title: Dist. 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Quid sit* frui.

Habito de *uti* et *utibili*, consequenter quaeritur de *frui* et *fruibili*, et primo, quid sit *frui* per essentiam, utrum scilicet sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.

### Quaestio Unica. *Utrum frui sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.*

1. Quod sit actus voluntatis, videtur per primam definitionem, quae est: *Frui est amore inhaerere* etc.[^1]; sed amor est voluntatis: ergo et *frui* similiter. Si dicas, quod amor sumitur ibi communiter, secundum quod est in qualibet vi respectu sui actus; contra: in omnibus aliis definitionibus idem dicitur. Unde dicitur in sequenti[^2]: «Fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit». Quietatio autem voluntatis est.

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Et in alia[^9] similiter: «Frui est uti cum gaudio». Gaudium autem ad voluntatem proprie pertinet.

2. Item, ostenditur ratione, quia fruitione delectamur[^10], secundum quod delectabile est differentia boni, cum sit bonum honestum, conferens et delectabile; bonum autem obiectum est voluntatis: ergo *frui* est solius voluntatis.

3. Item, eo fruimur, quo quietamur; sed quietatio respicit rationem finis, «et finis rationem boni[^11]», et «bonum est obiectum voluntatis»: ergo fruitio, quae ordinat ad illud, similiter.

**Sed contra:**

1. Omnis virtus appetit uniri suo obiecto, quo habito delectatur, si cognoscit, et quiescit: ergo motus cum quietatione et delectatione est omnium virium: ergo cum talis sit fruitio, fruitio erit in omnibus, non tantum in voluntate;

2. Item, absentia rei amatae potius contristat amantem, quam delectat[^12]; quod enim delectat ipsum, hoc est, quia videt ipsam et habet. Si ergo motus fruitionis est cum delectatione vel est ipsa delectatio: ergo hoc[^13] est, quia videt illud in quo est ipsa delectatio; sed visio respicit cognitivam: ergo etc.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^14]: «Haec est summa merces, ut ipso perfruamur». Sed super illud Psalmi: *Ostendam illi salutare* etc., dicit Glossa[^15], quod «visio est tota merces»: ergo si fruitio est merces, fruitio est visio per essentiam; sed visio est in cognitiva sive in ratione: ergo etc.

4. Item, fide et spe tendimus in Deum: aut ergo fruendo, aut utendo; sed non utendo, cum Deo non sit utendum: ergo fruendo: ergo fide et spe fruimur; sed fides est habitus rationis cognitivae; sed cuius est habitus, eius est actus: ergo actus fruitionis est actus[^16] rationis; similiter videtur de irascibili: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Frui* sumtum essentialiter est actus voluntatis, sumtum dispositive est actus etiam aliarum potentiarum.

**Respondeo:** Secundum aliquos[^17] *frui* pertinet ad omnes vires; et hoc dicunt, quia omnes vires remunerabuntur; qui dicunt etiam, quod[^18] in gloria erit magis proprie rationis, quia immediatius se habet ad delectationem.

Sed aliter videtur dicendum secundum Augustinum, scilicet quod sit actus ipsius voluntatis. Cum enim tres dentur definitiones de *frui*, omnes dantur penes actum voluntatis, quem tripliciter est considerare. Primo modo communiter, prout dicit motum cum delectatione; et sic definit Augustinus[^19]: «Frui est uti cum gaudio». Secundo modo, prout dicit motum cum quietatione; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino *de Doctrina christiana*: «Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam»; et hoc modo accipitur *proprie*. Tertio modo accipitur, prout complectitur utrumque, scilicet quietationem et delectationem; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino decimo *de Trinitate*: «Frui est quiescere in cognitis, voluntate propter se delectata», et sic accipitur *propriissime*.

Quia ergo *frui* secundum omnem acceptionem dicit delectationem vel quietem vel utrumque, et omne tale habet rationem boni, et hoc est obiectum voluntatis: ideo loquendo essentialiter, *frui* est actus voluntatis. Sed quia voluntas nec delectatur nec quietatur nisi in eo, quod cognoscit vel per fidem vel per speciem[^20], et in eo, quod habet per spem vel in re, ideo actus aliarum virium ad hunc disponunt, non tamen sunt ipsum *frui*, essentialiter loquendo.

Ex hoc patet solutio[^21] ad illud quod communiter solet quaeri, quare *frui* non definitur per actum cognitionis, sicut delectationis. Tamen[^22] haec quae-

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stio fundata est super falsum. Augustinus enim ponit in notificatione una, quod est cognitionis, cum dicit: «Frui est quiescere in cognitis»; cadit tamen ibi sicut dispositio.

Ex hoc etiam patet, quare non definitur per fidem et[^23] spem, sicut per caritatem, quia caritas inducitur in concupiscibilem, cuius est *frui*. Tamen ista quaestio similiter fundata est super falsum, quia amor, quo definitur *frui*, est communis ad amorem castum et libidinosum[^24], quo avarus fruitur auro, non proprius ipsius caritatis.

**Ad opposita:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus habet delectari et quietari[^25], cum unitur suo obiecto; dicendum, quod ipsa voluntas, ut vult Augustinus[^26], amat sibi et aliis. Et sicut etiam dicit Anselmus[^27]: «Voluntas inclinat alias vires et aliis meretur», ideo eius quietatio et delectatio redundat in alias vires. Unde sicut voluntas non sibi cognoscit, sed ratio cognoscit sibi et voluntati, ita voluntas sibi et rationi delectatur et ipsam quiescere facit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amans non fruitur, nisi videat vel habeat; dicendum, quod videre et habere requiruntur ad *frui*, similiter et amare. Nam si quis videt aliquid et habet, nunquam delectatur, nisi amet; aliter tamen requiritur visio quam amor. Nam visio disponit, similiter et tentio, sed amor delicias suggerit. Unde est quasi acumen penetrans[^28], et ideo ei maxime convenit unire et per consequens delectare et quietare: ideo essentialiter, non dispositive, est fruitio. Propter quod est intelligendum, quod actus voluntatis potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet per modum appetitus et[^29] complacentiae. Primo modo antecedere potest ipsam visionem; secundo vero consequitur, et in hoc est perfecta ratio ipsius fruitionis, scilicet in complacentia rei visae et habitae.

3. Ad illud: *Visio est tota merces*; dicendum, quod illud non dicitur proprie, sed per concomitantiam[^30], quia visio et complacentia, in qua est perfecta ratio fruitionis, inseparabiliter se habent.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fide et spe fruimur; dicendum, quod illud non est verum per se, quia quaelibet harum accipit rationem tendentiae[^31] a caritate; unde fruitio non est ex istis nisi per caritatem. Sola enim caritas considerat finem in ratione finis et obiecti. Unde non dicitur aliquis sperare Deum, sicut amare.

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### Article II. *What enjoyment is.*

Having treated of *use* and *the useable*, the inquiry next concerns *enjoyment* and *the enjoyable*, and first, what *enjoyment* is essentially — namely, whether it is an act of the will, or of the other powers.

### Sole Question. *Whether enjoyment is an act of the will, or of the other powers.*

1. That it is an act of the will is shown by the first definition, which is: *To enjoy is to cleave by love,* etc.[^1]; but love is of the will: therefore *enjoyment* likewise. If you say that love is taken there commonly, according as it is in any power whatever with respect to its own act; against this: in all the other definitions the same is said. Hence it is said in what follows[^2]: «We enjoy things known, in which the will, delighted, comes to rest.» But rest is of the will.

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And in another[^9] likewise: «To enjoy is to use with joy.» But joy belongs properly to the will.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason: because by fruition we are delighted[^10], according as the delightful is a difference of the good, since the good is the honorable, the useful, and the delightful; but the good is the object of the will: therefore *to enjoy* is of the will alone.

3. Likewise, we enjoy that by which we come to rest; but rest regards the formal character of an end, «and an end the formal character of the good[^11]», and «the good is the object of the will»: therefore fruition, which orders to that, likewise.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every power seeks to be united to its object, and, this being had, is delighted (if it knows) and comes to rest: therefore motion together with rest and delight belongs to all the powers: therefore, since fruition is such, fruition will be in all, not only in the will;

2. Likewise, the absence of the loved thing rather grieves the lover than delights him[^12]; for what delights him is the fact that he sees it and has it. If therefore the motion of fruition is with delight, or is delight itself: therefore this[^13] is so because he sees that in which is the delight itself; but vision regards the cognitive [power]: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^14]: «This is the highest reward, that we may enjoy himself.» But upon that of the Psalm: *I will show him my salvation,* etc., the Gloss says[^15] that «vision is the whole reward»: therefore if fruition is the reward, fruition is vision essentially; but vision is in the cognitive [power] or in reason: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, by faith and hope we tend toward God: therefore either by enjoying or by using; but not by using, since God is not to be used: therefore by enjoying: therefore by faith and hope we enjoy; but faith is a habit of cognitive reason; but whose is the habit, his is the act: therefore the act of fruition is an act[^16] of reason; the same seems to be the case for the irascible [power]: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> *To enjoy*, taken essentially, is an act of the will; taken dispositively, it is an act also of the other powers.

**I respond:** According to some[^17] *enjoyment* pertains to all the powers; and this they say, because all the powers will be rewarded; who say also that[^18] in glory it will be more properly of reason, because reason has a more immediate relation to delight.

But it seems must be said otherwise according to Augustine, namely that it is an act of the will itself. For since three definitions of *to enjoy* are given, all are given in terms of an act of the will, which can be considered in three ways. *First*, commonly, inasmuch as it signifies motion with delight; and thus Augustine defines it[^19]: «To enjoy is to use with joy.» *Secondly*, inasmuch as it signifies motion with rest; and in this way it is defined by Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine*: «To enjoy is to cleave by love to some thing for its own sake»; and in this way it is taken *properly*. *Thirdly*, it is taken inasmuch as it embraces both, namely rest and delight; and in this way it is defined by Augustine in book ten *On the Trinity*: «To enjoy is to come to rest in things known, the will being delighted for their own sake»; and so it is taken *most properly*.

Since, therefore, *to enjoy* according to every acceptation signifies delight or rest or both, and every such thing has the formal character of the good, and this is the object of the will: therefore, speaking essentially, *to enjoy* is an act of the will. But since the will is not delighted and does not come to rest except in that which it knows either by faith or by sight[^20], and in that which it has by hope or in reality, therefore the acts of the other powers dispose toward this, but are not *enjoyment* itself, speaking essentially.

From this is clear the solution[^21] to that which is commonly wont to be asked: why *enjoyment* is not defined by an act of cognition, as it is by [an act of] delight. Yet this[^22] ques-

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tion is founded upon a falsehood. For Augustine in one notification puts what is of cognition, when he says: «To enjoy is to come to rest in things known»; yet it falls in there as a disposition.

From this also is clear why it is not defined by faith and[^23] hope, as it is by charity, because charity is brought into the concupiscible [power], to which *enjoyment* belongs. Yet this question likewise is founded upon a falsehood, since the love by which *enjoyment* is defined is common to chaste love and to lustful love[^24], by which the miser enjoys gold — not proper to charity itself.

**To the opposites:**

1. To that, then, which is objected, that every power has [the capacity] to be delighted and to come to rest[^25] when it is united to its object; it must be said that the will itself, as Augustine[^26] holds, loves for itself and for the others. And as Anselm[^27] also says: «The will inclines the other powers and merits for the others»; therefore its rest and delight redound to the other powers. Hence, just as the will does not know for itself, but reason knows for itself and for the will, so the will is delighted for itself and for reason, and makes reason come to rest.

2. To that which is objected, that the lover does not enjoy unless he sees or has [the beloved]; it must be said that to see and to have are required for *enjoyment*, likewise also to love. For if anyone sees something and has it, he is never delighted unless he loves; but vision is required otherwise than love. For vision disposes, likewise too holding, but love offers the delights. Hence it is, as it were, a piercing sharpness[^28], and therefore it most befits it to unite and consequently to delight and to bring to rest: therefore essentially, not dispositively, it is fruition. On account of which it must be understood that the act of the will can be considered in two ways, namely by way of appetite and[^29] of complacency. In the first way it can precede the vision itself; in the second it follows, and in this is the perfect formal character of fruition itself, namely in the complacency of the thing seen and had.

3. To that: *Vision is the whole reward*; it must be said that this is not said properly, but by concomitance[^30], because vision and complacency, in which is the perfect formal character of fruition, are inseparably connected.

4. To that which is objected, that by faith and hope we enjoy; it must be said that this is not true *per se*, because each of these receives its character of tending[^31] from charity; whence fruition does not arise from these except through charity. For charity alone considers the end under the formal character of end and of object. Hence no one is said to *hope for* God, as [he is said to] *love* [Him].

en: Verse 1. — A little earlier we exhibit the reading of codd. R V W X Y Z aa bb; other codd., omitting *Deus*, place *Dominus* after *Abrahae*, from which the Vatican edition does not greatly differ, reading: *est ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam*. Next, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged *Deo* after *utitur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here adds *et sic utitur*.

la: In Vat. hic additur *definitione probatur idipsum*, quod tamen abest a mss. et ed. 1. — De hac definitione vide lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: In the Vatican edition there is here added *definitione probatur idipsum*, which however is absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1. — On this definition see the letter of the Master, c. 3.

la: Concinnius mss. cum sex primis edd., omittendo hic a Vat. additum *sed delectabile*.

en: The manuscripts together with the first six editions [read] more elegantly, omitting *sed delectabile* added here by the Vatican edition.

la: Aristot., I. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 2: *Absolutus namque finis bonum est nec non finis bonum*. — Et de sequenti propositione ait I. *Rhetor.* c. 10. (in ed. Stoer, c. 28.): *Est autem voluntas quidem appetitio boni cum ratione coniuncta; nemo enim vult, nisi quando aliquid bonum esse putaverit*. Vide etiam I. *Ethic.* c. 1. — Mox cod. 1 *ordinatur* pro *ordinat*.

en: Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* I, c. 2: *For an absolute end is a good, and not less an end is a good*. — And on the following proposition he says, *Rhetoric* I, c. 10 (in ed. Stoer, c. 28): *But the will is indeed an appetite for the good joined with reason; for no one wills [something] except when he has judged it to be a good*. See also *Ethics* I, c. 1. — Next, cod. 1 [reads] *ordinatur* for *ordinat*.

la: Sequimur maiorem partem codd. utACFGIKLORSUVWXYZ etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 substituendo *delectat* loco *delectet*, ac mox (exceptis edd. 2, 3 et 6) *quia* loco *quod*.

en: We follow the greater part of the codices — namely A C F G I K L O R S U V W X Y Z, etc. — and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, substituting *delectat* for *delectet*, and next (except for edd. 2, 3, and 6) *quia* for *quod*.

la: Perturbatam lectionem Vat., quae hic addit *delectare*, castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.

en: We have corrected, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, the disturbed reading of the Vatican edition, which here adds *delectare*.

la: August., in *Expos. Psalmi* 90, 16.

en: Augustine, *Exposition of Psalm* 90, [verse] 16.

la: Plures codd. ut A G H I K M V W Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt *actus*.

en: Several codices — such as A G H I K M V W Y Z, etc. — together with ed. 1 omit *actus*.

la: Huius opinionis fertur fuisse Antisiodorensis, sive melius Autisiodorensis, teste Dionysio Carthusiano, hic. q. 3.

en: Of this opinion is said to have been [William] of Auxerre (Antisiodorensis, or better Autisiodorensis), on the testimony of Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3.

la: Cod. X satis bene hic addit *frui*. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc non ita bene *immediate* pro *immediatius*.

en: Cod. X aptly enough here adds *frui*. Next, the Vatican edition with cod. cc, not so aptly, [reads] *immediate* for *immediatius*.

la: De tribus sequentibus definitionibus fruitionis ex Augustino sumtis vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post *Secundo* omittit *modo*.

en: On the three following definitions of fruition taken from Augustine, see here the letter of the Master, c. 2 and 3. — Next, the Vatican edition with cod. cc, after *Secundo*, omits *modo*.

la: Mendosam lectionem Vat. ponentis *spem* loco *speciem* correximus ope codd. F H I ee gg hh ii et ed. 1; error multorum codd., qui cum Vat. habent *spem*, provenit ex modo consimili ista duo verba abbreviandi. Sumta est haec locutio ex verbis Apostoli II. Cor. 5, 7: *Per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem*. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. — Mox Cod. R post *tamen* addit *ipsi*.

en: We have corrected the faulty reading of the Vatican edition, which puts *spem* for *speciem*, by the help of codd. F H I ee gg hh ii and ed. 1; the error of the many codd. which with the Vatican have *spem* arises from the similar manner of abbreviating these two words. This expression is taken from the words of the Apostle, II Cor. 5:7: *For we walk by faith, and not by sight*. Cf. also III Sent. d. 31 a. 2 q. 1 ad 5. — Next, cod. R after *tamen* adds *ipsi*.

la: Contra mss. et sex primas edd. habet Vat. *resolutio*, et paulo post contra maiorem partem mss. utACFGHKLRSTUV etc. et ed. 1 *consuevit* pro *solet*. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 1 *dilectionis* loco *delectationis*, sed non bene, sicuti ex corp. quaestionis patet.

en: Against the manuscripts and the first six editions, the Vatican has *resolutio*; and a little later, against the greater part of the manuscripts — namely A C F G H K L R S T U V, etc. — and ed. 1, [it reads] *consuevit* for *solet*. Then many codd. with ed. 1 [read] *dilectionis* in place of *delectationis*, but not rightly, as is clear from the body of the question.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione et posito *cum* pro *Tamen*, legit *delectationis*, cum *haec quaestio fundata sit super falsum*; sed minus apte, quia responsio cum ipsa quaestione incongrue coniungitur contra morem Seraphici; insuper est contra omnes antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc, having changed the punctuation and putting *cum* for *Tamen*, reads *delectationis*, [making it run] *haec quaestio fundata sit super falsum*; but less aptly, since the response is incongruously joined to the question itself, against the Seraphic's custom; moreover it is against all the older manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Cod. W *vel*.

en: Cod. W [reads] *vel*.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus particulam *vel*, quae hic a Vat. male additur, quia verbum *libidinosum* large acceptum etiam concupiscentiam oculorum complectitur. Codd. P et Q post *caritatis* addunt *est*; cod. X autem legit: *ideo non est proprius ipsius caritatis*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have removed the particle *vel*, which is here wrongly added by the Vatican edition, because the word *libidinosum*, broadly taken, also embraces the concupiscence of the eyes. Codd. P and Q after *caritatis* add *est*; but cod. X reads: *ideo non est proprius ipsius caritatis*.

la: Licet multi mss. utACGKLOSTUVWXYZ omittant *et quietari*, retinendum tamen duximus, tum quia in aliquibus antiquioribus mss. ut F H I etc. invenitur, tum quia superius in ipsa obiectione exhibetur.

en: Although many manuscripts — A C G K L O S T U V W X Y Z — omit *et quietari*, we have nevertheless judged it should be retained, both because it is found in some older manuscripts such as F H I, etc., and because it is exhibited above in the objection itself.

la: Colligitur ex XV. *de Trin.* c. 22, ubi ostendit, quod memoria, intellectus et amor seu voluntas non sint sua nec sibi, sed supposito agant, quidquid agunt. Et in praecedentibus capitulis trinitatem in anima repertam cum Trinitate divina comparando, c. 17 de Spiritu S. ait: *ipse autem et sibi et illis non nisi diligit*. — Plurimi codd. *ut vult* pro *ut dicit*.

en: Gathered from *On the Trinity* XV, c. 22, where he shows that memory, intellect, and love (i.e. will) are not their own nor for themselves, but act for the supposit whatever they do. And in the preceding chapters, comparing the trinity found in the soul with the divine Trinity, in c. 17 he says of the Holy Spirit: *He himself does not love except both for himself and for them*. — Very many codd. [read] *ut vult* for *ut dicit*.

la: Libr. *de Concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arbitrio* c. 11. et 12, ubi dicit, quod voluntas movet omnia instrumenta, quae in nobis sunt, ut manus etc.; et quod ex ipsa «descendit omne meritum hominis». — De doctrina hic posita vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Book *On the Harmony of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will*, cc. 11 and 12, where he says that the will moves all the instruments which are in us, such as the hands, etc.; and that from it «descends every merit of man». — On the doctrine here set forth, see II Sent. d. 24 p. 1 a. 2 q. 1.

la: Hic loquendi modus sumtus est ex Hugonis de S. Victore *Expos. in Dionysii libr. de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 7.

en: This manner of speaking is taken from Hugh of St. Victor's *Exposition on Dionysius' Book on the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 7.

la: Cod. X hic repetit *per modum*.

en: Cod. X here repeats *per modum*.

la: Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 magis usitatum verbum *concomitantiam* loco *concomitationem*.

en: We have restored, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, the more usual word *concomitantiam* in place of *concomitationem*.

la: Cod. X *tendentis*. In fine responsionis cod. R addit *et propter hoc non valet*.

en: Cod. X [reads] *tendentis*. At the end of the response cod. R adds *et propter hoc non valet*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solutione principali huius quaestionis, scilicet quod fruitio sit actus voluntatis, omnes antiqui doctores cum Seraphico conveniunt; attamen iam istis temporibus circa quasdam subtiles de hac re quaestiones erant controversiae.

Primo quoad ipsum conceptum fruitionis S. Bonaventura docet, fruitionem praesupponere quidem cognitionem sive visionem tanquam dispositionem, tamen, essentialiter loquendo, ipsam esse actum voluntatis, qui importet tum dilectionem tum delectationem, sive esse formaliter actionem voluntatis, nempe amorosam eius inhaesionem, ad quam sequitur inseparabiliter passio delectationis; cfr. hic ad 2. et dub. 1. 2; III. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 2, et ibid. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Hexaem. Serm. 12. in fine. Idem docet Scotus cum suis, Richard. a Med., B. Albert. M., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand. — Alii vero doctores volunt, fruitionem esse formaliter ipsam delectationem, non quidem qualemcumque, sed ultimatam, seu quae coniuncta est cum quietatione; ipsam vero non esse amorem nisi connotative et causaliter; ita discipuli S. Thomae, teste Caietano (ad S. I. II. q. 1. a. 1.), Dionys. Carth. aliique.

Secundo, quoad actum, in quo fruitio formaliter consistit, docet S. Bonav., hic ad 1. et 2; II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4: omnem delectationem spiritualem ortum habere ex amore voluntatis, praesupposita perceptione convenientis. Consentiunt Alex. Hal., Henr. Gand., Richard. a Med. qui inter alia dicit: «Actum cognitivae non sequitur delectatio nisi mediante actu appetitivae.» Hoc negatur ab auctoribus secundae sententiae.

Tertio, hinc orta est celebris controversia, praecipue inter asseclas S. Thomae et Scoti agitata, utrum scilicet beatitudo in patria formaliter consistat in actu intellectus sive in visione, qui tum amorem tum delectationem inseparabiliter habet annexa, immo «virtualiter continet et causaliter exerit» (Caietanus), an potius, ut vult Scotus cum aliis multis, in actu voluntatis, qui visionem supponit et delectatione completur. Hanc quaestionem tangit S. Bonav., hic ad 3.; plura vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. 1. q. 5. Haec controversia cohaeret cum doctrinis psychologicis praecipue de relatione inter intellectum et voluntatem.

**II.** De quaestione hic proposita: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. 3. in Oxon. et Report. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 1. et 2. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 12. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 49. q. 6. n. 26.; de delectatione etiam agit S. a. 50. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** On the principal solution of this question, namely that fruition is an act of the will, all the ancient doctors agree with the Seraphic; nevertheless already in these times concerning certain subtle questions about this matter there were controversies.

*First*, as to the very concept of fruition, St. Bonaventure teaches that fruition does presuppose cognition or vision as a disposition; yet, speaking essentially, it is itself an act of the will, which imports both love and delight, that is, it is formally an act of the will — namely its loving adhesion, upon which inseparably follows the passion of delight; cf. here ad 2 and dub. 1, 2; III Sent. d. 29 a. 1 q. 2, and ibid. d. 35 a. 1 q. 1 in corp.; II Sent. d. 38 a. 1 q. 2 ad 4; Hexaem. Sermon 12 at the end. The same is taught by Scotus with his followers, Richard of Mediavilla, Blessed Albert the Great, Peter of Tarantasia, Henry of Ghent. — But other doctors hold that fruition is formally delight itself — not, indeed, any sort, but the ultimate, that is, that which is conjoined with rest; and that fruition is not love except connotatively and causally; so the disciples of St. Thomas, on the testimony of Cajetan (on S. I-II q. 1 a. 1), Denis the Carthusian, and others.

*Secondly*, as to the act in which fruition formally consists, St. Bonav. teaches here, ad 1 and 2; II Sent. d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 4: that every spiritual delight has its origin from the love of the will, supposing the perception of what is suitable. Alexander of Hales, Henry of Ghent, [and] Richard of Mediavilla agree, who among other things says: «An act of the cognitive [power] is not followed by delight except mediated by an act of the appetitive [power].» This is denied by the authors of the second opinion.

*Thirdly*, hence arose the famous controversy, agitated especially between the followers of St. Thomas and of Scotus, namely whether beatitude in the fatherland formally consists in the act of the intellect or in vision, which has both love and delight inseparably annexed — nay, «virtually contains and causally exerts [them]» (Cajetan); or rather, as Scotus with many others holds, in an act of the will, which presupposes vision and is completed by delight. This question is touched by St. Bonav. here, ad 3; see more in IV Sent. d. 49 p. 1 q. 5. This controversy coheres with psychological doctrines, especially concerning the relation between intellect and will.

**II.** On the question here proposed: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV q. 26 m. 4. — Scot., here q. 3 in Oxon. and Report. — St. Thom., here q. 1 a. 1; S. I-II q. 11 a. 1 and 2. — B. Albert M., here a. 12 and 17. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2 q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here I princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 49 q. 6 n. 26.; on delight he also treats in S. a. 50 q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deo sit fruendum
Whether God is to be enjoyed

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De fruibili.*

Ostenso, quid sit frui per essentiam, quaestio est de fruibili, et

*primo*, utrum Deo contingat frui;

*secundo*, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deo sit fruendum.*

Circa primum, quod sit Deo fruendum, ostenditur sic.

**Fundamenta.**

1. «Eo fruendum est, quod beatos nos facit[^1]», quia in beatitudine est recta fruitio; sed Deo beati efficimur, quia ipse est nostra beatitudo: ergo Deo est fruendum.

2. Item, bonum est amabile; ergo magis bonum magis amabile et summe bonum summe amabile[^2]; sed eo fruimur, quod summe amamus: ergo etc.

3. Item, pulcrum delectat et[^3] magis pulcrum magis delectat, ergo summe pulcrum summe delectat; sed eo fruimur, in quo summe delectamur: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

**Ad oppositum.**

1. Ubi est fruitio, ibi est delectatio; «sed delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti[^4]»; Dei autem ad creaturam nulla est convenientia, immo summa distantia: ergo nec delectatio, ergo nec fruitio.

2. Item, excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum vel saltem contristat, quia delectatio est in mediis[^5]: ergo pari ratione excellens intelligibile corrumpit vel contristat intellectum. Sed Deus est excellentissima lux: ergo contristat, non delectat, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod sensibilis potentia est corruptibilis, non intellectus; hoc non solvit, quia intellectus, dum est in carne, fatigatur et impeditur in actu, corpore corrupto.

3. Item, ubi fruitio, ibi quietatio; sed in infinito non est quietatio, «quia semper est aliquid extra accipere[^6]»: ergo cum Deus sit infinitus, in Deo non est quietatio, ergo nec fruitio.

> **Conclusio.** Deo proprie est fruendum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deo fruendum est, eo quod ipse solus perfecte finit[^7] et delectat ipsam animam propter se et super omnia.

**Ad argumenta.**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod delectatio est coniunctio convenientis etc.; dicendum, quod[^8] est convenientia per unius naturae participationem vel per comparationem communem[^9]. Prima convenientia facit communitatem univocationis, secunda communitatem analogiae sive proportionis. Et haec est secundum triplicem differentiam: aut secundum similem comparationem duorum ad duo, ut sicut homo ad animal, ita albedo se habet ad colorem; aut secundum dissimilem comparationem duorum ad unum, ut animalis et cibi ad sanitatem; vel

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secundum comparationem duorum ad invicem, ut puta cum unum est imitatio vel similitudo alterius. Similitudo enim non convenit cum consimili[^10] in tertio, sed se ipsa. Sic est in proposito, quia anima est expressa similitudo Dei. Haec convenientia in uno extremo ponit inclinationem et indigentiam, in alio quietationem et sufficientiam, quia unum[^11] factum est propter alterum, unde ordinatur ad alterum. Et quoniam ad inclinationis quietationem et indigentiae suppletionem, ubi est sensus, est delectatio sive sequitur[^12], ideo anima cum tali modo quietatur a Deo, fruitur eo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excellentia sensibilis corrumpit sensum: ergo etc., dicendum, quod non est simile de intelligere et sentire. Et ad hoc est triplex ratio: una est ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, alia ex parte apprehensi sive obiecti, tertia est ex parte modi apprehendendi.

Ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, quia sensus potest corrumpi, intellectus autem non. Cuius ratio est, quia sensus dependet ab organo, in quo est quaedam medietas et harmonia, quae non tantum corrumpitur per contrarium, sed per excellens; sed intellectus non dependet ab organo, quia est vis immaterialis, ideo non tristatur in excellenti[^13].

Ex parte obiecti non est simile, quia obiectum intelligibile[^14] excellens iuvat et confortat, quia influentia talis cognoscibilis procedit ab intimis et intrat ipsam potentiam, et ideo ipsam confortat et corroborat. Sicut si magnus mons daret virtutem portandi se, facilius ferretur quam parvus; sic est in intelligibili, quod Deus est. Sensibile autem obiectum tantum extra excitat, et ideo hoc corrumpit, illud autem non.

Ex parte modi apprehendendi similiter est dissimilitudo, quia sensus in apprehensione sui obiecti tendit ad exterius, unde percipiendo[^15] illud dispergitur exterius nec fortificatur[^16] interius, ideo debilitatur. Sed obiectum intellectus cum sit intimum ipsi intellectui, in eius perceptione virtus non dispergitur, sed colligitur, et quanto virtus est magis unita, tanto fortior.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinito; dicendum, quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet per privationem perfectionis; et sic materia dicitur infinita, et talis infiniti non est finire, sed potius finiri indiget, secundum quod[^17] est possibile. Alio modo infinitum dicitur per privationem limitationis; et quod sic infinitum est, proprie habet finire, quoniam ultra ipsum, cum non sit maius cogitare, non contingit aliquid appetere. Unde talis infinitas convenit ultimo fini, quae[^18] maxime habet finiendi rationem.

english:
### Article III. *On the enjoyable.*

Having shown what it is to enjoy through essence, the question concerns the enjoyable, and

*first*, whether God can be enjoyed;

*second*, whether He alone is to be enjoyed.

### Question I. *Whether God is to be enjoyed.*

Concerning the first, that God is to be enjoyed, is shown thus.

**Foundations.**

1. "That is to be enjoyed which makes us blessed[^1]," since right enjoyment lies in beatitude; but we are made blessed by God, since He Himself is our beatitude: therefore God is to be enjoyed.

2. Likewise, the good is lovable; therefore the more good is the more lovable, and the supremely good is supremely lovable[^2]; but we enjoy that which we love supremely: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the beautiful delights, and[^3] the more beautiful delights more; therefore the supremely beautiful delights supremely; but we enjoy that in which we are supremely delighted: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

**To the opposite.**

1. Where there is enjoyment, there is delight; "but delight is the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting[^4]"; but there is no fittingness of God to the creature, but rather the greatest distance: therefore no delight, therefore no enjoyment.

2. Likewise, an excelling sensible object corrupts the sense or at least saddens it, since delight lies in middle things[^5]: therefore, by parity of reasoning, an excelling intelligible object corrupts or saddens the intellect. But God is the most excelling light: therefore He saddens, He does not delight, therefore etc. If you say that the sensible power is corruptible, the intellect is not; this does not solve the matter, since the intellect, while it is in the flesh, is wearied and impeded in its act, the body being corrupted.

3. Likewise, where enjoyment is, there is rest; but in the infinite there is no rest, "since there is always something beyond to be received[^6]": therefore, since God is infinite, in God there is no rest, therefore neither enjoyment.

> **Conclusion.** God is properly to be enjoyed.

**I respond:** It must be said that God is to be enjoyed, in that He alone perfectly terminates[^7] and delights the soul itself for His own sake and above all things.

**To the arguments.**

1. To that, then, which is objected, that delight is the conjunction of the fitting etc.; it must be said that[^8] there is a fittingness through participation in one nature, or through a common comparison[^9]. The first fittingness produces the community of univocation, the second the community of analogy or proportion. And this latter is according to a threefold difference: either according to a similar comparison of two to two, as just as man is to animal, so whiteness is to color; or according to a dissimilar comparison of two to one, as of the animal and food to health; or

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according to a comparison of two to each other, as for instance when one is the imitation or likeness of the other. For a likeness does not agree with that-which-is-like it[^10] in a third [term], but in itself. So it is in the case at hand, since the soul is the express likeness of God. This fittingness, in the one extreme, posits inclination and indigence, in the other rest and sufficiency, since the one[^11] is made for the sake of the other, whence it is ordered to the other. And since, for the rest of the inclination and the supplying of the indigence, where there is sense, there is delight, or [delight] follows[^12], therefore the soul, when it is rested in such a way by God, enjoys Him.

2. To that which is objected, that an excelling sensible object corrupts the sense: therefore etc., it must be said that the case of understanding and sensing is not alike. And for this there is a threefold reason: one is on the part of the apprehending power, another on the part of the apprehended or the object, the third is on the part of the mode of apprehending.

On the part of the apprehending power, since the sense can be corrupted, but the intellect cannot. The reason for this is that the sense depends on an organ, in which there is a certain mean and harmony, which is corrupted not only by the contrary, but by the excelling; but the intellect does not depend on an organ, since it is an immaterial power, and so it is not saddened by an excelling [object][^13].

On the part of the object it is not alike, since an excelling intelligible[^14] object aids and strengthens, since the influence of such a knowable proceeds from interior depths and enters the power itself, and therefore strengthens and fortifies it. Just as if a great mountain were to give the power of bearing itself, it would be borne more easily than a small one; so it is in the intelligible, which God is. But the sensible object only stirs from outside, and therefore this corrupts, but that does not.

On the part of the mode of apprehending there is likewise dissimilarity, since the sense, in the apprehension of its object, tends outward, whence by perceiving[^15] it, it is scattered outwardly and is not strengthened[^16] inwardly, therefore it is weakened. But since the object of the intellect is interior to the intellect itself, in its perception the power is not scattered, but gathered, and the more the power is unified, the stronger it is.

3. To that which is objected concerning the infinite, it must be said that the infinite is said in two ways, namely, by privation of perfection; and thus matter is called infinite, and it is not for such an infinite to terminate, but rather it stands in need of being terminated, insofar as[^17] this is possible. In another way the infinite is said by privation of limitation; and that which is infinite in this way properly has [the power] to terminate, since beyond it, since nothing greater can be conceived, nothing else can be sought. Whence such infinity belongs to the last end, which[^18] most of all has the character of terminating.

la: August., I. *De Doctr. christ.* c. 33. n. 37: *Illo enim frueris, quo efficieris beatus.* — In quo textu cod. R post *Illo* addit *solo*.

en: Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, bk. I, c. 33, n. 37: *For you enjoy that by which you are made blessed.* — In which text codex R, after *Illo*, adds *solo*.

la: Simile argumentum reperitur in Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. 7, ubi agit de felicitate, quae est bonum optimum, ideoque et maxime exoptandum ac amandum. Cfr. III. *Topic.* c. 1. seq.

en: A similar argument is found in Aristotle, *Ethics* bk. I, c. 7, where he treats of happiness, which is the best good, and therefore most to be desired and loved. Cf. *Topics* bk. III, c. 1 and following.

la: Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.

en: We have supplied the particle *et* from the older manuscripts and the first edition.

la: Haec delectationis definitio est S. Doctori ceterisque Scholasticis familiaris et convenit cum ea, quam exhibet Avicenna in fine VIII. *Metaph.* c. 7. circa finem: *Delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis, secundum quod conveniens est* — Quae ab Avicenna data definitio fundari videtur in illa, quam Aristot., I. *Rhetor.* c. 11. tradit: *Est autem delectatio motus quidam animae et constitutio simul tota, sensibilis, in existentem naturam* (haec definitio explicatur ab Henr. Gand., S. a. 50. q. 2.). Ed. Paris. 1878 sic Aristot. interpretatur: *Positum sit igitur nobis, voluptatem esse motionem quandam animi et constitutionem subitam sensuque percipiendam in statu conveniente naturae.* Cfr. etiam VII. *Ethic.* c. 11. seq. et praecipue X. *Ethic.* c. 1-5. ac II. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 7, ubi plura ad delectationem (voluptatem) pertinentia explicantur. — Mox, contradicentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc *facturam* pro *creaturam*. Paulo post cod. R *infinita* loco *summa*.

en: This definition of delight is familiar to the holy Doctor and to the other Scholastics, and agrees with that which Avicenna gives at the end of *Metaph.* VIII, c. 7, near the end: *Delight is nothing other than the apprehension of the fitting insofar as it is fitting* — This definition given by Avicenna seems to be founded on that which Aristotle, *Rhetoric* bk. I, c. 11, transmits: *Delight, however, is a certain motion of the soul and a complete settling, sensible, into its existent nature* (this definition is explained by Henry of Ghent, S. a. 50. q. 2.). The Paris edition of 1878 thus interprets Aristotle: *Let it then be laid down by us that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul and a sudden settling, to be perceived by sense, into a state agreeable to nature.* Cf. also *Ethics* bk. VII, c. 11 and following, and especially *Ethics* bk. X, c. 1-5, and *Magna Moralia* bk. II, c. 7, where many things pertaining to delight (pleasure) are explained. — Next, against the older manuscripts and the first edition, the Vatican edition together with the later codex cc has *facturam* in place of *creaturam*. A little later codex R has *infinita* in place of *summa*.

la: Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 123. (ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot, III. c. 2.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489 legitur: *Manifestum autem ex his, et propter quid excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensitiva... Et manifesta est ex hoc causa, propter quam sensibilia intensa corrumpunt instrumenta sensuum.* Et text. 143. (ed. Paris. loc. cit.): *Proportio autem est symphonia... unde et delectabilia quidem sunt, dum dicuntur sincera et mixta entia ad rationem... excellentia autem contristant aut corrumpunt.* Tandem libr. III. text. 29: *Et est delectari aut tristari agere sensitiva medietate ad bonum et malum in quantum talia.* — Vat. rationem additam contra mss. et ed. 1 ita exhibet: *quia vera delectatio non est nisi in mediis*. Cod. X circa finem huius argumenti loco *in carne* ponit *in corpore*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* bk. II, text 123 (Paris Firmin-Didot ed., III. c. 2.), where according to the Venice edition of 1489 one reads: *It is manifest from these things, and why the excellences of sensibles corrupt the sense-faculties... And the cause is made manifest from this, on account of which intense sensibles corrupt the instruments of the senses.* And text 143 (Paris ed., loc. cit.): *Proportion, moreover, is a symphony... whence delightful indeed are things said to be sincere and the entities mixed unto reason... but excellences sadden or corrupt.* Finally, bk. III, text 29: *And to be delighted or to be saddened is for the sensitive [faculty] to act by a middle state with respect to good and evil insofar as they are such.* — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, gives the added reason thus: *since true delight is only in middle things*. Codex X, near the end of this argument, places *in corpore* in place of *in carne*.

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 63. (c. 6.): *Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus semper aliquid accipere extra est; cuius autem nihil est extra, id est perfectum et totum.* — Mox praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 non ita bene Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc *ergo non fruitio*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* bk. III, text 63 (c. 6.): *The infinite, therefore, is that of which, according to quantity, for those receiving it there is always something to be received beyond; but that of which nothing is beyond is the perfect and the whole.* — Next, against the testimony of the older manuscripts and the first edition, not so well does the Vatican edition together with the later codex cc have *ergo non fruitio*.

la: Id est, *quietat*.

en: That is, *brings to rest*.

la: Corruptam lectionem Vat. et recentioris cod. cc, in qua ponitur *et* pro *vel* et omittitur *communem*, restauravimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. X *dicendum, quod convenientia dicitur vel per*. — De convenientia vide Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. 1. et VII. *Phys.* text. 21-34. (c. 4.).

en: We have restored from the older manuscripts and the first edition the corrupt reading of the Vatican edition and of the later codex cc, in which *et* is put in place of *vel* and *communem* is omitted. A little earlier codex X has *it must be said that fittingness is said either through*. — On fittingness see Aristotle, *Categories* c. 1, and *Physics* bk. VII, text 21-34 (c. 4.).

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *se habet*, quod Vat. cum aliquibus tantum codd. hic addit.

en: Most codices together with the first edition omit *se habet*, which the Vatican edition, together with only some codices, here adds.

la: Plures mss. ut A F G H K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 *simili*. Mox mendum Vat., quae post *se ipsa* addit *anima*, castigamus ex mss. et ed. 1; cod. X *sed est se ipsa similis*. In lectione in textum recepta *similitudo* sumitur concrete et sensus est: *simile ratione similitudinis convenit immediate cum consimili*. — Paulo post cod. T *homo* pro *anima*; plures vero codd. ut C L R S U omittunt *anima*, sed non bene.

en: Several manuscripts such as A F G H K S T Y etc., with the first edition, [have] *simili*. Next, the error of the Vatican edition, which after *se ipsa* adds *anima*, we correct from the manuscripts and the first edition; codex X has *sed est se ipsa similis*. In the reading received into the text, *similitudo* is taken concretely, and the sense is: *the like, by reason of likeness, agrees immediately with the like.* — A little later codex T has *homo* in place of *anima*; several codices however, such as C L R S U, omit *anima*, but not rightly.

la: Cod. X hic repetit *unum*.

en: Codex X here repeats *unum*.

la: Cod. WXZ adiungunt *ibi*, et mox cod. A post *sequitur* repetit *delectatio*.

en: Codices W, X, Z add *ibi*, and next codex A, after *sequitur*, repeats *delectatio*.

la: Cod. X addit *etiam*. Paulo post codd. aa bb *spiritualis* loco *immaterialis*. Mox codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam codd. A C G I L S T U W post *tristatur* omittunt *in*; codd. R et ff ponunt *ab*; cod. bb vero *ex*; plures autem ut F H K. etc. cum ed. 1 *in*.

en: Codex X adds *etiam*. A little later codices aa and bb have *spiritualis* in place of *immaterialis*. Next, the codices do not agree among themselves; for codices A C G I L S T U W, after *tristatur*, omit *in*; codices R and ff put *ab*; codex bb has *ex*; many however, such as F H K etc., with the first edition, have *in*.

la: De hac differentia inter sensum et intellectum vide Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 123. et 143. paulo supra relatos, et libr. III. text. 4. (ed. Paris. c. 4.): *Necesse est itaque, quoniam (intellectus) omnia intelligit, immixtum esse;* et text. 7: *Quod autem non similis sit impassibilitas sensitivi et intellectivi, manifestum est sensoriis et sensu. Sensus enim non potest sentire ex vehementi sensibili... sed intellectus cum aliquid intellexerit valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit inferiora, sed et magis; sensitivum enim non sine corpore est, hic (intellectus) autem separabilis est.*

en: On this difference between sense and intellect see Aristotle, *On the Soul* bk. II, text 123 and 143, recounted a little above, and bk. III, text 4 (Paris ed., c. 4.): *It is therefore necessary, since (the intellect) understands all things, that it be unmixed;* and text 7: *That the impassibility of the sensitive and of the intellective are not alike is manifest in the sense-organs and in sense. For sense cannot sense from a vehement sensible... but the intellect, when it has understood something very intelligible, does not understand inferior things less, but even more; for the sensitive is not without a body, but this (the intellect) is separable.*

la: Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. substituimus *intelligibile* loco *intelligentiae*.

en: On the authority of the older [manuscripts] we have substituted *intelligibile* in place of *intelligentiae*.

la: Ita codd. C H K O S T U Y aa bb et ed. 1; sed codd. A F I L M R V W X Z *participando*; Vat. autem cum cod. cc *per*. Mox codd. X et Y *confortatur* loco *fortificatur*.

en: Thus codices C H K O S T U Y aa bb and the first edition; but codices A F I L M R V W X Z [have] *participando*; the Vatican edition, however, with codex cc, has *per*. Next, codices X and Y have *confortatur* in place of *fortificatur*.

la: Cod. cc *scilicet quantum* pro *secundum quod*.

en: Codex cc has *scilicet quantum* in place of *secundum quod*.

la: Codd. F et I *qui*, satis bene, et conveniunt quoad sensum cum cod. T, qui habet *quia*.

en: Codices F and I have *qui*, which is well enough, and agree as to sense with codex T, which has *quia*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc et sequentem quaestionem alii antiqui commentatores Lombardi sub una quaestione tractant. — Circa analogiam eiusque differentias, de qua sermo est in solut. ad 1, fusius S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 14. q. 2; d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 4. in corp.; d. 25. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — De comparatione duorum ad duo etc. infra d. 46. q. 5. in corp. — De analogia proportionis et proportionalitatis cfr. infra d. 48. q. 1; d. 33. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4; et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; IV. Sent. d. 1. dub. 3.

**II.** De ipsa hac quaestione: Scot., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic q. 12. et seqq. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Biel, hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This and the following question other ancient commentators on Lombard treat under a single question. — Concerning analogy and its differences, of which there is mention in the solution to [obj.] 1, the holy Doctor speaks more fully below at d. 14. q. 2; d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 4. in the body; d. 25. a. 2. q. 2. in the body. — On the comparison of two to two etc., below at d. 46. q. 5. in the body. — On the analogy of proportion and proportionality, cf. below d. 48. q. 1; d. 33. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4; and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; IV. Sent. d. 1. dub. 3.

**II.** On this question itself: Scotus, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 3. — B. Albert, here q. 12. and following. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. — Biel, here q. 4.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum solo Deo sive bono increato fruendum sit.*

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum solo Deo sive bono increato sit fruendum; et quod sic, videtur.

**Fundamenta.**

1. Illo solo est fruendum, quod est propter se diligendum; sed illud solum[^1] est propter se diligendum, quod est propter se bonum; illud autem propter se est bonum, quod bonitatem, quam habet, nec habet ab alio, nec bonitas illa est *ad aliud*; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

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2. Item, illo solo est fruendum, quod quietat animae appetitum; sed animae appetitus non quietatur sufficienter nisi in eo quod est illa perfectius et maius bonum; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

3. Item, appetitus non sufficienter quietatur nisi per aliquid, quod animam implet, quia ex ea parte anima deficit in quiete, qua deficit in plenitudine; sed[^2] est capax Dei secundum appetitum: ergo si omne creatum est in infinitum minus illo, nullum supplet animae appetitum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus[^3]: «Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest implere».

4. Item, bonum, quod potest cogitari, potest appeti: ergo si aliquo maius bonum potest cogitari, maius illo potest appeti; sed omni finito maius potest cogitari: ergo maius potest appeti: ergo nullum finitum terminat animae appetitum sufficienter: ergo solo bono infinito, quod Deus est, est fruendum, quo habito, non potest amplius cogitari nec desiderari.

**Contra:**

1. Videtur, quod bono creato contingat frui, quia, quamvis appetitus materiae sit infinitus, tamen per formam creatam incorruptibilem[^4] sufficienter finitur: ergo similiter videtur, quod sit aliquod bonum creatum, quod sufficienter finiet animae appetitum; sed omni tali est fruendum: ergo aliquo bono creato est fruendum.

2. Item, appetitus humanus est finitae capacitatis, ergo non capit nisi finitum, vel si capiat infinitum, capit finite; ergo si finiatur per illud quod capit, finitur per bonum finitum: ergo videtur, quod aliquo bono finito sit fruendum.

3. Item, specialiter videtur, quod homine sit fruendum, quia omni eo est fruendum, quo Deus fruitur; sed Deus homine fruitur, quia hominem amat; sed amore illo, quo amat se, amat hominem, quia non est in eo[^5] duplex amor; sed primus est fruitionis: ergo et secundus.

4. Item, videtur specialiter de virtute; quia omni eo est fruendum, quod est propter se appetendum; haec est manifesta per se; sed omne bonum honestum est propter se appetendum, «quia honestum est quod sua vi nos trahit et dignitate sua nos allicit», sicut dicit Tullius[^6], et Augustinus dividit honestum contra utile; sed virtus cadit in genere honesti: ergo virtute est fruendum.

5. Item, videtur specialiter de beatitudine. Omni eo est fruendum, quo habito animus quiescit et delectatur et nihil ultra potest quaerere; sed beatitudo creata est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> Solo Deo proprie est fruendum; improprie frui licet bonis spiritualibus, quae delectant et fini sunt coniuncta.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod solo Deo est fruendum, proprie accepto frui, prout dicit motum cum delectatione et quietatione. Sed communiter accepto frui, prout dicit motum cum delectatione tantum[^7], omnibus, quae spiritualiter delectant et coniuncta sunt fini, cuiusmodi sunt fructus, dona et beatitudines, potest frui homo non indebite; sed primo modo solo Deo.

Et ratio huius est, quia nihil potest animam sufficienter finire nisi bonum, ad quod est[^8]. Hoc autem est bonum summum, quod superius est anima, et bonum infinitum, quod excedit animae vires. Cognitio enim animae naturalis[^9] est cognitio non arctata; unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia cognoscuntur. Similiter affectio eius nata est diligere omne bonum; ergo nullo bono sufficienter finitur affectus, nisi quod[^10] est bonum omnis boni et quod est omnia in omnibus.

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De quo bono Exodi trigesimo tertio[^11]: *Ostendam tibi omne bonum*. Hoc autem est summum bonum: ergo etc.

Item[^12], nihil sufficienter finit animam nisi bonum infinitum, quia ad hoc, ut finiatur, necesse est, ipsam finiri secundum aestimationem; alioquin non esset beata, nisi se existimaret beatam. Aestimatio autem supergreditur omne finitum, quia omni finito potest maius cogitari aliquid: ergo cum affectio possit[^13] se extendere ubi et aestimatio, necessario affectio animae supergreditur omne finitum; et si hoc, nullo bono finito sufficienter finitur. Fruendum est ergo solo Deo, quia summum bonum et infinitum.

Et non solum Deo fruendum propter perfectam finitionem, sed etiam propter perfectam delectationem. Ad delectationem enim concurrit[^14] delectabile et coniunctio eius cum eo quod delectatur. Omne autem, quod delectat animam, delectat in ratione boni et pulcri; et quoniam solus Deus est ipsa[^15] bonitas et pulcritudo, ideo in Deo solo est perfecta delectatio.

Item, quia ibi est coniunctio; solus autem Deus est qui perfectissime coniungitur. Nam coniungitur secundum[^16] veritatem et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi.

Omnes enim[^17] hae quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc: quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**

1. *Ad illud* vero quod obiicitur de appetitu materiae; dicendum, quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tanquam ad perfectionem substantialem, ex qua[^18] et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est, formam esse eiusdem generis cum materia, nec est omnino supra materiam: ideo finita est omnis talis forma. Talis autem, si sit incorruptibilis, propter unionem[^19] arctat appetitum materiae et arctatum finit; unde non finitur in sua amplitudine. Appetitus autem animae non sic arctatur propter unionem cum appetibili, immo dilatatur; et ideo oportet, quod perficiatur aliquo omnino summo.

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod[^20] non capit nisi finite; dicendum, quod infinitum bonum finite capit, quoniam ipsa est finita. Sed quoniam bonum illud est infinitum, ideo ab ipso totaliter absorbetur, ut iam eius capacitas undique terminetur. Unde non tantum gaudebit, sed sicut dicit Anselmus[^21], *in gaudium Domini introibit*. Quod si tantum caperet et non vinceretur nec absorberetur, adhuc posset insurgere appetitus ad amplius aliquid capiendum. Patet igitur, quod ad hoc quod anima compleatur, quamvis capacitatem habeat finitam[^22], tamen necesse est adesse bonum infinitum.

3. *Ad illud* vero quod obiicitur de homine; dicendum, quod Deus diligit hominem, et amor Dei est amor fruitionis; tamen homine non fruitur, quia diligendo se diligit hominem, id est, fruendo se utitur homine. Quod patet sic: quia dilectio Dei ad creaturam non est affectio, sed effectus[^23] communicatio. Communicatio autem secundum rationem habitualem attenditur secundum bonitatem; quia bonum est quod natum est se communicare. Secundum rationem vero actualem attenditur sive respicit voluntatem; quia enim vult, ideo facit. Ratio ergo communicandi venit ex voluntate et bonitate, sicut ratio cognoscendi ab exemplari et intelligentia. Quia igitur ex conversione voluntatis supra suam bonitatem nos diligit[^24], ideo se fruendo nos diligit.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur de virtute, quod virtus est bonum honestum; dicendum, quod bonum honestum dicitur dupliciter: aut quod est pure bonum, aut in quo relucet eius similitudo. Primo modo honesto est fruendum, proprie accepto frui, quia hoc solum terminat et quietat. Secundo modo non, nisi communiter accipiatur, prout dicit delectationem.

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Huiusmodi enim[^25] propter assimilationem ad Deum habent pulcritudinem, qua nos delectant et alliciunt; tamen in ipsis non est quiescendum, quia tunc amittunt pulcritudinem, quia «virtutes, cum ad se referuntur, superbae sunt et inflatae[^26]».

5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur de beatitudine; dicendum, quod beatitudo creata non finit appetitum per se, sed per coniunctionem cum increata: unde anima ipsam[^27] diligit propter Deum, non propter se.

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### Question II. *Whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed.*

Lastly it is asked whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed; and that it is so, seems [evident].

**Foundations.**

1. That alone is to be enjoyed which is to be loved for its own sake; but that alone[^1] is to be loved for its own sake which is good for its own sake; and that is good for its own sake which neither has from another the goodness it has, nor is that goodness *in relation to anything else*; but this is God alone: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, that alone is to be enjoyed which quiets the appetite of the soul; but the soul's appetite is not sufficiently quieted save in that which is a more perfect and greater good than itself; but this is God alone: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the appetite is not sufficiently quieted save through something which fills the soul, since the soul fails in rest on that side on which it fails in fullness; but [the soul][^2] is capable of God according to appetite: therefore, if every created thing is infinitely less than that [God], no [created thing] supplies the soul's appetite. And this is what Augustine[^3] says: «Nothing less than the Trinity can fill a soul that is capable of the whole Trinity».

4. Likewise, the good which can be thought can be desired: therefore, if a greater good than some [given good] can be thought, a greater than that can be desired; but a greater than every finite [good] can be thought: therefore a greater can be desired: therefore no finite [thing] sufficiently terminates the soul's appetite: therefore the only infinite good, which is God, is to be enjoyed, which once possessed, nothing further can be thought or desired.

**On the contrary:**

1. It seems that the created good may be enjoyed, since although the appetite of matter is infinite, yet through a created incorruptible form[^4] it is sufficiently terminated: therefore similarly it seems that there is some created good which sufficiently terminates the soul's appetite; but every such [good] is to be enjoyed: therefore some created good is to be enjoyed.

2. Likewise, the human appetite is of finite capacity; therefore it does not grasp save the finite, or if it grasps the infinite, it grasps finitely; therefore if it is terminated by that which it grasps, it is terminated by a finite good: therefore it seems that some finite good is to be enjoyed.

3. Likewise, specially it seems that the human being is to be enjoyed, since that is to be enjoyed by which God enjoys; but God enjoys the human being, since he loves the human being; but with that love with which he loves himself, he loves the human being, since there is not in him[^5] a twofold love; but the first is of enjoyment: therefore also the second.

4. Likewise, specially it seems concerning virtue; since that is to be enjoyed which is to be desired for its own sake; this is manifest per se; but every honorable good is to be desired for its own sake, «since the honorable is what by its own force draws us and by its own dignity attracts us», as Tully[^6] says, and Augustine divides the honorable against the useful; but virtue falls in the genus of the honorable: therefore virtue is to be enjoyed.

5. Likewise, specially it seems concerning beatitude. That is to be enjoyed by the possession of which the mind rests and is delighted, and can seek nothing further; but created beatitude is of this kind: therefore, etc.

### Conclusio.

> God alone is properly to be enjoyed; it is improperly permitted to enjoy spiritual goods, which delight and are conjoined to the end.

**I respond:** It must be said that God alone is to be enjoyed, taking "to enjoy" properly, insofar as it expresses a motion with delight and quieting. But, taking "to enjoy" commonly, insofar as it expresses a motion with delight only[^7], a human being can not unfittingly enjoy all things which spiritually delight and are conjoined to the end—of which kind are the fruits, gifts, and beatitudes; but in the first mode [he can enjoy] God alone.

And the reason for this is that nothing can sufficiently terminate the soul except the good for which it exists[^8]. But this is the highest good, which is above the soul, and the infinite good, which exceeds the powers of the soul. For the soul's natural cognition[^9] is a cognition not constrained; whence it is born in a certain way to cognize all things, whence its cognition is not filled by any cognoscible save what has in itself all cognoscibles and by which once cognized all things are cognized. Likewise its affection is born to love every good; therefore the affection is not sufficiently terminated by any good save by that which[^10] is the good of every good and which is "all in all".

Of which good [it is said] in Exodus the thirty-third[^11]: *I will show thee every good*. But this is the highest good: therefore, etc.

Likewise[^12], nothing sufficiently terminates the soul save the infinite good, because for it to be terminated, it is necessary that it be terminated according to estimation; otherwise it would not be blessed, unless it esteemed itself blessed. But estimation transcends every finite [thing], since something greater than every finite [thing] can be thought: therefore, since affection can[^13] extend itself where also estimation [extends], necessarily the soul's affection transcends every finite [thing]; and if this, [it is] not sufficiently terminated by any finite good. Therefore God alone is to be enjoyed, since [he is] the highest and infinite good.

And not only is God to be enjoyed on account of perfect termination, but also on account of perfect delight. For to delight there concurs[^14] the delightable and the conjunction of it with that which is delighted. But everything which delights the soul delights under the account of good and beautiful; and since God alone is goodness and beauty itself[^15], therefore in God alone is there perfect delight.

Likewise, because there is conjunction; but God alone is the one who is most perfectly conjoined. For he is conjoined according to[^16] truth and intimacy. For God alone, on account of supreme simplicity and spirituality, glides into the soul, so that according to truth he is in the soul and more intimate to the soul than [the soul] itself is to itself.

For all[^17] these four reasons reduce to one, namely to this: that since the soul is born to perceive the infinite good, which is God, therefore in him alone it ought to rest and enjoy him.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:**

1. *To that* which is objected concerning the appetite of matter; it must be said that the appetite of matter is ordered to form as to substantial perfection, out of which[^18] also matter becomes one [thing]; and therefore it is necessary that the form be of the same genus as the matter, nor is it altogether above matter: therefore every such form is finite. But such [a form], if it be incorruptible, on account of union[^19] constrains the appetite of matter and once constrained terminates it; whence it is not terminated in its [own] amplitude. But the appetite of the soul is not so constrained on account of union with the desirable, rather it is dilated; and therefore it is required that it be perfected by something altogether highest.

2. *To that* which is objected, that[^20] [the soul] does not grasp save finitely; it must be said that it grasps the infinite good finitely, since [the soul] itself is finite. But since that good is infinite, therefore by it [the soul] is wholly absorbed, so that its capacity is on every side terminated. Whence it will not so much rejoice, but, as Anselm[^21] says, *it will enter into the joy of the Lord*. For if it merely grasped and were not conquered and absorbed, the appetite could still rise up to grasp something further. It is therefore evident that, for the soul to be completed, although it has a finite capacity[^22], yet it is necessary that the infinite good be present.

3. *To that* which is objected concerning the human being; it must be said that God loves the human being, and the love of God is the love of enjoyment; yet he does not enjoy the human being, since by loving himself he loves the human being, that is, by enjoying himself he uses the human being. Which is evident thus: that God's love toward the creature is not affection, but [a] communication of effect[^23]. But communication, according to habitual account, is attended to according to goodness; since the good is what is born to communicate itself. According to actual account, however, it is attended to or regards the will; since because [God] wills, therefore he acts. Therefore the account of communicating comes from will and goodness, just as the account of cognizing [comes] from the exemplar and intelligence. Since therefore from the conversion of his will upon his own goodness he loves us[^24], therefore by enjoying himself he loves us.

4. *To that* which is objected concerning virtue, that virtue is an honorable good; it must be said that the honorable good is said in two ways: either as what is purely good, or as that in which its likeness shines forth. In the first mode the honorable is to be enjoyed, taking "to enjoy" properly, since this alone terminates and quiets. In the second mode not, unless it be taken commonly, insofar as it expresses delight.

For such [virtues][^25] on account of assimilation to God have beauty, by which they delight and attract us; nevertheless in them one is not to rest, since then they lose their beauty, since «the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and inflated[^26]».

5. *To that* which is objected concerning beatitude; it must be said that created beatitude does not terminate the appetite per se, but through conjunction with the uncreated: whence the soul loves it[^27] on account of God, not on account of itself.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *solum*, quod male abest a Vat. et recentiore cod. cc. — De hac propositione minore argum. cfr. Aristot., VIII. *Ethic.* c. 5: *Quod enim absolute bonum ac iucundum est, amabile est atque eligibile; unicuique vero quod unicuique est tale.* Cfr. etiam I. *Ethic.* c. 1. 2. et 8, ubi de ultimo fine; et I. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 2, ubi de bono in communi agitur.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have added *solum*, which is wrongly absent from the Vatican [edition] and from the more recent cod. cc. — On this minor proposition of the argument, cfr. Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 5: *For what is good and pleasant in an absolute sense is lovable and choiceworthy; but to each one, what is such for each one.* Cfr. also *Ethics* I, c. 1, 2, and 8, where the ultimate end is discussed; and *Magna Moralia* I, c. 2, where the good in general is treated.

la: Supple cum cod. I *anima*. Paulo infra fide codd. cum ed. 1 post *nullum* expunximus *creatum*; cod. W ponit *implet* pro *supplet*.

en: Supply *anima* (soul) with cod. I. A little below, on the authority of the manuscripts with ed. 1, after *nullum* we have removed *creatum*; cod. W has *implet* for *supplet*.

la: Potius auctor libri *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 27, ubi sic habetur: *Animam tamen hominis, id est mentem, nulla creatura iuxta substantiam implere potest, nisi sola Trinitas.* Et paulo inferius: *Solius enim Trinitatis est intrare et implere naturam sive substantiam, quam creavit.*

en: Rather, the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 27, where it is so stated: *Yet the soul of man, that is, the mind, no creature can fill according to substance, save the Trinity alone.* And a little below: *For it belongs to the Trinity alone to enter and fill the nature or substance which it has created.*

la: Vat. et cod. K *creatam corporalem et incorruptibilem*; omnes fere codd. omittunt *corporalem et*; melioris notae codd. ut FGHTW aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 retinent solummodo *incorruptibilem*; alii ut A habent *incorporalem*; solummodo V *corporalem*, X *corruptibilem*; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *incorporalem et incorruptibilem*. Praeter auctoritatem codd. pro nostra lectione facit eiusdem convenientia tum cum solutione huius obiectionis, tum cum doctrina nostri Doctoris. Intelligi enim potest assertio hic posita tum de caelo empyreo, sicut cod. aa intelligit, addendo: *ut patet in corporibus caelestibus*, tum de ipsa anima, quae iuxta Seraphicum, licet sit spiritualis et incorporea, non omnino expers est compositionis ex forma et materia; et II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. explicite de ipsa affirmatur, quod appetitum materiae perfecte satiet et quietet. Quoad caelum empyreum Scholastici iuxta Aristotelem communiter asserebant, ipsum esse et incorruptibile et immobile. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. et III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. — Mox cod. T *finiat* loco *finiet*.

en: The Vatican [ed.] and cod. K read *creatam corporalem et incorruptibilem* (created, corporeal, and incorruptible); almost all manuscripts omit *corporalem et*; manuscripts of better repute such as FGHTW aa bb ee ff and ed. 1 retain only *incorruptibilem*; others such as A have *incorporalem*; only V has *corporalem*, X *corruptibilem*; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *incorporalem et incorruptibilem*. Besides the authority of the manuscripts, our reading is supported by its agreement both with the solution of this objection and with the doctrine of our Doctor. For the assertion posited here can be understood both of the empyrean heaven, as cod. aa understands it, adding: *as is evident in the celestial bodies*, and of the soul itself, which according to the Seraphic [Doctor], although it is spiritual and incorporeal, is not wholly exempt from composition of form and matter; and in II Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in the body, it is explicitly affirmed of [the soul] that it perfectly satisfies and quiets the appetite of matter. As to the empyrean heaven, the Scholastics following Aristotle commonly asserted it to be both incorruptible and immobile. Cfr. II Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. and III Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. — Soon after, cod. T reads *finiat* in place of *finiet*.

la: Cod. K *Deo* pro *eo*.

en: Cod. K reads *Deo* (God) for *eo* (him).

la: Libr. II. *Rhetor.* c. 53. (ed. Taurin. 1823): *Nam (honestum) est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad se, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate.* — De divisione boni, quae ex August. affertur, vide ipsius lib. 83 Qq. q. 30. — Immediate post mendum Vat. *dividitur* loco *dividit* castigamus ex mss. et primis edd.

en: *Rhetoric* II, c. 53 (Turin ed. 1823): *For (the honorable) is something which by its own force allures us to itself, capturing not by any gain, but drawing by its own dignity.* — On the division of the good which is adduced from Augustine, see his book *83 Questions*, q. 30. — Immediately after, we correct the Vatican [ed.]'s mistake *dividitur* in place of *dividit* from the manuscripts and the earliest editions.

la: Cod. K hic addit *sic*. Mox multi codd. ut AFGHKWXYZ ee etc. cum ed. 1 pro *fini* habent *frui*.

en: Cod. K here adds *sic* (thus). Soon after, many manuscripts such as AFGHKWXYZ ee etc. with ed. 1 have *frui* (to enjoy) for *fini* (to the end).

la: Vat. addit *creata*, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [ed.] adds *creata* (created), which however is absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: *Naturalis* refertur ad *cognitio*, ita ut sensus sit: *Si inspicias naturam cognitionis, quae animae competit, ipsa non est arctata.* — Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, *rationalis* loco *naturalis*, sed non ita bene. — De propositione, quae deinde sequitur, vide Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 4. in q. praeced. cit.

en: *Naturalis* refers to *cognitio*, so that the sense is: *If you inspect the nature of the cognition which belongs to the soul, it is not constrained.* — The Vatican [ed.], against the manuscripts and ed. 1, has *rationalis* in place of *naturalis*, but not so well. — On the proposition which then follows, see Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 4, cited in the preceding question.

la: Cod. K adiungit *per illud*, quae additio videtur adiuncta, quia supplendum est *eo* sive *illo*.

en: Cod. K adds *per illud* (through that), which addition seems adjoined, since *eo* or *illo* must be supplied.

la: Vers. 19.

en: [Exodus 33,] verse 19.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes mss.: *Similiter* pro *Item* et paulo post ter *existimatio* loco *aestimatio*.

en: The Vatican [ed.], against nearly all the manuscripts: *Similiter* (likewise) for *Item* (likewise) and a little after, three times, *existimatio* for *aestimatio*.

la: Vat. contra codd. A T aa bb etc. *posset*, sed minus apte, quia agitur hic de naturali consecutione, quae subiecto semper inest. Hinc et immediate post Vat., obnitente maiore parte mss. ut AGKLOTVWXYZ etc. et ed. 1, minus bene *extendere eo, ubi est existimatio*. Cod. cc. *ut* loco *ubi*. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. ut ACFGHKLOSTUVWZ etc. cum ed. 1 post *et si* substituimus *hoc* pro *haec*. Cod. K planius *et si hoc, ergo*.

en: The Vatican [ed.], against codd. A T aa bb etc., has *posset* (it could), but less fittingly, since the matter here concerns a natural consequence, which is always present in the subject. Hence also, immediately after, the Vatican [ed.], with the greater part of the manuscripts such as AGKLOTVWXYZ etc. and ed. 1 resisting, less well [reads] *extendere eo, ubi est existimatio*. Cod. cc has *ut* in place of *ubi*. A little below, on the authority of very many manuscripts such as ACFGHKLOSTUVWZ etc. with ed. 1, after *et si* we have substituted *hoc* for *haec*. Cod. K more plainly: *et si hoc, ergo*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *concurrit* loco *concernitur* et paulo post castigavimus mendum Vat., quae cum recentiore cod. cc habet *delectat* pro *delectatur*. — Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. arg. 1. ad opp.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *concurrit* (concurs) in place of *concernitur* (is concerned) and a little after we have corrected the mistake of the Vatican [ed.], which together with the more recent cod. cc has *delectat* for *delectatur*. — Cfr. above, a. 3. q. 1. arg. 1. ad opp.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *ipsa*, quod Vat. *omittit*.

en: We have supplied from the manuscripts and ed. 1 the word *ipsa* (itself), which the Vatican [ed.] omits.

la: Cod. W *per*.

en: Cod. W reads *per* (through).

la: Cod. R *autem*.

en: Cod. R reads *autem* (however).

la: Supple hic, sicuti et paulo infra, post *omnino* cum cod. T *forma*.

en: Supply here, as also a little below, after *omnino* with cod. T the word *forma* (form).

la: Multi codd. antiquiores et meliores ut ACFGLORSTUXYZ etc. ponunt *sibi* pro *sui*. Mox cod. T post *unde* falso omittit *non*. — Sententiam hic positam S. Doctor breviter complectitur III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. his verbis: *Sicut dicimus de forma caeli, quod complet appetitum materiae, quia materia eius non appetit esse sub ulteriori forma, adeo forma ipsam statuit in actualitate completa.* Cfr. Scot., II *Phys.* q. 1. n. 1. et 15.

en: Many of the older and better manuscripts such as ACFGLORSTUXYZ etc. read *sibi* (to itself) for *sui* (of itself). Soon after, cod. T after *unde* wrongly omits *non*. — The opinion here posited the Holy Doctor briefly summarizes in III Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6 in these words: *Just as we say of the form of the heaven that it fills the appetite of matter, since its matter does not desire to be under any further form, so the form establishes [the matter] itself in complete actuality.* Cfr. Scotus, *Physics* II, q. 1. n. 1 and 15.

la: Subaudi cum cod. X *anima humana*. Mox cod. A post *bonum finite* addit *anima*.

en: Understand with cod. X *anima humana* (the human soul). Soon after, cod. A after *bonum finite* adds *anima* (soul).

la: *Proslog.* c. 26: «Non ergo totum illud gaudium intrabit in gaudentes, sed toti gaudentes intrabunt in gaudium». Alludit ad Matth. 25, 21. — Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *totum* pro *tantum*.

en: *Proslogion* c. 26: «Therefore not the whole of that joy shall enter into those who rejoice, but those who rejoice, wholly, shall enter into the joy». He alludes to Matthew 25,21. — Immediately after, the Vatican [ed.], contrary to the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] *totum* for *tantum*.

la: Plures antiquiorum codd. ut ACGOSTUX bb ee ff cum ed. 1, sensu eodem remanente, *quamvis capacitate habeat finitatem, necesse est.*

en: Several of the older manuscripts such as ACGOSTUX bb ee ff with ed. 1, the sense remaining the same, [read] *quamvis capacitate habeat finitatem, necesse est* (although it has finitude in capacity, it is necessary).

la: Vat., quae habet *affectus*, emendatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.

en: The Vatican [ed.], which has *affectus* (affection), is emended from the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.

la: Ed. 1 hic addit *Deus*, quod certe subaudiendum est.

en: Ed. 1 here adds *Deus* (God), which certainly must be understood.

la: Subaudi cum cod. R *virtutes*. Mox plures antiquiores codd. ut ACFGKLORSUYZ ee post *pulcritudinem* loco *qua* habent *quia*.

en: Understand with cod. R *virtutes* (virtues). Soon after, several of the older manuscripts such as ACFGKLORSUYZ ee, after *pulcritudinem*, have *quia* in place of *qua*.

la: August., XIX. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 25: *Virtutes, cum ad se ipsas referuntur nec propter aliud expetuntur, etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt.*

en: Augustine, *On the City of God* XIX, c. 25: *The virtues, when they are referred to themselves and not sought on account of something else, even then are inflated and proud.*

la: Lapsum librariorum Vat. ponentium *ipsa* pro *ipsam* correximus ope mss. et ed. 1.

en: A scribal slip of the Vatican [editors], who place *ipsa* for *ipsam*, we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Omnes antiqui doctores, excepto Durando, conveniunt in ea sententia, quod solo Deo obiective et materialiter sit fruendum, beatitudine vero creata sive beatitudine subiective sumta (ut moderni loquuntur), formaliter tantum. Seraphicus Doctor in solut. ad 5. iam reprobaverat Durandi (hic. q. 2.) singularem et falsam opinionem, quod actus mentis, quo Deus immediate attingitur, sit fruitionis obiectum immediatum, Deus vero eiusdem obiectum remotum.

**II.** Quomodo quis improprie frui possit virtutibus, magis explicatur II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, ubi etiam exponitur, quomodo dona, fructus et beatitudines coniuncta sint fini, qui secundum Scripturam est caritas. — Valde notanda sunt profunda et copiosa argumenta, quibus Seraphicus probat, quod in Deo solo sit perfecta delectatio et quietatio, de quo etiam egregie loquitur II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam S. Thom. S. c. Gent. I. c. 43; III. c. 48. 50. — Quoad illapsum Dei in animam cfr. II. Sent. d. 8 p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

Quoad quaestionem principalem vide auctores in Scholio praecedenti.

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english_scholion:
**I.** All the ancient doctors, except Durandus, agree in this opinion: that God alone is to be enjoyed objectively and materially, but [that] in created beatitude—or in beatitude taken subjectively (as the moderns speak)—only formally. The Seraphic Doctor in the reply to the fifth [objection] had already rejected the singular and false opinion of Durandus (here, q. 2.), [namely] that the act of the mind by which God is immediately attained is the immediate object of enjoyment, while God is the remote object of the same.

**II.** How one can improperly enjoy the virtues is more fully explained in II Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, where it is also expounded how the gifts, fruits, and beatitudes are conjoined to the end, which according to Scripture is charity. — The profound and copious arguments by which the Seraphic [Doctor] proves that in God alone is perfect delight and quieting are greatly to be noted, on which subject he also speaks excellently in II Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. also S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 43; III. c. 48. 50. — As to the gliding-in of God into the soul, cfr. II Sent. d. 8 p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

As to the principal question, see the authors in the preceding Scholion.

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