *ordination and relation*, because unformed faith by the advent of grace begins to be completely ordered toward the end and to tend toward God and to be pleasing to Him[^p499-1]. — The arguments showing that unformed faith becomes formed by the advent of grace are therefore to be granted.

*To 1.* To that which is first objected on the contrary, that no sin becomes formed, therefore etc.; it must be said that it is not similar. For it is easier for something to be *deformed* than to be *informed*, because more is required for good than for evil[^p499-2]; therefore it does not follow, if the underlying habit of a virtue can be *bent crooked*, that sin and vice can be *rectified*. And from the same cause it does not follow, if sin cannot become formed, that a virtue cannot become unformed. — It can also be said otherwise, that *sin* can be taken in two ways, namely *abstractly* and *concretely*[^p499-3]. If it is taken abstractly, it is impossible for sin to be able to be formed, since it is pure malice; but if it is taken *concretely*, so that sin is called a certain disposition of the soul in which there is the deformity of malice — as when someone abstains for the sake of vainglory, the abstinence itself becomes a fault to him — in this way, by reason of such an underlying habit which is deformed by fault, it can be informed by grace. And in this way we say that a formed virtue is made unformed, namely by reason of the underlying habit, which is indifferent to the state of fault and of grace.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a dead work cannot become living; it must be said that it is not similar. For a *work* passes and does not remain except in its root; therefore it is impossible for any work to be vivified which has not taken its origin from a living root. And to this extent we say that works done in charity can revive, but those which have been done outside charity cannot be vivified; for that grace could not reach them, since they have simply passed into the past[^p499-4]. But it is not so with the *habits of the unformed virtues*, which remain in the soul after the advent of grace itself and can be beautified and adorned and ordered toward the end through grace itself.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that no accident can be altered; it must be said that this is true with respect to *proper* change; but nothing prevents us from understanding that alteration occurs in an accident by reason[^p499-5] of an alteration made in the *subject*; just as *whiteness* is now bright, now dim, by reason of an alteration made in its *proper subject*; and *color* is now dark, now luminous, by reason of a transmutation made in the *transparent medium conjoined to it*. So faith is now unformed, now formed, by reason of an alteration made in the *soul*, which now has grace, now is deprived of it through fault.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that from things which are of diverse genera there does not come to be one thing essentially; the answer is now plain; since, as was said before, the *informing* of the unformed habit of a virtue by grace is not by an *essential union*, but rather according to a certain *ordination* and direction toward the end. For properly speaking, accidents do not have matter and form[^p499-6]; but that the unformed habit is said to be the *matter* of faith, and that which is superinduced to be its *form*, this is according to a certain comparison, just as was said before of light and color. Hence just as, when I say *an illuminated color*, I say two things, yet after the manner of one, because they are ordered to one act, namely to moving sight; so, when I say *formed faith*, I say two things, namely *faith and grace*, yet after the manner of one, because they are ordered to one meritorious work, namely to believing in God.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that unformed faith is not transmuted except accidentally; it must be said that a transmutation that is *accidental* in the genus of *nature* can be *essential* in the genus of *morals*; just as is clear of some act which, through the *privation* of some accidental circumstance, is in the genus of vice, and through *position* is in the genus of virtue. In this way it must be understood in the matter proposed. For although it is accidental to that habit to be with grace or without grace; nevertheless it is *essential* to it to be with grace, insofar as it is the principle of *merit*. Moreover, the habit of unformed faith itself, even with grace set aside, retains the character of a *virtue*[^p499-7]; therefore

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from this it cannot be concluded that faith is not under the genus of *virtue* as under its proper genus.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that as the soul stands to its powers, so grace stands to the virtues; it must be said that this is not an *altogether-complete likeness*, for the reason that there is not so great a diversity of grace from the virtues with respect to their formal principle as there is of the soul from its powers, as was shown in the second book[^p500-1], where this question was treated. For the *virtues* are not said to be the virtues of grace itself, through which *grace operates*, as the soul operates through its powers. — Nor is it to be understood that grace and virtue[^p500-2] are in *diverse subjects*. For these lead to a false imagining, namely to this, that grace comes *entirely* into the soul and its powers just as the soul comes into the body and its organs. For then it would necessarily be required that, when grace departs through sin, all the habits of the virtues which it carries with it would be expelled; which from experience itself is plainly false. And therefore that argument does not conclude, because it takes as similar what is very dissimilar.

But a *likeness* can be taken of the *infusion* of grace and of the virtues in rain and sown earth; just as of the *informing* of the virtues by grace a likeness is taken in light and color. For if one rain comes upon earth in which diverse seeds have been planted which have not[^p500-3] sprouted, it makes it sprout and produce diverse plants according to the diversity of the seeds. But if it has already sprouted otherwise, yet because of the lack of water the plants are already dried up; then the rain coming again makes those plants grow green again. So grace, advening into a soul in which there are the seedbeds of the habits of the virtues, makes it sprout, in such a way that, when grace is had, the virtues too are had as a consequence, and it continually makes those sprouts[^p500-4] grow, until it leads them to perfection. And if it happens that, by the merit of sin, the moisture of grace is taken away, those habits of the virtues become as it were dry; and afterward, if the rain and moisture of grace are restored, it is not necessary that the soul sprout anew from the beginning; but those which sprouted revive again through the advening moisture of grace[^p500-5]. — Thus it can be clearly enough understood how *grace* is infused *together* with the *virtues* into the soul, and why it is sometimes said to be infused *together* with the *underlying habits*, but sometimes *not*, although grace, as far as it is in itself, is always infused uniformly.

But that the seedbeds of the virtues, as to the *underlying habits*, are planted in the nature of the rational mind, can be expressly had from Augustine in many places[^p500-6], and from Bernard in the tenth chapter of *On the Love of God*, and in the book *On the Conferences of the Holy Fathers*, and in many other places. Whatever, however, may be the case about this — since that question has its place elsewhere[^p500-7] — for the present let it suffice to have said this much concerning the question proposed: that, according to the judgment and opinion of the Master, that position seems to be the truer which says that unformed faith becomes formed through advening grace, whether it be formed by grace itself *mediately* or *immediately*[^p500-8].

---

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.

en: See vol. I, p. 835, note 5.

la: Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6.

en: Cf. below, d. 36, q. 6.

la: Et fusius exponitur IV. d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3.

en: And it is set out more fully in IV [Sent.], d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. *et sic.*

en: Editions 1 and 2, with several codices, read *et sic* ["and thus"].

la: Vers. 26. Glossa allegata sumta est ex Bedae exposit. in v. 17: *Mortua est enim in semetipsa sine operibus caritatis, quibus reviviscat et animetur.* — Subinde pro *sed si* plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *sed contra si*, cod. bb *sed tunc si*, codd. H N T *sed contra*, omisso *si*.

en: Verse 26. The Gloss cited is taken from Bede's exposition on v. 17: *For it is dead in itself, without the works of charity by which it might revive and be animated.* — Further, for *sed si* very many codices and editions 1, 2 read *sed contra si*, codex bb *sed tunc si*, codices H N T *sed contra*, omitting *si*.

la: Bonum esse enim, ut August., de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 36, ait, esse formatum. Nonnullum ergo bonum est et capacitas formae. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. q. 1.

en: For to be good is, as Augustine says in *On True Religion*, c. 18, n. 36, to be formed. Therefore there is some good and some capacity for form. Cf. II Sent., d. 35, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XIV. — Pro *revivificantur* codd. A G N *reviviscunt*, cod. aa *reviviscuntur*.

en: Cf. IV Sent., text of the Master, d. XIV. — For *revivificantur* codices A G N read *reviviscunt*, codex aa *reviviscuntur*.

la: Libr. I. Comment. in Categorias (seu Praedicam.) Aristot., ubi circa finem illa verba: » maxime vero substantiae proprium esse videtur, cum unum et idem numero sit, contrariorum susceptibilem [ideoque et alterabilem] esse », commentans ait: Hoc enim in nullis aliis invenitur; namque in qualitate qualitas non erit eadem neque uno numero contrariorum susceptiva; idem enim et unum numero non erit album atque nigrum, cum album fuerit et post in nigrum vertitur, tota qualitatis species permutatur, et non erit unum atque idem numero quod contrarium est, sed *diversum* etc.

en: Book I of the *Commentary on the Categories* (or *Predicaments*) of Aristotle, where, near the end, commenting on these words: « but it seems most proper to substance that, while remaining one and the same in number, it is receptive of contraries [and therefore alterable] », he says: For this is found in no others; for in quality, quality will not be one and the same nor numerically receptive of contraries; for one and the same thing in number will not be white and black, since, when it has been white and afterward is turned to black, the whole species of the quality is changed, and that which is contrary will not be one and the same in number, but *diverse*, etc.

la: Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. et 33. (IV. c. 10. et 28.) et X. text. 11. seqq. (IX. c. 3.).

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, texts 16 and 33 (IV, cc. 10 and 28), and X, texts 11 ff. (IX, c. 3).

la: Quod, aliis testimoniis praetermissis, Aristot. ostendit in IV. Top. c. 1. circa initium, ubi docet, genus non esse assignatum, « si non in eo *quod quid est* [essentialiter] praedicatur, sed ut accidens ».

en: Which Aristotle shows, other testimonies being passed over, in *Topics* IV, c. 1, near the beginning, where he teaches that a genus is not properly assigned « if it is not predicated *in respect of what a thing is* [essentially], but as an accident ».

la: Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 1. — In *minori* post *potentias* non pauci codd. omittunt *suas*, et in fine arg. cum edd. 1, 2 pro *formetur* substituunt *formatur.*

en: Cf. below, d. 36, q. 1. — In the minor [premise] after *potentias* not a few codices omit *suas*, and at the end of the argument, with editions 1, 2, they substitute *formatur* for *formetur*.

la: Vide quaest. praeced.

en: See the preceding question.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 600, nota 1.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 600, note 1.

la: Codd. A K repetunt *virtus.*

en: Codices A K repeat *virtus*.

la: Cod. O addit *et virtutum.*

en: Codex O adds *et virtutum* ["and of the virtues"].

la: Pro *secundum quod* Vat. *sed.*

en: For *secundum quod* the Vatican edition reads *sed*.

la: Cassiodor., in Ps. 12. in initio ait: *Caritas enim Dei* … exteriorem procreat etc. — quaedam vernalis est pluvia virtutum, sub qua et beata voluntas germinat et operatio sancta fructificat. Petr. Pictav., III. Sent. c. 1: *Ros infunditur terrae, qui infusus invenit fecunditatem in terra, illam excitat; ex qua excitata et ex rore procreatur germen, ex germine fructus. Ros est divina gratia; terrae fecunditas sive terra liberum arbitrium; germen motus interior; fructus actio exterior. Nam gratia infunditur menti huius hominis. Illa statim excitat liberum arbitrium, et procreatur motus caritatis, scilicet diligere. Statim diligit homo, et ille motus exteriorem procreat* etc.

en: Cassiodorus, on Ps. 12, at the beginning says: *For the charity of God* … begets the exterior etc. — there is a certain vernal rain of the virtues, under which both the blessed will germinates and holy operation bears fruit. Peter of Poitiers, III Sent., c. 1: *Dew is infused into the earth, which, once infused, finds fertility in the earth, and rouses it; and from the earth thus roused and from the dew a shoot is begotten, and from the shoot fruit. The dew is divine grace; the fertility of the earth, or the earth, is free choice; the shoot is the interior movement; the fruit is the exterior action. For grace is infused into the mind of this man. It at once rouses free choice, and a movement of charity is begotten, namely to love. At once the man loves, and that movement begets the exterior [action]* etc.

la: Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): *Quemadmodum in aliis corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his destruere quam construere.* Cfr. II. Ethic. c. 6, et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 3 (c. 4): *Just as in other things it is easier to destroy than to make, so too in these it is easier to pull down than to build up.* Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 6, and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 4, § 31.

la: De quo fusius agitur II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *Aliter etiam* non pauci codd. *Aliter enim*; paulo inferius pro *formari* edd. *informari* et in fine solut. *quoniam indifferens* pro *qui indifferens.*

en: Of which more fully in II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for *Aliter etiam* not a few codices read *Aliter enim*; a little below, for *formari* the editions read *informari*, and at the end of the solution *quoniam indifferens* for *qui indifferens*.

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. XIV. lit. Magistri et Comment. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — Pro *cesserint* edd. 1, 2 cum plurimis codd. perperam substituunt *cesserit*, pariterque perperam aliquanto superius dicunt edd. cum Vat. omittunt *nisi* post *nec manet.* Infra pro *quae manent* edd. *qui manent.*

en: Cf. IV Sent., d. XIV, text of the Master and Commentary, p. II, a. 2, q. 3. — For *cesserint* editions 1, 2 with very many codices wrongly substitute *cesserit*, and likewise wrongly somewhat above the editions, with the Vatican edition, omit *nisi* after *nec manet*. Below, for *quae manent* the editions read *qui manent*.

la: Pro *ratione* codd. A U *respectu.* Post pauca pro *obscura* edd. *obscuratur.*

en: For *ratione* codices A U read *respectu*. A little after, for *obscura* the editions read *obscuratur*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 8. seq. (VI. c. 3.). — In seqq. respicitur illud Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2: *Ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum.* Cfr. tom. II. pag. 639, nota 2.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 8 f. (VI, c. 3). — In what follows there is reference to that saying of Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 2: *Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one thing.* Cf. vol. II, p. 639, note 2.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1.

en: Cf. above, q. 1.

la: Verba *et virtus*, quae in edd. desunt, supplevimus ex codd. A K N Z bb.

en: The words *et virtus*, which are lacking in the editions, we have supplied from codices A K N Z bb.

la: Pro *non* codd. A K U Z melius *nondum.* Subinde pro *illam germinare* edd. cum aliquot codd. non bene *illa germinare.* Inferius pro *denuo* cod. K *de novo.*

en: For *non* codices A K U Z better read *nondum*. Further, for *illam germinare* the editions with some codices read, not well, *illa germinare*. Below, for *denuo* codex K reads *de novo*.

la: Ex codd. A K Z bb adiunximus *germina.*

en: From codices A K Z bb we have added *germina*.

la: Ita codd. G H; in aliis *reviviscant*, edd. *reviviscat.* Paulo superius pro *germinavit* cod. A *germinaverunt*; paulo inferius pro *cum virtutibus* codd. A K *in virtutibus.* Subinde pro *in animam* multi codd. *in anima*, ac pro *et quare* Vat. *et qualiter.*

en: Thus codices G H; in others *reviviscant*, the editions *reviviscat*. A little above, for *germinavit* codex A reads *germinaverunt*; a little below, for *cum virtutibus* codices A K read *in virtutibus*. Further, for *in animam* many codices read *in anima*, and for *et quare* the Vatican edition reads *et qualiter*.

la: Libr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 10. n. 29; III. c. 20. n. 56. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 901, nota 2. nec non pag. 903, nota 9. In Serm. 117. (alias 38. de Verbis Domini) c. 8. n. 11. S. Doctor dicit: *Voluit enim Deus inseminare omni animae initia intellectus, initia sapientiae.* Et in Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.) c. 4. legitur: *Habeatque anima per exercitium virtutes, quarum facultates habet per naturam.* — Bernard., de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. n. 6, postquam virtutem munus Dei significavit, adiungit: « *Clamat nempe intus ei innata et non ignorata rationi iustitia, quia ex toto se illum diligere debeat* » etc. Expressius etiam haec sententia profertur in Epist. ad Fratres de Monte Dei (inter opera Bernardi, sed auctore Guigone Carthus.), II. c. 2. n. 7, ubi praemisso, quod « *virtus omnis homini naturalis est* » et quod « *naturae res est* », quaeritur: « *Quid est virtus* » ? et respondetur: « *Filia rationis, sed magis gratiae. Vis enim quaedam est ex natura; ut autem virtus sit, habet ex gratia. Vis est ex iudicio approbantis rationis, virtus autem ex appetitu illuminatae voluntatis. Virtus enim est voluntarius in bonum assensus* » etc. Et in Tract. de gratia et lib. arb. c. 6. n. 17. legitur: *Simplices namque affectiones insunt naturaliter nobis, tanquam ex nobis; additamenta ex gratia. Nec aliud profecto est, nisi quod gratia ordinat quas donavit creatio, ut nihil aliud sint virtutes nisi ordinatae affectiones.* — Cum codd., quos sequuntur edd., retinuimus scripturam *cap. 10. de Amore Dei.* — Ex Cassiani libro de Collationibus, cuius hic mentio fit, afferimus sententiam hanc, collat. 13. c. 12: « *Dubitari ergo non potest, inesse quidem omnia animae naturaliter virtutum semina beneficio Creatoris inserta* »; sed simul observamus, quod Cassianus aliter accipit *semina virtutum* quam August., scil. ut semina verae pietatis, cuiusmodi sunt bonae cogitationes, pia desideria, initia etiam fidei et aliarum virtutum, quibus homo se praeparet ad gratiam, et quorum intuitu conferatur illi gratia. Quam acceptionem sive sententiam impugnat S. Prosper in libro contra Collatorem, c. 13. n. 37. seqq. — Ex aliis Patribus sufficiat hic memorare Basil., in Hexaëm. homil. 9. n. 3, et Regul. fusius tract., interrog. 2. n. 2; Chrysost., in Epist. ad Eph. homil. 2. n. 3; Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 14. circa finem; Hieronym., in Gal. 1, 15. — Mox pro *pluribus* codd. G T *plurimis.*

en: Book II of *On Free Choice*, c. 10, n. 29; III, c. 20, n. 56. Cf. vol. II, p. 901, note 2, and also p. 903, note 9. In *Sermon* 117 (elsewhere 38, *On the Words of the Lord*), c. 8, n. 11, the holy Doctor says: *For God willed to sow in every soul the beginnings of understanding, the beginnings of wisdom.* And in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among Augustine's works), c. 4, one reads: *Let the soul have through exercise the virtues whose faculties it has by nature.* — Bernard, *On the Love of God*, c. 2, n. 6, after he has signified that virtue is a gift of God, adds: « For justice, innate to it and not unknown to reason, cries out within that it ought to love Him with its whole self » etc. This judgment is also expressed more clearly in the *Letter to the Brethren of Monte Dei* (among Bernard's works, but by the author Guigo the Carthusian), II, c. 2, n. 7, where, having premised that « every virtue is natural to man » and that « it is a matter of nature », it is asked: « What is virtue? » and the answer is: « The daughter of reason, but more of grace. For there is a certain power from nature; but that it be a virtue, it has from grace. The power is from the judgment of approving reason, the virtue from the appetite of an illumined will. For virtue is a voluntary assent to the good » etc. And in the *Treatise on Grace and Free Choice*, c. 6, n. 17, one reads: *For simple affections are in us naturally, as it were from ourselves; the additions are from grace. Nor indeed is it anything else than that grace orders those things which creation has bestowed, so that the virtues are nothing else than ordered affections.* — With the codices, which the editions follow, we have retained the reading *c. 10, On the Love of God.* — From Cassian's book *On the Conferences*, of which mention is here made, we cite this judgment, Conference 13, c. 12: « It cannot therefore be doubted that there are indeed in the soul naturally all the seeds of the virtues, implanted by the benefit of the Creator »; but at the same time we observe that Cassian takes *the seeds of the virtues* otherwise than Augustine, namely as seeds of true piety, such as good thoughts, pious desires, the beginnings even of faith and of the other virtues, by which a man may prepare himself for grace, and in view of which grace is conferred on him. This sense or judgment St. Prosper attacks in his book *Against the Collator*, c. 13, n. 37 ff. — Of the other Fathers let it suffice to mention here Basil, on the *Hexaemeron*, homily 9, n. 3, and *Rules Treated at Greater Length*, question 2, n. 2; Chrysostom, on the *Letter to the Ephesians*, homily 2, n. 3; Damascene, II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 14, near the end; Jerome, on Gal. 1:15. — Soon, for *pluribus* codices G T read *plurimis*.

la: Infra d. 33. q. 5. — Sententia Magistri habetur hic in lit. c. 5. — Paulo inferius pro *quae dicit* cod. Q *qua dicitur.*

en: Below, d. 33, q. 5. — The judgment of the Master is found here in the text, c. 5. — A little below, for *quae dicit* codex Q reads *qua dicitur*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{497,498,499,500}-{L,R}-*.png` (Vol III PDF-priority inversion over the cascade-shattered Respondeo + three-opinion corpus + Solutiones), with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw lines 34526–34797) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Marginalia trimmed (`Fundamenta.` / `Ad oppositum.` / `Conclusio 1./2.` / `Triplex opinio.` / `Opinio 1./2./3. explicatur.` / `Non probatur.` / `Simile, sed differt quoad esse primum.` / `Quoad esse secundum est perfecta similitudo.` / `Solutio oppositorum.` / `Notandum.` / `Alia solutio.` / `Duplex informatio.` / `Haec similitudo deficit.` / `Alia similitudo de infusione.` / `Epilogus.` / `De habitibus virtutum innatis.`).

**Structure.** Opener → arguments pro (1–6: faith-was-formed-before-sin/restored; *a-minori* from grace-informs-nature; infused-habit-closer-to-grace; mortified-works-vivified; living-habit-merits-eternal-life; James-2 Gloss *reviviscit ex operibus*) → Sed contra (1–5: no-sin-becomes-formed; no-dead-work-becomes-living; accident-cannot-be-altered [Boethius]; diverse-genera-no-essential-unity; accident-not-genus-of-species) + arg 6 (soul:powers :: grace:virtues) → Conclusio (*formatur … unum per ordinationem et relationem*) → Respondeo (three opinions on how the informis-habit is formed: [1] not formed at all by/with grace; [2] formed by the *virtus fidei* infused *with* grace; [3 = author, probabilior] grace as **light to colors** / **rain to seedbed** — *esse primum* vs *esse secundum*) → Solutiones Ad 1–6. **No standalone scholion** — q5's body closes at *…mediate, sive immediate⁸*, and footnote 8 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem`) explicitly directs the reader to q4's scholion §II, which already treats q5's matter (the matter-form analogy). Hence `has_scholion: false`.

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- **p.499 ×7** (`[^p499-1..7]`): nn.1–4 begin in the L-column band (n.4 continues into R), nn.5–7 in the R-column band.
- **p.500 ×8** (`[^p500-1..8]`): nn.1–6 in the L-column band (n.6, the long Augustine/Bernard/Cassian/Prosper note, continues into R), nn.7–8 in the R-column band.

**Page breaks:** p.497→498 (mid-Sed-contra, between arg 5 and arg 6); p.498→499 (mid-Respondeo, at the light/colors simile, *…efficiuntur* luminosi *per unam luminositatem super-* | *venientem*); p.499→500 (mid-*Ad 5*, *…tenet rationem virtutis⁷; ideo* | *ex hoc non potest concludi*).

**Footer migration.** IN: none from q4 — q4 closed at its Scholion §II on p.496 (raw 34525); QUAESTIO V opens fresh at the top of p.497 (raw 34526) and p.497's footer band restarts at n.1 as q5's own. OUT: none — q5's body ends at raw 34797; the DUBIA opens at raw 34798 (running head `DIST. XXIII. DUBIA. 501`) with its own footer restart.

**Seam.** Opens at QUAESTIO V header (raw 34526), continuous from q4's Scholion §II close (raw 34525). Closes at *…mediate, sive immediate⁸* (raw 34797) before `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` (raw 34798). Both ends clean; no cascade-merge splice in the tail.

**[?] flags:** none. 450 dpi bands fully legible across all four pages; the long apparatus quotations (Aristotle *Categories*, Peter of Poitiers, the Augustine/Bernard/Cassian note) were transcribed from both the PDF bands and the IA OCR with no impossible-Latin residue.

**pdf = printed + 22** (printed 497–500 = PDF 519–522).